Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00375/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00375-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE AZEVEDO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

CITY OF FRESNO, CITY OF FRESNO )

POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER )

KARR, and DOES 1 through 10, )

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

 1:09-CV-375 AWI DLB

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 26, 32)

 This case arises from the detention and arrest of Plaintiff Lawrence Azevedo by Fresno

police officer Defendant Nathan Carr (“Carr”) while Azevedo was staying at a residence on

Weldon Avenue. Azevedo has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Carr and the City of

Fresno (“the City”). After dismissal of claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment, Azevedo

alleges violations of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures, including excessive force. Azevedo also alleges Monell liability against the City. Both

parties move for summary judgment on the issue of Carr’s seizure of Azevedo, including Carr’s

entry into the Weldon residence’s front yard. Additionally, Defendants move for summary

judgment on Azevedo’s Monell liability claims, while Azevedo moves for sanctions based on the

City’s alleged spoliation of evidence. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on Azevedo’s seizure entry and seizure claims, grant and deny

summary judgment on various Monell issues, and grant Azevedo a permissive inference jury

instruction based on spoliation of evidence by the City.

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 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

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At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 7, 2007, Carr was in a marked police car with

his partner, Officer Juan Avila (“Avila”). See DUMF 12; PUMF 1. Both Carr and Avila were in

uniform and identifiable as police officers. DUMF 35. The officers observed an illegally parked

motorcycle in front of 2105 E. Weldon Avenue (hereinafter, “the Property”). See DUMF 12;

PUMF 1. Carr declares he recognized the motorcycle from a prior contact on October 26, 2007. 

See PUMF 2; DUMF 12. He also recognized the helmet as looking the same as the one on the

rider in the prior contact. DUMF 12. 

Carr informed Avila that he had observed the same motorcycle approximately 12 days

earlier in the vicinity, when he pulled behind it, ran the plates and noted the tags were expired by

more than one year. DUMF 13. Specifically, on October 26, 2007, while assigned to uniformed

patrol duties and driving a marked police vehicle, Carr pulled behind a motorcycle and ran the

plates. DUMF 10. The tags were expired in excess of one year. Id. Carr intended to make a

traffic stop due to the expired tags. Id. The motorcycle quickly stopped, pulling up on the

sidewalk before Carr initiated the stop. Id. Carr was in uniform and immediately exited his

vehicle and waved the rider over. Id. The rider looked at Carr and then sped off driving

recklessly, jumping the curb, speeding, and failing to stop for stop signs. Id. Fresno Police

Department Event Report 07BO520 details the October 26, 2007, event and lists the registered

owner of the motorcycle as Alexander Renteria. DUMF 11. However, Azevedo was not the 2

“DUMF” refers to Defendants’ undisputed material fact; “PUMF” refers to Plaintiff’s undisputed material

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facts; “PAUMF” refers to Plaintiff’s additional undisputed material facts. Additionally, the parties make many

objections to various pieces of evidence/proposed facts. To the extent that the Court utilizes such evidence/proposed

facts, any objections thereto are deemed overruled.

Citing page 45, lines 10 to 21 of his deposition testimony, Azevedo contends that this incident never

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occurred. Those lines, plus testimony into page 46, read:

Q: Prior to your arrest . . . on November 7, 2007, do you remember an incident where you were riding the

motorcycle, and an officer followed you, and you pulled over and the officer pulled over and got out of his

vehicle and then you drove away from the scene?

A: No.

Q: That never happened?

A: Not with me. Not with me.

Q: Who else would have been riding that motorcycle besides you?

A: Nobody. So it wasn’t my motorcycle.

Mr. Fattahi: I’m going to interpose an objection. Vague as to time.

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driver of the motorcycle on October 26, 2007. See Footnote 2, supra. 

Looking at the motorcycle and the helmet, Carr recalled that the registration was expired

by over a year, and that the driver had evaded his original attempt to initiate a traffic stop. 

DUMF 14. The license plate of the motorcycle involved in the prior incident matched that of the

one parked in front of the Property. DUMF 15. Officer Carr confirmed again that the

registration had expired. DUMF 17. He examined the motorcycle and could not locate a VIN

number. Id.; see also PUMF 4. A tow truck was dispatched to impound the motorcycle since 3

the tags were expired and the VIN could not be located. DUMF 17; see also PUMF 3. 

Regulations allowed Carr to impound the motorcycle without contacting the owner. PUMF 38.

Q: Well, in October of 2007, who else would have been riding that motorcycle besides you?

A: Well - -

. . . . .

A: I don’t even remember that date for number one. But it wasn’t – it wasn’t – I know I wasn’t driving

– I didn’t have no altercations with the cops because I always stayed – because I knew the tags were

bad, I always, like, didn’t cause attention. I’ve never been – I’ve never had no cops behind me or any

of that, because I wouldn’t drive fast, or I wouldn’t do nothing against the law because I knew my

tags were bad. So I mean –

Q: So you knew you were driving with expired tags?

A: Yes, ma’am. I’m not saying the chase or any kind of officer trying to pull a bike over. I’m just

saying it wasn’t mine, so - -

Azevedo Depo. 45:10-46:19. Additionally, on the night of November 7, 2007, Azevedo was in possession of a

Suzuki motorcycle which he received from Alex Renteria. DUMF 16. Azevedo testified that he could not remember

how long he had been riding the motorcycle prior to November 7, 2007. See Azevedo Depo. 38:1-14. Azevedo

could not say if he had been riding the motorcycle for a day, a week, or a month. See id. at 38:12-21.

The Court is not persuaded that a genuine dispute exists. Once Azevedo was questioned about a particular

time frame (October 2007), Azevedo stated that he did not remember that “date”/time frame. Azevedo then stated

that the driver was not him. He later appears to state that he is not disputing that an officer attempted to pull a bike

over, it just was not his. Additionally, Azevedo does not address the authenticity of the police report dated October

26, 2007. Further, Azevedo has not shown that Carr did not tell Avila that Carr recognized the bike from a previous

encounter. Finally, Azevedo could provide no time frame in which he had been riding Renteria’s motorcycle. In

other words, Azevedo may well started driving the bike after October 26, 2007. In light of the October 26, 2007,

police report, Avila’s testimony of Carr’s conversation with him, Azevedo’s lack of recollection regarding October

2007, and Azevedo’s inability to provide any time frame whatsoever in which he had been riding Renteria’s

motorcycle (other than November 7, 2007), the evidence indicates that on October 26, 2007, Carr saw a bike with

the same plates as the one in front of the Property, but the driver of that motorcycle was not Azevedo. Azevedo’s

testimony, especially his inability to establish any time frame in which he had been riding the motorcycle, is not

sufficient to create a genuine disputed issue of material fact regarding the October 26, 2007, encounter.

Azevedo disputes this fact by stating that the motorcycle’s VIN was noted on the FPD Vehicle Inventory

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Report form, dated November 7, 2007. See Fattahi Opp. Dec. Exh. D. However, Defendants rightly point out that

there is no indication of how the VIN was found or determined. That another officer, having unknown experience

and knowledge and using unknown methods, was later able to locate a VIN does not change the fact that Carr was

unable to do so. Without evidence that the VIN was easily detectable or sufficiently legible or otherwise “in plain

sight,” that another officer located the VIN does not sufficiently contradict that Carr was unable to do so.

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Carr looked up prior attachments for the Property on the patrol car’s computer before

exiting the car. See PUMF 5. Carr reviewed an entry from October 9, 2007. PUMF 6. In the

upper third portion of the entry it is noted that “resd is vacant.” Fattahi Dec. Exh. H. In the

officer’s notes at the bottom of the entry, it was noted that: the Property was rented to a tenant

named “Anita Bernal,” it “appears that the resident has not been home,” it “appears that the

resident may be out of town or gone.” See PUMF 7; Fattahi Dec. Exh. H. When asked about

this entry, Carr testified that “that the owner of the house was reporting the residence was vacant

and it appeared the homeowner had moved out.” Carr Depo. 32:2-4. Avila testified that he

recalled the entry as indicating that the Property was “possibly vacant.” Avila Depo. 11:15-18.

The Property was surrounded by a waist high spiked, wrought iron fence. See PUMF 20;

DUMF 26. The fence looks sturdy, but the iron bars appear to be thin and there are significant

spaces/gaps between the bars; as such, the fence does not prevent people from seeing the

Property and the front yard. See Carr Dec. Exh. D. The iron fence is a modest distance from the

house. PUMF 21. The iron fence has two gates, one in front and one on the west side of the

house (“west-gate”). See Carr Depo. 38:7-19. Both gates had locking mechanisms. See PUMF

24. The front gate is directly across from the house’s front door, and there is a cement pathway

that leads from the front gate to the front door. See Carr Dec. Exh. D. The west-gate opened to

the backyard and led to the street and to a detached garage. See Carr Depo. 38:9-39:2; Avila

Depo. 18:16-19:3. The owner of the Property, Jose Coria (“Coria”), had the iron fence installed

for the safety of his family after a man tried to break in. See PUMF 23. Further, there was a

wooden fence, which had a wooden gate, that separated the front yard from the backyard. See

Carr Depo. 38:23-39:10; PUMF 32. The gate of the wood fence that separated the front yard

from the back yard had a reflective sign on it that warned, “BEWARE OF DOG.” PUMF 33. 

The mailbox was outside of the front fence. PUMF 22.

On November 7, 2007, the wood gate separating the front yard from the back yard was

open, but the west-gate to the street was closed. PUMF 32. There was “a lot” of dog waste 4

DUMF 21 indicates that the west-gate was open, while PUMF 32 indicates that the west-gate was shut.

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The dispute is immaterial for this order. For ease, the Court will view the west-gate as being closed.

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everywhere outside the house, including the front yard. PUMF 31. The front iron gate was

completely closed that night. PUMF 42. Azevedo always kept the gate locked by wrapping a

tire chain around it so it could not be pried up. PUMF 43. Carr and Avila testified that a metal 5

chain, similar to a “bike chain,” was wrapped or draped around the front gate to prevent the gate

from swinging open. See Avila Depo. 21:21-22:14; Carr Depo. 45:17-47:15. Carr testified that

the front gate’s lock mechanism did not work. See Carr Depo. 46:22-47:2.

As Carr and Avila continued their investigation, they observed that the Property had

overgrown vegetation and appeared to be vacant. DUMF 21. The house’s front metal security 6 7

screen door was wide open. Id. Although the wood front door appeared closed, PUMF 34, the

officers also noticed that the front door appeared significantly damaged with a hole where the

doorknob and lock set should have been. DUMF 21. There were newspaper and cloth/curtains

covering some of the front windows. Id.; PUMF 35. Several other windows had no coverings. 

