Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00569/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CIBA SPECIALTY CHEMICALS )

CORPORATION, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0569-WS-C

 )

TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER )

COMPANY, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to File Petition of Intervention (doc. 24)

submitted by would-be intervenors Jessie Fisher, Arlean Reed, Barbara Byrd, and Ronald

McIntyre, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, the

“Intervenors”). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

I. Background.

Plaintiffs Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corporation, Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. and

Ciba-Geigy Corporation (collectively, the “Ciba Entities”) brought this declaratory judgment

action against defendants Tensaw Land and Timber Company, Inc. and Palamar Land Company,

L.P. (collectively, “Defendants” or “Tensaw/Palamar”). Although the Complaint and Amended

Complaint have been ordered temporarily sealed (see docs. 23, 33) to facilitate settlement, the

crux of the dispute is Defendants’ contention that the Ciba Entities contaminated their hunting

and fishing properties in or near McIntosh, Alabama with Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane

(“DDT”) in the 1950s and 1960s, then concealed their actions. This contamination is alleged to

have emanated from a pesticide plant operated by the Ciba Entities in McIntosh beginning in or

about 1952. In light of the disagreement between the Ciba Entities and Defendants as to the

existence and extent of any contamination on Defendants’ property, and as to the legal viability

of Defendants’ threatened claims, the Ciba Entities request a declaration as follows: (a) that any

chemicals on Defendants’ property do not pose a risk to humans or wildlife, or otherwise

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 1 of 11
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constitute damage to that property; (b) that the Ciba Entities are not liable in tort for any

chemicals on Defendants’ property; (c) that any claims Defendants might bring against the Ciba

Entities are barred on grounds of limitations, laches, statutes of repose, or estoppel; (d) that

Defendants’ property value has not been diminished by Ciba’s McIntosh operations; and (e) that

the Ciba Entities should be awarded costs and other relief. (Amended Complaint, at 6-7.) On

December 2, 2005, less than two months after the Complaint was filed, the Ciba Entities’ cocounsel of record submitted an Affidavit (doc. 26, Exh. A) stating that the Ciba Entities and

Tensaw/Palamar “have reached an agreement in principle to resolve this dispute” and that

“execution of any settlement agreement should occur within the next 4-6 weeks.” (Id.) On

December 23, 2005, the Ciba Entities’ counsel represented to the Court that the settlement

process had been slightly delayed by year-end holidays, but that settlement should be concluded

by no later than January 31, 2006. (See doc. 31.)

Against this backdrop appear the Intervenors, who are named plaintiffs in a separate

lawsuit filed as a putative class action against the Ciba Entities, styled Jessie Fisher, et al. v.

Ciba Specialty Chemical Corporation, et al., Civil Action No. 03-0566-WS-B (the “Fisher

Action”), and presently pending before the undersigned. According to the Third Amended Class

Action Complaint (doc. 212) in the Fisher Action, the Ciba Entities “have committed intentional

ongoing environmental damage” (Id., ¶ 3) by operating the McIntosh facility in a manner that

contaminated or otherwise devalued the Intervenors’ property in and around McIntosh via

groundwater, surface water, soil, sediment and air contamination through release of various

hazardous compounds (including DDT, among others) on a daily basis up to and including the

present. (Id., ¶¶ 19-21, 25-26.) The Fisher Action alleges that the Ciba Entities’ conduct has

“damaged the [putative] Class by diminishing the value of their homes and properties making it

difficult, if not impossible, to sell or mortgage their homes and properties, thereby preventing

Plaintiffs from realizing the true worth of their homes and properties indefinitely.” (Id., ¶ 29.) 

As property owners in the vicinity of the Ciba Entities’ McIntosh facility, Tensaw and Palamar

would presumably be prospective class members in Fisher.

