Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02930/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02930-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Exhibit 1 is the Clerk’s Transcript, attached to respondents’ answer.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRIUS CONWELL,

Petitioner,

 v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al., 

Respondents /

No. C 05-2930 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is petitioner Demetrius Conwell’s (“Conwell”) petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents Jeanne Woodford and

Thomas L. Carey have filed an answer and supporting documents, to which Conwell has

replied by filing a traverse. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in

opposition to the petition, the Court rules as follows.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2001, a jury in Alameda County Superior Court convicted Conwell of

involuntary manslaughter with respect to the death of Daniel Spates (“Spates”) and found

that Conwell, in the commission of the involuntary manslaughter, used a “deadly and

dangerous weapon, to wit: a crutch.” (See Ex. 1 at 560.)1

 The jury also convicted a codefendant, Mario Christopher Washington (“Washington”), of voluntary manslaughter with

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The jury found Conwell not guilty of murder and of voluntary manslaughter, (see Ex.

1 at 555, 557), and found Washington not guilty of murder, (see Ex. 1 at 564).

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The California Court of Appeal’s opinion is Exhibit D to the petition, and is also

Exhibit 8 to the answer.

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respect to Spates’s death. (See Ex. 1 at 563.)2

 On October 30, 2001, the trial court, after

conducting a bench trial, found true the allegation that Conwell had a “serious-felony/strike

prior” and “two prison-term priors.” See People v. Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, at *1 (Cal.

App. 2004).3

 The trial court subsequently sentenced Conwell to “a total of nine years

comprised of a two-year low term for involuntary manslaughter, doubled to four for the

strike, plus five for the serious-felony prior, with terms for the weapon use and other priors

stayed.” See id. (internal citations omitted).

On March 16, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Conwell’s conviction and

denied Conwell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. On June 23, 2004, the

California Supreme Court denied Conwell’s request for review of the California Court of

Appeal’s decision, (see Petition Ex. G), and, on June 8, 2005, denied Conwell’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus, (see Petition Ex. F).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Court of Appeal’s March 16, 2004 decision.

Conwell, Washington, Spates and all eyewitnesses to the homicide were denizens of

Peralta Park, a recreational and lagoon-type area of Oakland featuring an estuary channel

connecting Lake Merritt to the San Francisco Bay. Spates died after an altercation there on

a Thursday night, August 31, 2000, and his decomposing body was found floating

facedown in shallow waters of the estuary behind Laney College on the Monday morning of

September 4, 2000.

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In addition to the witnesses and evidence discussed below, the prosecution offered

the testimony of a deputy sheriff, who testified that as he helped to retrieve the body, he

spotted Washington and asked him if he was aware of any disturbance, and that

Washington denied having any such awareness. Additionally, the prosecution offered bank records showing Spates had withdrawn $100 from an ATM on the evening he died.

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A. Prosecution Case4

1. Larry Cox (“Cox”)

Cox, an unemployed resident of the park, had been treated at a hospital on August

31, 2000, and was released at 6:36 p.m. with a pair of crutches. When he got to Peralta

Park later that evening, he saw Washington, Conwell, and Spates enter the park, each of

whom seemed to have been drinking, and Spates was “out of control” and staggering. The

trio sat with Cox at a picnic table.

Cox testified that Washington and Conwell viciously beat up on a defenseless

Spates for no good reason, beyond Washington wanting some money from him, and then

rifled through his pockets before dragging him off to the estuary waters. Specifically, as

they all sat at the picnic table, first discussing sports, Washington kept asking Spates, in a

loud and aggressive voice, if he had any money, and Spates kept saying he didn't have

any. Washington grabbed Spates by the legs, and Conwell grabbed him by an arm, and

they dragged him over to a platform, where Washington threw him to the ground and kicked

him hard in the head about eight times, yelling, “Get up, get up.” The kicks were “sharp”

and “vicious,” and Spates lay on the ground, his arms up trying to cover his head. When

Spates rose and staggered to a bench by Cox and sat down, Conwell punched Spates in

the face a couple of times, knocking him back to the ground. Spates at some point kicked

or “twitched” but was helpless. Washington administered a second set of about eight kicks

to the head, and Conwell, weighing about 230 pounds, grabbed the crutch out of Cox’s

hand and, kneeling over Spate’s supine body, put the middle part “across his throat” and

pressed down hard for a minute or so, choking him. At this point Spates was not moving at

all. Washington took a wallet from Spates’s back pocket, went through it, tossed papers

out, and threw it to the ground. Then, with Washington lifting the legs and Conwell lifting

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under the arms, they carried Spates toward the estuary. Spates seemed unconscious and

was not moving as they carried him off. Cox walked off to his campsite to sleep. Cox had

told them to stop after the crutch was used, feeling they were “most definitely” hurting

Spates.

2. Joe Johnson (“Johnson”)

Johnson was employed but living in the park. He saw Washington, Conwell and

Spates leave together, saying they had to go take care of something. All three later

returned and sat on the picnic table in front of him, along with others. Johnson had been

drinking. A scuffle broke out. Spates, who looked drunk, was staggering around, twice

reaching out to hug Washington, but Washington pushed him away, knocking him down the

second time. Conwell told Spates to “chill” and told him to stay down when he fell, but

Spates rose and tried this time to hug Conwell. Spates was “[o]ut of control but harmless.”

Johnson described the altercation as starting with an “argument,” after which Spates

kept reaching out trying to hug Washington but was pushed to the ground. “They”

(apparently meaning Washington) then “started putting blows on” Spates, knocking him

down. Spates tried to return punches but missed and wound up back on the ground, where

Washington inflicted a series of 10 or so hard kicks to Spates’s head and body, before

walking off and leaving him on the ground. Conwell stayed on the bench during this, telling

Spates to chill and stay down. Washington returned and inflicted another round of kicks,

until Johnson called out, “Hey, that’s enough.” Spates was so drunk he could not defend

himself. Then Conwell rose, got a crutch from Cox and “pressed it over [Spates’s] throat.” 

Kneeling over him, with a hand on each side of the throat, Conwell leaned his weight

forward on the crutch and “pressed on his larynx” for a minute or more, saying something

about having to “help Mario [Washington].” After Conwell rose, Spates lay still, but

Johnson heard him breathing, “maybe a little raspy,” as Johnson headed off toward his

sleeping spot. After a minute or so, Conwell returned and pressed the crutch over Spates’s

throat again, only longer this time. When Johnson later looked back over a wall from his

sleeping spot 70 to 75 feet away, he saw Conwell dragging Spates to the “lake.” He did not

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see Washington at that point.

3. Kenneth McGuffin (“McGuffin”)

McGuffin was employed but, like Johnson, sleeping and hanging out in Peralta Park. 

He had arrived at the BART station near the park, and met Cox, who was on crutches. 

