Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03813/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03813-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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For the Northern District of California

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE B. SONG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SHYUE Y. CHANG and DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-03813 CRB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Now before the Court is plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

A court may authorize a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment

of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay

such fees or give security therefor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff has submitted the

required documentation, and it is evident from his application that his assets and income are

insufficient to enable plaintiff to prosecute the action.

Viewing plaintiff’s application in isolation, it appears that he should be allowed to

proceed IFP. A court is under a continuing duty, however, to dismiss a case whenever it

determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-- (iii).

This action is identical to a previous action filed by plaintiff and dismissed by this 
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Court, 05-3041. Plaintiff is a physician. He alleges that while he was working as an intern at

Taipei Veterans General Hospital in Taiwan in the 1980’s he was treated by defendant, a

surgeon, for treatment of snoring. Plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally created a

severe upper airway obstruction and that this intentional conduct caused plaintiff to become

permanently disabled. He alleges that defendant engaged in such “intentional mayhem”

because defendant “resented Plaintiff’s American medical education, advanced degrees and

U.S. citizenship.” Complaint at p. 3.

The Court dismissed plaintiff’s original complaint in 05-3041 because plaintiff did not

identify under what law or statute he made his claims. The Court also held that it did not

have venue of plaintiff’s claims. As plaintiff had not identified any law pursuant to which he

was bringing his suit, the Court treated the complaint as a demonstrated that venue in this

district was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b). The Court also found that plaintiff’s

complaint demonstrated that the Court did not have personal jurisdiction of defendant, a

Taiwan surgeon; in particular, the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations did not satisfy either

general or specific jurisdiction. For all these reasons, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s new complaint identifies the statute pursuant to which he brings his claim:

the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. section 2333. That statute provides:

Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or

business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,

survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the

United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and

the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. 

The statute also provides for venue in this district. 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (venue is proper

“where any plaintiff resides”).

While plaintiff’s new action demonstrates that the Court has venue of his claim, the

complaint must nonetheless be dismissed. First, plaintiff does not add any allegations that

would demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction of defendant, a Taiwan surgeon. 

See Estate of Unger v. Palestinian Authority, ___F.Supp.2d___, 2005 WL 3005810

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005) (dismissing 18 U.S.C. section 2333 claims for lack of personal
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G:\CRBALL\2005\3813\orderofdismissal.wpd 3

jurisdiction). That statute provides that process may be served “in any district where the

defendant resides, is found, or has an agent.” 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a). The complaint alleges

that defendant does not reside in any district; inside he resides and is found in Taiwan.

Second, the statute provides a cause of action for those injured by acts of

“international terrorism.” International terrorism is defined as acts that “appear to be

intended–(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a

government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by

mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(B)(i)(ii)(iii). Plaintiff

alleges that defendant intentionally botched the surgery because he resented plaintiff’s

American medical training. Such allegation, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

cannot reasonably be read as alleging an act of international terrorism as is defined by the

statute. This is especially so given that plaintiff alleges that he did not even discover

defendant’s “intentional mayhem” until nearly 20 years after the surgery. Such “hidden”

conduct cannot be designed to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” 

In sum, plaintiff cannot state a claim under 28 U.S.C. section 2333 as a matter of law. 

Thus, his request to proceed with this lawsuit without the prepayment of fees is denied, and

his complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Nov. 14, 2005

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE