Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02120/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Revolution Distribution, an Arizona

limited liability company, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Evol Nutrition Associates, Inc., a Georgia

corporation; Jeremy Nickels, an

individual; Jessica Nickels, an individual,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-2120-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant Evol Nutrition Associates, Inc.’s Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue (Doc. 12) and Defendants

Jeremy and Jessica Nickels’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and

Improper Venue (Doc. 19). The Court now rules on the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Revolution Distribution (“Revolution”) brought this action against

Defendants Evol Nutrition Associates, Inc. (“Evol”) and Jeremy and Jessica Nickels, seeking

declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ rights to use their similar trademarks and also

asserting trademark infringement and unfair competition claims against Defendants.

Revolution is an Arizona limited liability company. According to the Complaint,

Revolution is involved in the invention, sale and marketing of various “unique novelty

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 1 In the Complaint, Revolution refers to its mark both as the “Zan E. Bar” mark and the

“Zane E. Bar” mark. It is unclear to the Court whether these different spellings are a result

of a typographical error, in which case the Court cannot determine which is the proper

spelling, or whether Revolution uses both spellings. For the remainder of this Order, the

Court will use the “Zan E. Bar” spelling to refer to Revolution’s mark.

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products,” including clothing and accessories and also “specialty herbal aroma therapy

products and supplements.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 6. Revolution created the “Zan E. Bar” trademark

on or about January 25, 2011 and has used it in interstate commerce since March 2011.1

 Id.

at ¶¶ 7-8. Beginning on May 15, 2011, Revolution advertised its “Zan E. Bar” product at the

Atlantic City Champs trade show. Id. at ¶ 9. There is no indication that Revolution

attempted to register the trademark.

 Evol is a Georgia corporation. Doc. 13 at ¶ 3. Jeremy and Jessica Nickels, a married

couple residing in Georgia, are Evol’s CEO and CFO, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 2-4. According

to Jeremy Nickels, “Evol is engaged in the business of inventing and distributing herbal and

nutritional products, and is a leader in the novelty, herbal and nutritional products industries.”

Id. at ¶ 5. 

Jeremy and Jessica Nickels created the “Zaney Bar” trademark, naming it after their

son. Doc. 13 at ¶ 12. On August 23, 2011, a trademark application for the “Zaney Bar”

trademark, for use with goods in the “herbal supplements” class, was filed with the United

States Patent and Trademark Office. Doc. 1 at ¶ 11; Doc. 1-3, Ex. 5. Jeremy and Jessica

Nickels are listed as co-applicants on the application. Doc. 1-3, Ex. 5. The application

alleges a first use date of May 12, 2011. Id.

Further, Evol operates two websites: http://www.evolnutrition.com (“Evol Nutrition

site”) and http://www.reddawnparty.com (“Red Dawn Party site”). Doc. 28 at ¶¶ 6-9.

Consumers may use these websites to purchase Evol’s products. Id. Evol’s sales through

its websites account for less than 3% of Evol’s monthly sales. Id. at ¶ 9. On September 18,

2011, Evol sold two packages of its Zaney Bar product to a purchaser in Arizona through the

Red Dawn Party site. Id. at ¶ 6. In addition, through non-web-based sales, Evol has sold its

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 2 Defendants argue in their reply briefs that the Court should strike and disregard

Revolution’s responses as being untimely pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(c), which generally

requires that responsive memoranda be filed within fourteen days after service of a motion.

L.R. Civ. 7.2(c). However, Local Rule 7.2(c) makes an exception for motions filed under

Local Rule 12.1. Id. That rule states that the “time schedule for response, reply, and oral

argument for motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction shall be the same as for motions for

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56.1, Local Rules of Civil Procedure. L.R. Civ. 12.1.

Thus, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1(d), Revolution had thirty days to file its response,

plus the additional three days added under Rule 6(d) for certain methods of service, including

by electronic means. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). The Court finds that Revolution’s responses were

timely filed, and therefore the Court will deny Evol’s request to strike the responses. 

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Zaney Bar product to three different stores in Arizona for a total amount of $640. Id. at ¶ 11.

