Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01187/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01187-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN DARIO GARCIA, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SMITH, STEWART, CHANCE, MOORE,

CLUCK, VASQUEZ, WALL, BROWN,

STRICKLAND, ELIAS, SAVALA,

MERCHANT, SUGLICH, CONTRERAS,

MORRIS, CORTEZ, PEDERSEN,

HIRING AUTHORITY JOHN/JANE

DOE’S #1 TO 5,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING REQUEST BY PLAINTIFF

TO AMEND CIVIL COMPLAINT [ECF

NO. 59], AND GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF NO. 50] 

Plaintiff Ruben Dario Garcia, Jr., and his brother, Lenin

Garcia, state prisoners proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint on

June 1, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff

Ruben Garcia filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that same

day [ECF No. 2]. United States District Court Judge Roger T.

Benitez issued an Order granting Ruben Garcia’s Motion to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis, dismissing Lenin Garcia from the lawsuit, and

dismissing the entire Complaint for failing to state a claim [ECF

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1

 Because the Second Amended Complaint, Opposition, and

Surreply are not consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to

them using the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing

system.

2 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

No. 5]. Plaintiff Ruben Garcia, Jr., filed a First Amended

Complaint on October 5, 2010, which was also dismissed sua sponte

for failing to state a claim [ECF Nos. 9, 15]. 

On December 7, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a Second Amended

Complaint against seventeen named prison officials, Defendants

Smith, Stewart, Chance, Moore, Cluck, Vasquez, Wall, Brown,

Strickland, Elias, Savala, Merchant, Suglich, Contreras, Morris,

Cortez, and Pedersen [ECF No. 16]. Garcia alleges that the

Defendants retaliated and conspired against him because he

exercised his First Amendment right to petition the government

through prison grievance procedures. (See generally Second Am.

Compl. 7-20, ECF No. 16.)1 Plaintiff argues that Defendants

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and

procedural due process, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment, and his First Amendment right to

access the courts. (See generally id. at 17-21.)

On February 3, 2011, Judge Benitez sua sponte dismissed

Garcia’s due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and access to

courts causes of action for failing to state a claim [ECF No. 17]. 

He directed service of the Second Amended Complaint on Defendants

for Plaintiff’s remaining claims of retaliation, conspiracy, and

equal protection. (Order 7-8, Feb. 3, 2011, ECF No. 17.) Garcia

then filed a motion for relief from the Court’s Order and a Notice

of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, challenging the district court’s February 3, 2011 Order

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2

 The district court ruled on Garcia’s motions because

Plaintiff’s Ninth Circuit appeal was jurisdictionally defective. 

(Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. Vacate Order 1, ECF No. 29.) The Ninth

Circuit later dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction [ECF

No. 49]. 

3

 Although the filings are identical, the Court will treat

Garcia’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 58]

and his Request to Amend [ECF No. 59] as separate documents [ECF

No. 57].

3 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

[ECF Nos. 18-20, 22]. While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending,

this case was transferred to United States District Court Judge

Anthony J. Battaglia [ECF No. 26], and Plaintiff filed another

motion contesting the district court’s February 3, 2011 Order

dismissing certain claims [ECF No. 28]. Judge Battaglia

subsequently denied both of Garcia’s motions challenging that Order

[ECF No. 29].2

The Request by Plaintiff to Amend Civil Complaint was filed

nunc pro tunc to June 3, 2011 [ECF No. 59].3 There, Garcia asks

that the Court permit him to amend his Second Amended Complaint to

cure the deficiencies identified by the district court in its

February 3, 2011 Order. (Req. Pl. Amend Civil Compl. 2, ECF No.

59.) To date, the Defendants have not opposed his Motion. 

Also before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by

Defendants Brown, Chance, Cluck, Contreras, Cortez, Elias,

Merchant, Moore, Morris, Pedersen, Savala, Smith, Stewart,

Strickland, Suglich, Vasquez, and Wall on April 26, 2011, along

with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 50]. All

seventeen named Defendants move to dismiss Garcia’s equal

protection causes of action for failing to state a claim. (Mot.

Dismiss 1, ECF No. 50; see id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5.) In

addition, Defendants Cluck, Elias, Morris, Pedersen, and Strickland

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each argue that they should be dismissed from the lawsuit because

the allegations set forth against each of them are insufficient to

state a claim. (Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No. 50; see id. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 2-5.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was

filed nunc pro tunc to June 3, 2011 [ECF No. 58]. The Defendants

filed a Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2011 [ECF No. 60]. Garcia’s

Supplemental Motion in Opposition was filed nunc pro tunc to July

6, 2011, which the Court construes as a Surreply [ECF No. 63]. 

This Court has reviewed the Second Amended Complaint and

Garcia’s Request to Amend. The Court has also reviewed Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’ Reply, and

Garcia’s Surreply. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s

Request to Amend should be DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The contentions in Garcia’s Second Amended Complaint arise

from events that occurred while he was incarcerated at Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California (“Donovan”). 

(Second Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 16.) The Plaintiff’s surviving

claims in counts one, two, three, and four allege retaliation,

conspiracy, and equal protection causes of action. (See generally

id. 7-20.)

In count one, Garcia complains that on July 25, 2009, he was

present when Plaintiff's brother handed Defendant Sergeant Vasquez

a grievance challenging the new rule requiring inmates to walk to

the “chow hall” in single file and with their shirts tucked in. 

