Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04644/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04644-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY HOUSTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner, Social Security

Administration*

Defendant

 /

No. C-05-4644 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR

REMAND; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Randy Houston (“Houston”) brings the above entitled action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(“the Commissioner”) denying Houston’s claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”)

benefits under the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Houston’s motion for summary

judgment or remand and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Pursuant to Local Rule 16-5, the motions have been submitted on the papers without oral

argument. Having considered the parties’ submissions in support of an in opposition to the

motions, the Court rules as follows.

_______________________________________________

*Michael J. Astrue is substituted for his predecessor Jo Anne Barnhart. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d)(1).

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“The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing

whether a claimant is disabled.

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant

is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is

automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is

not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.”

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2

BACKGROUND

Houston was born on May 28, 1961. (See Certified Transcript of Administrative

Proceedings (“Tr”) at 98.) On September 20, 2002, Houston filed an application for SSI

benefits, alleging an inability to work as of December 31, 1990. (See Tr. at 98.) On

December 19, 2002, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied his application, (see

Tr. 50-53), and, on August 23, 2003, denied his request for reconsideration, (see Tr. 55-

58). Houston then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (See

Tr. 59.) A hearing before an ALJ was conducted on December 7, 2004, at which time

Houston was represented by counsel and testified. (See Tr. 25.) Additionally, S. Melvin

Dorinson, M.D. (“Dr. Dorinson”), testified as a medical expert. (See id.)

On June 15, 2005, the ALJ issued a decision analyzing Houston’s claim under the

five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations,1

finding as follows: (1) Houston has not engaged in substantial gainful activity as of

December 31, 1990 (see Tr. 26-27); (2) Houston has a “severe” impairment, specifically,

“borderline intellectual functioning,” (see Tr. 27); (3) Houston’s impairments, singly or in

combination, do not meet or equal an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments, 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1 (see id.); and (4) Houston has the residual functional

capacity to perform his past relevant work as a janitor and as an asbestos removal worker,

(see Tr. 33). Accordingly, the claim was denied at the fourth step.

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3

On October 26, 2005, the Appeals Council denied Houston’s request for review of

the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 7.) Thereafter, Houston commenced the instant action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s determination to deny disability benefits will not be disturbed if

it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the application of correct legal

standards. See Reddick v. Charter, 157 F. 3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “Substantial

evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F. 3d 1015, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court

must consider the administrative record as a whole, and weigh both the evidence

supporting and detracting from the ALJ’s decision. See id. If the evidence is susceptible of

more than one rational interpretation, the reviewing court will uphold the decision of the

ALJ. See id.

DISCUSSION

Houston argues the ALJ erred at step three of the five-step analysis.

A claimant is considered disabled when he is unable “to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . .

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). At step three, the ALJ determines whether the

claimant has a “listed” impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). When “a

claimant’s impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically

equivalent to the criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed disabled.” See

Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F. 3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted).

Here, the listing on which Houston relies is Listing 12.05(C). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1. Under Listing 12.05(C) a claimant is disabled if he has “[a] valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” See 20 C.F.R.

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2

After the hearing, Dr. Weiss conducted a psychological evaluation of Houston at the

ALJ’s request. (See Tr. 330.)

4

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The ALJ found that Houston’s impairments were not severe

enough to meet or equal any listed impairment.

A. First Prong of 12.05(C)

In finding Houston did not meet Listing 12.05(C) the ALJ did not expressly address

whether Houston met the first prong of the listing, which, as noted, is that the claimant has

a “valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1. Houston argues he established such prong as a matter of law.

The record includes two sets of IQ test findings. The first was performed in March

2000 by Stephen Singley, M.A. (“Singley”), a clinical psychologist, who reported Houston

has a verbal IQ of 73, a performance IQ of 72, and a full scale IQ of 70. (See Tr. 219.) 

