Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00707/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00707-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT S. LLOYD, # 250886, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

 v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14cv707-MHT

) (WO)

KENNETH JONES, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 filed by Alabama prisoner Robert S. Lloyd (“Lloyd”). Doc. No. 1.1 

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2006, a Butler County jury found Lloyd guilty of rape in the first degree, in 

violation of § 13A-6-61, Ala. Code 1975, and sodomy in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-6-

63, Ala. Code 1975. After a sentencing hearing on February 8, 2007, the trial court sentenced 

Lloyd to consecutive terms of 20 years’ imprisonment.

Lloyd appealed, presenting the following claims:

1. His due process rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion 

requesting a jury trial on his competency to stand trial.

2. The trial court exceeded its authority by “ignoring” the conclusion of the 

court-appointed psychologist that Lloyd was not competent to stand trial.

3. The trial court abused its discretion by privately contacting the courtappointed psychologist and instructing him to change his evaluation of 

Lloyd’s competence.

4. He was prejudiced by the admission of hearsay testimony at trial.

 1 Document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court in this action. Page 

references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

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See Doc. No. 8-6.

On December 14, 2014, by unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals affirmed Lloyd’s conviction and sentence. Doc. No. 8-8. With specific regard 

to Lloyd’s claim that the trial court improperly contacted the court-appointed psychologist and 

instructed him to change his evaluation of Lloyd’s competence, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals held that the claim was not preserved for appellate review because the issue was not raised 

before the trial court and was raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 9-10. Lloyd did not apply

for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or seek certiorari review in the Alabama 

Supreme Court. On January 3, 2008, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate 

of judgment. Doc. No. 8-9.

On February 22, 2008, Lloyd filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of 

the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure presenting the following claims:

1. The prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence to the defense.

2. The trial court improperly ordered the court-appointed psychologist to 

change his evaluation of Lloyd’s competency to stand trial.

3. He was denied due process when the trial court denied his request to have 

his competency determined by a jury.

4. The trial court erred by disregarding the court-appointed psychologist’s

recommendation to postpone the trial to reevaluate Lloyd’s competency.

5. The trial court erred by allowing inadmissible hearsay evidence.

6. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (a) failing to 

move to have the charges against him reduced to sexual assault; (b) failing 

to move for dismissal of the charges after discovering that physical evidence 

had been lost; and (c) failing to object to the admission of out-of-court 

statements by the victim.

7. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing 

to properly argue the issue regarding the admission of hearsay evidence.

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Doc. No. 8-11 at 8-21.

The State responded to Lloyd’s Rule 32 petition, and on May 17, 2011, the trial court 

entered an order summarily denying the petition. Doc. No. 8-11 at 29-40, 56-57. The trial court 

found that Lloyd’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel failed to meet the 

specificity requirements of Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.6(b)2 as well as the requirements of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).3 Id. at 56. The court found that Lloyd’s remaining claims were 

precluded under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(4) because they were raised on direct appeal. Id.

Lloyd appealed from the denial of his Rule 32 petition, arguing that the trial court erred in 

denying his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and in summarily denying his 

petition when he was “tried and convicted while mentally incompetent.” Doc. No. 8-12. On 

January 27, 2012, by unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying Lloyd’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 8-14. Lloyd

applied for rehearing. See Doc. No. 8-10 at 1. On February 24, 2012, the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals overruled Lloyd’s application for rehearing. Id. at 1-2. On March 14, 2012, the 

 2 Rule 32.6(b) provides that each claim in the Rule 32 petition: 

must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is 

sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare 

allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law 

shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.6(b).

3 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be evaluated against the two-part test of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 689. Second, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of judgment. Id. at 2. Lloyd did not seek 

certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court.

Lloyd filed a second Rule 32 petition in May 2010, while his first Rule 32 petition was 

pending in the trial court. See Doc. No. 8-16 at 17; Doc. No. 8-20 at 2. The trial court summarily 

dismissed the petition after Lloyd’s in forma pauperis application was denied and Lloyd failed to 

pay the filing fee. Id. 

On April 30, 2012, Lloyd filed in the trial court what he styled as a “Motion/Request for 

Forensic DNA Testing,” in which he set forth the following claims:

1. He was actually innocent of the offenses of which he was convicted.

2. He was wrongfully convicted because of his mental illness.

3. The prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony to obtain his 

conviction.

