Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00066/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00066-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMANDO SANDOVAL, etc., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

MERCED UNION HIGH SCHOOL, )

et al., )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-066 REC/DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 8)

AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

FILE A FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF

THE FILING DATE OF THIS

ORDER

On April 24, 2006, the court heard defendants’ motion to

dismiss. 

Upon due consideration of the arguments of the parties and

the record herein, the court grants the motion to dismiss with

regard to the allegations in Paragraph 44(B) of the Complaint and

otherwise denies the motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth

herein.

On January 18, 2006, Armando Sandoval, a minor, by his

guardian, Jose Sandoval, filed a Complaint for Damages and

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Plaintiff’s pleadings and briefs in this action are in a very 1

small font, making them difficult to read. Unless there is a

technical reason for the use of this font, plaintiff’s counsel is

requested to increase its size to save the court and staff from

serious eyestrain. 

Although the Eleventh Cause of Action refers to Education 2

Code § 230.5, there is no such provision in West’s Annotated

California Codes.

2

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Named as defendants are the 1

Merced Union High School District and various employees of the

School District. The Complaint alleges that

While attending Atwater High School Plaintiff

experienced pervasive, severe and unwelcome

harassment based on his gender and sexual

orientation. Plaintiff’s classmates harassed

him physically and verbally on a near daily

basis. Plaintiff was continuously subjected

to epithets such as ‘faggot,’ ‘fag,’ ‘queer,’

‘homo,’ and ‘cocksucker.’ Plaintiff’s

classmates threatened to assault, injure, and

kill Plaintiff because of his gender and

sexual orientation. On several occasions

Plaintiff was subjected to actual assault,

battery, and physical violence on school

grounds during and after school. Defendants,

who had the authority to institute corrective

measures, were aware of the harassment, yet

repeatedly and intentionally failed to take

appropriate or necessary measures to stop the

abuse suffered by Plaintiff. 

The Complaint alleges that plaintiff “has filed an administrative

claim for damages under the California Tort Claims Act with the

MUHSD.” Paragraphs 13 through 45 allege the facts common to all

causes of action. The Eleventh Cause of Action is captioned

“Cal.Education Code §§ 200, 201, 212.5, 220, 230, 230.5, 231.5

and 233.5 Sex Discrimination Against All Defendants.”2

Defendants now move to dismiss portions of the Complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

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As noted above, although the Eleventh Cause of Action refers 3

to Education Code § 230.5, there is no such provision in West’s

Annotated California Codes.

3

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Specifically, defendants move to dismiss the Eleventh Cause of

Action on the ground that the provisions of the California

Education Code upon which the cause of action is based do not

provide a private right of action. In addition, defendants move

to dismiss the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Causes

of Action and/or specific factual allegations relevant to those

causes of action on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply

with the claim requirement of the California Government Tort

Claim Act.

A. Eleventh Cause of Action - Private Right of Action.

As noted, the Eleventh Cause of Action alleges sex

discrimination in violation of California Education Code §§ 200,

201, 212.5, 220, 230, 231.5 and 233.5. 

3

In arguing that the above-cited provisions of the California

Education Code do not provide a private right of action,

defendants refer the court to Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified

School District, 964 F.Supp. 1369 (N.D.Cal. 1997).

In Nicole M., Judge Patel addressed the defendants’ motion

to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff

had alleged that, beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1993

when she transferred to another school, male students repeatedly

sexually harassed her by unwanted verbal comments regarding

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plaintiff’s breasts and figure, and on one occasion involved a

male student touching plaintiff’s breast during class. On

January 4, 1993, plaintiff’s mother told the principal, Guzman,

that plaintiff was being sexually harassed at school and gave

Guzman the names of the boys who had harassed plaintiff and the

names of female students who had witnessed the harassment. 

Sometime later, Guzman also learned that plaintiff had been

sexually assaulted in one of her classes. Guzman suspended the

boy who had sexually assaulted plaintiff for one day. Guzman

took other actions in response to the reported sexual harassment

that plaintiff alleged was inadequate and counter-productive. 

Guzman spoke with the female students who had witnessed the

sexual harassment, promising to keep the meeting confidential. 

However, Guzman broke that promise and others at the school,

including the harassers, discovered that plaintiff had reported

the harassment. Guzman moved plaintiff into new classes so that

she could avoid the worst harassers. However, when the worst

harasser was moved into one of plaintiff’s new classes,

plaintiff’s complaints were unavailing. In early February 1993,

plaintiff’s mother told Guzman and the superintendent of the

school district, Crocker, that at least one boy continued to

sexually harass plaintiff. Because plaintiff no longer felt safe

at the school, she transferred to a school in another district in

mid-February 1993. In resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge

Patel ruled in pertinent part:

Plaintiff’s sixth claim charges MUSD and

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Crocker with violating the prohibition

against sexual harassment in educational

institutions as provided by California

Education Code sections 200, 212.5, 212.6,

220 and 230. Section 220 provides: ‘No

person shall be subjected to discrimination

on the basis of sex in any program or

activity conducted by an educational

institution.’ (West 1994) Section 230 defines

sex discrimination to include, inter alia,

harassment or other discrimination among

persons, including students, on the basis of

sex ... MUSD and Crocker argue that sections

220, 212.5, 212.6, 220 and 230 do not provide

a private right of action.

