Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02130/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02130-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDERICK J. PALMER,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16CV2130 BAS (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO DENY

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

Petitioner Frederick J. Palmer (“Petitioner” or “Palmer”) has filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”).1) A jury 

found Petitioner guilty of selling a controlled substance and misdemeanor resisting arrest

and he was sentenced to eleven years.

2

 

The Petition is organized into six grounds for relief: (1) trial court erred in 

sustaining police officer’s surveillance privilege claim; (2) trial court erred in failing to

sua sponte give an expert opinion instruction; (3) trial court erred in failing to sua sponte

 

1 All citations to the Petition are to the ECF chronological page numbers for ease of 

reference.

2 Case No. SCD 253727 in the Superior Court of San Diego County

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give an instruction on the union of act and intent or mental state; (4) ineffective 

assistance of counsel, failing to strike prior strike and insufficiency of the evidence, and 

cumulative error;

3

(5) augment request;4and (6) unauthorized sentence.

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Cynthia Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After 

consideration of the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, as well as all lodgments the Court 

recommends the Petition be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 

35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn 

from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

B. The People’s Case

On January 24, 2014, Palmer sold 0.16 grams of cocaine base to San Diego 

Police Officer Radford Pajita. Officer Pajita testified that at around 5:00 

p.m., while he working undercover as a member of a narcotics sale 

surveillance team (surveillance team), he approached a group of four 

people—two men and two women—on the southeast corner of Park 

Boulevard and E Street in San Diego, an area known for high narcotics 

activity. He asked the shorter of the two men—a Black male wearing a 

 

3 As explained more fully below, it is hard to assess exactly what Petitioner is claiming 

under Ground Four, but the Court has attempted to decipher any claims and address each.

4 Although Petitioner identifies a “Ground Five: Augment requests,” it does not appear to 

be a ground for habeas relief. Additionally, Petitioner seems to restate this request more 

briefly under a subheading seven later in his Petition. (Pet. at 26.) The Court maintains 

Petitioner’s numbering of his grounds for ease of reference to his Petition. 

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Black hoodie—for a “twenty,” which is street jargon for $20 worth of 

narcotics. The man said he did not have any. As Officer Pajita began to walk 

away, the other man—a bigger Black male wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt 

(Palmer)—asked Officer Pajita what he was looking for. When Officer 

Pajita said he wanted a “twenty,” Palmer looked both ways down Park 

Boulevard and then held out his hand. In his hand were three rocks of 

cocaine base. Officer Pajita, who was wearing a one-way radio transmitter, 

handed Palmer a prerecorded $20 bill in exchange for the cocaine base. 

Officer Pajita began walking away and then transmitted a “bust signal” to 

the other police officers in the surveillance team, who were monitoring his 

unrecorded transmissions. Officer Pajita testified he gave the other officers a 

description of the person from whom he had bought the drugs, telling them 

he was a Black male wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and “wired” glasses.

At trial, Officer Pajita identified Palmer, who was in the courtroom, as the 

man who sold him the cocaine base. Officer Pajita testified that he 

recognized Palmer because he and Palmer were “literally a foot apart” at the 

time of the transaction, and he noticed at that time that Palmer’s hair was 

tied in the back in a pony tail and he wore wired glasses.

After Officer Pajita identified Palmer, the prosecutor showed Officer Pajita a 

photograph and asked him whether he recognized it. Officer Pajita 

responded that he recognized it as a photograph of Palmer that was taken on 

January 24, 2014, after he was arrested. Officer Pajita testified that the 

photograph accurately depicted what Palmer looked like on that day because 

it showed Palmer wearing the “same clothing,” the “same wire glasses,” the 

“same hooded sweatshirt” that “he was wearing when he sold [Officer 

Pajita] the narcotics and when he was taken into custody.” The photograph 

was then shown to the jury.

San Diego Police Detective Jesus Sanchez testified he was part of the 

surveillance team on January 24, 2014; he was wearing plain clothes and 

monitoring Officer Pajita over the one-way wire that Officer Pajita was 

wearing; and he heard Officer Pajita say: “Gray sweatshirt, gray sweatshirt.” 

Detective Sanchez testified that this meant that Officer Pajita “had just 

purchased narcotics from somebody wearing a gray sweatshirt.” Detective 

Sanchez testified that as Officer Pajita was saying this, he (Detective 

Sanchez) saw a Black male wearing a gray sweatshirt walking along Park 

Boulevard away from Officer Pajita and then turning onto E Street. 

Detective Sanchez testified he “lost visual as soon as [the Black male] 

turned the corner.” He did not see anyone else wearing a gray sweatshirt. 

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Detective Sanchez radioed the man’s description and direction of travel to 

uniformed officers, including San Diego Police Officer Marlo Woods.

Officer Woods, wearing a full police uniform and driving a marked police 

vehicle, observed a Black male wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt walking 

westbound near Park Boulevard. At trial, Officer Woods identified Palmer 

as the man he observed from his police vehicle. Officer Woods testified that 

he had been called in by one of the undercover officers in the area to “detain 

that person.” Officer Woods also testified that, after he saw Palmer, he 

stopped and exited his vehicle, approached Palmer on the 1100 block of E 

Street, and told him to wait there. As Officer Woods approached him, 

Palmer began walking backwards and started looking around. Officer 

Woods testified he had a feeling Palmer was getting ready to run, so he told 

Palmer not to run. Palmer then “took off running.”

