Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 While this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas, for disposition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 72.3, the Court has determined that a Report and

Recommendation regarding Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is unnecessary. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

72.3(a) (unless all parties consent, dispositive motions filed in § 1983 prisoner cases are referred to

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY A. FRANKLIN,

CDCR# E-66269,

Civil No. 07-0438 BTM (LSP)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 46]

vs.

L.E. SCRIBNER; D.W. BELL; G.J.

GIURBINO; R. MADDEN; T. OCHOA;

M.E. BOURLAND; E. TRUJILLO;

HALEY; R. NELSON Jr; ORTIZ;

VARGAS; M. GREENWOOD; ROBERT

BASS; P. ZILL,

Defendants.

I. Procedural Background

On March 8, 2007, Gregory A. Franklin (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed

a Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Ochoa, Trujillo, Haley, Nelson, Ortiz,

Vargas, Scribner, Bell and Madden filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b).1

 Instead of filing an Opposition, Plaintiff sought and received leave of

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28 magistrate judges for “proposed findings and recommendations to the district judge, unless the district

judge orders otherwise.”).

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Court to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

on September 4, 2007. Defendants Bell, Haley, Madden, Ochoa, Ortiz, Nelson, Scribner,

Trujillo, Vargas, Zill and Bass filed a second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint. The Court granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file his Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion. However, Plaintiff subsequently filed two Oppositions on November 26

[Doc. No. 58] and December 27, 2007 [Doc. No. 65]. Both Oppositions appear to be identical

and thus, the Court will refer to the Opposition filed on November 26, 2007. Defendants have

filed a Reply to the first Opposition filed by Plaintiff [Doc. No. 63].

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from an unspecified foot condition. As a result, he was

issued a “soft shoe chrono” for the last eleven years. (FAC at 6.) Plaintiff has received surgery

for one foot and is awaiting surgery for his other foot. (Id.) On September 7, 2005, Plaintiff was

told by an unnamed correctional officer that he must wear“shower shoes” to the shower and he

would not be permitted to wear his soft shoes that provided more support. (Id.) The unnamed

correctional officer indicated that this order came from Warden Giurbino and the prohibition on

soft shoes in the shower would continue while the prison was on “lockdown” status. (Id.) 

On that same day, September 7, 2005, Plaintiff’s cell was searched by Defendant Bass.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bass confiscated Plaintiff’s walkman and radio. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Bass took his walkman because Bass realized that he “had a previous

unpleasant encounter with [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 10.) A few months later, on April 17, 2006, there

was another cell search and Plaintiff had further personal items removed from his cell. (Id. at

7.) Defendants Ortiz and Vargas informed Plaintiff that they were required to remove these

items pursuant to a memorandum issued by Warden Scribner which set forth items inmates were

authorized to have in their cell. (Id.) 

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2

 California prisoners in the A-1-A group are assigned to a full-time credit qualifying work,

educational, or vocational training program. As a result, A-1-A inmates earn one-for-one worktime

credit, i.e., for every qualifying day’s work, the inmates earn a day of credit that may be subtracted from

their sentence. 15 CAL. CODE REGS. § 3044(b)(1)

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Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied “fresh air and recreation” from August 18,

2005 to January 2006 during which time the prison was on “lockdown” status due to a riot. (Id.

at 8.) Further, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Scribner, Ochoa, Bourland, Nelson,

Greenwood and Madden have “not allowed [Plaintiff] to receive adequate fresh air and

recreation from January 2006 [until] the present.” (Id.)

Plaintiff has a job within the prison as a member of an A-1-A work group.2

 Plaintiff’s

shift provides for days off on the weekend. (Id. at 9) However, Plaintiff alleges that inmates

who are assigned to a different shift, a shift that gets days off during the week, have twice as

many recreational hours. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Zill, on more than

one occasion, refused to feed Plaintiff in his cell. (Id. at 10) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant

Trujillo fabricated evidence against him resulting in a rules violation report in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance against Trujillo. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant Bell

liable for due process violations because Defendant Bell “screened out” a number of Plaintiff’s

administrative grievances. (Id. at 11.)

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims and Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims as to Bass and Trujillo for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

A. Standard of Review per FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to some

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) before bringing this suit, therefore, they seek dismissal

under the “non-enumerated” provisions of FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that

“failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter of abatement” not going to the merits of the

case and is properly raised pursuant to a motion to dismiss, including a non-enumerated motion

under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). See Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837

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3

 In so finding, the Ninth Circuit also made clear that unlike a motion for summary judgment,

“dismissal of an action on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits.”

