Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-05251/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-05251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Case No. 19-CV-05251-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICARDO A. VASQUEZ CRUZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 19-CV-05251-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1-1

On August 22, 2019, Petitioner Ricardo Vasquez Cruz (“Petitioner”) filed a verified 

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner is a 

native and a citizen of El Salvador who is currently detained in Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. See Pet. ¶ 7; ECF No. 1-3 (“Sanchez Decl.”), Ex. B (“Vasquez 

Cruz Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing is 

unlawful and in violation of due process, and requests that the Court either (1) order his immediate 

release; or (2) order Respondents William P. Barr, Kevin McAleenan,1 Richard Valeika, and 

 

1 Chad Wolf has replaced Kevin McAleenan as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. Pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Chad Wolf automatically substitutes Kevin McAleenan 

as a respondent in this matter.

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Case No. 19-CV-05251-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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Wendell Anderson (“Respondents”) to provide Petitioner “a custody hearing at which the 

government is required to justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence that 

[Petitioner] is a danger or flight risk.” Pet. ¶¶ 4, 48.

On August 22, 2019, Petitioner also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”) seeking the same relief. See ECF No. 1-1 (“TRO Mot.”). On September 5, 2019,

Respondents filed a Consolidated Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 6 (“Opp’n”). On September 16, 2019, 

Petitioner filed a Reply. ECF No. 7 (“Reply”). 

Having considered the briefing and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS

Petitioner’s habeas petition and DENIES as moot Petitioner’s TRO motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner first entered the United States in 1999 after fleeing El Salvador because of gang 

violence. Vasquez Cruz Decl. ¶ 2. Beginning in 2001, Petitioner held lawful status as a 

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) beneficiary. Id. ¶ 3. At issue in this case, on January 16, 

2018, Petitioner was convicted of felony violations of: (1) California Penal Code section 273.5(a), 

corporal injury of a spouse or cohabitant; and (2) California Penal Code section 273a(a), child 

abuse. Reyes Decl. ¶ 10. Petitioner was sentenced to 364 days in jail and three years of probation 

for these 2018 offenses. Id. Unrelated to the instant case, Petitioner also has other convictions on 

his record, but an alien is subject to mandatory detention only where the release from state custody 

“is directly tied to the basis for detention under [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)].” Matter of Garcia 

Arreola, 25 I. & N. Dec. 267, 269 (BIA 2010). Because of Petitioner’s conviction, Petitioner lost 

his status as a TPS holder. Pet. ¶ 12; Vasquez Cruz Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.

On May 17, 2018, immediately after serving his jail sentence, Petitioner was arrested by 

ICE agents, who have held Petitioner in custody since that date. Pet. ¶ 13; Vasquez Cruz Decl. ¶ 

8. Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as removable from the 

United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Reyes

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. A. On June 26, 2018, Petitioner requested a custody redetermination hearing (also 

referred to throughout as a “bond hearing”), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Pet. ¶ 2. Pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1226(a), an alien may be detained pending a decision of whether the alien is to be 

removed from the United States. Under this provision, the Attorney General may keep the alien in 

detention or allow release on condition of parole or bond. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959 

(2019). If the Attorney General decides to detain the alien, the alien may seek review of the 

Attorney General's decision at a hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 8 C.F.R. § 

236.1(d)(1), and the IJ may grant release on bond. Id. at 959–60. In those hearings, the alien 

bears the burden of proving that he “poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.” Id.

Relevant here, however, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Attorney General is mandated 

to detain any alien who has, for instance, committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). 

An individual detained under § 1226(c) may ask an IJ to reconsider whether the mandatory 

provision applies to him. During this hearing, called a “Joseph hearing,” the detainee “may avoid 

mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, that he was not convicted of the 

predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that the detainee is 

in fact subject to mandatory detention.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003) (citing 

Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)). If an alien is properly detained under § 

1226(c), the IJ lacks the authority to release the alien on bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D) 

(“[A]n immigration judge may not redetermine conditions of custody imposed by [DHS] with 

respect to . . . [a]liens in removal proceedings subject to section 236(c)(1) of the Act.”). 

