Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02161/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02161-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VFD CONSULTING, INC., 

Plaintiff,

 v.

21st SERVICES; 21st HOLDINGS, LLC; PAUL

KIRKMAN; and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive.

Defendants.

_______________________________________

No. C 04-2161 SBA

(Consolidated with Case No. 04-2162 SBA)

 

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 56, 68]

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Serve and File an Amended Answer

with a Combined Counterclaim/Third Party Complaint ofDefendants 21st Services, 21st Holdings LLC, and

PaulKirkman (collectively, "Defendants") [Docket No. 56] and the MotionforLeave to Intervene ofCoventry

First LLC [Docket No. 68]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties and Coventry

First LLC in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without

a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for Leave

to Serve and File an Amended Answer with a Combined Counterclaim/Third Party Complaint and GRANTS

Coventry First LLC's Motion for Leave to Intervene.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

Plaintiff VFD Consulting, Inc.("VFD") is a California corporation that conducts businessin Mendocino

County. Compl. ¶ 1. VFD is in the business ofproviding risk assessment research and product development

to the life insurance and related industries. Id. ¶ 7. VFD created a process that estimates the life expectancy

ofindividuals with medicalimpairments who are over 65 years old ("Elders"). Id. The process developed by

VFD is used to price life insurance settlements. Id. The process' design, methodology, and mortality

assumptions incorporate knowledge of estimating life expectancies for Elders with medical impairments,

knowledge of what kind of information is routinely available in medicalfiles, and knowledge of what mortality

assumptions are best used in such a process. Id. 

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2

Defendants 21st Services and 21st Holdings, LLC (collectively "21st") are businesses operating out

ofMinnesota. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Paul Kirkman is the President of 21st Services. Id. ¶ 18. 21st is in the life insurance

settlement business. Id. ¶ 8. One of the services that 21st provides is life expectancy calculations through a

product known as "MedDiag." Id. ¶ 7, 8.

In 1998, VFD and 21st entered into a written agreement whereby VFD was to provide 21st with the

process thatVFD developed to estimate the life expectancy of Elders for use in 21st's MedDiag system. Id.

¶¶ 7, 9. The process that VFD developed for MedDiag remained the intellectual property of VFD. Id. ¶ 7.

In 2001, VFD and 21st entered into an oral contract that modified the terms of their original contract. Id. ¶¶

9-15. In December 2003, VFD and 21st began the process ofnegotiating a new contract. Id. ¶¶ 18-25. On

February 10, 2004, VFD notified 21st that it was inbreachoftheir oralcontract and demanded that 21st cease

and desist from using VFD's intellectual property. Id. ¶ 26. 21st, however, disavowed the existence of the

oral contract. Id. ¶ 27. 

During the period of1998 to January 2004, VFD was contacted approximately two to three times per

year by Kirkman to discuss minor adjustments of MedDiag's quantitative assumptions. Id. ¶ 35. Each time,

VFD provided Kirkman with recommendations regarding the way the MedDiag program should be adjusted.

Id. VFD did not ever look at the actual output of MedDiag or conduct a study of MedDiag's effectiveness.

Id. VFD believed that 21st was responsible for requesting such an examination, to the extent that 21st

determined that an examinationwas appropriate. Id. VFD did, however, consistently inquire about MedDiag's

performance status. Id. 21st repeatedly assured VFD that MedDiag's "output was on target and was doing

fine." Id.

In January 2004, during the contract negotiations between VFD and 21st, VFD learned from the

Michael Gaines ("Gaines"), the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of a company named EMSI, that one of

EMSI's prospective clients, Coventry Financial(also known as "Coventry"), was displeased with the accuracy

of 21st's MedDiag system. Id. ¶ 37. Id. ¶ 38. When VFD contacted 21st about these concerns, Kirkman

denied that 21st was having any problems with Coventry. Id. Gaines later confirmed that the president of

Coventry was "very emphatic about his displeasure, and specifically stated that 21st and EMSI both did not

produce accurate results." Id. ¶ 39. 

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1The case was assigned number C 04-2161.

2The case was assigned number C 04-2162.

3Generally, in both complaints, Plaintiff VFD asserts that the viatical settlements calculated by the

MedDiag system are inaccurate and fraudulent. See Notice of Removal at Ex. A.

