Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02084/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02084-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JESSICA COSTA;

NO. CIV. S-05-2084 FCD/KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NATIONAL ACTION FINANCIAL

SERVICES, and ELIZABETH DOE; 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff Jessica

Costa’s (“plaintiff”) motion for reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and the California Rosenthal

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code 

Case 2:05-cv-02084-FCD-KJM Document 67 Filed 04/30/08 Page 1 of 15
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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

§ 1788 et seq. For the reasons set forth below,1 plaintiff’s

motion is GRANTED in part.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a debt plaintiff incurred to

NextCard. (Pl.’s Verified Complaint for Damages, filed October

15, 2005, ¶ 18). Plaintiff defaulted on the debt. (Id. ¶ 20). 

The debt was subsequently assigned to defendant National Action

Financial Services (“defendant” or “NAFS”) for collection. (Id.

¶ 21). On March 17, 2005 plaintiff received a voice mail message

at her home from NAFS. The caller for NAFS, Elizabeth Doe,

failed to state her message was from a debt collector and in

regards to the debt owed on plaintiff’s NextCard account. 

(Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed

Nov. 30, 2007 (“DUF”), ¶ 7). Thereafter, plaintiff filed suit in

the United States District Court, Northern District of California

on June 6, 2005, claiming defendant violated FDCPA and RFDCPA and

seeking emotional distress damages pursuant these statutes. The

case was transferred to this district on October 18, 2005. 

(Docket #1).

On March 20, 2006, defendant served an offer of judgment,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 68,2 to

plaintiff in the amount of $2,002.00 plus “reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs, to be mutually agreed upon by the parties, or if

no agreement can be reached, to be determined by the court in

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3 It was not clear from the parties’ cross-motions for

partial summary judgment whether the motions resolved the

entirety of the case. However, on April 1, 2008 the parties

stipulated that the court’s December 19, 2007 order on the

motions resolved the case and that judgment should be entered

pursuant to the court’s order. (Docket #61). The court thereby

dismissed plaintiff’s claims with respect to “Elizabeth Doe” and

entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against NAFS in the

amount of $2,000.00 on April 2, 2008. (Docket #62).

3

accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.” (Docket #59, Ex. 3). 

Plaintiff did not accept the offer. 

In October 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for partial

summary judgment relating to her claims for violations of FDCPA

and RFDCPA. (Docket # 27). Defendant subsequently filed a

cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim

for emotional distress damages. (Docket #30). The court granted

plaintiff’s motion, awarding plaintiff statutory damages in the

amount of $2000.00. The court also granted defendant’s motion

for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for

emotional distress damages, thereby limiting plaintiff to a total

recovery of $2,000.3 (Mem. & Order, filed Dec. 19, 2007). 

Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorney’s fees and

costs, as the prevailing party on the statutory claims. 

Plaintiff seeks $53,828.00 in attorney’s fees and $897.27 in

costs. (Pl.’s Mot. for Reasonable Att’y Fees and Costs, filed

Feb. 28, 2008 [“Mot.”], at 7). Defendant does not dispute the

amount of costs claimed, but contends a reasonable attorney’s

fees award to plaintiff is $2,688.00. (Opp’n, filed Mar. 28,

2008, at 16).

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4

STANDARD

When an individual consumer succeeds in an FDCPA action, she

is entitled to recover “the costs of the action, together with a

reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692k(a)(3). Similarly, a prevailing party under the RFDCPA is

entitled to “costs of the action” and “reasonable attorney’s

fees.” Cal Civ. Code § 1788.30(c). The court must calculate

awards for attorney’s fees using the “lodestar” method. See

Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n. 4 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224

F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated

by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party

reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.

1996).

However, when a Rule 68 offer is made, a court must

determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees award in

light of the results obtained after the Rule 68 offer. Haworth

v. State of Nevada, 56 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 68

allows a defendant to serve upon a plaintiff a “judgment on

specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

68(a). If a Rule 68 offer is rejected and “the judgment that the

[plaintiff] finally obtains is not more favorable than the

unaccepted offer, the [plaintiff] must pay the costs incurred

after the offer was made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). A plaintiff

who rejects a Rule 68 offer and recovers less by prosecuting the

case is not entitled to collect any post-offer attorney’s fees if

the relevant fee statute treats attorney’s fees as part of

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5

“costs.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). However,

where Congress defines costs and attorney’s fees separately,

attorney’s fees are not necessarily subject to the cost-shifting

provision of Rule 68. Id.

