Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00334/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00334-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Zane William Gray, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-334-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Petitioner

Zane William Gray. (Doc. 11). On March 12, 2010, Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan

issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) in which he recommended that the Court

deny the Petition with prejudice due to Mr. Gray’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A)’s one year statute of limitations. (Doc. 22). Mr. Gray timely filed Objections

to the R & R on April 15, 2010 (Doc. 26); nevertheless, because those objections are without

merit, the Court accepts the R & R as set forth in this Order. 

BACKGROUND

In January 2006, Mr. Gray was convicted of aggravated assault in Arizona State Court

and sentenced to 12.5 years imprisonment for threatening his mother with a meat cleaver.

Following an unsuccessful appeal in state Court, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus on February 12, 2009. The petition, however, was dismissed with leave to

Case 2:09-cv-00334-GMS Document 30 Filed 08/09/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

amend because Mr. Gray failed to identify any basis for habeas relief. (See Dkt. # 10.) As the

Court stated in its June 17, 2009 Order:

“Petitioner seeks a reduction of his sentence because ‘12.5 years

is a long time.’ Petitioner does not allege a constitutional

violation but states, ‘forgive me for not going th[rough] a[n]

Amendment. I gave up on everything but by the “Grace of God”

I am saved th[rough] Jesus Christ.’” Petitioner makes no

allegations relevant to his conviction or sentence.” 

(Dkt. # 10 at 2.) On July 3, 2009, Petitioner filed an amended petition, alleging that his Sixth

Amended right to a speedy trial was violated. (Dkt. # 11.) In the R & R, Judge Duncan

recommends that the petition be dismissed with prejudice because the claim raised in the

amended petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Dkt. # 22.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal district courts “‘may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].’” Carrillo-Lozano v. Stolc, 669 F.

Supp.2d 1074, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). While a district judge “must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,” Schmidt v.

Johnstone, 263 F. Supp.2d 1219, 1225 (D. Ariz. 2003)), no such review is necessary when

the parties do not raise specific objections. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (holding

that district courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not

the subject of an objection”); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is made.”); CarrilloLozano, 669 F. Supp.2d at 1076 (same). 

DISCUSSION

The claims alleged in Mr. Gray’s amended habeas petition are barred under the oneyear statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As Judge Duncan stated in the R & R, 

A new claim raised in an amended habeas petition filed after the

expiration of the limitations period, relates back to the original

petition, thereby avoiding a limitations bar, if it arises “out of

the same core of operative facts as a claim contained in the

Case 2:09-cv-00334-GMS Document 30 Filed 08/09/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

original petition.” Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2008) (citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005)). “It is

not enough that the new argument pertains to the same trial,

conviction, or sentence.” Id.

(Dkt. # 22 at 5.)

Mr. Gray’s original petition was timely; however, it was dismissed due to his failure

to allege any facts or legal arguments that would entitle him to relief. To the extent the

second petition does contain a viable habeas claim, it was untimely under AEDPA unless it

relates back to the original petition. Because Mr. Gray concedes that he raised no claims in

his first petition, there is no claim to which his amended petition could possibly relate back.

Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (to relate back, and to thereby

avoid a limitations bar, the amended petition must arise “out of the same core operative facts

as a claim contained in the original petition”). 

In his Written Objections, Mr. Gray does not direct any argument toward the R & R.

Instead, he asserts that Judge Duncan should have treated his amended petition as a “second

or successive” petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2). Upon review of Mr. Gray’s

filings, however, the Court concludes that Judge Duncan properly treated Mr. Gray’s filing

as an amended petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides, 

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior

application shall be dismissed unless--

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,

no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty

of the underlying offense. 

Based on these parameters, Mr. Gray’s amended habeas petition clearly did not satisfy the

requirements to be treated as a successive petition. See id. Moreover, even if Mr. Gray’s

amended petition could somehow be construed as a properly filed second or successive

Case 2:09-cv-00334-GMS Document 30 Filed 08/09/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

petition, he was required to obtain an order from the Ninth Circuit before filing the second

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). Mr.

Gray fails to bring forth anything suggesting that he obtained permission from the Ninth

Circuit to pursue a second habeas petition. Accordingly, his Objections are without merit.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

(1 Judge Duncan’s R & R is ACCEPTED. (See Doc. 22). 

(2) Petitioner Zane William Gray’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice. (See Doc. 11).

(3) A certificate of appealability is DENIED and leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on appeal is DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-00334-GMS Document 30 Filed 08/09/10 Page 4 of 4