Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cv-01294/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cv-01294-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GORDON LOREY GRILZ, )

) No. CIV 02-1294 PCT RCB (MS)

Petitioner, ) 

) O R D E R

vs. ) 

)

TERRY L. STEWART, et. al., )

)

Respondents. ) )

On July 11, 2002, Petitioner Gordon Lorey Grilz filed a

Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. On July 25, 2006, the Court denied the Petition as

untimely under the one-year statute of limitations of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Order

(doc. # 25). Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner's

motion for certificate of appealability (doc. # 28). Having

carefully reviewed the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before a prisoner can appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition,

a certificate of appealability must issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); 

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Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 "only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate of appealability must

"indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy" the requirement. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).

When a § 2254 petition is denied on procedural grounds, as in

the present case, a certificate of appealability may issue only if

the prisoner can show both "(1) that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling" and "(2) that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right." Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 780

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Both

are threshold inquiries, and a court may dispose of an application

for a certificate of appealability by "resolv[ing] the issue whose

answer is more apparent from the record and arguments." Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000).

II. DISCUSSION

In this case, Petitioner's § 2254 petition (doc. # 1) was

denied as time-barred under the AEDPA's one-year statute of

limitations. Order (doc. # 25) at 7-23. The facts relevant to

that decision are set forth in great detail in the Court's order of

July 25, 2006. See id. at 2-6. Petitioner has not demonstrated

that jurists of reason would conclude differently than the Court

with respect to the various arguments he raised in favor of tolling

the AEDPA's one-year limitations period. In light of arguments

made on his present motion, a few points merit repetition and

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emphasis.

A. Mailbox Rules

Contrary to Petitioner's view, the Court's application of the

common-law mailbox rule does not impose a Herculean burden on

prisoner litigants. See Mot. (doc. # 28) at 5. The presumption

could have possibly been raised by Petitioner in a number of ways. 

For example, had Petitioner's former counsel provided an affidavit

that he actually mailed Petitioner's notice of petition for his

state petition on October 10, 1996-- not merely "caused [the

notice] to be mailed" by delivering it to his secretary-- or

retained a proof of mailing from the post office, the common-law

mailbox rule may have been satisfied. See Anderson v. United

States, 966 F.2d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the Court has

explained that the prison mailbox rule, under which a pro se

petition is deemed filed at the moment it is delivered to prison

officials for forwarding to the court clerk, see Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), is inapplicable to the facts of this case

where Petitioner was represented by counsel and no documents were

delivered to prison officials, see Order (doc. # 25) at 10 n.4.

B. Post-Conviction Rules Applied by State Court

Likewise, there is little room for debate among reasonable

jurists as to which post conviction rules the state court relied

upon in considering his second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 

Petitioner still believes that the state court's cognizance of his

second petition under the post-conviction rules of 1996 is implicit

proof that the requisite notice had been filed in October of 1996. 

Mot. (doc. # 28) at 6; see also Reply (doc. # 11) at 2; Objections

(doc. # 23) at 5. The state court's written opinion expressly

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1

 In view of this background, reasonable jurists would not

disagree that Petitioner had failed to raise a colorable argument

warranting an evidentiary hearing concerning the state court's record

keeping. Cf. Mot. (doc. # 28) at 6-7.

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repudiates this theory. In rejecting the State's assertion that

the second petition was untimely, the judge stressed that the

"post-conviction rules in effect at the time of [Petitioner's]

conviction [i.e., not 1996] allowed him to file a Notice of PostConviction Relief at any time." Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 1

(emphasis added). Whether the state court was wrong to do so is of

no consequence. Although Petitioner may be correct in stating that

the state court should have applied the post-conviction rules of

1996, see Mot. (doc. # 28) at 6, the court's clear admission that

it did not do so extinguishes the premise of Petitioner's

inferential argument. The court applied the rules in effect at the

time of Petitioner's conviction. Answer (doc. # 7), Ex. H at 1. 

Given that there were no time limitations under those rules, see

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1983), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)

(West 1985), there is no way to reasonably construe the court's

order as tacitly acknowledging that a notice had previously been

filed. See Order (doc. # 25) at 11-12, 12 n.5.1

C. Equitable Tolling

Finally, reasonable jurists would not disagree that the Court

correctly relied upon and applied Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005), in finding Petitioner ineligible for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner asserts that his case is distinguishable from Pace,

because the Supreme Court in that case held that an untimely filed

state petition did not qualify for statutory tolling under 28

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U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Mot. (doc. # 28) at 7. However, the

issue of statutory tolling in Pace was decided separately from the

question of equitable tolling. On equitable tolling, the Supreme

Court explained that the petitioner's delay of five years in filing

his state petition, followed by five months of delay in filing his

federal petition, demonstrated that he had failed to pursue his

rights diligently. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19. It was on this

basis that the petitioner was found ineligible for equitable

tolling. See id. Similarly, in this case, Petitioner delayed by

at least ten years in filing his second state petition, and by six

months in seeking federal relief. See Order (doc. # 25) at 22. It

was for these considerably lengthier and unexplained delays that

the Court found him ineligible for equitable tolling. See id. 

Petitioner attempts to justify these delays by pointing out

that the AEDPA had not been in force during much of that time, and

explaining that he had believed he was entitled to statutory

tolling as early as October of 1996. See Mot. (doc. # 28) at 8-9. 

The Supreme Court implicitly rejected both of these arguments in

Pace. Although the petitioner's claims were available to him in

1986 and 1991, prior to the AEDPA's enactment, the Supreme Court

still considered the petitioner's delay in filing his state

petition unjustified. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19. And although,

like Petitioner in this case, he may have believed that his state

petition was properly filed and entitled to statutory tolling under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the Supreme Court still considered his

subsequent delay of five months in pursuing federal relief

unjustified. See id.

As to Petitioner's arguments concerning the adequacy of the

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prison libraries and contract paralegals, reasonable jurists would

not disagree with the conclusion of the Magistrate Judge, R&R (doc.

# 15) at 10-13, as adopted by this Court, Order (doc. # 25) at 20,

that neither constituted an unconstitutional state-created

impediment to the filing of Petitioner's federal application. For

these reasons, the Court finds that probable cause does not exist

for an appeal of its decision on equitable tolling.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that tolling

of the one-year limitations period was not warranted in this case

on the basis of (1) statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) for the period from October 10, 1996 through January 8,

2002, see Order (doc. # 25) at 9-13, (2) belated discovery of the

factual predicate of one claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, see id. at 13-18, or (3) equitable tolling, see id. at 20-

22. Because a request for a certificate of appealability may be

denied on the strength of a procedural ruling, the Court need not

reach the constitutional questions of Petitioner's underlying

claims. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's motion for certificate of

appealability (doc. # 28) is DENIED.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and Petitioner pro se.

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