Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-04985/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-04985-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 11-cv-04985-JST (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 by petitioner Robert Young, challenging the validity of a judgment obtained 

against him in state court. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, and petitioner has filed 

a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 17, 1990, in a capital case trial, an Alameda County Superior Court jury found 

petitioner guilty of three counts of first degree murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187 (counts 1, 5, and 8), 

two counts of robbery, id. at § 211 (counts 2 and 7), two counts of attempted murder, id. at 

§§ 664/187 (counts 3 and 6), and one count of attempted robbery, id. at §§ 664/211 (count 4). The 

jury found true the enhancement allegations that petitioner personally used a firearm during the 

commission of each crime, id. at §§ 1203.06, 12022.5, and found true the enhancement allegations 

attendant to the count 2 robbery and count 3 attempted murder that petitioner inflicted great bodily 

injury upon his victim, id. at §§ 1203.075, 12022.7. The jury additionally found true the robberymurder special circumstance allegation charged attendant to the count 1 and count 5 murders, id.

at § 190.2(a)(17)(i) (now (a)(17)(A)), and lastly found the multiple-murder special circumstance 

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allegation true as well, id. at § 190.2(a)(3)). Ex. A at 992-99, 1006-15; Ex. B at 3719-26.1

Petitioner subsequently admitted the truth of a prior-conviction allegation. Ex. A at 1022; Ex. B at 

3728-30.

On November 8, 1990, the jury returned its penalty-phase verdict against petitioner, fixing 

his punishment at death. Ex. A at 1067; Ex. B at 4103-04.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court sentenced petitioner to death on the count 1 and 

count 5 first degree murder convictions, and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility 

of parole on the count 8 first degree murder conviction. With respect to the remaining convictions 

and enhancements the trial court imposed a 45-year determinate state prison sentence, but ordered 

that sentence stayed under Cal. Penal Code § 654. Ex. A at 1088-93; Ex. B at 4135-40.

Petitioner's automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court proceeded. Petitioner filed 

his Appellant's Opening Brief on April 13, 2001, Ex. C, the People of the State of California filed 

their Respondent's Brief on October 1, 2001, Ex. D, and petitioner subsequently filed his

Appellant's Reply Brief, Ex. E. Petitioner made 11 attacks on the guilt-phase judgment against 

him in his briefing, including claims of insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and 

instructional error. Exs. C, E. Petitioner also made numerous attacks on the death judgment 

against him. Id.

On April 23, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, again making allegations attacking the guilt-phase judgment against him, 

including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and some of the claims he had raised on 

direct appeal. Ex. F. In his state habeas application petitioner also attacked the penalty-phase 

judgment against him, and argued therein that he had established a prima facie case that he was

mentally retarded. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the execution of a 

mentally retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment)).

On December 30, 2003, with respect to petitioner's state habeas application, the People of 

the State of California filed an Informal Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 

 

1 All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by respondent in support of the 

answer, unless otherwise indicated.

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California Supreme Court. Ex. G.

On January 31, 2005, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in petitioner's direct 

appeal, rejecting all of his assignments of error and affirming both the guilt and death judgments 

against him. Ex. H; People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149 (2005).

On February 2, 2005, in the California Supreme Court, petitioner filed a Reply to Informal 

Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Ex. I.

On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court, seeking discretionary review of the California Supreme Court's decision on direct 

appeal. Ex. J. On October 3, 2005, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Young v. 

California, 546 U.S. 833 (2005).

On October 11, 2006, the California Supreme Court issued the following order in 

petitioner's state habeas proceeding:

Each request for judicial notice is denied. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th

238, 268, fn. 6.) The Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is

ordered to show cause in the Alameda County Superior Court, when the matter is

placed on calendar, why petitioner's death sentence should not be vacated and

petitioner sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the

ground that he is mentally retarded within the meaning of Atkins v. Virginia[,] [] 536

U.S. 304, as alleged in Claim XIII of the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed April

23, 2003. (See In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40.) The return is to be filed on or

before November 9, 2006. All other claims set forth in the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus are denied. Each claim is denied on the merits. Except insofar as they allege

ineffective assistance of counsel as a substantive basis for relief, the following claims

are additionally barred to the extent they were raised and rejected on appeal (In re

Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 825, 829-841; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218,

225): claims II, IV, V, and XXI. Kennard, J., is of the opinion an order to show

cause should be issued as to claims XV and XIX.

Ex. K.

On October 8, 2010, the Alameda County Superior Court issued an order granting

petitioner habeas corpus relief vacating his death sentence. The court found that petitioner had

sustained his burden of proof that he is mentally retarded. The court then resentenced petitioner

to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on counts 1 and 5. Ex. L.

On October 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court,

raising 20 claims of federal constitutional error. Docket No. 1. These attacks on his convictions

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are ones he raised on direct appeal in state court, on state habeas, or both.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following background facts describing the crime and evidence presented at trial are 

from the opinion of the California Supreme Court on direct appeal:

2

1. The Attempted Murder and Robbery of Manzine Miller and the Murder of Terry 

Rivers

In the early morning hours of January 30, 1989, Manzine Miller and Terry Rivers were 

selling rock cocaine in front of Miller's house on East 24th Street in Oakland (Miller's 

house). Around 2:30 a.m., Miller observed a black-over-green Ford turn onto Highland 

Avenue from East 24th Street and park. Moments later, defendant and another man 

walked from Highland Avenue and approached Miller. Defendant told Miller he wanted to 

purchase $50 worth of rock cocaine. Miller indicated to defendant that he could sell him 

the drug, but would have to get it from his supplier. Defendant told his companion to 

watch the street and then followed Miller along a pathway through a nearby vacant lot 

known as the "swamp," towards Miller's supplier. As they walked, defendant pulled out a 

gun, told Miller to get on his knees, and robbed him of the rock cocaine he had in his 

pocket. As Miller begged defendant not to shoot him, defendant shot him above his right 

hip. Miller survived the gunshot wound and watched defendant walk back towards his 

(Miller's) house. Miller heard three gunshots shortly after defendant left. When the police 

arrived at Miller's house, they found the body of Terry Rivers lying across the front 

entryway.

2. Murder of Glen Frazier and Attempted Robbery of Melva Fite

Sometime after 2:00 a.m. on January 30, 1989, on 89th Avenue in Oakland, defendant 

exited a vehicle and approached Melva Fite and Glen Frazier as they talked with Frazier's 

cousin, Ricky Smith. Defendant suddenly began shooting at Smith. Smith ran to a house, 

and Fite and Frazier ran up 89th Avenue. Defendant followed Fite and Frazier in his 

vehicle. Defendant's cousin, Patrick Jackson, was riding in the front passenger seat. When 

defendant caught up with Fite and Frazier near the intersection of 90th Avenue and Cherry 

Street, he exited the vehicle and demanded their money. Frazier told defendant they did 

not have anything. Defendant then accused Frazier of previously robbing him. Frazier 

replied that he did not know defendant. As he and Fite crouched down on their knees, they 

begged defendant not to shoot. Defendant told Fite to run, and moments later, Fite heard 

two shots fired. She saw Frazier slump to the ground. Frazier died later that morning from 

a gunshot wound to his lower back. 

//

 

2

This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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3. Murder of Sylvester Davis; Attempted Murder of Luther Thomas; Robbery of Gerald 

Livingston

In the early morning hours of February 19, 1989, defendant crashed through the living 

room window of a "crack house" on 74th Avenue (74th Avenue house). Luther Thomas, 

Veronica Robinson, Joseph Lee Batiste, Gerald Livingston, Veronica Hackett, and 

Sylvester Davis were present in the house. Defendant immediately began shooting at 

Thomas, the "doorman," as he ran towards the kitchen. Thomas suffered a gunshot wound 

to his forearm and escaped from the house. During the commotion, Davis left the 

northwest bedroom, and entered the southwest bedroom where he jumped out of the 

window. Robinson, who had been hiding in the closet, followed Davis out of the window. 

Meanwhile, defendant entered the northwest bedroom and robbed Livingston of $40. 

Defendant then left the bedroom and entered the southwest bedroom. Livingston heard the 

sound of a window breaking, followed by three gunshots. Within minutes after the 

shooting stopped, defendant entered the northwest bedroom, looked at Livingston, and 

then left the house through the front door. Outside, Robinson had crawled toward the front 

of the house while Davis had crawled toward the rear of the house. Robinson heard Davis 

say, "Oh, they going to kill me" and another gunshot. Shortly after defendant left the 

house, Livingston went to the front door and looked out. He saw defendant standing on 

the sidewalk and heard Davis moaning in pain. A vehicle pulled up in front of the house as 

Livingston went back into the house. 

4. Ballistics Evidence

Chester Young, a retired ballistics expert formerly employed by the Oakland Police 

Department, analyzed six bullets recovered from the three crime scenes in this case: the 

three bullets recovered from each of the bodies of Miller, Rivers, and Frazier; a bullet 

recovered from the living room wall at Miller's house; and two bullets recovered from the 

74th Avenue house. Young explained to the jury that two bullets are declared "a positive 

match" when they share a particular number and type of identification characteristics. 

When the bullets do not share common identification characteristics, the presence of a 

"pseudo land impression," a very rare mark that is caused by a defect in the gun, very 

strongly suggests that the bullets were fired from the same gun. Based on his analyses, 

Young concluded that because all six bullets had one or two pseudo land impressions, 

there was a "very strong" likelihood that all of the bullets were fired from the same gun. 

That gun was never recovered.

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149, 1166-68 (2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. 

Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

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A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 

constitutional error at issue "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

"applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases," or if it 

"confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06. "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal 

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously 

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court's 

jurisprudence. "[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). "A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view 

different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous." 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

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Here, the California Supreme Court, in its opinion on direct review, addressed nine of the 

claims petitioner raises in the instant petition. The California Supreme Court thus was the highest 

court to have reviewed the claims in a reasoned decision, and, as to those claims, it is the 

California Supreme Court's decision that this Court reviews herein. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005).3 The 

remaining claims were presented to the California Supreme Court only in petitioner's state petition 

for writ of habeas corpus, which was summarily denied as to all claims other than the claim that 

petitioner's death sentence should be vacated on the ground that he is mentally retarded. When 

presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a 

federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state 

court decision is objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This "[i]ndependent review . . . is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the 

only method by which [a federal court] can determine whether a silent state court decision is 

objectively unreasonable." See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). "Where a 

state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must 

be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." See

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

B. Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner raises twenty claims for federal habeas relief in his petition. The claims are most 

sensibly addressed in the following order, with the original enumeration shown in parentheses: 

1) prosecutorial misconduct during jury selection (claim 3); 2) selective prosecution (claim 2); 

3) prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument (claim 4); 4) prosecutorial misconduct in 

presenting "false and misleading evidence" (claim 5); 5) prosecutorial misconduct in failing to 

disclose exculpatory evidence (claim 6); 6) ineffective assistance of counsel during guilt-phase 

investigation (claim 7); 7) ineffective assistance of counsel during guilt-phase performance (claim 

8); 8) ineffective assistance of counsel in investigating and presenting mental health evidence 

 

3

 The one exception is petitioner's Wheeler/Batson claim, to which the Court applies de novo 

review, as discussed below. See discussion at III.B.1, ante.

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(claim 9); 9) improper rebuttal (claim 10); 10) insufficient evidence as to count 1 (claim 11); 

11) insufficient evidence as to count 5 (claim 12); 12) jury misconduct (claim 13); 

13) instructional error in court's limiting of instructions (claim 14); 14) instructional error 

regarding robbery-murder special circumstance (claim 15); 15) false and unreliable ballistics 

evidence (claim 16); 16) actual innocence (claims 17-19); 17) missing record (claim 1); and 

18) cumulative error (claim 20). 

1. Jury Selection

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove from the jury pool 

all of the African-American women.4 The parties do not dispute the California Supreme Court's 

description of the relevant trial court proceedings, as follows:

During jury selection, and after the prosecutor exercised his ninth peremptory challenge, 

defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to strike 

all of the African-American female prospective jurors from the jury panel—namely, D.D., 

V.S., and B.W.4 He added that two African-American male prospective jurors were seated 

on the panel. The trial court indicated it was not, at that time, finding a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Counsel then noted for the record that "all of the black women called into 

the jury box at this time have been excused by the prosecution." The parties proceeded to 

use their remaining peremptory challenges and ultimately selected a jury and four 

alternates. Three African-American males were among the jurors selected.

Fn 4: Although defendant initially identified B.W. as one of the prospective jurors 

against whom the prosecutor discriminated, defendant now concedes that the 

prosecutor "may have had a legitimate basis for exercising a peremptory challenge"

against this prospective juror given her apparent difficulty with accepting the 

testimony of drug users as credible evidence, and given many of the prosecution's 

percipient witnesses were drug users. Therefore, our analysis is limited to whether 

defendant stated a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination only as to 

Prospective Jurors D.D. and V. S.

Thereafter, out of the jury's presence, the trial court addressed defendant's Wheeler motion. 

It identified the African–American female prospective jurors by name (D.D. and V.S.), 

noted they were members of two cognizable groups, i.e., women and African-Americans, 

and then ruled that the defense had not made a prima facie case of discrimination.

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1171-72.

a. Equal Protection Standard

The use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defense to exclude 

 

4

Petitioner is an African-American male.

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cognizable groups from a jury may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Georgia v. 

McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992). The Supreme Court first held that the Equal Protection 

Clause forbids the challenging of potential jurors solely on account of their race, see Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), and later extended this protection to challenges solely based on 

gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-43 (1994)).5 Batson permits prompt 

rulings on objections to peremptory challenges under a three-step process: (1) the defendant must 

make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of 

race (or gender) "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 

discriminatory purpose;" (2) if the prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 

articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question; and (3) if the prosecutor 

carries the burden of showing a race-neutral explanation, the defendant has the burden to prove 

purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 97-98. A party establishes a prima facie 

equal protection violation based on race by showing that: (1) the defendant is a member of a 

cognizable racial group, (2) the group's members have been excluded from the jury, and (3) the 

circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. Batson, 476 

U.S. at 96. 

b. Standard of Review 

Here, petitioner challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes by way of a motion 

under People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280 (1978). The trial court denied the motion because it 

found, relying on Wheeler, no prima facie case of racial discrimination. The Wheeler motion 

procedure used by California courts does not satisfy the constitutional requirement laid down for 

the first step of Batson, however. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); Wade v. 

Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). California courts have routinely imposed the more 

stringent requirement that the defendant "show a strong likelihood," Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 

rather than merely "raise an inference," Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, that the prosecutor had excluded 

venire members from the petit jury on account of their race. Wade, 202 F.3d at 1196-97. Because 

 

5

The California counterpart to Batson is People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978).

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California courts using the Wheeler procedure have not applied federal law as clearly established 

by the United States Supreme Court, a federal habeas court need not defer to the California court's 

findings as it would otherwise be required to do under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Wade, 202 F.3d at 

1197. 

In People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 4th 1302 (2003), the California Supreme Court attempted to 

rectify the situation by concluding that "Wheeler's terms 'strong likelihood' and 'reasonable 

inference' state the same standard"—one that is entirely consistent with Batson. 30 Cal. 4th at 

1313. Batson, the state high court held, "permits a court to require the objector to present, not 

merely 'some evidence' permitting the inference, but 'strong evidence' that makes discriminatory

intent more likely than not if the challenges are not explained." Id. at 1316 (emphasis added). The 

Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, and made clear that "California's 'more likely than 

not' standard is at odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson." Johnson v. California, 

545 U.S. at 173. To satisfy Batson's first step, a defendant need not persuade the judge that the 

challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination; rather, he need only 

produce evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 

occurred. Id. at 171. Accordingly, federal habeas courts should continue to apply Wade's de novo 

review requirement whenever state courts use the "strong likelihood"/"more likely than not"

standard, as these courts are applying a lower standard of scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the 

federal constitution permits. Accord Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(applying de novo review where state court applied "strong likelihood" standard); Cooperwood v. 

Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).

Here, the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that petitioner had not 

established a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the prosecutor. The California Supreme 

Court's decision was announced after the United States Supreme Court had granted a petition for a 

writ of certiorari, but before it had announced its decision in Johnson v. California. Consequently, 

the California Supreme Court applied California's "strong likelihood"/"more likely than not"

standard in finding that petitioner had not made a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson. 

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1172. As that is the wrong standard, pursuant to Wade, this Court will 

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review de novo the California Supreme Court's finding of no prima facie case of discrimination.6

c. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that while Batson prohibits discrimination based 

on race or gender, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 

combination of race and gender, such as "black males," may establish a cognizable group for 

Batson purposes. Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other 

grounds, Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). See also United States v. 

Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987) (holding Batson

does not apply to claims based on "black men" or "black women"). Thus, this Court limits its 

inquiry to whether petitioner has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson, 

without regard to gender.7

Here, the first and second elements of the Batson prima facie case of discrimination are 

met because the prospective jurors are African-American and the prosecutor used peremptory 

strikes to remove them. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The issue is whether the third element is met, 

namely whether the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the challenges were based on 

race. See id.

In Batson, the Supreme Court noted that, in "'deciding whether the defendant has made the 

requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances,' and noted that a 

'prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his 

challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose.'" Williams v. Runnels, 

432 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97). The Supreme Court 

reiterated in Johnson that "a defendant may rely on 'any other relevant circumstances' to raise an 

 

6 Respondent correctly points out that, in footnote 6 of its order, the California Supreme Court 

acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had granted cert in People v. Johnson and 

made clear that the exact test was not critical to its resolution because "the facts here do not give 

rise to any reasonable inference of discriminatory purpose." People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1172 

n.6 (emphasis added). Thus there is support for respondent's argument that the California 

Supreme Court used the appropriate standard, making its opinion entitled to AEDPA deference. 

See Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006). This Court will nonetheless review 

the state court's findings de novo.

7

In his petition, petitioner does not appear to claim that women generally improperly were 

excluded from the jury.

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inference of discriminatory purpose." Id. (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170). 

In assessing "all relevant circumstances" surrounding challenged peremptory strikes, for 

purposes of determining whether there is an inference of discrimination under Batson, "Supreme 

Court precedent requires a comparative juror analysis." Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1149

(9th Cir. 2006). Comparative juror analysis involves determining whether non-challenged jurors 

possess any of the characteristics on which the prosecution challenged jurors in the protected 

group. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 482-83 (2008); Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1150. Contrary to 

the view of the California courts, comparative juror analysis should take place on appeal even 

when the trial court did not engage in such analysis.8 Id. at 1148-50. 

In his petition, petitioner does not challenge the prosecution's decision to strike B.W. 

Indeed, on direct appeal, petitioner ultimately conceded that the prosecutor may have had a 

legitimate basis for excusing B.W., "given her apparent difficulty with accepting the testimony of 

drug dealers as credible evidence, and given many of the prosecution's percipient witnesses were 

drug dealers." Ex. H at 9, n.4. Petitioner contends, however, that the prosecutor's decision to 

strike D.D. and V.S. was based on unconstitutional considerations. Petition at 63-65. The record 

does not support this contention, however, as it reveals unique qualities of D.D.'s and V.S.'s 

answers to the jury questionnaires and voir dire that provide race-neutral reasons for striking them. 

As to D.D., the prosecutor learned that D.D. had worked with his office and with law 

enforcement on sexual assault cases. Ex. B. at 1304, 2307-08. The prosecutor explained that he 

had spoken with colleagues from his office and learned that they held the opinion that D.D. had "a 

difficult time perceiving the truth" and that she had exaggerated her own credentials or 

qualifications. See id. As the California Supreme Court further found, D.D. worked as a 

therapist, and the prosecutor may have reasonably believed that D.D. would have difficulty setting 

aside her own expertise as a therapist in evaluating the evidence, particularly the penalty phase 

evidence pertaining to extreme mental disturbance or emotional illness. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 

 

8 On this point, the Ninth Circuit in Boyd amended its earlier opinion which had held to the 

contrary. Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1144 (citing Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008,1013 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

In this case, the California Supreme Court did not conduct a comparative juror analysis, though it 

did find race-neutral reasons for striking D.D. and V.S. See People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1174.

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1174. Finally, D.D. stated in voir dire that she believed one explanation for the increase in crime 

is an "increase in the double standard of our governmental system." Ex. A at 6913; Ex. B at 1294. 

And when asked in voir dire, "But you indicated there is no reason why you couldn't be a fair and 

impartial juror after evaluating all the evidence in this case?," D.D. answered "I don't know." Ex. 

B at 1306. Although these distinctive aspects of D.D.'s answers are not conclusive that she would 

not have been a good juror, the Court is mindful that at the voir dire stage lawyers are only making 

their best guess at how a prospective juror may act, and D.D.'s answers certainly provide a raceneutral basis for the perception that she might not have been impartial. No other jurors gave an 

anti-government explanation for the increase in crime. See United States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 

913-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding it permissible and race neutral to challenge a juror based on his 

opinions of the criminal justice system, even where the opinion is that the system is racist). Nor 

did any other jurors have a therapy background or experience working with the district attorney's 

office. See Mayes v. Premo, 766 F.3d 949, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding trial court's acceptance 

of prosecutor's background checks was not an objectively unreasonable application of Batson). As 

a result, a comparative juror analysis does not raise an inference of discrimination as to D.D. 

As to V.S., the prosecutor explained that she worked for the California State Automobile 

Association where she assisted insurance defense lawyers. Ex. B at 2308. The prosecutor felt that 

this made V.S. more likely to identify with the defense team. Id. The record supports this 

explanation. As summarized by the California Supreme Court:

Regarding Prospective Juror V. S., the prosecutor reasonably might have challenged her 

because of her experience as an insurance claims specialist. V.S. disclosed she assisted 

defense attorneys in preparation for litigation and arbitration. In response to questioning, 

she indicated she sometimes took an active role in the process. Although V.S. stated she 

might not speak up in settlement conferences or negotiations "[i]f our defense attorney is a 

strong attorney and he doesn't need my input," she said she would "have something to say"

if the attorney "doesn't put forth something that I think is essential to evaluating the claim 

and helping the judge make a decision as to, you know, what is fair or in helping the 

judge." In light of these voir dire responses, the prosecutor might reasonably have 

challenged V.S. on the basis that she might be overly defense oriented in evaluating and 

deliberating the charges against defendant.

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1174. Finally, the prosecutor also noted that V.S. was pregnant and 

expressed his opinion that someone who is "bearing new life" might "find it very difficult to 

exterminate someone else's life." Ex. B at 2308. Again, there is nothing in the record showing 

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that other jurors similarly situated to V.S. were permitted to remain on the jury. There were no 

other jurors, for example, who reported that they worked in defense litigation or who reported that 

they were pregnant at the time of jury selection. A comparative juror analysis does not raise an 

inference of discrimination.

9

 

In sum, the record in this case does not create an inference of discrimination in the 

prosecutor's peremptory challenges to three African-American female prospective jurors. The 

prosecutor did not strike all of the African-American or women venirepersons; the state courts 

found race-neutral reasons for striking the prospective jurors at issue; this was not a case that 

involved gender or race discrimination10; and a comparative juror analysis does not raise an 

inference of discrimination. As a result, petitioner has not established a prima facie case of 

discrimination under the first step of the Batson analysis.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Selective Prosecution

Petitioner claims the prosecution and trial were "permeated with racial bias and 

discrimination," which the Court construes as a claim for selective prosecution. Petition at 47-59. 

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court only in his state habeas petition, 

which was summarily denied on the merits. Ex. F at 18-40.

Although the decision whether to prosecute and what charges to bring generally rests 

entirely in the prosecutor's discretion, this discretion is subject to constitutional constraints. 

 

9

The Court notes that petitioner also attempts to support his Wheeler/Batson claim based on the 

prosecutor's treatment of similarly situated venirepersons in other cases. Petitioner made the same 

claim in his state habeas petition, which was summarily denied on the merits. The United States 

Supreme Court has never held that one of the relevant circumstances in determining whether there 

existed an inference of discriminatory purpose in a prosecutor's peremptory challenges in a 

particular case is how he or she conducted voir dire in other cases. Petitioner cites to no case law, 

nor is the Court aware of any, in which evidence of jury selection in unrelated cases was used to 

find a Batson violation. Thus, the state court's decision here cannot be contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Carey v. Musladin, 

549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). In any event, petitioner does not point to any other case in which the 

prosecutor here was found by the trial judge to have violated Wheeler/Batson. Thus, the state 

court had reasonable grounds to deny this claim.

10 Cf. Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1996) (insufficient prima facie case for 

exclusion based on sexual orientation where neither sexual orientation nor other discrimination 

was at issue in case and there were neutral reasons for challenge). 

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United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). One of these constraints is that the 

prosecutorial decision may not violate equal protection by resting on "'an unjustifiable standard 

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Id. Courts presume that prosecutors have 

properly discharged their official duties. Id. In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor 

has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present "'clear evidence to the 

contrary.'" Id. A prosecutor's charging decision cannot be judicially reviewed absent a prima 

facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis, such as gender, race, or denial of a 

constitutional right. United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992).

To establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution, the claimant must show that the 

prosecutorial policy (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) was motivated by a discriminatory 

purpose. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. In order to establish a discriminatory effect, the claimant 

must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. See id. The 

fact that he is part of a protected class does not alone provide a colorable basis for believing that a 

selection has taken place; nor would evidence that other members of the protected class were 

prosecuted. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705-08 (1989), superseded by statute on 

other grounds, P.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, as stated in Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 

(9th Cir. 2009).

Petitioner supports his claim by pointing to declarations submitted by two Alameda 

County public defenders, Charles Denton and Michael Ogul, in the 1994 capital case of People v. 

Johnny Lee Barnes, Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. 103157. Ex. 103 to Ex. F. The 

Court has reviewed the declarations. The Denton declaration offers evidence of Alameda County 

murder cases involving non-African-American defendants in which the prosecutor chose not to 

seek death at the penalty phase. The declaration, and the cases discussed therein, are offered in 

support of petitioner's argument that the prosecution was racially motivated in bringing capital 

charges. As discussed above, petitioner's death sentence has been vacated, and thus, this is no 

longer a capital case. Petitioner's argument that the sentencing charges were discriminatory is 

therefore moot.

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The Ogul declaration offers evidence of Alameda County murder cases involving nonAfrican-American defendants in which special circumstances were either filed or could have been 

filed but the defendants were either not prosecuted for any special circumstances or the 

prosecution agreed to a disposition that did not result in the finding of any special circumstances. 

The Ogul declaration lists and describes nine cases, as follows:

Luis Chavez [ASC #H-14646], a Hispanic or Asian male was charged with murder with 

special circumstances. Although he had previously suffered two prior convictions for 

murder, the Alameda County District Attorney's Office allowed him to plead guilty to 

second degree murder without any special circumstances.

David Misch [ASC #H-13958], a white male, was charged with murder and ultimately pled 

to second degree murder, although he was arrested for murder and violation of Vehicle 

Code section 1085, the evidence demonstrated probable cause to believe that a robbery 

special circumstance was true, and he had suffered at least three prior felony convictions in 

proceedings brought and tried separately.

Amalie Cooper [ASC #110025], a female, was charged with murder but pled guilty to 

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense although the evidence disclosed that she took 

the defendant's wallet during the commission of the homicide, thereby demonstrating 

probable cause to believe the truth of a robbery special circumstance; moreover, Ms. 

Cooper had a substantial record of previous criminal offenses.

John Jaco [ASC #H-16129A], a Hispanic male was allowed to plead guilty to second

degree murder although the evidence demonstrated probable cause to believe that the 

murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, thereby supporting a robbery special 

circumstance, and despite the fact that he had previously suffered three felony convictions 

in separate proceedings, including a prior conviction for manslaughter.

