Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02093/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1346wd Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WANITA GATES, individually, as 

decedent Rayshaun V. Cole’s successor in 

interest; A.C., a minor, by and through her 

guardian ad litem, Kendra Thompson; 

J.C., a minor, by and through his guardian 

ad litem, Jessica Richards; K.C., a minor, 

by and through her guardian ad litem, 

Wanita Gates; S.G., a minor, by and 

through her guardian ad litem, Ebony 

Gregg; N.M., a minor, by and through her 

guardian ad litem, Katrina Copeland; 

C.M., a minor, by and through her 

guardian ad litem, Charome Moss; B.P., a 

minor, by and through his guardian ad 

litem, Tiaisha Sneed;

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

RESPONSIBLE CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION OFFICIALS 

DOES 1 through 20; and DOES 21

through 25, inclusive, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-2093-JAH-BGS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

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INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s (“Defendant” or 

“United States”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12 (b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. No. 4–1]. The motion has been fully briefed. After careful 

consideration of the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth below, the United States’

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Rayshaun Cole (“Cole”) was a United States Navy veteran, defense contractor, and 

real estate investor. See Doc. No. 1, ¶ 17. In October of 2015, Cole was living in Chula 

Vista with his girlfriend, Melissa Hayes-Spencer (“Hayes-Spencer”) who was employed 

as a CBP agent. Id. The couple was not married and had no children together, although 

Cole had seven children from previous relationships. Id. On or about October 17, 2015, 

Hayes-Spencer fatally shot Cole in the chest using her CBP issued firearm. Id. at ¶ 18.

Several months after the shooting, Hayes-Spencer was killed in a car accident. See Doc. 

No. 4–1, pg. 7.

Cole’s mother Wanita Gates along with his seven children (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

initiated this lawsuit against Defendants on October 11, 2017. [Doc. No. 1]. In the 

complaint, Plaintiffs assert several claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

against the United States and unknown United States Customs and Border Protection 

(“CBP”) personnel. Id. The FTCA claims include: (1) Wrongful Death, (2) Negligent 

Hiring, Supervision and Retention, (3) Negligent Training, and (4) Negligent Entrustment 

of a Firearm. Id. The complaint also includes several Bivens claims against the unknown 

CBP personnel for civil rights violations. Id. On December 15, 2017, the United States 

filed this Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 4]. 

The motion has been fully briefed by the parties. See Doc. Nos. 5, 6. On February 16, 2017, 

this Court took the motion under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. [Doc. 

No. 7].

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DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss 

a. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) 

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory. Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). Under 

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required to set forth a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and 

“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations 

omitted). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible 

when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In other words, 

“the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task 

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the reviewing court must 

assume the truth of all factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the 

form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). “Nor 

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does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider facts alleged in the 

complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached 

to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes 

judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court 

determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend 

unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts. Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995).

b. Analysis

As an initial matter, in its Motion to Dismiss the United States makes several 

arguments to which Plaintiffs concede. First, the only proper defendant to a FTCA claim, 

is the United States. See Doc. Nos. 4–1, 5. Accordingly, the FTCA claims, as to the 

Customs and Border Protection officials, are DISMISSED with prejudice. Next, the 

United States argues that there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity permitting the 

recovery of prejudgment interest under the FTCA. See Doc. No. 4–1, pg. 20. Plaintiffs do 

not oppose striking the request for an award of prejudgment interest from their complaint, 

and as such, the prayer for an award of prejudgment interest is STRICKEN from the 

complaint. See Doc. No. 5, pg. 10. 

As to the merits, the United States makes several arguments in support of its Motion 

to Dismiss. First, it is the United States’ position that the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the FTCA claims due to the discretionary function exception, which acts 

as a jurisdictional bar to FTCA claims. See Doc. No. 4–1, pgs. 12–16. Next, the United 

States contends that the complaint fails to plead facts supporting a breach of an alleged 

duty by CBP or that the alleged breach was the cause of Plaintiffs’ injury. Id. at pg. 16–20.

Finally, the United States argues that Plaintiff Wanita Gates lacks standing to bring a 

wrongful death action based on her status as the decedent’s mother. Id. at pg. 22. The 

arguments will be addressed in turn below.

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i. Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA

The FTCA is a “limited waiver of sovereign immunity, making the Federal 

Government liable to the same extent as a private party for certain torts of federal 

employees acting within the scope of their employment.” United States v. Orleans, 425 

U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). The FTCA waives the federal 

government’s sovereign immunity when its employees are negligent within the scope of 

their employment. Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1995). There are 

exceptions to the FTCA’s immunity waiver including the discretionary function exception, 

which bars claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of 

the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

In other words, the discretionary function exception restores the government’s immunity 

in situations where its employees are carrying out governmental or “regulatory” duties.

