Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03658/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03658-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have

expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated

by the undersigned.

2 Plaintiff did not file his opposition by December 6, 2005 as per this court’s

November 15, 2005 order. The court has accepted and considered the papers submitted, but

it does not condone the failure to make timely filings and warns against future noncompliance.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PAUL CASAREZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN BENITO and SHERIFF

CURTIS HILL,

Defendants.

 /

No. C04-03658 HRL

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT

COUNTY OF SAN BENITO’S MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; AND (2) GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT HILL’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re: Docket No. 36]

On January 3, 2006, this court heard the motion for summary judgment filed by

defendant Sheriff Curtis Hill (“Hill”) and for partial summary judgment filed by defendant

County of San Benito (“County”).1

 Plaintiff Paul Casarez opposed the motion.2 Having

considered the papers filed by the parties, as well as the arguments of counsel, the court issues

the following order.

*E-FILED ON 1/12/06*

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I. BACKGROUND

In this civil rights action, plaintiff claims that during three periods of incarceration at the

San Benito County Jail (“Jail”), he was denied proper medical care and accommodations for a

below-knee amputation of his right leg. He also claims that the floors of the disabled persons’

shower at the Jail were slippery when wet and presented a dangerous condition for amputee

inmates like himself. Except as otherwise indicated, the following facts are not materially

disputed:

In 1987, plaintiff was involved in a motorcycle accident resulting in the below-knee

amputation of his right leg. He wears a prosthesis, and the amputation site requires care and

hygiene.

The County owns and operates the Jail. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Jail on three

separate occasions in 2002 and 2003 for the purpose of serving a sentence imposed after a

criminal conviction. He was incarcerated for an accumulated total of approximately 29 days as

follows: (1) from October 4, 2002 to October 15, 2002; (2) from June 20, 2003 to June 28,

2003; and (3) from September 9, 2003 to September 16, 2003.

Plaintiff did not take showers with the general inmate population. Instead, he was given

access to a disabled persons’ shower. Because the disabled persons’ shower facility is located

in front of the booking room, a jail staffer was required to escort plaintiff to and from his

showers.

Plaintiff claims that in order for him to maintain good hygiene at the amputation site, it

is medically necessary for him to shower twice daily – once in the early morning upon rising

and again later in the day as needed. There is no dispute that plaintiff was sometimes allowed

to take morning showers, although plaintiff complains that those showers, when allowed, were

generally in the late morning. Further, plaintiff contends that he usually was not permitted to

take a second shower during the balance of the day, and sometimes went without any shower at

all. He claims that as a result, he developed rashes and sores at the amputation site.

Plaintiff also claims that defendants failed to adapt the Jail’s shower facilities to permit

him to shower safely. He alleges that the Jail’s shower floors presented a dangerously slippery

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condition for him, resulting in his June 28, 2003 slip-and-fall accident in which he says he

suffered back and knee injuries requiring protracted medical treatment. According to plaintiff,

the accident occurred when he attempted to adjust the water nozzle while showering in the

disabled persons’ shower.

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on August 27, 2004. His original complaint alleged

claims under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12181, et seq., and (3) the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. On August 2, 2005, defendants

moved for summary judgment as to the first and third claims for relief. However, defendants

later withdrew that motion when the parties stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff’s first and

third claims and to the filing of an amended complaint.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff asserts an ADA claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et

seq. against both defendants, seeking damages for alleged disability discrimination. He also

asserts a state law claim against defendant Sheriff Hill for dangerous condition of public

property under Cal. Gov. Code § 830, et seq.

The County now moves for partial summary judgment as to the ADA claim on the

ground that plaintiff is not entitled to any monetary damages because he cannot show that the

County acted with deliberate indifference. Defendant Hill moves for summary judgment as to

the ADA claim on the ground that he cannot be sued in his individual capacity under the ADA. 

Additionally, Hill also moves for summary judgment as to the state law claim on the grounds

that (1) there is no evidence indicating that he had notice of any alleged defect or dangerous

condition in the Jail’s shower facilities; and (2) he is immune from suit under Cal. Gov. Code §

820.2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which

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demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). In order to meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc.,

210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d at 1102. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead must produce admissible

evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id. Further, it must

“identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” 

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co.,

55 F.23d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task to “scour the

record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.”). A genuine issue of fact is one that could

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

1. Sheriff Hill

Plaintiff concedes that defendant Hill cannot be sued in his individual capacity under the

ADA and has withdrawn the ADA claim as to him. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145,

1155-56 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding “that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the

ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999,

1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Title II provides disabled individuals redress for discrimination by a

‘public entity.’ . . . That term, as it is defined within the statute, does not include individuals.”) 