4. The prosecution deliberately suppressed impeachment evidence.

5. The State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because it 

was based on the victim’s “confused” and “false” testimony.

Doc. No. 8-16 at 7-9. In his motion, Lloyd invoked § 15-18-200, Ala. Code 1975,4 and requested 

that the rape kit collected in his case be submitted to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences 

for DNA testing, arguing that such analysis would prove his “factual innocence.” Id. at 7-8.

 4 Section 15-18-200 pertains to motions for forensic DNA testing and analysis by persons 

convicted of a capital offense and provides, in pertinent part:

An individual convicted of a capital offense who is serving a term of imprisonment 

or awaiting execution of a sentence of death, through written motion to the circuit 

court that entered the judgment of sentence, may apply for the performance of 

forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on specific evidence, if that evidence 

was secured in relation to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the 

conviction of the applicant, is still available for testing as of the date of the motion, 

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The trial court issued an order stating that it intended to treat Lloyd’s request for DNA 

testing as a Rule 32 petition and directing the State to respond. The State filed a response in August 

2012, arguing, among other things, that Lloyd’s request for DNA testing was precluded by Rule 

32.2(b) (precluding successive Rule 32 petitions) and Rule 32.2(c) (providing the limitation period 

for filing a Rule 32 petition) because it failed to satisfy the requirements for newly discovered 

material facts in Rule 32.1(e).

5

 Id. at 17-22. Specifically, the State argued that Lloyd knew, at the 

 

forensic DNA testing was not performed on the case at the time of the initial trial, 

and the results of the forensic DNA testing, on its face, would demonstrate the 

convicted individual’s factual innocence of the offense convicted. The filing of a 

motion as provided in this subsection shall not automatically stay an execution.

§ 15-18-200(a), Ala. Code 1975.

5 Rule 32.1(e) provides:

Subject to the limitations of Rule 32.2, any defendant who has been 

convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the court of original 

conviction to secure appropriate relief on the ground that:

....

(e) Newly discovered material facts exist which require that the conviction 

or sentence be vacated by the court, because:

(1) The facts relied upon were not known by the petitioner or the 

petitioner’s counsel at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to file a posttrial 

motion pursuant to Rule 24, or in time to be included in any previous collateral 

proceeding and could not have been discovered by any of those times through the 

exercise of reasonable diligence;

(2) The facts are not merely cumulative to other facts that were known;

(3) The facts do not merely amount to impeachment evidence;

(4) If the facts had been known at the time of trial or of sentencing, the 

result probably would have been different; and

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time of trial, that he had not provided a DNA sample for testing and knew that the rape kit had not 

been presented as evidence against him. Id. In addition, the State argued that § 15-18-200, Ala. 

Code 1975, applies only to defendants convicted of capital offenses and that the proper avenue for 

defendants, like Lloyd, convicted of noncapital offenses to seek DNA testing in the post-conviction 

context is through a Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 8-17 at 32-34.

On January 22, 2013, the trial court issued an order finding:

Treating the Defendant’s Request as a Motion pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-

18-200, the Court finds that the Defendant is not entitled to relief and the Motion 

is due to be DENIED.

However, if the Defendant is pursuing his request as a Petition for Relief 

from Conviction or Sentence, this is a successive Petition and is precluded by Rule 

32.2(b), Rule 32.2(a)(3), Rule 32.2(a)(5), Rule 32.2(c), and Rule 32.6(b), and is 

hereby DISMISSED.

Doc. No. 8-17 at 35-36.

Lloyd appealed, arguing that his request for DNA testing was a proper motion under § 15-

18-200, Ala. Code 1975, that the trial court erred in treating his motion as a Rule 32 petition, and 

that he was entitled to DNA testing of the rape kit in his case to prove his innocence. See Doc. 

No. 8-18. In a published opinion issued on October 4, 2013, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding:

 

(5) The facts establish that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which 

the petitioner was convicted or should not have received the sentence that the

petitioner received.

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.1(e).

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1. Contrary to Lloyd’s argument, § 15-18-200, Ala. Code 1975, applies only 

to defendants convicted of capital offenses and therefore does not apply to 

Lloyd, who was not convicted of a capital offense.

6

2. Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure is the proper avenue 

for individuals convicted of noncapital offenses to seek DNA testing.

