Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02296/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02296-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Center for Biological Diversity, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sally Jewell, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-02296-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 This case involves Plaintiffs’ attempts to have the Sonoran Desert population of 

bald eagles listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. This 

population of the bald eagle, which will be referred to in this order as the “desert eagle,” 

has been the subject of two previous lawsuits in this Court. See Ctr. For Biological 

Diversity v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 659822 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008); Ctr. For Biological 

Diversity v. Salazar, 2011 WL 6000497 (D. Ariz. Nov. 30, 2011). Plaintiffs challenge 

the decision of the Fish and Wildlife Service that the desert eagle is not a distinct 

population segment under the Endangered Species Act. 

 The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. Docs. 30, 63. The 

motions are fully briefed (Docs. 63, 66, 68), and the Court heard oral argument on 

October 10, 2014. The Court will grant summary judgment for Defendants. 

I. Background. 

 The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) defines “species” to include “any distinct 

population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 1 of 22
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) is an agency charged with determining when a 

portion of a species constitutes a distinct population segment (“DPS”). 

 The bald eagle was first listed as an endangered species on March 11, 1967. The 

listing occurred under the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, a predecessor to 

the ESA. Following enactment of the ESA in 1973, the bald eagle was listed as 

endangered in 43 states and threatened in 5 others. 43 Fed. Reg. 6230 (Feb. 14, 1978). 

On July 12, 1995, the bald eagle was reclassified as threatened in all states. 60 Fed. Reg. 

36000. 

 The bald eagle is an ESA success story. Under the protection of the ESA, bald 

eagle numbers increased significantly throughout the United States from less than 500 

breeding pairs in 1963 to almost 10,000 breeding pairs in 2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 37346. As 

a result this remarkable recovery, FWS removed the bald eagle from the threatened 

species list in 2007. 

In 2004, as delisting was being considered, the Center for Biological Diversity 

(“CBD”) filed a petition asking FWS to designate the desert eagle as a DPS and provide 

for its continued protection under the ESA. Upon receiving such petitions, FWS must 

issue a 90-day finding on whether the “petition presents substantial scientific or 

commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted.” 16 

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b). After some delay and litigation, FWS 

found that CBD’s petition did not “present substantial scientific or commercial 

information to indicate that the Sonoran Desert bald eagle constitutes a valid DPS.” 71 

Fed. Reg. 51549 at 51556 (Aug. 30, 2006). 

 CBD challenged the finding in this Court, and in 2008 Judge Mary H. Murguia set 

aside the finding as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act 

(“APA”). Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 659822 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

6, 2008). Judge Murguia stated that she had “no confidence in the objectivity of the 

agency’s decision making process” due, in part, to evidence that FWS officials in 

Washington, D.C. had given “marching orders” to local FWS personnel that the petition 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 2 of 22
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

was to be denied. Id. at *12. Judge Murguia remanded the petition to FWS with orders 

to conduct a full status review and issue a finding on whether the desert eagle constituted 

a DPS. Id at *15-16. 

 After additional public comment and review, FWS issued its finding in February 

2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 8601-01 (Feb. 25, 2010). FWS found that the desert eagle population 

was not a DPS eligible for listing under the ESA. Id. Plaintiffs challenged this new 

finding in this Court, and the undersigned judge set it aside. See Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. Salazar, 2011 WL 6000497, at *14 (D. Ariz. Nov. 30, 2011). The Court held 

that the finding was based on a 2007 delisting procedure and rule that “failed to comport 

with the notice, comment, and consultation requirements of the law.” Id. at *9. The 

Court found the finding to be an abuse of discretion and ordered FWS to complete a new 

finding based on information gathered during the status review ordered by Judge 

Murguia. Id at *14. 

 FWS issued its new finding on May 1, 2012, again finding that the desert eagle is 

not a DPS (the “2012 Finding”). 77 Fed. Reg. 25792-01 (May 1, 2012). FWS also found 

that desert eagles are not threatened or endangered. Id at 25828. In this lawsuit, 

Plaintiffs claim that the 2012 Finding, like FWS’s previous actions on the desert eagle, is 

arbitrary and capricious. 

II. DPS Policy and the 2012 Finding. 

 FWS has issued a formal policy on how DPS decisions are to be made (the “DPS 

Policy”). The DPS Policy reflects Congressional guidance that DPS designations should 

be used “sparingly” while “encouraging the conservation of genetic diversity.” 61 Fed. 

Reg. 4725. The policy requires FWS to evaluate three elements in deciding whether a 

portion of a species constitutes a DPS entitled to protection under the ESA – discreteness, 

significance, and conservation status. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. 

A population satisfies the first element – discreteness – if it is “markedly separated 

from other populations of the same taxon” by “physical, physiological, ecological, or 

behavioral factors,” or if it is “delimited by international boundaries within which 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 3 of 22
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

differences [in species management] exist that are significant.”1 Id. The 2012 Finding 

found the desert eagle population to be discrete because it is physically separated from 

other populations of bald eagles and because there is little or no immigration to and 

emigration from the surrounding populations. 77 Fed. Reg. at 25801-05. Plaintiffs agree 

with this finding and do not challenge it in this case. 

