Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04351/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04351-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY L. MORRISON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-04351 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Having considered the Defendants’

motion, relevant legal authority and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court

HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is the second time this matter has been before the Court on a motion to dismiss, and

the relevant factual circumstances are set forth in the Court’s Order dated January 30, 2006,

dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend. In brief, Plaintiff Roy L. Morrison (“Morrison”)

is an African American male who has been employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(“Bureau”) for over twenty-two years. (FAC ¶¶, 1, 6.) Morrison contends after he was assigned

to the Western Regional Office of the Bureau, he performed in an exemplary fashion and was

advised that he was slated to be promoted to a Senior Executive Service Position at either a

Penitentiary or a Medium High Institution. (Id., ¶ 17.) Morrison further alleges that he was

denied such a position and instead was assigned to the low level security Prison Camp in

Duluth, Minnesota. Morrison contends he was reassigned to replace a white male at the Duluth

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1 Plaintiff does include the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a Defendant in the

caption but concedes he did so in error and agrees that Attorney General Gonzales is the only

proper defendant in this action. (Opp. at 18:8-13.) Accordingly, to the extent it has been

named in the FAC, Defendant Federal Bureau of Prisons is dismissed from this action.

2

prison, who had less experience and was less qualified than Morrison. (Id., ¶¶ 18-19.) 

Morrison alleges this demotion was retaliatory. (Id., ¶ 19.) Upon learning of this transfer,

Morrison consulted an EEO counselor in August 2004. (Id., ¶ 20.) Morrison contends that after

lodging his complaint, he was subject to further reprisals. (Id.) 

Morrison also contends that he and “other African American employees at the Western

Regional Office (“WRO”) were forced to endure an environment permeated by behavior which

was both objectively and subjectively offensive. This offensive behavior affected the terms and

conditions of [Morrison’s] employment, including freedom from not only a racially

discriminatory hostile work environment, but also disparate treatment and retaliation for

complaining about unlawful discrimination as well as promotional opportunities and favorable

transfers.” (Id., ¶ 9.) Morrison contends that the “conduct which constitutes [his] racially

hostile work environment claim began in the Spring of 2004,” but in August 2004, “the

environment had become sufficiently severe and pervasive enough to require [him] to make an

EEO complaint and to subsequently seek medical assistance.” (Id., ¶ 22.)

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Morrison’s FAC, in its entirety, and assert that: (1)

Morrison fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a hostile work environment claim; (2) he

cannot recover for discrete actions occurring prior to July 9, 2004; and (3) he again names

improper defendants.1 In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement.

A. Legal Standards.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should

not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts

supporting his or her claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also De La Cruz

v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a

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2 Morrison again argues that Defendant ignores other deadlines controlling the

administrative process, citing to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). (Opp. at 16.) Notwithstanding the

fact that section 2005e-16 is the applicable statutory provision, Morrison’s argument

confuses the issue of an appropriate limitations period for bringing a claim in the District

Court with the separate and distinct issue of whether he has exhausted his administrative

remedies.

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plaintiff to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct. No technical forms

of pleading or motions are required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a plaintiff need not “set out in

detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short

and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint is construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint are taken to be

true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The court, however, is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 

Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) a party can

“attack the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency,

and in so doing rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v.

City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Morrison Has Not Exhausted Retaliation or Discrimination Claims Based on

Discrete Adverse Actions that Occurred Prior to July 9, 2004.

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC in its entirety on the ground that Morrison has not

exhausted administrative remedies for any allegedly discrete discriminatory conduct that

occurred prior to July 9, 2004, a matter the Court addressed in its January 30, 2006 Order

dismissing the initial complaint with leave to amend.2 “To establish federal subject matter

jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking

adjudication of a Title VII claim.” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002)

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3 This finding would not necessarily preclude Morrison from offering evidence

of this conduct as background evidence. See, e.g., Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1108-1112 (discussing

plaintiffs’ ability to offer evidence of time barred conduct to support claims that were not

time barred).

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(citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 267 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) and EEOC v. Farmer

Bros., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Under regulations applicable to federal employees, “[a]ggrieved persons who believe

they have been discriminated against on the basis of race ... must consult a Counselor prior to

filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). 

This contact must occur “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory

or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.” Id., §

1614.105(a)(1). See also Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104 n.4, 1105; Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles,

349 F.3d 634, 644-46 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing exhaustion requirement in context of

retaliation claim). 

