Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00157/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00157-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM KENNERSON, Civil No. 13-CV-0157-GPC (WMc)

Petitioner,

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

WILLIAM KNIPP, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner WilliamKennerson (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding in forma

pauperis and in pro per, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (Dkt. No. 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Magistrate Judge William

McCurine, Jr. filed a report and recommendation (“Report”) recommending that the

petition be denied in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 21.) Petitioner filed objections to the report

and recommendation on July 22, 2013. (Dkt. No. 22.) After a thorough review of the

issues, the documents presented, and objections filed, the Court ADOPTS the

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and DENIES the petition for writ of

habeas corpus. The Court also DENIES a certificate of appealability.

///

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Procedural Background

On July 18, 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty of four counts of committing a

lewd act upon a child in violation of California Penal Code section 288(a) and three

counts of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child in violation of California Penal

Code section 288(b)(1). In addition, the jury found true that: (1) Petitioner committed

the offenses against more than one victim; and (2) Petitioner had substantial sexual

conduct with a child under fourteen years of age. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1, ECF No.

13-3 at 131-137.) On October 30, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 45 years

to life plus 12 years in state prison. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1, ECF 13-3 at 140-141.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal claiming:

(1) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of his request for a

continuance to recall witnesses; (2) the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction sua

sponte on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrom constituted error; (3) the trial

court erred in granting the jury’s request to view a videotaped interview during

deliberations; and (4) the trial court erred when it precluded Petitioner from cross

examining the victim of an uncharged offense about her mental state at the time of an

investigative interview. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 3, ECF 13-18.) On June 10, 2011, the

appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in a reasoned opinion. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 6, ECF 13-21.) 

On July 20, 2010 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, raising claims one, two and four above, which were raised in the court

of appeal. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 7, ECF 13-22.) The California Supreme Court denied

the petition without comment or citation on September 22, 2010. (Resp’t Lodgment No

8, ECF 13-23.)

On August 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Superior Court, County of San Diego, East County Division, claiming

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the following issues on

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appeal: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the filing of a

second amended information on the day of trial; (2) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failure to request CALCRIM jury instruction 1192 and/or 1193; (3) trial

court error for failure to compel the production of witnesses Socorro and Christian; and

(4) failure to prove all the elements of count five of the second amended information.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 9, ECF 13-24.) On September 30, 2011, the state superior court

denied the Petition in a reasoned decision. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 10, ECF 13-25.)

On November 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the California Court of Appeal, raising the same claims made in his previous state

habeas petitions filed on August 1, 2011. (Resp’t Lodgment No 13 ECF 13-28.) On

December 6, 2011, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition in a written decision.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 12 ECF 13-27. )

On February 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the California Supreme Court, and raised the same claims made in his previous state

habeas petitions filed on August 1, 2011 and November 11, 2011. (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 13, ECF 13-28.) The California Supreme Court denied the Petition without

comment or citation on June 13, 2012. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 14, ECF 13-29.) 

On August 6, 2012, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Supreme Court, and raised the same claims made in his previousstate

habeas petitions filed on August 1, 2011; November 11, 2011 and February 16, 2012. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15, ECF 13-30.) The California Supreme Court denied the

Petition on October 24, 2012, citing to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993).

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 16, ECF 13-31.)

On November 28, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court alleging his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendmentsto the United StatesConstitution were violated because appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise three pointsin the appellate briefing. 

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(Dkt. No. 1.) Petitioner also requested an evidentiary hearing in support of his

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

On June 25, 2013, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. issued a report and

recommendation denying the Petition. (Dkt. No. 21.) On July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed

an Objection to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 22.)

Factual Background

The following factual background istaken from the unpublished appellate court

opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction on direct review. The Court presumes these

factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner may

rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.;

see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). 

A. Christian

In 1999, when Christian was 11 or 12 years old, her mother began

dating Kennerson. At that point in time, Christian, her mother and

her brother lived in an apartment in El Cajon. Later in 1999,

Christian, her mother and her brother moved into Kennerson’s Jamul

home. Kennerson molested Christian both when her family was

living in the apartment in El Cajon and later when they moved into

his home. 

On one occasion, Kennerson forced Christian to rub her hand up and

down on his penis while her brother and mother were in the house. 

