Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04011/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04011-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY J. HONG,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-4011 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RIGHT MANAGEMENT IN PART AND DENYING IT IN PART

CONSULTANTS, INC.,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Defendant Right Management Consultants, Inc.’s (“Right” or “defendant”) motion for

summary judgment came on for hearing on February 1, 2006, before this court. Having

read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authorities, and good cause appearing, the court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES

it in part as follows and for the reasons stated at the hearing.

INTRODUCTION

Hong was employed by Right from August 1996 until April 1999, and again in

October 2000 until April 2003, as a client services consultant (“CSC”). She brings four of

her seven claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code

§ 12940 et seq. (“FEHA”), including claims for (1) sexual harassment; (2) gender

discrimination; (3) failure to prevent violations; and (4) retaliation. Hong also asserts claims

under state law for: (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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BACKGROUND

Hong was employed by Right for nearly three years in its San Francisco office from

1996-1999 as a CSC, a position that Right characterizes as a “salesperson.” During that

time, Hong was supervised at least in part by Tim Dorman, James Greenway’s

(“Greenway”) predecessor. Hong voluntarily left Right to pursue other business

opportunities in 1999. 

In September 2000, Greenway became Executive Vice President (EVP) of Right’s

Western Group, taking over Tim Dorman’s position. Around that same time, Greenway

recruited Hong to return to Right’s San Francisco Office. He offered Hong a position as

Regional Managing Principal (“RMP”) for Northern California, which Hong declined.

Instead, Hong returned as a CSC, level 3. The primary job of a CSC is to develop new

business and manage existing client accounts. At the time Hong returned, an RMP (the

position Hong was originally offered) had not yet been hired, so Greenway was Hong’s

interim immediate supervisor. That same fall 2000, Greenway also hired Kirk Maxfield

(“Maxfield”) for a CSC position, a colleague of Hong’s who worked closely with her and

later became one of her closest allies at Right.

Greenway then hired several RMPs who immediately supervised both Hong and

Maxfield during 2001. John Beck was among those hired. Beck was hired in January

2001, and he left Right several months later in April 2001. Hong claims that Beck was

asked to leave; whereas, Right contends that Beck quit because of Hong’s and Maxfield’s

insubordination.

In April 2001, Greenway hired Christine Mellon (“Mellon”) to serve as RMP. Mellon

was RMP and Hong’s immediate supervisor until January 2002. During this time, Hong

alleges that Greenway began sexual relationships with at least two Right employees,

including Irene Holland (“Holland”) and Emily Mora (“Mora”). Hong, however, did not report

or complain about the relationships.

In June 2001, Greenway promoted Hong to a CSC, level 4 position. Around that

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Mellon gave Hong a seemingly decent performance evaluation in late 2001 that, in

retrospect, she characterized as “overly rosy” several years later in her deposition testimony.

Mellon claims that Greenway had encouraged her to keep a favorable tone with Hong in her

performance review. 

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same time, Right announced the development of a new program to recognize its top

performing employees, called the President’s Advisory Council (also “PAC”).

In November 2001, Mellon gave Hong a formal performance evaluation. The

parties’ characterization of the evaluation differs. Right casts it in a much more negative

light than Hong.1 That same month, Hong claims to have observed Greenway become

intoxicated at a company training event in Carmel, California, and grab the buttocks of

another female Right employee, Michele Pirnik. She also claims that Greenway had sexual

relationships that weekend with employees Mora and Holland. Again, Hong did not report

or complain about Greenway’s conduct, though.

One month later, in December 2001, Greenway selected Hong for Right’s

President’s Advisory Council. Soon after, in early January 2002, Jay Klein (“Klein”)

replaced Mellon as RMP and became Hong’s immediate supervisor. It was primarily during

Klein’s tenure as RMP that Hong claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of

her gender and subjected to sexual harassment. Right, on the other hand, contends that

Hong, along with Maxfield, was insubordinate, unmanageable, and plagued with

performance problems.

Klein allegedly “counseled” Hong on a number of occasions in 2002 and 2003

regarding her performance. The first time was just a couple of weeks after he became

RMP, when on January 23, 2002, he counseled her for disregarding management

structure. He again counseled her in early March 2002 regarding her resistance to

changes that he was implementing.

Hong meanwhile complained to Greenway regarding Klein’s alleged gender-based

discrimination and harassment. In March 2002, Hong complained to Greenway that Klein

had difficulty working with women.

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Klein did not supervise Gaines. Instead, Paul Wright, the Managing Vice President of

Right’s Organizational Consulting (OC) Group for the Pacific Northwest region was responsible

for supervising Gaines. On May 24, 2002, Wright issued a warning memo to Gaines regarding

the incident.

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Around this same time, in either March or April 2002 (Hong alleges early April 2002;

whereas, Right asserts it was early March 2002), Hong was informed by Maxfield that

another Right coworker, Michael Gaines (“Gaines”), had referred to Hong as a “fucking

matriarch” on either two or three occasions. Hong, however, did not personally overhear or

witness Gaines’ comments.

On April 2, 2002, Klein again counseled Hong, this time regarding her lack of

teamwork and difficulties working with her. Two days later, on April 4, 2002, Hong reported

Gaines’ comments to Klein. Right asserts that on that very same day, Gaines was issued a

written warning, and that the problem immediately ceased.2 Klein also again spoke with

Hong that day regarding difficulties working with her. On April 9, 2002, Klein issued a

written summary of Hong’s performance and work-related issues. 

In May 2002, Hong and Klein both attended a function in the Bahamas honoring

members of Rights’ President’s Advisory Council. Shortly after, Hong complained to

Greenway regarding Klein’s treatment of female employees at the Bahamas function. 

Hong complained that Klein repeatedly referred to women as “girl,” “honey,” and

“sweetheart.” Hong also contends that at that same function, Rich Pinola (“Pinola”), Right’s

CEO and board chairman, groped and propositioned her. Hong, however, never reported

Pinola’s misconduct. One month later, in June 2002, Hong contends that she renewed her

complaints regarding Klein with Greenway. 

