Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00533/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD BALDINE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0533 DFL DAD P

vs.

CAREY, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the judgment of conviction

entered against him in the San Joaquin County Superior Court on charges of transportation of

marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) jury

instruction error violated his right to due process; (2) his right to confront the witnesses against

him was violated when the jurors conducted an experiment during their deliberations; (3) his

right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court denied his motion for new trial on the ground

of juror misconduct; (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (5)

the prosecution violated his right to due process when it mishandled crucial evidence necessary

to prove his innocence. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the December 20, 2001, opinion by the 1

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-4,

filed on May 10, 2004, as exhibit D to respondents’ answer. The Court of Appeal’s opinion was

partially published. See People v. Baldine, 94 Cal. App. 4th 773 (2001).

2

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A jury convicted defendant Richard John Baldine of transportation

of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code § 11360, subd. (a)) and

possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). In

a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true an attempted robbery

strike allegation (Pen Code, §§ 664/211, 667, subds. (b) - (I),

1170.12) and two prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5,

subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for eight years.

* * *

Prosecution case-in-chief

On April 3, 2000, Tracy Police Officer Tomas Ribota conducted a

traffic stop of Jennifer Pesout for a Vehicle Code violation. 

Defendant was a passenger in Pesout’s car. When it was

discovered that Pesout did not have a valid driver’s license and had

an outstanding warrant, she was arrested. Because defendant’s

driver’s license had expired, and no other driver was available,

Ribota decided to impound the car. Defendant was asked to step

out of the car and an inventory search began.

Officer Ribota first searched the front seats. He found doughnuts

on the floor, a knife under the seat, and a portable radio scanner

between the two front seats. The scanner was not on, but Ribota

turned it on to see if it worked and found that it did. The scanner

received the Tracy Police channel. Ribota placed these and other

items on top of the car. Defendant, who was standing about 25 feet

away, asked for the doughnuts, the scanner, and a set of keys.

The search progressed to the back seat, where Officer Ribota

located some plastic jugs of water and a man’s black leather jacket. 

He searched the jacket for valuables and found a large clear plastic

bag containing four small bags of suspected marijuana. The jacket

also contained a small ounce scale. As Ribota was stuffing the

suspected marijuana and scale back into the jacket pockets,

defendant said, “Throw that jacket back here.” Ribota asked, “This

jacket?” and defendant replied, “Yeah, it’s mine.” Ribota put

down the jacket, went over to defendant, and asked him “how

much weed” was in the jacket. Defendant said that there was no

marijuana in the jacket. Based on the quantity of marijuana and the

presence of the scale and scanner, Ribota arrested defendant for

possession of marijuana for sale. Laboratory analysis of the four 

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baggies revealed that each baggie contained between 25 and 28

grams of substance containing marijuana.

Defense

Defendant testified that he was a neighbor of Pesout and had never

been in her car before. He was not wearing a black leather jacket. 

Defendant had in his possession the doughnuts, a pack of tobacco

containing a $5 bill, a knife, and the scanner.

The scanner was not operational. It “[n]eeded to be charged or

needed batteries.” When turned on, it “would come on for a

second then just completely shut off.”

Defendant denied ownership of the jacket. However, he admitted

telling Officer Ribota, “I guess you could say it’s mine.”

Defendant admitted a 1993 felony conviction for possession of a

dangerous weapon.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal in the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District, in which he claimed that: (1) the jury was erroneously instructed with CALJIC

No. 17.41; (2) his motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was erroneously denied; and

(3) juror misconduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

(Answer, Ex. D at 2.) Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed in its entirety in a

reasoned decision dated December 20, 2001, which was certified for partial publication. 

(Answer, Ex. D.) On January 29, 2002, petitioner raised the same claims in a petition for review

filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) That petition was summarily denied by

order dated March 13, 2002. (Answer, Ex. F.) 

On March 17, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, in which he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel, and that the prosecution committed misconduct when crucial exculpatory

evidence was mishandled. (Answer, Ex. G.) The California Superior Court denied that petition

on the merits by order dated April 14, 2003. (Answer, Ex. H.) Petitioner raised the same claims

in a May 2, 2003, petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal. 

(Answer, Ex. I.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated May 15, 2003. (Answer,

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Ex. J.) Petitioner raised the identical claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated

February 4, 2004. (Answer, Ex. L.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Jury Instruction Error

Over a defense objection, petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No.

17.41.1, which provides as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their

deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis, it

is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court

of the situation.

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 208.) Petitioner claims that the giving of this jury

instruction violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and his Sixth Amendment

right to a trial by jury. Specifically, petitioner contends that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 “impinged

upon” the jurors’ right to engage in jury nullification, had a “powerful chilling effect on free

expression during deliberations,” and intrudes upon the privacy of jury deliberations. (Pet. at 5,

5(a); Traverse at 9.) Petitioner also argues that the instruction contradicts CALJIC No. 17.40,

also given at petitioner’s trial, which instructed the jury that “the People and the defendant are

entitled to the individual opinion of each juror.” (CT at 2-3.) Petitioner argues that the error in

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giving this jury instruction “must be deemed a structural error” which is not subject to harmless

error analysis. (Pet. at 5(a).) 

