Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00348/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00348-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAREY JAY CRAVEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-0348-GEB-KJN

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”).

1

 In his motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not 

disabled from February 28, 2011, the date plaintiff’s application was filed, through the date of the 

final administrative decision. (ECF No. 19.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff’s 

motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF 

No. 21.)

////

////

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15).

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

For the reasons that follow, the court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, 

grants the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and enters judgment for the 

Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on December 12, 1964, obtained his GED, but admits that someone else 

took the test to obtain the credential for him, and previously worked as a security guard.

2

 

(Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 39, 42, 80.) On March 14, 2011, plaintiff applied for SSI, 

alleging that he was unable to work as of January 1, 2005. (AT 13, 177-187.) On July 18, 2011, 

the Commissioner determined that plaintiff was not disabled. (AT 13, 123-28.) Upon plaintiff’s 

request for reconsideration, the determination was affirmed on October 25, 2011. (AT 13, 133-

38.) Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which 

took place on August 2, 2012, and at which plaintiff (represented by counsel) and a vocational 

expert testified. (AT 13, 32-90.) 

In a decision dated October 26, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under 

a disability, as defined in the Act, from February 28, 2011, the date plaintiff filed his application, 

through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 13-24.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on 

January 14, 2014. (AT 1-6.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action in federal district court on 

February 4, 2014, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) failed to fully and fairly develop the record by not requesting further opinion 

evidence; (2) improperly assessed the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) improperly 

relied on the erroneous testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”).

////

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s 

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s standard 

five-step analytical framework.3 At Step One, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged 

 

3 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

in substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2011, the date plaintiff filed his application. (AT 

15.) At Step Two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

“diabetes with diabetic peripheral neuropathy, hepatitis C viral infection, gastroesophageal reflux 

disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, 

antisocial personality disorder, and substance abuse.” (Id. (citations omitted).) However, at Step 

Three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meet or medically equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (Id.) In particular, the ALJ considered plaintiff’s impairments under the criteria of 

listings 3.02, 3.03, 6.02, and 11.14 and determined that he did not meet any of these listings. (AT 

15-17.)

Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) for the relevant time period as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the 

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 

416.967(b) except he is limited to simple repetitive tasks in a nonpublic setting; he 

is restricted to occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; and he must 

avoid concentrated exposure to workplace hazards, such as work at heights.

(AT 17.) 

At Step Four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(AT 22.) Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ, based on the VE’s testimony, determined that

considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed, specifically,

 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

mail clerk, hand packager, and janitor. (AT 24, 84-86.)

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined in 

the Act from February 28, 2011, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 24.)

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

1. Whether the ALJ Failed to Fully and Fairly Develop the Record

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by violating her duty to fully 

and fairly develop the record. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ breached this duty 

because she did not order that plaintiff undergo a consultative examination, try to obtain opinion 

evidence from plaintiff’s treating physicians, or seek additional evidence beyond that already 

contained in the record.

“The ALJ always has a ‘special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure 

that the claimant’s interests are considered ... even when the claimant is represented by counsel.’” 

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 

443 (9th Cir. 1983)). “When the claimant is unrepresented, . . . the ALJ must be especially 

diligent in exploring for all the relevant facts.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

It is well established that a claimant bears the burden of providing medical and other 

evidence that support the existence of a medically determinable impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998) (“At all times, the 

burden is on the claimant to establish her entitlement to disability insurance benefits.”). Indeed, it 

is “not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better position to provide information 

about his own medical condition, to do so.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. 

Nevertheless, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also explained:

The ALJ in a social security case has an independent duty to fully 

and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s 

interests are considered. This duty extends to the represented as 

well as to the unrepresented claimant. When the claimant is 

unrepresented, however, the ALJ must be especially diligent in 

exploring for all the relevant facts ... The ALJ’s duty to develop the 

record fully is also heightened where the claimant may be mentally 

ill and thus unable to protect her own interests. Ambiguous 

evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty 

to conduct an appropriate inquiry.

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). In short, “[a]n ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is 

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 

evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tonapetyan, 242 

F.3d at 1150).

