Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-01051/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-01051-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Torts to Land

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DIALYSIS CLINIC, INC., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CASE NO.1:10-CV-1051-WKW

) [WO]

BAY LINE RAILROAD, LLC, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On March 28, 2009, heavy rains flooded a business in Dothan, Alabama. 

Plaintiffs Dialysis Clinic, Inc., and Beazley Insurance Company, Inc., (collectively

“the Clinic”) claim Defendants Bay Line Railroad, LLC, and Chattahoochee Bay

Railroad, LLC, (collectively “the Railroads”) are to blame. The parties have filed

motions seeking to exclude all or part of the testimony of six expert witnesses. This

order will address only the Clinic’s motions to exclude the testimony of Chester

Rhodes and Burl Daniel (Doc. # 90), and Larry Young (Doc. # 91). For the reasons

that follow, the motions are due to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) confers subject matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction

and venue are uncontested, and there are allegations sufficient to support both.

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 1 of 9
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 and Daubert,

and its progeny. Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise

if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts

of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

In Daubert, the Supreme Court made it clear that Rule 702 assigns the trial

court a gatekeeping role to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence

admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509

U.S. 579, 589 & 597 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.

137, 141 (1999) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence ‘assign to the trial judge the task

of ensuring that an expert’s testimony rests both on a reliable foundation and is

relevant to the task at hand.’” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). This gatekeeping

responsibility is the same when the trial court is considering the admissibility of

expert technical evidence. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.

2

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 2 of 9
In the Eleventh Circuit, expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 if it

satisfies three broad requirements:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he

intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his

conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry

mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,

through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise,

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of

Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1999)). These

requirements are known as the “qualifications,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness”

prongs. See id.

Moreover, whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in

understanding the evidence or a fact in issue “goes primarily to relevance.” Daubert,

509 U.S. at 591. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is

not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The Fifth Circuit said it this way: Assisting the trier of fact means that “the

trial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more than the

lawyers can offer in argument.” Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir.

1992). 

3

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 3 of 9
In the end, however, the court’s gatekeeping role under Daubert “is not

intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Allison v. McGhan,

184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999). Where the basis of expert testimony satisfies

Rule 702, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and

careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of

attacking [debatable] but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

III. BACKGROUND

This case hinges upon resolution of a relatively simple question: Did the

Railroads cause the Clinic’s flood damage by improperly maintaining a culvert? To

answer that question, the parties have enlisted a slew of experts , and each side of this

dispute has moved to exclude select expert testimony of the other. This matter comes

before the court on two of those motions, which challenge the opinions of three

defense experts. (See Docs. # 90, 91.)

IV. DISCUSSION

At issue here is the expert testimony of Chester Rhodes, Burl Daniel, and Larry

Young. This opinion addresses each in turn.

A. Chester Rhodes

Chester Rhodes, an expert for the Railroads, has been involved in the railroad

industry for over forty years. In his report, Mr. Rhodes reaches three conclusions: (1)

4

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 4 of 9
there were no issues with the culvert prior to the storm;1

 (2) the corrugated metal pipe

was properly installed in the culvert prior to the storm; and (3) prior to the storm, the

Railroads were in full compliance with all applicable regulations.

1. On the Culvert’s Uneventful History

In his report, Mr. Rhodes’s bases his first conclusion on “review of depositions

by Dewayne Swindall and Jeff Richardson and my own personal knowledge.” (Doc.

# 101-1, at 6.) Mr. Rhodes’s personal knowledge is not a sufficient ground for this

opinion; even if there was a history of problems with the culvert, there is no reason

Mr. Rhodes would have known. Indeed, the Railroads could call virtually anyone to

testify that, based on his own personal knowledge, there was no history of issues with

the culvert. Absent some explanation of how Mr. Rhodes would have known of

problems with the culvert, his lack of such knowledge cannot be used to suggest

affirmatively there were none.

Mr. Rhodes’s first conclusion, then, is supported only by the deposition

testimony of two of the Railroads’ employees. One of those employees has been

designated as a witness who will testify at trial (Doc. # 110, at 2), and presumably the

other will be called to do so as well. Mr. Rhodes’s expertise does not appear to add

1

 Mr. Rhodes’s report actually says “no exceptions were taken to the subject culvert prior

to the flood.” (Doc. # 101-1, at 6.) The court follows the Railroads’ lead to paraphrase that

opinion as saying there were no issues with the culvert. (See Doc. # 101, at 4–5.)

