Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07030/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 150
Nature of Suit: Overpayments &amp; Enforcement of Judgments
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 2015 Decided August 18, 2015

No. 14-7030

BANNEKER VENTURES, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

JIM GRAHAM, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00391)

Mark A. Grannis argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were Mark D. Davis and Anne K. Langer. 

Brian K. McDaniel entered an appearance.

Douglas M. Bregman argued the cause for appellee 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Daniel P. 

Golden, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General 

Counsel for the Council of the District of Columbia, argued 

the cause for appellee Jim Graham. With them on the joint 

brief were Geoffrey T. Hervey, Gerard J. Stief, V. David 

Zvenyach, General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel for 

the Council of the District of Columbia, John R. Hoellen, 

Deputy General Counsel, and Manasi Venkatesh, Assistant 

General Counsel, Brian L. Schwalb, Seth A. Rosenthal, and 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 1 of 42
2

Moxila A. Upadhyaya. Bruce P. Heppen entered an 

appearance.

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: The Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority (WMATA), like many transit 

authorities across the country, does more than build and run 

transit systems. WMATA is empowered to acquire, own, and 

convey real property to promote transit-oriented development. 

One way it does so is through a program that invites 

developers to submit proposals to develop WMATA property,

and then grants the competitively selected developer an 

exclusive period during which to negotiate for a final 

development contract to carry out its proposal.

Plaintiff in this case, real estate developer Banneker 

Ventures, LLC, alleges that WMATA signed a contractually 

binding Term Sheet preliminarily selecting Banneker to 

develop property above a Metrorail station and giving 

Banneker the exclusive right to negotiate a final development 

agreement. Banneker further alleges that one of WMATA’s 

Board Members, Jim Graham, abused his Board position and 

his seat on the Council of the District of Columbia to work 

behind the scenes with one of Banneker’s rival bidders, 

LaKritz Adler Development, to derail WMATA’s 

negotiations with Banneker. According to Banneker,

Graham sought to steer the development job to LaKritz Adler, 

a Graham supporter and campaign contributor. WMATA 

dragged out its negotiating period with Banneker for many 

months during which, the complaint alleges, Banneker met 

WMATA’s every shifting demand. WMATA then let the 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 2 of 42
3

Term Sheet expire without consummating a final 

development agreement. WMATA eventually sold the 

property to another developer.

Banneker raises several distinct claims arising from its 

dashed opportunity. It asserts that WMATA, through 

Graham, breached the Term Sheet’s exclusivity provision and

obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that Graham and 

LaKritz Adler conspired to interfere with Banneker’s contract 

(the Term Sheet) and prospective business advantage. The 

complaint exhaustively chronicles the facts underlying those 

claims and, for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that 

the district court erred in dismissing them. 

Banneker also asserted tort claims against WMATA and 

Graham. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Banneker’s fraud claim against WMATA as barred by 

sovereign immunity. Graham’s asserted absolute official 

immunity from suit for tortious interference requires further 

consideration. The district court evaluated the complaint at 

too high a level of generality and failed to place the burden on 

Graham to establish his entitlement to official immunity. 

Because the absolute official immunity questions have yet to 

be analyzed by the district court at the requisite level of 

factual specificity, we vacate the dismissal of the tort claims 

against Graham and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 3 of 42
4

I. Background

A. Allegations1

In the spring of 2007, WMATA invited bids to redevelop 

its property above the Shaw-Howard/Florida Avenue 

Metrorail station. Banneker, Defendant LaKritz Adler 

Development, and ten other developers submitted bids. 

Banneker proposed building “The Jazz at Florida Avenue,” a 

mixed-use development that would include 103 new 

residential units and 11,750 square feet of retail space. At 

first, things seemed to go Banneker’s way. Its bid received 

the support of the local neighborhood commission, investors 

expressed interest, and Banneker’s presentation to WMATA 

staff was well received. WMATA made its initial selection of 

Banneker to develop the site, and the parties negotiated a 

Term Sheet that contained many of the material terms of the 

deal and a contractually guaranteed, exclusive, five-month 

negotiating period for Banneker and WMATA to arrive at a 

final development agreement. See Term Sheet, J.A. 111 §§ 4, 

7, 12. Banneker paid WMATA $100,000 in exchange for the 

exclusive negotiation right, which fee was in addition to the 

$100,000 it had already paid as a “proposal deposit.”

After its preliminary success, Banneker soon met 

resistance. Defendant Jim Graham was a member of the D.C. 

Council and one of the District’s two voting members on 

 1 This factual account is based on the allegations of the Amended 

Complaint. J.A. 10. At the pleading stage, we accept all the wellpleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The question is 

whether Banneker will have an opportunity to try to prove in court 

what it has alleged. We express no opinion as to the truth of what 

is recited here as fact.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 4 of 42
5

WMATA’s Board of Directors.2 LaKritz Adler and its 

principals Joshua Adler and Robb LaKritz (collectively,

LaKritz Adler) were major contributors to Graham’s 

campaigns and projects, whereas Graham believed that 

Banneker contributed to his political opponents. From the 

start, Graham opposed Banneker and favored LaKritz Adler 

for the Florida Avenue project. Graham and LaKritz Adler 

colluded for the next two years to engineer an opportunity for 

LaKritz Adler to wrest the contract or some of its benefits 

from Banneker. That alliance was only half successful: 

Banneker ultimately lost the project, but a different developer, 

not LaKritz Adler, took its place.

Starting while WMATA’s staff was negotiating the Term 

Sheet with Banneker, Graham sought to derail the process. 

Graham told one of Banneker’s principals, Warren Williams, 

that Graham would cast his D.C. Council vote in favor of 

Williams on a lottery contract he sought if Williams would 

pull Banneker out of the WMATA project. Graham solicited 

campaign contributions and substantial financial support from 

another Banneker principal in exchange for Graham’s support 

of the Banneker bid. Graham also pressured two of 

Banneker’s development partners to drop off of the project in 

an effort to cause WMATA staff to abandon negotiations with 

Banneker and give the project to LaKritz Adler instead.

Meanwhile, Banneker was in negotiations with Howard 

University over a parcel adjacent to the WMATA Florida 

 2 WMATA is governed by a Board of Directors composed of eight 

members, two from each signatory of the interstate compact that 

formed it—the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia—and two 

from the federal government. D.C. Code § 9-1107.01 ¶ 5(a). The 

Board acts through majority vote but, in order for a vote to carry, 

the majority must contain at least one member of each contributing 

jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 8(a).

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 5 of 42
6

Avenue property that Banneker wanted to develop at the same 

time as the WMATA project. LaKritz Adler falsely told 

Howard University that WMATA had already selected it to 

develop the Florida Avenue property, not Banneker. Graham 

also pressed Banneker at a lunch meeting to add LaKritz

Adler to its development team, claiming that doing so would 

be a precondition of Board approval of the Term Sheet. 

Immediately following the lunch, Banneker received 

unsolicited calls and e-mail messages from LaKritz Adler 

proposing transfer of Banneker’s option on the adjacent parcel 

to LaKritz Adler—timing that Banneker alleges shows 

Graham’s collusion with LaKritz Adler.

In June 2008, WMATA’s Board of Directors approved 

the Term Sheet and Banneker executed it. But Graham did 

not give up. He pressured his fellow WMATA Directors in a 

closed-door session to impose an affordable housing 

requirement on Banneker that, based on his experience,

Graham anticipated would “delay, interfere with or otherwise 

scuttle Banneker’s efforts during the” negotiation period to 

follow. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. Graham also directed WMATA 

staff to “stop or delay negotiations” so as to “delay or destroy 

Banneker’s ability to fully realize the benefit of its period of 

exclusive negotiation.” Id. ¶ 127.

Upon becoming Chairman of the WMATA Board in 

January 2009, Graham “me[t] with WMATA’s staff to 

pressure the WMATA staff to find a way for LaKritz Adler to 

be included” in Banneker’s development plan. Id. ¶ 131. 

