Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03538/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03538-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES DAVID WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03538-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

ADDRESSING OTHER PENDING 

MOTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James David Williams, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Correctional 

Training Facility (“CTF”), filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 

his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the following prison officials based on their 

involvement in Plaintiff’s unclothed body search on June 29, 2016: California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Secretary Scott Kernan; CTF Warden S. Hatton; 

Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”) Lieutenant V. Khan; ISU Sergeant S. Kelley1; ISU 

Correctional Officers Z. Brown and Officer S. Patterson; CTF Appeals Coordinator J. Truett; and 

two Doe Defendants. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion 

for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 14. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and 

Defendants have filed a reply. Dkts. 25, 27. The parties have also filed other pending motions 

which will all be addressed below, including: Defendants’ Administrative Motion to File 

Confidential Documents Under Seal (dkt. 15), which Plaintiff opposes (dkt. 16); Plaintiff’s request 

for leave to amend the original complaint (dkt. 16), which Defendants oppose (dkt. 19); Plaintiff’s 

“Motion to Request Service of this Action to Additional Defendants” (dkt. 17); and Plaintiff’s 

motion for appointment of counsel (dkt. 21).

Having read and considered the papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court 

 

1 Defendant Kelley’s name was initially misspelled as “Kelly.” The Court has been 

informed that the correct spelling is “Kelley.” Dkt. 19 at 1

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hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment,2 GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the original complaint, and addresses the remaining pending 

motions.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

A. The Parties

At the time of the events set forth in his complaint, Plaintiff was a state prisoner who was 

incarcerated at CTF, which is where he is still currently incarcerated. See Dkt. 1 at 1. Also during 

the time frame at issue, the following Defendants were employed by the CDCR and CTF: CDCR 

Secretary Kernan; CTF Warden Hatton; CTF Appeals Coordinator Truett; ISU Lieutenant Khan; 

ISU Sergeant Kelley; and ISU Officers Brown (a male officer) and Patterson (a female officer).

B. Plaintiff’s Version

The following background relating to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is taken from 

the Court’s January 5, 2018 Order:

Plaintiff claims that on June 29, 2016, Defendants Brown and 

Patterson, along with two unidentified prison officials from the 

Investigative Services Unit (“I.S.U.”) (i.e., “John Doe (I.S.U.)” and 

“unidentified Supervising Sgt. John Doe”), subjected him to “cruel 

and unusual sexual invasion of privacy [and] sexual misconduct” 

when they forced him to do an “open-public full body strip 

search . . . [t]hen a rectum/cavity search. 4” Dkt. 1 at 3. Furthermore, 

 

2

In a separate and concurrently filed written Order, the Court directs Defendants to file a 

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion on Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims.

3 This Order contains a few acronyms. Here, in one place, they are:

CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

CTF California Training Facility

ISU Investigative Services Unit

PREA Prison Rape Elimination Act 

STG Security Threat Group 

4 Plaintiff had initially alleged that Defendants ordered him to submit to a “rectum/cavity 

search.” Dkt. 1 at 3. However, Defendants clarify that Plaintiff was not subject to a cavity search, 

which would have been conducted in a medical setting under the supervision of a doctor. See 

Brown. Decl. ¶ 9; see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3287(b)(5). In his declaration, Plaintiff again 

alleges that he was subjected to a “Cavity Search.” See Pl. Decl. ¶ 6. In their reply, Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff’s aforementioned allegation is “misleading” because the “unclothed body 

search was strictly a visual inspection of [Plaintiff’s] body.” Dkt. 27 at 5. Defendants again 

clarify that no “cavity search” was performed because such a search “may only be performed by 

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Defendant Patterson, who is a female officer, was present during the 

search and took “sexually suggestive photographs” of Plaintiff while 

he was partially nude. Id. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Brown 

laughed at him during the cavity search. Id. at 5. Plaintiff adds that 

Defendants did not explain “the purpose of the photos . . . nor what 

authorize[d] them” to take such photos. Id.

Plaintiff claims that after he reported the incident, an investigation 

was conducted by Defendants Khan, Truett, and Kell[e]y. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff claims that their investigation was “flawed” and that they 

“covered up the conduct that occurred.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hatton “failed to correct this 

underground conduct of I.S.U. staff, and continues to allow this 

treatment to occur . . . .” Id. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Kernan 

“denied correction and training of these rouge actions of CTF 

Staff . . . violating Plaintiff [by] continuing to use female staff to 

conduct unsecure, non-emergency strip searches of male inmates 

(cross-gender).” Id.

Dkt. 7 at 2 (brackets and footnote added). Plaintiff claims that such treatment of inmates has 

violated his constitutional rights and that female correctional officers are still being allowed to 

take partially nude photographs of male inmates. Id. (citing Dkt. 1 at 6). Thus, upon conducting 

an initial review of the complaint, the Court determined that, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s 

allegations were sufficient to state cognizable claims for the violation of his rights under the 

Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (en banc); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922-25 (9th Cir. 

2017)). The Court further noted that in his complaint Plaintiff had named two Doe Defendants—

“yet to be identified [H]ispanic male, John Doe (I.S.U.)” and “unidentified Supervising Sgt. John 

Doe”—whose names he intended to learn through discovery. See Dkt. 1 at 3. The Court 

dismissed his claims against these Doe Defendants without prejudice to move to file an amended 

complaint to add them as named defendants. Id. at 3 (citing Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 

F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2003)). As explained below, Plaintiff is now attempting to do so by

requesting to add two named Defendants to this action: ISU Correctional Sergeant S. Rodriguez 

and ISU Correctional Officer R. Salas, who were also employed by CTF during the time frame at 

 

medical professionals when there is a need to extricate items concealed in the inmates’ body 

cavities.” Id. at 6. Nothing in the record indicates that there was any need to extricate such items 

from Plaintiff’s body cavity. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ clarification. Therefore, the 

Court need not address Plaintiff’s allegations relating to any “rectum/cavity search.”

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issue. See Dkts. 16, 17. The Court will address Plaintiff’s request later on in this Order.

C. Defendants’ Version

In the instant dispositive motion, Defendants have elaborated more on the factual 

background of Plaintiff’s claim, and the Court includes it as Defendants’ version below. 

[] THE BODY SEARCH AND DISCOVERY OF 

CONTRABAND IN THE CELL.

The Investigative Services Unit (ISU) received a tip that Williams and 

his cellmate [inmate Jason Smith5] might be in possession of cellular 

phones. (Brown Decl. ¶ 4.) On June 29, 2016, the date of the events

alleged in this complaint, Defendant Brown—who is an ISU officer—

arrived at Williams’s housing unit shortly after 6:00 a.m. (Id.) 

Williams and his cellmate asked to exit the cell. (Id. ¶ 5.) Brown’s 

colleague performed a clothed body search of Williams and his 

cellmate, which consisted of a pat-down and the use of a handheld 

metal detector. 

