Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00286/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONNIE DEVLYN, PAUL GLAU and No. 2:10-cv-00286-MCE-DAD

KRSTO KNEVICH,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN MUNICIPAL UTILITY

DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action Plaintiffs Connie Devlyn, Paul

Glau, and Krsto Knenevich (“Plaintiffs”) collectively allege

twenty causes of action against Defendant Lassen Municipal

Utility District (“Defendant”) for wrongful conduct alleged to

have been committed in the course of their employment by

Defendant. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in its entirety. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 2

allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint unless otherwise

specified.

2

Specifically, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first,

second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth,

fourteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth claims for

relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendant concurrently

moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second, fifth, sixth, seventh,

eighth, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth,

sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth

claims for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted pursuant to 12(b)(6). Additionally, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Defendant moves to strike

the portion of Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeking penalties

under California Labor Code § 1102.5.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motions are

denied in part and granted in part.1

BACKGROUND2

A. Connie Devlyn

Plaintiff Connie Devlyn (“Devlyn”) has been employed by

Defendant since 1975. She alleges that she has been subject to a

hostile work environment throughout her career because of her

gender. 

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3

Devlyn states that her co-workers routinely engaged in overtly

sexual conduct such as posting photographs of nude women in her

work area, leaving sexually oriented magazines in the restroom,

making sexual comments and suggestions to her, and performing

mock sex in front of her on other male employees or on a training

dummy. Her male co-workers are also said to have committed

various pranks including coming into her office to pass gas,

hanging a purple bra in the break room after she endured surgery

for breast cancer, hiding a dead skunk in her work area, and

tying the emergency exit door to her work area shut. 

Devlyn states she repeatedly reported the misconduct to

management but they failed to take adequate action. Instead,

Devlyn alleges that her manager ignored her reports and attempted

to intimidate her into not filing a Complaint. An investigation

was conducted, but Devlyn believes it was cursory. The

investigator found Devlyn’s claims to be without merit. 

Devlyn states Defendant later retaliated against her for her

complaints by diminishing her working conditions and relocating

her to a less safe work area. She eventually complained to the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In February 2009, she

received a right to sue letter. 

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4

B. Paul Glau

Plaintiff Paul Glau (“Glau”) worked as a Facilities Manager

for Defendant from 1991 until December 31, 2009. Glau states

that in that time he opposed the campaign of sexual harassment

against a fellow employee (Devlyn) and provided a statement to

management in support of her complaints. 

In May 2008, Glau began to suspect that excess levels of

toxic substances were present at one of Defendant’s work sites. 

He reported his findings but reviewing officials determined that

Glau had mistaken the scientific notations reflecting the

contamination levels. No corrective action was taken. 

Glau contends that subsequent to his reports of

contamination and his statement regarding the sexual harassment

claim, Defendant retaliated against him by taking away his

company vehicle, withholding information from him, and assigning

him lesser work than the executive job responsibilities

previously given to him. 

Defendant also proposed Glau’s termination. However when an

internal investigator found termination to be unwarranted, Glau

alleges that a General Manager told him that if he did not retire

by the end of 2009 he would be fired. Glau agreed to retire on

December 31, 2009. He asserts that his retirement was a

constructive discharge.

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5

C. Krsto Knezevich

Plaintiff Krsto Knezevich (“Knezevich”) has worked for

Defendant since 1997. During that time he served as a

subordinate under co-Plaintiff Paul Glau. As part of his duties,

Knezevich states he participated in reporting suspected high

levels of toxic substances present at one of Defendant’s work

sites. Knezevich alleges that he also opposed the sexual

harrasment of a co-worker (Devlyn) and he submitted a statement

in support of her complaints. 

As a result of these actions, Knezevich alleges that

Defendant retaliated against him by wrongfully issuing him a

written reprimand and assigning him lesser more dangerous tasks

with reduced potential for promotion. Knezevich asserts that

these tasks resulted in him being injured and now unable to work. 