Together, they walked to the park where McGuffin, wanting to sleep, was distracted to find

that his and Johnson’s sleeping gear were gone. It was 11 p.m. or later, and Spates,

Johnson, Washington and Conwell were also at the park. As McGuffin approached, Spates

came up to him, drunk, swaying “like a palm tree in a hurricane,” and wanting $15 dollars

McGuffin owed him. McGuffin didn’t have the money and told him so; Conwell grabbed

Spates’s arm and told him to sit down and leave McGuffin alone. McGuffin left to buy

beers, and afterward went to a dumpster where he found his sleeping gear. He paid no

attention to what was going on with the group and couldn’t have seen them from the

dumpster, but as he climbed out of it he heard an altercation between Washington and

Spates. Walking back to the group, he saw Spates on his hands and knees, and

Washington kicking him, saying, “Get up, get up.” Each time Spates tried to rise,

Washington kicked him some more. Spates was too drunk to defend himself, and

Washington kicked so hard it was “like watching Ray Wersching kick a field goal.” Spates

took over 10 kicks in all, to the body, shoulders, and head. McGuffin called out for

Washington to stop, saying, “You know the man is drunk. Why don’t you leave that man

alone.” Washington kept kicking, and Conwell said from his bench near Johnson, “Man,

leave it alone, Ken, you don’t know what [it]’s about.” McGuffin said, “Fine,” and, nervous

about police contact, told Johnson, “Man, I’m outta here, they’re gonna kill this boy.”

As McGuffin left, Spates lay on his back and seemed to be alive; Spates had moved

his “hands and legs,” at least until “the alcohol finally won over.” The last McGuffin saw,

Washington and Conwell were on each side of Spates, as if “trying to help him get up.”

4. Lee Patton (“Patton”)

Patton was employed, and was homeless by choice and slept in Peralta Park. He

knew Spates, Washington and Conwell. About a week after learning of Spates's death,

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Patton’s denial of his presence at the scene was consistent with other witnesses,

none of whom said they saw him there except for Cox, who said “maybe Lee” was there.

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Patton encountered Washington watching a basketball game in Peralta Park. As Patton

went to leave the park, Washington, who was limping, asked to borrow $5. Patton said he

didn’t have it but would give it to him when he came back through the park. Then

Washington added, “Lee, I have something to tell you” and asked him not to tell. He said

that “Danny [Spates] came to the park talking a lot of shit, and he fired on” (hit) him, and

that “both him and Demetrius [Conwell] began hitting him and kicking him,” with

Washington throwing the first punch. Washington said he “hurt his foot by kicking Danny.” 

Then using the plural pronoun “we,” Washington said they “grabbed Larry Cox’s crutch,”

“hit him” with it, “drug Danny down to the creek,” and “put him on the side of the beach and

he was living, he was gasping for air.” Patton, wanting to hear no more, said so and left.

Months later police officers interviewed Patton. When Patton told them what

Washington had said and that he didn’t know anything more than that, this didn’t seem to

satisfy them. The police officers said they had information that he was there, and they

might have the district attorney charge him as an accessory. Frightened, Patton lied and

made up a story comprised of conversations with Cox and McGuffin and other “talk going

on in the park.” In a 12-minute taped statement he told them he entered the park, heard

Washington and Conwell cussing at someone and saw them swing at, and hit and kick

someone on the ground “on his head, body, side, ribs, whatever.” He said he heard

someone say to cut that out and then saw Washington and Conwell drag someone. After

awhile, he thought he heard “some splashing in the water.”

The story was untrue, Patton testified, because he never saw the altercation.5

 The

truth, Patton further testified, was that he ended up tired and drunk at Peralta Park around

11 p.m., found Johnson asleep, drank with him and then went to sleep, either nearby or at

a motel. He first heard from sheriff’s deputies, after Labor Day, that a body had been found

with a “crushed larynx” and, later, that it was Spates. Washington made his admissions to

Patton shortly after that.

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5. Paul Herrmann, M.D. (“Dr. Herrmann”)

Forensic pathologist Dr. Herrmann performed an autopsy on Spates’s body on

September 5, 2000, the day after its discovery. He also examined photographs taken

when the body was recovered from the water and somewhat less decomposed, and he

had laboratory tests done on bodily fluids. The body was in an advanced state of

postmortem decomposition, with “skin slippage [sloughing] in many areas,” discoloration of

the skin, and skin wrinkling consistent with four days’ immersion in salt water. External

examination showed a contusion around the right eye, cheek and upper mandible, which

were swollen and discolored, as was confirmed by internal examination. Contusions also

appeared on the scalp, consistent with kicking or hitting, and there was hemorrhaging at

the larynx.

Internal examination confirmed bruising to the hyoid bone, near the larynx, and a

fracture of the superior thyroid horn, a small bony structure on the larynx about half to

three-quarters of an inch long and less than a pencil width. The most delicate of all parts of

the larynx, the structure extends from beside and behind the protruding upper part of the

larynx back deep into the neck. The area is protected by being above the breastbone and

under the chin, but Spates’s was broken at the cartilage base on the left side, an injury

common in strangulation and caused by constant, severe pressure being applied. Such an

injury might also be caused by a severe kick or blow, but Spates had none of the expected

localized hemorrhage in the soft tissue under the skin surface to support that hypothesis.

Herrmann could not “completely rule [it] out” though, because a severe blow with an

instrument or body part of sufficient size and smoothness might fracture the structure

without leaving a bruise. It would take a lot of force to fracture the horn in an adult male,

but someone of Conwell’s weight kneeling over the body and pressing on the neck with a

crutch “would certainly do it.”

The larynx is a rigid structure that helps keep the airway open so that one can

properly breathe and pass air over the vocal chords to make sound. Pressure on the neck

sufficient to fracture the superior thyroid horn carries life-threatening risks of blocking

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airways, occluding blood flow to and from the brain and possibly even interfering with the

vagus nerve, which controls heartbeat. The fracturing of the horn structure also carries

life-threatening effects after the strangulating pressure is removed. Partial loss of rigidity

from the breakage partially occludes the airway, although generally not enough to cause

respiratory failure. Also, the injury is extremely painful, and the body reacts as if something

were going down into the airway. The larynx goes immediately into laryngo-spasm, where

the vocal cords come together in a spastic fashion, closing off that space between them

(the glottis) so that the victim has “great difficulty” trying to talk or move air. Any breathing

is noisy and any speech “very hoarse.”

Laboratory testing revealed a blood alcohol level of .35 percent, which could be a

fatally high level in some people, but the passage of time and condition of the body made

this an unreliable gauge of Spates’s intoxication at death. The process of decomposition

itself causes production of alcohol from bacteria in the blood and body tissues. This alone

would typically account for .12 to .15 percent but could range as high as .35, thus leaving

Herrmann unable to say whether Spates had any alcohol in his system when he died. 

Even attributing just .15 to the decomposition, the difference of .20 would render most

people “badly intoxicated” but not unconscious, even considering the added effect of

cocaine also detected in his system.

Cocaine was detected in Spates’s blood at .07 micrograms per milliliter; cocaine

metabolite benzoylecgonine was detected in his urine at .18. This showed cocaine

ingestion within six hours of death but was a “very low level” typical of anyone who ingests

cocaine. It did not show serious intoxication and was “certainly” not a cause of death. 