Although the clothed body search with a handheld metal detector had 

negative results for contraband, Brown was not convinced that 

Williams did not conceal other contraband on his person because the 

clothed body search could only detect metal objects, but not drugs, 

for example. (Id. ¶ 6.) Brown and his colleague, officer Salas, 

escorted Williams to the housing unit’s shower area for the purpose 

of performing an unclothed body search. (Id.) Such searches are 

routinely performed in shower areas because the showers are private, 

more spacious than cells, and because no other inmates have a direct 

view inside the shower area, as they would of a cell. (Id. ¶ 7.) And 

unclothed body searches are generally conducted early in the morning 

to limit the amount of disturbance on the housing unit’s programming 

and operations. (Id. ¶ 4.) Also, early-morning times are favored 

because most inmates, except for a few who have work assignments, 

are inside their cells until shortly after 7:00 a.m., when the morning 

release for breakfast occurs. (Id.)

The unclothed body search that Brown performed was strictly visual 

and lasted approximately one minute. (Id. ¶ 8.) The search did not 

include any physical touching. (Id. ¶ 9.) The body search consisted 

 

5

Inmate Smith, the other inmate housed in Plaintiff’s cell (F Wing cell number 331), see 

Brown Decl., Ex. A, filed a civil rights action in this Court, in which he also alleges that his 

Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the same prison officials based on their involvement in 

a similar unclothed body search on June 29, 2016. See Smith v. Hatton, Case No. C 17-04030 

BLF (PR). On November 15, 2018, the Honorable Beth Labson Freeman granted Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Khan and Kelley, and she also 

granted their motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants 

Brown, Patterson, Rodriguez, and Salas on the merits and based on qualified immunity. See Dkt. 

67 of Case No. C 17-04030 BLF (PR). Judge Freeman has also dismissed the Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendant Hatton. See Dkt. 70 of Case No. C 17-04030 BLF (PR). Inmate Smith’s 

case is still pending as to his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants

Brown, Patterson, Rodriguez, and Salas. See Dkt. 66 of Case No. C 17-04030 BLF (PR).

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only of a visual inspection of Williams’s hair, mouth, armpits, arms,

palms, and feet. (Id. ¶ 8.) Williams was also required to bend forward 

at the waist, spread his buttocks, and cough several times. (Id.) This 

was necessary to ensure that he did not conceal contraband in his anal 

cavity, which is how inmates often conceal drugs and other forbidden

items. (Id.) Overall, such unclothed body searches are routinely 

done as part of inspections of inmates, and they may be conducted 

often times on an unannounced and random basis. (Id. ¶ 10.) And on

that day, several other cell and body searches were performed, 

including a body search of Williams’s cellmate. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Reasonable steps were taken to ensure Williams’s privacy while he 

disrobed and during the search. (Id. ¶ 10.) Brown and his colleague, 

Salas, were alone with Williams in the shower area and they stood 

around him and blocked the shower area opening, thus guaranteeing 

that any possible onlookers—if any would have walked by that early 

in the morning—could not have a direct line of view or observe the 

activity inside the shower area. (Id.) The search was conducted in a 

professional manner and Brown did not embarrass, harass or laugh at 

Williams, or ma[k]e any derogatory remarks, touching, gesturing, or 

comment that would have been construed as sexual. (Id.) A cavity 

search was not performed. (Id. ¶ 9.) Cavity searches may only be 

conducted in a medical setting under the direct supervision of a 

physician. (Id.)

Thereafter Brown proceeded to Williams’s cell. (Id. ¶ 12.) The cell 

search confirmed the information that ISU had received, as two 

cellphones and two chargers were found hidden behind and inside a 

mattress. (Id.) The cellphones had Internet, camera, and GPS 

capabilities. (Id.) Brown confiscated the items as contraband. (Id.)

[] PATTERSON’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE EVENTS 

ALLEGED AND HER ROLE AS A SECURITY THREAT 

GROUP INVESTIGATOR.

Like Brown, Patterson is an ISU officer at CTF. (Patterson Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Patterson is assigned to Investigations and she investigates inmates 

for possession and introduction of contraband into the prison, and any 

criminal activity within the institution. (Id.) More importantly, she 

is tasked with investigating and documenting inmates’ Security 

Threat Group (STG) status. (Id.) 

STG refers to any group of offenders CTF reasonably believes poses 

a threat to the physical safety of other inmates and staff due to the 

very nature of the groups. (Id. ¶ 5.) Some of these groups at CTF 

include the Bloods, Crips, Mexican Mafia, Aryan Brotherhood, and 

Black Guerilla Family. (Id. ¶ 5.) One of the indicia of STG 

membership is the use of gang tattoos. (Id. ¶ 6.) ISU officers take 

photographs of inmates and their tattoos to document their STG 

status. (Id. ¶ 10.) For Patterson, this is an essential part of her job 

responsibilities as an investigator. (Id.) These photographs are for 

the sole internal use of ISU. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

At the conclusion of the visual unclothed body search on June 29, 

2016, Williams was ordered to put on his underwear briefs, which he 

did. (Brown Decl. ¶ 12.) It was only at that point that Brown called 

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Patterson to enter the showers area and photograph Williams. (Id.) 

Patterson was not present during the unclothed body search and she 

would not have had a direct line of sight or any other opportunity to 

observe Williams while he was nude during the search because Brown 

and his colleague blocked the shower opening. (Id.; Patterson Decl. 

¶ 8.) Although Patterson was not the only ISU officer able to 

photograph inmates, she was assigned to take photographs on that 

particular day. (Patterson Decl. ¶ 10.)

Patterson took several photographs, including four default shots of 

Williams’s front, back, left side, and right side. (Id. ¶ 12.) Some of 

the photographs also include close-up shots of Williams’s tattoo on 

his back. (Id.) Williams wore white underwear briefs in all 

photographs and the only exposed areas of his body were his arms, 

legs, and torso. (Id.) Williams’s genitals and private areas were not 

captured by the photos or otherwise exposed to Patterson at any time

during her taking of the photographs, or before. (Id.) Williams was 

not nude. (Id.) Patterson’s interaction with Williams was 

professional, uneventful, and without incident. (Id. ¶ 13.) She likely

gave Williams verbal commands, but in keeping with the ethical code

of the job, she did not touch him or make any sexual, derogatory, or

humiliating remarks. (Id.)

Williams complained that copies of the photographs were never 

provided to him. (Compl. Ex. A at 11.) But there is no law that holds 

that the refusal to provide such photographs is a constitutional 

violation. And such photographs are for the sole internal use of the 

Investigative Services Unit because they contain sensitive 

information that, if disseminated intentionally or inadvertently to the 

prison population, could expose Williams to assault and harassment 

from other inmates. (Patterson Decl. ¶ 11.) Nevertheless, at the 

request of the Attorney General’s Office, arrangements were made at 

the prison for Williams to view copies of all the photographs that were 

taken of him on June 29, 2016, so that he might satisfy himself that 

the photographs are not sexually suggestive. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 5.) [FN 

2]

[FN 2:] E. Galvan’s declaration was submitted in support of 

Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Administrative Motion to File 

Confidential Documents Under Seal. Exhibit A to Galvan’s

declaration contains the seven photographs that were taken of 

Williams on June 29, 2016.

