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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Unit.ed Sta.tail Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

EARLL. WEATHERFORD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

OTIS BOWEN, M.D., Secretary, Health and) 

Human Services, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAR l 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2430 

(D.C. No. 86-C-731-C) 

{ N. D. Ok la. ) 

Before MCKAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, Chief 

Judge.** 

**Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Earl Weatherford appeals from the district court's order 

affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of 

disability benefits. Mr. Weatherford claimed disability due to 

heart disease, but the Secretary found he was not disabled 

pursuant to the criteria set forth in the social security 

regulations and thereby denied him benefits. On appeal, the 

magistrate recommended the Secretary's decision be affirmed, and 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2430 Document: 010110024625 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 1 
the district court agreed. Mr. Weatherford now asks that we 

reverse the lower court's holding. We affirm. 

Mr. Weatherford originally applied for disability benefits in 

1975, alleging he suffered from coronary artery disease. He 

received benefits for arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease with 

angina pectoris from 1975 until 1982 when he was terminated after 

a disability review. Mr. Weatherford appealed his termination to 

the Appeals Council, which denied his appeal on April 27, 1983, 

but did not file for further review in the district court. 

Instead, he filed a new application for disability benefits in 

January of 1984, claiming a disability beginning May 1, 1983, 

through the present. 

A hearing on Mr. Weatherford's new application was conducted 

before an Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.), during which 

appellant requested his application be amended to claim disability 

beginning in 1975. In support of his application, Mr. Weatherford 

presented medical reports from several physicians and the results 

of various treadmill and other medical tests used to measure the 

presence and degree of heart disease. Based on appellant's stated 

symptoms, coupled with varying test results, each physician 

diagnosed appellant as having coronary artery disease and 

therefore concluded he was totally or substantially disabled. 

After an initial appeal and remand, the A.L.J. ultimately 

concluded that the April 27, 1983, decision to terminate Mr. 

Weatherford's benefits was res judicata as to appellant's 

application for benefits for his condition prior to that date. 

The A.L.J. thereby declined to reopen appellant's earlier case. 

2 

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As to appellant's 

condition after May 

objective medical 

application for benefits due to his heart 

1, 1983, the A.L.J. determined that the 

evidence did not support a finding that 

appellant was disabled under the standards provided in the social 

security regulations. Rather, the A.L.J. concluded Mr. 

Weatherford's condition amounted to "arteriosclerotic heart 

disease with angina pectoris, functional classification II or III, 

stable for many years, essential hypertension without evidence of 

end organ damage, exogenous obesity, and general poor physical 

conditioning." Tr. Vol. II at 13. The A.L.J. noted that, because 

the objective evidence did not support a finding of disability 

under the Listing of Impairments under which a claimant could be 

found disabled per se, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1982) 

(Listing of Impairments), the consideration of disability rested 

solely on Mr. Weatherford's allegations of severe chest pain. The 

A.L.J. found this testimony to be self-serving and incredible. In 

reaching this conclusion, the A.L.J. considered as important the 

fact that Mr. Weatherford had not seen a physician for several 

years, had not been hospitalized for his condition since 1977 

except for a short stay in a California hospital, gave 

inconsistent testimony concerning his educational background and 

job skills, and claimed to have had several "heart attacks," which 

allegation was unsupported by the medical evidence in the record. 

The A.L.J. concluded that the evidence showed Mr. Weatherford had 

the residual functional capacity to engage in a full range of at 

least light work, and was therefore not disabled. The Secretary 

affirmed this decision. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2430 Document: 010110024625 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 3 
Mr. Weatherford raises three issues on appeal. First, he 

contends the A.L.J. erred in refusing to reopen his previous 

disability case. Second, he alleges there was not substantial 

evidence in the record to support the A.L.J.'s decision. That 

appellant was not disabled per se according to the Listing of 

Impairments. Third, he argues the Secretary erred in permitting 

the testimony of a medical advisor who had previously treated the 

appellant, which testimony Mr. Weatherford claims tainted the 

entire case. 

