Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00821/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00821-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE JACOBS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV0821-H (POR)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTHOFF, Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement,

Defendant.

On April 18, 2005, Plaintiff Lee Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against

Michael Cherthoff, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“Defendant”), setting forth claims for retaliation and

discrimination in employment. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment or partial summary judgment on August 18, 2006. (Doc. No. 22.) On

September 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. No. 27.) Defendant filed a reply

on September 11, 2006. (Doc. No. 32.) The Court held a hearing on September 18,

2006. Beth Clukey, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared for Defendant and

Thomas Tosdal appeared for Plaintiff. After reviewing the papers and hearing oral

argument, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or partial

summary judgment.

Case 3:05-cv-00821-H-NLS Document 35 Filed 09/20/06 Page 1 of 14
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Background

Plaintiff is a veteran of the United States military. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-9.) He served

as a Commissioned Officer in the United States Marines from 1977 to 1984. (Id., Ex.

1 ¶¶ 3-4.) He transferred to the United States Army in 1984, where he remained until

August 1986. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 6.) Since 1986, Plaintiff has served as a Lieutenant Colonel

in the United States Army Reserves. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 6.) He has been recalled to active

duty several times since 1986. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 7-9.) From his military work, Plaintiff

sustained permanent injuries to his spine, back, neck and knees. (Id., Ex. 2 at 128:7-

140:10.) 

On March 15, 1987, Plaintiff started work at the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) as a special agent. (Def.’s Ex. A at 8:14-16; 12:2-4.) He became a

senior special agent sometime around 1997 or 1998. (Id., Ex. A at 12:8-23.) Plaintiff

worked at several DHS locations in and around San Diego. (Id., Ex. A at 14:2-18:4.)

From 1998 to January 2003, he was assigned to the Resident-Agent-In-Charge/San

Ysidro (“RAIC/SY”) office. (Id., Ex. A at 15:21-16:18; Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 11.) Mike Flax

(“Flax”) was Plaintiff’s Group Supervisor at RAIC/SY. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 12.) Robert Tine

(“Tine”) was the supervisor in charge of the RAIC/SY office from 1997 to mid-2000.

(Def.’s Ex. D at 11:5-13.) Walter Collette (“Collette”), took over as Associate Special

Agent in Charge in 2000. (Id., Ex. G at 12:5-15.) Tine and Collette reported to Special

Agent In Charge (“SAIC”) Edward Logan (“Logan”). (Id., Ex. G at 11:11-12.) 

A. Plaintiff’s Sexual Harassment Complaint

In December 1999, Plaintiff claims his co-worker, Rachel Ealy (“Ealy”), told him

that Tine asked her out on a dinner date. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 18; Ex. 2 at 54:10-15, 95:1-11.)

In January 2000, Plaintiff reported Tine’s dinner invitation, which he classified as

sexual harassment, to several supervisors who directed him to meet with Frank

Marwood (“Marwood”), an Assistant Special Agent in Charge. (Def.’s Ex. A at 62:5-

21, 64:1-21, 66:4-5; Def.’s Ex. E at 35:11-14.) Plaintiff met with Marwood, and

complained of the alleged sexual harassment, and also made complaints about Flax’s

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actions as a group supervisor, and about alleged discrimination by Tine and Flax

because of Plaintiff’s military reserve status. (Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 70:1-5.) Plaintiff alleges

that he indirectly raised a complaint against Collette as well, but not specifically by

name. (Id., Ex. 2 at 71:1.) At the end of the meeting, Marwood informed him that

someone would investigate his sexual harassment complaint. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 22-29.) 

Marwood subsequently informed Collette that a complaint was made by an

employee about a supervisor alleging sexual harassment. (Def.’s Ex. E at 36:12-14; Ex.

G at 28:21-29:2.) Marwood claims that he did not divulge the identity of the

complainant to Collette at that time. (Id., Ex. G at 29:3-6.) Collette directed Marwood

to report directly to SAIC Logan for further handling of the complaint. (Id., Ex. E at

36:14-21; Ex. G at 27:5-24, 29:20-30:5.) 