3

2. Procedural History.

On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction against

Defendants in the SuperiorCourt ofMendocino County (VFDConsulting, Inc. v. 21st Services, et al., case

number CVG-0492383). Also on May 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract, Fraud,

Negligence, Misappropriation and Conversion against Defendants in the SuperiorCourt ofMendocino (VFD

Consulting, Inc. v. 21st Services, et al., case number CVG-0492385). 

On June 1, 2004, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal relating to the removal of VFD Consulting,

Inc. v. 21st Services, et al., case number CVG -0492385, from Mendocino County SuperiorCourt.1 Also

on June 1, 2005, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal relating to the removal of VFD Consulting, Inc. v.

21st Services, et al., case number CVG-0492383, from Mendocino County Superior Court.2 Both cases

were removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 

On July 21, 2004, Defendants filed a Notice ofRelated Cases, explaining that case numbers 04-2161

and 04-2162 were actions involving the same parties, and arising out of the same facts and circumstances.3

In fact, Defendants represented that the sole difference between the two cases was that case number 04-2161

sought a preliminary injunction and that case number 04-2162 sought monetary damages. On September 7,

2004, the two cases were ordered related by this Court.

On November 10, 2004 Coventry First LLC ("Coventry") filed a civil action against 21st Services in

the United States District Court forthe Eastern District of Pennsylvania entitled Coventry First LLC v. 21st

Services, Civil Action No. 2:04-cv-05239 PBT (hereinafter "the Pennsylvania complaint" or "Pennsylvania

action"). The Pennsylvania complaint is premised on Coventry's assertion that 21st Services knew or should

have known that the mortality risk assessments and life expectancy projections it provided (and continues to

provide) to settlement providers were and are false. Coventry also asserts that 21st Services violated

Pennsylvania's Viatical Settlements Act. 

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4Although it is not clearly stated in either party's pleadings, according to the briefs filed by both parties

with regard to the instant motions, Vera Dolan is the owner of VFD.

4

On February 7, 2005, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Leave to Serve and File an Amended

Answer with a Combined Counterclaim/Third Party Complaint ("Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Answer" or "Defendants' Motion"). Defendants seek to add certain counterclaims against Plaintiff VFD and

a third-party complaint against Coventry First LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability corporation doing business

in California, and Vera Dolan, a resident of California.4 Also on February 7, 2005, Defendants filed an ex

parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer.

Defendants based their request on the grounds that they would be "substantially harmed or prejudiced" if not

allowed to amend their answer before discovery began.

On February 8, 2005, this Court denied Defendant's ex parte application due to Defendants' failure

to identify a substantial harm or prejudice that necessitated a shortened time for the hearing. Per the Court's

Order, Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer was set for hearing on March 29, 2005.

On February 15, 2005, 21st Services filed an answer to the Pennsylvania complaint. 21st Services'

answer to the Pennsylvania complaint included counterclaims against Coventry. 

On March 1, 2005, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion. On March 8, 2005,

Defendants filed a Reply brief in support of their Motion forLeave to File an Amended Answer. In the Reply,

Defendants conceded, for the first time, that they were involved in similar litigation against Coventry in the

United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On March 9, 2005, Coventry filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene. On March 16, 2005, Coventry

filed an ex partemotion for Order Shortening Time for the filing of a Motion forLeave to Intervene. Through

its ex parte motion, Coventry sought to have Coventry's Motion for Leave to Intervene heard on March 29,

2005. In its Motion forLeave to Intervene, Coventry requested leave to intervene as a matter of right, under

FRCP 24(a), or permissively under FRCP 24(b), solely for the purpose of opposing Defendants' Motion. 

On March 23, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Venue in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. In their Motion to Transfer Venue, Defendants sought to transfer the Pennsylvania action to this

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jurisdiction.

On March 24, 2005, this Court filed an Order denying Coventry's ex parte motion for Order

Shortening Time. The hearing on Coventry's Motion for Leave to Intervene and Defendants' Motion for Leave

to File an Amended Answer was continued to April 26, 2005.

On April 15, 2005, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied

21st Services' Motion to Transfer Venue.

On April 20, 2005, Defendants filed an ex parte application for leave to file further briefing.

Specifically, Defendants requested leave to file a supplementalbrief addressing the UnitedStates DistrictCourt

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's denial of 21st Services' Motion to Transfer Venue.