Williams was issued a pass to meet the Litigation Coordinator of the 

Correctional Training Facility on April 11, 2018. (Id.) Williams 

viewed the photographs without any incident. (Id. ¶ 6.) He requested 

copies of the photographs, but his request was denied for the reasons 

stated above. (Id.) No other photographs were taken of Williams on 

June 29, 2016. (Id. ¶ 4.)

[] WILLIAMS’S ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE.

A. Truett’s Role and the Processing of the Grievance.

On July 12, 2016, Williams filed administrative grievance CTF-S-16-

01503 about the events surrounding the unclothed body search. 

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(Khan Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) The grievance was received in the Appeals 

Office on July 14, 2016, where Truett—the Appeals Coordinator at

CTF—screened the form to ensure compliance with the filing 

requirements, assigned a number to the grievance, and logged it in the 

database. (Id.; Truett Decl. ¶ 7.) The Appeals Office receives

hundreds of inmate grievances each month and the disposition of 

grievances follows a routine, consistent, and overt process consistent 

with applicable regulations. (Truett Decl. ¶ 11.)

Part of Truett’s job responsibilities include receiving, logging, 

routing, and monitoring the disposition of inmate grievances. (Id. 

¶ 1.) Upon completing the screening process, Truett sent Williams 

two letters. One letter was a standard screening letter to inform 

Williams that the Appeals Office had received his grievance and that 

it would be processed according to Section 3084.9(i) of Title 15 of 

the California Code of Regulations, because it contained allegations

against staff members. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. A.) The other document sent to 

Williams was a memorandum informing him that the complexity of 

the decision and action would require a delay in the review of the 

grievance, and provided him with an estimated completion date. (Id.) 

Per regulation, grievances containing allegations of staff misconduct 

are presented to the hiring authority or a designee, hence why Warden 

Hatton was a co-signatory on the memorandum and approved the 

delay in reviewing of the appeal. (Id. ¶ 9.)

But aside from performing the initial screening, processing the 

application, and presenting it to the Warden, Truett was not involved 

at any stage of the reviewing process or any of the subsequent 

investigations of Williams’s allegations. (Id. ¶ 10.) Truett has no 

control over how any administrative grievances are reviewed and 

investigated, whether such grievances pertain to alleged staff 

misconduct or not. (Id.) Further, she cannot influence the outcome 

and disposition of administrative grievances at the prison level. (Id., 

¶ 12.) Nor can she influence the decision at the Third Level of 

Review, which is separate and independent from the institutional 

levels of review at the prison. (Id. ¶ 12.) In any event, the Third Level 

of Review found that Williams’s allegations were appropriately 

reviewed and evaluated by the prison staff. (Id.)

Truett has not conspired with anyone to deny Williams’s grievance 

and his grievance was not singled out. (Id. ¶ 11.) There was no 

collusion between staff members or any attempt to conceal staff 

misconduct. (Id.) Although Williams did not obtain the relief he 

requested and the outcome for which he hoped, it does not mean that 

staff members conspired against him. (Id.) And most important, 

Truett was not involved in any of the events that allegedly occurred 

on June 29, 2016. (Id. ¶ 10.)

B. Khan’s Review of the Grievance and His Conclusions.

Defendant Khan is an ISU lieutenant. (Khan Decl. ¶ 1.) Khan was 

not personally involved nor was present during the events alleged in 

the complaint. (Id. ¶ 14.) But Khan interviewed Williams in 

connection with the allegations contained in his administrative 

grievance during the Second Level Review of the grievance. (Id. 

¶¶ 5-6.) In that grievance, Williams alleged that Defendant Brown 

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and “assisting ISU staff” violated his privacy. (Id. Ex. A.) The 

administrative grievance made no mention of Defendants Kernan, 

Hatton, Khan, Kelley, and Truett, and nothing was alleged against 

them. (See Ex. A.)

During the interview, Williams expressed his disagreement with the 

unclothed body search and felt it was unnecessary because he had 

already been given a clothed body search with a metal detector, with 

negative results for contraband. (Id. ¶ 7.) Williams did not say that 

Defendant Patterson was present during the unclothed body search, 

but he recalled that Patterson photographed him when he had his 

boxers on. (Id.) He further stated that none of the officers touched 

him during the search. (Id.)

Also during the interview, Williams merely reiterated the contents of 

his administrative grievance and offered no new information. (Id. 

¶ 8.) And he did not pose any questions regarding the identification 

and names of ISU staff who might have been unknown to him at that 

time, or else Khan would have provided him with that information. 

(Id.) In addition to the interview with Williams, Khan conducted 

other interviews and reviewed the photographs that Patterson took. 

(Id. ¶ 9.) The photographs were not nude photos. (Id. ¶ 10.) Further, 

the photographs were taken in the private area of the showers where 

no onlookers could have observed Williams. (Id. ¶ 11.) And in any 

event, inmates in the showers are often nude or partially nude when 

they shower together, so even if other inmates could have observed 

Williams during the search, that would not have been any different 

than other inmates showering next to him on any other given day.

(Id.) Khan also reviewed a list of non-confidential enemies to ensure 

that Williams had no enemy concerns at the prison, as well as a CDC128-B Form dated August 2, 2008. (Id. ¶ 9.) The CDC-128-B form 

documented a correctional officer’s interview with Williams during 

his period of incarceration at a different institution, when Williams

admitted to being an associate of a Crip gang. (Id.) The form also 

documented an unclothed body search which revealed a marijuana 

leaf tattoo on Williams’s back as a depiction of his gang affiliation. 

(Id.)

Khan’s investigation and review of Williams’s grievance revealed no 

evidence that Williams was harassed, humiliated, or that any sexual 

misconduct occurred by any officers or staff present that day, and that 

no CDCR policy was violated. (Id. ¶ 12.) Moreover, the third and

final level of review (1) found that Khan had appropriately reviewed 

and evaluated Williams’s allegations, and (2) agreed with Williams’s 

findings and declared that no change or modification of his decision 

was warranted. (Id.) Finally, Khan was not obligated to interview 

every witness that Williams might have indicated to him, as inmates 

are not allowed to decide how investigations are conducted. (Id. 

¶ 13.) Instead, officers use their training and experience to gauge the 

credibility of the allegations and resolve them effectively in a manner 

that weeds out frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. (Id.)

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[] WILLIAMS’S PREA COMPLAINT AND KELLEY’S 

INVESTIGATION.

Williams was identified as a potential victim of staff sexual 

misconduct on July 12, 2016, when he filed his administrative 

grievance. (Kelley Decl. ¶ 6.) Kelley is an ISU sergeant and did not 

personally or physically participate in the events that gave rise to 

Williams’s allegations. (Id. ¶ 3, 12.) Nor was he involved in the 

investigation and review of Williams’s administrative grievance. (Id. 

¶ 6.)