Officer Woods further testified that Palmer ran across E Street, jumped a 

fence, and ran through a parking lot toward 11th Avenue. While Officer 

Woods pursued him on foot, San Diego Officer Christopher Blomberg, who 

also was wearing a police uniform and driving a marked police vehicle, 

drove toward Palmer’s location on 11th Avenue. Officer Blomberg drove his 

vehicle onto the sidewalk, got out, and yelled at Palmer to stop. Palmer 

stopped running and turned around. Officer Woods ordered Palmer to get on 

the ground, and he complied. Officers Woods and Blomberg then arrested 

Palmer. At trial, Officer Blomberg identified Palmer as the suspect he 

handcuffed.

B. Defense Case

The defense did not present any evidence. During closing arguments, 

defense counsel argued that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Palmer was the person who sold the cocaine base to 

Officer Pajita.

(Lodgment 9 at 3-6.)

II. Procedural History

On August 21, 2014, a jury found Petitioner guilty of selling a controlled substance 

(Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11352(a)) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code § 

148(a)). (Lodgment 1-3 at 337-338; Lodgment 3 at 153-154.) On August 25, 2014, the 

trial court found Petitioner had one prior conviction for narcotics sales (Cal. Health & 

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Saf. Code § 11370.2(a)), one prior strike conviction for purposes of California’s Three 

Strikes Law (Pen. Code § 245(a)(1)), and had served two prior prison terms.5 (Lodgment 

1-3 at 350-352.) On October 4, 2014, Petitioner’s motion to strike his prior strike was 

denied and he was sentenced to 11 years for the conviction for selling a controlled 

substance (four years doubled under the Three Strikes law to eight, plus three years for a 

prior narcotics sales conviction).

6

 (Lodgment 1-4 at 357-358.) The trial court initially 

stayed the two prison priors, but later struck them. (Id. at 358; Lodgment 5 at 40.01, 46-

48.)

On June 17, 2015, Petitioner filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal 

raising five issues: (1) trial court erred in sustaining privilege claims under California 

Evidence Code § 1040;

7

(2) trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury 

regarding the weight to give expert testimony; (3) trial court erred in failing to sua sponte

instruct the jury regarding the union of act and mental state; (4) trial court erred in 

denying motion to strike Petitioner’s prior strike conviction; and (5) cumulative error. 

(Lodgment 6.) As discussed in more detail below, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 

judgment in a reasoned decision. (Lodgment 9.) Petitioner raised similar claims in a 

Petition to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 10.) It was summarily denied. 

(Lodgment 11.) 

Petitioner filed his federal Petition on August 22, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition 

was initially dismissed for failing to pay the filing fee or provide adequate support for his 

request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6.) The case was reopened on 

December 12, 2016 because Petitioner paid the filing fee. (ECF No. 8.) The Court issued 

 

5 Petitioner waived a jury determination on his priors. (Lodgment 1-1 at 13-14.) 

6 Petitioner was also sentenced to 180 days concurrent for the misdemeanor conviction 

for resisting arrest.

7 All further code section references are to the California Evidence Code unless otherwise 

noted. 

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a briefing schedule. (Id.) Respondent timely responded to the Petition on February 14, 

2017. (ECF Nos. 10-11.) Petitioner did not file a Traverse.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

applicable to this Petition, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “This is a 

‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 

(2011); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). 

“The ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application of’ clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are 

distinct and have separate meanings.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-75 (2003)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant relief only when ‘the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.’” Loher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), ‘a state-court 

decision involves an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the 

facts of the particular state prisoners case.’” Id. (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 

1697, 1705 (2014). Unreasonable application is “not merely wrong” or “even clear 

error.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). It must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that 

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the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Id. at 1377 (quoting Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411. 

Under § 2254(d)(2) “a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s 

finding and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by substantial 

evidence” or “challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient 

in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Regardless of the type of challenge, ‘the question under AEDPA is not whether a federal 

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.” Id. “[W]hen the 

challenge is to the state courts procedure, . . . [the court] must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect in the state court’s fact-finding process is pointed out 

would be unreasonable in holding that the state courts fact-finding process was 

adequate.’” Id. at 1146-47; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2004). (the federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal 

standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported 

by the record.”).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims.8 See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-

 

8 The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wilson v. 

Sellers, 2017 WL 737820, on February 27, 2017, to address whether the Supreme Court’s 

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06 (1991); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013). Here, the 

California Court of Appeal’s April 4, 2016 decision is the last reasoned decision.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One – Surveillance Privilege, Evidence Code § 1040

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in sustaining Officer Pajita’s claims of 

privilege under Evidence Code § 1040 without following the procedures mandated by 

Evidence Code §§ 1040 and 1042. As detailed more fully below, Officer Pajita invoked 

Evidence Code § 1040 in response to two questions on cross examination. The first was 

where the other members of the surveillance team were. The second was how many 

officers were observing the events. The trial court sustained the privilege claim as to 

both, indicating he would not be required to answer any questions that would 

compromise officer safety, and Officer Pajita was not required to disclose the

information. As discussed more fully below, the Court of Appeal found no error in the 

trial court sustaining the privilege and that even if there were any error, it was harmless.