The second test was performed in January 2005 by Laurie Weiss, Ph.D. (“Dr. Weiss”), who

reported Houston has a verbal IQ of 74, a performance IQ of 68, and a full scale IQ of 69. 

(See Tr. 309.)2

“In cases where more than one IQ is customarily derived from the test administered,

e.g., where verbal, performance, and full scale IQs are provided,” the SSA “use[s] the

lowest of these in conjunction with 12.05.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

§ 12.00(D)(6)(c). Here, as noted, in both sets of IQ tests, Houston’s “full scale” IQ fell

within the required range, and, in the later set of tests, his “performance IQ” also fell within

the required range. The Commissioner does not point to any other test result that shows

Houston’s lowest IQ score is not within the required range. Consequently, there is no

conflict in the record on this issue.

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Houston meets the first prong of Listing 12.05(C).

B. Second Prong of 12.05(C)

Once a claimant satisfies the first prong of 12.05(C), “the determinative issue is

whether [the claimant] suffers from a physical or other mental impairment which imposes

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an additional work-related limitation of function, in satisfaction of the second prong of

section 12.05(C).” See Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F. 2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1986). An

impairment imposes an “additional and significant work-related limitation of function” when

its “effect on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities is more than slight or

minimal.” See id. Here, Houston asserts he has a back impairment or an “other” mental

impairment, specifically, an adjustment disorder. Houston argues that the ALJ erred in

finding that neither additional impairment imposes the requisite additional limitation on his

ability to perform work functions.

1. Back Impairment

The record includes evidence from treating, examining, and consulting physicians,

some of whom provided opinions restricting Houston from certain work activities as a result

of Houston’s reported back pain. Houston argues that such opinions support a finding that

his back pain imposes an additional and signification limitation on his ability to work, and

that the ALJ erred in not adopting the functional limitations set forth in such opinions.

Specifically, Houston relies on the following opinions regarding functional limitations:

(1) a November 25, 1991 report by Jonathan Francis, M.D. (“Dr. Francis”), who

opined that, in light of a 1990 auto accident in which Houston “sprain[ed]” his “lumbosacral

spine” and Houston’s having reported “constant light to moderate pain” as a result thereof,

Houston had “lost approximately half of preinjury capacity for performing such activities as

bending, stooping, lifting, pushing, pulling, and climbing or other activities involving

comparable physical effort,” (see Tr. 212, 214);

(2) an April 2000 report by Claude H. Koons, M.D. (“Dr. Koons”), who reviewed

Houston’s records and determined Houston had “chronic back strain” in light of Houston’s

reporting he had “constant” low back pain, “aggravated by any movement and cold

weather,” that “radiates down his legs which get weak and occasionally give out,” (see Tr.

234), and who, in an accompanying form, checked boxes thereon to indicate Houston could

occasionally lift no more than 20 pounds and frequently lift no more than 10 pounds, must

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3

Dr. Carlson did not identify the nature of the “new evidence.”

4

The name of the physician who signed the report is illegible. (See Tr. 295.)

6

periodically alter sitting and standing positions to relieve pain, and could occasionally climb,

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, (see Tr. 239-40);

(3) an August 2000 report by Rodney Carlson, M.D. (“Dr. Carlson”), who stated he

had reviewed the records considered by Dr. Koons, as well as “new evidence received,”3

and that he “affirmed” the assessment made by Dr. Koons, (see Tr. 246);

(4) a report dated July 7, 2003, in which Peter Biale, M.D. opined that Houston,

during a June 2003 examination, exhibited “[l]imitation of the lumbosacral spine,”

specifically, his range of motion was “flexion: 20 degrees, extension: 5 degrees, [and]

lateral flexion: right and left 10 degrees,” and, consequently, Houston was exertionally

limited, specifically, in an 8-hour work day, he could sit less than 6 hours, could stand and

walk less than 2 hours, could not lift over 10 pounds, could engage in limited pushing,

pulling, climbing and balancing, and could never stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, (see Tr.

