Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00037/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00037-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GLEN I. TAYLOR, #127 254, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CASE NO. 2:12cv-037-TMH

 )

CYNTHIA DILLARD, ) (WO)

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This case is before the court on the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. #23), 

entered on March 27, 2014, and the Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. #26), filed on April 21, 2014.

Plaintiff has objected to the Recommendation that Defendants' Motion for Summary 

Judgment be granted with respect to his complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding his 

challenge to the constitutionality of Alabama's parole statute. 

The Magistrate Judge initially determined that Plaintiff's challenge to the alleged use of 

false information to deny him parole in 2009 was barred by the limitation period. Plaintiff 

maintains that as a request for declaratory judgment under Rule 57, F.R.Civ.P., his challenge to 

the constitutionality of Alabama's parole statute is not subject to a limitations bar. First, the 

Magistrate Judge indicated in a footnote that "[w]hile [plaintiff] requests that the instant matter 

be allowed to proceed as a declaratory action pursuant to Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201), the proper avenue is under a § 1983 action. See 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (prisoner may bring § 1983 action for declaratory and 

injunctive relief challenging constitutionality of state parole procedures)." Second, in his 

Case 2:12-cv-00037-TMH-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/25/14 Page 1 of 4
2

complaint, Plaintiff referred to the alleged use of false information during his 2009 parole 

hearing and the Magistrate Judge addressed this specific contention. See Doc. No. at pg. 18. The 

Recommendation did not bar Plaintiff's entire complaint on limitation grounds. This objection is 

without merit.

Plaintiff also raised an equal protection challenge, arguing that the parole board has 

granted parole to individuals convicted of sex offenses at a substantially lower rate over the past 

several years than to individuals convicted of non-sex related offenses ("at a ratio of some 5 to 1 

of all other offenders") and that parole is granted at a substantially disproportionate lower rate to 

white-surnamed prisoners than to comparable black-surnamed prisoners. The Magistrate Judge 

determined that "Plaintiff has generally alleged discrimination, but has not identified any nonspeculative, specific facts tending to suggest that any of the treatment he allegedly received from 

the Board was based on invidious racial discrimination. Plaintiff’s bald suspicions and assertions 

of discrimination are unsupported by specific factual allegations, and they are, therefore, 

insufficient to state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Plaintiff maintains in 

his objection that absolute proof does not have to be shown at this point in the proceeding and 

that he cannot be expected to provide specific details until he has engaged in discovery. He goes 

on to state that the mere fact that his complaint is lacking in detail is not grounds for dismissal. 

Contrary to this belief, a plaintiff in a §1983 action must state specific facts, not merely 

conclusory allegations, to support a claim. Plaintiff's unsupported and wholly conclusory 

allegations of equal protection violations are insufficient to state an equal protection violation. 

This objection is without merit.

Plaintiff then challenges Alabama's parole statute alleging that it is unconstitutionally 

vague, fails to give parole-eligible inmates sufficient notice of the requirements of suitability for 

Case 2:12-cv-00037-TMH-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/25/14 Page 2 of 4
3

parole, creates the insurmountable task of requiring the Board to possess the requisite personal 

knowledge of each parole-eligible inmate's suitability for parole, fails to define the stated 

parameters of the statute, requires the Board to predict future behavior - a task that is humanly 

impossible, and is so nebulous as to grant uncontrolled power as well as unlimited discretion to 

the Board in making its parole decisions. As he did in his complaint, Plaintiff argues in his 

objection that these issues lead to decision-making on an ad hoc and subjective basis with the 

attendant danger of arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory application. Doc. No. 26 at 6. 

Plaintiff relies on Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F.Supp. 1080, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), to support his 

claim that Alabama's parole statute is unconstitutional. In Cicero, the court granted class 

certification to a suit by prisoners in New York state correctional facilities which challenged the 

standards and methods by which the New York State Board of Parole granted or denied parole. 

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), Plaintiff's reliance on Cicero is unavailing. In Greenholtz, the 

Court determined that the United States Constitution does not create a liberty interest in parole. 

Nor does Alabama law create a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause in 

parole because the statutes governing parole are framed in discretionary terms. As fully 

explained in the Recommendation, because Alabama inmates have no protected liberty interest 

in parole, they cannot have a liberty interest in parole consideration or other aspects of parole 

procedures. Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Alabama, he cannot 

establish any claim for violation of due process in the procedures attendant to parole decisions. 

As the Recommendation, therefore, points out, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he is entitled 

to relief with regard to his parole challenges on the basis of a violation of the Due Process 

Clause. This objection is without merit.

Case 2:12-cv-00037-TMH-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/25/14 Page 3 of 4
4

After conducting an independent evaluation and de novo review of the file in this case, 

the court has determined all of the Plaintiff’s objections to be without merit, and they are hereby 

OVERRULED. The court ADOPTS the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and it is 

hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. #1) is DENIED.

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #18) is GRANTED.

3. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice, with costs taxed against the Plaintiff.

DONE this 25th day of April, 2014.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:12-cv-00037-TMH-SRW Document 27 Filed 04/25/14 Page 4 of 4