Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cv-01294/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cv-01294-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GORDON LOREY GRILZ, )

) No. CIV 02-1294 PCT RCB (MS)

Petitioner, ) 

) O R D E R

vs. ) 

)

TERRY L. STEWART, et. al., )

)

Respondents. ) )

This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July

11, 2002 by Petitioner Gordon Lorey Grilz, currently incarcerated

at the Arizona State Prison in Florence, Arizona. An answer (doc.

# 7) was filed on September 18, 2002, and Petitioner filed a timely

reply (doc. # 11) on October 25, 2002. On March 25, 2005, the

Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (doc. #

15) recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed in its

entirety as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations

established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R 

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(doc. # 23) and supplemental exhibits (doc. # 24) in support of

these objections. Having reviewed the record, the R&R, and

Petitioner's objections and exhibits, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Direct Appeal

On May 14, 1981, Petitioner was convicted in the Superior

Court of Arizona in Yavapai County on one count of first-degree

murder and one count of second-degree murder in connection with the

shooting deaths of his estranged wife, Linda Grilz, and her friend,

Kim Hopfinger. See State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 666 P.2d 1059,

1061 (1983). Petitioner's defense at trial was based on insanity

induced by prolonged drug and alcohol abuse. Id.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that certain crime scene

photographs and a tape recording of Linda Grilz's telephone call to

the Sheriff's Department should not have been admitted into

evidence, the jury instruction on insanity was improper and

unconstitutional, and the sentence for the second-degree murder was

improperly enhanced. Id. The Supreme Court of Arizona determined

that the challenged evidence was admissible and held that the jury

instructions, while having an improper tendency to confuse the

jury, were not unconstitutional. Id. at 1062-68. However, the

Court found that the sentence for the second degree murder

conviction was improperly enhanced. Id. 1067-68. On June 14,

1983, the court affirmed the convictions and the life sentence in

connection with the first-degree murder conviction, but remanded

for resentencing in connection with the second-degree murder

conviction. Id. at 1061.

On remand, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a fourteenCase 3:02-cv-01294-RCB Document 25 Filed 07/26/06 Page 2 of 23
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1

 Although Braun's affidavit asserts his familiarity with the

AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations as of October 10, 1996, see

Reply (doc. # 11), Ex. 3 ¶ 4, Petitioner contends that he never had

knowledge of the same and that Braun never made him aware of the

limitations period. See Objections (doc. # 23) at 8, 10; Errata

(doc. # 24) at 3-4.

2

 Petitioner's first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was

filed on December 16, 1981, before his convictions had become final

on direct review. Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. A. That petition was

denied on January 28, 1982. Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. B.

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year sentence for the second-degree murder conviction, to be served

consecutive to the life sentence for the first-degree murder

conviction. See Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. C at 2. The Arizona Court

of Appeals affirmed the new sentence. Id. at 14. On October 11,

1985, after the Supreme Court of Arizona had denied further review,

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate finalizing

Petitioner's convictions. See Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. D, E.

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On September 30, 1996, seven months after the AEDPA went into

effect, Petitioner retained attorney David Braun for representation

in state post-conviction proceedings.1 Reply (doc. # 11), Ex. 3 ¶

3. Braun's affidavit states that, on October 10, 1996, he obtained

a fully executed Notice of Post-Conviction Relief from Petitioner,

which he gave to his secretary on the same day to be mailed to the

Superior Court of Arizona in Yavapai County. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. Thus,

Braun claims that by these actions he "caused [the Notice] to be

mailed." Id. ¶ 8. The state court has no record of such filing

and neither Petitioner nor counsel has submitted a copy of the

executed notice or a conformed copy of its filing. See id. ¶¶ 6-8.

On October 29, 1998, Petitioner filed his second2 Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court of Arizona in Yavapai

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3

 Although this claim is not asserted in his second Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief, the trial court's extensive discussion of

this claim suggests that it was properly brought to the court's

attention some time before its ruling. See Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H

at 2-6.

