Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55253/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

POM WONDERFUL LLC, a Delaware

limited liability company,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT G. HUBBARD, JR., DBA

Portland Bottling Company, DBA

Pur Beverages,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55253

D.C. No. 

2:13-cv-06917-

MMM-CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

October 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed December 30, 2014

Before: David M. Ebel,* Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and Susan P.

Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ebel

* The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Judge for the United States

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 1 of 26
2 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

SUMMARY**

Trademark / Preliminary Injunction

The panel reversed the district court’s order denying a

motion for a preliminary injunction in a trademark

infringement action under the Lanham Act.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion

in finding that Pom Wonderful, owner of the “POM” standard

character mark, was unlikely to demonstrate a likelihood of

consumer confusion and therefore was unlikely to succeed on

the merits of its claim regarding defendants’ use of the word

“p4m” on their pomegranate-flavored drink.

The panel remanded with instructions that the district

court consider whether, in light of the panel’s decision, Pom

Wonderful met its burden of proving the other elements for

a preliminary injunction.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 2 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 3

COUNSEL

Joseph Scott Klapach (argued), Klapach & Klapach, Beverly

Hills, California; Daniel Beck, Roll Law Group P.C., Los

Angeles, California; Douglas N. Masters, Loeb & Loeb LLP,

Chicago, Illinois, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Heather Lynn McCloskey (argued) and James J.S. Holmes,

Sedgwick, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

EBEL, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the district court’s order denying

Plaintiff-Appellant Pom Wonderful’s motion for a

preliminary injunction. Pom Wonderful—the owner of the

“POM” standard character mark—brought a trademark

infringement claim against Defendant-Appellee Robert G.

Hubbard, Jr., d/b/a Portland Bottling Company and Pur

Beverages (“Pur”) to stop Pur from using the word “p4m” on

its pomegranate-flavored energy drink. The district court

denied Pom Wonderful’s motion, finding that Pom

Wonderful is unlikely to demonstrate a likelihood of

consumer confusion and therefore is unlikely to succeed on

the merits of its trademark infringement claim. 

Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),

we hold that the district court abused its discretion in finding

that Pom Wonderful is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its

claim and, accordingly, we reverse. Because the district

court’s decision to deny Pom Wonderful’s motion for a

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 3 of 26
4 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

preliminaryinjunction was tainted by its mistaken likelihoodof-success determination, we remand with instructions that

the district court consider whether, in light of our decision

today, Pom Wonderful meets its burden of proving the other

elements for a preliminary injunction: that it is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; that the

balance of equities tips in its favor; and that a preliminary

injunction is in the public interest.

I. Background1

Pom Wonderful owns numerous trademark registrations

that together comprise the “POM” brand family of

trademarks. These trademarks are used in connection with

various goods, including pomegranate juice beverages. In

addition to producing its own “POM” brand goods, Pom

Wonderful also sells its pomegranate ingredients to other

companies in the food and beverage industry. On occasion,

Pom Wonderful licenses the use of its “POM” brand

trademarks to these other companies. 

Before 2002, when Pom Wonderful first began using the

“POM” brand trademarks in connection with beverages, no

one in the industry was known to have used the term “pom”

in any way. Since 2002, Pom Wonderful has sold more than

190 million bottles of pomegranate juice, making it the

leading seller of 100% pomegranate juice in supermarkets

throughout the United States. Pom Wonderful’s annual

supermarket sales exceed $60 million. 

1 This appeal comes before us on the preliminary injunction record, and

we therefore accept all of the parties’ undisputed allegations and all of the

district court’s undisputed findings of fact as true for the purposes of our

analysis. 

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 4 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 5

Pom Wonderful has devoted a great deal of time—and

spent millions of dollars—marketing and selling its “POM”

brand products. In 2011 and 2012 alone, Pom Wonderful

spent $24 million promoting its pomegranate juice beverages. 

To protect its investment, and the rights of companies that

license its “POM” brand trademarks, Pom Wonderful actively

polices third-party uses that may infringe on its trademark

rights.

