Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00731/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00731-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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3:17-cv-0731-WQH-MDD 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SEDRIC EUGENE JOHNSON,

CDCR #AZ-2648,

Plaintiff,

vs.

A. DE LA TRINIDAD; R. FLORES; J. 

SOTO; D. LAMONT; 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0731-WQH-MDD

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF 

COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 

AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 

Sedric Eugene Johnson (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State 

Prison, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

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Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2), and later filed a Motion 

for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 9).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, 

prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether their action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (b)(4). The institution having custody of the 

prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s 

income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016)). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. 

at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report demonstrating his trust account activity and balances for the six-months preceding 

the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 4, 6-7; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s prison 

certificate, but it shows that he has a current available balance of zero. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointed counsel in this matter on the grounds that he is indigent 

and “lacks the credentials to advocate myself to the Courts [sic] standards[.]” (ECF No. 

9 at 3). However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. 

Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion 

to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. 

of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion may be exercised only 

under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 

(9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider 

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whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is 

unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” 

Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cano v. Taylor, 

739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice. Nothing in Plaintiff’s

Complaint or in his Motion to Appoint Counsel suggests he is incapable of articulating 

the factual basis for his discrimination claims, which appear “relatively straightforward.” 

Id. In fact, the Court finds, based on its screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint under the 

standards of review discussed below, that Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient factual content 

to state plausible claims. However, at this initial stage of the pleadings, Plaintiff has not 

yet shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Therefore, the Court finds no 

exceptional circumstances and DENIES his Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 9) on 

that basis. See, e.g., Cano, 739 F.3d at 1218 (affirming denial of counsel where prisoner 

could articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved, but did not 

show likelihood of succeed on the merits).

III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” 

or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A 

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint 

may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that on August 30, 2016, Centinela State Prison (“CEN”)

Correctional Officer De La Trinidad used unnecessary and unreasonable force against 

him. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff also claims Correctional Officer Soto observed the 

incident but failed to intervene. Id. Finally, Plaintiff claims Correctional Officer Flores 

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applied handcuffs “in a cruel and unusual manner” and Defendant Lamont failed to 

properly “document” and “treat” his injuries. Id. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

at 7.

Based on these allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficient to 

survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (When prison officials stand accused 

of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry 

is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”); Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 

(9th Cir.1995) (holding that “a prison official can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 

rights by failing to intervene”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (prison 

officials are liable if they act with deliberate indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical 

needs); id. at 104 (deliberate indifference “is manifested by prison [officials] intentionally 

denying or delaying access to medical care.”).

Therefore, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of summons 

Plaintiff’s Complaint on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court 

shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 

4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or 

deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915[.]”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 9) without 

prejudice.

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

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3. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED 

TO THIS ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

certified copies of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve Defendants. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285s as 

completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant 

may be found and/or subject to service, and return them to the United States Marshal 

according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP 

package.

6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All 

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.

R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

7. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

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and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone 

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 

required to respond).

8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or 

which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may 

be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2017

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