Aside and apart from Williams’s administrative grievance, a Prison 

Rape Elimination Act (PREA) review was initiated. (Id.) PREA 

investigations are conducted whenever inmates complain that they are 

sexually abused by staff or other inmates. (Id.) PREA-related 

documents are confidential due to the sensitive nature of the content 

and CDCR’s overarching concern for the protection of victims of 

sexual abuse. (Id.) PREA investigations include the monitoring of

inmates for a period of 90 days following their allegations of sexual 

violence or misconduct, as well as referrals to mental health 

consultations. (Id. ¶ 7.)

Kelley conducted the investigation of Williams’s PREA complaint 

and allegations. (Id. ¶ 5.) But because Khan had already interviewed 

Williams about the same allegations, Kelley did not himself interview 

Williams to avoid redundancy. (Id. ¶ 8.) Instead, Kelley relied on the

information conveyed by Williams to Khan. (Id.) Altogether, the 

PREA investigation occurred over the course of several months, from 

July 2015 through the end of January 2017, when ISU completed the 

investigation. (Id.)

The information obtained during the course of the investigation, 

coupled with the lack of reliable witnesses and lack of physical and 

forensic evidence, did not support Williams’s allegations. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Ultimately, Williams’s allegations were found to be unsubstantiated 

and the investigation was closed. (Id., Ex. A.) Kelley was not 

obligated to interview every witness suggested to him by Williams 

and an investigation is not rendered “flawed” merely because an

inmate disagrees with the outcome. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Dkt. 14 at 12-18 (brackets, footnote 2 in original, and footnote 5 added).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Pending Motions

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion for Service of Process

In his original complaint, Plaintiff claimed that, in connection with the unclothed body 

search on June 29, 2016, his constitutional rights were violated by Defendants Brown and 

Patterson, along with two unidentified prison officials from ISU, whose identities were initially 

not known to him. Plaintiff used Doe Defendant monikers for these unidentified officers. After 

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Defendants filed their dispositive motion, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to name 

Defendants Rodriguez and Salas in place of the Doe Defendants. Dkt. 16. Plaintiff also filed a

motion for service of process on the aforementioned newly-named Defendants. Dkt. 17. The 

motion to amend the complaint and motion for service of process are GRANTED. Defendants 

Rodriguez and Salas are added as Defendants, and the Court orders service of process on these 

newly-added Defendants.6 

However, the Court need not wait for such service to take effect or delay its resolution of 

the pending dispositive motion because the instant motion is based on declarations from 

Defendants Brown and Patterson and as a result presents a complete picture of these Defendants 

and the newly-named Defendants’ version of the incident. Plaintiff makes no effort to distinguish 

between the versions that would have been filed by the served Defendants versus the newly-named 

(and unserved) Defendants, and thus this demonstrates that his briefs in opposition to the 

dispositive motion were not filed with the understanding that he only needed to address his claims

against the served Defendants. The issues having been fully briefed, the Court can proceed and 

determine whether the served Defendants and newly-named (and unserved) Defendants are 

entitled to judgment in their favor as to the Eighth Amendment claim. There is no need to delay 

the resolution of the pending motion by several months so that Defendants Rodriguez and Salas

can be served with process, retain counsel (who would probably be the same as counsel for the 

served Defendants), and file a separate motion for summary judgment that makes an argument and 

factual presentation identical to the one made by the served Defendants. The most practical 

approach therefore is to allow Defendants Rodriguez and Salas to be added as Defendants in place 

of the Doe Defendants, but not to waste the time necessary to have them served with process prior 

to ruling on the pending dispositive motion. Therefore, the Court will resolve the pending 

dispositive motion below.

 

6 As mentioned above, the Court will be issuing a separate and concurrently-filed Order 

addressing still pending Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and thus service of process on 

these newly-named Defendants is warranted in order for them to answer to these claims. See

supra footnote 2.

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2. Defendants’ Motion for an Order to File Confidential Documents Under Seal

In connection with the instant dispositive motion, Defendants seek, in accordance with this 

District’s Civil Local Rules 7-11 and 79-5(b), to file under seal the exhibit attached to the 

declaration of CTF Litigation Coordinator E. Galvan in support of Defendants’ dispositive motion:

Confidential Exhibit A. The Court has considered Defendants’ motion, including the confidential 

documents at issue submitted for in camera review, and the declaration of Litigation Coordinator 

Galvan filed in support of Defendants’ sealing request. Defendants have established that the 

information they seek to file under seal implicates legitimate safety and security concerns and 

should be protected from disclosure to Plaintiff and the public. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion for administrative relief to file certain documents under seal, and issues 

certain instructions to the Clerk of the Court relating to these documents, as indicated below. Dkt. 

15.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 14. In 

the motion to dismiss, Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in 

their official capacities are barred, that any claim for punitive damages should be dismissed, that 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief as to Defendants Kernan, Hatton, Khan, 

Kelley, and Truett, and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies against to 

Defendants Kernan, Hatton, Khan, Kelley, and Truett. Defendants also move for summary 

judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity.

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

claims against all Defendants in their official capacities, the claim for punitive damages, and the 

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Kernan, Hatton, Khan, Kelley, and Truett for failure 

to state a claim.7 The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 

merits and based on qualified immunity related to the Eighth Amendment claim.8 Finally, the 

 

7 Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to 

Defendants Kernan, Hatton, Khan, Kelley, and Truett, the Court need not address Defendants’ 

alternative ground for dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

8

 Because the Court is dismissing all claims against Defendants Kernan, Hatton, Khan, 

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Court will address any remaining pending motions below.

1. Motion To Dismiss

a. Standard of Review

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and a complaint that fails to do so is subject to 

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). “A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of 

two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 

claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Failure to state a claim is grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling on a question of law. Parks Sch.

of Bus., Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995). “The issue is not whether the 

plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim.” 

Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009). 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in 

the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Symington, 51 F.3d 

at 1484. However, a district court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. 

Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). But a pro se pleading must be liberally construed and, 

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 

 

Kelley, and Truett based on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court will limit its discussion of 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claims against served Defendants Brown and 

Patterson as well as unserved Defendants Rodriguez and Salas.

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b. Analysis

1) Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from Defendants in their individual and official capacities. 

Dkt. 1 at 3. 

However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against them in 

their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Dkt. 14 at 23.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars from the federal courts 

suits against a state by its own citizens, citizens of another state, or citizens or subjects of any 

foreign state. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985) abrogated on other 

grounds as noted in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996). Unless a state has waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, a state cannot be sued regardless of 

the relief sought. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Eleventh Amendment 

immunity extends to suits against a state agency, Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 

(9th Cir. 2009) (CDCR and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity), and to suits for damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985). California has not waived its Eleventh 

Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983 in federal court. 

Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, because the CDCR is a 

state agency, its employees, who are the aforementioned Defendants, sued in their official 

capacities are immune from suit for monetary damages.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official 

capacities are DISMISSED as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.9 Because it is clear that this 

jurisdictional bar cannot be cured by further amendment to the complaint, the dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities is without leave to amend. As 

such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims against Defendants in their 

official capacities. Dkt. 14. 

