Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06673/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06673-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN CABALES,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT AYERS, JR., warden, 

Respondent. /

No. C 06-6673 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

John Cabales, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action seeking a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for

consideration of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will

be denied.

BACKGROUND

Cabales pled guilty to second degree murder in 1990 in San Joaquin County Superior

Court. He was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in prison. His habeas petition does

not concern that conviction directly, but instead focuses on a December 28, 2005 decision by

the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) to deny him parole.

The BPH identified several reasons for its decision that Cabales “is not suitable for

parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society, or a threat to public safety,

if released from prison.” RT 46. The BPH based its decision on the commitment offense,

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Cabales’ escalating pattern of criminality, and his in-prison misconduct. Although it

commended Cabales for his participation in therapy and completion of work placement

programs and recognized that Cabales was getting better, the BPH noted that Cabales’

improvements were recent and did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability. RT 47-48. 

Cabales sought relief in the state courts. The San Joaquin County Superior Court

summary denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a reasoned decision. Resp. Exh. 6. 

The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied his

petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Resp. Exhs. 8 and 10. 

Cabales then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

two cognizable issues: whether the BPH’s denial of parole violated Cabales’ right to due

process and whether the denial of parole violated the terms of Cabales’ plea agreement. The

court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not issue. Respondent filed an

answer and Cabales filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action concerns the execution of the sentence of a prisoner housed at San Quentin State

Prison in Marin County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006).

The San Joaquin County Superior Court’s decision is the last reasoned decision, and

therefore is the decision to which § 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. The Sufficiency Of The Evidence Claim

1. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support A Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

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could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and

assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law

in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the BPH's use of evidence about the

crime that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts for

applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.

2007). Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor

of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on

an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a

due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of a parole

release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because

of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which criticized the Biggs statements

as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: "Under AEDPA it is not

our function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on unchanging

factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole applicant's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole at

subsequent parole consideration hearing). Recently, Irons determined that due process was

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not violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole

for a prisoner 16 years into his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases

(Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a

prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with

due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of

years required by his sentence." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665; see e.g., id. at 660 (inmate in 16th

actual year of his 17-to-life sentence). 

The message of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such

as the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight

to be attributed to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future

dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and

Irons). Sass did not dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a criminal act

committed 50 years ago is less probative of a prisoner's current dangerousness than one

committed 10 years ago. Not only does the passage of time in prison count for something,

exemplary behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for something according to Biggs and

Irons. Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that the

decision not be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make

for an arbitrary decision.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

2. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A

first degree murder conviction yields a base term of 25 years to life and a second degree

murder conviction yields a base term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re

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Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal

Code § 190. The upshot of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date

normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The

regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of

crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years,

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depending on some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve

based only on the matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence

puts the cart before the horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and

regulations that requires the prisoner first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the

prisoner is found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he

panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The

California Supreme Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this

federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he

nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole"

but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be

considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction

for that offense"). 

 3. Some Evidence Supports The BPH's Decision In Cabales’ Case

The BPH found Cabales unsuitable for parole based on the circumstances of the

murder, his prior criminality, and his prison misconduct.

a. Commitment Offense

The facts of the crime were taken from the probation officer's report and read into the

record by a BPH commissioner:

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On July 11, 1988 at approximately 5:10, according the Stockton police, [] four

pedestrians in the area of Scott and Counter Street in the City of Stockton were being

assaulted by an assailant wielding a shotgun. An investigation revealed that Rafael

Garcia died as a result of shotgun wounds; and that [Miguel] Asseas and Louis

Gonzales also sustained shotgun wounds and that [Miguel] Pastel was beaten about

the head with a shotgun stock. Witness, Steven Hill, informed me that . . . the suspect

exited the vehicle with what appeared to be a shotgun and loaded it, fired two rounds

at one pedestrian and struck the other in the head with the stock of the shotgun . . . [a

witness] observed the driver [of] the vehicle shoot a third victim at the northwest

corner of the intersection above and then fire the shotgun and still another victim who

was further up the street walking northbound on Commerce Court. The car then fled

the scene. Inmate was identified as the individual with the shotgun. 

RT 8-10; see Resp. Exh. 3, p. 1. 