In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the California Court of Appeal rejected

petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No.

17.41.1. The state appellate court explained its reasoning as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court erred reversibly by instructing

the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (jury misconduct). He argues

CALJIC No. 17.41.1 improperly infringes on the right of jurors to

freely deliberate, violates their First Amendment right to free

expression, threatens the jury’s role as a check on the court,

impinges upon the practice of jury nullification, impermissibly

delves into the jurors’ thought processes, violates his right to a

verdict produced by free and frank deliberation, and chills the

independent and impartial judgment of each juror. He asserts the

error is “structural,” and thus requires reversal per se. We are not

persuaded.

Even if we were to assume, solely for the sake of argument, that

giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 was federal constitutional error, the

error would not be reversible per se. In People v. Molina (2000)

82 Cal.App.4th 1329 (Molina), this court held that any error in

giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 is not reversible per se, but is subject

to harmless error analysis under the standard of Chapman v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]. (Molina, supra, at

p. 1335.)

In this case, the jury was escorted to the deliberation room on the

afternoon of November 9, 2000, following closing arguments and

final instructions. The court adjourned for the day at 4:15 p.m. 

Following a holiday weekend, deliberations resumed at 9:00 a.m.

on November 13, 2000. At 11:30 a.m., the jury indicated that a

verdict had been reached. “The jury did not communicate with the

court during its deliberations. We will not infer that the jury

instruction had any impact prejudicing defendant. We reject

defendant’s speculative assumption that the instruction had a

chilling effect on the jurors’ deliberations, inhibiting the kind of

free expression and interaction among jurors that is so important to

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 After the state appellate court issued this decision, the California California Supreme 2

Court, using its supervisory authority over the lower state courts, discontinued the use of CALJIC

No. 17.41.1 because of its "potential" to intrude on jury deliberations. People v. Engelman, 28

Cal. 4th 436, 440 (2002).

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 the deliberative process. There is no warrant for that view on this

record.” (Molina, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336.)

(Opinion at 4-5.)2

Petitioner’s claim for relief is foreclosed by the decision of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals in Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004). In Brewer, the Ninth

Circuit held that, regardless of the "constitutional merits" of CALJIC No. 17.41.1, habeas corpus

relief was unavailable on the identical claim presented by petitioner here because there is "no

Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing" that use of this jury instruction violates a

defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 955-56. Here, as in Brewer, petitioner "has pointed to no

Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC 17.41.1--either on its face or as

applied to the facts of his case--violated his constitutional rights." Id. at 957. Thus, the state

court's rejection of petitioner's jury instruction claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, the

error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 623 (1993) (holding that a federal court may not grant habeas relief for trial errors without a

showing of actual prejudice, defined as a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict”). As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury in

petitioner’s case quickly reached a verdict without apparent difficulty. Petitioner’s jurors did not

ask any questions or communicate with the court in any way. There is simply no indication that

the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in this case chilled the jurors’ exercise of free speech or

prevented free and full deliberations. The conclusion of the state appellate court that a finding of

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prejudice under the circumstances of this case would be merely “speculative” is not

unreasonable. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Juror Misconduct/Trial Court Error

Petitioner’s next two claims concern the actions of his jurors when, during

deliberations, they turned on the radio scanner to see if it worked. Petitioner claims that this

“experiment” constituted juror misconduct which violated his right to a fair trial. Petitioner also

claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial on this basis. In the

published portion of its opinion, the California Court of Appeal explained the background to this

claim and its resolution as follows: 

Background

Defendant's new trial motion alleged the jury committed

misconduct during deliberations by conducting an unauthorized

experiment. The motion was supported by defendant's trial

counsel's declaration that, after trial, he interviewed a juror who

disclosed that the jury decided to turn on the scanner and check the

condition of the battery. According to the juror, the scanner

worked well and there was nothing wrong with the battery. The

jury concluded that, since defendant's testimony was that the

scanner was not working, his testimony as a whole was not

credible. 

After hearing argument, the trial court denied the new trial motion. 

The court noted that in People v. Cumpian (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th

307 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 861], the “jury took a duffel bag that was

involved in the evidence and tried putting it over their shoulder and

so forth because it was connected to the defendant's testimony. 

There the court pointed out the jury's re-enactment of that evidence

did not constitute the receipt of evidence out of court but was

merely an experiment directed at proffered evidence. To prohibit

jurors from analyzing exhibits in the light of proffered testimony

would obviate any reason for sending physical evidence in the jury

room in the first instance. [¶] As the jurors['] experiment was

based on evidence received in court, there was no juror

misconduct. And I think that basically is the precedent for this

particular case because it-that scanner was received in evidence. 

And obviously there would be no point in giving the jury evidence

unless they do have an opportunity to examine and look at it

closely. And so we keep telling them obviously in every trial

we're going to let them see the evidence and let them handle it and

look it over and see whether or not the nature of the evidence is

consistent with either the People's testimony or the defense

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testimony and so forth. [¶] I don't think that is the type of

experiment that is precluded by the court and would serve as a

basis for the granting of a new trial. So regardless, even assuming 

that all the statement in the affidavit is correct, I don't believe that's

grounds for a new trial.”

