Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02280/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02280-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Alan Howell, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Sheila Sullivan Polk, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV-04-2280-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiffs claimed that defendants committed various constitutional torts with regard

to the search of their home. We granted summary judgment for defendants on most claims,

and a jury found for defendants on the remainder. We now have before us plaintiffs' motion

for a new trial (doc. 202), defendants' responses (docs. 218, 219, 220), and plaintiffs' reply

(doc. 222).

I

A

Plaintiffs claimed that the search of their home was unreasonable because defendants

waited an insufficient period of time after knocking and announcing their presence before

breaching their front security door. The jury concluded otherwise. Plaintiffs now contend

that the clear weight of the evidence elicited at trial shows a five-second waiting period; that

we concluded in our order of February 24, 2006 (doc. 135) that a wait of less than eight

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seconds is constitutionally unreasonable; and that therefore the verdict is against the clear

weight of the evidence. We disagree.

First, plaintiffs misread our order. We concluded that viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to plaintiffs–that defendants began the breach immediately upon

knocking and announcing their presence–that defendants acted unconstitutionally, and

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants–that defendants waited eight

seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before beginning to breach the

security door–that defendants acted constitutionally. We further concluded that there is a

disputed issue as to the length of the waiting period, and we formed no conclusions as to the

constitutionality of a waiting period greater than zero but less than eight seconds. Order of

February 24, 2006 at 14-21. We did not conclude that a five-second waiting period was

unreasonable as a matter of law.

Moreover, even if we had formed a conclusion as to the constitutionality of a fivesecond waiting period under these circumstances, and yet denied the motions for summary

judgment, that conclusion would not have precluded a contradictory yet reasonable jury

verdict. The summary judgment mechanism allows a court to eliminate the need for a trial

where there are no disputed issues of material fact. However, the evidence submitted

pursuant to Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., does not necessarily correlate with the evidence that

ultimately reaches the jury at trial. Accordingly, the court and the jury may reach two

rational, yet inconsistent, conclusions.

Finally, plaintiffs set forth no reason from which to conclude that a five-second wait

is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs cite no evidence and set forth no arguments based upon the

facts of the case. Plaintiffs base their conclusions upon their incorrect reading of our order,

and a state court decision which has no evidentiary or preclusive value. The Supreme Court

acknowledged just a few days ago that its "reasonable wait time" standard was "necessarily

vague." Hudson v. Michigan, 48 U.S.L.W. 4311, 4313 [U.S. Jun. 15, 2006]. For these

reasons, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

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1

 Plaintiffs contend that McConney stands for the proposition that the reasonableness

of a search in exigent circumstances is a pure question of law. To the contrary, McConney

holds that the question is a mixed question of fact and law that is more similar to a question

of law than to a question of fact. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1205.

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B

Plaintiffs also seek a new trial on the ground that the jury instructions with regard to

the reasonableness of the search are erroneous. To prevail, plaintiffs must show not only that

the instructions are incorrect; they must also show that they were prejudiced by them, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 61, and that they objected with particularity to them before the jury began

deliberating, Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 810 (7th Cir.

1980); 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 59.13[2][b][i][B].

The parties were given an opportunity to be heard with regard to the instructions.

Plaintiffs objected that the reasonableness instructions did not inform the jury that a wait of

less than eight seconds is unconstitutional, and a wait of more than eight seconds is

constitutional. Trial Tr. Excerpt of April 25, 2006 at 5. Plaintiffs now contend that the

instruction is erroneous because the question of the reasonableness of a search when an

exigent circumstances defense is raised is a pure question of law. Plaintiffs waived their

right to raise this objection because they failed to raise it before deliberation. Moreover,

plaintiffs are incorrect; the question of the reasonableness of a search is in all circumstances

a mixed question of fact and law. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir.

1984) (en banc) (abrogated on other grounds).1

C

Plaintiffs also seek a new trial on the grounds that some evidence was improperly

submitted to the jury and other evidence was improperly excluded from the jury. To prevail

on these claims, plaintiffs must show error and prejudice.