On August 28, 2002, Klein held a staff meeting. Right contends that Klein and

Maxfield got into a heated argument at the meeting, and that Hong inappropriately aligned

herself with Maxfield. After the meeting, Klein apparently recommended to Greenway that

both Hong and Maxfield be terminated based on their conduct during the meeting. 

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Greenway agreed to the termination of Maxfield, but Right asserts that Greenway “saved

Hong’s job” and refused to fire her.

Hong complained to Greenway after the meeting that Klein had set both she and

Maxfield up for ridicule. She contends that Greenway refused to initiate a human resources

investigation of Klein thereafter.

On November 26, 2002, Klein gave Hong a negative performance review, following

which Right asserts that she received the lowest overall rating for any CSC in the office. In

January 2003, Klein again counseled Hong regarding her performance. 

In April 2003, Right underwent a national reduction in force (“RIF”). Klein apparently

initially recommended to Greenway that only one male CSC, Peter Engler (“Engler”), be

fired. Greenway, however, suggested that Klein consider adding Hong to his list. Klein

revised the list, added Hong, and Greenway approved her termination.

On March 29, 2004, Hong filed an administrative charge with the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and was issued a right to sue letter. 

Hong filed her complaint in state court on September 8, 2004. On September 22, 2004,

Right answered the complaint and removed the case to federal court. Right filed its motion

for summary judgment on December 22, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to 

material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.

56. Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there

is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

 the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and the discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the court that there is

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. If the moving party

meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that

there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250.

 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond

 the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “To

show the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least some

significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte,

Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990). The court must view the evidence in a

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d

574, 578 (9th Cir. 2003). The court must not weight the evidence or determine the truth of

the matter, but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Balint v. Carson

City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).

Deference to the nonmoving party has some limits. Thus, a plaintiff cannot rest on

the allegations in her pleadings to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Brinson v .

Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). Self-serving affidavits will

not establish a genuine issue as to material fact if they fail to state facts based on personal

knowledge or are too conclusory. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th

Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial,

“the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Regardless of whether plaintiff or defendant is the moving party, each party must

“establish the existence of the elements essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear

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the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

 Right now seeks summary judgment on all seven claims alleged in Hong’s

 complaint.

1. Sexual Harassment Claim

Hong alleges two bases for her harassment claim: (1) that a hostile and abusive

work environment existed based on Klein’s conduct toward her, and based on the

treatment of women generally in the workplace; and (2) Right created intolerable working

conditions by allowing widespread sexual favoritism. 

a. Hostile Environment based on Klein’s Conduct Directed at Plaintiff

Hong contends that she was a constant target of Klein’s harassing behavior. Hong

alleges that Klein often berated her and made disparaging comments about her

professional ability and competence. She provided numerous examples of Klein’s alleged

harassing conduct, including: 

• Treating her in a dismissive, sexist manner by raising his hand to her for her

to “shut up” when she disagreed with him, something that he did not do to

male CSCs;

• Stepping in front of Hong to block others’ view of her as if she were nonexistent to demean and intimidate her, again something Hong alleges Klein

did not do to male CSCs;

• Standing over Hong and pointing his finger while berating her in an effort to

upset and intimidate her;

• Humiliating Hong in front of fellow employees by wrongfully accusing her of

not selling enough, while exempting male employees from such treatment;

• Refusing to acknowledge that derogatory term “fucking matriarch” constituted

sexual harassment under Right’s policy;

• Excluding Hong from training sessions, company task forces and executive

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Regarding the other male employees that Hong claims received favorable treatment

from Klein, Gaines and Bob Gilbert, Right argues that neither reported to Klein and that “Klein

did not have the authority to give them preferential treatment.” Right points out that Gaines

and Gilbert were not CSCs or salespersons, but were instead organizational consultants.

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dinners;

• Assigning accounts that Hong brought in to male counterparts; and

• Praising Hong’s male peers in sales meetings, while deliberately singling

Hong out and accusing her of not selling enough. 

She argues that Right is strictly liable for Klein’s sexual harassment. 

Right argues that Klein never made a gender-based derogatory remark to Hong

herself. Kortan v. California Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). Right

also contends that the record shows that Klein did not in fact give males preferential

treatment, and notes that Klein supervised three male CSCs, including Maxfield, Engler,

and Michael Markavage. Right further notes that Klein recommended that both Maxfield

and Engler be terminated, and they in fact were terminated. As for the remaining CSC,

Markavage, Right asserts that there is no evidence that Klein treated him differently than

the other CSCs; and that regardless, he was not comparable to Hong because he was a

CSC 3 – not a CSC 4, as was Hong.3

 

To state a prima facie case for “hostile environment” sexual harassment under

FEHA, plaintiff must allege that she: (1) was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances,

conduct or comments; (2) the harassment complained of was based on sex; and (3) the

harassment was “so severe or pervasive” as to “alter the conditions of the victim’s

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608

(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting federal case law for hostile environment sexual harassment

claims under California law). Additionally, in order to render the employer liable for hostile

environment harassment, plaintiff must prove that the employer knew or should have

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known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Gov.C. §

12940(j)(1). Under FEHA, an employer is strictly liable for workplace harassment by a

supervisor. State Dept. of Health Services v. Sup.Ct. (McGinnis), 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1042

(Cal. 2003).

Offensive words and conduct that are directed at an employee because of his or her

gender may create a hostile workplace environment even though the words and conduct

are not sexual in nature. See Birschtein v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 92 Cal.App.4th

994, 1001-1002 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also Accardi v. Sup. Ct., 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 348

(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing approvingly Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,

1485 (3rd Cir. 1990) (“the pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to

women generally and addressed to female employees personally may serve as evidence of

a hostile environment”)). “To plead a cause of action for [hostile environment] sexual

harassment, it is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the

discrimination and that if the plaintiff “had been a man she would not have been treated in

the same manner.” Birschtein, 92 Cal.App.4th at 1001. “Offensive comments alone may

cause an employee’s work environment to be sufficiently hostile to constitute actionable

harassment if they are pervasive enough to interfere with the reasonable victim’s work

environment.” Mayfield v. Trevors Store, Inc., 2004 WL 2806175 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2004)

(citing Birschtein, 92 Cal.App.4th at 1002).

