Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01175/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01175-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RASHAD PHILLIP SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

W.L. MONTGOMERY and 

KAMALA D. HARRIS.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 16-cv-1175-WQH-AGS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1) (the “Petition”) filed by Petitioner 

Rashad Phillip Scott on May 12, 2016. The Petition names W.L. Montgomery and Kamala 

D. Harris as Respondents. Pet. at 1. On September 13, 2016, Montgomery filed an Answer 

to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 10). On December 16, 2016, Scott

filed a Traverse (ECF No. 19.)

I. Background

A. The Incident 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36

(1992) (holding that findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from 

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those facts, are entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are 

taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion1:

Defendants [Dontaye Craig, Fredrick Roberson, and Rashad Scott] 

and Marlon Johnson were active members of the criminal street gang 

Emerald Hills, an affiliate of the Bloods gang. Johnson had moved to Los 

Angeles, and on May 23, 2009, a Saturday during Memorial Day weekend, 

he drove to San Diego and met up with Defendants. They spent their time 

together drinking and smoking marijuana. That evening, Defendants and 

Johnson went to the Solola Apartment complex, where they had their 

photograph taken together (Solola photo).

Early on May 24, 2009, near the closing time for bars, Johnson drove 

Defendants to the Gaslamp Quarter. The Gaslamp Quarter is not claimed 

by a particular gang, but members from different gangs frequent the area.

Johnson parked near the intersection of E Street and Fifth Avenue, 

and he and Defendants walked west on the north side of E Street. They 

were conspicuous because they were not dressed in club attire.

Craig, Roberson, and Scott wore black hooded sweatshirts 

(hoodies), and under his hoodie Scott wore a distinctive black, white, and 

green striped shirt. Roberson also wore gloves and a gray baseball cap with 

an “SD insignia” on it. Johnson wore a gray tee shirt and a du-rag.

Richard Turner was a documented member of the criminal street 

gang West Coast Crips, a main rival of Emerald Hill. At about 2:00 a.m. 

on May 24, Turner and some friends left Belo, a club on the north side of 

E Street. Roberson and Scott, who were walking ahead of Craig and 

Johnson, encountered Turner’s group. Roberson and Scott were acting 

aggressively, and Johnson heard them say “multiple things” to Turner’s 

group, but he could not make out the content.

A witness saw three or four men walking west on E Street toward 

Belo. The first two men in the group wore dark hoodies, and about four or 

five minutes before the shooting he heard one of them say, “What’s that 

Emerald like, motherfucker?” He also heard “a lot of gang language” and

“different gang names.” The comments made this witness fear “something 

bad might happen.” Another witness also heard gang challenges, such as 

“Blood, what’s brackin?” (Bloods), and “What’s crackin?” and “Cuz” 

(Crips).

Roberson and Scott continued walking west, and when Johnson and 

Craig got to Turner, he bumped into Johnson and said, “What did you say?”

 

1 Scott and his co-defendants Dontaye Coleman Craig and Fredrick Dwayne Roberson were tried 

jointly and their appeals were consolidated. See generally, ECF No. 11-42 at 2–3.

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Johnson denied saying anything. According to Turner, Johnson grabbed 

his chain and displayed a gun. Turner smacked Johnson’s hand and said, 

“Don’t touch me.” Turner pounded his fist into his hand and loudly said, 

“Let’s get it on.”

It was unclear how many people were with Turner, so Craig directed 

Johnson to fetch Roberson and Scott. Both Craig and Johnson caught up 

with them at the northeast corner of E Street and Fourth Avenue, and 

Johnson said he “was ready to go.” Johnson and Craig crossed to the south 

side of E Street and headed east to get to Johnson’s car. When Johnson 

reached the southwest corner of E Street and Fifth Avenue, he ran into a 

friend and stopped to chat. Roberson and Scott had also crossed to the 

south side of E Street and they joined Johnson and Craig. While Johnson 

was busy with his friend, Craig, Roberson, and Scott talked.

Turner’s group had headed east on the north side of E Street, and 

someone in Defendants’ group said, “There he go over there.” At that 

point, Defendants returned to the north side of E Street. Johnson heard “a 

loud dispute” and followed Defendants.

Witnesses heard the exchange of more gang terms, such as “Uptown 

Emerald Hills,” and, “This is Crip, this is Crip.” Johnson saw Roberson 

and Scott together “backing into the middle of the street.” Johnson grabbed 

Roberson, but Roberson “looked like he was ready to go,” meaning “get 

active, fight.” Roberson threw off his hoodie and sucker punched a member 

of Turner’s group. A fight ensued in the street, which was crowded with 

club goers.

Johnson’s attention then turned to Turner. Johnson approached 

Turner “about to fight,” and two photographs taken during the incident 

show them facing each other and “posturing.” Before they threw any 

punches, however, several gunshots rang out. A witness heard the shooter 

say, “I don’t chuck ’em,” which she took to mean in gang lingo, “I don’t 

fight.” When the shooting stopped, Defendants and Johnson ran to his car 

and fled to the Solola Apartment complex.

Turner was shot multiple times and seriously injured. Lakiesha 

Mason, a bystander celebrating her 21st birthday, was shot in the head and 

killed, and Willy Aldridge, another bystander, was shot in the back and 

seriously injured.