3. Post-conviction requests for DNA testing by noncapital defendants should 

be made within the confines of “newly discovered material facts” under 

Rule 32.1(e).

4. Lloyd failed to satisfy Rule 32.1(e)(1)’s requirement that he was unaware 

of the facts relied upon, or could not have discovered them through 

exercising reasonable diligence, at the time of trial or sentencing or in time 

to file a post-trial motion under Ala.R.Crim.P. 24, or in time to be included 

in any previous collateral proceedings. Specifically, Lloyd did not establish 

that he was unaware of the existence of the rape kit or that he could not have 

had the rape kit tested by any of those times, or that he could not have 

discovered the existence of the rape kit or obtained DNA testing of the rape 

kit by any of those times through exercising reasonable diligence.

5. Because Lloyd failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.1(e)(1), his 

claim was subject to the grounds of preclusion in Rule 32.2, specifically, 

 6 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, in objecting to the trial court’s treatment of 

his request for DNA testing as a Rule 32 petition, Lloyd had relied on Searcy v. State, 77 So.3d 

174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), for the proposition that § 15-18-200 had been “modified” by the 

Alabama Supreme Court and was no longer limited to “death-row” inmates. According to Lloyd, 

Searcy was convicted of rape and sodomy and was serving a life sentence and was permitted to 

file a post-conviction motion for DNA testing pursuant to § 15-18-200. The Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals held that Lloyd’s reliance on Searcy was misplaced:

First, Searcy was an opinion from this Court, not from the Alabama Supreme Court 

as Lloyd alleged. Most importantly, however, Searcy “was convicted of capital 

murder for murdering Rory Lynn Kirkland during the course of a burglary,” not of 

rape and sodomy as Lloyd argued. Searcy, 77 So.3d at 175. Therefore, this Court’s 

opinion in Searcy did not modify the plain language in § 15-18-200 limiting it 

solely to individuals convicted of a capital offense.

Lloyd, having been convicted of rape and sodomy and not of a capital 

offense, is clearly not within the category of individuals permitted to request DNA 

testing pursuant to § 15-18-200. Additionally, there is no specific statute providing 

an avenue for an individual convicted of a noncapital offense to seek DNA testing 

in the post-conviction context.

Lloyd v. State, 144 So. 3d 510, 513-14 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

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Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5) (precluding claims that could have been, but 

were not, raised at trial and on appeal); Rule 32.2(b) (precluding successive 

Rule 32 petitions); and Rule 32.2(c) (providing the limitation period for 

filing a Rule 32 petition).

Lloyd v. State, 144 So.3d 510 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (Doc. No. 8-20). Lloyd applied for 

rehearing, and on December 13, 2013, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overruled his 

application for rehearing. See Doc. No. 8-15 at 1-2; Doc. No. 16-2. Lloyd did not seek certiorari 

review in the Alabama Supreme Court, and on January 2, 2014, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals issued a certificate of judgment. Doc. No. 8-15 at 2.

On July 28, 2014, Lloyd initiated this federal habeas action by filing a § 2254 petition 

asserting the following claims:

1. The trial court violated his due process rights by privately contacting the 

court-appointed psychologist and instructing him to change his evaluation 

of Lloyd’s competence to stand trial.

2. DNA testing of the rape kit collected in his case would prove his innocence 

of the crimes of which he was convicted; therefore, the trial court should 

have granted his post-conviction request for DNA testing of the rape kit.

Doc. No. 1 at 5-7.

The respondents argue that Lloyd’s claims are procedurally defaulted because he failed to 

present them to the state courts under the State’s procedural rules and they were not subjected to 

one complete round of state court appellate review. Doc. No. 8 at 8-12. After consideration of the 

parties’ submissions, the record, and the pertinent law, the undersigned finds that Lloyd is not 

entitled to habeas relief because his claims are procedurally barred from federal review; therefore, 

his § 2254 petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural-Default Doctrine

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Before a § 2254 petitioner may obtain federal habeas corpus review, he must “exhaust” his 

federal claims by raising them in the appropriate court, giving the state courts an opportunity to 

decide the merits of the constitutional issue raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). To exhaust a claim fully, a petitioner must “invok[e] one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 

U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process includes an 

appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court, and a 

petition for discretionary review – a petition for a writ of certiorari – filed in the Alabama Supreme 

Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2001); Ala.R.App.P. 39 and 40. The 

exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings as well as to direct appeals. 

