Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01106/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jesus Razo, ) CV 08-1106-PHX-NVW (JM)

)

Petitioner, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

v. )

)

Warden Blair, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

_________________________________)

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket

No. 1] filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was

referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the

record, deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial and Sentencing

By Indictment filed March 31, 2003, the State charged Petitioner with committing the

following five offenses on December 9, 2002: the manslaughter of Veronica Armenta, a class

2 dangerous felony (Count 1); the aggravated assaults of Sonia Diaz and Rosie Guerrero,

class 3 dangerous felonies (Counts 2 and 3, respectively); the endangerment of Victoria

Armenta, a class 6 dangerous felony (Count 4); and leaving the scene of a fatal injury

accident, a class 3 felony (Count 5). (Ex. A, Item 1.) The facts underlying the charges were

summarized by the Arizona Court of Appeals as follows:

On the date of the incident, a vehicle insured by

[Petitioner’s] parents and driven by [Petitioner] approached a

school bus from the rear at a high rate of speed. The bus was

stopped in the far right of the three westbound lanes, with its

flashing lights operating and its stop sign deployed. A small

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

white car was stopped near the bus in the far left of the

westbound lanes, waiting as the bus unloaded students.

As [Petitioner’s] vehicle approached the bus, the sole

passenger told [Petitioner] to look out because he believed that

they might crash. In an effort to avoid the bus, [Petitioner]

attempted to maneuver into the middle lane. However,

[Petitioner] lost control of the vehicle and struck the rear of the

white car, “overroad” the car, became airborne and flipped over.

[Petitioner’s] vehicle came to rest on its left side in front of the

school bus. The impact spun the white car 180 degrees and

knocked it approximately forty feet form the point of impact. It

was determined that [Petitioner’s] vehicle was traveling at a

minimum of fifty-two miles per hour at the time of impact and

may have been slowing down from a higher speed. The speed

limit was forty-five miles per hour.

 After the vehicles came to a rest, [Petitioner] and the

passenger climbed out of the passenger side door and fled the

scene on foot. The passenger fled because he had an

outstanding warrant. Witnesses who followed [Petitioner]

caught up with him and persuaded him to return. When

[Petitioner] was unable to climb over a fence on his return, he

waited at that location for police officers to arrive. He was

ultimately taken away by ambulance. 

The white car contained four persons - two women and

two young girls who were the driver’s daughters. The two

women were injured, as was the driver’s five-year-old daughter,

who died of her injuries. The driver’s other daughter sustained

only minor injuries.

Evidence indicated that [Petitioner] had used marijuana

one to two hours prior to the incident and that he was impaired

by marijuana at the time of the incident. Drug paraphernalia

associated with marijuana use was found in [Petitioner’s]

vehicle, and [Petitioner] smelled of marijuana.

(Ex. O, pp. 1-4.)

The jury found Petitioner guilty of Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, but acquitted him on Count

5 (leaving the scene of a fatal injury accident). (Ex. A, Items 89-95; Exhibit B, Item 97;

Exhibit J, pp. 2-4.) On January 28, 2005, the trial court imposed four presumptive prison

terms: 10 1⁄2 years for manslaughter (Count 1), 7 1⁄2 years for aggravated assault (Count 2),

7 1⁄2 years for aggravated assault (Count 3), and 2 1⁄4 years for endangerment (Count 4). (Ex.

K, pp. 34-35.) The sentences for Count 1 and Count 2 were ordered to be served

consecutively, and the sentences for Count 3 and Count 4 were ordered to run concurrently

with the sentence on Count 2, which resulted in a total of 18 years imprisonment. (Id.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

B. Direct Appeal

On September 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a counseled brief in the Arizona Court of

Appeals raising the following claims:

1. Petitioner was subjected to a warrantless arrest without

probable cause.

2. The identification procedure used by law enforcement

was constitutionally flawed because, as a single person

“lineup,” it was unduly suggestive, and violated

Petitioner’s right to counsel.

3. The in-court identification of Petitioner by Marion

Hawkins was not reliable.

4. The improper identification procedure used by law

enforcement tainted the subsequent arrest and search

warrant obtained by the Glendale Police Department.

5. The testimony of the State’s drug recognition examiner

and the testimony of the State’s toxicology expert were

inadmissible as fruits of the Miranda violation.

6. Petitioner’s statements to the drug recognition examiner

and all the police officers were not voluntary and should

have been suppressed.

7. Petitioner’s urine sample was obtained illegally and

should have been suppressed.

8. The sentencing hearing violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. 

9. The trial court permitted prohibited victim sentencing

recommendations. 

10. Petitioner’s consecutive sentences violated double

jeopardy.

(Ex. L.)

On December 23, 2005, the State filed its answering brief, wherein it argued that

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences should be affirmed because none of his arguments

warranted reversal. (Ex. M.) On January 26, 2006, Petitioner filed his reply brief. (Ex. N.)

On May 18, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in an unpublished Memorandum Decision. (Ex. O.) 

