Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00216/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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These documents include: (1) 2006 trapping data for the ABM; (2) a March 2004

draft Cumulative Impacts Assessment; (3) documents relating to the Population Viability

Analyses (“PVA”) for the ABM, and possibly additional documents identified in response

to FOIA requests and discovery requests in other actions; and (4) any documents

presently withheld from the administrative record on the grounds of privilege that are

subsequently released. (Doc. 46 at 1-2, 7-9).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIERRA CLUB, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0216-WS-M

 )

DICK KEMPTHORNE, etc., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to present

testimony and extra-record evidence in support of their motion for preliminary injunction. 

(Doc. 46). The plaintiffs identify the following as evidence they would like to present: 

(1) testimony and/or declarations from three experts in population biology and the

Alabama beach mouse (“ABM”); and (2) documents believed by the plaintiffs to be part

of the agency’s records but not included in the administrative record submitted to the

Court. (Id. at 1-2).1

 The defendants have filed responses, (Docs. 49, 52), and the

plaintiffs a reply, (Doc. 60), and the motion is ripe for resolution. 

The plaintiffs challenge the action of defendant United States Fish and Wildlife

Service (“FWS”) in issuing Habitat Conservation Plans (“HCP”) and Incidental Take

Permits (“ITP”) in favor of the private developer defendants. In particular, in Count One

of the amended complaint the plaintiffs challenge the Biological Opinion (“BO”) issued

by FWS as a predicate to the HCPs and ITPs, claiming it does not comport with the

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Count Two of the amended complaint alleges that FWS’s Final Environmental

Impact Statement (“FEIS”) violates the National Environmental Policy Act and the APA,

but the motion for preliminary injunction addresses only the BO under Count One. (Doc.

8).

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Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).2

The plaintiffs concede that their challenge to the BO is governed by the APA. 

(Doc. 8 at 17). See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 174-75 (1997); Funds for

Animals v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996). Under the APA, “[t]he reviewing

court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found

to be ... arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law ....” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The plaintiffs challenge the FWS’s action as

arbitrary and capricious, (Doc. 8 at 17), which they define as requiring the Court to

consider “whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal authority, whether it has

explained its decision, whether the facts on which it purports to rely have some basis in

the record, and whether the agency considered the relevant factors.” (Doc. 46 at 3

(internal quotes omitted)). Cf. Arango v. United States Department of the Treasury, 115

F.3d 922, 928 (11th Cir. 1997) (under the APA, a court “can set aside an agency’s

decision only if the agency relied on improper factors, failed to consider important

relevant factors, or committed a clear error of judgment that lacks a rational connection

between the facts found and the choice made”) (internal quotes omitted).

“In applying that standard [of judicial review set forth in the APA], the focal point

for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new

record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 

“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review ... to

the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.” 

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). 

The plaintiffs do not quarrel with these principles, but they argue that there are

circumstances under which a reviewing court can look beyond the administrative record,

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and they insist that several of those circumstances are present here. In particular, the

plaintiffs argue that they may present evidence not in the administrative record because:

(1) the BO fails to address certain relevant factors and treats others only in conclusory

fashion; (2) the matters involved are complex and technical; (3) the BO relies upon

studies whose authors question FWS’s use of their work; (4) the administrative record

does not include all documents that FWS had before it; and (5) there is no opportunity for

public input on a BO. (Doc. 46 at 2-3, 5-11). The Court examines these bases in turn.

With respect to the first ground, the plaintiffs argue that the BO’s allegedly

inadequate treatment of various factors allows them to present evidence from their experts

because it is questionable “whether the agency ‘considered all of the relevant factors and

... explained its decision.’” (Doc. 46 at 5). The plaintiffs’ quote is from a Ninth Circuit

case indicating that evidence beyond the administrative record may be introduced in this

circumstance. Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit antecedents of this rule, however, make plain that any evidence admitted under

this exception must be “‘obtain[ed] from the agency, either through affidavits or

testimony.’” Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988)

(emphasis added) (quoting Camp, 411 U.S. at 143). As Animal Defense Council makes

clear, this is a limitation imposed by the Supreme Court itself. The plaintiffs do not seek

to introduce evidence from FWS but from their own experts. This exception is thus

inapplicable.

With respect to the second ground, the governmental defendants expressly, and the

private defendants tacitly, acknowledge the existence of an exception for testimony

presented to explain technical terms or complex subject matter. (Doc. 49 at 11; Doc. 52

at 7). However, the Ninth Circuit (on whom the plaintiffs rely for their articulation of the

exception) emphasizes that the exception is “narrowly construed and applied.” Lands

Council, 395 F.3d at 1030. The plaintiffs’ effort to come within this limited exception

falls far short.