Analysis

This court recently set forth the controlling principles as follows:

“'[N]ot every experiment constitutes jury misconduct.” [J]urors

must be given enough latitude in their deliberations to permit them

to use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their

verdicts. [Citations.]“ ( United States v. Avery (6th Cir. 1983) 717

F.2d 1020, 1026.)' [Citation.] 'It is a fundamental rule that all

evidence shall be taken in open court and that each party to a

controversy shall have knowledge of, and thus be enabled to meet

and answer, any evidence brought against him. It is this

fundamental rule which is to govern the use of ... exhibits by the

jury. They may use the exhibit according to its nature to aid them

in weighing the evidence which has been given and in reaching a

conclusion upon a controverted matter. They may carry out

experiments within the lines of offered evidence, but if their

experiments shall invade new fields and they shall be influenced in

their verdict by discoveries from such experiments which will not

fall fairly within the scope and purview of the evidence, then,

manifestly, the jury has been itself taking evidence without the

knowledge of either party, evidence which it is not possible for the

party injured to meet, answer, or explain.' [Citation.]” ( People v.

Bogle (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 770, 778-779 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 739]

(Bogle); see Higgins v. L. A. Gas & Electric Co. (1911) 159 Cal.

651, 656-657 [115 P. 313].)

Defendant testified that the scanner was not working, because it

“[n]eeded to be charged or needed batteries”; when turned on, it

“would come on for a second then just completely shut off.” 

During deliberations, the jury turned on the scanner but it did not

“just completely shut off.” Rather, it “worked well,” and “there

was nothing wrong with the battery.”

By turning on the scanner and observing its operation, the jury

merely “use[d]” it “ 'according to its nature to aid them in weighing

the evidence which has been given and in reaching a conclusion

upon a controverted matter.' ” (Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p.

778.) Turning the switch that energized the scanner in this case

closely resembles turning the key that unlocked the safe in Bogle. 

The act was squarely “'within the lines of offered evidence'” and

did not “'invade'” any “'new fields.'” ( Ibid., italics omitted.) Nor

did the jury's experiment lead to any “ 'discoveries' ” that did not

“'fall fairly within the scope and purview of the evidence.'” (Ibid.)

Rather, the jurors' “discovery” that the scanner “worked” was

squarely within the scope of defendant's claim that it did not work. 

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Defendant's complaint is not that the experiment invaded a new

field, but that he had no opportunity to plow new ground in

response to the experiment. Thus, he had no chance to “show[]

that the scanner had some malfunction which explained why

sometimes it worked only for 'a second.'” Nor did he have a

chance to “explore the chain of custody more assiduously to see if

there was a possibility that the scanner was in a different

condition” than it had been when seized approximately seven 

months previously. The experiment itself had not yielded evidence

on either of these points.

Defendant does not contend the scanner in fact had a “malfunction

which explained why sometimes it worked only for 'a second.'” 

Nor does this silent record permit such a contention. Whether his

inability to pursue the issue was prejudicial can only be determined

on habeas corpus. (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692,

728-729 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248].)

Chain-of-custody issues are present whenever physical evidence

capable of submission to the jury is introduced at trial. Objections

related to the chain of custody are waived if not timely asserted.

(Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999,

1011 [147 Cal.Rptr. 195].) Defendant's argument would create an

end run around this rule whenever deliberating jurors manipulate

the physical evidence before them.

Defendant contends the jury's consideration of evidence adduced

by its experiment violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront

the evidence against him and, because this error was structural in

nature, reversal is required. We are not persuaded.

“In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case

necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence developed'

against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public

courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's

right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.”

Turner v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 466, 472-473 [85 S.Ct. 546,

550, 13 L.Ed.2d 424, 429].) When a jury considers extraneous

facts not introduced in evidence, “'a defendant has effectively lost

the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and the assistance

of counsel with regard to jury consideration of the extraneous

evidence.'” (Hughes v. Borg (9th Cir. 1990) 898 F.2d 695, 700,

quoting Gibson v. Clanon, (9th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 851, 854.)

However, where physical evidence admitted at trial is used by the

jury “according to its nature,” and any experiments are confined

“within the scope and purview of the evidence” (Bogle, supra, 41

Cal.App.4th at p. 778), the jury does not receive “extraneous facts

not introduced in evidence” within the meaning of Hughes v. Borg,

supra, 898 F.2d 695 at page 700. Here, the jury only considered

material that was in evidence, that defendant had an opportunity to 

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 The confrontation clause requires that defendants be afforded an adequate opportunity 3

to confront the evidence against them. (e.g., Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 1121,

1148 [99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 5 P.3d 203].) Although the jury's experiment may have taken

defendant by surprise, he was not without an opportunity to ascertain the scanner's working

condition during the evidentiary portion of the trial.

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confront, and that could properly be viewed. Defendant's Sixth

Amendment claim has no merit.3

People v. Baldine, 94 Cal. App. 4th 773, 777-80 (2001).

