Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORA LAVERY-PETRASH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

JAMES (JIM) HEARD, DAVID

WITTHAUS, ARTHUR DEWSEN, and

ANNALISE O’CONNOR, 

 Defendants.

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2:11-cv-01520-GEB-DAD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants David Witthaus (“Witthaus”), Arthur Dewsen

(“Dewsen”), Annalise O’Connor (“O’Connor”), and James Heard (“Heard”)

(collectively referred to as “individual Defendants”), and Dignity

Health (“Dignity Health”) (collectively all defendants are referred to

as “Defendants”) each move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in her Third

Amended Complaint (“TAC”). (Mem. of Points & Auth. in Supp. of Defs.’

Mot to Dismiss TAC (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 55.) Defendants argue since

Plaintiff’s TAC does not “correct the pleading problems” existing in the

Second Amended Complaint, dismissal should be without leave to amend.

Plaintiff failed to file an opposition brief or a statement of nonopposition, as required by Local Rule 230(c). 

Dignity Health argues it was formerly known as Catholic 1

Healthcare West, and has been erroneously sued in this action as Sierra

Nevada Memorial Hospital.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

Decision on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion

requires determination of “whether the complaint’s factual allegations,

together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for

relief.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047,

1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007)).

When determining the sufficiency of a claim under Rule

12(b)(6), “‘[w]e accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and

construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party.’” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th

Cir. 2008)). However, this tenet does not apply to “‘legal conclusions

. . . cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Id. (quoting W. Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.3d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Therefore,

conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.

2004)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges in her TAC that during her employment at

Dignity Health she experienced harassment and retaliation in violation

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of her rights under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).

(TAC, ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff also alleges a negligence claim against

Defendants, arguing they negligently failed to prevent harassment and

retaliation she experienced. (Id. ¶¶ 29–31. )

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A. First Claim: Employment Discrimination (which Plaintiff labels

“Harassment Claims for Hostile Work Environment”)

Plaintiff’s first claim is labeled “Harassment Claims for

Hostile Work Environment”. (TAC 2:8.) Defendants argue this claim is

insufficient under FEHA or Title VII since Plaintiff “fail[s] to plead

facts to establish she was subjected to harassment based on a particular

characteristic, such as age or sex [;and], merely pleads the conclusion

that she was harassed.” (Defs.’ Mot. 5:27-6:1.) This claim is

insufficient to support a hostile work environment harassment claim

because it does not contain a harassment allegation. 

The claim’s label, however, is not dispositive of “whether

plaintiff[ has] pled a cognizable claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6),” since

“[t]he court . . . analyzes ‘the underlying conduct which forms the

basis of plaintiff[’s] . . . claim[] and not the label of the claim[

itself] to determine’ whether plaintiff[ has] stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Newhouse v. Aurora Bank FSB, --- F. Supp. 2d 

---, No. CIV S-12-00223 KJM-KJN, 2013 WL 85414, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

(quoting Clancy v. Bay Area Bank, 1997 WL 182291, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

7, 1997) (citing Scott v. Gulf Oil, 754 F.2d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985),

Since the TAC contains two paragraphs numbered 10, two paragraphs 2

numbered 11, two paragraphs numbered 12, and two paragraphs numbered 13,

the remaining paragraphs in the TAC after these errors are misnumbered.

For clarity, this order refers to the true number of each paragraph

rather than the incorrect numbers used in the TAC.

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abrograted on other grounds by Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne,

482 U.S. 1 (1987)); see also Int’l Star Registry of Ill. v. ABC Radio

Network, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 982, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing NAACP

v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“[F]or

Rule 12(b)(6) purposes it does not matter whether [Plaintiff] places any

label–or even the wrong label–on the claim.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges

that Dignity Health “discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of sex

and age . . . by engaging in a course of conduct,” and that she “filed

a timely charge of sex and age discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission [(“EEOC”)].” (TAC ¶¶ 7, 20.) Since “the [evident]

factual predicate for [P]laintiff[’s first] claim is that [D]efendants[’

acts constituted employment discrimination, t]he court therefore must

analyze [P]laintiff[’s claim] as though it were a claim for [employment

discrimination].” Newhouse, 2013 WL 85414, at *7. 