LaKritz Adler also called WMATA staff to tell them that 

now-Chairman Graham had asked LaKritz Adler to “make a 

deal” with Banneker. Id. ¶ 133. During the same period, 

Graham shared Banneker’s confidential bid information with 

LaKritz Adler to provide the rival firm with a competitive 

advantage. Graham also forced a third Banneker 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 6 of 42
7

development partner to drop out of the deal through delay, 

and demanded that Banneker replace it with LaKritz Adler.

Graham used his power on the Board to delay and 

undermine negotiations between Banneker and WMATA staff 

over a final agreement. Repeatedly, when Banneker and 

WMATA staff reached agreement on material terms, and 

WMATA staff recommended that the Board approve a final 

agreement, Graham initiated changes or otherwise prevented 

closure. He delayed Board consideration of a final 

agreement, directed staff to stop negotiations, switched the 

deal from a lease to a sale and then back to a lease again, and 

ordered the staff to re-appraise the property, giving rise to a 

new round of negotiations.

It was in the midst of that extended back and forth that

Banneker learned Graham had instructed the WMATA staff 

to “obtain Best and Final Offers from Banneker and the two 

other firms who WMATA [had already] considered before 

selecting Banneker,” including LaKritz Adler. Id. ¶ 155. 

WMATA’s General Counsel prepared a memo at Graham’s 

request regarding whether WMATA had the authority to 

solicit “Best and Final” offers from other developers during 

the period that the Term Sheet set for exclusive negotiations 

between WMATA and Banneker. (The memo, however, 

concluded that WMATA could not do so until Banneker’s 

exclusivity period expired.)

In January 2010, the Board instructed WMATA staff to 

negotiate a larger up-front fee from Banneker to develop the 

site, and extended the negotiation period again. Banneker 

agreed to the Board’s terms. By March, “all material terms of 

the Revised Term Sheet, including price, were agreed to by 

Banneker and WMATA staff at which time the WMATA 

staff, for the final time, recommended that the WMATA 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 7 of 42
8

Board approve the agreement.” Id. ¶ 166; see also id. ¶ 213. 

But, rather than approve the final agreement as the staff had 

negotiated it with Banneker, the Board indefinitely tabled 

approval of the deal “for the purpose of allowing Banneker’s 

exclusive right to ‘time out.’” Id. ¶ 174. WMATA then reissued a solicitation for bids, this time for a sale of the site, 

and sold the property to another developer. WMATA 

returned half of the $200,000 in deposits Banneker had paid 

it. 

After The Washington Post began reporting allegations 

that Graham tried to barter his D.C. Council vote and 

pressured Banneker and its development partners to drop out 

of the project, WMATA retained the law firm Cadwalader, 

Wickersham & Taft, LLP, to conduct an investigation. (The

parties dubbed the resulting report the Bondi Report, after the 

Cadwalader partner Bradley J. Bondi, who was its lead 

investigator and author.) The Bondi Report concluded that 

Graham failed to remain impartial, showed favoritism toward 

a competing vendor, appeared to barter a WMATA project for 

his vote on the D.C. Council, and attempted to circumvent the 

WMATA Board by pressuring Banneker to drop out of the 

project. A separate report by the Director of the Office of 

Integrity and Oversight in the office of the District of 

Columbia Chief Financial Officer concluded that Graham’s 

offer to support Williams to obtain the lottery contract was

“inappropriate.” Id. ¶¶ 9 & n.3, 109. The District of 

Columbia Board of Ethics and Government Accountability 

also investigated, and found sufficient evidence to conclude 

that Graham violated applicable ethical guidelines. As a 

result, the Council reprimanded Jim Graham—making that 

only the second time in the D.C. Council’s thirty-eight-year 

history of home rule that the Council formally reprimanded 

one of its members.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 8 of 42
9

B. Procedural History

Banneker filed this lawsuit in 2013, alleging that 

WMATA breached the Term Sheet and the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing by violating the exclusivity 

provision and negotiating without genuine intention of 

reaching agreement. Banneker also claims that WMATA 

staff defrauded Banneker by repeatedly telling Banneker’s 

principals that a deal was close when staff members knew or 

should have known that the WMATA Board would not

approve it. It further claims that Graham, LaKritz Adler, and 

that firm’s principals engaged in civil conspiracy and tortious 

interference with Banneker’s prospective business advantage

and its contract with WMATA.

3

 

The district court dismissed all of Banneker’s claims at 

the pleading stage. The court held that Banneker had failed to 

state a claim against WMATA for breach of the contract or 

the implied covenant because, it concluded, Banneker did not 

adequately allege that WMATA negotiated with LaKritz 

Adler, and because the Term Sheet did not bind WMATA to 

execute a final development agreement. See Banneker 

Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 20 F. Supp. 3d 184, 198-201

(D.D.C. 2013) (Banneker I). The court also held that 

WMATA and Graham were immune from suit on the tort 

claims, and that Banneker failed adequately to state a claim 

against LaKritz Adler for tortious interference. Id. at 192-98; 

Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 19 F. Supp. 3d 231, 245-

51 (D.D.C. 2014) (Banneker II). Banneker filed a timely 

notice of appeal. Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

 3 The complaint also asserted claims for unlawful restraint of trade 

and unjust enrichment, and a civil conspiracy claim against 

WMATA, but Banneker does not press those claims on appeal.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 9 of 42
10

II. Legal Standards

We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal of Banneker’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 

Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Except for allegations of fraud or mistake, see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 9(b), we do not require “detailed factual 

allegations” for a claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). We accept all 

the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true 

and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in 

the plaintiff’s favor. Id. Nevertheless, “[t]hreadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” nor do we assume the 

truth of legal conclusions. Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it is not a “probability 

requirement.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A 

claim crosses from conceivable to plausible when it contains 

factual allegations that, if proved, would “allow[] the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id.

 The Twombly Court stated that a well-pleaded complaint 

should be allowed to proceed “even if it strikes a savvy judge 

that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and that 

a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” 550 U.S. at 556 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint survives a 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 10 of 42
11

motion to dismiss even “[i]f there are two alternative 

explanations, one advanced by [the] defendant and the other 

advanced by [the] plaintiff, both of which are plausible.” 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). It is 

inevitable that the defendant’s version will sometimes prove 

to be the true one, but that does not relieve defendants of their 

obligation to respond to a complaint that states a plausible 

claim for relief, and to participate in discovery.

Defendants moved to dismiss certain tort claims based on 

sovereign immunity. As it must on motions to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, a district court considering a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction accepts the 

allegations of the complaint as true. Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of 

Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Where 

necessary to resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 

12(b)(1), “the court may consider the complaint supplemented 

by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint 

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution 

of disputed facts.” Id. Here, however, the district court did 

not purport to resolve any disputed facts, nor did it give notice 

to the parties of any intention to do so. We therefore review 

de novo the district court’s dismissal on jurisdictional 

grounds, taking the allegations of the complaint as true. Id.

III. Contract Claims

Banneker claims that WMATA breached its Term Sheet 

because Graham, acting as WMATA’s agent, negotiated with 

LaKritz Adler in violation of Banneker’s exclusivity rights. 

Banneker also asserts that WMATA violated the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing by unilaterally 

abandoning negotiations before a final agreement was 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 11 of 42
12

reached.4 We hold that Banneker adequately stated both 

claims and accordingly reverse.

A. Breach of the Exclusivity Provision

WMATA concedes that the Term Sheet bound it to 

negotiate exclusively with Banneker, but argues that it never 

negotiated with LaKritz Adler and so never breached the 

agreement. The complaint’s allegations make a powerful 

circumstantial case to the contrary: WMATA, through 

Graham, communicated frequently and in detail with LaKritz 

Adler concerning the Florida Avenue site. Graham leaked to 

LaKritz Adler confidential information about Banneker’s 

plans so that LaKritz Adler could develop a competitively 

attractive alternative to Banneker’s proposal. LaKritz Adler 

called WMATA staff directly and, during that call, pressed its 

interest in the project subject to the Term Sheet and discussed 

Banneker’s confidential bid information. Am. Compl. ¶ 261. 

