Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-05850/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-05850-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONGXIAO YUE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

Defendant. /

No. C07-05850 MJJ

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff Dongxiao Yue’s (“Yue” or “Plaintiff”)

Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (“Motion for Default”) against Defendants Sun Microsystems

(“Sun”) and Storage Technology Corporation (“StorageTek”) (collectively, “Defendants”); and (2)

Defendant Sun’s Motion for Sanctions. (Docket Nos. 13, 15.) Both motions are opposed. For the

following reasons, the Court DENIES both motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2006 Netbula LLC filed an action (the “2006 case”) against Sun,

StorageTek, International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”), EMC Corporation (“EMC”) and

Darden Restaurants (“Darden”). (See No. CV 06-7391MJJ.) In that action, Netbula alleged that the

defendants engaged in: (1) copyright infringement, (2) intentional fraud, (3) breach of contract, (4)

statutory unfair competition under California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.;

and (5) equitable accounting and imposition of a constructive trust. (See No. CV 6-7391MJJ,

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Complaint, Docket No. 15.) While not a party to the 2006 action, Yue is the founder of Netbula and

was intimately involved in the prosecution of the 2006 case. 

On November 19, 2007 pro se Plaintiff Yue filed this action (the “2007 case”) against

StorageTek and Sun. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 10, 2007, which added a

number of individual defendants. (See Docket No. 9.) In the 2007 case, Plaintiff alleges ten claims

of copyright infringement. (See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 9.) The 2007 case was originally

assigned to Judge Illston who, on December 3, 2007, issued an Order of Referral for the Court to

determine if the 2006 and 2007 cases were related.

The defendants in the 2006 case sought summary judgment on the copyright infringement

claim and the Court held a hearing on the matter on December 14, 2007. After completion of the

summary judgment hearing, the Court held a status conference and the discussion turned to the

interrelationship between the 2006 and 2007 cases. On the record, the Court related the 2007 case to

the 2006 case. (See Transcript of Proceedings, Docket No. 131 (“Transcript”) at 65:10-11.) The

Court also granted Defendants an extension of time to answer the 2007 Complaint in light of the

pending motion for summary judgment in the 2006 case. 

On July 2, 2008, Yue filed a Motion for Default against Defendants StorageTek and Sun. In

addition to opposing Plaintiff’s Motion for Default, Defendant Sun also seeks an order imposing

sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Default Judgment

There is a two-step process to secure a default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55. Plaintiff must first seek an entry of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

55(a). Under Rule 55(a), the Clerk may enter default “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend” the action. Once the default is

entered, plaintiff may then seek a default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 55(b)(1) and (2). The

decision of whether to grant or deny a request for default judgment lies within the sound discretion

of the district court. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980).

B. Motion for Sanctions

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There are multiple legal bases for the Court’s authority to impose sanctions on a party. As is

relevant here, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United

States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the

excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such

conduct.

Under § 1927, a litigant’s recklessness, rather than bad faith, is sufficient to justify an imposition of

sanctions. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001) Such fees are intended to serve as a

sanction against counsel personally for reckless or bad faith conduct in the course of litigation. See

Trulis v. Martin, 107 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir.1995). Section 1927 sanctions may also, however, be

imposed upon a pro se plaintiff. See Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1989).

In addition, the Court has the “inherent power to levy sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, for

‘willful disobedience of a court order . . . or when the losing party has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting Roadway

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)). Under the Court’s inherent power, however,

sanctions are only available “if the court specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad

faith.” Id. at 994. Conduct that is tantamount to bad faith includes “recklessness when combined

with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Default Judgment

Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a judgment of default against Defendants because they

failed to plead or otherwise defend within the prescribed time required by the rules or a valid court

order. (See Plf.’s Motion at 1-2.) Plaintiff’s request for default judgment is flawed for two reasons. 

First, procedurally, Plaintiff failed to seek entry of default from the Clerk before making a motion

for default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 55(a). Second, on the merits, Plaintiff is not entitled to

entry of default or default judgment because Defendants did not default. Plaintiff filed the Amended

Complaint on December 10, 2007. At the December 14, 2007 hearing, the Court ordered that no

responsive pleading would be due until such time as the Court set a date at the upcoming status

conference. On January 2, 2008, when Plaintiff filed this Motion for Default, the Court had not yet

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held the aforementioned status conference or set a deadline for Defendants’ responsive pleading. 

Thus, Defendants did not fail to plead or otherwise defend this action and did not default. The Court

therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Default.

B. Defendant is Not Entitled to Sanctions

Defendant Sun argues that Plaintiff filed the Motion for Default knowing that the Court

previously ordered that no responsive pleading was due and that default would not be entered. 

(Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 3.) This, Sun contends, was plainly undertaken in bad faith and

unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings because Sun was forced to prepare an

opposition to the Motion for Default and prepare this Motion for Sanctions. (Id.) Plaintiff, on the

other hand, essentially contends that there was not a clear Court order and that there is not a

sufficient showing of bad faith. (Plf.’s Opp. at 4-6.) While the Court agrees with Defendants that

Plaintiff multiplied the proceedings in this case unnecessarily, the Court also finds that sanctions are

not appropriate. 

At the outset, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the Court’s December 14,

2007 orders were unclear. On the record, the Court related the 2006 and 2007 cases and suggested

that the parties confer and stipulate to extending the deadline for the responsive pleading in the 2007

case. (See Transcript at 65:3, 66:3-15.) After conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff refused to stipulate

to an extension of time. The Court then ordered that no responsive pleading would be due until such

time as the Court set a date at the upcoming status conference. Plaintiff clearly understood the

Court’s order, as three days after the order was issued Plaintiff wrote, in a letter to the Court, that

“Your Honor unilaterally granted [Defendant’s] request for extension in filing an answer in the C07-

5850-SI case and told him that no default will be taken.” (See Plaintiff’s December 17, 2007 Letter

to the Court, Docket No. 129 at1-2.) Thus, the Court’s orders were clear and Plaintiff’s Motion was

untimely and unnecessary. 

The Court does not, however, find that Plaintiff unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the

proceedings or proceeded in bad faith. Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, claims that he moved for default

out of an abundance of caution to avoid inadvertently waiving any rights he may have otherwise

had. Because the Court related the cases on the record and did not contemporaneously file a written

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order, the precise impact of the Court’s orders may have created some ambiguity for this pro se

Plaintiff. Thus, the Court finds that while Plaintiff was aggressive in prosecuting his case, the record

does not support a finding that he acted recklessly or with bad faith. While Plaintiff is cautioned

against multiplying proceedings without a sufficient legal basis in the future, the Court finds that

sanctions against this pro se Plaintiff are not appropriate at this juncture. The Court therefore

DENIES Defendant Sun’s Motion for Sanctions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Default and DENIES

Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2008 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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