Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01157/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01157-38/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORIO FUNTANILLA, JR.,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-1157 LKK GGH P

vs.

KAREN KELLY, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment. 

For the following reasons, the court recommends that plaintiff’s motion be denied and

defendants’ motion be granted.

II. Summary Judgment Standards Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

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nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

On January 20, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing

a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d

409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

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26 Defendants Sacks, Payne, Nakagawa and Diggs have been dismissed. 1

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III. Background

This action is proceeding on the original complaint filed May 28, 2002, as to

defendants Kelly, Sacks, Jaffe, Lipon, Ewing, Holliday, Stewart, Stiles, Goughnour, Walker,

Guyton, Feryance, Lieber, Payne, Karde, Lucas, Rianda, Kalvelage, L’Etoile and Lankford.1

Plaintiff alleges 17 causes of action. Original Complaint, ¶¶ 77-93. 

1. All defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights. Id., ¶ 77. 

2. Defendant Stiles retaliated against him and violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by denying his request to be transferred to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH)

for treatment for his sexual mental disorder. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Stiles

refused to transfer him because he was a sex offender and had recently testified

against a former prison guard. Id., ¶ ¶ 25-27, 78. 

3. Defendants Kelly, Jaffe, Lipon and Ewing violated the Eighth Amendment by

refusing to transfer plaintiff to ASH for treatment for his sexual mental disorder. 

Id., ¶¶ 28-24, 79.

4. Defendants Payne, Kelly and Holliday violated the Eighth Amendment by

referring to plaintiff as a snitch and sex offender in front of another inmate on

August 5, 1999. Id., ¶¶ 35-37, 80.

5. Defendants Kelly and Holliday violated the Eighth Amendment by telling him

that he could not be treated for his sexual mental disorder. Id., ¶¶ 38-39, 81.

6. Defendants Kelly and Holliday retaliated against plaintiff for requesting a

transfer to ASH for mental health treatment by falsely charging plaintiff with

disobeying orders on September 13, 1999. The rules violation report stated that

by asking defendant Holliday for a transfer to ASH, plaintiff had violated a

previous order to have no further contact with defendant Holliday. Id., ¶¶ 40-42,

82.

7. Defendants Stewart and Holliday violated the Eighth Amendment by telling

plaintiff’s cellmate, from September to November 1999, that plaintiff was a sex

offender and snitch. Defendants asked plaintiff’s cellmate to hurt plaintiff. These

threats caused plaintiff to suffer an epileptic seizure on October 3, 1999, that

shattered one of plaintiff’s molar teeth. Id., ¶¶ 43, 83.

8. Defendant Holliday retaliated against plaintiff for filing a grievance against her

by filing a false rules violation report against him in November 1999. As a result

of this report, plaintiff lost his job. Plaintiff was later found guilty of the report. 

Id., ¶¶ 44-45, 51, 84.

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 Plaintiff states that this claim is made against a defendant Norabyke. However, no 2

defendant Norabyke is listed in the caption of the complaint nor in the section of the complaint

where plaintiff lists the defendants. For that reason, no defendant Norabyke has been served. 

Because plaintiff did not clearly list Norabyke as a defendant, the court will disregard all claims

against this defendant. 

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9. Defendants Payne, Guyton, Feryance, Walker and Stiles violated plaintiff’s

right to due process when they placed him in administrative segregation (ad seg)

for being over familiar with staff which threatened the safety and security of the

institution. These charges were false. While in ad seg, plaintiff’s mental status

fell before normal, he attempted suicide and suffered from depression. Id., ¶¶ 47-

50, 85.

