Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00129/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Plaintiffs have withdrawn the count of perjury (doc. # 22 at 14), and have stipulated

that they will not pursue punitive damages against the City of Williams (id. at 14). These

aspects of Defendant’s Motion will be granted. (Doc. # 17 at 2.) 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Castaneda et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Williams et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV07-00129-PCT-NVW

ORDER

The court has considered Defendant City of Williams’ Motion To Dismiss (doc. # 17),

Plaintiffs’ Response (doc. # 22), and the Reply (doc # 26). 

Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Coconino County Superior Court on

December 12, 2006. (Doc. # 1 Ex. 1.) The case was removed on January 11, 2007. (Id; doc.

# 11.) In this Motion, Defendant City of Williams (“City”) assails the legal sufficiency of

Plaintiffs’ federal and state-law claims.1

 The parties are familiar with the factual background

of this case, which will not be rehearsed here. The City’s Motion will be denied for the

reasons set forth below.

I. Legal Standard

A claim must be supported by “a short and plain statement” with enough heft to “show

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule is designed to “give

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the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it resets.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

at 1964 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[O]nce a claim has been stated

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations

in the complaint.” Id. at 1968 (abrogating a literal reading of Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if the facts alleged do not state a claim that is

“plausible on its face.” Id. at 1973. When assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, all

factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir. 1994), and

all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party as well. Jacobsen v. Hughes

Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).

II. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claim Was Timely 

Plaintiffs’ federal right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Williams

accrued, at the earliest, on April 18, 2005, when Defendant Jason Moore first issued a

citation to Plaintiff Steven Castaneda for “Exhibition of Speed.” (Doc. # 14 at 3); see Kimes

v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) (a federal claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action). Plaintiffs

initiated this action on December 12, 2006, well within the two-year limitations period for

section 1983 claims in this State. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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III. Prima Facie Case for Causation under Section 1983 

The City contends that Plaintiffs have “not alleged a prima facie case for municipal

liability” under section 1983 “because they fail[ed] to allege that the unconstitutional

municipal practice . . . was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.”

(Doc. # 26 at 3.) This argument lacks merit. 

“In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare

allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or

practice.” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

and internal quotations omitted). A section 1983 plaintiff must also allege that the

challenged policy, custom, or practice was the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the

constitutional deprivation. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing

section 1983 causation requirements in a summary judgment posture). 

Plaintiffs have satisfied these minimum pleading requirements. The First Amended

Complaint identifies the offensive policy, custom, or practice, “The City of Williams . . .

tolerated misconduct of its police officers, and encouraged misconduct by failing to

adequately supervise, discipline or train [its] police officers,” and it further suggests that

Defendant Moore’s offensive conduct conformed to this policy. (Doc. # 14 at 9.) Plaintiffs

next allege that the City of Williams’ “exercise of these established policies and customs .

. . violated Plaintiffs’ . . . clearly established rights under the United States Constitution

against unreasonable searches and seizures of [their] person . . . home and property.” (Id. at

9.) The necessary inference of causation between the polices and customs of the City of

Williams and the constitutional injuries sustained by Plaintiffs is supplied by the portions of

the pleadings quoted above. The operative Complaint contains “enough factual matter (taken

as true) to suggest” that Plaintiffs suffered actionable constitutional deprivations as a result

of the City of Williams’ official policy, custom, or practice of failing to adequately supervise,

discipline or train its police officers. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964; see Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Therefore, Plaintiffs have “nudged their [section

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1983] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” and this is all that is required

from them at this time. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973; cf. Huffman v. County of Los Angeles,

147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (testing sufficiency of the evidence of causal connection

between official policy and alleged constitutional violation in a section 1983 municipal

liability case).

IV. State-Law Recovery against the City is Limited to a One-Year Limitations

Period 

Counts six through 10 of the First Amended Complaint seek relief against the City on

state-law grounds. (Doc. # 14 at 11-12.) These claims are subject to a one-year limitations

period. A.R.S. § 12-821 (“All actions against any public entity or public employee shall be

brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterwards.”); A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(B) (“[A] cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been

damaged and knows or reasonably should knows the cause, source, act, event,

instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage); see Gust, Rosenfeld

& Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588, 898 P.2d 964, 966 (1995).

Plaintiffs may not assert any state-law theory of liability against the City of Williams

that accrued more than one year before the filing of this action on December 12, 2006.

However, the “gravamen” of Plaintiffs’ Complaint relates to events occurring on or after

December 15, 2005. (Doc. # 22 at 14.) For example, the state-law claims of Ray and Debra

Castaneda accrued on December 15, 2005, when their residence was searched and their

property and persons were seized. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff Steven Castaneda specifically

“concede[s] that with respect to [his] state law claims only, [he is] precluded from seeking

damages for any event prior to December 11, 2005.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiffs’ state-law claims

were timely filed on December 12, 2006, “within one year after the cause of action

accrue[d].” A.R.S. § 12-821.

