Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00771/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00771-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2010, the court sentenced petitioner to 25-year-to-life under California’s Three Strikes law. 

Petitioner claims he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when his attorney failed to raise 

Petitioner’s incompetency and seek a hearing on it and by counsel’s failure to investigate defenses 

related to his mental competency, to seek a pela bargain and to present defenses at sentencing related 

to his mental condition. Finally, Petitioner claims his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

recommends the petition be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2010, Petitioner was convicted in the Fresno County Superior Court of possession of a dirk 

or dagger. (Cal. Pen. Code § 120220(a)). (Volume I, Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (“Volume CT 

page”), p. 12). Petitioner admitted two prior “serious” or “violent” felonies that qualified as strikes 

under California’s “Three Strikes” law (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(d) & (e)). (Id.). As a result, the court 

THOMAS EARL PUTNEY,

 Petitioner,

v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 13)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 1 of 19
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sentenced him to 25 years-to-life.

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the “5th

DCA”), which affirmed the conviction. (Excerpt of Record (“EC”) 7). The California Supreme 

Court did similarly. (Doc. 29, Exh. 1). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

The following facts are derived from the probation officer's report. The incident occurred at 

Coalinga State Hospital, a secured maximum security forensic hospital that houses sexually 

violent predators, mentally disturbed offenders, and state prisoners with mental disorders. On 

November 19, 2010, hospital police officers observed four inmates engaged in suspicious 

behavior in the hallway. Officers heard several people yelling and a group of individuals 

exchanging punches with one another. One of those individuals, Putney's co-defendant, inmate 

Joseph Taylor, was seen holding a weapon. Taylor refused to drop the weapon when ordered to 

do so and continued running down the hallway chasing another inmate. Taylor approached an 

officer and lunged at him with the weapon, striking him in the center abdomen with what 

officers believed was a knife, and then continued to run down the hallway. Officers deployed 

pepper spray and eventually subdued Taylor, at which time he was found to be unarmed.

About 30 minutes later, another officer made contact with Putney. Although Putney initially 

denied having a weapon, officers searched Putney and found a homemade manufactured 

weapon six inches long on his person. The blade was flat, had a dark tint, and was sharpened 

on both ends. Putney told an officer he was just protecting his “homey,” Taylor, and “I didn't 

use it, but would have.” 

According to the probation report, as a juvenile Putney had sustained petitions for arson (§ 

452, subd. (b)), vehicle theft (Veh.Code, § 10851) and battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (c)), and was 

committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) in 1987. He was paroled from CYA in 

November 1988, and in March 1990, was discharged from CYA parole under dishonorable 

circumstances. One month later, he was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor weapons 

charge (former § 12020, subd. (a)). This conviction was followed by a string of arrests and the 

following convictions: (1) possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf.Code, § 11364) in 

July 1990; (2) fighting (§ 415) and misdemeanor weapons charge (former § 12020, subd. (a)), 

in August 1990; and (3) misdemeanor weapons charge (former § 12020, subd. (a)) in 

September 1990, for which he received two years probation.

Putney's three strike priors arose from offenses committed in 1990. Between June and August 

1990, Putney forcibly raped and sodomized two young boys, ages four and nine. The nineyear-old boy suffered anal trauma and internal hemorrhoids as a result of Putney's forcible 

rape. The four-year-old, who suffered scarring on his anus, related that Putney threatened him, 

saying “he better not tell.” In a psychological evaluation of Putney, performed by Dr. Ronald 

Byledbal, M.D. in February 1991, Putney was diagnosed as a pedophile. According to Dr. 

Byledbal, “the pedophilic oriented towards male victims has a higher recidivism and is more 

recalcitrant to treatment.” In 1991, Putney was convicted of three counts of section 288, 

subdivision (a), and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 2 of 19
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In 1992, while in prison, Putney was convicted of being a prisoner in possession of a weapon 

(§ 4502) and sentenced to an additional two years. In February 2003, Putney was found to be a 

sexually violent predator pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, and ordered 

to be confined for two years in a state hospital. From 2003 to the present offense, Putney has 

been under continual commitment at both Coalinga and Atascadero State Hospitals.