Edwin Pauley [ASC #89786], pled guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a negotiated 

disposition with the Alameda County District Attorney's Office. He was originally 

charged with murder, robbery, and a robbery-murder special circumstance.

Hal Haydon [ASC #95433] was charged with murder and one robbery-murder special 

circumstance but was allowed to plead guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a 

negotiated disposition with the Alameda County District Attorney's Office.

Joey Lockett, aka Mohammed Akmad [ASC #109424], was found guilty of first degree 

murder after a jury trial. The jury had specifically been instructed on first degree felony 

murder during the commission of a robbery. Although the evidence patently demonstrated 

probable cause to believe the truth of a robbery special circumstance, no special 

circumstance was charged—despite the fact that Mr. Lockett had suffered at least one prior 

felony conviction.

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Michael Horton [ASC #101599] was charged and convicted of first degree murder on a 

felony (robbery) murder theory. The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed his conviction 

for instructional error, but specifically ruled that the felony murder instruction was proper 

and that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction on that theory. Nevertheless, 

Mr. Horton was never charged with any special circumstance.

James Hollister, Charles Ellis, and Caleb Ellis are currently charged with murder in 

Alameda County Superior Court [ASC #109256A, 10956B, and 109256C]. Although the 

evidence demonstrates probable cause to believe the truth of robbery or kidnapping murder 

special circumstances, none of the defendants is charged with any special circumstance.

Ex. 103 to Ex. F. Petitioner uses this declaration to support his argument that the prosecutor in his 

case charged petitioner with special circumstances when similarly situated non-African-American 

defendants were not so charged. 

As an initial matter, the Ogul declaration concedes that special circumstances were in fact 

charged in three of the above nine cases and is silent as to whether special circumstances were 

charged as to another three of these cases. Thus only the last three of the listed cases, in which

Ogul is clear that no special circumstances were charged, can be considered as support for 

petitioner's differential charging claim. Three cases is not a large enough sample size to find 

differential charging.

In any event, the Court does not agree that the facts of these nine cases, as represented by 

Ogul, are more serious than the facts in the underlying case. To reiterate, the evidence here shows 

that petitioner embarked on a heinous crime spree that covered two days and three locations and 

resulted in two robberies, two attempted murders causing serious bodily injury, and three murders 

performed via point-blank shootings. Petitioner has not shown that the crimes committed in the 

nine above-listed cases were similar in seriousness, such that the prosecutor's decision to charge

petitioner with robbery-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances was based on 

petitioner's race. Thus, the state court had reasonable grounds to deny this claim.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.11

 

11 Although petitioner's claim is that his whole trial was "permeated" with racism, the main 

evidence he uses to support this claim comes from other cases. Regarding petitioner's allegations 

of racism in the underlying trial, the Court has addressed his claim of racist jury selection above 

and will address his claim of juror racial bias below.

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3. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument

Petitioner claims several instances of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in several different comments he 

made during the guilt phase portion of the trial, and that, singly or cumulatively, this misconduct 

amounted to a due process violation. Petition at 66-83. Petitioner also contends that the 

prosecutor committed numerous acts of misconduct at the penalty phase, rendering his death 

sentence unconstitutional. See id. at 66, 80-81, 83-94. Given that petitioner is no longer subject 

to a death sentence, having been granted habeas relief in state court, the Court will not address his 

penalty phase allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.12

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus; "the appropriate standard 

of review for such a claim . . . is the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of 

supervisory power." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a 

trial fundamentally unfair. Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (noting, "the 

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of 

the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor"). Under Darden, the first issue is whether the 

prosecutor's remarks were improper; if so, the next question is whether such conduct "infected the 

trial with unfairness." Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). A prosecutorial 

misconduct claim is decided by "examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the 

prosecutor's remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

With respect to the guilt-phase allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, petitioner 

specifically alleges that the prosecutor: (1) engaged in a pattern of attacks on defense counsel's 

honesty and integrity, Petition at 68-77; (2) engaged in a pattern and practice of denigrating 

 

12 Indeed, petitioner appears to concede in his Traverse that the penalty phase allegations were not 

intended as separate claims but rather as "additional support" for his other prosecutorial 

misconduct claims. Traverse at 27.

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petitioner, id. at 77-78; and (3) argued "false 'facts' not in evidence," id. at 78-83. Respondent 

argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted, and, even if it were addressed on its merits, it must 

be denied. 

a. Procedural Default

The state appellate court determined that petitioner had waived all three claims:

Defendant claims the prosecutor engaged in numerous acts of misconduct during closing 

arguments in the guilt phase. Except as noted below, defense counsel failed to request an 

assignment of misconduct or an admonition, or both, as to each asserted claim of 

misconduct. Defendant concedes we have held that, in general, failure to request an 

assignment of misconduct and an admonition forfeits a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

on appeal unless an objection or request for admonition would have been futile or an 

admonition would not have cured the harm. (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 

1001, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) He contends the trial court's responses to 

defendant's objections during summation and rebuttal suggested any objection or request 

for an admonition would have been futile. Citing our decision in Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 

pages 820–821, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, defendant also argues he should be 

excused from the legal obligation to object to prosecutorial misconduct because the 

prosecutor's summation was "so poisonous" that repeated objections by counsel would 

have risked angering the court or the jurors. 

Defendant, however, fails to show that any of these exceptions applies to any of his 

failures to object. We therefore conclude that defendant has forfeited each claim of 

misconduct.

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1188.

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the 

decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate 

to support the judgment. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In cases in 

which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent 

and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred. See id. at 750. 

The rule cited here by the Court of Appeal, specifically, that a defendant must make a 

contemporaneous objection at trial in order to preserve an issue on appeal, has been found to be a 

sufficiently independent and adequate procedural rule to support the denial of a federal petition on 

grounds of procedural default. See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(finding claim procedurally defaulted based on California's contemporaneous objection rules). 

The claim is therefore procedurally defaulted.

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b. Merits Analysis

Although the California Supreme Court found that the prosecutorial misconduct claims 

were procedurally waived, it also found that the claims failed on the merits. In each instance, it 

found that either the prosecutor did not commit misconduct or that any misconduct he did commit 

was harmless even absent admonition. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1188-98. Given the length of the 

state court's discussion, this Court will not repeat it here. This Court has reviewed the state court's 

analysis and finds that its basis for denying relief was objectively reasonable. See id. The state 

court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent.

Finally, even assuming any of the prosecutor's comments was inappropriate, it cannot be 

said that the comments "so infected the trial with unfairness" as to make the conviction a denial of 

due process. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929. The jury was instructed that the arguments of the 

attorneys were not evidence. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1193, 1197. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 

704, 713 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim in part because court had 

instructed jury that attorneys' statements were not evidence); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 

206 (1987) (jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions). Finally, the evidence 

at trial—particularly the identification evidence, the testimony of Patrick Jackson, and the 

ballistics evidence—overwhelmingly pointed to petitioner's guilt. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

4. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Presenting "False and Misleading Evidence"

Petitioner claims the prosecutor presented false and misleading evidence. Petition at 94. 

Specifically, he asserts that the prosecutor "attempted to insinuate to the jury that petitioner was 

responsible for a fourth killing that had not been charged, failed to control a government witness, 

and committed other misconduct in concealing, manufacturing, and manipulating evidence as well 

as presenting false and misleading evidence." Id. at 95. 

Petitioner cites four different events in support of this claim: prosecution questioning of 

Patrick Jackson; prosecution questioning of ballistics expert Chester Young; prosecution

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questioning of surviving victim Manzine Miller; and intentional placement of a witness in 

petitioner's jail cell to create aggravating evidence for use in the penalty phase. Id. at 96-99. Once 

again, the Court does not address the last of these events as it concerns the penalty phase, and 

petitioner has already received state-court habeas relief vacating his death sentence.

The remaining allegations of guilt-phase prosecutorial misconduct concerning the 

presentation of evidence are ones that petitioner made on direct appeal in the California Supreme 

Court. Ex. C at 136-51. He reiterated them in his habeas petition in the California Supreme 

Court. Ex. F at 119-27. The California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, summarized and rejected 

the claim as follows:

a) References to Uncharged Homicides and the Valente Bullet

Defendant complains the prosecutor improperly implied defendant had committed 

uncharged homicides during his direct examination of Jackson, defendant's cousin.

Jackson testified that shortly after defendant shot Frazier, defendant told Jackson he did so 

because Frazier had robbed him earlier. The prosecutor asked, "Aside from what you have 

testified here as to witnessing, did the defendant, your cousin, tell you that he had killed 

other people?" Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds. The trial court overruled 

the objection, and Jackson answered, "No." The prosecutor then asked, "Did you tell the 

police on March 13th of 1989 that your cousin had told you of other killings?" During a 

conference held outside the jury's presence, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's 

questions on the ground of irrelevance because there was no evidence defendant was 

involved in either the Rivers or Davis murders or any other uncharged killings. The 

prosecutor explained he intended to ascertain only whether defendant told Jackson about 

the Rivers or Davis murders, and that the factual basis of his question was the transcript of 

an interview of Jackson by Sergeants Brian Thiem and Ramon Paniagua. The transcript, 

however, indicated only that the police officers asked Jackson if defendant told him of any 

other "shootings" and that Jackson responded, "Uh-huh." When Sergeant Thiem then 

asked Jackson what defendant said about other shootings, Jackson declined to discuss the 

matter further. The trial court indicated it was unsure whether there was a factual basis for 

the prosecutor's question, because Jackson was questioned only about other shootings, not 

other killings, and then sustained defense counsel's relevance objection on that ground.

The trial court granted defense counsel's subsequent request to strike any references to 

"any other shootings," instead of "killings," and admonished the jury to "disregard any 

other reference to any other shootings," again instead of "killings."

Contrary to respondent's assertion, we believe defendant has preserved his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct for review. Although he did not request an assignment of 

misconduct or an admonition that the jury disregard the impropriety, through his relevance 

objection he gave the trial court an opportunity to correct the asserted abuse—an 

opportunity the court took advantage of by striking any references to "any other shootings"

and admonishing the jury to "disregard any other reference to any other shootings."

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Although preserved for review, defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct nonetheless 

fails on the merits. It is well established that a prosecutor may not "'ask questions of a 

witness that suggest facts harmful to a defendant, absent a good faith belief that such facts 

exist.'" (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 562, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) 

In other words, "a prosecutor may not examine a witness solely to imply or insinuate the 

truth of the facts about which questions are posed." (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 

52, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.) Here, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial 

court did not find the prosecutor lacked a good faith belief for his question regarding other 

killings defendant may have mentioned to Jackson; instead, the court concluded it was 

unsure whether there was a factual basis for the question. Further, the circumstance that 

the prosecutor failed to distinguish between "other shootings" and "other killings" in his 

question to Jackson is unremarkable in this case because each of the three murder 

victims—Rivers, Frazier, and Davis—was killed in a shooting. We therefore conclude the 

prosecutor's question about other killings was not improper.

* * *

Defendant next complains that during the direct examination of its ballistics expert, the 

prosecutor improperly insinuated a second time that he had committed uncharged 

homicides. The expert testified regarding his comparison of the bullet recovered from 

Frazier's body with bullets recovered from the 74th Avenue house. The prosecutor then 

asked the expert whether he had received a "request from homicide" to examine other

bullets. The expert responded that he retrieved four bullets from the property room, 

identifying them as the "Rivers," "Frazier," "Miller," and "Valente" bullets. When the 

prosecutor began to question the expert specifically regarding his examination of the 

Valente bullet, defense counsel objected to the question as follows: "If it please the court, it 

has no relevance." The prosecutor interjected, "That is why we are getting rid of it right 

now." The prosecutor and defense counsel ultimately stipulated the Valente bullet had 

different characteristics and was not related to this case or to defendant, and this stipulation 

was read to the jury. Assuming the contention was preserved for appellate review, any 

misconduct was harmless given the stipulation that the Valente bullet had nothing to do 

with defendant's case. 

b) Miller's "No Remorse" Response

Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by intentionally eliciting 

inadmissible and prejudicial testimony from prosecution witness Manzine Miller. He 

further complains this misconduct constituted error under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 

U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, by implying, contrary to his Fifth Amendment 

privilege against compelled self-incrimination, that defendant's failure to testify supported 

an inference of guilt. 

At the conclusion of the prosecutor's redirect examination of Miller, the prosecutor asked, 

"Is there any doubt in your mind that the defendant shot you?" Miller answered, "There's 

no doubt. He still has that same look when he did shoot me, no remorse whatsoever."

Defense counsel objected that the response was "purposely conclusionary on the part of the 

witness" and moved that the response be stricken. The trial court overruled counsel's 

objection and effectively denied the motion to strike.

We reject defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the threshold because he failed 

to request an assignment of misconduct or an admonition that the jury disregard the 

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impropriety on the ground now asserted. (Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 284, 96 

Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) 

We also reject the claim on the merits. A prosecutor engages in misconduct by 

deliberately eliciting inadmissible testimony. (People v. Valdez 2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 125, 

8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296 (Valdez).) Here, no such misconduct occurred. Miller's 

"no remorse" remark was nonresponsive. Further, there is no reasonable likelihood that 

the jury would have understood Miller's response as referring to defendant's failure to 

testify. (See Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 662–663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705, 

citing Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 611–615, 85 S.Ct. 1229.) Thus, no 

Griffin error occurred.

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1185-88.

In light of the foregoing, petitioner's allegations—that false and misleading evidence was 

presented amounting to prosecutorial misconduct—fail. First, the Miller "no response" allegation 

is procedurally defaulted pursuant to California's contemporaneous objection rule. See Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 729-30; Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1092-93.

Second, the Court finds that the state court's analysis denying relief was objectively 

reasonable. Applying the legal principles on prosecutorial misconduct outlined above to 

petitioner's current allegations, the state court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Finally, even assuming error, the evidence of petitioner's guilt was so strong that any due 

process violation did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). As discussed above, 

petitioner's identity as the murderer was supported by physical evidence, identification evidence, 

and the testimony of witnesses.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

5. Prosecutorial Misconduct – Failure To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suppressing possibly 

exculpatory evidence. Specifically, petitioner claims the prosecution suppressed: (1) evidence of 

possible third party culpability, (2) impeachment evidence regarding prosecution witness Melva 

Fite, and (3) evidence that government agents used force and coaching to obtain Patrick Jackson's

statement implicating petitioner. Petition at 99. Petitioner presented these claims in state court 

only in his state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied on the 

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merits.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that "the suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 

of the prosecution." Id. at 87. In order to succeed on a Brady claim, a petitioner must show: 

(1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or 

impeaching; (2) that it was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

(3) that it was material (or, put differently, that prejudice ensued). Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 

691 (2004). Evidence is material if "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 

469-70 (2009). 

a. Third Party Culpability

As to evidence of possible third party culpability, the jury convicted petitioner of the 

attempted murder of Luther Thomas, the robbery of Gerald Livingston, and the murder of 

Sylvester Davis (counts 6, 7, and 8, respectively), all of which occurred in the early morning hours 

of February 19, 1989, at the "crack house" located at 2661 74th Avenue in Oakland. Petitioner 

contends that the prosecution "withheld evidence which would have provided powerful evidence 

of third-party culpability" for these three convictions, "including evidence of numerous robberies 

and armed assaults" that occurred at 2661 74th Avenue prior to February 19, 1989. Petition at 99, 

¶ 267.

Petitioner supported this alleged Brady violation in state court, and continues to support 

the allegation, with the declaration of one Joseph Lee ("J.L.") Batiste, who lived at 2661 74th 

Avenue in 1988 and 1989. Petition at 101-02 (citing Ex. 51 to Ex. F). Therein Batiste declared:

Two days before Sylvester Davis was killed the house was robbed. This was at

about five o'clock in the morning. I was in the living room with Tyrice Ross and two

or three other people. There was a knock on the door, and when I opened it, two men

were standing there wearing masks and pointing guns at me. The men wore black ski

masks, but I could tell they were black men by their voices. They were much taller

and bigger than I was, but I cannot accurately estimate their height today. One of

them said "Give me the money. Give me the dope." He repeated this several times. They 

also said, "don't be looking at us," and made us lie down on the floor. I told

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them we didn't have any money or dope, and they warned us, "Don't sell dope out of

this place no more." They then left the house.

Ex. 51 to Ex. F at p. 2, ¶ 8.

The "Tyrice Ross" to whom Batiste referred provided a declaration to substantially the

same effect as Batiste's. See Ex. 64 to Ex. F at 2, ¶ 7. According to petitioner, during the

February 17 incident "the perpetrators used language strikingly similar to that used by the

perpetrators of the February 19 incident, announced that the house was in their turf, stated that

they had warned Batiste previously against selling drugs in the house, and warned they would

return if they heard Batiste or others were selling drugs again. . . . Had these reports been

disclosed, the defense could have presented convincing evidence that Davis was killed not by

petitioner, but by third parties. . . ." Petition at 101-02.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim of Brady error. Richter, 131 

S. Ct at 789. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution withheld this "third-party culpability"

information from the defense in violation of Brady fails because Batiste specifically disclaimed 

that police came to the home after this February 17 incident and that he spoke to the occupants 

about it. Ex. 51 to Ex. F at 2-3, ¶ 8. Ross offered nothing to the contrary. Ex. 64 to Ex. F. The 

United States Supreme Court has never held that law enforcement has actual or constructive 

knowledge of an unreported crime that occurred days before at the scene of the crime, such that

law enforcement has a Brady obligation to turn the unreported information over to the defense.

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74-77 (denying habeas relief in absence of clearly established 

federal law). Further, the only commonality between the February 17, 1989 and February 19, 

1989 incidents is that the assailant used the language along the lines of, "Give me money. Give 

me dope." Ex. 51 to Ex. F at 2-3, ¶¶ 8, 9. The state court could have reasonably concluded that 

this slim link was insufficient to show that the February 17 perpetrators were also culpable of the 

February 19 incident. Cone, 556 U.S. at 469-70.13

Batiste also averred in his declaration to the California Supreme Court that in December 

1988 his cousin Demard Williams and Demard's girlfriend, Dorthea ("Dot") Johnson, were also 

 

13 Indeed, even assuming there was a way for the evidence to be "turned over," the prosecution 

may have argued that petitioner was one of the February 17 perpetrators.

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living at 2661 74th Avenue, and that on the 14th:

I was in my room in the basement of the house when gunmen came in, robbed

the house, and shot Dot. I remember the date because it was my birthday. The police

were called to the house and took reports after that incident.

Ex. 51 to Ex. F at 1, ¶ 4.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim of Brady error because the

information is not material. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789. There is no reasonable

probability—a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—that had the

prosecution disclosed this evidence to the defense petitioner would have received a different

result on counts 6, 7, and 8. Cone, 556 U.S. at 469-70. The state high court could have 

reasonably concluded that it was pure conjecture by petitioner that had the jury learned that a 

robbery and shooting occurred at 2661 74th Avenue on December 14, 1988, by unidentified

"gunmen," that the jury would have then had a reasonable doubt in the testimony of Luther

Thomas and Gerald Livingston, who identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the attempted 

murder, robbery, and murder that occurred at 2661 74th Avenue on February 19, 1989. Ex. B at 

2926-30, 2990-91, 3022.

Petitioner next claims, "At least two other home invasion felonies were committed in this

residence during a period of approximately six months prior to the Davis homicide. However, no

reports of any of these incidents were disclosed to the defense." Petition at 101, ¶ 269. The

California Supreme Court could have reasonably rejected this claim of Brady error on the grounds 

it was a conclusory allegation, given that petitioner did not submit any evidence substantiating the 

other alleged home invasion felonies. Nor does petitioner provide any documentation to support 

the claim herein.14 Clearly established federal law does not permit the grant of habeas relief on 

conclusory and unsupported claims. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (mere 

conclusions of violations of federal rights in a federal habeas petition without specifics do not state 

a basis for habeas corpus relief).

 

14 The Batiste declaration refers to one robbery occurring "several months" before the February 

19, 1989 incident, but he specifically refers to the perpetrator as a man named Sergio. Ex. 51 to 

Ex. F at 1, ¶ 3.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

b. Melva Fite

As to evidence allegedly impeaching Melva Fite, the eyewitness to the killing of Glen 

Frazier, petitioner asserts that the prosecution suppressed evidence that Fite "was addicted to crack 

cocaine and alcohol, had a long history of lying and dissembling to the courts, and suffered from 

psychiatric illness which caused her to fabricate and fantasize accounts." Petition at 102, ¶ 270. 

In support of this claim, petitioner cites to the report and other documents from the probation 

officer's file of Fite's 1987 forgery case. Petition at 102-03 (citing Exs. 86-87 to Ex. F). 

Specifically, petitioner relies on a July 1987 letter from Fite's probation officer to Fite's trial court, 

in which the officer states that Fite had given the officer "much false information, especially with 

regard to data in the Social Services files from Children's Protective Services. She has a history of 

non-compliance and non-cooperation as well as lying and dissembling to the Court, according to 

Social Services information. She has not cooperated properly during the presentence period and 

has failed to keep one of her two scheduled appointments and submit information requested of 

her." Id. Petitioner next points out that a September 1987 probation department memo to the 

same court stated that Fite had become homeless and lost each of her six children to foster care, 

and admitted "a recent problem with both alcohol and drug abuse." Id. The probation officer told 

the court that she had referred Fite "to a community health program for psychotherapy, in view of 

her painful childhood experiences of rejection and abuse, about which she fantasizes and 

fabricates various accounts." Id. Petitioner asserts that the foregoing evidence "would have 

permitted the defense to thoroughly demolish the credibility of Melva Fite's testimony, both with 

respect to her version of the events of January 30, 1989, and with respect to her identification of

petitioner as the perpetrator of the Glen Frazier killing." Petition at 103, ¶ 272.

A review of the record shows that defense counsel did impeach Fite with her felony 

forgery conviction. Ex. B at 2744, 2754. Defense counsel also challenged Fite's identification of 

petitioner as the perpetrator. Specifically, on cross-examination of Melva Fite during her 

testimony in the prosecution's guilt-phase case-in-chief, and also during the defense guilt-phase 

case, defense counsel established that on March 1, 1989, Fite viewed a photo lineup that included 

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a picture of petitioner. She identified that picture as the photo of the man who assaulted her and 

killed Frazier, but was not absolutely sure. Ex. B at 2656-57, 2659-61, 2751-52, 2757-58. Fite 

told the police that she could identify the assailant in person, but at a physical lineup held on 

March 3, 1989—a lineup that included petitioner—she did not identify anyone, and only 

expressed uncertainty about someone other than petitioner. Id. at 2657-58, 2661-68, 2744-47, 

2758, 3235-40. 

Defense counsel also challenged Fite's version of events. Specifically, at the prosecution's 

guilt-phase case-in-chief, Fite testified that in the early morning hours of January 30, 1989, as she 

and Glen Frazier proceeded up 89th Avenue, the assailant and another person pulled up to them in 

a black-over-green Ford LTD. Ex. B at 2639-42, 2748-49, 2680-8. Petitioner, whom Fite had 

never seen before, exited the passenger's seat and, in Fite's words, "walked behind me and Glen 

going towards Plymouth and 89th. And then he turned around looking towards Rick and asked: 

are you talking to me?" Id. at 2642, 2648-49, 2727. Fite denied having told Oakland Police 

officer Derek Norfleet that the gunman had exited a blue Cadillac, and denied telling Norfleet that 

the driver never exited the car. Ex. B at 2686-87, 2693.

In the defense case, by way of impeachment, petitioner presented evidence that when 

Officer Norfleet took a statement from Melva Fite on the morning of January 30, 1989, she was 

"shocked" and very emotional. Ex. B at 3161-62, 3168-70, 3175-76. Norfleet testified that Fite 

had told him that earlier that morning she saw two men in the same car at both 89th and 90th 

Avenues and that it was the passenger who got out and did the shooting at both locations. Id. at 

3164-65. At no point did Fite tell Norfleet that the driver had exited the car. Id. at 3165, 3183. 

She did say that she thought the car was as an older model blue Cadillac. Id. at 3180.

Oakland Police sergeant Brian Thiem also took a statement from Fite at headquarters when 

Norfleet brought her there at around 7:35 a.m. on January 30, 1989. Ex. B at 3230, 3233, 3241-

42. Fite initially told Thiem that the person who had fired the gun at both 89th and 90th Avenue 

exited the passenger's side of the car. Id. at 3231-32. However, later in the interview Fite said she 

thought the shooter might have gotten out of the driver's side of the car at 90th Avenue. Id. at 

3245-47. Even later in the interview, after further discussion, while still sure the shooter had 

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exited the passenger's side on 89th Avenue, Fite became convinced the shooter had exited the 

driver's side of the car on 90th Avenue. Id. at 3247-51. Fite repeated that the same person had 

gotten out of the car at both locations and said she remembered this clearly because of the jacket 

the gunman wore, and also because of his face. Id. at 3250-51.

When Sergeant Thiem showed Fite a book that contained pictures of cars, she was sure

the gunman's car was either a Chevrolet Impala or a Chrysler New Yorker, of approximately a

1972 vintage. Ex. B at 3233-34, 3253-55, 3259. Fite described the color as "turquoise greenish,

bluish," with a dark top. Id. at 3256-57.

Finally, in guilt-phase summation, defense counsel vigorously attacked Fite's credibility. 

Ex. B at 3514-18, 3521-24, 3526-30, 3534. For example, defense counsel argued in closing that:

Melva Fite kept adapting her statements to fit the situation that existed at the time she was 

giving the statement.

* * *

Ms. Fite is the person that [the prosecution] would like to have you believe. And she is a 

person who has been convicted of forgery, a felony. Now, she tells you she thinks it is a 

misdemeanor. Well, it is not a misdemeanor at all. The record reflects it is a felony. She 

had been convicted of a felony. Forgery is saying something is genuine when, in fact, it 

isn't.

Well, that is exactly what she is doing in this courtroom. She is saying that this is the 

genuine article that committed that crime against Frazier when, in fact, it isn't.

Ex. B at 3514-18.

In light of the above, the state court could have reasonably found that any additional 

impeachment evidence that could be garnered from Fite's 1987 probation file, had it been 

presented at trial, would not have changed the result of the proceeding. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

c. Patrick Jackson

As to petitioner's cousin, Patrick Jackson, petitioner contends that the prosecution "failed 

to reveal that Jackson's tape-recorded statement to [police investigators], obtained on or about 

March 13 and 15, 1989, was obtained through physical intimidation and threats which occurred 

prior to the time when the officers turned on the tape recorder and read Jackson the Miranda 

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warnings." Petition at 107, ¶ 284. Petitioner further contends that the officers periodically 

coached Jackson on what to say at times when the tape recorder was turned off. Id. 

The record reflects that on March 13, 1989, Oakland Police sergeants Brian Thiem and 

Ramon Paniagua traveled to a California Youth Authority facility in Sacramento and interviewed 

Patrick Jackson regarding the January 30, 1989 killing of Glen Frazier. Ex. B at 3125-26. At 

petitioner's guilt-phase trial, Jackson testified under a grant of immunity and essentially 

corroborated the testimony of Melva Fite by giving testimony from which the jury could have 

reasonably inferred that his cousin, petitioner, shot Glen Frazier on an Oakland street on the 

morning of January 30, 1989. Id. at 2767-2811. At various points during that testimony, in an 

attempt to refresh recollection, the prosecutor provided Jackson with the transcript of his taperecorded March 13, 1989 interview with Paniagua and Thiem. Ex. B at 2771-73, 2786-87, 2806-

07, 2808-09.

