Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02234/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02234-55/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Review Agency Decision

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION, et 

al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

RICHARD W. COREY, et al.,

 Defendants.

LEAD CASE: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM

CONSOLIDATED WITH MEMBER 

CASE: 1:10-cv-163-LJO-BAM

ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 

BRIEFING

Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’1 motions to amend their respective complaints under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (“Rule 15(a)”). Docs. 355, 358. Plaintiffs seek to amend their 

complaints in order to challenge the November 2015 amendments to California’s Low Carbon Fuel 

Standard (“the 2015 LCFS”), 17 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 95480 et seq. See Doc. 356 at 2; Doc. 358-1 at 3. 

Among other things, the RMFU Plaintiffs seek to add “as-applied” constitutional challenges to the 2015 

LCFS. 

Defendants2largely do not oppose the motions. They do, however, oppose the RMFU Plaintiffs’ 

 

1 There are two groups of Plaintiffs in this consolidated action. The first group, the “RMFU Plaintiffs,” is composed of Rocky 

Mountain Farmers Union, Redwood County Minnesota Corn and Soybean Growers, Penny Newman Grain, Inc., Fresno 

County Farm Bureau, Nisei Farmers League, California Dairy Campaign, Rex Nederend, and Growth Energy. The second 

group, the “AFPM Plaintiffs,” is composed of American Fuels & Petrochemical Manufacturers Association fka National 

Petroleum & Refiners Association, American Trucking Associations, and The Consumer Energy Alliance.

2 Defendants are various official capacity defendants.

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request to add their as-applied constitutional claims. Briefly summarized, Defendants contend the 

Court’s prior rulings and the RMFU Plaintiffs’ prior statements preclude the claims. 

Though Defendants do not frame any of their arguments in terms of futility, their argument that 

the Court’s prior rulings and the RMFU Plaintiffs’ prior statements now preclude their proposed asapplied challenges is best construed as an argument that permitting those challenges would be an 

exercise in futility. And though Defendants do not provide any theory or authority for their argument, 

the Court construes the argument to be based on the law of the case doctrine.

The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a court from “reconsidering an issue that 

already has been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United States v. 

Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). “The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit 

alike have recognized that an action brought following a reversal and remand for further proceedings in 

the same litigation is the same case for purposes of application of the law of the case doctrine.” Ischay v. 

Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 

U.S. 129, 136 (1921); Hansen & Rowland v. C.F. Lytle Co., 167 F.2d 998, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1948)). “For 

the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have been decided explicitly or by necessary 

implication in the previous disposition.” United States v. Lumni Nation, 763 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Lumni Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 

2000)). “‘An argument is rejected by necessary implication when the holding stated or result reached is 

inconsistent with the argument.’” United States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005)).

The Court addressed whether the parties had standing to pursue preemption claims against the

Original LCFS in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 

2011) (“RMFU Ethanol”). The Court found that only one of the RMFU Plaintiffs, Growth Energy, had 

associational standing on behalf of its members to pursue its preemption claim. Id. This was due, in part, 

to the Court’s explicit finding that Growth Energy had proffered evidence that at least some of its 

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members had been injured by the Original LCFS:

For example, the declaration of Stuart H. Harden (“Mr. Harden”), filed on November 1, 2010, in 

support of the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion, concludes that “real 

and present harm to corn ethanol producers in the Midwest as a result of the LCFS regulations 

can be demonstrated by the effects on fair value of each of the plants noted herein.” Mr. Harden 

based his conclusion on confidential business information—filed under seal—from 25 members 

of Growth Energy. Similarly, the second declaration of Robert Whiteman, filed under seal on 

May 12, 2011, identifies specific plants and the alleged injuries suffered thereto based on the 

first quarter of the LCFS.

Id. at 1100. These and other declarations thus led the Court to conclude that Growth Energy had suffered 

an actual injury sufficient to provide it with standing to pursue its preemption claim. Id. at 1101. 

With regard to the remaining RMFU Plaintiffs, the so-called “Farmer Plaintiffs,” the Court 

reached an opposite conclusion. Prior to ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

parties conducted limited discovery on the issue of whether the RMFU Plaintiffs had standing. Id. at 

1098. “Through their interrogatories, Defendants asked the Farmer Plaintiffs whether the LCFS has 

caused or will cause economic injuries to them or their members.” Id. at 1098. But, “[t]he limited 

discovery conducted . . . produced limited results.” Id. at 1097. In fact, the Farmer Plaintiffs produced no

evidence that the Original LCFS caused them any injury and effectively conceded the point. Id. The 

Court therefore found that they did not have standing to assert their preemption claim. Id. at 1098. 

Because the RMFU Plaintiffs’ proposed as-applied claims necessarily require evidence of actual 

injury3, the issue, then, is whether the Court’s finding in RMFU Ethanol that the Farmer Plaintiffs failed 

to provide any such evidence precludes them from asserting their proposed as-applied claims against the 

2015 LCFS. Generally, that finding would have preclusive effect here under the law of the case doctrine. 

See United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Failure to apply the doctrine of the 

law of the case absent one of the [exceptions] constitutes an abuse of discretion.”). However, the 

doctrine does not apply when there has been a change in the intervening controlling authority that makes 

 

3 Both claims require a showing of actual injury to establish the RMFU Plaintiffs’ standing, see RMFU Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 

2d at 1095. Further, to the extent their as-applied Commerce Clause claim asserts the 2015 LCFS has discriminatory effects, 

the RMFU Plaintiffs will be required to provide evidence of those effects to succeed on the claim. See MTD Order, 2015 WL 

5096279, at *31.

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reconsideration appropriate. See Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

“intervening controlling authority” exception “includes changes in statutory as well as case law.” 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by 

Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The change in the law, however, must be 

material. See TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009); Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 

924, 930 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, whether the Farmer Plaintiffs should be permitted to assert their as-applied claims 

against the 2015 LCFS turns on whether that statute constitutes a material change in the law, that is, 

whether the 2015 LCFS is materially different from the Original LCFS. If the 2015 LCFS is materially 

indistinguishable from the Original LCFS, the Farmer Plaintiffs cannot establish actual injury and 

therefore cannot assert their contested as-applied claims, which necessarily require a showing of actual 

injury-in-fact. See Legal Aid Servs. of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010); 

RMFU Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).

4

The 

RMFU Plaintiffs argue that the 2015 LCFS “is substantially different from the [Original LCFS] in 

form,” though they provide no meaningful explanation in support. Id. at 9. Defendants provide no 

argument as to whether the 2015 LCFS is materially different from the Original LCFS.

The Court therefore requires more information and input from the parties. The parties are 

directed to submit briefs, not to exceed ten pages, providing explained answers to the following:

1. Is the 2015 LCFS materially different from the Original LCFS? 

2. Do the Court’s prior findings in RMFU Ethanol concerning the RMFU Plaintiffs’ standing 

apply here?

3. Does the law of the case (or any other doctrine) bar the RMFU Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims?

The RMFU Plaintiffs shall file their supplemental brief on or before May 20, 2016. Defendants shall file 

 

4 This also raises the question of whether the Farmer Plaintiffs would have standing to pursue any claim against the 2015 

LCFS; however, Defendants explicitly state that they do not challenge the RMFU Plaintiffs’ standing at this stage. See Doc. 

360 at 6 n.8 (“To be clear, Defendants are not challenging Plaintiffs’ standing.”).

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their supplemental brief on or before May 27, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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