Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00633/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00633-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM RAY JONES, SR.,

 Plaintiff,

 

 vs.

LEHIGH SOUTHWEST CEMENT 

COMPANY, INC., a California Corporation; 

And DOES 1-50,

 

 

 Defendant. 

1:12-CV-0633 AWI JLT

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION 

FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT, ORDER 

AND BILL OF COST FROM 

DEFENDANTS”

Doc. #’s 97 and 102

On May 16, 2014, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion 

for summary judgment on the second amended complaint of plaintiff William Ray Jones, Sr. 

(“Plaintiff”) by defendant Lehigh Southwest Cement Company (“Defendant”). Plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleged a single claim for relief pursuant to Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The court’s order of May 16 (hereinafter, 

the May 16 Order”) granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that 

Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence to show that his termination at was the result of racially 

discriminatory motivation. The court analyzed the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim 

according to the three elements set forth in Moore v. City of Charlotte N.C., 754 F.2d 1100 (4th 

Cir. 1985). There elements are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff 

engaged in conduct similar to workers outside the protected class; and (3) the plaintiff was 

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disciplined more harshly than the non-class members who engaged in similar conduct. Id. at 

1105-1106.

The court noted that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated following an accident in 

which a vacuum truck whose movement Plaintiff was supervising collided with an object on the 

floor causing in excess of $100 damages. The evidence presented showed that Plaintiff was 

subjected to disciplinary action and ultimately termination because; (1) he tested positive for the 

presence of cannabinoids in his urine following a drug screening and confirmatory drug test 

required under his employment contract; and (2) because he failed to report the accident to any 

supervisory person. The court’s May 16 Order that “Plaintiff’s failure to adduce any facts at all 

regarding Defendant’s treatment of employees outside Plaintiff’s protected category who have 

been involved in accidents resulting in injury or monetary loss over $100 is fatal to both 

Plaintiff’s prima facie case and to any chance of showing that Defendant’s reliance on drug 

testing results to terminate Plaintiff were pretextual. Doc. # 92 at 8:9-14.

Currently before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a 

party from a final order or judgment on grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief 

from the operation of the judgment.” The motion for reconsideration must be made within a

reasonable time, in any event “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding 

was entered or taken.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief (“Motion”) is somewhat ambiguously worded, but the 

following appears to summarize the substance of Plaintiff’s motion:

The [D]efendants failed to provide important details regarding major 

changes that would have definitely resulted in a different decision by 

Judge Ishii. The [P]laintiff provided the court with details in his Motion 

in Opposition to the [D]efendant’s Summary Judgment (opposition filed 

March 3, 2014 in Fresno); the new details include the firing of all key 

employees mentioned in the [D]efendant’s affidavits and declarations. 

The [P]laintiff’s submission to the court that LehighSouthwest Cement 

employees, Rita Rivas and others employed with Lehigh Southwest 

Cement were implicated along with Tehachapi Valley Hospital District 

(who were also fired) in the falsification of a drug test for the [P]laintiff. 

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Apparently this information was either overlooked or ignored by the court.

Doc. # 2:21-3::4.

As the observed in its May 16 Order, Plaintiff did not submit anything resembling a set 

of disputed or undisputed facts in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Rather, Plaintiff attached a 232-page assemblage of emails, witness statements, court pleadings 

and the like. The court has reviewed this collection of documents and can find nothing that 

substantiates what Plaintiff appears to contend were irregularities with the testing of Plaintiff’s 

urine for unauthorized drugs; or what Plaintiff terms a “staged” drug test. The relevance of 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant fired “all key employees” is not explained nor is there any 

evidence to substantiate the allegation. Even if there was evidence that all the key individuals 

who gave accounts of the accident (and those involved in the drug testing) were fired, there is no 

connection the court can discern between that and proof of a racial motivation behind Plaintiff’s 

termination.

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert that he was prevented from accessing 

information critical to his case; Defendant correctly points out that the problem was of Plaintiff’s 

own making inasmuch as it was Plaintiff who scheduled the depositions and failed to appear at 

them. Plaintiff has presented no reason why the decision of the Magistrate Judge denying 

modification of discovery following Plaintiff’s motion should be reconsidered. 

The court notes that Plaintiff a document on July 28, 2014, titled “Notice of Motion to 

Vacate: Sur Reply to Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment” 

(hereinafter, the “Sur Reply”). Doc. # 102. Although captioned as a motion and originally 

docketed as such by the court, the Sur Reply is actually a response to Defendant’s opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. The Sur Reply reasserts the allegations of the 

Motion and takes issue with some of the costs submitted by Defendants for depositions and lab 

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results. The court has examined Plaintiff’s Sur Reply and finds there is nothing set forth therein 

that alters the court’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to 

Rule 60(b).

The court finds Plaintiff has failed to articulate any reason he should be granted relief 

from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).

THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment 

pursuant to Rule 60(b) is DENIED. The case shall remain CLOSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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