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County raising the following claims: (1) the 911 dispatcher's

failure to send help in response to the first emergency call

constituted newly discovered evidence of an intervening and

superceding cause of death, (2) he received ineffective assistance

of trial counsel for various reasons, (3) that appellate and postconviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the

ineffectiveness of trial counsel on direct review or in his first

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief3

, (4) the trial court's refusal

to provide supplemental instructions regarding premeditation

violated his due process rights, and (4) the prosecution committed

misconduct, in violation of his due process rights, by interfering

with defense counsel's ability to call a witness. Answer (doc. #

7), Ex. F. at 7-24.

One respect in which Petitioner contended he had received

ineffective assistance from trial counsel was that counsel had

decided not to call a crucial defense witness, Mary Ann Jordan,

possibly as a result of collusion with the prosecutor. Id. at 13-

14, 23-24. Petitioner expected that Jordan could have testified

about the character of the victim, Kim Hopfinger, for pursuing

married women. Id. At trial, counsel told Petitioner "that he and

[the prosecutor] had discussed Jordan and that they had decided

that she 'had been through enough,' [and] therefore he would not

call her as a witness at trial." Errata (doc. # 24) at 2 n.1. On

November 30, 1998, a private investigator hired by Petitioner's

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post-conviction counsel to investigate this claim discovered that

the prosecutor had previously represented Jordan in an unrelated

matter and thereafter maintained a personal relationship with her. 

See Errata (doc. # 24), Ex. 1 at 1, 4.

On August, 18, 2000, the court denied the petition and, on

January 8, 2002, the Supreme Court of Arizona issued an order

denying review. Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 1-6; Reply (doc. #

11), Ex. 1.

On July 11, 2002, Petitioner filed the present Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) in this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 setting forth the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: His right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment was violated because the trial judge's jury 

instruction improperly eviscerated the state's burden to 

prove him sane.

Ground Two: Trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth

Amendment for failing to:

a. object to the insanity jury instruction

b. request a voluntariness hearing

c. adequately and effectively argue for a change of venue

d. subpoena crucial defense witnesses

e. cross-examine state witnesses

f. request a blood or urine test

g. renew a Rule 11 motion to have Petitioner's competency

to stand trial determined

h. strike a juror for cause who knew a prosecution 

witness

i. object to a deficient jury instruction on 

premeditation

j. raise all available defenses; and

k. seek a new trial based on a court employee making 

statements to the jury with the intent to influence.

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Ground Three: Appellate counsel was ineffective under the

Sixth Amendment for failing to raise the above 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his first 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Ground Four: The trial court erred in violation of his 

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to 

provide the correct jury instruction on premeditation.

Pet. (doc. # 1) at 5-8.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing

state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas

'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given

effect to the extent possible under the law." Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

403-04 (2000)). Thus, a state prisoner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief with respect to any federal claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the

state court's adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); accord Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 896

(9th Cir. 2002). To determine whether a state court decision is

contrary to federal law, the district court must look to the

state's last reasoned decision as the basis for its judgment. 

Campbell, 302 F.3d at 896.

Under the AEDPA's "new, highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 334

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n.7 (1997), the district court is not permitted to make a de novo

determination of any federal claim adjudicated on the merits by the

state court. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003),

overruling Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.

2000). State court findings of fact are presumed to be correct

unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v.

Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2003); Zichko v. Idaho, 247

F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359,

363 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. DISCUSSION

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is

governed by the AEDPA. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210

(2003); Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336. The AEDPA requires a state

prisoner to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year after

the state conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If

a prisoner's conviction became final before the AEDPA's enactment,

as in Petitioner's case, the prisoner would have a one-year grace

period expiring on April 24, 1997 within which to file a petition. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) governs the calculation of the

AEDPA's one-year grace period, such that the grace period would

expire on April 24, 1997, not April 23, 1997). The AEDPA's oneyear statute of limitations is strictly applied; a petitioner who

takes advantage of a longer state statute of limitations in

exhausting state remedies will be barred from seeking federal

relief. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that "section 2244(d)(1) is not a per se violation

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of the Suspension Clause" because the "AEDPA's one-year statute of

limitations, even if in tension with a longer state statute of

limitations, does not render federal habeas an inadequate or

ineffective remedy.").