A black hoodie, a gray baseball cap with an “SD” insignia, and four 

.38–special–caliber bullet fragments were found at the scene. Roberson’s 

DNA was found on the hoodie and the cap, and gunshot residue was found 

on the hoodie. When Roberson was arrested in August 2010, he had a 

baseball cap with an “SD” insignia that was nearly identical to the one 

found at the scene.

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Johnson was indicted on the same charges as defendants, but he 

eventually agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admit to a 

gang allegation in exchange for his testimony. [Footnote omitted.] In 

addition to providing many of the facts recounted above, he identified 

Roberson and Scott in a video taken near Belo shortly before the shooting. 

Johnson also identified himself as squaring off against Turner in two 

photographs someone took during the fight. Johnson testified that when 

the photographs were taken, Roberson and Scott were standing to his left 

and Craig was standing to his left and slightly behind him. Shadowy figures 

near Johnson in one of the photos were Defendants, and it appeared that 

Craig’s arm was extended.

Further, Johnson testified Roberson was not wearing either his 

hoodie or his cap when he returned to the car. Johnson identified the hoodie 

and cap found at the scene as the ones Roberson wore. When Johnson and 

Defendants reached his car, Johnson asked who did the shooting. Craig, 

who was in the front seat, was holding a gun and admitted he was the 

shooter.

Johnson’s former girlfriend, Carmen Torres, testified Johnson was 

with her in the early morning hours of May 24, 2009. Johnson told her he 

went downtown with friends and “after the club, they got into an altercation 

and one of his friends started shooting.” The only friend Johnson 

mentioned by name was Craig.

Tony Mallard testified that at his birthday party in October 2010, 

Craig told him he tried to shoot “a Crip dude” in the Gaslamp, and he 

accidentally shot a woman. Craig also told Mallard “he was going to let 

the other guys take the fall for him.” Mallard asked Craig why he “parties 

every day,” and Craig said “he partied like it might be the last time.”

Candace Hosburg witnessed the events, mostly from the outside

patio of a bar on the south side of E Street. She testified she heard a verbal 

altercation across the street. She looked over and saw three men, one of 

whom she later identified as Turner. He was “yelling something” and was 

“pretty hyped up.” The two other men walked west toward Fourth Avenue. 

One of them was dressed in a gray shirt, jeans, and a du-rag, and the other 

was dressed in a black leather jacket and jeans.

Hosburg lost sight of the man in the leather jacket. She kept her eye 

on Johnson because she “just felt something was wrong.” He crossed to 

the south side of E Street and headed east. He walked up to two men 

wearing black hoodies and standing by a tree in front of the patio. The three 

men talked for about a minute, and then crossed to the north side of E Street. 

The men wearing hoodies raised the hoods over their heads. A fight broke 

out between two groups, and people were throwing punches at each other. 

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She heard gunshots, but she did not see the shooter.

From the Solola photo, Hosburg identified Johnson as the man in the 

gray shirt and du-rag. She also identified Scott as one of the men standing 

by the tree and “one of the people who walked into the street with 

[Johnson].” She was asked, “The male with the striped shirt, does he look 

similar to the person you saw? Or you think that is the person you saw?”

She responded, “That is the person that I saw.” She was then asked, “So 

you’re sure about that?,” and she responded, “Yes.” She identified Craig 

from the photo as looking similar to the man in the black leather jacket, 

based on his “build and his height.”

Numerous witnesses observed the shooter, and their descriptions 

varied considerably. Craig’s attorney referred to him as “some six-footthree, 285 pounds.” Several witnesses described the shooter as tall, up to 6 

feet 3 inches tall, between 200 and 220 pounds, and wearing a black hoodie 

and jeans or dark pants. Other witnesses described the shooter as shorter, 

from 5 feet 8 to 10 inches tall, and “kind of chunky” or weighing 

approximately 170 pounds.

One witness testified the shooter wore a black hoodie and a baseball 

cap with an “SD” insignia, and as he ran off it appeared he was removing 

the hoodie. When presented with one of the photographs taken of Turner 

and Johnson preparing to fight, this witness testified the shadowy figure 

behind Johnson was the shooter, the figure Johnson identified from the 

photo as Craig. Another witness testified the shooter wore a “hooded 

sweatshirt,” and it “[l]ooked like he had a hat on.” [Footnote 5: One 

witness told an investigator that he thought Johnson was the shooter. At 

trial, however, this witness clarified that he thought Johnson was armed 

because “it looked like he was pulling up his pants” and “maybe [he] could 

have been reaching for a gun.”]

San Diego Police Detective David Collins, a gang expert, testified 

Emerald Hills’s primary activities included “narcotics, assaults, murder, 

pimping.” He described several predicate offenses involving shootings by 

Emerald Hills gang members. [Footnote 6: In May 2005, Terrence Jarvis 

was convicted of shooting at a car driven by a rival gang member through 

Emerald Hills territory, and Tyree Shine was convicted of assault with a 

firearm. A one-year-old child was also in the car. When Jarvis was arrested 

a .38–caliber gun was found nearby. In April 2007, Jonathan Hensley was 

convicted of attempted murder while armed with a firearm, and Craig 

Phillip Nash was convicted of attempted murder. The victim, a minor and 

Crips gang member, came to San Diego to visit his girlfriend. She arranged 

for the victim to stay at an apartment, which unbeknownst to her was 

inhabited “with Blood gang members.” Nash believed the victim was there 

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to “put a hit in on” him, and he decided to “do a preemptive strike.”

