Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05122/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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t 

.• 

UNITED 

v. 

JOE L. 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unlt.-f Statee Coan fl Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

NOV l 419SO 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

BLANTON, ) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Nos. 89-5122 

& 

89-5195 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-118-02 

& 

D.C. No. 88-CR-061-04) 

( N. D . Okla • ) 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the brief°s and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R •. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cases are therefore ordered 

Defendant appeals from two orders of the district court 

denying his motions for relief filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2255. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 1 
In 1987, defendant was indicted in the Northern District of 

Oklahoma on seven counts of conspiracy to defraud the United 

States, failing to file currency transaction reports (CTRs), and 

making false statements in CTRs in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 371, 

1001, 1002 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322. D.C. No. 87-CR-118-02. 

(Tulsa case.) In 1988, defendant was indicted in Texas on charges 

of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 

18 u.s.c. S 371 and making false statements in violation of 18 

u.s.c. SS 3, 1001, 1002 and 31 u.s.c. SS 5313, 5322. That case 

was transferred to Oklahoma pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 20. D.C. 

No. 88-CR-061-04. (Dallas case.) 

In the Tulsa case, defendant pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy and one count of making a false statement in a CTR. He 

was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on count one and three 

years on count two, to be served consecutively. He was also 

ordered to make restitution to the Internal Revenue Service in the 

amount of $7,280.00, to pay one half the cost of prosecution in 

the amount of $3,264.66, and to pay a special assessment of $50.00 

on each count. 

In the Dallas case, defendant pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to defraud the United States and was sentenced under 

the Sentencing. Reform Act of 1984, 28 u.s.c. S 994(a)(Sentencing 

Guidelines) to sixty months' imprisonment and three years' 

supervised release to be served concurrently with count two in the 

Tulsa case. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $12,500.00 and a 

special assessment of $50.00. Defendant took no appeal from 

either conviction. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 2 
No. 89-5122 

In his first S 2255 motion, defendant raised eleven issues: 

1. The court erred in imposing a three-year term of 

supervised release in the Dallas case because the Supreme Court in 

Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980) held that a special 

parole term cannot be imposed for conspiracy to commit drug 

offenses under 29 u.s.c. S 846. Defendant acknowledged that he 

was convicted under 18 u.s.c. S 371, but argued that the two 

sections are worded "basically the same." 

2. The court violated the ex post facto clause by applying 

the Sentencing Guidelines to his sentence in the Dallas case 

because he was not personally involved in the Texas conspiracy 

after March 11, 1986. 

3. The court erred in finding him guilty of aiding and 

abetting in count two of the Tulsa case because the indictment did 

not allege the elements necessary for that charge. 

4. The indictment in the Tulsa case was inadequate to 

inform him of the charges to which he pled thereby subjecting him 

to double jeopardy. 

5. The court did not strictly comply with the mandates of 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 because it failed to establish that he fully 

understood the charges. 

6. The court did not strictly comply with the mandates of 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 because the court did not determine either 

that he understood what the alleged conspiracy was or that he had 

knowledge of or furthered the conspiracy. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 3 
- ~ 

' 

7. Defendant could not be convicted of conspiracy because 

he only conspired with a government informant who cannot be a true 

coconspirator. 

8. Defendant was denied due process and equal protection 

because the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) contained 

inaccuracies. 

9. Defendant was denied "reasonably effective assistance of 

counsel" because counsel did not correct court records to show 

that his name is Joe not Joseph, did not listen to ninety-six tape 

recordings of conversations between him and his codefendants and 

"failed to make a fact-finding determination on a 31⁄2 hour video of 

a meeting held in Dallas, Texas, between defendant and a 

coconspirator," had been drinking when he advised defendant to 

enter guilty pleas, failed to conduct a proper investigation which 

would have established his innocence, and failed to present his 

objections to the PSI. 

10. The Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional. 

11. Defendant was entrapped. 

The district court denied defendant's motion holding that 

grounds three through eleven were precluded because defendant had 

failed to raise them on direct appeal: 

not be used as a substitute for a 

It is only where the judgment was 

jurisdiction, the sentence imposed was 

by law, or there was such a denial or 

the constitutional rights of the 

render the judgment vulnerable to 

that a motion to vacate will lie 

Section 2255 may 

direct appeal. 

rendered without 

not authorized 

infringement of 

prisoner as to 

collateral attack, 

under S 2255. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 4 
" 

I District Court's order of July 22, 1989, at 3, quoting Peoples v. 

United States, 365 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1966). 

As to defendant's first two grounds, the court held that the 

Sentencing Guidelines were properly applied because the conspiracy 

continued beyond their enactment date. Therefore, sentencing 

under the Sentencing Guidelines did not violate the ex post facto 

clause. The court also held that under the Sentencing Guidelines 

the imposition of supervised release was mandatory. 

On appeal, defendant argues: 

1. He was entrapped. 

2. He could not be convicted for conspiracy because he only 

conspired with a government informant who is not a 

conspirator." 

"true 

3. The trial court erred in finding him guilty of aiding 

and abetting in count two of the Tulsa case. 

4. The indictment was inadequate to inform him of the 

charges to which he pled and to provide him with safeguards 

against double jeopardy. 

5. He was denied due process and equal protection because 

the PSI contained false allegations. 

