Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KUO LIN, et al. 

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01484-GEB-DAD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff Scott Johnson seeks attorney’s fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 12205 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) for injuries he asserts 

he received when he encountered barriers at the T & R Taste of 

Texas eating establishment (“the restaurant”), owned by 

Defendants Kuo Lin and Chiu Lin (collectively, “Defendants”). The 

following issues were tried to the bench: Plaintiff’s disability 

access claims alleged under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 

(UCRA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq., and his request for 

injunctive relief sought under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1201. 

Plaintiff did not prevail on his ADA claims and 

therefore has not shown he is entitled to an award of attorney’s 

fees under the ADA. Plaintiff did prevail on two of his UCRA 

claims and is therefore entitled to an award of reasonable 

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attorney’s fees under Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a).

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks $21,335.00 in attorney’s fees. 

Defendants argue this amount “is excessive and unreasonable,”

contending that Plaintiff has not justified each attorney fee 

rate he seeks and certain hours billed. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s 

Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Opp’n”) 1:24-26, ECF No. 

50.) When determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee 

request:

The court . . . follow[s] a two-step process. 

First, the court determines the lodestar 

calculation—“the number of hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation multiplied by a 

reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Second, 

the court may adjust the lodestar figure 

“pursuant to a variety of factors.” Gonzalez 

v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). . . . There is a strong 

presumption, however, that the lodestar 

amount is reasonable. Fischer v. SJB–P.D. 

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n. 4 (9th Cir.

2000).

In determining the size of an appropriate fee 

award, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 

courts need not “achieve auditing perfection” 

or “become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox 

v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011). 

Rather, because the “essential goal of 

shifting fees ... is to do rough justice,” 

the court may “use estimates” or “take into 

account [its] overall sense of a suit” to 

determine a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.

Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc., No. CIV. 2:13-1610 WBS, 2014 WL 

6634324, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014).

A. Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff submits a “Billing Statement” itemizing the 

time spent by his attorneys—Mark Potter, Ray Ballister Jr., Phyl 

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Grace, Christina Sosa, Amanda Lockhart, and Isabel Masanque. 

(Pl.’s Ex. 2 (“Ex. 2”), ECF No. 49-3.)

Defendants argue: “Plaintiff’s billings . . . are . . . 

‘top heavy’” since more experienced attorneys performed work that 

could have been performed by less experienced associates.

1 (Opp’n 

at 1:28.) However, Defendants have not shown justification for 

the court “to impose its own judgment regarding the best way to 

operate [Plaintiff’s retained] law firm, []or to determine if 

different staffing decisions might have led to different fee 

requests.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Therefore, Defendants objection is overruled.

1. Billings by Potter

Defendants object to Potter’s billing of 3.3 hours on 

March 23, 2015 for the following tasks: “Reviewed the defense 

opposition to our MSJ; drafted the Reply Brief[.]” (Ex. 2 at

p. 2.) Defendants argue that “[t]he Motion for Summary Judgment 

was denied.” (Opp’n at 2:7-8.) Plaintiff replies in relevant 

part:

It seems that the defense is suggesting that 

[P]laintiff should not recover because the 

motion was unsuccessful. Aside from the fact 

that the defense would have benefited greatly 

if the motion had been granted and everyone 

spared the time and expense of trial, the 

argument lacks legal merit. Unless the motion 

was utterly frivolous, the plaintiff can 

expect that his attorney’s fees will be 

reimbursed for good faith work, including a 

motion for summary judgment that sought to 

end the case without the need for trial.

(Pl.’s Reply Br. (“Reply”) 3:16-24, ECF No. 51.)

 

1 In particular, Defendants object to senior attorney Mark Potter’s October 

31, 2014 billing entry on the grounds that “it could have been done by less 

senior attorneys.” (Opp’n at 2:5-6.)

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However, the referenced motion was not supported 

sufficiently to justify a fee award; therefore, this billing has

not been shown to be reasonable and is DENIED. See generally

Cabrales v. Cnty. of L.A., 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (“a plaintiff who 

is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary 

step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney’s fees even 

for the unsuccessful stage”)(emphasis added).