 In assessing the second element – significance – the DPS Policy requires FWS to 

“consider available scientific evidence of the discrete population segment’s importance to 

the taxon to which it belongs.” 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. The DPS Policy identifies four 

factors to be considered in evaluating the significance of a population: (1) persistence of 

the population in an ecological setting unusual or unique for the taxon; (2) evidence that 

loss of the population would result in a significant gap in the range of a taxon; 

(3) evidence that the population represents the only surviving natural occurrence of a 

taxon; and (4) evidence that the population differs markedly from other populations of 

the species in its genetic characteristics. Id. The DPS Policy makes clear that these 

factors are not exclusive. Id. The policy further instructs that “[b]ecause precise 

circumstances are likely to vary considerably from case to case, it is not possible to 

describe prospectively all the classes of information that might bear on the biological and 

ecological importance of a discrete population segment.” Id. 

 In applying the first significance factor – “persistence of the population in an 

ecological setting that is unusual or unique for the taxon” – the 2012 Finding considered 

the broad variety of settings in which bald eagles live: 

Bald eagles are highly adaptable, wide-ranging habitat generalists. Across 

the range of the species, there is no “usual” ecological setting, in terms of 

the elevation, temperature, prey species, nest tree species, or type of water 

source[.] The bald eagle is capable of inhabiting areas throughout North 

America, so long as a sufficient food source persists. 

77 Fed. Reg. at 25806. 

 

1

 A “taxon” is a taxonomic category, such as a species. Coos Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Kempthorne, 531 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 4 of 22
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The 2012 Finding provided additional detail to support its conclusion that the bald 

eagle is a “habitat generalist” that can survive almost anywhere. It noted that the bald 

eagle is distributed across the North American continent, “from the Aleutian Islands to 

Baja California, Mexico, and from northeastern Canada to Florida.” Id. It found that the 

bald eagle “breeds at elevations ranging from sea level to mountains as high as 10,000 

feet,” and occupies a wide range of aridity including “some of the driest areas in the 

United States and . . . some of the wettest.” Id. The 2012 Finding noted that although 

bald eagles generally nest in trees along rivers, lakes, and seacoasts in proximity to a 

sufficient source of prey, they have also been documented to nest on cliffs, on the ground, 

in mangroves, in caves, and in man-made structures such as cell-phone towers. Bald 

eagles are not limited to eating any particular species of or even class of prey. Id.

 Because the bald eagle lives in such a wide range of settings, FWS concluded that 

it could not find the desert eagle significant to the species as a whole merely because it 

lives in the desert. “Though the Sonoran Desert Area may represent a unique set of 

habitat characteristics, we cannot say it is unusual or unique for the bald eagle such that 

persistence there is significant to the bald eagle species as a whole.” Id. 

To determine whether the desert eagle is significant to the species as a whole, 

FWS asked whether it has adapted in ways that could benefit the species in times of stress 

or catastrophic loss. Id. at 25806-07. For example, FWS considered the relatively small 

size of the desert eagle, but found no evidence that its size resulted from a unique 

adaptation to the desert. Id. FWS instead found that its size was likely due to the latitude 

at which it lives. Id. at 25807. FWS cited studies showing that bald eagle size generally 

increases with more northerly latitudes, “consistent with Bergmann’s Rule, which holds 

that animal size increases with increasing latitude due to changes in climate.” Id. FWS 

noted studies finding that bald eagles in Florida, which is farther south than Arizona, are 

the smallest, and that their size decreases from north to south within the State of Florida. 

Id. FWS thus concluded that “small size is not an adaptation unique to the Sonoran 

Desert but is rather part of the natural variability of the taxon as a whole.” Id.

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 5 of 22
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 FWS considered the porosity of the desert eagle’s egg shells, a factor cited by 

some in arguing that the desert eagle has adapted uniquely to the hot desert environment. 

FWS found only one study that addressed egg shell porosity – a 1992 study by Hunt et al. 

The study did not draw any conclusions about the significance of porosity and was based 

on an extremely small sample size of only four eggs. Id. FWS concluded that “it would 

not be scientifically robust to draw any conclusions” from such a limited study. Id.

 FWS examined differences in life history traits of the desert eagle, including the 

timing of breeding, feeding habits, nest-site selection, and juvenile migration. Id. at 

25807-08. As with size, however, studies reviewed by FWS suggested that variations 

were likely due to differences in latitude. Id. For example, “the breeding chronology of 

Florida birds (further south than the Sonoran Desert Area eagles) is even earlier than 

those in the Sonoran Desert.” Id. at 25807. 

On the basis of this analysis, FWS concluded that persistence of the desert eagle in 

the Sonoran Desert did not support a finding that the desert eagle is significant to the bald 

eagle species as a whole. As FWS explained: “the combination of a highly adaptable 

species persisting in a varied habitat base leads us to conclude that the particular 

variations displayed in the Sonoran Desert Area population do not make that population 

more ecologically or biologically important[.]” Id. at 25808. 