Collette called Ealy in the Spring or Summer of 1999 to discuss the alleged

sexual harassment incident. (Id., Ex. I at 46:23-47:4.) Collette told Ealy that if she felt

harassed, she should report it so that the incident could be investigated. (Id., Ex. E at

40:10-16; G at 23:18-24:11.) Ealy informed Collette that she did not intend to pursue

a complaint for sexual harassment and that the matter had been resolved with Tine. (Id.,

Ex. I at 48:1-15.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Assignment to the AMID Group

In June 2000, the Commissioner of Customs directed RAIC/SY to provide two

agents for a six month detail in the Air and Marine Interdiction Division (“AMID”),

which controlled all marine vessels within Customs. (Def.’s Ex. E at 17:2-19; Ex. F at

1; Pl.’s Ex. 19 at 33:6-18; Ex. 4 at 43:14-22.) The Commissioner’s directive

requested that the appointed agents have experience as Marine Enforcement Officers

(“MEO”) as well as prior boat handling experience. (Pl.’s Ex. 19 at 33:6-18; Def.’s Ex.

F.) Flax approached the RAIC/SY employees as a group about the appointments and

requested volunteers. (Id., Ex. 3 at 70:5-71:3.) Fidel Mcree and Jeffrey Burdett

volunteered for the assignment. (Id., Ex. 3 at 71:18-21.) 

/ / / /

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Four RAIC/SY employees were identified as qualified candidates for the AMID

detail. (Def.’s Ex. E at 19:6-19.) Plaintiff was included among the candidates because

of his prior boat-handling experience. (Id., Ex. E at 18:5-6, 19:14-24.) Ultimately,

Collette selected McCree and Plaintiff for the AMID detail. (Pl.’s Ex. G at 37:1-20.)

Upon learning of his selection for the AMID detail, Plaintiff notified Flax that

he had neck, spine and lower back problems stemming from prior injuries, which would

affect his ability to perform the duties of the position. (Def.’s Ex. A at 102:12-103:1;

Pl.’s Ex. 2 ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked Flax on several occasions to be

removed from the AMID detail and Flax declined to remove Plaintiff each time. (Pl.’s

Ex. 2 ¶¶ 42-51.) Plaintiff provided Flax with his medical records, detailing his injuries.

(Def.’s Ex. A at 103:14-17, 104:5-7.) Plaintiff contends that Flax told Plaintiff that if

he reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, he would have to recommend Plaintiff for a

fitness-for-duty examination and that Plaintiff could lose his job if he failed. (Id.) 

 After the meeting with Plaintiff, Flax e-mailed Collette about his concerns over

Plaintiff’s ability to meet the physical demands of the AMID position. (Def.’s Ex. H.)

He sent a copy of the e-mail to Plaintiff. (Id.) The e-mail stated in part that Plaintiff

notified Flax of his service related injuries which could be exacerbated by the duties of

the AMID detail, but that Plaintiff was willing to support the AMID mission. (Id.) Flax

further stated “I am concerned that I have received this information and if I let

[Plaintiff] go without reporting this to a higher authority, I or the Customs service might

be liable if [Plaintiff] gets hurt of becomes disabled . . . .” (Id.)

Soon after Flax sent the e-mail, Plaintiff sent a reply to Collette. (Id.) He stated:

I do have orthopedic problems that are known to Customs Human

Resources and have been disclosed during every scheduled Customs

physical. Although I am not in perfect health, I am capable of safely

participating in all duties assigned an S/A or MEO. I appreciate Mike’s concerns regarding my health, however, I work out on a regular basis and am probably physically stronger than 90% of the current Customs Agent work force. Should my TDY assignment to AMID turn out to aggravate

an existing orthopedic condition, I will let you know and return to [RAIC/SY] . . . .

/ / / /

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(Id.) Plaintiff claims that he wrote the e-mail because he did not want to undergo a

fitness-for-duty examination over fear of losing his job. (Def.’s Ex. A at 107:1-21.) 

Plaintiff was released from the AMID detail in October 2000. (Id., Ex. A at

76:17-77:6.) 

C. Plaintiff’s Internal Affairs Complaint

When Plaintiff left the AMID detail in October 2000, he was involved in the

Internal Affairs investigation of his AMID supervisor for drinking while on duty.

(Def.’s Ex. A at 94:14-95:8; Ex. M at 45:5-7.) During the same time, Plaintiff made a

formal complaint via the Harassment Task Force hotline to the Internal Affairs

Harassment Task Force on October 19, 2000. (Id., Ex. N at 1067.) Plaintiff told the

Internal Affairs Harassment Task Force that he was discriminated against and harassed

because of his disability. (Id.) He also complained that Flax and Tine, his superiors at

RAIC/SY, had retaliated against him because he was a member of the Army Reserves.