On June 19, 2006, Petitioner filed with the Arizona Supreme Court a petition for

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

review which raised the following arguments: (1) the police lacked probable cause to arrest

Petitioner; (2) the pretrial identification was unduly suggestive and occurred in the absence

of counsel: (3) Petitioner urine sample was taken in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1388(E) and

State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 297, 100 P.3d 452 (App. 2004); (4) the police used information

gained during an unwarned interrogation in violation of Miranda and Missouri v. Siebert,

542 U.S. 600 (2004); (5) Petitioner’s post-arrest statements to the drug-recognition expert

were involuntary, in light of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); and (6) Petitioner’s

sentencing hearing was defective because the trial court heard the testimony of a victim and

a non-victim (Hawkins) and admitted “previously suppressed evidence regarding gang

affiliations and tattoos to be made.” (Ex. P.) On December 13, 2006, the Arizona Supreme

Court summarily denied review. (Ex. Q.) 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 5, 2007, Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, filed a notice of

post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Ex. R.) On January 8, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed a

PCR petition raising one claim: the trial court’s minute entry of the sentencing hearing

incorrectly reflected a cumulative sentence of 25.5. years, instead of the 18-year sentence that

the trial court had pronounced at the sentencing hearing. (Ex. S.) The State concurred with

Petitioner’s assertion of error. (Ex. T.) Accordingly, the trial court, on June 6, 2007, issued

a minute entry order pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.4 correcting

Petitioner’s sentence. (Ex. U.)

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

In the Petition now before the Court, Petitioner has alleged the following grounds for

relief:

I. Petitioner was subjected to a warrantless arrest without

probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

II. Petitioner was subjected to: (1) an unduly suggestive out

of court identification in a one main line-up in violation

of the Sixth Amendment; (2) deprived of counsel at a

pre-trial identification procedure; and (3) subjected to an

improper in court identification which was tainted by the

improper pre-trial identification.

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

III. Petitioner’s statements to the drug recognition examiner

Sergeant Stephens were not voluntarily made.

IV. Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated

when the officers obtained a urine sample without a

warrant.

V. Petitioner’s due process and Sixth Amendment rights

were violated during the sentencing hearing when the

trial court improperly permitted: (1) non-victim Marion

Hawkins (the bus driver) to provide victim impact

testimony; (2) victims and Hawkins to recommend that

the maximum sentence be imposed; (3) untrue hearsay

testimony from victims that; and (4) hearsay testimony

from officers regarding Petitioner’s gang affiliations.

VI. Petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy through the

imposition of consecutive sentences for crimes that arose

from a single act. 

Petition, pp. 5-10.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal court may

consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion occurs either when a claim has

been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971),

or by establishing that a claim has been procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies

remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his claims to the

state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these claims. See

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been “fairly presented” if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which the claim is based.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

1995). The operative facts must be presented in the appropriate context to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied, for example,

when a claim is presented in state court in a procedural context in which its merits will not

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

be considered in the absence of special circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct.

at 1060. An exact correlation of the claims in both state and federal court is not required.

Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the federal claim must have been fairly presented

to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court found his

claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims in any forum, that

no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.

1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, Respondents contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground VI and

portions of Grounds II and V. With the exception of a portion of Ground V, which is

addressed below, Respondents contend, contrary to what the Ninth Circuit held in Swoopes,

that Petitioner was obligated to present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court and, because

he failed to do so, he did not exhaust his claims as required by 28 U.S. C. § 2254(c).

Specifically, Respondents argue that Swoopes was wrongly decided and is no longer good

law and that under Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004), Petitioner was also required to

petition the Arizona Supreme Court to review his claims. This argument has been addressed

and rejected a number of times in this district and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that

Swoopes survived the Baldwin decision. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th

Cir. 2005). As Respondents cite no other basis for finding that these claims were not fairly

presented in the Arizona courts, there is no basis for finding that the claims were not

exhausted.

In relation to the remaining claim, the portion of Ground V where Petitioner contends

that the victims made “false statements” about him that were “not true,” Petition, p. 9,

Respondents contend that the claim was never presented as a federal constitutional claim in

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

the Arizona courts. In reading the Petition and the Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal,

Petitioner appears to ascribe the “false” and “untrue” statements to Officer Hammer. In the

Petition, the allegations of false statements appear after Petitioner’s complaints about the

testimony of the victims and the bus driver, Marion Hawkins, but before his complaints about

the testimony of Officer Hammer regarding his gang affiliation. Petition, p. 9. In relation

to the victim testimony and that of Mr. Hawkins, Petitioner does not allege that it was false

or untrue, but that the testimony of Mr. Hawkins was improper as he was not a “victim”

under Arizona law, and that the victims were improperly allowed to recommend a harsh

sentence. 

It is the testimony of Officer Hammer that is described in the Petition as “misleading

and inaccurate” and thus appears to be the testimony about which Petitioner is complaining

when he describes “false” and “untrue” testimony. Petitioner extensively challenged this

testimony on direct appeal. Exhibit L, pp. 55-57. In doing so, Petitioner described the

admission of the testimony as a “violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment rights

to a fair trial.” Id., p. 52. He also cited federal authority, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808

(1991), and Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), which identified the legal standards

that he urged the Arizona court to apply. Accordingly, this portion of Petitioner’s Ground

V is also exhausted.