“The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s 

physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping 

the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id. However, as some 

courts have persuasively observed, the ALJ “does not have to exhaust every possible line of 

inquiry in an attempt to pursue every potential line of questioning. The standard is one of 

reasonable good judgment.” Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation 

omitted)

In support of his argument, plaintiff cites to 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e), which provides that 

an ALJ may arrange for an additional examination of a claimant at the expense of the Social 

Security Administration when “the information [the ALJ] need[s] is not readily available from the 

record of [the claimant’s] medical treatment source” or the ALJ is “unable to seek clarification 

from [the claimant’s] medical source.” Plaintiff asserts that this regulation mandated the ALJ to 

obtain a state agency consultative examination of plaintiff’s physical impairments because 

plaintiff was unable to obtain an RFC opinion from his treating physicians. However, contrary to 

plaintiff’s interpretation, this regulation states that under such circumstances an ALJ “may order a 

consultative examination while awaiting receipt of medical source evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.912(e) (emphasis added). Given the permissive language of this regulation, it is clear that it 

allowed the ALJ to obtain a consultative examination for plaintiff, but it did not create a duty to 

do so as plaintiff appears to suggest. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that the regulations 

required the ALJ to obtain a physical consultative examination of plaintiff lacks merit.

////

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiff next argues that he “was unable to obtain a physical RFC questionnaire or 

medical source statement from any of his Kaiser treating physicians concerning the physical 

impairments caused by his diabetic peripheral neuropathy,” therefore leaving the record 

insufficient for the ALJ to determine plaintiff’s physical RFC. (ECF No. 19 at 24.) However, it 

was plaintiff who carried the burden of providing medical and other evidence that supported the 

existence of his claimed impairments and the impact that they had on his ability to work. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 (1987); Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601. In this instance, the ALJ’s duty to 

develop the record would have been triggered only had the ALJ determined that the record was

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. Here, 

there was no reasonable indication that the medical record was insufficient so as to prevent the 

ALJ from making her determination based on substantial evidence. Indeed, plaintiff’s counsel 

himself told the ALJ at the administrative hearing that the record before the ALJ was complete. 

(AT 35.)

The record contained sufficient medical evidence and treatment notes upon which the ALJ 

based her well-reasoned RFC determination. While the record does not contain opinion evidence 

from plaintiff’s treating physicians, and does not contain any examining physician opinions with 

respect to plaintiff’s physical limitations, it is replete with objective medical evidence from which 

the ALJ reasonably made an RFC determination based on substantial evidence. The record 

contains numerous medical reports related to plaintiff’s diabetic neuropathy, chronic obstructive 

pulmonary disease (“COPD”), gastroesophageal disease, and other physical impairments. (See, 

e.g., AT 478, 938, 940-41, 1384, 1389-90, 1557, 1559, 1562-63.) The ALJ clearly considered 

this evidence when determining plaintiff’s RFC. (AT 20-21.)

Furthermore, the record before the ALJ contained just more than raw medical data 

regarding plaintiff’s physical impairments, it also contained medical opinions issued by Dr. 

Amon and Dr. Williams, two state agency non-examining physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s 

medical records and opined about plaintiff’s physical functional limitations on a function-byfunction basis. (AT 91-104, 106-121.) The ALJ stated in her decision that she gave these 

opinions “significant weight” in determining plaintiff’s physical RFC. (AT 21.) Plaintiff appears 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

to argue that the ALJ improperly relied solely on the opinions of the state agency non-examining 

physicians to determine plaintiff’s physical RFC because the ALJ was not at liberty to rely solely 

on this evidence to support her determination. While plaintiff is correct that the opinion of a nonexamining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating 

or examining professional, Lester, 81 F.3d at 831, the ALJ in this case did not rely on the nonexamining opinions for this purpose because there were no treating or examining opinions to 

reject. The ALJ’s RFC determination merely had to be supported by substantial evidence from 

the record; nothing restrained her from relying on the opinions of plaintiff’s non-examining 

physicians as evidence in support of this determination. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097.

Furthermore, the ALJ noted that “[n]o single assessment ha[d] been completely adopted as the 

[RFC] determined [in her decision].” (AT 21.) The ALJ also stated that she had “adopted those 

specific restrictions on a function-by-function basis that are best supported by the objective 

evidence as a whole.” (Id.) Indeed, while the ALJ gave “significant weight” to these opinions, 

she also relied upon plaintiff’s numerous treatment records, which substantially supported the 

ALJ’s RFC determination that plaintiff’s physical impairments were not so severe as to preclude 

him from completing light work with some additional restrictions. 

In short, plaintiff fails to show that the evidence in the record was ambiguous or was

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of plaintiff’s impairments. Therefore, the ALJ was not 

obligated to further develop the record by seeking the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians 

and having plaintiff examined by state agency physicians.

