Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05748/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05748-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 12, 2003, and Petitioner filed a traverse on 1

February 26, 2004, and a supplemental traverse on August 27, 2004. (Court Docs. 127, 134, 137.) In Findings and

Recommendations issued concurrently herewith, the Court has recommended that the petition be denied. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY TYRONE FOSTER,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSIE B. GARCIA, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 99-5748 OWW DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S SECOND

MOTION TO AMEND 

[Docs. 147, 148, 149]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was filed on May 28, 1999, is 

currently pending review on the merits by this Court. Petitioner filed one previous request to

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exhaust a claim based on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.#d.2d 403 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). (Court Doc. 142.) Respondent filed an opposition

to Petitioner’s motion on December 9, 2005. (Court Doc. 143.) The motion was denied on

January 25, 2006. (Court Doc. 145.) 

On July 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a second request for a stay based on a newly discovered

claim. (Court Doc. 147.) On September 15, 2006, Petitioner filed an addendum to his request. 

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28 As Respondent correctly states, at the time, the diversion statute provided that a defendant did not plead 2

guilty, but was ordered to participate in a drug education, treatment, or rehabilitation program for six months to two

years. People v. Ormiston, 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 687 n.7 (2003). Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the

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(Court Doc. 148.) Respondent filed an opposition to Petitioner’s request on September 22, 2006. 

(Court Doc. 149.) Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s opposition on October 16, 2006. 

(Court Doc. 152.) 

DISCUSSION

In his request and addendum, Petitioner contends that he has recently discovered facts

supporting a claim that the prosecutor in his trial violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83

S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). (Court Doc. 147, at 1, 4-5.) Specifically, Petitioner states

that in late 2004, another state prisoner informed him that the victim in his criminal case, Darnell

Packard, and a prosecution witness, Kevin Coleman, each had a prior arrest for the offense of

possession of cocaine base for sale (Cal. Penal Code § 11351.5.) (Court Doc. 147, at 1-2; Court

Doc. 148, Exhs. C, D, & E, at 3.)

Beginning in January 2006, Petitioner filed various requests with the state court for Mr.

Packard’s and Mr. Coleman’s arrest records. (Court Doc. 147, at 1; Court Doc. 148, Exh A at 7,

Exh. B at 1; Exh. E at 3, Exh. E, Appendix A [Freedom of Information Act request dated January

14, 2006].) 

Petitioner has submitted court documents relating to the arrest of Darnell Lamont Packard

and Kevin Wayne Coleman. (Court Doc. 147, at 2.) As Respondent submits, these names match

the names of the victim and a prosecution witness in Petitioner’s trial. (See RT 58, 150.) A

complaint was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court on or about April 1, 1991, in case

number 43901-4 charging both men with a violation of California Penal Code section 11351.5,

possession of cocaine base for sale. (Court Doc. 148, Exh. C.) Both men were held to answer

the charges on May 7, 1991. (Id.) However, the documents submitted by Petitioner demonstrate

that the State moved to dismiss the charge against Mr. Packard on December 5, 1991, and he was

ordered discharged. (Court Doc. 147, Exh. A, Appendix E.) Subsequently, on August 9, 1993,

Mr. Coleman’s case was dismissed. (Id, Appendix F.) The minutes further reflect that Mr.

Coleman had completed a California Penal Code section 1000 diversion program as ordered.2

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28 charge would be dismissed and the arrest would be deemed not to have occurred. Id. 

AEDPA refers to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 3

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(Id., Appendix F.) 

Petitioner contends that the prosecution suppressed evidence of these arrests in violation

of Brady. (Court Doc. 147, at 4; Court Doc. 148, at 2.) 

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a

district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present his

unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance and then to return to federal court for

review of his perfected petition. 

Nevertheless, stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances, because the

procedure frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay 3

the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal

habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court

prior to filing his federal petition. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court held that a stay and abeyance is

“only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. 

In Rhines, the Supreme Court noted that, while the procedure should be “available only in

limited circumstances,” it “likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a

stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his

unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner

engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

A. Good Cause For Failure To Exhaust

As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner did not present the instant Brady violation

until July 5, 2006 (Court Doc. 147), twelve years after his conviction, years after extensive

postconviction litigation in the state courts that included six state habeas petitions, and after

numerous and various filings in this Court. As previously stated, Petitioner claims:

Approximately late 2004. While the petitioner was housed at: “Salinas

State Prison level IV, another Fresnoan state prisoner coveyed [sic] to petitioner

that Packard was once arrested for sales of “Crack Cocaine” to a Fresno

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undercover Police Officer?