 Turning to the second significance factor – “evidence that loss of the population 

segment would result in a significant gap in the range of the taxon” – FWS concluded 

that a significant gap would not occur. Id. at 25809. FWS found that the desert eagle 

does not represent a significant percentage of the total number of bald eagles, and that 

“the actual amount of suitable bald eagle habitat in the Sonoran Desert Area is in general 

limited and represents a minute fraction of the total suitable habitat for bald eagles 

throughout their range.” Id. Further, FWS found that “the Sonoran Desert Area itself 

does not play any particular role in the life history of the bald eagle[.]” Id. 

Consequently, FWS found that the loss of eagles in the Sonoran Desert Area would not 

represent a significant gap in the range of the bald eagle as a whole. Id. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 6 of 22
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Applying the third significance factor, FWS found no evidence that the desert 

eagle “represents the only surviving natural occurrence of a taxon that may be more 

abundant elsewhere as an introduced population outside its historic range.” Id. On the 

fourth factor, FWS found no evidence that desert eagles have genetic characteristics that 

are markedly different from other bald eagles. Id. at 25809-10. Plaintiffs do not 

challenge these third- or fourth-factor determinations. 

 On the basis of these findings, the 2012 Finding concluded that the desert eagle 

does not constitute a DPS. FWS nonetheless proceeded to evaluate the conservation 

status of the desert eagle, finding that it is not threatened or endangered. Id. at 25810-27. 

Plaintiffs challenge the finding’s application of the first and second significance factors 

and its conclusion that the desert eagle is not endangered or threatened. 

III. Legal Standard. 

 The APA governs judicial review of administrative decisions involving the ESA. 

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“[S]ummary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for deciding the legal question of 

whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did.” Occidental Eng’g 

Co. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court 

must set aside a final, non-discretionary agency action that is arbitrary or capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 

Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1571 (9th Cir. 1993). 

An agency action is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors 

which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important 

aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Court must determine 

whether the agency’s decision is “founded on a rational connection between the facts 

found and the choices made . . . and whether [the agency] has committed a clear error of 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 7 of 22
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

judgment.” Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1243 

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court’s review must be “highly deferential, presuming the agency 

action to be valid and . . . affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its 

decision.” Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citation omitted). At the same time, the Court “must not rubber-stamp . . . administrative 

decisions that [are] inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the 

congressional policy underlying a statute.” Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

IV. Significance. 

 Plaintiffs argue that the 2012 Finding’s consideration of the second DPS element – 

significance – is arbitrary and capricious for four reasons: (1) by considering the 

adaptation of desert eagles to conditions in the Sonoran Desert in its evaluation of the 

persistence factor, FWS improperly revised the DPS Policy and ignored the plain 

language and past applications of the policy; (2) FWS failed to consider all relevant 

evidence in its evaluation of the persistence factor; (3) FWS ignored science regarding 

the importance of peripheral populations in its “significant gap” analysis; and (4) FWS 

did not consider the impact of climate change on bald eagles. The Court will address 

each of these arguments separately. 

A. Adherence to the DPS Policy. 

 As noted above, the first factor identified in the DPS Policy for evaluating the 

significance of a population to the species as a whole is the “[p]ersistence of the discrete 

population segment in an ecological setting unusual or unique for the taxon.” 61 Fed. 

Reg. at 4725. Plaintiffs argue that the 2012 Finding, by considering the extent to which 

desert eagles have adapted to the desert environment, ignores the plain meaning of this 

language and constitutes an unlawful change in its application. Doc. 52 at 19-24.2

 The 

Court will address these two arguments separately. 

 

2

 Docket citations are to page numbers placed on the top of each page by the Court’s CMECF system, not to numbers on the bottom of each page. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 8 of 22
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1. Plain Language of the DPS Policy. 

Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of this persistence factor should control – if 

a population persists in an ecological setting that is unique or unusual for the species, this 

factor is satisfied and supports a finding that the population is significant to the species as 

a whole. Plaintiffs argue that the 2012 Finding imposed an additional requirement not 

found in the language of this factor when it analyzed the desert eagle’s adaptation to the 

desert environment. Doc. 52 at 13-18. Plaintiffs assert that this departure permitted FWS 

to conclude that “bald eagle nesting habitats in Arizona are among the most unusual 

nesting habitats occupied by the species,” and yet still find the desert eagle not significant 

to the species because it lacks identifiable adaptations. Doc. 52 at 17. Plaintiffs call this 

“significance squared,” and argue that it conflicts with the wording of the policy. Id. 

 The Court does not find that the DPS Policy should be read as rigidly as Plaintiffs 

suggest. The policy does not state that a population is significant merely because it 

persists in a unique ecological setting. Persistence is one of four significance factors 

identified in the policy, and the policy expressly states that the agency’s analysis “may 

include, but is not limited to” these factors. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. Thus, the four factors, 

including persistence in a unique setting, appear to be both optional (“may include”) and 

non-exclusive (“not limited to”). The DPS Policy further instructs that “[b]ecause precise 

circumstances are likely to vary considerably from case to case, it is not possible to 

describe prospectively all the classes of information that might bear on the biological and 

ecological importance of a discrete population segment.” Id. Rather than establishing 

wooden criteria designed to control FWS’s determination, the DPS Policy is expressly 

flexible, permitting the agency to consider a variety of relevant factors, only some of 

which are identified in the policy. 

