Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01095/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01095-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GARTH TOBLER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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2:13-cv-1095-TMP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Garth Tobler, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration (ACommissioner@) denying his application for a 

period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (ADIB@). Mr. Tobler timely 

pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the decision of the 

Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. '' 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Mr. Tobler was fifty-two years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge=s 

(AALJ=s@) decision, considered by 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1563(d) to be a Aperson closely 

approaching advanced age.@ (Doc. 12, p. 4). Mr. Tobler has a post-graduate degree in 

divinity, and his past relevant work experience is as a chaplain and pastor. (Id.) Mr. 

Tobler claims that he became disabled on February 28, 2009,1 due to symptoms and 

 1 February 28, 2009, is claimant’s amended alleged onset date; the original alleged onset date 

FILED

 2014 Aug-20 AM 11:25

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-01095-TMP Document 14 Filed 08/20/14 Page 1 of 18
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limitations related to hydrocephalus, attention deficit disorder, depression, anxiety, and 

stenosis of the back. (Id.)

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the 

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. 

'' 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The 

first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is Adoing substantial gainful 

activity.@ 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). If he or she is, the claimant is 

not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the Commissioner next 

considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. 

'' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must 

meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The 

decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 

1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant=s impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 

20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to 

step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant=s impairments meet or 

equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant=s impairments fall 

within this category, he or she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id.

If they do not, a determination of the claimant=s residual functional capacity will be 

 

was June 10, 1998. (Tr. at 63).

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made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(e), 

416.920(e). Residual functional capacity (ARFC@) is an assessment, based on all 

relevant evidence, of a claimant=s remaining ability to do work despite his or her 

impairments. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.945(a)(1).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant=s impairments 

prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

'' 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past 

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the 

claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id.

Step five requires the court to consider the claimant=s RFC, as well as the claimant=s age, 

education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other 

work. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other 

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the Commissioner to 

demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform; and, once that 

burden is met, the claimant must prove his or her inability to perform those jobs in 

order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Tobler met 

the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2013. 

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(Tr. at 10).2 He further determined that Mr. Tobler has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the amended alleged onset of his disability in February 2009. (Id.) 

According to the ALJ, Plaintiff has somatoform disorder, which is considered Asevere@

based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found that 

the impairment neither meets nor medically equals any of the listed impairments in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 11). The ALJ did not find Mr. Tobler=s 

allegations to be supported by his history, and he determined that he has the residual 

functional capacity to Aperform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the 

following non-exertional limitations: No greater than moderate difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.@ (Tr. at 13-14).

According to the ALJ, Mr. Tobler is able to perform his past relevant work as a 

pastor. (Tr. at 15). He determined that the Plaintiff has Aperformed [his work as a 

pastor] long enough to obtain the skilled [sic] required to adequately perform this 

work.@ (Id.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that the Plaintiff Ahas not been 

under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 28, 2009, through 

the date of this decision.@ (Id.)

 2 Page references are to the page number assigned in the bound administrative record, not 

page numbers within a particular transcript or exhibit.

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II. Standard of Review

This court=s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a 

narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson 

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 

2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, 

but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 

1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. AThe substantial evidence standard 

permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and >the 

possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent 

an administrative agency=s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.=@

Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting 

Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm=n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds 

that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner=s decision, the court must 

affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No 

decision is automatic, however, for Adespite this deferential standard [for review of 

claims] it is imperative that the court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the decision reached.@ Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 

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1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See 

Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

The court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is 

disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant=s residual functional capacity, and the 

application of vocational factors Aare not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, 

opinions on issues reserved to the commissioner because they are administrative 

findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or 

decision of disability.@ 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). Whether the plaintiff 

meets the listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a question 

reserved for the ALJ, and the court Amay not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, 

or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.@ Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 

1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). 

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standards and Substantial Evidence

The court is under an obligation to Ascrutinize the record in its entirety to 

ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding.@ 

Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982)(citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 

1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). ASubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than 

a preponderance.@ Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1223, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). It is 

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such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed 2d 

842 (1971). The Plaintiff takes the position that Athe decision of the Commissioner is 

not supported by substantial evidence.@ (Doc. 12, p. 2). 

