Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT I. REESE, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy DUNCAN 

BROWN (Badge #1220), and 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy ZACHARY 

ROSE (Badge #832), 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00559-GEB-DAD 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN 

LIMINE*

 Plaintiff moves in limine for a pretrial order 

precluding the admission of certain evidence at trial. Each 

motion is addressed below. 

 Motion in Limine No. 1 

 Plaintiff moves to preclude Detective Robert Tracy from 

“giving any bullet trajectory opinions in this case including his 

opinion, first stated in [his] May 28, 2015 declaration, that it 

was Deputy Brown’s round that struck Plaintiff.” (Pl.’s Mot. in 

Limine (“MIL”) No. 1 7:5-7, ECF No. 96.) Plaintiff argues: 

 

*

 These motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. 

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Detective Tracy’s bullet trajectory opinions 

in this case . . . constitute expert 

opinion . . . . Although there might be some 

circumstances under which there could be 

obvious general observations about bullet 

trajectories made that are not based on 

specialized knowledge, the bullet trajectory 

opinions in this case stated by Detective 

Tracy clearly do require specialized 

knowledge. Defendants did not disclose 

Detective Tracy as an expert witness . . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . Although a few courts have found 

that bullet trajectory evidence, under some 

circumstances, did not require “specialized 

knowledge” within the meaning of [Federal] 

Rule [of Evidence (“FRE”)] 702, the weight of 

authority clearly finds that bullet 

trajectory analysis requires at least some 

degree of specialized expertise.” 

 Relevant here, Detective Tracy’s 

statements are clearly based on scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge 

within the scope of [FRE] 702. Detective 

Tracy was not identified as an expert witness 

in this case and is not qualified to render 

expert opinion. . . . 

 . . . . 

 Detective Tracy was not a percipient 

witness to the shooting. His statements that 

he determined which round struck Plaintiff 

and that the round fired by Deputy Brown 

struck Plaintiff are opinions that are 

properly the subject of expert testimony 

only. Defendants did not disclose Detective 

Tracy as an expert witness in their 

Designation of Expert Witnesses Pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [(“FRCP”)] 

26(a)(2). Their failure to do so has 

prejudiced the Plaintiff’s case. 

 Detective Tracy’s bullet trajectory 

opinions at summary judgment came after all 

witness disclosure deadlines and thus 

deprived Plaintiff of an opportunity to seek 

a rebuttal ballistic expert. There was, 

further, no opportunity to seek a second 

deposition or to explore the bas[es] of 

Detective Tracy’s opinions and qualifications 

to render such opinions because discovery was 

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closed. As discussed at the final pretrial 

conference[,] it is undisputed that despite 

being assigned to review [Plaintiff’s] 

shooting, Detective Tracy did not include his 

bullet trajectory opinions in any report. If 

Detective Tracy acquired additional data or 

performed or obtained additional testing in 

regard to forming these opinions, there is no 

record of it. In the absence of a report, 

Plaintiff has no means of effectively crossexamining Detective Tracy about his bullet 

trajectory opinions. On all of these bases, 

defendants’ non-disclosure of Detective 

Tracy’s bullet trajectory opinions has 

prejudiced the Plaintiff’s case. 

(Id. at 2:20-3:18, 6:16-7:3 (citations omitted).) 

 Defendants oppose the motion, rejoining that “Det. 

Tracy is not being offered as an expert[; t]here is no per se 

rule that bullet trajectory or path of travel requires expert 

testimony.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s MIL No. 1 3:14-15, ECF No. 

119.) Defendants argue: 

Det. Tracy made observations about physical 

locations of evidence that allowed him to 

conclude about the likely path of travel. 

Here, physical location of the recovered AR15 round from a partition wall inside the 

apartment approximately five feet up, versus 

the evidence of a ricochet on the ground and 

recovered 9mm round lodged into a closet 

door, which appeared to be in line with the 

ricochet. Taking into account the approximate 

height of the wound, the conditions of the 

rounds, did not require specialized 

knowledge, but based on simply logic grounded 

in simple line-of-sight determinations. 

Indeed, photographs show the ricochet tear 

through the carpet, the path of travel 

through ottoman fabric, a hole in the closet 

door, to allow what appears to be an obvious 

likely path of travel. Such observations do[] 

not require specialized knowledge, but simple 

“line of sight” deductive reasoning. 

