Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01355/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01355-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ARIZONA CONTRACTORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; ARIZONA

EMPLOYERS FOR IMMIGRATION

REFORM, INC., an Arizona non-profit

corporation; CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, a Washington

D.C. non-profit corporation; ARIZONA

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, an

Arizona non-profit corporation;

ARIZONA HISPANIC CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE, INC., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; ARIZONA FARM

BUREAU FEDERATION, an Arizona

non-profit corporation; ARIZONA

RESTAURANT AND HOSPITALITY

ASSOCIATION, an Arizona non-profit

corporation; ASSOCIATED MINORITY

CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, an

Arizona non-profit limited liability

company; ARIZONA ROOFING

CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, an

Arizona non-profit corporation;

NATIONAL ROOFING

CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION, an

Illinois not-for-profit corporation;

WAKE UP ARIZONA! INC., an

Arizona non-profit corporation; and

ARIZONA LANDSCAPE

CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., an Arizona non-profit corporation, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

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No. CV07-1355-PHX-NVW (lead)

No. CV07-1684-PHX-NVW (member)

ORDER

Case 2:07-cv-01355-NVW Document 106 Filed 12/21/07 Page 1 of 29
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 JANET NAPOLITANO, Governor of

the State of Arizona; TERRY

GODDARD, Attorney General of the

State of Arizona, 

Defendants. 

CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC.;

and SOMOS AMERICA, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official

capacity as Governor of the State of

Arizona; TERRY GODDARD, in his

official capacity as Attorney General of

the State of Arizona; and GALE

GARRIOTT, in his official capacity as

the Director of the Arizona Department

of Revenue, 

Defendants. 

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I. Nature of the Motion and Related Proceedings

Plaintiffs have appealed the December 7, 2007 judgment dismissing this action

without prejudice for lack of a justiciable case or controversy against these Defendants. 

They now seek an injunction preventing the Defendants from implementing or enforcing

the Legal Arizona Workers Act, A.R.S. §§ 23-211 through 214 (the Act), for the duration

of the appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). (Doc. ## 91 and 94.) The court’s corrected Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Doc. # 87) and Judgment thereon (Doc. # 85)

principally concluded: (1) that Plaintiffs lack standing based on imminent threat of

enforcement, as they proved no threat by anyone, including the Defendants; (2) that

Plaintiffs proved cost-of-compliance injury from forced participation in E-Verify

sufficient for standing if they sued a proper defendant; and (3) that redress would not be

effective against the Defendants Governor, Attorney General, and Director of the

Department of Revenue because the Act does not give them the enforcement power that

coerces participation in E-Verify.

Case 2:07-cv-01355-NVW Document 106 Filed 12/21/07 Page 2 of 29
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Both groups of Plaintiffs have filed new actions on December 10 and 12, 2007,

adding one or all of the county attorneys as defendants and seeking interim injunctive

relief identical to what is sought here as an injunction pending appeal. Those actions are

now consolidated under Arizona Contractors Association, Inc. v. Candelaria, No. CV 07-

2496 PHX-NVW (“Arizona Contractors II”). On December 18, 2007, the court held a

case management conference and set a hearing for January 16, 2008, on the motions for

preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiffs’ motions for temporary restraining order in Arizona Contractors II were

heard on December 18, 2007. The county attorney Defendants acknowledged that it

would take them weeks or months to investigate complaints and prepare to initiate any

proceedings under the Act. They avowed that, though they will carry out their duties

without intentionally delaying, they could and would bring no proceedings before

February. If, because of extraordinary or unforeseeable events, they were able and

thought it necessary to bring proceedings before then, they would advise the court and

Plaintiffs in time for them to seek a temporary restraining order. Thus, the immediate

relief against enforcement sought in these motions and by the motions for temporary

restraining order in Arizona Contractors II is now unnecessary and could not become

necessary until February at the earliest. By that time the court will have heard and ruled

on the motions for preliminary injunction in Arizona Contractors II.

Despite that withdrawal of any need for interim injunctive relief against the

enforcing officers before February, Plaintiffs continue to seek an immediate injunction

against compliance with E-Verify. They no longer seek an order against anyone who will

do anything to them during the term of the injunction. Rather, they effectively seek a

declaratory judgment to commence and run for a limited time period, but with permanent

effect thereafter, absolving them from any liability for not using E-Verify. The relief

sought in these motions for injunction pending appeal and in the motions for temporary

restraining order in Arizona Contractors II has been transformed.

By separate order this day, the motions for temporary restraining order in Arizona

Case 2:07-cv-01355-NVW Document 106 Filed 12/21/07 Page 3 of 29
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Contractors II are denied for the following reasons: (1) there is insufficient likelihood

that Plaintiffs will succeed on issues that demand remedies in the short term; (2) it may be

improper to issue a temporary restraining order that is really a declaratory judgment; (3)

the balance of hardships tips against Plaintiffs rather than for them; and (4) there will be

full opportunity at the January 16, 2008 preliminary injunction hearing to address issues

that may occasion interim relief thereafter.

II. Standards for Injunction Pending an Appeal

An injunction pending appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) is an

extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly. Reading & Bates Petroleum Co.

v. Musslewhite, 14 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Stays pending appeal constitute

extraordinary relief.”); United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 729 (E.D. Tex. 1981)

(“Since such an action interrupts the ordinary process of judicial review and postpones

relief for the prevailing party at trial, the stay of an equitable order is an extraordinary

device which should be sparingly granted.”). 

Four factors must be considered on Rule 62(c) motions: “(1) whether the stay

applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)

whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where

the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); NRDC v. Winter,

502 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the importance of the public interest factor)

(citations omitted). See also Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

472 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he moving party [must] demonstrate ‘either a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or

that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.’”). 

