Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-01149/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-01149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

ELVIS TOLBERT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:05cv1149-MHT

) (WO)

BRIGGS and STRATTON )

CORPORATION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Elvis Tolbert brings this racediscrimination lawsuit against defendant Briggs and

Stratton Corporation (B & S). Tolbert asserts that

B & S failed to promote him and eventually fired him, all

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17.

Additionally, he asserts a state-law claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. This court

has original jurisdiction over the Title VII claims

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), as well as

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

This case is currently before the court on B & S’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, summary judgment will be granted on the Title VII

claims, and the state-law claim will be dismissed without

prejudice.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the court must view the admissible evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Tolbert, the

admissible evidence reflects the following facts. B & S

is a manufacturer of small gas-powered engines. Its

plant in Auburn, Alabama has three general areas: iron

machining, aluminum machining, and assembly. Each area

is supervised by an area manager, and within each area

are several team leaders, or coaches. A coach is a

salaried supervisor with direct responsibility for hourly

employees.

Tolbert, who is black, worked for B & S from 1996

until 2004. He began as a temporary worker, but he was

soon hired as a permanent employee. He was quickly

promoted from production operator to ‘setup,’ and then,

in November 1996, to coach. From November 1996 until

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February 2002, he was a coach in the assembly area of the

plant.

During the period of employment from 1996 to 2002,

Tolbert experienced several problems that were not

resolved to his satisfaction. One such problem was a

conflict over his selection of “lead setups,” special

assistants who would fill in during a coach’s absence.

According to Tolbert, white coaches were given complete

discretion in choosing lead setups, whereas B & S’s

management initially rejected Tolbert’s selection of two

black employees to be lead setups. (Ultimately Tolbert

was permitted to choose black employees for that role.)

Another significant problem Tolbert experienced

involved insubordination by a white hourly employee,

Daniel Reeves, who was under his supervision. Reeves

refused to carry out duties that Tolbert had assigned

him, so Tolbert wrote him up for insubordination.

According to Tolbert, such misconduct at B & S ordinarily

resulted in termination of the hourly employee. In this

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case, however, Reeves was not disciplined in any way.

Tolbert interprets this incident, as well as the incident

involving his selection of lead setups, as evidence that

B & S did not give black coaches the same authority and

respect that they gave white coaches.

Tolbert recalls several other incidents and

complaints that left him dissatisfied with his treatment

by B & S during this period. One incident involved

Tolbert’s struggle to obtain a chair for his office.

Another involved an e-mail that used an offensive term

unrelated to race. Tolbert also recounts two minor

altercations he had with white employees who were not his

supervisors. Lastly, Tolbert suspects he received less

training and less pay than he deserved, but he has no

evidence to support this opinion. However, none of these

incidents or complaints, including those involving the

selection of lead setups and B & S’s failure to terminate

Reeves, led Tolbert to file a compaint with the Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or lodge any

other type of formal complaint prior to this lawsuit.

Tolbert had served in the Navy Reserve since his

discharge from active service in 1990. In February 2002,

when he was still a coach in the assembly area, he was

recalled to full-time active duty. Consequently, from

February 2002 until July 2003, Tolbert was away from

B & S on military leave.

When Tolbert returned to B & S, he remained a coach,

but he was reassigned to the iron-machining area of the

plant, which manufactures engine parts known as flywheels

and crankshafts. Tolbert, who supervised the flywheel

unit, was one of seven coaches in iron machining. Three

coaches, including Tolbert, were on first shift; three

were on second shift; and one was on third shift. Three

of the seven coaches, including Tolbert, were black. The

area manager for iron machining, Robert Westphal, was

white.

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In 2004, there were several ongoing problems in the

iron-machining area. The problems included the failure

to meet production goals and the presence of unidentified

parts and baskets in the area. The iron-machining

coaches were counseled by Westphal and the plant manager,

Harold Smith, about several problems that were occurring

in that area. Tolbert was among the coaches counseled,

but the counseling took place collectively; Tolbert was

not counseled on an individual basis. The parties

dispute the extent to which the problems in that area

were attributable principally to Tolbert, but it is not

disputed that some problems existed prior to Tolbert’s

arrival in the iron-machining area and that some problems

were occurring on all three shifts, not just Tolbert’s.

At some point, Westphal began to focus on Tolbert as

the source of problems in his area. Westphal transferred

some of Tolbert’s responsibilities--production of Model

20 flywheels--to another coach, Mallory Covington.

(Covington is black.) In December 2004, Westphal asked

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Tolbert to write a list of issues needing improvement.

