Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT I. REESE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Sacramento County Sherriff’s 

Department Deputy ZACHARY 

ROSE (Bade 832),

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-00559-GEB-KJN

ORDER CONCERNING ENTRY OF 

JUDGMENT 

The trial in this action concluded on November 6, 2015, 

when the jury returned a general verdict with answers to written 

questions, finding in part in a general verdict that Defendant 

Zachary Rose is liable for, inter alia, subjecting Plaintiff to 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. (Revised Verdict Form 1:17-21, ECF 

No. 164.) Judgment was entered on November 9, 2015, under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 58(b)(1)(A). (ECF No. 165.) 

However, on November 10, 2015, judgment was vacated in an Order 

stating: “The Court mistakenly authorized judgment to be entered 

prematurely under [Rule 58(b)(1)(A)], which applies to the entry 

of judgment following the return of [only] a general verdict. 

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[However, i]n this case, the jury returned a general verdict with 

answers to written questions.” (Order Vacating J., ECF No. 167 

(emphasis added).) Therefore, the judgment in this case is 

controlled by Rule 58(b)(2)(A), which prescribes: “Subject to 

Rule 54(b), the court must promptly approve the form of the 

judgment, which the clerk must promptly enter, when: (A) the jury 

returns a . . . general verdict with answers to written 

questions . . . .” Rule 54(b) prescribes in pertinent part that a 

partial judgment should “only” be issued “if the court expressly 

determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 54(b). It was decided that this determination could not be 

made since immediately after the jury was discharged and 

permitted to leave the courtroom, Defendants’ counsel stated in 

response to the Court’s inquiry “Anything further to cover?”, 

“We would reserve the arguments regarding Heck and qualified 

immunity for a [Rule] 50(b) motion that we will be intending 

later on.” (Trial Tr. 967:10–12, ECF No. 185.)

In light of Defendants’ representation that they would 

make arguments that could bear on the ultimate judgment entered 

in this case, and the Rule 54(b) prescription that a partial 

judgment should “only” be issued “if the court expressly 

determines that there is no just reason for delay[,]” (Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b)), the Court authorized briefing on the issues. 

(Order Declining to Enter J. & Setting Br. Sch., ECF No. 177.) 

Defendant Rose submitted a supplemental brief arguing he is 

entitled to qualified immunity, “in light of the jury answers to 

written questions.” (Def. Rose’s Suppl. Br. Re Qualified Immunity 

1:23-25, ECF No. 190.)

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Oral argument on the qualified immunity issue was 

scheduled for hearing on January 14, 2016; however at that 

hearing, the Court first probed the basis for Plaintiff’s 

contention in a post-trial brief that the judge “deprived 

[Plaintiff] of procedural due process” when the judge “vacat[ed]” 

the Clerk’s November 9, 2015 Rule 58(b)(1)(A) “judgment summarily 

[and] sua sponte,” “without notice and a hearing.” (See Pl.’s 

Mem. Resp. to Defs.’ Post-Trial Brs. Re Qualified Immunity 5:15–

21, ECF No. 192.) Plaintiff responded by withdrawing his

procedural due process argument.

Next, Defendant Rose’s counsel was asked whether he was 

making a qualified immunity motion under any Rule. Defendant 

Rose’s response evinced he has not yet moved under Rule 50(b) for 

judgment on his qualified immunity defense, and Defendant Rose 

ultimately said his supplemental brief concerning qualified 

immunity was only filed because he thought it was ordered. Since 

Defendant Rose has not yet sought qualified immunity in a postverdict motion, his supplemental briefs on the issue are 

disregarded. 

Defendants also stated at the January 14, 2016 hearing 

that they are not opposed to judgment being entered immediately

based on the Revised Verdict Form, filed November 6, 2015, 

provided that it is clear that judgment is also entered in favor 

of Defendant Duncan Brown. However, the Clerk’s judgment that 

enters judgment in accordance with the jury verdict rendered on 

November 6, 2015, need not be amended.

In light of Defendant Rose’s failure to articulate a 

“just reason for delay in entering judgment” as required by Rule 

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54(b), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with 

the jury verdict rendered on November 6, 2015.

Dated: January 14, 2016

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