Christian did not report the assault to her mother because she was

frightened. On another occasion, Kennerson forcibly sodomized

Christian. While he was sodomizing Christian, Kennerson put his

hand over her mouth to muffle her screams. Christian’s brother

knocked on the door and asked if everything was alright; Kennerson

responded that he was helping Christian. Kennerson told Christian

that if she told anyone he would do it again and hurt her family. 

When the familywasliving in Kennerson’s home, Christian’s mother

noticed Kennerson coming from Christian’s room and that Christian

was terrified of sleeping alone. She became suspicious and moved

out of the home three months after moving into it. 

In 2002, after her mother’s relationship with Kennerson had ended,

Christian told her mother about the molestations and they both

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reported the incidents to the police. 

B. Carla 

After Kennerson’s relationship with Christian’s mother ended, he

met another woman, Leticia. Kennerson married Leticia in 2002 and

she and her five-or six-year-old daughter Carla moved into his home.

Between 2003 and 2004 Kennerson molested Carla. He touched her

breasts and vagina over her clothes. 

Carla reported the molestations to her mother when she was eight

and after she learned Kennerson was not her biological father. 

Leticia was not sure Carla was being truthful because previously

Carla had made false accusations about an uncle. 

Carla met with a social worker in 2006 and a videotaped forensic

interview was conducted. Initially in the interview, Carla reported

that yet another uncle had molested her and her cousin and denied

that any other molestation had occurred. However, later in the

interview, Carla described how Kennerson had molested her. 

C. Nancy

About 10 years before Kennerson molested Christian and Carla,

Kennerson began molesting an 11- or 12-year-old girl Nancy, who,

along with her mother, lived in Kennerson’s home. Kennerson

rubbed Nancy’s breasts over her nightgown when she was lying

down orsleeping. One time when she was 17-years-old, Nancy woke

up and Kennerson was digitally penetrating her vagina. Nancy told

her mother about the molestations when she was 17. 

(Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 13-22; People v. Kennerson, D054115, Slip Op. at 2-3.)

Discussion

A. Scope of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A district court may adopt those parts of a

Magistrate Judge’s report to which no specific objection is made, provided they are not

clearly erroneous. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152-53 (1985).

Petitioner does not provide specific objections to Ground Two. If no specific

objections are made, the district court may adopt those parts of a Magistrate Judge’s

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report provided they are not clearly erroneous. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 152-53. After

a review of the report and recommendation and finding the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion not clearly erroneous, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation

and DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus as to Ground Two.

Petitioner filed specific objections as to Grounds One and Three A, B and C. 

Therefore, the Court will conduct a de novo review of these claims.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”)

A defendant claiming IAC must show both (1) deficient performance under an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate deficient performance, "[t]he challenger's

burden isto show 'that counsel made errorsso seriousthat counsel was not functioning

as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' " Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To

demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that "but for counsel's unprofessional

errors," there is a reasonable probability "the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"); see Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792

("The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable"). 

"Because failure to meet either [Strickland] prong is fatal to [an IAC] claim, there is

no requirement that we 'address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes

an insufficient showing on one.' " Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695

(2002) ("Without proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense . . .

the sentence or conviction should stand") (citation omitted).

Reviewing courts must apply a "strong presumption" that "counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range ofreasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689; see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1400-01 (2011) (courts must give

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"attorneys the benefit of the doubt" for proceeding as they did).

"[I]t is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state court decision applied Strickland incorrectly." Ortiz-Sandoval v.

Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 699). "[E]ven

a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was

unreasonable." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. The issue under AEDPA is whether the state

court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable, not just whether

defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id.

at 785 (Federal habeas courts must ask "whether there is any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard," not "whether counsel's actions were

unreasonable"). 

Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to

the effective assistance of counsel because his appellate counsel did not raise the

following issues on appeal. 

1) Ground One - Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Second

Amended Information

Petitioner complains his appellate counsel did not raise trial counsel’s failure to

object to the second amended complaint, which allegedly contained different offense

dates than those identified in the first amended complaint. (Pet. Mem., ECF No. 1 at

31; Traverse, ECF No. 19 at 6-7.) 