See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Habeas claims not properly exhausted in the state courts are procedurally defaulted if 

presentation of the claims in state court would be barred by state procedural rules. Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). 

“[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the 

claims procedurally barred[,] ... there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.” 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (citations omitted); see Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 

(11th Cir. 2003). 

2. “Adequate and Independent State Ground” for Denying Relief

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Federal habeas review may also be unavailable for claims that a state appellate court has 

rejected on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. When a state prisoner fails to 

follow state procedural rules, thereby procedurally defaulting on a claim, the authority of federal 

courts to review the prisoner’s state court criminal conviction is “severely restricted.” Johnson v. 

Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991). “Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred 

by the procedural-default doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and 

expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and 

independent state ground for denying relief.” Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 

1992).

By its very definition, the adequate and independent state-ground doctrine requires 

the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s 

judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. See Fox Film Corp. 

v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). Thus, by applying this doctrine to habeas 

cases, [Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)] curtails reconsideration of the 

federal issue on federal habeas as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state 

procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision. In this way, a state court may 

reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and 

comity.

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989).

3. Exceptions to Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural-default doctrine either through showing 

cause for the default and resulting prejudice, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), or 

establishing a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” which requires a colorable showing of actual 

innocence, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1995). Cause for a procedural default must 

ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show that some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules or that the procedural default 

resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; United States v. Frady, 

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456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors at trial 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, “infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494. Prisoners 

asserting actual innocence as a gateway to review of defaulted claims must establish that, in light 

of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

B. Lloyd’s Claims Are Procedurally Defaulted.

1. Trial Court’s Alleged Contact with Court-Appointed Psychologist

In his § 2254 petition, Lloyd claims that the trial court violated his due process rights by 

privately contacting the court-appointed psychologist and instructing him to change his evaluation 

of Lloyd’s competence to stand trial. Doc. No. 1 at 7. Lloyd raised this claim on direct appeal, 

where the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held the claim was not preserved for appellate 

review. The appellate court stated:

Lloyd contends that the trial court abused its discretion in privately 

contacting Dr. Kirkland [the court-appointed psychologist] and, Lloyd asserts, 

“instructing [him] to change the evaluation report without reevaluating” Lloyd. 

(Appellant’s brief at p. 3.) The record shows that this issue was not raised in 

Lloyd’s motion for new trial nor was it otherwise raised before the trial court.

“‘An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate 

review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.’” Dickey v. State, 

901 So.2d 750, 756 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), quoting Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 

2013 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Because this issue was not raised before the trial 

court, it is not properly preserved for appellate review.

Doc. No. 8-8 at 9-10.

Here, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied review of Lloyd’s claim on the 

adequate and independent state procedural ground that issues not raised in the lower court cannot 

be raised for the first time on direct appeal. This procedural bar is firmly established and regularly 

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followed by Alabama appellate courts.7 See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 913 So. 2d 1150, 1156 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2005); Ray v. State, 527 So.2d 166, 167-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Smith v. State, 

393 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981). Because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

stated clearly and expressly that its judgment rested on a procedural bar, Lloyd’s claim is 

procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review.8 Atkins, 965 F.2d at 955.

Lloyd does not attempt to demonstrate cause for his failure to present his defaulted claim 

to the state courts in compliance with applicable procedural rules. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488;

Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. Nor has he established a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 324-27. That alternative method of escaping procedural default requires a colorable 

showing of actual innocence, which Lloyd has not made. Schlup requires that a petitioner asserting 

his actual innocence support his claim “with new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not 

presented at trial.” 513 U.S. at 324. 

The record reflects that Lloyd was aware at the time of trial of the existence of the rape kit, 

for which he waited over five years after trial before requesting DNA testing. Therefore, regarding 

his alleged actual innocence, he has not offered evidence that is “new.”9 Moreover, Lloyd’s claim 

 7 In order to bar federal review, the state procedural bar must have been “firmly established and 

regularly followed” at the time of the alleged default. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).

8 It may also be noted that, following this procedural default, Lloyd further defaulted, by nonexhaustion, when he filed no application for rehearing on direct appeal and did not file a petition 

for writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court. 

