Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00683/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00683-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GUSTAVO TORRES DE LA RIVA, 

Petitioner,

vs. 

KIM HOLLAND, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 15CV0683-WQH(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

RE MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. No. 12] 

Petitioner Gustavo Torres De La Riva (“Petitioner”) has filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Respondent Kim Holland (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

Petition contending Petitioner’s claims are untimely and time-barred by the 

statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. No. 12.) The Court, 

having reviewed the Petition, Motion to Dismiss, and all the supporting 

documents and lodgments submitted by the parties, hereby recommends the 

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED WITH 

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PREJUDICE. 

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On August 18, 2008, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of forcible 

rape while acting in concert in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 261(a)(2) and 

264.1; one count of forcible rape in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2); and 

one count of robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211. (Pet. at 1; Lodgment 

No. 8 at 1.) The jury found true the allegations that during the commission of the 

rapes, Petitioner moved the victim and substantially increased the risk of injury 

over and above the risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense in violation 

of Cal. Penal Code. §§ 667.61(a), (c), and (d)(2). (Lodgment No. 8 at 1-2.) The 

jury further found true the allegations that Petitioner personally kidnapped the 

victim in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 207, 209, or 209.5, and personally used 

a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm in the commission of the robbery in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 12022(a)(1). (Lodgment No. 8 at 2.) The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate prison term of fifty years to life, plus a 

determinate term of eight years. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed an appeal, in which he argued he received ineffective 

assistance from his attorney and was denied due process because the trial court 

failed to comply with Cal. Penal Code § 1093(f). (Pet. at 3). The California Court 

of Appeal reversed the conviction on count three and affirmed the trial court 

judgment in all other respects on September 27, 2010. (Lodgment No. 8 at 14.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Rehearing in the California Court of Appeal, which 

was denied on October 19, 2010. (Lodgment Nos. 11, 12.) Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on 

December 15, 2010. (Lodgment Nos. 13, 14.) 

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 On October 5, 2011, Petitioner constructively filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court, alleging he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel and was denied due process because the trial court failed 

to comply with Cal. Penal Code § 1093(f).1 (Pet. at 5; Lodgment No. 19.) On 

February 29, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Lodgment 

No. 20.) 

 On October 26, 2014, Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition, in 

which he alleges the same claims previously raised before the state courts, 

namely that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied due 

process. (Pet. at 6.) 

DISCUSSION

A. The Petition is Time-Barred Under AEDPA 

 The statute of limitations under the AEDPA applies to Petitioner’s 

presentation of claims in this Court. Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 128 F.3d 

1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on other grounds in Calderon v. 

U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 

(1999). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d): 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

                                                                

1 Under the mailbox rule, a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed when the 

prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the court’s clerk because the prisoner 

is unable to control the time of delivery. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

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seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(A)-(D). 

The conclusion of direct review of Petitioner’s conviction occurred on 

December 15, 2010, when the California Supreme Court denied the petition 

for review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Adding the ninety days within which 

a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed, the date on which Petitioner’s 

conviction became final was March 15, 2011. See Wixom v. Washington, 

264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, absent any applicable 

tolling, Petitioner had until one year later, March 15, 2012, to file his federal 

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Petitioner did not file his federal 

habeas petition until October 30, 2014, over two years after the statute of 

limitations expired, the Court next analyzes whether Petitioner is entitled to 

statutory or equitable tolling. 

/// 

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B. Statutory Tolling

 The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the Atime during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review . . . is pending.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d)(2). AAn application 

for post-conviction review is pending while a California petitioner completes 

a full round of state collateral review, including during the period between 

(1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner=s filing of a 

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely 

under state law.@ Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original). In 

California, A[a]s long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate review 

within a >reasonable time,= he could count as >pending= (and add to the 1-

year time limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court reached 

an adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state 

court.@ Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 222-23 (2002)). 

