Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01875/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01875-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Derrick Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Robert Brady, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01875-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Although this case is currently on appeal, the Court of Appeals referred this matter 

to the Court for the limited purpose of determining whether Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis 

(“IFP”) status should continue for the appeal, or whether the appeal is frivolous or taken 

in bad faith. Doc. 95. For the following reasons, the Court will revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status for the appeal. 

 On January 28, 2015, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims against 

Defendants Rogers, Puchek, Brady, Newton, and the Town of Quartzsite for failure to 

comply with the state’s notice of claim statute. Doc. 37 at 4-5. The Court dismissed 

claims against Defendant Vederman based on absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s failure to 

allege facts to support claims for actions that are not protected by immunity. Id. at 5-6. 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Defendants La Paz County, 

La Paz County Board of Supervisors, and the Town of Quartzsite for failure to state the 

legal theory under which the municipal defendants could be held liable, and for failure to 

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allege sufficient facts. Id. at 6-7. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims against 

Defendants La Paz County and La Paz County Board of Supervisors based on the actions 

of its employees because neither of the two agents was responsible for the alleged torts. 

Id. at 8-10. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 1983 unreasonable search and seizure 

claim against Defendants Brady and Newton because Plaintiff’s allegations do not show 

that the officers acted without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 10-11. The Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Defendants Rogers, Puchek, 

Brady, and Newton based on prosecutorial immunity (Rogers), for lack of state action 

(Puchek), and for failure to state any allegations related to the prosecution beyond the 

initial decision to arrest (Brady and Newton). Id. at 11-14. Finally, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against all Defendants for failure to allege any facts that 

would support a “class of one” claim. Id. at 14. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to 

amend his federal and state law claims against Defendants La Paz County, La Paz County 

Board of Supervisors, the Town of Quartzsite, Brady, and Newton, and leave to amend 

his state law claims against Defendant Puchek. Id. at 14-16. Plaintiff’s only claim that 

survived was his section 1983 unreasonable arrest claim against Defendants Brady and 

Newton. Id. at 14. 

 On June 17, 2015, the Court again dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims except his 

section 1983 false arrest claim and his civil conspiracy claim against Defendants Brady 

and Newton. Doc. 65 at 5-6. This time, however, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s other 

claims with prejudice because he “re-pled claims the Court dismissed with prejudice” and 

“failed to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court’s earlier order.” Id. at 9. The 

Court warned Plaintiff that a failure to prosecute the case would result in dismissal under 

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 

On November 20, 2015, Defendants Brady and Newton filed a motion for 

summary judgment. See Doc. 78. Plaintiff never responded. On February 16, 2016, the 

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and for failure 

to comply with the Court’s previous orders. Doc. 89 at 2-3. The Court, however, 

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dismissed the action without prejudice. Id. at 3. The Clerk entered a judgment of 

dismissal that same day. See Doc. 90. On March 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a notice of 

appeal. Doc. 91. 

 A district court may deny a party IFP status if all claims on appeal are frivolous. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 674-75 (1958). As 

discussed in the Court’s previous orders, the majority of Plaintiff’s claims were wholly 

without merit. See Docs. 37; 65; 89. Appeal pertaining to any of these claims would be 

frivolous or taken in bad faith. After two rounds of motion practice, Plaintiff was left 

with only two non-frivolous claims – his false arrest claim and civil conspiracy claims 

against Defendants Brady and Newton. Ordinarily this would be sufficient to permit 

Plaintiff to proceed with IFP status on appeal, but Plaintiff failed to prosecute his action 

in direct violation of the Court’s June 17, 2015 order. Plaintiff also failed to respond to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, even after being ordered to do so. Doc. 89. 

As a result, the Court dismissed the claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); 

Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(citations omitted) (recognizing that courts may sua sponte dismiss actions under Rule 

41(b) for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with the court’s orders). The Court 

specifically considered the five factors required by the Ninth Circuit before making the 

dismissal decision. Doc. 89 at 3 (citing Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 

1995)). 

 Because the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice because of his 

repeated failures to follow the rules and comply with Court orders, and his refusal to 

respond to the motion for summary judgment even after being ordered to do so, the Court 

concludes that any appeal of the dismissal would be frivolous. 

 

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 IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s IFP status is revoked for this appeal. 

 2. The Clerk shall transmit this order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

 Dated this 25th day of March, 2016. 

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