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, petitioner has the

right to be tried by an impartial jury and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify

against him. Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 876 -877 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)). 

Moreover, under Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), petitioner is entitled “to a jury that

reaches a verdict on the basis of evidence produced at trial, exclusive of ‘extrinsic evidence.’”

Grotemeyer, 393 F.3d at 877. In conducting their deliberations, “[j]urors have a duty to consider

only the evidence which is presented to them in open court.” Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d

880, 887 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73). “Evidence not presented at trial,

acquired through out-of-court experiments or otherwise, is deemed ‘extrinsic.’” United States v.

Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991). As explained in Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d

851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980):

When a jury considers facts that have not been introduced in

evidence, a defendant has effectively lost the rights of

confrontation, cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel

with regard to jury consideration of the extraneous evidence. In

one sense the violation may be more serious than where these

rights are denied at some other stage of the proceedings because

the defendant may have no idea what new evidence has been

considered. It is impossible to offer evidence to rebut it, to offer a

curative instruction, to discuss its significance in argument to the

jury, or to take other tactical steps that might ameliorate its impact.

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“Juror misconduct typically occurs when a member of the jury has introduced into

its deliberations matter which was not in evidence or in the instructions.” Thompson v. Borg, 74

F.3d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir.1987)). 

Nonetheless, a jury is permitted to examine evidence which was admitted at trial. United States

v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153,

159 (4th Cir. 1961) (noting “the rule that ‘the mere making of a more critical examination of an

exhibit than was made during the trial is not objectionable.’”). 

The California Court of Appeal's conclusion that the jury’s turning on of the

scanner that had been admitted into evidence was not improper is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in this case. This case does not

involve a juror conducting an experiment on an item not received in evidence. Cf. Marino, 812

F.2d at 504 (juror looking at her ex-husband's gun to see how hard you had to pull the trigger to

shoot it constituted extrinsic evidence); Jennings v. Oku, 677 F.Supp. 1061, 1062 (D. Hawaii

1988) (misconduct where the entire jury left the jury room and conducted an experiment on the

foreman’s car to resolve how the defendant’s fingerprint could have been found on the door of

the car); Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979) (jury foreman improperly engaged in an

out-of-court experiment during the course of his deliberations where he went to a car dealership,

asked to look at a pickup truck, and once in the truck, made certain twisting movements in an

apparent attempt to test the petitioner's self-defense explanation). Nor did the jurors conduct any

independent research, see e.g., Gibson, 633 F.2d at 855 (jurors independently obtained evidence

from medical encyclopedia regarding rarity of defendant's blood type after judge ruled such

evidence inadmissible), or bring extraneous documents to the deliberations. See United States v.

Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (jurors bringing news article about tax fraud

sentences to deliberations in a tax fraud case deemed extrinsic evidence); United States v.

Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (jurors reading a court file containing inadmissible

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evidence constituted consideration of extrinsic evidence). Rather, petitioner’s jurors merely

examined evidence introduced in this case to determine whether petitioner’s statements regarding

the evidence were true. This does not constitute misconduct. See e.g., Porous Media Corp. v.

Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1997) (jurors testing the strength of filters admitted

into evidence was not improper because the experiment was “merely part of the expected process

of scrutinizing the evidence as part of its deliberations”); Banghart v. Origoverken, A.B., 49 F.3d

1302, 1306-07 (8th Cir. 1995) (jury did not consider “extraneous evidence” in products liability

action arising from alcohol stove explosion when, during deliberations, jurors dropped toothpicks

and wooden matches that were not entered into evidence into stove which had been admitted into

evidence to test validity of plaintiff's expert's theory of how explosion occurred; rather, jurors

were merely testing truth of statements made concerning stove design); Taylor v. Reo Motors,

Inc., 275 F.2d 699, 705 (10th Cir. 1960) (court rejected plaintiff’s claim of jury misconduct

where jury dismantled and reassembled a trial exhibit using pocket knives, nail clippers and other

pocket tools to test the validity of certain trial testimony, reasoning that “[i]f the experiment or

demonstration was conducted by the jury for the purpose of testing the truth of the statements

made concerning the functioning of the heat exchanger, it was proper”). 

Cases finding juror misconduct due to improper experiments typically involve

either a situation in which a jury conducted an experiment outside of the presence of the other

jurors and reported the results to those jurors, or a situation where the jurors considered physical

evidence which was not admitted at trial. In the present case, the alleged jury misconduct does

not fall into either of these categories. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury in

petitioner’s case merely used the scanner “according to its nature to aid them in weighing the

evidence and reaching a conclusion upon a controverted matter.” (Opinion at 7.) The jury was

entitled to do this. As the court stated in Grotemeyer, “[t]he Sixth Amendment entitles a

defendant to an “impartial” jury, not to an ignorant one.” 393 F.3d at 879. 

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Petitioner has cited no case, and this court has found none, in which the United

States Supreme Court has suggested that the handling of admitted evidence such as that engaged

in by petitioner’s jury amounts to a violation of petitioner’s right of confrontation, his right to an

impartial jury, or any other constitutional right. Further, as noted by the state appellate court,

petitioner was not deprived the opportunity to demonstrate that the police scanner was defective. 