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Thus, if the court finds that the prisoner has failed to exhaust

nonjudicial remedies, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3).

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F.2d 365, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1988); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding a non-enumerated motion under Rule 12(b) to be “the proper pretrial motion for

establishing nonexhaustion” of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).3 Wyatt

also holds that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

is an affirmative defense which defendant prison officials have the burden of raising and

proving. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, unlike under Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies per 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once within the discretion of

the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has been construed broadly to “afford

[ ] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing

the initiation of a federal case, id. at 525-26, and to encompass inmate suits about both general

circumstances and particular episodes of prison life--including incidents of alleged excessive

force. Id. at 532. Finally, “[t]he ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint

under § 1983 may be entertained,” “regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 741 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner’s civil rights action must be

dismissed without prejudice unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before

he filed suit, even if he fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

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The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to administratively

appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals

as adversely affecting their welfare.” CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several

levels: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3)

second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director

of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.

Cal. 1997) (citing CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3084.5). The third or “Director’s Level” of review

“shall be final and exhausts all administrative remedies available in the Department [of

Corrections.]” See Cal. Dep’t of Corrections Operations Manual, § 54100.11, “Levels of

Review;” Barry, 985 F. Supp. at 1237-38; Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (S.D.

Cal. 2001).

C. Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to Plaintiff’s Case

It is well established that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense under the PLRA which the Defendants must plead and prove. See Jones v. Bock, et al.

__U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 910 (Jan. 22, 2007). Here, to support their claim that Plaintiff did not

exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his equal protection claim or his retaliation

claims against Trujillo and Bass, Defendants provide the declaration of D. Edwards, the Appeals

Coordinator at Calipatria State Prison. In this declaration, D. Edwards claims that he has

reviewed all administrative grievances filed by Plaintiff while at Calipatria and he could find no

grievances alleging denial of equal protection due to Plaintiff’s work status or any claims with

regard to retaliation by Defendants Trujillo and Bass. See Defs.’ Mot, D. Edwards Declaration

at ¶¶ 4-5.

In Opposition, Plaintiff claims that he did submit an administrative grievance with regard

to Defendant Bass but it was “screened out” because it was untimely. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.

However, the Supreme Court has made clear that Plaintiff must “properly exhaust” his

administrative remedies before filing a prison conditions action. In Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S.

__, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (June 22, 2006), the Supreme Court held that “[p]roper exhaustion demands

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4

 A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.

1992)

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compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the

course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2386. The Court further held that “[proper

exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance

with the applicable procedural rules ... as a precondition to bring suit in federal court.” Id.

Plaintiff admits that the grievances with respect to the retaliation claims against Trujillo

and Bass were rejected by prison officials as untimely. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) As a result, Plaintiff

has failed to rebut Defendants’ showing that he failed to properly exhaust his administrative

grievances with respect to these claims. Thus, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims against Trujillo and Bass for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies as required

by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Plaintiff claims that he did exhaust his equal protection claims and points to his grievance

filed on November 28, 2005 in support of a finding that he exhausted this claim. See Pl.’s Opp’n

at 6. Plaintiff requests that the Court review the grievance previously attached to his Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order. See Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, Exhibit, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form

Log No. CAL-A-0600565 dated November 28, 2005. The Court liberally construes this as a

request for judicial notice.4

 In this grievance, Plaintiff references privileges being revoked due

to a lockdown caused by a racial riot. Id. The Court cannot find any connection between this

grievance filed by Plaintiff and his claims in his First Amended Complaint alleging that members

of a different work group had better access to the recreational yard. Thus, the Court finds that

Defendants have adequately met their burden to show that Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies with regard to his equal protection claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a).

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IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) 

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974). Unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim, a complaint cannot be dismissed without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district court should grant leave to amend

when complaint fails to state a claim “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly

be cured by the allegation of other facts” and if “it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can

correct the defect”) (citations omitted). 

Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). And, while liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases,” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261, “[t]he plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v.

Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation

omitted).

B. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages to the extent that

he is suing them in their “official capacity.” See Defs.’ Mot. at 12. While the Eleventh

Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against a state actor sued in his official

capacity, it does not bar damage actions against a state official sued in his personal or individual

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capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989); Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). When a state actor

is alleged to have violated both federal and state law and is sued for damages under section 1983

in his individual or personal capacity, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar, even if state law

provides for indemnification. Ashker v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff brings this § 1983 suit against Defendants in their official capacities.