Through these policing efforts, Pom Wonderful

discovered that Pur was selling a pomegranate-flavored

energy drink labeled “p4m” and informed Pur of Pom

Wonderful’s ownership interest in the “POM” brand

trademarks. When Pur refused to change its packaging, Pom

Wonderful filed suit, alleging that Pur’s use of the word

“p4m” violated Pom Wonderful’s trademark rights under the

Lanham Act.2See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Shortly after

filing its first amended complaint, Pom Wonderful moved for

a preliminary injunction to enjoin Pur from selling or

marketing its “p4m” beverage.

The district court denied the motion. Specifically, after

considering the eight Sleekcraft factors,3the district court

found that Pom Wonderful is unlikely to demonstrate a

2 Pom Wonderful also alleged that Pur violated California’s unfair

competition and unfair business practices statute, as well as California’s

common law. We do not consider these claims because Pom Wonderful

moved for a preliminary injunction premised only on its federal trademark

infringement claim. 

3 These factors, first articulated in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599

F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Mattel

Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003),

guide a district court’s likelihood-of-confusion determination.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 5 of 26
6 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of Pur’s

“p4m” beverage. Absent a likelihood of confusion, the

district court concluded that Pom Wonderful is unlikely both

to succeed on the merits of its trademark claim and to meet its

burden of proving the other Winter4 factors for issuance of a

preliminary injunction: that a preliminary injunction is

necessaryto prevent irreparable harm to Pom Wonderful; that

a balancing of the equities favors a preliminary injunction;

and that a preliminary injunction is necessary to protect the

public interest. The district court accordingly denied the

motion for a preliminaryinjunction, and Pom Wonderful filed

a timely notice of appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s

order denying Pom Wonderful’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d

1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). This case implicates two of the

ways in which a district court might abuse its discretion. See

id. First, a district court abuses its discretion if the court rests

its decision on an erroneous legal standard. Id. To determine

whether a district court abused its discretion in this way, we

review legal conclusions de novo. Id. Second, a district court

abuses its discretion if the court rests its decision on a clearly

erroneous finding of fact. Id. To determine whether a district

court abused its discretion in this way, we review factual

findings for clear error. Id. Clear error results “from a

factual finding that was illogical, implausible, or without

support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the

 

4

 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)

(outlining a four-part test that a party seeking a preliminary injunction

must satisfy). 

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 6 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 7

record.” M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we defer

to a district court’s factual findings unless, “based on the

entire evidence,” we are left with “a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Lahoti v.

Vericheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Because de novo review is more stringent than clear error

review, it is important to determine which standard applies

before considering whether the district court abused its

discretion in this case. Pom Wonderful argues that de novo

review applies because the district court’s decision to deny

injunctive relief was grounded in a number of asserted legal

errors that the district court committed in applying the

Sleekcraft factors. We disagree. Although legal standards

certainlyinform a district court’s application of the Sleekcraft

factors, Ninth Circuit precedent requires us to review the

district court’s Sleekcraft-factor findings for clear error.

In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., we held

unequivocally that “the clearly erroneous standard should be

applied in reviewing a trial court’s determination concerning

likelihood of confusion.” 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir.

1985) (en banc). Since Levi Strauss, we have further clarified

that a district court’s individual Sleekcraft-factor

findings—which guide the ultimate likelihood-of-confusion

determination—also should be reviewed for clear error. Pac.

Telesis Grp. v. Int’l Telesis Commc’ns, 994 F.2d 1364, 1367

(9th Cir. 1993); Reno Air Racing Ass’n. v. McCord, 452 F.3d

1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006). 

We are bound by that precedent. Accordingly, in

reviewing the district court's preliminary-injunction decision

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 7 of 26
8 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

for an abuse of discretion, we consider whether the district

court clearly erred in finding that Pom Wonderful is unlikely

to demonstrate a likelihood of consumer confusion.