1. Evidence Code §§ 1040 & 1042

The Court provides the following overview of the “surveillance post” privilege for 

reference in considering Petitioner’s claim and the Court of Appeal’s decision. Section 

1040 “provides a privilege for nonpublic ‘information acquired in confidence by a public 

employee in the course of his or her duty,’ the disclosure of which would be ‘against the 

public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the 

information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.’” People 

v. Lewis, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 1431 (2009) (quoting Evid. Code § 1040). “[A] police 

surveillance post falls within the ambit of the privilege granted by section 1040.” Id. In 

People v. Montgomery, the court explained that the “surveillance location privilege,” 

similar to the confidential informer privilege, recognizes that hidden surveillance 

 

decision in Harrington, 562 U.S. 86, silently abrogated Ylst’s direction to look through a 

summary ruling to the last reasoned decision.

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locations may continue to be useful for law enforcement, but only if those locations 

remain secret. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1019 (1988). The court went on to explain that 

disclosing the unknown surveillance location may also threaten the safety of officers 

using the location in the future or the property owners allowing law enforcement to use 

the location. Id.; see also People v. Walker, 230 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235-36 (1991) 

(summarizing justifications for the privilege). The privilege is typically at issue when a 

defendant seeks testimony about the location from which a testifying officer observed a 

drug transaction to challenge the accuracy of the testimony, i.e. too far away to see the 

defendant or transaction clearly due to an obstructed view or based on the distance. See 

Lewis, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 1432-1437 (summarizing cases). 

When a claim of privilege is raised, a defendant challenging the claim must make a 

prima facie showing for disclosure. Montgomery, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1021; see also 

People v. Oppel, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 1152 (1990) (analyzing § 1042 procedure with 

regard to confidential information and explaining “[i]t is incumbent on the defendant to 

make a prima facie showing for disclosure before an in camera hearing is appropriate.”) 

If the defendant makes that prima facie showing, the court should then “hold an in 

camera hearing attended by the party claiming the privilege” and allow the defendant “an 

opportunity to propose questions to be asked at this hearing.” Montgomery, 205 Cal. 

App. 3d at 1021. 

Then, under § 1042, if the trial court sustains the privilege, the court ‘shall make 

such order or finding of fact adverse to the prosecution as is required by law upon any 

issue in the proceeding to which the privileged information is material.’” Lewis, 172 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1432 (quoting § 1042)). “[T]he location from which the surveillance was 

performed is not material, for purposes of section 1042’s adverse finding requirement, if 

the accuracy of the testifying officer’s testimony about the surveillance observations is 

unquestioned, or at least is sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence such that 

there is no realistic possibility that disclosing the surveillance location would create a 

reasonable doubt in the minds of a reasonable jury about the officer’s veracity.” Lewis, 

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172 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 1438 (2009); see also People v. Bradley, 7 Cal. App. 5th 607, 

624 (2017) (“A surveillance location is not material where the officer’s testimony about 

what he saw is sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence.”). 

2. Analysis

As explained above, under AEDPA, the Court considers only whether the Court of 

Appeal’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Early v. Packer, 

537 U.S. at 8; § 2254(d). Here, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial court’s 

application of §§ 1040 and 1042. The court found Petitioner was afforded an opportunity 

to make a prima facie showing for disclosure and even if he was not, the error was

harmless because he would not have been able to establish a prima facie need for 

disclosure. (Lodgment 9 at 11-19.) The court additionally rejected Petitioner’s claim 

that if the proper procedures were followed, he would have been entitled to an adverse 

finding, such as striking Officer Pajita’s testimony. 

As to the opportunity to make a prima facie showing, the Court of Appeal found 

Petitioner had at least two opportunities to make that showing in favor of disclosure. 

First, the court found he could have attempted to raise the issue following the first 

question that prompted the privilege claim. (Id. at 12.) When Officer Pajita invoked the 

privilege in response to the question about where the other officers were located (“where 

was the surveillance?”), the trial court sustained the privilege, but Petitioner made no 

attempt to make a prima facie showing that the information should be disclosed at the 

time. (Id.; Lodgment 1-2 at 248.) The Court of Appeal accurately explained that

counsel’s only response was to request the judge explain to the jury why the privilege 

claim was being sustained. (Lodgment 9 at 12; Lodgment 1-2 at 248 (“I’d ask the court 

to explain to the jury why the objection is being sustained so that it’s not left open.”).) 

The Court of Appeal also concluded Petitioner had a second opportunity to make a prima 

facie showing at the sidebar ordered by the trial judge when the privilege was raised in 

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response to a question about how many officers were observing the transaction. 

(Lodgment 9 at 12-13.) As the Court of Appeal notes, this conference was not recorded, 

but a settled statement was prepared for purposes of Petitioner’s appeal. (Lodgment 9 at 

13 n.5.) It reflects there was a discussion among the court and counsel and the trial judge 

indicated she would not require Officer Pajita to answer any questions that might 

compromise his or other officer’s safety. (Id.; Lodgment 4 at 61-68.) 

The Court of Appeal goes on to explain that even if Petitioner was denied an 

opportunity to make a prime facie showing, the error was harmless because Petitioner 

would not have been able to make a prima facie showing for the disclosure. (Lodgment 9

at 13.) Specifically, the court found that the only testimony Petitioner needed to 

undermine, Officer Pajita’s, was not affected by the undisclosed information concerning 

other surveillance team members. (Id. at 13-14.) Petitioner’s defense was that the 

prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was the person that 

sold drugs to Officer Pajita. But, as the Court of Appeal explained, “the only testifying

witness who observed the narcotics transaction was Officer Pajita, who engaged in the 

face-to-face transaction with Palmer.” (Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).) The Court of 

Appeal found the credibility of Officer Pajita’s testimony identifying Petitioner as the 

person he engaged in the transaction with would not have been affected by the 

information about other surveillance team members. (Id. at 14.) 