“The requirement of a ‘strong showing’ of likelihood of success on the merits is

more stringent than the ‘reasonable probability’ standard that is applicable to an

application for a preliminary injunction.” Davis v. Meyers, 101 F.R.D. 67, 69 (D. Nev.

1984) (citing Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 1970)). It is sometimes said

Case 2:07-cv-01355-NVW Document 106 Filed 12/21/07 Page 4 of 29
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that the “success on the merits factor cannot be rigidly applied,” and that “district courts

properly ‘stay their own orders when they have ruled on an admittedly difficult legal

question.’” Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Cackette, No. Civ. S-06-2791, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 76933 at *6, 2007 WL 2914961 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007) (citations

omitted). “However, the Hilton test is only to be reformulated in this manner when the

movant has made a strong showing as to the other three Hilton factors.” Digital

Commc’ns. Network, Inc. v. AB Cellular Holding LLC, Case No. 99-5418, 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 15107 at *18, 1999 WL 1044234 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1999) (“Because

Plaintiffs have not made a strong showing as to the other three Hilton factors, the Court

declines to give the Plaintiffs a ‘break’ on the question of strong likelihood of success on

the merits.”) (citations omitted). 

“In a case in which ‘the moving party seeks to stay governmental action taken in

the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,’ the injunction should be

granted only if the moving party meets the more rigorous likelihood-of-success standard.” 

Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Plaza Health Labs., Inc.

v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1989)); Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir.

2000). The movant also must make a “strong showing” of likelihood of success where

the irreparable injury it claims is merely prospective monetary damages. “Traditionally,

the irreparable injury contemplated by Rule 62(c) is that which will make the appeal

moot. Thus, prospective monetary damage is not irreparable injury.” Stop H-3 Ass’n v.

Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Haw. 1972) rev’d on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th

Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).

In this case, an injunction pending appeal is not needed to protect the jurisdiction

of the appellate courts from mootness or other threat. Appellate jurisdiction of this case is

secure whether or not the Act is enjoined in the meantime. Rather, the injunction

deprives the Act’s beneficiaries of its substantive protection for the extended period of an

appeal and causes other harms, despite the court’s probable lack of jurisdiction to give

that substantive relief. This suggests that a strong likelihood of success on the merits

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ought to be necessary to issue an injunction pending appeal that grants substantive relief. 

Another circumstance of this case also suggests that more be demanded for an

injunction pending appeal. Plaintiffs’ new suit Arizona Contractors II is identical, except

that it is against proper defendants and has subject matter jurisdiction, and is pending and

ready for a preliminary injunction ruling in January. 

III. Plaintiffs Have Little Hardship from Participating in E-Verify, and the

Balance of Hardships is Strongly Against an Injunction Pending Appeal

A. Plaintiffs’ Hardship is Minimal

Plaintiffs offer mostly sweeping generalities for the hardship they must show to

warrant an injunction pending appeal or a temporary restraining order before the January

16, 2008 preliminary injunction hearing in Arizona Contractors II. The hardship comes

down to nothing more concrete than the expense of using E-Verify. Counsel admitted at

trial that no Plaintiff lacks a computer or internet access. The only cost is employee time

in learning the program, submitting the names of new hires after January 1, 2008, and

assisting new employees who wish to communicate with the federal government to

resolve out-of-date government records. That would be a few hundred to a few thousand

dollars a year for the large majority of employers. (Doc. # 87 at 8, 11.)

If Plaintiffs bear this hardship of complying with the Act, there will be no other

hardship because the Act itself effectively assures that compliance with E-Verify will

avoid virtually all license sanction proceedings and defeat any that are brought. (Doc. #

87 at 9, 18–19.) If lawful workers with tentative nonconfirmations show the basis, the EVerify process itself assures that their government records will be updated and their

employers will not be charged with violating the Act. 

The hardship of using E-Verify is an increment to the already pervasive regulation

of labor and employment in our society. The cost of it meets the minimum for standing,

but no Plaintiff showed at trial that the actual cost will be material in the context of its

business operations. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Ariz. 1990) rev’d

on other grounds, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While Yniguez has established a

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sufficient threat of enforcement to provide an actual controversy for purposes of Article

III and the Declaratory Judgment Act, she has not established an enforcement threat

sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.”); Lawson v. Hill, 368 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir.

2004) (“Even if we are wrong to suppose the risk of prosecution too remote to confer

standing to sue . . . the district judge was right not to enter an injunction . . . . [A]n

injunction is an extraordinary remedy.”). Moreover, complying with E-Verify,

unwelcome though it may be for other reasons, will have off-setting business benefits for

Plaintiffs. If historical statistics hold true, 92% of them will find it easier than the I-9

process alone. An overwhelming majority will find it an effective and reliable tool for

employment verification. All of them will rate the program “Excellent,” “Very Good,” or

“Good.” (Doc. # 87 at 8.) The one thing it will not do is allow them to keep hiring nearly

as many unknown unauthorized aliens, but that is not a “hardship” that could count under

the law. 

The hardship that could count from complying with the Act while the court of

appeals considers this case, which is having to participate in E-Verify, is insignificant in

practical terms for all but the fewest of businesses. No Plaintiff presented evidence at

trial, or credible evidence since trial, that the cost of E-Verify compliance for it or any of

its members will be significant.

Moreover, since no county attorney could bring an enforcement proceeding before

completion of preliminary injunction proceedings in Arizona Contractors II, the

justification for emergency injunctive relief or a restraining order — to stop someone

from doing something harmful — is absent. Plaintiffs now reach beyond asking for

protection from imminent government action and instead are demanding a binding

adjudication that absolves them from the legal effect of the Act. Plaintiffs offer no

authority for this kind of declaratory judgment relief at the commencement of a case, or

upon the appeal of a case where jurisdiction was lacking, when no overt acts of harm are

threatened by any Defendant.

