Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02450/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SVK 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jimmy Oram, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Mike Linderman, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-02450-PHX-FJM (BSB) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Jimmy Oram, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona Department 

of Corrections (ADC), brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Defendants Mike Linderman, Charles Manning, Wexford Health Services (Wexford), Dr. 

Thomas Bell, and Cameron Lewis, Facility Health Administrator (FHA). (Doc. 41, 

Second Amend. Compl. (SAC).) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the 

remaining claims—Counts I through III. (Doc. 72.) Defendants Wexford, Bell, and 

Lewis, who are Defendants in Count III only, cross-move for summary judgment.1

 (Doc. 

80.) Defendants Linderman and Manning, who are Defendants in Counts I and II only, 

file a separate cross-motion for summary judgment.2

 (Doc. 99.) 

 

1

 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 

952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 82.) 

2

 Counts I and II raise religious exercise claims under the First Amendment and 

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Court will 

address those Counts by separate Order. 

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 The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion on Count III, grant Defendants’ Motion on 

Count III, and dismiss the claim and Defendants Wexford, Bell, and Lewis. 

I. Background 

 In Count III, Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 

Defendants Wexford and Bell arbitrarily discontinued his diabetes medication and Lewis 

failed to correct the problem. Plaintiff claims that as a result of being denied the 

medication, he experienced vomiting, dizziness, fatigue, and general malaise. 

 In support of his Motion, Plaintiff submits his Statement of Facts (Doc. 73 (PSOF 

¶¶ 33-47)), his declaration (Doc. 74, Pl. Decl. ¶¶ 32-46), and various exhibits (Doc. 75, 

Exs. 12-18 (in part)). Defendants submit their Statement of Facts (Doc. 81 (DSOF)) and 

exhibits (id.). Plaintiff submits his reply and response (Doc. 86) and his Statement of 

Facts in Response to Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 87 (PSOFR)) with additional exhibits. 

Plaintiff also files a Motion for Leave to Authenticate Plaintiff’s Exs. B-E, which are 

attached to PSOFR; Defendants oppose. (Docs. 94, 102.) 

II. Summary Judgment Standard 

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial 

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 

record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the 

burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a material 

factual dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

 When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the 

judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine 

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whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of 

the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is 

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 248-49. 

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

III. Count III—Wexford Health Services, Dr. Bell, and Mr. Lewis 

A. Background Facts 

Wexford is the private company that during the relevant time period contracted 

with ADC to provide health care services to ADC inmates. (PSOF ¶ 33.) Dr. Bell and 

Mr. Lewis were employees of Wexford. (PSOF ¶¶ 34, 35; Doc. 81, Ex. 3, Bell Decl. ¶ 2, 

Ex. 9, Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) 

Plaintiff, who is housed at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, asserts 

that he is diabetic and takes Metformin. He claims that when he does not have his 

medication, his blood-sugar levels can rise dangerously. (PSOF ¶ 36.) Dr. Bell was 

Plaintiff’s treating physician and on June 4, 2012, ordered Plaintiff Metformin through 

December 2012. On November 17, 2012, Plaintiff stopped receiving the medication and 

began to experience mild symptoms within days. On November 25, he submitted a 

Health Needs Request (HNR) for medication. (PSOF ¶ 38.) The pharmacy advised 

Plaintiff on November 27 that the medication was discontinued. (PSOF ¶ 39; DSOF ¶ 

21.) 

 On December 4, 2012, in response to an inmate letter about the lack of 

medication, Plaintiff was advised by CO III Neu that he sent an email “to the FHA.” 

(PSOF ¶ 40.) When Plaintiff did not receive a further response, he filed a grievance. (Id.

¶ 41.) 

 Defendants concede that the medication was discontinued. (DSOF ¶ 23.) But 

they assert that in August of 2012, Dr. Bell left ASPC-Lewis and worked exclusively at 

ASPC-Florence and ASPC-Eyman and did not return to ASPC-Lewis until January 15, 

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2013. From August 2012 until January 15, 2013, Dr. Bell did not treat inmates at ASPCLewis. (Id.) After Dr. Bell left ASPC-Lewis, Dr. Erin Corridon, a temporary doctor who 

is not a Defendant, provided treatment to inmates at ASPC-Lewis. (Id. ¶ 17.) The 

pharmacy records show that Dr. Corridon renewed Plaintiff’s Metformin prescription on 

November 9, 2012 for six months but the quantity prescribed was zero. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23, Ex. 

5.) 

 On January 30, 2013, after his return to ASPC-Lewis, Bell examined Plaintiff, 

ordered tests, and prescribed two Metformin prescriptions. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40.) According to 

Defendants, one Metformin prescription was for 30 days, which Plaintiff received that 

day; the other prescription was for 17 days and was filled on February 19. (Id. ¶¶ 43-46.) 

