Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00681/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Angel Valdez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-681-TUC-FRZ-DTF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jose Angel Valdez has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before this Court are

the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner did not file a reply. The

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, dismiss the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The grand jury indicted Petitioner for sexual conduct with a minor under 15 and two

counts of molestation of a child under 15. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, Doc. 2.) Subsequently, the State

filed an Allegation of Dangerous Crimes Against Children alleging that Count 1, sexual

conduct with a minor, involved a child 12 years of age or younger. (Id., Doc. 29.) Petitioner

was convicted on all 3 charges. (Id., Doc. 92 .) The jury found, as to Count 1, that the victim

was under 12. (Id.) Petitioner was sentenced to a mandatory 35 years to life for the sexual

conduct charge (dangerous nature) and to ten-year terms for the molestation charges,

concurrent with each other but consecutive to the 35-year term. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, Doc. 111.)

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Petitioner challenged only his sentence on appeal and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

(Doc. 13, Ex. M.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id., Ex. O.)

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-conviction Relief (PCR). (Doc. 13, Ex. P.) The court

appointed Petitioner’s appellate attorney to represent him for the PCR proceeding. (Id., Ex.

Q.) Counsel filed notice that he could not find any colorable PCR claims. (Id., Ex. R.)

Petitioner was granted the right to, and did, file a pro se PCR petition. (Id., Ex. X.) The Court

dismissed the petition, denying the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims on their

merits and finding the remaining claims precluded. (Id., Ex. Z.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals granted Petitioner’s petition for review but denied relief. (Doc. 13, Exs. BB, CC.)

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises four multi-part claims. Respondents concede that the petition is

timely (Doc. 13 at 17), however, they contend that Claims 1, 3 and 4 are procedurally

defaulted. The Court first evaluates these claims for exhaustion and then evaluates the

properly exhausted claims on the merits.

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner clearly alert the state court that he is alleging a

specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (general appeal to due process

not sufficient to present substance of federal claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-

70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency

of evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury, and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked

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specificity and explicitness required); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish

exhaustion.”).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner

is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR

petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided

only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and

the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in

a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present

it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims

in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)

(stating that the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any

presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32,

the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732,

735 n.1; see also Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62.

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

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 1 Respondents summarize Claim 1(c) differently than the Court, and they did not

include in their summary the IAC portion of the claim, labeled by the Court as Claim 1(c)(ii).

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shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT ANALYSIS

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges that (a) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the State

failing to give notice that he was charged with sexual conduct with a minor under the age of

12, because the indictment charged him with sexual conduct with a minor under the age of

15; (b) (i) trial and (ii) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance based on their failure

to research and raise issue 1(a); and (c) (i) his Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses

was violated when his son was denied the right to testify, and (ii) trial counsel was

ineffective in allowing this to happen.1

Petitioner did not raise these claims on direct appeal or in his PCR petition. (Doc. 13,

Exs. H, X.) He acknowledged this fact in his petition to this Court. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Therefore,

he failed to fairly present these claims in state court. If Petitioner were to return to state court

now to litigate Claims 1(a), 1(b)(i), and 1(c) they would be found waived and untimely under

Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because they do not

fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). These claims

are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Claim 1(b)(ii) alleging ineffectiveness of appellate counsel possibly could still be

raised in state court. Petitioner was represented by the same counsel on appeal and in his first

PCR proceeding and it would have been improper for that counsel to allege his own

ineffectiveness. State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 (2006). Therefore, it

is not clear that this claim would be precluded if raised in a subsequent PCR petition. Id.

Because this claim is without merit, the Court addresses and dismisses it below. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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 2 The Court and the Respondents’ summary of the subparts of Claim 3 are slightly

different.

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Claim 3

Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because (a) he was

made to stand trial for, and convicted of, a charge not contained in the indictment, and (b) the

State broadened the dates of the offenses in the indictment by amendment. He also alleges

(c) that the State violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy by

charging him in Counts 1 and 2 for the same conduct because Count 2 was a lesser-included

offense of Count 1.2

Petitioner represents that he raised this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals but then

indicates it was not presented in entirety. (Doc. 1 at 14.) Review of his opening appellate

brief and PCR petition reveals that he did not fairly present any portion of this claim in state

court. (Doc. 13, Exs. H, X.) If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this

claim, it would be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to

preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). This claim is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted.

