Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01785/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01785-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4

5 9Y: DEPUTY

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MARISSA GLOVER, Case No.: 3:16-cv-01785-BEN-BLM

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STAY CASE AND

COMPEL ARBITRATION

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14 COMENITY CAPITAL BANK,

15 Defendant.

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17 Before this Court is the Motion to Stay Case and Compel Arbitration filed by

Defendant Comenity Capital Bank (“Comenity”). (Docket No. 18.) The motion is fully

briefed. The Court finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers without oral

argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1 .d. 1. For the reasons set forth below, the

Motion is denied without prejudice to refile at the conclusion ofthe trial described in 9

U.S.C. § 4.

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23 BACKGROUND1

24 PlaintiffMarissa Glover alleges that, “[i]n or about 2015, an imposter opened an

25 account with GameStop that was financed by Comenity” on her behalfwithout her

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i The following overview ofthe facts are drawn from the allegations ofthe Complaint.

(Docket No. 1.) The Court is not making findings offact. 28

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knowledge or consent. (Id. at 136.) She first learned ofthis account in mid-2015 (the

“Account”). (Id. at fflf 26, 36.) Plaintiffsubsequently conducted an investigation and

determined she was the victim ofidentity theft. (Id. at f 27.) She unsuccessfully

attempted to resolve the Account informally with Comenity. (Id. at fflj 28, 35.) Even

though she was attempting to resolve the issue, Comenity allegedly harassed Plaintiff

with telephone collection efforts and demeaning collection letters. (Id. at 129.) As a

result, Plaintiff claims she suffered various damages, including “attorneys’ fees, loss of

credit, loss of ability to purchase and benefit from credit, increased costs for credit,

mental and emotional pain and anguish, and humiliation and embarrassment of credit

denials.” (Id. at 134.)

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11 DISCUSSION

Comenity moves to compel arbitration asserting Plaintiffs claims are subject to an

existing arbitration agreement between them. (Docket No. 18.) Comenity contends that

Plaintiff opened the Account and agreed to its terms, and is thereby subject the arbitration

agreement.

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Section 2 ofthe Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that:

A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be

valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

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9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 demonstrates “‘a national policy favoring arbitration’ of claims

that parties contract to settle in that manner.” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 352-53

(2008) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).

Under Section 3 ofthe FAA, where an issue involved in a suit or proceeding is

referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing, the district court “shall on

application of one ofthe parties stay the trial ofthe action until such arbitration has been

had in accordance with the terms ofthe agreement...” 9 U.S.C. § 3. The language is

mandatory, and district courts are required to order arbitration on issues as to which an

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1 arbitration agreement has been signed. Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052, 1058

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)).

The role ofthe district court is “limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to

arbitrate exists and, ifit does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at

issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party “cannot be required to submit to

arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Tracer Research Corp. v.

Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994). A court must determine

whether there is an agreement to arbitrate before ordering arbitration. Wagner v. Stratton

Oakmont, Inc., 83 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1996). In doing so, a court “should not

assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and

unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so.” First Options ofChicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,

514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Unlike determining the scope ofthe disputes covered by a

valid arbitration agreement, in the face ofsilence or ambiguity a court presumes the

parties intended a court to determine arbitrability. Id. at 944-45.

Here, Comenity asserts Plaintiffs claims must be arbitrated because she entered

into a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement. To support this assertion, Comenity

produced an employee declaration and supporting exhibits, including the arbitration

agreement and some ofComenity’s records ofthe Account. (Docket Nos. 18-1 to 18-3.)

In her Opposition and supporting Declaration, Plaintiffresponds that she is not required

to arbitrate her claims because she “did not incur the charges at issue” and “did not agree

to arbitrate such charges.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Docket No. 19-1, Declaration ofMarissa

Glover (“Glover Deck”) 5-6.)

In its Reply, Comenity claims “Plaintiff does not dispute in her Opposition that she

opened a Game Stop credit card account or that she entered into a credit card agreement

(“CCA”) with an arbitration clause.” (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Comenity also contends “there

is irrefutable evidence that Plaintiff opened the Game Stop credit account and the charges

on the account were authorized by Plaintiff.” (Id.) Comenity submitted an additional

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employee declaration, the credit card application, some ofthe Account’s statements from

2015, a personal money order, a transcript of a recorded conversation allegedly between a

Comenity representative and Plaintiffin which the caller requests balance information,

and Plaintiffs police report. (Docket Nos. 20-1 to 20-8.)

Comenity’s arguments ignore the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint that she did

not open the Account. (Compl. ^ 36.) That “Plaintiffs credit card account was applied

for in person at the Game Stop retail store,” is not inconsistent with Plaintiffs allegation

that someone else opened the Account in her name. (Def.’s Reply at 3) (emphasis in

original.) It is plausible that an imposter entered the Game Stop store using Plaintiffs

personal information to obtain a credit card. Similarly, it is plausible that an imposter

called Comenity using the same information to request balance information.

Additionally, although Plaintiffmade a reference to the Account as “Plaintiffs Game

Stop Account” this is also not inconsistent with the allegations in her Complaint. (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2.) For all intents and purposes, the Account may be considered as belonging to

Plaintiffby virtue ofthe fact that it is in her name. However, Plaintiffnever admits that

she opened the Account in her Opposition, and her Complaint makes it clear that she

alleges that she did not.

Therefore, the Court finds that there is a genuine question offact in need of

resolution. Accordingly, the Court shall schedule a trial for resolution ofthese issues.

See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“Ifthe making ofthe arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or

refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial

thereof.”). The Court orders the parties to meet and confer and to file a joint

proposed trial plan within two weeks ofthe date of this order. The joint proposed

trial plan shall address, inter alia, whether the trial shall be a jury trial or a bench trial,

how long the trial is expected to take, when the parties would prefer trial to be scheduled,

and what discovery is needed for trial.

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1 CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES without prejudice

Defendant’s Motion Stay Case and Compel Arbitration. As discussed above, within two

weeks ofthe date ofthis order, the parties shall meet and confer, consult with the

Courtroom Deputy regarding available trial dates, and file a joint proposed trial plan to

adjudicate the issue ofwhether Plaintiff consented to the arbitration agreement.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ^7

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9 DATED: Apri 2017

[ON. ROGER T. BENITEZ

fiited States District Judge 10

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