Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00373/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

DANNY CAIL, Husband and )

Administrator of the Estate of )

Teresa Cail, Deceased, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:14-CV-373-WKW

 ) [WO]

JOE RYAN ENTERPRISES, INC., )

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This wrongful-death action arrived here after removal from the Circuit Court 

of Russell County, Alabama, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441, and 1446(b). 

Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, which hinges solely on whether 

Defendant Joe Ryan Enterprises, Inc.’s principal place of business is in Georgia or 

in Alabama. (Doc. # 11.) If it is in Alabama, as Plaintiff contends, this action 

must proceed in the Alabama state court where it commenced. If Joe Ryan

Enterprises, Inc.’s principal place of business is across the border in Georgia, as 

Defendants argue, diversity jurisdiction is proper. 

The court allowed limited jurisdictional discovery, and the parties submitted 

supplemental briefing. The motion to remand is ready for resolution. Applying 

the nerve-center test adopted by the Supreme Court in Hertz Corporation v. 

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Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), the court finds that Defendants have not met their 

burden of showing that Joe Ryan’s principal place of business is not in Alabama. 

Accordingly, there is not complete diversity of citizenship, and Plaintiff’s motion 

to remand is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on 

them by Congress. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). 

At the same time, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Burns v. 

Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Hence, in actions removed 

from state court to federal court, federal courts strictly construe removal statutes, 

resolve all doubts in favor of remand, and place the burden of establishing federal 

jurisdiction on the defendant. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328–30 

(11th Cir. 2006).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s wife, Teresa Cail, died on March 8, 2013, while operating a 2005 

Mack 700 truck as a contract driver for Defendant Joe Ryan Enterprises, Inc. (“Joe 

Ryan”). Plaintiff alleges that tire tread separation caused the accident that killed 

Mrs. Cail. As the widower and administrator of the estate of Mrs. Cail, Plaintiff 

commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Russell County, Alabama, against 

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the tire’s manufacturer and Joe Ryan. Plaintiff alleges that Joe Ryan was 

responsible for the maintenance and service of the tire and the truck. 

Joe Ryan, incorporated in Georgia in 1985, is a “heavy hauling and trucking 

business” with approximately thirty employees, thirty trucks, and twelve 

customers. (Doc. # 105.) The company has two officers and directors: Norbert 

Quick, the president and chief executive officer (“CEO”); and Diane Quick, the 

secretary and chief financial officer (“CFO”). 

Joe Ryan hauls sand and gravel, scrap metal, and clay to and from “various 

places in Georgia and Alabama,” and these operations are based out of Joe Ryan’s 

location in Phenix City, Alabama. (Doc. # 1-5; Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 10.) Phenix 

City is where Joe Ryan carries out its physical operations and has a business 

license. The grounds at the Phenix City location include a maintenance shop with 

three mechanics, space to park the company-owned trucks, and office space for Joe 

Ryan’s president and employees. 

Mr. Quick’s office is at the Phenix City location, where he works six days a 

week managing the business operations of the company, including personnel 

management, equipment purchasing, and negotiations with prospective customers. 

More specifically, Mr. Quick “drum[s] up business,” “puts out fires with thirty 

employees,” hires and fires drivers, maintains and monitors drivers’ records for 

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compliance with Department of Transportation regulations, and oversees the 

maintenance of company-owned vehicles. (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 9–12, 31–32, 38–

39.) He decides when it is time to buy new trucks and whether to renovate the 

office space at Phenix City. (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 32, 38–39.) 

Mr. Quick performs ninety percent of his job duties from the Phenix City 

site, and the other ten percent from Georgia, either from his or Ms. Quick’s home. 

(Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 53.) The employees consider Mr. Quick the “boss,” 

alongside his dispatcher, whom Mr. Quick describes as his “right-hand man.” (Mr. 