He could have conducted his own demonstration at trial, but chose not to do so. 

For all of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that his

constitutional rights were violated by the jurors’ “experiment” on the police scanner nor on his

claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the ground of jury

misconduct.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel. After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in

turn below.

1. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance of sufficient

investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound judgments.” 

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

2. Trial Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance due to

numerous alleged errors described in detail below. The California Superior Court denied

petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s decisions were

anything other than trial tactics which are not reviewable on habeas

corpus. Petitioner has therefore failed to set forth a prima facie

case of ineffective assistance of counsel so far as these claims are 

concerned. (People v. Weaver, 26 Cal.4th 876, 29 P.3d 103, 111

Cal.Rptr. 2d 2.)

In addition, petitioner has failed to set forth any facts to either

support his contentions or demonstrate prejudice as a result of

counsel’s actions. He has therefore failed to set forth a prima facie

case for habeas corpus relief. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)

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466 U.S. 668; People v. Weaver, supra; In re Bower, (1985) 38

Cal.3d 865; 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269; People v. Jackson

(1980) 28 Cal.3d 264; 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149; and In re

Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 125 Cal.Rptr. 286.)

(Answer, Ex. H.) 

a. Failure to Tape Record Interview with Ms. Pesout

Petitioner informs the court that his trial counsel interviewed Ms. Pesout prior to

trial and that her statements corroborated petitioner’s version of the events in all respects. (Pet.

at 6.) However, according to petitioner, Ms. Pesout did not testify at trial “due to procedural

reasons.” (Id. at 6A.) Petitioner claims that his trial counsel should have tape-recorded or had an

investigator present at his interview with Ms. Pesout in case she later became unavailable to

testify. He argues, “Ms. Pesout’s testimony was never heard as she was coerced into not

testifying and counsel was the only person who had heard her version and he could not put it

before the jury due to procedural reasons.” (Id.) 

Petitioner raised this argument in his motion for new trial in state court. (CT at

263.) In that motion, petitioner advanced the following arguments:

During trial, a hearing was held pursuant to Evidence Code section

402 (providing that a state trial court “may hear and determine the

question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or

hearing of the jury”), during which time witness Jennifer Pesout

was questioned as to an interview she gave to Mr. Remlinger

(petitioner’s trial counsel). Mr. Remlinger asked for the hearing in

order to establish that Ms. Pesout had told him in May or June of

2000 that the leather jacket in which the contraband was located

had been in the back seat of her car before she picked up Defendant

and that Defendant did not own the jacket or what was in its

pockets. The District Attorney convinced the Court to allow him

to impeach Ms. Pesout by presenting evidence that, some months

after the above-mentioned interview, Defendant had assaulted

Witness Pesout and threatened her with further bodily injury.

In granting the People’s motion to impeach the witness, the judge

recognized that Ms. Pesout’s interview with Mr. Remlinger would

be admissible as a prior consistent statement. Mr. Remlinger,

however, was unable to present testimony at either the 402 hearing

or later at trial as to the content of Ms. Pesout’s interview with him

because he did not have a third-party investigator present during

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the interview. He could not himself testify in the trial since he was

Defendant’s attorney, or at least he so concluded. As a result, Mr.

Remlinger decided not to present Ms. Pesout’s testimony at all.

By failing to have an investigator present when he interviewed a

critical witness, Mr. Remlinger effectively eliminated the one

independent witness who could testify to Defendant’s innocence. 

He put himself in a position where he would have to testify and

then argue his own credibility to the jury. When he chose not to

present Ms. Pesout at all, his actions removed a meritorious

defense available to Defendant.

(Id. at 263-64.) The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for new trial, reasoning that his

counsel’s decision not to call Ms. Pesout as a witness at trial was a tactical decision. The trial

judge ruled as follows:

Now the big evidence problem here probably is Ms. Pesout’s –

however that’s is (sic) pronounced – testimony here. Again, as

pointed out by the DA here, that was a strategy decision on the part

of Mr. Remlinger. I don’t see anything with respect to the decision

he made that would justify the granting of a new trial on that. He

decided not to call her. It was done because the district attorney

did have some information that would again indicate perhaps her

testimony was less than credible if she took the stand and testified

as represented. So that was purely a reasonable strategic decision

on the part of counsel at the time.

So I – I don’t think his failure to have somebody else present while

he interviewed her really was relevant to this issue and does not

serve as a basis for granting a new trial. So on that ground, court is

going to deny the motion for a new trial.

(Reporter’s Transcript (RT) at 429.) 

The state court record reflects that after the trial court ruled Ms. Pesout could be

impeached with evidence of prior domestic violence and threats made by petitioner, petitioner’s

trial counsel made the following statements:

Your Honor, I guess my question would be in order for me to

figure out what I want to do, I need to know whether my client 

wants to testify. If he wants to testify, I would put him on the stand

now, have him explain what occurred on April 3rd.

And I probably will leave Ms. Pesout out of it, because I think that

the – these subsequent acts are going to be enormously prejudicial 

to my client. If he doesn’t want to testify, then under those

circumstances I will take my chances with Ms. Pesout.