Defendants also object to Potter’s billing of 3.2 hours 

on September 4, 2015 for the following task: “Drafted the 

plaintiff’s post trial briefing as directed by court[.]” (Ex. 2

at p 2.) Plaintiff replies:

The defense never explains what a reasonable 

amount would have been. But the argument 

lacks merit. It took 3.2 hours. It dealt with

issues that the Court wanted further briefing 

over – issues that are somewhat nuanced – and 

the trial outcome hung in the balance. 

Spending 3.2 hours was both reasonable and 

fair.

(Reply at 4:15-19.)

Plaintiff is correct. Therefore, Defendant has not 

shown that this billing is unreasonable.

2. Billings by Ballister

Defendants object to Ballister’s billing of five (5)

hours on August 23, 2015 for the following tasks: “Prepped case 

for Trial, drafted outlines of direct, cross, argument; prepared 

pocket briefs for anticipated[] issues[.]” (Ex. 2 at p. 4.)

Defendants have not shown that this billing is 

unreasonable.

Defendants next object to Ballister’s seven (7) hours 

billed on August 25, 2015 for the following tasks: “Final [trial] 

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prep, travel[ed] to (and from) and conducted the Trial today; 

notes to file afterward for the briefing.” (Ex. 2 at p. 4.)

Plaintiff replies:

Mr. Ballister billed a total of seven hours 

for both travel and trial time. Given that 

trial, itself, was almost four hours (not 

including time before and after in the 

courthouse), the defense never bothers to 

explain why this is an unreasonable entry or 

justify the request to strike the billing 

entry in its entirety.

(Reply at 5:5-9.)

Defendants have not shown that this billing is 

unreasonable.

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate

“The number of hours reasonably expended on th[is]

litigation,” must be multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate in 

order to calculate the lodestar amount. “Determination of a 

reasonable hourly rate is not made by reference to rates actually 

charged the prevailing party[; i]n determining a reasonable 

hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate 

prevailing in the community for similar work performed by 

attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 

Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 

1986)(citation omitted), amended on denial of reh'g, 808 F.2d 

1373 (9th Cir. 1987). In general, “the relevant community is the 

forum in which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 

F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“The hourly rate for successful civil rights attorneys 

is to be calculated by considering certain factors, including the 

novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try 

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the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience 

held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.” Moreno v. City 

of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). “While 

disability access cases are a subset of civil rights practice, it 

would be naive to equate the level of skill required to litigate 

a routine disability access case with the level of skill required 

to successfully litigate a more complicated civil rights case 

raising novel or complicated constitutional issues.” Wayside 

Prop., Inc., 2014 WL 6634324 at *6. The burden is on the party 

seeking fees “to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the 

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 866, 895 n. 11 (1984).

Plaintiff seeks the following hourly rates for his 

counsel: $350 for Potter and Ballister, $250 for Grace, and $200 

for Lockhart, Sosa and Masanque. (Mot. at 3:3-4.)

Plaintiff submits a declaration from Mark Potter in 

support of these rates, in which he declares: he is the managing 

partner of the Center for Disability Access (CDA), the law firm 

retained by Plaintiff in this action; he has “devoted more than 

[ninety-five percent] of [his] practice to disability issues for 

more than [twenty-one] years,” (Potter Decl. ¶¶ 2,6, ECF No. 49-

2); and has litigated “over 2,000 disability cases.” (Id. at

¶ 6.) Potter also declares: Ballister is an associate at CDA who 

has “been in practice for [twenty-nine] years” and “has focused 

exclusively on disability access cases” for the past nine years

(id. at ¶ 7); and Grace is an associate at CDA with twenty years 

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of experience and has maintained an exclusive disability access 

practice for the past eight years (id. at ¶ 8). Potter also avers 

that Lockhart is an associate at CDA who graduated in 2011 (id.

at ¶ 9); Masanque is an associate at CDA who graduated in 2012

(id. at ¶ 10); and Sosa is an associate at CDA who graduated in 

2011 (id. at ¶ 11).