Neither of the parties nor the court has

found any authority explicitly confirming or

denying the existence of a private right of

action under the sections relied upon by

plaintiff. It seems relatively wellestablished under California law that ‘[t]o

imply a private right of action, the court

must determine that a private right of action

is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the

statute.’ Arriaga v. Loma Linda Univ., 10

Cal.App. 4th 1556, 1564 ... (1992); see also

Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal.App.3d

558, 570 ... (1981). Here, plaintiff has a

private right of action under Title IX,

section 1983 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 

As a result, a private right of action need

not be inferred under the California

Education Code sections cited by plaintiff. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is granted.

964 F.Supp. at 1390.

Noting that the Complaint before the court alleges causes of

action under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Unruh Act,

defendants argue that the court should dismiss the Eleventh Cause

of Action.

The court notes Nicole M. was based on the 1994 version of

the Education Code. The court further notes that the Education

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Code was amended in 1998 by A.B. 499. In relevant part, A.B. 499

amended Education Code § 200. Prior to its amendment in 1998,

Section 200 provided:

It is the policy of the State of California

to afford all persons, regardless of their

sex, equal rights and opportunities in the

educational institutions of the state. The 

purpose of this chapter is to prohibit acts

which are contrary to that policy and to

provide remedies therefor.

A.B. 499 amended Section 200 to provide:

It is the policy of the State of California

to afford all persons in public schools,

regardless of their sex, ethnic group

identification, race, national origin,

religion, or mental or physical disability,

equal rights and opportunities in the

educational institutions of the state. The

purpose of this chapter is to prohibit acts

which are contrary to that policy and to

provide remedies therefor.

Prior to the 1998 amendments, Education Code § 45 provided:

(a) All pupils have the right to participate

fully in the educational process, free from

discrimination and harassment.

(b) California’s public schools have an

affirmative obligation to combat racism,

sexism, and other forms of bias, and a

responsibility to provide equal educational

opportunity.

(c) Harassment on school grounds directed at

an individual on the basis of personal

characteristics or status creates a hostile

environment and jeopardizes equal educational

opportunity as guaranteed by the California

Constitution and the United States

Constitution.

(d) There is an urgent need to prevent and

respond to acts of hate violence and biasrelated incidents that are occurring at an

increasing rate in California’s public

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schools.

(e) There is an urgent need to teach and

inform pupils in the public schools about

these rights, as guaranteed by the federal

and state constitutions, in order to increase

pupils’ awareness and understanding of their

rights and the rights of others, with the

intention of promoting tolerance and

sensitivity in public schools and in society

as a means of responding to potential

harassment and hate violence.

(f) It is the intent of the Legislature that

each public school undertake educational

activities to counter discriminatory

incidents on school grounds and within

constitutional bounds, to minimize and

eliminate a hostile environment on school

grounds that impairs the access of pupils to

equal educational opportunity.

A.B. 499 renumbered Section 45 as Section 201 and amended Section

201 to include subparagraph (g):

It is the intent of the Legislature that this

chapter shall be interpreted as consistent

with Article 9.5 (commencing with Section

11135) of Chapter 1 of Part 1 of Division 3

of Title 2 of the Government Code, Title VI

of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42

U.S.C. Sec. 1981, et seq.), Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. Sec.

1681, et seq.), Section 504 of the federal

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. Section

794(a)), the federal Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. Sec.

1701, et seq.), the federal Equal Educational

Opportunities Act (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 et

seq.), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Secs. 51

t0 53, incl., Civ. C.), and the Fair

Employment and Housing Act (Pt. 2.8

(commencing with Sec. 12900), Div. 3, Gov.

C.), except where this chapter may grant more

protections or impose additional obligations,

and that the remedies provided herein shall

not be the exclusive remedies, but may be

combined with remedies that may be provided

by the above statutes.

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The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for A.B. 499 states in pertinent

part: “This bill would specify that the provisions on

discrimination may be enforced through a civil action.” 

Because Nicole M.’s holding was based on the version of the

relevant Education Code provisions in effect in 1994 and because

the subsequent amendments to the Education Code made by A.B. 499

and the legislative history of those amendments indicate that the

Legislature intended that the provisions could be enforced

through a civil action, the court concludes that defendants’

reliance on Nicole M. is misplaced and that Nicole M. is no

longer authoritative. The court further concludes that the

Legislature concluded that a private right of action was needed

to implement the statutory scheme under the Middlesex test. In

order to imply a private right of action under Middlesex, a court

must determine: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons

the statute is intended to protect; (2) a private remedy will

appropriately further the purpose of the litigation; and (3) such

a remedy appears to be needed to assure the effectiveness of the

statute. See Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F.3d

171, 174 (9 Cir. 1997), citing Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 th

Cal.App.3rd 558, 570 (1981). Here, it cannot be doubted that

plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the California

Education Code provisions are intended to protect and that a

private remedy will appropriately further the purpose of the

litigation. Given the statement in the Legislative Counsel’s

Digest and in Section 201(g), the court concludes that the

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Legislature believed that such a remedy is needed to assure the

effectiveness of the statutory scheme. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eleventh

Cause of Action is denied.

