Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01250/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01250-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR W. JONES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1250 GEB DAD P

vs.

MEL HUNTER, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a former state prisoner subsequently confined pursuant to a civil

commitment. He is proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a December 13, 1999 finding by the Sacramento County

Superior Court that he was a sexually violent predator pursuant to § 6600 of the California

Welfare and Institutions Code, and a resultant commitment to Atascadero State Hospital for two

years. He seeks relief on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that

his referral for evaluation as a sexually violent predator and subsequent commitment violated his

right to due process. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 A sexually violent predator is defined in California law as “a person who has been

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convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed

mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is

likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6600(a)(1). A probable cause hearing is held after a petition for commitment is filed to

determine “whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is

likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6602(a).

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BACKGROUND

[Petitioner] was convicted of sexually violent offenses in 1976 and

1985. His parole was revoked twice after his release from prison

in 1994, and he served additional time in prison. He was taken into

custody in June 1997 for a suspected third parole violation.

On July 29, 1997, [petitioner] was referred to the Department of

Mental Health (DMH) for evaluation as an SVP.

After a hearing on August 13, 1997, [petitioner] was found to be in

violation of his parole, and he was sentenced to six months in

prison, with credit for time served on the parole hold. 

[Petitioner’s] release date was scheduled for December 14, 1997.

(Answer, Ex. C (hereinafter Opinion), at 2). 

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On November 24, 1997, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed a petition

pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6600, et seq., alleging that petitioner was a

sexually violent predator. Petitioner was arraigned on December 4, 1997. After four motions to

dismiss were denied, jury trial commenced on November 30, 1999. On December 13, 1999, the

jury found that petitioner was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of California

Welfare & Institutions Code § 6600. On that same date the Sacramento County Superior Court

entered an order committing petitioner to the Department of Mental Health. (Clerk’s Transcript

on Appeal (CT) at 715; Resp’ts’ June 4, 2003, Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) 

On December 20, 1999, counsel filed a notice of appeal on petitioner’s behalf.

(CT at 716.) The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the

judgment against petitioner on November 21, 2001. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, arguing that his commitment was in excess of the trial court’s

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jurisdiction due to the failure of the Department of Mental Health and Department of 

Corrections to follow statutory requirements in initiating the proceedings. The petition for

review was denied on January 29, 2002. (Id. at 2 & Exs. A & B.)

Petitioner subsequently filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, one petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal, and two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Answer,

Exs. F, G, K, N, P.) All of these petitions were denied. (Answer, Exs. H, I, M, O, Q.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Due Process

Petitioner claims that his commitment as a sexually violent predator runs afoul of

the Due Process Clause because his referral to the California Department of Mental Health for

evaluation was carried out in violation of the procedural requirements set forth in California

Welfare & Institutions Code § 6601. 

California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6601(a)(1) provides as follows:

Whenever the Director of Corrections determines that an

individual who is in custody under the jurisdiction of the

Department of Corrections, and who is either serving a determinate

prison sentence or whose parole has been revoked, may be a

sexually violent predator, the director shall, at least six months

prior to that individual's scheduled date for release from prison,

refer the person for evaluation in accordance with this section.

However, if the inmate was received by the department with less

than nine months of his or her sentence to serve, or if the inmate's

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release date is modified by judicial or administrative action, the

director may refer the person for evaluation in accordance with this

section at a date that is less than six months prior to the inmate's

scheduled release date.

Petitioner contends that the state courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether

he was a sexually violent predator because the District Attorney filed the referral petition in his

case outside the time limitations contained in California Welfare & Institutions Code §

6601(a)(1), set forth above. Specifically, petitioner argues that (1) he is not a person serving a

determinate or indeterminate sentence or a person whose parole had been revoked at the time the

referral was made to the DMH; (2) the referral was not made at least six months prior to his

release date; and (3) the District Attorney could not lawfully refer petitioner for evaluation less

than six months prior to his release date because petitioner was not received by the department

with less than nine months of his sentence to serve, nor was his sentence modified by judicial or

administrative action. (Fourth Amended Petition (Pet.) at 5a.) Petitioner notes that in his case

the referral petition was filed after his arrest for a parole violation but before the parole hearing

had taken place or had even been scheduled, and that the referral on July 29, 1997 occurred less

than six months prior to his scheduled release date of December 14, 1997. (Id.) Petitioner

summarizes his arguments as follows:

According to W.I.C. § 6601(a), the CDC never acquired the

jurisdiction to make an SVP referral. With a parole revocation

of six (6) months and a release date (12-14-97) that was only four

(4) months away from the date (8-13-97) that I was sentenced, it

was/is impossible for the CDC to have acquire (sic) the jurisdiction

to make a lawful referral to the DMH. The referral would have

been unlawful no matter when it was made.

