Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08030/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHANITO SALAZAR BACA, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-8030 PCT GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

P. RIDER, et al., )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 5, 2008. See

Docket No. 1. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) on September 9, 2008. See Docket

No. 14. On October 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a pleading

captioned as a motion to withdraw his habeas petition, which was

signed by Petitioner on October 18, 2008. See Docket No. 15. 

I Procedural background

Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree

premeditated murder by a Navajo County jury. Answer, Exh. B at

5. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment

pursuant to this conviction. Id., Exh. B at 5. Prior to

Petitioner’s trial the state filed a motion in limine seeking to

allow impeachment of Petitioner’s credibility, if he chose to

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1

 The witness did not testify as to the crime committed by

Petitioner for which he was placed on probation.

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testify, by introducing evidence of a prior felony conviction

for burglary and a prior conviction for criminal damage. Id.,

Exh. B at 3. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion in

limine. Id., Exh. B at 3.

The testimony presented at Petitioner’s trial indicated

that he stabbed his victim after having an altercation with the

victim earlier in the day. Id., Exh. E. Two witnesses

testified the victim identified Petitioner by name as his

assailant. Id., Exh. E. A witness testified Petitioner

confessed stabbing the victim to them shortly after the crime.

Id., Exh. B at 2 & Exh. E. An eyewitness to the crime testified

she saw Petitioner stab the victim. Id., Exh. E at 170. This

witness also testified she had been drinking and using

methamphetamine prior to the commission of the crime. See id.,

Exh. E at 99-101 & 117-18. 

During presentation of the defense’s case, a lawenforcement witness was shown a copy of a court record and the

witness testified the record showed that the victim had

previously been convicted of a felony. Id., Exh. G at 540-41.

Upon cross-examination of this witness by the state, the witness

was shown a copy of a court record and the witness testified the

record showed that Petitioner had been sentenced to probation by

the Navajo County Superior Court. Id., Exh. G at 540-41.1 After

this statement by the law-enforcement witness, Petitioner’s

counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. Id., Exh. E at 541-

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2

 The trial court stated: “Ladies and gentlemen, I sustained

the objection to the last question. You’re to disregard that question

and also not to speculate as to why the objection was made. Thank

you.” Answer, Exh. G at 551.

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51 & Exh. B at 4. The jury was excused and argument heard, and

the objection was sustained; however, the motion for a mistrial

was denied. Id., Exh. E at 541-51 & Exh. B at 4. After the

jury returned to the courtroom, the jury was instructed to

disregard the question, and impliedly the answer, to which

defense counsel had objected and to not speculate about the

objection. Id., Exh. E at 551 & Exh. B at 4.2 

Petitioner did not testify at his trial and his counsel

argued during closing that the state had not met its burden of

proving Petitioner had committed the crime. Id., Exh. B at 5.

Counsel also argued that, alternatively, Petitioner’s actions

were self-defense or that the crime was manslaughter, rather

than premeditated murder. Id., Exh. B at 5.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Id., Exh. B at 5. Petitioner asserted in his direct

appeal that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to grant a mistrial after evidence of Petitioner’s prior

conviction was introduced, which evidence was improperly

elicited by the prosecutor; (2) he was denied his right to due

process of law because a law enforcement witness was allowed to

testify that Petitioner refused to submit to a warrantless

search of his person, i.e., an intoxilyzer test and a DNA test;

(3) the trial court erred by precluding a defense witness from

testifying contrary to the testimony of the person to whom

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Petitioner allegedly confessed, in violation of his federal

Sixth Amendment right to present a defense to the charges

against him. See id., Exh. B; Petition, Attach. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence in a decision issued August 23, 2005.

See Answer, Exh. B. Petitioner did not seek review of this

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court nor did he seek certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 2.

Petitioner filed an action for state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on July 18, 2006. See id.; Petition, Attach. Respondents

declare that Petitioner raised the claims stated in his federal

habeas petition in the Rule 32 action filed July 18, 2006, and

aver they have been unable to obtain a record of Petitioner’s

Navajo County Superior Court Rule 32 proceedings. See Answer at

2. 

The Navajo County Superior Court denied relief in the

Rule 32 action, although it is not known on what basis, i.e.,

waiver or default of the claims, or on the merits of the claims.

Id. at 2 & Exh. C. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review

of the Superior Court’s denial of Rule 32 relief in a decision

issued November 30, 2007. Id., Exh. C. 

