Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01142/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JASON JOHN McLAUGHLIN, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-01142 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On or about May 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner filed an amended petition on June 25, 2010. Doc. 4.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12 & Doc. 13) on September 27, 2010.

Petitioner has not filed a reply to the answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

On January 6, 2003, a Maricopa County grand jury

returned an indictment charging Petitioner with six counts

related to possession and sale of heroin, methamphetamine,

cocaine, and marijuana. See Answer, Exh. A. The state

subsequently amended the indictment to allege historical prior

convictions, multiple offenses not committed on the same

occasion, and commission of offenses while released from

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confinement. Id., Exh. B.

 Petitioner signed a written plea agreement on April 8,

2003, regarding the charges stated in the indictment returned

January 6, 2003. The agreement provided Petitioner would plead

guilty to three counts of the indictment, i.e., one count of

selling narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony, one count of selling

dangerous drugs, a class 2 felony, and one count of selling

marijuana, a class 3 felony. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement

provided the other counts of the indictment would be dismissed.

On May 13, 2003, the trial court sentenced Petitioner

to concurrent terms of four years probation with regard to each

of the three counts of conviction, the terms of probation to

begin that date. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner received oral and

written notice of his rights to review. Id., Exh. E. 

At a hearing conducted June 27, 2005, the state alleged

that Petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his

probation. Id., Exh. F. A revocation hearing convened on June

27, 2005. Id., Exh. F. On October 12, 2005, the trial court

reinstated Petitioner to a term of four years probation pursuant

to his conviction for sale of dangerous drugs, sale of narcotic

drugs, and sale of marijuana. The reinstated probation was to

commence upon the conclusion of a sentence of incarceration for

a separate offense which Petitioner was then serving. Id., Exh.

G. Petitioner was again issued written notice of his rights to

review of this decision. Id., Exh. H.

On January 31, 2008, following a second revocation

proceeding, Petitioner was again reinstated to a term of four

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years probation, to date from August 2, 2007. Id., Exh. I.

Petitioner was again issued written notice of his rights to

review. Id., Exh. J. 

On January 13, 2009, following a third revocation

proceeding, the state trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation

on each of the three original counts of conviction, based on a

finding Petitioner had violated his probation by using heroin.

Id., Exh. K & Exh. N. Having found Petitioner had violated the

terms of his probation, the state trial court imposed concurrent

terms of imprisonment on each of the three counts of conviction,

the longest of which was a term of four years. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner was given credit for time served. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner was again issued written notice of his rights to

review. Id., Exh. L. 

On January 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se notice

of appeal, seeking review of the trial court’s revocation of

probation. Id., Exh. M. On May 27, 2009, Petitioner’s

appointed counsel in his direct appeal filed an Anders brief,

asserting counsel could find no meritorious argument to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner filed a pro se

brief in his direct appeal, asserting: “I looked at the A.R.S.

code on entrapment and this case meets all three conditions of

that code.” Id., Exh. O. 

On October 20, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court’s finding that Petitioner had violated

his probation and also affirmed the sentences of imprisonment

imposed by the trial court. Id., Exh. P. The appellate court

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construed Petitioner’s supplemental brief liberally, noting that

it was unclear if Petitioner was asserting he was entrapped in

2002 and 2003 or if he was asserting he was entrapped with

regard to the charge giving rise to the revocation of probation.

The appellate court noted the fact that Petitioner admitted

using illegal opiates during his probation revocation

proceedings. The state Court of Appeals also noted Petitioner

admitted using illegal opiates during the 2003 criminal

proceedings resulting in a plea agreement. Id., Exh. P at 3–4.

With regards to Petitioner’s underlying 2003

convictions, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the waiver

principle applied to defeat relief on this claim because the

issue was raised for the first time on appeal and because

Petitioner’s guilty plea waived the defense of entrapment. Id.,

Exh. P at 4–5. The Court of Appeals alternatively held that

Petitioner could not satisfy all the elements of the defense of

entrapment because the underlying convictions resulted from

successful attempts by undercover police officers to purchase

illicit drugs from Petitioner. Id., Exh. P at 6. The appellate

court found that there was no evidence to suggest that

Petitioner was not predisposed to selling drugs but for

undercover officers acting as buyers. Id., Exh. P at 6.

With regards to the probation violation matter, the

Court of Appeals ruled that the waiver principle applied to the

claim of entrapment because the issue was raised for the first

time on appeal. Id., Exh. P at 4. Addressing the merits of

Petitioner’s claim, the appellate court held that the defense of

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entrapment was inapplicable because at issue was Petitioner’s

voluntary written admission of a probation violation, rather

than his guilt of a criminal charge. Id., Exh. P at 5.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals assumed that, even if

entrapment applied to the proceedings, there was no evidence

that the idea of committing the probation-violating-offense,

i.e., using heroin, originated with anyone other than

Petitioner. Id., Exh. P at 5. 

