Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00916/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00916-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Bradshaw, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CV 05-0916-PCT-PGR 

) 

v. )

) ORDER

)

United States Department of )

Agriculture, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________)

Pending before the Court are the parties' Cross-Motions for Partial Summary

Judgment. The Court now rules on the motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For many years 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (1998) provided that "[a]ll uses of National Forest

System lands, improvements, and resources" constituted "special uses" requiring

"authorization from the authorized user" to conduct the use. This long-standing permitting

regulation allowed the Forest Service to manage all special uses on National Forest Service

lands. However, as Courts began to construe the regulation "as not requiring an authorization

for special uses that occur on National Forest Service roads and trails" a "gap in regulatory

coverage in the special use program" was created. 

In response, some commercial operators "design[ed] their services to fit the regulatory

gap, potentially compromising the quality of the recreation experience, public safety, and the

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interests of the United States." Such operations created numerous management difficulties

for the Forest Service, including: (1) requiring the Forest Service to implement "intensive

case-specific monitoring" to ensure companies claiming to operate only on forest roads and

trails actually so confined their operation; (2) creating "an uneven playing field among

businesses, some of which operate under a special use authorization and pay a land use fee,

while others do not;" and (3) impeding the Forest Service's ability to regulate use of National

Forest System road and trials in popular areas where "uncontrolled use can result in land and

resource impacts, user conflicts, or increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic with associated

traffic safety concerns on Forest System roads and trails."

Consequently, on January 22, 2003, the Forest Service published a proposed rule to,

among other things, "clarify that activities requiring a special use authorization on National

Forest System lands are also subject to the requirement for a special use authorization when

they are conducted on National Forest System roads and trials . . . ." The Forest Service

noted that while "[a] final determination will be made for the final rule," its "preliminary

assessment was that the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-

4347, did not require an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement

("EIS") for the proposed rule.

The proposed rule invited public comment over a sixty-day period. During this time,

the Forest Service received 4,055 comments, including comments from many of the

Plaintiffs. The Forest Service analyzed the comments and responded to them as part of the

seventeen page, single spaced comment review included in the preamble of the final rule.

On July 13, 2004, after completing its analysis of public comments, the Forest Service

published the finalized clarifying regulation with an effective date of August 12, 2004.

Included with the finalized regulation was the above mentioned comment analysis, which

discusses the public comments and general concerns about NEPA compliance. The Forest

Service confirmed its preliminary assessment that NEPA did not require an environmental

assessment or an EIS for the proposed rule because the regulation merely provided "more

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consistent procedures for processing special use proposals and applications and administering

special use authorizations . . . ." The Forest Service specifically noted that subsequent, site

specific "[i]ssuance of a special use authorization for a specific use as provided in this rule,

however, may trigger the need for documentation of environmental analysis on a case-bycase basis under NEPA."

Through the present action, the Plaintiffs have challenged the promulgation of the new

aforementioned rule in general, and its implementation and enforcement in the Sedona

Ranger District specifically. The Plaintiffs contend that the rule violates several federal laws

and policies and NEPA in particular. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs assert that promulgation of

the rule is an arbitrary and capricious action that may be redressed by declaratory and

injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). Arguing the substantial

merit of their claims and the threat of immediate and irreparable injury, the Plaintiffs

requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65 and/or a stay of agency action under the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 705. After an

evidentiary hearing in April of 2005, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive

relief. 

The Court further ordered that Counts 3 and 4 of the Plaintiffs' First Amended

Complaint were dismissed through stipulation, that Counts 2, 5 and 6 were stayed pending

the outcome of administrative appeals, and that Count 1 would be resolved through summary

judgment. A stipulated briefing schedule was entered as to Count 1 on October 20, 2005, and

the present motions were filed accordingly.

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, empowers federal

courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" if they fail

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Title 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) provides that a reviewing Court shall "hold unlawful and set aside

agency action,, findings, and conclusions found to be – (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power,

privilege or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of

statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial

evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record

of any agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts

are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court."

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to conform to six specified standards.1 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490

U.S. 360, 377-78 (1989). The APA imposes a narrow and highly deferential standard of

review limited to a determination of whether the agency acted in a matter that was "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C.

706(2)(A). An agency's decision may only be called "arbitrary and capricious" if: 

the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important

aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision

that runs counter to evidence before the agency, or is so

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in vew

or the product of agency expertise.

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th

Cir. 1996). The Court is to review the administrative record as a whole, or those parts cited

by a party, when deciding whether an agency has acted in accordance with the law. Florida

Power & Light Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985).

When faced with a motion for summary judgment in an APA case, the function of the

district court is to determine whether or not, as a matter of law, the evidence in the

administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did. Occidental

Engineering Co. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir.