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B. An Injunction Will Gravely Injure the Interests of the State, the

Interests of Others, and the Public Interest

Plaintiffs’ motions wholly fail to acknowledge the harm to the interests of the

State, the interests of others, and the public interest from an injunction pending appeal or

temporary restraining order. Those ignored harms can be listed in somewhat ascending

order as follows.

1. The State’s expenditure to inform every employer by October 1, 2007, of

the Act and of the obligation to comply with E-Verify after December 31, 2007, would be

wasted. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 279, § 3. (Joint Statement of Facts, Doc. # 72

(“Facts”) Ex. 6.) Giving individuals actual notice of the law, when it begins, and how to

avoid risk by complying with E-Verify, was critical to the legislature’s purpose of

achieving effective deterrence with the fewest number of employers suffering actual

sanctions. If the effective date of the Act is delayed by court order, that legislative

purpose of fairness by giving individual notices would be defeated unless a new notice is

sent when the Act is allowed to go into effect. This suggests that such delay must be

denied or that Plaintiffs must post a bond to cover the cost of a new notice under Rule

62(c) in the appeal or Rule 65(c) in Arizona Contractors II. 

At the December 18, 2007 hearing, the Executive Branch of the State of Arizona

spoke in two voices. Counsel for the Attorney General took the position that no second

notice would be necessary after an injunction is lifted because the Act does not speak to it

and no money is appropriated to pay for it. Counsel for the Governor took the position

that a second notice would be necessary to repair the harm of an injunction. The court

concludes that the Governor has the better understanding of the Act and of the

consequences of an interim injunction. This either weighs against an interim injunction

or weighs in favor of requiring a bond from Plaintiffs to cover the cost of a second notice.

2. Confusion would arise among employers, with the prospect of serious

prejudice to some. Of approximately 150,000 employers in Arizona, the large majority

apparently have not yet enrolled in E-Verify. An injunction easily could cause many to

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think they are excused from the Act and from E-Verify compliance, perhaps permanently,

even though this is not a class action and an injunction would protect only the Plaintiffs. 

If Plaintiffs’ case fails in the end, many employers could in good faith find themselves

exposed to the Act’s harsh sanctions because they did not know when to comply. The

risk of catastrophic loss to other employers from a confusion-causing injunction

outweighs the minimal cost to Plaintiffs from compliance.

The harm of confusion would be multiplied by the legal uncertainty about whether

an injunction that restrains an officer’s conduct would grant anyone any long-term

protection. It is only certain that an injunction would prevent the commencement or

maintenance of enforcement proceedings until the injunction is lifted. If the injunction

were lifted, the county attorneys would not be barred from bringing future proceedings

for violations that occurred during the term of the temporary injunction, and it is unsettled

whether the interim injunction would be a defense to the later enforcement actions. 

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982) (noting that the issue is unresolved);

Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. Thomas, 881 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1989) (whether the

interim injunction is a defense would have to be decided in the later enforcement action

itself). These are risks with grave consequences to the public, even if Plaintiffs are

willing to take them.

3. People disagree whether the great number and continuing flow of

unauthorized workers into the United States has more benefits than costs. But no one can

disagree that the costs and benefits accrue differently to different people in our society. It

is the responsibility of our elected representatives in Congress and in our legislatures to

strike the balance among those competing social and economic interests. It is the

responsibility of the courts to implement the balance as it has been struck, until it is struck

differently. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996).

The balance now struck is in favor of an economy for those who may work in the

United States. See Incalza v. Fendi N. Am., Inc., 479 F.3d. 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting H.R. Rep. 99-682(I), at 46, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5650) (“In

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passing IRCA, Congress wished to stop payments of wages to unauthorized workers,

which act as a ‘magnet . . . attract[ing] aliens here illegally,’ and to prevent those workers

from taking jobs that would otherwise go to citizens.”). The benefits in fact to those who

come to this country against the law to make better lives for themselves, to those who

save from lower cost labor and general depression of wages from employing unauthorized

aliens, and to those who enjoy the products of unauthorized labor at lower prices, do not

count. The beneficiaries chosen identically by federal and Arizona law prevail over all

who benefit from unauthorized alien labor.

Suspension of the Act, whether for a month or for the years it could take to

conclude an appeal, would defeat the public interest as chosen by the Legislature and as

permitted by Congress. If there is room for debate about the means Congress has

permitted to states, there is none about whether Congress and the Legislature have

vindicated the same substantive policies. 

4. Those who suffer the most from unauthorized alien labor are those whom

federal and Arizona law most explicitly protect. They are the competing lawful workers,

many unskilled, low-wage, sometimes near or under the margin of poverty, who strain in

individual competition and in a wage economy depressed by the great and expanding

number of people who will work for less. (Facts Ex. 22I at 1.) (“[T]he U.S. Commission

on Immigration Reform reported . . . [that] illegal immigration, can have adverse

consequences by helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal

costs for state and local governments.”). See also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,

357–58 (1976) (“Employment of illegal aliens in times of high unemployment deprives

citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on

substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales

and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal

aliens under such conditions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.”); Incalza,

479 F.3d at 1011. 

If the Act is suspended, whether for a month or for years, the human cost for the

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least among us, measured by each person’s continued deprivation, multiplied by their

number, will be a great quantum. Even if the injunction is lifted later, their loss will

never be paid back. Against all this, Plaintiffs suffer only the expense of having their

computer staff log some more hours, with off-setting business benefits as well, and

helping authorized workers clear up their records. This is not a sharp tipping of the

balance of hardships in favor of Plaintiffs. The balance does not even tip in their

direction.