9 The Eleventh Circuit has not directly decided whether evidence available at trial but simply not 

presented should be considered “new” under Schlup. See Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of 

Corrections, 672 F.3d 1000, 1018 n.21 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining to reach issue but discussing 

decisions from other circuits, some holding that evidence is not “new” under Schlup if it was 

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of actual innocence is based on the speculative possibility that DNA testing of the rape kit might 

reveal potentially exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Cummings v. Dovey, 2008 WL 4664975, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that claim based on the assertion that DNA testing that had yet to be 

performed would have revealed another culprit was speculative and did not constitute the “reliable 

new evidence” needed to support an actual innocence claim); Williams v. Hines, 2013 WL 

5960673, at *12 (E.D. La. 2013) (because petitioner could only speculate that additional DNA 

testing would produce favorable or exculpatory results, he failed to present new, reliable evidence 

to establish his actual innocence). Based on the record, there is no reason to believe that DNA 

testing would not prove inculpatory as to Lloyd rather than exculpatory. Moreover, even if such 

testing of the evidence were to be conducted, it would not necessarily lead to Lloyd’s exoneration 

as a matter of fact, because even test results that indicated negative for the presence of Lloyd’s 

DNA would not establish Lloyd’s factual innocence.10

Because Lloyd does not establish that either the cause-and-prejudice or actual-innocence 

exception applies to his defaulted claim, the claim is foreclosed from federal habeas review.

2. Post-Conviction Request for DNA Testing of Rape Kit

 

available at trial but petitioner chose not to present it to the jury, others holding that evidence is 

“new” under Schlup so long as it was not presented at trial). In any case, even if Lloyd’s 

unpresented evidence is considered “new” under Schlup, that evidence, as discussed in this 

Recommendation, does not enable Lloyd to carry his burden of demonstrating that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the alleged new evidence. 

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

10 Lloyd’s victim, the daughter of his former girlfriend, testified against him at trial, providing 

details about his sexual attack on her one evening when she was left in his care when she was ten 

years old. Doctors and counselors who treated the victim at the hospital after she reported the 

incident, and in later counseling sessions, determined that she had been sexually abused. Doctors 

discovered injuries to the victim’s vagina and anus consistent with sexual assault. 

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Lloyd claims that DNA testing of the rape kit collected in his case would prove his 

innocence of the crimes of which he was convicted and that, therefore, the trial court should have 

granted his post-conviction request for DNA testing of the rape kit. Doc. No. 1 at 5.

In the self-styled “Motion/Request for Forensic DNA Testing” that he filed in April 2012 

- over five years after his trial - Lloyd alleged for the first time that DNA testing of the rape kit 

would prove his factual innocence. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of Lloyd’s motion, the 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that because Lloyd was a “noncapital defendant”

requesting DNA testing, his motion was properly construed as petition for post-conviction relief 

under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure (and not a motion under § 15-18-200, 

Ala. Code 1975, as Lloyd had argued11), and that a request forsuch relief through a Rule 32 petition 

should be made within the confines of “newly discovered material facts” under Rule 32.1(e). 

Lloyd, 144 So.3d at 515-16. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Lloyd failed to 

satisfy Rule 32.1(e)(1)’s requirements that the facts relied on indeed be newly discovered and not 

previously discoverable through exercising reasonable diligence:

Lloyd did not allege in his petition that he was unaware of the existence of the rape 

kit performed on P.P. or that he could not have had the kit tested for DNA at the 

time of trial or sentencing or in time to file a posttrial motion pursuant to Rule 24, 

Ala.R.Crim.P., or in time to be included in any previous collateral proceeding, and 

that he could not have discovered the existence of the rape kit or obtained DNA 

testing of the rape kit by any of those times through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence. See Rule 32.1(e)(1). Lloyd also did not allege in his petition that his 

request for DNA testing was based on new technological improvements in DNA 

testing that were not available at the time of his trial, at the time of his sentencing, 

at the time of any posttrial motion, or at the times he filed his previous Rule 32 

petitions.

 11 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated that § 15-18-200 applies to requests for DNA 

testing only by defendants convicted of capital offenses. Lloyd, 144 So.3d at 515.

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Lloyd, 144 So. 3d at 517. The court observed, “it is clear that Lloyd was well aware of the existence 

of the rape kit before his trial - the rape kit was specifically mentioned during a pretrial hearing.” 

Id.