1985). There are no disputed facts for the Court to resolve since this is accomplished at the

agency level. Id.

A. Categorical Exclusion

Count One of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint maintains that the Forest

Service "did not prepare and environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement

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as required by NEPA, by regulations of the Council on Environmental Equality ("CEQ"), i.e.

40 C.F.R. § 1501.2, and by their own administrative policies directives and regulations, i.e.

Forest Service Handbook ("FSH") 1909.15, Chapter 10." The Forest Service admits that no

environmental assessment or EIS was prepared in connection with the publication of the

proposed final rule; however, the Forest Service states that no such statement or assessment

was required under the applicable law since the rule did not constitute a major federal action

or a major substantive policy change.

Section 4332(2)(c) of NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an environmental

impact statement for every major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 defines major federal action to include:

(a) . . . new and continuing activities, including projects and

programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted,

new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies or procedures; and regulated or approved by federal agencies; 

legislative proposals. . . .

(b)(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and

interpretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq . . . . .

. . . . formal documents establishing an agency's policies which

will result in or substantially alter agency programs.

The CEQ's regulations provide for two methods of determining whether a proposed major

federal action requires preparation of an EIS. First, the agency may conduct a preliminary

examination, called an environmental assessment, of the proposed action. 40 C.F.R. §§

1501.4, 1508.9. The environmental assessment serves to briefly provide sufficient evidence

and analysis to determine whether the action will have a significant effect on the environment

which is the threshold for preparation of an EIS. Id. at § 1508.9.

Second, under the CEQ's regulations, which were promulgated pursuant to NEPA,

each agency is directed to identify classes of actions that normally "do not individually or

cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and are, therefore, excluded

from the requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or an EIS. Id. at §§

1507.39b)(2), 1508.4; Alaska Center for the Environment v. U.S. Forest Service, 189 F.3d

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851, 857 (9th Cir. 1999). These classes of actions are called "categorical exclusions." Alaska

Center, 189 F.3d at 857. However, the agency's procedures must also provide for

extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant

environmental effect and therefore, require preparation of an environmental assessment or

an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. Accordingly, for each action that may fit the criteria for a

categorical exclusion, the agency must assess whether there are any extraordinary

circumstances that increase the significance of the action's potential environmental effects.

However, it is important to note that "[t]he mere presence of one or more of these resource

conditions does not preclude use of categorical exclusion," as "[i]t is the degree of the

potential effect of a proposed action on these resource conditions that determines whether

extraordinary circumstances exist." FSH Part 1909.15, Section 30.2

The Forest Service provides its criteria for identifying categorical exclusions in the

FSH Part 1909.15, Chapter 30. Under section 31.12(2) of Chapter 30, the Forest Service

categorically excludes "[r]ules, regulations, or policies to establish Service-wide

administrative procedures, program processes, or instructions." In addition, the Forest

Service provides a non-exhaustive list of some "rules, regulations or policies" that fall within

this categorical exclusion, including changes to conditions of special use authorizations. Id.

at § 31.12(2)(d).

On January 22, 2003, the Forest Service published a proposed rule to amend

regulations at 36 C.F.R. Part 251, Subpart B, that govern special uses on National Forest

System land. Prior to this proposal, the former regulation at 251.50(d) provided that a special

use authorization was not required for use of National Forest System roads and trails, unless

mandated by an order issued pursuant to 261.50 or a regulation issued pursuant to 261.70.

Courts have construed this provision as not requiring authorization for special uses that occur

on National Forest System roads and trails and have invalidated orders issued pursuant to

section 261.50 that required a permit for special uses occurring on Forest System roads. The

Forest Service found that the various court rulings created a gap in regulatory coverage in

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the special uses program. The new rule requires those who wish to conduct special uses,

including outfitting and guiding on National Forest Service roads and trails, to submit a

proposal to an authorized officer and obtain a special use authorization.

The Plaintiffs claim that the rule implemented by the Forest Service is so unlike the

usual examples of routine administration that no honest , rational, unbiased decision-maker

could have determined that the categorical exclusion of section 31.1b, subpart (2) was

applicable to it. The Plaintiffs argue that the rule constitutes a major, substantive change in

policy that will necessarily have far-reaching economic, environmental and social

ramifications. However, the Plaintiffs cite no legal basis or facts in the administrative record

to support their argument.

