Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01990/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSE ANGEL PEREZ SANCHEZ, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-1990-PHX-JAT (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

On October 15, 2007, Petitioner, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prisons

Complex in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a

Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Doc. No. 1.)1

Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition on December 12, 2007. (Doc. No. 6.) No

reply was filed. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order DISMISSING Grounds One, Three and Four, and

GRANTING RELIEF as to Ground Two. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Change of Plea and Sentencing

On August 15, 2002, seven individuals were involved in an armed attack on an

apartment complex in Mesa, Arizona in Maricopa County. (Ex. A, R.T. 4/1/03 at 13-

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2 “Ex.” refers to the exhibits attached to Respondents’ Answer and

Response to Order. 

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15.)2

 The individuals took property or currency from several individuals while armed

with a handgun. (Id., at 14.) 

On August 26, 2002, the Maricopa County Grand Jury returned a 15-count

indictment charging Petitioner, along with six co-defendants, with three counts of firstdegree burglary, four counts of armed robbery, seven counts of kidnapping, and one

count of aggravated assault. (Ex. O.) 

On November 21, 2002, co-defendants Jesus Morqui, Jose Burruel and Robert

Wilson pled guilty pursuant to plea agreements. (Ex. B.) On December 4, 2002, codefendant Enrique Rosas pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (Id.) On December

6, 2002, co-defendant Cesar Martinez Pena pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.

(Id.) On January 28, 2003, co-defendant Jesus Arviz pled guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement. (Id.) 

The trial court sentenced Morqui, Pena and Wilson to 6.5 years’ imprisonment;

Burruel to 5 years’ imprisonment, and Rosas to 10.5 years imprisonment. (Ex. C.)

Arviz, whose plea agreement included a plea to the dangerous nature of the offense,

was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. (Ex. C.) 

On April 1, 2003, Petitioner entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to Count

1, burglary in the first degree, a class 2 dangerous felony; Count 7, armed robbery, a

class 2 dangerous felony; and Count 10, kidnapping, a class 2 felony. (Ex. A, Plea

Agreement.) The State also agreed to dismiss the remaining charges as part of the

agreement. (Id.) The trial court accepted the Petitioner’s plea on that same date. (Ex.

A, R.T. 4/1/03 at 20; Ex. B.) 

On June 13, 2003, at the time of sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw from

the plea agreement. (Ex. D, R.T. 6/13/2003, at 3.) The trial court denied the motion

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and proceeded with sentencing. (Id., at 22.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated

term of fourteen years imprisonment in the Arizona Department of Corrections

(“ADC”), with 301 days credit for time served on Counts 1 and 7, to be served

consecutively, and was placed on intensive probation for Count 10 for a period of five

years upon release from ADC. (Id., at 30-32.) 

B. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On June 26, 2003, Petitioner filed his first notice of post-conviction relief. (Ex.

G.) On March 1, 2004, Consuelo Ohanesian, a Deputy Legal Advocate, filed a Notice

of Completion of Post-Conviction Review by Counsel with the trial court, noting that

she had reviewed the record, and was unable to identify any claims for relief to raise in

post-conviction relief proceedings. (Ex. H.) Counsel requested that the trial court grant

an extension of time to allow Petitioner to file a pro per petition with the court. (Ex.

H.) The trial court granted counsel’s request. (Ex. I.) 

On May 6, 2004, the trial court struck Petitioner’s first pro per petition for postconviction relief because it exceeded the 25-page maximum provided by Rule 32.5.

(Ex. J.) The trial court granted Petitioner an extension of time to submit a petition in

compliance with Rule 32.5. (Id.) On June 8, 2004, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

revised petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.5, noting that, although

it was less than 25 pages in length, “the handwriting is so small that [the] petition is

illegible.” (Ex. K.) 

 C. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On March 8, 2005, the trial court received a second notice of post-conviction

relief raising a claim pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Answer,

at 9; Petition, at 2; Ex. L.) On March 15, 2005, the trial court ruled on the notice,

allowing the petition to proceed as to the only claim raised – a Blakely issue – and

appointed counsel. (Id.) On January 23, 2006, the trial court found that Petitioner was

not entitled to relief, as Petitioner’s initial Rule 32 proceedings were dismissed with

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prejudice by the court prior to the effective date of Blakely. (Ex. M.) Accordingly, the

trial court dismissed the petition pursuant to Rule 32.6(c) (Id.) 

