Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00721/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00721-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 2/28/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHARLES NEERDAELS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

GROUP SHORT TERM DISABILITY AND

LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN FOR

EMPLOYEES OF AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES,

INC.,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 04-00721 JF

ORDER1 (1) DENYING AS MOOT

THE PLAN’S MOTION TO

RECONSIDER, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING

NEERDAELS’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Docket No. 60, 64, 72]

Plaintiff Charles Neerdaels (“Neerdaels”) moves for summary judgment to determine

that, at the relevant time, his disability made him eligible to receive long-term disability benefits

from Defendant Group Short Term Disability and Long Term Disability Plan for Employees of

Akamai Technologies, Inc. (“the Plan”). Defendant moves for summary judgment to determine

that Neerdaels is not eligible to receive long-term disability benefits. Both motions are opposed. 

The Court heard oral argument on February 17, 2006.

Case 5:04-cv-00721-JF Document 81 Filed 02/28/06 Page 1 of 12
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 Neerdaels explains that he returned to work because he could not accept labeling

himself as disabled. See, e.g., AR0292.

2

Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

In addition, the Plan filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 10, 2004

order, in which the Court held that it would review the Plan’s denial of Neerdaels’s claim for

long-term disability benefits de novo. The Plan argued that, in Abatie v. Alta Health & Life

Insurance Company, 421 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit overruled earlier case law

cited by the Court as establishing a conflict of interest. However, as the parties noted at oral

argument, the Ninth Circuit recently decided to rehear Abatie en banc. Abatie v. Alta Health &

Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 317032 (9th Cir. Feb 06, 2006). Accordingly, the Court will deny the

Plan’s motion for reconsideration as moot and review the Plan’s denial of Neerdaels’s claim de

novo. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Neerdaels’s claim that the Plan improperly denied him long-term

disability benefits to which he was entitled under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974 (“ERISA”). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

Neerdaels, who has multiple sclerosis (“MS”), was hired by Akamai Technologies, Inc.,

(“Akamai”) in September 1999 as its director of engineering. On December 19, 2001, he took a

leave of absence from work due to complications related to his MS. He received short-term

disability benefits from December 27, 2001 through March 5, 2002. On March 6, 2002, with

authorization from his doctor, Peter Cassini, Neerdaels returned to work.2 However, less than

two months later, on April 23, 2002, he tendered his resignation to Akamai, effective May 6,

2002.

In March 2003, Neerdaels submitted to the Plan an application for long-term disability

benefits. The Plan is administered and insured by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company

(“Hartford”). On March 31, 2003, Hartford denied Neerdaels’s claim, concluding that he no

longer was covered by the Plan, because he ceased to be an “Active Full-time Employee” when

Case 5:04-cv-00721-JF Document 81 Filed 02/28/06 Page 2 of 12
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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

he terminated his employment with Akamai on May 6, 2002. See AR0051-53. On September

23, 2003, Neerdaels appealed the denial of long-term disability benefits, claiming that Hartford

had made an error in its conclusion that he was not eligible. See AR0152-60. Hartford obtained

an independent record review of Neerdaels’s file from Dr. Brian Mercer, who concluded, among

other things, that “[f]rom 12/21/01 through 3/5/02 [Neerdaels] would not have been capable of

functioning at a full-time sedentary level since he had well-documented exacerbations with

sensory loss in the lower extremities,” but that “[t]he medical record provided do [sic] not

provide objective information that would support Mr. Neerdaels’ inability to function at a fulltime sedentary capacity from 5/4/02 through 8/27/02.” AR0082-83.

On December 9, 2003, Hartford informed Neerdaels of its determination that its original

decision to deny his claim for long-term disability benefits was appropriate and would stand. It

agreed that Neerdaels was disabled for the period of December 21, 2001, through March 5, 2002,

but found no medical evidence to support his claim that he was disabled at the time he resigned. 

Therefore, Hartford concluded that Neerdaels was not covered under the Plan at the time of his

resignation, as he no longer was in an eligible class of employees. This determination

represented Hartford’s final decision on Neerdaels’s claim. See AR0071-75. Neerdaels filed the

instant action on February 20, 2004.