On April 21, 2005, this Court granted Defendants' ex parte application. The Court also directed

Plaintiff and Coventry to file supplementalbriefing on or before April 26, 2005. The Court continued the April

26, 2005 hearing on Defendants' and Coventry's motions to May 10, 2005.

ANALYSIS

A. Coventry's Motion for Leave to Intervene

Coventry has filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or,

alternatively, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), for the sole purpose of opposing Defendants'

Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer. Defendants oppose Coventry's Motion, and argue that

Coventry may only seek leave to intervene as a full party to the litigation and not for a limited purpose.

1. Limited Intervention

Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Coventry's request to intervene solely for the limited purpose of

opposing Defendants' Motion is permissible in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., LG Electronics Inc. v. Q-Lity

Computer, 211 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N. D. Cal. 2002) (permitting non-party to intervene for limited purpose of

opposing plaintiff'smotionto amend its patent infringement contentions). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has expressly

held that a non-party seeking to intervene need not intervene as a full party to the litigation, but may intervene

for a limited purpose. See, e.g., Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th

Cir.1992) (approving intervention of nonparty who sought only to modify a protective order).

Since it is well-established that a non-party may intervene forthe limited purpose ofopposing a motion,

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the next inquiry is whether Coventry has met the requirements of Federal Rule 24(a)(2) or Federal Rule

24(b)(2).

2. Intervention as a Matter of Right

Rule 24(a)(2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs interventionas a matter ofright,

provides: 

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action 

. . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transactionwhich

is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the

action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect

that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Rule 24(a) is construed liberally in favor of potential intervenors. Southwest Center

for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Forest Conservation Council

v. United States Forest Service, 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir.1995)). Allowing parties with a practical

interest in the outcome of a particular case to intervene often prevents or simplifies future litigation involving

related claims and, at the same time, allows an additionalinterested party to express its views before the court.

Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1496 n. 8 (emphasis in original). 

The Ninth Circuit applies a four-part test to evaluate motions for intervention under Rule 24(a): 

(1) the motion must be timely; 

(2) the applicant must have a significantly protectable interest relating to the property

or transaction which is the subject of the action; 

(3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a

practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; and 

(4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the

action.

Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999).

Coventry argues that it meets all ofthe criteria setforth in Smith. First, Coventry argues that its Motion

for Leave to Intervene is timely, as this Court has not yet ruled on Defendants' Motion. Second, Coventry

contends that its "significantly protectable interest" is adequately demonstrated by the fact thatDefendants seek

to join Coventry as a necessary party to the instant litigation and have sought leave to file a third-party

complaint against Coventry. Third, Coventry argues that the disposition of this action would, as a practical

matter, impair or impedes its ability to protect itsinterests because it would be forced to litigate the same claims

in two different courts if this Court grants Defendants leave to file the third-party complaint against Coventry.

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Finally, Coventry argues that its interests are not adequately represented by Plaintiff, since Plaintiff is not also

a party to the litigationbetweenCoventry and Defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In response,

Defendants dispute only that Coventry has effectively shown that its interests are not adequately represented

by Plaintiff.

In determining whether a would-be intervenor's interests are adequately represented by an existing

party, the Court considers: (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all

the intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and

(3) whether the would-be intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties

would neglect. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir.1996). The

burden of showing inadequacy is minimal, and the applicant need only show thatrepresentation ofitsinterests

by existing parties "maybe" inadequate. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268 F.3d at 823 (citing

Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10 (1972)). 

Here, the fact that Plaintiff is not a party to the Pennsylvania litigation is significant. Unlike Coventry,

Plaintiff clearly does not have first-hand information regarding the status or procedural posture of the

Pennsylvania litigation. Indeed, much of the information pertaining to the Pennsylvania action has been provided

to the Court through the briefing on Coventry's Motion to Intervene. Further, although Plaintiff argues that it

would also be inconvenienced if Coventry were joined as a party to this action, Coventry's and Plaintiff's

interests would be practically impaired in different ways. For example, Plaintiff argues that it would need to

expend time and resources monitoring the Pennsylvania action, but admitsthat it would not actually be a party

to the litigation. In contrast, Coventry argues that it is currently a party to the Pennsylvania action and would

therefore be forced to endure duplicative litigation. Accordingly, Coventry has shown that its interests are not

adequately represented by Plaintiff. As such, this Court hereby GRANTS Coventry the right to intervene for

the purpose of opposing Defendants' Motion.

