Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04088/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Scheduling Further Briefing

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD AUSTIN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent.

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No. C 06-4088 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS; FURTHER

SCHEDULING ORDER

(Docket No. 10)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Prison Terms’ (“Board’s”)

denial of parole. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not

be granted. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition and petitioner has filed

opposition. Respondent filed a reply and petitioner filed a response to the reply. Having

reviewed the papers, the court DENIES respondent’s motion to dismiss and issues a

further scheduling order as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

In 1980, petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years-to-life in prison after his

conviction in Sacramento Superior Court for second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code §

190). Petitioner has received six parole hearings, and he challenges the Board’s

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Scheduling Further Briefing

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continued denial of parole at these hearings. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the

state superior court which was denied on November 1, 2004. Petitioner filed a habeas

petition with the state appellate court which was denied on January 26, 2005. Petitioner

then filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court which was denied on March 22,

2006. Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 30, 2006.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the allegations in the

petition do not establish standing, and are too vague to state a cognizable claim for relief.

Respondent asserts that petitioner lacks standing and that his allegations are too vague

because he has failed to identify the specific parole hearing at which the Board violated

his rights. In order to establish standing under Article III of the United States

Constitution, petitioner “must allege personal injury traceable to the defendant’s allegedly

unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Moreover, a petition is subject to dismissal for vagueness if the

petitioner fails to allege specific facts that show a federal claim is presented. Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 1999, 204-05 (9th Circ. 1995).

In the Order to Show Cause, the court found that petitioner had asserted the

following two claims for relief: (1) that the Board violated his due process protections

and guarantees under clearly established federal law through parole denials by continually

denying parole based upon the commitment offense; and (2) the Board’s continued denial

of parole violates petitioner’s plea agreement contract that he entered into and that this

contract is enforceable under both state and federal law. Respondent asserts that

petitioner’s allegations that the Board “continually denied” his rights fails to establish

standing and are too vague because respondent cannot discern when or at what hearing

petitioner’s rights were violated. Federal courts have a duty to construe pro se petitions

for writs of habeas corpus liberally, however, Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th

Cir. 2001), and when liberally construed, petitioner’s allegations do sufficiently identify

the parole hearings at which he claims the Board violated his rights.

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Scheduling Further Briefing

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Petitioner sets forth his claims in attachments to his form federal petition.

Included in the attachments is a form petition to the California Supreme Court, as well as

a “Memorandum of Points and Authorities” (“MPA”) in support of his habeas petition,

both of which are dated January 22, 2005. Petitioner sets forth his two claims in the form

petition to the California Supreme Court, and then he continues to explain the claims in

greater detail in the MPA. In explaining his first claim, petitioner states in the MPA that

he has appeared before the Board “a total of six time[s], and in every parole hearing the

[Board] has found petitioner unsuitable based upon the commitment offense.”

(Attachment to Petition, MPA at 3.) As the MPA was dated January 22, 2005, such an

allegation, when liberally construed, clarifies what petitioner means by the Board

“continually” denying his right to due process; petitioner is claiming that the Board has

violated his right to due process six times, at every one of his six parole hearings that

occurred prior to January 22, 2005. As such, petitioner’s allegations set forth sufficient

facts to show a federal claim is presented. Such allegations also sufficiently alleges injury

to satisfy the standing requirement – the injury being that petitioner’s right to due process

was violated six times, at each of the pre-2005 parole hearings.

In connection with his second claim, that the Board’s “continued denials of parole”

violated his plea agreement, petitioner explains that such violations occurred “once

petitioner’s term of confinement reached 22 years.” (Attachment to Petition, Form

Petition to California Supreme Court at 4.) As petitioner was convicted in 1980, such an

allegation, when liberally construed, fairly indicates that petitioner is asserting that the

Board violated his plea agreement at every parole denial that occurred between 2002 and

the January 22, 2005, when the form petition was signed and dated. As such, plaintiff’s

allegations with respect to his second claim are sufficiently specific to state a cognizable

claim for federal habeas relief, and sufficiently allege an injury to establish standing.

Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition (docket no. 10) is DENIED.

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Scheduling Further Briefing

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2. Respondent shall file with the court and serve on petitioner, within sixty

days of the issuance of this order, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on petitioner a copy of all

portions of the underlying prison disciplinary record that have been transcribed previously

and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition.

3. If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a 

traverse with the court and serving it on respondent within thirty days of his receipt of

the answer.

4. It is petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner is reminded

that all communications with the court must be served on respondent by mailing a true

copy of the document to respondent’s counsel. Petitioner must keep the court and all

parties informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper captioned “Notice of

Change of Address.” He must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

This order terminates Docket No. 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

3/28/08

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