Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAL-MART STORES, INC., A

Delaware corporation and WALMART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST,

a Delaware statutory trust,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF TURLOCK; TURLOCK CITY

COUNCIL; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-5278 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART SAVE MART

SUPERMARKETS’ REQUEST FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING

PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 

72-303.

I. INTRODUCTION

Save Mart Supermarkets (“Save Mart”), a non-party, moves for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order granting

Plaintiffs Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Wal-Mart Real Estate

Business Trust’s (“Wal-Mart”) Motion to Compel Compliance with

Subpoena Duces Tecum. (Doc. 30, Mag. Order). Wal-Mart opposes. 

(Doc. 33, Pl.’s Opp.). Oral argument was heard on

April 18, 2005, with counsel for all parties appearing. 

Save Mart’s motion was granted in part and denied in part. The

subpoena was modified. A protective order is to be executed by

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1 As part of its claim for Declaratory Relief, Wal-Mart

seeks a declaration that the Ordinance at issue is null and void

on the grounds that it (a) violates the equal protection clauses

of the United States and California constitutions; (b) violates

the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution; and (c) is

unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 59).

2

agreement of the parties. (See Doc. 63, Proposed Second Amended

Protective Order (“Proposed Protective Order”)). 

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Wal-Mart filed this action against Defendants City of

Turlock (“City”) and Turlock City Council (“City Council”) on

February 11, 2004. (Doc. 1, Compl., filed Feb. 11, 2004). WalMart did not name as defendants individual Turlock City Council

members. Wal-Mart brings six claims against the City and the

City Council (collectively, “Defendants”): (1) Equal Protection

under the United States Constitution; (2) Equal Protection under

the California Constitution; (3) Commerce Clause;

(4) Unconstitutionally Vague and Uncertain; (5) Deprivation of

Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) Declaratory Relief.1

Also on February, 11, 2004, Wal-Mart filed a Petition for

Writ of Mandate in the Superior Court for Stanislaus County,

pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act. (See Doc.

40, Pl.’s Opp. 9). On April 30, 2004, during the course of the

state court proceedings, the City lodged an administrative record

relating to the petition to the Stanislaus County Superior Court. 

(Id.).

Wal-Mart’s claims in this action arise out of an ordinance

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2 The other grocers included Raley’s, Inc.; Safeway, Inc.;

and/or Richland Markets. Individual agents of each of these

entities are also listed in the requests.

3

passed by the City Council on January 13, 2004 (“Ordinance”),

which prohibits stores with over 100,000 square feet of sales

floor area, of which more than five percent (5%) of the sales

floor area is devoted to the sale of nontaxable goods such as

groceries, from opening in the City of Turlock. (Doc. 32, Save

Mart’s Mem. 2-3). While Wal-Mart currently operates a store in

the City of Turlock, the Ordinance effectively prevents Wal-Mart

from opening a larger “Superstore” in the City of Turlock. 

On July 30, 2004, Wal-Mart served Save Mart, a third party,

with a Deposition Subpeona Duces Tecum (“the Subpoena”) for the

production of documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. (See

Doc. 14, Kinsey Decl. in Support of Motion to Compel, Ex. B

Subpoena). The Subpoena contained sixty-seven (67) separate

document requests. Save Mart objected to the Subpoena and

refused to produce the documents. Wal-Mart moved to compel

production of the documents. (Doc. 12, Pl.’s Motion to Compel). 

In the Subpoena, Wal-Mart generally requested information

and documents regarding communications between Save Mart and City

staff, City Council members, and City officials, as well as

communications between Save Mart and third parties, including

other grocers and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union.2

Wal-Mart specifically requested communications relating to: 

Wal-Mart; any Wal-Mart store in the City of Turlock; any Wal-Mart

Supercenter in the city of Turlock; the Turlock “Big Box”

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3 “Big Box Ordinance” is defined as follows by the Subpoena:

“any past, existing, or future ordinance, regulation,

legislation, or rule of general applicability placing limitations

or prohibitions on the size or merchandise mix of large-scale

retailers including, without limitation, the January 13, 2004,

ordinance enacted by the City of Turlock.” (Subpoena, Addendum

A, 1).

4 Representatives from the following entities were also,

according to Wal-Mart, present at the meeting: Safeway, Inc.;

Raley’s Supermarkets; Richland markets; United Food and

Commercial Workers Union, Local 588. (Doc. 40, Pl.’s Opp. 3-4).

City officials present included the Turlock City Mayor; the

Director of Community Development for the City; Planning Manager

for the City; and the City Manager. (Id.).

4

Ordinance; or any “Big Box” Ordinance.3 (See Doc. 14, J. Kinsey

Decl. in Support of Mot. to Compel, Ex. B Subpeona). 