In their proposed Petition of Intervention (doc. 24), Intervenors insist that the disposition

of the instant action “may be utilized to greatly impair and/or impede Intervenors’ ability to

protect their interests” in the Fisher Action. (Petition, ¶ 4.) Specifically, the Intervenors express

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 2 of 11
1 Intervenors proffer this argument despite the fact that Defendants’ counsel has not

yet appeared in this action, such that the identity, credentials, qualifications and skills of

Tensaw/Palamar’s attorney(s) are unknown to Intervenors. The inconsistent nature of

Intervenors’ contention on this point is underscored by the fact that they decry their inability “to

assess the adequacy of counsel” in one breath, then protest that their interests “cannot possibly

be adequately represented” by such counsel in the next. (Reply Brief, at 2, 5.)

2 In a reply brief, Intervenors amplify their fear that any settlement between the

Ciba Entities and Tensaw/Palamar is somehow “suspect” by dint of the fact that the Complaint is

under seal, thereby depriving the underlying negotiations of necessary scrutiny “in the light of

day by this Court and others.” (Reply (doc. 28), at 6 n.2.) This argument overlooks the

fundamental truth that private parties appearing in this District Court routinely enter into

confidential settlement agreements, free from scrutiny or second-guessing by this Court or

anyone else. Clearly, there is nothing inherently nefarious or improper about a settlement whose

terms are confidential or otherwise not subject to judicial or third-party review.

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alarm that judicial determinations in this case may have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect

in the Fisher Action. (Id., ¶ 5.) Intervenors further balk that Tensaw and Palamar’s counsel in

this case cannot and will not adequately represent the Intervenors’ interests, given the recent

inception of this action as compared to the two years that the Intervenors’ counsel have

represented them in connection with the Fisher Action. (Id., ¶ 6.)1

 Finally, Intervenors object

that any declaratory judgment entered by the undersigned in this action “may affect their

property interests” in unspecified ways and that settlement negotiations between the Ciba

Entities and Tensaw/Palamar may not be “conducted as arms-length transactions.” (Id., ¶ 7.)2

II. Analysis.

Intervenors contend that their Petition is proper under both the intervention as of right

standards set forth in Rule 24(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., and the permissive intervention provisions of

Rule 24(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court will consider each of these bases for intervention in turn.

A. Intervention as of Right Pursuant to Rule 24(a).

Under Rule 24(a)(2), intervention as of right is authorized when “the applicant claims an

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant

is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the

applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented

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3 A separate clause of Rule 24(a) authorizes intervention as of right when “a statute

of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene.” Rule 24(a)(1). Intervenors do

not identify any such statutory basis for intervention here.

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by existing parties.” Id.3

 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a four-pronged test for evaluating

requests for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), consisting of the following elements: (1) whether

the application for intervention is timely; (2) whether the putative intervenor has an interest

relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the litigation; (3) whether the

intervenor “is so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or

impair his ability to protect that interest”; and (4) whether his interest is represented inadequately

by existing parties. Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2004); see

also United States v. City of Miami, 278 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2002); Acceptance Indem.

Ins. Co. v. Southeastern Forge, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 697, 700 (M.D. Ga. 2002). A district court must

grant a Rule 24(a) motion if all four prerequisites are satisfied. See Purcell v. BankAtlantic

Financial Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Once a party establishes all the

prerequisites to intervention, the district court has no discretion to deny the motion.”).

There is no quarrel as to the timeliness of the Intervenors’ Motion, nor could there be

given that it was filed a bare six weeks after the Complaint, in advance of any responsive

pleading by Defendants, and indeed prior to any appearance by Defendants’ counsel in this

action. Further, in opposing the Motion, the Ciba Entities do not purport to rebut Intervenors’

assertion that Tensaw/Palamar are inadequate to represent the Intervenors’ interests; therefore,

the Court will assume that this criterion is satisfied, as well. Thus, the key battlegrounds for the

Rule 24(a)(2) component of the Intervenors’ request are whether they have a cognizable interest

relating to the property or transaction at issue in this case and, if so, whether disposition of this

case is likely to impair or impede the Intervenors’ ability to protect that interest. The Court

answers both of these questions in the negative.

