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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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BARBARA A. 

v. 

UNITED AIR 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci!'cuit 

JUL 2 8 1992 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk WHALEN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

LINES, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 91-1191 

(D.C. No. 90-S-606) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff Barbara Whalen appeals from a judgment dismissing 

her complaint under 42 u.s.c. S 2000e (Title VII) alleging that 

Defendant United Air Lines discharged her from employment on 

account of sex. Plaintiff contends that the district court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1191 Document: 010110275099 Date Filed: 07/28/1992 Page: 1
applied an erroneous legal standard, and that its finding of no 

discrimination is clearly erroneous. We disagree and affirm. 

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Customer Service 

Representative. In October 1988, Plaintiff's supervisor, Regina 

Gamlin, discovered what she thought were discrepancies in 

Plaintiff's time and attendance records (pay certs). Gamlin 

called a meeting with Plaintiff to discuss the discrepancies. 

Plaintiff had no explanation other than that she had been under 

stress due to domestic problems, and might have made some errors 

filling out the pay certs. Plaintiff met again with Gamlin and 

Gamlin's supervisor, Truman Jeter, and offered the same 

explanation for the discrepancies. Gamlin and Jeter then notified 

Plaintiff in writing of a formal meeting at which Plaintiff was to 

appear and answer the charges of falsifying her pay certs. 

Plaintiff attended this meeting with counsel. Following the 

meeting, Gamlin recommended to Jeter that Plaintiff be terminated. 

Plaintiff was formally notified of the termination, received two 

additional hearings at which she was represented by counsel, but 

the termination was upheld. Plaintiff then filed sex 

discrimination charges. 

Following a trial to the court, the district court found that 

Plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of sex discrimination. It 

further found that Defendant had articulated a nondiscriminatory 

reason for Plaintiff's discharge -- that she had committed one of 

the most serious, if not the most serious offense that Gamlin had 

ever observed during her employment with Defendant. It finally 

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found that Plaintiff failed to prove Defendant's reason for the 

discharge was pretextual. 

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in requiring 

her to provide direct evidence of discrimination after she 

established her prima facie case. In a Title VII disparate 

treatment case, the plaintiff has the initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case. If she does so, the burden 

shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. The 

plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant's legitimate reason was a pretext for 

discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). The plaintiff may do so directly by 

proving that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 

defendant, or indirectly by showing that the defendant's 

explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256. While the 

plaintiff's ultimate burden is to persuade the factfinder that the 

defendant intentionally discriminated against her, id. at 253, she 

is not required to produce direct evidence of discriminatory 

intent. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 

460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983). Rather, she may prove her case by 

direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. 

The district court stated that Plaintiff's ultimate burden of 

persuasion might by met by "direct evidence of discrimination, or 

indirectly." Appellant's App. at 48. We see nothing else in the 

district court's decision indicating that it failed to apply the 

correct law. 

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Plaintiff next challenges as clearly erroneous the district 

court's finding that Plaintiff failed to prove Defendant's reason 

for discharging her was pretextual. The district court's findings 

will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Verniero v. Air 

Force Academy Sch. Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 390 (10th Cir. 

1983). Findings will not be declared clearly erroneous unless, 

after reviewing the entire record, we are convinced that a mistake 

has been made. Id. at 390-91. 

Plaintiff attempted to show pretext by proving that male 

coworkers who committed similar offenses were never discharged for 

the first offense, while female employees had been discharged for 

first offenses. A female plaintiff discharged and not rehired 

because of alleged misconduct may establish pretext by proving 

that male employees involved in acts of "comparable seriousness" 

were nevertheless retained or rehired. See McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The male employees need 

not have committed the exact same offense as the plaintiff, only 

offenses of comparable seriousness. See McAlester v. United Air 

Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The burden is on the plaintiff to show the similarity between 

her conduct and that of male employees who were treated 

differently. See Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 

1989); Lanear v. Safeway Grocery. 843 F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 

1988). A finding that conduct is of comparable seriousness is 

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Stotts v. 

Memphis Fire Dep't, 858 F.2d 289, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1988). While 

the district court did not make an express finding of comparable 

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seriousness, 

Plaintiff's 

employees. 

its other findings indicate it did 

situation was comparable to those of 

not 

the 

think 

male 

Plaintiff argues that several male employees were not 

discharged although they committed disciplinary infractions for 

which termination was appropriate. Defendant's "You and United" 

employee handbook lists nineteen rules violations that will 

subject an employee to discharge. Plaintiff was charged with 

violating two of these rules, falsification of company records, 

and cheating. Jeter testified that violation of any of the 

nineteen rules could but would not necessarily lead to discharge. 

The offenses are not listed in order of seriousness, nor are they 

of comparable seriousness. Rather, the seriousness depends on the 

individual circumstances. 