Plaintiff’s first claim contains a sex-based employment

discrimination allegation. “Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer

to ‘discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual’s [sex] . . . .’” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit

Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1)).

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning employment discrimination

are the following: 

7. [Dignity Health] discriminated against Plaintiff

on the basis of sex and age . . . by engaging in a

course of conduct . . . includ[ing] treating

Plaintiff differently from . . . male employees and

younger female employees; . . . and affirmatively

den[ying Plaintiff], via it[s] employee, David

Whitthaus [sic], the opportunity to interview for

the new position of Laboratory Supervisor, for

which Plaintiff applied and believed to be

qualified for.

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8. . . . Plaintiff observed that Defendant, Arthur

Dewson [sic], harassed her (age 58[)] . . . .

9. . . . Defendant, Arthur Dewson [sic], dictated

restrictions as to the duties allowed to certain

lab technicians, in particular, said Plaintiff

herein; i.e, he would not allow her to plate the

urines and/or conduct cultures - procedures that he

prescribe [sic] exclusively to male lab technicians

such as Mike Olsen.

. . . 

[18]. . . . Plaintiff received her latest

performance evaluation from Ms. Hogland[, which]

was very positive, consistent with the performance

evaluations conducted prior to the discrimination

of Defendant, David Whithaus [sic], on behalf of

his employer, Defendant, Dignity Health . . . .

(TAC ¶¶ 7–9, 18.) These allegations are sufficient to allege sex-based

Title VII and FEHA employment discrimination claims but are insufficient

to allege age-based discrimination. Therefore, Plaintiff’s age-based

discrimination claim is dismissed; however, Plaintiff’s sex-based

discrimination claim survives Defendants’ dismissal motion.

B. Second Claim: Hostile Work Environment Harassment Claims 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment harassment claims, alleged under FEHA and Title VII, arguing 

that Plaintiff “fail[s] to plead facts to establish she was subjected to

harassment based on a particular characteristic, such as age or sex[;

and] merely pleads the conclusion that she was harassed.” (Defs.’ Mot.

5:27-6:1.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “contentions do not

constitute a sufficient factual basis to support a sexual or age based

harassment claim as the allegations do not demonstrate either a sexual

or age related bias.” (Id. 6:28–7:2.)

“California courts have adopted the same standard [that

federal courts use under Title VII] for hostile work environment sexual

harassment claims under the FEHA.” Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television

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Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 279 (2006) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (1989)). “[A]n employee

claiming harassment based upon a hostile work environment [under FEHA or

Title VII] must demonstrate that . . . she was subjected to . . .

conduct[] or comments that were (1) unwelcome; (2) because of sex

[and/or age]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] to alter

the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Id. at 278-79 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(citations omitted). “[A] workplace may give rise to liability when it

‘is permeated with discriminatory [sex- and/or age-based] intimidation,

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Id. at 279 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). “[W]hether an

environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking

at all the circumstances[, which] may include the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris,

510 U.S. at 23.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in her hostile work

environment harassment claim: 

10. Defendant, Arthur Dewson [sic], would hover

over the Plaintiff while she was working on a

machine in the hematology area. This area is

extremely small and holds three (3) large machines.

Said defendant, on many occasions . . . , would

come up behind the Plaintiff and press himself

against the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff turned

around with the machine’s controls in her hands,

her elbows would bump into Dewson’s [sic] stomach.

When queried by the Plaintiff as to why Dewson

[sic] was so close to her and pressing himself onto

her, his response was “I am watching you”.

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11. Further, in the lab, Defendant, Arthur Dewson

[sic], would sit in front of the centrifuge

(spinner) with his legs propped up on the counter.

