Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00288/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00288-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD PAUL, 

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF AMADOR, a Political

Subdivision of the State of

California; AMADOR COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TODD D.

RIEBE, individually and in his

professional capacity; DAVID

IREY, individually and in his

professional capacity; COUNTY

OF TUOLUMNE, a Political

Subdivision of the State of

California; TUOLUMNE COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NINA DEAN,

individually and in her

professional capacity; RUSSELL

MOORE, RON HALL, individually

and in their employment and

professional capacities for the

COUNTY OF AMADOR, and DOES 1-

50, inclusive,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-00-0288 DFL/DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

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In this civil rights lawsuit, plaintiff Richard Paul brings

twelve claims against various counties and county officials

relating to his arrest during the investigation of his friend

Robert Womack (“Womack”). Defendants Todd Riebe (“Riebe”)and Ron

Hall (“Hall)(collectively “defendants”) move for summary judgment

on all of Paul’s claims against them. Paul has filed no

opposition to defendants’ motion. For the reasons stated below,

defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

I. 

A. The Underlying Womack Investigation

In May 1998, the Amador County Land Use Agency initiated an

investigation of Womack and two other individuals for allegedly

violating numerous environmental laws in conjunction with the

extraction, transportation, and disposal of an underground

storage tank. (Mot. at 2-3.) The matter was referred to the

Amador County District Attorney’s Office for prosecution. (Id.)

In June 1998, then-District Attorney Stephen Cilenti

assigned defendant Hall, an investigator for Amador County, to

investigate the case. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, defendant David

Irey (“Irey”), a San Joaquin County deputy district attorney

specializing in environmental prosecutions, was also assigned to

the Womack matter. (Id.) Irey recruited defendant Russell Moore

(“Moore”), a California highway patrol officer, to assist in the

investigation. (Id.) The investigation of Womack proceeded

throughout 1998, culminating with a search of Womack’s home on

October 30, 1998 and the return of a 21-count indictment against

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Womack and others on December 1, 1998. (Id. at 4.)

B. The Arrest of Paul

On January 4, 1999, defendant Riebe was sworn in as the

district attorney of Amador County. (Id.) On January 13, 1999,

Moore led the execution of a second search of Womack’s residence

as part of the continuing investigation of Womack. (Id.) Hall

participated in the search, but Riebe was not involved. (Id.) 

Paul was present at Womack’s home during the January 13, 1999

search. (Id.) During the execution of the search warrant, the

officers found a loaded gun under a sofa cushion. (Id.) Paul

and several other individuals were in the vicinity of the loaded

gun when it was found. (Id.)

That afternoon, the Amador County Sheriff’s Dispatch

conducted a criminal history check on Paul. (Id.) Defendants

assert that it is department policy to run a background check on

individuals present at the site of a search when a loaded weapon

is found improperly stored. (Defs.’ Ex. 5 ¶ 13.) James Walshaw

(“Walshaw”), an investigator for the Amador County District

Attorney’s Office, requested the criminal history check on Paul. 

(Mot. at 5.) The report showed that Paul had outstanding felony

charges in Tuolumne County. (Id.) 

Following up on the report, Walshaw contacted the Tuolumne

County District Attorney’s Office and spoke to legal clerk Signle

L. Cain (“Cain”) to determine if Paul was a fugitive. (Id.) 

Cain confirmed that a 1992 battery charge against Paul was still

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 The battery charges related to allegations by Paul’s 1

stepdaughter that Paul battered her. (Defs.’ Ex. 23.) The old

warrant had never been served because of an inability to locate

Paul. (Mot. at 6.)

 It is unclear whether Walshaw asked Tuolumne County to 2

reissue the warrant. However, that is not a critical issue for

this motion. 

4

outstanding and could be reissued. (Id. at 6.) Cain then 1

prepared an affidavit in support of Paul’s arrest, attached the

investigative report of Tuolumne County Sheriff Jim Gragg to the

new arrest warrant, and submitted these documents for review by

Tuolumne County Deputy District Attorney Kim Seavey. (Id.) 2

After reviewing the information provided by Cain, Seavey signed

the new affidavit and presented it to a Tuolumne County judge,

who issued a new warrant on February 5, 1999. (Id.) 

