Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_07-cv-00481/USCOURTS-alsd-2_07-cv-00481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Emma Lightsey filed a notice with this Court on October 22, 2007, that she had

been transferred to the Montgomery Women’s Facility, P.O. Box 75, Mount Meigs, Alabama

36057. (Doc. 9)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

EMMAREAN C. LIGHTSEY, :

AIS 238811,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 07-0481-CG-C

:

TROY KING, et al.,

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Emmarean C. Lightsey, a state prisoner presently housed at the

Montgomery Women’s Facility in Mount Meigs, Alabama (Doc. 9),1

 has

petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Petitioner is challenging the validity of her November 23, 2004 murder

conviction in the Circuit Court of Perry County, Alabama. On December 20,

2004, Lightsey was sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence were affirmed on appeal by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

on November 10, 2005, Lightsey v. State, 954 So.2d 1142 (Ala.Crim.App.

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2005) (table); the court overruled her application for rehearing, id., on

December 9, 2005 (Doc. 6, Exhibit B, at 2 (“On December 9, 2005, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Petitioner’s timely application

for rehearing and denied her motion to accept the submitted Statement of

Facts.”)). The Alabama Supreme Court denied Lightsey’s petition for writ of

certiorari and issued its certificate of judgment on April 14, 2006. (Doc. 6,

Exhibit C) Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Perry

County, Alabama collaterally attacking her conviction and sentence on July

11, 2006. (Doc. 6, Exhibit D) The trial court dismissed the petition, without a

hearing, on June 5, 2007 (Doc. 6, Exhibit E); Lightsey did not appeal the trial

court’s dismissal of her Rule 32 petition (see Doc. 6, Exhibit F, Docket Sheet).

In her petition before this Court, filed June 22, 2007 (Doc. 1, at 12),

Lightsey raises the following grounds which she claims entitle her to relief:

(1) she was denied her Fourteenth Amendment right to an examination

to determine if she was competent to stand trial;

(2) her attorney did not file a motion to suppress a videotape of the

deceased;

(3) she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to a fair and speedy

trial;

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(4) the jury was not polled following media accounts chronicling her

prior legal problems;

(5) the prosecutor, without objection from defense counsel,

intentionally used peremptory challenges to remove white jurors from the

venire;

(6) the prosecutor commented on her post-arrest silence in violation of

her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination;

(7) the trial court erroneously allowed three members of the deceased’s

family to give hearsay testimony;

(8) the prosecution admitted that the case against her was

circumstantial;

(9) her trial attorney did not contact three witnesses who could have

validated her self-defense claim;

(10) the trial judge denied her a pre-trial hearing and entered a

vindictive sentence;

(11) the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals erred in finding the

statements she challenged as hearsay were not hearsay and then using those

statements to find sufficient evidence for her conviction; and 

(12) an inventory of items taken from the crime scene did not list four

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items which were later recovered from Agent Guthrie’s office. 

The respondents contend that this Court is procedurally barred from

reaching the merits of all grounds of the petition, save for those two grounds

related to the admission of hearsay testimony. With respect to those hearsay

claims, respondents contend that Lightsey has failed to establish that the state

court’s decision regarding these issues was contrary to federal law or an

unreasonable application of the law to the facts of her case. This case is ripe

for a decision by this Court.

This cause is before the Court on the petition, the respondents’ answer,

with attachments, and petitioner’s response to this Court’s procedural default

order. A careful review of the record has been completed and it is determined

that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under consideration may

be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is required.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Lightsey was convicted of the murder of Michael Sapp in the

Circuit Court of Perry County, Alabama on November 23, 2004. (Doc. 6,

Exhibit A) She was sentenced to life imprisonment on December 20, 2004.

(Id.) “Lightsey filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of

law.” (Id. at 1-2)

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2. Petitioner then filed a direct appeal from her conviction and

sentence in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (See id.) That court

affirmed Lightsey’s conviction and sentence by memorandum opinion. (Id.)

The record reflects that Emma Lightsey was in a

common-law marriage with Michael Sapp, with whom she was

living in a Strobel house owned by Sapp’s employer. Lightsey

first met Sapp in 1996 when she was working at the Marion

Junction Co-op and Sapp was working for Dunkan Farms. They

began a relationship which led to their engagement in January

2002. Lightsey testified that their relationship was “tumultuous

almost from the beginning” and their relationship worsened after

they began living together. She further testified that Sapp and

she drank four half-gallon containers or rum every night until

they passed out. She stated that on the weekends, they began

drinking at noon. Lightsey testified that Sapp was “the kindest,

gentlest man” when sober, but became jealous, possessive and

difficult to reason with when he drank. Lightsey testified that

when Sapp was intoxicated, he hit her and dragged her through

the house by her ankles.

