Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01767/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01767-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AutoZone, Inc.,

Defendant.

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No. CV-06-1767-PCT-PGR 

 

ORDER ON REMAINING MOTIONS

IN LIMINE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff/Intervenor Farr’s Motion in Limine to

Preclude Reference to Settlement Negotiations (doc. #131), wherein he requests

that any references to AutoZone’s offers of reinstatement be precluded pursuant

to Fed.R.Evid. 408 on the ground that they constituted settlement offers, and the

related Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 8 to Limit Damages (doc. #140),

wherein it requests, pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 102

S.Ct. 3057 (1982), that any award of back-pay and front-pay to Farr be cut-off as

of December 21, 2004, which it contends is when it made its first of three

unconditional offers to reinstate Farr with his guide dog. Having considered the

parties’ memoranda in light of the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds that

both motions should be denied as the complete resolution of both involves the

Case 3:06-cv-01767-PGR Document 163 Filed 12/17/08 Page 1 of 8
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determination of material issues of fact that fall within the province of the jury.

While Fed.R.Evid. 408(a) generally bars the admission of statements and

conduct made “in the course of compromise negotiations[,]” an employer’s

unconditional offer of reinstatement in a discrimination case is admissible and

does not fall within the scope of Rule 408. See id. at 227, 102 S.Ct. at 3063

(Supreme Court held that, absent special circumstances, when an employer

makes an unconditional offer to an employee terminated as a result of

discrimination to reinstate that employee to a substantially equivalent job, the

employee’s rejection of that offer forecloses any claim for future front pay and

tolls the continuing accrual of back-pay liability under Title VII as of the date of the

employee’s rejection.); Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 909 (2nd

Cir.1997).

The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that either of the letters that

AutoZone sent in December of 2004 constituted offers of settlement because

they were sent in response to the EEOC’s requests for information and only

incidently dealt with the issue of Farr’s possible reinstatement. The Court also

cannot conclude as a matter of law that the December, 2004 letters constituted

unconditional offers of reinstatement for purposes of the Ford Motor Co. case due

to their vagueness and due to the fact that they were not sent to Farr, but rather

to Bentley Brunson, the EEOC investigator assigned to Farr’s case. See e.g.,

Bahadirli v. Domino’s Pizza, 873 F.Supp. 1528, 1536 (M.D.Ala.1995) (Court

concluded that a reinstatement offer was insufficient for Ford Motor Co. purposes

in part because the offer was made to the EEOC and not to the plaintiff employee

and there was no evidence that the offer was ever passed on to the plaintiff.)

While AutoZone’s letter of March 27, 2007, which was sent to Farr’s

Case 3:06-cv-01767-PGR Document 163 Filed 12/17/08 Page 2 of 8
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attorney, is facially an offer of settlement for purposes of Rule 408, the

admissibility of the letter cannot be resolved at this time because the record has

not been sufficiently developed to permit a determination as to whether the letter

falls within the exception created by the Ford Motor Co. case. At the very least,

there is the unresolved issue of whether Farr’s rejection of the reinstatement offer

was or was not objectively reasonable. See e.g., Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d

1456, 1463 and 1465 (8th Cir.1994) (Court concluded that a reinstatement offer

that was reasonably rejected by the employee does not terminate the accrual of

damages, and that the reasonableness of the rejection is a question of fact for the

jury to resolve.)

Also pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1: To

Preclude Information Obtained Through Ex Parte Communications with

Supervisors (doc. #133). Having considered the parties’ memoranda in light of

the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds that the motion should be denied.

AutoZone seeks an order precluding the plaintiffs from presenting any

evidence based on information that EEOC investigator Jeremy Yubeta obtained

through ex parte communications with former AutoZone managerial employees

Steve Agredano and Scott Anderson, who Yubeta interviewed on July 14, 2005

and May 27, 2005, respectively, without AutoZone’s knowledge or permission. 

AutoZone’s motion is premised on the Arizona Supreme Court’s Ethical Rule 4.2,

which provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate

about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be

represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of

the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so[,]” and on Lang v. Superior

Court, 826 P.2d 1228, 1234-35 (Ariz.App.1992), which permits a lawyer to have

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1

 Although the Court is not now deciding the issue, the Court notes that

there is at least some authority supporting the plaintiffs’ contention that the EEOC

did not violate Rule 4.2 in having its investigator conduct ex parte interviews with

Agredano and Anderson. See e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n

v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 6 F.Supp.2d 784, 788 (N.D.Ill.1998)

(Court noted, without deciding the issue, that “there is authority for the proposition

that the EEOC’s investigation of a charge of discrimination falls within the

exception to the no-contact rule where contact is permitted if ‘otherwise

authorized by law.’”); United States v. Teeven, 1990 WL 599373, at *4 (D.Del.

Sept. 28, 1990) (Court concluded in a False Claims Act case that the

Government did not violate Rule 4.2 by conducting ex parte interviews with the

defendant’s employees as part of its investigation prior to the formal institution of

a civil proceeding against the defendant.); ABA Committee on Ethics and

Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1496 (1983) (ABA found that Rule 4.2

does not require an investigator employed by a government agency to contact a

company’s lawyer before commencing his investigation where the government

agency is statutorily authorized to conduct such an investigation.) 

