Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02579/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTA DE LA TORRE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2579-LAB (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

[DOCKET NUMBERS 19, 21, 22.]

vs.

LEGAL RECOVERY LAW OFFICE,

et al.,

Defendants.

This order amends and replaces the Court’s order of September 30, 2013 (Docket no.

30). The Clerk is directed to remove that order from the docket, and in its place file this

order, nunc pro tunc to September 30.

Plaintiff Marta De La Torre brought this action under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (FDCPA), the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), California’s

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act), and several state theories

including negligence, invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion. Capital One Bank was

previously a Defendant, and De La Torre brought a claim against it under the Truth in

Lending Act. But Capital One has since been dismissed and that claim was dropped. Thus,

the only federal claims are brought under the FDCPA and the TCPA; the remainder are

state-law claims.

/ / /

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The complaint is not as clear as it could or should be, and does not make clear the

chronology of events on which the claims are based. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify

certain basic facts. Capital One had filed a lawsuit against De La Torre in state court, and

was awarded $3,072 plus attorney’s fees. The Legal Recovery Law Office (“LRLO”)

represented Capital One in this action. The remaining Defendants are employed by LRLO

and De La Torre alleges they helped LRLO attempt to collect debt. At some point, LRLO and

its employees, acting for Capital One, tried to collect money they said De La Torre owed

Capital One. De La Torre alleges they tried to collect more than was owed, used abusive

tactics in collecting it, and caused her harm as a result.

After Capital One’s Dismissal as a party, the remaining Defendants filed three

potentially dispositive motions: a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (by all

Defendants, Docket no. 19), a motion to strike pursuant to California Civil Code § 425.16 (by

Defendants Rebecca Beretta, LRLO, and Lorena Ray, Docket no. 22), and another motion

to strike pursuant to California Civil Code § 425.16 (by Defendants David Cotter and Mark

Walsh, Docket no. 22). The basis for striking claims is a state-law defense and applies only

to the state-law claims, not those brought under federal law. These motions are all

interrelated, and the Court will therefore consider them together. 

Legal Standards

Motion to Dismiss

A Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”Id. at 555. "[S]ome

threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset" before a case is permitted to proceed.

Id. at 558 (citation omitted). The well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the Court to

infer “the mere possibility of conduct;” they must show that the pleader is entitled to relief. 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

De La Torre cites old, pre-Bell Atlantic standards such as the “no set of facts”

standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 350 U.S. 41 (1957). These standards, under which

dismissal was only rarely possible, were overruled by Bell Atlantic. See 550 U.S. at 562–63.

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all

allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of

Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). However, the

Court is "not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by

documents referred to in the complaint," and does "not . . . necessarily assume the truth of

legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." Warren

v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). "Generally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim is limited to the contents of the complaint.” Id. at 1141 n.5.

Motions to Strike

In considering Defendants’ motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, the

Court must first ask whether they "ha[ve] made a threshold showing that the challenged

cause of action arises from a protected activity." Gallanis-Politis v. Medina, 152 Cal.App.4th

600, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). As this language suggests, the burden is on Defendants to

make this showing. See also Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53,

67 (Cal. 2002). A protected activity is an act "in furtherance of [a] person's right of petition

or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public

issue." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). This includes:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or

judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written

or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or

review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding

authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open

to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any

other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the

constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of

public interest. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).

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But if Defendants’ alleged acts fall within the first two prongs of this section, they are “not

required to independently demonstrate that the matter is a ‘public issue’ within the statute’s

meaning.” Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4 834, 842–43 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. th

2005). 

If the Court determines that De La Torre’s causes of action against Defendants do not

arise from a protected activity, that is the end of the analysis, and the anti-SLAPP motion

fails. If the Court determines otherwise, the burden shifts to De La Torre to demonstrate a

probability of prevailing on her claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §425.16(b)(1). This means she

“must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient

prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

plaintiff is credited.” See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4 1048, 1056 (2006) (citation and th

(quotation marks omitted)

Defendants are not required to show that all activities were protected, but only that

“protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim.” See A.F.