In the summer of 2002, Mary Beth Hatfield, Sapp’s first

cousin, was visiting with Lightsey and Sapp at their residence

when she asked Lightsey a personal question. Lightsey became

“irate” and threatened to kill Hatfield. Lightsey denied that she

threatened to kill Hatfield.

On another occasion in June or July 2002, when Sapp’s

daughter, Angela, was visiting with the couple, Lightsey left the

house, sat on the porch, and drank alcohol for five hours. When

Sapp approached Lightsey later in an attempt to engage in

sexual activity with her, Lightsey attempted to get into her car

and drive away. Sapp grabbed the strap of her purse to restrain

her and she began to kick Sapp, scream, and blow the car horn

to prevent Sapp from restraining her. Lightsey then threatened

to kill Sapp and his daughter after coming back into the house.

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Lightsey denied she threatened to kill Sapp and his daughter.

Anita Crawford, whose husband, Bo Crawford, is Sapp’s

uncle, testified that in the summer of 2002, Bo Crawford

received a telephone call from Lightsey. Anita Crawford

answered the phone call initially and remained on the line while

her husband spoke with Lightsey because Lightsey’s voice

sounded agitated. Mrs. Crawford heard Lightsey say “if you

want to see your son of a bitch nephew you better come get him

now or I’m going to kill him.” Lightsey denied she threatened

to kill Sapp over the phone.

On Labor Day in 2002, Lightsey got into an argument

with Sapp and demanded that he leave the kitchen. Sapp

approached Lightsey, struck her, and knocked her to the floor.

Sapp then grabbed her and tried to pull her up when the handgun

that Sapp was carrying in his waistband fell to the floor.

Lightsey grabbed the weapon and pointed it at Sapp. Sapp began

to leave the kitchen but turned, made a gesture at Lightsey,

walked to the refrigerator, and leaned against it. Lightsey then

fired the gun into the living room. Sapp then began to move

towards Lightsey after calling her either a “stupid bitch” or a

“crazy bitch.” Lightsey then fired two shots at Sapp and he fell

to the floor.

Lightsey dialed the operator to ask for an ambulance.

Tory Ratcliff, a Dallas County Haynes ambulance dispatcher,

answered the telephone call and Lightsey told Ratcliff [] she

needed help because “Michael’s been shot.” Ratcliff realized

that the call was from Perry County, and she realized that she

could not send an ambulance to another county. Ratcliff told

Lightsey that another ambulance was being sent, but Ratcliff did

not contact the Perry County Sheriff’s Department because she

assumed that someone else would report the incident.

Lightsey hung up the phone and drove to her mother’s

house and met her sister, Linda Coffer, at the door. Lightsey told

her sister that Sapp had been shot. Coffer observed bruises on

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Lightsey’s hands and scratches on her knees. Lightsey spent the

night at her mother’s house and, in the morning, Coffer called

Billy Faile, Lightsey’s attorney. The first time the shooting was

reported to the authorities was when Faile contacted the Perry

County Sheriff’s Department that morning and officers were

sent to Sapp’s residence where they discovered Sapp’s body.

John Bailey of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation

found a .38 caliber handgun and projectiles that had been fired

from the weapon at the scene. Dr. John McDuffy, the director at

the Tuscaloosa laboratory of the Alabama Department of

Forensic Sciences, testified that Dr. Michael Glenn performed

an autopsy on Sapp and determined the cause of death as a

gunshot wound. Dr. Glenn also determined that Sapp did not die

until an hour and a half to two hours after being shot. Dr. Glenn

could not testify at Lightsey’s trial because he was in the

hospital at the time.

Lightsey argues on appeal that the trial court erred in

admitting the hearsay testimony from Anita Crawford as to

Lightsey’s comments to Bo Crawford on the phone, and the

hearsay evidence from Angela Sapp as to Lightsey’s threat to

kill her and her father. Lightsey also argues that the evidence

was insufficient to sustain her conviction.

I.