III. Analysis

We now turn our attention to the issue on appeal: whether

the district court abused its discretion in denying Pom

Wonderful’s motion for a preliminary injunction. “A

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy

. . . .” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). In Winter v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court

announced a four-part test that a party seeking a preliminary

injunction must satisfy. 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Under the

Winter test, the moving party must establish that: (1) it is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the

balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in

the public interest. Id.

A. Likelihood of Success

As a threshold matter, Pom Wonderful must establish a

likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark

infringement claim. To prevail on its claim, Pom Wonderful

must demonstrate that (1) it has a protected ownership

interest in the “POM” mark, and (2) Pur’s use of the word

“p4m” is likely to cause consumer confusion, thereby

infringing upon Pom Wonderful’s rights. See Dep’t of Parks

&Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124

(9th Cir. 2006). Although the district court correctly found

that Pom Wonderful is likely to prove that it has a protected

ownership interest in the “POM” standard character mark (the

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 8 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 9

first element of a trademark claim), it committed clear error

in finding that Pom Wonderful is unlikely to demonstrate a

likelihood of consumer confusion (the second element of a

trademark claim).

1) Protected Ownership Interest

Registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of the

validity of the mark, the registrant’s ownership of the mark,

and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in

connection with the goods specified in the registration. See

15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). When proof of registration is

uncontested, the ownership interest element of a trademark

infringement claim is met. See Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC

Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996).

The district court correctly found that Pom Wonderful is

likely to prove that it has a protected ownership interest in the

word “pom” because Pom Wonderful proffered a copy of its

“POM” federal trademark registration. This registration was

issued in 2002 for use with fruit juices, and Pur does not

contest the registration on appeal. The uncontested

registration therefore establishes not only the validity of the

“POM” mark and Pom Wonderful’s ownership of the mark,

but also Pom Wonderful’s exclusive right to use the mark in

connection with fruit juices.5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). 

5

 “Although the validity of a registered mark extends only to the listed

goods or services, an owner’s remedies against confusion with its valid

mark are not so circumscribed.” Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay, Inc.,

511 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, having “established a

protectable interest by proving it is the owner of a registered trademark,

[PomWonderful] does not additionally have to showthat [Pur’s] allegedly

confusing use involves the same goods or services listed in the

registration.” Id. at 972. 

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 9 of 26
10 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

Importantly, Pom Wonderful’s exclusive right to use the

“POM” mark covers all design variations of the word because

“POM” was registered as a standard character mark.6

Standard character registrations “are federal mark

registrations that make no claim to any particular font style,

color, or size of display.” Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank

Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Because a

word registered in standard characters is “not limited to any

particular rendition of the mark,” In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601

F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted), the registration covers the word per se, 3 McCarthy

on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:58 (4th ed.)

(updated Sept. 2014). Therefore, Pom Wonderful’s exclusive

right to use its “POM” standard character mark is extremely

broad, covering the word in all types of depictions.

2) Likelihood of Consumer Confusion

Despite Pom Wonderful’s exclusive right to use all design

variations of its “POM” standard character mark, establishing

a protected ownership interest “is only half the battle” in a

trademark infringement claim. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v.

W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, Pom

Wonderful also must show that a reasonably prudent

consumer in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the

6 Before 2003, “standard character” marks were called “typed” marks. 

See 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:58 (4th ed.)

(updated Sept. 2014). Despite the change in nomenclature in 2003, these

terms are synonymous and have been interpreted as bestowing the same

broad scope of protection to trademark holders. Id. Because the “POM”

mark was registered in 2002, it is technically registered as a typed mark. 

However, we refer to it as a standard character mark to reflect modern

usage.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 10 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 11

origin of Pur’s “p4m” beverage and to associate that beverage

with Pom Wonderful. See Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v.

SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). We look

to the following eight Sleekcraft factors for guidance in

assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion: (1) strength

of the protected mark; (2) proximity and relatedness of the

goods; (3) type of goods and the degree of consumer care;

(4) similarity of the protected mark and the allegedly

infringing mark; (5) marketing channel convergence;

(6) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (7) defendant’s

intent in selecting the allegedly infringing mark; and

(8) likelihood of product expansion. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft

Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on

other grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,

353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).

