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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PILED 

United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cirruit 

FOR 'l'BE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 141990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WAYNE KITCHENS, 

Plaintiff, 

GARY L. RICHARDSON, 

Movant-Appellant, 

LLOYD PAYTON, 

Movant-Appellee, 

v. 

BRYAN COUNTY NATIONAL BANK, 

Defendant. 

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No. 90-7020 

(D. C. No. 84-183-C) 

( E • D • Okla • ) 

ORDER ARD JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shali not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7020 Document: 010110051280 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 1 
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34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 1 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This appeal involves the continuing saga of two attorneys 

fighting over the division of a fee. 

A detailed review of the facts is not essential to this 

appeal. Appellant (Richardson) and Appellee (Payton) are both 

attorneys. Payton filed suit on behalf of his client. Richardson 

took the case over during the early stages of pleading and 

discovery and successfully pursued the case to a $200,000 verdict, 

which was upheld by this court in Kitchens v. Bryan County Nat'l 

Bank, 825 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Payton then filed an attorney's lien and moved for one-half 

of the attorney fees. 2 Richardson filed an ·offer of judgment in 

the amount of $5,000. Following two evidentiary hearings the 

trial court allowed Payton one-half of the attorney fees, which 

was in excess of the $5,000 offer of judgment. Richardson 

appealed this decision, and in an unpublished order and judgment 

in appeal No. 89-7000 we reversed and remanded with instructions 

to pay to Richardson all of the funds held by the court as 

attorney fees. 

1 Both parties have waived oral argument. 

2 The total attorney fees in question 

$120,000. 

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were approximately 

Appellate Case: 90-7020 Document: 010110051280 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 2 
Upon remand, Richardson filed a motion for costs including 

statutory attorney fees contending that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 

he was so entitled. This broke down to approximately $746 in 

costs and $19,100 in attorney fees. The district court denied the 

motion, stating: 

The plaintiff was the prevailing party in this case. A 

dispute arose between plaintiff's original attorney and 

his subsequent attorney as to entitlement to attorney's 

fees. After motions, hearings, and an appeal, it was 

ordered that plaintiff's subsequent attorney, Gary 

Richardson, was entitled to all of the attorney fee as 

prevailing party in this case. Mr. Richardson now 

applies to this court for attorneys' fees on the 

litigation over who was entitled to the attorney's fee. 

The court finds that this dispute is not a separate 

case in which there is a "prevailing party" for purposes 

of attorneys' fees. Attorney's fees have already been 

granted in this case to the "prevailing party." Mr. 

Richardson chose to litigate this dispute in this case, 

rather than filing a separate lawsuit. Further, the 

court finds that this subsequent dispute between lawyers 

was unnecessary and should have been reasonably 

negotiated and settled between the attorneys. It has 

nothing to do with this case or its parties. Rather, 

its creation and pursuit was fostered by the personal 

differences of ex-law partners. 

Accordingly, as to the litigation over the 

attorney's fee dispute herein, in the interests of 

justice and the discretion of the court, the court finds 

that each attorney should bear the expense of their own 

attorney's fee and costs. Plaintiff's application for 

attorneys' fees is denied. 

We note at the outset that "the decision to award or deny 

attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the court, 

and, on appeal, review is subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard. Goichman v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466, 1471 (10th 

Cir. 1988). See also Security Nat'l Bank of Enid v. Bonnett, 623 

P.2d 1061, 1064 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). 

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Appellate Case: 90-7020 Document: 010110051280 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 3 
Richardson now appeals, asserting: 

I. The Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, in 

holding that Richardson was not a prevailing party in 

the litigation between Richardson and Payton. 

II. Under Rule 68, F.R.Civ.P., the Trial Court is 

required to assess costs against a losing party who 

rejected a proper Offer to Allow Judgment tendered at 

least 10 days prior to trial which offer was of greater 

value than the amount ultimately awarded or received by 

the losing party. 

III. Under Title 5 O.S.Ann. § 6 and Title 42 O.S.Ann. 

§ 176, the prevailing party in an action on an 

attorney's lien is entitled to attorney's fees as costs 

of the. action. 

IV. Under Rule 54(d), the Trial Court is required to 

review the clerk's denial of taxation of costs, upon 

timely motion, for the proper taxation of costs due as a 

matter of course to the prevailing party. 

I 

Richardson claims that as he made an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 for $5,000, and as he received far more, 

he is therefore a "prevailing party" and as such is entitled to 

costs. Payton responds by citing Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 

450 U.S. 346 (1981). 

Rule 68 provides in part: "[A] party defending against a 

claim may offer to allow judgment to be taken against the 

defending party If the judgment finally obtained by the 

offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay 

the costs .... " 

The Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss Rule 68 in 

Delta Airlines. In Delta Airlines, the defendant made an offer of 

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Appellate Case: 90-7020 Document: 010110051280 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 4 
judgment to plaintiff. The offer was refused, the case was tried, 

and plaintiff lost. The defendant then moved to recover his 

costs. The Supreme Court held that Rule 68 applies only to offers 

made by defendants and only to judgments obtained by the 

plaintiff. Id. at 352. The Supreme Court then decided that Rule 

68 was inapplicable to the case because it was the defendant who 

obtained the judgment. 

Assuming, without deciding, that Payton enjoys the legal 

status of plaintiff as he brought the claim alleging he was 

entitled to one-half the attorney fees, we see no distinction 

between Delta Airlines and the case before us. 

In his reply brief, Richardson tacitly concedes this argument 

and argues that the substantive provisions of Okiahoma law should 

control. 3 He argues that the Oklahoma law controls and was 

triggered when he filed his Rule 68 offer of judgment. 

The basic flaw in Richardson's argument is that he failed to 

properly raise this issue in the trial court. Mr. Richardson 

filed an application to set attorney fees requesting attorney fees 

"pursuant to 42 o.s. §176 and Rule 68." We also note that when 

Richardson made his offer of judgment it was specifically made 

"pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 

3 Richardson cites Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1101, which provides in 

part that if plaintiff fails to obtain judgment for more than was 

offered by the defendant, he shall pay the defendant's costs from 

the time of the offer. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7020 Document: 010110051280 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 5 
Mr. Richardson cannot now argue to the contrary. We cannot and 

will not consider an argument made for the first time in this 

court. 

II 

Richardson next argues that he is entitled to his costs of 

$746.40 pursuant to Rule 68. This issue is also resolved by Delta 

Airlines wherein the Supreme Court held that Rule 68 has no 

application to a case in which judgment is entered against the 

plaintiff-offeree and in favor of the defendant-offerer. 

III 

Richardson's next argument is that the trial court should 

have granted his attorney's fees as costs. As noted, the 

appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See 

Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1471; Security Nat'l Bank, 623 P.2d at 1064. 

Richardson has failed to demonstrate to this court that the 

district court abused its discretion in deciding against an award 

of attorney's fees under Okla. Stat. tit. 42, S 176. 

IV 

Richardson's final argument set forth above lacks merit and 

warrants no discussion. 

The decision of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons 

stated in this order and judgment. 

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( Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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