Lightsey argues on appeal that the trial court erred in

admitting hearsay testimony from Anita Crawford as to

Lightsey’s comments to Bo Crawford on the phone, and the

hearsay evidence from Angela Sapp as to Lightsey’s threat to

kill her and her father. The State contends that the testimony

was admissible under the Rule 803(3), Ala.R.Evid., “then

existing mental condition” exception to the hearsay rule. When

Lightsey objected at trial to the admission of the hearsay

testimony of Crawford, the trial court responded that the

statement was not hearsay. When Lightsey objected at trial to

the admission of the hearsay testimony of Sapp, the trial court

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responded that the testimony was admissible under Rule 804,

Ala.R.Evid., as an admission against interest.

Rule 804(b)(3), Ala.R.Evid., states that a statement

against the declarant’s interest is an exception to the hearsay

rule:

(3) Statement Against Interest. A

statement which was at the time of its making so

contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or

proprietary interest that a reasonable person in the

declarant’s position would not have made the

statement unless believing it to be true.

Furthermore, Rule 803(3), Ala.R.Evid., states that a

statement that shows the mental state of a declarant is an

exception to the hearsay rule:

(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or

Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant’s

then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or

physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,

design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),

but not including a statement of memory or belief

to prove the fact remembered or believed unless

it relates to the execution, revocation,

identification, or terms of declarant’s will.

A trial court’s order governing the

admission or exclusion of evidence constitutes

reversible error when the trial court has exceeded

its discretion in admitting or excluding the

evidence. Where an issue presents a pure question

of law, such as one relating to a defendant’s

constitutional rights, this Court’s review is de

novo.

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This Court has held that hearsay evidence is admissible

under Rule 803(3), Ala.R.Evid., when offered for the purpose of

showing the declarant’s then existing mental state and not

offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the statement:

Rule 803(3), Ala.R.Evid., establishes an

exception to the hearsay rule where the out-ofcourt statement concerns the [t]hen existing

mental, emotional, or physical condition of the

declarant. A statement of the declarant’s then

existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or

physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,

design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),

constitutes an exception to the hearsay [rule].

Thus,

[a] person’s statement of his then

existing design, intent, motive,

emotion, and the like is admissible

as tending to show the existence in

him of such intent, plan, motive or

design. This is a generally

recognized exception to the hearsay

evidence rule and holds true though

the declarant is neither a party nor

the privy of a party to the action

and though the declarant is a party

who offers the statement in behalf

of himself.

It has been recognized that a person’s

design, plan, or intent to do a certain act is

relevant to prove that he did indeed do the

particular act in question. Among the ways of

proving that he had the design or plan is to show

statements by him, prior to the claimed act,

indicating that he had the design. Thus, in the

present case, the witness’s testimony concerning

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the victim’s statement of her plan, design, or

intent to travel home was admissible and relevant

to prove that she actually undertook a course of

action in order to get home, specifically,

hitchhiking with the appellant and his

codefendants.

The State offered the testimony of Anita Crawford as to

what Lightsey said in the phone call to Crawford’s husband to

show the mental state of Lightsey. The statement of Angela

Sapp was likewise offered to show the mind set and intent of

Lightsey. Although the court ruled that Sapp’s statement was

admissible for reasons other than those argued by the State, and

the court did not explain [under] what rule Crawford’s statement

was admissible, we will not overturn a trial court’s ruling if it is

correct for any reason:

If the circuit court is correct for any reason,

even though it may not be the stated reason, we

will not reverse its denial of the petition.

Because the statements were admissible under Rule 803(3),

Ala.R.Evid., Lightsey is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

II.

Lightsey also argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain her conviction. In her motion for judgment of acquittal

and in her brief on appeal, however, Lightsey does not allege

what element or elements of the crime the State failed to prove.

Lightsey makes the general allegation that there was not

substantial proof that there was an intentional murder. Rule

28(a)(10), Ala.R.App.P., requires the appellant to state in his

brief specifically what issues are being challenged and to

provide:

(10) Argument. An argument containing the

contentions of the appellant/petitioner with

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respect to the issues presented, and the reasons

therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other

authorities, and parts of the record relied on[.]

This Court has held that a general allegation and the mere

citation of case law with no explanation as to the case law’s

relevancy to the facts of the present case are insufficient to

satisfy the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala.R.App.P., as to

the appellant’s argument.