Plaintiff, when bringing blood that was collected

by the phlebotomist into the back of the lab where

Dewson [sic] was, could not walk around him because

the upper portion of his body completely blocked

the spinner. The only way Plaintiff could put the

blood into the spinner was to lean over Dewson’s

[sic] legs. Plaintiff is 5’3” in height. Being so

short, her upper body (chest) would have to lean

into Dewson’s [sic] legs in order to reach the

spinner. Plaintiff repeatedly asked Dewson [sic] to

move, but he refused. His comment to Plaintiff was

that “you can reach it”. Plaintiff feared she could

not say anything more because Defendant, Arthur

Dewson [sic], was the lab’s supervisor on the night

shift, which was the shift she worked.

12. One night, when co-worker Constance Goodwin was

working the same shift as Plaintiff, Defendant

Arthur Dewson [sic] came to the front of the lab

and demanded that Plaintiff work in the back of the

lab. When Plaintiff asked Dewson [sic] why he was

so threatening and abusive towards her, his comment

was “because I can, and if you don’t like it you

can go get a fucking different job”. He also told

Plaintiff that night “I am going to decrease your

pay”. . . .

. . . 

[26]. . . . By the following acts or omissions to

act, said defendants intentionally caused damage to

[Plaintiff]:

a. Plaintiff being forced to continue to work

with co-worker, Defendant Arthur Dewson [sic],

after her reporting of his constant and ongoing

harassment of her (yelling, screaming,

threatening), despite her request to work with

another technician (Mike Olson) in another area of

the laboratory when said defendant was working the

same shift as Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not allowed

to work in the back area of the laboratory where

Defendant, Arthur Dewson [sic], worked, if a male

laboratory technician was available to work during

the same shift. When Plaintiff was forced to work

with Defendant, Arthur Dewson [sic], approximately

90% of her 40 hour work week, after her request to

work with another technician (see above), he would

physically hover over her, refuse to assist her if

he believed she need assistance, and then commence

to scream, yell and threaten her. 

. . .

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[28]. During the time in question, Plaintiff

repeatedly reported to Defendant, Human Resource

Manager Annalise O’Connor, about the ongoing abuse

she was subjected to by certain male supervisors

(Dewson [sic], Witthaus). Neither Dewson [sic] or

Witthaus suffered any negative consequences as a

result, and the harassment and abuse continued.

(TAC ¶¶ 10-12, 26, 28.) These conclusory allegations fail to

“demonstrate that . . . [Plaintiff] was subjected to . . . conduct[] or

comments that were . . . because of [her] sex [and/or her age].” Lyle,

38 Cal. 4th at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998)). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment harassment claim is dismissed.

C. Second Claim: Retaliation

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim, arguing that Plaintiff has “failed to allege . . . facts”

“‘sufficient to establish [causation,] the third element of [a] prima

facie [retaliation] case[, which] may be inferred from circumstantial

evidence.’” (Defs.’ Mot. 9:23–24, 9:20–21 (quoting Order 5:9-10).)

Defendants further argue that “Plaintiff has . . . failed to allege any

facts that she engaged in protected conduct under either Title VII or

the FEHA, [and therefore] she cannot establish a prima facie case of

retaliation.” (Defs.’ Mot. 10:12–13.)

“[T]he antidiscrimination objectives and public policy

purposes of [FEHA and Title VII] are the same, [and California courts]

rely on federal decisions to interpret analogous parts of the state

statute.” Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th 1607,

1614 n.3 (1995) (quoting Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 26

Cal. App. 4th 846, 851 (1994) (citing Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr., 6

Cal. App. 4th 639, 662 (1992); Mixon v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 192

Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1316 (1987)). “[T]o establish a prima facie claim of

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retaliation under FEHA [or Title VII], [P]laintiff[] must prove that

[(1) she] engaged in protected activity, [(2) her] employer subjected

[her] to adverse employment action, and [(3)] there was a causal link

between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” Lee v. Eden

Med. Cntr., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing

Iwekaogwu v. City of L.A., 75 Cal. App. 4th 803, 814 (1999)). “Causation

sufficient to establish the third element of the prima facie case may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge

that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and the proximity in

time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.