Wal-Mart also requested information, documents, and

communications relating to a purported “closed door” August 22,

2003, meeting attended by both Turlock City Council members and

other City officials, including the mayor, and by representatives

of Save Mart and other California grocers.4 During oral

argument, Wal-Mart stated that at the meeting, the Turlock City

Council members met with the grocers and the Union

representatives individually for hour-long intervals. Wal-Mart

contends that the meeting caused the City to withdraw its support

for a Wal-Mart Supercenter and thereafter enact the Ordinance,

which completely prohibits Wal-Mart from building its planned

Supercenter within the City. 

The parties agree that the discovery requested in this case

relates only to the commerce clause claim. The commerce clause

claim was the only claim addressed by the magistrate judge. In

its commerce clause claim, Wal-Mart alleges that the Ordinance

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5

has the effect of purposefully discriminating against out-ofstate retailers, such as Wal-Mart, in favor of in-state

retailers, such as Save Mart. (Id. at ¶ 46). Even though the

parties did not consider Wal-Mart’s other claims, the discovery

requested here may be relevant to those claims as well. 

Wal-Mart’s equal protection claim (under both the United States

and California Constitutions) is that, under the Ordinance, other

similarly-situated large-scale grocers are permitted to operate

in the City, while Wal-Mart is not. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-40). WalMart’s civil rights claim appears to be a claim of deprivation of

economic rights to develop its real property under the Civil

Rights Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-6). Deprivation an identifiable,

protectable economic interest by unconstitutional means under

color of state law can give rise to a civil rights claim. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On January 14, 2005, the magistrate judge heard oral

argument regarding the motion to compel. (See Doc. 27, Minutes). 

On January 28, 2005, the magistrate judge granted in part WalMart’s Motion to Compel. (Doc. 30, Mag. Order 6). The

magistrate judge ordered Save Mart to produce the following

documents: 

[D]ocuments regarding or relating to communications or

meetings, or intended or anticipated communications or

meetings with the City [of Turlock] after August 22, 2002,

by Save Mart or any other person or entity relating to the

Big Box Ordinance, Wal-Mart or Wal Mart’s Supercenter.

(Doc. 30, Mag. Order 6).

Save Mart refused to comply with the magistrate judge’s

January 28, 2005, Order, and moved for reconsideration. (Doc.

25, Save Mart’s Mem., filed February 25, 2005). Wal-Mart

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5 Wal-Mart filed its original opposition on March 4, 2005. 

(Doc. 37). Wal-Mart filed an “Amended Opposition” on March 7,

2005. (Doc. 40).

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opposed.5 (Doc. 40, Pl.’s Opp. Mar. 7, 2005). Save Mart

replied. (Doc. 46, Save Mart’s Reply, filed March 21, 2005). 

Oral argument was heard on the objections April 18, 2005. 

Natalie M. Weber, Esq., appeared on behalf of Save Mart. 

Benjamin P. Fay, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants the

City of Turlock and Turlock City Council. William C. Hahesy,

Esq., and Jon P. Kinsey, Esq., appeared on behalf of Wal-Mart. 

The Subpoena was modified. Counsel were ordered to submit a

proposed order that reflected the rulings modifying the subpoena.

On May 5, 2005, counsel for all parties jointly submitted a

proposed modified order. (Doc. 62, Proposed Order Denying Save

Mart’s Request for Reconsideration). The parties also jointly

submitted a Proposed Second Amended Protective Order (Doc. 63,

Proposed Order). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Local Rule 72-303(f), a district court applies

the following standard in reconsidering a magistrate court’s

decision:

The standard that the assigned Judge shall use in all

such requests is the “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Section 636(b)(1)(A) sets forth the standard of review as

follows:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary

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6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) also sets forth the standard for a

district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s order: “The

district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider [a

party’s] objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of

the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.” Id. (emphasis added). 

7

 . . . a judge may designate a magistrate [judge] to

hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before

the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for

judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to

dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by

the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case,

to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action,

to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an

action. A judge of the court may reconsider any

pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it

has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

(emphasis added).6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is the applicable standard for

discovery, and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the

claim or defense of any party....”