Petitioner filed his section 2254 action on March 5,

2008. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were

violated. Petitioner contends the state failed to disclose

exculpatory evidence and also alleges that the prosecutor

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engaged in misconduct by introducing improper evidence.

Petitioner further maintains that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of trial counsel and that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Petitioner

seeks to have his sentence reduced to one commensurate with

second-degree murder or manslaughter, arguing he could not

properly be found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder

because the murder weapon did not belong to Petitioner. 

Respondents state that the petition “appears to be

timely,” but argue the petition must be dismissed because

Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal habeas claims by

presenting them to the Arizona Supreme Court. Answer at 3. 

The Court concludes, for the reasons that follow, that

Petitioner has properly exhausted his federal habeas claims by

raising them before the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct

appeal and in his first state action for post-conviction relief;

the prevailing legal precedent does not require that Petitioner

raise his federal habeas claims before the Arizona Supreme Court

to properly exhaust the claims. 

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

Absent particular circumstances, the Court should not

entertain the merits of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

before the petitioner’s state remedies have been “exhausted.”

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3

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that--

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the

applicant.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c) (2006 & Supp. 2008).3 Although it

may deny relief on the merits of an unexhausted claim, the

District Court may not grant federal habeas relief on the merits

of a claim which has not been exhausted in the state courts.

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728,

1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.

Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). 

To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule

upon the merits of the constitutional claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, including cases in which a term of

life imprisonment is actually imposed, the “highest court” test

of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

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either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence).

The Arizona Supreme Court has clearly stated that

Arizona state court remedies are “exhausted,” for federal habeas

corpus purposes, after a defendant sentenced to a term of life

imprisonment has been given each appeal to which he has a right,

i.e., review by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a direct appeal

or an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Crowell, 483 F.

Supp. 2d at 932 (D. Ariz. 2007); Arizona v. Sandon, 161 Ariz.

157, 158 (1989); Arizona v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 585 (1984).

The Sandon court held that “[o]nce the defendant has been given

the appeal to which he has a right, state remedies have been

exhausted” and “the case in the Arizona courts is over.” 161

Ariz. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221. 

Because Arizona criminal defendants do not have a right

of direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court except in cases

wherein the death penalty is actually imposed, see Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-4031 (2001 & Supp. 2007), and

because they have no right to appeal the denial of

post-conviction relief to the Arizona Supreme Court, any appeal

to this “highest court” is a remedy that is “unavailable” to

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4

 

In sum, the language in Swoopes on life sentences

was dictum unnecessary for the correct

disposition of that case. The subsequent

repetition of that dictum as dictum in other

cases does not change its character. Nor do any

of the dicta undercut the clarity of the

pronouncement by the Arizona Supreme Court,

together with the 1989 enactments of the Arizona

Legislature, that discretionary review in

non-capital cases is ‘unavailable’ for purposes

of federal habeas exhaustion. Petitioner

sufficiently exhausted.”

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Arizona defendants sentenced to a term of life imprisonment

within the meaning of Boerckel. In Crowell the District Court

concluded: “Arizona has plainly removed discretionary State

Supreme Court review from the standard review process for cases

carrying life sentences...” 483 F. Supp. 2d at 933. The

District Court determined, accordingly, that a petitioner

sentenced to a term of life imprisonment had exhausted his

federal habeas claims by submitting them to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. Id.4

B. Standard of review with regard to properly exhausted

claims for relief

“Habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ available

only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged and

for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation.’”

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1145 (2006), quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 633-34, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993).

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

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court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68

(2005); Cook v. Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 547 U.S. 1138 (2006). The Court must decide whether the

United States Supreme Court has “clearly established” the point

of law Petitioner relies upon as a basis for habeas relief by

examining the holdings of the Supreme Court, rather than the

opinions of the lower courts or the Supreme Court’s dicta. See

Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 653. 

Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has

clearly established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based

on a claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are

“without the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court

precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).

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If the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue

raised by Petitioner in its holdings, the state court’s

adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408

(2006). Therefore, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an

open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the

state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

by rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner.

Cook, 516 F.3d at 818, quoting Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 654; Crater

v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

The state Superior Court’s reasons for denying some of

the claims stated in the federal habeas petition, i.e., the

claims raised by Petitioner in his first state action for postconviction relief, are unknown. It is unknown if the state

court denied the claims summarily, for a procedural reason, or

based on the waiver or default of claims, or based on the merits

of the claims. Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Rule 32 relief

was summary. 