The court finds that Hong’s testimony and that of her co-workers Craig and Maxfield,

raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the numerous instances of alleged misconduct by

Klein, as directed at Hong, were based on her gender. Craig’s and Maxfield’s credibility will

be issues for the jury.

b. Hostile Environment based on Male Conduct Directed at Plaintiff

and Other Women

Hong also argues that a hostile work environment existed for female employees

generally at Right. She contends that both Klein and Greenway contributed to this hostile

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work environment. Hong notes that in contrast to the “overt sexist hostility” that Klein

exhibited towards her, he often demeaned younger female employees in the manner in

which he referred to and touched them. Hong asserts that she personally witnessed Klein’s

behavior toward other female employees and also received complaints from these women

who were afraid to lodge a formal complaint. In support, Hong relies on her declaration and

deposition testimony from Maxfield. Specifically, Hong asserts that Klein would regularly:

• Refer to younger female employees as “girls,” “sweetheart,” and “honey;”

• Lurch forward, stare, and “do the rundown” with his eyes over the bodies of

female subordinates; and

• Put his arms around female employees, pressing his chest up against their

back or touching elbows with them.

Hong also personally observed Greenway’s conduct towards female employees, and

knew that Greenway was having sexual relationships with several female Right employees. 

In her declaration, Hong asserts that CEO Pinola propositioned her at a corporate event.

Hong further relies on deposition testimony from another Right employee, Gayle Weibley,

that she, too, was propositioned by CEO Pinola.

Right argues that Hong’s hostile environment claim must fail for several reasons,

including that: (1) many of the allegations are time-barred; (2) Hong cannot base her claim

on conduct of which she was not personally aware; and (3) the alleged conduct was not

severe and pervasive. 

i. Time Bar/Exhaustion/Continuing Violation

Right argues that Hong may not base her sexual harassment claim on Gaines’,

Greenway’s, or Pinola’s conduct because these allegations are time-barred since Hong

failed to file a timely administrative charge. Richards v. Ch2m Hill, 26 Cal.4th 798, 823 (Cal.

2001). Hong counters that Gaines’, Greenway’s, and Pinola’s conduct is not time-barred

based on the “continuing violation doctrine.” She argues that “systematic discrimination

practices” occurred at Right, and that the allegations are therefore actionable even if some

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or all occurred prior to the limitations period. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. Further, Hong argues

that the allegations should be considered exhausted because they are sufficiently similar to

those allegations included in her administrative claim and that the administrative claim

should be construed liberally. Baker v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, 209 Cal.App.3d

1057 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

Under FEHA, an employee must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the

statute by filing a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)

and must obtain from the DFEH a notice of right to sue in order to be entitled to file a civil

action in court based on FEHA violations. Romano v. Rockwell Internat’l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th

479, 492 (Cal. 1996). The timely filing of an administrative complaint is a prerequisite to

bringing a civil action for damages under FEHA. Id. Regarding the applicable limitation

period, FEHA provides that no complaint for any violation of its provisions may be filed with

DFEH “after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful

practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.” Id. (citing Gov.C. § 12960).

However, under the continuing violation doctrine, California courts have recognized

that employers will be “liable for actions that take place outside the limitations period if these

actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.” 

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1056 (Cal. 2005) (citing Richards, 26

Cal.4th at 812). The California Supreme Court has noted that “[i]n order to carry out the

purpose of the FEHA to safeguard the employee’s right to hold employment without

experiencing discrimination, the limitations period set out in the FEHA should be interpreted

so as to promote the resolution of potentially meritorious claims on the merits.” Richards, 26

Cal.4th at 819.

In determining whether the continuing violation doctrine should apply, the court

considers whether “the employer’s actions were (1) sufficiently similar in kind – recognizing .

. . that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to

reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms; (2) have occurred

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Plaintiff’s administrative complaint asserts:

Klein not only contributed to the disparate treatment of Right’s female managers

and staff, he also endorsed the derogatory and harassing behavior of certain

male employees by failing to address complaints raised by female employees.

In April 2002, one of the younger male employees repeatedly referred to me as

a “fucking matriarch.” I was deeply offended by the derogatory remarks and

notified Mr. Klein in writing to that effect. Mr. Klein discounted my concern by

responding that he did not find the comment “matriarch” to be “bad or offensive.”

Right claims that this male employee was counseled for his remarks. However,

I was never notified of any investigation or disciplinary action taken against the

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with reasonable frequency; and (3) have not acquired a degree of permanence.” Id. at 823. 

This case is nearly identical to Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court. 97

Cal.App.4th 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). In Medix, the court held that the plaintiff had not

administratively exhausted her employment claims against individual defendants where she

failed to name the individual defendants in either the caption or the body of her

administrative charge. Id. at 117-18. The state appellate court examined its prior decisions

on the issue, and noted that since its prior decisions, the form administrative charge had

been revised to put claimants on notice that they needed to specifically identify individuals –

not just the named employer. Id. at 117-18 (noting that “[t]he word ‘person’ has been

inserted after ‘employer’ in the [caption] section seeking the identity of the alleged

discriminator” and additionally that “the form has a place for individual discriminators to be

identified”). The form approved by the Medix court was the very form utilized by Hong here. 

Hong identified “Right Management” on her administrative charge, and specifically

listed Jay Klein as the alleged discriminator. The body of Hong’s charge, which included a

three and one-half page description of the conduct giving rise to the charge, does not

mention Pinola or Gaines by name at all. It mentions Greenway, but only to explain Hong’s

hiring and the person to whom she complained regarding Klein. It does not mention any

alleged misconduct by Greenway. However, it does, without naming Gaines, specifically

reference the incident regarding Gaines’ “fucking matriarch” comment.4

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individual.

