Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02215/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02215-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 10cv2215

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEKOU HARRIS,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 10cv2215-BTM (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSIONS OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE; 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND

(3) DECLINING TO ISSUE A

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

vs.

J. TIM OCHOA, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner claims his

state and federal constitutional rights were violated because the trial court improperly excluded

a defense witness from testifying at his trial. (Pet. at 6-9.)

Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) submitted by

United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. (Doc. No. 13.) The Magistrate Judge found

that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief because the determination by the state court (that

any possible error flowing from the exclusion of the witness was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt), was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, and did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 8-10.) The

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Magistrate Judge also found that Petitioner’s state law claims were not cognizable on federal

habeas, and that any federal constitutional violation was harmless. (R&R at 10-11.) Petitioner

has filed objections to the R&R stating his disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s findings,

and arguably presenting a new claim alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

in connection to the exclusion of the witness. (Doc. No. 17.) 

The Court has reviewed the R&R and the Objections thereto pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), which provides that: “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

As set forth in the R&R, a man named Costner was approached by an undercover police

officer, agreed to purchase rock cocaine for the officer, and was given a marked $20 bill.

Costner approached Petitioner, who was sitting in the passenger seat of a parked car with two

other individuals. The officer observed Petitioner place a small item in Costner’s hand, observed

Costner inspect the item in a nearby lighted area, and then hand Petitioner a $20 bill. Costner

returned to the officer and gave him the small object, which turned out to be rock cocaine.

Costner was immediately arrested and found to have $2 and a cocaine pipe on his person. The

police stopped Petitioner’s car a few blocks away and the marked $20 bill was found on his

person. The driver of the car was Petitioner’s former girlfriend, Ms. Adams. Defense counsel

indicated at the beginning of the second day of trial that, against his advice, Petitioner wished

him to call Ms. Adams as a witness to testify that Petitioner did not give Costner cocaine during

the exchange, but either gave him two one-dollar bills or gave him change for a twenty-dollar

bill. The trial court excluded Adams as a witness because: (1) she was disclosed late in violation

of state law in that Petitioner was aware of her possible testimony well before trial; (2) she

changed her story in that she had told the police that night that she had not been paying attention

during the transaction; (3) she had a close relationship to Petitioner and had been available prior

to trial; (4) defense counsel indicated that he would prefer not to call her as a witness because

her story was implausible but was seeking to do so at Petitioner’s insistence; and (5) her

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testimony would impact Costner’s defense by insinuating that Costner had the cocaine on him

all the time and would therefore provide a basis for severance of his trial from Petitioner’s trial.

(R&R at 6.)

The appellate court declined to reach the issue of whether Petitioner’s constitutional

rights were violated by the refusal to allow Ms. Adams to testify, and instead found that any

possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Ms. Adams’s proffered

testimony was implausible in light of the evidence seized from the suspects. (R&R at 9.) The

Magistrate Judge correctly found that the appellate court’s determination was neither contrary

to, nor involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established federal law, and did not

involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 8-10.) The Magistrate Judge also

correctly found that in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the limited value of Ms.

Adams’ testimony, any federal constitutional violation arising from the exclusion of her as a

witness “did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict,” and wastherefore harmless. (R&R at 10, quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

623 (1993).)

The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s findings in full with respect to all of the

claims presented in the Petition and OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections thereto. The Court

will address in the first instance the contention raised by Petitioner in his Objections that his

right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel was violated in relation to the exclusion

of Ms. Adams as a witness. (See Obj. at 2.)

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must

first show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Petitioner

must also show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious they deprived Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable.” Id. Both deficient performance and prejudice must be established in

order to establish a constitutional violation. Id.

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 Although this claim was not presented to the state supreme court, the exhaustion requirement 1

is satisfied, “if it is clear that (the habeas petitioner’s) claims are now procedurally barred under (state)

law.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996), quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989). “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732

(1991)). It appears clear that Petitioner has satisfied the technical requirements of exhaustion with

respect to this claim because any attempt by Petitioner to return to state court at this time in order to seek

further post-conviction relief would certainly meet with the imposition of a procedural bar. See In re

Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 788 n.9 (1998) (In re Clark “serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we

shall apply the successiveness rule when we are faced with a petitioner whose prior petition was filed

after the date of finality of Clark.”),see also In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 797-98 (1993) (“the general rule

is still that, absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition for

writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied,” and describing

the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to that rule); Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. –, 131 S.Ct.

-4- 10cv2215

The record presently before the Court provides no basis for a finding of deficient

performance by counsel. However, assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner could establish that the

exclusion of Ms. Adams was somehow caused by deficient performance of his counsel, he

cannot establish a constitutional violation because he is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of

an ineffective assistance claim. Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that

the result of the proceeding would have been different absent the error. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 406 (2000); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prejudice inquiry is to be considered in

light of the strength of the prosecution’s case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir.),

amended, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). In the context of federal

habeas review, “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly

deferential.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). 

The R&R correctly found that any error resulting from the exclusion of Ms. Adams as a

witness did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict in light

of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, and in light of the limited (if not actually

negative) value of Ms. Adams’ testimony. For these same reasons, Petitioner cannot establish

a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had Ms. Adams

testified. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner intended to present an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, such a claim would not entitle him to habeas relief even under a de novo review,

and irrespective of any failure to present the claim to the state supreme court.1

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1120, 1125-31 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness requirement set forth in Robbins and Clark

providing that a prisoner must seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time

the petitioner or counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support

of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied); see also

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-201 (2006) (holding that federal courts should assume that

California courts consider petitions filed after unexplained delays of thirty to sixty days to be untimely.)

-5- 10cv2215

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set forth in

this Order, and DENIES the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court DECLINES to

issue a Certificate of Appealability.

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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