(Id. at 3:5-14.) 

 It is unclear precisely what bullet trajectory evidence 

is within the scope of the motion. Given the in limine record, 

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Plaintiff has not shown that certain bullet trajectory evidence 

concerning the nature of a hole or tear made by a bullet, or the 

direction from which the bullet(s) came in light of the 

referenced impact(s) is inadmissible under FRE 701. Therefore, 

the motion is DENIED. 

Motion in Limine No. 2

Plaintiff moves to “exclud[e] any evidence 

. . . [concerning Plaintiff’s] text messages recovered after the 

shooting[,]” including “a message dated ‘March 25’ from ‘Nathan,’ 

which reads, ‘U pulled a knife on brittany...u really should 

think about movin...soon...real talk.... im losin ur number after 

this text (sic).’” (Pl.’s MIL No. 2 2:2-4, 3:9-13, ECF No. 97.) 

Plaintiff argues: 

 This motion is based on four independent 

rationales. The first is that Plaintiff[’s] 

. . . text messages are plainly irrelevant 

since the defendant officers were neither 

aware of them at the time they used lethal 

force against Plaintiff, nor did the messages 

refer to any incident at issue in this case. 

Second, any argument that [Plaintiff] was 

engaged in any specific conduct based solely 

on his text messages (about his conduct on a 

separate occasion) would involve an improper 

inference based on [Plaintiff’s] alleged 

character. Third, any reference to these text 

messages would be highly prejudicial at trial 

in this case, and would also necessitate a 

mini-trial about the previous episode that is 

the subject of the text messages. [Fourth, 

the text messages are hearsay.] 

(Id. at 2:10-11, 3:14-22.) 

 Defendants counter: 

 These text messages are highly relevant 

and admissible under [FRE] 404(b)(2) to show 

Plaintiff’s motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of 

mistake or accident, and/or state of mind, in 

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answering the knocking on his door (by Deputy 

Rose) so close in time to these events. In 

other words, the text messages . . . are 

highly probative to show why Plaintiff opened 

the door in the manner the deputies 

observed. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s MIL No. 2 2:17-22, ECF No. 120.) 

Defendants further rejoin that “the text messages are relevant to 

show Plaintiff’s credibility.” (Id. at 3:15.) Defendants argue: 

[Plaintiff] claims to have been asleep at the 

time the deputies[] knocked, yet the 

quickness of the door opening with a knife in 

his hand after the knocks would reasonably 

imply Plaintiff was not asleep, and tends to 

impeach him in terms of his claim that he did 

not have any plan in opening the door, such 

as seeking to scare whoever was at the door. 

Regardless, where Plaintiff himself, sent a 

text, such is an admission of a party. That 

he admitted for example, that “any senseable 

[sic] person would at that time of night or 

morning should” in response to Nathan’s 

accusation of pulling a knife on Brittany 

supports a reasonable inference that 

Plaintiff did not deny doing so, put [sic] 

was admitting having done so in offering an 

explanation why he did so. The accusation of 

Nathan of “pulling a knife” would be offered 

to show what Plaintiff was responding to in 

its proper context. 

(Id. at 3:15-24 (first [sic] in original).) 

 [FRE] 404(b) is properly applied as 

follows: 

 “Upon objection . . . , the proponent of 

the evidence . . . should be required to 

identify the specific purpose or purposes for 

which [the party] offers the evidence of 

‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts.’ By so 

requiring, we do not mandate 

hypertechnicality. . . . Nevertheless, the 

[proponent’s] purpose in introducing the 

evidence must be to prove a fact that . . . 

[is] in issue . . . . 

 After requiring the proponent to 

identify the specific purpose for which the 

evidence is offered, the district court must 

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determine whether the identified purpose 

. . . is “material”; that is, whether it is 

“in issue” in the case. If the court finds it 

is, the court must then determine, before 

admitting the other acts evidence, whether 

the probative value of the evidence is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice under [FRE] 403. If the 

evidence satisfies [FRE] 403, then, after 

receiving the evidence, the district court 

must “clearly, simply, and correctly” 

instruct the jury as to the specific purpose 

for which they may consider the evidence.” 

United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 

1070, 1076-77 (6th Cir. 1996)). “Indeed, when a proponent of 

[FRE] 404(b) evidence contends that it is both relevant and 

admissible for a proper purpose, ‘the proponent must clearly 

articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical 

inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the 

defendant has the propensity to [act in a certain manner].’” 

Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 191 (3rd Cir. 2000) 

(quoting United States v. Morely, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 

1999)). 

 Here, Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden to 

admit the text messages under FRE 404(b). They have neither 

clearly identified a specific purpose permitted under FRE 404(b), 

nor shown that such purpose is material to this case. Cf. United 

States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating 

FRE 404(b) “allows the use of other-act evidence only when its 

admission is supported by some propensity-free chain of 

reasoning”; “caution[ing] against judicial freelancing in . . . 

[the FRE 404(b) limiting instruction] area”; and stating “the 

limiting instruction should be customized to the case rather than 

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boilerplate.”). 

 However, the in limine record lacks sufficient factual 

context for a pretrial ruling concerning whether any text message 

evidence is admissible for impeachment. Therefore, it has not 

been shown that the exclusion of this evidence can be decided 

before trial. 

Motion in Limine No. 3 

 Plaintiff seeks to “exclude evidence of [his] arrest, 

prosecution[,] and [misdemeanor] conviction” of violating 

California Penal Code section 417(a)(1),1

 arguing “there is no 

permissible purpose for admitting this evidence at trial.” (Pl.’s 

MIL No. 3 1:23-26, 2:8, ECF No. 98.) Plaintiff contends, inter 

alia: “[a]pplication of Heck v. Humphr[ey], 512 U.S. 477 (1994) 

as a potential bar to this civil suit has been . . . rejected”; 

Plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea to violation of section 

417(a)(1) is inadmissible against him under FRE 410(a)(2); 

evidence of the conviction is “not admissible as impeachment 

evidence under [FRE] 608, since the underlying conduct is not 

probative of Plaintiff’s character for truthfulness”; and 

“because there is no evidence regarding the factual basis for 

[his] no contest plea [in state court], its admission poses a 

high risk of misleading the jury, confusing the issues, causing 

undue prejudice[,] and wasting time.” (Id. at 3:3-4, 3:20-21, 

4:16-20, 7:26-28.) 

 

1

 California Penal Code section 417(a)(1) prescribes, in relevant part: 

“[any] person who . . . in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits 

any deadly weapon . . . in a rude, angry, or threatening manner . . . is 

guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not 

less than 30 days.” 

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 Defendants rejoin: “while reference to the plea or 

conviction may not be admissible for consideration by the jury, 

the conviction itself and underlying facts related to the 

conviction should be considered by the Court as a potential bar 

to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims under Heck v. Humphrey.” 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to MIL No. 3 2:4-7, ECF No. 121.) Except for 

Defendants’ argument under Heck, Defendants have not opposed this 

motion. 

 Defendants argue under Heck: 

[Plaintiff’s] nolo contendere plea to the 

charge under California Penal Code 417(a)(1) 

bars Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under 

Heck v. Humphrey, that specific findings by 

the jury in response to special factual 

interrogatories [in this federal lawsuit] 

may support the application of a Heck bar to 

Plaintiff’s claims . . . . 

(Id. at 2:7-11.) 

 However, Defendants’ Heck v. Humphrey defense was 

raised earlier in this action in a summary judgment motion, which 

was rejected by District Judge John A. Mendez (“Judge Mendez’s 

MSJ ruling”). (See MSJ Hr’g Tr. 5:23-10:14, ECF No. 68.) 

Defendants have not shown that Judge Mendez’s MSJ ruling does not 

foreclose the Heck v. Humphrey argument raised in opposition to 

this in limine motion. It was established during the summary 

judgment proceeding that there is no factual basis supporting 

Plaintiff’s plea, and Defendants have not shown a basis for 

reconsideration of Judge Mendez’s MSJ ruling. 

 Nor have Defendants shown that their opposition does 

not concern a substantive legal issue that was required to have 

been raised within the law and motion cutoff date prescribed in 

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the May 10, 2013 Status Order. (Status Order 2:6-19, ECF No. 12; 

see id. at 2:11-16 (“The parties are reminded that motions in 

limine are procedural devices designed to address the 

admissibility of evidence and are cautioned that the court will 

look with disfavor upon substantive motions presented at the 

final pre-trial conference or at trial in the guise of motions in 

limine.”).) 

 For the stated reasons, this in limine motion is 

GRANTED. 