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As a result, the court concludes that Hong has not administratively exhausted the

allegations regarding Greenway or Pinola. See id. (trial court properly sustained employer’s

demurrer to sexual harassment claims where “plaintiff neither listed [individual

discriminators] in the administrative charge [caption], nor did she name them in the body of

the complaint form as alleged perpetrators”). She has, however, exhausted the allegations

regarding Gaines.

The court further finds that the sexual affairs that Hong has alleged with respect to

Greenway and Pinola do not constitute “continuing violations” under the state law standards

set forth above. The course of conduct to which Hong objected, and which was the subject

of her administrative complaint, concerned Klein’s treatment of her and female employees in

general – not the sexual affairs currently alleged. To the extent that Hong’s administrative

complaint alleged conduct involving Greenway, it concerned only his inadequate follow-up to

her complaints regarding Klein. 

This case is unlike those in which the courts have found that the continuing violation

doctrine should permit the inclusion of time-barred, unexhausted allegations. Those cases

involved a course of failure or refusal to accommodate a disabled employee, see Richards,

26 Cal.4th at 821, or a course of retaliatory conduct. See also Yanowitz, 36 Cal.4th at 1058. 

Here, the alleged affairs and misconduct by Greenway and Pinola are not sufficiently similar

in kind to the facts and misconduct alleged by Hong in her administrative charge regarding

Klein. See Richards, 26 Cal.4th at 823. For this reason, Hong will be prohibited from

utilizing arguments and evidence of Greenway’s and Pinola’s alleged affairs and related

misconduct as bases for her sexual harassment claim.

ii. Conduct Directed at Others

Right also argues with respect to Greenway’s sexual relationships with Holland and

Mora, that his conduct cannot form the basis for a hostile working environment claim

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because it was not directed at Hong and did not occur in her “immediate work environment.” 

Fischer, 214 Cal.App.3d at 610-11; see also Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.4th

511, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Right asserts that Hong cannot establish a hostile

environment claim based on the testimony of others – including Craig, Maxfield, and

Weibley – if she neither experienced nor knew about the incidents to which they testified. 

“Whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at

all the circumstances.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Those

circumstances include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. “Evidence of the

general work atmosphere, involving employees other than the plaintiff, is relevant to the

issue of whether there existed an atmosphere of hostile work environment.” Fischer, 214

Cal.App.3d at 610-611. “[O]ne who is personally subjected to offensive remarks and

touchings can establish a hostile work environment by showing the harassment existed in

the place of employment.” Id.; see also Beyda, 65 Cal.App.4th at 519 (concluding that

“incidents of sexual harassment directed toward other employees in the work environment

[are] relevant to th[e] evaluation” of whether a hostile environment existed). 

However, where the plaintiff is not personally subjected to the offensive remarks or

touching, the plaintiff must establish that she personally witnessed the harassing conduct or

was otherwise aware of it. Beyda, 65 Cal.App.4th at 519. Otherwise, that conduct “cannot

alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id.

Accordingly, harassment directed toward others of which plaintiff was unaware when it

occurred has no bearing on whether plaintiff reasonably considered her working

environment abusive. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000).

As discussed above, Hong has not exhausted the allegations regarding Greenway

and Pinola’s conduct, and is precluded from introducing these allegations for that reason. 

Additionally, the court finds that Hong may not rely on evidence regarding Pinola’s

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conduct toward Gayle Weibley and Pinola’s conduct toward other Right employees because

Hong was not aware of the conduct. However, that is not the case regarding Greenway. 

Hong has introduced sufficient evidence that she was aware of Greenway’s affairs, and that

is all that is required under the circumstances. Nevertheless, as set forth above, Hong

cannot rely on the evidence concerning Greenway’s affairs because such allegations are

unexhausted.

As for Klein’s conduct toward other female employees, the court finds that Hong has

submitted sufficient evidence that she was aware that such conduct was occurring. 

Accordingly, Hong may rely on evidence regarding Klein’s conduct toward other women in

the workplace in support of her hostile environment sexual harassment claim.

iii. Severity

Right also argues that the alleged incidents involving Klein constituted “simple

teasing” and are insufficient to state a claim for hostile environment harassment. Right

further contends that the alleged conduct was too isolated and sporadic.

The level of severity required to transform a merely annoying or uncomfortable work

environment into an actionable, sexually harassing “hostile environment” is usually a

question of fact to be determined by looking at all of the circumstances. See Harris, 510

U.S. at 22-23. Those circumstances include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its

severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely offensive, and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Id.

“Isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to a discriminatory

change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 788 (1998). A single incident generally will not be sufficient unless it is very

severe. Clarke Co. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001); see also Ellison v.

Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In evaluating this issue, the court has considered Klein’s conduct toward other female

employees, in addition to that directed at Hong, to determine whether his conduct was

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sufficiently severe. Hong has alleged numerous incidents of harassment, which the court

does not find to be isolated. Additionally, the court finds that the frequency and the context

of the alleged conduct create a triable issue of fact regarding the severity. 

c. Sexual Favoritism

Hong also contends that Right created intolerable working conditions by allowing

widespread sexual favoritism or “reverse discrimination.” See Miller v. Dep’t of Corrections,

36 Cal.4th 446 (Cal. 2005). She argues that Greenway heavily favored those women with

whom he was having sexual affairs, including Holland and Mora, for salary increases,

promotions, bonuses, working hours, and favorable account assignments.

Right again posits a number of arguments in opposition to a sexual favoritism claim. 

Most significantly, Right asserts that Hong did not exhaust the sexual favoritism claim. Right

also notes that Hong did not advance the claim in her complaint or in her initial disclosures. 

Based on the discussion set forth above regarding exhaustion, the court finds that

Hong is barred from asserting sexual favoritism as a basis for her harassment claim

because she failed to exhaust the claim administratively. As noted, Hong failed to mention

Greenway and/or Pinola’s misconduct in her administrative complaint. The administrative

complaint did not allege sexually hostile or inappropriate conduct with respect to any Right

supervisors except Klein. Furthermore, plaintiff’s complaint in this case does not include a

favoritism claim. 

d. Conclusion

In conclusion, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment in part

and DENIES it in part as to the harassment claim. The motion is GRANTED in so far as

Hong is precluded from basing the harassment claim on allegations regarding Greenway’s

and Pinola’s misconduct. Hong is also barred from asserting sexual favoritism as a basis for

the harassment claim.