Plaintiff also submits in support of the requested

rates a declaration from attorney John D. O’Connor, asserted by 

Plaintiff to be his “attorney’s fee expert.” The O’Connor 

declaration concerns what O’Connor avers to be reasonable rates

in “Northern California.” O’Connor’s supports this averment by 

referencing rates awarded in the San Francisco Bay Area legal 

community. “[H]owever, the relevant market here is . . . not [the 

San Francisco Bay Area, since i]t is without question that the 

rates in the nearby San Francisco legal community exceed those in 

this legal community.” Wayside Property, Inc., 2014 WL 6634324 at

*6. Further, Plaintiff also relies on the portion of the O’Connor

declaration that utilizes what O’Connor characterizes as “the 

Laffey Matrix[, which] is maintained by the Department of Justice 

in Washington, D.C.[,] to determine the reasonable hourly rates 

for this case[; however, t]he suggested Laffey Matrix rate 

contemplates practice in the Washington, D.C. legal community and 

has been rejected as an adequate tool to assess market rates in 

this [legal community].” Id. at *7 (citing Fitzgerald v. Law 

Office of Curtis O. Barnes, No. 1:12-CV-00071-LJO-GAS, 2013 WL 

1627740 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013), findings and 

recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1896273 (E.D. Cal May 6, 2013)).

Lastly, O’Connor avers that he is “well aware of the 

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rates charged by labor specialty firms such as the firm of 

Jackson Lewis, a nationwide labor and employment litigation firm, 

and Littler Mendelson, another employment and labor litigation 

firm. . . . [as well as] the rates of Downy Brand, . . . [and 

t]he rate charged by the partners [in this case] is below these 

rates.” (O’Connor Decl. at ¶ 34.) “O’Connor does not suggest, 

however, that the ‘labor specialty firms’ or Downy Brand handle 

routine disability access cases or, even assuming they do, 

identify the rates charged to individual plaintiffs in those 

cases.” Wayside Prop., Inc., 2014 WL 6634324 at *7. Plaintiff has

“not cited a single a case from [this legal community] or 

provided an affidavit [from an attorney in this legal 

community] . . . that supports the rates [he] seek[s].” Id. at 

*8.

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to present

sufficient evidence supporting the rates he seeks, “[d]istrict 

judges can . . . consider the fees awarded by other judges in the 

same locality in similar cases.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115. The 

decision in Wayside Property, Inc., 2014 WL 6634324 at *8, an 

Eastern District disability access case where Plaintiff sought 

attorney’s fees billed by CDA attorneys, supports application of 

the following hourly rates: $300 for Potter, $260 for Ballister, 

$175 for Grace, and $150 for Lockhart, Sosa, and Masanque. See 

also Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, Civ. No. 2:13-1544 WBS 

EFB, 2014 WL 1334006, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal April 3, 2014) (holding 

that a $300 hourly rate for Potter and Ballister and a $175 

hourly rate for Grace were reasonable rates in litigating a 

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disability access case in this legal community).2

Accordingly, the lodestar in this case is $16,193.50, 

calculated as follows:

Potter 30.2 x $300 = $9,060.00

Ballister 15.1 x $260 = $3,926.00

Grace 2.9 x $175 = $507.50

Lockhart 1.7 x $150 = $255.00

Sosa 13.8 x $150 = $2,070.00

Masanque 2.5 x $150 = $375.00

= $16,193.50

C. Costs

Plaintiff also seeks $5,827.90 in costs for 

investigation, filing fee, service costs, trial transcripts, and 

expert witness. (Ex. 2 at p. 1.) These costs are awarded to 

Plaintiff.

II. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons Plaintiff is awarded $16,193.50

in attorneys’ fees and $5,827.90 in costs. 

Dated: March 30, 2016

 

2 In Wayside Property Inc., the court determined that it was previously 

mistaken in Allied Trailer Supply, 2014 WL 1334006, in believing that 

Ballister was a partner at CDA and therefore, Ballister’s reasonable rate was 

reduced from $300 to $260. Wayside Prop., 2014 WL 6634324 at *8.

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