Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01444/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA GUADALUPE JEFFREY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-cv-01444-WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 13, 14]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable William Q. 

Hayes, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil 

Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff Maria Guadalupe Jeffrey filed a Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. (Compl. 1-3, ECF 

No. 1.) 

/ / /

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Now pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment be DENIED, and that judgment be entered reversing the decision of 

the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff Maria Jeffrey filed applications for a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits and for SSI benefits under Titles II and XVI, 

respectively, of the Social Security Act, alleging disability since December 1, 2011, due 

to shoulder injury, rib/leg/back and neck pain. (Admin. R. Attach. #5, 199-213, ECF No. 

10; id. Attach. #6, at 226.) After her applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration, (Admin. R. Attach. #4, 125-30, 133-38, ECF No. 10), Jeffery requested 

an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), (id. at 139-40). 

An administrative hearing was held on March 10, 2016. (Id. Attach. #2, at 56.) Plaintiff 

appeared at the hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from her (through an 

interpreter) and a vocational expert (“VE”). (Id. at 56-74.)

As reflected in his May 6, 2016 hearing decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from her alleged onset 

date through the date of the decision. (Id. at 29-37.) The ALJ’s decision became the 

final decision of the Commissioner on May 15, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1-3.) This timely civil action followed.

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step 

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 

2011, her alleged onset date. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 31, ECF No. 10.) 

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At step two, he found that that Jeffrey had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; right shoulder impingement 

syndrome status-post arthroscopy, with low grade partial-thickness tear of the 

supraspinatus tendon; and right knee osteochondral damage. (Id.) The ALJ concluded

that these impairments resulted in more than minimal work-related functional limitation. 

(Id.)

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff Jeffrey did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 32.)

Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b). (Id. at 32-34.)

For purposes of his step-four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the 

VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile would not be 

able to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. Accordingly, the ALJ found 

that Jeffrey was unable to perform her past relevant work as actually performed or as 

generally performed in the national economy. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 34-35, ECF No.

10.)

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. As of 

the alleged onset date, the ALJ classified Plaintiff as a younger individual (age 18-49)

who subsequently changed age category to an individual closely approaching advanced 

age (age 50-54) with a high school education for whom transferability of skills was 

immaterial. (Id. at 35.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with 

Plaintiff’s vocational profile could perform the requirements of occupations that existed 

in significant numbers in the national economy (i.e., folder and hand packager), the ALJ 

found that Jeffrey was not disabled. (Id. at 35-36.)

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III. SOLE ISSUE IN DISPUTE

The sole issue in dispute in this case is whether the ALJ erred at step five of the 

Commissioner’s sequential evaluation process. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ erred by failing to apply Rule 202.09 of the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines. (See Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 13.) Jeffery asserts that the ALJ failed 

to satisfy the Commissioner’s burden of proof at step five because he did not establish 

whether Plaintiff was illiterate or unable to communicate in English. (Id. at 5-9.) In 

response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ could satisfy the step five burden by 

either (1) vocational expert testimony or (2) reference to the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines. (See Def.’s Mem. P. & A. Attach. #1, 6, ECF No. 14.) The Commissioner 

asserts that the ALJ’s step-five finding is supported by substantial evidence and that 

Plaintiff’s limited ability to speak English did not prevent her from performing the 

occupations identified by the VE. (Id. at 4-7.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence 

and whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 

841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but 

less than a preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers 

v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record 

as a whole and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803

F.2d 528, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one 

rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 

753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984).

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V. DISCUSSION

A. The Medical-Vocational Guidelines

The Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines, also known as the “grids,” 

correlate a claimant’s age, education, previous work experience, and RFC to direct a 

finding of disabled or not disabled, without the need of testimony from vocational 

experts. See Heckler v. Brown, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983); Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 

1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989). The grids categorize jobs by three physical “exertional” 

levels, consisting of sedentary, light, and medium work. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1101 (9th Cir. 1999). These exertional levels are further divided by the claimant’s age, 

education, and work experience. Id. The grids direct a finding of disabled or not 

disabled based on the number of jobs in the national economy in the appropriate 

exertional category. Id.

As the Ninth Circuit explained in Cooper, 880 F.2d at 1155-56 (footnotes omitted):

The ALJ must apply the grids if a claimant suffers only from an 

exertional impairment. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§

200.00(a) & (e) (1988). In such cases, the rule is simple: the grids provide the 

answer. Where the grids dictate a finding of disability, the claimant is eligible 

for benefits; where the grids indicate that the claimant is not disabled, benefits 

may not be awarded. However, where a claimant suffers solely from a 

nonexertional impairment, the grids do not resolve the disability question, id. 

at § 200.00(e)(1); other testimony is required. In cases where the claimant 

suffers from both exertional and nonexertional impairments, the situation is 

more complicated. First, the grids must be consulted to determine whether a 

finding of disability can be based on the exertional impairments alone. Id. at 

§ 200.00(e)(2). If so, then benefits must be awarded. However, if the 

exertional impairments alone are insufficient to direct a conclusion of 

disability, then further evidence and analysis are required. In such cases, the 

ALJ must use the grids as a “framework for consideration of how much the 

individual's work capability is further diminished in terms of any types of jobs 

that would be contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations.” Id. In short, 

the grids serve as a ceiling and the ALJ must examine independently the 

additional adverse consequences resulting from the nonexertionary 

impairment.

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If, as Jeffrey contends, Rule 202.09, contained in the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines, directs a finding of disabled based on her limitation to light work due to her 

exertional limitations, then contrary to the Commissioner’s contention, the ALJ could not 

satisfy his step-five burden by relying on the VE’s testimony. See Lounsburry v. 

Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Before turning to a vocational expert, 

the ALJ should have analyzed whether [the claimant’s] exertional impairments were 

enough, by themselves, to warrant a finding of disabled.”).