See Carr Depo. 35:21-22; Carr Dec. Exh. D. A low light could be seen through the paper and

around the corners of the windows. DUMF 21. At this point the officers were concerned that 8

there was a possible burglary or unlawful trespass, in addition to the original

concerns about the motorcycle, i.e. the motorcycle may have been stolen. See DUMF 24;

Azevedo kept the front gate secured with a chain for his safety, to keep his dog from getting loose, and to

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keep Coria out. See Coria Depo. 28:10-14; Azevedo Depo. 53:7-19, 54:23-55:1. Azevedo also submits that, every

time Coria came to the Property, the front gate was always locked. See PUMF 25. However, Defendants rightly

objects that the deposition testimony does not describe how the gate was locked, how often Coria would go to the

Property, or even when Coria last went to the Property. The Court will not consider PUMF 25.

At his deposition, Carr testified that the “grass was overgrown, it was growing up along the edge fo the

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house.” Carr Depo. 48:2-7. Azevedo contends that the grass on the lawn was normal, and relies on the picture of the

house and on Coria’s testimony that he did not have to pull weeds or large amounts of grass from the yard.

However, the photograph of the lawn grass is generally inconclusive, but grass does appear to be growing up the

edge of the house. As for Coria’s testimony, he does not say when he trimmed the yard, and he testified that he did

not recall how the grass appeared on November 7. In light of the color photograph of the Property, the Court will

view the term “overgrown” as meaning grass was growing along/up the side of the house.

Azevedo disputes portions of DUMF 21 through citation to recorded statements by Avila and Carr made

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during an internal affairs investigation. The Court does not believe that a genuine dispute exists. The gist of

Azevedo’s argument is that some of the assertions made by Carr and Avila in this motion were not made during the

interviews. The Court does not see contradicting, “sham” testimony by the officers that would cause it to disregard

the deposition testimony. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991).

It was later determined that the light emanated from the fireplace. See Carr Depo. 43:7-10; PUMF 36.

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PUMF’s 39, 41, 70. Based on the previous incident with the motorcycle, the expired registration

and the apparent lack of a VIN number, as well as the possibility of a burglary or squatting or

unlawful trespass, the officers decided to make contact at the location, to attempt to find the

owner of the motorcycle, and to investigate the security of the residence. See DUMF 23.9

Carr and Avila decided to enter the property and then approach the front door. See

PUMF 40. Carr never considered getting a warrant and did not attempt to contact Coria before

entering. PUMF’s 44, 48. Carr removed the chain from the iron fence gate, and the officers 10

went through the gate towards the front door. See PUMF’s 50, 52. Removing the chain and

opening the front gate was the only way to get into the front yard aside from attempting to hop

the spiked fence. PUMF 51. After entering the gate and upon approaching the front door, the 11

officers noticed locking mechanism pieces, which appeared consistent with both the wood front

door and metal screen door, laying on the porch and in the flower bed. DUMF 28. Carr also 12

noticed a glove next to the broken lock which is consistent with someone unlawfully entering a

house. DUMF 29. Neither Carr nor Avila announced their presence verbally before they 13

reached the front door. PUMF 53. 

At the porch, Carr looked through a hole in the wood front door into the living room. See

PUMF 54. Avila was standing on the grass in front of the house, one foot east of the path

leading to the porch stairs and front door. PUMF 59. In an attempt to investigate and make

contact with whomever was in the residence, Carr knocked on the wood front door. See DUMF

DUMF 23 is undisputed because the arguments Azevedo uses to dispute it have already been discussed and

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rejected.

After the incident, officers called Coria using the cell phone number that was listed on the prior

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attachment at the residence on October 9. PUMF 49.

Defendants dispute this fact by arguing that “a side gate,” which the Court takes to mean the west-gate,

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provided access. However, Carr and Avila both indicated that the west-gate led to the backyard, not the frontyard.

See Carr Depo. 38:20-25; Avila Depo. 18:21-19:3. PUMF 51 is undisputed.

Azevedo disputes this DUMF by arguing that it was dark outside and Carr claimed not to have noticed

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dog feces in the yard. Neither contention actually disputes DUMF 28.

Azevedo disputes the DUMF in part by arguing that “Carr was asked what he saw before approaching the

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residence and he did not mention seeing a glove.” However, the DUMF indicates that Carr saw the glove after he

entered the front yard, not before. DUMF 29 is undisputed.

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30. The wood front door immediately swung open since it was not secured, and Carr for the 14

first time announced, “Fresno Police.” See DUMF 30; PUMF’s 55, 56; Carr Depo. 43:20-24. 

Once the door opened, a large dog immediately began to growl and bark, and advanced

on Avila in an aggressive and threatening manner. DUMF 31. See Carr drew his gun and

backed up. PUMF 57. Avila back-peddled away from the dog. See PUMF 60. While Carr was

yelling at the dog, Azevedo came outside the threshold of the front door, and Carr told him to get

his dog. PUMF 61; see also DUMF 31. Azevedo called his dog, and it stopped in its tracks and

turned, then Azevedo heard a gunshot. PUMF 62. Avila fired a shot at the dog in response to 15

the dog’s aggression. See DUMF 31. The bullet impacted the step just below the porch in front

of the threshold of the front door, and the dog was not injured. See DUMF 31; PUMF 64. Avila

shot at Azevedo’s dog while the dog was on the grass near the porch steps, and Azevedo was on

the porch by the threshold of the front door. See PUMF 63; Carr Depo. 61:8-17. Azevedo then

walked down and grabbed his dog. PUMF 65; DUMF 32. Carr told Azevedo to put the dog in

the house and close the door. PUMF 66. Azevedo picked up the dog and took it inside the

house. PUMF 67; DUMF 32. However, the door was still not secured. DUMF 32.16

Because of their concerns about Azevedo’s dog and their safety, the officers asked

Azevedo to step outside the gate and ordered him to sit on the curb. See DUMF 33; PUMF 68; 17

Azevedo Depo. 81:22-25. Carr told Plaintiff twice to sit down on the sidewalk in front of the

gate. PUMF 69. Requesting that Azevedo take a seat on the curb was consistent with taught and

Azevedo disputes DUMF 30 by arguing that Carr and Avila intended to “detain and/or arrest” him.

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Azevedo cites PUMF’s 68 through 71. These PUMF’s involve Carr telling Azevedo to walk outside the gate and sit

on the curb (PUMF’s 68, 69), the offenses that Carr was investigating (PUMF 70), and that Carr and Avila believed

that they had detained Azevedo (PUMF 71). However, these facts do not take into account the encounter with dog

after the door opened, do not address the officers’ intent, and three of the facts (68, 69, and 71) do not address the

“pre-knock” time frame. DUMF 30 is undisputed.

There is a dispute whether the dog had stopped at the time that the shot was fired. For purposes of this

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motion, it does not matter whether the dog had stopped when Avila fired, as no damages are sought for the gunshot.

Azevedo disputes this fact by stating the dog remained in the house until animal control arrived.

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However, that the dog remained in the house does not change the fact that the door was not secured, especially since

the door appeared to be missing its handle and lock.

Azevedo takes issue with the word “asked.” However, since the officers do not dispute that they had

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detained/seized Azevedo, whether the officers “asked” or “ordered” is of no consequence.

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trained police practices, as a matter of Azevedo’s safety and the safety of the officers. See

DUMF 34. The officers believed that they had detained Azevedo and that he was not free to go

about his business. See PUMF 71. Azevedo was being detained while the officers investigated a

possible burglary, trespass, squatting, and stolen motorcycle. See DUMF 37; PUMF 70. 

Azevedo did not sit at the curb very long before he attempted to flee by running down the

street. See DUMF 36; PUMF 72; PAUMF 66. Carr told Azevedo to keep his hands visible. See

DUMF 39. Avila inquired whether Azevedo had any weapons in his possession, and Azevedo 18

jumped up and ran. Id. Azevedo did not recall being asked questions by the officers. 

See Azevedo Depo. 90:13-91:2. 

While fleeing from the officers, Carr deployed his department issued taser on Azevedo,

after which Azevedo was taken into custody. DUMF 41. It appears Azevedo was tasered while

he was on cement or concrete. See Azevedo Depo. 95:1-4. Azevedo suffered multiple facial

fractures and injuries, which required surgery the insertion of metal plates into his face. See 19

PAUMF’s 76, 115, 116, 117. Carr testified that he deployed the Taser while running after

Azevedo at full speed. See PAUMF 69. Carr had been gaining on Azevedo. See Ramirez Depo.

at 27-28. Azevedo was neither assaultive nor combative, and Carr never saw anything that

looked like a weapon in Azevedo’s possession before deploying the taser. See PAUMF’s 70, 71.

Both officers believed that they had probable cause to arrest Azevedo for violation of

Penal Code § 148. DUMF 41. Part of the reason Azevedo ran from the officers was because he

was in possession of methamphetamine. See DUMF 40. Azevedo had probably taken

methamphetamine within 24 hours of his arrest. See DUMF 43; Azevedo Depo. 60:2-7. After

placing Azevedo under arrest, Carr found drugs and drug paraphernalia. PAUMF 77; DUMF 44.

Although Azevedo was arrested for violations of Penal Code § 148(a)(1), Health and Safety

There is a genuine dispute whether Azevedo was reaching into his waistband – Carr declares yes, but

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Azevedo testified no. Also, Azevedo disputes whether Carr told him to keep his hands visible and whether Avila

asked if he had weapons. However, the testimony cited by Azevedo simply states that Azevedo did not recall being

asked questions. Of particular note, when asked whether he remembered the officers asking about weapons,

Azevedo replied, “No. I don’t recall it, but I ran right away too.” Azevedo Depo. 90:23-91:2. In these

circumstances, Azevedo’s lack of recollection does not adequately dispute whether Avila asked about weapons.

There is a dispute as to whether additional force was used against Azevedo. However, Azevedo’s

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excessive force claims are not at issue in this motion.

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Code § 11377(a), and Business and Professions Code § 4140, see DUMF 45, no criminal charges

were ever filed against Azevedo arising out of this event. See PAUMF 78. 

