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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 2013 Decided January 3, 2014

No. 12-5132

FREDERICK SCHLOTTMAN,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00752)

George M. Chuzi argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Javier M. Guzman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Before: TATEL, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Because the federal government’s 

administrative procedures for resolving complaints of 

discrimination are complex and confusing, individuals 

sometimes file their complaints with the wrong agency. In an 

effort to deal with this problem, Congress adopted a savings 

clause: “[i]n any case in which an employee is required to file 

any action . . . under this section and the employee timely 

files the action . . . with an agency other than the agency with 

which the action . . . is to be filed, the employee shall be 

treated as having timely filed the action . . . as of the date it is 

filed with the proper agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 7702(f) (emphasis 

added). So how does this provision apply where, as here, the 

complainant initiates an action before the wrong agency—

timely according to the rules of that agency but untimely

according to the rules of the proper agency? Because we

understand that the savings clause measures timeliness with 

respect to the deadlines for filing with the proper agency, we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

I.

In July 2008, Appellant Frederick Schlottman, a 

probationary employee serving as a legislative analyst at the 

Department of Labor (DOL), wrote a letter to his second-level 

supervisor alleging that his Division Chief, Priscilla Johnson, 

was “harassing him and creating a hostile work environment.” 

Compl. ¶ 8. Two months later, Schlottman authored a report 

that criticized Johnson’s performance. On January 15, 2009, 

Schlottman was fired for unsatisfactory performance, 

effective January 31, 2009. 

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Schlottman believes that DOL fired him in retaliation for 

his criticism of Johnson and discriminated against him on the 

basis of “age, disability, sex and ‘EEO [Equal Employment 

Opportunity] whistleblower’ reprisal.” Appellant’s Br. 6. A 

probationary employee like Schlottman has three avenues 

through which to pursue such claims. First, to challenge a 

termination based on discrimination or retaliation in violation 

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, he may pursue an EEO 

claim with his employing agency. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614 

(describing procedures for raising EEO claim) (“the EEO 

route”). Second, if he believes that his termination was also

based on marital status or political affiliation, he may directly 

appeal his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board

(MSPB). See 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b), (d) (“the MSPB route”).

In pursuing a discrimination claim, however, he may not 

proceed down the EEO and MSPB routes simultaneously. 

Instead, whichever route he formally initiates first “shall be 

considered an election to proceed in that forum.” 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.302(b). Third, to challenge his termination under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 

16 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) 

(“WPA”), the probationary employee must first file a 

complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and may 

then appeal to the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 

1221(b) (“the whistleblower route”). 

These administrative pathways impose different 

deadlines. Under the EEO route, the individual must file a 

formal Title VII complaint within fifteen days of being 

notified of his right to do so. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b). 

Under the MSPB route, he must file his direct appeal within 

thirty days of the effective date of termination. See 5 C.F.R. § 

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1201.154(a). Under the whistleblower route, he must first file 

a complaint with the OSC. See 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). If the 

OSC dismisses the complaint, the individual must file an 

appeal—known as an Individual Right of Action (IRA)—with 

the MSPB within 65 days of the OSC issuing its written 

notification of the dismissal. See 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1).

As the timeline on the following page demonstrates, 

Schlottman’s effort to navigate these Rube Goldberg-like

procedures began on January 31, 2009 when he initiated the 

whistleblower route by filing a complaint with the OSC. Four

days later, on February 4, Schlottman initiated the EEO route

by contacting an EEO counselor at DOL. The OSC dismissed 

Schlottman’s whistleblower complaint on April 6, citing his 

failure to allege a violation of the Whistleblower Protection 

Act. Then, on May 1, the EEO counselor notified Schlottman 

of his right to file a formal EEO complaint within fifteen

days. Significantly for this case, however, Schlottman chose 

not to file a formal EEO complaint within this time period, 

opting instead to pursue the whistleblower route by filing an 

appeal with the MSPB on June 4. His appeal had two 

components: (1) a direct appeal alleging retaliation in 

violation of Title VII and discrimination based on marital 

status or political affiliation, and (2) an IRA. See 5 U.S.C. 

1221(a) (providing for Individual Right of Action in 

whistleblower reprisal cases). Why Schlottman chose to raise 

his Title VII claim before the MSPB is unclear, especially 

since he tells us that his allegation of discrimination based on 

marital status or political affiliation (a prerequisite for filing 

with the MSPB) was “inadvertent[].” Appellant’s Br. 8 n.1.