Evol has continued to sell its Zaney Bar product to purchasers in Arizona since the filing of

this lawsuit. Doc. 32 at ¶ 11. Evol has also sold other products that are not at issue in this

case to Arizona, which have made up “the vast majority” of Evol’s sales in Arizona. Id. 

On October 10, 2011, Revolution received a cease and desist letter from a law firm

retained by Evol. Doc. 1-3, Ex. 6. The letter states the following: 

This letter is an express demand for [Revolution] to cease and desist from

falsely infringing upon Evol’s products and trademarks, including but not

limited to “Zaney Bar.” . . . [Revolution] has intentionally and willfully sought

to capitalize on Evol’s intellectual property. [Revolution’s] use of “Zan E.

Bar” is an intentional infringement upon Evol’s “Zaney Bar” trademark.

Id. The letter further threatens the filing of a lawsuit against Revolution if it does not comply

with the demand. Id. There is no indication that Revolution responded to the letter.

However, shortly after receiving the letter, Revolution filed this lawsuit on October 27, 2011.

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the

alternative, to transfer venue. Evol’s motion was filed on January 5, 2012 (Doc. 12). The

Nickels filed a joint motion on January 30, 2012 (Doc. 19). Revolution filed responses to

Evol’s and the Nickels’ motions (Docs. 26 & 29) on February 9, 2012 and March 5, 2012,

respectively, and Defendants filed replies (Docs. 27 & 30) on February 21, 2012 and March

15, 2012.2

 As discussed below, the Court concludes that it may properly exercise personal

jurisdiction over Evol, though not over the Nickels. However, the Court further holds that

transfer of venue to Georgia is appropriate. 

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II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Sher

v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). A defendant may move prior to trial to

dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); see, e.g., Data

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Rule 12(b)(2)).

When a defendant does so, “the plaintiff is ‘obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit

or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction’” over the defendant. Cummings v. W. Trial

Lawyers Ass’n, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (D. Ariz. 2001) (quoting Scott v. Breeland, 792

F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986)). Conflicts over statements contained in the plaintiff’s and

defendant’s affidavits “must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d

at 800 (citing AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)).

If the Court decides a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without an

evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional

facts. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Uncontroverted

allegations in the Complaint are deemed true for purposes of resolving the motion. Id. 

When, as here, no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the Court applies the

law of the forum state. Id. The Arizona long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction

to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4.2(a); see also A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995)

(stating that under Rule 4.2(a), “Arizona will exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

litigant to the maximum extent allowed by the federal constitution”).

Absent traditional bases for personal jurisdiction (i.e., physical presence, domicile,

and consent), the Due Process Clause requires that a nonresident defendant have certain

minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Doe v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050

(9th Cir. 1997). The Due Process Clause protects a defendant’s “liberty interest in not being

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subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful

‘contacts, ties or relations.’” Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269-

70 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985)).

If the Court determines that Defendants’ contacts with Arizona are sufficient to satisfy

the Due Process Clause, then the Court must exercise either “general” or “specific”

jurisdiction over Defendants. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 414-15 nn.8-9 (1984) (citations omitted). The nature of Defendants’ contacts with

Arizona will determine whether the Court exercises general or specific jurisdiction. Id.

Here, Plaintiff does not contend that the Court has general jurisdiction over either Evol or the

Nickels. Thus, the Court will only consider whether it has specific jurisdiction over

Defendants.

A. Evidence Considered by the Court

In considering Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court has considered the following

evidence submitted by Revolution: 1) the Complaint; 2) Revolution’s response to Evol’s

Motion; and 3) Revolution’s response to the Nickels’ motion. In addition, the Court has

considered the following evidence submitted by Evol and the Nickels: 1) Evol’s motion; 2)

Evol’s reply; 3) the Nickels’ motion; 4) the Nickels’ reply; 5) the four declarations submitted

by Jeremy Nickels (Docs. 13, 20, 28 & 32); and 6) the declaration submitted by the Nickels’

attorney (Doc. 31). The Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing; therefore Revolution must

only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction over Evol

The Court must determine whether Evol has established sufficient contacts with the

forum state such that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the company would not offend

the Due Process Clause. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The Ninth Circuit applies a threepart test to determine whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to

subject it to the state’s specific jurisdiction. Under this three-part test, specific jurisdiction

exists only if: (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, or

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purposefully directed conduct at the forum that had effects in the forum; (2) the claim arises

out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports

with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it is reasonable. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.

Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,

Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1997)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the

first two prongs of the test.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “If the plaintiff succeeds in

satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a

compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

1. “Purposeful Availment”

The first prong may be satisfied by either showing that the defendant “purposefully

availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum” or “purposefully

directed his activities toward the forum.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). Though these two concepts both fall under the

umbrella of “purposeful availment,” the Ninth Circuit has clarified that “availment and

direction are, in fact, two distinct concepts.” Id. “A purposeful availment analysis is most

often used in suits sounding in contract. . . . A purposeful direction analysis, on the other

hand, is most often used in suits sounding in tort.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802

(internal citations omitted). Here, the underlying cause of action is trademark infringement,

which is akin to a tort case. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th

Cir. 1998). Thus, the Court will apply the purposeful direction analysis.

The three-part Calder effects test, taken from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder

v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), is used to evaluate purposeful direction. Under this test, “the

defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the

forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum

state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206

(9th Cir. 2006). 

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 3 Other Courts have applied the Cybersell framework in the context of a “purposeful

availment” analysis, rather than a “purposeful direction” analysis. See First Serv. Networks,

Inc. v. First Serv. Maint. Grp., Inc., No. CV 11-1897-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 1413369, at *2

n.3 (D. Ariz. April 24, 2012); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Bobosky, No. CV 10-603-PK, 2010 WL

4365795, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 8, 2010). Furthermore, at least one court has noted that Ninth

Circuit courts have used both “purposeful direction” and “purposeful availment” analyses

in trademark infringement actions. Adidas Am., 2010 WL 4365795, at *4. Hence, regardless

of whether the Court’s analysis under Cybersell more properly falls under “purposeful

availment” or “purposeful direction,” the Court finds that the first prong of the test for

specific jurisdiction over Evol has been met.

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a. Intentional Act

To satisfy the first requirement of the effects test, it is enough that a defendant

performed “an actual, physical act in the real world.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. The

defendant need not have intended “to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Id.

Here, Evol’s actions in maintaining its websites and selling and shipping its allegedly

infringing products to purchasers in Arizona constitute intentional acts. Thus, the first prong

of the effects test is satisfied. 

b. Express Aiming

“The second part of the Calder-effects test requires that the defendant’s conduct be

expressly aimed at the forum.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d

1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Evol’s intentional conduct included selling and

distributing allegedly infringing products to purchasers in Arizona, including sales to three

stores in the state and one sale to a purchaser that was completed through Evol’s Red Dawn

Party website.

The determination of whether Evol’s activities undertaken through its website were

expressly aimed at Arizona is assessed under the Cybersell framework.3

 See Adobe Sys. Inc.

v. Childers, No. 5:10-cv-03571-JF/HRL, 2011 WL 566812, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011).

In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit held that the operation of a passive website is not sufficient

to establish purposeful availment. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419-20. Conversely, operation of

an interactive website, which is one that allows users to “exchange information with the host

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computer” often is sufficient for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant operator.

Id. at 418. Furthermore, the Cybersell decision as been interpreted to suggest that an

interactive website that results in actual business transactions conducted with the forum state

will meet the requirement for purposeful availment:

In [Cybersell], the Ninth Circuit held that posting an advertisement on a

passive Internet site is insufficient to create purposeful availment. . . .

However, the Cybersell court also indicated that an interactive web site which

allowed defendant to transact business over the Internet would constitute

purposeful availment. . . . It further suggested that any transaction of business

with the forum’s residents, whether through the Internet or otherwise, would

constitute purposeful availment. 

Park Inns Int’l, Inc. v. Pac. Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762, 763 (D. Ariz. 1998)

(internal citations omitted).