Quick’s Dep., at 12, 15–16.) From the Phenix City site, the dispatcher assigns 

drivers their routes each day and collects tickets (or bills of lading) from the 

drivers after they make their deliveries. At the end of each week, the dispatcher 

takes the tickets to Ms. Quick. (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 28.) 

Ms. Quick lives approximately twelve miles from the Phenix City location, 

across the border in Columbus, Georgia.1 She manages the financial side of the 

business from her home office in Columbus. In Mr. Quick’s words, “[W]e work 

and bring the money to her, and she takes care of it.” (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 42.) 

Ms. Quick prepares payroll checks, pays corporate taxes, processes unemployment 

and worker’s compensation claims, sends out billing statements, makes bank 

 

1 Mr. and Mrs. Quick, although married when Joe Ryan was formed in 1985, are now 

divorced. During their marriage, Ms. Quick performed her job duties from the marital home in 

Hamilton, Georgia. She now works from her home in Columbus, Georgia. 

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deposits, balances bank statements, types contracts for bids and new customers, 

deals with Joe Ryan’s corporate accountant, and handles corporate filings with 

governmental agencies. (Ms. Quick’s Dep., at 7–8; Ms. Quick’s Aff., at 2.) 

Additionally, at the Columbus office, Ms. Quick maintains Joe Ryan’s corporate 

books, personnel files, and banking records. No other employees work at Ms. 

Quick’s home office, and Ms. Quick also has responsibilities as the CFO for 

another business that is not related to Joe Ryan. 

The parties do not dispute that Joe Ryan’s state of incorporation is Georgia, 

but they dispute whether Joe Ryan has its principal place of business in Alabama 

or Georgia for purposes of the complete-diversity requirement. Defendants argue 

that Joe Ryan’s principal place of business, or nerve center, is in Georgia, while 

Plaintiff, whose decedent is an Alabama citizen,1 maintains that it is in Alabama.

III. DISCUSSION

Because this is a removed action, the burden of persuasion is on Defendants 

to show that complete diversity exists, and they must support the jurisdictional 

facts “by competent proof.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96–97. Whether Joe Ryan 

maintains its principal place of business in Alabama or Georgia is dispositive of 

the jurisdictional issue, but Defendants do not have to “conclusively” demonstrate 

 

1

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (“[T]he legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall 

be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent . . . .”).

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Joe Ryan’s principal place of business so long as they show that it “is not in a State 

which would destroy complete diversity,” i.e., is not in Alabama. Sweet Pea 

Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1248 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). 

“Complete diversity requires that no defendant in a diversity action be a 

citizen of the same state as any plaintiff.” MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 

F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by 

Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 77; see also § 1332(a). A corporation’s citizenship 

derives from its state of incorporation and principal place of business. See

§ 1332(c)(1). 

In Hertz, the United States Supreme Court adopted the nerve center test for 

determining a corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of diversity 

jurisdiction. The “nerve center” refers to “the place where a corporation’s officers 

direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–

93. Generally, the nerve center will “be the place where the corporation maintains 

its headquarters – provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, 

control, and coordination . . . .” Id. at 93. Metaphorically, the nerve center is 

where the “brain” of the corporation is located. Id. at 95. The nerve center does 

not necessarily lie where “the bulk of a company’s business activities visible to the 

public take place,” that is, if the direction and control of those business activities 

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occur from a location in another state. See id. at 96. And “the nerve center test 

will not, in all instances, ‘automatically generate a result,’” but “it nonetheless 

‘provides a sensible test that is relatively easier to apply’” than other formulations 

courts have used to pinpoint a corporation’s principal place of business. Hoschar 

v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 170 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hertz, 559 

U.S. at 96); see also Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. 

10cv214, 2010 WL 3338550, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2010) (explaining that 

Hertz’s adoption of the nerve center test, which focuses on “a single location –

toward the center of direction, control, and coordination –” eliminates the need to 

“weigh[ ] different factors such as corporate functions, assets, or revenues against 

each another”).

