Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00541/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00541-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZEST IP HOLDINGS, LLC, a

Delaware limited liability company;

ZEST ANCHORS, LLC, a

Delaware limited liability company, 

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10cv541-GPC(WVG)

ORDER:

1) GRANTING IN PART/DENYING IN

PART IMPLANT DIRECT SYBRON

INT’L AND IMPLANT DIRECT

SYBRON MFG., LLC’S (“IDSI”)

OMNIBUS MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS/

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Dkt. No. 475.]

2) GRANTING IN PART/DENYING IN

PART IMPLANT DIRECT INT’L,

IMPLANT DIRECT LLC, AND

IMPLANT DIRECT MFG., LLC’S

(“IMPLANT DIRECT”) MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND TO AMEND

INVALIDITY CONTENTIONS

[Dkt. No. 478.]

3) DENYING IDSI’S MOTION IN

LIMINE TO EXCLUDE REPORT

AND TESTIMONY OF DR. SUSAN

SCHWARTZ MCDONALD

[Dkt. No. 444.]

4) DENYING IMPLANT DIRECT’S

MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE

EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY OF

DR. ROBERT C. VOGEL

[Dkt. No. 450.] 

vs.

IMPLANT DIRECT MFG. LLC, a

Nevada limited liability company;

IMPLANT DIRECT LLC, a

Nevada limited liability company;

IMPLANT DIRECT INT’L, a

Nevada corporation,

Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court are two omnibus dispositive motions and two

evidentiary motions filed by Defendants Implant Direct Sybron International and

Implant Direct Sybron Manufacturing, LLC (collectively, “IDSI”); as well as

Defendants Implant Direct Mfg. LLC, Implant Direct LLC, and Implant Direct

International (collectively, “Implant Direct”). (Dkt. Nos. 444, 450, 475, 478.) The

Parties have fully briefed all four motions. (See Dkt. Nos. 472, 484, 494, 495, 496,

497, 504, 505, 508, 509, 539, 542, 555, 556, 557.)1

 A hearing was held on October

14, 2014. (Dkt. No. 537.) Lisa Ferri, Esq., Manuel J. Velez, Esq., and Andrew

Edelstein, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Zest IP Holdings, LLC and Zest

Anchors LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Zest”); Christopher Mead, Esq. and A.

James Isbester appeared on behalf of the IDSI Defendants; and Michael Hurey,

Esq., Christopher Dugger, Esq., and Robert Treiman appeared on behalf of the

Implant Direct Defendants.

The IDSI and Implant Direct Defendants move the Court for judgment on the

majority of Plaintiffs’ theories of liability for patent infringement, trademark

infringement, false designation of origin, false advertising, and unfair competition

regarding Defendants’ conduct occurring prior to December 31, 2010.

2

 Based on a

review of the Parties’ briefing, the lengthy record, submitted evidence, oral

arguments by the parties, and the applicable law, the Court: (1) DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE IDSI’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Report and

1After the hearing on the present motions, IDSI filed an “Ex Parte Application

for Leave to Supplement the Record” and an “Ex Parte Application for Leave to

Supplement the Record Regarding ClaimConstruction Hearing.” (Dkt.Nos. 539, 555.)

The Court GRANTS the motions to the extent that IDSI seeks to supplement the

record, and has considered IDSI’s supplemental documents. However, finding it

unnecessary, the Court DENIES IDSI’s request to submit additional supplemental

briefing.In addition, to lessen prejudice to Zest due to IDSI’s untimely filing, the Court

has also considered Zest’s responses in opposition to IDSI’s motions for leave to

supplement the record. (Dkt. Nos. 542, 556-57.)

2The Parties have filed separate motions concerning Defendants’ liability for

conduct occurring after December 31, 2010. (See Dkt. Nos. 456, 467, 468.)

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Testimony of Dr. Susan Schwartz McDonald, (Dkt. No. 444); (2) DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Implant Direct’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Witness

Testimony of Dr. Robert C. Vogel, (Dkt. No. 450); (3) GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part the IDSI Defendants’ Omnibus Motions for Judgment on the

Pleadings and for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 475); and (4) GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part the Implant Direct Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary

Judgment and to Amend Invalidity Contentions, (Dkt. No. 478). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As set forth in prior orders in this case, this is a patent and trademark

infringement action involving dental attachment products. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 13.)

The gravamen of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is that Implant Direct

manufactures, offers for sale, and sells the “GoDirect” dental attachment product

and the GoDirect Prosthetic System (“GPS”) (collectively, “Accused Products”) in

violation of Zest’s patents and falsely and unfairly uses the ZEST® and LOCATOR®

trademarks when marketing the Accused Products. (See Dkt. No. 13 ¶¶ 6, 7, 20, 21,

24-28, 30-32.)

I. Zest’s Patents and Trademarks

The patents at issue in this case are U.S. Patent No. 6,030,219 (“the ‘219

Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,299,447 (“the ‘447 Patent”). (Id. ¶¶ 12-13; Id. Exs.

A, B.) Issued on February 29, 2000, the ‘219 Patent relates to a dental attachment

assembly comprising of: (1) an abutment member for attachment to a tooth root,

implant, or adjacent tooth; (2) a male member for hinged engagement in a; (3) cap

secured in a dental appliance. (Id. Ex. A, ‘219 Patent at 1.). Zest’s most recently

amended infringement contentions, dated July 25, 2012, contend that Implant Direct

infringes claims 1-5, 7, 10-14, and 21-26 of the ‘219 Patent. (Dkt. No. 475-4, Chin

Decl. Ex. 1 at 1.) 

The ‘447 Patent was filed as a “continuation-in-part of the application that led

to the ‘219 [P]atent” and was issued on October 9, 2001. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 4.) As

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described by Zest, the ‘447 Patent shares much of the same patent specification as

the ‘219 Patent, but includes patent claims directed towards “other features of the

. . . dental attachment assembly, including additional means for attaching and

securing the different parts in the multi-component system.” (Id.) Zest’s most

recently amended infringement contentions contend that Implant Direct infringes

claims 1-2, 4-6, 8-9, 13-14, and 19 of the ‘447 Patent. (Dkt. No. 475-4, Chin Decl.

Ex. 1 at 1.)

Zest makes and has sold the Locator®

 overdenture attachment system

described and claimed in the ‘219 and ‘447 Patents. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶¶ 11-12.)

Zest has registered trademark rights for the Zest

®

 and Locator® marks as U.S.

Registration 989,049; U.S. Registration 1,251,485; and U.S. Registration No.

2,559,602. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16 and Exs. C, D.) Zest’s Locator® overdenture attachment

system consists of three parts, sold separately: (1) the “abutment,” also described in

this litigation as the “female”; (2) the “liner,” also described in this litigation as the

“male”; and (3) a “cap.” 

II. Relationship Between the Parties

 Between January 1, 2008 and May 27, 2010, Zest and Implant Direct

maintained a distributorship relationship. (Id. ¶ 22; see also Dkt. No. 529-8, Dugger

Decl. Ex. 13, Distribution Agreement.) Under the terms of the Parties’ distribution

agreement (“Distribution Agreement”), Zest granted Implant Direct a “nonexclusive right . . . to purchase, market and distribute ‘Locator Abutments’

manufactured by Zest” for use on specific Implant Direct implants. (Dkt. No. 259-8

at Zest 001736.) Zest also granted a non-exclusive right to Implant Direct “to

purchase, market and distribute ancillary products (the ‘Locator Attachments’), for

sale and distribution throughout the world.” (Id.) Zest accordingly designed

Locator®

 abutments for Implant Direct implants to be sold by Implant Direct. (See

Dkt. Nos. 550, 550-1, Velez Decl. Exs. 2, 3.)

While Implant Direct served as a distributor of Zest Locator

®

 abutments and

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attachments, the President and CEO of Implant Direct, Dr. Gerald Niznick (“Dr.

Niznick”), began designing a product later marketed and sold as the “GoDirect”

implant. The GoDirect product line “copied the geometry of the Locator abutment

attachment surface.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 4.) Specifically, Dr. Niznick testified that he

instructed Ines Aravena, an Implant Direct engineer, to “reverse-engineer . . . from

the Zest locator abutment” to create the “top part” of the GoDirect implant. (Dkt.

No. 493-5, Velez Decl. Ex. 7, May 11, 2012 Niznick Depo. at 89:17-90:9.) Dr.

Niznick testified Implant Direct then created the bottom of the GoDirect implant by

“mat[ing the reverse-engineered top] with the bottom of, say, [an existing Implant

Direct implant] and decid[ing] how I want[ed] the neck.” (Id. at 90:11-17.) Implant

Direct then “added certain features to it.” (Id. at 90:20.) 

Zest learned that Implant Direct was developing the GoDirect product in

August 2008, and in a series of letters Zest threatened to sue for patent infringement

if Implant Direct made a “one-piece Locator Attachment Mini Implant without the

permission of Zest Anchors, Inc.” (Dkt. No. 494-2, Velez Decl. Exs. 9, 10.) Implant

Direct continued design of the GoDirect implant, conducting tests on the implant

through 2008, (Dkt. No. 550-3, Velez Decl. Ex. 13) (internal Implant Direct

memorandum documenting equivalence between Zest’s Locator abutment

attachment features and the GoDirect implant features), beginning to market the

product as early as late 2008, and offering the GoDirect implant for sale in 2009.

(Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 20, Ex. E at 2). Implant Direct has marketed the GoDirect implant as

“compatible” with Zest’s Locator

®

 attachment system; in other words, as usable in

conjunction with Zest’s Locator® liner and cap. For example, a July 2009 Implant

Direct newsletter states:

GoDirect - Locator

®

 Attachment Compatible Implant

The GoDirect 1-piece implant includes a snap-on plastic transfer and comfort

cap. The Locator®

 Attachment, consisting of a metal housing and a selection

of plastic retentive caps can be purchased from Implant Direct or directly

from Zest Anchor Company. The GoDirect implant, transfer and comfort cap

will cost just $150 . . .

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(Dkt. No. 13 Ex. E at 2) (emphasis in original). 

Between March and April 2010, Zest terminated the Distribution Agreement

with Implant Direct and filed the instant suit against Implant Direct. (Dkt. No. 494-

4, Velez Decl. Ex. 18; see also Dkt. No. 1.) Dr. Niznick then “designed and went to

market with Implant Direct’s own GPS abutments, liners, and caps that fit the nonpatented geometry of the Locator abutment attachment surface.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at

5.) An Implant Direct engineer, Ines Aravena, testified that the Zest Locator

abutment, GoDirect implant, and GPS abutments have the same dimensions and

shape. (Dkt. No. 494-4, Velez Decl. Ex. 21 at 92:4-93:20.) On August 27, 2010,

Zest filed a First Amended Complaint in the present action, including allegations

regarding Implant Direct’s GPS system. (Dkt. No. 13.)