Importantly, although these Sleekcraft factors “channel

the analytical process,” they do not necessarily dictate a

result. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135,

1141 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the factors are “fluid,” a

“plaintiff need not satisfy every factor, provided that strong

showings are made with respect to some of them.” Surfvivor

Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir.

2005). Thus, despite the important role that the Sleekcraft

factors play in determining whether a likelihood of confusion

exists, it is “the totality of facts in a given case that is

dispositive.” Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1140 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Our evaluation of the Sleekcraft factors and of the totality

of the facts in this case leads us to conclude that the district

court clearly erred—and therefore abused its discretion—

when it found that Pom Wonderful failed to demonstrate that

it is likely to show a likelihood of consumer confusion. 

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 11 of 26
12 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

Although the district court correctlyfound that the strength of

mark, relatedness of goods, and degree of consumer care

factors weighed in favor of Pom Wonderful, it incorrectly

found that the similarity of marks, marketing channel

convergence, actual confusion, defendant’s intent, and

product expansion factors weighed against Pom Wonderful.

When these errors are corrected and the totality of the facts is

considered, it is clear that Pom Wonderful is likely to

demonstrate a likelihood of consumer confusion. 

Strength of Mark

We begin our likelihood-of-confusion analysis by

examining the strength of Pom Wonderful’s “POM” mark. 

The district court correctly found that this factor weighs in

Pom Wonderful’s favor. The scope of a mark’s trademark

protection depends on its strength, “with stronger marks

receiving greater protection than weak ones.” Entrepreneur

Media, 279 F.3d at 1141; see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at

1058. 

To determine the strength of Pom Wonderful’s “POM”

mark, we begin by placing it on the conceptual distinctiveness

spectrum. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058. On this

spectrum, the most distinctive marks—i.e., arbitrary and

fanciful marks—receive the most trademark protection,

whereas the least distinctive marks—i.e., generic marks—

receive no trademark protection. Entrepreneur Media, 279

F.3d at 1141. Suggestive and descriptive marks lie between

these two extremes, with suggestive marks being entitled to

greater protection than descriptive marks. Id. Unlike

descriptive marks, which “define qualities or characteristics

of a product in a straightforward way,” suggestive marks

convey impressions of goods that require the consumer to

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 12 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 13

“use imagination or any type of multistage reasoning to

understand the mark’s significance.” Id. at 1141–42 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly found that the “POM” mark is

suggestive because the word “POM”—which is not ascribed

independent pomegranate-related meaning by conventional

dictionaries—requires customers to use some additional

imagination and perception to decipher the nature of Pom

Wonderful’s goods. This finding, however, does not by itself

render the “POM” mark strong because suggestive marks,

although stronger than descriptive or generic marks, are still

“presumptively weak.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058. 

However, we next consider whether the “POM” mark has

achieved sufficient marketplace recognition to transform it

into a strongmark. See id. (explaining that “placement within

the conceptual distinctiveness spectrum is not the only

determinant of a mark’s strength” and that actual marketplace

recognition can “transform a suggestive mark into a strong

mark”); see also Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1144

(explaining that suggestive marks “may be strengthened by

such factors as extensive advertising, length of exclusive use,

[and] public recognition”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Considering the national scope of Pom Wonderful’s sales

and marketing efforts, the district court correctly found that

Pom Wonderful enjoys sufficient marketplace recognition to

render its “POM” mark commercially strong. Pom

Wonderful is the leading supermarket-seller of 100%

pomegranate juice nationwide and in several major cities. 

Since 2002—when Pom Wonderful first acquired the

exclusive right to use all iterations of the “POM” mark in

connection with fruit juices—Pom Wonderful has sold more

than 190 million bottles of juice. And, Pom Wonderful

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 13 of 26
14 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

extensively markets its products through a wide variety of

outlets, including television and newspaper ads, web media,

billboards, trade shows, and charity events. In light of this

evidence, which is uncontested on appeal, the district court

correctly found that Pom Wonderful is likely to demonstrate

that the “POM” mark is strong.