C. Pendency of a Jurisdictionally Sound Fresh Action Against Proper

Parties, Ready for a Preliminary Injunction Ruling in January, Weighs

Against an Appeal Injunction in the Weeks Before Then

Plaintiffs’ inexplicable failure to join one or more county attorneys as defendants

when warned about it in September weighs heavily against a jurisdictionally infirm merits

injunction in this appeal. Plaintiffs could have joined them with trivial expense and no

delay. They took a profitless gamble in ignoring the need for a county attorney

defendant, and their urgency is of their own making. Plaintiffs’ newly filed action,

Arizona Contractors II, seeks identical relief against the proper defendants and will result

in an appealable preliminary injunction ruling as soon as January. That tips the balance

of hardships more strongly against them on their requests for interim injunctive relief.

IV. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A. Jurisdictional and Justiciability Issues

The court sees little prospect of success on appeal on any of Plaintiffs’ alleged

justiciable injuries except the one injury the court found sufficient. That ground is that

the operation of the Act coerces Plaintiffs to endure economic injury from use of EVerify. (Doc. # 87 at 18–21.) That issue has some novel aspects (id. at 18, 20) and is

based on fears grounded in credible but not certain interpretations of the Act and of

federal law. It is subject to fair debate. Plaintiffs could lose ground if the court of

appeals has a different understanding of that issue.

The court resolved only one debatable question of justiciability against Plaintiffs. 

It held that it could provide no redress against the Attorney General, since only county

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attorneys have the enforcement power that forces Plaintiffs to use E-Verify. Having

considered Plaintiffs’ further briefing on their pending motions, the court remains of the

view that Plaintiffs misunderstand the redressability requirement for justiciability in costof-compliance injury cases. They appear to think that since a declaratory judgment

invalidating the Act would help them, it matters little whom the declaratory judgment

runs against. This expansion of coercive relief to officers in the umbras and penumbras

of those with the actual power that harms would take the redressability requirement into

fictions. It would threaten, and perhaps step across, the Eleventh Amendment boundaries

on the jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.

2001) (en banc); Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 1997). Giving leeway to the

abstractions and difficulty that attend questions of justiciability, the court still concludes

that it is unlikely that Plaintiffs will sustain this contention or their claim of subject matter

jurisdiction against these Defendants.

Because Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their jurisdictional appeal, and an

injunction pending appeal is not necessary to avoid loss of appellate jurisdiction, they

have a much heightened burden to warrant an injunction.

B. The Immigration Reform and Control Act Expressly Authorizes,

Rather Than Preempts, the Licensing Sanctions in the Act 

 The court also must assess Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits,

assuming they prove jurisdiction in this appeal, for the relief they seek in these motions is

on the merits of their claims. Because the court has found that the balance of hardships

tips strongly in favor of the Defendants, Plaintiffs bear a high burden to prove that the

statute is most likely invalid. They have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits,

much less a strong likelihood.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power

to exclude state legislation in a field as Congress defines it. Any analysis of state

authority “begin[s] with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess

sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations

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imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).

Preemption analysis does not infer that “Congress ha[s] deprived the States of the power

to act.” Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 238 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting

N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979)). The analysis

“start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that was a clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The intent of Congress is the “touchstone” of any

preemption analysis, Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963),

and there is generally a “strong presumption against finding that state law is preempted by

federal law,” Comm. of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distribs. v. Straton, 92 F.3d 807, 811

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 943

(9th Cir. 1992)).

Field preemption can be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly

contained in its structure and purpose.” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.

88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Implied field preemption exists

where “the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the

inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’” Id. (quoting Fid.

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).

 A state law may also be “preempted’ if it conflicts with a federal law, but that

simply means that federal law is supreme over any contrary state law. Conflict

preemption is present when “compliance with both State and federal law is impossible, or

when the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric.

Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). A mere difference between state and federal law is not conflict. Fla.

Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). 

Before the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), 8 U.S.C. §

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1101, et seq., there was no express or implied field preemption of state laws prohibiting

the employment of unauthorized aliens. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In De

Canas v. Bica, a California statute prohibited employers from hiring aliens who were not

entitled to lawful residence in the United States if the employment would adversely affect

lawful resident workers. The Supreme Court held that the state law was not preempted

because it did not regulate immigration or regulate in a field that the federal government

had occupied. It did not decide whether the California law conflicted with any specific

federal law. Id. at 358–64. Like the California law, the Act does not regulate

immigration because it does not determine “who should or should not be admitted into the

country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” Id. at 355. De

Canas sets the framework for implied preemption analysis of unauthorized alien

employment laws. 

1. The Plain Language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) Authorizes State

Licensing Sanctions

Congress left no room in IRCA for courts to infer field preemption; it expressly 

preempted some state powers and expressly affirmed other state powers. Section

1324a(h)(2) of Title 8, U.S.C., provides:

The provisions of this section [8 U.S.C. § 1324a] preempt any State or local

law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and

similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for

employment, unauthorized aliens.

(Emphasis added.) The task at hand is to give fair meaning to this express permission of

sanctions by “licensing and similar laws” upon “those who employ . . . unauthorized

aliens.” The task is not to wonder whether field preemption could be found in IRCA’s

structure if Congress had not expressly condoned state licensing sanctions.

Consistent with IRCA, the Act authorizes suspension or revocation of business

licenses for conduct that is also prohibited by IRCA. A.R.S. § 23-212(A) and (F). The

Act falls within the plain meaning of IRCA’s safe harbor for “licensing and similar laws.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). That is enough to defeat this facial challenge. A facial challenge

to a law must prove that “no set of circumstances exists under which [the law] would be

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1

 For example, only an individual adjudicated to have violated the Act could raise a

challenge that the ancillary remedy of ordering dismissal of all unauthorized aliens exceeds

the safe-harbor of § 1324a(h)(2). No Plaintiff stands in that place yet. If a non-essential part

of the Act did fall in a proper case, the rest still would stand. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 279,

§ 5 (severability clause).