 In addition, the stated purpose of the persistence inquiry is not simply to find a 

population that persists in a unique setting, but to determine whether that population is 

important to the species as a whole. The policy directs that “[i]n carrying out this 

examination, the Service will consider available scientific evidence of the discrete 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 9 of 22
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

population segment’s importance to the taxon to which it belongs.” Id. 

As FWS explained in the 2012 Finding, when a species exists across a wide range 

of unique ecological settings, as does the bald eagle, the fact that it persists in one 

particular location such as the Sonoran Desert says little about whether the population in 

that location is important to the species as a whole. It may simply reflect the species’ 

ability to exist almost anywhere. FWS appropriately conducted a further inquiry in 

determining whether the desert eagle has developed attributes by its life in the desert that 

are important to the species as a whole. This inquiry is consistent with the DPS Policy’s 

expressly flexible approach and with the directive that FWS determine whether a 

particular population is important to the entire species. 

 Where a species is not widely dispersed in a variety of settings – where it is 

limited primarily to one setting – its persistence in another, different setting might by 

itself be significant to the species as a whole. Loss of the species in that unique setting 

could leave the species with only one setting in which to survive, making it more 

vulnerable to catastrophic events. Thus, there may well be DPS inquiries where 

adaptation is not relevant. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 25806 (contrasting the bald eagles’ 

ability to thrive in a variety of settings “with a situation where a portion of the range of a 

particular species exhibits one set of similar habitat characteristics but the distinct 

population segment utilizes a different set of habitat characteristics.”). The DPS Policy’s 

flexible approach allows the agency to consider these and other relevant factors when 

deciding if a particular population is important to the species as a whole. 

 In short, the Court does not agree that the 2012 Finding was inconsistent with the 

language of the DPS Policy. 

 2. Did FWS Adopt a New Policy Interpretation? 

 Plaintiffs argue that the 2012 Finding effectively adds an adaptation requirement 

to the persistence factor of the DPS Policy. They argue that this addition significantly 

changes the policy without appropriate public notice and comment. Plaintiffs raised this 

issue in their earlier suit, and the undersigned directed FWS on remand to “address 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 10 of 22
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

whether it has adopted a new interpretation of the DPS Policy and, if so, the reasons for 

and validity of the change.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2011 WL 6000497, at *10. 

As a result, FWS conducted a review of its previous DPS findings. FWS noted 

that some DPS evaluations have found that the subject population persisted in an unusual 

or unique environmental setting and yet was not important to the species as a whole. 

2012 AR 984. Other DPS decisions found that a setting could be considered unique, but 

FWS could find no adaptation to the environment that would make the population which 

persists there important to the species as a whole. These include a 2010 finding on the 

mountain whitefish, a 2010 finding on the Upper Missouri River arctic grayling, and a 

2011 decision on the Mohave fringe-toed lizard. 2012 AR 986. FWS found that it 

frequently has considered species that persist in a wide variety of environmental 

conditions and has concluded that the persistence of such species in any particular unique 

setting is not significant to the species as a whole. These include a 2005 finding on the 

Southern Rocky Mountain population of the boreal toad, a 2009 finding on the coaster 

brook trout, a 2011 finding on the Lake Sammamish kokanee, and a 2011 finding on wild 

plain bison. 2012 AR 987. After reviewing these prior findings, FWS concluded: 

The DPS Policy . . . does not mandate that the mere presence of 

unusual habitat characteristics means that the population is significant to 

the taxon[.] As articulated in previous determinations, we use the unusual 

or unique nature of the ecological setting as one consideration in evaluating 

whether persistence of that population is significant to the conservation of 

the taxon as a whole. Therefore, in applying the “unusual or unique 

ecological setting” significance category in the DPS [P]olicy, we evaluate 

not only whether the population persists in an area with habitat 

characteristics that are unusual or unique, but whether in the biological 

expertise of the agency, persistence of that population is significant to the 

conservation of the taxon as a whole. . . . [W]e have considered 

evolutionary and life-history adaptations to be potential indicators that 

persistence of that population is significant to the taxon. This approach to 

applying the “unusual or unique ecological setting” significance category 

. . . gives meaning to all of the words in that significance category of the 

DPS [P]olicy, and it is in keeping with Congress’s directive to use the 

authority to list DPSs sparingly. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 11 of 22
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2012 AR 988. This review by FWS demonstrated that consideration of the desert eagle’s 

adaptation to its new environment was not a new approach. 

FWS also used the 2012 Finding to clarify that adaptation is not a mandatory 

consideration in every persistence inquiry: “The DPS Policy does not require evidence 

of adaptation to a unique or unusual ecological setting in order to make a finding of 

significance; however, direct evidence of adaptation to an ecological setting could be a 

strong indication that persistence of the population segment in that ecological setting is 

significant to the taxon as a whole.” 77 Fed. Reg. 25806 (emphasis added). FWS 

explained that “this action is consistent with the Service’s prior interpretations of the DPS 

Policy, and, as such, the Service has not adopted a new interpretation of DPS Policy.” 77 

Fed. Reg. 25808. 

