Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01737/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01737-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RYAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

United States Court of .Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 14 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

No. 88-1737 

(D.C. No. 87-1147) 

(D. Kansas) 

CAREFREE VACATIONS, INC., 

and LEO E. SHARP, SR., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Leo Sharp appeals from the district court's entry 

of default judgment against him. On appeal, Sharp asserts four 

points of error: (1) the district court erred in asserting 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1737 Document: 01019975683 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 1 
jurisdiction over him: (2) the district court erroneously allowed 

his attorney to withdraw, thereby preventing an adequate defense: 

(3) he should be able to sue appellee Ryan International Airlines 

("Ryan") for damages: and (4) Ryan failed to notify the district 

court that appellant had claims in their files of $40,000 that 

should have offset anything owing them. 

For substantially the same reasons articulated by the 

district court in its Opinion and Order of November 10, 1987, we 

reject Sharp's argument that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction. We agree with the district court that its exercise 

of personal jurisdiction violated neither Kansas' long-arm statute 

nor due process. 

We also reject Sharp's argument that he was not represented 

by counsel. Sharp was informed by both sets of counsel that were 

representing him that they intended to withdraw. Moreover, prior 

to the final pretrial conference, the court suggested to Sharp 

that he promptly retain new counsel. See Magistrate Memorandum 

and Order, p. 5 (Jan. 28, 1988). There is no indication in the 

record that Sharp's lack of counsel was anything but his own 

fault. 

Finally, we reject Sharp's arguments that he should have been 

able to sue Ryan for damages and offset other claims. In its 

Memorandum and Order of January 29, 1988, the magistrate struck 

Sharp's Answer and Counterclaim, wherein Sharp raised those 

issues. Sharp did not object to that order before the district 

court as required by Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Therefore, he has waived the right to object the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1737 Document: 01019975683 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 2 
magistrate's order on appeal. See Singletary v. B.R.X., Inc., 828 

F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The law is settled that 

appellate courts are without jurisdiction to hear appeals directly 

from federal magistrates."). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 88-1737 Document: 01019975683 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 3