Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02034/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02034-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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All documents referenced from case number CIV 09-2034-PHX-MHM will be

hereinafter designated “CVDoc.” and all documents referenced from case number CR 01-

486-PHX-MHM will be designated “CRDoc.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.

Lloyd George Sinclair, 

Defendant/Movant.

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CR 01-486-PHX-MHM

CIV 09-2034-PHX-MHM (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Defendant/Movant Lloyd George Sinclair (hereinafter “Movant”), who is confined

in the Federal Correctional Institution in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a pro se “Motion Under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal

Custody,” and Memorandum in Support (CVDoc. 6, 7)1

. On June 9, 2010, Respondent filed

a Response (CVDoc. 11). On June 23, 2010, Movant filed a Traverse (CVDoc. 12). In

accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court deny and dismiss the Motion.

///

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2

 “ER” refers to the Ninth Circuit Appellant’s Excerpt of Record, followed by the

relevant tab number. “SER” refers to the Ninth Circuit Appellee’s Supplemental Excerpts

of Record, followed by the relevant page number(s). “PSR” refers to the Presentence Report.

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BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2003, a federal Grand Jury returned a fourth superseding indictment

against Movant, charging him with the following felony counts: (Count One) Conspiracy to

Commit Money Laundering, (Count Two) Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute

Marijuana, (Counts Three to Five) Possession or Use of a Firearm During and in Relation to

a Drug Trafficking Offense Resulting in a Death. (CRDoc. 131; ER2

 25.) The indictment

also included a forfeiture allegation. (Id.) Five of the co-defendants in the indictment

entered plea agreements with the government, and two remain fugitives. (PSR at 1a; CRDoc.

808-809.)

Movant pled not guilty, and after a 14-day trial, on September 24, 2004, was

convicted on all counts. (CRDoc. 648, 693.) On April 29, 2005, Movant was sentenced as

follows: Count One - 57 months in prison, followed by 3-years of supervised release. Count

Two.- life imprisonment, to be followed by 5-years of supervised release. Counts Three and

Four - life imprisonment, to be followed by 5-years of supervised release. Count Five - 25

years, followed by 5-years of supervised release. The sentences on Counts Three through

Five were ordered to be served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment. The terms

of supervised release were ordered to run concurrently. Movant was also ordered to pay

restitution in the amount of $5,000.00. (CRDoc. 816.)

Movant filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and on June 26, 2008, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals filed a Memorandum decision affirming Movant’s convictions and

sentence. (CVDoc. 11, Exh. A.) The mandate issued on July 18, 2008. (Id., Exh. B.)

Movant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.

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For reasons that are not clear to the Court, Respondent in its Response identifies

seven grounds for relief raised by Movant in his §2255 Motion (CVDoc. 6), instead of eight,

and also identifies 72 sub-claims of relief raised by Movant, that do not appear in Movant’s

§2255 Motion. Movant points out this anomaly in his Traverse. (CVDoc. 12, at 18.) It

appears Respondent misread the structure of Movant’s Memorandum in Support of his §2255

Motion, that, although lengthy and elaborately outlined, did retain the substance of Movant’s

§2255 claims. Nonetheless, Respondent does address, albeit in a fashion that is very

confusing and cumbersome to the Court, all of Movant’s arguments.

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Movant filed his §2255 Motion on September 28, 2009. (CvDoc. 1.) In his Motion,

he raises the following eight grounds for relief3

:

Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Trial and Direct

Appeal Process, in violation of Movant’s Sixth Amendment Right to

Confrontation. (CVDoc. 6, at 5.)

Movant’s claim is based upon his trial counsel’s failure to object or move for a

mistrial based the introduction during trial of an out-of-court statement in violation of his

right to confront witnesses, and his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal.

(Id., at 19.) The statement was introduced during trial through government witness Rutty,

who related statements made to him by Movant’s co-defendant Henry, on a basketball court

after the crimes had been committed that “we knocked down three guys,” and that Henry had

robbed three “Mexicans” in Phoenix and “took their weed.” (CVDoc. 7, at 44.)

Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Pretrial Process,

When Counsel Unprofessionally Allowed [Movant] to Participate in “Free

Talks” With the Government. (CVDoc. 6, at 6.) 

This claim is based upon trial counsel’s failure to advise Movant not to participate in

“free talks” with the government. (Id., at 20.) He claims he was prejudiced because “[a]ll

the talks did was cause another superseding indictment and more serious charges and give

the government more evidence and leads to more evidence to use against [Movant].”

(CVDoc. 7, at 48.)

Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Trial Process

when Counsel Failed to Advise him, and Affirmatively Misadvised him, as to

his Constitutional Right to Testify. (CVDoc. 6, at 7.)

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Movant claims that trial counsel “did not advise [Movant] that he had the ultimate

authority to decide whether to take the stand and testify. . .” (Id., at 21.) Movant claims he

was prejudiced because if he had been properly advised he “would have taken the witness

stand and directly rebutted each and every material fact presented through the perjured

testimony of Witness Kevin Stone, whose ‘credibility’ was material to the jury verdict and

[Movant]’s sentence.” (Id., at 22.)

Ground Four: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Direct Appeal

Process, when Counsel Failed to File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court. (CVDoc. 6, at 8.)

Movant claims that his sentence was in violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), which “rejected any appellate rule that required

‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.” (CVDoc.

7, at 55.) Movant concedes that his appellate attorney did not argue in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals that Movant’s sentence was in violation of Gall v. United States, but argues

that he is prejudiced because, if his appellate attorney had filed a petition for certiorari, then

“there is a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals would have been vacated by the

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals would have been instructed to reconsider his

sentence in light of Gall v. United States, . . .” (Id., at 57.)

Ground Five: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel due to the Cumulative Impact

of Multiple Deficiencies or Errors by Counsel During the Pretrial, Plea, Trial,

Sentencing, and Direct Appeal Process. (CVDoc. 6, at 9.)

Movant claims that he was prejudiced by the cumulative impact of the “multiple

deficiencies and errors” of counsel. (CVDoc. 7, at 60.)

Ground Six: Movant was Denied Due Process of Law in the Trial Process,

when Movant was Convicted of Money Laundering Without Proof of “Intent

to Conceal” the Funds. (CVDoc. 6, at 10.)

Movant claims that “no evidence was presented at trial that [Movant] conducted

monetary transactions ‘with intent to conceal’ the funds,” as required by the Supreme Court

in Regalado-Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008), and therefore those convictions

should be reversed. (CVDoc. 7, at 64.)

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Ground Seven: Movant’s Consecutive Sentences in Counts 3-5 for Violation

of 18 U.S.C. §924(C)(1) are Unlawful Because Movant was Already Subjected

to a “Mandatory Minimum” of 10 Years in Movant’s Count 2 Conviction.

(CVDoc. 6, at 10.)

Movant claims that because he was subjected to a mandatory minimum 10-year

sentence on Count Two, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) preclude the imposition of

consecutive sentences on Counts Three through Five. (CVDoc. 7, at 63.) 

Ground Eight: Movant’s Conviction and Sentence are Violative of the First,

Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution.

(CVDoc. 6, at 11.)

Movant argues that his conviction and sentence “are violative of his right to freedom

of speech and to keep and bear arms and to petition, his right to be free of unreasonable

search and seizure, his right to Due Process of law, his rights to counsel, to jury trial, to

confrontation of witnesses, to present a defense, and to compulsory process, and his right to

be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Constitution.” (Id., at 11.)

Movant requests that the Court order an evidentiary hearing, because “many of the

material allegations concern events which took place outside the courtroom and are not,

therefore, part of the ‘files and records.’” (CVDoc. 7, at 67.) Movant also requests that his

conviction be vacated and the indictment dismissed, or that his sentence be vacated and that

he be resentenced with a “downward variance and without the money laundering sentence

and the sentences for violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) running concurrent to his other

sentences.” (Id., at 70.)

 LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Statute of Limitations.

The Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) establishes a

one-year limitations period for federal prisoners to collaterally attack their convictions. The

period runs from the latest of, as it pertains here, the date on which the judgment of

conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(1). The judgment of conviction in the case

of a prisoner who has filed an appeal becomes final after the time for seeking certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court has expired. United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058, 1059 (9th

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Cir. 2000). The deadline for seeking review on certiorari is 90 days from the date of entry

of judgment by the lower court. Sup.Ct.R. 13(1).

The decision of the appellate court in Movant’s case was entered on June 26, 2008;

therefore, Movant’s deadline for filing a petition of certiorari was September 23, 2008. His

§2255 Motion was therefore due one-year from that date, on September 22, 2009.

Respondent argues that Movant did not meet this deadline because he filed the instant §2255

Motion on September 28, 2009. Movant claims that he mailed his motion for filing on

September 22, 2008, which is consistent with a “Certificate of Filing” that was attached to

his Motion for Permission to File Oversized Brief (CVDoc. 1, at 4), and the “Certificate of

Filing” that was attached to his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Sentence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (CVDoc. 3-1, at 3). Movant signed the certificates, under

penalty of perjury, indicated that he had deposited his pleading (Docs. 1,2,3) into the prison

legal mail collection box on September 22, 2009. The signature date on Movant’s §2255

motion, his motion for filing, and his memorandum also indicate September 22, 2009.

(CVDoc. 1, at 3; CVDoc. 2, at 30; CVDoc. 3-1, at 2.) The District Court Clerk filed the

pleadings on September 28, 2009, which is not inconsistent with a purported September 22

mailing. Respondent does not dispute Movant’s factual claim. “[A]n incarcerated pro se

litigant completes service under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) upon submission to prison authorities for

forwarding to the party to be served.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir.

1995) (citations omitted); see Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (2001) (applying the

prison mailbox rule in the habeas context). Thus, under the circumstances present here,

Movant’s §2255 Motion was timely filed under the AEDPA.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Grounds One through Five.

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

 is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14.

“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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The court shall not grant a prisoner an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and

the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,

. . .” 26 U.S.C. §2255. Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1928) A hearing

is not required when credibility issues can be conclusively decided on the basis of

documentary testimony and evidence in the record. Id., at 277. A prisoner must “allege

specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d

1155 (9th Cir. 1996). See also, Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989)

(vague assertions with no supporting facts do not warrant habeas relief).

1. Ground One.

Claimant asserts that his counsel failed to object, move for a mistrial or appeal based

upon a violation of his right to confront witnesses against him. Specifically, Movant

complains about the admission of the out-of-court statement of Jerome Henry. Movant’s trial

counsel did object at trial, and raised as an issue on appeal, that the district court erred by

introducing the statement because (1) the government did not establish the existence of a

conspiracy which included witness Rutty and Movant, (2) the statement of Henry against

himself was used to implicate Movant; and (3) it was not established that the statement was

made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. (CRDoc. 632, Opening br. at

37.) The Ninth Circuit considered the issue and upheld the district court’s admission of the

hearsay. (CVDoc. 11, Exh. A, at 3, n.1.)

Generally, a § 2255 Movant may not relitigate an issue he unsuccessfully raised on

appeal. United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Redd,

759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Redd raised this precise claim in his direct appeal, and

this court expressly rejected it. Therefore, this claim cannot be the basis of a §2255

motion.”). “Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service

for an appeal.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (citation omitted). The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Movant’s claim that a confrontation clause

violation occurred, and his claim was rejected. Furthermore, contrary to Movant’s assertion,

his trial counsel did object to the admission of the testimony (CRDocs. 609, 632, 679, at 28.),

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and did raise the issue on appeal. Even if Movant could establish deficient performance, he

is not prejudiced, given the appellate court’s review and rejection of the claim.

