Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01943/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01943-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 12, 2009

Decided January 13, 2010*

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge     

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1943

ABDUL M. LOVE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DAVID KIRK, et al.

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

06 C 1537

Joan Humphrey Lefkow,

Judge.

O R D E R

Abdul Love filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that while he was

confined in the pretrial detention unit at the Lake County, Illinois Correctional Center,

employees of the County Sheriff’s Department violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process by transferring him into the segregation unit from the general jail population

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1943 Page 2

without a hearing.  The district court ruled in favor of the sheriff’s department motion for

summary judgment.  Love appeals, and we affirm.

In October 2005 Love was arrested and placed in the pretrial detention unit pending

a hearing on a cocaine charge.  Shortly thereafter the sheriff’s criminal investigations unit

informed Patrick Firman, chief of corrections of the Lake County Sheriff’s Department, that

Love—while confined in the general inmate population—attempted to solicit the murder of

the police officer who arrested him in his pending criminal case.  Subsequently, Love was

indicted and charged with the solicitation of murder in the cocaine case.

As a result of the attempted murder solicitation, Love was transferred in January

2006 to the administrative segregation unit (“ASU”) where he was placed in “lock‐down”

status for 23 hours per day, keeping him from interacting with the other inmates.  David

Kirk, Sergeant of the Lake County Sheriff’s Department, explained in a letter that, based on

Love’s criminal conduct, he was being transferred to ASU for the safety of the staff and

other inmates as well as his own safety.  The letter stated,

Mr. Love, you have been assigned to Status 3 Segregation.    This is an

administrative segregation and the current charges that you face, nessitates [sic]

the need for this segregation.

Your segregation status is in the best interest of your safety and the safety and

security of the Lake County Sheriff[’]s Adult Correctional Division.      

Love was ordered segregated for an indefinite period of time, but the jail’s classification

committee routinely reviewed his placement to determine whether he could be returned to

the general population.  Shortly after being transferred to ASU, Love gave one of the jail’s

officers a letter containing a threat to two Lake County judges.  Although Love denies

writing the letter or intending to personally threaten the judges, the letter became part of

Love’s record for the classification committee’s consideration during his confinement.  

Love filed several grievances and requested a hearing as well as challenged the

conditions of his segregation.  Jail officials denied Love’s request for a hearing, stating that it

is not a part of the ASU’s procedure.  In response to one of Love’s grievances, Firman also

explained that while in ASU, Love’s ability to mix with other inmates would be limited:

“[d]ue to your demonstrated behavior, the serious nature of your criminal actions while in

custody, and my concerns for the safety and security of this facility.”  Both Firman and Kirk

later testified at the deposition hearing that Love posed a significant security risk to the

Lake County Sheriff’s Adult Correctional Division and that ASU was the only place where

they could closely monitor his activity.  Kirk added that had Love’s “alleged charges” been

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No. 09‐1943 Page 3

reduced or dropped, he probably would have been released from ASU.  But jail officials

received no information during 2006 which would lead them to cast any doubt about their

decision that Love posed a security risk, necessitating Love’s continued segregation until

January 2007.  Thereafter, a change in the jail’s command structure took place, and he was

transferred back to the general inmate population.

Love filed this suit in March 2006, alleging that the defendants (Kirk, et. al.) violated

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when he was placed in segregation without

a hearing.  Love argued that his segregation was punishment for his alleged solicitation

attempt, and “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an

adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

535 (1979).  Love claimed that the defendants were somehow constitutionally required to

provide him a disciplinary hearing before transferring him into the segregation unit.  

The trial judge granted summary judgment for the defendants (jail officials), ruling

that the defendants were entitled to take the steps necessary “to maintain security and order

at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees” or otherwise

ensure the “effective management of the detention facility.” See id. at 540.  Furthermore,

Love failed to establish that his segregation required a due process hearing under Bell.  In

Bell, the Supreme Court held that, unlike one convicted and sentenced, a pretrial

detainee—not yet found guilty of any crime—may not be punished for misconduct while in

custody without due process.  Id. at 535‐37; see Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438‐39 (7th Cir.

2002); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1995).  To establish a right to due process, a

pretrial detainee must demonstrate either 1) an “expressed intent to punish on the part of

detention facility officials” or 2) that the challenged condition or restriction lacked a

reasonable relationship to a legitimate, non‐punitive administrative purpose.  Bell, 441 U.S.

at 538‐39; see Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999).  After reviewing the

undisputed facts in this case, the trial court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an

express intent on the part of the defendants to punish him nor did he establish the lack of a

reasonable relationship between his segregation and a legitimate, non‐punitive purpose.

On appeal Love argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

the defendants because a genuine issue of material fact existed dealing with the question of

whether his segregation was punitive and if so, necessitated a disciplinary hearing.  Love

contends that the defendants’ express intent to punish him is reflected in statements by

Firman and Kirk in which they justified his segregation as being based on his solicitation

“charges” and “criminal actions” while in custody.   

After reviewing the record, we are convinced that Love failed to establish that the

defendants expressly intended to punish him.  When read in context, the statements of

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No. 09‐1943 Page 4

Firman and Kirk justify segregating Love in order to promote the safety of those in the

facility as well as the general public.  See Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 291 (defendant’s decision to

segregate detainee for “unacceptable conduct” lacked punitive intent because context of

statement showed that the conduct posed a security threat); cf. Higgs, 286 F.3d at 438‐39

(question of punitive intent was ambiguous where letter justifying segregation for

detainee’s threatening behavior did not expressly refer to security concerns).  Although

Love now challenges the veracity of the defendants’ stated rationale for placing him in

segregation, he failed to point out anything in the record that demonstrates that the

defendants expressly intended to punish him.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538; Zarnes, 64 F.3d at

291.

Absent proof of any jail officials’ express intent to punish him, Love’s only

alternative under Bell, then, depends on his ability to establish that his segregation was

either arbitrary or not reasonably related to a legitimate, non‐punitive, administrative

purpose.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538‐39; Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005); Rapier,

172 F.3d at 1005.  The trial judge considered Love’s admission that Firman believed the ASU

was the only appropriate unit in the Lake County Correctional Center where he could

monitor Love’s activities to preclude any future harm and concluded that Love failed to

ascertain a purpose for his segregation beyond its legitimate function of preventing harm to

the officer he threatened, other inmates, and other institutional personnel.  On appeal, Love

has again failed to properly challenge this conclusion, and he cannot adequately contest the

legitimacy of segregating an inmate attempting to solicit the murder of a police officer.  

On the other hand, Love does raise two additional arguments for the first time on

appeal.  He contends that the duration of the segregation imposed on him is an “atypical

and significant hardship” relative to the ordinary incidents of prison life, a standard

applicable only to convicted prisoners.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Rapier, 172

F.3d at 1004‐05.  He also refers to the specific restrictions of his segregation (i.e., restricted

access to the commissary, television, outdoor recreation, and educational services) as

exceeding the purpose of the segregation to promote the safety of the facility as well as the

general public.  See Kennedy v. Mendoza‐Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).  Neither of these

arguments were presented to the trial court when Love was represented by counsel.  These

arguments are thus forfeited, and we see no need to consider them.  See Witte v. Wisconsin

Dept. of Corrections, 434 F.3d 1031, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.      

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