Motion in Limine No. 4

 Plaintiff moves to exclude “any evidence, testimony, 

argument, or reference at trial to his own criminal history or 

prior bad acts[,]” arguing such evidence “is plainly irrelevant, 

. . . would involve an improper inference based on [Plaintiff’s] 

character[, and] . . . would be highly prejudicial at trial.” 

(Pl.’s MIL No. 4, 1:19-2:2, ECF No. 101.) 

This motion lacks the concreteness required for a 

pretrial in limine ruling. See, e.g., Weiss v. La Suisse, Soc’y 

D’Assurances Sur La Vie, 293 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 

2003) (denying motion to exclude evidence for a “lack[] of 

specificity[,]” stating “[n]o particular documents or testimony 

have been identified in the motion”); Colton Crane Co., LLC v. 

Terex Cranes Wilmington, Inc., No. CV 08-8525 PSG (PJWx), 2010 WL 

2035800, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2010) (stating “motions in 

limine should rarely seek to exclude broad categories of 

evidence, as the court is almost always better situated to rule 

on evidentiary issues in their factual context during trial”). 

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Motion in Limine No. 5

Plaintiff seeks to limit Defendants’ toxicology expert 

Dr. Richard Clark’s trial testimony as follows: to preclude him 

from testifying as to conclusions 1 and 2 in his report, to 

exclude his opinions that drugs and alcohol affected Plaintiff’s 

memory or caused him to act in a certain manner at the time of 

his interaction with Defendants Brown and Rose, and to exclude 

any testimony concerning cocaine usage. (Pl.’s MIL No. 5 2:2-8, 

ECF No. 103.) Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the referenced 

areas of testimony are addressed in turn. 

First, Plaintiff argues “Dr. Clark should be prohibited 

from testifying as to his conclusions numbered 1 and 2[,]” 

contending they “consist of one-sided recitations of some 

evidence in this case,” and are “neither based on Dr. Clark’s 

medical opinions nor [are] helpful to the jury.” (Id. at 4:10-

12.) Dr. Clark’s first and second conclusions are stated in his 

expert report as follows: 

 l. On March 25, 20ll around 0430 in 

the morning, a caller to 911 stated there was 

an individual who shot a gun and had a 

steak knife in his hand at Oakwood 

Apartments. The individual had fired the gun 

outside and entered apartment #144. The 

caller also noted the armed individual in 

apartment #144 was possibly high on drugs. 

Several deputies responded to the address 

provided by the caller. 

 2. The deputies decided to take a “low 

key” approach at the residence. They 

positioned themselves at the front and back 

of the apartment, but due to the potential to 

encounter an armed and intoxicated 

individual, several had their service weapons 

drawn. At approximately 0500, one of the 

deputies knocked on the front door of 

apartment #144. According to the deputies at 

the front door, shortly after the knocking, 

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the door flew open and a male subject (later 

identified as [Plaintiff]) began exiting the 

apartment holding a large knife extended 

above his head. The deputies noted 

[Plaintiff] to lean forward with the knife in 

a potential stabbing motion toward Deputy 

Rose. At that time, Deputy Brown fired one 

round from his rifle, striking Mr. Reese, 

followed by a shot from the service weapon of 

Deputy Rose which did not strike [Plaintiff]. 

(Clark Report 1, ECF No. 103, ECF p. 8 of 19.) 

Second, Plaintiff seeks to preclude Dr. Clark from 

testifying that alcohol and/or drugs contributed to Plaintiff’s 

behavior or caused him to act in a certain way, including Dr. 

Clark’s stated opinion “with medical probability that th[e] level 

of alcohol in his system and the presence of marijuana led to or 

contributed to his agitated and bizarre behavior.” (Pl.’s MIL No. 

5 4:13-15, 5:9-11, 5:24-25; Clark Report 3, ECF p. 10 of 19.) 

Plaintiff argues: 

 As a toxicologist, Dr. Clark is 

qualified to testify regarding the potential 

range of effects that drugs or alcohol can 

have on a person. However, there is no 

foundation for Dr. Clark to opine that the 

alcohol or drugs in Plaintiff’s system had 

any specific effect on his behavior, on the 

outcome of the incident, or on his recall of 

the events following the incident, on the 

night in question. Any . . . testimony that 

purports to determine what alcohol or 

marijuana “caused” [Plaintiff] to do . . . or 

how it affected him on a certain occasion is 

speculation. . . . Such opinions are also 

outside Dr. Clark’s expertise as a 

toxicologist. 

