Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02566/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02566-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUSTAFA WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-2566 JLS (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 173)

vs.

N. GRANNIS; SILVA H. GARCIA;

E. A. CONTRERAS; OFFICE OF

WATCH COMMANDER;

E. MARRERO; CHIEF MEDICAL

OFFICER; OFFICE OF

REGISTERED NURSES;

P. A. CORTEZ; ABAD; and 

D. SMITH,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is Defendants E.A. Contreras (“Contreras”), E.

Marrero (“Marrero”), P.A. Cortez (“Cortez”),Abad (“Abad”), and D. Smith’s (“Smith,”

and, collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary

Judgment (“MSJ”). (ECF No. 173.) Also before the Court are the Declaration of

Attorney Timothy J. Kral in Support of Defendants’ MSJ (ECF No. 174); Plaintiff

Mustafa Wright’s (“Plaintiff”) Opposition to Defendants’ MSJ (ECF No. 176);

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ MSJ, Eight Exhibits, and Declaration in Support

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(ECF No. 181); Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Oppositions(ECF No. 182); Plaintiff’s

Sur-Reply (ECF No. 188); and Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply (ECF

No. 191). This matter was originally set for a hearing before U.S. Magistrate Judge

Mitchell D. Dembin on January 17, 2014. (See ECF No. 173.) This Court now takes

the matter under consideration without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7.1(d)(1). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ MSJ. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On November 4, 2009, Plaintiff—a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis—initiated the instant civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against N.

Grannis (“Grannis”), Silva H. Garcia, Contreras, the Office of Watch Commander,

Marrero, the Chief Medical Officer, the Office ofRegistered Nurses, Cortez, Abad, and

Smith, alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No.

1.) 

On January 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

realleging his claims asto all previously named defendants save Grannis and the Office

of Registered Nurses. (ECF No. 8.) On April 1, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s FAC. (ECF No. 24.) On March 14, 2011, this Court adopted a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) from U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major and

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Smith, Marrero, and Contreras. (ECF No. 50.) 1

On April 27, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”),

restating his Eighth Amendment claims against Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Abad, and

Smith. (ECF No. 53.) On May 11, 2011, Smith, Marrero, and Contreras moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. (ECF No. 58.) On March 12, 2012, this Court adopted the

R&R of Magistrate Judge Dembin dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against these

As recommended by Magistrate Judge Major, this Court denied the motion to dismiss 1

as to Defendants Abad and Cortez. (See generally Order, ECF No. 50; R&R 9–10, ECF No.

35.)

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Defendants. (ECF No. 80.) This Court declined to adopt the recommendation that

Plaintiff’s claims against Smith, Marrero, and Contreras be dismissed with prejudice,

instead “allow[ing] Plaintiff a final attempt to amend his complaint.” (Id. at 14.)

On April 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), again

restating his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants. (ECF No. 81.) On April

20, 2012, Smith, Marrero, and Contreras again moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC. 

(ECF No. 83.) On October 4, 2012, this Court adopted the R&R of Magistrate Judge

Dembin granting in part and denying in part Smith, Marrero, and Contreras’ motion to

dismiss. (ECF No. 120.) 

Defendants subsequently filed the present MSJ. In one of his oppositions,

Plaintiff noted that two third parties on whom subpoenas had been served had failed

to properly respond, and, as a result, there could be additional discovery that would

affect the outcome of Defendants’ MSJ. (Second Opposition 16–17, ECF No. 181.) 

Plaintiff moved to compel discovery responses. (ECF No. 202.)

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Dembin issued Orders directing that new

subpoenas be served on the third parties and demanding that the two third parties

respond properly to the subpoenas. (ECF Nos. 217, 225.) The third parties responded

and demonstrated their compliance with Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Orders. (ECF No.

229.) Magistrate Judge Dembin then granted Plaintiff permission to file a

supplemental brief on or before September 12, 2014 to explain how the additional

discovery responses affected the disposition of Defendants’ MSJ. (ECF No. 233.) 

Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief. (ECF No. 234.)

