Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00492/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00492-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIN HOLLENBECK,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0492 LKK JFM P

vs.

GAIL LEWIS, et al., ORDER AND

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the sentence of twenty-six

years to life in prison sentence imposed following his 1995 conviction of one count of possession

of 4.65 grams of methamphetamine. The jury found petitioner had been previously convicted of

three prior violent felonies and one prior serious felony. Petitioner claims the trial court abused

its discretion by failing to dismiss his prior serious or violent felony offenses and that his

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

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 California Penal Code § 1385 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he judge or magistrate may, 1

either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in

furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” The California Supreme Court has held

that in cases charged under California’s Three Strikes law, a court may exercise the power to

dismiss prior convictions at the time of sentencing in the furtherance of justice. People v.

Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-30 (1996).

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II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Failure to Strike Prior Convictions

Petitioner first claims that the trial court abused its discretion under California

Penal Code § 1385(a) when it declined, at the time of sentencing, to strike his prior felony

convictions that arose in one case in the furtherance of justice. On appeal, petitioner argued that 1

the trial court based its decision almost entirely on petitioner’s criminal history and failed to take

into account mitigating factors, and twisted mitigating factors into aggravating ones. (Ex. A to

Answer, Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 19) Petitioner argued that all four of his felony

convictions arose from one event. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner acknowledged his long history of drug

addiction and the existence of authority holding that it may not be used as a factor in mitigation,

People v. Reid, 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 370 (1982), but argued it should not be treated as a factor in

aggravation. (Ex. A to Answer, Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 21 & n. 5-6.) Finally, petitioner

argued that the trial court failed to meet the criteria required by People v. Superior Court

(Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-30 (1996).

This claim essentially involves an interpretation of state sentencing law. As

explained above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court

determinations on state law questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. So long as a state sentence “is

not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or

ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of state statutes are

matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

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Cir. 1994).

Under California's Three Strikes law, a defendant may be considered to have two

prior strikes even though he was convicted of both qualifying offenses in a single judicial

proceeding. People v. Askey, 49 Cal.App.4th 381, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 785 (Ct.App.1996). 

The state court record reflects that prior to the sentencing proceedings, petitioner’s

trial counsel filed four separate motions to strike petitioner’s prior felony convictions, based on: 

cruel and unusual punishment and the State and Federal Constitutions (CT 166-77), Penal Code

§ 667 enhancement on basis of ex post facto law prohibition (CT 178-83), Three Strikes law (CT

184-98), and allegation of Penal Code § 667(b) - (i) (CT 217-25.) At the hearing on the motions,

the judge declined to reduce petitioner’s present offense to a misdemeanor and refused to strike

the prior convictions. (RT 629; CT 255.) The judge stated he had reviewed petitioner’s criminal

record and considered that petitioner had become more violent, had been using drugs since age

11, and had failed rehabilitation efforts. (RT 629.) In addition, the judge noted that shortly after

petitioner was paroled from the serious felony convictions he was under the influence of

methamphetamine at the time he was arrested and found to be in possession of 4.65 grams of

methamphetamine, and the evidence suggested he was also in possession of a weapon, all while

absconded on parole. (RT 629-30.) The judge commented that petitioner had not demonstrated

anything in his background that would give the judge hope that petitioner had learned from his

past encounters with the law. (RT 630.) These conclusions are not contrary to the facts in the

trial record. 

After reviewing Romero and People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148,158 (1998), the

California Court of Appeal found that in determining whether to strike a prior felony conviction,

the court must determine whether the circumstances take the [petitioner] outside the spirit of the

Three Strikes law.” (People v. Hollenbeck, slip op. at 9-10.) The state court then reviewed the

trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion under a deferential standard. (Williams, 17 Cal.4th

at 162.)

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In this case, a review of the trial court’s discretion makes it

abundantly clear that its decision must be affirmed under the

deferential abuse of discretion standard.

First, the court was justified in denying [petitioner] relief based

upon his lengthy criminal record because [petitioner’s] commission

of yet another felony within three months of his release on parole

in 1994, following his conviction for four violent or serious

felonies (which themselves followed 11 misdemeanor convictions),

demonstrated that he was well within the spirit of the Three Strikes

law.

Second, the trial court did not simply review [petitioner’s] criminal

record. It also considered “the particulars of his background,

character, and prospects” as provided in Williams, supra, 17

Cal.4th at p. 161, including [petitioner’s] education, drug history,

job possibilities, and family history. The trial court found that

[petitioner] was not sincere about curing his drug habit because he

had failed to enroll in drug rehabilitation programs while in prison

prior to the resentencing hearing. Instead, the court noted that

[petitioner] was found in possession of inmate alcohol and had

smuggled tobacco into the jail. The court commended [petitioner]

for attempting to complete his general education diploma, but

noted that he had failed to earn it. In light of [petitioner’s] lengthy

criminal record and the equivocal conclusions that can be drawn

from his background and prospects, [petitioner] was not outside of

the spirit of the Three Strikes law.