There are two statutory bases relevant to this case under

which the AEDPA's limitations period may be tolled or delayed. 

First, the AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled by statute

during the pendency of properly filed state petitions challenging

the judgment or claim at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Patterson,

251 F.3d at 1247 (holding that pendency of properly filed state

petition statutory tolled the one-year grace period for filing of

federal petition challenging pre-AEDPA conviction). Second, the

AEDPA's one-year limitations period does not begin to run until

"the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

In addition to these statutory bases, equitable tolling of the

limitations period may also be appropriate where "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to

file a petition on time." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner argues that this Petition should be found timely

based on sections 2244(d)(2) and 2244(d)(1)(D) as well as

principles of equitable tolling. For the reasons below, as well as

the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge's R&R (doc. # 15),

the Court finds that neither of the statutory or equitable bases

upon which Petitioner relies are sufficient to overcome the

conclusion that Petitioner's claims are barred by the AEDPA's oneCase 3:02-cv-01294-RCB Document 25 Filed 07/26/06 Page 8 of 23
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year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

A. Statutory Bases to Toll or Delay the Limitations Period

Petitioner raises the following statutory bases to toll or

delay the limitations period: (1) his one-year grace period for

filing his federal petition should be tolled from October 15, 1996

until January 8, 2002, the period during which he contends his

second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was pending in the state

court, see § 2244(d)(2), and (2) with respect to his claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure

to call a potential defense witness, the one-year limitations

period did not begin to run until November 30, 1998, the date on

which he claims the factual predicate of that claim was discovered

by his private investigator, see § 2244(d)(1)(D). Reply (doc. #

11) at 2-4, 7; Objections (doc. # 23) at 3-8.

1. Pendency of Properly Filed State Petition

Petitioner states that Braun, who was retained as postconviction counsel on September 30, 1996, met with him on October

10, 1996 to obtain an executed Notice of Post-Conviction Relief,

which Braun subsequently delivered to his secretary for mailing to

the state court. Reply (doc. # 11), Ex. 3 ¶¶ 3-5. Petitioner

maintains that Braun "caused [the notice] to be mailed to the

[Superior Court of Arizona for Yavapai County]" on October 10, 1996

and, therefore, the notice should be deemed to have been received

by the court on or about October 15, 1996. See id. ¶ 8. Thus, for

purposes of tolling under section 2244(d)(2), Petitioner contends

that he had a properly filed state petition pending from October

15, 1996 to January 8, 2002 such that the present Petition, filed

July 11, 2002, would be timely by six days.

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4

 Petitioner suggests that the prison mailbox rule may also

apply. See Objections (doc. # 23) at 5-6. The prison mailbox rule,

under which a petition is deemed filed at the moment it is delivered

to prison officials for forwarding to the court clerk, only applies

to filings by pro se petitioners. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,

276 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir.

2001). In this case, Petitioner was represented by counsel in

connection with his post-conviction proceedings and, therefore, the

prison mailbox rule does not apply.

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Petitioner's argument relies in part on the common law mailbox

rule that the "proper and timely mailing of a document raises a

rebuttable presumption that it is received by the addressee."4

Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1992); Reply

(doc. # 11) at 4. To raise this presumption, the proponent must

show "direct proof of a timely postmark." Anderson, 966 F.2d at

491. For example, in an Eight Circuit decision discussed with

approval by the Ninth Circuit in Anderson, the court held that this

requirement had been met where the proponent "testified that he saw

the postal clerk 'weigh the envelope, put postage on it, cancel it,

and put it into the appropriate bundle of outgoing mail.'" Id.

(quoting Wood v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d 1155, 1157 (8th Cir. 1990)).

In the present case, Petitioner has not produced any proof

sufficient to raise the presumption that the notice of his second

petition was received by the court. His attorney states in his

affidavit that he obtained an executed notice from Petitioner,

which he subsequently gave to his secretary. There is no proof,

however, that the secretary followed through by mailing the notice

to the court. Absent such evidence, the simple assertion that

Braun's actions "caused [the notice] to be mailed," does not

constitute proof of a timely mailing. Petitioner suggests that

this critical evidentiary gap can be bridged by affording deference

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to Braun as an officer of the court. This adds nothing to the

analysis because Braun's statements, even if true, do not prove

that the notice was mailed by his secretary. Without proof of the

antecedent fact of the Notice's mailing, there can be no

presumption that it was received by the court.

