Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01763/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01763-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1763

LADERIAN MCGHEE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL A. DITTMANN,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:12-cv-00320-NJ — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 28, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Laderian McGhee filed a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, challenging his 2004 

convictions in Wisconsin state court. In the petition, he asserted, among other claims, that the state court had deprived 

him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The district court 

denied the petition. We granted a certificate of appealability 

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2 No. 14-1763

limited to his self-representation claim. For the reasons set 

forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In the early morning hours of April 9, 2004, two women 

were mugged on the street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and 

their purses taken. A vehicle was also taken from the street 

and driven to another location. Police arrested Mr. McGhee 

in connection with the offenses. 

Mr. McGhee was later charged in the Milwaukee County 

Circuit Court with armed robbery, theft of movable property 

from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner’s 

consent. The public defender’s office appointed attorney 

Richard E. Thomey II as his counsel. 

Mr. McGhee was tried by a jury in August 2004. On the 

first day of trial, defense counsel notified the court that 

Mr. McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested 

that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel 

acknowledged that he had not provided proper notice of this 

defense, but explained that Mr. McGhee had not mentioned 

it to him until two days before trial. Defense counsel also 

moved to withdraw as Mr. McGhee’s attorney. He submitted that withdrawal was warranted because (1) Mr. McGhee 

wished to discharge him; and (2) based on his knowledge of 

the case, he believed that putting on Mr. McGhee’s alibi deCase: 14-1763 Document: 42 Filed: 07/22/2015 Pages: 23
No. 14-1763 3

fense raised “certain ethical problems.”1 After hearing arguments from both sides, the court denied the motions. 

Following the court’s rulings, Mr. McGhee asked to 

speak, at which point the following exchange occurred: 

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, first of all, 

the man never—my attorney never asked me 

about no alibi. So how can I address him with 

my alibi if I never even seen him? I called his 

office several times. He doesn’t return my 

phone calls to come see me. How can I tell him 

I have a alibi if I can’t get in touch with him? 

I’m in the prison. I’m incarcerated. He’s my attorney. He supposed to come see me. He 

doesn’t come see me. 

Second of all, for him to sit up here and say 

something about my witnesses as far as perjury 

or anything of that nature, that’s a bunch of BS 

also. I don’t know where that came from. 

And for you to sit up and try to tell me this 

man going to be my attorney ‘cause of the 15 

day thing, the man didn’t tell me nothing 

about that. I’m withdrawing him as my attorney. That’s the bottom line of that.

THE COURT: All right. You wanted me to 

discharge him. Do you understand today we’re 

going to trial today?

 1 R.20 at 16.

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THE DEFENDANT: We—I ain’t going to 

no trial today.

THE COURT: We’re going to trial.

THE DEFENDANT: You might be going to 

trial. I ain’t.

THE COURT: All right. Now I’ll explain to 

you that if you—

THE DEFENDANT: You ain’t explain shit 

to me ‘cause I ain’t going to no motherfucking 

trial, period.

THE COURT: If you decide to be disruptive—

THE DEFENDANT: Fuck the trial. I ain’t 

going to no motherfucking trial. What part of 

that don’t you understand?

MR. THOMEY: For my part, I know you 

denied this motion already, but I’m asking the 

Court to reconsider.

THE DEFENDANT: You going to make me 

go to trial with a motherfucker that got me 

guilty before I even get in this motherfucker.

MR. THOMEY: I think it’d be difficult for 

he and I to cooperate in conducting his defense 

in light of his recent statements.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McGhee, I’m

going to give you an opportunity to calm 

down. I’m going to give you an opportunity to 

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No. 14-1763 5

remain in the courtroom. However, if you’re 

going to—

THE DEFENDANT: The man ain’t got my 

best interest at heart. You sitting here trying to 

make me go to trial with a man who already 

got me convicted before the damn jury even 

get in. What fucking part of that don’t you understand?

THE COURT: All right. You can remove 

the defendant from the courtroom at this point. 

Just before the jury comes back, I’ll give him an 

opportunity to return to the courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: I’m not returning to 

this motherfucker. Evidently you don’t understand. This man got me guilty before I even 

fucking get in the motherfucking courtroom. 