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“ex parte contact with a former employee of an opposing party who is

represented by counsel without violating ER 4.2 unless the acts or omissions of

the former employee gave rise to the underlying litigation or the former employee

has an ongoing relationship with the former employer in connection with the

litigation.”

Rule 4.2 specifically makes an exception for ex parte contacts which are

“authorized by law.” While the Court concludes that Rule 4.2 is generally

applicable to the EEOC, the specific legal issue underlying AutoZone’s motion is

whether Rule 4.2 is applicable to ex parte contacts by an EEOC investigator

during a pre-litigation, administrative investigation, which is when the ex parte

contacts at issue took place. AutoZone has not, however, cited to, or discussed,

any case law deciding that specific issue in its favor, and has thus not met its

burden of persuading the Court that its motion should be granted.1

 

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In any case, it is not clear to the Court at this time why precluding the

admission of the statements of Agredano and Anderson resulting from the ex

parte contacts by the EEOC’s investigator would change anything in this case as

both Agredano and Anderson were subsequently deposed and their deposition

testimony is admissible in evidence.

Also pending is Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2: Preclude Chad Farr

From Having Guide Dog at Trial (doc. #134). Having considered the parties’

memoranda in light of the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds that the

motion should be denied. To the extent that AutoZone believes that Farr’s

dependence on his guide dog is exaggerated, that is an issue it can present to

the jury through evidence and argument. The Court will permit the guide dog to

remain in the courtroom during the trial so long as its presence does not disrupt

the proceedings.

Also pending is Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 to Preclude Evidence

or Testimony Regarding Worsening of Eyesight (doc. #135). Having considered

the parties’ memoranda in light of the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds

that the motion should be denied. While AutoZone broadly requests pursuant to

Fed.R.Evid. 403 that no witness be allowed to testify that Farr’s eyesight is

getting progressively worse based on its contention that any such testimony

would contradict the medical evidence, the gist of the motion is directed at Farr’s

own testimony. AutoZone’s position is unpersuasive because courts have

routinely held, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 701, that lay individuals are capable of

reliably understanding and testifying about their own medical condition. The

issue of whether Farr’s perception of the status of his eyesight is contradicted by

the medical evidence is an issue for the jury to resolve.

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Also pending is Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 6 to Preclude

Photographs (doc. #138). Having considered the parties’ memoranda in light of

the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds that the motion should be granted. 

Since the plaintiffs have not opposed AutoZone’s contention that photographs of

Farr’s family are irrelevant and prejudicial, no such photographs will be admitted

into evidence. Furthermore, since the plaintiffs have opposed AutoZone’s

contention that photographs of Farr’s guide dog are irrelevant and prejudicial only

to the extent that the Court’s bars the guide dog from the courtroom during trial,

there is no remaining issue regarding the admissibility of these photographs since

the Court is permitting the guide dog to remain in the courtroom. The Court will

therefore not permit the proffered photographs of the guide dog to be admitted

into evidence.

Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of

Defense Expert Ginger McRae (doc. #141). Having considered the parties’

memoranda in light of the oral argument of counsel, the Court finds that the

motion should be denied.

While the plaintiffs argue that AutoZone’s expert, Ginger McRae, is not

qualified to be an expert in this case, the Court disagrees. McRae’s 24-year

career in labor and employment law renders her qualified for purposes of

Fed.R.Evid. 702. While she has no specific expertise in the use of guide dogs as

an accommodation in an ADA case, that does not preclude her from being

qualified to opine as to the reasonableness of AutoZone’s response to Farr’s

accommodation request under acceptable human resources practices. The

weight to be given to McRae’s testimony regarding the use of a guide dog as an

ADA accommodation is for the jury to decide.

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2

 While the Court shares the plaintiffs’ concerns regarding the relevance of

McRae’s expected testimony regarding the reasonableness of AutoZone’s

requests to Farr for his medical records and his guide dog’s certification as there

does not at this time appear to be any dispute among the parties that AutoZone

was entitled to seek that information and was provided with the requested

information, such relevance issues will be resolved at trial.

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While the plaintiffs also argue that McRae’s proffered testimony is

inadmissible because it would not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or

in determining the facts, the Court concludes that at least some of her testimony

would be admissible. To the extent that the plaintiffs raise specific objections at

trial to McRae’s testimony, the Court will resolve those objections at that time.2

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff/Intervenor Farr’s Motion in Limine to

Preclude Reference to Settlement Negotiations (doc. #131) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine No.1: To

Preclude Information Obtained Through Ex Parte Communications with

Supervisors (doc. #133) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2:

Preclude Chad Farr from Having Guide Dog at Trial (doc. #134) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 to

Preclude Evidence or Testimony Regarding Worsening of Eyesight (doc. #135) is

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 6 to

Preclude Photographs (doc. #138) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 8 to

Limit Damages (doc. #140) is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of

Defense Expert Ginger McRae (doc. #141) is denied.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2008.

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