Before Banneker’s Term Sheet expired, Graham sought to 

formally solicit bids from Banneker’s competitors, including 

LaKritz Adler, during the exclusivity period. Though 

WMATA did not follow through, it is reasonable to infer 

from all of those allegations taken together that Graham 

negotiated with LaKritz Adler regarding its possible 

development of the Florida Avenue site, in violation of the 

exclusivity term of WMATA’s agreement with Banneker.

WMATA seizes on separate allegations that Graham also 

helped LaKritz Adler in its efforts to become part of 

Banneker’s development team. WMATA argues that neither 

Graham nor any other WMATA personnel entered into 

negotiations with LaKritz Adler to replace Banneker—only to 

 4 In the district court, Banneker also claimed that the Term Sheet 

was a contract for conveyance of the property, but it does not press 

that claim on appeal.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 12 of 42
13

see whether LaKritz Adler might join Banneker’s team. 

Allegations pointing to Graham’s efforts to help LaKritz 

Adler benefit by getting a piece of Banneker’s projected work 

are not, however, inconsistent with allegations that Graham 

simultaneously sought to help LaKritz Adler to displace 

Banneker from the project altogether. Banneker is entitled to, 

and does, allege that Graham did both. 

B. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing

Banneker’s second contract claim is that WMATA 

breached its obligation under the Term Sheet to negotiate in 

good faith by interposing terms and conditions extraneous to 

the Term Sheet and unilaterally abandoning negotiations 

toward a final agreement. The allegations of Banneker’s 

complaint make clear that it had a contract that imposed on 

the parties a duty to negotiate in good faith. The parties’ 

Term Sheet, although preliminary to any binding development 

contract, was itself a binding contract to negotiate. That 

acknowledged, contractually binding obligation to negotiate 

carried with it the implied duty to do so in good faith. See 

Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006); 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981); 23 Williston 

on Contracts § 63:22 (4th ed.).

Under an often-cited typology of preliminary agreements 

to negotiate final agreements, the Term Sheet was a “Type II” 

agreement, or one that “expresses mutual commitment to a 

contract on agreed major terms, while recognizing the 

existence of open terms that remain to be negotiated.” 

Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. 

Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Leval, J.); see Stanford 

Hotels Corp. v. Potomac Creek Associates, L.P., 18 A.3d 725, 

735-36 (D.C. 2011) (applying Tribune). In contrast to a Type 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 13 of 42
14

I agreement, which is “preliminary only in form” because the 

parties have reached “complete agreement” and need only to 

formalize it, Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498, parties to a Type II 

agreement have not reached complete agreement, but “can 

bind themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement in the 

sense that they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate 

together in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement 

within the scope that has been settled in the preliminary 

agreement,” id. 

The Term Sheet on its face is manifestly a Type II 

agreement. The Term Sheet recites that it is “intended to 

summarize the principal terms of a proposal being considered 

by” the parties, and to express the parties’ “wish to negotiate a 

Definitive Agreement.” Term Sheet, Preamble. It states that 

its “binding effect” is to give Banneker “the exclusive right to 

negotiate a Definitive Agreement with WMATA.” Id. § 12. 

And it sets forth many of the material terms of the deal, 

including the definition of the property to be leased, the base 

rent for the property, formulas for how the rent would change 

based on time, occupancy, and the density of the 

development, the security deposit Banneker would pay upon 

execution of a final agreement, an outline of the 

improvements Banneker intended to build on the property, 

and the corporate structure of the development team. 

Through the Term Sheet, Banneker and WMATA established 

“a general framework within which they could proceed while 

preserving flexibility in the face of future uncertainty,” Brown 

v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2005), and after 

executing the Term Sheet at significant expense to Banneker, 

they proceeded under that rubric.

 As a Type II agreement, the Term Sheet did not 

guarantee the parties would reach complete agreement, but it 

was nonetheless binding. Type II agreements contemplate 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 14 of 42
15

that negotiations may fail, either because “good faith 

differences in the negotiation of the open issues may prevent a 

reaching of final contract” or because the parties mutually 

abandon the negotiation. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498. But a 

duty to negotiate in good faith under a Type II agreement is 

violated by a party unilaterally “renouncing the deal, 

abandoning the negotiations, or insisting on conditions that do 

not conform to the preliminary agreement.” Id.; see also 

Stanford Hotels, 18 A.3d at 735-36 (quoting Tribune).

 Banneker’s allegations that Graham directed cessation 

of negotiations and interjected new terms and conditions that 

were not part of Banneker’s Term Sheet suffice to show lack 

of good faith. According to the complaint, Banneker and 

WMATA staff reached final agreement on the open terms 

multiple times over twenty months, but the WMATA Board 

repeatedly altered the deal, delayed it, and ultimately tabled it 

for the purpose of letting the negotiation period “time out” 

with no final agreement. Those allegations show that 

WMATA “simply refused to proceed further” in the 

negotiations, even though it had no justification and no good 

faith disagreement had arisen with Banneker—conduct 

inconsistent with the duty of good faith. United House of 

Prayer for All People v. Therrien Waddell, Inc., 112 A.3d 

330, 344 (D.C. 2015); see also L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, 

LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2011). Much of 

Graham’s alleged misconduct occurred before Banneker and 

WMATA executed the Term Sheet, but Graham also acted to 

interfere with Banneker’s ability to secure a final agreement 

during the twenty months of negotiations after the Term Sheet 

was signed. He pressured Banneker to drop a development 

partner in favor of LaKritz Adler, instructed WMATA staff to 

stop or delay negotiations, and explored the possibility of 

soliciting more bids.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 15 of 42
16

The decisions in Tribune, Stanford Hotels, and United 

House of Prayer are instructive. In Tribune, a prospective 

borrower’s commitment letter established a Type II 

agreement to negotiate. 670 F. Supp. at 496, 499. When the 

borrower “broke off negotiations, declining to negotiate 

further unless the lender agreed” to a new term not anticipated 

by the commitment letter, the court found a breach. Id. at 

491, 506. The court noted that the borrower had reserved to 

its Board of Directors the right to approve or reject the loan, 

but held that the borrower could not abuse that condition by 

going through the motions of negotiating the loan to the

parties’ mutual satisfaction, only to “defeat its obligations 

under the binding agreement of commitment merely by 

having its Board do nothing.” Id. at 503. Similarly, in 

Stanford Hotels, the parties entered an agreement to negotiate 

the final purchase of a hotel. The seller thereby “obligated 

itself to negotiate exclusively and in good faith with [the 

purchaser] and to sign a Definitive Agreement if they were 

able to agree on terms.” 18 A.3d at 734-35. When the 

purchaser showed itself “willing to concede” on all of the 

open issues “if necessary to close on the sale,” id. at 731 n.5, 

the seller who responded by holding out for a more 

advantageous alternative, stringing the purchaser along, and 

ultimately abandoning the negotiations, was in breach, id. at 

731-33. In United House of Prayer, a party violated an 

enforceable Type II agreement when it “terminated 

discussions . . . without offering any explanation of what 

terms its lawyer purportedly found unacceptable and by 

declining to negotiate . . . or even to discuss the matter,” even 

though the counterparty communicated its willingness to 

discuss any remaining issues or concerns. 112 A.3d at 344. 

So too, here: Banneker’s allegations that Graham, in his 

capacity as an agent of WMATA, acted to delay, interfere 

with, and ultimately defeat a final development agreement 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 16 of 42
17

between WMATA and Banneker adequately state a claim for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Further, we find no relevance, in the context of the agreement 

at issue in this case, that WMATA’s Board reserved for itself 

the right to approve or disapprove a final agreement. 