2. Ground Two.

Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective in allowing Movant to participate in

“free talks” with the government before trial. Specifically, Movant claims that his “free

talks” resulted in a superseding indictment with more serious charges, and resulted in the

government having additional evidence against him. (CVDoc. 7, at 48.) He does not identify

with any degree of specificity what evidence was gained by the government during the free

talks that was presented to the grand jury to support additional charges, or what evidence was

gained by the government during the free talks that was used at trial to support his

convictions. Movant’s trial counsel signed an affidavit avowing the following:

[Movant] alleges that I could have but did not advise him to not participate in

free talks. [Movant] participated in free talks in New York prior to me being

appointed to represent him. He made some admissions concerning his

involvement in the drug transaction that resulted in the murders prior to my

representation of him. Once I was appointed to represent him I discussed with

him whether or not he should continue to cooperate with law enforcement. He

decided that it was in his best interest to continue to cooperate.

(CVDoc. 11, Exh. C.)

 Although a defendant’s attempted cooperation with law enforcement has been

recognized as a critical stage of the proceedings, United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111,

1120 (9th Cir. 2003), Movant does not demonstrate, beyond his bare assertion, that by

“allowing him” to cooperate with law enforcement, counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Doubtless, an attorney’s recommendation that a client

cooperate with law enforcement may be good advise, and may lead to beneficial

consideration by the government and by the court. In any event, Movant does not

demonstrate prejudice. “The evidence used to construct the government’s theory of the case

against [Movant] was gained from other cooperating co-defendants and forensic evidence.

It did not come from statements that the defendant made during the free talks.” (CVDoc. 11,

at 14) (setting forth the evidence presented in support of the conviction). Also, Movant did

not admit his participation in the homicides, but claimed to an interviewing detective, prior

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to Movant’s counsel being appointed to represent him, that a co-defendant was responsible.

(PSR at ¶¶16-19; CRDoc. 677, at 90-132.) Movant does not assert a viable claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel.

3. Ground Three.

Movant asserts that his trial counsel failed to advise him, and affirmatively

misadvised him of his right to testify during his trial in his own defense, and that if he had

“taken the witness stand” he would have “directly rebutted each and every material fact

presented through the perjured testimony of witness Kevin Stone whose credibility was

material to the jury verdict and [Movant]’s sentence.” (CVDoc. 7, at 50.) Movant does not

explain what part of Kevin Stone’s testimony he considers “perjured,” or how he would

effectively rebut Stone’s testimony. Furthermore, his trial counsel, in a sworn affidavit,

indicated that he discussed with Movant his right to testify, and that Movant chose not to.

(CVDoc. 11, Exh. C; CRDoc. 837, at 9.) During trial, his counsel undertook a vigorous

cross-examination of Kevin Stone. (CRDoc. 681, at 86-139.) Movant’s unsupported

assertion is insufficient to constitute a viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

4. Ground Four.

Movant claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective by not filing a petition for

a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Movant’s counsel did not file a petition because

he did not believe that there were any issues to appeal that the Supreme Court would

consider, and he discussed this decision with both Movant and his mother. (CVDoc. 11, Exh.

C.) Review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of

judicial discretion, and will be granted only for compelling reasons. Sup.Ct.R. 10. The

Ninth Circuit 3-page Memorandum decision in Movant’s case hardly falls within the

“character of the reasons” that the Supreme Court grants review, as set forth in Rule 10 of

the Supreme Court Rules. Furthermore, Movant does not claim that he told his counsel to

file a petition, or that when his counsel notified him of his decision not to file a petition he

could not have file a pro se petition. Thus, his claim is distinguished from an attorney’s

failure, at a defendant’s request to file a direct appeal (an appeal of right) from his judgment

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and conviction. See, United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005).

Movant does not establish that his appellate counsel was ineffective in not filing a petition

for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court.

5. Ground Five.

Movant argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors during the pretrial,

trial, sentencing and direct appeal amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition

to alleging the above errors of counsel, Movant asserts the following errors of trial counsel:

trial counsel failed to advise him adequately as to all the facts and law relevant to his decision

to plead not guilty and pursue a favorable plea agreement, failed to move for suppression of

evidence material to his conviction and sentence, failed to investigate or present exculpatory

evidence and failed to timely object to the admission of evidence, failed to timely request

appropriate jury instructions and failed to object to improper prosecution argument, failed

to investigate or present evidence and legal authority at sentencing, and failed to move for

downward departure or variance at sentencing. He also claims that his appellate counsel

failed to argue the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine facts not

charged in the indictment, and that his appellate and trial counsel labored under a conflict of

interest. (CVDoc. 6, at 24-26.) 