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(Id. at 210.) Counsel’s comments make it clear that his decision not to call Ms. Pesout as a

witness resulted from his desire to avoid the prejudicial effect upon petitioner the impeachment

evidence against her would likely have. That strategic decision did not stem from counsel’s

decision to interview Pesout alone without recording her statement. In other words, counsel

would not have called Ms. Pesout to the stand even if he had independent verification of her

interview statements. Further, because petitioner testified to his version of the events, counsel’s

failure to record Pesout’s statements had only a minor impact, if any, on petitioner’s ability to

present his case to the jury. In this regard, petitioner’s claim is directed primarily to trial

counsel’s tactical decision not to call Ms. Pesout as a witness because the risk of prejudice to

petitioner outweighed whatever benefit her testimony might have had. However, counsel’s

tactical decisions are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This court also

notes that nothing in the record indicates petitioner’s counsel could or should have known when

he first interviewed Ms. Pesout that she would be unavailable at trial. “In assessing prejudice, [a

reviewing court] does not ask what a defendant might have done had he benefitted from

clairvoyant counsel.” Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The conclusion of the California Superior Court that petitioner failed to

demonstrate either substandard performance or prejudice is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

b. Failure to Locate and Call Witnesses

Petitioner challenges the failure of his trial counsel to locate and call numerous

witnesses at his trial. He first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to “identify and present as a witness the person who sold Petitioner the police scanner

just prior to Petitioner’s arrest.” (Pet. at 6A.) Petitioner claims that this person could have

testified that the scanner “was not working, for more than a few seconds, on the day of

Petitioner’s arrest;” that the batteries on the scanner were “weak,” that “an operational problem

existed on that day” and that petitioner was not “actively seeking to purchase a scanner and the

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fact that it was in the vehicle was not to facilitate the transportation, or possession for sale of

marijuana.” (Id.) Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel should have called: (1) witnesses

who saw petitioner before he entered Ms. Pesout’s vehicle, who could have testified that he was

not wearing or carrying the leather jacket; (2) witnesses who could have testified that petitioner

“had never worn the leather jacket in question in all the time they had known him;” (3) witnesses

who had seen the actual owner of the leather jacket wearing it “in close proximity to the time it

was discovered in Ms. Pesout’s vehicle;” (4) an electronics expert to testify that the scanner was

broken or defective, or to explain whether it could have become “recharged” after being in police

custody; and (5) witnesses who would have known whether petitioner owned a scale. (Id. at 6A6B.). Petitioner’s suggestions as to the possible substance of testimony from these proposed

unnamed witnesses are not substantiated by the state court record or by anything contained in

petitioner’s filings in this court.

 Even assuming arguendo that defense counsel’s failure to locate and call the

unnamed witnesses listed above was outside "the wide range of professionally competent

assistance" that the Sixth Amendment requires, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. At

most, petitioner appears to be arguing that further investigation and interviews may possibly have

turned up helpful evidence. Any such contention is insufficient to establish prejudice. See Dows

v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (to establish that counsel was ineffective for failing

to produce a witness at trial, a habeas petitioner must provide "evidence that this witness would

have provided helpful testimony for the defense," such as an affidavit from the alleged witness);

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim

denied where he presented no evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he

investigated further, or what lengthier preparation would have accomplished); United States v.

Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of

ineffectiveness claim because he offered no indication of what potential witnesses would have

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testified to or how their testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on these claims.

c. Failure to Conduct Investigation

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable

investigation of his case. Specifically, he contends that counsel improperly failed to: (1) locate

the leather jacket and have it tested to determine the true owner of the jacket and to establish that

petitioner was not the owner; (2) “show that due to Ms. Pesout’s suspended driver’s license that

Ms. Pesout rarely used the vehicle and should have known who the regular operator was, or who

was the most logical suspect for leaving the contraband in the vehicle;” and (3) have the scale

and baggies tested for fingerprints. (Pet. at 6B-6C.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to these claims of

ineffective assistance. Petitioner’s unsupported claim that the result of further investigation into

these areas would have led to a different verdict is insufficient to establish prejudice. See

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“presentation of conclusory allegations

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal”); Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 632; Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by

a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20,

26 (9th Cir. 1994)). This court cannot say that counsel’s failure to conduct investigation into

these areas suggested by petitioner “render[ed] the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Accordingly, petitioner

is not entitled to relief on these claims.

d. Failure to Object to the Mishandling/Destruction of Evidence

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

“object to the state’s mishandling/destruction of evidence – which kept the leather jacket from

being before the jury, and had Petitioner kept the jacket and attempted to present it as evidence,

the state would have objected that it was not the same jacket that the marijuana was found in.” 

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 In the traverse, petitioner states that he made continuous requests to the trial court for 4

substitute counsel, pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). (Traverse at 15.) 

Petitioner explains that he “voiced a variety of objections,” including that his counsel “had

promised certain things in the case which had not been done, including filing a motion to strike

the prior serious felony allegations facing petitioner.” (Id.) Petitioner states that there was a

“complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship” and that the court “should have relieved

petitioner’s counsel and appointed another attorney.” (Id.) This claim is not contained in the

petition. To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise a new claim in this manner, it

must be rejected. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is

not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief); see also Greenwood v. Fed.

Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only issues which are argued

specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Even if this claim had been properly

raised, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Petitioner’s Marsden claim

is stated in cursory fashion, with no specific reference to the trial court record and without a

sufficient explanation of the facts surrounding the claim. Although the record reflects that

petitioner made two Marsden motions (see RT at 1, 57), the transcripts of these motions were

21

(Pet. at 6C.) The leather jacket was not destroyed or lost. Rather, as conceded by petitioner and

as reflected by the record, the leather jacket was returned to petitioner after his arrest. (Pet. at 6E;

RT at 151, 227.) As explained below in more detail, there is no evidence that the leather jacket

was mishandled by the prosecution. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to “object” on this basis did

not constitute ineffective assistance. 

e. Failure to Be Truthful with Petitioner

Petitioner contends that because of trial counsel’s “failure to be truthful,”

petitioner was forced to file two motions for substitute counsel. (Pet. at 6B-6C.) Specifically,

petitioner states that his trial counsel: (1) told petitioner that if Ms. Pesout testified the District

Attorney would take her children away from her and make her life miserable, thereby joining

with the state “in the coercion of a defense witness to deprive Petitioner of a defense;” (2) made

untrue statements to petitioner about Ms. Pesout in an attempt to “drive a wedge between

Petitioner and the main witness who could prove his innocence;” and (3) attempted to undermine

petitioner’s defense in retaliation for petitioner’s attempts to “fire him.” (Id. at 6C.) These vague

and unsupported allegations do not establish that counsel rendered ineffective assistance or that

petitioner suffered prejudice as a result thereof. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204; James, 24 F.3d at 26. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on these claims.

4

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sealed and have not been lodged with this court. (Id.) Petitioner has provided insufficient

support for his claim that a request for substitute counsel was improperly denied and his

allegations do not satisfy the specificity requirement. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. In addition, as

is clear from the record, the trial court allowed petitioner on two occasions to fully express his

complaints about his trial counsel. That is all that is constitutionally required. See Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“the Sixth Amendment requires on the

record an appropriate inquiry into the grounds of such a motion, and that the matter be resolved

on the merits before the case goes forward”); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.

1982) (“Thus, the state trial court’s summary denial of a defendant’s motion for new counsel

without further inquiry violated the Sixth Amendment.”) For these reasons, even if petitioner’s

Marsden claim had been properly presented to this court, it should be rejected. 

22

3. Appellate Counsel

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to raise on appeal the following claims: (1) the trial court erred when it ruled that Ms.

Pesout could be impeached with statements she made about the domestic violence incident

involving petitioner; (2) the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motion to suppress; (3)

the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motions to substitute counsel; (4) petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated because he was clothed in “jail attire” during trial; (5) the trial

court erred when it concluded that the leather jacket and baggies of marijuana need not be

presented in court; and (6) the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motion to strike a prior

conviction for purposes of sentencing. (Pet. at 6D; Traverse at 17.) Petitioner does not elaborate

on these claims, explain how they are meritorious, or offer any explanation as to why his

appellate counsel should have raised these claims instead of, or in addition to, those he raised on

appeal. For this reason alone, petitioner’s claims in this regard should be rejected. See Jones, 66

F.3d at 204; James, 24 F.3d at 26. Relief as to this claim should also be denied on the merits.

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751

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(1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the

ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is

not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise

meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a

showing of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing

to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to demonstrate prejudice in this

context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9. 

On appeal, petitioner’s counsel raised three claims: the jury was erroneously

instructed with CALJIC No. 17.41.1; jury misconduct violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

confrontation rights; and petitioner’s motion for new trial based on jury misconduct was

erroneously denied. (Answer, Ex. D at 2.) These claims were rejected by the California Court of

Appeal in a lengthy opinion that was certified for partial publication. This fact indicates that the

claims raised by petitioner’s appellate counsel were significant and meritorious. On the other

hand, petitioner has failed to show that he would have prevailed on appeal on the other claims he

suggests appellate counsel should have raised. Specifically, petitioner has not demonstrated that

the trial court’s decision to allow Ms. Pesout to be impeached with evidence of her prior

statements, its ruling on petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence, its decision that the leather

jacket and baggies of marijuana were not required to be produced in court, and its ruling on

petitioner’s motion to strike his prior conviction were erroneous, rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair, or otherwise violated his right to due process. 

As for petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise

the issue of how he was clothed when appearing before the jury at trial, it is true that a defendant

in a criminal case may not be compelled to appear in front of the jury wearing identifiable prison

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garb. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 512 (1976); United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d

1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). However, a criminal defendant may choose to dress in jail clothes. 

See Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989); Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13. Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate, or even to allege, that he was forced to appear in prison clothing during

trial, in violation of his constitutional rights. Lastly, as discussed above, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motions to substitute counsel. 