Relatedness of Goods

The district court also correctly found that Pom

Wonderful is likely to demonstrate that its juice beverages are

related to Pur’s “p4m” energy drink. “Related goods (or

services) are those ‘which would be reasonably thought by

the buying public to come from the same source if sold under

the same mark.’” Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc.,

683 F.3d 1190, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sleekcraft, 599

F.2d at 348 n.10). To satisfy the relatedness factor, parties

need not be direct competitors, id.; see also Entrepreneur

Media, 279 F.3d at 1147 (explaining that goods are related

when both companies offer products relating to the same

general industry), so long as the goods “are similar in use and

function,” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350. 

The district court correctly found—and Pur does not

contest—that fruit-juice beverages and fruit-flavored energy

drinks are sufficiently complementary and related that a

reasonable consumer could connect them and be confused

regarding the source of the products. Both beverages are

pomegranate-based or pomegranate-flavored, single-serve,

and marketed for their healthful properties. Although Pur’s

“p4m” carbonated energy drink is somewhat different from

Pom Wonderful’s 100% juice beverages, the use and function

of these products is clearly related. Accordingly, the district

court correctlyweighed this factor in Pom Wonderful’s favor.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 14 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 15

Degree of Consumer Care

We further conclude that the district court correctly found

that Pom Wonderful is likely to demonstrate that consumers

exercise a low degree of care and sophistication when

selecting inexpensive, single-serve beverages like Pom

Wonderful’s juices or Pur’s “p4m” energy drink. Unlike

purchasers of expensive goods—whom we expect to be more

discerning and less easily confused—purchasers of

inexpensive goods “are likely to exercise less care, thus

making confusion more likely.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at

1060. Here, the district court found that the beverages at

issue cost between $1.99 and $2.49, and neither party

disputes this finding on appeal. Accordingly, the district

court properly weighed this factor in Pom Wonderful’s favor

because consumers are likely to exercise a low degree of care

when purchasing either company’s inexpensive pomegranate

beverages.

Similarity of Marks

The district court, however, clearly erred in finding that

the similarity–of–marks factor weighed against Pom

Wonderful. This factor is always important in determining

whether a likelihood of confusion exists because when

“marks are entirely dissimilar, there is no likelihood of

confusion.” Id. at 1054. Accordingly, as the similarities

between two marks increase, so too does the likelihood of

confusion. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d

1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000). The following axioms define and

delimit the similarity analysis: (1) similarity is best evaluated

by appearance, sound, and meaning; (2) marks should be

considered in their entirety and as they appear in the

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 15 of 26
16 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

marketplace7; and (3) similarities weigh more heavily than

differences. See Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1144. 

With these constraints in mind, it is clear that the similarity

factor weighs in Pom Wonderful’s favor.

Turning first to the appearance of the “POM” mark on the

left and the “p4m” mark on the right, the marks possess many

obvious visual similarities.

Most significantly, each mark is comprised of the same three

letters. These three letters are presented in the same order,

with a stylized second letter (i.e., the “o” in “POM” is heart7 Pom Wonderful argues that it is improper for this court to consider the

products’ trade dress (i.e., their packaging and labeling) when assessing

the similarity of the products’ trademarks. We disagree. This court “does

not consider the similarity of the marks in the abstract, but rather in light

of the way the marks are encountered in the marketplace and the

circumstances surrounding the purchase.” Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay

Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Because consumers will encounter “POM” and “p4m” as they

appear on their respective labels and advertising materials, we consider

these items when reviewing the marks’ visual similarities. Although the

“POM” mark at issue is a word mark (i.e, it does not contain design

elements), we consider the “POM” design mark that includes a heartshaped “O” in evaluating the mark’s visual similarities because “the only

images of Pom Wonderful’s products included in the preliminary

injunction record [show that] the ‘O’ in ‘POM’ is in the shape of a heart.” 

