Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01047/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONIA R. RANDELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEVI STRAUSS & CO. and CINDY MOORE,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-1047 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendants Levi Strauss & Co. and Cindy Moore move for summary

judgment. Plaintiff Tonia Randell opposes this motion. The matter

was heard on March 24, 2006. Having considered all of the papers

filed by the parties, the evidence cited therein and oral argument

on the motion, the Court grants Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

In May, 1990, Defendant Levi Strauss hired Plaintiff, an

African-American woman. Previously, Plaintiff had been working at

a job where she was paid approximately half of what she would be

paid starting at Levi Strauss. Before Plaintiff was hired, she

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1In addition, in April, 2003 Plaintiff signed a Statement of

Commitment, which stated:

I acknowledge that my working relationship with LS&CO. is

"at will," meaning either party can terminate the

relationship at any time, for any or no reason. This

relationship cannot be modified except in a written

agreement signed by the Senior Vice President of Human

Resources. By agreeing to comply with LS&CO.'s Worldwide

Code of Business Conduct, I understand and agree that

there is no contract of employment created.

2

signed her employment application, which, directly above her

signature, stated:

I understand and agree that if I become employed by Levi

Strauss & Co. . . . my employment may be terminated by

myself or LS & Co. at any time with or without cause and

with or without notice. I further agree and understand

that only the President or Executive Vice President may

enter into any employment agreement contrary to the above

and then only if such employment agreement is in writing.

After accepting employment, Plaintiff signed an Acknowledgment and

Agreement of Employment Relationship, which stated:

I acknowledge and agree that it is the policy of Levi

Strauss . . . that unless there is a written employment

agreement to the contrary signed by the employee and the

President, Executive Vice-President or a Senior VicePresident of Levi Strauss Associates, Inc., each employee

including myself is an employee-at-will. I further

acknowledge and agree that as an employee-at-will either

I or the Company can terminate my employment at any time

for any reason with or without cause. I also acknowledge

and agree that only the President, Executive VicePresident or a Senior Vice-President of Levi Strauss

Associates, Inc. has the authority to enter into an

employment agreement that changes my status as an

employee-at-will and that no such employment agreement

will be binding on the Company unless it is written and

signed by an authorized officer and the employee.1

 Although she signed documents stating that she was an at-will

employee, Plaintiff states that she was informed that as long as

she performed all of her duties satisfactorily, she would remain

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employed at Levi Strauss. Specifically Bonita Richardson, her

hiring manager, told her that "Levi Strauss was a good company to

work with, it was fair, it was a place that if I chose to I could

retire from." Plaintiff states that she relied on Ms. Richardson's

representation in accepting a job at Levi Strauss, and that because

of those statements she did not read the documents that she signed. 

After she started working at Levi Strauss, Ms. Richardson would

tell her that she was lucky to work at Levi Strauss and that she

had a career with the company. In addition, Ms. Richardson told

Plaintiff that she wanted her to move up in the company. 

In 1995, Defendant Moore interviewed, and hired, Plaintiff for

a position in Levi Strauss' Quality Assurance Department. During

the interview, Defendant Moore told Plaintiff that she had a job

with Levi Strauss as long as she did her job, and that the Company

was "like a family," "a comfortable work environment," and "a place

to grow."

After being hired for this position, Plaintiff first came

under Defendant Moore's supervision. Plaintiff claims that she was

the only African-American person in her department and that

Defendant Moore began exhibiting hostility and animosity toward

her. Plaintiff claims that such treatment was not related to her

work performance. 

In 1996 or 1997, Plaintiff and a co-worker complained to human

resources representative Rudy Collin that Defendant Moore was

excluding Plaintiff and her co-workers, and giving preferential

treatment to a newly hired temporary employee, a Caucasian female. 

Although Plaintiff claims that she made it clear that she felt

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Defendant Moore's actions were racially motivated, Mr. Collin

states that at no point did Plaintiff or her co-worker suggest that

Defendant Moore's actions were motivated by discrimination; nor did 

he draw that conclusion himself. Mr. Collin notes that, as an

African-American, he is "sensitive, both professionally and

personally, to claims of discrimination."

