Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03096/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03096-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PENNY LEE KREBS,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION:

(1)GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 20] AND

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF 

No. 22]

(3)REMANDING FOR FURTHER 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

PROCEEDINGS

On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff Penny Lee Krebs filed a Complaint seeking 

judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s 

(“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denial of disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental social security income under Titles II and XVI the Social Security Act. 

(ECF No. 1.) On April 24, 2017, the Commissioner filed her Answer and the 

Administrative Record, and the Court issued a briefing schedule. (ECF Nos. 12-14.) On 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 22
2

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

July 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking reversal of the 

final decision denying benefits and payment of benefits, or, in the alternative, a remand 

for further administrative proceedings. (Pl.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment [EFC No. 20] 

(“Mot.”).) Plaintiff argues the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed reversible 

error in rejecting the opinions of two treating physician’s and Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the severity of her symptoms. (Id.) On August 28, 2017, the Commissioner

filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Cross Mot.”) [ECF Nos. 22-

23].) Plaintiff filed a Reply on September 14, 2017. (ECF No. 24.) 

The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino has referred this matter to Magistrate Judge 

Bernard G. Skomal on a report and recommendation basis. Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1), 

the Court finds the parties’ cross-motions suitable for decision on the papers and without 

oral argument. After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, the administrative 

record and the applicable law and for the reasons discussed below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, the 

Commissioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, and that the matter 

be remanded to the agency for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

social security income on August 24, 2012 alleging disability beginning on December 26, 

2007. (AR 175-185.) Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (AR 

113-117, 121-125.) Plaintiff received a hearing before an ALJ on February 4, 2015 at 

which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified, along with a Vocational Expert. 

(AR 34-58.) On May 29, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 

disabled and denied Plaintiff’s applications for benefits. (AR 18-28.) The Appeals 

Council denied review on November 2, 2016. (AR 1-2.)

///

/// 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 22
3

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ DECISION

The Court briefly summarizes the ALJ’s five-step analysis and then discusses the 

relevant portions of the decision and Administrative Record in more depth below in 

analyzing the particular issues raised in this appeal. 

The ALJ’s decision goes through each potentially dispositive step of the familiar 

five-step evaluation process for determining whether an individual has established his or 

her eligibility for disability benefits.1 (AR 39-50.); see Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2011); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since December 26, 2007. (AR 20.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff 

had “the following severe impairments: history of epilepsy, controlled; carpel tunnel 

syndrome, status-post carpal tunnel surgery; osteoarthritis, bilateral knees; migraine 

headaches; and obesity.” (AR 20). At step three the ALJ considers whether the 

claimant’s impairments “meet or equal” one or more of the specific impairments or 

combination of impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the 

listings. See §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 

416.925, 416.926. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet a listing. 

 

1

In order to qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must show that: (1) he or she suffers 

from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result 

in death, or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than twelve months; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing 

the work that he or she previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment 

that exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). An applicant 

must meet both requirements to be “disabled.” Id. The applicant has the burden to establish 

disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). The claimant bears the 

burden of proving he is disabled. Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

689 (9th Cir. 2009). But, at step five, discussed below, the Commissioner bears the burden 

of showing the claimant can do other kinds of work that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy “taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity, 

age, education, and work experience.” Id.

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 22
4

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(AR 21-22.) 

If the claimant does not meet a listing, the ALJ “assess[es] and makes a finding about 

[the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other 

evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). A 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is the “maximum degree to which the 

individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental 

requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(c). The RFC is used 

at the fourth and fifth steps to determine whether the claimant can do their past work (step 

four) or adjust to other available work (step five). Id. 

Here, the ALJ found the following RFC for Plaintiff:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant can lift and/or 

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, in 1⁄2 hour 

intervals; the claimant can sit, stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday with normal breaks; the claimant cannot push/pull with the 

legs; the claimant cannot climb ladders, but can occasionally climb 

stairs and ramps; the claimant cannot kneel, crawl, and balance; the 

claimant can occasionally stoop and bend; the claimant cannot walk on 

uneven ground; the claimant cannot do work requiring forceful 

gripping and/or grasping with either hand, due to carpal tunnel 

syndrome; and the claimant cannot work on heavy moving machinery, 

due to a history of seizure disorder.