Petitioner offered the California Supreme Court no documentation supporting his 

allegation of police coercion and coaching of Jackson. For example, petitioner does not provide a 

declaration from Jackson recanting the testimony or attesting to the conditions of the police 

interview. The state court could have therefore reasonably denied the claim as conclusory. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789; Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05. Further, Jackson appeared at trial 

for cross-examination regarding his out-of-court testimony and the police interrogation techniques; 

a fact that courts have recognized safeguards admission of such statements against a due process 

violation. Nasrichampang v. Woodford, 288 F. App'x 367, 368 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams 

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 596 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.15

 

15 Petitioner tacks on an argument that the prosecution failed to disclose jail medical records 

showing petitioner suffered from sprained and broken ankles prior to the offenses. Petition at 108, 

¶ 285. This evidence and its relevance are discussed more below. Suffice it to say that the state 

court reasonably denied this claim given petitioner and/or defense counsel already knew or should 

have known about petitioner's medical condition. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir. 

1998) ("There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential 

facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is 

available . . . from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government 

to disclose.") (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, petitioner, not the 

prosecution, was in the best position to know about his medical condition.

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6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilt-Phase Investigation

Petitioner asserts multiple claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Alexander 

Selvin and Bud Meloling. All claims variously allege that counsel failed to investigate and 

present exculpatory evidence pertaining to the guilt-phase of his trial. Petition at 108-132. 

Petitioner presented this claim only on state habeas to the California Supreme Court, which 

summarily denied it on the merits. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must 

establish two factors. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms, id. at 

687-88, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom," Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). "A court considering a 

claim of ineffective assistance must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was 

within the 'wide range' of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689). 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., 

that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the petitioner is 

challenging his conviction, the appropriate question is "whether there is a reasonable probability 

that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 

695. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Richter, 131 

S. Ct. at 792 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). It is unnecessary for a federal court considering

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on habeas review to address the prejudice prong, i.e., the 

second factor of the Strickland test, if the petitioner cannot establish incompetence, as required 

under the first prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

The standards of both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland are "highly deferential, and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quotation marks 

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and citations omitted). "[T]he question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel's actions were 

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland's deferential standard." Id.

"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. "In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 

judgments." Id. at 691.

That an attorney might have conducted a more thorough investigation does not establish

deficient performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). "[T]he duty to investigate

does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up;

reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further

investigation would be a waste." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). The question is

not what the best lawyer or even what most good lawyers would have done, but whether a 

reasonable lawyer could have acted as defense counsel did. Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105,

1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, the relevant inquiry is

not what trial counsel could have done, but whether counsel's actions were reasonable. Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998).

To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call a favorable witness, a 

federal habeas petitioner must identify the witness, provide the testimony the witness would have 

given, show the witness was likely to have been available to testify and would have given the 

proffered favorable testimony, and demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had such testimony 

been introduced, the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to the petitioner. See

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner's mere speculation that 

the witness would have given helpful information if interviewed by counsel and called to the stand 

is not enough to establish ineffective assistance. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th

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Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

In Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit denied a petitioner's 

claim that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate and call a witness, where the 

petitioner only provided his own "self-serving affidavit" and no other evidence, such as "an 

affidavit from [the] alleged witness," that the witness would have given helpful testimony. Id. at 

486-87; cf. Alcala, 334 F.3d at 872 & n.3 (distinguishing, inter alia, Dows; finding ineffective 

assistance of counsel where petitioner submitted interviews reflecting testimony missing witnesses 

would have provided).

At the outset, the Court notes petitioner has offered only his own conclusory statements 

and fails to provide a factual showing that his trial counsel in fact failed to investigate the 

purported exculpatory information. Petitioner thus fails to show ineffectiveness on the part of 

defense counsel. See United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 

petitioner must make sufficient factual showing to substantiate ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim). On this basis alone, the state court had reasonable grounds to deny the claims. Richter, 

131 S. Ct. at 786. The Court nonetheless addresses each claim below.

a. Crimes Against Manzine Miller and Terry Rivers

Petitioner alleges the following claims of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

investigation of the Rivers homicide and Miller shooting incident (counts 1, 2, and 3).

i. Miller's Identification of Petitioner

Petitioner claims defense counsel did not properly investigate victim Manzine Miller's 

eyewitness identification of petitioner as his assailant in connection with count 2 (robbery) and 

count 3 (attempted murder). Petition at 110-11. Petitioner states that had counsel conducted a 

proper investigation they would have learned that Miller's identification suffered from many of the 

"biasing factors" that empirical social science research data has established "taint" identifications 

(e.g., Miller had never seen petitioner before; attacks are stressful and the accuracy of eyewitness 

identification "plummets when the observer is in a stressful situation"; Miller had ingested a large 

amount of alcohol and crack cocaine; there is no correlation between certainty and accuracy; and 

the lineup procedures the police used with Miller "were themselves suspect"). Id. Petitioner 

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concludes that counsel should have "retain[ed] an expert witness to analyze Miller's testimony or 

to testify regarding the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony or Miller's identification of petitioner, . 

. . and it is at least reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been obtained had 

counsel retained such an expert and presented evidence undercutting the credibility of Miller's 

identification." Id. at 111.

Petitioner has offered no evidence that an identification expert would have provided 

favorable testimony at trial. He merely speculates that such an expert could be found. Such 

speculation is insufficient to establish prejudice. See Grigsby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th 

Cir. 1997) ("Speculation about what an expert could have said is not enough to establish 

prejudice.").

Further, closing argument shows that defense counsel defended against counts 2 and 3 by

acknowledging that petitioner went into the swamp with Miller, but arguing that petitioner didn't

rob Miller, and shot him only because he (petitioner) credibly felt that Miller was about to rob

him. Ex. B at 3500-09, 3513.

Now, if you believe Mr. Miller that, in fact, [petitioner] took his rock of

cocaine as part of a break yourself, give me all your money routine, then it is a

robbery. The law is clear it is a robbery. But I submit to you before you come to that

conclusion, you consider the other factors; whether or not something like that under

those conditions could even be observed under those facts.

Did he shoot him because he was afraid he was going to get ripped off himself?

That is more reasonable. And if the evidence points to two possible reasonable

interpretations of the facts, you have to adopt the reasonable. I am sorry. If one is

reasonable and one is unreasonable, you adopt the reasonable, even if it points to his

innocence.

If both are reasonable, you still have to adopt the one that points to his

innocence.

If one is reasonable and one is unreasonable, the one that is reasonable points to

guilt, then you find the one that points to guilt and you find him guilty. That is what

circumstantial evidence is all about.

Did he intend to kill Manzine Miller? He shot him in the hip from six or seven

feet away. He shot him in the hip.

Ex. B at 3508-09.

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Here, counsel reasonably defended against counts 2 and 3 given the evidence that Miller 

had ample time to see his assailant, and adequate lighting to do so as well. Ex. B at 2374-77, 

2382, 2427-28, 2446, 2483-86. Miller testified: "The kitchen—we went in the kitchen. You're not 

going to forget the person that shoot you, I tell you that." Id. at 2485. In interpreting Strickland, 

courts have repeatedly held that they will refuse to second-guess counsel's tactical decision to 

present a particular theory of defense when the decision was reasonable under the circumstances. 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 

1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

ii. Miller's Mental Impairments and Addictions

Petitioner claims that counsel failed to investigate Miller's background and learn that "at 

the time of his testimony, Miller was undergoing treatment for brain damage, drug and alcohol 

addiction, and a history of psychiatric disorders, all of which severely impaired his ability to 

perceive, recollect, and testify credibly regarding the events of January 30." Petition at 111.

The state court could have reasonably denied the claim as conclusory. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 

204-05. The medical records petitioner cites in support of the present subclaim are from 1992. 

Ex. 80 to Ex. F. The 1992 records do not establish that in October 1990, at the time of his 

testimony in this case, Miller suffered from any of the ailments or difficulties described by 

petitioner. Petitioner fails to specify which, if any, of the facts described in the 1992 records were 

in existence at the time of trial and could have been discovered by counsel through reasonable 

diligence. Further, although the medical records state that Miller was in a confused state after 

being brought by paramedics for hospital treatment on May 8, 1992, nothing in the 1992 medical 

records addresses Miller's ability to perceive, recollect, or testify.

As part of this second allegation of guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness, petitioner 

complains that counsel did not investigate and discover Lonnie Eugene Nero, who would have 

testified that Miller was a long-time abuser of crack cocaine, heroin, and alcohol. Petition at 112 

(citing Ex. 56 to Ex. F). Exhibit 56 is a declaration signed by Nero in 2003, in which he states that 

"after midnight" throughout January 1989, "Manzine was always messed up. In addition to the 

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drugs he used, he also drank a lot, sometimes to the point where he would pass out. Other times 

he would be so drunk and messed up that it didn't seem like he knew what was going on." Ex. 56 

to Ex. F, ¶ 4. Nero's declaration contains no statement that Manzine Miller was "messed up" to 

the point of passing out in the early morning hours of January 30, 1989, nor does Nero declare that 

he was available to petitioner's defense counsel in 1989 and 1990, and that he would have testified 

to the contents of his declaration. These omissions are fatal to the present ineffectiveness claim. 

See Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1002 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005); Dows, 211 F.3d at 486; Bragg, 

242 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Finally, the record shows that defense counsel Selvin and Meloling, as part of the defense 

presented on counts 2 and 3, went to great lengths to emphasize Miller's admission that he was 

"not exactly sober" during his encounter with petitioner, in a clear effort to have the jury draw the 

inference that Miller lied about petitioner robbing him. Ex. B at 2400-01, 2416-18, 2443-44, 

2476-79. In light of this argument, the state court could have reasonably found that any additional 

impeachment evidence, even assuming it was reasonably discoverable, would not have changed 

the result of the proceeding. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

iii. Miller's Psychiatric Illnesses

Petitioner next claims that defense counsel failed to investigate and discover that Miller 

"suffered from psychiatric illnesses which rendered his testimony inherently incredible." Petition

at 112-13. According to petitioner, "Miller was diagnosed not only with polysubstance abuse, but 

also with a 'personality disorder' not otherwise specified . . . . [¶] The diagnosis continued that 

Miller's personality disorder demonstrated 'antisocial traits,' a reference to antisocial personality

disorder," which has deceit and manipulation as central features. Id.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this ineffectiveness claim due to a lack

of support. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05; James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner again cites medical records for Miller from 1992, Petition at 112 (citing Ex. 79 to Ex. 

F), rather than any records in existence at the time of trial some two to three years earlier. 

Petitioner fails to show how any information contained in the medical file could have reasonably 

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been discovered by defense counsel.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

iv. Miller's Conflicting Testimony

Petitioner's Exhibit 120 in the California Supreme Court is two pages of notes from 

Oakland Police officer Voznik regarding the interview he had with Miller in the emergency room 

of Highland Hospital on the morning of January 30, 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit 81 in the California 

Supreme Court is the police report detailing the statement Miller gave at that time—a statement 

that was "not completed because Miller was rushed into surgery." Ex. 81 to Ex. F at 2. In his next 

allegation of guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness, petitioner states that these two exhibits do 

not reflect Miller mentioning two matters he later testified to: (1) that he and his assailant went 

into Miller's kitchen together, and (2) that the assailant took a $20 rock of cocaine from him when 

they were in the swamp together and the assailant pulled the gun. Petition at 113. Petitioner also 

notes that Miller told Officer Voznik that he (Miller) "did not see them" (petitioner and Jackson) 

"with a car," and that Miller contradicted this statement at trial. Id.

Petitioner appears to claim that counsel should have impeached Miller with the 

contradiction and omissions from the police report and officer notes. The California Supreme 

Court could have reasonably concluded that there exists no reasonable probability of a different 

result had counsel impeached Miller in the manner suggested. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The 

jury likely would have understood that the omission from and contradictions between Miller's 

police statement and trial testimony resulted from the fact that he gave the police statement 

immediately after getting shot and as he was being rushed into surgery, and therefore his failure to 

include or correctly recount every detail regarding the shooting was understandable.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

v. Other Witnesses Who Contradict Miller

Petitioner next claims that defense counsel failed to interview or develop information from 

Miller's uncle, Harvey Edwards, and Terry Rivers' girlfriend, Michelle Williams. Petition at 114. 

According to petitioner, "Edwards told police that he and Michelle stayed in the kitchen for twenty 

minutes prior to the shooting and that Miller had come into the kitchen alone." Id. (citing Ex. 116 

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to Ex F). "In her contemporaneous statement to the police, Michelle Williams also agreed that she 

was in the house with Edwards for 15 minutes prior to the shooting, but did not mention Miller or 

the shooter coming into the kitchen." Id. at 114 (citing Ex. 125 to Ex. F).

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. First, as noted above, petitioner 

only speculates that defense counsel failed to interview Edwards and Williams. In any event, 

petitioner presented no declaration from either Edwards or Williams stating that they were 

available to defense counsel in preparation for trial and that they would have testified in the 

manner petitioner now claims. Allen, 395 F.3d at 1002 n.2; Dows, 211 F.3d at 486.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

vi. Miller's Identification of the Assailants

Petitioner claims defense counsel failed to investigate and develop evidence that Miller 

gave police descriptions of petitioner and of Patrick Jackson that "did not even begin to match"

what petitioner and Jackson really looked like. Petition at 114-15. This claim fails because the 

California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that counsel reasonably decided to 

forgo a misidentification defense in favor of a defense on counts 1, 2, and 3 that placed petitioner 

and Jackson in the area, but had petitioner defending himself from Miller in the swamp (counts 2 

and 3) and had Jackson killing Rivers (count 1). Ex. B at 3500-09, 3513. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 

789-90 (counsel had reason to question the truth of defendant's account of events, and pursuing 

forensic evidence could have exposed his story as an invention). "To support a defense argument 

that the prosecution has not proved its case it sometimes is better to try to cast pervasive suspicion 

of doubt than to strive to prove a certainty that exonerates." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 790. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

vii. Reconstruction Expert

Manzine Miller initially testified that after petitioner shot him and left, five to ten minutes 

passed before he (Miller) heard the sound of the three additional gunshots—see Ex. B at 2387-88, 

2467-68—the gunshots that the prosecution theorized petitioner fired to kill Terry Rivers (count 

1). However, on cross-examination Miller testified that he heard the shots three minutes later, and 

he then admitted that it could have been less than two minutes later, "or more." Id. at 2468-69. 

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Miller continued: "Like I say, it could have been two to three minutes." Id. at 2497. "Two 

minutes." Id. at 2503. Finally, defense counsel asked Miller to reconstruct the time period 

between the shot which struck him and the three shots he heard coming from the street, slapping 

his thigh once for each gunshot. Id. at 2503-04. Defense counsel declared for the record that this 

reconstruction showed the passing of eight seconds between the time petitioner shot Miller to the 

time the first shot came from the street. Id. at 2504. Petitioner assumes that Manzine Miller's 

"eight second" testimony was the absolute truth, and thereon claims that counsel failed to "retain a 

criminalist, investigate the crime scene, or attempt a reconstruction of this incident for the jury to 

demonstrate that no person could have covered the distance in the amount of time allotted." 

Petition at 115-16. 

The California Supreme Court could have reasonably rejected this claim on the ground that 

if Miller's "eight second" testimony reflected what the jury was going to accept as the truth, trial

counsel did not need an expert to reconstruct the incident for the jury to demonstrate that no

person could have covered the distance at issue in eight seconds. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789. As 

they did, counsel could reasonably use summation to stress this common-sense point to the jury:

Now, question, can you connect [petitioner] with the Rivers shooting factually

without the gun? And the answer is, no, you can't. You can't. Because from a time

standpoint, and we went through this very carefully with Manzine Miller. Manzine

Miller first said in response to a question by [the prosecutor] was five or ten minutes

from the time he was shot until the time he heard the three shots up above.

First he said [Petitioner] ran up the hill and then there were three shots. 

He crawled across 23rd Street and was taken over there by the paramedics and was taken

to Highland Hospital and treated and so on. All right.

On the witness stand he said first on direct examination two to three minutes.

And you will recall this, I am sure, when it came right down to it, from the standpoint

of sequence of events, I asked him very carefully. Mr. Miller, would you illustrate

for us the time lapse between the time you were shot and the time that you heard the

other shots. And he said there was—he said I was shot and then he paused and he

went and he patted himself on the thighs. And I recorded eight seconds between the

two. The judge recorded nine seconds. But in any event, the record reflects that eight

seconds passed.

Now, by the best evidence that the prosecution has established through one of

the officers, I think it is Officer Bowden—I can be mistaken about his name, but I

think it was Officer Bowden—was 125 to 150 feet from the point where Mr. Miller

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was shot to the point in front of the house.

Mr. Miller says it is between five and six hundred feet. You can look at the

aerial photo and it will show the path that had to be traversed from the point down

here at the tree. This is the tree that is down right here. Up the hill, up here, up the

swamp, back over to the front of the house and shoot Terry Rivers after he shot

Manzine Miller.

I submit to you that it is not factually possible based on the evidence you heard

that you cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that that happened that way.

Why isn't it just as reasonable to assume, if you will, that Patrick Jackson,

standing in front of that house, who had been there watching the house, and who had

been there watching the street, why can't you just reasonably, just as reasonably

assume and find, if you will, that Patrick Jackson, who has been given immunity from

that murder in order to testify, that he killed Terry Rivers.

Ex. B at 3511-12.16

No criminalist was needed. In any event, petitioner provides no declaration from a 

criminalist showing what he or she could have said at trial.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

viii. Petitioner's Ankles

Petitioner's next several claims of guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness concern the 

failure of defense counsel to investigate and present the evidence that in the early morning hours 

of January 30, 1989, petitioner was still suffering from the severely sprained ankles he had first 

injured on January 2, 1989. According to petitioner, this evidence would have shown that it was 

physically impossible for him to have committed the killing of Terry Rivers as he could not have 

covered the terrain necessary in the time allotted by Manzine Miller. Petition at 115-19 (citing 

Exs. 18, 115, 128 to Ex. F).

The state court had reasonable basis to deny this claim. First, the actions of counsel are 

 

16 Evidence, even conflicting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a verdict unless, in the view

of the reviewing court, the evidence the jury relied on to convict was inherently improbable or

physically impossible. People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 303-06 (1986). Petitioner appears to 

argue that because Manzine Miller testified that the only way he could measure the time between 

the shot at him and the shots he later heard was to "give you an example," Ex. B at 2497, the 

testimonial "eight second" reconstruction had to be the only testimony from him on this point that 

the jury could accept. This argument ignores the fact that the jury had Miller before them, and 

may have seen something in his demeanor or abilities (combined with other evidence in the case), 

which caused them to discredit his "eight-second reconstruction," and credit his direct evidence 

testimony of the estimated "minutes" between the shots at him and the shots he later heard.

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often determined or influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 691. Petitioner does not provide evidence that he ever told counsel about his ankles. He thus 

fails to show that counsel was put on notice to investigate a "physical impossibility" defense. See

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 186 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim that counsel

should have explored the possibility of an insanity defense because defendant fails to show that

counsel was put on notice to explore an insanity defense).

Further, in light of Miller's conflicting testimony, the basis for this claim is itself 

speculative. As discussed above, the state court could have reasonably concluded that the jury 

relied on Miller's "five minute" or "two-to-three minute" testimony in reconstructing the time 

lapse between the shots. As such, it was unlikely that petitioner's ankle would prove "physical 

impossibility."

Finally, the documents petitioner submits to show the injury are jail records from 1989 and 

1990 documenting ankle injuries (Ex. 18 to Ex. F), and Highland Hospital medical records from 

1989 documenting the same (Ex 115 to Ex. F). No doctor or medical expert expresses an opinion 

as to whether petitioner had the mobility to commit the offenses against Miller and Rivers in the 

manner described by the prosecution.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

ix. Zorana Hodges

Sixteen-year-old Zorana Hodges was interviewed by police on the morning of January 30, 

1989, regarding the shootings that had occurred on East 24th Street earlier that morning, and she 

said she saw a "hit man" in the neighborhood "before the shooting" and watched him enter the 

swamp with two other men. Ex. 126 to Ex. F at 11-13. Petitioner assigns deficient investigation 

to defense counsel for making "no effort" to interview Hodges, for failing "to further investigate 

her story," for failing to "effectively cross-examine Miller on this matter," and for failing to 

"present this information to the jury." Petition at 119-20. Petitioner alleges that it is reasonably 

probable he would have received a more favorable verdict had counsel contacted Hodges and 

followed up on her police report:

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Hodges would have testified that she and Mack were dealing crack cocaine out of a

car on East 23rd Street on the night of the shooting. [Citation.] Miller himself was a

regular customer of Hodges' and had purchased a $20 rock of crack cocaine from her

earlier that evening. Hodges would have testified that the area in which the shooting

took place was the center of a turf dispute between a gang called "the Momos" and a

newer gang which had only recently moved into the area and was drawing customers

away from the Momos and cutting into their profits. Hodges, who was affiliated with

the Flames, had herself been warned by the Momos not to sell crack in the

neighborhood. Hodges would have also testified that fandangling, or selling fake

crack cocaine, as Terry Rivers was doing, was considered so serious an offense in the

community that a crack seller who did so would be unlikely to be alive 24 hours later.

Hodges would also have confirmed that she saw the tall "hit-man" in the neighborhood on 

the day of the shooting. Hodges would also have severely undercut Manzine Miller's 

credibility. She would have testified that when he came up to her reporting that he had just 

been shot, he referred to multiple perpetrators and made it sound as though he had been 

caught in a cross-fire. [Citation.] This would have contradicted Miller's testimony at trial 

that he had been robbed and shot by a single perpetrator, giving rise to the suspicion that 

Miller decided to lie about what happened in order to protect himself from retaliation by 

the Momos, the rival gang, or the hit-man and instead jumped at the chance to pin the 

crime on a single perpetrator from a different neighborhood.

Petition at 120 (citing Ex. 66 to Ex. F).

The state court had reasonable basis to deny this claim because it could have reasonably 

concluded that counsel would have not been able to secure Hodges's testimony. Hodges does not 

state in her state high court declaration that she would have testified, which is fatal to the present

ineffectiveness claim, Dows, 211 F.3d at 486, and in fact states in her declaration that after her 

police interview, "I left that neighborhood as soon as I could after that. I did not want to be 

involved in that business and I never went back." Ex. 66 to Ex. F, at 3, ¶ 11.

Zorana Hodges has also declared that she tried to tell the police "as little as possible." Ex.

66 to Ex. F at 3, ¶ 9. "Everything that I said to the police was true, but the whole time I was

trying to say as little as possible because I knew that everything that I said could come back to

haunt me." Id. "I have been shown a transcript of the statement I made to the police on the day

of the crime and I was surprised to see that I said as much as I did, especially about the hit-man.

If anyone had found out, I would have been in big trouble." Id. at 3, ¶ 10. Based on these 

statements, the state court could have reasonably found that, even if counsel had found Hodges, 

she would not have been cooperative with them, or testified.

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Although petitioner is correct that defense counsel, even without Hodges herself, could 

have attempted to introduce Hodges's statement to the police, as discussed above, it was a 

reasonable tactical decision to forgo a defense that completely exonerated petitioner in favor of a 

defense that placed petitioner and Jackson in the area, but had petitioner defending himself from 

Miller in the swamp and had Jackson killing Rivers. Indeed, Miller's purported statement to 

Hodges that "some guys had come up and just started shooting," id. at 2, ¶ 6, was not entirely 

inconsistent with the prosecution's version of events placing both petitioner and Jackson at the 

scene. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

x. Lonnie Eugene Nero

Petitioner claims that defense counsel did not investigate and discover Lonnie Eugene 

Nero so that Nero could have testified that count 1 victim Terry Rivers sold a man named Kenny

McDaniel fake crack on January 27, 1989 on East 24th Street, and that on both the 28th and 29th 

of January, McDaniel returned to the neighborhood, armed, looking to retaliate against Rivers. 

Petition at 120-21 (citing Ex. 129 to Ex. F). The California Supreme Court could have reasonably 

rejected this ineffectiveness claim because petitioner has not provided a declaration from Nero 

stating that he would have testified in the manner petitioner describes. Allen v. Woodford, 395 

U.S. at 1002 n.2; Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d at 486. Indeed, exhibit 129 to exhibit F is a barely 

legible copy of a statement Nero presumably gave to police following the crime. Nero makes no 

mention of McDaniel in the declaration he submitted to the state court. See Ex. 56.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

xi. Larry Galbert

Petitioner claims defense counsel failed to investigate and discover that in January 1989

petitioner "worked as a delivery and errand boy for Larry Galbert, one of East Oakland's largest

drug dealers," and thus "had no motive to rob a small-time crack dealer" like Manzine Miller "of

a single $20 rock. . . . If petitioner had wanted money or drugs, Galbert would have given it to

him. . . . Petitioner was also from a different part of East Oakland some 50 blocks away from the

scene of the East 24th Street incident. There was no reason for petitioner to travel all the way

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across town in order to rob a total stranger of a single $20 rock of crack cocaine." Petition at 121 

(citing Exs. 53 and 54 to Ex. F).

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. First, petitioner presents no 

evidence that he put counsel on notice that he worked for Galbert. See Hensley, 67 F.3d at 186. 

Second, assuming counsel could have discovered such evidence through reasonable diligence, 

petitioner suffered no prejudice because petitioner makes no showing counsel could have 

presented the evidence. Although Galbert declares that petitioner worked for him and that he 

(Galbert) would have given petitioner money or drugs had petitioner asked, Ex. 54 to Ex. F, 

Galbert's declaration does not state that he was available to counsel in 1989 and 1990 and would 

have testified then, if asked, that he was a large-scale drug dealer who employed petitioner and

who would have given petitioner money or drugs. Galbert declares only that he would have 

testified "about [petitioner's] character and about what was going on in the neighborhood." Ex. 54 

to Ex. F at 4, ¶ 10. See Allen v. Woodford, 395 U.S. at 1002 n.2; Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d at 486.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

xii. Other Interviews

Petitioner claims defense counsel failed to interview Patrick Jackson; Montrece Martin 

Fields's adoptive brother, Darius Fields; and unnamed "others." Petition at 121-22. According to 

petitioner, had counsel conducted these interviews and conducted a "complete investigation" into 

Fields's background, counsel would have discovered that it was Fields and Jackson who were 

together on East 24th Street on the morning of January 30, 1989, and Fields who perpetrated the 

robbery and attempted murder of Manzine Miller. Id. The California Supreme Court reasonably 

rejected this ineffectiveness claim due to a lack of support. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05; 

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d at 26. Petitioner provides no declarations from Patrick Jackson, Darius 

Fields, or the unnamed "others" stating that they were available to trial counsel and would have 

testified in a manner that exculpated petitioner and inculpated Jackson and Montrece Fields on 

counts 1, 2 and 3.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

//

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b. Crimes Against Glen Frazier and Melva Fite

Petitioner alleges the following claims of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

investigation of the attempted robbery of Melva Fite (count 4) and the murder of Glen Frazier

(count 5).

i. "Claim of Right" Defense

At trial, Patrick Jackson testified that moments before petitioner committed his crimes 

against Frazier and Fite, petitioner had been robbed, and Frazier was one of the robbers. Ex. B at 

2780, 2788, 2796. Petitioner claims that defense counsel performed ineffectively by not accepting 

Patrick Jackson's testimony as true, and not developing other information through other witnesses 

to establish that Frazier and Fite's cousin Ricky Smith had indeed robbed petitioner. Petition at 

123. From that evidence, petitioner continues, counsel should have argued that petitioner had "a 

'claim of right' defense to the crimes of robbery or attempted robbery and would have eliminated 

any felony murder theory or special circumstance." Id. (citing People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 

950 (1999)).