On June 27, 2018, in response to Petitioner’s June 26, 2018 request for a bond hearing, the 

IJ scheduled a hearing for Petitioner to show that he is not properly classified as an alien subject to 

mandatory detention. Sanchez Decl., Ex. A; Pet. ¶ 14; Reyes Decl. ¶ 13. On July 17, 2018, 

through counsel, Petitioner filed a brief that argued that Petitioner’s crimes of conviction did not

constitute CIMTs that would render Petitioner subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1226(c). Pet. ¶ 15; Reyes Decl., Ex. D. That same day, the IJ, citing his lack of jurisdiction, 

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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denied Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing. Pet. ¶ 2. In particular, the IJ decided that 

Petitioner’s California Penal Code section 273.5 conviction is a CIMT, which renders Petitioner 

subject to mandatory detention, and that under the INA section 236(c), the IJ lacked jurisdiction to 

grant a bond hearing. Pet. ¶ 16; Reyes Decl., Ex. C.

On July 24, 2018, Petitioner filed another request for a bond hearing and argued that the IJ 

had jurisdiction to hold a bond hearing. Reyes Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. F. On August 1, 2018, the IJ 

denied Petitioner’s second request for bond hearing because the IJ again found that Petitioner 

failed to show that he is not subject to mandatory detention. Reyes Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. G. On August 

14, 2018, Petitioner timely filed an appeal of the IJ’s decision with the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”). Pet. ¶ 2. On August 24, 2018, the IJ issued a bond memorandum describing his 

rationale for denying the request for custody redetermination. Reyes Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. J.

On October 11, 2018, while his appeal was pending with the BIA, Petitioner filed his first 

habeas petition with the Court (Case No. 18-CV-06215-LHK). Pet. ¶ 2. The Court denied his 

petition without prejudice because Petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

See Vasquez Cruz v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-06215-LHK, 2018 WL 6047287 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 

2018). Subsequently, on December 13, 2018, the BIA issued its decision, which affirmed the IJ’s 

decision that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention. Pet. ¶ 2; Sanchez Decl., Ex. F. 

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court 

on August 22, 2019. See Pet. at 1. 

On December 3, 2018, Petitioner was found removable by IJ Joseph Park, and the BIA 

affirmed on May 16, 2019. Reyes Decl., Exs. M, O. Petitioner currently has a petition for review 

(“PFR”) of his final order of removal pending with the Ninth Circuit (Case No. 19-71238), and a 

temporary stay of removal is in effect. Reyes Decl. ¶ 29. At present, Petitioner continues to be 

detained without a bond hearing at the Yuba County Detention Facility. Pet. ¶¶ 2, 7.

II. DISCUSSION

In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner argues that relief is warranted because his 

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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conviction under California Penal Code section 273.5 is not a crime involving moral turpitude 

(“CIMT”), and thus he is not subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing. Pet. ¶¶ 3. 

Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the instant petition because it lacks jurisdiction to 

grant the requested relief. Opp’n at 5–6. Respondents also argue that, even if the Court has 

jurisdiction, the Court should deny the petition on the merits because Petitioner’s conviction under 

California Penal Code section 273.5 is a CIMT, Id. at 6–11. The Court first considers whether it 

has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim and then turns to the merits of Petitioner’s claim.

A. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss this habeas petition because the petition 

raises “a question of law that must be raised in his PFR pending with the Ninth Circuit,” pursuant 

to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9). Resp. at 5–6. Petitioner argues that those provisions do not 

deprive the Court of jurisdiction because whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 

presents a legally distinct issue from whether he is removable. Reply at 7–8. The Court agrees 

with Petitioner.

Recently, in Nielsen v. Preap, the United States Supreme Court considered an immigration 

habeas corpus class action raising the question whether aliens were subject to mandatory detention

when the government failed to detain the aliens upon their release from state custody pursuant to 

§ 1226(c). 139 S. Ct. 954, 960–61 (2019). Before reaching the merits, the Supreme Court first 

considered whether § 1252(b)(9) required the petitioners to raise their claim only in the context of 

a judicial review of a final removal order. The Supreme Court found that § 1252(b)(9) did not 

present a jurisdictional bar:

As in Jennings , respondents here "are not asking for review of an order of removal; 

they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek 

removal [as opposed to the decision to deny them bond hearings]; and they are not 

even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be 

determined. Under these circumstances, . . . § 1252(b)(9) does not present a 

jurisdictional bar.”

