Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01375/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01375-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338pt Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

APPLE INCORPORATED, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 17cv1375 DMS(MDD) 

ORDER:

GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART APPLE’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

REGARDING (1) PATENT 

EXHAUSTION, (2) 

NONINFRINGEMENT OF U.S. 

PATENT NO. 8,698,558 AND (3) PRESUIT DAMAGES; AND 

GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART QUALCOMM’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[REDACTED] 

APPLE INCORPORATED, 

Counter Claimant, 

v.

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, 

Counter Defendant. 

 This case comes before the Court on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. 

Apple moves for summary judgment on the issues of patent exhaustion, noninfringement 

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of the ‘558 Patent and pre-suit damages, while Qualcomm moves for summary judgment 

that two prior art references do not anticipate the ‘949 Patent. For the reasons set out below, 

Apple’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Qualcomm’s motion is granted in 

part and denied in part.

I.

APPLE’S MOTION

 Apple moves for summary judgment that products made by Pegatron do not infringe 

 because of a license between Qualcomm and Pegatron. Apple 

also moves for summary judgment of noninfringement on the ‘558 Patent, and for summary 

judgment on the issue of pre-suit damages. 

A. Patent Exhaustion 

“The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what others 

can do with an article embodying or containing an invention.” Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,

569 U.S. 278, 283 (2013). It provides that “[t]he authorized sale of an article that 

substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent 

holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.” Quanta Computer, 

Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008). “’Substantial embodiment’ is 

established if (1) the only reasonable and intended use of the article is to practice the 

allegedly exhausted patent; and (2) the article embodies the essential or inventive features 

of the allegedly exhausted patent.” JVC Kenwood Corp. v. Nero, Inc., 797 F.3d 1039, 1046 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). “The rationale underlying the doctrine rests upon the theory that an 

unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the 

purchaser’s use of that item thereafter because the patentee has bargained for and received 

full value for the goods.” Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). “Patent exhaustion is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement, and 

like other issues in which there are no disputed factual questions, may be properly decided 

by summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). 

/ / / 

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 As the party asserting patent exhaustion, Apple bears the burden of proving the 

elements of that defense. As stated above, one of those elements is substantial 

embodiment, and to prove that element, Apple must show “there is no reasonable noninfringing use.” Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F.Supp.2d 68, 162 (D.D.C. 2006). See 

also Cascades Computer Innovation, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 70 F.Supp.3d 863, 

868-89 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Keurig, 732 F.3d at 1373) (same). Apple failed to meet that 

burden here. Indeed, its motion does not even mention, much less discuss, whether this 

element is met. Instead, Apple focuses on the authorization element, which appears to be 

undisputed. That this element is undisputed, however, is not enough. Apple must still 

show the “substantial embodiment” element is met, and it has failed to do so. Accordingly,

Apple’s request for summary judgment on this issue is denied. 

B. Noninfringement 

Next, Apple moves for summary judgment of noninfringement of the ‘558 Patent. 

Specifically, Apple argues there are no genuine issues of material fact that 

of the accused products does not literally infringe the “offset current” 

limitation of independent claim 15 and dependent claim 19, and that 

of the accused products does not infringe claim 15 or 19 under the doctrine of equivalents.1

1.

 The parties agree the “Offset Adjust” block is one structure that is accused of 

satisfying the “offset current” limitation of claim 15, and that Qualcomm alleges 

 literally infringes this limitation. Apple argues there is no evidence 

to support this allegation, and therefore it is entitled to summary judgment of no 

infringement. 

 

1 Apple also moves for summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 7 based on the 

Court’s finding that claim is invalid as indefinite. As Qualcomm points out, however, the 

invalidity finding renders any claim of infringement of claim 7 moot. Accordingly, 

Apple’s request for summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 7 is denied as moot. 

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In support of its argument, Apple relies on the testimony of Qualcomm’s technical 

expert on the ‘558 Patent, Arthur W. Kelley, Ph.D. During his deposition, Dr. Kelley was 

asked, 

 (Decl. of Zachary Flood in Supp. of Qualcomm’s Opp’n to Mot. 

for Partial Summ. J., Ex. I at 83:2-3.) Dr. Kelley’s response was: 

 

(Id. at 6-12) (emphasis added). On its face, this testimony supports Apple’s argument. 

