Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02379/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02379-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Jesse Seineke,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-2379 DFL PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Ed Alameda, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner and psychiatric patient

proceeding without counsel in a civil rights action.

The complaint alleges defendant Davis injected plaintiff

with a syringe of air and then laughed. Plaintiff claims the

event made him paranoid causing profound psychological damage. 

Defendant Davis seeks summary judgment and plaintiff

opposes. 

A party may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for

a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

Case 2:02-cv-02379-DFL-PAN Document 37 Filed 06/30/05 Page 1 of 6
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forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The

moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

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is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged is

implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

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McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth Amendment

occurs when prison officials deliberately are indifferent to a

prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold for a medical claim

under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

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Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted).

“Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197

(acknowledging a plaintiff may demonstrate officers “must have

known” of risk by showing medical need was obvious and extreme). 

Allegations of an inadvertent failure to provide adequate

medical care do not state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Neither simple malpractice,

nor even gross negligence, constitute “deliberate indifference.” 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

There is evidence the incident with the empty syringe did

cause serious harm to plaintiff’s precarious mental state and

exacerbate his pre-existing tendency to distrust medical staff. 

Thus, a jury could find there was a substantial risk to

plaintiff’s health and safety. However, plaintiff offers nothing

to support a finding Davis actually drew the inference that

plaintiff would be so harmed by a prick with an empty syringe. 

Plaintiff presents no evidence his unusual mental susceptibility

was so obvious and extreme Davis “must have known” of the risk. 

Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197. Davis declares she acted by accident

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and acted reasonably to abate any harm by immediately removing

the needle without pressing the plunger. In opposing summary

judgment plaintiff offers nothing to controvert Davis’

declaration and accuses her of nothing more than negligence. 

This is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. The

undisputed facts entitle Davis to summary judgment as a matter of

law. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendant’s

February 18, 2005, motion for summary judgment be granted and

summary judgment be entered for defendant Davis.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 20 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: June 29, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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