In 1999, Plaintiff was transferred to a different department

with a new supervisor. But in 2002, Plaintiff was transferred back

to Defendant Moore's department. Plaintiff states that after

learning she was being transferred back, she complained to Christy

Silva, a human resources representative, that Defendant Moore would

find a way to fire her and that, because she was the only Black

person in the Department, Defendant Moore would take every

opportunity to single her out and express her negative and hostile

feelings toward Plaintiff. Ms. Silva, who is still an employee at

Levi Strauss, states that, although she does not recall the details

of their conversation, at no point during that meeting did

Plaintiff state, or even suggest, that Defendant Moore was

discriminating against her. 

In 2002, Defendant Moore gave Plaintiff an unfavorable

evaluation. All of Defendant Moore's previous evaluations of

Plaintiff had been positive, and in 2003 Defendant Moore gave

Plaintiff another positive evaluation, resulting in a raise. 

In November, 2003, Plaintiff received a summons for jury duty

by the San Francisco Superior Court. Levi Strauss offers its nonexempt employees paid time off for jury duty as part of its Time

Off with Pay Program (TOPP). In January, 2004, Plaintiff informed

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her co-worker Rodel Ramos, the TOPP coordinator, that she had been

summoned for jury duty. He advised her to follow the instructions

on the summons. She did. 

On Friday evening, January 23, 2004, Plaintiff dialed the

telephone number provided by the summons and was instructed that

she was required to report for jury duty on the morning of January

26, 2004. On that Monday morning, Plaintiff left a message at work

that she would be reporting for jury duty. Plaintiff reported to

the jury assembly room and was informed she was on telephone

standby. Instead of returning to work, Plaintiff went home. On

her time card for Monday, however, Plaintiff reported nine hours of

paid time off for jury duty. Monday evening, Plaintiff called the

telephone number on the summons and was informed she was on

telephone standby for Tuesday, January 27, 2004. On Tuesday,

Plaintiff went to work and worked a full day. Tuesday evening,

Plaintiff again called the telephone number on the summons and was

instructed to report to the jury room on Wednesday, January 28,

2004. On Wednesday, Plaintiff went to the jury assembly room. She

was excused to leave and informed that she was on telephone

standby. Plaintiff left, picked up lunch and went to work. On her

time card for Wednesday, she reported five hours off for jury duty. 

Plaintiff was not instructed to report for jury duty on Thursday or

Friday, and she went to work, working full days. 

Upon receiving Plaintiff's TOPP time report without any proof

of jury duty, Mr. Ramos contacted the San Francisco Court for proof

of jury duty. He received a letter, stating, in part,

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Tonia Randell was not required to appear for jury service

during the week of January 26, 2004. She was on

telephone standby the entire week and not required to

report in for jury service. . . . I have checked our

records for Jan. 26th and Jan. 28th and I do not see this

juror's name on any of our lists. She would be on a list

if she checked in.

Mr. Ramos reported this information to Defendant Moore, who

then contacted human resources representative Grace Downey. Ms.

Downey advised Defendant Moore that misreporting TOPP time was a

violation of Company policy, which could result in termination. 

According to Defendant Moore, after she consulted with Ms. Downey,

she informed Plaintiff that unless she could provide some evidence

that she was on jury duty, as reflected in her TOPP report, she

would be terminated for violating Company policy; Plaintiff left

work that day and never returned. According to Plaintiff, however,

Defendant Moore came into her office on February 20, 2004 and

stated that she was fired for filing a false TOPP report. 

Levi Strauss terminated Plaintiff's employment. Defendants

state Plaintiff was fired for falsely reporting jury duty time off,

a violation of Company policy. Plaintiff contends that she was

impermissibly fired based on her race, color and national origin. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

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evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. Breach of Contract

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is

barred as a matter of law because Plaintiff had an express at-will

employment relationship with Levi Strauss. Plaintiff responds that

she has presented credible evidence of an implied employment

contract with Levi Strauss and thus summary judgment must be

denied.