Respondent contends California law gives the state court authority to allow an

amendment to the complaint at any time during the proceedings to correct an

insufficiency as long as the amendment occurs before the issuance of a verdict or

judgment. (Ans. Mem., ECF No. 12-1 at 12:21-28.) Respondent further argues the

amended complaint was proper and did not prejudice Petitioner’s defense because it

merely reflected a correction in the dates of the offense at issue. Therefore, appellate

counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue. Id. at 13:11-15. 

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The magistrate judge concluded Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that his

appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to present

a meritless claim on appeal. The judge found the amendment was permissible under

California law because the complaint did not change the perpetrator, the victims or the

crimes alleged. Therefore, the appellate counsel’s decision not to raise the claim was

not ineffective and recommended this claim be denied. (ECF No. 21 at 10.)

In his objection, Petitioner argues the amendment to the first amended complaint

broadened the basis of conviction and violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) He further argues that section 1009

of the California Penal Code does not allow amendment to a complaint unless the

evidence was taken at the Preliminary Examination. (ECF No. 22 at 5.)

Petitioneris unable to demonstrate that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to bring up this claim on appeal. Section 1009 of the California

Penal Code

[a]uthorizes amendment of an information at any stage of the proceedings

provided the amendment does not change the offense charged in the original

information to one not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary

examination...Moreover, a trial court correctly exercises its discretion by

allowing an amendment of an information to properly state the offense at the

conclusion of the trial. Similarly, where the amendment makes no substantial

change in the offense charged and requires no additional preparation or evidence

to meet the change, the denial of a continuance is justified and proper.

People v. Winters, 221 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1003 (1990).

The amendment, which Petitioner complains broadened the basis of conviction,

only changed the date of the conviction at issue not the crime alleged, victims, or

perpetrator. Therefore this amendment was permissible under California law and

appellate counsel’s decision not to raise this meritless argument was not deficient. See

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F. 2d 1428, 1434 (1989); see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d

1263, 1274 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining counsel is not under an obligation to file

“kitchen-sink briefs” on appeal.) 

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In addition, Petitioner has not shown he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s

failure to present the claim on appeal because the difference between the dates of

crimes identified in the first and second amended complaints had no effect on the

defense of the case against Petitioner. In sum, no additional preparation or evidence

was needed to present a defense. The variance in time frames between the amended

complaints was immaterial to Petitioner’s defense, which was that he did not molest

Christian, Carla and Nancy. 

The Court finds the state court’s adjudication of this claim did not involve an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus as to

Ground One. 

2) Ground Three A - Prosecution’s Failure to Produce Juvenile, School and

Custody Records for Victim Christian 

Petitioner complains his appellate counsel should have raised the issue of the

prosecution’s failure to produce various exculpatory juvenile records, school records,

and custody records for victim Christian which may have revealed false molestation

allegations made by Christian against other men. (Pet. Mem., ECF No. 1 at 32).

Respondent argues Petitioner’s appellate counsel did raise this issue on appeal and the

CaliforniaCourt of Appeals rejected his claim. (Ans. Mem., ECF 12-1 at 16.) However,

after reviewing the Lodgments of the State Court record and the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation, it is clear that this claim was not brought up on appeal and

therefore, this Court will review the claim de novo. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 13, ECF 13-

21.) 

The magistrate judge concluded Petitioner’s Brady claim, of being denied

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exculpatory records, failed because he did not prove the first element of a Brady

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

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violation; namely thatChristian’s juvenile, school, and custody records were materially

exculpatory or impeaching. The judge further found the school record at issue, which

suggested Christian’s involvement in some kind of court proceeding in 2004, was

immaterial to the issue of Petitioner’s molestation of Christian in 1999 and 2001 and

would not have changed the result of the proceeding given Christian’s direct testimony

against Petitioner. Petitioner also failed to present evidence to demonstrate how the

school records would have “put the case in such a different light as to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-35 (1995). The

judge further found that Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing

to raise this issue because the issue was without merit. (ECF No. 21 at 15-17.)

In his objection, Petitioner argues his Brady claims are “materially exculpatory

impeaching” and would show that the alleged incident of molestation would have been

outside of the time line charged. (ECF No. 22 at 15.)