B. Compliance with California Government Tort Claims Act. 

Defendants contend that the factual allegations set forth in

paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 29,

31, 33, 34, 36, 40 and 44(B) should be dismissed because these

allegations do not appear in plaintiff’s claim under the

California Government Tort Claims Act. 

In resolving this aspect of the motion to dismiss, the court

takes judicial notice of plaintiff’s tort claim filed on November

22, 2005, wherein it is stated in pertinent part:

4. The circumstances giving rise to this

claim are as follows:

Claimant Armando Sandoval is an openly gay

high school student at Atwater High School. 

From September 2004 to the present Claimant

Sandoval has been subjected to harassment by

students in the form of derogatory epithets

such as ‘fag’ ‘fagot’ [sic] ‘homo’

‘cocksucker’ and ‘queer.’ Although school

officials were aware of the harassment

Claimant Sandoval was undergoing they took no

reasonable actions to stop the harassment.

Merced Unified School District’s failure to

discipline Claimant’s Sandoval’s harassers

led to one of them assaulting Claimant

Sandoval with a knife outside the school

cafeteria on January 31, 2005.

Claimant Sandoval has also received notes

threatening his life in his locker. Once

again no reasonable action was taken to

investigate the matter, discipline Claimant

Sandoval’s harassers, or to assure Claimant

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Sandoval’s safety.

On or about September 13, 2005 a student

harassed, spit, and attacked Claimant Armando

Sandoval at Atwater High School and when

Armando defended himself, the Merced Unified

School District’s employees responded by

suspending Armando Sandoval from Atwater High

School.

Merced Unified School District’s failure to

discipline Claimant Sandoval’s harassers has

led to them spitting on him and in multiple

batterys against Claimant Sandoval’s person.

Merced Unified School District employees have

themselves harassed, discriminated and

retaliated against Claimant Sandoval by

preventing him from attending classes in

which he was enrolled, suspending Claimant

Sandoval without justification, taking

disciplinary actions against Claimant

Sandoval which was [sic] unwarranted, failing

to allow Claimant Sandoval the same

privileges as other students, unfairly

seeking to have Claimant Sandoval evaluated

as being somehow ‘learning impaired,’ falsely

and fraudulently stating that Claimant

Armando Sandoval’s parents had consented to

place Armando Sandoval in independent study,

intimidating Claimant Sandoval, and other

actions.

Despite the fact that Merced Unified School

District’s own internal investigation found

that Claimant’s prior complaint to Merced

Unified School District was substantially

justified it failed to take any remedial

actions specified in its own report.

This tort claim names the employees who caused these injuries to

plaintiff as Kelly J. Bentz, Sylvia Smith, Kuljit Malhi, Linda

Lucas, Paul Shirlock, Ralph Calderon, Robert Fore, Scott Clinton,

Brian Ballenger, Jordan Bell, Andy Miller, Kenneth Rhoades,

Jeffrey Blackwell, all school board members, and possibly others

to be identified. Plaintiff’s tort claim filed on November 22,

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2005 was denied. Thereafter, the School District granted

plaintiff’s request to file a late claim. Plaintiff filed the

second tort claim on December 27, 2005. Paragraph 4 of that

tort claim and the names of the public employees are identical in

all respects to the one filed on November 22, 2005, except that

this later tort claim describes events from September 2004 “to

the present”, i.e., until December 27, 2005. This second tort

claim also was denied.

The allegations in the Complaint that defendants move to

dismiss as not being included in the tort claims are as follows:

14. In September 2004 Vice Principal Malhi

and campus liaison Steven Menezes searched

Plaintiff’s backpack.

15. On or about November 2, 2004 Plaintiff

was sent to the ‘responsibility center’ for

allegedly disrupting class. In fact,

Plaintiff had not been disrupting class but

had been sent to the center due to his sexual

orientation.

16. On or about November 4, 2004 Plaintiff

was told by a MUHSD counselor that, ‘One more

screw-up and you’re in IHS.’ IHS is an

independent study program and would result in

Plaintiff not attending Atwater High School.

17. Early in the Spring Semester of 2005

Atwater High School male students in

Plaintiff’s drama class told Plaintiff that,

‘being gay is sick.’ After Plaintiff

complained of this conduct Defendant failed

to investigate it.

18. In the Spring Semester of 2005 Plaintiff

was unable to use the regular restroom

because other students would harass Plaintiff

based on his sexual orientation. MUHSD was

aware of this problem and took no reasonable

steps to correct it.

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19. In the Spring Semester of 2005 Mr.

Rhoades, Plaintiff’s third period teacher,

repeatedly ignored Plaintiff and made him

raise his hand to speak in class while he

allowed other students to speak without

raising their hands. A fellow student

informed Plaintiff that Mr. Rhoades had

stated, ‘I don’t like gay people.’

20. In the Spring Semester of 2005 Plaintiff

was repeatedly harassed by students as he

passed by the classroom of Mr. Schiber. 