Alternatively, Petitioner points out that, under the postconviction rules in effect in 1996, the filing of a notice was

required to initiate post-conviction proceedings. Reply (doc. #

11) at 2; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1996) ("A proceeding is

commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with

the court in which the conviction occurred."). Thus, Petitioner

suggests that the state court's cognizance of his second Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief is implicit proof that the requisite

notice had been filed–- this notwithstanding the absence of any

court record of such filing. Id.; Objections (doc. # 23) at 5

("The very fact that the trial court allowed counsel to file a

substantive petition in 1998 presupposes that timely 'Notice' was

filed."). Petitioner argues that had the notice not been received

"the trial court surely would have said so" in its order denying

relief. Objections (doc. # 23) at 6.

This inferential line of argument is only valid if the court

relied upon the 1996 post-conviction rules. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a) (West 1996); Isley v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004). However, it is clear from the first

paragraph of the court's order that the 1996 rules were not

applied. See Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 1. Instead, the court

applied the post-conviction rules in effect at the time of

Petitioner's conviction which, unlike the 1996 rules, did not

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5

 In rejecting the State's assertion that the petition was

untimely, the judge stressed that the "post-conviction rules in

effect at the time of [Petitioner's] conviction allowed him to file

a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief at any time." Answer (doc. # 7),

Ex. H at 1. (emphasis added). This conclusion could not have been

reached under the 1996 rules and would only have been consistent

under the rules in effect either in 1983, when his conviction and

sentence for first-degree murder became final, or in 1985, when his

sentence for the second-degree murder became final. Compare Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1983) ("A petition may be filed at any time

after entry of judgment and sentence.") and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)

(West 1985) (same) with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1996) ("In a

non-capital case, the notice must be filed within ninety days of the

entry of judgment and sentence . . . ."). Moreover, neither the 1983

rules nor the 1985 rules required the filing of a "notice" to

initiate post-conviction proceedings. Compare Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a) (West 1983) ("A proceeding is commenced by filing a petition

. . . .") and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1985) (same) with Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1996) ("A proceeding is commenced by timely

filing a notice of post-conviction relief . . . .").

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require the filing of a notice to initiate proceedings.5 See id.

As such, it would be a fallacious inference to construe the order

as tacitly acknowledging that a notice had previously been filed.

Finally, Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing

wherein the clerk of the Superior Court of Arizona in Yavapai

County would be called to testify about the record keeping in his

case. Reply (doc. # 11) at 4. The need for such a hearing is

premised on Braun's allegation that his representation of

Petitioner was "plagued" by the court's "routine failure to timely

file and/or return conformation copies of motions filed on

[Petitioner's] behalf." Reply (doc. # 11), Ex. 3 ¶ 6. Braun

suggests that the only possible explanation for the lack of a court

record reflecting that a notice had been filed is that the notice

must have been "misplaced, misfiled, or lost" by the court. Id. ¶

7. Because of the conspicuous lack of evidence that his secretary

filed the notice, this Court cannot accept the characterizations

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and conclusions drawn in Braun's affidavit as raising a colorable

argument for an evidentiary hearing concerning the state court's

record keeping.

For purposes of tolling under section 2244(d)(2), the Court

finds that Petitioner had a properly filed petition pending in

state court from October 29, 1998 until January 8, 2002. 

2. Newly Discovered Facts

In Ground Two of the Petition, Petitioner asserts that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a crucial defense

witness, Mary Ann Jordan. Pet. (doc. # 1) at 6. Petitioner

contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on

this claim until November 30, 1998, claiming that under section

2244(d)(1)(D) this was the earliest date he could have discovered

the factual predicate of this claim through the exercise of due

diligence. Reply (doc. # 11) at 7. For the stated reasons below,

the Court finds that Petitioner knew the factual predicate of this

claim since the time of his trial, making the present Petition

untimely. Alternatively, the Court notes that the claim would also

be denied on its merits under section 2254(d).

a. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)

On November 30, 1998, a private investigator hired in

connection with Petitioner's second state petition discovered that

the prosecutor had previously represented Jordan in an unrelated

matter and thereafter maintained a personal relationship with her. 