 Statutory tolling for the filing of an application for state post-conviction 

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) applies here because Petitioner 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court 

before the statute of limitations expired. Calculation of the statute of 

limitations in this case, taking into account statutory tolling, is as follows. As 

explained above, the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final 

was March 15, 2011. Petitioner then had one year from that date, until 

March 15, 2012, in which to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner filed 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which 

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tolled the time from when Petitioner filed the petition on October 5, 2011 

until February 29, 2012 (a total of 147 days), when the California Supreme 

Court denied the petition. (Lodgment Nos. 19, 20.) Therefore, Petitioner 

had until August 12, 2012 to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner, 

however, did not constructively file his federal habeas petition until October 

26, 2014 (the date on which he signed the Petition), which rendered the 

Petition over two years late. (Pet. at 6.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s federal 

petition is time-barred unless he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

 Equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions is permitted in the Ninth Circuit, but Petitioner bears the burden of 

showing equitable tolling is appropriate. Espinoza-Matthews v. State of 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner must establish 

two elements: A(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.@ Pace v. 

DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The diligence required is 

Areasonable diligence,@ not Amaximum feasible diligence.@ Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Equitable tolling is available only if some Aexternal force@ beyond the 

Petitioner=s direct control caused the untimeliness. Velasquez v. Kirkland, 

639 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2011). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most 

cases, and Athe threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very 

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.@ Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner first contends he is entitled to equitable tolling because he 

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was in segregated facilities “for a long time.” (Pet. Doc. No. 1 at 14-15.) 

Here, Petitioner’s placement in segregated facilities does not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances because his placement was the direct result of 

his admitted criminal actions: attempted homicide, battery on a peace 

officer, and battery on a cellmate with a weapon. (Doc. No. 1 at 14-15.) 

Furthermore, even if Petitioner’s placement in segregated facilities did 

constitute extraordinary circumstances, Petitioner fails to allege his 

administrative segregation occurred during a period of time that would toll 

the statute of limitations. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner’s solitary 

confinement does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance entitling him 

to equitable tolling. 

Petitioner also maintains he is entitled to equitable tolling because he 

had “little or no access” to the law library. (Pet. Doc. No. 1 at 15.) There are 

some circumstances where no access to necessary legal materials for 

preparing a federal habeas petition, such as materials describing AEDPA, 

may entitle a prisoner to equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 

F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). However, prison officials may limit access 

to the law library under certain circumstances, such as lockdowns or 

administrative segregation, and thus such reasons generally do not qualify 

as extraordinary circumstances. See Wilder v. Runnels, 2003 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 19114, *9, 2003 WL 22434102 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2003). 

Consequently, Petitioner’s limited access to the law library as a result of his 

solitary confinement does not constitute extraordinary circumstances for 

two reasons. First, unlike the petitioner in Whalem/Hunt who had no access 

to legal materials containing the AEDPA, Petitioner vaguely alleges “little to 

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no” access to the law library. Second, also unlike the Petitioner in 

Whalem/Hunt, Petitioner’s conduct was the cause of his limited access to 

the law library, as his admitted criminal actions which resulted in solitary 

confinement.2 

Lastly, Petitioner claims entitlement to equitable tolling because he 

lost all of his legal documents. (Pet. Doc. No. 1 at 15.) “[E]quitable tolling 

may be appropriate when a prisoner had been denied access to his legal 

files.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). Petitioner, however, has failed 

to establish entitlement to equitable tolling under Spitsyn because he was 

not denied access to his legal files, but rather “lost” his legal 

documentation. Therefore, the Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that 

losing his legal documentation constitutes an extraordinary circumstance 

entitling him to equitable tolling. In sum, Petitioner has failed to meet his 

burden of proving extraordinary circumstances, and thus fails to meet the 

first element for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner has also failed to allege he exercised reasonable diligence 

entitling him to equitable tolling, nor could he in light of the two year delay 

in filing his federal habeas petition. Petitioner has thus not satisfied his 

burden to prove entitlement to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews, 432 

F.3d at 1026. 

/// 

                                                                

2 Petitioner also fails to identify a specific time period during which he had limited access to the 

law library.

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CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner 

did not timely file his federal habeas petition under the AEDPA and failed to 

statutory or equitable tolling is appropriate given the facts of his case. Therefore, 

the Court hereby RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted by the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1). 

 IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 21, 2015, any party to this action 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 31, 2015. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez 

v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 7, 2015 

 

 _________________________ 

 Jan M. Adler 

 U.S. Magistrate Judge 

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