Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02348/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125(a) False representation of goods sold in interstate commerce

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMETEK CTS US, Inc. and AMETEK 

CTS GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Advanced Test Equipment Corp.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-02348-H-AHG

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION AND A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER 

[Doc. No. 10.]

On December 9, 2019, Plaintiffs AMETEK CTS US, Inc. and AMETEK CTS 

GmbH (“Plaintiffs” or “AMETEK”) filed a complaint alleging violations of the Lanham 

Act among other state law causes of action. (Doc. No. 1.) Presently before the Court is 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed December 9, 2019. (Doc. No. 2.) The 

Court held a telephonic hearing on the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order on 

December 18, 2019 at 10:30 am. Jason White along with other representatives, appeared 

for the Plaintiffs. John M. Billy made a special appearance to request a continuance so that 

ATEC could obtain counsel for the corporation. James P. Berg and Jamison Berg, 

nonlawyer representatives for ATEC, also were telephonically present for the hearing. At 

the hearing Mr. Berg represented to the Court that “the press release with the allegedly 

false statements at issue in the complaint had been taken down from ATEC’s website and 

that ATEC would not disseminate similar statements.” (Doc. No. 19 at 2.) The Court 

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granted Defendant’s request for a continuance and continued the hearing on the Motion for 

a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order to January 10, 2020 at 11am.

On January 6, 2020, Defendant opposed the motion. (Doc. No. 20.) On January 9, 2020, 

Plaintiffs replied. (Doc. No. 21.) The Court held a hearing on the motion on January 10, 

2020. Jacon C. White appeared for Plaintiffs and Jacob T. Spaid appeared for the 

Defendant. For the following reasons the Court denies the motion for a preliminary 

injunction and temporary restraining order without prejudice. 

Background

Plaintiffs AMETEK CTS US, Inc. and AMETEK CTS GmbH (collectively, 

“AMETEK”) seek a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order against 

Defendant Advanced Test Equipment Corp. (“ATEC”).1

AMETEK is a manufacturer of sophisticated electronic instruments in the 

automotive, telecommunications, energy, aerospace, power, research, medical and 

industrial markets. (Doc. No. 2, Ex. 2. ¶ 1.) AMETEK sells directly to consumers and also 

distributes its products through commercial partners. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant ATEC has been 

a distributor of AMETEK’s products. (Id.) Specifically ATEC has been a purchaser of 

AMETEK’s TESTEQ, IFI, Milmega and EM Test lines of products for use in rental pools. 

Id. AMETEK and ATEC have been doing business in this manner for nearly 15 years with 

approximately $17 million in sales between the two companies. (Doc No. 20-4 at 2.) 

On September 7, 2019, AMETEK informed ATEC that it would have to “decline 

the opportunity for non-warranty service requests on behalf of ATEC going forward.” 

(Doc. No. 2, Ex. 3.) Defendant responded negatively to this development. (Id. at 4.) In a 

September 17, 2019 email, Jim Berg, CEO of ATEC, wrote that it “is very clear that 

Ametek is no longer going to support the many millions of dollars of equipment that ATEC 

has purchased from them over the years.” (Id.) The same day, Rick Powell, Director of 

 

1 Since the standard for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) is nearly identical to a Preliminary 

Injunction the Court does not address the TRO separately. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush 

& Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Sales for the Americas, wrote back to Mr. Berg, informing him that AMETEK would 

“continue to repair anything that is still under warranty.” (Id.)

On December 4, 2019, Defendant issued a press release titled “AMETEK CTS No 

Longer Calibrating or Repairing Equipment After The Warranty Expires.” (Id. at Ex. 1.)

This press release was also simultaneously disseminated over ATEC’s LinkedIn, 

Facebook, and Twitter accounts as well as Defendant’s website and through email. (Id.)

The body of the press release stated that “AMETEK CTS has notified them [ATEC] that 

they would no longer be supporting their products after the warranty period has expired.” 

(Id.) Following the issuance of this press release, AMETEK began to receive inquiries from 

its various customers and distributors about whether AMETEK would continue to support 

its products after the end of their warranty. (Doc. Nos. 10. Ex.7, 8, and 12.) 