Even a level twice or three times as high would not have been a cause of death. Dr.

Herrmann found “with medical certainty” that Spates’s cocaine ingestion “had nothing to do

with his death.” Only in conjunction with severe heart disease, extreme exercise or other

factors not apparent in Spates would such cocaine ingestion have produced or caused

cardiac arrhythmia or heart attack.

Spates’s heart, at 460 grams, was moderately enlarged, but Dr. Herrmann found no

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sign of atherosclerosis, scarring from a past heart attack, or any other coronary or arterial

disease. A dying person can produce a “death rattle” that laymen might mistake as a brief

gasping for air or choking, but it would take a greatly enlarged heart (500 to 600 g), plus

severe hypertension or other coronary or arterial disease, to create a fatal ventricular

fibrillation or heart attack causing death. An enlarged heart (over 400 g) could be caused

by long-term chronic use of cocaine, but Spates’s enlargement was not great, especially

given that some enlargement is common in black men generally, as is hypertension, which

is another possible cause of enlargement. In Dr. Herrmann’s view, it was not possible that

Spates died of a heart attack. One might suffer a heart attack as the result of a severe

beating, for example, but that would make the beating, not the heart attack, the cause of

death.

Dr. Herrmann opined that the cause of death was blunt trauma to the neck, face and

scalp. Herrmann could not be sure of the “exact mechanism” of the injuries, such as the

means of inflicting blows or the order of blows and the neck injury. The blows to the face or

the back of the head could have caused unconsciousness, making it easier to strangle

Spates or cause loss of the gag reflex so that he would be asphyxiated by his tongue

occluding his airway, or perhaps have drowned when placed in the water. There was no

sign of concussion, but concussion does not usually leave “a demonstrable lesion” visible

from autopsy. The neck injury was described as blunt force trauma to the neck, rather than

strangulation, because an absence of fingernail marks or other such definitive evidence left

it uncertain “how the force was applied.” Dr. Herrmann did not “know what the scenario

was,” but was certain that trauma to the neck contributed significantly to Spates’s death,

even if someone had knocked him out and thrown him in the water afterward. The neck

compression and bone fracture would pose “a very severe problem for anyone” and could

have been a sole or contributing cause of death.

Dr. Herrmann had begun his autopsy expecting a drowning, knowing the body was

found floating in the water, but then found head and neck injuries and deemed them to be

the causes of death. Those findings, however, did not rule out drowning as “the final thing

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In addition to the testimony and evidence discussed below, Conwell also offered

two witnesses who testified that Conwell had broken up fights between homeless men in

the past, and three witnesses who testified about prior violent acts by Spates. Additionally,

a witness offered by Conwell testified, apparently unexpectedly, that Spates was not

violent.

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that finished him,” and Dr. Herrmann could not tell whether Spates might still have been

alive when placed in the water. He found fluid in the lungs but could not tell whether any of

it had been inhaled or, rather, whether it was all produced through decomposition. There

was no aquatic life or material in the stomach, but if Spates did drown, his injuries were

enough alone to have rendered him unable “to care for himself” in the water. The injuries

were also enough alone to have killed him.

B. Defense Case

Defendants opted for what counsel described to the trial court as “a joint defense.” It

portrayed Spates as an aggressor, and Washington and Conwell acting defensively or

nonmaliciously. Washington did not testify; Conwell did.6

1. Conwell

Conwell met Spates at a mental health facility Conwell attended for suicide

counseling. They hit it off, and Spates became his best friend. Spates was a guy “you

would die for, go the extra mile for, put your life on the line for, go the extra mile for, do

anything for.” Spates had mental problems but was “not slow.”

Conwell used marijuana and drank beer but did not care for hard liquor or use

cocaine. Spates used crack cocaine – daily if he had the money – and drank alcohol and

took various pills. Spates was nice and mellow when sober but, when drinking, drank

heavily and got crazy, “like a madman.” Conwell would calm him down by talking to him.

Conwell met Washington more recently, and they became friends, though not as

close as Conwell and Spates were. Washington drank and used crack cocaine; people

said that he engaged in homosexual acts for money.

Sometime after 4:00 p.m. on August 31, 2006, Conwell was at a pizza place when

Spates came by and asked if Conwell wanted to “kick it.” Spates bought alcohol with a $20

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bill and gave Conwell $10 change to buy marijuana. Conwell bought some, and they

walked back toward Lake Merritt, on the way meeting two guys from East Oakland. Spates

said he used to stay with them and that they thought he owed them rent, but the men gave

them no trouble. Conwell and Spates walked on to the lake. They got to Peralta Park after

stopping once for Conwell to smoke a joint and Spates to drink a bit. For the next two or

three hours, Conwell sat smoking, and Spates and Washington drank. Around 4:30 or 5:00

p.m., Spates announced he was going to the bank to get money to buy crack. Washington

said he was hungry, and all three walked in the direction of an ATM. At a BART station,

Washington saw two girls he knew, and Spates continued on his own. When Spates

returned 25 to 30 minutes later, they all walked back to the park. Spates and Washington

went off to buy crack. Spates later made second and third crack runs alone, bringing back

more beer on his second run. Conwell kept smoking weed and “was getting high,” as was

Washington, from crack.

Those present in the park now included Conwell, Washington, Spates, and

acquaintances Johnson and Cox. When McGuffin arrived, Spates aggressively “rushed”

him, asking for “the $15 that you owe me,” but Conwell said, “[J]ust relax, calm down, man.” 

McGuffin left. Everything was “cool” as the group sat talking, but trouble arose when

Spates, referring to Washington, said, “I’m not the only guy here who doesn’t like girls,” and

loudly charged him with being homosexual. Conwell, Washington and others urged Spates

to “be cool,” but he persisted, “just out of control.” Washington stepped back as Spates

came at him, and then pushed Spates away. Spates fell but came back to grab him around

the legs. Washington kicked to get away, and then a full fight broke out between them,

Spates grabbing at Washington, Washington kicking at Spates some more and Spates

even lunging or swinging at Conwell, who was trying to calm him.

The first skirmish ended quickly, as Conwell urged Spates to be cool and sat him

down on a bench. Spates remained combative, rising to struggle with Conwell and

demanding that Conwell leave him alone so he could fight Washington. Spates grabbed a

piece of sprinkler pipe from the ground and swung it at Conwell, who said he didn’t want to

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fight and tried to calm him. Cox took his crutch and handed it to Washington, to “make the

fight even,” and Conwell then took it when Washington urged: “D, use the crutch. Defend

yourself.” Spates threw the pipe at Conwell, who then pushed Spates down with the crutch

and held it sideways across his chest. After 30 to 45 seconds, Spates agreed to “be cool.” 

Conwell let him up and laid the crutch down. As Conwell sat down, Spates lay there “for a

little while” and was “gagging or choking.” While gasping for air, Spates said, “I’m going to

get you.” Spates rose to his feet, still wanting to fight and still saying he had seen

Washington with “gay people” and “by gay bars.”