At step two of his analysis, the ALJ determined that Mr. Tobler suffered from the 

severe impairment of a somatoform disorder. (Tr. at 10). The ALJ based this 

conclusion exclusively on the testimony of Dr. Alfred Jonas, a psychiatric specialist and 

testifying medical expert who reviewed Mr. Tobler=s medical records. (Tr. at 27). Dr. 

Jonas did not treat or examine Mr. Tobler, or even meet him in person. Dr. Jonas 

testified as follows regarding his suspicion that Mr. Tobler suffers from a somatoform 

disorder:

So I think on the surface of it, I would say that it would appear as if [Mr. 

Tobler] did not have any severe psychiatric or non-psychiatric problems. 

But there is one other way to look at this record, and that is to think in 

terms of the possibility that he is essentially preoccupied with his 

symptoms. And in that case, we could be thinking about something like a 

somatoform disorder. And that is probably where I would look in terms 

of a diagnosable condition.

 

(Tr. at 30). In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Jonas rejected all of the other physical and 

psychiatric impairments claimed by the plaintiff, despite evidence from multiple treating 

physicians and psychologists.

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The description of a somatoform disorder used in the hearing and the ALJ=s 

opinion was found in listing 12.07A Subparagraph 3 and describes the disorder as the 

A[u]nrealistic interpretation of physical signs or sensations associated with the 

preoccupation or belief that one has serious disease or injury.@ (Tr. at 39). The ALJ=s 

determination that Mr. Tobler suffers from a somatoform disorder is not supported by 

objective medical evidence, but only the speculation of Dr. Jonas.

3

 There is no 

mention of a somatoform disorder in the medical records submitted in this case by any 

of the psychiatrists or psychologists who treated the plaintiff and were most familiar 

with him. Neither Mr. Tobler=s medical doctors nor psychiatric doctors, of which 

there are several, ever asserted the opinion that Mr. Tobler=s symptoms may be a 

product of a somatoform disorder, that Mr. Tobler is Apreoccupied@ with his symptoms, 

 3 Dr. Jonas’s testimony on this point was the following:

So it’s really not made clear from the record that he actually has the functional 

problems of which he complains. So I think on the surface of it, I would say that it 

would appear as if he did not have any severe psychiatric or non-psychiatric 

problems. But there is on other way to look at this record, and that is to think in 

terms of the possibility that he is essentially preoccupied with his symptoms. And 

in that case, we would be thinking about something like a somatoform disorder. 

And that is probably where I would look in terms of a diagnosable condition. 

There are some other conditions that are diagnosed in the record. There certainly 

is the old hydrocephalus and the present [sic] of the shunt.

(Tr. at 30). The court finds this testimony to be speculative and conjectural, not a substantial

basis for rejecting the evidence from plaintiff’s treating physicians, psychiatrists, and 

psychologists.

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or that the symptoms are not as severe as Mr. Tobler alleged. The first mention of a 

somatoform disorder or anything similar is made by a medical expert called to testify by 

the ALJ, Dr. Jonas, at the supplemental ALJ hearing in September 2011. (Tr. at 30). 

Accordingly, this court cannot find that the ALJ=s determination that Mr. Tobler suffers

only from the severe impairment of a somatoform disorder is supported by substantial

evidence. The only evidence of it is mere conjecture by Dr. Jonas.4

 Indeed, at the 

 4 The conjectural nature of Dr. Jonas’s opinion is further confirmed at several points in his 

testimony. After examining the plaintiff’s work and pay pattern for several years prior to 

applying for disability, Dr. Jonas stated:

Well, this is a very, very peculiar pattern of earnings, where he goes from nothing 

to well above SGA; to nothing, well above SGA. And I would – if I were to try to 

evaluate his situation better than I can now, I would want to know what that’s all 

about. And I would be curious to know whether this [is] somatic preoccupation.