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Save Mart argues that the magistrate judge’s order was

incorrectly decided for the following reasons: (1) the magistrate

judge erred in holding that no privileges apply, including the

First Amendment associational privilege, the privacy privilege,

and the deliberative process privilege; (2) the magistrate judge

erred in not balancing Save Mart’s purported First Amendment and

privacy interests against Wal-Mart’s need for the requested

information; (3) the magistrate judge’s order is overbroad; and

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(4) the magistrate judge erred in refusing to consider the merits

of Wal-Mart’s Commerce Clause claim. Save Mart also argues that

the magistrate judge’s order fails to properly protect the

documents Save Mart was ordered to produce. Save Mart requests a

protective order be entered and also requests in camera review

for privileged and otherwise “protected” documents. Save Mart

makes no argument that there is newly discovered evidence or a

change in the law. Wal-Mart opposes Save Mart’s motion, and also

argues that Save Mart’s motion was not timely filed.

A. Whether Save Mart’s Motion for Reconsideration was

Timely Filed.

Wal-Mart argues in its opposition that Save Mart’s motion

was not timely filed. Save Mart maintains that its motion was

timely filed. The magistrate judge’s order issued on

January 28, 2005, and was served on counsel for Plaintiff and

Defendant by the clerk of court via e-mail on the same day. 

Save Mart was not served electronically by the clerk. Instead,

counsel for Wal-Mart served Save Mart with the magistrate judge’s

order via facsimile and overnight courier on February 7, 2005. 

(Doc. 31, Notice of Service). Save Mart filed and served its

Motion for Reconsideration on February 25, 2005. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) requires a party to serve and file

objections to a magistrate judge’s order within 10 days of being

served with the order:

Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the

magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and file

objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign

as error a defect in the magistrate judge’s order to which

objection was not timely made.

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7 No different period of time was prescribed by the

magistrate judge in his order or by the district judge.

9

Id. Local Rule 72-303(a), likewise provides that “[r]ulings by

Magistrate Judges shall be final if no reconsideration thereof is

sought from the Court within ten (10) court days calculated from

the date of service of the ruling on the parties, see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), (e); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a),(d), unless a different

time is prescribed by the Magistrate Judge or the Judge.”7

Save Mart’s motion for reconsideration was timely filed. 

Wal-Mart sent Save Mart the magistrate judge’s order via

facsimile and overnight courier on February 7, 2005. Save Mart

is correct in that service by facsimile and overnight courier is

not technically proper service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. Rule 5

allows service by means other than United States Mail, including

electronic means, but only if the party to be served consented in

writing to such service. There is no evidence that Save Mart

consented in writing to service by facsimile or overnight

courier. 

Assuming that Save Mart did so consent and was properly

served with the order on February 7, 2005, Save Mart’s filing of

the motion for reconsideration was nevertheless timely. When the

prescribed period is less than eleven days, then Saturdays,

Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a);

see also Local Rule 6-136(b). Legal holidays include federal

holidays listed in Rule 6(a) and any holidays designated by the

state in which the district court sits. California recognized

both February 11, 2005, and February 21, 2005, as state holidays. 

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See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 6700(d), (e). February 21, 2005, was also

recognized as a federal holiday (Washington’s Birthday). Also,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) provides for 3 additional days to be added

to the prescribed period when notice is served on the party by

means other than in-person delivery. 

Save Mart had thirteen court days from February 7, 2005, to

file and serve its objections. Thirteen days from

February 7, 2005, excluding weekends and holidays, is February

26, 2005, a Saturday. When the last day of a period falls on a

weekend day, such as Saturday, it is not included and the period

runs from until the end of the next day that is not a weekend day

or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e). In this case, that date

was Monday, February 28, 2005. Because Save Mart filed its

motion on Friday, February 25, 2005, its motion was timely filed. 

Save Mart’s objections to the magistrate judge’s order are not

time-barred.

B. Whether the Requested Documents are Protected by

Privilege.

Save Mart argues the requested documents are privileged

because (1) they are related to protected associational

activities under the First Amendment; (2) Save Mart has a

protectable privacy right in the requested documents; and (3) the

documents are protected by the deliberative process privilege.

As a preliminary matter, Save Mart offers no factual basis

for its privilege arguments. Save Mart fails to provide a

description of the nature of the documents to be produced, as is

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2), and instead provides

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conclusory, blanket assertions of privilege over broad categories

of documents, which is not allowed or acceptable under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.; see also Diamond State

Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Col, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 691, 697-8 (D. Nev.

1994) (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070

(9th Cir. 1992)).

1. Whether the Requested Documents Are Protected by

the First Amendment Expressive Association

Privilege.

The magistrate judge found that “the documents requested are

not related to ‘protected associational activities’ of Save Mart

thereby implicating the First Amendment.” (Doc. 30, Mag. Order

5-6). Save Mart argues that the magistrate judge erred in this

finding because the documents relate to Save Mart’s purported

associational activities that are protected by the First

Amendment.

The First Amendment does not explicitly provide for freedom

of association. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no

law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and

to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 

However, a freedom to associate has long been recognized as an

implicit aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First

Amendment. See I.D.K., Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1199

(9th Cir. 1988); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-3 (1958). 

