Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05379/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05379-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF RANDY L LOPES,

Plaintiff,

 v

JO ANNE B BARNHARDT,

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant. /

No C 04-5379 VRW

ORDER

This court entered an order on December 29, 2005 granting

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Doc # 14. Judgment was

then entered in favor of defendant. Doc # 15. 

Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, filed January 12,

2006 (Doc # 16), seeks further judicial review of the court’s order

pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On

this motion the plaintiff contends the court erred because: (1)

“this court impliedly affirmed ALJ Lazuran’s determination that

because the court did not find jurisdiction, ALJ Lazuran did not

have jurisdiction. The court made no such ruling binding ALJ

Lazuran from reopening the ALJ Ball decision,” and (2) “the 

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Case 3:04-cv-05379-VRW Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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administrative record from page number 425 to 623 is entirely new

as to facts and allegations by plaintiff.”

A party may seek to challenge an order granting summary

judgment through reconsideration under FRCP 59(e). Reconsideration

of an order is deemed appropriate only where: (1) newly discovered

evidence is presented to the court, (2) the summary judgment was

manifestly unjust or a clear error was committed, or (3) an

intervening change in controlling law is present. Schwarzer, et

al, ch 12-17 California Practice Guide Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial § 14:362 (The Rutter Group 2006). The court may

refuse to consider evidence that was available prior to summary

judgment or previously raised in opposition to summary judgment. 

Backlund v Barnhart, 778 F2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir 1985); Novato Fire

Protection Dist v United States, 181 F3d 1135, 1142, n 6 (9th Cir

1999). 

This court’s Civil Local Rule 7-9(c), which governs

motions for reconsideration brought before the entry of judgment,

is in accord: it similarly prohibits the repetition of previouslymade arguments and reliance on previously submitted evidence and,

moreover, requires the moving party to seek prior leave of court

before filing such motion. To obtain such leave, the moving party

must pass the stringent test of establishing: (1) the existence of

a material difference in fact or law * * * that in exercise of

reasonable diligence the party * * * did not know such fact or law

at the time of the interlocutory order, (2) the emergence of new

material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such

order, or (3) a manifest failure by the court to consider material

facts * * * which were presented * * * before such order.

Case 3:04-cv-05379-VRW Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In summary, a party disappointed in the outcome of a

motion may not simply return to the court seeking a different

result without presenting, for good cause shown, different facts

and/or law. That is what plaintiff has done on this motion. 

Plaintiff’s first argument is merely a rehash of

arguments made in its summary judgment papers and is not properly

presented to the court on a FRCP 59(e) motion under the authorities

stated above. The illogical assertion in plaintiff’s second

argument that evidence in the administrative record was “new”

within the meaning of Backlund and related authorities, is without

merit: the evidence in question was included in the administrative

record and was before the court at the time the cross motions for

summary judgment were adjudicated. Accordingly, plaintiff has

presented no new evidence in support of its motion. 

Plaintiff’s motion under FRCP 59(e) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-05379-VRW Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 3 of 3