(Tr. at 42) (emphasis supplied). Thereafter, Dr. Jonas began questioning the plaintiff indirectly 

through the ALJ, seeking an explanation for why plaintiff was able to work during some years 

prior to the alleged onset date. But when the plaintiff attempted to explain that the combination of 

all of his medical conditions and the medication he must take for them made him unemployable, 

the ALJ cut him off, as follows:

[Claimant] Thinking on that, not thinking up an excuse or any of that, the things 

are –

ALJ He’s really at a loss, doctor. He’s just struggling to kind of come 

up with something, but I don’t think he’s [INAUDIBLE] –

CLMT -- conditions taken all together make it impossible for me to hold a 

job –

ALJ All right, we’re going to have to wrap it up –

CLMT Okay.

ALJ -- because I think we’re impinging on the doctor –

(Tr. at 47).

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conclusion of Dr. Jonas’s testimony, he ultimately declined to state an opinion. When 

the ALJ asked Dr. Jonas “can I have your call on this [plaintiff’s condition],” he 

commented about some of the treating physicians, but then said, “So I don’t want to –

I don’t want to just try to resolve it by guessing.” (Tr. at 49). By refusing to guess, 

Dr. Jonas acknowledged that he was only speculating that plaintiff may suffer only from 

a somatoform disorder. This is not a substantial basis for rejecting the evidence of the 

treating physicians.

Beyond failing to support his determination with substantial evidence, the ALJ 

applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating Dr. Jonas=s testimony in relation to the 

reports and medical records from Mr. Tobler=s treating physicians. Although the ALJ

discusses in his opinion why he finds the opinions of Dr. Pitts, Dr. Echols, and Dr. 

Kahn5 unreliable, he did so after expressing doubt about the credibility of all treating 

physicians. When the plaintiff’s attorney asked Dr. Jonas whether he agreed that 

treating physicians would be a better source of information about the plaintiff’s 

condition, the ALJ interrupted, saying:

Well, this is an ongoing question, doctor. When you deal with claimants 

and claimant’s counsel, they always push the treating physician, and they 

always say, well, that person’s only a consultative. And I know what the 

law is about giving the benefit to the treating, but I always feel --- and I felt this 

 

5 The ALJ discusses only the report from Dr. Kahn=s consultative physical exam, conducted 

on December 30, 2009. (Tr. at 14).

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when I tried cases --- that a person who was impartial has a lot of relevance to me and 

weight as opposed to someone who’s partial like persons who have been treating a long 

time. Now I may be in the minority there, but I think there’s merit to 

somebody like yourself. He’s not your patient. You’re giving your call 

as best you can, and you’re totally impartial. People who treat for a long 

period of time develop relationships, and I don’t know if they have the 

same degree of impartiality.

(Tr. at 50). Under Eleventh Circuit authority, a treating physician=s testimony is 

entitled to Asubstantial or considerable weight unless >good cause= is shown to the 

contrary.@ Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations 

omitted). By immediately downgrading the credibility of treating-physician evidence 

simply because it came from a treating physician, the ALJ improperly failed to give the 

treating physician evidence offered by plaintiff the proper degree of credibility required 

under Eleventh Circuit authority.

Moreover, the ALJ barely (if at all) acknowledged the other doctors who 

provided medical treatment to the plaintiff over several years. The ALJ mentions only 

one note written in 2009 by Dr. Zenko Hrynkiw, the Plaintiff=s neurologist, in which 

Dr. Hrynkiw noted that Mr. Tobler was doing well and that he denied headaches or 

dizziness and had a normal neurological examination. Dr. Hrynkiw has provided 

treatment for Mr. Tobler since 1998, when his hydrocephalus first was diagnosed. 

Although the ALJ points to a single treatment note, he fails to take into account other 

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treatment notes by Dr. Hrynkiw showing that plaintiff suffered “Left-sided 

sensorineural hearing loss, presumably related to hydrocephalus” in May 2006 (Tr. at 

554); a “three-week history of headaches” in June 2007 (Tr. at 552); and “headaches, 

dizziness and unsteadiness” in January 2009 (Tr. at 549).6

 Although the ALJ is not 

required to mention every piece of evidence provided, that the ALJ cherry picks only 

one treatment note out of a treatment record spanning more than a decade indicates a 

failure to properly examine and credit the plaintiff=s treating physicians.

In determining that Mr. Tobler had only the severe mental impairment of a 

somatoform disorder, the ALJ summarily disregarded, in favor of the testimony of Dr. 