The court, however, finds that there is a triable issue regarding the existence of

hostile environment sexual harassment based on Klein’s conduct toward Hong and his

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conduct toward other female Right employees, and DENIES summary judgment on these

grounds.

2. Discrimination Claim

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on disparate

treatment for sex discrimination, Hong must show that 1) she is a member of a protected

class, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; 3) there is a causal connection

between her protected status and the adverse employment action; and 4) similarly-situated

individuals outside the relevant class were treated better than she was. Peterson v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004), citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)). 

If Hong can satisfy this prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to Right to

“articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. 

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002). If Right can do so, the burden shifts

again to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the alleged legitimate reason is in fact a pretext for

discrimination. Id. Hong “can avoid summary judgment only by demonstrating through

specific, substantial evidence that the real reason for her termination was her gender.” Horn

v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 806-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In

showing pretext, Hong may “demonstrate either (by additional facts or legal argument) that

the defendant's showing was in fact insufficient or (by competent evidentiary materials) that

there was a triable issue of fact material to the defendant's showing.” Martin v. Lockheed

Missiles, 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

Right argues that Hong cannot make out a claim for gender discrimination because:

(1) she cannot demonstrate that she suffered any adverse employment action or a

connection between the alleged conduct and her gender; (2) Right had legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons (“LNBR”) for Hong’s termination; (3) because Greenway

was responsible for hiring plaintiff and discharging her, the “same actor inference” applies,

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and Hong’s burden of proof is heightened; and (4) Hong cannot demonstrate that Right’s

non-discriminatory reasons were pretext. 

a. Prima Facie Case

Right argues that acts comprising the lengthy list of Klein’s alleged misconduct,

including giving more favorable job assignments to male employees, excluding Hong from

business dinners, unjustly criticizing her performance, requesting things on an expedited

basis, and not allowing her to train new employees, do not constitute “adverse employment

actions.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 918, 921 (being ostracized, having difficulty getting desired

work and vacation dates, criticism, and unwarranted performance evaluation were not

adverse action); Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869

(9th Cir. 1996). Right also contends that Hong has not demonstrated that such actions were

undertaken on the basis of her gender, as opposed to “anything other than the proper

exercise of management discretion.”

Right further contends that because Greenway was responsible for recruiting Hong to

return to Right in 2000, and for approving her layoff in 2003, there is “a strong inference that

there was no discriminatory action.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-

71 (9th Cir. 1996) (“where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and firing of a

discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong

inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive”). Right points to six additional

facts that it claims support an inference of non-discrimination regarding Greenway: (1) that

he actively recruited Hong to return in 2000, despite warnings regarding Hong from his

predecessor, Dorman; (2) that he offered Hong the RMP position initially; (3) that he

promoted Hong to CSC4 in June 2001; (4) that he appointed Hong to the President’s

Advisory Council in 2002; (5) that he prohibited RMP Mellon from taking more aggressive

performance measures against Hong; and (6) that he saved Hong’s job in August 2002

when Klein wanted to terminate her. 

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Right also argues that there is a strong inference of non-discrimination based on

Klein’s actions. Right notes that Klein hired three CSCs during his tenure as RMP, one of

whom was female. It further asserts that at the time of Hong’s layoff, Klein supervised three

female CSCs and two male CSCs, and initially only recommended one male CSC, Engler,

for layoff. Right suggests that these facts demonstrate that Klein’s actions were genderneutral. 

While the court agrees that Hong is unable to make a prima facie showing of gender

discrimination as to Greenway, it nevertheless concludes that she has made a sufficient

prima facie showing that Klein discriminated against her based on her gender. The same

actor inference applies to Greenway, who hired Hong. Additionally, as set forth by Right, a

long list of undisputed evidence undermines any prima facie case of discrimination as to

Greenway. Finally, for the reasons discussed above with respect to the harassment claim,

Hong is unable to base her gender discrimination claim on Greenway’s conduct because

those allegations are unexhausted. 

However, the same analysis does not apply with respect to Klein. First, there is no

dispute that Klein did not hire Hong; and the same actor inference is therefore inapplicable. 

Second, the allegations regarding Klein are exhausted.

As for the other elements of Hong’s prima facie case, the fact that Hong was

terminated pursuant to Klein’s decision to recommend her inclusion in the RIF is sufficient

adverse action. The court further finds that with respect to Klein, Hong has demonstrated a

triable issue as to whether there is a causal connection between her protected status and

the adverse employment action.

b. LNBR/Pretext

Right also asserts several LNBRs for Hong’s termination, which fall into three

categories: (1) Hong’s performance and personality issues; (2) Right’s changing business

structure to integrate organizational consulting (“OC”); and (3) Right’s national RIF.

Right notes that prior to Klein’s hiring, Hong had received what it characterizes as a

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negative performance evaluation from RMP Mellon and had a bad reputation with

Greenway’s predecessor, Dorman. Additionally, Right cites to the declaration of Wright, the

then-manager of the OC group for the Pacific Northwest, who allegedly called for Hong’s

and Maxfield’s termination because of his difficulties working with them. Right further notes

that Klein counseled Hong on numerous occasions regarding her poor performance. Right

also asserts that it terminated Hong because her “new business development and OC

business efforts were abysmal and she had a history of significant performance problems.” 

Furthermore, Right notes that it was undergoing a “radical change in its business” at the

time of Hong’s layoff. At that time, it was emphasizing the OC business, an area in which it

claims Hong’s performance was especially poor.