Order 31–32.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 16 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 17

shaped, and the “o” in “p4m” has a breve over it). In

addition, the letters in both marks are uniformly cased (i.e.,

they are either all uppercase, or all lowercase) and presented

in a simplistic, white front that is offset by a dark maroon

background. 

Admittedly, the marks also possess some visual

dissimilarities, particularlywhen we consider the marks in the

context of their respective labels, with the Pom Wonderful

bottle on the left, the front of the Pur can in the center, and

the back of the Pur can on the right.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 17 of 26
18 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

As these images reveal, the presentation of the marks

differs in terms of prominence, font, size, and capitalization

(i.e., “POM” is prominently displayed at the top of the bottle

in thicker font and larger uppercase letters, whereas “p4m” is

placed near the bottom of the front of the can8in slimmer font

and smaller lowercase letters). In addition, the middle letter

in each mark is stylized differently (i.e., the “o” in “POM” is

shaped like a heart and is filled-in with red color, whereas the

“o” in “p4m” has a breve over it and is not filled-in with

color). 

However, because “[l]ooks aren’t everything,” we next

compare the marks’ sound and meaning. Brookfield, 174

F.3d at 1055. As for the sound of the marks, the district court

found that “POM” and “p4m” are pronounced in precisely the

same manner. Because neither party contests this finding on

appeal, we agree that the marks are aurally identical. 

As for the meaning of the marks, the district court found

that “POM” and “p4m” mean precisely the same thing, as

“each refers to pomegranate flavoring and/or ingredients.” 

Order 33. Because neither party contests this finding on

appeal, we agree that the marks are semantically identical. 

This similarity is particularly noteworthy because

“[c]loseness in meaning can itself substantiate a claim of

similarity of trademarks.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352.9 

8 However, “p4m” is more prominently placed near the top of the back

of the can where a consumer would look for nutrition facts. The record

also reflects that Pur displays the “p4m” mark in its advertising and

promotional materials with varying degrees of prominence.

9 Non-visual similarities are particularly important where, as here, there

is no evidence that consumers encounter the marks side-by-side in the

marketplace. To illustrate the potential that aural and semantic similarities

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 18 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 19

Balancing the marks’ many visual similarities, perfect

aural similarity, and perfect semantic similarity more heavily

than the marks’ visual dissimilarities—as we must10—the

similarity factor weighs heavily in Pom Wonderful’s favor. 

And, because a lesser degree of similarity is required when a

trademark holder’s mark is strong, the commercial strength

of the “POM” mark amplifies the significance of the marks’

many similarities. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay Inc., 506

F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact that the

similarity involves the use of a much stronger mark would

make that similarity weigh more heavily in the analysis of

this factor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)). Mistakenly

weighing the marks’ differences more heavily than their

similarities, the district court clearly erred in finding that the

similarity of marks factor weighed against Pom Wonderful.

Marketing Channel Convergence

The district court also clearly erred in finding that the

marketing channel convergence factor weighed against Pom

Wonderful. Just as visual, aural, and semantic similarities

between marks increase the likelihood of confusion, so too do

convergent marketing channels. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. 

In assessing marketing channel convergence, courts consider

whether the parties’ customer bases overlap and how the

increase the likelihood of consumer confusion, consider the confusion that

could arise if one verbally asked a friend to buy “a ‘POM’ drink,”

intending that the friend purchase a Pom Wonderful product for him or

her. Unless the friend is already familiar with the requester’s pomegranate

beverage preferences, the friend could easily return with Pur’s “p4m”

beverage, having reasonably concluded that “p4m” is pronounced the

same, and has the same meaning, as the drink requested.

 

10

 See Enterpreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1144.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 19 of 26
20 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

parties advertise and market their products. Nutri/System,

Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th Cir.

1987). Marketing channels can converge even when different

submarkets are involved so long as “the general class of . . .

purchasers exposed to the products overlap.” See Sleekcraft,

599 F.2d at 353 (finding convergence where both companies

sold boats to authorized retail dealers in diverse localities,

used the same sales methods, advertised extensively through

different national magazines, and priced their products almost

identically).