II. Factual Background 

On June 5, 2008, Smith escorted inmate K. Hopkins (“Hopkins”) to Plaintiff’s

cell at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) and presented

Hopkins as Plaintiff’s new cellmate. (Decl. of Att’y Timothy J. Kral in Supp. of Defs.’

MSJ(“Kral Decl.”) Ex. B (Deposition of Mustafa Wright), at 157:8–11, ECF No. 174.) 

Plaintiff had double cell status and was not entitled to the cellmate of his choice. (Id.

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at 44:24–45:20.) Plaintiff immediately told Smith that he was reluctant to be housed

with Hopkins because Hopkins appeared to be mentally disturbed and physically ill. 

(Id. at 158:18–22; TAC 7, ECF No. 81; First Opp’n 4, ECF No. 176; Second Opp’n 44

(Decl. of James Brown), ECF No. 181.) Smith responded by laughing and telling

Plaintiff, “He’s a little crazy, but we’ve got to house him.” (TAC 8, ECF No. 81.)

On June 6, 2008, Plaintiff heard rumors that Hopkins had been moved out of his

previous cell because Hopkins’ former cellmate had refused to reenter the cell with

Hopkins housed there. ( Id.) Plaintiff complained to Smith that Hopkins had been up

all night mumbling profanities and threatening Plaintiff with comments such as, “I’m

going to get your ass.” (Id.) Smith looked into the cell, where he could see Hopkins

holding his genitals and smiling. (Id.; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 167:9–11, ECF No. 174.)

Smith dismissed Plaintiff’s concerns, however, telling Plaintiff, “You can handle

yourself.” (Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 167:23–24, ECF No. 174.)

On June 7, 2008, Plaintiff took his complaint to Abad, a counselor. (TAC 8,

ECF No. 81.; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 194:21–22, 197:4–20, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiff

repeated that he did not feel safe with Hopkins. (Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 176:4–11, ECF

No. 174.) Abad informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff could be housed in an Administrative

Segregation Unit instead. (Id. at 175:7–11.) Plaintiff declined. (Id. at 175:12–18.) 

That same day, inmate Ramon Murillo (“Murillo”), a third party, declares that

he overheard a conversation between Smith, Marrero, and Contreras. (Kral Decl. Ex.

C (Decl. of Ramon Murillo) ¶ 4, ECF No. 174-1.) Murillo reports that Marrero asked

Smith, “How is it going with the Booty Bandit?” (Id.) In response, Contreras asked, 2

“You mean Hopkins?”, which brought a laugh from all three men. (Id.) Smith

answered Marrero’s question by stating that “no one wanted to live with Mr. Hopkins

so [I] was going to place him with Mr. Wright.” (Id.) Smith further commented that

“Mr. Wright might enjoy himself, he [i]s big enough.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the term “Booty Bandit” refers to someone who tries “to rape 2

people in prison.” (Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 229:24–230:1, ECF No. 174.)

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On June 8, 2008, Plaintiff returned to Abad’s office to ask if he or Hopkins could

be moved to another cell. (Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 202:6–9, ECF No. 174.) Abad asked

Plaintiff to step out of the office and telephoned Cortez. (Id. at 204:1–15.) Abad and

Cortez then spoke in private about Hopkins. (Id.) When Plaintiff was brought back

into Abad’s office, Abad told Plaintiff that he would bring Hopkins before the

classification committee, but until then Hopkins would remain housed with Plaintiff. 

(Id at 204:15–23.)

Throughout June 10, 2008, Plaintiff noticed pain in and around his rectum. 

(TAC 9, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 113:1–6, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiff saw that

his sheets and clothes had been changed, but didn’t remember changing them. (TAC

9, ECF No. 81.) He also woke up later than usual and wasfatigued the whole day. (Id.

at 9–10; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 99:13–22, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiff also felt constipated,

“which wasn’t the norm.” (TAC 9, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 102:5–14, ECF

No. 174.) When Plaintiff attempted to take a nap, he noticed Hopkins attempting to

pour some medication into Plaintiff’s coffee mug. (TAC 10, ECF No. 81.) 

At this point, Plaintiff “vividly remember[ed]” events from the prior evening. 

(Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff recalled seeing Hopkins pour a white powder into his soup

when Plaintiff was distracted by a visitor. (Id.; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 149:5–150:25, ECF

No. 174.) “Images flashed through [Plaintiff’s] mind” of being raped by Hopkins and

pushed around his cell in a stupor. (TAC 10, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at

115:4–14, 117:12–24, ECF No. 174.) 

James Brown (“Brown”), a neighboring inmate, declares that, in June 2008, he

heard Plaintiff and Hopkins arguing in their cell, but Brown does not identify what

Plaintiff and Hopkins were arguing about or the exact date ofthe argument(s). (Second

Opp’n 44 (Decl. of James Brown), ECF No. 181.) Nor does Brown declare that any of

the Defendants heard or responded to the argument(s). (Id.)

After recalling the events of the previous night, Plaintiff went to the nurse’s

station and reported what he remembered. (TAC 10, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at

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32:3–4, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiff was brought to Alvarado Hospital and examined. 

(TAC 10–11, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B, at 32:5–10, ECF No. 174.) 

An October 2, 2008 Investigative Services Unit report discovered no evidence

of rape. (Decl. of Robert G. Borg (“Borg Decl.”) ¶ 65, ECF No. 173-3.) The

December 23, 2008, San Diego Sheriff’s Department (“SDSD”) Crime Lab report was

likewise negative for rape. (Id. ¶ 66.) The Sexual Assault Response Team (“SART”)

investigation, which included a forensic study of Plaintiff, found some redness and

swelling of the anal cavity but, again, no evidence of rape. (Id. ¶ 67.) 

According to his sworn declaration, Dr. Bruce Barnett (“Dr. Barnett”), an expert

retained by Defendants, found that Plaintiff had not been “abnormally or excessively

sedated” and was not subject to any sexual assault. (Declaration of Bruce Barnett,

M.D. (“Barnett Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 173-2.) A July 11, 2008, exam by Nurse Rankle

found no injuries to Plaintiff’s rectum or anus and, despite some redness of the rectum,

found no evidence of rape. (Id. ¶ 12(A).) According to Dr. Barnett, the redness of the

rectum was not significant, as the exam revealed no trauma or injuries consistent with

rape. (Id. ¶ 12(B).) Blood and urine tests collected by Nurse Rankle showed no

evidence that Plaintiff had been drugged. (Id. ¶ 12(C).) 

After returning from Alvarado Hospital, Plaintiff heard rumors that Hopkins, at

his previous prison, had been placed in administrative segregation for drugging and

raping his cellmate. (TAC 11, ECF No. 81.) The record reveals that Hopkins was

accused of battery by his former cellmate atCalifornia State Prison-Sacramento (“CSPSAC”) and placed in administrative segregation pending investigation ofthose charges. 

(Borg Decl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 173-3.) However, the alleged battery did not include sexual

misconduct of any type, and the investigation concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to charge Hopkins with battery. (Id.) 

Prior to his transfer to Donovan, Hopkins was cleared by CSP-SAC for double

cell housing. (Id. ¶ 20.) According to Robert Borg (“Borg”), an expert in correctional

settings and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

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procedures, such a classification would have been made by the Classification Services

Representative (“CSR”) who approved Hopkins’ transfer. (Id.) Hopkins’ status was

also reviewed by the Receiving and Release Sergeant in compliance with Operational

Plan (“OP”) 85 and CCR 3269(a). (Id. ¶ 27.) Borg declares that a review of Hopkins’

inmate file dating back to 1991 did not reveal a pervasive pattern of in-cell violence,

and Hopkins has no criminal history of sex offenses. (Id. ¶ 29). 

According to a CDCR Form 128-G, on October 5, 2001, an inmate accused

Hopkins of sexual assault. (Id.; Second Opp’n 45, ECF No. 181.) According to Borg,

however, Hopkins did not receive a Rule Violation Report for the “unsubstantiated

allegation,” and Hopkins was not reclassified to single-cell status as a result of the

accusation. (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(C); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the Court weighs the evidence presented by the parties,

“[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to

be drawn in [his] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. A

genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could find for the nonmoving party.” Id.; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Seaboard Corp.,

677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ”

as to the outcome of the dispute, summary judgment must be denied. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 250–51. 