Appellant first contends that the Secretary erred in refusing 

to reopen and to review the previous denial of benefits. In 

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the United States Supreme 

Court held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review 

denials by the Secretary of petitions to reopen a case unless the 

denial is contested on constitutional grounds. This conclusion 

was based on the Court's view that Congress intended to limit 

judicial review of such discretionary decisions as "a policy 

choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated 

litigation of stale eligibility claims." Id. at 109. Because 

there is no constitutional challenge here, we do not have 

jurisdiction to review the A.L.J.'s decision not to reopen the 

previous case. 

As an alternative argument, Mr. Weatherford contends that the 

A.L.J. reopened the case de facto when he accepted and considered 

new evidence. Appellant cites several cases to support this 

proposition, but a review of these cases clearly shows that courts 

are only willing to find a de facto reopening where the A.L.J. 

4 

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issues a full opinion on the merits of the claim and does not 

apply or mention res judicata or specifically refer to reopening 

principles. Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1025 (1986); McGowen v. Harris, 666 

F.2d 60, 67-68 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Purter v. Heckler, 771 

F.2d 682, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1985)(the A.L.J. neither discussed 

whether it should reopen Purter's claims nor mentioned res 

judicata); Taylor ex rel. Peck v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1112, 1114-15 

(10th Cir. 1984)(case was in fact reopened where A.L.J. did not 

refer to res judicata and did not specifically decline to reopen 

the decision but determined the case on the merits). In the 

present case, the A.L.J. specifically stated that the new evidence 

did not warrant the reopening of the case and held that the 

decision terminating appellant's benefits prior to the new 

application date was res judicata. Tr. Vol. II at 15. The 

exception to the Califano v. Sanders rule, as applied in 

Krumpelman and McGowen above, does not apply to this case. 1 

Second, Mr. Weatherford challenges the Secretary's 

determination that he was not disabled. The scope of our review 

of the Secretary's evaluation of disability status is limited to 

determining whether the finding as to disability is supported by 

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982); Tillery v. 

Schweiker, 713 F.2d 601, 603 (10th Cir. 1983). 2 

1 In his conclusion, appellant makes an additional argument that 

his case should have been reopened to be evaluated under the new 

Act which provides for the medical improvement standard. We 

reject this argument for the reasons stated by the Fifth Circuit 

in Richardson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 444, 445-47 (5th Cir. 1987). 

2 Substantial evidence is "defined as 'such relevant evidence 

5 

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The Secretary must follow a five-step process in evaluating a 

claim for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1988). If a 

person is found to be disabled or not disabled at any point, the 

review ends. § 416.920(a). The five steps are as follows: 

(1) A person who is working is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(b). (2) A person who does not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments severe enough 

to limit the ability to do basic work is not disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). (3) A person whose impairment 

meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the 

regulations is conclusively presumed to be disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(d). (4) A person who is able to 

perform work she has done in the past is not disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). (5) A person whose impairment 

precludes performance of past work is disabled unless 

the Secretary demonstrates that the person can perform 

other work. Factors to be considered are age, 

education, past work experience, and residual functional 

capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). 

Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. 

Yuckert, 482 u.s. 137, 107 s.ct. 2287, 2290-96 (1987); cf. 

Tillery v. Schweik er , 713 F .2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Mr. Weatherfor d o nly challenges the Secretary's determination 

under step three above, that appellant's impairment does not meet 

the criteria set out in the Listing of Impairments. Appellant 

argues to the contrary, that he has an impairment which equals the 

condition contained i n § 4.00 (Cardiovascular System) of the 

Listing of Impairmen ts . A finding of disability under the Listing 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." . . [T]he determination is not merely a 

quantitative exercise. Evidence is not substantial "if it is 

overwhelmed by other evidence -- particularly certain types 

of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) or if 

it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion." 

Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1985)(citations 

omitted). 