2. Whether the ALJ Erred in Assessing the Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the degree of his pain and limitations was not credible to the extent that it was 

inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination.

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

Here, in determining that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible to the extent it was 

inconsistent with the RFC assessment, the ALJ reasoned as follows:

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the 

claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent 

those statements are inconsistent with the residual functional 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

capacity assessment herein.

Additionally, I find the claimant’s testimony is inconsistent with the 

objective medical evidence and further undermines the claimant’s 

credibility. The claimant alleged he was disabled because of 

COPD. Substantial evidence, however, does not support the 

claimant’s allegation that the severity of this impairment caused the 

claimant to be disabled. Indeed, a chest x-ray performed on April 

23, 2010, showed no acute cardiopulmonary abnormalities. In 

addition, on December 7, 2012, the claimant had normal breathing 

sounds and chest expansion, and had no shortness of breath. 

Moreover, on January 26, 2011, the claimant had a normal chest 

examination that showed no evidence of acute cardiopulmonary 

disease. While not the sole basis for discounting the claimant’s 

subjective testimony, the inconsistency of the claimant’s testimony 

and the objective medical evidence is a legitimate factor in 

assessing an adverse credibility finding.

The claimant’s testimony that he has not worked since 2007 is 

inconsistent with the evidence of record. The medical records from 

Kaiser Permanente indicate that he helped his aunt build a floor and 

worked in a scrap metal industry. This discrepancy diminishes the 

persuasiveness of the claimant’s subjective complaints and alleged 

functional limitations.

Additionally, I discredit the claimant’s subjective complaints 

because there is substantial evidence that the claimant attempted to 

exaggerate the severity of his symptoms. The psychological 

consultative examiner suggested that the claimant did not give his 

best effort and may have “deliberately performed poorly.” This 

evidence suggests the claimant exaggerated the severity of his 

symptoms for secondary gain. Accordingly, I diminish the 

claimant’s overall credibility.

Moreover, I diminish the claimant’s credibility because substantial 

evidence in the record shows that the claimant failed to comply 

with prescribed treatment. Indeed, the claimant never attended 

hepatitis C classes and did not show up for an ultrasound. Further, 

the records indicate that the claimant’s diabetes symptoms arose 

from noncompliance with insulin. This demonstrates a possible 

unwillingness to do what is necessary to improve his condition. It 

may also be an indication that his symptoms were not as severe as 

he purported. Although it is not the primary basis for the decision 

in this case, the claimant’s failure to follow prescribed treatment 

without a good reason is a basis for finding the claimant is not 

disabled.

I find that the claimant’s inconsistent statements relating to his 

history of drug and [alcohol] abuse adversely affect his credibility. 

Specifically, the claimant testified that he did not use alcohol. Yet, 

medical records indicate that on May 16, 2012, the claimant used 

alcohol. Further, the claimant reported that he was not using drugs, 

yet urine toxicology screens were positive for barbiturates and 

“benzos.” These multiple inconsistencies and lack of candor about 

alcohol and substance abuse diminish the claimant’s credibility.

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Considering all of these individual credibility factors together and 

in view of the meager objective evidence during the relevant period, 

the claimant’s credibility and allegations of inability to perform any 

substantial gainful activity during the relevant period are 

considerably inconsistent. The credibility of the claimant’s 

allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms and limitations 

is diminished because those allegations are greater than expected in 

light of the objective evidence of record.

(AT 18-19 (citations to the record omitted).) As discussed below, this assessment provided 

multiple specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony.

First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of his 

impairments, particularly the impact of his COPD, was not consistent with the objective medical 

evidence in the record. In support of this determination, the ALJ cited to several of plaintiff’s 

treating records spanning from April of 2010 to February of 20124that suggest that plaintiff did 

not suffer from symptoms associated with COPD or from acute cardiopulmonary disease. (See

AT 19, 938, 1518, 1559.) While plaintiff is correct in noting that an ALJ may not rely solely on 

the lack of objective medical findings concerning a claimed impairment to discredit the claimant, 

see Thomas, 278 F.3d at 960, the ALJ in this case used the medical evidence in the record that 

conflicted with plaintiff’s allegations concerning the severity of her symptoms to corroborate his 

determination that plaintiff’s testimony was exaggerated, rather than relying on it as the sole basis 

for his credibility finding. Indeed, the ALJ expressly stated in her decision that this conflict was 

“not the sole basis for discounting [plaintiff’s] subjective testimony.” (AT 19.) As discussed 

below, the ALJ provided other clear and convincing reasons for finding plaintiff not credible. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s discussion of inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and the findings 

expressed in his treating records was not in error. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of 

medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the 

ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”).