Id. at 962 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018)). The Supreme Court 

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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concluded that it had jurisdiction to reach the merits of the petitioners’ claims that they were not 

subject to mandatory detention. Id. at 963.

Preap is on all fours with the instant case. As in Preap, Petitioner brings a habeas petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his mandatory detention without bond hearing. See Preap, 

139 S. Ct. at 961. Petitioner is “not asking for review of an order of removal,” and he is “not 

challenging the decision to detain [him] in the first place or to seek removal” as opposed to the 

decision to deny him a bond hearing. Id. at 962 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841). Moreover, 

in the instant proceedings, Petitioner is “not even challenging any part of the process by which 

[his] removability will be determined.” Id. In fact, Petitioner’s conviction for a purported “crime 

involving moral turpitude” is not even the basis on which he is being charged as removable. 

Opp’n at 6; see also Reyes Decl., Ex. O (affirming IJ’s finding that Petitioner is removable on 

other grounds). Accordingly, Preap confirms that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not present a 

jurisdictional bar to the Court’s consideration of Petitioner’s claim.

Respondents’ other citations are unavailing. For instance, Respondents cite the Ninth 

Circuit’s opinion in J.E.F.M. to argue that Petitioner raises a question of law that must be raised 

with a petition for review of a final removal order. Opp’n at 5–6 (citing J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 

F.3d 1026 ((9th Cir, 2016)). The J.E.F.M. court held, “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 

1252(b)(9) mean that any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any removal-related 

activity can be reviewed only through the PFR process.” J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis in 

original). But, as discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has clearly held that whether 

an alien is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is a separate issue from the 

underlying removal proceedings. See Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 962. Holding otherwise would 

effectively insulate the agency from review of its decision to detain an alien through removal 

proceedings until after removal proceedings had concluded. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (providing 

judicial review upon issuance of final order). 

Similarly, Respondents rely upon the Court’s prior order denying Petitioner’s intial habeas 

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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petition. Opp’n at 6 (citing Vasquez Cruz, 2018 WL 6047287, at *5). However, the Court did not 

hold that it would lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim upon his exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. Instead, the Court stated that, upon receiving a BIA decision regarding 

his mandatory detention, “[i]f Petitioner is dissatisfied with the BIA's decision, he then may file a 

petition for habeas corpus in the district court.” Vasquez Cruz, 2018 WL 6047287, at *4. Other 

courts within this district have similarly found jurisdiction to consider whether an alien is subject 

to mandatory detention. See, e.g., Bermudez v. U.S. Immigration & Custom Enf't, No. C07-

2983VRW(PR), 2008 WL 269481, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) (“Petitioner may properly bring 

in this court via habeas his claim of denial of his due process right to a bail hearing.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim.

B. Merits 

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), aliens convicted of a CIMT are subject to mandatory 

detention and are thus ineligible for a bond hearing. See also 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2). Petitioner 

argues that he is not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because his 

prior conviction under California Penal Code section 273.5 was not a CIMT. Respondents argue 

that the IJ and BIA correctly found Petitioner’s section 273.5 conviction to be a CIMT and that

Petitioner is therefore subject to mandatory detention. The Court finds that Petitioner is eligible 

for a bond hearing because his conviction under section 273.5 is not categorically a CIMT.

1. Categorical Approach

To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, the 

Court must “first make a categorical comparison of the elements of the statute of conviction to the 

generic definition, and decide whether conduct proscribed by [the statute of conviction] is broader 

than, and so does not categorically fall within, this generic definition.” Huerta–Guevara v. 

Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has squarely held that California Penal Code section 273.5 is overbroad 

with respect to the victims covered by the statute and thus not categorically a crime involving 

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PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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moral turpitude. For example, the Ninth Circuit explained in Cervantes v. Holder, “Our 

precedents make clear that . . . [Cal. Penal Code section] 273.5(a) is not categorically a CIMT.” 

772 F.3d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 2014). The Cervantes court contrasted its holding in Grageda, where 

the Ninth Circuit held that corporal injury of a spouse is categorically a CIMT, with MoralesGarcia, in which the Ninth Circuit held that corporal injury of a cohabitant is not categorically a 

CIMT. See id. (citing Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.1993); Morales-Garcia v. 

Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.2009)). Specifically, in Morales-Garcia, the Ninth Circuit held 

that not all of the victims covered by section 273.5 had the degree of vulnerability that would give 

rise to a CIMT. Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1066. The Ninth Circuit drew a bright line between 

spousal victims and non-spousal victims because other relationships covered by the statute 

“embody a lesser level of commitment, trust, and dependency than marriage, which, for example, 

creates community property rights, and subjects former spouses to dissolution procedures.” 

Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1065–66. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit contrasted spousal victims 

with non-spousal victims, who may have no more than a “substantial, amorous relationship and, 

perhaps, a sporadic shared living arrangement.” Id. at 1066. Thus, the Morales-Garcia court 

explained, “[N]ot all victims under [California Penal Code section 273.5] are particularly 

‘vulnerable,’ nor are they ‘entitled to . . . care and protection” by the perpetrator.’”)). 

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has clearly held that section 273.5 is categorically 

overbroad, and the Court follows suit.

2. Divisibility

If the state offense is broader than the federal offense, courts use the modified categorical 

approach if the state offense is divisible. Divisible means that the state offense “comprises 

multiple, alternative versions of the crime.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 262 (2013). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that California Penal Code section 273.5 “is a divisible statute for 

which a conviction under one portion of the statute (corporal injury against a spouse) will qualify 

as a CIMT, while conviction under other subsections (for example, corporal injury against a 

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cohabitant) will not.” Cervantes, 772 F.3d at 588.

Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), is irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit’s previous holdings that 

section 273.5 is divisible with respect to victim type. See Pet. ¶ 27. Respondents argue that the 

Ninth Circuit has reiterated that section 273.5 is divisible even after Mathis. Opp’n at 9 (citing 

Heredia v. Sessions, 720 Fed. App’x 376 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)). Because the Court finds 

that Petitioner is entitled to relief even if the statute is divisible, the Court need not determine 

whether Ninth Circuit precedent finding section 273.5 to be divisible is irreconcilable with Mathis. 

Instead, the Court will assume that section 273.5 is divisible and will proceed to consider 

Petitioner’s conviction under the modified categorical approach.

3. Modified Categorical Approach

Petitioner contends that, even if section 273.5 were divisible, his conviction record 

demonstrates that he was not convicted of a CIMT under the modified categorical approach. TRO 

Mot. at 21–24. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s conviction record definitively establishes that 

he was in a dating relationship with his victim, which Respondents claim renders Petitioner’s 

conviction a CIMT under the modified categorical approach. Opp’n at 10–11.

Under the modified categorical approach, the Court “consider[s] whether the ‘judicially 

noticeable facts in the record indicate that [the alien] was convicted of the elements of the 

generically defined crime.’” Cervantes, 772 F.3d at 588 (quoting Huerta–Guevara v. Ashcroft, 

321 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Ninth Circuit has further elaborated that, “[i]f the record 

does not conclusively establish that the noncitizen was convicted of the elements of the generic 

offense, then she was not convicted of the offense for purposes of the immigration statutes.” 

Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 

569 U.S. 184, 194–95 (2013)). The Ninth Circuit’s holding closely tracked Moncrieffe, where the 

United States Supreme Court found that ambiguity in the record “means that the conviction did 

not ‘necessarily’ involve facts that correspond” to the federal offense, which thereby placed the 

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burden on the government rather than the petitioner. Id. (citing Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194–95)). 

The Ninth Circuit thus held that, irrespective of any statutory burdens of proof, the burden is on 

the government to conclusively prove a match under the modified categorical approach. Id. at 

1048–49. “[W]hether the record of conviction necessarily established the elements of the 

disqualifying federal offense ‘is a legal question with a yes or no answer.’” Id. at 1049 (quoting 

Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 489 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Watford, J., concurring)).

