Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02031/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PACIFIC WEST HOME

MORTGAGE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-2031-BAS(BLM)

ORDER:

(1) REMANDING ACTION TO

STATE COURT FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION; AND

(2) TERMINATING INDIA RAYL’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS MOOT

[ECF No. 3]

v.

INDIA RAYL, et al.,

Defendants.

On May 27, 2014, Plaintiff Pacific West Home Mortgage, LLC (“Pacific West”)

commenced this unlawful-detainer action based on California Civil Procedure Code §

1161a against Defendants India Rayl and Robert R. Rayl in the San Diego Superior

Court. On August 29, 2014, Ms. Rayl removed this action to federal court, and

concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The removal is based on

federal-question jurisdiction. Ms. Rayl asserts that the federal question involves the

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Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5220, which Defendants invoked

in their answer to the complaint.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Ms. Rayl’s Notice of Removal is

deficient and REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized

by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow

Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

(9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002);

O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong

presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the

burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also

Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990);

O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish subject matter

jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United Investors Life

Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may

consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th

Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an

‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo

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Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States

v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)).

II. ANALYSIS

In order to invoke this Court’s federal-question jurisdiction, the defendant must

demonstrate that the civil action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, ortreaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “It is settled that the answer to this jurisdictional

question must be determined solely from the face of the complaint unaided by the

answer, petition for removal or other papers.” Farmco Stores, Inc. v. Newmark, 315

F. Supp. 396, 397 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (citing Gully v. F. Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113

(1936); Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1950)) (emphases added).

Ms. Rayl asserts in her notice of removal that Defendants’ answer invoking the

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, and Defendants’ demurrer depending on

“Defendants’ rights and Plaintiff’s duties under federal law” provide the basis for

federal-question jurisdiction. In making that assertion, Ms. Rayl tacitly concedes that

there are no allegations from the face of the complaint that demonstrate the existence

of a federal question for jurisdictional purposes. Upon reviewing the complaint, the

Court confirms that that is the case here—that the unlawful-detainer claim in the

complaint does not arise from the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bilbaeno, No. C-12-01707,

2012 WL 3987317, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012) (finding that an unlawful-detainer

claimnot based upon any federalstatute cannot establish federal-question jurisdiction).

More importantly, it is settled law that Ms. Rayl cannot rely on Defendants’

answer or demurrer to provide the basis for determining federal-question jurisdiction. 

See Farmco Stores, 315 F. Supp. at 397. Consequently, the Court must reject Ms.

Rayl’s proposition that removal is proper under federal-question jurisdiction arising

from assertions in Defendants’ answer and demurrer. Left only with the allegations in

the complaint, the Court cannot conclude that this action arises under the Constitution,

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laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because there is doubt as

to the right of removal, federal jurisdiction must be rejected. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at

566.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

Ms. Rayl fails to provide an adequate explanation supported by law to

demonstrate federal-question jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court REMANDS this action

to the San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Additionally, the Court

TERMINATES AS MOOT Ms. Rayl’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF

No. 3.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 23, 2014

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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