Shit. What part this jackass doesn’t understand?[2]

The court later allowed Mr. McGhee to return to the 

courtroom. Despite the court’s warnings, however, 

Mr. McGhee did not stay silent for long. Shortly after the 

start of voir dire, defense counsel, while introducing himself, 

told prospective jurors that Mr. McGhee would be the only 

defense witness. Mr. McGhee immediately objected to this 

remark, stating, “Wait a minute. Wait a minute. What happened to my witnesses?”3 It appears from the transcript that 

 

2 Id. at 19–22.

3 Id. at 32. 

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the court initially tried to ignore Mr. McGhee’s interjection. 

Mr. McGhee, however, continued to press the issue, at which 

point the following colloquy took place:

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I want to 

know how come my witnesses can’t come? My 

attorney apparently doesn’t—

THE COURT: Mr. McGhee, you get an opportunity to speak through your lawyer.

THE DEFENDANT: I want to—

THE COURT: We discussed this.

THE DEFENDANT: First of all, my witnesses can’t come, you won’t let me fire my attorney. My attorney done tried to withdraw his 

self from the case, and you steady trying to 

make me go through with this case.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McGhee, we’ve 

gone through this before. You have an opportunity—

THE DEFENDANT: But you—Evidently 

you not understanding. If the man don’t want 

to represent me, the man got me as guilty already, why would I sit up here, go to trial in 

front of all these people? The man sat here and 

told you out his own mouth that he is not trying to defend me. That doesn’t make any sense.

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No. 14-1763 7

THE COURT: Mr. McGhee, this is not an

opportunity—

THE DEFENDANT: It ain’t—

THE COURT: This isn’t an opportunity for 

you to argue with me.

THE DEFENDANT: Finna sit up here and 

railroad me. I’m not finna sit up here like no 

idiot. Let the man sit here. He done told you he 

is not trying to defend. The man ain’t even 

called none of my witnesses. Want me to sit up 

here go against four people against me. I can’t 

call none of my witnesses in front of all these 

people. What you think, I’m fucking stupid?

THE COURT: Mr. McGhee, if you’re going 

to continue like this, you’ve been warned.

THE DEFENDANT: Fuck warned. I’m telling you if I can’t have my witnesses, fuck this 

trial too. Simple as this. I’m not finna—Nobody 

in this damn trial sit up here with no lawyer 

that sat there and told you he not going to defend you.

THE COURT: Mr. McGhee.

THE DEFENDANT: Nobody in this jury sit 

up here and let the man—

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, at 

this point we’re going to take a recess.

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Excuse the jury.

(Jury excused.)

THE DEFENDANT: He said all this, and 

this judge won’t do shit about it. Fucking right, 

and remember that shit too. The motherfucker 

said he wasn’t defending me. This man still going to make me go to court with this motherfucker. They won’t let me have my motherfucking witnesses but want me to go to court. 

Why the fuck would I go to court with a motherfucker that got me sent to prison already? I 

don’t need a motherfucking microphone. Remember that shit. All niggers ain’t stupid. I 

ain’t finna sit up here and let your ass railroad 

me or you either. Sit in this motherfucking 

courtroom like I’m a fucking dummy. Sit up 

here and accept this shit.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McGhee, are 

you going to remain silent while we’re proceeding today—

THE DEFENDANT: Man—

THE COURT: —or are you going to have 

continued outbursts in the manner you are?

THE DEFENDANT: Man, whatever.

THE COURT: I’m going to give you a 

chance, Mr. McGhee, to be quiet and sit there 

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No. 14-1763 9

during the course of this trial, selection of the 

jury.

THE DEFENDANT: You expect me to sit 

here and not say nothing in my own defense? 

You expect me—This man ain’t speak up for 

me. Somebody got to speak up for me. If I 

don’t do it, who going to do it?

THE COURT: Mr. McGhee, if you’re not 

going to be quiet while we select the jury—

THE DEFENDANT: Go ahead, select them.

THE COURT: Are you going to remain 

quiet?

THE DEFENDANT: Go ahead, select them.

THE COURT: If you have another outburst 

like that, I’m going to remove you from the 

courtroom. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I be removed from 

this motherfucker sooner or later anyhow. 

Come on.

THE COURT: Are you going to be quiet?

THE DEFENDANT: I’ll let you all select 

them. I done say what I had to say.