Hensley was called, and he arrived with a gun. As the victim tried to flee 

he was shot. In March 2008, Malcolm Jackson was convicted of possession 

of a firearm by a felon.] Further, [Detective Collins] testified Emerald 

Hills and the West Coast Crips have a “violent rivalry.”

Detective Collins explained the importance of respect in gang 

culture. If a gang member feels disrespected, he must retaliate “to keep 

[his] status within the gang.” It is “a clear sign of disrespect” for a rival 

gang member to “call out” the name of his gang. The calling out of a rival 

gang name is a “challenge,” or “hit-up.” If “you have a rival calling it out, 

you should step up and take care of business at that point, and that may 

mean either challenging them and backing them down, or, if you have to, 

beat them down or do whatever you have to do to show that . . . you are the 

number one gang.” Gang members know a hit-up will cause “at bare 

minimum, a physical fight,” and that fights often escalate, involve deadly 

weapons, and result in serious injury or death.

Further, gang members “travel in packs because there’s security in 

numbers.” They back up each other, and if a member fails to provide back 

up, at a “bare minimum, you’re going to get what’s called DP, or 

disciplinary punishment. Your own gang will come in and discipline you 

for failing to follow through in backing up the homies.” The DP could be 

anything from “a beat down” to death.

Detective Collins was asked a hypothetical question with the facts of 

this case, and he explained it “would definitely promote the gang in the 

sense that [Defendants] have gone back after their rival. In a crowded 

street, . . . they’ve challenged that rival and they’ve taken that rival down 

through a shooting. The use of the gun is basically the ultimate power that 

a gang member can have in the sense of controlling someone.” Guns are a 

status symbol in gang culture, and a member willing to use a gun “is going 

to have more status” because gun use “creates . . . fear and intimidation.”

(Lodgment No. 11-42 at 4–12.)

B. State Court Proceedings

On February 15, 2012, Scott and codefendants Roberson and Craig were charged by 

consolidated information with first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a), attempted 

murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 667), and assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 

245 (a)(1)). (ECF No. 11-27 at 26 – 27). The information alleged that Scott committed all 

three offenses in association with, and for the promotion of, a criminal street gang (Cal. 

Penal Code §186.22(b)(1)). Id. at 28–31. The information also alleged that Scott was a 

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principal in committing counts one and two and that at least one of the principals personally 

used a firearm during the commission of counts one and two (Cal. Penal Code §§ 

12022.53(b)-(e)(1)). Id. at 29–30. Finally, the information alleged that Scott committed 

the offenses when he was a juvenile over the age of 16 (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 707(d)(1)). Id. at 29–31. 

Scott and his two codefendants were tried together. See ECF No. 11-28 at 63. On 

September 17, 2012, a jury found Scott guilty on all three counts. (ECF No. 11-31 at 157–

161).2 The jury also found the gang and gun allegations as to each count to be true. Id. 

On December 13, 2012, the trial court sentenced Scott to a prison term of 35 years-to-life. 

(ECF No. 11-32 at 232–233).3 

Scott appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, arguing that (1) 

there was insufficient evidence to prove he was involved in the fight which led to the 

shooting; (2) the trial court improperly allowed gang expert testimony; (3) the jury was

improperly instructed; and (4) the accumulation of trial errors rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. (ECF No. 11-39 at 34–80). Petitioner further requested the appellate 

court review the trial court’s in camera Pitchess hearings. Id. at 80–83. Finally, Scott 

joined in the arguments raised on appeal by his codefendants. Id. at 83.

While Scott’s appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided People v. 

Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th 155 (Cal. 2014). There, the court held that, as a matter of law, there can 

be no aider and abettor culpability for first degree premeditated murder under the natural 

and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting liability. Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th. at 

 

2 The jury also found Craig and Roberson guilty on all counts. (ECF No. 11-42 at 2). The court 

sentenced Craig to 11 years, eight months, plus 75 years-to-life. (ECF No. 11-32 at 3–4). Roberson, who 

also admitted two prior strike convictions, was sentenced to 20 years, plus 189 years-to-life. Id. at 5–6.

3 The trial court sentenced Scott to 25 years-to-life on count one, plus 10 years consecutive for the gun 

allegation. (ECF No. 11-32 at 232). As to count two, the court imposed the upper term of nine years plus 

25 years-to-life for the gun allegation. Id. at 233. Petitioner received the upper term of four years on 

count three, plus five years consecutive for the gang allegation. Id. The sentences on counts two and 

three were to run concurrent with the sentence imposed on count one. Id.

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158–59. In light of the holding in Chiu, the Court of Appeal reversed Scott’s first degree 

murder conviction and reduced it to second degree murder. (ECF No. 11-42 at 55). The 

Court of Appeal also reversed the 10-year gun enhancement imposed as to count one. Id.

at 4. The court rejected Scott’s other claims on appeal and ordered him resentenced in 

accordance with its opinion. Id.4

Scott filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on July 6, 2015. 

