Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00199/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00199-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DOROTHY MARAGLINO, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 15-cv-199-WQH-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 20] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

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For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in 

part. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

At the time she filed her Complaint, Dorothy Maraglino 

(“Plaintiff”) was a pre-trial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 12). On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed the 

operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff names the County of San Diego (“County”), 

San Diego County Sheriff William D. Gore, San Diego County Assistant 

Sheriff (“Asst. Sheriff”) Rich Miller, San Diego County Sheriff Captain 

(“Capt.”) Edna Milloy, and San Diego County Sheriff’s Detectives Susan 

Fiske and Brian Patterson in their official and individual capacities 

(“Defendants”). (ECF No. 4 at 5-7 ¶¶ 4-9). 

Plaintiff sets forth multiple claims that her constitutional rights 

were violated when San Diego Sheriff’s Department (“SDSD”) personnel 

allegedly: (1) sexually harassed her; (2) solicited her to perform an 

illegal act; (3) solicited her to commit perjury; (4) behaved 

inappropriately towards her; (5) interfered with her medical care; (6) 

denied her medical and dental care; (7) improperly shackled her while 

she was pregnant; (8) injured her through improper shackling; (9) 

denied her educational opportunities; (10) read and censored her legal 

mail; (11) denied her access to legal and pro per resources; (12) and 

denied her contact visits with her minor child. (ECF No. 4 at 8-13). 

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Plaintiff additionally claims that SDSD has a general practice of 

implementing policies which violate her constitutional rights. (Id.). 

Plaintiff seeks: (1) injunctive and declaratory relief; (2) nominal, 

compensatory and punitive damages; (3) costs and reasonable fees; (4) 

pre- and post-judgment interest; and (5) other “just and equitable” 

relief. (Id. at 14-15). 

 On November 25, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

FAC. (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff sought three extensions of her time to file 

an opposition, and the Court extended her time to respond from 

December 21, 2015, to March 30, 2016. (ECF Nos. 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 

31). Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal 

quotations omitted). The pleader must provide the Court with “more 

than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] 

must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court 

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is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). 

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 

895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 

(9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in her 

complaint that bring her claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court “may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. 

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

III. BACKGROUND FACTS 

 The FAC sets forth few, often vague, details in support of each 

claim. In her first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fiske sexually 

harassed her during Plaintiff’s post-arrest questioning and booking on 

May 10, 2012. (ECF No. 4 at 8 ¶¶ 17-19). Plaintiff claims that, “[w]hile 

the Plaintiff was undressed, photographed, had hairs pulled, 

fingerprinted, and other forensic procedures performed, Defendant 

Fiske made lewd, condescending, humiliating and highly embarrassing 

comments of a sexual nature.” (Id. ¶ 19). 

 In her second claim, Plaintiff alleges that on April 15, 2012, 

Defendant Patterson solicited her to commit an illegal act during the 

execution of a search warrant at Plaintiff’s home. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). 

Plaintiff claims that Patterson asked her to question a suspect who was 

represented by an attorney and in custody. (Id. ¶ 21). 

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 In her third claim, Plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2012, 

Defendant Patterson solicited her to commit perjury. (Id. at 9 ¶¶ 22-

26). Plaintiff claims that Patterson asked her to say she saw a suspect 

in custody at a particular time and place. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff refused. 

(Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff asserts that Patterson threatened to make Plaintiff 

a suspect if she refused to comply and, when she refused, she was 

arrested as a conspirator. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26). 

 In her fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges that on May 10, 2012, 

Defendant Patterson and his unnamed partner transported her to Las 

Colinas Detention Facility (“LCDF”). (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff claims that 

Patterson “made highly inappropriate comments . . . and passed [] [her] 

a pair of handcuffs to secure herself.” (Id. ¶ 28). 

 In her fifth claim, Plaintiff alleges that during the week of October 

27, 2012, she drank cleaning fluid. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff claims that 

unnamed jail staff “elected to neglect” to alert paramedics, resulting in 

a three hour delay in receiving treatment and gastric damage. (Id. ¶¶ 

30-31). Plaintiff asserts that a “USMC” physician thought it best to 

admit Plaintiff into care and began the process but SDSD Deputies 

Casey and Storrs, who are not named as defendants, were able to have 

Plaintiff released into SDSD care. (Id. at 10 ¶¶ 32-34). 

 In her sixth claim, Plaintiff alleges that in June 2012, she 

requested dental procedures “required by law for pregnant inmates,” 

which were denied because Plaintiff was not yet sentenced. (Id. ¶¶ 35-

36). Plaintiff further claims that in June 2013, a staff physician wrote 

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her two medical referrals, but unnamed SDSD staff refused to take her. 

(Id. ¶¶ 37-38). 

 In her seventh claim, Plaintiff alleges that in the weeks between 

May 15 and July 31, 2012, she was shackled while pregnant during 

transport to court appearances in violation of California law. (Id. ¶¶ 

39-40). Plaintiff claims that during the week of May 15, 2012, this 

improper shackling resulted in her falling, but she was stopped before 

hitting the ground by a court deputy and her attorney. (Id. ¶ 41). 

 In her eighth claim, Plaintiff alleges that on December 11, 2014, 

an unnamed SDSD transportation corporal secured her shackles too 

tightly and told her to “hurry up,” resulting in scratches on Plaintiff’s 

wrists and swollen and discolored ankles. (Id. 11 ¶¶ 42-45). Plaintiff 

states that her injuries were treated by SDSD medical staff. (Id. ¶ 46). 

 In her ninth claim, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied the ability 

to participate in a correspondence paralegal class, thereby violating her 

constitutional right to an education. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48). Plaintiff claims the 

denial was the result of a postcard-only policy which restricted the type 

of mail inmates could receive. (Id. ¶ 48-49). Plaintiff states she filed a 

tort claim requesting the County pay for her education, but the claim 

was denied as untimely. (Id. 50-51). 

 In her tenth claim, Plaintiff alleges that in late 2014 she noticed 

that unnamed SDSD staff were censoring legal communications 

between her and her assigned attorney, and were censoring items she 

wished to take to legal visits. (Id. at 12 ¶¶ 53-54). Plaintiff claims she 

filed grievances that included allegations that unnamed SDSD 

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personnel were reading her legal communications to her attorney. (Id. 

¶ 56). Plaintiff states that in September 2014 Sergeant Masterson, who 

is not named as a defendant, responded to her grievances and informed 

her that jail staff were entitled to inspect inmate legal mail to verify its 

contents. (Id. ¶ 57). Plaintiff claims that the “State Board of 

Standards” verified that the practice is illegal but SDSD refused to 

change it. (Id. ¶ 59). 