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review with the court of appeals,

arguing that the June 4, 2004 dismissal of Petitioner’s pro per petition for postconviction relief did not relieve the court of jurisdiction to hear a successive petition

based on Blakely v. Washington, which was a significant change in the law. (Ex. P, at

5.) The petition for review with the court of appeals was denied without comment on

March 12, 2007. (Ex. R.) On April 16, 2007, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona

Supreme Court raising the same issue as the petition for review to the appellate court.

(Ex. S.) Respondents filed a Notice of Acknowledgment, stating that the issue had

already been presented to the trial and appellate courts, and that the petition for review

established no basis for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and that they would

therefore not be filing a response. (Ex. T.) The petition for review to the supreme court

was denied without comment on July 17, 2007. (Ex. U.) 

E. Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

October 15, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner raises four claims: (1) Ineffective assistance

of counsel; (2) A violation of his 6th Amendment right to have a jury determine the

existence of aggravating factors; 3) A 5th Amendment/Due Process violation caused by

his attorney’s failure to forward sentencing letters to the trial judge; and (4) an 8th

Amendment violation caused by excessive punishment disproportionate to the crime.

(Petition, at 5-8.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

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B. Statute of Limitations

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ

of habeas corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). Respondents concede the timeliness of the habeas petition. Based on a

review of the record, the Court finds that the petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a petitioner

must exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court

every claim raised in his federal habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 731 (1991); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in

a federal habeas action must exhaust his federal claims in the state courts “by invoking

one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process” before he may

submit those claims in a federal habeas petition); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to give the state

the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal

rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In order to provide a state with this necessary opportunity, “the

prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting

that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

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A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts

and legal theories on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6

(1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898 (9th Cir. 2001). In state court, the petitioner must describe not only the operative

facts but also the asserted constitutional principle, for if “state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States

Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (“If a habeas petitioner

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in

federal court, but in state court.”). A petitioner does not ordinarily “fairly present” a

federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition, brief, or similar

papers to find material that will alert it to the presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541

U.S. at 32-33 (rejecting contention that petition fairly presented federal ineffective

assistance of counsel claim because “ineffective” is a term of art in Oregon that refers

only to federal law claims, since petitioner failed to demonstrate that state law uses

“ineffective assistance” as referring only to federal law rather than a similar state law

claim); Harless, 459 U.S. at 6 (holding that mere presentation of facts necessary to

support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar to federal claim, is

insufficient; petitioner must fairly present the substance of the federal claim); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal

due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only

on state grounds); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that

petitioner failed to “fairly present” federal claim to state courts where he failed to

identify the federal legal basis for his claim). 

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court

of Appeals. A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not

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necessary for purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v.

Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are

exhausted by review by the court of appeals); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes for assertion that in cases not carrying a life sentence

or the death penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of

federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the distinction between

exhaustion and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule.

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal

claim applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal

claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is

clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Thus,

in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to exhaust a federal claim in

state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

“available” to him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court

pursuant to an adequate and independent procedural bar may not be

considered in federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and

prejudice for the default, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would result if the federal court refused to consider the claim. 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from

federal review in either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in

federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be

defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, the

claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present

the claim in a necessary state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now

find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as

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3 Although the Ninth Circuit has recently suggested that under

Rule 32.2(a)(3), there are exceptions to the rule that a District

Court can make such a determination for claims which require

a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, see Cassett, v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, (9th Cir. 2005), this Court does not

address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised

in this case by the Petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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“technical” exhaustion, because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state

court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available3

. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

269-70 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99. 

Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to seek

post-conviction relief on the ground that his conviction was in violation of the

Constitution of the United States. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a). Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, however, governs when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction

proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their convictions or sentences

in state court. Under Rule 32.2(a), relief is barred on any claim which could have been

raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

claims which fall under sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1, and which were

justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Furthermore, Rule 32.4 (a) requires that a petition for post-conviction relief must

be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or 30 days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Again, the exceptions to this requirement are claims asserted under

subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

Thus, in situations where a petitioner might otherwise attempt to revive an

unexhausted federal claim in state court, and the state court might invoke the procedural

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bars of Rule 32.2(a) and 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in rejecting such

an attempt, there is an adequate and independent state ground barring Petitioner from

raising these claims in state court proceedings thereby creating a procedural default for

purposes of federal habeas review. See eg. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, (holding

that Rule 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar). 