(Court Doc. 148, Exh. E at 3.) 

As Respondent submits, despite Petitioner having notice of his alleged Brady violation

claim, Petitioner took no action at all for more than a year until he submitted a Freedom of

Information Act request (Court Doc. 147, Exh. B, Appendix A.), and wrote to the Fresno County

Superior Court (Court Doc. 147, Exh. B, Appendix D, E), on January 14, 2006. Even at this

juncture, Petitioner has not taken steps to exhaust his Brady claim in the state courts by filing a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Although Petitioner claims that he must seek a stay from this

Court in order to exhaust this claim, Petitioner was nonetheless able to exhaust the claim in state

court when he became aware of its existence. Additionally, Petitioner claims that he has filed a

complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act (Court Doc. 147, Exh. A), and a complaint with the

California State Bar (Court Doc. 147, Exh. B), these are not steps toward exhausting the instant

Brady claim in state court. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause for his

failure to seek prompt steps at exhausting this claim once he admittedly discovered the factual

predicate in “late 2004.” 

B. Unexhausted Claims Potentially Meritorious

As previously stated, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor suppressed impeachment

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, based on his “newly discovered evidence.” 

First, as Respondent points out, the Court could likely never reach the merits of

Petitioner’s claim as it is barred by the AEDPA one-year limitations period. Assuming that

Petitioner did not discover the factual predicate for his claim until “late 2004" (Court Doc. 148,

Exh. E at 3), the one-year limitations period began to run at that time (28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D)) and expired in late 2005 without Petitioner having taken any action to toll it. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Nor does the claim relate back to any claim in the federal petition filed

on May 28, 1999. (Court Doc. 1.)

Second, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the claim is potentially meritorious. In

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

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evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution." See also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-281 (1999). The Supreme

Court has stated that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been

no request by the accused. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The duty to disclose

encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Such evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id., at 682; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (1995). Additionally,

“the rule encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438. To constitute a Brady violation, the

Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test: 1) “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; 2) “[T]hat evidence must

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently”; and 3) “[P]rejudice must

have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 218-282.

Petitioner has not, and likely cannot, demonstrate that the evidence that he recently

discovered was “material” in that there is a reasonable probability that, had it been provided to

the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Petitioner has submitted

evidence that both Mr. Coleman and Mr. Packard were charged with possession of cocaine base

for sale in 1991. However, the evidence submitted by Petitioner does not demonstrate that Mr.

Packard engaged in any misconduct, as the charge against him was dismissed eight months after

the complaint was filed, on December, 5, 1991, on the prosecution’s motion. (Court Doc. 147,

Exh. B, Appendix E.) 

Although the charges against Mr. Coleman were not dismissed, Petitioner’s documents

demonstrate the he successfully completed a diversion program pursuant to Penal Code section

1000 et seq. (Id., Appendix F.) Pursuant to California law, at that time, the arrest was deemed

not to have occurred. Ormiston, 105 Cal.App.4th at 687 n.7, 690 n.10. Accordingly, as

Respondent submits, this evidence would not have had great impeachment value. Moreover, Mr.

Coleman’s trial testimony was brief and somewhat cumulative of Mr. Packard’s testimony (See

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RT 150-155.) Mr. Coleman testified that he had encountered Mr. Packard, a relative, shortly

after Packard had escaped from the carjacked vehicle. (RT 151.) Mr. Coleman testified that Mr.

Packard appeared to be in shock. (RT 153.) Mr. Packard told him that he had been carjacked

and he was able to take the gun away from the perpetrator. (RT 153.) Thus, even if Mr.

Coleman’s entire testimony had been discounted, it was immaterial to the verdict and would have

made no difference.

To the extent Petitioner contends that the arrests resulted in bias in favor of the

prosecution, his claim is without merit. As Respondent points out, in his state bar complaint,

Petitioner suggests that Mr. Packard and Mr. Coleman were “placed into a drug diversion

program pursuant to a hidden plea bargain. . . .” (Court Doc. 147, Exh. B at 2.) However, both

Mr. Packard’s and Mr. Coleman’s cases were resolved with dismissal of the charges prior to

Petitioner committing his criminal offense on October 19, 1993. 