Reply (doc. # 11) at 7; Objections (doc. # 23) at 6-8; Errata (doc.

# 24), Ex. 1 at 1,4. Thus, Petitioner contends that under section

2244(d)(1)(D) the statute of limitations clock would have begun

ticking on November 30, 1998, but remained tolled under section

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6

 Like Petitioner in this case, Hasan's conviction became final

prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, allowing him until April 24,

1997 to file his federal habeas petition. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at

1151.

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2244(d)(2) during the pendency of his state petition until January

8, 2002, making his ineffective assistance claim timely by

approximately six months. Reply (doc. # 11) at 7; Objections (doc.

# 23) at 6-8.

To better appreciate Petitioner's argument, it is necessary

first to review the requirements of a successful Sixth Amendment

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court has

stated that a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance requires

the petitioner to demonstrate (1) that counsel's representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the

deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984); Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner likens this case to

Hasan, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the limitations period

does not begin to run on an ineffective assistance claim until the

petitioner discovers the factual predicate for both prongs of the

Strickland test. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1155.

In Hasan, the petitioner filed a federal habeas petition on

June 1, 1998 claiming that counsel had been ineffective for failing

to investigate, or to demand inquiry into, possible juror

misconduct. Id. at 1152. Because the petition was filed after the

one-year grace period allowed by the AEDPA, Warden Galaza moved to

dismiss Hasan's petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).6

In response, Hasan contended that the limitations period did not

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7

 The Ninth Circuit opinion does not expressly indicate which

claims were raised in Hasan's state petition. However, the fact that

Hasan's first federal petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust

state remedies, while the second petition was allowed to proceed on

the basis that state remedies were exhausted, strongly suggests that

the ineffective assistance claim was raised and decided on the merits

in Hasan's state petition. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1152-53.

Moreover, the fact that Hasan filed the state petition approximately

four months after his December 1996 discovery, and obtained an

affidavit confirming that information only two days after the filing

of his state petition is further proof that he pursued the

ineffective assistance claim in his state petition. See id.

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begin to run with respect to his ineffective assistance claim until

December 1996. Id. at 1153. It was at this time, Hasan asserted,

that he learned the facts that would have been revealed by an

investigation into the juror misconduct-- that a prosecution

witness in another case, who had reportedly slipped a surreptitious

note to a juror in Hasan's case, was at the time romantically

involved with a prosecution witness testifying against Hasan. Id.

On April 22, 1997, Hasan filed his state habeas petition

raising an ineffective assistance claim based on the information he

learned in December 1996 and, two days later, obtained an affidavit

from the witness in his case verifying that information.7 See id.

at 1152-53. His state petition was ultimately denied by the

California Supreme Court on April 29, 1998, approximately one month

prior to the filing of his federal habeas petition. Id. at 1151-

52. Thus, Hasan argued that under section 2244(d)(1)(D) the

limitations period did not begin to run until December 1996--

rather than the AEDPA's April 24, 1996 effective date-- and was

tolled during the pendency of his state petition under section

2244(d)(2), making his federal petition timely by approximately

seven months. See id. at 1153, 1155 n.4. The Ninth Circuit did

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not adopt Hasan's version of when the limitations clock began

ticking. See id. Instead, the panel remanded to the district

court to determine if Hasan could have, with the exercise of due

diligence, discovered the factual predicate for both of the

Strickland elements of his ineffective assistance claim at any time

before May 24, 1996. Id. If so, Hasan's claim would still have

been untimely under section 2244(d)(1)(D). See id.