 . . . . 

 . . . Dr. Clark is qualified to testify 

as to what the effects of drugs or alcohol 

might be on a person, but he cannot know, and 

has conceded that he does not know how 

alcohol or drugs actually affected Plaintiff 

in this case. 

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(Pl.’s MIL No. 5 4:21-5:23.) Plaintiff further argues that such 

opinions are contrary to Dr. Clark’s deposition testimony “that 

he did not know whether drugs and alcohol affected Plaintiff’s 

behavior during the incident or whether Plaintiff’s drug and 

alcohol consumption prior to the shooting affected his recall of 

events afterwards.” (Id. at 4:16-5:5, 5:26-28.) 

 Third, Plaintiff seeks to preclude Dr. Clark from 

“testifying or opining about cocaine[,]” arguing “[a]lthough 

Plaintiff has testified that he consumed a line of cocaine the 

evening [before] the shooting, Dr. Clark has acknowledged that 

there is no medical evidence of any cocaine in his system such 

that it could have affected his behavior.” (Id. at 6:5-9.) 

 Defendants rejoin that Dr. Clark’s conclusions Nos. 1 

and 2 “reasonably appear to simply be Dr. Clark’s summary of the 

facts as he understood the material he reviewed, [as] such are 

not opinions, and Plaintiff is welcome to cross-examine Dr. Clark 

regarding any facts or assumptions made in forming his opinions.” 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s MIL No. 5 2:23-26, ECF No. 123.) 

Defendants further counter: 

[Dr.] Clark is a retained expert witness in 

behavioral toxicology, not just toxicology[, 

and] . . . he was [disclosed] as such: “Dr. 

Clark is an expert behavioral toxicologist 

and emergency room physician who will testify 

regarding the toxicology results in this 

case, and the effect of the drugs and alcohol 

used by Plaintiff on his behavior and the 

circumstances of the events in question.” 

Thus, where Plaintiff attempts to exclude his 

testimony because he improperly limits his 

expertise to just “toxicology”, such is 

improper. 

 . . . . 

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 Plaintiff also appears to seek to 

exclude Dr. Clark’s opinions based on alleged 

inconsistencies, or characterization of 

behavior of one who is under influence of 

drugs and alcohol. Defendants submit 

Plaintiff appears to misstate the opinions or 

confuse any distinction being made between 

quantification of affect, versus medical 

relational causation between the alcohol and 

drug use to behavior and memory. 

 In other words, it appears Plaintiff’s 

argument is not that Dr. Clark’s opinion[s] 

are not admissible under Daubert . . . but 

whether there was a sufficient factual basis 

to render an opinion, or his opinions are 

inconsistent. . . . [S]uch arguments do not 

render [his] opinion[s] inadmissible, but go 

to the weight of the opinions. 

(Id. at 2:4-3:8.) 

 Defendants’ arguments concerning Dr. Clark’s 

“conclusions” Nos. 1 and 2 do not demonstrate the probative value 

of the challenged information as it concerns the nature of Dr. 

Clark’s anticipated expert testimony. Further, other arguments 

raised by Defendants are unclear. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not 

shown that the permissible scope of Dr. Clark’s testimony can be 

decided before trial. Therefore, this motion is DENIED. 

Motion in Limine No. 6

Plaintiff moves to exclude certain defense 

reconstruction photos (Defs.’ Exs. N-1 through N-23) from trial, 

arguing they “were not timely disclosed[;]” are irrelevant “since 

they do not depict the shooting, and instead only reflect the 

defense use of force expert’s one-sided reconstruction of the 

event[;]” and “are more prejudicial than probative, since the 

jury could substitute [a one-sided] visual image for the 

necessary evaluation and weighing of the evidence presented on 

both sides.” (Pl.’s MIL No. 6 2:2-3, 3:7-15, ECF No. 95.) 

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 Concerning the timing of disclosure, Plaintiff 

contends: 

 The photographs at issue were not 

disclosed together with [Defendants’ use of 

force expert] Massad F. Ayoob’s [FRCP] 26 

report or as a part of any supplemental 

[FRCP] 26 disclosure. Instead, they were 

produced for the first time at Mr. Ayoob’s 

deposition. 

 . . . . 

