Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00677/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00677-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN JOSEPH CATANZARITE,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

R. HOREL, Acting Warden; D.

SMITH, Captain; R. LINFORD,

Counselor; L. POLK, CDW; P.

SOMERA, Counselor; and R.

KIRKLAND, Warden, all at Pelican

Bay State Prison; and M.

CARRASCO, Captain; K. E. TODD,

CDW; D. COWEE, Counselor; J.

COWEN, Counselor; T. MEADORS,

Acting Warden; M. BRYANT,

Captain; M. NIPPER, Counselor; M.D.

STAINER, Acting Warden; O. PENA,

CDW; and J. GENTRY, lieutenant, all

at the California Correctional

Institution,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-0677 WHA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 76)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, filed a pro se

civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On October 10, 2007, the complaint was found to

state a cognizable claim that defendants violated plaintiff’s right to due process in connection

with his placement in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) for an indeterminate term. 

Defendants R. Horel, D. Smith, R. Linford, L. Polk, P. Somera, R. Kirkland, M. Carrasco, K. E.

Case 3:07-cv-00677-WHA Document 78 Filed 05/07/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Todd, D. Cowee, J. Cowen, T. Meadors, M. Bryant, M. Nipper, M.D. Stainer, O. Pena, and J.

Gentry filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted on March 10, 2010, over

plaintiff’s opposition. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on the same day. Plaintiff

has filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 

ANALYSIS

A motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59 must be made within ten days of

entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The motion was filed on April 5, 2010, twentyone days after entry of judgment. The “mailbox” rule allows a filing by a prisoner proceeding

pro se to be deemed filed on the date plaintiff handed it to prison authorities for mailing. There

is no evidence as to when plaintiff handed the instant motion to prison officials for mailing, but

the earliest possible date is the date he signed it – March 29, 2010, which is more than ten days

after the entry of judgment. Consequently, even under the “mailbox” rule, the motion to alter or

amend judgment under Rule 59(e) (docket number 76) is untimely and must be DENIED. 

Even construed as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), which has no time

limit, the motion fails on its merits. Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more

of the following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s

decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the

judgment; (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v.

ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993). Although couched in broad terms,

subparagraph (6) requires a showing that the grounds justifying relief are extraordinary. 

Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of his motion, all of which challenge the

finding that plaintiff’s participation in taking a prison employee hostage, tying her up, and

threatening her with a flame and flammable aerosol can constituted “some evidence” that he

posed a risk of harm and danger to the institution, and thereby satisfied the requirements of due

process for his placement and retention in the SHU. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

Case 3:07-cv-00677-WHA Document 78 Filed 05/07/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

455 (1985) (holding that prison disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due process

requirements unless there is "some evidence" in the record to support the findings of the prison

disciplinary board). To begin with, plaintiff’s arguments challenge the reasoning and analysis

of the court’s order, and as such they are properly raised on appeal, not in a motion for

reconsideration. See Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corp., 637 F.2d at 1341 (motions for

reconsideration should not be frequently made or freely granted; they are not a substitute for

appeal or a means of attacking some perceived error of the court). In any event, his arguments

are without merit. 

 First, plaintiff argues that Hill’s “some evidence” standard only applies to the initial

decision to place him in the SHU, not to the periodic decisions to keep him there. Plaintiff cites

no authority in support of this argument, nor is the Court aware of any. Hill certainly does not

make that distinction; it simply applies to a disciplinary decision by prison officials, see 472

U.S. at 454-55, such as the decisions to place and retain plaintiff in the SHU. Second, plaintiff

argues that on certain occasions prison officials relied on other evidence instead of the hostage

incident to keep plaintiff in the SHU, including evidence of plaintiff’s psychiatric instability,

disciplinary problems, prior escape attempts, risk of being harmed, and plans to attack prison

staff, which evidence plaintiff argues was unreliable. That is not what the evidence reflects, but

even if it were, the hostage incident does not need to be the evidence that officials actually

relied on in every decision to retain plaintiff in the SHU in order for it to constitute “some

evidence” under Hill. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. Ibid. As the hostage incident

was evidence in the record that could support the decision that plaintiff presented an undue risk

to the safety of the institution and staff, and therefore to retain plaintiff in the SHU, the rule in

Hill was met. While at some point in time the hostage incident might be too old to still evince

any current dangerousness, that was not the case here where only six years had passed between

the hostage incident and the date of the latest SHU decision challenged herein. Lastly, plaintiff

argues that the officials who decided to place and retain him in the SHU do not have that

authority under state law. Even if true, he cites no authority, however, and the court is aware of

Case 3:07-cv-00677-WHA Document 78 Filed 05/07/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

none, that such a violation of state law implicates his federal right to due process. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the motion to alter or amend judgment (docket number 76)

is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7 , 2010. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

G:\PRO-SE\WHA\CR.07\CATANZARITE677.REC.wpd

Case 3:07-cv-00677-WHA Document 78 Filed 05/07/10 Page 4 of 4