Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03952/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03952-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Defendants object to plaintiff’s reply brief and to certain portions of the

supporting declaration of plaintiff’s counsel, Andrew Coombs. The stated objections are

based on one or more of the grounds of relevance, lacking in foundation or personal

knowledge, speculation, or hearsay. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s reply brief and

Coombs’ declaration contain new facts and arguments that were not raised in the initial

moving papers. However, the court finds that the challenged statements were properly raised

in response to arguments that defendants made (apparently for the first time) in their

opposition. Moreover, the court finds that defendants had sufficient opportunity to respond

to those arguments at the motion hearing. The court appreciated what was relevant and what

was not and considered the declaration for what it was worth.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER, S.A.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AKANOC SOLUTIONS, INC., MANAGED

SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC. STEVEN CHEN

and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Defendants. /

No. C07-03952 JW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL DOCUMENTS

[Re: Docket No. 30]

Plaintiff Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. moves for an order compelling defendants to

produce documents, or alternatively, permitting plaintiff to conduct a forensic examination of a

sampling of defendants’ servers. Defendants oppose the motion. Upon consideration of the

moving and responding papers,1

 as well as the arguments presented, this court grants the

motion.

*E-FILED 7/15/2008*

Case 5:07-cv-03952-JW Document 65 Filed 07/15/08 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 Plaintiff’s requests reportedly defined “website” or “websites” as terms

“refer[ring] to all Internet content hosted by YOU at each of the Interest websites located

within uniform resource locators or domain names including but not limited to those listed in

Exhibit A attached hereto.” (Reply at 2 n.1).

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Plaintiff sues for alleged trademark and copyright infringement. It claims that

defendants are secondarily liable for infringement because they provide Internet hosting

services for a number of websites that sell counterfeit Louis Vuitton merchandise. Defendants

say that they simply provide access to the Internet by renting Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses

and Internet bandwidth to third-party resellers and other Internet hosting companies who, in

turn, host individual websites. Defendants further contend that, unless a specific complaint is

brought to their attention, they have no knowledge or control over the contents of websites

hosted on their servers.

Plaintiff moves to compel two categories of documents concerning the websites2 –

namely: (1) publicly posted Internet content evidencing offers made of counterfeit Louis

Vuitton merchandise on the websites; and (2) traffic logs that evidence the volume of

underlying counterfeit activity. Plaintiff says that these documents are called for by Request

Nos. 1, 5, 7, 12, 13, 21, 22, 24 and 25.

Defendants agreed to produce correspondence and emails sent to them concerning the

websites and any subsequent “take down” notices sent to re-sellers. However, defendants assert

that responsive documents otherwise never existed or are not in their possession, custody or

control. (See Lowe Decl., Exs. 1501 and 1502). Apparently for the first time in their

opposition brief, defendants also contend that their production of the requested information

would violate the federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.) and the Stored

Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2702).

A. Defendants’ General Objections

Preliminarily, plaintiff argues that defendants did not object to any of the specific

requests at issue. Defendants maintain that they properly objected by asserting General

Objections on several grounds, including that the information is protected by the attorney-client

Case 5:07-cv-03952-JW Document 65 Filed 07/15/08 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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privilege and the attorney work product doctrine, and that the requests are vague, ambiguous,

overbroad and unduly burdensome. (Lowe Decl., Exs. 1501 and 1502).

Grounds for objection to discovery requests must be stated with specificity as to each

request. See FED.R.CIV.P. 34(b)(2). This is particularly true with respect to claims of privilege. 

See FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(5)(A). Here, defendants merely asserted a number of boilerplate,

blanket General Objections at the outset of their responses. This practice obscures the extent to

which defendants may be withholding information in response to each request and does not

satisfy the requirement for specificity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Accordingly, this court

concludes that, except as to any objections asserted in response to specific requests, defendants

did not properly object to the requests in question.

B. Publicly Posted Internet Content and Traffic Logs

Defendants initially took the position that they do not deal directly with individual

websites and are therefore unable to produce the requested data. However, they acknowledge

that they own the servers on which the requested information resides; and, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 34 requires a party to produce not only documents in its control, but also those in its

possession or custody. FED.R.CIV.P. 34(a)(1).

Nonetheless, defendants now contend that, even if they could be said to possess the

requested information, they are prohibited from disclosing it to plaintiff by the federal Wiretap

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702.

Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986 to protect

the privacy of electronic communications. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868,

874 (9th Cir. 2002). “Title I of the ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act, which previously

addressed only wire and oral communications, to ‘address[] the interception of . . . electronic

communications.’” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986)). “Title II of the ECPA created

the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which was designed to ‘address[] access to stored wire

and electronic communications and transactional records.” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at

3 (1986)).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Louis Vuitton’s requested production is not prohibited by the federal Wiretap Act. “The

Wiretap Act makes it an offense to ‘intentionally intercept [] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic

communication.’” Konop, 302 F.3d at 876 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)). The Ninth Circuit

has held that, in order for information to be “intercepted” within the meaning of the Wiretap

Act, “it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.” Id. at 878. 