Claim 4

 Petitioner alleges that he did not receive a fair trial in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process, based on the grounds alleged in Claims 1 through 3.

Petitioner did not fairly present this catch-all claim in state court either on appeal or in a PCR

proceeding (Doc. 13, Exs. H, X), a fact which he acknowledges in his petition (Doc. 1 at 17).

If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found

waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). This claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

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Cause and Prejudice

Claims 1(a), 1(b)(i) and (ii), 3 and 4 are procedurally defaulted and subject to

dismissal absent a ground to overcome the default. In the petition, Petitioner asserts that his

failure to properly raise Claims 1, 3 and 4 was due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.

He further alleges that if these claims had been properly raised the result of the proceedings

would have been different. He did not file a reply brief, responding to Respondents’

procedural default arguments; however, the Court addresses cause and prejudice to the extent

raised in the petition.

Claims 1(a), 1(c)(i), 3 and 4 are record-based claims that should have been raised, if

at all, on direct appeal. Therefore, to the extent these claims were viable, it is appellate

counsel that should have raised them in state court. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

that violates the Sixth Amendment can serve as cause for a petitioner’s failure to properly

exhaust claims in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). However, before

ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may be used to establish cause for a procedural default,

it must be presented to the state court as an independent claim. Id. at 489. Petitioner did not

allege in his PCR petition that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any

claims. (Doc. 13, Ex. X.) However, because he was represented by the same counsel on

appeal and in his first PCR proceeding, it would have been improper for that counsel to

allege his own ineffectiveness. See Bennett, 146 P.3d at 67, 213 Ariz. at 566. Therefore, it

is not clear that this claim would be precluded if raised in a subsequent PCR petition. Id.

Because this could operate as cause if exhausted, the Court will assess the merits of Claims

1(a), 1(c)(i), 3 and 4 to determine if Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise

them on appeal.

Claims 1(b)(i) and 1(c)(ii), alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel should have

been raised, if at all, in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding. There is no constitutional right to PCR

counsel, thus, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated when counsel is ineffective in such a

proceeding. However, because a PCR proceeding is the first time in Arizona that IAC at trial

may be raised, the Supreme Court holds that if PCR counsel is ineffective pursuant to the

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standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in failing to raise a trial IAC

claim, that may constitute cause to excuse a default of that claim. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1315 (2012). Subsequent to the State filing its brief in this case, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that an allegation that PCR counsel was ineffective, as cause to excuse the default

of an IAC at trial claim, does not have to be exhausted. Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054,

1072 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, PCR counsel’s failure to raise Claims 1(b)(i) and 1(c)(ii) could

operate as cause to excuse the defaults. Therefore, the Court will assess the merits of Claims

1(b)(i) and 1(c)(ii) to determine if Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel not raising them.

Claims 1(a) and 1(b)(i)

Petitioner alleges that (a) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the State

failing to give notice that he was charged with sexual conduct with a minor 12 or under, and

(b) (i) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance based on his failure to research and raise

issue 1(a). More specifically, Petitioner alleges that he was charged in the indictment with

sexual conduct with a minor under 15 (not a minor 12 or under) but convicted and sentenced

based on sexual conduct with a minor 12 or under. A charge of sexual conduct with a minor

12 years of age or younger carries a mandatory sentence of 35 years to life, while sexual

conduct with a minor under the age of 15 (but not 12 or under) carries a presumptive

sentence of 20 years. A.R.S. § 13-705.

The Court looks first at Claim 1(a). Petitioner’s allegations are without merit because

he had notice of the State’s intent to prove to the jury that he engaged in sexual conduct with

a child 12 or under. On September 2, 2005, the grand jury returned an indictment charging

Petitioner, in Count 1, with sexual conduct with a minor under 15, a class two felony, a

dangerous crime against children. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, Doc. 2.) The indictment cites, among

other statutes, A.R.S. § 13-604.01 (which is now found at A.R.S. § 13-705). On January 3,

2006, the State filed an Allegation of Dangerous Crimes Against Children, citing A.R.S.

