Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01379/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01379-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN E. RANSOM, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

A. K. SCRIBNER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-01379 AWI LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his conviction by

jury trial on July 16, 1996, of second degree robbery and petty theft with a prior in violation of Cal.

Penal Code §§ 211, 666. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Answer to Petition (hereinafter “Answer”).

Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 35 years to life. Id. 

On November 1, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. Petitioner claims his placement in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) violates his due

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process rights under the 14 Amendment to the Constitution. On July 10, 2006, Respondent filed an

th

answer to the petition. Respondent contends the petition was filed outside the one-year limitations

period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Respondent further contends Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted on his claims and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the

claims. Lastly, Respondent claims the petition is without merit. Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

DISCUSSION

A. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on November 1, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the limitations period commenced on the date Petitioner

discovered the factual predicate of his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Since Petitioner is

challenging his placement in the SHU, the relevant date is January 10, 2002, when the Departmental

Review Board (“DRB”) approved Petitioner’s transfer from California State Prison, Sacramento, to

the SHU at Corcoran State Prison. See Exhibit B, Answer; see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3376.1

(DRB decision serves as Director’s Level decision and is not appealable). Pursuant to § 2244(d), 

Petitioner had one year until January 10, 2003, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until

November 1, 2005, nearly 3 years beyond the due date. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant

petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

1. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Chavis v. Evans, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements

for statutory tolling. Id.

Here, Petitioner filed one post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim in the state courts, to wit, a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, the petition does not toll the limitations period because it was not filed until

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The Supreme Court noted that it has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is available 1

under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In Pace, the Supreme Court again declined to do so and only assumed for the sake of

argument that it did, because Respondent assumed as much and Petitioner was not entitled to tolling under any standard. 125

S.Ct. at 1814 n. 8.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

November 29, 2004, over 22 months after the limitations period had already expired. As noted by

Respondent, Petitioner did file petitions with the Kings County Superior Court and the California

Court of Appeal; however, these petitions concerned an April 2003 decision and not the January

2002 decision. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 1

(1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain th

v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears th

the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; Smith v. Duncan,

297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). th

Assuming it is available, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he makes no

argument he should be granted equitable tolling, and this Court can find no reason why the petition

should be equitably tolled. Accordingly, the petition remains untimely. 

B. Procedural Default

Respondent further contends Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claimed. The

California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition with citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750

(1993) and In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734 (1941). Respondent contends the citation to Clark signals a

California court’s refusal to hear the merits of a petition based on the petitioner’s failure to present

claims in a timely fashion. Respondent alleges the citation to Miller signals the court’s refusal to

review the merits of a successive petition absent a change in the law or facts. 

A federal court will not review claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state court

has denied relief on those claims on a state law ground that is independent of federal law and

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This doctrine

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of procedural default is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Id., at 730-32.

There are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and refuse

to evaluate the merits of a claim because the petitioner violated a state’s procedural rules. 

Procedural default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

In addition, the state law ground must be independent of federal law. “For a state procedural

rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal

law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704, citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Morales

v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 (“Federal habeas th

review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law.’”) “A state law is so interwoven if ‘the state has made application of

the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the determination of

whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152

(9 Cir. 2000), quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). th

In Bennett v. Mueller, the Ninth Circuit found that California’s untimeliness rule was

independent after In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, 77 Cal.Rptr2d 153 (Cal. 1998); see Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581-83 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Also, a federal court may only impose a procedural bar on claims if the procedural rule that

the state used is adequate to support the judgment. To be adequate, “the state’s legal grounds for its

decision must be firmly established and consistently applied.” King v. LaMarque, ___ F.3d ___,

2006 WL 2684539 *1 (9 Cir. 2006), citing Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9 Cir. 2003). th th

To be firmly established and consistently applied, the rule must be clear and certain. King, 2006 WL

2684539 *1, citing Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9 Cir. 2002); see also Fields v. th

Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (The state procedural rule used must be clear,

th

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's purported default). While the

ultimate burden of proving adequacy rests with the respondent, the petitioner must place the state’s

affirmative defense of independent and adequate state procedural grounds at issue “by asserting

specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure.” Id. In this case,

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Respondent has asserted a procedural bar; however, Petitioner has not placed the affirmative defense

at issue. Therefore, the procedural bar is both independent and adequate.

If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas

review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual

prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9 Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. th

at 750; Park, 202 F.3d at 1150. Petitioner has not done so. 

Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed as procedurally barred.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Respondent further contends the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the

petition. Respondent alleges the petition concerns the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement and is

therefore appropriately brought in a civil rights complaint.

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show

that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus

petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of his

confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases. In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method for a

prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-

42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

In this case, Petitioner claims he has been unlawfully placed in the SHU. He does not allege a

loss of time credits or anything else that would affect the duration of his confinement. Thus,

Respondent is correct in arguing that Petitioner is challenging the conditions of his confinement, not

the fact or duration of that confinement. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief,

and this petition must be dismissed. Should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims, Petitioner must do

so by way of a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED as procedurally barred, violating the limitations period, and for failure to allege

grounds that would entitle Petitioner to habeas corpus relief. . 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy, any

party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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