Effective December 31, 2010, the Implant Direct entities transferred all their

assets to newly-created IDSI entities, and effectively ceased operations. (See Dkt.

No. 521, Velez Decl. Ex. 1.) IDSI has continued sales of the Accused Products, and

released a revised version of the GPS male liner (called “GPS internal male” by the

Parties), after January 1, 2011.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As set forth above, on March 12, 2010, Zest filed the initial Complaint in the

present action, naming Defendants Implant Direct International, Implant Direct

LLC, and Implant Direct MFG, LLC. (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 27, 2010, Zest filed a

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the current operative Complaint. (Dkt. No. 13.)

The FAC alleges eight causes of action against the Implant Direct Defendants:

(1) Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,030,219; (2) Infringement of Patent No.

6,299,447; (3) Trademark Infringement; (4) False Designation of Origin; (5) False

Advertising; (6) California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); (7) California

statutory False Advertising Law; and (8) Common Law Unfair Competition. (Id.) 

I. Affirmative Defenses

On September 17, 2010, Implant Direct filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ First

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Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 17.) Defendants’ Answer claimed the affirmative

defenses of: (1) non-infringement; (2) no inducement; (3) invalidity under 35 U.S.C.

§§ 102 and/or 103; (4) invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph; (5)

invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph; (6) prosecution history

estoppel; and (7) unenforceability. (Id. at 9-11.) On December 9, 2010, U.S.

Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo entered a case management conference order

setting a March 14, 2011 deadline for any motions to amend the pleadings. (Dkt.

No. 27 at 1.) On May 19, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to amend the Answer to

assert a counterclaim against Plaintiffs for declaratory judgment of invalidity as to

U.S. Patent No. 6,299,447. (Dkt. No. 32.) On January 20, 2012, U.S. District Judge

Larry Alan Burns denied Defendants’ motion due to Defendants’ failure to show

diligence in seeking to amend the Answer. (Dkt. No. 81 at 4) (finding a lack of

diligence because Defendants sought to amend the Answer two months after the

deadline and took eight months to conduct a prior art search after learning new

information). 

On September 11, 2013, Implant Direct filed a Motion to “Clarify That It

May Assert Patent Exhaustion and Implied License at Trial, or in the Alternative,

for Leave to Amend Answer to Assert Patent Exhaustion and Implied License as

Defenses.” (Dkt. No. 282.) On January 8, 2014, this Court denied Implant Direct’s

motion to clarify and denied leave for Implant Direct to amend its Answer. (Dkt.

No. 331.) Specifically, the Court found that Implant Direct’s Answer had not raised

either patent exhaustion or implied license, and that Implant Direct had failed to

show good cause to modify the scheduling order in order to untimely amend its

Answer. (Id.)

II. Discovery and Spoliation of Evidence

Zest filed a motion for spoliation and discovery abuse sanctions against

Implant Direct on August 27, 2012. (Dkt. No. 121.) Magistrate Judge Gallo held

two hearings on the motion, on October 19, 2012 and on May 29, 2013. (Dkt. Nos.

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145, 228.) On November 25, 2013, Judge Gallo issued an Order: (1) granting in part

and denying in part Zest’s motion for spoliation and discovery abuse sanctions; and

(2) recommending an adverse jury instruction at trial. Specifically, Judge Gallo

made the following factual findings and conclusions of law: (1) Defendants’ duty to

preserve documents arose on October 22, 2008, when Plaintiffs notified Defendants

of a potential lawsuit against Defendants should Defendants decide to market their

allegedly infringing product, (Dkt. No. 312 at 13); (2) Defendants failed to

implement a “litigation hold or document preservation policy on October 22, 2008,

or at any time before the Complaint was filed, or after the Complaint was filed,” (id.

at 4); (3) Defendants spoliated two categories of documents - the emails of Ines

Aravena and Gerald Niznick, (id. at 13-14); (4) an adverse inference jury instruction

was warranted; and (5) monetary sanctions were warranted. 

Implant Direct filed objections to Judge Gallo’s order and recommendation.

(Dkt. No. 372.) On June 16, 2014, this Court overruled Implant Direct’s objections

and, after conducting a de novo review, found that at least two Implant Direct

employees despoiled evidence after a duty to preserve evidence arose in this case.

(Dkt. No. 440 at 22.) In addition, the Court found that Zest suffered prejudice from

Implant Direct’s spoliation of evidence “at least as to evidence related to Dr.

Niznick’s communications with third parties over combining the GoDirect product

with Zest products and to communications between Dr. Niznick and Ms. Aravena

[the Implant Direct and IDSI engineer that worked with Dr. Niznick to design the

Accused Products] over the development of the GoDirect implant.” (Id. at 26.) The

Court granted Zest an adverse jury instruction sanction against Implant Direct, the

precise language of which will be determined at trial. (Id.) 

III. Joinder of IDSI

Under the terms of a transaction agreement dated November 17, 2010

(“Transaction Agreement”), Implant Direct entered into a corporate transaction with

Sybron Canada Holdings, Inc. for an “arms-length” sale whereby the Implant Direct

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entities formed and transferred 100% of their interests into wholly-owned

subsidiaries, which were then purchased by Sybron Canada Holdings, Inc.

(“Sybron”). (See Dkt. No. 521, Velez Decl. Ex. 1.) In particular, Implant Direct

Mfg. LLC became Implant Direct Sybron Manufacturing, LLC and Implant Direct

International became Implant Direct Sybron International LLC. (See Dkt. No. 146 at

4; Dkt. No. 521-2, Velez Decl. Ex. 3, Chang Depo. at 69:20-70:4.) 

Following a series of discovery disputes between the Parties, Zest filed a

motion to formally join the IDSI entities to the present action as

successors-in-interest to the Implant Direct entities pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 25(c). (Dkt. No. 116.) After holding a hearing on the propriety of

joinder, (Dkt. No. 184, Hearing Transcr.), this Court denied Zest’s motion to join

the IDSI entities on the ground that Zest had not properly served IDSI with the

motion. (Dkt. No. 185.) The Court further granted Plaintiffs fifteen days to properly

effectuate service and took the motion under submission. (Dkt. No. 185.) On

February 19, 2013, the IDSI entities filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to join.

(Dkt. No. 190.) On April 15, 2013, this Court issued an order granting Zest’s

motion to join the IDSI entities as successors-in-interest to Implant Direct. (Dkt.

No. 202.) In particular, this Court found that the benefits of joinder outweighed

Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking joinder and that IDSI was not unduly prejudiced because

“IDSI has had an opportunity as an interested party to influence the direction that

Implant Direct has sought in the litigation up to this point.” (Id. at 4-6.) 

On May 6, 2013, without seeking leave to do so, the IDSI entities filed an

Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, asserting a counterclaim against

Plaintiffs for patent invalidity and asserting the affirmative defenses of patent

exhaustion and implied license, among others. (Dkt. No. 211.) On May 31, 2013,

Zest filed a motion to strike IDSI’s Answer and Counterclaim arguing that IDSI was

attempting to file the very same Answer and Counterclaim that Implant Direct was

previously disallowed by Judge Larry Burns to file, (see Dkt. No. 81), and that

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IDSI, as a successor-in-interest to Implant Direct, was not entitled to start the case

anew under Rule 25(c). (Dkt. No. 226, 226-1.) On October 16, 2013, this Court

granted Zest’s motion to strike IDSI’s answer and counterclaim. (Dkt No. 301 at

4-10.) This Court has since held that IDSI, as successor-in-interest to Implant

Direct, is bound to this Court’s orders and Implant Direct’s litigation decisions in

this case. (Dkt. No. 558.)

IV. Claim Construction

On April 10, 2012, Judge Larry Alan Burns presided over the claim

construction (“Markman”) hearing in this case. (Dkt. No. 88; see also Dkt. No. 543,

Hearing Transcr.) The Parties briefed and argued four sets of claim terms in the

‘219 and ‘447 Patents for construction: (1) “s wivel” and “swivel engagement”;

(2) “cavity”; (3) “snap engagement”; and (4) “predetermined angle.” Following the

Parties’ presentations and Judge Burns’ comments at the Markman hearing, Implant

Direct withdrew its request that Judge Burns construe the second through fourth

claim terms, agreeing “with Zest’s suggestion that these terms do not require

construction, and that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language should

apply.” (Dkt. No. 91-2 at 2.)

Judge Burns’ Order Following Markman Hearing accordingly construed only

the “swivel” and “swivel engagement” claim terms found in Claims 1, 21, 22, and

23 of the ‘219 Patent. (Dkt. No. 99.) Judge Burns construed “swivel joint” and

“swivel engagement” as “a rotational or hinging connection between the male

member and the cap, in which the rotational or hinging motion is around one or

more axis.” (Id. at 20.) Judge Burns further ordered that “swiveling” be construed as

“any rotational movement or hinging action between the male member and the cap,

around one or more axis” whereby “rotational movement” and “hinging action” are

not both required. (Id.) 

V. Present Motions

The Parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to Zest’s

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allegations relating to conduct occurring after the transfer between Implant Direct

and IDSI. The Court has ruled on those motions separately. (Dkt. No. 558.) At issue

in the present omnibus motions is Defendants’ liability for Zest’s allegations related

to Implant Direct’s conduct prior to January 1, 2011. (Dkt. Nos. 475, 478.) In

addition, IDSI has filed a motion to exclude the report and testimony of Dr. Susan

Schwartz McDonald, Zest’s trademark infringement expert. (Dkt. No. 444), to

which Implant Direct has filed a notice of joinder, (Dkt. No. 472). Implant Direct

has also filed a motion to exclude the report of Dr. Robert C. Vogel, Zest’s indirect

patent infringement expert. (Dkt. No. 450.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when it

affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of

any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). The moving party can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the

nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element of his

or her claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be

denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot

rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the

pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails

to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986). In making this determination, the court must “view[] the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing

of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are

for the trier of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

“Summary judgment is as appropriate in a patent case as in any other.”

Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835

(Fed. Cir. 1984). For a defendant seeking summary judgment of non-infringement,

“nothing more is required than the filing of a ... motion stating that the patentee had

no evidence of infringement and pointing to the specific ways in which accused

[products] did not meet the claim limitations.” Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana

Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

 To infringe a patent claim, the accused product or process must incorporate

each and every limitation of the claim. See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC,

748 F.3d 1159, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese

& Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). “If any claim limitation

is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of

law.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir.

2013).“[S]ummary judgment of noninfringement can only be granted if, after

viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no

genuine issue whether the accused device is encompassed by the claims.” Id. at

1304. “Whether a claim is infringed under the doctrine of equivalents may be

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decided on summary judgment if no reasonable jury could determine that the

limitation and the element at issue are equivalent.” Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185

F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis

Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)). 