5

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 5 of 9
anything to that testimony; rather, his report and the Railroads’ brief do not indicate

he did anything more than take the employees at their word and conclude there was

no history of issues with the culvert. Allowing Mr. Rhodes’s testimony on his first

conclusion would be needlessly cumulative and would not “help the trier of fact to

understand the evidence,” so it is due to be excluded. See Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702.

2. On the Corrugated Metal Pipe’s Proper Installation

Next, Mr. Rhodes concludes that the corrugated metal pipe extension was

properly installed before the storm of 2009. Even assuming Mr. Rhodes is qualified

to render an opinion on the installation of the pipe, nothing in his report suggests he

had any basis for concluding the pipe was properly installed before the flood. Mr.

Rhodes’s report states only that he visited the culvert in May of 2012. (See Doc. #

101-1, at 5.) By then, the old corrugated metal pipe that allegedly caused the flood

had been removed and replaced with a new one, which was properly installed in Mr.

Rhodes’s opinion. (See Doc. # 101-1, at 5.) 

The court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure expert testimony is the product of

“reliable principles and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Nothing in Mr. Rhodes’s report

or the Railroads’ arguments sheds any light on the methodology Mr. Rhodes

employed to conclude the old corrugated metal pipe was properly installed before the 

6

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 6 of 9
storm by inspecting a different pipe installed after the fact. As a result, Mr. Rhodes’s

second opinion must be excluded.

3. On the Railroads’ Regulatory Compliance

Finally, Mr. Rhodes concludes that “Chattahoochee Bay Railroad was in full

compliance with all applicable Federal Railroad Administration Regulations” prior to

the flood. (Doc. # 101-1, at 6.) In this circuit, however, it is well settled that “[a]

witness . . . may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the

jury’s only source of law. Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537,

1541 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Nicholson v. McCabe, No. CV-02-H-1107-S, 2003

WL 25676474, at *1 (N.D. Ala., June 2, 2003) (finding an expert’s opinion that a

defendant violated a federal regulation was an inadmissible legal conclusion). 

Further, as far as regulatory compliance is concerned, it does not appear that Mr.

Rhodes’s testimony would “bring to the jury more than the lawyers can offer in

argument.” Salas, 980 F.2d at 305. Accordingly, Mr. Rhodes’s legal conclusion that

the Railroads were in full compliance with federal regulations must be excluded.

B. Burl Daniel

Burl Daniel, an expert for the Railroads, opines that the Clinic could have

obtained renewal flood insurance had it chosen to repair the old building. (Doc.

# 101, at 22.) According to the Railroads, Mr. Daniel’s opinions are relevant to this

7

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 7 of 9
case because the Clinic argued replacement costs define the proper measure of damage

to the Clinic’s building. Because the court has now rejected that argument (see Doc.

# 122), Mr. Daniel’s testimony is no longer relevant. As a result, the Clinic’s motion

to exclude Mr. Daniel’s testimony is due to be granted.

C. Larry Young

In a twenty-three-page brief supported by 460 pages of exhibits, the Clinic

moves to exclude the testimony of Larry Young to the extent he would estimate the

cost of replacing storm-damaged dialysis machines. The Clinic does not move to

exclude Mr. Young’s calculation of the value of the damaged dialysis machines using

a cost-per-hour valuation. (See Doc. # 113, at 2.)

The Railroads oppose the motion in a ten-page brief supported by forty-two

pages of exhibits, arguing that “Young’s ‘cost-per-hour’ calculation is an essential

element in determining the diminution value of [the Clinic’s] property.” (Doc. # 105,

at 2 n.1.) The Railroads concede, however, that the “‘cost-per-hour’ calculation is the

more accurate reflection of the fair market value of the dialysis machines” when

compared to Mr. Young’s estimated replacement costs. (Doc. # 105, at 3 n.2.)

The Clinic’s six-page reply is largely devoted to pointing out that the lack of

disagreement between the parties on this point. Both the Clinic and the Railroads

agree Mr. Young should be allowed to testify on the cost-per-hour valuation of the

8

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 8 of 9
dialysis machines; neither the Clinic nor the Railroads have argued Mr. Young’s

testimony on replacement value should be admitted. The court will not second-guess

583 pages of filings that show no hint of meaningful disagreement, so the Clinic’s

motion to exclude Mr. Young’s testimony on replacement costs is due to be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that

(1) The Clinic’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Opinions of Chester Rhodes

and Burl Daniel (Doc. # 90) is GRANTED as to the opinions challenged

in that motion;

(2) The Clinic’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Larry Young (Doc.

# 91) is GRANTED as to the opinions challenged in that motion. 

DONE this 9th day of November, 2012.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9

Case 1:10-cv-01051-WKW-CSC Document 123 Filed 11/09/12 Page 9 of 9