Tolbert responded with a list of 127 deficiencies.

Westphal then approached Smith, the plant manager, and

recommended Tolbert’s termination. Westphal documented

several specific instances of substandard performance by

Tolbert that had recently caused problems in the area.

On December 10, 2004, B & S terminated Tolbert for poor

performance.

Following Tolbert’s departure, B & S did not hire

another coach to take Tolbert’s place. Some of Tolbert’s

duties had already been transfered to Covington, and

B & S reassigned the remaining supervisory duties to

Roger Milby, a white supervisory employee in the ironmachining area. Milby was a manufacturing specialist

whose pay grade was already a step above Tolbert’s and

whose responsibilities as a manufacturing specialist

covered all three shifts in the iron-machining area.

Milby continued in his position as manufacturing

specialist in addition to picking up those of Tolbert’s

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duties that had not already been transferred to

Covington.

Following the filing of a timely EEOC complaint and

receipt of a right-to-sue letter in response, Tolbert

brought this suit.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Claims

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge

any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). This suit alleges

‘disparate treatment’ based on race, in violation of that

statute. A disparate-treatment suit is one in which the

plaintiff alleges he or she was treated differently, and

almost always less favorably, because of his or her

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protected status. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).

In a disparate-treatment case, the plaintiff must

prove that the employer acted with discriminatory

purpose, motive or intent. Id; see Williams v. Motorola,

Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002). The

plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent by producing

circumstantial evidence. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs.,

Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).

A circumstantial case proceeds according to the

familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny.

Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331. First, the plaintiff must

establish a prima-facie case of discrimination. Id.

Next, the employer must produce a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. Lastly,

the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for

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unlawful intentional discrimination. Id. (citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 802-04).

Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell

Douglas, the establishment of a prima-facie case creates

a presumption of discrimination. Id. The employer can

eliminate the presumption by producing a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, which then shifts the burden

back to the plaintiff to produce “sufficient evidence to

find that the employer’s asserted justification is

false,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Although the prima-facie case

shifts the burden of production to the employer, it does

not reallocate the burden of persuasion. At all times

the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

employer acted with discriminatory intent. St. Mary’s

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Texas

Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981); Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331. At the summaryCase 3:05-cv-01149-MHT-TFM Document 51 Filed 02/08/07 Page 11 of 26
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judgment stage, there need not be independent evidence of

discrimination; there must simply be sufficient evidence

of pretext to send the case to a jury such that the jury

could infer the ultimate fact of intentional

discrimination from the pretext. Reeves, 530 U.S. at

146-49.

1. Discriminatory Discharge

The gravamen of Tolbert’s complaint is discriminatory

discharge, which the court will address first. Pursuant

to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court begins its

discriminatory-discharge analysis by determining whether

Tolbert can establish a prima-facie case. “To establish

a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the

plaintiff must show that she (1) was a member of a

protected class, (2) was qualified for the job, (3)

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was

replaced by someone outside the protected class.”

Cuddeback v. Florida Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235

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(11th Cir. 2004). Here, there is no dispute about the

first and third elements: Tolbert is black, and he was

fired. As for the second and fourth elements, however,

B & S argues that Tolbert was not qualified for his

position and that he was not replaced by anyone.

The court concludes that there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to the second element of the prima-facie

case, Tolbert’s qualification for his position. He had

held the ‘coach’ position for many years, and there is no

evidence that the qualifications for the position

changed. B & S argues that Tolbert’s poor job

performance renders him unqualified, but of course

Tolbert disputes B & S’s allegation that his job

performance was inadequate. Furthermore, where the issue

of whether the plaintiff was qualified to perform his job

is intertwined with the question of whether the

employer’s reason for terminating him was pretextual, the

plaintiff’s job performance should not be scrutinized as

part of the qualification element of the prima facie

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stage. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 n.3 (11th

Cir. 1997). In sum, because a reasonable jury could find

that Tolbert was qualified, summary judgment against

Tolbert is not proper on this element of the prima-facie

case.

Although Tolbert’s replacement is a closer issue, the

court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material

fact about this fourth element as well, whether Tolbert

was replaced by someone outside the protected class.

Tolbert alleges that he was replaced by Milby, a white

man. B & S argues that Tolbert was not replaced but that

Milby, a higher-paid worker, merely assumed Tolbert’s

duties. In terms of Tolbert’s ability to make out a

prima-facie case, the question of whether Milby

officially replaced Tolbert is immaterial. If an

employer could insulate itself from a Title VII suit

merely by reassigning a discharged employee’s duties to

a white employee but never formally call it a

replacement, Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII

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would be thwarted. See Al-Hashimi v. Scott, 756 F.Supp.

