Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02100/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02100-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID RODELL LIGHTFOOT, II, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-2100-EFB (TEMP) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act, respectively.1

 The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, 

which have been submitted without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s 

motion is granted, the Commissioner’s motion is denied and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

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 1

 This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c); ECF Nos. 7 & 9. 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 20, 2013, plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging disability 

beginning on October 1, 2009. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 169-83. His applications were 

denied initially, id. at 121-25, and upon reconsideration, id. at 129-33. 

 Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing which was held before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) on April 9, 2014. Id. at 35-60. Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and 

testified. Id. at 35-36. In a decision issued on May 16, 2014, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not 

disabled. Id. at 29. The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2014. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since October 1, 2009, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: status-post 

hernia repairs/status-post gastrotomy, obesity, status-post cardiac 

arrest, irritable bowel syndrome, major depressive disorder, and 

borderline intellectual functioning (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)). 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926). 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) except lift/carry and push/pull 20 pounds occasionally 

and 10 pounds frequently and sit and walk/stand six hours in an 

eight-hour workday with sit/stand options allowing for a brief 

change of position. The claimant could never climb 

ladders/ropes/scaffolds and should avoid heights and moving 

machinery, occasionally climb ramps/stairs, bend, stoop, crouch, 

balance, and crawl, and should have immediate access to a 

bathroom. The claimant could perform simple routine task (sic) 

with occasional public contact. 

 6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). 

7. The claimant was born on July 2, 1974 and was 35 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged 

disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963). 

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8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from October 1, 2009, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 18-29. 

 On July 11, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

May 16, 2014 decision, id. at 4-6, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the 

Commissioner. Thereafter, plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).2

LEGAL STANDARD 

 “The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 2

 On September 19, 2014, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff’s request for an extension 

of time to file a civil action. AR at 1-3. 

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 A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden if 

the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

APPLICATION 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “rejected medical opinion evidence . . . out-of-hand . . . 

without articulating legitimate reasons for doing so.” ECF. No. 17 at 15.3

 Specifically, plaintiff 

contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician and the 

opinion of an examining physician. 

 The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

 3

 Page number citations are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF system 

and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a 

treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285; Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 

1990). The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Id. at 831. In addition, greater weight 

should be given to the “‘opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of 

specialty.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(5)). Finally, although a treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to 

significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 

physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” 

Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

 Here, Dr. Sid Cormier, Ph.D., examined plaintiff, which included a review of plaintiff’s 

medical records, an interview and observation of the plaintiff, as well as the administration of 

several tests. AR at 598-602. Pursuant to his examination and testing Dr. Cormier opined, in 

relevant part, as follows: 

Psychologically, the ramifications of this man’s moderate 

depression and borderline intellectual functioning may mildly to 

moderately impair his ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks 

and perhaps seriously impair his ability to perform complex and 

detailed ones. 

I suspect that his borderline intellectual functioning and moderate 

depression may moderately impair his ability to maintain regular 

attendance and perform work activities on a consistent basis. 

For a simplistic job he would probably not require special 

additional supervision. His overall ability to complete a normal 

workday or workweek without interruptions resulting from the 

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ramifications of his moderate depression and borderline cognitive 

functioning may be moderately impaired in any other type of job. 

Formal memory testing indicated that he is quite capable of 

accepting and remembering instructions from supervisors. 

Id. at 603. 

 Regarding the ability to functionally interact with supervisors and co-workers, Dr. 

Cormier opined that plaintiff’s “reported history and interview behavior did suggest possible 

significant impairment regarding his ability to interact with coworkers and the general public and 

he indicated that he has a very low frustration tolerance.” Id. 

 The ALJ’s decision acknowledged and discussed Dr. Cormier’s opinion but ultimately 

discounted it, according it only “some weight . . . because the claimant could occasionally interact 

with the public.” Id. at 27. Apparently focusing on Dr. Cormier’s contrary opinion, the ALJ 

stated that “the claimant is capable of performing simple routine tasks, completing a normal 

workday, and interacting with co-workers and supervisors based upon the claimant’s Function 

Report, which indicated he shops, goes fishing, and shops (sic).” Id.

 As noted, an examining physician’s uncontradicted opinion may be rejected only for clear 

and convincing reasons, and when an examining physician’s opinion is controverted by another 

doctor’s opinion, the examining physician’s opinion may be rejected only for specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

Here, the function report notwithstanding, it is unclear why the ALJ elected to reject Dr. 

Cormier’s opinion. The ALJ simply rejected portions of Dr. Cormier’s opinion based on 

plaintiff’s report that he “shops” and “goes fishing,” without providing any explanation of how 

those facts contradict Dr. Cormier’s opinion. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”). See generally

Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This court has repeatedly asserted that 

the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, 

driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as 

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to her overall disability.”); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Social Security 

Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits”). 

 Similarly, the opinions provided in the physician’s reports of September 11, 2013 and 

February 25, 2014, were rejected by the ALJ with little explanation. The reports, completed by 

nurse practitioner William Blackmon but signed and approved by Dr. Nirmal S. Mehton,4 stated 

that plaintiff had “a physical or mental incapacity that prevents or substantially reduces his[] 

ability to engage in work and/or training” on a “[f]ull-time” basis. AR at 731-32. The ALJ, 

however, gave Dr. Mehton’s opinion “little weight” because it was purportedly “not consistent 

with the medical evidence as a whole, Dr. Alvarez’ opinions, Dr. Mauro, Dr. Lockmiller, and Dr. 

Colsky’s opinions, which concluded that [plaintiff] is capable of performing unskilled light 

work.” Id. at 28. 

 However, 

[t]o say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 

mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of 

specificity . . . required, even when the objective factors are listed 

seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He 

must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather 

than the doctors’, are correct. 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 

1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary 

support for his interpretation of the medical evidence.”); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“Broad and vague” reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion do not 

suffice).5

 Moreover, it appears that Dr. Alvarez, an emergency room physician, provided a 

treatment note from a June 4, 2013 ER visit, not an opinion as to plaintiff’s functional limitations. 

 4

 Dr. Mehton signed off on those reports on April 21, 2014, stating that he concurred with 

those “findings.” AR at 731-32. 

5

 It is unclear whether the ALJ considered Dr. Mehton to be treating or examining 

physician. Regardless, in either case the ALJ is required at a minimum to provide specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Mehton’s opinions. Lester, 

81 F.3d at 830-31. 

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AR At 70. Dr. Mauro, Dr. Lockmiller and Dr. Colsky were non-examining state agency 

physicians. Id. at 113, 117, 638. As noted above, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician 

cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either 

an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. See also Ryan v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the opinion of an examining 

physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician”). 

 Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ failed to offer 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting the 

opinions of Dr. Cormier and Dr. Mehton. Plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to relief with respect to 

this claim. 

SCOPE OF REMAND 

 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, 

the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act.” Id. at 1021. See also Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 

1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain 

and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”). 

 Here, the record has not been fully developed, further administrative proceedings would 

serve a useful purpose and the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether plaintiff is, in 

fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Accordingly, this matter will be 

remanded for further proceedings. 

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 On remand, the ALJ shall analyze the opinions of Dr. Cormier and Dr. Mehton and, if any 

portion of their opinions are not adopted, the ALJ shall provide specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is denied; 

 3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed for the reasons indicated above; 

 4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 5. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff. 

DATED: March 29, 2016. 

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