§ 13-604.01(A) and alleging that Count 1 was a dangerous crime against a child 12 years of

age or younger. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, Doc. 29.) Petitioner was tried on the three counts in the

amended indictment, and a mistrial was declared on April 3, 2006, when the jury could not

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 3 To the extent Petitioner argues that providing notice other than by way of grand jury

indictment violated his constitutional rights, his claim fails on legal grounds. The Fifth

Amendment requirement of indictment by a grand jury has not been incorporated against the

states. See Hurtado v. People of State of Cal., 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Branzburg v. Hayes,

408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972).

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reach a verdict on any counts. (Id., Doc. 61.) The verdict forms presented to that jury asked

the jury to decide, if it found Petitioner guilty on Count 1, whether the victim was under the

age of 12. (Id., Doc. 50.) When Petitioner was re-tried in August 2006, and found guilty on

all three charges, the verdict form asked the same question as to Count 1, whether the victim

was under the age of 12. (Id., Doc. 92.) These documents make clear that Petitioner and his

counsel had notice long before his second trial commenced in August 2006, that the State

intended to prove that the victim was 12 years of age or younger. Petitioner’s claim fails

because the record demonstrates that he had notice the State would be trying to prove, as to

Count 1, that the victim was 12 or younger.3

 Because the factual premise of Claim 1(a) fails,

Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise this claim on appeal.

Claim1(b)(i) fails because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise Claim

1(a), which is without merit. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant first

must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, a defendant must show that the mistakes

made were “prejudicial to the defense,” that is, the mistakes created a “reasonable probability

that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. A court need not address both prongs of an ineffectiveness claim, if it

is easier to dispose of it solely by assessing prejudice, the court is free to do so. Id. at 697.

Petitioner’s IAC claim fails because there is not a reasonable probability that Claim 1(a)

would have succeeded if trial counsel had raised it because Petitioner had notice of the

charges on which he was tried.

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In light of this analysis, Petitioner has not demonstrated actual prejudice arising from

the procedural default of Claims 1(a) and 1(b)(i). Therefore, they are procedurally defaulted

and subject to dismissal on that ground. Alternatively, regardless of exhaustion they are

meritless and may be dismissed on that basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Claims 1(c)(i) and (ii)

In Claim 1(c) Petitioner alleges that (i) his Sixth Amendment right to compel

witnesses was violated when his son was denied the right to testify, and (ii) trial counsel was

ineffective in allowing this to happen. 

The record contains a motion from the prosecutor to preclude Petitioner’s son from

testifying at the first trial. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, Doc. 49.) The court granted the motion on the

morning of the fourth day of trial; however, later that day the court reversed its decision and

ruled that the defense could call him to testify or show the videotape of his statement. (Id.,

Doc. 48 at 1-2.) The minute entry further reflects that the videotape was shown to the jury.

(Id. at 3.) At Petitioner’s second trial, his son was called as a witness and testified. (Doc. 13,

Ex. E at 74-77.) Petitioner does not allege anything specific as to which his son was

precluded from testifying and there is nothing in the record indicating his testimony was

limited.

Because Petitioner’s son testified at trial and he has not asserted that counsel failed

to elicit specific testimony, there is no factual basis for these claims. Thus, Petitioner has not

demonstrated actual prejudice arising from the default of Claims 1(c)(i) and (ii). Therefore,

they are procedurally defaulted and subject to dismissal on that ground. Alternatively,

regardless of exhaustion they are meritless and may be dismissed on that basis. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2).

Claim 3

Petitioner first argues, in Claims 3(a) and (b), that his right to due process was violated

because he was convicted of a charge, and offenses occurring on certain dates, that was not

contained in the indictment presented to the grand jury. These claims fail on legal grounds

because the Fifth Amendment requirement of indictment by a grand jury has not been

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incorporated against the states. See Hurtado v. People of State of Cal., 110 U.S. 516, 538

(1884); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972).

Next, Petitioner alleges in Claim 3(c) that the State violated the Fifth Amendment

prohibition on double jeopardy by charging him in Count 2 with a lesser-included offense

of Count 1. In Count 1, Petitioner was charged with sexual conduct with a minor, which was

based on Valdez performing oral sex on the victim. Valdez argues that he necessarily touched

the victim’s genitals while committing Count 1, and that touching was the factual basis for

the molestation charge of Count 2. This claim fails because it is factually erroneous.

