Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00043/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00043-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARYN WATERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00043-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR 

SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

Re: Dkt. No. 65

On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff Sharyn Waters filed this action against Defendant Kohl’s 

Department Stores, Inc. alleging that she was injured in a slip and fall incident at Defendant’s 

Hayward, California store. On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions for 

spoliation of evidence and requested that the Court give the jury an adverse inference instruction.

On April 2, 2015, the Court held a hearing, and after careful consideration of the parties’ 

arguments and moving papers, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion for sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2011, Plaintiff Sharyn Waters allegedly tripped and fell at Defendant 

Kohl’s Department Store, Inc.’s Hayward, California store. (Compl., Dkt. 1, Ex. A.) She claims to 

have fallen as a result of “(1) narrowly spaced clothing racks, and (2) litter [] remain[ing] on the 

floor . . . [which caused] her to smash her head on the floor with violent force resulting in severe, 

permanent, and substantial injuries and permanent bodily and mental damage.” (Compl. at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s fall was witnessed by her son Robert McQueen. 

On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff and John Philip Waters filed this action in Alameda 

County Superior Court, which Defendant subsequently removed to federal court. Thereafter, John 

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Philip Waters dismissed his claims against Defendant with prejudice. 

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on August 26, 2014. On January 8, 

2015, after holding a hearing and considering supplemental briefing, the Court denied Kohl’s 

motion for summary judgment and found that “Plaintiff’s fall triggered Kohl’s duty to preserve all 

relevant video evidence, rather than only the video that showed her fall, so an adverse inference 

[jury] instruction may be appropriate to explain the absence of additional surveillance video.” 

(Order on Mot. for Summary J., “MSJ Order,” Dkt. No. 57 at 8.)

On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed her motion for sanctions for spoliation of video 

evidence. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 65.) Defendant filed its opposition on March 6, 2015. (Def.’s 

Opp’n, Dkt. No. 71.) Plaintiff filed her reply on March 13, 2015. (Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 72.)

On April 2, 2015, the Court held a hearing at which both parties appeared.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts are vested with inherent powers “‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the 

orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. 

Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 

(1991)). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that trial courts possess “inherent 

discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to the destruction or 

spoliation of relevant evidence,” and that sanctions for spoliation of evidence may be imposed 

under the court’s inherent powers to manage its own affairs. Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 

1329 (9th Cir. 1993); Jackson Family Wines, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., No. CV 11-5639 EMC 

(JSC), 2014 WL 595912, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 

951, 958 (9th Cir.2006)).

Spoliation “refers to the destruction or material alteration of evidence or to the failure to 

preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” 

Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing West v. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)). Evidence of spoliation may be grounds for 

sanctions, which may include an adverse inference instruction. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics 

Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Akiona v. United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 

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(9th Cir. 1991)). 

While the Ninth Circuit has not set forth the standard for when an adverse inference 

instruction is appropriate, courts in this district have adopted the Second Circuit’s three-part test, 

which provides that “a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of 

evidence must establish[:] (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to 

preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed ‘with a culpable state 

of mind’; and (3) that the evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” Residential Funding 

Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Byrnie v. Town of 

Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107-12 (2d Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., Io Grp. Inc. v. GLBT Ltd., No. C-10-

1282 MMC DMR, 2011 WL 4974337, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011); Vieste, LLC v. Hill 

Redwood Dev., 2011 WL 2198257, at *2 (N.D.Cal. June 6, 2011); World Courier v. Barone, No. 

C 06–3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 

Hummer Winblad Venture Partners (In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig.), 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 

1078 (N.D.Cal. 2006); Hamilton v. Signature Flight Support Corp., No. C 05–0490 CW(MEJ), 

2005 WL 3481423, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2005); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 888 

F. Supp. 2d 976, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that Kohl’s engaged in the willful spoliation of video evidence when its 

employees retained only nine minutes of video footage pertaining to Plaintiff’s slip and fall. (Pl.’s 

Mot. at 5-6.) As a result of this conduct, Plaintiff requests that the Court give an adverse inference 

instruction to advise the jury of Kohl’s conduct and that they may infer that the video footage 

would have been harmful to Kohl’s.

A. Whether Kohl’s engaged in spoliation of evidence such that an adverse jury 

instruction is appropriate.

An adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence is appropriate if: (1) 

the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was 

destroyed; (2) the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) the evidence was 

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relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would 

support that claim or defense.

i. Duty to Preserve Relevant Evidence

Kohl’s argues that while it had control over the surveillance footage, it did not destroy any 

“potentially relevant” evidence. (Def.’s Opp’n at 1.) Litigants have a duty to preserve “what [they 

know], or should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 

of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject 

of a pending discovery request.” Toppan Photomasks, Inc. v. Park, No. 13-CV-03323-MMC, 2014 

WL 2567914, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014) (quoting Io Grp., 2011 WL 4974337, at *5). This 

may arise before litigation is formally commenced. See World Courier, 2007 WL 1119196, at *1.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not precisely defined when the duty to preserve is 

triggered, courts in this district generally agree that, “[a]s soon as a potential claim is identified, a 

litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant 

to the action.” In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Apple Inc. v. Samsung 

Electronics Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Based on the video footage retained, 

which showed Plaintiff seriously falling and hitting her head, the Court finds that Kohl’s should 

have contemplated litigation at the time of Plaintiff’s fall, thereby triggering its duty to preserve.

ii. Defendant’s Requisite State of Mind

Previously, Defendant unsuccessfully argued that it did not destroy any relevant evidence. 

(See MSJ Order at 7-8.) Now, Defendant argues that it did not destroy any “potentially relevant” 

evidence. (Def.’s Opp’n at 1.) This shift in position is likely because “[a] party’s destruction of

evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party has ‘some notice that the documents were 

potentially relevant to the litigation before they were destroyed.’” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 

F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 

1001 (9th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). 

Defendant offers the declarations of Selina Gill and Mariela Banu in support of this 

assertion, in which both declarants state that despite the two to four cameras capturing the general 

area of Plaintiff’s fall, “there never existed any other video footage showing Plaintiff’s incident or 

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the immediate vicinity where Plaintiff commenced her fall . . . .” (Decl. of Selina Gill, “Gill 

Decl.,” Dkt. No. 71-1 ¶¶ 4, 7; Decl. of Mariela Banu, “Banu Decl.,” Dkt. No. 71-2 ¶¶ 4, 7.)1 At 

their depositions, however, neither declarant could remember how many cameras captured the 

incident. (Dep. of Selina Gill, “Gill Dep.,” Dkt. No. 66-1 at 36:19-37:5; Dep. of Mariela Banu, 

“Banu Dep.,” Dkt. No. 66-2 at 16:5-11.)

Additionally, Ms. Banu’s declaration contains a paragraph that seeks to clarify her 

deposition testimony that there were two cameras that captured video footage of the incident. 

(Banu Decl. ¶ 9.) In her declaration, Ms. Banu clarified that she interpreted “incident” to mean 

both Plaintiff’s fall and any footage of Plaintiff, rather than just Plaintiff’s fall. Id. This is not 

significant, because the declarations confirm that there was a rotating P.T.Z. camera that captured 

footage of Plaintiff being taken out of the store in a wheelchair. (Gill Decl. ¶ 8; Banu Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Since Plaintiff’s fall occurred near the exit, that area is in the vicinity of where the incident 

occurred and should have been retained. As a result, the Court need not rule on whether the 

declarations relied on by Kohl’s contradicts the declarants’ sworn deposition testimony.

As previously stated in the Court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, Kohl’s failure to retain additional footage requires the Court to take its word that such 

footage did not capture Plaintiff’s fall or any other evidence relevant to her claims, such as the 

condition of the area from which she fell. Whether Kohl’s employees destroyed the potentially 

relevant evidence unintentionally or intentionally is of no consequence, because Plaintiff may 

obtain an adverse inference instruction even in the absence of a finding of bad faith. Unigard Sec. 

Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Glover 

v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (A court may exercise its broad discretionary 

power to issue an adverse inference instruction based on potential relevance to the litigation 

without a finding of bad faith.). Here, there is no dispute that Kohl’s destruction of the video 

surveillance footage was willful, even if not in bad faith.

///

 

1

The Court notes that the two declarations are virtually identical.

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iii. Relevance

Defendant contends that its employees did not retain the P.T.Z. camera footage “because it 

did not show either the incident itself or any portion of the store close to where Plaintiff 

commenced her fall” and, as a result, was not relevant. (Def.’s Opp’n at 3.) At the hearing, 

Defendant elaborated that the footage destroyed was not relevant to causation, because the video 

retained showed that Plaintiff did not slip on the clothing tag that was recovered and, based on

witness statements, was believed to be the cause of her fall.

This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the duty to preserve is not limited by 

statements given by potential witnesses. That the loss prevention associate decided to retain only 

nine minutes of video footage, which definitively proved that a clothing tag recovered did not 

cause Plaintiff’s fall, does not mean that there was no other potentially relevant footage.

Second, relevancy is a very broad standard and is not limited to causation. Even if the 

footage from the second surveillance camera and extended footage from the stationary camera,

that was produced, did not show Plaintiff’s fall, it is relevant to show the condition of the premises 

for liability purposes. At the hearing, Defendant conceded that earlier video footage from the 

stationary camera could have shown how long the clothing tag had been on the floor. Such 

evidence would be relevant to show that Kohl’s failed to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the 

premises. At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that footage of the general area—including footage 

from the stationary camera that showed the right hand side of the store, which was also not 

retained—is relevant to show whether Kohl’s conducted general sweeps to remove debris. The 

Court agrees.