 The expert witness disclosure deadline 

and rebuttal witness disclosure deadlines 

were February 27, 2015 and March 13, 2015, 

respectively. Given that the photographs were 

both in existence and in Defendants’ 

possession almost a full year prior to their 

disclosure, the failure to disclose is not 

substantially justified. 

 Plaintiff was prejudiced by the late 

disclosure in the form of unfair surprise at 

the deposition, which was being taken 

telephonically. The Defendants’ late 

disclosure left Plaintiff’s counsel with no 

reasonable opportunity to cross examine the 

expert, Mr. Ayoob about the photographs. 

Defendants clearly failed to comply with 

[FRCP] 26(a) in regard to these photographs 

and Plaintiff was greatly prejudiced. 

(Id. at 3:18-5:6 (citations omitted).) 

Defendants counter: 

while not provided as part of the expert 

report, the photographs were disclosed during 

the deposition of Mr. Ayoob in response to a 

request for production, and therefore the 

failure was harmless[;] are relevant[;] . . . 

and their probative value is not outweighed 

by any prejudice under [FRE] 403. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s MIL No. 6 1:27-2:2, ECF No. 124.) 

Defendants further assert concerning their argument that the late 

disclosure of the photographs was harmless: 

Here, while the expert report disclosures on 

February 27, 2015 admittedly did not include 

the photographs, the[y] were produced on 

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April 25, 2015. Counsel for Plaintiff did not 

seek to continue or postpone the deposition. 

Likewise, while acknowledging an opportunity 

to ask questions, [he] expressly determined 

not to. As this occurred six (6) months ago, 

any failure to disclose at the time of the 

report was cured by the disclosure at the 

deposition, and thus was harmless. 

(Id. at 3:17-21.) 

 “[FRCP 26] requires the parties to disclose the 

identities of each expert and, for retained experts, requires 

that the disclosure includes the experts’ written reports.” 

Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 827 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)). Such reports 

must contain, in relevant part: “(i) a complete statement of all 

opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for 

them; [and] . . . (iii) any exhibits that will be used to 

summarize or support them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis 

added). 

 “[FRCP] 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these requirements by 

forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be 

disclosed by [FRCP] 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.” Yeti 

by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Two express exceptions ameliorate the harshness of 

[FRCP] 37(c)(1): The information may be introduced if the 

parties’ failure to disclose the required information is 

substantially justified or harmless.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(c)(1)). “[T]he burden is on the party facing sanctions to 

prove harmlessness.” Id. 

Among the factors that may properly guide a 

district court in determining whether a 

violation of a discovery deadline is 

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justified or harmless are: (1) prejudice or 

surprise to the party against whom the 

evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that 

party to cure the prejudice; (3) the 

likelihood of disruption of the trial; and 

(4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not 

timely disclosing the evidence. 

Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. App’x 705, 713 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 

(7th Cir. 2003)). 

 Here, Defendants have shown that the late disclosure of 

the referenced photographs was harmless. Although Plaintiff makes 

a conclusory argument that he was “greatly prejudiced” by the 

disclosure of the photographs during Mr. Ayoob’s deposition, he 

has not shown how he has been prejudiced. The photographs are 

“merely illustrative” of Mr. Ayoob’s opinions and the bases 

therefore. Cabassa-Rivera v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., No. 05-

1217(JAF), 2006 WL 6870560, at *12 (D.P.R. May 2, 2006) (denying 

motion in limine to preclude expert from testifying about matters 

covered during deposition that were not contained in the expert’s 

report). Further, “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff[] w[as] 

surprised by what transpired at [the] deposition, [he] ha[s] had 

. . . ample time” to accommodate accordingly. Id. Mr. Ayoob was 

deposed on April 25, 2015, approximately six months before trial 

was scheduled to commence. 

 Further, Plaintiff has not shown that the photographs 

are irrelevant or should be excluded under FRE 403. 

 For the stated reasons, this motion is DENIED. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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Motion in Limine No. 82

 Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence concerning 

Plaintiff’s receipt of “any type of governmental financial 

assistance” as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, arguing “in 

today’s society[,] there may be jurors who take a dim view of 

someone who receives any sort of public assistance and, on the 

basis of poverty, denigrate the merits of [his] claim.” (Pl.’s 

MIL No. 8 1:23-24, 2:3-5, ECF No. 99.) Plaintiff further argues 

the Court “should . . . redact . . . any testimony or documents 

to the extent such . . . evidence reflects on his economic 

condition.” (Id. at 2:18-20.) 

