Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 This matter was referred to a United States magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern

District Local Rule 72-302.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MILTON OTIS LEWIS,

NO. CIV. S-02-0013 FCD GGH DP

Petitioner,

v. DEATH PENALTY CASE

JEANNE WOODFORD, Warden, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondent.

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This matter is before the court on respondent Jeanne

Woodford’s motion for reconsideration of the portion of the

magistrate judge’s Order and Findings & Recommendations

(“Order”), filed January 23, 2007, which indicates that the

remaining claims that have not been addressed by summary judgment

will be subject to an evidentiary hearing.1 For the reasons set

forth below, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.

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2 The court adopts the factual background set forth by

the magistrate judge in his findings and recommendations. (See

Order, filed Jan. 23, 2007, at 15-20).

3 The magistrate noted that respondent will not be

permitted to make another motion for summary judgment on the

merits of the remaining claims.

2

BACKGROUND2

On January 23, 2007, the magistrate judge issued an Order

and Findings & Recommendations, addressing respondent’s motion

for summary judgment on selected claims. This was the second

such motion brought in this case, and was supposed to be omnibus,

i.e., every claim susceptible to summary judgment was to be

noticed. (See Order at 8 n.1). The magistrate judge stated that

this motion brought an end to law and motion on the merits prior

to an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 5). The magistrate judge

found that no claims adjudicated in the motion needed to be

resolved by an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 8). However, he

ordered that “[t]he remaining claims, i.e. those not adjudicated

previously or in the motion,” proceed to an evidentiary hearing,

“except for those claims which are procedurally deficient under

[the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)],

or shall otherwise be finally resolved after evidentiary

hearing.” (Id.)3

STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and

Eastern District Local Rule 72-303(f), a magistrate judge’s order

regarding non-dispositive pretrial motions shall be upheld unless

“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);

E.D. Cal. Local R. 72-303(f); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)

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(“A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter . . .

where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”); Grimes v. San Francisco,

951 F.2d 236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be

modified or set aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with

the definite and firm conviction,’ that the [magistrate judge’s]

key findings are mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

243 (2001) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Respondent seeks reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

decision that the claims which have not previously been

adjudicated in the summary judgment motions (the “remaining

claims”) will proceed to an evidentiary hearing, absent

respondent’s opposition to such a hearing. Respondent argues

that the Order is mistaken and contrary to law in that it sets up

a rebuttable presumption that the remaining claims warrant an

evidentiary hearing based solely on the fact that those claims

were not addressed in Respondent’s prior cross-motion and motion

for summary judgment.

The AEDPA provides, in relevant part:

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court, a determination of a factual issue

made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden

of rebutting the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the

factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that

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(A) the claim relies on – 

(I) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (emphasis added). Under the AEDPA, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e), the district court’s discretion to grant an

evidentiary hearing is substantially restricted. Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999); see Cardwell v.

Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1998) overruled on other

grounds by Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

AEDPA imposes an express limitation on the power of a federal

court to grant an evidentiary hearing.”) (emphasis in original). 

In order for a petitioner to be granted an evidentiary hearing,

the district court must first determine whether a factual basis

exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim. If such

a factual basis exists, then the court must examine the factors

set forth by the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,

313 (1963). Under Townsend, a petitioner is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing if:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved

in the state hearing; (2) the state factual

determination is not fairly supported by the record as

a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the

state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair

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hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly

discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not

adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6)

for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact

did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair

fact hearing.

Id. at 313. If a factual basis for the claim has not been

developed in the state court, under the AEDPA, the petitioner may

only be permitted an evidentiary hearing if he meets at least

“one of the two narrow exceptions stated in the statute.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). It is

petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that the statutory

requirements of the AEDPA governing evidentiary hearings have

been met. See id. at 669-71; Baja, 187 F.3d at 1077-78.

The magistrate judge’s Order does not address whether

petitioner has demonstrated that he is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on all of the remaining claims. The Order states that

“[r]espondents will be permitted to oppose any evidentiary

hearing on the grounds that the AEDPA precludes such.” (Order at

8). Implicit in this ruling is that AEDPA requirements may not

have been met by petitioner. Thus, the magistrate judge’s ruling

turns on a presumption that petitioner is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. However, an evidentiary hearing can only be

permitted where the statutory requirements of the AEDPA have been

met. Therefore, respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the

magistrate judge’s Order directing that the remaining claims

should proceed to an evidentiary hearing, absent an opposing

motion by respondent, is GRANTED. To the extent that petitioner

seeks an evidentiary hearing on any of his remaining claims, 

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petitioner is directed to file a motion for such a hearing and

provide respondent an adequate opportunity to respond. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2007.

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