WMATA’s Board approved the Term Sheet, which obligated 

WMATA to negotiate in good faith. As in Tribune, because 

WMATA had committed to negotiate the project to the 

parties’ mutual satisfaction, it could not then “defeat its 

obligations under the binding agreement of commitment 

merely by having its Board do nothing.” Tribune, 670 F. 

Supp. at 503.

WMATA responds, relying exclusively on the Bondi 

Report, that it was not required to extend the negotiation 

period any further because the parties had reached an 

intractable, good faith impasse over contract terms. WMATA 

attached the Bondi Report to its motion to dismiss. In 

WMATA’s view, the Bondi Report exonerates it of any claim 

of failure to negotiate in good faith because the report pegged 

the parties’ failure to reach agreement under the Term Sheet 

on “business reasons.” In particular, the report concluded 

that, while Graham acted unethically, there were good faith 

disagreements between Banneker and WMATA and other 

business reasons that prevented them from reaching a final 

development agreement. See, e.g., Bondi Rpt., J.A. 140, at 

50. 

Defendants argue that we must assume the veracity of the 

Bondi Report, even at the pleading stage, by virtue of the 

incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Banneker’s complaint 

refers to the Bondi Report, commissioned by WMATA and 

released in 2012, as a source of Banneker’s knowledge of 

certain facts, such as Defendants’ “behind-the-scenes and 

closed-door actions.” Am. Compl. ¶ 81. Banneker did not 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 17 of 42
18

attach the report to its complaint or purport to endorse its 

overall analysis. Defendants contend that we must treat the

report as adopted in toto by Banneker. We disagree.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) permits a plaintiff 

to attach an exhibit to the complaint, rendering the exhibit 

“part of the pleading for all purposes.” Incorporation by 

reference can also amplify pleadings where the document is 

not attached by the plaintiff, but is “referred to in the 

complaint and [] integral to [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Kaempe 

v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A district court 

may consider a document that a complaint specifically 

references without converting the motion into one for 

summary judgment. See id.; 5A Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1327 (4th 

ed. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 

The prototypical incorporation by reference occurs where 

a complaint claims breach of contract, and either party 

attaches to its pleading an authentic copy of the contract itself. 

Because the contract is a legally operative document that is a 

necessary element of the claim, the contract is “integral” to 

the plaintiff’s claim—it “form[s] the basis for a claim or part 

of a claim.” Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).5

 A pleading’s 

 5 Defendants cite several cases similarly involving incorporation of 

documents upon which the plaintiffs’ claims were based, the 

authenticity of which was not in question. See Clorox Co. Puerto 

Rico v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st 

Cir. 2000) (incorporating advertising copy alleged to have been 

misleading); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 

1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (incorporating annual report where 

plaintiffs’ claim rested on report’s failure to disclose facts); Kramer 

v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1991) 

(incorporating documents alleged to contain misrepresentations 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 18 of 42
19

reference to even a part of a fully integrated and authentic 

contract thus incorporates the contract as a whole into the 

complaint. 

The incorporation by reference doctrine has limits, 

however. If a document itself comes before the court only as 

an attachment to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it may not 

be appropriate for the court to treat the entire document as 

incorporated into the complaint. Some of our sister circuits 

have rejected the “fantastic argument” that “all facts 

contained in any attachments to a complaint are automatically 

deemed facts alleged as part of the complaint.” Carroll, 362 

F.3d at 986 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Rule 10(c) “does not require a plaintiff to adopt every word 

within the exhibits as true for purposes of pleading simply 

because the documents were attached to the complaint to 

support an alleged fact.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. 

v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 454-56 (7th Cir. 1998); 

see also Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th 

Cir. 2008); West-Anderson v. Missouri Gaming Co., 557 F. 

App’x 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2014). For example, the Second 

Circuit has explained that a written contract “will defeat 

invocation of the Statute of Frauds, and a document that 

discloses what the complaint alleges it concealed will defeat 

the allegation of concealment,” but a libel plaintiff who 

attaches to her complaint the allegedly libelous writing does 

not adopt the libelous statement as true, thereby defeating her 

own claim. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 

674 (2d Cir. 1995). When considering incorporation, it is 

necessary to consider “why a plaintiff attached the 

 

forming basis of plaintiff’s claim); Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of 

Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2009) (incorporating contract 

where plaintiff’s case rested on breach of contractual duty).

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 19 of 42
20

documents, who authored the documents, and the reliability of 

the documents.” N. Ind. Gun, 163 F.3d at 455. 

In evaluating Banneker’s claims, we will not rely on 

those portions of the Bondi Report not adopted by Banneker. 

Banneker’s claims here are not based on the Bondi Report. 

The report is not necessary to Banneker’s claims. It was 

commissioned by a defendant and its reliability is unknown.6 

Banneker referred to some of the report’s recitations to show 

how it learned some facts in the complaint, but it did not 

purport to and was not required to adopt the factual contents 

of the report wholesale. 

Ignoring, as we must at the pleading stage, the opinions 

and conclusions of the Bondi Report, we find nothing in the 

complaint substantiating WMATA’s position that Banneker 

has failed to state a claim for breach of the duty to negotiate 

in good faith. 

IV. Tortious Interference and Conspiracy Claims against 

LaKritz Adler

Banneker asserts claims against LaKritz Adler for 

tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with 

prospective business advantage, and civil conspiracy. To 

state claims for tortious interference under District of 

Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a 

 6 Defendants would have been entitled to rely on the Bondi Report

to show any inaccuracy in Banneker’s allegations about its 

contents, because a referenced document may always be read “to 

evidence what it incontestably shows.” Gant, 69 F.3d at 674 

(emphasis added). But that is not the same as treating the report’s 

contents as though they were alleged by Banneker itself, and thus 

taking them all as true. And Defendants do not assert, in any case, 

that Banneker has mischaracterized the Bondi Report.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 20 of 42
21

contract or business expectancy, the defendant’s knowledge 

of the contract or business expectancy, intentional 

interference causing the breach of the contract or termination 

of the business expectancy, and damages. See Sturdza v. 

United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 

Bennett Enters., Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 

499 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Banneker argues that LaKritz Adler, 

acting in concert with Graham, (1) interfered with its Term 

Sheet by causing WMATA to breach its exclusivity and good 

faith obligations, and (2) interfered with its business 

expectancy in a final agreement by causing WMATA to 

abandon negotiations. The district court dismissed both 

tortious interference claims because it concluded that 

Banneker had alleged neither a valid contract nor a valid 

business expectancy. Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 248-51. 

We hold that Banneker adequately stated its claims and 

therefore reverse.

First, our resolution of the contract claims establishes that 

Banneker alleges the existence of a valid contract. The 

district court held that the Term Sheet was not enforceable. 

As we have discussed, however, the Term Sheet was a valid 

Type II agreement that bound WMATA to negotiate 

exclusively and in good faith with Banneker. 

Banneker also alleges a valid business expectancy in the 

completion of a final development agreement. A business 

expectancy “must be commercially reasonable to anticipate” 

before its loss may be actionable. Browning v. Clinton, 292 

F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In holding that Banneker lacked a valid business 

expectancy, the district court reasoned that, after signing the 

Term Sheet, Banneker could “only hope[] to enter into a final 

contract with WMATA” because the possibility that the 

Board would approve a final deal “was too remote to establish 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 21 of 42
22

a valid business expectancy.” Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 

249. The district court relied extensively on Carr v. Brown, 

395 A.2d 79, 82 (D.C. 1978). There, a real estate developer 

applied for a permit to relocate a portion of an alley and for a 

zoning variance that would enable him to develop his 

property. When another property owner and his attorney 

expressed their opposition and “incite[d] . . . area residents to 

oppose the alley closing and relocation,” the developer sued 

them for losses caused by the resultant delay in approval of 

the permit. Id. at 83. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the 

developer’s business expectancy was “too remote, depending 

as [it does] on governmental approval,” particularly because 

the opponents to the permit were “participating in procedures 

fixed by statute which specifically invite opposition.” Id. at 

84. Carr itself distinguishes its facts from the type of 

expectancy at issue here, as it expressly does not purport to 

apply to “a claim by the plaintiff that he has an expectancy of 

doing business with a governmental body and that expectancy 

is unjustifiably interfered with by the defendant.” Id.