Here, Evol admits that it operates “an interactive website to enable commercial

activity.” Doc. 27 at 3. More importantly, Evol has admitted that it sold its allegedly

infringing Zaney Bar product to an Arizona purchaser through the Red Dawn Party website,

Doc. 28 at ¶ 6, thereby using the interactive website to conduct business with the forum of

Arizona. Apart from its web-based sale, Evol has admitted that it has sold and distributed

its Zaney Bar product to three different stores in Arizona and continues to make such sales

in Arizona. The Court finds that Evol’s interactive websites, along with its product sales to

Arizona purchasers, are sufficient to show that Evol expressly aimed its conduct at Arizona.

c. Harm Caused in Forum State

The third prong of the effects test requires that the defendant’s conduct causes harm

that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered by the plaintiff in the forum state. See

Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206. With regard to the amount of harm suffered, the Ninth Circuit has

stated that the “brunt” of the harm to the plaintiff need not be suffered in the forum state. Id.

at 1207. Rather, “[i]f a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is suffered in the forum

state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been suffered in another state.” Id.

Here, the alleged harm to Revolution is the infringement of its trademark. Thus,

Evol’s conduct, which includes selling allegedly infringing products directly to purchasers

in Arizona, caused the alleged harm to Revolution in Arizona. Furthermore, the cease and

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desist letter that Evol sent to Revolution provides prima facie evidence that Evol knew that

Revolution was located in Arizona and using a similar trademark. Thus, the Court finds that

the three prongs of the Calder effects test have been satisfied. 

2. Claim Arises Out of Forum-Related Activities

With regard to the second prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction, the Ninth

Circuit has adopted a “but for” test for determining whether a plaintiff’s cause of action

arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Doe, 112 F.3d at 1051. The “arising

out of” requirement is met if, but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state,

the cause of action would not have arisen. Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561

(9th Cir. 1995).

The “but for” test is satisfied in this matter because the cause of action arises out of

Evol’s forum-related activities. But for Evol’s infringing use of Revolution’s trademark,

including on products sold to purchasers in Arizona, Revolution’s trademark infringement

action against Evol would not have arisen. The Court therefore finds that the alleged

trademark infringement arises out of Evol’s Arizona-related activities.

3. Reasonableness

An unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause even if the

“purposeful availment” and “arising out of” requirements of the specific jurisdiction test are

satisfied. Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1995). But the Court

presumes that its exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable if the first two

requirements of the specific jurisdiction test are met. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500

(9th Cir. 1995). Once a plaintiff satisfies the first two requirements for specific jurisdiction,

the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant, which must come forward with a

“compelling case” that personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.

The Ninth Circuit considers the following seven factors in determining whether the

exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable: (1) the extent of the

defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant of

litigating in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state;

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(4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial

resolution of the dispute; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. See Ziegler,

64 F.3d at 475.

Because the Court has found that Revolution has met the first two requirements of

specific jurisdiction, Evol must come forward with a compelling case to rebut the

presumption that jurisdiction in Arizona is reasonable. Evol has failed to meet its burden.

Further, because Evol has not directly addressed the reasonableness requirement in its

briefing, the Court will only briefly address the relevant factors. 

Based on its sales of products to purchasers in Arizona, the Court finds that Evol has

purposefully interjected itself into Arizona to conduct business. Further, though it is

arguably more inconvenient for Evol to litigate this case in Arizona than in its home state of

Georgia, the Court finds that there would only be a marginal increase in inconvenience.

Thus, litigating in Arizona is likely just as inconvenient to Evol as litigating in Georgia

would be to Revolution. There is also no apparent conflict with the sovereignty of Georgia,

and Arizona clearly has an interest in adjudicating a dispute involving alleged infringement

of one of its resident’s trademarks. Evol has put forth no evidence that resolution of this

dispute will be less efficient in Arizona. Finally, though Georgia presents an alternative

forum, there is no indication, with regard to the question of whether exercising personal

jurisdiction over Evol is appropriate, that litigating the case there would be more reasonable.