FWS’s review of prior DPS determinations and its clarifying statements in the 

2012 Finding persuade the Court both that FWS has considered adaptation in the past and 

that its consideration of that factor in the 2012 Finding did not constitute a change of the 

DPS Policy. Considering adaptation when evaluating a habitat generalist like the bald 

eagle comports with the policy’s flexible approach and with its directive that the agency 

determine whether the population is important to the species as a whole. 

Moreover, when an agency interprets its own policies, courts must defer to the 

interpretation. The Court defers to FWS’s conclusion that the 2012 Finding is consistent 

with prior DPS determinations and does not constitute a change of policy. California v. 

F.C.C., 39 F. 3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n agency’s interpretation of its own 

policies and prior orders is entitled to deference.”) (citing California v. F.C.C., 905 F.2d 

1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990)); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Com’rs v. F.C.C., 746 F. 

2d 1492, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FCC’s interpretation of its own policies and regulations 

entitled to “great deference”) (quoting Washington Association for Television & Children 

v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 684–85 (D.C.Cir.1983)); Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 779 F. 

Supp. 2d 1126, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[T]he [Department of Labor’s] interpretation of 

its own regulations through these [opinion] letters is given ‘a high degree of deference’ 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 12 of 22
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”) (quoting Imada v. Hercules, 

138 F. 3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

In arguing to the contrary, Plaintiffs point to a December 10, 2008 Investigative 

Report by the Inspector General of the Department of the Interior (“IG Report”).3

 The 

portions of the IG Report in the record suggest that the Inspector General investigated 

whether the original DPS determination for the desert eagle, and other FWS decisions, 

were politically influenced. Doc. 32-2. The report recounts a 2006 conference call 

between FWS personnel in the regional and national offices concerning the desert eagle, 

during which a participant reported that FWS Assistant Director for Endangered Species, 

Ben Loenhoffer, wanted to apply an “evolutionary standard” to the significance analysis. 

The report states that Mary Richardson, Region 2 Supervisory Fish and Wildlife 

Biologist, objected and asserted that an evolutionary standard “was not a part of the FWS 

distinct population segment policy.” Doc. 32-2 at 4. She reportedly asked whether such 

a standard had been used in the past, and was told by the Washington participants that 

this would be the first time. Id. The IG Report states that Loenhoffer was later asked 

about the statement attributed to him in the conference call – that an “evolutionary 

standard” should be used – and Loenhoffer said he had no knowledge of it. Id. at 7. The 

IG Report recounts these statements as part of its narrative, but makes no effort to 

determine which of the statements is correct or what was meant by “evolutionary 

standard.” 

Plaintiffs cite several other internal FWS documents. An edited page, apparently 

from a 2009 internal memo, suggests that FWS adopted a “new” policy in May 2009 

when it concluded that persistence in a unique ecological setting is not enough, and that 

FWS must also find that that the population has adapted evolutionarily to the setting. 

 

3

 The Court takes judicial notice of the IG Report. The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute if it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201 (b)(2). Reports prepared by administrative agencies are proper subjects of judicial notice. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F. 2d 380, 385 (9th 

Cir. 1953). 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 13 of 22
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2010 AR 6045. Plaintiffs cite statements from a different region of FWS regarding a 

DPS decision on coaster brook trout to the same effect. 2010 AR 6228; see also 2010 

AR 5992. Plaintiffs also rely on an August 2009 memorandum from the Region 2 

Director recommending that the desert eagle be found to be discrete and significant. 

2010 AR 6680-82. The memo suggests that the Washington office of FWS has stated 

that for a population to be found significant “we must be able to demonstrate that the 

population has adapted evolutionarily to the setting.” Id. at 6680 (emphasis added). The 

memo concludes: “[i]f absolute information on evolutionary adaptation is required for a 

finding of significance based on unique or unusual ecological settings, formal guidance to 

that effect should be provided and we will reevaluate our draft findings as appropriate 

and consistent with this new guidance.” Id. at 6682 (emphasis added). 

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument. The IG Report contains 

somewhat conflicting, second-hand accounts of a statement supposedly made by 

Assistant Director Loenhoffer, snippets of communications from other internal sources, 

and comments on an apparent proposal that adaptation be made a mandatory part of the 

persistence inquiry. The 2012 Finding makes clear that such a mandatory requirement 

has not been adopted by FWS, making the comments on any previously proposed 

mandatory requirement irrelevant. Moreover, the Court finds the FWS analysis on 

remand to be a more thorough history of the application of the DPS Policy than can be 

constructed from the various pieces of evidence cited by Plaintiffs. The Court therefore 

does not accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the 2012 Finding constituted a new and 

improper change of the DPS Policy or reflected the continuation of the “marching orders” 

that Judge Murguia found improper.4

 

4

 The Court also notes that even if some of the statements cited by Plaintiffs can be viewed as inconsistent with the conclusions in the 2012 Finding, opinions of employees within an agency are not controlling as to agency policy. U.S. v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 

1391 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The views of agency employees contained in intra-agency documents are not, however, expressions of FTC policy.... Rather they are part of the exchange of ideas—the give and take—central to the formulation of such policy.”) (internal citations omitted); Vons Companies, Inc. v. U.S., 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 21 (Fed. Claims 

2001) (courts should be “extraordinarily hesitant to attribute to the IRS or the Treasury Department interpretations of a revenue ruling made by individual IRS employees that 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 14 of 22
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Failure to Consider All Evidence. 