(ECF No. 11-43). In it, Scott argued there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions and that gang expert testimony was erroneously admitted. Id. On September 

9, 2015, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation. 

(ECF No. 11-44). 

II. Scope of Review

Scott’s Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a 

habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early 

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). In order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court 

“must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

4 The appellate court ordered that, on remand, the trial court not impose a sentence greater than 35 

years to life. (ECF No. 11-42 at 54).

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A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those 

decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” 

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant 

habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be 

“objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “[A] federal 

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams 

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) 

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes the it provides the basis 

for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75–76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. 

“[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

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[Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the 

state court renders its decision.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.

III. Discussion

Scott raises two claims in his Petition: (1) his due process rights were violated 

because there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and (2) his due process 

rights were violated by the admission of gang expert testimony. Pet. at 21–54. 

Montgomery contends that both claims must be denied because Petitioner has failed to 

establish that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. (ECF No. 10-1).

A. Insufficient Evidence

In claim one, Scott contends that his due process rights were violated when he was 

convicted based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, Scott contends that there was 

insufficient evidence to establish that he was the shooter or that he aided and abetted the 

shooting or the fight. Pet. at 18–39. Scott raised this claim in his petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court, (ECF No. 11-43 at 7–9), and it was denied without comment or 

citation, (ECF No. 11-44). This Court therefore looks through to the last reasoned decision 

to address the claim: that of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06.

1. State Court Proceedings

At trial, the jury found Scott guilty of first degree murder based on the prosecution’s 

theory that the murder was the natural and probable consequence of the fight involving 

Scott’s codefendants and rival gang members (including Turner), and that Scott had 

participated or aided and abetted his cohorts in that fight. (ECF No. 11-42 at 2). As 

discussed above, while Scott’s direct appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court 

held that there could be no aider and abettor culpability for first degree premeditated 

murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th at 158–

59. Accordingly, because the California Court of Appeal found (and the state conceded) 

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that no evidence presented at trial supported a finding that Scott was the shooter or aided 

and abetted in the shooting, his first degree murder conviction was erroneous. (ECF No. 

11-42 at 30, 55).

The Court of Appeal went on to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 

support a finding of second degree murder based on evidence that Scott aided and abetted 

the fight and that Lakiesha Mason’s murder was a natural and probable consequence of 

that fight. Id. at 23, 31. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reduced Scott’s first degree 

murder conviction to second degree murder. Id. at 55. The court stated, in relevant part: 

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their 

convictions. 

“‘[]In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 

entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.[’]

[Citation.][”] [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment 

the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from 

the evidence. [Citation.] We may reverse for lack of substantial 

evidence only if []“upon no hypothesis whatever is there 

sufficient substantial evidence to support”[] the conviction. 

(People v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1508.) Since we reverse 

Defendants’ first degree murder convictions, we determine whether 

substantial evidence supports convictions for second degree murder, 

attempted murder, and assault with a firearm.

[. . .]

Scott contends, and we agree, that the evidence does not support a 

finding he was the shooter or that he directly aided and abetted the shooting.

The People apparently concede the point, by not addressing those theories as 

to Scott and focusing solely on his culpability under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine. (See People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480.)

Scott also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

finding he aided and abetted the target crime of simple assault or public fight, 

for purposes of the natural and probable consequences doctrine. He asserts 

he was “simply present.” He submits that this case is distinguishable from 

[People v.] Medina, [] 46 Cal.4th 913, [(2009)] because “there was no 

evidence [h]e participated in confronting or punching Turner or anyone with 

him, no evidence he mad-dogged, flipped a gang sign, hollered a gang name.”

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“‘[W]hen a particular aiding and abetting case triggers application of 

the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine . . . the trier of fact must 

find that the defendant, act[ed] with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose 

of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, 

or facilitating the commission of a predicate or target offense; (3) by act or 

advice aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated the commission of the target

crime.’” (People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 993.) “‘[I]n general 

neither the presence at the scene of a crime nor knowledge of, but failure to 

prevent [the crime], is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting its 

commission.’” (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) The 

jury may, however, consider these factors in determining whether one is an 

aider and abettor, along with other factors such as “‘companionship, flight, 

and conduct before and after the crime.’” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 261, 273.)

Scott ignores evidence that he and Roberson exchanged gang 

challenges with Turner’s group near Belo several minutes before the shooting. 

Roberson and Scott were walking ahead of Craig and Johnson, and witness 

testimony shows that either Roberson or Scott said, “What’s that Emerald like, 

motherfucker?” Further, this witness heard other gang terms, and another 

witness heard the exchange of Bloods and Crips terms. Johnson testified 

Roberson and Scott made comments and behaved aggressively when they 

passed Turner. Contrary to Scott’s position, the trouble did not begin when 

Johnson encountered Turner’s group, it escalated.

Further, Scott could have stayed on the south side of E Street after 

exchanging gang challenges with Turner’s group, but after talking with 

Roberson and Craig he decided to return to the north side with them to 

confront Turner’s group. Although there is no evidence Scott threw any 

punches, he stood next to Roberson, Craig, and Johnson, and backed them up.