Plaintiff reported this harassment to

Defendant Bentz. Despite having informed

Defendant Bentz and Mr. Schiber’s presence

during the incidents themselves Defendants

permitted the harassment to continue and took

no reasonable steps to prevent its reoccurrence.

...

22. On or about January 28, 2005 a student

called Plaintiff a ‘stupid bitch’ and pushed

him into the mud due to Plaintiff’s sexual

orientation. On or about January 31, 2005

the student menaced Plaintiff with a knife

and threatened to kill him in front of

numerous witnesses. Nevertheless it took

several hours before the student was relieved

of the knife or anyone at MUHSD called the

police. Furthermore, MUHSD illegally placed

the Plaintiff on ‘administrative leave’ for a

week as a result of the incident.

23. In or about February 2005 a student

called Plaintiff a ‘faggot’ in the classroom

of Defendant Miller. Plaintiff replied,

‘there is no homophobia allowed.’ Defendant

Miller said, ‘yeah, there is, it’s a fear

just like a fear of spiders.’ Defendant

Miller took no action regarding the student

referring to the Plaintiff as a ‘faggot.’ 

Throughout the Spring 2005 semester Defendant

Miller was aware that Plaintiff was

undergoing harassment in his classroom yet

took no steps to prevent its occurrence.

...

25. On or about February 18, 2005 a student

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falsely accused Plaintiff of harassing him,

called Plaintiff a ‘fucking faggot’ and

grabbed Plaintiff’s hand while saying, ‘Hey,

sexy.’ Plaintiff reported the incident and

Defendant failed to take adequate measures to

ensure that the derogatory name called

ceased. The name calling continued.

26. On or about February 23, 2005 a student

harassed Plaintiff by throwing an object at

his head and calling him a, ‘faggot.’ 

Despite Plaintiff reporting this incident on

three occasions the harassment continued.

27. On or about February 25, 2005 Plaintiff

reported a student for harassing and calling

him names such as ‘queer’ and saying phrases

such as, ‘Oh, you’re too close’ and jumping

away from Plaintiff. Defendant failed to

take adequate measures to stop the

harassment.

28. In or about February or March 2005

Plaintiff was taking [sic] to a student in

class about being gay and the teacher,

Defendant Miller, said, ‘Oh stop it, you’re

turning me on.’

29. On or about March 2, 2005, Defendant

Miller told Vice Principal Bentz that Armando

thought she was ‘hot.’ Plaintiff had never

said anything of the sort. Defendant

Miller’s actions resulted in Plaintiff being

reprimanded by Defendant Bentz.

...

31. On or about March 24, 2005 a female

student told Plaintiff that she would get a

fellow male student’s telephone number for

him. Plaintiff told her not to do so. The

female student asked the male student for his

number for Plaintiff despite his express

statement not to. The male student then

reported the incident and Plaintiff was

counseled despite there being no evidence

whatsoever that he had made any comment

concerning the student or sought out the

telephone number. Furthermore, Plaintiff is

informed and believes that heterosexual

students who seek to obtain the telephone

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numbers of fellow students are not counseled

for such conduct.

...

33. On or around April 5, 2005 MUHSD allowed

it to become generally known that Plaintiff

was represented by counsel and was

considering a lawsuit against MUHSD.

34. On or about April 11, 2005 a magazine

page depicting a nude man in a bathtub was

placed on Plaintiff’s desk with a card

stating, ‘You know you want his body.’ 

Plaintiff reported the incident to Defendant

Bentz. Defendants failed to take adequate

steps to stop the harassment.

...

36. In or about April 2005 Plaintiff was

interested in trying out from the

pep/cheerleading squad. Plaintiff was

informed by several members of the football

team that they would quit the team if he did

so. The coach of the team was aware of this

and similar incidents. Nevertheless no

action was taken by MUHSD.

...

40. On or about May 26, 2005 Plaintiff

arrived to take his final examination in his

earth science class. Upon his arrival

Plaintiff told his teacher that he wished to

take the final examination. Plaintiff was

asked by the teacher, in a voice audible to

the entire class, why Plaintiff wanted to

take the final examination as it ‘would not

help your grades at all’ humiliating

Plaintiff in front of the class.

...

44[¶] B. After meeting with Defendants and

Defendants’ representatives on December 12,

2005, Plaintiff agreed to return to Atwater

High School on January 3, 2006. Plaintiff

returned to school on January 3, 2006. On

January 10 and 12, 2006, plaintiff was

harassed, called names and threatened by

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other students. Defendants failed and

refused to take any actions to prevent the

harassment and threats against Plaintiff. On

January 17, 2006, Plaintiff was threatened by

a student who told Plaintiff that he was

going to kill him after school. Plaintiff

left school prior to the completion of

classes on January 17, 2006. Plaintiff now

fears for his safety to the extent that

afraid to attend Defendants’ school ....

Defendants argue that because the above-quoted factual

allegations were not included in plaintiff’s tort claims, the

court must dismiss these specific allegations. 

