Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. HUNTER, D.V.M.; and

HOWARD ELEY,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; SHERIFF

SCOTT JONES, in his official

capacity, 

 Defendants.

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2:06-cv-00457-GEB-EFB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT*

Plaintiffs seek to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure section 59(e) “to include Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and a Permanent Injunction.” (Pls.’ Mot. to Amend J.

1:25-27, ECF No. 194.) Plaintiffs argue: “they proved that police

wrongdoing was part of a ‘policy, plan, or a pervasive pattern’ of

police excessive force; thus, this Court may issue an appropriate

injunction to prevent the misconduct from continuing.” (Id. at 7:10-12.)

Defendants rejoin, inter alia, that “[P]laintiffs do not have

standing to seek injunctive relief.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 4:3, ECF No. 205.)

Defendants argue: “None of the numerous cases cited by [P]laintiffs

stand for the proposition that two [individuals], neither of whom is in

the custody of the County, or are likely to be in the future, have

This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

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standing to seek non class injunctive relief as to the County’s jail

operations.” (Id. 3:22-25.)

Plaintiffs reply that “[a] number of doctrines have developed

. . . to permit courts to review a case in which it is no longer

possible to remedy the particular grievance giving rise to the

litigation.” (Pls.’ Reply 4:23-25, ECF No. 207.) In particular,

Plaintiffs argue the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

doctrine applies to this case. (Id. 4:26-28.) Plaintiffs argue: “[i]t

was impossible for Mr. Hunter to have brought the challenge to

[Defendants’] excessive force policy . . . before . . . Mr. Hunter[’s]

very brief initial incarceration was completed.” (Id. 5:12-15.)

“To have standing to assert a claim for prospective injunctive

relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that he is realistically

threatened by a repetition of [the injury].’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695

F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95, 109 (1983)). “This threat must be ‘real and immediate,’ rather than

merely ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Marable v. Nitchman, 262 F.

App’x 17, 22 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103). “Past

wrongs may bear on whether there is a threat of repeated injury, but

they do not, in themselves, demonstrate a present case absent

‘continuing, present adverse effects.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102).

“The burden of establishing standing[,] as well as an

entitlement to equitable relief[,] lies squarely with the

plaintiffs . . . .” Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 367 (E.D. Cal.

2002) (citing San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121,

1126 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

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Here, neither Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Sacramento

County Main Jail (“Jail”) when the Complaint was filed, and neither

Plaintiff has shown that “he is realistically threatened by a repetition

of [the use of force at the Jail].” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109; see also

Nelson v. King Cnty., 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (stating the plaintiff bears

the burden of “showing a likelihood of recurrence”). Further,

notwithstanding the jury verdict that each Plaintiff was subjected to

excessive force at the jail, these findings do not “establish a real and

immediate threat” that either Plaintiff “would again be” subjected to

force in the Jail. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. In light of the factual

showing in the pending motion, the likelihood of each Plaintiff being

subjected to “the threat of future harm” at the Jail involves “an

extended chain of . . . speculative contingencies, all of which would

have to be fulfilled in order to have the threat . . . become manifest.”

Nelson, 895 F.2d at 1252. “[T]he Supreme Court and [the Ninth C]ircuit

have repeatedly found a lack of standing where the litigant’s claim

relies upon a chain of speculative contingencies, particularly a chain

that includes the [litigant’s future] violation of . . . law.” Id.; see

also Melendres, 695 F.3d at 998 (“[S]tanding is not appropriate where a

plaintiff can avoid injury by avoiding illegal conduct . . . .”); Eggar

v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 317 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming

district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ equitable claims on

standing grounds where it was “speculative” whether the plaintiffs would

be subjected to the alleged misconduct in the future). 

Further, Plaintiffs’ argument that an injunction should issue 

because the excessive force to which they were subjected is governed by

the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine is inapplicable

to this case. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Nelson: “While . . . the

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standards for evaluating the threat of future harm under the standing

and mootness doctrines are similar, the ‘capable of repetition but

evading review’ doctrine is an exception only to the mootness doctrine;

it is not transferable to the standing context.” Nelson, 895 F.2d at

1254. “This exception governs cases in which the plaintiff possesses

standing, but then loses it [during the course of litigation].” Id.

“Since [Plaintiffs] did not have standing” for prospective injunctive

relief when the action was commenced because neither Plaintiff was then

incarcerated in the Jail and neither Plaintiff has shown a realistic

threat of repeated injury, “their invocation of this exception is not

warranted.” Id.

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the

judgment is denied. 

Dated: August 8, 2013

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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