II. Judgment on the Pleadings

Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early enough

not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” When

deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, “the allegations of the nonmoving party must be

accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied

are assumed to be false.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The court construes all material allegations in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation

Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, judgment on the

pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the

pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550.

Documents attached to, incorporated by reference in, or integral to the

complaint may be properly considered under Rule 12(c) without converting the

motion into one for summary judgment. Rose v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 396

F.Supp.2d 1116, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2005). However, judgment on the pleadings is

improper when the district court goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue; such

a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Hal

Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550.

DISCUSSION

I. IDSI’s Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment/Judgment on the

Pleadings

IDSI moves for summary judgment on Zest’s patent claims, and for

“judgment on the pleadings” as to Zest’s remaining claims for trademark

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infringement, false designation of origin, and violation of federal and state false

advertising laws.

A. Zest’s Procedural Arguments

As an initial matter, the Court notes three procedural arguments raised by

Zest that apply to IDSI’s motion as a whole: (1) that IDSI’s motion relies on the

unsworn expert report of Dr. Niznick as well as unauthenticated documents; (2) that

IDSI’s reliance on Dr. Niznick’s testimony precludes summary judgment because

Dr. Niznick is biased due to his financial interest in the outcome of this litigation

and because Dr. Niznick has credibility issues; and (3) the Court granted Zest an

adverse inference jury instruction stemming from the spoliation of evidence by IDSI

employees, which entitles Zest to argue to the jury that IDSI destroyed documents

that would have proven Zest’s claims. 

Although the Court has noted these arguments, and they are well taken, these

procedural issues do not defeat summary judgment in this case. In particular, the

Court finds that although IDSI uses Dr. Niznick’s report and testimony to support

its motion, the motion primarily focuses on the adequacy of Zest’s infringement

theories. Furthermore, while the Court did award Zest an adverse jury instruction

due to Implant Direct’s spoliation of evidence, a spoliation of evidence finding does

not allow a party who has produced no evidence in support of a claim to survive

summary judgment on that claim. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128

(2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court turns to IDSI’s arguments for summary

judgment and judgment on the pleadings on each of the causes of action alleged

against Implant Direct for pre-2010 Transaction conduct. 

B. Patent Infringement Claims

Zest’s Amended Complaint advances theories of: (1) direct patent

infringement; (2) induced and contributory patent infringement; and (3) willful

patent infringement entitling Zest to enhanced damages. IDSI seeks summary

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judgment on all three theories as they relate to pre-acquisition components.3 

Summary judgment of noninfringement is a two-step analysis. “First, the

claims of the patent must be construed to determine their scope. Second, a

determination must be made as to whether the properly construed claims read on

the accused device.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,

1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted)..

As to the first step, Zest alleges Implant Direct’s GoDirect implant product

and the pre-acquisition GPS products directly infringe the ‘219 Patent both literally

and by the doctrine of equivalents. The remaining independent claims of the ‘219

Patent, claims 1 and 22, require three additional claim limitations which IDSI

asserts are not present in the GPS design: (1) a releasable snap engagement between

the male member and the cap, (2) “rounded,” “convex,” and “concave” shapes of the

external walls of the male liner and interior walls of the cap, and (3) a “swivel joint”

between the liner and cap. (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 7.) 

IDSI argues Zest’s patent infringement expert, Dr. Brunski, has offered “late,

absurd constructions of several claims limitations.” IDSI’s motion attacks Dr.

Brunski’s opinions as to how Implant Direct’s GPS liner product has a “releasable

snap engagement”; how the GPS liner is “rounded”; how the walls of the GPS liners

and caps are either “convex” or “concave,” and argues that Dr. Brunski’s opinion

departs from Judge Burns’ construction of a “swivel joint” at the Markman hearing

in this case. In light of its disagreement regarding Dr. Brunski’s opinions, IDSI

argues: (1) that the Court has a duty to resolve any claim construction disputes as a

matter of law, right up to the time of jury deliberations, and the Court should reject

Dr. Brunski’s “late constructions”; or (2) in the alternative, if the Court adopts

Zest’s “absurd claim constructions,” those claim constructions render Zest’s patents

3 After the November 2010 acquisition ofImplant Direct, IDSI released a revised

version of the GPS male liner (called “GPS internal male” by the Parties) in January

2011.IDSI’s motion for summary judgment focuses on the pre-acquisition components

and does not include the GPS internal male in its motion. 

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invalid as indefinite.

The Court addresses each of the three “constructions” attacked by IDSI, then

addresses IDSI’s argument related to invalidity. In addition, the Court briefly

addresses IDSI’s argument regarding the doctrine of equivalents.

1. Direct Infringement

a. Pre-Acquisition Male Liners

IDSI argues that combinations that include the pre-acquisition liner do not

infringe the ‘447 Patent or independent claims 21 and 23 of the ‘219 Patent. (Dkt.

No. 475-1 at 22.) IDSI asserts that these claims require both internal and external

snap engagements between the male member and the abutment and that the preacquisition liner lacks the required internal snap engagement. Zest responds that the

issue is moot because it does not contend that the original pre-acquisition GPS male

liner infringes any claim requiring an inner and outer snap engagement between the

male and abutment. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 18.) 

The infringement claim was not withdrawn by Zest and, as such, requires a

determination. In view of the lack of opposition to the motion, the Court finds that

the combinations that include the pre-acquisition liner do not infringe any claims of

the ‘447 Patent and asserted claims 21 and 23 (and its dependent claims 24-25) of

the ‘219 Patent. 

b. Releasable Snap Engagement

IDSI argues that combinations that include the GPS pre-acquisition liner and

caps do not infringe independent claim 1 (and dependent claims 2,3,4,7,10, 12, 13

and 14) and independent claim 22 of the ‘219 Patent because each of the claims

requires a “releasable snap engagement.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 11.) 

Zest’s infringement contentions include an assertion that the combination of

the GPS pre-acquisition liner and cap infringe independent claims 1 and 2 of the

‘219 Patent. In order for the GPS liner and cap to infringe these claims, there must

be a “releasable snap engagement” between the GPS male liners and caps. At the

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claim construction hearing before Judge Burns, Implant Direct proposed that the

Court should construe “releasable snap engagement” (in relation to claim 2 of the

‘219 Patent) to mean “that the retention head comes into direct contact with the

socket and is physically held in place due to the contact between the two parts.”

(Dkt. No. 38 at 5.) Zest took the position that no construction was necessary, but

that “releasable snap engagement” meant that “the engagement must allow for

freedom of movement.” (Id.) Implant Direct later withdrew its request that the Court

construe the terms “cavity,” “snap engagement,” and “predetermined angle.” (Dkt.

No. 91-2 at 2.) Accordingly, the term “releasable snap engagement” should be given

its plain, ordinary meaning.

Proper construction turns on the “ordinary and accustomed meaning” of the

claim term “as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” See, e.g., HockersonHalberstadt v. Avia Group Int’l, 222 F.3d 951, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing cases). 

Dr. Brunski has opined that a person of “ordinary skill in the art” relevant to the

‘219 and ‘447 Patents is a general dentist, a dental specialist, or a trained dental

technician working under the guidance of a dentist, or an individual with a

bachelor’s degree in biomechanical engineering, mechanical engineering, materials

engineering or related discipline with a similar level of experience in the field of

dental attachments. (Dkt. No. 529-1 at 5-6.) 

As to “releasable snap engagement,” the Court will begin its analysis by

examining the dictionary meaning of the terms in conjunction with a plain reading

of the intrinsic evidence. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d

1193, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“By examining relevant dictionaries, encyclopedias

and treatises to ascertain possible meanings that would have been attributed to the

words of the claims by those skilled in the art, and by further utilizing the intrinsic

record to select from those possible meanings the one or ones most consistent with

the use of the words by the inventor, the full breadth of the limitations intended by

the inventor will be more accurately determined and the improper importation of

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unintended limitations from the written description into the claims will be more

easily avoided.”); see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d

1313, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (looking to non-technical dictionary for ordinary

meaning of claim term “including”); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d

1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (using Random House Unabridged Dictionary to define

the ordinary meaning of “portion”).

Based on the dictionary definition, the word “releasable” ordinarily means, as

an adjective, “that can be released” and “intended or configured to release.”

American Heritage Dictionary, Fourth Edition (2000). “Release” means to “[t]o set

free from confinement, restraint or bondage, to free from something that binds,

fastens or holds back.” Id. As to “snap”, the term has numerous definitions. The

dictionary definition of “snap,” which ISDI relies on, is “a clasp, catch or other

fastening device that operates with a snapping sound.” Id. In addition, “snap” is

defined as “the sudden release of something held under pressure or tension.” Id.

Meanwhile, “engagement” is defined as the “act of engaging or state of being

engaged” while “engage” is defined as “to interlock or cause to interlock.” Id. 

“Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a

part. . . . For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of

dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims.”

Markman v. Westview Instrs., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),

aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

75 F.3d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[A] claim interpretation that would exclude

the inventor’s device is rarely the correct interpretation; such an interpretation

requires highly persuasive evidentiary support . . . .”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v.

BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We share the district court’s

view that it is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention in a way that

excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would read

the specification in such a way.”). “However, in looking to the specification to

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construe claim terms, care must be taken to avoid reading ‘limitations appearing in

the specification . . . into [the] claims.’” Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve

Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet

Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).

IDSI raises two arguments against Dr. Brunski’s opinion that there is a

releasable snap engagement between the original GPS male liners and caps. IDSI

first argues Implant Direct did not design the male liner to form a “releasable snap

engagement” with the cap. It designed its liner to lock into place in the cap

permanently. The liner then can only be removed using a special tool in a process

that destroys the liner. (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 11) (citing Niznick Rpt. at 18; Niznick

Dep. at 195:11-20). Relying on dictionary definitions and the specification, IDSI

claims that “releasable snap engagement” is a “fastening device that operates with a

snapping sound to bring something into an interlocked state from which it can then

be freed with another snap.” IDSI argues the Court must resolve any differing claim

constructions prior to giving this case to a jury. 

In opposition, Zest argues that Dr. Brunski’s opinions flow from the claim

language. Dr. Brunski opines that the ‘219 claims language provides that the snap

engagement must be releasable and provide for freedom of movement between the

male member and the abutment. (Dkt. No. 550-1 at 11.) Dr. Brunski continues that

the ‘219 claims similarly provide for freedom of movement between the male

member and the cap. (Id. at 12.) As characterized by Zest, “Dr. Brunski opined that

there is a releasable snap engagement between the male and cap even if a tool is

necessary to remove the male and even if removal could potentially destroy the

male.” (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 20.) Zest argues nothing in the claim language requires

the liner to be reusable, and that reliance on dictionary definitions is improper

because the claim language is clear that “reusable” is not a limitation in any of the

claims. 

