Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_24-cv-00152/USCOURTS-ared-2_24-cv-00152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

DELTA DIVISION

GABRIEL GONZALEZ PETITIONER 

No. 2:24-cv-00152 LPR/PSH 

CHAD GARRETT, Warden 

FCI Forrest City Low RESPONDENT 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge 

Lee P. Rudofsky. You may file written objections to all or part of this 

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this 

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

DISPOSITION 

 Petitioner Gabriel Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) brings this habeas corpus action 

challenging the computation of his sentence under the First Step Act. The First Step 

Act (“FSA”), enacted on December 21, 2018, directed the Attorney General to 

Case 2:24-cv-00152-LPR Document 16 Filed 12/12/24 Page 1 of 7
develop a risk and needs assessment system (the “System”) for Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Inmates were to be classified as minimum, 

low, medium, or high risk for recidivism. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)(1). Regardless of 

their classification level, all inmates were to be reassigned to “appropriate evidencebased recidivism reduction programs (“EBRRP”) or productive activities (“PAs”)” 

to ensure that inmates at each risk level had an opportunity to reduce their 

classification while incarcerated. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)(5). The System was designed 

to provide incentives and rewards for inmates to participate in EBRRPs and PAs. 18 

U.S.C. § 3621(d). Among the rewards for participation in EBRRPs and PAs is the 

earning of time credits (“ETCs”) which can be applied toward time in prerelease 

custody or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(d)(4). Gonzalez’ claim centers 

around the following provision: 

(B) Availability. – A prisoner may not earn time credits under this 

paragraph for an evidence-based recidivism reduction program that the 

prisoner successfully completed – 

(i) prior to the date of the enactment of this subchapter; or 

(ii) during official detention prior to the date that the prisoner’s 

sentence commences under section 3585(a). 

18 U.S.C. § 3621(d)(4)(B). 

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 Gonzalez correctly observes that this section cites EBRRPs but does not 

include PAs in describing the parameters for earning ETCs. Gonzalez reasons that 

this omission should result in him receiving ETCs for activities he has engaged in 

prior to the enactment of FSA. Gonzalez, convicted in 2006, contends he is entitled 

to ETC for his participation in activities which he deems to be PAs -- “all of my 

prison jobs, all of my ACE [Adult Continuing Education], art, religious, 

correspondence school, and other classes” beginning in February 2006. Doc. No. 2-

1, page 22. He calculates that he is entitled to 7.18 years of ETC based upon his job 

assignments and activities. Doc. No. 2-1, page 56. Gonzalez’ interpretation of the 

section is incorrect, and he cannot earn ETCs for activities pre-dating the enactment 

of FSA. 

 There are instances in the FSA where the phrase “evidence-based recidivism 

reduction programs” is paired with “productive activities.”1

 On other occasions, the 

phrase “evidence-based recidivism reduction programs” stands alone.2

 In one 

section of the statute, 3621(d), the bolded title is “Evidence-based recidivism 

reduction program incentives and productive activities rewards” and the next 

sentence uses the phrase EBRRP without mention of PAs. 

1 Ten times the phrases are used in conjunction: 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)(5), (a)(6), (b), (d), 

(d)(4)(A), (d)(4)(A)(i), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)c), (d)(5), and (d)(e). 2 There are six instances where EBRRP is not accompanied by PA: 18 U.S.C. § 

3621(a)(3), (d), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4)(B).

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The Court declines Gonzalez’ invitation to make much of this language, 

deeming activities he performed prior to the enactment of the FSA to be PAs 

entitling him to ETCs. The Court need not unravel the reasons behind the variance 

in the usage of EBRRP and PA because the language of the FSA is unambiguous on 

the statute’s application to Gonzalez. 

 A primary reason for this conclusion is that the FSA clearly indicates it is 

prospective in nature. The title, “Development of risk and needs assessment system” 

signals there will be a System in place only after the Attorney General develops it. 

The statute directs the System to develop programs and then reassign inmates to 

appropriate EBRRBs or PAs – there is no suggestion that current or past activities 

are relevant to the System that is to come after enactment of the FSA. The new 

EBRRP and PA programs are, per the the FSA, distinct from “any other rewards or 

incentives for which a prisoner may be eligible.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(d)(6). There is 

no interplay between activities pre-dating the FSA and the programs arising from 

the System created by the FSA. 

 Secondly, the precise language of the statute provides ETCs may not be 

earned “prior to the date of enactment” of the FSA. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(d)(4)(B). 