The right of association can, under some circumstances, protect

against the discovery of information or documents by the

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government. Id.; see also Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States,

207 F.R.D. 1, 2-4 (D.D.C. 2002). For example, the associational

privilege can protect against discovery of membership lists of

civil rights organizations or political parties. See id. 

The party from whom discovery is sought has the burden to

establish an associational privilege exists. Id. That party

must show that disclosure of the information sought would induce

members to withdraw from the organization, or dissuade others

from joining the organization, because they fear that exposure of

association with the organization will lead to threats,

harassment, or reprisal. Id. If the party claiming the

privilege succeeds in meeting this burden, the burden then shifts

to the government to show it has an interest in the information

that outweighs the impingement on the associational right.

Save Mart’s claim of associational privilege fails. First,

Save Mart cannot assert an infringement of a constitutional right

against a private party such as Wal-Mart unless it can show that

the private party’s infringement somehow constitutes state

action. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229

(9th Cir. 1996). None of the cases Save Mart cites hold that the

associational privilege protects against discovery by a private

party. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227

(9th Cir. 2000); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,

622 (1984); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Britt v.

Super. Ct., 20 Cal.3d 844 (1978). Instead, those cases hold that

individuals or entities are protected against compelled

production of information to the government or a governmental

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8 The United States Supreme Court has recognized two types

of associational privileges: 

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected

“freedom of association” in two distinct senses. In one

line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to

enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships

must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because

of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the

individual freedom that is central to our constitutional

scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives

protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In

another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right

to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities

protected by the First Amendment -- speech, assembly,

petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of

religion.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-8. The privilege claimed here seems to

be the latter, considering Save Mart’s vague references to its

“communications with third parties regarding this important

political issue.” (Doc. 32, Save Mart’s Mem. 5). Save Mart does

not appear to be claiming a right to maintain “intimate human

relationships.” Instead, Save Mart seems to claim a right to

13

entity. 

Second, Save Mart has not identified the beliefs, views, or

associations it seeks to protect. Save Mart makes only vague

references to its “communications with third parties regarding

this important political issue.” (Doc. 32, Save Mart’s Mem. 5). 

Save Mart is a business competitor of Wal-Mart seeking to prevent

the entry of a “superstore” into the Turlock market based on

perceived adverse business consequences arising from enhanced

competition. Conclusory assertions of unspecified expressive

association are not protectable. For a group to be protected by

the First Amendment’s expressive association right, it must

engage in “expressive association,” which constitutes “some form

of expression, whether it be public or private.”8 Boy Scouts of

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associate for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by

the First Amendment.

14

Amer. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); see also Roberts, 468

U.S. at 617-8; City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25

(1989). While expressive association is “not reserved for

advocacy groups,” there must be “some form of expression” for the

associative right to exist. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. Under a

charitable interpretation, Save Mart suggests its expressive

association is its opposition to the Turlock Wal-Mart

Supercenter, which is shared with various unidentified “third

parties,” and expressed in a political forum before the City

Council of Turlock. However, even if opposition to the Wal-Mart

Supercenter is “expression,” Save Mart cites no law supporting

the expressive associational rights of corporations. 

Third, even if Save Mart could establish that it, as a

corporation, engages in some kind of expressive association with

others, the notion that the substance of communications regarding

the activities, meetings, and communications of a governing

representative body would lead to threats, harassment, or

reprisal is beyond unreasonable. Not only does Save Mart not

identify any persons or entities with whom it currently

associates, Save Mart also does not identify any persons or

entities who would be dissuaded from associating with it if the

information (whatever it may be) were disclosed. 

Save Mart fails to explain how disclosure of its views would

dissuade others from associating with Save Mart for fear of

threats, harassment, or reprisal. The only evidence Save Mart

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offers regarding the “chilling effect” that would result from the

production of such documents is a comment by a Wal-Mart developer

(whom Wal-Mart contends was not authorized to speak on Wal-Mart’s

behalf) that was published in a newspaper. Lee Jamieson is

quoted in a Bakersfield newspaper as having purportedly stated,

“When Mr. Herum’s company [i.e., Save Mart] goes to do another

project, payback is going to be a bitch.” (See Doc. 40, Pl.’s

Opp. 17 n. 19). This statement does not establish the requisite

“chilling” on Save Mart’s purported associational activities.