(AR 22.)

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not do her past work. (AR 26.) At step 

five, the ALJ considers whether the claimant can do other work, taking into account the 

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and the limitations in the RFC. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(v). If the claimant can do other available work, then the claimant is found 

not disabled. If not, then the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 

2001). Here, the ALJ heard and relied on testimony from a vocational expert that work 

existed in significant numbers in the national economy for a person of Plaintiff’s age, 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 22
5

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

education, work experience, and subject to the RFC found by the ALJ. (AR 27-28, 54.)

As discussed below, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of two treating 

physician opinions from Dr. Salvatore Tarantino and Dr. Ahmed Mohammed and the 

ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the severity of her symptoms based on 

credibility. (AR 23-25.) As explained more below, Dr. Tarantino and Dr. Mohammed’s 

opinions find Plaintiff is more limited that the RFC assessed by the ALJ. 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek 

judicial review of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court has jurisdiction 

to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. See 

id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5). The matter may also be remanded to the Social Security 

Administration for further proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

If the Court determines that the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial 

evidence or are based on legal error, the Court may reject the findings and set aside the 

decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by 

isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 

F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The Court may “review only the reasons 

provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground 

upon which he did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rejection of Treating Physicians’ Opinions

The ALJ rejected two treating physician opinions, those of Dr. Tarantino and Dr. 

Mohammed. The ALJ acknowledged that both were treating physicians and the 

Commissioner does not suggest otherwise in her briefing.2 (AR 25.) The Court first sets 

 

2 There are three types of physicians: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating 

physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 22
6

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

out the requirements for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician and then considers 

whether the ALJ decision meets the standard as to each treating physician’s opinion.

1. Applicable Law

Treating physician opinions are afforded greater weight “because ‘he is employed 

to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.’” 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A treating physician’s opinion is entitled 

to substantial weight.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Embrey 

v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have made it clear that the medical 

opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians are entitled to special weight”). “The 

medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as 

it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] 

case record.’” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2)).

3

 “When a treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, it is 

weighted according to factors such as the length of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

 

and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995)). 

Generally, the weight to be given descends, with the greatest weight given to treating 

physicians and the least to non-examining physicians. Id. (citations omitted). 

3 The Commissioner argues treating physician opinions are not entitled to any special 

weight because those opinions are on issues reserved to the Commissioner. (Cross Mot. 

at 3 n.3.) It appears this may be why the Commissioner has not cited or addressed the 

standards that follow regarding rejection of a treating physician opinion. (See supra

footnote 4.) However, “a treating physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, 

can be rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis 

added) (“In sum, reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability 

are comparable to those required for rejecting a treating doctors medical opinion). 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 22
7

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization of the physician.” Id.

(citing § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6)). Failing to consider the factors for weighing the opinion 

“alone constitutes reversible legal error.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676.

“In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed 

standards that guide [the court’s] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” 

Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) “To reject [the] 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must state clear and 

convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)). “If a treating or 

examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only 

reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Id. (quoting Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216). “The ALJ can meet this burden by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 

(quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)); Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. 

“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick, 157 

F.3d at 725. Further, “an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little 

weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that 

another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that 

fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 995, 1012–13 

(citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)).4

 

4 Although, as discussed below, the Commissioner asserts reasons why the ALJ’s 

rejection of Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions should be affirmed, the 

Commissioner does not acknowledge or address the standards for rejection of a 

uncontradicted or contradicted treating physician opinion — clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence or specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citations omitted). 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 22
8

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In considering whether an ALJ has properly rejected a doctor’s opinion, the court 

must rely only on the ALJ’s stated bases for rejecting the claimant’s disability claims. 

Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677 n.4 (“Because the ALJ did not provide these explanations herself 

as a reason to reject [the treating doctor’s opinion], the district court erred in looking to the 

remainder of the record to support the ALJ’s decision, and we cannot affirm on those 

grounds.”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009 (“We review only the reasons provided by the ALJ 

in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did 

not rely”); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon 

which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses 

that its action was based.”).

2. ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Tarantino and Dr. Mohammed’s Opinions5

The ALJ decision set forth the following in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Tarantino 

and Dr. Mohammad

I have read and give less weight to the medical source statements of Dr. 

Tarantino, a treating physician, and Dr. Mohammad, a treating physician, as 

the medical evidence of record does not support these evaluations and 

assessments of functioning. (16F, pp. 1-2; 17F p.1). The claimant complained 

of headaches that worsened after the passing of her grandmother (9F, p.5). 

There is no objective support for her claims of such frequent migraines, and 

she had normal neurological examinations of her head. (11F, pp. 10, 16). 

(AR 25.)

a) ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Tarantino’s Opinion

Dr. Tarantino, provided an opinion dated December 22, 2014, indicating Plaintiff 

has polyneuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral knee arthritis, seizure disorder, and 

numbness bilaterally in her wrists/hand, and pain bilaterally in her knees. (AR 788.) He 

 

5 The Court sets forth the ALJ’s rejection of the two treating physician opinions at issue 

together because the ALJ decision combines the analysis. As explained below, the Court 

attempts to distinguish the reasons given for rejecting one versus the other in considering 

the ALJ’s rejection of each.

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 22
9

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

identifies pain and/or pain disorder and side effects from prescribed medication as 

conditions affecting Plaintiff’s ability to work. (Id.) He indicates that the pain from the 

diagnosed conditions identified would constantly interfere with her concentration, 

persistence, and pace in performing work tasks. (Id.) As to lifting, she can occasionally 

lift less than 10 pounds but never anything 10 pounds or more. (Id.) As to sitting, she can 

sit cumulatively four hours in an eight-hour work day and for 30 minutes at one time. (Id.

at 788-89.) As to standing or walking, she can stand or walk cumulatively one hour in an 

eight-hour work day and 15 minutes at one time. (Id. at 789) As to handling and finger 

manipulation, he finds she can engage in handling, grasping, turning, twisting with hands 

a maximum of one hour in an 8-hour day and the same for fine finger manipulation. (Id.) 

He finds she would need unscheduled breaks hourly in an eight-hour workday with 10-15 

minutes of rest before returning to work. (Id.) As to medications, he indicates the 

following side effects: drowsiness from hydrocodone and SOMA and dizziness from 

Gabapentin. (Id.) He finds Plaintiff’s claims as to pain credible and objectively supported 

by nerve conduction studies and x-rays. (Id.) Finally, he indicates that Plaintiff would 

have difficulty sustaining full time work because she suffers from chronic pain, she is 

unable to lift or stand, and she is on chronic pain medications. (Id.) 

(1) Analysis of ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Tarantino’s Opinion

The ALJ rejects Dr. Tarantino’s opinion based on the following, “the medical 

evidence of record does not support these evaluations and assessments of functioning.” 

(AR 25) The few sentences that follow concern Plaintiff’s migraines which were primarily 

addressed by Dr. Mohammad’s opinion.6 

 

6 As explained below, these additional sentences regarding Plaintiff’s migraines are also 

not sufficient to reject Dr. Mohammad’s opinion. The same would be true as to Dr. 

Tarantino. Dr. Tarantino’ opinion does not address Plaintiff’s migraines specifically, but 

even if considered regarding the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Tarantino’s opinion, this would 

not alter the Court’s conclusion that the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject Dr. Tarantino’s opinion. 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 22
10

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although the ALJ does not identify which, if any, opinion by another doctor 

contradicted Dr. Tarantino’s opinion, for purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes Dr. 

Tarantino’s opinion was contradicted by the state agency reviewers and considers whether 

the ALJ’s decision meets the standard, outlined above, for rejecting a treating physician’s 

contradicted opinion.

7

 See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 (finding the ALJ failed to expressly 

find a treating physician opinion contradicted the rejected opinion, but inferring from the 

record that it was and finding the decision failed to meet the standard for rejection of a 

contradicted treating physician opinion). 