1987).

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based on the following

allegations: 

7. [Dignity Health] discriminated against Plaintiff

on the basis of sex and age . . . by . . .

retaliat[ing] for Plaintiff’s involvement as a

union steward; . . . retaliat[ing] for Plaintiff’s

repeated filing of grievances to said Defendant for

its discriminatory treatment of her . . . . 

. . . 

[26]. . . . By the following acts or omissions to

act, said defendants intentionally caused damage to

[Plaintiff]:

. . . 

c. Defendant, David Whitthaus [sic], providing

a list to Plaintiff in mid-September, 2010,

containing the names of several of her co-workers

and their alleged comments about her - none of

which were substantiated or verified by him - and

were later refuted by said coworkers upon their

subsequent initial knowledge of said list and the

alleged comments contained therein;

d. Plaintiff being notified by Defendant,

David Whitthaus [sic], in mid-September, 2010,

immediately after receipt by said Defendant of the

challenge of those co-workers to the abovereferenced list and negative comments, that she was

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subject to a 90 day performance re-evaluation of

her last performance evaluation which took place in

May, 2010. Said “re-evaluation” took place in

December, 2010, some 7 months afterward, and

resulted in another negative performance

evaluation[.]

. . . 

[28]. During the time in question, Plaintiff

repeatedly reported to Defendant, Human Resource

Manager Annalise O’Connor, about the ongoing abuse

she was subjected to by certain male supervisors

(Dewson [sic], Witthaus). Neither Dewson [sic] or

Witthaus suffered any negative consequences as a

result, and the harassment and abuse continued.

Plaintiff, with an exemplary work record, was

retaliated by receiving her first write-up in seven

years of employment. Further, that write-up

appeared in her next performance review, which was

also negative as a result. The reason given by

Defendant, David Witthaus, for the write-up was

that Plaintiff was spreading “malicious gossip”.

That “malicious gossip” was her reports of the

harassment and abuse. Clearly, a reasonable

inference can be made that Plaintiff’s report about

Dewson’s [sic] conduct was causally related to the

negative performance review and write-up that

Plaintiff received.

(TAC ¶¶ 7, 26, 28.) These allegations do not provide “sufficient . . . 

circumstantial evidence” to support drawing a reasonable inference that

Plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC discrimination charge, Plaintiff’s

coworkers’ challenge of Witthaus’s list of alleged comments made by

them, or Plaintiff’s report to O’Connor about Dewsen’s and Witthaus’s

conduct were causally related to Plaintiff’s negative performance

reviews or written warnings. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is dismissed.

D. Third Claim: Negligence

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence

claim, arguing that “Plaintiff has failed to properly plead a claim for

negligence against any of the named Defendants.” (Defs.’ Mot. 12:3–4.)

“In the employment context, a claim for negligence requires the

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existence of a legal duty of care by an employer to an employee, a

breach of that [duty], proximate causation of plaintiff’s damages, and

damages.” Scott v. Solano Cnty. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 459 F. Supp.

2d 959, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

Plaintiff’s negligence allegations are the following: “[A]ll

of the named defendants were negligently the legal cause of damages to

[Plaintiff] by reason of her employer’s discrimination and the

individual[] defendants’ harassment of her, inclusive of her employer”;

“Plaintiff has indeed herein alleged a harassment claim, and thus can

and does allege[] a claim for negligence, based on her employer’s

alleged failure to protect her from harassment”; and “[s]aid defendants

had a duty to act to protect Plaintiff from harassment and retaliation[

and] were negligent in not exercising due care to prevent the harassment

and retaliation.” (TAC ¶¶ 29–31.) These conclusory allegations are

insufficient to support a negligence claim. Therefore, this claim is

dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s age-based employment

discrimination claim and her second and third claims are dismissed.

Further, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days from the date on which

this order is filed to file a Fourth Amended Complaint in which she

addresses the deficiencies in any dismissed claim.

Dated: May 28, 2013

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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