Upon finding that Lloyd failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.1(e)(1), the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals held that his request for DNA testing was subject to the various grounds 

of preclusion in Rule 32.2. Id. Because it was clear that Lloyd knew about the rape kit before 

trial, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Lloyd’s request was “precluded by Rule 

32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5) because it could have been, but was not, raised and addressed at trial and on 

appeal.” Id. The court went on:

Moreover, because this is Lloyd’s third Rule 32 petition, his request is 

precluded by Rule 32.2(b) as successive. Although it is unclear from this Court’s 

records whether or not Lloyd requested DNA testing in his second petition, under 

the circumstances in this case, that does not prohibit our application of Rule 32.2(b). 

If Lloyd did request DNA testing in his second petition, his current request is 

precluded under the provision in Rule 32.2(b) that “[t]he court shall not grant relief 

on a successive petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the same 

petitioner.” If Lloyd did not request DNA testing in his second petition, then his 

current request is precluded under the provision in Rule 32.2(b) that “[a] successive 

petition on different grounds shall be denied unless” (1) the new grounds are 

jurisdictional or (2) the petitioner establishes that “good cause exists why the new 

ground or grounds were not known or could not have been ascertained through 

reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, and that failure to entertain 

the petition will result in a miscarriage of justice.” A request for DNA testing as a 

newly-discovered-material-facts claim is not jurisdictional, and Lloyd failed to 

allege in his petition good cause for not making his request for DNA testing in 

either of his two previous petitions.

Finally, Rule 32.2(c) provides:

 “Subject to the further provisions hereinafter set out in this 

section, the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a 

conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and 

(f), unless the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction 

appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within one (1) year after 

the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal 

Appeals under Rule 41, Ala.R.App.P.; or (2) in the case of a 

conviction not appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within 

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one (1) year after the time for filing an appeal lapses; provided, 

however, that the time for filing a petition under Rule 32.1(f) to seek 

an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal or denial of a petition 

previously filed under any provision of Rule 32.1 shall be six (6) 

months from the date the petitioner discovers the dismissal or denial, 

irrespective of the one-year deadlines specified in the preceding 

subparts (1) and (2) of this sentence; and provided further that the 

immediately preceding proviso shall not extend either of those oneyear deadlines as they may apply to the previously filed petition. 

The court shall not entertain a petition based on the grounds 

specified in Rule 32.1(e) unless the petition is filed within the 

applicable one-year period specified in the first sentence of this 

section, or within six (6) months after the discovery of the newly 

discovered material facts, whichever is later; provided, however, 

that the one-year period during which a petition may be brought 

shall in no case be deemed to have begun to run before the effective 

date of the precursor of this rule, i.e., April 1, 1987.”

Lloyd’s petition was filed over four years after this Court issued the certificate of 

judgment finalizing his convictions and, as noted above, it is clear that Lloyd was 

aware of the existence of the rape kit before his trial began. Therefore, his request 

for DNA testing was also clearly time-barred by Rule 32.2(c).

Id. at 517-18 (footnote omitted).

Thus, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated clearly and expressly that its judgment 

rested on the procedural bars found in Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), 32.2(b), and 32.2(c). 

These procedural bars are firmly established and regularly followed by Alabama appellate courts. 

See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 696 So.2d 1170, 1171-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 

(a)(5) and 32.2(c)); Horsley v. State, 675 So. 2d 908, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (Rules 32.2(a)(3) 

and (a)(5), 32.2(b), and 32.2(c); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(regarding Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5): “If an Alabama court has denied post-conviction relief 

based on the petitioner’s failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal, a federal Court cannot 

review that claim unless” the cause-and-prejudice or actual-innocence exception applies); Whitt v. 

State, 827 So. 2d 869, 875-76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (Rule 32.2(b)); Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006) (regarding Rule 32.2(c)); Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 863 (11th 

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Cir. 2005) (same); Kuenzel v. Commissioner, Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 690 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 

2012) (same). Lloyd’s claim is therefore procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas 

review. Atkins, 965 F.2d at 955. Because, as with his first claim, Lloyd does not establish that 

either the cause-and-prejudice or actual-innocence exception applies to his defaulted claim, the 

claim is foreclosed from federal habeas review. 12

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition for 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case be DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation 

or before November 4, 2016. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general 

objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar 

a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in 

the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s 

order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District 

Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 

404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 

1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE, this 20th day of October, 2016.

 12 As with his first claim, Lloyd further defaulted this claim by non-exhaustion when he did not 

file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court after the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of his Rule 32 petition.

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 /s/ Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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