 In her eleventh claim, Plaintiff alleges that although she has 

representation in her criminal case, she is actively pursuing a few pro 

per civil cases. (Id. ¶ 60). Plaintiff states that she has been repeatedly 

denied access to pro per legal resources. (Id. ¶ 61). 

 In her twelfth claim, Plaintiff alleges that she was permitted by 

the court to have contact visits with her minor child beginning in April 

2013. (Id. at 13 ¶ 62). Plaintiff claims that in December 2013 her visit 

was canceled because a new policy was implemented that denied 

Administrative Segregation (“ADSEG”) inmates contact visits. (Id. ¶ 

63). Plaintiff states that she filed numerous grievances which have not 

restored her visits. (Id. ¶ 64). 

 In her thirteenth claim, Plaintiff alleges that SDSD repeatedly 

adopts and implements policies that violate the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights of inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 65-67). Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants’ actions and inactions caused and will continue to cause her 

injury and are motivated by ill-intent and committed with reckless 

indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. ¶¶ 68-69). 

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Duplicative Parties 

1. Sheriff Gore 

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Gore is a final policy maker for 

County jails, including where Plaintiff was incarcerated (LCDF) at the 

time of these events. (ECF No. 4 at 5 ¶¶ 3, 5). Plaintiff asserts that 

Sheriff Gore is responsible for the administration of County jails and for 

the actions of SDSD staff “who interpret and apply the mail policy for 

inmates.” (Id.). 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that her constitutional rights were 

violated by: (1) a “postcard only” mail policy that restricted her receipt 

of mail, thereby violating her right to education; and (2) a “scanning 

policy” where jail personnel would censor and read her legal mail, 

thereby violating Plaintiff’s attorney-client privilege. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ 47-

51; at 12 ¶¶ 53-59). 

Defendants argue that Sheriff Gore should be dismissed in his 

official capacity because naming him is unnecessary and duplicative. 

(ECF No. 20 at 8-10). Defendants contend that the County is the real 

party in interest for any official capacity policy claim. (Id.). 

 None of the published cases Defendants cite require dismissal of 

an official named in an official-capacity suit. See Vance v. Cnty. of 

Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that when 

both an officer and the local government entity he works for are named 

in a lawsuit and the officer is named in his official capacity, the officer 

is a redundant defendant and may be dismissed); see also Luke v. 

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Abbott, 954 F. Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding it would be 

proper for a district court to either dismiss an official if the entity he 

represents is a properly named defendant and even then only if the 

plaintiff does not also bring suit against the official in their individual 

capacity). Rather, these precedents approve of pleadings naming the 

official as “simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of 

which an officer is an agent.” Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (citing 

Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 659 n.55). Graham states that “there is no 

longer a need” to name both the official and the local government entity. 

Graham, 473 U.S. at n.14 (emphasis added). None of these cases 

require the dismissal of Sheriff Gore. 

 Defendants ignore Bell v. Baca, No. CV0102067 DDP (SHX), 2002 

WL 368532 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2002), which considered facts 

comparable to those presented here and distinguished Luke and Vance. 

Bell held: 

Some district courts have held that if individuals are 

being sued in their official capacities as municipal officials 

and the municipal entity itself is also being sued, then the 

claims against the individuals are duplicative and should be 

dismissed. See, e.g., Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. 

Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In Luke v. Abbott, the court 

decided that “[a] plaintiff cannot elect which of the defendant 

formats to use. . . . If only the official-capacity officer is 

named, it would be proper for the Court upon request to 

dismiss the officer and substitute instead the local 

government entity as the correct defendant.” 954 F. Supp. 

202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 

It is axiomatic, however, that the plaintiff is master of 

his complaint. Therefore, the Court declines to follow the 

analysis adopted in Luke. The defendant provides no 

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compelling reason why the Court should override the 

plaintiff’s choice of defendant and substitute the County of 

Los Angeles for Sheriff Baca. Absent any Ninth Circuit 

authority to the contrary, the Court denies the defendant’s 

request to formally substitute the County of Los Angeles as 

the defendant in place of Sheriff Baca. 

Bell, 2002 WL 368532, at *2. 

 Dismissal of a duplicative official is permissive, not mandatory. 

See Lara v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-08469 DDP JCGX, 2013 WL 

100192, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (comparing Bell, 2002 WL 368532 

at *2 with Luke, 954 F. Supp. at 204). Plaintiff is the master of her 

complaint, and on this record the Court finds Bell persuasive. 

 Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Sheriff 

Gore in his official capacity must dismissed as a duplicative party. 

 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the County Sheriff is the 

final policy maker in operating county jails and is separately suable 

apart from the county under § 1983. Streit v. Cnty. of L.A., 236 F.3d 

552, 567 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff specifically alleges that Sheriff Gore 

is “a final policy maker for Defendant County.” (ECF No. 4 at 5 ¶ 5). 

Because Sheriff Gore is separately suable, the Court finds he is a proper 

party. Streit, 236 F.3d at 567. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Sheriff Gore in his official capacity as a duplicative party be 

DENIED. 

2. Assistant Sheriff Miller 

Plaintiff alleges Asst. Sheriff Miller is head of the Detention 

Services Bureau and responsible for the operation and management of 

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County jails. (ECF No. 4 at 6 ¶ 6). Plaintiff asserts that Asst. Sheriff 

Miller is responsible for the “promulgation and implementation of 

Detention Services Bureau policies, including the policies challenged 

herein.” (Id.). Defendants argue that Asst. Sheriff Miller, in his official 

capacity, is a duplicative party. (ECF No. 20 at 8). 

“[A]n assistant sheriff is not a policy maker.” Kitchens v. Mims, 

No. CV-05-1567-DCB P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8789, at *27 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 26, 2015). But “a plaintiff may show that an official policymaker 

either delegated policymaking authority to a subordinate or ratified a 

subordinate’s decision, approving the decision and the basis for it” for 

the purposes of showing municipal liability. Hyland v. Wonder, 117 

F.3d 405, 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 126-27 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). “Under 

California law, the [municipality]’s charter determines municipal 

affairs such as personnel matters.” Hyland, 117 F.3d at 414 (citing City 

and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Patterson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 95, 102 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 1988)). The Charter of the County of San Diego § 605 provides 

that “[t]he Sheriff shall organize the Sheriff’s Department for efficient 

and effective law enforcement.” Id. 