Hodges’s arguments do not comply with

Rule 28(a)(10), Ala.R.App.P. In each of his

claims, Hodges cites only a single case; however,

he engages in no discussion whatsoever as to how

those cases are relevant to the particular issues

raised or supportive of his contentions. Merely

citing a case with no discussion as to its relevance

is insufficient to satisfy Rule 28(a)(10).

We have stated that it is not

the function of this court to do a

party’s legal research. Similarly,

we cannot create legal arguments

for a party based on undelineated

general propositions unsupported

by authority or argument. 

Because Hodges has failed to comply with

Rule 28(a)(10), his final two issues are deemed to

be waived.

Lightsey’s general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

with no explanation how the evidence was insufficient to sustain

the conviction does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10),

Ala.R.App.P. 

Moreover, the State provided sufficient evidence to

support the conviction. This court has held:

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In deciding whether there is sufficient

evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the

judgment of the trial court, the evidence must be

reviewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution. Conflicting evidence presents a jury

question not subject to review on appeal, provided

the state’s evidence establishes a prima facie case.

The trial court’s denial of a motion for a judgment

of acquittal must be reviewed by determining

whether there existed legal evidence before the

jury, at the time the motion was made, from

which the jury by fair inference could have found

the appellant guilty. In applying this standard, the

appellate court will determine only if legal

evidence was presented from which the jury could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. When the evidence raises

questions of fact for the jury and such evidence, if

believed, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, the

denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal by

the trial court does not constitute error.

The State presented the testimony of Angela Sapp, who stated

Lightsey threatened her and her father, and the testimony of

Crawford, who stated that she heard Lightsey threaten Sapp over

the telephone. Furthermore, Lightsey admitted that she shot

Sapp in the kitchen of their home. Additionally, Lightsey did not

report the incident to the police or stay with Sapp to ensure he

received medical attention. The State presented ample evidence

from which the jury could, and did, find that Lightsey

intentionally murdered Sapp. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

(Id. at 2-10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)) Lightsey’s

application for rehearing was overruled by the Alabama Court of Criminal

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appeals on December 9, 2005 (Doc. 6, Exhibit B, at 2) and, on April 14, 2006,

the Alabama Supreme Court denied Lightsey’s petition for writ of certiorari

(Doc. 6, Exhibit C). 

3. Lightsey filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Perry

County, Alabama collaterally attacking her conviction and sentence on July

11, 2006. (Doc. 6, Exhibit D) In her brief in support of the Rule 32 petition,

Lightsey raised the following claims: (1) due to her attorney’s neglect, she was

denied her Fourteenth Amendment right to determine her competency to stand

trial; (2) her trial attorney erred in failing to file a motion to suppress the

videotape of the deceased; (3) she was denied her constitutional right to a

speedy trial; (4) defense counsel erred in polling the jury following media

coverage at the beginning of the trial; (5) her attorney was ineffective for

allowing the prosecutor to strike Caucasian jurors; (6) the State unlawfully

commented on her post-arrest silence; (7) witnesses call by the State testified

to hearsay; (8) the prosecutor did not have enough evidence to take the case to

a jury because he admitted the case was circumstantial; (9) her attorney

provided ineffective assistance by failing to present all of her witnesses to

validate her claim of self-defense; (10) her attorney was ineffective for failing

to introduce into evidence the 911 tape; (11) she was denied a pre-trial

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hearing; (12) the trial court was vindictive during sentencing; (13) the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals erred in finding hearsay statements were

not, in fact, hearsay and then turning around and using those statements in

support of finding sufficient evidence for the jury to convict her of the murder

of Michael Sapp; (14) the inventory of items taken from her house did not list

four items which Agent Guthrie later admitted he locked in his office; and (15)

counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena the ABI file. (Compare id.,

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM BRIEF FOR RULE 32 Petition with Doc.

6, Exhibit E))

4. On June 5, 2007, the trial court entered the following order

denying Lightsey’s Rule 32 petition:

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s

petition for relief from conviction or sentence filed pursuant to

Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court

had previously entered an order directing the parties to submit

evidence by affidavits or written interrogatories or depositions

in lieu of an evidentiary hearing within sixty (60) days of

October 27, 2006. The petitioner has failed to submit any

evidence in support of her petition. The respondent, State of

Alabama, has filed an affidavit of trial counsel which does not

address the allegations in the petition.

