Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01229/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01229-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LINDA GUERRERO, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-01229-WQH-NLS 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Dkt. No. 16]; and 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Dkt. No. 21]. 

Linda Guerrero (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under the Social Security Act. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration’s (“Defendant”) final decision denying her claim for Supplemental 

Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Act. This case was referred for a report 

and recommendation on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B). After considering the papers submitted, the administrative record, and 

the applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment and for reversal or remand be DENIED and that Defendant’s cross motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History. 

On July 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplement Security Income 

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleges a disability onset date of 

August 20, 2007. AR 124-29, 140. 

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claim initially and on reconsideration. AR 

74-78, 86-92. She requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

The ALJ held a hearing on September 17, 2014. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at 

the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff returned to gainful employment on 

September 1, 2013, and thus she amended her SSI claim to reflect a “closed application 

period.” Plaintiff seeks benefits solely for the period starting on July 23, 2012 (the date 

she filed the application) through September 1, 2013 (the date she returned to work). AR 

37-38. 

On November 20, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision. He found Plaintiff was not 

under a disability from July 23, 2012 through September 1, 2013. AR 20-28. On March 

3, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner for judicial review purposes. AR 1-4. 

Plaintiff timely commenced this action in federal court. 

B. Plaintiff’s Background. 

Plaintiff was born on October 6, 1962. AR 131. The highest grade in school she 

completed was the twelfth grade. AR 148. In a disability report, Plaintiff stated she 

worked in customer service in the retail industry from 1998 through 2011, working six 

hours per day for five days per week. AR 147. She assisted customers, stocked product, 

and served as a cashier. AR 148. In 2007, she suffered a work-related injury to her back. 

AR 210, 228. 

Plaintiff claims that she suffers from back problems due to surgery and severe pain 

in her left leg, and that these conditions limit her ability to work. AR 146. She also 

claims she suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome. AR 286. 

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C. Medical Evidence in the Record. 

1. Plaintiff’s Previous Work-Related Injury (2007). 

On January 6, 2007 Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury to the lumbo-sacral 

junction while at the Navy Exchange. AR 210, 228. She received epidural steroid 

injections for lumbar radiculopathy in spring 2007. She underwent surgery for a spinal 

fusion L-5-S1 with laminectomy on August 29, 2007. AR 222, 228. She also had a 

transforaminal epidural steroid injection in February of 2008. AR 217.

2. Workers’ Compensation Primary Treating Physician Dr. Tayyab 

(2008). 

On March 31 2008, Dr. Neil Tayyab issued a primary treating physician’s 

permanent and stationary report. AR 227. He reviewed Plaintiff’s workplace injury, 

injection procedures and surgery. He reported that the “surgery went quite well and 

postoperatively she was walking around very nicely and had significantly reduced low 

back pain and also did not complain to any leg pain.” AR 228. But a few weeks later, 

Plaintiff began experiencing pain in her lower left leg. Id. Dr. Tayyab then tried a 

number of ultimately unsuccessful methods to treat and decrease the pain. He opined that 

Plaintiff reached her maximum medical improvement and a permanent and stationary 

status regarding her lumbar spine. AR 230. He opined she should not push or pull more 

than 10 pounds, should not repetitively bend or twist, and should not stand or walk for 

more than 30 minutes at one time—or for more than two hours total—in an eight-hour 

workday. AR 230. 

In May 2008 Dr. Tayyab opined that Plaintiff had reached maximum medical 

improvement, could only work four hours per day, and would not be able to work an 

eight-hour workday for at least three-to-six more months. AR 238. In August of 2008, 

he opined Plaintiff could still only work four hours per day and would not be able to 

work an eight-hour workday for three more months. He opined Plaintiff’s daily 

limitations included sitting for four hours, standing for one hour, walking for one hour, 

and reaching and using her wrists and elbows for up to eight hours. AR 237. 

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3. Dr. Sabourin’s Report – Consultative Orthopedist (May 2013). 