2. Permissive Intervention. 

Even if Coventry were not entitled to intervene as a matter of right, however, it would be permitted to

intervene under Federal Rule 24(b)(2). 

Rule 24(b)(2) states: 

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Indeed, this is made apparent by the fact that Defendants seek to join Coventry as a necessary party

to the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), which requires a finding that Coventry "claims an

interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in [Coventry's]

absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede [Coventry's] ability to protect that interest . . . ." See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 

6

 Defendants also erroneously contend that the assertion of new claims against Coventry and Dolan is

permissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a). Defendants' reliance on Federal Rule 14(a) is

misplaced. Federal Rule 14(a) provides only that "a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a

summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the actionwho is or may be liable to the

third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." Fed. R. Civ. P.

14(a) (emphasis added). Since Defendants do not contend that either Dolan or Coventry is liable for Plaintiff's

claim against Defendants, Rule 14(a) is inapplicable.

8

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action 

. . . when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law

or fact in common . . . . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the

original parties. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). 

Here, Coventry wishes to be heard only with respect to issue ofwhether itshould be joined as a party

to this litigation. Defendants' desire to join Coventry as a party, and Coventry's desire to prevent Defendants

fromsuing it in two different courts forthe same claims, necessarily involve common questions oflaw and fact.5

Further, Coventry's interventionwill not unduly delay or prejudice the rights ofthe existing parties because the

scope of its intervention is limited to the instant motions. Accordingly, even if Coventry were not entitled to

intervene as a full matter of right under Federal Rule 24(a)(2), this Court would permit Coventry leave to

intervene under Federal Rule 24(b)(2). 

B. Motion for Leave to Serve and File An Amended Answer With a Combined

Counterclaim/Third-Party Complaint.

In their Motion forLeave to Serve and File an Amended Answer, Defendants seek to leave to file and

serve a combined pleading that contains: (1) new counterclaims against VFD; (2) a third-party complaint

against Vera Dolan, the owner of VFD; and (3) a third-party complaint against Coventry. 

Defendants argue that leave to file an amended answer should be granted under FederalRules of Civil

Procedure 13(e), 15(d), 19(a), and 20(a). Specifically, Defendants assert that leave to amend a pleading is

"freely given," pursuant to Rules 15(d) and 13(e).6 Defendants further contend that Coventry must be joined

to the action as a necessary party under FederalRule 19(a). Alternatively, Defendants argue that they should

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7Despite the fact thatVera Dolan is also a new party to this litigation, Defendants improperly rely only

on FederalRules 13(e), 14(a), and 15(d) to establish that they may file a third-party complaint against Dolan.

However, since Defendants' request to join Dolan as third-party defendant to this action is unopposed,

Defendants are hereby GRANTED leave to file a third-party complaint against Dolan. 

9

be allowed to join Coventry pursuant to the permissive joinder provision of Federal Rule 20(a). 

Federal Rule 15(d)stands forthe generalproposition that "the court may, upon reasonable notice and

upon such terms as are just, permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or

occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(d). Federal Rule 13 authorizes a party to assert a counterclaim or cross-claim against its

opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. Specifically, Federal Rule 13(e) provides that "[a] claim which either

matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving a pleading may, with the permission of the court, be

presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading." Id.

FederalRule 19(a) governs the joinder ofpersons necessary to an action and provides in relevant part:

A person who is subject to service ofprocess and whose joinder will notdeprive the

court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party

in the action if(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among

those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject ofthe

action and is so situated that the disposition ofthe action in the person's absence may

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest

or (ii) leave any ofthe persons already parties subject to a substantialrisk ofincurring

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed

interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be

made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person

may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) governs permissive joinder. It provides:

All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against

them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising

out ofthe same transaction, occurrence, orseries oftransactions or occurrences and

if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A

plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the

relief demanded. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).

