Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01751/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01751-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

On November 17, 2006, Plaintiff Donna Morgen informed the 1

Court that Plaintiff Dennis Morgen had passed away and that the case

should proceed with the surviving Plaintiff. The caption has been

changed to reflect this.

All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil 2

Procedure.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNA MORGEN, )

) 2:05-cv-1751-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant United States of America moves for dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 1 2

for lack of jurisdiction, arguing Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”); or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and moves for

dismissal of the Department of the Navy as a Defendant in this FTCA

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In addition, Plaintiff moved to strike Defendant’s untimely 3

Reply brief; however, since the Reply brief is not relied on in this

order, this issue is not reached.

This dismissal is reflected in the caption. 4

2

action. Since “the United States is the only proper party defendant 3

in an FTCA action,” the Department of the Navy is dismissed. Kennedy 4

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998).

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff seeks recovery for personal injuries and loss of

consortium stemming from Dennis Morgen’s (“Morgen”) asbestos-caused

mesothelioma. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7.) Plaintiff asserts that while

Morgen worked at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (“PSNS”) he was exposed to

asbestos products and asbestos-related materials which caused him to

develop mesothelioma. (Id. ¶ 7.) Morgen worked there from March 1963

through October or November 1963. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Morgen’s job at PSNS consisted of testing communications

equipment aboard Navy ships. (Pl.’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s SF”) ¶

19.) This job required Morgen to spend up to twenty-five hours a week

on board ships and to participate in three sea-trials each lasting two

to three nights. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 25, 26.) Morgen’s duties included

working in the compartment housing the electronics equipment, climbing

through hatches, and traversing catwalks, which took him through

virtually the entire length of the ship. (Id. ¶ 23.) Morgen did not

handle or use asbestos or asbestos-containing materials as part of his

job, nor did he see anyone using asbestos or asbestos-containing

materials. (Def.’s Ex. O, at 107.) 

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3

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to seek dismissal of a claim

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “[A] Rule 12(b)(1) motion

can attack the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations

despite their formal sufficiency, and in so doing rely on affidavits

or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v. Chico,

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). “With a [rule] 12(b)(1) motion, a

court may weigh the evidence to determine whether it has

jurisdiction.” Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.

2005). 

II. Motion to Dismiss Analysis

“The FTCA’s waiver of immunity is limited by a number of

exceptions. One of these is the discretionary function exception

. . . [which] exempts from liability any claim . . . based upon the

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an

employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be

abused.” Bear Medicine v. United States, 241 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th

Cir. 2001). “It is the government’s burden to demonstrate the

applicability of the discretionary function exception.” Whisnant v.

United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005). “The Supreme

Court has established a two-prong test for determining the

applicability of the discretionary function exception.” Bibeau v. P.

N.W. Research Found., Inc., 339 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991)). “First, we

ask whether the alleged wrongful conduct violated a specific and

mandatory regulation or statute. If so, the conduct is outside the

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Plaintiff argues that Beckett should be precluded from 5

testifying because he was not disclosed as a percipient or expert

witness. This argument is unavailing because Defendant disclosed

Beckett pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) and Beckett has not been retained as

an expert. Plaintiff also argues there is no evidence Beckett is

testifying from personal knowledge. This argument is also unavailing

since Beckett’s declaration clearly sets forth the basis for his

personal knowledge. Beckett declares he “worked as a civilian employee

of the Navy at the [PSNS]” in 1963 and that his division “was

responsible for establishing safety rules and making on the job safety

(continued...)

4

realm of discretion. If there is no mandatory regulation or statute

involved, we then ask whether the conduct was susceptible to being

based upon social, economic, or political policy.” Bibeau, 339 F.3d

at 945 (internal citations omitted). “[T]he basis for the

discretionary function exception was Congress’ desire to prevent

judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions

grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium

of an action in tort.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Violation of a Specific and Mandatory Regulation or Statute

Defendant asserts that “in 1963 there were no mandatory

statutes, regulations, or policies prescribing specific courses of

action for PSNS to take regarding asbestos exposure.” (Def.’s Mot. at

17:6-7.) Plaintiff counters “the Navy’s failure to warn workers of -

or protect them against - the hazard posed by the ubiquitous asbestoscontaining shipyard dust was, in fact, governed by applicable policies

or regulations.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16:11-13.) 

