Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” and consequently failed to pay them overtime 

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wages, failed to provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium 

wages in lieu thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. 

(See generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 

147).) 

Charter now moves to dismiss (1) Count Five of 

plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, alleging unlawful 

calculation, deduction, and payment of commission wages, to the 

extent that it is based on alleged violations of Labor Code 

sections 204 and 2751; (2) Count Nine of the complaint, alleging 

violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., in its entirety; and

(3) Count Ten of the complaint, alleging violation of 

California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. 

Code §§ 2698 et seq., in its entirety. (See Mot. to Dismiss

(Docket No. 163).)

I. Facts & Procedural History

Much of this case’s factual and procedural background 

is set forth in the court’s accompanying Order addressing 

plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order and for Leave 

to File a Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the court will 

not repeat it here except where relevant to the instant motion.

Plaintiffs worked for Charter in California, either as 

Account Executives or as Direct Sales Representatives, for 

varying periods from January 2015 until March 2020. (SAC at 

¶¶ 5-9.) Lionel Harper, the initial plaintiff in this action, 

worked for Charter until March 2018. (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

On September 14, 2018, after his employment had ended, 

Harper filed a notice with California’s Labor and Workforce 

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Development Agency (“LWDA”) (the “Notice”), sending a copy to 

Charter, to notify them of Charter’s alleged violations of the 

Labor Code. (See SAC, Ex. 2 (“Notice”) at 1.1) In the Notice, 

Harper identified himself as “a former employee of Charter 

Communications, LLC,” specified that he sent the letter “on 

behalf of [himself] and all aggrieved employees,” and noted that 

he intended to bring a civil PAGA action absent notice from the 

LWDA that it intended to investigate the alleged violations. 

(See id. at 1-2.)

Following an arbitration through JAMS, and after Harper 

did not receive notice from the LWDA that it intended to 

investigate, on May 3, 2019 he filed a complaint against Charter 

in Shasta County Superior Court (1) alleging the same Labor Code 

violations, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated 

individuals; (2) alleging violation of the UCL; and (3) bringing 

a representative PAGA action seeking civil penalties for the 

alleged Labor Code violations. (See Docket No. 1-1.) 

Charter removed the case to this court on May 17, 2019. 

(See Docket No. 1.) Harper subsequently amended his complaint 

twice, to add plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal, 

on December 13, 2019 and June 4, 2021. (See Docket Nos. 45, 

147.) He also subsequently submitted three amended notices to 

the LWDA, to reference the other plaintiffs and to add additional 

detail, on September 9, 2020, June 11, 2021, and July 15, 2021. 

(SAC, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 147); Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 1 & 

1 Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint marks this notice 

as “Exhibit 1,” though it is the second exhibit included in the 

complaint. For purposes of this order, the court refers to 

plaintiffs’ exhibits by the sequence in which they appear.

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22 (Docket No. 170-2).)

II. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 

dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the 

allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although legal conclusions 

“can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported 

by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.

A. Counts Five (Commission Payments) and Nine (UCL)

In light of the court’s accompanying Order Re: 

Defendant’s Motions to Compel Arbitration, the court will deny

Charter’s motion to dismiss Count Five of the Second Amended 

Complaint in part and Count Nine in its entirety as moot, without 

prejudice, as to plaintiffs Harper, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal. 

Further, because the court has stayed resolution of those claims 

2 Plaintiffs’ opposition to the instant motion likewise 

labels multiple exhibits as “Exhibit 1.” The court refers to 

them in the same manner as noted in the previous footnote.

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pending arbitration, (see id.), the court will also deny the same 

portions of Charter’s motion to dismiss as moot, without 

prejudice, as to plaintiff Sinclair. Because only the resolution 

of plaintiff Harper’s PAGA claim has not been stayed, in this 

order the court will only substantively address Charter’s motion 

to dismiss Count Ten of the complaint.

B. Count Ten (PAGA)

Charter seeks to dismiss plaintiff Harper’s PAGA claim 

in its entirety, contending that because of various alleged 

deficiencies in Harper’s initial notice to the LWDA, he has 

failed to satisfy PAGA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. 

