Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_93-cv-05390/USCOURTS-caed-1_93-cv-05390-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT P. SMITH, III,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JAMES GOMEZ,

Defendant. 

 /

1:93-cv-05390-AWI-DLB-P

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 185)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 147)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT

ORDER CONCLUDING ACTION

Plaintiff, Robert P. Smith, III (“plaintiff”), is a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was

referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On July 15, 2004, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and

Recommendations herein which were served on the parties and which

contained notice to the parties that any objections to the

Findings and Recommendations were to be filed within thirty (30)

days. On August 3, 2007, plaintiff filed objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations. On August 20,

Case 1:93-cv-05390-AWI-DLB Document 207 Filed 01/18/08 Page 1 of 9
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2007, defendant filed a reply to plaintiff’s objections.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 73-305, this court has conducted a

de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the

entire file, the court finds the Findings and Recommendations to

be supported by the record and by proper analysis. Because the

procedural history of the case and facts are known to the parties

and cited the parties’ briefs they will not be repeated here. 

In short, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his First

Amendment right to access the courts by having regulations which

deemed Plaintiff was not indigent and could afford to pay for

photocopying. Plaintiff states that this rule caused him to

choose between paying for photocopies of his state habeas

petition, requiring him to not use the prison canteen for

approximately five months, or foregoing his state habeas

petition, allowing him to buy basic supplies from the canteen. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff

could have filed his state habeas corpus petition and choose not

to file the petition, and instead, to use his limited funds on

hobbies and a higher quality necessities than those provided by

the prison. In making this finding, the Magistrate Judge pointed

out the vast filings in this action and that the amount of

photocopies made to proceed with this case far outnumbers the

photocopies needed to file a state habeas petition.

In the objections, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation conflicts with Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff claims that Rhodes stands

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for the proposition that a First Amendment right can still exist

even if a Plaintiff proceeds with a civil rights complaint. It

appears Plaintiff’s position is that his filings in this action

cannot be reviewed to determine if Plaintiff was able to file his

habeas petition. Rhodes is of no assistance to Plaintiff. In

Rhodes, the Ninth Circuit found that to maintain a viable First

Amendment retaliation claim, five basic elements must be shown:

“(1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408

F.3d at 56-68. The Ninth Circuit further held that a plaintiff

need not "demonstrate a total chilling of his First Amendment

rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation

in order to perfect a retaliation claim," and as such, the

plaintiff’s filing of a civil rights action does not necessarily

show First Amendment rights were not chilled. Id., at 568-69.

Unlike Rhodes, this action is not a retaliation case. 

Plaintiff is alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to

access the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)

(inmates have fundamental constitutional right of access to the

courts). Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to access the courts

is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and

civil rights actions. Id. at 354. An inmate claiming

interference with or denial of access to the courts must show

that he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 351. Where a

prisoner asserts a backward-looking claim seeking a remedy for a

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lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: “1) the

loss of a 'nonfrivolous' or 'arguable' underlying claim; 2) the

official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that

may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available

in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th

Cir.2007) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14

(2002)). Because the complaint concerns access to the courts and

not retaliation, Rhodes is of minimal value. However, even

assuming that Rhodes provides some guidance in this access to the

court’s case, the fact Plaintiff was able to proceed in this

action was only one factor from which the Magistrate Judge

concluded that the undisputed facts showed Plaintiff, rather than

Defendants, caused Plaintiff from being unable to make the

relevant photocopies. Simply put, the undisputed facts show

Plaintiff was not in a “catch-22" situation where he had to

choose between filing his state habeas petition or avoiding

disciplinary charges because he did not have proper hygiene. 

The motion for summary judgment focused on the reason

Plaintiff was unable to file a state habeas action. In essence,

the Magistrate Judge found the second element listed above was

lacking - Evidence that Defendants’ acts frustrated the state

litigation. See Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076. This second element

requires the plaintiff to “show that the alleged violation of his

rights was proximately caused” by the state actor defendants. 

Id. at 1077. In Phillips,the plaintiff alleged that the

defendant’s refusal to allow him access to a comb-binding machine

resulted in the plaintiff being unable to timely file his

petition for certiorari seeking review of the plaintiff’s state

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court post conviction relief action. Id. at 1076. In

addressing the proximate cause element, the defendant argued that

the plaintiff could have used an alternate means of binding his

petition for certiorari or he could have submitted the petition

unbound. The Ninth Circuit found that: “[e]ven if Hust's

actions were not an insurmountable obstacle to Phillips's attempt

to assert his claim, Hust effectively prevented Phillips from

filing his cert. petition by arbitrarily and selectively denying

him access to the comb-binding machine.” Id. at 1077. 