The ALJ has not explained why he is rejecting Dr. Tarantino’s opinion other than 

the boilerplate language — “medical evidence of record does not support these evaluations 

and assessments of functioning” — that provides no insight into what medical evidence he 

is referring to as a basis for rejecting Dr. Tarantino’s opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-

13 (“[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing 

nothing more than . . . criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive 

basis for his conclusion.”). 

In looking to other portions of the ALJ decision, including those cited by the 

Commissioner, for reasons the ALJ may have rejected the opinion, the ALJ does discuss 

Plaintiff’s carpel tunnel, one of the diagnoses identified in Dr. Tarantino’s opinion. In 

noting a hand surgeon, not Dr. Tarantino, has recommended surgery for carpel tunnel, the 

ALJ seems to reject that recommendation based on a normal neurological exam from two 

 

7 The Court notes that generally the Court should not look to the record for reasons that

the ALJ did not rely on himself, including considering a treating physician opinion to be 

contradicted when the ALJ did not provide that explanation. See Trevizio, 871 F.3d at 

677 n.4 (finding the district court erred in looking to the remainder of the record for 

reasons to support the ALJ’s rejection of a treating physician, including finding it 

contradicted). However, because the Court can infer it was contradicted, at least in part, 

by the state examining physicians’, as argued by the Commissioner, and the ALJ decision 

fails to meet the less demanding standard for rejection of a contradicted opinion, the 

Court applies that standard. 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 22
11

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

years prior and more recent nerve conduction exams showing “mild carpel tunnel” (AR 

25.) The ALJ describes the carpel tunnel condition as “mild to moderate” earlier in the 

decision when addressing Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and finds Plaintiff’s symptoms 

will be alleviated by the upcoming surgery and her weight loss. (AR 23.) However, events 

yet to come would not be a basis, at least not without further explanation, for rejecting Dr. 

Tarantino’s opinion about her limitations prior to them. And, it is not clear how exactly 

the finding of mild to moderate carpel tunnel provides a basis to reject Dr. Tarantino’s 

opinion. This would also only be of any consequence to the hand/finger grasping and 

manipulation limitations in Dr. Tarantino’s opinion. There are no other references to Dr. 

Tarantino’s opinion or other reasons provided by the ALJ explaining the rejection of his 

opinion. The ALJ has not “set forth his own interpretations and explain[ed] why they, 

rather than [Dr. Tarantino’s], [is] correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

The Commissioner also argues the Court should rely on medical records she believes 

support rejection of Dr. Tarantino’s opinion.

8

 But, the ALJ did not rely on any of the 

records cited to reject Dr. Tarantino’s opinion and, to the extent the ALJ relied on them 

elsewhere in the decision, they are discussed above. The Court cannot create the ALJ’s 

reasons for rejecting the opinion for him from the record and then decide whether those 

reasons are specific and legitimate and supported by substantial evidence. “T]he district 

court errs by developing its own reasons to discount [the treating physician] opinion, rather 

 

8 Two pages of the record cited by the Commissioner are also cited by the ALJ in the 

paragraph rejecting Dr. Tarantino and Dr. Mohammad’s opinion, however, they do not 

seem to support the ALJ’s assertion or the Commissioner’s. (AR 618, 624.) The ALJ 

cites them in support of a lack of objective support for Plaintiff’s frequency of migraines 

based on normal neurological examinations of her head and the Commissioner cites them 

as generally normal examinations. (AR 25.) However, these pages just list Plaintiff’s 

vital signs and do not address her limitations as a result of any of the diagnoses addressed 

by Dr. Tarantino or Dr. Mohammad’s opinions. (AR 618, 624.) To the extent there is 

something here that undermines Dr. Tarantino’s opinion, it is not apparent to the Court 

and illustrates why the Court should not find reasons not given or explained by the ALJ 

to support the rejection of a treating physician opinion. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677.

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 22
12

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

than reviewing the ALJ’s reasons for substantial evidence.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677 

(emphasis added). When “the ALJ [does] not provide [the] explanations [himself] as a 

reason to reject [the treating doctor’s opinion], the district court err[s] in looking to the 

remainder of the record to support the ALJ’s decision, and we cannot affirm on those 

grounds.” Id. at 677 n.4. 