2

 Whether the Act’s definition of license is too broad in some particulars is an asapplied challenge that must await a case and a plaintiff threatened to lose what he contends

is not a “license” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 

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valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).1

The Act’s definition of licenses that may be suspended or revoked comes within

the plain meaning of “licensing” as IRCA uses it. “License” means any state or local

“authorization that is required by law and that is issued . . . for the purposes of operating a

business in this state.” A.R.S. § 23-211(7)(a). It includes articles of incorporation, a

certificate of partnership, a foreign corporation registration, and a transaction privilege

(sales) tax license, but not a professional license.2

 A.R.S. §§ 23-211(7)(b) and (c). 

Plaintiffs’ further argument that Congress could not have meant to permit the grave

sanction of license suspension or revocation again fights the most obvious meaning of the

words Congress used. 

2. The Licensing Sanction Authorization is Not Conditioned on

Completed Federal Proceedings Against the Violator; the

Legislative History Does Not So State and Could Not Defeat the

Statutory Language if it Did

Plaintiffs contend that the § 1324a(h)(2) authorization of state licensing sanctions

only authorizes states to enforce the federal sanctions of IRCA and, of course, states

cannot do that because only the Attorney General of the United States can commence

federal enforcement proceedings. Defendants rephrase this argument, without changing

its substance, as contending that states may only impose further licensing sanctions on

employers who already have been found liable in completed federal proceedings under

IRCA.

This interpretation would reduce the express authorization of state “licensing and

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similar laws” to nothing. It is wholly without textual basis in the statute. Plaintiffs base

their argument on a sentence in the House Judiciary Committee Report on IRCA. H.R.

Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. The

legislative history does not substantiate Plaintiffs’ interpretation, but even if it did, it

could not change the statute or add words. The language of the statute that Congress

approved, not language from the House Report concerning the statute, controls. Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[T]he authoritative

statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history.”); Hoffman Plastic Compounds,

Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 n.4 (2002) (describing House Report No. 99-682 as a

“single Committee Report from one House of a politically divided Congress” and noting

that the dissent’s reliance on the report “is a rather slender reed”); Sprietsma v. Mercury

Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.

658, 664 (1993)) (asserting that express preemption analysis focuses on the plain wording

of the statute, “which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive

intent.”). Based on the plain statutory language, no prior federal enforcement action is

necessary before a state may impose sanctions against an employer’s license, and the field

preemption inquiry ends there.

In any event, the legislative history, and the House Report in particular, do not

compel the meaning Plaintiffs urge. After the De Canas decision, Congressional bills

calling for federal employer sanctions began to contain preemption clauses for the first

time. See, e.g., S. 2252, 95th Cong. § 5 (1976); H.R. 9531, 95th Cong. § 5 (1976). None

passed.

The March 1, 1981 final report and recommendation of the Select Commission on

Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended that any attempt at immigration reform

provide sanctions for employers who knowingly hire undocumented immigrants, but the

report did not recommend federal preemption of complementary state laws. In following

sessions of Congress, bills were introduced based on the recommendations of the Select

Commission, but they included preemption clauses similar to that in the bills from the

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95th Congress. See S. 1765, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4832, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 2222,

97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong. (1982); S. 529, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1510,

98th Cong. (1983). Again, none passed. 

In the 99th Congress, S. 1200 and H.R. 3810 contained preemption clauses that for

the first time included the exception “other than through licensing and similar laws.” 

Unlike the earlier bills, S. 1200 was enacted and became the Immigration Reform and

Control Act of 1986. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report dated August 25, 1985, did

not comment on the express authorization of state licensing and similar laws, and the

Senate passed the bill on September 19, 1985. See S. Rep. No. 99-132 (1985). One of

four House Committee Reports, however, the House Judiciary Committee Report dated

July 16, 1986, did comment on the licensing exception to preemption:

The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically

preempt any state or local laws providing civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on

the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens.

They are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes

concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license to any person

who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this legislation.

Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or “fitness to do

business laws,” such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which

specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or

referring undocumented aliens.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662

(“House Report”). The conference committee report said nothing about preemption. See

H. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1000 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840. Therefore,

whatever the meaning of the House Judiciary Committee Report’s comment, it was not

before the Senate when it approved the bill.

The House Report also does not support Plaintiffs’ argument. Their interpretation

overlooks the first quoted sentence, which paraphrases the bill as preempting only state

“fines” and “criminal sanctions.” The Arizona Act imposes no fines or criminal

sanctions. Plaintiffs rely on the second quoted sentence, which no doubt correctly states

that state licensing processes are not preempted as to “any person who has been found to

have violated the sanctions provisions of this legislation.” But Plaintiffs go further and

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assert that the example given in that sentence exhausts the entire meaning of the licensing

sanction authorization. The passage does not so state, and the very next sentence gives

further examples of permitted licensing sanction laws that are not tied to completed

federal violation proceedings. Though one could look for further light in the legislative

history (Plaintiffs acknowledged that they did not review the floor debates), one need

look only to the sentence after the one Plaintiffs rely upon to see that the House Report

does not bear the meaning they would give it.

Finally, if the House Report did mean what Plaintiffs contend, such an attempt to

override the plain language of the statute would be precisely the kind of excess that the

modern view of legislative history illegitimates. The Members or their staff must write

amendments into the bill, not into the Report.

C. The Act Does Not Conflict With IRCA

As noted above, conflict preemption exists when “compliance with both State and

federal law is impossible, or when the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Mich.

Canners & Freezers Ass’n Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469

(1984). A mere difference between state and federal law is not conflict. Fla. Lime &

Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). Conflict preemption is not

implied absent an “actual conflict.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990)

(citation omitted). “Tension between federal and state law is not enough to establish

conflict preemption.” Incalza v. Fendi N. Am., Inc., 479 F.3d. 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)). In addition, “[w]here

state enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests concurrent

enforcement activity is authorized.” Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th

Cir. 1983) (citing Fla. Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142), overruled on other grounds

by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d. 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).