Spates came again at Washington, who was “pissed” by then and fought back, this

time pushing Spates to the ground and “kicking him and kicking him and kicking him.” As

Spates was “defending himself” on all fours, unable to rise against the kicks, Johnson

arrived and repeatedly ordered Washington to stop. Washington stopped, and Spates lay

motionless “in a weird position,” partly on his back. There was “a lot of blood” – “a mess.” 

Spates had blood on his face, was bleeding from the mouth area, and was bruised.

Conwell grew concerned. He went over to Spates, shook and called to him, and got

no response or movement. Spates was limp. Conwell checked for pulse, listened for a

heartbeat and checked for breathing, but found none. He lifted Spates, and sat him on a

bench; Spates fell over. Conwell lay Spates back on the ground and told Cox he thought

Spates was dead. Spates did not gasp or choke now; he was just “out.” Conwell thought

of calling an ambulance, but people argued the police would come and never believe “it

was just a fight and the guy died.” Someone suggested taking Spates to the water, that he

might “come to” with cold water on him. Conwell decided to move the body to the water. 

Conwell gathered up things he thought had fallen out of Spates’s pockets and put them

back. Nobody tried CPR; Conwell explained, “We knew he was dead – no pulse, no

heartbeat.” Yet, not being “a medical doctor,” Conwell kept “hoping” that Spates was not

dead. Asked what Spates did at the end, Conwell said: “After the last part of the kicking he

didn’t do anything. He was just laying there.” As to not calling an ambulance, he repeated,

“We thought he was dead.”

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With Washington’s help for the first few yards, Conwell dragged the body to the

water’s edge leading to the estuary, and left it on the mud. During the dragging Spates’s

pants had slid down, and Conwell tried to pull them back up. He “knew [Spates] was dead”

but put one of Spates’s arms in the water “just hoping” it might revive him. Conwell sat

alone with the body for about 30 minutes, feeling angry and sad, then left and slept for

several hours.

The water had been “really low” when Conwell left but had risen upon his return

hours later. The body was gone. He learned days later that a body was found in the

estuary and mentioned this to Washington. They heard later that Spates “died of a crushed

larynx.” Conwell, though not convinced, was “afraid that [he] might have” done it with the

crutch and so did not mention to police that he had used a crutch across Spates’s chest

area to hold him down. He made up a story that there had been a fight just between

himself and Spates and that he had done the kicking. “Bad experiences with the police” led

him to lie and cover up. He wanted to “take all the blame” for himself because it was “an

accident,” and Washington was “a pal” of his.

2. Jaime Cortes, M.D. (“Dr. Cortes”)

Dr. Cortes had renewed Seroquel prescriptions for Spates at a walk-in clinic in

Oakland since February 1999, when Spates first came in saying he needed the drug to

help him sleep. Dr. Cortes had treated Spates for respiratory and other ailments over the

years. Dr. Cortes did not check with the doctor who originally prescribed Seroquel to

Spates, and, being unfamiliar with the drug, read about its use for psychosis and, before

renewing it, learned from a pharmacist that it was used for insomnia. He renewed it 14

times, the last time 30 days before Spates died. Dr. Cortes did not feel qualified to

diagnose psychosis but, in seeing Spates 24 times over the years, never saw any signs of

psychosis. Spates complained of being depressed but never of hearing voices.

3. Fred Rosenthal, M.D. (“Dr. Rosenthal”)

Forensic psychiatrist Dr. Rosenthal, who had not treated Spates, testified that

Seroquel is used to treat psychotic patients with illnesses like schizophrenia and

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schizoaffective disorder, is nonaddictive, and has potentially dangerous and “definitely

unpleasant” side effects. A patient who stops taking antipsychotic drugs might experience

insomnia along with a relapse into psychotic symptoms. A schizophrenic with paranoia

might lash out at those he thinks are plotting against him, and may manifest personality

shifts that might popularly be called “Dr. Jeckle-Mr. Hyde” shifts. Consuming alcohol or

cocaine may interfere with the efficacy of antipsychotic drugs, but alcohol and cocaine may

themselves produce violence and psychosis.

4. Raymond Kelly, Ph.D. (“Dr. Kelly”)

Forensic toxicologist Dr. Kelly put the likely range of cocaine in Spates’s system

higher than Herrmann had. Accepting Herrmann’s laboratory results, Dr. Kelly placed the

likely cocaine level at death as between .07 and .25 and possibly higher. At .07, one would

be intoxicated for driving purposes; a .25 level was “a very typical” level for someone under

its influence. No Seroquel was detected, but this was inconclusive because the screening

test was designed to detect drugs of abuse and would detect high levels, not therapeutic

levels.

Dr. Kelly testified briefly about the pathology of cocaine use, while stressing that he

was not a physician or pathologist, and that his role as a laboratory director was not to

assess a cause of death, but to provide information to forensic pathologists for that

purpose. According to Dr. Kelly, death triggered by cocaine use, short of some heart tissue

damage in chronic users, often “doesn’t leave any pathological signs” evident through

autopsy. Generally, however, cocaine use constricts coronary blood vessels, increasing

heart rate and blood pressure and increasing the need for oxygen. In other words,

increased use affects the heart. Also, cocaine can have effects on the heart “that catch up

with you later,” and “you may not even have cocaine in your system at the time you just

keel over dead of some effect on your heart muscle that's been produced by prior cocaine

use.” Dr. Kelly stated “that didn't happen in this case, to [his] understanding at least.”

//

//

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C. Rebuttal

Detective Loman related statements Conwell gave to him on December 18, 2000. 

Conwell first swore he never saw the altercation, saying he joined Spates that day, asked

him for marijuana, walked with him to the lake and, on the way, joined two East Oakland

guys Spates knew and with whom Spates had a problem; Conwell claimed he stayed

behind the other three until reaching the park and that he left the park before any fight. 

Confronted by the officers, Conwell then cried, and asked “how much time would he get for

this” and gave an altered account, now admitting having beaten Spates. He said he was

only trying to help Spates but that Spates lunged at him, prompting him to push Spates so

that he fell. Conwell had “told him to be cool,” but Spates rose up and “still wanted to fight.” 

Conwell slapped him, but Spates persisted. They traded punches on the ground, and

Conwell helped Spates onto a bench. Spates still wanted to fight, and Conwell punched

him some more and “told him to be cool.” Conwell “beat up” Spates, but didn’t mean to. 

Conwell then heard McGuffin say, “Stop, you’re gonna kill that dude,” and Conwell walked

away. Spates had blood around his mouth and “seemed to be out.” Then Conwell

decided, “Fuck this. I’m not going to jail for no assault,” and tried to wake Spates up, but

could not. When, after 10 or 15 minutes, Spates stirred groggily and made “gurgling

sounds,” Conwell turned him “on his side so he wouldn’t choke on his blood.” He thought

about calling an ambulance but figured “they wouldn’t believe him if he told them he didn’t

have anything to do with it.” By now the original group of people was gone. Conwell

checked for a pulse on Spates’s neck and wrist, and also for breath, but found none. He

grabbed Spates’s body and, alone, “dragged him into the water.” He told the interviewing

officers, “I’ll do the time, Daniel didn’t do anything to me.”