The Court of Appeal also found the trial court did not err in failing to make an 

adverse finding, such as striking Officer Pajita’s testimony, because Petitioner could not 

have shown the undisclosed testimony was material to Petitioner’s defense of mistaken 

identity. (Lodgment 9 at 15.) The Court of Appeal found that because none of the other 

surveillance team members testified about observations of the transaction from a 

surveillance location, their locations and the number of them that were observing were 

not material. (Id. at 15.) The court additionally found the privileged information was not 

material with respect to Officer Sanchez’s testimony — hearing a description from 

Officer Pajita of the seller and seeing someone meeting that description (Black male, gray 

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sweatshirt) walking along Park Boulevard away from Officer Pajita’s location — because 

it was sufficiently corroborated by Officer Woods’ testimony. (Id. at 16 (citing Lewis, 

172 Cal. App. 4th at 1438 (finding location of surveillance is not material if testimony is 

corroborated by independent evidence)).) Officer Woods testified that he also heard a 

description of the suspect (Black male, gray hooded sweatshirt), and observed someone 

meeting that description walking westbound near Park Boulevard, while driving a marked 

police car. (Id. at 17.) 

The Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner’s contention that the trial court erred 

in failing to make a specific finding under § 1040(b)(2) that disclosure was against public 

interest because the need to preserve confidentiality outweighed the need for disclosure. 

(Id. at 17.) The court found the trial court’s statement to the jury that the privilege was 

sustained for officer safety reasons and the determination following the side bar that the 

court would not require Officer Pajita to answer any questions that would compromise 

his or other officers’ safety complied with the statute even if the specific words of the 

statute were not used. (Id. at 17-18.) 

Finally, the Court of Appeal found that even if the trial court erred in any way as to 

§§ 1040 or 1042, the errors were harmless because the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was 

overwhelming. (Id. at 18.) Officer Pajita testified that he purchased drugs from 

Petitioner, was literally a foot away from him at the time, identified him at the scene, 

identified him in court, and provided a specific description of him following the 

transaction (Black male, gray hooded sweatshirt, hair tied back in a ponytail, wired 

glasses) that a matched a photograph taken of Petitioner that night. (Id. at 18-19.)

a) Alleged Error of State Law

 In Ground One, Petitioner claims that “the trial court prejudicially erred when it 

sustained Officer Pajita’s claim of privilege under Evidence Code [§] 1040 without 

following the procedures mandate[d] by Evidence Code [§§] 1040 [and] 1042.” (Pet. at 

15.) Similarly, under the heading “Questions Presented,” Petitioner states the trial court 

erred under Evidence Code §§ 1040 and 1042. (Pet. at 27.) The Petition states only a 

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potential error of state law, i.e. that the state court failed to follow procedures mandated 

by state law. However, “[i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to 

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United 

States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Little v. Crawford, 449 

F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (Courts “cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one 

occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court 

on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question.”). Federal habeas 

writs may not issue on the basis of a perceived error of a state law. Id. (“[I]t is not the 

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.”); see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F2d 918, 919-920 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“The issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; the 

presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.”). In this respect, 

the Court recommends the claim be denied because the Petition states only an error in the 

application of state law. However, the Court has considered possible constitutional 

challenges below because Petitioner mentions Due Process in his Petition and in his 

petitions before the state courts, one of which is attached to his Petition here. (Pet. at 35-

77.) In his state petitions, he raised Due Process and the Confrontation Clause challenges

concerning the surveillance privilege. (Lodgment 6 at 20-32; Lodgment 10 at 17-19.) As 

explained below, even if Ground One is construed as asserting violations of the 

Confrontation Clause and Due Process, it still fails. 

b) Confrontation Clause

Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right to cross examine adverse 

witnesses. Deleware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1988). However, trial courts 

may place limits on cross examination. Id. at 679. The Supreme Court has not addressed 

California’s surveillance post privilege, however, district courts analyzing § 1040 have 

looked to the Supreme Court’s analysis of a similar privilege, the informer’s privilege for 

guidance. Haider v. Dir. of Corrs., 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1195-1196 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 

(citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957)); Babers v. Harrington, 2012 

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WL 6839919, at*12-13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012) (the same). Rovairo explained that 

“[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communications

is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination 

of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis added). 

The court also set out a balancing test between the “public interest in protecting the flow 

of information” and “the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Id. at 62. “Whether a 

proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular 

circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible 

defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant 

factors.” Id.

Although explained in terms of California’s §§ 1040 and 1042, the Court of 

Appeal found that Petitioner could not show that the testimony he sought was relevant. 

(Lodgment 9 at 13-15.) In particular, the court found it significant that the location and 

number of other officers involved did not undermine Officer Pajita’s testimony that he 

bought cocaine base from Petitioner in a face-to-face transaction. (Id.) The number and 

location of the other officers was not relevant because none of them testified that they 

observed Petitioner sell the cocaine base. (Id. at 15.) 

The Court cannot find the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on this issue was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner was 

entitled to try to undermine Officer Pajita’s testimony through cross examination and 

present his defense. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (“the 

Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair 

opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby 

calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ 

testimony.”) However, the location and number of other surveillance team members did 

not undermine Officer Pajita’s testimony or any other witness’ testimony because no one 

testified to observations of the transaction from a surveillance location. Officer Sanchez

did testify that he was observing from a surveillance location, but he also testified on 

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cross examination that he did not see the transaction and that even after he identified 

Petitioner in the area based on Officer’s Pajita’s description, he lost track of him. 