1567, 1579 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (Edenfield, C.J.) (“The

defendant argues that since no new [employee] was hired,

the plaintiff’s position has not been ‘filled’ by anyone.

The Court agrees with the plaintiff that this

technicality should not be used to circumvent the

plaintiff’s rights under the statute.”). Insofar as most

of Tolbert’s duties were assumed by a white employee, a

reasonable jury could conclude that Tolbert was “replaced

by someone outside the protected class,” Cuddeback, 381

F.3d at 1235. For summary-judgment purposes, therefore,

the fourth element of the prima-facie case has been met.

There is another reason why the fourth element of the

prima-facie case should not prevent Tolbert from moving

forward:

“The method suggested in McDonnell

Douglas for pursuing this inquiry ...

was never intended to be rigid,

mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it

is merely a sensible, orderly way to

evaluate the evidence in light of common

experience as it bears on the critical

question of discrimination. A prima

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facie case under McDonnell Douglas

raises an inference of discrimination

only because we presume these acts, if

otherwise unexplained, are more likely

than not based on the consideration of

impermissible factors.”

Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)

(emphasis added). In other words, even if Tolbert does

not strictly satisfy the fourth prima facie element, the

inquiry most faithful to Title VII is whether B & S’s

acts, viewed in the light most favorable to Tolbert and

if otherwise unexplained, raise an inference of

discrimination. It seems clear that they do. Here,

B & S terminated a qualified black employee who had been

a coach for eight years and reassigned the majority of

his duties to a white employee who, though paid more than

Tolbert, had no experience as a coach. The court

concludes that these facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to Tolbert and if otherwise unexplained, raise

an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, summary

judgment is not proper at the prima facie stage of the

McDonnell Douglas inquiry.

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Now that Tolbert has made out a prima-facie case, the

burden of production shifts to B & S to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for having

terminated him. As stated, the defendant does not bear

the burden of proof on this issue; it need only produce

admissible evidence of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 254-55 & n.8). Here, B & S’s burden of production is

easily met. B & S states that Tolbert was terminated for

poor job performance, and this is supported by abundant

evidence in the record.

At this point Tolbert’s prima-facie case has been

rebutted and he has the burden to prove that B & S’s

stated reason for firing him, poor job performance, is a

pretext for intentionally firing him because of his race.

Although Tolbert has the burden of proof for the case

overall, B & S, as the movant in the summary-judgment

stage of the proceeding, has the burden to show that

there is no genuine issue as to “the ultimate fact of

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intentional discrimination,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147

(quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511). Tolbert can survive

summary judgment if the court finds that there is

“sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted

justification is false.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. As

stated, at the summary-judgment stage, there need not be

independent evidence of discrimination; there must simply

be sufficient evidence of pretext to send the case to a

jury such that the jury could infer the ultimate fact of

intentional discrimination from the pretext. Id. at 146-

49.

In this case, the court concludes that summary

judgment is warranted because there is no evidence in the

record to support a reasonable inference by a jury that

B & S’s stated reason for firing Tolbert, poor job

performance, was false.

Tolbert makes three arguments for pretext. First, he

argues that the problems in his area were attributable to

other coaches and that these coaches were not fired.

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Second, he argues that the problems in his area existed

before he got there and he was unjustly blamed for a

situation he did not create. Third, he has pointed to

other race-related problems he was having at work prior

to his military leave that could indicate racial animus

on the part of his employer.

Ultimately, none of these points amounts to a genuine

issue of material fact that would allow a jury to infer

that Tolbert’s termination was racially motivated. With

regard to the other coaches, Tolbert never identifies

similarly situated white coaches who exhibited equally

poor job performance but were not fired. In fact,

Tolbert states in his deposition that he knows of no

other coach in his area who was treated better than he

was. B & S, on the other hand, produces evidence that it

also fired white supervisors for poor performance,

including an engineer in Tolbert’s area. Admittedly,

B & S never shows exactly what happened to the white

coaches in Tolbert’s area. But B & S does not have to

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show it fired the white coaches in Tolbert’s area unless

there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that the white coaches were, in all relevant

respects--that is, in terms of their job performance--

similarly situated to Tolbert. See Smith v. PAPP Clinic,

P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (11th Cir. 1987).

