Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00559-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG SCHUB, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

ERNEST MERRILL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 05-CV-00559-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT AND

FOR SANCTIONS (DOC. 5)

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

A related action, Ernest Merrill, et al., v. County of Madera, et

al, case number 1:05-CV-00195-AWI-SMS (related action), is also

proceeding. The two matters were ordered related by Judge Coyle

on June 28, 2005, in the present action, action number 1:05-CV00559-AWI-SMS, and this action was reassigned to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge. The matters have been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules

72-302 and 72-304. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion

to remand action number 1:05-CV-00559-AWI-SMS.

I. Background

On April 26, 2005, Defendants removed the instant action

from the Madera County Superior Court, filing a notice of

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removal. The complaint attached thereto (Exh. 1) was filed by

Plaintiffs Craig Schub and Michelle Gillette, residents of Orange

County, California, and owners of property that they purchased

from Defendants in February 2003 in order to build a home and run

a cattle operation thereon. (Id. at 1.) Defendants have an

easement over Plaintiffs’ property to use for a road into

Defendants’ adjoining property to facilitate residential and

business activities on the property. Defendants are Ernest

Merrill, an individual allegedly residing in Madera County,

California, and his wife, Defendant Lila Merrill; Ernest Merrill

was further alleged to be the president, shareholder, and alter

ego of Defendants Dream Catcher Ranch, Inc. (DC) and Little Butte

Cattle Company (LB), which were alleged to be purported to be

Nevada corporations. 

The claims stated were as follows: (1) Breach of Easement

Agreement (failure to comply with terms of a written easement by

engaging in unlawful, wrongful and dangerous grading of a road

being built on Plaintiffs’ property, improper use of the

easement, and leaving debris); (2) Specific Performance; (3)

Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; (4) Abatement of Nuisance

(caused by the aforementioned conduct and by failing to comply

with governmental regulations, which in turn caused the County of

Madera to “red tag” the property and thereby to prevent

Plaintiffs from using the roadway to serve their own property and

from developing their own property); (5) Trespass; (6)

Declaratory Relief (regarding the scope of the easement); (7)

Termination of Easement; (8) Negligence (breach of duty created

by regulations and law promulgated by Madera County, California

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Department of Fish and Game, and other governmental agencies);

and (9) Fraud (misrepresentation by Defendants at the time of

purchase regarding Plaintiffs’ property being buildable, gated,

fenced, and secure).

In the body of the notice of removal, Defendants requested

that the Court take judicial notice of all documents filed in the

related action. They explained that in the related action, the

Plaintiffs were the Merrills (Defendants here), who alleged that

the County of Madera and other county-related defendants violated

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free from illegal

interference with their right to contract pursuant to the United

States Constitution, Art. I, § 10 (concerning the agreement

between Schub/Gillette and the Merrills pursuant to which the

Merrills are contractually obligated to complete grading and

maintenance of the road over the Schub’s property); to due

process of law and to protection from unlawful takings of

property, and to protections under the commerce clause and the

First Amendment. In the related action, the Merrills asserted

that the County of Madera wrongfully cancelled and/or refused the

Merrills’ applications for permits to grade the road, and that

this refusal was based on the private purposes of the wife of

Gary Gilbert, who is a defendant in the related action, a

neighbor who did not want the property developed, and a Madera

County Supervisor.

In the body of the notice of removal in the instant case,

Defendants Merrill assert that the transaction or occurrence that

forms the basis of the related action is the same as that which

forms the basis of the present action. In the last sentence of

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the notice of removal, Defendants ask the Court to join in this

action the parties in the related action.

Defendants subsequently filed on May 23, 2005, in this

action a motion to consolidate the two actions, to implead third

party defendants (the County of Madera, Madera County Supervisor

Gary Gilbert, and Madera County Planning Department employees

Angela Basch and Mark Meyers); and to consolidate and join the

parties in this case into case number CIV-F-05-0195 AWI SMS. A

similar motion has been filed in the related case. These motions

are not presently set for hearing. 

On May 10, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand and for

sanctions. On May 23, 2005, a response to the motion was filed by

Defendants. On June 6, 2005, a reply to the response was filed.

