Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00503/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00503-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM M. PICKARD, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO DEALER 

SERVICES, INC.; STEVEN WEIL, 

JR.; WEIL WRECKER SERVICE, 

INC.; ALLSTAR RECOVERY, 

LLC; ADESA, INC.; and KAR 

AUCTION SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:16-cv-00503-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff William M. Pickard, III has filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s April 29, 2016 order striking certain claims from his 

amended complaint. (Doc. 12). The Court liberally construes Mr. Pickard’s 

motion both as a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file a second 

amended complaint. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by 

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part Mr. Pickard’s motion.

FILED

 2017 Mar-16 AM 09:44

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-00503-MHH Document 14 Filed 03/16/17 Page 1 of 4
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I. BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint (Doc. 6), Mr. Pickard asserted claims under the 

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58; the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–641; the Fair Credit 

Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–66j; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–

67f; and the Uniform Commercial Code. (Doc. 6, pp. 7–11). On April 29, 2016, 

the Court entered an order striking from the amended complaint Mr. Pickard’s 

claims under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the Fair Credit Billing Act. (Doc. 8, pp. 

1–2). The Court explained that the Dodd-Frank Act does not create a private cause 

of action. 

In his motion for reconsideration and for leave to file a second amended 

complaint, Mr. Pickard states that he “erroneously cited the Fair Credit Billing Act 

as a statutory basis for his claims” and that the Federal Debt Collection Practices 

Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in fact, “addresses the claims alleged by 

the facts in the [amended complaint].” (Doc. 12, p. 1). Mr. Pickard also contends 

that the Court erred in striking his claims under the Dodd-Frank Act and presents 

the Court with authorities to support his contention. (Doc. 12, pp. 2–5). Mr. 

Pickard asks the Court to reconsider its April 29, 2016 order striking his claims, to

Case 2:16-cv-00503-MHH Document 14 Filed 03/16/17 Page 2 of 4
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“restor[e] his Dodd-Frank claims,” and to “grant leave for him to assert claims . . . 

under the [FDCPA].” (Doc. 12, p. 5).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for leave to assert claims under the FDCPA

A plaintiff who wishes to file an amended complaint more than 21 days after 

the complaint was served on the defendant must obtain the written consent of 

opposing counsel or permission from the Court, and the Court must “freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 

Accordingly, the Court grants Mr. Pickard’s motion for leave to file a second 

amended complaint to include claims under the FDCPA.

B. Motion for reconsideration of Dodd-Frank claims

“[R]econsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed 

sparingly.” Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 

1256, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2006). “Indeed, as a general rule, ‘[a] motion to reconsider 

is only available when a party presents the court with evidence of an intervening 

change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct 

clear error or manifest injustice.’” Id. at 1268 (quoting Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., 

Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (M.D. Ala. 2003)) (alteration provided by 

Rueter). “A motion for reconsideration should not be used to present authorities 

Case 2:16-cv-00503-MHH Document 14 Filed 03/16/17 Page 3 of 4
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available at the time of the first decision or to reiterate arguments previously 

made.” Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Pickard does not present the Court 

with evidence of an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new 

evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Instead, Mr. 

Pickard merely presents authorities that were available when the Court entered its 

order striking Mr. Pickard’s Dodd-Frank claims from the amended complaint. 

Accordingly, Mr. Pickard has not met his burden with respect to the “extraordinary 

remedy” of reconsideration, and the Court denies Mr. Pickard’s motion. See 

Rueter, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Mr. Pickard’s motion for 

leave to file a second amended complaint to assert claims under the FDCPA. 

(Doc. 12). The Court DENIES Mr. Pickard’s motion for reconsideration of the 

Court’s April 29, 2016 order striking his Dodd-Frank claims from the amended 

complaint. (Doc. 12). Mr. Pickard’s second amended complaint shall be limited to 

the addition of claims under the FDCPA.

DONE and ORDERED this March 15, 2017.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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