Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04324/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04324-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR PARNELL III,

Petitioner,

v.

MIKE EVANS, Warden,

Respondent. _________________________________________

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No. C 05-4324 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket no. 14)

Petitioner Arthur Parnell III, filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss the instant

petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) -- the statute of

limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner

opposes the motion. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Respondent's

motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND 

An Alameda County jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder and arson, with a

deadly weapon enhancement. On April 2, 2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to state prison

for sixty-six years to life. 

On May 30, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. (Resp't Ex. 1.) 

On August 13, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review. (Resp't

Ex. 2.)

On October 27, 2003, Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition in this Court. See

Parnell v. Lamarque, Case No. C 03-4801 SBA (PR). On December 22, 2004, the Court dismissed

the petition for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies as to one of his claims -- his Fourteenth

Amendment claim -- and granted Petitioner leave to file an amended petition within forty-five days

of the date of the Order asserting only his exhausted claims. (Dec. 22, 2004 Order at 4.) Otherwise

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his failure to file an amended petition within the forty-five day time frame would result in the

dismissal of his petition. (Id.) On February 2, 2005, Petitioner withdrew his petition in order to

exhaust his state judicial remedies as to his unexhausted Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Clerk

thus terminated his first federal action on February 2, 2005. 

On May 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior

Court. (Resp't Ex. 3.) The superior court denied the petition on May 13, 2005. (Resp't Exs. 4, 5.)

 On June 16, 2005, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal. 

(Resp't Ex. 6.) The appellate court denied the petition on July 1, 2005. (Id.) 

On July 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court,

seeking review of the appellate court's denial of his habeas petition. (Resp't Ex. 7.) The state

supreme court denied the petition for review on September 28, 2005. (Id.)

On October 6, 2005, Petitioner signed his second federal habeas petition, and it was file

stamped in this Court on October 25, 2005.

DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed a statute of limitations on

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on

which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state

action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, such as Petitioner,

ordinarily must file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date his process of direct

review came to an end. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

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1 A pro se federal habeas petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison

authorities for mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a federal or state

habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison authorities for mailing,

rather than the date it is received by the courts). October 6, 2005 is the date the instant petition was

signed and the earliest date that the petition could have been delivered to prison authorities for

mailing. The Court assumes for the purposes of this discussion that the petition was delivered to

prison authorities on that date. 

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(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The one-year period generally will run from "the date on which the judgment became final

by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). "Direct review" includes the ninety-day period during which a criminal appellant

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether he actually

files such a petition or not. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In the present case, the California Supreme Court denied review on August 13, 2002. The

judgment became final for purposes of the statute of limitations ninety days later, on November 11,

2003. See Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159. The one-year limitations period, therefore, began to run on

that date. Accordingly, Petitioner had until November 11, 2004 to file his federal habeas petition. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner's first federal petition was timely because it was filed on

October 27, 2003, before the limitations period expired. However, his second federal habeas

petition filed on October 6, 2005,1 almost one year after the limitations period had expired, is

untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitations period was tolled under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of time. AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under

§ 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review [with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" Dictado v.

Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). In Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is also tolled

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2 In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of appeal, and superior courts all have

original habeas corpus jurisdiction. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Although a superior court order denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may

file a new habeas corpus petition in the court of appeal. Id. If the court of appeal denies relief, the

petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the supreme court. Id. at 1006 n.3.

3

 May 6, 2005 is the date Petitioner's state habeas petition was signed and the earliest date

that the petition could have been delivered to prison authorities for mailing; therefore, it will be

deemed filed on that date. See Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1268

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 The Court also finds that Petitioner's second federal habeas petition does not relate back to

his first federal habeas action, which was dismissed as unexhausted and subsequently withdrawn by

Petitioner. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (petition that has been

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during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher

state court. In California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original writ' system," this

means that the limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between a state court's

disposition of an original state habeas petition and the filing of a further original state habeas

petition in a higher court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the

higher court. See id. at 220-25.2

 

In the present case, Petitioner's state habeas petition was deemed filed on May 6, 2005,3

which was almost two years after the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on

direct appeal. It also was about six months after the November 11, 2004 deadline for filing his

federal habeas corpus petition. Because the state habeas petition was filed after the one-year statute

of limitations had expired, the time it was pending in state court cannot serve to toll the statute. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

That Petitioner filed a previous federal habeas action in this Court does not compel a

different result. It is well-established that an application for federal habeas review is not an

"application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). 