Brown Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 4th 1118, 1124–25

(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2006). If Defendants meet their burden, De La Torre then must

“demonstrate the cause of action has some merit.” Id.

Even if an anti-SLAPP motion is granted, a plaintiff ordinarily will be granted leave to

amend. See Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th

Cir. 2004). But leave to amend will be denied if amendment would be futile. See Gardner v.

Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009).

The parties have attached exhibits to their briefs, which is permitted. But arguments

must be raised in the brief itself, not in exhibits. The Court is not required to read exhibits

and infer arguments from them. See Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d

1026, 1030 (9 Cir. 2001) (“A lawyer drafting an opposition to a . . . motion may easily show th

a judge, in the opposition, the evidence that the lawyer wants the judge to read.”) Citations

to exhibits must explain the significance of the cited evidence, and the parties cannot

circumvent page limits by simply incorporating by reference other documents, such as

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attached or lodged exhibits. See Pagtakhan v. Doe, 2013 WL 3052865, slip op. at *5

(N.D.Cal., June 17, 2013) (“Plaintiffs also may not circumvent the page limits by

incorporating by reference other documents.”) Furthermore, it is not the Court’s role to read

exhibits and use the information it finds there to create arguments for parties. See

Marrapese v. Univ. of Calif. Bd. of Regents, 2013 WL 2476272, slip op. at *2 (S.D.Cal., June

7, 2013) (citing, inter alia, Jacobson v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364–66 (9 Cir. 1986)) (“The th

Court cannot comb through [the plaintiff’s] exhibits and create arguments for him.”)

Correctness of State Court Judgment

The judgment of a state court forms part of the factual pattern here. The complaint

alleges that Capital One sought to recover $3,748.22, but the court awarded only $3,072.

(Compl., ¶ 32.) The court also awarded Capital One $7,500 in attorney’s fees against De La

Torre. (Id.) To the extent De La Torre (or any of the Defendants, for that matter) might be

asking the Court to review that judgment, the Court is without jurisdiction to do so. See

Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9 Cir. 2010) (discussing application of Rooker- th

Feldman doctrine). This does not bar De La Torre from asserting an allegedly illegal act by

an adverse party. See id. But, at the same time, the Court accepts the state judgment as res

judicata.

Discussion

De La Torre filed the same opposition to both sets of Defendants’ motions to strike. 

Her opposition begins by arguing that because Defendants were not parties to the state

court action, they are not protected by California’s anti-SLAPP law. In support of this, she

cites this Court’s own ruling in Rouse v. Clark Law Offices, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (2006).

Rouse is inapposite. There, the defendant law offices were pursuing a cause of action

against a debtor named Dale Rouse, but mistakenly tried to collect debts from Martin Rouse,

his estranged son. Id. at 1034. The law offices kept calling even after Martin made clear he

was not Dale Rouse. Id. They also served him with process in a suit against Dale Rouse,

obtained a default judgment, and put a lien on his, Martin’s property. Id. The fact that Martin

provided documents proving he was not Dale Rouse was no deterrent. Id. As the Court’s

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ruling makes clear, the defendants could not benefit from anti-SLAPP protections because

their harassment of Martin Rouse did not arise from a lawsuit against him. It arose instead

from a lawsuit against Dale Rouse, and they had reason to know the two were not the same

person. “Merely because legal action is filed after protected activity took place does not

mean it arises from that activity.” Id. at 1039 (citing City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69,

70 (2002)). In other words, the fact that a creditor is suing or preparing to sue does not give

it carte blanche to deal in any manner it chooses with people it has reason to know are

unconnected to the lawsuit.

Here, De La Torre concedes she was the defendant in the state court suit, and Capital

One was the plaintiff. She also concedes Capital One hired LRLO to represent it. A protected

act includes “qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation.”