Qualcomm argues, however, that “operative to” does not mean “operative to,” but 

rather means “capable of” or “able to,” and applying that definition, there is, at a minimum, 

a genuine issue of material fact about whether meets the “offset 

current” limitation. However, Qualcomm did not submit “operative to” for construction 

by the Court. Absent further construction, the term is accorded its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and that would not include “capable of” or “able to.” That other courts may have 

construed “operative to” as “able to” or consistent with “capable to” does not mean the 

term should be construed that way in this case. In this case, the claim describes a switcher 

that “comprises a summer operative to sum the input current and an offset current and 

provide a summed current,” (emphasis added), and there is no dispute 

 does not satisfy that limitation.2

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

2 Qualcomm’s reliance on the testimony of Apple’s expert Alyssa Apsel, Ph.D. does not 

change this conclusion as she did not state was “operative to” 

anything, much less “operative to sum the input current and an offset current and provide 

a summed current[.]” (See Flood Decl., Ex. J at 158.) 

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2.

The only other structure alleged to satisfy the “offset current” limitation in claims 

15 and 19 is . Qualcomm concedes this structure does not literally 

infringe the “offset current” limitation, but asserts it does infringe under the doctrine of 

equivalents. Apple argues Qualcomm is not entitled to a range of equivalents for this 

limitation due to prosecution history estoppel, therefore Apple is entitled to summary 

judgment of no infringement. 

To support this argument, Apple relies on case law stating “that canceling a broader 

independent claim and replacing it with a dependent claim rewritten into independent form 

[is] a ‘clear surrender of the broader subject matter’ that presumptively bar[s] application 

of the doctrine of equivalents.” Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 

F.3d 1131, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector 

Distribution Systems, Inc., 347 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Qualcomm disputes 

that the facts of this case warrant application of the presumption. Specifically, it argues 

the presumption applies only “when the dependent claim includes an additional claim 

limitation not found in the cancelled independent claim ...[,]” id. at 1141, and that the facts 

of this case do not fit that scenario. However, the Court disagrees. The prosecution history 

clearly reflects that in response to an office action, Qualcomm canceled independent claim 

20 and replaced it with dependent claim 22 rewritten into independent form, which 

ultimately issued as claim 15 of the ‘558 Patent. (Decl. of Robert Yeh in Supp. of Apple’s 

Mot., Ex. J at QCAppleITC-00000910-11, QCAppleITC-00000984.) This evidence also 

clearly reflects that dependent claim 22 included additional claim limitations not found in 

independent claim 20, i.e., the elements of the switcher. (Id.) Thus, contrary to 

Qualcomm’s argument, the presumption applies to this case. 

 Qualcomm argues, nonetheless, that there is an exception to this presumption where 

“the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to 

the equivalent in question[.]” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,

535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002). This exception is “very narrow.” Honeywell, 523 F.3d at 

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1315 (citing Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 

1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). To invoke it, the patentee “must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that, based on the prosecution history, the ‘objectively apparent reason for 

the narrowing amendment’ was only tangentially related to the equivalent.” Integrated 

Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Techs., Inc., 734 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Festo 

Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2003)). “Silence does not overcome the presumption.” Honeywell, 523 F.3d at 1316. 

 Here, Qualcomm has not met its burden to show the exception applies. Although 

Qualcomm asserts the prosecution history “confirms that the ‘offset current’ element was 

‘merely tangential’ to the prosecution[,]” (Qualcomm’s Resp. in Opp’n to Apple’s Mot. at 

18), the prosecution history itself does not demonstrate the “the reason for the narrowing 

amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent.” Festo, 344 

F.3d at 1369. Rather, the prosecution history reveals that Qualcomm rewrote dependent 

claim 22 into independent form, which added the “offset current” limitation to the claimed 

invention. 

Qualcomm argues there is no “meaningful difference” between the “offset” 

limitation in original independent claim 20 and the “offset current” limitation in original 

dependent claim 22. (Qualcomm’s Resp. in Opp’n to Apple’s Mot. at 19.) However, there 

is nothing in the prosecution history to support this argument, and it is the prosecution 

history that determines whether the exception applies. Qualcomm’s assertion that “offset” 

and “offset current” describe the same limitation even though the terms are distinct does 

not show the reason for the amendment was “only tangentially related to the equivalent.” 

Integrated Tech., 734 F.3d at 1358. Rather, because the alleged equivalent focuses on the 

“offset current” limitation, which was part of the amendment, “the amendment bore a 

direct, not merely tangential, relation to the equivalent.” Honeywell, 523 F.3d at 1316. 

Accordingly, Qualcomm is not entitled to a range of equivalents for the “offset current” 

limitation, and without that, Apple is entitled to summary judgment of no infringement of 

claims 15 and 19 of the ‘558 Patent. 