Dr. Sabourin did a consultative exam of Plaintiff regarding the reported pain in her 

neck, left wrist, upper back, lower back, hips, knees and ankles. AR 253-257. Plaintiff 

drove herself to the appointment. AR 253. She reported that she had neck pain for two 

years, saw a doctor for it, and the doctor just told her to take Tylenol. Id. She did not 

have any workup done for the pain in her left wrist and hand. Id. Plaintiff received a 

lumbar fusion in August 2007. Id. Dr. Sabourin reported normal posture and gait, 

normal range of motion for the neck, pain with left lateral flexion, no spinal deformities 

or spasms. AR 254. As for her wrists, there was slight tenderness in the left wrist but no 

redness or swelling. AR 255. She tested negative for Tinel’s and Phalen’s tests. Id. Her 

left leg was also tender but without any inflammation in the joints, or redness, swelling or 

instability. Id.

Based on his examination Dr. Sabourin concluded that Plaintiff could lift, carry, 

push or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, could stand, sit or walk 

for six hours out of an eight-hour day, could climb, stoop, kneel and crouch occasionally, 

and had no manipulative limitations or need for assistive devices to ambulate. AR 256. 

D. Vocational Evidence. 

1. Plaintiff’s Past Work. 

In a disability report Plaintiff stated she worked in customer service in the retail 

field from 1998 to 2011. AR 147. The detailed earnings query shows Plaintiff worked at 

Macy’s in 1998, at the Navy Exchange Service Command in 2000, at Macy’s in 2003, 

and at J C Penney’s in 2004. AR 134. Plaintiff worked at the Navy Exchange in 2005, 

and then at the Navy Exchange and Kohl’s Department Stores in 2006. 

In January of 2007, while working at the Navy Exchange, Plaintiff sustained a 

workplace injury. AR 135, 210, 228. The detailed earnings query does not show any 

reported earnings for 2008 and 2009. AR 135. 

The detailed earnings query also shows Plaintiff worked at the Marine Corps 

Community Services, Marine Corps base in 2010. AR 50, 135. Plaintiff stated in a 

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disability report that she was laid off from work for reasons unrelated to her alleged 

impairments in April of 2011. AR 146-147; Exs. 5D, 7E. The detailed earnings query 

does not show any reported earnings for 2012 and 2013. But Plaintiff testified at the 

hearing that on September 1, 2013, she began working again as a cashier at Purdy’s. AR 

41-42, 48. 

2. Vocational Expert Testimony. 

Vocational Expert John Kilcher testified at the hearing. AR 46. He reviewed the 

file and exhibits to acquaint himself with Plaintiff’s vocational background. Id. He 

characterized Plaintiff’s vocational background as a Customer Service Clerk at the light 

level, semi-skilled, SVP 4. AR 47. He testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s 

background in age, education and work experience—who was limited to light work and 

to only occasional postural activities but able to do frequent bilateral handling and 

fingering—would be able to return to her past work. Id. He also characterized Plaintiff’s 

work as Retail Customer Service, light level, semi-skilled, SVP of 3. AR 49. 

Upon questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney Mr. Kilcher testified that an individual 

who is limited to lifting no more than 10 pounds and standing and walking no more than 

two hours out of an eight hour day would not be able to do their past work or any other 

work at the light level; any work would have to be sedentary. AR 49. 

E. Plaintiff’s Testimony at the Hearing. 

Plaintiff testified that she could not work during her alleged period of disability 

because of pain, tingling, and numbness in her left leg and pain due to carpel tunnel in 

her hands. AR 39. She testified that during the period she could not work, she could 

only be on her feet for 15 to 20 minutes before it began to hurt, could only sit for about 

20 minutes because her lower back hurt, and at most could lift 10 pounds. AR 45. 

Plaintiff also testified about her daily activities. She said that she could wash her 

hair, feed herself, dress and tie her shoes “at a certain level.” AR 40. When asked what 

she meant by “a certain level,” she clarified that though she would bend over to tie her 

shoe, it would cause pain because of her back surgery. Id. She said she could tie her 

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shoes “here and there,” and that she did not use buttons or clasps to fasten her bra. Id. 

She testified she could not drive a car because of the pain in her left leg, and her son 

drove her around. AR 40-41, 45. She would cook meals using a microwave, and her son 

would cook and bring her food. Id. Her son did her laundry for her. AR 41. 

When the ALJ asked why she believed she could not work in July of 2012, 

Plaintiff’s attorney clarified that Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of 2007 and that 

July 23, 2012 is only her SSI application date. AR 43. The ALJ then asked Plaintiff if 

she asserts she has not been able to work since 2007 because of her back, to which 

Plaintiff responded yes. AR 43. Later, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s earnings records 

showed she worked in 2010. AR 50. He asked where she worked during that time 

period. Id. Plaintiff’s attorney noted that she worked at the Marine Corps Community 

Services, and Plaintiff stated she worked part-time as a cashier at that time. Id.

