Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01652/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01652-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN LEE SWETALLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendants. /

Case No. 1:13-cv-01652-SKO

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(Doc. 24)

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 11, 2016, counsel for Plaintiff, Lawrence Rohlfing, Esq., filed a motion for an 

award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).1 (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff was served with a 

copy of the motion for attorney’s fees by mail on May 22, 2015. (Id., p. 10.) On June 12, 2015, 

the Court issued a minute order requiring Plaintiff Allen Lee Swetalla (“Plaintiff”) and the 

Commissioner to file their objection to Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion, if any, by no later than August 

10, 2016. (Doc. 25.) A copy of the minute order was served on the Plaintiff and the 

Commissioner on July 28, 2016. (Doc. 25.) The Commissioner filed her statement of nonopposition on August 1, 2016, and Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. (See Doc. 26.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for an award of attorney’s fees is GRANTED

in the amount of $15,700, subject to an offset of $5,026.34 in fees already awarded pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) on March 16, 2015 (see Doc. 22).

 

1

 Vijay Patel, an attorney with the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, acted as counsel for Plaintiff throughout 

the pendency of this matter in the District Court. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 

decision denying his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) The 

Court reversed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits and remanded the case to the agency for 

further proceedings regarding the apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Doc. 19.) Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and 

against the Commissioner on January 6, 2010. (Doc. 20.) On March 12, 2015, the parties 

stipulated to an award of attorney fees and expenses under EAJA. (Docs. 21; 22.) Pursuant to the 

parties’ stipulation, counsel was awarded $5,026.34 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 22.) 

On remand, the Commissioner issued a decision finding Plaintiff disabled. (See Doc. 24, 

pp. 8-9 (Declaration of Lawrence Rohlfing); Doc. 24-2 (agency letter summarizing award of 

benefits).) On June 29, 2016, the Commissioner issued a notice that retroactive disability benefits 

had been awarded to Plaintiff and that $21,731.45, representing 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past-due 

benefits, had been withheld from Plaintiff’s award of disability benefits for payment of any 

applicable attorney’s fees. (Doc. 24-2, p. 4.) On July 11, 2016, Lawrence Rohlfing filed a motion 

for attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,700, with an offset of $5,026.34 for EAJA fees already 

awarded. (Doc. 24, p. 7.) It is counsel’s § 406(b) motion for attorney’s fees that is currently 

pending before the Court.

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 

they have successfully represented social security claimants. § 406(b) provides the following:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter 

who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 

allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 

of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 

certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in 

addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 

provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 

awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 

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1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The 

Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite that the § 406(b) attorney’s fee award 

is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 324, 328 

(4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The goal of fee 

awards under § 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while ensuring that 

the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.

The twenty-five percent (25%) maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts 

are required to ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 

(§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, 

§ 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). “Within 

the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought 

is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (holding 

that § 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 

reasonable” but “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits 

awarded”). 

Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 

§ 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . ‘looking 

first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). The United States Supreme Court has identified 

several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee 

agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) the character of the 

representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in 

dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 

benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 

attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent 

cases. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08). 

//

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Here, the fee agreement between Plaintiff and the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

provides:

If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the Social 

Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is a 

separate 25% of the backpay awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ 

decision for work before the court. Attorney shall seek compensation under 

[EAJA] and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable for 

court work. 

(Doc. 24-1 (signed September 12, 2013).)

The Court has considered the character of counsel’s representation of Plaintiff and the 

good results achieved by counsel, which included an award of benefits. As Plaintiff’s counsel, the 

Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing spent 28.5 hours representing Plaintiff, ultimately gaining a 

favorable decision in that the Commissioner’s decision was reversed and remanded to the agency 

for reconsideration. (Rohlfing Decl., ¶ 5; Doc. 24-3 (time sheets accounting for 24.7 attorney 

hours and 3.8 paralegal hours spent representing Plaintiff before the district court).) There is no 

indication that a reduction of the award is warranted due to any substandard performance by 

Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel secured a successful result for Plaintiff. There is also no evidence 

that counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in delay. 

Attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,700 represents less than 25% of the past-due benefits 

paid to Plaintiff and are not excessive in relation to the past-due award. (Doc. 24, p. 4.) See 

generally Taylor v. Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00957-SMS, WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) 

(granting petition for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of 

$20,960.00); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-00490-LJO-DLB, WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

9, 2011) (recommending an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of 

$34,500.00); Logan-Laracuente v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-00983-SMS, WL 4689519, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 10, 2010) (granting petition for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount 

of $23,558.62).

In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee nature of this case 

and counsel’s assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under such terms. See Hearn v. 

Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Because attorneys like Mr. Sackett 

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contend with a substantial risk of loss in Title II cases, an effective hourly rate of only $450 in 

successful cases does not provide a basis for this court to lower the fee to avoid a ‘windfall.’”

(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807)). 

An award of Section 406(b) fees, however, must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s 

fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Plaintiff was 

previously awarded $5,026.34 in fees pursuant to the EAJA; as such, the fee award will be offset 

by $5,026.34.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the fees sought by Plaintiff’s 

counsel pursuant to Section 406(b) are reasonable. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s 

fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $15,700 is GRANTED, subject to an offset of 

$5,026.34 for EAJA fees previously awarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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