The Hertz Court also recognized that “there will be hard cases” under the 

nerve center test, for example, where the corporation “divide[s] [its] command and 

coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations, 

perhaps communicating over the Internet.” 559 U.S. at 95–96. Even in the hard 

cases, though, the nerve-center test should “point[ ] courts in a single direction, 

towards the center of overall direction, control, and coordination.” Id. at 96.

Prior to Hertz, in circuits where the nerve center test already governed, 

courts formulated factors to assist in finding a corporation’s nerve center. The 

district court in Guitar Holding Co. enumerated the “most common” factors:

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1) location of corporate and executive offices; 2) the site where dayto-day control is exercised; 3) the exclusivity of decision making at 

the executive office and the amount of managerial authority at that 

location; 4) the location where corporate records and bank accounts 

are kept; 5) where the board of directors and stockholders meet; 

6) where executives live, have their offices, and spend their time; 

7) the location where corporate income tax is filed; 8) the location 

designated in the corporate charter; and 9) the location where a) major 

policy, b) advertising, c) distribution, d) accounts receivable 

departments and e) finance decisions originate.

2010 WL 3338550, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants contend that the “nerve center” of Joe Ryan is in Columbus, 

Georgia, where its CFO, Ms. Quick, works. Defendants portray Ms. Quick as the 

brains of the corporation, and they argue that the fact that the day-to-day 

operations of the business occur in Phenix City, Alabama, is not determinative.

Plaintiff says, on the other hand, that Mr. Quick is an “active CEO and 

President who directs, controls, coordinates[,] and manages the activities of Joe 

Ryan” from the operations facility in Phenix City, where the “‘actual business 

activities’” of “‘hauling and trucking’” take place. (Doc. # 23, at 14 (quoting Mr. 

Quick’s Dep., at 42–43).) Plaintiff contends that, because Joe Ryan is a small 

company with a single operational facility, “the day-to-day operations of the 

company are the company’s corporate activities,” making Phenix City the nerve 

center. (Doc. # 23, at 18.) For the reasons that follow, the court finds that 

Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that Joe Ryan’s principal 

place of business is not in Alabama.

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Initially, the court observes that this is one of the “hard cases” to which 

Hertz alludes in that the only two officers of the corporation – the CEO and the 

CFO – perform their separate duties in different states. 559 U.S. at 1194. Not 

surprisingly, Plaintiff and Defendants take opposing positions as to whether the 

CEO or the CFO directs, controls, and coordinates Joe Ryan’s activities.

The foregoing legal principles yield several factors that arguably point to 

Columbus, Georgia, as the “nerve center.” Ms. Quick, the CFO, works from her 

home office in Columbus, Georgia. In Columbus, the CFO calculates and files 

corporate income taxes, deals with the corporate accountant, administers payroll, 

collects delivery tickets, bills customers, receives payments, processes worker’s 

compensation and unemployment claims, and handles corporate filings with 

governmental agencies. Additionally, the corporate bank account is in 

Columbus; corporate books, corporate records, and personnel files are kept in 

Columbus; and governmental filings originate in Columbus. In short, 

administration of the financial side of the business occurs in Columbus; the 

completion of paperwork for legally required corporate formalities takes place in 

Columbus; all corporate and personnel records are kept in Columbus; and the CFO 

works from an office in Columbus. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing factors, after careful review of the evidence, 

including Mr. Quick’s deposition testimony, the court finds that Mr. Quick – the 

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corporation’s highest officer – maintains substantial discretion and authority over

the direction, control, and coordination of Joe Ryan’s activities from his Phenix 

City office, where he works six days a week and makes ninety percent of his 

business decisions. For one, the evidence reveals that the decision-making 

functions for generating income for the business are made in Phenix City. Mr. 

