Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00350/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00350-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIM E. MOORE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHASE BANK; BNC MORTGAGE, INC.;

NDEX West LLC; STIRLING FUNDING

CORPORATION; KEVIN CAYLOR; and DOES

1-20,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 08-0350 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT

CHASE BANK'S MOTION

TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for

Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Jim Moore, Docket No.

19, and the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant Chase Bank. 

Docket No. 12. Defendants BNC Mortgage, Inc. ("BNC"), and Chase

Bank filed Oppositions to the Preliminary Injunction Motion,

Docket Nos. 26, 28, and Plaintiff submitted Replies. Docket Nos.

32, 33. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss

Chase Bank and Chase Bank submitted a Reply. Docket Nos. 20, 22. 

The Court held hearings on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction

on April 4 and 7, 2008. After reviewing the parties' submissions

and considering the parties' arguments at the hearings, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and GRANTS

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1 Plaintiff filed a Request to Strike Declaration of Linda

Denicola. Docket No. 32. Denicola is the Senior Vice President of

Quality Control with Defendant BNC Mortgage and her declaration was

submitted in support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Docket No. 27. Plaintiff's

Request is GRANTED with respect to the following statement in

Denicola's Declaration: "Mr. Moore's assertion that he somehow

believed he would receive a 30 year fixed rate note at somewhere

between 6.5 and 7.5% simply cannot be believed." Id. at 4. What

Plaintiff may or may not have believed is not a fact based on

personal knowledge about which Ms. Denicola is competent to

testify. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff's Request to Strike

Denicola's Declaration is otherwise DENIED.

2

Defendant Chase Bank's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice all claims

with respect to Chase Bank. 

II. BACKGROUND

The present action arises out of Plaintiff's September 2004

refinancing of his home loan with Defendants. Plaintiff's

original mortgage loan was with Wells Fargo in the amount of

approximately $224,000. Denicola Decl. Ex. C.1 In addition,

Plaintiff had a preexisting loan with Irwin Home Equity for

$49,202.35. Id. Ex. D. With his September 2004 refinance,

Plaintiff also received cash proceeds of approximately $19,000. 

Id. ¶ 8. The total amount of Plaintiff's new, September 2004

loan, including fees, was $302,600. Id. Ex. L Statement of Loan -

Closed End. 

The essence of Plaintiff's claim is that he was misled into

agreeing to the September 2004 refinance loan. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Stirling Funding "cold-called" him and told him he

was eligible for favorable interest rates if he wished to

refinance his home mortgage. Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1, Ex.

1 Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff states that Defendants Stirling Funding

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2

 It is clear from the Truth in Lending Disclosure, and

Plaintiff does not allege otherwise, that the Disclosure does not

create any rights or liabilities. The second line from the top of

the document states: "THIS IS NEITHER A CONTRACT NOR A COMMITMENT

TO LEND." Compl. Ex. 2 (capitalization in original).

3 There is some evidence, including testimony at the

hearings, indicating that the initial rate of the loan was actually

8.225%. For purposes of this Order, whether the initial rate was

8.225% or 9.186% is not important. The Court therefore assumes

that the initial rate was 9.186%.

3

and Kevin Caylor, an officer or representative of Stirling

Funding, told him that they would be able to provide a 30-year,

fixed-rate loan at between 6.5% and 7.5%. Id. ¶ 17. On September

15, 2004, these Defendants provided Plaintiff with a Truth in

Lending Disclosure stating that the rate on Plaintiff's new

mortgage would be 7.706% and the payments, over approximately 30

years, would be roughly $1960 per month.2 Id. Ex. 2. Two weeks

later, Plaintiff alleges that he was advised by these Defendants

by telephone that he had been approved for this loan. Id. ¶ 20. 

One week after this phone call, a notary/signing agent came to

Plaintiff's house with the loan documents, which Plaintiff signed. 

Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff asserts that while he was signing the papers,

the notary "was in a hurry and rushed [him] through the signing

process." Id. ¶ 26. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he did

not realize that the loan he agreed to actually contained an

initial adjustable rate of 9.186% with a ceiling rate of 15.225%.3

Id. Ex. 5 Adjustable Rate Note. 