(See Mot. to Dismiss at 12-22 (Docket No. 163).) In particular, 

Charter argues that the Notice was fatally deficient for purposes 

of the PAGA claim because the Notice (1) failed to identify the 

“aggrieved employees” on whose behalf Harper sought to bring a 

representative PAGA action, (2) failed to set forth sufficient 

“facts and theories” to provide the LWDA an adequate basis for 

deciding whether to investigate the alleged violations and to 

provide Charter an adequate basis for deciding whether and how 

vigorously to defend itself, and (3) omitted certain theories 

under which Harper alleges Labor Code violations under his PAGA 

claim; and because (4) the amended notices Harper subsequently 

submitted to the LWDA cannot suffice to cure these deficiencies 

because they were submitted after PAGA’s statute of limitations

had run and after this litigation had commenced. (See id.)

1. PAGA Background and Requirements

PAGA was enacted to remedy systemic underenforcement of 

worker protections. Williams v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 5th 531, 545 

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(2017). To achieve this goal, PAGA allows an employee to bring a 

civil action against an employer for violations of the Labor 

Code. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a).

“First, however, the employee must give ‘written notice 

. . . to the [LWDA] and the employer of the specific provisions 

. . . alleged to have been violated, including the facts and 

theories to support the alleged violation.’” Alcantar v. Hobart 

Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cal. Lab. 

Code § 2699.3(a)(1)); see Arias v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 

981 (2009) (same). Then, if the LWDA notifies the employee and 

employer within 60 days that it intends to investigate the 

alleged violation(s), or if no notice is provided within 65 days, 

the employee may bring suit. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(A).

PAGA’s notice requirement was implemented to “allow[ ] 

the [LWDA] to act first on more serious violations such as wage 

and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure 

less ‘serious’ violations.” Dunlap v. Super. Ct., 142 Cal. App. 

4th 330, 338-39 (2d Dist. 2006) (quoting Cal. S. Rules Comm., 

Off. of S. Floor Analyses, Bill Analysis for SB1809, at 5-6 (Aug. 

27, 2004)); see also Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1057 (notice 

requirement exists “to allow the [LWDA] to intelligently assess 

the seriousness of the alleged violations” and “permit the 

employer to determine what policies or practices are being 

complained of so as to know whether to fold or fight”); Williams, 

3 Cal. 5th at 545-46 (purpose of LWDA notice requirement “is to 

afford . . . the LWDA[ ] the opportunity to decide whether to 

allocate scarce resources to an investigation, a decision better 

made with knowledge of the allegations an aggrieved employee is 

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making and any basis for those allegations”). 

To effectuate these goals, courts adjudicating PAGA 

claims require that plaintiffs serving as PAGA representatives 

have “compl[ied] with the statute’s notice requirements” before 

bringing suit. See Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1056; Brown v. Ralphs 

Grocery Co., 28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 834-36 (2d Dist. 2018); Khan 

v. Dunn-Edwards Corp., 19 Cal. App. 5th 804, 808-810 (2d Dist. 

2018). “Considering the remedial nature of legislation meant to 

protect employees,” however, in evaluating compliance courts 

“construe PAGA’s provisions broadly, in favor of this 

protection.” Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 83 

(2020).

2. Amendments and Operative Notice

Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the Notice might 

have insufficiently described the “facts and theories” Harper 

alleges in his PAGA claim, those inadequacies have been cured by 

subsequently filed amended LWDA notices. (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Dismiss at 37-38 (Docket No. 170).) However, as the court 

explained in its accompanying Order addressing plaintiffs’ Motion 

for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, amended LWDA notices 

filed after PAGA’s statute of limitations has run and after a 

civil PAGA action has commenced cannot support that PAGA claim. 

Accordingly, in evaluating whether PAGA’s notice requirements 

have been satisfied in order to decide the instant motion, the 

court will look to the original notice.

3. Identification of Aggrieved Employees

In moving to dismiss plaintiff Harper’s PAGA claim, 

Charter first argues that the Notice was inadequate to satisfy 

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PAGA’s prerequisites to suit because it did not specify who the 

“aggrieved employees” Harper sought to represent were. (Mot. to 

Dismiss at 8 (Docket No. 163).)

Although PAGA’s “facts and theories” provision does not 

reference employees other than the one who submits a notice to 

the LWDA and subsequently brings a civil action, see Cal. Lab. 