(FAC at 2.) The Eleventh Amendment imposes no bar to Plaintiff’s damages action against

Defendants for acts alleged to have been taken in their personal capacity. See Stivers v. Pierce,

71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff can seek

damages in a section 1983 action if he alleges facts sufficient to show personal liability through

individual actions or omissions, taken under color of state law, which cause the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh

Amendment grounds only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages against them in their official

capacities. 

C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims - Inadequate Medical Care

Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that

involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103

(1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1057 (9th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause is

violated when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “Medical” needs include a prisoner’s “physical, dental, and mental

health.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).

To show “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must

allege facts which demonstrate that he was confined under conditions posing a risk of

“objectively, sufficiently serious” harm and that prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state

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of mind” in denying him proper medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.

1995) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, there is both an objective and a subjective component

to an actionable Eighth Amendment violation. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.

2002).

Although the “routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” is inadequate to satisfy

the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, see Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731

(9th Cir. 1999), the objective component is generally satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges

facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [that]

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.” Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (quotations omitted); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131-32; see also Doty

v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (“serious” medical conditions are those

a reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment, those which significantly affect the

prisoner’s daily activities, and those which are chronic and accompanied by substantial pain).

However, the subjective component requires the prisoner to also allege facts which show

that the officials had the culpable mental state, which is “‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1057.

Here, liberally construing Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations

with regard to his foot issues are sufficient to support the “objective” component in that he

appears to have a serious medical need which has required surgery and the need to wear soft sole

shoes. In order for deliberate indifference to be established, a defendant must purposefully

ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s prior or possible medical need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d

at1060; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a

defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

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Here, Plaintiff apparently seeks to hold these Defendants liable because they instituted

a policy that required inmates to wear “shower shoes” to the shower. (FAC at 6.) Plaintiff

claims that wearing these shoes caused harm to his medical condition. (Id.) While that may be

true, there is simply no allegation from which the Court could find that these Defendants were

even made aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition, let alone intentionally disregarded the need

for him to wear soft shoes. Plaintiff has attached documents, including his administrative

grievances, that seem to indicate that some Defendants were aware of his medical need but

refused to accommodate that medical need. However, Plaintiff must allege specific facts as to

each Defendant he seeks to hold liable for this alleged “deliberate indifference” by specifying

what they actually knew with regard to his serious medical need. The mere fact that there was

a policy requiring inmates to wear shower shoes, without specific knowledge that such a policy

would cause harm to Plaintiff, is not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

inadequate medical treatment claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) but will give Plaintiff

the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint.

D. Eighth Amendment - Outdoor Exercise Claims

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied outdoor exercise

from August 18, 2005 until January 2006. (FAC at 8.) Defendants seek dismissal of this claim

because they claim that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, in fact, implies that Plaintiff did

receive some outdoor exercise during this time period and it was not a total deprivation of

outdoor exercise. 

 “Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth

amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect

persons convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation

omitted). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires

neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find

desirable. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246.

Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,”

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which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it results

in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976);

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes not only physical

torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle, 429

U.S. at 102.

As with Plaintiff’s other Eighth Amendment claim, to assert an Eighth Amendment claim

for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements:

one objective and one subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087

(9th Cir. 1994).

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. This objective component is

satisfied if the institution fails to provide sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at1246.

As stated above, the subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind,

requires “deliberate indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. In his First Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges: (1) that he was completely deprived of “fresh air and recreation” for a period

from August 18, 2005 to January, 2006; and (2) that Defendants Scribner, Ochoa, Bourland,

Nelson, Greenwood, and Madden have not allowed Plaintiff to “receive adequate fresh air and

recreation from January 2006 [to] the present.” (FAC at 8.) In Spain, the court stated that

“regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being

of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199.

With respect to the total deprivation of outdoor exercise from August 2005 until January

2006, Plaintiff alleges that this was due to the actions of Defendant Giurbino. (FAC at 8.) 

However, Plaintiff has yet to serve Defendant Giurbino in this matter. Accordingly, while these

facts may rise to the level of a constitutional violation, Plaintiff must first properly serve

Defendant Giurbino before he can proceed on this claim.

