Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01412/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01412-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 26:7609 IRS: Petition to Quash IRS Summons

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOLOMAN-NABRES FAMILY TRUST, CASE NO. CV F 05-1412 OWW DLB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON

Plaintiff, PETITION TO QUASH IRS SUMMONS AND

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs. PETITION TO QUASH IRS SUMMONS AND

TO COUNTER PETITION TO ENFORCE

IRS SUMMONS

FRED CHYNOWETH, Revenue (Docs. 1, 8.)

Agent,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America (“Government”) seeks to dismiss a petition to quash Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) summonses, demand for bill of particulars, request for injunction and claim

for personal damages filed by Gary Tedder, acting as a trustee of plaintiff Solomon-Nabres Family Trust

(“Petitioner”) and to enforce the IRS summonses issued to Charles Schwab and Company, Inc. (“Charles

Schwab”) and Bank of America. The Government further seeks to substitute itself in place of defendant

Revenue Agent Fred Chynoweth (“Agent Chynoweth”) as the real party in interest. 

On June 2, 2006, the Court granted Petitioner’s request for a continuance of the hearing on the

motion to dismiss and ordered Petitioner to secure representation of counsel to appear on its behalf. The

Court advised Petitioner that its failure to secure counsel would result in a recommendation that this

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action be dismissed. The hearing was continued to July 21, 2006. On July 5, 2006, Gary Tedder, acting

as trustee of Petitioner, filed an opposition to the Government’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s petition

and to enforce the IRS summons. Pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(c), (h), this Court considered the

Government’s motions on the record and without oral argument or the July 21, 2006 hearing, which was

vacated. For the reasons discussed below, this Court RECOMMENDS to:

1. DISMISS Agent Chynoweth and substitute the United States of America in his place;

2. DENY the petition to quash the IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of

America; and

3. GRANT the Government’s motions to dismiss the petition and to enforce the IRS

summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America.

BACKGROUND

Agent Chynoweth is investigating Petitioner’s tax liabilities for the tax years 2002 and 2003.

On October 19, 2005, Agent Chynoweth served third party record-keeper summonses on Charles

Schwab and Bank of America. The summons issued to Charles Schwab requested records relating to

petitioner’s accounts with Charles Schwab and designated November 18, 2005 as the date of appearance.

The summons issued to Bank of America requested records relating to petitioner’s accounts with Bank

of America and designated November 22, 2005 as the date of appearance. On October 19, 2005, Agent

Chynoweth served Petitioner notice of the summonses by certified mail.

On November 8, 2005, Gary Tedder, acting as trustee of Petitioner, filed a “Petition to Quash

Summons, Demand for a Bill of Particulars, Request for Injunction, Claim for Personal Damages”

(“petition”) to challenge validity of the IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America and

its service. The petition names Agent Chynoweth in his individual capacity as the sole defendant. Agent

Chynoweth received the petition by mail on March 20, 2006. Neither the United States Attorney nor

the Attorney General have been served with the petition. 

On May 1, 2006, the Government filed its papers to:

1. Dismiss all claims against Agent Chynoweth and to substitute the Government as

defendant;

2. Dismiss the petition on the following grounds:

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(a) Lack of subject matter jurisdiction in that Petitioner failed to serve its petition

within 20 days after Petitioner received notice of the IRS summons; 

(b) The petition to quash was improperly filed in propria persona by a trustee, Gary

Tedder, who is not a licensed attorney; and 

(c) Lack of personal jurisdiction as Petitioner has failed to timely serve the United

States; and

3. Enforce the IRS summons.

Agent Chynoweth’s supporting declaration states:

1. The IRS does not possess the summoned records;

2. The summoned records are necessary “to properly investigate the financial information

to aid in the examination of petitioner’s federal tax liabilities for the tax years 2002 and

2003;

3. “All administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code for issuance of

summons have been taken”; and

4. To the present, there is no “criminal referral to the Department of Justice in effect with

respect to petitioner for tax years 2002 and 2003, as defined in Section 7602(d) of Title

26, U.S.C.

As noted, Petitioner was ordered to secure licensed counsel to appear on behalf of Petitioner in

this matter. Petitioner has failed to do so. In violation of the Court’s June 2, 2006 order, Gary Tedder

filed a purported opposition on behalf of Petitioner.

DISCUSSION

Real Party In Interest

The Government claims it is the real party in interest to be substituted as defendant in place of

Agent Chynoweth in that Agent Chynoweth acted in his official capacity to issue the IRS summons. The

Government is correct. “When an action is one against named individual defendants, but the acts

complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the United

States, the action is in fact one against the United States.” Atkinson v. O’Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th

Cir. 1989). “[A] suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a suit against the

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Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references will be to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 1

§ 1, et seq.