(Id.) He also reported the alleged sexual harassment incident between Tine and Ealy.

(Id.) Internal Affairs began a fact-finding inquiry on January 19, 2001 regarding

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint. (Id.) 

 D. Plaintiff’s Nonselection for Promotion

Plaintiff applied for a group supervisor position at RAIC/SY, a GS-14 position,

on or about May 24, 1999. (Def.’s Ex. A at 177:8-17; Ex. Q at 1.) However, Customs

overlooked Plaintiff’s application, and he did not receive priority consideration for the

GS-14 position. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 62.) Due to the oversight, Plaintiff was given priority

consideration for the next available GS-14 position. (Id.; Ex. 7 at 1.) 

Despite the priority consideration, Plaintiff was not promoted in May 2001 when

a group supervisor position at RAIC/SY became available. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 65-67.) On

February 6, 2002, Collette issued a written “Justification For Non-Selection” (“the

justification”). (Def.’s Ex. R.) Collette wrote that Plaintiff had not demonstrated the

level of ability and performance to become a group supervisor. (Id.) He listed several

reasons why he felt that Plaintiff was not the most qualified candidate, including: (1)

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an incident in May 2000 with a fellow agent, Tamiko Francis, where Plaintiff “became

irate;” (2) failing to maintain his government vehicle; (3) lateness and absenteeism

during his tenure with AMID; (4) a demonstrated lack of managerial ability; and (5) a

January 2001 letter of caution from Flax which cited Plaintiff’s failure to open cases in

a timely manner; factual inconsistencies in his written reports; submission of reports

that were not properly reviewed; and failure to follow operating procedures in port

investigations. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Collette’s stated reasons were false, trivial, or a pretext for

retaliation. Plaintiff claims that the Tamiko Francis incident was so minor that his

supervisor, Larry Latocki, who witnessed the entire argument, did not intervene beyond

requesting that Plaintiff and Francis tone it down. (Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 27:1-25.) Plaintiff

also claims that he forgot to change the oil on his government vehicle once in 15 years

of service because of a problem with his e-mail when he was transferred to the AMID

detail and because of new forms for vehicle service which were issued a month prior

to the incident. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 107-111.) Plaintiff further alleges that he did not know

why he was removed from the AMID detail; he does not recall being late or absent.

(Id., ¶ 118.) Finally, Plaintiff claims the letter of caution was patently false, evidenced

by Flax’s failure to cite to any specific instances to support the allegations made in the

letter. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 18, 2005. He sets forth claims for: (1)

retaliation based on Plaintiff’s assignment to the AMID detail; (2) discrimination/failure

to accommodate based on Plaintiff’s assignment to the AMID detail; (3) retaliation

based on the denial of promotion; and (4) discrimination based on the denial of

promotion. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a court may grant summary judgment in favor of a

party upon a claim “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion” when determining whether any genuine issues of material

fact exist. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970) (citation

omitted); see also Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). Material facts

are only those that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(internal citation omitted). 

The nonmoving party, however, may not rely solely on the mere allegations or

denials of its pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citation omitted). Material facts are only those that “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

To survive summary judgment on a discrimination claim under Title VII, a

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough

School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003). When the plaintiff meets his

initial burden of production, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its

employment decision was motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons. Cornwell v. Electra

Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2006); see also McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973). The burden then shifts back to the

plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext. Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 801-803. 

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“The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title

VII and ADEA claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise

to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d

885, 889 (1994) (internal emphasis omitted) (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371,

1375 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990)). Additionally, a plaintiff can

prove pretext by offering direct or circumstantial evidence “that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or

otherwise unbelievable, or . . . directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more

likely motivated the employer.” Raad, 323 F.3d at 1194. In this context, the Court

should treat both direct and circumstantial evidence alike. Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539

U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003). A plaintiff’s subjective belief that his employer engaged in

discriminatory conduct will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Cornwell, 439

F.3d at 1028. 

B. Analysis

1. Retaliation: Assignment to the AMID detail

In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his assignment to the AMID

detail in July 2000 violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 because it constituted retaliation for

the sexual harassment complaint he made regarding the Tine/Ealy incident. (Compl.