Cain left a message with Walshaw informing him that the

warrant had been issued as of February 5, 1999. (Id.) Walshaw

then contacted the Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Department and

requested that an abstract of the warrant be sent to the Amador

County Sheriff’s Department. (Id.) After receiving the

abstract, Sergeant Milbourne of the Amador County Sheriff’s

Department arrested Paul on February 16, 1999 at the Amador

County Government Center. (Id.) 

Paul was held in the Amador County Jail for less than

twenty-four hours. (Id. at 7.) He was released on February 17,

1999 after posting $5,000 in bail. (Id.) On February 23, 1999,

Tuolumne County District Attorney Nina Dean asked the issuing

judge to dismiss the charges against Paul in the interests of

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justice. (Id.) The charges were dismissed on February 24, 1999. 

(Id.) 

C. Alleged Defamatory Statements About Paul

On January 22, 1999, the evidence presented to the grand

jury for the Womack criminal investigation became public record. 

(Id.) In conjunction with that event, Riebe issued a press

release urging residents to read the transcript so as to form

their own opinions about the Womack incident and pointing out

certain excerpts from the testimony that he believed the readers

would find “interesting” or informative. (Defs.’ Ex. 28.) 

Paul’s grand jury testimony was one of the eighteen excerpts

specifically mentioned in the press release. (Id.) 

 In addition to the press release, Riebe and Irey gave a

joint radio interview on March 2, 1999, and Riebe gave a

television interview on March 5, 1999. These interviews focused

primarily on the Womack investigation, but Riebe also briefly

discussed Paul’s arrest. (Id. Exs. 29, 30.) Riebe explained why

Paul was arrested and what involvement Riebe personally had in

the decision to arrest Paul. (Id.) 

D. Procedural History

On February 16, 2000, Paul filed this § 1983 lawsuit against

several Amador and Tuolumne County officials, as well as against

the counties themselves. Paul alleges that the defendants

arrested him on bogus charges and defamed him in public comments

in retaliation for Paul’s support of Womack and his public

criticism of the Womack investigation. Paul translates this

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 The twelve claims are as follows: (1) violation of 3

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and First Amendment;

(2)violation of Fourth Amendment; (3) substantive due process;

(4) false arrest and imprisonment; (5) abuse of process; (6)

malicious prosecution; (7) libel per se (relating to the issuing

of the warrant accusing Paul of battery); (8) slander per se

(relating to the radio interview, television interview, and press

release); (9) libel per se (relating to the publication of the

affidavit in support of the warrant accusing Paul of battery);

(10) fraud; (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (12) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

 The court received notice of defendant Russell Moore’s 4

death on May 14, 2002. Having received no motion for

substitution of parties by Paul within ninety days of the notice

of death, Moore is DISMISSED from the case. Fed.R.Civ.P.

25(a)(1). 

 It is unclear why Irey has not filed a summary judgment 5

motion as well. 

 On January 19, 2005, the court granted Paul a sixty-day 6

extension to attempt to obtain counsel and file an opposition to

this summary judgment motion. After Paul failed to do either of

these things, and provided the court with no explanation for his

failure to do so, the court submitted defendants’ summary

judgment motion. 

6

basic allegation into twelve claims relating to his allegedly

wrongful arrest and the allegedly libelous statements made

against him. Following the dismissal of various defendants, the 3

only remaining defendants in the suit are Riebe, Hall, and Irey.4

Defendants Riebe and Hall now file this motion for summary

judgment on all of Paul’s claims. Paul, who is now representing 5

himself pro se, has not filed an opposition to defendants’

motion.6

II.

“A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion

[at trial] . . . has both the initial burden of production and

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the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary

judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos.,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). To carry its burden

of production, “the moving party must either produce evidence

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough

evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Id. To carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion, “the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. 

If a moving party carries its burden of production, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or

defense. Id. at 1103. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce

enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the

moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Id. 

Although the mere fact that no opposition has been filed does not

excuse the moving party from meeting its burden on the summary

judgment motion, the court is not required to search the record

for some genuine issue of material fact. Carmen v. San Francisco

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court may rely entirely on evidence designated by the moving

party. Id. 

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an

affirmative defense, it bears the burden of establishing all of

the essential elements of the defense to warrant judgment in its

favor. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

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888 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, defendants have moved for summary

judgment based both on arguments that Paul does not have

sufficient evidence to support his burden of persuasion at trial

and on the basis of several affirmative defenses. For the

following reasons, defendants have presented sufficient evidence

to satisfy their summary judgment burden. Summary judgment is

therefore appropriate on all of Paul’s claims against them. 