285-88);

(5) a “medical assessment” form completed in April 2004 by an Eastmont Wellness

Center physician,4

 in which boxes were checked to indicate Houston had “pain, muscle

spasm” and “appropriate radicular distribution of sensory and reflex loss,” and, as a result,

Houston should avoid lifting, prolonged standing or walking for more than 30 minutes in an

8-hour work day, and prolonged sitting for more than 30 minutes in an 8-hour work day,

(see Tr. 295); and

(6) an October 3, 2004 report by Richard Thunder, M.D. (“Dr. Thunder”), in which Dr.

Thunder diagnosed Houston with “mechanical low back pain” with a “possible radicular

component,” and stated that Houston was limited to carrying 50 pounds occasionally and

25 pounds frequently, to sitting at two-hour intervals with ten-minute breaks for a total of

eight hours, to standing and walking at least six hours a day in limited intervals, and to

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5

Houston asserts that Dr. Dorinson, who testified as a medical expert at the hearing,

agreed with Dr. Thunder’s opinion as to functional limitations. The ALJ did not interpret Dr.

Dorinson’s testimony in such a manner, and Houston fails to show the ALJ’s interpretation

of Dr. Dorinson’s testimony was erroneous. Indeed, in the passage on which Houston

relies, Dr. Dorinson appears to be endeavoring to explain why Dr. Thunder might have

found any functional limitations in light of Dr. Thunder’s observation, discussed infra, that

Houston engaged in “amplification” of his symptoms and falsely claimed certain types of

pain, as opposed to agreeing with Dr. Thunder’s opinion as to the presence of limitations. 

(See Tr. 357-58.)

6

Additionally, Houston relies on statements by other medical personnel, although

such personnel did not provide opinions as to functional limitations, specifically:

(1) medical notes from a “Dr. Madson,” which state that Houston, on various dates between

December 1999 and March 2000, complained of “chronic low back pain,” (see Tr. 249, 251-

53); (2) medical notes from Ronny Kafiluddi, M.D. (“Dr. Kafiluddi”), which state that

Houston, on various dates between March 2000 and September 2000, complained of lower

back pain, including a claim on one occasion that his pain was a “12” on a scale of 1-10,

(see Tr. 261-71); (3) clinical notes of Joseph J. Chen, M.D. (“Dr. Chen”), which indicate that

Houston, in April 2001, reported his pain as “a constant, aching and burning type of pain

that is rated as 10/10,” (see Tr. 255); (4) August 2002 notes from physicians in the

emergency room of the Genesis Medical Center, specifically, Scott C. Ludwig, M.D., who

stated Houston had complained of “chronic recurrent back pain,” (see Tr. 258) and a “Dr.

Remmes,” who provided a “diagnostic impression” of “chronic low back pain,” (see Tr. 260);

and (6) notes of Lisa Nelson, a certified physician’s assistant, which state Houston reported

in August 2002 that he has “excruciating back pain nearly all the time,” (see Tr. 275), and,

in September 2002, that “his left leg is paralyzed if he moves too much and he just has to

sit still for a period of time until movement comes back,” (see Tr. 273).

7

limited climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling, pushing, and pulling,5

 (see Tr.

303).6

The ALJ rejected such opinions on the ground that the “majority of orthopedic

‘findings’ and subsequent ‘functional restrictions’ in the record [were] based almost

exclusively on [Houston’s] subjective complaints,” and that Houston was not credible. (See

Tr. 32.) As the ALJ put it, “Based on [Houston’s] lack of credibility in combination with the

paucity of objective findings relating to orthopedic pathology, I do not find any consistent or

verified orthopedic or neurological pathology or dysfunction which would significantly

restrict his ability to perform basic work with activity. I also do not find any other physical

impairment of significance. . . . In essence, therefore, I find that [Houston] has an

essentially normal physical exertional residual functional capacity.” (See Tr. 32.)