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United States.” Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9 Cir. 1985); see Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 th

U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052 (1963); Burgos v. Milton, 709 F.2d 1, 2 (1 Cir. 1983); English v. Krubsack,

st

371 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing revenue agent and substituting Government as

real party in interest in action to quash IRS summons). Moreover, Agent Chynoweth is immune from

individual liability for his revenue agent actions. See Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9 Cir. 1985). th

As such, the Government is the proper defendant to warrant dismissal of Agent Chynoweth and

substitution of the Government in his place.

Untimely Service of Petition

The Government contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in that Petitioner failed

to comply with 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) to serve the petition within 20 days after notice of the IRS 1

summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the

Government “is immune from suit unless it has expressly waived such immunity and consented to be

sued.” Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1458. The Government consents to petitions to quash IRS summonses when

a challenging taxpayer files and serves “by registered or certified mail” to the IRS, through its revenue

agent designated in the notice of summons, a petition to quash no later than 20 days after the IRS

provided notice of summons to the taxpayer. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A), (B); Travis v. Miki, 394

F.Supp.2d 1277, 1280 (D. Hi. 2005). Section 7609(b)(2)(A)’s 20-day filing requirement is

jurisdictional. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9 Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Fogelson v. th

United States, 579 F.Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983); Grishman v. United States, 578 F.Supp. 73, 74

(S.D. N.Y. 1983); Bilodeau v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 234, 235 (D. N.H. 1983); Riggs v. United

States, 575 F.Supp. 738, 741-742 (N.D. Ill. 1983). “[T]he twenty-day limit must be strictly construed

because it is a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Ponsford, 771 F.2d at1309.

The notice is given under section 7609, and the 20-day period begins to run on the date the IRS gives,

sends or mails notice of the summons to the taxpayer, not until its receipt by the addressee. Stringer v.

United States, 776 F.2d 274, 275-276 (11 Cir. 1985); Franklin v. United States, 581 F.Supp. 38 (E.D. th

Mich. 1984); Bilodeau, 577 F.Supp. 234; Riggs, 575 F.Supp. at 741.

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Here, Agent Chynoweth served Petitioner on October 19, 2005 by certified mail notice of the

summonses. Although Petitioner timely filed its petition on November 8, 2005 and within 20 days of

notice of the IRS summons, Petitioner did not serve Agent Chynoweth (who is named as the Respondent

in the Petition) until March 20, 2006. Petitioner served Agent Chynoweth by mail and Agent

Chynoweth represents that he has not been personally served with the Petition. Neitherthe United States

nor the Attorney General have been served with the Petition. Petitioner failed to comply with section

7609(b)(2)(B) to serve the petition on the IRS or Agent Chynoweth within 20 days and in turn to invoke

this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition. See Chapple v. Internal Revenue Service, 1996 WL

249351, p. 1 (D. Id.) (petition to quash IRS summons dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

due to failure to comply strictly with section 7609(b)(2)(B) to send copy of petition to issuing revenue

agent within 20 days of notice of IRS summons); Dame v. United States, 643 F.Supp. 533, 534-535

(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to serve petition to quash

on summoned party within 20 days); Shipley v. United States, 1994 WL 731541, p. 1-2 (dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to file and serve petition to quash IRS summons within 20

days). In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Petition must be dismissed.

The record reveals further deficiencies as to petition service on the United States Attorney

General and the United States Attorney for this district. Service of process on the Government is

effectuated:

(A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United

States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or to an assistant United

States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing

filed with the clerk of the court or by sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail addressed to the civil process clerk at the

office of the United States attorney and

(B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered

or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District

of Columbia, and

(C) in any action attacking the validity of an order of an officer or agency of the

United States not made a party, by also sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail to the officer or agency.

F.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(1)(A) – (C) (Bold added).

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) authorizes a motion to dismiss for “insufficiency of service of process.” If

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service of process is not accomplished within 120 days of filing an action, this Court is empowered to

dismiss the action. See F.R.Civ.P. 4(m); Reynolds v. United States, 782 F.2d 837, 838 (9 Cir. 1986). th

Petitioner has failed to file a proof to show service of the petition on the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

Eastern District of California and the U.S. Department of Justice. Petitioner’s failure to serve these

offices further supports dismissal of its petition.

Petitioner’s Pro Se Filing Status

The petition was filed by Gary Tedder, who identifies himself as a trustee of Petitioner. Mr.

Tedder does not identify himself as an attorney and a trust cannot file a cause of action in federal court

in propria persona. C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9 Cir. 1987). On th

June 2, 2006, Petitioner was ordered to secure counsel to appear on behalf of Petitioner in this matter

and warned that failure to secure licensed counsel would result in a recommendation that this action be

dismissed. Petitioner has failed to do so, which further supports dismissal of the petition. 