The Defendant was convicted of Murder following a jury

trial. She was sentenced to a term of life in prison on December

20, 2004. She filed motions for new trial with the trial court both

of which were denied. She then appealed and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals confirmed her conviction. A certificate of

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affirmance was issued on April 14, 2006. The instant petition

was filed on July 11, 2006.

The petitioner has raised several issues in her petition.

She first claims that she was denied the right to a competency

hearing. This issue is precluded because it could have been but

was not raised at trial. Further there is no evidence submitted

that there was any issue regarding her competency at trial.

She next contends that her defense counsel did not file a

motion to suppress a video of the deceased. There has been no

evidence regarding this issue nor has she demonstrated how she

was prejudiced by his failure to file a motion to suppress the

video. If the video was admitted into evidence it would have

been admissible under the rules of evidence and she would not

have been entitled to suppress the same anyway.

The petitioner next claims she was denied the right to a

speedy trial. A motion for speedy trial was never filed with the

Court. There is no evidence to show that she suffered any

prejudice based on this claim.

She next claims that defense counsel did not pol[l] the

jury after media coverage began of the trial. There has been no

evidence presented to show that a different outcome would have

resulted by failure of the defense counsel’s request that the jury

be polled during the trial. There is no evidence that there was

any media or other bias o[n] the part of the jury during the trial.

She next claims that her attorney was ineffective by

allowing the prosecution to strike Caucasian jurors. There has

been no evidence presented to show that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the State’s manner of striking

the jury nor was there any showing of prejudice or racial bias on

the part of the State of Alabama in the manner in which it struck

the jury. The petitioner has further failed to show that there

would have been a different outcome but for her attorney’s

performance regarding the jury selection process.

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The petitioner next contends that her attorney was

ineffective for allowing testimony that does not appear in the

trial transcript. She contends that the State commented on her

post arrest silence and allowed her to testify regarding her post

arrest silence. These statements do not appear in the trial

transcript and there is no evidence that this occurred.

The petitioner next claims that witnesses called by the

State testified to hearsay. This is a matter that was raised on

direct appeal and denied by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

She next contends that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction. This matter was raised on appeal or could

have been raised on appeal [and] therefore it is precluded.

The petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for

not calling all defense witnesses. She fails to show which

witnesses could have been called and how the outcome of the

trial would have been different but for the failure to call these

witnesses.

She next contends that her counsel was ineffective

because he did not introduce the 911 tape into evidence. There

has been no evidence regarding this matter submitted nor has

she shown how a different outcome would have resulted if the

tapes had been admitted into evidence.

The petitioner next claims that she was denied a pre-trial

hearing. She has failed to show[,] allege[,] or prove any

prejudice that occurred by not having a pre-trial hearing. There

was no reason to have a pre-trial hearing. The petitioner was

present during arraignment and she was formerly and legally

arraigned on the indictment. There were no pending pre-trial

matters that were not raised prior to trial. She has failed to show

any prejudice.

The petitioner claims that the trial court was vindictive

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during sentencing. There is no evidence shown to support this

allegation. She was sentenced within the range of punishment

set forth for a Class “A” Felony. She received a proper and legal

sentence. She has failed to show any ground for which relief

could be granted under Rule 32 by this claim.

She next claims that there was a reference to a letter from

her defense attorney. The Court does not understand this

allegation and it does not give her a basis for relief under Rule

32.

She next contends that there were certain items recovered

from the crime scene by the Alabama Bureau of Investigation

which were not turned over to the Defense. She makes no

claim[] as to how this could affect the conviction or how it

would entitle her to any relief under Rule 32.

Lastly the Defendant contends that her counsel was

ineffective by failing to subpoena the ABI file. She fails to

allege how this failure would have resulted in a different

outcome in her trial.

Based on the foregoing the Court finds that the

Defendant’s petition for relief from conviction or sentence is

due to be and the same is hereby denied. There is no evidence

submitted by the petitioner to support her petition and most of

the grounds that she raised are either precluded or fail to state a

ground fro relief pursuant to Rule 32.

(Doc. 6, Exhibit E)

5. Petitioner did not appeal the trial court’s dismissal of her Rule

32 petition. (See Doc. 6, Exhibit F) Instead, Lightsey filed the instant petition

in this Court on June 22, 2007. (See Doc. 1, at 12)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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A. Procedural Default Doctrine.

1. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court

rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment." Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553-2554. This

rule applies whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at

729, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review

when a state court declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the

petitioner fails to meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-730, 111

S.Ct. at 2554; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53

L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (federal courts must honor legitimate state trial and

appellate procedural rules when enforced by state courts and must decline to

review on the merits claims that the state treats as barred absent a showing of

cause for non-compliance with such rules and resulting prejudice); Alderman

v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.) ("Pursuant to the doctrine of procedural

default, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief, who fails to raise

his federal constitution[al] claim in state court, or who attempts to raise it in

a manner not permitted by state procedural rules is barred from pursuing the

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same claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice

from the default."), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S.1061,

115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). "In these cases, the state judgment

rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Coleman, 501

U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. at 2554 (citations omitted).

2. The application of the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine in the habeas context is grounded in concerns of federalism and

comity. Id.

Without the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in

habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas

would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by

independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the

limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State's interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554.

 3. An additional consideration comes to the fore when the

independent and adequate state ground supporting a petitioner's custody is a

state procedural default. Id. at 731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The Supreme Court has

long held

that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition

should be dismissed if the prisoner has not

exhausted available state remedies as to any of his

federal claims. (citations omitted) This

exhaustion requirement is also grounded in

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principles of comity; in a federal system, the

States should have the opportunity to address and

correct alleged violations of state prisoners'

federal rights.

 . . .

[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the

State's procedural requirements for presenting his

federal claims has deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirement for exhaustion; there are no

state remedies any longer "available" to him.

(citations omitted) In the absence of the

independent and adequate state ground doctrine in

federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able

to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting

their federal claims in state court. The

independent and adequate state ground doctrine

ensures that the States' interest in correcting their

own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas

cases.

Id. at 731, 732, 111 S.Ct. at 2554-2555, 2555.

4. In the habeas context, federal courts are to "presume that there

is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the

decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven

with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.'" Id. at 735, 111

S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041, 103 S.Ct.

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 20 of 34
21

3469, 3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ("[A] procedural default

does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review

unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and

expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar."). In all other

cases, the presumption is not applicable. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 111

S.Ct. at 2559. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d

334 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Harris v. Reed presumption is

inapplicable to a claim that is never presented to the state courts. Id. at 299,

109 S.Ct. at 1069 ("The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state

court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal

habeas proceeding."). Moreover, the presumption "looks through"

unexplained orders to the last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

Where there has been one reasoned state

judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same

ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly appear[s] to

rest primarily upon federal law," Coleman, 501

U.S., at 740, 111 S.Ct., at 2559, we will presume

that no procedural default has been invoked by a

subsequent unexplained order that leaves the

judgment or its consequences in place. Similarly

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22

where . . . the last reasoned opinion on the claim

explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will

presume that a later decision rejecting the claim

did not silently disregard that bar and consider the

merits.

501 U.S. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. Also, the presumption may not be applied

in cases in which the state court opinion did not, at a minimum, discuss the

federal grounds at issue." Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 211 (11th Cir. 1993)

("Coleman and Ylst lead us to conclude that we may not assume that had the

state court issued an opinion, it would have ignored its own procedural rules

and reached the merits of this case. In fact, the most reasonable assumption is

that had the state court ruled, it would have enforced the procedural bar.").

Finally, "where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the

independent state procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the

federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the

merits of the claim." Alderman v. Zant, supra, 22 F.3d at 1549.

5. When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal

court is barred from reaching the merits of that claim unless the petitioner "can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at

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23

750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. The cause and prejudice standard applies "uniformly

to all independent and adequate state procedural defaults." Id. at 750-751, 111

S.Ct. at 2565.

In procedural default cases, the cause

standard requires the petitioner to show that

"some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in

state court. (citation omitted). Objective factors

that constitute cause include "'interference by

officials'" that makes compliance with the state's

procedural rule impracticable, and "a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel." (citation

omitted). In addition, constitutionally

"[i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause."

(citation omitted). Attorney error short of

ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does

not constitute cause and will not excuse a

procedural default. (citation omitted). Once the

petitioner has established cause, he must show

"'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of

which he complains." (citation omitted). 

 

 

Federal courts retain the authority to issue

the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow

class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show

cause for a procedural default. These are

extraordinary instances when a constitutional

violation probably has caused the conviction of

one innocent of the crime. We have described

this class of cases as implicating a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. (citation omitted).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 23 of 34
24

517 (1991).

