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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-1057 

PETER ENGER, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CHICAGO CARRIAGE CAB CORP., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:14-CV-02117 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2016 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff taxi drivers (collectively, 

“the drivers”) brought a class action suit against their taxi 

company employers. The drivers contend that defendants 

violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 

ILCS 115 et seq. (“IWPCA”), by improperly charging them to 

work and forcing them to bear their own operating expenses, among other things. The drivers also assert a cause of acCase: 15-1057 Document: 61 Filed: 01/11/2016 Pages: 10
2 No. 15-1057 

tion based on a theory of unjust enrichment. Defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss. 

The IWPCA provides employees with a cause of action 

against employers for the timely and complete payment of 

earned wages. The Act defines “wages” narrowly—a wage is 

compensation owed by the employer pursuant to an employment agreement between the parties. See 820 ILCS 115/2. The 

district court assumed for purposes of the motion to dismiss 

that the drivers were employees and that the parties had entered into an employment agreement. But the court granted 

defendants’ motion to dismiss because that employment 

agreement did not obligate defendants to compensate the 

drivers, and thus, the drivers’ claims regarding improper 

fees could not be brought under the IWPCA. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. Background 

Plaintiffs are current and former Chicago taxi drivers 

who worked for defendant taxi companies.1 To drive one of 

defendants’ taxis, the driver must pay a daily or weekly 

“shift fee.” Essentially, shift fees are lease payments that allow the driver to operate one of defendants’ taxis and earn 

income. If paid on a daily basis, the fees range from $100 to 

$125, and weekly fees range from $500 to $800 or more. A 

 1 Plaintiffs are Peter Enger, Karen Chamberlain, Courtney Creater, 

Gregory McGee, and Finn Ebelechukwu. Taxi company defendants are 

Chicago Carriage Cab Co.; Yellow Cab Affiliation, Inc.; Flash Cab Co.; 

and Dispatch Taxi Affiliation, Inc. As part of this suit, plaintiffs also sued 

individual taxi company owners Simon Garber, Michael Levine, Henry 

Elizar, Savas Tsitiridis, and Evgeny Friedman. 

Case: 15-1057 Document: 61 Filed: 01/11/2016 Pages: 10
No. 15-1057 3

driver must also pay operating expenses, which include fuel, 

airport taxes, upkeep, and sometimes insurance payments. 

The drivers do not earn traditional wages or overtime 

pay—their only source of income is what they make in fares 

and tips from passengers. As a result, the drivers contend 

that they often receive less than minimum wage and for 

some shifts, pay more for fees and expenses than they receive from fares and tips. 

On March 26, 2014, the drivers brought a putative class 

action on behalf of “all ... persons who have worked as taxi 

drivers in Chicago, Illinois, over the last ten years for any of 

the defendants or their affiliates and have had to pay weekly 

fees or daily fees (for 12 or 24 hour shifts) in order to work as 

taxi drivers.” The drivers’ complaint alleged that defendants 

violated the IWPCA by improperly classifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them the minimum 

wage or overtime pay, improperly charging them to work, 

and forcing them to bear their own operating expenses. The 

complaint also asserted a cause of action based on a theory 

of unjust enrichment. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 

drivers could not seek recovery under the IWPCA because 

they had not alleged the existence of an employment contract or any agreement to pay the drivers’ wages. Defendants 

conceded for purposes of the motion to dismiss that the 

drivers would be considered employees under the IWPCA’s 

broad employment relationship test. 

The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

The court determined that the complaint adequately pled the 

existence of an implicit employment agreement between the 

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4 No. 15-1057 

drivers and defendants, but nonetheless concluded that the 

drivers had failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) because that agreement did not require 

defendants to pay the drivers any wages, nor did it provide 

for overtime pay. Thus, the drivers’ claims regarding a lack 

of a fair wage and improper fees could not be brought under 

the IWPCA. In addition, the district court determined that 

because the drivers’ claim for unjust enrichment was premised on the same allegedly improper conduct as the drivers’ 

IWPCA claims, the unjust enrichment claim failed. This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 

de novo, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Citadel Grp. 

Ltd. v. Wash. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). 