The court finds Herst does not compel a result different

than that recommended by the Magistrate Judge. Here, Defendants

have not merely pointed out another hypothetical way Plaintiff

might have been able to file his state habeas petition even

though it violated state procedural rules, such as the state

court accepting a filing without any copies. The undisputed

facts show that Plaintiff could have paid for the copies, but

decided that he would use his limited funds on other items. In

addition, there is no evidence that Defendants’ actions were

arbitrary and selective. Rather, Plaintiff challenges a prison

rule that appears to be applied evenly to all prisoners with

prison jobs. Thus, even though Phillips cautions against finding

a lack of causation based on other speculative avenues available

to the prisoner, this court finds the facts of this case are

sufficiently different than Phillips as to warrant a different

result.

In the objections, Plaintiff also complains about various

delays in this action, some of which happened while this action

was assigned to the undersigned and some of which happened when

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 The court notes that many of the contentions which Plaintiff wishes to add in an amended complaint 1

concern events that occurred during the litigation of this action and these claims do not concern the access to the

courts at issue in this action. While such unrelated claims are not per se disallowed, the fact the claims concern

other acts and other Defendants is another reason not to allow this action, which has been pending for fifteen years to

continue any longer. 

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this action was before the Ninth Circuit or other Judges in this

court. While the court declines to find that this action has

proceeded in a timely manner at all stages, this court is

addressing the motions currently before it. Plaintiff’s claims

concerning the court’s 2004 orders are without merit at this time

because the Ninth Circuit has already given Plaintiff the

opportunity to file the opposition he claims he was unable to

file in 2004. In addition, the fact this action was filed in

1993 is evidence that the court should resolve the pending motion

quickly and not allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint,

putting this action back at “square one.” See Texaco, Inc. v. 1

Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9 Cir 1991) (“Undue delay is a th

valid reason for denying leave to amend.”).

Plaintiff also complains in the objections about the court’s

failure to appoint counsel to represent Plaintiff. There is no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v.

Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Title 28

U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to

"request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding is

forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not give the

courts the power to make "coercive appointments of counsel."

Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).

The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under

Section 1915 only in "exceptional circumstances," the

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determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the

likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved. Rand v. Rowland, 113

F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir.1997) withdrawn in part on other grounds

on reh'g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); Wilborn

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1986). The basic

contention in this action is not overly complex. Plaintiff’s

vast filings indicate that he is able to litigate effectively,

having filed many motions before this court and having obtained a

favorable result from the Ninth Circuit in pro se. Finally, the

court notes that, despite the court’s efforts, this court has

remarkably few attorneys who are willing to accept prisoner civil

rights actions. Plaintiff is correct that he would be served by

the assistance of counsel, but as the Ninth Circuit has

recognized, “any pro se litigant certainly would be better served

with the assistance of counsel,” and as such the Plaintiff must

“show that because of the complexity of the claims he was unable

to articulate his positions.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. The court

finds this is not such a case.

Plaintiff also contends that this court has relied on

unsubstantiated records from Plaintiff’s prison canteen records. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Magistrate Judge did not

rely on these records. Rather, the Magistrate Judge concluded

Plaintiff had failed to show that the purchase of required

supplies made it impossible for him to pay for legal copies. In

addition, the court notes that it is undisputed based on

Plaintiff’s own admissions that Plaintiff purchased items from

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the canteen and these purchases resulted in Plaintiff not having

enough money to file his state habeas petition.

Plaintiff maintains that this action is like Gluth v.

Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991), in which an inmate in

Arizona was required to purchase necessary hygienic supples from

the canteen that he could not afford and was subject to

disciplinary action if he failed to meet prison grooming

standards. This court agrees with Defendants and the Magistrate

Judge that the undisputed evidence shows Plaintiff was not given

the same impossible requirement. The evidence shows that free

hygiene supplies were available, but Plaintiff desired to

purchase a higher quality in the canteen. Plaintiff also desired

canteen money to purchase necessities for his hobbies, including

running. There is no evidence Plaintiff would be subject to

punishment if he did not purchase these items from the canteen. 

Neither high quality hygiene supplies or hobby materials are

items that are protected by the Constitution. Unlike the

plaintiff in Gluth, Plaintiff was not given the choice between

purchasing required hygiene supplies or legal supplies. 

Plaintiff was merely given the choice between purchasing desired

hygiene supplies, along with items to support Plaintiff’s

hobbies, or legal supplies. Such a choice does not violate the

Constitution. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed July 15, 2004,

are ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed October

12, 1999, is GRANTED;

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3. The Clerk of Court enter judgment in favor of

defendant; and,

4. This action is therefore CONCLUDED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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