 Even if FWS’s interpretation of the DPS Policy is correct and not a departure from 

previous interpretations, Plaintiffs argue that FWS failed to consider all appropriate 

evidence when it addressed the desert eagle’s persistence in a unique environment. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs point to a 2009 memo in which FWS biologists suggested that “the 

bald eagle in the harsh environment of the Sonoran Desert Area may represent a resilient 

population, capable of withstanding catastrophes due to its unique adaptations, which 

benefits the taxon as a whole.” 2010 AR 6682. This memo also asserted that the desert 

eagles’ “persistence in the Sonoran Desert Area is valuable in that they may serve as a 

place of safe refuge following a catastrophic event that causes the decline of eagles 

elsewhere in their range.” Id. 

The 2009 memo cited by Plaintiffs asserts that the desert eagle may be “capable of 

withstanding catastrophes due to its unique adaptations.” 2010 AR 6682. The memo 

then discusses several possible adaptations, including the desert eagle’s breeding 

chronology and nesting locations. Id. at 6681-82. As shown above, these very 

adaptations, along with others, were addressed in detail in the 2012 Finding and were 

found not to be unique to the Sonoran Desert population of bald eagles. 77 Fed. Reg. at 

25806-08. Although the 2009 memo also noted the high heat of the Sonoran Desert and 

the fact that the desert eagle population was one of five “strongholds” where bald eagles 

survived DDT use in the United States, the memo ultimately reflected an opinion, a 

judgment call, as to whether the desert eagle population is important to the bald eagle 

species as a whole. The Court cannot say that FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously 

when it came to a different conclusion in the 2012 Finding, particularly in light of its 

careful inquiry into whether the desert eagle displayed adaptations that would render it 

uniquely important to bald eagles generally. Nor can the Court conclude that the very 

general assertions in the 2009 memo that the desert eagle is “resilient” or that the 

Sonoran Desert could constitute a “safe refuge” for bald eagles in the future render the 

 represent their personal views, rather than the official position of the agency.”). 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 15 of 22
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2012 Finding arbitrary and capricious. 

A “diversity of opinion by local or lower-level agency representatives will not 

preclude the agency from reaching a contrary decision, so long as the decision is not 

arbitrary and capricious and is otherwise supported by the record.” WildEarth Guardians 

v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Farley, 11 F.3d at 

1391; Vons Companies, 51 Fed. Cl. at 21. Moreover, even if the 2009 memo could be 

viewed as a different and earlier view within the agency, agencies are free to change 

course on the basis of new evidence or reasoned analysis. Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (observing that “the fact that a 

preliminary determination by a local agency representative is later overruled at a higher 

level within the agency does not render the decision making process arbitrary and 

capricious.”). 

 C. Significant Gap Evidence. 

 The second factor listed in the DPS Policy for determining whether a population 

segment is significant to the species as a whole is whether “loss of the discrete population 

segment would result in a significant gap in the range of a taxon.” 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. 

FWS acknowledged in the 2012 Finding that loss of the desert eagle population would 

create some gap in the range of the bald eagle, but concluded that the gap would not be 

significant under the DPS Policy. 77 Fed. Reg. at 25808-10. 

 “For purposes of the gap in the range analysis, the term ‘significant’ has its 

commonly understood meaning, which is ‘important.’” Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. 

Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home 

Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotes omitted). There is 

no guidance in the DPS Policy as to what makes a gap important, and “FWS has given 

different reasons for the importance of gaps in various listing rules.” Nat’l Ass’n of 

Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing DPS Policy,

61 Fed. Reg. 4722-01 at 4725). In Home Builders, for example, FWS said the gap was 

significant because it would decrease the genetic variability of the taxon, reduce the 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 16 of 22
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

current range of the taxon, reduce the historic range of the taxon, and extirpate the taxon 

from the United States. Id. 

 In analyzing whether the gap created by loss of the desert eagle would be 

significant, the 2012 Finding noted that the bald eagle population in the Sonoran Desert 

Area is “neither numerous nor constitute[s] a significant percentage of the total number 

of bald eagles throughout the range of the taxon.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 25809. In 2009, there 

were 48 breeding pairs of desert eagles in Arizona, where most of the desert eagles 

reside, which constituted less than one-half of one percent of the bald eagle breeding 

pairs in the lower 48 states and “much less” than one-half of one percent of the breeding 

pairs throughout the range of the species. Id. 

