Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07232/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07232-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 1999 Decided June 25, 1999

No. 97-7232

Alvin Darrell Smith,

Appellant

v.

District of Columbia, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02029)

Caroline M. Brown, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief as amicus curiae on behalf of

appellant.

Alvin D. Smith, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

appellant.

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Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were John M.

Ferren, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to the "three-strikes"

provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28

U.S.C. s 1915(g), the district court denied appellant Alvin

Darrell Smith's application to proceed in forma pauperis in

his civil suit against prison officials, and dismissed his complaint without prejudice to his bringing a paid complaint.

Smith appeals the district court's order, and seeks to proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal. We conclude that he is not

entitled to in forma pauperis status in this court. We also

conclude that our denial of in forma pauperis status does not

make Smith liable for fees, although he must of course pay

the required fees in full if he wishes to proceed with his

appeal.

I. Background

Appellant Smith is a prisoner of the D.C. Department of

Corrections. On August 14, 1997, Smith mailed a complaint

to the U.S. District Court, bringing suit against the District

of Columbia, the D.C. Department of Corrections, and several

correctional officers. Smith alleged that his civil rights were

violated under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 when he was not allowed to

bring religious and educational materials when transferred

from Lorton Correctional Complex to a facility in Ohio.

Smith's complaint was accompanied by an application to

proceed in forma pauperis, and a prison trust account report

for the one-and-a-half-month period he had been at the new

facility.

On September 5, 1997, a district court judge issued an

order allowing the provisional filing of the complaint, but

requiring Smith to provide the court with a prison trust

account report from his previous institution. However, on

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October 30, 1997, a second judge issued an order denying the

application to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground that

Smith on at least three previous occasions had brought civil

actions that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for

failure to state a claim, so that he could not proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. s 1915(g). The district court cited

two cases in which Smith was plaintiff that were dismissed for

failure to state a claim on August 29, 1997 (CA No. 97-1987

and CA No. 97-1988) and one which was dismissed for failure

to state a claim on October 16, 1997 (CA No. 97-2485). After

denying in forma pauperis status, the order dismissed the

complaint without prejudice to Smith's right to file a paid

complaint.

Smith filed a notice of appeal encompassing the current

action as well as the three previously dismissed cases to

which the district court's order referred. The appeals from

the three earlier decisions were dismissed for lack of prosecution. Nos. 97-7233, 97-7231, 97-7230 (D.C. Cir. July 23,

1998). On August 17, 1998, Smith's application to proceed in

forma pauperis in this case was referred to this panel, and an

amicus was appointed on Smith's behalf.

II. The Three-Strikes Determination

Because Smith has not paid the required fees in this court,

our first question is whether he is entitled to proceed in

forma pauperis here. The District claims that 28 U.S.C.

s 1915(g) prevents Smith from proceeding in forma pauperis. Under that section, prisoners with three or more socalled "strikes" may proceed in forma pauperis only in very

limited circumstances:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal

a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this

section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,

while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

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unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.

28 U.S.C. s 1915(g). In the government's view, the three

dismissals cited by the district court all count as "strikes"

under this provision, since they were all for failure to state a

claim.1 However, amicus argues that none of these three

dismissals should count as strikes. In amicus's view, this

result follows from two propositions, both of which amicus

urges us to adopt. First, amicus asserts that we should

recognize that the three-strikes determination must be based

on the situation at the time an appeal or complaint is filed,

even if, as here, the decision regarding in forma pauperis

status is actually made some time later. Second, amicus

urges that dismissals should not count as strikes until appeal

has been exhausted or waived. Amicus claims that if these

two propositions are accepted, the three cited dismissals do

not count as strikes.

However, we conclude that even assuming that we accepted

amicus's two propositions as a general matter, each of the

three cited dismissals here would nonetheless count as

strikes, because the time for appeal of those dismissals had

expired when this appeal was filed. The first two of the

dismissals in question occurred on August 29, 1997, while the

third occurred on October 16, 1997. Under F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1),

the notice of appeal in a civil action must be filed within 30

days of the challenged order or judgment. A notice of appeal

by an inmate is treated as timely if it is deposited in the

institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for

filing. F.R.A.P. 4(c)(1). The 30-day time limit is " 'mandato-

__________

1 In addition to the three dismissals cited by the district court,

the government argues that two other dismissals, both prior to the

enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, should count as

strikes. Furthermore, our own examination reveals that Smith has

actually been the plaintiff in a total of seventeen civil actions while

incarcerated. Because we conclude that the three dismissals cited

by the district court all count as strikes under s 1915(g) for the

purposes of this appeal, we need not decide whether Smith has

other strikes as well.