The officers interviewed Conwell a second time that same day to ask about the

crutch and possible robbery. Conwell said that Washington “came after everything was

over.” Then he said Washington “was there but he only wanted to talk about what he

[himself] did.” Conwell denied using a crutch to hit or hold Spates down, and he said he

thought Spates had about 20 bucks on him and was “waiting for payday.”

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A third interview occurred that evening at Conwell’s instigation. He said he was

ready to tell the entire story without omitting anything – about his own and another person’s

involvement. But by the time the tape machine was on, he said he did not want to talk

about anyone else’s involvement, “only his, and that he would think about it” and decide

later if he wanted to say more.

DISCUSSION

A district court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction on the basis of a

claim reviewed in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“[I]t is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied [clearly

established federal law] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002).

Conwell argues he is entitled to relief on a number of grounds, which the Court

considers in turn.

A. Instructions

Conwell argues “the jury was not adequately instructed on the elements of the crime

of conviction,” (see Petition at 13:5-6), which, as noted, was involuntary manslaughter. 

Specifically, Conwell argues the jury was not instructed that causation is an essential

element of involuntary manslaughter, was given an incorrect instruction as to proximate

cause, and was given an incorrect instruction as to the element that the defendant commit

an act dangerous to human life.

1. Causation As Essential Element

The trial court, after instructing the jury as to murder, gave the following instruction:

Lesser to murder are voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. 

I’m going to instruct you on what the elements of those offenses are. The

crime of manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice

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Exhibit 2 is the Reporter’s Transcript, which is attached to respondents’ answer.

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aforethought. It is not divided into degrees but is of two kinds, namely,

voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.

(See Ex. 2 at 2062.)7

After next instructing the jury as to voluntary manslaughter, including an instruction

that a conviction for voluntary manslaughter required a finding “the perpetrator’s conduct

resulted in the unlawful killing,” (see Ex. 2 at 2063), the trial judge gave CALJIC No. 8.45,

which defines involuntary manslaughter:

Every person who unlawfully kills a human being without malice aforethought

and without an intent to kill and without conscious disregard for human life is

guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of section 192(b).

There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred in the actual but

unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril

to life or great bodily injury.

A killing in conscious disregard for human life occurs when a killing results

from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to

life, which act is deliberately performed by a person who knows that his

conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard

for human life.

A killing is unlawful within the meaning of this instruction if it occurred:

1. during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony which is

dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its commission; or

2. in the commission of an act ordinarily lawful which involves a high degree

of risk of death or great bodily harm without due caution and circumspection.

An unlawful act not amounting to a felony consists of a battery, a violation of

Penal Code section 242.

The commission of an unlawful act without due caution and circumspection

would necessarily be an act that was dangerous to human life in its

commission.

In order to prove this crime each of the following elements must be proved:

1. a human being was killed; and

2. the killing was unlawful.

(See Ex. 2 at 2066-67.) Thereafter, the trial court read a number of other instructions,

some of which, as discussed below, pertained to involuntary manslaughter.

In the Court of Appeal, Conwell, focusing on the last paragraph in CALJIC No. 8.45,

argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, in said instruction, that causation

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8

In addition, the Court of Appeal identified CALJIC No. 8.58, which as read to the

jury, stated:

If a person unlawfully inflicts a physical injury upon another person and that

injury is the cause of the latter’s death, that conduct constitutes an unlawful

homicide even though the injury inflicted was not the only cause of the death.

Moreover, that conduct constitutes unlawful homicide even if:

1. the person injured had already been weakened by disease, injury, physical

condition or other cause; or

2. it is probable that a person in sound physical condition injured in the same

way would not have died from the injury; or

3. it is probable that the injury only hastened the death of the injured person; or

4. the injured person would have died soon thereafter from another cause or

causes.

(See Ex. 2 at 2069.)

9

The Court of Appeal summarized Conwell’s closing argument as follows: “Spates’s

own actions set in motion the chain of events, that neither defendant’s use of force was

fatal, and that the death was unexpected and, consistent with Dr. Kelly’s testimony,

probably caused by an enlarged heart overloaded by the combined stresses of alcohol,

cocaine, perhaps Seroquel, and the fight.” See People v. Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, at

*20.

18

was a required element. The Court of Appeal rejected Conwell’s argument, finding that,

although CALJIC No. 8.45 did not expressly reference causation as an element, other

instructions read to the jury after CALJIC No. 8.45 did advise the jury that the jury had to

find Conwell’s acts caused Spates’s death in order to convict Conwell of involuntary

manslaughter, specifically, CALJIC No. 8.55, which, as read to the jury, stated, “To

constitute murder or manslaughter, there must be, in addition to the death of a human

being, an unlawful act which was the cause of that death.” (See Ex. 2 at 2069.)8 The Court

of Appeal further rejected Conwell’s argument for the reason that the issue of whether

Conwell’s use of force was a cause of Spates’s death was the central focus of Conwell’s

closing argument. The Court of Appeal, in addition to summarizing the closing argument,9

quoted Conwell’s counsel’s argument that, “My favorite [instruction] is 8.55,” which counsel

correctly stated to the jury required that “there must be, in addition to the death of a human

being, an unlawful act which was a cause of that death.” See People v. Conwell, 2004 WL

505240, at *20.

Conwell argues the Court of Appeal’s finding is contrary to or involved an

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10Conwell also cites Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), which addresses when

“contradictory instructions,” one of which can be understood as “impart[ing] to the jury an

unconstitutional understanding of the allocation of burdens of persuasion,” give rise to a

constitutional deprivation. See id. at 322-23. The instant case, however, does not involve

“contradictory instructions.”

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unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the United States Supreme

Court. Specifically, Conwell relies on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), for the

proposition that a trial court’s failure to instruct on an essential element deprives the

defendant of due process. See id. at 364 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).

The Court of Appeal’s finding that the jury was, in fact, instructed that causation was

an essential element is not a clearly unreasonable application of Winship or any other

United States Supreme Court decision,10 in light of the explicit instructions identified by the

Court of Appeal that advised the jury the defendant’s act must be a cause of the death, as

well as causation being the focus of the closing arguments. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431

U.S. 145, 153-54 (1977) (holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief where trial court

failed to explicitly identify causation as essential element for crime of second-degree

murder, where counsel “stressed” causation in closing arguments and trial court read to

jury statutory language requiring jury to find “defendant’s conduct caused the death of

another person”).

Accordingly, Conwell has failed to show he is entitled to relief on his claim that the

jury was not advised causation was an essential element of the crime of involuntary

manslaughter.

2. Proximate Cause Instruction

The trial court gave the following instruction defining causation: “The criminal law

has its own particular way of defining cause: A cause of the death is an act that sets in

motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of

the act, the death and without which the death would not occur. There may be more than

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11Exhibit 3 is “Appellant’s Opening Brief” filed by Conwell in the Court of Appeal; it is

attached to respondents’ answer.