Rusheen, 37 Cal. 4 at 1056. th

De La Torre’s Request for Judicial Notice

The complaint and oppositions cite various cases in which LRLO or Capital One was

sued for illegal debt collection. The complaint cites entire dockets, not any documents within

those dockets. (Compl., ¶ 88.) In support of her oppositions, De La Torre requests that the

Court take judicial notice of her counsel’s PACER search. His declaration states that he ran

a PACER search for “Legal Recovery Law Offices” and downloaded the first six complaints

he pulled up; and three of the six alleged unlawful prelitigation collection calls not made in

aid of litigation.

This is not properly the subject of judicial notice, principally because it is not relevant.

See Fed. R. Evid. 402. The mere fact that either or both were sued, even if they were sued

many times, is immaterial. The fact that other parties made allegations of illegal debt

collection against them is inadmissible hearsay. None of the citations are specific enough

to establish collateral estoppel as to any issue, because they only identify allegations, not

proved or adjudicated facts. And even if De La Torre had cited parts of the record showing

either or both violated debt collection laws on some other occasion, that would not be

admissible to show they had so acted on this occasion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 404(b). The

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standard for taking judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201, is far from being met here, and the

request is DENIED.

Motion to Strike by Defendants Cotter and Walsh

These two Defendants point out they are both attorneys employed by LRLO, and

argue they were not involved in any prelitigation activity, and their first involvement with De

La Torre occurred when LRLO filed suit on behalf of Capital One. Cotter provides a

declaration stating that his role in the matter was limited to litigation-related matters such as

discovery, trial, and settlement negotiations with De La Torre’s attorney. (Cotter Decl. in

Supp. of Mot. to Strike (Docket no. 22-3), ¶¶ 8, 9.) He says he never communicated with De

La Torre except in her attorney’s presence. (Id., ¶ 10.) He also says his employment with

LRLO began after LRLO filed suit. (Id., ¶ 11.)

Walsh provides a declaration stating that his activity was limited to prosecution of the

complaint, and that he communicated with De La Torre only in the presence of her attorney. 

(Wash Decl. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike (Docket no. 22-4), ¶¶ 4–7.)

De La Torre denies any of this is true, but in evaluating the first prong, the Court only

considers whether the movants have made the required threshold showing. Cotter’s and

Walsh’s evidence is sufficient to meet this standard because it shows their actions were

taken in furtherance of litigation. The burden therefore shifts to De La Torre to show that the

complaint is legally sufficient, and that it is supported by sufficient evidence to make out a

prima facie case. See Rusheen, 37 Cal. 4 at 1056. th

The complaint’s allegations in support of the particular state law claims incorporate

previous factual allegations as to Defendants generally, including the following:

• Defendants placed calls to De La Torre’s cellular and home phone.

• They called her after she demanded the calls to end.

• Someone at an unspecified time told De La Torre over the phone she

owed $4,929.36, which was more than she owed.

• The Defendants demanded a down payment of $1500 at an

unspecified time.

(Compl., ¶¶ 16, 17, 31, 37.) 

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The complaint identifies both Cotter and Walsh as attorneys employed by LRLO,

which they do not dispute. (Compl., ¶¶ 3–4.) It also says they were acting as debt collectors,

and knowingly and willingly violated the law while attempting to collect a debt (id.), which is

really a series of legal conclusions, not factual allegations.

The complaint also includes several conclusory allegations as to Defendants

generally. It alleges that Defendants are “debt collectors that used abusive, unfair, false and

misleading statements in an attempt to collect a debt” from De La Torre, and that they were

at all times acting at Capital One’s direction. (Id. ¶ 15.) It also alleges De La Torre prevailed

in the state court action, because the court found that LRLO , Cotter, Walsh, and Capital

One were attempting to collect more than she owed. (Id., ¶ 36.) But an earlier allegation

makes clear this last conclusion is unwarranted. The state court found De La Torre liable not

only for $3,072.00, but also for $7,500 in attorney’s fees. (Id., ¶ 32.) De La Torre’s

conclusion, in other words, is that because Capital One recovered about $700 less than it

asked, she was in fact the prevailing party. But the fact that the court awarded substantial

attorney’s fees shows this conclusion is unwarranted. The remainder of the factual

allegations are limited to what Capital One or LRLO did.