Putney told the probation officer that he was placed in foster care when he was nine years old 

after his grandmother physically abused him and he was left alone at home. Putney said his 

uncles sexually abused him when he was five and eight. Putney had a history of suicide 

attempts, beginning at age 12. He attempted suicide in 1991, and again while in prison in 1995 

and 1999. Putney stated he had received different diagnoses ranging from bipolar to psychotic 

and schizophrenic disorders, and he had sometimes seen people and heard voices. At the time 

of the probation department report, Putney said he was not suicidal and was not receiving 

medication. In the past he had been off and on medication. He stopped taking medications 

three months before because he was getting extremely paranoid that the medication was 

hindering his thoughts and causing nerve damage.

When interviewed by the probation officer on December 29, 2010, Putney said he saw the 

fight; he did not see Taylor with a weapon and he did not give him one. Putney admitted 

having a knife himself and said it had been in his possession for over a year. He hid the knife 

in different places so he would not be caught with it. He claimed he needed a weapon for 

protection because he had been abused by staff, inmates and police officers over the years.

(ER 7, pp. 3-5).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 

(2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Lindh, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment). The 

instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Legal Standard of Review

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 3 of 19
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 4 of 19
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). 

Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by the AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard is applied and 

courts do not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 

911, 918 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2002); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2009).

IV. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to declare a doubt 

regarding Petitioner’s competency or to request a hearing on said competency; (2) ineffective 

assistance of counsel in failing to investigate mental defenses prior to entry of a plea, failure to attempt 

to plea bargain the case to a reduced sentence, and failure to present and argue mental defenses at 

sentencing; and, (3) a sentence of 25 years-to-life violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 

cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 13, pp. 6-7). 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Doubt As To Competency And Hearing)

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

Putney contends trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to 

declare a doubt as to his competency and request a competency hearing. As the record contains 

no substantial evidence of incompetency and nothing to suggest a hearing would be favorable, 

his claim fails. 

In order to successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel, Putney must prove two 

components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 5 of 19
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Putney cannot show deficient performance because there was insufficient evidence of 

incompetency to trigger counsel's obligation to declare a doubt. Indeed, “If an attorney has 

doubts about his client's competence but those doubts are not supported by medical reports or 

substantial evidence, he does not render ineffective assistance by forgoing an evidentiary 

hearing.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 (Garcia), citing People v. Hill

(1967) 67 Cal.2d 105.) “Competent counsel is not required to make all conceivable motions or 

to leave an exhaustive paper trail for the sake of the record. Rather, competent counsel should 

realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense 

that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem appropriate under the 

circumstances.” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509; see also People v. Weaver

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 931; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 985, disapproved on another 

point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 fn. 22.)

Putney asserts there was ample evidence of mental illness and questionable competence that 

required defense counsel to seek the advice of an expert to determine whether he was 

competent. But there is nothing on this record to suggest that Putney's competence was 

questionable. To establish incompetence, “[t]he evidence must indicate that defendant is 

incapable of comprehending the charges against him and of cooperating with counsel in his 

defense.” (People v. Dudley (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 866, 872.) In taking Putney's change of plea, 

the trial court asked Putney several times whether he understood the consequences of his plea; 

each time Putney responded that he did. In addition, the trial court specifically asked defense 

counsel if he was satisfied Putney understood the nature and terms of the plea and its 

consequences; defense counsel responded “I do, Your Honor.” The court painstakingly 

questioned Putney on each of his constitutional rights to ensure he understood each right he was 

waiving; Putney answered each question directly and appropriately in the affirmative. Given 

Putney's responses, his background and history of mental illness do not support a finding of 

current incompetence. (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281 [“Evidence regarding 

past events that does no more than form the basis for speculation regarding possible current 

incompetence is not sufficient.”].)

The record also does not suggest that Putney was incapable of assisting counsel. Putney 

confirmed to the trial court before taking his change of plea that he had enough time to discuss 

the issue with his attorney, he understood his attorney adamantly disagreed with his decision, as 

well as the attorney's reasoning, but he did not agree with it “[f]or personal reasons.” Defense 

counsel also confirmed that he had advised Putney numerous times about the consequences of 

the plea, which Putney would confirm if asked. At sentencing, defense counsel remarked that 

while talking with Putney, he found him to be “an intelligent individual.” Nothing that occurred 

during the hearings in this matter suggests that Putney was incapable of comprehending the 

charges against him or of assisting defense counsel. 