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can carry his burden

in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the

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nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party

“failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect

to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 322–23. 

Once the moving party satisfies thisinitial burden, the nonmoving party must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. To do so,

the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To survive summary judgment the nonmoving party must “make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322. Furthermore, the nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly

supported motion for summary judgment by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials

of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the nonmoving party must

identify those facts of record that would contradict the facts identified by the movant. 

Id. at 256–57; Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

The district court is “not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny

a motion for summary judgment.” Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409,

1417–18 (9th Cir. 1988); Nilsson v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Nonetheless, the court may exercise its discretion, “in appropriate circumstances,” to

consider materials in the record that are on file but not “specifically referred to” by the

parties. Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court need not, however, “examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine

issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate

references so that it could be conveniently found.” Id.

Moreover, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not

accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council

v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “No valid interest is served by withholding

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summary judgment on a complaint that wraps nonactionable conduct in a jacket woven

of legal conclusions and hyperbole.” Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir.

1989).

ANALYSIS

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that

a person acting under color ofstate law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the

conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 3301–31 (1986). A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus

on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions

are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment ensures

that prisoners are kept in conditions compatible with “civilized standards, humanity,

and decency.” Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). The state has an obligation

to “assume some responsibility for [an inmate’s] safety and general well-being.” 

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). 

Accordingly, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Although

an inmate will naturally be exposed to harsh and uncomfortable conditions,

“gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no

‘legitimate penological objective.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548

(1984)).

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In his TAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by: (1) failing to classify Hopkins

with single-occupant cell status despite knowledge that Hopkins had raped his prior

cellmate, (2) housing Hopkins with Plaintiff despite knowing that Plaintiff was on a

sensitive needs yard due to “being pressured by inmates in general population to

perform sexual acts,” and (3) refusing to transfer Hopkins to another cell despite

knowing that Hopkins posed a risk to Plaintiff. (TAC 19–21, ECF No. 81.) Plaintiff

alleges that each of these acts or omissions resulted in Plaintiff being drugged and

raped by Hopkins. (Id.)

In their MSJ, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

fails as a matter of law. (MSJ 15, ECF No. 173-1.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff

has failed to show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk

of harm, that he was sexually assaulted by another inmate, or that Defendants were

indifferent to his medical needs. (Id. at 15, 19, 22.) Defendants also contend that

Plaintiff’s claims based on supervisory liability fail. (Id. at 24.) 

I. Deliberate Indifference

In order to state a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment,

an inmate must firstshow that he suffered a deprivation or injury that was “objectively,

sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal citations omitted). Second, the

plaintiff must show that the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”

in that they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to

an inmate.” Id. Deliberate indifference requiresthat the official know of and disregard

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The official must not only be

aware of facts from which one could reasonably infer that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, but must also actually draw that inference. Id. 

“A plaintiff may make the factual showing that a prison official had the requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842 (internal citations omitted). A showing of mere

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negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Id. at 837. Even gross

negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference. Id. However, “[t]urning a blind

eye to the relevant surrounding facts will not shield a prison official from liability.” 

Swan v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “‘If the evidence

shows that a [prison official] merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly

suspected to exist . . . , liability may be imposed.” Id. at 1182 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 843 n.8). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

failing to protect him from Hopkins. (TAC 12, ECF No. 81.) Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants failed to put Hopkins through an inmate classification process

and place Hopkins in single cell housing. (Id. at 13–14.) Both of these omissions,

according to Plaintiff, were in violation of CDCR regulations. (Id.) Plaintiff further

alleges that, as a result of these failures, Hopkins was placed in Plaintiff’s cell, which

caused Plaintiff’s sexual assault. (Id.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. (MSJ 15, ECF

No. 173-1.) First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the objective

element of his Eighth Amendment claim because he failsto establish that Hopkins was

classified as dangerous and because there is no evidence that a rape actually occurred. 

(Id. at 16–19). Second, Defendants contend that Plaintifffailed to satisfy the subjective

element of his Eighth Amendment claim because there is no evidence that any

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. (Id. at 20–22). 

