Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00383/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Communications Act of 1934

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

J & J Sports Productions Incorporated,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Francisca A. Gonzalez-Arvizu, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00383-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court are Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment (Doc. 16) and 

the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Doc. 16-1). The Application will 

be denied. 

 Plaintiff contracted to obtain the exclusive nationwide distribution rights to a 

March 8, 2014 light middleweight bout between Saul Alvarez and Alfredo Angulo (the 

“Program”). (Doc. 1 at 4.) Through a series of sublicensing agreements, Plaintiff 

granted the right to exhibit the Program to various hotels, bars, restaurants, and clubs 

across North America. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that without obtaining a sublicense, 

Defendant Taco Mich & Bar and its “managing member,” Defendant Francisca A. 

Gonzalez-Arvizu, “did unlawfully intercept, receive, publish, divulge, display, and/or 

exhibit the Program at the time of its transmission at their commercial establishment in 

Phoenix.” (Id. at 3, 5.) 

 Plaintiff filed suit on March 3, 2015, seeking damages on two causes of action. 

The first alleges a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605, the relevant portions of which provide: 

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Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18, United States Code, no 

person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in 

transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall 

divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 

meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or 

reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, 

(2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to 

its destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the 

various communicating centers over which the communication may be 

passed, (4) to the master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in 

response to a subpena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on 

demand of other lawful authority. No person not being authorized by the 

sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the 

existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 

intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled 

thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign 

communication by radio and use such communication (or any information 

therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not 

entitled thereto. No person having received any intercepted radio 

communication or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, 

purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) 

knowing that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish 

the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 

communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or any 

information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of 

another not entitled thereto. 

47 U.S.C. § 605(a). The second cause of action claims Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. 

§ 553. That provision forbids any person to “intercept or receive or assist in intercepting 

or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically 

authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by 

law.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). 

 Defendants were served with process in April 2015 (Doc. 10, 11) but did not 

appear. On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Request to Enter Default (Doc. 12), which the 

Clerk granted ten days later (Doc. 15). Plaintiff now moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), for entry of a default judgment. 

“Entry of default judgment ... is not a matter of right. Entry of a default judgment 

is entirely within the court’s discretion and may be refused where the court determines no 

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justifiable claim has been alleged or that a default judgment is inappropriate for other 

reasons.” SuperMedia LLC v. Law Offices of Malkin & Assocs. P.L.L.C., No. CV-12-

2491-PHX-LOA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18105, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2013) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Factors which may be considered by 

courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment include: (1) the 

possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) 

the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the 

possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 “Eitel require[s] that a plaintiff state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover.” 

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (D. Ariz. 

2006) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where [a] 

default has been entered, as in this case, the factual allegations of the complaint, except 

those relating to the amount of damages, [are] taken as true.” Siemens Med. Solutions 

USA, Inc. v. Sequoia Techs., No. CV-05-0529-PHX-FJM (LOA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

11267, at *41 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2006) (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 It is undisputed that § 553 prohibits unauthorized interception of cable (or wire) 

communications and § 605 bars interception of radio (or satellite) communications. See J 

& J Sports Prods. v. Preciado, No. CV-14-02232-PHX-NVW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

29809, at *5-8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2015); DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is clear . . . that the ‘communications’ protected by § 605(a) include 

satellite television signals.”). The weight of authority is that § 605 does not also extend 

to wire communications. Preciado, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29809, at *6-7. “Of the five 

courts of appeals to address the scope of § 605, four have found that it does not apply to 

wire communications.” Id. at *7. 

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 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make clear whether Defendants’ alleged 

interception of the Program occurred by cable or by radio. On the majority view of 

§ 605, the Complaint therefore fails to plead the necessary factual predicates of either a 

§ 553 or a § 605 claim. Because Defendants have not appeared, Plaintiff explains that it 

“cannot conclusively determine the precise method of interception and reception” (Doc. 

16-1 at 10), and it therefore requests damages only under § 605. Plaintiff, however, fails 

to plead other information, of which it is aware, that might suggest whether its § 605 

claim is “plausible” within the meaning of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009). For example, the Complaint does not 

explain over what kind(s) of technology Plaintiff transmitted the Program, the most 

common methods of interception, which devices a restaurant of Defendants’ size is likely 

to possess, or whether there exist methods of interception not covered by either § 553 or 

§ 605. There may well be reason to believe that an allegation of radio, as opposed to 

cable, interception is plausible. But Plaintiff offers none. Instead, it hides behind 

ambiguous language—“intercept, receive, publish, divulge, display, and/or exhibit”—that 

it hopes will permit pleading of two (probably) mutually exclusive causes of action. On a 

motion for default judgment, such noncommittal pleading is insufficient, especially 

where a plaintiff has not pled important information within its own knowledge. 

 Plaintiff has not stated a claim. Under Eitel, default judgment is not appropriate. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment 

(Doc. 16) is denied. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file by August 27, 2015, an 

amended complaint, upon which he may effect service of process. If by that date 

Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, the Clerk shall terminate this case. 

 Dated this 6th day of August, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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