The state court reasonably rejected this claim because defense counsel could have 

reasonably believed they had no evidentiary support for a claim-of-right defense on counts 4 and 

5. Under California law a claim-of-right defense provides that a defendant's good faith belief, 

even if mistakenly held, that he or she has a right or claim to property they take from another 

negates the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery. People v. Tufunga, 21 

Cal. 4th at 938. A California trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense 

unless there is substantial evidence that the defendant acted with a subjective good faith belief he 

or she had a lawful claim on the taken property. Id. at 944; see also People v. Barnett, 17 Cal. 4th 

1044, 1145 (1998). Here, petitioner presents no supporting documentation, nor is there anything 

in the record, establishing that petitioner had the requisite good faith belief that would entitle him 

to a claim-of-right defense.

Furthermore, as discussed above, counsel defended petitioner against counts 4 and 5 by

vigorously attacking the credibility of Melva Fite, including her identification of petitioner. 

Counsel used that evidence, plus some of Fite's prior inconsistent statements regarding who had 

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approached her and Glen Frazier, to argue that it was Patrick Jackson who shot and killed Glen 

Frazier, and that there existed reasonable doubt that a robbery of Fite even took place. Ex. B at 

3514-35. Counsel could have reasonably decided not to present the alternative or contradictory 

defense that petitioner committed the robbery but did so with a "claim of right." See Correll v. 

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel's tactical decision to choose one reasonable 

defense theory to the exclusion of a different, conflicting theory cannot support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

ii. Intoxication Defense

Petitioner asserts he was "intoxicated on alcohol or drugs at the time of the incident"

comprising counts 4 and 5 and that "Patrick Jackson had so testified and others at the scene could 

have done so as well." Petition at 124. Petitioner claims counsel's failure to investigate this 

evidence "deprived petitioner of a theory of reduced culpability." Id.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. Jackson testified only that 

petitioner may have had a beer or two in the time period preceding the encounter with Fite and 

Frazier. Ex. B at 2829-31, 2860-61. This alone does not establish intoxication, and there is 

nothing else in the record showing petitioner was intoxicated. Further, there is no evidence that 

petitioner put his counsel on notice of this defense. See Dyer v. Calderon, 122 F.3d 720, 733 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (no ineffectiveness in failing to investigate whether defendant was high on PCP at the 

time of the crime where defendant had not told counsel he had smoked PCP prior to the crime)

vacated on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

iii. Fite's Intoxication

Next petitioner alleges that victim Melva Fite had spent the entire evening of January 29, 

1989, "drinking at the Apartment C bar on East 14th Street. At the time of the incident, she was 

under the influence of a combination of alcohol and crack cocaine, and had come to a notorious 

crack cocaine hotspot to purchase more. Thus, her ability to attend, perceive, and recollect the 

events of that evening were severely impaired." Petition at 124. Petitioner claims counsel should 

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have investigated this information. The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this 

ineffectiveness claim due to a lack of support. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05; James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d at 26. Petitioner points to nothing in the record to support his allegations.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

iv. Impeachment Evidence Relating to Fite

Petitioner next claims that counsel failed to conduct sufficient investigation into Fite's 

"lengthy background of criminal activity, deception and falsehoods, addictive behavior, and 

psychiatric problems which reflected adversely upon her veracity and credibility." Petition at 124. 

Part of the evidence petitioner faults counsel for not discovering is the evidence petitioner

claims the prosecution withheld from the defense in violation of Brady: the July 1987 letter from

Fite's probation officer, discussed above in section III.B.5.b, supra, in which the officer states that 

Fite had given the officer "much false information, especially with regard to data in the Social 

Services files from Children's Protective Services. She has a history of non-compliance and noncooperation as well as lying and dissembling to the Court, according to Social Services 

information. She has not cooperated properly during the presentence period and has failed to keep 

one of her two scheduled appointments and submit information requested of her." Id. at 124-25 

(citing Ex. 87 to Ex. F at 15). Petitioner also points out that a September 1987 probation 

department memo to the court stating that Fite had become homeless and lost each of her six 

children to foster care, and admitted "a recent problem with both alcohol and drug abuse." Ex. 87 

to Ex. F at 2-3. The probation officer told the court that she had referred Fite "to a community 

health problem for psychotherapy, in view of her painful childhood experiences of rejection and 

abuse, about which she fantasizes and fabricates various accounts." Id.

The Court first notes that petitioner fails to establish that the July 1987 letter was available 

to defense counsel. Not only does petitioner admit that this evidence was never turned over by the 

prosecution, but a review of Exhibit 87 to Exhibit F reveals that the probation report was under 

seal. Even assuming that defense counsel somehow could have discovered the report and that it

constituted permissible impeachment evidence, petitioner suffered no prejudice from its absence at 

trial. Trial counsel extensively impeached Melva Fite and extensively argued to the jury in 

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summation that her testimony lacked credibility. Ex. B at 3514-18, 3521-24, 3526-30, 3534. That 

impeachment included evidence that Fite had a prior felony conviction for forgery, id. at 2744, 

2754, and the evidence that while Fite had told the police she could identify Glen Frazier's killer in 

person, at a physical lineup held on March 3, 1989, a lineup which included petitioner, she did not 

identify anyone and only expressed uncertainty about someone other than petitioner, id. at 2657-

58, 2661-68, 2744-47, 2758, 3235-40. The jury nevertheless believed Fite. It is not reasonably 

probable any additional impeachment evidence would have caused the jury to change its mind. 

See Brown v. Uttecht, 530 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We give 'great deference' to 

'counsel's decisions at trial'" regarding cross-examination of witnesses).17

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

v. Fite's Identification of Petitioner

At petitioner's guilt-phase trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Fite, at petitioner's 

preliminary hearing, identified petitioner as her attempted robber and as the murderer of Glen 

Frazier. Ex. B at 2659, 2668-70. At trial, Fite remained positive that petitioner was the assailant. 

Id. at 2656, 2659, 2762. Petitioner claims that defense counsel performed ineffectively in not 

retaining an expert on eyewitness identification to establish that Fite suffered from many of the 

biasing factors that taint identifications. Petition at 126-27.

As discussed above, the record shows that on cross-examination of Fite during her 

testimony in the prosecution's case-in-chief at the guilt phase, and also during the defense's guiltphase case, petitioner's attorneys established that on March 1, 1989, Fite viewed a photo lineup 

which included a picture of petitioner. She identified that picture as the assailant, but was not 

absolutely sure. Ex. B at 2656-57, 2659-61, 2751-52, 2757-58. Although Fite told the police that 

she could identify Frazier's killer in person, at a physical lineup held on March 3, 1989—a lineup 

that included petitioner—she did not identify anyone, and only expressed uncertainty about 

someone other than petitioner. Id. at 2657-58, 2661-68, 2744-47, 2758, 3235-40. As also 

 

17 The Court does not address petitioner's other claims that counsel failed to investigate evidence 

relating to Fite as all the claims relate to information on Fite post-dating petitioner's trial. See

Petition at 126 n.33.

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discussed above, defense counsel also vigorously attacked Fite's credibility and identification in 

guilt-phase summation:

Melva Fite says oh, no, same guy. I would recognize him if I saw him in a

lineup.

Well, she was shown a lineup on the Third of March. She was shown a lineup

at the Oakland Police Department. The photographs are here. You can look at them.

It looks just like this man here. He was not quite as heavy as he was now. He has

been consuming jail food for the last year and a half. And he hasn't gotten much exercise, 

so he is heavier now. But he looks exactly the same otherwise. His face is

exactly the same. And she didn't pick him out. As a matter of fact, she not only

didn't pick him out, but she picked out somebody else, a filler as being the person by

question mark, mind you, not with an "X," but a question mark.

But she didn't even indicate to any degree that this man was responsible.

Sure, when she got to Oakland Municipal Court in January of last year, after all

he is sitting at the counsel table. He is the only Black in front of the counsel rail. He

is sitting at the counsel table between [co-counsel] and myself and she says that is the

man.

Well, he is accused of these crimes. Everybody knows who he is at that time

and she knows who he is at that time. So she is reinforcing her identification. Yeah,

that is him. And in court she has no trouble. That is him. Well, God, if we had

somebody else in here we were defending, we would be in the wrong courtroom. It

has to be [petitioner]. Who else are we defending in this case?

Ex. B at 3517-18.

On this record, the state court reasonably rejected this claim. Trial counsel did not 

demonstrate incompetence by deciding to address the accuracy of the identification made by 

Melva Fite through argument, rather than through expert testimony. Such testimony was not 

guaranteed to be helpful to the defense, especially after it was subjected to cross-examination. As 

quoted above, during summation trial counsel devoted attention to Fite's eyewitness identification 

of petitioner, and listed factors the jury could consider in determining the accuracy of the

identification evidence. Apart from the portion of the argument quoted above, counsel continued

to vigorously attack Fite's credibility, relying on certain inconsistent statements and alleged

implausibilities in her account of the morning of January 30, 1989. Ex. B at 3521-24, 3526-30,

3534. A decision to appeal to the jury's common sense, rather than to attempt to impress them

with expert testimony, does not demonstrate incompetence, but is instead a rational tactical choice.

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See e.g., Cantu v. Collins, 967 F.2d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Smith, 772 F.2d 668, 674

(11th Cir. 1985). In any event, petitioner again fails to establish what an identification expert 

would have said at trial.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

vi. Where Bullet Entered Glen Frazier

Petitioner claims counsel "failed to adequately investigate, develop, and challenge the 

prosecution theory regarding the manner in which" Glen Frazier was killed. Petition at 128. 

Petitioner notes that the pathologist testified that the bullet wound to Frazier was consistent with 

him having been shot from behind while down on his hands and knees. Ex. B at 2621. Because 

Melva Fite, Patrick Jackson, and Delores White all testified that the perpetrator was facing Frazier 

at the time he shot him, petitioner proffers that the sole explanation for this discrepancy "is that the 

perpetrator fired the shot downward, either at Frazier's legs or at the sidewalk itself, and the bullet 

caromed off the sidewalk and a short retaining wall behind the spot where Frazier was kneeling 

before striking Frazier in the back." Petition at 128 (citing Ex. 108 to Ex. F). According to 

petitioner, 

In spite of this discrepancy in the testimony and the obvious implications of the

only logical explanation, counsel did not retain a criminalist, further investigate,

develop, or present evidence, or cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses regarding

this matter. This evidence would have been crucial because it would have demonstrated 

that even if petitioner had been the perpetrator, the perpetrator did not intend to kill 

Frazier.

Id.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this ineffectiveness claim. Petitioner

presents nothing to support his claim that the bullet which killed Glen Frazier entered his back 

after careening off the sidewalk and a retaining wall. Presumably counsel recognized that even if 

they could somehow establish from the bullet trajectory that petitioner had no intent to kill Frazier

when he shot him, petitioner was still guilty of first degree murder under the prosecution's felonymurder theory.18

 Ex. B at 3479-81; Cal. Penal Code § 189.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

 

18 The prosecution's felony-murder theory is discussed more at section III.B.7.f, ante.

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vii. Investigation of Patrick Jackson

As noted earlier, defense counsel argued to the jury in summation that based upon the 

evidence before the jurors there existed a reasonable doubt that any robbery of Melva Fite or Glen 

Frazier took place, and that the most reasonable inference from the evidence was that it was 

Patrick Jackson, and not petitioner, who shot and killed Glen Frazier. Ex. B at 3514-35. 

Petitioner now alleges that "Patrick Jackson, not petitioner, killed Glen Frazier." Petition at 129. 

Petitioner claims that "[c]ounsel could have discovered this information through interviews with

Jackson himself and through a complete investigation into the incident." Id.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this allegation of guilt-phase

investigation because petitioner does not offer the necessary declaration from Patrick Jackson or

any other evidence suggesting Jackson would have confessed to killing Glen Frazier to petitioner's 

attorneys. Nor does petitioner offer details as to what counsel should have done to conduct a more 

"complete investigation" that would have led to the discovery of admissible evidence conclusively 

proving that Jackson killed Frazier. Petitioner does present the declaration of his mother, who 

avers that Patrick Jackson confessed to her in 2001 that he killed Frazier. Ex. 62 to Ex. F. There 

is no evidence that any such confession was available eleven years earlier, at the time of trial.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

c. Crimes Against Sylvester Davis, Luther Thomas, and Gerald Livingston

Petitioner alleges the following claims of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

investigation of the attempted murder of Luther Thomas, the robbery of Gerald Livingston, and 

the murder of Sylvester Davis (counts 6, 7, and 8).

i. Investigation of Other Perpetrators

The crimes comprising counts 6, 7, and 8 occurred at 2661 74th Avenue in Oakland on the

morning of February 19, 1989. Petitioner faults counsel for not discovering the exculpatory 

"evidence" that petitioner claims the prosecution withheld in violation of Brady: (1) that on 

December 14, 1988, "gunmen" entered 2661 74th Avenue, "robbed the house," and shot one of the 

occupants, Ex. 51 to Ex. F at 1, ¶ 4, and (2) that on February 17, 1989, at about 5:00 a.m., J.L. 

Batiste and Tyrice Ross were in 2661 74th Avenue when two masked men with guns entered. 

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Batiste declares: "The men wore black ski masks, but I could tell they were black men by their

voices. They were much taller and bigger than I was, but I cannot accurately estimate their height

today. One of them said 'Give me the money. Give me the dope.' He repeated this several times.

They also said, 'don't be looking at us,' and made us lie down on the floor. I told them we didn't

have any money or dope, and they warned us, 'Don't sell dope out of this place no more.' They

then left the house." Ex. 51 to Ex. F at 2, ¶ 8; see also Ex. 64 to Ex. F at 2, ¶ 7.

According to petitioner, the above shows that on February 19, 1989:

. . . more than one perpetrator was present at the scene of the offense at the time the

offense was committed; that the offense was committed by drug suppliers who were

upset with JL Batiste, the operator of the crack house, for selling drugs purchased

from other suppliers in their turf; that Batiste, not Davis, was the intended target of

the perpetrators; that previous shootings and robberies had occurred at the crack

house shortly before this incident; and that the perpetrators warned and threatened

Batiste and others that they would return and kill Batiste if he continued to sell the

wrong drugs there; and that the eyewitness identification testimony of Luther Thomas

and Gerald Livingston was inherently unreliable.

Petition at 129, ¶ 292.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim. First, as petitioner himself 

conceded above, defense counsel was not aware of the earlier offenses occurring at 2661 74th 

Avenue, and, as discussed above, it appears that the February 17 incident was never reported to 

the police. Defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to interview the occupants of the house 

because they were likely hostile to the defense and unlikely to cooperate.

Further, there exists no reasonable probability—that is, no probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome—that had counsel presented the jury with the evidence of 

other crimes at 2661 74th Avenue petitioner would have received a different result on counts 6, 7, 

and 8. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692- 94. Specifically, it is not reasonably probable that, had the jury 

learned that a robbery and shooting occurred at 2661 74th Avenue on December 14, 1988, by 

unidentified "gunmen," it would have had a reasonable doubt in the testimony of Luther Thomas 

and Gerald Livingston identifying petitioner as the perpetrator of the attempted murder, robbery, 

and murder which occurred at 2661 74th Avenue on February 19, 1989. The same reasoning 

applies to what allegedly occurred on February 17, 1989.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

ii. Thomas and Livingston Identifications

Last, petitioner claims defense counsel should have hired an expert to demonstrate that the 

identifications of petitioner by Thomas and Livingston were unreliable. Petition at 130-31. The 

record shows the following: Livingston described his February 19, 1989 assailant as being about 

six feet tall, and wearing a red shirt with a black waist-length "Members Only" jacket and a dark 

knit Navy-style beanie. Ex. B at 2891, 2894, 2914-17, 2920. Thomas described his perpetrator as 

being in his early twenties, between five feet six inches and five feet eight inches tall, about 155 

pounds, and wearing a dark three-quarter length coat with a hood and a New York Yankees cap. 

Ex. B at 2979, 3000-02.

Defense counsel stressed all of this in summation, arguing that because of the disparate

descriptions by Thomas and Livingston, and because of Thomas's statement to police that "they"

(not a he) had come to the front door of the residence, there existed evidence of multiple

perpetrators. And, because there existed no direct evidence of who shot Sylvester Davis, there 

existed reasonable doubt as to petitioner's guilt of that murder charge, especially considering that

the prosecution's theory was that petitioner was the direct perpetrator. Ex. B at 3547-3600.

Counsel also stressed to the jury that they had reason to doubt the accuracy of Livingston's

identification given his cocaine ingestion on the evening in question, and given that while he

identified petitioner at the live lineup, he had failed to identify petitioner at the photo lineup. Id.

at 3563-64, 3575-77. "Ask yourself one question. Five days later he goes and sees a lineup. Is it

possible, perhaps, that the person he sees in the lineup is the person, one of the people he saw in

the photo? Is that what activates him, his mind process, as opposed to being the person who he

saw at the time?" Id. at 3576.

On this record, the state court reasonably rejected this claim. As with the other 

identifications discussed above, counsel did not demonstrate incompetence by deciding to address 

the accuracy of the Thomas and Livingston identifications through argument, rather than expert 

testimony. Such testimony would have been subject to cross-examination and was not guaranteed 

to help the defense. Petitioner again fails to establish what an identification expert would have 

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said at trial.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

d. Cumulative Error

Petitioner's cumulative error argument is also without merit. In some cases, although no 

single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors 

may still prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. Alcala v. Woodford, 

334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003). Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when 

the government's case is weak. United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). In this 

instance, as discussed above, many of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

based upon conclusory and unsupported allegations. In every other case, the Court has found that 

counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Where there is 

no single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011); Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

7. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilt Phase Performance

Petitioner asserts multiple claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, all of which 

variously allege that counsel provided prejudicially deficient "guilt-phase performance." Petition 

at 132-53. Petitioner presented this claim only on state habeas to the California Supreme Court, 

which summarily denied it on the merits. 

a. Petitioner's Alias

Petitioner's first claim of guilt-phase performance ineffectiveness concerns an alleged 

"alias," i.e., "Robert Carter." Petition at 133-36. Specifically, petitioner claims that counsel not 

only failed to consistently use his true name, "Robert Young," but also failed to object to the use 

of the "a.k.a. Robert Carter" in the Information; failed to move for an order prohibiting reference 

to the "a.k.a." before the jury; failed to object when the prosecutor and witnesses referred to 

petitioner as "Robert Carter " in front of the jury; and repeatedly referred to petitioner as "Robert 

Carter." Id. Petitioner argues that counsel's reference to petitioner by an alias was

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prejudicial not only because it suggested that petitioner was a member of the supposed "criminal 

class," but also because it provided non-evidentiary support for the prosecutor's baseless argument 

that petitioner was "a gangster, an out and out gangster," and "a street gangster." Id. at 135-36 

(citing Ex. B at 4044, 4050).

The record confirms that witnesses referred to petitioner as "Robert Carter" and that at 

times both the prosecutor and defense counsel referred to petitioner as "Robert Carter" (as well as 

"Robert Young"). See e.g., Ex. B at 2332, 2767, 2926, 3116, 3121, 3127, 3137, 3141, 3143, 3144, 

3211, 3240, 3748, 3762, 3772, 3779. However, the California Supreme Court reasonably rejected 

this claim of guilt-phase performance ineffectiveness. No reason for the existence or use of 

"Carter" was ever elicited or otherwise given to the jury. In other words, no evidence was ever 

presented explaining why petitioner had the last name "Carter" in addition to "Young," and no 

evidence was ever presented as to the significance of the "Carter" name. The trial court instructed 

the jury that it could decide the issues in this case based only on the evidence presented. Ex. B at

3653. Because there existed no evidence regarding the significance of why petitioner was known 

as "Robert Carter," the alias had no probative value and could not have been prejudicial. The

prosecutor never made any argument that petitioner's use of a second last name inculpated him. 

For the jury to have reached any conclusions about petitioner having the name "Carter" in addition 

to "Young," the jury would have had to engage in speculation, contrary to the instructions given 

them. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (jury is presumed to have followed the 

trial court's instructions). Even assuming that the jury did draw unsupported conclusions from the 

alias, the evidence against petitioner was strong enough that it cannot be said that the alias tilted 

the balance against petitioner.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

b. Ballistics Expert

Petitioner's next several allegations of guilt-phase performance ineffectiveness concern the 

prosecution's ballistics evidence. Petition at 136-40. More specifically, petitioner alleges that 

because the ballistics and tool-mark evidence was so crucial, defense counsel Selvin and Meloling 

were "obliged, at a minimum," to retain their own ballistics expert; have that expert examine the 

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bullets in evidence to either confirm or dispute the conclusions of the prosecutor's ballistics expert, 

criminalist Chester Young; have the expert assist in cross-examination of Young; and have the 

expert testify. Petition at 136-37, ¶ 302, 304. Petitioner also claims that counsel "deficiently"

addressed the prosecution's ballistics evidence, in that counsel did not challenge "the scientific 

validity of bullet matching" in part through a "Kelly/Frye" motion. Id. at 136, 140, ¶¶ 302, 311.19

Petitioner claims counsel should have used a ballistics expert of their own to emphasize through 

testimony that Young was offering only opinions—and ones based on "questionable assumptions"

at that. Petition at 137-38, ¶ 305-06. Petitioner faults counsel for not cross-examining Young 

"with respect to his demonstrable bias," and particularly faults counsel for acknowledging the 

expertise of Young by agreeing to stipulate to his qualification as an expert. Id. at 139-40, ¶¶ 309-

10. According to petitioner "there was no conceivable reason for the defense to actually endorse 

the expertise of this prosecution witness and enhance his credibility in the eyes of the jurors." Id.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected these allegations of guilt-phase 

performance ineffectiveness. Trial counsel could have reasonably believed that they could gain 

credibility with the jury by endorsing the qualifications of Chester Young and his ballistics

opinions in this case. Indeed, Young was so well-respected as a firearms identification expert that 

the trial court remarked that if the defense would not stipulate to his expertise, the court "would 

take judicial notice of it." Ex. B at 3032.

In any event, the record makes clear defense counsels' strategy with respect to Young and 

the ballistics evidence. The defense wanted to emphasize Young's expertise and experience 

because, as counsel explored with Young during cross-examination, a determination of whether 

fired bullets match by examining their striations, "depends on the experience of the examiner." 

Ex. B at 3095. And, as defense counsel also probed with Young, a very experienced examiner like 

himself could classify only two of the bullets as positively matching (the Miller mantel bullet and 

the Rivers body bullet—two bullets counsel urged Patrick Jackson fired), notwithstanding Young's 

 

19 The California Supreme Court in People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 (1976), held that when faced 

with a novel method of proof, there must be a "preliminary showing of general acceptance of the 

new technique in the scientific community." Id. at 30; see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 

(D.C. Cir. 1923).

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"strong suspicion" or belief in the likelihood that the same gun had fired all six bullets at issue in 

this case:

Q. Well, as an expert Mr. Young, you were looking at these bullets to

determine whether or not, in fact, they were fired from the same gun; isn't that true?

A. Well, it is not all black and white. There is a gray area in between. And

this falls in the gray area closer to one end than the other end.

Q. It is in a gray area?

A. It is in a gray end closer to the match than not match.

Q. But is still not a match?

A. Correct.

Q. Because you are not satisfied that it is a match?

A. Correct.

Q. And you are the expert, right?

A. Yes.

Ex. B at 3100. In summation, defense counsel vigorously argued that the "gray area" referred to 

by Chester Young could not equal proof beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner committed all 

the shootings in this case. Ex. B at 3535-40. Thus, petitioner's current criticisms establish nothing 

but hindsight disagreement with an unsuccessful trial tactic, which is insufficient to sustain an 

ineffectiveness finding. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984) (tactical 

decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance simply because, in retrospect, better tactics are 

known to have been available).

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that no relief

was warranted because petitioner failed to present evidence demonstrating that a defense ballistics 

expert would have yielded a more favorable result. The Court does not read petitioner's only 

supporting evidence, the 2002 Criminal Law Bulletin article, see Ex. 1 to Ex. F, as containing 

information that would have led counsel to information in 1989 that would have sustained a 

successful Kelly/Frye motion precluding Young from offering his opinions. And petitioner 

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provides no declaration from any expert stating he or she would have so testified at trial, which is 

fatal to his claim. See Allen, 395 F.3d at 1002 n.2; Dows, 211 F.3d at 486; Grisby, 130 F.3d at 

373 (noting "[s]peculation about what an expert could have said is not enough to establish 

prejudice").

Finally, although petitioner maintains trial counsel could have asked cross-examination 

questions to explore Chester Young's "demonstrable bias" as a former employee of the Oakland 

Police Department and should not have stipulated to criminalist Young's expert qualifications as 

they did, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably found that it was not reasonably 

probable such further questioning or challenge to his qualifications would have led the jury to 

reject Young's opinions. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

c. Competency Proceedings

Petitioner next claims that by the end of the guilt phase counsel were aware of substantial 

evidence that petitioner was incapable, because of mental disease or defect, of understanding the 

nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense, such that counsel should have 

moved for a competency hearing. Petition at 140-41. Petitioner states the following as evidence 

of his incompetence to stand trial:

On October 6, 1990, three days before the defense rested its case, Dr. Robert

Kaufman, a neuropsychologist who had examined petitioner for the defense,

completed a report of his findings. In that report, Kaufman concluded that petitioner

had a total IQ score of only 75, placing petitioner in what Kaufman stated was the

borderline range of intelligence, at just the fifth percentile among adults nationwide.

However, Kaufman found that petitioner's verbal IQ of 73 placed him in only the

fourth percentile for his age group. His subtests in this area were "uniformly poor"

and "especially impaired" in the areas of acquired general knowledge and

comprehension. Petitioner could not correctly state the number of weeks in a year or

name recent presidents of the United States. He was unable to define simple words

and had only a "marginal vocabulary." His standard scores were the equivalent of

those of a fourth-grader. Kaufman found that petitioner demonstrated "compromise

in higher-level reasoning skills" and "compromised brain functioning."

Petition at 140-41, ¶ 312 (citing Ex. 98 to Ex. F).

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim. Dr. Kaufman never 

expressed an opinion that petitioner was not competent to stand trial. To the contrary, Dr. 

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Kaufman's report specifically states:

[Petitioner] appeared to be well-oriented to time, person, and place and displayed no signs 

of impairment in logical thought processes. He was able to communicate his thoughts and 

appear to understand all instructions and questions posed to him.... [Petitioner's] thought 

processes appeared to be logical and sequential, though he had some difficulty 

remembering some dates regarding his past.

Ex. 98 to Ex. F.

Indeed, the California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, specifically rejected a penalty 

phase claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a competency 

hearing. People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1214-18. Significantly, the state court noted that Dr. 

Kaufman made no diagnosis that petitioner suffered from a developmental disability and 

specifically testified that petitioner was not suffering from a thought disorder. See id. The Court 

has reviewed the state court's analysis and finds that its basis for denying relief was objectively 

reasonable. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

d. Crimes Against Manzine Miller and Terry Rivers

With respect to the Manzine Miller assault and robbery (counts 2 and 3) and Terry Rivers 

homicide (count 1), petitioner claims that "counsel failed to competently investigate evidence 

demonstrating that petitioner was not present at the scene of the incident, evidence undermining 

the credibility of Manzine Miller, or substantial evidence of third party culpability." Petition at 

141. This claim repeats several of petitioner's allegations of guilt-phase investigation 

ineffectiveness. It fails here for the same reasons discussed above. See discussion at III.B.6.a, 

supra.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

e. Physical Impossibility Defense

Petitioner next claims that trial counsel failed to "develop and present" the "physical 

impossibility" evidence, i.e., the medical records showing that petitioner had badly sprained both 

ankles on January 2, 1989. Petition at 142. For the reasons this claim failed as an allegation of 

guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness it fails as an allegation of guilt-phase performance 

ineffectiveness. See discussion at III.B.6.a.viii, supra.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

f. Failure to Argue Against Felony Murder Instruction

The trial court instructed the jury on robbery, in part, as follows:

The commission of the crime of robbery is not confined to a fixed place or a

limited period of time.

