Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08104/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karissa Mayes, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Credit Solutions Corporation, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV10-8104 PCT-DGC

ORDER

After timely filing the status report (Doc. 13) required by this Court’s November 1,

2010 order (Doc. 8) and obtaining the Clerk’s entry of default as to each Defendant

(Docs. 10, 14), Plaintiff moves for default judgment against each Defendant for violations

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) (Doc. 15). 

A court may grant default judgment against a party if default has been entered. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In doing

so, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the

plaintiff; (2) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (3) whether default was

due to excusable neglect; (4) the policy favoring a decision on the merits; (5) the merits of

the claim; (6) the sufficiency of the complaint; and (7) the amount of money at stake. See

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In applying the Eitel factors, “the

factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be

taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 

In light of the executed summons documents (Docs. 7, 11), the Court finds that each

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Defendant has been properly served as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

Neither Defendant has made an appearance in this case, and the allegations are undefended.

The Court further finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment for

Plaintiff. Without a judgment, Plaintiff is left with no remedy for defendant debt collectors’

conduct. The material facts required to establish violations of the FDCPA have been

sufficiently pled against each defendant debt collector. Although personal service was made

on Defendant Krauss on August 25, 2010, and substituted service was made on Defendant

Credit Solutions Corporation on October 19, 2010, neither defendant has appeared to defend

this suit after more than six months and four months, respectively. The Court therefore

concludes that Defendants’ default is not due to excusable neglect. Moreover, the complaint

alleges repeated violations of the FDCPA by Defendants, and their absence from this case

precludes a decision on the merits. Accordingly, the Court will take all factual allegations

in Plaintiff’s complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, as true. The Court

further finds that it has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, that venue is

proper in this Court because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred

in this judicial district, and that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because their

conduct caused harm in this district and they had or should have had an expectation to be

haled into court in this district. In sum, the Court finds each defendant liable for the conduct

alleged.

Having determined liability, the remaining issue is appropriate relief. In a default

judgment action, the amount of damages will not automatically be assumed true. See

Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (stating that “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those

relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true”). Plaintiff must “‘prove up’ the

amount of damages it is claiming.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06-

03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007); see PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal.

Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff is required to

provide proof of all damages sought in the complaint.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), 55(b).

Here, Plaintiff requests actual and statutory damages, as well as costs and attorney

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 On January 5, 2010, Michael presented himself as representing Defendant Credit

Solutions Corporation. See Doc. 15-3 ¶ 1. On January 27, 2010, Michael presented himself

as representing Defendant Krauss. Id. ¶ 3. Neither Defendant appeared to dispute that

Michael represented each of them independently.

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fees. Doc. 17. The costs and attorney fees are well-documented (Docs. 15-4, 15-5, 15-6),

the Court finds the evidence satisfactory and the fees to be reasonable, and will grant the

award of costs and attorney fees as requested, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(a)(3). Plaintiff is hereby

awarded $480.00 for costs and $3,012.50 in reasonable attorney fees, for a total of $3,492.50.

As to statutory damages, the FDCPA permits a statutory award of up to $1,000 against

each liable debt collector. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). The individual, Michael, who acted on behalf

of each Defendant made three calls to Plaintiff, threatened Plaintiff with immediate

garnishment in 24 hours, used abusive and demeaning language toward Plaintiff, and called

Plaintiff’s place of employment.1

 Doc. 15-3. Based on this evidence, the Court finds that

Michael’s conduct was intentional. In light of the above findings, the Court awards statutory

damages against each Defendant in the amount of $1,000.00, for a total of $2,000.00.

As to actual damages, Plaintiff requests $10,000.00 for emotional distress. Doc. 15-1

at 3. Plaintiff’s affidavit asserts that she “spent several days and nights without sleeping or

eating,” and that she “became depressed and withdrawn worrying about what would happen

to [her] and to [her] family if [she] was sued or had [her] wages garnished.” Doc. 15-3.

Plaintiff’s statements are conclusory and have not “proven up” actual damages. See In re

Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting, in the context of a different cause

of action, that “[a]n individual may establish emotional distress damages clearly in several

different ways,” including medical evidence, “[n]on-experts, such as family members,

friends, or coworkers,” or a personal affidavit from which it is “readily apparent even without

corroborative evidence” that the individual suffered “significant emotional harm”). Plaintiff

has not sought professional assistance from a medical professional, does not assert that the

distress caused her to miss work, admits that she just hung up after Michael screamed at her

during the first call, admits that the second call was a voicemail, and provides no

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corroborating evidence of the effects of the distress from family members or co-workers. In

light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the statutory damages assessed above are sufficient

to make Plaintiff whole and will deny the request for actual damages.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 15) is granted as stated above.

2. Plaintiff is awarded one thousand U.S. dollars ($1,000.00) in statutory

damages against each Defendant severally, plus interest at ten percent (10%)

per annum until the principal has been fully paid.

3. Plaintiff is awarded three thousand four hundred ninety-two U.S. dollars and

fifty cents ($3,492.50) in costs and attorney fees against Defendants jointly

and severally, plus interest at ten percent (10%) per annum until the principal

has been fully paid.

4. The Clerk shall enter judgment against Defendants as stated above and

terminate this case.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2011.

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