Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01729/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01729-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA OLSCHEWSKE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 10-1729 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

REMAND

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B-P),

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiffs’ motion for an order remanding the above-entitled action to the Superior

Court of California, County of San Francisco, came on for hearing before this court on

August 11, 2010. Plaintiffs appeared by their counsel Richard M. Grant, and defendant

Rockwell Automation, Inc. (“Rockwell”) appeared by its counsel Nichole Gage. Having

read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authority, and good cause appearing, the court DENIES the motion.

This is an action brought by the heirs of Thomas Olschewske, deceased, alleging

injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. Plaintiffs originally filed this action in

December 2008, asserting claims against numerous defendants. On March 10, 2010,

plaintiffs amended the complaint to substitute Rockwell Automation, Inc. (“Rockwell”) for

one of the “Doe” defendants. 

On April 22, 2010, Rockwell removed the case, asserting federal officer jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Rockwell contends that plaintiffs’ claims against Rockwell

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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are based on the decedent’s exposure to equipment allegedly supplied by the United

States Navy – products that Rockwell claims would have been designed and manufactured

in accordance with specifications provided by the United States Government, and designed

and built under the direction and control of the U.S. Government and its officers. 

The removing party bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gaus v.

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). To remove a case falling within the federalquestion grant of jurisdiction, the removing party must show that a federal question appears

on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Motley, 211 U.S.

149, 152 (1908). An actual or anticipated federal defense will not justify removal. Id. 

However, removal under the federal officer removal statute is different, as it allows

removal on the basis of a federal defense. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), “[t]he United

States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the

United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act

under color of such office” may remove the case to federal court. Removal is proper if the

removing party can demonstrate (a) that it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute;

(b) that there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer's

directions, and plaintiff's claims; and (c) that it can assert a “colorable federal defense.” 

Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006); see Mesa v.

California, 489 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1989)). 

 “[W]hen federal officers and their agents are seeking a federal forum, we are to

interpret section 1442 broadly in favor of removal.” Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252 (because it

is important to the federal government to protect federal officers, removal rights under 

§ 1442 are much broader than those under § 1441); see also Jefferson County v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1999) (under federal officer removal statute, suits against federal

officers may be removed despite nonfederal cast of complaint). The asserted federal

defense need only be “colorable” and not “clearly sustainable. . . . The officer need not win

his case before he can have it removed.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).

Here, Rockwell claims that it is shielded from liability by the military contractor

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defense. This defense “immunizes contractors who supply military equipment to the

Government from the duties imposed by state tort law.” In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases,

960 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1992). The defense is appropriate when the defendant

establishes that the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; the

equipment conformed to those specifications; and the supplier warned the United States

about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the suppliers but not the

United States. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1998).

As the court indicated at the hearing, the amended complaint is largely

incomprehensible. In particular, the complaint (or the version provided to the court) does

not specify which particular Rockwell products are alleged to have contributed to the

decedent’s injuries. Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the case should be remanded

because Rockwell cannot show a causal nexus between the claims asserted by the

plaintiffs and the products produced by the defendant, and cannot “prove” that the federal

contractor defense applies. 

As an initial matter, to the extent that plaintiffs argue that Rockwell, as the party that

bears the burden of proof on its affirmative defenses, must “prove” that the federal

contractor defense applies in this case, the court disagrees. The cases clearly state that

Rockwell may remove the case if it is able to articulate a “colorable” federal contractor

defense – which is not the same thing as establishing that a defense applies to bar

asserted claims. 

Plaintiffs also argue that Rockwell cannot show a causal nexus between plaintiffs’

claims and Rockwell’s products because none of the military specifications provided by

Rockwell required that the products or equipment include asbestos. At the hearing, the

court asked counsel for Rockwell to indicate where, in the approximately 1000 pages of

military specifications (written in minuscule font) attached to the Declaration of Thomas F.

McCaffery, the court might find some indication that asbestos was “required” to be used in

the manufacture of electrical components. Counsel for Rockwell was able to point to only

one reference, in the specification for relays for electrical equipment, where the

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specification stated, with regard to “molded plastic,” that “[e]xisting stocks of molded parts

using approved grades of asbestos-phenolic molding materials may be utilized until

exhausted.” In response, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that “may be utilized” does not mean

“is required to be used.”

However, the court has located other references in the specifications that are

sufficient for purposes of this motion to show that the Navy required the use of asbestos as

an insulating material in some types of electrical equipment. It is technically true, as

plaintiffs assert, that Rockwell’s declarant, Thomas F. McCaffery, “fails to cite any instance

[in the voluminous specifications] that the U.S. Navy specified the use of asbestos in

electrical switches or controllers.” Nevertheless, the specification MIL-C-2174, “Controllers

and Master Switches, Direct-Current,” does describe various classes of insulation, and

states that “Class B insulation consists of mica, asbestos, fiber glass, and similar inorganic

materials in built-up form with organic binding substances,” adding that “where Class B is

specified no insulation having a lower temperature limit than Class B shall be used.” 

While this provision, and similar provisions in specifications for other equipment,

may not directly and unequivocally state that “asbestos is required for ‘x’ product,” as the

emphasis in the specifications appears to be more on technical requirements as they

pertained to the performance of insulating materials, the court finds that these references to

the use of asbestos-containing insulation are sufficient to establish a connection between

the U.S. Navy requirements as set forth in the specifications and plaintiffs’ claims regarding

exposure to asbestos via contact with Rockwell’s products or equipment. 

By contrast, in the cases cited by plaintiff – Pippins v. Atlas Turner, No. C-03-3006

WHA (N.D. Cal., Sept. 23, 2003); Groombridge v. Asbestos Defendants, No. C-00-1654

MMC (N.D. Cal., June 23, 2000) – the courts specifically noted that the word “asbestos” did

not appear anywhere in the materials submitted by the defendants. Accordingly, the court

finds that Rockwell has sufficiently established, for purposes of removal, that there is a

causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer's directions, and

plaintiff's claims.

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Plaintiff’s other main argument is that Rockwell cannot prove its federal contractor

defense because it cannot show that it warned the U.S. Navy about hazards of asbestos

that were unknown to the Navy. The court finds, however, that Rockwell has adequately

established that the U.S. Navy’s knowledge of the hazards of asbestos exposure from 1946

through the mid-1960s was “state of the art,” as the established, peer-reviewed study on

asbestos exposure was a report funded by the Navy and conducted at Navy shipyards. 

Thus, the court finds that Rockwell has asserted a “colorable” federal contractor defense.

The motion to remand is DENIED. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2010 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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