Although Houston argues the ALJ had no legitimate basis to reject the opinions of

such physicians, Houston does not expressly argue that the ALJ erred in determining

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7

At the hearing, Dr. Dorinson testified that “Waddell” signs refer to “non-organic

findings.” (See Tr. 357.) As Dr. Dorinson explained, “In other words, it’s exaggerated pain

. . . and not due to any underlying organic problem.” (See id.) For example, “If you ask him

to turn without moving his back, in other words just rotating shoulders, he would complain

of back pain.” (See id.)

8

Houston was not credible. Nevertheless, given that Houston’s argument implicitly

challenges such finding, the Court considers whether the ALJ properly found Houston

lacked credibility.

An ALJ is “free to disregard” a medical opinion based on a claimant’s “subjective

complaints” where the claimant is not credible. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F. 3d 1144,

1149 (9th Cir. 2001). In rejecting a claimant’s statements as not credible, however, “the

ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the

court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant’s testimony.” See

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F. 3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining a claimant’s

credibility, “the ALJ may consider his reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in

his testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work record,

and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect

of the symptoms of which he complains.” See Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F. 3d 789,

792 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, the ALJ found Houston was not credible because, on a number of occasions,

Houston had exaggerated his pain symptoms to physicians. (See Tr. 32.) This finding is

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, (1) in 2000, Dr. Kadiluddi found Houston

had “all Waddell signs that are positive . . . and specific for malingering,”7 (see Tr. 263),

observed that Houston, although claiming pain at a level of “10 on a 10-point scale,” was

able to “move[ ] easily from chair to bed,” (see Tr. 267), and opined that Houston acted in a

manner “which typically [was] not a classical radicular pattern,” (see id.), (2) in 2001, Dr.

Chen found Houston “exhibit[ed] dramatic pain behavior,” yet “declined” to see a physical

therapist or undergo a “functional activity evaluation,” and had engaged in “overreaction”

during the examination, (see Tr. 255-26), and (3) in 2004, Dr. Thunder found “[Houston’s]

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response during the exam [was] quite out of proportion to the other aspects of the physical

exam,” that “there appear[ed] to be some amplification,” and that Houston claimed “pain

with false axial rotation, pain with false axial compression as well as hypersensitiv[ity] to

light touch on the skin of his back and pain out of proportion to stimulus,” (see Tr. 303).

Additionally, the ALJ found Houston was not credible because he had made

inconsistent statements about his “post onset earnings.” (See Tr. 32.) This finding likewise

is supported by substantial evidence. At the hearing, Houston asserted that when he

worked as a janitorial supervisor in 1999 and 2000, he had only received rent reduction as

compensation, although he had earlier signed an SSA application stating he had received

$10 per hour for such work. (See Tr. 115, 328-39.) SSA work history records supported

the truth of the earlier-made statement, because they show Houston received $432 in

income in 1999 and over $2230 in 2000. (See Tr. 101, 328.)

Because the ALJ identified specific and legitimate reasons for finding Houston not

credible, and such reasons are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds the ALJ

did not err in his assessment that Houston was not credible.

As set forth above, the ALJ stated that the “majority” of medical opinions on which

Houston relied were based on Houston’s subjective complaints, which could suggest the

ALJ was of the view that a “minority” of opinions setting forth functional limitations were

based on something other than Houston’s subjective complaints. As noted, however, the

ALJ found there was a “paucity of objective findings relating to orthopedic pathology.” (See

Tr. 32.) Such finding was supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing,

specifically, the hearing testimony of Dr. Dorinson that the record did not contain such

evidence, (see Tr. 358), which finding was, in turn, supported by substantial evidence in the

record, specifically, (1) Dr. Francis’s opinion that Houston’s 1991 MRI showed “no

abnormalities” and that a “thermography” was “normal,” (see Tr. 212); (2) Dr. Madson’s

opinion that Houston had “no neurologic deficits,” (see Tr. 249); (3) Dr. Kafiluddi’s opinion

that the results of an MRI and a “5-view series of the lumbar spine” were “normal,” (see Tr.