“Dismissal is proper if it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

that would entitle him to the relief requested.” R.J.R. Servs., 

Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989) 

(citation omitted). 

A. IWPCA Claims 

On appeal, the drivers contend that the district court relied on an overly narrow definition of “wages” that improperly excluded tips and other forms of indirect compensation. 

Specifically, the drivers argue that the implied contract allowing them to collect fares and tips from passengers provides for indirect compensation from defendants, and thus, 

the district court improperly dismissed their IWPCA claims. 

The drivers also maintain that defendants violated the 

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No. 15-1057 5

IWPCA, which prohibits employers from taking deductions 

from an employee’s wages unless certain conditions are 

met,2 by requiring the drivers to pay shift fees and bear their 

own operating expenses. 

The IWPCA provides employees with a cause of action 

against employers for the timely and complete payment of 

earned wages. 820 ILCS 115/3. The Act defines “wages” narrowly—a wage is “compensation owed an employee by an 

employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties ... .” 820 ILCS 115/2 (emphasis added). 

As such, to state a claim under the IWPCA, the drivers are 

required to demonstrate that they are owed compensation 

from defendants pursuant to an employment agreement. See, 

e.g., Brand v. Comcast Corp., No. 12 CV 1122, 2013 WL 

1499008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2013) (holding that “to state 

a claim under the IWPCA, [plaintiff] must allege that [defendant] owed him the unpaid wages pursuant to an employment contract or agreement”); Dominguez v. Micro Ctr. 

Sales Corp., No. 11 C 8202, 2012 WL 1719793, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 

May 15, 2012) (“[T]he IWPCA mandates overtime pay or any 

other specific kind of wage only to the extent the parties’ 

contract or agreement requires such pay.”). Like the district 

court, we assume that the parties’ relationship is governed 

by an implicit employment contract. 

We agree with the district court that the drivers’ IWPCA 

claims fail because the drivers have not demonstrated that 

 2 The employer may take deductions from wages if those deductions 

are: “(1) required by law; (2) to ... benefit ... the employee; (3) in response to a valid wage assignment or wage deduction order; [or] (4) 

made with the express written consent of the employee, given freely at 

the time the deduction is made ... .” 820 ILCS 115/9. 

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defendants owed them “wages.” It is undisputed that the 

parties’ employment agreement did not obligate defendants 

to compensate the drivers—it only required defendants to 

make their cabs and medallions available to the drivers so 

that they could collect tips and fares from passengers. In fact, 

the drivers admitted in their complaint that they “receive no 

wages; instead, their only source of income is what they 

manage to make in fares and tips.” 

In spite of this admission, the drivers insist that we 

should construe “wages” as including indirect compensation.3 To support this argument, the drivers primarily rely 

on cases from other state courts involving exotic dancers 

who successfully brought claims for unpaid wages under 

their state minimum wage statutes, despite the fact that they 

received no base wages from their employers. E.g., Terry v. 

Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 336 P.3d 951, 953 (Nev. 2014); In re 

Wage Claims of Smith v. Tyad, Inc., 209 P.3d 228, 233 (Mont. 

2009); State ex rel. Roberts v. Bomareto Enters., Inc., 956 P.2d 

254, 255 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). The problem with this argument is that those state minimum wage statutes define 

“wages” broadly to include tips and other forms of indirect 

 3 Defendants contend that because the drivers admit in their complaint that they do not receive wages, we should not consider this argument on appeal because it relies on “new facts.” See Flying J Inc. v. City of 

New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 542 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that allegations in plaintiff’s briefs must be consistent with the statement of facts 

contained in the complaint). Although the drivers’ admission is telling, 

their argument that they earn “wages” does not rest on a different factual picture than that in the complaint. Rather, the drivers contend that we 

should interpret the IWPCA’s definition of wages as encompassing income earned from third parties. Thus, we are not precluded from addressing the drivers’ argument in this appeal. 

Case: 15-1057 Document: 61 Filed: 01/11/2016 Pages: 10
No. 15-1057 7

compensation and are thus distinguishable. The drivers do 

not cite to a single case interpreting the IWPCA as including 

indirect compensation in its narrow definition of “wages.” 