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court

unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state

court, or demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Id. at 750;

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). If a claim has never been fairly

presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state

remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989); Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

Cause is defined as a “legitimate excuse for the default,” and prejudice is defined

as “actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106

S.Ct. 2639 (1986) (a showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that “some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rule”). Prejudice need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show

cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. To bring himself within the narrow class of

cases that implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner “must come

forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence,” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d

669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), which can

be shown when “a petitioner ‘presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that

the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

D. Standard of Review: Merits

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Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for

habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution

of state and federal criminal sentences.’ “ Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. 1933,

1939-40 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The

AEDPA's “ ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt .” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party's

claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other

non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply

a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became

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final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim

under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal

law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly

established” federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the

petitioner's state court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey

v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient

legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower

federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 127

S.Ct. at 654; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while

only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive”

in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law

unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of §

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it

confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to

analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill

state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court cases] to the

facts of the prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974.

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule

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from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular ... case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For

a federal court to find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent

“unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court's

decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409; Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1939; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) ( Miller-El II). A state court decision

“based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state

court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the

“burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1939-40; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240. However,

it is only the state court's factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject to

§ 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42 (“The clear

and convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains

only to state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its

rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan,

313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.

2000). In those circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to

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assess whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling

federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is

reviewed independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the state court's ultimate

decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes,

336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state court did not decide the merits of a properly raised

claim will the claim be reviewed de novo, because in that circumstance “there is no

state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at

1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v.

Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Grounds One, Three and Four

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust any of his claims

in his initial Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) proceeding because he failed to seek

review of those claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner has submitted that Grounds One through Four of his Petition were

submitted for review by the state supreme court. (See Petition, at 5 -8.) The record

belies this assertion, however, as there was no petition for review filed after his first

“of-right” petition for post-conviction relief, and the only issue raised in the petition for

review from the second petition for post-conviction relief was the Blakely issue. 

Respondents have included in the record two letters from the Arizona Court of

Appeals that indicate that Petitioner, while represented by counsel, attempted to file a

petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was first refused filing by the

Clerk of Court for the Arizona Court of Appeals for failure to comply with Rule 31.19

(Ex. V, letter dated April 18, 2007 from Clerk of Court), and next refused because

Petitioner was represented by counsel and the Clerk of Court noted that he was not

allowed to file documents on his own behalf. (Ex. V, letter dated May 15, 2007)

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Although it is not evident that Petitioner attempted to raise Grounds One, Three

and Four with the Supreme Court in the unauthorized pro per petition for review, this

Court concludes that even if he had argued these claims, Petitioner could not have

exhausted those claims by raising them for the first and only time in a petition for

review with the Arizona Supreme Court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989 ) (holding that the requirement that a claim raised on federal habeas corpus

previously have been “fairly presented” to the state courts is not satisfied by the firsttime presentation of the claim to a state appellate court under a procedure that, by state

rule, permits discretionary review only when “there are special and important reasons

therefor”)(citations and quotations omitted). 

Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to

present these claims in an additional petition for post-conviction relief. The state courts

have never had an opportunity to address the legal theories presented in Grounds One,

Three and Four of Petitioner's federal habeas Petition in a procedurally appropriate

manner. Further, Petitioner is barred from returning to state court to raise this claim.

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). Nor does Petitioner fall within the narrow exceptions to

the procedural bar rule. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Petitioner would be precluded

from raising these claims in another petition for post-conviction relief. Rule 32.2(a)(3),

Ariz.R.Crim.P. These claims, therefore, are procedurally defaulted. 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of Grounds One, Three and Four is barred

absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

2. Cause and Prejudice

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the following claims: All claims asserted

in Grounds One, Three and Four. Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural

default for any of the claims. 

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Petitioner's status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute

cause for his failure to present any of his grounds for relief to the Arizona courts.

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986)(finding that

an illiterate pro se petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse

a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988)(finding

that petitioner's arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse

lawyers did not constitute cause.)

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard. Additionally, Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence to

support any assertion of innocence which would allow this court to consider these

claims as a ground for a writ of habeas corpus in spite of the procedural default.

Because petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence that he is innocent of

these crimes, a miscarriage of justice will not occur if the court declined to review the

procedurally defaulted claims on the merits.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner asserts in Ground Two that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating factors. 