On the basis of the aforesaid conduct by Defendant and

Defendant’s employees, Plaintiffs collectively filed suit,

alleging twenty causes of action. 

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). 

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6

Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion

constitutes a facial attack, the court must consider the factual

allegations of the complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker,

645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to

amend should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

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7

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. at 1964-65

(internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is not

required to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 

“Rule 8(a)(2)...requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

assertion of entitlement to relief. Without some factual

allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant

could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair

notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which

the claim rests.” Id. 

A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the

“plaintiffs...have not nudged their claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 

Id. 

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8

Nevertheless, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”

Id. at 556.

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then

decide whether to grant leave to amend. A court should “freely

give” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad faith[,]

dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue prejudice to

the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment, [or] futility of

the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is denied

only when it is clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be

cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

C. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “(T)he function of a 12(f)

motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. 

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Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)

(rev’d on other grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,

114 S. Ct. 1023, 127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994)) (internal citations

and quotations omitted). Impertinent matter consists of

statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the

issues in question. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts 1-5, 7-8, 11-12, 14-15,

and 18-19 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Defendant asserts that these claims are

jurisdictionally defective in that Plaintiffs have failed to

allege exhaustion of applicable administrative remedies. As to

Counts 1-5, 7-8, and 14-15, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs

failed to obtain prerequisite right to sue letters from the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) as required

for claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

(“Title VII”) and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) respectively. 

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 Plaintiffs’ Complaint addresses its claims as arising 3

under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”), whereas Defendant’s

Motion refers to such claims as arising under the Resource

Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”). The Court acknowledges that

the RCRA was enacted as an amendment to the SWDA, and therefore

reference to either would be appropriate. For consistency, the

Court will refer only to the SWDA. 

10

As to Counts 11-12 and 18-19, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs

failed to apply to the Secretary of Labor for review as required

for claims arising out of the Comprehensive Environmental,

Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and Solid Waste

Disposal Act (“SWDA”). Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs’ 3

failure to obtain right to sue letters or apply to the Secretary

of Labor for review deprive this Court of subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. 

1. Right to Sue Letter

Plaintiffs’ Counts 1-5, 7-8, and 14-15 allege sexual

harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, retaliation in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, sexual harassment in violation

of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j), failure to prevent sexual

harassment in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k), and

retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h).

For federal claims arising under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e,

et seq., a plaintiff must first file an administrative complaint

with EEOC and receive a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5. 

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11

Similarly, for state claims arising under FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code

12900, et seq., a plaintiff must first file an administrative

complaint with DFEH and receive a right to sue letter.

Defendant complains that Plaintiffs initiated suit on

February 9, 2010 but did not file their administrative claims and

receive right to sue letters until February 26, 2010, after they

filed the civil action. Defendant asserts that, resultantly,

Plaintiffs’ relevant claims are jurisdictionally defective.

However, subsequent to receiving right to sue letters,

Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on April 6, 2010.

Under this operative complaint, Plaintiffs have properly alleged

exhaustion of applicable administrative mandates such that they

are now authorized to file suit in district court. In the

operative complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged that the obtained

right to sue letters. Jurisdiction has been sufficiently

established.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Counts 1-5, 7-8, and 14-15 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

2. Application for Review by the Secretary of Labor

Plaintiffs’ Counts 11-12 and 18-19 allege retaliation for

reporting contamination addressed by CERCLA in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 9610(a), and retaliation for reporting contamination

addressed by SWDA in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6971.