 Defendants rejoin that “this evidence is relevant to 

Plaintiff’s claims for noneconomic damages, bias and motivation 

for suit, and does not run afoul of [FRE] 403.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to 

Pl.’s MIL No. 8 1:26-28, ECF No. 125.) Defendants argue: 

In this case, Plaintiff requests noneconomic 

damages from Defendants based on his post 

incident pain and suffering, and a diminished 

quality of life as a result of injuries he 

sustained from the shooting. Plaintiff 

identifies three separate testimonial 

witnesses . . . to testimony about the effect 

of the shooting on Reese’s “quality of life.” 

By making that damage claim, Defendants 

submit that Plaintiff has put his preshooting quality of life directly at issue. 

Therefore, Defendants must be allowed to 

explore different aspects of Plaintiff’s 

quality of life prior to the incident[, 

which] . . . may include . . . his financial 

condition. . . . In that regard, [that] there 

was a need for Plaintiff to participate a 

County General Assistance Program tends to be 

probative of the quality of his life before 

the incident on March 25, 2011. . . . 

Further, Plaintiff’s financial condition 

 

2

 There is no Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 7. (See Pl.’s Notice, ECF 

No. 104.) 

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before this lawsuit is directly relevant to 

bias against the County, and motivation to 

pursue this litigation against the County. 

For these reasons, Defendants submit that 

Plaintiff’s acceptance of public assistance 

by way of participation in a General 

Assistance program prior to the incident is 

relevant to his damages claims in this case 

. . . . 

(Id. at 2:22-3:12.) 

 Although it has not yet been decided how the jury will 

be instructed on the damages issues, it is understood that 

Plaintiff seeks pain and suffering damages under federal and 

California law. The California Supreme Court states in Capelouto 

v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93 (1972): 

In general, courts have not attempted to draw 

distinctions between the elements of “pain” 

on the one hand, and “suffering” on the 

other; rather, the unitary concept of “pain 

and suffering” has served as a convenient 

label under which a plaintiff may recover not 

only for physical pain but for fright, 

nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, 

mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, 

embarrassment, apprehension, terror or 

ordeal. 

 Here, Plaintiff has not shown that the source(s) of 

money Plaintiff receives for subsistence are not probative of the 

“nervousness,” “anxiety,” “worry,” and/or “apprehension” 

components of his claimed “pain and suffering” damages. Further, 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that such evidence’s relevance, in 

that regard, is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice that drawing [the asserted] adverse inference” could 

cause Plaintiff. Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 

1258, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Therefore, this motion is DENIED. 

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Motion in Limine No. 9 

 Plaintiff moves to exclude any evidence or reference at 

trial to “an encounter between Plaintiff . . . and his neighbors” 

that occurred before the shooting, arguing such evidence: is 

irrelevant “since the defendant officers were unaware of it at 

the time they used lethal force against Plaintiff”; is improper 

character evidence under FRE 404; and should be excluded as 

highly prejudicial. (Pl.’s MIL No. 9 2:2-13, ECF No. 102.) 

 This motion lacks the concreteness required for a 

pretrial in limine ruling. 

Motion in Limine No. 10 

 Plaintiff moves to “exclude Plaintiff’s unrelated drug 

and alcohol use,” arguing: “[e]xcept for [Plaintiff’s] blood 

alcohol and THC content at the relevant time and alcohol and 

marijuana consumption March 24-25, 2011, Plaintiff’s alcohol and 

drug use holds no probative value to the issues in this case[,]” 

and is highly prejudicial. (Pl.’s MIL No. 10 1:22-24 2:10-12, ECF 

No. 100.) 

 Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s “historical drug 

use/abuse is probative for purposes of damages[,]” arguing 

“Plaintiff’s past drug and alcohol use clearly affects his 

quality of life, in comparison from past to present, which in 

turn affects the calculation of damages.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s 

MIL No. 10 2:8-9, 2:19-21, ECF No. 127.) Defendants further 

rejoin: 

 In terms of unfair prejudice, 

Plaintiff’s argument that such evidence is 

prejudicial falls far short of whether its 

probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 

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of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence under [FRE]. 403. 

(Id. at 2:23-26.) 

 Plaintiff has not shown that this motion can be decided 

before trial. Therefore, it is DENIED. 

Dated: October 26, 2015 

 

 

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