As is discussed below, in order for Neerdaels to establish that he is eligible to receive

long-term disability benefits from the Plan, he must show that he was disabled during the period

from May 6, 2002, the effective date of his resignation, through the 90-day elimination period,

which ended on August 4, 2002. The following evidence is relevant to the determination of

whether Neerdaels can prove that he was disabled during this period.

On March 6, 2002, Dr. Cassini wrote a letter authorizing Neerdaels to return to work

following his leave of absence due to complications related to his MS, which began in December

2001. See AR0286. On March 25, 2002, Dr. Cassini made the following notes regarding

Neerdaels’s condition:

Mr. Neerdaels’ lower extremity numbness and paresthesias have almost

Case 5:04-cv-00721-JF Document 81 Filed 02/28/06 Page 3 of 12
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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

completely resolved. It is now confined to a saddle distribution and tips of his

toes. Strength has improved. He is experiencing some tremor on Wellbutrin-SR

150. He is now taking this pill once every 2-3 days. Amantadine is effective

early in the morning for fatigue. He continues to use Ambien on an as needed

basis each night. He returned to work March 6th. He continues to struggle with

some mild depression. He believes he has bounced back physically and his lower

extremity function is near normal. We discussed switching from Avonex to

Rebif. Because of severe side effects on Avonex despite actually being on a

higher dose of medication with Rebif Mr. Neerdaels will not be changing his

therapy.

AR0285. On April 23, 2002, Neerdaels tendered his resignation, effective May 6, 2002, and his

termination was characterized as a “voluntary” end of employment on an Akamai form. See

AR0332. An April 23, 2002 e-mail message from Paul Sagan stated that Neerdaels had told him

that he would “take a few weeks off [following his resignation] and then begin a search.” 

AR0333.

On June 17, 2002, over a month after Neerdaels resigned, Dr. Cassini made the following

notes regarding Neerdaels’s condition:

Mr. Neerdaels continues to meet a group up at UCSF. He is interested in the

multi-center study to determine the safety and efficacy of Natalizumab when

added to Avonex.

The patient’s symptoms have been stable. He recently rode his mountain bike up

the West side of the Santa Cruz Mountains near Aptos. He has done quite well

since using clips. This decreased his need for coordination and he can rely more

on lower extremity strength. Mr. Neerdaels quite [sic] his job and is spending a

great deal of time with [his] 3-1/2 and 1-1/2 year old children. He comes to the

valley twice a week to do some consulting.

Mr. Neerdaels has experienced a slight increase in his depression. He believes this

is related primarily to difficulties within the marriage.

AR0284. 

On June 20, 2002, Dr. Pelletier, Neerdaels’s physician for a study related to MS at the

University of California San Francisco, made the following statements about Neerdaels’s

condition:

He is a 36 y-o right-handed male patient who was diagnosed with MS in

December of 1998 after his second attack of numbness. His initial symptoms

occurred on July 4th 1998 when he acutely experienced pins and needles from his

knees bilaterally down to his feet. It lasted about 1 month and went away

completely without medication. Six months later he experienced a second episode

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

in December of 1998, he had some difficulty walking, didn’t feel his feet touching

the ground, leg numbness and a Lhermitte’s sign. He received Neurology

attention, brain MRI showed 3-4 lesions. A diagnosis of MS was given at that

time. He initiated Avonex therapy in February 1999. Since then he’s been having

sensory attacks once to twice a year despite the use of Avonex. His last welldocumented attack was in December of 2001 when he went numb from his upper

thorax down his feet involving his arms. . . . He his [sic] now left with some

residual sensory deficits and difficulty running and playing soccer. He has several

mild pseudo-attacks lasting few days that he attributes to his young children

constantly having respiratory infections. He denies having progressive deficits

between attacks. He has some urinary hesitancy and no current infections.

. . . He denies depressive symptoms. . . . 

His physical exam today is essentially normal . . . . His overall EDSS is 2.0 today

AR0255.