Summons Enforcement

The Government seeks to enforce the IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America.

The IRS has broad investigatory powers under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7613.

Under section 7602(a)(1), the IRS is empowered to issue a summons to compel examination of “books,

papers, records or other data which may be relevant or material” to an inquiry for purpose of

“ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made” and

“determining” and “collecting” tax liability. The relevance requirement under section 7602 is whether

the requested material “might have thrown light upon the correctness of the return.” United States v.

Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813-815 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 1501 & n. 11 (1984); David H.

Tedder & Associates, Inc. v. United States, 77 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9 Cir. 1996). The IRS may issue a th

summons to investigate “merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even because it wants

assurance that it is not.” United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57, 85 S.Ct. 248 (1964) (quoting United

States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643, 70 S.Ct. 357 (1950)).

Under section 7608(a) and (b), IRS agents are authorized to “serve subpoenas and summonses

issued under authority of the United States.” Section 7602(a)(2) provides the IRS is not limited to

issuing summonses to taxpayers under investigation and is authorized to summon “any person having

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possession, custody, or care of books of account” relating to the taxpayer or to summon “any other

person the Secretary may deem proper” to produce such information and testimony under oath relevant

and material to inquiry. A summons may be directed to almost anyone. See, e.g., Chen Chi Wang v.

United States, 757 F.2d 1000, 1002 (9 Cir. 1985) (statute provides IRS with “broad powers to summon th

information relevant to determining the liability of any taxpayer.”) The summons power must be

construed broadly since it is “critical to the investigative and enforcement functions of the IRS.” Arthur

Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 104 S.Ct. at 1501.

Under section 7609(a)(1), a summons may be issued to a third party (not the taxpayer) and

require the third party to give “testimony on or relating to, the production of any portion of records made

or kept on or relating to, or the production of any computer software source code . . . with respect to, any

person (other than the person summoned) who is identified in the summons . . .” Section 7609(i)(1)

obligates a summoned party “to assemble the records requested” and to “be prepared to produce the

records pursuant to the summons on the day on which the records are to be examined.” 

Section 7609(b)(2)(A) authorizes the IRS to “seek to compel compliance with [an IRS]

summons.” Section 7604(a) grants this Court jurisdiction to enforce an IRS summons. To enforce an

IRS summons, the IRS must establish a prima facie case (“Powell requirements”) to demonstrate its

“good faith” that the summons: (1) is issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) seeks information relevant for

that purpose; (3) seeks information that is not already within IRS possession; and (4) satisfies all

administrative steps required by the United States Code. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58, 85 S.Ct. at 254-255;

Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117, 119 (9 Cir. 1995). th

In Liberty Financial Services v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9 Cir. 1985), the Ninth th

Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

To establish a need for judicial enforcement, this showing need only be minimal. This

is necessarily true because the statute must be read broadly in order to ensure that the

enforcement powers of the IRS are not unduly restricted. United States v. Balanced

Financial Management, Inc., 769 F.2d 1440, 1443 (10 Cir. 1985). Assertions by th

affidavit of the investigating agent that the requirements are satisfied are sufficient to

make the prima facie case. United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342,

1345 (9 Cir. 1983); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 536-37 (7 Cir. 1981), cert. th th

denied, 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1712, 72 L.Ed.2d 135 (1982). 

The Ninth Circuit has further commented: “The government’s burden is a ‘slight one’ and typically is

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satisfied by the introduction of the sworn declaration of the revenue agent who issued the summons that

the Powell requirements have been met.” Fortney, 59 F.3d at 119 (citing United States v. Dynavac, Inc.,

6 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9 Cir. 1993)); United States v. Gilleran, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9 Cir. 1993)). th th

Agent Chynoweth’s declaration satisfies the Powell requirements to establish a prima facie case

that he issued the summonses in good faith. In his declaration, Agent Chynoweth explained that he

issued the summons legitimately in that the summoned records are necessary “to properly investigate

the financial information to aid in the examination of Petitioner’s federal tax liabilities for tax years 2002

and 2003." Agent Chynoweth confirmed he complied with IRS summons requirements by serving the

summonses by personal service on Charles Schwab and by certified mail to Bank of America. Agent

Chynoweth also confirmed that he served notice of the summons by certified mail on Petitioner. In

addition, he declared that the IRS lacks possession of the records sought by the summonses and that

there has been no referral for criminal prosecution for the pertinent tax years 2002 and 2003. 