Due process requiresthe prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence within its

possession. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d

300, 309 (9th Cir. 2010). In Brady, the Supreme Court held “suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material only if there is

a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,

682 (1985). A “‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. Accordingly, in order to establish a Brady violation,

petitioner must show the material exculpatory or impeaching evidence wassuppressed

by the state, either wilfully or inadvertently, resulting in prejudice. Stickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 743 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner’sBrady claimfails because he has not proven thatChristian’s juvenile,

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school and custody records were materially exculpatory or impeaching, and has thus,

not proven the first element in a Brady claim. Petitioner wanted to cross-examine

Christian’s mother with respect to a 2004 written statement she had given school

officials explaining Christian’s long absence from school. In the 2004 statement,

Christian’s mother stated Christian had been a victim in an on-going trial. Because the

complaint in Petitioner’s case was not filed until 2007, his trial counsel wanted to know

whether the statement referred to another alleged molestation or otherwise undermined

Christian’s credibility. The trial court, however, determined the school record was

insufficient to warrant further investigation or a continuance of the trial to attempt

impeachment on cross-examination. The court found the possible inconsistency was

“peripheral matters” that did not bear on whether Christian was molested years earlier.

(Resp’t Lodgment 2, ECF No. 13-14 at 114.) 

Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish the materiality element of a Brady

violation. The school record at issue, which suggested Christian’s involvement in

come kind of court proceeding in 2004, was immaterial to the issue of Petitioner’s

molestation of Christian in 1999 and 2001 and would not have changed the result in the

proceeding given Christian’s direct testimony against Petitioner. Petitioner has

presented no additional evidence to prove the materiality ofthe alleged Brady violation

apart from stating the records would have shown the incident was outside of the time

line charged. However, the 2004 school record does not bear on the 1999 and 2001

molestations because the records are five to three years after the molestation. In

addition, Petitioner has not shown he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to

present the claim on appeal because such a claim is without merit. 

The Court finds Petitioner cannot demonstrate his appellate counsel failed to

raise a meritorious issue and therefore fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the

petition for writ of habeas corpus as to Ground Three A. 

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3) Ground Three B - Trial Court’s Preclusion of the Cross-Examination of

Witness Nancy Spencer

Petitioner complainsthat his appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of the trial

court’s preclusion of the cross-examination of witness Nancy Spencer regarding her

mental condition. (Pet. Mem., ECF No. 1 at 32). Respondent argues Petitioner’s

appellate counsel did raise this issue on appeal and the California Court of Appeals

rejected his claim. (Ans. Mem., ECF 12-1 at 16.)

The magistrate judge concluded that Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised the

issue of the trial court’s preclusion of the cross-examination of witness Nancy Spencer

regarding her mental condition. The judge reviewed the state court record and

confirmed the issue was raised on direct appeal by Petitioner’s appellate counsel. 

Furthermore, the issue was considered and addressed by the appellate court in its

unpublished written opinion filed June 10, 2010. Accordingly,the judge recommended

this issue be denied. 

In his objection, Petitioner seems to argue that the appellate court came to an

unreasonable determination based on the facts of this issue which was contrary to

federal law. (ECF No. 22 at 15.) However, this objection brings up an issue that was

not a claim made by Petitioner in his original complaint. Petitioner does not address

the issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if he did make

an objection that the appellate court made an unreasonable determination based on the

facts of this issue, his objection would be without merit because the appellate court’s

decision was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The appellate court found no error

in precluding the cross-examination of witness Nancy Spencer as to her mental state

and hospital stay at the time she reported the molestations in 2002. (Id.) The appellate

court found that Nancy’s mental state and hospital stay was not relevant to the issues

presented at trial. (Id.) The court determined that although her mental state and

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hospital stay might be relevant to attack Nancy’s credibility, any relevance was far

outweighed by the invasion of privacy that the examination would entail and that the

issue was purely collateral. (Id.) Under federal law, the “trial judges retain wide

latitude...to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'

safety, or interrogation that isrepetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). After reviewing the appellate court decision this

Court determines that the appellate court properly found that the limit on the crossexamination of Nancy Spencer was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law because it prevented harassment of the

witness over an irrelevant, collateral issue. Therefore, petitioner’s objection, even if

brought up in his original claim, is without merit. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus as to

Ground Three B. 