6. He was denied effective assistance of counsel because 

(in addition to the issues raised to the district court) he 

instructed counsel to file a timely notice of appeal which counsel 

agreed to do but never did. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 5 
7. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d), he has the right to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 1 

Generally, we will not consider claims raised for the first 

time on appeal. See Baker v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 

650, 663 (10th Cir. 1986). However, here, defendant has raised on 

appeal a potential claim of serious constitutional magnitude. 

Defendant argues that he instructed counsel to file a timely 

notice of appeal which counsel agreed to do but never did. 

Even though defendant pled guilty, he is still entitled to a 

direct appeal with regards to the few issues he could have raised 

on direct appeal. See Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 

1990). When "counsel's failure essentially waived 

respondent's opportunity to make a case on the merits: it 

is difficult to distinguish respondent's situation from that of 

someone who had no counsel at all." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 

387, 395 n.6 (1985). In such cases, prejudice is presumed. See 

generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also 

Estes v. United States, 883 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1989)("A 

criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel 

on a first appeal as of right .. [C]ounsel's failure to file 

a notice of appeal when so instructed by the client constitutes 

ineffective assistance of counsel for purposes of section 2255."): 

Gray v. United States, 834 F.2d 967, 967 (11th Cir. 1987)("[I]f an 

1 We note that issues defendant raised to the district court 

but did not brief on appeal are consi~ered waived. See United 

States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 554 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990)(citing 

United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1986)): 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 6 
J attorney fails to file an appeal after the defendant requests him 

to do so, the defendant was denied effective assistance and is 

entitled to an out-of-time appeal, without any showing of 

likelihood of prevailing on the appeal."); Ferguson v. United 

States, 699 F.2d 1071, 1072 (11th Cir. 1983)("[A]n attorney's 

total failure to file an appeal after being instructed to do so 

will always entitle the defendant to an out-of-time appeal, 

regardless of the defendant's chances of success."). 

Therefore, we must remand this case to the district court for 

consideration of this claim. We have previously noted that the 

question of whether [defendant's] counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a timely 

notice of appeal depends upon his interaction with 

(defendant]. If defense counsel explained the pros and 

cons of an appeal to [defendant] and [he] made a knowing 

and intelligent choice not to appeal, counsel's failure 

to timely file could not have violated [defendant's] due 

process rights. If counsel did not adequately advise 

his client or if he ignored his client's wishes, the 

failure to file an appeal may well have denied 

[defendant] due process of law. 

Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1556 (10th Cir. 1988)(citation 

omitted). 

Should defendant prevail on this issue, he shall be granted 

an out-of-time appeal. See Bell v. Lockhart, 795 F.2d 655, 658 

(8th Cir. 1986)(state court's review of defendant's 

post-conviction petition was not a "constitutionally adequate 

substitute for a direct appeal."); cf. United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 164-65 (1982)(The same standard of review does not apply 

to section 2255 motions as applies on direct appeal.). 

Should defendant not prevail, the district court should then 

consider whether defendant deliberately bypassed a direct appeal. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 7 
The district court correctly held that a section 2255 motion is 

not a substitute for a direct appeal. "[A] final judgment 

conunands respect. For this reason, we have long and consistently 

affirmed that a collateral challenge may not do service for an 

appeal." Frady, 456 U.S. at 165. 

However, "failure to take a direct appeal from conviction 

does not deprive a federal post-conviction court of power to 

adjudicate the merits of constitutional claims; the question 

rather is whether the case is one in which refusal to exercise 

that power would be appropriate." Kaufman v. United States, 394 

U.S. 217, 220 n.3, 227 n.8 (1969). 

The district court must make this determination in the first . instance. The Supreme Court has held that constitutional claims 

should not be denied solely because they should have been raised 

on direct appeal. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 223-24. However, the 

Court implied that constitutional claims should not be decided 

when direct appeal procedures were deliberately bypassed. Id. at 

220 n.3. See generally United States v. Spawr Optical Research, 

Inc., 864 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 51 

(1989); Cheek v. United States, 858 F.2d 1330, 1335 (8th Cir. 

1988)(deliberate bypass operates as a waiver of defendant's right 

to challenge conviction through section 2255 proceeding). 

No. 89-5195 

In this section 2255 motion, defendant alleged that hi~ PSI 

contained mistakes. The district court entered a minute order 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 8 
\ denying the motion for the same reasons stated in its order 

denying defendant's first section 2255 motion. 

On appeal, defendant argues that there was an unfair 

disparity in the sentencing between him and his codefendant in the 

Tulsa case because his codefendant was only sentenced to ninety 

days in jail plus five years' probation. Defendant also argues 

that the "district court failed to consider other sentences 

imposed on other criminals for commission of the same crime in 

other jurisdictions" in violation of his eighth amendment rights. 

We will not consider defendant's appellate issues because he 

did not raise them initially to the district court. See Baker, 

788 F.2d at 663. we also note that the issue raised to the 

district court was raised in No. 89-5122 and is, therefore, a 

successive petition. "The sentencing court shall not be required 

to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on 

behalf of the same prisoner." 28 u.s.c. S 2255. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma in No. 89-5122 is VACATED, and the 

case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this 

order and judgment. 

89-5195 is AFFIRMED. 

The judgment of the district court in No. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-5122 Document: 010110047963 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 9