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10 No. 14-1763

THE COURT: All right.[4]

Following this exchange, the court took a short recess, 

during which time Mr. McGhee was equipped with a stun 

belt to prevent further disruptions. Upon reconvening, defense counsel renewed his motion to withdraw, stating, “I 

think the only way that [Mr. McGhee] can really get a fair 

trial now is with a new attorney whom he has confidence in 

and who, from the outset, can explore this alibi defense that 

he has.”5 The court denied the motion. 

Before bringing the jury back in, the court gave 

Mr. McGhee the option of being handcuffed to his chair rather than wearing the stun belt:

THE COURT: ...Instead of the stun belt 

and the wheelchair and shackle, we will handcuff you and those handcuffs can then be hidden underneath the table if you sit quietly and 

you sit up close to the table. And there’s a skirt 

around the table, and the jury won’t see any of 

that.

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t care if the jury 

see it or not, Your Honor. Don’t make no sense. 

I mean, don’t make no difference whether they 

see it or not ‘cause I’m not being represented 

like I supposed to. And I demand and the man 

asked to withdraw from the case to you three, 

four times. What attorney do you know does 

 

4 Id. at 34–37.

5 Id. at 44.

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No. 14-1763 11

that? And I don’t know, for some reason you 

just got it in your head that you just going to 

make me keep him as an attorney, make him—

I don’t know. I don’t know. Maybe it’s something, but I don’t know.[6]

The court eventually decided to leave Mr. McGhee in the 

stun belt, but to seat him in a regular chair with a belly 

chain. 

After ensuring that Mr. McGhee’s chains were not visible 

to the jury, the court gave Mr. McGhee a final warning about 

being disruptive, triggering the following exchange:

THE COURT:...Mr. McGhee, again I’m just 

going to warn you, if you become disruptive 

and you shout out once again, we’ll have to 

remove the jury and remove you from the 

courtroom and complete the—

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, just give 

me a chance to speak like everybody else. 

That’s all I ask. If I can speak, we’ll have no 

problems.

THE COURT: Sir, you’re going to speak 

through your lawyer.

THE DEFENDANT: I can’t speak to my 

lawyer as you already know. I don’t know why 

you keep saying that. We wouldn’t have this 

problem—

 6 Id. at 46–47.

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MR. THOMEY: Do you mean you want to 

speak throughout the trial or speak when it’s 

your turn to be a witness?

THE DEFENDANT: I mean speak when 

they saying something. You going to speak up 

for it. I’m going to speak up for myself if 

somebody got to say it. Judge ain’t going to say 

it for me.

MR. THOMEY: I can’t tolerate putting on 

that kind of defense. I’m going to have a second chair.

THE COURT: I’m not going to allow it. If 

he engages in that, I’m going to remove him 

from the courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: You’re telling me I 

can’t tell my attorney to speak up for me?

THE COURT: You can talk to your lawyer 

quietly and not shout it out for everybody to 

hear in the courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: Ain’t talking about 

shout it out.

THE COURT: During the course of the trial, you’ll have opportunities to speak with 

your lawyer. If you become disruptive, you interrupt the questioning of the jury, you interrupt the questioning of any witnesses, we’ll 

remove you from the courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: If he don’t—You 

know what, go ahead with the trial.

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No. 14-1763 13

THE COURT: All right. Let’s bring the jury 

back out.[7]

In the proceedings that followed, Mr. McGhee did not again 

speak out of turn in front of the jury. 

The jury found Mr. McGhee guilty on all counts. The 

court sentenced him to seventeen years’ imprisonment followed by ten years of extended supervision. 

B.

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed Mr. McGhee’s conviction. Mr. McGhee then filed a 

petition for review in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; the 

court denied his petition as untimely. 

In response, Mr. McGhee returned to the court of appeals, where he filed a motion seeking to reinstate his right 

to a direct appeal, claiming that his trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective. The court of appeals denied his motion, reasoning that Mr. McGhee could pursue his ineffective 

assistance claim in collateral proceedings under State v. 

Knight, 484 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1992). Knight sets out the appropriate procedure for pursuing an ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel claim in Wisconsin courts. In particular,

Knight requires that such a claim be pursued via a habeas 

petition filed in the court that considered the direct appeal. 