(Lodgment 1-2 at 260-61.) The location of the surveillance team and the number 

observing the transaction was not relevant because there was no testimony as to their 

observations.

As to the significance of the information to Petitioner’s defense of mistaken 

identity, Petitioner asserts nothing more than speculation. Petition states that “[t]he 

information was material to the defense,” but offers no explanation how. (Pet. at 15.) In 

his state petitions, he argued that if other officers had observed the transaction as Officer 

Pajita did, they would have testified to it, but if their versions contradicted Officer 

Pajita’s, Petitioner could have called them as witnesses. (Lodgment 6 at 26; Lodgment 

10 at 15-16.) Petitioner is essentially seeking to undermine testimony against him that 

was never given. As explained above, this privilege typically becomes an issue when a 

police officer testifies to observations of a drug sale from a surveillance location. The 

location may be relevant to undermine the testifying officer’s observations if it was at a 

significant distance or there was some basis for asserting the view might have been 

obstructed. But that was not the case here because the testifying witness was engaged in 

the transaction9and the only other officers that testified, did not testify to observations of 

the transaction from a surveillance location. The location and number of officers 

observing did not matter because none of them testified against Petitioner. As to the 

Confrontation Clause, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the crime 

charged, Petitioner’s defense, and in particular the insignificance of the location and 

 

9 At trial, there was an issue raised as to Officer Pajita’s location when he identified 

Petitioner after he was taken into custody by other officers, but a stipulation that Officer 

Pajita was at a “reasonable distance” when he identified Petitioner was read into the 

record at trial. (Lodgment 1-2 at 300.) Officer Pajita also identified Petitioner as the 

person he purchased cocaine base from in court. (Id. at 238.) 

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number of surveillance team members that did not testify against Petitioner there was no 

violation of the Confrontation Clause in sustaining the privilege.

Even if the trial court erred in sustaining the privilege, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this claim because Petitioner has not shown the error was prejudicial. A 

showing of constitutional error under the Confrontation Clause only merits habeas relief 

if the error was prejudicial, that is, if it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence 

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)); see also Slovik v. 

Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Confrontation Clause errors are 

subject to harmless error analysis). “[I]n reviewing state court decisions for harmless 

error in the context of habeas petitions, federal courts review to determine if the error had 

‘a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Slovik, 

556 F.3d at 755 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). As discussed above, the information 

that was not disclosed was the location of and number of surveillance team members 

observing the transaction. Assuming there were any other officers observing the 

transaction, the most Petitioner could have done is point to the absence of those officers’ 

testimony. But, when considered in the context of Officer Pajita’s testimony that 

Petitioner sold him cocaine base and Officer Pajita’s identification of Petition following 

the transaction and in court, as well as Petitioner running when confronted by police, the 

Court cannot find the error, assuming there was one, had “a substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id.

c) Due Process

As to a possible Due Process violation, “[i]t is well settled that a state court’s 

evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders 

the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Spivey v. 

Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Henry v. Kernan, 177 F.3d 1152, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner must show that the alleged error “so fatally infected the 

proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. 

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For the same reasons discussed above, the Court cannot find sustaining the 

privilege rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner was seeking information that 

might have been relevant if any of the other officers testified to observations from the 

undisclosed locations. Even if this was an error and the trial court should have required 

the disclosure, given no other officer testified to the transaction, the impact on

Petitioner’s trial was, at best, minimal. The most significant evidence against Petitioner, 

his sale of cocaine base to an undercover police officer that identified him and that he ran 

when confronted by police, would not have been undermined in any significant way by 

the information about how many additional officers were observing the transaction or the 

locations from which they observed it. And, the most Petitioner might have been able to 

do with that information is speculate about the absence of their testimony to reinforce that 

no one other than Officer Pajita testified that Petitioner sold Officer Pajita cocaine base. 

Petitioner’s counsel essentially did just that in closing, noting the absence of anyone other 

than Officer Pajita seeing the transaction and the possible ways he might have been 

mistakenly identified. (Lodgment 1-2 at 322-26.) Even if there was an error in 

sustaining the privilege, Petitioner has not shown that the alleged error “so fatally 

infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 

919. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED on 

Ground One. 

B. Grounds Two and Three – Jury Instructions

Petitioner asserts in Grounds Two and Three that the trial court erred in failing to 

sua sponte instruct the jury under California jury instructions CALCRIM 332 and 251.10

As with Ground One, in Grounds Two and Three, the Petition does not assert how the 

 

10 The Petition does not identify under Ground Three the specific instruction Petitioner 

argues the trial court should have sua sponte given. However, he identifies CALCRIM 

251 in his petitions before the state court.

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alleged errors by the trial court in failing to give particular California jury instructions 

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. (Pet. at 16-17.) As 

explained more fully above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal 

court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, law, or treaties 

of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

“On federal habeas, the issue is ‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected 

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 

F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72). In conducting this 

analysis, the instruction must be considered in the context of the entire trial record and 

the instructions as a whole. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 

141, 147 (1973)). “The burden on the habeas petitioner is ‘especially heavy’ where, as 

here, the alleged error involves the failure to give an instruction.” Id. (quoting Hendricks 

v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended); see also Murray v. Schiro, 

746 F.3d 418, 451 (9th Cir. 2014) (“An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less 

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.”). Additionally, even if there is an 

error, to obtain relief, the error must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. 

