Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03292/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03292-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FI .L 1~ D 

~nited St.ates C<',llrt of App<:2.b Terit'.1 C,,.~ui'; 

MAYO 5 1992 

:::?.ORERT L. HOECKEE 

DORIS RINGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) Cler!: 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) No. 91-3292 

) (D.C. No. 89-CV-1358) 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN 

SERVICES, 

) (D . Kansas) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff Doris Ringer was awarded Social Security disability 

insurance benefits from December 27, 1987, through December 31, 

1988. She filed this action in the district court, seeking an 

order that the Secretary's determination of the onset date of her 

disability was incorrect and that she was entitled to benefits 

beginning April 27, 1983. The district court denied her request, 

and she appeals. 1 At issue is whether the Secretary for Health 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

(continued on next page) 

1 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 1
and Human Services' determination of onset date is supported by 

substantial evidence. We find that it is not and grant 

plaintiff's request for benefits as of April 27, 1983. 

To qualify for disability bene fits, a claimant must establish 

that she has a medically determinable physical or mental condition 

which prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity 

for a period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential evaluation 

process for determining such disability. See Williams v. Bowen, 

844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(describing the five-step 

sequence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The five-step sequence provides 

that the claimant (a) is not gainfully employed, (b) has a severe 

impairment, (c) has an impairment which meets or equals an 

impairment presumed by the Secretary to preclude substantial 

gainful activity, listed in Appendix 1 to the Social Security 

Regulations, (d) has an impairment which prevents her from 

engaging in her past employment, and (e) has an impairment which 

prevents her from engaging in any other work, considering her age, 

education, and work experience. The claimant bears the 

burden of proving that she is disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), 

that is, that she is not presently working in any employment, has 

a severe impairment or has an impaired condition which meets or 

equals one of those listed in the regulations, and is not able to 

return to her past work. See,~, Channel v . Heckler, 747 F.2d 

(continued from previous page) 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 2
577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984). The Secretary then bears the burden of 

proving the final step in the application analysis, that a 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to engage in gainful 

employment appropriate to her age, education, and work experience, 

even if it is not the work the cla imant has performed in the past, 

and that such job exists in the national economy. Flint v. 

Sullivan, 951 F.2d 264, 267 (10th Cir. 1991); Hargis v. Sullivan, 

945 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991); Channel, 747 F.2d at 579. 

Plaintiff had a history of he alth problems, including chronic 

sporadic back pain following removal of a disc in 1980, chronic 

severe pulmonary problems, and chronic depression. She claimed 

that this combination of problems rendered her unable to work from 

April 27, 1983, through December 31, 1988. The Appeals Council 

made the following factual findings: 

1. The claimant met the special 

requirements of the Act on April 27, 1983, the 

the claimant stated she became unable to 

continued to meet them through December 31, 

not thereafter. 

earnings 

date that 

work and 

1988, but 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since April 27, 1983 . 

3. The claimant has the following 

bronchial asthma, hypertension 

heart failure by history, status 

mild depression. 

impairments: 

congestive 

laminectomy, 

severe 

with 

post 

4. 

severity 

Subpart P 

1987, but 

The claimant's pulmonary 

to equal Section 3.02 A and 

of the Regulations No. 4 as 

not prior thereto. 

disorder is of 

B of Appendix 1 to 

of December 29, 

5. Accordingly the claimant was under a 

"disability" commencing December 29, 1987, but not prior thereto. 

6. The statements regarding the severity of the 

claimant's condition and the restrictions imposed by her 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 3
impairments are not supported by the clinical findings 

to the degree alleged prior to December 29, 1987. 

7. The claimant ha[d] 

capacity prior to December 29, 

medium exertional work not 

pulmonary irritants. 

the residual functional 

1987, to perform light to 

involving exposure to 

8. The claimant's past relevant work as a sheet 

metal assembly worker did not require the above noted 

limitations. 

9. The claimant's impairments d[id] not prevent 

the performance of the past relevant work. 

10. The claimant, therefore, was not under a 

"disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, at 

any time prior to December 29, 1987. 