Such is the case here, as FDCPA and RFDCPA define attorney’s

fees separately from costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Cal Civ.

Code § 1788.30(c). Therefore, attorney’s fees in this action are

not included in costs and are not automatically shifted by Rule

68. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 9; see also Haworth, 56 F.3d at 1051. 

The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award

post-offer attorney’s fees where the plaintiff obtains a judgment

for less than the amount of the Rule 68 offer. See Haworth, 56

F.3d at 1052. For counsel to be awarded attorney’s fees postRule 68 offer, a counsel’s actions in continuing to prosecute the

case must be reasonable. See Haworth, 56 F.3d at 1052; see also

Solomon v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 222 F.R.D. 418, 423 (C.D. Cal.

2004) (finding counsel’s actions in continuing to prosecute the

FDCPA action post-Rule 68 offer were unreasonable and thus

awarding counsel only pre-offer attorney’s fees). In determining

reasonableness, the court must consider: (1) the amount of the

Rule 68 offer; (2) the stage of the litigation at which the offer

was made; (3) what services were rendered thereafter; (4) the

amount obtained by the judgment; and (5) whether it was

reasonable to continue litigation after the Rule 68 offer was

made. Haworth, 56 F.3d at 1052-53.

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4 While plaintiff filed a Bill of Costs, in the amount of

$4,143.99, on February 28, 2008 (Docket #55), she concedes in

moving for attorney’s fees and costs that pursuant to Rule 68 she

may only recover her pre-offer costs of $897.27.

6

ANALYSIS

A. Costs Awarded

Plaintiff was offered $2,002.00 plus reasonable costs and

attorney’s fees on March 20, 2006. Had plaintiff accepted the

offer of judgment, she would have received more than was actually

awarded. Accordingly, the cost shifting provision of Rule 68

applies. Plaintiff concedes the Rule 68 offer of judgment bars

her recovery of costs post-offer and, therefore, only seeks the

costs incurred prior to March 20, 2006, which total $897.27. 

(Mot. at 7:17-21.)4 Defendant does not oppose this award of

costs. (See generally Opp’n; Def.’s Obj. to Pl.’s Bill of Costs,

filed Mar. 13, 2008). Thus, because plaintiff is the prevailing

party as to her claims for violations of FDCPA and RFDCPA,

plaintiff is entitled to recover her pre-Rule 68 costs of

$897.27. 

B. Reasonableness of an Attorney’s Fees Award Post-Rule 68

Offer

Plaintiff asserts an attorney’s fees award need not bear any

relation to the amount of damages awarded, and therefore, her

request for $53,828.00 in attorney’s fees is not unreasonable

even considering the actual damages award of only $2,000.00. 

Plaintiff relies on Civitello v. First Credit of America, LLC. to

support the proposition that an attorney’s fees award can greatly

exceed the actual damages recovered in FDCPA actions. 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 46620 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (the plaintiff was awarded

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5 Indeed, plaintiff’s motion relies on a number of cases,

like Civitello, which approved attorney’s fees awards that far

exceeded the statutory damages recovered. (Mot. at 11, 12). 

However, these cases did not involve Rule 68 offers of judgment,

and thus, they are inapposite. In this case where an offer of

judgment was made and rejected, a different analysis of

reasonable attorney’s fees is required.

7

$98,924.00 in attorney’s fees in an FDCPA case that awarded

$3,240.80 in actual damages). Plaintiff’s reliance on Civitello

is misplaced. Significantly, in Civitello the defendant did not

make a Rule 68 offer of judgment.5 Id. Here, defendant made a

Rule 68 offer in the early stages of litigation before any

substantial discovery or motion practice. Plaintiff decided to

reject the settlement offer and continue litigation for another

year and a half. When plaintiff refused the Rule 68 offer, she

should have known her refusal to settle may have a substantial

adverse impact on the amount of attorney’s fees she may recover

for services rendered after the offer. See Haworth, 56 F.3d at

1052. As the court noted in Haworth, “[j]ust because a plaintiff

has [a statutory] violation in her pocket does not give her a

license to . . . run up the attorney’s fees and then recover them

from the defendant.” See id.; see also French v. Corporate

Receivables, Inc., 489 F.3d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 2007) (denying

FDCPA plaintiff attorney’s fees incurred after a Rule 68 offer

when final judgment did not exceed the offer). 