Second, the ALJ determined that the conflict between plaintiff’s testimony that the last 

time he worked was in 2007 and evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff had engaged in 

 

4

The ALJ erroneously states in her decision that the February 7, 2012 medical record she cited to 

in support of this determination was issued on December 7, 2012. (AT 19, 1518.)

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

work after his alleged onset date further undermined his testimony. Indeed, while plaintiff 

testified at the administrative hearing that he had not worked anywhere since 2007 (AT 43), 

Kaiser Permanente treating records from February of 2012 state that plaintiff had been working as 

recently as early 2012 (AT 1557 (“[Plaintiff] supposedly went to Oregon 2 weeks after [a January 

18, 2012 colonoscopy] and helped his aunt with building a floor but then came back to be with his 

wife. He even has a job now working in scrap metal.”)). The ALJ may consider such

inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his conduct and work record when 

weighing the claimant’s credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. Here, there existed substantial 

evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff was less than truthful about his work history. (See

AT 1557.) The ALJ properly relied on this evidence to determine that plaintiff’s testimony was 

less than credible. 

Third, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was less than credible based on evidence in the 

record that plaintiff exhibited behaviors suggestive of decreased motivation and effort. This 

constituted another proper reason for discounting plaintiff’s testimony. See Mohammad v. 

Colvin, 595 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence of malingering is also sufficient to 

support a negative credibility finding.”). As highlighted by the ALJ, Dr. Eargle, a consulting 

psychologist, noted that “there are concerns that [plaintiff] did not give his best effort and might 

have deliberately performed poorly” on psychological tests she administered. (AT 845.) The 

ALJ reasonably drew from this evidence of decreased effort to support her determination that 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of his limitations and pain was less than credible.

Fourth, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s credibility was diminished by the fact that he 

failed to fully comply with the treatments his treating physicians prescribed. Specifically, the 

ALJ cited to plaintiff’s treating records that demonstrated that plaintiff failed to attend hepatitis C 

classes, a scheduled ultrasound, and did not use insulin with the frequency his treating physicians 

prescribed. (AT 19, 942, 1605.) To be sure, the record contains a number of other treating 

records indicating plaintiff’s non-compliance with his prescribed treatments beyond those the 

ALJ cited to in support of this reasoning. (See, e.g., AT 935, 1140, 1465, 1604, 1624.) The ALJ 

was permitted to consider any “unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

to follow a prescribed course of treatment” on plaintiff’s part when weighing his credibility. 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. Plaintiff admits that he did not always use his insulin medication 

as prescribed because he “forgets to take [h]is afternoon dose of insulin 99 percent of the time,” 

but argues that he also did not take the medication because his “shame and self-loathing cause 

him to, in effect, have a death wish.” (ECF No. 19 at 41-42.) Such an explanation, however, is 

insufficient to invalidate the ALJ’s reasoning. Furthermore, the ALJ noted in her decision that 

this reason was “not the primary basis for” her adverse credibility determination. (AT 19.) Given 

the number of other valid and well-supported reasons the ALJ gave in support of her adverse 

credibility determination, it cannot be said that she erred by considering plaintiff’s failure to 

follow his prescribed treatment in arriving at her well-reasoned credibility conclusion.

Finally, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s testimony was not entirely credible because he 

made inconsistent statements relating to his history of drug and alcohol use. In particular, the 

ALJ cited a conflict between plaintiff’s testimony during the administrative hearing that he had 

not used alcohol and drugs recently and his treating records indicating that he had used such 

substances more recently. Specifically, plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that he 

stopped using alcohol about 7 to 8 months prior to the August 2, 2012 hearing date, and had used 

methamphetamine about 3 months prior to that date, but had not used other illicit drugs for at 

least a couple of years. (AT 60-61.) The ALJ determined that this contradicted treating notes 

from May 16, 2012, indicating that plaintiff was using alcohol “occasionally” and a urine test 

taken on February 21, 2012, showing that plaintiff was “positive for . . . barbituates, benzos, and 

all kinds of benzos this time, although he had only gotten Norcos” from his treating physician. 

(AT 1557, 1598.) This constituted substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s negative credibility 

determination because it permitted the ALJ to infer that plaintiff’s “lack of candor [regarding his 

drug and alcohol use] carrie[d] over to h[is] description of physical pain.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

959. Accordingly, this constituted yet another valid reason in support of the ALJ’s decision to 

find plaintiff not credible.

