Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05553/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05553-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARNEICE KATHRINE HALLJOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05553-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS; DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

Re: Dkt. No. 21

Before the Court is defendants City and County of San Francisco (“the City”) and 

Micki Callahan’s (“Callahan”) Motion to Dismiss, filed December 12, 2018, pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Carneice Kathrine HallJohnson has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having read and 

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules 

as follows.1 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, on November 6, 2017, Callahan, the Director of the City’s 

Department of Human Resources, “held a post-deprivation hearing with [plaintiff] . . ., via 

telephone conference, to reconsider [plaintiff] for entry into a training program and to 

receive back benefits from being dismissed from her as-needed position with [the City].” 

(See Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that, during the telephone conference,

Callahan “assured [plaintiff] . . . that she would voluntarily provide [her] with her former 

 

1 By order filed January 28, 2019, the Court took the motion under submission. 

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training position . . . [with] back pay.” (See id. ¶ 11) According to plaintiff, Callahan also 

“apologized to [plaintiff], and said that she had been discriminated against, and the 

reason was for her race and [her developmental mental] disability.” (See id. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Callahan, despite having made the above-referenced 

promises, thereafter “den[ied] to reinstate [her] into the federally funded training program, 

and disallow[ed] her to compete for government employment” due to her race and 

developmental mental disability. (See id. ¶¶ 28-29, 33-34.) 2 In particular, plaintiff alleges 

that Callahan told her she “could never pass a civil service examination, and therefore 

[she] could never compete for a permanent position through the City and County of San 

Francesco’s [sic] Civil Service process and at no time [would] the City . . . allow [her] to 

do that because of the [C]ity’s municipal policy.” (See id. ¶ 12). 

Based on the above, plaintiff brings her Complaint in the instant action, by which 

she asserts defendants have discriminated against her based on her race and disability, 

and thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and section 602 of 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 26-36.) 

By the instant motion, defendants seek an order dismissing plaintiff’s Complaint in 

its entirety. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “can be 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 

under a cognizable legal theory.” See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Consequently, “a 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

 

2

In the Complaint, plaintiff does not challenge her initial dismissal from the training 

program, only her lack of reinstatement. 

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allegations.” See id. Nonetheless, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” See id. (internal quotation, citation, and 

alteration omitted).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Generally, a district court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not consider 

any material beyond the complaint. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Documents whose contents are alleged 

in the complaint, and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically 

attached to the pleading, however, may be considered. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 

449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, a district court may consider any document “the 

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily 

relies,” regardless of whether the document is referenced in the complaint. See Parrino 

v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the Court may consider matters 

that are subject to judicial notice. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend the Complaint is subject to dismissal because, among other 

reasons, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, 

defendants contend, res judicata applies in the instant action because “the claims raised 

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in the present action are the same claims as the claims finally adjudicated by this Court 

in” Hall-Johnson v. City and County of San Francisco, C 18-1409-MMC (“Hall-Johnson I”) 

(see Mot. at 1:9-10). 

“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent 

action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” See

Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted); see also Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 

1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding res judicata “bar(s) all grounds for recovery which 

could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same 

parties on the same cause of action” (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted)). 

Res judicata applies “whenever there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on 

the merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties.” See Owens, 244 F.3d at 713

(internal quotation and citation omitted). 

A. Identity of Claims 

For purposes of res judicata, courts, in evaluating “whether two suits involve the 

same claim or cause of action,” consider “four criteria,” namely: “(1) whether the two 

suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts; (2) whether rights or interests 

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the 

second action; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) 

whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions.” See Mpoyo v. 

Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). “These criteria are not 

applied mechanistically.” Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The first criterion, for example, “is the 

most important,” see id. (internal quotation and citation omitted); indeed, the Ninth Circuit 

has “often held the common nucleus criterion to be outcome determinative under the first 

res judicata element,” see Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 988. The Court next turns to the abovereferenced four criteria. 

As noted, the Ninth Circuit “use[s] a transaction test to determine whether the two 

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suits share a common nucleus of operative fact.” See Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (listing, as

first criterion, “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts”). 

“Whether two events are part of the same transaction or series depends on whether they 

are related to the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be tried 

together.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Here, defendants contend plaintiff’s claims in the instant action and Hall-Johnson I

“involve the exact same transaction and occurrence.” (See Reply at 2:11-12.) As set 

forth below, the Court agrees. 

In both Hall-Johnson I and the instant action, plaintiff asserts claims against the 

City and Callahan predicated on her November 6, 2017, telephone conference with 

Callahan. As noted, plaintiff’s claims in the instant action are based on allegations that 

Callahan, during the above-referenced conference, refused to “reinstate [plaintiff] in the

federally funded training program” and thereby “disallow[ed] her to compete for 

government employment” on the basis of her race and disability. (See Compl. ¶ 28; see 

also id. ¶¶ 32-34.) Similarly, in Hall-Johnson I, the sole claim asserted against Callahan

is predicated on the November 6, 2017, telephone conference, specifically an allegation 

that, Callahan, during said conference, “refus[ed] to hire” plaintiff in a permanent position 

because of her race and disability and thereby “discriminated against [her] in employment 

and opportunities for employment.” (See RJN,

3 Ex. A ¶ 122 (second set); see also id.

¶ 108 (first set).)4,5

 

3 Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of the Third Amended Complaint 

(“TAC”) and certain other documents filed in Hall-Johnson I is hereby GRANTED. 