Petitioner asserts in support of this claim that the state courts are refusing to

acknowledge that Blakely is a significant change in the law that would probably

overturn Petitioner’s conviction or sentence. (Petition at 6.) Additionally, Petitioner

asserts that the June 4, 2004 dismissal of Petitioner’s pro per petition for postconviction relief did not relieve the court of jurisdiction to hear a successive petition

based on Blakely v. Washington. (Id.) 

1. Exhaustion

Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted the Blakely claim by

raising the claim in his successive PCR petition and petition for review to the state

appellate courts. (Answer, at 11.) 

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2. Relevant Facts

Petitioner’s first “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by

the trial court by minute entry dated June 4, 2004, and filed June 8, 2004. Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, was decided sixteen days later, on June 24, 2004. 

When petitioner raised the Blakely issue in a successive notice of post-conviction

relief filed on March 8, 2005, the trial court, after further briefing by appointed counsel,

concluded that Petitioner’s “initial Rule 32 Petition For Post-Conviction Relief was

dismissed with prejudice by the Court prior to the effective date of Blakely v.

Washington. As a consequence, Defendant is not entitled to relief as requested in the

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief...” and the trial court consequently denied relief and

dismissed the petition pursuant to Rule 32.6(c). (Ex. M.) 

The issue Petitioner presented for review to the court of appeals and supreme

court was “[w]hether the June 4, 2004 dismissal of Appellant’s pro per petition for postconviction relief relieved the court of jurisdiction to hear a successive petition based on

Blakely v. Washington, which was a significant change in the law.” (Ex. P, at 2.) Both

the court of appeals and supreme court denied petition for review without comment.

(Ex’s R and U.) 

3. Merits

The state court unreasonably applied federal law in holding that Blakely did not

apply to Petitioner. Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. 542 U.S. at 296. Decisions

establishing new constitutional rules do not generally apply retroactively to cases on

collateral review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305 (1989) (plurality). The Ninth

Circuit has held that the new rule announced in Blakely does not apply retroactively to

cases that were already final for purposes of direct review at the time it was decided.

Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir.2005). It is clearly established,

however, that “failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases

pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” Griffith

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v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). Thus, the applicability of Blakely turns upon

whether Petitioner's conviction and sentence were already "final" when Blakely was

decided.

The Supreme Court has instructed that “State convictions are final ‘for purposes

of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has

been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or

a timely filed petition has been finally denied.’" Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411

(quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).

In Arizona, a guilty plea waives the right to a "direct appeal" and allows

"review" only by petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 17.1(e). This is known as a "Rule 32 of-right

proceeding." Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1. The Rule 32 of-right proceeding preserves the

state constitution's guarantee of appellate review for pleading defendants and is the

"functional equivalent" of a direct appeal. State v. Ward, 211 Ariz. 158, 163

(Ariz.App.2005); State v. Cleere, 213 Ariz. 54, *1, n. 2 (Ariz.App. 2006). A pleading

defendant's conviction is not "final" while his timely-filed Rule 32 of-right proceedings,

including review, are pending. See id.

Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on July 8, 2004, thirty (30)

days after the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief, when Petitioner’s opportunity to petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for

review had expired. See Rule 32.9(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P. (stating that defendant has 30

days after the filing of a decision to file a petition for review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals). Thus, Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was not yet final when

Blakely was decided, and Blakely applies to Petitioner’s case. 

Respondents first argue that “at the time the trial court imposed sentence in June

2003 there was no clear Supreme Court precedent that in a non-capital case a defendant

was entitled to a jury finding on any aggravated circumstances that enhanced his

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sentence within the statutory range.” (Answer, at 12.) Respondent’s reliance on what

precedent was binding as of Petitioner’s sentencing date is misguided. As noted in this

Court’s discussion above, the correct determination, under Teague and Griffith, is

whether or not Petitioner’s conviction was final at the time of the Blakely decision. It

was not. 

Second, Respondents assert that Petitioner “agreed to an aggravated range of

sentence as part of his plea agreement” and, under United States v. Garcia, 507 F.3d

1213 (9th Cir. 2007), when a sentence is within the range agreed upon, a federal district

court need not comport with the guidelines and under federal law an appellate court is

without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The decision in Garcia, however, was

amended and superseded by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855

(9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the court in the first Garcia decision was reviewing a plea

agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and

determined that the defendants sentences, well within the statutory maximums, were not

“imposed in violation of law” and therefore, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), the court was

without jurisdiction to review the sentence. Thus, even if the first Garcia decision was

good law, the facts of the specific plea agreements in that case, as well as the unique

federal statutory considerations in addition to the sentences that were imposed below

the statutory maximum, readily distinguish Garcia I from the present case. 