Quick, and sometimes his dispatcher to whom Mr. Quick has delegated substantial 

authority, decide who will conduct business with Joe Ryan. (Mr. Quick’s Dep.,

at 39–40.) Mr. Quick also solicits new customer contracts. In Mr. Quick’s words, 

“I know how to bid jobs, go after the customer. I could sell you a load of rock, 

even if you didn’t need it . . . . [T]hat’s how good I am. And that’s what I’ll do: 

meet people, make money.” (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 44.) On the other hand, the 

evidence reveals that, in Columbus, Ms. Quick’s job with respect to contracts is 

administrative. She types the contracts and sends the contracts where Mr. Quick 

tells her to send them. (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 61.) Overall, Mr. Quick is the one 

who makes the decisions that keeps the business financially afloat. He “brings the 

money” to Ms. Quick who then deposits the money in the bank account, cuts 

checks for employees, and pays the business’s bills. (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 42.) 

Moreover, the evidence establishes that Mr. Quick makes other major 

governance decisions with respect to the business’s overall activities, without input 

from the CFO. From his Phenix City office, Mr. Quick decides who to hire and 

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fire and what capital expenditures to make (e.g., when to buy new trucks and 

whether to renovate office space), and oversees the company’s compliance with 

federal safety regulations. Although Defendants object to the categorization, the 

facts bear out that Ms. Quick is more akin to a “bookkeeper,” and not the source of 

the overall direction, control, and coordination of Joe Ryan’s activities.2 (Mr. 

Quick’s Dep., at 42.) 

Defendants point out correctly that, under the nerve center test, a 

“corporation’s day-to-day operations are not relevant to the nerve center test under 

Hertz.” Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 172 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The court has focused not on the day-to-day operations, but rather on who is 

directing, controlling, and coordinating those operations. In this instance, the daily 

operations happen to occur at the same locale where those operations are directed, 

controlled, and coordinated. Based upon the structure of Joe Ryan’s business, the 

operations facility and nerve center collide, and Defendants have presented no 

authority that the two cannot be the same. 

 

2

 Ms. Quick attests, without elaboration, that Joe Ryan “approves and disseminates all 

policies and procedures in Columbus,” but this attestation is conclusory and not competent 

evidence. The only written company-authored policy is the “company policy book,” which also 

is referred to as the “employee handbook.” (Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 41.) The extent of Ms. 

Quick’s substantive involvement in writing the policy book is not clear from the record. (See

Mr. Quick’s Dep., at 41.) The evidence bears out that Mr. Quick had discussions with his 

dispatcher and son at the Phenix City site with respect to the formulation of the policy book, but 

it is not clear if Ms. Quick was involved in those discussions. There is evidence of Ms. Quick’s 

administrative involvement in Columbus in that she typed the policy and made copies for Mr. 

Quick to distribute to employees at the Phenix City location. (Ms. Quick’s Dep., at 12.) Suffice 

it to say, the evidence does not establish that all corporate policy emanates from Columbus.

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The conclusion is sound in this case. Joe Ryan is not a corporation with “far 

flung” and multiple business operations that are controlled from a separate, central

site. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Burdette Realty Imp., Inc., 102 F. 

Supp. 2d 673, 676 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (“The nerve center test has been recognized 

as well-suited for corporations that have no clear center of corporate business 

activity because the corporation is engaged in “far-flung and varied” business 

operations that are carried on in different states.”). Rather, the operations occur at 

a single location where there is a daily inflow and outflow of hauling activities, and 

it makes sense that Joe Ryan’s top officer would remain on that site in order to 

exert direction, control, and coordination over the business’s activities. In short, 

“[t]he over-all supervision and coordination of all functional operations” is in 

Phenix City. Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 864 

(S.D.N.Y. 1959).

Joe Ryan can have only one principal place of business. On this record, 

Defendants have not shown under the nerve center test either that Joe Ryan’s 

principal place of business is in Georgia or that it is not in Alabama. Accordingly, 

complete diversity is lacking, and remand is required. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Diversity jurisdiction in this removed action is lacking. Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. # 8) is GRANTED, and that 

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this action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Russell County, Alabama, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take the necessary steps to 

effectuate the remand.

DONE this 4th day of November, 2014.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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