¶¶ 20-25.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s superiors who assigned him to AMID were

not aware of his sexual harassment complaint and that Plaintiff was not protected by

Title VII because the underlying incident did not constitute sexual harassment.

An employee’s right to report or complain of unlawful discrimination in

employment is protected by Title VII. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S.

268, 269 (2001). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an

employee because the individual has opposed an unlawful employment practice. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

prove that: “‘(1) [he] engaged in protected activity, (2) [he] suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between [his] activity and the

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employment decision.’” Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Raad, 323 F.3d at 1196-97). If plaintiff can demonstrate a prima

facie case for retaliation, then the court utilizes the burden shifting scheme set forth in

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-803. Id. Thus, where the plaintiff makes out a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a non-discriminatory reason

for the employment action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994)). If the

defendant meets its burden, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the proffered

reason for the employment action was a pretext for discrimination. Manatt v. Bank of

America, NA, 229 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A genuine dispute exists regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. In July 2000, a

few months after Plaintiff reported his complaint about the Tine/Ealy incident and

Marwood investigated his complaint, Plaintiff was selected for the AMID detail.

(Def.’s Ex. A at 62:5-21, 64:1-21, 66:4-5; Ex. E at 17:2-19; Ex. F at 1.) Plaintiff’s

superiors at RAIC/SY chose Plaintiff for the AMID position despite Plaintiff’s protests

and over fellow employees who volunteered for the assignment. (Pl.’s Ex. G at 37:1-

20.) Defendant points to Plaintiff’s e-mail agreeing that he was appropriate for the job.

Although Defendant contends that the decision makers for the AMID selection were

unaware of Plaintiff’s involvement in the sexual harassment complaint and aware of his

written acknowledgement of fitness for the position, Plaintiff asserts that reasonable

inferences support his conclusion that the transfer was motivated by retaliation. These

disputes are not merely issues of law, and raise credibility questions for the trier of fact.

Based on the proximity of Plaintiff’s complaints to his selection for the AMID detail,

in combination with the timing of the letter of caution and Plaintiff’s non-selection for

promotion, the Court concludes that a question of fact exists whether Plaintiff’s

superiors retaliated against him for reporting the alleged sexual harassment. See e.g.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on this claim.

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2. Discrimination/Failure to Accommodate: Assignment to the AMID Detail

Plaintiff alleges in Count II of his complaint, that Defendant failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability when he was assigned to the AMID detail and discriminated

against him in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and 29 C.F.R. §

1630.4(d)(I). (Compl. ¶¶ 26-29.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff, on his own initiative,

terminated the interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation. 

The ADA mandates that employers make reasonable accommodations for

employees with known disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Willis v. Pacific

Maritime Assoc., 236 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001). “[O]nce an employee requests

an accommodation or an employer recognizes that the employee needs an

accommodation but the employee cannot request it because of a disability, the employer

must engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine the appropriate

reasonable accommodation.” Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d

1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no critical language that an employee must use to

request an accommodation. Barnett v. U.S. Air., Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir.

2000). Once the employee makes the request, the parties engage in an interactive,

flexible process to determine the appropriate, reasonable accommodation. Zivkovic,

302 F.3d at 1089. That process requires: “(1) direct communication between the

employer and employee to explore in good faith the possible accommodations; (2)

consideration of the employee’s request; and (3) offering an accommodation that is

reasonable and effective. Id. (citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114-15.). The employer will

be held liable for a failure to accommodate, only when the breakdown in the interactive

process is attributable to the employer. Id. (citing Beck v. Univ. of. Wis. Bd. of

Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

The parties dispute who bears the fault for the breakdown in the interactive

process. Plaintiff notified Flax about his disabilities and concerns regarding the rigors

of the position when he first learned of his assignment to the AMID detail. (Def.’s Ex.

A at 102:12-103:1; Pl.’s Ex. 2 ¶ 43.) Plaintiff claims that he engaged Flax in

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conversation about the assignment on numerous occasions. (Pl.’s Ex. 2 ¶¶ 42-51.)

After repeated attempts to persuade Flax of his inability to perform the AMID

assignment, Plaintiff provided Flax with his medical records to verify his disability.

Flax refused to consider the records, stating that if he looked at them, he would have to

refer Plaintiff for a fitness-for-duty examination and that Plaintiff could lose his job.