The language of County Charter § 605 gives Sheriff Gore broad 

discretion in organizing and delegating authority within SDSD. It is 

plausible that Sheriff Gore delegated policy-making authority for LCDF 

and other County jails to Asst. Sheriff Miller or ratified his policy 

decisions and the bases for them. Thus, Asst. Sheriff Miller is 

separately suable in his official capacity. 

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Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Asst. Sheriff Miller in his official capacity as a duplicative 

party be DENIED. 

 3. Captain Milloy

 Plaintiff alleges that Capt. Milloy is responsible for various 

subdivisions of the Detention Services Bureau, including implementing 

policies at LCDF. (ECF No. 4 at 6 ¶ 7). Defendants argue that Capt. 

Milloy should be dismissed in her official capacity as a duplicative 

party. (ECF No. 20 at 10). 

As stated previously, only a final policy maker may be held liable 

for unconstitutional policies. Plaintiff claims that Capt. Milloy is a 

“[c]ommander with the Detention Services Bureau.” (ECF No. 4 at 6 ¶ 

7). Plaintiff only alleges that Capt. Milloy implemented policies. (Id.). 

Unlike Sheriff Gore and Asst. Sheriff Miller, Plaintiff does not claim 

Capt. Milloy is responsible for the overall management and operation of 

County jails or that she promulgated policies for them. The Court 

therefore finds that Capt. Milloy should be dismissed in her official 

capacity because she lacks final policy-making authority for the 

purposes of municipal liability under § 1983. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Capt. Milloy as a duplicative party in her official capacity be 

GRANTED without leave to amend. 

 4. County of San Diego 

Plaintiff alleges that the County is “responsible for the actions 

and/or inactions and the policies, procedures, customs and practices of 

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[SDSD] and its employees and agents.” (ECF No. 4 at 5 ¶ 4). 

Defendants do not contest that the County is properly named. (ECF 

No. 20 at 10). Accordingly, the Court finds that the County is a 

properly named Defendant for the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss. 

C. Official Capacity Policy Claims 

 Plaintiff alleges that the postcard and scanning policies violate 

her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 (Id.). 

To plead a civil rights violation under § 1983, Plaintiff must 

sufficiently allege: (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution 

and United States law; and (2) that a person acting under color of state 

law committed the violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Plaintiff adequately alleges the second element because all Defendants 

acted in the course of their official duties under state law. Plaintiff’s 

 

1 Although Plaintiff invokes the Eighth Amendment, she was a 

pre-trial detainee at the time of the events and when she filed the 

Complaint and the FAC. (ECF No. 4 at 4, 13). Claims arising before 

conviction and sentence are not subject to the Eighth Amendment. 

Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393 & n.6 (1989). 

A pre-trial detainee’s § 1983 claims arise under the Due Process 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth 

Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); 

Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

1991). However, a pre-trial detainee’s Due Process rights are “at least 

as great” as those Eighth Amendment protections enjoyed by convicted 

prisoners. Maddox v. Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1414 (9th Cir. 1986); 

see also Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (stating deliberate indifference standard is applicable to pretrial detainee alleging due process violations against county officials for 

failure to address medical needs).

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official capacity policy claims turn on whether her Due Process rights 

were violated by the mail policies. 

A plaintiff alleging that her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

rights were violated must meet two elements: (1) there is a protected 

liberty interest; and (2) the plaintiff was deprived of that interest 

without Due Process. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 

The “range of interests protected by procedural due process is not 

infinite . . . . Due Process is required only when a decision of the State 

implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (citing 

Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-571). 

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely for the acts of others, 

e.g., solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. 

Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). “But the 

municipality may be held liable when execution of a government’s policy 

or custom inflicts the injury.” L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 

(2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (emphasis in Humphries) 

(internal quotations omitted). 

 1. Postcard-only Policy 

 Plaintiff claims that SDSD implemented a “postcard only” mail 

policy which restricted her mail and “neutralized” her right to 

education. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ 48-49). Plaintiff states she was attempting to 

participate in paralegal “correspondence classes.” (Id. ¶¶ 48, 50). 

Plaintiff asserts that her information package and application were 

rejected by unnamed jail staff because they were not in the form of a 

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postcard. (Id. ¶ 49). Plaintiff claims she filed a tort claim in January 

2015 demanding the County pay $499 and allow her to study via a 

correspondence course. (Id. ¶ 50). Plaintiff states the County rejected 

her claim despite it being timely filed. (Id. ¶ 51). Plaintiff alleges the 

denial of her mail concerning correspondence classes violates California 

Penal Code § 1063.2 (Id. ¶ 47). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to 

state a factually plausible claim that the postcard policy violates her 

constitutional rights. (ECF No. 20 at 11). 

 Prisoners, including pre-trial detainees, have a liberty interest in 

receiving mail and are entitled to some Due Process protections when 

deprived of it. Roberts v. Apker, 570 Fed. Appx. 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 2003)). If mail is 

rejected, inmates must be provided with: “(1) notice to the inmate of the 

rejection, (2) a reasonable opportunity to appeal the rejection, and (3) 

review by an independent official.” Id. 

Plaintiff received notice because she states that the “information 

and application were rejected and logged into [the] jail computer as 

being rejected for not being a postcard.” (ECF No. 4 at 11 ¶ 49). 

Plaintiff filed a tort claim over the issue, but does not allege she was 

denied either an opportunity to appeal or that an independent official 

failed to review the rejection. (Id. ¶ 50). Plaintiff therefore fails to 

 

2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1063 was repealed in 1988 and related to 

challenging the jury. It appears that Plaintiff intended to refer to CAL.

CODE REGS. § 1063 which provides parameters for local detention 

facilities in adopting policies and procedures regarding inmate 

correspondence. 

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allege sufficient facts to meet the second element of her Due Process 

claim. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569. Dismissal of this claim without prejudice 

and with leave to amend is appropriate, because it is not apparent that 

it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend the complaint by adding 

allegations to support the second element of her Due Process claim. 

Although Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a violation of her Due 

Process rights, the Court, construing Plaintiff’s FAC liberally as 

required, finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a First 

Amendment violation. 

Because Plaintiff claims it was the restriction on inmate mail that 

violated her alleged right to education under the Due Process clause, 

the First Amendment is implicated. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 

1048 (9th Cir. 2011). The First Amendment applies to the states via the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 

(2015). Both prisoners and pre-trial detainees enjoy “a First 

Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 

264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Pre-trial detainees and prisoners 

do not have the same “full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated 

individual.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. “[R]estrictive prison regulations are 

permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (citing Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted). 