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California Labor Code § 2922 provides that "an employment,

having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either

party on notice to the other." The "at-will" presumption provided

in section 2922, however, may be overcome by an implied agreement

not to terminate without good cause. Foley v. Interactive Data

Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 680 (1988). The Foley court cited several

factors that may be considered in determining whether such an

implied agreement exists, including "'the personnel policies or

practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service,

actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of

continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which

the employee is engaged.'" Id. (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, 116

Cal. App. 3d 311, 326-27 (1981), overruled on other grounds Guz v.

Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000)). An important

consideration is what the parties actually and mutually understood,

based on express words and on conduct. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 337. 

Although a statement in a written personnel policy that employment

is at-will creates a presumption that employment is at-will, it

does not by itself preclude a plaintiff from rebutting that

presumption. But if there is an express, written at-will

employment contract signed by the employee, that presumption cannot

be overcome. Id. at 339-40. 

Here, Plaintiff thrice signed agreements stating that she was

an at-will employee: before she was hired, after she accepted

employment and less than a year before she was terminated. When

asked if the Statement of Commitment she signed in April, 2003,

confirms that as of 2003 her employment continued to be at-will,

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Plaintiff responded, "Based on the document today, yes." 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues there was a breach of contract

because she was informed that as long as she performed all her

duties satisfactorily, she would remain employed and have a career

at Levi Strauss. Specifically, Plaintiff was told by the hiring

manager that "Levi Strauss was a good company to work with, it was

fair, it was a place that if I chose to I could retire from," and

that there were good career opportunities at Levi Strauss. Such

evidence, however, is insufficient to prove an implied employment

agreement. As explained in Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc., 97 Cal.

App. 4th 934, 944 (2002), a case Plaintiff cites, "Although the

California courts will under some circumstances imply an agreement

contrary to the statutorily presumed at-will status, the courts

will not imply an agreement if doing so necessarily varies the

terms of an express at-will employment agreement signed by the

employee." Nor is Plaintiff's statement that she never read or

understood any of the three agreements she signed regarding at-will

employment sufficient to create a dispute of material fact, and she

provides no authority to suggest otherwise. California courts have

long ago found that failure to read a contract before signing is

not in itself a reason to refuse its enforcement. See, e.g., Frame

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d

668, 671 (1971).

Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on the breach of

contract claim.

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II. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because there

is no employment contract. Plaintiff acknowledges that the

viability of her implied covenant claim is contingent upon the

viability of her breach of contract claim. Because Plaintiff

cannot establish the existence of an implied contract to terminate

only for just cause, she cannot state a cause of action for breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the

ground that she was terminated without good cause. See Gould v.

Maryland Sound Indus., Inc., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1153 (1995).

Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on the claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fear dealing.

III. Fraud and Deceit

Plaintiff asserts that she was defrauded because, before she

accepted employment, she was informed that, as long she competently

performed her job, Levi Strauss would treat her fairly and

discharge her only for good cause. Plaintiff claims that she

relied on those representations. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's

fraud and deceit claim fails because Defendants made no actionable

representation or promise, and Plaintiff was not justified in

relying on the representations and/or promises Plaintiff purports

were made.

Actionable fraud requires an intentional misrepresentation of

past or existing fact; predictions or statements as to future

events are deemed opinions, and are not actionable fraud. Borba v.

Thomas, 70 Cal. App. 3d 144, 152 (1977). As noted above, Plaintiff

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states that she was told that "Levi Strauss was a good company to

work with, it was fair, it was a place that if I chose to I could

retire from." Plaintiff stated that Defendant Moore told her that

she had a position with Levi Strauss as long as she did her job,

and that the company was "like a family," "a comfortable work

environment," and "a place to grow." These are opinions about Levi

Strauss and Plaintiff's future with Levi Strauss. And a promise of

future conduct is actionable as fraud only if made without the

present intent to perform. See Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc., 48

Cal. App. 4th 471, 481 (1996). During her deposition Plaintiff

stated that she believed Defendant Moore and Ms. Richardson were

sincere at the time they made the promises. 