10. Defendants Stiles, Walker, Feryance, Ewing and Lipon retaliated against

plaintiff and violated the Eighth Amendment when they refused his requests for

single cell status in 1999 and early 2000 after plaintiff told them that he was

threatened by his cellmates. On April 13, 2000, plaintiff’s cellmate attempted to

assault him. Defendants then placed plaintiff in ad seg. On April 19, 2000,

plaintiff appeared before the classification committee. Defendant Feryance told

plaintiff that he would remain in ad seg because he (plaintiff) stated that he would

be filing grievances and complaints with the FBI. Plaintiff was released from ad

seg on April 30, 2000. On May 28, 2000, plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate. 

Upon his release from the infirmary, defendants Stiles and Feryance put plaintiff

in ad seg again. These defendants tried to place plaintiff’s old cellmate in

plaintiff’s cell on June 27, 2000. When plaintiff refused, he was charged with

refusing a cellmate. Id., ¶¶ 52-64, 86.

11. Defendant Lucas and Karde violated the Eighth Amendment in February

2000 by telling plaintiff’s cellmate that plaintiff was snitch and sex offender. On

April 13, 2000, the cellmate attempted to assault plaintiff. When plaintiff was

later released from ad seg, these defendants continued to tell plaintiff’s new

cellmate “rumors” about plaintiff. On May 28, 2000, the new cellmate attacked

plaintiff because of what defendants had told him. Id., ¶¶ 57, 60, 62, 87.

12. Defendant Rianda violated the Eighth Amendment by not responding to his 2

January 31, 2000, request for single cell status until August 2, 2000. Id., ¶¶ 57,

59, 64, 88.

13. Defendants Feryance, Lieber and Stiles violated plaintiff’s right to due

process when they placed plaintiff in ad seg on April 13, 2000, after he was

assaulted by his cellmate. Defendants wrongly decided to retain plaintiff in ad

seg. Id., ¶¶ 57, 89.

14. Defendants Feryance and Goughnour retaliated against plaintiff on April 19,

2000, when they told him that he would not be released from ad seg after he told

them that he would be filing a complaint with Internal Affairs and the FBI. Id., ¶¶

58, 90.

15. Defendants Stiles, Lieber and Feryance violated the Eighth Amendment in

May 2000 when they placed him in ad seg after the May 28, 2000, assault by his

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cellmate. Id., ¶¶ 62, 91.

16. Defendants Feryance and Goughnour violated plaintiff’s right to due process

on June 7, 2000, when they refused to release plaintiff from ad seg. Id., ¶¶ 63, 92.

17. Defendants Kalvelage, L’Etoile and Lankford retaliated against plaintiff and

violated the Eighth Amendment and his right to due process. Plaintiff told prison

officials that he was assaulted by his known enemy, inmate Manago. After an

investigation, plaintiff was charged with falsely reporting that he had been

assaulted. The classification committee recommended to the Departmental

Review Board, of which defendants were members, that plaintiff be transferred to

the general population at Mule Creek State Prison. Defendants instead imposed a

12 month indeterminate term at the Corcoran Security Housing Unit (SHU). 

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment as to claim 12. Defendants move

for partial summary judgment as to claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 17. 

IV. Discussion

Defendants originally did not file a summary judgment motion. Therefore, this

action was set to proceed to trial on all seventeen claims raised in the original complaint. 

Following the February 25, 2008, further trial confirmation, the Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton

found that appointment of counsel for plaintiff was warranted. On March 6, 2008, the court

appointed counsel, David Springfield, to represent plaintiff. On May 19, 2008, counsel for

plaintiff and defendants filed a status report stating that the issues for trial could be narrowed by

summary judgment motions. Accordingly, on June 2, 2008, this court issued a scheduling order

setting forth the time for filing dispositive motions. On October 1, 2008, plaintiff himself filed a

motion for partial summary judgment as to the claims against defendant Rianda only. On

October 15, 2008, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 

On October 20, 2008, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw due to

unspecified “significant circumstances.” On October 27, 2008, defendants filed a statement of

non-opposition to this motion. On December 3, 2008, plaintiff filed an opposition. In his

opposition, plaintiff stated that he did not have a “personality clash” with his lawyer, although he

believed that counsel was inexperienced, overwhelmed and not up to speed. Plaintiff also stated

that his opposition to the motion to withdraw was prepared after consulting with jailhouse

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lawyer, W. Berry. 