C. Intentional Dilatory Litigation Tactics

A stay is not appropriate if “a petitioner engages in abusive litigation tactics or intentional

delay. . . .” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

 Notwithstanding this is Petitioner’s second motion to stay in less than a year, the amount

of delay that Petitioner has engaged in presenting the claim to this Court, coupled with the fact

that Petitioner, an experienced litigator, has failed to present his claim to the state courts,

suggests that Petitioner is attempting to delay the instant proceedings. 

Moreover, as Respondent argues, it appears that Petitioner is likely to engage in more

abusive litigation if granted a stay. A document attached to the addendum filed on September

15, 2006, appears to be Petitioner’s proposed amendment to his federal petition. (See Court Doc.

148, Exh. E at 1.) The amendment is not limited to a presentation of the newfound Brady claim. 

Rather, Petitioner raises numerous issues both old and new, including: counsel’s failure to file a

motion to dismiss the case (Id. at 1); a conflict motion hearing was held in his absence (Id. at 2);

a police report regarding an unnamed eye-witness who named someone else as the shooter was

also suppressed (Id. at 4); he was not arraigned within forty-eight hours (Id. at 5, 8); he had no

counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing (Id.); the superior court and Public Defender’s

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Office have not supplied requested documents (Id. at 6); the clothing that he wore on the day of

the crime was lost before trial (Id. at 8); the identification procedure employed after the crime

was unconstitutional (Id. at 10-16); and the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct in

argument (Id. at 17). 

Petitioner’s delayed and continued presentation of several claims, both old and new,

demonstrate that he is attempting to abuse the process by presenting claims that have already

been presented to the Court or raise additional unauthorized claims, beyond his newfounded

Brady claim. As such, the Court cannot find that Petitioner is not attempting to engage in

abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. 

D. Application of Taylor and Kelly to Stay of Exhausted Petition

The Ninth Circuit has questioned, but not resolved, whether the standards set forth by the

United States Supreme Court in Rhines apply when the petitioner seeks to stay a fully exhausted

petition. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9 Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit noted that Rhines th

held that the district court authorized stays of mixed petitions in limited circumstances. Id. at

660. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the “three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure approved in

Taylor and Kelly” might still be valid. Id.; see Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9 Cir. 2002); th

Calderon v. District Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981 (9 Cir. 1998). This implicates that the th

limitations set on the stay and abeyance in Rhines might not apply. See Jackson, 425 F.3d at

659; see, e.g. Romero v. Runnels, No. CIV S-04-0459, 2006 WL 2460736 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug.

23, 2006); Lugo v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0580, 2006 WL 449130 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006). 

Respondent disagrees with the view expressed in Jackson, arguing that Taylor and Kelly

were decided before Rhines. Kelly and Taylor held that a district court presented with a mixed

petition should (1) allow a petitioner to amend the petition by deleting the unexhausted claims,

(2) entertain a request for a stay in order to exhaust the claims, and (3) allow the petitioner to

amend the stayed petition to add the claims once they are exhausted. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070;

Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986-89. The Taylor court cautioned that district courts should not have

“carte blanche” to stay petitions, giving the petitioner who seeks to stall the process as an

example of where a stay should not be granted. Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986 n.11. 

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Respondent argues that a Petitioner seeking a stay of an exhausted petition should not be

permitted to evade the requirements imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Rhines. 

According to Respondent, Rhines sought to address the very problem addressed in Kelly and

Taylor: how to accommodate the total exhaustion requirement and the AEDPA limitations period

when a petitioner presents a mixed petition. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275; Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070;

Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986. Respondent reasons that the better view is that Rhines supplants the

three-step procedure. 

The Court need not resolve the question whether Rhines applies to the instant stay,

because as Respondent submits, even if the minimal limitations of Taylor and Kelly apply,

Petitioner is still not entitled to a stay. Petitioner’s substantial delay in presenting the Brady

claim, after he discovered the claims in “late 2004", has caused the one-year statute of limitations

to run. Moreover, as previously discussed, there is evidence that suggests Petitioner is attempting

to stall the process of federal review. See Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986 n.11. As such, the Court finds

that a stay is not warranted under Taylor and Kelly. 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s request to stay the petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 20, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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