In addition, actionable fraud requires justifiable reliance. 

Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 799, 807 (1990). 

Citing Slivinsky, Defendants contend that, even if Plaintiff can

establish a misrepresentation or false promise, she cannot, as a

matter of law, establish that she justifiably relied upon the

alleged misrepresentation or false promise. In Slivinsky, the

court ruled that the plaintiff's alleged reliance on the

defendant's oral promises of continuing employment was "simply not

justifiable" because the representations contradicted the parties'

agreement which provided that the employment was at-will. Id. As

noted above, here, Plaintiff signed three agreements acknowledging

that her employment was at-will. 

In response, Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish, or

even address, any of the cases cited by Defendants. Nor does she

cite any admissible evidence. Instead, she states that she

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2Plaintiff's discrimination claims are not analyzed

separately. Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under

§ 1981 and FEHA follows the same legal principles as those

applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case. See Fonseca v.

Sysco Food Servs., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Nidds v.

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996).

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"obviously justifiably relied" upon representations by her new

employer as indicated by her acceptance of employment. She further

states that, although she believed that the representations when

made were sincere, she later learned that the representations were

false as reflected by the actions against her by Defendants. But,

as held in Slivinsky, if a "plaintiff adduces no further evidence

of fraudulent intent than proof of nonperformance of an oral

promise, [s]he will never reach a jury." Id. Here, Plaintiff

produces no further evidence, and thus this claim will not reach a

jury.

To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must establish through

admissible evidence that there exists a genuine issue of material

fact as to each of the elements of this claim. She does not. 

Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on the fraud and deceit

claim.

IV. Discrimination

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for race, color and

national origin discrimination in violation of California's Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claims fail

because she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination

and cannot rebut Defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

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3

Defendants also argue that supervisory employees are not

subject to individual liability for claims under FEHA. See, e.g., Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 663 (1998). Plaintiff offers no

opposition on this issue, and the Court grants summary judgment to

Defendant Moore on the FEHA claims.

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for terminating her.3

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

(1981), the Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework

for evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence in

employment discrimination suits. Within this framework, plaintiffs

may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by reference to

circumstantial evidence: plaintiffs must show that they are members

of a protected class; that they were qualified for the position

they held or sought; that they were subjected to an adverse

employment decision; and that they were replaced by someone who was

not a member of the protected class or that the circumstances of

the decision otherwise raised an inference of discrimination. St.

Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (citing

McDonnell Douglas and Burdine). Once plaintiffs establish a prima

facie case, a presumption of discriminatory intent arises. Id. To

overcome this presumption, the defendant must come forward with a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. 

Id. at 506-07. If the defendant provides that explanation, the

presumption disappears. See id. at 511; Wallis v. J.R. Simplot

Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).

In response to the defendant’s offer of a non-discriminatory

reason, plaintiffs must produce “specific, substantial evidence of

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pretext.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.

1983). To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs must introduce

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the reason the employer articulated is a pretext for

discrimination. Plaintiffs may rely on the same evidence used to

establish a prima facie case or put forth additional evidence. See

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000);

Wallis, 26 F.3d at 892. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that "in

deciding whether an issue of fact has been created about the

credibility of the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons, the

district court must look at the evidence supporting the prima facie

case, as well as the other evidence offered by the plaintiff to

rebut the employer’s offered reasons. And, in those cases where

the prima facie case consists of no more than the minimum necessary

to create a presumption of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas,

plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.” Wallis, 26

F.3d at 890. To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs "must tender a

genuine issue of material fact as to pretext." Id. (quoting

Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d

1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991)(in determining whether the proffered

reason is pretext, “the plaintiff need produce very little evidence

of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of fact”). The

factfinder’s disbelief of the defendant’s proffered reason, along

with the elements of the prima facie case, may “suffice to show

intentional discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a

protected class, and that Defendants terminated her. Plaintiff

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Defendants contend that this evidence contradicts what

Plaintiff stated in her deposition. It does not. In her

deposition, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Moore never criticized

her work or criticized her in coaching sessions. Defendants do not

point to testimony by Plaintiff that Defendant Moore never

criticized her based on non-work related issues.