IDSI’s second argument against Dr. Brunski’s opinion is that “Dr. Brunski

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used the term releasable snap engagement to mean two different things depending

on which attachment to the male liner it referred to.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 28-29)

(citing Brunski Depo. 172:7-24). IDSI argues that if the Court were to accept

application of the phrase “releasable snap engagement” to include both the

engagement between the liner and abutment designed to be taken off thousands of

times, and to the engagement between the liner and cap which can only be separated

once with the force of a special tool, destroying the liner in the process, then Zest’s

patents are fatally invalid. (Id. at 26.)

As to the second argument, Zest replies that the ‘219 Patent specification

teaches that a “releasable snap engagement” is an engagement that allows the

components to be separated and that the teaching applies to both the connection

between the male liner and abutment and between the male and the cap, even if

those connections do not work in exactly the same way. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 26.) 

“Releasable” as used in the ‘219 Patent should be given its plain, ordinary

meaning, which is that the components are capable of being released from one

another. Nothing in the claims, specification or prosecution history discloses that

“releasable” requires the freeing of the male liner from both the abutment and cap

without destroying the liner. The fact that an embodiment of the patented device

provided for releasability and reusability of a component does not limit

“releasability” to require reuse of the released component. In this case, Dr. Brunski

has opined that the components of the GPS system are “releasable.” (Dkt. No. 529-1

at 18.) The Court agrees with Zest that “releasable snap engagement” applies to

both the engagement between the male liner and abutment, and the engagement

between the male liner and cap. The application of this term to both forms of

engagement is not inconsistent and does not render the patents fatally invalid.

As to term “snap” as used in the patents, there is nothing that supports IDSI’s

argument that a snapping sound during release is required. Rather, the claim

language along with the specifications and prior art make it clear that “snap” means

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“the sudden release of something held under pressure or tension.” In this case, Zest

has offered sufficient evidence that the GPS components provide for “releasable

snap engagement” to create a genuine issue of fact. The Court finds that IDSI has

failed to establish that this claim limitation is absent from the GPS liner and cap. 

The Motion for Summary Judgment based on this limitation is DENIED. 

c. Rounded, Convex, and Concave Liner and Cap

In order for the GPS pre-acquisition liner and cap to infringe independent

claims 1 and 2 of the ‘219 Patent, the outer “skirt” surface of the liner and the inner

surface of the cap must have “rounded” surfaces. The male liner’s skirt must have a

“rounded, convex out surface” and the inner surface of the cap must have a

“rounded, concave inner surface.” (See Dkt. No. 13-1, Ex. A at 13:51-58, 5:55-65.)

The Parties agreed during the Markman claim construction proceedings that the

terms “rounded,” “convex,” and “concave” would be given their plain, ordinary

meanings. 

1. The Liner

In Zest’s patent specification, the tops of the liners are flat, and the “skirt” of

the liner falls from the flat top in a continuous bell-like or skirt-like shape. Implant

Direct’s pre-acquisition GPS liner also has a flat top, but there is a notch at the top

of the “skirt” and the sides (below the notch) fall basically straight down vertically.

Zest’s expert, Dr. Brunski, opines that the original GPS male has a “rounded,

convex outer surface” by taking photographs of physical samples and taking

measurements of the samples from the photographs. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 24) (citing

Dkt No. 478-2, Ex. 1 at Ex. 13, filed under seal at Dkt. No. 529-1). 

According to IDSI, the “plain, ordinary meaning of rounded and convex or

concave shapes is an essentially continuous curve in the same shape, not a series of

different shapes. Merriam-Webster defines ‘rounded’ as ‘having a round or curving

shape,’ ‘flowing rather than jagged or angular.’” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 17) (quoting

Chin Decl. Ex. 15). IDSI argues that the GPS liner has a “notch” at the top of the

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skirt that the ‘219 specifications do not have. As a result, IDSI argues Dr. Brunski

improperly begins his measurements at the lowest point in the notch rather than

what IDSI considers the top of the skirt. An illustration of this is in Zest’s brief.

(Dkt. No. 494-1 at 24.) Zest outlines in yellow what Dr. Brunski measured as the

“skirt” – IDSI says instead that the “skirt” includes the top portion that juts out,

which would prevent the entire skirt as a whole from being considered “rounded” or

“convex.” 

Zest relies upon Dr. Brunski’s conclusion that the original GPS male has a

skirt with a rounded, convex surface. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 24.) Dr. Brunski analyzed

the the shape of the subject GPS male skirt by taking photographs of physical

samples and taking measurements of the samples from the photographs. (Dkt. No.

529-1, Ex. 13.) Zest argues that Claims 1 and 22 only require a “rounded” skirt and

not a skirt that is round like a circle. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 32.) 

2. The Cap

Independent claims 1 and 22 from the ‘219 Patent require the inner surface of

the cap to have “rounded” and “convex” surfaces. (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 16.) IDSI

asserts that this claim limitation requires that the shape of the inner side of the cap

be concave like a bowl capable of holding water. (Id.) IDSI points to Dr. Brunski’s

deposition testimony that the inner surface of the Implant Direct cap would not hold

water in most portions. (Dr. Brunski Dep. 354:24-357:20.) IDSI argues that the GPS

cap lacks a concave, rounded cavity as provided by the ‘219 Patent. IDSI points out

that Implant Direct designed the external side surfaces of its liner with ridges to fit

into matching grooves in the interior sides of the GPS metal caps. 

Zest’s reply relies on Dr. Brunski’s analysis of the GPS cap which reveals,

among other things, that the engineering specifications for the radius of curvature

for the inner surface of the cavity is 0.002 inches. (Dkt. No. 529-1, Ex. 1.) Dr.

Brunski’s examination of the cap led to his opinion that the GPS cavity has a

rounded, concave inner surface. (Id.) Dr. Brunski asserts in the alternative that the

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GPS cap has a cavity with a rounded concave inner surface under the doctrine of

equivalents. (Id., Ex. 1 at 22.) 

Ultimately, the Parties’ experts disagree as to precise area of the skirt that

must be “rounded” or “convex” and whether the cap has a rounded cavity. This

disagreement is best left for the trier of fact to resolve. Scripps Clinic & Research

Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To the extent

that apparent inconsistencies among the [expert’s] three declarations raise questions

of credibility and weight . . . they were improperly resolved on summary

judgment.”); see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., No. C-09-01201

RMW, 2011 WL 11709387, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011). Trial by document is

an inadequate substitute for trial with witnesses, who are subject to examination and

cross-examination in the presence of the decision-maker. Sartor v. Arkansas

Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944). 

The Court DENIES IDSI’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the

“rounded, convex” and “rounded cavity” limitations finding a genuine issue of fact

for the jury to determine. 

d. Swivel Joint

IDSI also argues that combinations that include pre-acquisition liners and

caps do not infringe any of the independent claims of the ‘219 Patent because there

is no “swivel joint” between the GPS male liners and the caps. Judge Burns’

Markman order construed “swivel joint” as “a rotational or hinging connection

between the male member and the cap, in which the rotational or hinging motion is

around one or more axis.” (Dkt. No. 99 at 18.) Judge Burns also found that “the

swivel terms only apply to the physical connection between the cap and the

retention member.” (Id. at 20.) 

IDSI argues the Implant Direct GPS liner product was designed so that it

would not move relative to the dental appliance (the cap). IDSI quotes Judge Burns’

Markman order for support, as well as deposition from Dr. Brunski acknowledging

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that this was Dr. Niznick’s probable intent in designing the GPS product. (Dkt. No.

475-1 at 22) (citing Dkt. No. 99 at 19; Brunski Depo. 257:9-18). In short, according

to IDSI, because Zest’s ‘219 Patent requires a swivel joint between the liner and the

cap, and Dr. Niznick designed the GPS products so the liner would not move

relative to the cap, the GPS product cannot infringe Zest’s patent.

The entirety of Dr. Brunski’s opinion as to how the GPS cap and liner

literally contain a “swivel joint” states:

The connection between the original GPS male and GPS cap is a

swivel joint, a connection that allows the male to rotate or hinge within

the cap. There are no features in the design of the original GPS male

that would prevent it from rotating inside the GPS cap. (IDL 000073.)

Instructional videos made by Defendants show that the male is installed

by rotating or hinging movement of the male inside the cap.

(www.implantdirect.com/us/popout/GoDirect_TeamApproach_HiQ2.ht

m.) Once inside the cap, a small amount of torque can be applied to

rotate the original GPS male within the GPS cap. (Ex. 9; IDL

002907-908; IDL 011904-905.) Additionally, finite element

simulations show that the original GPS male hinges relative to the GPS

cap when it is lowered over the abutment member (Ex. 10), when snap

engaged onto an abutment member (Ex. 11), and when the cap is

axially loaded (Ex. 12.).

(Dkt. No. 529-1, Ex. 3 at 2.)

IDSI argues Dr. Brunski sets forth “two creative, but absurd, ways around

Implant Direct’s non-infringing design.” The first opinion IDSI disagrees with is

that “a rotational or hinging connection” between the liners and caps is satisfied by

the fact that the GPS liners and caps move slightly different distances in the same

direction. (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 23.) This contention appears based on Dr. Brunski’s

deposition testimony that he “ran finite element analyses based on Implant Direct’s

engineering drawings and concluded that when the liner and cap were placed under

pressure, the plastic liners would deform and separate from the metal cap in the

microscopic range of 15-50 microns.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 23) (citing Dkt. No. 533-1,

Brunski Depo. at 253, 256). IDSI argues this is a new claim construction – that

microscopic separation between the liner and the cap can constitute “swiveling.” 

The Court finds that microscopic deformation produced by pressure on a

resilient material, such as nylon, does not constitute a “swivel joint.” The

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microscopic deformation or separation is incidental to the resilience of the material. 

Under Zest’s theory any nylon male member coupled with a metal cap would

qualify as a swivel joint. The Court concludes that Zest’s theory either reconstructs

the term “swiveling” in a manner that improperly expands the constructed term or

forces the Accused Products to fit into the constructed term without any rational

basis.

The second “swiveling” theory IDSI takes issue with is the theory that,

“[u]sing only Implant Direct liners and caps attached together, without attaching the

liners to an abutment, Dr. Brunski determined that it was theoretically possible to

spin the liner slightly in the cap by applying torque.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 23.) IDSI

argues there is no evidence that this has actually happened in anyone’s mouth,

because Dr. Niznick has testified that it requires less torque to rotate the connection

between the liner and the abutment than it does to rotate the liner and the cap – this

means that when all three pieces are assembled, and torque is applied, any rotation

would happen between the liner and the abutment before any rotation could occur

between the liner and the cap. (See id. at 23-25) (citing Dr. Niznick’s rebuttal report

at 16-17). 