Here, plaintiff says that it is not seeking information during transmission and agrees to exclude

any such communications from its requests.

Defendants nonetheless maintain that the requested production will cause them to

violate the SCA. “Generally, the SCA prevents ‘providers’ of communication services from

divulging private communications to certain entities and/or individuals.” Quon v. Arch

Wireless Operating Co., __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 2440559 at *5 (9th Cir., June 18, 2008). 

Defendants say that they are prohibited from producing the requested information by SCA

Section 2702(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person or entity providing an “electronic

communication service” to the public to “knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents

of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). 

Defendants have provided few details about how their business operates or the nature of their

relationship with their customers; and, the little information that has been is very generalized.

However, the cases cited by defendants concern the disclosure of the contents of email

messages, personal text messages, private messages posted for a limited number of subscribers

on a secure website, and the like. Here, by contrast, plaintiff seeks information – publicly

posted content evidencing offers of counterfeit Louis Vuitton merchandise – that was broadcast

on publicly accessible websites to the public at large. “The legislative history and the statutory

structure [of the ECPA] clearly show that Congress did not intend to criminalize or create civil

liability for acts of individuals who ‘intercept’ or ‘access’ communications that are otherwise

readily accessible by the general public.” Snow v. Directv, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (11th

Cir. 2006). Nor is there anything in the record presented to indicate that the requested server

logs, which reflect the volume of traffic to the allegedly infringing websites, contain the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3 Defendants say that they give password control to their customers. 

Nevertheless, at the motion hearing, defendants also confirmed that their servers rotate in and

out of use, that defendants initially assign passwords to their clients, and that defendants also

re-set passwords when servers have been “returned” or “abandoned.”

4 Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr. Coombs’ supplemental declaration was not

submitted in compliance with the court’s Civil Local Rules. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(d). 

Nevertheless, the key issues in dispute were only raised by defendants for the first time in

their opposition brief; and, given the nature of the parties’ dispute, this court found that

resolution of the instant dispute was aided by more information, not less. Moreover, at the

motion hearing, each side had ample opportunity to address all issues raised in the papers. 

Accordingly, this court has exercised its discretion and considered the belated declaration. 

However, plaintiff is admonished to comply with the court’s rules on all future filings.

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contents of any communications. Even if they did, plaintiff indicates that it is willing to accept

a redacted production that excludes such communications.

Although defendants assert that they have no ability to access the content on their own

servers, they acknowledged at oral argument that such access is technologically feasible.3

 It

was further suggested at the hearing that defendants control the router that directs traffic to the

assigned IP addresses – an assertion which defendants did not deny. And, the record presented

suggests that they have the ability to conduct searches of some kind. (See Coombs Suppl.

Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Exs. A and B).4

Defendants argue that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome because they claim

that the requests, as drafted, call for information from potentially thousands of websites. (Opp.

at p. 2, n.2). However, plaintiff indicates that it is willing to limit the discovery to 67 websites

that it has identified as selling allegedly counterfeit Louis Vuitton merchandise. (See Reply,

Ex. B). As such, this court finds that the discovery is reasonably tailored and that any burden

that may be imposed is not undue.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT plaintiff’s motion to compel is

GRANTED as follows:

No later than July 31, 2008, defendants shall either (1) produce all responsive publicly

posted Internet content evidencing offers made of counterfeit Louis Vuitton merchandise and

traffic logs evidencing the volume of underlying counterfeit activity, or (2) permit inspection of

their servers to allow plaintiff an opportunity to ascertain the same. The discovery shall be

limited to the 67 allegedly infringing websites identified by plaintiff. In the event an inspection

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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is held, it shall be conducted pursuant to an appropriate protocol. The court trusts that the

parties should be able to agree upon a suitable protocol between themselves. However, if they

are not, each side shall submit its proposed protocol for this court’s consideration and the court

shall decide upon the protocol to be followed.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

July 15, 2008

Case 5:07-cv-03952-JW Document 65 Filed 07/15/08 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:07-cv-3952 Notice has been electronically mailed to: 

J. Andrew Coombs andy@coombspc.com, jeremy@coombspc.com 

James A. Lowe info@gauntlettlaw.com, arm@gauntlettlaw.com, bse@gauntlettlaw.com,

jal@gauntlettlaw.com, pam@gauntlettlaw.com 

Annie S Wang annie@coombspc.com, andy@coombspc.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Case 5:07-cv-03952-JW Document 65 Filed 07/15/08 Page 7 of 7