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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐3166

JANET A. RILEY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ELKHART COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:12‐cv‐00564‐CAN—Christopher A. Nuechterlein, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2016

Before BAUERandWILLIAMS,Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,

*

District Judge.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff‐appellant, Janet Riley, sued

defendant‐appellee, Elkhart Community Schools (“ECS”), for

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), discrimination under the Age

*

  Of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,

sitting by designation.

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2 No. 15‐3166

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (“ADEA”),

and violation of her equal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Riley

roots her causes of action in ECS’s failure to promote her to

various positions during her career as a teacher with the school

district. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS

on all claims, based on procedural bars and insufficient

evidence. We affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

ECS has employed Riley, an African‐American female, as

a teacher since 1980. She has served in multiple capacities

during her tenure. Currently, she teaches business education

at Elkhart Central High School and leads evening and summer

adult education classes. She has an administrator’s license and

is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named

the ECS Teacher of the Year.

From 2005 through 2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for

twelve different positions with ECS. Seven positions are

relevant to this appeal. In 2007, Riley applied for an assistant

principal position at Elkhart Memorial High School. ECS hired

Carey Anderson, who is white. In 2008, Riley again applied for

an assistant principal position, this time at Central High

School. ECS hired Andrew Bridell, who is white. In 2009, Riley

applied for two more assistant principal positions, one at

Northside Middle School, the other at Memorial High School.

ECS hired Mary Wisniewski, who is white, for the position at

Northside Middle School; it hired Krista Hennings, who is

African‐American, for the position at Memorial High School.

In 2010, ECS posted two academic dean positions, but did

not advertise them as administrative positions. Riley did not

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No. 15‐3166 3

apply forthese positions; ECS hired two white males underthe

age of 40 forthe openings. In both 2010 and 2013, Riley applied

forthe coordinator position of the Blazer Connection program,

an after‐school tutoring program. In both instances, ECS hired

white males. Finally, in the spring of 2012, Riley again applied

for two open assistant principal positions, one at Central High

School and the other at Memorial High School. ECS appointed

a committee to screen potential candidates. The screening

committee reviewed the candidates and made recommenda‐

tions to the superintendent. The committee chose Riley for an

interview, butrecommended Jason Gratsy, a white male under

40, and JaNeva Adams, an African‐American female under 40,

forthe openings. The committee noted that Gratsy and Adams

performedbetterin theirinterviews thanRiley;ECSultimately

hired Gratsy and Adams.

On May 12, 2011, Riley filed an Equal Employment Oppor‐

tunity Commission charge againstECS, claiming thatrace, sex,

and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not

promoted her to any of the positions for which she had

applied. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter on April 26,

2012.

On July 24, 2012, Riley filed a pro se complaint in federal

court alleging discrimination, harassment, libel, defamation,

and retaliation by ECS. On August 8, 2012, Riley filed an

amended complaint, alleging violations of Title VII race and

sex discrimination, ADEA age discrimination, and violation of

equal rights under § 1981. She filed both incarnations of the

complaint in the Southern District of Indiana, which trans‐

ferred the case to the Northern District of Indiana, where both

parties reside.

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4 No. 15‐3166

Riley retained counsel on November 26, 2012, and the

parties agreed on January 16, 2013, to have a magistrate judge

adjudicate the dispute. On May 13, 2015, ECS moved for

summary judgment. The district court granted summary

judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on

procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims

because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence.

Riley appealed.

II.  DISCUSSION

First, like the district court, we winnow down Riley’s bevy

of claims to those which we will assess on their merits. The

other claims failfor proceduralreasons. Some claims appearin

her original complaint but not in the amended complaint; an

amended complaint supersedes any prior complaint, and

becomes the operative complaint. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699

F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). So any claim in

Riley’s original complaint not included in her amended

complaint is extinguished. Id. These include her claims of

hostile work environment and disparate treatment.

Riley argues that we should be lenient towards her because

she drafted the original and amended complaints without

assistance of an attorney. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749

F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (“[w]e have

repeatedly emphasized that pro se petitions ... should be held

to standards less stringent than formal pleadings drafted by

attorneys”). However, while Riley did draft her complaints

pro se, she has had counsel since November 2012. Since

retaining counsel, she has never moved to amend her com‐

plaint. Having had counsel for over three years, and ample

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No. 15‐3166 5

opportunity to amend her complaint, she is not entitled to the

usual pro se leniency.

