Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02124/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN HANS LAKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEP’T; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-2124 JLS (AGS)

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On October 16, 2017, Steven Hans Lake (“Plaintiff”), formerly incarcerated at the 

George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) 

In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) The Court 

granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, denied his Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 

(ECF No. 4.)

On December 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and 

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later filed a second Motion to Appoint Counsel on January 4, 2018. (ECF Nos. 5, 7.) Once 

again, the Court dismissed his FAC for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has now filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

to which he has added a number of new defendants. (ECF No. 11.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, the Court is obligated by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are1“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of 

filing “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 

Under the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants 

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing § 1915(e)(2)).

A. Standard of Review

“The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits 

need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

 

1

 At the time Plaintiff filed his original Complaint, he was incarcerated at the George Bailey Detention 

Facility. (See ECF No. 1, at 1.)

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applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). 

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

Plaintiff claims that he “informed GBDF medical and correctional officers” that he 

did not have his arthritis medication. (SAC 5.) Plaintiff claims that the lack of medication 

“led to a gout attack which left [him] unable to move [his] left elbow,” as well as 

“crippling” him to the “point that [he] couldn’t walk.” (Id.) 

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Seven days later, Plaintiff “informed the morning nurse of the seriousness of the 

gout attack” by “showing her [his] elbow” and that he was “visibly limping and struggling 

to walk.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges the nurse “turned and walked off disregarding 

[his] please to be taken to medical for help. (Id.) Plaintiff then asked a “deputy for help” 

and was told that he “had an appointment coming up ‘next week.’” (Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted a grievance on August 31, 2017, “demanding to see the doctor 

for a ‘serious medical need.’” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this “grievance was read and 

signed, therefore acknowledged by the Nurse ARJIS #5703.” (Id.) The grievance was 

returned to Plaintiff with the notation that he “had an appointment coming up ‘this week.’” 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted another grievance on September 3, 2017 because he had “not 

seen the doctor yet in regards to [his] gout attack and [his] pleas to deputies were falling 

on deaf ears.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that they disregarded “the fact that [he] could 

barely walk and had extreme swelling” in his left elbow and foot. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he 

was told “it wasn’t serious enough.” (Id.) This grievance was “read and signed, therefore 

acknowledged by Nurse ARJIS #5890 and returned by Nurse 5150 stating that Plaintiff 

“had a doctor’s appointment coming up soon.” (Id.) 

Two days later, Plaintiff “asked a deputy to check on the appointment” and was told 

that he had an appointment scheduled for September 9, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was 

“still visibly limping and struggling to walk.” (Id.) Plaintiff “went to court” on September 

7, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff claims the “judge could clearly see the seriousness of [his] 

condition” and “ordered medical to evaluate and treat” Plaintiff’s medical needs. (Id.) 

Four days later, on September 11, 2017, Plaintiff “still had not seen a doctor.” (Id.) He 

submitted another grievance “letting GBDF medical know” that he still had not seen a 

doctor. (Id. at 7.) The grievance was returned to Plaintiff with the statement that he “had 

a court order to see the doctor on September 13, 2017.” (Id.)

However, on September 13, 2017, the day “came and went with no appointment or 

visit to the doctor.” (Id.) Plaintiff was forced to do a “man down” situation on September 

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16, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Young told him that if he “didn’t go back to 

[his] bunk he would take [Plaintiff] to the hole.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he “spoke with 

Deputy Whitney and Smith about the situation shortly after and was taken to medical in a 

wheelchair.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff had another “gout attack” on September 29, 2017 and “put in a medical 

request explaining [he] was having another gout attack in [his] left foot and could barely 

walk.” (Id.) This request was “returned four days later and signed by Nurse 5150 stating 

that [Plaintiff] had a doctor’s appointment coming up soon.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff 

claims that “appointment never came.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $12 million in compensatory 

and punitive damages against each of the named defendants. (See id. at 13, 15.)

C. Supervisory Defendants

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against supervisory defendants requires 

sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) to the extent he seeks relief 

under § 1983 against Defendants GBDF Facility Commander and GBDF Medical Director. 

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. 

Wash. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ketchum v. 

Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Second Amended Complaint

contains no factual allegations describing what these Defendants did, or failed to do, other 

than allegations that are “responsible for training, suspension, hiring, and conduct of 

defendants.” (SAC 4.) 

`To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold them liable for the actions of their subordinates, 

there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 

F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate indifference is a stringent standard 

of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious 

consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less 

stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would result in de facto respondeat 

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superior liability on municipalities . . . .’” (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

392 (1989))). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 

(9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”). A person deprives 

another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which 

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not stated a claim against 

these Defendants because he has failed to allege facts regarding what actions were taken 

or not taken by these Defendants which caused the alleged constitutional violations. See 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and vicarious liability will not attach under 

§ 1983.” (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978))).

