Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00294/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSE VACA-ORTEGA,

Defendant-Petitioner.

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Civil No. 13-CV-294-L

Criminal No. 12-CR-1335-L

ORDER DISMISSING WITH

PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S 

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR

CORRECT SENTENCE 

On February 4, 2013, Petitioner Jose Vaca-Ortega (“Petitioner”) filed a motion pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The Court has fully reviewed the

record and, for the reasons set forth below, DISMISSES Petitioner’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2012, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement with the Government.1

Under the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to waive any right to appeal, or to

1

 Under the plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended a Base Offense Level of 8 and agreed that

the specific offense characteristics of Petitioner’s prior conviction would be determined by the Court at the time

of sentencing for purposes of applying any increase pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1). (Plea Agreement, ¶ 10.) At

sentencing, the Court applied a 16 level increase pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) and Petitioner’s Total Adjusted

Offense Level, after a 3 level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and a 2 level departure for fast track was

19, with a resulting advisory guideline range of 63-78 months. The Government recommended that the Court

sentence Petitioner to 63 months custody at the low-end of the guideline range. Defense counsel sought a criminal

history departure from criminal history category VI to V and a 4-level downward departure for fast track. 

Defense counsel requested a 48-month sentence. 

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collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, unless the Court imposed a custodial sentence

greater than the high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to

the plea agreement. (See Plea Agreement, ¶ 11.) On January 14, 2013, this Court sentenced

Petitioner to a term of 57 months in custody. This sentence reflected the Court’s adoption

Defense counsel’s request for a departure from criminal history category VI to V and imposition

of the sentence at the low end of the resulting guideline range of 57-71 months. 

ANALYSIS

Petitioner waived both the right to appeal and the right to collaterally attack the judgment

and sentence as part of his plea agreement. Because Petitioner does not challenge the validity of

the waiver, the Court finds that the waiver should be enforced. A knowing and voluntary waiver

of a statutory right is enforceable. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.

1990). The right to collaterally attack a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is statutory in nature,

and a defendant may therefore waive the right to file a § 2255 petition. See, e.g., United States

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (by entering plea agreement waiving right to

appeal sentencing issues, defendant relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from his

sentence on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory evidence).

The scope of a § 2255 waiver may be subject to potential limitations. For example, a

defendant’s waiver will not bar an appeal if the trial court did not satisfy certain requirements

under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ensure that the waiver was

knowingly and voluntarily made. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. Such a waiver might also

be ineffective where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, or

if the sentence imposed violates the law. Id.; United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th

Cir. 1996). Finally, a waiver may not “categorically foreclose” defendants from bringing § 2255

proceedings involving ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver. Abarca,

985 F.2d 1012, 1014; United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case,

none of these potential limitations on the validity of Petitioner’s waiver are applicable. First, the

record indicates that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Plea agreement and

that the requirements of Rule 11 were adhered to. (See Findings and Recommendation, Doc.

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22.) Second, the sentence imposed by the Court was in accordance with the negotiated plea

agreement, and in accordance with the applicable sentencing guidelines. 

Regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Sixth Amendment to

the Constitution provides that every criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of

counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court enunciated the

test for determining whether a criminal defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In

order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has the burden of

showing both: 1) that his defense counsel’s performance was deficient; and, 2) that this deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 690-92; Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036

(9th Cir. 1995). 

To satisfy the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test, the Petitioner must show

that his counsel’s advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). In considering this issue, there is a

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of acceptable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Moreover, post-hoc complaints about the strategy or

tactics employed by defense counsel are typically found to be insufficient to satisfy the first

prong of Strickland. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 956 (2d Cir. 1991)

(appellant’s displeasure with strategy employed by trial counsel insufficient to establish

ineffectiveness). To satisfy the second prong, a section 2255 petitioner must show that he was

prejudiced by the deficient representation he received. The focus of the prejudice analysis is on

whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). 

Here, the Court will not consider whether any aspect of his counsel’s performance could

be considered outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases because

he has not identified any resulting prejudice. The record refutes Petitioner’s claim that counsel

failed to present any mitigating factors that would weigh in favor of a less severe sentence. The

plea agreement in this case clearly stated that the maximum sentence Petitioner could receive

was 20 years. (Plea Agreement, ¶ 1.) It also states that any attempt to seek departures under §

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3553 would be deemed a breach of the plea agreement. (Plea Agreement, ¶ 10.) Moreover,

Defense counsel filed Objections to the Pre-Sentence Report requesting a departure in

Petitioner’s criminal history category, arguing that one of Petitioner’s prior convictions was too

old to be considered in calculating his criminal history score. The Court agreed and based

Petitioner’s sentence on the lower category. Defense counsel also filed a Sentencing

Memorandum in which she explained that Petitioner only returned to the United States as a

result of the stress of being separated from his sister, who has bone cancer, and his resulting

“overwhelming desire” see her again. She also argued that Petitioner has changed as a result of

the recent birth of his first child, which has inspired a new sense of responsibility in Petitioner. 

The Court considered these factors but weighed them against Petitioner’s extensive criminal

history, which includes a conviction for attempted murder and assault with a firearm and

declined to apply further departures.

Even assuming that Petitioner’s counsel did assure him that he would receive a lower

sentence under the plea agreement, this would not provide Petitioner with a basis for relief. See,

e.g., United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (defense attorney’s failure to

accurately inform the defendant of the sentencing range he faced did not entitle him to challenge

his guilty plea). Moreover, Petitioner signed a plea agreement stating he understood any estimate

of probable sentence by defense counsel is a prediction and not a promise and would not be

binding on the court. (Plea Agreement, ¶ 9.)

Finally, Petitioner claims it was ineffective assistance for his counsel to fail to forcefully

present to the court factors weighing in favor of a departure of 2 points for cultural assimilation.

Even if the failure to do so had been outside the range of sufficiently professional or competent

assistance required from defense counsel, he could not have been prejudiced because the

departure is inapplicable to Petitioner. When considering whether to apply the departure for

cultural assimilation, the Court must consider the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history.

Here, Petitioner has a lengthy history of serious, violent crimes and, as a result, the departure

would be inapplicable. 

As stated above, Petitioner signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to waive any right

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to appeal, or to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, unless the Court imposed a

custodial sentence greater than the high end of the guideline range recommended by the

Government pursuant to the plea agreement. (See Plea Agreement, ¶ 11.) In the plea

agreement, Petitioner initialed his assent that his plea was knowing and voluntary, and signed

acknowledging that he fully understood the agreement’s terms. Therefore, Petitioner’s valid

waiver of his right to appeal forecloses his claim his counsel’s failure to present mitigating

factors to this Court or failed to advise him of the consequences of his plea constituted

ineffective assistance.

 Thus, the Court finds that none of the recognized limitations to a defendant’s waiver of

the right to bring a § 2255 motion are present in this case. Therefore, the collateral attack waiver

provision in Petitioner’s plea agreement will be enforced. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner has waived his right to

collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence in this matter. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 19, 2013

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

Jose Vaca-Ortega

Reg. No. 324-08-298

California City 

Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

P.O. Box 3001-0001

California City, CA 93504

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