The other reasons referenced by the Commissioner, the brevity of the opinion and 

absence of citation to medical records in the opinion, fail for the same reason. The ALJ 

did not provide them. Trevizio, 871, F.3d at 677 n.4 (“Because the ALJ did not provide 

these explanations [himself] as a reasons to reject [the treating physician’s opinion], we

would err in looking to the remainder of the record to support the ALJ’s decision.”) There 

is an additional problem with rejecting Dr. Tarantino’s opinion based on the form and 

length. The ALJ cannot “reject the responses of a treating physician without specific and 

legitimate reasons for doing so, even where those responses were provided on a ‘checkthe-box’ form, [are] not accompanied by comments, and [do] not indicate to the ALJ the 

basis for the physician’s answers.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677 n.4 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 

80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)). Here, Dr. Tarantino’s opinion does include some 

check boxes as to particular weights and frequency of lifting and time frames she can sit 

and stand based on her diagnoses. However, it also includes Plaintiff’s diagnoses and 

comments concerning the effects of her prescribed medications, what objective medical 

evidence supports her pain complaints and why she would have difficulty sustaining work

on a full time basis. (AR 788-89.)9 Rejection based on the form, had the ALJ done so, 

 

9 “[T]here is no authority that a ‘check-the-box’ form is any less reliable than any other 

type of form; indeed, agency physicians routinely use these types of forms to assess the 

intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of impairments.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677 n.4. 

The Court does acknowledge there are cases suggesting that check-box or checklist forms 

may be part of the reason an opinion is rejected, however, those cases also reflect it is not 

the only reason, and it certainly does not relieve the ALJ of the obligation to provide 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for the rejection. See 

Baston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 22
13

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would not have been proper.

Finally, even “[w]hen a treating physician’s opinion is not controlling,” it should be 

“weighted according to factors such as the length of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization of the physician.” Trevizo, 

871 F.3d at 675 (citing § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6)). Here, the ALJ did not consider these factors. 

“This failure alone constitutes reversible legal error.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676. 

b) ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Mohammad’s Opinion

Dr. Mohammad provided an opinion, dated January 15, 2014, indicating that 

Plaintiff suffers from chronic migraines. (AR 790.) He describes her pain level as severe 

and indicates she is credible as to her claims of pain. (Id.) He appears to indicate there is 

not an objective medical reason for the pain. (Id.) He finds Plaintiff would have difficulty 

sustaining full time work due to chronic migraines. (Id.) He estimates she would likely 

miss more than four days of work per month due to her chronic migraines. (Id.) 

(1) Analysis of ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Mohammad’s Opinion

The language discussed above, “medical evidence of record does not support these 

evaluations and assessments of functioning” is applied to Dr. Mohammad as well as Dr. 

Tarantino. Additionally, the ALJ notes Plaintiff “complained of headaches that worsened 

after the passing of her grandmother.” (AR 25.) He also indicates “[t]here is no objective 

support for her claims of such frequent migraines, and she had normal neurological 

examinations of her head.” (Id.) 

As with Dr. Tarantino’s opinion, the ALJ does not identify which, if any, opinion by 

another doctor contradicted Dr. Mohammad’s opinion, but for purposes of this analysis, 

 

rejection of opinion based on report being brief and conclusory in addition to the report 

stating it was based claimant’s subjective descriptions of pain and the report not being 

supported by treatment notes); Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(affirming rejection of opinion consisting of checked off boxes where the report was 

internally contradictory and contradicted by all earlier medical reports). 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 22
14

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Court assumes Dr. Mohammad’s opinion was contradicted by the state agency 

reviewers and considers whether the ALJ’s decision meets the standard, outlined above, 

for rejecting a treating physician’s contradicted opinion.10 See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 

(finding the ALJ failed to expressly find a treating physician opinion contradicted the 

rejected opinion, but inferring from the record that it was and finding the decision failed to 

meet the standard for rejection of a contradicted treating physician opinion).

As discussed above, the ALJ applied the same boilerplate language, discussed above, 

to Dr. Mohammad’s opinion that he did to Dr. Tarantino’s — “medical evidence of record 

does not support these evaluations and assessments of functioning.” As discussed above, 

it provides no insight into what medical evidence he is referring to as a basis for rejecting 

Dr. Mohammad’s opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13 (“[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects 

a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than . . . criticizing 

it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.”). 