[Petitioner’s] arguments to the contrary are unavailing. [Petitioner]

complains that the court’s decision “rested almost entirely upon his

criminal history.” But, as noted, the court did consider

[petitioner’s] background, character, and prospects, including his

education and his failure to seek treatment for his drug addiction. 

As we read the transcript of the trial court’s decision, it simply did

not find that the other aspects of [petitioner’s] background,

character, and prospects took him outside the spirit of the Three

Strikes law in light of his lengthy criminal record.

In People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 305, the defendant

argued that the trial court erred in refusing to strike any of his prior

serious or violent felonies “because the court failed to weigh the

relevant sentencing factors, including his age, the nature and

circumstances of his current nonviolent offense and the remoteness

of his prior offenses.” (Id. at pp. 308-309.) Like the [petitioner]

here, he charged “that the only factor actually considered by the

court was ‘violence, or the threat of violence involved in the prior

strike convictions and the current offense’ . . . .” (Id. at p. 309.) 

The Court of Appeal ruled that to reverse the trial court’s decision,

the defendant had to demonstrate that “the trial court’s decision

was irrational or arbitrary” and that “the fact that the court focused

its explanatory comments on the violence and potential violence of

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[defendant’s] crimes does not mean that it considered only that

factor.” (People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309, 310.) 

Likewise, here, the fact that the court focused its explanatory

comments on the [petitioner’s] criminal record does not mean that

it considered only that factor or that its decision was irrational.

[Petitioner] complains that the court “ignored abundant evidence . .

. that [petitioner] had undergone fundamental change for the

better.” To the contrary, the trial court’s detailed explanation of its

rationale for its decision showed that it considered all the evidence

presented on [petitioner’s] behalf. The court simply found that the

alleged improvement in [petitioner’s] behavior was not credible. 

We note that the evidence of his changed attitude was based on the

testimony of relatives and a clinical director of an alcohol and drug

counseling program, who interviewed [petitioner] twice. The court

was entitled to place more weight on [petitioner’s] actions,

including the fact that he continued to offend while absconding

from parole, than on the testimony of relatives and of a drug

treatment counselor who had two limited interviews with him. We

are not permitted to reweigh the evidence in the manner advocated

by [petitioner]. (Citation omitted.)

[Petitioner] argues that the court “ignored the critically important

fact that the four [felony] convictions arose from the same

transaction.” But the court was aware of that fact: It recited that

the four felonies arose when [petitioner] and others “robbed four

other men in a residential apartment.” Moreover, [petitioner] does

not explain how the fact that the felony convictions arose out of a

single circumstance takes [petitioner] outside the spirit of the Three

Strikes law when they are part of a longer and continuing criminal

record and are not remote in time.

[Petitioner] asserts that the court improperly used his drug

addiction as an aggravating circumstance and claims that it cannot

be so used. But the court did not use his drug addiction as an

aggravating circumstance to increase his punishment; it simply

noted that his lengthy drug history did not take him outside the

spirit of the Three Strikes law. And there is no reason why it

would. Indeed, in People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957,

963-964, the court suggested that when a defendant’s long-standing

drug addiction or alcoholism plays a significant role in his criminal

record and the defendant has failed to take the necessary steps to

overcome his addiction, despite repeated opportunities (as here),

the addiction is more properly used in aggravation than mitigation.

[Petitioner’s] citation to People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th

1245, is also unavailing. There, the Second Appellate District

affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss two of Bishop’s

strikes in the furtherance of justice on the grounds the strikes were

remote (17 to 20 years old), the current offense for petty theft was

nonviolent, and the resulting 12-year sentence would keep the 50-

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 If petitioner’s sentence had been imposed under an invalid statute and/or was in excess 2

of that actually permitted under state law, a federal due process violation would be presented. 

See Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (due process violation found where

petitioner’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole could not be

constitutionally imposed under the state statute upon which his conviction was based). However,

petitioner has not made that showing here.

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year-old defendant in prison for a significant period of time. (Id. at

pp. 1248, 1251.) But the decision in Bishop preceded Williams

and thus was not informed by the correct standard: whether the

circumstances placed defendant outside the spirit of the Three

Strikes scheme. Further, the strikes here are not remote as in

People v. Bishop. And finally, the Court of Appeal in People v.

Bishop concluded that while “the People and perhaps even this

court may be of the opinion that Bishop appears undeserving of

leniency, the paramount consideration is not what the prosecution,

defense or appellate court might conclude. Rather, what counts is

what the trial court in this case concluded, as expressed by the

reasons it stated under section 1385, subdivision (1). On this

record, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to dismiss two

of Bishop’s strikes in furtherance of justice constituted an abuse of

discretion.” (Id. at p. 1251.) Thus, Bishop merely stands for the

proposition that a trial court’s lawful exercise of discretion to strike

a prior conviction, based on different facts and a different standard

than applied in this case, should not be reversed on appeal. Bishop

also properly observes that it matters not that the appellate court

might have decided the case differently in the first instance, but

that it only matters whether the trial court’s decision was an abuse

of discretion.