Cabales’ version of the events was slightly different. He stated that he was in a park

when several men attacked and robbed him. Resp. Exh. 3 at 1. After they ran away, he went

to his friend’s house where he borrowed a shotgun to chase after the men and get his

belongings back. Cabales stated that when he caught up with the men, they came towards

him with knives. Cabales told the men to stay where they were, but when they started

running, he tried to shoot them and hit them in the legs. “One guy was running down a slope

and the spread of the shotgun shell, I guess, hit too high, and some of the shot hit him in the

back. When that happened, I panicked and just took off.” Id. at 2. 

At the hearing, it was clarified that there were two separate shootings. Cabales

admitted that “the first person that I shot at, it was a mistake,” RT 11, apparently meaning

that the person was not involved in the earlier incident in the park. 

The BPH considered the circumstances of the murder and concluded that it was

carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. A circumstance tending to indicate

unsuitability for parole is that "the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered

in determining whether that circumstance exists are that there were multiple victims, "[t]he

offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense," "[t]he

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation

to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). 

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There was some evidence in the record to support the BPH’s finding that Cabales

committed the offense in “an especially calculated manner” and “in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.” RT 46. Even

accepting Cabales’ version of the events, he had time to go to his friend’s house, borrow a

gun, and hunt down the men who robbed him. The evidence shows that he had time to

reflect and supports the conclusion that Cabales planned the attack. The BPH further noted

that “multiple victims were attacked in separate [incidents] and one was killed.” Id. “The

motive for the crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. The

evidence supported this view. A witness saw Cabales fire two rounds from a shotgun at one

man and strike another man in the head with the gun. Resp. Exh. 4 at 2. Cabales then

returned to his vehicle and drove away. At a different intersection, another witness saw

Cabales shoot a third victim and fire the gun at a fourth victim. Id. Even if the men had

robbed Cabales, his motive was very trivial in relation to the calculated and extreme manner

in which he attacked them by firing a shotgun at them as they tried to run away. The

evidence is very clear that any robbery definitely had concluded when Cabales engaged in

his murderous conduct. He left the park, retrieved a double-barreled shotgun, got in a car

and went in search of the robbers. He shot first at the wrong person before finding the people

he thought had robbed him. The shots he fired killed one person and hit two others. And he

beat a third person with the stock of the shotgun. As the district attorney also argued, even if

one accepted Cabales’ version as true, this killing wasn’t to stop a robbery but looked more

like revenge. RT 38; see also RT 48-49. The BPH identified more than the minimum

elements of a first degree murder when it determined that the facts of the murder showed

Cabales’ unsuitability for parole. 

Cabales also urges that it was improper for the BPH to rely on the fact that multiple

victims were attacked, arguing that such reliance is improper because he was not tried and

convicted by a jury of attacking multiple victims. He argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000) forbids the use of the information. His argument fails, because the

information is properly considered by the parole authority. Cabales’ sentence is 15-to-life,

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and the BPH has not used the fact that he shot at and hit several people to extend his sentence

beyond the life maximum to which he was sentenced. Apprendi is not implicated by the

BPH’s use of the information about the particulars of the crime

b. Pre-Offense Behavior

The BPH also relied on Cabales’ pre-offense history to determine that he was not

suitable for parole. “The inmate had a record of previous - an escalating pattern of criminal

conduct. Inmate failed the previous grants of probation and parole and cannot be counted

upon to avoid criminality. He has failed to profit from society’s previous [sic] to correct his

criminality, including juvenile probation, California Youth Authority, probation, county jail,

prior prison terms and parole.” RT 47. 

The record supports the BPH’s reliance on Cabales’ pre-offense criminality in finding

him unsuitable for parole. Cabales committed the killing for which he is now in prison when

he was 33 years old. It was far from his first brush with the law. He had been adjudged a

ward of the juvenile court for an unknown matter in February 1969, when he was about 14

years old. He was put in juvenile hall again in 1971 for being out of control. In November

1972 he was booked into juvenile hall yet again for being out of control and for arson. In