 

9 Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants sued 

in their individual capacities. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66.

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2) Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state claims that 

“Defendants acted with an evil motive or were recklessly indifferent to [Plaintiff’s] rights.” Dkt. 

14 at 23. The Court agrees. The dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is in order, as 

punitive damages may be awarded in a Section 1983 suit only “when the defendant’s conduct is 

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 

There is no indication whatsoever that any of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing rose to this 

requisite high level of culpability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is 

DISMISSED. Dkt. 14.

3) Failure to State a Claim

The United States Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it 

permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a 

prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny 

under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). A prison 

official violates the Eighth Amendment only if two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation 

alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

A prisoner may state an Eighth Amendment claim under Section 1983 for sexual 

harassment if the alleged sexual harassment was sufficiently harmful, i.e., a departure from “the 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” and the defendant 

acted with intent to harm the prisoner. See Thomas v. District of Columbia, 887 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 

(D.D.C. 1995) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1992)) (internal quotations and 

citation omitted). Sexual assault, coercion, and harassment certainly may violate contemporary 

standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 

F.2d 1521, 1525-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment may also be 

violated by certain body searches. See id. (emphasizing many female inmates’ history of abuse, 

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“psychological differences between men and women,” and intrusive physical nature of search); cf. 

Byrd v. Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2017) (pretrial 

detainee’s allegation that he alerted prison officials of his discomfort with defendants’ policy of 

permitting female guards to regularly view his bathroom and shower use from 4-5 feet away 

because of detainee’s past sexual abuse was sufficient to state a claim for relief against cruel and 

unusual punishment).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kelley, Kahn, and Truett “conducted a flawed 

investigation” of Plaintiff’s accusations against Defendants Brown and Patterson and “covered up 

the conduct that occurred.” Dkt. 1 at 5. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Hatton failed to 

correct the underground conduct of ISU staff, and continues to allow this treatment to occur on 

inmates.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Kernan “denied correction and training of 

these rogue actions if CTF staff violating Plaintiff and continuing to use female staff to conduct 

unsecure, non-emergency strip searches of male inmates . . . . Id.

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under Section 1983 if the plaintiff 

can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a 

federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2013). However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Khan, Kelley, and Truett were involved 

in or proximately caused Plaintiff’s unclothed body search. Plaintiff also does not allege that 

these Defendants engaged in sexual harassment against him. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 

that Defendants Kelley, Khan, and Truett were only involved as investigators into the 

circumstances of the unclothed body search after the search had already occurred. To the extent 

that Plaintiff is suing Defendants Khan and Truett based on their involvement in handling the 

relevant grievance relating to the claims in this action, there is no constitutional right to a prison 

administrative appeal or grievance system. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (“There is no legitimate claim of 

entitlement to a grievance procedure.”). There is also no right to a response or any particular 

action. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“When the claim 

underlying the administrative grievance involves a constitutional right, the prisoner’s right to 

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petition the government for redress is the right of access to the courts, which is not compromised 

by the prison's refusal to entertain his grievance.”). 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendants Kelley, Khan, and Truett, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim 

against Defendants Kelley, Khan, and Truett is GRANTED. While leave to amend should 

generally be given to a pro se plaintiff, leave is not required when it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies could not be overcome by amendment. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-

36 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, based on these facts, no amendment could overcome the lack of a legal 

basis for liability against Defendants Kelley, Khan, and Truett. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendants Kelley, Khan, and Truett are DISMISSED without leave to amend.

With respect to Defendants Kernan and Hatton, Plaintiff does not allege that these 

Defendants were involved in/proximately caused the unclothed body search, nor that these 

Defendants engaged in sexual harassment against him. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant 

Hatton failed to prohibit female correctional officers from conducting strip searches and taking 

partially nude photographs of male inmates, and that Defendant Kernan failed to train his 

subordinates who allow female staff to participate in the aforementioned actions. Dkt. 1 at 5. 

Based on these facts, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendants Hatton and Kernan. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim 

against these Defendants is GRANTED. However, this dismissal is with leave to amend. A

supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the 

constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 

2012). A supervisor may also be liable if there is evidence of “a policy so deficient that the policy 

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), 

abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). It is insufficient for a 

plaintiff only to allege that supervisors knew about a constitutional violation and that they 

generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific

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policy” or “a specific event” implemented or instigated by them that led to the constitutional 

violations. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). Here, 

Plaintiff has not proffered any facts from which it can be inferred that Defendants Hatton and 

Kernan knew about any constitutional violation, or that these Defendants created a specific policy 

or procedure which led to the alleged violation. 

It is not beyond doubt, however, that Plaintiff could provide a set of facts in support of a 

claim against Defendants Hatton and Kernan which would entitle Plaintiff to relief. Thus, the 

claim against Defendants Hatton and Kernan is DISMISSED with leave to amend to allow 

Plaintiff an opportunity to provide more facts to support a cognizable claim for relief against these 

Defendants.

In sum, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendants Khan, Kelley, and Truett, and all claims against these Defendants are 

DISMISSED without leave to amend. Meanwhile, as explained above, Plaintiff has not stated a 

cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Hatton and Kernan, and therefore 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against these Defendants is 

GRANTED. However, the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Hatton and Kernan is 

dismissed with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to provide more facts to support a 

cognizable claim for relief against these Defendants, as further directed below.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes 

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that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the 

task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then 

shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

A district court may consider only admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Patterson, Brown, Kelley, 

Khan and Truett have submitted declarations and attached exhibits, including copies of the 

grievance responses and the Rules Violation Report related to the June 29, 2016 incident at issue. 

Dkts. 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-5, 14-6; Dkt. 14-3 at 6; Dkt. 14-5 at 6-9; Dkt. 14-6 at 6-16. Attached to 

Defendant Kelley’s Declaration is a copy of the “general chrono regarding the staff sexual 

misconduct allegation log number CTF-PREA-16-07-019.” Dkt. 14-4 at 6. Because the 

aforementioned documents have been properly authenticated pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

803(6), the Court will consider these documents in connection with Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. In addition, Defendants have submitted Litigation Coordinator Galvan’s 

declaration and copies of the photographs taken of Plaintiff, which the Court has reviewed and

ordered to be filed under seal.

Plaintiff has verified his complaint and declaration10 in support of his opposition by 

 

10 Defendants have filed an objection to Plaintiff’s declaration supporting his opposition 

based on several grounds, including that certain paragraphs in his declaration “make speculative 

and conclusory allegations that lack any foundational and evidentiary support, and are irrelevant, 

in violation of Civil Local Rule 7-5 and Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 602, and 701” and also 

that they “are argumentative, in violation of Civil Local Rule 7-5.” Dkt. 27 at 16-17. The Court 

notes Defendants’ objection and stresses that it only considers Plaintiff’s allegations in his 

declaration to the extent such allegations are based on his personal knowledge and set forth 

specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 

(9th Cir. 1995). Further, the Court may, in this Order, refer to Plaintiff’s verified declaration in 

support of his opposition as his “declaration/opposition” or cite to it as “Pl. Decl.”