Here, it is likely that Pom Wonderful will be able to show

that both companies use parallel market channels. First, both

companies sell their products in supermarkets located

throughout the United States. As the top-supermarket seller

of pomegranate juice, Pom Wonderful sells its products all

over the country and in key cities such as Los Angeles,

Chicago, New York, Boston, Atlanta, Dallas, Pittsburgh, and

Charlotte. Pur, in turn, sells its products to distributors and

supermarkets in Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Montana, North

Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,

Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, and Colorado. 

In addition to selling their products in at least one

overlapping state (Texas),11both companies sell their

products in an overlapping supermarket chain (Albertson’s). 

Although it is unclear whether Pom Wonderful and Pur

products are sold simultaneously in the same Albertson’s

stores, this uncertainty does not alter our analysis because a

 

11 Because Pom Wonderful is the leading seller of 100% pomegranate

juice beverages in supermarkets nationwide, it is possible that its products

are sold in other states that also sell Pur’s “p4m” beverage. However, the

preliminary injunction record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to

draw this inference.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 20 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 21

channel of trade is not limited to identical stores or agents. 

See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970

F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that “a channel of

trade includes the same type of distribution channel” and that

channels converge “when products [are]sold under opposing

marks in supermarkets and grocery stores across the

country”).

Second, the products at issue are highly similar. Both

companies sell pomegranate-based or pomegranate-flavored

beverages that are inexpensive and marketed to healthconscious consumers. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp.,

725 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding market channel

convergence where the goods at issue—pens—were

“essentially interchangeable,” “inexpensive,” and

“disposable”). Although Pom Wonderful advertises its

products using a much broader range of outlets than Pur uses,

the similarities between the products suggest an overlapping

general class of consumers. 

Because Pom Wonderful and Pur sell highly similar

products in supermarkets located across the country, the

marketing channel convergence factor weighs in Pom

Wonderful’s favor. The district court clearly erred in finding

that this factor weighed against Pom Wonderful, mistakenly

requiring Pom Wonderful to prove that its beverages were

sold in the very same brick-and-mortar stores as Pur’s “p4m”

beverage. Although such proof would surely increase the

likelihood of consumer confusion, the absence of identical

channels does not, by itself, undermine Pom Wonderful’s

likelihood of proving that the marketing channels converge.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 21 of 26
22 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

Actual Confusion, Defendant’s Intent, & Product

Expansion

Turning to the remaining Sleekcraft factors—actual

confusion, defendant’s intent, and product expansion—we

determine that the district court clearly erred by weighing

these factors against Pom Wonderful when, in the context of

this case, these factors are simply neutral. Although the

district court correctly found that Pom Wonderful failed to

adduce evidence of actual past confusion between its products

and Pur’s products, of Pur’s intent to deceive when it adopted

the “p4m” mark, or of either party’s plans to expand their

products into new markets, the district court incorrectlyfound

that the absence of such proof weighed against Pom

Wonderful.

Failing “to prove instances of actual confusion is not

dispositive against a trademark plaintiff” because “difficulties

in gathering evidence of actual confusion make its absence

generallyunnoteworthy.” Perfumebay.com, 506 F.3d at 1176

(internal quotation mark and emphasis omitted); see also

Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d

1069, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that actual

confusion is “of diminished importance” at the preliminary

injunction stage because “a motion for preliminary injunction

normally occurs early in litigation,” before the parties “have

amassed significant evidence of actual confusion”). 

Similarly, evidence of the defendant’s intent to confuse

customers or of product expansion is not required for a

finding of likelihood of confusion. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d

at 1208 (characterizing the intent factor as minimally

important and explaining that intent to confuse consumers is

not necessary to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion);

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 22 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 23

Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 509 (9th Cir. 2011)

(characterizing the product expansion factor as “neutral”

because neither party presented evidence regarding the

likelihood of expansion).

The absence of any proof regarding actual confusion, the

defendant’s intent, and product expansion does not affect our

likelihood-of-confusion analysis. Pom Wonderful’s lack of

evidence with respect to these factors neither undermines nor

advances its ability to prove likelihood of confusion. Thus,

we conclude that the district court clearly erred by weighing

these factors against Pom Wonderful.

