Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01410/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01410-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANITA SOUPHALITH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1410-H (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

REMANDING CASE FOR

ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS

vs.

MICHEAL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

On July 13, 2006, plaintiff Anita Souphalith (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint

pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) requesting judicial

review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) regarding the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for disability

insurance benefits. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment regarding her § 205(g) claim. (Doc. No. 14.) On July 18, 2007,

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 17.) On August 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a

reply to Defendant’s opposition. (Doc. No. 20.)

On August 20, 2007, the Court held a hearing on this matter. Attorney Mary

Adele Mitchell appeared for Plaintiff at the hearing and attorney Jacqueline A.

Case 3:06-cv-01410-H-AJB Document 22 Filed 08/21/07 Page 1 of 9
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Forslund appeared for Defendant. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment, reverses the decision of the ALJ, and remands this case to the ALJ

for further hearings consistent with this order. 

Background

Plaintiff filed an initial application for Social Security Disability Insurance

Benefits on March 10, 2004. (Tr. 16.) Plaintiff was denied initially and upon

reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (“Administration”). (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing on November 17, 2004. (Id.) 

At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was thirty-nine years old and had an eighth

grade education. (Tr. 17.) Plaintiff had past relevant work experience as an electronics

assembler. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff claimed she became unable to work on October 27, 2002

due to hyperthyroidism due to Graves’ Disease, back pain, chronic headaches,

forgetfulness, weakness, sleep problems, anxiety, depression, fatigue, and allergies.

(Tr. 17, 74.) 

At the hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 27, 2000, had “severe”

impairments of Graves’ Disease and anxiety with depression, but that Plaintiff’s

impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or equal an impairment

listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulation number 4, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.

P, app. 1. (Tr. 17-19.) The ALJ subsequently found that Plaintiff retained the physical

residual functional capacity to perform a full range of heavy work, and the mental

residual functional capacity to “understand, remember and carry out simple, one/two

step instructions; maintain concentration and attentionforsimplerepetitivework;relate

and interact with supervisors and co-workers; and tolerate low job-related stress.” (Tr.

20-21.) Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience was as

an electronics assembler, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) number 721.684-

022, and that based on Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity she could perform work

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as an electronics assembler as she performed that occupation, and as that job is

generally performed in the national economy. (Tr. 22-23.) The decision became final

when the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s findings by decision dated May 9, 2006.

(Tr.4-6.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards Regarding Review of Denial of Disability Claim

Section 205(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review

of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section

205(g) provides that a District Court has the power to enter a judgment affirming,

modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding

the case for rehearing. See id. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.”

Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988).

“Evidence can be ‘substantial’ if it is more than a scintilla, even though less than a

preponderance.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports

and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. See id. If the evidence can support

an outcome for either the Commissioner or the claimant, a reviewing court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See id. Even if the reviewing court finds

that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, however, the court

must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in

weighing the evidence and reaching his decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d

653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Under the Act, in order to qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must

demonstrate that: (a) the claimant suffers from a medically determinable physical or

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and (b) the

impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work that the claimant

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previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful

employment that exists in the national economy. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “If a claimant meets both

requirements, he or she is ‘disabled.’” Id.

The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for

determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See id.

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The Ninth Circuit has summarized this process:

The burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four. As to step

five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. If a claimant is found to be

“disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequence, there is no need

to consider subsequent steps. 

The five steps are:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful

activity? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of

the Social Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits.

If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation proceeds

to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is

“not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be

resolved at step two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific

impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled”

and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s

impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in the

regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and

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the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the

past? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to

disability insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she

did in the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four

and the evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(e).

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the

claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance

benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do

other work, then the Commissioner must establish that there are a

significant number of jobs in the national economy that claimant can do.

There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing

that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national economy

that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by

reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is

“not disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot

meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to

disability benefits. See id.

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99.

An ALJ has “a duty to fully and fairly develop the record to assure that the

claimant’s interests are considered.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th

Cir. 1998). Ambiguous evidence or an inadequate record to allow for the proper

evaluation of the evidence triggers the ALJ’s duty to “conduct a proper inquiry.” See

id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)). Such proper

inquiry may be conducted in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s

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1

 Although Defendant indicated at oral argument, based on 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1560(c), that reasoning development is only considered at step 5 of the

sequential process, § 404.1560(c) states that the Administration will consider the same

residual functional capacity at step four and step five of the sequential process. 