 Courts addressing postcard-only policies have found such policies 

implicate the First Amendment rights of prisoners and pre-trial 

detainees. See Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049 (stating that “publishers and 

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inmates have a First Amendment interest in communicating with each 

other”); Nelson v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-5407-PSG (JPR), 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56274, at *39 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2015) (finding that 

postcard policy implicates inmates’ First Amendment rights); Covell v. 

Arpaio, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152-53 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding postcard 

policy implicates inmates’ First Amendment rights); see also Prison 

Legal News v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. 14-0773-GHK (EX), 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 84574, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (finding postcard 

policy unconstitutional where defendants offered no evidence that it 

enhanced jail security). 

 The postcard policy at its core is a restriction on inmate mail 

which implicates the First Amendment. (ECF No. 4 at 5-7 ¶¶ 5-7, at 11 

¶ 47-49). The issue of whether Defendants can establish a legitimate 

penological interest in the postcard policy is a question to be resolved at 

another juncture in the proceedings. The Court finds that Plaintiff 

adequately alleges a violation of her First Amendment right to send and 

receive mail. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s postcard-only policy claim be GRANTED with 

leave to amend as to her Due Process claim, but DENIED as to 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment postcard policy claim. 

 a. Denial of Education 

Plaintiff also claims that the postcard policy violated her right to 

education. (ECF No. 4 at 11 ¶¶ 48). Plaintiff alleges that she filed a 

tort claim requesting the County to pay $499 for her paralegal course 

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but was rejected. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51). Defendants argue that prisoners do 

not have a constitutional right to education. (ECF No. 20 at 16). 

“In general, a prisoner has no constitutional right to . . . education 

while in prison.” McKinney v. Kuzirian, No. 91-16462, 1992 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 19135, at *3-4 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 

78, 88 n.9 (1976); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

But “state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to 

procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980). “County boards 

of education are authorized to provide general education services to 

prisoners in county jails.” L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 669 F.3d 

956, 962 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cal. Educ. Code § 1900).3 

 Although the County has authority to provide educational 

programs in its jails, there is no statutory or constitutional requirement 

that it must provide such programs. McKinney, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 

19135, at *4. The County chose not to pay for or provide Plaintiff with 

her desired paralegal course, which is within its discretion. Plaintiff’s 

claim for denial of education therefore fails. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for denial of education be GRANTED

without leave to amend. The Court recommends that this claim be 

dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff has not argued that 

 

3 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1900 states in relevant part that counties 

“shall have authority” to implement educational programs in county 

jails. The statute is silent on whether counties must provide 

educational programs to adults in county jails. 

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she can provide any additional facts to cure the defect in the claim and 

this Court is aware of none. 

 2. Scanning Policy 

Plaintiff claims unnamed LCDF staff read and censored her legal 

mail and items she took with her to legal visits, thereby violating her 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 12 ¶ 54). Plaintiff alleges she 

filed grievances over the “frequent violation.” (Id. ¶ 56). In response, 

Sergeant Masterson told Plaintiff that jail policy allows staff to visually 

inspect mail to verify its contents. (Id. ¶ 57). Plaintiff claims the “State 

Board of Standards” confirmed that the scanning policy is illegal but 

SDSD refused to change it. (Id. ¶ 59). Defendants argue that jail staff 

are legally allowed to scan inmate mail to verify its contents and 

therefore Plaintiff’s claim fails. (ECF No. 20 at 16). 

 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees inmates access to the 

courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). This right of access 

“guarantees no particular methodology but rather the capability of 

bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of 

confinement before the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 

(1996). Plaintiff must establish she suffered an actual injury to her 

ability to defend against the charges pending against her. Id. at 351-

353. Plaintiff fails to allege any injury to her criminal case resulting 

from the alleged censorship of her legal mail and the Court cannot 

supply the missing allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Plaintiff’s Due 

Process claim arising from the reading and censorship of her legal mail 

therefore fails. This claim should be dismissed with leave to amend, 

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because it is not apparent that Plaintiff will be unable to supply 

allegations to cure the defect in this claim. 

 Although Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a Due Process 

violation arising from the reading and censoring of her legal mail, the 

Court, construing Plaintiff’s FAC liberally as required, finds that 

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. 

 A prisoner’s right to send and receive mail is attenuated by the 

prison’s competing right to adopt regulations and policies “reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests,” including “security, order, 

and rehabilitation.” Whitherow, 52 F.3d at 265 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. 

at 89 and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). However, 

“[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 

protections of the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. 

It is permissible for jail staff to open and inspect legal mail, but 

not read it, in the inmate’s presence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

575-77 (1974) (emphasis added). “The practice of requiring an inmate 

to be present when [her] legal mail is opened is a measure designed to 

prevent officials from reading the mail in the first place.” Nordstrom v. 

Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577) 

(emphasis in original). “Courts have analyzed claims regarding the 

confidentiality of attorney-client communications under various 

constitutional principles, including . . . the [Due Process clause and] 

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 909 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “In American criminal law, the right to privately confer with 

counsel is nearly sacrosanct.” Id. at 910. 

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 The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states via the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 

(1963). “A criminal defendant’s ability to communicate candidly and 

confidentially with [her] lawyer is essential to [her] defense.” 

Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 910. “One threat to the effective assistance of 

counsel posed by government interception of attorney-client 

communications lies in the inhibition of free exchanges between 

defendant and counsel.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 

(1977). “[T]he Constitution does not permit . . . [the] reading [of] 

outgoing attorney-client correspondence.” Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 910-

11 (emphasis in original). “Pretrial detainees have a significantly 

greater interest in the right to counsel than convicted prisoners.” U.S. 

v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 797 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The Ninth Circuit in Nordstrom addressed a plaintiff’s § 1983 

claim against prison staff reading his legal mail. Id. The court held 

that the plaintiff adequately stated a Sixth Amendment claim where he 

alleged that: (1) prison officials had a policy and practice of reading his 

legal mail; (2) prison officials claimed the right to do so; and (3) the 

policy violated his ability to confidentially communicate with his 

attorney. Id. at 911. The Ninth Circuit dispensed with the substantial 

prejudice requirement for Sixth Amendment claims. Id. at 912 (Bybee, 

J. dissenting). 

 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee who is “represented by legal 

counsel for her criminal case.” (ECF No. 4 at 12 ¶ 60). Plaintiff asserts 

similar claims as the plaintiff in Nordstrom: (1) there is a policy by 

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which jail staff read and censor her legal communications between her 

and her attorney; (2) Sgt. Masterson stated that jail staff are entitled to 

inspect inmate legal mail; and (3) the scanning policy violates her 

attorney-client privilege. (ECF No. 4 at 12 ¶¶ 53-58). “It is obvious . . . 

that a policy or practice permitting prison officials to not just inspect or 

scan, but to read an inmate’s letters to [her] counsel is highly likely to 

inhibit the sort of candid communications that the right to counsel and 

the attorney-client privilege are meant to protect.” Nordstrom, 762 F.3d 

at 910 (emphasis in original). Following Nordstrom, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff adequately states a Sixth Amendment claim. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s scanning policy claim be GRANTED with leave to 

amend as to Plaintiff’s Due Process claim, but DENIED as to Plaintiff’s 

Sixth Amendment claim. 