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one cause of the death. When the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently

to a cause of the death, the conduct of each is a cause of death if that conduct was also a

substantial factor contributing to the result. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the

moment of the death and acted with another cause to produce the death.” (See Ex. 2 at

2045-46.)

In the Court of Appeal, Conwell argued the trial court erred by failing to give, in

addition to the causation instructions set forth above, a “specific instruction, sua sponte, on

the doctrines of proximate and intervening causes.” (See Ex. 3 at 66).11 According to

Conwell, if the jury been given such “specific instruction,” the jury might have found

Spates’s death was caused by an intervening event for which Conwell was not responsible,

which events Conwell identified as (1) “Spates’s reengagement in the fight with

Washington,” (2) Spates’s “sudden congestive heart failure,” and/or (3) “the workings of the

tide tables.” (See Ex. 3 at 68.)

The Court of Appeal rejected Conwell’s argument. First, the Court of Appeal,

understanding Conwell was not arguing the above-quoted instructions, as given, were

“incorrect as far as they went,” found that “the lack of amplifying language” as to

intervening causes was waived by Conwell’s “failure to request it below.” See People v.

Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, at *17 (holding “party may not complain on appeal that an

instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete

unless the party had requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language”). Second, the

Court of Appeal found that the instructions given did not omit the element of proximate

cause, because “language requiring an injury to be a direct, natural and probable

consequence of a defendant’s act necessarily refers to consequences that are reasonably

foreseeable.” See id. at *17-18. Finally, the Court of Appeal held the instant case did not

involve any “odd facts” that might warrant clarifying instructions on proximate cause; as an

example, the Court of Appeal stated that Spates’s rising from the ground and restarting the

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12Gaudin was issued after the Court of Appeal’s decision herein. Accordingly, the

Court understands petitioner to be relying on the authority cited in Gaudin, specifically,

Sullivan, which, as cited by Gaudin, states: “The prosecution bears the burden of proving

all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the factfinder beyond a reasonable

doubt of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements.” See Sullivan, 508 U.S.

at 277-78 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

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fight was “not unforeseeable or extraordinary given that Spates was under attack.” See id.

at *19.

Conwell argues the Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of federal law as set forth in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.

506 (1995). In the portion of Gaudin on which Conwell relies, the Supreme Court stated

that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury

determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is

charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” See id. at 510 (citing Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275, 277-78 (1993);12 see also id. at 522-23 (holding “trial court’s refusal to allow the jury to

pass on the ‘materiality’ of [defendant’s] false statements” violated defendant’s Fifth and

Sixth Amendment rights because “materiality” was essential element of crime at issue). 

Although not clearly expressed by Conwell, Conwell’s argument appears to be (1) that the

Court of Appeal erred in concluding the jury was properly instructed as to proximate cause,

and (2) that the jury, in light of the improper instruction, did not consider whether there were

any unforeseeable intervening events following Conwell’s use of the crutch.

As noted, the trial court instructed the jury that a “cause of the death is an act that

sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable

consequence of the act, the death and without which the death would not occur.” The

Court of Appeal’s finding, that such instruction was sufficient to advise the jury that an act is

not a cause of a death if the act sets in motion an indirect or unnatural or improbable

consequence, is not a clearly unreasonable application of the principle set forth in Sullivan

and reiterated more recently in Gaudin. Moreover, Conwell fails to show there is any error

in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning it was not unforeseeable that Spates would continue to

fight with Washington after Conwell had held Spates down with the crutch.

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Additionally, although the Court of Appeal did not expressly state why Spates’s

alleged “sudden congestive heart failure” and/or “the workings of the tide tables” could not

constitute unforeseeable events, the reasoning underlying such implicit findings is apparent

from the record, and does not constitute a clearly unreasonable application of federal law. 

First, no evidence was offered that Spates, in fact, had “sudden congestive heart failure”

and, in any event, it is not unforeseeable that Conwell’s act of holding Spates on the

ground by forcing a crutch down against either Spates’s throat or chest might cause a lifethreatening reaction. Second, assuming, arguendo, Spates’s death was caused by

drowning, it is not unforeseeable that the act of placing an unconscious person in a body of

water at low tide would result in that person’s drowning as the tides changed, if not before.

Finally, the Supreme Court has held that a jury verdict “will not ordinarily be set

aside for error not brought to the attention of the trial court,” even on direct appeal. See

United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936). Rather, “exceptional circumstances”

must be shown, for example, that the errors are “obvious, or if they otherwise seriously

affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See id. at 160. 

Here, Conwell fails to identify any “exceptional circumstances.”

Accordingly, Conwell has failed to show he is entitled to relief based on his claim that

the trial court erred with respect to instructing on the issue of proximate cause.

3. Dangerous Act Instruction

As noted, the trial court gave CALJIC No. 8.45, which defines involuntary

manslaughter:

Every person who unlawfully kills a human being without malice aforethought

and without an intent to kill and without conscious disregard for human life is

guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of § 192(b).

There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred in the actual but

unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend one’s self against imminent

peril to life or great bodily injury.

A killing in conscious disregard for human life occurs when a killing results

from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to

life, which act is deliberately performed by a person who knows that his

conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard

for human life.

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A killing is unlawful within the meaning of this instruction if it occurred:

1. during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony which is

dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its commission; or

2. in the commission of an act ordinarily lawful which involves a high degree

of risk of death or great bodily harm without due caution and circumspection.

An unlawful act not amounting to a felony consists of a battery, a violation of

Penal Code section 242.

The commission of an unlawful act without due caution and circumspection

would necessarily be an act that was dangerous to human life in its

commission.

In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved:

1. A human being was killed; and

2. The killing was unlawful

(See Ex. 2 at 2066-67.)

In the Court of Appeal, Conwell argued that the penultimate paragraph of CALJIC

No. 8.45, the above-quoted instruction, “effectively negate[d] the ‘dangerous act’ element,”

(see Ex. 3 at 55), thereby removing an element from the jury’s consideration, specifically,

the element, set forth in the fourth of the above-quoted paragraphs and as applicable to the

instant facts, that Conwell’s use of the crutch was “dangerous to human life under the

circumstances of its commission.”

The Court of Appeal rejected Conwell’s argument, relying on the following

instruction, CALJIC No. 8.46, given by the trial court to define “without due caution and

circumspection”:

The term ‘without due caution and circumspection’ refers to negligent acts

which are aggravated, reckless and flagrant and which are such a departure

from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under

the same circumstances as to be contrary to a proper regard for human life or

danger to human life or to constitute indifference to the consequences of such

act. The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent acts

could reasonably have been foreseen and must also appear that death or

danger to human life was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or

misadventure, but the natural and probable cause of an aggravated, reckless

or grossly negligent act.