A robbery is still in progress after the original taking of physical possession of

the stolen property while the perpetrator is in possession of the stolen property and

fleeing in an attempt to escape. Likewise, it is still in progress so long as the

immediate pursuers are attempting to capture the perpetrator or regain the stolen

property.

A robbery is complete when the perpetrator has alluded [sic] any pursuers, has

reached a place of temporary safety, and is in unchallenged possession of the stolen

property after having affected [sic] an escape with such property.

Ex. B at 3686.

The jury convicted petitioner on count 1 of the first degree murder of Terry Rivers, either

under a premeditation-deliberation theory or a felony-murder (robbery) theory. Ex. B at 3480,

3670-73, 3719. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that petitioner killed

Rivers during the commission of a robbery. Id. at 3719-20.

Petitioner claims that even if there was sufficient evidence that he shot Manzine Miller

and shot and killed Terry Rivers, there was insufficient evidence that he committed the crimes

during the commission of a robbery, and trial counsel Selvin and Meloling performed ineffectively 

in not making such an argument. Petition at 142-45. More specifically, according to petitioner, 

there was no evidence that his leaving the scene of the Miller robbery and walking to the front of 

Miller's home was a flight or an escape from that robbery. "Here there was nothing to 'escape'

from. The Miller shooting occurred in an unlighted area in an overgrown vacant lot shielded from 

view from the street, and there were no other witnesses, real or apparent. Miller himself was 

unarmed, had been shot, and would certainly not have attempted to follow petitioner, nor was it 

likely that anyone else would [have] come walking through the area until the following day. Thus,

it is difficult to characterize petitioner's actions following the Miller shooting as 'flight.'" Id. at 

144, ¶ 319. And, petitioner continues: "Certainly by the time he arrived at the sidewalk in front of 

Miller's house, if not sooner, petitioner had reached a place of temporary safety. Since petitioner 

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must have reached this location before the fatal shot was fired at Terry Rivers, the Rivers killing 

cannot have occurred during the flight after the Miller robbery." Id. at 145, ¶ 321.

The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that defense counsel were not

ineffective in failing to make the above arguments in guilt-phase summation. The record reflects

that defense counsel had a different theory. They argued to the jury that the most reasonable

interpretation of the evidence was that petitioner went into the swamp with Manzine Miller, but

he did not rob Miller and shot him only because he thought Miller was about to shoot first. Ex.

B at 3500-09, 3513. As stated earlier, trial counsel have great latitude to present a particular

theory of defense and present it via summation. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 790 ("There is a 'strong 

presumption' that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics 

rather than 'sheer neglect.'").

Second, the California Supreme Court reasonably rejected petitioner's claim that counsel

should have argued that there existed insufficient evidence to support the theory that he killed

Terry Rivers during the commission of the Manzine Miller robbery because, as the state high

court held on direct appeal, petitioner's view of the evidence is incorrect:

Defendant contends . . . that even if there existed sufficient evidence that he

killed Rivers, the evidence is insufficient to establish the murder occurred during the

commission of the Miller robbery.

We disagree. First, the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that defendant

robbed Miller—that is, defendant took property from Miller by means of force or

fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him of that property. ([Cal. Penal

Code] § 211.) Second, a rational trier of fact could have found the Miller robbery

was not complete when defendant shot and killed Rivers.

A robbery is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary

safety (People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 822), and the jury here was so instructed.

[] Miller testified Rivers had been "fandangling," i.e., selling fake drugs, in front of

the house and may have been outside at the time he left with defendant and headed

towards the "swamp" to buy some cocaine from one of his suppliers. The jury thus

could have reasonably inferred that defendant killed Rivers in order to eliminate a

potential witness against him in a prosecution for the robbery and attempted murder

of Miller. (See People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 365-368.) In addition,

because "[t]he scene of a robbery is not a place of temporary safety . . ." (People v.

Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375), the jury reasonably could have found

that the robbery was not yet complete at the front of Miller's house at 2:30 a.m.,

approximately 120 to 150 feet from the "swamp" where defendant had robbed

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Miller moments before.

Accordingly, the record contains sufficient evidence that defendant shot and

killed Rivers during the commission of a robbery, and thus committed first degree

murder under the theory of robbery felony murder.

Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1175-77. For all the reasons explicated in this analysis, defense counsel 

could have reasonably decided that arguing against a felony-murder finding, in relation to the 

Terry Rivers murder, would be futile.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

g. Admitting Petitioner's Presence

As noted above, defense counsel defended petitioner against the count 2 and count 3 

charges that he attempted to murder and robbed Manzine Miller by tacitly acknowledging that 

petitioner went into the swamp with Miller, but arguing that petitioner did not rob Miller and shot 

him only because he (petitioner) credibly felt that Miller was about to rob him. Ex. B at 3500-09, 

3513. Petitioner contends that this constituted prejudicial deficient performance. Petition at 145-

46. Petitioner elaborates: "There was no conceivable tactical reason for counsel to have made 

these admissions. Not only did they contradict what their client had told them, they also 

contradicted the medical evidence which counsel had in their files showing that petitioner could 

not have been the person who shot Miller. Counsel's improper concessions and admissions placed 

petitioner in a false light and greatly prejudiced his case." Id. at 146, ¶ 324.

The California Supreme Court could have reasonably rejected this claim as an improper

conclusory allegation of ineffectiveness. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789; Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05; James v. Borg, 24 F.3d at 26. Petitioner offers no declaration or other

evidence in support of his claim that he told counsel he did not shoot Miller. Dows v. Wood, 211

F.3d at 486; Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir. 2005) (no ineffectiveness absent 

affidavits from the omitted witnesses to show what favorable information they had); Allen v. 

Woodford, 395 F.3d at 1002 n.2. Petitioner also fails to offer support for the claim that medical 

evidence existed in counsel's files "showing that petitioner could not have been the person who 

shot Miller." To the extent he is referring to his ankle injury, the claim has been discussed and 

rejected above.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

h. Failure to Make "Claim of Right" Defense

Petitioner next contends that defense counsel "performed deficiently with regard to the 

Frazier homicide in failing to present evidence of the robbery of petitioner, argue a claim-of-right 

defense, or request an instruction on this theory." Petition at 146, ¶ 325. According to petitioner, 

"Had counsel argued this theory and requested appropriate instructions on it, counsel would have 

eliminated the first-degree felony murder verdict and the robbery special circumstance, and 

petitioner's conviction with respect to this count would have been for an offense no greater than 

second-degree murder." Id. at 147, ¶ 326. For the reasons this claim failed as an allegation of 

guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness, it fails as an allegation of guilt-phase performance 

ineffectiveness. See discussion at III.B.6.b.i, supra.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

i. Impeachment of Melva Fite

Petitioner next claims that counsel performed with unconstitutional ineffectiveness "in 

failing to impeach Melva Fite with evidence of her cocaine addiction, mental health problems, and 

other evidence of her lack of credibility." Petition at 147, ¶ 327. For the reasons this claim failed 

as an allegation of guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness, it fails as an allegation of guilt-phase 

performance ineffectiveness. See discussion at III.B.6.b.iii-iv, supra.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

j. Identification Expert

Petitioner claims. "Counsel also failed to impeach the credibility of the prosecution's

supposed eyewitnesses—Melva Fite, Gerald Livingston, Manzine Miller, and Luther Thomas—by

retaining and presenting an expert witness regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony."

Petition at 147-48, ¶ 328. For all of the reasons this claim failed when petitioner

presented it as a multi-pronged claim of guilt-phase investigation ineffectiveness, it fails here. See

discussion at III.B.6.a.i, III.B.6.b.v, and III.B.6.c.ii, supra.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

//

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k. Failure to Object to Prosecution's Closing Argument

Petitioner claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to all of 

the instances of misconduct committed by the prosecutor during his guilt-phase summation as 

alleged above. See discussion at III.B.3, supra. Petition at 148-49, ¶¶ 329-30. According to 

petitioner, "Although the prosecutor's argument to the jury—particularly his rebuttal argument at 

the guilt phase—was replete with abusive misconduct, counsel let much of this misconduct pass 

by without objection or comment." Id. at 148, ¶ 329.

The California Supreme Court had reasonable basis to deny this claim on state habeas 

because on direct appeal the state high court had already addressed each of the allegations of 

prosecutorial misconduct in summation on the merits, and concluded that some of the allegations 

were without merit, and others that were meritorious, either singly or cumulatively, were harmless. 

See People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1188-98. Petitioner (1) has not identified any unobjected-to 

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in summation that the California Supreme Court did not 

address on the merits on direct appeal; and (2) has not shown that such an allegation was 

meritorious and prejudicial. See also Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 1994) 

("'many trial lawyers refrain from objecting during closing argument to all but the most

egregious misstatements by opposing counsel on the theory that the jury may construe their

objections to be a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality'"); United States v. Necoechea, 986

F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Because many lawyers refrain from objecting during opening

statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during

closing argument and opening statement is within the 'wide range' of permissible professional

legal conduct.").

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

l. Failure to Object to Other Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that defense counsel performed deficiently in four more respects in 

failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct:

Counsel also failed to move in limine to prevent the prosecutor from referring

to the "Valente" bullet, which was not related to this case, but which the prosecutor

introduced into his questioning of Chester Young to insinuate that police suspected

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petitioner of a fourth killing. ([Exh. B at] 3049-3051.) Counsel also performed

deficiently in failing to request a jury admonition and mistrial when the prosecutor

questioned his expert on this subject. Counsel also performed deficiently in failing to

request a jury admonition and mistrial when the prosecutor committed egregious

misconduct in asking Patrick Jackson whether petitioner had admitted other killings,

in spite of the fact that the prosecutor had no good faith basis for this question. ([Exh.

B at] 2838-2841.) Counsel was also deficient in failing to object on explicit

prosecutorial misconduct grounds when Manzine Miller gratuitously testified that

petitioner had "no remorse" for shooting him. ([Exh. B at] 2502.)

Petition at 149-50, ¶ 331.

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim on state habeas because on 

direct appeal the state high court had already held that: (1) "the prosecutor's question about other 

killings was not improper"; (2) any prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the "Valente" bullet 

"was harmless given the stipulation that the Valente bullet had nothing to do with [petitioner]'s 

case"; and (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in questioning Manzine Miller in the way 

that led to Miller's "no remorse" response. See People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1185-88.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

m. .32 Caliber Weapon

When the police arrested petitioner on March 1, 1989, they searched his home pursuant to 

a warrant. They found a .32 caliber pistol in his bedroom, and a red and black jacket. Ex. B at 

3033, 3135-36. Petitioner alleges that defense counsel performed ineffectively by not objecting on 

relevance and undue prejudice grounds to the admission of the evidence of the .32 caliber weapon. 

Petition at 150, ¶ 332. Petitioner argues that because all of the fired bullets at the three crime 

scenes in this case were either of .38 caliber or .357 magnum character, "the .32 caliber gun found 

under the bed of a room which petitioner shared with his younger brother, Terrence, could not 

have been the weapon which fired these bullets." Id.

The California Supreme Court did not unreasonably reject this allegation of ineffective

assistance. Even assuming that counsel should have objected and that the objection would have 

been sustained, given all of the other properly admitted evidence of petitioner's guilt of the 

charged crimes in this case, it is not reasonably probable that petitioner would have received a 

more favorable verdict had counsel succeeded in preventing the jury from learning of the .32 

caliber weapon found in his bedroom. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692-94.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

n. Jury Instructions Regarding Aiding and Abetting

Petitioner claims that counsel "performed deficiently in failing to object or request 

clarification regarding the confusing jury instruction restricting consideration of aiding and 

abetting to 'the following four instructions.' (CALJIC No. 3.00; [Ex. A at] 918; [Ex. B at] 3675.)" 

Petition at 150, ¶ 333. Because this is the entirety of petitioner's present claim, the California 

Supreme Court could have reasonably rejected it as an improper conclusory claim that also made 

no attempt to establish prejudice from any deficient performance. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 

204-05; James v. Borg, 24 F.3d at 26.

Additionally, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that the

allegedly "confusing" jury instructions were not in fact confusing and therefore counsel did not

perform deficiently in failing to object to the instructions or request clarification. Indeed, the state 

court, on direct appeal, specifically denied petitioner's claim that the instructions were confusing:

Prior to instructing on aiding and abetting, the trial court stated: "The following four 

instructions should be considered by you only as they apply to counts four [attempted 

robbery of Fite] and five [Frazier murder]," followed by the relevant instructions.13

Immediately thereafter, the court instructed as to second degree murder pursuant to 

CALJIC No. 8.30. 

Fn 13: Specifically, the trial court read the following four instructions: (1) CALJIC 

No. 3.00 (Principals—Defined); (2) CALJIC No. 3.01 (Aiding and Abetting—

Defined); (3) CALJIC No. 3.02 (Principals—Liability for Natural and Probable 

Consequences); and (4) CALJIC No. 8.27 (First Degree Felony Murder—Aider 

and Abettor).

Defendant contends that based on the above instructions, the trial court misinformed the 

jury that it could consider the instruction defining second degree murder only with regard 

to the Frazier murder, because the jury would have erroneously believed CALJIC No. 8.30 

was one of the "following four instructions" to be considered only as it applied to count 4 

(attempted robbery of Fite) and count 5 (Frazier murder).20 We reject the contention.

. . .

 

20 CALJIC 8.30 states: "Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human 

being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being 

but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation."

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The record contains no inquiries from the jury regarding the application of these 

instructions. We agree with respondent that if the instructions were susceptible of the 

interpretation defendant now asserts, counsel likely would have objected at trial on this 

basis. Such an omission suggests that " 'the potential for [confusion] argued now was not 

apparent to one on the spot.' " (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 535, 250 Cal.Rptr. 

550, 758 P.2d 1081 [failure to object to trial court's remarks about potential jury 

investigation suggested the potential for coercion was not discernible], quoting Lowenfield 

v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 240, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568.) Counsel's arguments, 

moreover, informed the jury that it could consider second degree murder as to the Rivers, 

Frazier, and Davis murders. Therefore, we find no basis to conclude the jury 

misinterpreted the above instructions or was confused in any manner as to the applicability 

of the second degree murder instruction to all of the charged murders. Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court did not erroneously limit the second degree murder instructions to 

the Frazier murder charge.

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1202-03.

Because the state court reasonably rejected the merits of petitioner's position on direct 

appeal that the instructions were confusing, it necessarily, and reasonably, rejected petitioner's 

habeas claim that counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the instructions and requesting 

clarification. "[T]rial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 

objection." Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the state court 

supported its finding in part on the very fact that counsel did not object, it also noted that the jury 

never asked for clarification and that counsel's arguments would have clarified any confusion.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

o. Instruction Regarding Patrick Jackson's Immunity

Petitioner claims that defense counsel "performed deficiently in failing to request a jury 

instruction informing the jury that the grant of immunity from prosecution to Patrick Jackson 

could be considered as reflecting negatively on his credibility." Petition at 150, ¶ 333. Petitioner 

argues that Jackson's testimony was the principal reason he was convicted on counts 1 through 5, 

and because three juror declarations show "confusion among the jurors with respect to why 

Jackson's immunity agreement was significant," "counsel's failure to request proper instructions . . 

. was prejudicial and contributed directly to petitioner's conviction. . . ." Id. at 150-51, ¶ 333.21

 

21 Declarations about jurors' “mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment” are generally 

inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). In any event, only one of the three juror declarations 

mentions Jackson and merely states, "[T]here was so much other evidence [sic] witnesses that 

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The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this allegation of ineffective

performance by counsel. The record shows that the trial court instructed the jury with the thenstandard instruction on witness credibility, CALJIC No. 2.20, which informed the jurors that they

could, in determining a witness's believability, consider, among other things, "the existence or

nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive." Ex. B at 3659-60. On four occasions during

closing argument defense counsel alluded to the fact that Patrick Jackson had testified for the

prosecution under a grant of immunity for murder, and suggested that the jury should consider

that fact as reflecting negatively on Jackson's credibility. Ex. B at 3499, 3512, 3514, 3518. The

trial court also instructed the jury that if petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that

Patrick Jackson was an accomplice to counts 1 through 5, the jury ought to view his testimony

with distrust. Ex. B at 3667-69.

Considering what counsel did to attack Patrick Jackson's credibility in summation, and

considering the instructions the trial court gave on Jackson's credibility, petitioner's claim that

counsel should have requested a more specific instruction (which petitioner does not set forth)

informing the jury that the grant of immunity to Jackson could be considered as reflecting

negatively on his credibility, is unpersuasive. Where the jury instructions that are given are not

improper and qualify as an accurate statement of the law, the failure of a defense attorney to

object or request additional instructions is not objectively unreasonable under Strickland.

Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

p. Failure to Pursue Writ Proceedings

Petitioner claims counsel failed to engage in interlocutory writ proceedings after the 

magistrate presiding over the preliminary hearing denied the defense motion to dismiss under 

section 995 of the California Penal Code. Petition at 151, ¶ 334. At petitioner's preliminary 

hearing in this case, Patrick Jackson, after answering a preliminary question about whether he 

knew petitioner, refused to answer any further questions. Ex. A at 429-31. The magistrate 

 

picked him out of a line. And his very own cousin turning him in." Ex. 145 to Ex. F at ¶ 5.

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informed Jackson that each time he refused to answer a question, after being ordered to do so by 

the court, he would be found in contempt and sentenced to five days in the county jail. Id. at 431.

After talking to his attorney Jackson still refused to testify. Ex. A at 432. The magistrate

proceeded to inform Jackson that he was going to begin contempt proceedings and then sentence

him for his refusal to obey a lawful court order. Id. The magistrate added: "Well, I guess Mr.

Jackson's ready to serve a long, long time because that's exactly what we're going to do to Mr.

Jackson." Id. After Jackson's counsel asked for and received a five-minute recess to discuss

matters further with Jackson, counsel announced that Jackson would testify. Id. at 432-33.

However, the crux of Jackson's subsequent testimony was that he did not remember much about

the events of January 30, 1989. The prosecution then played a taped statement for Jackson in an

attempt to refresh his recollection—a statement in which he inculpated petitioner in the attempted

robbery of Melva Fite and murder of Glen Frazier. Id. at 434-49, 475-82, 587-605. The

magistrate ultimately ruled that Jackson's "I can't remember" answers were "contrived

and I think that the entire tape is admissible as his prior inconsistent statement under the existing

case law." Id. at 440, 475-82.

After the preliminary hearing and the magistrate's holding of petitioner to answer, defense

counsel filed a motion under section 995 of the California Penal Code, asking the superior court to 

dismiss the Information, specifically counts 1, 4, and 5 (the murder of Terry Rivers, the attempted 

robbery of Melva Fite and Glen Frazier, and the murder of Frazier, respectively). Ex. A at 563-

605. Counsel argued that petitioner had been denied a substantial right at the preliminary hearing 

because the magistrate had coerced testimony out of Patrick Jackson ("creating the vehicle 

whereby the prosecution could introduce the witness' prior inconsistent statement") as if the 

magistrate were a second prosecutor. When that testimony and taped statement were removed 

from the case, defense counsel argued, there remained only evidence insufficient to support counts 

1, 4, and 5. Id. Defense counsel further argued that the coercion occurred when the magistrate 

erroneously threatened Jackson with contempt punishment the law does not permit. In In re 

Keller, 49 Cal. App. 3d 663, 670-71 (1975), the state appellate court held that a witness who 

makes it clear he or she will answer no questions regarding an incident can be punished for only 

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one contempt (with a maximum punishment of five days' imprisonment or a fine or both, see Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 1218), and not for each refusal to answer a particular question relating to the 

incident. The magistrate can also jail the witness while the hearing is in process, id., or request 

that the witness be prosecuted for a violation of section 166(a)(6) of the California Penal Code. In 

re Keller, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 670.

The superior court denied the section 995 dismissal motion, Ex. A at 612, and petitioner 

now claims that counsel "performed deficiently in failing to engage in interlocutory writ 

proceedings" challenging the superior court's denial of the section 995 dismissal motion. Petition 

at 151, ¶ 334. According to petitioner, the magistrate's actions at the preliminary hearing were 

"clearly in excess" of his "jurisdiction and abusive," and therefore the dismissal motion "was 

meritorious and should have been pursued." Id. Petitioner further claims that by failing to bring 

writ proceedings following the superior court's denial of the dismissal motion, trial counsel 

"waived the issue for appeal." Id. (citing People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 529 (1980)).

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim of ineffectiveness. First, 

failure to pursue writ proceedings from the denial of the section 995 motion did not waive the 

issue on appeal as petitioner now claims. Where the defendant is denied a substantial right at the 

preliminary hearing, such a denial would support the setting aside of the information. But it is the 

defendant's failure to make a section 995 motion at all that waives the issue on appeal. See People 

v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1148 (1987) (failure to raise logical impossibility of special 

circumstance allegation), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (c), (d), as stated in

People v. Mil, 53 Cal. 4th 400, 408 (2012). In Pompa-Ortiz, the case cited by petitioner, the 

California Supreme Court discarded a per se reversal rule in the context of pretrial error 

correctable by pretrial writ. The court overruled previous cases which assumed that preliminary 

hearing error could not be cured by a fair trial and adopted the requirement that prejudice must be 

shown when a defendant raises the erroneous denial of a section 995 motion on appeal from the 

resulting conviction. No prejudice need be shown if a pretrial writ seeks review of the denial of 

the section 995 motion. 

Second, defense counsel may have reasonably believed that a writ proceeding would be 

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unsuccessful and opted not to use their limited time and resources to pursue a writ. Under 

California law, on review by appeal or writ, the reviewing court in effect ignores the superior 

court's ruling on the section 995 motion, and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate 

holding the defendant to answer. People v. Laiwa, 34 Cal. 3d 711, 718 (1983). An appellate court 

affirms the denial of a section 995 motion even if the magistrate considered inadmissible evidence, 

if the remaining admissible evidence was such that it could have sufficiently led the magistrate to 

conclude that probable cause existed. Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 8 (1955). Here, 

there existed evidence apart from Jackson's taped statement sufficient to sustain the holding order 

as to counts 4 and 5. Victim Melva Fite identified petitioner as the perpetrator of those crimes in 

court at his preliminary hearing. Ex. A at 338-39. And, once sufficient cause existed to believe 

petitioner in fact shot Glen Frazier (count 5), that circumstantially provided the probable cause 

that he was responsible for the Rivers murder (count 1), given the ballistics evidence that 

positively matched the bullet taken from Frazier with one of the bullets fired at Rivers, and given 

the evidence that petitioner was present at the Rivers murder scene (moments earlier he had shot 

Manzine Miller). Ex. A at 193-209, 297-99.

If a defense attorney does not perform in violation of Strickland when he or she does not

make an objection that has no merit, Juan H v. Allen, 408 F.3d at 1273, then counsel may 

reasonably refrain from pursuing writ proceedings of dubious merit.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

q. Jury Selection

Petitioner claims counsel performed deficiently during jury voir dire and jury selection 

proceedings because while counsel "made a Batson motion to challenge the prosecutor's removal 

of all the African-American women from the jury," counsel "failed to make an adequate record 

regarding the composition of the jury," and failed to make an adequate record regarding "the 

prosecutor's purported investigation of prospective juror [D.D.]." Petition at 151, ¶ 335.

The state court reasonably rejected these two claims of ineffective assistance. First, they 

are conclusory and unsupported by any specifics. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05; James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d at 26. Further, the California Supreme Court reasonably held on direct appeal that 

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the trial court properly denied the defense's Batson/Wheeler motion. People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 

at 1170-74. Petitioner has not only wholly failed to establish on habeas corpus how counsel 

"failed to make an adequate record regarding the composition of the jury," but he has failed to 

demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the 

Wheeler motion had counsel made the unidentified "adequate" record regarding the composition 

of the jury. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692-94. This same conclusion applies to 

petitioner's claim that counsel failed to make an adequate record regarding the prosecutor's 

purported investigation of prospective juror D.D.22

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

r. Deficiency in Closing Argument

Petitioner claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in presenting a closing 

argument that was wanting in three ways: (1) counsel failed "to argue persuasively" that the man 

who shot from the southwest bedroom of the house on 74th Avenue could not have shot Sylvester 

Davis because his view of Davis would have been entirely blocked by the camellia bush next to 

that window; (2) counsel "failed to argue that petitioner had a nonviolent record and no record of 

firearm use and that the prosecutor's theory that he would suddenly kill three people for no reason 

within the space of three weeks was therefore inherently implausible"; and (3) counsel 

"performed deficiently in failing to present and argue evidence that petitioner did not use crack 

cocaine and therefore did not have a drug-related motive to commit these killings." Petition at 

152-53, ¶ 336.

The state court had a reasonable basis to reject these claims. First, petitioner points to 

nothing in the record regarding the location of the purported camellia bush. In any event, trial 

counsel gave a lengthy argument expressing the defense position as to why petitioner was not 

 

22 Petitioner also alleges that counsel failed to conduct an adequate voir dire of the jurors

with respect to a number of penalty-phase issues, including (1) whether the jury truly understood

that a sentence of life without parole actually meant that petitioner would die in prison, and 

(2) whether the jury truly understood that the life- or death-sentence decision resided with them, 

and that a death verdict was not required under any circumstance. Petition at 151-52, ¶ 335.

Petitioner also faults counsel for not peremptorily challenging Juror A.M., "based upon his view

on the death penalty." Id. The Court does not address these allegations, given that petitioner

has already received penalty-phase relief in state court.

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guilty of the Davis homicide. Ex. B at 3547-3600. The jury rejected this position. Given the 

strong evidence of petitioner's guilt, there exists no reasonable probability the jury would have 

returned a not-guilty verdict had counsel focused on the presence of the camellia bush in 

argument. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692-94.

Second, it is improper for lawyers to argue in summation "facts" that were not presented as 

evidence. Thus, counsel did not perform ineffectively at the guilt phase in not arguing that 

petitioner had a nonviolent record and no record of firearm use because there was no evidence in 

the guilt-phase record concerning his past. Nor would such an argument have affected the 

outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692-94.

Third, concerning petitioner's claim that defense counsel performed deficiently in failing to 

present and argue evidence that petitioner did not use crack cocaine and therefore did not have a

drug-related motive to commit these killings, that claim fails as conclusory. Petitioner does not

substantiate his premise that he did not use crack cocaine by pointing to the admissible evidence

counsel could have used to prove that fact. Presumably counsel knew from Dr. Kaufman what

petitioner had told him: That beginning at age 18, petitioner began using alcohol and drugs

almost continuously. Ex. B at 3911.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

s. Failure to Request Funding

Petitioner next claims: "To the extent that counsel's failure to conduct adequate 

investigation or perform competently with respect to any of the enumerated instances of deficient 

performance can be attributed to a lack of funding or resources, counsel performed below the 

Sixth Amendment standard in unreasonably failing to request the necessary funds." Petition at 

153, § 337. The state court reasonably rejected this claim as hypothetical given the lack of 

information in the record pertaining to defense funding. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

t. Cronic Error

Petitioner's final claim of guilt-phase performance ineffectiveness is that the failings of 

counsel were, taken together, "so obviously below" the Strickland standard of care as to amount to

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a failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and merit habeas relief 

without a showing of prejudice. Petition at 153, ¶ 338 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 

648 (1984)).

 In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court held that where counsel's conduct is 

egregiously prejudicial, no showing that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would 

have been different is required, and prejudice and ineffective assistance are presumed. Cronic, 

466 U.S. at 658-62. These will be those rare cases where counsel "entirely fail[ed] to subject the 

prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 659.

