Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01923/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01923-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony P. Keyter, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John McCain, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-1923-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Anthony P. Keyter has filed a complaint against Senators John

McCain and Jon Kyl alleging that they breached their common law, moral, and statutory

duties by failing to investigate wrongful conduct by President George W. Bush and other

federal and state officials who allegedly have disregarded the commission of 1.6 million

crimes. Doc. #1. Defendants McCain and Kyl have moved to dismiss the complaint

pursuant t o Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Doc. #9. Plaintiff has filed a

response and Defendants have filed a reply. Docs. ##13, 18. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Background

This is not Plaintiff’s first legal action. T he wrongs alleged in his complaint arise out

of Plaintiff’s marital dissolution proceedings in the State of Washington. Plaint iff has

litigated various claims and appeals in Washington state court, has filed a lawsuit against

President Bush in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and has

Case 2:05-cv-01923-DGC Document 20 Filed 01/17/06 Page 1 of 8
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sued 230 st at e and federal government officials in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington. These lawsuits arose from the same or similar grievances

as this case, and all have been dismissed. Plaint iff’s litigation activities are described in

some detail in Keyter v. 230 Government Officers, 372 F. Supp. 2d 604, 605-08 (W.D. Wash.

2005). The Court also notes that the United States Supreme Court has denied Plaintiff’s

petition for writ of certiorari arising from his action in the District Court for the District of

Columbia. See Keyter v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 386 (2005).

This action originally was brought only against Defendants McCain and Kyl. See

Doc. #1. After these Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a Certificat e of

Service that purported to attach a “First Amended Complaint/Action to Compell” (sic) that

added 29 additional defendants. Doc. #11, Attach. 1. These include the Vice President,

Secretary of State, current and former Attorneys General, Director of the FBI, United St at es

Attorneys and Assistant United States Att orneys, five additional Senators, two District

Court judges, nine members of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, the Chief Justice of the United States (in his cap acit y as a former member

of the D. C. Circuit), and others. See id. The allegations, claims, and prayer for relief in the

amended complaint are virtually ident ical t o those in the initial complaint. Compare Doc.

#11, Attach. 1, with Doc. #1.

Discussion

I. The Operative Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint was issued after Defendants M cCain and Kyl had

moved to dismiss this action. Plaintiff was entitled to amend his comp laint without leave

of court at that point because the mot ion to dismiss did not constitute a “responsive

pleading” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Wright, Miller

& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1483 at 585 & n.9 (“[C]ourts have held

that the filing of a motion to dismiss will not prevent a party from subsequently amending

without leave of court[.]”). Plaintiff did not purport to amend as of right, nor did he

formally move to amend his complaint. He filed a certificate of service that attached a cop y

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The FTCA was amended in 1988 by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and

Tort Compensation Act, commonly known as the Westfall Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679. This Act

“conferred immunity to federal employees acting within the scope of their office or

employment[.]” Adams v. United States, 420 F.3d 1049, 1052 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005);

see United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 163 (1991) (“The Act confers such immunity by

making an FTCA action against the Government the exclusive remedy for torts committed

by Government employees in the scope of their employment.”).

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of the amended comp laint and a notice and ex parte motion for joinder. See Docs. ##11-12,

19. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court will deem these filings as

Plaintiff’s assertion of the amended complaint as a matter of right under Rule 15(a). See

Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe

pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints.”). As a result,

the Court will treat Plaintiff’s amended comp laint as the operative pleading for purposes

of this Order.

II. Plaintiff’s Tort Claims.

Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendants owed him a legal duty not to breach the

laws of the United States and that Defendants maliciously and recklessly violated that duty

and caused him harm. Doc. #11, Attach. 1 ¶ 2. Plaintiff purp ort s to allege common law tort

claims against Defendants in counts one, two, three, five, and seven of the amended

complaint. Id. ¶¶ 34-57, 66-74, 85-86. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount

of $10 million against each Defendant. Id. ¶ 87.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), as amended, bars claims against employees

of the United States for injuries arising from their negligent or wrongful acts or omissions

while acting within t he scop e of their office or employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2679(b)(1).

Relief for such injuries may be sought only against the United States and only after

exhausting administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675, 2679(b)(1).1

 Because Plaintiff

has not sued the United States or alleged that he has exhausted his administrative

remedies, his claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2675(a), 2679(b)(1).