Code § 2699.3(a)(1)(A), PAGA defines “aggrieved employee” as “any 

person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom 

one or more of the alleged violations was committed,” id. at 

§ 2699(c). Courts interpreting PAGA’s notice provisions have 

also read into them a requirement that the other employees whom 

the primary employee seeks to represent be sufficiently 

identified. See, e.g., Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 836 n.5; 

Briggs v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, LA CV18-08457 JAK (AFMx), 2020 WL 

6260001, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020).

In Brown, the operative LWDA notice identified the 

plaintiff as an “hourly-paid security guard,” but referred to the 

employees whom she sought to represent simply as “aggrieved 

employees.” 28 Cal. App. 5th at 830. In light of the various 

statutory violations alleged in the notice, however, which was 

two pages long, the California Court of Appeal was able to “infer 

. . . that the other ‘aggrieved employees’ [we]re non-exempted, 

hourly-paid workers employed by defendants and against whom 

defendants committed the alleged Labor Code Violations.” Id. at 

830, 836 n.5. On this basis, the court “conclude[d that] the 

. . . Notice sufficiently identified the other aggrieved 

employees.” Id. at 836 n.5.

By contrast, in Briggs, upon which Charter relies, (see

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Def.’s Reply at 13 (Docket No. 187)), the notice “fail[ed] to 

provide any specific factual allegations to support any of 

Plaintiff[’]s claims under the Labor Code,” including identifying 

the aggrieved employees the plaintiff sought to represent. 2020 

WL 6260001, at *8. Instead, it referred only to “other former 

and current employees.” Id. at *6. The Briggs court compared 

this situation to that in a prior case, wherein the notice had 

identified the aggrieved employees as “all other similarly 

situated current and former non-exempt hourly employees of 

Sunrise Senior Living Management during the four years preceding 

the date of this notice,” which the court had deemed adequate, 

and determined that the Briggs plaintiff’s notice was 

insufficient. Id. at *8 (citing Shiferaw v. Sunrise Senior 

Living Mgmt., Inc., 2:13-cv-02171-JAK-PLAx, 2016 WL 6571270, at 

*19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016)).

Here, Harper’s notice is readily distinguishable from 

the one in Briggs.3 Through his PAGA claim, Harper “seek[s] to 

recover civil penalties . . . on behalf of the State of 

California, Plaintiffs, and all outside salespersons and 

commission-eligible employees in California . . . who were 

aggrieved . . . during the relevant PAGA period.” (SAC at ¶ 98 

3 Further, to the extent that the approaches taken by the 

courts in Briggs and Brown differ, this court will adopt the 

approach taken in Brown, which appears to be the most relevant 

decision from a California court of appeal interpreting this 

requirement. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1052, 1052 

n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (state appellate courts’ interpretations of 

state statutes entitled to deference by federal courts except 

where in conflict with higher state courts or where the federal 

court is “convinced that the highest court of the state would 

decide to construe the statute otherwise”) (quoting West v. Am. 

Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)) (alterations adopted).

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(Docket No. 147).) This is plainly more specific than the “other 

former and current employees” referenced in the Briggs notice. 

Further, although the Notice does not directly define 

“aggrieved employees” as including “commission-eligible 

employees,” it nonetheless alleges that “[Charter] recruits and 

incentivize[s] sales employees like [Harper] by emphasizing their 

ability to earn commissions” and goes on to allege numerous 

commission-related violations committed against them. (See

Notice at 4 (Docket No. 147).) This language readily lends 

itself to the inference that “aggrieved employees” here includes 

employees occupying sales roles who were paid -- or who were 

eligible to be paid -- commissions. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th 

at 836 n.5.

Likewise, although the Notice does not include

plaintiffs’ allegation that many of the claimed violations were 

due to Charter’s alleged misclassification of them as outside 

salespersons, as Charter observes, (see Mot. to Dismiss at 1, 16

(Docket No. 163)), it repeatedly refers to “nonexempt employees 

like [Harper].” (E.g., Notice at 3 (Docket No. 147).) The 

complaint’s basic contention as to this group of employees is 

that they, like the named plaintiffs, were “misclassified as 

exempt,” i.e., exempt from Labor Code requirements the violation 

of which the complaint alleges. (See SAC at ¶¶ 13-15 (Docket No. 

