Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07227/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07227-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 1998 Decided April 21, 1998

No. 95-7225

Thomas P. Athridge, Sr., et al.,

Appellants

v.

Hilda Rivas, trading as

Churreria Madrid Restaurant,

Appellee

No. 95-7226

Thomas P. Athridge, Sr., et al.,

Appellants

v.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,

Appellee

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No. 95-7227

Thomas P. Athridge, Sr., et al.,

Appellants

v.

Jesus Iglesias, et al.,

Appellees

No. 95-7228

Thomas P. Athridge, Sr.,

Individually and as Father and

Next Friend of Thomas P. Athridge, Minor,

Appellant

v.

Jorge Iglesias, et al.,

Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv01222)

(No. 92cv01866)

(No. 92cv01867)

(No. 92cv01868)

William J. Rodgers argued the cause for appellants.

Charles B. Long was on brief.

Paul R. Pearson argued the cause for appellees Jesus and

Alicia Iglesias. Irving Starr entered an appearance.

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David F. Grimaldi argued the cause for appellees Rivas

and Churreria Madrid Restaurant.

Roger W. Heald was on brief for appellee Aetna Casualty &

Surety Co.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs Tommy Athridge (Tommy) and his father Thomas P. Athridge,

Jr., appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to

the defendants in a civil action arising from an automobile

accident in which Tommy was seriously injured. We affirm

the grant of summary judgment to defendants Jesus and

Alicia Iglesias and their insurer, the Aetna Casualty & Surety

Company (Aetna), and reverse and remand with respect to

defendants Francisco and Hilda Rivas and the Churreria

Madrid Restaurant for the reasons set forth below.

I.

On July 29, 1987 defendant Alicia Iglesias sent her

16-year-old son, Jorge, (Jorge) to mow the lawn at the

residence (located in the District of Columbia) of his cousins,

defendants Francisco and Hilda Rivas, who were out of town

at the time. While at the Rivases', Jorge entered their house

through an open window, found the keys to the Rivases'

manual transmission VW Jetta on a kitchen windowsill and

decided to drive the car. The Jetta was registered to Francisco Rivas and to the restaurant he owns, defendant Churreria Madrid Restaurant.

Jorge and his friend, James Ko, drove the Jetta to a local

mall where they met up with Tommy, John Thornburg and

several other friends at about noon. Jorge drove Tommy,

Thornburg and some of the other teenagers to the house of

another friend, Erin Rupp, for a pool party. Jorge, Thornburg and Ko left the party in the Jetta an hour later. As

Jorge was driving away, however, Thornburg noticed that

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Tommy's school books were still in the car. Jorge then

turned the car around and drove back toward Rupp's house,

stopping at a stop sign approximately 440 feet from the

house. Jorge then began to accelerate towards the Rupp

house. Tommy, who was with a group of people in the Rupp

driveway, moved into the street and began waving his arms in

an apparent attempt to stop the car. Jorge, however, continued to accelerate towards Tommy, reaching a speed of approximately 40 mph. Tommy remained in the middle of the

road. At the last moment, Tommy tried to leap out of the

way but Jorge swerved in the same direction. The Jetta

struck Tommy and threw him against the windshield. The

car then swerved, ran onto a neighbor's lawn, struck a large

rock, became airborne and eventually landed in a ravine

where it hit two trees. Tommy sustained multiple injuries,

including extensive skull fracture and permanent brain injury.

On May 4, 1989 Tommy and his father filed a diversity 1

suit against Jorge (as operator of the vehicle) and Francisco

Rivas and Churreria Madrid Restaurant (as registered owners of the vehicle), alleging that Jorge's negligence caused

Tommy's injuries. On October 21, 1991 Francisco Rivas and

his restaurant moved for summary judgment, asserting that

Rivas had not given Jorge permission to drive the car. The

plaintiffs opposed the motion on the ground that the "permissive use" issue involved disputed facts and was only one of

several bases of liability. On February 24, 1992 the district

court denied the motion.

In August 1992 the plaintiffs moved for leave to file an

amended complaint and also filed three new actions: (1) one

against Hilda Rivas, who was not named in the original

action, on theories of agency and negligence; (2) one against

Jorge's parents, Jesus and Alicia Iglesias, on theories of

agency, negligence and negligent entrustment; and (3) one

against Aetna, the Iglesiases' insurer. The district court

consolidated the three new actions with the original lawsuit.

The Iglesiases then moved for summary judgment and Aetna

__________

1 The Athridges are residents of the state of Maryland; the

Rivases are residents of the District of Columbia.