Appellate counsel’s decision to press only claims that he believed, in his

professional judgment, had more merit that the claims suggested by petitioner was "within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397

U.S. 759, 771 (1970). For these reasons, the state court determination with regard to petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he failed to 

conduct appropriate testing of the scale, jacket, and baggies found in Ms. Pesout’s car. Petitioner

contends that such tests would have established that he did not own these items. Specifically,

petitioner alleges:

No attempt was made to lift fingerprints from the scale, baggies, or

leather jacket – nor was any attempt made to preserve fingerprint

evidence by police during the course of their investigation and

therefore that evidence was unavailable to show that had

fingerprint evidence been taken it would have belonged to

someone other than Petitioner, as Petitioner did not own the leather

jacket where the marijuana and scale were allegedly found

according to officer Ribota, nor did Petitioner have knowledge or

ownership of marijuana or a scale on April 3, 2000.

(Pet. at 6E.) Petitioner also contends that the police did not conduct tests on the jacket, baggies

and scale because petitioner was an “exfelon.” (Traverse at 18.) Petitioner raised this claim in

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court, California Court of

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Appeal, and California Supreme Court. (Answer, Exs. G, I, K.) In all of these courts, the claim

was summarily denied. (Answer, Exs. H, J, L.)

“A defendant’s due process rights are violated if prosecutorial misconduct renders

a trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’” Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 (1986)). According to the Supreme Court, “the

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of

the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

Thus, the federal habeas court must distinguish between “ordinary trial error of a prosecutor and

that sort of egregious misconduct . . . amount[ing] to a denial of constitutional due process.” 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647-48 (1974).

Petitioner has failed to make the required showing in support of his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct. The state court record reflects, and petitioner concedes, that the

leather jacket was returned to him after his arrest. (Pet. at 6E; RT at 151, 227.) The marijuana

found in the jacket was tested by the prosecution and then placed in a secured vault. (Id. at 161.) 

The prosecutor conceded that he had not tested any of these items for fingerprints. (Id. at 152.) 

At the end of trial, petitioner’s counsel made an oral motion to dismiss based on the prosecutor’s

failure to produce the marijuana and leather jacket at trial. (Id. at 225.) The prosecutor

responded that he did not “think there’s any reason why [he] had to bring the marijuana in to

show it’s marijuana,” and that he chose, instead, to rely on witness testimony to establish the

ownership of the jacket, the nature of the substance found in the baggies, and the chain of

custody of these items. (Id. at 226-28.) The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss because he

couldn’t “think of any rule that requires that they actually physically bring the dope or anything

else here to the courtroom.” (Id. at 228.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

not fingerprinting the jacket, baggies, and scale. The prosecutor explained that he chose to rely

on witness testimony to establish that petitioner owned the jacket and possessed the marijuana

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 Throughout his petition and traverse, petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of the 5

charges against him. (Answer at 17 n.6; see also Pet. at 6C.) Assuming arguendo that petitioner

is making a freestanding claim of actual innocence, it should be rejected. In Herrera v. Collins, a

capital case, a majority of the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the execution of an

innocent person would violate the Constitution. A different majority of the Supreme Court

explicitly so held. Compare 506 U.S. at 417 with 506 U.S. at 419 and 430-37. See also House v.

Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2084 (2006) (declining to resolve whether federal courts

may entertain claims of actual innocence but concluding that the petitioner’s showing of

innocence in that case fell short of the threshold suggested by the Court in Herrera); Jackson v.

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc). Although the Supreme Court did not specify the standard applicable to this type

of “innocence” claim, it noted that the threshold would be "extraordinarily high" and that the

showing would have to be "truly persuasive." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. See also Carriger, 132

F.3d at 476. The Ninth Circuit has determined that in order to be entitled to relief on such a

claim a petitioner must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent. Jackson, 211 F.3d at

1165; Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476-77. Even assuming arguendo that a freestanding claim of

innocence may be maintained in this non-capital case, petitioner has failed to make the required

showing. Accordingly, relief as to any such claim should be denied. 

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and scales found in its pockets. This decision was reasonable under the circumstances of this

case and did not constitute egregious misconduct rendering petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair. Petitioner does not allege that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony

regarding the ownership of the jacket and other items, nor could he. There appears to be no

evidence that petitioner did not own the jacket. Certainly there is no evidence that the prosecutor

knew petitioner did not own the jacket or had any doubts about its ownership or its contents. 

Petitioner’s allegation that a test for fingerprints would have established that he did not own the

items in question is based on pure speculation and does not establish a constitutional violation. 

See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204; James v. Borg, 24 F.3d at 26. In short, there is no evidence

of misconduct or prejudice. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct. 

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E. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on his claims. (Traverse at 18.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), a district court presented with a request for an evidentiary

hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a petitioner’s

claims and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v. Ducharme,

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187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir.

2005; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). He must also “allege[]

facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir.

2000). Petitioner has not demonstrated that any additional facts need to be determined in order to

resolve the claims raised in the instant petition. Further, this court has determined that relief as

to petitioner’s claims should be denied on the merits because the state court’s decision was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on

petitioner’s claims. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 445; Earp, 431 F.3d 1166. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 2, 2006.

DAD:8:baldine533.hc

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