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As discussed above, three physicians who examined Houston during different years

found that Houston had engaged in, respectively, “malingering,” “overreaction,” and

“amplification” during physical examinations in which Houston was asked to perform

various tasks, such as lifting and straightening his legs. Under such circumstances, and in

light of Houston’s general lack of credibility, the ALJ did not err to the extent the ALJ was

unpersuaded by opinions that were based on impressions formed after observing Houston

attempt to perform such tasks as leaning forward or lifting his legs.

9

Of course, in the future, should any such “focal bulge” increase in size or

significance, Houston may reapply for benefits.

10

263); (4) Dr. Chen’s finding that there was “no definite evidence of any structural etiology

for [Houston’s] pain,” that Houston’s x-rays were “unremarkable,” and that both the x-rays

and an MRI showed “well-hydrated” discs, (see Tr. 256-57); and (5) Dr. Remmers’s finding

that there was “no evidence of abnormalities along the spine,” (see Tr. 260). Further, none

of the opinions setting forth limitations identify any objective evidence, except to the extent

one might characterize a physician’s impression of Houston’s responses to exercises, such

as Houston’s attempting to lean forward, as objective in nature. (See, e.g., Tr. 303 (Dr.

Thunder opining that Houston “forward flexes to 10 degrees, limited by pain”).)8

In his reply, Houston relies on notes prepared by Stefan Haller, M.D. (“Dr. Haller”), in

which Dr. Haller interpreted the results of an MRI conducted on February 14, 2005, (see Tr.

315-17), and in which Dr. Haller noted an “abnormal signal . . . within the annulus fibrosus

at L5-S1, focally in midline consistent with an annular tear,” (see Tr. 315). Although

Houston’s counsel states “[a]n annular tear is certainly capable of producing back pain,”

(see Pl.’s Reply at 8:12), Houston fails to offer any evidence that the MRI revealed a

condition that causes pain, let alone pain that would interfere with Houston’s ability to work. 

As the ALJ noted in quoting Dr. Haller’s opinion, (see Tr. 30), the “abnormal signal”

revealed “a very minimal if any focal bulge,” (see Tr. 315) i.e., that the condition, if it existed

at all, was of the smallest degree detectable.9 Indeed, it is Dr. Haller’s opinion that the MRI

reflected “no significant protrusion,” “no significant indentation” and “no impingement.” 

(See Tr. 316.) Further, with the exception of said “very minimal if any” finding, Houston’s

spine was “normal” and “unremarkable.” (See Tr. 315).

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10Chandler, along with Dr. Weiss, signed the report, which identifies Chandler as

having performed the examination. The ALJ treated the report and the attached form as

containing the opinions of Dr. Weiss, as do the parties in the instant briefing.

11

Accordingly, Houston has not shown the ALJ erred in finding Houston’s asserted

back impairment did not impose a significant work-related limitation of function.

2. Adjustment Disorder

As discussed above, Houston can establish the second prong of Listing 12.05(C) if

he has an “other” mental impairment that imposes a “significant work-related limitation of

function,” in addition to the limitations imposed by his low IQ scores. See 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App. 1. In that respect, Houston asserts he has an “adjustment disorder”

that constitutes the requisite “other” mental impairment, and that the ALJ erred in finding

Houston was not restricted from work functions by any mental impairment other than the

restrictions imposed by Houston’s “borderline intellectual functioning.” (See Tr. 32.)