“Such proceedings have come to be known in Wisconsin as 

‘Knight petitions.’” McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 561 n.2

(7th Cir. 2010).

 7 Id. at 53–55.

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14 No. 14-1763

C.

In November 2007, Mr. McGhee filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. In 

the petition, he asserted, among other claims, that the trial 

court had erred by not allowing his “request for substitution 

of counsel.”8

The court denied the petition. With respect to the substitution issue, the court concluded that “[t]he defendant’s failure to pursue this issue on [direct] appeal preclude[d] him 

from raising [the] issue in the circuit court” on collateral review.9 As for whether his counsel had been “ineffective for 

failing to pursue this issue on appeal,” the court concluded 

that that claim was one which would have to “be addressed 

to the appellate court under Knight.”10

Mr. McGhee did not pursue his substitution-of-counsel 

argument on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of his other claims, and the Supreme 

Court of Wisconsin denied discretionary review. 

In October 2009, Mr. McGhee filed a federal habeas petition in the district court, alleging, among other claims, that 

the state trial court had “erred in denying [his request for] 

substitution of trial counsel.”11 In July 2010, he filed a letter 

 

8 R.17 at 53–55.

9 Id. at 70.

10 Id.

11 R.1 at 16.

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No. 14-1763 15

seeking to withdraw voluntarily his petition in order to pursue reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The district 

court granted the motion. 

Returning to the state supreme court, Mr. McGhee filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have his appellate rights reinstated. The court granted the writ, reinstated and deemed timely filed the petition for review in his direct appeal, and denied the petition. 

Mr. McGhee then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court of appeals under Knight. He asserted 

that his appellate counsel had been ineffective by failing to 

appeal the trial court’s denial of his “request to dispense 

with his court appointed attorney and represent himself.”12

The court of appeals denied the petition. It concluded that 

Mr. McGhee never had “clearly and unequivocally declare[d] [a] desire to represent himself” and thus that his 

“appellate counsel [could not] be faulted for not arguing 

[the] issue.”13 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.

D.

In April 2012, Mr. McGhee filed a pro se petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus in the district court. In his petition, he 

asserted, among other claims, that the state trial court had 

 

12 R.19 at 127.

13 Id. at 212.

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16 No. 14-1763

violated his “right to discharge counsel and ‘SPEAK FOR 

HIMSELF’ (by appearing pro se).”14

In its answer, the State contended that Mr. McGhee had 

not exhausted his self-representation claim. Specifically, it 

submitted that he had failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and that, when he later did so during his state habeas 

proceedings, it was within the context of an ineffectiveassistance claim. The State also defended Mr. McGhee’s conviction on the merits, contending (1) that he never clearly 

and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation, 

and (2) that he forfeited his right to self-representation based 

on his disruptive conduct. 

The district court denied Mr. McGhee’s petition. With respect to his self-representation claim, the court determined 

that the state court of appeals’s ruling on his Knight petition 

was sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas review. Turning to the merits, the court concluded that Mr. McGhee’s request to proceed pro se was ambiguous and thus that the state court had not erred in denying

his Faretta claim. The court declined to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

Mr. McGhee timely appealed and sought a certificate of 

appealability from this court with respect to his Faretta claim 

only. We granted the certificate.15

 

14 R.1 at 11.

15 The district court had jurisdiction over Mr. McGhee’s petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Our jurisdiction is secure under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 

and 2253(a).

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No. 14-1763 17

II

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. McGhee contends that his 2004 convictions were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment 

right to self-representation and that the state court’s determination that he had not clearly and unequivocally invoked 

that right was objectively unreasonable.16 We review the dis-

 

16 On appeal, the State does not contend, as it did before the district 

court, that Mr. McGhee procedurally defaulted on his self-representation

claim by failing to assert it on direct appeal. Compare Lewis v. Sternes, 390 

F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that an ineffective assistance 

claim was insufficient to exhaust “the underlying issue that the attorney 

in question neglected to raise”), with McGhee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 567 

n.9 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have recognized that in some circumstances, 

where ineffective assistance claims are presented as a means to reach the 

embedded claims and those claims are the real substance of a petitioner’s 

challenge, we will consider them fairly presented.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Indeed, when the issue was raised at oral argument, 

counsel for the State openly acknowledged that it was “not arguing procedural default,” explaining (in an apparent about-face) that 

Mr. McGhee’s Knight petition was sufficient to preserve his Faretta claim 

for federal habeas review. Oral Argument at 9:41. Because the State has 

declined to pursue this issue on appeal, we need not address it here. The 

procedural default doctrine “is an affirmative defense that the State is 

obligated to raise and preserve, and consequently one that it can waive.” 

Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 669 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Here, because the State concedes that it is “not arguing 

procedural default,” we consider the issue waived. See id. at 670 (concluding that the State had waived a procedural default defense by deliberately choosing not to assert it); see also United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 

897, 904 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that arguments not raised in a party’s 

opening brief are waived).

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18 No. 14-1763

trict court’s denial of Mr. McGhee’s habeas petition de novo. 

Smith v. Brown, 764 F.3d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), a federal court may grant habeas relief to a petitioner whose claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in 

State court,” only if the state court’s adjudication of that 

claim (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “‘Unreasonable’ in [the AEDPA] context means more than just incorrect; 

it means something...lying well outside the boundaries of 

permissible differences of opinion.” Corcoran v. Neal, 783 

F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The relevant decision for purposes of our assessment 

under AEDPA is the decision of the last state court to rule on 

the merits of the petitioner’s claim,” Eichwedel v. Chandler, 

696 F.3d 660, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)—in this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals 

of Wisconsin denying post-conviction relief.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta v. California, 422 

U.S. 806 (1975), establishes the substantive law governing

our analysis of Mr. McGhee’s claim. In Faretta, the Court 

held that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right 

to self-representation, see id. at 819, and that, to exercise that 

right, a defendant must “knowingly and intelligently” waive 

his right to counsel, see id. at 835. The Court further concluded that, under the facts of the case, the defendant’s right to 

self-representation had been violated. See id. at 835–36. In 

reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized, among othCase: 14-1763 Document: 42 Filed: 07/22/2015 Pages: 23
No. 14-1763 19

er facts, that the defendant had “clearly and unequivocally 

declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel.” Id. at 835. On the basis of this 

language, many courts, including the Court of Appeals of 

Wisconsin, have interpreted Faretta as requiring that a defendant “clearly and unequivocally” articulate a desire to 

represent himself in order to invoke his Faretta rights.17

Here, Mr. McGhee does not contest this widely held view 

of Faretta. Rather, he contends that he is entitled to habeas 

relief because the state court’s determination that he had not 

clearly and unequivocally invoked his Faretta rights was objectively unreasonable. Specifically, he submits that his desire for self-representation was evident from the following:

(1) his repeated demands to discharge his attorney, (2) his 

declaration that he was going to “speak up for [himself]” 

and that he could not be “expect[ed]...to sit [t]here and...say 

nothing in [his] own defense,” and (3) his request “to speak 

like everybody else.”18 Taken together, Mr. McGhee asserts, 

these statements leave “no question that [he] was requesting 

 

17 See United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A demand 

to proceed pro se must be unequivocal.”); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 

1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Although Faretta was not primarily concerned 

with clarity and equivocation in making a request to proceed pro se, it is 

clear from the Court’s decision that a trial court’s obligation to conduct a 

‘Faretta hearing,’ at which a defendant is made aware of the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation, is triggered by the defendant’s clear 

and unequivocal assertion of a desire to represent himself.” (alteration 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Darby, 766 N.W.2d 

770, 776–78 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting cases).

18 R.20 at 36–37, 53; Appellant’s Br. 27–28.

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20 No. 14-1763

to represent himself.”19 In response, the State submits that 

none of Mr. McGhee’s statements, “whether viewed in isolation or in [the] aggregate, amount to a clear and unequivocal 

invocation of [his] right [to] self-representation.”20

The State’s argument makes clear that the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin reached a reasonable conclusion. 

Mr. McGhee never clearly articulated a desire to represent 

himself. A request to discharge counsel, without more, ordinarily does not signal a clear desire for self-representation. 