B. Merits

Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state decision

was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision

can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority,

or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially

indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state

court decision is contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision

of a state court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092,

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Grounds I and IV

In both Grounds I and IV, Petitioner contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated. Specifically, in Ground I, Petitioner asserts that he was subjected to a warrantless

arrest without probable cause, and in Ground IV he alleges his urine sample was obtained

without a warrant. Petition, pp. 5 & 8. As Respondents contend, these claims are not

cognizable on habeas review.

A federal district court cannot grant habeas corpus relief based on an alleged Fourth

Amendment violation if the state court has provided the petitioner with a “full and fair

opportunity to litigate” the Fourth Amendment issue. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494

(1976); Woolery v. Arvan, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1993); Hernandez v. City of Los

Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a “fourth amendment claim is not

cognizable as a basis for federal habeas relief, where the state has provided an opportunity

for full and fair litigation of the claim”). In Stone, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose

behind the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement from future unconstitutional conduct

by removing an incentive to disregard the Fourth Amendment. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492.

However, the Court also recognized that excluding evidence that is not untrustworthy creates

a windfall to the defendant at a substantial societal cost. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90;

Woolery, 8 F.3d at 1327-28. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Stone, 428 U.S. at 493,

that permitting petitioners to raise search and seizure claims in a writ of habeas corpus would

not significantly deter Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the Court concluded that

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

petitioner should not be permitted to raise search and seizure claims where the State provided

the petitioners an opportunity for full and fair litigation of their claims. Id. at 493-494. The

Ninth Circuit, relying on Stone, explained that:

[I]n cases where a petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim has

been adequately litigated in state court, enforcing the

exclusionary rule through writs of habeas corpus would not

further the deterrent and educative purposes of the rule to an

extent sufficient to counter the negative effect such a policy

would have on the interests of judicial efficiency, comity and

federalism.

Woolery, 8 F.3d at 1326 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 493-494);see also Withrow v. Williams,

507 U.S. 680 (1993) (stating that Stone's limitation on habeas relief rested on prudential

concerns, namely “the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on collateral review

outweighed any potential advantage to be gained by applying it there”). Thus, the only

Fourth Amendment issue properly addressed by this Court is whether Petitioner had a fair

opportunity to litigate his claims. 

The record reflects that Petitioner did move in the trial court to suppress the urine

sample evidence. (Ex. A, Item 21.) Two witnesses and Petitioner testified at the hearing

(Ex. B, Item 65; Ex. C, pp. 4-32.) The trial court denied the motion and allowed the State

to present the urine evidence in its case in chief. (Ex. C, pp. 31-32.) Petitioner also raised

the claim on direct appeal. (Ex. L, pp. 46-51.) The Arizona Court of Appeals found no error:

Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s

ruling, the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing

established that one of the emergency room doctors treating

defendant ordered that a sample of his urine be obtained for the

hospital. There is no evidence that this sample was sought for

any reason other than medical purposes. Further, there is no

evidence that defendant refused or sought to refuse medical

treatment, as in the case relied upon by defendant, State v.

Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 100 P.2d 452 (App. 2004). The order

for the urine sample was relayed to defendant by a nurse. The

nurse, not a police officer, asked defendant for the sample.

Defendant was not threatened with criminal charges if he

refused to provide a sample. By the time the nurse asked

Defendant for the sample, defendant was suspected of driving

while impaired. As defendant urinated into a cup, a police

officer stood behind defendant to make sure defendant did not

place anything but his urine into the cup. As the officer did so,

the nurse stood next to the officer but on the other side of a

curtain. When defendant was finished, the officer took the cup

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

from defendant and immediately handed it to the nurse. A

portion of the sample was later provided to law enforcement

personnel. 

(Ex. O, pp. 20-21.) Based on these factual conclusions, the court concluded that “the

evidence introduced at the suppression hearing was sufficient to establish that the urine

sample was obtained in compliance with the provisions of A.R.S. § 28-1388(E),” and found

no error. The claim was then raised in Petitioner’s petition for review by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied. (Exs. P & Q.) Based on the history of this

claim, it is apparent that Petitioner, who does not argue otherwise, was provided a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the claim. Accordingly, federal relief is unavailable. See OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the relevant inquiry is

“whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so

or even whether the claim was correctly decided”).

In Ground I, Petitioner claims he was subjected to a warrantless arrest without

probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This claim was first raised by

Petitioner in his opening brief on direct appeal. (Ex. L, p. 19.) Despite his failure to raise

the claim in the trial court, the Court of Appeals reviewed the claim for fundamental error

and found none. (Ex. O, pp. 4-8.) Petitioner then included the claim in his petition for

review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Ex. P, pp. 1-2, 8-9.) As was the case with Ground

IV, the record establishes, and Petitioner does not assert otherwise, that he was provided the

opportunity to litigate this claim in the state courts and that the claim was addressed when

raised. See Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 899 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the relevant inquiry

is “whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do

so or even whether the claim was correctly decided”). This claim does not provide a basis

for habeas relief. 