However, as outlined above, the ALJ does add some additional comments as to Plaintiff’s 

migraines. The Court addresses each.

The ALJ accurately cites a record indicating Plaintiff’s headaches worsened after 

the passing of her grandmother. (AR 577.) The neurology follow-up note from Dr. 

Mohammad to Dr. Tarantino is from November 12, 2012. (Id.) However, there is no 

explanation how this undermines Dr. Mohammad’s opinion regarding the severity of 

Plaintiff’s migraines and their impact on her ability to function. The Court could speculate 

the ALJ is suggesting the migraines are some sort of short-lived response to the loss of a 

loved one, but that would not be supported by substantial evidence because Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with and being treated for migraines at least as early as March 2010 with the 

frequency increasing steading from 2010 to 2014. (AR 295, 298-99, 793-95.) The lack of 

explanation on this point is of particular consequence because, as explained more below, 

 

10 See also infra footnote 7. 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 22
15

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the frequency of Plaintiff’s migraines and when they 

began are inaccurate and contradictory.

The ALJ states “[t]here is no objective support for her claims of such frequent 

migraines, and she had normal neurological examinations of the head. (11F, pp. 10, 16).” 

(AR 25.) The records the ALJ cites in support of the conclusion that she had normal 

neurological examinations of the head do not support that conclusion. As noted previously, 

these two pages of the record provide Plaintiff’s vital signs and there are no reports as to 

neurological examinations at all. (See infra footnote 8.) 

As to the assertion that there is no objective support for Plaintiff’s claims as to the 

frequency of her migraines, there are at least two problems. First, the ALJ does not explain 

how Plaintiff’s claims as to the frequency of her migraines is a reason to reject Dr. 

Mohammad’s opinion. Second, even if the Court assumes the ALJ rejected Dr. 

Mohammad’s opinion because he thought it was based on Plaintiff’s self-reports as to the 

frequency of her migraines, as the Commissioner now asserts, the ALJ has not provided 

any explanation or support for that conclusion. 

The ALJ does not explain how Plaintiff’s claims as to the frequency of her migraines 

supports rejection of Dr. Mohammad’s opinion. The Commissioner asserts that Dr. 

Mohammad’s opinion “was based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of the frequency of 

her headaches.” (Mot. at 6.) “An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is 

based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

incredible.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morgan 

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, the ALJ did 

not give that reason and, as noted above, the Court cannot “develop[] its own reasons to 

discount [a treating physician] opinion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 677. 

Even if the Court assumes the ALJ was rejecting Dr. Mohammad’s opinion because 

he believed it was based on Plaintiff’s reports as to the frequency of her migraines, he 

makes no findings or otherwise explains to what extent Dr. Mohammad’s opinion is based 

on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints or a basis for reaching such a conclusion. Other than 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 22
16

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the pages in the record discussed above that would not suggest the opinion is based on 

Plaintiff’s reports, the ALJ only cites the pages of the doctors’ opinions. (AR 25.) In 

rejecting Dr. Mohammad’s opinion, the ALJ does not discuss other medical records or 

notes from Dr. Mohammad or how those records indicate the extent to which Dr. 

Mohammad’s opinion is based on Plaintiff’s self-reports. The ALJ does not even discuss 

the opinion or explain why he is concluding it is based on Plaintiff’s claims regarding 

frequency.11 The Court cannot determine whether this reason is supported by substantial 

evidence when the ALJ does not explain what he is basing this conclusion on. 

Finally, as with Dr. Tarantino’s opinion, the ALJ “did not consider factors such as 

length of the treating relationship, the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of 

the treatment relationship, or the supportability of the opinion” that the ALJ should 

consider when the treating physician’s opinion is not controlling. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)). “This failure alone constitutes reversible legal error.” Id. 

B. ALJ’s Credibility Determination as to Plaintiff

The ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(5)(A).” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fair v. 