The allegations in support of the Rosenthal Act, negligence, and intrusion on

seclusion (or invasion of privacy) claims, other than the factual allegations incorporated by

reference, are wholly conclusory. They consist of the type of formulaic recitals Bell Atlantic

held were insufficient. See 550 U.S. at 555. The factual allegations are far from sufficient to

state a claim against Cotter or Walsh under any of the three state-law theories.

Cotter and Walsh have raised the litigation privilege as to all claims against them. This

privilege covers communications made by litigants and their counsel “in connection with or

in preparation of litigation”. Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4 892, 908 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. th

2002). The privilege is broad, and shields communications having “some relation” to judicial

proceeding. See A.F. Brown 137 Cal. App. 4 at 1126. It covers communications made th

before litigation began, as long as litigation was contemplated in good faith and under

serious consideration. Id. at 1128. This includes prelitigation demands, provided they would

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otherwise qualify. See Aronson v. Kinsella, 58 Cal. App. 4 254, 315–16 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. th

1997).

De La Torre cites Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–94 (1995) for the proposition

that when lawyers act as debt collectors, their activity is actionable. This precedent has no

application here, however, because that case dealt solely with a FDCPA claim. The motion

to strike seeks only to strike state law causes of action, which are subject to state law

defenses including the litigation privilege.

The opposition makes numerous references to debt collection letters, and De La

Torre’s own declaration says she received six of them. (De La Torre Decl. (Docket no. 26-1),

¶ 8.) But the complaint says nothing about De La Torre receiving any letters. Furthermore,

the suggestion that these were “debt collection letters” is a legal conclusion. 

The only evidence De La Torre points to is her own declaration, and her husband’s.

Her opposition says that this declaration “identifies each of the defendants as engaging in

the complained of pre-litigation conduct.” (Opp’n to Cotter & Walsh Mot. (Docket no. 26),

11:2–9.) The Court has examined her declaration, and although she swears under penalty

of perjury that all Defendants called her numerous times before the lawsuit was filed, she

does not parcel out who made which calls, when they were made, or what was said on the

calls. The Court accepts De La Torre’s and her counsel’s representations that what she

intends to swear to is that she knows both Walsh and Cotter called her before the lawsuit

began. Even so, this evidence is unpersuasive, because all it says is that the calls were 1

made “prior to the filing of this lawsuit.” It also does not differentiate out which Defendants

made which calls. This leaves open the distinct possibility that Cotter and Walsh called her

in connection with the lawsuit. Accepting that as true, Walsh’s and Cotter’s declarations

cannot be wholly true, but they still would be entitled to claim the litigation privilege. 

The Court believes this is what De La Torre’s counsel intends to say, because it is 1

the only way that De La Torre’s declaration can be construed as relevant or helpful. If this

is not correct, De La Torre’s counsel must correct the misimpression before taking any

further action against Walsh or Cotter. In the absence of any correction, the Court will accept

his representation that he has conferred with his client about what she meant to say, and

that she did intend to state, under penalty of perjury, that she knows both Cotter and Walsh

called her before litigation began. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

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De La Torre’s husband’s declaration (Docket no. 26-2) says essentially the same

thing. The only information it adds is that “defendants called [his] place of work and left

messages regarding the debt collection activity on my wife’s account.” (Id., ¶ 6.) The

declarations say that each of the calls said the purpose was to collect a debt and that the call

was being recorded. This does not show whether Cotter, Walsh, or anyone else was acting

as a debt collector within the meaning of the law; it is also consistent with their being

attorneys making demand on a debt before filing suit.

The Court therefore finds De La Torre has failed to carry her burden, and that Cotter

and Walsh are entitled to prevail on their motion to strike the state law claims against them.

Motion by Defendants LRLO, Beretta, and Ray

These three Defendants argue, and have provided evidence, that Capital One hired

them to file a lawsuit to collect a debt. (LRLO, Beretta, & Ray Mot., Ex. 1 (Rundquist Decl.),

¶ 4.) They have provided a phone log, authenticated by a declaration, that they say shows

that only four calls were placed to De La Torre’s home before litigation began. (Id., Exs. 1

& 2.) They provide evidence that these calls were made solely in order to verify her home

address so that they could serve her with process. (Rundquist Decl., ¶ 5.) Their motion says

nothing specific about any calls they placed to her cell phone, but it characterizes the calls

to her home as the only calls they made to her. They deny calling De La Torre’s husband’s 2

work, and provide evidence to support this. (Id., ¶ 10.)

