Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01274/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01274-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIMITRI Z. STORM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CSATF WARDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01274-BAM (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE 

DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST PRIOR TO FILING 

SUIT

(ECF No. 1)

TWENTY-ONE (21) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Dimitri Z. Storm (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust 

the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211

(2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199–1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is required 

regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all suits 

relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Case 1:24-cv-01274-JLT-BAM Document 8 Filed 10/23/24 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that unidentified CDCR officers interfered with or 

otherwise tampered with phone calls made from his tablet or otherwise disrupted, intercepted, or 

blocked his network connections. (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that certain calls 

made on or about October 17, 2024 were disrupted and intercepted. (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff further 

states that “There as of yet is no Administrative Grievance procedure for issues concerning 

CSATF STAFF interfering & disrupting (the GTL-TABLET-PHONE) as these officers are not 

known or present for identifying due to the fact that they work at a offsite location controlling 

(the GTL-TABLETS-Wifi) the network/connections etc. They are (“John Doe”) right now until a 

subpoena for records identifies who they are—in summary right now there is no safeguards in 

place such as grievance procedures to address this.” (Id. at 3 (text lightly edited).) The complaint 

is signed and dated October 18, 2024, one day after the phone calls at issue. (Id. at 5.)

Although Plaintiff alleges that no administrative grievance process is available because he 

does not know the names of the officers involved, the Court notes that the grievance process does 

not require the names of staff members, but requires only that a claimant “describe all 

information known and available to the claimant regarding the claim, including . . . names and 

titles of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff members) . . . to the best of the 

claimant’s knowledge.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 3482(c). In addition, while Plaintiff may 

not be aware of specific staff members involved in the alleged claims, Plaintiff also names the 

Warden of CSATF, the Secretary of CDCR, and the Governor of California as additional 

defendants to this action, and Plaintiff does not allege that he attempted to file administrative 

grievances against any of these known and identified individuals.

Based on the information provided, it appears Plaintiff filed suit prematurely without first 

exhausting his administrative remedies in compliance with the PLRA, section 1997e(a).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to show cause within twenty-one (21) 

days from the date of service of this order why this action should not be dismissed, without 

prejudice, for failure to exhaust prior to filing suit. See, e.g., Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 

(9th Cir. 2014) (in rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, it 

may be dismissed for failure to state a claim); Medina v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 

Case 1:24-cv-01274-JLT-BAM Document 8 Filed 10/23/24 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2:16-cv-0765 AC P, 2016 WL 6038181, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016) (“When it is clear from 

the face of the complaint and any attached exhibits that a plaintiff did not exhaust his available 

administrative remedies before commencing an action, the action may be dismissed on screening 

for failure to state a claim.”); Lucas v. Dir. of Dep’t. of Corrs., 2015 WL 1014037, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (relying on Albino and dismissing complaint without prejudice on screening 

due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:24-cv-01274-JLT-BAM Document 8 Filed 10/23/24 Page 3 of 3