1. CALCRIM 332

As to 332, Petitioner argues the trial court should have given the expert opinion 

instruction because Officer Pajita provided an expert opinion. The Petition does not 

identify the testimony Petitioner believes constituted expert testimony, explain the 

alleged error in not giving the instruction, or otherwise explain how any error was 

prejudicial to Petitioner. However, in looking to Petitioner’s Petition before the 

California Court of Appeal, he argues the following testimony by Officer Pajita

constituted expert testimony: meaning of street jargon (“a twenty”), that the sale occurred 

in a high narcotics area, the likelihood of recovering prerecorded currency and reasons it 

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sometimes is not recovered, that those selling drugs work in groups, and that cocaine base 

can break into smaller pieces. (Lodgment 6 at 40-48.) 

As to 332,11 the Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Officer Pajita 

gave expert testimony and the trial court erred in not sua sponte instructing under 332, 

but found the error was harmless. (Lodgment 9 at 25.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal 

found Petitioner failed to show there was a reasonable probability the jury would have 

rendered a more favorable verdict if the instruction had been given. (Id. at 25.) In 

reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal identified other instructions that were given 

concerning judging the credibility of any witnesses, the option to believe none of a 

witness’ testimony, factors to consider in evaluating a witness’ testimony, and an 

instruction that the jurors were the exclusive judges of the facts. (Id. at 25.) Based on 

these instructions, the Court of Appeal found the jury would have properly considered 

Officer Pajita’s testimony, “including any expert opinions he may have given.” 

(Lodgment 9 at 26.) In rejecting one of Petitioner’s arguments, the Court of Appeal also 

found it significant that the supposed expert testimony did not have anything to do with 

Petitioner’s defense of mistaken identity. (Id. at 26.) 

Petitioner has not shown that the absence of an instruction that was largely covered 

by other instructions “itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

 

11 The relevant portion of CALCRIM 332 provides:

(A witness was/Witnesses were) allowed to testify as [an] expert[s] and to 

give [an] opinion[s]. You must consider the opinion[s], but you are not 

required to accept (it/them) as true or correct. The meaning and importance 

of any opinion are for you to decide. In evaluating the believability of an 

expert witness, follow the instructions about the believability of witnesses

generally. In addition, consider the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, and education, the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the 

facts or information on which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You 

must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and 

accurate. You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, 

unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.

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violate[d] due process.” Clark, 450 F.3d 904. Assuming Officer Pajita’s testimony was 

expert testimony and the trial court erred in not giving the instruction, as the Court of 

Appeal explained, the way the jurors were instructed to treat any witness’ testimony was 

very similar to how jurors would have been instructed to treat an expert witness’ 

testimony under 332. CALCRIM 226 instructed in part, “you alone must judge the 

credibility or believability of the witnesses . . .[and] you must judge the testimony of each 

witness by the same standards.” The only distinction might have been the instruction to 

consider the underlying information on which the expert relied in reaching their opinion. 

However, in the context of the trial as a whole, any impact would have been minimal. 

Most of the testimony Petitioner identifies as being expert testimony had very little to do 

with Petitioner’s defense. His defense was that he was not the person that sold drugs to 

Officer Pajita. This required challenging the accuracy of Officer Pajita’s identification of 

Petitioner and emphasizing he did not have the prerecorded currency. In this respect, the 

only testimony that Petitioner has identified as being expert testimony that was of any 

significance is the testimony concerning reasons prerecorded currency might not be

recovered and that drug dealers work in groups. His testimony regarding it being a high 

narcotics area and explaining the meaning of a “twenty” (somewhat self-evident from 

what was exchanged for twenty dollars after Officer Pajita asked to buy a twenty) had no 

bearing on his defense. The Court cannot find the absence of the additional emphasis the 

expert instruction might have placed on how the jurors were to consider this limited 

testimony so infected the entire trial that Petitioner’s conviction violated due process.

2. CALCRIM 251

As to 251,12 Petitioner argues the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction.

CALCRIM 251 explains the required union of act and wrongful intent or mental state for 

 

12 CALCRIM 251 provides:

The crime[s] [(and/or) other allegation[s]] charged in this case require proof 

of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.

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the crime alleged. The Court of Appeal found this instruction was not necessary because 

the other instructions given on the specific charged offenses – CALCRIM 2656 for 

resisting arrest and CALCRIM 2300 for selling a controlled substance – adequately 

informed the jury that the prosecution had to prove Petitioner committed the charged 

offenses with the required mental state. (Id. at 28.) As to the resisting arrest, the Court of 

Appeal explained that the jury was instructed “when the defendant acted, he knew or 

reasonably should have known that Marlo Woods was a peace officer performing or 

attempting to perform his duties.” (Id.) And while CALCRIM 2300 did not contain 

similar language, the trial court did give CALCRIM 225 that instructed the prosecution 

had to prove “not only that Palmer did the acts charged, but also that he acted with a 

particular intent.” (Id.) The Court of Appeal concluded that these instructions 

sufficiently instructed that the prosecution had to prove Petitioner committed the acts 

charged and that when he acted he had the required mental state or intent.