In Fall River Joint Unified School District v. Superior

Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 431 (1988), the tort claim alleged that the

student was injured when one of the school doors closed with

sufficient force slam the student’s head against the steel door

frame. In his complaint, the plaintiff included an allegation

and cause of action that the school had negligently failed to

supervise students engaged in horseplay. The Court of Appeal

held in pertinent part:

Government Code § 945.4 requires, as a

prerequisite to maintenance of an action

against a public entity for damages arising

out of an alleged tort, the timely filing of

a claim, and its rejection. Section 910

provides that the claim must include a

general description of the injuries and the

names of the public employees who caused

them. Furthermore, ‘If a plaintiff relies on

more than one theory of recovery against the

[governmental] agency, each cause of action

must have been reflected in a timely claim. 

In addition, the factual circumstances set

forth in the written claim must correspond

with the facts alleged in the complaint; even

if the claim were timely, the complaint is

vulnerable to a demurrer [or motion for

judgment on the pleadings] if it alleges a

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factual basis for recovery which is not

fairly reflected in the written claim.’ ....

206 Cal.App. 3d at 434.

However, the California Supreme Court addressed this issue

in Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint

Powers Insurance Authority, 34 Cal.4th 441 (2004), Stockett

presented a tort claim that he was wrongfully terminated for

supporting a female employee’s sexual harassment complaints

against a broker, Malone, which harassment was in violation of

the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the public policy of

California; that Stockett became aware that members of the

Executive Committee and Malone had purchased insurance without

determining that the insurer provided the lowest price or value

to its members, and refused to select a provider through a

competitive bidding process; and that Malone and some members of

the Executive Committee, learning that Stockett was considering

soliciting other bids, conspired to induce the Executive

Committee to terminate Stockett by meeting secretly and making

false charges against him. After JPIA denied Stockett’s claim,

he filed a lawsuit against JPIA. He later moved to amend his

complaint to allege that he had been wrongfully terminated in

violation of public policy on three grounds: (1) opposing sexual

harassment by Malone in the workplace; (2) objecting to a

conflict of interest involving Malone’s dual role as both JPIA’s

insurance consultant and a vendor of insurance products to JPIA;

and (3) exercising his First Amendment right of free speech by

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objecting to JPIA’s practice of not having its insurance

purchased on the open market through an open bid process, which

was in the best interests of JPIA’s member agencies. JPIA

unsuccessfully opposed the motion to amend, claiming that the

facts in the amended complaint had not been set forth in the

government tort claim. At trial, Stockett also argued that he

had been terminated for exercising his free speech rights when he

made statements to Smart’s California Workers’ Compensation

Bulletin, an insurance industry newsletter, to the effect that

JPIA’s workers’ compensation insurer was selling insurance below

cost. After a plaintiff’s verdict, JPIA appealed. The Court of

Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that “[b]y allowing the

conflict of interest and free speech theories to be presented to

the jury, the trial court allowed the Stocketts to present a very

different case than one based solely on retaliation for objection

to sexual harassment.” The California Supreme Court reversed the

Court of Appeals. In so doing, the Supreme Court explained:

The purpose of these statutes is ‘to provide

the public entity sufficient information to

enable it to adequately investigate claims

and to settle them, if appropriate, without

the expense of litigation.’ ... Consequently,

a claim need not contain the detail and

specificity required of a pleading, but need

only ‘fairly describe what [the] entity is

alleged to have done.’ ... As the purpose of

the claim is to give the government entity

notice sufficient for it to investigate and

evaluate the claim, not to eliminate

meritorious actions ..., the claims statute

‘should not be applied to snare the unwary

where its purpose has been satisfied. 

...

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The claim, however, need not specify each

particular act or omission later proven to

have caused the injury ... A complaint’s

fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond

that given in the claim is not fatal, so long

as the complaint is not based on an ‘entirely

different set of facts.’ ... Only where there

has been a ‘complete shift in allegations,

usually involving an effort to premise civil

liability on acts or omissions committed at

different times or by different persons than

those described in the claim,’ have courts

generally found the complaint barred ...

Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds

further detail to a claim, but is predicated

on the same fundamental actions or failures

to act by the defendants, courts have

generally found the claim fairly reflects the

facts pled in the complaint.

34 Cal.4th at 446-447. In holding that Stockett’s tort claim

complied with the requirements of California law, the Supreme

Court noted that the claim generally stated the circumstances of

his termination and that the termination had been wrongful

because it was effected in violation of California public policy. 

The Supreme Court further held that “[w]hile Stockett’s claim did

not specifically assert his termination violated the public

policies favoring free speech and opposition to public employee

conflict of interest, these theories to do not represent

additional causes of action and hence need not be separately

presented under [California Government Code] section 945.4.” Id.

at 447. The Supreme Court distinguished Fall River because

the additional theories in Stockett’s amended

complaint did not shift liability to other

parties or premise liability on acts

committed at different times or places. In

Fall River, the plaintiff was injured at

school when a steel door struck his head. 

His notice of claim stated the injury was

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caused by the school’s negligent maintenance

of the door, but his complaint additionally

alleged the school had negligently failed to

supervise students engaged in horseplay ...

The court held that the factual divergence

between claim and complaint was too great;

the complaint alleged liability ‘on an

entirely different factual basis than what

was set forth in the tort claim.’ ...