Hong argues that Right’s LNBRs are pretextual based on inconsistencies in the

evidence and the timing of Right’s decision to fire Hong. First, Hong disputes Right’s

characterization of her performance. She notes that in Greenway’s deposition testimony, he

conceded that “Hong was consistently a top revenue producer throughout her employment

at Right.” She further notes that Greenway selected her for the President’s Advisory

Council. While Hong admits that her new and OC business fell short of Klein’s goals, she

asserts that her revenue was “on par or higher than other employees of the San Francisco

office who were not fired.” She also argues that her revenue numbers would have been

higher if she had not been sabotaged by Klein and subjected to his favoritism of male

employees. Hong further notes that Klein was intent on firing her as soon as he arrived at

Right. 

Right, in reply, points out evidence that Hong had performance issues with RMPs

Mellon, Beck, and Dorman before Klein arrived. Further, as for the PAC, Right suggests,

based on Greenway’s deposition testimony, that Greenway’s selection of Hong for the honor

was to signal to her that she could still “fix her performance issues.” 

Although a RIF, like that alleged by Right, is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for termination, to the extent that Right asserts that Hong was selected for the RIF based on

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her performance, she has sufficiently demonstrated pretext via evidence that she was

clearly recognized by Right as a top performer on several occasions. See Martin, 29 Cal.

App. 4th at 1732.

For these reasons, the court DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

to this claim. 

3. Failure to Prevent Violations Claim

Hong also argues that Right violated FEHA and its own employment policies by

 “fail[ing] to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment

from occurring.” Gov.C. § 12940(I). 

California Government Code § 12940 provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification . . . [f]or an

employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and

harassment from occurring." The California Supreme Court has stated that FEHA "makes it

a separate unlawful employment practice" for an employer to violate § 12940(k). State

Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.4th 1026 (Cal. 2003). 

However, it is also clear that there can be no violation of 12940(k) absent a finding of

actual discrimination. See Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring a finding of actual

discrimination before a violation of section 12940(k) becomes actionable) (citing Trujillo v.

North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). “[T]here's no

logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer

for not preventing discrimination that didn't happen." Trujillo, 63 Cal.App.4th at 289.

Hong asserts that “despite the numerous complaints made by [her] and others to

Greenway about Klein’s offensive treatment toward women and discriminatory behavior, no

action was taken.” She contends that Right’s own policy required that a report be made to

the VP of Human Resources, which was not done. She also states that neither she nor

Maxfield were contacted for follow-up, and that Greenway’s alleged inaction “gave Klein free

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license to harass his female subordinates.” 

Right argues that because summary judgment should be granted regarding Hong’s

claims for discrimination and harassment, it must also be granted on this claim as well. 

Right further argues that the claim must also fail because it took the requisite reasonable

steps to prevent discrimination and harassment, noting that Klein received its employee

handbook and participated in sexual harassment training. See Montero v. Agco Corp., 192

F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Because the court determines that triable issues exist with respect to Hong’s

harassment and discrimination claims, it DENIES Right’s motion for summary judgment as

to this claim. The court further notes that Hong has demonstrated a triable issue as to

whether Greenway and Klein complied with the company’s harassment policies; thus, Right

is not entitled to summary judgment based on the existence of the handbook and the

company training alone. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (existence of policy relevant

to whether employer exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment).

4. Retaliation Claim

Hong also claims that Klein’s harassing behavior intensified after she voiced her

concerns to Greenway regarding Klein’s treatment of female staff. 

FEHA protects employees against retaliation for making a complaint or for opposing

 conduct made unlawful under the Act. Gov.C. § 12940(h). The standards for a retaliation

claim are the same under FEHA as Title VII. Flait v. North American Watch Corp., 3

Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The elements require that: (1) the plaintiff

establish a prima facie case of retaliation; (2) the defendant articulate a legitimate,

nonretaliatory explanation for its acts; and (3) the plaintiff show that the defendant’s

proffered explanation is merely a pretext. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must: (1)

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5

Under FEHA, all that is required with respect to the complaints is that the employee

have a reasonable belief that the employer was engaging in discriminatory or harassing

conduct. See L’Oreal, 36 Cal.4th at 1048. Additionally, a formal complaint and/or legal terms

and buzzwords are not required. See id. It is sufficient that an “employee’s comments, when

read in their totality, oppose discrimination.” Id.

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show that he or she engaged in a protected activity;5 (2) that the defendant subjected her to

an adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected

activity and the adverse action. Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453

(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 614. In other words, a plaintiff must

demonstrate a causal relationship between protected complaints and an adverse

employment action. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928. 

Hong appears to focus this claim on alleged retaliation by Klein as opposed to

Greenway. She contends that Klein’s hostile and abusive behavior toward her in spring

2002 occurred around the same time that Greenway would have related Hong’s complaints

regarding Klein to Klein. 

The evidence demonstrates that Hong first complained to Greenway regarding

Klein’s alleged gender-based discrimination and harassment in March 2002. Hong

subsequently complained to Greenway regarding Klein’s gender-based misconduct in May

and June 2002. Right does not dispute that these complaints were made, or that the

complaints constituted protected activity. 

Instead, Right challenges the existence of a causal link between Hong’s complaints

regarding Klein and any adverse actions. Right, citing to Klein’s declaration and

Greenway’s deposition testimony, asserts that Klein was unaware of any of the complaints

Hong made about him to Greenway. Right also emphasizes a pre-complaint counseling

session on January 23, 2002, that Klein held with Hong regarding her performance to

suggest that Klein’s post-complaint performance meetings and reviews with Hong were not

causally connected to Hong’s complaints. 

Hong does not cite to any evidence demonstrating that Klein had knowledge of her

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complaints to Greenway, but instead argues that “[w]hile Greenway and Klein deny that

Klein was informed of the complaints made by Hong and Maxfield about [Klein], their

credibility is one of the central issues that will be submitted to the jury for its determination.” 

Oppos. at 22. Hong also suggests that the close proximity in time between her complaints

and the alleged adverse actions implies a causal connection.

“Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff

had engaged in the protected activity." Morgan v. Regents, 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 70 (Cal .Ct.