(See id. Ex. 2 at 2067.) The Court of Appeal also found the jury’s express finding that

Conwell used a crutch in the commission of the involuntary manslaughter necessarily

meant the jury found that Conwell broke Spates’s larynx with the crutch and, in light

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thereof, held “[i]t is impossible to conclude that the absence of clearer instruction on the

dangerousness of the battery had anything to do with the result.” See People v. Conwell,

2004 WL 505240, at *28.

Conwell argues the Court of Appeal’s finding is contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the United States Supreme

Court, specifically, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). In Sandstrom, the

Supreme Court considered an instruction that provided: “[T]he law presumes that a person

intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” See id. at 512. The Supreme

Court held that when given in a case where “intent” is an element, the instruction is

unconstitutional because it has “the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof . . .

on the critical question of [the defendant’s] state of mind.” See id. at 521-24 (holding

presumption improper where defendant charged with “deliberate homicide”).

Here, unlike in Sandstrom, the charge in question does not involve an intentional

killing. Further, as noted, the Court of Appeal found the jurors would have understood,

from the instructions given, that in order to find a battery was committed “without due

caution and circumspection,” the jury was required to find the manner in which Conwell

committed the battery was dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its

commission. Conwell fails to demonstrate such finding constitutes an unreasonable

application of Sandstrom.

Moreover, with respect to the Court of Appeal’s alternative finding that any error was

harmless, Conwell does not take issue with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that if he broke

Spates’s larynx with the crutch, any possible confusion created by the “absence of clearer

instruction on the dangerousness of the battery” was harmless. Rather, Conwell argues

that the Court of Appeal’s harmless error finding is based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts as found by the jury, i.e., that, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s

understanding of the facts, the jury did not find that he broke Spates’s larynx. As noted, a

federal court may grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if a state court’s adjudication

of a federal claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

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13It appears that one juror wrote the first sentence, as well as the fragmentary

second sentence up to and including the word “killing,” and that a second juror wrote the

third sentence and the portion of the second sentence after the word “killing.” (See id.)

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of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Further, where, as with the instant petition, a federal court is reviewing the

propriety of a state court’s finding that an error was harmless, the court “may not award

habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was

unreasonable.” See Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2007). Here, the Court of

Appeal’s understanding of the facts as found by the jury is not unreasonable. As noted, the

jury expressly found Conwell used a crutch in the commission of the offense, two

eyewitnesses to the altercation testified that Conwell pressed the crutch down on Spates’s

neck, and the pathologist who performed the autopsy determined that Spates’s larynx had

been fractured.

Accordingly, Conwell has failed to show he is entitled to relief on the asserted

ground the trial court erred with respect to its instructions on the “dangerous act” element.

B. Jury Questions

Conwell argues the trial court erred by failing to properly answer two jury questions.

The two subject notes were submitted by the jury toward the end of the second day

of deliberations, at 3:50 p.m. See People v Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, * 21.

The first note read: 

The charge, Battery 16.140 and the charge, Involuntary Manslaughter 8.45

Does the fact that a killing occurred render the charge Involuntary Manslaughter

 or

Does that fact (alone) allow battery

(See Ex. 1 at 547.)

The second note read:

Can or does 16.140 apply due to the fact a human being was killed & knowing

that 3.30 can apply to Battery 16.140? Because the belief that a defendant

was not involved in the killing, even If I know there was a killing, but I don’t

believe his actions resulted in the killing, for only 1 defendant.

(See Ex. 1 at 549 (strikeout in original).)13

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The trial court advised the parties it intended to send the jury the following written

response:

You must decide the case for each defendant separately. The definition of

battery was supplied solely to provide meaning to the language of the

involuntary manslaughter instruction. A conviction of battery as to either

defendant is not an option.

(See Ex. 2 at 2302.)

Counsel for co-defendant Washington requested that, instead, a different answer be given: 

“I would ask that the jury be instructed based on the whole question, ‘Does the fact that a

killing occurred render the charge involuntary manslaughter or does that fact alone allow

battery?’ That should be answered, ‘A killing by itself without a causal connection does not

render the charge involuntary manslaughter . . . .” (See id.) The trial court responded that

it did not understand the question to ask “Does the fact that a killing occurred render the

charge involuntary manslaughter?,” but, rather, that the first phrase was “connected to the

next clause, ‘or does that fact alone allow battery,’” (see Ex. 2 at 2303), and stated its

proposed response would answer “the entire question,” (see id.). Counsel for Conwell then

suggested a “solution,” specifically, that the trial court refer the jury to “that one-sentence

instruction, ‘in order for there to be murder or manslaughter, there must be the death of a

human being caused by an unlawful act,’” (see id.), to which the trial court responded, “If

they keep wondering about it I can do that also,” (see id.). Thereafter, the trial court sent

the jury the response it had prepared, (see Ex. 1 at 550), and the jury returned a verdict

that afternoon at 4:35 p.m. See People v Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, at * 21.

In the Court of Appeal, Conwell argued that the jury was asking, in effect, that if they

found Conwell had committed a battery, would they have to convict him of involuntary

manslaughter, and that it constituted a deprivation of due process for the trial judge not to

have responded that any battery had to be a cause of death in order for the jury to convict

on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, Conwell argued, the trial court

should have responded to the jury’s notes as follows: “If you don’t believe (in fact, if you

are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant’s actions caused the

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14With respect to the fourth reason, the Court of Appeal explained:

Fourth, our federal high court has reasoned that where a record shows

complete instruction, an adequate if incomplete response to a question, a jury

not shy about asking the court for guidance, and a substantial period of time

elapsing before verdict and without further inquiry from the jury, it is

reasonable to assume that the jury had no further difficulty. (Weeks v.

Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 225, 234-236, 120 S. Ct. 727, 145 L. Ed. 2d 727

[two hours of further deliberating].) The time lapse here was 45 minutes

minus whatever time it took to fashion the three-sentence response to the

notes. This was less than the two hours in Weeks, but the issue in Weeks

was whether jurors weighed mitigating evidence, something that would have

taken time. Here, were we to accept defendants’ dire premise that the jury

understood the court’s response to mean that causation was utterly

unnecessary, there would have been no need for any further deliberations at

all, much less 30 minutes or so, because resolving any debate on causation

would have been deemed pointless. We assume, rather, that jurors used the

time to discuss and resolve causation.

(See id.)

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‘killing,’ then you must acquit the defendant of all charges.” (See Ex. 3 at 63.)

The Court of Appeal found that, although the response suggested by Conwell “could

have been helpful,” the trial court did not err with respect to the response actually given. 

See People v. Conwell, 2004 WL 505240, * 22. In so holding, the Court of Appeal

provided four reasons: (1) the trial court’s response advising the jury to decide each

defendant’s case “separately” implicitly directed the jury to “separately decide whether

each defendant’s ‘actions resulted in the killing,’” thus “affirm[ing] that causation was

required,” (see id.); (2) the overall instructions “unmistakably required causation,” (see id.);

(3) CALJIC No. 8.45, one of the instructions to which the jury itself referred, addressed

causation by stating “a killing in conscious disregard for human life occurs when a killing

results from an intentional act,” (see id.) (emphasis in original); and (4) the temporal

relationship between the response and verdict indicates the jury understood causation was

required, (see id.).14

Conwell argues the Court of Appeal’s decision constituted an unreasonable

application of Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946). In Bollenbach, the

Supreme Court reversed a conviction, where the trial court answered a jury’s question with

an incorrect statement of law, specifically, a direction to “presume” a fact on which the

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15Exhibit 4 is the “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” filed by Conwell in the Court of

Appeal; it is attached to respondents’ answer.