On December 12, 2008, the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The

court ordered defendants to serve plaintiff with their summary judgment motion within five days. 

The court ordered plaintiff to file his opposition to defendants’ motion within thirty days. The

court ordered defendants to file their opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion within

thirty days. 

After being granted an extension of time, defendants’ filed their opposition to

plaintiff’s motion on January 28, 2009. 

On February 4, 2009, plaintiff filed his opposition. Plaintiff did not address the

merits of defendants’ motion. Rather, he argued that defendants’ motion should be vacated

because he did not consent to former counsel’s agreement to permit the filing of the motion.

On February 9, 2009, the court issued an order stating that defendants’ summary

judgment motion was submitted for decision and that plaintiff could not file any other papers

regarding the motion unless directed by the court. In making this order, the court observed that

plaintiff was a very frequent, sophisticated litigator well known to the undersigned. The court

observed that it had not directed plaintiff to file what was, in essence, a motion to strike

defendants’ summary judgment motion, or authorize plaintiff to unilaterally choose, in his

discretion, to file piecemeal opposition. 

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the

nonmoving party does not file opposing material, even if the failure to oppose violates a local

rule. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2003); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652

(9th Cir. March 9, 1994), citing Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 

However, when the local rule does not require, but merely permits the court to grant a motion for

summary judgment, the district court has discretion to determine whether noncompliance should

be deemed consent to the motion. Id.

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For the reasons stated in the February 9, 2009, order, this court now finds that

plaintiff has failed to oppose defendants’ summary judgement motion. Based on plaintiff’s

failure to file an opposition, the court concludes that plaintiff has consented to defendants’

motion for summary judgment. In the alternative, the court has reviewed the record and finds

that defendants’ motion has merit. The only claim warranting further discussion is claim 12

against defendant Rianda, on which plaintiff has moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Rianda violated the Eighth Amendment by not

responding to his January 31, 2000, grievance requesting single cell status until August 2, 2000. 

In his summary judgment motion, plaintiff refers to exhibits E and F as evidence of his letter to

defendant Rianda and her response. Exhibit E is a letter from plaintiff addressed to Linda

Melching, Chief of Inmate Appeals, dated April 2, 2000. In this letter, plaintiff seeks

information regarding the appeal he sent to Melching’s office on January 31, 2000. Exhibit F is a

form sent to plaintiff on April 10, 2000, from Linda Melching stating that his appeal has been

received but not yet completed. 

In their opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendants first argue that the motion is

untimely. The June 2, 2008, scheduling order stated that all summary judgment motions were to

be filed on or before September 1, 2008. At the time the court issued the scheduling order,

plaintiff was represented by counsel. Because the court allowed counsel to withdraw, the court

will deem plaintiff’s motion timely filed.

Defendants go on to argue that there is no evidence that defendant Rianda was

involved in the allegedly untimely response to plaintiff’s grievance. Defendants refer to the same

exhibits identified by plaintiff in his motion demonstrating that Linda Melching, and not

defendant Rianda, responded to plaintiff’s grievance. Defendants also refer to defendant

Rianda’s declaration attached as an exhibit to their summary judgment motion. In this

declaration defendant Rianda states she worked as the Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch from

July 2001 to July 2002. She states that plaintiff’s grievance was submitted and decided before

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she was the Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch. 

Because the evidence clearly demonstrates that defendant Rianda had no

involvement in the allegedly untimely denial of plaintiff’s at-issue grievance, the court

recommends that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion be denied and defendants’ summary

judgment motion be granted as to this claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (no. 165) be denied;

2. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (no. 170) be granted; claims

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 17 should be dismissed; this action should proceed to trial as to

claims 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 03/19/09

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

fun1157.sj

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