1

Plaintiffs moved in limine to exclude evidence relating to a baggie that allegedly

contained marijuana residue. We granted that motion out of concern that the evidence would

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be used to establish an improper post-hoc vindication of the search and because the evidence

had not been preserved. Pretrial Conf. Tr. at 10-11. Nonetheless, at trial, defense counsel

Crown distributed to the jury a nine-page packet of documents in which the marijuana

residue was referenced on page seven. Upon learning of this blunder, we thoroughly

admonished the jury not to consider the evidence, and explained that the evidence is

irrelevant to the claims and that defendants do not contend that the marijuana belonged to

plaintiffs. Trial Tr. Excerpt of April 19, 2006 at 16-22. We denied plaintiffs' motion for a

mistrial without prejudice to its post-verdict renewal. Id. at 16. Subsequently, plaintiffs'

counsel also published evidence that referred to the baggie allegedly containing drug residue.

In this context, plaintiffs' counsel asserted that the previous admonishment "[took] care of

the problem." Trial Tr. Excerpt of April 20, 2006 at 5. Nonetheless, we again admonished

the jury to disregard this evidence. Trial Tr. Excerpt of April 25, 2006 at 3.

Plaintiffs contend that they were prejudiced by defendants' improper publication. We

disagree. We promptly and thoroughly instructed the jury to disregard the evidence and

"juries are presumed to heed cautionary instructions by the court." United States v.

McCormac, 309 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, any prejudice to plaintiffs is in

part attributable to their own disclosure of the evidence to the jury. Therefore, defendants'

improper disclosure was harmless error.

2

Defendant Johnson moved in limine to exclude evidence related to any damages that

arose after Robert Howell fired his gun. We granted the motion, concluding that the shooting

was a superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation. Pretrial Conf. Tr. at

5. Plaintiffs contend that we erred in that conclusion.

Plaintiffs' contention is moot because defendants prevailed on all claims at trial, and

therefore an alleged error with regard to damages evidence is not prejudicial. Moreover,

plaintiffs' contention is incorrect. Plaintiffs contend that defendants are liable for harms

arising out of Robert Howell's arrest because the unconstitutional search caused him to fire

his gun which led to his arrest. We concluded at the summary judgment stage that

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defendants knocked and announced their presence before breaching the interior front door;

that there was no evidence to show that defendants knew or had reason to believe that their

announcements were incomprehensible; that therefore defendants did not provoke the

shooting; and that therefore defendants were not liable for the mere use of force and the

arrest. Order of February 24, 2006 at 24-25, 27-28. Put another way, the shooting was a

superseding cause that broke the chain of causation. Without any Erie doctrine analysis,

plaintiffs urge us to apply Arizona common law tort principles to the causation analysis,

which they contend yield an opposite result. However, plaintiffs' claims arise from the

United State Constitution, and therefore we accurately drew our conclusions with regard to

provocation and proximate cause from federal law. Id. (citing Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d

1177 (9th Cir. 2002) and Alexander v. San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)).

D

Plaintiffs also challenge conclusions that we reached in our order resolving the

motions for summary judgment. Although captioned as a motion for a new trial, this is an

untimely motion for reconsideration, see LRCiv 7.2(g), and is accordingly denied. Plaintiffs

attempt to circumvent the timeliness problem by contending that some evidence at trial was

unavailable when we considered the motions for summary judgment, and had we considered

that evidence, we would have reached different conclusions. But it was plaintiffs' burden to

timely bring that evidence to our attention. When a party moves for summary judgment, the

adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing

a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A party may use discovery mechanisms to

obtain evidence, and to the extent evidence is unavailable, it may request that the court

accordingly deny the motion for summary judgment or grant a continuance. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(f). Plaintiffs do not contend that they did either, or that they were prevented from doing

so by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by defendants. Therefore, we will not

now reconsider our order resolving the motions for summary judgment.

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II

Plaintiffs state that "[s]ince judgment as a matter of law must be granted Plaintiffs on

liability on this claim, the only question for the jury upon new trial will be the amount of

damages or nominal damages that should be awarded against each defendant." Motion for

a New Trial at 4. Despite this clear language requesting judgment as a matter of law,

plaintiffs clarify that they filed no such motion. Reply at 6. To be clear, we do not grant

judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs either because plaintiffs did not so move, or

because they failed to timely move before submission of the case to the jury. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50.

III

For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiffs' motion for a new trial

(doc. 202) and DENYING plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law (doc. 202).

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

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