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subsequently joined the motion. The district court set a pretrial conference for October 22, 1992. The parties attended

but there is no record of the proceedings. The plaintiffs'

counsel maintains that he was instructed by the district court

to be prepared at the next hearing, scheduled for November

16, 1992, to "show that they were entitled to get to a jury" by

submitting "an opening statement ..., a proffer of evidence,

showing sufficient facts that would entitle them to get to a

jury." Plaintiffs' Statement of Proceeding Under Fed. R.

App. P. 10(c) at 3; JA 783. According to the plaintiffs'

counsel, the court informed him that he need not be prepared

on November 16 to establish the facts.

At the November 16 hearing the district court heard arguments by the Iglesiases and Aetna on their joint motion for

summary judgment. The court also considered the Rivases'

oral motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' counsel responded by

proffering the proposed testimony of Thornburg, who would

testify that before the incident Jorge had bragged about

having driven cars in the past, including a Porche owned by

the Rivases. The proffer was oral because, as the Athridges'

lawyer explained to the court:

There is no pending motion for summary judgment as to

[the Athridges'] claims on [sic] the Rivases. There has

not even been an answer filed on the Hilda Rivas newer

case. And I am kind of caught between a rock and a

hard place on that one, because had I been opposing a

formally filed motion for summary judgment, which I did

on a previous occasion, having to do with permissive

use--had I been opposing that today, which is not really

before the Court, I would have, obviously, been compelled to produce affidavits, testimony or otherwise.

I came in under the posture that I am to proffer evidence, which I stand by my proffer of what the evidence

will be, but there is no pending motion for summary

judgment.

So, consequently--and I have disclosed if I may, because

I want to be abundantly clear. I don't want to be

thought of as having misled the Court or counsel.

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Had I believed that it was in a different posture, then we

could have done that, but what we have done today is

simply a proffer of evidence. And I have disclosed the

existence of these people. This is my work product.

And that there are no depositions is not my problem or

my fault.

11/16/92 Proceedings Tr. 43:20-44:16.

By order filed July 19, 1995 the district court dismissed the

claims against all defendants except Jorge, explaining that

it is apparent that Jorge Iglesias acted upon a youthful

impulse of his own. His relationship to each and every

one of the named defendants in these cases was not such

as to render any one or more of them vicariously liable

for his tortious conduct. He was not driving the car in

the service of either his own parents or their relatives, or

of the restaurant coincidentally registered as a co-owner

of the car. He had no permission to use the car from

anyone, express or implied. There is no evidence from

which it could be found that any defendant could or

should have reasonably foreseen that Jorge would commit a criminal act, much less that an innocent youngster

far removed from the scene would suffer in consequence.

Athridge v. Iglesias, No. 89-1222, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. filed

July 19, 1995).

The plaintiffs appealed and moved for an order settling the

record on appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) in order to

summarize the substance of what occurred during the October 22 conference. The Iglesiases and Aetna filed objections.

The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion, stating that

"the Memorandum and Order of July 19, 1992 granting

judgments from which the appeal is taken is self-explanatory"

and that "[t]he informal (and inconclusive) pretrial proceedings in chambers of October 22, 1992, played no part in the

Court's decision." Athridge v. Iglesias, No. 89-1222, slip op.

at 2 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 1997).

The case against Jorge proceeded to a bench trial. On

November 8, 1996 the district court held, inter alia, that

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Jorge "t[ook] the car without the permission of the owner."

Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (D.D.C. 1996).

The court held that Jorge "violated the duty of care to avoid

colliding with" Tommy and "was also negligent when he

operated at an excessive speed, approximately 40 mph, on a

street in a residential neighborhood." Id. at 1190. The court

found that "this excessive speed was a proximate cause of the

collision with plaintiff." Id. The court also "conclude[d] on

the basis of the evidence that plaintiff was contributorily

negligent" since "[a] reasonably prudent person would not

stand in the middle of the road when an inexperienced driver

is rapidly approaching in a vehicle." Id. at 1191. Nevertheless, the district court noted that "[d]espite his contributory

negligence, a plaintiff may be permitted to recover under the

last clear chance doctrine" and that Tommy was entitled to

recover since "[t]here was ample room for [Jorge] to pass

[Tommy] on either side, but [Jorge] continued directly towards him." Id.

The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs,

awarding Tommy's father $110,010.78 in damages for medical

expenses and awarding Tommy damages of $1,400,000 for

diminished earning capacity and $4,000,000 for pain and suffering. Id. at 1194. On June 30, 1997 this Court summarily

affirmed the district court, explaining that Jorge "failed to

demonstrate that the district court's findings of fact were

clearly erroneous." Athridge v. Iglesias, No. 96-7261, slip op.

at 1 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1997).

Now before this Court are the Athridges' appeals of the

district court's grant of summary judgment to the Iglesiases

and their insurer as well as its sua sponte grant of summary

judgment to the Rivases and the Churreria Madrid Restaurant.