On the night of November 7, Azevedo had been asleep in the front bedroom of the house

with his dog. See PUMF 15; DUMF 1. Although he could not recall for how long, see DUMF 1,

Azevedo had been staying at the Property for more than one day before November 7. See PUMF

14. Coria (the owner) rented the Property to Anita Abraham. See PUMF 12. Azevedo testified

that Abraham asked him to stay at the Property and watch her belongings while she was

incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail. See Azevedo Depo. 49:4-14; PUMF 13; DUMF 2. Coria

had begun eviction proceedings against Abraham, but he did not know whether the eviction 

process had been completed as of November 7, 2007. See Coria Depo. 25:5-26:1. Azevedo

testified that he would not leave the Property until either Abraham “got out of jail” or Coria “did

it the legal way of evicting.” Azevedo Depo. 54:6-8. Azevedo did not pay rent, did not receive

mail at the Property, and Coria had told Azevedo to leave. See DUMF’s 3, 4, 5. At the time of

the incident, Azevedo’s “more permanent” residence was a motor home that was parked in front

of his friend’s house. See DUMF 7; Azevedo Opp. Dec. ¶ 3. With the possible exception of

some socks and a shirt, Azevedo’s clothes were at his motor home and not at the Property. See

DUMF 8; Azevedo Opp. Dec. ¶ 2. Aside from a motorcycle helmet, some socks, and a shirt,

Azevedo cannot identify any items that belonged to him that were at the Property on the night of

the incident. See DUMF 9; Azevedo Opp. Dec. ¶ 2.

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v.

American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary

judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of

identifying the portions of the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);

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Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings

Assn, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002). A dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant

must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of

proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of

evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim. See James River Ins.

Co. v. Schenk, P.C., 519 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984; Nissan Fire

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails

to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has no obligation to produce

anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the

moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish

that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. The

opposing party cannot “‘rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading’ but must

instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)). 

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Stegall v. Citadel Broad,

Inc., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air,

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and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference

may be drawn. See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2008);

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of

material fact does not spring into being simply because a litigant claims that one exists or

promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d

15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007);

Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a

“motion for summary judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or

‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427

F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the court has the discretion in appropriate

circumstances to consider materials that are not properly brought to its attention, but the court is

not required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact

where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. See

Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmen v. San

Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails

to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is

entitled to summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103.

I. DETENTION OF AZEVEDO

A. Azevedo’s Standing

Plaintiff’s Argument

Azevedo argues that he has standing to challenge the entry into the Property’s curtilage. 

Azevedo was an overnight guest of the Property’s renter, Abraham. That Coria was the

landlord/renter does not matter, nor does it matter that Anita may have been behind in her rent. 

As an overnight guest of Abraham, Azevedo had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

Property, and thus has standing. 

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue that Azevedo had no legitimate expectation of privacy. Although

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Azevedo claims he was an overnight guest, he does not know how long he was there, did not pay

rent, did not receive mail, lived in a motorhome, and had his clothes in the motorhome. Azevedo

has no verification that he was authorized to stay at the house. His bald assertion that he was an

overnight guest is insufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. 

Legal Standard

A person who claims that a search violated the Fourth Amendment bears the burden of

proving that the search was illegal and that the person had a legitimate expectation of privacy in

the thing searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); United States v. $40,955.00

in U.S. Currency, 554 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 2009). The expectation of privacy must be

actually/subjectively held and must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); $40,955.00, 554 F.3d at 756. A person’s “status

as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home

that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97

(1990); see Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a person’s bald

assertion, without more, that he is an overnight guest is insufficient to establish his actual status

an overnight guest. See United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Discussion

The evidence presented is insufficient for the Court to decide as a matter of law whether

Azevedo has standing to challenge the officers’ entry into the Property’s yard. Azevedo claims

that he was the overnight guest of Abraham, who rented the Property. A person may be the guest

of a lessee/renter and have a legitimate expectation of privacy as the lessee’s/renter’s guest. See

Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 533; United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Azevedo had some socks, a shirt, a motorcycle helmet, and his dog at the house. Azevedo was

also able to exclude the owner of the Property, Coria, from entering the yard and the Property. 

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See Azevedo Depo. 53:7-19; PUMF 29. Coria’s testimony and Azevedo’s testimony indicate 20

that Azevedo had stayed in the house longer than a single night. Further, Azevedo was able to

identify the person who gave him permission to stay at the house, the circumstances behind the

permission, and the reason for his presence at the house. All of these facts tend to show that

Azevedo had Abraham’s permission to be an overnight guest in the house. However, the real

force of Azevedo’s arguments are based on his own testimony about Abraham’s request or

invitation. The Ninth Circuit has warned that bald assertions of permission do not establish

one’s status as an overnight guest. Defendants rely heavily on Armenta. However, this case is

not quite like Armenta, because Azevedo, unlike the Armenta, was able to identify the person

who gave consent for him to be an overnight guest (and there is no dispute that Anita was the

leased/rented the Property), explained the circumstances behind that consent, and also 21

successfully excluded the owner of the property. Nevertheless, conspicuously absent from this

case is any evidence from Abraham, who is asserted to be a friend of Azevedo’s. Also absent is

evidence of items that one would expect to find in the possession of an overnight guest, i.e. full

change of clothes, toothbrush, etc.

Azevedo’s argument on this point is close to amounting to little more than his own “bald

assertion” of guest status. See Armenta, 69 F.3d at 308. Nevertheless, the Court believes that

the evidence could support a finding that Azevedo was an overnight guest. Because a trier of fact

could reasonably reach opposite conclusions regarding Azevedo’s status, the Court denies

summary judgment to both parties on the issue of Azevedo’s standing. 

B. Curtilage

Plaintiff’s Argument

Azevedo argues that the fenced front area of the Property was protected curtilage pursuant

to the factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987), and as applied in the

PUMF 29 is undisputed and reads: “In past encounters, Coria would knock on the front gate and Plaintiff

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would come out of the house.”

Coria’s testimony indicates that he had begun eviction proceedings, but did not know when or if those

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proceedings had completed. The Sixth Circuit has held that overdue rent, without an actual eviction, does not

eliminate a renter’s, or a renter’s guest, reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented property. See Washington,

573 F.3d at 284-85.

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case of Madruga v. County of Riverside, 431 F.Supp.2d 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The front of the

Property was completely enclosed by the highest fence that the local City ordinance allows, and

the mailbox was on the outside of the fence. There was a “beware of dog” sign on the wood gate. 

The front of the iron fence was a modest distance from the house. The two gates of the iron

fence were closed and “locked.” The locking of the gate effectively extended the walls of the

house. Therefore, the front of the Property was protected curtilage.

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue that the front yard is not protected curtilage. The yard and porch are

clearly visible to any passer-by. The iron fence is meant to be more decorative than to provide

any privacy, and is only waist high. There are no signs stating “no trespassing,” and the “beware

of dog” sign is not on the iron fence, but instead is on the wood gate that separate the front and

back yards. Finally, the manner in which the iron gate was secured is probative. A chain was

looped around the fence. There was no locking mechanism on the chain, and the chain simply

had to be lifted up. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the front yard. 

Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment protects both a home and the home’s curtilage. See United

States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984);

United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1988). Curtilage is “the area to which

extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of

life.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180; United States v. Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir.

2004). The Supreme Court has explained that curtilage questions are to be resolved with

particular reference to four factors: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the

home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature

of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area

from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d

1069, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1997). The

“primary focus” and “central component of this inquiry is whether the area harbors the intimate

activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Dunn, 480 U.S.

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at 300, 301 n.4; United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1993). “Every curtilage determination is distinctive and

stands or falls on its own unique set of facts.” United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424, 1426 (9th

Cir. 1993).22

Discussion

The first Dunn factor is proximity of the disputed area to the home. The Court will view

the disputed area as the front yard. “Proximity is not determinative as there is no fixed distance

at which curtilage begins or ends.” Soliz, 197 F.3d at 502. The parties have not given the Court

any measurements of the land parcel, the front yard, or the distance of the home to the front of

the fence. Nevertheless, photographs of the front of the Property reveal a typical urban lot that is

not particularly large. Azevedo describes the distance from the house to the front of the fence as

“modest.” While hardly precise, describing the distance as “modest” is fair and indicates a

distance that is close to the home. This factor weighs in favor of a finding of curtilage.

The third factor is the uses to which the front yard was put. No evidence has been

presented about the uses of the front yard. The picture of the house and the front yard gives no

hint as to any uses. The only function may be to simply separate the street from the front porch. 

There is an indication that Azevedo would let his dog roam the front yard at night in order for the

dog to relieve itself. The Court has reservations about whether Azevedo’s use may be 23

considered in determining whether the front yard is curtilage. Azevedo did not rent the Property,

did not own the Property, and has attempted to characterize himself as an “overnight guest.” In

other words, Azevedo had no long term connection to the Property. As such, the relevant uses

would appear to be those of Abraham, who actually rented and lived at 2105 E. Weldon, and

Depew, Traynor, Furrow, and Soliz, cited above, were all overruled on the issue of the appellate standard

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of review for curtilage determinations in United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 913 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Azevedo identified no uses in his brief in support of summary judgment. See Court’s Docket Doc. No. 32

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at p. 11-12. The Court gleans this use from the undisputed fact regarding the dog waste in the front yard, the

undisputed fact that the dog was inside the home at the time of the incident, from Azevedo’s reply in which he states

that the fence was used to extend the territory of his dog at night, and Azevedo’s testimony that states the dog used

the front yard for “a restroom.” Azevedo’s reply, however, cites no evidence in support of his express assertion (in

fact, the assertion is about one line, see Court’s Docket Doc. No. 56 at 4:9-10) and there is no evidence to indicate

how long or how often the dog was allowed to roam the front yard.

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under whose authority Azevedo claims to have standing. Nevertheless, this issue has not been

briefed because the suggested use was not raised until Azevedo’s reply brief. Assuming without

deciding that the “overnight guest” Azevedo’s use of the alleged curtilage has probative value,

this use does not even involve a “private” activity by Azevedo, or any human for that matter. It

is hardly a use associated with the “privacies of life,” especially given the frequency with which

people walk their dogs in public (be it parks or sidewalks) for this very purpose. See Soliz, 197

F.3d at 502-03. This factor weighs against a finding of curtilage.

The second Dunn factor is whether the front yard is surrounded by an enclosure that

surrounds the home. Although not conclusive, “[f]encing configurations are important factors in

defining the curtilage.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 n.4; Davis, 530 F.3d at 1078. Here, the front yard

and the home are surrounded by the wrought iron fence. The presence of the iron fence is

indicative of curtilage. However, courts have also observed that, generally “the enclosure factor

weighs against those who claim infringement of the curtilage when their land is divided into

separate parts by internal fencing.” Bleavins v. Bartels, 422 F.3d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1278 (2d Cir. 1996). The Property has more than one

fence and there are separate demarcations on the property parcel. Specifically, there is also a

wooden fence that separates the front and backyards. That fence is a six foot tall “standard

fence,” and it prevents people from “seeing over it.” See Carr Depo. 39:1-10. It is significantly

different from the iron fence in both height and design. Further, the “beware of dog” sign is on

the wooden fence, to the side of the house – it is not on the iron fence. That the sign is on the 24

wooden fence indicates that the dog in question is located behind the wooden fence, not inside

the iron fence in the front yard. The wooden fence, as well as the “beware of dog” sign on that

fence, indicate a separateness between the front and back yards and the house. This sense of

separateness is further reinforced by the absence of evidence regarding use of the front yard. The

iron fence weighs in favor of curtilage, but the presence of the wood fence, which creates

additional demarcations by separating the front yard from the rest of the property, tempers this

consideration and weighs against curtilage. See Bleavins, 422 F.3d at 452.