Detective Collins testified that gang members rely on back up from other gang 

members, and if a gang member failed to provide backup he would suffer 

disciplinary punishment, which could be anything from a beating to death.

Additionally, after the shooting, Scott did not disassociate himself from 

Roberson, Craig, and Johnson. Rather, he ran with them back to Johnson’s 

car and fled with them to the Solola Apartment complex. We are satisfied that 

substantial evidence supports a reasonable inference Scott aided and abetted 

his fellow gang members in the fistfight.

(ECF No. 11-42 at 15–16, 30–31).

2. Applicable Law

The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause is violated “if it is found 

that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof 

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of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); see 

also Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 6 (2011) (per curiam). In reviewing sufficiency of 

evidence claims on federal habeas, courts must engage in a thorough review of the state 

court record and view the evidence in the “light most favorable to the prosecution and all 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from this evidence.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 

1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Furthermore, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence 

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 

1995) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) amended on 

denial of reh’g, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986)). A petitioner faces a “heavy burden” when 

seeking habeas relief by challenging the sufficiency of evidence used to obtain a state 

conviction on federal due process grounds. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. 

A petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim must be examined “with reference to the 

elements of the criminal offense as set forth by state law.” Id. Under California law, 

second degree murder is the “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, 

but without the additional elements—i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation—

that would support a conviction of first degree murder.” People v. Neito Benitez, 4 Cal. 

4th 91, 102 (Cal. 1992) (citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 189). Malice may be either 

express or implied. Cal. Penal Code § 188. Express malice requires an intent to kill;

implied malice does not. See People v. Gonzalez, 54 Cal. 4th 643, 653 (Cal. 2012). Malice 

is implied when a person “willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of 

which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard 

for the danger to life that the act poses.” Id. (citing People v. Knoller, 41 Cal. 4th 139, 152 

(Cal. 2007)).

 Furthermore, under well-settled principles of California law, a defendant is guilty 

for any crime that he aids and abets, as well as any additional offenses that are committed 

by a principal if those additional offenses are a “natural and probable consequence” of the 

crime originally aided and abetted. People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 261 (Cal. 1996). 

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Stated differently, an aider and abettor “is guilty not only of the offense he intended to 

facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed.” People 

v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 12 (Cal. 1985). For example, “if a person aids and abets only an 

intended assault, but a murder results, that person may be guilty of that murder, even if 

unintended, if it is a natural and probable consequence of the intended assault.” People v. 

McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1117 (Cal. 2001). 

As such, for liability as an aider and abettor to the original target offense, the trier of 

fact must find that the defendant aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the 

commission of the target offense with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator 

and the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of a 

predicate or target offense. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th at 262. For liability as an aider and 

abettor to a non-target offense, the trier of fact must also find that the defendant’s 

confederate committed an offense other than the target crime and that the offense 

committed by the confederate was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime 

that the defendant aided and abetted. Id.

The test for liability of an aider and abettor for collateral criminal offenses is casespecific, dependent upon “all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular 

defendant’s conduct.” People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 518, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 

Whether the crime actually committed by the defendant’s confederate is a natural and 

probable consequence of the target offense is a factual question for the jury to resolve based 

on “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Id. at 531 (citing Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 

at 12, n.5).

3. Evidence Introduced at Trial

Johnson, who was originally a defendant in the case, agreed to testify in exchange 

for a plea agreement to which he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to a 

gang allegation, carrying a sentence of three to eleven years. (ECF No. 11-6 at 23–24). 

Johnson was a member of the Emerald Hills gang. Id. at 30–31, 65. He testified that 

Roberson, Craig and Scott were also Emerald Hills gang members. Id. at 26–27, 31, 65. 

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According to Johnson, on May 23, 2009, he met up with Craig, Roberson and Scott 

and they spent the day smoking and drinking. Id. at 33. That evening the group went to

the Solola Apartments for a while and then went downtown. Id. Johnson identified a photo 

taken at the Solola Apartments that evening, depicting Johnson, Demeatrice Harris,5

Roberson, Craig, and Scott. Id. at 33–34. Scott was wearing a striped shirt in the photo. 

Id. at 34. Craig was wearing a black shirt and Roberson was in a gray shirt and gloves. Id. 

Johnson testified that the group was wearing the same clothes when they went downtown, 

except that Scott and Roberson had put on dark jackets or hoodies, and Craig put on a 

patterned sweatshirt. Id. at 35–36, 58–59. The group arrived in the Gaslamp Quarter of 

downtown San Diego as the bars in the area were closing. Id. at 39.

At about 2:00 a.m., Richard Turner, a documented member of the West Coast Cripps 

street gang, and his friends left the nightclub Belo. (ECF No. 11-7 at 36–37). The West 

Coast Crips were a main rival of Emerald Hills. (ECF No. 11-12 at 106). As Turner and 

his group walked on the north side of E Street, they encountered Scott and Roberson, who 

were walking toward them, ahead of Craig and Johnson. (ECF No. 11-6 at 39). Scott and 

Roberson exchanged words with Turner. Id. Witnesses heard either Scott or Roberson say 

“What’s that Emerald like, motherfucker.” (ECF No. 11-8 at 75). Turner then also 

exchanged words with Johnson. (ECF No. 11-6 at 39). Witnesses also overheard 

comments including “What’s brackin?”, “What’s crackin?”, and “Cuz” and understood the 

comments to be “gang language.”6 (ECF No. 11-3 at 104–05; ECF No. 11-8 at 68–73). 

