Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02471/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marcus Jeffey Reaves, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Ryan Thornell, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-23-02471-PHX-DWL (MTM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. Doc. 1. 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

 Petitioner was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court cases ##CR 2021- 

115011 and CR 2021-127035 of attempted and actual possession of narcotics for sale and 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to multiple terms of 

imprisonment. Because Petitioner’s three grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted 

without excuse, the Court recommends his Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 A. Facts. 

The presentence investigation report summarized the facts as follows: 

On April 21, 2021, police conducted a traffic stop of [Petitioner]. Petitioner denied 

the presence of drugs or weapons in the car. Police found a firearm on the driver’s 

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seat; a search of [Petitioner] and the car identified cocaine and other suspected 

drugs. [Petitioner] admitted he could not lawfully possess the firearm but stated it 

was not his. In the trunk of the car police located a backpack containing a short 

barrel rifle with no serial number, an empty holster that fit the handgun from the 

driver’s seat, 160 runs of ammunition, three baggies of methamphetamine, and more 

pills. 

Doc. 11-1 at 210, Ex. V (CR 2021-115011 case). 

On July 19, 2021, [Petitioner] was in a motel room when motel security officers 

responded to a request to fix an air conditioner. As a security officer used his cell 

phone to photograph drug paraphernalia in the room, [Petitioner] tried to slap the 

phone out of the officer’s hand. After an officer pushed [Petitioner] back, 

[Petitioner] withdrew a revolver from his waistband and pointed it at the two 

security officers. One officer drew his firearm; the other officer used his taser on 

[Petitioner]. [Petitioner] later told police that the gun was not his and that he picked 

it up from the bed when he saw the security officers; [Petitioner] denied pointing 

the gun at the security officers. 

Doc. 11-1 at 211, Ex. V (CR 2021-127035 case). 

 Petitioner was indicted on various charges. He pled guilty to possession of narcotics 

for sale with one prior felony conviction (CR 2021-115011), doc. 11-1 at 154, Ex. R; and 

aggravated assault (CR 2021-127035). Id. at 148, Ex. Q. 

 On November 30, 2022, a Superior Court judge sentenced Petitioner to 10 years of 

imprisonment for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently with a 9.25 year 

sentence for possession of narcotics for sale. 

B. Post Conviction Proceeding. 

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief in both cases. Doc. 11-1 at 228, 

232; Exs. W, X. On September 1, 2023, Petitioner filed his PCR petition. Id. at 287, Ex. 

EE. Petitioner asserted his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the vehicle 

search on April 21, 2021, that a Superior Court judge had committed misconduct, and that 

his counsel had been ineffective. Id. at 288. On March 18, 2024, the PCR Court dismissed 

the petition for failure to present a material issue of fact or law justifying relief. Id. at 312, 

Ex. II. Petitioner did not seek review of the dismissal. 

III. PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION 

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on November 28, 2023. Doc. 1. As summarized 

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by this Court, in Ground One Petitioner “alleges his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 

were violated when officers questioned him and searched his vehicle without a warrant or 

exigent circumstances;” in Ground Two, he alleges the “Supremacy Clause ‘will not permit 

[the] state court to usurp function[s] that Congress has assigned to federal regulations;’” in 

Ground Three, Petitioner “asserts he is illegally imprisoned in violation of the Supremacy 

Clause.” Doc. 8 at 1-2. 

 On May 24, 2024 Respondents filed a limited Answer. Doc. 11. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted without excuse 

 “Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust 

available state remedies, thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(cleaned up). “[T]he exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair 

opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the 

federal courts . . . .” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The prisoner “must 

‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court,” id. at 29 (citations omitted), and 

“clearly state the federal basis and federal nature of the claim, along with relevant facts,” 

Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 2011). In non-capital cases, claims of Arizona 

prisoners “are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals 

has ruled on them.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 

Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp.2d 925, 933 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

If a petitioner failed to raise a claim in state court, a federal court should dismiss the 

petition with prejudice “if it is clear that the state court would [now] hold the claim 

procedurally barred” under a state procedural rule upon the petitioner returning to state 

court to exhaust his claims. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

 The procedural default doctrine is rooted in “the adequate and independent state 

ground doctrine.” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under that doctrine, federal courts should decline to consider federal law issues 

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if the judgment “rests on a state-law ground that is both independent of the merits of the 

federal claim and has an adequate basis for the court’s decision.” Id. at 1230–31 (quoting 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989)). 