They also argue, and provide evidence, that later communications with De La Torre

were made only to notify her they were about to file suit, (Rundquist Decl. ¶ 6) or during the

course of litigation. (Id., ¶¶ 7–9.)

Because Defendants LRLO, Beretta, and Ray have provided evidence showing they

made the calls alleged in the complaint only in connection with litigation, they have made the

The Court construes this, as well as the Rundquist Declaration, as representing that

2

these three Defendants made calls only to De La Torre’s home number, and none to her cell

phone. (See Rundquist Decl., ¶ 5 (characterizing the phone calls to De La Torre’s home

number as “[a]ll pre-litigation phone calls”).) If this is incorrect, or if Defendants’ counsel has

not confirmed that Rundquist intended to so state under penalty of perjury, Defendants’

counsel is directed to correct the misimpression promptly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

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threshold showing. The burden therefore shifts to De La Torre to show that the complaint

is legally sufficient, and that it is supported by sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie

case. See Rusheen, 37 Cal. 4 at 1056. th

Because De La Torre’s opposition makes virtually the same arguments as her

opposition to Cotter’s and Walsh’s motion, it suffers from many of the same defects. The

Complaint’s factual allegations as to these Defendants are somewhat more specific,

however.

The Complaint alleges Ray and Beretta were attorneys employed by LRLO. Other

than the allegations already discussed, the allegations against LRLO concern allegedly

improper service of process (Compl., ¶¶ 18–19); misstatements (through Ray) about the

service of process (id., ¶ 20); the filing of a false proof of service (id., ¶ 21), misstatements

about the validity of service (id., ¶ 22); LRLO’s leaving of voicemails or messages at De La

Torre’s home number and her husband’s work number (id., ¶¶ 23, 25); LRLO’s continuing

to contact De La Torre after she told them to stop and after someone at LRLO said they

would stop (id., ¶¶ 27, 29); LRLO’s contacting De La Torre after it knew she was represented

by counsel (id., ¶ 28); LRLO’s filing of a lawsuit seeking a larger amount than it ultimately

recovered (id., ¶¶ 30, 32, 33, 36); and LRLO’s demands that De La Torre pay her debt on

unreasonable terms, including a down payment of $1500. (Id., ¶¶ 37–39.) The only

allegations about Beretta are conclusory allegations similar to those made about Walsh and

Cotter. i.e., that she is a debt who knowingly and willingly violated the law while trying to 3

collect a debt. Other than a similar conclusory allegation about Ray, and the allegation in

paragraph 20 that Ray made a misstatement about service of process, the only allegation

against her is that she falsely implied she was an attorney at law. (Id. ¶ 47(d).) This conflicts

with paragraph 5, however, which alleges that Ray “is, and at all times herein mentioned

was, an attorney employed by LRLO . . . .”

/ / /

The Complaint refers to both Ray and Beretta as “he.” (See Compl., ¶¶ 5, 6.) But the 3

fact that their names are Lorena and Rebecca, respectively, suggests that they are women.

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LRLO, Ray, and Beretta rely on the litigation privilege. The Complaint makes clear

many of the acts LRLO is alleged to have committed occurred during or in connection with

litigation, and Ray and Beretta as individuals are hardly alleged to have done anything. The

remaining allegations against LRLO and the generalized allegations against all Defendants

are not specific enough as to the time frame and content to rule out the possibility that the

litigation privilege applies.

De La Torre’s brief argues that unlawful prelitigation debt collection activities are not

protected by the litigation privilege. That may be so, but the complaint doesn’t plead facts

showing that communication by LRLO, Ray, and Beretta with De La Torre consisted of debt

collection as opposed to litigation-related activities. For example, if these Defendants in good

faith contemplated litigation and were making prefiling demands, their demands would be

protected. See Aronson, 58 Cal. App. 4 at 315–16. The one to whom such a demand is th

directed might well object to it or insist that preparation for litigation cease, but if this is

litigation activity, it would still be protected. 