II.

Summary judgment is granted if "there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our review of

a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Riddell v. Riddell

Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

"While district courts possess the authority to enter summary

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judgment against a party sua sponte, ... that authority may

only be exercised 'so long as the losing party was on notice

that she had to come forward with all her evidence.' "

McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d

1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

447 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)).

A.

We first consider the district court's sua sponte grant of

summary judgment to the Rivases. We reject the Rivases'

claim that the Athridges were on notice because of the

October 22, 1992 conference. We cannot determine whether

such notice was adequate because of the district court's

failure to settle the record regarding that conference. Rule

10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing

or trial was made ... the appellant may prepare a

statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best

available means, including the appellant's recollection.... Thereupon the statement and any objections or

proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district

court for settlement and approval and as settled and

approved shall be included by the clerk of the district

court in the record on appeal.

Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) (emphasis added). In addition, our

Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures

states:

If no transcript is available, the appellant may prepare

and file with the district court a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means,

including recollection, and serve it on the appellee. The

appellee has ten days to serve objections or proposed

amendments in response. The district court then approves the statement as submitted or amended, and

certifies it to this Court as the record on appeal.

Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures: United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

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sion to move for settlement of the record is discretionary,

once the motion is made the district court is obligated to act

in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) and Circuit procedure. Here, the Athridges properly filed a proposed statement and served it on the appellees. The Iglesiases and

Aetna timely filed objections.2 In its curt denial of the

appellants' motion, the district court merely stated that "the

Memorandum and Order of July 19, 1992 granting judgments

from which the appeal is taken is self-explanatory" and "[t]he

informal (and inconclusive) pretrial proceedings in chambers

of October 22, 1992, played no part in the Court's decision."

Athridge v. Iglesias, No. 89-1222, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. filed

Apr. 23, 1997).

Whether Rule 10(c) and Circuit procedure were followed is

of critical importance in determining if adequate notice was

provided to the appellants that they were to come forward

with all of their evidence at the November hearing. See, e.g.,

McBride, 800 F.2d at 1212. Moreover, we are not persuaded

by the appellees' argument that Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) is

inapplicable because the October proceeding cannot be characterized as a "hearing or trial." The purpose of Fed. R.

App. P. 10(c) would be thwarted by such a narrow reading.

Indeed, "[a]ppellate consideration of the ultimate question in

a case must not be frustrated by ... failure to include in the

record preliminary proceedings which were in reality part of

the trial process, and which might be found to be of vital

significance on appeal." Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d

789, 792 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (explaining this Court's sua

sponte request that trial court reporter produce transcript of

relevant pretrial proceedings "in the interest of both parties,

and of the due administration of justice").3

__________

2 The record does not reflect that the Rivases objected to the

plaintiffs' motion to settle the record.

3 Even assuming the October proceeding was a pre-trial conference but not a "hearing," Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e) requires "[a]fter any

conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall be entered

reciting the action."

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What is clear from the record is that (1) Francisco Rivas

did not renew his summary judgment motion after his first

motion was denied in February 1992, (2) Hilda Rivas, who

was added as a defendant after Francisco and the restaurant

had moved for summary judgment, did not move for summary judgment and in fact never answered the complaint, (3)

the Athridges had no opportunity to depose Hilda or Francisco Rivas because the district court stayed discovery at the

October 1992 proceeding 4 and (4) the negligence claims made

against the Iglesiases (agency, negligent supervision and negligent entrustment) were different from those asserted

against the Rivases (consent) so that the fact that the Iglesiases had filed a summary judgment motion did not adequately place the plaintiffs on notice that summary judgment might

be granted sua sponte to the Rivases if the Iglesiases prevailed on their motion.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that "a nonmoving party go beyond the pleadings and by [its]

own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts that

there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also DKT Memorial

Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 298 (D.C.

Cir. 1989). If the Athridges had known that they faced

summary judgment with regard to the Rivases, they could

have invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) "which allows a summary

judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion

to be continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an

__________

4 The record suggests that discovery was stayed by the district

court on October 22. The plaintiffs' assertion that the district court

informed the parties on October 22 that "no discovery or further

discovery would be allowed to anyone pending the Court's further

rulings," JA 784, was not challenged by the Iglesiases or by Aetna

in their responses to the plaintiffs' Rule 10(c) motion. See JA 784-

85, 791-93, 811-15.

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opportunity to make full discovery." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326.