A. Objective Element

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to establish that the conditions of his

confinement were unconstitutional, as Plaintiffshows neither that his confinement with

Hopkins was unreasonable nor that Hopkins actually raped him. The Court agrees.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations in his TAC, the evidence shows that Hopkins

was properly classified during the intake process and was not randomly assigned to

Plaintiff’s cell. According to Borg’s sworn statements, prior to Hopkins’ transfer from

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CSP-SAC to Donovan, Hopkins was cleared for double cell housing by the

Classification Services Representative at CSP-SAC who approved the transfer. (Borg

Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 173-3.) Although Hopkins’ cellmate at CSP-SAC had accused

Hopkins of battery, the battery allegations did not include sexual misconduct of any

type, and the investigation into the allegations concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to charge Hopkins. (Id. ¶ 19.) When Hopkins arrived at Donovan, his status

was again reviewed by the Receiving and Release Sergeant, in compliance with OP 85

and CCR 3269(a). (Id. ¶ 27.) According to CCR 3269, the single Rules Violation

Report for the substantiated battery was insufficient basis for reclassifying Hopkins to

a single-cell status. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

Plaintiff notes that, according to a CDCR Form 128-G, Hopkins had been

accused of a sexual assault on October 5, 2001. (Second Opp’n 45, ECF No. 181.) 

However, that accusation was unsubstantiated; therefore, Hopkins did not even receive

a Rule Violation Report for the supposed incident. (Id.; Borg Decl. ¶ 29, ECF No. 173-

3.) Significantly, a November 30, 2006 Classification Chrono following the incident

found that Hopkins did not meet single-cell housing criteria. (Id.) In sum, Hopkins’

record reveals that he had neither a pervasive pattern of in-cell violence nor a criminal

history of sex offenses, rendering his double-cell classification reasonable. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Nor does the evidence in the record support Plaintiff’s contention that in-cell

violence at Donovan had been escalating prior to his attack. Plaintiff claims that

Defendants’ interrogatory responses show that in-cell violence had been escalating. 

(Second Opp’n 22–25, ECF No. 181.) In actuality, Defendants’ interrogatory

responses show that between January 2007 and July 2008, there were 13 reported

sexual assaults and 46 reported assaults at Facility Three, but that in 2006 there were

163 assaults and an unknown number of sexual assaults in all of the facilities at

Donovan. (Id.) However, Facility Three has a smaller population size than Donovan

as a whole, and thus no inference about trends in in-cell violence at Donovan can be

drawn from the data. Plaintiff has provided no other evidence on this point. 

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Further, with the exception of Plaintiff’s own statements, there is no evidence

that Hopkins sexually assaulted or raped Plaintiff. When Nurse Rankle examined

Plaintiff on July 11, 2008, she saw only some redness of the rectum. (Barnett Decl. 

¶ 12(A), ECF No. 173-2.) She found no injuries to Plaintiff’s rectum or anus and no

evidence of rape. (Id.) Moreover, the blood and urine tests she collected showed no

evidence that Plaintiff had been drugged. (Id. ¶ 12©.) 

Later reports corroborate Nurse Rankle’s findings. An October 2, 2008

Investigative Services Unit report discovered no evidence of rape. (Borg Decl. ¶ 65,

ECF No. 173-3.) Similarly, the December 23, 2008 SDSD Crime Lab report found no

evidence of rape. (Id. ¶ 66.) The SART investigation, which included a forensic study

3

of Plaintiff, found some redness and swelling ofthe anal cavity, but, again, no evidence

of rape. (Id. ¶ 67). After reviewing the relevant medical files, Dr. Barnett found that

Plaintiff had not been “abnormally or excessively sedated” and was not sexually

assaulted. (Barnett Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 173-2.) According to Dr. Barnett, the redness

of Plaintiff’s rectum was not significant and Plaintiff exhibited no traumas or injuries

consistent with rape. (Id. ¶ 12(B).) Ultimately, Plaintiff’s self-serving statements,

uncorroborated by other evidence, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted) (“[T]his court has refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only

evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.”). 