The only evidence De La Torre offers is her and her husband’s declarations, making

approximately the same statements as before. Even accepting her statement that LRLO,

Ray, and Beretta called for some other purpose than to gain information about where to

serve De La Torre, the calls may still fall within the litigation privilege if they were logically

connected to the litigation in some other way. De La Torre also points to her and her

husband’s declarations saying that other calls were made to them. But in the absence of

details about what was said during the calls, when the calls were made, and who made

them, this evidence does not does not make out a prima facie case. The motion to strike

must therefore be granted as to claims against LRLO, Ray, and Beretta as well.

Motion to Dismiss

The motion argues, first, that the Complaint is insufficiently pled, that it fails to give

individual Defendants notice of what they are alleged to have done, and on what facts its

claims rest. 

/ / /

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The Complaint is built primarily on legal conclusions, starting with the fact that LRLO

and its employees were debt collectors. Whether a person or entity is a debt collector within

the meaning of the FDCPA or Rosenthal Act is a legal determination. The conclusion

whether a person is a debt collector is based on facts, such as whether the person is in the

regular business of consumer-debt collection. See Anderson v. Kimball, Tirey & St. John

LLP, 2013 WL 5229814, at *3 (S.D.Cal., Sept. 16, 2013) (construing meaning of “debt

collector” as used in the FDCPA); Long v. Nationwide Legal File & Serve, Inc., 2013 WL

5219053, at *13 (N.D.Cal., Sept. 17, 2013) (construing meaning of “debt collector” as used

in the Rosenthal Act). For example, an attorney who is not in the regular business of

collecting consumer debts is not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA, see 

Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995), and no attorney is a debt collector within the

meaning of the Rosenthal Act. See Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 547–48

(N.D.Cal. 2005). A law firm that, in the ordinary course of business regularly engages in debt

collection can, however be a debt collector. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). 

De La Torre argues that because the motion to dismiss did not specifically attack the

allegations as insufficient to show Defendants were debt collectors, she does not need to

address this. The motion, however argued that the allegations in general were insufficient

to plead a claim. 

Defendants also object that the Complaint does not say which allegations support

claims against which Defendants, which is true. As it stands, the complaint alleges that

nearly all Defendants together engaged in all the activity underlying De La Torre’s claims.

For purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts De La Torre’s factual

allegations. 

The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated numerous sections of the FDCPA. 

(Compl., ¶ 51.) The motion to dismiss goes through the allegations supporting each of these,

arguing that they are insufficient, and explaining what is missing from the pleadings. De La

Torre, in opposition, argues she is not required to plead all facts necessary to establish her

claim, and that the Defendants and the Court should infer what she has not pleaded. For

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example, the Complaint alleges that LRLO contacted De La Torre after she told it she was

represented by counsel. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Defendants point out that doing so is not always a

FDCPA violation; for example, if her attorney consented to it or if her attorney failed to

respond within a reasonable time, the communication does not violate the FDCPA. See 15

U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). De La Torre’s argument that the Court can reasonably infer these

conditions are absence is incorrect, particularly because Defendants have specifically

challenged them. If she wants the Court to accept facts at the pleading stage, she must

plead them. The pleaded facts need not rule out every possibility, but they must at least

plausibly show that De La Torre is entitled to relief. See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 554

(holding that, at the pleading stage, plaintiffs were required to plead facts to exclude the

reasonable possibility that defendants acted lawfully). Defendants make similar arguments

with regard to other FDCPA and Rosenthal claims. 

As another example, the complaint alleges some unspecified person told De La Torre

she owed $4,929.36, which was more than she owed. (Compl., ¶ 31.) Apparently she intends

Defendants and the Court to assume this was LRLO. But in the previous paragraph she

made allegations that both LRLO and Capital One proceeded to collect on an amount not

owed. This leaves open the possibility that someone working for Capital One told her this. 