November 1973, he was arrested for two counts of homicide; these were dismissed in the

interest of justice and he was convicted of being an accessory to a felony; he was referred to

the CDC on January 1974 for a diagnosis under Penal Code §1203.03. In April 1974, he was

committed to the CYA for being an accessory to a felony and second degree burglary,

although the conviction was set aside and dismissed (apparently upon his successful

completion of his incarceration) in May 1977. See Resp. Exh. 3, pp. 2-3. His adult criminal

record included the following: He was arrested in November 1977 for attempted burglary

and carrying a loaded firearm, which led to a conviction of misdemeanor disorderly conduct

and a suspended 60-day jail sentence as well as a 2-year probation term. In August 1978, he

was arrested for burglary, which led to a conviction and 16-month prison term. Within four

months of his release from prison, he was arrested for fighting and trespassing, which led to a

misdemeanor conviction and a 90-day suspended jail sentence as well as a 24-month

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probation term. He was arrested in September 1981 for attempted homicide, which was

dismissed in the interest of justice. In June 1986, he pled no contest to one count of

misdemeanor child abuse. Resp. Exh. 3, p. 3. Two years later he committed the murder in

this case. 

Consideration of and reliance on Cabales’ pre-offense criminal history was not

improper. Although the prisoner's "previous record of violence" on a victim is a specifically

listed circumstance, the list of circumstances in § 2402(c) is non-exclusive, and § 2402(b)

specifically allows the BPH to consider a great range of relevant and reliable information,

such as the prisoner's "past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented." Cabales’ prior criminal activity could be

considered by the BPH as tending to show unsuitability. There was plenty of evidence to

support the BPH’s determination that his pre-offense criminality as well as his failure to

profit from previous attempts to address his criminality tended to show he was not suitable

for parole. 

c. In Prison Behavior

Section 2402(b) allows the BPH to consider a great range of relevant and reliable

information, such as the prisoner's social history and past and present mental state. The BPH

also may consider evidence that the "prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison or

jail" as tending to indicate unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(6). 

The BPH found that Cabales had not demonstrated sufficient positive change in

prison. He had received three CDC-115 (serious rules violation) disciplinary reports. The

most recent CDC-115 was in 1999 for mutual combat in which he dislocated another

inmate’s jaw. RT 47; Resp. Exh. 3, p. 6. He had received another CDC-115 in 1999 for

possession of tattoo paraphernalia. Id. He also had received a CDC-115 in 1993 for

possession with intent to traffic methamphetamine. Resp. Exh. 3, pp. 4, 5. He also had

received eleven CDC-128s for lesser transgressions. Consideration of and reliance on

Cabales’ prison behavior and failure to demonstrate sufficient positive change was not

improper. 

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The psychological evaluation also raised serious concerns about whether he had

changed for the better. The psychologist wrote, “Given Mr. Cabales’s socialization as a

violent individual and protracted history of offenses involving violence, there is the

possibility that he would revert to what is most familiar to him if living outside a controlled

environment.” Resp. Exh. 4 at 5. One cannot read that evaluation without developing grave

doubts about Cabales’ ability to live outside prison without hurting people with whom he

gets into conflict. The psychologist who evaluated Cabales certainly saw him as a work in

progress with much work still to be done, as evidenced by his comments that Cabales “has

begun to understand” the benefits of avoiding violence, “has begun to see some gain from”

his participation in self-help, “has begun a process of substituting old values of meeting goals

through force with more socially conforming behaviors and attitudes, and “has begun to

incorporate values and skills that would allow him to live free of violence in the community.” 

Id. at 4-5.

Cabales argues that he has participated in therapy in prison and has been disciplinefree for several years. Both the psychological report and the BPH recognized Cabales’

achievements and progress. The BPH acknowledged Cabales’ participation in Alcoholics

Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous and stated that he was “getting better.” RT 49. 

However, the BPH also noted that Cabales’ gains were recent and he needs more “therapy,

self-help and programming in order to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress in a

non-destructive manner and to gain further insight into the crime.” RT 47. There was

sufficient evidence to support the BPH’s reliance on the insufficiency of Cabales’ progress in

prison as tending to show he was unsuitable for parole. 

d. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision

 The BPH noted that Cabales had various in-prison achievements, but concluded that

the positive factors did not outweigh the factors discussed above showing unsuitability. The

factors listed by the BPH in support of its determination that Cabales was not suitable for

parole had some evidentiary support. And the factors were factors that could be considered

in determining parole suitability. 

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The San Joaquin County Superior Court correctly identified the “some evidence”

standard as the standard for judicial review of BPH decisions and reasonably applied it to

consider the evidentiary support for the BPH’s conclusion that Cabales was not suitable for

parole. See Resp. Exh. 6. The San Joaquin County Superior Court’s rejection of Cabales’

insufficient evidence claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the

Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard. He is not entitled to the writ.