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signing them under penalty of perjury.11 Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 20-1 at 9. However, Plaintiff has not 

verified his opposition or his “Statement of Disputed Factual Issues Re: Opposition to 

Defendant[s’] Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment” because he failed to sign either 

under penalty of perjury. See Dkts. 20, 20-2. The Court may treat the allegations in the verified 

complaint and declaration as opposing affidavits to the extent such allegations are based on 

Plaintiff’s personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder 

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating a plaintiff’s verified 

complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, he stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 

not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). 

b. Analysis of Merits

As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that on June 29, 2016, Defendants Brown and 

Patterson as well as the two Doe Defendants (Defendants Rodriguez and Salas) subjected him to 

“cruel and unusual sexual invasion of privacy [and] sexual misconduct” when they forced him to 

be undergo to an unclothed body search. Dkt. 1 at 3. Furthermore, Defendant Patterson, who is a 

female officer, was present during the search and took “sexually suggestive photographs” of 

Plaintiff while he was partially nude. Id. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Brown laughed at 

him during the search. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that such treatment of inmates has violated his 

 

11 Also attached in support of Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition are the grievance 

responses that are mostly similar to those attached to Defendants Khan’s and Truett’s declarations. 

See Dkt. 1, Ex. A; Dkt. 14-5 at 6-9; Dkt. 14-6 at 6-16. As these documents are evidence already 

considered in connection with the summary judgment motion, the Court will also consider the 

same documents submitted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has also submitted various CDCR Operation 

Manual procedures relating to searches as well as Defendants’ declarations and responses to 

interrogatories, to which Defendants do not object. Pl. Decl., Exs. C1-C2, D1, E1-E2, F1-F3. 

Also submitted by Plaintiff are various exhibits to which Defendants have objected to as 

“irrelevant and confusing or misleading,” including: a grievance relating to a disciplinary action 

stemming from Plaintiff being found guilty in possession of a cellphone (Pl. Decl., Ex. A2); 

documents relating to the communal shower, Plaintiff’s tattoos, Defendant Kahn’s confirmation as 

an Institution Gang Investigator, Inmate M. Barss’s grievance relating to June 5, 2018 “Litigation 

Clarification,” and a CDCR Form 22 filed by Plaintiff relating to whether there was a 128-B 

Chrono filed on June 29, 2016 (Pl. Decl., Ex. B1-B5); and Operations Procedures relating to 

“Temporary Holding Cells” (Pl. Decl., Ex. D2). The Court notes Defendants’ objections and 

stresses that it only considers relevant evidence that have been properly authenticated pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).

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constitutional rights and that female correctional officers are still being allowed to take partially

nude photographs of male inmates. Id. at 6. In essence, Plaintiff claims that Defendants sexually 

harassed him by subjecting him to an unclothed body search as well as by allowing a female 

correctional officer to take partially nude photographs of him, and that they did so to deliberately 

embarrassed and humiliated him. Based on these allegations, the Court found that Plaintiff stated 

a cognizable claim that the aforementioned Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

As mentioned above, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual 

punishment on prisoners. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Courts considering a prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment claim must ask: (1) if the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, 

and (2) if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional 

violation. Id. at 8 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A prisoner may state an 

Eighth Amendment claim for sexual harassment if the alleged harassment was sufficiently 

harmful, and the defendant acted with intent to harm the prisoner. Thomas, 887 F. Supp. at 3-4 

(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

violates contemporary standards of decency, even in the absence of significant injury. Hudson, 

503 U.S. at 9. And, as explained above, sexual assault, coercion, and harassment certainly may 

violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm. See 

Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525-31.

Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard or official, however, gives rise to an Eighth 

Amendment violation—the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of force. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2012) (no Eighth 

Amendment violation against officer who was alleged to have rubbed his thigh against plaintiff’s 

thigh while plaintiff was on toilet and to have begun smiling before leaving cell laughing); 

Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1998) (no Eighth Amendment violation where 

employees briefly touched inmate’s buttocks with apparent intent to embarrass him). A prisoner 

must therefore establish that the alleged sexual harassment was egregious, pervasive, and/or 

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widespread in order to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Compare Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525-31 

(prison policy requiring male guards to conduct body searches on female prisoners inflicted pain 

sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment) and Watson v. Jones, 980 F.2d 1165, 1165-66 (8th 

Cir. 1992) (finding Eighth Amendment violation where correctional officer sexually harassed two 

inmates on almost daily basis for two months by conducting deliberate examination of genitalia 

and anus) with Green v. Thompson, No. C 10-5721 WHA (PR), 2013 WL 550621, *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 12, 2013) (granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment claim that over the course of three weeks and between one and three times, prison 

guard grabbed prisoner’s buttocks and testicles, and made sexual comments to prisoner because it 

did not rise to the level of constitutional violation). In comparison, mere verbal sexual harassment 

does not necessarily amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding summary judgment dismissal of Eighth Amendment 

claim where prison guard exposed himself to prisoner in elevated, glass-enclosed control booth for 

no more than 30-40 seconds). Lastly, courts must accord prison administrators wide-ranging 

deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices to further institutional order and 

security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Here, the record shows that the ISU received information that Plaintiff and his cellmate 

were in possession of cellphones, which was confirmed by the cell search and subsequent 

confiscation because they are considered to be contraband. Brown Decl. ¶¶ 4, 12, Ex. A.

Moreover, according to prison regulations, such searches, including “[r]andom or spot-check 

inspections of inmates,” are permitted in prison especially where a reasonable suspicion exists that 

an inmate may have unauthorized or dangerous items concealed on his person. See Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3287(b). Overall, the goal of such searches is “to prevent possession and 

movement of unauthorized or dangerous items and substances into, out of, or within the 

institution.” Id. Moreover, the record shows that the searches of Plaintiff’s cell and his person 

were one of several searches conducted in Plaintiff’s housing unit that morning, including a 

similar search of his cellmate, as mentioned above. Brown Decl. ¶ 13. While Plaintiff seems to 

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“contest[] the possession of the cellphone [D]efendants allege was inside the cell where Plaintiff 

was assigned,” see Pl. Decl. ¶ 14, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence contradicting that the ISU 

received the aforementioned tip that led to the search. Meanwhile, Defendants have offered 

evidence that such a search is permitted when correctional staff are searching for illegal 

contraband. On these facts, Plaintiff has not shown that the unclothed body search was done for 

the purpose of harassment. Instead, the Court notes that prison regulations allow for such searches 

in order to further institutional order and security, and as stated above, this Courts must accord 

prison administrators wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of such policies. See

Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 917.

Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations rise to the level of the egregious, pervasive, and/or 

widespread conduct necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants have 

presented undisputed evidence shows that no Defendant physically touched Plaintiff during the 

unclothed body search or while Defendant Patterson took photographs of Plaintiff. Defendants’ 

alleged conduct—laughing at Plaintiff during the search—does not rise to the level of pain 

sufficient to violate the objective component of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim 

alleging that guard humiliated inmate when the guard approached the inmate while the inmate was 

on the toilet, rubbed the inmate’s thigh, “began smiling in a sexual [way], and left the cell 

laughing”); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171-72 (concluding that claim that a guard exposed himself to 

inmate while making crude comments was not sufficiently serious to satisfy an Eighth 

Amendment violation because it was an isolated incident that was short in duration and there was 

no allegation of physical contact between the guard and the inmate); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 

614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that female officials’ observation of unclothed male inmate, 

accompanied by “gawking, pointing, and joking” but without physical contact, was not sufficient 

to meet “objectively harmful” prong of Eighth Amendment test stating, “[t]o hold that gawking, 

pointing, and joking violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment would trivialize 

the objective component of the Eighth Amendment test and render it absurd”). 

As explained above, Defendants have provided the Court with copies of the photographs 

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taken by Defendant Patterson, which the Court has ordered to be filed under seal. See Galvan 

Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A. Specifically, the exhibit includes the photographs Defendant Patterson took of 

Plaintiff on June 29, 2016, following the unclothed body search. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Upon conducting a

review of the photographs, the Court finds that in all of the photographs except for the ones 

depicting only the upper portions of Plaintiff’s body, it is clear that Plaintiff is wearing boxer 

shorts. Id., Ex. A. None of the pictures show any part of Plaintiff’s genitalia. To the extent 

Plaintiff argues that the taking of photographs of Plaintiff in his boxer shorts violated the Eighth 

Amendment, the Court finds that there is an absence of evidence that the taking of photographs 

was sufficiently harmful such that it violated contemporary standards of decency. See, e.g., 

Goodrick v. Sandy, No. 1:10-cv-00603-EJL, 2013 WL 5409653, * 10 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2013) 

(granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on prisoner’s claim that he was subjected to 

strip search and photographing of his naked body because claim did not satisfy objective or 

subjective components of Eighth Amendment), aff’d by Goodrick v. Carlin, No. 13-35923, 616 

Fed. Appx. 222 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015) (unpublished memorandum disposition)

Finally, it seems that Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that a female correctional officer 

(Defendant Patterson) participated in the search and argues that the prison violates the male 

inmates’ constitutional rights by “continuing to use female staff to conduct unsecure, nonemergency strip searches of male inmates (cross-gender).” Dkt. 1 at 5. However, by itself, 

“[c]ross-gender searches cannot be called inhumane and therefore do[] not fall below the floor set 

by the objective component of the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 

623 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1995)). In contrast, 

the Ninth Circuit has upheld a district court’s finding that there was sufficient “infliction of pain” 

to trigger the Eighth Amendment in a cross-gender search case with exacerbating circumstances. 

See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525-27. In Jordan, the Ninth Circuit relied upon several facts that, 

combined with the policy of a clothed pat down search, was sufficient to support a finding of 

“infliction of pain” capable of satisfying the objective component of the Eighth Amendment. 

Specifically, the evidence in Jordan showed that female inmates were forced to undergo clothed, 

intrusive, pat down searches conducted by male prison officials; there were physical, emotional, 

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and psychological differences between men and women; and some of the women subject to search 

were women who had been physically and sexually abused in the past. In sum, the Ninth Circuit 

recognized that the evidence in Jordan showed that the female inmates had certain vulnerabilities 

that would cause a cross-gender pat down search to exacerbate pre-existing mental conditions 

which could cause severe psychological trauma. Id. 

The unclothed body search at issue in instant matter is distinguishable from the pat down 

searches in Jordan. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the June 29, 2016 

incident was the only time these specific Defendants ordered Plaintiff to submit to an unclothed 

body search. Defendants claim that the search took approximately one minute, while Plaintiff 

asserts it was longer than one minute. However, the record does not indicate that the search lasted

for an inordinate amount of time. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not come forth with supporting 

evidence showing that he suffered from any pre-existing condition that would have been 

exacerbated by the unclothed body search.12 And, lastly, no evidence exists showing that the 

unclothed body search involved any physical contact. For these reasons, no evidence exists to 

show that Plaintiff suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious harm to violate the Eighth 

Amendment. 

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Defendants’ actions during the June 29, 2016 unclothed body search violated Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on the merits as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Brown and 

Patterson, who are the served Defendants.

c. Qualified Immunity

Defendants claim, in the alternative, that qualified immunity would protect them from 

liability. Dkt. 14 at 29-31.

“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if 

 

12 Plaintiff claims that he “was diagnosed with External Hemorrhoids by Medical 

Personnel at CTF on April 14, 2016.” Pl. Decl. ¶ 9. However, Plaintiff has not supported such a 

claim with any medical evidence. Furthermore, he does not allege that such a condition was

exacerbated or affected in any way by the unclothed body search.

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constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she 

confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). The issue of qualified immunity 

generally entails a two-step process, which requires the court to determine first whether the 

defendant violated a constitutional right, and then to determine whether that right was clearly 

established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). 

In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court modified the Saucier test 

and “gave courts discretion to grant qualified immunity on the basis of the ‘clearly established’ 

prong alone, without deciding in the first instance whether any right had been violated.” James v. 

Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 650-51 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing Saucier standard after Pearson). The 

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it 

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; see, e.g., Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 

(9th Cir. 2002) (court may grant qualified immunity by viewing all of the facts most favorably to 

plaintiff and then finding that under those facts the defendants could reasonably believe they were 

not violating the law). In the instant case, the Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights were not violated. Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

Defendants prevail as a matter of law on their qualified immunity defense because the record 

establishes no Eighth Amendment violation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

However, even if a constitutional violation occurred with respect to Plaintiff’s June 29, 

2016 unclothed body search, Defendants argue that they remain entitled to qualified immunity as 

to the Eighth Amendment claim. Dkt. 14 at 31. Defendants argue that “[a]t the time of the search 

on June 29, 2016, it was clearly established that cross-gender observation of a strip search by 

prison personnel, at least in cases where there were no allegations of physical contact or other

harassing behavior, does not violate the Constitution.” Id. (citing Morris v. CDCR, Case No. 16-

cv-5547, 2017 WL 2494654 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017); Malo v. Hernandez, Case No. 13-cv-01781-

SJO, 2014 WL 7246730, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014); Carlin v. Manu, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D.

Oregon 1999); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that strip searches 

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conducted within view of female staff are generally permissible); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860

F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that visual body cavity searches “involving no touching” 

are reasonable); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 493 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to reach 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment challenge to strip search observed by female prison guards because 

it did not involve “the type of shocking and barbarous treatment protected against by the [E]ighth 

[A]mendment.”). 