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presents evidence that she was performing competently in the

position she held at the time she was terminated. Although

Plaintiff received an unsatisfactory work performance evaluation in

2002, she received a positive work evaluation and raise in 2003. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff produces no evidence of

circumstances suggesting a discriminatory motive. But their

reliance on Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267 (9th

Cir. 1996), is misplaced. Bradley held that "where the same actor

is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a

discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short

period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no

discriminatory motive." 104 F.3d at 270-71. Defendants omit

Bradley's requirement that both the hiring and the firing occur

within a short period of time. Here, Defendant Moore hired

Plaintiff for a position in Quality Assurance Department in 1995. 

Plaintiff was terminated almost a decade later. 

Plaintiff produces circumstantial evidence of discrimination:

she states that she was the only African-American in her

department; that she was treated less favorably than other

employees in the department; and Defendant Moore singled Plaintiff

out and expressed hostile feelings toward her that were not based

on her work performance.4

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Regardless of whether Plaintiff presents a prima facie case of

discrimination, Defendants have produced evidence that they had a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Plaintiff. 

Defendants state that Plaintiff was fired because she violated

company policy by falsely reporting fourteen hours of time off for

jury duty. As Defendants note, it is undisputed that the San

Francisco Superior Court sent a letter to Defendants stating that

Plaintiff was not required to appear for jury service during the

week and that Levi Strauss policy states that falsification of time

cards is a serious offense that may lead to immediate termination. 

In her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that she marked on her time

sheet that she was out for jury duty for nine hours on Monday and

five hours on Wednesday, even though she was not.

Plaintiff submits no evidence to show that Defendants' alleged

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing her is pretext. 

She states that it was a common practice at Levi Strauss not to

return to work after reporting for jury duty and that no other

employee was required to return to work after reporting for jury

duty. According to Plaintiff, when Defendant Moore was summoned

for jury duty she disappeared from work, even though she was on

standby. But Plaintiff was terminated for falsely reporting time

off for jury duty on her time card, not for failing to return to

work after reporting for jury duty. Plaintiff provides no

competent evidence that Defendant Moore or any other employee took

paid time off for jury duty when they were not on jury duty.

Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on the claims for

discrimination in violation of FEHA and section 1981.

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V. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that, in addition to being fired for

discriminatory reasons, she was fired in retaliation for reporting

discrimination. Defendants argue that this FEHA retaliation claim

fails because she cannot show that she was engaged in protected

activity that was causally connected to her termination and, as

noted above, Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must

show that she engaged in protected activity, that she was

thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action by her

employer and that there was a causal link between the two. Morgan

v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (2000). As

Morgan explains, the causal link may be established by an inference

derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant's

knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and

the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly

retaliatory employment decision. Id. "Essential to a causal link

is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had

engaged in the protected activity." Id. (quoting Cohen v. Fred

Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Here, as Defendants note, Plaintiff provides no evidence to

show the required causal link. She does not address the necessary

connection between reporting Defendant Moore's allegedly

discriminatory behavior to human resources, the protected activity,

and being terminated. She points to no evidence showing that

Defendant Moore was aware of Plaintiff's complaints of

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discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that, after she was transferred

from Defendant Moore's department, she told Ms. Amanda Cattermole,

her new supervisor, who she later discovered was Defendant Moore's

close friend, about her "awful experiences with Moore." But

Plaintiff does not establish how she knew that this supervisor was

a close friend and thus likely told Defendant Moore about her

comments; nor does Plaintiff state that she told the supervisor

that she had reported Defendant Moore's discriminatory conduct to

human resources. Unlike Plaintiff, Defendants do provide evidence

that Defendant Moore and Ms. Downey were not aware that Plaintiff

engaged in protected activity. In the absence of evidence that

Defendant Moore and Ms. Downey were aware of Plaintiff's complaints

of discrimination, the causal link necessary for a claim of

retaliation cannot be established. See id. at 73.

