Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02286/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW FORREY HOLGERSON,

CDCR #E-19753,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MR. D. PARAMO;

MISS MESSLER, M.D.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02286-JLS-RBB

ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DENYING MOTIONS TO 

ALLOW AMENDING OF 

COMPLAINT AND TO REINSTATE 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND

(3) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(ECF Nos. 2, 4, 6)

Plaintiff Matthew Forrey Holgerson, currently incarcerated at the California Health 

Care Facility (“CHCF”) located in Stockton, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims his constitutional 

rights were violated when he was previously housed at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in 2017 and 2018. (Id. at 1.) He has not prepaid the full 

civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed 

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).

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Before the Court could rule on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, he filed a Motion 

to Allow Amending of Original Complaint and a Motion to Reinstate In Forma Pauperis. 

(ECF Nos. 4, 6.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Legal Standard 

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to 

preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner:

[H]as, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 

the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 

v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the 

PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred 

from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the 

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. 

Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

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prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” ElShaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 

F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When ... presented with multiple claims within a single 

action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 

dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th 

Cir. 2016)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1051–52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.”).

B. Discussion

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it contains no “plausible 

allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). In his “Motion to 

Reinstate In Forma Pauperis Status,” Plaintiff appears to be challenging a ruling in an 

Eastern District of California proceeding in which he was denied IFP status pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). (See ECF No. 6 at 1–2.) In the Eastern District matter, the Court found 

that several of Plaintiff’s previous actions constituted “strikes” because they had been 

dismissed as frivolous. (Id. at 2–3.) 

Plaintiff denies that these matters were frivolous and claims that he was trying to 

explain “mind control systems” that were developed by “alien species technology” and

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used on “American citizens.” (Id. at 3.) This Court cannot overturn or modify the decision 

of another District Court. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “mind control systems” found in the 

matters which were determined to be “strikes” are frivolous. “[A] complaint, containing 

as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an 

arguable basis either in law or in fact. . . . [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a 

complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual 

allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a 

complaint is frivolous, the court need not accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce 

the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations,” id. at 327, to determine whether they are 

“‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional,’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) 

(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). 

In the matter before this Court, Plaintiff appears to claim that he suffered from back 

pain when he was housed at RJD in 2017. (See Compl. at 4.) He seeks to hold an RJD 

physician liable for failing to be “aware of [his] laying in [his] cell for four days without 

appropriate medical attention or pain relief.” (Id. at 2.) At the time Plaintiff filed this 

action on November 29, 2019, however, he was housed at CHCF, not RJD. Thus, there 

are simply no plausible of allegations of “imminent danger of serious physical injury at the 

time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055. 

While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Case No. 

3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United 

States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. 

Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of 

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proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)).

Based on a review of its own docket and other court proceedings available on 

PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Matthew Holgerson, identified as CDCR Inmate #E19753, while incarcerated, has had three prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that 

they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

They are: 

(1) Holgerson v. Knowles, et al., Case No. 2:02-cv-00036-GEB-GGH (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 27, 2002) (Order adopting report and recommendation dismissing 

action as frivolous and for failing to state a claim) (strike one);

(2) Holgerson v. Knowles, Case No. 2:06-00144-GEB-CMK (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

12, 2006) (Order adopting report and recommendation dismissing action for 

failing to state a claim) (strike two); and

(3) Holgerson v. Lizarraga, et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-01767-EFB (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 28, 2015) (Order granting IFP and dismissing action as frivolous 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated at least three

“strikes” as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 

prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 

the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is 

itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

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II. Conclusion and Orders

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g); (2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to 

prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

(3) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Amending of Original Complaint (ECF No. 4); 

(4) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 6); 

(4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and (5) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2020

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