Petitioner is correct that Count 1 was based on him performing oral sex on the minor

victim. The victim testified that this occurred after they watched a movie and Valdez was

driving the victim home. (Doc. 13, Ex. C at 109-16.) The victim testified that Petitioner

stopped in a dark location and had the victim stand on the bumper of his van with his pants

down. (Id. at 111-12.) In contrast, the victim testified that the child molestation allegations

of Count 2 occurred earlier in the evening when Petitioner was driving him back from the

store. (Id. at 98.) While in the van, Petitioner touched the victim’s testicles with his hand

underneath his clothing. (Id. at 98-100.) Because the factual basis of each charge is distinct

there is no basis for Petitioner’s allegation that Count 2 was a lesser included offense of

Count 1.

Because Claim 3 is without merit, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel not raising

this claim on appeal. Therefore, the claim is procedurally defaulted and subject to dismissal

on that ground. Alternatively, regardless of exhaustion it is meritless and may be dismissed

on that basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Claim 4

In Claim 4, Petitioner argues that his right to due process was violated by the

allegations set forth in Claims 1 through 3. In this Order the Court assesses the merits of

Claims 1 through 3. The Court determined that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the

record and the allegations in his Petition. Thus, a claim of cumulative error based on the

these claims would fail and Petitioner was not prejudiced by appellate counsel not raising this

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claim. Claim 4 is procedurally defaulted and subject to dismissal on that ground.

Alternatively, regardless of exhaustion it is meritless and may be dismissed on that basis. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Conclusion

Petitioner fails to demonstrate prejudice arising from the default of Claims 1(a),

1(b)(i), 1(c)(i) and (ii), 3 or 4. Therefore, they are procedurally defaulted and subject to

dismissal. Alternatively, these claims are meritless and may be dismissed on that basis.

Miscarriage of Justice

Petitioner did not allege in the Petition that there will be a miscarriage of justice if his

defaulted claims are not addressed on the merits, and he did not file a reply brief where he

would have been more likely to raise such an argument. To demonstrate a fundamental

miscarriage of justice based on factual innocence, a petitioner must show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). To establish the requisite probability,

the petitioner must demonstrate with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

at 324, 327. Nowhere in the Petition has Valdez presented new evidence or argued that he

is actually innocent. Therefore, there are no grounds on which the Court could find a

miscarriage of justice.

MERITS

Legal Standard for Relief Under the AEDPA

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the

“acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

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Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of

the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became

final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

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clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Claim 1(b)(ii)

Claim 1(b)(ii) alleges that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

to research and raise the issue that Petitioner did not receive sufficient notice of the charge

against him, specifically, that he was convicted of sexual conduct with a minor 12 or under

(not a minor under 15 as charged in the indictment). 

Valdez had a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. See

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). To establish IAC, Petitioner must show that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance caused him

prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that

there is a “reasonable probability” that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the appeal would

have been different. Id. at 694. Thus, the Court assesses whether, if Claim 1(b)(ii) had been

raised on appeal, there is a reasonable probability it would have been successful.

As thoroughly addressed above when discussing the default of Claims 1(a) and 1(b)(i),

Petitioner received notice well before trial that the State would be presenting evidence that

he committed sexual conduct with a minor 12 or under. Therefore, counsel was not

ineffective for challenging lack of notice on appeal and Petitioner was not prejudiced by the

omission. Claim 1(b)(ii) is without merit.

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 4 Within this claim Petitioner again mentions the alleged lack of notice as to the charge

for Count 1, which the Court has addressed and found meritless in its discussion of Claim

1(b). In their Answer, Respondents address not only Count 1 but also Petitioner’s sentences

on Counts 2 and 3. Because Petitioner challenged only his sentence on Count 1 in his federal

petition, the Court limits its discussion to that count.

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Claim 2

Petitioner alleges that his sentence on Count 1 constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.4

 Petitioner was sentenced to 35 years to

life on Count 1, sexual conduct with a minor under 15, which was noticed as a dangerous

crime against children involving a minor twelve or under. The Arizona Court of Appeals

denied this claim finding that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because

it was not grossly disproportionate to the crime. (Doc. 13, Ex. M at 8-12.) The appellate court

found several facts particular to the circumstances of the crime in Count 1:

Valdez was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for performing oral sex on

an eleven-year-old boy . . . . In committing these crimes, Valdez violated L.’s

trust and the trust of L.’s family and engaged in extraordinary premeditated,

predatory, and manipulative behavior that exploited the boy’s youthful naivete.