On September 23, 2003, for the purpose of Neerdaels’s appeal, Dr. Cassini wrote a letter

describing Neerdaels’s physical condition, in which he described the history of Neerdaels’s

condition:

Mr. Neerdaels has been under my care since January 2000. He presented at that

time with two episodes of paresthesias, pain and dysmetria affecting the lower

extremities. The first episode occurred in July 1999. Although both spells

severely limited Mr. Neerdaels’ ability to walk safely they did resolve to the point

that he returned to work. Mr. Neerdaels was worked up and found to have

multiple sclerosis. He has had numerous relapses over the last few years despite

being on immuno-modulating therapy. . . . 

Over the years Mr. Neerdaels’ neurologic deficits have slowly increased. Due to

the nature of his disease his physical limitations were only worsened over time. . . .

AR0130.

On November 26, 2003, Dr. Mercer wrote a letter to Dr. Cassini, summarizing and

verifying a conversation between the two doctors:

I specifically asked you regarding his functional capabilities during the late

spring and summer of 2002. We discussed your medical record entry of June of

2002, in which you noted he was able to ride a mountain bike. You indicated that

he could ride a bike better than walking, since this eliminates the need for sensory

deficit input from his feet that is necessary to maintain balance while standing. 

You feel that he had a good balance of his trunk and upper body allowing him to

ride a bicycle. However, at that time, you felt that his gait was significantly

impaired. I also asked you about the indication that he was consulting two times

per week; and how this might be interpreted from the cognitive perspective. I was

wondering that if he truly had a fixed cognitive deficit how he might be able to

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

consult two times per week. You reiterated that you feel he had impaired insight

and had made inappropriate choices including during that time period. In March

of 2002, you noted that he did have fine tremor and was taking Amantadine due to

poor energy and had ongoing saddle numbness. However, we did discuss that a

return to work on 3/6/02. You described that you felt that he was trying to

achieve more than he was actually capable of doing, but you did not want to stand

in his way of trying to do this. In your opinion, you felt that he was disabled at

that point. Mr. Neerdaels saw himself as a young healthy individual, although

suffering from multiple sclerosis, who was the provider for his family, which

would required [sic] him to work, and therefore, he did everything he could to try

to return to work. I asked you if you were aware of any details of events that

occurred during March through June, which led him ultimately to leave work. 

You indicated that you were unaware of this and did not record it in the medical

record.

I asked your opinion about Mr. Neerdaels’ work capability. You feel that since

2001, including through the rime that he worked in 2002 and onward, that he was

totally disabled from full-time sedentary employment. You feel this is based upon

his frequent intermittent exacerbations of multiple sclerosis causing focal

neurologic deficits, his cognitive difficulties, and fatigue. Although he did work

from March through June of 2002, you felt that this was a special attempt by Mr.

Neerdaels to try to continue to work when it was not clearly advisable or likely to

succeed. You noted that he may have a few good days intermittently, he has had

no sustained level of food functionality that would allow him to work on an

ongoing basis.

AR0085-86. In reviewing Neerdaels’s record, Dr. Mercer concluded:

The medical record provided do not provide objective information that would

support Mr. Neerdaels’ inability to function at a full-time sedentary capacity from

5/4/02 through 8/27/02. As noted previously, he had significant improvement of

functionality during this time, was able to ride mountain bike, and was doing

some part-time consulting work.

Dr. Cassini indicates that he believes that Mr. Neerdael has had cognitive deficits

for a prolonged period of time. However, the medical records do not contain

mental status examinations that document cognitive abnormalities to substantiate

restrictions or limitations from the cognitive perspective. There is simply no

objective data in the records to delineate any need for cognitive restrictions. The

ability to do consulting work two times per week in the late spring of 2002 would

be inconsistent with a fixed cognitive deficit requiring significant cognitive

restrictions or limitations at that time.

AR0084. Dr. Mercer stated that “from approximately 3/6/02 through 8/27/02, [Neerdaels] would

have been capable of functioning at a full-time sedentary capacity.” AR0083.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the de novo standard of review, this Court “must review de novo the plan

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

administrator’s decision to deny benefits.” Parra v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 258 F. Supp.