Here, by contrast, Banneker was doing business with 

WMATA. LaKritz Adler is alleged to have interfered with a 

prospective final agreement. We hold that it was 

commercially reasonable for Banneker to anticipate the 

consummation of the deal anticipated by the Term Sheet. 

Banneker had far more than a “hope” of closing the deal; the

very purpose of the Term Sheet was to produce a final 

agreement. Indeed, Banneker and WMATA staff reached 

agreement many times. WMATA staff repeatedly 

recommended approval. And the Board had in the past rarely 

voted against a development agreement recommended by the 

staff. On these facts, as alleged, Banneker had a justified 

expectation that a development agreement would be finalized. 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 22 of 42
23

Banneker also adequately alleged the remaining elements 

of tortious interference. Banneker alleged that LaKritz Adler 

had knowledge of its Term Sheet, and therefore of its 

exclusivity rights and expectancy in a final agreement, and 

Banneker has also made the requisite “strong showing of 

intent,” Bennett, 45 F.3d at 499 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), or “bad faith,” Sorrells v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks 

Bros., Miller & Rhoads, 565 A.2d 285, 292 (D.C. 1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The allegations that 

LaKritz Adler and Graham embarked on a long campaign to 

induce WMATA to partly or wholly displace Banneker 

suffice to plead causation. And Banneker alleged that the 

campaign to undermine its bid caused WMATA to breach its 

exclusivity and good faith obligations, and ultimately cost 

Banneker the project.7

 

LaKritz Adler argues that Banneker failed adequately to 

allege that LaKritz Adler’s conduct was the cause of any 

breach of the Term Sheet or WMATA’s abandonment of 

negotiations because it is Graham who is alleged to have been 

the “primary wrongdoer in the entire affair.” Appellee Br. 53 

(quoting Appellant Br. 32). We disagree. Banneker alleges 

that LaKritz Adler “used [its] relationship with Graham to 

induce Graham and WMATA’s staff and Board to breach its 

contract to negotiate exclusively with Banneker,” Am. Compl.

¶ 270, and to cause WMATA to abandon negotiations. 

District of Columbia courts have adopted the Restatement’s 

 7 We reject the argument made by Defendants that LaKritz Adler 

could not have caused the failure of negotiations because WMATA 

was an independent decision maker. The crux of Banneker’s claim 

against LaKritz Adler is that its conspiracy with Graham, a 

WMATA Board Member, impaired Banneker’s competitiveness 

and prompted the Board to end the negotiations without 

consummating a final agreement. The merits of that theory must 

await the proof.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 23 of 42
24

formulation of the claim of tortious interference. Havilah 

Real Prop. Servs., LLC v. VLK, LLC, 108 A.3d 334, 345 

(D.C. 2015). The Restatement recognizes Banneker’s 

inducement theory: 

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with 

the performance of a contract . . . between another 

and a third person by inducing . . . the third person 

not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to 

the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other 

from the failure of the third person to perform the 

contract.

Onyeoziri v. Spivok, 44 A.3d 279, 286-87 (D.C. 2012)

(second ellipsis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 766 (1979) (“Restatement”)); see also Restatement § 

766B (defining tortious interference with prospective business 

advantage to include interference consisting of “inducing . . . 

a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective 

relation).

In support of its claim of tortious interference against 

LaKritz Adler, Banneker alleges a circumstantial case that 

LaKritz Adler, both by its direct actions and its inducement of 

Graham, undermined the exclusivity term and helped to 

scuttle any final development agreement with WMATA. 

Banneker alleges that LaKritz Adler was in frequent 

communication with Graham, that Graham leaked to LaKritz 

Adler confidential bid information, that LaKritz Adler, 

knowing that information to be confidential, used it in a 

phone call with WMATA, and that Graham sought to re-open 

the bidding process in the middle of Banneker’s exclusivity 

period. In addition, Banneker alleges that LaKritz Adler was 

a major contributor to Graham’s campaigns and projects, that 

it made contributions during Banneker’s exclusivity period, 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 24 of 42
25

Am. Compl. ¶ 26, and that, despite knowing and 

understanding the nature of WMATA’s exclusivity 

obligations, LaKritz Adler exercised its financial influence 

over Graham to induce WMATA to breach the exclusivity 

clause of the Term Sheet. Finally, Banneker alleges that 

LaKritz Adler made repeated calls to WMATA staff for the 

purpose of disparaging Banneker, id. ¶ 272, that it interfered 

in Banneker’s attempts to develop the Florida Avenue site 

alongside a parcel owned by Howard University, and that it 

formulated a plan with Graham to delay and obstruct 

Banneker’s negotiations with WMATA. At the pleading 

stage, those allegations, taken together, state a claim for 

inducement of WMATA’s breach of the exclusivity term. See 

supra Part III.A. (discussing breach of contract claim). 

Banneker also alleges that LaKritz Adler’s conduct and its 

inducement of Graham’s conduct resulted in WMATA’s 

ultimate abandonment of negotiations. Given the minimal 

showing required at this early procedural stage, those 

allegations suffice to state a claim for tortious interference 

with prospective business advantage.

Contrary to LaKritz Adler’s position, Banneker need not 

allege inducement through egregious means, such as libel, 

slander, coercion, or disparagement. See Appellee Br. 55. 

“[I]nducement may be any conduct conveying to the third 

person the actor’s desire to influence him not to deal with the 

other.” Restatement § 766 cmt. k. Such conduct may include 

“intimidation,” but it also includes “persuasion,” such as the 

persuasion coupled with financial influence alleged here. Id.

§ 766 cmt. h. Even were egregious means required, 

moreover, Banneker alleged not only that LaKritz Adler 

stayed in frequent communication with Graham, but also that 

it called WMATA staff “every few months to disparage 

Banneker while attempting to convince WMATA” to give 

LaKritz Adler the project. Am. Compl. ¶ 272.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 25 of 42
26

Nor may LaKritz Adler claim as a defense that it was 

merely pursuing its “financial interest.” Appellee Br. 57. In 

the District of Columbia, the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing legal justification or privilege for the inducement 

of a breach. Onyeoziri, 44 A.3d at 287. Economic 

competitors are free to use means that are not wrongful to 

cause third parties not to enter into prospective contractual 

relations “or not to continue an existing contract terminable at 

will.” Restatement § 766B. “A party may not, however, 

under the guise of competition actively and affirmatively 

induce the breach of a competitor’s contract in order to secure 

an economic advantage over that competitor.” Dunn v. Cox, 

163 A.2d 609, 610 (D.C. 1960) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Restatement § 766B cmt. h (“[W]hen B is 

legally obligated to deal with C, A is not justified by the mere 

fact of competition in inducing B to commit a breach of his 

legal duty.”). 

Here, Banneker alleges that its contract with WMATA 

was not terminable at will. The Term Sheet secured to 

Banneker an exclusive negotiation period designed to bring 

about a final agreement. LaKritz Adler allegedly knew of the 

exclusivity term, but induced WMATA, through Graham, to 

breach that term. And LaKritz Adler’s means of 

inducement—financial influence and persuasion—would, if 

substantiated, suffice to make out a claim against LaKritz 

Adler. See Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (Va. 

1985); cf. Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 

1, 14 (1894) (citing Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118, Eng.

Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853)); Beekman v. Marsters, 80 N.E. 817, 

819 (Mass. 1907).

We conclude that Banneker, at this early procedural 

stage, has stated claims for interference with contract and 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 26 of 42
27

prospective business advantage.8 We therefore reverse the 

district court’s dismissal of Banneker’s tortious interference 

claims against LaKritz Adler. Because LaKritz Adler does 

not argue that the conspiracy claim is otherwise inadequately 

stated, we also reverse the dismissal of that claim.