Movant does not offer any specific facts in support of these broad claims. Mere

conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel was ineffective. Shah, 878 F.2d

at 1161. “Notice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point

to a real possibility of constitutional error.” O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990) (citations omitted). Furthermore, his counsel did object to the court considering any

facts not decided by the jury in determining Movant’s sentence. (CRDoc. 834, at 8.)

Regarding the allegation of conflict-of-interest, Movant’s counsel avowed in an affidavit

sworn under oath that he “never represented any other party or victim in the case. . . . [and]

[does] not believe that [he] had a conflict of interest.” (CVDoc. 11-3, at 2.) Movant does

not, in any event, identify the purported conflict. Movant’s claim that the cumulative errors

of counsel constituted ineffective assistance is without merit.

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To the extent Movant claims his counsel was ineffective by not raising as an issue

the fact that the crime of money laundering requires proof of an “intent to conceal” as set

forth by Supreme Court in its decision in Regalado-Cuellar , that claim is addressed infra,

as the sufficiency of his money laundering conviction is the substance of his claim in Ground

Six. Also, to the extent Movant claims his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to an

unlawful sentence, the legality of his sentence is addressed infra, as it is the subject of his

claims in Grounds Seven and Eight. 

C. Substantive Claims: Grounds Six through Eight.

6. Ground Six.

Movant claims that he was denied Due Process because he was convicted of money

laundering without proof of “intent to conceal” the funds. (CVDoc. 6, at 10.) Movant

procedurally defaulted this claim by not raising it in his direct appeal. “If a criminal

defendant could have raised a claim of error on direct appeal but nonetheless failed to do so,

he must demonstrate both cause excusing his procedural default, and actual prejudice

resulting from the claim of error.” United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.

1993) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982)). Movant does not offer any

justification for not having raised the issue on appeal, or demonstrate actual prejudice. Even

if appellate counsel had raised the issue on appeal, Movant can not establish a likelihood that

his appeal would be successful.

Movant cites Regalado-Cuellar for the proposition that the crime of money

laundering, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) requires proof of an intent to conceal the

laundered funds. The government presented proof at trial that Movant committed various

acts of concealment of drug proceeds sufficient to establish an “intent to conceal.” The

government presented evidence that Movant had Monika Williams purchase a BMW and rent

other vehicles for him with the proceeds he received from distributing marijuana. (CVDoc.

11, at 17-18, Exh. D.) Movant’s claim that his conviction on Count One, Conspiracy to

Commit Money Laundering, was obtained in violation of his Due Process rights fails on

procedural grounds, and alternatively, on the merits.

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7. Ground Seven.

Movant claims that his consecutive sentence in Counts Three through Five are

unlawful because he was subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10-years on Count

Two. (CVDoc. 7, at 64.) Movant was given a 57-month sentence on Count One, Conspiracy

to Commit Money Laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) and §2, a life sentence on

Count Two, Conspiracy to Possess with the intent to Distribute Marijuana, Aid and Abet, in

violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1)&(b)(1)(A)(vii), §846, and §2, a life sentence on Counts

Three and Four and 25-years on Count Five, Possession or Use of a Firearm During and in

Relation to a Drug Trafficking Offense Resulting in Death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§924(c)(1)(A)(iii). (CRDoc. 817.) Counts One and Two were ordered to be served

concurrently, and counts Three through Five were ordered to be served consecutively to any

other term of imprisonment. (Id.) Movant argues that his consecutive sentences are

unlawful, because the statutory provision that the court used to justify the imposition of

consecutive sentences, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii), “did not apply to defendant because a

greater minimum sentence was otherwise provided by the armed career criminal provision,

18 U.S.C. §924(e), which subjected [Movant] to a fifteen-year minimum sentence.”

(CVDoc. 7, at 64.) He cites United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2nd Cir. 2008) in

support of his argument. 