A. No Vicarious Liability

Defendants’ central argument is that, except for the

allegedly defamatory statements Riebe made in his press release

and media interviews, they did not participate in any of the

alleged, wrongful acts underlying Paul’s claims. (Mot. at 9.) 

Accordingly, defendants argue that all of the claims against them

should be dismissed, other than the slander per se claim against

Riebe, because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. 

(Id.) 

The evidence presented by defendants to support this

argument is sufficient to satisfy their burden on summary

judgment. First, the evidence shows that neither Riebe nor Hall

was involved in the events leading up to Paul’s arrest. Rather,

Walshaw ordered the background check on Paul, contacted Tuolumne

County about the outstanding warrant, and requested that an

abstract of the new arrest warrant be sent to the Amador County

District Attorney’s Office without informing or discussing these

actions with Riebe. (Defs.’ Ex. 17 ¶¶ 11, 14, 15.) Riebe did

not learn about any of these activities until after the warrant

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9

had been re-activated and, upon learning that the arrest warrant

had been re-activated, did not order Paul’s arrest. (Id. Ex. 14

¶¶ 10, 12, 15.) 

Likewise, although Hall was present at the January 13, 1999

search of Womack’s residence, he did not initiate the background

check or participate in the events leading up to the arrest. 

(Id. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 6, 12, 17, 21.) Although Walshaw advised Hall that

Tuolumne County would probably reissue the warrant, Hall did not

participate in the arrest and only found out later that the

arrest had taken place. (Id.) 

Paul’s deposition testimony does not contradict this

evidence. Paul admits that the only reason he believes that

Riebe was involved in his arrest was that he had hand-delivered

letters (concerning the Womack matter) to Riebe’s office in the

days proceeding his arrest, and his arrest occurred at the Amador

County Government Center. (Id. Ex. 16 at 139-141.) Similarly,

Paul’s only reason for believing that Hall was involved in his

arrest was that Hall worked on the Womack investigation and had

previously delivered a subpoena to Paul to appear before the

Womack criminal grand jury. (Id. at 141-43.) 

Second, the evidence shows that neither Riebe nor Hall was

involved in the initiation, preparation, or carrying out of the

affidavit or warrant that was re-issued by Tuolumne County. The

battery charge had been on the books since 1992. (Id. Ex. 20 ¶¶

3-4.) After Walshaw contacted Tuolumne County about the

outstanding warrant as part of routine police procedure, Tuolumne

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County officials reissued the warrant. (Id. Ex. 21 ¶¶ 3-4.) As

stated above, Riebe and Hall took no part in the decision to

contact Tuolumne County, in the decision made by Tuolumne County

to reissue the warrant, or in the execution of the warrant. 

Based on these uncontroverted facts, there is no genuine

dispute that Hall and Riebe were involved in the actions leading

up to Paul’s arrest and the re-issuing of the 1992 arrest warrant

by Tuolumne County. Accordingly, Hall is entitled to summary

judgment on all of Paul’s claims against him, and Riebe is

entitled to summary judgment on all of Paul’s claims except for

the slander per se claim. 

B. The Slander Per Se Claim

In Paul’s eighth cause of action, he alleges that Riebe

intentionally slandered him during the March 2nd radio interview

and the March 5th television interview, as well as in the January

22nd press release. Although Riebe admits to making these

statements, and therefore this claim cannot be decided on the

same ground as all the others, Riebe is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim for several other reasons. First,

everything that Riebe stated about Paul in these interviews was

true, and truth is a complete defense against civil liability for

defamation. See Goehring v. Wright, 858 F.Supp. 989, 1004

(N.D.Cal. 1994). 

In his press release, Riebe did not mention specifics about

Paul’s grand jury testimony; rather, he merely pointed to the

pages of grand jury proceedings in which Paul was a witness. 

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 There are slight factual discrepancies concerning where 7

Paul was when the gun was found. (Mot. at 5 n.6.) Riebe’s

comment in the interview was that “Mr. Paul at one point was

ordered to sit on the couch. He’s sitting on the couch. 

Underneath the cushion of the couch is a loaded weapon -- a

loaded firearm.” Paul claimed in his deposition that he was told

to go sit on the cushion after the gun had been removed. (Defs.’

