Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04694/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04694-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 5/18/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

E.M., a minor, by and through his parents, E.M.

and E.M.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

PAJARO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS, and CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06-4694 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 1

DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

[re: docket nos. 40, 42]

Defendants California Department of Education (“CDE”) and Office of Administrative

Hearings (“OAH”) move to dismiss the sole claim asserted against them in the first amended

complaint (“FAC”) of E.M., a minor suing by and through his parents (“E.M.”). The Court has

considered the briefing as well as the oral argument presented at the hearing on March 9, 2007. 

For the reasons discussed below, the motions will be granted without leave to amend. 

Case 3:06-cv-04694-MMC Document 54 Filed 05/18/07 Page 1 of 8
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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of E.M.’s claim that he has been and is being denied a free

appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Improvement Act (“IDEIA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. The IDEIA provides that in order to

receive federal funding a state must have a policy in effect that assures all children with

disabilities the right to a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). If a child qualifies for special education

services under the IDEIA, the child’s instruction is based upon an Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”). 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

In California, the responsibility to identify children with disabilities and determine

appropriate educational placements and related services through the IEP process is placed by

statute on the “district, special education local plan area, or county office” of the child’s

residence. Cal. Educ. Code § 56300. A parent may file an administrative complaint “with

respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the

child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(b)(6)(A). Upon the receipt of such administrative complaint, the local educational agency

has thirty days to resolve the matter to the parent’s satisfaction. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). If

the local educational agency fails to resolve the matter within thirty days, the parent may proceed

with an impartial due process hearing conducted by the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. §§

1415(f)(1)(A), 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). All applicable timelines for a due process hearing commence

upon the expiration of this thirty-day period. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). In California, the

state educational agency, Defendant CDE, contracts with Defendant OAH to conduct these

hearings. Any party aggrieved by the final administrative decision resulting from such due

process hearing may seek de novo judicial review in a district court of the United States or in a

state court of competent jurisdiction. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

E.M., a student in Defendant Pajaro Valley Unified School District (“PVUSD”), claims

that he is eligible for special education services and has been denied such services by PVUSD. 

E.M. filed an administrative complaint against PVUSD before the OAH on December 5, 2005,

which complaint was rejected for insufficiency. E.M. filed an amended administrative complaint

Case 3:06-cv-04694-MMC Document 54 Filed 05/18/07 Page 2 of 8
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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

on January 4, 2006, which complaint was deemed sufficient. An Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) conducted a prehearing conference on February 23, 2006, and commenced a six-day due

process hearing on February 28, 2006. E.M. claimed among other things that he had been denied

a FAPE from 2002 onward, and that his parents were entitled to reimbursement for independent

assessments, evaluations and services obtained on behalf of E.M.. The ALJ issued a decision

unfavorable to E.M. on May 8, 2006.

E.M. filed the instant action on August 2, 2006, and on December 15, 2006 filed the

operative FAC asserting the following claims: (1) an appeal from the ALJ’s decision, seeking

judicial de novo review as to whether E.M. is entitled to special education services and related

issues (asserted against PVUSD); (2) failure timely to issue the administrative decision in

violation of the IDEIA (asserted against CDE and OAH); (3) violation the Unruh Civil Rights

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 by discriminating against E.M. on the basis of ancestry and race in

determining that he is not a student with disabilities (asserted against PVUSD); and (4) violation

of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (asserted against PVUSD). PVUSD answered

the FAC on January 4, 2007. CDE and OAH instead filed the instant motions to dismiss,

challenging claim 2, the only claim asserted against them by E.M. CDE and OAH seek dismissal

on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and on the basis of failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air For Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the moving party asserts that the

allegations in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In a

factual attack, the moving party disputes the truth of the allegations in the complaint, which

otherwise would be sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In resolving a facial attack, the

Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177,

1179 (9th Cir. 2005). In resolving a factual attack, the Court need not presume the truthfulness

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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

of the allegations set forth in the complaint and may consider evidence beyond the face of the

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id.;

Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. Once the moving party has presented affidavits or other evidence

tending to show that subject matter jurisdiction does not lie, the plaintiff must present affidavits

or other evidence sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under

a cognizable legal theory. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to

dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave

to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by

amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When

amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp,

90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. DISCUSSION

In claim 2, E.M. asserts that the ALJ did not issue his due process decision within the

statutory forty-five day period. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (formerly codified at 34 C.F.R. §

300.511) (providing that the public agency must provide a final decision within forty-five days). 

As discussed above, all applicable timelines for a due process hearing commence upon the

expiration of the thirty-day resolution period. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). E.M.’s amended

administrative complaint was filed on January 4, 2006. The thirty-day resolution period expired

February 3, 2006, at which time the forty-five day period was triggered. The forty-five day

period expired March 20, 2006. The ALJ did not issue his final due process decision until May

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 E.M. asserts that the ALJ’s decision was issued sixty-six days late, while OAH asserts

2

that the decision was issued thirty-six days late. These discrepancies in calculation do not affect

the Court’s analysis.