V. Tort Claims and Sovereign and Official Immunity

Defenses

Banneker asserts a fraud claim against WMATA, 

alleging it misled Banneker as to its chances of securing 

Board approval. Banneker also asserts claims for tortious 

interference and civil conspiracy against Graham for his 

attempts to undermine Banneker’s bid. The district court 

 8 We also reject LaKritz Adler’s argument that its conduct is 

shielded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “under which 

petitioning the Government for redress of grievances, whether by 

efforts to influence legislative or executive action or by seeking 

redress in court, is immune from liability.” Covad Commc’ns Co. 

v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To our 

knowledge, we have never applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 

which arose in the context of the antitrust laws, to bar liability for 

common law torts; Defendants cite no case to the contrary. Cf. 

Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Even were 

we to do so now, and we take no position on the matter, the 

doctrine does not apply to parties “engaged in private commercial 

activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure the 

passage or enforcement of laws.” Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 

& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962). “Private efforts to 

influence governmental bodies acting in an economic rather than a 

political framework, e.g., a governmental procurement agency, 

have been held unprotected” because they are business, not 

political, activity. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. 

Ass’n, 663 F.2d 253, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also George R. 

Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 

(1st Cir. 1970).

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 27 of 42
28

dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

on the ground that WMATA and Graham enjoy immunity 

from suit. We affirm as to WMATA but vacate and remand

as to Graham.

A. WMATA’s Sovereign Immunity From Claims of Fraud 

During Negotiations

Banneker alleges that it relied to its detriment on 

WMATA’s rosy predictions of Banneker’s chances of 

securing a final deal, and that WMATA should have disclosed

Graham’s attempts to prevent the deal from closing.9

 The 

district court held that Banneker’s fraud claim against 

WMATA was barred by sovereign immunity. We affirm.

WMATA, a quasi-governmental entity created by an 

interstate compact, is protected against common law tort 

actions by sovereign immunity. See KiSKA Construction

Corp., N.S.A. v. WMATA, 321 F.3d 1151, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). District courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter 

judgment against WMATA unless its limited waiver of 

immunity applies. Id. Section 80 of the WMATA Compact 

waives immunity for contract claims and claims of torts 

“committed in the conduct of any proprietary function,” but 

not torts committed “in the performance of a governmental 

function.” D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(80); see also KiSKA, 321 

F.3d at 1158. “Because it is difficult to distinguish between 

public and private sector functions with any precision,” we 

ask whether the claim seeks to impose liability for conduct 

that is discretionary, in which case the claim is barred by 

immunity, or ministerial, in which case the claim may 

proceed—a dichotomy we have imported from the Federal 

 9 Banneker’s fraud claim against WMATA below was broader. We 

address here only the narrowed theory of liability for fraud that 

Banneker presses against WMATA on appeal.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 28 of 42
29

Tort Claims Act. Beebe v. WMATA, 129 F.3d 1283, 1287 

(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 

1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997).10 Discretionary duties generally 

“involve[] judgment, planning, or policy decisions” and are 

immunized as reflecting sovereign choices. KiSKA, 321 F.3d 

at 1159 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Merely 

ministerial duties, which can “involve[] enforcement or 

administration of a mandatory duty at the operational level,

even if professional expert evaluation is required,” are treated 

as not exercising distinctively sovereign powers and so are 

not immunized. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We apply a two-part test to determine whether 

WMATA’s conduct is immunized as discretionary. Because 

“sovereign immunity does not bar suits based on an 

employee’s failure to follow [a] prescribed course of 

conduct,” we ask first whether “any statute, regulation, or 

policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 

employee to follow.” Id. at 1159 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If the tort claim arises from a WMATA employee’s 

failure to act as the law specifically prescribes, the conduct is 

not shielded by immunity. If the law leaves the conduct in 

question to the official’s discretion, we then ask “whether the 

exercise of discretion is grounded in social, economic, or 

political goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Only 

actions grounded in such discretion retain “governmental 

function” immunity. 

Our decision in KiSKA governs Banneker’s fraud claim 

against WMATA. There, a contractor on a tunnel project 

 10 We have also held that “quintessential” governmental functions 

such as law enforcement are entitled to immunity. See Beebe, 129 

F.3d at 1287. WMATA concedes that Banneker’s fraud claim is 

not directed at the performance of a quintessential government 

function.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 29 of 42
30

sued WMATA for fraud, claiming that WMATA’s Invitation 

for Bids (IFB) failed to disclose the report of a technical 

expert that WMATA had retained in developing the IFB’s 

requirements. Id. at 1154-55. The contractor alleged that its 

project cost double its bid, and that it would have bid 

differently had WMATA disclosed the expert’s report

recommending more extensive measures for keeping the 

tunnel dry. Id. at 1155-56. In the absence of “any statute, 

regulation or policy that ‘specifically prescribe[d]’ the content 

of WMATA’s IFBs,” and because the duties of good faith and 

fair dealing and of accurate project description did not 

“specifically prescribe” that content, the court held that 

WMATA retained “broad discretion to determine the contents 

of the tunnel project’s bid package.” Id. at 1160. WMATA 

was thus immune. 

The same is true here. The parties agree that WMATA 

has broad discretion to select appropriate bidders and to 

negotiate final agreements. Banneker argues only that 

WMATA lacked the discretion to lead bidders to believe they 

would receive approval from the Board when, in fact, one of 

its Board Members was actively working to prevent it. 

Nothing of which we are aware, however, so limits 

WMATA’s discretion. See also Greenbelt Ventures LLC v. 

WMATA, 481 F. App’x 833, 839-40 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 

no statute, regulation, or policy governed WMATA’s course 

of conduct while negotiating joint development agreement); 

Monument Realty LLC v. WMATA, 535 F. Supp. 2d 60, 78

(D.D.C. 2008). Banneker invokes the WMATA Standards of 

Conduct for Board Members, but it does not argue that those 

standards apply to WMATA staff. It is only the conduct of 

the staff that Banneker challenges with its fraud claim. 

Banneker does not contend that WMATA’s challenged 

conduct, if discretionary, is nonetheless not immunized. 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 30 of 42
31

Banneker apparently accepts that whatever discretion 

WMATA exercises in selecting bidders and negotiating 

agreements is the kind of discretion that is “susceptible to 

policy judgment,” and so immunized. We therefore affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of Banneker’s claim for fraud 

against WMATA because it is barred by sovereign immunity.

B. Graham’s Official Immunity Defense to Tort and 

Conspiracy Claims

Graham’s immunity is a more complicated matter. As it 

does against LaKritz Adler, Banneker asserts claims against 

Graham personally for tortious interference with prospective 

business advantage and contract, and for civil conspiracy.11 

By virtue of his role as a member of WMATA’s Board, 

Graham enjoys absolute official immunity for discretionary 

conduct within the scope of his office. The district court 

dismissed all of Banneker’s claims against Graham as barred 

by immunity. We find that the district court committed three 

errors: The court failed to apply federal common law to 

Graham’s claim of immunity, it failed to place the burden on 

Graham to establish his entitlement to immunity, and it 

analyzed Graham’s conduct at too high a level of generality. 

Because the record and briefing before us do not enable us

definitively to apply the correct immunity analysis to the 

claims against Graham, we vacate the district court’s 

dismissal of the claims against Graham and remand for 

further proceedings.

“When officials are threatened with personal liability for 

acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be 

induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew 

their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to 

 11 Banneker asserted the same claims against Graham in his official 

capacity, but does not press those claims on appeal.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 31 of 42
32

the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their 

conduct.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). 

Absolute official immunity is thus meant “not to protect an 

erring official, but to insulate the decisionmaking process 

from the harassment of prospective litigation.” Westfall v. 

Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988). Even so, immunity “comes 

at a great cost,” as it contravenes “the basic tenet that 

individuals be held accountable for their wrongful conduct.” 