It is undisputed that Morrison did not contact an EEOC counselor until August 23, 2004,

and Morrison does not contend there are grounds to toll that time period. In National R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court held that discrete acts are

not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 (2002). Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse

employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice. Id. at

114. Applying the holdings of Morgan, Lyons and Vasquez to the facts of this case, because of

his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Morrison is barred from pursuing discrimination

or retaliation claims based upon on discrete actions occurring prior to July 9, 2004.3 To the

extent Plaintiff bases his retaliation or discrimination claims on conduct occurring prior to that

date, as set forth in Counts I and II, of the First Amended Complaint, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, but to the extent these claims are based on conduct occurring on or after

July 9, 2004, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

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4 This allegation was apparently included as a response to the Court’s statement

that he could not proceed based on actions occurring prior to July 9, 2004 barring tolling or a

claim for a hostile work environment. (Jan 30, 2006 Order at 7:20-27.)

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C. Morrison’s Hostile Work Environment Claim Shall Be Dismissed Without Leave to

Amend.

With respect to employees of the Federal Government, Title VII provides that “[a]ll

personnel actions affecting [federal employees] ... shall be made free from any discrimination

based on race ... .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). A defendant may violate Title VII when the

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently

or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at

642.4 A hostile work environment is comprised of a series of acts that collectively constitute

one “unlawful employment practice.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. Defendants assert, in part, that

the hostile work environment claim should be dismissed because Morrison’s claims are not

based on non-discrete acts occurring on or after July 9, 2004. 

In Morgan, the Supreme Court explained that a hostile work environment claim could

include actions outside the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), which requires

a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment

practice to preserve a civil action, as long as one act supporting the claim fell within the

appropriate limitations period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117-19. The Ninth Circuit has construed

the holding in Morgan to require that the timely act supporting a hostile work environment be a

“non-discrete” act rather than a “discrete” act. Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections, 419

F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If the flames of an allegedly hostile work environment are to rise

to the level of an actionable claim, they must do so based on the fuel of timely non-discrete

acts.”).

In this case, it is undisputed that Morrison was required to exhaust administrative

remedies by consulting with an EEOC counselor within 45 days of the matter alleged to be

discriminatory. Morrison did not consult with a counselor until August 23, 2004, therefore to

have preserved a hostile work environment claim, Morrison must rely on non-discrete acts

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occurring on after July 9, 2004. However, to the extent Morgan alleges non-discrete acts in his

FAC, none of those acts occurred between July 9, 2004 and August 23, 2004. At the hearing on

this motion, Plaintiff conceded there were no additional facts on which he was basing his hostile

work environment claim. Accordingly, the hostile work environment claim is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. 

D. Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

Defendants also move to strike the following sections of the FAC, which relate to

Morrison’s supervisor Joe Gunja: (1) a reference to “ethnic cleansing” on page 4 line 5; and

allegations regarding Mr. Gunja at page 8 lines 14-17.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to strike “from any pleading any

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for

relief or the defenses being pleaded.’” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.

1993), overruled on other grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 

“‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary to the

issues in question.” Id. Ultimately, the decision as to whether to strike allegations is a matter

within the Court’s discretion. Id. 

In its January 30, 2006 Order, the Court ordered that the allegations relating to Mr.

Gunja’s behavior be excluded unless Morrison could clearly link these allegations to his

employment discrimination and retaliation claims. Morrison contends that Mr. Gunja engaged

in certain improper activities and retaliated against Morrison when he (Morrison) reported this

behavior. Neither the initial complaint nor the FAC make clear when Morrison reported this

behavior to authorities, and the Court finds that Morrison has not established that these are

allegations are clearly linked to his retaliation and discrimination claims. Accordingly, unless

Morrison reported this behavior to authorities on or after July 9, 2004, they should not be

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5 This finding would not necessarily preclude Morrison from offering evidence

of this conduct as background evidence. See, e.g., Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1108-1112 (discussing

plaintiffs’ ability to offer evidence of time barred conduct to support claims that were not

time barred).

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referenced in the amended complaint contemplated by this Order.5 If Morrison can show that

these events occurred on or after July 9, 2004, the Court strongly urges Morrison to set forth

those allegations in a more general fashion, i.e. as the Court has done in this Order. 

The Court shall exercise its discretion and strike the reference to ethnic cleansing. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Order, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART. Morrison shall file a second amended complaint by no later than June 2, 2006, that: (a)

omits any reference to the hostile work environment claim from Count I, and that Count should

be limited to his claims for racial discrimination based on conduct occurring on or after July 9,

2004; and (b) omit any reference to ethnic cleansing; and (c) omit any reference to the

allegations regarding Mr. Gunja’s alleged improper activities unless Morrison can, in good faith,

represent he reported those activities on or after July 9, 2004. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2006 _________________________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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