Save Mart has cited and quoted from numerous First Amendment

cases, and has propounded First Amendment rhetoric throughout its

brief. Save Mart’s attempt to analogize itself to members of

political parties, civil rights organizations, and professional

associations fails. Save Mart’s arguments are based on a

misperception of the purpose of the associational privilege -- to

protect against infringement of First Amendment rights by the

state. Save Mart has not shown how its communications with or

about the City regarding Wal-Mart or the Ordinance are

protectable by an associational privilege. The dispute here is a

straightforward one between business competitors fighting over

plaintiff’s entry into a local market.

The magistrate judge’s order are not clearly erroneous. 

Save Mart’s request for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

finding of no associational privilege is DENIED.

2. Whether Save Mart has a Protectable Privacy

Interest in the Requested Documents.

The magistrate judge found that Save Mart “failed to

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identify a privacy interest warranting protection from

disclosure.” (Doc. 30, Mag. Order 5). Save Mart argues that the

magistrate judge erred in this finding, but has not offered

factual support for its blanket contention that “the case law

cited by Save Mart...demonstrates that the Magistrate Judge’s

Order is clearly erroneous and contrary to law.” (Doc. 32, Save

Mart’s Mem. 6).

None of the cases Save Mart cites recognize a privacy

privilege that protects broad categories of a private

corporation’s documents from production by another private party. 

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); United

States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 305-7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Local

174, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, &

Helpers of Amer. v. United States, 240 F.2d 387, 391 (9th Cir.

1956); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d

394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976). Wal-Mart is a private party. The

cases cited by Save Mart address the extent to which the Fourth

Amendment protects a corporation from the investigatory power of

the government. These cases have no application here. 

Furthermore, Save Mart has not identified the privacy interest it

seeks to protect.

There is no basis upon which to overturn the magistrate

judge’s order on privacy grounds. Save Mart’s request for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s finding of no privacy

privilege is DENIED.

//

//

//

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9 Save Mart notes that the City filed a joinder to Save

Mart’s Opposition to Wal-Mart’s Motion to Compel, wherein the

City states “the City hereby asserts the deliberative process

privilege as outlined and argued in Save Mart’s opposition

brief.” (Doc. 32, Save Mart’s Mem. 8). 

10 Other purposes of the deliberative process privilege

include: 

to insure that subordinates within an agency will feel free

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3. Whether the Requested Documents Are Protected by

the Deliberative Process Privilege.

The magistrate judge found that “[t]he deliberative process

privilege is...inapplicable in that this privilege only protects

the decision making processes of government agencies and

therefore must be invoked by the City. Assembly of the State of

Cal. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th

Cir. 1992).” (Doc. 30, Mag. Order 6). Save Mart argues that the

magistrate judge erred in this finding because the City has in

fact invoked the deliberative process privilege.9 

What Save Mart disingenuously omits from its analysis,

however, is that the deliberative process privilege can only be

invoked by the government or governmental entities. United

States v. Rozet, 183 F.R.D. 662, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)). The privilege

does not protect private corporations such as Save Mart. See id. 

A private business has no deliberative process privilege.

“The deliberative process privilege is based on the

perceived need to encourage candor within the decision-making

process by protecting predecisional communications from

disclosure.”10 Id. Furthermore, “[i]ts purpose is to allow

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to provide the decision maker with their uninhibited

opinions and recommendations without fear of later being

subject to public ridicule or criticism; to protect against

premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have

been finally formulated or adopted; and to protect against

confusing the issues and misleading the public by

dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales

for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate

reasons for the agency’s action.

Rozet, 183 F.R.D. at 665 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v.

Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

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agencies freely to explore possibilities, engage in internal

debates, or play devil’s advocate without fear of public

scrutiny.” Assembly of the State of Cal., 968 F.2d at 920. 

“This privilege permits the government to withhold documents that

reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations

comprising part of a process by which government decisions and

policies are formulated.” Id.

The deliberative process privilege does not protect

communications between a government official and a private third

party. Such communications are not, by definition, governmental

deliberations. This means communications and information

exchanged among private parties and government representations

are not within the “deliberative process.”

There is no basis upon which to question the magistrate

judge’s order on deliberative process privilege grounds. 

Save Mart’s request for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

finding of no deliberative process privilege is DENIED.

//

//

//

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C. Whether the Magistrate Judge Erred Not Weighing Save

Mart’s Purported First Amendment or Privacy Interests

Against Wal-Mart’s Need for Discovery.

Save Mart argues that even if there is no associational

activity or privacy privilege, the magistrate judge erred in not

weighing Save Mart’s “First Amendment and privacy interests”

against Wal-Mart’s need for the requested information. (Doc. 32,

Save Mart’s Mem. 9 (“Even if the requested information is not

protected by a privilege per se, the existence of strong First

Amendment and privacy interests warrant consideration.”)). Save

Mart’s argument is without merit. 