We conclude that [petitioner] has not established that the trial court

abused its discretion in any way.

(People v. Hollenbeck, slip op. at 10-15.)

The trial court’s decision not to strike petitioner’s prior felony convictions was not

fundamentally unfair. This decision with respect to the application of state sentencing law is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and does not justify federal habeas

relief. Further, after a careful review of the sentencing proceedings, this court finds no federal

constitutional violation in the state trial judge’s exercise of his sentencing discretion. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.2

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B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner claims that his sentence of twenty-six years to life in prison constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. This claim was raised on direct appeal and rejected by the state court of appeal on

the ground that the sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual under either the

California State Constitution or the United States Constitution. (Ex. B to Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, People v. Hollenbeck, No. C030659, slip op. at 15-23 (January 23,

2001).)

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the United States Supreme Court

made clear that, in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison sentence, the “only

relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’

framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear,

applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73 (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983);

and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). The Andrade Court concluded that two

consecutive 25-years-to- life sentences with the possibility of parole, imposed under California's

three-strikes law following two petty theft convictions with priors, did not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment. Id. at 77; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a

sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under California's three-strikes law did

not violate the Eighth Amendment). “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Rummel,

445 U.S. at 272.

In Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, post-Andrade, that a three strike sentence of twenty-five years

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 A “wobbler” is an offense that can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony 3

under applicable law. See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004).

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to life in prison for a third shoplifting offense, a “wobbler” under state law , constituted cruel and 3

unusual punishment. In Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the court of appeals

distinguished Ramirez, finding that the petitioner in Rios had a “lengthy criminal history,” had

“been incarcerated several times,” and because the strikes used to enhance the petitioner’s

sentence had “involved the threat of violence.” Id. at 1086.

Like the petitioners in Rios and Ramirez, in the instant case petitioner’s

commitment offense, possession of methamphetamine, is also a “wobbler” under California law.

 See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d at 1051. The record reflects that petitioner’s criminal history,

however, including the strikes that support his sentence, were more similar to Rios than Ramirez. 

In 1991, petitioner was convicted of three counts of home invasion robbery and one count of

residential burglary. (CT 205.) The 1991 conviction was enhanced by his possession and use of

a shotgun. (CT 205.) In 1990, petitioner sustained two misdemeanor convictions for petty theft. 

(RT 205.) From 1987 to 1989, petitioner sustained two misdemeanor convictions for possessing

a dangerous weapon (CT 203), three counts of misdemeanor battery (CT 203), one count of

misdemeanor exhibition of a firearm (CT 204), one count misdemeanor obstructing an officer

(CT 204). Unlike Rios, petitioner’s strikes included violence, not just a threat of violence.

The record suggests that petitioner’s commitment offense was a relatively minor

offense, and arguably his criminal history relates to a longstanding narcotics addiction. 

However, as noted above, the circumstances under which a prison sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment are “exceedingly rare.” Given the legal authority that binds this court, petitioner’s

criminal history precludes a finding that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Finally, on March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a request that the court take judicial

notice of Duran v. Castro, Case No. CIV S-00-0305 LKK JFM P. Petitioner’s request will be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 201. Petitioner’s request is unsupported by facts or argument. 

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 The possession of heroin charge on which Duran was convicted is a felony, although 4

not characterized as a serious or violent crime. Cal. Health & Safety Code 11350(a); Cal. Pen.

Code § § 667(d), 667.5(c).

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Petitioner may have cited Duran because at the time of his request, the district court assigned to

Duran’s petition for writ of habeas corpus had granted Duran’s claim that his sentence imposed

under Three Strikes law violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Id. However, on July 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed

and remanded Duran’s case to the district court. Id. Ultimately, Duran’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus was denied in toto on April 9, 2004.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the facts of Duran further support denial of the

instant petition. Duran pled guilty to possession of 1.55 grams of heroin in exchange for a

recommendation that he serve no more than twenty-five years to life in prison. (Duran v. Castro,

CIV S-00-0305 LKK KJM P, March 12, 2004 Findings and Recommendations at 1.) Consistent

with the plea agreement, Duran admitted he had suffered two prior serious felonies for kidnaping

a child and his mother in 1989, and Duran was sentenced to twenty-five years to life. (Id.) After

applying Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003),

the district court found that based on Duran’s criminal record, it could not be reasonably disputed

that Duran fell within the category of persons who have committed serious or violent felonies

and who continue to commit felonies. (Duran v. Castro, CIV S-00-0305 LKK KJM P, March

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12, 2004 Findings and Recommendations at 4-5.) 

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s application

for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s March

12, 2003 request to take judicial notice is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 29, 2005. 

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holl0492.157

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