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(See Second Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 16.) Defendants Vasquez,

Steward, and Chance then threatened Garcia that unless he withdrew

the grievances he had filed, he would be sent to administrative

segregation. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff asserts that soon after,

Defendant Chance ordered Garcia to place his hands against the wall

and spread his feet. (Id. at 9.) Defendants Vasquez and Chance

grabbed Plaintiff by the back of his shirt, screamed at him, and

told him that he should withdraw his grievances. (Id.) Garcia

contends that Sergeant Vasquez sent Plaintiff to his housing unit

and told him that he had one hour to consider whether to retract

his appeals. (Id.) Defendant Wall then approached Plaintiff's

cell and told Garcia that Lieutenant Elias wanted to know whether

he had decided to withdraw the grievances. (Id.) When Garcia

responded that he would not retract them, he was purportedly

handcuffed and escorted to the “inside of the program office.” 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that while in the office, Defendant Wall

grabbed a video camera and began recording an interview of the

Plaintiff conducted by Lieutenant Elias, during which Garcia stated

that he was being sent to administrative segregation on fabricated

charges in retaliation for filing grievances against Defendant

Chance and other staff. (Id.) Defendant Elias interrupted

Plaintiff to ask him whether he was claiming that staff used

excessive force on him, to which Garcia replied that he was not. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Elias was visibly upset and yelled to Defendant

Wall to turn off the video camera, and she terminated the

interview. (Id. at 10.)

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Defendant Elias filed a segregation order that same day, which

was also signed by Defendant Moore, instructing that Plaintiff be

retained in administrative segregation. (Id. (citing id. Attach.

#3 Ex. 10, at 2).) Garcia maintains that the order was issued

without justification and under the pretext that Garcia had alleged

an excessive use of force. (See id. at 7-10.) By signing a

segregation order based on fabricated events, Defendants Elias and

Moore conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff. (See id. at 10.) 

The Plaintiff argues that two days later, he submitted an

inmate appeal challenging his improper segregation, and hearings

were conducted in response. (Id.) Garcia maintains that

Defendants Cortez, Suglich, and Contreras subsequently conceded

that there was no evidence to support Defendant Elias’s decision to

segregate Garcia. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff was nonetheless held in

administrative segregation, in part, pending completion of an

investigation into his unrelated complaint of excessive force,

submitted over a year earlier, on April 20, 2008. (Id. at 11-12;

see id. Attach. #3 Ex. 13, at 21, Ex. 14, at 23.) The Defendants

fabricated this investigation merely to retain Plaintiff in

segregation. (Second Am. Compl. 11-12, ECF No. 16.) Garcia

contends that Defendants Cortez, Suglich, and Contreras conspired

with Defendants Elias and Moore to retaliate against Plaintiff by

keeping him in segregation. (Id. at 12; see id. at 10.) According

to Plaintiff, neither the July 25, 2009 segregation order nor the

subsequent investigation was supported by any evidence. (Id. at

12.) 

Donovan’s Institution Classification Committee ultimately

released Plaintiff from administrative segregation on September 3,

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2009. (Id.; see id. Attach. #3 Ex. 14, at 23.) The committee

noted that Garcia was partially restricted from being housed with

“black, mexican, and white” inmates due to past altercations. 

(Id.) When Plaintiff was released from administrative segregation,

Defendants Savala and Wall assigned Garcia to a cell with a Mexican

inmate, and Plaintiff refused the housing assignment. (See Second

Am. Compl. 12-13, ECF No. 16.) Without reviewing Garcia’s central

file to determine his housing restrictions, Defendant Savala issued

a segregation order for Garcia’s refusal to accept assigned

housing. (Id. at 13; see id. Attach. #3 Ex. 17, at 36.) The

Plaintiff alleges that he was once again placed in administrative

segregation in retaliation for filing grievances. (Second Am.

Compl. 14-15, ECF No. 16.) Defendants Wall, Savala, Suglich, and

Contreras then issued a rules violation report that was also

supported by fabricated charges in retaliation and in furtherance

of their conspiracy to punish Plaintiff. (Id. at 15.) 

In count two, Garcia argues that he was released from

administrative segregation again on October 9, 2009. (Id. at 17.)

That same day, Plaintiff signed a cell move request that he gave to

his brother and former plaintiff, Lenin Garcia, who then signed it

and submitted it to prison officials. (Id.) Plaintiff and his

brother requested to be housed in the same cell together, pursuant

to Donovan’s “convenient cell move program,” a program that allows

inmates who are similarly situated to ask to be celled together 

(Id.) The brothers had been cellmates for five and one-half years

before Garcia was sent to administrative segregation, and at the

time the form was submitted, Plaintiff’s brother did not have any

cellmate. (Id.) The Defendants denied the cell move request;

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Plaintiff and his brother subsequently submitted several additional

applications that were also denied. (Id.) Yet, Defendants

permitted four other sets of brothers housed in facility three to

be celled together through this program. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff

urges that the denials were part of Defendants’ conspiracy to

retaliate against him. (Id. at 17.) As a result, Garcia contends

that he was denied the equal opportunity to participate in the

institutional program and be treated the same as similarly situated

inmates. (Id. at 18.)