Plaintiff disputes that he received his prescription on January 30. Instead, he asserts that 

he did not receive his medication until February 20. (PSOFR ¶ 38.) 

 Lewis first began working as Complex Manager on December 3, 2012 and his 

email was not set up until several days later. (DSOF ¶¶ 28-31, Ex. 9, Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 1, 

2.) He avers that he did not receive Plaintiff’s medical grievance until January 30, 2013, 

and scheduled an appointment for Plaintiff to see Dr. Bell that same day (DSOF ¶¶ 35-

36.) 

B. Legal Standards 

To prevail on a claim under the Eighth Amendment for prison medical care, a 

prisoner must demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure 

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain and (2) that the defendant’s response was deliberately 

indifferent. Id. To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of 

and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate 

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indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 But mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not 

support a claim under § 1983. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980). Inadequate treatment due to malpractice or even gross negligence does not 

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison 

medical personnel regarding an appropriate medical diagnosis or treatment are not 

enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 

332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 C. Discussion 

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. 

 1. Preliminary Issue—Plaintiff’s Motion to Authenticate and 

 Admissibility 

In his SAC, Plaintiff asserts policies or practices by Wexford and Bell of 

(1) arbitrarily discontinuing life-saving medications to save money and (2) failing to train 

staff to appropriately address inmates’ HNRs. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 5, 13.) 

Plaintiff submits four exhibits with the PSOFR that he moves to have 

authenticated. (Doc. 94; ref. Doc 87, Ex. B, “Written Cure Notification”; Ex. C, Wexford 

Organizational Chart; Ex. D, ADC Press Release; Ex. E, Inmate Letter Response.) 

Defendants object on grounds of admissibility and authentication. (Docs. 91, 102.) 

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit B is a letter, dated September 21, 2012, from the ADC to 

Wexford, designated a Written Cure Notification. (PSOFR ¶¶ 5, 16; Ex. B.) The 

document is self-authenticating. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(1). It contains the Arizona State 

Seal as well as the ADC Seal. Moreover, Defendants do not claim that the letter is not 

what it purports to be. (Doc. 102.) Plaintiff argues that the letter is admissible under 

Rule 803(6) and (8). (PSOFR ¶ 5.) Relying on this Cure-Notification letter, Plaintiff 

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further asserts that “according to ADC officials, ‘Wexford’s Regional and Corporate 

personnel,’ were aware that within just the first 6 weeks of the start of their contract more 

than ‘8350’ prisoner’s medications were discontinued and there weren’t enough medical 

personnel to meet their medical needs.” (Doc. 87 at 2.) In fact, this letter states that 

during August 2012, ADC conducted random reviews of prescriptions and learned that “a 

significant number of inmates may not have been receiving their medications as 

prescribed due to expired prescriptions and inappropriate renewals or refills. 

Approximately 8,358 prescriptions required review and potential renewal to ensure 

inmates receive their required medications.” (Id., Ex. B at 2) (Emphasis added.) The 

letter also alleges “inadequate staffing levels in multiple program areas at multiple 

locations.”3

 (Id. at 5.) Defendants object to the admissibility of the letter. (Doc. 91 at 3.) 

 The Court finds that although the letter is admissible to show that Wexford was on 

notice of alleged problems with medications, see e.g. U.S. v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1472 

(9th Cir. 1991), the allegations in the letter regarding the existence of those problems are 

not admissible against Wexford or any Wexford employee. That is, the allegations 

themselves are not evidence of a problem with medications. Those allegations are 

hearsay made in the context of a contract dispute between ADC and Wexford, and they 

are not admissible as admissions against Wexford under Federal Rule of Evidence 

801(d)(2). 

 In addition, Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in an admissible form to establish 

the existence of widespread problems with medications. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 

Only admissible evidence may be considered in ruling on a summary judgment motion. 

Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). While material produced at the 

summary judgment stage need not be in the form of admissible evidence, in order to 

create a genuine dispute of fact, a party must demonstrate at summary judgment that he 

can present evidence in support of the fact that would be admissible at trial. “At the 

 3

 Plaintiff does not raise an issue of understaffing in his SAC, so the Court will not 

consider it. See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (a 

party may not raise new claims in response to a summary judgment motion). 

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summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. 

We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 

1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding on summary judgment that that even if a diary was not 

admissible, it was sufficient if the contents of the diary were admissible where the 

contents were mere recitations of events within the plaintiff’s personal knowledge to 

which she could testify at trial); see also Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 

(9th Cir. 2001) (although a party need not produce at summary judgment evidence in a 

form that would be admissible at trial, it was an abuse of discretion to consider 

information in an affidavit that failed to set forth facts that would be admissible in 

evidence because it was not made on personal knowledge). 

 As the commentary to Rule 56(c)(2) states, “[t]he burden is on the proponent to 

show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is 

anticipated.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), Advisory comm. notes to 2010 Amendments. 