App. 2000). “[I]n some cases, causation can be inferred from timing alone where an

adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“nearly 18-month lapse between

protected activity and an adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to give rise

to an inference of causation”); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)

(causation existed where adverse action occurred less than three months after complaint

was filed); Flait, 3 Cal.App.4th at 478 (sufficient causal link where employee was terminated

a “few months” after engaging in protected conduct). The Ninth Circuit has, however,

cautioned that a “specified time period cannot be a mechanically applied criterion. A rule

that any period over a certain time is per se too long (or, conversely, a rule that any period

under a certain time is per se short enough) would be unrealistically simplistic.” Coszalter v.

City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2003).

The short periods of time between the complaints and adverse actions here –

sometimes only days and at most several months – might give rise to an inference sufficient

to satisfy this element of Hong’s prima facie case. However, as noted, Klein had already

begun counseling Hong regarding her performance prior to her first complaint to Greenway,

evidence that tends to dispel an inference of retaliation. Additionally, Hong has not

introduced any evidence that Klein was aware of the complaints. “In the absence of

evidence that . . . [Klein] w[as] aware of [Hong’s] past filing of a grievance, the causal link

necessary for a claim of retaliation cannot be established.” Morgan, 88 Cal.App.4th at 72 

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In fact, the opposite is true. Greenway hired, promoted, and appointed Hong to the

President’s Advisory Council.

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(plaintiff’s claim that rehiring applications were rejected based on prior EEOC complaints

failed where plaintiff “presented no evidence to directly refute the declarations disclaiming

knowledge of his prior grievance”).

However, to the extent that Hong also intended to base her claim on alleged

retaliation by Greenway, there can be no dispute that Greenway was aware of the

complaints because Greenway was the person to whom Hong complained. There is also no

evidence, as with Klein, that Greenway had taken any disciplinary action against Hong prior

to her complaints to him regarding Klein.6 

However, there is other strong evidence that tends to break the causal link between

Hong’s complaints and any retaliatory action on Greenway’s part. It is undisputed that Hong

complained to Greenway regarding Klein’s behavior in March, May, and June 2002. 

Following those complaints and prior to Hong’s February 2003 termination, Greenway

intervened on Hong’s behalf in August 2002 and refused to terminate her pursuant to Klein’s

recommendation. This intervening favorable treatment is sufficient to dispel any inference of

a causal link between Hong’s protected activity and the adverse action. See Manatt v. Bank

of America, 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (employer’s decision to give plaintiff a pay

raise and selection for prestigious assignment between time of plaintiff’s complaint and

decision not to promote her dispelled any causal link necessary for retaliation claim).

Because Hong has failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, the court

GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

5. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Claim

Defendant did not address this claim separately in its motion, but appears to argue

that summary judgment should be granted as to this claim for the same reasons that it

should be granted on the preceding claims.

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To establish a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under California

law, plaintiff must show: 1) that she was terminated from her employment, 

2) that the termination was a violation of public policy, i.e., that there was a nexus between

the termination and the plaintiff's status or protected activity, 3) and damages. Turner v.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1258-59 (Cal. 1994). 

In order to support a wrongful discharge claim under California law, a public policy

must be (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) “public” in the

sense that it “inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving merely the interests of

the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) “substantial” and

“fundamental." Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 880, 901 (Cal. 1997). A discharge

in violation of FEHA may give rise to a common law claim for wrongful discharge. 

Stevenson, 16 Cal. 4th at 901. The fundamental public policy against sex discrimination

and sexual harassment in the workplace is rooted in the California Constitution. Rojo v.

Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 89 (Cal. 1990).

Because the court concludes that triable issues exist regarding plaintiff’s harassment

and gender discrimination claims, the court also DENIES summary judgment on this claim. 

6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Hong also contends that she is entitled to recover damages for negligent infliction of

emotional distress under common law. The elements of a cause of action for negligent

infliction of emotional distress include: (1) the defendant engaged in negligent conduct; (2)

the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress; and (3) the defendants’ negligent conduct

was a cause of the serious emotional distress. Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 134 Cal.App.4th

1220, 1226 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).

Right argues that any emotional injury that Hong suffered as a result of her

employment or termination is preempted by the workers compensation system. Robomatic,

Inc. v. Vetco Offshore, 225 Cal.App.3d 270, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Shoemaker v. Myers,

52 Cal.3d 1, 19-20 (Cal. 1990). 

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Because the worker's compensation system provides the exclusive forum for

employees seeking redress for workplace remedies, a plaintiff cannot bring a common law 

infliction of emotional distress claim for "ordinary employer conduct that intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly harms [him]." Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 714 (Cal.

1994). That limitation however, "does not apply ... when the 'injury is a result of conduct,

whether in the form of discharge or otherwise, not seen as reasonably coming within the

compensation bargain.’” Kovatch v. California Case Management Co., 65 Cal.App.4th

1256, 1277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the Workers' Compensation Act does not

preempt intentional infliction of emotional distress claims predicated upon wrongful

termination in violation of public policy) (quoting Shoemaker, 52 Cal.3d at 19-20), overruled

on other grounds by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2001); see also

City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1154-55 (Cal. 1998) (employee's

wrongful discharge claim based on disability discrimination not subject to exclusive

jurisdiction of workers' compensation); Accardi, 17 Cal.App.4th at 341 (workers'

compensation not the exclusive remedy for emotional distress claim based on sexual

harassment discrimination in violation of the FEHA).

Here, like the cases cited above, Hong’s emotional distress claims, based on the

alleged sexual harassment and discrimination, are not barred because “the distress is

engendered by an employer’s illegal practices.” Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist.,

79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“claim for emotional and psychological

damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an

employer’s illegal discriminatory practices”). The court therefore concludes that there is a

triable issue as to whether the injury Hong suffered was the result of conduct not seen as

reasonably coming within the compensation bargain. Summary judgment on this claim is

DENIED.

7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

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Hong also alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress include: (1)

extreme and outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard

of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4)

actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire

Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 (Cal. 1970).

In addition to the workers compensation preclusion argument addressed above, Right

argues that Hong is unable to demonstrate the “outrageous conduct” element for infliction of

emotional distress. Right, however, makes the same arguments as to this element that this

court rejected regarding the harassment claim. Right contends that the only conduct that

Hong alleges consisted of isolated and sporadic instances. 