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physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing,

or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.

Id.; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The decision whether to reverse and remand for further administrative

proceedings, or to reverse and award benefits, is within the discretion of the court. See

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Remand is appropriate “where

additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects.” Bilby v. Schweiker, 762

F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984).

When the evidence is inconclusive, questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts

in the testimony are functions solely of the Commissioner. See Sample v. Schweiker,

694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

II. Step Four

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision pursuant to step four of the sequential

process that Plaintiff could return to her past employment as an electronics assembler

as actually performed and as generally performed in the national economy,

notwithstanding her residual functional capacity, was not supported by substantial

evidence. Plaintiff points out that the ALJ incorrectly stated that an electronics

assembler is an unskilled job, which correlates to a specific vocational preparation

level (“SVP”) of 1 or 2, when the DOT, which was cited by the ALJ, indicates that the

position (DOT number 721.684-022) is a semi-skilled work activity with an SVP of 3.

Defendant counters that this error was harmless since SVP is typically considered at

step 5 of the sequential process, and the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet her

burden at step 4.

Regardless, the DOT also states that an electronics assembler, DOT 721.684-

022, requires a level 2 reasoning development.1 The DOT defines a level 2 reasoning

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development as having the ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out

detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” and “[d]eal with problems

involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” U.S. Dep’t of

Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles app. C (4th ed. 1991). A level 1 reasoning

development, however, is defined as having the ability to “[a]pply commonsense

understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions,” and “[d]eal with

standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from these situations

encountered on the job.” Id. Therefore, it appears that the ALJ should not have found

that Plaintiff was able to perform the job of an electronics assembler as the job is

performed in the national economy, because that requires a level 2 reasoning

development (being able to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral

instructions), while Plaintiff, according to the ALJ’s findings, only retains a level one

reasoning development (being able to carry out carry out simple one- or two-step

instructions (Tr. 21)). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(c) (“A limited ability to carry out

certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding, remembering, and

carrying out instructions . . . may reduce your ability to do past work.”). Accordingly,

the Court concludes that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is able to perform her past

relevant work as an electronics assembler, as that job is performed in the national

economy, is not supported by substantial evidence.

A disability insurance benefits claimant may be found to be able to perform her

past relevant work, however, either because she can perform her past relevant work as

generally performed in the national economy or as it is actually performed. See Lewis

v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ also concluded that

Plaintiff could return to her occupation as performed. (Tr. 23.) This conclusion was

made, however, without any substantial analysis. An ALJ must issue a written decision

which gives the findings of fact and the reasons for the decision. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.953(a), 416.1453(a); see also Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“Although the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ

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still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion. . . .

This requires specific findings as to the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the

physical and mental demands of the past relevant work, and the relation of the residual

functional capacity to the past work.”). The Court concludes that the ALJ failed to

meet his duty of making specific factual findings regarding the relation of Plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity to her past work. Accordingly, the Court reverses and

remands this case for further administrative proceedings. Upon remand, the ALJ

should either make a reasoned factual finding that Plaintiff has the residual functional

capacity to apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved

written or oral instructions and deal with problems involving a few concrete variables

in or from standardized situations, as required for an electronics assembler as that job

is generally performed in the national economy according to the DOT, or make a

reasoned factual finding that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as actually performed can

be performed by Plaintiff despite her mental residual functional capacity that limits her

to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, one or two step instructions,

or proceed to step five of the sequential process. 

III. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments

Since the Court has concluded this case should be remanded, it declines to

address Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of physician

assistant Andrea Gasper and failed to consider the opinion of Plaintiff’s husband. 

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment and DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, reverses the

decision of the ALJ, and remands this case to the ALJ for further hearings consistent

with this order. Accordingly, if Plaintiff seeks attorney fees, she may file a petition

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) within thirty days from the filing date of this Order.

The Defendant will have fourteen days thereafter to file an opposition. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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