Jonas, the medical records from almost all of the doctors who treated Mr. Tobler for 

physiological conditions. This had the effect of undermining the severity of plaintiff’s 

physical impairments by reducing them to a mere somatic disorder. This is not the 

correct legal standard. A treating physician=s testimony is entitled to Asubstantial or 

considerable weight unless >good cause= is shown to the contrary.@ Crawford v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. 

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted). AGood 

cause@ exists for an ALJ not to give a treating physician=s opinion substantial weight 

when the: A(1) treating physician=s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) 

evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician=s opinion was 

 6 All of these dates predate the filing of the claim for disability benefits on April 6, 2009.

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conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor=s own medical records.@ Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v. 

Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Agood cause@ existed where 

the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the physician=s own record). The 

ALJ did not identify good cause for disregarding the medical records from the Plaintiff=s 

treating physicians. In fact, most of the medical records submitted as evidence in this 

case were not mentioned at all in the ALJ=s opinion. 

The ALJ plainly did not apply the correct legal standard when determining 

whether the Plaintiff=s severe impairment or combination of impairments met or 

equaled those found in the listings. During the hearing, the ALJ told Dr. Jonas, AI=m 

just going to rely on you, doctor, all right. If [the Plaintiff=s impairment] is [listing] 

12.07(3) and it satisfies at least two of the B requirements, please let me know, and we=ll 

just end it there.@ (Tr. at 40). Dr. Jonas replied, A[the impairment] does not.@ (Id.) 

The decision of whether Mr. Tobler=s impairments met or equaled a listing was not 

Dr. Jonas=s to make, and the failure of the ALJ to consider all of the evidence related to 

that question is a failure to apply the correct legal standard to the analysis of the 

evidence.

Opinions such as whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant=s residual 

functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors Aare not medical opinions, 

. . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are 

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administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the 

determination or decision of disability.@ 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The 

court is interested in the doctors= evaluations of the claimant=s Acondition and the 

medical consequences thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his [or 

her] condition.@ Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such statements by a physician are relevant 

to the ALJ=s findings, but they are not determinative, as it is the ALJ who bears the 

responsibility for assessing a claimant=s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1546(c). The ALJ seems to have wholly substituted Dr. Jonas=s opinion for his 

own. This is not an appropriate legal conclusion and, in practice, undermines the 

purpose of evaluation of claims by ALJs. Accordingly, Mr. Tobler=s claim is due to be 

remanded for further scrutiny of the record. 

B. Severe and Nonsevere Impairments

As previously mentioned, the ALJ determined that Mr. Tobler suffered from the 

severe impairment of a somatoform disorder. The plaintiff, however, brought his 

claim for DIB on the basis of symptoms relating to both mental and physical 

impairments. (Doc. 12, p. 4). Mr. Tobler listed the following impairments on his 

Disability Report: depression; anxiety; hypertension; arthritis in the ankles, knees, hips, 

back, wrists, and elbows; sleep apnea; hydrocephalus; arrhythmia-tachycardia; stenosis 

in the lower back; bunions; psoriasis; spastic colon; enlarged prostate; hearing loss in the 

left ear; cataracts; Fuch=s dystrophy, which is progressive degeneration of the cornea; 

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chronic bronchitis; chronic prostatitis; hemorrhagic gastritis; acid reflux; ocular 

migraine; and bleeding ulcer. (Tr. at 203).

The ALJ failed to examine how the Plaintiff=s hydrocephalus may affect his 

ability to exert himself physically. The ALJ adopted Dr. Jonas=s opinion that the 

hydrocephalus is Aasymptomatic@ despite four shunt replacement operations that Mr. 

Tobler underwent between 1999 and 2004, nor plaintiff’s testimony that he could lift no 

more than five pounds without danger of displacing the shunt. The ALJ did not 

discuss the years of treatment Mr. Tobler received at Cardiovascular Associates (CVA). 

Treatment notes from CVA indicate that the Plaintiff consistently complained of chest 

pain and chronic daytime fatigue. As recently as May 2010, Mr. Tobler was being 

treated at CVA for heart palpitations and atypical chest pain. (Tr. at 963). 