Plaintiff/Appellant's Appendix (hereinafter designated as "R.") at 

30-31. Plaintiff challenges the Appeals Council's determination 

of the onset of her period of disability, claiming that the 

Secretary did not carry his burden of proof that, despite her 

combination of impairments, she could have pursued 

employment from April 27, 1983, to December 29, 1987. 

gainful 

This court reviews the Secretary's decision 

[denying benefits] to determine only whether his 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the Secretary applied correct legal standards 

when making his decision. Substantial evidence is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. We cannot reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the 

Secretary. 

Hargis, 945 F.2d at 1486 (citations omitted); see also Richardson 

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(defining the standard for 

"substantial evidence"); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We "review the 

record as a whole, and 'the substantiality of the evidence must 

take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its 

weight.'" Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 4
1987)(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 

(1951)). Review of the record reveals that several of the 

findings of the Appeals Council, set forth below, are not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

A. Severity of plaintiff's condition, considering her combination 

of impairments. 

The Appeals Council found: "3. The claimant has the 

following severe impairments: bronchial asthma, hypertension with 

congestive heart failure by history, status post laminectomy, mild 

depression. 11 ;

2 and "6. The statements regarding the severity of 

the claimant's condition and the restrictions imposed by her 

impairments are not supported by the clinical findings to the 

degree alleged prior to December 29, 1987." R. at 30. 

It is clear from the evidence in the record that plaintiff's 

back problems and resultant pain were not severe enough, in and of 

themselves, to be totally disabling; nor was her pulmonary 

impairment; nor was her depression. We do not have to "reweigh" 

the evidence, however, to conclude from the record that these 

difficulties combined in plaintiff to cause severe dysfunction in 

her life. See,~= 

This is an individual whose emotional reaction, that is 

her depression, was to a back injury and her failure to 

2 We are at a loss to understand the inherent contradiction of 

including "mild depression" in a finding describing plaintiff's 

"severe impairments." To avoid belaboring the inconsistency, we 

will assume that the Appeals Council intended to render a formal 

finding that her depression was not "seve re," see R. at 29 ("[T]he 

Council concludes that the claimant's depressive disorder does not 

constitute a severe mental impairment."), in our review of the 

record evidence of plaintiff's depression. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 5
improve. The acceptance 

difficult for her. This in 

pulmonary dysfunction 

serious continuing problems 

of being disabled was quite 

conjunction with her ... has resulted in rather 

with depression. 

. . . It is my opinion that [plaintiff's] 

depressive syndrome is related to her inability to 

adjust to unacceptable physical limitations that prevent 

her from returning to work. It is my further opinion 

that if she were able to return to work her depression 

would be a more treatable condition and would not in and 

of itself be disabling. 

R. at 166 (8/26/85, letter from treating psychotherapist). 

We also note the same practitioner's observation of March 24, 

1986, describing the changing nature of her treatment. Before 

December 1985, the thrust of treatment for plaintiff was 

rehabilitation. After that time, her treatment shifted to helping 

her accept her "likely permanent disability." R. at 179. This 

observation is consistent with the contemporaneous treating 

physicians' clinical notes detailing suggestions for possible 

vocational rehabilitation during the period 1983-85, which 

contrast with their later retrospective analysis of that period 

concluding that such rehabilitation had not been possible and that 

plaintiff had indeed been disabled during the entire period 

beginning in April 1983. See,~, R. at 163-65. 

Plaintiff's treating psychotherapist opined that plaintiff 

suffered from disabling depression caused by her inability to 

work, in turn caused by her pulmonary and back problems. The 

Appeals Council wrote that this opinion was not supported by any 

"mental status examination, psychological testing, or even 

clinical interview data." R. at 29. Indeed, no raw clinical data 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 6
of psychological testing was included in the record. 3 We note, 

however, that three of her treating physicians during the 

pertinent time period diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from 

chronic depression which interfered with her activities. See R. 

at 124-26 (her treating physician from 1980-83); R. at 146, 155 

(her treating physician from 1983-88); R. at 178-79, 184-85, 

198-99, 222 (her psychotherapist from 1983-88). The consistency 

of this diagnosis, supported by specific observations of her 

behavior,~, R. at 184-85, 198-99, from her treating physicians 

during the period 1983-87, coupled with a complete lack of 

contradictory evidence, in the form of empirical testing, 

contemporaneous reports, or professional opinions, renders hollow 

the Appeals Council's denial of the debilitating severity of her 

depressed condition. 