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

An ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis when evaluating the credibility of a 

claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain and impairments. Garrison, 759 F.3d at

1014 (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). “First, the 

ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Id. (citations omitted). “Once the claimant produces medical evidence 

 

11 As discussed below, his reliance on Plaintiff’s claims regarding the frequency of her 

migraines is also problematic because the ALJ makes contradictory findings on this 

point.

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 22
17

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony 

as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical 

evidence.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th 

Cir. 1991)). 

Plaintiff has satisfied the first step. The ALJ found “the claimant’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” 

(AR 24.) Accordingly, the Court finds the first step satisfied. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he claimant need not show that her impairment could 

reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only 

show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.”)

“If the claimant satisfies the first step of this analysis, and there is no evidence of 

malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 

1014-15; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 834). These reasons must be “sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that 

the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 

F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). “The ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony 

is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1284; see also Parra, 481 F.3d at 750 (“The ALJ must provide clear and convincing 

reasons to reject a claimant’s subjective testimony, by specifically identifying what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”).

The ALJ may consider at least the following when assessing a claimant’s credibility: 

(1) reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in either the claimant’s testimony or 

between claimant’s testimony and conduct; (3) daily activities; (4) work records; and 

(5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity and effect 

of claimant’s condition. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59; Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1995)). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 22
18

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [then a reviewing court] may not engage 

in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Although the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments could be expected to cause her 

symptoms, he found her statements concerning “the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of these symptoms . . . not credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” (AR 

24.) In looking to the ALJ decision to find the ALJ’s reasons for finding her not credible, 

it appears the ALJ doubted her claims as to how long she could walk, the frequency of her 

migraines, and when her migraines began. (AR 23.) However, the Court can only find the 

ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s claim as to 

how long she could walk. 

The ALJ seems to discredit Plaintiff’s claims about her migraines based on her 

migraines not beginning until 2014. (AR 23.) The ALJ cites a letter from Dr. Holmes that 

indicates Plaintiff had been seen since March of 2014 for migraines. (Id.) The ALJ 

characterizes this as an indicator that Plaintiff’s migraines are a more “recent condition.” 

(Id.) This is not a specific, clear, and convincing reason to reject Plaintiff’s claims as to 

the severity of her symptoms from migraines. Even if the Court only looks to the ALJ’s 

own summary of Plaintiff’s medical history, it is clear Plaintiff was being treated for 

migraines by her neurologist, Dr. Mohammad, for years prior to 2014. (AR 24.) As noted 

above, she started receiving treatment for migraines as early as 2010 and they increased in 

the following years. (AR 295, 298-99, 793-95.)

As to the frequency of Plaintiff’s migraines, the ALJ found Plaintiff “did not tell any 

medical providers she had migraines as frequent as she asserted at the hearing, which is 

three to four times a day.” (AR 23.) There are two problems with discrediting Plaintiff on 

this basis. First, as noted above, the ALJ reaches two different conclusions as to Plaintiff’s 

testimony as to the frequency of her migraines. He finds she is reporting three to four per 

day here, (AR 23), and later in the decision, (AR 25), but indicates earlier in the decision 

that she testified she had migraines about two to four times per a week. (AR 23.) It might 

make sense to discredit Plaintiff based on contradictory reporting of the frequency of her 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 22
19

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

migraines.12 However, that is not what the ALJ did. The ALJ makes two contradictory 

findings as to the frequency Plaintiff reported and then relies on one to discredit her. The 

Court cannot find that is a specific, clear, and convincing reason to reject her claims as to 

the frequency of her migraines.

The ALJ notes that Plaintiff is “able to walk with her father for about 30 minutes.” 

(AR 23.) The ALJ does not specifically explain how this undermines her claims, but he 

does note earlier in the discussion of her claims regarding her symptoms that she claims in 

her function report that she is unable to walk for more than a few minutes.13 (AR 23.) This 

provides a specific, clear, and convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s claim as to the 

length of time she can walk.

The Commissioner argues the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s allegations because they 

were not supported by the objective medical evidence, but the ALJ does not indicate that 

is the reason he is discrediting her symptoms. And, to the extent the ALJ did reject 

Plaintiff’s claims as to the severity of her symptoms based on objective medical evidence 

he failed to “state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in 

the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d 1284; see also Parra, 481 F.3d at 750 

(“The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons to reject a claimant’s subjective 

testimony, by specifically identifying what testimony is not credible and what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.”) 