 FWS found that loss of the desert eagle would create a gap in the range of the 

taxon, particularly since studies have found little evidence of bald eagle immigration into 

the Sonoran Desert Area, but FWS was unable to find evidence that “any gap created in 

the range would be significant to the taxon as a whole.” Id. This was due to the fact that 

the number of desert eagles is not a significant percentage of bald eagles generally, there 

is “no evidence of distinctive traits or genetic variations” that would be important to the 

species as a whole, and the “actual amount of suitable bald eagle habitat in the Sonoran 

Desert Area is in general limited and represents a minute fraction of the total suitable 

habitat available for bald eagles throughout their range.” Id. 

FWS also found that the Sonoran Desert does not play any particular role in the 

life history of the species. Id. FWS noted that the Sonoran Desert “is not the sole 

breeding or rearing location for bald eagles,” nor is it “only one of two parts of the 

species range such that loss of eagles in one part would result in a significant gap.” Id. 

FWS reached this conclusion: “Having reviewed the best available scientific 

information with respect to the biological or ecological significance of the [desert eagle], 

we have determined that loss of eagles in the Sonoran Desert Area would not represent a 

significant gap in the range of bald eagles as a whole.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that FWS ignored several scientific studies regarding peripheral 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 17 of 22
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

populations. Doc. 52 at 13. Plaintiffs cite a 2009 draft desert eagle finding in which 

FWS employees cited peripheral population studies and recommended that the desert 

eagle be designated a DPS. Id. at 14-16. Plaintiffs argue that these studies are ignored in 

the 2012 Finding, something an agency cannot do when making ESA listing decisions. 

Kern County Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2006). Although it 

is true that the 2012 Finding does not address all of the studies mentioned in the 2009 

draft, a careful review of that 2009 draft persuades the Court that this does not render the 

2012 Finding invalid under the APA. 

 The first peripheral population study mentioned in the 2009 draft is Lessica and 

Allendorf, 1995, p. 754. 2012 AR 505. The 2009 draft describes this study as indicating 

“that peripheral populations are likely to occur in ecologically marginal or stressful 

situations, and that distinct traits found in peripheral populations may be crucial to a 

species, allowing adaptation to environmental change.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the 

importance of the Lessica and Allendorf study is its suggestion that peripheral 

populations may develop “distinct traits” that are important to the species as a whole. 

This, of course, is precisely what the 2012 Finding considered in detail – whether the 

desert eagle has developed distinct traits or adaptations that are important to the bald 

eagle population as a whole. FWS could find reliable evidence of none. In its discussion 

of the Lessica and Allendorf study, the 2009 draft mentioned egg characteristics 

addressed in the Hunt study of 1992 (id.), but this is the same study FWS addressed in the 

2012 Finding when it considered egg shell porosity (77 Fed. Reg. at 25807). FWS found 

that the Hunt study “did not reach any conclusions as to the significance this difference in 

egg shell porosity may have to Arizona eagles,” that it was based on “an extremely small 

sample size of four eggs,” and that no other reported studies have analyzed the 

significance of the Hunt observations. Id. As a result, FWS concluded that “it would not 

be scientifically robust to draw any conclusions from the Hunt et al. (1992) study.” Id. 

 The second peripheral population study cited in the 2009 draft is Vucetich and 

Waite, 2003, p. 643-644. 2012 AR 506. In discussing the study, the 2009 draft observed 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 18 of 22
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“that peripheral and isolated populations may experience pressure at the genetic level 

favoring development of a specific trait rather than a variety of traits.” Id. (emphasis 

added). The examples of such possible traits mentioned in the 2009 draft are, again, 

those mentioned in the 1992 Hunt study, including, among others, egg characteristics and 

the small size of the desert eagle. Id. These characteristics were considered carefully in 

the 2012 Finding, as was the Hunt study. 77 Fed. Reg. at 25807. 

 The third and final peripheral population study mentioned in the 2009 draft is 

Channell and Lomolino, 2000a, p. 85. 2012 AR 506. The draft cites this study as 

suggesting that peripheral populations survive more frequently than do populations in the 

core of their historical range when species undergo dramatic reductions in their range. Id. 

The draft then again mentions the 1992 Hunt study, and also asserts that desert eagles 

survived DDT better than did other bald eagle populations, an indication that they fit the 

pattern observed by Channell and Lomolino. This aspect of the Channell and Lomolino 

study is not addressed in the 2012 Finding. The 2012 Finding does note, however, that 

bald eagles survive throughout North American, in a variety of settings, and are not 

limited to any particular core range, findings that would seem to be at least partially 

responsive to the discussion in the 2009 draft. 

 The Court concludes that the essential points made by the 2009 draft report from 

the first two peripheral population studies – that peripheral populations may develop 

specific traits valuable to the species as a whole, as possibly illustrated by the 1992 Hunt 

study – are addressed directly in the 2012 Finding and in more detail than in the 2009 

draft. Although the essential point made by the 2009 draft from the third study is not 

addressed directly, it is addressed indirectly, and the Court cannot conclude from this 

single omission that the 2012 Finding is arbitrary and capricious.5

 

 

5

 Plaintiffs cite briefly to another early draft of a desert eagle study that mentioned studies by Levin (1970) and Meffe (1997). Doc. 52 at 14. But the discussion of these 

studies again focuses on adaptations that may result from a population’s isolation. See 

2010 AR 3987 (“When a peripheral population is isolated from other populations, the isolated peripheral population may become highly adapted to local conditions.”) 