On June 10, 2005, the hearing on the motion to remand and for

sanctions was vacated pending the order relating cases. The Court

on its own motion has set the motion for hearing. Subsequently

the Court vacated the hearing because the matter was deemed

suitable for decision without oral argument. On August 9, 2005,

the matter was ordered submitted to the Court for consideration

and for preparation of findings and recommendations by the

Magistrate Judge and for decision by the District Judge after the

passage of an appropriate time for the filing of objections and

any reply thereto.

II. Jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge

Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) provides in pertinent part:

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary--

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear

and determine any pretrial matter pending before

the court, except a motion for injunctive relief,

for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment,

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to dismiss or quash an indictment or information

made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a

criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance

of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, and to 

involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the 

court may reconsider any pretrial matter under

this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that

the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings,

and to submit to a judge of the court proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the 

disposition, by a judge of the court, of any

motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications

for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted

of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions

challenging conditions of confinement.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Nondispositive Matters. A magistrate judge to whom

a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense

of a party is referred to hear and determine shall 

promptly conduct such proceedings as are required and

when appropriate enter into the record a written

order setting forth the disposition of the matter. 

Within 10 days after being served with a copy of 

the magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and 

file objections to the order; a party may not 

thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate

judge’s order to which objection was not timely made.

The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall

consider such objections and shall modify or set aside

any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to 

be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

(b) Dispositive Motions and Prisoner Petitions. A

magistrate judge assigned without consent of the

parties to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a

claim or defense of a party or a prisoner petition

challenging the conditions of confinement shall 

promptly conduct such proceedings as are required.

A record shall be made of all evidentiary proceedings

before the magistrate judge, and a record may be made

of such other proceedings as the magistrate judge

deems necessary. The magistrate judge shall enter 

into the record a recommendation for disposition

of the matter, including proposed findings of fact

when appropriate. The clerk shall forthwith mail

copies to all parties.

 

The question presented is whether a motion to remand a

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proceeding to state court is a nondispositive motion that a

magistrate judge can determine, or a dispositive motion that a

district judge must determine so that a magistrate judge may only

issue findings and recommendations. Some of the circuit courts of

appeals have held that motions to remand are dispositive, and

thus a magistrate judge does not have jurisdiction to determine

such a motion. The reasoning is that although such motions are

not enumerated in § 636(b)(1)(A), they nevertheless are

functionally the equivalent of a motion for involuntary dismissal

because they determine that there will not be a federal forum

available to entertain a particular dispute. Vogel v. U.S. Office

Products Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514-17 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting a lack

of decisions from other circuits); First Union Mortgage Corp. v.

Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994-97 (10th Cir. 2000); In re U.S.

Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has not taken a position on whether or

not a Magistrate Judge can rule on a motion to remand an action

to state court. Some district courts have taken the position that

a motion to remand is not dispositive and thus may be determined

by a magistrate judge. See Bearden v. PNS Stores, Inc., 894 F.

Supp. 1418, 1419 n. 1 (D. Nev. 1995). The present motion involves

a determination of subject matter jurisdiction and, if granted,

will terminate the availability of a federal forum. In an

abundance of caution, the Magistrate Judge will thus proceed by

way of findings and recommendations.

III. Analysis

A. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect

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other than subject matter jurisdiction must be made

within 30 days after the filing of the notice of

removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before

final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

An order remanding the case may require payment of 

just costs and any actual expenses, including

attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.

A certified copy of the order of remand shall be

mailed by the clerk to the clerk to the clerk of 

the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed

with the case (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs are alleging a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction; thus, their motion is thus timely because it was

made before final judgment.

B. General Principles of Removal and Remand

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 

Congress, any civil action brought in a State court

of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the

defendant or the defendants, to the district court

of the United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is pending.

For purposes of removal under this chapter, the 

citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious

names shall be disregarded.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right 

arising under the constitution, treaties or laws

of the United States shall be removable without

regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.

Any other such action shall be removable only if none

of the parties in interest properly joined and served

as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such

action is brought.

Thus, only state court actions that originally could have been

filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the

defendant; otherwise, federal question jurisdiction is required.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The time

for testing federal question jurisdiction is the time of removal.

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Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320,

326-27 (5th Cir. 1998).

The statute regarding removal is strictly construed against

removal jurisdiction, and federal jurisdiction must be rejected

if there is any doubt as to the right of removal; the removing

defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper

by proving facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,

566-67 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 95

F.3d 856, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1996).