(Id. at 5c; see also Traverse at 22.) Petitioner argues, in essence, that the California Department

of Corrections could not lawfully refer him for evaluation as a sexually violent predator pursuant

to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6601 because his case could not and did not fall

within the time limits specified in that code section.

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The California Court of Appeal described petitioner’s argument on appeal as

follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction

in ordering a civil commitment because the referral for DMH

evaluation did not comply with statutory requirements. 

Specifically, he argues the referral was premature because it

occurred before his parole was revoked. . . .

Defendant relies on section 6601, subdivision (a)(1), which

authorizes referral for evaluation for an individual “who is either

serving a determinate prison sentence or whose parole has been

revoked . . . .” Defendant correctly notes that, on July 29, 1997,

the day of his referral for evaluation, he was not serving a

determinate sentence, nor had his parole been revoked. While he

was in custody on a parole hold on that date, his parole was not

revoked until two weeks later, on August 13, 1997. Defendant

asserts that because he did not meet either of the statutory

prerequisites for a referral, the court lacked the jurisdiction to later

order his civil commitment.

(Opinion at 3.) 

The state appellate court rejected petitioner’s arguments and concluded that the

commitment order was proper. The court reasoned as follows:

Initially, we note defendant did not raise this complaint at the

probable cause hearing. In fact, rather than claiming that his

referral for evaluation was premature, defendant repeatedly argued

at that hearing that the referral was too late. It was not until just

before trial that defendant first argued that the referral to DMH

occurred too soon. Under these circumstances, defendant cannot

be said to have preserved this matter for appellate review.

Furthermore, setting aside any question of waiver, defendant’s

claim lacks merit. Even if we assume section 6601, subdivision

(a)(1) applies, defendant errs in concluding that any failure to

comply with this provision invalidates the court’s subsequent

action and automatically compels reversal.

When evaluating whether a statutory provision is to be given

directory or mandatory effect, courts generally look to the purposes

behind the procedural requirements to determine whether

invalidation is necessary to promote the statute. (citation omitted.)

The SVPA was designed to protect the public and allow time for

evaluations and judicial proceedings to be completed before an

SVP’s release date. (citation omitted.) Here, at the time of the

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 This time in custody was credited against defendant’s subsequent sentence for the 2

parole violation. (See generally Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2635.1, subd. (c); People v. Bruner

(1995) 9 Cal. 4th 1178, 1181, fn. 1 [confinement on parole hold credited against subsequent

revocation term].)

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DMH referral, defendant was lawfully in custody on a parole hold.2

Under these circumstances, where there is no hint of negligence or

intentional wrongdoing, to hold that the allegedly premature

referral for evaluation deprived the court of acting on a later filed

SVP petition would thwart the intent of the SVPA. Numerous

cases have held that a court is not deprived of jurisdiction when an

individual is not lawfully in custody when a petition is filed. 

(citations omitted.) To hold that a court loses jurisdiction under

these circumstances, even though an individual is lawfully in

custody, is not necessary to the purpose of the SVPA and would

indeed be at odds with that purpose.

The prerequisites outlined in section 6601, subdivision (a)(1) must

therefore be deemed directory, not mandatory. Defendant has not

demonstrated any prejudice whatsoever from the “premature”

referral to DMH. He has not even hinted as to how he would have

benefited had the referral been delayed two weeks, until after his

parole was officially revoked.

We emphasize the petition itself was timely filed. Section 6601,

subdivision (a)(2) specifically authorizes an SVP petition to be

filed “if the individual was in custody pursuant to his or her

determinate prison term, or . . . [parole revocation term]. A

petition shall not be dismissed on the basis of a later judicial or

administrative determination that the individual’s custody was

unlawful, if the unlawful custody was the result of a good faith

mistake of fact or law. This paragraph shall apply to any petition

filed on or after January 1, 1996.

At the time the SVP petition was filed on November 24, 1997,

defendant was lawfully in custody and serving time for violating

his parole. The petition was therefore properly filed, and the court

had jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings. Defendant

argues that, because section 6601, subdivision (a)(2) was not

effective until July 22, 1999 (Stats. 1999, ch. 136, § 1), its

application in this case poses ex post facto concerns. (citations

omitted.) However, as defendant acknowledges in a footnote, the

California Supreme Court has held that SVP proceedings are civil

in nature and do not implicate ex post facto concerns. (citation

omitted.) Moreover, given the Legislature’s express determination

that this provision is declarative of existing law, there is no ex post

facto violation.