3 The record contains no raw data, but does include several 

references to 1983 testing (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 

Inventory (MMPI)) which formed the basis of plaintiff's treating 

physician's recommendation that she seek help from a 

psychotherapist. It also contains references to two MMPis 

administered by her psychotherapist in 1983 and 1984 which formed 

the basis of his diagnosis of serious and deepening depression. 

R. at 144, 146, 158, 168. The raw data was not requested by the 

ALJ or the district court during consideration of plaintiff's 

application for benefits, although each has the power and the 

responsibility to develop a complete record. See,~, Dixon v. 

Heckler, 811 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1987): 

It is clear that, under the Social Security Act, 

the claimant has the burden of proving a disability. 

But it is equally clear that a Social Security 

disability hearing is a nonadversarial proceeding, in 

which the ALJ has a basic duty of inquiry, "to inform 

himself about facts relevant to his decision and to 

learn the claimant's own version of those facts." The 

duty of inquiry also extends to the district court in 

its review of the ALJ's determination. 

Id. at 510 (citations omitted). 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 7
The opinion of an applicant's treating physician may be 

rejected if the Secretary gives specific, legitimate reasons for 

doing so. Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 

1988); Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Here, the Secretary justifies his rejection of the contemporaneous 

opinions of plaintiff's three treating physicians by arguing that 

there was insufficient supportive objective data. Under the 

record before us, these "reasons" are insufficiently specific . 

In addition, the Appeals Council stated that "[t]here are few 

convincing signs of depression, save for a possible guilty 

reaction to not working." R. at 29. Apparently the Appeals 

Council failed to note the testimony at the ALJ hearing by 

plaintiff and her daughter detailing the regular interference with 

plaintiff's functional abilities consistent with a diagnosis of 

chronic depression, R. at 56-76, and to note the repeated 

references to the debilitating effects of her depression from her 

treating physicians. 

The interaction between plaintif f's physical pain and her 

depression is of critical importance in this case, and that 

interaction is not specifically addressed in the Appeals Council's 

findings. Plaintiff had a disc r emoved in 1980 and had recurring 

reaggrevations of that are a of her back which caused pain severe 

enough to r e quire hospitalization in April 1983. The prescribed 

tre atme nt for her back pain was physical therapy, and plaintiff 

responded cooperatively by attending physical therapy sessions, by 

joining a "spa" and attending wate r the rapy sessions, and by doing 

physical the rapy e xercises at home . Thi s c our se of t r eatment was 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 8
helpful to the extent she was able to pursue it. However, her 

chronic pulmonary impairments, which were consistently documented 

to have been present throughout the period in question, often 

interfered with her ability to pursue the necessary exercises for 

her back. 

We hold that plaintiff's pulmonary impairment, documented by 

her treating physician during the period in question, in 

combination with the debilitating effects of her depression, 

documented by contemporaneous reports from her treating physicians 

and her psychotherapist, together with her status of 

post-laminectomy are sufficient to provide objective support for 

plaintiff's subjective reports of pain. See Luna v. Bowen, 834 

F.2d 161, 162 n.2, 164 (10th Cir. 1987)(only a loose nexus must 

exist between objectively proven impairment and subjectively 

alleged pain). We further hold that this combination of 

impairments, as documented in the record, could have been 

described as severe and could have been documented to have begun 

as of at least April 27, 1983. 

B. Ability to do past work. 

The Appeals Council found: 

d[id] not prevent the performance 

R. at 31. 

"9. The claimant's impairments 

of the past relevant work." 

The record reflects that plaintiff's treating physicians 

consistently noted plaintiff's inability to return to her previous 

work as a sheet metal assemble r at an aircraft manufacturing 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 9
plant4 and the necessity for her to have vocational retraining. 

See, ~, R. at 149 (11/3/83, treating physician: "We discussed 

at some length whether or not she is ever going to return to the 

type of work she has been doing previously and I told her I 

doubted that she would be able to do this."); R. at 150 (1/4/84, 

treating physician: "I do not think she is going to be able to 

return to her original [occupation] which was in sheet metal 

work."); R. at 163 (8/17/83, treating physician: "She 

cannot perform heavy physical activity. In addition, she should 

avoid dusty environments or environments with fumes or toxins. 