Id. The Supreme Court “has generally been quite sparing in 

its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity,” 

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, and has held absolute official

immunity “justified only when the contributions of immunity 

to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the 

perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens,” Westfall, 484 

U.S. at 295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are 

careful not to “lose sight of the purposes of the official 

immunity doctrine” when determining if an official is, in the 

context of a particular case, entitled to absolute immunity. Id.

at 299-300.

We have repeatedly held that the federal common law of 

absolute immunity governs the scope of immunity for 

WMATA officials. E.g., Griggs v. WMATA, 232 F.3d 917, 

920 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1288. The district 

court here applied the law of the District of Columbia to 

determine whether Graham is entitled to absolute immunity. 

See Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 246-48. That holding is in 

error, and requires reversal to the extent that District of 

Columbia immunity law produced a different result than that 

which would have obtained under federal law.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 32 of 42
33

In weighing claims of absolute immunity, we apply the 

two-part test of Westfall v. Erwin.

12 WMATA officials enjoy 

absolute immunity when their conduct falls “within the scope 

of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in 

nature.” Westfall, 484 U.S. at 297-98; see also Beebe, 129 

F.3d at 1289. The Supreme Court has endorsed a “functional”

approach to the inquiry. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224; see also 

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959). The burden of 

establishing immunity must be borne by the official claiming 

it. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299.

1. Scope of Official Duties

Banneker asserts that all of Graham’s allegedly tortious 

conduct fell beyond the scope of his official duties, and is thus 

not immunized under Westfall.

13 Our inquiry into the scope 

of an official’s duties depends “not [on] the title of [the]

office but the duties with which [the official] is entrusted.”

Barr, 360 U.S. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Conduct that is at least “within the outer perimeter of [an 

official’s] line of duty” is shielded by absolute immunity. Id.

at 575; see also Griggs, 232 F.3d at 922. By contrast, an 

official loses the protection of immunity when he crosses that 

line and acts in a manner that is “manifestly or palpably 

beyond his authority.” Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 

 12 Westfall was superseded by statute for claims brought under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act, but still applies to claims of personal 

liability against WMATA officials. See Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289. 

13 Banneker acknowledges the apparent tension between its theories 

that Graham acted within the scope of his employment for purposes 

of the contract claims against WMATA and beyond the scope of his 

official duties for purposes of immunity from his own personal

liability for tort. We need not resolve that tension now, at the 

pleading stage, because Banneker is permitted to plead both in the 

alternative.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 33 of 42
34

786 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 

483, 498 (1896)). One way that an official acts manifestly 

beyond his authority is through the use of “manifestly

excessive means,” even if he does so in the conduct of duties 

otherwise within his official purview. McKinney v. Whitfield, 

736 F.2d 766, 769-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted); cf.

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978).

14

The district court considered all of Graham’s alleged 

tortious conduct immune because it conceived of the inquiry 

at too high a level of generality. Rather than analyzing each 

challenged act, the district court read Banneker’s complaint as 

attempting to impose liability on Graham for his 

“involvement[] as a WMATA Board Member . . . in setting 

contract terms for the development of the Site.” Banneker II, 

19 F. Supp. 3d at 248. The appropriate focus, however, is on 

the relationship between “the act complained of” and the 

corresponding “matters committed by law to [the official’s] 

control or supervision.” Barr, 360 U.S. at 573 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). At a high enough level of 

generality, almost any act that has any relationship to an 

overarching duty, such as the duty to vote on real estate 

projects, will be immunized. We must instead evaluate the 

relationship of each of the challenged acts to Graham’s 

relevant, official duties. With respect to each act, we ask 

 14 See also Griggs, 232 F.3d at 922 (officer empowered to make 

arrests was not immunized because he used manifestly excessive 

means when he commanded his dog to attack the plaintiff after the 

plaintiff complied with the officer’s order, and failed to command

the dog to cease its attack); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 359 (8th 

Cir. 1980) (supervisors empowered to make employment decisions 

were not immunized because they “did not simply misuse their 

authority but went clearly beyond it by threatening [their employee] 

with criminal charges [in order to force him to resign] instead of 

attempting to dismiss him for cause”).

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 34 of 42
35

whether it was among those entrusted to Graham and, if so, 

whether Graham’s means of accomplishing his official duties 

were manifestly excessive. Graham is entitled to immunity 

only if he persuades us that each alleged act was taken 

appropriately in performance of a corresponding official duty.

Some of Banneker’s allegations are aimed at the core of 

Graham’s official duties. For example, Banneker alleges that 

Graham persuaded his fellow Board members to add an 

affordable housing requirement to the project when approving 

the original Term Sheet. That plainly constitutes an exercise 

of Graham’s authority as a Board member to urge a Board 

resolution to impose conditions on development projects, and 

there is no allegation that Graham pursued the affordable 

housing requirement through excessive means.

Other allegations challenge conduct manifestly beyond 

Graham’s authority. Banneker alleged that Graham sought to 

barter a vote in his capacity as member of the D.C. Council 

for his vote as a WMATA Board member on the Florida 

Avenue project, and attempted to extort Banneker. Those acts 

are manifestly beyond the authority of a WMATA Board 

Member and so not immunized. 

That leaves allegations of particular acts by Graham that 

do not fall clearly within or without the outer perimeter of his

official duties as we currently understand them. Banneker 

alleges that Graham exceeded the scope of his authority by

leaking confidential bid information to LaKritz Adler in 

violation of applicable regulations, pressuring Banneker’s 

development partners to drop out, pressuring Banneker to add 

LaKritz Adler to its team, seeking to steer the project to 

LaKritz Adler in violation of Banneker’s exclusivity rights, 

and giving direction to WMATA staff in connection with the 

Florida Avenue project in violation of WMATA policy. 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 35 of 42
36

Banneker’s allegations, however, are not enough for us to 

decide the question. The scope of Graham’s duties is 

determined by “controlling law,” Butz, 438 U.S. at 489, which 

here includes the WMATA Compact and the regulations 

governing WMATA Board Members’ conduct. Graham bore 

the burden of establishing his entitlement to official immunity

by reference to those sources of law and WMATA policy, but 

he made no effort in the district court to do so. The record 

does not contain, for example, any reliable information about 

the authority of a Board Member to direct WMATA staff, or 

to participate in or influence negotiations. Without that 

information, the district court was left only with Banneker’s 

allegations. 

Although the immunity issue may be identified through a 

motion directed to the pleadings, courts may, where 

appropriate, answer the question of whether an official has 

acted within the outer perimeter of official duties through 

limited evidentiary analysis focusing on the nature and scope 

of the job duties in question. The “functional analysis 

governing absolute immunity” may call for a “limited factual 

inquiry” to determine “in what role the challenged function 

was exercised” and “preclud[e] on occasion disposition at the 

Rule 12 stage.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 

1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in 

some cases, affidavits from superiors elucidating an 

employee’s duties are required to support “[t]his type of 

limited inquiry.” Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. 

v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 292 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 

In the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, scope-ofemployment questions sometimes are resolved in that manner. 

We have held that, in cases in which factual disputes over the 

scope of employment arise at the pleading stage, “limited 

discovery” may be appropriate. See Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 

1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Such inquiries primarily 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 36 of 42
37

involve matters already known to the defendant official; they 

tend to be discrete inquiries, the general prospect of which is 

“unlikely to deter any official in the vigorous pursuit of his 

responsibilities,” Expeditions, 566 F.2d at 292 n.5, and 

comport with the essential character of official immunity 

questions as ones that “should be decided at the earliest 

opportunity,” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 253 (2007).

In light of these principles, we hold that Graham failed to 

bear his burden to establish the scope of his official duties and 

to situate his conduct within its outer perimeter. On the 

limited record we have, we have little trouble concluding that 

the allegations of extortion and the alleged attempt to barter a 

D.C. Council vote for a WMATA vote manifestly exceeded 

the scope of Graham’s official duties; we have equally little 

trouble concluding that Graham’s attempt to add an affordable 

housing requirement fell within the scope of his official 

duties. The remaining allegations are more difficult, 

however, and require more fact-specific inspection. We 

therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand for 

the district court to consider in the first instance which of 

Graham’s other actions fell beyond the outer perimeter of his 

official duties and whether those actions that did fall beyond 

the outer perimeter, taken together, state claims against 

Graham for tortious interference and civil conspiracy.