Accordingly, Hill’s motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.

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3 The ADA defines the term “qualified individual with a disability” as:

an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable

modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of

architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the

provision of auxilliary aids and services, meets the essential

eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the

participation in programs or activities provided by a public

entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

4 The ADA definition of “public entity” includes “any State or local

government” and “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality

of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A), (B).

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2. County of San Benito

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. For purposes of the instant motion, the County apparently does not

dispute that plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability”3 or that the Jail is a “public

entity”4

 within the meaning of the ADA. Further, at the hearing, defense counsel stated that

there may be an issue as to whether the accommodations provided to plaintiff were reasonable. 

Nonetheless, it contends that plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, obtain monetary damages

under the ADA because there is no evidence suggesting that the County acted with “deliberate

indifference” to his claimed need for accommodation.

“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilition Act, a

plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County

of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). To establish intentional discrimination under

the ADA, the plaintiff must show that defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” Id. 

“Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139.

The first element of the deliberate indifference test is satisfied “[w]hen the plaintiff has

alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation

is obvious, or required by statute or regulation) . . ..” Id. at 1139. The plaintiff bears the burden

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of establishing an ADA violation, and he is obliged to identify specific, reasonable and

necessary accommodations that the defendant failed to provide. Id. (citing Memmer v. Marin

County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999)). “[I]n order to meet the second element of

the deliberate indifference test, a failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than

negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. at 1139.

In the instant case, plaintiff acknowledges that the County did a number of things to

accommodate his disability. Indeed, in his opposition, he does not dispute, address or raise any

issues as to the County’s evidence indicating that:

• During his first two incarcerations, he had an extra mattress which he used to

elevate his leg (albeit the mattress apparently was provided by another inmate

rather than by Jail staff). (Serverian Decl., Ex. A (Casarez Depo., 78:22-25,

79:25-80:14));

• Plaintiff was permitted to bring creams and bandages with him into his cell and

was permitted to see a doctor on at least two occasions to examine his leg. 

(Serverian Decl., Ex. A (Casarez Depo., 74:17-75:7); Ex. B (Casarez Depo.

148:17-149:4), Ex. C (Turturici Depo. 15:4-20));

• Plaintiff was allowed to see a prosthetic specialist and to be seen by doctors

(Severian Decl., Ex. A (Casarez Depo., 59:3-14), Ex. B (Casarez Depo., 144:19-

145:7, 16-19); Ex. C (Turturici Depo., 31:25-32:19)); and

• After plaintiff’s June 28, 2003 slip-and-fall, he was transported to the hospital

for examination, and Jail officials worked to secure his early release from so that

he could tend to his back injuries (Severian Decl., Ex. A (Casarez Depo., 58:17-

59:2), Ex. B (Casarez Depo., 164:6-22), Ex. D (Escamilla Depo., 66:25-68:10)).

The only apparent dispute centers around (1) the County’s alleged failure to provide

plaintiff with sufficiently early and frequent daily showers and (2) the adequacy of the Jail’s

shower facilities. Plaintiff asserts that he “ha[s] a medical need to shower promptly after [he]

awake[s] in the morning, and again during the day, in order to maintain proper hygiene with

[his] amputated stump . . ..” (Casarez Decl., ¶ 3; see also Adams Decl., Ex. 1, (Casarez Depo.,

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5 The record presented indicates that except for inmates in administrative

segregation, all inmates are generally permitted one shower per day, and those showers are

not usually documented. (Serverian Decl., Ex.C (Turturici Depo. 52:9-11, 18-21)). 

Consequently, other than his June 28, 2003 slip-and-fall, there apparently is no

documentation of when plaintiff took his showers at the Jail. (Serverian Decl., Ex. D

(Escamilla Depo. 37:6-15)).

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67:18-68:21)). As noted above, it is undisputed that plaintiff was permitted morning showers

on some occasions. For example, during his second incarceration from June 20 to June 28,

2003, plaintiff was permitted to shower before noon on three or four occasions. (Serverian

Decl., Ex. A (Casarez Depo. 91:3-12); Adams Decl., Ex. 2 (Escamilla Depo. 36:13-37:3)). 

While it is not clear exactly when plaintiff took his showers,5 there is also no apparent dispute

that plaintiff was not always permitted to take morning showers or showers twice daily.

