Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01180/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL H. MIROYAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEBORAH RYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01180-JCS (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California state detainee proceeding pro se, has filed this federal civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he raises claims against a state judge in 

whose criminal court plaintiff appeared as a defendant, the state court‟s clerks, and the 

district attorney. After reviewing his allegations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the 

Court DISMISSES the complaint.1 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In its initial review of this pro se complaint, this Court must dismiss any claim that 

is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

 

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Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Docket No. 3.) The magistrate 

judge, then, has jurisdiction to issue this order, even though defendants have not been 

served or consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 

532 (5th Cir. 1995). 

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(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 

be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 

(9th Cir. 1994). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that (1) state court judge Deborah Ryan violated his constitutional 

rights by silencing him in court without justification; (2) the court clerks refused to file his 

petition for writ of prohibition against another state court judge; and (3) district attorney 

Jin-Lang Lee‟s prosecution against him was malicious and she lied to a grand jury in order 

to indict him in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

1. Claim 1

A state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts 

performed in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967); 

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (ruling on a motion and 

exercising control over a courtroom are normal judicial functions, e.g., judge who denied 

disability accommodation to litigant was absolutely immune). “A judge will not be 

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in 

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 

„clear absence of all jurisdiction.‟” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 

(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)); see also Mireles v. Waco, 

502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or 

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United States District Court

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malice); Sadorski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (mistake alone is not 

sufficient to deprive a judge of absolute immunity). 

The doctrine of judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief in § 1983 

actions. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). However, § 1983 itself provides that “in any action 

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‟s judicial 

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 

declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Claim 1 is DISMISSED. The actions described by plaintiff (controlling her 

courtroom by silencing plaintiff) were performed in Ryan‟s judicial capacity. She is 

therefore immune to any claims for money damages, despite plaintiff‟s allegations of 

malice and bad faith. 

Any claims for injunctive relief are also DISMISSED. Plaintiff has not alleged, nor 

is there anything in the complaint to support an inference, that a declaratory decree was 

violated, or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Under these circumstances, Ryan is 

immune from claims for injunctive relief. 

Also, if plaintiff seeks relief from Ryan‟s actions, the proper method is to appeal the 

judge‟s decisions to the state appellate court, or file a federal habeas action, rather than file 

a suit under § 1983.

2. Claim 2

Claim 2 is DISMISSED because the clerks are also immune from suit. The 

Supreme Court has recognized that some officials perform special functions which, 

because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune when Congress 

enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability. Buckley v. 

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1993). This immunity extends to individuals 

performing functions necessary to the judicial process. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 

895-96 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the common law, judges, prosecutors, trial witnesses, and 

jurors were absolutely immune for such critical functions. Id. at 896. The Court has taken 

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a “functional approach” to the question of whether absolute immunity applies in a given 

situation, meaning that it looks to “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of 

the actor who performed it.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269 (1993) (quoting Forrester v. White, 

484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). Accordingly, state actors are granted absolute immunity from 

damages liability in suits under § 1983 for actions taken while performing a duty 

functionally comparable to one for which officials were immune at common law. Miller, 

335 F.3d at 897. Here, because the clerks‟ use of their discretion in declining to file his 

petition is necessarily a part of the judicial process, they are immune from suit for 

damages. 

3. Claim 3

A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts 

within his role as an “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated 

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-

31 (1976). This includes absolute immunity from liability for their conduct before grand 

juries. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991). 

Claim 3 is DISMISSED. Prosecuting plaintiff falls, without doubt, within the range 

of conduct for which a state prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. She is also 

immune from suit for her conduct before the grand jury. 

CONCLUSION

This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in 

favor of defendants, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2016

_________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

 Chief Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL H. MIROYAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEBORAH RYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01180-JCS 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 16, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Michael H. Miroyan ID: ATT211

Elmwood Correctional Facility

701 S. Abel Street

Milpitas, CA 95035 

Dated: May 16, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Karen Hom, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JOSEPH C. SPERO

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