Plaintiff then testified that her hands began to hurt around 2012. Id. She testified 

she did not do any physical therapy on her hands and that she saw a doctor who twice 

told her he would order a brace for her hands. AR 44. But she never obtained the brace 

and the doctor gave her Ibuprofen and muscle relaxers instead. Id.

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION 

A. The Sequential Process. 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must 

show that he or she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected 

to last at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). The Social Security regulations 

establish a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether an applicant is disabled 

under this standard. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If not, then at step two the ALJ must determine 

whether the applicant suffers from a severe impairment or a combination of impairments. 

Id. § 416.920(c). If the impairment is severe, at step three the ALJ must determine 

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whether the applicant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an 

impairment contained under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. § 

416.920(d). If the applicant’s impairment meets or equals a listing, he or she must be 

found disabled. Id. 

If the impairment does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ must determine the 

applicant’s residual functional capacity. Then, the ALJ must determine at step four 

whether the applicant retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant 

work. Id. § 416.920(f). If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, at step five 

the ALJ must consider whether the applicant can perform any other work that exists in 

the national economy. Id. § 416.920(g). 

The applicant carries the burden to prove eligibility from steps one through four 

but the burden at step five is on the agency. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Applicants not disqualified at step five are eligible for disability benefits. Id.

B. Substance of the ALJ’s Decision. 

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

from July 23, 2012 through September 1, 2013. AR 22. At step two, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s back disorder and carpal tunnel syndrome constituted severe impairments. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that would meet or medically equal any listed impairments. The ALJ next 

found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. 416.927(b), except she can occasionally perform postural activities and can do 

frequent fingering and handling with the bilateral upper extremities. AR 23. At step 

four, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a customer service 

clerk and as a retail sales clerk. AR 27. The ALJ further stated that this past relevant 

work does not require her to perform work-related activities precluded by her residual 

functional capacity. Id. The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability as 

defined in the Social Security Act since July 23, 2012, the date she filed her application, 

through September 1, 2013. 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must 

affirm the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and applies the correct legal standard. Id. Substantial evidence means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate support to support a conclusion.” 

Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2003). When the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion 

must be upheld. Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2004). It is not the court’s job to reinterpret or re-evaluate the evidence, however much a 

re-evaluation may reasonably result in a favorable outcome for the plaintiff. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Whether Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work Amounted to Substantial 

Gainful Activity. 

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff performed past relevant work. 

Past relevant work is defined as “work that you have done within the past 15 years, that 

was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for you to learn to do it.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1). An individual engages in substantial gainful activity if she does 

significant physical or mental activities for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. 

Generally, if an individual has earnings from employment or self-employment above a 

specific level set out in the regulations, it is presumed she demonstrated the ability to 

engage in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.974. Here, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff performed the work within 15 years of the date of the ALJ’s decision for a 

sufficient length of time to learn and provide average performance, and did so “at the 

level of substantial gainful activity.” AR 28. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s conclusion at step four is not supported by substantial 

evidence because the record does not demonstrate a level of “substantial gainful activity.” 

Dkt. 16-1 at 10-12. Specifically, she argues that her past earnings did not meet the 

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monthly minimum monetary amount set in the regulations. Id. Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff waived the substantial gainful activity argument because she failed to raise it in 

the underlying proceedings, and that in any event, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s finding of substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff does not counter the waiver 

argument but says this court should review the issue because the ALJ cited to the 

earnings record and earnings query in his decision. 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing and on appeal to 

the Appeals Council. Social Security claimants, when represented by counsel, “must 

raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on 

appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.1999). That is because the ALJ, 

rather than the district court, is “in the optimal position” to evaluate the evidence and 

apply it to the law. Id. The court will “only excuse a failure to comply with this rule 

when necessary to avoid a manifest injustice[.]” Id. A manifest injustice occurs when a 

plaintiff did not have a “reasonable basis for thinking that there was a conflict at the time 

of the hearing.” Padlo v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 735734, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) 

(finding a manifest injustice would arise where counsel did not have an advance 

opportunity to study the jobs the vocational expert cited for possible inconsistencies with 

the ALJ’s hypotheticals). 

