Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03069/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03069-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARIBU A. WILLIAMS, AP-1400,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT W. FOX, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 15-3069 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Alameda County Superior Court of

second degree robbery. The court also found true the allegation that petitioner

had a prior conviction of first degree burglary, a violent felony and a strike, and

sentenced him to nine years in state prison. Petitioner appealed, but the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction and the Supreme

Court of California denied review. 

Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that the trial court prejudicially erred in delivering two

written instructions to the jury, which counsel had withdrawn and therefore had

not been orally read to the jury by the court. Per order filed on September 2,

2015, the court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated a cognizable

claim under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to

show cause and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

Case 3:15-cv-03069-CRB Document 14 Filed 03/03/16 Page 1 of 13
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 BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the procedural and factual

background of the case as follows:

A criminal information was filed on March 20, 2012, by the Contra

Costa County District Attorney alleging that appellant had

committed second degree robbery ([Cal. Penal Code] §§ 211,

212.5, subd. (c)) of Eric Rojo. The information also alleged

appellant was armed with a handgun at the time of the robbery

within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), and that he

used a handgun in the commission of the offense within the

meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The information

further alleged that appellant had a prior conviction of first degree

burglary, a violent felony, and a “strike.” (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a),

667, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b)–(i)).

A jury trial commenced on March 12, 2013. The evidence material

to the issues before us included the following:

On the morning of January 18, 2012, Eric Rojo was walking on

24th Street in Richmond toward his class at the Richmond Civic

Center. He had $48 in cash on his person—$3 consisting of three

single bills in his pocket, and $45 consisting of one $5 and two $20

bills, in his wallet.

Appellant rode his bicycle on the sidewalk toward Rojo and looked

at him. Rojo moved into the street to avoid any confrontation.

Appellant rode up to Rojo, stopped, and ordered, “Give me a

dollar.” Rojo replied, “I don’t have a dollar,” and kept walking.

Appellant then circled around Rojo, blocking his forward progress.

Appellant again ordered, “Give me a dollar” and “I’m not playing

around.” Rojo looked to see if appellant had a weapon. He saw

what appeared to be bottom of the handle of a handgun inside the

pouch of appellant’s black hooded sweatshirt. Rojo was scared and

gave appellant the $3 he had in his pocket. Appellant then said, “I

know you have more.” Rojo pulled out his wallet, showed it to

appellant, and handed the rest of his money over to appellant.

Appellant rode off on his bike.

Rojo, walked back to his house on 23rd Street. He told his cousin,

Ignacio Jaime, that he [had] just been robbed. Jaime said to call the

police, but Rojo instead wanted to look for appellant and to call

police if they saw him.

Jaime then drove Rojo around in his truck looking for someone

wearing a black sweatshirt, a black shirt, blue jeans, and a New

York Yankees baseball cap, the clothing Rojo described his

assailant wore at the time of the robbery. About 15 minutes later,

Rojo saw appellant sitting on his bike and wearing the same clothes

he had on at the time of the robbery. Appellant saw them, smiled,

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1

Appellant had chosen not to testify during the trial.

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and rode off. As Jaime and Rojo followed, appellant turned, looked,

and gestured with his empty hand like he was pointing a gun and

firing at them three or four times. The two then stopped and called

the police.

Five minutes later, Rojo and Jaime met Richmond Police Officer

Ronald Vinson. Dispatch radioed the description of the suspect

given to police earlier by Rojo to another Richmond police officer,

Ramon Middleton, who saw appellant matching that description,

riding a dirt bike.

Officer Vinson took Rojo and Jaime to the location where appellant

had been detained. Officer Vinson separated the pair, and showed

appellant to each of them. Rojo identified appellant as the man who

robbed him, and Jaime identified appellant as the man they had

pursued. Officer Middleton searched appellant and found two $20

bills and three $1 bills in his right front pocket. No gun was found.

During the trial, outside the presence of the jury, the court and

counsel reviewed the jury instructions to be given. Everyone agreed

that they would have to wait to hear testimony to determine

whether CALCRIM No. 361, on “Failure to Explain or Deny

Adverse Testimony,” was applicable to the facts of the case. At that

same time, the prosecutor withdrew his request to give CALCRIM

No. 375, “Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent,

Common Plan, Etc.” since he did not introduce any prior offenses.