Again, Petitioner has not shown that the absence of an instruction that was covered 

by other instructions “itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process.” Clark, 450 F.3d 904. Here, any error at all would be in not giving 

an instruction, as opposed to giving an incorrect instruction. And, the absent instruction 

must be consider in the context of the whole trial, including instructions as to the specific 

offenses with an additional instruction explaining the jurors must find he acted with the 

required intent. This weighs against a finding of a due process violation because the 

absence of an instruction, particularly one that is accurately covered by other instructions, 

 

For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] (in this case/ of <insert name[s] 

of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g., burglary, as charged in Count 1> [or 

to find the allegation[s] of <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true]), that 

person must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act [or intentionally 

fail to do the required act], but must do so with a specific (intent/ [and/or] 

mental state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required 

are explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].

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is less likely to mislead a jury. Additionally, a review of the entire trial transcript reflects 

that Petitioner’s intent was not an issue in this case. His defense was mistaken identity. 

Either he was or was not the person that sold cocaine base to an undercover officer. To 

the extent there was any error, it was not on an issue of significance in the case and it did 

not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S.at 637-38. 

The Court RECOMMENDS relief be DENIED on Grounds Two and Three.

C. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner claims “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Declined to 

Strike [Petitioner’s] prior strike conviction.” (Pet. at 18.) In support, the Petition 

includes language about the combined effect of cumulative errors violating his 

constitutional rights. (Id.) Petitioner then goes on to state that his counsel was 

ineffective due to many errors. (Id.) However, the only potential error stated under this 

ground is “counsel at trial presented no defence[sic] for appellant but went off of the 

district attorney[‘s] evidence, never presenting her version . . . of appellant’s reasonable 

doubt. Ineffective assistance of counsel.[sic]” 

The only other references in the Petition to ineffective assistance of counsel are 

under a heading for Questions Presented. (Pet. at 27). Petitioner repeats Ground Two 

above, that the trial court erred in failing to give CALCRIM 332, but follows with “then 

counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel” and also repeats the claim that 

defense counsel did not provide a defense later in that same section. (Id.) This portion 

of the Petition also states that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion to strike a prior 

strike? Appellant fits in the scope to have the strike striking [sic].” (Id.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court can identify three possible claims Petitioner may 

be asserting that are briefly addressed below: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based 

on failing to request CALCRIM 332 and failing to present a defense; (2) trial court error 

in failing to strike Petitioner’s prior strike; and (3) cumulative error.

///

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1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel13

Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeal considered 

Petitioner’s claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel related to 332 or 

Petitioner’s claim regarding presenting a defense because they were not raised on 

appeal.14 

However, even applying only Strickland v. Washington’s deferential review, rather 

than the doubly deferential review created by deference under Strickland and AEDPA’s 

state court deference combined, on a review of the record, the claims fail. See Woods, 

135 S. Ct. at 1376 (explaining doubly deferential review); 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

“A defendant who claims to have been denied effective assistance [of counsel] 

must show both that counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient 

performance caused him prejudice.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). This “first prong sets a high bar.” Id. “A defense lawyer 

navigating a criminal proceeding faces any number of choices about how best to make a 

client’s case.” Id. Counsel’s constitutional obligation under Strickland is satisfied “so 

long as his decisions fall within the ‘wide range’ of professionally competent assistance.” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. “The 

question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under 

 

13 To the extent Petitioner is arguing that his counsel was ineffective in failing to 

convince the trial court to strike his prior strike, that claim would have no merit. His 

counsel filed a Sentencing Statement seeking to strike his prior strike. (Lodgment 3 at 

122-125.) Additionally, at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, she emphasized how long ago 

the strike was, that his behavior was not escalating, and emphasized this was only a $20 

transaction. (Lodgment 1-4 at 356-57.) Although she was unable to overcome 

Petitioners criminal history, including two felonies and numerous parole violations in the 

intervening years since his strike conviction, her representation certainly fell within the 

wide range of professionally competent assistance. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775.

14 There is no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his Petition to the California 

Supreme Court and the only ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his Petition

to the Court of Appeal were based on failing to preserve issues on appeal. 

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‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most 

common custom.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.) 

“It is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment’ that Strickland’s first prong is 

satisfied.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Courts need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the 

defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

However, assuming a defendant can establish deficient performance under this highly 

deferential standard, prejudice must also be shown. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. “It is 

not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 

proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). A defendant “must demonstrate 

‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

As to counsel not requesting CALCRIM 332, Petitioner has not shown that not 

requesting this instruction fell outside the range of acceptable assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner’s counsel may have had strategic reasons for not requesting the instruction, 

including not wanting to give any more weight to Officer Pajita’s testimony. In closing, 

Petitioner’s counsel emphasized that the jury should not give any greater weight or 

emphasis to his testimony and should question his testimony, even though he was a 

police officer, as they would anyone else that might testify. (Lodgment 1-2 at 322 .) 

Giving the expert opinion instruction might have added additional guidance on how to 

treat the portions of his testimony that qualified as expert testimony, but it would also 

have treated him as an expert, which might have led the jury to give his testimony more 

rather than less weight. Additionally, as discussed more fully above, given the other 

instructions that addressed the weight to give to Officer Pajita’s testimony, Petitioner has 

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not shown the result of the case would have been different had the instruction been given. 

Because Petitioner has failed to meet either the deficiency or prejudice prongs of 

Strickland, the Court recommends relief on this claim be denied.

As to Petitioner’s claim that his counsel failed to present a defense, that is simply 

not accurate. Based on a review of the record, counsel’s defense was mistaken identify. 

She emphasized that the prerecorded currency used to pay for the cocaine base was not 

found on Petitioner, that only one officer observed the transaction and identified 

Petitioner, and she sought to undermine that identification based on the time of day 

(getting dark) and distance from which Petitioner was later identified by Officer Pajita. 