On December 4, 2019, AMETEK, through its counsel, sent a letter to Mr. Berg 

demanding that “ATEC immediately remove the press release from its website, as well as 

all other locations . . . .” (Id. Ex. 17.) Two days later, on December 6, 2019, Mr. Berg 

responded indicating that ATEC would deliver “an appropriate response to your request” 

within 10 business days. (Id. Ex. 18.) On December 9, 2019, ATEC offered to publish a 

retraction, prepared by AMETEK, of the press release. (Doc. No. 20 at 3.) Instead, later 

that same day, December 9, 2019, AMETEK filed their complaint with this Court. (Doc. 

No. 1.) 

On December 18, 2019 the Court held a telephonic hearing on the motion for a 

Temporary Restraining Order. At the hearing Mr. Berg represented to the Court that “the 

press release with the allegedly false statements at issue in the complaint had been taken 

down from ATEC’s website and that ATEC would not disseminate similar statements”

during the course of this litigation. (Doc. No. 19 at 2.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); see Earth Island Inst. v. 

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Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[P]laintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction 

face a difficult task in proving that they are entitled to this ‘extraordinary remedy.’”) 

(quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). It is “a device for preserving the status quo and preventing 

the irreparable loss of rights before judgment.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, 

Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). “The grant or denial of a motion for a preliminary 

injunction lies within the discretion of the district court.” Johnson v. California State Bd. 

of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Winter, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 

must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in 

his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The 

Ninth Circuit balances these “Winter factors” using a “sliding scale” approach, where “a 

stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the 

Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). However, Winter “requires 

the plaintiff to make a showing on all four prongs.” Id. at 1135. 

II. Analysis

a. Irreparable Harm

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to suffer 

irreparable harm. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The mere “possibility” of irreparable harm is not 

sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 

1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “Purely economic harms are generally not irreparable, as 

money lost may be recovered later, in the ordinary course of litigation.” Idaho v. Coeur 

d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Los Angeles Memorial 

Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634 F2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (denying a preliminary 

injunction because lost revenues, diminution of property value and loss of substantial 

goodwill are all monetary damages that can be remedied by a damages award). Although 

loss of goodwill may constitute irreparable injury, the loss must be based on factual 

allegations and not be purely speculative. Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of 

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State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. 

Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Evidence of loss of control 

over business reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.”); 

Adidas America, Inc. v. Sketchers USA, Inc. 890 F.3d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 2018) (damage to 

good will “can constitute irreparable harm so long as there is concrete evidence in the 

record of those things.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs contend that, absent a preliminary injunction, they will suffer irreparable 

harm as a result of Defendant’s misleading press release. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 15-17.) 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s allegedly false statements strike “at [a] key building block 

upon which AMETEK’s reputation relies.” (Id.) AMETEK contends that this loss of 

control over how their company is perceived in the marketplace constitutes an irreparable 

harm. (Id.) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not actually established any harm to their 

goodwill or loss of control and that the potential loss of future sales cannot constitute an 

irreparable injury. (Doc. No. 20 at 12-13.)2

Ultimately, the emails offered as evidence by Plaintiffs show, at most, that some 

consumers were confused by ATEC’s press release. However, the Ninth Circuit has 

explained that customer confusion is not the same thing as irreparable harm. Herb Reed 

Enterprises, 736 F.3d at 1250 (“This evidence, however, simply underscores customer 

confusion, not irreparable harm.”) None of the customers, in the emails provided by 

Plaintiffs, state that they now have a negative impression of Plaintiffs business or that they 

would refuse to use Plaintiffs’ services in the future. (See Doc. Nos. 10-1--10-19, 16-1--

 

2 Defendant also argues that the motion is moot since the offending statements have been 

unpublished. (Doc. No. 20 at 5.) However, a defendant “cannot automatically moot a case simply by 

ending its unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013). Rather, “a 

defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing 

that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). Since 

Defendant makes no argument that its behavior “could not reasonably be expected to recur,” the Court 

has no basis to consider the case moot.

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16-8.) The emails provided by Plaintiffs are not like the complaints that supported the 

Ninth’s Circuit finding of irreparable harm in Life Alert Emergency Response, Inc. v. 

LifeWatch, Inc. 601 F. App’x 469, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (sufficient evidence of 

irreparable injury where employee submitted “declaration reporting numerous and 

persistent complaints from would-be customers”). In that case Plaintiff provided direct 

evidence of consumers complaining about their products as a result of the disputed conduct. 

Id. Here there is no analogous evidence in the record. Plaintiffs have not provided enough 

concrete evidence in the record to justify the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief at 

this time. 