The ultimate act for which Valdez was sentenced to life imprisonment was

protracted – oral sex with L. for seven to ten minutes – and involved securing

the victim’s assistance by having the boy act as a lookout during the sex act.

(Id. at 4.)

Petitioner argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it was

mandated by statute and is disproportionate to the crime. Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on either portion of this claim. First, the Supreme Court has concluded that individualized

sentencing is not constitutionally required in non-capital cases, rejecting the argument that

a sentence (other than death) is cruel and unusual solely because it is mandatory. Harmelin

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991).

Second, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s proportionality claim

was not objectively unreasonable. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of

proportionality is somewhat opaque, but it is clearly established that a sentence that is grossly

disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed violates the Eighth Amendment.

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Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). Although the Court has not clearly defined the

parameters of this principle, it will be met only in the extraordinary case. Id. at 73, 77. The

Arizona appellate court cited the clearly established law from the Supreme Court, setting

forth the grossly disproportionate standard, and nothing in their opinion is contrary to the

governing law. (Doc. 13, Ex. M at 8-12.)

Next, the Court assesses whether the state court opinion was an unreasonable

application of the clearly established law. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71. “[T]he governing

legal principle gives legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the

scope of the proportionality principle - the ‘precise contours’ of which ‘are unclear.’” Id.

(quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998). The first step in an Eighth Amendment challenge is to

make a “threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed.” Harmelin,

501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Valdez’s 35 year to life sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his

offense – preying upon an 11-year-old child in order to engage in extended oral sexual

contact him. The Supreme Court has found no gross disparity for less serious crimes with

lengthy sentences: life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for third felony of

obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses (priors for a $28.36 forged check and $80 of credit card

fraud), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); 40 years for possession of nine ounces of

marijuana and drug paraphernalia, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1983); life imprisonment

without possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine, Harmelin, 501 U.S.

957; 25 years to life for third felony, grand theft of approximately $1200 (priors for three

burglaries and one robbery), Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); and consecutive

sentences of 25 years to life for two petty thefts under $100 each, treated as felonies due to

prior conviction (recidivist priors for three burglaries), Andrade, 538 U.S. 63. The Supreme

Court has found an Eighth Amendment violation based on proportionality in two instances:

15 years imprisonment, chained at the ankle and wrist, hard and painful labor, and restriction

on civil rights for life, for falsifying a document, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349

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(1910); and a life sentence without possibility of parole for a “no account” check for $100

(with six priors for nonviolent minor felonies), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).

Comparison of Valdez’s crime and sentence with these cases undermines his

argument. The only cases the Supreme Court found to be grossly disproportionate involved

life without possibility of parole for a minor non-violent crime, Solem, and a sentence that

went beyond imprisonment to include painful labor and lifelong impairment of rights for a

minor offense, Weems. Petitioner’s sentence is not comparable to those circumstances.

Further, the Court upheld a sentence of life without parole for possession of a large volume

of cocaine because, in part, it threatened serious harm to society. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 1002

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Valdez’s crime in this case is as serious or worse than the crime

committed in Harmelin. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1344-45 (11th Cir.

2010) (upholding a mandatory minimum 30 year sentence for crossing a state line with intent

to engage in a sexual act with an eleven-year-old (the act was not completed) and finding the

crime “as bad or worse” than Harmelin’s drug crime). The Supreme Court has acknowledged

that States have a compelling interest in safeguarding minors’ well being and that the

“prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective

of surpassing importance.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (addressing

regulation of child pornography). Further, courts have noted repeatedly the severity of crimes

involving sexual abuse of children and the extensive harm they cause. See Farley, 607 F.3d

at 1345 (collecting cases). In light of the severity of the crime and the fact that Petitioner’s

sentence allows for parole, his sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crime he

committed. At a minimum, Valdez’s case is not the extraordinary case that violates the

Eighth Amendment and the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

Claims 1(a), 1(b)(i), 1(c)(i) and (ii), 3 and 4 are procedurally defaulted and should be

dismissed on that basis. Alternatively, these claims are without merit. Claims 1(b)(ii) and 2

do not warrant relief under the AEDPA and should be dismissed on the merits. Based on the

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foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an order DISMISSING

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days.

No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any objections filed should be

captioned with the following case number: CV-11-681-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2013.

Case 4:11-cv-00681-FRZ Document 16 Filed 03/28/13 Page 17 of 17