Moreover, Putney cannot establish the outcome would have been different if his trial counsel 

had declared a doubt as to his competency. “[Penal Code s]ection 1368 requires a competency 

hearing when the court declares a doubt as to competence. [Citation.] The court did not declare 

a doubt. A declaration of doubt by counsel alone is not sufficient to trigger a statutory right to a 

competency hearing. Section 1368 is written in terms of whether a doubt arises in the mind of 

the trial judge and is then confirmed by defense counsel. [Citation.] ‘If ... a doubt arises in the 

mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, he or she shall ... inquire of the 

attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally 

competent.’ [Citation.] If, in response, ‘counsel informs the court that he or she believes the 

defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the 

defendant's mental competence is to be determined in a hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘A doubt in the 

mind of counsel, or anyone else other than the trial court is not sufficient to require a hearing on 

the issue of sanity under the statute.’” (Garcia, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169–170; see also 

People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1111–1112 [judge not compelled to order 

competency hearing based on defense counsel's opinion the defendant might be incompetent; 

defendant's claim his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 6 of 19
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

failed where record did not demonstrate a substantial doubt as to the defendant's competency].) 

Given the lack of substantial evidence of Putney's incompetence, there is no reasonable 

probability the outcome would have been different if counsel had declared a doubt as to his 

competence.

(ER 7, pp. 5-8).

2. Federal Standard For Effective Assistance Of Counsel

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of 

counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

reviewed according to Strickland 's two-pronged test. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th 

Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75(1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of 

counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is 

that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective). 

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s deficient 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, Petitioner must establish that he 

suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what 

counsel could have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1998). 

With the passage of the AEDPA, habeas relief may only be granted if the state-court decision 

unreasonably applied this general Strickland standard for ineffective assistance. Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). Accordingly, the question “is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard “was incorrect but 

whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. In effect, the 

AEDPA standard is “doubly deferential” because it requires that it be shown not only that the state 

court determination was erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 7 of 19
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Moreover, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state 

court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. 

See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway 

courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations”). 

Here, the state court identified the appropriate federal standard by applying Strickland. Thus, 

the only issue is whether the state court’s adjudication, i.e., that defense counsel’s representation was 

neither deficient nor prejudicial, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that it was not. 

3. Federal Standard For Competency

Generally, a person whose "mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the 

nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his 

defense may not be subjected to a trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). The test for 

competency to stand trial is whether the defendants "has sufficient present ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as 

factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 

(1960). 

The due process clause requires a state trial court to inquire sua sponte into a defendant's 

competency if "a reasonable judge would be expected to have a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's 

competence." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Lewis, 991 

F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.1993); DeKaplany v. Enmoto, 540 F.2d 975, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1976). A bona 

fide doubt exists if there is "substantial evidence of incompetence." Lewis, 991 F.2d at 527; see also 

Moran, 57 F.3d at 695. "Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's 

competency to stand trial." DeKaplany, 540 F.2d at 981. "Although no particular facts signal 

incompetence, suggestive evidence includes a defendant's demeanor before the trial court, previous 

irrational behavior, and available medical evaluations." Moran, 57 F.3d at 695.

The issue presented on habeas review is not whether Petitioner was incompetent to enter a plea 

of guilty, admit his prior strikes, and submit to the sentence imposed. See Lewis, 991 F.2d at 527. 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 8 of 19
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Instead, the issue is whether Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel for counsel’s 

failure to express a doubt as to Petitioner’s competence and to request a hearing regarding Petitioner’s 

competency, which, in turn, would be required only if the state trial court had information before it 

which should have caused the court to have a bona fide doubt as to Petitioner’s competency. See id. In 

resolving this issue, we examine only the information that was before the state trial court at the time of 

the pretrial, entry of plea, and sentencing proceedings. Id.

4. Analysis

Respondent contends that Petitioner has proffered to the Court evidence that was not before the 

state court when it considered this issue, i.e., specifically (1) a then three-year-old unpublished decision 

by a California Court of Appeal upholding a lower court’s finding that Petitioner was incompetent to 

give informed consent to medical treatment using psychotropic medications; (2) a California 

Department of Mental Health DMH Wellness and Recovery Plan dated March 24, 2010; (3) an 

evaluation prepared by Dr. Jay Adams, dated January 30, 2009, and (4) an evaluation prepared by Dr. 

L. C. Miccio-Fonseca, dated May 21, 2007. (Doc. 29, p. 20). Respondent contends this evidence 

should not be considered in analyzing whether the court’s adjudication was objectively unreasonable. 

