Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02491/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02491-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SuperMedia LLC, a Delaware limited

liability company, f/k/a Idearc Media

LLC,

 Plaintiff, 

vs.

Law Offices of Malkin & Associates

P.L.L.C., an Arizona professional limited

liability company; and Gregory Malkin

P.L.L.C., an Arizona professional limited

liability company,

 Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-2491-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This matter arises on Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of Default against Defendants Law Offices of Malkin & Associates P.L.L.C. and Gregory Malkin P.L.L.C.

(“Defendants Malkin”), Defendants Malkins’ unauthorized filing of an untimely Answer,

and Defendants Malkins’ Response and Objection to Entry of Default. (Docs. 22, 24-25) 

I. Background

On November 20, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action, alleging causes of action

for breach of contract, contractual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, and unjust enrichment. (Doc. 1) Defendants Malkins were properly served with

the summons and complaint. (Docs. 8-9) All parties have consented to jurisdiction to a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 14, 16, 18) After denying

Defendant Law Offices of Malkin & Associates P.L.L.C.’s Motion to Quash Service of

process on January 22, 2013, the Court ordered Defendants Malkins to answer the

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Complaint on or before Friday, February 1, 2013. (Doc. 20) Anticipating Defendants

Malkin would file a timely answer, the Court scheduled a Rule 16 scheduling conference

for Wednesday, February 20, 2013. (Doc. 21) Defendants Malkin, however, failed to

timely answer, and, on February 4, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an Application for Entry of

Default against Defendants Malkin. (Doc. 22) The Clerk entered Defendants Malkins’

defaults on February 5, 2013. (Doc. 23) No application or motion for default judgment

has been filed to date. Three days later, on February 8, 2013, Defendants Malkin filed an

untimely Answer, and a separate filing entitled Response and Objection to Entry of

Default, which “[m]oves this Court to deny the Application for Default[,]” which has

already been entered. (Docs. 24-25)

II. Defaults and Default Judgments

 Entry of default and default judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Obtaining a default judgment, however, is a two-step process. Sierra Nevada

Corp. v. Digibee Mobile Ltd., 2012 WL 1298545, at *1 (D. Nev. April 13, 2012) (citing

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)) (“Eitel apparently fails to understand the two-step process required by Rule 55.”) (citation omitted). First, Rule 55(a)

provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought

has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” An entry of default is what a clerk enters

when the default is established by affidavit or otherwise. Rule 55(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Second, after a clerk enters default, a party must seek entry of default judgment under

Rule 55(b). Default is not freely granted, however, as a case should, whenever possible,

be decided on the merits. TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also Mattivi Bros. Leasing Inc. v. Ecopath Industries LLC, 2011 WL

2784609, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2011) (citing United States v. Signed Personal Check

No. 730, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that Rule 60(b) is applied less

liberally than Rule 55(c) because in the Rule 55(c) context “there is no interest in the

finality of the judgment with which to contend”). 

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1

 Of course, Defendants Malkin have appeared in this action by Defendant Law

Offices of Malkin & Associates PLLC filing its Motion to Quash Service, doc., and by

Defendant Gregory Malkin P.L.L.C. filing its Consent to Jurisdiction before a United States

Magistrate Judge, doc. 18. See Greenfield v. Brenner, 2006 WL 776772, at (E.D. Wash.

March 23, 2006) (filing notices of appearance constitute an appearance under Rule 55(b)(2)).

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After a defendant’s default has been entered by a clerk pursuant to Rule 55(a), a

plaintiff may apply for a default judgment, and, depending upon the nature of relief

requested in the complaint and whether the defendant has appeared in the action, judgment may be entered by the clerk or the court. See Rule 55(b)(1) and (2), Fed.R.Civ.P. If

the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared in the action either

personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with

written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.1

 Fed.R.Civ.P.

55(b)(2); In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 1993). “No party in

default is entitled to 55(b)(2) notice unless he has ‘appeared’ in the action.”. Wilson v.

Moore & Associates, Inc., 564 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1977). Entry of default judgment,

however, is not a matter of right. Santa Fe Auto Ins. Co., Inc. v. Black, 2013 WL 310369,

at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2013) (citation omitted); Doe I v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1271

(N.D. Cal. 2004). Entry of a default judgment “is entirely within the court’s discretion

and may be refused where the court determines no justifiable claim has been alleged or

that a default judgment is inappropriate for other reasons.” Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d at 1271

(citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

“Pursuant to Rule 55(c), a district court may set aside the entry of default upon a

showing of good cause.” Brandt v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108,

1111 (9th Cir. 2011). “What constitutes ‘good cause’ is within the discretion of the trial

court.” FOC Financial Ltd. Partnership v. National City Commercial Capital, 612

F.Supp.2d 1080, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2009) (granting defendant’s motion to set aside default)

(citing, inter alia, Haw. Carpenters’ Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir.

1986) (“Rule 55(c) frees a court considering a motion to set aside a default entry from the

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restraint of Rule 60(b) and entrusts determination to the discretion of the court.”). The

burden of proof rests with the moving party. Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington

Restaurants Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). This burden, however, is not

“extraordinarily heavy.” TCI Group Life, 244 F.3d at 700.

The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors, which courts consistently refer to as

the “Falk factors,” to consider in a Rule 55(c) good-cause analysis: “(1) whether the

plaintiff will be prejudiced, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3)

whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1111

(quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984). Although the burden rests on

the moving party, the factors are to be “liberally interpreted” in favor of setting aside

default. Haw. Carpenters’Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986);

Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hyrdrolec, 854 F.2d 1538,

1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“philosophy of modern federal procedure favors trials

on the merits”) (citation omitted). A sufficient finding against the movant on any one

factor negates good cause. See Franchise Holding II, 375 F.3d at 926 (“As these factors

are disjunctive, the district court was free to deny the motion if any of the three factors

was true.”) (internal citation omitted).

III. Discussion

Because Defendants Malkin have not timely moved for leave to file their Answer

out of time pursuant to Rule 6(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., have been defaulted by the Clerk, and

have not filed a motion requesting the Court’s leave to file or lodge an untimely Answer,

it will be stricken sua sponte without prejudice. See Lamarr v. Chase Home Finance,

LLC, 2008 WL 4057208 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 2008); Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin

GmbH, 307 F.Supp.2d 2 (D.D.C. 2004). “The proper procedure at this point in the

litigation is for Defendants to move to set aside the entry of default.” Arizona Opera Co.

v. AZ Opera Co., 2007 WL 1958779, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2007). Like the scenario in

Arizona Opera Co., although Defendants Malkin have nominally and implicitly moved to

set aside the entry of default in their Response and Objection to Entry of Default, they

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have not articulated the proper standard under Rule 55(c), explained why their default

should be set aside, and provided the requisite “[m]emorandum setting forth the points

and authorities relied upon in support of the[ir] motion.” See LRCiv 7.2(b). Absent a

written stipulation between the parties, the Court will only decide a motion to set aside

Defendants Malkins’ defaults on the merits, using the proper legal standard and controlling authorities. Thus, the Court will overrule without prejudice Defendants Malkins’ 

Response and Objection to Entry of Default.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Law Offices of Malkin & Associates P.L.L.C.

and Gregory Malkin P.L.L.C.’ Answer, doc. 24, is STRICKEN without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Law Offices of Malkin &

Associates P.L.L.C. and Gregory Malkin P.L.L.C.’ Response and Objection to Entry of

Default, doc. 25, is OVERRULED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the February 20, 2013 Scheduling Conference

is hereby VACATED.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2013.

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