 Thus, as set forth above, in determining the reasonableness

of an attorney’s fees award post-Rule 68 offer, the court must

consider: (1) the amount of the Rule 68 offer; (2) the stage of

the litigation at which the offer was made; (3) what services

were rendered thereafter; (4) the amount obtained by the

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6 FDCPA awards a plaintiff statutory damages, not to

exceed the amount of $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and RFDCPA awards a plaintiff statutory damages,

in the maximum amount of $1,000.00 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1788.30(b).

8

judgment; and (5) whether it was reasonable to continue

litigation after the Rule 68 offer was made. Haworth, 56 F.3d at

1052-53. The court has discussed above the first and fourth

factors: The amount of the Rule 68 offer exceeded the amount

obtained by the judgment, and thus, the first and fourth factors

favor awarding no post-offer attorney’s fees. See Solomon, 222

F.R.D. at 423. 

The second factor requires the court to examine the stage of

litigation at which the offer was made. Here, the offer was made

early in the litigation, on March 20, 2006, before any

substantial discovery or motion practice. (Mot. Ex. A at 1-3). 

According to plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records, only 16 hours

of work were preformed pre-Rule 68 offer. Id. The purpose of

Rule 68 is to encourage settlement when reasonable settlement

offers are made. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. If plaintiff had

accepted the early offer of judgment, plaintiff could have

avoided over $48,000.00 in attorney’s fees, as accepting the

offer would have eluded hundreds of hours of legal work. 

Further, defendant’s $2,002.00 offer of judgement was reasonable

in light of the relevant statutory authority governing damages.6

Plaintiff failed to accept the offer and instead pursued recovery

of actual damages through her claim for emotional distress

damages. However, plaintiff did not have the facts to support

such a claim. (Mem. and Order, filed Dec. 19, 2007 [“December 19

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9

Order”], at 18, 19). As the court noted in its December 19

Order, this was not a case in which the debt collector repeatedly

called and harassed plaintiff despite being asked not to call. 

(December 19 Order at 19). Plaintiff initiated the bulk of the

conduct with defendant by continuing to call defendant back after

defendant hung up on plaintiff several times. Additionally,

plaintiff’s symptoms were not sufficient to demonstrate extreme

distress, as she only claimed she was upset and angry at the

time, that her hands shake and are sweaty when she now receives

calls from unknown persons, and that she has occasional trouble

sleeping to date. Id. Thus, for all of these reasons, the

second factor favors awarding no post-offer attorney’s fees.

The third factor requires the court to consider what

services were rendered after the offer of judgment. Plaintiff’s

attorneys have submitted billing records which demonstrate that

significant discovery and motion practice occurred post-offer. 

In fact, the billing records indicate approximately 230 hours of

work were preformed post-offer at a cost of $48,788.00. Although

this factor weighs in favor of an award of fees, it is not

persuasive because the court finds the work performed after the

Rule 68 offer was unjustified. Accord Solomon, 222 F.R.D. at 423

(awarding only pre-offer attorney’s fees to plaintiff, despite

the extensive amount of discovery and motion practice performed

post-offer). 

The fifth factor, whether it was reasonable to continue

litigating the case after the Rule 68 offer was made, is the most

important factor the court considers in deciding to award

reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. Here, plaintiff’s continued

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28 7 The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue. 

(December 19 Order at 16).

10

pursuit of this case in an effort to obtain emotional distress

damages was not reasonable. District courts are split over

whether a plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress damages under

FDCPA are evaluated under the state law governing the tort of

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) or some

lower standard.7

 However, regardless of which standard the court

adopted, plaintiff’s claims of stress did not rise to the level

necessary to set forth a viable claim for IIED under either state

law or any lower threshold established in some case law. 