4) Ground Three C - Trial Court’s Allowance of and Prosecution’s Use of

Alleged “False Testimony”

Petitioner complainsthe trial court and the prosecution colluded to present false

evidence or suppress exculpatory evidence at trial. Petitioner contends appellate

counsel should have raised the introduction of victim Carla’s unreliable videotaped

interview into evidence, on appeal. (Pet. Mem., ECF No. 1 at 27, 32-33; Traverse, ECF

No. 19 at 8-10.) Specifically, Petitioner claims the videotaped interview was unreliable

because earlier interviews Carla had with the National City Police Department and

Child Protective Services were not videotaped. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 33.) Respondent

argues the reliability of Carla’s videotaped interview is not a meritorious issue; thus

Petitioner’s appellate counsel had no obligation to raise it on appeal. (Ans. Mem., ECF

12-1 at 16:8-16.)

The magistrate judge concluded the admission of Carla’s videotaped interview

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did not violate the Constitution’s confrontation requirement because Petitioner had the

opportunity to cross-examine Carla. The judge further found there was no evidence in

the record to demonstrate Carla’s videotaped interview was unreliable. The court

found that since there was no constitutional violation and no evidence that the

videotape was unreliable, appellate counsel’s failure to raise the argument on appeal

did not constitute ineffective assistance and recommended that this claim be denied.

(ECF No. 21 at 21-22.)

In his objection, Petitioner argues that he was denied a full and unrestrained

cross-examination of the original interviews of Carla in June, July, and August 2006. 

He also argues that there is evidence in the record to demonstrate Carla’s videotaped

interview was unreliable. (ECF No. 22 at 16.)

Under federal law, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal

habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law by infringing upon a specific

constitutional or federal statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of a fair trial

guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v.

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court

cannot disturb a state court’s decision to admit evidence on due process grounds unless

the admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial as to render the trial

fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995);

Colley v. Summer, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Specifically, Petitioner must demonstrate the evidentiary error at issue was

constitutional in dimension and was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619 (1993). The court must find that the error has “‘a substantial and injurious

effect’ on the verdict.” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). In cases of reliability of testimonial statements, “the only

indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the

Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

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36, 68 (2004). 

Although Petitioner was not afforded the right to confront Carla in her original

interviews in June, July and August 2006, Petitioner was able to confront Carla when

she testified at trial. Petitioner actually did confront Carla, as he cross-examined her.

(Reporter’s Transcript, ECF No. 13-9 at 64:6-97:7.) Petitioner was also able to cossexamine the social worker who conducted the videotaped interview of Carla.

(Reporter’s Transcript, ECF No. 13-10 at 26:26-54:16.) 

Petitioner produces no evidence that Carla’s videotape was unreliable. 

Furthermore, there is no indication that even if the admission of the videotape into

evidence were error, it had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus

as to Ground Three C. 

C. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal courts must approach the

factual record and "substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an

evidentiary hearing." Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Evidentiary hearings associated with federal habeas proceedings deciding state

prisoner's constitutional claims are prohibited unless the "stringent requirements" of

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000);

Cullen, 131 S.Ct at 1400-01 ("Section 2254(e)(2)imposes a limitation on the discretion

of federal habeas courtsto take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing."). That section

provides that "[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings," no evidentiary hearing on the claim will be held in federal

court unless the petitioner shows that "the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional

law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable," or the claim relies on "a factual predicate that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence," and that "the facts

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underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner makes

no such demonstration.

"If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas

petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before

that state court." Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1400. If a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) "does not satisfy that statutory requirement, it is "unnecessary to reach the

question whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim." Id.

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 444). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds

that none of Petitioner’s claims warrants federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) restricts federal habeas review to the

state court record. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is

DENIED. 

D. Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, “[t]he district

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability should be issued only where

the petition presents “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A certificate of appealability “should issue when the prisoner

shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Based on the Court’s review of the petition, the Court finds no issues are

debatable among jurists of reason and that no jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. See id. 

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Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED as to the claims in the petition. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court

ADOPTS the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in its entirety and

DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court also DENIES a certificate

of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 19, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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