After a review of all the factors, the Court finds Evol has failed to present a

compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and

substantial justice. Because Revolution has satisfied the three-prong specific jurisdiction

test, the Court finds that it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Evol. The Court therefore

denies Evol’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

C. Specific Jurisdiction over Jeremy and Jessica Nickels

Jeremy and Jessica Nickels’ alleged contacts with Arizona resulted from their

activities as officers of Evol. Thus, the Court must apply the “fiduciary shield” doctrine to

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determine whether exercising jurisdiction over the Nickels is proper. “Under the fiduciary

shield doctrine, a person’s mere association with a corporation that causes injury in the forum

state is not sufficient in itself to permit that forum to assert jurisdiction over the person.”

Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, some other reason

for the court to disregard the corporate form must exist. Id. “Because the corporate form

serves as a shield for the individuals involved for purposes of liability as well as jurisdiction,

many courts search for reasons to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ in jurisdictional contexts parallel

to those used in liability contexts. Thus, the corporate form may be ignored in cases in which

the corporation is the agent or alter ego of the individual defendant . . . or where there is an

identity of interests between the corporation and the individuals.” Id. at 520-21 (internal

citations omitted). Further, the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of proving

that the court should pierce the corporate veil and exercise jurisdiction. See Flynt Dist. Co.,

Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1984).

The Davis decision also questions the continuing viability of the fiduciary duty

doctrine as a defense to personal jurisdiction under Arizona’s long-arm statute. Specifically,

the court noted that, in Calder, “the Supreme Court appears to have signalled that the

question whether there exists a jurisdictional corporate shield is not . . .” an issue “of

constitutional dimensions.” Davis, 885 F.2d at 521. Rather, the Davis court found that, in

both Calder and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Supreme Court

appeared to reject the notion that an individual’s status as an employee could prevent the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over that individual. Id. The Davis court also observed that

“although Arizona courts previously recognized a corporate shield limit on their long-arm

jurisdiction, . . . Arizona has more recently focused on corporate officers’ individual contacts

to assert personal jurisdiction, rather than restricting their jurisdiction to cover the corporate

entity only.” Id. (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that “because the

Arizona long-arm statute extends to the limit of constitutional due process . . . and because

it is not equitably limited by the fiduciary shield doctrine, the reach of long-arm jurisdiction

in Arizona is effectively stretched by the reasoning of Calder and Keeton.” Id. at 522.

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Hence, “Arizona’s long-arm statute may, consistent with constitutional due process, allow

assertion of personal jurisdiction over officers of a corporation as long as the court finds

those officers to have sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona.” Id. Because the parties

argue based on the fiduciary shield doctrine, the Court will consider whether jurisdiction over

the Nickels is proper under both that doctrine and the minimum contacts doctrine. 

Here, Revolution’s Complaint does not include any facts or allegations that would

support piercing the corporate veil with respect to the Nickels. Revolution also has not

submitted any declarations or affidavits alleging facts that would provide a prima facie

showing of jurisdiction. Rather, most of Revolution’s response to the Nickels’ motion to

dismiss makes almost identical arguments to those found in its response to Evol’s motion to

dismiss. The Court finds that those arguments, which simply assume that the Nickels are

responsible for all of Evol’s activities, do nothing to establish that jurisdiction over the

Nickels is proper.

In the little space that Revolution uses to address the fiduciary duty doctrine,

Revolution only alleges that the Nickels 1) developed and selected the “Zaney Bar”

trademark; 2) applied for a trademark application for the “Zaney Bar” trademark as

individuals; 3) own and operate Evol’s websites; and 4) caused a cease and desist letter to

be sent to Revolution. Doc. 29 at 9-10. Of these allegations, only the first and second have

any factual support. Defendants have offered evidence that the Evol Nutrition website is

registered to Evol, not to the Nickels. Doc. 31, Ex. A. Neither party has provided any

factual support for the ownership of the Red Dawn Party website. Finally, the cease and

desist letter was sent on behalf of Evol, refers to “Evol’s products and trademarks,” and

makes no mention of either Jeremy or Jessica Nickels. Doc. 1, Ex. 6. The Court finds that

the allegations, even if all true, merely reflect actions that the Nickels undertook in their

capacity as employees of Evol and do not establish an alter ego relationship or an identity of

interests between the Nickels and Evol. Revolution has therefore provided no basis for this

court to pierce the corporate veil with respect to the Nickels.

