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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ISABEL MORFIN; MICHAEL KOTLISKY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellants, ) 

) 

J1JN ~I 7 woo 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 89-2140 

) 

ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ) 

MARILYN DAVENPORT, Individually ) 

and as an agent for Albuquerque ) 

Public Schools; JOHN MONDRAGON, ) 

Individually and as agent for ) 

Albuquerque Public Schools; KAREN ) 

HILL, Individually and as an agent ) 

for Albuquerque Public Schools, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. CIV 86-1391 JC 

Eric Isbell-Sirotkin (Aaron Bartels with him on the brief), of 

Girard Street Legal Clinic, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gregory D. Huffaker, Jr. (David E. Brown with him on the brief), 

of the Poole Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-appellants Isabel Morfin and Michael Kotlisky appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-appellees 

Marilyn Davenport and John Mondragon. 1 The plaintiffs claim that 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

1 Karen Hill and the Albuquerque Public Schools also are named 

Appellate Case: 89-2140 Document: 01019880455 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 1 
the defendants retaliated against them for engaging in 

constitutionally protected conduct. The district court held that 

some of the conduct was not protected, and that it was not clearly 

established at the time that the remainder was protected (and 

therefore, the defendants acted within their qualified immunity). 

BACKGROUND 

When we review a summary judgment, we resolve all factual 

disputes, and draw all inferences, in favor of the party against 

whom judgment was granted. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 

899 F.2d 951, 979 (10th Cir. 1990). Viewed in this light, the 

relevant 2 facts are as follows: 

During the 1985-86 academic year, Kotlisky and Morfin, who 

are married to each other, were employed at the Sandia Base 

Elementary School ("Sandia''), which is part of the Albuquerque 

Public Schools ("APS"). Davenport was the principal of Sandia; 

as appellees. However, the plaintiffs have not appealed the 

grounds upon which the district court ruled in these defendants' 

favor. This appeal concerns only Davenport and Mondragon. 

2 There are material factual disputes regarding the defendants' 

motivation which prevent summary judgment on the grounds that the 

plaintiffs' allegedly protected conduct was not a substantial 

factor in the challenged employment decisions or that the same 

actions would have been taken anyway. See,~, Wulf v. City of 

Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1989). The evidence also 

is inconclusive on the question of whether the plaintiffs' rights, 

if any, were outweighed by the State's interest in efficient 

public services. See id. at 856. 

Therefore, summary judgment was proper only if the 

plaintiffs' conduct was not constitutionally protected (or it was 

not clearly established that the conduct was constitutionally 

protected). Facts not relating to these questions have been 

omitted. 

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Mondragon was her supervisor. The exclusive bargaining agent for 

APS staff was the American Federation of Teachers ("AFT"). 

The previous principal of Sandia had been reassigned, in part 

because of parental complaints about discipline. Mondragon 

deposition at 9. Further community interest in school discipline 

was created when the superintendent of APS announced that the 

district would adopt a new disciplinary theory. Davenport deposition at 38. 

At the beginning of the year, Davenport described to the 

staff her philosophy of discipline. Kolitsky deposition at 174. 

Kolitsky and Morfin held a different view, Kotlisky deposition at 

141, 180; Morfin deposition at 94, and complained to Sandia 

personnel, APS administrators, and Davenport herself that she had 

not set out sufficiently clear consequences for misbehavior, 

Benavidez deposition at 13; Lewis deposition at 28; Morfin deposition at 95-96; Kotlisky deposition at 187, 205-06. 

In November, Kotlisky missed a staff meeting because some 

children needed supervision. Kotlisky deposition at 403. 

Davenport was informed of his whereabouts. Id. at 411. She later 

denied knowing where he was, and she also falsely denied knowing 

that Kotlisky was a member of a counselors' advisory board, and 

periodically had to leave school to attend board meetings. Id. at 

318, 420, 429. Davenport then required Kotlisky to leave her a 

note every time he left the school grounds. Id. at 425. No one 

else had to do this. Id. at 429. Kotlisky filed a grievance with 

the AFT. Id. at 427. 

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Kotlisky filed another grievance in December, with both the 

AFT and the National Education Association ("NEA''), another teachers' union, concerning the fact that Davenport was improperly asking teachers to evaluate staff members. Id. at 319. 

In January, after Kotlisky complained to Mondragon that 

Davenport could not fairly evaluate him, the three of them met. 

Mondragon insulted Kotlisky and told him he had no right to file a 

grievance against Davenport or to question her disciplinary 

policy. Id. at 477-96. Dissatisfied with the unions' inability 

to ease the situation, Kotlisky and Morfin met with APS' employee 

relations supervisor. Id. at 506. 

Davenport called Morfin to a meeting to discuss allegedly 

insubordinate and unprofessional behavior on Morfin's part. 

Davenport affidavit at 13. Morfin conferred with an NEA 

representative. Morfin deposition at 249. 