D. Generalized Policy Claim 

 Plaintiff asserts that SDSD “repeatedly” implements policies that 

violate her Due Process and Eighth Amendment rights and that 

Defendants’ actions are “motivated by ill motive and intent.” (ECF No. 

4 at 13 ¶¶ 65-29). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are 

legal conclusions without factual basis. (ECF No. 20 at 11). 

 “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can . . . identify[] 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide 

the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff must provide the court 

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with “more than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Id. at 678. 

 Plaintiff’s generalized policy claim sets forth no factual 

allegations. Plaintiff makes general assertions that SDSD implements 

policies that frequently violate her constitutional rights. Plaintiff does 

not name or describe these policies. Legal conclusions couched as 

factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Id. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s generalized policy claim be GRANTED with leave 

to amend. 

E. Individual Capacity Policy Claims 

Plaintiff names Sheriff Gore, Asst. Sheriff Miller and Capt. Milloy 

in their individual capacities. (ECF No.4 at 5-6). Plaintiff makes no 

allegation that Sheriff Gore, Asst. Sheriff Miller or Capt. Milloy were 

personally involved in, present during or knew of the alleged violations 

at LCDF. (ECF No. 5-7 ¶¶ 5-7). 

 Individual liability in a § 1983 action attaches only if the plaintiff 

can show the defendant personally participated in the constitutional 

violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of their 

subordinates under § 1983. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 479 (1986). Vague or conclusory allegations of supervisory 

misconduct are insufficient. Ivey, 376 F.2d at 268. It is not enough for 

a plaintiff to allege that a supervisory official is liable as an individual 

because he knew about the constitutional violation or created policies 

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and procedures that resulted in the violation. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 

F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff fails to allege that Sheriff Gore, Asst. Sheriff Miller or 

Capt. Milloy were present during, personally involved in or otherwise 

had knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations. The Court 

cannot provide the missing allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

“Plaintiff’s bald and conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish 

individual liability under [] § 1983.” Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Sheriff Gore, Asst. Sheriff Miller and Capt. Milloy in their 

individual capacities be GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Earlier in this Report and Recommendation, this Court 

recommended that Capt. Milloy, in her official capacity, be dismissed 

without leave to amend. Because the Court now also recommends that 

Capt. Milloy, in her individual capacity, be dismissed with leave to 

amend, the Court RECOMMENDS that Capt. Milloy be DISMISSED

from the action without prejudice. 

F. Claims against Detectives Fiske and Patterson 

 1. Detective Fiske 

Plaintiff alleges that Fiske was present when Plaintiff was 

arrested, questioned and processed. (ECF No. 4 at 7 ¶ 8). Plaintiff 

claims that Fiske sexually harassed her by making “repeated lewd, 

condescending, humiliating and highly embarrassing comments of a 

sexual nature” during Plaintiff’s booking procedures. (Id. at 8 ¶ 19). 

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Defendants argue that embarrassing or inappropriate comments do not 

violate a constitutional right. (ECF No. 20 at 12). 

Mere allegations of verbal harassment or abuse are not sufficient 

to state a claim under § 1983. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 

(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th 

Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff does not state what Fiske said and makes no more 

than a general claim that Fiske sexually harassed her. (ECF No. 4 at 8 

¶¶ 17-19). Plaintiff must provide the Court with “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim against Fiske fails. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for sexual harassment against Detective 

Fiske in her official and individual capacities be GRANTED with leave 

to amend. 

As this is the only claim alleged against Defendant Fiske, the 

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Fiske be DISMISSED from 

the action without prejudice. 

 2. Detective Patterson 

Plaintiff makes three separate allegations against Defendant 

Patterson: (a) soliciting an illegal act; (b) soliciting perjury; and (c) 

inappropriate behavior. (ECF No. 4 at 7-9 ¶¶ 9, 20-28). 

 a. Soliciting an Illegal Act 

Plaintiff alleges that Patterson executed a search warrant at her 

home and that during the search Patterson “solicited” her to question 

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another suspect, who was represented by counsel. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). 

Plaintiff contends Patterson’s solicitation violates “civil law.” (Id.). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege she was coerced 

into making self-incriminating statements and that Patterson’s conduct 

did not so shock the conscience as to be actionable under § 1983. (ECF 

No. 20 at 12). 

“[U]nlawful police interrogation techniques might give rise to a 

substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 923 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the 

standard for demonstrating a substantive Due Process violation under 

the Fourteenth Amendment is high. Id. Only the most egregious 

official misconduct will be found to violate Due Process. Cnty. of 

Sacramento v. Lewis, 520 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). “[P]olice torture or 

other abuse” exemplifies the level of misconduct necessary to trigger the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003). 

A Due Process claim involving police misconduct during questioning is 

only cognizable if the official misconduct “shocks the conscience” or 

otherwise “violates the decencies of civilized conduct.” Lewis, 520 U.S. 

at 846. 

Plaintiff makes no showing that Patterson’s behavior, apart from 

asking an allegedly improper question, “violate[d] the decencies of 

civilized conduct.” Plaintiff does not allege that she was tortured or 

abused into giving a response. The Court cannot provide the missing 

allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Plaintiff’s claim against Patterson 

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for soliciting an illegal act falls short of official misconduct that “shocks 

the conscience.” Lewis, 520 U.S. at 846. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for soliciting an illegal act against Detective 

Patterson in his official and individual capacities be GRANTED with 

leave to amend. 

b. Soliciting Perjury 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2012, Patterson “made a pretext 

call” to her and requested that she “say that the suspect in custody had 

been seen by [Plaintiff] at a specified time and place.” (ECF No. 4 at 9 

¶¶ 22-24). Plaintiff refused. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff claims that Patterson 

then threatened to make her a suspect if she did not comply. (Id. ¶ 25). 