2. Discretionary Conduct

Turning to the second part of the Westfall analysis, 

Banneker argues that, even if all of Graham’s conduct was 

within the bounds of his official duties, his conduct was not 

discretionary, and therefore not immune, because it violated 

the WMATA Standards of Conduct. As we have discussed in 

connection with WMATA’s claim of sovereign immunity, we 

apply a two-part test to determine whether a decision is 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 37 of 42
38

immunized as discretionary. See Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289

(applying sovereign immunity discretionary/ministerial 

dichotomy to claim of official immunity). First, we ask 

whether “any statute, regulation, or policy specifically 

prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow”; if so, 

the conduct is not shielded by immunity because it is not 

discretionary. KiSKA, 321 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). If not, and the official has room to exercise 

discretion, we next ask “whether the exercise of discretion is 

grounded in social, economic, or political goals,” making it an 

exercise of governmental judgment and so immune. Id.

The district court held that Graham had discretion in 

voting on Banneker’s project, and considered all of 

Banneker’s allegations as seeking to impose liability for the 

exercise of that discretion. Here, again, the district court 

reviewed the complaint at too high a level of generality. The 

correct analysis is whether “the alleged tortious conduct is 

discretionary.” Westfall, 484 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). 

Banneker does not seek to impose liability for Graham’s vote 

on the project, but for various actions relating to the vote that 

Banneker alleges were prohibited by the regulations 

governing Board Members’ conduct. The district court must

parse Banneker’s allegations at a finer level of specificity in 

order to address those claims of prohibited action and resolve 

Graham’s claim of immunity.

The district court also held that the Standards of Conduct 

did not cabin Graham’s discretion for purposes of immunity 

because they do not “prescribe” a course of action for 

WMATA Board Members to follow: they “describe how not

to act, not how to act.” Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 246. 

We disagree. “[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it 

involves an element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz v. 

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). “If [an] employee 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 38 of 42
39

violates [a] mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter 

from liability because there is no room for choice and the 

action will be contrary to policy.” United States v. Gaubert, 

499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991). For example, we have observed 

that the limitation of an officer’s judgment during a high 

speed chase—such as the limitation of “the speed of a vehicle 

in hot pursuit—indicates that the [police department] already 

had made the decision to limit the officer’s exercise of 

discretion.” Biscoe v. Arlington Cty., 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Consequently, “effective law enforcement 

would not be hindered by enforced adherence to such 

regulations” through civil liability. Id.; see also Keller v. 

United States, 771 F.3d 1021, 1024 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding 

Federal Tort Claims Act discretionary function exception 

does not apply “if prison personnel violate a mandatory 

regulation”). We see no difference between a prescription by

policy that leaves no room for choice and a proscription that 

does the same. In both cases, the public official’s discretion 

is cabined such that violation of the regulation cannot by 

definition “involve[] judgment, planning, or policy 

decisions.” KiSKA, 321 F.3d at 1159 n.9 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Imposition of liability for operational actions 

that violate mandatory policies phrased as prohibitions, like 

liability for violation of policies phrased as affirmative duties, 

does not “pose threats to the quality and efficiency of 

government.” Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1363 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

The Standards of Conduct are absent from the record, but 

Banneker alleges that the standards clearly prohibited Graham 

from leaking confidential information. Banneker also alleges

that the Bondi Report concluded Graham violated the 

Standards of Conduct when he (1) created a conflict of 

interest by seeking to barter his D.C. Council vote on the 

lottery contract for his WMATA vote on Banneker’s project, 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 39 of 42
40

and (2) showed favoritism to LaKritz Adler “by appearing to 

continue to support LaKritz Adler’s proposal for, or inclusion 

in, the Florida Avenue Project while at the same time 

opposing Banneker Ventures.” Bondi Rpt. 6. The Bondi 

Report’s conclusions relied on and quoted portions of the 

Standards of Conduct that require Board Members to “strictly 

avoid engaging in actions which create conflicts of interest or 

the appearance of a conflict of interest” and state that it is 

“imperative that Board Members act impartially in their 

official conduct by avoiding any actions which might result in 

favored treatment or appearances thereof toward any 

individual, private organization, consultant, contractor or 

potential consultant or contractor.” Id. at 2. Those portions 

of the Standards of Conduct purport to cabin the discretion of 

Board Members.

Graham’s alleged leaking of confidential information 

manifestly violated the Standards. But, unlike the alleged

prohibition on the leaking of confidential information, the 

conflict of interest standards quoted in the Bondi Report 

capture a wide swath of conduct more susceptible of 

contextual judgment. Some actions may fall clearly within 

the prohibition, such that the prohibition leaves “no room for 

choice,” while others may fall into a gray area that cannot 

fairly be characterized as clearly “contrary to policy.” 

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. In the context of demarcating the 

scope of official duties, we have held that only conduct that is 

“manifestly or palpably beyond” the scope of official duties is 

unprotected by official immunity. Simons, 643 F.2d at 786 

(quoting Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498). We hold that the same 

rule applies to the question of whether conduct is 

discretionary: Only alleged conduct that manifestly violates 

an ethical proscription or other statute, regulation, or policy 

that constrains the exercise of discretion may be subject to 

liability. Both the scope-of-duties and discretionary-conduct 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 40 of 42
41

inquiries thus leave unprotected only conduct that is plainly 

unauthorized.

As we have noted, the complete Standards of Conduct are 

not in the record. It may be that Graham’s attempts to steer 

the project to LaKritz Adler manifestly contravened the 

regulations governing his conduct as a Board Member. It is 

also possible that the regulations were not so clear as to 

render Graham’s conduct plainly beyond his discretion. 

Because the burden was Graham’s to rebut Banneker’s 

allegations, dismissal was inappropriate. See, e.g., Keller, 

771 F.3d at 1024-25 (reversing grant of summary judgment in 

FTCA suit on “scant record” of “what procedures and 

regulations applied” to employees for purposes of 

discretionary function exception because government bore 

burden of establishing entitlement to immunity).

However, without the benefit of the full Standards of 

Conduct and briefing from the parties, together with 

appropriate factual development, if any, that would clarify the 

scope of the relevant Standards and place Banneker’s 

allegations in context, we cannot finally distinguish which of 

Banneker’s allegations are barred by official immunity and 

which are not. For the same reason, we cannot decide in the 

first instance whether any allegations that are not barred by 

official immunity, taken together, suffice to state a claim for 

tortious interference and civil conspiracy. We therefore 

vacate the district court’s dismissal of Banneker’s claims 

against Graham and remand for further consideration in light 

of the foregoing principles.

* * *

As we have discussed, Graham will not enjoy official 

immunity for any actions that either fall beyond the scope of 

his official duties or are not discretionary in nature. See 

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 41 of 42
42

Westfall, 484 U.S. at 297-98; Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289. On 

remand, the district court should evaluate, for each action 

complained of: (1) whether the alleged action, if established 

at trial, would be one that manifestly exceeded the scope of 

Graham’s official duties or was carried out through manifestly 

excessive means; or (2) whether the alleged action, if 

established at trial, would manifestly violate any statute, 

regulation, or policy governing WMATA Board Members’ 

conduct. Any action that would be unauthorized under either 

standard is unprotected by immunity. The district court 

should therefore evaluate whether the actions that it concludes 

would not be immunized, taken together, state a claim against 

Graham for tortious interference or civil conspiracy.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Banneker’s contract claims against WMATA and 

its tort claims against LaKritz Adler. We affirm the dismissal 

of Banneker’s claim for fraud against WMATA, vacate the 

dismissal of Banneker’s tort claims against Graham, and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #14-7030 Document #1568376 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 42 of 42