Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05089/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05089-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DONNA I. BERRY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-5089

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Donna I. Berry appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

June 20, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$1,506.43 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 9.50 attorney hours of work before the court

at an hourly rate of $150.00 in 2004, $155.00 in 2005, and $158.75 in 2006, and $31.55 in

expenses. (Doc. # 10-11). Defendant has filed a response, objecting to certain hours claimed.

(Doc. # 13).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

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the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

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or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at an hourly rate of $150.00 in

2004, $155.00 in 2005, and $158.75 in 2006, for the 9.25 hours which she asserts she devoted

to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden

of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of theConsumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 11)

and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned

believes her argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. However,

we find that the requested hourly rate is excessive and find that an award based upon an hourly

rate of $148.00 per hour, reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent

hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th

Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for

the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claimsshe spent working on this

case. Defendant argues that the 1.00 hour submitted on May 25, 2005, four the preparation of

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four summons in this case should be discounted because this work could have been performed

by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987)

(work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA).

We agree with defendant. Accordingly, we deduct 1.00 hour from the total number of

compensable hours sought.

Defendant also argues that the 0.25 hour submitted on July 25, 2006 (receive and review

order of remand), should be deducted because this appears to be the Order sent by the Appeals

Council. Work performed at the administrative is not compensable under the EAJA. See

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984) (time spent at the administrative

level is not compensable under the EAJA). Plaintiff’s counsel noted the receipt of the Judgment

from this court on June 20, 2006. As the document received on July 25, 2006, was not filed by

this court, we agree with defendant that the time submitted should be deducted. Accordingly,

we deduct 0.25 hour from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks a total of 4.42 hours of work from August 5, 2004, through May

23, 2005. The Complaint was filed in this court on May 23, 2005. (Doc # 1). We note, time

spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker,

728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time submitted on the above

referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint with this court.

Therefore, we will allow 1.50 hours. Accordingly, 2.92 hours must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on May 24, 2005 (receive and review Order from

Magistrate). This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced date, should

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not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than five or six

minutes to review these document. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark.

1989). Therefore we are reducing the 0.25 hour submitted on the above date to 0.10 hour.

Accordingly, 0.15 hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 2.33 hours for the research and preparation of the

EAJA petition and brief. We find the time sought to be excessive and deduct 0.83 hour from the

total compensable time sought by counsel.

Finally, defendant argues that the $9.45 submitted for photocopying and the $22.10

submitted for postage are excessive. We disagree, such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA

and we find $33.15 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir.

1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA for:

4.35 (9.50-5.15) attorney hours, at the rate of $148.00 per hour, and for $31.55 in expenses, for a

total attorney's fee award of $675.35. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of,

any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten days

from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right

to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and

specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 14 day of August 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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