Merits Of the Petition

The Government contends that Petitioner’s challenges to the IRS summons lack merit and that

Petitioner fails to meet its heavy burden to quash the summons. After the Government establishes a

prima facie case of an IRS summons’ good faith, “a ‘heavy’ burden falls upon the taxpayer to show an

abuse of process” or “the lack of institutional good faith.” Dynavac, Inc., 6 F.3d at 1414; Anaya v.

United States, 815 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9 Cir. 1987); Liberty Financial, 778 F.2d at 1392. A taxpayer th

challenging an IRS summons “must allege specific facts and evidence to support his allegations.”

Liberty Financial, 778 F.2d at 1392. IRS “summons enforcement proceedings should be summary in

nature.” United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 1193 (1989) (quoting legislative

history).

Petitioner offers nothing to substantiate its heavy burden to quash the IRS summonses to Charles

Schwab and Bank of America.

Controlling Organic Law

In its petition, Petitioner challenges IRS authority under section 7602 to issue a summons on

grounds that the “organic and controlling summons authority is § 3173 of the Revised Statutes,” which

purportedly “impeaches” such section. Such challenge is meritless in that section 7602 grants the IRS

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broad summons powers. “Under 26 U.S.C. § 7602, the IRS has broad powers to summon information

relevant to determining the liability of any taxpayer.” Chen Chi Wang, 757 F.2d at 1002. Section

7602(a) empowers the IRS to “obtain such information from the taxpayer himself, or it may require

production from ‘any person’ holding records ‘relating to the business of the person liable for tax’ or

‘any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper.’" Chen Chi Wang, 757 F.2d at 1002

(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)). The IRS may issue a summons for the purposes set out in section 7602,

including "ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made,

determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any such liability."

26 U.S.C. § 7602(a); Crystal v. United States, 172 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9 Cir. 1999). th

The IRS was authorized to issue its summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America.

Delegation Of Authority

Petitioner asserts that Agent Chynoweth lacks delegated authority to issue the summons under

26 U.S.C. § 7602 and asserts that only Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms agents have such authority. This

argument lacks merit in that section 7804(a) authorizes the IRS to employ revenue agents “for the

administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws,” including those regarding IRS

summonses. Under 26 C.F.R. § 301.7602-1 and IRS Delegation Order No. 4 (Revision 22), the duties

of issuing and serving administrative summonses are delegated to IRS agents, such as Agent Chynoweth.

As noted above, the IRS has broad authority to summon records from third parties. Petitioner fails to

demonstrate Agent Chynoweth lacked authority to issue the summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank

of America. 

Particular Liability

Petitioner next claims that since it “timely filed accurate and correct returns for the years in

question” and “self determined a liability” of which the IRS has information, the IRS has no ability to

take any further verification action. The petition further claims “where that information is already within

the Commissioner’s possession, the Summons is invalid.” Clearly, the IRS is authorized to investigate

Petitioner’s tax liability. Section 7602(a)(1) empowers the IRS to examine “books, papers, records or

other data which may be relevant or material” to an inquiry for “ascertaining the correctness of any

return, making a return where none has been made” and “determining” and “collecting” tax liability.

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The relevance requirement under section 7602 is whether the requested material “might have thrown

light upon the correctness of the return.” Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 813-815 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct.

at 1501 & n. 11 (1984); David H. Tedder & Associates, 77 F.3d at 1169. The IRS may issue a summons

to investigate “merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that

it is not.” Powell, 379 U.S. at 57, 85 S.Ct. 248 (1964) (quoting Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642-643,

70 S.Ct. 357). Agent Chynoweth was authorized to issue the IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and

Bank of America to investigate Petitioner’s tax liability despite whether Petitioner self-determined its

tax liability. Agent Chynoweth correctly notes that the IRS lacks the information sought from Charles

Schwab and Bank of America.

Perjury Statement

Petitioner asserts that section 6065 requires the IRS summons to be signed under penalty of

perjury. Petitioner’s reliance on section 6065 is erroneous because it applies to tax returns and related

documents submitted to the IRS, not to IRS summonses. See Morelli v. Alexander, 920 F.Supp. 556,

558 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Villella v. United States, 2000 WL 968773, p. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this Court RECOMMENDS to:

1. DISMISS named defendant IRS Revenue Agent Fred Chynoweth and substitute the

United States of America in his place;

2. DENY the petition to quash the IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of

America; 

3. GRANT the United States of America’s motion to dismiss the petition and to enforce the

IRS summonses to Charles Schwab and Bank of America; and

4. DIRECT this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendant United States of

America and against plaintiff Soloman-Nabres Family Trust and to close this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this action,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. Within thirty days of service

of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties and the magistrate judge and otherwise in compliance with

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this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings

and recommendations, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 29, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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