Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00695/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00695-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROGER SHULER, and CAROL

SHULER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LUTHER STRANGE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:16-CV-0695-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

An order dismissing this case with prejudice (Doc. 154) and an accompanying

memorandum opinion (Doc. 153) were entered on January 13, 2017. (Doc. 28). Postjudgment, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Leave of Court To Amend Complaint, Per

FRCP 15 (Doc. 155) (the “Amend Motion”), a Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment

Under FRCP 59 (Doc. 156) (the “Rule 59(e) Motion”),1and a Motion To Recuse

(Doc. 157) (the “Recusal Motion”), all on the same date of February 9, 2017. 

On February 23, 2017, another judge of this court denied Plaintiffs’ Recusal

Motion, but, nevertheless, “for reasons wholly unrelated” to the contents of the

1

See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later

than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”).

FILED

 2017 Feb-27 AM 11:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-00695-VEH Document 169 Filed 02/27/17 Page 1 of 7
Recusal Motion, recused himself from further participation in the case. (Doc. 165 at

1). As a result of this recusal order, the action was reassigned to the undersigned by

the Clerk’s Office. See CM/ECF margin entry dated Feb. 23, 2017 (“This case is

reassigned to Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins.”). Therefore, the undersigned is now

responsible for deciding Plaintiffs’ Amend and Rule 59(e) Motions. The court begins

with Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion

1. Rule 59(e) Standard

“The decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion

of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237,

1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Commodities

Group, 753 F.2d 862, 866 (11th Cir. 1984)). “While, as a rule, parties are not entitled

to ‘two bites at the apple’, there are occasions in which reconsideration should be

entertained.” Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Am.

Home, 763 F.2d at 1239).

As the Eleventh Circuit has summarized the limited scope of relief that is

available to a litigant under Rule 59(e):

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“The only groundsfor granting [a Rule 59]motion are newly-discovered

evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d

1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used]

to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could

have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v.

Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).

Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Jacobs v.

Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Reconsidering the

merits of a judgment, absent a manifest error of law or fact, is not the purpose of Rule

59.”); Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1442 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of a Rule

59(e) motion is not to raise an argument that was previously available, but not

pressed.”).

2. Analysis

Nowhere within Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion do they state the applicable

standard. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ points contained in their Rule 59(e) Motion fallshort

of reaching Rule 59(e)’s limited scope for obtaining post-judgment relief. As

correctly observed in the opposition (Doc. 164) filed by Defendants Preston Crider

and Angela Gulledge Crider (collectively, the “Crider Defendants”), Plaintiffs’ postjudgment motion “is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the Plaintiffs’

previously dismissed claims.” (Doc. 164 at 1 ¶ 1). Importantly, Plaintiffs’

disagreement with the court’s reasons for dismissing their case does not, in any

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manner, demonstrate that the 45-page memorandum opinion thoroughly supporting

the with-prejudice dismissal contained manifest errors of law or fact.

Plaintiffs also do not suggest that some newly discovered evidence requires

that the dismissal of their case be reconsidered. Therefore, no basis for awarding

Plaintiffs any Rule 59(e) relief exists under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent and

their Rule 59(e) Motion is DENIED.

B. Plaintiffs’ Amend Motion

1. Principles Governing Rule 15(a) 

“Leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1581 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit

“reviewsthe denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.” Steger

v. General Electric Company, 318 F.3d 1066, 1080 (11th Cir. 2003);see also Henson

v. Columbus Bank and Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A district

court has great discretion when determining whether an amendment to the complaint

should be allowed once responsive pleadings have been filed.”). 

At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that granting leave to

amend under Rule 15(a) is not appropriate post-judgment unless a party has obtained

relief from that judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). 

The problem with Jacobs’s arguments is that Rule 15(a), by its

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plain language, governs amendment of pleadings before judgment is

entered; it has no application after judgment is entered. In United States

ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, we made this clear.

[Rule] 15(a) has no application once the district court has

dismissed the complaint and entered final judgment for the

defendant. Czeremcha v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 724 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th

Cir. 1984). Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 1489. Post-judgment, the plaintiff may seek

leave to amend if he is granted relief under Rule 59(e) or

Rule 60(b)(6). Id.; Czeremcha, 724 F.2d at 1556; Ahmed v.

Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207-09 (3d Cir. 2002); Lindauer

v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996); Dussouy v.

Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 n.1 (5th Cir.

1981).

470 F.3d 1350, 1361 n.22 (11th Cir.2006). Given this precedent, we

could hardly hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying

Jacobs leave to amend his complaint post-judgment.

Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis by underlining added).

When an opposing party challenges a proposed amendment under Rule 15(a)

as futile, the district court must decide whether “the complaint, as amended, would

necessarily fail.” St. CharlesFoods, Inc. v. America’sFavorite ChickenCo., 198 F.3d

815, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1999). The futility standard is comparable to that applicable

to a motion to dismiss. See B.D. Stephenson Trucking, L.L.C. v. Riverbrooke Capital,

No. 5:06-CV-0343-WS, 2006 WL 2772673, at *6 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (“[T]hus, if the

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amended complaint could not survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, then the amendment is

futile and leave to amend is properly denied.” (citing Burger King Corp. v. Weaver,

169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (“denial of leave to amend justified by futility

when ‘complaint as amended is stillsubject to dismissal’”))); Florida Power &Light

Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming district

court’s denial of motion for leave to amend as futile because amended claim “would

not withstand a motion to dismiss”). 

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs’Amend Motion is procedurallybarred byEleventhCircuit precedent

which precludesthemfromseeking leave to amend under Rule 15(a) unlessthey have

secured post-judgment relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Jacobs, 626 F.3d

at 1344-45 (discussing limitations of Rule 15(a) when movant seeks to amend postjudgment). Here, Plaintiffs have not unlocked the door for seeking Rule 15(a) postjudgment relief through either the Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) key.

Alternatively, the court has considered the proposed amended complaint(Doc.

155-1) that is attached to Plaintiffs’ Amend Motion and agrees with the Crider

Defendants that “Plaintiffs do not set forth any additional factual allegations that

would in any way change the legal analysis that [the previously assigned judge] has

already undertaken.” (Doc. 164 at 2 ¶ 4). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ proposed amended

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pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss and to grant Plaintiffs’ Amend

Motion would be futile. Accordingly, for both of these independent reasons,

Plaintiffs’ Amend Motion is DENIED. 

III. Conclusion

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) and Amend Motions are both DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of February, 2017.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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