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C. Pre-suit Damages 

The final issue raised in Apple’s motion is whether Qualcomm is entitled to recover 

pre-suit damages. Apple argues Qualcomm is not entitled to recover these damages 

because it failed to comply with the patent marking statute and failed to provide actual 

notice prior to filing this case. Qualcomm responds that Apple is not entitled to summary 

judgment on this issue because Apple disputes whether Qualcomm’s products practice the 

patents in suit.3

 

“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), a patentee who makes or sells a patented article 

must mark his articles or notify infringers of his patent in order to recover damages.” Arctic 

Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 143 (2018). This statute sets out a limitation on 

damages; it is “not an affirmative defense.” Id. at 1366 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United 

States, 729 F.2d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Thus, although “an alleged infringer who 

challenges the patentee’s compliance with § 287 bears an initial burden of production to 

articulate the products it believes are unmarked ‘patented articles’ subject to § 287[,] ... 

the patentee bears the burden to prove the products identified do not practice the patented 

invention.” Id. at 1368. 

 Qualcomm has not met that burden here. Indeed, Qualcomm does not dispute that 

Apple has met its burden of identifying the Qualcomm products that allegedly practice the 

patented invention. Instead, Qualcomm argues Apple has not met its burden “to show the 

applicability of the patent marking statute.” (Qualcomm’s Resp. in Opp’n to Apple’s Mot. 

at 10.) But that is not Apple’s burden. As stated by the Federal Circuit in Arctic Cat, “[t]he 

patentee bears the burden of pleading and proving he complied with § 287(a)’s marking 

requirement.” 876 F.3d at 1366 (citing Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996)). Qualcomm has not presented any evidence to that effect here, and thus it has 

 

3

 Qualcomm does not appear to dispute that it did not provide actual notice to Apple prior 

to filing this case. 

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not met its burden. Accordingly, Apple is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of 

pre-suit damages. 

II. 

QUALCOMM’S MOTION

Turning to Qualcomm’s motion, Qualcomm moves for summary judgment that two 

prior art references, the CELL reference and Blackfin, do not anticipate the asserted claims 

of the ’949 Patent. Apple responds that there are genuine issues of material fact that 

preclude summary judgment for Qualcomm. 

“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 means lack of novelty, and is a question of 

fact.” Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Determining whether a claim 

is anticipated involves two steps: (1) construing the claims, and (2) comparing the properly 

construed claims to the prior art. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1346 

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “To anticipate, every element and limitation of the 

claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim.” 

Brown, 265 F.3d at 1351 (citations omitted). 

 Here, Qualcomm argues it is entitled to summary judgment that the CELL reference 

does not anticipate the asserted claims of the ‘949 Patent because the per loader/per binary 

parameters and/or segment list, which are alleged to satisfy the “image header” limitation 

of claim 1 of the ‘949 Patent, are not “part of” the executable software image. Apple 

responds that the parties’ agreed upon construction of “image header” does not require that 

it be “part of” the executable software image.” Rather, it requires only that the “image 

header” be “associated with” the executable software image. 

According to the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Worksheet, the parties agreed 

that “image header” would be construed as “a header associated with the entire image that 

specifies where the data segments are to be placed in the system memory.” (ECF No. 195-

2 at 9) (emphasis added). Although Qualcomm accuses Apple of proposing a new claim 

construction in defending against Qualcomm’s motion, (Qualcomm’s Reply in Supp. of 

Mot. at 4), it is Qualcomm that is proposing a new construction here, not Apple. The 

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parties agreed the “image header” need only be “associated with” the executable software 

image, not that it be “part of” the image. If the parties wish to amend their previous 

agreement or submit this term for construction by the Court, they are free to do so, but 

given the parties’ current agreement, Qualcomm is not entitled to summary judgment that 

the CELL reference does not anticipate the asserted claims of the ‘949 Patent. 

The parties’ agreed upon construction of “image header” also factors into the 

analysis of the Blackfin reference, but on a different issue. Here, Qualcomm argues 

Blackfin does not anticipate because the executable software image Apple relies on 

includes only one data segment whereas the asserted claims require more than one data 

segment. In support of this argument, Qualcomm now relies on the parties’ agreed upon 

construction of “image header,” which requires “data segments,” while Apple attempts to 

retreat from that construction. Again, the parties agreed upon the construction of “image 

header,” and according to that agreement, it requires “data segments,” plural. As stated 

above, if the parties wish to amend their previous agreement and submit this term for 

construction, they are free to do so. As previously agreed, however, the term “image 

header” requires more than one data segment. Because the alleged “image header” 

described in Blackfin contains only one data segment, Qualcomm is entitled to summary 

judgment that Blackfin does not anticipate the asserted claims of the ‘949 Patent. 

III. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set out above, Apple’s motion for summary judgment is granted in 

part and denied in part. Specifically, Apple’s motion on patent exhaustion is denied and 

its motion on noninfringement and pre-suit damages is granted. Qualcomm’s motion is 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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also granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Court denies the motion as to the 

CELL reference and grants the motion as to Blackfin. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 4, 2019 

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