Additionally, some of Riley’s claims are time‐barred. Both

Title VII claims and ADEA claims must be filed within 300

days of the alleged discriminatory act or unlawful practice. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e‐5(e)(1)(Title VII statute oflimitations); 29U.S.C.

§ 626(d)(1)(B) (ADEA statute of limitations). Section 1981

claims must be filed within four years of the alleged discrimi‐

natory act. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook

Cty., Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. R.R.

Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382–83 (2004)). Here, Riley

filed her first charge of discrimination—her EEOC com‐

plaint—on May 12, 2011. Any Title VII or ADEA violation

related to an incident occurring before July 16, 2010 (300 days

before the filing), and any alleged § 1981 violation related to an

incident occurring before May 12, 2007 (four years before the

filing), are therefore time‐barred. This eliminates Riley’s Title

VII claims relating to the positions for which she applied in

2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. It also eliminates her § 1981

claims related to the position for which she applied in 2005 and

2006. The district court ruled that Riley’s § 1981 failure to

promote claims relating to four assistantprincipalpositions for

which she applied in 2007, 2008, and 2009 were also time‐

barred. This was incorrect: the claims were brought within the

four‐year statute of limitations period.

When the dust settles, these four § 1981 claims as well as

three Title VII claims remain. All of these causes of action are

forfailure to promote. The § 1981 claims relate to the following

positions: (1) assistant principal available in 2007; (2) assistant

principal available in 2008; (3) assistant principal at Central

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High School available in 2009; and (4) assistant principal at

Memorial High School available in 2009. The Title VII claims

relate to the following positions: (1) the academic dean

positions available in 2010;(2)the Blazer Connection coordina‐

tor position available in 2010;1 and (3) the assistant principal

positions available in 2012.

The district court correctly held thatRiley failed to produce

sufficient evidence for any of these claims to survive summary

judgment. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,

construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non‐

moving party, Riley. E.g., Chaib v. Geo Group, Inc., 819 F.3d 337,

340 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); accord. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir.

2016). Here, summary judgment for ECS on these claims is

appropriate because Riley either failed to produce evidence

entirely or produced evidence that did not create a triable issue

of fact under the relevant legal framework.

To proceed to trial on a failure to promote claim, a plaintiff

either must produce “sufficient direct or circumstantial

evidence that [the employer’s] promotion decisions were

1

   We do not consider her 2013 application forthis position. On August 14,

2014, Riley filed an EEOC complaint regarding her failure to receive the

position in 2013. She received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on

December 11, 2014, but neverincorporated the allegations from this second

right to sue letter into her complaint. Any allegation not found in the

amended complaint is forfeited. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 997. This includes

her 2013 application for the Blazer Connection coordinator position.

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No. 15‐3166 7

intentionally discriminatory or make an indirect case of

discrimination” under the burden‐shifting method of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).

Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 735 (7th Cir. 2014).

Here, Riley has chosen the indirect path. Under this rubric,

Riley must first produce evidence of a prima facie case for

failure to promote; if she does so, ECS must then produce

evidence of “a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

employment action”; if the employer produces evidence of a

legitimate reason, the plaintiff must then produce evidence

that the employer’s “stated reason is a pretext.” Simpson v.

Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04).

To demonstrate a prima facie case for failure to promote, a

plaintiff must produce evidence showing that: (1) she was a

member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the

position sought; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4)

the employer promoted someone outside ofthe protected class

who was not better qualified for the position. Jaburek v. Foxx,

813 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Summary

judgment forthe employeris appropriate if the employee fails

to establish any of the elements of a prima facie case for failure

to promote. See Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted).

First, Riley cannot prove a prima facie case for the § 1981

claim regarding the assistant principal position for which she

applied in 2009. Section 1981 causes of action are limited to

discrimination claims based on race. See McDonald v. Santa Fe

Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285–86 (1976); Humphries v.

CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 402–03 (7th Cir. 2007) (section

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1981 establishes causes of action for racial discrimination as

well as retaliation for opposing racial discrimination). ECS

hired Krista Hennings, an African‐American, for the assistant

principal position at Memorial available in 2009. Therefore,

Riley cannot show that ECS promoted someone outside of her

protected class forthe position she sought. SeeJaburek, 813 F.3d

at 631. She cannot establish a prima facie case for this § 1981

claim as a matter of law.