2. Ground II

Petitioner’s first claim under Ground II is that he was subjected to an unduly

suggestive out of court identification in a one man line-up in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. The last reasoned decision in the state courts came from the Arizona Court of

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Appeals in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Under the habeas statute, this Court must determine

if the Court of Appeals applied the correct legal standard and made a reasonable

determination of the facts based on the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As

discussed below, the state court satisfied both these considerations. 

The Court of Appeals initially presented the applicable legal standard by concurring

with the trial court’s assessment that “[a] ‘one-man show-up’ is inherently suggestive.” (Ex.

O, p. 9, quoting State v Williams, 144 Ariz. 433, 439, 698 P.2d 678, 684 (1985).) The court

then noted, however, that “a show-up identification is admissible if the identification is

reliable,” and cited five factors to consider in evaluating reliability:

1. The witness’ opportunity to view the defendant at the

time to the offense;

2. The witness’ degree of attention;

3. The accuracy of any prior description of the defendant by

the witness;

4. The witness’ level of certainty at the identification; and

5. The length of time between the crime and the

identification.

(Id., citing Williams, 144 Ariz. At 440-41, 698 P.2d at 685-686.)

A review of federal authority addressing the issue establishes that the Court of

Appeals applied the correct legal standards. Just as the state court concluded, an

identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive when it emphasizes the focus upon a

single individual thereby increasing the likelihood of misidentification. See United States

v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir. 1985). However, to prevail on habeas review, a

petitioner must show that the identification procedure used was ““so unnecessarily suggestive

and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.””

Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has identified the

factors to be considered when determining the reliability of an identification procedure, and

they are the same as those identified by the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (identifying same five factors as those identified in State

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

v Williams, 144 Ariz. 433, 439, 698 P.2d 678, 684 (1985)). Thus, the Court of Appeals

applied the correct legal standard.

The Court of Appeals determination of the facts in this case was not only reasonable,

but hardly questionable. In finding that identification sufficiently reliable, the court reasoned

as follows:

In this case, the pretrial identification was made by the

bus driver. The bus driver observed defendant and his vehicle

in the large left side rear view mirror of the bus as the defendant

approached the bus from the rear. He also observed the

defendant directly as he passed by the bus. The bus driver was

able to observe two people in the vehicle. He recognized the

defendant as the “heavy set” driver and also saw a “skinny”

passenger. [FN 3: It was later established that the passenger

weighed 132 pounds and the defendant weighted in the area of

250 pounds.] The bus driver could see defendant’s face, and

noted the “fatness” of his cheeks and his dark hair. The bus

driver also observed defendant as he stood in front of the bus

shortly before the fled the scene. The bus driver estimated that

he observed defendant for five to ten seconds, but stated that “it

seemed like forever . . . .” The bus driver testified that

defendant’s face was “imprinted” in his memory.

After the incident, an officer drove the bus driver to the

hospital. The bus driver was told only that he was being taken

to the hospital to see if someone there could have been involved

in the accident. Once he arrived, the bus driver was told that the

person he would observe may or may not be the person he saw

at the scene, and that he may or may not be wearing the same

clothes. When the bus driver first observed defendant from the

hallway outside his treatment room, defendant was covered with

a sheet up to his neck so that only his head was visible. When

the bus driver observed defendant, he spontaneously stated that

the was positive defendant was the driver and did so without

hesitation. The bus driver then described defendant’s jersey.

An officer then went into the room and pulled down the sheet to

reveal defendant’s black jersey with yellow numbers. The bus

driver then stated that defendant was “definitely the driver.”

The bus driver did not see any handcuffs.

(Ex. O, pp. 10-11.)

A review of the record establishes that the testimony of the bus driver, Marion

Hawkins, was entirely consistent with the factual findings of the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Mr. Hawkins testified that he was driven by officers to the hospital and then told “to come

over and look at someone,” and to “see if you recognize him.” (Ex. C., p. 47.) He said he

then “walked into the room and . . . recognized the driver of the vehicle.” (Id., pp. 47-48.)

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

He was then asked if he was positive, and stated that “I am positive that’s the driver of the

vehicle.” (Id., p. 48.) He was then thanked and he left. (Id.) On cross-examination, Mr.

Hawkins certainty was not shaken and he testified that “when you see something like this,

it is a face that you don’t forget. It is kind of imprinted.” (Id.) On re-direct examination,

Mr. Hawkins described Petitioner as wearing “blue baggie pants” and a “dark colored jersey”

with “yellow numbers on it” when he saw him at the scene of the accident. (Id., p. 54.) He

was then asked what Petitioner was wearing when officers at the hospital removed the sheet

that was covering Petitioner’s clothing, and he stated, “He was wearing that jersey.” (Id.)

 In light of Mr. Hawkins’ testimony, the Arizona Court of Appeal reasonably

determined that there was no reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification. See Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (“It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be

avoided is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”) (internal quotations

omitted). As such, the decision was consistent with federal law and habeas relief is

unavailable.