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ry and jurisdictional.' " Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United

States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Here, the

notice of appeal of the three dismissals and the present case

was dated December 6, 1997, and was received by the district

court on December 11, 1997. Amicus argues that we cannot

determine whether the appeals from the three earlier dismissals were timely because it is not apparent from the

record on what date Smith mailed the notice of appeal. But

even if it is unclear precisely when the notice of appeal was

placed in the mail, it is clear that it could not have been

before December 6, the date Smith completed the notice.

Amicus also points out that the record "does not indicate

whether" any motions were filed which would have tolled the

time for filing a notice of appeal under F.R.A.P. 4(a)(4).

Amicus Br. at 12 n.3. But given that the docket contains no

mention of any such motions, it is not clear what other

"indication" amicus would want. Thus December 6 is the

earliest possible effective date of filing, which places Smith's

attempted appeals of the three earlier dismissals well outside

the 30-day period provided by F.R.A.P. 4(a).2

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2 It may well be that Smith's appeal in this case was also

untimely. However, because we determine that Smith is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis, we do not actually reach this

issue. Although Rule 4's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional,

determination of in forma pauperis status is in a sense logically

antecedent to the timeliness determination--an appellant who has

neither paid the full fees required nor been granted in forma

pauperis status is not entitled to have this court consider his appeal

at all, even to note untimeliness. We do not decide whether in

forma pauperis status is itself a jurisdictional issue. But see

Garcia v. Silbert, 141 F.3d 1415, 1417 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating

that s 1915(g) is not jurisdictional and electing to reach merits

although s 1915(g) precluded appellant from proceeding without fee

payment); Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1996)

("[T]here is no indication that Congress meant the new i.f.p. requirements to be jurisdictional."). However, we do conclude that

satisfaction of this court's fee requirements, either by full payment

or by a grant of in forma pauperis status and submission of the

initial partial payment required by s 1915(b), is an administrative

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Despite the fact that Smith did not appeal the three

dismissals at issue within the time period provided by

F.R.A.P. 4(a), amicus urges that the dismissals should not

count as strikes given that Smith filed notices of appeal of

those dismissals at the same time he filed his notice of appeal

in this case. In amicus's view, those dismissals should not

count as strikes because their appeal was "pending" when the

present appeal was filed. In other words, amicus would have

us allow a prisoner to convert what would otherwise have

been a strike into a non-strike by filing an untimely notice of

appeal. Clearly, to accept this argument would provide an

avenue for prisoners to effectively circumvent the threestrikes provision. A prisoner barred from proceeding in

forma pauperis by the existence of previous strikes could

avoid the intended consequences of s 1915(g) by filing untimely appeals of the dismissals constituting strikes. Amicus

offers no statutory justification for this view, and we decline

to adopt it. Even if district court dismissals do not count as

strikes while appeal is available, once the time for appeal has

expired, that is the end of the matter, and untimely attempts

to appeal do not change the situation. At the time this appeal

was filed, Smith had at least three previous dismissals in the

district court for failure to state a claim, and the time for

appeal of those dismissals had expired. It is of no import

that the appeals of the three dismissals at issue were actually

dismissed for nonprosecution rather than untimeliness. The

district court dismissals should not fail to count as strikes

simply because the untimely appeals of those dismissals suffered from other flaws as well. Thus even if amicus is correct

that we must assess the situation at the time of filing, and

that strikes do not count as long as appeal is available, these

propositions are of no help to Smith.

III. Liability for Fees

Having concluded that Smith is not entitled to proceed in

forma pauperis, we face the question of whether he now

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hurdle that we may properly require an appellant to clear before

considering even our jurisdiction to actually hear the appeal.