See United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(“[S]omething more than just firing one’s attorney is required before one clearly and unequivocally requests to proceed pro se.”). Here, although Mr. McGhee did request, explicitly, to discharge his attorney, he never asked to forego 

counsel entirely.21 Tellingly, when asked whether he was 

ready to proceed to trial that day without counsel, 

Mr. McGhee did not ask to represent himself, but rather declared that he was not “going to no trial today.”22 Because 

this statement suggests that Mr. McGhee was “seeking more 

time to retain other counsel rather than seeking to proceed 

 

19 Appellant’s Br. 29.

20 Appellee’s Br. 29.

21 Although Mr. McGhee certainly was frustrated with the proceedings 

and with the performance of his attorney, statements expressing such 

frustration do not clearly communicate a desire to conduct one’s own 

defense. See United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (“A 

general expression of dissatisfaction with an attorney should not be construed as an invocation of the Faretta right to represent oneself....” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

22 R.20 at 20.

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No. 14-1763 21

pro se,” we cannot conclude that it expresses a clear desire 

for self-representation. United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 

742 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Loya-Rodriguez, 672 

F.3d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that conduct which 

could be construed as “result[ing] from a desire for different 

counsel” does not clearly and unequivocally express a desire 

for self-representation).

Similarly, Mr. McGhee’s declaration that he was going to 

“speak up for [himself]” and that he could not be “expect[ed] ...to sit [t]here and...say nothing in [his] own defense” do not clearly communicate a desire to proceed without counsel.23 Mr. McGhee made these statements during 

the course of an expletive-ridden tirade against the court’s 

earlier rulings excluding his witnesses and denying the 

withdrawal of his attorney. During that outburst, he accused 

the court of trying to “railroad” him and stated that he was 

not going to “sit...[t]here and accept” it.24 Further, when 

warned about his behavior, Mr. McGhee responded, “Fuck 

warned. I’m telling you if I can’t have my witnesses, fuck 

this trial too.”25 Viewed in this context, Mr. McGhee’s desire 

to “speak up for [himself]” suggests an intent to disrupt the 

proceedings rather than a request for self-representation. 

Finally, Mr. McGhee’s request “to speak like everybody 

else” does not clearly express a desire for selfrepresentation.26 Whether considered in isolation or in con-

 

23 Id. at 36–37.

24 Id. at 36.

25 Id. at 35.

26 Id. at 53.

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text, this statement is ambiguous. See Loya-Rodriguez, 672 

F.3d at 858 (concluding that a defendant’s request “to communicate..., personally and verbally, during the following 

hearings, with the Court,...without the help of an attorney” 

did not clearly indicate a desire for self-representation). At

the time Mr. McGhee made this request, he had just been 

reprimanded for his disruptive courtroom behavior. When 

asked what he meant by the request, Mr. McGhee responded, “I mean speak when they saying something. You going 

to speak up for it. I’m going to speak up for myself if somebody got to say it. Judge ain’t going to say it for me.”27 The 

court understood these remarks as a request for permission

to interrupt the proceedings. In light of Mr. McGhee’s prior 

disruptive conduct, we believe that the court’s interpretation 

of his remarks was reasonable.28 Thus, even if his request to 

“speak like everybody else” could be interpreted as a request to proceed without counsel, it certainly does not constitute a clear and unequivocal demand to do so. See Burton v. 

Collins, 937 F.2d 131, 134 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The fact that there 

is more than one reasonable interpretation of the dialog between Burton and the trial judge is, in a sense, the best evidence that Burton did not clearly and unequivocally assert 

his right to self-representation.”); cf. United States v. Best, 426 

 27 Id. at 54.

28 We also note that Mr. McGhee did nothing to correct the court’s alleged misunderstanding of his request. Rather, after the court made clear 

that it understood his remarks as a request for permission to interrupt 

the proceedings, Mr. McGhee responded, “You’re telling me I can’t tell 

my attorney to speak up for me?” Id. Such a statement does not sound 

like the response of a defendant wishing to represent himself; indeed, it 

suggests exactly the opposite.

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No. 14-1763 23

F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that “we will indulge 

every reasonable presumption against [a defendant’s] waiver” of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Viewing these various requests together, as Mr. McGhee 

suggests, does not change our conclusion. Whether considered individually or in the aggregate, Mr. McGhee’s statements do not clearly and unequivocally communicate a desire for self-representation. The state court’s decision was 

certainly not unreasonable. The district court properly denied habeas relief.

Conclusion

Because the state court reasonably determined that 

Mr. McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his 

Faretta rights, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

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