Faber, 56 F.3d at 1124. “The purpose of the discretionary function exception is to protect 

the ability of the government to proceed with decision making in carrying out its unique 

and vital functions without ‘second-guessing’ by the courts as to the appropriateness of its 

policy choices.” Gaede v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV F 12-0468 LJO DLB, 2013 WL 

129303, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1015, 101st Cong. 2nd. Sess. 

134 (1991)).

While a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction 

under the FTCA, the United States bears the ultimate burden of proving the discretionary 

function exception should apply. Faber, 56 F.3d at 1124. The Supreme Court has 

established a two-step process for evaluating whether a claim falls within the discretionary 

function exception. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 

1273, 1275, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 

531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1958, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988); United States v. S.A. Empresa 

de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813, 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 

2764, 2768, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). First, the court examines whether the government’s 

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actions are “discretionary in nature, acts that involv[e] an element of judgment or choice.” 

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this examination, 

it is “the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the 

discretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Varig, 467 U.S. at 813. “If there 

is . . . a statute or policy directing mandatory and specific action, the inquiry comes to an 

end because there can be no element of discretion when an employee has no rightful option 

but to adhere to the directive.” Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th 

Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “even assuming the challenged 

conduct involves an element of judgment, it remains to be decided whether that judgment 

is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 

499 U.S. at 322–23 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The exception protects only 

government actions and decisions based on social, economic, and political policy.” Miller 

v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The United States argues that Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims all arise out of the 

discretionary acts of the CBP concerning the hiring, training, supervision, retention, and 

issuance of a firearm to Hayes-Spencer, and as such, are barred by the discretionary 

function exception. Doc. No. 4–1, pg. 16. The United States cites to numerous Ninth 

Circuit decisions wherein the Court of Appeals held negligent or reckless employment, 

supervision, and training of government employees falls squarely within the discretionary 

function exception of the FTCA. Id. at pg. 15 (citing Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 

1001 (9th Cir. 2000); Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. 

Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs’ argue the discretionary function 

exception does not apply to this case because CBP’s own policies and procedures mandate 

that Hayes-Spencer should have never been issued a firearm. Doc. No. 5, pg. 6. 

As stated above, Plaintiffs’ are required to advance a claim that is facially outside 

the discretionary function exception in order to defeat a motion to dismiss. Prescott v. 

United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992)). Here, Plaintiffs’ have not pleaded facts 

sufficient to demonstrate that the discretionary function exception does not apply to the 

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CBP’s hiring, training, supervision, retention, and issuance of a firearm. See GordoGonzalez v. United States, 873 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[W]ithout pleading specific 

facts sufficient to show that the challenged conduct did not involve a discretionary 

function, the plaintiff cannot lay claim to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. We 

need go no further.”). Plaintiffs’ do not allege in the body of their complaint, nor do they 

attach as an exhibit, a specific CBP policy or procedure that governs the challenged 

conduct. In their opposition, Plaintiffs’ cite to numerous CPB policies, arguing that based 

upon such policies, CBP had no discretion to issue Hayes-Spencer a firearm. Doc. No. 5, 

pg. 6. However, in determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a court may 

not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. California Dep't of Corr., 151 

F.3d 1194, 1197 fn. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th 

Cir.1993); see also 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“The 

court may not . . . take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing 

the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 

7(a).”)). Accordingly, because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

FTCA claims, they are DISMISSED.

1

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ second and third FTCA causes of action assert claims 

solely for the negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training of Hayes-Spencer by the 

CBP. See Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 39–52. As previously noted, the United States argues that such 

activities are clearly embraced within the purview of the discretionary function exception. 

See Doc. No. 4–1, pg. 15. In opposition, Plaintiffs’ argue in a very general sense that the 

discretionary exception does not apply, but Plaintiffs’ do not address the specific arguments 

of the United States. Instead, the entirety of Plaintiffs’ opposition focuses on CBP’s 

negligent entrustment of a firearm. By failing to address the arguments made against their 

 

1 Finding dismissal appropriate based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court need not address 

the United States’ remaining arguments.

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claims for the negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training of Hayes-Spencer in 

their opposition, Plaintiffs’ have waived them. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 

Countrywide Fin. Corp., 802 F.Supp.2d 1125 (C.D.Cal.2011) (“[I]n most circumstances, 

failure to respond in an opposition brief to an argument put forward in an opening brief 

constitutes waiver or abandonment in regard to the uncontested issue.”). Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ second and third causes of action are DISMISSED with prejudice.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint is 

GRANTED;

a. Plaintiffs’ second and third FTCA claims, and all FTCA 

claims as to the unknown Customs and Border Protection 

officials are DISMISSED with prejudice;

b. All remaining claims against the United States are 

DISMISSED without prejudice;

2. To the extent that Plaintiff is able to cure the noted deficiencies, 

Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint within twentyone (21) days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 5, 2018

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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