One witness, Michael Reynolds, testified that after hearing the exchange of gang terms, he 

felt “something bad might happen.” (ECF No. 11-8 at 75). 

 

5 Harris was a member of Lincoln Park gang, an ally of Emerald Hills gang. (ECF No. 11-12 at 208). 

Both Lincoln Park and Emerald Hills are sets of the Bloods gang. Id. at 105. 

6 Detective Collins, who testified as a gang expert, stated that “brackin” is a term associated with 

Blood sets, while “crackin” and “cuz” are associated with Crip sets. (ECF No. 11-12 at 108–09). 

Detective Collins also stated that use of the term “what’s brackin” by a member of a Blood set to member 

of a rival Crip set would be seen as a challenge. Id.

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Another witness, Candace Hosburg, testified that shortly after the verbal altercation 

she saw two men who were part of the verbal altercation walk away from Turner, heading 

west on E Street. (ECF No. 11-9 at 132). Hosburg identified one of the men as Johnson. 

Id. at 143–44. Johnson walked back across the street and then headed east on E Street 

toward Fifth Avenue. Id. at 135. He walked up to two other males who were standing near 

a tree and started talking to them. Id. The two other males were wearing black hoodies, 

jeans, and T-shirts. Id. at 136. Their hoods were down. Id. at 137. One of them was 

wearing a striped shirt under his hoodie. Id. at 146. Hosburg identified him as Scott. Id. 

All three men then crossed the street and walked toward Fifth Avenue and E Street. Id. at 

138. Two of the men, including Scott, put up their hoods. Id. Shortly thereafter, Hosburg 

turned around to see people throwing punches. Id. at 138–39. The fight moved from the 

northwest sidewalk to the southwest. Id. at 140. She heard gunshots and started 

running. Id.

4. Discussion

This evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient 

to support a finding that Scott aided and abetted the street fight. Evidence supported the 

theory that Scott was involved in the initial verbal altercation with Turner and his cohorts. 

A reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that, after the verbal altercation between 

Turner’s group and Craig and Johnson escalated, Scott and Roberson crossed the street to 

return to where Craig was in order to support their fellow gang members in anticipation of 

a fight. Johnson testified that when he “squared off” against Turner (in preparation for the 

fight), Scott was standing immediately to his left. (ECF No. 11-6 at 46–47). Shots rang 

out seconds later. Id. at 50.

Detective Collins, the gang expert, explained that a gang “hit up” is when one gang 

member challenges a rival gang member, typically by making a comment such as “Where 

are you from?”. (ECF No. 11-12 at 149, 154–55). The rival gang member is expected to 

indicate the name of his gang. Id. at 113. At that point, there will often be a physical fight 

at minimum. Id. at 113–14. Collins testified that gang members are generally aware that 

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such fights can lead to deadly altercations, and are expected to back each other up. Id. A 

gang member’s status in the gang depends on their willingness to fight for the gang. Id. at 

109. A reasonable juror could view this evidence as support for the finding that when the 

verbal challenges were made by Scott and/or his codefendants to Turner and his cohorts, 

Scott was encouraging and facilitating the fight that followed. This, in conjunction with 

Scott crossing the street to join Craig and standing with his fellow gang members as the 

fight started, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support 

the conclusion that Scott aided and abetted the fight.

Scott contends that there was no evidence that he “threw any punches” or “maddogged, flipped any gang signs or yelled any gang names.” (ECF No. 19 at 4–5). First, 

there is no need to prove Scott himself threw any punches or personally participated in the 

fight. As discussed above, in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, the prosecution 

only needed to show that Scott intended to, and did, encourage, facilitate or assist those 

who did participate. See Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th at 262. Second, as discussed above and 

contrary to Scott’s contention, there was evidence that he was involved in the verbal 

altercation, during which gang challenges were made. Scott relies on the testimony of 

Turner, who stated that he did not make any gang challenges and that none were made 

towards him. ECF No. 19 at 5 (quoting ECF No. 11-7 at 38). As noted above, however, 

there was testimony from other eyewitnesses that Scott and his companions did indeed 

exchange gang challenges prior to the fight. See, e.g., ECF No. 11-3 at 104–05; ECF No. 

11-8 at 68–75. This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Scott’s reliance on Juan H. is misplaced. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that 

there was insufficient evidence to establish the defendant shared his brother’s intent to 

shoot a rival gang member, whom the brothers had confronted about shots fired into their 

house. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1277. During the confrontation, the defendant’s brother pulled 

out a gun and shot and killed the rival gang member. Id. at 1267. The Ninth Circuit noted 

that, although the defendant stood behind his brother during the killing, he did not say or 

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do anything that could have been construed as encouraging the brother to kill the gang 

member. Id. at 1267, 1278–79. That is not the case here where, as discussed above,

witnesses testified that Scott and/or his cohorts had exchanged gang challenges with Turner 

and other rival gang members prior to the fight. See, e.g., ECF No. 11-3 at 104–05; ECF 

No. 11-8 at 68–75. In addition, evidence showed that Johnson crossed the street and 

approached Scott and Roberson just prior to the fight. (ECF No. 11-9 at 135). After the 

three talked for a few minutes, they crossed back to the north side of the street. Id. at 138. 