Petitioner’s next subclaim in Ground II is that he was deprived of counsel during the

identification procedure conducted at the hospital. Addressing this claim, the Court of

Appeals concluded that, “[b]ecause criminal proceedings had not been initiated, defendant

was not entitled to counsel. State v. Tresize, 127 Ariz. 571, 575, 623 P.2d 1, 5 (1980).” (Ex.

O, pp. 11-12.) The court did not err in reaching this conclusion. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406

U.S. 682 (1972), the United States Supreme Court refused to extend the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel to pre-indictment identification. The Court explained that a defendant’s

Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversarial

proceedings have been formally initiated. Id. at 688-89. Here, the identification at the

hospital occurred on December 9, 2003, and proceedings were not formally initiated against

Petitioner until March 31, 2004, when he was indicted. (Ex. A, Item 1; Ex. C., pp. 33, 39 &

46.) Just as the State court determined, Petitioner was not entitled to counsel pre-indictment

and he is therefore not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

 In the third portion of Ground II, Petitioner contends that the in-court identification

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

was “tainted by the improper pre-trial identification where counsel was required . . . .”

Petition, p. 6. As discussed above, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that

Petitioner was not subjected to improper pre-trial identification and was not entitled to

counsel were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law. As such,

those assertions do not provide a basis for finding that the in-court identification was tainted

by those assertedly improper events. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

3. Ground III

Petitioner next claims that his statements to the drug recognition examiner (“DRE”),

Sergeant Stephens, were involuntary. This is the case, Petitioner contends because, even

though he had been administered his Miranda warning, he had been in the presence of police

officers for about four hours, he had not had anything to eat or drink, he was in severe pain

due to the accident, he was heavily medicated, and he had already been subjected to a nonMirandized interrogation which exceed two hours in duration during which time he was

handcuffed. Petition, p. 7. 

In concluding that Petitioner’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary, the Arizona

Court of Appeals provided the following evaluation of the claim:

“To determine the voluntariness of a statement, the

appropriate inquiry is whether, under the totality of the

circumstances, the statement was the product of coercive police

tactics.” State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 601, 944 P.2d 1204, 1215

(1997). The critical element in the inquiry is whether police

conduct constituted overreaching. State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70,

75, ¶ 10, 7 P.2d 79, 84 (2000). Our ultimate determination is

whether Defendant’s will was overborne. See Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). An additional factor to be considered

in cases where the suspect is under the influence of drugs is

whether the drugs rendered the suspect unable to understand the

meaning of his statements. State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335,

342, 690 P.2d 54, 61 (1984). As previously noted above, while

we consider only the facts presented at the suppression hearing

and review those facts in the light most favorable to sustaining

the ruling on a motion to suppress, we review de novo the legal

question of whether defendant’s constitutional rights were

violated.

We find no error in the determination that the defendant’s

post-Miranda statements were voluntary. Regarding the

medications administered at the hospital, the officers were aware

of the specific medications given to defendant, the defendant

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

exhibited no signs that the medications affected his ability to

communicate. Regarding the “head injury,” this actually

consisted of a minor injury described as a “scratch” and/or a

“scrape” which also did not affect defendant’s ability to

communicate. There is nothing in the record to indicate that

defendant received any treatment for this or any other head

injury. While defendant did complain of back pain, there is

nothing to indicate this affected the voluntariness of his

statements.

Regarding defendant’s other allegations, as noted above,

the pre-Miranda “two hour interrogation” consisted of the

question “what happened” surrounded by small talk. There is

nothing in the record to suggest that this was in any way

coercive. Regarding the allegation that defendant’s hospital

gown was “yanked up” and that he was deprived food and

water, there is simply nothing in the record to support either

allegation. Finally, in regard to the alleged confinement, other

than the fact that defendant was in police custody, there is

nothing in the record to indicate this “confinement” was in any

way coercive, unduly or otherwise, or even uncomfortable.

(Ex. O, pp. 17-18.) After contrasting the facts presented by Petitioner from those presented

in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the appeals court concluded:

This case is not analogous to Mincey. There is no evidence of

coercive police tactics or overreaching. There is no evidence

that defendant’s medical condition or the medications he had

been given in any way affected his ability to communicate or

rendered him unable to understand the meaning of his

statements. There is nothing in the record to indicate the

defendant’s will was overborne. We find no error in the

determination that defendant’s post-Miranda statements to

police officers were voluntary.

(Ex. O, p. 19.)

Petitioner takes no issue with the law applied by the Arizona Court of Appeals. The

mixture of Arizona and federal authority applied in the decision resulted in a standard

consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the section 2254 requirement to apply that law.

As Respondents indicate, the quoted passage from Lee is derived from Colorado v. Connelly,

479 U.S. 157 (1986), where the Court explained that “[c]oercive police activity is a necessary

predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167. The appeals court also cited

Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000), identifying the ultimate determination as whether

the defendant’s will was overborne. Id. at 434.