(Def.’s Ex. A at 103:14-17, 104:5-7.) Flax e-mailed Collette regarding his concerns

over Plaintiff’s ability to perform the AMID assignment without further injury. (Def.’s

Ex. H.) He copied Plaintiff on the e-mail. (Id.) Subsequently Plaintiff sent a reply email to both Flax and Collette, stating that he was willing to accept the AMID position

and was in great shape. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he sent the e-mail because he did not want

to lose his job. (Def.’s Ex. A at 107:1-21.) Defendant argues that the interactive

process broke down at Plaintiff’s will when he sent the e-mail stating that he was

willing to accept the AMID assignment. However, Plaintiff argues that his superiors,

particularly Flax, all but refused to engage in the process prior to that point. Plaintiff

presents evidence that other RAIC/SY employees volunteered for the assignment, yet

RAIC/SY chose Plaintiff over his repeated protests. Plaintiff contends that RAIC/SY

could have chosen another candidate for the AMID position from the list of qualified

candidates or from the entire office pool. Plaintiff points out that Jeffrey Burdett

volunteered but was turned down in favor of sending Plaintiff. (Def.’s Ex. E at 18:5-6,

19, 14-24; Pl.’s Ex. G at 37:1-20.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court

concludes that questions of fact exist whether Plaintiff or Defendant caused the

breakdown in the interactive process. See e.g. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly,

the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

3. Retaliation: Failure to Promote

Plaintiff alleges in Count III of his complaint that the decision not to promote him

in January 2001 violated 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. §

12203(a), because it constituted retaliation for his protected EEO activity. (Compl. ¶¶

30-32.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show a causal connection between his

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protected activity and his nonselection and even if he could, Plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that the proffered reasons for his nonselection were pretextual.

The Court concludes that questions of fact exist as to this issue. Defendant

argues that its decision not to promote Plaintiff could not constitute retaliation because

Plaintiff did not file an EEO complaint until August, 2001. However, Plaintiff’s

protected activity began when he reported what he thought was sexual harassment to

his superiors at RAIC/SY in January 2000. (Def.’s Ex. A at 62:5-21, 64:1-21, 66:4-5;

Def.’s Ex. E at 35:11-14.) Plaintiff contends that shortly thereafter, from January 2000

to August 2001, his superiors at RAIC/SY engaged in conduct which was retaliatory.

During that period, he claims that they transferred him to a position they were aware

that he did not want and was possibly not physically capable of performing, threatened

him with termination, issued a letter of warning, overlooked him for promotion and then

declined to promote him at all. Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to raise a question

of pretext. See Manatt, 229 F.3d at 800. Based on the totality of the information in the

record and the disputed version of the facts, the Court concludes that a factual question

remains on this issue. See e.g. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

4. Discrimination: Failure to Promote

In Count IV of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated

against him based on his disability, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a), and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(d)(I). (Compl. ¶¶ 33-36.) Defendant argues that no

evidence exists that Plaintiff’s superiors at RAIC/SY acted with discriminatory animus.

To prove that Defendant discriminated against him in his nonselection, Plaintiff

must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job

which he applied for and that the employer actively sought applicants; (3) he was

rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) someone of comparable qualifications was

ultimately selected. Raad, 323 F.3d at 1193. If Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case,

the burden shifts to Defendant to present a nondiscriminatory explanation, at which

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point Plaintiff must prove pretext. See Id.

Plaintiff claims Defendant’s stated reasons for not promoting him were a pretext

for discrimination based on his disability. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not

promoted because of his poor performance, as set forth in the written justification.

From the totality of the information in the record, the Court concludes that there are

genuine issues of fact whether Defendant’s proffered reasons were a pretext. See

Manatt, 229 F.3d at 800; see also Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.

C. Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff objects to portions of the evidence offered by Defendant in support of

his motion for summary judgment. To the extent that the evidence is proper under the

Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court considered the evidence. To the extent the

evidence is not proper, the Court did not consider it.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment or partial summary judgment. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2006

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

Thomas Lee Tosdal 

Tosdal Smith Steiner & Wax

600 B Street, Suite 2100

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San Diego, CA 92101-4508

US Attorney’s Office, Civil Division

Southern District of California

880 Front Street, Suite 6253

San Diego, CA 92101

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