When more than one state court has adjudicated a

federal habeas claim, the Court must analyze the last “reasoned”

decision to determine if the state’s denial of relief on the

claim was clearly contrary to federal law. See Barker v.

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5

Under AEDPA, a federal court is permitted to

grant habeas relief only if the state court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ... If the state

court reaches the merits without providing

reasoning for us to review, however, “we

independently review the record to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its

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Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). When there is no “reasoned”

state court decision explaining the state’s denial of a claim

presented in a federal habeas petition, the District Court must

perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether

the state court’s decision summarily denying the claim was

objectively reasonable. See Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857,

863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008);

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890; Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742

(9th Cir. 2005).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

denying relief on the claim was contrary to clearly established

federal law, the Court must determine whether Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate

denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s

decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d

724, 734-36 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Larson v. Palmateer, 515

F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. ___, 77

U.S.L.W. 3201 (Oct. 06, 2008) (No. 07-11485).5

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application of Supreme Court law.” Brazzel v.

Washington, 491 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. ___, 77 U.S.L.W. 3201 (Oct. 06, 2008) (No. 07-11485).

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Petitioner bears the burden of proving his

constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Cook, 516 F.3d

at 816. Additionally, a section 2254 writ of habeas corpus is

available only when there has been a transgression of federal

law binding on state courts. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1567 (1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas relief may not be premised

on the mere allegation that something in the state court

proceedings was contrary to general notions of fairness; the

United States Constitution must specifically protect against the

alleged unfairness before the petitioner may obtain relief. See

Engle, 456 U.S. at 119, 102 S. Ct. at 1567; Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1088.

C. The merits of Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct by introducing improper evidence, i.e., the fact that

he had previously received a sentence of probation.

Petitioner asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to a

fair trial was violated, and his rights pursuant to Brady v.

Maryland were violated, because the Navajo County attorney did

not disclose to Petitioner or his counsel an exhibit, i.e., a

probation report, which was the exhibit shown to the defense

witness which elicited their statement that Petitioner had been

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placed on probation. Petitioner contends the introduction of

this evidence prejudiced him notwithstanding the trial court’s

instruction to the jury regarding this testimony. See Petition

at 6. 

Petitioner alleges he exhausted this claim in his

direct appeal. In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the

trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial

after evidence of Petitioner’s prior conviction was introduced.

Petitioner also alleged the prosecutor had improperly elicited

the testimony that Petitioner had previously been convicted.

Construing the claim as one asserting the trial court abused its

discretion in denying a mistrial because there was erroneously

admitted testimony, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded

Petitioner was not deprived of any right by the denial of the

mistrial. The Court of Appeals concluded the curative

instruction and that the “jury did not consider in deliberating

their verdict that [Petitioner] had previously been convicted

and placed on probation.” Answer, Exh. B at 7. Accordingly,

the Court of Appeals determined, there was no reasonable

probability that the verdict would have been different absent

the admission of this fact. Id., Exh. B at 7-8. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decisions that Petitioner

was not denied his right to due process of law or a fair trial

because evidence of a prior bad act was admitted, and that the

trial court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial

based on the introduction of the evidence, were not clearly

contrary to federal law. 

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To be entitled to habeas relief on a claim of erroneous

admission of evidence, the petitioner must demonstrate the error

had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s

verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22;

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431,

1435 (1986); Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir.

1994). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has never

held that the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s

prior bad acts per se violates the United States Constitution.

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5, 112 S. Ct. 475, 484

n.5 (1991); Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046-47 (9th Cir.

2008). 

Petitioner’s case is distinguishable from the cases

wherein a trial court admits prior bad acts evidence without

giving a limiting instruction, and the failure to do so is found

to violate the defendant’s right to due process. Additionally,

the United States Supreme Court has never squarely held that the

failure to give the limiting instruction violates the

defendant’s right to due process. See, e.g., Kater v. Maloney,

459 F.3d 56, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2006). In this matter the trial

court did not “admit” the evidence, although it denied the

motion for a mistrial based on the fact the evidence was

elicited by the state and heard by the jury. The trial court

instructed the jury to disregard to the question, in effect

instructing the jury to disregard the answer. Accordingly,

there is no “clearly established” federal law, i.e., a Supreme

Court holding, in support of the proposition for relief asserted

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by Petitioner.