Scott and Roberson raised their hoodies and soon thereafter a fight broke out between two 

groups. Id. at 138–39. Looking at this evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Scott aided, promoted, or 

encouraged his fellow gang members to get into a physical altercation with Turner and 

other rival gang members.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. Prunty, 107 F.3d 1337, 1342 (1997) is 

similarly distinguishable. In Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit held that there was insufficient 

evidence that the defendant aided and abetted fellow gang members who shot and then ran 

over a victim with their car, killing him. 107 F.3d at 1342, overruled on other grounds in

Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 1998). In Mitchell, there was no evidence 

that the defendant had encouraged or assisted the driver of the car by word or action. Id. 

The court stated that membership in a gang, in and of itself, was not proof of the intent 

required to establish the elements of aiding and abetting. Id. at 1342 (“[T]here is no proof 

that [defendant] said anything to the driver of the vehicle in the minutes between the 

shooting and the fatal U-turn.”). Again, that is not the case here, where the record contains 

ample evidence to support the conclusion that Scott took specific steps to encourage, 

promote or assist in the fight prior to the shooting. 

Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the shooting was 

the “natural and probable cause” of the fight. Detective Collins testified that gang members 

are generally aware that fights following a gang “hit up” can lead to a deadly altercation. 

(ECF No. 11-12 at 113–14). He stated that, in gang culture, violence garners respect; the 

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more violent the person is, the higher their gang status. Id. at 109. Based on this evidence, 

a reasonable juror could conclude that the shooting was the natural probable consequence 

of a gang fist fight. See People v. Medina, 46 Cal. 4th 913, 922-26 (Cal. 2009) (concluding 

a rational juror could have found shooting was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a 

gang assault); People v. Gonzalez, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 

(concluding that a shooting of rival gang member during a retreat from a fight was the 

natural and probable consequence of the gang fight); People v. Godinez, 2. Cal. App. 4th 

492, 499-500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a fatal stabbing of a rival gang member either 

during or after a fistfight was a natural and probable consequence of the fight).

In conclusion, and for the foregoing reasons, viewing the entire record as a whole in 

the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could find that Scott was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of second degree murder, attempted murder, and assault. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

B. Testimony of Gang Expert

In ground two, Scott claims his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

allowed improper testimony of a gang expert, Detective Collins. Pet. at 40–45. 

Specifically, Scott contends that Collins improperly testified as to his opinion on the 

ultimate issue of foreseeability, an issue which should have been reserved for the jury. Id.

at 41. Scott raised this issue in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, 

which was denied without comment or citation. (ECF Nos. 11-43 and 11-44). As such, 

this Court looks through to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the last reasoned 

state court decision to address this issue. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

1. Opinion of the California Court of Appeal

The California Court of Appeal rejected Scott’s argument that Collins improperly 

testified as to his opinion on the ultimate issue of foreseeability, stating:

Scott, joined by Roberson, contends Detective Collins’s testimony 

improperly usurped the jury’s role in determining whether the shootings were 

foreseeable, or a natural and probable consequences of the physical 

altercation. “‘As a general rule, a trial court has wide discretion to admit or 

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exclude expert testimony.’” (People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 

494, 506.)

‘“[T]he admission of gang evidence over an . . . objection will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s decision 

exceeds the bounds of reason.[’] [Citation.]” [Citation.] Since 

at least 1980, our courts have recognized that evidence of gang 

sociology and psychology is beyond common experience and 

thus a proper subject for expert testimony. [Citations.] [¶] The 

People are entitled to “introduce evidence of gang affiliation and 

activity where such evidence is relevant to an issue of motive or 

intent.” [Citation.] “[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the 

incentive for criminal behavior, its probative value generally 

exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in 

admitting evidence of its existence.[]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, 

when evidence of gang activity or affiliation is relevant to 

motive, it may properly be introduced even if prejudicial.

(People v. Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 275; [see also] People v. 

Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 

Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550 [(]“Expert testimony repeatedly has been offered to 

show the ‘motivation for a particular crime, generally retaliation or 

intimidation’ and ‘whether and how a crime was committed to benefit or 

promote a gang.’”[)].)

In People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371, the defendant 

objected to the following exchange with a gang expert: “‘Q. Now, do you 

have an opinion as to a gang member’s expectation of what will result from,

let’s say, a mutual yelling out of gang names or affiliations? [¶] A. Yes. [¶] 

Q. And what is that opinion? [¶] A. The gang member would expect a 

violent confrontation.’” The court held the officer’s testimony did not exceed 

the permissible scope because it “focused on what gangs and gang members 

typically expect and not on [the defendant’s] subjective expectation in this 

instance.” (Ibid.)

Scott cites the following exchange during Detective Collins’s 

testimony:

Q. Based on your experience, do verbal arguments between rival 

gang members often turn into physical altercations? 

A. Yes, they do. 

Q. And taken a step further, do these physical altercations often 

turn violent and involved serious injuries or death? 

A. Yes.

Q. And in these incidents, it is often that weapons are used 

during these verbal altercations that escalate? 