Zest’s opposition relies on Dr. Brunski’s simulations which found that in use

the male skirt moves or hinges relative to the cap which is consistent with the

court’s construction of a “swivel joint.” (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 30.) In addition, Zest

argues that the fact that Dr. Brunski measured the torque without attaching the male

to an abutment is irrelevant because the claims at issue do not require the swiveling

to occur while the male is in use. (Id.) The Court disagrees with a portion of Zest’s

position. 

With respect to rotation outside of the mouth, it is true that neither the claims

or specifications specify that swiveling must occur while the male is in use.

However, as recognized in White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886):

The context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the

purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the

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purpose of changing it, and making it different from what it is. The claim is a

statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee

define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as

an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain

import of its terms.

As to context, Dr. Brunski has recognized that the ‘219 Patent provides for

rotational or hinging connection in the swivel joint which allows for freedom of

movement between the male and the cap in order to reduce wear and loosening of

the attachment. (Dkt. No. 529-1 at 13.) It is plain that reducing wear and protection

against loosening of the attachment can only occur when the male and cap are in use

in the mouth. Thus, it is implicit that swiveling of the male/cap must occur in the

mouth. 

Zest’s argument that swiveling can occur outside the user’s mouth would

ignore the stated purpose of the invention. To the extent that Zest argues that

rotation can occur when the Accused Products are outside of the mouth, the Court

finds that such a construction is illogical and does not create a genuine issue of fact. 

However, while Dr. Brunski did not conduct the rotation tests within the mouth, he

testified that rotation within the mouth was theoretically possible. (Brunski Dep.

232:1-20.) As such, the Court concludes that summary judgment at this stage is

inappropriate. Based on the record before the Court, there is a genuine of fact

whether “rotation” occurs when the Accused Products are in use in a customer’s

mouth. 

In its opposition, Zest also relies on the “hinging” that occurs when the

original GPS is lowered over the abutment member (Dkt. No. 529-1 at Ex. 10),

when snap engaged onto an abutment member (Ex.11), and when the cap is axially

loaded (Ex. 12). Each of these alternatives suffers from the same deficiency that

rotation outside of the mouth suffers from, i.e., the rotation does not occur while the

male is in use within the mouth. As such, these theories lack any basis. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds a genuine issue of fact

that pre-acquisition liners and caps include a “swivel joint” between the male liners

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and caps based on the “rotation” theory. 

e. Doctrine of Equivalents 

In the alternative, Zest argues that if there is no literal infringement as to the 

“swiveling” claim, there is infringement through the doctrine of equivalents. (Dkt.

No. 494-1 at 31.) In his report, Dr. Brunski explained that the function of the swivel

joint/swivel engagement is to provide a rotational or hinging connection between

the male and the cap, and in particular, one with freedom of movement between the

two components. Dr. Brunski opined that the connection between the GPS male and

cap performs the same function in substantially the same way to achieve

substantially the same result as the swivel joint claimed in the ‘219 Patent. (Dkt. No.

529-1, Ex. 1 at 21.) This opinion is partly based on the claim that the GPS system

achieves rotational or hinging between the male and cap by having a resilient nylon

member that is separable from the rigid cap yet both have corresponding surfaces.

The resiliency of the GPS male relative to the GPS cap allows for freedom of

movement between the male and the cap. (Id.) In addition, Dr. Brunski opines that

the connection between the original GPS male and GPS cap serves the function of

providing a means for attachment through rotational or hinging connection that

allows for freedom of movement between the male and cap. (Id.) 

The Supreme Court has recognized that there are “various legal limitations on

the application of the doctrine of equivalents” which are “to be determined by the

court either on a pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for

judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury verdict.” 

Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. Two such “legal limitations” are: (1) the

“all-elements rule,” which bars a patentee from asserting “a theory of equivalence

[that] would entirely vitiate a particular claim element,” and (2) prosecution history

estoppel, which bars a patentee from asserting a scope of equivalency surrendered

during prosecution. Id.

Applying the “all-elements rule” to the instant case, the Court holds that

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microscopic deformation produced by pressure on a resilient material does not

qualify as “swiveling” under the ‘219 Patent. Zest’s doctrine of equivalents

argument would vitiate the requirement of swiveling by expanding the term well

beyond its construction. Cf. Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206

F.3d 1408, 1415-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding no infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents because the structures of the patented invention and the accused product

were “not even close” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

However, IDSI has not addressed Dr. Brunski’s opinion regarding the

doctrine of equivalents as it applies to the “torque” theory. Unlike the deformation

theory of swiveling, the Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists whether the

pre-acquisition GPS products possess a “swivel joint” under the torque theory. 

e. Invalidity

IDSI argues that if the Court accepts Dr. Brunski’s “late constructions,” those

claim constructions render Zest’s patents invalid as indefinite and obvious from the

prior art of the Sulc patent, 4,540,367 (Sept. 10, 1985), (filed in this case as Dkt.

No. 475-10). Zest counters that IDSI cannot assert an invalidity defense because

Implant Direct informed Zest in supplemental interrogatory responses that Implant

Direct did not currently contend that the patents were invalid. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at

40.) 

This argument brings to a head a contention between the Parties that has been

repeated in briefing on multiple motions in this case. On one hand, Zest repeatedly

asserts that infringement and invalidity are two completely separate analyses, and

that it is legal error for IDSI to “rel[y] on its distorted interpretation of Zest’s

infringement case to argue invalidity.” (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 3.)

At the same time, however, it is also “axiomatic” that “claims are construed

the same way for both invalidity and infringement.” Source Search Techs., LLC v.

LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Amgen Inc. v.

Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). IDSI argues

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that Zest may not construe its patents differently when arguing that the patents are

valid as opposed to when Zest is arguing that Implant Direct/IDSI’s products

infringe Zest’s patents.

As previously noted, summary judgment of noninfringement is a two-step

analysis: “First, the claims of the patent must be construed to determine their scope.

Second, a determination must be made as to whether the properly construed claims

read on the accused device.” Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1304 (internal citation

omitted). Zest’s patent infringement case, following these steps, is that (1) the

patent claims are construed with their plain meaning; and (2) the (broad) plain

meaning reads on the GPS products as opined by Dr. Brunski. IDSI, however,

argues in reverse – that the second step (Dr. Brunski’s opinions) uses broad

interpretations, which means that Zest’s patents are invalid if they are interpreted

the way Dr. Brunski opines. Zest is correct that IDSI’s argument improperly relies

on Zest’s infringement case to make an invalidity case; but IDSI is correct that the

way Zest reads its patent must be consistent when Zest is defending against

invalidity and when Zest is arguing infringement. 

IDSI’s argument is that “Zest’s claim constructions render its patents invalid

as obvious and anticipated by Sulc.” (Dkt. No. 475-1 at 30-34.) However,

“[o]bviousness is a question of law with several underlying factual inquiries: (1) the

scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the

claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention; and

(4) objective considerations such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved

need, and the failure of others.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.

Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v.

John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,

Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007)). Patent invalidity must be established by clear and

convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 

In its reply, IDSI argues that Zest’s expert has interpreted the phrase

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“releasable snap engagement” and the words “convex,” “concave,” and “rounded”

in ways that stretch the English language beyond its limits. Given Zest’s

interpretations of the claims, IDSI contends the ‘219 claims do not succeed in

informing those skilled in the art of the invention with reasonable certainty.

The Court agrees that a number of opinions of Dr. Brunski misapply the term

“swiveling” as constructed by the Court. In fact, the Court has expressly discounted

these opinions. However, as to other opinions offered by Dr. Brunski, the Court has

rejected IDSI’s attacks and reasoning. To the extent that Implant Direct did not

waive the invalidity defense, the Court finds IDSI lacks the evidence to support

summary judgment due to invalidity. The Court finds that IDSI has failed to

demonstrate inconsistency by clear and convincing evidence to entitle it to summary

judgment due to patent invalidity. 

 2. Induced/Contributory Infringement

As to Zest’s claims of induced or contributory patent infringement, IDSI

argues that the doctrines of patent exhaustion and implied license preclude all of

Zest’s claims based on combinations of Zest’s products and Implant Direct’s

products. “Patent exhaustion” and “implied license” are affirmative defenses. See,

e.g., Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (patent

exhaustion); Carborundrum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d

872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (implied license). Zest opposes IDSI’s motion on the

ground that this Court has previously disallowed Implant Direct and IDSI from

asserting the defenses of patent exhaustion and implied license, and that Defendants

may not do so now. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 32) (citing Dkt. Nos. 301, 331). 

The Court finds that these affirmative defenses have been waived. As set

forth above, Implant Direct failed to plead the affirmative defenses of “patent

exhaustion” or “implied license” in its Answer filed on September 17, 2010, (Dkt.

No. 17); IDSI’s Answer and Counterclaim filed October 16, 2013 was struck by this

Court on the ground that IDSI could not assert new claims and defenses in this

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litigation, (Dkt. No. 301); and Implant Direct’s September 11, 2013 motion to

clarify that it may assert patent exhaustion and implied license as defenses was

denied by this Court on January 8, 2014, (Dkt. No. 331). In accordance with this

Court’s prior orders, the Court again finds that patent exhaustion and implied

license were not timely pled as affirmative defenses in this case, and the defenses

have been waived. 

IDSI argues that the Supreme Court recently held in Medtronic, Inc. v.

Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), that the patentee bears the

burden of proving infringement. IDSI claims that this holding “coupled with the

context of Zest’s claims for induced and contributory infringement” should “lead

this Court to look beyond non-analytical dicta [holding that patent exhaustion is an

affirmative defense].”

The Court disagrees. Although the Supreme Court in Medtronic did affirm

the principle that the patentee bears the burden of proving infringement, the fact that

the burden is on Plaintiffs to prove their case does not abrogate Defendants’

responsibility to plead affirmative defenses in order to avoid waiving them. See,

e.g., Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (“Ordinarily in civil litigation, [an

affirmative defense] is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an

amendment thereto. . . An affirmative defense, once forfeited, is excluded from the

case.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

3. Willful Infringement 

IDSI moves for summary judgment on Zest’s claims of willful patent

infringement. IDSI argues that summary judgment is appropriate because “Implant

Direct had objectively reasonable positions that the GPS products did not infringe

Zest’s claims, and an objectively reasonable position that dentists were free to use

Locator parts purchased from Zest in combination with GPS parts.” (Dkt. No. 475-1

at 45.)

The Federal Circuit has outlined a two-prong test for willful infringement.

