Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01022/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION 

HOSEA J. DUMAS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-1022

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Hosea J. Dumas, brings this action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his

application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court

has before it the brief of the Plaintiff (Doc. 8), brief of the

Commissioner (Doc. 9), and the transcript of the Social Security

proceedings. 

Procedural Background.

Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on September 28,

2004. (Tr. 47-49). Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date

of June 15, 2000, because of heart attacks, congestive heart

failure, and pulmonary edema (Tr. 69). Plaintiff’s application

was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 26-28, 35-

37). On August 31, 2005, a video teleconference was held at

Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and

a vocational expert (VE) appeared and testified (Tr. 215-235).

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Based on the Plaintiff’s earnings record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had 1

sufficient quarters of DIB coverage to remain insured through June 30, 2003 (Tr. 11, 52). See

20 C.F.R. § 404.130. 

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In a December 12, 2005 Opinion, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s

severe congestive heart failure, relating to ischemic heart

disease and hypertension, was a “severe” impairment, but that no

evidence existed prior to his date last insured (DLI), June 30,

2003, to show the existence of an impairment or combination of

impairments that was medically equal to one listed in Appendix

1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 (Tr. 14, Finding 3). 

The ALJ determined that prior to Plaintiff’s DLI on June 1

30, 2003, he retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to

perform medium work, and his past relevant work as a shipping

manager did not require the performance of work-related

activities precluded by his limitations (Tr. 14, Findings 5 &

6). On February 7, 2006, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner (Tr. 3-5). Plaintiff seeks

judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. 

Evidence Presented.

At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified he was

sixty-three years old and attended school through fifth or sixth

grade. Plaintiff indicated he last worked within the shipping

department of a light bulb manufacturing company, but he stated

he began to work for a temporary agency doing various odd jobs.

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Plaintiff never stated when he moved to Connecticut, but he worked for Light 2

Sources Inc., in Connecticut, beginning in 1989. 

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Plaintiff maintained he did this so he could “be in control of

it,” and if the temporary agency called him for work he could

decline if he did not “feel like it.” (Tr. 228-229). 

Plaintiff’s alleged date of onset is June 15, 2000.

Plaintiff was unable to provide medical evidence of any heart

problems prior to his emergency room visit in August 2004. (Tr.

215-235). Plaintiff stated he lived in Connecticut until his 2

return to Camden, Arkansas, in May 2004. (Tr. 215 & 228).

Plaintiff indicated he received treatment and prescriptions for

high blood pressure and continued that medicine throughout his

stay in Connecticut, but the treating doctor died before

Plaintiff’s application was filed. (Tr. 215-235). However,

Plaintiff was unable to provide the location or name of any

clinic or hospital that treated him prior to 2004. (Tr. 224).

At the hearing, Plaintiff reported difficulties with

climbing stairs, focusing, feeling tired, breathing, pains in

the joints and bones, and nausea. (Tr. 215-235). Plaintiff’s

earnings record showed as follows: in 1999, Plaintiff earned

$3,100; in 2000, only $1,800; and zero from 2001 forward. (Tr.

229). In July 2004, Plaintiff began drawing Social Security

benefits, which are scheduled to increase in amount when

Plaintiff reaches age 65. (Tr. 230-231). 

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Also appearing before the ALJ was a Vocational Expert (VE)

who indicated that Plaintiff’s shipping manager occupation

resembled a warehouse worker more than an actual shipping

manager. Warehouse worker is classified as unskilled medium

work, whereas shipping manager is deemed skill work at the light

level. (Tr. 233-234). 

Applicable Law.

This Court's role is to determine whether the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on

the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583

(8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind would find it

adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's

decision must be affirmed if the record contains substantial

evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966

(8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in

the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the court

may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in

the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or

because the court would have decided the case differently.

Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other

words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two

inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of

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the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068

(8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security

disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by

establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at

least one year and prevents him from engaging in any substantial

gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217

(8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment”

as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,

or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has

lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner's regulations require application of a

five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for

disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in

substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether

the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s)

meet(s) or equal(s) an impairment in the listings; (4) whether

the impairment(s) prevent(s) the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform

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other work in the national economy given his age, education, and

experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only if the

final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the

plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of his

residual functional capacity (RFC). See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683

F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920.