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A. Yes.

Q. From your experience, are gang members who are involved 

in physical fights aware that this action often results in serious 

injury or death?

[A.] Yes.

Scott submits that the testimony was “nothing more than a thinly veiled 

expression on an ultimate issue in this case, to wit, whether it was reasonably 

foreseeable (to . . . Scott) that a physical fight often results in serious injury or 

death.” Detective Collins, however, did not testify about Defendants’

subjective knowledge that gang warfare often turns deadly, he was testifying 

generally about the knowledge of gang members. The testimony is similar to 

that approved of in People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371. It is 

also similar to the gang expert testimony in Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 

918 [:] “When gangs have a disagreement, you can almost guarantee it’s going 

to result in some form of violence, whether that be punching and kicking or 

ultimately having somebody shot and killed.”[]. The evidence does not 

exceed the permissible scope of gang expert testimony. “It is difficult to 

imagine a clearer need for expert explication than that presented by a 

subculture in which this type of mindless retaliation promotes ‘respect.’” 

(People v. Olquin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.)

Later in Detective Collins’s testimony, the issue of whether Defendants 

were active gang members was addressed. Scott and Roberson do not dispute 

that Defendants’ names could, of course, properly be used in that testimony. 

In conjunction with that evidence, the following exchange took place: 

Q. . . . Do you have an opinion as to whether . . . Scott would 

have knowledge of Emerald Hills criminal street gang’s criminal 

activity? 

A. Yes. I believe he would be aware of them.

Q. And the same question in regards to . . . Roberson.

A. Yes.

Detective Collins also opined Craig would have knowledge of Emerald Hills’s 

criminal activity.

Scott and Roberson complain that this testimony impermissibly went to 

their subjective knowledge. “An expert . . . may not testify that an individual 

had specific knowledge or possessed a specific intent.” (People v. Garcia, 

supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513, citing People v. Killebrew (2003) 103 

Cal.App.4th 655, 658.) The People assert the testimony was more akin to 

objective knowledge than subjective knowledge because Detective Collins 

opined that Defendants would be aware of Emerald Hills’ criminal street gang 

activity, rather than that they were aware of it.

On this record, we agree with the People. Detective Collins’s testimony 

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was lengthy and he repeatedly discussed gang culture and psychology 

generally. He acknowledged he did not participate in the investigation of this 

case or interview any of the Defendants. The jury likely understood Detective 

Collins lacked knowledge as to what whether [sic] Defendants were actually 

aware of Emerald Hills’s criminal activities.

Additionally, even if this testimony should have been excluded, 

reversal is unwarranted. A harmless error analysis applies to the admission 

of gang expert testimony. (People v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 511, 

citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) “Under Watson, 

defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that a result more 

favorable to defendant would have been reached absent the error.” (People v. 

Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 263.) Defendants’ knowledge of Emerald 

Hills’s criminal activities was but one factor relevant to foreseeability and 

culpability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and thus the 

evidence was not tantamount to an opinion of guilt. (See People v. Valdez, 

supra, at p. 509.) Detective Collins properly testified that Defendants were 

active members of Emerald Hills, the shootings were done for the benefit of 

the gang, and gang members generally know fistfights between rival gang 

members often escalate and turn deadly. It is not reasonably probable the jury 

would have found in favor of Defendants absent Detective Collins’s opinion 

they would have knowledge of Emerald Hills’s prior criminal activities.

(Lodgment No. 14 at 32-35.)

2. Discussion

First, to the extent Scott asserts the trial court’s admission of the gang expert’s

testimony was in violation of California rules of evidence, his claim is not cognizable on 

habeas review and must be denied. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) 

(holding that issues regarding state law are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review 

and that it is not the province of the federal habeas court to re-examine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions).

“Evidence erroneously admitted warrants habeas relief only when it results in the 

denial of a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the right to due process.” Briceno v. 

Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 6 –68); see also 

Holly v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Failure to comply with state 

rules of evidence is not necessarily a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on 

due process grounds. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. 

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Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The due process inquiry in federal habeas 

review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered 

the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. Only if there are no permissible 

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. 

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that, in cases governed by the AEDPA 

standard of review, the Supreme Court has never held that “the Constitution is violated by 

the admission of expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue to be resolved by the trier 

of fact.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Duvardo v. 

Giurbino, 410 Fed. Appx. 69, 70 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never 

held that the admission of expert testimony on an ultimate issue to be resolved by the trier 

of fact violates the Due Process Clause”); Waggoner v. Hernandez, 393 F. App’x 449, 452 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that Waggoner is [arguing] that the expert’s testimony 

invaded the province of the jury, Waggoner fails to cite any United States Supreme Court 

case holding that an expert may not offer an opinion regarding the ultimate issue to be 

decided by the trier of fact.”); Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1077 (rejecting claim that expert’s 

testimony that hypothetical robberies were gang-related was unconstitutional because 

“there is no clearly established constitutional right to be free of an expert opinion on an 

ultimate issue”). “When there is no clearly established federal law on an issue, a state court 

cannot be said to have unreasonably applied the law as to that issue.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 

1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)). Thus, Scott’s 

claim fails under AEDPA.

IV. Conclusion

The Petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED.

Dated: July 26, 2018

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