Plaintiff also agrees that he requested, and was given, extra towels, blankets and chairs

to help him maneuver in the shower. For example, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that

during his first incarceration, plaintiff requested extra blankets to minimize the slipperiness of

the shower floor, and Jail personnel granted his request that same day. (See Casarez Decl., ¶ 4;

see also Adams Decl., Ex. 1 (Casarez Depo., 92:4-93:19, 147:16-148:4); Adams Decl., Ex. 5). 

Plaintiff agreed that after he was given the requested blankets and towels, he was able to take a

shower without falling or injuring himself. (Adams Decl., Ex. 1 (Casarez Depo., 94:12-16)). 

He further acknowledges that when he was permitted to shower during his third incarceration,

Jail staff did provide him with the extra chairs and blankets or towels that he requested. 

(Casarez Decl., ¶ 6). However, there apparently is also no dispute that Jail personnel did not

provide extra towels, blankets and chairs for plaintiff for all of his showers.

The County argues that there is no issue as to deliberate indifference because plaintiff

acknowledges that the County did not act in bad faith or with malice. However, the County has

not convincingly demonstrated that bad faith or malice is required in order to find that it acted

with deliberate indifference. Indeed, in Duvall, the Ninth Circuit determined that “deliberate

indifference,” and not “discriminatory animus,” is the appropriate test for determining whether

there has been intentional discrimination. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138.

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Plaintiff agrees that if Duvall did not require the County to conduct a fact-specific

inquiry as to a reasonable accommodation, then the County’s conduct might be characterized as

merely negligent. However, and notwithstanding the County’s occasional acquiescence to his

specific requests for accommodation, plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence to raise a

triable issue as to deliberate indifference because the County did not conduct any investigation

through which it might have determined that other accommodations – namely, non-skid tape,

rubber matting and the use of the Jail’s hand-held showerhead – would have been reasonable. 

Here, he contends that his requested extra towels, blankets and chairs were not reasonable

accommodations and were, at best, awkward solutions.

The Ninth Circuit describes a public entity’s duty on receipt of a request for

accommodation as follows:

[A public entity] is required to undertake a fact-specific

investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable

accommodation, and we have provided the criteria by which to

evaluate whether that investigation is adequate. ‘[M]ere[]

speculat[ion] that a suggested accommodation is not feasible falls

short of the reasonable accommodation requirement; the Acts

create a duty to gather sufficient information from the [disabled

individual] and qualified experts as needed to determine what

accommodations are necessary.’ . . . Furthermore, the Attorney

General’s regulations require the public entity to ‘give primary

consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities

when determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is

necessary. . . . Accordingly, a public entity does not ‘act’ by

proffering just any accommodation: it must consider the

particular individual’s need when conducting its investigation

into what accommodations are reasonable. Because in some

instances events may be attributable to bureaucratic slippage

that constitutes negligence rather than deliberate action or

inaction, we have stated that deliberate indifference does not

occur where a duty to act may simply have been overlooked, or

a complaint may reasonably have been deemed to result from

events taking their normal course.

Id. at 1139. This court is not prepared to conclude, as a matter of law, that acquiescing to a

disabled person’s requests vitiates the need to conduct an investigation as to a reasonable

accommodation. However, the only question before this court on the instant motion is whether

there is sufficient evidence to create a triable issue that the County acted with deliberate

indifference in providing the accommodations (reasonable or not) that it did. Although plaintiff

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6 The record indicates that at the time of the pertinent events, Turturici was a

lieutenant, but has, in the last several months, been appointed Under Sheriff. (Adams

Decl., Ex. 4 (Hill Depo., 15:5-8)).

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has presented evidence indicating that Jail personnel, including Under Sheriff6 Turturici and

Sergeant Escamilla, were aware of his stated need for a morning shower and showers twice

daily, he has cited no evidence indicating that defendants were aware of his claimed need for an

early morning shower. Indeed, the testimony he cites indicates that there was no discussion as

to a specific time in the morning for plaintiff’s first shower. (See Adams Decl., Ex. 2

(Escamilla Depo., 34:6-36:6); Ex. 3 (Turturici Depo., 33:25-34:18)). Moreover, the instant case

does not present a situation where the County provided “just any accommodation”; rather, the

record indicates that it provided plaintiff with the very accommodations he requested.

Further, plaintiff argues that the County’s failure to provide him with extra blankets,

towels and chairs for all of his showers is sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of

deliberate indifference. However, he has not cited any evidence indicating whether the

County’s admitted failure to do so was due to some deliberate action or inaction or whether it

was attributable to mere negligence.