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In short, the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction in ordering a

civil commitment.

(Id. at 3-6.)

Respondent argues that the state appellate court’s ruling that petitioner waived

this issue for appeal because of his failure to raise an objection at the probable cause hearing

constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s

claim. (Answer at 11-14.) State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural

default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court

“‘will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court

rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.’” Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule is only “adequate” if

it is “firmly established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,

424 (1991)). See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o be deemed

adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.”)

The state rule must also be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” 

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1983)). Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, the claims may be

heard if the petitioner can show: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. A state court's application of

a procedural rule is not undermined where, as here, the state court simultaneously rejects the

merits of the claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Although the state appellate court addressed petitioner’s claim regarding the

timing of the referral on the merits, it also expressly held that the issue was waived on appeal

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 Petitioner asserts that he has established cause because his trial counsel rendered

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ineffective assistance when he failed to raise a due process objection to the SVP referral at the

probable cause hearing. (Traverse at 29.) “Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not cause, but

attorney error rising to the level of an independent constitutional violation (in the form of

ineffective assistance of counsel) does constitute cause.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044,

1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54). Petitioner’s counsel did not render

ineffective assistance due to his failure to raise a due process objection to the referral procedure

on the same grounds alleged by petitioner in the instant petition because, as explained below,

there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to do so. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851,

872 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that counsel is not ineffective for refraining from arguing an issue

that has little or no prospect of success). Accordingly, trial counsel’s inaction does not rise to the

level of “cause” for petitioner’s default. 

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because of defense counsel’s failure to object. (Opinion at 3.) Respondent has met his burden of

adequately pleading an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense. See Bennett 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner does not deny that his trial counsel failed to

raise a contemporaneous objection to the SVP referral on the same grounds that he asserts here. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate 

the inadequacy of California's contemporaneous-objection rule as unclear, inconsistently applied

or not well-established, either as a general rule or as applied to him. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586;

Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s claim is therefore

procedurally barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10

(1989); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (claim that defendant’s due

process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on the definition of

“major participant” was procedurally barred because counsel failed to make a contemporaneous

objection to the instruction at trial). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there was cause

for his procedural default or that a miscarriage of justice would result absent review of the claim

by this court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir.

1999). The court is therefore precluded from considering the merits of this claim. 3

Even were this claim not procedurally barred, it lacks merit. Petitioner argues that

he has a liberty interest in the state’s compliance with the procedural requirements set forth in

California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6601 which was deprived without due process when the

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 Any claim that petitioner’s referral for SVP evaluation violated only state law is not 4

cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Park, 202 F.3d

at 1149; Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

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state failed to comply with those requirements. As a result, according to petitioner, the state

court lacked jurisdiction to order his civil commitment.4

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the

protection of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Protected liberty interests may arise from two

sources; the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Myron v.

Terhune, 457 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner does not claim that the Due Process

Clause itself confers a liberty interest in a state’s compliance with California Welfare &

Institutions Code § 6601(a)(1), nor does he cite any authority in support of such an argument. 

Rather, petitioner claims that § 6601 itself confers a liberty interest in the state’s compliance with

the procedural requirements of that section because of the mandatory language contained therein. 

Petitioner notes that the statute uses the word “shall” in one instance when addressing the referral

for evaluation. 

“A State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on

official discretion.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). A state law must satisfy

two requirements in order to create a liberty interest protected by the federal Constitution. “First,

the law must set forth ‘substantive predicates' to govern official decision making and, second, it

must contain ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ i.e., a specific directive to the decision-maker that

mandates a particular outcome if the substantive predicates have been met.” Myron, 457 F.3d at

999 (quotations omitted). “[T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint

which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

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 Pursuant to California law, “the question of whether a public official's failure to comply 5

with a statutory procedure should have the effect of invalidating a subsequent governmental

action has been characterized as a question whether the statute should be accorded mandatory or

directory effect.” People v. Curtis, 177 Cal. App. 3d 982, 987 (1986). “[I]n evaluating whether a

provision is to be accorded mandatory or directory effect, courts look to the purpose of the

procedural requirement to determine whether invalidation is necessary to promote the statutory

design.” People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 958 (1977). 

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incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The mere fact that a

statute uses the word “shall” does not necessarily establish a liberty interest. See Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1098 (9th Cir. 1986) (the word “shall” alone is not sufficient to create

a liberty interest).