She was faced with an undercover officer testifying that her client sold him drugs face-toface on the street and when he was stopped by police, he ran. Petitioner’s counsel did 

present a defense well within the range of professional assistance. The jury just did not 

believe it. Because Petitioner has failed to identify any deficiency or show how that 

deficiency was prejudicial, the Court recommends this claim be denied.

2. Failing to Strike a Prior Strike

Petitioner appears to be challenging the trial court’s denial of his Romero motion to 

strike his prior strike conviction. See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996). As 

noted above, because Petitioner had a prior conviction that qualified as a strike under 

California’s Three Strikes law, his four-year mid-range sentence on his conviction for 

selling a controlled substance was doubled to eight years. However, the only basis the 

Court can identify for his challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike the 

strike is that he believes the record did not support it. Under Ground Four’s supporting 

facts, the Petition states “abuse of discretion conviction is not supported by the record.” 

(Pet. at 18.) Given the denial of a Romero motion is reviewed by the Court of Appeal for 

abuse of discretion and the ground is titled in part “Declined to strike appellant’s prior 

strike conviction,” it appears Petitioner is arguing that the trial court’s decision not to 

strike his prior strike was not supported by the record. (Id.) 

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As noted above, federal habeas writs may not issue on the basis of a perceived 

error of a state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (“[I]t is not the province of a federal 

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). 

Sentencing error claims, like the one asserted here, generally do not raise a federal 

constitutional question and are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Brown v. 

Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 901 

(2003), remanded to 66 Fed. Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2003) (claim that trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to strike prior conviction alleged under Three Strikes Law not 

cognizable on federal habeas review); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider the merits of whether particular prior conviction qualifies 

for sentence enhancement under California law because it is not cognizable on federal 

habeas corpus review); Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir.1994) (“Absent a 

showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing 

law does not justify federal habeas relief”); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 

(9th Cir.1994) (“The decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively 

is a matter of state criminal procedure and it not within the purview of federal habeas 

corpus”); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim of due 

process violation based on denial of merger of convictions for purposes of sentencing 

because there is no federal right to merger of convictions). 

“The federal constitutional question is whether [the error] is so arbitrary or 

capricious as to constitute an independent due process . . . violation.’” Richmond v. 

Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)); see 

also Christian, 41 F.3d at 469 (“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state 

court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.”).

As an initial matter, the Petition does not identify any error in the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to strike his prior strike, certainly not one rising to the level of 

fundamental unfairness or that could be considered arbitrary or capricious. In the state 

court petitions, he emphasized how long ago the strike was, that his felony convictions 

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since were not violent, and challenged the trial court’s conclusion that he was a drug 

dealer. However, as the Court of Appeal explained, the record before the trial court 

reflected that Petitioner had a 30-year criminal record, that in addition to receiving 

numerous lengthy sentences, he also violated parole multiple times, including as recently 

as 2011 when he violated parole two days after being released from prison. (Lodgment 9 

at 31-32.) Petitioner has not shown any error in the state’s application of its own 

sentencing law, certainly not one so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a due process 

violation. The Court recommends this claim be denied.

3. Cumulative Error

Petitioner asserts that the combined effect of multiple trial court errors violated due 

process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The Court of Appeal rejected this 

claim, finding any errors did not rise to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.

“The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no 

single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently warrant 

reversal.” Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Parle v. 

Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007)). However, relief is only warranted “when 

there is a ‘unique symmetry’ of otherwise harmless errors, such that they amplify each 

other in relation to a key contested issue in the case.” Id. (quoting Parle, 505 F.3d at 

927). The errors Petitioner raises, to the extent they are errors at all, do not amplify each 

other. Testimony regarding the number officers observing the drug sale and their 

locations does not become a more significant error because two jury instructions were 

absent. Rather than impacting each other on a key issue, they largely have little 

connection and concern issues that were not key in the case. Because the combined

effect of the errors asserted did not infect the trial with unfairness, relief on this claim is 

not warranted. 

The Court RECOMMENDS the claims asserted under Ground Four be DENIED.

///

///

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D. Ground Five

Ground Five is titled “Augment requests” and is followed by a list of trial 

documents. (Pet. at 19.) Listed later in the Petition under a heading 7, also titled 

Augment request, Petitioner request transcripts. (Pet. at 26.) Although Petitioner has not 

explained why he needs these documents, all the items identified in both lists have been 

provided to Petitioner as lodgments in this case. Accordingly, the Court recommends the 

requests be denied as moot. 

E. Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that his sentence was unauthorized. (Pet. at 20-

22, 26.) He claims under California Penal Code § 1385 his two prison-prior term 

enhancements should have been stricken rather than stayed and the trial court should be 

required to state its reasons for striking the prison priors. (Id. at 20.) It does appear from 

the record that when Petitioner was originally sentenced his prison priors were stayed. 

(Lodgment 3 at 126-127 (October 9, 2014 Felony Abstract of Judgment).) However, on 

January 16, 2015, the trial court recalled the sentence and amended it to strike 

Petitioner’s two prison priors and stated its reasons for striking them. (Lodgment 5 at 

48.) This appears to have been done at the request of Petitioner’s appellate counsel. 

(Lodgment 5 at 19-22.) Given the relief Petitioner seeks has already been provided by 

the trial court, the Court RECOMMENDS relief on Ground Six be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 13, 2017, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than October 27, 2017.

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 22, 2017

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