By contrast, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, which sets 

the minimum hourly rate that an employee must be paid regardless of the underlying employment agreement, defines 

“wages” broadly to include “compensation due to an employee by reason of his employment, including allowances ... 

for gratuities ... .” 820 ILCS 105/3(b) (emphasis added). In 

other words, the legislature evidenced its ability to define 

“wages” so as to encompass indirect forms of compensation 

in a neighboring wage law. This textual difference further 

supports our conclusion that an employee suing under the 

IWPCA must seek to collect compensation owed by his employer, and not third parties. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 

508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“[W]here [the legislature] includes 

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another ..., it is generally presumed that [the legislature] acts 

intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 

(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Lastly, the drivers argue that even under the IWPCA’s 

narrow definition, the district court ignored evidence that 

the drivers receive “wages” from defendants in the form of 

credit card remittances. When a passenger pays by credit 

card, that fare may be processed by the taxi company’s credit card processing service and remitted to the driver by defendants (although some drivers use their own credit card 

processing services to bypass defendants altogether). But the 

fact that payment sometimes flows through defendants does 

not alter the reality that the obligation to pay the driver arisCase: 15-1057 Document: 61 Filed: 01/11/2016 Pages: 10
8 No. 15-1057 

es from the passenger, and not the taxi company. If, for example, the passenger’s credit card was declined and the passenger had no cash to pay for the fare, the taxi company 

would not be required to compensate the driver for the 

money that the passenger should have paid. In other words, 

the taxi company is nothing more than an intermediary, and 

it is inaccurate to characterize any remittance from defendants as a wage. 

Because the drivers have not shown that they are entitled 

to wages from defendants, their argument that defendants 

made improper deductions from their wages by requiring 

them to pay fees and expenses fails as a matter of law. Defendants do not pay the drivers’ wages and so they cannot 

be sued for taking deductions from those non-existent wages. More broadly, it is inaccurate to characterize the shift fees 

and other expenses that the drivers voluntarily pay to operate defendants’ cabs as a deduction. Instead, the drivers’ 

payment of fees and expenses is the consideration offered in 

exchange for the right to lease a cab and medallion under the 

parties’ implicit agreement. And although the drivers agreed 

to pay those fees and expenses, they now attempt to use the 

IWPCA to rewrite the terms of their employment agreement. 

But again, the IWPCA provides no substantive relief beyond 

what the underlying employment contract requires. In other 

words, the IWPCA exists to hold the employer to his promise under the employment agreement; by asking the judiciary to graft new terms into an employment contract without 

employer’s consent, the drivers turn the IWPCA on its 

head.4

 4 Although the drivers have failed to state a claim under the IWPCA, 

we note that there are arguably other avenues of redress for the allegedly 

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No. 15-1057 9

B. Unjust Enrichment Claim 

In their complaint, the drivers argued that under their 

employment arrangement with defendants, they were forced 

to pay substantial sums of money to work, and that defendants unjustly benefitted as a result. The district court dismissed the drivers’ unjust enrichment claim because it was 

based on the same allegedly improper conduct as their 

IWPCA claims. See Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 

517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on 

the same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then 

the unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related 

claim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall 

with the related claim.”). 

On appeal, the parties dispute whether unjust enrichment provides an independent cause of action under Illinois 

law. However, we need not resolve this issue because 

“[w]hen two parties’ relationship is governed by contract, 

they may not bring a claim of unjust enrichment unless the 

claim falls outside the contract.” Utility Audit, Inc. v. Horace 

Mann Serv. Corp., 383 F.3d 683, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 

People ex rel. Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 165, 

177 (Ill. 1992). The drivers do not dispute that the parties’ 

employment relationship is governed by an implied contract. Because the drivers’ claim of unjust enrichment chal-

 

unjust terms of their employment. For example, if the drivers are unable 

to earn a minimum wage under the terms of their employment arrangement, they may have a cause of action under either the Illinois Minimum 

Wage Law or the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 820 ILCS 105; 29 U.S.C. § 

201, et seq. 

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10 No. 15-1057 

lenges the terms of that contract, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court. 

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