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See In Re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In Seagate, the Federal

Circuit held that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages

requires at least a showing of objective recklessness. Id. The Seagate court

instructed that “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and

convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood

that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Id. If this threshold

objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this

objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement

proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the

accused infringer.” Id. When a defense or noninfringement theory asserted by an

infringer is purely legal (e.g., claim construction), the objective recklessness of such

a theory is a purely legal question to be determined by the judge. See Powell v.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2011); DePuy Spine, Inc.

v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(explaining that ensnarement has underlying factual issues but is ultimately a

question of law for the judge that is “‘to be determined by the court, either on a

pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a

matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury verdict’” (quoting

Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8)).

Under the objective first prong of the Seagate test, the Court must make a

threshold determination of objective willfulness based on “an objective assessment

of potential defenses based on the risk presented by the patent.” Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed Cir. 2012).

The Court is required to determine, “based on the record ultimately made in the

infringement proceedings,” whether a “reasonable litigant could realistically

expect” those defenses to succeed. Id. at 1008 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). If, in view of the facts, the asserted defenses were not reasonable, only

then can the jury’s subjective willfulness finding be reviewed for substantial

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evidence. See Powell, 663 F.3d at 1236. The question is whether Implant Direct’s

broader claim construction was so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could

believe it would succeed. See Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM

GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To be objectively baseless, the

infringement allegations must be such that no reasonable litigant could reasonably

expect success on the merits.” (citation and internal quotation omitted)).

IDSI argues that, under the first prong, Zest “cannot meet its burden of

proving an objectively high risk of infringement by clear and convincing evidence.”

(Dkt. No. 475-1 at 46.) IDSI relies on its arguments against infringement to make

the point that Implant Direct’s belief that they were not infringing was reasonable. 

The Court has held that the GPS male line and cap do not possess a “swivel

joint” by virtue of the nylon male liner deforming under pressure. As to rotation of

the liner within the cap, Implant Direct offered evidence that Dr. Niznick pointed

out that when the liners and caps were actually attached to the abutment, the force

necessary to spin the liner around the abutment was less than the force required to

spin the liner in the cap. (Niznick Rpt. at 16-17.) Implant Direct relied on this

opinion to conclude that the GPS products were not capable of swiveling” in the

mouth of the user. However, while a close question, the Court has found that based

on a contrary opinion of Dr. Brunski, a question of fact exists as to whether the GPS

male liner “swivels” as taught by the patents-at-issue.

Zest argues that summary judgement is inappropriate because the objective

recklessness issue is predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact.

(Dkt. No. 494-1 at 37.) Specifically, Zest contends that a fact finder could find the

following facts sufficient to support a conclusion of willful infringement:

(1) Implant Direct was aware of the patents-in-suit when it developed the Accused

Products, (2) Implant Direct was aware that the patents-in-suit cover Zest’s Locator

attachment system, (3) Implant Direct instructed its engineers to copy Zest’s

Locator attachment system, (4) Implant Direct designed the Accused Products to be

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used with Zest’s Locator attachment system, (5) Implant Direct knew that

combining the Accused Products with Zest’s Locator attachment system would

infringe the patents-in-suit, (6) employees responsible for the design of the Accused

Products destroyed documents that would have shown Implant Direct’s intent to

design the Accused Products in a way that would infringe the patents-in-suit,

(7) Implant Direct instructed dentists to combine the Accused Products with Zest’s

Locator attachment system, and (8) Implant Direct knew that it was unlawful to

instruct dentists to combine the Accused Products with Zest’s Locator attachment

system yet continues to do so. (Dkt. No. 494-1 at 37-38.)

The first four categories of facts cited by Zest involve Implant Direct’s

awareness or knowledge of the patents-in-suit at the time that the Accused Products

were designed (fact categories 1 and 2); and Implant Direct’s instructions for

engineers to copy the Locator system or make them compatible with the Locator

system (fact categories 3 and 4). However, evidence of copying is “of no import on

the question of whether the claims of an issued patent are infringed,” either literally

or by equivalents. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35-36). Accordingly,

evidence of copying in a case of direct infringement is “relevant only to Seagate’s

second prong, as it may show what the accused infringer knew or should have

known about the likelihood of its infringement.” DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1336. 

Zest relies on Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No.

C08-04990, 2012 WL 233762, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2012), for the proposition

that copying the ideas of another is properly considered when determining the

objective standard for willful infringement. Meanwhile, Mformation cites

MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, 809 F.Supp.2d 463, 483 (E.D. Va. 2011), to

support this conclusion. However, MeadWestvaco depends on Read Corp. v.

Portec. Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) which is a pre-Seagate case and

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does not address the objective standard for willful infringement.4 As to the

consideration of copying in evaluating the objective recklessness standard, the

Court will follow DePuy’s instruction limiting consideration of copying evidence to

Seagate’s second subjective prong. 

As to fact category 7 (despoiling discoverable information), the Court has

found that Implant Direct failed to produce discoverable communications between

employees involved in the design of the Accused Products and despoiled emails

regarding the development of the Accused Products. The question remains whether

this evidence is properly considered in the objective determination of willfulness.

Seagate observed that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to

this objective inquiry.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. The Seagate court also

recognized that “in ordinary circumstances, willfulness will depend on an

infringer’s prelitigation conduct.” Id. at 1374. To the extent that the destroyed

emails are evidence of the state of mind of Implant Direct’s designers, as well as

post-litigation conduct (despoiling of discovery), the Court concludes the evidence

is not relevant to the objective inquiry. 

Finally, Zest has offered citations to support fact categories 5 and 8 that

Implant Direct knew that combining the Accused Products with Zest’s Locator

attachment system would infringe the patents-in-suit and knew that it was unlawful

to instruct dentists to combine the Accused Products with Zest’s Locator attachment

system. However, the cited exhibits do not match the claimed evidence. (Dkt. No.

4 The Read standard appliesin determining whether an infringer “acted in [such]

bad faith as to merit an increase in damages awarded against him” and instructs a trier

of fact to consider in its bad faith determination: (1) whether the infringer deliberately

copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the

other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith

belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; and (3) the infringer’s behavior

as a party to the litigation. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826-27, superseded on other

grounds as recognized in Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,

1578 (Fed. Cir.1996). 

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494-1 at 37-38.) 5 IDSI, for their part, do not dispute the accuracy of Zest’s claims

or respond as to the effect this evidence should be accorded. 

The Seagate court in defining “recklessness” recognized “that ‘the term

[reckless] is not self-defining.’ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).

However, ‘[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts . . . in the face

of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should

be known.’ Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton § 34, pp. 213-14; Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 500 (1965)).” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. Zest essentially argues that IDSI

was reckless because it knew that its actions harmed Zest by infringing on the

patents-at-issue. The Court finds that this evidence creates a genuine issue of fact

on the objective recklessness issue that must be decided by the trier of fact at trial.

As such, IDSI’s motion for summary judgment that any infringement was not wilful

is DENIED.6

B. Trademark Infringement

Aside from Zest’s patent claims, Zest’s First Amended Complaint also

includes causes of action (“COA”) for Trademark Infringement (Third COA) under

the Lanham Act; False Designation of Origin under the Lanham Act (Fourth COA);

False advertising under the Lanham Act (Fifth COA); Unfair Competition under

5For example, Zest relied on Velez. Decl., Ex.26 at 74:21-75-15, for Implant

Direct admissionsthat combining the GPS abutment with Zest's Locator liner and male

would infringe the patents-in-suit. However, Ex. 26 does not contain the cited portions

and instead is a transcript from Dr. Niznick’s deposition at 299:1-302:25. (Dkt. No.

551-8.)

6Following submission of the pending motions, Defendants submitted

supplemental briefing based on the recent Federal Circuit case of Stryker Corp. v.

Zimmer Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 7210311 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2014), and Zest has

replied. (Dkt. Nos. 571, 577.) In Stryker, a jury found Zimmer had infringed the

plaintiff’s patents and the district judge trebled that amount after finding the defendant

willfully infringed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that while Zimmer infringed

the patents, the infringement was not willful because “Zimmer’s defenses to the

infringement of each patent claim that Stryker asserted were not objectively

unreasonable, and, therefore, it did not act recklessly.” Stryker, 2014 WL 7210311, at

*9.Given that the determination of objectively recklessisfact intensive, the Court does

not rely on Stryker to reach its decision. 

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California’s UCL (Sixth COA); False Advertising under California law (Seventh

COA); and Unfair Competition under California Common Law (Eighth COA). (Dkt.

No. 13.)

IDSI challenges Zest’s Trademark Infringement and False Designation of

Origin claims under the Federal Lanham Act, as well as Zest’s UCL claim, on the

ground that the doctrine of nominative fair use bars Zest’s claims of trademark

infringement. In addition, IDSI challenges Zest’s trademark expert, Dr. Susan

McDonald, and moves for her exclusion under Daubert and Federal Rule of

Evidence 702. (Dkt. No. 444.) 

IDSI’s basic argument is that trademark law seeks to address situations where

a defendant has used a plaintiff’s marks to “incorrectly identify the source of the

mark with the defendant itself.” New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc.,

971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). IDSI argues all of the allegedly infringing uses

of Zest’s marks involve Implant Direct’s statements that the Accused Products are

compatible with Zest’s Locator products. IDSI argues this use is protected as a

“nominative fair use.” 

The Ninth Circuit in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d

1171, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2010) has laid out the test for the “nominative fair use

defense” as such:

In cases where a nominative fair use defense is raised, we ask whether (1) the

product was “readily identifiable” without use of the mark; (2) defendant

used more of the mark than necessary; or (3) defendant falsely suggested he

was sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder. Playboy Enters., Inc. v.

Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at

308-09). This test “evaluates the likelihood of confusion in nominative use

cases.” Id. It’s designed to address the risk that nominative use of the mark

will inspire a mistaken belief on the part of consumers that the speaker is

sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder. The third factor speaks

directly to the risk of such confusion, and the others do so indirectly:

Consumers may reasonably infer sponsorship or endorsement if a company

uses an unnecessary trademark or “more” of a mark than necessary. But if the

nominative use satisfies the three-factor New Kids test, it doesn’t infringe. If

the nominative use does not satisfy all the New Kids factors, the district court

may order defendants to modify their use of the mark so that all three factors

are satisfied; it may not enjoin nominative use of the mark altogether.

Zest argues IDSI may not raise a nominative fair use defense because

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nominative fair use was never pled as an affirmative defense or raised in

interrogatory responses. IDSI counters: 

Ninth Circuit law is clear that it is unnecessary for IDSI to plead or prove

nominative fair use as an affirmative defense. In Toyota, the Ninth Circuit

expressly held that the district court erred in “treat[ing] nominative fair use as

an affirmative defense to be established by the Tabaris only after Toyota

showed a likelihood of confusion.” Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1182. The Court held

that “[o]n remand, Toyota must bear the burden of establishing that the

Tabaris’ use of the Lexus mark was not nominative fair use.” Id. at 1182

(emphasis in original).