Plaintiff refused and was subsequently arrested as a conspirator. (Id. ¶ 

26). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege that she was 

coerced into making self-incriminating statements or that Patterson’s 

conduct rose to the level of actionable misconduct under § 1983. (ECF 

No. 20 at 12). 

If Plaintiff was compelled to comply with Patterson’s request “by 

methods so brutal and so offensive to human dignity that they shock the 

conscience,” then the Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Chavez, 

538 U.S. at 774 (internal quotations and citations omitted). By her own 

admission, Plaintiff states she twice refused to make a statement. 

(ECF No. 4 at 9 ¶¶ 24, 26). Plaintiff does not allege that Patterson did 

anything after her second refusal that could be considered so brutal or 

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offensive to human dignity as to shock the conscience and the Court 

cannot supply the missing allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of soliciting perjury against Detective 

Patterson in his official and individual capacities be GRANTED with 

leave to amend. 

 c. Inappropriate Behavior 

Plaintiff alleges that Patterson made “highly inappropriate 

comments” and gave Plaintiff a pair of handcuffs “to secure herself.” 

(ECF No. 4 at 9 ¶ 28). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim because inappropriate comments and behavior do not violate a 

constitutional right. (ECF No. 20 at 12). 

Mere allegations of verbal harassment or abuse are not sufficient 

to state a claim under § 1983. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 738 (citing 

Oltarzewski, 830 F.2d at 139). Plaintiff does not state what Patterson 

actually said or how giving her handcuffs to secure herself was 

inappropriate. (ECF No. 4 at 9 ¶ 28). Plaintiff’s allegations are 

threadbare and she fails to state a claim against Patterson for 

inappropriate behavior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of inappropriate behavior against Detective 

Patterson in his official and individual capacities be GRANTED with 

leave to amend. 

Because this Court has recommended finding that each of the 

three claims against Detective Patterson be dismissed with leave to 

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amend, the Court RECOMMENDS that Detective Patterson be 

DISMISSED from the action without prejudice. 

G. Miscellaneous Claims

 Plaintiff makes various claims of violations and misconduct 

against SDSD personnel. (ECF No. 4 at 9-13). Plaintiff does not name 

any of the individuals involved as Defendants. (Id.). 

 1. Medical Claims 

Plaintiff argues that SDSD personnel interfered with her medical 

and dental care and injured her while she was shackled. (ECF No. 4 at 

9-10 ¶¶ 29-38, at 11 ¶¶ 42-46). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim for deliberate indifference to her medical needs because 

none of her claims involve a serious medical condition and she received 

treatment for her shackle injuries. (ECF No. 20 at 14-16). 

“Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth 

Amendment. Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth 

Amendment, however, [the Court] appl[ies] the same standards.” Frost 

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 

535 n.16 and Redman, 942 F.2d at 1441). 

Prison authorities have a responsibility to provide for an inmate’s 

medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In the worst 

instance, a failure to do so may cause an inmate to suffer serious 

physical injury or death, or in a less serious scenario, pain serving no 

“penological purpose,” thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 

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103. However, medical malpractice, negligence or a prison accident 

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 105; 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (overruled on 

other grounds). The test is “whether the officials exhibited deliberate 

indifference.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Deliberate indifference is a high standard. Hamby v. Hammond, 

No. 3:14-cv-05065-RBL-KLS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34678, at *52 

(W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2015). To meet the deliberate indifference 

standard on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two 

prongs: one objective and one subjective. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 

1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). 

To satisfy the objective prong, a plaintiff must show that she has a 

serious medical need. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A serious 

medical need is shown if a failure to provide adequate treatment results 

in wanton or unnecessary infliction of pain. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1059. 

To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show the prison 

official was deliberately indifferent to her needs. Colwell, 763 F.3d at 

1066. This means the official knew of an excessive risk to the inmate’s 

health and safety and then consciously disregarded it to the inmate’s 

harm. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

official must have been aware of facts or factual circumstances that 

would allow him to draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious 

harm to the inmate’s health and safety exists, and he must also draw 

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that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis 

added). 

 a. Cleaning Solution 

Plaintiff claims that during the week of October 27, 2012, she 

drank “caustic cleaning solution.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 29). Plaintiff alleges that 

unnamed jail staff “elected to neglect” to call paramedics for three 

hours, causing “gastric damage.” (Id. ¶¶ 30-31). Plaintiff claims that a 

“USMC” doctor admitted her but SDSD Deputies Casey and Storrs 

convinced the doctor to release her into “SDSD care.” (Id. at 10 ¶¶ 32-

34). 

Because Plaintiff does not name the individuals who were 

involved as Defendants, her claim must be dismissed. The Court finds 

that Plaintiff may be able to cure her pleading deficiencies through 

proper amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (instructing that a prisoner “be given an opportunity to 

amend [her] complaint” because the prisoner “could cure the 

deficiencies in [her] complaint by naming the correct defendants”). 

Although Plaintiff does not name a proper defendant for this 

claim, an inmate poisoning herself objectively constitutes a serious 

medical need. Plaintiff claims that staff “elected to neglect” to 

immediately alert paramedics causing a three hour denial of treatment. 

(ECF No. 4 at 9 ¶¶ 30-31). The use of the word “elected” connotes that 

the delay in calling paramedics was the result of a conscious decision on 

the part of LCDF personnel rather than mere negligence. Plaintiff’s use 

of the word “elected” also plausibly suggests that jail officials knew that 

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she drank cleaning fluid, knew that it posed an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health and safety and then consciously chose to not call 

paramedics for three hours resulting in gastric damage. Plaintiff has 

stated a claim for deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057;

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for medical interference arising from 

drinking the cleaning solution be GRANTED, and that this claim be 

DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

 b. Dental Procedure and Medical Referrals 

In June 2012, Plaintiff alleges that she requested dental 

procedures which were denied because she was not yet sentenced. (Id. 

¶¶ 35-36). Plaintiff alleges the denial violates California law. 4 (Id. ¶ 

35). In 2013, Plaintiff asserts that a staff doctor wrote her two referrals 

for an orthopedist and neurologist but she was not taken to either. (Id. 

¶¶ 37-38). 