Plaintiff contends that the redness and swelling of his rectum is indicative of

rape. (Second Opp’n 14–15, ECF No. 181.) Plaintiff also cites the District Attorney’s

(“DA”) Complaint Request which states that the “SART exam is consistent with the

sodomy.” (Id. Ex. 8.) Plaintiff conveniently overlooks that the same report, however,

Plaintiff questions the authenticity and reliabilityof this report, seeminglyarguing that 3

long delays in processing samples and delivering results permit the inference that this evidence

has been tampered with. (See Resp. to Order 4–8, ECF No. 234.) Discounting this report, the

fact remains that the other reports were negative for rape. Further, because the reports were

processed by separate entities, the Court finds no reason to believe that any purported

tampering with one report draws into question the rest. 

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concluded that there was insufficient evidence of rape and thus ordered additional

testing. (Id.) Thus, the DA’s Complaint Request does not contradict the SART or the

other reports indicating that no rape occurred. Rather, the numerous laboratory tests

and reports, which were based on SART kit evaluations of Plaintiff and Hopkins,

concluded that there was no evidence of rape or sexual assault. 

To establish a violation of a prison official’s duty to take reasonable steps to

protect inmates from physical abuse, the prisoner must establish that the official was

deliberately indifferent to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834. Plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether

Defendants failed to classify Hopkins’ cell status, wrongly classified Hopkins, or

ignored Hopkins’ classification when assigning him to Plaintiff’s cell. Likewise,

Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was actually drugged, raped, or sexually

assaulted by Hopkins. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was

exposed to an excessive danger or that he suffered an unreasonable constitutional

deprivation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Because Plaintiff has failed to meet the

objective requirement of his Eighth Amendment claim, his claim fails as a matter of

law. 

B. Subjective Element

Had Plaintiff met his burden with respect to the objective element, there would

be a genuine issue of fact requiring trial on the subjective element with respect to

Smith, Marrero, and Contreras, but not with respect to Abad and Cortez. In Berg v.

Kincheloe,theNinth Circuit articulated the deliberate indifference standard with regard

to the prevention of inmate attacks:

A prisoner may state a section 1983 claim under the eighth and

fourteenth amendments against prison officials where the officials acted

with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury by

another prisoner. The “deliberate indifference” standard requires a

finding of some degree of “individual culpability,” but does not require

an express intent to punish. The standard does not require that the guard

or official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack

another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated

to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he must

have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.

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794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 

If Plaintiff had met the objective element the evidence would create an issue of

material fact regarding Smith’s, Contreras’, and Marrero’s subjective awareness of a

danger to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff alleges that Smith, Marrero, and Contreras joked

about Hopkins’ propensity for sexual violence and a possible sexual attack against

Plaintiff. (TAC 20, ECF No. 81.) Plaintiff provides the declaration of Murillo, who

declared that he overheard this conversation on June 7, 2008—two days before the

alleged attack. (Kral Decl. Ex. C (Decl. of Ramon Murillo) ¶ 4, ECF No. 174-1.)

Defendants rely on Borg’s declaration to support their assertion that Smith, Contreras,

and Marrero had no access to Hopkins’ file, so they would have been unaware of

Hopkins’ history of violence, and that, even if they did have access to Hopkins’ file,

there was no such history of violence. (MSJ 22, ECF No. 173-1; Borg Decl. ¶¶ 19, 22,

29, 62, ECF No. 173-3.) Defendants’ evidence does not invalidate Murillo’s

declaration, however. These conflicting statements present conflicting facts that, if

Plaintiff had established a constitutional deprivation, would have needed to be resolved

by trial. 

Plaintiff also supports his argument that Defendants had subjective awareness of

Hopkins’ dangerousness with the declaration of inmate James Brown. (Second Opp’n

at 44, ECF No. 181.) In his declaration, Mr. Brown states that he heard Plaintiff and

Hopkins arguing in their cell in early June 2008. (Id.) This statement, however, is

insufficient to show that Defendants were indifferent to a substantial danger to

Plaintiff’s safety, as the statement does not indicate that any of Defendants actually

heard the argument. Moreover, the mere fact of an argument would not, in and of itself,

indicate to Defendants that Hopkins planned to sexually assault Plaintiff. Even if such

an argument would have alerted Defendants that such an attack was to occur, such

suspicion is insufficient to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Berg, 794

F.2d at 459. Accordingly, the Court accords this argument no weight. 