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Plaintiff attempts to avoid the preclusive effects of the FTCA by claiming that he

has sued Defendants in their personal, not their official, capacities. Indeed, the first

sentence of Plaintiff’s amended complaint states that Plaintiff “brings this civil action for

damages against Defendants in their personal capacities.” Doc. #11, Attach. 1 ¶ 1

(emphasis in original). The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, however, make clear that

Plaintiff has sued Defendants based on act s or omissions within the scope of their federal

offices. 

Plaintiff alleges the following: “[w]hen President Bush, as Chief Executive of the

nation failed to abide by t he law, the Defendants were requested by way of their position

of authority under the United States to see t o t he execution of the laws” (¶ 17) (emphasis

in the original); “[e]ach Defendant was requested to perform his/her sp ecific duties under

the law regarding t he crimes of the President and the other government conspirators” (¶

18); “[e]ach Defendant holds a special position of trust in society and a pertinent position

in government to deal with violation of law” (¶ 19); “[e]ach Defendant had a duty to deal

with the crimes, but each Defendant failed” (¶ 28); “Plaint iff will petition this Court for a

mandamus to compel each Defendant to deal with the particular parcel of criminal

allegations placed before him/her, each according to his/her own statutory duties” (¶ 29);

Plaintiff seeks “to compel these delinquent servant s of the people to perform their duty to

see to the welfare of the people, which duty is obligated by law” (¶ 31); Plaintiff seeks an

order from the Court “[c]ompelling [D]efendant(s) to obey the law and to comply with and

to execute his/her particular statutory duties with respect t o t he particular parcel of

allegations of multiple crimes presented to him/her by the Plaintiff” (Prayer for Relief ¶ 7).

In addition to these allegations of failure to perform official duties, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant s failed to act when contacted through their official offices: “Information

was provided to the Defendants in a Dossier Crimes filed with the Judiciary Committees of

Senate and House, with the courts and wit h t he Department of Justice, which dossier

meticulously details and provides prima facie evidence of the crimes committed by the

conspirators.” Doc. #11, Attach. 1 ¶ 18.

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Thus, although Plaintiff seeks to avoid the bar of the FTCA by alleging that he has

sued Defendants in their personal capacities, the detailed allegations of his amended

complaint make clear that he has sued Defendants for failure to perform their official duties.

Such claims are barred by the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2679(b)(1); Smith, 499 U.S. at

163; Kee v. United States, 168 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As amended, the [FTCA]

essentially ‘immunizes United States employees from liability’ for negligent or wrongful

acts committed within the scope of their employment.”) (quoting Green v . Hall, 8 F.3d 695,

698 (9th Cir. 1993)); Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that as

amended, the FTCA “provides that ‘the remedy against the United States’ under the FTCA

‘is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for monetary damages’”) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)) (alteration omitted).

Upon certification that Defendants were in fact acting within the scope of their

office as alleged in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court generally would substitute the

United States as a defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Plaint iff, however, has not

alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2672, 2675(a). The Court thus lacks jurisdiction over any tort claims against the United

States. See id.; Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9t h Cir. 1992) (“We have

repeatedly held that [the] ‘claim requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional in nature and

may not be waived.’”) (citations omitted); Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502-03

(9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal where the plaintiff made an administrative claim after

filing suit and stating: “ Because the [administrative claim] requirement is jurisdictional,

it ‘must be strictly adhered to. This is particularly so since the FTCA waives sovereign

immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.’”)

(quoting Jerves, 966 F.2d at 521); Blair v. IRS, 304 F.3d 861, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim for medical

expenses because the claim was not prop erly exhausted with a federal agency under §

2675(a)).

Although the Court might normally allow a plaintiff leave to amend to add

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allegations of exhaust ion, t he Court concludes that a second amendment should not be

permitted in this case because Plaintiff has filed this action in bad faith and the amendment

would be futile. See W. Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991)

(grounds for denying amendment include bad faith and futility of the amendment); Saul

v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err in denying

leave to amend where the amendment would be futile, or where the amended complaint

would be subject to dismissal.”) (citations omitted). 

Leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires, particularly for pro se

litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976

(9th Cir. 2002) (“We are very cautious in approving a district court’s decision to deny pro

se litigants leave to amend.”). But Plaintiff is not a typical pro se litigant. Plaintiff has

asserted these claims without success in several courts. See Keyter, 372 F. Supp. 2d at

605-08. His complaint in the Western District of Washington was dismissed with prejudice

and without leave to amend in part because it was frivolous and its prosecut ion was an

abuse of the court system and the defendants. See id. at 612. His claim in the District of

Columbia was also found meritless. See Keyter v. Bush, 2005 WL 375623 at *1 (granting

motion for summary affirmance of dismissal order because “ [t]he merits of the parties’

positions [was] so clear as to warrant summary action”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct . 386.

Plaintiff now seeks another forum in which to pursue yet another group of government

officials including the judges who ruled on his previous cases. Such a re-assertion of

previously dismissed and meritless claims is not brought in good faith and does not

warrant further amendment. The Court will not grant leave to amend.

III. Plaintiff’s Claims Based on Criminal Statutes.

Three of Plaintiff’s causes of action purport to be based on federal criminal statutes.

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is based on 18 U.S.C. § 4, his fifth cause on 18 U.S.C.

§ 241, and his sixth cause on 18 U.S.C. § 371. Doc. #11, Attach. 1 ¶¶ 58-65, 68, 75-84. But

these criminal statutes do not p rovide a private right of action. Plaintiff is well aware of this

fact, having had similar claims dismissed in his federal actions in the District of Columbia

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2

 Defendant s M cCain and Kyl asserted a variety of additional arguments that the

Court need not address. The Court notes, however, that Defendant s’ st anding argument

cannot form a basis for dismissal at this stage of t he lit igat ion. See Bernhardt v. L.A.

County, 279 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal of pro se litigant’s civil rights

act ion because her “general factual allegations [were] presumed to embrace those specific

fact s t hat are necessary to support standing”) (citation and alterations omitted); Mendoza

v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1167-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal for lack of

standing because the plaintiffs “must be allowed to make their case through the

presentation of evidence”); Lujan v . Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55, 561 (1992) (“At the

pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct

may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss ‘we presume that general factual allegations

embrace those specific facts that are necessary t o support the claim.’”) (citation and

alteration omitted).

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and Western District of Washington. See Keyter v. Bush, No. 03-2496 slip op. at 6-7

(D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2004); Keyter v. 230 Gov ’t Officers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11. The Court

will again dismiss these claims for failure to state a cause of action.

IV. Dismissal of New Defendants.

The grounds for dismissing the claims against Defendant s M cCain and Kyl apply

equally to the claims against the 29 new Defendants named in Plaintiff’s amended

comp laint. As noted above, Defendant did not change the substance of his complaint

when he added t hese defendants. Because the FTCA does not create a cause of action for

tortious conduct against federal officials acting within the scope of their offices, Plaintiff’s

tort claims must be dismissed. And because federal criminal statutes provide Plaintiff with

no private right of action, his claims based on such statutes must be dismissed.2

V. Additional Order.

Plaintiff has burdened the Court’s docket with voluminous filings. His response to

the motion to dismiss and two supplement s include 44 attachments encompassing

hundreds upon hundreds of pages. As one example, Attachment 1 to Plaintiff’s response

to the motion to dismiss (Doc. #13) purports to file criminal charges against President

George W. Bush and includes more than 30 pages of material supposedly outlining the

crimes of the President and his “[s]tate-supported tyranny upon the populous.” Because

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Plaint iff has seriously overburdened the Court’s docket with such filings, Plaintiff will be

prohibited from filing in t his Court any further claim arising from the subject matter of this

case. See Keyter v. 230 Gov’t Officers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 613.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. T he motion of Defendants United States Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl

to dismiss the complaint (Doc. #9) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint against Defendants McCain and Kyl and

against 29 additional Defendants (Doc. #11) is dismissed in its entirety.

3. All other pending motions (Doc. ##12, 16, and 19) are denied as moot.

4. Plaintiff Ant hony P. Keyter is prohibited from filing in this Court against any

of the 31 named defendants any further claim arising from the subject mat t er of this case.

Any future filing that violates this prohibition will be subject to summary dismissal by the

Court and may subject Plaintiff to a citation for Contempt of Court.

5. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 13th day of January, 2006.

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