Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00326/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MIGUEL A. SOTO, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-00326 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On or about February 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on August 28, 2009.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. As of

October 29, 2009, Petitioner has not filed a pleading in reply

to the answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

On August 26, 1999, Petitioner was indicted by a

Maricopa County grand jury on one count of second degree murder.

See Answer, Exh. A. On or about February 5, 2001, Petitioner

entered into a written plea agreement allowing him to plead

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guilty to one count of manslaughter. Id., Exh. B. In the

written plea agreement the state stipulated that Petitioner

would not be sentenced to a term of more than 20 years

imprisonment. Id., Exh. B. On June 26, 2001, Petitioner was

sentenced to an aggravated term of 15 years imprisonment

pursuant to his guilty plea to one count of manslaughter. Id.,

Exh. D. 

Petitioner timely initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the first appeal “of right” for an Arizona defendant

who pleads guilty to the charges against them. See id., Exh. E.

In his action for post-conviction relief Petitioner asserted:

(1) his sentence was improperly predicated on erroneous

information; (2) there were misrepresentations in the criminal

history related in the presentence report; and (3) he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. See id., Exh. F. The state

trial court denied relief. The state court summarily concluded

Petitioner had failed to present a colorable claim for relief.

See id., Exh. G. Petitioner sought review of this decision by

the Arizona Court of Appeals which denied review on August 8,

2003. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner did not seek review of the

denial of relief by the Arizona Supreme Court.

More than five years later, on November 19, 2008,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Appeals

Court, however, he did not file a successive Rule 32 petition in

the Maricopa County Superior Court. See id., Exh. I. The Court

of Appeals denied review, concluding that the successive

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Petition for Review was untimely filed. Id., Exh. I. 

On February 17, 2009, Petitioner filed his pending

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner contends he is

entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because, he

argues, the state trial court erred by sentencing him in

violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on prisoners

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions.

See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002).

The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of

the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2009). See also Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

397 (2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the conclusion of his first action for state

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of

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limitations began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32

of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action on August 8, 2003. Therefore,

allowing for the time Petitioner could have sought review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run

on or about September 10, 2003, and expired on or about

September 11, 2004. See Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th

Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).

Compare Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir.

2007); Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2008).

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action until

February 17, 2009, more than four years after the statute of

limitations expired. The action initiated by Petitioner in the

state courts in 2008 could not and did not restart the alreadyexpired statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

claims. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir.

2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

A state-court petition that is filed after the expiration of the

statute of limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the

running of the limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135,

1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408

(6th Cir. 2001).

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated

that the Court should still determine whether a section 2254

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

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failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not responded to the assertion that his

habeas claims are not timely. Petitioner does not offer the

Court a reason why equitable tolling might be warranted in his

circumstance. Petitioner has not established that he is

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

because he has not presented evidence of due diligence or a

factor outside the defense which resulted in his failure to

timely file his habeas action.

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Soto’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

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service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 30th day of October, 2009.

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