Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01338/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01338-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT L. ROARK,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1338 LKK DAD P

vs.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden, et al., AMENDED

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

In light of petitioner’s objections to the findings and recommendations issued in

this case and good cause appearing, this court vacates the findings and recommendations issued

on October 9, 2009, and hereby issues the following amended findings and recommendations.

Petitioner is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on July 11, 2005 in the Nevada County Superior Court on charges of assault

with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats, following his plea of nolo contendere to those

charges. He seeks relief on the grounds that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied.

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PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At petitioner’s preliminary examination, Alex Felty testified that on October 14,

2004, he was at his gold mining camp on the Bear River when he was approached by petitioner,

whom he had known and worked with for several years. (CT at 73-74.) Petitioner asked Felty to

return some mining equipment he had loaned to him, and which should have been returned the

day before. (Id. at 74-75.) Mr. Felty had been unable to return the equipment on the previous

day because he had run over his girlfriend’s puppy with his truck and had to stay home to console

his girlfriend. (Id. at 75-76.) When Felty explained this to petitioner, petitioner became very

angry and hit Felty on the forehead with a stick while threatening to kill him. (Id. at 76-77.) Mr.

Felty sustained a deep gash on his forehead and was treated at the hospital. (Id. at 78-79.) On

cross-examination, Mr. Felty testified that he and petitioner had quarreled in the past but had

“gotten back to the point where we were very good friends.” (Id. at 83.) He further testified that

petitioner’s girlfriend, T.C.; Felty’s “dredge partner” Richard Sales; and a woman named Lyne

McCarthy were present at the scene. (Id. at 85.) 

Jesse King, a Nevada County Deputy Sheriff, testified that he responded to an

address in Grass Valley on the night of October 14, 2004. (Id. at 89.) He spoke to T.C., who told

him that petitioner threatened to kill Mr. Felty and assaulted him with a stick at Felty’s mining

camp. (Id. at 90-92.) Officer King arrested petitioner and searched his tent, where he found a

wooden stick and drug paraphernalia. (Id. at 91, 93-95.) On the way to the county jail, petitioner

told Officer King that he had been “framed” and that he had merely been defending himself

against Mr. Felty, who had a knife. (Id. at 101.) No other person mentioned to Officer King that

Mr. Felty had a knife. (Id. at 103-04.) Lyne McCarthy told Officer King that she heard petitioner

and Felty arguing and then saw petitioner chasing Felty with a stick or a bat in his hand. (Id. at

105-08.) 

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Subsequently, petitioner 

pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §

245, subd. (a)(1) [fn omitted]- -count 1) and threatening to commit

a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury (§ 422 --

count 2). In exchange, the prosecution amended count 2 from a

felony to a misdemeanor; and dismissed a great bodily injury

enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 1, a count of

possession of paraphernalia ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11364 -- count

3), and an unrelated misdemeanor (case No. M05-063). Defendant

was sentenced to state prison for four years and to county jail for

six months consecutively. To satisfy the latter term, the court used

120 of the reported 265 days of custody credit and added 60 days

of conduct credit (180 days total). Defendant was awarded the

balance of 145 days of custody credit and 72 days of conduct

credit. He was ordered to pay a $635 fine, including penalty

assessments, a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), and a $200

restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked (§ 1202.45).

(Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. 2, Decision of the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District, at 1-2.)

Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and a brief in

accordance with the decision in People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979), in which counsel set

forth the facts of the case and requested that the appellate court review the record and determine

whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc.1.) The California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District modified the judgment to award petitioner

additional custody and conduct credits but otherwise affirmed petitioner’s judgment of

conviction. (Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. 2 at 3.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Nevada

County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The Superior Court rejected petitioner’s claims,

reasoning as follows:

Petitioner, following his plea of “no-contest” and sentence to

prison, has filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He

claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his

preliminary hearing, because counsel did not investigate his

defenses beforehand. Assuming, without finding, that his

allegations are true, he is not entitled to relief. His “no contest”

plea waived any claim he had that he did not receive proper

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representation at the preliminary hearing. See Blackledge v. Perry

(1974) 417 U.S. 21, 29-30.)

The petition is therefore denied.

(Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. 4.)

Petitioner subsequently filed petitions seeking habeas relief in the California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District and California Supreme Court. (Resp’ts’

Lodged Docs. 5, 7.) Both of those petitions were summarily denied. (Resp’ts’ Lodged Docs. 6,

8.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for

granting habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). If the state court’s decision

does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review

of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). See

also Frantz v. Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that

we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such

error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues

raised.”).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned

state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court

decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. 

Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle

v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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II. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several

respects. First, he claims that counsel failed to conduct sufficient investigation to enable him to

adequately challenge the testimony of government witnesses Felty and Deputy King at his

preliminary hearing. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of petition (P&A) at 9-

12, 21-23.) Second, he contends that Deputy King testified falsely at the preliminary hearing

without objection by trial counsel. (Id. at 12-15.) Third, petitioner claims that his trial counsel

improperly failed to object to the illegal search of his tent. (Id. at 13-14.) Fourth, he claims that

his trial counsel was “burdened by a conflict between his client’s interests and his own

sympathies to the prosecution’s position.” (Id. at 16.) Fifth, petitioner contends his trial counsel

failed to investigate whether Mr. Felty was armed, in order to support a possible defense of selfdefense. (Id.) Sixth, petitioner contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate and interview

potential defense witnesses. (Id. at 21-23; Traverse at 3-5.) Petitioner summarizes these claims

as follows:

By his inaction, deliberate or otherwise, [counsel] deprived himself

of the reasonable bases upon which to reach informed tactical and

strategic decisions. Most importantly, [counsel] called no

witnesses and presented no defense at the Preliminary

Examination, other than an inept attempt to cross-examine

prosecution witnesses. Thus, [counsel] defrauded both the court

and his client and ill served his client . . .

(P&A at 17.) In his traverse, petitioner also faults counsel for “refus[ing] to file briefs or motions

to suppress evidence.” (Traverse at 2.) 

In addition, petitioner claims that his trial counsel operated under a prejudicial

conflict of interest in that he failed to recognize that his investigator was too busy with other

cases to sufficiently investigate petitioner’s case. (P&A at 18-24.) Petitioner faults his trial

counsel for failing to replace the defense investigator, and argues that this “conflict” resulted in

prejudice to his case. (Id. at 20; Traverse at 3, 7.) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel hired

the investigator even though he knew he was not “willing to commit the time or undertake the

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 Petitioner also argues that the California courts “erred” in denying his state habeas 1

petitions. (P&A at 26-27; Traverse at 11-12.) This is not a separate claim for habeas relief and

will not be considered by this court as such because the question of whether the state courts’

rejection of petitioner’s habeas claims were contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law will be considered in connection with petitioner’s substantive ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. Petitioner also argues that he “was denied competent counsel, and because of

this constitutional infirmity, petitioner is entitled to relief under the Apprendi/Blakely appeal

Rights.” (Id. at 26.) Petitioner has not demonstrated any entitlement to habeas relief pursuant to

the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) or Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). Instead, it appears that petitioner has made this statement solely because he

specifically declined to waive his appeal rights with respect to any claim based on the Blakely

decision. (See Pet., Ex. Y.) Because he has presented no such claim in his federal habeas

petition, this court will not address any Apprendi and Blakely claim. Finally, in his traverse,

petitioner argues that because of his “unlawful incarceration,” he has “suffered cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Traverse at 2.) A

traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner is

attempting to belatedly raise an Eighth Amendment claim for the first time in the traverse, relief

should be denied. In any event, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the sentence imposed in

his case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on any such claim.

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work necessary for a complicated case,” and that both counsel and the investigator “considered

petitioner guilty a foregone conclusion.” (P&A at 23.)

Petitioner also claims that there was an overall failure by his trial counsel to

conduct sufficient investigation. (Id. at 24-26.) He argues,

in representing a criminal defendant, counsel owes the client a duty

of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, a duty to advocate

the defendant’s cause, a duty to consult with the defendant on

important decisions, a duty to keep defendant informed of

important developments in the course of the prosecution, and a

duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the

trial a reliable adversarial testing process.

(Id. at 26.) Petitioner claims that he entered a plea of nolo contendere because his trial counsel

advised him that prosecution witnesses Felty and Deputy King were credible, even though

counsel had not conducted sufficient investigation to determine whether they were credible or

not. (P&A at 7, et seq.) 