I do not think she will be able to do activity requiring 

fair amounts of exertion."). Plaintiff testified before the ALJ 

that after she reinjured her back at work in April 1983, the 

4 On one Social Security Administration application form for 

benefits, plaintiff described a typical day at her previous job in 

the following terms: three hours per day walking; six hours per 

day standing; zero to one hour per day sitting; constantly 

required to bend and reach; weight required to be lifted and 

carried varied from five pounds to over fifty pounds (in the form 

of sheet metal and tools), with the heaviest weight lifted checked 

at 100 pounds, and weight frequently lifted and carried checked at 

up to twenty-five pounds. R. at 115 . She described her work as 

using "rivet guns, drills, alligator squeeze, rivet shavers, 

bucking bars, small squeezes." R. at 121. On a different form, 

she responded that she spent one hour per day walking, four hours 

per day standing, and one to four hours per day sitting; she 

reported frequently lifting and carrying up to twenty-five pounds. 

R. at 187. She described her basic duties as: "Drilling out and 

putting together sheet metal products. Ranged from light to very 

heavy. Some jobs required heavy constructional . I have also 

worked outside, in Dusty areas, in areas with a strong smell of 

paint. Setting up jigs, turning Jigs." Id. The ALJ found that 

she could return to this past work, R. at 46, a conclusion echoed 

in the Appeals Council's decision, R. at 29 ("The claimant 

describes [her past] work as essentially light to occassionally 

[sic] medium work. The Dictionary of Occ upational Titles (D.O.T . ) 

indicates that the job (D.O.T. code 804 .281-010), as customarily 

performed, does not entail exposure to significant pulmonary irritants."). 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 10
physicians for her employer would not clear her to return to her 

previous work. R. at 54-55. 

In contrast, there is no evidence in the record to support 

the Appeals Council's conclusion that plaintiff could return to 

her previous work as a sheet metal assembler. We hold that this 

finding was clearly erroneous. 

C. Residual functional capacity to perform other work in the 

national economy. 

The Appeals Council found: II 7 • The claimant has the 

residual functional capacity prior to December 29, 1987, to 

perform light to medium exertional work not involving exposure to 

pulmonary irritants." R. at 31. 

Having noted that the record contains sufficient evidence to 

support plaintiff's claim that she was not gainfully employed 

during the relevant period and that she suffered from a 

combination of impairments which, taken together, produced a 

severe disabling condition which precluded returning to her 

previous employment, we examined the record for evidence 

sufficient to support the Secretary's burden of showing that 

during the relevant period of time plaintiff could engage in some 

other gainful employment in the national economy. We found only 

two references to this issue in the record. 5 

5 The pertinent social security regulation, 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1571, states: "If you are able to engage in substantial 

gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled." The 

ALJ considered plaintiff's ability to care for herself at home as 

support for his conclusion that she was able to perform gainful 

work in the national economy. R. at 46. While§ 404.1571 also 

(continued on next page) 

11 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 11
First, the physician treating plaintiff's pulmonary 

impairments opined on August 17, 1983, that, based only on her 

pulmonary functioning, she could "easily handle any sort of a job 

where a great deal of exercise was not involved such as 

secretarial type or clerical work . " R. at 163. This report does 

not indicate that this physician considered or was asked to 

consider plaintiff's degree of impairment caused by the 

combination of her pulmonary impairments, her depression, and her 

back pain. Second, in connection with possible vocational 

rehabilitation training, on November 3, 1983, her treating 

physician seemed to imply that she could work in a less physically 

difficult job when he stated that training to be a medical 

laboratory technician would "be an excellent choice for her. " R. 

at 149. 6 

(continued from previous page) 

states that the general activities of an applicant can be used to 

show that an applicant can do more than she actually did, 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1572 states: "Generally, we do not consider 

activities like taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, 

therapy, school attendance, club activities, or soci al programs to 

be substantial gainful activity. " This is common sense; the work 

setting places demands on an individual for consistent application 

of some level of work that the home setting does not . At home, 

the individual can stop and rest at will, adjust the method of 

working and goals of the work to her situation, and can work 

sporadically during difficult peri ods. 

Consequently, we reject this as conclusive evidence, by 

itself, that plaintiff was able to pursue gainful work in the 

national economy. It would be r e levant evidence if combined with 

other objective evidence showing that plaintiff, impaired by the 

combination of problems described above, was capable of regular, 

sustained employment during this period. We did not find such 

other objective evidence in the r e cord. 