Second, Riley cannot prove a prima facie case regarding the

2010 academic dean positions because she never applied for

the positions. So ECS could not have rejected her.2 See Jaburek,

813 F.3d at 631 (citing Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health

Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.

2013))(summary judgmentfor defendant onTitle VIIfailure to

promote claim appropriate where plaintiff never applied for

promotion). Because Riley failed to produce evidence that she

was rejected forthe positions, she cannot establish a prima facie

case; the claims fail as a matter of law.

Third, Riley did not prove a prima facie case regarding the

Blazer Connectioncoordinatorposition, because being rejected

2

   Riley argues that she did not apply for the positions because she did not

know that they were administrative positions. Citing Eighth Circuit dicta,

Riley argues that the application requirement can be excused where the

employer has no formal application process or where the employee is

unaware of the opportunity. See Kehoe v. Anheuser‐Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095,

1105 n.13 (8th Cir. 1996). Even if this were established Eighth Circuit

law and we adopted it, Riley’s own deposition undermines her argument.

There, she stated that she knew of the position and did not apply because

the position required certain teaching certifications that she lacked. There

is no evidence that surreptitious ECS action precluded her from applying.

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No. 15‐3166 9

for this position does not constitute a sufficiently adverse

employment action. Failure to promote claims are only

actionable if not receiving the position is a “materially ad‐

verse” employment action. Carter v. Chi. State Univ., 778 F.3d

651, 660 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Atanus, 520 F.3d at 677. Gener‐

ally, this means that the position for which the plaintiff was

rejected offered markedly greater compensation, responsibili‐

ties, or title. See Hilt‐Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456,

465–66 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Riley presented no evidence of

how the Blazer Connection position offered a significant pay

raise, increase in responsibilities, or boost in title. The district

court appropriately called it a lateral move. Riley’s failure to

produce evidence that being rejected for the position was an

adverse employment action dooms her claim as a matter of

law.

Riley’s remaining claims fail because she has not produced

sufficient evidence of pretext. Regarding the 2012 assistant

principal positions, Riley has produced evidence of a prima

facie case for age discrimination: (1) she is over 40 years old; (2)

she has extensive teaching experience and an administrator’s

license, so she is qualified; (3) ECS rejected her for the posi‐

tions; and (4) ECS instead hired two people outside of the

protected age group—both Gratsy and Adams were under

40—who did not have her teaching experience.3

3

  Riley cannot establish a prima facie case for race or sex discrimination

because Adams, like Riley, is an African‐American female. But the effect of

hiring Adams on Riley’s race and sex discrimination claim relating to

Gratsy is hazier. The district court essentially viewed the position as one

(continued...)

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10 No. 15‐3166

But ECS has produced evidence of a nondiscriminatory

reason for not hiring Riley: both Adams and Gratsy were more

qualified for the position than Riley. See Scruggs v. Garst Seed

Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (hiring someone whom

employer believes is better qualified for position is legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for action). ECS produced the list of

factors that the screening committee considered in recom‐

mending candidates. These factors were:

a. [Administrative] [c]ertification;

3

  (...continued)

position with two openings. This means that because ECS hired an African‐

American female forthe position, both ofRiley’s race andsexdiscrimination

claims fail, regardless of whether ECS also hired a person who is outside

Riley’s protected race and sex classes. Riley argues that we should view the

position as two distinct positions giving rise to two distinct failure to

promote claims. This means that even if ECS hired Adams, Riley can still

bring a separate claim relating to ECS hiring Gratsy.

It is hard to divine from the record whether Riley raised this argument

in the district court, so she has likely waived the argument. E.g., Homoky v.

Ogden, 816 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 2016). Further, she cites no precedent for

her position. But the district court’s ruling also cites no precedent, and it

would be improper to hold that the opinion reflects our jurisprudence on

the issue. The few analogous cases could be used to justify either position.

See, e.g., Jordan v. City of Gary, Ind., 396 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2005); Rooks v. Girl

Scouts of Chicago, 95 F.3d 1154 (Table) (7th Cir. 1996), 1996 WL 459941

(unpublished opinion). Ultimately, we find no reason to decide the topic

here: even if we were to agree with Riley and find that she has produced

evidence of a prima facie case for race and sex discrimination related to

hiring Gratsy, she has not produced sufficient evidence of pretext, and her

claim would still fail as a matter of law.