6. In their answer, the respondents assert that all of Lightsey’s

claims, save for those dealing with the hearsay claim she raised on direct

appeal, are procedurally defaulted under O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (“[I]n order to exhaust state remedies as

to a federal constitutional issue a prisoner is required to file a petition for

discretionary review in the state’s highest court raising that issue, if

discretionary review is part of the appellate procedure in the state.”) due to

petitioner’s failure to seek review in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

and the Alabama Supreme Court following the trial court’s dismissal of her

Rule 32 petition (see Doc. 6, at 4 & 5 (“All of Lightsey’s claims except for

those concerning the alleged improper admission of hearsay testimony [] have

been procedurally defaulted. . . . Lightsey failed to properly exhaust any claim

except for claims (g) and (k) by raising it in the Alabama Supreme Court. . .

. [S]he failed to appeal the dismissal of her Rule 32 petition. [] Because the

trial court denied Lightsey’s Rule 32 petition on June 5, 2007, her time for

appealing that decision expired on July 17, 2007. . . . Federal habeas claims not

included in a petition for discretionary review with the state’s highest court are

procedurally defaulted if the time for including such issues in such a petition

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 24 of 34
2 Petitioner’s sole response is that she filed a motion for appointment of counsel

which she claims the trial judge ignored. (Doc. 8, at 1) This Court does not find that this

25

has expired.”).

7. It is clear to the undersigned that Lightsey has procedurally

defaulted her claims for relief, other than her hearsay and sufficiency of the

evidence arguments, based upon her failure to appeal the dismissal of her Rule

32 petition to the Alabama appellate courts and thereby exhaust these claims.

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S.Ct. at 1732 (“Because

the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair

opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are

presented to the federal courts, we conclude that state prisoners must give the

state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process.”); see also id. at 848, 119 S.Ct. at 1734 (“Boerckel’s failure to present

three of his federal habeas claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in a timely

fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims.”). 

 8. Turning to the issue of cause and prejudice, this Court finds that

petitioner has met neither prong of the standard. Although Lightsey was

extended the opportunity to establish cause and prejudice (see Doc. 7), her

response to the Court’s order does not address either prong;2

 therefore, it is

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 25 of 34
argument constitutes either a cause or prejudice argument particularly in light of the fact that

petitioner filed her federal habeas petition only a little over two weeks after the circuit court’s

dismissal of her Rule 32 petition.

26

found that the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural default doctrine

is not applicable in this case. See Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1313

(11th Cir. 1994) (in abuse of the writ case, appellate court suggests that habeas

courts need perform no analysis when the petitioner fails to argue an exception

to application of the doctrine), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160, 115 S.Ct. 1122,

130 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1995); Tower v. Phillips, supra, 7 F.3d at 211 (court

addressed only the single cause argument proffered by the petitioner). 

9. The fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence

exception does not apply in this case because petitioner has not satisfied the

Murray v. Carrier standard. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639,

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). That standard requires Lightsey to show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.” 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-2650. To be credible,

a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence--that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 26 of 34
27

115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); see also id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at

867 (“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the

light of the new evidence.”). Lightsey has not come forward with any evidence

which establishes her actual innocence and thereby undermines her murder

conviction. Accordingly, this case is not one of those rare cases in which the

actual innocence exception is applicable. 

B. Merits Discussion of Collateral Petition Claims.

10. Lightsey filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in this

Court on or about June 22, 2007, and therefore, her case is governed by 28

U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (AEDPA). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518,

146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 530 (11th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 L.Ed.2d 270 (2001). As

amended, § 2254 now provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim— 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 27 of 34
3 Based upon the facts as found by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in its

decision, it is clear that no argument can be made that the decision of the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented to the state courts. More to the point, since this Court must presume as

correct the determinations of all factual issues made by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,

petitioner simply cannot rebut that presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

The appellate court’s findings are based upon what a reasonable jury could have found the

evidence to be. 

28

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (footnote added). Moreover, the Act, as

amended, presumes as correct all determinations of factual issues made by a

State court and places the burden upon the petitioner of rebutting such a

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e).

11. In Williams v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court held that 

§ 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to

grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ

may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied— the statecourt adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 28 of 34
29

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under

the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on

a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the

“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523; see Bottoson, supra,

234 F.3d at 531 (“In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to

a new context where it should apply.’”). 