C. Determination of Jurisdiction

In their opposition to the motion to remand, Defendants do

not argue that this Court originally had jurisdiction. Instead,

they argue that the Court should consolidate the two actions

pending in this Court and should implead the County of Madera and

its employees. However, § 1441 permits removal only of a civil

action brought in a state court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a

measure of judicial power; if the Court lacked jurisdiction at

the time of removal, then given the lodging of Plaintiff’s

objection to removal jurisdiction, the Court is not empowered at

this point to order consolidation or joinder because absent

removal jurisdiction, it lacks the power to make orders affecting

the procedural or substantive aspects of the case. See Stock West

Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that

in the absence of jurisdiction (there diversity) at the time of

removal, the Court later lacked the power to enter an abstention

order or to rule on the merits of an immunity defense). 

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The determination of subject matter jurisdiction for the

purposes of this motion to remand must be made on the basis of

the facts as they existed as of the time the notice of removal

was filed. Pullman Co. v.Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939)

(diversity, separable controversy, jurisdiction to be determined

at the time of the filing of the petition for removal, and not on

the basis of a later-filed amended complaint). The presence of a

counterclaim which the defendant may raise will not create

diversity jurisdiction because in the absence of a specific

statutory exception, a federal court can exercise removal

jurisdiction over a case only if it would have had jurisdiction

over it as originally brought by the plaintiff. See Snow v. Ford

Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977) (amount in

controversy).

Further, it is established that to the extent that subject

matter jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction,

the issue is governed by “well pleaded complaint rule,” whereby

in the absence of jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship,

and further assuming that there is not complete federal

preemption, federal jurisdiction exists only if a federal

question is affirmatively and distinctly presented on the fact of

the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Westinghouse Electric Corp.

v. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 934, 937 (9th Cir.

1993). Defendant may not inject a federal element not pleaded in

order to create federal question jurisdiction; a right or

immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States

must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.

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Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Labrorers Vacation Trust, 463

U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at

399; Karambelas v. Hughes Aircrat Co., 992 F.2d 971, 974-75 (9th

Cir. 1993). Federal question jurisdiction may not be created by

the presence of a federal defense. Franchise Tax Board v.

Construction Labrorers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. at 10-12.

Further, the fact that there may be a related action brought

by the Defendants in this action that might involve a federal

question does not render this action, which is pleaded as an

action involving only state-law claims, one within the subject

matter jurisdiction of this Court. Section 1441 requires that the

district court have original jurisdiction over an action before

it may be removed pursuant to § 1441. Syngenta Crop Protection,

Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (holding that ancillary

jurisdiction over a controversy does not provide the original

jurisdiction required for removal under § 1441). The existence of

the other action does not confer original jurisdiction over the

instant action. Absent a subsequent decision on the merits, a

post-removal amendment that adds a valid federal claim does not 

cure lack of removal jurisdiction at the time of removal. Libhart

v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979).

A fortiori, Defendants’ mere assertion of a desire to consolidate

the cases or to amend pleadings to include parties involved in

the other case does not suffice to render this action removable

at the time the notice of removal was filed. In the present case,

Plaintiffs, who filed the motion to remand within fifteen days of

the date of removal, have timely objected to the removal. This is

not a case in which the Defendants validly asserted a federal

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counterclaim to which the Plaintiffs failed to object before the

case proceeded to a decision on the merits. 

D. Asserted Bases of Jurisdiction

Applying the principles set forth above, the asserted bases

of jurisdiction must be reviewed. In the notice of removal,

Defendants asserted that the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1335, 1367(a), 1397, 1441(a) through

(c), and 1446.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Section

1441 provides that any civil action of which the district courts

have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising

under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States

shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence

of the parties. A claim arises under federal law if federal law

creates the claim or if the plaintiff’s right to relief

necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of

federal law. Franchise Tax Board v.Construction Laborers Vacation

Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). The complaint contains no claim

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. Thus, this Court has no federal question jurisdiction

over the instant action.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) provides that the district

courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens

of different states. It is the burden of the defendants to allege

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 Defendants’ request that the Court take judicial notice of the pleadings in the related action is granted in

part; the Court takes notice of the complaint and of the docket in the related case. United States ex. rel. Robinson

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

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the jurisdictional facts necessary for diversity jurisdiction.

Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). For diversity

purposes, a person is a citizen of the state in which the person

is domiciled; a domicile is defined to include physical presence

at a given location of residence coupled with an intent to remain

there indefinitely. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.

1986). 

Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiffs and Defendant

Ernest Merrill are residents of Madera County, California, and

that they use the same address as the DC and LB enterprises in

Madera County. Taking judicial notice of the unverified complaint

in the related action,1 the Merrills there allege that in 2002

they purchased a mobile home to place on their property in Madera

County, they sought to put a deck on that home, and that they

intend to make that property their permanent residence. (Complt.

at 2, 5 ,9.) The Defendants have not alleged or supplied facts

showing that they are domiciled in a state other than California.

Thus, Defendants have not shown subject matter jurisdiction

based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to § 1332.

Likewise, Defendants have not shown subject matter

jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1335, which provides for

jurisdiction in district courts of civil actions that involve

claimants of diverse citizenship “as defined in section 1332,”

and that are actions of interpleader or in the nature of

interpleader, which involves adverse claimants to a single

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instrument or piece of property that is deposited with the Court.

There is neither diverse citizenship nor interpleader involved in

this case.

There is no jurisdiction shown pursuant to § 1367(a), which

provides in pertinent part that in any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts

shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

are so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution. The problem,

as previously set forth, is that in the present action, no

original jurisdiction has been established.

Defendants have not established jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1397, which provides that a civil action of interpleader

or in the nature of interpleader under § 1335 may be brought in

the district in which one or more claimants resides. As

previously noted, this is not an action under § 1335.

Likewise, Defendants have not established jurisdiction

pursuant to the removal statutes. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)

provides:

Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of

action within the jurisdiction conferred by section

1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise

non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire

case may be removed and the district court may

determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,

may remand all matters in which State law predominates.

As previously discussed, within this action there is joined no

separate and independent claim or cause of action within the

jurisdiction conferred by § 1331. Thus, § 1441 does not confer

jurisdiction. 

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Likewise, § 1446 deals exclusively with the procedural

mechanism for removal; it is not a basis of jurisdiction.

In summary, Defendants have not demonstrated that this Court

had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action at the

time of removal. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to

state court should be granted.

IV. Attorney’s Fees

An order remanding a case may require payment of just costs

and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 

result of the removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An award of fees is

in the Court’s discretion and may be made in the absence of a

finding that a party proceeded in bad faith, Moore v. Permanente

Medical Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1992); fees may

even be awarded where the removal was fairly supportable and yet

wrong as a matter of law. Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film

Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). Such an award will be

reversed only if it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of

fact, or if the district court wrongly determined that the case

should be remanded to state court. Id. at 1105. The Court, in is

discretion, makes an equitable determination whether plaintiffs

should be forced to bear their own costs or whether costs should

be shifted to the defendant; any attorney’s fees awarded must be

reasonable. See Braco v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., 138

F.Supp.2d 1260, 1270 (C.D.Cal. 2001). The term “just costs”

includes fees incurred in bringing the motion to remand and is

limited to costs that were incurred in federal court that would

not have been incurred had the case remained in state court.

Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 329, 330 (7th Cir. 1998).

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Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel, John G. Michael, declared under

penalty of perjury that his normal hourly rate is $285.00, and

that this rate is reasonable and customary in the community given

his level of experience and expertise. He spent 11.2 hours

researching, analyzing, and reviewing Defendants’ removal

documents, pleadings, and motion for interpleader and joinder of

parties to the related case, as well as preparing the motion for

remand and for sanctions, including the supporting papers. He

spent 3.1 hours reviewing and analyzing Defendants’ opposition to

the motion to remand and preparing the reply papers. He

anticipates spending two more hours preparing for and attending

the hearing, for a total of 16.3 hours on the motion. 

Given the lack of a showing of an arguable basis of

jurisdiction, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should not be

forced to bear their own costs. The hourly rate and hours claimed

by counsel for the tasks described are reasonable. The Court

concludes that fees should be awarded for 14.3 hours because no

time will be spent on preparation for and attendance at the

hearing. Accordingly, the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to

be awarded is $4,075.50. 

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to the Madera

County Superior Court BE GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of

$4,075.50 BE GRANTED; and

3. The action BE ORDERED remanded to the Superior Court for

the County of Madera.

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This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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