It is clear from the documents submitted by the parties that

Plaintiff signed and initialed all of the relevant paper work,

including the new Truth in Lending statement containing the higher

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4 Attached to Plaintiff's Complaint are copies of the Notice

of Trustee Sale, the Truth in Lending Statements from September 15

and September 23, the Notice of the Right to Cancel, the Promissory

Note, and the Deed of Trust. See Compl. None of the documents,

save the Deed of Trust, is signed by Plaintiff. It is unclear

whether this is intended to suggest that Plaintiff in fact did not

sign most of the loan agreement documents. If so, not only has

Plaintiff failed to make this highly relevant argument in his

briefs, but these documents stand in stark contrast to those

submitted by Defendants, all of which contain Plaintiff's signature

or initials. For these reasons, the Court assumes that the

operative documents are those submitted by Defendants.

5 Defendant Chase Bank's Request for Judicial Notice of the

Assignment of Deed of Trust, Substitution of Trustee, and Notice of

Trustee's Sale is GRANTED. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

4

interest rate and higher monthly payments, Denicola Decl. Ex. F,

the promissory note, id. Ex. G, deed of trust, id. Ex. H,

adjustable rate rider, id. Ex. I, good faith estimate, id. Ex. J,

statement of loan-closed end, id. Ex. L, the final conditional

loan approval, id. Ex. M, and the notice of right to cancel. Id.

Ex. N.4 Although Plaintiff alleges that these documents were

filled with "legalese and . . . mumbo-jumbo," Compl. ¶ 32, the

numerical terms of the loan are on clear display. In addition,

the promissory note and the deed of trust are both the standard

forms used in California. Denicola Decl. ¶ 12. 

Plaintiff was able to make payments on this loan for almost

three years. Since May 2007, however, Plaintiff has not made any

payments and has been in default. Compl. ¶ 37; Defendant Chase

Bank's Opp'n at 2. On November 20, 2007, a Notice of

Trustee's Sale was recorded with the Contra Costa Recorders

Office. Def. Chase Bank's Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"),

Docket No. 31, Ex. 3.5

 On January 4, 2008, Plaintiff filed a

Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for

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Contra Costa County, alleging six causes of action: (1)

declaratory judgment for violations of California Civil Code §

2924 et. seq, which establishes protections and procedures for

valid foreclosure sales; (2) unfair business practices under

California Business and Professions Code § 17200; (3) fraud,

pursuant to California Civil Code § 1572; (4) unconscionability;

(5) breach of contract; and (6) accounting. In addition,

Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order from the state

superior court prohibiting the foreclosure sale of his home. Mot.

at 2. Defendants subsequently filed a timely notice for removal.

Plaintiff now seeks a Preliminary Injunction staying the

foreclosure sale of his home pending the outcome of the

litigation. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1.

III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Legal Standard

In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief

must show "either: (1) a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that

serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in

its favor." A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013

(9th Cir. 2001). These two alternatives "are not separate tests

but the outer reaches of a single continuum." Regents of Univ. of

Cal. v Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1994). 

"Essentially, the trial court must balance the equities in the

exercise of its discretion." Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. MetroSound

U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993).

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B. Analysis

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating

either a "combination of probable success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable harm, or that serious questions are

raised and the balance of hardships tips in its favor." A&M

Records, 239 F.3d at 1013. Although loss of one's home to a

foreclosure sale is almost certainly an irreparable harm and most

likely presents the possibility of significant hardship, Plaintiff

cannot escape the fact that he signed the mortgage papers at issue

in order to refinance his home loan. His signature and initials

appear on all of the necessary documents, including the truth in

lending statement, Denicola Decl. Ex. F, the promissory note, id.

Ex. G, deed of trust, id. Ex. H, and adjustable rate rider, id.

Ex. I. These documents expressly state the various interest rates

Plaintiff would be charged. See, e.g., id. Ex. G, Promissary Note

and Ex. I, Adjustable Rate Rider (stating that Plaintiff's

interest rate would be capped at 15.225% and providing a schedule,

including the amount, for monthly payments). All of these

documents are either signed or initialed by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that a preliminary injunction is

necessary because of two alleged statutory defects with the notice

of default and the notice of trustee sale. Pursuant to California

Civil Code §§ 2924c(b)(1) and 2924f, a notice of foreclosure sale

must contain, inter alia, "a statement of the total amount of the

unpaid balance of the obligation secured by the property to be

sold" and "either a toll-free telephone number or telephone number

in this state of the trustee . . . ." 