In addition to the group-based subjective awareness allegations, Plaintiff claims

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that Smith was subjectively aware of the danger Hopkins posed to Plaintiff due to

Smith’s involvement in transferring Hopkinsto Plaintiff’s cell. The evidence of Smith’s

limited involvement in Hopkins’ transfer does not, however, establish the requisite

subjective awareness. According to Borg’s sworn declaration, Smith was not involved

in the decision to house Hopkins with Plaintiff. (MSJ 20, ECF No. 173-1; Borg Decl.

¶¶ 51–54, ECF No. 173-3.) Plaintiff has introduced no evidence to the contrary. Smith

did not enter or approve the decisions to transfer Hopkins. (Borg Decl. ¶¶ 52–53, ECF

No. 173-3.) Indeed, the decision to house Hopkins with Plaintiff was made on the

morning of June 4, 2008, when Smith was off-duty. (Id. ¶ 51.) Even if Smith had been

involved in the decision, there is no evidence that Smith was orshould have been aware

that such a move would have been dangerous to Plaintiff. Both Hopkins and Plaintiff

were placed in accordance with their cell statuses, which were assigned by third parties. 

Even if Smith had reason to question their statuses, according to Borg, there was no way

for Smith to independently verify Hopkins’ housing status or dangerous nature. (Id. ¶

57.) 

Plaintiff also produced no evidence to support his allegation that Smith moved

Hopkins from cell 126 in unit 13 to cell 223 in unit 14 on June 3, 2008 in response to

another inmate’s refusal to double-cell with Hopkins. (TAC 21, ECF No. 81.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has presented no admissible evidence to contradict the sworn

statements of Borg and the objective evidence concerning Hopkins’ and Plaintiff’s cell

statuses. Smith’s involvement in transferring Hopkins to Plaintiff’s cell presents no

genuine issue as to Smith’s individual subjective awareness. 

With regard to Abad and Cortez, Plaintiff has presented no admissible evidence

indicating that either was aware of and disregarded a substantial danger to Plaintiff’s

safety posed by Hopkins. Rather, the evidence shows that Abad and Cortez responded

immediately and appropriately to Plaintiff’s concerns, despite the fact that there was no

substantial danger to Plaintiff’s safety. On June 7, 2008, Plaintiff complained to Abad

that Hopkins was crazy and that Plaintiff wanted Hopkins moved out of his cell. (TAC

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8, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B at 197:4–20, ECF No. 174.) Abad set up a meeting

with Plaintiff in his office, listened to Plaintiff’s complaint, and spoke to Cortez

telephonically about Hopkins. (TAC 8, ECF No. 81; Kral Decl. Ex. B at

200:10–204:17, ECF No. 174.) Abad informed Plaintiff that he and Cortez would

immediately investigate. (TAC 8, ECF. No. 81). Plaintiff admits that Abad

acknowledged Plaintiff’s concern and offered to immediately move him to

Administrative Segregation so that Plaintiff would not have to share a cell with Hopkins

until the matter could be investigated. (Kral Decl. Ex. B at 205:22–206:1, ECF No.

174). Abad’s offer to place Plaintiff in Administrative Segregation may have had a dual

purpose—to address Plaintiff’s safety concerns and as a threat of disciplinary action

under CDCR 3269(g) for refusing to accept a housing assignment. (See Borg Decl. ¶

63, ECF No. 173-3.) Nevertheless, the offer provided an immediate mechanism for

addressing Plaintiff’s safety concern while Abad and Cortez further investigated the

situation. 

As established above, Hopkins was properly classified and assigned to Plaintiff’s

cell in accordance with all prison guidelines. Hopkins did not have a history of violence

that justified a different cell status, and, even if he did, Plaintiff has not established that

Defendants were aware of that history. Defendants, although under no obligation to

move Hopkins based merely on Plaintiff’s complaints, offered to move Plaintiff to

administrative segregation so they could investigate, but Plaintiff rejected this option. 