Plaintiffs have also offered two declarations from Mr. Huntsman, a Vice President 

at AMETEK CTS GmbH. (See Doc. Nos. 10-2, 16.) Mr. Huntsman asserts that 

“AMETEK’s reputation in the marketplace has been harmed by ATEC’s false statements” 

and that “AMETEK expects to lose future sales” as result of ATEC’s conduct. (Doc. No. 

10-2 at 34.) But Mr. Huntsman’s assertions are conclusory and cannot support a finding of 

irreparable harm. See Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 

1473 (9th Cir. 1985) (no showing of irreparable harm where declarations from the 

plaintiff’s own executives were “conclusory and without sufficient support in facts” and 

“[n]one of the advertisers say[] that [they] will discontinue business with [plaintiff]”). Mr. 

Huntsman’s conclusory declarations do not provide the concrete evidence necessary to

support a finding of irreparable harm. 

b. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The court will now also address the likelihood of Plaintiffs success on the merits. 

Plaintiffs bring six causes of action against Defendant: (1) false advertising under § 43(a) 

of the Lanham Act, (2) a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17500, 

(3) a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, (4) a claim for 

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (5) a claim for negligence 

interference with prospective economic advantage, (6) and a claim for trade libel. (Doc. 

No. 1 ¶34-76.) However, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction only addresses the 

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likelihood of Plaintiffs’ success on their false advertising claim. The Court will therefore 

only consider Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their false advertising claim. 

False Advertising

To prove a claim for false advertising under the Lanham Act, Plaintiffs must establish:

1) in advertisements, defendant made false statements of fact about its own or 

another’s product;

2) those advertisements actually deceived or have the tendency to deceive 

substantial segment of their audience;

3) such deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing 

decision;

4) defendant caused its falsely advertised goods to enter interstate commerce; and

5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as the result of the foregoing either by 

direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant, or by lessening of the goodwill 

which its products enjoy with the buying public.

CKE Rest. v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142–43 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing

Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F. 3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has made literally false statements about the scope of 

AMETEK’s post-service warranty therefore satisfying the first prong of the test. (Doc. No. 

10-1 at 10-11.) Plaintiffs point to the title of the press release issued on December 4, 2019 

which reads: “AMETEK CTS No Longer Calibrating Or Repairing Equipment After The 

Warranty Expires.” (Id.) AMETEK argues that this is a false statement because this implies 

that AMETEK is no longer calibrating or repairing equipment after the warranty for any 

purchaser. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 10-11.) Plaintiffs also take issue with the body of the press 

release which states in part that “AMETEK CTS has notified them [ATEC] that they would 

no longer be supporting their products after the warranty period has expired.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs argue that these statements “convey the message that AMETEK no longer 

supports any of its TESEQ, IFI, and EM Test products for any of its customers” when in 

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fact AMETEK is still supporting these product lines after warranty as long as the relevant 

machines were not purchased by ATEC. (Id.) 

Defendant opposes stating that the contested statements are true in the context of the 

entire press release. (Doc. No. 10-2 at 2.) ATEC argues that it is true that AMETEK had 

reached out to the Defendant to notify them that they would “decline the opportunity for 

non-warranty service request on behalf of ATEC going forward.” (Doc. No. 10-2 at 2.)

To demonstrate falsity, “a plaintiff may show that the statement was literally false, 

either on its face or by necessary implication, or that the statement was literally true but 

likely to mislead or confuse consumers.” Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 

F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997.) The parties’ moving papers and arguments during the 

hearing reveal numerous disputes of fact that preclude the Court from determining that the 

Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of a Lanham Act false advertising claim at this 

stage. Both parties raise reasonable arguments about the the contested statements.

Plaintiffs’ argument that the subject line of the press release is misleading is not without 

merit but Defendant’s contention that the subject line must be read in context with the body 

of the release is also compelling. In deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, the 

district court is not bound to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed 

questions of fact.” Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 

F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). The question of whether a 

consumer reading this press release would have been misled or confused is at this point a

contested factual question. Accordingly, the Court declines to resolve these factual disputes 

on such a limited record and finds Plaintiff have not carried their burden of demonstrating

a likelihood of success on the merits at this stage.

Since Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a likelihood of success 

on the merits, the Court need not address Defendant’s remaining arguments or the 

remaining factors necessary for injunctive relief. See Amylin Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 

Co., 456 F. App’x 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Conclusion

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or a 

likelihood of irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish entitlement 

to a preliminary injunction, and the Court denies Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary 

injunction and temporary restraining order. See Winter 555 U.S. at 20. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 13, 2020

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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