147).) Although somewhat less strong than the inference 

regarding commission-eligible employees, a similar inference may 

also be drawn from the Notice as to employees referenced in the 

complaint who were allegedly misclassified. Accordingly, the 

court concludes that the Notice adequately identifies the 

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“aggrieved employees.”

In its reply, Charter also argues that, because the 

portion of the Notice alleging violation of Labor Code sections 

226, 432, and 1198.5 does not specify that employees other than 

Harper experienced such violations, the Notice failed to advise 

the LWDA that he sought to challenge these violations on a 

representative basis, precluding him from doing so here. (See

Def.’s Reply at 12 (Docket No. 187).) In support of this 

argument, Charter relies on Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp., 19 Cal. 

App. 5th 804 (2d Dist. 2018). There, the California Court of 

Appeal held that because the plaintiff’s notice specified that it 

only advised the LWDA of his own claims against his employer, 

making no reference whatsoever to any other current or former 

employees, it failed to indicate that he sought to bring a 

representative action, which is the only type of action that may 

be brought under PAGA. See id. at 809-10, 810 n.1.

Charter argues that under Khan, Harper may not 

challenge alleged violations of sections 226, 432, or 1198.5 

because the relevant portion of the Notice did not reference 

other employees. However, the Notice here is quite different 

than the one in Khan. Whereas in Khan, the plaintiff made clear 

that his notice did not challenge any violations on behalf of 

other employees, see id. at 807 (observing that the notice stated 

that it “shall constitute written notice . . . of my claims 

against my former employer,” and that the plaintiff “admitted 

that his notice . . . ‘does not reference any other current or 

former employee besides [him]’”), here the Notice states at its 

outset, “[O]n behalf of Employee and all aggrieved employees, 

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this letter gives written notice to the [LWDA] and to [Charter]

of serious and ongoing violations of the California Labor Code,” 

(Notice at 1 (Docket No. 147)).

Accordingly, the Notice makes clear that Harper sought 

to challenge the violations alleged therein on a representative 

basis, notwithstanding the fact that one portion of the Notice 

does not specify this. Indeed, in Khan, the court examined two 

prior cases, one in which a plaintiff’s notice “referred to 

‘employees’ and employees’ ‘wage statements,’” and another in 

which the notice “advised the agency that counsel represented 

[the plaintiff] ‘in a potential class action,’” and observed that 

those notices had “sufficiently suggested claims on multiple 

employees.” See Khan, 19 Cal. App. 5th at 809-10 (quoting York 

v. Starbucks Corp., CV-08-07919 GAF (PJWx), 2012 WL 10890355, at 

*4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012); Gonzalez v. Millard Mall Servs., 

Inc., 09-cv-2076-AJB(WVG), 2012 WL 3629056, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 

21, 2012)). 

Here, because the Notice’s references to other 

employees are even more prevalent, it sufficiently suggested that 

Harper sought to pursue a representative claim as to all alleged 

Labor Code violations, including sections 226, 432, and 1198.5. 

See Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1148-49 

(C.D. Cal. 2019) (despite fact that notice’s allegations of one 

violation only referenced plaintiff, fact that notice’s opening 

language stated intent to represent “all impacted employees” 

“sufficiently suggested claims on behalf of aggrieved employees” 

for purposes of that violation, distinguishing Khan).

4. Sufficiency of Facts and Theories in Notice

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In its motion, Charter also argues that the Notice does 

not set forth sufficient “facts and theories,” as the term is 

used in the PAGA statute, to have adequately informed the LWDA or 

Charter of the alleged violations. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 16-21 

(Docket No. 163).) Specifically, it argues that the Notice is 

inadequate because it fails to reference plaintiffs’ allegation 

that they were misclassified. (See id. at 16.) It also contends 

that many of the Notice’s allegations merely recite the 

requirements of the relevant Labor Code provisions and assert 

that Charter did not comply with them, and argues that 

consequently, the Notice does not satisfy PAGA’s administrative 

exhaustion requirement, requiring dismissal of Harper’s PAGA 

claim. (See id. at 16-21.)

For support, Charter cites Alcantar, 800 F.3d 1047. 