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Plaintiff first argues that a preliminary injunction is

necessary because the amount due as stated in the notice of

trustee's sale was not accurate. Plaintiff's reasoning, however,

is not persuasive. Plaintiff's sole argument for why the amount

due in the notice of trustee sale was incorrect is that this

amount is more than his initial loan. Plaintiff argues that

because he had been making payments on the loan for more than two

years, it is impossible for him to owe, as of November 20, 2007,

$307,967, when his initial loan was only for $302,600. See RJN

Ex. 3, Notice of Trustee Sale; Denicola Decl. Ex. L, Statement of

Loan--Closed End. 

Given the rate of interest on Plaintiff's loan, it is

entirely possible that Plaintiff's loan obligation actually

increased over the years even though he was making payments. As

Plaintiff conceded at the April 4 hearing, for the first two years

of the loan he had been making payments of roughly $1,950 per

month. Thus, each year, Plaintiff's payments totaled

approximately $23,400. Plaintiff's loan, however, was for

$302,600 and the interest rate was 9.186%. Denicola Decl. Ex. L. 

Each year for the first two years the interest alone on

Plaintiff's mortgage was $27,796.84 (9.186% of $302,600). As

Plaintiff's total payments for each of these first two years was

approximately $23,400, and the interest on the loan for each of

these first two years was approximately $27,796.84, it is not hard

to understand how Plaintiff's loan obligation is now greater than

the initial loan. This is especially true given that Plaintiff

has failed to make payments on his loan for the last 12 months. 

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6 This interest was calculated using the following rates: 

from May 2007 through October 2007, the rate was 11.225% and from

November 2007 through April 2008 the rate was 12.225%.

8

The bare fact that the amount due in the notice of trustee sale

was greater than the principal of Plaintiff's initial loan does

not prove that this amount is incorrect. 

This analysis was corroborated by Susan Ramirez, a witness

for Chase Bank. At the April 7 hearing, she testified that

Plaintiff has been in default for 12 months. The interest

Plaintiff owes on these 12 months is $34,696.17.6 The remaining

principal is $296,605. Plaintiff's total loan obligation is now

$331,302.

At the April 7 hearing, Plaintiff presented a witness,

Patrick Pulatie, who testified as to what Plaintiff's loan

obligation would be today if Plaintiff's loan were a 30-year fixed

mortgage with an interest rate of 7.5%. Even if Plaintiff had

this loan, however, he would still owe, according to his own

witness, $24,948 in back-payments alone. Plaintiff's counsel

represented that Plaintiff does not have the capacity to pay any

of this amount already owed.

Even if there were some discrepancy between the number

Plaintiff was told he owed and the actual number he owed, he has

not alleged any prejudice. First and foremost, as Plaintiff's own

witness testified, if the Court were to somehow rewrite

Plaintiff's loan so that it was a 30-year, fixed mortgage at 7.5%,

Plaintiff would still have a total loan obligation of $314,000. 

Thus, even according to Plaintiff's best case scenario, he still

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owes more than what even Defendants initially estimated. 

Given that, by Plaintiff's own calculations, he owes more

than what Defendants initially stated, Plaintiff's failure to

allege any prejudice is all the more glaring. Simply put,

"[t]here is no evidence that [Plaintiff] was misled in any way by

the Default Notice." Knapp v. Doherty, 123 Ca. App. 4th 76, 99

(Ct. App. 2004). "One of the signal purposes of the notice of

default is to advise the trustor of the amount required to cure

the default." Id. In the present case, any errors on the default

notice "did not cause [Plaintiff] to act or fail to act in any way

that [will] result[] in [his] loss of [his] property." Id. He

has not alleged, for example, that he attempted to pay the amount

due and was unable to because he did not know the actual amount he

owed. Without even an allegation of prejudice, the Court will not

intervene based on what may be, at most, a technicality. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the trustee sale did not contain

a toll free telephone number or the telephone number of a trustee

in California, as required by § 2924f. This argument is also

without merit. Plaintiff concedes that there was in fact a

telephone number listed. See Compl. ¶ 53. Plaintiff argues,

however, that because the number only connected to a recording, it

did not satisfy § 2924f. Given that the statute does not specify

whether a live person must be at the other end of the line, the

Court will not create such a requirement. More importantly,

Plaintiff has again failed to allege any prejudice. Plaintiff has

not asserted, for example, that he tried to contact the trustee

but was unable to because of a defective telephone number. To the

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contrary, from all appearances, Plaintiff knew who to contact had

he been willing or able to pay his loan obligations. This

inference is only strengthened by the fact that Plaintiff was able

to serve all of the Defendants when Plaintiff initiated the

present law suit in state court.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that his mortgage loan is governed

by the Homeowner's Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), 15 U.S.C. §

1602 et seq. In defining which mortgages are governed by HOEPA, §

1602 states: 

A mortgage referred to in this subsection

means a consumer credit transaction that

is secured by the consumer's principal

dwelling . . . if--

(A) the annual percentage rate at

consummation of the transaction will

exceed by more than 10 percentage

points the yield on Treasury

securities having comparable periods

of maturity . . .; or 

(B) the total points and fees

payable by the consumer at or before

closing will exceed the greater of--

(i) 8 percent of the total loan

amount; or 

(ii) $400.