As previously indicated, the Court reviews an agency decision not to prepare an EIS

under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultz,

992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1991). This standard also applies to an agency's determination

that a particular action falls within one of its categorical exclusions. Bicycle Trails Council

of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996). The specific categorical exclusion

used by the Forest Service for the regulation is "rules, regulations, or policies to establish

Service-wide administrative procedures, program processes, or instructions." See FSH

1909.15, section 31.2. The promulgation of the rule at issue falls within this categorical

exclusion as a "rule, regulation or policy" by establishing a requirement for permits for all

special uses conducted on National Forest System roads and trials; and "establishing Servicewide administrative procedures" by enumerating which activities require permits and under

what circumstances. Here, the rule merely requires those who wish to conduct a special use

on National Forest System roads and trails to submit a proposal to an authorized officer to

obtain a special use authorization. The rule does no more. As the Defendants correctly note,

the rule does not have "an immediate on-the-ground effect." The rule does not issue permits

nor does it allocate any resources. As stated, the rule provides that commercial outfitters and

guides, among others, need a special use permit to operate on National Forest System lands.

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It is clear to the Court that the Forest Service did not violate NEPA in deciding that

preparation of an environmental assessment or an EIS was not necessary prior to the

promulgation of the rule at issue. "An agency satisfies NEPA if it applies its categorical

exclusions and determines that neither an environmental assessment or an EIS is required,

so long as the application of the exclusions to the facts of the particular action is not arbitrary

or capricious." Bicycle Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1456 fn 5. It appears that the Plaintiffs

may have confused what is required under NEPA to issue the regulation with what may be

required under NEPA to actually issue site-specific special use authorizations. As explained

in the July 13, 2004 publication of the finalized rule, although issuing new site-specific

special use authorizations may affect the environment, the clarifying regulation does not

actually determine whether any particular use of the National Forest System lands, road, or

trails will be permitted. When applications are made for site specific special use

authorizations, those decisions may trigger the need for documentation of environmental

analysis on a case-by-case basis. As written, the rule has no immediate impact on the

environment; therefore, the NEPA provisions requiring an environmental assessment or an

EIS are not yet triggered. See, e.g., Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at

1449.

Furthermore, under the Forest Service's special use regulations at 36 C.F.R. §

251.45(e)(6) and (g)(1) and (2), environmental analysis in not required until a proposal for

a special use authorization has met two levels of screening. If the proposal fails to pass both

levels, NEPA requirements are not triggered. The regulations clearly state that the

applications for special use authorizations will be evaluated pursuant to NEPA, if necessary,

before issuance of the permit. However, the Forest Service was not required to conduct

further screening under NEPA for promulgation. 

B. Extraordinary Circumstances

The Plaintiffs also argue that extraordinary circumstances existed in the rule-making

phase that precluded the Forest Service from relying on a categorical exclusion. However,

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the Plaintiffs seem to misinterpret FSH 1909.5, section 30.3, subpart 2, when making this

argument. The regulation outlines the resource conditions that should be considered in

determining whether extraordinary circumstances related to the proposed action warrant

further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or EIS. Those resource

conditions are as follows:

a. Federally listed threatened or endangered species or

designated critical habitat, species proposed for Federal listing

or proposed critical habitat, or Forest Service sensitive species.

b. Flood plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds. c.

Congressionally designated areas, such as wilderness,

wilderness study areas, or national recreation areas. d.

Inventoried roadless areas. e. Research natural areas. f.

American Indian and Alaskan Native religious or cultural sites.

g. Archaeological sites, or historic properties.

 However, the provision also expressly states that "[t]he mere presence of one or more of

these resource conditions does not preclude use of a categorical exclusion. It is the degree

of the potential effect of a proposed action on these resource conditions that determines

whether extraordinary circumstances exist." Id. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs merely states that

examples of (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are present in the Sedona Ranger District, but the

Plaintiffs fail to make any specific allegations as to what those extraordinary circumstances

might be or how the presence of those circumstances precluded the use of a categorical

exclusion. 

In this case, the Forest Service concluded that the rule would have no effect on the

listed resource conditions, and the Court has no reason to find such a decision to be in error.

The final rule advises that the issuance of a special use permit under the regulation "may

trigger the need for documentation of [environmental assessment] on a case-by-case under

NEPA" indicating that the agency clearly knew and understood its present and future

obligations under NEPA.

C. Count Six

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Although the Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment on Count Six of their First

Amended Complaint, this claim is not ripe for review. The Court's Order dated October 24,

2005 specifically states that Count 6 of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is stayed

pending further outcome of the administrative appellate process. As such, the Court need not

address the arguments raised by the Plaintiffs at this time.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the Forest Service's decision

to apply a categorical exclusion to the promulgated rule was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

The record in this case clearly shows that the agency could have reasonably have found the

facts as it did; therefore, the Court must affirm.

IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 

58) is DENIED regarding Count One of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both the Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 65), and Intervenor Pink Jeep's Cross-Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) are GRANTED regarding Count One of the Plaintiffs' First

Amended Complaint.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2006.

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