The improper admission of “prior bad acts” evidence

violates a defendant’s right to due process if it infringes on

a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision, or if

the introduction of the evidence deprives the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See, e.g.,

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). However,

a federal court “cannot disturb on due process grounds a state

court’s decision to admit prior bad acts evidence unless the

admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that

it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id.

The Supreme Court has established a general principle

that the admission of evidence which is “extremely unfair” to

the defendant, may violate the defendant’s right to due process.

See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S. Ct. 668,

674 (1990); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir.

2006). However, “[a] state court’s evidentiary rulings can form

the basis for federal habeas relief under the due process clause

only when they were so conspicuously prejudicial or of such

magnitude as to fatally infect the trial and deprive the

defendant of due process.” Parker v. Bowersox, 94 F.3d 458, 460

(8th Cir. 1996). The improper admission of evidence, which a

habeas petitioner contends was unduly prejudicial, has violated

the petitioner’s right to due process only when there were no

permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the

evidence. See Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.

1998).

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Given the testimony in this matter, i.e., that the

victim identified Petitioner as his assailant to two people

before he died, and the testimony of the eyewitness who watched

Petitioner stab the victim, the fact that Petitioner had

previously committed an infraction for which he received a

sentence of probation was not likely to have had a substantial

and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision in this regard was not

clearly contrary to established federal law. 

Petitioner also couches this habeas claim as one

asserting prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of Brady v.

Maryland. Petitioner alleges that the state failed to disclose

evidence to him, i.e., the fact of his prior convictions and the

state court docket report indicating he had been convicted and

placed on probation, and that this “failure” violated his

federal constitutional rights, citing Brady v. Maryland.

The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v.

Maryland that a defendant’s right to due process of law is

violated when the government fails to disclose evidence that is

material to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. See 373 U.S.

83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). 

This duty extends not only to exculpatory

evidence but also to “evidence that the

defense might have used to impeach the

Government’s witnesses by showing bias or

interest.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.

667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375 [] (1985).

Evidence is material if “there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.”

Id. at 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375. To prove

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materiality, a defendant need not demonstrate

that it is more likely than not that he would

have received a different verdict with the

evidence; rather, reasonable probability’ of

a different result is ... shown when the

government’s evidentiary suppression

‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434,

115 S. Ct. 1555, [] (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S. Ct. 3375).

Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 578 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding the

government’s failure to disclose a leniency deal with a witness

was reversible error).

In order to prevail on a Brady claim presented in a

federal habeas action, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1)

the evidence at issue was favorable to the petitioner, either

because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was

suppressed by the government, either willfully or inadvertently;

and (3) prejudice resulted. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527

U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). If the

petitioner was aware of the essential facts enabling him to take

advantage of any exculpatory evidence at the time of his trial,

however, the government does “not commit a Brady violation by

not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense.”

United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1978), quoted

in Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner has not established a Brady violation. The

state moved to introduce Petitioner’s prior convictions at his

trial. Petitioner himself knew of his prior convictions, and

the prior convictions were not exculpatory. Accordingly, the

state court did not err in concluding Petitioner’s

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constitutional rights were not violated by the alleged “failure”

to disclose Petitioner’s prior convictions to Petitioner.

2. Petitioner further argues that he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984) (requiring the habeas petitioner to

identify the specific acts of counsel which constituted their

deficient performance to exhaust the claim); Moorman v. Schriro,

426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding a petitioner could

not argue ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas

action if they had not raised the specific factual basis for the

claim in the state courts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2984

(2006); Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004).

The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable

professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2054.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

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537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (internal quotations

omitted). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added). To succeed on an assertion his

counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel failed to

raise a particular argument the petitioner must establish the

argument was likely to be successful, thereby establishing that

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v.

McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.

Ct. 722 (2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 177 (2007).

Petitioner alleges he exhausted his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim by raising it in his direct appeal.

Petitioner contends his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel did not stipulate to Petitioner’s prior

convictions, allowing this information to be introduced at trial

instead via the cross-examination of the defense witness with

the probation report. The alleged error was not deficient

performance; counsel attempted to keep the fact of Petitioner’s

prior convictions from the jury and moved for a mistrial when

the fact that Petitioner had been on probation was elicited from

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6

 Ground III of the petition restates the claims made in

Claim I and again alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment

rights by the introduction of the evidence that Petitioner had

previously been convicted and placed on probation. The supporting

argument in this section of the petition is extremely vague, and the

undersigned concludes the claim is addressed in the section of the

Report and Recommendation dealing with Petitioner’s first claim for

habeas relief.