(December 19 Order at 18-21 [finding the subject conduct does not

rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct as a matter

of law nor do the claims allege more than mere “transitory” or

“trivial” symptoms of distress]).

In this case, plaintiff alleged conduct that was, at most,

rude and impolite. Significantly, the conduct occurred in only

two voice mail messages and four brief conversations taking place

on one afternoon. As noted in the court’s December 19 Order,

such conduct was not actionable as an IIED claim, nor was it

enough to recover emotional distress damages under any lower

standard applied by some courts. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot.

Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 (1987) (“Mere insults, indignities,

threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities” are

not actionable as “outrageous conduct”); (December 19 Order at

18). 

Furthermore, the only evidence of plaintiff’s emotional

distress was her own testimony, and this evidence demonstrated

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11

her alleged emotional distress was transitory in nature and not

of the type recoverable under FDCPA or RFDCPA. Indeed, plaintiff

had no corroborating evidence--no witnesses to confirm her

symptoms and no documentary evidence to support her claims. 

Without such evidence to buttress her assertions, it was

unreasonable for plaintiff to continue litigating after the Rule

68 offer. Plaintiff assumed the risk of pursuing the emotional

distress claim on limited evidence and should have known her

refusal to settle may have a substantial adverse impact on the

amount of attorney’s fees she may recover. See Haworth, 56 F.3d

at 1052. 

Accordingly, in examining the five factors for determining

reasonable attorney’s fees in light of a Rule 68 offer, the court

awards plaintiff only her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred

pre-Rule 68 offer. Id. (finding the court has broad discretion

in refusing to award post-offer attorney’s fees where the

plaintiff obtains judgment for less than the amount of the Rule

68 offer); see also Solomon, 222 F.R.D. at 423 (denying post-Rule

68 offer attorney’s fees as unjustified in an FDCPA case);

French, 489 F.3d at 404 (denying post-Rule 68 offer attorney’s

fees as unreasonable in an FDCPA case). 

C. Attorney’s Fees Awarded Pre-Rule 68 Offer

As discussed above, the court must calculate awards for

attorney’s fees using the “lodestar” method. Ferland, 244 F.3d

at 1149 n. 4. “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the

number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales, 96 F.3d at

363. Here, the court finds the hours expended by plaintiff’s

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8 Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 2008 WL 1792808

(9th Cir. April 22, 2008), cited by plaintiff, is not relevant to

determining the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees post-Rule

68 offer because Camacho did not involve such an offer. However,

Camacho is instructive for this court on the determination of the

prevailing market rate for plaintiff’s attorneys’ services.

12

attorneys post-Rule 68 offer are unreasonable, and therefore, it

only needs to assess the reasonableness of the pre-offer

attorney’s fees.8

The court determines a reasonable hourly rate by

establishing the “rate prevailing in the community for similar

work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, expertise, and

reputation.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir.

1997). Generally, the relevant community is the forum in which

the district court sits. Camacho, 2008 WL 1792808, *4. Neither

party contends that an exception to the general rule applies in

this case, and therefore, the relevant community is the Eastern

District of California (“Eastern District”). Id. Plaintiff’s

attorneys, Mr. Swigart and Mr. Hyde, whose firm is based in San

Diego, California, request a rate of $315.00 per hour. (Mot. at

7; Docket #54). Defendant argues $210.00 per hour is the

reasonable rate for the work performed in this case. (Opp’n at

13). Supporting $210.00 per hour as a reasonable rate, defendant

emphasizes “the $210 per hour paid to defense counsel is the only

evidence of a market rate [in the Eastern District] for this type

of litigation before the Court.” (Id.). 

