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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR O 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk DONALD ANDERSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

RALSTON-PURINA, d/b/a 

KEYSTONE INTERNATIONAL, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 87-2061 

(D.C. No. 85-F-2494 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before SEYMOUR and SETH, Circuit Judges, and SEAY,* District 

Judge. 

Plaintiff Donald Anderson, a quadriplegic as a result of 

traumatic injuries sustained in a skiing accident, brought this 

negligence action against Ralston-Purina d/b/a Keystone 

International (Keystone). He alleged that Keystone's negligence 

in creating a pile of man-made snow and allowing it to remain r 

ungroomed on the ski slope caused his skiing accident. The jury 

found in favor of Keystone after a four-day trial, and Anderson 

filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied his 

motion, and he appealed. We affirm the district court. 

*Honorable Frank H. Seay, United States District Judge, Eastern 

District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 1 
Anderson's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred 

in excluding evidence of certain prior consistent statements he 

sought to introduce in order to rehabilitate himself as a witness. 

He advances his claim by way of three separate arguments. First, 

Anderson asserts that the court completely failed to apply Federal 

Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(l)(B), which classifies prior consistent 

statements of a declarant testifying at trial and subject to 

cross-examination as nonhearsay when offered "to rebut an express 

or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or 

improper influence or motive .• He next argues that the 

court improperly applied Federal Rule of Evidence 106, which 

permits an adverse party to require the introduction of such 

portions of a writing or recorded statement as "ought in fairness 

to be considered contemporaneously" at the time a writing or 

recorded statement is introduced, because the court applied it to 

the exclusion of Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). Finally, Anderson contends 

that the court improperly applied Rule 106 when it excluded the 

1 Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B) reads in relevant part: 

"(d) A statement is not hearsay if --

(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 

and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 

statement and the statement is 

(B) consistent with the declarant's testimony 

and is offered to rebut an express or implied 

charge against the declarant of recent 

fabrication or improper influence or motive II 

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Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 2 
introduction of some deposition statements during the redirect 

examination of Anderson. 

Anderson argues extensively in his brief that the prior 

statements he sought to have admitted were prior consistent 

statements within the meaning of the rule. We agree. Contrary to 

Anderson's assertion on appeal, however, we are convinced by our 

review of the record that the trial court did apply Rule 

80l(d)(l)(B) to permit the introduction of prior consistent 

statements, but chose to limit the amount of evidence admitted 

pursuant to the rule. 2 We therefore find it unnecessary to 

2 We find particularly illuminating in this regard the colloquy 

that occurred when Anderson's counsel attempted to introduce 

portions of Anderson's deposition during redirect: 

"THE COURT [in response to an objection by 

Keystone's counsel]: I think he can ask if a consistent 

statement is perhaps not in variance with what he has 

said right now. 

"[ANDERSON'S COUNSEL]: That's the purpose, your 

Honor. 

"THE COURT: If it's a question of completeness, if 

there is a question and answer on both sides of the 

question asked by counsel to give us a complete 

sequential approach, the Court will allow it, but to 

take various questions as to consistency, what he said 

now, the court won't allow that procedure." 

Rec., vol. III, at 172. A fair reading of this interchange is 

that the trial court recognized Anderson's right both to require 

the introduction of relevant portions of the deposition pursuant 

to the "completeness rule" and to offer prior consistent 

statements from the deposition for purposes of rehabilitating 

Anderson pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B). The court, 

however, decided to limit the introduction of rehabilitating prior 

consistent statement evidence, which Anderson's counsel 

acknowledged to be the goal. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 3 
address Anderson's claim that the district court erroneously 

applied Rule 106 to the exclusion of Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). Nor do we 

find it necessary to address his contention that the trial court 

incorrectly applied Rule 106 in limiting his reference to the 

deposition on redirect. Instead, we focus our analysis on whether 

the trial court erred in limiting the extent of prior consistent 

statements Anderson sought to introduce for rehabilitative 

purposes pursuant to Rule 80l(d}(l}(B}. 

Before turning to the merits of Anderson's claim, we note 

that evidentiary rulings are committed to the sound discretion of 

the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a prejudicial 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1028 

(10th Cir. 1986). This general principle encompasses rulings on 

the extent of prior consistent statement evidence admissible for 

purposes of rehabilitating a witness under Rule 80l(d}(l}(B}. See 

~ Unitred States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532 (8th Cir. 1986}; 

United States v. Blankinship, 784 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1986}; 

United States v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1981). 

The trial court stated in its order dismissing Anderson's 

motion for a new trial that it had limited the amount of 

deposition testimony Anderson could introduce because it was 

cumulative within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 3 

3 Rule 403 provides: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 4 
See Mock, 640 F.2d at 632 (exclusion of "essentially cumulative 

evidence"}; cf. K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 

1148, 1155 (10th Cir. 1985) (decision to admit or exclude 

cumulative evidence under Rule 403 within sound discretion of 

trial court and will not be reversed absent clear abuse of 

discretion). To determine whether the court abused its discretion 

in so ruling, we have considered the specific instances of 

impeachment and whether any rebuttal testimony was admitted. The 

first and third impeachments concerned, respectively, the general 

issue of whether Anderson always knew why he fell, and the 

specific question of whether he knew why he fell in this 

particular case. The second impeachment concerned the condition 

of the snow and whether Anderson had modified his skiing style to 

accommodate the conditions. 

At the time of the first impeachment, Anderson's counsel 

requested the judge to require that an additional question and 

answer from the deposition be read in conjunction with the 

impeaching depositon testimony. This additional material 

indicated Anderson's belief that he would not have fallen if the 

conditions had been normal. Although the judge apparently granted 

this request under Rule 106, the question and answer served to 

rebut the implication raised by Keystone's use of the deposition 

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by • 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 

needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 

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Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 5 
that Anderson fell without knowing why, and so fulfilled the 

purpose of Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). On redirect, Anderson's counsel was 

permitted to refer to three separate statements in the deposition. 

The first concerned the existence of some abnormality as the 

source of his fall. The second focused on the specific 

characteristics of the pile of man-made snow and whether they 

played "a part" in causing his fall. Finally, after the point at 

which the judge instructed Anderson's counsel that he would not 

permit repetitive references to the deposition, counsel framed 

another question based on the deposition regarding whether the 

same specific factors referred to in the second reference had 

"played a significant part" in causing his fall. The question and 

answer were as follows: 

"Q Do you remember, Don, telling us at your deposition 

that the condition of the whale, combination of the 

size, the height, and the hard-packed icy nature, the 

ungrooomed, ungraded nature of the manmade snow played a 

significant part in causing both your fall and your 

injury? 

"A Yes." 

Rec., vol. III, at 172. 

Anderson now urges that "at least twelve different statements" are consistent with his trial testimony and that he should 

have been permitted to introduce them. Appellant's Opening Brief 

at 19-20. All of these statements attest to Anderson's perception 

as to the condition of the snow, the condition (size, etc.) of the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2061 Document: 010110024506 Date Filed: 03/06/1989 Page: 6 
pile of man-made snow, or some abnormality in the slope or snow 

that contributed to his fall. Nothing in these statements adds 

anything to the statements that the trial court did admit into 

evidence. The court's exercise of its discretion to deal with 

evidentiary matters is especially appropriate when faced with 

"essentially cumulative evidence," or ''evidence adding only a 

minor incremental probity." Mock, 640 F.2d at 632. We cannot 

find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to limit 

the admission of prior consistent statements in this case. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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