In count three, the Plaintiff maintains that he had been

assigned a job at the laundry division of the Prison Industry

Authority (PIA) since February 14, 2008. (Id. at 19.) When he was

released from administrative segregation on October 9, 2009,

Defendants Suglich, Cortez, and Contreras refused to reinstate

Plaintiff to his job, despite his prior satisfactory job

performance. (Id.) Since his release from administrative

segregation, Garcia maintains, there were at least thirty job

openings at PIA laundry, yet the Defendants conspired to deny him

reinstatement without cause. (Id.) Other inmates were transferred

to administrative segregation for several months, terminated from

their jobs at PIA laundry, and were subsequently reinstated to

their positions when they were released from segregation. (Id.) 

The Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ conduct therefore violates

his right to equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Id.)

In count four, Garcia makes generalized allegations of a

conspiracy to violate his civil rights, reiterating the

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constitutional violations he has specified in counts one, two, and

three. (Id. at 20.)

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Garcia seeks leave to amend his allegations to cure the

defects identified by the district court in its February 3, 2011

Order. (Req. Pl. Am. Civil Compl. 2, ECF No. 59.) The Plaintiff

does not provide any additional basis for his request.

On February 3, 2011, the district court judge previously

assigned to this case dismissed Plaintiff’s due process, cruel and

unusual punishment, and access to courts causes of action without

prejudice and without leave to amend, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). (Order 2, 7, Feb. 3, 2011, ECF

No. 17.) The current district court judge, Judge Battaglia, found

that Garcia’s subsequent challenges of Judge Benitez’s ruling were

without merit. (Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. Vacate Order 2-3, ECF No.

29.) Because Plaintiff’s due process, cruel and unusual

punishment, and access to courts causes of action were dismissed

without leave to amend, the district court should DENY Garcia’s

request to amend them. 

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 874 (2009). 

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,

and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792

F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to

present evidence to support the asserted claims. Jackson v.

Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 184 (2005) (quotation

omitted); see Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is generally proper

only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988)). 

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The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is not required to accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”) 

“Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the court may not generally consider materials

outside of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151

F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citations omitted). 

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc, 51 F.3d at

1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

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1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

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Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se

civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a pro se

litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

These guidelines apply to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

 All of the Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s equal

protection claims should be dismissed because Garcia failed to

allege that he is a member of a protected class and that defendants

acted with the intent to discriminate. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 50.) Additionally, Defendants Cluck,

Elias, Morris, Pedersen, and Strickland each argue they should be

dismissed. (Id. at 2-5.) 

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A. Failure to State an Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

ensures that similarly situated persons are treated alike. City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

This right extends to prisoners. Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974). The equal protection guarantee safeguards not only

groups of people, but also individuals who would constitute a

“class of one.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000). 

A plaintiff can establish an equal protection cause of action

by demonstrating that the defendant intentionally discriminated on

the basis of plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, such as

race, religion, national origin, and poverty. Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998); Damiano v. Fla.

Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986); see

United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011)

(stating that prisoners do not constitute a suspect class for equal

protection purposes). Alternatively, if the state action does not

implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a

plaintiff can make an equal protection claim by establishing that

the defendant intentionally treated plaintiff differently from

other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis for

the difference in treatment. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553

U.S. 591, 601 (2008); Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 

1. Defendants’ argument

 The Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim is that after he

was released from administrative segregation, his requests to be

housed with his brother were denied, and he was not reinstated to

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 The basis for Plaintiff’s equal protection allegations is

that he was not permitted to live with his brother and was not

reinstated to his job at PIA laundry. (See Second Am. Compl. 17-

19, ECF No. 16.) Yet, in his Opposition, Garcia attempts to expand

the scope of his equal protection claim to include his placement in

administrative segregation. (Opp’n 5, ECF No. 58.) Because this

is an argument raised for the first time in the Opposition, the

Court will only consider Garcia’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as

pleaded in the Second Amended Complaint. Schneider, 151 F.3d at

1197 n.1; see Harrell, 13 F.3d at 236. 

15 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

his prison job at PIA laundry. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 5, ECF No. 50.) “These allegations, while admittedly sufficient

to plead a case for retaliation, do not plead a case for a

violation of the equal protection clause.” (Id.) Merely being an

inmate, Defendants contend, does not make Plaintiff part of a

suspect class. (Reply Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 60.) Because Garcia

has not argued that he is a member of a protected class and that

Defendants intended to discriminate against him because of his

membership in that class, Defendants insist that Plaintiff has

failed to state an equal protection claim. (Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 50.)

2. Plaintiff’s argument

Garcia maintains that he has adequately alleged a Fourteenth

Amendment claim. (See Opp’n 4-6, ECF No. 58.)4 Plaintiff argues

that Defendants did not allow him to participate in the convenient

cell move program. (See Opp’n 6, ECF No. 58.) Specifically,

Defendants granted other similarly situated inmates’ cell move

requests but denied Plaintiff’s requests to retaliate against him. 

(Id.) With regard to the job reinstatement, Garcia has alleged

that two other prisoners lost their jobs at the laundry department

when they were placed in segregation for several months, yet both

inmates were subsequently reinstated. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff, in

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contrast, was not reinstated to his job. (Id. at 5-6.) Garcia

insists that Defendants’ disparate treatment was in retaliation for

his refusal to retract his grievances. (See id. at 6.) 

