Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00792/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00792-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN M. GARDNER, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-0792-GPC-JLB

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING CAFEPRESS

INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS;

[ECF No. 12]

(2) GRANTING TELLAPART,

INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS;

[ECF No. 18]

(3) VACATING HEARING DATE

v.

CAFEPRESS INC., a Delaware

corporation, PRIDEANDMORE, a

person or business, TELLAPART,

INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Defendant CafePress Inc.’s (“CafePress”) and Defendant

TellApart, Inc.’s (“TellApart”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss. (ECF

Nos. 12, 18.) Plaintiff Steven M. Gardner (“Plaintiff”) opposes. (ECF No. 20.)

The parties have fully briefed the motion. (ECF Nos. 12, 18, 20, 22.) The Court

findsthe motion suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS both motions to

dismiss.

/ /

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 4, 2014, Plaintifffiled a complaint alleging copyright infringement and

violations of 17 U.S.C. § 1202 by CafePress and one of its users. (ECF No. 1.) On

September 8, 2014, Plaintifffiled a first amended complaint(“FAC”) adding TellApart

as a defendant. (ECF No. 6.)

On October 3, 2014, CafePress filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) On

October 20, 2014, TellApart filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) On November 7,

2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motions. (ECF No. 20.) On

November 21, 2014, Defendants filed an reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (ECF No. 22.)

Plaintiff and CafePress are also engaged in another copyright dispute before this

Court to which this case has been low-numbered, Gardner v. CafePress (“GardnerI”),

No. 3:13-cv-1108-GPC-JLB. (See ECF No. 4.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he is copyright holder of U.S. Copyright VA-851-029

(“Harmony of Wolves”). (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that CafePress user

PrideAndMore infringed Plaintiff’s copyright in “Harmony of Wolves.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 25.)

Plaintiff alleges thatCafePress infringed Plaintiff’s copyrightin “Harmony ofWolves.”

(Id. ¶ 26.)Plaintiff alleges thatCafePress sent TellApart infringing copies of “Harmony

of Wolves” and that TellApart advertised these images on the internet. (Id. ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff alleges that “defendants intentionally removed or altered CMI, distributed

CMI knowing that the CMI was removed or altered, distributed copies of images

knowing that CMI has been removed or altered.” (Id. ¶ 53.)

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Judicial Notice

Generally, on a motion to dismiss, courts limit review to the contents of the

complaint and may only consider extrinsic evidence that is properly presented to the

court as part of the complaint. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.

2001) (court may consider documents physically attached to the complaint or

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documents necessarily relied on by the complaint if their authenticity is not contested).

However, a court may take notice of undisputed “matters of public record” subject to

judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment. Id.(citing FED.R.EVID.201; MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500,

504 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may take

notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.

B. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a

court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a

complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to

plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. 

While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual

allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual

content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of

a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief

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will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th

Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003);

W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

CafePress requests judicial notice of its Terms of Service and three documents

from Gardner I: (1) the docket, (2) this Court’s February 26, 2014 order in Gardner I

(the “GardnerI Partial Summary Judgment Order”), and (3) thisCourt’s September 25,

2014 order in Gardner I (the “Gardner I Amendment Order”). (ECF No. 12-2.)

TellApart requests judicial notice of two documents from Gardner I: (1) the docket,

and (2) the Gardner I Partial Summary Judgment Order. (ECF No 18-2.)

Defendants’ requests for judicial notice of the court documents are properly

noticeable. The docket and orders a federal trial court case are matters of public record

and are capable of accurate and ready determination. Finding the court documents

relevant, the Court takes judicial notice of all four documents. However, CafePress’s

requestfor judicial notice ofits Terms of Service is not properly noticeable. Documents

on CafePress’s website are not public documents and thus can be changed at any

moment by CafePress. Moreover, while CafePress argues that FAC ¶ 12 “explicitly

references” the Terms of Service, the phrase “CafePress.com uses many start of the art

technologies to produce the items we sell” does not appear in CafePress’s terms of

service. (See ECF No. 12-2, at 3; ECF No. 12-3, Ex. D.) Accordingly, the Court does

not take judicial notice of CafePress’s Terms of Service.

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B. Rule 4(m)

If a defendant is not served within 120 days of the complaint being filed, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires the Court to either dismiss without prejudice or

order that service be made within a specified time. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). However, if

the plaintiff shows good cause, the Court is required to extend the time allowed for

service. Id. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s error constitutes good

cause. (Compare ECF No. 20, at 4–6 with ECF No. 22 at 3–4.)

While Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed, Rule 4(m) allows

the Court to instead require that service be made within a specified time. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(m). As Plaintiff has already served all defendants, (see ECF Nos. 8, 10, 11,

24), the Court finds that a Rule 4(m) dismissal would be inappropriate and the issue

moot. Were the Court to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4(m), time and resources would be

wasted while Plaintiffrefiled the complaint and reserved the defendants because a Rule

4(m) dismissal would be without prejudice.

C. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for statutory damages and attorney fees

are barred by the Gardner I Partial Summary Judgment Order and the law of the case

doctrine. (ECF No. 12, at 7–8.) In Gardner I, this Court ruled that Plaintiff could not

recover statutory damages and attorney fees because he was unable to show that any.

(Gardner I, No. 3:13-cv-1108, ECF No. 48, at 14–16.) The law of the case doctrine is

a prudential doctrine that states that “when a court decides on a rule, it should

ordinarily follow that rule during the pendency of the matter.” Mayweathers v.

Terhune, 136 F. Sup. 2d 1152, 1153–54 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

The main issue is whether CafePress’s alleged infringement of “Harmony of

Wolves” in response to a request from a second user constitutes a separate instance of

infringement from CafePress’s alleged infringement of “Harmony of Wolves” in

response to a request from a first user. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp.,

528 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008). While CafePress argues that the Gardner I Partial

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Summary Judgment Order decides the issue, the Court disagrees. The GardnerI Partial

Summary Judgment Order did not address a situation where multiple users had

uploaded “Harmony of Wolves,” rather it dealt with a situation where a single user

uploaded “Harmony of Wolves” and then CafePress allegedly infringed “Harmony of

Wolves” in response to that upload. (See GardnerI, No. 3:13-cv-1108-GPC-JLB, ECF

No. 15-4 ¶ 33.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the Gardner I Partial Summary

Judgment Order did not decide the issue of whether CafePress’s alleged activity in

response to multiple users constitutes a single act or multiple acts of infringement.

However, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the alleged infringement

commenced after his registration of “Harmony of Wolves” to plead a cause of action

for statutory damages or attorney fees. See 17 U.S.C. § 412(2). Plaintiff’s complaint is

devoid of any factual allegations asto the timing of the alleged infringement in relation

to his registration of “Harmony of Wolves.” (See FAC.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first

cause of action as to attorney fees and statutory damages is DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. 17 U.S.C. § 1202

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1202 cause of action fails to plead sufficient

facts. (ECF No. 12, at 8–9.) Defendants further argue three reasons why Plaintiff

cannot maintain a § 1202 cause of action: (1) Plaintiff cannot show that CafePress

knowingly removed or altered CMI, (2) Plaintiff cannot allege that CafePress removed

or altered CMI in the form of Plaintiff’s name or signature, and (3) Plaintiff cannot

allege that CafePress provided false CMI. (Id. at 9 –12.) Plaintiff does not argue any

reason why Defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1202 cause of action should be denied,

and instead argues that Plaintiff “can allege a § 1202 claim.” (ECF No. 20, at 12.)

§ 1202 creates liability for persons who either: (1) “intentionally remove or alter

any [CMI],” without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, “knowing, or . .

. having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal

an infringement”; or (2) distribute CMI “knowing that the [CMI] has been removed or

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altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law.” 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). The

definition of CMI includes the work’s title, the author’s name, and the copyright

owner’s name, among other information. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c). Plaintiff’s§ 1202

allegations merely repeat the language of § 1202 and do not contain any factual

allegations to support a § 1202 cause of action. (See FAC ¶¶ 3, 35–68.)

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff could plead facts sufficient to maintain

a § 1202 cause of action. While Defendants argue that any alleged CMI removal or

alteration must be “knowing,” (see ECF No. 12, at 9–10), § 1202 is not so limiting. §

1202 creates liability even in the absence of knowledge if the defendant “ha[d]

reasonable grounds to know.” See 17 U.S.C. § 1202. Thus even if Defendants are

correct that Plaintiff cannot allege that CafePress had knowledge, Plaintiff does not

need to allege knowledge to maintain a § 1202 cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

§ 1202 cause of action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

E. Request for Leave to Amend

Finally, in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff

attempts to “request[] leave to amend to file a Second Amended Complaint that

contains the added factual allegations in Gardner II.” (ECF No. 20, at 13.) As Plaintiff

has sought leave to amend in an opposition rather than in a motion, the Court declines

to consider the issue of leave to amend. See Nejo v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 09-cv-879-

BEN-JMA, 2010 WL 371906, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2010) (declining to consider

a request for an expungement order first raised in a reply brief). If Plaintiff wishes to

seek leave to amend his complaint, separate from this Court’s dismissal without

prejudice, he should file the appropriate motion with this Court.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, (ECF Nos. 12, 18), are GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s first cause of action as to attorney fees and statutory damages

and § 1202 cause of action are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

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AMEND;

3. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies

noted herein, he may do so by following the instructions in this Court’s

Consolidation Order and filing a consolidated complaint in Gardner I on

or before February 6, 2015; and

1

4. The hearing set for December 19, 2014, is VACATED.

DATED: December 16, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

The Court has set a deadline that follows the anticipated ruling on CafePress’s 1

pending motion to dismiss in GardnerI, (No. 3:13-cv-1108-GPC-JLB, ECF No. 122),

so as to avoid the possibility of Plaintiff having to file a multiple consolidated

complaints depending on the outcome of said motion.

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