 As noted, Petitioner sought PCR review in state court. Doc. 11-1 at 287-292, Ex. 

EE. However, the issues Petitioner now raises in his habeas petition were not presented to 

the PCR Court, and were not presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, as Petitioner did 

not appeal the PCR Court’s dismissal of his PCR petition. See PCR petition, doc. 11-1 at 

287-89, Ex. EE, raising a Fourth Amendment issue, not the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

issues raised in his habeas petition, as well as omitting the Supremacy Clause grounds now 

asserted in the habeas petition. Accordingly, all three grounds in the habeas petition are 

procedurally defaulted. Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-31. 

 At this point Petitioner is barred from returning to state court to raise the claims he 

now asserts in his habeas petition, as his claims are not permitted in a second PCR. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(d)-(h) (specifying claims permitted in a second PCR), and Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 33.2(a) (precluding claims waived by guilty plea or waived in previous PCR 

proceeding, except for claim of violation of a constitutional right that that can only be 

waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by defendant). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

33.4(b)(3)(A), (B) (barring untimely PCR claims), and Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 

450 (2002) (petitioner waives a claim by not raising it in a previous PCR proceeding, unless 

the right involved requires a knowing and voluntary waiver). See also Hurles v. Ryan, 752 

F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases 

for denying relief.”). 

To obtain review of a procedurally defaulted claim, a petitioner must show “either 

cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or that failure to review the claims would 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 Petitioner has not asserted or shown cause for his procedural default. Having filed 

a timely PCR petition raising issues different than those he now wishes to litigate in his 

habeas petition, it is evident that no external and objective factor impeded Petitioner’s 

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ability to comply with Arizona’s state procedural rules – the issues now raised in 

Petitioner’s habeas petition could have been, but were not, raised in his previous state court 

PCR. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). 

 Petitioner has also not stated a credible claim of actual innocence. “Actual 

innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the 

impediment is a procedural bar . . . or expiration of the AEPA statute of limitations.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 383-84 (2012). “Actual innocence means factual 

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 615 

(1998). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). 

The main thrust of Petitioner’s habeas petition is his disagreement with the trial 

court’s refusal to grant his motion to suppress the search of his car, which resulted in the 

discovery of a firearm and drugs. See doc. 1 at 6-7. However, in his plea colloquy, when 

asked whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was “giving up” the argument from 

his motion to suppress, Petitioner answered “yes.” Doc. 11-1 at 176, Ex. S. Further, 

Petitioner acknowledged that he had not been forced or threatened in any way to give up 

his right to trial. Id. at 177. 

 On this record, where Petitioner does not present a credible claim of actual 

innocence, supported by new reliable evidence, no fundamental miscarriage of justice will 

result from a failure to review his claims. See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-

267 (1973), holding that federal habeas relief was generally not available for “deprivation 

of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of a guilty plea,” where “a criminal 

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with 

which he is charged.1

” 

1

 In both of his plea agreements Petitioner acknowledged that he was waiving and giving 

up “any and all motions, defenses, objections or requests which he has made or raised, or 

could assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition of a 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 Having determined that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred without excuse, 

the Court will recommend his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE; 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen 

days within which to file a response to the objections. 

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sentence consistent with this agreement.” See doc. 11-1 at 150, Ex. Q (aggravated assault 

case); id. at 156, Ex. R (possession of narcotics for sale case). 

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 Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 

Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not 

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2024. 

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