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The plaintiffs first repeat their complaint that the BO does not address certain

relevant factors, viz., inbreeding depression, significance of the PVA models,

determination of the population and habitat necessary for survival and recovery, and the

effect of predators. (Doc. 46 at 5). Were there some disagreement as to whether these are

“relevant factors” within the contemplation of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of

review, the “technical and complex” exception might allow the plaintiffs to present expert

testimony to establish the point. The defendants, however, concede that each item on the

plaintiffs’ list is a relevant factor. (Doc. 49 at 16-20; Doc. 52 at 8 n.8). Any failure of the

BO to address these factors must be evaluated under the first exception and, as discussed

above, that exception requires any additional evidence to come from the agency. 

The plaintiffs next argue that the “technical and complex” exception applies

whenever there is a challenge to whether the agency utilized a “qualified expert” or

reached a decision “reasonable by the standards of the discipline.” (Doc. 46 at 5-6). 

There are at least two fatal flaws with this approach. First, “federal courts apply the

‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard, as opposed to the ‘reasonableness’ standard, when

reviewing final agency decisions under the Administrative Procedures Act.” City of

Oxford v. Federal Aviation Administration, 428 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Second, were extrinsic evidence permissible whenever the reasonableness of a decision

were challenged, the exception would swallow the rule — a result incompatible with this

“narrow” exception.

Finally, the plaintiffs assert without amplification that issues such as population

dynamics, population genetics, and habitat needs “require focused outside testimony.” 

(Doc. 46 at 6-7). This assertion is too vague to allow analysis and, in any event, is so

open-ended that it, like the plaintiffs’ previous argument, would impermissibly engulf the

rule if accepted. 

With respect to the third ground, the governmental defendants question whether

the plaintiffs’ experts truly take issue with FWS’s use of their studies, (Doc. 49 at 12-13),

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but there is a more basic problem with their attempt to go beyond the administrative

record in this manner. In the sole case on which they rely, before issuing the challenged

decision the agency had already received from the expert the critical declaration that was

allowed in evidence on judicial review. Carlton v. Babbitt, 26 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111

(D.D.C. 1998). While this document was not in the administrative record (because it had

been submitted in another matter), it was within the agency’s possession when it rendered

its decision. The plaintiffs here do not seek to present a written critique that was

possessed by FWS when it issued its BO, and the exception is thus inapplicable.

With respect to the fourth ground, the defendants do not disagree that the plaintiffs

are entitled to a complete administrative record, and FWS has agreed to supplement that

record to include additional trapping data, the draft Cumulative Impacts Assessment, and

the documents identified by FWS in other responses but omitted from the administrative

record it originally submitted. (Doc. 49 at 1, 9-11). FWS is ordered to amend the

administrative record accordingly on or before May 11, 2007. Because these documents

will become part of the administrative record, it is unnecessary to consider whether the

plaintiffs could present them in evidence otherwise. 

The only contested documents that FWS has not agreed to add to the

administrative record (other than those as to which it has asserted a claim of privilege,

which will be tested by separate motion) reflect certain trapping data, which FWS says

“were not relied on ... due to the time required to finalize the analysis and the final

document.” (Doc. 49 at 10 n.5). It is not clear from FWS’s statement whether the

documents arrived before or after the BO was issued. The point is significant, because

the Court’s review “is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the

[agency] at the time [it] made [its] decision.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). FWS has not attempted to support the proposition that, of the

universe of documents in its files on this matter when it issued the BO, only that subset on

which it actually relied constitutes the administrative record. Accordingly, FWS is

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The Eleventh Circuit has cited several of these exceptions while quoting from a

Ninth Circuit opinion, but it did so without expressing approval of them. See Preserve

Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History v. United States Corps of Engineers, 87 F.3d 1242,

1247 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). The only exception clearly adopted by the Eleventh Circuit

applies “where there is initially a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior by the

agency.” Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1262

(11th Cir.2007) (internal quotes omitted). The plaintiffs have not invoked this exception.

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ordered to file and serve, on or before May 14, 2007, a statement as to whether the

withheld trapping data were received before the BO was issued. If the trapping data were

received before the BO was issued, FWS is ordered to amend the administrative record

to include the data on or before May 14, 2007. 

With respect to the fifth ground, the defendants agree that biological opinions are

issued without public notice and comment. (Doc. 49 at 26; Doc. 52 at 9). As they point

out, however, the plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that this circumstance

entitles them to go beyond the administrative record. Nor do the plaintiffs offer any

support for their insistence that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence limiting the evidence

on judicial review to the administrative record is premised on the existence of such public

participation. (Doc. 46 at 10). The plaintiffs’ argument rings especially hollow in this

case, since the FEIS prepared by FWS was subject to public notice and comment, and the

plaintiffs took advantage of the opportunity to submit comments, including on matters

now made the subject of the experts’ proposed testimony. (Doc. 49 at 22; Doc. 52 at 10). 