Finally, Plaintiff submits that it is disingenuous for

Defendants to concede that he has stated a retaliation claim but

deny that he has stated an equal protection claim. (Surreply 6,

ECF No. 63; see Opp’n 6, ECF No. 58.) Garcia asserts that by their

concession, Defendants have actually accepted responsibility for

violating Garcia’s right to equal protection through their

retaliatory and conspiratorial acts. (Opp’n 6, ECF No. 58;

Surreply 7, ECF No. 63.) Although Plaintiff does not have a

constitutional right to have a prison job or to be housed with a

particular inmate, Garcia contends that he has a right to be

treated the same as other inmates. (See Opp’n 6, ECF No. 58;

Surreply 6-7, ECF No. 63.) 

3. The Second Amended Complaint

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails

simply because he has not asserted discrimination based on his

membership in a protected class. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 5, ECF No. 50.) They represent that Garcia’s theory of

liability represents a “fundamental misunderstanding of the equal

protection clause.” (Reply Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 60.) 

On the contrary, the Defendants’ theory ignores Supreme Court

precedent and reads the Equal Protection Clause too narrowly. In

Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, the Court

determined “whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a

‘class of one’ where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a

class or group.” The answer was yes. Id. “Our cases have

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recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class

of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated

and that there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.” Id.

Although Garcia’s assertions do not involve a fundamental

right or a suspect classification, he can establish a “class of

one” equal protection claim by showing that Defendants treated him

differently without any rational basis for the mistreatment. 

Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603; Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Reece v. Sisto,

No. CIV S-10-0203 JAM EFB P, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87931, at *7-8

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that plaintiff had stated an

equal protection claim under an Olech-type analysis, despite

defendants’ contention that plaintiff failed to allege he was a

member of a protected class). 

Here, Garcia has alleged that, unlike the other inmates in

facility three, Defendants intentionally prevented him from

participating in the institutional cell move program merely because

he filed too many grievances. (See Second Am. Compl. 17-18, ECF

No. 16.) The Plaintiff and his brother are both Peurto Rican, and

at the time the initial cell move request was submitted, Plaintiff

was restricted from being housed with “black, mexican, and white”

inmates, and his brother was housed in a cell by himself. (Id. at

17; see id. Attach. #3 Ex. 14, at 23.) The brothers were

compatible cellmates because they had lived in the same cell for

five and one-half years prior to Garcia’s segregation. (Second Am.

Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants Merchant

and Suglich admitted their retaliatory motive to Plaintiff during a

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verbal altercation with him. (Id.) The Defendants granted cell

move requests submitted by four other sets of inmate brothers also

housed in facility three. (Id. at 18.) 

Similarly, Garcia has asserted that, unlike the other inmates 

in facility three, Defendants intentionally denied him

reinstatement to his prison job at PIA laundry when he was released

from administrative segregation. (Id. at 19.) The Defendants

reinstated several other facility three inmates to their jobs at

PIA laundry, even though those prisoners had arrived at the

facility after Garcia. (Id.) Two of those prisoners, inmates

Vargas and Isbirr-Rogers Wright, were similarly placed in

administrative segregation for departmental investigations on two

different occasions. (Id.) Both prisoners were terminated from

their jobs at PIA laundry, and they spent several months in

segregation. (Id.) On each occasion, Defendants reinstated the

two inmates at PIA laundry after they were released back to general

population. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that he was likewise sent to

administrative segregation for a departmental investigation and

terminated from his job at PIA laundry, yet the Defendants refused

to reinstate him even though there were more than thirty job

vacancies in the department. (Id.) The Plaintiff insists that

Defendants treated him differently merely to punish him for filing

so many grievances. (Id.) 

Garcia has adequately identified, beyond a speculative level,

other individuals with whom he can be compared for equal protection

purposes. See Hamer v. El Dorado County, No. CIV S-08-2269 KJM EFB

PS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20436, at *38-39 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1,

2011). Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a “class of one” equal

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protection claim by asserting that Defendants intentionally treated

him differently from other similarly situated inmates without any

rational basis. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603; Olech, 528 U.S. at

564. The Defendants have not provided a rational basis for the

alleged differential treatment. See Reece, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

87931, at *7-8 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss because it

was uncertain whether the justification for their conduct would

provide a rational basis for treating plaintiff differently from

other inmates). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the equal protection

claims on the basis that Garcia has not alleged that he is a member

of a protected class and that Defendants intended to discriminate

against him because of that status should be DENIED.

B. Failure to State a Claim Against Defendants Cluck, Elias,

Morris, Pedersen, and Strickland

In addition, these five Defendants each argue that they should

be dismissed from the lawsuit because Garcia has not stated a claim

against any of them. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF

No. 50.) 

1. Correctional Officer Cluck

Defendant Cluck initially argues that to the extent

Plaintiff's brother submitted the cell move request, Plaintiff

lacks standing to make allegations against Cluck on behalf of

Plaintiff’s brother. (Id. at 2; Reply Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 60.) 

Further, Garcia has alleged that Defendant Savala directed that

Plaintiff's cell move request be denied. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 50 (citing Second Am. Compl. 17, ECF No.

16).) Plaintiff has not asserted that a correctional officer, such

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as Cluck, had any authority to grant the cell move request or

overrule a lieutenant's direct orders. (Id.) 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff insists that he has standing to

challenge the denial of the cell move request submitted by his

brother. (Opp'n 7, ECF No. 58.) Prison regulations provide that

any two prisoners seeking to be housed together pursuant to

Donovan’s cell move program must submit one form that is signed by

all applicable individuals. (Id. (citing Second Am. Compl. Attach.