Plaintiff points to no evidence other than the Cure-Notification letter to establish the 

alleged widespread policy or practice of failing to provide medications. Plaintiff does not 

submit the underlying data referred to in the Cure-Notification letter that purports to form 

the basis of the allegations. He does not claim to have the data, and he does not identify 

other evidence in admissible form to prove a policy or practice of failing to provide 

medications. Moreover, discovery is closed. (Doc. 20, 67.) Thus, Plaintiff does not 

explain how he will present evidence on this point in a form that would be admissible. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Without admissible evidence, Plaintiff fails to create a 

genuine issue of disputed fact regarding such a policy. 

 The January 2013 News Release, which Plaintiff seeks to have authenticated, 

merely states that ADC and Wexford agreed to terminate the contract. (Doc. 87, Ex. D.) 

It contains no probative evidence regarding any issues in the case, and therefore the 

motion for authentication is denied. The Court will address the authentication of the 

remainder of the exhibits in question as they are relevant to the issues. 

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2. Defendants 

 a. Dr. Bell 

 The undisputed facts show that Dr. Bell prescribed Plaintiff’s Metformin on June

4, 2012 through December 2012. It is also undisputed that Bell was not at the ASPCLewis facility from August 2012 until January 15, 2013, and he did not treat ASPCLewis inmates during his absence. Plaintiff argues that it is irrelevant that Bell did not 

treat inmates because Bell was Wexford’s Medical Director, and under ADC policy, he 

was “accountable to ensure all inmates are provided access to health care.” (PSOFR ¶ 

16.) But there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore a 

defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff=s 

constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. 

Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Thus, Bell’s position as Medical Director is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as 

to his liability. Plaintiff’s motion to authenticate the organizational chart showing Bell as 

medical director at PSOFR, Ex. C is denied as moot.

 Nevertheless, as a supervisor, Bell could be deliberately indifferent if he “was 

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection 

exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Lolli 

v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003). The requisite causal connection 

can be established in a number of ways: the plaintiff may show that the supervisor 

knowingly refused to terminate acts by others that he knew or should have known would 

inflict a constitutional injury; that he acquiesced in a constitutional deprivation by 

subordinates; or that he exhibited a reckless or callous indifference to the prisoner’s 

constitutional rights. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Dubner v. City of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 

(9th Cir. 2011).

 Plaintiff suggests that Bell was aware of the “expired medication issue” because 

on September 21, 2012, ADC provided Wexford the Cure-Notification letter. (PSOFR ¶¶ 

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5, 16; Ex. B.) First, as noted, the allegations in the letter are inadmissible hearsay as to 

“expired prescriptions and inappropriate renewals or refills.” Second, there is no 

evidence that Bell ever saw the letter or otherwise knew about the alleged problem; Bell 

is not listed as a recipient of the letter. And although Plaintiff alleged in his SAC that it 

was Bell’s policy, he offers no evidence to support the claim. Instead, Plaintiff admits 

that Bell prescribed Metformin for Plaintiff. 

Bell attests that after he returned to ASPC-Lewis, he examined Plaintiff on 

January 30, ordered tests, and prescribed Metformin that same day. However, Plaintiff 

asserts that he did not receive his medication until February 20—20 days later. (PSOFR 

¶ 38.) He further states that “though Bell filled out the prescription[,] . . . he never 

processed it or followed up on it.” (Id.) 

But Plaintiff provides no evidence that Bell failed to “process” the prescription; he 

does not explain what he means by this conclusory allegation and offers no evidence that 

Bell had a duty to follow-up on the prescription absent a complaint from Plaintiff 

regarding non-receipt of his medication. Plaintiff’s speculation is not evidence of Bell’s 

deliberate indifference. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 

In sum, there is no evidence that Bell was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

medical needs. Bell actually prescribed Plaintiff Metformin on two occasions and was 

otherwise absent and not treating Plaintiff during the relevant timeframe. Summary 

judgment is granted in favor of Bell. 

 2. Lewis 

It is undisputed that Lewis is an administrator; he held the title of Complex 

Manager, formerly known as the FHA. Plaintiff alleges that under ADC regulations, 

Lewis had the duty to investigate medical grievances and correct problems in a timely 

manner. (PSOF ¶ 35.) Plaintiff asserts that Lewis knew for almost two months that the 

medication had been stopped but took no action to remedy the situation. (PSOFR ¶ 37.) 