In sum, the ALJ gave multiple specific, clear and convincing reasons for why she found 

plaintiff’s testimony not credible that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Therefore, plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in making this determination is without merit.

3. Whether the ALJ Properly Relied on the VE’s Testimony at Step Five

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step five by relying on VE testimony that 

lacked evidentiary value because it was based on improper hypotheticals and information.

An ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a vocational expert, based on 

alternate interpretations of the evidence. However, the hypothetical that ultimately serves as the 

basis for the ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical that is predicated on the ALJ’s final RFC 

determination, must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the 

claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding 

that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). However, the ALJ “is free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that 

are not supported by substantial evidence.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 

2006). Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, an ALJ may synthesize 

and translate assessed limitations into an RFC assessment (and subsequently into a hypothetical to 

the vocational expert) without repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the RFC 

assessment or hypothetical. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(holding that an ALJ’s RFC assessment that a claimant could perform simple tasks adequately 

captured restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace, because the assessment was 

consistent with the medical evidence). 

Plaintiff asserts that because the ALJ failed to properly develop the record and find 

plaintiff’s testimony credible, the hypotheticals she posed to the VE based on her RFC 

determination were improper because the RFC failed to reflect all of plaintiff’s limitations. This 

argument, however, lacks merit because, for the reasons stated above, the ALJ fulfilled her duty 

to develop the record and gave proper reasons for finding plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 

impact of his impairments not credible. Because the ALJ found plaintiff not credible, she was not 

required to include any of plaintiff’s alleged limitations beyond those already included in the RFC 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

determination. The ALJ posed hypotheticals to the VE that were based on the limitations 

outlined in the ALJ’s RFC determination, which was supported by substantial evidence from the 

record. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument is not well taken.

Second, plaintiff argues that the hypotheticals posed to the VE were ambiguous because 

the ALJ told the VE to assume that the hypothetical person had the same educational history as 

plaintiff instead of telling the VE that the hypothetical individual “did not finish high school.” 

(ECF No. 19 at 46.) Plaintiff claims this distinction was necessary because it was revealed 

through plaintiff’s testimony during the administrative hearing that plaintiff did not actually attain 

an education commensurate with receiving his GED because he had someone else take the test to 

obtain that credential for him. Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded to obtain further 

VE testimony because it is not certain that the jobs the VE testified plaintiff could perform were 

jobs that required a high school education or GED. This argument is frivolous. The transcript of 

the administrative hearing demonstrates that the VE was present during the entirety of the 

proceedings, including when plaintiff testified that he had not legitimately obtained his GED. 

(See AT 34.) Therefore, the VE was almost certainly aware of this admission when the ALJ 

posed the hypotheticals and directed the VE to take plaintiff’s education level into account when 

responding to those hypotheticals.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony because the 

VE gave erroneous job numbers when testifying that plaintiff had the RFC to perform the 

representative job of mail clerk. Plaintiff claims that the testimony regarding the number of 

available jobs for this occupation was incorrect because the VE used the numbers cited in the 

Standard Occupational Classification codes for “Mail Clerks and Mail Machine Operators, 

Except Postal Service,” which also includes jobs other than mail clerk that have different 

functional requirements. Plaintiff argues that this testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”), therefore requiring the ALJ to inquire into the conflict. Plaintiff 

admits that the ALJ admonished the VE to advise her of a conflict between the VE’s testimony 

and the DOT (AT 83), but argues that the VE failed to testify as to the conflict plaintiff 

highlights. Plaintiff argues that remand is necessary for further proceedings to resolve this 

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

conflict. However, even assuming, without determining, that this conflict amounted to error, it 

was harmless error. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e may not 

reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.”). The VE provided two other 

representative occupations that plaintiff is able to perform given his RFC, namely hand packager 

and janitor, that existed in significant numbers. (AT 85-86.) Because the ALJ properly relied on 

the VE’s testimony regarding these other two occupations to determine at step five that there were 

jobs plaintiff could perform given his RFC that existed in significant numbers, the ALJ properly 

established that plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Act. See Lester 81 F.3d at 828 n.5. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument is not well taken.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) be DENIED.

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) be 

GRANTED.

3. Judgement be entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case and vacate all dates. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Dated: July 31, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-00348-GEB-KJN Document 24 Filed 07/31/15 Page 16 of 16