The ALJ also failed to mention the Plaintiff=s records at Montclair Rheumatology 

for arthritis pain and with Dr. Nicholas Braswell for urology issues. A 

gastroenterologist, Dr. Subhash Bajaj, treated Mr. Tobler from 2003 into 2008, but the 

ALJ did not mention any of his findings. The ALJ also did not address Dr. Kahn=s 

report dated December 30, 2009, stating that Mr. Tobler tires easily due to a heart 

arrhythmia, cannot lift due to increased intracerebral pressure caused by his 

hydrocephalus, and that lumbar stenosis makes Mr. Tobler unable to walk. (Tr. at 

829). The ALJ also did not consider the several years of treatment Mr. Tobler received 

from Dr. Stephen Favrot for his left-side hearing loss Apresumably related to 

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hydrocephalus.@ (Tr. at 554). From 2001 to 2009, Mr. Tobler went from being able to 

hear things as quiet as 45 decibels in his left ear to being able to hear things only as quiet 

as 60 to 65 decibels. (Tr. at 893, 947).

Other than a somatoform disorder, the ALJ did not discuss to what degree any of 

the claimed impairments were to be considered severe, leading the court to believe that 

the ALJ determined that none of the claimed issues imposed any impairment. This 

court is not at liberty to re-weigh the evidence and determine which, if any, of the above 

impairments are severe, non-severe, or not impairments. However, because there are 

diagnoses and varying levels of treatment in the record for the claimed impairments, the 

ALJ must assign an impairment level to them, based on the evidence in the record. 

The ALJ may well find that none of the claimed impairments actually create any 

impairment B severe or otherwise, but if he does so, he must explain why. That 

determination as well must be supported by substantial evidence. 

C. Onset Date

The Plaintiff originally claimed that his disability onset date was June 10, 1998, 

the date on which his hydrocephalus was diagnosed. At the first ALJ hearing in June 

2011, the ALJ stated:

ALJ: Okay. Well, you alleged disability when you were 39 in >98, which -

- we really can=t go back that far. We could, but you wouldn=t get any 

money anyway. It was filed 4/06/2009. Do you want to amend it to 

something that would be at least relevant?

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ATTY: Your honor --- yeah, your honor, I=m looking at his earnings 

record. And what -- according to my notes, the date he last worked was 

sometime in February 2008, and that=s about when they taper -- when the 

earnings taper off. 

ALJ: Do you have SGA at 2008?

VE: February 28th, 2009.

ALJ: I mean, do you have it for calendar year 2008?

VE: Your honor, I=m pulling that up now. 

ALJ: All righty.

. . . 

VE: Your honor, the last date employed I show is 2/28/09.

ATTY: Okay. Okay. Then if Mr. Tobler is amenable to that, we=ll go 

with that as your onset date, if that=s the date - -

CLMT: That=s fine.

(Tr. at 63-64). That the Plaintiff would not be eligible to collect benefits back to his 

alleged onset date does not necessitate amendment of the alleged onset date. If Mr. 

Tobler began having symptoms relating to his current claim of disability in 1998, the 

ALJ=s opinion should reflect a study of the record beginning at the start of his 

symptoms. It appears that the ALJ began his examination of the medical records in 

2007, as the ALJ does not mention any earlier medical records. At least one of the 

Plaintiff=s alleged impairments has existed since 1998, and several other medical records 

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reflect treatment for a much longer time-frame than is discussed in the ALJ=s opinion. 

In order to develop a true picture of the severity, longitude, and progress of the 

Plaintiff=s impairments, it is necessary to scrutinize the entire record, from the onset of 

the alleged impairments to the date of the ALJ’s decision. 

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mr. Tobler=s 

arguments, the Court finds that the Commissioner=s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is not in accord with the applicable law. Accordingly, it is 

hereby ORDERED that the Commissioner’s determination that the plaintiff is not 

entitled to DIB is VACATED and REMANDED to the Agency to review Mr. Tobler=s 

claim in light of the entire record. An order of final judgment will be entered 

contemporaneously herewith.

DONE this 20th day of August, 2014.

________________________________ 

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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