6 

But see R. at 185 (9/29/87, letter from psychotherapist: "In 

my considered professional opinion the i nteraction of her physical 

disabilities and her depressive disorder render her incapable of 

12 

(continued on next page) 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 12
Based on this record, the physician hired by the Social 

Security Administration to review the medical records opined that: 

The exact date of onset is obviously arbitrary but since 

the only adequate pulmonary function test [her October 

28, 1987, pulmonary function tests] is submitted in 

Exhibit 43 (results of that testing], I would give the 

claimant the date of onset to the combined period as of 

that date. Prior to that time a residual functional 

capacity for light work with avoidance of smoke, fumes, 

dust and etc, would be reasonable. 

R. at 223. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560 requires that residual functional 

capacity to work must be reviewed in conjunction with an 

applicant's age, education, and work experience. In April 1983, 

plaintiff was forty-eight years old. She had completed only tenth 

grade but had earned her GED. On March 24, 1986, her 

psychotherapist wrote that plaintiff "is actually poorly educated 

and she is quite simple and unsophisticated in her thinking." R. 

at 178. On August 7, 1985, a social security administration 

employee wrote on an interview form: "[She] has very poor 

memory. " R. at 11 7 . Her work experience included being a 

waitress "off and on over a period," being an "LPN" in a hospital 

from 1969-74, 7 and being a sheet metal assembler in the aircraft 

factory from 1974-83. R. at 186. 

(continued from previous page) 

productive work. Particularly she would not be able to meet 

production norms and sustain work with adequate attendance in a 

standard job situation."); R. at 199 (4/5/88, form completed by 

psychotherapist: "She has never been able to function in a work 

setting since April of 1983."). 

7 She described this work on a social security information form 

in this way: "I worked as an LPN in Spe cial Procedures Services. 

Removed stitches, drains, Changed Dr e ssings, Put on Packs, 

assisted Dr. Pushed Dressing Cart, Re arranged Patients in bed for 

treatments. assisted Drs." R. at 188. 

13 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 13
Nonexertional limitations such as pain must be taken into 

consideration in determining the applicant's residual functional 

capacity. Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 225 (10th Cir. 1989). In 

addition to plaintiff's pain, discussed above, other evidence of 

nonexertional limitations was offered by plaintiff, and it 

contradicted a conclusion that she would be able to hold a job. 

Testimony from plaintiff and her daughter and information 

plaintiff provided in her application for social security benefits 

supported her claim that she had "good days" and "bad days;" that 

sometimes she could do some housework and go to the store; and 

that some days her family, who stopped by to check in on her three 

times a week, had to help her with her daily activities. R. at 

56-58, 60-61, 118-19 . 

After reviewing the record, we agree with the Social Security 

Administration's reviewing physician that the choice of onset date 

for plaintiff's disability is "arbitrary." Proof of residual 

functional capacity to perform work in the national economy, 

however, is the Secretary's burden which must be sustained by 

"substantial" evidence, Hargis, 945 F . 2d at 1486; by "such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion," id.; by "more than a scintilla" of 

evidence, Flint, 951 F.2d at 266. Although there is some evidence 

in the record by which it is possible to infer that plaintiff 

might have been able to perform some gainful employment at some 

point before December 28, 1987, we are constrained to find that 

the Secretary did not sustain his burden of proof that claimant 

was able to participate in gainful activity from April 27, 1983, 

14 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 14
through December 29, 1987. See, ~, Soc. Sec. Rul. 88-13 

(detailing the kinds and variety of evidence which must be 

gathered and considered prior to arriving at a disability decision 

involving an applicant alleging disabling pain); Soc. Sec. 

Rul. 83-10 (listing specific requisites of sitting, standing, 

walking, and bending for the performance of "sedentary," "light," 

and "medium" work; explaining how an applicant's RFC is to be 

applied to the "grids" in the regulations; elaborating on the 

different levels of work described in the regulations). Absent a 

showing by the Secretary of plaintiff's actual residual functional 

capacity and the level of work of which she was capable as of a 

date certain, we conclude that the most appropriate onset date of 

plaintiff's disability under the facts of this case was April 

27, 1983. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is REVERSED, and plaintiff's motion to approve 

disability benefits dating from April 27, 1983, to December 31, 

1988, is hereby GRANTED. We REMAND this matter for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior Circuit Judge 

15 

Appellate Case: 91-3292 Document: 010110246248 Date Filed: 05/05/1992 Page: 15