Stockett’s complaint, in contrast, alleged

liability on the same wrongful act, his

termination, as was stated in his notice of

claim.

Id. at 448. The California Supreme Court in Stockett further

held:

Nor were the fundamental facts underlying

Stockett’s claim changed in his amended

complaint. Rather, the free speech and

conflict of interest theories simply

elaborated and added detail to his wrongful

termination claim by alleging additional

motivations and reasons for JPIA’s single

action of wrongful termination. This case is

thus similar to previous cases holding that

the claim fairly reflected the theories of

liability set forth in the complaint. In

Blair v. Superior Court, supra, ... for

example, the plaintiff, a passenger, was

injured when the driver lost control of his

vehicle on a highway and collided with a

tree. His claim stated the state had

negligently constructed and maintained the

highway surface, particularly by failing to

sand it to prevent icing, whereas the

complaint alleged the state had failed to

provide warning signs and a guardrail on the

highway ... The appellate court stated the

general claim of ‘negligent construction’

could ‘reasonably be read to encompass

defects in the placement of highway

guardrails ... or inadequate warning signs,’

and the plaintiff was not obliged to specify

in his notice of claim his particular

theories of negligence ... The claim and

complaint were based on the same foundation:

‘because of its negligent construction or

maintenance, the highway at the scene of the

accident constituted a dangerous condition of

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public property.’ ... Stockett’s claim and

complaint, similarly, are based on the same

factual foundation, viz., that certain named

JPIA agents wrongfully terminated him. 

In comparing claim and complaint, ‘we are

mindful that “[s]o long as the policies of

the claims statutes are effectuated, [the

statutes] should be given a liberal

construction to permit full adjudication on

the merits.”’ ... If the claim gives adequate

information for the public entity to

investigate, additional detail and

elaboration in the complaint is permitted.

By notifying JPIA of its act (wrongful

termination) that caused his injury (loss of

earnings, mental and physical pain and

suffering) and naming those JPIA agents he

believed responsible, Stockett’s claim

provided sufficient information for JPIA to

investigate and evaluate its merits. 

Contrary to JPIA’s suggestion, a reasonable

investigation of a wrongful termination claim

would not be limited to the motives for

termination hypothesized in the fired

employee’s claim form; certainly it would not

be so limited where, as here, the employee at

the time of termination asked for the reasons

and was refused them. A reasonable

investigation by JPIA would have included

questioning members of the committee to

discover their reasons for terminating

Stockett and an evaluation of whether any of

the reasons proffered by the committee,

including but not limited to the theories in

Stockett’s claim, constituted wrongful

termination. (Cf. Sandhu v. Lockheed

Missiles and Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th

846, 859 ... [where administrative charge

claimed only racial discrimination, complaint

was not defective in alleging national origin

discrimination as well; ‘we are confident

that the administrative investigation into

Sandhu’s claim of disparate treatment because

he was “Asian” would likely have encompassed

both race and national origin’]; Baker v.

Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1989) 209

Cal.App.3d 1057, 1065 ... [investigation of

administratively charged instances of

discrimination ‘would lead to the

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investigation of subsequent discriminatory

acts undertaken by respondents in retaliation

for appellant’s filing an internal

grievance’].)

In summary, Stockett adequately presented to

JPIA his wrongful termination cause of

action. His notice of claim satisfied the

purposes of the claims statutes by providing

sufficient information for the public entity

to conduct an investigation into the merits

of the wrongful termination claim, and the

complaint’s free speech and conflict of

interest theories of termination in violation

of public policy were fairly reflected in the

claim because the complaint did not change

the fundamental facts of the claim. Stockett

was therefore not precluded from amending his

complaint to include these theories or from

presenting them to the jury.

Id. 448-450. 

Defendants argue that “the factual circumstances stated in

the written claim as the basis of the public entity’s liability

must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint.” In so

arguing, defendants refer the court to Loehr v. Ventura County

Community College Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1082-1083 (1993):

“Although a claim need not conform to pleading standards, the

facts constituting the causes of action must substantially

correspond with the circumstances described in the claims as the

basis of the plaintiff’s injury.” 

In opposition, plaintiff contends that the Complaint “is

based on the same legal and factual theories set forth in his

California Tort Claim and fully satisfy the requirements of the

Act as set forth in Stockett ....” Plaintiff argues:

[T]he general allegations of Plaintiff’s tort

claim do fairly encompass the more detailed

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pleadings of his lawsuit. For example, in

his claim Plaintiff asserted, ‘Merced Unified

School District’s employees have themselves

harassed, discriminated and retaliated

against Claimant Sandoval by preventing him

from attending classes in which he was

enrolled, suspending Claimant Sandoval

without justification, taking disciplinary

actions against Claimant Sandoval which was

[sic] unwarranted, failing to allow Claimant

Sandoval the same privileges as other

students, unfairly seeking to have Claimant

Sandoval evaluated as being somehow ‘learning

impaired,’ falsely and fraudulently stating

that Claimant Armando Sandoval’s parents had

consented to place Armando Sandoval in

independent study, intimidating Claimant

Sandoval, and other actions.’ ... Numerous

items objected to by the Defendants are

merely examples of how, ‘District’s employees

have themselves harassed, discriminated and

retaliated against Claimant’ as asserted in

Plaintiff’s claim, ‘taking disciplinary

actions against Claimant Sandoval which was

[sic] unwarranted’ and ‘suspending Claimant

Sandoval without justification.’ In his

complaint at paragraph 15 where plaintiff

pleads that, ‘On or about November 2, 2004

Plaintiff was sent to the “responsibility

center” for allegedly disrupting class. In

fact, Plaintiff had not been disrupting class 

but had been sent to the center because of

his sexual orientation’ and paragraph 22 in

which Plaintiff pleads that,’ Marin [sic]

Unified High School District illegally placed

the Plaintiff on “administrative leave” for a

week as a result of the incident.’ 