The holding in that case is inapplicable here. The defendant in Whitley had been

convicted of one count of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of at least three

violent felonies or serious drug offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) and §924(e).

Whitley, 529 F.3d at 151. The Second Circuit court held that the “exception” provision of

18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(1)(A) should be read literally, to prevent the application of the mandatory

consecutive clause, (c)(1)(D)(ii), when a defendant is subjected to a greater mandatory

minimum under that subsection or any other provision of law. (Id., at 158.) Movant was not

convicted of a §922(g)(1) offense, and was not otherwise subjected to a “greater minimum”

sentence under any other provision of law, and thus, the “exception” provisions of

§922(c)(1)(A) does not apply to him. 

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Furthermore, the majority of federal circuit courts have found, contrary to the Second

Circuit, that the “except” language of §924(c) “connotes a comparison between alternative

minimum sentences for a violation of §924(c), not between sentences for separate violations

of §924(c) and another statute.” U.S. v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203, 211 (3rd Cir. 2009). The

United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split as to the

interpretation of the introductory clause of Section 924(c). See, Abbott, supra, cert.

granted, Abbott v. U.S., — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1284 (2010).; United States v. Gould, 329

Fed.Appx. 569 (2009), cert. granted, Gould v. United States, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1283

(2010). Thus, Movant’s claim regarding his consecutive sentences is without merit.

8. Ground Eight.

Movant’s broad claims that his conviction and sentence violate his rights under the

First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment without identifying specific facts

in support of these claims is not sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing, or the relief

requested. Movant claims that “many of the material allegations concern events which took

place outside the courtroom and are not, therefore, part of the files and records.” (CVDoc.

7, at 67.) Without more, Movant fails to “state facts that point to a real possibility of

constitutional error.” O’Bremski, 915 F.2d at 420.

Movant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective as he failed to investigate or

present evidence and legal authority at sentencing, and failed to move for downward

departure or variance at sentencing. (See, Ground Five, infra.) Movant claims that his

appellate counsel was ineffective as he failed to argue the denial of his Sixth Amendment

right to have a jury determine facts not charged in the indictment. (Id.)

Movant’s counsel objected at sentencing to the court considering any drug amounts,

not found by the jury, in the calculation of the applicable guideline offense level. (CRDoc.

834, at 8, 11.) He objected to the court’s cross-reference to the first-degree murder statute

in determining the base offense level for Count Two, Conspiracy to Possess with the Intend

to Distribute Marijuana. (Id., at 26.) Movant’s counsel also objected to the imposition of

consecutive sentences on the §924(c) counts. (Id., at 38-39.) The Court considered counsel’s

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objections, and acknowledged the advisory nature of the guidelines before imposing

sentence. (Id., at 43.) Finally, Movant raised these issues on appeal, and the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals found that “[t]he district court properly considered the factors under §3553

during [Movant]’s sentencing hearing.. . . [and] properly applied the appropriate sections and

cross-references in the Sentencing Guidelines.” (CVDoc. 11, Exh. A, at 3.) The court

further found that “[Movant]’s sentences on each count of conviction are within the

Guideline ranges and are in all respects reasonable.” (Id.) The record does not establish that

Movant’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, and Movant presents no new facts or

law that trial counsel should have brought to the attention of the court to support a sentencing

variance, or what facts his appellate counsel should have raised to support a claim that the

Court sentenced him based upon factors not found by a jury. Movant’s claim that his

conviction and sentence were in violation of his constitutional rights fails on the merits.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Movant’s claims are barred by a valid

waiver, or are barred as merit less. Movant has not raised facts or issues that entitle him to

an evidentiary hearing on his claims. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Movant’s

request for an evidentiary hearing, and his §2255 Motion be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s pro se “Motion Under 28

USC § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody”

(CivDoc. 6) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2010.

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