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would render him disabled per se. Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d at 

145-46 ("The Regulations provide that if the severity of a 

claimant's impairment meets or exceeds that found in the Listing 

of Impairments, he will be found 'disabled without considering 

[his] age, education, and work experience."'). This step of the 

evaluation process is completely objective, in that it is based 

solely on meeting the specific clinical and laboratory 

requirements set out in the Listing of Impairments. 3 

Mr. Weatherford claims he has coronary artery disease, a 

narrowing of the arteries. He alleges that the Listing of 

Impairments addresses his particular condition in § 4.00B, which 

states: 

B. Congestive heart failure ... [or] [o]ther 

congestive, ischemic, or restrictive (obstructive) heart 

disease such as caused by cardiomyopathy ... may 

result in significant impairment dues [sic] to 

congestive heart failure, rhythm disturbances, or 

ventricular outflow obstruction in the absence of left 

ventricular enlargement as described in 4.02B1. 

However, the ECG criteria as defined in 4.02B2 should be 

fulfilled. Clinical findings such as symptions [sic] of 

dyspnea, fatigue, rhythm disturbances, etc., should be 

documented and the diagnosis confirmed by 

echocardiography or a cardiac catheterization. 

3 The medical findings consist of symptoms, signs and laboratory 

findings. 

We will always base our decision about whether your 

impairment(s) is medically equal to a listed impairment 

on medical evidence only. Any medical findings in the 

evidence must be supported by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. We will 

also consider the medical opinion given by one or more 

medical ... consultants designated by the Secretary in 

deciding medical equivalence. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a) (Emphasis added). 

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20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt p, App. 1, §4.00B. 

referred to in the above, requires an" 

Section 4.02B2, 

. ECG showing QRS 

du r ation less that 0.12 second with Svl plus Rv5 (or Rv6) of 35 

mm. or greater and ST segme nt depressed more than 0.5 mm. and low, 

d i phasic or inve rted T wa ves i n leads with tall R waves". Id. 

The medical evidence in the record is obviously lacking in 

many of the requirements l isted above. In his brief, appellant 

attempts to demonstrate the existence of restrictive heart disease 

by simply citing to over one hundred pages of record and fails, in 

the most part, to ma ke any specific references to any medical or 

phys i cian r epo r ts which support his contention. 4 From our review 

of the record, Mr. Weatherford failed to demonstrate all the 

criteria required in this section of the Listing of Impairments. 

Appellant also argues that his condition meets the 

requirements of§ 4.04(B)(7)(a) of the Listing of Impairments. 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, this subsection is 

applicable only if acceptable treadmill exercise tests are not 

available. Id. §4.04(B) Several such tests are contained in the 

record. Second, from a practical standpoint, Mr. Weatherford does 

not meet the criteria set forth in the subsection. The specific 

arteries found to be impaired in Mr. Weatherford's medical 

reports 5 are not included in the list of arteries covered by the 

4 This court is not required to sift through the entire record in 

order to support a party's position. Friedel v. City of Madison, 

832 F.2d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 1987); Mitchel v. General Elec. Co., 

689 F.2d 877, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1982). 

5 A coronary arteriogram completed in 1977 showed a ninety 

percent narrowing of the left anterior descending artery in its 

midportion and a sixty percent obstruction of the obtuse margin of 

the circumflex at its origin. 

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subsection, namely the left main coronary artery or a proximal 

coronary artery. Accordingly, appellant has not shown that he 

meets the Listing criteria on the evidence presented. We conclude 

tha t substantia l evidence exists in the record to support the 

Se c re t ary's d ecision that Mr . Weatherford was not disabled per se. 

Appellant 's final contention concerns the testimony of Dr. 

Nelson, whom the A.L.J. used as a medical advisor. Mr. 

Weatherford consented to Dr. Nelson's testimony prior to and 

during the hearing. After the hearing, Mr. Weatherford remembered 

he had been treated by Dr. Nelson in 1974 and had a personality 

conflict with him. He therefore filed a written objection to the 

testimony. Appellant contends the testimony tainted the entire 

case and requests the case be remanded for a new hearing. The 

A.L.J. stated in his decision that, because Dr. Nelson had treated 

Mr. Weatherford in the past, "this would obviously disqualify the 

testimony given by Dr. Nelson as a medical advisor." Tr. Vol. II 

at 19. Appellant has given no reason and we see nothing to 

suspect that the A.L.J. could not appropriately ignore the 

testimony of Dr. Nelson in rendering his opinion. The record 

contains substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by 

the A.L.J. without Dr. Nelson's testimony. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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