There is no indication that other signs, such as “no trespassing” signs, were on either fence.

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The final Dunn factor is the steps taken to protect the front yard from observation by

passers by. The Court cannot see that any steps were taken to prevent the front yard from

observation. As discussed above, there was a wrought iron fence. However, pictures of the

Property show that the iron fence does nothing to prevent the front yard from observation. The

iron bars are thin, the fence is not high (three and a half to four feet, perhaps), and there are

significant gaps between each bar. The iron fence was erected by Coria, not to prevent others

from observing the front yard or the activities occurring therein, but to act as a deterrent to, or

provide safety from, burglars and thieves. See PUMF 23. There is no evidence that the iron

fence was meant to prevent observation from passers by. In reply, Azevedo has indicated that

City ordinances prevent fences from being more than 4' tall. Be that as it may, the purpose of the

fence was never to obscure observation. Further, a fence is not the only method of preventing

observation. Physical boundaries, such as thick trees, shrubberies, or underbrush may effectively

block visibility and prevent observation. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 903 (9th

Cir. 2001). However, there are no trees, bushes, or other natural barriers in the front yard that

materially obscure observation. There is simply no evidence that steps were taken to protect the

front yard from observation. This factor weighs against a finding of curtilage. 

The primary focus in determining curtilage is whether the area “harbors the intimate

activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Dunn, 480 U.S.

at 300, 301 n.4. The Court sees no evidence of any intimate or private activity in the front yard

that is associated with either the home or one’s private life. Application of the Dunn factors

reveal that the front yard is essentially open to public view, no evidence of any use has been

presented, and there are additional demarcations within the wrought iron fence. The evidence

simply indicates an enclosed piece of land that is close to the house. Cf. Cowart v. Enrique, 311

Fed. Appx. 210, 213-214 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Dunn factors to conclude that a front yard

was not curtilage despite the fact that the front yard was enclosed by a fence). When an area is

open to view and there is no indication of it being used by the resident, it is unclear how that area

can be said to harbor private or intimate activity. 

Azevedo relies heavily on a case from the Central District of California, Madruga. The

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yard in Madruga had the following characteristics: it was immediately adjacent to the home, it

was surrounded by a 5' 4" tall solid wall that shielded the home from public view, a “warning –

guard dog” sign was posted on the wall very close to the entrance foot gate, there were two 5' tall

wooden gates that were shut, and the yard “was used for activities intimately associated with

those that take place inside the house itself such as barbecues, parties, or as an area of quiet

contemplation.” Madruga, 431 F.Supp.2d at 1056. These characteristics are materially different

from the Property’s front yard. The “beware of dog” sign in this case was not on the iron fence,

rather it was on the wooden fence that separated the front and backyards. The Madruga fence

was solid, tall, and could certainly keep out prying eyes. The iron fence in this case, however,

was much shorter, not solid, and does nothing to prevent observation. The yard in Madruga was

used for barbecues, parties, and quiet contemplation. No use has been adequately identified in

this case, and the suggested use is neither private nor comparable to barbecues, parties, and quiet

contemplation. The Court readily agrees that the yard in Madruga was protected curtilage. 

However, “[e]very curtilage determination is distinctive and stands or falls on its own unique set

of facts.” Depew, 8 F.3d at 1426. The facts in this case are distinguishable from Madruga, and

those facts do not show that the front yard “harbors the intimate activity associated with the

sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 301 n.4. 

The evidence and arguments do not show that the front yard is protected under the Fourth

Amendment as curtilage. Summary judgment in favor Defendants for the officers’ entry into the

front yard will be granted.

C. Seizure of Azevedo

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was

occurring. The information about the motorcycle, the residence being reported as vacant, and the

their observations of the house indicated criminal activity. Because the officers had reasonable

suspicion, they lawfully detained Azevedo for questioning. 

Once Azevedo was lawfully detained, he jumped up from the curb and ran from the

officers. Both police experts agree that, if a person who is lawfully detained runs from the

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police, that person is in violation of Penal Code § 148(a)(1) for obstructing a police officer and

thus, is subject to arrest. Since that is what Azevedo did, there was probable cause to arrest him.

Alternatively, Carr requests qualified immunity because, under the totality of the

circumstances, a reasonable officer could conclude that Carr’s actions were lawful.

Plaintiff’s Response

Azevedo argues that the officer’s entry into the yard was illegal. The officers cannot rely

on the “knock and talk” exception because they had the intent to detain Azevedo when they

entered the curtilage. Further, the “knock and talk” exception does not apply because measures

had been taken to impede entry into the yard, and those measures would indicate to a reasonable

person that entry was restricted. 

In order to commit the crime of obstructing a police officer, there must be a lawful

detention. However, because the officers’ entry into the yard was unlawful, the detention of

Azevedo was also unlawful. Because the detention was unlawful, there could be no probable

cause to arrest Azevedo under Penal Code § 148. 

Legal Standard

“The Fourth Amendment requires police officers to have probable cause before making a

warrantless arrest.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009); see

Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). “Probable cause to arrest exists

when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person

of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person

being arrested.” Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009);

John v. City of El Monte, 515 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts look to “the totality of the

circumstances known to the arresting officers, to determine if a prudent person would have

concluded there was a fair probability that the defendant had committed a crime.” John, 515

F.3d at 940; see Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 

For seizures that do not amount to a full arrest, police may “detain or seize an individual

for brief, investigatory purposes, provided the officers making the stop have reasonable suspicion

that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2009)

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see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 (1968); Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1020. “To determine whether

[an investigatory] stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we consider whether, in light of

the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Palos-Marquez,

591 F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2010); see Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1021. “The reasonable suspicion

standard is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and merely requires a minimal level

of objective justification.” Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 990-991 (9th Cir.

2002); see also Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1020. “Conduct innocent in the eyes of the untrained may

carry entirely different messages to the experienced or trained observer,” and thus, may form

“reasonable suspicion.” Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1021.

“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home,

whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,

181 (1990). In fact, “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). However, where officers have

probable cause to arrest, the “warrantless arrest of a suspect [who is standing in the doorway and]

who voluntarily opens the door of his dwelling in response to a noncoercive knock by the police”

does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1426-27

(9th Cir. 1995). Similarly, a suspect who “voluntarily opens the door of his residence in response

to a non-coercive ‘knock and talk’ request may be temporarily seized “outside the home (or at the

threshold) provided that [the officers] have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United

States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). If the police “use no force, threats, or

subterfuge,” a person’s decision to open the door exposes that person to view, and the privacy

interests identified in Payton v. New York are not violated. Id.; see Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.

Discussion

There are two seizures at issue – the initial detention where the officers told Azevedo to

sit on the curb, and the arrest. Azevedo’s opposition is premised primarily on the theory that,

because the front yard was curtilage, Carr acted unlawfully when he entered the front yard. 

However, as the Court has determined, the front yard is not curtilage. Thus, Carr’s entry into the

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front yard was lawful. Nevertheless, a lawful entry into the front yard does not end the inquiry. 

Initial Detention

Under Crapser, a person may be temporarily seized in the doorway or outside the

threshold of a residence as long as there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the

police did not use force, threats, or subterfuge to get the person to open the door or step outside

the threshold. See Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1147-48; Price v. Austin Police Dep’t, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 39378, *29-*31 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2007). 

The Court does not see that Azevedo exposed himself to public view due to force, threats,

or subterfuge by the officers. Prior to Azevedo exiting the home, the officers knocked on the

front door and, when the door opened, Carr announced “Fresno police.” Azevedo relies on

testimony by Carr to argue that Carr forcibly caused the front door to open. Carr testified that he

knocked on the front wooden door, the door swung open, hit the wall, and remained wide open. 

See Carr Depo. 43:21-22; see also Avila Dec. ¶ 5. There is no evidence of how hard Carr

knocked on the door or how hard it hit the wall. However, the evidence establishes that the front

door was missing its handle and lock set. See DUMF 21; Carr Dec. ¶¶ 5, 8; Avila Dec. ¶¶ 3, 4. 

Under such circumstances, it is unknown how securely the front door could remain shut. No

evidence has been identified that shows how Azevedo kept the door shut, how well the door

functioned, or whether the door was secured in any manner besides being shut. Carr’s testimony

shows that he simply knocked on the door. Without a lock and handle, it is not surprising that the

door would swing open after someone knocked on it. The evidence does not indicate that Carr’s

knock was improper or excessive.

Once the door was open, the officers for the first time announced that they were “Fresno

police.” Prior to this announcement, the officers had said nothing. Identifying themselves as the

police is a natural and proper response to the door opening. There is no indication that Carr

announced “Fresno police” in order to verbally seize Azevedo. Importantly, no evidence has

been presented that Azevedo even heard Carr identify himself. 

The evidence shows that Azevedo was sleeping in a bedroom in the house when the

officers knocked on the door. According to Azevedo, what woke him was his dog. See Azevedo

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Depo. 66:16-18. Azevedo testified that he heard his dog barking, the dog ran out of the bedroom,

then ran out the front door, and Azevedo heard yelling but does not know what was being said.25

See Azevedo Depo. 66:16-69:25. Azevedo followed quickly behind his dog and went outside the

house. See DUMF 31; PUMF 61. The first time that Azevedo saw the officers was after

Azevedo stepped out of the house. See Azevedo Depo. at 81:5-8. It is apparent that Azevedo

exited the house because he was following after his dog – he did not exit due to anything that the

officers said or did. See Azevedo Depo. 66-69. In other words, Azevedo did not exit the house

due to force, threat, or subterfuge by the officers. See Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1148.

With respect to probable cause, prior to entering the front yard, the officers knew that the

tags on the motorcycle were expired, the VIN of the motorcycle could not be found, and about

twelve days earlier the driver of this motorcycle ignored Carr’s gesture to stop and instead sped

away in a reckless fashion. These are articulable, particular, and objective facts that create a

reasonable suspicion that the motorcycle may be stolen. See Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1275;

Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 990. Also, the computer indicated that the Property was possibly vacant,

there was newspaper on the windows, some windows had no coverings, some windows had

cloth/curtains, grass was growing up against the house, the metal security door of the house was

open, there was a hole in the front door where the lock and door knob should have been, and a

low light could be seen in the corner of the window. These are articulable, particular, and

objective facts that create a reasonable suspicion that either a trespass or burglary may be

occurring. See Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1275; Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 990. At this point, the

officers decided to approach the house in order to talk to someone about the motorcycle and

investigate the security of the house. See Carr Dec. ¶ 6; Avila Dec. ¶ 4. After Carr undraped 26

The evidence indicates that the officers were yelling at the dog. See PUMF 61.