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1In fact, Petitioner testified at the suppression hearing that it was Officer Aldridge who

went and spoke to the doctor or nurses about his pain and was then given medication. (Ex.

O, pp. 101-102.)

- 16 -

Petitioner’s contention is that the Court of Appeals, in finding his statements

voluntary, unreasonably applied the law to the facts. He complains that his gown was

“yanked up” and that he was never offered food or water. The Court of Appeals found

nothing in the record to support these claims and Petitioner has offered nothing other than

his allegations. Petitioner has attached to his Reply medical records reflecting his treatment

while at the hospital. The records contain no indication of whether he was given food or

water; however, the records do show he was being tended to: he was evaluated, given x-rays

and medicated for his pain complaints.1

 Given the documentation of Petitioner’s treatment

at the hospital, it certainly was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals to conclude that

Petitioner’s claims of mistreatment did not support his claim of involuntariness.

The Court of Appeals also dismissed any notion that Petitioner’s pre-Miranda

statements showed coercion and noted that the claimed two hour interrogation “consisted of

the question ‘what happened’ surrounded by small talk.” (Ex. O, p. 18.) Petitioner has not

identified any additional information, in the record or otherwise, that would cause this Court

to find the Court of Appeals’ determination on this issue was unreasonable. 

Petitioner’s most substantial basis for claiming coercion is that he was suffering the

effects of the accident and was under the influence of pain medication “commonly known

to cause confusion, extreme fatigue, disorientation and impaired judgment.” Petition, p. 7.

In his brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals and in his reply in this case, Petitioner likens his

condition to that of the defendant in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). In rejecting

this argument, the Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished Mincey as follows:

In Mincey, a suspect’s statements to a police officer while in the

hospital were found to be involuntary under the circumstances.

However, the facts of Mincey are distinguishable from the

instant case. Mincey had suffered injuries serious enough to

require hospitalization for nearly a month. He was interrogated

while in intensive care, “encumbered by tubes, needles, and a

breathing apparatus” used for “more critical” patients. He

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

complained of “unbearable” pain to the officer. He displayed

confusion and the inability to think clearly, and some of his

responses were incoherent. Even thought Mincey repeatedly

asked the officer to leave him alone, the officer stopped the

interrogation only when Mincey lost consciousness or when he

was given medical treatment. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,

389-401 (1978). 

(Ex. O, p. 19.) A review of the transcripts supports the Court of Appeals’ application of

Mincey.

During the hearing on his motion to suppress the use of his urine sample at trial,

Petitioner testified that the pain medication he was given was “just for the backache I had.”

(Ex. C., pp. 24-25 & 71.) Officer Aaron Aldridge, who was with Petitioner at the hospital,

did not know that Petitioner was the driver of the Bronco involved in the wreck. (Id., p. 58.)

He explained that his job “was basically to stand next to [Petitioner] during the entire time

in the emergency room.” (Id.) Officer Aldridge asked Petitioner what had happened and

Petitioner told him that he was a passenger in the Bronco and that an individual named

“Chris” was the driver. (Id.) After that conversation, Officer Aldridge, using a relaxed tone,

and Petitioner made small talk about tattoos, Petitioner’s life in Chicago, and his medical

treatment. (Id., pp. 58-69.) 

After Mr. Hawkins identified Petitioner as the driver, Officer Tim Reardon placed

Petitioner under arrest and read him his Miranda warnings. (Ex. O, pp. 70, 75.) While

interviewing Petitioner, Reardon, who knew Petitioner had been medicated, did not notice

any outward signs affecting Petitioner’s ability to communicate. (Id., p. 81.) He noticed

some minor lacerations to Petitioner’s extremities and his scalp, but Petitioner never

indicated that pain was affecting his memory or his statements. (Id., p. 82.) 

Officer Geena Stephens performed the drug recognition examination. (Ex. O, p. 78,

89.) After again discussing his Miranda rights, Officer Stephens conducted what she

characterized as a “partial DRE exam.” (Ex. O, p. 91.) She indicated that Petitioner’s

responses to her questions were appropriate, but that he did complain of back pain and

Officer Stephens’ impression was that “he was pretty banged up and he hurt all over,” but

she did not believe his condition affected his ability to answer her questions. (Ex. O, pp. 92-

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

93.) On cross-examination, Officer Stephens indicated she was aware that Petitioner had

been given Xanax and Percocet, “but it didn’t appears to be impairing his ability to speak

with [her] and understand [their] conversation.” (Id., p. 94.) 

Respondents have cited several cases that support the reasonableness of the State

court’s finding that, despite Petitioner’s injuries and medications, his post-Miranda

statements were voluntarily made. The Ninth Circuit cases make clear that a defendant can

voluntarily waive his Miranda rights despite being in the hospital, on medication and in pain.

United States v. Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding statement voluntarily

made even where defendant had recently returned from surgery, was in pain and had recently

been administered a general anesthetic); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th

Cir. 1985) (finding statements voluntary even though defendant in pain and under the

influence of pain killer). 