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The MSPB dismissed Schlottman’s IRA for lack of 

jurisdiction, made no mention of his direct Title VII appeal, 

and informed him that he could appeal the Board’s decision in 

one of two ways. Pursuing neither option, Schlottman

EEO ROUTE

Feb. 4, 

2009

Schlottman began 

informal EEO counseling 

with DOL, alleging 

discrimination on basis 

of sex, age, disability, 

and “EEO 

Whistleblower” reprisal

May 1, 

2009

Schlottman received 

notice of right to file 

formal EEO complaint 

within 15 days

Sept. 

17, 

2009

Schlottman filed formal 

EEO complaint with DOL

Oct. 

29, 

2009

Schlottman received DOL 

decision dismissing EEO 

complaint as untimely

Nov. 

20, 

2009

Schlottman appealed 

dismissal to EEOC, which 

denied both the appeal 

and reconsideration.

WHISTLEBLOWER/MSPB ROUTE

Jan. 31, 

2009

Schlottman filed 

whistleblower complaint 

with OSC

Apr. 6, 

2009

OSC dismissed complaint 

for failure to allege 

violation of WPA. 

Deadline for appeal: 65 

days from date of notice.

June 4, 

2009

Schlottman appealed 

dismissal to MSPB in two 

parts: 1) direct appeal of 

marital/political and Title 

VII discrimination, 2) IRA 

of OSC’s dismissal of 

whistleblower claim

Sept. 23, 

2009

MSPB dismissed IRA for 

lack of jurisdiction but 

did not address the 

direct appeal. MSPB 

advised Schlottman of 

two options for appeal, 

and he took neither.

Options & Deadlines for Filing a Title VII Claim (Probationary Employees)

EEO Route (if alleging Title 

VII discrimination)

File formal complaint directly with agency within 15 

days of being notified of right—here, May 16, 2009

MSPB Route (if alleging 

both marital/political + 

Title VII discrimination)

File direct appeal with MSPB within 30 days of 

effective date of termination—here March 2, 2009

SCHLOTTMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

Jan. 31, 

2009

Schlottman’s term as probationary employee effectively 

terminated. He appealed termination using two routes.

Figure 1: Timeline of Schlottman’s Administrative Actions

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returned to the EEO route, in which he had received his 15-

day right-to-file notice on May 1. Well outside this 

timeframe, on September 17, Schlottman filed a formal EEO 

complaint with DOL. DOL dismissed the complaint as 

untimely, and Schlottman appealed to the EEOC, which 

denied the appeal and later denied Schlottman’s motion for 

reconsideration. 

Schlottman then filed a Title VII action in district court.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the 

government moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Specifically, the government argued 

that Schlottman’s “claims were not preserved by the savings 

clause because the appeal was not timely.” See Schlottman v. 

Solis, 845 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (D.D.C. 2012). In response, 

Schlottman argued that his formal EEO complaint should be 

deemed timely pursuant to the savings clause set forth in 5 

U.S.C. § 7702(f). Under that clause, which applies to “mixed 

cases” that involve adverse personnel actions appealable to 

the MSPB and that also include allegations of discrimination, 

if an “employee timely files the action, appeal, or petition 

with an agency other than the agency with which the action, 

appeal, or petition is to be filed, the employee shall be treated 

as having timely filed the action, appeal, or petition as of the 

date it is filed with the proper agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 7702(f).

According to Schlottman, the clause saved his claim because 

he filed a “mixed case appeal” with the MSPB on June 4, 

2009, well within 65 days of the OSC’s April 6 notice that it 

was dismissing his whistleblower complaint. See 5 C.F.R. § 

1209.5(a)(1) (specifying deadline for appealing OSC 

dismissal). The district court granted the government’s motion 

to dismiss, concluding both that Schlottman’s whistleblower

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complaint did not qualify as a “mixed case” complaint 

capable of triggering the savings clause, see Schlottman, 845 

F. Supp. 2d at 111 n.6, and that, even if it did, “the savings 

provision does not apply because . . . neither [Schlottman’s] 

appeal to the MSPB nor his appeal to the EEOC was timely 

filed,” id. at 111.

Schlottman appeals. We review de novo a dismissal for 

failure to state a claim. Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 595 

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

II.