Rather than show deliberate indifference, thisshowsthatCortez and Abad were actively

concerned with Plaintiff’s safety and took reasonable steps to address Plaintiff’s alleged

problems with Hopkins. Accordingly, Plaintiff has introduced no evidence to show that

either Defendant Cortez or Defendant Abad were deliberately indifferent to his safety

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Thus, even if Plaintiff

had established a triable issue of fact on the objective element of his deliberate

indifference claim, his claim would still fail as to Defendants Abad and Cortez on the

subjective element. 

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In sum, the Murillo declaration offered by Plaintiff creates a triable issue of

material fact as to the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim as to

Defendants Smith, Marrero, and Contreras, but not as to Defendants Abad and Cortez. 

Because Plaintiff has failed, however, to satisfy the objective element of his claim, the

entire claim fails as a matter of law as to all Defendants, and summary judgment is

appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

II. Supervisory Liability

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a theory of direct liability based on a

supervisor’s “knowledge and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her

subordinates.” See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). A supervisor

is liable in his individual capacity for “the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208 (citing

Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)).

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either

(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient

causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.” Id. at 1207 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

The requisite casual connection is present when the supervisor sets in motion a series

of acts by others or knowingly refuses to terminate a series of acts by others that the

supervisor “knows or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a

constitutional injury.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir

1991); Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff alleges that Marrero and Contreras violated his rights by “failing to train,

instruct, supervise, and control subordinates.” (TAC 17, ECF No. 81.) Plaintiff

contends that Marrero and Contreras failed to provide necessary training despite

incessant cell violence. (Second Opp’n 10, ECF No. 181). Defendants contend that this

claim fails because the assignment of Hopkins to Plaintiff’s cell was made according to

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established policy and there was nothing in Hopkins’ history indicating any risk of rape. 

(MSJ 24, ECF No. 173-1.) Thus, Marrero and Contreras neither failed to train their

subordinates nor exhibited deliberate indifference. (Id.) 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish a necessary element of his claim. For the

reasons already identified, Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation. 

Without such a deprivation, there is no basis to hold either Marrero or Contreras liable

as a supervisor. Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. 

Even had Plaintiff established a constitutional violation, Plaintiff does not allege,

much less establish, that either Marrero or Contreras were personally involved in the

decision to house Hopkins with Plaintiff. Plaintiff has likewise failed to establish any

causal connection between Marrero or Contreras and the allegedly unconstitutional

behavior. Plaintiff has introduced no evidence showing that either was responsible for

instructing any subordinate Defendants in cell assignment or acquiesced in

unconstitutional behavior. Nor has Plaintiff shown that any Defendant failed to follow

CDCR policy regarding cell assignment. Rather, both Marrero and Contreras provided

detailed discovery responses outlining their training and supervision efforts, and no

Defendant claimed ignorance in proper cell assignment procedure. (See Second Opp’n

11, 35–39, ECF No. 181.) 

Plaintiff points to Smith’s discovery responses, which state generally that Smith

received training and instruction regarding how to keep inmates safe. (Id. at 11.) 

Plaintiff contends that because Smith failed to specify that this training was provided

by Marrero or Contreras, it is an admission that Marrero and Contreras failed to train

him. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that Marrero and Contreras failed to train staff with

regard to OP 85. (Id. at 12.) However, as Defendants urge, Plaintiff takes these

discovery responses out of context and ignores the bulk, which detail how Marrero and

Contreras provided training and supervision and that reveal that neither Marrero nor

Contreras was in charge of cell assignments or training regarding cell assignments. 

(Resp. to Second Opp’n 9, ECF No. 182.) Ultimately, Smith’s responses, which fail to

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specify who trained him, do not contradict the otherwise significant evidence that

Marrero and Contreras provided adequate training and instruction to their subordinates. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of any material fact as to

supervisor liability for Defendants Marrero and Contreras. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference by prison officials in violation of his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment fails as a matter

of law. Although Plaintiff presented a triable issue of fact on the subjective element as

to Defendants Smith, Marrero, and Contreras, Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the objective

element of his claim is determinative. Plaintiff also failed to establish a genuine issue

of material fact with respect to supervisor liability. Thus, the evidence shows that no

genuine issue of material fact exists, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 26, 2014

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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