There, the plaintiff’s notice, in its entirety, read as follows:

Our offices have been retained by Joseluis 

Alcantara [sic] (Plaintiff). Plaintiff is a 

former employee of ITW Food Equipment Group, 

LLC aka Hobart Service (Defendant). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant (1) failed 

to pay wages for all time worked; (2) failed 

to pay overtime wages for overtime worked; 

(3) failed to include the extra compensation 

required by California Labor Code section 

1194 in the regular rate of pay when 

computing overtime compensation, thereby 

failing to pay Plaintiff and those who 

earned additional compensation for all 

overtime wages due; (4) failed to provide 

accurate wage statements to employees as 

required by California Labor Code section 

226; (5) failed to provide reimbursement for 

work related expenses as required by Labor 

Code § 2802; and, (6) failed to provide off- duty meal periods and to pay compensation 

for work without off-duty meal periods to 

its California employees in violation of 

California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 

512, and applicable Industrial Welfare 

Commission orders. Said conduct, in 

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addition to the forgoing, violated each 

Labor Code section as set forth in 

California Labor Code section 2699.5.

Id. at 1057 (alterations in original). As the Ninth Circuit 

observed, “The only facts or theories that could be read into 

this letter are those implied by the claimed violations of 

specific sections of the California Labor Code—that [defendant]

failed to pay wages for time worked, failed to pay overtime wages 

for overtime worked, failed to include the extra compensation 

required by § 1194 in the regular rate of pay when computing 

overtime compensation, and so on.” See id. Accordingly, it held 

that the notice -- “a string of legal conclusions with no factual 

allegations or theories of liability to support them” -- was

“insufficient to allow the [LWDA] to intelligently assess the 

seriousness of the alleged violations.” See id.

Since Alcantar, the California Supreme Court has also

spoken to the degree of detail that an LWDA notice must include. 

In Williams, it stated that “[n]othing in . . . section 2699.3, 

subdivision (a)(1)(A), indicates the ‘facts and theories’ 

provided in support of ‘alleged’ violations must satisfy a 

particular threshold of weightiness, beyond the requirements of 

nonfrivolousness generally applicable to any civil filing.” 

Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 545. 

In Brown, the California Court of Appeal interpreted 

these decisions in the course of evaluating the sufficiency of an 

LWDA notice. It observed that, under Alcantar’s reasoning, “the 

notice provision requires something more than bare allegations of 

a Labor Code violation.” Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 836 (citing 

Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1057). However, it nonetheless took a 

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somewhat permissive approach. For example, where the notice, in

alleging that the defendant failed to maintain accurate or 

complete wage statements under Labor Code section 226, alleged a 

“failure to include the [employer’s] name and address” on those 

statements, the court held that “[t]his minimal fact supports the 

alleged violation, making the . . . Notice adequate.” See id. at 

838. Nevertheless, the court deemed the notice deficient as to 

other claims, where, for example, the plaintiff simply alleged 

that “she and other aggrieved employees ‘did not take all meal 

and rest periods and were not properly compensated for missed 

meal and rest periods’ in violation of [Labor Code] sections 

226.7 and 512.” See id. at 837.

Brown thus most clearly illustrates the standard to be 

applied in evaluating the sufficiency of an LWDA notice: Where an 

allegation in an LWDA notice simply recites Labor Code 

requirements and asserts that the defendant failed to adhere to 

them, those allegations are typically insufficient to support a 

PAGA claim as to those violations. See id. at 836-38; Alcantar, 

800 F.3d at 1057; Briggs, 2020 WL 6260001, at *7; Mays, 354 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1147. On the other hand, where an allegation 

includes even “minimal fact[s]” beyond that, it is generally 

sufficient to support an associated PAGA claim. See Brown, 28 

Cal. App. 5th at 838; Bowen v. Target Corp., EDCV 16-2587 JGB 

(MRWx), 2020 WL 1931278, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020) 

(notice need not “lay out an intricate factual basis for [an 

employee’s] claims” or include “extensive specificity,” but 

rather is sufficient if it “does more than merely recite a 

‘string of legal conclusions’”) (quoting Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 

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1056); Mays, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (notice “‘is sufficient’ . . 

. if ‘it contains some basic facts about the violations’”) 

(quoting Green v. Bank of Am., N.A., 634 F. App’x 188, 190 (9th 

Cir. 2015)); see also Kim, 9 Cal. 5th at 83 (courts are to 

“construe PAGA’s provisions broadly, in favor of [employee] 

protection”). 