In this case, considering the facts reasonably determined by the Arizona Court of

Appeals, the record establishes that Petitioner spoke voluntarily to Officers Reardon and

Stephens. His rights were twice explained, and Petitioner indicated that he understood them

and was nevertheless willing to talk. Although Petitioner was likely in some amount of pain

as a result of his injuries from the collision, the injuries were not so severe as to “render him

unconscious or comatose.” Martin, 781 F.2d at 674; see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 396

(statements involuntary where defendant unable to speak due to tube in his mouth and was

intermittently losing consciousness). On this record, the Court cannot conclude that

Petitioner’s will was overborne and that his statements were involuntary.

4. Ground V

Petitioner’s Ground V arguments are that his due process and Sixth Amendment rights

were violated when, during his sentencing hearing, the trial court a improperly permitted: (1)

non-victim Marion Hawkins (the bus driver) to provide victim impact testimony; (2) victims

and Hawkins to recommend that the maximum sentence be imposed; (3) untrue hearsay

testimony from victims; and (4) hearsay testimony from officers regarding Petitioner’s gang

affiliations. As explained below, none of these claims merit relief.

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

In response to Petitioner’s contentions that Mr. Hawkins should not have been

permitted to testify and that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at his

sentencing hearing, Respondents correctly assert that Petitioner raised these claims in state

court as state-law questions which fall outside the realm of habeas review. Although

Petitioner raised these claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals under a heading referencing

due process and the Sixth Amendment, both arguments were based entirely on state law

grounds and absolutely no mention of federal authority was raised. 

With regard to Mr. Hawkins’ testimony, Petitioner asserted his testimony was

admitted in violation of a state statute, A.R.S. § 13-703.01(S)(2), and in support of his

argument cited State ex rel. Thomas v. Foreman, WL 2005 2099800 (Ariz. App. 2005). The

Court of Appeals described and addressed the argument as follows:

Defendant argues that the trial court should not have

allowed the bus driver to make a statement at the sentencing

hearing as he was not a “victim” as defined by A.R.S. § 13-

4401. Although the bus driver was not a victim as defined by

the statute, there was no objection at trial. Defendant has

provided no authority which required the trial court to prohibit

the bus driver from speaking at the sentencing hearing, and we

are aware of none. We find no fundamental error. 

(Ex. O, pp. 21-22.) 

Petitioner also contends that the state court impermissibly considered statements at

his sentencing hearing that were hearsay, irrelevant, inflammatory, lacking foundation, and

that evidence of his gang affiliation was admitted in violation of Miranda. In denying these

claims, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained:

We find no error in the consideration of this evidence.

Defendant admitted his gang affiliation in his presentence

report. Information in presentence reports may be considered to

determine the existence of mitigating and aggravating

circumstances. State v. Carbajal, 177 Ariz. 461, 463, 868 P.2d

1044, 1046 (App. 1994). Regarding defendant’s assertion that

this evidence constituted hearsay, hearsay evidence may be

considered in the determination of the existence of aggravating

and mitigating factors. See State v. Marquez, 127 Ariz. 3, 6, 617

P.2d 787, 790 (App. 1980). [FN 8: Contrary to defendant’s

assertions, not all evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation was

suppressed. Only defendant’s pre-Miranda statements, which

included statements about gang affiliation, were suppressed.]

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

(Ex. O, pp. 22-23.) 

Each of these arguments was raised under state law, with the exception of Petitioner’s

claim that statements about his gang affiliation were admitted in violation of Miranda.

Petitioner still has offered no federal authority supporting his contentions, but merely points

out that he captioned this group of arguments with references to federal constitutional

guarantees. The mention of those guarantees was insufficient to inform the state court that

he was raising a federal constitutional claim. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and

thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he

specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88

(9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Duncan

[v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995)], this court has held that the

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either

by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if

the federal basis is “self-evident.” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d

882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,

7, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim on

federal grounds. Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th

Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir.

1996); . . . .

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Petitioner cited no federal

law or decision from the federal courts in either his state court briefing or the instant petition.

Accordingly, this Court is prohibited from reviewing these claims.

As for his assertions that his gang affiliation was admitted in violation of Miranda,

Petitioner has offered no facts or supporting authority that calls the state court’s decision into

doubt. Most important, he has not disputed that his gang affiliation was admitted in his

presentence report and, assuming it was, how its use at sentencing violated Miranda. Given

these shortcomings, there is little for this Court to evaluate in relation to this claim and there

is no basis to find the state court’s determinations unreasonable.

Petitioner’s next claim under Ground V is that the victim’s family members were

improperly permitted at the sentencing hearing to offer inflammatory hearsay and request that

Petitioner be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment, 27 years. Petitioner asserts

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

that these events violated his Sixth Amendment rights and, in support of his claims, cites the

federal case of Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). (Ex. L, pp. 57-58.) Addressing

this argument, the state court concluded that, “[r]egardless of whether this was proper, the

trial court clearly disregarded these statements when it imposed presumptive sentences on

all counts and did so in a manner that even the aggregate time served will be substantially

less than the sentences sought by decedent’s family. We find no fundamental error.” (Ex.