25

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26

dispute is insufficient. Further, the Court sees no differences between the suspicions that Carr and Avila had about

the possible occupant of the house, and the suspicions that the police had in Crapser (officer suspected that Crapser

was the same “Gunner Crapser” who was the subject of a warrant), Vaneaton (officers believed that Vaneaton was

receiving stolen property), and Price (officers believed Price had threatened and brandished a knife at his neighbor).

In these cases, the suspects were seized at their doorsteps (although Crapser assumed that a seizure occurred) after

they opened their doors, yet the seizures were held to be constitutional. See Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1142, 1147-48;

Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424-27; Price, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39378 at *8-*12, *29-*31.

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the chain from the iron fence’s front gate, see PUMF 50; Carr Depo. 45:21-47:9; Sealed Exhibit

G, the officers approached the house. The officers saw pieces of door locks and handles, which

matched both the front door and front metal security door. These pieces were seen on the porch

and in the flower bed next to the porch. Additionally, a glove was seen in the flower bed next to

a door lock, which is consistent with a break-in. These are very significant and probative facts. 

The observation of the glove and locks and handles augment and further support reasonable

suspicion. When the officers knocked on the door, they had at least reasonable suspicion that a

trespass or a burglary was being committed. Knocking on the door in order to investigate the

house’s security was appropriate and reasonable. Cf. Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141,

1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that, under the facts of the case, officers “could have knocked at

the door [of the house]. . . and politely asked the occupants whether they were entitled to be

there.”). Additionally, when the door opened after Carr knocked, Azevedo’s dog came out

barking and growling. The dog was large and caused the officers to back-peddle. The officers

had a legitimate concern for their safety. The facts known about the motorcycle, combined with

the computer entry about the Property, the appearance of the property (the grass growing up the

house and the windows), the missing handles and locks from the front doors, the locks and

handles lying on the porch and the flower bed, and the glove in the flower bed, caused the

officers to have a reasonable suspicion that the unknown rider of the motorcycle may be

committing a trespass or burglary in the house (and possibly theft of the motorcycle). Thus, there

was reasonable suspicion to detain Azevedo once he exited the house. See Palos-Marquez, 591

F.3d at 1275; Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1142, 1147-48; Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424-27; Price, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39378 at *8-*12, *29-*31. The encounter with the dog raised legitimate safety

concerns, and it was reasonable to order Azevedo to the curb, which was only a modest distance

from the house, in order to investigate. See DUMF’s 33, 34. 

Because the officers had reasonable suspicion that burglary or trespass was occurring, had

reasonable fears about their safety from the dog, and because Azevedo did not exit his house due

to force, threats, or subterfuge by the officers, Azevedo’s Fourth Amendment rights were not

violated when he was seized after exiting the house. See Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1142, 1147-48;

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Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424-27; Price, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39378 at *8-*12, *29-*31. 

Alternatively, qualified immunity is appropriate. The facts outlined above are strongly

indicative of a trespass or burglary. Especially probative are the computer entry about the

possible vacancy of the house and the locks and gloves found on the porch and in the flower bed. 

Further, given Crapser’s discussion and approval of Vaneaton (in which officers had probable

cause to arrest, knocked on the door, asked Vaneaton’s identity, and then arrested him just inside

the doorway), and the lack of force, threats, and subterfuge, a reasonable officer in Carr’s

position could have reasonably believed that the detention met the parameters of Crapser. In

short, a reasonable officer could have reasonably believed that Azevedo’s detention was

constitutional. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-06 (2001); Crapser, 472 F.3d at 1142,

1147-48; Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2003); Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at

1424-27.

Summary judgment in favor of Carr on this claim is appropriate.

Arrest

The elements of a Penal Code § 148(a) obstruction offense are: “(1) the defendant 27

willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer; (2) when the officer was engaged in the

performance of his or her duties; and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known

that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” 

People v. Simons, 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1108-09 (1996). However, a person “cannot be

convicted of an offense against an officer engaged in the performance of official duties unless the

officer was acting lawfully at the time.” Id. 

Here, there is no dispute that if a lawfully detained person runs from the police, he is in

violation of Penal Code § 148. See DUMF 42. The dispute is whether Azevedo was lawfully

detained. As discussed above, although Azevedo argues to the contrary, the Court has found that

In pertinent part, Penal Code § 148(a)(1) reads:

27

Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer, or an

emergency medical technician . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her

office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not

exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one

year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

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he was lawfully detained. Because Azevedo was lawfully detained, Carr had probable cause to

arrest Azevedo once Azevedo attempted to run away. See John, 515 F.3d at 940; Cal. Pen. Code

§ 148(a); Simmons, 42 Cal.App.4th at 1108-09; DUMF 42.

Alternatively, excluding issues of excessive force, Azevedo’s arrest is improper only if

the Terry detention was unlawful. As discussed above, a reasonable officer could have

concluded that reasonable suspicion existed and that Crapser was followed. Therefore, for the

same reasons, a reasonable officer in Carr’s position could have reasonably believed that

probable cause existed to arrest Azevedo for violation of Penal Code § 148(a). See Saucier, 533

U.S. at 200-06 (2001); John, 515 F.3d at 940; Lawrence, 340 F.3d at 956-57; Simmons, 42

Cal.App.4th at 1108-09. 

Summary judgment in favor of Carr on this claim is appropriate.

II. Monell Liability

Defendant’s Argument

The City argues that Azevedo has identified several policies, but none of his contentions

have merit. There is no evidence that the City has an unconstitutional policy regarding training,

as the evidence shows the City’s training materials are consistent with POST standards. 28

Further, officers receive on-going training through various courses, programs, and seminars. 

Carr is certified in the use of a taser, and POST does not exclude the use of a taser against a

fleeing suspect. 

Any contention that the City has an unconstitutional policy/practice of detaining and

arresting individuals without probable cause is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, the

evidence shows that probable cause existed to arrest Azevedo.

Any contention that the City fails to supervise its officers is not supported by the

evidence. At the time of the incident, officers were supervised through a chain of command from

sergeant through chief. There was daily supervision through the chain of command, and officers

POST is the “Peace Officer Standards and Training” and is recognized as the authority that governs the

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training of police officers in California. DUMF 46.

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received yearly evaluations. Further, the officers were expected to comply with department

practices, training, and procedure, and are subject to discipline for failing to do so.

Similarly, there is no evidence of a failure to discipline. Administrative staff review and

examine incidents in which force is used in order to determine whether the force was reasonable

under the circumstances. It is the policy of the City to conduct thorough investigations.

Finally, any contention that the City has a custom and practice of falsifying reports and

evidence is not supported by the evidence. It has always been the policy of the City to require

accurate reporting by its officers. It has never been the policy to allow falsification.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Azevedo argues that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Carr acted pursuant to an

official policy. Standing order 2.5.8 is deficient in that it instructs officers to disregard the risk of

collateral injuries from an uncontrolled fall while running over a hard surface. Standing order

2.5.8 and 2.5.10 are deficient in that they instruct officers to report taser use on an honor system,

including documenting a subject’s force that required the use of force, taking and reporting

witness statements, but does not include downloading taser data. Pursuant to these policies, Carr

unnecessarily tasered Azevedo, invented a fact that Azevedo “reached to his waistband,” altered

witness statements in the force report, and did not download his taser data, knowing that no

meaningful review would occur. Also, it is clear that the City had alternatives to these policies. 

Taser International’s materials warn of risks due to uncontrolled falls. It is also well established

that officers should be sequestered if they are involved in a significant use of force, and should

not conduct their own use of force investigation.

Azevedo argues that there is also evidence of a longstanding custom of the City using a

taser to seize fleeing subjects who were unarmed, non-threatening, and who had not committed

serious crimes. In addition to this case, Carr and Avila combined to taser six such subjects, and

the conduct of the officers was approved.

Azevedo also argues that there is a dispute regarding the failure to train on the proper use

of a taser, that is, that the taser should not be used on a non-felony suspect who posses no

imminent threat to anyone’s safety, but is merely running away. The facts of this case, Carr’s

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testimony, Avila’s testimony, both officers’ multiple use of taser on people like Azevedo, and the

statements and approval of other City police officers indicating that such use is in line with

training and guidelines. Further, there is no question that encounters with suspects who flee

over hard surfaces is something that can be expected to occur relatively frequently. Taser

International’s own materials and warnings show that the occurrence and danger associated

therewith are obvious.

Finally, Azevedo argues that the evidence indicates that Police Chief Dyer ratified Carr’s

conduct. Despite the obvious inadequacy of the investigation, Dyer (through his delegate Deputy

Chief Nevarez) approved the determination that Carr should be “exonerated” of the excessive

force claim. Although failure to discipline by itself is insufficient, the failure to discipline

combined with the obvious inadequacies of the investigation and the outrageous conduct of Carr,

is sufficient to support a finding that Dyer, and thus the City, ratified Carr’s conduct.

Legal Standard

Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be

liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). A

municipality, however, “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] under a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see Long, 442 F.3d at 1185; Ulrich v. City & County

of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability only attaches where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through “execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 984. Municipal

liability may be premised on: (1) conduct pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy; (2) a

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local

government entity; (3) a decision of a decision-making official who was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy

in the area of decision; or (4) an official with final policymaking authority either delegating that

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authority to, or ratifying the decision of, a subordinate. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th

Cir. Or. 2008); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 984-85;

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A “custom” for purposes of municipal liability is a widespread practice that, although not

authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to

constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112, 127 (1988); Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 890 (9th Cir.

1990). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it

must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the

conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. A

“policy” is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the

subject matter in question.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2008)

In order to show ratification, a plaintiff must show that the “authorized policymakers

approved a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127; Lytle, 382

F.3d at 987; Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Neither the mere failure to

overrule a subordinate’s actions, nor the mere knowledge of an unconstitutional act by

themselves can constitute ratification. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987; Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239; Gillette

v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992). Instead, the “policymaker must have

knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it.” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987. A

single failure to discipline an officer, without something more, is insufficient to establish

ratification. See Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing and 29

parenthetically discussing Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989)); Kanae v.

Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1191 (D. Haw. 2003) Although the plaintiff must establish that

there is a genuine issue of material fact, generally “ratification is a question for the jury.” 

Christie, 179 F.3d at 1238-39; Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995).

Overruled on other grounds, Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).