The present case is distinguishable from Hasan in that Hasan

claimed to have discovered the basis of his ineffective assistance

claim in December 1996, well before filing his state petition on

April 22, 1997. Petitioner, on the other hand, makes the unusual

argument of having discovered the factual predicate of his claim on

November 30, 1998, one month after he had already presented that

claim to the state court in his second Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief filed on October 29, 1998. Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. F at 13-

14, 23-24; Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 3-4, 6. The information

gleaned by Petitioner's private investigator may have fleshed out

the details of the claim he had already presented. However, it

cannot be said that the information obtained on November 30, 1998,

simply by sharpening the facts upon which the issues in his case

would be decided, actually established the factual predicate of the

claim he already knew to raise and investigate. Because

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim had already been

presented to the state court, and was subsequently decided on the

merits, it would be incongruous to hold that the factual predicate

of the identical claim in Petitioner's federal petition became

known at a later date based on the discovery obtained during the

pendency of his state petition. As such, Petitioner cannot

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credibly deny having understood the factual predicate of his

ineffective assistance claim at some time prior to raising that

claim in his second state petition.

The question remains how long before the filing of his second

state petition could Petitioner, through the exercise of due

diligence, have discovered the factual predicate of his ineffective

assistance claim. In this regard, Petitioner takes exception to

the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that had he sought collateral

relief prior to April 24, 1997 "he could have obtained the same

'disclosure' that the prosecutor maintained a relationship with a

potential trial witness." R&R (doc. # 15) at 10; Objections (doc.

# 23) at 7. However, the fact that Petitioner learned of the

prosecutor's relationship with Jordan while investigating his

already pending state petition demonstrates that knowledge of that

relationship was not a factual predicate of his claim.

For all that appears, Petitioner should have perceived the

basis of his ineffective assistance claim as early as trial when

counsel told him "that he and [the prosecutor] had discussed Jordan

and that they had decided that she 'had been through enough,' [and]

therefore he would not call her as a witness at trial." Errata

(doc. # 24) at 2 n.1; accord Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. F at 13-14, 23-

24; Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 3-4, 6. At that time, Petitioner

would have been aware of the allegedly deficient performance of

counsel based on his decision not to call Jordan as a witness. 

Moreover, Petitioner would have understood the potential for

prejudice stemming from the absence of Jordan's testimony as well

as the appearance of collusion based on trial counsel's admission

that his decision not to call Jordan was reached in consultation

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8

 Even if additional facts were required to understand the basis

of his ineffective assistance claim, Petitioner fails to demonstrate

any diligence in discovering those facts during the enormous lapse in

time between his trial in 1981 and his hiring of the private

investigator in 1998. Instead, he has relied only on the argument

that the information discovered in November 1998 established the

factual predicate of his claim.

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with the prosecutor. See Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. F at 13-14, 23-24. 

Thus, the facts known at trial were sufficient to place Petitioner

on notice as to both Strickland elements of his ineffective

assistance claim. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1155.8

In sum, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis under

section 2244(d)(1)(D) to find that the statute began to run on his

claim at any time after April 24, 1996. Furthermore, because he

had allowed the one-year limitations period to elapse before filing

his second state petition on October 29, 1998, his federal petition

is time-barred under the AEDPA. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823.

b. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, even if not timebarred, would be denied on the merits. Because this claim was

adjudicated on the merits by the state court, the AEDPA prohibits

this Court from granting relief unless the state court's

adjudication of Petitioner's claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

For purposes of section 2254(d)(1), "the rule set forth in

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9

 The court held that Petitioner's claims of ineffective

assistance with respect to trial counsel were procedurally defaulted

due to Petitioner's failure to assert these claims on direct appeal

or in his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Answer (doc. #

7, Ex. H at 2. Claims found by a state court to be procedurally

defaulted, as in the present case, are "adjudicated on the merits"

for purposes of section 2254(d). See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S.

660, ___, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2091 161 L. Ed. 2d 982, 988 (2005). In

this case, the state court not only found the claims procedurally

defaulted, but went on to analyze the claims on their merits to

determine whether appellate counsel had rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to assert the claims regarding trial counsel.

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Strickland qualifies as 'clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Williams,

529 U.S. at 391. Under the Strickland test for ineffective

assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and (2) the deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91; Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154. 