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V. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Filing Was Sufficient

A. The Statutory Requirements

Defendant City of Williams finally urges the court to dismiss all state-law claims for

failure to comply with Arizona’s notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). (Doc. # 17

at 8-10.) To maintain an action against a public entity or a public employee in Arizona, a

putative litigant must first file a claim with persons authorized to accept service for the public

entity or employee within 180 days of the accrual of that litigant’s cause of action. A.R.S.

§ 12-821.01(A). “The claim shall contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity or public

employee to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).

The statute also requires the putative litigant to include “a specific amount for which the

claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount” in his notice of claim. A.R.S. §

12-821.01(A) (emphasis added). 

B. The Houser Decision 

In Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 299, 152 P.3d 490,

496 (2007), the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the notice of claim statute must be

strictly construed. Section 12-821.01(A) “clearly” and “unequivocally” defines “the specific

requirements that must be met for a claimant to file a valid claim with a government entity.”

214 Ariz. at 299, 152 P.3d at 496 (surveying legislative history). The Houser court dismissed

the plaintiff’s state-law cause of action for failure to include a sum specific in the claim letter.

However, in the course of its decision, the court observed that the plaintiff also failed to

“provide [any] facts supporting the amount claimed.” Id. at 297 n. 3, 152 P.3d at 494 n.3

(emphasis in original). 

To satisfy the literal terms of the statute, claimants must “explain the amounts

identified in the claim by providing the government entity with a factual foundation to permit

the entity to evaluate the amount claimed.” Houser, 214 Ariz. at 296, 152 P.3d at 493. This

statutory “requirement ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that

constitute quick unrealistic exaggerated demands.” Id. at 296, 152 P.3d at 493 (citation and

internal quotations omitted). “Compliance with this statute is not difficult; the statute does

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not require that claimants reveal the amount they will demand at trial if litigation ensues.”

Id. at 296, 152 P.3d at 493. Houser enforces the clear and unequivocal intent of the Arizona

legislature. It does not work a “sea change” in the applicable law as Plaintiffs mistakenly

contend. Simmons v. Navajo County, 2007 WL 1200940 (D. Ariz. 2007); (doc. # 22 at 10-

12). 

C. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Claim 

Plaintiffs’ former counsel submitted a notice of claim letter to the City of Williams

on June 8, 2006. (Doc. # 17 Ex. A.) The letter was filed “within 180 days of the accrual”

of the state-law causes of action relating to the events of December 15, 2005. The notice of

claim contains “facts sufficient to permit the [City of Williams] to understand the basis upon

which liability is claimed.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A); (Doc. # 17 Ex. A at 2 (discussing

execution of search warrant at Plaintiffs’ residence and false arrest of Steven Castaneda).)

The letter includes “a specific amount for which the claim can be settled,” $50,000, and it

contains some “facts supporting that amount,” i.e., “Ray Castaneda experienced difficulty

in breathing due to the physical and emotional distress of his home being searched and was

transported to and treated at the Flagstaff Medical Center.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A); (doc. #

17 Ex. A at 2). 

Plaintiffs provided the City with information, however sparse, about the nature and

the extent of Ray Castaneda’s “physical and emotional” injuries. This factual foundation

satisfies the literal requirements of the statute because it permitted the City “to evaluate the

amount claimed.” Houser, 214 Ariz. at 296, 152 P.3d at 493. A full account of all the

injuries claimed by each plaintiff is not required. Houser’s footnote three, which faults the

plaintiff for failing to “provide any facts supporting the claimed amounts,” has no application

here.” Id. at 297 n. 3, 152 P.3d at 494 n.3 (emphasis in original); see Florian v. Perkinson,

2007 WL 1317263 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

The June 8, 2006 notice of claim letter did not identify every theory of common law

liability ultimately asserted by Plaintiffs in their First Amended Complaint. However, as the

City itself concedes, the June 8, 2006 letter does not limit Plaintiffs to the legal theories

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identified therein. (Doc. # 26 at 10.) Section 12-821.01(A) makes factual disclosure, not

artful pleading, a precondition to suit. The claim letter is not a prelude to substantive legal

briefing but is rather a tool to be used by public entities to “investigate and assess liability,”

facilitate “the possibility of settlement prior to litigation,” and assist “in financial planning

and budgeting.” Houser, 214 Ariz. at 294, 152 P.3d at 491 (citation and internal quotations

omitted). Plaintiffs’ notice of claim contained “facts sufficient to permit the [City of

Williams] to understand the basis upon which liability [for the events of December 15, 2005]

is claimed.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). It follows that Plaintiffs may prosecute any and all

claims arising out of the operative facts identified by them, including malicious prosecution.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant City of Williams’ Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. # 17) is granted as to the count of perjury and as to the claim for punitive damages

against the City. The Motion is otherwise denied.

DATED this 12th day of June 2007.

 

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