4 The above-referenced Exhibit A is the TAC filed in Hall-Johnson I and includes a first 

set of 118 numbered paragraphs, followed by a second and third set, beginning again, 

respectively, with a ¶ 81 and a ¶ 177. 

5 Although the claim asserted against Callahan does not expressly identify the event on 

which it is based (see id. ¶ 122 (second set)), the only allegations in the TAC filed in HallJohnson I that pertain to Callahan are those that describe her conduct during the 

November 6, 2017, telephone conference (see id. ¶ 108 (first set)). 

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Although, in Hall-Johnson I, plaintiff also asserted a number of claims against the 

City and her former supervisor, Laura Moeslein (“Moeslein”), based on events that took 

place in 2015 (see id. ¶¶ 51-104 (first set); see also id. ¶¶ 81-120 (second set)), those 

allegations further illustrate the connection between the two cases. In particular, plaintiff 

alleged Moeslein informed her that the City, based on her race and disability, “refus[ed] to 

take [her] on as a permanent hire” (see id. ¶ 70 (first set)) and that the following week, 

she “was terminated” from her as-needed position (see id. ¶ 103 (first set)), a component 

of the training program, the completion of which program was a prerequisite for 

permanent employment (see id. ¶¶ 55, 64 (first set)). 

In sum, the two cases arise out of the “same transactional nucleus of facts,” see

Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987, and could have been “conveniently tried together,” see id., not 

only because the claims against Callahan, as alleged in both actions, are based on a 

single telephone conference held on November 6, 2017, but also because they are 

premised on the same interrelated series of events. Specifically, the City’s refusal to 

consider plaintiff for permanent employment in 2015 was the impetus for its decision to 

remove her from the training program in 2015 and to deny her reinstatement in 2017, 

which denial, in turn and in a circular fashion, resulted in her inability to qualify for 

permanent employment. 

The second criterion also is satisfied. In Hall-Johnson I, the Court, by order filed 

September 18, 2018, dismissed the TAC in its entirety “without further leave to amend 

and with prejudice” (see RJN, Ex. C at 2:2) on the ground that all of the claims alleged 

therein were either time-barred or not cognizable. (See id. at 1:21-22 (adopting Report 

and Recommendation); see also RJN, Ex. B at 14:1-2 (recommending dismissal of TAC

because “all of [the] claims were time-barred (to the extent they were cognizable claims 

to begin with)”.) In the instant action, plaintiff once again seeks to hold the City and 

Callahan liable for Callahan’s conduct during the above-referenced telephone 

conference. Under such circumstances, if the instant action were allowed to proceed, 

defendants’ “freedom from liability” for such conduct, which was established in HallCase 3:18-cv-05553-MMC Document 28 Filed 03/19/19 Page 6 of 8
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Johnson I, “could be impaired.” See Costantini, 681 F.2d at 1202; see also Eblovi v. 

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 WL 5645150, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014)

(holding, where first action for improper foreclosure was dismissed, prosecution of 

second action predicated on same foreclosure “could impair [d]efendants’ freedom from 

liability for the foreclosure [as] established in [first action]”). 

The third and fourth criteria likewise are satisfied. Both cases are based on 

infringement of the same right, specifically, the right to pursue and secure, with the City, 

employment opportunities free from race and disability discrimination. See Nnachi v. City 

& Cty. of San Francisco, 2010 WL 3398545, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (holding 

where first action alleged age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

and second action alleged violation of Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, 

second action barred by res judicata; finding both actions “involve[d] infringement of the 

same right – [p]laintiff’s alleged right to be free from discrimination from his employer”). 

Moreover, both cases would require presentation of the same evidence, specifically, 

evidence regarding the content of the November 6, 2017, telephone conference, as well 

as evidence pertaining to the City’s alleged “municipal policy” (see Compl. ¶ 9; see also

RJN, Ex. A ¶ 107 (second set)) of race and disability discrimination. 

Accordingly, all four of the criteria bearing on whether the two cases share an 

identity of claims having been satisfied, the first element of res judicata is satisfied. 

B. Final Judgment on the Merits 

“An involuntary dismissal generally acts as a judgment on the merits for the 

purposes of res judicata, regardless of whether the dismissal results from procedural 

error or from the court’s considered examination of the plaintiff’s substantive claims.” In 

re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 885 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Nnachi, 2010 WL 3398545 at 

*5 (holding “[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice, or without leave to amend, is 

considered a final judgment on the merits”). 

As noted above, plaintiff’s TAC in Hall-Johnson I was involuntarily dismissed

without further leave to amend and with prejudice.

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Accordingly, the second element of res judicata is satisfied. 

C. Identity or Privity Between the Parties 

“The third element of the res judicata test requires identical parties or privies in the 

two actions.” Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 988. 

Hall-Johnson I and the instant action involve identical parties because, in both 

cases, plaintiff identified herself as the complaining party and named Callahan and the 

City as defendants. (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 7-8 with RJN, Ex. A at ¶¶ 7-8 (first set).)

Accordingly, the third element of res judicata is satisfied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby 

GRANTED and the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2019 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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