(Dkt. No. 475-1 at 53.) The Court disagrees with IDSI’s reading of Toyota. IDSI’s

cited section of Toyota discusses improper burden shifting by the district court –

nowhere does the Ninth Circuit say it is unnecessary that defendants “plead”

nominative fair use as an affirmative defense. While it is true that the Toyota court

held that “[a] defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a defense need only

show that it used the mark to refer to the trademarked good [and] [t]he burden then

reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion,” 610 F.3d at 1183, Implant

Direct/IDSI must still have raised the defense as an affirmative defense. See, e.g.,

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,

1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (calling nominative fair use and fair use affirmative defenses);

Gorski v. The Gymboree Corporation, No. 14-CV-01314-LHK, 2014 WL 3533324,

at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2014) (Koh, J.) (addressing nominative fair use as an

affirmative defense); 1800 GET THIN, LLC v. Hiltzik, No. CV11-00505 ODW

(PJWx), 2011 WL 3206486, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2011) (recognizing nominative

fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement). 

The Court agrees with Zest’s contention that to hold otherwise would unfairly

allow Defendants to, as here, wait until the eve of trial to raise a nominative fair use

defense for which the Ninth Circuit has held it is the plaintiff’s burden to disprove.

See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1182-83. Therefore, IDSI’s Motion for Summary Judgment

on Zest’s trademark claims is DENIED.

1. Expert Report of Dr. Susan McDonald

The Court notes here that IDSI moves to exclude the expert report of Dr.

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Susan McDonald. (Dkt. No. 444.) IDSI primarily moves to exclude the report on the

ground that Dr. McDonald did not address the Nominative Fair Use factors and her

opinions are therefore irrelevant and unreliable. Zest counters that Dr. McDonald

submitted her report in January 2013, long before IDSI asserted a nominative fair

use defense in its summary judgment motion filed in July 2014. The Court denies

IDSI’s motion on the ground that, as discussed above, IDSI did not timely raise a

nominative fair use defense.

IDSI’s motion to exclude Dr. McDonald’s report also argues that Dr.

McDonald should be precluded from testifying as to Defendants’ “bad faith” and as

to trademark dilution. (Dkt. No. 444-1 at 21-24.) Zest does not rely on these points

in opposition to summary judgment. The Court overrules these objections to Dr.

McDonald’s report and denies them without prejudice. IDSI may renew its

arguments in motions in limine to the extent they are still relevant.

C. False Designation of Origin, UCL, and False Advertising

IDSI argues it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to all of Zest’s

federal and state false advertising claims due to Zest’s failure to meet the

heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Parties

dispute whether “judgment on the pleadings” is appropriate at this stage as well as

whether Zest’s federal False Advertising allegations must meet the heightened

pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 

As an initial matter, IDSI’s motion focuses on the sufficiency of Zest’s First

Amended Complaint. As the Court will not consider materials outside the pleadings

in considering the sufficiency of Zest’s federal and state false advertising claims,

the Court will treat IDSI’s motion with respect to these claims as a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are

closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the

pleadings.”); but see Techsavies, LLC v. WDFA Mktg. Inc., C10-1213 BZ, 2011 WL

996267 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (converting a motion for judgment on the

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pleadings into a motion for summary judgment because “[i]ssues about whether

[defendant] adequately pled its affirmative defenses and counterclaims should have

been raised well before the last day for dispositive motions”). 

Second, although the Ninth Circuit has yet to decide whether the heightened

pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to Lanham Act claims, the Ninth Circuit

has applied the rule to other types of false advertising claims under California law.

See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying

Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California Business and Professions

Code section 17200); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102-04 (9th

Cir. 2003) (applying Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California

Business and Professions Code section 17500). District courts have, in turn,

extended that rule to false advertising claims under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., VIP

Products, LLC v. Kong Co. LLC, No. CV10-0998-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 98992, at

*3-4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2011); Ecodisc Tech. AG v. DVD Format/Logo Licensing

Corp., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean

Spray Cranberries, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1123-24 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The

Court adopts the approach of these courts and applies Rule 9(b) to Plaintiffs’ false

advertising allegations.

However, even applying the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b),

the Court finds Zest’s false advertising allegations as alleged in the First Amended

Complaint sufficient to state a claim for false advertising. IDSI argues Zest’s false

advertising claims fail to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b)

because Zest “does not allege what specific Implant Direct advertisements allege

that Implant Direct products are affiliated with or authorized by Zest, what words

Implant Direct uses to communicate this message, or any specific false claims.”

(Dkt. No. 475-1 at 57-58.)

The Court disagrees. In particular, Zest’s Amended Complaint alleges that: 

Implant Direct is using the ZEST and LOCATOR trademarks in a

prominent manner in connection with the “GoDirect” product such that

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consumers are likely to be confused into believing that the “GoDirect”

product is authorized, endorsed or sponsored by Zest. (A printout of

this advertisement from the Implant Direct website is attached hereto as

Exhibit H). Further, the words “Featuring ZEST LOCATOR

Compatible Platform” are also likely to cause confusion, deception or

mistake because the “GoDirect” product is not in fact “compatible”

with the Zest LOCATOR attachment system, but is instead a copy of

one or more of the components of the Zest LOCATOR attachment

system. Furthermore, the use of the same words “Featuring Zest

LOCATOR Compatible Platform” in describing the “Go Direct” and

the Zest Locator is likely to cause confusion, deception or mistake

among consumers.

(Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 37.) This allegation in itself appears to plead “the who, what,

when, where, and how” of the alleged false advertising. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.

USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616,

627 (9th Cir. 1997)). Specifically, the “who” is Implant Direct; the “what” is

representing the GoDirect product as authorized, endorsed, or sponsored by Zest;

the “when, where, and how” is placing the advertisement on Implant Direct’s

website. Considering only the pleadings, the Court finds that Zest’s FAC states a

claim for state and federal false advertising. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

IDSI’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II. Implant Direct’s Motion for Summary Judgment/to Amend Invalidity

Contentions

Implant Direct joins IDSI’s motions. (Dkt. Nos. 472, 484.) However, Implant

Direct also separately moves for partial summary judgment that Implant Direct did

not infringe the Zest Patents and did not willfully infringe Zest Patents. (Dkt. Nos.

478, 529.) In addition, Implant Direct moves to amend its invalidity contentions,

(id.), and to exclude the expert report of Zest’s indirect patent infringement expert,

Dr. Robert C. Vogel, (Dkt. No. 454-1). 

A. Direct Patent Infringement

As to Zest’s patent infringement claims, Implant Direct seeks partial summary

judgment of non-infringement on three additional subsets of Zest’s claims: (1) on

any claims related to the updated GPS male, the “internal connection” male; (2) on

any claims that the GoDirect implant infringes Claims 1, 21, and 23 of the ‘219

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Patent or Claim 1 of the ‘447 Patent; and (3) on any claims related to infringement

of Claims 5 and 9 of the ‘219 Patent. (Dkt. No. 529 at 7-10.) In addition, Implant

Direct argues it is entitled to summary judgment because “[a]ll of the asserted

claims of the ‘219 and ‘447 Patents require multiple component parts to be

combined together in an overall assembly” while Implant Direct did not sell its

dental attachment products in an assembled form. (Dkt. No. 529 at 10-12.) 

1. Internal Connection (revised) GPS Male

Implant Direct first moves for partial summary judgment on any of Zest’s

claims against Implant Direct related to the GPS internal connection product. (Dkt.

No. 529 at 7-8.) Implant Direct argues the GPS internal connection male was not

developed until 2011 and that Implant Direct did not make or sell the GPS internal

connection product. (Id. at 8) (citing July 19, 2011 Niznick Depo at 134).

Zest responds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary

judgment on whether Implant Direct developed the GPS internal connection product

prior to the transferring of its assets and liabilities to IDSI at the end of 2010. (Dkt.

No. 495-1 at 15-16.) Zest cites Dr. Niznick’s deposition testimony for the

proposition that “Dr. Niznick . . . created and designed the original and revised GPS

males at the same time in March of 2010.” (Id. at 16) (citing Velez Decl. Ex. 7,

Niznick Depo at 187:6-188:8). 

In reply, Implant Direct points out that development is not the same as

making or selling a product, and Zest has not cited any legal authority for the

proposition that “the mere conception or design of a product constitutes patent

infringement.” (Dkt. No. 509 at 2.) 

The Court GRANTS Implant Direct’s motion with respect to Zest’s patent

infringement claims related to the revised GPS internal connection male. The record

is clear that Implant Direct did not sell or offer to sell the GPS internal connection

male. (See Dkt. No. 478-1, Statement of Undisputed Facts 3, 5.) While Dr. Niznick

may have testified to designing the GPS internal connection male prior to the sale of

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Implant Direct’s assets and liabilities to IDSI, patent infringement law protects only

unauthorized “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing of] any patented

invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Zest has pointed to no issues of fact as to whether

Implant Direct made, used, offered to sell, or sold the GPS internal connection male

prior to transferring assets and liabilities to IDSI, and the Court GRANTS Implant

Direct summary judgment on this issue. 

2. GoDirect Implant

Second, Implant Direct moves for summary judgment on Claims 1, 21, and 23

of the ‘219 Patent and Claim 1 of the ‘447 Patent on the ground that these claims

require an “abutment member” and the GoDirect implant is an implant, not an

abutment. (Dkt. No. 529 at 8-9.) The issue here is that in the Zest Patents, the

“abutment member” claims state that the abutment member is for “attachment to a

tooth root, implant, or adjacent tooth.” See ‘219 Patent Claim 1. This is because

Zest’s patented assembly is for an abutment, liner, and cap – whereby the abutment

would ordinarily screw into an implant (such as the implants sold by Implant

Direct). However, Dr. Niznick designed his GoDirect implant product as an implant

pre-attached to an abutment made with Zest’s abutment specifications. Implant

Direct is therefore claiming that the GoDirect implant is not an “abutment” because

it is not for attachment to a tooth root, implant, or adjacent tooth – because the

implant is pre-attached, it would not make sense to attach another implant to the

GoDirect implant. 

Zest argues there is no dispute that the GoDirect product has both an

abutment and an implant, citing IDSI’s acknowledgment of this fact and Dr.

Niznick’s failed applications to the patent office for his GoDirect implant. (Dkt. No.