Save Mart cites three cases to support its argument. Unlike

the associational and privacy privilege cases discussed above,

the issue in these cases involves discovery of information by

private parties, rather than by the government. Nevertheless,

these cases are distinguishable and do not apply here.

The court in Marrese v. Amer. Academy of Orthopeadic

Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds,

470 U.S. 373, held that the plaintiffs’ discovery request was

impermissibly overbroad where it requested all membership

applications for a ten-year period from the defendant, a private

surgeons’ professional association. The plaintiff surgeons, who

made the request, were challenging their denial of membership in

the defendant association. The court held the applications were

not protectable by a First Amendment privilege, but found a

privacy interest in the applications, discovery of which the

district judge should have approached in a more reserved manner,

//

//

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11 Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion in Marrese: 

[B]arring the plaintiffs or their counsel from all

access to the membership files would probably make it

impossible for them to prove their antitrust case. But

there were various devices that the district judge

could have used to reconcile the parties’ competing

needs. For example, he could have examined the

membership files himself in camera, a procedure

described by the Supreme Court in a related context as

“a relatively costless and eminently worthwhile method

to insure that the balance between petitioners’ claims

of irrelevance and privilege and plaintiffs’ asserted

need for documents is correctly struck.

726 F.2d at 1160 (citation omitted).

In reversing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme

Court did not address the discovery issue. Marrese v. Amer.

Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) (“We

granted certiorari limited to the question whether the Court of

Appeals correctly held that claim preclusion requires dismissal

of the federal antitrust action....”). The Supreme Court held

that the federal full faith and credit statute required that the

federal court consider state law of claim preclusion in

determining whether state court judgment dismissing the surgeons’

complaint barred subsequent federal antitrust claim which could

not have been raised in the state proceeding. Id. at 379-80.

20

including but not limited to the use of in camera review.11

Similarly, the court in In re Sealed Case (Medical Records),

381 F.3d 1205, 1217-8 (D.C. Cir. 2004), found that all of an

individual’s medical records were not absolutely protected by a

psychotherapist privilege. Nevertheless, the medical records

were sufficiently private to be protected from unconditional

discovery. In that case, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the

complete medical file of a non-party disabled group home

resident. The court found that the district judge’s discovery

order inappropriately ordered the production of the co-resident’s

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entire medical file, “regardless of whether it was relevant to a

claim or defense, regardless even of whether it was relevant to

the subject matter of the case.” Id. at 1216. Save Mart fails

to identify the documents sought, so it is impossible to

determine whether they contain information that is as potentially

sensitive as that contained in the medical file of a disabled

group home resident. The likelihood that corporate records of

communications relating to the deliberations of a local

government body are as sensitive as such medical records is

extremely small. In re Sealed Case does not support Save Mart’s

position.

Save Mart also cites an observation from Justice Powell’s

concurrence in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-7 (1979): 

“The District Court must ensure that the values protected by the

First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege

in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a

proper balance.” (Doc. 32, Save Mart’s Mem. 9). Save Mart takes

the quote out of context. The Herbert court held that a

newspaper had no absolute First Amendment privilege in its

editorial process. At the outset of his concurrence, Justice

Powell states: “I write to emphasize the additional point that,

in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a

district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests

as well as the private interests of the plaintiff.” Id. at 177-8

(emphasis added). This case is not a libel suit against a

newspaper by a public figure, and Save Mart has made no showing

that the interests to be protected here resemble in any respect

those in Herbert.

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In short, Save Mart has not yet identified substantive

information deserving of protection that is in any way analogous

to the personal information contained in the surgeons’

applications in Marrese; highly sensitive medical information

contained in the file of the mentally disabled third-party in the

In re Sealed Case; or the editorial processes of the newspaper in

Herbert. There is no basis to conduct an in camera review based

on privacy interests because Save Mart has not described the

nature of the information or submitted any documents for review. 

The magistrate judge’s order does not fail to balance First

Amendment or privacy interests against Wal-Mart’s need for

production, as no such interests were presented. 

Save Mart’s request for reconsideration of the magistrate

judge’s order on the basis of failure to balance interests is

DENIED. If Save Mart has documents it claims are privileges the

court will conduct an in camera review.

D. Whether the Magistrate Judge’s Order is Overbroad.

The magistrate judge’s order states:

Save Mart is ORDERED to produce documents regarding or

relating to communications or meetings, or intended or

anticipated communications or meetings with the City after

August 22, 2002, by Save Mart or any other person or entity

relating to the Big Box Ordinance, Wal Mart or Wal Mart’s

Supercenter. 