15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1). 

The parties apparently agree that the only way in which HOEPA

could govern Plaintiff's loan is if the operative annual

percentage rate is greater than 13%. Denicola Decl. ¶ 19; Pl.'s

Reply at 4. Neither party discusses or analyzes the points and

fees of the loan, and the Court therefore concludes that only

subsection (A) of § 1602(aa) is applicable to the present

controversy. 

Plaintiff argues that because the maximum rate of his loan

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7

 It is not clear, and Plaintiff provides no indication, of

what benefit Plaintiff might gain were his loan governed by HOEPA. 

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was 15.225%, this rate is the controlling rate with respect to

HOEPA. See Denicola Decl. Ex. G Promissory Note at 1. Defendants

contend that the operative rate is the rate of the loan at the

time the mortgage agreement was made, which in this case was

9.186%. See id. Ex. L Statement of Loan - Closed End.

The statutory language of § 1602 supports Defendants'

position. Specifically, § 1602 states that it is the rate "at

consummation of transaction" that controls. 15 U.S.C. §

1602(aa)(1). With respect to Plaintiff's loan, the rate at the

time of consummation of the agreement was 9.186%. That the

promissory note and other relevant documents contained a clause

stating that the interest rate would never be greater than 15.225%

does not change this. The only authority cited by Plaintiff in

support of his position that the interest rate cap, rather than

the actual rate at the time the agreement was consummated, should

control is an opinion out of the Southern District of West

Virginia. See Short v. Wells Fargo Bank, 401 F. Supp. 2d 549

(S.D.W. Va. 2005). This case, however, is inapplicable to the

present controversy, as it concerned subsection (B) of § 1602(aa)

and did not address subsection (A). See id. at 562 (stating "[i]n

order to trigger HOEPA in this case, the total points and fees

must exceed 8% of" the loan amount); see also id. at 556

(discussing only 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(B)). For these reasons,

the Court finds that Plaintiff's loan is not governed by HOEPA.7 

Plaintiff's allegation that he was rushed into signing the

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loan documents and that he was prejudiced because the documents

contained "mumbo jumbo and legalese" is simply insufficient to

overcome the stark fact that he signed the various agreements,

thereby binding himself to their terms. This is especially true

given Plaintiff's prior experiences with mortgages. Furthermore,

the Court finds that Defendants complied with the relevant

foreclosure statutes. For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for

Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. 

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Although Defendant Chase Bank's Motion is styled as a Motion

to Dismiss, it is, in reality, a Motion for Summary Adjudication. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (stating "[i]f, on a motion under Rule

12(b)(6) . . ., matters outside the pleadings are presented to and

not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as none for

summary judgment under Rule 56"). In the present action, both

parties rely on numerous documents and declarations outside of the

pleadings.

Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgment should be granted where the

evidence is such that it would require a directed verdict for the

moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986). Thus, "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment

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. . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In

addition, entry of summary judgment in a party's favor is

appropriate when there are no material issues of fact as to the

essential elements of the party's claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

247-49.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff's first cause of action is for declaratory relief

pursuant to California Civil Code § 2924f. For the reasons stated

above, this claim fails against Chase Bank. 

Plaintiff's second cause of action is for unfair business

practices pursuant to California Business and Professions Code §

17200 et seq., and § 17500 et seq. "California's unfair

competition statute prohibits any unfair competition, which means

'any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.'" 

In Re Pomona Valley Med. Group, 476 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.). "This

tripartite test is disjunctive and the plaintiff need only allege

one of the three theories to properly plead a claim under section

17200." Med. Instrument Dev. Labs. v. Alcon Labs., CV 05-1138,

2005 WL 1926673, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005). It is unclear

which prong or prongs of § 17200 Plaintiff alleges against Chase. 

The Court therefore addresses all three. 

Under the fraudulent theory of § 17200, courts have held that

it is necessary to "show deception to some members of the public

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interest," Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.