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying relief in his direct

appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion

for reconsideration. Id., Exh. Q. On April 20, 2010, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of

the Court of Appeals’ decision. Id., Exh. S. 

On March 5, 2009, prior to the date the Arizona Supreme

Court denied review in his direct appeal, Petitioner initiated

an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. U. Petitioner

was appointed counsel to represent him in these proceedings.

Id., Exh. U. Petitioner argued that his attorney in his

probation revocation proceedings was ineffective because counsel

failed to argue for Petitioner’s reinstatement to probation.

Id., Exh. U. 

On May 14, 2010, the state trial court denied relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. V. The trial court

concluded Petitioner had failed to establish a colorable claim

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he had not

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shown that counsel erred or that any error was prejudicial. In

the context of prejudice, the state court noted state law had

required the trial court to impose a term of imprisonment for

Petitioner’s commission of a felony while on intensive

probation. Id., Exh. V. 

On June 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner asserts he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel because “Counsel

did not present the issue that the State pursued a case of

entrapment.”

II Analysis

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute of limitations with regard to

Petitioner’s 2003 convictions expired in 2004 or 2005.

Accordingly, The federal habeas petition is not timely with

regard to Petitioner’s original convictions, but the petition

appears to be timely with regard to the revocation of probation.

Petitioner properly exhausted a federal habeas claim

that he was denied the ineffective assistance of counsel in his

probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 29-30, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349-50 (2004); Robinson v.

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub

nom., Ryan v. Robinson, 79 U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. Nov 08, 2010)

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(No. 10-34); Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1014 (2009). Petitioner also arguably

properly exhausted a claim that he was “entrapped” with regard

to the activity resulting in the revocation of probation.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on these

claims because the state court’s decision that Petitioner’s

rights were not violated is not clearly contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. See See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75,

127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834,

838 (9th Cir. 2009). In the context of habeas review, the

factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008). The “presumption of

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court,

as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.”

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05

(1982). See also Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1086 (2010).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

the basis of a claim that the performance of his counsel during

his revocation proceedings was unconstitutionally ineffective.

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In Petitioner’s direct appeal regarding his probation revocation

and resulting sentence of imprisonment, the state appellate

court held that the defense of entrapment was inapplicable

because at issue was Petitioner’s voluntary written admission of

a probation violation, rather than his guilt of a criminal

charge. See Answer, Exh. P at 5. Nonetheless, the Court of

Appeals assumed that, even if entrapment applied to the

proceedings, there was no evidence that the idea of committing

the probation-violating-offense, i.e., using heroin, originated

with anyone other than Petitioner. Id., Exh. P at 5.

On May 14, 2010, the state trial court denied relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. The trial court concluded

Petitioner had failed to establish a colorable claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he had not shown

that counsel erred or that any error was prejudicial. In the

context of prejudice, the state court noted state law had

required the trial court to impose a term of imprisonment for

Petitioner’s commission of a felony while on intensive

probation. 

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney's performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

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2064. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Martin v. Grosshans, 424 F.3d 588, 592

(7th Cir. 2005). Additionally, prejudice from counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance is less likely when the case

against the defendant is strong. See, e.g., Avila v. Galaza,

297 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting the cases so

holding).

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. “An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at

25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). Vague or

conclusory claims do not establish evidence sufficient to

conclude the state court’s decision was clearly contrary to

federal law. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir.

1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

Additionally, defense counsel’s “strategic choices made after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible

options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices

made after less than complete investigation are reasonable

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments

support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

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at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. 

Under AEDPA, we apply Strickland to each

individual case, irrespective of whether the

precise fact pattern at issue has been

considered previously by the Supreme Court.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S. Ct.

1495 (That the Strickland test “of necessity

requires a case-by-case examination of the

evidence ... obviates neither the clarity of

the rule nor the extent to which the rule

must be seen as ‘established’ by this

Court.”). “[B]ecause the Strickland standard

is a general standard, a state court has even

more latitude to reasonably determine that a

defendant has not satisfied that standard .”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.

Ct. 1411, 1420, [] (2009) []. We do not,

however, afford the state courts a blank

check to determine, at their whim, whether an

attorney’s conduct was reasonable or

unreasonable...

Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Arizona courts twice considered that Petitioner was

not entitled to defense of entrapment. The District Court is

obliged to accept the Arizona courts’ determination that

Petitioner was not prejudiced by the alleged failure to raise

the issue in either his criminal proceedings or his revocation

proceedings. Accordingly, because Petitioner was not prejudiced

by the alleged error in failing to present an entrapment

defense, Petitioner was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel and is not entitled

to habeas relief on this claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is not timely

filed with regard to his initial convictions and sentences. To

the extent Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to

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the effective assistance of counsel during his probation

revocation proceedings, the petition may be denied on the merits

of the claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. McLaughlin’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

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objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 3rd day of December, 2010.

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