(Id.). The Court agrees with Respondent and will not consider this evidence in its analysis.

In Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), the United State Supreme Court held that review 

under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the prisoner’s 

claim on the merits. The Court held that the provision’s “backward-looking language requires an 

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.” Id., at 182. Thus, § 2254(d)(1) 

requires federal courts to “focu[s] on what a state court knew and did,” and to measure state-court 

decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court renders its decision.’” Id.

(quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)(emphasis in original); Greene v. Fisher, 2011 

WL 5335411, no. 10-637, Nov. 8, 2011. 

The four documents listed above were not presented to the state court when it considered 

Petitioner’s state habeas petitions; instead, they apparently were proffered for the first time in these 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 9 of 19
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings.2 Applying Pinholster’s holding, this Court cannot consider such evidence since this 

Court’s habeas review is limited to a consideration of the state court record at the time the state court 

rendered its decision. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182.3 

Analyzing the evidence that was before the state court when it considered this issue, the Court 

concludes that Petitioner has not established ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland’s 

“doubly deferential” standard. The 5th DCA set forth the salient facts regarding why no deficient 

performance was evidenced in the record: the trial judge inquired multiple times whether Petitioner 

understood the consequences of pleading guilty; Petitioner replied appropriately and affirmatively each 

time; the court inquired of defense counsel whether he had discussed the relevant circumstances and 

consequences with his client and counsel confirmed that he had; and the trial court inquired extensively 

of Petitioner regarding his understanding of giving up certain constitutional rights. Also, Petitioner 

confirmed that he had discussed pleading guilty with his counsel, that he understood counsel disagreed 

with him, but that Petitioner had “personal reasons” for pleading guilty. Nothing in any of these 

circumstances even remotely suggests that Petitioner was incompetent. Moreover, it bears emphasis 

that Petitioner had a lengthy juvenile and adult criminal history and was not unfamiliar with the legal 

process. Also, Petitioner had been confined for some years in a setting where he was receiving 

treatment for his mental issues. Everyone involved was aware that Petitioner had a mental illness 

 

2

Petitioner argues that, because his appellate counsel sought to expand his appointment before the 5th DCA to 

include competency issues, and the 5th DCA denied that request, Petitioner fits within a narrow exception to Pinholster

where the Petitioner’s “inability to develop all the facts supporting his claim was the fault of the state court itself.” (Doc. 

31, p. 15.) This is unpersuasive. First, as Petitioner concedes, the evidence presented to the 5th DCA was “minimal.” (Doc. 

31, p. 14). Giving due AEDPA deference to the state court’s adjudication of its own state rules and law, this Court will not 

second-guess the 5th DCA’s decision based on “minimal” evidence. Second, no explanation has been forthcoming about 

why counsel did not, upon discovering the four documents at issue here, immediately seek to exhaust them factually in state 

court rather than risk having them excluded under Pinholster should the Court disagree with counsel regarding whether or 

not Petitioner fit within some exception to that case.

3

Petitioner asks that, if the Court holds that Pinholster excludes this evidence from consideration, this Court should 

grant a stay and abeyance of proceedings to allow Petitioner to exhaust the factual allegations in state court and then include 

them in the petition upon exhaustion, pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 369 (2005). (Doc. 31, p. 3). In Rhines, the U.S. 

Supreme Court noted that the stay procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. 

Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only when (1) good cause exists for petitioner’s failure to exhaust; (2) 

petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless” and (3) there is no indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive 

litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278; Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, 

Petitioner has offered no explanation at all, let alone “good cause,” for failing to raise this issue in state court despite the fact 

that this evidence was readily available. 

In addition, Petitioner has not shown that the evidence submitted here has any bearing on the issue of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Three of the documents were composed several years prior to Petitioner’s entry of plea and the most 

recent was composed approximately nine months before the plea. Given the fact he was receiving ongoing treatment, it is 

difficult to envision how documents this remote would have any probative value as to Petitioner’s competency in December 

2010 when he appeared before the trial judge to enter his plea. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s request to stay 

proceedings to factually exhaust this claim.

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 10 of 19
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

history that was being addressed. Under all of these circumstances, as the 5th DCA noted, there was 

simply insufficient evidence of incompetency to trigger any duty to act on the part of defense counsel. 