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a defense witness. Additionally, any stipulation to the fact of

a prior conviction would have allowed the introduction of the

fact to the jury, albeit not in the manner which actually

occurred during the trial. Furthermore, there is no indication

that the alleged error was prejudicial to Petitioner; the

overwhelming evidence introduced at his trial, including the

eyewitness testimony, was more likely the reason for the jury’s

verdict than any assumption drawn from the fact that Petitioner

was on probation.6

Petitioner maintains there was insufficient evidence

introduced at his trial to support his conviction.

Petitioner contends his Fifth Amendment rights were

violated because there was no evidence presented at the trial

that the murder weapon belonged to him, or that connected him to

the murder weapon, i.e., DNA or fingerprint evidence.

Petitioner alleges he exhausted this claim by raising it in his

first state action for post-conviction relief. Petitioner

asserts the state denied this claim as waived because Petitioner

did not raise the claim in his direct appeal. 

An assertion that a verdict is against the “weight of

the evidence,” as distinguished from a claim that the evidence

was legally insufficient, is not cognizable as a basis for

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federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d

1097, 1105 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal habeas court has no

power to grant habeas corpus relief because it finds that the

state conviction is against the ‘weight’ of the evidence ...”);

Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1922) (“a writ of

habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence

...”); Cameron v. Birkett, 348 F. Supp. 2d 825, 838 (E.D. Mich.

2004). This is because a verdict against the weight of the

evidence is not an error of federal constitutional dimension

unless the record is so devoid of evidentiary support that a due

process issue is implicated. See Cukaj v. Warren, 305 F. Supp.

2d 789, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 

Accordingly, the test for federal habeas relief is not

whether the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence,

but whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

See Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 648 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

A District Court’s review on habeas asks only the question of

whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to prove

all of the elements of the offense for which the petitioner was

convicted. Cameron, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 838.

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient evidence was

introduced at trial to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction,

the Court must decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light

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7

The inquiry is based upon the entire record and

the reasoning process actually used by the trier

of fact, known or not, is not considered.

[Jackson] at 319 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (“The

question of whether the evidence is

constitutionally sufficient is of course wholly

unrelated to the question of how rationally the

verdict was actually reached.”).

The amendments to the habeas corpus statutes set

forth in AEDPA have added an additional degree of

deference to state courts' resolution of

sufficiency of the evidence questions. See

Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir.

2000) (noting that, if a state court has

addressed a sufficiency of the evidence claim,

the federal court’s review in a habeas proceeding

is governed by § 2254(d)).

Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003).

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most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) (emphasis in original). See also Juan

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1276 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

546 U.S. 1137 (2006). Additionally, a petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief if the evidence is merely

susceptible to an interpretation other than the defendant’s

guilt. Jackson, 433 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2725; United

States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992).7 

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the record

is so totally devoid of evidentiary support for the challenged

conviction as to violate due process. See Crow v. Eyman, 459

F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972). Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to support a petitioner’s guilty verdict. Jackson,

442 U.S. at 324-25, 99 S. Ct. at 2792; Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d

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557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence to support

a murder conviction when the “evidence was almost entirely

circumstantial and relatively weak”); Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d

538, 547 (8th Cir. 2005) (“This case is similar to a host of

others in which this Court affirmed convictions based solely on

circumstantial evidence despite our recognition that alternate

possibilities existed”).

As noted supra, there was a great deal of evidence

presented at Petitioner’s trial that he was the individual who

stabbed the victim, including eyewitness testimony and the

statements of two witnesses that the victim told them Petitioner

was the person who had stabbed him. Evidence was presented that

Petitioner and the victim had argued earlier in the day.

Accordingly, Petitioner was not convicted of first-degree

premeditated murder, rather than second-degree murder or

manslaughter, in violation of his right to due process of law or

a fair trial.

IV Conclusion

Petitioner properly exhausted his federal habeas claims

by presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct

appeal or in his timely state action for post-conviction relief.

However, the state court’s decision that Petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights were not violated as he asserts was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Petitioner’s motion to “withdraw” his habeas petition states

that he does not have proper access to legal assistance and that

he “has been procedurally denied proper state access to relief,

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but upon this showing of cause and prejudice” asks the Court to

dismiss his petition to allow him to exhaust his claims in the

state courts. As noted supra, Petitioner has exhausted his

claims and, accordingly, the motion to withdraw should be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Baca’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

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of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 27th day of October, 2008.

 

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