 Lewis asserts that he started working at ASPC-Lewis on December 3, 2012, and 

that his e-mail was not set up until several days later. (DSOF, Ex. 9, Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 1, 

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2.) Plaintiff disputes the date of the e-mail set-up, arguing that CO III Neu stated in his 

December 1, 2012 response to Plaintiff’s inmate letter, that he sent an e-mail “to the 

FHA” regarding the medical issues. (PSOFR ¶ 28.) But even assuming that Neu’s 

statement is admissible to show Neu sent an e-mail to FHA, the statement is ambiguous 

as to when the e-mail was sent, and provides no evidence as to when or whether Lewis 

actually received the e-mail. The Court finds that PSOFR, exhibit E is irrelevant to the 

question of whether Lewis actually received an e-mail notification. Plaintiff’s motion to 

authenticate exhibit E is denied as moot. 

 Plaintiff filed a grievance directed to Neu on December 19, writing “Emergency” 

at the top. (DSOF, Ex. 11 (Doc. 81-1 at 40)) It is stamped as received in the Health Unit 

on December 27. (Id.) Plaintiff speculates that the grievance was therefore processed 

and delivered to Lewis as an emergency medical grievance. (PSOFR ¶ 34.) But 

Plaintiff’s speculation is not evidence that the grievance was received earlier by the 

Health Unit and then delivered to Lewis. Instead, protocol at ASPC-Lewis required that 

medical emergencies were to be conveyed by the CO III to medical staff, not to 

administrative staff such as Lewis. 

 Lewis attests that to the best of his recollection he did not become aware of the 

grievance until January 30, 2013. (DSOF, Ex. 9 ¶ 6.) The grievance is not addressed to 

Lewis and there is no evidence to contradict Lewis’s claim. Once Lewis received 

Plaintiff’s grievance on January 30, 2013, Lewis acted to ensure that Plaintiff received 

appropriate medical treatment by scheduling an appointment with Dr. Bell the very same 

day. (DSOF 37). 

 In sum, there is insufficient probative evidence to show that Lewis was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, in other words that he was aware of 

Plaintiff’s medication issue prior to late January and, knowing of a risk to Plaintiff, failed 

to take action. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If a prison 

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated 

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the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”). Summary judgment is granted 

in favor of Lewis. 

 3. Wexford 

It is well established that although municipalities and local governmental units can 

be sued under § 1983, they cannot be held liable solely because they employed a 

tortfeasor; that is, they cannot be liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The requirements of Monell apply to 

§ 1983 suits against private entities acting under color of law. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. 

Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). 

 A plaintiff can establish private-entity liability by proving “that a[n] . . . employee 

committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal [entity] policy or 

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the 

. . . entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff must also 

prove that the policy caused the constitutional violation. Id. In his SAC, Plaintiff alleged 

that Wexford began deliberately discontinuing life-saving medications to save money. 

(Doc. 40, SAC, Count III, ¶ 5.) 

 But as noted, Plaintiff provides no admissible evidence of such a policy. In 

contrast, two Wexford doctors prescribed Plaintiff’s Metformin during the relevant time 

period, and Bell renewed the prescription immediately upon his return to ASPC-Lewis. 

Moreover, Defendants provide evidence that throughout the relevant timeframe, Plaintiff, 

continued to receive medications for all of his other conditions, including hypertension, 

cholesterol, and hypokalemia. (DSOF ¶¶ 49-52.) Providing such medications is 

inconsistent with the policy alleged by Plaintiff. At most, non-receipt of the Metformin 

was an isolated exception to Plaintiff’s overall treatment, and there was no “purposeful 

act” or “failure to respond” to Plaintiff’s medical needs. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Mere negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Wood, 900 

F.2d at 1334. 

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 Additionally, there is insufficient probative evidence that “expired medication 

renewal” was the “moving force” behind Plaintiff’s non-receipt of his Metformin, 

particularly since he received numerous other medications for other conditions during the 

same period. See Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Wexford was understaffed and that there was no 

pharmacy in the complex. (Doc. 86 at 3.) Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence of 

these allegations. But even if true, these allegations are beyond the scope of the SAC, 

and there is no proof that understaffing or lack of the pharmacy in the complex caused the 

discontinuation of the medication. 

 Plaintiff fails to establish that the interruption in receipt of his medication was 

caused by a policy or practice of Wexford or that Wexford was otherwise deliberately 

indifferent to his medical needs. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Wexford. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment on Count III (Doc. 72), Defendants Wexford, Bell, and Lewis’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 

Authenticate Plaintiff’s Exs. B-E (Doc. 94). 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III (Doc. 72) is denied; 

the Clerk of Court is directed to ensure that the docket reflects that Plaintiff’s Motion is 

still pending as to Counts I and II. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Authenticate Plaintiff’s Exs. B-E (Doc. 94) 

is denied as moot. 

 (4) Defendants Wexford, Bell, and Lewis’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 80) is granted; the claim in Count III is dismissed with prejudice and 

Defendants Wexford, Bell, and Lewis are dismissed. 

... 

... 

... 

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 (5) The remaining claims are Counts I and II against Linderman and Manning. 

 Dated this 9th day of June, 2014. 

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