#4 Ex. 21, at 27, ECF No. 16).) Plaintiff argues that he was

merely adhering to departmental guidelines by filling out and

signing the cell move request form so that his brother could sign

in agreement and submit it to Defendants. (Id. at 7-8.) Garcia

additionally maintains that officer Cluck was the housing unit

officer who had a duty to process the cellmate request by

submitting it to his immediate supervisor. (Id. at 8.) 

 The Defendant replies by arguing that there is nothing to

suggest that Cluck failed to process the cell move request himself

or present it to a supervisor for processing. (Reply Mem. P. & A.

2, ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff also has not pointed to any allegation

demonstrating that following a supervisor's instructions

constitutes conspiratorial conduct. (Id.) 

a. Standing

Defendant Cluck's argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to

challenge the denial of the cellmate request submitted by his

brother is unavailing. It is well established that a plaintiff may

not assert the legal rights of third parties. Powers v. Ohio, 499

U.S. 400, 410 (1991); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 

Yet, Garcia's alleged harm is the denial of a request for a cell

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move that he completed and that was signed by both Plaintiff and

his brother, Lenin Garcia. It is inconsequential that his brother

ultimately submitted the joint request because Plaintiff had a

sufficient interest in whether the request was granted or denied,

as he asserts it led to the deprivation of a constitutional right. 

(See Second Am. Compl. 17-18, ECF No. 16 (alleging retaliation,

conspiracy, and equal protection claims arising from the denial of

the cellmate application request); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (stating

that a plaintiff must allege a “distinct and palpable injury to

himself,” even if it is an injury shared by other nonparty

individuals). 

b. Retaliation

“A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are

not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Inmates have a

constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances and to

file suit without being subjected to retaliation by government

officials. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005);

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); see

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Silva v. Di Vittorio,

No. 08-15620, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19610, at *22 (9th Cir. Sept.

26, 2011). Because retaliation by prison officials may chill a

prisoner's exercise of legitimate constitutional rights,

retaliatory conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise

rise to the level of a violation. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235,

1242 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

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A plaintiff can state a conspiracy to violate civil rights

claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849

F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988)). To make a claim under § 1985, a

plaintiff must set forth “an allegation of racial or class-based

discriminatory animus.” Id.; see also Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Garcia's Second Amended

Complaint does not advance a racial or other discriminatory motive,

and Plaintiff has specified that his conspiracy claim is made

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Second Am. Compl. 20, ECF No. 16.) 

The Court will therefore evaluate Garcia's conspiracy claim under

the requirements of § 1983.

 “To recover under § 1983 for such retaliation, a plaintiff must

prove: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2)

as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to

engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial

causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity

and the adverse action.” Blair v. Bethel School Dist., 608 F.3d

540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citing Pinard v.

Clatskanie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

“[A] successful retaliation claim requires a finding that ‘the

prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate

goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly

enough to achieve such goals.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rizzo v Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and

proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the

conduct he complains of.” Id. 

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In the Second Amended Complaint, Garcia asserts that

Defendants Cluck and Brown, as well as a nonparty officer,

“notified” Plaintiff’s brother that because Plaintiff and his

brother had filed grievances and lawsuits against Donovan staff,

they would not be allowed to be cellmates anymore. (Second Am.

Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) Garcia and his brother submitted several

other applications to Defendant Cluck, as well as several other

Defendants, which were all denied. (Id.) 

First, the Plaintiff has alleged that he was engaged in the

constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the government

by way of inmate grievances. Blair, 608 F.3d at 543; see Rhodes,

408 F.3d at 567 (stating that inmates have a First Amendment right

to file prison grievances). 

Second, Garcia has claimed that he was subject to adverse

action that would discourage an ordinary person from further

engaging in the protected activity. See Blair, 608 F.3d at 543.

Plaintiff urges that his brother properly submitted the request

form to Officer Cluck, the housing unit officer who had a duty to

process it by presenting it to his immediate supervisor. (Opp'n 8,

ECF No. 58; see also Second Am. Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) Garcia

claims Defendant Cluck threatened that “because the Plaintiff and

Lenin Garcia had filed grievances and have litigation against

[prison staff] that they are not going to allow the Plaintiff and

Lenin Garcia to cell-up together anymore . . . .” (Second Am.

Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff further maintains that all of

the cell requests that he and his brother submitted “had been

denied by Defendants.” (Id.) 

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If true, Cluck’s threat could discourage a reasonable person

from exercising the right to free speech. Brodheim v. Cry, 584

F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the mere threat of

harm can be an adverse action regardless of whether it is carried

out, even if the threat lacks an “explicit, specific threat of

discipline”); see also Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676,

687 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that a threat made in retaliation

for the exercise of First Amendment rights is actionable under §

1983); Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216, 218 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A]

threat of retaliation is sufficient injury if made in retaliation

for an inmate’s use of prison grievance procedures.”); Orr v.

Hernandez, No. CV-08-0472-JLQ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68739, at *18

(E.D. Cal. July 20, 2009). 

Further, Garcia has asserted that he and his brother submitted

a joint grievance for preventing them from being cellmates. 