495-1 at 17.) Because of Zest’s conclusion that the GoDirect is really an “abutment

plus” [an implant], Zest relies on the fact that the claim language uses the word

“comprising” to conclude that extraneous parts (the attached implant) do not render

the abutment portion of the GoDirect no longer an abutment. (Id. at 16-17) (citing

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Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 

The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment on whether the GoDirect implant is an “implant,” as Implant

Direct contends, or an “abutment attached to an implant” as Zest contends. 

3. Claims 5 and 11 of the ’219 Patent

Implant Direct also moves for summary judgment on Zest’s claims that

Implant Direct’s Accused Products infringe claim 5 and 11 of the ‘219 Patent on the

ground that Zest has abandoned these claims. (Dkt. No. 529 at 9-10.) Zest asks that

the Court should “deny this motion as moot because Zest informed ID in its most

recent interrogatory responses that it was not asserting infringement of Claims 5 and

11.” (Dkt. No. 495-1 at 20.) 

Zest does not provide any authority for the proposition that interrogatory

responses can render an issue moot. Nonetheless, given Zest’s interrogatory

responses and the lack of any opposition to Implant Direct’s motion on this issue,

the Court GRANTS partial summary judgment as Claims 5 and 11 of the ‘219

Patent. 

4. Entire Assembly

Implant Direct argues that “[a]ll of the asserted claims of the ‘219 and ‘447

Patents require multiple component parts to be combined together in an overall

assembly,” yet Implant Direct did not “make, use, offer to sell, or sell its dental

attachment products in an assembled form.” (Dkt. No. 529 at 10.) Implant Direct

claims that Zest has not provided any evidence that Implant Direct infringed the

Zest Patents by making or selling a complete assembly. (Id.) (citing Deepsouth

Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Limelight Networks, Inc.

v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118 (2014)). 

Zest argues Implant Direct failed to disclose this new non-infringement

theory in interrogatory responses or update its expert reports to include this defense.

(Dkt. No. 495-1 at 20-22.) In addition, Zest argues Implant Direct’s theory fails as a

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matter of law because the “Federal Circuit has routinely held that the preamble does

not limit claim scope.” (Dkt. No. 495-1 at 22) (citing Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.

Elec. for Imaging, Inc., No. 2013-1600, 2014 WL 3377201, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

Finally, Zest argues that Deepsouth and the other cases relied upon are inapposite

and do not apply to cases, such as the present one, where the products at issue are

sold as a unit (i.e., abutment, male, and cap are sold together in a kit) and the

patents-in-suit have claims directed to that combination of components. 

As to the asserted failure to disclose this non-infringement theory, Zest fails

to identify the source of the obligation to assert the “assembled as a whole” noninfringement theory. Instead, Zest relies upon civil procedure rules governing the

supplementing of expert disclosures and responses to discovery requests. (Dkt. No.

495-1 at 20-21.) Absent specific facts to establish an obligation to disclose the noninfringement theory, the Court finds that Implant Direct is not precluded from

asserting this theory of non-infringement. 

On the merits, the Court finds that Deepsouth and the other cases relied upon

by Implant Direct are inapplicable to the instant case. In Deepsouth, the issue

presented was limited to whether a defendant exporting an allegedly infringing

product in less than fully assembled form for use abroad constituted an unauthorized

“making” of any patented invention within the United States. The Supreme Court

held that the word “makes” as used in 35 U.S.C. section 271(a) does not extend to

the manufacture of the constituent parts of a combination machine, and the

unassembled export of the elements of an invention does not infringe the patent. 

In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates that Implant Direct sells, within

the United States, the Accused Products as a unit consisting of the abutment, male

and cap. (Dkt. No. 495-1, Ex. 44.) The Court rejects the contention that the patentsin-suit require an “operable” assembly. There is nothing within the claims or

specifications that imposes such a limitation. 

///

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B. Willful Patent Infringement

Implant Direct also contends that summary judgment is appropriate as to the

issue of willfulness based on pre-acquisition product infringement. For the same

reasons outlined above as to IDSI’s motion, the motion is DENIED.

C. Implant Direct’s Motion to Amend Invalidity Contentions

Implant Direct also moves, pursuant to Patent Local Rule 3.6(b)(3), to amend

its invalidity contentions in light of: (1) the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); and (2) the

updated report and testimony given by Zest’s patent infringement expert, Dr.

Brunski. (Dkt. No. 529 at 20-37.) Implant Direct contends that Nautilus set forth a

new standard for indefiniteness regarding the invalidity of patent claims. (Id. at 20-

21.) Implant Direct also contends that Dr. Brunski’s updated report and deposition

indicated that Zest was raising a new “friction fit” theory of infringement (i.e., that

the Accused Products infringe the releasable snap engagement limitation through a

friction fit rather than a snap engagement).7 (Id. at 32-34.) In addition, Implant

Direct argues that it has been diligent in bringing this motion and that Zest will not

be unduly prejudiced. (Id. at 35-36.) 

Zest counters that Implant Direct’s motion to amend its invalidity contentions

should be denied because: (1) Implant Direct informed Zest in its 2012 interrogatory

responses that it would not be pursuing an invalidity defense, and therefore Zest did

not pursue any related discovery; (2) Implant Direct’s motion is untimely; (3) the

Supreme Court’s Nautilus decision is irrelevant; (4) Zest is not asserting a friction

7On January 31, 2014, the Court previously denied without prejudice Implant

Direct’s prior motion to amend its invalidity contentions related to Zest’s purported

“friction fit” theory of infringement. (Dkt. No. 362 at 13.) The Court reasoned that it

was “not convinced that Plaintiffs are yet pursuing a new infringement theory” and

noted that “Plaintiffs have not amended their infringement contentions to include a

‘friction fit’ theory” and “the parties have not yet taken any expert discovery.” (Id.)

The Court also reminded the parties that for any future motion to amend contention,

“the party seeking amended must meet the Patent LocalRules’ burden ofshowing good

cause to amend and no undue burden on the opposing party” under Patent Local Rule

3.6. (Id. at 13-14.)

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fit infringement theory; and (5) Zest would be unduly prejudiced if Implant Direct is

allowed to amend because it would require the Court to reopen discovery and allow

another round of summary judgment motions. (Dkt. No. 495-1 at 31-41.)

Implant Direct replies that: (1) the Supreme Court’s Nautilus decision is

applicable; (2) Dr. Brunski’s testimony shows that Zest is asserting a friction fit

theory; (3) its motion is timely because it could not have brought it until after Dr.

Brunksi’s deposition and the Nautilus decision; and (4) Zest will not suffer undue

prejudice because the amendments will not require re-opening fact discovery and

Zest has caused much delay in this action. (Dkt. No. 509 at 15-19.)

Patent Local Rule 3.6(b)(3) provides that after the completion of claim

construction discovery, “absent undue prejudice to the opposing party, a party

opposing infringement may only amend its validity contentions upon a timely

motion showing good cause.” To make a satisfactory showing of good cause, a

party seeking to amend its invalidity contentions must show that it “acted with

diligence in promptly moving to amend.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power

Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the moving party is able to

establish diligence, the Court should then consider prejudice to the non-moving

party in determining whether to grant leave to amend. See id. at 1368. 

The Court concludes that Implant Direct has failed to show that it acted with

diligence in seeking amendment of its invalidity contentions. Implant Direct waited

nearly three months after the Supreme Court issued Nautilus on June 2, 2014 to file

this motion on August 18, 2014. In addition, Implant Direct did not file this motion

until five months after it received Dr. Brunski’s updated report on March 14, 2014,

and almost two months after Dr. Brunski’s deposition on June 20, 2014. See O2

Micro Int’l Ltd., 467 F.3d at 1367 (district court did not abuse its discretion by

finding lack of diligence where the defendant waited almost three months after

deposition to serve its proposed amended contentions and two more weeks to

formally move to amend); Verinata Health Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-

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cv-5501-SI, 2014 WL 1648175, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (determining that

the defendant was diligent in seeking to amend its invalidity contentions where it

provided the plaintiff the proposed amendments two days after the court granted the

plaintiff’s motion to amend its infringement contentions, and defendant filed its

motion about a week after the plaintiff refused to consent to the proposed

amendments). 

Moreover, the Court concludes that amendment of Implant Direct’s invalidity

contentions would prejudice Zest. Allowing Implant Direct to amend its invalidity

contentions at this late stage would require the Court to reopen fact and expert

discovery and the summary judgment motion deadline. See CBS Interactive, Inc. v.

Etilize, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 195, 203 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that the defendant’s

“right to amend in good faith is far outweighed by its (and the court’s)

countervailing duty to avoid prejudicing [the plaintiff] through eleventh-hour

alterations”); see also Verinata Health Inc., 2014 WL 1648175, at *3 (determining

that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the defendants’ amendment of

invalidity contentions because there was still ample time left in the discovery period

as four months remained until the close of fact discovery and seven months

remained until the close of expert discovery).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Implant Direct’s motion to amend its

invalidity contentions. 

D. Motion to Exclude Dr. Vogel’s Testimony and Report

Implant Direct moves to exclude Dr. Robert C. Vogel from testifying at trial

or any proceeding in this action on the grounds that the proposed expert testimony

fails to satisfy the standards established under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Dkt. No. 450.) 

Zest responds that Dr. Vogel’s report and deposition testimony clearly

establish that he is qualified as an expert on the subject of his opinions and that his

opinions are reliable. (Dkt. No. 497 at 1.) 

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Zest’s response to Implant Direct’s Motion for Summary Judgment relies on

Dr. Vogel’s opinions only once: to support the contention that “the reports and

sworn testimony of Drs. Brunski and Vogel support the conclusion that a person of

ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have considered the GoDirect

product as containing an abutment as claimed in the patents-in-suit.” (Dkt. No.

495-1 at 19-20 & n.77.)

The Court DENIES the motion as to these summary judgment proceedings, as

the Court has not relied on Dr. Vogel’s opinions in arriving at its decision and thus

the motion to exclude is MOOT. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE IDSI’s Motion in Limine to

Exclude Report and Testimony of Dr. Susan Schwartz McDonald,

(Dkt. No. 444);

2. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Implant Direct’s Motion to

Exclude the Expert Witness Testimony of Dr. Robert C. Vogel, (Dkt.

No. 450); 

3. GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the IDSI Defendants’ Omnibus

Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings Motion and for Summary

Judgment, (Dkt. No. 475); 

4. GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Implant Direct Defendants’

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and to Amend Invalidity

Contentions, (Dkt. No. 478);

5. GRANTS IDSI’s Ex Parte Application for Leave to Supplement

Record, (Dkt. No. 539), to the extent it seeks to supplement the record,

but DENIES IDSI’s request to file additional supplemental briefing;

and

6. GRANTS IDSI’s Ex Parte Application for Leave to Supplement

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Record Regarding Claim Construction Hearing, (Dkt. No. 555).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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