Here, however, the court granted summary judgment sua

sponte in a written order well after the hearing--leaving the

appellants with no option but to appeal, on an inadequate

record, to this Court. The district court erred in granting the

Rivases summary judgment sua sponte because it is unclear

whether the district court afforded the Athridges sufficient

notice or "a full opportunity to conduct discovery." Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); see also First

Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we must reverse the summary

judgment as to the Rivases and remand to the district court

for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' claims against them

and the Churreria Madrid Restaurant.

B.

By contrast, the Iglesiases moved for summary judgment

in September 1992 and the appellants therefore had ample

notice of their duty to respond and sufficient time to file a

Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery but did not. The

Athridges had advanced three bases of liability against the

Iglesiases: (1) negligent supervision because they should

have known of Jorge's history of driving without a license; (2)

negligent entrustment based on their having placed Jorge in

a position with access to car keys; and (3) agency because the

instruction to "mow the lawn" created an employer-employee

relationship. None of their claims has merit.

First, the Iglesiases are not liable for "breach of duty to

supervise" as the cases cited by the appellants themselves

demonstrate. For example, in Batemen v. Crim, the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals explained that parents are

liable for the acts of their children "where the parent has

permitted a minor to use a dangerous instrumentality, or

where they have knowingly permitted, encouraged, or failed

to discourage, conduct inherently dangerous to others or

prohibited by laws intended to promote public safety." 34

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A.2d 257, 258 (D.C. 1943). In Batemen, however, the court

rejected the plaintiff's "claim[ ] that a lack of supervision,

without evidence of prior conduct requiring the exercise of

parental restraint, renders a parent responsible for acts of a

minor which with greater supervision would not have occurred" because "the evidence does not show that the conduct

of the minors prior to the instant occurrence was such that

their parents, with closer supervision, would have been aware

that they were engaging in conduct which was unlawful or

which might inflict injury upon others." Id. at 258.

Here the Athridges similarly failed to demonstrate that

Jorge's parents were "aware that [Jorge was] engaging in

conduct which was unlawful or which might inflict injury upon

others." Id. They offered no evidence that Jorge's parents

knew that he had driven before the day of the accident. They

offered no evidence that the Iglesiases knew that Jorge had

access to the Rivases' house or car; rather, the evidence

indicated that the Rivases were out of town and that the

house would therefore be locked. We reject their assertion

that Jorge drove well enough to raise an inference that the

Iglesiases were aware that he could drive. Finally, the fact

that Jorge knew how to drive, and, according to the plaintiffs,

had driven a motorcycle, is insufficient to support an inference that Jorge's parents should have known that Jorge could

also drive a car. Moreover, this evidence does not support an

inference that Jorge had driven recklessly on any earlier

occasion or that his parents knew about any such recklessness. In sum, "to render a parent responsible for injuries

resulting from the wrongful acts of a minor, his negligence in

the exercise of parental supervision must have some specific

relation to the act complained of, which is lacking in the

present case." Id.

We also affirm the grant of summary judgment to the

Iglesiases on the negligent entrustment claim. The Restatement of Torts provides:

It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or

to engage in an activity which is under the control of the

actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person

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intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself

in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

Restatement (Second) of Torts s 308. This section applies

only if the third person is "entitled to possess or use the thing

or engage in the activity only by the consent of the actor."

Id. comment a. Here the plaintiffs offered no evidence that

the Iglesiases had control of the Rivases' car or that the

Iglesiases authorized their son to use it. Further, there was

no evidence presented that they knew Jorge would have

access to a car or to car keys.

Finally, the Iglesiases are not liable under the theory that

Jorge was acting as their employee. The Restatement of

Torts provides:

A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so

to control his servant while acting outside the scope of

his employment as to prevent him from intentionally

harming others or from so conducting himself as to

create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if (a)

the servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the

master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter

only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master,

and (b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know that

he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or

should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.

Id. s 317; see also International Distrib. Corp. v. American

Dist. Tel. Co., 569 F.2d 136, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding

security company liable for its employees' theft at business

where it provided security).

Although the record is somewhat unclear whether Jesus

Iglesias operated a lawnmowing business, the plaintiffs produced no evidence that Jorge mowed the Rivases' lawn as

part of any business. Indeed, there is no evidence that

Jorge's father directed him to mow the lawn; instead, Mrs.

Iglesias gave the order. Nor is there any evidence that

Jorge was using a chattel of his father. Finally, as with the

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negligent supervision claim, Jorge's history as a driver was

not sufficient to infer that the Iglesiases should have known

of the need to supervise Jorge.5

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Rivases and to the Churreria Madrid

Restaurant, affirm the grant of summary judgment to the

Iglesiases and Aetna and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

__________

5 While the plaintiffs rely on Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc.,

331 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1983), where the father's instruction to "mow

the lawn" was sufficient to create an employer-employee relationship, we find that case easily distinguishable in that there the lawn

was located next to the father's tavern.

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