Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05363/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05363-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed June 23, 1998

No. 97-5363

Jasper Napoleon Buchanan,

Appellant

v.

Audrey Manley, Surgeon General, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01840)

Jasper Buchanan, pro se, filed a brief for appellant.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Jasper Buchanan, proceeding without counsel,

filed a complaint against the Surgeon General of the United

States, the president of the American Medical Association

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("AMA"), and the heads of two tobacco companies. Buchanan, who is incarcerated in South Carolina, alleged that the

Surgeon General and the president of the AMA "deliberately

neglected" their duties to protect him from health risks

associated with the tobacco companies' products. He further

alleged that the heads of the tobacco companies intentionally

distributed their products without a warning notice regarding

the health risks of smoking, and that he suffered injury as a

result. Although his complaint does not describe the products at issue, on appeal he has provided exhibits showing the

companies' packages for cigarette rolling papers and cigarette

tobacco. Buchanan styled his complaint as one brought

under the Federal Tort Claims Act but also claimed that his

eighth amendment rights have been violated. He sought

declaratory relief and damages.

After determining that there were no viable federal claims

and dismissing the Surgeon General as a defendant, the

district court concluded that the only proper basis for its

jurisdiction would be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1332, which

provides for diversity jurisdiction in civil actions. The district

court then determined that venue in the District of Columbia

was improper and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

We publish this opinion to address the district court's sua

sponte dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper

venue.1

In Anger v. Revco Drug Co., 791 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(per curiam), we held that the district court may not sua

sponte dismiss a case as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. s 1915(d) 2

on the sole ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction

over the defendants or that venue is improper. The court

reasoned that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate

that personal jurisdiction is a matter to be raised by motion

or responsive pleading, not by the court sua sponte. There-

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1 The district court's rulings that Buchanan failed to state a

federal claim against any of the defendants, and its dismissal of the

Surgeon General as a defendant, do not warrant a published opinion

and are affirmed by separate order.

2 Current version at 28 U.S.C. s 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

fore, before the complaint has been served and a response

received, the court is not positioned to determine conclusively

whether personal jurisdiction exists." Anger, 791 F.2d at 958

& n.3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and (h)(1), and extending

their application to sua sponte dismissals for improper venue). The court also concurred in the Third Circuit's statement that it is "inappropriate for the trial court to dispose of

the case sua sponte on an objection to the complaint which

would be waived if not raised by the defendant(s) in a timely

manner." Id. at 958 (quoting Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15,

19 (3d Cir. 1976)).

As Anger makes clear, the district court erred by sua

sponte dismissing Buchanan's complaint. We conclude, howUSCA Case #97-5363 Document #361550 Filed: 06/23/1998 Page 2 of 6
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ever, that such procedural error is harmless in cases where,

as here, the appellant has had an opportunity to challenge the

district court's ruling on appeal but has failed to demonstrate

that venue is proper. This conclusion is consistent with this

court's longstanding practice of allowing such error to be

cured on appeal. In the past, this court has affirmed a sua

sponte dismissal on venue or personal jurisdiction grounds

when it is clear that one or both of those defenses exists and

no further factual development in the district court is necessary. The court has determined whether affirmance is warranted by issuing to appellees an order to show cause why the

district court's dismissal order should not be vacated and the

case remanded, and simultaneously inviting appellees to raise

threshold defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and

improper venue. We now adopt, with the approval of the full

court, a modified procedure that eliminates the requirement

of an order to show cause directed at appellees.3 This

approach differs from the court's current practice only in that

appellees will no longer be required to enter an appearance

and raise the venue and personal jurisdiction defenses in

every case.

Although the defenses of improper venue and lack of

personal jurisdiction are waived if not raised in a timely

manner, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), this does not automati-

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3 Because this change in procedure has been considered and

approved by the full court, it constitutes the law of the circuit. See

Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

cally preclude an appellate court from affirming the sua

sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. s 1915(e) on

the basis of those defenses without first requiring appellees to

raise them. In cases where the complaint is dismissed before

it is served, a defendant who never had notice of the suit

cannot be said to have waived an affirmative defense. Moreover, the usual concern behind requiring defenses such as

lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant and improper

venue to be raised early or waived--that is, the possible

unfairness to a plaintiff of rejecting a suit "after considerable

time and expense has been invested in it"--are not present

when the case is dismissed at the outset. Pino v. Ryan, 49

F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirmative defense appearing on

the face of the complaint may be a basis for sua sponte

dismissal as frivolous prior to service of the complaint).

One significant concern that does arise when the district

court sua sponte dismisses a complaint on the basis of a

venue or personal jurisdiction defense is that the plaintiff

does not have an opportunity to raise arguments supporting

venue or personal jurisdiction.4 Accordingly, we will allow

appellants to raise arguments supporting venue or personal

jurisdiction, and even proffer evidence, for the first time on

appeal. Often appellants will have addressed venue or personal jurisdiction in a motion or brief, but if not, the court will

issue an order to show cause to appellants to allow them to

demonstrate that venue is proper or that the court has

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personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Only if appellants

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4 Several circuits nevertheless have allowed the sua sponte

dismissal of a complaint as frivolous based on an affirmative defense

that appears on the face of the complaint. See Nasim v. Warden,

Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en

banc) (statute of limitations), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996);

Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Moore v.

McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson v.

Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 1063 (1992); Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1476 (10th

Cir. 1987) (waiver); Sanders v. United States, 760 F.2d 869, 871-72

(8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (personal jurisdiction).

can make the relevant showing will appellees be required to

enter an appearance and respond to an order to show cause

why the district court's dismissal order should not be vacated

and the case remanded. This procedure gives appellants

notice of affirmative defenses and an opportunity to be heard,

allows appellees to avoid the burden of appearing in a case

that appears clearly to have been brought in the wrong court,

and prevents pointless remands where the district court's

procedural error is harmless. See 28 U.S.C. s 2111 ("On the

hearing of any appeal ... in any case, the court shall give

judgment after an examination of the record without regard

to error or defects which do not affect the substantial rights

of the parties.").

In this case, Buchanan has addressed in his brief the

district court's venue ruling, but has failed to demonstrate

that venue here is proper. As noted above, we have by

separate order affirmed the district court's dismissal of Buchanan's federal claims. Arguably, the complaint states a

common law tort claim for failure to warn Buchanan of the

health risks associated with the use of cigarette rolling paper

and loose tobacco. The only possible basis for federal jurisdiction over this claim is the diversity statute. See 28 U.S.C.

s 1332.5 The venue provisions for diversity actions, however,

are not met. Such actions may be brought in a judicial

district where (1) any defendant resides, if all defendants

reside in the same State, (2) a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of the property that is the subject of the action is

situated, or (3) where any defendant is subject to personal

jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no

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5 Although the complaint alleges more than $75,000 as the

amount in controversy and it appears that there may be complete

diversity between Buchanan and the defendants, the allegations of

the complaint are not detailed enough to determine with absolute

certainty where each litigant resides. The court need not reach

that issue, however, given our conclusion that venue is improper.

See In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 1998 WL 16351, *7

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (court may dismiss on non-merits grounds before

finding subject matter jurisdiction).

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district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28

U.S.C. s 1391(a). The complaint gives addresses for the nonfederal defendants in Illinois and Kentucky, and Buchanan

has not alleged that any of them resides in the District of

Columbia. Moreover, no part of the events or omissions

which gave rise to the claim are alleged to have occurred

here. Nor has Buchanan shown that the action could not be

brought in any other district. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court's dismissal for improper venue.6

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6 The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

that transfer would not be in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C.

s 1406(a). Not only are there substantive problems with Buchanan's claims, but the sketchy allegations of the complaint make it

difficult to determine where this case could properly be brought.

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