Hence, counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Petitioner’s argument is based upon Petitioner’s history of mental problems, his willingness to 

plead guilty to a crime that would trigger a Three Strikes sentence, and making several statements about 

the judge “playing with” Petitioner’s intelligence. (Doc. 31, p. 5). As to the latter, counsel 

characterizes these statements as “quasi-paranoid;” however, from a cold record, such a “diagnosis” is 

simply insupportable. Many reasons may exist for why Petitioner felt the court was “playing” with him

by repeatedly inquiring into his knowledge and understanding of what he was about to do. Although 

such repeated inquiries may have seemed unnecessary and overbearing to Petitioner and that fact that 

he was disturbed by the court’s such exhaustive inquiries, does not necessarily point to any mental 

incompetency. 

Regarding Petitioner’s “alacrity” to plead guilty, the decision was made after full consultation 

with counsel and with the knowledge that counsel disagreed with that strategy. Again, many reasons 

may exist for why Petitioner chose to go against counsel’s advice and many reasons may exist for why 

Petitioner chose to do so at that particular point in the proceedings. However, none of those reasons 

invariably points toward incompetency. 

Finally, Petitioner’s history of mental troubles was an established fact at the sentencing hearing. 

As mentioned, Petitioner was confined and undergoing treatment specifically for those troubles. It is 

circular reasoning to suggest that the mere fact that Petitioner was undergoing treatment establishes his 

incompetency. If the Court were to presume anything, it would be that Petitioner’s years of treatment 

would have made it far less likely that he was incompetent.

Regarding prejudice, the 5th DCA noted that Petitioner could not show that, had counsel 

requested a hearing, a better outcome would have been forthcoming because, under California law, 

defense counsel cannot force a competency hearing. Rather, the trial court must initiate that process 

based on his or her own perceptions of the defendant’s state of mind. The state court concluded that 

nothing in the record suggested Petitioner’s incompetency, and hence the trial judge was under no duty 

to order such a hearing. Because defense counsel could not himself initiate that process, no prejudice 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 11 of 19
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inured to Petitioner as a result. This is not a close case. The record is simply devoid of evidence that, 

as of the date of the entry of plea, Petitioner was incompetent. That being the case, counsel’s 

performance could not be deficient for failure to express a doubt about competency.

B. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel (Investigation, Plea Bargaining, And Sentencing)

1. Standard of Review

Respondent contends that Petitioner failed to raise this issue in state court and therefore it is 

unexhausted. Petitioner argues that the claim of inadequate investigation and failure to present 

evidence of mental incompetence at the plea bargain and sentencing stages, were sufficiently integrated

into the first ineffective assistance claim. The Court agrees with Petitioner.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state the initial opportunity to 

correct the alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose 

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and 

fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's 

factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 

112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 12 of 19
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

In his Traverse, Petitioner observes that his petition for review before the California Supreme 

Court expressly referenced not only counsel’s failure to express a doubt as to Petitioner’s competence 

but his failure to investigate Petitioner’s mental status for purposes of both entering a plea and, 

subsequently, sentencing under Three Strikes. (Doc. 31, p. 11). While sparse, the allegations “fairly 

present” the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate Petitioner’s mental 

condition for purposes of trial, plea, and sentencing. Accordingly, the Court determines the claim is 

exhausted.

When a state court decision on a petitioner's claims rejects some claims but does not expressly 

address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim 

was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091, 185 

L.Ed.2d 105 (2013). Moreover, where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no 

reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to 

determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852,

860 (9th Cir. 2011); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 13 of 19
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that when there is an adjudication on the merits but no reason 

for the decision, the court must review the complete record to determine whether resolution of the case 

constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply 

reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the 

state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.”). “[A]lthough we independently 

review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 

1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the 

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court 

decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, 

the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court 

to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Because the issue was presented to the state court and the state court did not issue a reasoned 

decision thereon, this Court will independently review the claim. In so doing, the Court, for the reasons 

set forth below, concludes that counsel’s performance was not deficient. 

2. Analysis.

As mentioned previously, Petitioner was housed in a confined treatment center at the time the 

events occurred giving rise to his conviction in this case. Petitioner’s mental health history was welldocumented and, presumably, well-known to both counsel and the trial judge. This context is crucial to 

the Court’s determination because the issue is not whether Petitioner was actually suffering some form 

of mental disability at the time he entered his plea, nor even whether, at the time he entered his plea, he 

was incompetent, but whether, at the time of the plea, circumstances existed and evidence was available 

such that no competent attorney would not have proceeded with entry of plea without expressing a 

doubt as to Petitioner’s competency and without seeking to further investigate the issue. 