29

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A municipality’s failure to train its employees may create § 1983 liability where the

“failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

[employees] come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Long, 442

F.3d at 1186; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). “The issue is

whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether such inadequate training can

justifiably be said to represent municipal policy.” Long, 442 F.3d at 1186. A plaintiff alleging a

failure to train claim police officers must show: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2)

the municipality had a training policy that “amounts to deliberate indifference to the

[constitutional] rights of the persons' with whom [its police officers] are likely to come into

contact;” and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the municipality properly

trained those officers. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee,

250 F.3d at 681. A municipality is “deliberately indifferent” when the need for more or different

action, “is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current procedure] so likely to result in the

violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers ... can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; Lee, 251 F.3d at 682. A

“pattern of tortious conduct,” despite the existence of a training program, or “highly predictable”

constitutional violations due to a “failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to

handle recurring situations,” are circumstances in which liability for failure to train may be

imposed. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1997); Long, 442

F.3d at 1186-87. However, “adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that

they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the [municipality]

liable.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. “Mere proof of a single incident of errant behavior is a

clearly insufficient basis for imposing liability on the County.” Merritt v. County of Los

Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989); see also McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

Discussion

For there to be Monell liability against the City on the policies/practices identified by

Azevedo, there must also be a finding that excessive force was used. Cf. Los Angeles v. Heller,

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475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding no Monell liability in the absence of a constitutional

violation); Long v. City & County of Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). 

However, no party has moved for summary judgment on Azevedo’s excessive force claims. 

Therefore, in order to resolve the summary judgment motion on the Monell issue, the Court must

and will assume that excessive force was used against Azevedo. Under this assumption, and

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Azevedo as the non-moving party, there are

genuine disputes of material fact on the Monell claim.

Conduct Pursuant to Official Policy

Azevedo focuses on Standing Order (“SO”) 2.5.8 and SO 2.5.10 in arguing that

constitutional violations occurred pursuant to an “official policy.” See Court’s Docket Doc. No.

41 at pp. 19-20. 

First, relying on PAUMF’s 79, 80, and 81, Azevedo states that Standing Orders 2.5.8 30

“instructed officers to disregard the risk of collateral injuries from an uncontrolled fall while

running over a hard surface.” Id. at 19:13-15. Carr testified that he believed that he followed

SO 2.5.8 on the night in question. See Carr Depo. 99:20-22; see also PAUMF 80. However, the

pertinent portion of SO 2.5.8 reads, “The [taser] should not be used on a subject whose position

or activity may result in collateral injury (e.g. falls from height, falls into a body of water that

presents a drowning risk, operating vehicles).” PAUMF 79. Azevedo’s assertion about SO 2.5.8

does not match the policy’s language. There is nothing that instructs officers to disregard the

possibility of uncontrolled falls over a hard surface. In fact, SO 2.5.8 instructs officers to be

cognizant of collateral injuries due to a subject’s position or activity, which would seem to entail

running over a hard surface. If SO 2.5.8 actually instructed officers to disregard the uncontrolled

falls over hard surfaces, there would be a significant problem. But the order does not, and

Azevedo presents no evidence that shows SO 2.5.8 is interpreted as directing officers to

Citing Carr’s deposition at 99:23-100:7, PAUMF 81 reads that Carr believed that SO 2.8.5 did not apply

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unless a person was on a balcony, rooftop or staircase, and not when someone is running at full speed. This PAUMF

does not aid Azevedo. First, that section of deposition testimony has nothing to do with instructions to disregard

uncontrolled falls over hard surfaces. See Carr Depo. 99:23-100:7. Second, the cited deposition section appears to

the Court to focus more on the meaning and application of the term “fall from height.”

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disregard uncontrolled falls over hard surfaces. Because SO 2.5.8 does not instruct officers to

disregard the possibility of uncontrolled falls as Azevedo contends, there is no Monell liability

based on this aspect of SO 2.5.8. Summary judgment on this Monell theory is appropriate.

Second, relying on PAUMF’s 86, 87, and 88, Azevedo states that SO 2.5.8 and SO 31

2.5.10 instruct officers who use force to follow the “honor system,” including documenting

behavior that required the use of force and taking and reporting witness statements. To the extent

that Azevedo is complaining about the officer documenting why he believed that the particular

force used was required, the Court sees no problem with such a practice and Azevedo does not

explain why such a procedure is problematic. Including the officer’s explanation of why he used

force seems both reasonable and desirable. Further, if by “honor system” Azevedo is criticizing

that the officer who used force is required to self-report his use of force, there is no explanation

of why this is an improper practice and there is no indication that Azevedo was harmed as a

result of that practice because Carr in fact reported using force. 

However, Azevedo has a more substantial point regarding the policy of requiring the

officer who used force to also obtain witness statements. Azevedo’s police procedures expert,

Roger Clark, has declared: “Contrary to proper procedure, the Fresno Police Department

endorsed Officer Carr conducting his own use of force witness interviews. Because of the

serious injuries that occurred, FPD should have required supervisors on the scene to sequester

Carr and Avila, take their separate statements, and then assign other investigators to take the

statements of civilian witnesses.” Clark Dec. ¶¶ 15-16 (emphasis added). Neither SO 2.5.8 nor

SO 2.5.10 discuss situations in which the officer who used force should not interview

eyewitnesses. See Sealed Exhibits H, I. Clark’s opinion is augmented because there is an issue

regarding a witness’s statement in this case. Eyewitness Ramon Ramirez testified during his

deposition that he saw an officer, i.e. Carr, hit Azevedo with a flashlight. See Ramirez Depo.

28:11-24. Ramirez also stated that he was interviewed by an officer and he told the officer about

PAUMF 86 states that SO 2.5.8 and SO 2.5.10 require an officer who used the force to interview

31

witnesses and write the report. PAUMF 87 states that SO 2.5.10 requires officers to document the behavior that

required the use of force. PAUMF 88 deals with taser data downloads.

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seeing Azevedo getting hit with the flashlight. See id. at 29:15-22. Carr’s report indicates that

he interviewed Ramirez, and Carr’s deposition testimony suggests that the Carr did so alone. See

Carr Depo. 102:17-21; Sealed Exhibit E. Carr’s report does not include anything regarding the

flashlight. See Sealed Exhibit E. Again, assuming that excessive force was used, the policy that

Carr followed allowed him to selectively report and omit evidence. It is possible that an officer

32

could think that he could cover-up excessive force by utilizing this interview process and

omitting evidence. In light of Clark’s declaration that the severity of the injuries required

sequestration, the policies identified by Azevedo, and the specific incident with Ramirez’s

statement, the Court believes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the policy

of requiring officers who use force that results in severe injury to conduct their own witness

interviews. Summary judgment on this Monell theory will be denied.33

Lastly, citing PAUMF 89, Azevedo argues that SO 2.5.8 and SO 2.5.10 require no

meaningful review of taser deployments by supervisors or others. PAUMF 89 states, the “only

administrative review of taser deployments pursuant to FPD’s written policies is a short form to

be completed by the involved officer’s direct supervisor based solely on the officer’s report, and

forwarded to various individuals.” PAUMF 89 is supported by citations to SO 2.5.8, SO 2.5.10,

and the use of force form/report that was filled out by Carr’s supervisor, Sgt. Brown. However,

Azevedo’s argument is conclusory. There is no citation to expert opinions, no explanation of

why the City’s review procedures “require no meaningful review,” no explanation of what

“meaningful review” should have been done, and it is not clear that the use of force report

completed by Sgt. Brown is based “solely” on Carr’s version of events. Cf. DUMF 57. In fact,

The Court is not holding that the City has a policy of tolerating officers falsifying reports. See DUMF 58.

32

In reply, the City argues that it is impractical and unreasonable to sequester an officer every time he uses

33

force against a suspect. The Court agrees. However, Clark has declared that the severity of the injuries Azevedo

suffered required sequestration. The Court is not holding that a policy of having the officer who used force also

interview witnesses is per se improper. The Court is merely holding that, because expert testimony has stated that

the injuries were sufficiently severe, the particular policies presented to the Court (SO 2.8.5 and SO 2.5.10) do not

contain exceptions to who conducts the interviews, and it appears Ramirez statement was not accurately taken, a

genuine dispute has been created.

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the report indicates that Brown spoke to Azevedo. See Sealed Exhibit K. Azevedo’s argument 34

is inadequately developed. Summary judgment on this Monell theory is appropriate.

Longstanding Practice or Custom

Azevedo argues that the City has a custom of using tasers on unarmed, nonthreatening

suspects who are running on hard surfaces. Azevedo relies on PAUMF’s 107, 108, 109, and 110. 

PAUMF’s 107, 108, and 110 are undisputed and indicate that “Carr had previously used his taser

on at least two unarmed people who were running away over a hard surface and not reaching for

their waistbands,” PAUMF 107, the taser was ineffective on one person, but the taser was

effective on the other and that person lost muscle control and fell forward, see PAUMF 108, and

Carr reported the incident of the person who fell forward. See PAUMF 110. It is also

undisputed that Avila testified that he had previously used his taser approximately three times on

people who were running away. See Avila Depo. 52:17-22; see also PAUMF 109. 

The PAUMF’s and the evidence cited do not establish a custom or longstanding practice. 

As to Carr’s testimony, all that is shown is that the suspects were not armed, were not reaching

for waistbands, were running full speed on a hard surface, and one fell forward on the hard

surface. See Carr Depo. 86:12-87:14. As to Avila’s testimony, all that is shown is that the other

incidents involved suspects who were running away. See Avila Depo. 52:17-22. The problem is

that there is insufficient detail. The deposition testimony does not establish what crimes were at

issue, whether the suspects had been assaultive, or whether they posed a danger to those in the

area. Moreover, with Avila’s testimony, it is completely unknown whether the suspects were

even running over hard surfaces. It is undisputed that POST standards allow for the use of taser

on a fleeing suspect, depending on the totality of the circumstances. See Clark Depo. 64:20-25. 

Similarly, one of the express considerations in examining whether the use of a taser was

reasonable is whether the suspect was actively resisting or fleeing. See Bryan v. McPherson, 590

F.3d 767, 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2009). The other incidents Azevedo relies upon have not been

shown to be sufficiently similar to this case, and the single incident of this case does not establish

The use of force form/report was made by Sgt. Brown and was reviewed and approved by a lieutenant, a

34

captain, and a deputy chief. See Sealed Exhibit K.

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a custom. Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. Summary judgment on this Monell theory is appropriate. 

Failure To Train/Enact Policy

The Court agrees with Azevedo that there is a triable issue of fact regarding training. 