The alleged acts also do not establish that minimum contacts existed between the

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Nickels and Arizona. Moreover, Revolution makes no allegations of any other contacts that

exist between the Nickels and Arizona that might satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.

However, in one of Jeremy Nickels’s declarations, he makes clear that neither he nor his wife

have any contacts with Arizona. They do not pay nor owe taxes to Arizona, are not licensed

by Arizona, and have never even traveled to Arizona in either an individual or business

capacity. Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 7-9. Therefore, the Court finds that Revolution has failed to show

that Jeremy and Jessica Nickels have satisfied the minimum contacts requirement in their

personal capacities. Nor has Revolution demonstrated how jurisdictional discovery would

allow it to contradict Jeremy Nickels’s declaration or otherwise establish that the Nickels are

subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. See Terracom, 49 F.3d at 562 (“Where a plaintiff’s claim

of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the

face of specific denials made by defendants, the Court need not permit even limited

discovery.”) (quoting Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D.N.C. 1988)). Thus,

the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the Nickels. However, for the reasons

discussed below with respect to transfer of venue, the Court will deny as moot the Nickels’

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

III. PROPER VENUE

Defendants have also challenged Revolutions’ choice of venue under 28 U.S.C.

1391(a) and (c). However, section 1391(a) applies only to cases “wherein jurisdiction is

founded only on diversity of citizenship.” Because this case involves federal trademark

claims under the Lanham Act, jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity and thus section

1391(a) does not apply. Further, the Lanham Act does not contain its own venue provision,

see Woodke v. Dahm, 70 F.3d 983, 983 (8th Cir. 1995), so one of the other general venue

provisions must apply. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) applies and provides an appropriate

basis for venue in this district. 

Under § 1391(b)(2), venue in a “civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely

on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in . .

. a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

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claim occurred.” In a trademark suit brought under the Lanham Act, “a ‘substantial part’ of

the events giving rise to the claims occur in any district where consumers are likely to be

confused by the accused goods, ‘whether that occurs solely in one district or in many.’”

Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1286 (D. Ariz.

2009) (quoting Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Here, Revolution has not alleged sufficient facts in the Complaint to establish that

venue is appropriate in Arizona. In fact, Revolution does not address venue in the Complaint

at all. Nevertheless, as described above, the declarations of Jeremy Nickels establish that

Evol has sold allegedly infringing products to purchasers in Arizona through both web- and

non-web-based sales. This evidence is sufficient to establish that consumer confusion caused

by the accused goods is likely to occur in Arizona. Therefore, venue is appropriate in this

district under § 1391(b)(2). 

IV. TRANSFER OF VENUE

Finally, Defendants also request, in the alternative to dismissal, that the Court transfer

this case to the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),

a district court may, “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of

justice, . . . transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought.” A court may consider several factors when deciding whether to transfer venue,

including the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the extent of the parties’ contacts with the forum,

the contacts in the forum relating to the plaintiff's cause of action, the availability of nonparty witnesses, and the accessibility of evidence. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d

495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A district court has “discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an

‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Id. at 498

(internal quotation omitted). Also, a court need not have personal jurisdiction over a

defendant in order to transfer a case under § 1404(a). See Kawamoto v. CB Richard Ellis,

Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211-12 (D. Haw. 2002). 

With regard to convenience of the parties, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually

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given “substantial deference” where the plaintiff has chosen its home forum. Reiffin v.

Microsoft Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d. 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2000). However, the plaintiff’s choice of

its home forum is only one factor to be considered and is not dispositive. Impra Inc. v.

Quinton Instruments Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1890, 1891, 1990 WL 284713, at *1 (D. Ariz.

1990). But “[t]he interest of justice factor is the most important of all.” Amazon.com v.

Cendant Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

“Consideration of the interest of justice, which includes judicial economy, ‘may be

determinative to a particular transfer motion, even if the convenience of the parties and

witnesses might call for a different result.’” Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Factors to be considered in the interest

of justice analysis include “ensuring speedy trials, trying related litigation together, and

having a judge who is familiar with the applicable law try the case.” Id. (quoting Heller Fin.,

Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989)).

