Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05608/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05608-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL SALAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLARK E. DUCART, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05608-JST 

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Kern Valley State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding events that took place at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) where 

he was previously housed. His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A. His request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate order.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

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necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

B. Complaint

Plaintiff has named as defendants PBSP Warden Clark Ducart, PBSP Community 

Resource Manager (“CRM”) Losacco, and the former PBSP Jewish chaplain Jonathan Kriendler. 

Plaintiff converted to Judaism in 2012. 

On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that PSBP staff had discriminated 

against Jewish inmates when they ignored his request to hold a religious meal ceremony to 

commemorate Passover but allowed Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic inmates to hold religious 

meal events. This appeal was granted in full in that prisoners were allowed to hold religious meal 

ceremonies without discrimination or delay. ECF No. 1 at 9–10. 

On February 24, 2016, during a Jewish service, Defendant Kreindler informed Plaintiff and 

the other Jewish inmates that his purpose was to discourage the inmates from the Jewish religion. 

Defendant Kreindler further informed Plaintiff that he did not consider any of the prisoners to be 

Jewish because they did not have Jewish mothers; that he (Defendant Kreindler) is racist; and that 

it is part of Judaism to separate gentiles (non-Jews) from Jews and Jewish practices. ECF No. 1 at 

8–9. 

On March 1, 2016, Defendant Kriendler denied two requests made by Plaintiff for 

religious meal events to celebrate Passover and Shavuot. ECF No. 1 at 10. Defendant Losacco 

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did not respond to Plaintiff’s request for a supervisor-level review of Defendant Kriendler’s 

denial. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but was unable to hold a religious meal ceremony. ECF No. 1 

at 10. 

On or around January 31, 2017, Defendant Kriendler tried to remove Plaintiff from the 

Jewish Kosher diet program based on the false pretext that Plaintiff was unable to have two eating 

utensils and that Plaintiff did not fast on January 8, 2017 to observe the Asara B’Teves holiday. 

ECF No. 1 at 10. 

On February 12, 2017, while attending Jewish services, Plaintiff was informed by 

Defendant Kriendler that the Kosher meals were not being prepared in accordance with Jewish 

dietary rules in that the meals were being cooked in the same ovens as non-kosher meals. Plaintiff 

informed CRM Losacco and Warden Ducart about, and filed a grievance regarding, this issue, but 

no action was taken to ensure that the meals served as part of the Kosher diet program met Jewish 

Kosher standards. ECF No. 1 at 10–11. 

On March 26, 2017, Plaintiff asked Defendant Kriendler to authorize a Seder meal during 

Passover for him so that he could observe the high holiday. Defendant Kriendler denied the 

request, stating that he could not help someone whom he did not believe to be Jewish and that if 

Plaintiff persisted in such requests, he might face reprisals. Plaintiff informed CRM Losacco of 

Defendant Kriendler’s comments. There was no response from CRM Losacco, but Defendant 

Kriendler responded that it was an outright lie and that he could not provide a goy (a Jewish 

convert born of a non-Jewish woman) with a Seder meal. 

On April 30, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a request to Warden Ducart that Jewish prisoners in 

PBSP A Yard be allowed to hold a religious meal ceremony to commemorate Shavuot. Warden 

Ducart ignored this request, and Defendant Kriendler responded that Plaintiff did not have the 

required chaplain approval for this request. ECF No. 1 at 12. 

That same day, Plaintiff sent a request for supervisor review to CRM Losacco regarding 

Defendant Kriendler’s various misconducts, with a copy also sent to Warden Ducart. Neither 

CRM Losacco nor Warden Ducart provided a timely response. On May 16, 2017, Plaintiff 

submitted another request for supervisor review to CRM Losacco concerning the religious meal 

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ceremony, and again informed CRM Losacco that Defendant Kriendler was racist and actively 

discouraging Jewish prisoners of certain races from practicing Judaism. CRM Losacco did not 

respond. On May 16, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a grievance against Defendant Kriendler for his 

racially biased denials of Plaintiff’s religious accommodation requests. 

On December 7, 2017, Defendant Kreindler filed a “whistleblower/discrimination/

retaliation lawsuit” against Defendants Warden Ducart and CRM Losacco that alleged that he had 

been hired for the express purpose of reducing the number of Kosher meals served to PBSP 

inmates; that he was pressured to find excuses to refuse prisoners’ religious accommodations such 

as by citing inmates for minor lapses in Jewish practices; and that PBSP’s kitchen was not 

complying with kosher dictates. ECF No. 1 at 9.

C. Legal Claims

In Plaintiff’s first cause of action, he alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment 

right to exercise his religious beliefs when they were deliberately indifferent to his requests for 

religious meal ceremonies and for Seder meals. “Inmates retain the protections afforded by the 

First Amendment, ‘including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” 

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 

482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a 

defendant burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in activities he 

sincerely believes are mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884–85. Plaintiff’s allegation that 

Defendants refused his requests, made between March 2016 and April 2017, for religious meal 

ceremonies and for Seder meals states a cognizable First Amendment free exercise claim. 