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2001). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling of the limitations period during the time frame Petitioner's first federal habeas action was

pending in this Court.4

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dismissed without prejudice no longer pending within meaning of relation-back doctrine); see also

Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (relation-back doctrine inapplicable when initial

habeas petition was dismissed because there is no pleading to which to relate back); Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that habeas petition filed after previous

petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies does not relate

back to earlier petition). 

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 The record shows that Petitioner sent a letter to the Court on April 29, 2005 asking about

the status of his case.

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Accordingly, statutory tolling is not sufficient to overcome the time bar to Petitioner's second

federal habeas petition.

II. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of

limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. Equitable tolling is unavailable in

most cases, because it is applied only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

"When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The petitioner must show that the "extraordinary circumstances"

were the cause of his untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that this "extraordinary exclusion" should

apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The threshold to meet the

burden for equitable tolling under AEDPA is a high one. Id. at 1066. 

Petitioner claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the time frame that his first federal

habeas action was pending in this Court. (Opp'n at 2-4.) He claims that he filed his first federal

petition "almost two in [sic] a half weeks before Petitioner's actual year would have started." (Id. at

1.) He "then followed the Court's instructions and choose [sic] to withdraw his petition so as to

exhaust any issues that were unexhausted." (Id.) He claims that he "didn't find out about the

granting of his withdrawl [sic] motion until April 2005."5

 (Id.) He then filed his state habeas

petition on May 11, 2005, and exhausted his unexhausted claim as previously mentioned. Petitioner

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adds that he "always made it a point to diligently seek redress in the courts." (Id. at 3.)

Although directed to do so, Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner's opposition. As

such, Respondent has not addressed whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling based on the

aforementioned reason. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Respondent's motion to dismiss without

prejudice to renewing the motion and addressing the issues of equitable tolling raised in Petitioner's

opposition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 14) is DENIED

without prejudice to renewing the motion and addressing the issues set forth above no later that sixty

(60) days of the date of this Order. If Respondent chooses to file a renewed motion, Petitioner shall

file an opposition, no later than thirty (30) days of his receipt of the renewed motion, and

Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner a reply no later than fifteen (15) days of

receipt of any opposition.

2. Should Respondent fail to file a renewed motion to dismiss within the sixty-day time

frame, Respondent is directed to SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent shall file with this Court and serve upon Petitioner, no later than sixty (60) days of the

date of this Order, an Answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file

with the Answer a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed previously

and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing a Traverse with the

Court and serving it on Respondent no later than forty-five (45) days of his receipt of the Answer. 

Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed submitted and ready for decision fortyfive (45) days after the date Petitioner is served with Respondent's Answer. 

3. It is Petitioner's responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the court

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk of the Court headed

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.05\Parnell4324.denyMTD(sol).frm 7

"NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS," and comply with any orders of the Court within the time

allowed or ask for an extension of that time. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Martinez v.

Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

4. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court, whether by way of

formal legal motions or informal letters, must be served on Respondent by mailing a true copy of the

document to Respondent's counsel. 

5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

However, the party making a motion for an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty to

comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion for an extension of

time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order

addressing the motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an extension of time must

be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

 6. This Order terminates Docket no. 14.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2008 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge 

 

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.05\Parnell4324.denyMTD(sol).frm 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PARNELL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EVANS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-04324 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 2, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Arthur Parnell T50222

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960-1050

Dated: April 2, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

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