///

 

12 Her testimony at the hearing on this point was somewhat unclear until her counsel 

clarified through questioning that she has both severe headaches and migraines, for which 

she takes different medication. (AR 49.) She testified the migraines are worse and she 

gets them two to four times a week. (AR 50.)

13 Plaintiff’s Function Report, completed on October 27 or 28, 2012 does reflect she was 

unable to stand, sit, walk, or stairs for more than a few minutes, (AR 250), and she did 

testify at her hearing that she accompanies her father on a 30 minute walk up the block 

and back. (AR 45.) She does not indicate how frequently, although she refers to it as his 

maintenance program for his COPD. (Id.)

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 22
20

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The ALJ did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s allegations as to the onset of her migraines or their frequency, but did provide a 

specific, clear, and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s claim regarding the length of 

time she could walk. 

C. Harmless Error

Harmless error analysis applies in social security cases. Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 

1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). “ALJ errors in social security cases are harmless if they are 

‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Id. at 1173 (quoting Stout 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Carmickle v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (An ALJ’s reliance on 

erroneous reasons is harmless so long as the “remaining reasoning and ultimate 

credibility determination were adequately supported by substantial evidence”). “[W]here 

the magnitude of an ALJ error is more significant, then the degree of certainty of 

harmlessness must also be heightened before an error can be determined to be harmless.” 

Id. The Court cannot find the above errors, particularly the rejection of two treating 

physicians’ opinion harmless. The ALJ’s RFC differs in numerous respects from Dr. 

Tarantino and Dr. Mohammad’s opinions, including lifting 20 pounds frequently, hourly

unscheduled breaks, sitting for six hours in an eight hour day, and missing more than four 

days per month of work. (AR 22, 53, 788-90.) If these opinions were credited, even in 

part, it would be consequential to the ultimate disability determination. 

V. Remand

The Court recommends the matter be remanded to the agency for further 

administrative proceedings. “The rare circumstances that result in a direct award of 

benefits are not present in this case.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir.

2018). “When the ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must 

remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award of benefits.” Id.

at 1045 (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

The credit-as-true analysis “permits, but does not require, a direct award of benefits on 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 22
21

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

review but only where the [ALJ] has not provided sufficient reasoning for rejecting 

testimony and there are no outstanding issues on which further proceedings in the 

administrative court would be useful.” Id. at 1044. Under the three-part rule, the Court 

first considers “whether the ‘ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion.’” Id. at 1045 (quoting 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019). This step is met for the reasons set forth above. 

However, at the second step, the Court considers “whether there are ‘outstanding 

issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be made’ and whether 

further administrative proceedings would be useful.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 

1101). “In evaluating this issue, [the Court] consider[s] whether the record as a whole is 

free from conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps, whether all factual issues have been resolved, and 

whether the claimant’s entitlement to benefits is clear under the applicable legal rules.” 

Treichler, 775 F3d at 1104-05. “Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 

uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.” Id. at 

1105. When, as here, the ALJ’s findings regarding the claimant’s subjective symptom 

testimony are inadequate, remand for further findings on credibility is appropriate. See 

Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1995). As noted above, the Commissioner 

attempts to provide reasons the ALJ did not by citing medical records the ALJ did not rely 

on in his cursory rejection of Dr. Tarantino and Dr. Mohammed’s opinions. Additionally, 

Plaintiff attempts to undermine the ALJ’s conclusion as to those opinions sheer volume of 

references to Plaintiff’s medical records. As discussed above, the Court is not going to 

create reasons the ALJ did not give or support, but the Court does find under these 

circumstances, further administrative proceedings are necessary to allow the ALJ to do this 

evaluation. The Court recommends the case be remanded. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) be GRANTED, that the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) be DENIED, and that 

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 22
22

16cv3096 JLS (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the case be REMANDED to the agency for further proceedings. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted 

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 7, 2018, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy to all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than March 14, 2018.

Dated: February 20, 2018

Case 3:16-cv-03096-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 02/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 22