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III. Legal Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

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IV. Analysis

All of the instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel alleged by petitioner 

occurred prior to the entry of petitioner’s plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him. The

law is clear that petitioner may not raise claims of deprivation of his constitutional rights that

occurred prior to his plea. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that

he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). See also McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994)

("As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently

seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations"), overruled on other

grounds in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137

(9th Cir. 1992) (“petitioner’s nolo contendere plea precludes him from challenging alleged

constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry of that plea”); Hudson v. Moran, 760

F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary and intelligent guilty plea precludes federal habeas

relief based upon “independent claims” of pre-plea constitutional violations). Under these

circumstances, a prisoner may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of his guilty

plea in habeas proceedings. Ortberg, 961 F.2d 135 at 137. To the extent that a petitioner seeks

to claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel premised on his attorney’s allegedly

faulty advice, he may do so only based upon that advice as it related to the decision to enter his

nolo contendere plea. Any ineffective assistance claims relating to other, earlier actions by his

counsel are barred by the holding in Tollett v. Henderson. See Moran, 57 F.3d at 700.

Petitioner attacks the voluntary and intelligent character of his guilty plea by

alleging that the advice he received from his counsel to plead guilty was inadequate because

counsel told him that witnesses Felty and Deputy King were credible, without having conducted

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 Petitioner’s claims regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to the preliminary hearing 2

testimony of Officer King and Alex Felty, failure to object to the illegal search of his tent, failure

to investigate whether the victim was armed, failure to investigate and interview potential

defense witnesses, failure to present a competent defense at the preliminary hearing, failure to

“file briefs or motions to suppress evidence,” failure to replace his defense investigator, and

overall failure to conduct sufficient investigation into petitioner’s case, are all claims arising

prior to the entry of plea that do not implicate the voluntariness of petitioner’s plea of nolo

contendere and have therefore been waived by petitioner when he entered his nolo contendere

plea . Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.

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sufficient investigation to be able to make that decision. To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner 2

must show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases, and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). As explained in Hill,

where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or

discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination

whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to

plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood

that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change

his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will

depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely

would have changed the outcome of a trial. 

474 U.S. at 59. Petitioner has failed to make the required showing. 

Petitioner takes issue with his trial counsel’s failure to investigate specific

witnesses who could possibly have established that Axis Felty was a drug abuser and dangerous,

and that he had threatened petitioner in the past. (P&A at 22-23.) Petitioner also faults counsel

for failing to point out discrepancies in the testimony of Deputy King at the preliminary hearing. 

However, there is no evidence that any of these witnesses would have testified as petitioner

hopes, that they would have been credible had they so testified, or that their testimony would

have undermined the case against petitioner. Petitioner’s unsubstantiated allegations are

insufficient to establish either deficient performance by counsel or prejudice. The allegations

also fail to demonstrate that further investigation of these witnesses would have led counsel to

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change his recommendation as to the plea or would have changed the outcome of a trial. In light

of these failures, petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel’s advice to plead guilty in exchange

for a reduced sentence was unreasonable or that petitioner’s plea was involuntary. Although

petitioner implies that counsel’s purportedly deficient performance, in general, contributed to his

decision to enter a plea, these allegations fall far short of establishing that his trial counsel’s

allegedly erroneous advice contributed to petitioner’s entry of an involuntary and unknowing

nolo contendere plea. 

Petitioner was facing a possible sentence of eight years in prison, plus an

additional six months in jail. (Answer at 15.) Pursuant to his plea agreement, certain charges

against petitioner were reduced or dropped and petitioner was sentenced to the stipulated term of

four years in state prison and six months in the county jail with the appropriate credits being

awarded. In light of the benefit to petitioner resulting from his plea and the stipulated-to

sentence, counsel’s advice to petitioner that he should accept the plea offer was certainly not

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, given this benefit, petitioner has not

established that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.

The state court record reflects that the defense investigator hired by petitioner’s

trial counsel wrote a letter approximately four months after petitioner’s preliminary examination

in which he advised counsel that, while he had been too busy to devote significant time to

petitioner’s case before then, he was now “free to delve deeply into the merits and details of

People v. Roark.” (Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. 9.) Petitioner argues that this letter demonstrates the

investigator did not conduct sufficient investigation into his case and that his trial counsel was

aware of this failure to investigate. However, the letter in question does not demonstrate that

petitioner’s case had not been sufficiently investigated by the time trial counsel advised petitioner

to plead guilty, which occurred more than two weeks after the date of the letter. Nor do

petitioner’s allegations, or the letter he points to in support thereof, establish that his trial counsel

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 As noted, petitioner received the sentence that was stipulated to by the parties as part of 3

the plea agreement that was placed on the record at the time the plea was entered. (See

(Reporter’s Transcript of June 1, 2005 at 3; Reporter’s Transcript of July 11, 2005 at 8-11.) 