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becomes liable for the full filing and docketing fees, or

whether he need only pay the fees if he seeks to proceed with

his appeal. Under the PLRA, a prisoner allowed to proceed

in forma pauperis no longer escapes liability for fees. He is

simply permitted to pay the fees in installments rather than

in a single payment. 28 U.S.C. s 1915(b). Smith, however,

is not being allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus, he

must pay the full fees in advance if he wishes to pursue his

appeal. But must he also pay the full fees even if he does not

pursue his appeal?

Section 1915(b)(1) provides that "if a prisoner brings a civil

action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall

be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee." 28 U.S.C.

s 1915(a)(3). Thus the question is whether when a prisoner

files a notice of appeal and application to proceed in forma

pauperis, and his application is denied, we will treat him as

having "file[d] an appeal in forma pauperis" so that the fee

requirement attaches. Id. Although some courts have required prisoners to pay the full filing fee whenever their in

forma pauperis application is denied, see Newlin v. Helman,

123 F.3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1997); Henderson v. Norris, 129

F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181,

184 (2d Cir. 1996), it has not been our practice to do so. For

example, in Wooten v. District of Columbia Metropolitan

Police Department, 129 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we considered a prisoner's attempt to proceed in forma pauperis on

appeal after the District Court had certified that the appeal

was not taken in good faith. We agreed that the appeal was

not in good faith and therefore that Wooten could not proceed

in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. s 1915(a)(3). But we did

not then require him to pay the fees, instead noting that he

could choose to pay the $105 fees and pursue his appeal, or

that if he did not pay within 14 days, his appeal would be

dismissed. Indeed, given what we perceived as the appeal's

apparent lack of merit, we suggested that it would be "foolish" for Wooten to pay the fees and proceed. Wooten, 129

F.3d at 208. See also In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Cir.

1997). Similarly, several other circuits appear to follow the

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ing fee payment. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,

1182 (9th Cir. 1999); Banos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th

Cir. 1998); Keener v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation &

Parole, 128 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1997).

In accordance with our past practice, we will not require

fee payment here, unless Smith wishes to proceed with his

appeal. Section 1915(b)(1) imposes fee liability when "a

prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma

pauperis." 28 U.S.C. s 1915(b)(1). This wording differs

significantly from that of subsection 1915(a)(2), which requires a prisoner to file an affidavit of poverty and certified

copy of his prison trust fund account whenever "seeking to

bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action" in

forma pauperis. Id. s 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added). While

Smith is clearly seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, we will

not treat him as having "filed an appeal in forma pauperis"

when he has not been granted in forma pauperis status and

his appeal has not been considered.3 For the present purpose, we will deem a prisoner to have "file[d] an appeal in

forma pauperis" as soon as he has both filed a notice of

appeal and been granted in forma pauperis status, but not

before.

Although requiring prisoners denied in forma pauperis

status to pay the full fees even though their appeal is not

considered would arguably provide an additional deterrent to

prisoner filings, our disposition here can hardly be viewed as

encouraging prisoner appeals. Unless he pays the required

fees, Smith's appeal will be dismissed. In addition, our

conclusion that Smith has three strikes will allow summary

treatment of any future applications for in forma pauperis

status. In our view, requiring prisoners to pay the full fees

in such situations would create either administrative difficulty

or an incentive for the prisoners to continue to pursue their

appeals. If a prisoner did not have sufficient funds to pay the

fees, requiring immediate payment in full would result pri-

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3 He will, however, have filed a notice of appeal, so that our

conclusion has no implications for when the appeal is filed for

purposes of F.R.A.P. 4.

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marily in an ongoing collection effort for the office of the

clerk of this Court. If, on the other hand, a prisoner was able

to pay the fees in full, our requiring him to do so whether or

not he proceeded with his appeal would leave him no disincentive to proceeding--if the prisoner would be responsible for

the full fees in any case, it would only make sense for him to

continue to pursue his appeal. In contrast, by imposing the

fees only if a prisoner who has been denied in forma pauperis status proceeds further, our approach should give such a

prisoner every incentive to consider carefully whether his

appeal warrants further pursuit.

IV. Conclusion

Because Smith had three strikes at the time he filed this

appeal, we deny his application to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1915(g). If he pays the filing fee

within fourteen days of receiving the court's opinion and

order, then his appeal may proceed. If not, then it will be

dismissed. See Wooten, 129 F.3d at 208.

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