(Doc. 30, Mag. Order 6). While this language is not altogether

clear, it can reasonably be interpreted to require production of

documents regarding or relating to actual or intended

communications or meetings with the City about the Ordinance,

Wal-Mart, the proposed Wal-Mart Supercenter, where the

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communications or meetings took place between Save Mart and the

City or between Save Mart and a third party. 

The standard for discoverable information under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is low. Parties may obtain discovery

information that may reasonably lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Relevant

information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.”).

The parties contend that the information requested relates

to Wal-Mart’s commerce clause claim, and specifically to WalMart’s claim that the Ordinance is discriminatory in effect or

purpose. All public input to the City of Turlock relating to the

Ordinance’s effect or purpose is relevant and discoverable. WalMart is entitled to know what was communicated to the City

relating to the proposed Wal-Mart Supercenter and the Turlock

“big box” ordinance. This information includes any documents

that may reflect what was or was intended to be communicated to

the City, including but not limited to communications with third

parties. All such input could shed light on the overall basis

upon which the legislative judgement was made. The public is

entitled to know all information that went into the legislative

decision.

During oral argument on April 18, 2005, the Court reviewed

each of the sixty-seven document requests from the original

subpoena. The scope of information requested in the subpoena was

determined to be overbroad, and the language was narrowed. (See

Doc. 62, Proposed Order). The magistrate judge also found the

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information contained in the requests to be overbroad, and

modified the requests accordingly in the Order Granting in Part

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with the Subpoena Duces

Tecum (Doc. 30). While unclear, the magistrate judge’s order is

not clearly erroneous. The magistrate judge’s order will not be

overturned on these grounds.

Save Mart also argues that the magistrate judge’s order is

overbroad in that it “requires production of communications with

the City rather than restricting production to communications

with members of the City Council, who constitute the decision

makers in this case.” (Doc. 32, Save Mart’s Mem. 11). 

Communications with city officials other than City Council

members could reasonably lead to the discovery of relevant,

admissible information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The

magistrate judge’s order is not overbroad insofar as it requests

communications between Save Mart city officials other than City

Council members. 

Save Mart also contends that the discovery requests are

cumulative in that the state administrative record relating to

the Petition for Writ of Mandate proceedings in Stanislaus County

Superior Court has already been produced to Wal-Mart. However,

it is not clear that Save Mart produced all relevant documents

during the state court proceedings. (See Doc. 40, Pl.’s Opp. 23-

4). Wal-Mart’s requests are not cumulative on these grounds.

Save Mart also argues that the order is overbroad to the

extent that it requires the production of documents relating to

the time period after the ordinance was passed. This argument

also fails. The requested documents and information that date

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from the time period after the Ordinance was passed reasonably

relate to, among other things, the purpose of the Ordinance, the

City’s alleged discriminatory intent, or other communications

between Save Mart and the City that bear on further efforts to

burden interstate competition and other issues relevant to the

commerce clause claim.

Finally, Save Mart objects to the time period in the

magistrate judge’s order which goes back to August 22, 2002. 

Wal-Mart stated during oral argument that it did not acquire the

property in Turlock for the proposed Supercenter until “late

2002/early 2003.” Wal-Mart began to conduct due diligence and

search for properties in late 2002. Wal-Mart acknowledged that

its plans to build a Supercenter in Turlock were not widely-known

until the property was acquired. The parties agreed during oral

argument to limit the relevant time period for the production to

January 1, 2003.

There is no basis upon which to overturn the magistrate

judge’s order on the grounds that it is overbroad. Save Mart’s

request for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order on

the grounds that it is overbroad is DENIED. The magistrate

judge’s order is modified as to time period. The Subpoena is

modified as stated in Doc. 62 (Proposed Order).

E. The Merits of Wal-Mart’s Commerce Clause Claim.

Save Mart contends that the magistrate judge erred in not

considering the merits of Wal-Mart’s commerce clause claim. 

Save Mart is incorrect. The magistrate judge’s discovery order

states: 

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Although Save Mart argues the Ordinance does nothing more 

than prohibit a particular mode of operation and therefore

does not implicate the Commerce Clause, Wal-Mart’s claim is

contrary. The Court will not resolve this issue, which goes

to the merits of Wal-Mart’s claim, in a discovery motion. 

Specifically, Wal Mart claims that the Ordinance prohibits

it, an out of state company, from opening “Discount

Superstores” in the City. Wal Mart further claims that the

Ordinance does not impose any prohibitions whatsoever on any

California-based retailers, including the local retailers

such as Save Mart. 

(Doc. 30, Mag. Order 4). The magistrate judge also cited

commerce clause law in the order: 

The Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism,

regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic

interest by burdening out of state competitors. Wyoming v.

Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). A finding that state

legislation constitutes economic protectionism may be made

on the basis of either discriminatory purpose or

discriminatory effect. Baccus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,

270 (1984).

(Id. at 4 n.6).

Save Mart argues that Wal-Mart is not an “out-of-state”

producer as a matter of law. Save Mart also argues that Wal-Mart

bases its status as an “out-of-state” business solely on the fact

that it is incorporated in Delaware and its headquarters is in

Arkansas. Save Mart cites Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,

437 U.S. 117, 127-8 (1978), which held that Exxon was not an “instate” business for purposes of the commerce clause, even though

it was incorporated in Maryland. The Supreme Court looked to

Exxon’s business operations within the state (instead of its

state of incorporation), and reasoned that Exxon was not “instate” because it did not operate any retail stores in Maryland. 

Wal-Mart responds that it is an out-of-state producer for

the purpose of the Commerce Clause because no California retailer

currently operates or plans to operate a “Discount Superstore” of

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the size and scope of those operated by Wal-Mart. (Doc. 40,

Pl.’s Opp. 27). Wal-Mart cites Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling,

710 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) in support. That court held

that a New York statute prohibiting the use of boats longer than

ninety feet from fishing in New York waters violated the Commerce

Clause because it was enacted to protect New York commercial

fishermen from out-of-state competitors. Id. at 894-5. The

court reasoned that the statute discriminated against New Jersey

based fishermen, despite that the out-of-state fishermen could

avoid the effect of the statute by using boats 90-feet long or

less. 

It is not correct to decide, on a discovery motion, whether

Wal-Mart is in fact an “out-of-state” producer. Save Mart has

failed to show that Wal-Mart’s claim is meritless or frivolous. 

Wal-Mart has at least a colorable claim that it is an out-ofstate business.

Likewise, Save Mart’s contention that the Ordinance in no

way implicates the Commerce Clause is mistaken. As the

magistrate judge noted, state legislation may constitute economic

protectionism on the basis of discriminatory purpose or effect. 

See Baccus Imps., 468 U.S. at 270. Save Mart has not shown that

Wal-Mart’s claim that the Ordinance is discriminatory in effect

is frivolous or meritless.

There is no basis upon which to overturn the magistrate

judge’s order on the grounds that he failed to consider the

merits of Wal-Mart’s commerce clause claim. Save Mart’s request

for reconsideration on that ground is DENIED.

//

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F. Whether Save Mart Is Entitled to a Protective Order

and/or in camera Review Relating to the Requested

Documents.

Save Mart argues that the magistrate judge’s order fails to

adequately protect the requested documents. Save Mart requests

that if produced, a protective order be entered requiring that

the documents first be reviewed by the district court in camera,

and that they be labeled “Highly Confidential - Attorney’s Eyes

Only.” Save Mart identifies its purported “privacy interests” as

a justification, and claims that it “identified specific facts

supporting its First Amendment privilege and privacy concerns,”

without identifying any such “specific facts” in its motion,

either in this section or the sections discussing Save Mart’s

purported privileges. Instead, Save Mart cites page 9 of its

opposition brief to Wal-Mart’s Motion to Compel. Page 9 of Save

Mart’s opposition contains only one sentence that is even

remotely related to a specific reason: “complying with the

Subpoena is incredibly unduly burdensome because the Subpoena

seeks documents that are not limited to the City of Turlock, but

which extend to any ‘Wal-Mart’ located anywhere in the country,

and ‘any Big Box Ordinance’ not limited to the City of Turlock.” 

The magistrate judge limited Wal-Mart’s discovery requests

accordingly in his order.

The Court GRANTS Save Mart’s request for in camera review

for specific documents and as to which Save Mart can specifically

identify a privileges. (See Doc. 63, Proposed Protective Order). 

Save Mart’s request that its documents be produced subject to

protective order was agreed to at the hearing and is GRANTED. 

On May 4, 2005, Save Mart submitted to the Court documents

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labeled “Save Mart In Camera 00001-00030.” Save Mart claimed the

documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege and the

work product privilege. The Court has reviewed the documents. 

All but one of the documents (“Save Mart In Camera 00001”) are

not privileged. The document labeled “Save Mart In Camera 00001”

is protected by the attorney work product and attorney-client

privilege and will be retained by the Court under seal. Save

Mart’s request to redact the name(s) of its counsel from the

remaining documents is GRANTED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Save Mart’s request for

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s January 28, 2005

order (Doc. 30) is DENIED. The magistrate judge’s order is

modified as to time period as stated herein. The Subpoena

is modified as stated in Doc. 62 (Proposed Order). 

Save Mart’s request for a protective order is GRANTED. 

Save Mart’s request for in camera review for privileged

documents is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 1, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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