2d 1058, 1064 (N.D. Cal., 2003). Unless “there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute,”

the Court “may decide the case by summary judgment.” Id. The burdens of proof under the de

novo standard of review are: “Plaintiff must carry the burden to prove that she was disabled

under the meaning of the plan and Defendants must carry the burden of proving the applicability

of any plan coverage exclusion they seek to invoke.” Sabatino v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of

Boston, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (N.D. Cal., 2003).

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents

evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that

party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49;

Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only

point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not

rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. 

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 An “Active Full-time Employee” is an employee who works for the employer on a

“regular basis in the usual course of the Employer’s business. The employee must work the

number of hours in the Employer’s normal work week..” POL038.

8

Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

III. DISCUSSION

In order to establish that he is eligible to receive long-term disability benefits from the

Plan, Neerdaels must prove that he was disabled under the terms of the Plan. The Plan’s

insurance policy provides that benefits become payable if (1) the claimant becomes “Disabled”

while insured under the plan, (2) the claimant remains “Disabled” throughout the “Elimination

Period,” (3) the claimant remains “Disabled” beyond the “Elimination Period,” (4) the claimant

is and has been during the “Elimination Period” under the “Regular Care of a Physician,” and (5)

the claimant submits “Proof of Loss” satisfactory to Hartford. POL028. The policy further

provides that coverage terminates on the earliest of a number of specified dates, including the

date the claimant ceases to be an “Active Full-time Employee.”3 POL034. If the insurance

terminates because the claimant’s employment terminates, then coverage is continued

automatically for thirty-one days after the termination. Id. However, if the claimant’s

employment terminates (i.e., he ceases to be an “Active Full-time Employee”) because he is

“Disabled,” his coverage is continued both during the “Elimination Period” while he remains

“Disabled” by the same “Disability” and after the “Elimination Period” for as long as he is

entitled to benefits under the policy. POL035. 

“Disabled” means that the claimant is prevented by sickness or another specified

condition from performing one or more of the “Essential Duties” of his occupation and, as a

result, his “Current Monthly Earnings” are no more than 80% of his “Indexed Pre-disability

Earnings.” POL038. An “Essential Duty” is a duty that is “substantial, not incidental,” is

“fundamental or inherent to the occupation,” and cannot be “reasonably omitted or changed.”

POL039. Being at work for the number of hours in the claimant’s regularly scheduled workweek

is an “Essential Duty.” Id. The “Elimination Period” is the period of time the claimant must be

“Disabled” before benefits become payable. For the purposes of this case, it is the first ninety

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

consecutive days of any one period of “Disability.” POL026. Under the policy, “Any day that

[claimant was] Actively at Work will not count towards the Elimination Period.” POL029. 

The Plan argues that Neerdaels must establish that he was disabled as of May 6, 2002, the

effective date of his resignation, and for the following ninety-day period. In some of his papers,

Neerdaels appears to argue that he may establish eligibility for benefits by showing that he was

disabled for the period beginning on December 19, 2001, when he took a leave of absence from

work due to complications related to his MS. However, elsewhere, he appears to concede that he

must establish his disability for the period beginning on May 6, 2002. The Court agrees with the

Plan that the relevant period begins on May 6, 2002. Neerdaels’s leave of absence beginning on

December 19, 2001 does not satisfy the Elimination Period requirement because he returned to

work full-time, with full pay, beginning on March 6, 2002, fewer than ninety days after his leave

began.

Neerdaels argues that Dr. Mercer’s conclusion that Neerdaels was not disabled during the

relevant period is incorrect because Dr. Mercer was not provided with a definition of Neerdaels’s

occupation. Neerdaels describes his position as the Vice President of Strategic Planning as

requiring 50 to 70 hours of work per week and an enormously high level of cognition. While it

appears from the record that Dr. Mercer neither discussed the precise requirements of

Neerdaels’s position nor evaluated expressly Neerdaels’s disability with reference to these

specific requirements, the Court concludes that these failures are not determinative. Because Dr.