The Court has already answered the question regarding a competency hearing in the negative.

Ground Two asks the same question in a slightly different fashion: whether those same facts, 

circumstances, evidence, and context would have prompted an attorney of reasonable competence to 

further investigate Petitioner’s mental state for purposes of entering a plea and sentencing. 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 14 of 19
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Undoubtedly, reasonable minds could differ on the answer, especially given the lengthy amount of 

information regarding Petitioner’s mental health history that would have been available to counsel. 

Petitioner has submitted evidence in the form of declarations suggesting that Petitioner was not 

consistent in taking prescribed medications and that, when not taking medications, he might be 

incompetent. 

The Court’s decision cannot be premised upon speculation or conjecture, which it most surely 

would be if based solely on a lengthy medical history that shows Petitioner’s progress and regression 

over many years, or, as Dr. Halon noted, the “chronic ups and downs of decompensation and 

recompensation.” (Doc. 31, Decl. of Robert L. Halon, p. 3). Petitioner’s mental health history, much 

of which is remote in time, his “alacrity” in changing plea, the “possibility” that he was not taking his 

medications, and the potential, but unknown, probative value of evidence that may have been produced, 

but was not must be weighed against other evidence. For example, the Court must consider the 

observations and interactions of the trial judge and defense counsel at the time of the plea, the lengthy 

questioning of Petitioner by the trial judge regarding the entry of the plea and waiver of constitutional 

rights, and the deference the Court must give to the state court’s adjudication. As mentioned, even upon 

independent review, the Court can afford habeas relief only when it is apparent that “there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. Weighing these 

competing considerations, and for the same reasons that the Court concluded that the state court’s 

adjudication of Ground One was not objectively unreasonable, the Court concludes that counsel’s 

failure to conduct a further investigation of Petitioner’s mental health for purposes of plea and 

sentencing was not objectively unreasonable. Having concluded that counsel’s performance was not 

deficient, the Court need not address prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion

We also reject Putney's claim that his 25–year–to–life sentence was constitutionally 

disproportionate. In determining whether punishment is constitutionally disproportionate, the 

courts examine the nature of the offense and offender, the punishment the same jurisdiction 

imposes for other offenses, and the punishment other jurisdictions impose for the same offense. 

(Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 290–291, overruled on another ground by Harmelin v. 

Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 964–965; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425–427.) A 

punishment involving “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “grossly out of proportion 

to the severity of the crime” violates the Eighth Amendment. (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 15 of 19
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. 153, 173.) A punishment “so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it 

shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity” violates article I, 

section 17 of the California Constitution. (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424, fn. omitted.)

California statutes imposing harsher punishment on recidivists have long withstood 

constitutional challenge. (See People v. Weaver (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 119, 125–126, and 

cases cited.) Putney argues his possession of the knife in the present case was a wobbler 

offense which involved no violence or physical harm, and when considered in conjunction with 

his background, character, and prior offenses, it is clear that his 25–year–to–life sentence shocks 

the conscience and is grossly disproportionate. We disagree. The primary goals of a recidivist 

statute “are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly

commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person 

from the rest of society for an extended period of time.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 

263, 284–285.) Defining that point in one's life and setting that time are both “matters largely 

within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 285.) Putney's sentence constitutes 

neither cruel and unusual punishment under the federal Constitution nor cruel or unusual 

punishment under the state Constitution. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17; see 

Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20–31; Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 66–

77; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516–1517.)

(ER 7, p. 11).

2. Federal Standard

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual that is “grossly disproportionate” to the 

crimes committed. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (holding that a California state court's 

affirmance of two consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life sentences for petty theft was not grossly 

disproportionate and not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law). See also Ewing v. 

California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life for theft under 

California's three strikes law was not cruel and unusual punishment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 

957, 961 (1991) (mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for first offense of possession 

of 672 grams of cocaine did not raise inference of gross disproportionality); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 

U.S. 263, 271 (1980).