If an issue is raised before the ALJ but not with the Appeals Council that issue is 

not waived in the district court. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 112 (2000); Edlund v. 

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1160 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001). And if an issue is raised before the 

Appeals Council but not with the ALJ that issue is likewise not waived in the district 

court. Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). But 

if an issue for which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof is not raised before either the 

ALJ or the Appeals Council, and the claimant—who was represented by counsel—had a 

reasonable opportunity to raise it, the issue is waived. See Simpson v. Colvin, 2016 WL 

3091487, *1 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2016) (explaining the nuances of the case law on waiver 

in a social security case); see Brewer v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4491498, *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 

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24, 2016) (finding that if an issue arises under Step 5 where the Commissioner bears the 

burden of proof the plaintiff’s failure to raise it with the ALJ or before the Appeals 

Council is not a waiver because the ALJ’s ruling could not have been anticipated). 

Here, Plaintiff carried the burden at Step 4 of showing that she did not retain the 

residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b); 

Celaya, 332 F.3d at 1180. The Administrative Record included Plaintiff’s earnings 

records, which showed that her annual earnings ranged from $581.15 to $7688.51 for the 

years she actually worked between 1999 and 2014. AR 137. It also included her 

disability report, where she reported that she earned $8.25 per hour, while working six 

hours per day for five days a week. AR 147. Plaintiff’s attorney reviewed her earnings 

record and discussed it at the hearing. But she never even mentioned that her past work 

did not demonstrate substantial gainful activity: 

Examination of Vocational Expert by Claimant’s Attorney 

Q: I noticed in her earnings record she’s always working at 

retail stores like Macy’s or Old Navy. Was there a 

reason that you just didn’t use retail sales clerk? 

*** 

Q: Okay, if I am going to do a hypothetical individual, I’m 

going to use...the treating source’s opinion, and I limit 

that individual to limit no more than 10 pounds, standing 

and walking no more than two hours out of an eight hour 

day. Is this individual able to do their past work or 

any other work at the light level?

A: No, they could not. That would be at a sedentary type 

work. 

AR 48-49 (emphasis added). 

 Based on the above questioning it appears that Plaintiff advocated for a finding that 

the earnings constituted substantial gainful activity because her question centered on 

whether Plaintiff could return to her past work. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel did not object 

to the ALJ asking about Plaintiff’s current capabilities given her past work experience: 

/ / / 

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Q: Do you have enough information to characterize Ms. 

Guerrero’s vocational background? 

A: Yes I do. She worked as a customer service 

clerk....Classified at the light level and that’s how the 

claimant had performed it and it’s semi-skilled....That’s 

all her past work. 

Q: So, that’s light and. 

A: Semi-skilled. 

Q: Semi-skilled. If we were to assume an individual similar 

to Ms. Guerrero in age, education, and work experience 

that was, excuse me, limited to light work. Further 

limited to only occasional postural activities, and 

frequent bilateral handling and fingering would that 

individual be able to return to Ms. Guerrero’s past 

work?

A: Yes, they could. 

Q: And would there be other work as well?

A: Yes, there would be.

Q: And could you characterize for us the cashier work that 

Ms. Guerrero is doing now? 

*** 

A: Okay. Her job would be classified as cashier II ...at the 

light level. And unskilled. 

AR 47-48 (emphasis added). 

 The ALJ’s questioning to the Vocational Expert centered on Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform past relevant work. AR 46-50; see AR 23 (assessing Plaintiff as retaining the 

residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work). If Plaintiff had no 

past relevant work because she did not have any substantial gainful activity, the ALJ’s 

examination would have focused on whether Plaintiff could perform any other work that 

exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Plaintiff’s counsel did not 

object to the ALJ’s examination based on ability to return to past work. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing expressly admitted that she reviewed 

Plaintiff’s earning records. She herself questioned Plaintiff regarding her past work. She 

did not object to the ALJ’s questioning regarding past work. If Plaintiff in fact wanted to 

argue that she had no past relevant work it was her burden to do so. She had the notice 

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and the opportunity to address it at the administrative hearing and in the Appeals Council 

filing. She did neither. The court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff waived this issue, and 

that no manifest injustice can occur from this finding of waiver because Plaintiff had a 

“reasonable basis for thinking that there was a conflict at the time of the hearing.” Padlo, 

2017 WL 735734, at *5; see Phillips v. Colvin, 593 Fed.Appx. 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(finding that Plaintiff’s failure to challenge a finding that he engaged in substantial 

gainful activity was waived when he failed to raise it at the administrative level through 

counsel and did not demonstrate a manifest injustice excusing the failure). 