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12

Defendant argues that for claims arising under CERCLA or

SWDA that Plaintiffs were required to apply to the Secretary of

Labor for a review of their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 6971(a), 9610(a). In support of this proposition, Defendant

relies on a Northern District of Indiana case, Rhode v. City of

West Lafayette, 850 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Ind. 1993). However, the

jurisdictional question in Rhode regarded an attempt to appeal an

administrative decision rendered by the Department of Labor, not

whether review by the Department of Labor was a necessary

precursor to civil suit. Moreover, Rhode holds no binding

authority over this Court and nothing in the statute or in Ninth

Circuit precedent requires that a plaintiff first apply to the

Secretary of Labor for review in order to assert a claim under

CERCLA or SWDA. Rather, the text of both CERCLA and SWDA state

that any employee who belives he has been fired or discriminated

against for reporting suspected contamination “may...apply to the

Secretary of Labor for review of such firing or alleged

discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971(a), 9610(a) (emphasis added). 

The language employed is permissive, not obligatory. This Court

may properly exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim without

prior administrative review.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Counts 11-12 and 18-19 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

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B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Jurisdiction having been established, the Court now turns to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 5-10, and 13-

20 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’

allegations are cursory, failing to sufficiently state facts in

support of their claims as necessary under the notice pleading

standard. The Court will address the claims brought by each

individual Plaintiff in turn. 

1. Claims Alleged by Devlyn

Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 5 and 6, as

alleged individually by Plaintiff Connie Devlyn. Defendant

argues that these claims consist of mere legal conclusions that

fail to meet the pleading standard. 

Counts 2 and 5 allege that Defendant, in response to

Devlyn’s complaints of sexual harassment, retaliated against her

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12940(h) “by changing her working conditions in a negative

manner, isolating her, and changing her work location to a less

convenient and safe area in the workplace”. Count 6 alleges

threats of violence in the workplace in violation of Cal. Civil

Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1. 

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To support her claim, Devlyn alleges several inappropriate acts

by her coworkers including hiding a dead skunk in her work area,

operating equipment in her vicinity in a manner calculated to

startle her, tying the emergency exit door in her work area shut,

and writing “Ding Dong the Witch is Dead” on a bulletin board

after Devlyn returned from surgery to treat breast cancer. She

also believes one of her coworkers tampered with the brakes of

her car.

For each of these claims, the allegations provided are by no

means mere “legal conclusion” but rather factual descriptions of

actions allegedly taken against Devlyn and her belief that such

action was committed in retaliation and constituted threats of

violence. Defendant need only be placed on notice of the facts

alleged and armed with the ability to construct a viable defense. 

That standard has been met here. 

Defendant additionally argues that Count 6 for “threats of

violence in the workplace” also falls short of the pleading

standard for failing to allege compliance with the California

Tort Claims Act. Defendant asserts that because the allegations

of Count 6 fall under California’s Ralph and Bane Acts

respectively, that Plaintiff is therefore required to follow the

presentment obligations of the California Tort Claims Act in

order to bring a claim. See Cal. Gov Code § 910, et seq. In

asserting this requirement, Defendant relies on Doe By and

Through Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560

(N.D. Cal. 1993); Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744

(Ct. App. 2002); and Gates v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 4th

481 (Ct. App. 1995).

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However, the case law Defendant relies upon is inapplicable. 

Both Doe and Gatto concern the Unruh Act, not the Ralph and Bane

Acts. Nor does Gates apply to the case at bar; although it

touches on Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 of the Ralph Act, there the

court’s ruling focused on the protections afforded to police

officers against “threats of violence” lawsuits for conduct

committed in the course of their duties. Here, Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiffs must first allege compliance with the

California Tort Claims act in order to state a claim for “threats

of violence in the workplace” is without merit.

 As to Counts 2, 5 and 6, Plaintiffs have met their burden

under the notice pleading standard. Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Counts 2, 5, and 6 pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) is denied. 

2. Claims Alleged by Glau

Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Counts 7-8, 10 and

13, as alleged by Plaintiff Paul Glau, for failure to meet the

pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Counts 7-8 allege that after Glau expressed support for a

fellow employee (Devlyn) in her complaints of sexual harassment,

Defendant retaliated against him by charging him with misconduct

and forcing his early retirement in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e3 and Cal. Gov’t Code § 1294(h). Count 10 alleges that after

Glau engaged in the “protected activity” of reporting toxic

substances, Defendant retaliated against him by forcing his early

retirement in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5. 