As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal analyzed the purposes

underlying California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6601(a)(1) and concluded that the language

contained therein was “directory” and not “mandatory.” (Opinion at 4.) The state court’s 5

conclusion that the language of § 6601(a)(1) is not mandatory in nature may not be set aside in

this federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (a federal writ is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law); Aponte v. Gomez, 993

F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal courts are “bound by a state court’s construction of its own

penal statutes”); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (a federal habeas

court must defer to the state court’s construction of its own penal code unless its interpretation is

“untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation”). 

This court also notes that the time limits set out in California Welfare & Institutions Code §

6601(a)(1) do not impose independent deprivations on a prisoner’s liberty nor do they impact

whether a prisoner is ultimately found to be a sexually violent predator. Rather, that provision

simply explains when a person in custody should be referred to the DMH for evaluation, in order

to ensure that an SVP determination is made prior to that person’s release. (Opinion at 4.) 

Under these circumstances, the state court’s conclusion that the language of § 6601 does not

create a liberty interest is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See

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 In reaching this conclusion the state appellate court found that there was “no hint of 6

negligence or intentional wrongdoing” in connection with petitioner’s referral for SVP

evaluation. (Opinion at 4.) Petitioner argues that, on the contrary, the referral form establishes

negligence and/or intentional wrongdoing on its face. Petitioner directs the court’s attention to a

handwritten notation on the referral form indicating that petitioner’s parole revocation hearing

had not yet taken place. (See Declaration of Oscar W. Jones in Support of Petitioner’s Fourth

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Declaration), Ex. A; Traverse at 8-10). Petitioner

also notes that none of the applicable prerequisites for referral of a person “with less than six

months prior to scheduled release,” such as himself, are checked on the form. (Traverse at 8-10.)

He argues that this demonstrates bad faith on the part of state officials because they knew

petitioner was not eligible to be referred for SVP evaluation but they referred him for evaluation

in any event. This court rejects petitioner’s argument that the referral form establishes bad faith

or negligence on the part of state authorities. The form simply clarifies petitioner’s custody

status. It is also accurate on its face, negating any intent to deceive. There is no evidence in the

record indicating that state authorities misused the referral form or negligently or intentionally

accepted petitioner for evaluation knowing he had been inappropriately referred or was not

eligible for evaluation. Petitioner has failed to rebut with “clear and convincing evidence” the

state court’s factual finding that there was no negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of

state authorities. Accordingly, this finding is presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). 

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Toussaint, 801 F.2d 1098; see also Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F. 3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The

question before us is not whether the state court of appeal applied an overbroad interpretation of

the SVPA's "in custody" requirement, but whether that court's interpretation and application of

the SVPA in this case violates federal due process. ”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1071 (2005);

Woodard v. Mayberg, 242 F. Supp. 2d 695, 706 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“And even if there was some

minor legal error in the "chain of custody" leading to the filing of the petition for commitment,

California courts have now made it clear that such error does not defeat jurisdiction to file the

petition because SVPA only requires "custody," not "lawful custody," before a petition is filed.”) 

The state appellate court also concluded that even assuming the requirements of 

§ 6601(a)(1) were applicable to this case and were violated as petitioner claims, petitioner was

not entitled to reversal of his SVP commitment. In this regard, the state court explained that the

purposes behind the statute would be thwarted if a technical violation of the timing requirements

for a referral to the DMH led to invalidation of a subsequent commitment order. This 6

conclusion by the state court, based on its interpretation of a state statute, may not be reviewed in

this federal habeas corpus action. Aponte, 993 F.2d at 707; Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1399.

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The California Court of Appeal also noted that petitioner had failed to

demonstrate prejudice resulting from the timing of his referral to the Department of Mental

Health. Habeas corpus relief may be granted in cases involving error “of the trial type” only

when the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict” and resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636-38

(1993). Petitioner argues that he suffered prejudice from the improper referral order because “the

referral would not have been made if the statutory Due Process requirements of WIC §6601 had

been followed.” (Traverse at 23.) Petitioner is apparently asserting that if state authorities had

“followed” the procedural requirements contained in § 6601, they would have realized that they

could not refer petitioner for evaluation at any time; therefore, he would not have been

committed as a sexually violent predator. This circuitous argument lacks merit and does not

establish prejudice. As discussed above, the California Court of Appeal properly concluded that

state authorities did not violate state law in referring and committing petitioner as a sexually

violent predator.