D. County of San Diego

In addition, the Court finds Plaintiff’s SAC requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) to the extent it seeks relief under § 1983 against the County 

of San Diego. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color 

of state law.” Campbell, 671 F.3d at 842 n.5 (citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). Although the County of San Diego may be considered a 

“person” properly subject to suit under § 1983, it may be held liable only where Plaintiff 

alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or 

execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated” by the municipality, or a “final decision maker” for the municipality. 

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Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–04 

(1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In order to allege a claim of municipal liability, Plaintiff must include in his pleading 

enough “factual content” to support a reasonable inference to show that: (1) he was 

deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the county had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to 

deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th 

Cir. 1996); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 

1996). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation regarding the 

existence of a custom or policy. 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) against the County of San Diego because he has failed to allege any facts 

which “might plausibly suggest” that he was denied proper medical care pursuant to any 

municipal custom, policy, or practice implemented or promulgated with deliberate 

indifference to his constitutional rights, or that such a policy was the “moving force” or 

cause of his injury. See Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 

(“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable 

to the municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a 

plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of 

culpability and must demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the 

deprivation of federal rights.”)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim against 

Defendant County of San Diego, and that it is subject to sua sponte dismissal with respect 

to this Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

/ / /

/ / /

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E. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The remaining named Defendants are the various GBDF nurses who responded to 

Plaintiff’s grievances. Based on the allegations set forth in his SAC, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim based on a delay or denial of medical care. In order 

to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must 

satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 

constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth 

Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of 

two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc). 

Plaintiff must plead the existence of an objectively serious medical need. McGuckin, 

974 F.2d at 1059–60 (“The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would 

find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition 

that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical 

treatment.”). Assuming the SAC provides sufficient allegations of a serious medical need, 

it is clear, for the following reasons, the SAC fails to include any further “factual content” 

to show that any Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical 

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 

104). 

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The only individually named Defendants are the GPDF Nurses2 who responded to 

Plaintiff’s grievances. Plaintiff filed a grievance on August 31, 2017 indicating that he was 

having a “gout attack.” (SAC, Ex. 6, Inmate Grievance/Appeal dated Aug. 31, 2017.) The 

same day, Nurse ARJIS #5708 purportedly responds “sir, you are scheduled to see this 

doctor this week.” (Id.) On September 3, 2017, Defendant “Nurse ARJIS #5150” 

responded to Plaintiff’s grievance seeking medical care by indicating “you have a MDSC 

appt coming up soon, please do not refuse when called.” (Id., Ex. 7, Inmate 

Grievance/Appeal dated Sept. 3, 2017.) In this grievance, Plaintiff also purportedly

indicates that “after suffering for nearly 10 days with a gout attack it has subsided.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff later filed a grievance on September 11, 2017, which was responded to by a GBDF 

official3 on September 12, 2017 indicating that Plaintiff had a “court order to see the doctor 

9/13/17.” (Id., Ex. 8, Inmate Grievance/Appeal dated Sept. 12, 2017.) 

The SAC lacks any specific allegations that the Defendants, all of whom are alleged 

to have only responded to an administrative grievances, acted with deliberate indifference 

to his plight by “knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to his health and safety.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557. Plaintiff does not allege that the responses to the grievances were inadequate 

but rather that he did not receive the care that was indicated in the grievances themselves. 

However, this is insufficient to find an Eighth Amendment violation. See Peralta v. 

Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference claim arising from a physician’s response to a grievance where they relied on 

the medical opinions of staff who investigated the plaintiff’s “complaints and already 

signed off on the treatment plan”). While Plaintiff alleges that he was not seen by medical 

personnel, he does not allege any plausible factual allegations that any of the named 

 

2

 Plaintiff also names “Nurse ARJIS #7662” as a Defendant but there are no specific factual allegations 

contained in the body of the SAC as to this Defendant and it does not appear that this individual responded 

to any of Plaintiff’s grievances attached as exhibits to his SAC.

3

 The name and the ARJIS number for this individual is unreadable. (See SAC, Ex. 8.)

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Defendants were at all responsible for any delay in receiving care or had any direct 

knowledge that he did not receive any care. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 

1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Inadvertent failures to provide adequate medical care, mere negligence or medical 

malpractice, delays in providing care (without more), and differences of opinion over what 

medical treatment or course of care is proper, are all insufficient to constitute an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105–07; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 

(9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). 

If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs based on a delay in providing him with medication or treatment, or with the 

refusal to provide him with medical care, he must not rely on conclusory allegations, but 

must allege facts which show that the Defendants knew of and deliberately disregarded his 

serious medical needs. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837.

F. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless it 

is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

Therefore, the Court will grant him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in 

this Order or he may notify the Court of the intent to proceed as to the excessive force 

claims only. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s SAC for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

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relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date this Order is 

electronically docketed to file a Third Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies 

of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he choose 

to file a Third Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ. Local Rule 15.1; Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged 

in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”); Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file a Third Amended Complaint that still fails to state a claim, 

his case may be dismissed without further leave to amend. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix 

his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of 

the entire action.”).

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved civil rights complaint 

form to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2018

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