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Finally, in Count 13, Glau alleges that his forced retirement

constituted a “constructive discharge” in violation of his

procedural due process rights.

All of these claims are comprised of facts sufficient to

meet the notice pleading standard. Defendant has been made aware

of the conduct and circumstances that Glau believes is unlawful,

and therefore may adequately prepare a defense in response to the

facts alleged. 

Defendant further argues that as regards to Count 10, Glau

has failed to state a claim as he did not participate in a

“protected activity” as required under Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5. 

Under the statute, a protected activity exists “where the

employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information

discloses a violation of state or federal statute.” Defendant

argues that because investigators later found that the toxic

levels Glau reported were not dangerous, that Glau therefore did

not have reasonable cause to believe a statute was being

violated.

However Defendant’s argument inappropriately alters the

definition of “protected activity,” implying that the person

reporting the suspected violation must be correct in order to be

protected. That is not what the statute requires. “Reasonable

cause” is the relevant standard, and here Defendant has alleged

that he reasonably believed that a statute was being violated. 

Finally, Defendant argues for dismissal of Counts 7-8, 10,

and 13 on the alternate ground that Glau did not suffer an adverse

employment action. Defendant argues Glau retired voluntarily and

was not subjected to a hostile working environment. 

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However, Defendant’s argument inherently invokes a dispute

regarding the terms of Glau’s “discharge.” Such a determination

is not a legal question but a factual one, which would benefit

from the discovery process going forward. All that is required

at this stage is that Glau provide factual support for his

allegation that he suffered adverse employment action by

Defendant. That standard has been met.

Resultantly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 7, 8, 10

and 13 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.

3. Claims Alleged by Knezevich

Defendant seeks to dismiss Counts 17-19, as alleged by

Plaintiff Krsto Knezevich, for failing to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. Counts 17-19 alleged that after

Knezevich participated in reporting suspected high levels of

toxic substances, Defendant retaliated against him by wrongfully

charging him with misconduct, reprimanding him, and assigning him

lesser tasks in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9610(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 6971.

Again, the facts alleged are sufficient to place Defendant

on notice of the claims brought against it such that Defendant

may construct a defense. Plaintiffs have met the necessary

pleading standard.

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Defendant additionally attacks Count 17 on the grounds that

Knezevich did not participate in a “protected activity” as

required for a retaliation claim under Cal. Labor code § 1102.5. 

Defendant argues that because Knezevich was employed as a

subordinate he cannot be said to have participated in the

“protected activity” of reporting suspected high levels of toxic

substances, as he was not the authority who actually submitted

the report. 

However, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that despite

Knezevich’s role as a subordinate he was still “irrationally

blamed” for the reporting of toxic substances (Pls.’ Compl. 14:7)

and that Defendant “was aware that Knezevich had participated in

the reports” (Pls.’ Compl. 15:11-12). When evaluating a Motion

to Dismiss, the Court must take the factual allegations of the

Complaint as true. In so doing, the Court finds that Knezevich

was sufficiently a participant in a protected activity as to

belie a claim for violation of Cal. Labor code § 1102.5. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 17-19

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.

4. Non-Opposition to Dismissal 

Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of Counts 9, 14-16, and

20. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss these claims is granted.

///

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C. Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief for civil penalties under

California Labor Code § 1102.5 as Defendant is a public entity. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Docket No. 8) is DENIED as to Counts 1-8, 10-13, and 17-

19. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts 9, 14-

16, and 20. Defendant’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint not later than

twenty (20) days after the date this Memorandum and Order is

filed electronically. If no amended complaint is filed within

said twenty (20)-day period, without further notice, Plaintiffs’ 

Counts 9, 14-16, and 20 will be dismissed without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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