B. Whether The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Testimony and 

Statements. 

A claimant’s subjective symptoms must be considered in a disability evaluation. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). In deciding 

whether to credit a claimant’s testimony about subjective symptoms or limitations, the 

ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1281. Under the first step, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other 

symptoms. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. If this test is satisfied, 

and there is no affirmative evidence that the claimant is malingering, then the ALJ must 

determine the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints. At the second step, the 

ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of symptoms as long as he 

gives specific, convincing reasons for doing so. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). “General findings are insufficient; rather, 

the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant's complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms. AR 24. But he found 

Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her 

symptoms were not entirely credible. AR 24. Specifically, they were inconsistent with 

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the medical record and with her reported activities of daily living and work history. 

Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff 

is not credible because the ALJ relied on evidence of activities that did not contradict her 

testimony or did not have any application to a work setting, did not confront her on any 

inconsistent statements, and drew improper inferences about her truthfulness regarding 

her work history and failure to seek medical treatment for her symptoms. Dkt. 16-1 at 

12-14. Defendant argues that the ALJ made specific credibility findings as to why he 

discredited her testimony and thus, substantial evidence supports his decision. 

1. Consistency with the Medical Record. 

An ALJ must determine the extent to which a claimant’s symptoms “can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and 

other evidence to decide how [those] symptoms affect [the claimant’s] ability to work.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). But those statements alone cannot be decisive on a disability 

claim. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“[a]n individual’s statement as to pain or other 

symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) 

(“statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are 

disabled”). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to compare Plaintiff’s testimony with the 

findings of Dr. Tayyab, the doctor who treated her in 2008 for a workers compensation 

injury. Dr. Tayyab opined that Plaintiff reached her maximum medical improvement and 

a permanent and stationary status regarding her lumbar spine and should not stand or 

walk for more than 30 minutes at one time—or for more than two hours total—in an 

eight-hour workday. AR 230. In August of 2008, he opined Plaintiff could still only 

work four hours per day. AR 237. These reports issued approximately four years before 

Plaintiff’s disability application of July 23, 2012. 

Despite the four-year delay between Dr. Tayyab’s findings and the disability 

application, the ALJ considered Dr. Tayyab’s opinion in order to view the record in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff. AR 24. The ALJ also cited to other medical evidence 

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and found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms and 

limitations were diminished in light of the objective evidence in the record. Those cited 

records include: 

 All radiological findings note that the spinal fusion is stable and the 

hardware is well placed. AR 25 (citing Exs. 1F, p.42; 3F; 5F, p.62). 

 At times Plaintiff reported no back pain or tenderness in her lumbar spine. 

AR 25 (citing Ex. 4F, pp. 13, 15-16). 

 Between the time that Dr. Tayyab found Plaintiff had met maximum medical 

improvement and Plaintiff’s application date, she worked part time and 

reported that she stopped working because she was laid off, as opposed to 

stopping work due to physical limitations. AR 25 (referring to AR 42, 146). 

 Plaintiff said she did not receive particularly helpful medical treatment but 

that she was ultimately able to return to work because she had relaxed and 

taken care of herself. AR 25 (referring to AR 42). 

 Dr. Sabourin, a consultative orthopedist, examined Plaintiff and opined that 

she could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, 

could stand, walk and sit for six hours in an eight-hour day, and could 

occasionally climb, stoop, kneel and crouch, all of which is consistent with 

Plaintiff’s longitudinal treatment record. AR 25-26 (citing Ex. 3F). 

 Dr. Tayyab opined that Plaintiff reached a permanent and stationary status 

regarding her lumbar spine but she is now working at a functional level that 

is greater than that status. AR 27. 

The court finds that the citations to this medical evidence in the record are specific 

enough to constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s credibility finding. See

Social Security Ruling 96-7p (credibility findings “must be sufficiently specific to make 

clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

the individual’s statements”). Further, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider this 

evidence when assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (finding 

ALJ can consider objective medical evidence when assessing credibility); see also Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical evidence 

cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can 

consider in his credibility analysis”). 