The Court agrees with Defendants. In light of clearly established principles at the time of 

the incident, Defendants could have reasonably believed that their conduct of subjecting Plaintiff 

to an unclothed body search was lawful, especially after they received a tip that Plaintiff may be in 

possession of contraband. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 561 (prisoners may be subjected to strip searches 

and body cavity searches); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985) (routine patdown searches which include the groin area, even when performed by guards of the opposite sex, 

do not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights). In addition, district courts within the Ninth 

Circuit have generally found no Eighth Amendment violation from a prisoner’s claim that officials 

conducted an unclothed body search without physical contact or took nude photographs. See, e.g., 

Dawson v. Beard, No. Case No. 1:15-cv-01867 DLB, 2016 WL 1137029, *5 (E.D. Cal. March 23, 

2016) (report and recommendation dismissing prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim that two 

unclothed body searches, one of which was in front of inmates and female officers, for failure to 

state a claim); Wilson v. Soto, Case No. CV 15-9546-PSG (JPR), 2016 WL 825194, *4-*5 (C.D. 

Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (report and recommendation dismissing with leave to amend prisoner’s claim 

that prison officials violated Eighth Amendment when prisoner was forced to strip naked and 

submit to a cavity search in the prison yard in front of inmates, female and male guards, and some 

guards pointed and laughed); Goodrick, 2013 WL 5409653, *10 (granting defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on prisoner’s claim that he was subjected to strip search and photographing of 

his naked body because claim did not satisfy objective or subjective components of Eighth 

Amendment); Carroll v. Read, No. CV 10-6964-CJC (DTB), 2013 WL 1858866, * (C.D. Cal. Jan. 

31, 2013) (report and recommendation dismissing for failure to state an Eighth Amendment claim 

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prisoner’s allegation that prison official conducted an unclothed body search on plaintiff, and 

ordered plaintiff to expose his buttocks to them two separate times because prisoner’s claim 

showed nothing more than a minimal or momentary discomfort); Blacher v. Johnson, No. 1:12-cv01159 GSA PC, 2012 WL 12906134, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012) (report and recommendation 

dismissing prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim that female correctional officers smirked or were 

condescending when prisoner was subjected to unclothed body search). 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and their motion for summary 

judgment will be GRANTED on this ground as well.

d. Unserved Defendants

Summary judgment may be properly entered in favor of unserved defendants where (1) the 

controlling issues would be the same as to the unserved defendants, (2) those issues have been 

briefed, and (3) Plaintiff has been provided an opportunity to address the controlling issues. 

Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir.) (citing, 

inter alia, Silverton v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir 1981)), cert. denied, 

516 U.S. 864 (1995). 

As mentioned above, two recently-named Doe Defendants have not been served and have 

not joined the other Defendants in their motion for summary judgment. The unserved Defendants 

in this case are Defendants Rodriguez and Salas. It is apparent, however, that the claims against 

the unserved Defendants are without merit and subject to summary adjudication. The allegations 

against the unserved Defendants in Plaintiff’s original complaint are the same as those against the 

served Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff’s allegations relating to his Eighth Amendment claim 

against Defendants Rodriguez and Salas are the same claim as against the served Defendants. 

There is no suggestion in the complaint, the exhibits attached thereto, or in the briefs and exhibits 

filed in connection with the present dispositive motion, that the analysis differs with respect to the 

unserved Defendants as opposed to the served Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants Rodriguez 

and Salas are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to the Eighth Amendment claim 

against them.

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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. Dkt. 21. Plaintiff requests the 

Court appoint counsel based upon the following: the complexity of the case; his imprisonment 

greatly limits his ability to litigate; he is unable to afford counsel; he has no legal education; and 

the appointment of counsel would “better enable Plaintiff to present evidence and cross-examine 

witnesses.” Id. at 2. However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter 

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only 

the power to “request” that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not give the courts the power to make “coercive appointments of 

counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The Court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under Section 1915 only in 

“exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the 

likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th 

Cir. 1997) withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 

banc); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Both of these factors must be viewed together before reaching a 

decision on a request for counsel under section 1915. Id. Neither the need for discovery, nor the 

fact that the pro se litigant would be better served with the assistance of counsel, necessarily 

qualify the issues involved as complex. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (where plaintiff’s pursuit of 

discovery was comprehensive and focused and his papers were generally articulate and organized, 

district court did not abuse discretion in denying request for counsel). 

Because Plaintiff has adequately presented his claims and the Court has granted 

Defendants’ dispositive motion as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim as well as allowed the 

parties to file briefs addressing Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, there are no 

exceptional circumstances presented requiring appointment of counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Dkt. 21.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and motion for service of process are 

GRANTED. Dkts. 16, 17. ISU Correctional Sergeant S. Rodriguez and ISU Correctional Officer 

R. Salas are added as Defendants. The Court orders service of process on these newly-added 

Defendants, and the Clerk shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of 

Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint (dkt. 1) and 

all attachments thereto, a copy of the Court’s January 5, 2018 Order of Service (dkt. 7), Plaintiff’s

motion to amend the complaint (dkt. 16), and copies of this Order as well as the concurrently-filed 

“Order Directing Defendants to File Dispositive Motion or Notice Regarding Such Motion” on:

ISU Correctional Sergeant S. Rodriguez and ISU Correctional Officer R. Salas at CTF.

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for administrative relief to file certain 

documents under seal. Dkt. 15. With respect to Defendants’ dispositive motion, the Clerk is 

instructed to maintain under seal the following: Confidential Exhibit A, which is attached to the 

declaration of Litigation Coordinator Galvan in support of Defendants’ Administrative Motion for 

an Order to File Confidential Documents Under Seal. The foregoing material shall be maintained 

under seal and not entered individually on the docket until the conclusion of this case and any 

appellate proceedings, after which time they should be returned to defense counsel upon timely 

request.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt. 14. The claims against 

Defendants in their official capacities and the claim for punitive damages are DISMISSED with 

prejudice. 

The Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Khan, Kelley and Truett is DISMISSED 

without leave to amend and with prejudice. 

The Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Kernan and Hatton is DISMISSED with 

leave to amend. If Plaintiff believes he can provide sufficient facts from which it can be inferred 

that Defendants Kernan and Hatton are liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must file an 

amendment to the complaint no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the filing date of this 

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Order. If Plaintiff fails to do so, Defendants Kernan and Hatton will remain dismissed and the 

dismissal will be without leave to amend and without further order from the Court. The Court 

further notes that it is providing Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amendment to the complaint

rather than an amended complaint, and thus Plaintiff will only need to allege a claim against 

Defendants Kernan and Hatton, and will not need to repeat the claim against the other Defendants. 

An amendment is read together with the complaint, whereas an amended complaint would 

supersede the complaint.

4. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment relating to the Eighth Amendment 

claim is GRANTED on the merits and based on qualified immunity as to served Defendants 

Brown and Patterson and as to unserved Defendants Rodriguez and Salas. Judgment will not be 

entered at this time, however, because there remain other claims that must be litigated. A single 

judgment will be entered after that is done.

5. By separate and concurrently-filed Order, the Court has reviewed the complaint and 

determined that it previously overlooked Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 

See Order Directing Defendants to File Dispositive Motion or Notice Regarding Such Motion. 

Thus, the portion of this Order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is limited to 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

6. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Dkt. 21.

7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 21.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 14, 2019

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