(Second Am. Compl. 22, ECF No. 16; see id. Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at

1-15.) The Plaintiff handed the initial appeal to Defendant Cluck

on October 14, 2009, yet he never received a response to that

appeal or subsequent appeals. (Second Am. Compl. 22, ECF No. 16

(citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at 1-15).) “The refusal to process

[the] appeal . . . was part of the conspiracy over a period of time

to frustrate the appeals process and dissuade the Plaintiff from

filling [sic] the instant Civil Complaint under the Civil Rights

Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Second Am. Compl. 22, ECF No. 16; see

Opp'n 8, ECF No. 58 (alleging that Defendant Cluck concealed and

refused to properly process the joint appeal challenging the

continued denial of cell move requests made by Plaintiff and his

brother). Garcia has adequately pleaded adverse action by Officer

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Cluck, and there is no indication that Cluck made the threat to

advance any legitimate goal. 

Defendant’s argument that he was directed by Defendant Savala

to deny the request is unavailling. Cluck is alleged to have

threatened that Plaintiff’s cell move requests would be continually

denied. (Second Am. Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) Garcia asserts that

Defendants Merchant and Suglich summoned him to the program office

and told him that they would ensure he would not cell with his

brother again because of his grievances, and Defendant Lieutenant

Savala would ensure that all staff members were instructed to do

the same. (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at 7, 11, 15; Ex. 4, at 26.) 

These contentions do not preclude Garcia from also stating a

retaliation claim against Officer Cluck for similar threats.

Third, Plaintiff has asserted a sufficient connection between

his filing of grievances and Cluck's threats that his cellmate

applications would continue to be denied. See Blair, 608 F.3d at

543; (Second Am. Compl. 17, ECF No. 16). Based on these

contentions, Defendant Cluck's Motion to Dismiss the retaliation

claim against him should be DENIED. 

c. Conspiracy

To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show (1) an agreement between the defendants to deprive plaintiff

of a constitutional right, (2) an overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and (3) a constitutional deprivation. Garcia v. Grimm,

No. 06cv225 WQH (PCL), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20522, at *24 (S.D.

Cal. Mar. 2, 2011); see also Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177

F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1999). “To be liable, each participant

in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but

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each participant must at least share the common objective of the

conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865

F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). Because conspiracies are secret

agreements, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a

conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from

evidence of the defendant’s actions.” Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at

856-57. Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to

state a claim for relief. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,

821 (9th Cir. 1989).

First, Garcia has adequately asserted that there was an

agreement between Cluck and the other Defendants to retaliate

against Plaintiff for his protected speech activities. See

Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856. Defendants Gluck and Brown purportedly

made threatening remarks. (Second Am. Compl. 17, ECF No. 16.) 

Plaintiff has pleaded facts demonstrating that Defendant’s actions

were “‘unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement.’” 

See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kunik v. Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574,

1580 (7th Cir. 1991)). 

Second, Plaintiff has alleged that Officer Cluck acted in

furtherance of an illegal objective. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at

856. The Defendant purportedly threatened that Plaintiff's cell

move requests would continually be denied and concealed the inmate

grievance that Garcia handed him on October 14, 2009, by refusing

to process it. (Second Am. Compl. 17, 22, ECF No. 16; see Opp’n 8-

9, ECF No. 58 (arguing that Defendant's statement is circumstantial

evidence that Defendant was part of the conspiracy to retaliate

against him because Cluck knew the “exact details of the plan” and

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shared the common objective of the conspiracy to retaliate against

Plaintiff).) Officer Cluck’s knowledge of the conspiracy can

reasonably be inferred from these actions. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d

at 857 (finding that defendants’ participation in the retaliatory

conspiracy could be inferred from their hostile statements and

threats). Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to infer that

Defendant’s actions were the result of an understanding to

accomplish the conspiracy’s objectives. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr.

v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d at 1301. 

Third, as discussed, the Plaintiff has alleged that

Defendant’s conduct resulted in Garcia’s constitutional rights

being violated. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856. Garcia has

asserted that he endured threats and adverse disciplinary responses

because he filed grievances. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 (“The

power of a threat lies not in any negative actions eventually

taken, but in the apprehension it creates in the recipient of the

threat.”) Consequently, Defendant Cluck’s Motion to Dismiss should

be DENIED.

2. Lieutenant Elias

Defendant Elias moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protective

claim on the basis that Garcia has not alleged that he is a member

of a protected class. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

3-4, ECF No. 50.) All the Defendants have asserted this argument. 

(See id. at 5.) For the reasons outlined above, the argument is

incorrect. See Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. Because the

Court has recommended that the argument is not a basis for

dismissing Plaintiff's equal protection claims, Elias fares no

better.

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The Defendant also contends that Plaintiff fails to state a

retaliation claim based on Elias’s purported termination of the

videotaped interview with Garcia and her alleged involvement in the

denial of Garcia’s cell move request. (Id. at 3-4.) Lieutenant

Elias maintains that Plaintiff lacks standing to contest the denial

of the cell move application, and there is nothing to suggest that

Elias had authority to grant the cell move over Defendant Savala's

instructions to deny it. (Id.) Finally, the Defendant argues that

Garcia's conspiracy claim against her also fails. (See id. at 3.)

In response, Plaintiff insists that he has sufficiently

pleaded that Lieutenant Elias and other Defendants verbally

harassed him and explicitly threatened that they would assign him

to administrative segregation unless he withdrew his inmate

grievances. (Opp’n 9-10, ECF No. 58.) Elias then used her

authority as a lieutenant to place Plaintiff in administrative

segregation. (Id. at 10.) Further, Garcia has maintained that as

program lieutenant, Elias had the authority to grant or deny a

prisoner’s cell move request. (Id.; Surreply 5-6, ECF No. 63.) 