Therefore, plaintiff argues, each of the allegations contained in

the Complaint are fairly related to those alleged in the claim

under the California Tort Claims Act.

Defendants argue that the fact that these allegations were

not described in the tort claims, coupled with the severity of

the allegations, means that defendants were not given adequate

notice to analyze these allegations, thereby running afoul of the

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Act’s notice provisions and the statute’s core purpose. 

Furthermore, defendants argue, plaintiff’s contention that the

contested allegations fairly relate to those events described in

the tort claims is without merit:

Plaintiff bases Defendants’ civil liability

on these specific allegations. In short,

Plaintiff asserts each allegation as a

distinct violation upon which Plaintiff’s

claims rest, and Plaintiff’s allegations

which occur after the filing of both of his

government tort claims are no exception. 

Consequently, if this Court were to allow

entirely new factual allegations, only found

in the civil complaint, to carry the same

possible liability as the factual allegations

properly asserted, Defendants would

necessarily need to analyze and defend

against specific allegations to which they

have no previous knowledge, which

specifically violates the CGTCA.

Finally, defendants refer to Stockett’s point in distinguishing

Fall River that “the additional theories in Stockett’s amended

complaint did not shift liabilities to other parties or premise

liability on acts committed at different times or places.” 34

Cal.4th at 448. 

The court concludes that, unless the substantial compliance

doctrine applies, see discussion infra, the allegations at issue 

must be dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to file a tort

claim with regard to those allegations for the reasons argued by

defendants. 

With regard to the allegations at issue, including those set

forth in Paragraph 44(B), plaintiff argues that he is entitled to

proceed in this action with regard to those allegations under the

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Substantial Compliance Doctrine.

In City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455

(1974), the California Supreme Court explained:

It is not the purpose of the claims statutes

to prevent surprise. Rather, the purpose of

these statutes is to provide the public

entity sufficient information to enable it to

adequately investigate claims and settle

then, if appropriate, without the expense of

litigation ... It is well-settled that claims

statutes must be satisfied even in the face

of the public entity’s actual knowledge of

the circumstances surrounding the claim. 

Such knowledge - standing alone - constitutes

neither substantial compliance nor basis for

estoppel. ...

The Supreme Court further held that in determining a contention

that there has been substantial compliance with the claim filing

requirements of the California Government Tort Claims Act, “two

tests shall be applied: Is there some compliance with all of the

statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient

to constitute substantial compliance.” Id. at 456-457. In

Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist., supra, 49 Cal.3d at 709, the

California Supreme Court held that “a document constitutes a

‘claim as presented’ triggering sections 910.8 [and] 911 ..., if

it discloses the existence of a ‘claim’ which, if not

satisfactorily resolved, will result in a lawsuit against the

entity.” “[T]o be sufficient to constitute a trigger-claim under

section 910.8, the content of the correspondence to the recipient

entity must at least be of such nature as to make it readily

discernible by the entity that the intended purpose thereof is to

convey the assertion of a compensable claim against the entity

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Plaintiff contends that defendants were aware in detail of 4

many of plaintiff’s factual allegations, including those not set

forth in the tort claims. In so asserting, plaintiff refers to the

Declaration of Daniel Bacon, plaintiff’s attorney, where Mr. Bacon

avers that he attended lengthy meetings with defendants’

representatives and attorneys in which plaintiff’s allegations were

discussed in detail, and avers that plaintiff filed an

administrative complaint with the District pursuant to 5 California

Administrative Code, §§ 4600-4671. This complaint resulted in the

District’s investigation of plaintiff’s allegations and

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which, if not otherwise satisfied, will result in litigation.” 

Green v. State Center Community College Dist., 34 Cal.App.4th

1348, 1358 (1995). “The doctrine of substantial compliance,

however, cannot cure total omission of an essential element from

the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully

with the statute.” Loehr v. Ventura County Community College

Dist., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 1083. 

Plaintiff argues that his tort claims presented sufficient

information to appraise the defendants of the nature of the

claims at issue, i.e., that the District’s employees had

discriminated against the plaintiff and failed to take reasonable

steps to stop the harassment and discrimination against the

plaintiff because of his sexual orientation. Plaintiff asserts: 

“It is this information which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s

claims and would have allowed ... [the] District to conduct an

appropriate investigation.” 

With regard to the allegations in the Complaint that were

not included in the tort claims of events that occurred prior to

December 27, 2005, the court concludes that plaintiff has

established substantial compliance with the claim requirement. 