Defendant submits the declaration of industrial hygienist

Roger Beckett, who later became responsible for all industrial hygiene

activities for the Navy in the Pacific Northwest region, in which he

declares that “[i]n 1963, PSNS did not have any specific and mandatory

rules or regulations covering asbestos removal and installation.”5

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(...continued) 5

inspections.” (Beckett Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Further, Plaintiff argues that

Beckett’s opinions are inadmissible because they “are not rationally

based on his perceptions, are not helpful to a clear understanding of

the statements he makes in his declaration and/or are based on

scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” (Pl.’s Objs. at

3:20-22.) This argument is also unavailing since Plaintiff makes no

specific argument about any of Beckett’s statements in his declaration

and why they are not based on his perception, not helpful, or based on

scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.

5

(Def.’s Ex. I ¶ 10.) He further declares that although the Navy’s

Bureau of Medicine had issued a recommendation that exposure to

asbestos be kept below a certain threshold minimum, the recommendation

was purely advisory. (Id.) In addition, he declares the Manual of

Safety Rules, which contained general guidelines for safe working

conditions, provided no recommendations for those who did not work

directly with asbestos. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff argues the Manual of

Safety Rules which suggests wearing “dust type or air-fed respirators

for . . . handling insulating materials” and “organic vapor type or

air-fed respirator[s] when exposed to . . . dust, fumes, or vapor” was

a mandatory regulation. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16:18-23.) 

The Manual of Safety Rules does not mention asbestos and its

introduction states it is merely a booklet of “commonly agreed-on

practices for working together safely.” (Def.’s Ex. I-E at II.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence contradicting

Defendant’s evidence that there were no mandatory regulations

regarding asbestos exposure in 1963. Defendant has satisfied the

first prong of the discretionary function exception test.

B. Conduct Susceptible to Being Based upon Social, Economic, or 

Political Policy

Defendant argues the decision to not warn or protect workers

who were not working directly with asbestos-containing materials falls

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within the discretionary function exception because “the plethora of

competing health hazards at PSNS” created a situation that made this

decision “susceptible to policy analysis.” (Def.’s Mot. at 17:19-22.) 

Plaintiff rejoins, citing Whisnant, for the proposition that “the

discretionary function exception has no application when the

government’s conduct pertains solely to health-and-safety concerns,

which are divorced from any social, economic or political policy

analysis.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 17:11-13.) 

However, the Ninth Circuit, in Whisnant, stated that the

discretionary function exception applies where the government faces

“[c]omplex decisions about . . . allocation of limited resources among

competing safety-promoting tasks.” 400 F.3d at 1184; see also United

States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797,

820 (1984) (stating the discretionary function exception applies to

“decisions [that] require the agency to establish priorities for the

accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives

sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as

staffing and funding”). Defendant submits uncontroverted evidence

that there were many safety hazards at PSNS and that as a result of

these competing safety hazards, Defendant focused on “known risks” and

determined the safety priority “was for people working directly with

asbestos; not persons indirectly exposed.” (Beckett Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) 

Therefore, Defendant’s decision, made under these circumstances, was

susceptible to policy analysis. 

Plaintiff further argues that since the government made “no

decision to forego warning bystanders of the hazard posed by the

ubiquitous asbestos dust present at its shipyard, . . . the government

has not exercised ‘discretion’ in any sense of the word.” (Pl.’s

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Opp’n at 20:9-12.) Defendant counters “it is settled law that the

‘susceptible to policy analysis’ standard means that no conscious

decision need be established.” (Def.’s Mot. at 16:9-10.)

The Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that

“the discretionary function exception cannot apply in the absence of a

conscious decision,” stating that “[i]f the decision to issue or not

to issue a warning is within the discretionary function exception,

then logically the failure to consider whether to issue one

necessarily falls within the exception as well.” Kennewick Irrigation

Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument on this

point is unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the discretionary function exception

bars Plaintiff’s claims and therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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