Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06344/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06344-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RUTHS. HOLMES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

P 1 LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 2 3 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) 

) 

FIRST SECURITY BANK AND TRUST) 

COMPANY; JAMES C. BEAVERS, ) 

) 

Nos. 89-6262 & 89-6344 

(D. C. No. CIV-89-0094-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Appellant Ruths. Holmes appeals from orders of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6344 Document: 01019971944 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 1 
dismissing her claims against defendant First Security Bank and 

Trust Co. (Bank), granting summary judgment to defendant Dr. James 

C. Beavers, and imposing sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

against her attorneys. We affirm in all respects. 

During the course of discovery in a state suit brought by 

Holmes against Beavers, her employer, for injuries sustained while 

employed as a housekeeper in his home, certain of Holmes's bank 

records were produced pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. 

Alleging a technical insufficiency, Holmes caused the first 

subpoena to be quashed, and the records were returned to the Bank. 

A second subpoena was issued and ruled proper, and the records 

were again produced pursuant to it. Brief of Appellees in No. 89-

6262 at 2. Trial of the state court action resulted in a jury 

verdict for the defendant Beavers. The plaintiff subsequently 

filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging the Bank was 

willful and grossly negligent in providing the records pursuant to 

the first subpoena "in violation of the federal and state privacy 

act provisions," and that it had thereby violated 12 U.S.C. § 3401 

et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Brief of Appellees 

in No. 89-6262 at 3. Plaintiff subsequently amended her complaint 

to include Beavers as a defendant, adopting against him all 

allegations previously made against the Bank and accusing him of 

causing the first subpoena to be issued and of receiving the 

records, thereby violating 42 u.s.c. § 1983 and plaintiff's Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6344 Document: 01019971944 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 2 
Defendant Bank moved for dismissal or, alternatively, for 

summary judgment. The district judge granted dismissal, finding 

that 12 u.s.c. § 3401 et seq. had no relevance to the suit and 

that the plaintiff did not satisfy the two prerequisites for 

establishing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (state 

action and deprivation of a constitutional right). Later, 

defendant Beavers moved for summary judgment, claiming the court 

"lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

because both elements of Plaintiff's jurisdictional claim are 

absent." The court agreed, finding that ''[t]he state court's 

action in issuing an order cannot be imputed to the private 

party seeking issuance of the order": thus, defendant Beavers was 

not ''acting under color of state law" (citing Torres v. First 

State Bank, 588 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 1978)). The court 

further held that "[r]elease of Plaintiff's bank records [did] 

not rise to a deprivation of a Constitutional right." Because the 

plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence to support her 

contention of state action by defendant Beavers, the court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In the same order the 

court also denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's 

order granting the Bank's motion to dismiss. 

Subsequent to plaintiff's filing of her notice of appeal in 

No. 89-6262, the defendants filed with the district court motions 

for attorney fees and to assess sanctions against plaintiff's 

counsel. The court held a hearing styled "Hearing on Motion for 

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Attorney Fees, Sanctions, and Dispute on Costs," at which only the 

defendants presented evidence. Counsel for the plaintiff was 

apparently unprepared, offered only vague objections to 

defendants' evidence and the proceedings, and declined even to 

cross-examine defendant's witness. 

fact for plaintiff's positions 

actors and that the plaintiff had 

Finding no basis in law or 

that the defendants were state 

a constitutionally protected 

interest in the bank records, the court concluded the lawsuit was 

"entirely frivolous" and that sanctions under rule 11 were 

justified. The court further found that defendants' requested 

fees were reasonable and that plaintiff's counsel presented no 

evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the court granted the fees 

under Rule 11, holding the plaintiff's attorneys Messrs. Braswell 

and Adjei personally and jointly and severally liable for payment 

within thirty days. The district court awarded defendant Beavers 

his attorney fees of $3,558 and defendant bank's attorney fees and 

costs of $4,126.15. The district court's order issued on 

September 22, 1989, and the plaintiff appealed to this court on 

October 11, 1989. 

Standard of Review 

The district court's order dismissing the plaintiff's case 

against the Bank was issued in response to the defendant Bank's 

motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 

existence of federal question jurisdiction (there was no diversity 

here) must appear on the face of a plaintiff's well pleaded 

complaint. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 860 

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Appellate Case: 89-6344 Document: 01019971944 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 4 
F.2d 1571, 1576 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 1967 

(1989). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law, which 

we review de novo. 