The state court had a reasonable basis to reject this claim. No fair reading of the record 

leads to the conclusion that this was a Cronic case—that counsel Selvin and Meloling performed 

in such a way that a complete breakdown in the adversarial process occurred, resulting in the 

constructive absence of counsel. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

u. Cumulative Error

Petitioner's cumulative error argument is also without merit. As discussed above the Court 

has found that in every instance of alleged ineffective performance, petitioner's claims are 

unsupported or counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

The one exception was counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence of the .32 

caliber weapon found in petitioner's bedroom. Based on this record, the Court concludes that 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on a claim that he suffered cumulative prejudice from trial 

counsel's alleged various instances of ineffective assistance in guilt-phase performance.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

8. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Mental Health Evidence

Petitioner claims trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to competently investigate 

and present mental health evidence in his defense. Petition at 153-62. Petitioner presented this 

claim only on state habeas to the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied it on the 

merits. 

The record reflects that at petitioner's penalty-phase trial the defense presented extensive

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evidence regarding petitioner's mental health, including the evidence of the results of the testing

done on petitioner by defense neuropsychologist Dr. Robert Kaufman. That testing led Dr.

Kaufman to conclude that petitioner had an overall or full-scale I.Q. of 75, which fell in the fifth

percentile, a so-called "borderline" region. Ex. B at 3920. The "borderline" region, according

to Dr. Kaufman, is "just above what qualifies for mental retardation," although persons in that

range can hold jobs and live independently. Id. at 3920-21, 3930-31. Based on petitioner's 

performance on a range of tests, Dr. Kaufman's ultimate mental status determination of petitioner 

was "probable organic mental disorder not otherwise specified." Ex. B at 3913, 3960. In layman's 

terms, this meant petitioner had "borderline level intelligence" and "clear deficits" in his 

"executive functioning," i.e., problems in his ability to accurately perceive social situations and 

develop strategies to solve problems. Id. at 3960-63. Petitioner was generally logical, however, 

and his behavior generally appropriate. Id. at 3966.

Petitioner faults counsel for not hiring Dr. Kaufman until August 1990, when jury selection 

was already underway. Petition at 157. Petitioner contends that had counsel hired Dr. Kaufman 

earlier, they could have made more effective use of his testing. Id. at 158. According to 

petitioner, "an accurate and timely assessment of petitioner's mental condition would have shown 

that petitioner was not competent to stand trial [and] did not actually form the mental states

required for first degree murder." Id. at 161, ¶ 352.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. First, as discussed above, Dr. 

Kaufman never expressed an opinion that petitioner was not competent to stand trial, and the 

California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, specifically rejected a penalty-phase claim that 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a competency hearing. Regarding 

petitioner's mental defense argument, the presentation of mental health evidence in California 

criminal trials is controlled in part by sections 25, 28, and 29 of the California Penal Code. These 

statutes provide in relevant part:

The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as

well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's

intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show

or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought,

knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.

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Cal. Penal Code § 25(a).

Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be

admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not

limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice

aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease,

mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not

the accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or

harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.

Cal. Penal Code § 28(a).

In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant's

mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the

defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are not

limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes

charged. The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required

mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact.

Cal. Penal Code § 29.

Here, while petitioner claims that the mental health evidence counsel failed to competently

investigate and present would have shown that he "lacked the capacity to form, and therefore did

not actually form, the mental states required for first degree murder," Petition at 161, ¶ 352,

petitioner makes that argument in conclusory fashion only. And the above-cited statutes show no 

reasonable probability that had the jury been aware of the mental health evidence he identifies, it 

would have concluded he did not have the required mental states for conviction when he acted as

charged on January 30 and February 19, 1989.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

9. Trial Court Error in Admitting Rebuttal Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecution to present an 

"improper rebuttal" case in the testimony of one Delores White. Petition at 162-71. Petitioner 

made the same claim on direct appeal in the California Supreme Court. The state court 

summarized and rejected the claim as follows:

Prosecution witness Melva Fite testified on direct examination that defendant, holding a 

gun, had exited the driver's side of the vehicle before he approached Fite and Frazier on 

90th Avenue and shot Frazier. On cross-examination, Fite acknowledged she had provided 

oral and written statements to police that the passenger exited the vehicle and did the 

shooting on 89th Avenue and 90th Avenue and that the driver never exited the vehicle. 

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During the defense case, Officers Derrick Norfleet and Brian Thiem both confirmed that 

Fite had stated the shooter exited the passenger side of the vehicle on 89th Avenue and 

90th Avenue. In rebuttal, the prosecution sought to call Delores White to rehabilitate Fite's 

credibility by testifying that she (White) observed the man who shot Frazier on 90th 

Avenue exit the driver's side of the vehicle and that another man was in the passenger seat. 

Defendant objected to the rebuttal as improper because the defense impeached Fite's 

credibility on cross-examination and because White had been available to the prosecution 

during its case-in-chief. The prosecutor replied the proffered testimony was proper to 

rebut evidence presented by the defense in its own case-in-chief that corroborated its 

impeachment of Fite.

Pursuant to People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 753–754, 312 P.2d 665, the court ruled 

White's testimony admissible and more probative than prejudicial. On appeal, defendant 

contends that the trial court erred. We disagree.

The decision to admit rebuttal evidence rests largely within the discretion of the trial court 

and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of demonstrated abuse of that discretion. 

(§ 1093, subd. (d); People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1232, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 

P.2d 1210.) In People v. Carter, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pages 753–754, 312 P.2d 665, we 

stated "proper rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case in the 

prosecution's possession that tends to establish the defendant's commission of the crime. It 

is restricted to evidence made necessary by the defendant's case in the sense that he has 

introduced new evidence or made assertions that were not implicit in his denial of guilt."

Restrictions are imposed on rebuttal evidence (1) to ensure the presentation of evidence is 

orderly and avoids confusion of the jury; (2) to prevent the prosecution from unduly 

emphasizing the importance of certain evidence by introducing it at the end of the trial; and 

(3) to avoid "unfair surprise" to the defendant from confrontation with crucial evidence late 

in the trial. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1211, 249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 

795; Carter, at pp. 753–754, 312 P.2d 665.)

Here, White's testimony corroborated the portion of Fite's testimony that had been 

impeached by defense witnesses Norfleet and Thiem. The substance of White's testimony, 

therefore, had already been conveyed to the jury during the prosecution's case-in-chief. 

Testimony that repeats or fortifies a part of the prosecution's case that has been impeached 

by defense evidence may properly be admitted in rebuttal. (See, e.g., People v. Carrera

(1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 322, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121; People v. Graham (1978) 83 

Cal.App.3d 736, 741, 149 Cal.Rptr. 6, disapproved on another ground in People v. Guiuan

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) Further, as the trial court 

determined, the introduction of White's testimony in rebuttal did not implicate the concerns 

addressed in Carter. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the 

rebuttal testimony.

Defendant additionally contends the trial court's error in admitting the rebuttal testimony 

violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution 

to due process of law and a fair trial and also violated section 1093 (order of trial 

proceedings), thereby impairing his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest under Hicks v. 

Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175. Assuming these 

claims were properly preserved for review (see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117, 133, 

2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), they are without merit because we have concluded that 

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the trial court did not err in admitting the rebuttal testimony. For the same reason, his 

contention that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by reserving White's testimony for 

rebuttal is also meritless.

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1198-1200. 

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 

(9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). Due process is violated 

only if there are "no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence." Jammal v. Van 

de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court "has not yet made a clear ruling 

that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation 

sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2009). Even if an evidentiary error is of constitutional dimension, the court must consider whether 

the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638; Dillard v. 

Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, petitioner has not shown that a specific constitutional guarantee was violated or that 

he was denied a fair trial. The state court determined that White's testimony essentially fortified 

the prosecution's case-in-chief, making it proper rebuttal evidence under California case law. 

Because the jury could have drawn the "permissible inference" that White had no motive to lie 

about what she observed as well as the "permissible inference" that her observations connected 

petitioner to the Frazier murder, petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated. See Jammal, 

926 F.2d at 920. 

Finally, a review of the record demonstrates that the prosecutor's case against petitioner 

was strong, so that even if the admission of White's testimony in rebuttal constituted error, there 

was no due process violation. As discussed above, not only did Fite and the ballistics evidence 

inculpate petitioner as the perpetrator of the offenses against Fite and Frazier, but so did the 

testimony of petitioner's cousin, Patrick Jackson.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

//

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10. Insufficient Evidence – Terry Rivers Murder

Petitioner claims that there existed insufficient evidence to support the count 1 conviction 

for first degree murder of Terry Rivers. Petition at 171-91. More specifically, petitioner contends 

insufficient evidence existed that he was the perpetrator at all. Petitioner alternatively contends 

that even if the evidence sufficiently proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Terry Rivers, 

"the evidence was still insufficient to establish that the crime was first degree murder" under either 

of the first degree theories presented to the jury: premeditation-deliberation, and felony murder 

(robbery). Petition at 173, 184, ¶¶ 386, 409. Petitioner lastly contends that because there was

insufficient evidence that he killed Terry Rivers during the commission of a robbery, he is due 

habeas relief striking the robbery murder special circumstance. Petition at 173, 184, 191, ¶¶ 386, 

409, 427.

Petitioner made the same claim on direct appeal in the California Supreme Court. The 

state court summarized and rejected the claim as follows:

Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Terry Rivers. The jury was 

instructed it could convict defendant of first degree murder based on the theory of robbery 

felony murder or of premeditated and deliberate murder. Because the jury found true the 

special circumstance that defendant killed Rivers during the commission of a robbery, it 

necessarily sustained at least the felony-murder theory. Defendant contends, in substance, 

the evidence is insufficient under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the federal Constitution to support his conviction for the first degree murder of Terry 

Rivers under either theory.

"In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is 'whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " 

(Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 269, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897, quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) We apply an identical 

standard under the California Constitution. (Ibid.) "In determining whether a reasonable 

trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate 

court 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in 

support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence.' " (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 

P.2d 738.) The same standard also applies in cases in which the prosecution relies 

primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396, 133 

Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) 

"In California, the first degree felony-murder rule 'is a creature of statute.' [Citation.] 

When the prosecution establishes that a defendant killed while committing one of the 

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felonies section 189 lists [including robbery], 'by operation of the statute the killing is 

deemed to be first degree murder as a matter of law.' " (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 896, 908, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265.) Under the felony-murder rule, a strict 

causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder is not required; what is 

required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the felony and murder were part of one 

continuous transaction. (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 207, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 

91 P.3d 222.) This transaction may include a defendant's flight after the felony to a place 

of temporary safety. (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1015–1016, 248 

Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017; People v. Portillo (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 834, 846, 132 

Cal.Rptr.2d 435.) 

Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree murder 

conviction of Rivers under a robbery-felony-murder theory because it fails to establish he 

killed Rivers during the commission of the Miller robbery. Under the foregoing standard, 

and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a rational trier of fact 

could have concluded that defendant robbed and shot Miller and then killed Rivers before 

completing the Miller robbery.

Miller testified defendant robbed and then shot him around 2:30 a.m. on January 30, 1989. 

Defense counsel conceded during summation that defendant shot Miller and, on appeal, 

defendant concedes the evidence is sufficient to prove he shot Miller.

Miller testified that after defendant shot him, defendant walked back towards Miller's 

house. Miller heard three additional shots fired, from several seconds to 10 minutes later. 

He then began crawling towards East 23rd Street to get help.

Police discovered Rivers's body lying on the front porch of Miller's house, across the front 

entryway. Rivers was killed by a single .38–caliber bullet to the back of his head. A 

dozen small white rocks were found next to Rivers's body. A second .38–caliber bullet 

was removed from a living room wall in Miller's house. Police did not find a third bullet 

that had penetrated a door to the front porch. A police evidence technician estimated the 

distance between Miller's house and the area where defendant shot Miller to be 120 to 150 

feet.

From these circumstances, a trier of fact could reasonably infer that defendant shot and 

killed Rivers. The ballistics evidence solidified this conclusion. The prosecution's 

ballistics expert opined that, based on the presence of one or two rare "pseudo land 

impressions" on each of the bullets he examined, including the one taken from Miller's 

body, the one taken from Rivers's body, and the one taken from Miller's living room wall, 

all of the bullets were fired from the same gun.

Defendant contends further that even if there existed sufficient evidence that he killed 

Rivers, the evidence is insufficient to establish the murder occurred during the commission 

of the Miller robbery.

We disagree. First, the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that defendant robbed 

Miller—that is, defendant took property from Miller by means of force or fear with the 

specific intent to permanently deprive him of that property. (§ 211.) Second, a rational 

trier of fact could have found the Miller robbery was not complete when defendant shot 

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and killed Rivers.

A robbery is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety (People 

v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 822, 103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7), and the jury here was so 

instructed. Miller testified Rivers had been "fandangling," i.e., selling fake drugs, in front 

of the house and may have been outside at the time he left with defendant and headed 

towards the "swamp" to buy some cocaine from one of his suppliers. The jury thus could 

have reasonably inferred that defendant killed Rivers in order to eliminate a potential 

witness against him in a prosecution for the robbery and attempted murder of Miller. (See 

People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 365–368, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.) In 

addition, because "[t]he scene of a robbery is not a place of temporary safety" (People v. 

Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 530), the jury reasonably could 

have found that the robbery was not yet complete at the front of Miller's house at 2:30 

a.m., approximately 120 to 150 feet from the "swamp" where defendant had robbed Miller 

moments before.

Accordingly, the record contains sufficient evidence that defendant shot and killed Rivers 

during the commission of a robbery, and thus committed first degree murder under the 

theory of robbery felony murder. 

Defendant additionally claims the lack of sufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

first degree murder based on a theory of felony murder also violated his right to a reliable 

penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 

point is without merit, given we have concluded there was substantial evidence to support 

his conviction on a felony-murder theory. 

Finally, defendant contends that, even if the evidence was sufficient to identify him as the 

shooter, it nevertheless was insufficient to support his conviction for the first degree 

murder of Rivers based on a theory of premeditation and deliberation. But because we 

have concluded defendant's first degree murder conviction is adequately supported under 

the theory of robbery felony murder and the jury found true the robbery-murder special 

circumstance, we need not address this point. (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 

1086, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40 (Berryman ), overruled on another point by People 

v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, fn. 1 (Hill ).)

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1175-78.

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Consequently, where a state prisoner alleges 

the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have 

led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such petitioner states a 

constitutional claim, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him 

to federal habeas relief, id. at 324. For purposes of determining such claim, the relevant inquiry is 

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whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

at 319. Where the record supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court must presume the 

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that 

resolution. Id. at 326. Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. Id. at 324.

Based on an independent review of the record, the state court's denial of this claim was 

objectively reasonable. The evidence adduced at trial shows: (1) petitioner took property from 

Miller and shot Miller in the "swamp," after which petitioner began to walk back toward Rivers

(People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1166); (2) Miller heard three additional shots fired, from several 

seconds to 10 minutes later (Ex. B at 2387-88, 2467-69, 2497, 2503-04); (3) ballistics expert 

Chester Young examined the pseudo land impressions on the bullets from Miller's body, River's 

body, and from Miller's living room wall and opined that the same gun fired all the shots (Ex. B at 

3058-59, 3062-63, 3087-92, 3099); and (4) Jackson admitted to Oakland police investigators that 

he had been with petitioner in a car at 2:30 a.m. on January 30 and that they had parked a block 

away from Miller's house (Ex. B at 3128). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that: (1) petitioner shot and killed Rivers; and (2) 

the Miller robbery was not yet complete when he did so. Petitioner makes much of the fact that 

Miller's courtroom reconstruction showed that only eight or nine seconds passed between the time 

petitioner shot Miller and the time Miller heard more shots, presumably those fired at Rivers. As 

discussed above, however, the jury could have reasonably relied on Miller's "five to ten minute" or 

"two to three minute" testimony in reconstructing the time lapse between the shootings. See

discussion at III.B.6.a.vii-viii, supra. And this Court must presume the trier of fact resolved any 

conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 326. See also

McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133-34 (2010) (finding the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to 

consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when it resolved 

inconsistencies in testimony in favor of the state prisoner).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

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11. Insufficient Evidence – Sylvester Davis Murder

Petitioner claims that there existed insufficient evidence to support the count 5 conviction 

for the murder of Sylvester Davis or to support the finding that the killing was premeditated and 

deliberate murder. Petition at 191-203. Petitioner made the same claim on direct appeal in the 

California Supreme Court. The state court summarized and rejected the claim as follows:

The jury found that defendant personally used a handgun during the commission of the 

offense, but did not find true the robbery-felony-murder or burglary-felony-murder specialcircumstance allegations, thus implicitly finding that the Davis killing was premeditated 

and deliberate first degree murder. Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction on this theory.

In order to address defendant's contention, we must set forth the facts at some length. In 

early 1989, Thomas lived in a room that he rented from Joseph Batiste at the 74th Avenue 

house in Oakland. The house was a single-story structure with a living room and garage in 

the front, a kitchen to one side, and a central hallway that led to two bedrooms in the rear. 

A small concrete porch extended from the front door to the large living room window. 

Crack cocaine was regularly bought, sold, and used at the house, characterized by one 

regular visitor as a "smoke house."

On February 19, 1989, shortly after 2:00 a.m., Thomas was in the living room watching 

television. Batiste, Livingston, Davis, Hackett, and Robinson were also in the house: 

Livingston and Davis in the northwest bedroom smoking cocaine, Batiste and Robinson in 

the southwest bedroom, and Hackett in the kitchen.

Steve Ross, who lived next door, came over to the house and briefly visited with Batiste. 

After Ross left, Thomas watched through a crack in the open front door and saw Ross 

speaking with defendant, who had just walked up the street. As Ross and defendant talked, 

Ross pointed to the house, and defendant looked over his shoulder in Thomas's direction. 

After Ross and defendant started walking up the street, Thomas shut the door and 

continued to watch them through the peephole in the door. When Thomas saw Ross 

walking towards the house next door, he resumed watching television.

Moments later, defendant knocked on the front door of the 74th Avenue house. Because 

Thomas did not recognize the name defendant gave, he looked out the peephole. Thomas 

saw defendant and asked again for defendant's name. When he still failed to recognize the 

name, Thomas called for Batiste and again looked out the peephole. Defendant had put his 

own eye up to the peephole and looked in. He then rattled the doorknob, took a half-step 

backwards, and walked towards the living room window.

Thomas stepped back from the door and heard a loud crash in the living room. He turned 

and ran towards the kitchen. As he did so, he saw the top of defendant's Yankees baseball 

cap and an arm with a pistol in the hand come through the window. Defendant shot 

Thomas through his right forearm as he ran. Thomas continued to run and eventually 

escaped the house through the garage door. 

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In the northwest bedroom, Davis and Livingston heard loud banging and then two 

gunshots. Upon hearing the shots, Davis ran out of the bedroom and into the southwest 

bedroom where he jumped out of the window. Robinson, who was hiding in the closet, 

followed. 

Livingston, meanwhile, had remained in the northwest bedroom. Defendant suddenly 

kicked open the bedroom door, brandishing a long-barreled black revolver with a brown 

handle. Defendant told Livingston to "give me your damn money." Livingston reached 

into his wallet and handed him two $20 bills. Defendant took the money and walked into 

the southwest bedroom. Livingston then heard the sound of a window breaking and three 

gunshots. After the shooting stopped, Livingston stayed in the northwest bedroom for two 

or three minutes. Defendant returned, looked at Livingston, and walked out of the house 

through the front door.

Outside the southwest bedroom window, Robinson had crawled to the south side of the 

house toward the front. Davis had run to the north side. Robinson heard Davis say, "Oh, 

they going to kill me," and then another gunshot.

About a minute after defendant left the house, Livingston walked to the front door and 

looked outside. Livingston heard Davis "hollering" as if he were "in a lot of pain."

Livingston retreated into the house as a dark four-door car pulled in front.

After Robinson had crawled past three or four houses, she was assaulted by someone 

matching defendant's description who hit her in the head with his gun. The man told 

Robinson not to return to the 74th Avenue house "because it was his turf."

Police discovered Davis's body lying in the front yard of the house next door. A trail of 

blood led from the intersection of the fences at the rear of the house and along the side to 

where Davis's body was found. The bullet that struck Thomas was found lodged in the 

refrigerator and was either a .38–caliber or .357–magnum lead bullet. A second shot, a 

.38–caliber lead bullet, was found in the hallway. A .32–caliber cartridge was found on a 

dresser in the southwest bedroom. The bullet that struck and killed Davis was never 

recovered. 

Thomas described the man who spoke with Ross and later knocked on the front door as 

being in his early 20's, between five feet six inches and five feet eight inches tall, and 

approximately 155 pounds. He wore a dark three-quarter-length coat with a hood and a 

New York Yankees cap. Livingston described the man who robbed him as about six feet 

tall and wearing a dark knit navy watch cap, black waist-length "Members Only" jacket, 

and red shirt. Robinson described the man who assaulted her as African American, five 

feet nine inches tall, between 26 and 29 years old, and wearing a black leather coat and a 

baseball cap.

As stated, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry 

is whether, on review of the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. (Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 269, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897; see also 

Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 317–320, 99 S.Ct. 2781.)

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Applying this standard, we conclude the above evidence constituted sufficient proof that 

defendant shot and killed Davis. The jury reasonably could have found that defendant (1) 

broke into the 74th Avenue house, (2) shot Thomas as he fled to the kitchen, then (3) 

robbed Livingston in the northwest bedroom, and (4) pursued and shot Davis after he 

jumped through the southwest bedroom window.

The testimony of the prosecution's ballistics expert bolsters this conclusion. The expert 

testified that the bullet taken from Frazier—whom the evidence overwhelmingly proved 

defendant shot and killed on January 30, 1989—and the bullet taken from the hallway at 

the 74th Avenue house were "likely" fired from the same gun. The expert also formed the 

"very, very strong" opinion that the Frazier bullet and the bullet recovered from the 

refrigerator at the same house were fired from the same gun. Thus, the expert's ballistics 

testimony strongly suggests that the gun used to kill Frazier was used to shoot Thomas at 

the 74th Avenue house. Because the evidence proved overwhelmingly that defendant had 

shot and killed Frazier approximately three weeks before, the jury could reasonably 

conclude that Thomas's identification of defendant as his assailant was reliable. It follows 

that, given the jury also found defendant shot at Thomas and attempted to murder him, it 

reasonably could conclude that defendant also shot and killed Davis. 

Defendant asserts the jury could not reasonably believe that he shot Davis because 

Livingston and Thomas described different assailants. He acknowledges that both 

identified defendant at trial but argues nonetheless that their conflicting descriptions and 

other evidence suggest that at least two gunmen were in the house that night.

In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility 

issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403, 133 

Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is 

the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (Ibid.) Moreover, unless the testimony is 

physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient 

to support a conviction. (People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 623, 211 Cal.Rptr. 

837.)

No inherent improbability appears in the identification testimony of either Livingston or 

Thomas, and nothing about the evidence shows the Davis murder would have been 

physically impossible for defendant to perpetrate. The jury, as the sole judge of the 

credibility of witnesses, could reasonably have rejected defendant's theory of two gunmen 

storming the house and instead accepted the prosecutor's argument that Livingston's 

description of the perpetrator's height and clothing was simply inaccurate. In addition, 

given the chaos prevailing at the 74th Avenue house in the early morning hours on 

February 19, 1989, conflicting descriptions would not be particularly surprising. 

Importantly, though, both witnesses identified defendant at trial as their assailant and 

identified the jacket worn by defendant on the day of his arrest as similar to the one the 

perpetrator wore. 

* * *

Defendant contends that even if the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant killed Davis, there is no evidence to establish the killing was 

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premeditated and deliberate and thus, first degree murder. We disagree.

"A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a 

showing of intent to kill.... 'Deliberation' refers to careful weighing of considerations in 

forming a course of action; 'premeditation' means thought over in advance. [Citations.] 

'The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of 

time. "The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. 

Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be 

arrived at quickly." [Citations.]' " (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080, 119 

Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 (Koontz).)

In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942 

(Anderson ), this court surveyed prior cases and developed guidelines to aid reviewing 

courts in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of premeditation and 

deliberation. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 

1159.) The court identified three categories of evidence pertinent to this analysis: 

planning, motive, and manner of killing. (Ibid., citing Anderson, at p. 27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 

550, 447 P.2d 942.) With respect to these categories, the Anderson court stated: "

'Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder 

typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely 

strong evidence of [planning] or evidence of [motive] in conjunction with [evidence of] 

either [planning] or [manner of killing].' " (Perez, at p. 1117, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 

1159, quoting Anderson, at p. 27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942.)

The Anderson guidelines are "descriptive, not normative," and reflect the court's attempt 

"to do no more than catalog common factors that had occurred in prior cases." (People v. 

Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159.) In developing these 

guidelines, the court did not redefine the requirements for proving premeditation and 

deliberation. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 

754 (Welch).) The categories of evidence identified in Anderson, moreover, do not 

represent an exhaustive list of evidence that could sustain a finding of premeditation and 

deliberation, and the reviewing court need not accord them any particular weight. (Perez, 

at p. 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 33, 

47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.)

Applying these guidelines, we find substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that 

defendant premeditated and deliberated the Davis murder. Shortly before it occurred, 

defendant was talking with Ross in front of the 74th Avenue house. As they talked, Ross 

pointed to the house, and defendant looked in the direction of Thomas, who was standing 

in the front doorway. A short time later, defendant knocked on the front door of the house. 

When asked for his name, defendant gave a name that Thomas did not recognize. 

Defendant then put his eye up to the peephole and rattled the door handle. He stepped 

back and walked along the porch towards the living room window. Moments later, 

defendant crashed through the living room window armed with a pistol. Thus, as 

defendant concedes, the evidence established defendant planned his entry into the house.

Defendant contends the mere fact of a planned entry, standing alone, is inconsequential 

because it does not establish premeditation and deliberation of a murder committed outside 

the home. Defendant, however, executed his planned entry into the house with a loaded 

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gun in his hand. Hence, the jury could infer that defendant "considered the possibility of 

murder in advance" and intended to kill. (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 993, 269 

Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 87, 241 Cal.Rptr. 

594, 744 P.2d 1127.) 

The jury could further infer from the evidence defendant's motive and a premeditated and 

deliberate manner of killing. The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's killings 

over this period showed a distinct pattern. He accosted Miller, Rivers, Frazier, Fite, and 

Smith while in possession of a loaded gun. He killed Rivers and Frazier and wounded 

Miller. He demanded money or contraband, but the point of this rampage seemed to be to 

intimidate his victims and to convince the survivors of his seriousness. The Davis murder 

fit the same pattern. Defendant went to the crack house armed with a gun. When the door 

remained barred, he smashed a window to get inside. He shot Thomas and took money 

from Livingston at gunpoint. He tracked Davis down when he made a desperate attempt to 

escape and cold-bloodedly executed him. Someone matching defendant's description 

pointed a gun at Robinson's back and told her not to go near the crack house again because 

"it was his turf." The jury could reasonably infer that this was defendant's motive and that, 

like the other incidents, it showed a premeditated and deliberate killing—even if the 

specific victim was selected more or less at random.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict that defendant committed the 

premeditated and deliberate first degree murder of Davis. 

Defendant further contends the insufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for first 

degree murder based on a theory of premeditation and deliberation violated his right to a 

reliable sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because 

we have concluded substantial evidence supported his conviction on such a theory, the 

point is without merit.

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1178-84 (footnote omitted).