In Plaintiff’s second cause of action, he alleges that Defendants violated his First 

Amendment right to exercise his religious beliefs, as protected by the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)1 when they were deliberately indifferent to his requests 

 

1 Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

when they ignored his requests that his kosher meals be prepared in a kosher kitchen is not 

cognizable because the Supreme Court has declared the RFRA unconstitutional with respect to 

city and state governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).

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that he be served Kosher meals prepared in a Kosher kitchen. Section 3 of RLUIPA provides: 

“No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in 

or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state prisons, state 

psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results from a rule of general 

applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person 

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 

furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Plaintiff’s allegation 

that Defendants refused his requests, made between February 2017 and May 2017, that his kosher 

meals be prepared in a kosher kitchen states both a cognizable First Amendment free exercise 

claim and a cognizable RLUIPA claim. 

In Plaintiff’s third cause of action, he alleges Defendants violated his rights under the 

Equal Protection Clause when they (1) refused to allow him to hold religious meal ceremonies and 

(2) refused to address his complaints that the PBSP kitchen was not preparing Seder meals in 

accordance with Jewish dietary rules, on the grounds that he was not Jewish because he was born 

of a Mexican woman, and not a Jewish woman. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 

protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). An Equal Protection claim can be stated in one of two 

ways. First, a plaintiff can allege that “defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” See Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976)). 

Alternatively, if the claims do not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff can establish an equal 

protection “class of one” claim by alleging that he “has been intentionally treated differently from 

others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 

936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable equal protection claim against 

Defendants. According to the complaint, although Defendant Kriendler admitted to being racist, 

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Defendant Kriendler’s reason for refusing Plaintiff’s request for religious accommodations was 

because Plaintiff was not born of a Jewish woman. Jewish inmates born of non-Jewish mothers 

are not a protected class. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is DISMISSED with prejudice because 

amendment would be futile. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (2000). However, the 

allegations in the third cause of action state a cognizable First Amendment free exercise claim. In 

stating a free exercise claim, the question is whether the inmate’s religious belief is sincere. See 

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he sincerely believes himself to be 

Jewish; that Defendants’ refusal to allow him to hold religious meal ceremonies and to address his 

concerns about the PBSP kitchen burdened his religious practice; and that the justification (that 

Plaintiff is not Jewish), is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See id. at 

884–85. These claims have already been found cognizable in the first and second causes of action.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunctive order, compensatory and punitive 

damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, cost of suit, and such further relief as the Court deems 

proper. ECF No. 1 at 17. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED as moot because he 

is no longer housed at PBSP. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s 

transfer from one prison to another while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims 

for injunctive relief concerning first prison’s policies). The Court also DISMISSES with prejudice 

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim against Defendants in their individual capacity, and Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 

claim for money damages against Defendants. RLUIPA does not authorize suits against state 

actors (including prison officials) acting in their individual capacities. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 

899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with other circuits addressing this issue). RLUIPA claims may 

only be brought against such defendants in their official or governmental capacities. Id. at 904. 

RLUIPA also does not authorize money damages against state officials, whether sued in their 

official or individual capacities. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). 

CONCLUSION

1. The Court DISMISSES the following claims with prejudice: the equal protection

claim, the RLUIPA claim against Defendants in their individual capacities, and the RLUIPA claim 

for money damages.

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2. The Court finds that the complaint has stated the following cognizable claims: 

Defendants’ refusal of Plaintiff’s requests, made between March 2016 and April 2017, for 

religious meal ceremonies and for Seder meals violated his First Amendment right to free exercise 

of religion; and Defendants’ refusal of Plaintiff’s requests, made between February 2017 and May 

2017, that his kosher meals be prepared in a kosher kitchen violated his First Amendment right to 

free exercise of religion and his rights under RLUIPA.

3. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint with all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order 

upon defendants PBSP Warden Clark Ducart, PBSP Community Resource Manager 

(“CRM”) Losacco, and the former PBSP Jewish chaplain Jonathan Kriendler at Pelican Bay 

State Prison. 

A courtesy copy of the complaint with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to 

the California Attorney General’s Office. 

4. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this Order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or a motion to stay as 

indicated above. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 

judgment, defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for 

summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, 

timely, and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. 

Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A 

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies similarly must be 

accompanied by a Wyatt notice. Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

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Plaintiff also must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding motions to dismiss for nonexhaustion provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion to dismiss. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

5. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

Plaintiff also is advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. You must “develop a record” and present it in your opposition in order to dispute any 

“factual record” presented by defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).

(The Rand and Wyatt notices above do not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said 

notices again concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies and motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

6. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’ 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

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any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendants’ 

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

8. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

9. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

10. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 26, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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