Supp. 2d 1099, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001), or allege that "members of

the public are likely to be deceived . . . ." Med. Instrument

Labs., 2005 WL 1926673, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff has failed to raise any material issues of fact in

support of his claim of fraudulent behavior under § 17200. 

Under the unfair theory of § 17200, 'unfair' "means conduct

that threatens an incipient violation of an anti-trust law, or

violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its

effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law,

or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition." CelTech Communications Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.

4th 163, 187 (Ct. App. 1999). Plaintiff has failed to raise any

material issues of fact regarding unfair conduct by Chase under §

17200. 

Under the unlawful theory, a plaintiff must allege "practices

forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or

municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court made." Saunders v.

Sup. Ct., 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, (Ct. App. 1994). In the present

case, Plaintiff alleges that Chase violated California Civil Code

§§ 2924c and 2924f. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has

failed to raise material issues of fact regarding these predicate

claims. Plaintiff's § 17200 claim under the unlawful theory

therefore also fails.

Plaintiff's third cause of action is for fraud. "The

elements of fraud are (a) misrepresentation (false representation,

concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or

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scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)

justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damages." Charnay v.

Cobert, 145 Cal. App. 4th 170, 184 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9(b) requires all fraud allegations be plead with

particularity. 

Plaintiff alleges that Chase Bank committed fraud by "falsely

stating in their notice of sale that the reasonable estimate of

costs, expenses, and advances is $307,967.68 on a loan principal

of $302,600," Compl. ¶ 71, and thereby attempting to "mislead and

defraud [P]laintiff by requiring him to pay sums of money which he

. . . does not owe." Compl. ¶ 72.

Plaintiff's fraud claim against Chase not only fails to

allege the elements of scienter, intent to defraud, and

justifiable reliance, but also lacks the requisite particularity. 

Thus, the fraud claim fails against Chase Bank.

Plaintiff's fourth cause of action is for unconscionability. 

Plaintiff alleges that the mortgage agreement he entered into with

Defendant BNC is unconscionable. Plaintiff concedes, however,

that he has not entered into a contract with Chase Bank. Chase

Bank was not a party to the initial mortgage agreement. The Deed

of Trust ("DOT") encumbering Plaintiff's property, as recorded

pursuant to the terms of the mortgage agreement now at issue,

identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS")

as the nominal beneficiary and Defendant BNC as the lender. 

Compl. Ex. 6. The DOT was subsequently assigned to LaSalle Bank

National Association as trustee for the structured asset

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investment loan trust (SAIL) 2004-BNC2. RJN Ex. 1 Assignment of

Deed of Trust. A Substitution of Trustee for the DOT was later

recorded naming Defendant NDEX West as the trustee. RJN Ex. 2. 

As there is no agreement between Chase Bank and Plaintiff,

Plaintiff's claim of unconscionability against Chase Bank fails as

a matter of law.

15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) supports this conclusion. Section

1641(f) states: "A servicer of a consumer obligation arising from

a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as an assignee

of such obligation for purposes of this section unless the

servicer is or was the owner of the obligation." Nothing in the

record indicates that Chase Bank is anything but the loan

servicer. Dismissal of Plaintiff's unconscionability claim

against Chase Bank is therefore proper.

Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for contractual breach of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Chase Bank

fails for the same reason: there is no agreement between Plaintiff

and Chase Bank.

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is for accounting. 

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a detailed description of all of his

financial obligations in relation to the loan at issue. At the

hearing, it was determined that Plaintiff's current loan

obligation is $331,302.8

 Thus, Plaintiff's cause of action for

accounting against Chase Bank is moot.

Finally, as noted above, Plaintiff has not made any payments

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on his mortgage since May 2007. Plaintiff has been living rentfree for 12 months. At the hearing held on Friday, April 4,

Plaintiff conceded that he has not set aside any money for the

payments that he owes in the event a judgment were rendered in his

favor. Plaintiff also conceded that he is unable to make any

back-payments for the period during which no payments were made. 

In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to waive his mortgage

obligations for the last 12 months. Such a request is beyond what

the Court is able or willing to do.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's

Motion for Preliminary Injunction and GRANTS Defendant Chase

Bank's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiff's action against

Defendant Chase Bank. Defendant Chase Bank's Motion to Strike the

Complaint, Docket No. 13, is MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2008

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-00350-SC Document 37 Filed 04/07/08 Page 17 of 17