For the reasons described above, the decision of the state court denying petitioner

relief on his due process claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States

Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his counsel at the probable cause hearing rendered

ineffective assistance. In this regard, petitioner argues that counsel: (1) “filed nonsensical

motions to dismiss SVPA petition;” (2) failed to discuss and review with petitioner his motions

to dismiss; (3) misinformed the state court that petitioner’s parole had been revoked by the CDC

prior to the SVP referral; and (4) failed to thoroughly review documents in his possession and

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 With respect to this last argument, petitioner appears to be claiming that his counsel

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failed to find and use the SVP referral form in support of his motion to dismiss. Petitioner

claims this form would have alerted his counsel to the fact that petitioner’s parole had not yet

been revoked when the referral was made, thereby rendering the referral unlawful. (See Traverse

at 13.)

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present “important evidence to the court.” (Pet. at 5; Traverse at 6.) Petitioner includes a copy 7

of counsel’s motion to dismiss the commitment referral proceedings, to show “just how

confusing and complicated (counsel) made a very simple issue, distorting the facts.” 

(Declaration at p. 2 & Ex. B.) Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. N.) The petition was summarily denied. 

(Answer, Ex. O.) 

The state court record reflects that attorney C. Emmett Mahle was petitioner’s first

attorney of record and that he represented petitioner at the probable cause hearing, filing several

motions on petitioner’s behalf. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 1-45; CT at 532, 541.) 

After the probable cause hearing, petitioner was ordered to stand trial. (RT at 46-47.) Attorney 

Mahle then informed the court that another attorney would take over the defense of petitioner’s

case. Counsel explained the reason for the substitution as follows:

At this time I have discussed this with Mr. Jones, and I have

discussed this with the panel administration. Based on my trial

schedule, and I have seven or eight trials set. I’ve previously 

discussed this with Mr. Jones. I am going to ask to be relieved at

this time.

Mr. Michael Aye, he is experienced in these matters having gone

through a full trial in this area, we have contacted him and spoke to

him at 1:30. He is prepared to step in. He has asked this matter to

be continued until Monday in Department 63. Mr. Sawtelle spoke

to him also downstairs. So that the panel would have no problem

with me being relieved, and Mr. Aye stepping in and setting a trial

date on Monday.

(Id. at 47.) Subsequently, Mr. Aye, as petitioner’s counsel, filed and argued another motion to

dismiss the referral petition and represented petitioner at his jury trial. (Id. at 56-62, 95.) The

motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Aye contains essentially the same due process arguments

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petitioner raises in his petition before this court. (CT at 657-60.) The state trial court denied the

motion to dismiss. (RT at 61-62.) 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See 466 U.S. at 687-88. After

a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s

performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong

presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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Here, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from attorney

Mahle’s representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958,

966 (9th Cir. 2006) (a federal habeas court is “well advised to bypass scrutinizing a criminal

defense attorney’s representation if the defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by it”). 

Petitioner argues that if Mr. Mahle had correctly explained the relevant facts in his motion to

dismiss, “there is an exceedingly high probability that the state courts would have ruled in

petitioner’s favor an (sic) dismissed the petition.” (Traverse at 14.) However, petitioner’s

second counsel, Mr. Aye, filed a motion to dismiss containing the same arguments and facts

petitioner believes his first counsel should have raised. (CT at 657-60; RT at 56-57.) At the

hearing on that motion, Mr. Aye made the same arguments petitioner makes in the instant

petition. (RT at 56-61.) Prior to announcing his ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge

acknowledged that petitioner’s parole had not been revoked when the referral was made and that

it appeared “the department made the referral at that time when the statute did not specifically

provide for.” (Declaration, Ex. C at 7.) Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, even if attorney Mahle had filed the same motion to dismiss that attorney Aye filed

and argued, a motion that petitioner approves of, it appears that the motion would have been

denied. 

Petitioner does not challenge his representation by attorney Aye, and there is

nothing in this record demonstrating that the verdict finding petitioner to be a sexually violent

predator was obtained in violation of his federal constitutional rights in any way. Petitioner has

therefore failed to establish that his representation by attorney Mahle “so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

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 In his traverse petitioner also claims that his appellate attorney rendered ineffective 8

assistance by failing to raise petitioner’s federal due process and ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims on appeal. (Traverse at 14.) To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly

raise a new claim in this manner, relief should be denied. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for

relief); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only

issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Even if such a

claim had been properly raised, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation. 

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v. Murray,

477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner

has provided no evidence that counsel’s decision as to which issues to present on appeal was not

the result of sound strategy. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Smith v. Stewart,

140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998). Further, in order to establish prejudice in this context,

petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on

appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.9. For the reasons set forth above, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that he would have prevailed on appeal had the issues in question been raised. 

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result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.8

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 13, 2006.

DAD:8

jones1250.hc

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