DISCUSSION 

I • 

The plaintiffs contend that in retaliation for constitutionally protected conduct, they were subjected to substantial harassment and abuse, 3 Kotlisky was transferred to anothe~ school, and 

3 We reject the defendants' apparent position, see Brief of 

Appellees at 15-17, that only adverse employment decisions, such 

as termination, suspension, or transfer, in retaliation for 

constitutionally protected conduct are illegal. Actions short of 

an actual or constructive employment decision can in certain 

circumstances violate the First Amendment. Agosto-de-Feliciano v. 

Aponte-Rocque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1214-18 (1st Cir. 1989); Messer v. 

Curci, 881 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1989); Pieczynski v. Duffy, 875 

F.2d 1331, 1333 (7th Cir. 1989); Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 

896, 900 (2d Cir. 1988); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 & n.9 

(3d Cir. 1987); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 434 & n.16 (9th 

Cir.), modified on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987). 

But see Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 

1980). The delineation of a precise standard shall await another 

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( 

Morfin's contract ~as not renewed. 4 The defendants are entitled 

to summary judgment if the plaintiffs did not produce evidence 

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

whether the defendants committed the acts of which the plaintiffs 

complain. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Because there is 

no evidence that Mondragon had anything to do with Morfin, he is 

entitled to summary judgment as to all of her claims. Genuine 

issues of fact do exist regarding Morfin's claims against 

Davenport and Kotlisky's claims against both defendants. 

II. 

Kotlisky and Morfin claim that they were punished for 

criticizing Davenport's disciplinary policy. Public employees may 

not be retaliated against for "speech on a matter of public 

concern,'' i.e., "political, ~ocial, or other concern to the community.'' Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). To make 

this determination, we consider the content, form, and context of 

the speech. Id. at 147-48. 

day. 

4 Kotlisky also claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated by security personnel acting at Davenport's behest. 

However, the portions of the record cited in the plaintiffs' brief 

do not discuss such an incident, and nowhere else in the record 

before us is there any evidence of an unreasonable search or 

seizure. The summary judgment on this claim must therefore be 

affirmed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Apparently, the plaintiffs have failed to fulfill their duty to 

ensure that the record on appeal contains evidence supporting each 

of their claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), ll(a). 

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Generally, speech by a public school employee about a policy 

or practice which can substantially and detrimentally affect the 

welfare of the children attending the school constitutes speech on 

a matter of public concern. See Johnsen v. Independent School 

Dist. No. 3, 891 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989); Rankin v. Independent School Dist. No. I-3, 876 F.2d 838, 843 (10th Cir. 

1989); Leuthje v. Peavine School Dist., 872 F.2d 352, 355 (10th 

Cir. 1989); cf. Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 

F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) ("The allocation of aide time among 

teachers is not a matter inherently of public concern."). On the 

record before us, this is such a case. 

Public officials are protected by qualified immunity. They 

are immune unless their conduct violates rights which were 

"'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). At th~ time the actions challenged 

herein were taken, it was not clear that our decision in Schmidt 

v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 25, 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 

1977), had not "establish[ed] a~ se rule exempting statements 

made in the course of official duties from the protection of the 

First Amendment," Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1442 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988). 

"In Schmidt, this court affirmed a district court decision that statements by a high school principal to the 

board of education concerning the school's career education program and football reserved ticket sales policy 

were 'not on issues of general public concern but statements at the school on the internal affairs of the 

school system.' This court went on to say, '[the statements] were part of his official functions. These 

statements do not invoke First Amendment protection.'" 

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Id. (quoting Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 25, 558 

F.2d at 984-85). That Schmidt did not establish such a rule was 

not clearly established until 1988. See Koch v. City of 

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d at 1442; see also Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 

814 F.2d 1489, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1987) (Seth, J., dissenting) 

(citing Schmidt for the proposition that a report prepared in the 

course of an employee's official duties was not speech on a matter 

of public concern), on reh'g en bane, 847 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988); Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 

734 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Schmidt for the proposition that 

complaints about who should coach the school's women's basketball / 

team "were internal problems with which defendants were required 

to deal in their official capacities. Such matters are not of 

general public concern."). Therefore, the defendants are 

qualifiedly immune on .the plaintiffs' free speech claims. 

III. 

The First Amendment protects the right of a public employee 

to join and participate in a labor union. Smith v. Arkansas State 

Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979); Saye v. St. Vrain 

Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d at 867; Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1342 (10th Cir. 1982); Key 

v. Rutherford, 645, F.2d 880, 885 (10th Cir. 1981). Kotlisky 

contends that he was retaliated against for filing grievances with 

the AFT. Both plaintiffs contend that they were retaliated 

against for associating with the NEA. 

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The right to join and participate in a labor union prohibits 

retaliation against an employee who files a grievance with the 

union. Stellmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891, 892 (D. Conn. 

1989); Gavrilles v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 

1984); see Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d at 1316-17; Professional 

Ass'n of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College 

Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 263 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

881 (1984); Carter v. Kurzejeski, 706 F.2d 835, 837-38 (8th Cir. 