Further, this court agrees with Judge Birotte in the 

Central District of California that, where a complaint puts 

forward multiple theories of recovery under a single section of 

the Labor Code, the notice need not describe each and every one,

see Mays, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1148, so long as it adequately 

advises the LWDA of the scope of the alleged violations under 

that section, see Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 545-46.

a. Misclassification Allegations

At the outset, Charter argues that because plaintiffs’ 

overarching basis for their allegations is that Charter 

misclassified them as exempt -- which Charter terms their 

“central, indispensable theory” -- the Notice, in light of PAGA’s 

“facts and theories” requirement, cannot support Harper’s PAGA 

claim as to any alleged violation because it omits this detail. 

(See Mot. to Dismiss at 16 (emphasis omitted) (Docket No. 163).)4 

As precedent makes clear, however, this argument is unavailing. 

Although aggrieved employees are required to at least 

include some “minimal detail[s]” in LWDA notices beyond the 

requirements of Labor Code provisions an employer has allegedly 

violated, they are not required to comprehensively explain the 

4 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Notice omits this 

detail. (See Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 33-35 (Docket No. 170).)

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basis of the alleged violations. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 

836-38; Bowen, 2020 WL 1931278, at *5. Nor are they required to 

explain how a broader practice by an employer resulted, in turn, 

in the individual alleged violations, so long as they provide

some details about those violations. See Bowen, 2020 WL 1931278, 

at *4-5 (rejecting argument that plaintiff’s failure to 

“specifically identify the theory of her on-premises rest period 

claim” rendered her notice insufficient because the notice 

nonetheless advised the LWDA of “some of the facts and theories 

in her on-premises rest period claims . . . , including all 

violated provisions of the Labor Code”). Accordingly, so long as 

Harper’s notice satisfies these standards, it is sufficient even 

absent specific reference to misclassification.5

5 Charter contends that, “as other courts have held,” 

Harper was “required” to include reference to misclassification 

in the Notice. (See Def.’s Reply at 13-14 (Docket No. 187).) 

However, the decisions Charter cites in support of this 

contention have not, in fact, so held. Sinohui, the only one 

that dismissed a PAGA claim, did so specifically because the 

notice “assert[ed] no facts to support the alleged violations,” 

which failed to distinguish it from the notice in Alcantar. See

Sinohui v. CED Ent., Inc., EDCV 14-2516-JLS (KKx), 2016 WL 

3406383, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2016). In fact, because of 

this deficiency, the court expressly declined to reach arguments 

the defendant had made about misclassification. See id. at *4. 

Conde, which upheld a PAGA claim where the notice 

included the plaintiff’s allegation that she had been 

misclassified, did so because this allegation represented one of 

the few details of any kind the notice included beyond listing 

statutory requirements, distinguishing it from Alcantar; although 

Conde found this detail sufficient, nowhere did it indicate that 

it was necessary. See Conde v. Open Door Mktg., LLC, 223 F. 

Supp. 3d 949, 971-72 (N.D. Cal. 2017). In Stevens, where the 

plaintiff likewise alleged misclassification in her notice, the 

court observed that this was one of many details it included, and 

concluded that together these were sufficient; again, the court 

nowhere indicated that this particular detail was necessary. See

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b. Labor Code Allegations

Charter also argues that most of the specific Labor 

Code violations alleged in the Notice do not set forth “facts and 

theories” sufficient to support the corresponding claims in 

Harper’s PAGA action, but rather simply list the relevant Labor 

Code requirements and assert that Charter violated them. (See

Mot. to Dismiss at 16-21 (Docket No. 163).)

i. Minimum and Overtime Wage Violations

The Notice’s first set of allegations, alleging failure 

to properly calculate and pay minimum and overtime wages in 

violation of Labor Code sections 510, 1182.12, and 1197, 

summarizes those sections’ requirements: Employers must pay 

employees at least the applicable minimum wage for all hours 

worked, with specified overtime rates for hours worked beyond 

eight hours in a day, forty hours in a week, and so on. (See

Notice at 2 (Docket No. 147).) It then states, in part: 

“Defendant regularly required employees during training to work a 

full day and then complete homework after the work day ended. 

The training and homework combined required employees to work 

more than 8 hours in a day, but Defendant did not keep track of 

Stevens v. Datascan Field Servs. LLC, 2:15-cv-00839-TLN-AC, 2016 

WL 627362, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016). 