Because Capital One is no longer a Defendant, this allegation does not explain why LRLO

would be liable. Furthermore, there is no connection with any other Defendant. The next

paragraph alleges that LRLO and Capital One sued to recover $3,748.22 but only recovered

$3,072.00, and that this shows they were trying to collect on a larger amount than they owed. 

Defendants’ motion correctly points out, however, that the Complaint does not “identify what

the state court, if anything, rejected as unrecoverable by contract or law.” (Mot., 16:13–15.)

Even if De La Torre were proceeding pro se and were entitled to liberal construction

of her complaint, she still could not expect the Court to supply facts she did not plead. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). The Motion

goes through a series of arguments of this type. The Court need not address each one in

detail; it is sufficient to say that they all follow the same general pattern. Defendants’

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arguments, in short, are well-taken. The Complaint relies too much on labels and

conclusions, and does not plead enough facts to make out a plausible FDCPA or Rosenthal

claim. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65.

With regard to the TCPA claims, Defendants make similar arguments. They also point

out that De La Torre never alleged the date or contents of even one call they are alleged to

have made. De La Torre did provide some information about the calls and contents, but

Defendants are correct that there is little to put them on notice of what she is alleging. For

example, Defendants probably would not be able to check their phone records for any calls

made to De La Torre’s cell phone or to her husband’s office without knowing when the calls

were made. The Complaint does say Defendants left messages that were overheard by

others (Compl., ¶¶ 23, 25), but does not plead facts showing that this was the intention or

fault of Defendants. 

Defendants also cite Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027 (9 Cir. 2010) for th

the proposition that false but not immaterial misrepresentations are not actionable under the

FDCPA. They argue that the misrepresentations De La Torre alleged against them were not

material. In reply, she merely argues they could materially mislead her, under the “least

sophisticated consumer” standard. (Opp’n, 12:11–13:21.) But her argument is that because

the statements were “patently false” and had something to do with collections, they must be

material. The alleged misrepresentations she identifies are also not all misrepresentations;

one of them is a promise (to stop calling her) that they didn’t keep, and another is allegedly

illegal service and pursuit of default judgment. (Opp’n, 13:13–16.) The others concern the

proper way service of process is effected. The Complaint doesn’t even include enough

information for the Court to determine whether the alleged misstatements about service of

process were material.

In short, the Complaint is insufficiently pleaded as to all federal claims. De La Torre

has, however, requested leave to amend, which will be granted. To avoid, if possible,

another round of motions to dismiss and amendment of the Complaint, De La Torre is

encouraged to review the statutes and common law elements of her claims under which she

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is suing, and to make sure she has pleaded facts to support her claims. By way of example,

she claims that Defendants intruded on her solitude by telephoning her and leaving

messages. While courts have sometimes allowed such claims against debt collectors for

phone calls, such claims generally arise only out of “truly egregious” behavior. See Smith v.

Capital One Fin’l Corp., 2012 WL 3138024, at *3 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 1, 2012).

Finally, if De La Torre amends, she should endeavor to the extent possible to provide

details such as approximate dates of calls, how many calls were made, who called her, and 4

what was said. 

Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, both motions to strike are GRANTED IN PART, and the motion

to dismiss is GRANTED. De La Torre’s state law claims are STRICKEN, but not without

leave to amend. Her federal claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

She may file an amended complaint no later than Thursday, October 24, 2013. If she

does not amend within the time permitted, the Court will assume she realizes she cannot

successfully amend, construe this as an intent to abandon her claims, and will dismiss the

action with prejudice. The parties are reminded to review notes 1 and 2, and if they have

given the wrong impression as to these or any other facts, to correct it.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 12, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

At present, the Court is accepting De La Torre’s allegation that all Defendants made 4

every phone call, including those alleged to have been made by the automatic dialer. This

seems improbable. If this is not true, De La Torre should try to clarify whether the call was

made by an individual, a group, or a mechanized device. All allegations in pleadings are

required to be made to the best of De La Torre’s counsels’ knowledge, formed after a

reasonable inquiry. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

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