There is no dispute that the City has a unit to ensure that its training is POST compliant. See

DUMF 47. However, Azevedo’s expert, Roger Clark, has indicated that the training does not

include or sufficiently address the issue of potential injuries from someone who falls

uncontrollably onto a hard surface due to a taser application. See Clark Depo. 64:10-19; Clark 35

Dec. ¶¶ 4, 9-13. Clark has also declared that a “person running away at full speed over a hard

surface is a situation encountered by urban law enforcement departments on a relatively frequent

basis.” Clark Dec. ¶ 17. In addition to Clark’s opinion, Azevedo rightly points out that Carr’s

use of force, i.e. using a taser on Azevedo while running full speed over a hard surface, was

reviewed and approved by multiple City police officers, including a sergeant, a lieutenant, a

captain, and the deputy chief. See PAUMF 95. A retired sergeant also stated that Carr’s conduct

was within guidelines and training. See PAUMF 111. Because the Court must assume excessive

force was used, a reasonable jury could look at the number of separate officers who concluded

that the use of force/the taser while Azevedo was running over a hard surface was proper is

indicative of inadequate training. Cf. Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d

1355, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that, had evidence been timely submitted and developed,

testimony from a particular sergeant that conduct was pursuant to policy and training might

indicate department-wide inadequacy of training); Russo v. Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1046-47

(6th Cir. 1992). Clark also opines that appropriate training regarding the dangers of uncontrolled

falls on a hard surfaces was available and known to the City through Taser International. See

Clark Dec. ¶¶ 12-14; Fattahi Opp. Dec. ¶ 17 & Sealed Exh. N. It is not a stretch to infer that, had

there been training that emphasized the dangers of uncontrolled falls on hard surfaces, Carr may

DUMF 50 posits that the City’s taser training was POST compliant. DUMF 50 cites potions of Clark’s

35

testimony. It is not clear whether the cited depositions excerpts are referring to the training regarding “use of force”

in general or use of the taser in particular. See Clark Depo. 62:12-63:22, 68:11-22. Nevertheless, on page 64, Clark

specifically states that the training materials do not “talk about” injuries from falling on a hard surface due to taser

application in response to a question about POST. See Clark Depo. 64:10-19. Page 64 of Clark’s deposition,

combined with Clark’s declaration, lead to the conclusion that DUMF 50 is disputed.

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not have used his taser. The cumulative effect of this evidence makes summary judgment on this

theory inappropriate. 

Ratification

Azevedo agrees that a failure to discipline alone is not sufficient to show ratification. 

Instead, citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991) and Grandstaff v. City

of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), Azevedo argues that an inadequate investigation and/or

outrageous conduct by Carr can combine with the failure to discipline and show ratification. 

With respect to outrageous conduct, Azevedo relies on Grandstaff. In that case, six

officers (the entire night shift of the City of Borger) followed a suspect to a ranch in the course of

a chase in which guns were fired. See id. at 165. Grandstaff worked at the ranch, saw the police,

and drove down to see what was happening. See id. Grandstaff heard what was happening over

the police loudspeakers, drove back to his house, told his family to stay inside, and drove back to

the officers for a second time in order to help. See id. When Grandstaff reached the officers,

they all opened fire on Grandstaff’s truck. See id. Grandstaff somehow managed to get out of

the truck, but as he was running away, he was shot in the back and died shortly thereafter. See

id. Following the incident, the City of Borger and the police department denied any and all

wrongdoing, issued no reprimands, and made no changes in their policies. See id. at 171. The

outrage and disgust of the Fifth Circuit blazes from the pages. The situation in Grandstaff is

nothing short of appalling. However, what happened in the case at bar is not nearly as

outrageous as Grandstaff. In the case at bar, a taser was used against a person who was fleeing

from officers over a hard surface and who had yet to explain his presence in/connection to a

house where the evidence suggested a possible burglary. The Court realizes there is a dispute

among the parties regarding the propriety of the force used. A jury may well conclude that the 36

force used was excessive. However, without downplaying the events or Azevedo’s extensive

facial injuries, what occurred on November 7 does not rise to the same level of outrageousness as

Grandstaff. Carr’s use of force was not sufficiently outrageous to show that the failure to

The Court emphasizes that it is making no determination regarding excessive force or whether Azevedo

36

was reaching for/into his waistband.

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discipline was a ratification of Carr’s conduct.

With respect to an inadequate internal affairs investigation, Azevedo relies on Larez. In

Larez, the Ninth Circuit noted that expert testimony stated that the investigation contained holes

and inconsistencies that should have been “readily visible to any reasonable police

administrator,” such as relying on testimony from an officer who was not present during some of

the incidents. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 647. Azevedo identifies seven shortcomings in the internal

affairs investigation. However, unlike Larez, Azevedo has pointed the Court to no expert

opinion regarding the obviousness or egregiousness of the shortcomings, and it is not clear to the

Court that these shortcomings are even shortcomings at all, or would be obvious to Chief Dyer/a

reasonable police administrator. 

First, Azevedo cites portions of one page of the internal affairs interview with Carr to

argue that the questions were improper and leading. See PAUMF 121 (citing Sealed Exhibit F at

9:7-24). However, those sections contain only two questions, and it is unknown whether Dyer

did or even should have reviewed the transcripts, versus relying on the report itself. Second,

Azevedo contends that the summary of Ramon Ramirez’s and other witnesses’ testimony is

essentially the same as that found in Carr’s report. However, the investigator stated the date and

time that he interviewed the witnesses, and the Court does not see how a similarity in versions,

especially since some witnesses stated that they had nothing to add, would be clearly indicative

of an improper investigation to a reasonable administrator. Third, Azevedo states that there were

no audio recordings of the witness statements. However, there is no evidence that audio

recordings must be utilized when taking a statement. Fourth, there was no reference to objective

evidence such as taser data or medical records, which would have substantiated Azevedo’s

claims. However, it is unknown what the Taser data would have shown since Carr stated that he

used the taser, and Sgt. Brown’s force report stated that taser darts were recovered, one from

Azevedo’s skin and one from Azevedo’s clothes. See Sealed Exhibit K. Also, Azevedo has

submitted no medical opinions regarding what the medical records would have revealed or

whether the injuries would have been inconsistent with falling front first onto cement. Fifth,

Azevedo states that Carr’s allegation about Azevedo reaching into/towards his waistband while

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running is a fact that did not appear in Avila’s statement, Brown’s use of force report, or Carr’s

original report. Azevedo is correct that Sgt. Brown’s use of force report does not include

Azevedo reaching to his waistband while running. However, the synopsis of Avila’s internal

affairs statement indicated that he was running behind Carr and was trying to keep up; in other

words, the report suggests an obscured view. Further, Carr’s report states that Azevedo brought

his (Azevedo’s) hands in front of him (Azevedo) while they were running, and then the report

references Azevedo reaching towards his waist while he was on the curb. See Sealed Exhibit E. 37

This is very similar to an assertion of reaching towards the waistband. Sixth, Azevedo argues

that he was not assaultive or combative, but the City taser policy limits taser use to combative

subjects. However, the cited taser policy reads that the taser should be considered if it would

“assist in the [seizure] of a combative subject and/or would reduce the risk of injury to

department members . . . .” PAUMF 93 (emphasis added). The internal affairs report concluded

that officer safety, due to the alleged attempts by Azevedo to reach into his waistband, made use

of the taser appropriate. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the policy identified by

Azevedo since that policy’s plain language does not limit its application to combative persons.38

See id. Finally, Azevedo concludes that the report recommending exoneration despite a lack of

evidence to support that conclusion. However, the synopsis of the various officers and witness

statements provide at least a colorable basis for exoneration. 

In summary, the conduct in this case is not close enough to the outrageous conduct of

Grandstaff. Also, in the absence of expert opinion, Azevedo has not adequately shown that the

shortcomings of the Internal Affairs investigation are sufficiently material or would have been

readily visible to a reasonable administrator. Cf. Larez, 946 F.2d at 647. As such, Azevedo has

simply shown a failure to discipline, which he agrees is alone insufficient. Accordingly,

summary judgment on Azevedo’s ratification theory is appropriate. See Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987;

Haugen, 339 F.3d at 875; Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239; Santiago, 891 F.2d at 382; Kanae, 294

Again, the Court realizes that there is a dispute regarding whether Azevedo reached into or towards his

37

waistband at any time.

Also, no evidence has been presented that the policy is interpreted to be limited to combative individuals.

38

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F.Supp.2d at 1191. 

III. Spoliation

Plaintiff’s Argument

Azevedo argues that Defendants despoiled evidence and should be sanctioned. In July

2009, Defendants sent Carr’s taser to Taser International (“TI”) for repair, but did not download

usage data from the taser unit. TI confirmed that once they received the taser unit, they

determined that the unit could not be repaired and instead destroyed the unit. The usage data was

relevant and highly probative. Carr had heard that the injuries were not consistent with falling

and knew that his taser kept track of deployment data. Ramon Ramirez stated that he saw Carr

strike Azevedo in the head with a flashlight and told Carr about this observation. Azevedo

testified that he felt “jiggly” while running, but broke his fall only to be picked up and dropped

on his face, which caused him to black-out. Azevedo suffered significant injuries and required

surgery to repair facial fractures. A jury could find that Carr never tasered Azevedo but instead

struck him with a flashlight and then used additional force to incapacitate him, or that several

taser applications were used after Azevedo was incapacitated, or some combination thereof. 

These factual disputes could have been conclusively established by the taser data, as it was the

best evidence of whether, when and how many times Carr used the taser on Azevedo. 

Defendants took no steps to preserve this data. Instead, they intentionally destroyed it. Azevedo

argues that the prejudice he now suffers is paramount. He was incapacitated by whatever force

was used to end his flight, everything “went black,” and he awoke with major injuries. None of

the percipient witnesses saw the taser used, but it was night and they were some distance away. 

If Azevedo had the taser data, he argues that he could have established that unreasonable force

was used. His task now is more difficult because he admits that he fled from the officers and has

a felony conviction. A default finding against Defendants on the excessive force claim is

appropriate. Alternatively, an adverse inference instruction, and simultaneous exclusion of

defense evidence of the force they claim was used, may be ordered. 

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Defendant’s Opposition

Defendants argue that sanctions are inappropriate. It is not obvious that Carr’s taser data

was highly relevant. Azevedo never requested that the data be preserved, including when he sent

his first request for production. Carr documented one taser application, and there is no evidence

that more than one application was used. Prior to this motion, there was no reason to think that

the taser data was potentially relevant because there was no question that the taser was used. 

Without questioning that the taser was used, the taser data’s relevance is unclear. The loss of the

data was inadvertent, and Azevedo can still make out a case based on his testimony, neighbor

witnesses, medical testimony, and photographs. Loss of the taser data does not impair Azevedo’s

case. 

Legal Standard

Court’s have the inherent authority to impose sanctions against a party for the destruction

or spoliation of relevant evidence. Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir.

2006); Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002); Glover v.

BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993). A party engages in spoliation of evidence “as a

matter of law only if [the party] had ‘some notice that the documents were potentially relevant’ to

the litigation before [the evidence was] destroyed.” United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314

F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002). “A party does not engage in spoliation when, without notice of

the evidence’s potential relevance, it destroys the evidence according to its policy or in the

normal course of business.” United States v. $40,955.00, 554 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The sanctions imposed for spoliation should be based upon, and take into account, the specific or

unique facts of the particular case. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg.

Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing with approval Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d

1239, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1988)). Among the sanctions available to a court are default of a claim

or defense, preclusion of evidence, an adverse inference instruction, and monetary sanctions. In

re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

 Dismissal or default “under a court’s inherent powers is justified in extreme

circumstances, in response to abusive litigation practices, and to insure the orderly administration

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of justice and the integrity of the court’s orders.” Halaco Engineering Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d

376, 380 (9th Cir. 1988). “Before imposing the ‘harsh sanction’ of dismissal, however, the

district court should consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the

party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958.

Generally, preclusion of evidence is appropriate when the admission of such evidence

would “unfairly prejudice an opposing party” because of the spoliation. Unigard, 982 F.2d at

368; In re Napster, 462 F.Supp.2d at 1078. 

“Short of excluding the disputed evidence, a trial court also has the broad discretionary

power to permit a jury to draw an adverse inference from the destruction or spoliation against the

party or witness responsible for that behavior.” Glover, 6 F.3d 1318 at 1329; see Akiona v.

United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991). The adverse inference is based on two

rationales, one evidentiary and one deterrent. Akiona, 938 F.2d at 161. “The evidentiary

rationale is nothing more than the common sense observation that a party who has notice that a

document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to

have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same position who does not destroy

the document.” Id. The deterrent rationale seeks to use the inference to deter “parties from

destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at trial.” Id. However, a “party should

only be penalized for destroying documents if it was wrong to do so, and that requires, at a

minimum, some notice that the documents are potentially relevant.” Id. “[W]hen relevant

evidence is lost accidentally or for an innocent reason, an adverse inference from the loss may be

rejected.” Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 824. The availability of other sources or types of evidence,

in addition to the despoiled evidence, may be considered by a court in determining if a sanction is

warranted. See id. at 824-25.

Relevant Deposition Testimony

In relevant part, Azevedo testified:

A: . . . But I know when I fell, I fell – I didn’t fall – land on my face. I caught

myself even after being electrocuted. That’s why I got scrapes – got scars

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right – one right there and one right there. Both where I caught – where I

actually caught myself from falling all the way on my face. 

Q: Do you remember being tazed?

A: Vaguely. I don’t actually recall where now. But I remember it kind of made

me feel like jiggly, and I fell down.

Q: Did you fall forward?

A: Yeah, I fell forward.

Q: Okay. And what were your arms doing when you fell forward?

A: I went, like, to break my fall. Even – even though I just put my arms

forward, and so I wouldn’t hit the ground. But I broke my fall from hitting

directly full face – excuse me, from face first.

Azevedo Depo.:92:3-21. Azevedo was subsequently asked: 39

Q: So do you remember actually hitting the ground?

A: Yes, I was still conscious.

Q: And describe what happened when you fell.

A: I just fell. I broke my fall. I felt like I got picked up, and then I hit the

ground and everything went black. I don’t remember after that.

Q: And when you say you felt like you got picked up, where were you picked up?

A: It felt like somebody had, like, grabbed my belt loop and picked me up by my

back end right here, and I felt like they dropped me and everything went

black.

Q: How far off the ground did you go?

A: I don’t know. I don’t know. I felt like I’d been lifted up. And I was off the

ground. I know I was not imaginarying [sic] it. And I hit the ground and

everything went black.

Azevedo Depo. 93:21-94:15. 

Discussion

The Court will not enter a default order against Defendants on Azevedo’s excessive force

claim. The Court does not see a disobedience of its orders, “abusive” conduct by Defendants, or

extreme and outrageous behavior. See Halaco, 843 F.2d at 380. Azevedo’s evidence from TI

indicates that the taser was sent to them on July 21, 2009, for “warranty repair work,” the taser

Azevedo also described “getting zapped,” and getting “shot with electricity.” Azevedo Depo. 88:16-17,

39

93:3.

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unit was not repairable, the unit was scrapped pursuant to policy, and the City was sent a

replacement unit two days later on July 23, 2009. See Fattahi Exhibit O. The letter from TI

indicates negligence, not bad faith. Without contrary evidence, it simply appears that Carr’s taser

was worn out, which is not surprising considering the incident with Azevedo occurred in

November 2007. Further, Carr admitted that he deployed his taser, Avila confirmed that Carr

deployed the taser, significantly the use of force sheet filled out by Sgt. Brown indicates that taser

darts were recovered from Azevedo’s person (one dart in the skin and one dart in the clothes),

and as listed above Azevedo in his deposition indicated that he was tasered. See Sealed Exhibits

E, G, K; Azevedo Depo. 88:16-17, 92:3-93:3. It is true that the taser data would likely have

definitively established whether the taser was in fact used. It appears that the question of

whether the taser was actually used is based exclusively on Ramon Ramirez’s testimony. 

However, as shown above, Ramirez’s testimony appears contrary to Azevedo’s own testimony

which acknowledges that it was the taser that brought him down to the ground. The loss of the

taser data does not prevent Azevedo from utilizing Ramon Ramirez at trial. Similarly, Azevedo 40

has not shown how the loss of the taser data prevents him for establishing excessive force. 

Azevedo still has his own testimony, photographs, medical testimony, and his expert witness. 

Default is a very harsh sanction, and the Court does not see that the rationale for its use applies in

the circumstances of this case. See Halaco, 843 F.2d at 380.

With respect to the requested lesser sanction, for similar reasons, the Court does not

believe that precluding evidence of “the type and amount of force [the officers] used,”

see Court’s Docket Doc. No. 32 at p. 22:9-10, would be appropriate. The Court agrees with

Defendants that the inference requested by Azevedo, i.e. that the jury may infer that excessive

force was used, when combined with the preclusion of evidence by the defense regarding the type

of force that the officers employed, is tantamount to a directed verdict. In terms of prejudice, as

discussed above, Azevedo still has his own testimony, Ramirez’s testimony, his expert’s

testimony, photographs, and medical evidence which may show excessive force. Azevedo may

The Court notes that if the taser was not used, then Azevedo has no Monell claims based on the use of a

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taser against someone who is running on a hard surface.

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be prejudiced in that, due to his black-out, he is unable to show that he was tasered multiple

times. However, Azevedo has pointed the Court to no evidence that actually indicates that

multiple taser applications were used. Further, the black-out may affect the damages that could

be recovered since Azevedo cannot recall anything after the black-out, which would include the

pain of additional taser applications. Further, the evidence regarding Monell liability seems to

generally focus on a single taser application. Roger Clark is critical of firing the taser against a

person who was running on a hard surface. Precluding the Defendants from offering evidence of

the force used would not permit them to answer Clark’s testimony/opinions. The preclusion that

Azevedo seeks would tip the scale too far in his favor relative to the evidence that was lost. The

Court will not grant Azevedo’s requested preclusion. Cf. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 368.

Having said this, the Court is troubled by the destruction of the taser data. A rebutable

inference regarding the destruction of the taser may be appropriate. However, because Azevedo

has not expressly requested this remedy, the Court will not make a ruling at this time. Instead,

the Court will allow Azevedo, if he so chooses, to argue for a rebutable inference through a

motion in limine.

CONCLUSION

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding the officers’ entry

into the Property’s front yard and Azevedo’s detention. The issues of standing, curtilage, initial

detention, and arrest are encompassed by these cross motions. 

With respect to standing, Azevedo’s testimony identifies the person who gave him

permission, the reasons and circumstances behind that permission, and that he was able to

exclude the owner from the property. The owner, Coria, indicated that Azevedo excluded him

from the property and that Abraham, the person identified by Azevedo, rented the Property. No

evidence from Abraham was presented. The evidence is more than a bare assertion of “overnight

guest status.” However, the evidence presented could allow reasonable juries to reach different

conclusions. The evidence does not show standing or a lack there of as a matter of law. Both

motions on this issue will be denied.

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As to curtilage, the evidence shows only that the front yard was enclosed and was close to

the house. There was inadequate evidence of any intimate or private use, there were separate

demarcations/fences within the Property, and there were no efforts to obstruct observation of the

front yard. Therefore, the front yard is not curtilage. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants

on this issue will be granted.

As to the initial detention of Azevedo, that is having him sit on the curb, the evidence

establishes that the officers had legitimate concerns for their safety, having Azevedo sit on the

curb is consistent with appropriate police practices, and the officers had reasonable suspicion that

the motorcycle was stolen and that a burglary or trespass was being committed. Under these

circumstances, the detention was reasonable. Alternatively, qualified immunity is appropriate

since a reasonable officer could reasonably conclude that the detention of Azevedo was

constitutional. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this issue will be granted. 

As to Azevedo’s arrest, since Azevedo was lawfully detained, the officers had probable

cause to arrest Azevedo when he fled from the officers. Alternatively, a reasonable officer could

reasonably conclude under the circumstances that the arrest was constitutional. Summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on this issue will be granted.

Defendants also request summary judgment on Azevedo’s Monell claims. There are

triable issues of material fact regarding the training of officers with respect to taser and

uncontrolled falls over a hard surface, and on the policy of requiring officers who use force that

results in severe injury to conduct witness interviews. Summary judgment in favor of the City on

these two theories will be denied. However, Azevedo presented insufficient evidence with

respect to the other identified Monell theories. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the

remaining Monell theories will be granted. 

Finally, Azevedo requests summary judgment on the issue of spoliation sanctions due to

the loss of taser data. Specifically, Azevedo requests an entry of default against Defendants on

his excessive force claim and alternatively requests an inference in favor of excessive for

combined with preclusion of evidence by the defense of the force that was used. However, under

the circumstances of the case, including the reason for the loss of taser, the other evidence

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available, and Azevedo’s own testimony, these sanctions are too harsh. Summary judgment will

be denied. However, if he chooses to do so, Azevedo may file a motion in limine regarding the

propriety of a rebutable spoliation inference instruction.41

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in

that:

a. Summary judgment on the issue of standing is DENIED;

b. Summary judgment on the issue of curtilage is GRANTED;

c. Summary judgment on the issues of detention and arrest is GRANTED;

d. Summary judgment on Monell liability for inadequate training regarding taser and

uncontrolled falls, and improper policy regarding witness interviews, as described

above, is DENIED; and

e. Summary judgment on all other Monell theories, as described above, is

GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and

3. Plaintiff may file a motion in limine regarding the propriety of a rebutable inference

instruction regarding spoliation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2010 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The motion in limine schedule will be set in the pre-trial order.

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