Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01133/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NENG SAYPAO PHA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

GARY SWARTHOUT, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-1133-MCE-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel on a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground 

that all but one of the claims is unexhausted. ECF No. 14. Petitioner opposes the motion and 

respondent has filed a reply. ECF No. 16, 17. The case was before the undersigned on January 

15, 2014, for hearing on respondent’s motion. Attorney Charles Bonneau appeared at the hearing 

on behalf of petitioner; attorneys Sally Espinoza and Justain Riley appeared on behalf of 

respondent. For the reasons stated on the record and as set forth below, respondent’s motion must 

be denied. 

 A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner 

has exhausted available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed 

to have waived the exhaustion requirement unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the 

requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 

Case 2:13-cv-01133-MCE-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

 Exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners fairly present federal claims to the 

highest state court, either on direct appeal or through state collateral proceedings, in order to give 

the highest state court “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its 

prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (some internal quotations 

omitted). “[A] state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in 

state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 

2000). “[T]he petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal 

law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is self-evident . . . .” Id. (citations 

omitted); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas 

corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement 

of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief”); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (to exhaust a claim, a 

state court “must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution”). 

 In addition to identifying the federal basis of his claims in the state court, the petitioner must 

also fairly present the factual basis of the claim in order to exhaust it. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 29 (2004); Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he petitioner must 

. . . provide the state court with the operative facts, that is, ‘all of the facts necessary to give 

application to the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” Davis v. Silva, 511 

F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 

1958)). 

 Where a petition contains both unexhausted and exhausted claims, the petition must be 

dismissed with leave to amend to allow the petitioner to file an amended petition stating only 

exhausted claims (either by exhausting the previously unexhausted claims prior to filing the 

amended petition or by deleting the unexhausted claims from the petition). Rose v. Lundy, 455 

U.S. 509, 520 (1982); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998); 

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-01133-MCE-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/07/14 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

 In the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, the core factual 

allegations of petitioner’s claim were expressed as follows: 

 About 11 days after the jury returned its verdicts, Juror No. 12 sent an email to the prosecutor where she stated that she felt that “God used you to heal a 

part of me,” and that the thought of the prosecutor actually prosecuting a person 

who had molested her some years prior “has gone deep into my soul.” After the 

prosecutor shared a copy with defense counsel, the latter asked the court for 

disclosure of juror identification information so that he could investigate further in 

order to prepare a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. . . . . 

 At the hearing upon the requests, the trial court found that there was not a 

prima facie case of juror misconduct, since there was nothing in the e-mail that 

indicated that the juror had allowed her infatuation with the prosecutor to affect 

her deliberations in the case, or that she shared her views of the prosecutor with 

any other juror. 

* * * 

 [T]his case presents the novel issue of a juror, on her own initiative, 

communicating with one of the parties in the case, after verdict, wherein she 

reveals her infatuation with the part and her belief that “God used you to heal a 

part of me.” Such statements are a persuasive indication that the jur[or] allowed 

her deep feelings toward the prosecutor to sway her vote on guilt or innocence; 

and that she may have confided in other jurors, during deliberations, about her 

strong feelings about the prosecutor. 

* * * 

 A defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an unbiased, impartial 

jury. (U.S. Const., Amndmts. 6 and 14; Cal. Const., Art. I, sec. 16; In re Hamilton

(1999) 20 Cal. 4th 273, 293; Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717. 722; In re 

Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 97, 110.) 

* * * 

 If animosity toward a party’s attorney is sufficient to show bias, then by 

parity of analysis, “falling in love” with an attorney is also sufficient to show bias. 

Certainly the trial court should have granted the defense an opportunity to inquire 

into the matter further. 

ECF No. 15, Lodged Doc. 7 at 16-18, 21, 24 (internal records citations omitted) 

 In the instant petition, petitioner presents one general argument – the denial of federal due 

process based on prejudicial juror misconduct. See ECF No. 1-1 at 21 (“petitioner was denied his 

federal constitutional right to due process because there was prejudicial juror misconduct, 

Case 2:13-cv-01133-MCE-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/07/14 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

involving an infatuation of a juror for the prosecutor, based on her own past victimization”); id. 

(“petitioner was tried by at least one biased juror, and he was denied Due Process by the failure to 

hold a hearing on the contamination of the remaining jurors by statements of Juror #12). In 

furtherance of this claim, petitioner asserts that: (1) “the prosecutor’s use of vouching and 

expression of personal opinion, which might otherwise be deemed harmless . . . , takes on special 

significance when viewed through the eyes of Juror # 12. In her eyes he could do no wrong”; and 

(2) “trial counsel should have accentuated [Juror No. 12’s potential bias], and should have 

pressed more vigorously for a new trial.” Id. at 31, 33. 

 Respondent argues that the petition consists of four separate constitutional claims: 1) trial 

court error in failing to disclose identifying information of jurors or to hold an evidentiary hearing 

on juror misconduct; 2) juror bias; 3) prosecutorial misconduct; and 4) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. Respondent concedes that the trial court error claim is exhausted. ECF No. 14 at 3-

4. Respondent argues the remaining three claims are unexhausted. 

 The petition for review before the California Supreme Court focused on the claim that the 

trial court erred in denying the request for an evidentiary hearing to explore the claim of juror 

bias. As noted, however, that petition also made clear petitioner’s due process claim that Juror 

No. 12 was “infatuated” with the prosecutor, and therefore biased. Respondent’s position that the 

juror bias claim was not fairly presented to the state court in the petition for review dices the issue 

too finely. See, e.g., ECF No. 17 (arguing in the reply brief that petitioner’s claim based on Juror 

No. 12’s “impartiality,” which was presented to the state court, is “related but not the same” to a 

claim of “actual bias”); see also Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1999) (warning 

against “unwarranted hairsplitting” in determining exhaustion of claims). Accordingly, the court 

finds that petitioner provided the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to consider the 

juror bias issue before presenting it to this court, and therefore it is exhausted. 

 At the hearing, petitioner’s counsel clarified that he does not intend to assert free-standing 

claims based on prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, they are 

merely examples of why his claim of juror bias, if proven, made a difference in the outcome of 

the trial. In light of this clarification, respondent’s motion to dismiss these “claims” as 

Case 2:13-cv-01133-MCE-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/07/14 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

unexhausted, appears moot. At the hearing, however, respondent argued that even so construed, 

these new factual allegations could not be raised in the federal petition because they were not 

presented in the petition for review before the California Supreme Court. Respondent is 

mistaken. The instant petition does not raise new and distinct claims that were not presented to 

the state courts. The “ultimate question for disposition” as presented to both this court and the 

California Supreme Court, is whether petitioner was denied due process based on prejudicial juror 

misconduct. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277. Petitioner’s “variations in the legal theory or factual 

allegations” do not preclude this court from considering this ultimate question. See id. The court 

finds that the allegations are properly before the court.

Given that the juror bias claim is exhausted, coupled with petitioner’s concession that he 

is not asserting free-standing claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the court finds that the petition is exhausted. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 14) be denied, and that respondent be ordered to file an answer within 60 days from the 

date of any order adopting this recommendation. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 6, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-01133-MCE-GGH Document 19 Filed 02/07/14 Page 5 of 5