Plaintiff does not claim she has a serious medical condition of 

which staff should have been aware of in June 2013 and therefore fails 

to meet the deliberate indifference objective prong. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104. Plaintiff does not allege any injury resulted from the denial of her 

 

4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6030(e)(4) requires that pregnant inmates be 

provided with a “[a] dental cleaning while in a state facility.” (emphasis 

added). Because Plaintiff is incarcerated in a county facility, § 

6030(e)(4) is inapplicable to her dental claims as a matter of statutory 

construction. 

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dental procedures or medical referrals. The Court cannot provide the 

missing allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for denial of medical and dental care be 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

c. Injuries from Shackles 

Plaintiff alleges she suffered “numerous scratches on [her] wrist, 

discolored and swollen ankles” as a result of being shackled on 

December 11, 2014. (ECF No. 4 at 11 ¶¶ 42-45). Plaintiff states her 

injuries were treated by jail medical staff. (Id. ¶ 46). 

Plaintiff’s claim fails because she does not allege that she was not 

provided with adequate treatment. See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 

(stating that the plaintiff must allege denial of treatment). Plaintiff 

admits she received treatment for her minor injuries. (ECF No. 4 at 11 

¶ 46). Plaintiff’s claim fails the objective prong of the deliberate 

indifference standard because she did not have a serious medical 

condition that was denied treatment. Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066; 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Plaintiff’s injuries were minor, she 

received treatment and, therefore, her claim fails. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for injuries arising from being shackled on 

December 11, 2014, be GRANTED without leave to amend. 

2. Improper Use of Shackles 

Plaintiff argues that she was improperly shackled while pregnant 

in violation of California law. (ECF No. 4 at 10 ¶¶ 39-40). Defendants 

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argue that Plaintiff does not allege a violation amounting to cruel and 

unusual punishment arising from being shackled. (ECF No. 20 at 13). 

Defendants contend that at most Plaintiff states a claim for negligence 

which is not actionable under § 1983. (Id. at 14). 

As stated herein, a pre-trial detainee’s claims are analyzed under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the same as Eighth Amendment 

standards. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane 

methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). Because jail is a harsh and restrictive institution, an injury does 

not automatically violate the Constitution. Id. A prisoner alleging 

cruel and unusual punishment must allege two elements: (1) a 

“sufficiently serious” deprivation which posed a “substantial risk of 

harm;” and (2) the defendant acted with intent to cause the plaintiff 

wanton and unnecessary suffering. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). The inquiry into the second element 

asks whether the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff’s health or safety. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

 a. Shackled While Pregnant 

Between May 15 and July 31, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that she was 

improperly shackled “numerous times” while she was pregnant during 

transport to court appearances. (ECF No. 4 at 10 ¶¶ 39-41). During the 

week of May 15, 2012, Plaintiff claims she fell while shackled but a 

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courtroom deputy and her attorney prevented her from hitting the 

ground. (Id. ¶ 41). 

Plaintiff does not allege that the deputies who shackled her 

intended to cause her harm, rather she alleges violations of California 

Penal Code § 3407(a). (ECF No. 4 at 10 ¶ 40). California Penal Code § 

3407(a) provides that “[a]n inmate known to be pregnant or in recovery 

after delivery shall not be restrained by the use of leg irons, waist 

chains, or handcuffs behind the body.” Id. Because § 3407(a) prescribes 

a duty to protect Plaintiff against the use of restraints while she is 

pregnant, a “violation of the duties [] imposed by statute . . . may 

subject [a defendant] to liability under section 1983.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978). Although Plaintiff fails to adequately 

allege that those deputies who shackled her acted with intent to harm 

her, she does allege a repetitive violation of § 3407(a) because she 

claims she was shackled while pregnant in multiple instances. (ECF 

No. 4 at 10 ¶¶ 39-40). Plaintiff states that when she fell she had “no 

access to hands to brace for the fall on the stomach.” (ECF No. 4 at 10 ¶ 

11). It is plausible that Plaintiff’s fall and inability to use her hands 

stemmed from the use of leg irons, waist chains or having her hands 

restrained behind her back, all of which California Penal Code § 3407(a) 

forbids. Because Plaintiff fails to name those individuals involved as 

Defendants, however, her claim must be dismissed. Plaintiff may cure 

her pleading deficiencies through proper amendment. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1130-31 (instructing that a prisoner “be given an opportunity to 

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amend [her] complaint” because the prisoner “could cure the 

deficiencies in [her] complaint by naming the correct defendants”). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of improper shackling while pregnant be 

GRANTED and be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

b. Improper Shackling on December 11, 2014 

On December 11, 2014, Plaintiff alleges her shackles were secured 

too tightly causing bruising, discoloration and swelling on her ankles 

and numerous scratches on her wrists. (Id. at 11 ¶ 45). 

Plaintiff does not allege that she was pregnant when she was 

shackled on December 11, 2014. Nor does she allege that the person 

who secured her shackles during transport did so with the intent to 

cause her harm. (ECF No. 4 at 11 ¶¶ 42-43). Plaintiff also fails to 

name as a Defendant the individual who shackled her. The Court 

cannot provide the missing allegations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

Jail officials can shackle inmates for security reasons during 

transport and when the inmate is otherwise out of her cell. LeMaire v. 

Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff cannot state a 

constitutional violation arising from her injuries because she alleges 

medical staff treated her injuries. (ECF No. 4 at 11 ¶ 46); see Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 107 (finding that treatment of injuries negated claim under 

§ 1983); see also Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (stating that plaintiff must 

allege denial of treatment). Plaintiff’s claim for improper shackling on 

December 11, 2014, therefore fails. 

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Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of improper shackling on December 11, 

2014, be GRANTED without leave to amend. 

3. Denial of Legal Resources 

Plaintiff alleges that she was denied access to pro per resources, 

law library access and use of a computer for “active” civil cases she filed. 

(ECF No. 4 at 8 ¶ 16, at 12 ¶¶ 60-61). Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

has no constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate civil claims. 

(ECF No. 20 at 17). 

An inmate’s right of access to the courts is grounded in the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 

1989). In Lewis, the Supreme Court instituted an actual injury 

requirement on prisoners alleging interference with their access to the 

courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Actual injury must be alleged for any 

access to the courts claim because it is a jurisdictional requirement 

giving the plaintiff standing to bring suit. Nevada Dep’t. of Corr. v. 

Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). A prisoner cannot satisfy 

the injury requirement with “any type” of injury. Id. A plaintiff 

pleading denial of access to the courts must allege interference with a 

direct criminal appeal, habeas corpus petition or civil rights action. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-56. 