1983); Columbus Educ. Ass'n v. Columbus City School Dist., 623 

F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park, 

643 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 1986), modified on other 

grounds, 831 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1987). 

The defendants contend that the unconstitutionality of 

retaliating against a grieving employee was not clearly 

established. We disagree. The unconstitutionality of retaliating 

against an employee for participating in a union was clearly 

established, and that right would be ''meaningless" if an employee 

could be punished for filing a grievance. Carter v. Kurzejeski, 

706 F.2d at 838. The ''contours of the right," Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640, to engage. in union activities free of 

retaliation clearly included filing a grievance. Gavrilles v. 

O'Connor, 611 F. Supp. 210, 211 (D. Mass. 1985) ("The impermissibility of retaliating against an employee for engaging in union 

activities was clearly established by 1982. Insofar as the filing 

and processing of grievances is a legitimate union pursuit, I rule 

that defendants reasonably should have known that retaliation for 

participating in that activity is constitutionally prohibited."). 

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A public employee's First Amendment rights also include "the 

right ..• to associate with the union of [his or her] choice," 

even one other than the exclusive bargaining agent. Missouri 

Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. New Madrid County R-1 Enlarged School Dist., 

810 F.2d 164, 166-67 (8th Cir. 1987); see Brown~ Alexander, 718 

F.2d 1417, 1429 (6th Cir. 1983); Alabama State Fed'n of Teachers 

v. James, 656 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981); 

Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 277-78 (8th Cir. 1978); Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 

F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 

460 (7th Cir. 1972) ("there is no reason to distinguish a union 

from any other association"). 

The right to associate with a union other than the exclusive 

bargaining agent also follows from the right to participate in 

union activities, though perhaps not as ineluctably as the right 

to file a grievance. In the absence of contemporary Tenth Circuit 

precedent directly concerning the issue, we may look to the law of 

other circuits when deciding whether or not a right was clearly 

established. See Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657-58 

(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). We hold that 

the plaintiffs' right to associate with the NEA was clearly 

established during the period in question. Consequently, the 

defendants were not qualifiedly immune. 

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IV. 

Morfin claims that she was retaliated against for her association with Kotlisky. 

First, relying upon our decision in Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 

1370 (10th Cir. 1981), she argues that she exercised a First 

Amendment right to associate with Kotlisky in support of his First 

Amendment activities when she accompanied him when he met, at different times, with an AFT representative and with APS's employee 

relations supervisor. Owens v. Rush involved a couple who both 

were employed by the county sheriff's department. The husband was 

fired after he accompanied his wife to her attorney's office and 

assisted her in the preparation of a Title VII complaint against 

the department. Id. at 1378-79. Leaving aside the question of 

whether or not the decision applies solely to associating with 

another in the preparation of litigation, we hold that Morfin's 

cl~im fails because she has not asserted that she actually assisted Kotlisky's pursuit of his complaints. Merely showing one's 

support is not sufficient. Copp v. Unified School Dist. No. 501, 

882 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Second, Morfin contends that Davenport acted against her 

because of the acrimony between Davenport and Kotlisky. The 

marital relationship is protected from unreasonable governmental 

interference. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 

(1984); ~ Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-36 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Actions taken by a public 

official against a public employee because of animosity for the 

employee's spouse can in certain circumstances, cf. note 3, supra, 

unconstitutionally burden the marriage relationship. Newborn v. 

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Morrison, 440 F. Supp. 623, 626-27 (S.D. Ill. 1977); cf. 

Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986); Hughes v. Lipscher, 720 F. Supp. 

454, 459-61 (D.N.J. 1989); Hall v. Board of Educ., 639 F. Supp. 

501, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See generally Hameetman v. City of 

Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1985). 

A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of 

intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to 

interfere with the relationship. Trujillo v. Board of County 

Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985). Davenport argues 

that Morfin failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether this association had any effect upon Davenport's 

actions. 

As we noted earlier, note 2, supra, there exist factual 

disputes regarding the defendants' motivation. This is no exception. Specifically, there was uncontradicted evidence that, following his transfer, Kotlisky was warned by several administrators 

that Morfin would be unprotected from Davenport's. 

"vindictive[ness]" unless she also transferred. Kotlisky deposition at 14. This evidence creates a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Davenport acted adversely to Morfin because of 

Morfin's association with Kotlisky. Cf. Hall v. Board of Educ., 

639 F. Supp. at 508-09. Summary judgment was not appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

Mondragon was entitled to summary judgment on all of Morfin's 

claims. Both defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the 

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plaintiffs' free speech claims. Neither defendant was entitled to 

summary judgment on Kotlisky's union association claims. 

Davenport was not entitled to summary judgment on Morfin's union 

association claim. She was entitled to summary judgment on 

Kotlisky's Fourth Amendment claim and Morfin's First Amendment 

association claim, but not on Morfin's marital association claim. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and 

REMANDED in part for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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