 In passing the federal laws that prohibit the employment of unauthorized aliens,

“Congress wished to stop payments of wages to unauthorized workers, which act as a

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magnet . . . attract[ing] aliens here illegally, and to prevent those workers from taking jobs

that would otherwise go to citizens.” Incalza, 479 F.3d at 1011 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (holding that IRCA did not preempt California employment law). Likewise, the

Act aims to sanction the licenses of knowing employers of unauthorized aliens within the

express permission of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2), and it does so without conflicting with

other federal laws.

Plaintiffs assert that Congress carefully selected the prohibitions, penalties,

procedures, and protections that properly balanced the competing policy objectives

surrounding passage of IRCA, and that any departure from those exact parameters by the

State necessarily stands as an obstacle to Congress’ full objectives. The argument that

Congress created an “integrated scheme,” any departure from which necessarily poses a

conflict, is an argument for implied field preemption. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Indus.,

Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 288 (1986). As the court has

explained, the fact that Congress expressly allowed states to impose licensing sanctions

forecloses the argument that it impliedly occupied the same field. Since Plaintiffs’

proposed “conflicts” are all based on differences between the State and federal

procedures, not incompatibilities, those contentions are merely reworded arguments for

field preemption. 

For example, Plaintiffs complain that the licensing penalties in the Act are more

severe than the penalties in the federal law. That argument ignores Congress’ express

approval of such state licensing penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). Similarly, they note

that the Act’s definition of “employee” does not match exactly the federal definition. As

a matter of statutory construction, it is improbable that the Act’s definition requires

verification of persons who are exempted from IRCA such as casual hires and

independent contractors. An “employment relationship” is required. A.R.S. § 23-211(3). 

Regardless, such a contention would at most narrow the Act and must be raised in an asapplied challenge by such an employer rather than in this facial challenge. Nor does any

Plaintiff show it has the types of workers necessary to raise this challenge.

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The Act does use a different adjudicatory process than IRCA, but conflict

preemption does not arise merely because state laws do not replicate federal laws and

procedures. The State’s law probably would be invalid if it attempted to invoke IRCA’s

hearing process for its own purposes, or if it attempted to make its own determination of

immigration status to affect a person’s admissibility or deportability from the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)(1), 1229a(a)(3). Instead, the Act determines an

employee’s eligibility to work in the United States for the purpose of imposing licensing

sanctions on an employer. 

Such a determination does not decide “who should or should not be admitted into

the country,” so it does not conflict with the federal government’s regulation of

immigration. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. Nor is the State’s procedure likely to conflict

with IRCA’s procedure, because the State makes its determination in the exercise of the

power that Congress expressly left to it under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). See Garrett v. City

of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that states may make

a formal determination of an individual’s alienage status for purposes authorized by

federal statute); House Report at 66–68, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5670–72 (discussing the

states’ responsibility to “verify whether alien applicants for certain public assistance

programs are in a lawful immigration status and thus eligible for participation”). States

must often determine an individual’s immigration status to administer state laws that do

not conflict with federal laws. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 36-2933 (eligibility for State health care

services); § 46-292 (eligibility for cash assistance); § 28-3153(D) (eligibility for a drivers’

license); Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22.A.4 (eligibility for bail); Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d

1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (eligibility for bail).

Importantly, the State defers to the federal government’s response to a lawful

request under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) to make this determination. It then ostensibly allows

the employer the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the federal government’s

determination. See A.R.S. § 23-212(H) (according the federal government’s

determination only a rebuttable presumption of accuracy); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65.2 (requiring

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an evidentiary hearing before sanctions may be imposed unless all parties waive the

hearing). This is harmonization with federal law, not conflict. The mere fact that the

parallel procedures could result in an employer being found in violation of the Act but not

IRCA does not establish conflict preemption. That is simply the result of the concurrent

enforcement activity in our federal system where Congress has specifically preserved

state authority.

When enacting IRCA, Congress sought to minimize undue burdens on employers. 

The Act does not make employers conform to a stricter standard of conduct than the

federal law. Liability under both IRCA and the Arizona Act requires that, at a minimum,

the employer “knowingly” employ an unauthorized alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A);

A.R.S. § 23-212(A). Both statutes include procedures for weeding out frivolous

complaints, and under both statutes the enforcement official has ultimate discretion to

decide whether to bring an enforcement action in any given case. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e);

A.R.S. § 23-212(C).

Congress and the State of Arizona have enacted anti-discrimination laws. 

Plaintiffs contend that Arizona’s reliance on those laws, rather than placing duplicate

provisions within the Act, conflicts with the federal policy of minimizing discrimination. 

The Supremacy Clause is not that weak. Arizonans remain protected by the prohibitions

against such discrimination in IRCA itself. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (defining and

prohibiting unfair immigration-related employment practices). Those protections

somewhat overlap the employment discrimination prohibitions found in federal and

Arizona law generally. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination based on “race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin”); A.R.S. § 41-1463(B) (prohibiting employment

discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, age, disability or national origin”). 

Moreover, the Act provides that it “shall not be construed to require an employer to take

any action that the employer believes in good faith would violate federal or state law.”

A.R.S. § 23-213. There is no conflict with the federal goal of discouraging discrimination

because the Act does not authorize, encourage, or even allow discrimination; nor does it

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deprive any worker of the express federal protections.

In sum, Plaintiffs have little chance of prevailing on their conflict preemption

argument. They simply note differences between IRCA and the Arizona Act. 

Differences are bound to arise where Congress has left it to the states to regulate a given

area concurrently with the federal government. 

D. Required Participation in E-Verify as Part of a State Licensing

Sanction Program Permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) is Not in

Conflict With or Pre-Empted by Federal Law 

Because use of E-Verify is voluntary under federal law, Plaintiffs assert that the

State’s requirement that all employers check the employment eligibility of new hires

through E-Verify is invalid under implied field preemption and conflict preemption. 

