Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01120/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01120-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CECILIA FRAHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SURYDEVARA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01120-AWI-GSA PC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO ENTER

EVIDENCE, ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS, AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(Docs. 40, 41, 43, 56)

Plaintiff Cecilia Fraher (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United

States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On May 6, 2008, the Magistrate Judge filed a Findings and Recommendations that

recommended Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction be denied. The Findings and

Recommendation was served on Plaintiff and contained notice that any objections to the Findings

and Recommendations were to be filed within thirty days. Plaintiff filed an Objection on May 27,

2008, and a supplemental Objection on June 16, 2008. On July 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion

to enter evidence, which the court construes as a motion to consider additional evidence and which

the court will grant.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a

de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the Findings

and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

As explained by the Magistrate Judge, a preliminary injunction is available to a plaintiff who

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“demonstrates either (1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm,

or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in its favor.” ” Walczak v.

EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 731 (9 Cir.1999); Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 th

F. 2d 935, 937 (9 Cir. 1987). Under either approach the plaintiff “must demonstrate a significant th

threat of irreparable injury.” 

The court has read Plaintiff’s complaint, motion for a preliminary injunction, objections, and

additional submitted evidence. These documents are not entirely clear what exactly Plaintiff desire

the court to order Defendants to do. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief requests that

Plaintiff be prohibited from retaliating against her for filing this action, and the court reinstate a

medical chrono written on March 5, 2007. Other documents before the court indicate that Plaintiff

desires to be kept in her current housing situation with an emergency medical button. Plaintiff also

appears to request that she be seen by a cardiologist ever six months. The Magistrate Judge

recommended the court deny Plaintiff’s motion because Plaintiff is not a medical expert and had not

submitted evidence that she will be harmed if the chrono is not reinstated. 

One of Plaintiff’s requests appears to be that the court order that she be seen by a doctor

every six months. Plaintiff has submitted evidence that on May 20, 2008, she was seen by Dr.

William J. Bommer, M.D., a cardiologist, some eight months after her last visit. Because

Plaintiff’s documents filed after May 20, 2008 concern the emergency medical button, it is unclear

if Plaintiff still seeks an order that she been seen every six months. Plaintiff has attached the May

20, 2008 medical report by Dr. Bommer. This document states that Plaintiff should “[r]eturn to the

clinic in six 6 month(s). Pacer clinic.” The document goes on to state that “Patients status is

expected to decline and she needs to return every 6 mos for checking her aortic [unclear] and

symptoms. Without regular care she would be at risk for death and serious injury.” Plaintiff

appears to be arguing that this document provides evidence to meet her burden of proof showing that

she will be irreparably harmed absent a court order for a visit with a cardiologist ever six months.

The first problem with Plaintiff’s evidence is it is not properly authenticated, and as such

cannot be considered. See Fed.R.Evid. 901. Second, even considering this document, the court

disagrees that it provides evidence Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the court does not order

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that she be seen by a cardiologist every six months. There is no evidence Defendants will not follow

Dr. Bommer’s advise that Plaintiff come back for a follow up visit in six months. In addition, while

the document does predict dire consequences if Plaintiff does not receive follow up care, this

document falls short of providing evidence that she will be irreparably harmed absent a court order

to see a cardiologist every six months. Thus, Plaintiff’s additional documentation does not convince

the court that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly determined Plaintiff had not met her burden of proof.

Plaintiff’s second request appearsto be that she be allowed to remain in her current cell with

an emergency medical button. Plaintiff provides no evidence, as opposed to argument, that Plaintiff

is even going to be removed from her current living accommodation because she filed this lawsuit.

Regardless, Plaintiff admits she has been told that she will placed in a skilled nursing facility instead

of the current cell. While the court is not unsympathetic toward Plaintiff’s wish that she continue

in her current housing situation, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that placing her in a skilled

nursing facility instead of a cell with an emergency medical button poses an unacceptable risk to

Plaintiff’s health and she will be irreparably harmed by the move. Plaintiff’s disagreement with

the alleged housing change is insufficient to entitle her a preliminary injunction. See Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to enter evidence to objection is GRANTED and the court

considers the evidence submitted on July 14, 2008;

2. The Findings and Recommendations, filed May 6, 2008, is adopted in full; and

3. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, filed March 28, 2008 and

supplemented on April 18, 2008, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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