Applying the legal principles on sufficiency of the evidence outlined above to petitioner's 

current claim, the state court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

12. Juror Misconduct

Petitioner claims that jury members engaged in misconduct. Petition at 203-12. 

Specifically, petitioner contends that: (1) two jurors concealed important information on voir dire, 

which would have resulted in their dismissal from the jury by defense challenge; (2) one juror 

harbored and concealed deep-seated racial bias which led him to reject the presumption of 

innocence and to prejudge the case, deciding guilt on the basis of race and other improper factors;

(3) one juror introduced extrinsic evidence into jury deliberations; (4) jurors inferred guilt from the 

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fact that petitioner did not testify; and (5) jurors discussed the case and deliberated prior to the 

conclusion of the presentation of evidence and also deliberated in the presence of an alternate 

juror. Id.23 In support of this claim, petitioner submits the declarations of jurors S.W. and A.M.,

as well as alternate juror S.L. Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court only

in his state habeas petition, which was summarily denied on the merits. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of 

impartial jurors. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Green v. 

White, 232 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2000). Due process requires that the defendant be tried by "a 

jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. Phillips, 

455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). See also United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 

1990). Jurors are objectionable if they have formed such deep and strong impressions that they 

will not listen to testimony with an open mind. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 n.3. A defendant is denied 

the right to an impartial jury if even one juror is biased or prejudiced. Fields v. Woodford, 309 

F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.), amended, 315 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 

970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Where a juror's actions or misconduct create "destructive 

uncertainties" about the indifference of a juror, bias should be presumed. Green, 232 F.3d at 677.

a. Misstatements During Voir Dire

The Ninth Circuit has identified three theories of juror bias based on a misstatement by a 

juror during voir dire: (1) McDonough-style bias (i.e., juror fails to answer honestly and, had he 

answered correctly, the information would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause, see

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)), (2) "actual bias, which 

stems from a preset disposition not to decide an issue impartially," and (3) "implied (or 

presumptive) bias, which may exist in exceptional circumstances where, for example, a 

prospective juror has a relationship to the crime itself or to someone involved in a trial, or has 

repeatedly lied about a material fact to get on the jury." Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 766 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (en banc). A petitioner may obtain a new trial because a juror failed to answer a voir 

 

23 Petitioner also inadvertently presented juror misconduct claims relating to the sentencing phase, 

which he withdraws in his Traverse. See Traverse at 82.

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dire question correctly by showing: (1) that the juror failed to honestly answer a voir dire question, 

and (2) that this undermined the impartiality of the petitioner's jury. See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 

F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

i. Juror S.W.

Petitioner claims that S.W. concealed important information on voir dire that, if disclosed, 

would have prompted the defense to excuse him by challenge. In support, petitioner submitted to 

the California Supreme Court, on state habeas, a declaration from S.W. signed in 2003 and stating 

in relevant part:

2. To me, this case was about thugs and drug deals. I know that neighborhood

in Oakland, where all the murders took place. My uncle built houses there. I even

know specific floor plans of houses in that neighborhood. I used to work on Fruitvale,

where I was robbed at gun point in the late 1970's.

24 I know what people in those

neighborhoods are like. Those neighborhoods are filled with thugs. I grew up in San

Leandro, which [was] mostly white in those days. San Leandro is right next door to

Oakland so I knew Oakland well. Oakland used to be a really nice, neighborhoody

place, not at all like it is now. It used to be made up mostly of whites and Portuguese.

It felt very safe and comfortable. Now it is mostly Mexican, Black and Asian.

3. My experiences with these neighborhoods in Oakland and my experience

being robbed at gun point have made me street-wise. My street smarts have gotten

me to the point where I can look at someone and know whether they are good or bad.

I knew this guy was bad. All the evidence of guilt was there. My street smarts gave

me an earthier picture of what really goes on in these kinds of situations, a grittier feel

of the neighborhood. When I worked in Oakland, there were always helicopters

flying above me, trying to get to all the thugs causing trouble.

4. Most of the witnesses that we heard testify were little drug addicts. They

were too high to remember or even care who shot at their friends. One of them was a

hooker. It was really obvious what she did for a living, even if it wasn't established

in court. It was so transparent who all those people were. We heard a person testify

that had been shot by Robert Young and survived, and he seemed like he couldn't

have cared less. He was too much of a junkie to even realize how close he came to

death.

5. Most of the people in that neighborhood don't take the time or make the

effort to care about what goes on around them. I once bought a car from a Chrysler

dealership near the neighborhood where the murders happened. The guy I bought my

car from told me about all the black guys that would come into their dealership with a

whole stack of cash and buy their cars flat out. The dealership just didn't care

 

24 Fruitvale Avenue in Oakland is approximately one-half mile from Highland Avenue and East 

24th Street, where the crimes against Miller and Rivers took place.

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because, to them, money was money and they didn't care where that money came

from.

Ex. 144 to Ex. F at 1-2, ¶¶ 2-5.

Petitioner alleges that this portion of Juror S.W.'s declaration directly contradicts answers

he gave on voir dire. Specifically, in an answer to the jury questionnaire inquiry, "Are you 

familiar with any of the locations where the offenses occurred?," S.W. responded negatively. Ex. 

136 to Ex. F at 3. Then, on individual voir dire questioning, S.W. and the court had the following 

exchange:

Q. We will ask you a few more questions that are not related to the death

penalty just to follow up on your questionnaire.

You indicated that you were not familiar with the locations where the crimes

took place?

A. No. Well, my parents lived in there on Delaware some place in the '40's

before I was even born, so I heard of some of these street names, but as far as being

there, ever being there, never.

Ex. B at 1019-20.

Also in his jury questionnaire Juror S.W. stated, in response to an inquiry regarding

membership in any special interest groups, that he did not belong to the National Rifle

Association. Ex. 136 to Ex. F at 10. In another portion of the questionnaire, in explaining that

he owned weapons (three), and why ("pistol for personal peace of mind, shotgun and rifle for

hunting"), S.W. stated that he did not belong "to any groups that advocate the right to own

weapons." Ex. 136 to Ex. F at 16.

Yet, in the declaration from Juror S.W. that petitioner presented to the California Supreme

Court, S.W. stated:

9. I am a member of the NRA. I've been a member of the NRA since I was 13

or 14. I grew up in a hunting family. My sister and I went through our NRA training

when we were kids so that we were educated about the guns that were always around

us. We always had beagles in our back yard that we were never allowed to play with

since they were hunting dogs.

Ex. 144 to Ex. F at 2, ¶ 9.

Petitioner has also submitted a declaration from defense counsel Alexander Selvin stating 

that he and co-counsel were of the opinion that members of the National Rifle Association "are 

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more likely that the average jurors to favor law enforcement over the defense and are also more 

likely than most jurors to impose the death penalty." Ex. 140 to Ex. F at 3, ¶ 8. Selvin further 

states that "if we had known that a juror was a member of the National Rifle Association, we 

would have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove him." Id.

On this record, petitioner has established that juror S.W. failed to answer honestly during 

voir dire and, had he answered correctly, the information would have provided a basis for a 

challenge. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556. Although defense counsel Selvin states in his 

declaration that he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to strike S.W., S.W.'s answers—

had he answered honestly during jury selection—provided a basis for a challenge "for cause," see

McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, particularly had he answered truthfully that he knew the area where 

the crimes occurred and had even been robbed at gunpoint there in the 1970’s.25 To disqualify a 

juror for cause requires a showing of either actual or implied bias, "'that is . . . bias in fact or bias 

conclusively presumed as a matter of law.'" United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111-12 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 266 (1995)). Applying this standard, courts have 

found implied bias in cases where the juror in question has had some personal experience that is 

similar or identical to the fact pattern at issue. See Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112-13 & n.4. 

Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to relief on this claim.

ii. Juror A.M.

Petitioner also submitted to the California Supreme Court, on state habeas, a declaration 

from juror A.M. stating in relevant part:

2. I made my decision for death based on premeditated murder. Robert chased

that couple down and murdered that man. That's premeditated. Nothing else held

any water with me. Nothing else moved me.

4. I told the court I believed in an eye for an eye. There was so much evidence

of his guilt. It was clear. So he deserved the death penalty. If there was evidence

that led to reasonable doubt I would have been open to it and another sentence. But

 

25 Although S.W. did report in his jury questionnaire that he had been the victim of a robbery, he 

did not indicate the location. His description, in total, reads: "Robbery alone in store when 

individual came in with gun forced to back of store and took the till a whole $65." Ex. 136 to Ex. 

F at 12. 

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there wasn't. Robert committed murder so he got death. There was nothing

mitigating that could have changed my verdict. If Robert had contested his guilt, then

maybe things would have been different. But since he didn't my mind was already

made up.

Ex. 142 to Ex. F at 1, ¶¶ 2, 4.

Petitioner claims that this testimony shows that A.M. concealed the fact that he would not 

have an open mind. The Court disagrees. First, the statements relate entirely to A.M.'s penaltyphase determinations in that he states that his decision to vote for a death sentence was based on 

the evidence of guilt.26 As discussed above, petitioner's penalty-phase contentions are now moot. 

Further, A.M.'s post-conviction statements that the crimes warranted the death penalty do not 

indicate that he lied on voir dire when he indicated that he would keep an open mind to the 

possibility of voting for life-without-parole and would not automatically vote for the death 

penalty. Ex. B at 2099-2101. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

b. Racial Bias and Prejudgment

Petitioner claims that S.W. was biased against black people and that such racial bias "led 

him to prejudge the case and to view petitioner as guilty from the beginning before deliberations 

had ever begun at either phase of petitioner's trial." Petition at 208, ¶ 474. 

As noted above, S.W.'s declaration includes statements such as that the neighborhoods

comprising the crime scenes in this case "are filled with thugs." Ex. 144 to Ex. F at 1, ¶ 2.27 "I

know what people in those neighborhoods are like." Id. "Most of the people in that neighborhood 

don't take the time or make the effort to care about what goes on around them. I once bought a car 

from a Chrysler dealership near the neighborhood where the murders happened. The guy I bought 

my car from told me about all the black guys that would come into their dealership with a whole 

stack of cash and buy their cars flat out. The dealership just didn't care because, to them, money 

 

26 Indeed, later in his declaration, A.M. states: "Maybe it would have been different if the penalty 

phase came first." Ex. 142 to Ex. F at 1, ¶ 8.

27 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "thug" as "a brutal ruffian or assassin. " See

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, retrieved Sept. 8, 2015, from http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/thug.

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was money and they didn't care where that money came from." Id. at 2, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 

S.W. states he "knew those neighborhoods and those people, and I knew the stuff they do." Id. at 

2, ¶ 6. "I grew up in San Leandro, which was mostly white in those days. San Leandro is right 

next door to Oakland so I knew Oakland well. Oakland used to be a really nice, neighborly place, 

not at all like it is now. It used to be made up mostly of whites and Portuguese. It felt very safe 

and comfortable. Now it is mostly Mexican, Black, and Asian." Id. at 1, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 

"My experiences with these neighborhoods in Oakland and my experiences being robbed at gun 

point have made me street-wise. My street smarts have gotten me to the point where I can look at 

someone and know whether they are good or bad. I knew this guy was bad." Id. at 1, ¶ 3

(emphasis added). "My street smarts gave me an earthier picture of what really goes on in these 

kinds of situations, a grittier feel of the neighborhood. When I worked in Oakland, there were 

always helicopters flying above me, trying to get all the thugs causing trouble. " Id. In addition to

the above comments, S.W. states:

10. In the court room there was a lot of intimidation stuff going on. We had to go up and 

down in the elevator with the witnesses a bunch of times, and they used to try to intimidate 

us. Most of them were underage, and they knew they were within protection of the law, so 

they came in with those cocky attitudes. It didn't bother me, though. They could have 

brought as many little black punks into the courtroom as they wanted, but they weren't 

going to scare me.

11. The bottom line was that Robert Young was an opportunistic bully. He knew that 

nobody in his neighborhood really cared about what happened to their community or even 

themselves. He took advantage of that. Robert Young's lawyers dressed him well, and 

made him look preppy. But I could still tell he was a thug, and he never did anything to 

convince me otherwise. 

Id. at 2, ¶ 10 (emphasis added).

These statements exhibit an alarming level of racism and prejudgment of the community in 

the crime areas, which seriously undermine S.W.'s impartiality as a juror. Respondent argues that 

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying about his or her mental processes 

concerning a verdict. Rule 606 provides:

(a) At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a 

juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the 

jury's presence. [¶] (b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. [¶] 

(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a 

verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that 

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occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another 

juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The

court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters. 

[¶] (2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: [¶] (A) extraneous prejudicial 

information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; [¶] (B) an outside influence was 

improperly brought to bear on any juror; or [¶] (C) a mistake was made in entering the 

verdict on the verdict form.

Fed. R. Evid. 606.

The Court finds that a juror's pre-existing racial bias is not the kind of "mental process[] 

concerning the verdict" that Rule 606(b) was intended to protect. As the advisory notes to Rule 

606(b) make clear, "the central focus has been upon insulation of the manner in which the jury 

reached its verdict, and this protection extends to each of the components of deliberation, 

including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any other 

feature of the process." Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee's note. "The policy does not, 

however, foreclose testimony by jurors as to prejudicial extraneous information or influences 

injected into or brought to bear upon the deliberative process." Id. Here, the evidence submitted 

in S.W.'s declaration—i.e. testimony as to his own pre-existing views of petitioner and the areas 

where the crimes occurred—does not relate to any "component" of the jury's deliberation. Rather, 

it is more analogous to the latter category—prejudicial extraneous information or influence—

which Rule 606(b) explicitly does not foreclose. Respondent's reading of the rule would 

essentially make it impossible to introduce evidence of a juror's pre-existing bias, thereby 

hindering the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury in federal post-conviction proceedings. 

See United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir. 1973) (where an offer of proof showed 

that there was a substantial likelihood that a criminal defendant was prejudiced by the influence of 

racial bias in the jury room, to ignore the evidence might very well offend fundamental fairness). 

Here, petitioner has established "actual bias, which stems from a preset disposition not to 

decide an issue impartially." Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d at 766. 

Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to relief on this claim.

c. Extrinsic Evidence

Petitioner claims that juror A.M. "also introduced extrinsic evidence into the jury 

deliberations, familiarizing the other jurors with the neighborhoods in which the crimes occurred." 

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Petition at 209, ¶ 478. Specifically, in his declaration submitted to the California Supreme Court, 

on state habeas, A.M. states that he "was a phone repairman and worked a lot in the areas where 

the crimes happened and [he] described those areas to the other jurors. [He] gave them a verbal 

tour of that part of Oakland." Ex. 142 to Ex. F at ¶ 9.

The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury verdict to be based on 

the evidence presented at trial. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965); Jeffries v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez v. 

Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389, n.4 (9th Cir. 2012). Evidence not presented at trial is deemed 

"extrinsic." See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987). Jury exposure to extrinsic 

evidence deprives a defendant of the rights to confrontation, cross-examination and assistance of 

counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 

1995). That the extrinsic evidence comes from a juror rather than a court official or other party 

does not diminish the scope of a defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment. See Jeffries, 114 

F.3d at 1490. 

However, not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial. United States v. 

Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974). Rather, "[t]he test is whether or not the misconduct has 

prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial." Id. A petitioner is 

entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the exposure to extrinsic evidence had 

"'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Sassounian v. 

Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 

(1993)); see Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). In other words, the 

error must result in "actual prejudice." See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; see also Estrada, 512 F.3d at 

1235 (noting that Brecht provides the standard of review for harmless error in cases involving 

unconstitutional juror misconduct).

Respondent fails to address petitioner's claim of juror misconduct based on introduction of 

extrinsic evidence. Petitioner, however, has made no showing that A.M.'s discussion of the areas 

where the crimes happened had any effect on the jurors. The state court could have reasonably 

rejected this claim on the ground that petitioner was not prejudiced by any misconduct.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

d. Petitioner's Failure to Testify

Petitioner claims that jurors S.W. and A.M. "held petitioner's exercise of his Fifth 

Amendment rights against him." Petition at 209, ¶ 477. Petitioner points to the following 

statements made by S.W. and A.M. in their respective declarations to the California Supreme 

Court, on state habeas:

The bottom line was that Robert Young was an opportunistic bully. He knew

that nobody in his neighborhood really cared about what happened to their

community or even themselves. He took advantage of that. Robert Young's lawyers

dressed him well, and made him look preppy. But I could still tell he was a thug, and

he never did anything to convince me otherwise. For that reason I thought it was

strange that he never testified.

Ex. 144 to Ex. F at 2-3, ¶ 11 (emphasis added).

Robert spoke through his lawyers and they never once said he didn't do it.

They were really grasping at straws. They had Robert's brother say a jacket was his,

but when he put it on you could see it was way too big. That was ridiculous. They

were obligated to do a job, but didn't have much to work with.

Ex. 142 to Ex. F at 1, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).

The trial court instructed the jury that petitioner had "a constitutional right not to be 

compelled to testify. You must not draw any inference from the fact that a defendant does not 

testify. Further, you must neither discuss this matter nor permit it to enter into your deliberations 

in any way." Ex. B at 3662-63. The Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) 

bars consideration of jurors' statements that they ignored the court's instructions and discussed a 

defendant's failure to testify during deliberations. Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.

2006); United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

e. Premature Deliberations

The record shows that the trial court admonished the jury not to discuss the case with 

anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until asked to do so. See e.g., Ex. B at 

218, 2458. Petitioner claims that, notwithstanding the admonition, the jury not only discussed the 

case prior to commencement of formal deliberations but did so in the presence of an alternate 

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juror. Petition at 210, ¶ 482. Petitioner supports this claim with the following portion of the 

declaration of alternate juror S.L., which was submitted to the California Supreme Court on state 

habeas:

I sat through the full trial and was involved in jury deliberations right up until

the end. . . . [¶] . . . What we as a jury always discussed with each other was the whole

idea of "beyond a shadow of a doubt." I kept on having to remind myself that my

decision was according to the law and nothing else. Not my personal feelings, not

Robert Young's family's personal feelings, but the law itself. The murder weapon

thing seemed really important to this concept. We were always kicking around the

question, could we really know what happened if there was never a murder weapon

found? But, just like the judge pointed out, there was so much other evidence,

witnesses that picked him out of a line. And his very own cousin turning him in.

Everything pointed to him being the shooter, such that I felt I was beyond a shadow

of any doubt. . . . [¶] . . . I was involved in discussions with the rest of the jury right

up until the point when the guilty verdict was decided upon. At the beginning of the

trial, half the people thought he was guilty, and the other half were undecided. But as

the trial went on, and more and more evidence built up, pretty much everyone

realized he was guilty. [¶] Among the jurors there were some leaders and some

followers. I was definitely a follower. I had never sat on a jury before and I just

wanted to listen to what everyone else had to say. There was one head juror, who

was in charge of moderating all the discussions. These conversations all took place in

one big room, sitting around that big table. I felt kind of left out at the end of the trial,

on the outside of everything that had been going on. I had been there everyday, and I

had been a part of all the discussions up to that point, so it felt weird to sit and wait

out in the court room as everybody else came to their decisions.

Ex 145 to Ex. F, ¶¶ 2, 5, 7-8. 

The state court could have had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. Assuming that this 

declaration is not foreclosed by Rule 606(b), as with the claim above, petitioner has failed to show 

that he was prejudiced by any misconduct arising out of premature deliberations. Indeed, here, the 

conversations described by S.L. involved discussion of a legal point favorable to petitioner, i.e., 

the requirement that the prosecution prove its case "beyond a shadow of a doubt." Further, 

premature deliberations are not as serious as private communication, contact, or tampering. Davis 

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 653 (9th Cir. 2004). "What is crucial is 'not that jurors keep silent 

with each other about the case but that each juror keep an open mind until the case has been 

submitted to the jury.'" Id. at 653 (quoting United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 

1974)). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

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13. Instructional Error – Limitation of Instructions

Petitioner claims that the trial court deprived him of his right to due process of law, and

other rights guaranteed under the Fifth , Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, because the

trial court limited the aiding and abetting, and intentional second degree murder instructions, to

the count 5 charge for the murder of Glen Frazier. Petition at 212-26, ¶¶ 485-519. Petitioner 

made the same claim on direct appeal in the California Supreme Court. The state court 

summarized and rejected the claim as follows:

a) Aiding and Abetting Instruction

Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on an aider and abettor theory of liability, 

as relevant to the Davis murder, on the basis that there was substantial evidence on which 

the jury could find he was not the actual perpetrator, but merely an aider and abettor. The 

trial court denied defendant's request. Defendant claims this was error.

Even absent a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law 

applicable to the case. (Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1085, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 

335.) The general principles of law governing a case are those that are commonly 

connected with the facts adduced at trial and that are necessary for the jury's understanding 

of the case. (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 

P.2d 903.) The trial court must give instructions on every theory of the case supported by 

substantial evidence, including defenses that are not inconsistent with the defendant's 

theory of the case. (Ibid.) Evidence is "substantial" only if a reasonable jury could find it 

persuasive. (People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 672, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 

563.) The trial court's determination of whether an instruction should be given must be 

made without reference to the credibility of the evidence. (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 

Cal.4th 935, 944, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168.) The trial court need not give 

instructions based solely on conjecture and speculation. (People v. Day (1981) 117 

Cal.App.3d 932, 936, 173 Cal.Rptr. 9.) 

Instructions on aiding and abetting are not required where "[t]he defendant was not tried as 

an aider and abettor, [and] there was no evidence to support such a theory." (People v. 

Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 404, 226 Cal.Rptr. 880.) In this case, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for instructions on aiding 

and abetting as to the Davis murder.

According to defendant, the evidence in the record establishes that at least two gunmen 

were in the house because: (1) Thomas and Livingston provided the police with different 

descriptions of the assailant; (2) the police found a .32–caliber cartridge in the southwest 

bedroom and recovered a .38–caliber bullet from the kitchen and another from the hallway; 

(3) Robinson heard Davis say, "Oh, they going to kill me"; (4) as Livingston observed the 

man in the knit watch cap in front of the house, Robinson was being accosted by the man 

in the baseball cap down the street; and (5) the presence of the dark four-door car in front 

of the house suggests that a "getaway driver" was used and that defendant did not act 

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alone. Under defendant's theory, a reasonable jury could have found that he shot Thomas 

with a .38–caliber gun and a second gunman shot and killed Davis with a .32–caliber gun 

as defendant accosted Robinson down the street.

Defendant overlooks the fact that both Thomas and Livingston positively identified him at 

trial as their assailant. These identifications were corroborated by their independent 

identifications of the jacket taken from defendant on the day of his arrest as "similar" to the 

one worn by their assailant on February 19, 1989. To find defendant guilty on a theory of 

aiding and abetting rather than as the actual shooter, the jury would have had to disbelieve 

either Thomas or Livingston and speculate, based on the descriptions Thomas and 

Livingston provided to investigators, that defendant and another gunman were in the 

house. The jury would have had to then speculate that (1) the other gunman shot and 

killed Davis; (2) defendant shot Thomas and accosted Robinson; and (3) in doing so, 

defendant acted with the intent of aiding and abetting the second gunman in killing Davis. 

Such speculation does not mandate instruction on an aiding and abetting theory. (People v. 

Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 785, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129, overruled on another 

ground in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 27–34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468; 

see also People v. Day, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 936, 173 Cal.Rptr. 9.) Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for aiding and abetting instructions 

as to the Davis murder.

Defendant further contends that the trial court's erroneous denial of his request for 

instructions on an aiding and abetting theory as to the Davis murder deprived him of an 

impartial jury, a reliable penalty determination, and due process under the Sixth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, respectively. Assuming these 

claims were properly preserved for review (see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117, 133, 

2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), his point is without merit because we conclude that the 

trial court did not err in declining the requested instructions.

b) Second Degree Murder Instructions

Prior to instructing on aiding and abetting, the trial court stated: "The following four 

instructions should be considered by you only as they apply to counts four [attempted 

robbery of Fite] and five [Frazier murder]," followed by the relevant instructions.

Immediately thereafter, the court instructed as to second degree murder pursuant to 

CALJIC No. 8.30.

Defendant contends that based on the above instructions, the trial court misinformed the 

jury that it could consider the instruction defining second degree murder only with regard 

to the Frazier murder, because the jury would have erroneously believed CALJIC No. 8.30 

was one of the "following four instructions" to be considered only as it applied to count 4 

(attempted robbery of Fite) and count 5 (Frazier murder). We reject the contention. 

"If a jury instruction is ambiguous, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction." (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 936, 963, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 

62, 72 & fn. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385.) " ' " '[T]he correctness of jury instructions 

is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of 

an instruction or from a particular instruction.' " ' " (Smithey, at p. 963, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 

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978 P.2d 1171, quoting People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248, 74 

Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) The reviewing court also must consider the arguments of 

counsel in assessing the probable impact of the instruction on the jury. (See People v. 

Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 189, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [any possibility of 

confusion about conspiracy instruction was diminished by the parties' closing arguments], 

disapproved on another ground in People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117–118, 2 

Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 9 

Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146 [correct view of the law regarding mitigating factors in 

penalty phase trial was reinforced by the parties' closing arguments].)

As a preliminary matter, a defendant's failure to request a clarification instruction forfeits 

that claim on appeal. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 237, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 

P.3d 1222.) Here, however, portions of the record regarding the parties' discussion of the 

jury instructions before the trial court are missing. Thus, because it cannot be ascertained 

whether defense counsel specifically requested clarification, we shall give defendant the 

benefit of the doubt and find the issue preserved for appeal. Nonetheless, defendant's 

claim is without merit.

The record contains no inquiries from the jury regarding the application of these 

instructions. We agree with respondent that if the instructions were susceptible of the 

interpretation defendant now asserts, counsel likely would have objected at trial on this 

basis. Such an omission suggests that " 'the potential for [confusion] argued now was not 

apparent to one on the spot.' " (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 535, 250 Cal.Rptr. 

550, 758 P.2d 1081 [failure to object to trial court's remarks about potential jury 

investigation suggested the potential for coercion was not discernible], quoting Lowenfield 

v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 240, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568.) Counsel's arguments, 

moreover, informed the jury that it could consider second degree murder as to the Rivers, 

Frazier, and Davis murders. Therefore, we find no basis to conclude the jury 

misinterpreted the above instructions or was confused in any manner as to the applicability 

of the second degree murder instruction to all of the charged murders. Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court did not erroneously limit the second degree murder instructions to 

the Frazier murder charge.

Defendant additionally contends that the trial court's error in this regard violated his rights 

to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, to a reliable penalty determination under 

the Eighth Amendment, and to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution. Assuming these claims were properly preserved for review 

(see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117, 133, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), they are 

meritless given we conclude that the trial court did not err.

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1200-03 (footnotes omitted).

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that 

"'the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

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process.'" Id. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). The instruction may 

not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a 

whole and the trial record. Id. Petitioner also must show actual prejudice from the error, i.e., that 

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, before 

the court may grant federal habeas relief. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (citing 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a theory of defense only "if the theory is legally 

cognizable and there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally find for the defendant." 

United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Due process does not require an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. See Hopper 

v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (holding instruction on lesser-included offense required only 

"when the evidence warrants such an instruction"). Moreover, "[a] state trial court's refusal to give 

[a requested] instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus 

proceeding." Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). "The error must so infect the entire trial" that the petitioner was deprived of the fair trial 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. "Whether a constitutional violation has occurred 

will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury." Duckett 

v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be 

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 

1987). A habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction, as 

opposed to a claim that involves a misstatement of the law in an instruction, bears an "'especially 

heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)).

