Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00300/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00300-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA APARTMENT

ASSOCIATION, A California

Corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv300-WQH-RBB

ORDER

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY APARTMENT

ASSOCIATION, INC., a California

Corporation,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction (“Application for Temporary

Restraining Order”) filed by Plaintiff California Apartment Association. (ECF No. 5).

BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2011, Plaintiff, “an association of owners and managers of rental

propert[ies] located throughout California and vendors who service them,” filed a Complaint

against Defendant San Diego County Apartment Association, Inc. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1). The

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is the owner of a copyright over “detailed instructive and

informative forms.” Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, without Plaintiff’s permission,

has “violated [Plaintiff]’s exclusive rights to its forms by substantially copying and adopting

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the constituted elements of [Plaintiff]’s original work and by publishing, reproducing, and

distributing [Plaintiff]’s forms to [Defendant]’s members.” Id. ¶ 15. The Complaint alleges

the following claims: copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, vicarious

copyright infringement, breach of contract, conversion and “money had and received.” Id. at

7.

On February 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed the Application for Temporary Restraining Order.

(ECF No. 5). Plaintiff moves for a temporary restraining order enjoining Defendant “from

using, copying, publishing, posting or making any other infringing distribution of the forms

owned, authored, and published by [Plaintiff].” Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s

“conduct in copying and misappropriating [Plaintiff]’s copyrighted works has resulted in

immediate and irreparable damage to [Plaintiff] who is threatened with the possibility of losing

its goodwill and market share in the apartment rental industry because actual and potential

members, especially those in San Diego County, can now get [Plaintiff]’s copyrighted work

from [Defendant].” Id. at 2. In support of the Application for Temporary Restraining Order,

Plaintiff submits two affidavits and exhibits consisting of forms and correspondence between

counsel for the parties. (ECF Nos. 6-7).

On February 28, 2011, Defendant filed an opposition to the Application for Temporary

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 12). Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to show a

likelihood of success on the merits. Defendant contends that, “[w]ith regard to [Plaintiff]’s

claim that it will suffer imminent, irreparable harm to its ‘goodwill’ absent the entry of a

temporary restraining order, such is utterly speculative and completely lacking in any

evidentiary support,” and “any harm suffered by [Plaintiff] could easily be compensated

through money damages.” Id. at 7.

On March 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the Application for Temporary

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 18).

DISCUSSION

When the nonmovant has received notice, as here, the standard for issuing a temporary

restraining order is the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Brown Jordan

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Int’l, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw. 2002); Lockheed

Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be

granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation omitted).

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must show “that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008); see also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v.

City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 

At a minimum, “the moving party must demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable

injury.” Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted). “[A]n injunction cannot issue merely because it is possible that there will be an

irreparable injury to the plaintiff; it must be likely that there will be.” Am. Trucking Ass’n, 559

F.3d at 1052. “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm

is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter,

129 S. Ct. at 375-76. If the moving party fails to meet the “minimum showing” of a likelihood

of irreparable injury, a court “need not decide whether [the movant] is likely to succeed on the

merits.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir.

1985).

“[E]conomic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because such

injury can be remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television &

Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum

Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (“Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time

and energy necessarily expended are not enough” to constitute irreparable injury) (quotation

omitted). However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has “recognized that intangible

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injuries, such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill, qualify as irreparable

harm.” Rent-A-Center, Inc., 944 F.2d at 603 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad.

Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also WMX Techs. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315,

1325 (9th Cir. 1996).

In American Trucking Association, the Ninth Circuit held that the movants

demonstrated irreparable injury when they were faced with a “Hobson’s choice” of either

signing an agreement which is “likely unconstitutional” or suffering such significant business

losses that “the result would likely be fatal.” Am. Trucking Ass’n, 559 F.3d at 1057-58. By

contrast, in American Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Communications, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470 (9th

Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction on the basis that the

movant had not demonstrated sufficient evidence to show irreparable harm:

Even if the evidence showed that four advertisers were unwilling to do business

with [plaintiff] because [defendant] had exclusives with desirable schools, this

would be insufficient evidence of irreparable harm. Without a sufficient

showing that these contracts threatened [plaintiff]’s existence, any loss in

revenue due to an antitrust violation is compensable in damages. ... The threat

of being driven out of business is sufficient to establish irreparable harm.

[Plaintiff]’s president stated that it sustained large losses in 1982-83, and he

forecast large losses again in 1983-84. These statements, standing alone, are

insufficient evidence that [plaintiff] is threatened with extinction.

Id. at 1473-74 (citing Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm’n, 634 F.2d at 1201-03).

The only evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of its contention that it will suffer

irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction is the following paragraph from the

declaration of Plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer:

If a charter member ... disassociates itself from [Plaintiff], it would typically

mean that an apartment owner affiliated to that charter (in this case, San Diego)

would have the option of either becoming a member of [Plaintiff], or of the local

organization, or both. [Plaintiff]’s copying of [Defendant]’s forms, however,

has seriously damaged [Plaintiff]’s actual and potential market share of the San

Diego rental apartment industry. In particular, to the extent someone is a

member of [Defendant], they no longer have an incentive or need to become a

member of [Plaintiff] because they are no longer required to be a ... member [of

Plaintiff] to access and utilize updated, instructional, and informative forms

because they are now made available by [Defendant] without the need for a ...

membership [with Plaintiff]. [Defendant] is thus surreptitiously and unfairly

cutting into [Plaintiff]’s market share of members. [Defendant]’s conduct is

causing serious damage to [Plaintiff]’s good will and reputation of being the

catalyst and market leader in the apartment industry and the exclusive source of

reliable, code-compliant and informative forms. Such damage is irreparable and

unquantifiable.

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(Bannon Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 7 at 3-4). 

Plaintiff has not produced evidence of specific members who chose not to renew their

membership with Plaintiff because they could access the allegedly infringing forms from

Defendant. Plaintiff has failed to support its general assertion of loss of goodwill and market

share with specific evidence sufficient to show that losses have in fact occurred or are likely

to occur. See Am. Trucking Ass’n, 559 F.3d at 1052 (“[A]n injunction cannot issue merely

because it is possible that there will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff; it must be likely

that there will be.”) (emphasis added). Based upon the evidentiary record, Plaintiff’s claims

of irreparable injury are speculative and do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive

relief. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting

a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674

(9th Cir. 1988); see also Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“[T]he court determined that [plaintiff] would lose goodwill and ‘untold’

customers. This finding, not based on any factual allegations, appears to be speculative.

Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to satisfy its burden of “demonstrat[ing] that irreparable injury is likely in the absence

of an injunction.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375.

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to show that monetary damages would not be sufficient

to remedy the alleged harm. See Bannon Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 7 at 2 (“Non-members can ...

purchase [Plaintiff’s] forms for a ... price.”); cf. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 944 F.2d at 603

(“[E]conomic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because such injury

can be remedied by a damage award.”).

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a significant threat of

irreparable injury, the Court “need not decide whether [Plaintiff] is likely to succeed on the

merits.” Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376 (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate that there exists

a significant threat of irreparable injury. Because [plaintiff] has not made that minimum

showing we need not decide whether it is likely to succeed on the merits.”) (citations omitted);

see also Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Big

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Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir.

1989) (same).

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for Temporary Restraining Order is

DENIED. (ECF No. 5).

DATED: March 18, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00300-WQH-RBB Document 20 Filed 03/18/11 Page 6 of 6