Plaintiff is not opposed to Defendant's request to file (1) new counterclaims against VFD; and (2) a

third-party complaint against Vera Dolan. Indeed, the assertion of new counterclaims against Plaintiff, who is

an existing party to the litigation, is expressly provided for under Federal Rule 13(a) and 15(d).7 Plaintiff is

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opposed, however, to the joinder of Coventry as a party to this litigation. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

Defendants should not be permitted to file a third-party complaint against Coventry because Defendants have

already asserted the same counterclaims against Coventry in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff

further argues that it would be unfairly prejudiced if Defendants were allowed to proceed against Coventry in

this action because Plaintiff "would be forced to engage Pennsylvania counsel to monitor or intervene in that

action to ensure that its rights in the California litigation are not compromised by any contrary ruling in the

Pennsylvania case." Pl's Limited Opp. to Defendants' Leave to File AnAmended Answer ("Pl's Lim. Opp.")

at 5:7-11. Plaintiff also notes that "orders or judgments in either case would raise serious issues of collateral

estoppel, res judicata and the potential for countervailing judgments or damage awards." Id. at 5:2-4.

Additionally, Plaintiff notes that "forcing two federal courts in different jurisdictions to oversee litigation of the

same issues with the same parties is a waste of scarce judicial resources and will likely lead to confusion and

duplicative litigation." Id. at 4:25-28. 

Coventry is also opposed to being joined as a party to this litigation on the grounds that it is already

litigating the same claims against Defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Coventry argues that

duplicative litigation should be discouraged by this Court, and that it would be unfairly prejudiced if forced to

defend against multiple actions in California and Pennsylvania. Coventry notes, on the other hand, that

Defendants would not be prejudiced if their motion is denied because Defendants would still be able to pursue

all of their claims against Coventry in Pennsylvania. 

In their initial moving papers, Defendants did not deny that the claims they sought to assert against

Coventry in the proposed third-party complaint were identical to those they had already asserted against

Coventry in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Indeed, based on a review of Defendants' proposed thirdparty complaint and Defendants' answer in the Pennsylvania action, it is apparent that Defendants could not

deny this, as the two pleadings are substantially identical. Defendants argued, however, that the third-party

complaint would not result in duplicative litigation because this Court could consolidate the two actions after

Defendants successfully transferred venue of the Pennsylvania action to this Court. Now that Defendants'

Motion to Transfer Venue has been denied, however, Defendants argue that this Court must join Coventry to

this litigation because the claims they seek to assert against Coventry in this Court arise under California law.

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Defendants' inconsistent arguments completely undermine their credibility. As Coventry has aptly

pointed out, Defendants may assert all of their claims against Coventry in the Pennsylvania action, regardless

of whether those claims arise under California or Pennsylvania law. Federal courts regularly adjudicate claims

arising under the laws of various states. See, e.g., Computer Aid, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 56

F.Supp.2d 526, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (interpreting California Business and Professions Code § 17200). As

such, the mere fact that Defendants may have cognizable claims against Coventry arising under California law

is not a sufficient reason to join Coventry as a party to this litigation.

As Coventry has also noted, the fact that the Pennsylvania court deniedDefendants'Motionto Transfer

Venue now guarantees that Defendants' counterclaims against Coventry will be tried in Pennsylvania. Thus,

granting Defendants leave to file the third-party complaint against Coventry in this Court would necessarily

result in duplicative litigation. As a general rule, duplicative litigation is heavily disfavored. See, e.g., Colorado

River Water Conserv.Dist. v.United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). In fact, joinder under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 19(a) is typically invoked to avoid subjecting parties to "double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for leave to file a third-party

complaint against Coventry is DENIED. 

//

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CONCLUSION

The Court hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

1. Coventry's MotionPursuantto FRCP 24(a)forLeave to Intervene [Docket No. 68] is GRANTED.

Coventry is granted leave to intervene as a matter of right for the limited purpose of opposing Defendant's

Motion for Leave to Serve and File an Amended Answer with a Combined Counterclaim/Third-Party

Complaint.

2. Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer [Docket No. 56] is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants are GRANTED leave to file an amended answer that contains

counterclaims against Plaintiff, who is an already existing party to this action. Defendants are also GRANTED

leave to join Vera Dolan as a party and leave to file a third-party complaint against Vera Dolan. However,

Defendants request to file a third-party complaint against Coventry is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Saundra Brown Armstrong 

Dated: 5-11-05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02161-SBA Document 89 Filed 05/11/05 Page 12 of 12