Finally, Patel and Casida only discussed 

misclassification in the context of class actions, and neither 

discussed PAGA’s notice requirements, making them inapposite. 

See Patel v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., 14-cv-04781-RS, 2016 WL 

1241777, at *1, 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016); Casida v. Sears 

Holdings Corp., 1:11-cv-01052 AWI JLT, 2012 WL 3260423, at *8 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 

WL 3763621 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012). Further, all of these 

cases predated Brown and Williams, meaning they could not 

consider the guidance those decisions offered, as this court has.

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or pay employees all wages for the time worked over 8 hours in a 

day or 40 hours in a week during training.” (Id. at 3.) It also 

alleges that Charter likewise failed to track hours worked 

outside of training weeks and consequently failed to pay 

employees overtime wages. (See id.)

By specifying that these alleged violations occurred 

both during and after training periods, and that, during training 

periods, they were the result of Charter requiring employees to 

complete homework after a full day of work, the Notice does more 

than repeat the statutory requirements and allege violation 

thereof, thereby clearing the “minimal facts” threshold. See

Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 838. It is therefore sufficient to 

support Harper’s PAGA claim as to Charter’s alleged violations of 

Labor Code sections 510, 1182.12, and 1197.

ii. Meal and Rest Break Violations

In its next set of allegations, alleging failure to 

provide uninterrupted meal and rest breaks or pay premium wages 

in lieu thereof in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 

512(a), the Notice proceeds in a similar fashion. After 

summarizing the statutory requirements, it alleges, in part, that

Charter “does not require or allow [Harper] and other nonexempt 

employees to clock-out and clock-in for each meal period and 

accurately record the existence and length of each meal period 

taken.” (Notice at 3 (Docket No. 147).) In doing so, it 

provides detail beyond that which is “implied by the claimed 

violations of specific sections of the California Labor Code,” 

Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1057 -- in part because these sections make 

no mention of clocking in or out for meal breaks, see Cal. Lab. 

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Code §§ 226.7, 512(a) -- and therefore is sufficient to support 

the PAGA claim as to these alleged violations.

iii. Commission Wage Violations

Next, the Notice alleges unlawful deductions of 

commission wages in violation of Labor Code sections 221, 223, 

224, and 2751. (See Notice at 4 (Docket No. 147).) After 

listing the statutory requirements, the Notice goes on to allege, 

in part, that Charter “recruits and incentivize[s] sales 

employees like [Harper] by emphasizing their ability to earn 

commissions,” “fails to pay all amounts owed” under its allegedly 

“unlawful and unfair compensation terms,” and consequently “has 

not paid [Harper] and similarly situated employees all of the 

commission wages they are owed.” (Id.) Because the Notice 

provides additional context beyond that implied by the statutory 

requirements, it gave the LWDA adequate notice under PAGA, 

notwithstanding its failure to specify how the commission 

compensation terms were allegedly unlawful and unfair, as Charter 

argues it was required to do. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 18 (Docket 

No. 163).)

Charter argues that the commission-related allegations 

are further deficient in that they do not include various 

specific violations of section 2751 that plaintiffs allege in the 

Second Amended Complaint, such as Charter’s alleged failure to 

give employees a fully signed copy of commission agreements or to 

clearly state in those agreements when commissions would be 

calculated, earned, and paid. (See id. at 18-19.) As noted

above, however, Harper was not required to describe each and 

every alleged violation of a particular Labor Code section that 

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he would ultimately include in the operative complaint, so long 

as the allegations were sufficient to apprise the LWDA of the 

scope of the violations. See Mays, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1148; 

Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 545-46. 

In addition to the already-noted details, this portion 

of the Notice also advised the LWDA that Charter allegedly “fails 

to perform all of its obligations under the [compensation] terms” 

and “relied on methods for the computation and payment of 

commissions that are not set forth in [those] terms.” (Notice at 

4 (Docket No. 147).) While these allegations lack the detail 

included in some of the other commission-related allegations, 

together they adequately conveyed the scope of the alleged 

violations to the LWDA. Accordingly, this set of allegations is 

sufficient to support Harper’s PAGA claim as to the alleged 

violations of sections 221, 223, 224, and 2751.

iv. Wage Statement Violations

The Notice also alleges failure to maintain accurate 

records and wage statements in violation of Labor Code sections 

226 and 1174(d). (See id. at 6.) After summarizing the 

statutory requirements, the Notice alleges in part that Charter 

“failed to keep accurate records reflecting [Harper]’s and other 

employees’ hours worked and when meal periods occurred” and that 

some wage statements “also failed to record the time worked, 

wages due, and inclusive dates of the applicable pay periods.” 