Totality of the Facts

Our review of the Sleekcraft factors reveals that five

factors weigh in favor of Pom Wonderful (strength of mark,

relatedness of goods, degree of consumer care, similarity of

marks, and marketing channel convergence) and three factors

are neutral (actual confusion, defendant’s intent, and product

expansion). None of the factors weighs in favor of Pur. 

Sheer numerosity of Sleekcraft factors, however, is not by

itself dispositive of the ultimate likelihood-of-confusion

determination. See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6

F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we next

consider whether—in light of the totality of the facts—the

district court’s likelihood-of-confusion determination rises to

the level of clear error. See Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at

1140. 

When reviewing the district court’s determination of

likelihood of confusion for clear error, we will not reverse

merely because we would have weighed the evidence

differently. Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1135. Despite this

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 23 of 26
24 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

deferential standard, we nonetheless conclude that the district

court clearly erred in finding that Pom Wonderful is unlikely

to demonstrate a likelihood of consumer confusion. This

finding is not plausible on the preliminary injunction record

because the district court mistakenly (1) weighed the

differences between the “POM” and “p4m” marks more

heavily than the similarities, (2) interpreted the marketing

channels factor as requiring Pom Wonderful to prove that it

sells its products in the same stores as Pur, and (3) weighed

three neutral factors against Pom Wonderful.

When these errors are corrected and the totality of the

facts is considered, it is clear that Pom Wonderful is likely to

show that consumers are likely to be confused as to the

source of Pur’s “p4m” beverage. Pur’s beverage not only

bears a mark that is visually, aurally, and semantically similar

to Pom Wonderful’s commercially strong “POM” mark—

which Pom Wonderful has used exclusively since 2002—but

also is designed for the same use and sold to the same general

class of consumers as Pom Wonderful’s juice beverages at a

price point where consumer discernment is weak. 

Accordingly, the district court’s likelihood-of-confusion

finding leaves us with the “definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.” See Lahoti, 586 F.3d at

1196. 

B. Irreparable Harm, Equities, & Public Interest

The district court also addressed the other three Winter

elements: likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of the

equities, and the public interest. The court found that these

elements, too, weighed against the issuance of an injunction

based, in significant part, on its conclusion that Pom

Wonderful is unlikely to establish a likelihood of consumer

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 24 of 26
POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD 25

confusion. Because the district court’s erroneous likelihoodof-confusion determination clearly influenced its rulings on

the remaining Winter elements, we cannot determine on this

record how the district court would have ruled on these

Winter elements had it correctly found that Pom Wonderful

is likely to succeed on the merits of its trademark

infringement claim. 

Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court

with instructions that it reconsider the final three Winter

elements in light of our holding that Pom Wonderful is likely

to succeed on the merits of its trademark infringement claim. 

When evaluating the likelihood-of-irreparable-harm element,

the district court should consider Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC

v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., 736 F.3d 1239,

1249, 1250–51 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff

seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement

case must establish a likelihood of irreparable harm that is

grounded in evidence, not in conclusory or speculative

allegations of harm), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 57 (2014), and

allow the parties to submit any additional evidence that the

district court deems appropriate.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court abused its discretion in denying Pom Wonderful’s

motion for a preliminary injunction because it made a clear

error in its determination of no likelihood of confusion.12

Because the district court’s likelihood-of-success

12

In reaching this conclusion we express no opinion on the ultimate

merits of the case. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228,

1238 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 25 of 26
26 POM WONDERFUL V. HUBBARD

determination tainted its evaluation of the remaining three

Winter elements, we reverse and remand this case with

instructions that the district court consider whether Pom

Wonderful can meet its burden of proving that it will suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of the equities tips in its favor, and that injunctive

relief would further the public interest. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

 Case: 14-55253, 12/30/2014, ID: 9364894, DktEntry: 24-1, Page 26 of 26