Tolbert points to no such evidence, and the court

knows of none. Based on the record now before the court,

no reasonable jury could infer from B & S’s treatment of

other coaches and employees in Tolbert’s area that

B & S’s stated reason for firing him, poor job

performance, was pretext for intentional race

discrimination.

Along the same lines, Tolbert’s argument that the

problems in his area predated his return from military

duty also does not create an issue of fact as to pretext.

B & S has produced evidence that coaches are expected to

improve the problems that predate their arrival. There

is obviously nothing unlawful, under Title VII, with

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firing supervisors who fail to improve problematic

situations, see Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d

1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (“federal courts do not sit

to second-guess the business judgment of employers”), and

Tolbert does not point to any evidence in the record that

suggests that similarly situated white supervisors

failed, to the same extent as Tolbert, to improve equally

problematic situations but were nonetheless retained.

With regard to Tolbert’s experiences before his

military leave, these simply do not rise to the level of

permitting a reasonable jury to infer that he was

terminated based on race or that B & S’s stated reason

for terminating him, poor job performance, was

pretextual. In general, plaintiffs can prove pretext

with direct evidence of racial animus by the employer in

previous incidents. See, e.g., Weaver v. Casa Gallardo,

Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1991); Sennello

v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 393, 394 (11th Cir.

1989). However, Tolbert has no direct evidence of racial

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discrimination. He has only circumstantial evidence--

which, in candor, is quite weak--that he ever was treated

differently based on his race. These incidents, which

occurred sometime between 1996 and 2002, do not amount to

evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer

that Tolbert was terminated in November 2004 on the basis

of race. See Burrell v. Bd. of Trustees, 125 F.3d 1390,

1393 (11th Cir. 1997).

In sum, B & S has produced evidence that Tolbert was

fired based on poor performance. Tolbert raises no

genuine issue of material fact to suggest that the stated

reason was a pretext for termination based on race.

Accordingly, summary judgment on Tolbert’s

discriminatory-discharge claim will be granted.

2. Failure to Promote

In addition to discriminatory discharge, Tolbert

claims that B & S violated Title VII by failing to

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promote him because of his race. There is practically no

evidence to support this claim.

“Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to prevail on

a claim of failure to promote, a plaintiff may establish

a prima facie case of ... discrimination by showing that:

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was

qualified and applied for the promotion; (3) she was

rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) other

equally or less qualified employees who were not members

of the protected class were promoted.” Wilson v. B/E

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004).

Here, of course, it is undisputed that Tolbert meets the

first element, membership in a protected class. The

remaining three elements, however, are in dispute.

According to Tolbert, he was in line to become a

senior supervisor in the iron-machining area and that

position went to Milby instead. But B & S’s evidence

shows that Tolbert was never considered for promotion,

that Milby occupied a different position (manufacturing

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specialist), and that Milby was not promoted. Tolbert

does nothing to rebut this evidence. In fact, the

evidence suggests that there was no senior supervisor in

Tolbert’s area, either before or after his termination.

The senior-supervisor position existed in other areas

of the plant, so it was not inconceivable that Tolbert or

another coach in his area could have been promoted. But

in order to make out a prima-facie case, Tolbert would

have to establish facts that, if otherwise unexplained,

would raise an inference that B & S’s failure to promote

Tolbert to the senior-supervisor position was racially

motivated. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. The record

cannot support a prima-facie case here.

Because Tolbert does not establish a prima face case,

there is no need to pursue the McDonnell Douglas

framework past the first inquiry. Accordingly, summary

judgment on Tolbert’s failure-to-promote claim will be

granted.

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3. Other Conditions of Employment

As for Tolbert’s allegations regarding various

incidents that occurred between 1996 and 2002, it does

not appear from the face of Tolbert’s complaint in this

suit that he intends for those allegations to represent

independent claims for relief under Title VII. This was

confirmed by Tolbert’s counsel at the pretrial conference

in this case. As such, the court considers those

allegations only in the context of Tolbert’s claims of

discriminatory discharge and failure to promote--which,

as stated, do not survive summary judgment.

B. Supplemental State-Law Claim

This court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim if ... [it] has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because summary judgment is due to

be granted on Tolbert’s Title VII claims, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

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state-law claim against B & S for intentional infliction

of emotional distress. Accordingly, the state-law claim

will be dismissed, albeit without prejudice. See United

Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27

(1966); L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 685 (11th Cir.

1995). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the applicable

statute of limitations under state law will be tolled 30

days so as to allow Tolbert time to refile that claim in

state court.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that

summary judgment should be granted in favor of B & S on

Tolbert’s Title VII claims, while his remaining state-law

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

should be dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 8th day of February, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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