(Id.) 

Unlike with the previous sets of allegations, Charter 

does not appear to challenge the sufficiency of these allegations 

to support related violations alleged in Harper’s PAGA claim, but 

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rather contends that they omit wage statement-related allegations 

included in the Second Amended Complaint, such that the PAGA 

claim must be dismissed as to those allegations. (See Mot. to 

Dismiss at 19-20 (Docket No. 163).) As discussed, however, 

Harper was not required to describe every alleged violation of 

each statute in the Notice. Because it appears that all of the 

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that Charter here 

challenges arise under section 226 of the Labor Code, and because 

the Notice includes adequate information to apprise the LWDA of 

the broad scope of the violations Harper alleges under that 

section, the Notice is sufficient to support his PAGA claim as to 

those allegations.

Charter also notes that some of the Second Amended 

Complaint’s wage statement-related allegations pertain to alleged 

violations that occurred more than one year before the Notice was 

filed. (See id. at 20.) It argues that because PAGA’s statute 

of limitations is one year, this provides a separate basis for 

dismissal of Harper’s PAGA claim to the extent that it alleges 

wage statement violations that occurred outside of the statutory 

period. (See id.) 

The court agrees. However, although PAGA has a oneyear statute of limitations, it provides that the statute is 

tolled during the pendency of the LWDA notice, i.e., up to 65 

days. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699.3(a)(2),(d); Hill v. Genuine 

Parts Co., 1:18-CV-1550 AWI SAB, 2019 WL 935976, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 26, 2019). Here, because 65 days passed after Harper 

submitted the Notice on September 14, 2018, and the LWDA did not 

respond, (see SAC at ¶ 3 (Docket No. 147)), the statute of 

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limitations was tolled for that period. Accordingly, in his PAGA 

claim, Harper may not challenge wage statement violations that 

are alleged to have occurred prior to July 11, 2017, and the 

court will grant Charter’s motion on that limited basis.

v. Timely Payment Violations

Lastly, the Notice alleges failure to timely pay wages 

during employment and upon termination, or to pay penalty wages 

for late payment of wages upon termination, in violation of Labor 

Code sections 201, 202, 203, and 204. (See Notice at 5 (Docket 

No. 147).)6 In addition to summarizing the statutory 

requirements, the Notice alleges, in part, that because of other 

previously mentioned alleged violations, such as failure to 

record all hours worked or pay all commission wages owed, “when 

[Charter] paid [Harper] and other former employees’ final 

paychecks, they were all miscalculated and too small,” and 

Charter “fail[ed] to pay all wages earned . . . at least twice 

monthly.” (Id.)

Charter argues that these allegations are simply 

derivative of the alleged overtime, minimum wage, commission, and 

meal and rest break violations, and that because those alleged 

violations were insufficient, these must be as well. (See Mot. 

to Dismiss at 20-21 (Docket No. 163).) However, because the 

court has already determined that the other allegations were 

6 The Notice also alleges failure to timely provide a 

copy of personnel records upon request in violation of Labor Code 

sections 226, 432, and 1198.5. (See Notice at 6-7 (Docket No. 

147).) However, because Charter has not challenged the 

sufficiency of the Notice as to those alleged violations, (see

Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 163)), the court will not address 

them here.

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sufficient to support Harper’s PAGA claim as to those alleged 

violations, Charter’s argument here must be rejected.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Charter’s Motion to 

Dismiss Count Five of plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint in 

part and Count Nine of plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint in 

its entirety be, and the same hereby is, DENIED without prejudice 

to the motion being renewed in the event that the stay ordered in 

the accompanying Order Re: Defendant’s Motions to Compel 

Arbitration is lifted; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Charter’s Motion to Dismiss 

Count Ten of plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, insofar as it 

is based on alleged violations of Labor Code Sections 226 and 

1174(d) that occurred prior to July 11, 2017, be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED;

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects 

Charter’s Motion to Dismiss Count Ten of plaintiffs’ Second 

Amended Complaint be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: October 12, 2021

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