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With respect to the remaining time period, it appears that Plaintiff has had some outdoor

exercise since January 2006 but he feels that it has been inadequate. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit

has found that total deprivation of outdoor exercise is sufficient to satisfy the objective

requirement for stating an Eighth Amendment claim. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th

Cir. 2000). Based on Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, it appears that he is not claiming that

Defendants Scribner, Ochoa, Bourland, Nelson, Greenwood or Madden have totally deprived

him of outdoor recreation. (FAC at 8.) Thus, the Court finds that to state an Eighth

Amendment claim with respect to inadequate recreational time, Plaintiff would have to allege

facts sufficient to demonstrate that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to an

excessive risk to inmate health.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff would have to allege the complete deprivation of outdoor exercise or clarify the

amount he received from January 2006 to the present for the Court to determine whether the

actions of the Defendants rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Scribner, Ochoa, Bourland, Nelson,

Greenwood, and Madden’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment outdoor exercise

claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

E. First Amendment Retaliation Claims 

Because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his

retaliation claims against Defendants Bass and Trujillo, the Court will only address the

remaining retaliation claims against Defendant Zill. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s

only retaliation claims against Defendant Zill are that he failed to feed him on several occasions

in March and April of 2006. (FAC at 10.)

A plaintiff suing prison officials pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation must allege sufficient

facts to show: (1) he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights; (2) the

alleged retaliatory action “does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving

institutional order and discipline,” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam); and (3) the defendants’ actions harmed him. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449

(9th Cir. 2000); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

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F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Courts must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the

evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.”

Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). Thus, the burden

is on the prisoner to allege facts which demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional

purposes motivating the actions he complains of.” Id. at 808.

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 2003). However, Plaintiff makes no such claim with regard to Defendant Zill. He

merely alleges that Zill refused to feed him on an unspecified number of occasions but he does

not allege that Zill’s actions were in any way retaliation for any action whatsoever on the part

of Plaintiff. 

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that

the actions of Defendant Zill were retaliatory because he has failed to show that Zill’s actions

lacked or failed to advance “legitimate penological goals such as preserving institutional order

and discipline.” Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815-16; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. 

For all these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against

Defendant Zill is also GRANTED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

F. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Defendant Bell seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims that Bell violated his due process

rights when he allegedly “lost, discarded, substantially delayed or misrepresented” Plaintiff’s

inmate grievances. (FAC at 11.)

The procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause apply

only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997). The

Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in an inmate grievance

procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process

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claim of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison]

grievance procedure”). A prisoner may only challenge a state action which does not restrain a

[constitutionally] protected liberty interest if that state action “nonetheless imposes some

‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); see also Neal, 131 F.3d at 827-28.

Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how Bell’s allegedly inadequate review and

consideration of his inmate grievances amounted to a restraint on his freedom not contemplated

by his original sentence or resulted in an “atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S.

at 483-484. Accordingly, the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

grievance procedure due process claims against Defendant Bell pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6).

G. Access to Courts

Defendant Bells also seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Bell violated his

right to access to the courts. Prison officials who deliberately interfere with the transmission of

a prisoner’s legal papers, or deny him access to a legitimate means to petition for redress for the

purpose of thwarting his litigation may violate the prisoner’s constitutionally protected right to

access to the court. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-55 (1996); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d

794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994). However, in order to state a claim for denial of access to the courts,

Plaintiff must allege a specific actual injury involving a nonfrivolous legal claim, Lewis, 518

U.S. at 351-55, and must allege facts showing that he “could not present a claim to the courts

because of the [Defendants’] failure to fulfill [their] constitutional obligations.” Allen v. Sakai,

48 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994). The right of access is only guaranteed for certain types of

claims: direct and collateral attacks upon a conviction or sentence, and civil rights actions

challenging the conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Even among these types of

claims, actual injury will exist only if “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was

being impeded.” Id. at 353 & n.3. 

///

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Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to show how or to what extent he was “actually

injured” by the actions of Defendant Bell. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-55. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendant Bell’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim.

H. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on qualified

immunity grounds. However, because the Court has dismissed the entirety of Plaintiff’s action,

the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the

defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the

deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is

no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”).

V. Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

(1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 46] and DISMISSES the entire action

without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and failure to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6);

(2) GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave to file and serve upon Defendants an

Amended Complaint which addresses each deficiency of pleading identified in this Order.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original

Complaint. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1. Any Defendant not named and any claim not re-alleged

in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 4, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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