The crux of Schlottman’s argument is that even though

he presented his Title VII claim in the wrong forum (the 

MSPB), because he did so along with a timely filed IRA as 

part of a “mixed case,” his formal EEO complaint should be 

deemed timely with the correct forum (the DOL) pursuant to 

section 7702(f)’s savings clause. The government disagrees

for three reasons. First, as a probationary employee, 

Schlottman “was not an employee for purposes of section 

7702(f), and thus not entitled to file a mixed case appeal with 

the MSPB.” Appellee’s Br. 9. Second, “there can be no such 

thing as a ‘mixed’ Individual Right of Action that would bring 

section 7702(f) into play.” Id. at 10. In other words, an 

allegation of discrimination together with a claim of 

whistleblower reprisal cannot constitute a “mixed case” under 

section 7702. Id. at 11. Finally, “even if section 7702(f) 

otherwise applied, Schlottman could not get relief because his 

direct discrimination-based appeal to the MSPB and his EEO 

complaint to DOL were untimely.” Id. at 10.

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We have no need to address the government’s first two 

arguments because, assuming that Schlottman filed a proper 

“mixed case” appeal under section 7702, we, like the district 

court, conclude that Schlottman’s appeal was untimely and 

therefore receives no protection from the savings clause. Of 

course, this conclusion is hardly obvious from the clause’s

ambiguous language. Although Congress enacted the savings 

clause to protect employees who, confused by the federal 

government’s complex procedures, file in the wrong forum, it 

failed to define a key statutory term—“timely.” For their part, 

the parties offer little help, as neither even attempts to define

the term. Instead, they simply assume definitions that produce

their preferred outcomes. In our view, their dispute boils 

down to the following question: Do we (as the government 

assumes) measure the timeliness of Schlottman’s formal Title 

VII complaint with respect to the deadlines of the proper

route, i.e., the EEO route, under which Schlottman formally 

filed his complaint, due May 16, on June 4? See Appellee’s 

Br. 10–11. Or do we (as Schlottman assumes) measure the 

timeliness of the complaint against the deadlines of the 

improper route, i.e., the whistleblower route, under which 

Schlottman timely filed his IRA, to which he appended his

Title VII claim as part of an alleged “mixed case”? See

Appellant’s Br. 22–23; 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A)(ii) 

(prescribing a 60-day deadline for appealing OSC dismissal).

This is not the first time this question has arisen. Indeed, 

every court and administrative agency to have considered the 

question has, though not expressly, applied the savings clause

only when a filing was timely under the deadlines of the 

proper forum. Put another way, they have applied the savings 

clause to excuse errors only in the place, not time, of filing.

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In Whittington v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 80 

F.3d 471 (Fed. Cir. 1996), a former federal employee, 

alleging that her removal was racially motivated, erroneously 

filed a mixed case with the EEOC instead of with the MSPB, 

but did so within the MSPB’s 20-day filing deadline. Id. at 

472. Over a year after her removal, she filed an appeal with 

the MSPB, the proper forum for her claim, and the MSPB

dismissed the appeal as untimely. Id. The Federal Circuit 

concluded that the MSPB erred by “failing to consider [the 

savings clause],” which would have saved the MSPB appeal 

as timely “if [the former employee] erroneously filed her 

appeal with EEOC within the time limit for filing with the 

[MSPB].” Id. at 474 (emphasis added).

In Williams v. USPS, 115 M.S.P.R. 318 (2010), the 

complainant faced a 30-day deadline for filing his 

discrimination claim with the MSPB. He instead filed his 

claim with the EEOC but within those thirty days. The MSPB 

found that because the complainant had adhered to the 

MSPB’s deadline, the savings clause preserved the 

discrimination claim, treating it as timely filed before the 

MSPB. Id. at 321–22. See also Godesky v. Department of 

Health & Human Services, 101 M.S.P.R. 280, 283 (2006) 

(treating as timely filed with MSPB a request filed with 

EEOC within MSPB deadline); Brent v. Department of 

Justice, 100 M.S.P.R. 586, 589–90 (2005), aff’d, 213 Fed. 

App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (treating as timely filed with 

MSPB a request filed with FLRA within MSPB deadline).

A district court in this Circuit has also measured

timeliness under the savings clause with respect to the

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deadlines of the proper forum. In Frank v. Ridge, 310 F. 