In this case, Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance

based on trial counsel's failure to call Jordan as a witness was

adjudicated on the merits in the state court.9 The order denying

Petitioner's second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief squarely

addresses the issue of defense counsel's failure to call Jordan as

well as Petitioner's "allegation of collusion between the

prosecutor and defense counsel." Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 3-4,

6. Focusing on Jordan's prospective testimony, the court noted

that the testimony anticipated by Petitioner would have been

inconsistent with an affidavit already supplied by Jordan and, in

any event, would not have been material or relevant to the defenses

raised by Petitioner at his trial. Id. at 4. In addition, the

court concluded that Petitioner had failed to establish his

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allegation of collusion between the prosecutor and defense counsel. 

Id. at 6. Under the circumstances, the court's conclusions that

counsel was not incompetent and that Petitioner was not prejudiced

by counsel's conduct were not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Strickland. Therefore, even if not time-barred,

Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance would be denied on the

merits pursuant to section 2254(d).

2. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner contends that the AEDPA's statute of limitations

should be equitably tolled because (1) post-conviction counsel led

him to believe that a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief had been

filed in 1996 and (2) ADOC's replacement of its prison law

libraries with contract paralegals constituted an impediment to the

filing of his federal application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution of the United States. For the

reasons set forth by the Magistrate Judge, see R&R (doc. # 15) at

10-13, as well as the reasons explained more fully below, the Court

rejects both arguments as unmeritorious.

In a recent case, the Supreme Court deliberately avoided

deciding whether the AEDPA's statute of limitations may be

equitably tolled. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, ___, 125 S.

Ct. 1807, 1815 n.8, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669, 679 n.8 (2005) (Rehnquist,

C.J.). However, because the parties had argued on the basis that

it could, the Court assumed that equitable tolling applies and

observed that the proponent must show "(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Id. at 1814, 1815 n.8 (citing

Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); accord

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Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The

one-year statute of limitations prescribed in the AEDPA may be

equitably tolled if 'extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time.'") (quoting Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107).

In Pace, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third

Circuit to reverse the district court's allowance of equitable

tolling, finding that the petitioner had not been diligent in

pursuing his claims. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1815. The Court

noted that although the petitioner's claims were available in 1986

and 1991, he "waited years, without any valid justification" to

assert those claims in an untimely state petition. See id. at

1810, 1815. Because the petitioner "[sat] on his rights for years

before he filed his [state] petition" and "also sat on them for

five more months after his [state] proceedings became final before

deciding to seek relief in federal court," the Court concluded that

the petitioner's lack of diligence precluded equitable relief. Id.

at 1815; see also McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 14, 19

(1874) ("Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been

gross laches in the prosecution of rights").

The instant case presents even longer delays than those in

Pace. Like Pace, Petitioner filed his second state petition long

after the claims asserted had been available to him. See Pace, 125

S. Ct. at 1810. Petitioner's claims, including his claim of

ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to call Jordan,

were available to him as early as 1983 and 1985, the years in which

his sentences became final for the first-degree murder and seconddegree murder convictions. Even accepting Petitioner's account of

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how his Notice of Post Conviction Relief was filed in 1996, there

is no explanation for the delay of more than ten years before his

decision to pursue his claims. Petitioner not only sat on his

rights for ten years before deciding to seek relief in state court,

but sat on them for six more months after his state post-conviction

proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal

court. The Supreme Court found Pace ineligible for equitable

tolling based on five years of delay in filing his state petition,

followed by five months of delay in filing his federal petition. 

Id. at 1815. By the same principle, this Court finds that

Petitioner's unexplained and lengthier delay constitutes gross

laches and exhibits a lack of diligence that makes equitable

tolling inappropriate in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court adopts the reasoning and conclusions of the R&R

(doc. # 15) in their entirety. For those reasons, as well as the

reasons discussed in this Order, the Court finds that Petitioner's

claims are barred by the AEDPA's statute of limitations, that

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and neither

section 2244(d)(2) nor section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides a basis to

find any of his claims timely.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation (doc. # 15) is ADOPTED. 

. . .

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) is DENIED.

DATED this 25th day of July, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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