 So far as the parties’ briefing reveals, the Eleventh Circuit has never adopted any

of the plaintiffs’ five proposed exceptions to the closed-record rule.3

 The Court assumes

without deciding that the Eleventh Circuit might adopt the first and second exceptions

(since they have been adopted in other courts) but concludes that the plaintiffs’ proposed

evidence does not fall within the confines of those exceptions. The Court concludes that

the Eleventh Circuit would not adopt the third and fifth proposed exceptions, since the

plaintiffs have been unable to support either one with authority or cogent analysis. 

Finally, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to a full administrative record

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but further concludes — with the possible exception of certain trapping data and any

documents as to which privilege has been improperly invoked — that the record should

be complete upon FWS’s promised supplementation. 

As noted, the plaintiffs seek to submit evidence on a motion for preliminary

injunction. The Court’s discussion above addresses the plaintiffs’ ability to present such

evidence for purposes of the first element of such relief: a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits. The plaintiffs argue that, even if they are unable to present

evidence as to that element, they may present evidence in order to establish the second

element: “a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted.” 

SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).

The defendants concede that a plaintiff challenging an agency decision under the

APA generally may introduce evidence to show irreparable harm, but they argue that the

Court should disallow the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence because it constitutes an

improper attempt to use non-record evidence to challenge the merits of the BO through

the guise of irreparable harm. (Doc. 49 at 6, 28-29; Doc. 52 at 10). 

Evidence admissible for one purpose is to be admitted for that purpose even if it is

inadmissible for another purpose. The proper cure in such a situation is not to exclude the

evidence but to limit its consideration to the proper purpose. Thus, the plaintiffs will be

allowed to present evidence for the limited purpose of establishing a substantial threat of

irreparable harm should injunctive relief be denied (presumably, through showing adverse

impacts on the ABM should the dune system be compromised by construction during the

pendency of this lawsuit). However, in their case-in-chief the plaintiffs may not use such

evidence to criticize the BO or underlying studies, reports, etc. in the administrative

record. In the event the defendants attempt to rely on any of these documents (directly, or

through the testimony of witnesses) as evidence that irreparable harm will not ensue

absent an injunction, they will open the door for the plaintiffs on rebuttal to present all

evidence at their disposal to show that the documents relied upon by the defendants are

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It appears that, to the extent the plaintiffs do not present their witnesses live at the

hearing, they intend to offer not the existing declarations but separate affidavits. (Doc. 46

at 1-2).

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flawed and thus not persuasive evidence concerning the absence of irreparable injury.

The governmental defendants request that the plaintiffs’ presentation of evidence

be limited to the three declarations they filed along with their motion for injunctive relief,

whether presented at the hearing as declarations or as live testimony. (Doc. 49 at 24-25). 

Such a restriction would effectively doom the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain injunctive relief,

since the declarations are shot through with criticisms of the BO and underlying

documents, which critiques may not be presented on the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. The

governmental defendants’ arguments for this extreme approach are plainly make-weight:

that the plaintiffs have not affirmatively identified additional testimony the declarants

could provide; that live testimony would hopelessly blur the distinction between

admissible evidence of irreparable harm and inadmissible evidence of a flawed BO; and

that counsel are too busy to depose the declarants. (Id.). The Court thus declines to

restrict the plaintiffs’ evidence to the existing declarations. 

For their part, the private defendants move to strike the declarations of the

plaintiffs’ experts. (Doc. 53). While the declarations as they presently exist are

presumably inadmissible on the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, they have yet to be offered into

evidence. Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied as premature.

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Finally, the private defendants move for an order requiring the plaintiffs to present

for deposition any witnesses whose testimony they intend to present live at the hearing. 

(Doc. 54). The parties are ordered to confer, on or before May 11, 2007, concerning the

scheduling of depositions of any witnesses, including those identified by the defendants. 

(Doc. 49 at 25; Doc. 52 at 14-16). Should they be unable to reach agreement among

themselves, the private defendants’ motion and any future motion concerning pre-hearing

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The parties are reminded of their representation to the Court that the hearing “is

not anticipated to last more than one day.” (Doc. 38). The Court has accommodated the

parties’ scheduling requests on the basis of this assurance, and the parties are therefore

expected to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the hearing is concluded within the

one day allotted. That obligation includes working together to streamline the

presentations at the hearing. The Court will not permit the hearing to be used as a

discovery device. 

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The defendants do not oppose the plaintiffs’ request to present such evidence. 

(Doc. 52 at 3 n.2).

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discovery will be addressed by Magistrate Judge Milling.5

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to present

testimony and extra-record evidence is granted to the extent that: (1) the plaintiffs may

present evidence of irreparable injury on their case-in-chief which does not criticize the

BO or underlying documents; (2) they may present challenges to the BO and/or

underlying documents in rebuttal, to the extent the defendants rely on them to show the

absence of irreparable injury; (3) FWS is to amend the administrative record as set forth

in this order; and (4) the plaintiffs may present evidence of standing.6

 In all other

respects, the plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

 DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of May, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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