We review an order granting summary judgment by the same 

standard employed by the district court. Missouri Pacific R. Co. 

v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir. 1988). We 

must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists 

and, if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. 

Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 775 (10th 

Cir. 1989). 

We review a decision to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11 under an abuse of discretion standard. Adamson v. 

Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Analysis 

At the outset we observe that the performance of counsel for 

the plaintiff in this case borders on the incompetent. Counsel 

have miscited the holdings of cases, failed to squarely address 

the deficiencies of plaintiff's case as pointed out by the 

defendants and the district court, suggested that "trends" in the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court should prevail over clear holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court, and repeatedly raised minor issues as 

red herrings to confuse the courts. We also feel compelled to 

observe that this is not the first time plaintiff's attorney Mr. 

Braswell has been sanctioned under rule 11 for his conduct of a 

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§ 1983 action. See Morris v. Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352 

(10th Cir. 1985). 

The facts in this case are apparently not in dispute 

(although counsel for the plaintiff attribute to certain facts 

significance correctly rejected by the trial court). The 

appellant's argument that there is a factual dispute concerning 

her damages is irrelevant in light of the district court's correct 

holding that no federally protected right was violated. We 

believe the district court correctly interpreted and applied the 

law to the facts. The plaintiff has asserted no federal cause of 

action. She has no constitutionally protected interest in records 

maintained by her bank concerning her account. United States v. 

Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). Neither the Bank in acting 

(even improperly) pursuant to a state court-issued subpoena, nor 

defendant Beavers in indirectly requesting through his attorney 

the issuance of that subpoena, was a "state actor'' or was acting 

"under color of law.'' See Torres v. First State Bank, 588 F.2d 

1322, 1325-27 (10th Cir. 1978); Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 

1260-61 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981). 

Thus, the second prerequisite for maintaining a§ 1983 action was 

also not satisfied. The Oklahoma cases cited by the plaintiff as 

supporting a privacy interest in bank records and the existence of 

state action under the circumstances here are either misconstrued 

or can be distinguished on their facts. Furthermore, neither 

defendant qualifies as the "government authority" referred to in 

Okla. Stat. tit. 6 §§ 2203-2204 and 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.; thus 

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the procedures in those statutes are inapplicable to this case. 

There is no basis in law or fact for appellant's claims that any 

right of hers recognized by federal law has been violated. 

Finally, we believe the court properly levied sanctions 

against plaintiff's counsel under Rule 11. We agree that the 

allegations in plaintiff's pleadings and other papers were not 

well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a goodfaith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 

existing law. An "appropriate sanction" is thus mandatory under 

the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 804 

F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1986). We do not believe the amounts of the 

court's awards to the defendants constituted an abuse of its 

discretion, given that all costs incurred by defendants arose from 

plaintiff's frivolous suit and the evidence showed that the fees 

were reasonable. There is no merit to counsel's suggestion that 

sanctions are not warranted against Mr. Adjei simply because he 

was not present at the hearing concerning sanctions. The district 

court properly found Mr. Adjei liable for sanctions by virtue of 

his signature on certain of the plaintiff's filings. Lastly, 

there also is no merit to the appellant's claim that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motions for sanctions 

and for fees because the plaintiff had already filed her notice of 

appeal from the court's final judgment in No. 89-6262. A district 

court may consider applications for attorney fees even after an 

appeal is taken because such motions are collateral to the merits 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 905 n.9 

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(10th Cir. 1989); Garcia v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 818 F.2d 

713, 721 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The appellant also asserts error in the district court's 

verbatim adoption of appellees' proposed order with findings of 

facts and conclusions of law. While this practice is to be 

discouraged, Everaard v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 

1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1988), the court's findings and conclusions 

must nevertheless be upheld unless clearly erroneous. We find the 

court's order sufficiently detailed and the findings therein not 

clearly erroneous. Finally, the appellant alleges defendant 

Beavers failed to comply with local Rule 6 concerning the 

itemization of requested fees and costs. We have reviewed the 

record and find no evidence to support this claim. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the rulings of the district court for 

substantially those reasons cited by the court in its orders of 

April 5, June 28, and September 22, 1989, and in the foregoing 

discussion. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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