On March 18, 2013, after the prosecution and the defense rested,

and again outside the presence of the jury, the court reviewed with

counsel the jury instructions to be given. The prosecutor withdrew

his request to give CALCRIM No. 361.1

Subsequently, the court read the final instructions to the jury.

Among the instructions read to the jury was CALCRIM No. 200,

which stated that “[s]ome of the instructions may not apply

depending on your findings about the facts of the case. Do not

assume just because I give a particular instruction that I am

suggesting anything about the facts. After you have decided what

the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as

you find them.” The court also admonished the jury with

CALCRIM No. 355, which told them that “[a] defendant has an

absolute constitutional right not to testify.”

The court also told the jury that it would provide jury instruction

packets for them to take to the jury room and forms that the jurors

could use to submit written questions to the court. The court did not

read to the jury CALCRIM Nos. 361 or 375, although they appear

in the record as part of the filed package of instructions given to the

jury.

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2

The allegation of use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) had been earlier

dismissed by the trial court.~(1CT81, 1RT 19)~

4

The jury found appellant guilty of second degree robbery, but also

found the arming allegation not true.2

On April 16, 2013, the prior conviction allegation was tried to the

court and found true. The court then imposed the lower term of two

years on the robbery conviction and doubled it to four years. The

court also imposed a five-year consecutive term under section 667,

subdivision (a)(1) for the prior violent conviction, for a total

aggregate state prison term of nine years.

People v. Williams, No. A138556, 2014 WL 2815587, at **2–4 (Cal. Ct. App.

June 23, 2014) (footnotes renumbered).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable

application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

B. Claim & Analysis

Petitioner claims that delivering the two written instructions to the jury,

which counsel had withdrawn and the court had not read to the jury, amounted to

a violation of his due process right to a fair trial. The claim is without merit. 

It is well established that a challenge to a jury instruction solely as an

error under state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71–72 (1991). To obtain federal

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habeas relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process. Id. at 72. The instruction may not be judged in artificial

isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and

the trial record. Id. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in

the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

Even if the instructional error resulted in constitutional error, the

reviewing federal habeas court must also find that the error resulted in actual

prejudice before relief may be granted. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,

146 (1998). The court must find that the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

Here, it is undisputed that the jury received two written instructions that

were withdrawn by counsel and not read to the jury by the court – CALCRIM

No. 361 (Failure to Explain or Deny Adverse Testimony) and CALCRIM No.

375 (Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan,

etc.). The two instructions at issue in the jury’s packet read as follows: 

361. TO EXPLAIN OR DENY ADVERSE TESTIMONY

If the defendant failed in (his/her) testimony to explain or deny

evidence against (him/her), and if (he/she) could reasonably be

expected to have done so based on what (he/she) knew, you may

consider (his/her) failure to explain or deny in evaluating that

evidence. Any such failure is not enough by itself to prove guilty. 

The People must still prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide

the meaning and importance of that failure.

Clerk’s Tr. at 213.

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375. OF UNCHARGED OFFENSE TO PROVE IDENTITY,

INTENT, COMMON PLAN, ETC.

The People presented evidence that the defendant committed

((another/other) offenses/the offenses of _____) that (was/were)

not charged in this case.

The People presented evidence (of other behavior by the defendant

that was not charged in this case/that the defendant _____).

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact

committed the (uncharged offenses/acts). Proof by a

preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof than

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a

preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely

than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this

evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the (uncharged

offenses/acts), you may, but are not required to, consider that

evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not:

The defendant was the person who committed the offenses alleged

in this case (./; or)

The defendant acted with the intent to _____ in this case (./; or)

The defendant had a motive to commit the offenses alleged in this

case (./; or)

The defendant knew _____ when (he/she) allegedly acted in this

case (./; or)

The defendant’s alleged actions were the result of mistake or

accident (./; or)

The defendant had a plan or scheme to commit the offenses alleged

in this case (./; or)

The defendant reasonably and in good faith believed that _____

consented (./; or)

The defendant _____.

In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of

similarity between the uncharged (offenses/ and acts) and the

charged offenses.

Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the

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limited purpose of _____.

Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad

character or is disposed to commit crime.

If you conclude that the defendant committed the (uncharged

offenses/acts), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along

with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that

the defendant is guilty of _____ or that the _____ has been proved.

The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ and allegation)

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 215-16 (emphasis added). 

The California Court of Appeal found that it was error to have included

the two withdrawn instructions in the packet of written instructions delivered to

the jury, but rejected Petitioner’s claim because it determined that the error did

not prejudice him. The court explained:

While both sides to this appeal agree that CALCRIM Nos. 361 and

375 had been withdrawn by counsel and were not read to the jury,

they disagree whether the record sufficiently documents that these

instructions were nevertheless delivered to the jury in the packet of

written instructions given to it at the commencement of

deliberations. We conclude that the record supports appellant’s

assertion that these two withdrawn instructions were delivered to

the jury as part of its instruction packet. Both CALCRIM Nos. 361

and 375 are contained in the packet on instructions titled “JURY

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN,” and are absent from that packet titled

“JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOT GIVEN.” (Original capitalization.)

This having been the case, it was error for the court to have

included these withdrawn instructions in the packet of written

instructions delivered to the jury at the commencement of its

deliberations. “ ‘It has long been the law that it is error to charge

the jury on abstract principles of law not pertinent to the issues in

the case. [Citation.] The reason for the rule is obvious. Such an

instruction tends to confuse and mislead the jury by injecting into

the case matters which the undisputed evidence shows are not

involved.’ (People v. Jackson (1954) 42 Cal.2d 540, 546–547....)”

(People v. Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 428.)

However, that does not end the matter. Appellant must show

prejudice, and we agree with respondent that he has not done so.

Initially we observe that the parties disagree as to what standard of

review we must apply to resolve the issue of prejudice. Appellant

contends that because the instruction erroneously given included

CALCRIM No. 361, where appellant chose not to testify at trial,

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that instruction constituted an improper comment on his refusal to

testify in violation of his right under Griffin v. California (1965)

380 U.S. 609, 616 (Griffin). Therefore, he argues that reversal is

required unless we determine that this error did not contribute to

the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).) Appellant also asserts

that even if the lower standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) applies to the error in giving CALCRIM

No. 375, because it is joined with Griffin error, the error was

cumulative and the higher standard applies to both. (People v.

Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 117.) Respondent argues that

the lower, Watson standard of review applies.

In our estimation, it matters not which standard of review applies

in this instance, because we conclude that under either Chapman or

the Watson standard, the errors did not prejudice appellant.

“[G]iving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally 

‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for

reversal.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67.)

Importantly, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 355,

which told them that “[a] defendant has an absolute constitutional

right not to testify.” The court also instructed the jury on the

presumption of innocence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Among the instructions both read and submitted in written form to

the jury was CALCRIM No. 200, which stated that “[s]ome of the

instructions may not apply depending on your findings about the

facts of the case. Do not assume just because I give a particular

instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts. After you

have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do

apply to the facts as you find them.”

Jurors are presumed to follow a court’s admonitions and

instructions. (Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 13

[improper admission of evidence did not deny due process in light

of the court’s jury instructions about the scope of evidence the jury

was to consider]; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 426 [“ ‘

“The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a

pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the

presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable

practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the

defendant.” ’ ”].)

There is no evidence to rebut this presumption. We note that the

trial court also told the jury that it would provide jury instruction

packets for them to take to the jury room and forms that the jurors

could use to submit written questions to the court. At no time did

the jury ask for clarification about the presence of either instruction

included in their packet, or express any confusion about them

whatsoever. Also, the prosecutor in closing argument made no

argument or comment on the substance of CALCRIM Nos. 361 or

375, that might conceivably have fed any misapprehension or

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confusion. We must presume jurors are intelligent persons capable

of understanding and applying a commonsense reading of

instructions. (People v. Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 796;

People v. White (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138–1139.)

Also relevant to the issue of potential prejudice is the very

language of CALCRIM No. 361, which limits consideration of the

failure to explain or deny adverse evidence “[i]f the defendant

failed in his ... testimony to explain or deny evidence against

him....” The fact that appellant did not testify makes it clear that

this instruction does not apply to the circumstances of this trial.