Other courts have considered Gonzalez’ argument, or a variation of the argument, 

and consistently found that activities prior to December 21, 2018, do not earn ETCs. 

Poff v. Carr, 2023 WL 2240463 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (no ETCs may be earned for 

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EBRRP programs completed prior to December 21, 2018); Schlegal v. Segal, 2023 

WL 4034594 ((D. Minn. May 23, 2023) (inmate may not earn credits “for 

programming or activities in which she participated prior to December 21, 2018”); 

and Salter v. Fikes, 2021 WL 2365041 (D. Minn. May 5, 2021) (FSA precludes 

inmates from earning credits for programs completed before December 21, 2018). 

The Court agrees with the reasoning of the foregoing cases and the plain language 

of the FSA. 

 Gonzalez also argues that a BOP Program Statement interpreting provisions 

of the FSA is not entitled to deference and therefore he is eligible to earn pre-FSA 

credits. The BOP regulation, found at 28 C.F.R. § 532.42(b)(1), provides that the 

FSA credits may be earned through “programming and activities” beginning on 

December 21, 2018. Gonzalez interprets this regulation to expand the meaning of 

the FSA and argues that this expansion is improper in light of Loper Bright Enters. 

v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), and its effect on deference previously conferred 

by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

 This argument, however, assumes reliance upon the regulation. The Court 

need not, and does not, rely upon the regulation. The Loper/Chevron analysis is 

inapplicable when the statute which the regulation is interpreting is unambiguous. 

The phrase “the date of enactment of this subchapter” in § 3632(d)(4)(B)(i) plainly 

means December 21, 2018, and so the Court need not consider the BOP's 

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interpretation. See Melgar [v. Barr, 379 F. Supp. 3d 783 (D. Minn. 2019] 379 F. 

Supp. 3d at 788 (“interpret[ing statute] exactly as written” and concluding that 

“[b]ecause the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court need not consider the 

agency's interpretation under step two of the Chevron deference analysis”); Salter v. 

Fikes, No. 20-CV-2253 (ECT/ECW), 2021 WL 2365041, at *4 (D. Minn. May 5, 

2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-2253 (ECT/ECW), 2021 

WL 2354934 (D. Minn. June 9, 2021); and Hare v. Ortiz, 2021 WL 391280 (D. N.J. 

Feb. 4, 2021) (there is “no ambiguity here” regarding the meaning of the date when 

the FSA was enacted, and Chevron analysis need not occur).3

 Gonzalez mistakenly relies upon Komando v. Warden, FCI Berlin, 2023 WL 

4101540 (D. N.H. Mar. 16, 2023) and other similar cases (Yufenyuy v. Warden, FCI 

Berlin, 659 F.Supp.3d 213 (2023) and Patel v. Barron, 2023 WL 6311281 (W.D. 

Wash. Sep. 28, 2023). These cases deal with the interpretation of when an inmate’s 

“sentence commences” under the FSA. They involve inmates sentenced after the 

enactment of the FSA, unlike Gonzalez, and they pre-date the Loper decision. The 

one common feature these cases have with Gonzalez’ case is that the decisions rested 

3 The Court is aware of Griffin v. Garrett, 2023 WL 11893858 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 31, 

2023), a pre-Loper case, which rests upon the BOP’s interpretation of the relevant 

regulation in finding the inmate ineligible to receive credits for PAs completed 

prior to December 21, 2018. The Court is persuaded that the result in Griffin need 

not have relied upon the interpretation of the regulation. 

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on the plain language of the FSA and not upon the BOP’s regulation interpreting it. 

The unambiguous language of the FSA was a benefit to the inmates in Komando, 

Yufenyuy, and Patel, providing that their sentences commenced at an earlier date 

than would have been used under the BOP regulation, thus allowing them to earn 

ETCs based on that date. However, the FSA’s clear language prohibiting ETCs from 

being earned prior to the enactment of the statute works against Gonzalez. These 

cases cited by Gonzalez do not prove his point. 

 In summary, the December 21, 2018, enactment date of the FSA initiated the 

development of the System under which inmates might earn ETCs by participating 

in EBRRPs and PAs. Activities pre-dating the enactment of the FSA are not 

grandfathered into the System. Because the language of the FSA is unambiguous 

on this issue, Loper/Chevron analysis is not implicated. 

 The petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed, and the relief 

requested denied. 

 IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 12th day of December, 2024. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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