In her Reply, Defendant concedes that she authored the order

instructing that Garcia be segregated. (Reply Mem. P. & A. 2-3,

ECF No. 60.) According to Elias, in the Second Amended Complaint,

Garcia made excessive force accusations, which justified her order. 

(Id.) For example, Plaintiff states that he was forced up against

the wall, had his shirt grabbed and his pants pulled, and was

threatened. (Id. at 2 (citing Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 16).) 

“Plaintiff's claim, then, that he was not making excessive force

allegations is not credible and on its face, the complaint shows

that there was a valid penological purpose in the initial

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administrative segregation order - the only order in which Elias

was involved.” (Id. at 2-3.) Garcia also has not argued that the

cell move request was ever submitted to Elias, and merely asserting

that Defendant could have approved the request is insufficient. 

(Id. at 3.) 

Defendant belatedly contests the adequacy of Plaintiff’s

allegations concerning her segregation order. (Id. at 2-3.) This

contention was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss. (Compare Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3-4, ECF No. 50 (arguing that

Garcia’s claims that she terminated the videotaped interview,

ordered the camera to be turned off in a menacing manner, and

denied the cell move request are insufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss), with Reply Mem. P. & A. 2-3, ECF No. 60 (acknowledging

that the Second Amended Complaint also charges Elias with issuing a

segregation order based on fabricated charges, yet insisting that

there was a peneological purpose for placing Garcia in

administrative segregation).) 

It is improper for a moving party to introduce different legal

arguments in a reply brief. United States ex rel. Giles v. Sardie,

191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894-95 (1990)); see Zamani v. Carnes,

491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not

consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”);

Dytch v. Yoon, No. C 10-02915 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22594, at

*9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011); Sogeti USA LLC v. Scariano, 606 F.

Supp. 2d 1080, 1086 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“The Court will not grant a

motion to dismiss on the basis of argument first raised in a

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reply.”). Accordingly, the Court will not consider the Defendant’s

alleged peneological justification for the segregation order. 

a. Retaliation

To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must contend

that he engaged in a protected activity and was subjected to

adverse action by the defendant that would discourage an ordinary

person from exercising that right. See Blair, 608 F.3d at 543. 

The plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id. 

In the Second Amended Complaint, Garcia has alleged that he

engaged in the protected activity of petitioning the government

through prisoner grievances. See Blair, 608 F.3d at 543. As

analyzed previously, Defendant’s argument that Garcia lacks

standing to challenge the denial of his grievances is without

merit. 

Elias is alleged to have sent Defendant Wall to ask whether

Plaintiff was going to withdraw his grievances. (Second Am. Compl.

9, ECF No. 16.) Later that day, Elias interviewed Garcia but

purportedly terminated the questioning when Garcia denied making

excessive force claims. (Id. at 9-10.) The lieutenant then issued

an order placing Plaintiff in administrative segregation and

subsequently denied Garcia’s cell move request, even though she had

the authority to grant it. (Id. at 10, 17; Opp’n 10, ECF No. 58.) 

These allegations are sufficient to constitute the “adverse action”

required to state a retaliation claim. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that retaliatory placement in

administrative segregation for filing grievances constitutes

adverse conduct); see Gonzalez v. Doe, No. 07-cv-1962-W(POR), 2010

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98207, at *22 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2010)

(explaining that adverse action exists where prisoners suffer

confinement). 

Finally, the Plaintiff has stated a sufficient causal

relationship between the protected activity and the adverse action. 

See Blair, 608 F.3d at 543. Although Garcia attributes certain

actions to Defendants Vasquez and Chance, Plaintiff has pleaded

that he never made an excessive force claim, which he reiterated

directly to the lieutenant. (Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 16.) 

Nonetheless, Elias is alleged to have fabricated a justification

for the segregation order because Garcia refused to withdraw his

grievances. For all of these reasons, the Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim should be DENIED.

b. Conspiracy

To allege a conspiracy to violate civil rights, a plaintiff

must assert there was an agreement between the defendants to

deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Gilbrook, 177

F.3d at 856. The defendant must have committed an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, resulting in a constitutional

deprivation. Id.

The Plaintiff has asserted that there was an agreement between

Elias and other Defendants to retaliate against Garcia for filing

inmate grievances. See id. He has also sufficiently pleaded that

Lieutenant Elias committed an overt act to further the Defendants'

conspiracy to retaliate. See id. Defendant purportedly sent an

officer to ask Plaintiff whether he had decided to withdraw his

grievances. When the Plaintiff denied that he was making an

excessive force claim, the lieutenant terminated the interview and

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issued a segregation order. Garcia also maintains that the

Defendant subsequently denied his cell move application. Lastly,

the Plaintiff contends that Defendant's actions violated his

constitutional rights because he was held in administrative

segregation as punishment for exercising his First Amendment

rights. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856. In light of the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant’s actions do

not advance a legitimate peneological justification. See Pratt, 65

F.3d at 806. 

Accordingly, Lieutenant Elias's Motion to Dismiss Garcia's

conspiracy claim should be DENIED.

3. Warden Morris and Correctional Counselor II Pedersen

Defendants Morris and Pedersen maintain that the only

contentions against them in the Second Amended Complaint concern

Plaintiff’s access to courts claim in count five, which was

dismissed on March 15, 2011. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

4, ECF No. 50.) Because there are no remaining causes of action

against them, Morris and Pedersen argue that they should be

dismissed entirely. (Id.) The Plaintiff argues in opposition that

he should be permitted to amend his Second Amended Complaint before

the Court rules on Defendants Morris and Pedersen’s Motion to

Dismiss. (Opp’n 11, ECF No. 58.) Morris and Pedersen challenge

Garcia’s request to amend because he does not provide any

indication as to what he seeks to allege against either Defendant. 