Mercer found that there was “no objective data in the records to delineate any need for cognitive

restrictions,” his medical conclusions would not have led to a finding of disability even if he had

considered Neerdaels’s specific job requirements. AR0084 (emphasis added).

Neerdaels also argues that, while Dr. Cassini noted on June 17, 2002 that Neerdaels was

doing consulting twice a week, “the evidence shows that consulting work consisted of a total of

seven hours spread over two weeks in January and February of 2003.” While the administrative

record includes a consulting statement for only seven hours of consulting, this evidence is not

conclusive proof that Neerdaels did not do any additional consulting, as was indicated by Dr.

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

Cassini. AR0204. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that there is not enough evidence to

establish that Neerdaels was disabled at the time he quit does not turn on the evidence, or lack

thereof, of Neerdaels’s consulting work. Instead, the Court bases its conclusion on the fact that

there is insufficient evidence of medical reports made during the relevant time period that would

establish that Neerdaels was disabled, in part as a result of cognitive defects.

Neerdaels directs the Court’s attention to a number medical opinions relating to his

disability, which, if they had been given during the relevant time period about the relevant time

period, might provide a triable issue of fact or lead the Court to find that Neerdaels was disabled

at the time he quit his job. However, the evidence to which Neerdaels cites does not rise to this

level. For example, while Dr. Cassini found that Neerdaels had “weakness/numbness in lower

extremities. impaired dexterity all 4 extremities,” this conclusion was made in March 2003,

seven months after the end of the relevant ninety-day period. AR0305. Dr. Cassini also told Dr.

Mercer that he believed that “since 2001, including through the time that [Neerdaels] worked in

2002 and onward, that he was totally disabled from full-time sedentary employment.” AR0086. 

Even these statements about Neerdaels’s disability are not conclusive evidence of his disability at

the time he quit his job because they were made in November, 2003. 

The contemporaneous evidence in the record of Neerdaels’s physical condition during the

relevant ninety-day period does not support a conclusion that Neerdaels was disabled at the time

he quit his job. On June 17, 2002, Dr. Cassini noted that “[Neerdaels’s] symptoms have been

stable. He recently rode his mountain bike up the West side of the Santa Cruz Mountains near

Aptos. He has done quite well since using clips. This decreased his need for coordination and he

can rely more on lower extremity strength. Mr. Neerdaels quite [sic] his job and is spending a

great deal of time with [his] 3-1/2 and 1-1/2 year old children. He comes to the valley twice a

week to do some consulting.” AR0284. When Dr. Pelletier examined Neerdaels on June 20,

2002, he noted that Neerdaels was then “left with some residual sensory deficits and difficulty

running and playing soccer. He has several mild pseudo-attacks lasting few days that he

attributes to his young children constantly having respiratory infections. He denies having

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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

progressive deficits between attacks. He has some urinary hesitancy and no current infections. . .

. He denies depressive symptoms. . . . His physical exam today is essentially normal.” AR0255.

Accordingly, having concluded that the evidence in the record does not establish that

Neerdaels was disabled during the relevant ninety-day period, the Court will deny Neerdaels’s

motion for summary judgment and grant the Plan’s motion for summary judgment.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plan’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plan’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, and that Neerdaels’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

DATED: February 28, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:04-cv-00721-JF Document 81 Filed 02/28/06 Page 11 of 12
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Case No. C 04-00721 JF

ORDER (1) DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, (2) GRANTING THE

PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING NEERDAELS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Thornton Davidson rosatilaw@aol.com, jjills2@hotmail.com, jll_flks@yahoo.com

Michelle Yumi McIsaac michelle.mcisaac@sdma.com, dennis.rolstad@sdma.com

Dennis G. Rolstad dennis.rolstad@sdma.com

Robert J. Rosati rosatilaw@aol.com, jjills2@hotmail.com, jll_flks@yahoo.com 

Case 5:04-cv-00721-JF Document 81 Filed 02/28/06 Page 12 of 12