In addition, Plaintiff does not address the fact that the last

discrimination complaint she claims she made occurred sometime in

2002, after she learned she was being sent back to Defendant

Moore's department, approximately two years before she was fired. 

Even assuming that Defendant Moore did know about protected

activity, the time that elapsed between Plaintiff's last complaint

to human resources and her termination is too long to support an

inference of causation. As the Supreme Court found, "The cases

that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge

of protected activity and an adverse employment action as

sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case

uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close." 

Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (inner

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citation and quotations omitted) (no causal relationship found when

adverse action was taken twenty months after protected activity);

see also Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.

2003) ("While courts may infer causation based on the proximity in

time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision, such an inference is not possible in this case

because approximately nine months lapsed between the date of

Manatt's complaint and the Bank's alleged adverse decisions.")

(inner citation and quotations omitted). Furthermore, between

Plaintiff's complaint and her termination, she received a positive

evaluation by Defendant Moore, resulting in a raise, which

undermines any inference that subsequent acts were motivated by

retaliatory animus. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 802.

Because there is no evidence of a causal link between

Plaintiff's protected activity and her termination, summary

judgment for Defendants is granted on the FEHA retaliation claim.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress fails because Defendants' alleged

conduct was neither extreme or outrageous and Plaintiff's claim is

barred by the California Workers' Compensation Act.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that, under the California law

of intentional infliction of emotional distress, "Summary judgment

is proper if a claim cannot 'reasonably be regarded as so extreme

and outrageous as to permit recovery.'" Schneider v. TRW, Inc.,

938 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross,

209 Cal. App. 3d 878, 883 (1989)). To be considered outrageous,

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the conduct "must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that

usually tolerated in a civilized society." Id. Mere insulting

language, rudeness and insensitivity do not constitute outrageous

conduct. Id. 

As Defendants note, although Plaintiff contends that she was

subjected to a "reign of terror," the specific facts presented at

her deposition, and even in her declaration, do not support that

contention. In her deposition, Plaintiff complained that Defendant

Moore sent her emails rather than speaking to her directly, left

other employees phone messages concerning her schedule while not

leaving Plaintiff the same messages; and asked other employees to

convey information to Plaintiff rather than convey the information

herself. Plaintiff acknowledged, however, that Defendant Moore

never became physically aggressive with Plaintiff or yelled at her. 

In her declaration, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Moore

continuously and routinely expressed hostility, animosity and

contempt toward Plaintiff, took every opportunity to single

Plaintiff out and express her negative feelings toward Plaintiff,

issued Plaintiff an unsatisfactory performance rating in 2002 and

treated a recently employed Caucasian female with few skills more

favorably than she treated Plaintiff. Plaintiff recalls an

incident at a co-worker's birthday party when Defendant Moore

ridiculed her, causing Plaintiff to become upset and leave the

celebration. 

Plaintiff's statement in her opposition that Defendant Moore's

conduct was shameful, arrogant, extreme, outrageous and inhumane is

not sufficient to create a material dispute of fact. As Defendants

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5To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which

there is an objection, the parties' objections are overruled. To

the extent that the Court did not rely on such evidence, the

parties' objections are overruled as moot. 

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note, Plaintiff fails to specify which facts she contends

constitute the outrageous behavior that makes up her claim. And

there is no evidence in the record from which a trier of fact could

reasonably find that Defendant Moore intentionally inflicted

emotional distress. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Defendant

Moore's conduct, as alleged by Plaintiff, is not the conduct of a

model supervisor. But it is not so extreme as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, nor does it qualify as the kind of

outrageous conduct necessary to support an action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 

Because Plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of a claim for

intentional infliction of emotion distress, the Court will not

address Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's claim is also

precluded by the exclusivity provisions of California's Workers'

Compensation Act. Summary judgment for Defendants is granted on

the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 17).5 Judgment shall enter

accordingly. Defendants shall recover their costs from Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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