That Ms. Banu and Ms. Gill suddenly recall that there was never “any other video footage 

showing Plaintiff’s incident or the immediate vicinity where Plaintiff commenced her fall at any 

other time between the opening of the store that day and Plaintiff’s departure” is immaterial, 

because there was additional video that was destroyed, including the video from the stationary 

camera that was produced. (See Banu Decl. ¶ 7; Gill Decl. ¶ 7.) The Court notes that both 

declarants made statements that are contradicted by the video footage produced. Specifically, both 

stated that “[n]o video capturing plaintiff’s fall or the area where she had fallen was destroyed, 

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either intentionally or unintentionally by me or any of Defendant’s representatives.” (Gill Decl. ¶ 

11; Banu Decl. ¶12)(emphasis added.) It is undisputed, however, that the video footage from the 

stationary camera prior to Plaintiff’s fall was destroyed, as only one minute of footage prior to 

Plaintiff’s fall was retained. It is also undisputed that the P.T.Z. camera’s video footage showing 

Plaintiff leaving the store in a wheelchair was destroyed. The Court has no way of knowing how 

much video footage there was leading up to Plaintiff getting into a wheelchair and leaving the 

store. It is inexplicable that Defendant decided not to preserve the footage from the P.T.Z. camera 

showing Plaintiff leaving in a wheelchair. Such footage is certainly relevant to show her condition 

at the time of the incident. If Defendant decided to destroy such relevant evidence, it is possible 

that other relevant evidence was also destroyed.

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s fall triggered Kohl’s duty to preserve all potentially

relevant video evidence, rather than only the video footage deemed by Kohl’s to be related to her 

fall. Therefore, an adverse inference instruction is appropriate to explain the absence of additional 

surveillance video.

B. Appropriate adverse inference instruction

In response to Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff requests that the Court give the following 

adverse inference jury instruction:

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

You are instructed that Kohl’s was aware of and had possession of 

additional video footage depicting Ms. Waters’ fall and the 

surrounding area. Despite an obligation to preserve that video, 

Kohl’s destroyed it.

As a result of this conduct, you may infer that the contents of this 

video footage would have been harmful to Kohl’s.

(Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7.)

In opposition, Kohl’s requests that Plaintiff’s motion be denied or, in the alternative, that 

the Court should delay ruling upon the motion until the conclusion of trial. (Def.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) 

As an initial matter, the Court declines to wait until trial to rule on Plaintiff’s motion. 

Should an instruction be given, Kohl’s asks that it “be modified to one that is much less 

harsh and that is in accordance with instructions approved in other decisions in comparable 

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situations in this district.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) Kohl’s offers an alternative instruction: “Defendant 

has failed to preserve evidence for Plaintiff’s use in this litigation after its duty to preserve arose. 

Whether this fact is important to you in reaching a verdict in this case is for you to decide.” Id. at 

7. Kohl’s relies on Apple, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 994, and Jackson Family Wines, 2014 WL 595912, 

at *8, in support of this less severe instruction. Id. Those two cases, however, both involved 

voluminous discovery, and the district court could not determine whether the parties’ “‘ability to 

go to trial’ was significantly hampered” by the spoliation of evidence. Apple, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 

994; Jackson Family Wines, 2014 WL 595912, at *8 (“A more harsh sanction would be 

inappropriate given the voluminous evidence that has been produced.”) 

Here, however, the additional video footage would have provided evidence not otherwise 

made available, including the condition of the premises for liability purposes—specifically that 

Kohl’s failed to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises. See discussion supra Part 

III.A.iii. Moreover, the instruction proposed by Kohl’s does not describe the evidence it 

destroyed, thereby rendering the instruction virtually meaningless. See Jackson Family Wines, 

2014 WL 595912, at *8 (jury instruction described evidence destroyed); but cf. Apple, 888 F. 

Supp. 2d at 993-94 (contents of emails destroyed in accordance with company’s retention policy 

were unknown). Accordingly, since the Court is aware of the general nature of the video footage, 

Plaintiff is entitled to a more robust jury instruction than the one offered by Kohl’s. That said, the 

Court agrees that Plaintiff’s offered instruction is too severe. 

Therefore, the Court will instruct the jury as follows:2

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

You are instructed that Kohl’s failed to preserve additional video 

surveillance footage after its duty to preserve arose. The destroyed

video footage depicted the general area of the store where Ms. 

Waters fell, Ms. Waters leaving the store in a wheelchair, and may 

have also captured her fall.

As a result of this conduct, you may infer that the contents of this 

video footage would have been harmful to Kohl’s.

 

2 At the hearing, the parties agreed to revisit the adverse inference instruction at the charging 

conference and make appropriate adjustments.

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This instruction is proportional to Defendant’s spoliation, because Kohl’s willfully destroyed 

relevant evidence that has significantly hampered Plaintiff’s ability to go to trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence is 

GRANTED, and the Court will give the adverse inference jury instruction set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2015

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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