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No. 15‐3166 11

b. Skills, abilities, attributes, training, and educa‐

tion which the applicant possesses which would

be necessary or desirable for an [ECS] adminis‐

trator, and any other employmentrequirements

imposed by law;

c. Contribution the applicant is likely to make to

students and/orthe school system due to special

training and/or competence;

d. Ability to communicate and relate effectively to

others;

e. Goodpastperformance inposition(s) with[ECS]

[s]chools or other school corporations;

f. Opportunity for professional growth of the

applicant; and

g. Length of service of the applicant in the [ECS].

ECS listed the factors in order of priority. Thus, length of

service in ECS—which Riley argues differentiates her from

Gratsy and Adams—was the least important factor for the

committee’s consideration.

ECS also produced the affidavit of Krista Hennings, who

was a member of the screening committee. Hennings averred

that the committee believed that Adams and Gratsy were the

best at answering interview questions, specifically the ques‐

tions relating to particular ways to improve the respective

school to which the applicant would be assigned. Hennings

noted how Gratsy’s and Adams’s answers to these specific

questions related directly to factors c, d, and f of the commit‐

tee’s assessmentrubric. Hennings also stated thatRiley did not

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12 No. 15‐3166

communicate as effectively in her interview; she tended to

criticize without providing potential solutions. Hennings also

noted that the committee did not view Riley’s teaching

experience with ECS as dispositive, given that seniority was

the least important factor in the screening committee’s rubric.

In response to ECS’s evidence, Riley needed to produce

evidence of pretext. She has not done so. Simply put, pretext is

a lie—“a phony reason for some action.” Smith v. Chi. Transit

Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Riley produced evidence that she has many

years of teaching experience, has an administrator’s license,

and performed well in the past, as evidenced by her Teacher of

the Year award; nevertheless, ECS hired two people with less

teaching experience. But we have set a high evidentiary barfor

pretext.Evidence ofRiley’s qualifications “only wouldserve as

evidence of pretext if the differences between her and [Adams

and Gratsy] were ‘so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be

no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment

that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at

issue.’” Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis added) (quoting Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169,

1180 (7th Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted).

Riley has not produced  evidence that she was clearly better

qualified for the position than Gratsy and Adams. The evi‐

dence presented shows that while Riley had more teaching

experience, all three had comparable administrative experience

and training. Thus, all three were on the same plane for the

assistant principal position, an administrative position.

Further, Riley has produced no evidence that contradicts

Hennings’s statements regarding the answers ofthe candidates

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No. 15‐3166 13

to the interview questions. Finally, the evidence produced

shows that ECS valued length of service to ECS as the least

important consideration forrecommending a candidate forthe

position. Therefore, since there is no evidence that she was

clearly better qualified than either Gratsy or Adams, Riley’s

age discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

Nor is there sufficient evidence of pretext for the § 1981

claims relating to her 2007, 2008, and 2009 applications to

assistant principal positions. In each instance, ECS hired a

white woman or man instead of Riley. She argues that she was

better qualifiedthanthese three because she had more teaching

experience and had worked at ECS longer. But this is not

sufficient evidence that she was clearly better qualified for the

positions.As with theTitle VII agediscriminationclaimrelated

to the 2012 assistant principal positions, that Riley had more

teaching experience does not carry particular weight. The

position was administrative, and each of the three people that

ECS chose obtained his or her administrator’s license at the

same time asRiley. Thus,Riley had comparable administrative

experience and training as the three candidates whom ECS

eventually hired. Riley’s only evidence of better qualifications

is that she has more seniority than the people hired. But

seniority is “not enough to meet her burden” for pretext.

Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.

2006) (citations omitted).

A court is not a “super personnel department that second‐

guesses employers’ business judgments.”Millbrook, 280 F.3d at

1181 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Judicial interven‐

tion is permissible if there is sufficient evidence of “unlawful

hiring practices,” particularly where an employer fails to hire

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or promote someone clearly better qualified than the person

chosen. Id. at 1180–81; see Deines v. Texas Dept. of Prot. and

Regulatory Services, 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999), quoted in

Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1179–80 (“The single issue for the trier of

fact is whether the employer’s selection of a particular appli‐

cant overthe plaintiff was motivated by discrimination.”). But

thatis notthe case here, because there is not sufficient evidence

that Riley was clearly better qualified than any of the three

people chosen. Riley’s § 1981 claims fail as a matter of law.

III.  CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of

ECS.

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