Here, the BIA examined Petitioner’s conviction record to conclude that Petitioner had not 

“carried his burden of proving that his particular offense of conviction was for non-spousal 

abuse.” ECF No. 1-3 (“Sanchez Decl.”), Ex. F at 4. However, it is “well established” that BIA’s 

determination that Petitioner was convicted of spousal abuse is not entitled to deference. See 

Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “The BIA has no 

special expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in construing state or federal criminal 

statutes and, thus, has no special administrative competence to interpret the petitioner's statute of 

conviction.” Id. Moreover, the BIA erroneously flipped the burden on to Petitioner, despite 

United States Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194–95

(holding that the government must establish that record of conviction conclusively shows 

categorical match). Accordingly, the BIA’s decision that Petitioner was convicted of spousal 

abuse does not warrant deference, and the Court’s analysis of Petitioner’s statute of conviction is 

de novo. Id.

As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has drawn a sharp distinction between spousal 

victims, in which case a conviction under California Penal Code section 273.5 constitutes a CIMT, 

and non-spousal victims, in which case a conviction under section 273.5 does not. See Cervantes, 

772 F.3d at 588. Respondents try to avoid this conclusion by citing state intermediate appellate 

court cases that undermine the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Opp’n at 10–11 (citing People v. Burton, 

243 Cal. App. 4th 129, 135–36 (2015) (holding that Cal. Penal Code § 273.5 categorically 

involves moral turpitude); People v. Rodriguez, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1398, 1402 (1992) (same)). 

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However, this Court is bound by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit until a state court of last resort 

renders a decision clearly irreconcilable with Ninth Circuit precedent. Cf. Miller v. Gammie, 335 

F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Court holds that Petitioner’s record of conviction does not “conclusively establish” 

that Petitioner was convicted of the elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. See 

Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1048. Specifically, under Marinelarena, the government must show 

that the record of conviction conclusively establishes that Petitioner was convicted of spousal 

abuse, as opposed to non-spousal abuse. Id.; see supra Section III.B.1 (discussing Ninth Circuit 

precedent that only section 273.5 convictions involving spousal victims are categorically a CIMT). 

The state’s Felony Complaint against Petitioner states:

COUNT 2: PC273.5(a) (Felony)

On or about November 17, 2017 at 8:33 PM, in the County of San Mateo, State of 

California, the crime of Injuring A Spouse, Cohabitant, Fiance, Boyfriend, Girlfriend 

Or Child’s Parent in violation of PC273.5(a), a Felony, was committed in that 

[Petitioner] willfully inflicted corporal injury resulting in traumatic condition upon 

Confidential Victim, who was someone with whom the defendant had a dating 

relationship.

Sanchez Decl., Ex. G at 2 (emphasis added). This document does not unambiguously specify that 

the victim was a spouse, and instead suggests that Petitioner and victim merely “had a dating 

relationship.” Id. Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea as to this count. Sanchez Decl., Ex. H 

at 1. However, the Declaration Concerning a Plea or Change of Plea to Guilty or Nolo Contendere 

simply lists his plea as to “273.5(a) P.C.,” with no further details. Id. This plea document thus 

fails to move the needle as to the government’s burden.

In total, the record falls far short of “conclusively establish[ing] that the noncitizen was 

convicted of” corporal injury of a spouse, see Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1048, which is the only 

type of victim for which a section 273.5 conviction would constitute a CIMT, see Cervantes, 772 

F.3d at 588. Indeed, the BIA agreed that the record was ambiguous: the BIA explicitly stated that 

“[Petitioner’s] conviction record does not conclusively establish the identity of his victim or the 

exact nature of his relationship to her.” See Sanchez Decl. Ex. F at 4. Accordingly, applying the 

Case 5:19-cv-05251-LHK Document 8 Filed 11/26/19 Page 11 of 12
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Case No. 19-CV-05251-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

modified categorical approach, the Court finds that Vasquez’s section 273.5 conviction was not a 

crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1054 (reversing BIA 

decision because petitioner’s record of conviction was ambiguous under modified categorical 

approach).

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Petitioner is ordered to be 

released within 60 days of the filing date of this order, unless the agency provides Petitioner with a 

new bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

Because the Court grants the habeas petition, the Court DENIES as moot Petitioner’s 

motion for a temporary restraining order, which seeks the same relief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 26, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-05251-LHK Document 8 Filed 11/26/19 Page 12 of 12