Because the court has concluded that triable issues exist regarding the harassment

and discrimination claims, and because “[i]t is settled that employment discrimination,

particularly that involving sexual harassment, can cause emotional distress and that such

distress is compensable under traditional theories of tort law,” summary judgment is also

DENIED with respect to this claim. See Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 65 Cal.App.4th 833,

848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

C. Parties’ Evidentiary Objections

1. Defendant’s Objections

In support of its motion, Right submitted a 225-page document in objection to Hong’s

evidence, which contained 390 individual objections. Right essentially objects to plaintiff’s

declaration and supporting exhibits line by line. The objections are generally for lack of

foundation, relevance, misleading, and in a few instances, “contradictory” based on alleged

contradictions between plaintiff’s declaration and deposition testimony. As the court stated

on the record, it will not rule on each of the individual objections. However, the court rules

as follows with respect to the general categories of Right’s objections. 

a. Office Romance Gossip

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Right objects to evidence regarding Greenway’s relationships with Holland and Mora,

and Pinola’s behavior with respect to Carol Weibley as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 

The court finds that the evidence is indeed irrelevant because: (1) plaintiff can not raise the

allegations in conjunction with her claims since the allegations are unexhausted; and (2)

with respect to Pinola, plaintiff was not aware of the conduct, so it cannot serve as support

for her hostile environment harassment claim. 

For these reasons, the court SUSTAINS the objections.

b. Co-Workers’ Opinions Re: Plaintiff’s Performance

Right argues broadly for exclusion of Craig’s and Maxfield’s testimony on the basis

that they did not supervise plaintiff, and that, therefore, their opinions are irrelevant. 

However, Craig’s and Maxfield’s testimony are not primary sources of evidence

regarding plaintiff’s performance. Instead, plaintiff’s performance evidence comes directly

from Greenway himself, who testified regarding his recruitment of Hong, his selection of her

for the President’s Advisory Counsel, from former supervisor Christine Mellon, from plaintiff,

from plaintiff’s exhibits, which consist of Right letters recognizing her performance, Right

revenue documents, and Right performance evaluations and related correspondence.

Instead, Craig testified primarily regarding plaintiff’s “likeability” and reputation at

Right – subjects on which Craig did indeed have personal knowledge and a basis for

testifying. Craig’s testimony on these subjects is also relevant because Right argued that

another reason for adverse employment action was Hong’s difficult personality and inability

to get along with co-workers. 

Maxfield’s testimony was similar to Craig’s. Neither appears to have testified as to

matters that were outside of their personal knowledge, such as performance evaluations or

employment honors. Accordingly, Right’s objections are OVERRULED.

c. Co-Worker Craig’s Opinions Regarding Klein

Right also contends that to the extent Hong relies on Craig’s testimony regarding

Klein’s treatment of employees, such reliance is misplaced because Craig did not work in

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the San Francisco office and has admitted that she was not in a position to observe Klein’s

alleged favorable treatment of male employees. 

The evidence reveals that Craig conducted meetings that included San Francisco

employees, and also occasionally worked with the San Francisco office. The evidence does

not suggest that Craig was isolated in the Silicon Valley office. 

The court therefore OVERRULES this objection. 

d. Plaintiff’s Declaration and Deposition Testimony

Right argues that Hong’s declaration contradicts her deposition testimony. It

contends that Hong cannot now “manufacture new instances of alleged harassment in a

declaration . . . crafted for the sole purpose of defeating summary judgment.” See Burrell v.

Star Nursery, 170 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1999). This court’s review of the declarations and

deposition testimony does not reveal any such manufactured allegations. The court

therefore OVERRULES Right’s objection. 

2. Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff filed her evidentiary objections late Thursday, January 26, 2006. The

majority of plaintiff’s objections concerned evidence Right submitted in support of its

opening papers. Therefore, as stated on the record, those objections, which were due with

plaintiff’s opposition no later than January 11, 2006, are untimely and are STRICKEN.

The court has, however, considered plaintiff’s objections to evidence Right submitted

in conjunction with its reply. Those objections concern portions of Hong’s deposition

testimony submitted via Arena’s declaration on reply. The court rules as follows:

(52) SUSTAINED. Defendant has miscited the portions of plaintiff’s deposition

testimony that support the particular assertions in the reply brief that it claims it

supports.

(53) OVERRULED. Defendant’s argument construing plaintiff’s deposition

testimony is appropriate and accurate.

(54) SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART. The objection is

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sustained only to the extent that defendant cites to plaintiff’s deposition

testimony for the proposition that “plaintiff agreed that the criticism was valid” 

because it misrepresents plaintiff’s testimony. 

D. Parties’ Sealing Requests

Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted numerous sealing requests with respect to

numerous documents, including briefs, exhibits, and deposition testimony. At the hearing,

the plaintiff withdrew all of her requests to seal. Defendant withdrew all of its requests to

seal with the exception of Greenway’s testimony regarding his private consensual

relationships with third parties. 

The court finds that the evidence is marginally if at all probative to any of plaintiff’s

claims since plaintiff has failed to exhaust those allegations and is therefore barred from

using this evidence as a basis for her claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant’s

request to seal ONLY Greenway’s testimony as described above pursuant to L.R. 79-5. 

Defendant shall resubmit its redacted and unredacted materials to conform to the above

ruling. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion for

summary judgment as to Hong’s harassment claim. The motion is GRANTED to the extent

that Hong is precluded from basing the harassment claim on allegations regarding

Greenway’s and Pinola’s misconduct as discussed above; plaintiff is also barred from

asserting sexual favoritism as a basis for the claim. The court, however, finds that there is a

triable issue regarding the existence of hostile environment sexual harassment based on

Klein’s conduct toward Hong and his conduct toward other female Right employees; and

DENIES summary judgment on these grounds. The court also GRANTS summary

judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

The court DENIES summary judgment on plaintiff’s gender discrimination, failure to

prevent violations, wrongful termination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and

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intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2006

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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