/ / / 

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Further, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was twice prescribed a splint for her carpal 

tunnel but never got one, waited one year in between doctor visits to complain about 

carpal tunnel, and returned to work three months after she was prescribed a splint for the 

second time. AR 25 (citing Ex. 4F, pp.22, 26). The ALJ found that her accounts of 

disabling pain and dysfunction did not correspond with the course of medical treatment 

regarding carpal tunnel. AR 24. Further, there is no argument or evidence that Plaintiff 

lacked the medical insurance or funds to follow up on her carpal tunnel or procure a 

splint, as twice prescribed. The court finds that the ALJ’s finding is reasonable here. See 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding unexplained failure to seek 

treatment can cast doubt on sincerity of claimant’s testimony); Stanistreet v. Chater, 21 

F.Supp.2d 1129, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the absence of medical treatment over a 

nine-month period suggested the claimant’s “subjective complaints of worsening 

symptoms and chronic, disabling pain are exaggerated”). 

In sum, the ALJ points to objective medical evidence that supports his finding that 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms are greater than what is 

demonstrated by the objective medical evidence in the record. 

2. Consistency with Reported Activities of Daily Living. 

The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony because he found it inconsistent with her 

complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. AR 24. In assessing the credibility of 

these subjective complaints, the ALJ may consider the claimant’s daily activities. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 148 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Differences between a claimant’s allegations and her conduct 

qualifies as substantial evidence that may be used in a credibility determination. Light v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The court is aware, though, “that 

ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with 

testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and 

all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more 

than merely resting in bed all day.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. July 14, 

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2014). But where a level of activity is inconsistent with a claimant’s claimed limitations, 

then the activities bear on a claimant’s credibility. Id.

Here, Plaintiff complained of limitations due to back pain, carpal tunnel and pain 

in her left leg during the relevant period. AR 39-41. But her daily activities during that 

time included preparing simple meals, taking care of her three-year-old granddaughter, 

and living free of any assistance from anyone except for driving and laundry. AR 24, 39-

41, 45, 158-160. She also did some housework, grocery shopping and sewing. Id. 

Considering his citations to her reported daily activities, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s 

daily activities were inconsistent with the claimed limitations is reasonable and supported 

by substantial evidence cited to in the record. Thus, the court may not “second-guess it.” 

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that there may be other 

reasonable interpretations of a claimant’s testimony but that if the ALJ’s finding is 

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence then the court cannot second-guess it); 

see Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing a claimant’s 

daily activities were self-limited and a lifestyle choice). 

3. Consistency of Statements Regarding Work History. 

The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony for her inconsistencies regarding work 

history. AR 24. For example, at the hearing both she and her attorney said she did not 

work from 2007 to 2013. AR 24, 42, 43, 44. But then when the ALJ asked her about her 

earnings record for 2010 where she earned $7,588, she admitted she had worked as a 

part-time cashier during that time for the Marine Corps Community Services. AR 50, 

135. Another earnings record showed that she also worked in 2011, and in her disability 

questionnaire she reported that she lost that job due to a layoff rather than due to any 

disability. AR 24 (citing Exs. 5D, 7E, AR 146-147). Even though these activities did not 

occur during the application period, they indicated to the ALJ that: 

[Plaintiff’s] daily activities have, at least at times, been 

somewhat greater than the claimant has generally reported. 

Additionally, the fact that the claimant provided inaccurate 

information on a matter so integral to determining disability 

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suggests that much of what the claimant has alleged may be 

similarly unreliable. 

AR 24. 

Plaintiff argues that any inconsistent statements are irrelevant because the ALJ 

failed to confront Plaintiff about these statements. Relying on immigration cases, 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ had to find deliberate deception to reject her statements. But that 

is not the law in Social Security cases, and the court does not condone Plaintiff’s attempt 

to shift the burden of being truthful and consistent to Defendant. See Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (discrediting testimony due to inconsistent 

statements). Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ cites to substantial evidence to 

support his discrediting of Plaintiff’s testimony based on her inconsistent statements. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be 

DENIED and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties by May 11, 2017. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

Any response to the objections shall be filed and served by May 18, 2017. The parties 

are advised that any failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 26, 2017 

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