Discussion.

The ALJ was required to consider all evidence related to

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including evidence that

related to the following: (1) plaintiff’s daily activities; (2)

the duration, frequency, and intensity of his pain; (3)

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of his medication; and (5)

functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320,

1322 (8th Cir.1984). An ALJ may not discount a claimant’s

subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails

to support them, but may discount those complaints where

inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed,

“Our touchstone is that [a claimant’s] credibility is primarily

a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).

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After reviewing the record, the Court finds the ALJ

adequately evaluated the factors set forth in Polaski, and

concluded there is substantial evidence supporting his

determination that plaintiff's complaints were not fully

credible. The testimony presented at the hearing and the

medical evidence contained in the record are not consistent with

plaintiff’s allegations that disability existed prior to June

30, 2003. Plaintiff argues the ALJ focused too heavily on the

fact that no medical evidence was available to support

Plaintiff’s alleged condition prior to June 30, 2003. (Doc. 8).

Because medical records were not available for that time period,

the Court finds the ALJ was unable to consider any Polaski

factors other than Plaintiff’s daily activities. There is no

record to provide for aggravating factors, medication

complications or benefits, or other functional restrictions that

might have been recommended by a physician. 

As the ALJ found, Plaintiff carries the burden of proving

he was disabled prior to June 30, 2003, in order to be eligible

for disability benefits. (Tr. 11-12). To qualify for Title II

disability benefits, disability must be established as of the

date last insured. Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir.

1998). 

There is no evidence Plaintiff was regularly seeking

medical care prior to DLI. See Kisling v. Chater, 105 F.3d

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1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the lack of medical

evidence supporting a claimant’s subjective complaints is a

factor that supports the discounting of such complaints).

Plaintiff testified he spent much of his savings on medical

examinations in order to assess the cause of his health

problems, however he could not provide any identifying

information of the doctors or clinics that treated him.

Plaintiff openly stated he had no proof of treatment for his

health problems aside from high blood pressure, for which he

continued to take a prescription medication. Plaintiff’s

attorney was asked by the ALJ if he would like to leave the case

open in order to find medical evidence to support Plaintiff’s

position, and the attorney stated he did not think “there’s any

medical to get.” (Tr. 234). 

Plaintiff's subjective complaints are also not consistent

with evidence regarding his daily activities. Plaintiff alleged

he was significantly limited in all exertional activity due to

pain and weakness. However, there is no evidence this was true

prior to June 30, 2003. Also, in Exhibit 1E, the claimant

reports he is still able to perform all self-care, and drive a

car (including unfamiliar routes). (Tr. 13). 

Allegations of disabling pain may be discredited by

evidence of daily activities inconsistent with alleged level of

pain. Gray v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 1999)

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(plaintiff’s ability to care for himself, do household chores,

drive a car short distances, and perform other miscellaneous

activities was inconsistent with his subjective complaints);

Pena v. Cater, 76 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly

discounted claimant's subjective complaints on the basis that

claimant was able to care for child, drive car, and sometimes go

to grocery store); Johnston v. Halala, 42 F.3d 448, 451 (8th

Cir. 1994) (claimant's ability to read, watch television and

drive indicated her pain did not interfere with her ability to

concentrate; claimant's visits with her children indicated she

could engage in some social functioning). 

The ALJ assessed the plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity (RFC), the most a person can do despite that person’s

limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using

all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical

records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the

claimant’s own descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v.

Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations

resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the

assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a “claimant’s

residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v.

Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s

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determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by

medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to

function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,

646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth

specifically a claimant’s limitations and to determine how those

limitations affect his RFC.” Id. 

In the present case, the ALJ considered a RFC assessment

from the vocational expert, plaintiff’s subjective complaints,

and his medical records. The ALJ determined that at all times

prior to DLI, Plaintiff was able to perform at the medium work

level. Based on the medical evidence and plaintiff’s daily

activities the Court finds substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s RFC determination.

Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds the

Commissioner’s decision properly supported and is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff’s case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and a

separate judgment in accordance with the above will be entered.

Dated this 19th day of January 2007.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson

HONORABLE ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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