Defendant employs a "constructive discipline" process 

pursuant to which it looks at the employee ' s entire file, his or 

her job performance, and the type of infraction to determine 

appropriate discipline, which can range from counseling to a 

warning to discharge. Defendant is not required to proceed 

through each phase before terminating an employee. Although it 

was her first offense, Plaintiff was discharged rather than being 

given a lesser form of discipline because of the nature of the 

offense and the fact that it was committed intentionally and 

without explanation on numerous occasions. 

Mark Annis, Ron Erlenbach, Herbert Spencer, Gary Pinson, and 

Larry Warren were disciplined but not discharged for first 

offenses involving substance abuse. Spencer was terminated when 

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he committed the same offense a few weeks later, despite his claim 

that he was experiencing personal problems. Pinson was suspected 

of being under the influence a second time, but when medical tests 

showed he was fit for duty, he was not terminated. Warren was 

fired when he was absent from work after being disciplined. 

David Graham received two notices and a "last chance letter" 

for unsatisfactory job performance. It is unclear from the record 

whether he was disciplined for violating one of the nineteen rules 

that subject an employee to discharge. He was not charged with 

falsifying company records. 

Jim Folmar was placed on final notice for using his position 

for personal gain by boarding himself and his son on a plane out 

of seniority order. He was investigated for falsifying his pay 

certs but when it was discovered that he had received permission 

to leave early, the charge was dropped. Folmar failed to show up 

for work on time several months later and was kept on final 

notice. 

Dahl Metzler was terminated for conspiring to defraud the 

company rather than being given a final notice because the offense 

"was a serious stand-alone rule violation that was worthy of 

discharge." Appellee's App. at 120. Metzler had previously been 

disciplined for inappropriately assigning ten seats. There is no 

indication in the record that the first offense was "similar 

conduct" to that for which he was terminated, as Plaintiff argues, 

or that it involved repeated instances of intentional dishonesty. 

It is unclear from the record that it was a dischargeable offense. 

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Melvin Griffin was disciplined but not discharged for 

soliciting money from customers. No further details are provided 

about this offense or Griffin's work history. 

Plaintiff argues that female employees were terminated for 

their first dischargeable offenses. Kathryn Frey received three 

warning notices for unacceptable dependability 

terminated. While unacceptable dependability is not 

before being 

one of the 

nineteen dischargeable offenses, it is an offense for which 

discharge is appropriate. Corrine Emanuel and Imogene Braswell 

were initially terminated for falsely claiming sick leave and for 

carrying a loaded handgun through a security check point, 

respectively, but were reinstated after they provided adequate 

explanations for their conduct. Both had been disciplined in the 

past. 

The record provides a basis for the district court's finding 

that Plaintiff, and females generally, were not treated less 

favorably than males in comparable situations. Defendant did not 

consider all nineteen "dischargeable" offenses as comparably 

serious. It had a practice of providing a second chance to 

employees accused of substance abuse-related offenses, which 

Plaintiff has not shown to be a pretext for discriminating against 

women. The record does not indicate that Graham's or Folmar's 

offenses involved repeated instances of intentional dishonesty, as 

did Plaintiff's. Plaintiff has not convinced us that the district 

court was mistaken in refusing to equate the completely different 

offenses committed by Graham and Folmar to that committed by 

Plaintiff. Dahl Metzler was terminated for an offense involving 

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dishonesty. Jeter testified that, although Metzler had previously 

received discipline for an unrelated offense, Metzler was 

discharged without regard to the prior offense. There is 

insufficient evidence to determine that Griffin's offense was of 

comparable seriousness to Plaintiff's. That Plaintiff was the 

only employee to have been terminated for a first offense, while 

true, does not establish discrimination where no other employee 

had been found guilty of a comparable offense. See Moore v. City 

of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1110 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 

U.S. 1021 (1985). 

Plaintiff also attempted to prove pretext by showing that she 

did not falsify her pay certs, as Defendant charged. However, 

"[c]ourts have held employers not liable under Title VII when they 

have discharged employees based on a good faith, albeit mistaken, 

belief a legitimate cause for discharge existed." Wheeler v. 

Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1986). 

Gamlin and Jeter admitted at trial that they then realized 

they were wrong about some, but certainly not all of the thirteen 

alleged discrepancies. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's failure 

to adequately investigate the discrepancies before recommending 

her termination establishes pretext. An employer's lack of 

inquiry into the validity of its reason for terminating an 

employee may show its belief in the validity of that reason was 

incredible, and the reason merely a pretext for discrimination. 

Bechold v. IGW Sys., Inc., 817 F.2d 1282, 1285 (7th Cir. 1987). 

While Gamlin may not have pursued every channel of inquiry, 

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Plaintiff had ample opportunity at five meetings and hearings to 

rebut the accuracy of Defendant's charges, but failed to do so. 

In any event, Plaintiff conceded that she falsified her pay 

certs on several of the occasions identified by Defendant. We 

conclude that the district court's finding that Plaintiff failed 

to prove pretext is not clearly erroneous. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

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