12. In this case, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed

the merits of petitioner’s hearsay claims and sufficiency-of-the-evidence

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 29 of 34
4 The undersigned views petitioner’s (eighth) claim, that the prosecution admitted

that the case against her was circumstantial, as her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Lightsey was convicted of murder. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61

L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Supreme Court held that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319,

99 S.Ct. at 2789. 

Under Alabama law, a person commits the crime of murder if “[w]ith intent to cause the

death of another person, he causes the death of that person or of another person[.]” Ala.Code §

13A-6-2(a)(1). “Because the element of intent, being a state of mind or mental purpose, is

usually incapable of direct proof, it may be inferred from the character of the assault, the use of a

deadly weapon and other attendant circumstances.” Cartwright v. State, 645 So.2d 326, 330

(Ala.Crim.App. 1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This element is normally a

question for the jury. See, e.g., Oryang v. State, 642 So.2d 989, 994 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). The

Alabama Supreme Court has specifically determined that intent to kill may be inferred from the

defendant’s act of using a deadly weapon. See, e.g., Ex parte Burgess, 827 So.2d 193, 199 (Ala.

2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 976, 123 S.Ct. 468, 154 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

Lightsey testified that she shot Sapp with his own pistol. Though petitioner made a call to

911, she left the premises without ensuring that emergency personnel responded to the call. Sapp

died several hours after he was shot by Lightsey. It is as clear to this Court, as it was the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, that in light of the foregoing evidence any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,

the undersigned simply cannot find that the state court adjudication was contrary to such law nor

can it be found that the state court unreasonably applied relevant Supreme Court precedent.

Moreover, it is not debatable among reasonable jurists that the result of which petitioner

complains is incorrect.

30

claim.4 Lightsey cannot establish her entitlement to relief under § 2254(d)(1)

& (d)(2) with respect to any of these issues. In this regard the undersigned

notes generally that petitioner has not and cannot show, under the “contrary

to” clause, that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, arrived at any

conclusions opposite to those reached by the Supreme Court of the United

States on any question of law or decided the case differently than the Supreme

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 30 of 34
31

Court did in a previous case presenting a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. Moreover, as indicated above, under the “unreasonable application”

clause, petitioner has not and cannot establish that the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals, though recognizing the correct governing principles from

the Supreme Court’s decisions, unreasonably applied those principles to the

facts in this case. Here, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, upheld the

evidentiary rulings of the trial court and determined that the trial judge

committed no error in admitting the testimony of Angela Sapp and Anita

Crawford. (Doc. 6, Exhibit A, at 4-7) 

13. It is clear that federal habeas courts are generally not

“‘empowered to correct erroneous evidence rulings of state trial courts.’”

Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737 (11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 405, 142 L.Ed.2d 329 (1998); see Keno v.

Crosby, 2006 WL 2711599, *8 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (“For the most part,

evidentiary rulings simply do not raise questions of a constitutional

magnitude.”).

Nevertheless, when a state trial court’s evidence rulings deny a

habeas petitioner fundamental constitutional protections, this

[c]ourt’s duty requires it to enforce the constitution’s guarantees

by granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Before relief

can be granted the error must rise to the level of a denial of

fundamental fairness. Such fundamental unfairness violates the

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 31 of 34
32

Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.

A denial of fundamental fairness occurs whenever the

improper evidence is material in the sense of a crucial, critical,

highly significant factor. 

Snowden, supra (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has

made no showing that any improper evidence was admitted by the trial court.

Therefore, the evidentiary rulings made in her case relating to the testimony

of Sapp and Crawford do not raise questions of constitutional magnitude.

Accordingly, the undersigned simply cannot find that the state court

adjudication was contrary to relevant case law nor can it be found that the state

court unreasonably applied relevant precedent. Moreover, it is not debatable

among reasonable jurists that the result of which petitioner complains is

incorrect. Stated differently, it is not debatable among reasonable jurists that

the appellate court’s rejection of petitioner’s hearsay arguments was inherently

incorrect. 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge is of the opinion that petitioner’s rights were not

violated in this cause and that her request for habeas corpus relief should be

denied.

The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 32 of 34
33

important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 20th day of December, 2007.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 33 of 34
34

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00481-CG-C Document 11 Filed 12/20/07 Page 34 of 34