Given all of these circumstances, we have no hesitation in

concluding that appellant was not prejudiced by the apparently

inadvertent inclusion of two inapplicable instructions in the jury’s

packet of written instructions.

Our conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that the evidence of

guilt was strong. Eric Rojo identified appellant as the person who

robbed him without real challenge. His cousin likewise identified

appellant as the person they began following shortly after the

robbery occurred. Appellant was dressed consistent with Rojo’s

description given to police when he called them, and appellant had

on his person cash close to the amount of that given to him by

Rojo. Indeed, appellant did not dispute that he asked for, and took

money from Rojo, but instead contended merely that he was

panhandling and that Rojo overreacted.

Lastly, dispelling any concern raised by appellant that the jury may

have been prejudiced against him for a failure to “explain or deny

adverse evidence” is the additional fact that the jury found the

personal use of a firearm enhancement “not true.” That finding

makes it all the more clear that the jury did not impose on appellant

any duty to explain what it was that Rojo saw in appellant’s hoodie

pocket, or why it was not in appellant’s jacket as of the time he was

later detained. The jury did just what was expected of it—it gave

appellant the presumption of innocence and held the prosecutor to

prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Williams, 2014 WL 2815587, at **4–7. 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s instructional

error claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state court reasonably

determined that any error in including the two withdrawn instructions in the

jury’s packet did not prejudice petitioner because any error was harmless under

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3

While the Chapman standard applies to criminal convictions challenged on

direct appeal, the less strict Brecht standard applies to state criminal convictions

challenged on federal habeas corpus. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. A state prisoner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the trial error resulted in actual prejudice

because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Id. at 637. 

11

the Chapman standard of review applicable on direct appeal, i.e., the court

determined that any error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman,

386 U.S. at 24.3

 

It is now well established that if the state court finds an error harmless

under Chapman, as the California Court of Appeal did here, federal habeas relief

is not available for the error “unless the state court’s harmlessness determination

itself was unreasonable.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (quoting

Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)). Thus, a federal court may grant relief

only if the state court’s harmlessness determination “was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded agreement.” Id. (quoting

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). That simply cannot be said

here. 

The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that the jury did

not consider the two instructions erroneously included in its packet of written

jury instructions – CALCRIM No. 361 (Failure to Explain or Deny Adverse

Testimony) and CALCRIM No. 375 (Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove

Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.). The court noted that the trial court

instructed the jury that “[s]ome of the instructions may not apply depending on

your findings about the facts of the case,” Rep.’s Tr. at 220 (CALCRIM No.

200), and that a “defendant has an absolute right not to testify,” id. at 228

(CALCRIM No. 355). The trial court also instructed the jury not to “consider for

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any reasons at all the fact that the defendant did not testify.” Id. at 229. Given

that petitioner did not testify and that no evidence of uncharged offenses was

presented, the court of appeal reasonably found that the jury followed its

instructions and did not consider the two inapplicable instructions in their packet. 

Cf. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (a jury is presumed to follow

its instructions). Additionally, the court of appeal reasonably found that the jury

did not consider the two inapplicable instructions in their packet because the jury

did not any seek clarification about them and because counsel did not discuss

them in their arguments to the jury. The instructions at issue were clearly

inapplicable. Importantly, the court of appeal reasonably determined that

petitioner was not prejudiced by the two inapplicable instructions in the jury’s

packet because the evidence against him was strong – Rojo identified petitioner

as the man who robbed him and Jaime identified him as the man he and Rojo

pursued shortly after the robbery, and petitioner had the money he had taken

from Rojo on him when he was arrested. Under the circumstances, it cannot be

said that the inclusion of the two irrelevant instructions in the jury’s packet of

written instructions had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict,’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)), much less that the state court’s

harmlessness determination was “unreasonable,” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199

(citation omitted). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

instructional error claim. See id.

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION 

After careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied

that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a

certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is DENIED

because petitioner has not demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\HC.15\Williams, K.15-3069.denial.final.wpd

Case 3:15-cv-03069-CRB Document 14 Filed 03/03/16 Page 13 of 13