 Plaintiff alleges interference with “active” civil cases, but fails to 

specify the causes of action. Absent additional information, the Court 

cannot determine whether this claim refers to a habeas corpus petition 

or civil rights action that would fall within Lewis’s actual injury

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requirement. The Court cannot provide the missing allegations. Ivey, 

673 F.2d at 268. Plaintiff fails to meet the actual injury requirement 

under Lewis and her claim therefore fails. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of denial of access to pro per resources, law 

library and computer be GRANTED with leave to amend. 

 4. Denial of Court Approved Contact Visits 

Plaintiff alleges that she is permitted contact visits with her 

minor child. (ECF No. 4 at 13 ¶ 62). Plaintiff claims that her December 

2014 contact visit was cancelled due to a new policy denying ADSEG 

inmates contact visits violating California Penal Code § 60305 and Title 

15 § 1053.6 (Id. ¶ 63). Plaintiff asserts that repeated grievances have 

not restored her contact visits. (Id. ¶ 64). Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff does not have an absolute right to contact visits as a pre-trial 

detainee. (ECF No. 20 at 18). 

Pre-trial detainees and other prisoners do not have an absolute 

constitutional right to contact visits. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 

588 (1984). “The denial of prison access to a particular visitor is well 

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison 

sentence, and therefore is not independently protected by the Due 

 

5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6030 establishes minimum standards for state 

and local correctional facilities. 

6 The Court believes Plaintiff intended to cite CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 

15, § 1053, which concerns ADSEG inmates. § 1053 provides in 

pertinent part: “[ADSEG] shall consist of separate and secure housing 

but shall not involve any other deprivation of privileges than is 

necessary to obtain the objective or protecting inmates and staff.” 

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Process Clause.” Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 

(1989) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s claim fails 

as a matter of law because she has no constitutional right to contact 

visits while incarcerated. Block, 468 U.S. at 588. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for denial of contact visits be GRANTED 

without leave to amend. 

H. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 

Plaintiff requests injunctive and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 4 at 

14 ¶ 72). Defendants argue that none of Plaintiff’s claims support a 

request for injunctive relief because Plaintiff fails to state a 

constitutional violation and because each alleged deprivation was an 

isolated event. (ECF No. 20 at 13). 

On February 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of 

Time to file an opposition. (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff states she is now 

incarcerated at a “CDCR [California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation] receiving center.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not bring her 

claims for injunctive or declaratory relief on behalf of anyone other than 

herself. Because Plaintiff is now in CDCR custody rather than SDSD 

custody, her request for injunctive relief from the allegedly 

unconstitutional SDSD policies and practices is now moot. See

McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(holding a prisoner’s release from custody generally terminates her 

legal interest in injunctive relief as a matter of law). 

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Because Plaintiff also requests declaratory relief from SDSD’s 

allegedly unconstitutional policies, she must demonstrate that there is 

a “present, live controversy.” Am. Tunaboat Ass’n. v. Brown, 67 F.3d 

1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995). “A federal court does not have jurisdiction 

to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to 

declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue 

in the case before it.” Id. (quoting Church of Scientology v. U.S., 506 

U.S. 9, 12 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted). The claim is moot and 

must be dismissed if an event transpires which precludes the court from 

granting effective relief. GTE California, Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 945 

(9th Cir. 1994). An exception exists if the plaintiff can demonstrate 

that “there is a reasonable expectation that [] [she] will be subjected to 

the same action again.” Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed’n. & Outdoor 

Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Because Plaintiff brings her claims on behalf of only herself and 

because she is no longer in SDSD custody, there is no longer a present 

and live controversy about whether the allegedly unconstitutional 

SDSD policies violate her personal constitutional rights for the 

purposes of granting declaratory relief. Furthermore, Plaintiff is 

unable to demonstrate that she reasonably expects to be subjected to 

the same alleged violations by SDSD again because there is no 

reasonable expectation that she will be transferred from CDCR custody 

back to SDSD custody. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief be GRANTED and 

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that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief be 

DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

Although Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief 

are dismissed, she may still pursue her claims for money damages 

arising from the claims that remain pending. See Ceniceros v. Bd. of Tr. 

of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878, 879 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1997) (finding that although plaintiff’s claims for injunctive 

and declaratory relief were mooted, plaintiff’s claim for monetary 

damages survived); see also Wilson v. Nevada, 666 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 

1982) (stating that although claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 

may be moot, the plaintiff could still seek monetary damages on his 

claim); Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (stating “[a] 

live claim for nominal damages will prevent dismissal for mootness”). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss in Part; and (3) DISMISSING: 

 Sheriff Gore in his individual capacity, without prejudice; 

 Asst. Sheriff Miller in his individual capacity, without 

prejudice; 

 Capt. Milloy in her official, with prejudice; 

 Capt. Milloy in her individual capacity, without prejudice; 

 Detective Fiske in her official and individual capacities, 

without prejudice; 

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 Detective Patterson in his official and individual capacities, 

without prejudice; 

 Plaintiff’s first claim of sexual harassment against Detective 

Fiske, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s second claim of soliciting an illegal act against 

Detective Patterson, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s third claim of soliciting perjury against Detective 

Patterson, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s fourth claim of inappropriate behavior against 

Detective Patterson, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s fifth claim of medical interference arising out of 

her drinking the cleaning fluid, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s sixth claim of denial of medical and dental care, 

with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s seventh claim of improper shackling while 

pregnant, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s eighth claim of improper shackling on December 

11, 2014, without leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s ninth claim of denial of education, without leave to 

amend; 

 Plaintiff’s Due Process claim arising from the postcard-only 

mail policy, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s tenth claim of denial of Due Process arising from 

the scanning policy, with leave to amend; 

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 Plaintiff’s eleventh claim of denial of access to pro per

resources, law library and computer, with leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s twelfth claim of denial of court approved contact 

visits, without leave to amend; 

 Plaintiff’s thirteenth claim of generally unconstitutional 

policies and practices implemented by SDSD, with leave to 

amend; and 

 Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. 

If the Court’s recommendations are adopted, the following claims 

remain PENDING: 

 Plaintiff’s ninth claim against the County of San Diego, 

Sheriff Gore and Asst. Sheriff Miller in their official 

capacities for violation of her First Amendment rights arising 

from the postcard-only policy; 

 Plaintiff’s tenth claim against the County of San Diego, 

Sheriff Gore and Asst. Sheriff Miller in their official 

capacities for violation of her Sixth Amendment rights 

arising from the scanning policy; and 

 Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages arising out of the 

pending claims. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than May 27, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.” 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

June 3, 2016. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 

(9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 5, 2016 

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