4

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recommendations with regard to those which the District’s

investigation found had merit, the School District sending a letter

to plaintiff’s counsel on May 24, 2005 stating that “[e]nough of

the allegations have been sustained, in whole or in part, that I am

recommending that all staff and students undergo sexual harassment

training before the end of the calendar year.” In a report dated

June 24, 2005, sent to plaintiff’s counsel, the School District

stated: “In order to prevent future issues from arising involving

Armando and others, the District will provide its staff and student

body at Atwater High School with additional, specific training on

avoiding and preventing illegal harassment, including harassment

based on actual or perceived sexual orientation no later than

January 1, 2006.” Therefore, plaintiff argues, the function of the

Tort Claims Act has been fulfilled. However, as noted above,

actual knowledge of the circumstances of the claim does not

constitute substantial compliance with the claim requirement.

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff relies on defendant’s

actual knowledge of all of the allegations of the Complaint except

those occurring in January 2006 because of the investigation of

plaintiff’s administrative complaint as constituting substantial

compliance with the claim requirement, plaintiff’s contention is

without merit.

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However, with regard to the allegations in paragraph 44(B),

the court concurs with defendants that plaintiff did not

substantially comply with the claim requirement with respect to

these alleged instances. With regard to these allegations, 

plaintiff does not merely elaborate or add further detail to his

claim, but alleges two entirely distinct factual occurrences

which transpired after the filing of the two tort claims. As

explained in Fall River, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 435-436:

[The substantial compliance doctrine] is

unavailing where the plaintiff seeks to

impose upon the defendant ... the obligation

to defend a lawsuit based upon a set of facts

entirely different from those first noticed. 

Such an obvious subversion of the purposes of

the claims act, which is intended to give the

governmental agency an opportunity to

investigate and evaluate its potential

liability, is unsupportable ... Here,

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defendant was given no warning that it might

be sued for its employee’s failure to

supervise plaintiff and his fellow students,

and had no opportunity to consider the

validity of such a claim until the filing of

the amended complaint.

As noted, the second tort claim detailed events from September

2004 “to the present”, i.e., until December 27, 2005. Defendants

would have had no notice and no reason to investigate acts

occurring after that date in order to assess their potential

liability for those acts. 

Plaintiff further argues that defendants have waived any

defense related to the insufficiency of plaintiff’s tort claims

by failing to comply with the legal requirement that defendants

notify a claimant of any defect or omission in the claim.

In so arguing, plaintiff relies on California Government

Code § 910.8, which provides in pertinent part:

If, in the opinion of the board or the

persons designated by it, a claim as

presented fails to comply substantially with

the requirements of sections 910 and 910.2,

or with the requirements of a form provided

under Section 910.4 if a claim is presented

pursuant thereto, the board or the person

may, at any time within 20 days after the

claim is presented, give written notice of

its insufficiency, stating with particularity

the defects or omissions therein. The notice

shall be given as prescribed by Section

915.4. The board may not take action on the

claim for a period of 15 days after the

notice is given.

California Government Code § 911 further provides:

Any defense as to the sufficiency of the

claim based upon a defect or omission in the

claim as presented is waived by the failure

to give notice of the insufficiency with

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respect to the defect or omissions as

provided in Section 910.8, except that no

notice need be given and no waiver shall

result when the claim as presented fails to

state either an address to which the person

presenting the claim desires notices to be

sent or an address of the claimant.

Plaintiff’s claim of waiver is without merit. Plaintiff’s

assertion requires that defendants be mind-readers and anticipate

that the facts alleged in the Complaint would include factual

allegations note detailed in the tort claims and notify plaintiff

that the tort claims were insufficient on that basis. 

Defendants argue that, because plaintiff failed to present a

tort claim with regard to these allegations, the court should

dismiss these allegations from the Complaint. 

Plaintiff argues that, because the tort claims alleged a

pattern of harassment and discrimination extending “‘[f]rom

September 2004 to the present’, it is clear from the nature of

the claim that the issues addressed in the document are ongoing

and have not ended.” Plaintiff further notes that a plaintiff is

required by California Government Code § 911.2(a) to file a tort

claim not later than six months from the date his cause of action

accrues. Plaintiff contends:

Based on the facts of this case it is clear

that Plaintiff’s causes of action as pled in

the complaint had already accrued prior to

December 27, 2005. Additional facts which

support plaintiff’s causes of action or which

caused additional injury to Plaintiff under

the same course of conduct as complained on

in the Plaintiff’s original claims do not

change the date at which his cause of action

accrued. Thus, Plaintiff believes that any

argument that Plaintiff needs to re-file his

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claims to reflect additional facts would be

contrary to the statutory scheme. 

The court does not agree. Plaintiff is seeking to impose

tort liability on defendants based on alleged tortious acts that

were not included in the tort claim and which occurred after the

tort claim was filed. Given the statutory scheme and the purpose

of the tort claim, plaintiff should have filed a tort claim with

regard to the acts described in paragraph 44(B). Because he did

not, the allegations in paragraph 44(B) are dismissed.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part as set forth herein.

2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint in

accordance with this Order within 30 days of the filing date of

the Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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