(emphasis added). The same is true of other studies mentioned in the draft. They are described as showing that peripheral populations may “exhibit adaptations” to their 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 19 of 22
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Nor can the Court conclude that the 2012 Finding’s evaluation of the “significant 

gap” factor is seriously flawed. A holistic look at a species’ population is appropriate 

when assessing whether a population gap would be significant to the species as a whole. 

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In 

other listing rules, the FWS has found a gap to be significant due to the loss of the United 

States range of a population only where some additional significance to the taxon as a 

whole also existed.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, the previous FWS “significant gap” 

findings identified by Plaintiffs are distinguishable. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 3424-01 

(finding that loss of marbled murrelet population would create significant gap where 

population made up 18 percent of the total distribution of species; the inhabited area 

contained an ecologically distinct forest system; peripheral population played an 

important role in maintaining opportunities for future biodiversity and speciation; and 

recovery of species without peripheral population may be impossible); 62 Fed. Reg. 

10730-01 (assessing peripheral nature of population of Arizona pygmy owl, 

acknowledging that peripheral nature of population may increase potential for population 

to diverge genetically, but concluding there was no evidence that population was, in fact, 

genetically distinct or that its loss would significantly affect the genetic diversity of the 

species as a whole); 62 Fed. Reg. 4183-01 (analyzing northern population of the 

copperbelly water snake, which constituted eight of thirteen clusters of entire population 

of species, completely cut off from southern population, making immigration between 

populations impossible). 

D. Climate Change. 

 Plaintiffs argue that FWS failed to consider the impacts of climate change as a 

relevant DPS factor. Doc. 52 at 18. Plaintiffs argue that climate change was considered 

in earlier draft findings and should therefore have been considered in the 2012 Finding. 

Doc. 52 at 18. The earlier draft cited by Plaintiffs, however, addressed climate change 

 unique setting. Id. at 3988 (emphasis added). Such adaptations are precisely what the 2012 Finding studied in detail. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 20 of 22
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

for this reason: “Bald eagles in the Sonoran Desert Area, having persisted in a drier, less 

humid environment, may be better adapted to conditions in different areas as 

temperatures increase.” 2012 AR 451 (emphasis added). Again, the earlier draft focused 

on possible adaptations that would make the desert eagle important to the bald eagle 

species as a whole. As discussed at length above, the 2012 Finding considered carefully 

whether the desert eagle has adapted to the desert environment in ways that would help 

bald eagles generally, and could find no evidence that it has. This inquiry essentially 

answered the question posed by Plaintiff’s climate change argument – whether desert 

eagles have unique characteristics that could help bald eagles as a whole in an era of 

global warming. Given the detailed analysis of adaptation evidence in the 2012 Finding, 

the Court cannot conclude that the finding is fatally flawed simply because FWS did not 

conduct the analysis under the heading of “climate change.”6

 

E. Significance Conclusion.

 In summary, the Court cannot conclude that the 2012 Finding “relied on factors 

which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important 

aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 

U.S. at 43. The Court finds that the 2012 Finding is “founded on a rational connection 

between the facts found and the choices made,” and that FWS has not made “a clear error 

of judgment.” Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1243. And despite Plaintiffs’ 

best arguments to the contrary, the Court cannot conclude that the 2012 Finding is the 

result of earlier “marching orders” that Judge Murguia appropriately found to be 

improper. 

 

 

6

 The Court notes that although FWS did not mention climate change in assessing the significance element of the DPS finding, it did take an in-depth look at the impacts of climate change in conducting its threat assessment. 77 Fed. Reg. at 25825-26. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 21 of 22
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

V. Threatened or Endangered. 

A population must qualify as a DPS before becoming eligible for a threatened or 

endangered listing. 61 Fed. Reg. 4722. Because the Court upholds FWS’s conclusion 

that the significance element of the DPS Policy is not satisfied, and that the desert eagle 

therefore does not qualify as a DPS, the Court need not reach the question of whether 

FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding the desert eagle not threatened or 

endangered. 

VI. Motion to Strike. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike the September 26, 2014 filing by FWS entitled 

“Defendants’ Notice of Completion of Internal Review” and the accompanying exhibit. 

Doc. 71 at 2. This filing concerns a finding by an internal Scientific Integrity Officer 

regarding FWS’s desert eagle decision. Plaintiffs argue that this material was produced 

years after the agency decision in this case, is outside the administrative record, and 

cannot be considered by the Court in its evaluation of the 2012 Finding. Doc. 71 at 4. 

The Court agrees. Judicial review is normally limited to the administrative record in 

existence at the time of the agency’s decision. Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 

222 F. 3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000). The motion to strike will therefore be granted. 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. 63) is granted, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 30) is denied, and 

Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc. 70) is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 4th day of November, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-02296-DGC Document 74 Filed 11/05/14 Page 22 of 22