At the same time, however, there is sufficient evidence to create a triable fact issue as to

whether the County acted with deliberate indifference in not providing plaintiff the use of the

Jail’s hand-held showerhead and in failing to provide him with morning showers and showers

twice daily. Here, the County presents evidence indicating that morning showers were not

always possible because (1) inmates were typically processed in the booking area for court

appearances at that time; and (2) plaintiff would sometimes not want to take a shower when he

was called. (Serverian Decl., Ex. C (Turturici Depo. 34:22-38:17). Further, the County has

presented evidence indicating that the showerhead was never offered to plaintiff because the

Jail has a policy of offering that showerhead only to wheelchair-bound inmates out of a concern

that the showerhead’s flexible hose poses a suicide risk. (Serverian Decl., Ex. E (Hill Depo.,

59:11-60:1)). Additionally, the County asserts that it was reasonable for Jail staff to assume

that plaintiff was better off without the hand-held showerhead so that he could have both hands

free to balance himself in the shower.

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As noted above, plaintiff has presented evidence indicating that Jail staff were aware of

his claimed need for two showers per day – one in the morning and one later in the day. (See

Adams Decl., Ex. 2 (Escamilla Depo., 34:6-36:6); Ex. 3 (Turturici Depo., 33:25-34:18)). While

it is not clear on which occasions plaintiff was unable to take a shower because he allegedly

refused to take one when called, plaintiff’s testimony suggests that there may have been times

when Jail personnel called at odd times when he was sleeping. (See Adams Decl., Ex. 1

(Casarez Depo., 176:1-6)). Further, plaintiff has presented evidence indicating that Jail

personnel were aware as early as his first incarceration of his concern about the slipperiness of

the shower’s wet tile floor. (See Casarez Decl., ¶ 4; see also Adams Decl., Ex. 1 (Casarez

Depo., 92:4-93:19, 147:16-148:4); Adams Decl., Ex. 5). Moreover, there appears to be no

dispute that Jail personnel were aware that the hand-held showerhead was available at the Jail. 

Further, there is no indication in the record presented that the County’s assumption that plaintiff

was better off without a hand-held showerhead was based upon anything other than speculation. 

See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.

The County argues that its policies and practices, especially with respect to security

matters, must nonetheless be given deference, citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and

Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). However, unlike Bell and Turner, the constitutionality of

the Jail’s security policies themselves are not in question here. In any event, the County has

cited no authority indicating that deference to its policies and decisions is absolute, and defense

counsel acknowledged at the hearing that the Jail is not above the ADA.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is at least a question as

to whether the County acted with deliberate indifference in failing to always provide morning

showers and showers twice daily or to offer plaintiff the use of the hand-held showerhead.

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B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Cal. Gov. Code §

830, et seq.)

Plaintiff contends that Hill is liable under Cal. Gov. Code § 830, et seq. for the injuries

sustained in his June 28, 2003 slip-and-fall accident. He claims that the Jail’s disabled persons’

shower facilities are dangerous because they contain tile floors which are slippery when wet

and, further, they lack a hand-held showerhead. Hill, who has been Sheriff since January 1999,

argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because (1) there is no evidence demonstrating

that he had any notice of an alleged dangerous condition of the Jail’s shower facilities; and (2)

he is, in any event, entitled to immunity from suit under Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2 for the decision

not to have a hand-held showerhead installed.

Under California law, a “dangerous condition” is defined as “a condition of property

that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury

when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is

reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” Cal. Gov. Code § 830(a). On the instant motion,

Hill does not challenge whether wet tile floors and lack of a hand-held showerhead constitute a

“dangerous condition.” The crux of his motion appears to be that even assuming a “dangerous

condition” existed, he had no notice of it.

Indeed, there apparently is no dispute that Hill had no actual notice of the alleged

dangerous condition presented by the Jail’s disabled persons’ shower. “A public employee had

actual notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 840.2 if

he had actual personal knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have

known of its dangerous character.” Cal. Gov. Code § 840.4(a). Here, Hill points to the annual

grand jury reports from 2001-2004 which show that the Jail’s shower facilities were

consistently maintained in good condition. (See Escamilla Decl., Exs. F-I; see also Serverian

Decl., Ex. E (Hill Depo., 39:5-18)). Hill also testified that (1) he has not heard of any complaint

that any shower floor is dangerously slippery for inmate amputees; (2) he is not aware of

anyone who complained about any amenity (or lack thereof) in the disabled persons’ shower;

(3) he is not aware of anyone, before June 2003, who sustained injuries using the disabled

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persons’ shower; (4) before 2003, no one told him that the floor of the disabled persons’ shower

was too slippery or hazardous in any way, (5) before 2003, no one told him that there was any

problem with the bench in the disabled persons’ shower; and (6) before the instant lawsuit was

filed, no one told him that there was any problem with the shower nozzle in the disabled

persons’ shower. (See Serverian Decl., Ex. E (Hill Depo., 73:17-22, 81:4-7, 81:11-82:5)).

Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Hill had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the Jail’s shower facilities. In

order to establish constructive notice, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that the public employee had the authority and it was his

responsibility as a public employee to inspect the property of the public

entity or to see that inspections were made to determine whether

dangerous conditions existed in the public property;

(2) that the funds and other means for making such inspections or for

seeing that such inspections were made were immediately available to

the public employee, and

(3) that the dangerous condition had existed for such a period of time

and was of such an obvious nature that the public employee, in the

exercise of his authority and responsibility with due care, should have

discovered the condition and its dangerous character.

Cal. Gov. Code § 840.4(b). Plaintiff presents evidence indicating that Hill agreed that the

annual grand jury reports do not address ADA compliance. (Adams Decl., Ex. 4 (Hill Depo.

50:11-51:3, 82:16-83:1, 86:22-87:16)). Whether the annual grand jury reports addressed

compliance with the ADA would appear to be irrelevant for purposes of plaintiff’s claim under

Cal. Gov. Code § 830.

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds

that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether Hill had

constructive notice of the alleged dangerously slippery shower floors. Here, plaintiff has

presented evidence indicating that during his first incarceration in October 2002, Jail personnel

were aware of his complaints that the floors of the disabled persons’ shower were slippery and

that he had slipped and fallen to his knees before June 28, 2003. (See Casarez Decl., ¶ 4; see

also Adams Decl., Ex. 1 (Casarez Depo., 92:4-93:19, 147:16-148:4)) and Ex. 5). He also points

to Hill’s deposition testimony which demonstrates that Hill has overall responsibility for the

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care and custody of the inmates at the Jail, albeit he delegates to his subordinates

responsibilities for inspecting and maintaining the Jail facilities. (See Adams Decl., Ex. 4 (Hill

Depo., 14:4-17:15, 45:1-12, 51:13-52:25, 75:2-76:9)). Hill also testified that he has

accompanied his command staff on Jail inspections in the past, but that he has not done so for

the past two or three years and has only done so four or five times since becoming Sheriff and

relies upon his staff to take care of such matters. (Id. (Hill Depo., 75:2-22)).

Defendant Hill nevertheless contends that, under Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2, he is immune

from suit for the decision not to maintain hand-held showerheads in the disabled persons’

shower. Under Section 820.2, “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his

act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov. Code. § 820.2. Hill testified that

when the Jail was built, a policy decision was made not to have a hand-held shower nozzle

permanently installed in the shower facilities to prevent or reduce the risk that inmates would

use the shower hose in suicide attempts. (Serverian Decl., Ex. E (Hill Depo., 59:11-60:1)). 

Hill’s cited testimony further indicates that the decision to maintain that policy was a

discretionary act, in which he weighed what he believed to be the rare need for wheelchairbound inmates for a hand-held showerhead against what he says is the ever-present potential for

suicide attempts by inmates. (Id.) As this was a discretionary act, the court agrees that Hill is

immune from suit to the extent plaintiff contends that his injuries are attributable to the decision

not to have hand-held showerheads installed. See Taylor v. Buff, 172 Cal. App.3d 384, 218

Cal.Rptr. 249 (1985) (concluding that sheriff was immune from suit under section 820.2 for the

policy decision not to use limited funds to replace cell locks resulting in injuries to an inmate).

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Because plaintiff has withdrawn his ADA claim against defendant Hill,

defendant Hill’s summary judgment motion as to that claim is DENIED as MOOT.

2. The County’s motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for

monetary damages under the ADA is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The

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motion is GRANTED as to the County’s failure to provide non-skid tape or rubber matting and

the failure to consistently provide extra towels, blankets and chairs. However, the motion is

DENIED as to the County’s failure to offer the use of the Jail’s hand-held showerhead or to

consistently permit morning showers and showers twice daily.

3. Defendant Hill’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for

dangerous condition of public property under Cal. Gov. Code § 830, et seq. is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED insofar as plaintiff attributes his

injuries to the decision not to install a hand-held showerhead in the disabled persons’ shower. 

The motion is also GRANTED as to Hill’s actual notice of the alleged “dangerous condition” of

the Jail’s shower facilities. However, the motion is DENIED as to whether Hill had

constructive notice of the alleged “dangerous condition” of the Jail’s shower facilities.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

January 12, 2006 /s/ Howard R. Lloyd

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5:04-cv-3658 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Michael Edward Adams equitist@earthlink.net 

Michael C. Serverian mserverian@rllss.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

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