B. Rule 202.09

Under Rule 202.09, an individual is deemed “disabled” if the person meets the 

following criteria: (1) limitation to light work; (2) closely approaching advanced age (i.e., 

50-54 years of age); (3) illiterate or unable to communicate in English; and (4) unable to 

perform past relevant unskilled work. See 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, App. 2, § 202.09.

Here, the ALJ found that Jeffrey was limited to a range of light work. (Admin. R. 

Attach. #2, 32, ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff was born on November 30, 1962, and therefore 

was forty-nine years old on the alleged disability onset date; she subsequently changed 

age category to closely approaching advanced age. (Id. at 35.) The ALJ also found that 

Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work, which he classified as 

unskilled. (Id. at 34-35.)

Thus, whether Rule 202.09 directs a finding of disabled based on Jeffery’s 

limitation to light work due to her exertional limitations turns on whether she is illiterate 

or unable to communicate in English. “[Plaintiff] is illiterate or unable to communicate 

in English if [she] is either illiterate in English or unable to communicate in English or 

both.” See Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted).

The Commissioner’s regulations define “illiteracy” as “the inability to read or 

write.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(1), 416.964(b)(1). The regulations go on to say: 

“We consider someone illiterate if the person cannot read or write a simple message such 

as instructions or inventory lists even though the person can sign his or her name.” Id. In 

Chavez v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 103 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1996), the 

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Ninth Circuit held that only literacy in English is considered; “illiterate” therefore means 

illiterate in English. The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that Plaintiff is 

literate in English. See Silveira, 204 F.3d at 1261. The Commissioner’s regulations 

define the “ability to communicate in English” as “the ability to speak, read and 

understand English.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(5), 416.964(b)(5). 

C. Plaintiff’s Literacy and Ability to Communicate in English

The ALJ failed to make any express findings regarding Plaintiff’s literacy and 

ability to communicate in English. He did find that Jeffrey had “at least a high school 

education.” (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 35, ECF No. 10.) But Plaintiff’s testimony that she 

had the functional equivalent of a high school education in Mexico, (see id. at 60, 72),

begs the question of whether she has the ability to read and write in English and “the 

ability to speak, read and understand English.” If Jeffery is illiterate or unable to 

communicate in English, she is disabled for purposes of Rule 202.09 under Silveira. At 

the administrative hearing, when asked whether she was able to speak or understand 

English, Jeffery responded (through the interpreter) “no,” before adding “just very little.” 

(See id. at 60.) She provided the same negative answer on the Disability Report form she 

submitted with her benefits application. (See id. Attach. # 6, at 225.) The Court notes 

that, on the same form, Plaintiff answered “yes” to the question, “Can you read and 

understand English?”; however, she answered “no” to the question, “Can you write more 

than your name in English?” (See id.) 

Other courts have found that similarly scant evidence of a plaintiff’s ability to read 

and write in English falls short of carrying the Commissioner’s burden of establishing 

literacy. See, e.g., Barrera v. Astrue, No. ED CV 12–764–E, 2012 WL 5381645, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (holding that burden not met). “The only direct evidence that 

Plaintiff can read and write in English (despite her denials of such ability) consists of 

Plaintiff’s vague response ‘Yeah, some’ to the ALJ’s question regarding whether Plaintiff 

can read or write ‘short, simple words, like ‘go,’ [and] ‘stop.’” Id. (alteration in original). 

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speaking “classes,” but the record did not disclose whether his work or classes required 

reading and writing. Id.; Obispo v. Astrue, No. CV 11–9381–SP, 2012 WL 4711763, at 

*4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012) (concluding that burden not met where plaintiff testified that 

he could read and speak “a little bit” of English, but it was unclear what plaintiff meant or 

the significance of this evidence where the plaintiff consistently required the assistance of 

an interpreter); Franco v. Astrue, No. EDCV 11–1473 SS, 2012 WL 3638609, at *13-14 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2012) (holding that burden not met where plaintiff answered, “A

little bit yes, but I don’t write it-I write it in my form of Spanish[,]” when asked if he 

could read English); Calderon v. Astrue, No. 1:08–cv–01015 GSA, 2009 WL 3790008, at 

*9-10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“A vague response of ‘[a] little bit’ in response to 

whether or not a claimant can read or write English is insufficient to establish that 

Plaintiff can read or write a simple message in the English language.”). 

Moreover, it is well-established that “[t]he ALJ always has a special duty to fully 

and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered[,]”

Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (quoting Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir.

2003)), and this special duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel,

Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). “An ALJ’s duty to develop the 

record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is 

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 

F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). Given the definition of illiteracy in the regulations and 

Plaintiff’s negative response to the question, “Can you write more than your name in 

English?” it was incumbent on the ALJ to develop the record further.

The Court therefore finds that the ALJ erred at step five in (a) failing to fully 

develop the record with respect to Jeffery’s literacy and ability to communicate in 

English and (b) failing to properly apply Rule 202.09 in his determination of whether she

was disabled.

/ / /

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 

599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Remand is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects 

in the decision. See Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewin, 654 

F.2d at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where no useful purpose 

would be served by further administrative proceedings, see Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 

525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (claimant deceased); where the record has been fully developed, 

see Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would 

unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits, Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“[T]he uncontroverted evidence establishes total disability.”).

Here, the Court has concluded that this is not an instance where no useful purpose 

would be served by further administrative proceedings; rather, additional administrative 

proceedings still could remedy the ALJ’s errors at step five of his analysis. See Silveira, 

204 F.3d at 1261-62 (remanding where ALJ made no express finding that claimant was 

literate in English and there was insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether 

he was literate in English).

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, and that judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 17, 2018. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before 

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August 24, 2018. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2018

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