Here, the only reason that Defendants offer in support of transferring the case to

Georgia is that all Defendants reside and are located in that state. Plaintiff also does not

provide specific reasons as to why venue is more appropriate in Arizona, other than to assert

that venue is proper in this district. Neither party mentions the locations of likely witnesses

or evidence. Thus, this Court cannot determine with any certainty which of the proposed

venues is likely more convenient. In light of the deference that is given to Revolution’s

choice of its home venue, the Court concludes that considerations of convenience favor

Arizona.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that in the interest of justice, transferring the case to

Georgia is appropriate. As discussed above, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Evol,

but it does not have personal jurisdiction over the Nickels. However, though it is Evol that

appears to be responsible for the sales of the allegedly infringing goods in Arizona, the

Nickels are the registered owners of the “Zaney Bar” trademark. Doc. 29-1, Ex. D.

Trademark owners have been held by other courts to be indispensable parties to infringement

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 4 Rule 19 governs the required joinder of parties. The Ninth Circuit utilizes a three-part

analysis to determine 1) whether a nonparty should be joined; 2) whether it is feasible to

order that the nonparty be joined; and 3) if joinder is not feasible, whether the case can

proceed in the nonparty’s absence or should be dismissed. EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co.,

610 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010). Though the Rule previously referred to “necessary”

and “indispensable” parties, it now refers to “persons required to be joined if feasible” and

persons in whose absence, if they cannot be joined, the action should not proceed. Id. at

1078 n.1. However, these amendments were merely stylistic. Id. 

 5

 Thus, the Court is not basing its decision to transfer on a determination that the Nickels

are indispensable parties under Rule 19; rather, the Court bases its decision on the various

considerations, outlined above, for making such a determination, which, in the Court’s view,

counsel for transferring the case in the interest of justice.

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actions under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4

 See, e.g., Int’l Importers,

Inc. v. Int’l Spirits & Wines, LLC, No. 10-61856-CIV, 2011 WL 7807548, at *8 (S.D. Fla.

July 26, 2011) (collecting cases); Jaguar Cars Ltd. v. Manufactures Des Montres Jaguar,

S.A., 196 F.R.D. 306, 308-10 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Doing so protects the trademark holder’s

rights and interests, avoids multiple suits concerning the same basic facts, and also “protects

the public interest in efficiently utilizing judicial resources.” May Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Ava

Import-Export, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 93, 96 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Thus, when trademark owners

cannot feasibly be joined to an infringement action for lack of personal jurisdiction, courts

have dismissed the claims to which the owner is indispensible under Rule 19. See, e.g.,

Jaguar Cars, 196 F.R.D. at 310.

A similar situation would arise here if the Court were to dismiss only the Nickels from

the case based on lack of personal jurisdiction. However, because neither party has

addressed the possibility of whether the Nickels are indispensable parties in its briefing, the

Court is not prepared to determine whether dismissal of Revolution’s claims is appropriate.5

Nor does the Court see a need to order further briefing on this issue. Rather, in the interest

of justice, the Court will transfer this case under § 1404(a) to the Norther District of Georgia,

Atlanta Division, where Defendants have admitted they are subject to personal jurisdiction

and venue is appropriate. The Court finds that this is the most appropriate course of action

in light of the lack of personal jurisdiction over the Nickels and the very minimal amount of

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contacts on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over Evol. Further, transferring the

case will ensure fair treatment to both parties—none of Revolution’s claims nor the parties

against which they are asserted will be dismissed, and all Defendants will have the

opportunity to protect their rights and interests with respect to this litigation. Finally, transfer

will ensure that this litigation, with respect to all involved parties and claims, proceeds in the

most expeditious and efficient manner possible, thereby promoting the public policy interest

in judicial economy.

V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying in part and granting in part Evol’s and Jeremy and Jessica

Nickels’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer

venue (Docs. 12 & 19). To the extent the motions seek dismissal for lack of personal

jurisdiction, they are DENIED. To the extent the motions seek transfer of venue to the

Norther District of Georgia, they are GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall transfer this

action to the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. 

DATED this 21st day of June, 2012.

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