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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

8, 2006, forty-nine days later. E.M. asserts in claim 2 that both CDE and OAH are responsible 2

for this delay and that the delay caused him injury.

This Court previously granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss E.M.’s claim based upon

the forty-five day period with leave to amend after concluding that the ALJ’s failure to comply

with the forty-five day period did not constitute a per se injury and that E.M. had not alleged

sufficient facts demonstrating actual injury arising from the delay in the issuance of the ALJ’s

decision. Order of 12/15/06 at 10. E.M. has reasserted his claim, alleging that he “experienced

harm every day that his decision was delayed,” FAC ¶ 98, and that “[e]ach day that the OAH

thoughtlessly avoided producing a decision in accordance with the law, was a day that Plaintiff’s

disability was unremediated,” FAC ¶ 101. 

Defendant OAH construes the Court’s order as permitting amendment only with respect

to the threat of future injury in the event he again appears before OAH, and argues that E.M.’s

addition of allegations regarding past injury is impermissible. OAH’s reading of the order is

narrower than was intended by the Court; the Court intended to afford E.M. the opportunity to

allege any facts that might demonstrate injury in fact resulting from the failure to issue a due

process decision within the forty-five day period.

The Court concludes that E.M. has failed to cure the defect of his original complaint. 

E.M.’s allegations to the effect that he “experienced harm every day that his decision was

delayed,” FAC ¶ 98, ignore the fact that OAH determined that he already was receiving a FAPE. 

As OAH points out, E.M. would not have obtained any additional educational benefits had the

ALJ’s decision been rendered within the forty-five day period. E.M. may, of course, prevail

upon his claim for de novo review of the ALJ’s decision and thereby obtain an adjudication that

he has been deprived of education benefits to which he was entitled. However, the injury

flowing from such deprivation would flow from the substance of the ALJ’s decision, not from

the fact that the decision was rendered after the expiration of the statutory forty-five day period. 

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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss claim 2 without leave to amend on the ground that E.M. has

not cured the deficiency identified in the Court’s prior order, namely, the failure to demonstrate

injury in fact arising from the issuance of the due process decision beyond the forty-five day

deadline.

An additional basis exists for dismissing claim 2 against CDE. CDE is not alleged to

have directly participated in the due process proceedings before OAH. E.M. seeks to establish

liability against CDE solely on the basis of his allegation that CDE is the “supervising

department for OAH.” FAC ¶ 4. E.M. has not cited any case law for the proposition that CDE is

liable for OAH’s failure to meet the forty-five day timeline or, indeed, for the proposition that

CDE in fact has supervisory responsibility over OAH. E.M.’s theory seems to be that, because

CDE is statutorily required to ensure a FAPE to every child, and because CDE contracts with

OAH to conduct administrative due process proceedings, CDE de facto is the “supervisor” of

OAH such that CDE can be held liable for OAH’s procedural deficiencies. E.M. relies heavily

on California Education Code § 56476, which reads in its entirety as follows:

The Governor or designee of the Governor, in accordance with paragraph (12) of

subsection (a) of Section 1412 of Title 20 of the United States Code and Section

300.142 of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations, shall ensure that each

agency under the Governor's jurisdiction enters into an interagency agreement

with the superintendent to ensure that all services that are needed to ensure a free

appropriate public education are provided.

Cal. Educ. Code § 56476. E.M. argues that “[i]t logically follows that if CDE must ‘ensure’ that

all ‘services’ are provided, that CDE must have to ‘supervise’ agencies by which it enters into

contracts with to ensure compliance.” Opp. at 7. The Court is unpersuaded that this language is

sufficient to render CDE liable for OAH’s failure to comply with the forty-five day timeline,

even if such failure were sufficient to give rise to a cognizable claim against OAH.

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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

IV. ORDER

The motions to dismiss claim 2 brought by CDE and OAH are GRANTED WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND.

DATED: 5/18/07

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 06-4694 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF CDE AND OAH WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(JFLC2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Sarah Fairchild sfairchild@leighlawgroup.com, sjfairchild@earthlink.net

Rebecca Phillips Freie RFreie@cde.ca.gov, JSpitz@cde.ca.gov

Howard Alan Friedman hfriedman@fagenfriedman.com, astarcks@fagenfriedman.com

Mandy G Leigh , NA mleigh@leighlawgroup.com, jambeck@schinner.com;

sfairchild@leighlawgroup.com

Laurie E. Reynolds lreynolds@fagenfriedman.com, tdavies@lozanosmith.com

Kimberly Anne Smith ksmith@fagenfriedman.com, cperez@fagenfriedman.com

Peter Marshall Williams Peter.Williams@doj.ca.gov, Jo.Farrell@doj.ca.gov 

Case 3:06-cv-04694-MMC Document 54 Filed 05/18/07 Page 8 of 8