(Reply Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff initiated this

lawsuit more than one year ago, he has amended his pleading twice,

and he has sued seventeen individuals. (Id.) If Garcia had a

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claim to make against either of them, Defendants maintain, he

should have asserted it already. (Id.) 

The Court has addressed Garcia’s attempt to amend claims that

Judge Benitez dismissed without leave to amend on February 3, 2011,

and Judge Battaglia affirmed on March 21, 2011. The Court will not

entertain Garcia’s access to courts claim because it was dismissed

without leave to amend. Because this allegation is the only

contention pleaded against Defendants Morris and Pedersen, Garcia’s

claims against them should be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

4. Sergeant Strickland

Defendant Strickland submits that Garcia’s only claim against

him concerns the denial of Plaintiff’s cell move request, which

Garcia lacks standing to challenge. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 4, ECF No. 50.) The Defendant further argues that nothing

in the record demonstrates he had actual authority to deny the cell

move request or overrule the orders of Defendant Lieutenant

Savala. (Id.; Reply Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 60.) According to

Strickland, Garcia’s conspiracy claim also fails. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4-5, ECF No. 50.) 

 Plaintiff reiterates that he does not lack standing to

challenge the denial of his cell move request. (Opp’n 11, ECF No.

58.) He also contends that Defendant Strickland was “assigned the

post of program and yard sergeant,” and he had the authority to

grant or deny Plaintiff’s cell move request. (Id.) Sergeant

Strickland’s failure to grant the request evidences his role in the

conspiracy to retaliate against Garcia for submitting grievances.

 (Id.)

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a. Retaliation 

The Plaintiff has asserted that he was engaged in the

constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the government

through inmate grievances. See Blair, 608 F.3d at 543. He has

failed to allege, however, that Strickland committed an adverse

action that would discourage an ordinary person from exercising his

or her rights. See id. The action taken by the Defendant —

receiving Plaintiff’s cell move request that was eventually denied

— was not “clearly adverse” to the Plaintiff and does not

constitute the type of adverse action required to state a

retaliation claim. See Garland v. Skribner, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

78835, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing examples of

action that is clearly adverse to the plaintiff). Garcia has not

provided facts suggesting that Strickland participated in the

decision to deny the request, caused the denial, or otherwise acted

in furtherance of the purported conspiracy. See Harris v. City of

Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that

liability is established by showing that defendants either

personally participated in a deprivation of plaintiff's rights, or

caused the deprivation to occur). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

the retaliation claim against him should be GRANTED. 

Courts must give a plaintiff leave to amend an allegation unless he

could not possibly cure the claim by asserting other facts. Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127. A plaintiff should not be given the opportunity

to amend when doing so would be futile. See James, 221 F.3d at

1077. A court's discretion regarding amendments is “especially”

broad if it has already granted the party leave to amend. 

Sitanggang v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 419 F. App'x 756, 757

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(9th Cir. 2011) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d

183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The district court dismissed Plaintiff's original Complaint,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b), 1915A(b), and granted him

leave to amend to correct the deficiencies outlined by the Court

[ECF No. 5]. The district court similarly dismissed Garcia's First

Amended Complaint, yet gave him leave to amend his pleading to cure

the defects identified by the court [ECF No. 15]. Because Garcia

has already been given two opportunities to state a retaliation

claim against Defendant Strickland, he should not be given further

leave to amend. See Sitanggang, 419 F. App'x at 757. 

 b. Conspiracy

Although Plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory manner that

there was an agreement between Sergeant Strickland and the other

Defendants to retaliate against him for filing grievances, the

facts in the Second Amended Complaint are insufficient to support a

retaliation claim. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856. Further,

Plaintiff has not stated that Defendant Strickland committed an

overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to retaliate. See id.

The allegations are insufficient to tie Strickland to the

conspiracy. Id. at 857. Merely alleging that Strickland was one

of multiple Defendants who received Plaintiff’s cell move requests

that were ultimately denied is insufficient to constitute an overt

act. Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to

state a claim, and Defendant Strickland’s Motion to Dismiss the

conspiracy cause of action should be GRANTED. See Burns, 883 F.2d

at 822. Because Plaintiff has had three opportunities to plead a

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conspiracy claim against Strickland, Garcia should not be given

further leave to amend. See Sitanggang, 419 F. App'x at 757. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss Defendants

Cluck and Elias from the lawsuit should be DENIED. The only

allegations against Defendants Morris and Pedersen concern

Plaintiff’s right to access the courts. Because this claim has

been dismissed without leave to amend, Defendants Morris and

Pedersen’s Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED without leave to

amend. Finally, the Motion to Dismiss Defendant Strickland from

the action should be GRANTED without leave to amend. With the

exception of Defendants Morris, Pedersen, and Strickland, the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims

on the basis that Garcia has not alleged that he is a member of a

protected class and that the defendants acted with an intent to

discriminate should be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 6, 2012. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 20, 2012. 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\GARCIA1187\R&R re Mot. Leave to Amend & MTD.wpd 37 10cv01187 AJB(RBB)

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: December 13, 2011 ______________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Battaglia

All Parties of Record

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