Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02122/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JOHN G. CORN and RUTH S. CORN,

NO. CIV. S 03-2122 MCE DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

On May 11, 2005, Defendant United States of America

(hereinafter the “Government”) filed a Motion for Summary

Adjudication of Issues in the present matter, pursuant to which

Plaintiffs John G. Corn and Ruth S. Corn (“Plaintiffs”) seek

personal injury damages pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (“FTCA”) as a result of a motor vehicle

collision involving Plaintiffs’ car and a truck driven by a

federal employee. The motion now before the Court requests

exclusion of certain categories of evidence on grounds that

Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the prerequisites for offering

such evidence, and in turn cannot recover the damages sought

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 2

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

based on that evidence. Given the exclusionary nature of the

relief sought in the Government’s motion, the Court deems its

requests to be in the nature of in limine relief. Consequently

the Court will treat the motion as made in limine rather than as

a request for summary adjudication of issues under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(d). For the reasons set forth below, the 1

Government’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.2

The Government’s moving papers make it clear that its motion

has a three-fold basis: First, the motion seeks an order

precluding Plaintiffs from offering any testimony of percipient

witnesses on grounds that no timely reports from such individuals

have been submitted. Second, in the absence of percipient

witness testimony, the Government contends that Plaintiffs also

cannot recover damages for their medical treatment without any

testimony to properly establish those damages. Finally,

according to the Government, Plaintiffs cannot recover damages

for their alleged real estate losses stemming from the accident

in question since they failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies for pursuing such a claim.

The Government’s first two requests both hinge on whether

Plaintiffs can submit percipient witness testimony without having

provided a written report setting forth the opinions to be

offered by such witnesses pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The

language of that Rule, however, is clear. A written report is

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

required with respect to retained, rather than percipient,

witnesses. The Court’s February 10, 2005 Pretrial (Status)

Scheduling Order states only that expert designation, and any

accompanying reports, must comply with the requirements of Rule

26(b)(2)(B). It does not state that percipient experts must

furnish the same report required of a retained witness.

The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendment to Rule

26, pursuant to which subdivision (a)(2)(B) was added, states

unequivocally as follows:

“The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B),

however, applies only to those experts who are retained or

specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or

whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the

giving of such testimony. A treating physician, for

example, can be deposed or called to testify at trial

without any requirement for a written report.”

This explanatory language applies squarely to the present case. 

To the extent the witnesses at issue are percipient, they need

not submit a written report. Moreover, a number of the

individuals in question are physicians or health care providers,

as to whom the Advisory Committee specifically notes that there

is no requirement for a written report.

The Government’s in limine request to exclude the testimony

of all percipient witnesses for failing to provide a written

report is accordingly denied. In addition, in seeking to

preclude Plaintiffs from offering any evidence in support of

their claim for medical expenses resulting from the accident in

question, the Government contends if Plaintiffs’ percipient

experts are excluded they have no expert basis for such damages. 

That position fails because the Government’s position on

percipient witnesses lacks merit. Plaintiffs’ physicians and/or

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While the Government also argues that medical expenses, if 3

allowed, should be limited to monies actually paid for such

expenses as opposed to the stated billing amount, Plaintiffs do

not dispute that California law mandates that result. See Hanif

v. Housing Authority, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 640 (1988); Nishihama

v. City and County of San Francisco, 93 Cal. App. 4th 298, 306-07

(2001).

4

health care providers can offer testimony with respect to the

reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses incurred by

Plaintiffs. Hence the Government’s motion to exclude evidence of

Plaintiffs’ medical expenses is also denied.3

The final argument posited by the Government’s motion does

have merit. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs claim damages for

real estate losses occasioned by their sale of two rental

properties. According to Plaintiffs, they had to sell those

properties because of accident-related injuries (See Dep. Of John

G. Corn, 86:24-87:11). Plaintiffs maintain that because the

properties increased in value following their sale they should be

able to collect that appreciation as accident-related damage.

As a prerequisite to bringing an action against the

Government in federal court, Plaintiffs were required to “have

first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency...” 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). A claim is deemed presented for purposes of

§ 2675(a) when a party has filed both a written statement

describing the injury and a sum certain damages claim. Blair v.

Internal Revenue Service, 304 F.3d 861, 863-64 (9 Cir. 2002); th

Warren v. United States Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

724 F.2d 776, 780 (9 Cir. 1984) (en banc). th

While both Plaintiffs submitted the necessary administrative

claims to the appropriate governmental agency on or about August

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

28, 2002, neither claim makes any reference whatsoever to alleged

real property losses stemming from this accident, despite the

fact that an itemization of damages is included with respect to

both Mr. and Mrs. Corn that includes detailed subcategories of

general damages, medical expenses, wage loss and loss of

consortium (See Exhibits 1 and 4 to the Government’s moving

papers herein).

As the Ninth Circuit has recently recognized, “all claims

must be filed with the appropriate agencies before claimants can

bring action in federal court”. Blair v. Internal Revenue

Service, 304 F.3d at 864. In Blair, the plaintiff made a sum

certain request for wage loss resulting from personal injuries he

attributed to allegedly wrongful conduct on the part of IRS

agents. The fact that the plaintiff failed to attach a definite

monetary figure to his claimed medical expense caused the Ninth

Circuit to conclude that plaintiff had not satisfied the

administrative prerequisites for suing the government for such

expenses. The plaintiff in Blair consequently failed to pass

statutory muster in presenting a viable medical expense claim

despite the fact that unspecified medical expenses were

specifically mentioned in his administrative claim.

In this case, unlike the circumstances confronted by the

Ninth Circuit in Blair, there was no mention at all of

Plaintiffs’ alleged real property losses in their administrative

claims. While Plaintiffs attempt to argue that those damages

should be incorporated within their wage loss claims, the two

kinds of purported losses are separate, distinct, and not

interchangeable. In the absence of proper exhaustion, the real

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

property loss claim is not properly before this Court. See id.

at 869. Hence that particular item of damage may properly be

excluded from consideration at trial, and any evidence pertaining

to such claims is the appropriate subject of an in limine

request. The Government’s motion in that regard is therefore

granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 1, 2005

___________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02122-MCE -DAD Document 41 Filed 07/01/05 Page 6 of 6