Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00298/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00298-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELVIN CARVER JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0298 DFL JFM P

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed March 17, 2005, plaintiff's complaint was

dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has now filed an amended

complaint.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

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(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer

v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

As he did in the original complaint, plaintiff names three defendants in the

complaint, including the Director of Corrections and the Chief Medical Officer at California

State Prison-Solano (CSP-Solano). The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). 

In the court’s March 17, 2005 order, plaintiff was advised that his claims against

the Director and the Chief Medical Officer are based on a theory of respondeat superior and

should not be included in any amended complaint. Plaintiff has again named these two

individuals as defendants, and the allegations of the amended complaint specifically rely on their

supervisorial positions and the responsibilities attendant thereto as the basis for imposition of

liability on these two individuals. (See Amended Complaint, filed April 13, 2005, at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff relies solely on a theory of respondeat superior to support his inclusion of the Director

and the Chief Medical Officer as defendants in this action and thus has failed to state a

cognizable claim for relief against either individual. 

Plaintiff also names as a defendant Nurse Donald Neal. Plaintiff again alleges

that on January 4, 2001, while eating dinner at CSP-Solano, he became unable to swallow or

regurgitate the food he had eaten. He finally managed to force the food down, but thereafter

suffered extreme pain. He was taken to the infirmary, where defendant Nurse Donald Neal asked

a series of irrelevant questions, refused to take x-rays that evening but told him to return in the

morning for x-rays, made him swallow Maalox, which intensified the pain, and sent him back to

his cell with instructions to return in the morning. Overnight plaintiff continued to suffer

extreme pain and difficulty breathing, and he vomited blood and had fluctuations in his body

temperature. The next morning plaintiff was taken to Queen of the Valley Hospital, where he

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 Exhibits appended to the amended complaint show that plaintiff’s allegation of neglect

against defendant Neal was sustained by the California Department of Corrections Officer of

Internal Affairs-Northern Region. (See Ex. E to Amended Complaint.)

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was diagnosed with a spontaneous rupture of the esophagus and a torn lower left lung. As with

the original complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Neal’s care was grossly negligent and

constituted medical malpractice.1 (Amended Complaint, at 6.) 

In this court’s March 17, 2005 order, plaintiff was advised that allegations of

gross negligence and medical malpractice were insufficient to state a cognizable claim in this §

1983 action and that in order to proceed here in this § 1983 action he would have to allege a

violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Order filed March 17, 2005, at 4.) 

Plaintiff has not, however, cured this defect in his amended complaint. Instead, he continues to

rely on state tort claims of gross negligence and medical malpractice by defendant Neal, which

are not cognizable in this § 1983 action.

Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a

cognizable § 1983 claim. The amended complaint has not cured the defects in his original

complaint. However, in a motion to recuse this court filed with his amended complaint, plaintiff

evidences an intent to rely, at least in part, on the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, good cause

appearing, plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to amend his complaint to raise a claim

under the Eighth Amendment. 

If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate

how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s rights under the

Eighth Amendment. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is once again

informed that allegations of gross negligence and medical malpractice are insufficient to support

a claimed violation of the Eighth Amendment, and plaintiff must expressly rely on the Eighth

Amendment in order to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. 

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In addition, the second amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). In In this regard, plaintiff is again cautioned that his

allegations against the Director of Corrections and the Chief Medical Officer at CSP-Solano are

insufficient to state a cognizable claim against either individual. 

Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order

to make plaintiff's second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged. 

On April 13, 2005, plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice and a motion to

recuse the undersigned. The request for judicial notice is, in fact, argument with this court’s

previous order dismissing his complaint and does not contain facts that might be the subject of

judicial notice. The request will be denied.

Plaintiff has not shown grounds that would warrant or require recusal of the

undersigned. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal will be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed. 

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

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second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint

must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended

Complaint”; plaintiff must file an original and two copies of the second amended complaint;

failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed.

3. Plaintiff’s April 13, 2005 request for judicial notice is denied.

4. Plaintiff’s April 13, 2005 motion to recuse is denied.

DATED: April 22, 2005. 

12

john2098.142

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