Houston relies on the opinion of Dr. Weiss, who, as noted, examined Houston on

January 25, 2005. In her report, Dr. Weiss offered two “diagnostic impressions,” one of

which was “borderline intellectual functioning,” which diagnosis was based, at least in part,

on Houston’s low IQ scores, (see Tr. 309-10); the second stated “impression” was

“adjustment disorder with depressed mood,” (see Tr. 310). Attached to the report is a form

completed by Jacklyn Chandler (“Chandler”), a Psychological Assistant,10 who offered the

opinion therein that Houston has a “marked” restriction in his ability to “understand and

remember detailed instructions” and to “carry out detailed instructions,” and has a

“moderate” restriction in his ability to “respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual

work setting” and to “respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting.” (See Tr.

311-12.)

Although neither the report nor the attached form indicates whether the claimed

restrictions were the result of Houston’s asserted “adjustment disorder with depressed

mood,” the ALJ interpreted the report and/or form as stating that the “moderate” restrictions

on Houston’s ability to respond appropriately to “work pressures” and “changes in a routine

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work setting” were the result of said impairment. The ALJ, however, declined to find that

Houston was, in fact, restricted in such a manner, because the ALJ did not adopt Dr.

Weiss’s “diagnosis impression” of “adjustment disorder with depressed mood.” Rather, the

ALJ agreed with the opinion provided by examining clinical psychologist Singley, who

diagnosed Houston with “borderline mental retardation,” but not with any other mental

impairment. (See Tr. 217-20.) 

“If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor's

opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are

supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F. 3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.

2005). Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Weiss’s opinion concerning additional restrictions in light

of an asserted adjustment disorder in favor of Singley’s opinion for two reasons: “[G]iven

[Houston’s] complete lack of credibility, in combination with the complete absence of any

psychiatric history or treatment therefore, I reject [the opinion].” (See Tr. 32.)

As discussed above, the ALJ’s finding that Houston was not credible is supported by

substantial evidence. Further, Houston’s lack of credibiilty is, under the circumstances, an

adequate basis for rejecting the opinion that Houston has an “adjustment disorder with

depressed mood,” given that Dr. Weiss’s report indicates said opinion is based on

Houston’s self-reporting: “[Houston] presented today as depressed. He reported

symptoms of depression that have occurred after a motor vehicle accident in 1990, limiting

his ability to work.” (See Tr. 310.) Moreover, the other cited reason, specifically, Houston’s

lack of treatment for such asserted impairment, is adequately supported; the record is

devoid of any evidence Houston sought treatment for an adjustment disorder or symptoms

thereof. The lack of such treatment, particularly given Houston’s contention that the

precipitating event occurred approximately fifteen years before the hearing conducted by

the ALJ, is a legitimate basis to reject the subject opinion. See Flaten v. Secretary of

Health & Human Services, 44 F. 3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding ALJ did not err in

discounting claimant’s allegation of disabling back pain because “ALJ was entitled to draw

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an inference from the general lack of medical care for back problems during the intervening

years between two surgeries”).

Houston argues the ALJ rejected the subject opinion by Dr. Weiss for a third reason

that, according to Houston, is not legitimate. Specifically, Houston relies on the following

sentence in the ALJ’s decision: “Dr. Weiss herself stated that she did not have any access

to any of [Houston’s] medical records.” (See Tr. 32.) Houston interprets such statement as

the ALJ’s having rejected Dr. Weiss’s opinion because she did not have Houston’s medical

records, and argues such reason is insufficient because the ALJ could have provided Dr.

Weiss with such records. The Court, however, does not interpret the statement in the

manner suggested by Houston. Rather, given that the statement was made immediately

after the ALJ stated he was rejecting the opinion because of Houston’s “complete lack of

credibility,” and given the content of Dr. Weiss’s report, it is apparent the ALJ was simply

commenting on the fact that the opinion was based on Houston’s subjective statements, as

opposed to being based on information provided by other physicians.

Accordingly, the Court finds Houston has not shown the ALJ erred in determining

Houston does not have a mental impairment, other than his borderline intellectual

functioning based on low IQ tests, that imposes significant limitations on his ability to work.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

1. Houston’s motion for summary judgment or remand is hereby DENIED; and

2. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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