Outside of the capital punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences that

are extremely and grossly disproportionate to the crime. United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th 

Cir.1992) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001). When reviewing an Eighth Amendment claim in a 

federal habeas corpus petition, the gross disproportionality principle is “the only relevant clearly 

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework” under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. The “gross disproportionality rule” applies “only in the 

‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72–73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. So 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 16 of 19
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

long as a sentence does not exceed statutory maximums, it will not be considered cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Mejia–Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 (9th 

Cir.1998); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir.1990). 

In assessing the compliance of a non-capital sentence with the proportionality principle, a 

reviewing court must consider “objective factors” to the extent possible. Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 

S.Ct. 3001 (1983). Foremost among these factors are the severity of the penalty imposed and the 

gravity of the offense. Id. at 290–91. If “a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 

sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” the reviewing court should 

compare the sentence with sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction and for the 

same crime in other jurisdictions. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. “Comparisons among offenses can be 

made in light of, among other things, the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, the 

culpability of the offender, and the absolute magnitude of the crime.” Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098. If a 

comparison of the crime and the sentence does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, 

a comparative analysis is unnecessary. Id.

3. Analysis

The Court concludes that no inference of gross disproportionality appears from the present 

record. As discussed previously, Petitioner had a long juvenile and adult criminal history, including 

serious sexual assaults and violence while incarcerated. The triggering offense for the Three Strikes 

sentence, i.e., possession of a dirk or dagger, was based upon conduct that represented a significant 

threat to the safety and security of inmates, medical staff, and correctional officers alike. The purpose 

of the Three Strikes law was to enhance sentences for recidivist offenders such as Petitioner. That is 

precisely how the law functioned in this case. Nothing in the record creates an inference of gross 

disproportionality. Even assuming that such an inference were justified, a comparison with other cases 

demonstrates that Petitioner’s sentence, while lengthy, was well within the range of recidivist sentences 

imposed in other cases and approved by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. See Andrade, 538 

U.S. at 77 (denying habeas relief on Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge to Three Strikes 

sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for stealing $150.00 in videotapes when petitioner 

had a lengthy but nonviolent criminal history); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008–09 (mandatory life sentence 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 17 of 19
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

without parole for first offense of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine is not so 

disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 37475, 102 S.Ct. 

703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding non-recidivist sentence of two consecutive 25 year 

prison terms for possession of nine ounces of marijuana and distribution of marijuana); cf. Solem, 463 

U.S. at 280–81 (sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent 

felony violates Eighth Amendment). 

Moreover, in cases arising on habeas review following the Supreme Court's decisions in 

Andrade and Ewing, the Ninth Circuit has frequently rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to 

California's Three Strikes Law sentences. See, e.g., Nunes v. Ramirez–Palmer, 485 F.3d 432, 439 (9th 

Cir.2007) (sentence of 25 years to life for crime of petty theft with a prior did not offend the 

Constitution where petitioner had extensive and serious felony record); Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 

1101–02 (9th Cir. 2006) (no Eighth Amendment violation where petitioner with prior offenses 

involving violence was sentenced to 25 years to life for possession of .036 grams of cocaine base); Rios 

v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2004) (sentence of 25 years to life for offense of petty theft 

with a prior imposed on petitioner with two prior robbery convictions was not objectively 

unreasonable); cf. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir.2004) (finding that habeas relief was 

warranted in “exceedingly rare” case where petitioner with minimal criminal history and no prior state 

prison sentence received a Three Strikes sentence for offense of petty theft with a prior); Gonzalez v. 

Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir.2008) (life sentence under California's Three Strikes law, triggered by a 

failure to register as a sex offender, violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment because there was no “rational relationship” between a failure to register and the 

probability defendant would recidivate as a violent criminal or sex offender).

Here, Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for possession of a dirk and dagger, 

and a finding that he previously suffered three prior violent or serious felony convictions. Petitioner's 

sentence is comparable to that of the defendants in Andrade and Harmelin, and allows for the 

possibility of parole, unlike Solem. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74; Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098 (eligibility 

for parole, albeit after 25 years, made California Three Strikes sentence “considerably less severe than 

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 18 of 19
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the one invalidated in Solem” ). For the above reasons, and in light of controlling jurisprudence, this 

Court cannot find that Petitioner's sentence is grossly disproportionate to his commitment offense.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1), be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 

days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10 days (plus three 

days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00771-LJO-JLT Document 33 Filed 03/11/16 Page 19 of 19