Supp. 2d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Frank v. 

Chertoff, 171 Fed. App’x 860 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a former 

federal employee actively pursuing a mixed MSPB appeal 

filed an EEO complaint alleging that his demotion was due to 

gender discrimination. The employing agency and the MSPB, 

to whom he later appealed, both declined to consider the 

gender-discrimination claim because the complainant had 

failed to raise it earlier in the MSPB process. See id. at 7.

Quoting Whittington, the district court noted that the savings 

clause would preserve a plaintiff’s MSPB appeal if he 

“erroneously filed [his] appeal with EEOC within the time 

limit for filing with the [MSPB].” Id. at 9 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (emphasis added). The district court thus 

concluded that the complainant’s discrimination claim was 

preserved before the MSPB. See id. at 10. We summarily 

affirmed in an unpublished judgment. See Frank, 171 Fed. 

App’x. at 861; see also In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (observing “persuasive authority” of 

unpublished orders).

Schlottman counters with two EEOC cases, Knowles v. 

Peña, EEOC Doc. 05930260, 1993 WL 1509932 (Aug. 12, 

1993), and Nuno v. Rumsfeld, EEOC Doc. 04A60029, 2006 

WL 1910448 (June 28, 2006), which he argues “preserve 

discrimination complaints when the employee filed an appeal 

which he was not permitted by law to file.” Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 19. But Schlottman’s reliance on these decisions is 

misplaced because both apply the savings clause to “save” 

complaints that were filed improperly with the MSPB but

within EEO deadlines. See also Alop v. Brady, EEOC Doc. 

05890680, 1989 WL 1007232, at *3 (Oct. 2, 1989)

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(concluding the same). Unlike the Knowles and Nuno

complainants, who never initiated informal EEO counseling

and instead pursued their discrimination claims solely—albeit 

incorrectly—with the MSPB, Schlottman consulted an EEO 

counselor, received his 15-day right-to-file notice, and then

failed to file his formal Title VII claim in any forum within 

those fifteen days. Knowles and Nuno thus provide no support 

for Schlottman’s argument that section 7702(f)’s savings 

clause preserved his untimely Title VII claim. 

Under all of these cases, Schlottman could have saved his 

Title VII claim and pursued it through the EEO route only if 

he had abided by the deadlines of that route. As the 

government explains in an analogy drawn from Whittington,

“if Schlottman, after receiving the right-to-file notice from the 

EEO counselor, had erroneously filed his formal EEO 

complaint with the MSPB within the 15 day-deadline 

prescribed by the notice, the complaint would have been 

considered timely filed with DOL.” See Appellee’s Br. 32. 

Instead, Schlottman first filed his formal Title VII claim with 

the MSPB on June 4, well after that 15-day deadline. His 

claim was thus untimely.

This result makes sense. Because Schlottman seeks to 

“save” his Title VII claim for the purpose of filing it 

according to the EEO route—the only avenue through which 

he could independently raise the claim—it seems logical to 

measure the timeliness of his claim according to that route’s 

deadlines. Doing so, moreover, ensures that complainants 

using the same route play by the same rules. It also avoids the 

numerous pitfalls inherent in Schlottman’s theory. For one 

thing, under Schlottman’s view his “timely filed [IRA] would 

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allow him to save an untimely discrimination claim with the 

MSPB when a non-probationary employee in the same 

circumstance who did not allege a whistleblower claim would 

be barred from doing so.” Appellee’s Br. 30. Moreover, were 

we to interpret the savings clause as Schlottman urges—

preserving claims that are timely with respect to the wrong

forum—we would effectively allow, and perhaps even incent, 

complainants to seek out improper forums with more

favorable deadlines in order to “save” untimely claims. For 

example, a probationary employee alleging neither marital nor 

political discrimination who could raise his Title VII claim 

only via the EEO route could “circumvent this jurisdictional 

limitation—and the EEO deadlines—by simply appending a 

discrimination claim to an [IRA].” Id. at 31. Finally, assuming 

it were otherwise possible, complainants would be free to 

“save” old discrimination claims simply by appending them to

distinct, timely-filed non-discrimination claims as part of 

alleged “mixed cases.”

In sum, because the savings clause excuses errors only in

the place, not time, of filing, Schlottman’s formal Title VII 

claim—filed well after the expiration of the EEO route’s 15-

day deadline—was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.

So ordered.

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