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prosecution had the burden of proof, and found the error was not harmless in light of the

jury’s having previously announced it was deadlocked and, after receiving the erroneous

response, it convicted the defendant within five minutes. See id. at 609-15. Although the

Supreme Court, in Bollenbach, did not explicitly state its holding was based on

constitutional grounds, see id. at 614 (stating issue was “whether guilt has been found by a

jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials in the federal

courts”), the Supreme Court, in a later case, indicated its holding was so based. See

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280; see also Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 44 (1967)

(Stewart, J., concurring) (describing Bollenbach as involving an “instruct[ion] in an

unconstitutional presumption”).

Petitioner’s reliance on Bollenbach is unavailing, because the trial court’s responses

to the jury’s questions here did not direct or imply that the jury should apply an

unconstitutional presumption. Further, to the extent Bollenbach is understood as setting

forth the broader principle that “palpably erroneous” responses to jury questions are

unconstitutional, see Weeks, 528 U.S. at 231 (referring to trial court’s response to jury

question given in Bollenbach as “palpably erroneous”), Conwell fails to show the trial court’s

response here was palpably erroneous, or, more specifically, that the Court of Appeal’s

decision that the response was not palpably erroneous constituted a clearly unreasonable

application of Bollenbach.

Accordingly, Conwell has failed to show he is entitled to relief based on the trial

court’s responses to the jury’s questions.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Court of Appeal, and heard at the

same time as his direct appeal, Conwell argued his trial counsel, William P. Cole (“Cole”),

was ineffective because Cole did not consult with an “independent pathologist” or call such

expert at trial. (See Ex. 4 at 7.)15 In support of this assertion, Conwell offered a declaration

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from Robert Anthony, M.D. (“Dr. Anthony”), a forensic pathologist, who stated that if he had

been called at trial, he would have testified that “there was no evidence sufficient to

convince [him] to a reasonable medical certainty that any specific cause of death could be

assigned in this case,” and that the “single most likely” among “many possible causes” was

that Spates died of a heart attack. (See Ex. 4, Anthony Decl. at 2 (emphasis in original).)

Additionally, Conwell offered a declaration from Cole, who stated that “[i]t appeared

to [him] that the examining pathologist – Dr. Paul Herrmann – never really established what

caused the death, and [trial counsel’s] investigation lead [sic] [him] to believe that the most

likely cause of Spates’ death was a heart attack brought on by a combination of his (preexisting) enlarged heart, his ingestion of crack cocaine and alcohol, and the exertions of the

fight that he started with the co-defendant, Mario Washington.” (See Ex. 4, Cole Decl. at

1.) Cole explained he did not consult with an independent pathologist, nor call one as a

defense witness for the following reasons:

I thought it unnecessary to do so, given that the prosecution’s own

pathologist (Dr. Herrmann) was unable to say more than that it was ‘possible’

that Spates had died of drowning, strangulation, or any other means

potentially inflicted by Conwell. (Also, another forensic pathologist would be

hobbled by the fact that, unlike Dr. Herrmann, he could not examine Spates’

body.)

I believed that I would be able to get what we needed – that is, to expose the

weakness of Dr. Herrmann’s conclusion – through effective crossexamination. In additional, I did call an eminent toxicologist, Dr. Ray Kelley,

whose testimony effectively countered Dr. Herrmann’s regarding the extent

and effects of Spates’ intoxication.

(See Ex. 4, Cole Decl. at 1-2.)

Finally, Conwell offered a declaration from Doron Weinberg, an attorney who stated

he has been qualified as an expert in the fields of attorney competence and ethics in

criminal defense, and who offered the opinion that Cole’s choice not to consult with or call

as a trial witness an independent pathologist was “an unreasonable and unprofessional

one.” (See Ex. 4, Weinberg Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9, 17.)

The Court of Appeal denied Conwell’s petition, for the reason that Conwell failed to

show a “prima facie case for relief.” See People v. Conwell, 2004 WL 505240 at * 42.

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Conwell argues that the Court of Appeal’s decision is a clearly unreasonable

application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, to

establish ineffective assistance, the petitioner must shown that his “counsel’s performance

was deficient” and the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” See id. at 687.

Here, as noted, Cole’s strategy was to focus on cross-examination of Dr. Herrmann,

whom Cole believed to be an unpersuasive witness on the issue of causation, and to call a

toxicologist, Dr. Kelly, as a witness. As planned, at trial Cole did engage in a lengthy crossexamination of Dr. Herrmann and did offer Dr. Kelly as a witness. During his closing

argument, Cole repeatedly argued that Dr. Herrmann’s opinions as to the cause of death

were insufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden to establish causation. (See, e.g., Ex. 2

at 2164:19-26 (arguing Dr. Herrmann’s testimony that “things probably happened, it

wouldn’t be enough”); Ex. 2 at 2165:20-23 (“Dr. Herrmann’s testimony was not scientific

testimony, it was a theory of the prosecution dressed up as medical testimony.”); Ex. 2 at

2171:4-10 (“He gets up on that stand and testifies almost exclusively about the various

possible manners of death . . . . He couches these all in possibilities. He even said at

some point this suggests the possibility. You don’t convict people of murder on

suggestions or possibilities.”).) Cole also argued that Dr. Kelly, who testified Spates had a

higher level of cocaine in his system than the level set forth by Dr. Herrmann, was more

credible that Dr. Herrmann with respect to analyzing the toxicology results, (see Ex. 2 at

2175:20 - 2179:11, 2184:24 - 2185:20), which argument supported Conwell’s arguments

that Dr. Herrmann was not credible and that a possible cause of death was a heart attack,

caused in part by high levels of cocaine in Spates’s system.

It was not a clearly unreasonable application of Strickland for the Court of Appeal to

determine that Cole’s strategic choices, specifically, Cole’s decision to focus on crossexamination of Dr. Herrmann, to offer Dr. Kelly as a witness, and to base a major part of his

closing argument on identifying what he perceived to be deficiencies in Dr. Herrmann’s

testimony, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, courts have

concluded that similar strategic choices do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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See, e.g., Hall v. Sumner, 682 F. 2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding trial counsel not

ineffective on account of asserted failure to pursue diminished capacity defense in murder

trial, where counsel “successfully elicited enough information on cross-examination of the

prosecution’s expert to make a credible closing argument on the issue [of diminished

capacity]”); see also Ellefson v. Hopkins, 5 F. 3d 1149, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding

counsel’s decision not to “call a medical expert to refute the State’s serologist” in sexual

assault case not deficient, where “trial counsel’s strategy was to call into question the

weight of the State’s scientific evidence through his cross-examination of the State’s

expert”); Franklin v. Anderson, 267 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (holding

counsel’s not hiring fingerprint expert not ineffective assistance in burglary/murder case,

where counsel “adequately challenged [the fingerprint] evidence through the crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses”).

Accordingly, Conwell is not entitled to relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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