Neither the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (Sept. 30, 1996), nor the Basic Pilot

Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003 (“Expansion Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-156,

117 Stat. 1944 (Dec. 3, 2003), requires such a conclusion.

Congress’ purpose for creating E-Verify was to experiment with a system to

improve employers’ ability to verify the work authorization of new hires beyond the I-9

system. The program was in an evaluative stage when it was created, and so Congress

was leery of mandating its use right away itself. Accordingly, it prohibited the Attorney

General from requiring participation in the program. IIRIRA § 402(a), 110 Stat.

3009-656. But that does not necessarily mean that Congress placed the conduct that it

excluded from federal mandate — whether to use E-Verify — also outside of the

residuum of conduct subject to the police power of the state. A decision not to invoke

federal coercive powers leaves conduct within the power of the states to compel or forbid

for proper legislative purposes. 

Unlike the regulation in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000),

nothing in the statutory text or history suggests that Congress intended to vest employers

with an individual right, good against the states’ police power, to choose whether or not

to participate in E-Verify. The federal statute in Geier sought to create a marketplace of

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individual choices from which better mixes of automobile safety and economy could

emerge. Id. at 874–75. When a California law mandated one choice, it defeated the

federally preferred marketplace. In contrast, federal policy encourages the utmost use of

E-Verify, not individual autonomy for the sake of some higher federal goal.

Congress did not cap participation levels. It allowed all employers in the

authorized states to use the program. Later, the Expansion Act opened participation to

employers in all fifty states. The federal government undertook advertising campaigns to

increase participation levels and utilize the excess capacity available. (Facts Ex. 11 at 10.) 

Notably, no party has submitted evidence that the federal government officers who

administer E-Verify view the state requirement as an obstruction. To the contrary, the

current administration and the DHS Secretary have endorsed making E-Verify mandatory

for all employers nationally. (Facts Ex. 15 at 8.) All of this proves that the federal

government encourages increased participation in E-Verify; it does not support an

inference that federal policy leaves no room for the states to supplement federal

requirements by mandating that employers use E-Verify. Plaintiffs’ failure to present

evidence from federal officers that the required Arizona participation in E-Verify is

unwelcome is highly damaging to their case. 

Arizona’s requirement will increase the volume of registered employers and the

number of inquiries processed through E-Verify. But Congress encourages state and

federal authorities to communicate regarding immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a);

8 U.S.C. § 1644. Requiring Arizona employers to check employment eligibility through

E-Verify does not abuse the system for a purpose that Congress did not intend. E-Verify

was created for precisely that purpose. Furthermore, Arizona’s use of E-Verify is for a

licensing sanctions program authorized by Congress in section 1324a(h)(2) of IRCA. 

Therefore, Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2006),

which found a conflict where the federal government was burdened by an inappropriate

use of its program, does not apply. The fact that the Act will result in additional inquiries

to the federal government is consistent with federal law. 

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The federal government, of course, retains the ability to terminate an employer’s

use of E-Verify or to discontinue the E-Verify program entirely. Despite Plaintiffs’

concerns that such an occurrence would force employers into non-compliance with State

law, there is no reason to think that the government would exclude users except for their

own misconduct. If E-Verify ceases to exist, there will be time enough to deal with that 

currently imaginary case.

Arizona’s decision to require employers to use E-Verify is an attempt to coordinate

State efforts to reduce the hiring of unauthorized aliens through licensing sanctions with a

federal government program that has the same goal. It does not stand as an obstacle, but

rather an aid to achieving the federal government’s purposes and objectives in a realm

explicitly left open to the states.

E. Procedural Due Process

1. Preclusion of the Employer’s Evidence Concerning Whether the

Employee Is Authorized Would Raise a Serious Question of

Procedural Due Process

Under both the federal and State constitutions, procedural due process requires that

a party have an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Due process requires notice that is reasonably calculated

under all of the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

and afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). It also requires “a fair trial in a fair

tribunal.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); United States v. Superior Court,

144 Ariz. 265, 280, 697 P.2d 658, 673 (1985). Due process “is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

The Act raises a serious question of procedural fairness to employers charged with

knowingly or intentionally employing an unauthorized alien. It provides the following

concerning Superior Court proceedings under the Act:

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On determining whether an employee is an unauthorized alien, the court

shall consider only the federal government’s determination pursuant to 8

United States Code section 1373(c). The federal government’s

determination creates a rebuttable presumption of the employee’s lawful

status. The court may take judicial notice of the federal government’s

determination and may request the federal government to provide

automated or testimonial verification pursuant to 8 United States Code

section 1373(c). 

A.R.S. § 21-212(H). This subsection is somewhat at war with itself. On the one hand,

the Superior court “shall consider only” the federal government’s determination. But on

the other hand, that determination only creates “a rebuttable presumption,” meaning that

other evidence may be considered. 

Unless there has already been an opportunity for fair and adequate determination

of the employee’s work authorization, the Superior Court proceeding must supply that

fair and adequate procedure. A procedure that bars all evidence from the employer on an

essential element plainly would fall short of due process of law. If this were the case,

Plaintiffs would have made a very substantial showing that the Act’s procedure is

probably unconstitutional.

However, that is probably not the meaning of subsection (H). It parallels

subsection (B), which prohibits enforcing officers from “independently making a final

determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the United States” apart from

the government’s § 1373(c) response. Subsections (B) and (H) are meant to protect

workers from being the direct subject of investigation and enforcement under the Act. 

But where the employer is on trial, the § 1373(c) determination creates only a rebuttable

presumption — meaning that the employer may present any evidence to prove the

employee’s lawful status and the employer’s lack of knowledge. It is only the State that

is prohibited from investigating workers directly and from offering extrinsic evidence of

their status.