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had a “conflict of interest” by virtue of his failure to discharge the investigator. There is no

evidence before the court that the investigator’s performance or counsel’s relationship with the

investigator constituted a conflict which “deprived [petitioner] of representation guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment.” Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In addition, this court has reviewed the transcript of petitioner’s change of plea

hearing and concludes that his nolo contendere plea was freely and voluntarily made, with full

knowledge of the consequences thereof. In this regard, a guilty plea must be knowing, 3

intelligent and voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama,

395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). “The voluntariness of [a petitioner's] guilty plea can be determined

only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady, 397 F.2d at 749. In

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court addressed the presumption of

verity to be given the record of plea proceeding when the plea is subsequently subject to a

collateral challenge. While noting that the defendant’s representations at the time of his guilty

plea are not “invariably insurmountable” when challenging the voluntariness of his plea, the

court stated that, nonetheless, the defendant's representations, as well as any findings made by the

judge accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral

proceedings” and that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 437 (1983) (plea is

presumed valid in habeas proceeding when the pleading defendant was represented by counsel);

Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006); Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561

(9th Cir. 1986). The record must affirmatively show that a criminal defendant's guilty plea is

intelligent and voluntary. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43. 

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Under Boykin, the record must reflect that a criminal defendant pleading guilty

understands, and is voluntarily waiving, his rights to the privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination, to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers. 395 U.S. at 243. However,

specific articulation of the Boykin rights “is not the sine qua non of a valid guilty plea.” Wilkins

v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974). Rather, if the record demonstrates that a guilty

plea is knowing and voluntary, “no particular ritual or showing on the record is required.”

United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In this case there was a full and complete colloquy between the court and

petitioner at the time he entered his plea. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 3-10.)

Petitioner affirmatively stated that he wanted to plead no contest to assault with a deadly weapon

and the misdemeanor charge of making criminal threats. (Id. at 4.) He stated that he had enough

time to talk to his trial counsel about the nature of the charges and any possible defenses that he

might have. (Id.) Petitioner stated he realized he had given up “any direct appeal [he] might

have to a higher Court except as to a sentencing error.” (Id.) Petitioner voluntarily waived his

rights to a trial by jury, the right to confront his accusers and his right against self-incrimination. 

(Id. at 5.) Petitioner was informed of the maximum penalty he could receive. (Id.) Petitioner

affirmed that he was pleading no contest because he was guilty of the offenses or he understood

there was enough evidence to prove his guilt at trial. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner stated that no one had

made any promises to him about what his sentence would be. (Id.) In the change of plea form

signed by petitioner, he agreed that there was a factual basis for the plea and that his decision to

plead nolo contendere had been made “freely and voluntarily without threat or fear to me or to

anyone closely related to or associated with me.” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 37.) 

Petitioner further acknowledged that he had “read, discussed, and have had explained to me by

my attorney” each of the items listed on the form. (Id. at 38.) Petitioner had notice of the nature

of the charges against him. (Id. at 3.) See Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 436 (in order for a plea to be

voluntary, an accused must receive notice of the nature of the charge against him, “the first and

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most universally recognized requirement of due process") (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.

329, 334 (1941)). This is sufficient for purposes of federal habeas review. Lonberger, 459 U.S.

at 436. There is nothing in the record before this court to overcome the presumption that

petitioner pled guilty voluntarily and intelligently. There is also no evidence that trial counsel’s

alleged deficient performance affected the knowing and intelligent nature of petitioner’s nolo

contendere plea. 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

 V. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing with respect to his claims. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), an evidentiary hearing is appropriate under the following circumstances:

(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-

(A) the claim relies on-

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,

no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying offense[.]

Under this statutory scheme, a district court presented with a request for an

evidentiary hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a

petitioner’s claims and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166

(9th Cir. 2005); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). A petitioner

requesting an evidentiary hearing must also demonstrate that he has a “colorable claim for relief.” 

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Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167 (citing Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670; Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d

706, 708 (9th Cir. 2004); and Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001)). To show

that a claim is "colorable," a petitioner is "required to allege specific facts which, if true, would

entitle him to relief." Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

The court concludes that no additional factual supplementation is necessary and

that an evidentiary hearing is not appropriate with respect to the claims raised in the instant

petition. The facts alleged in support of these claims, even if established at a hearing, would not

entitle petitioner to relief. Therefore, petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be

denied.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 20, 2010.

DAD:8:

roark1338.hc2

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