Cabales contends that the BPH erred in relying on the commitment offense to deny

parole. The weight to be attributed to the commitment offense may fade over time as a

predictor of current dangerousness as the dicta in Biggs and Irons state, but reliance on the

commitment offense 15 actual years into a 15-to-life sentence would pass muster under either

of those cases, and the BPH relied on much more than the commitment offense alone to

determine that Cabales was unsuitable. Furthermore, the rate at which the criminal conduct

fades as a predictor slows down when the prisoner engages in further misconduct and does

not demonstrate rehabilitation. Here, Cabales had accumulated three CDC-115s for rule

violations in prison and eleven CDC-128s for lesser infractions. One of the rule violations

was for fighting, indicated a continued tendency toward violence, and another was for

methamphetamine. He also had an unfavorable psychological evaluation. These raise

serious concerns about his ability to comply with the law and refrain from violence if

released. They indicate that his rehabilitation is still a work in progress. While Cabales and

other prisoners decry the use of the unchanging evidence of pre-incarceration events, inprison behavior is something the prisoner has control over, and the fact that a prisoner

continues to violate prison rules indicates that he does not have a very high level of selfcontrol, especially when the misconduct occurs years into the sentence and at a time when he

should realize how such conduct will reflect on his parole suitability. Biggs and Irons did not

stand for the proposition that in-prison behavior doesn't matter -- to the contrary, they stand

for the proposition that old bad facts can at a certain point be overcome by more recent good

facts regarding a prisoner's ability to conform to societal norms.

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B. The Breach Of Plea Agreement Claim

Cabales asserts that his plea agreement was breached when the BPH denied parole

because he expected that “[a]s long as he conducted himself honorably in prison, he would

secure release at the first available opportunity.” Petition, p. 15. He also asserts that there

was an agreement that the “crime was to be treated as second degree murder for all

purposes.” Id. 

The breach of plea agreement claim is time-barred. “A 1-year period of limitation

shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A habeas petition by a state prisoner

challenging a decision of an administrative body, such as the BPH, is covered by the statute

and the limitations period starts to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the factual predicate or basis of Cabales’ claim that his plea agreement was

violated was known to him no later than April 2000. He was not paroled when his minimum

eligible parole date (“MEPD”) arrived in April 2000. He had been found not suitable for

parole at his initial parole consideration hearing months earlier in February 1999, as well as

at his first subsequent parole consideration date on July 2002. The February 1999 decision

might have been an anticipatory breach, but certainly the actual breach occurred no later than

April 2000. Further, if there was any doubt in Cabales’ mind that prison officials were not

living up to his parole expectations, it was removed when he was denied parole again in July

2002. Cabales’ claim accrued in April 2000 and he did not file his federal habeas petition

within the one-year limitations period, even allowing for the time during 2005 and 2006 that

his state habeas petitions were pending. He could not revive the time-barred claim by

asserting that the agreement – which by his account was irrevocably breached in 2000 – was

breached again in 2005, no more than one can revive a time-barred claim on a contract by

alleging a new breach years after the contract was irrevocably breached.

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Even if the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, the breach of plea

bargain claim has no merit. “Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by

contract law standards.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)). Although a criminal

defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement, see Santobello v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971), there is no evidence that Cabales’ subjective

expectations about how parole would be decided were part of the plea agreement. He has not

pointed to any language in any plea agreement that shows that any particular term in his plea

agreement has been breached, but instead seems to argue that he never expected parole

consideration to work the way it does. The transcript of the change of plea agreement

contains no statement that Cabales would be paroled either by a specific date or under any

specified conditions; the “term” Cabales imparts to the agreement was at most his

unexpressed subjective belief. Cabales’ sentence upon his conviction based on the plea

agreement was 15-to-life and not a straight 15 year sentence. He has received the parole

considerations to which he was entitled under that agreement and sentence. The San Joaquin

County Superior Court’s rejection of Cabales’ breach of plea agreement claim was not an

unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by

the U.S. Supreme Court. Cabales’ claim that his plea agreement was breached in violation of

his right to due process fails. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. The clerk

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 31, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and negative institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social

history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered

from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the

probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed

marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

NOTE

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