This reconciliation of these difficult statutory passages has the virtues of making

sense, being fair to the employer, and avoiding unconstitutionality. See Mejak v.

Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 557, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, this

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Court must . . . give effect to every provision in the statute . . . [and] interpret the statute

so that no provision is rendered meaningless, insignificant, or void.”); Business Realty v.

Maricopa County, 181 Ariz. 551, 559, 892 P.2d 1340, 1349 (1995) (“We interpret

statutes to uphold their constitutionality, if that is possible. As a corollary, we strive to

give statutes meanings that avoid serious constitutional issues. We reach those only when

absolutely necessary.”). Defendants point out that because the Superior Court must

adjudicate whether the employer “knowingly” or “intentionally” employed an

unauthorized alien, “a judge will consider arguments and evidence that go to essential

elements of the Act.” (Doc. # 58 at 22 and n. 17.) Since that includes considering all the

employer’s evidence on whether the employee was an unauthorized alien, not just the

government’s § 1373(c) response, procedural due process will likely be afforded to

employers. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65.2 (requiring an evidentiary hearing before sanctions

under the Act may be imposed unless all parties waive the hearing).

Plaintiffs also argue that under § 1373(c) the government does not make a

“determination” of the employee’s “lawful status” to work. The government’s response

gives “the citizenship or immigration status” of a person. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). It is not

clear that a response failing to confirm an employee’s “lawful status” is a “determination”

that the employee lacks lawful status. In some circumstances, it may be that the

government’s response of non-confirmation means little in its own right. However, if the

government’s response fails to give enough information to determine an employee’s work

authorization, the State’s case fails. It does not mean that the employer is sanctioned

anyway. These questions are not adequately explored in this record.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not shown that the government’s response under 8

U.S.C. § 1373(c) will exclude an interactive process like that employed in E-Verify. That

process is fair, prompt, adequate, and provides opportunity to be heard. (Facts, Ex. 13,

App. C at C-2.) Errors in the government’s database concerning authorized workers can

be corrected. This record does not show what the government does or would do if the

State or the Superior Court requests such interactive and error-correcting processes under

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§ 1373(c). Plaintiffs fall short of proving that “no set of circumstances exists under which

[the Act] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Perhaps

this shortfall can be made up in the second case, Arizona Contractors II. 

Moreover, the issue is not ripe, as it could arise only in a Superior Court

enforcement proceeding, which no Plaintiff faces and which could not happen before

preliminary injunctive relief will be considered in Arizona Contractors II in January. 

Finally, if § 23-212(H) does unconstitutionally bar an employer from offering evidence, it

would be voided and severed, leaving the rest of the Act standing.

Though Plaintiffs have raised a substantial issue, they have not met their burden of

showing a strong likelihood of success on this issue. 

2. The Superior Court Process Is Fair and Adequate

Plaintiffs’ other procedural due process challenges have no merit. The other

Superior Court processes are subject to all the procedural protections of the Arizona

Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the Superior Court has full evidence-taking, fact-finding,

and discretionary authority on these issues, with the burden of proof on the State, there

can be no due process right to participate in the enforcing officer’s investigation and

preparation of his case (though civil enforcement proceedings are rarely brought without

first contacting the defendant). 

The Act nowhere says that county attorneys must prosecute all non-frivolous

cases, or ones motivated by discrimination. Plaintiffs’ other procedural fears are

improbable. If they ever arose in a real case, they could be decided, but there are no real

facts here and the Act is not deficient on its face.

F. Other Contentions

The Plaintiffs in No. CV 07-1355 raise other contentions that call only for brief

comment. 

The Act does not purport to reach the out-of-state employees of Arizona

employers; therefore it does not implicate the Commerce Clause. The county attorney

can bring an enforcement action only “in the county where the unauthorized employee is

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employed.” A.R.S.§ 23-212(D).

Plaintiffs have no substantive due process right to employ unauthorized aliens or to

refuse lawful precautions against doing so. This is not a separate argument but a

restatement of the federal preemption and procedural due process contentions.

The Act does not violate the separation of powers principle of Art. III of the

Arizona Constitution and does not have the improbable meanings Plaintiffs would give it

to implicate that principle.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing for

an injunction pending appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions for injunction pending appeal

(Doc. ## 91 and 94) are denied.

DATED this 21st day of December 2007.

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INDEX

I. Nature of the Motion and Related Proceedings ...........................2

II. Standards for Injunction Pending an Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

III. Plaintiffs Have Little Hardship from Participating in E-Verify, and the

Balance of Hardships is Strongly Against an Injunction Pending Appeal ......6

A. Plaintiffs’ Hardship is Minimal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

B. An Injunction Will Gravely Injure the Interests of the State, the

Interests of Others, and the Public Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

C. Pendency of a Jurisdictionally Sound Fresh Action Against Proper

Parties, Ready for a Preliminary Injunction Ruling in January, Weighs

Against an Appeal Injunction in the Weeks Before Then . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

IV. Likelihood of Success on the Merits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Jurisdictional and Justiciability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

B. The Immigration Reform and Control Act Expressly Authorizes,

Rather Than Preempts, the Licensing Sanctions in the Act . . . . . . . . . . 12

1. The Plain Language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) Authorizes

State Licensing Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2. The Licensing Sanction Authorization is Not Conditioned

on Completed Federal Proceedings Against the Violator;

the Legislative History Does Not So State and Could Not

Defeat the Statutory Language if it Did . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C. The Act Does Not Conflict With IRCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

D. Required Participation in E-Verify as Part of a State Licensing

Sanction Program Permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) is Not in

Conflict With or Pre-Empted by Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

E. Procedural Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1. Preclusion of the Employer’s Evidence Concerning

Whether the Employee Is Authorized Would Raise a Serious

Question of Procedural Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2. The Superior Court Process Is Fair and Adequate . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

F. Other Contentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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