Defendant is incorrect. Plaintiff proffers five

declarations of consumer rights attorneys practicing in

California, all of whom declare $315.00 per hour as a reasonable

rate for this type of plaintiffs’ work. (Docket #54). Although

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13

some of the declarations are from attorneys practicing in the

Northern and Southern Districts of California, one declaration is

from an attorney who practices in the Eastern District and he 

corroborates that $315.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for

similar work in the Eastern District. (Docket #54-8, Decl. of

Robert Wilcox); Cf. Camacho, 2008 WL 1792808, *4-5 (reversing the

trial court’s award of fees in an FDCPA case where the court did

not base the hourly rate awarded on evidence of the prevailing

rate in the Northern District of California). Plaintiff’s

counsel, Mr. Swigart, attests the same in his declaration filed

in support of the motion. (Docket #54-7.) In all, the

declarations proffered by plaintiff suggest a local market for

comparable legal work congruent with plaintiff’s request for an

hourly rate of $315.00. See McDonald v. Bonded Collectors,

L.L.C., S.D. Cal., Civ. 05-687 PCL, Order Awarding Attorney’s

Fees and Costs, at 8-9, Ex. B to Swigart Reply Decl. (Docket #63-

5). 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s extensive experience further

buttresses plaintiff’s request for an hourly rate of $315.00 for

her attorneys. For example, Mr. Swigart “has taken part in three

hundred cases and [has been involved in representing clients in]

fourteen published decisions, including seven related to FDCPA or

RFDCPA; he has attended seven training conferences concerned with

the FDCPA; he has ‘litigated numerous class actions surrounding

complex issues of the FDCPA and RFDCPA.’” Id. (finding Hyde &

Swigart’s $315.00 per hour rate to be reasonable in an analogous

FDCPA and RFDCPA case). Mr. Hyde is similarly accomplished. Id.

Mr. Swigart and Mr. Hyde’s extensive training and experience in

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FDCPA litigation substantiates the requested $315.00 hourly rate

as reasonable. Hyde & Swigart’s requested rates are in line with

those prevailing in this community for similar services preformed

by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation. 

Additionally, plaintiff has provided examples of prior

awards and legal precedent that support $315.00 per hour as the

prevailing market rate. (Decl. of Hyde, [Docket #54-7], ¶ 11;

Decls. of Hyde and Swigart, [Docket #63-2, 3], ¶ 7). In the

cases cited by plaintiff, the courts have either (1) approved the

$315.00 hourly rate, as in McDonald, or (2) the parties have

agreed upon $315.00 per hour as a reasonable rate. Accordingly,

considering the evidence presented by plaintiff, the court finds

that Mr. Swigart’s and Mr. Hyde’s rates of $315.00 per hour are

reasonable. See Camacho, 2008 WL 1792808, *6 (requiring that the

court expressly discuss the declarations filed by the parties,

and other supporting evidence, to determine whether the requested

hourly rate is consistent with the prevailing hourly rate in the

forum community for similar work by attorneys with similar skill,

experience and reputation). 

The second component of the lodestar calculation is the

hours billed. Through counsel’s billing records, plaintiff has

established that the pre-Rule 68 work preformed amounted to 16

hours. (Docket #54, Ex. A). Defendant’s contention that 3.2

hours should be subtracted from these hours is unpersuasive. 

First, defendant contends there was a “data entry error” and 0.8

hours of work “appears” incorrectly duplicated on counsel’s

billing record dated March 20, 2006. (Opp’n at 16). However, it

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9 As costs are awarded herein pursuant to FDCPA and

RFDCPA, the court will not separately tax plaintiff’s Bill of

Costs filed February 28, 2008 (Docket #55). Plaintiff is awarded

only those costs set forth in this order.

15

is entirely plausible that all the work listed on March 20, 2006

was performed by plaintiff’s counsel that day, and thus, the

court will not make this minor deduction. Secondly, the 2.4

hours plaintiff’s counsel spent opposing defendant’s motion to

dismiss for improper venue (prosecuted in the Northern District)

is time and labor reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel. 

Overall, Hyde & Swigart’s billing records adequately utilize

dates and descriptive titles for the work performed, and the

records substantiate 16 hours of pre-Rule 68 work. (Docket #54,

Ex. A). Therefore, the court finds the 16 hours expended by

plaintiff’s counsel pre-Rule 68 offer reasonable.

Accordingly, based on the lodestar calculation, attorney’s

fees are awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $5,040.00

(representing 16 hours multiplied by $315.00).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part

plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. The court

awards plaintiff $5,040.00 in attorney’s fees and $897.27 in 

costs.9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2008

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-02084-FCD-KJM Document 67 Filed 04/30/08 Page 15 of 15