O, p. 22.) Respondents contend that this decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, the holdings of then-existing Supreme Court precedent. 

While there is some authority that might be construed as supporting Petitioner’s

contentions, Petitioner has not cited and the Court is unable to find clearly established

Supreme Court precedent that would lead the Court to the result he seeks. In Booth v.

Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) the Supreme Court held that the admission of victim impact

testimony at a capital sentencing constituted a per se Eight Amendment violation. Payne v.

Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n. 2 (1991), reversed that holding, but left in place the

prohibition on opinions from family members about the crime, the defendant, and the

appropriate sentence. However, it is not clear that the reservation of Booth made in Payne

applies in cases non-capital cases such as Petitioner’s. Booth and Payne expressly address

the admissibility of victim impact evidence at a capital sentencing, prohibiting certain

information on the grounds that it would lead a jury to impose a death sentence in a arbitrary

and capricious manner. Booth, 482 at 502-03. As such, the holdings in Booth and Payne,

at least insofar as they prohibit victim impact testimony as to the appropriate sentence in noncapital cases, are not clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Huu Thanh

Nguyen v. Garcia, 477 F.3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Absent a holding by the Supreme

Court to apply the principles of Wainright and Doyle to competency hearings, we are bound

by the strictures of AEDPA to defer to the state court’s determination.”) 

Respondents also contend that there is no indication that the trial court improperly

considered the victims’ requests that the maximum sentence be imposed. The victims’

sentencing recommendations uniformly called for the imposition of the maximum aggregate

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

27-year sentence. (Ex. K, pp. 13, 18-20 & 26.) However, the trial court rejected the victims’

recommendations and instead ordered only two of the sentences to run consecutively,

resulting in the imposition of an 18-year sentence. (Id., p. 34.) Petitioner fails to note that

while even the presentence report requested a 27-year sentence (id., p. 27), the prosecutor

requested an 18-year sentence, and on the record the court stated that, “I agree with [the

prosecutor’s] assessment as to an appropriate amount of punishment.” (Id.) That the court

rejected the recommendations of the victims and the PSR, and expressed agreement with the

prosecutor’s recommendation of an 18-year sentence, suggests that the Petitioner was not

prejudiced by the victims’ recommendations. Thus, even if the trial court was in error in

allowing the victims to offer sentencing recommendations, there is nothing in the record to

suggest that “the error had a substantial injurious effect on [Petitioner’s] sentence. Hoffman

v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 540 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, any error was harmless. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) (holding

that sentencing errors are subject to harmless error analysis). Petitioner is accordingly not

entitled to relief on this claim.

5. Ground VI

In Ground VI, petitioner argues that his double jeopardy rights were violated because

he was sentenced to consecutive sentences for convictions arising from one incident. In the

first part of this claim, Petitioner explains that each of the charges stemmed from a single act

“that happened in a tenth of a second.” Petition, p. 10. This argument, as Respondents

contend, carries no weight as “[i]t is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to

distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n.3 (1981). 

Next, Petitioner claims that his rights were violated because “all the evidence is the

same for all the offenses and it was impossible to commit the ultimate crime without

committing the secondary crime.” Petition, p. 10. The state court rejected this claim, finding

it was not error to impose consecutive sentences “where a defendant has injured more than

one person as a result of a single act.” (Ex. O, p. 24 (citations omitted).) With the exception

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

of the Count 5 charge for leaving the scene of the accident, each count alleged against

Petitioner in the indictment identifies a separate victim. (Ex. A, Item 1 (Count 1– Veronica

Armenta; Count 2– Sonia Diaz; Count 3– Rosie Guerrero; Count 4– Victoria Armenta).) 

In light of the clear distinctions among the five counts, Petitioner's convictions survive the

Blockburger “same conduct” test. In Blockburger, the Supreme Court concluded that “the

test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each

provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. ” Blockburger, 284

U.S. at 304. Petitioner's convictions under Counts 1 through 4 required proof of separate

victims, and his conviction on Count 5 required proof that he left the scene, which was not

required of the other counts. Although Petitioner's conduct underlying Counts 1 through 4

may be identical, “the requirement of proof of disparate victims avoids any double jeopardy

concerns.” Faulkner v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2949053 at *15 (D.Ariz. Oct.9, 2007) (citations

omitted) (rejecting double jeopardy claim where Arizona court imposed consecutive

sentences for two counts of aggravated assault on police officers arising out of the same

incident). See also Riley v. Stewart, 2005 WL 3434710 (D.Ariz. Dec.13, 2005) (denying

habeas relief where Arizona court imposed consecutive sentences for each victim present

during the course of one armed robbery) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-369

(1983)); LaMotte v. Slansky, 661 F.Supp. 573 (D.Nev.1987) (rejecting double jeopardy claim

where consecutive sentences were imposed for each victim killed or injured as a result of

defendant's drunk driving). As such, Petitioner has presented no claim upon which he is

entitled to relief.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District

Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[Docket No. 1].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 08-1106-PHXNVW. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 10th day of February, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 24 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 25 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

Case 2:08-cv-01106-NVW-JR Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 26 of 26