Ex. 16 at 62-63.) This discrepancy is minor and insignificant,

given that Riebe’s larger point in making this statement was that

a background check on the people in the house was justified by

the circumstances of finding a loaded weapon in such a situation. 

 The record is unclear as to whether Walshaw requested 8

Tuolumne County to reissue the warrant or whether Tuolumne County

11

(Defs.’ Ex. 28.) In the March 2nd radio interview, Riebe did not

mention Paul at all. (Id. Ex. 29.) Finally, although Riebe did

discuss Paul’s arrest during the March 5th television interview,

no false statements were made. 

Specifically, Riebe made the following statements about

Paul’s arrest during the interview: (1) Riebe did not order

Paul’s arrest; (2) Riebe found out Paul had been arrested from

seeing a headline in a local newspaper; (3) Riebe later learned

that earlier on the day of Paul’s arrest, Paul had dropped off at

Riebe’s office a request for certain information; (4) Paul was

present at Womack’s residence at the time of the January 13, 1999

search; (5) a loaded weapon was found under a cushion of the

couch near where Paul was standing or sitting; (6) a criminal 7

background check was run on Paul because of the unusual and

dangerous circumstances of finding a loaded weapon under a couch

cushion; (7) the check led to the discovery of a dormant warrant

for battery; (8) the Tuolumne County District Attorney’s Office

decided to reissue the warrant; and (9) it is a common 8

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decided to issue the warrant on its own. (Defs.’ Exs. 17, 20.)

However, Riebe noted this discrepancy in the interview and

presented both sides of the issue. (Id. Ex. 30 at 72-73.) 

Moreover, any discrepancy in his statement was again

insignificant given that Riebe’s larger point in making this

statement was that he did not have anything to do with the reissuance of the warrant. 

12

occurrence for a law enforcement officer to learn that someone

residing within the county has an outstanding warrant from

another county, and in those situations, the standard procedure

is to inform the other county so that the other county can

determine how it wishes to proceed. (Id. Ex. 30 at 68-75.) As

discussed above, all of these statements are supported by the

affidavits and materials defendants submitted with their summary

judgment motion. 

Alternatively, summary judgment is appropriate on this claim

because Paul failed to comply with the California Torts Claim Act

(“CTCA”) requirements. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4 requires a

plaintiff to present a claim to a public entity before commencing

suit for money damages within six months of the alleged incident

giving rise to the claim. If the public entity rejects the claim

and supplies the claimant with proper notice under Cal. Gov’t

Code § 913, a plaintiff must file a complaint within six months

of the date such notice is delivered or deposited in the mail. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1). 

Paul presented his claim to Amador County in a timely

fashion, filing his CTCA claim on April 26, 1999. (Defs.’ Ex.

31.) Amador County rejected Paul’s CTCA claim and provided Paul

with the notice required by § 913 on May 11, 1999. (Id. Ex. 32.) 

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 It is unclear why the County of San Joaquin was included 9

in the amended claim. 

13

Paul then filed an amended CTCA claim with Amador County on

August 13, 1999. (Id. Ex. 33.) This amended claim was identical

to his original claim in all respects except one: the amended

claim dropped all claims against Ron Hall and Jim Walshaw and

added the County of San Joaquin. (Id.) Paul did not file his 9

complaint in federal court until February 16, 2000, approximately

nine months after his claim was rejected by Amador County and

exactly six months following his filing of the amended CTCA

claim. 

Whether Paul complied with the CTCA hinges upon whether his

amended CTCA claim restarted the six-month period in which he had

to file his claim in this court. California courts have held

that where the later CTCA claim “amounts to no more than an

attempt to amend the first claim,” the amended complaint does not

restart the six-month statute of limitations. Julian v. City of

San Diego, 183 Cal.App.3d 169, 176, 229 Cal.Rptr. 664 (1986)

(finding that plaintiff had failed to comply with CTCA’s

six-month limitation period and that plaintiff’s amended CTCA

claim did not restart the statute of limitations period because

the amended claim contained allegations that were “substantially

identical to those in the first claim”). 

Here, Paul’s amended CTCA claim is substantially identical

to his first CTCA claim; it did not raise any new claims, provide

any new information, or identify any new parties with ties to

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Amador County. Accordingly, Paul’s amended CTCA claim did not

restart the six-month statute of limitations, and the state-law

claims are untimely. 

III. 

For the above reasons, the court GRANTS Riebe’s and Hall’s

motion for summary judgment. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/10/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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