Respondents also argue that if Petitioner’s case were final on June 8, 2004, he

would not be entitled to the benefit of Blakely, and that there is no clear Supreme Court

precedent holding that at what point in the case of a collateral attack upon a guilty plea

the case is “final” for purposes of a retroactivity analysis. 

Under both applicable federal and state decisions, however, the state court was

unreasonable in its application of Teague and Griffith. As discussed above, the Arizona

courts treat a Rule 32 of-right petition as the “functional equivalent” of a direct appeal,

and were doing so prior to the appellate courts’ decisions denying review in this case.

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See State v. Ward, 211 Ariz. 158, 163 (Ariz.App.2005). Under Beard, supra, a state

conviction is not final for purposes of until the availability of direct appeal to the state

courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has

elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied. 

The state puts forward an additional argument that the state court’s decision was

not objectively unreasonable, asserting that at the time the PCR court made its decision,

a Ninth Circuit decision filed the same month also assumed that a pleading defendant’s

case was final when the judgment was entered, citing Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2004). This argument ignores the relevant time of

decision for purposes of habeas review, which in this case would be the Arizona

Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for review of the denial of his second

petition for post conviction relief, on July 17, 2007. Where there has been one reasoned

state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that

judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit clarified later, in Summers

v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 2007), both the petitioner in Isley, as well as the

State assumed that a Rule 32 of-right proceeding was collateral review under §

2244(d)(2), and that the Ninth Circuit had not considered the possibility that a Rule 32-

of right proceeding might be a form of direct review rather than collateral review, thus

its decision was “unconsidered dictum.” Summers was decided March 13, 2007, or four

months before the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review in this

case. It is irrelevant to Petitioner’s argument that the initial PCR court made its

decision nearly 3 years before Summers was decided. 

Finally, Respondents reassert an argument similar to that already discussed

above, that the failure of the trial court to apply Blakely did not have a “substantial and

injurious effect” on Petitioner’s sentence. Respondents argue that Petitioner “got what

he bargained for” and that the “aggravating circumstance was not the cause of his

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 Trial error is reviewable in state court under the harmless error

standard. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567. Harmless error review places

the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence. Id.

(citations omitted). 

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sentence, rather it was the range he bargained for.” This argument is simply without

merit. A judge, not a jury, found facts that made Petitioner eligible for an aggravated

sentence and, in doing so, applied a lesser standard of proof than Blakely requires. 

Federal courts apply the plain-error standard to review Sixth Amendment

violations to which defendant failed to object at sentencing. United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)(declining to reverse sentence based on Apprendi-error under

the fourth requirement of the plain error standard).

On habeas corpus review, the controlling standard of review is less stringent than

on direct review and inquires "whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or

influence,'" and whether the error resulted in "actual prejudice." Fry v. Pliler, ---U.S.---,

127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007), Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766 (1946) and United States v. Lane, 474

U.S. 438, 449 (1986), respectively).

In this case, because Petitioner did not object at the time of sentencing to the

failure to have a jury determine the aggravating factors, any Blakely violation would be

properly reviewed for fundamental error, rather than for trial error4

. State v. Henderson,

210 Ariz. at 568 (Fundamental error is "error going to the foundation of the case, error

that takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such

magnitude that the defendant could not have possibly received a fair trial."). Under the

analogous federal plain-error standard, an appellate court cannot reverse, based upon

an objection not timely raised in the lower court unless: (1) there was error, (2) the error

was "plain," (3) the error "affects substantial rights"; and (4) the error seriously affects

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the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Cotton, 535 U.S.

at 632 (citations omitted).

In this case, however, because the state courts found that Blakely did not apply

to Petitioner’s case, the courts made no finding as to prejudice. On the record before

this court, it is not clear that Petitioner could not establish prejudice, and that the error

was harmless. This is not a case where Petitioner admitted to the aggravating factors

as part of his plea agreement, or that a prior conviction was established as the basis to

impose an aggravated sentence. Therefore, the case should be remanded to the state

court for resentencing. 

IV. CONCLUSION

This Court recommends that the District Court DISMISS claims One, Three and

Four of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

This Court further recommends that the District Court GRANT Petitioner’s

request for relief as to Ground Two, and remand this case to the state court for

resentencing. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 07-1990-PHX-JAT.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 12th day of January, 2009.

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