This Court, having reviewed the record, agrees with the California Supreme Court's

findings that: (1) it is not reasonably probable that the jury could have found that petitioner was a 

mere aider and abettor to the Davis homicide; and (2) the trial court did not limit the second 

degree murder instruction to the Frazier murder charge. Consequently, it cannot be said that 

petitioner's preferred instructions would have resulted in a different verdict. See Calderon, 525 

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U.S. at 146. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

14. Instructional Error – CALJIC 8.80

The jury found true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegations attendant to the

first degree murder convictions: count 1 (Rivers) and count 5 (Frazier). Petitioner claims that 

CALJIC No. 8.80, the instruction the court gave the jury regarding the robbery-murder special 

circumstance, Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(i), violated his due process rights, as well as the 

Eighth Amendment, because it permitted a true finding on the special-circumstance allegation 

without requiring a finding that petitioner intended to kill. Petition at 226-28. 

Petitioner made the same claim on direct appeal in the California Supreme Court. The 

state court summarized and rejected the claim as follows:

c) CALJIC No. 8.80

Defendant was found death eligible based in part on the robbery-felony-murder special 

circumstances the jury found true with respect to the Rivers and Frazier murders. The 

robbery-felony-murder special circumstance applies when "[t]he murder was committed 

while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, or 

attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to 

commit ... [r]obbery ...." (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) Here, the trial court instructed the 

jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.80 [Pre–June 6, 1990 Special Circumstances—

Introductory] that if it found "beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual 

killer in the Terry Rivers killing in Count One, [and] the Glen Frazier killing in Count 

Five, ... you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find 

the special circumstances to be true." Citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158, 

107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127, and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 787, 102 

S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, defendant asserts that CALJIC No. 8.80 is constitutionally 

defective under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it permits a finding of 

death eligibility in the absence of a jury finding that the defendant either intended to kill 

the victim or, as a major participant in the underlying felony, exhibited a reckless 

indifference to human life.

"The United States Supreme Court has made clear that felony murderers who personally 

killed may properly be subject to the death penalty in conformance with the Eighth 

Amendment—after proper consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances—

even where no intent to kill is shown. (Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386–387 

[106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704]; see Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 152 [107 S.Ct. 

1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].) Subsequently, '[i]n People v. Anderson [ (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 

1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], we held that with respect to the actual killer, the 

court need not instruct on intent to kill in connection with felony-murder special 

circumstances. Such an instruction is required only when there is evidence from which the 

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jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer.' (People 

v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1193 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].)" (People v. 

Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 794, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310, italics omitted.) 

Defendant asks that we reconsider our decision in Anderson, but he offers no persuasive 

reason to do so. 

Defendant further asserts that as to the Rivers and Frazier murders, the evidence was 

insufficient to establish he was the actual killer and intended to kill. "Evidence that the 

defendant is the actual killer and guilty of felony murder ... establishes 'a degree of 

culpability sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to permit defendant's execution.' "

(People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1016, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; 

People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 632, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376 (Hayes).) 

Moreover, a jury's guilty verdict satisfies the requirements under Enmund, even though the 

trial court's instructions did not explicitly require it to find the Enmund factors, when "the 

theory on which the case was tried and the evidence received leave no doubt that the jury's 

verdict rested on a finding that the defendant killed or intended to kill." (Cabana v. 

Bullock, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 391, fn. 6, 106 S.Ct. 689.)

We conclude that the record and theories presented in this case leave no doubt that as to 

the Rivers and Frazier murders, defendant was the actual killer and intended to kill. 

With respect to the Rivers murder, the prosecution proceeded against defendant solely on 

the theory that he actually shot and killed Rivers before he completed his robbery of 

Miller. As demonstrated above (see ante, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 129–131, 105 P.3d at pp. 

501–503), substantial evidence supports defendant's conviction for the first degree murder 

of Rivers based on a theory of robbery felony murder.

The jury's true finding on the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun during 

the commission of the Rivers murder is further evidence that the jury concluded he actually 

killed Rivers. Defendant argues, however, that because a weapon is used, if it is merely 

displayed in a menacing manner and never fired (see People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 

293, 302, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77) the gun-use true finding does not necessarily 

establish that he is the actual killer. Although "[t]he finding of personal use ... would not 

in itself prove defendant was the actual killer" (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 

1120, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359), here the evidence shows that only one gun was 

used to commit the crimes at the Miller residence. The prosecution's ballistics expert 

testified that the bullets removed from the bodies of Miller and Rivers were fired from the 

same gun. The defense, moreover, presented no evidence that anyone else who may have 

been present at the Miller residence displayed in a menacing manner, or otherwise used, a 

gun. Thus, all evidence points to defendant as the one who actually shot and killed Rivers.

We conclude the jury necessarily found defendant to be the actual killer of Rivers, "thereby 

establishing a degree of culpability sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to permit 

defendant's execution." (Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 632, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 

376.)

With respect to the Frazier murder, the prosecution's case against defendant was similarly 

based upon the theory that defendant actually shot and killed Frazier during a robbery. 

This theory was supported by evidence that just before the Frazier murder, defendant and 

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his cousin, Patrick Jackson, approached Fite and Frazier as they stood on the sidewalk near 

the corner of 90th Avenue and Cherry Street in Oakland. Defendant exited the driver's 

side of the car, approached Fite and Frazier, pointed a dark gun at them, and demanded 

their money. Fite and Frazier begged for their lives. Moments later, after defendant told 

Fite to run, Fite heard two shots and then saw Frazier slump to the ground.

Patrick Jackson, defendant's cousin, testified under a grant of immunity that defendant was 

driving a black-over-green Ford LTD on the night in question and pulled into a driveway 

near 89th Avenue and Cherry Street. According to Jackson, defendant possessed a dark 

revolver with a brown handle when he initially got into the car. Jackson heard at least one 

shot and saw Fite run down Cherry Street. After defendant returned to the car, he drove 

Jackson to an apartment on 76th Avenue. Along the way, defendant told Jackson that the 

man he shot had robbed him earlier. At the apartment, defendant parked his car, and 

Jackson got his own car. Defendant and Jackson then went to a motel room that Jackson 

had rented during the afternoon of the 29th and spent the rest of the night watching 

television and sleeping.

The defense argued it was Jackson who exited the driver's side and shot Frazier and that, at 

most, defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting. But no evidence indicated that someone 

other than the actual killer possessed a gun. Thus, in finding defendant guilty of the first 

degree murder of Frazier and sustaining the allegation that he personally used a gun during 

commission of the murder, the jury necessarily rejected this defense and found defendant 

to be the actual killer. We therefore conclude that defendant's culpability was sufficiently 

established under the Eighth Amendment to permit his execution. (Hayes, supra, 52 

Cal.3d at p. 632, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.)

Accordingly, we need not address defendant's contention that, because the jury was also 

instructed on an aiding and abetting theory as to the Frazier murder, the trial court erred by 

failing to instruct the jury that it must find defendant was a major participant in the 

underlying felony (robbery) and acted with reckless indifference to human life before it 

could find him death eligible pursuant to the robbery-felony-murder special circumstance 

(section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A)). Any instructional error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (People v. Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1120, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 

P.3d 359; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.)

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1203-06.

Applying the legal principles on instructional-error claims outlined above to petitioner's 

current claim, the state court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

15. Ballistics Evidence

A trial, the prosecution presented the detailed expert testimony of retired Oakland Police

Department firearms examiner, Chester Young. Ex. B at 3030-100. In summary, Young

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testified that because the six bullets recovered in the case all shared "pseudo land impressions,"

which is a very rare occurrence, he strongly suspected that the same gun fired all six bullets, even 

though he could declare only two of the bullets—the bullet taken from the body of Glen Frazier

and the one found in the wall at Manzine Miller's home—were a positive match. Id. at 3056-59, 

3062-63, 3087-88, 3092, 3099.

Petitioner claims that this evidence, though presented as "hard science," was actually 

"subjective, unreliable, and erroneous." Petition at 228-41. As a result, petitioner claims that the 

presentation of this evidence amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, in violation of Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Petition at 229, ¶ 528. Petitioner presented this claim to the 

California Supreme Court only in his state habeas petition, which was summarily denied on the 

merits. 

A conviction obtained through the use of testimony which the prosecutor knows or should 

know is perjured must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the testimony could 

have affected the judgment of the jury. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The 

result is the same when the prosecutor, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 

uncorrected when it appears. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). To prevail on a 

claim based on Agurs/Napue, the petitioner must show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was 

actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually 

false, and (3) the false testimony was material. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 

889 (9th Cir. 2003). In evaluating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, this court considers 

whether the prosecution's actions "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process." See Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 912 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quotation marks omitted).

The claim fails at the first step, as petitioner fails to establish that Young's testimony was 

"actually false." Young explained to the jury that in examining a fired bullet, "rifling marks" or

"land groove impressions" are observed. Ex. B at 3038-41, 3048-49, 3058-59. They are produced 

by grooves that are cut into the bore of the barrel of the gun by the gun's manufacturer. Id. at 

3040-41, 3058. These grooves are cut along the length of the barrel's interior and are curved or 

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"twisted" slightly in one direction or the other in order to cause the bullet to spin for accuracy as it 

leaves the barrel. Id. at 3040. Because different manufacturers cut a different number of grooves 

in the interior of their gun barrels, the number of rifling marks these grooves leave on the bullet's 

surface aids ballistics experts in determining whether a single gun fired two or more different 

bullets. Id. at 3063-64. The raised areas in the gun's barrel between the grooves are called 

"lands," and these raised areas score corresponding grooves, called "land impressions" on the 

bullets. Id. at 3040, 3048-49, 3058-59. The division between the land and the groove in the barrel 

is called the "shoulder." Id. at 3048-49.

When I am comparing two bullets to see if they were fired by the same gun,

there are different things I look at. First of all, I insure that the right flank

characteristics are the same.

Basically that means if it is eight right rifling, I will not compare that with

something that is six right because there is no sense in doing it. It is different, fired

by different guns.

But if it is eight right versus eight right, then after that I will look for striations

or scratches on the bullet to see whether or not they were made by the same gun,

because the striations are unique if the pattern is unique. . . [¶] Indexing. . . . [¶]

Basically if I have a known bullet or a standard bullet, I will look for something that

is unique on one side, on one bullet. And it could be anything. A pattern might be

unique. If it is two double and a wide groove for example, and I focus on that on one

side, and on the other side—one side meaning under one microscope. I look at one

bullet first.

And then on the other bullet, I rotate the bullet until I find something that looks

similar to my index that I have chosen, which is just a unique feature.

Once I find that, then they could be the same or they could not be the same.

But if I find that, then I rotate both the bullets the same degree away from me or

either way to see if there are other markings that match.

Basically the index is a certain distance from a fixed shoulder. The shoulder

has to line up first, and then I see if the index marking that I am looking at is the same

distance from the shoulder. If it is not the same distance from the shoulder, it could

not have been made by the same defect in the gun.

So basically it is a starting point for comparison, the index is.

Ex. B at 3063-65.

Young examined six bullets in this case: the three bullets recovered from each of the 

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bodies of Manzine Miller, Terry Rivers, and Glen Frazier; the bullet recovered from the wall of 

Miller's living room at 2215 East 24th Street; and the two bullets recovered from the crime scene 

at 2661 74th Avenue. Ex. B at 3030-3100. All six bullets shared one or two "pseudo land 

impressions," "a defect possibly from the accumulation of metal in one of the grooves so now the 

groove has what looks like a land in it." Ex. B at 3058. Pseudo land impressions are a very rare 

occurrence and possibly attributable to a defect in the gun. This led Young to strongly suspect 

that, while not all the bullets were identical, the same gun had fired them all. Ex. B at 3058-59, 

3062-63, 3087-88, 3092, 3099.

Petitioner has not presented any expert to contradict Young's conclusions, and even if he 

did, he would still not be entitled to habeas relief because experts often disagree. See Harris v. 

Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1524 (9th Cir. 1991) (conflicting psychiatric opinions did not show that 

testimony of prosecution's expert was false). On this record, the California Supreme Court could 

have reasonably concluded that Chester Young's testimony was in no sense "false."

Even assuming arguendo that there was something false in Young's testimony, nothing in 

the record even suggests that the prosecution knew or should have known. To the contrary, the 

record shows that Young, "took over the firearms cases for the City of Oakland" in 1977, 

meaning, in his words, "every time a gun was fired in Oakland the case came to me." Ex. B at 

3032. He testified as a ballistics expert in Alameda County almost "three hundred times,"

including as an expert in "evidence slug comparison." Id. at 3031-32. Young was so wellrespected that the trial court remarked that if the defense would not stipulate to his expertise, the 

court "would take judicial notice of it." Id. at 3032.

Petitioner also claims that, because the ballistics evidence was inherently unreliable, its 

admission at trial violated Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the 

Supreme Court case addressing qualifying expert witnesses in federal court. Petition at 229-230,

¶ 528. Daubert is based on a federal rule of evidence, not the Constitution. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 

594-95; Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 757-58 (9th Cir. 2009) (Supreme Court has not ruled on 

whether state evidentiary rules governing qualifications of experts implicate federal due process). 

For that reason, California courts are not required to apply it, and in fact do not. See People v. 

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Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th 587, 594 (1994). Therefore, petitioner's claim, to the extent it is based on the 

assertion that his due process rights were violated by Young's qualifying as an expert, also fails 

because no Supreme Court case addresses whether a state court's decision to qualify a person as an 

expert can violate a defendant's due process rights. Thus, the state court's denial of this claim was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal authority.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

16. Actual Innocence

Petitioner claims that, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, he has discovered 

exonerating evidence that could not have been discovered at the time of his trial. According to 

petitioner, the evidence points to his actual innocence of the Rivers murder, the Miller attempted 

murder and robbery, the Frazier murder, and the Davis murder. Petition at 241-95. Petitioner 

presented this claim to the California Supreme Court only in his state habeas petition, which was 

summarily denied on the merits. 

"Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to 

state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in 

the underlying state criminal proceeding." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). "This 

rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not 

imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact." Id.; see also House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006); Dist. Atty's Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 

(2009) ("Whether such a federal right [to be released upon proof of actual innocence] exists is an 

open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it 

exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any 

claimant would have to meet."). Consequently, the California Supreme Court's denial of this 

claim cannot be unreasonable under AEDPA as there is no United States Supreme Court authority 

establishing a free-standing actual innocence right. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74-77 

(denying habeas relief in absence of clearly established federal law).

A petitioner may attempt to establish factual innocence in order to show that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from application of a procedural default. See

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Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995). Under this exception, a petitioner may establish a 

procedural "gateway" permitting review of defaulted claims if he demonstrates "actual innocence." 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 & n.32. 

[I]f a petitioner . . . presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free 

of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the 

gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims. 

Id. at 316. The required evidence must create a colorable claim of actual innocence, i.e., that the 

petitioner is innocent of the charge for which he is incarcerated, as opposed to legal innocence as a 

result of legal error. Id. at 321. It is not enough that the evidence show the existence of 

reasonable doubt. Petitioner must show "that it is more likely than not that no 'reasonable juror'

would have convicted him." Id. at 329. As the Ninth Circuit has put it, "the test is whether, with 

the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [p]etitioner 

guilty." Van Buskirk v. Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001). See, e.g., Carriger v. 

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (petition qualified for gateway on a showing 

principally that the chief prosecution witness had confessed to the crime under oath in the 

postconviction court and that prosecution had failed to produce file disclosing that witness was a 

known liar).

Here petitioner does not assert actual innocence as a Schlup procedural gateway. Rather, 

he presented a free-standing actual innocence claim, which, as explained above, is not cognizable. 

The Court has nonetheless reviewed the evidence submitted in support of petitioner's actual 

innocence claims. Petitioner's proffered evidence does not come close to establishing his actual 

innocence; at best, it represents an attempt to raise reasonable doubt, which is insufficient. Indeed, 

much of petitioner's "newly discovered evidence" has no support in the record.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

17. Missing Components of Record

Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to create or provide him with a complete record 

on appeal. Petition at 33-46. The California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, summarized and 

rejected this claim as follows:

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The appellate record in this case does not include the reporter's transcripts of the following 

proceedings or conferences: defendant's arraignment in the Alameda County Superior 

Court; a portion of the jury selection proceedings; a conference between the trial court and 

counsel during which the trial court excused Prospective Juror Heather H. by stipulation; 

two conferences between the trial court and counsel during which the parties agreed to 

excuse additional jurors by stipulation; a bench conference immediately preceding the 

testimony of prosecution witness Patrick Jackson; several conferences regarding jury 

instructions, penalty phase scheduling, and the readback of testimony; and a conversation 

between the trial court and the jury foreperson. The trial court conducted hearings to settle 

the record, but the parties were unable to fully reconstruct all of the unreported 

proceedings. Defendant claims the omission of these proceedings renders the record on 

appeal inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. A criminal defendant is entitled 

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to an appellate record that is adequate to 

permit meaningful review. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8, 58 

Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1166, 5 

Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 (Howard).) An appellate record is inadequate "only if the 

complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the defendant's ability to prosecute his appeal." 

(Alvarez, at p. 196, fn. 8, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The defendant bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the record is not adequate to permit meaningful appellate 

review. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 820, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) 

Inconsequential inaccuracies or omissions are insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. 

(Howard, at p. 1165, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) If the record can be reconstructed 

with other methods, such as "settled statement" procedures (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 

7, 32.3), the defendant must employ such methods to obtain appellate review (People v. 

Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 66, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118 (Hawthorne)). 

Defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice. He argues the omissions from the record are 

prejudicial because legal discussions may have occurred during these proceedings and 

because reversible errors may have occurred that are forever shielded from appellate 

review. He adds that transcripts of these unreported proceedings are also crucial to 

determine whether trial counsel performed competently. In essence, defendant argues that 

merely showing that the missing material may have contained matter that demonstrated 

error or reflected a constitutional violation satisfies his burden of establishing prejudice. 

But this amounts to nothing more than speculation, which is insufficient. (People v. 

Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 923, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571 (Pinholster ).) 

Because we find the appellate record adequate for us to reach the merits of defendant's 

claims, defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of portions of the record. (People v. 

Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 941, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (Frye ).) For this 

reason, his constitutional claims must fail. (Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 919–923, 4 

Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571; Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1165–1166, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 

268, 824 P.2d 1315.)

People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1169-70.

"The Federal Constitution imposes on the States no obligation to provide appellate review 

of criminal convictions." Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005). However, when a state 

chooses to provide for appellate review, the state must provide a defendant with "a record of 

sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of (his) claims" in order to satisfy the 

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constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 

189, 193-94 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Britt v. North Carolina, 

404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) ("there can be no doubt that the State must provide an indigent 

defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective 

defense or appeal"). "A 'record of sufficient completeness' does not translate automatically into a 

complete verbatim transcript." Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194. Rather,

[a]lternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they place before the 

appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's 

contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement 

based perhaps on the trial judge's minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's 

untranscribed notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, 

equally as good as a transcript.

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting id.). 

Whether a transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal depends on: "(1) the value of the 

transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the 

availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as the transcript." Britt, 

404 U.S. at 433-34.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the Britt criteria apply in evaluating a habeas petitioner's 

claim that the reconstruction of unrecorded portions of state trial court proceedings was inadequate 

for him to make an effective appeal. See Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(adopting Britt standard while noting, "There is no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority on 

the due process implications of a state court's failure to record portions of a criminal trial."). 

Petitioner has the burden of establishing prejudice from the lack of a complete transcript in light of 

the alleged value of the transcript and the availability of alternatives that would fulfill the same 

functions. Id. at 648-49 (finding that the petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief because he 

had not shown prejudice by the absence of a complete transcript); see Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 

604 (6th Cir. 2002) ("federal habeas relief based on a missing transcript will only be granted 

where the petitioner can show prejudice"); White v. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, 

939 F.2d 912, 914 (11th Cir. 1991) ("in a federal habeas corpus case brought by a state prisoner, 

the absence of a perfect transcript does not violate due process absent a showing of specific 

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prejudice").

The Court finds, for reasons similar to the California Supreme Court, that petitioner does 

not allege the necessary prejudice from any missing transcripts. Petitioner does not explain the 

value of such transcripts to his conviction. Nor does he identify anything that might appear in the 

transcripts that would have assisted him in advancing his claims or in formulating new ones. 

The Court is compelled to agree with petitioner, however, that a large number of 

proceedings are missing from the record. Petitioner has identified fifteen separate proceedings 

that went unrecorded.28 Further, the record before the Court is undeveloped as to how much was 

accomplished during the trial court's reconstruction proceedings to settle the record. Petitioner 

states that record correction proceedings were held in Alameda County Superior Court on 

February 19, 1999 and March 19, 1999. Petition at 35, ¶ 118. He also states the superior court 

issued its order correcting the record on July 14, 1999 and that two court reporters filed 

declarations attesting to proceedings that were not recorded. Petition at 35, ¶ 119. It appears that 

this Court has not received transcripts of the record correction proceedings nor the abovementioned order and declarations. 

The Court is unable to rule on this claim without additional information on the unrecorded 

proceedings. Rather than order further briefing, however, the Court declines to rule on this claim, 

given that petitioner is already entitled to relief on his juror misconduct claim.

18. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the foregoing asserted 

errors. Petition at 295-98. As discussed above, in some cases, although no single trial error is 

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a 

defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 

(9th Cir. 2003). Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the government's case is 

weak. United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). Where there is no single 

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. Hayes v. 

 

28 One of these proceedings, however, pertained to penalty-phase instructions, making the issue 

now moot. See Petition at 34, ¶ 115.

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Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011); Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Because petitioner is entitled to relief on his juror misconduct claim, the Court declines to rule 

on this claim.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Following oral argument in this matter, respondent filed a motion for an evidentiary 

hearing on petitioner's juror misconduct claim. Docket No. 28. Specifically, respondent asserts 

that a hearing is needed to determine whether Juror S.W. was telling the truth in his 2003 

declaration submitted in support of petitioner's state habeas petition. Although S.W. signed his 

2003 declaration under penalty of perjury, respondent argues that this is not evidence that S.W. 

was telling the truth because he also swore to the truth of his conflicting statements during voir 

dire in 1990.

29

The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is no longer possible at this point. The parties 

stipulate that Juror S.W. is now deceased, having passed away in 2010. See Docket No. 27. 

Consequently, to the extent disputes remain about S.W.'s credibility, a hearing would not resolve 

them.

Respondent specifically requests an evidentiary hearing to resolve the following factual 

questions:

Did juror S.W. tell the truth in his 2003 declaration when he states that he had personal 

knowledge of the crime scenes and had been a lifelong NRA member? Or did he tell the 

truth in his 1990 questionnaire and jury voir dire testimony when he stated that he did not 

have knowledge of the crime scenes and was not a member of the NRA? Did S.W. have 

racist beliefs that prompted him to prejudge the case?

Docket No. 28 at 5.

Regarding the first two questions, it is conceivable that evidence of petitioner's NRA 

membership, or lack thereof, could be introduced at an evidentiary hearing. However, as 

discussed above, the issue of S.W.'s NRA membership is not at the crux of petitioner's 

McDonough claim. Rather, it is the fact that S.W. had not answered truthfully that he was familiar 

with the area where the crimes occurred, and indeed had himself been robbed at gunpoint in the 

 

29

 The parties agree that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 

S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), does not bar an evidentiary hearing here.

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area, that would have provided a basis for a challenge "for cause" as required by McDonough. 

See 464 U.S. at 556. An evidentiary hearing without the testimony of S.W. would not resolve 

what he personally knew or did not know about the neighborhood where the crimes occurred.

Regarding the question of S.W.'s racial bias, the Court first notes that the many racist 

statements S.W. made in his 2003 declaration are not contradicted by anything he said during jury 

selection in 1990. Thus the only issue for potential resolution is not so much a factual dispute as it 

is a question of credibility, i.e., whether S.W. actually harbored racist views against petitioner. 

The Court is hard-pressed to find a reason why S.W. would choose to falsely make such racially

derogatory statements. The statements speak for themselves. The ability to make them at all 

reveals a deep-seated racism. In any event, it is difficult to imagine what evidence could possibly 

be presented to prove or disprove what S.W. meant by these statements. Any testimony from 

people who knew S.W. along the lines that he made non-racist statements at some other point in

time or conducted himself in a non-racist manner would not diminish S.W.'s own highly damning 

admissions.

Respondent, in his reply brief, variously proposes putting on the stand S.W.'s family 

members, friends, and/or the investigator who obtained S.W.'s declaration. Counsel for 

respondent does not represent that he has actually contacted any of these purportedly potential 

witnesses, let alone ascertained that they would (1) appear in court, and (2) impeach S.W.'s 

declaration. Even setting aside the hearsay problems such evidence would present, it is hard to 

imagine how such evidence could overcome the declaration made by S.W. himself. If S.W. 

himself could not deny bias in this situation, it appears futile to take testimony from any other 

person.

Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases directs a federal district court to review 

the materials listed therein and "to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted." The 

Advisory Committee's notes then state that "If the judge decides that an evidentiary hearing is 

neither required nor desirable, he shall make such a disposition of the petition 'as justice shall 

require.'" The notes continue, "[i]f no hearing is required, most petitions are dismissed, but in 

unusual cases the court may grant the relief sought without a hearing. This includes immediate 

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release from custody or nullification of a judgment under which the sentence is to be served in the 

future." See also Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he fact that a hearing 

would be permitted does not mean that it is required. The district court retains discretion whether 

to hold one."); Bemore v. Chapell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding with 

instructions for district court to grant habeas petition even where no evidentiary hearing had been 

held). The Court finds this is the type of "unusual" case contemplated by the Advisory 

Committee's notes to Rule 8. Given the limited probative value of the theoretical testimony that 

could impeach S.W.'s 2003 declaration, and the hearsay barriers to admitting such testimony, it 

appears any evidence offered at a hearing would be too thin to warrant use of the court's limited 

time and resources. 

Finally, respondent argues that petitioner has the burden to establish that S.W. was telling 

the truth in his declaration. See Docket No. 27 at 9 n.1. Respondent cites McKenzie v. 

McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1418-9 (9th Cir. 1994) and Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39, 41-42 

(9th Cir. 1997). These cases do not support respondent's position. Rather, they apply the basic 

rule that a habeas petitioner bears the burden of satisfying Section 2254 by showing that the state 

court's adjudication of a claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent (Section 2254(d)(1)) or was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts (Section 2254(d)(2)). Here, petitioner has discharged that burden by establishing, 

pursuant to Section 2254(d)(1), that the state court erred when it, accepting petitioner's evidence to 

be true, nonetheless rejected petitioner's juror misconduct claim.

30

 

30 The state court's rejection is not analyzed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), i.e., cannot be said to 

be "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts" because the state court made no factual 

determination at all. The state court never held a hearing on the juror misconduct claim and 

ultimately denied the claim summarily. A summary decision by a state court does not "implicitly" 

make any factual findings in support of the decision. Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 

2001) (refusing to infer factual findings from state court summary denial of habeas 

petition), overruled in part on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 

2003). A petition may be granted under Section 2254(d)(2) where the state court should have 

made a finding of fact but neglected to do so. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000-01 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (holding there may be "intrinsic challenges to state-court findings . . . where the state 

court should have made a finding of fact but neglected to do so"). This is not such a case. The 

Supreme Court has never held that a hearing is required in every case of potential juror 

bias. See Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Accordingly, respondent's motion for an evidentiary hearing will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court GRANTS habeas relief on petitioner's juror misconduct 

claim. The Court declines to rule on petitioner's missing records claim and cumulative error

claim. All other claims are DENIED. Respondent's motion for an evidentiary hearing is 

DENIED.

Accordingly, petitioner's conviction is VACATED. Respondent shall release petitioner 

from custody unless the state commences proceedings to retry petitioner within one hundred and 

twenty (120) days of the date of entry of judgment on this order. The Clerk shall send an 

informational copy of this order to the district attorney of Alameda County, in addition to the 

usual service on counsel of record.

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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