The type of “interest” necessary to sustain intervention as of right must be one that is

“direct, substantial and legally protectable.” Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy Lake Properties, Inc.,

425 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[A] legally protectable interest is

something more than an economic interest”; rather, the law requires that “the interest be one

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4 To render this abstract, amorphous concept more concrete, the Mt. Hawley panel

explained that a “legally protectable interest is an interest that derives from a legal right,” such as

where a putative intervenor sought to intervene in proceedings to interpret a state regulation and

state law conferred upon intervenor the legal right to participate. Id. at 1311 & n.5. Two other,

contrasting examples illustrate the point. In Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 302 F.3d

1242 (11th Cir. 2002), the State of Florida was deemed to have a legally protectable interest in a

lawsuit between Georgia and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regarding Georgia’s ability to

increase the water volume siphoned from Lake Lanier for use by the city of Atlanta. Because the

withdrawal of water from Lake Lanier would, as a practical matter, impact Florida via increased

wastewater discharges flowing downstream into Florida, the Georgia court concluded that

Florida’s interest in the proceedings was legally protectable. Id. at 1250-52. By comparison, in

Mt. Hawley, an insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action against two insureds

seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to provide coverage for a wrongful death action

arising from a drowning on the insureds’ property. The decedent’s estate sought to intervene as

of right, but was deemed not to have a legally protectable interest in a dispute over coverage that

may or may not be available under the subject insurance policy. 425 F.3d at 1311-12.

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which the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.” Id. at

1311 (quoting United States v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 710 (11th

Cir. 1991)).4

Here, the Intervenors do not claim to own or otherwise to have any legally cognizable

interest in the specific real property that is the subject of the dispute between the Ciba Entities

and Tensaw/Palamar. They do not purport to have been privy to any communications between

the Ciba Entities and Tensaw/Palamar regarding soil and water sampling performed on

Defendants’ properties in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, the sole interest in this dispute

identified by Intervenors is the ostensible overlap in issues litigated in this case and those

litigated in the Fisher Action. Because both actions involve questions as to whether the Ciba

Entities contaminated land in and near McIntosh, Alabama, Intervenors say, they have an interest

in the outcome of this case. Intervenors go on to state that this interest is direct, substantial and

legally protected “in that the nature of the disposition of the lawsuit may have a preclusive effect

on Intervenors’ ability to protect their interests that are so closely related.” (Reply Brief, at 3.) 

In particular, Intervenors articulate concern that any determination in this action that the Ciba

Entities did not contaminate the land of Tensaw and Palamar “may be pled by the Ciba Plaintiffs

as res judicata and/or collateral estoppel in the Fisher matter which would significantly affect

Intervenors’ interests.” (Petition, ¶ 5.)

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 5 of 11
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The Court perceives two critical flaws in the Intervenors’ efforts to bootstrap a legally

protectable interest in this controversy from the mere superficial similarity of subject matter

between this action and the Fisher Action. First and foremost, there is an inherent logical

deficiency in the notion that a ruling adverse to Tensaw and Palamar would spell doom for the

Intervenors’ claims against the Ciba Entities. It would do no such thing. Assuming the Court

found that Tensaw and Palamar’s property has not been contaminated and their property values

have not been diminished, there is no a priori reason why such holdings would extend to other

properties in other places. In other words, that testing over a period of nearly two decades at the

Tensaw/Palamar sites may reflect no significant DDT contamination says nothing about whether

plaintiffs’ properties presently are polluted with hazardous substances originating from Ciba’s

McIntosh plant. These are different transactions, different locations, and different factual

questions, such that a finding as to one is in no way outcome-determinative of the other. 

Second, even if findings regarding Defendants’ property were probative as to the

contaminated condition of Intervenors’ property, Intervenors’ stated fears of issue and/or claim

preclusion are misplaced. Absent the granting of their Motion to Intervene, Intervenors are not

parties to this action and cannot be bound by any rulings herein pursuant to collateral estoppel or

res judicata. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Under

res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a

prior action from re-litigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in that

action.”); Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (collateral

estoppel requires that “the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted must have had a

full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding”). “If identity or privity of

parties cannot be established, then there is no need to examine the other factors in determining

whether res judicata or collateral estoppel applies.” E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d

1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004). Plainly, there is neither identity of parties nor privity of parties as

between Tensaw/Palamar and the Intervenors. As such, any attempt by the Ciba Entities to

accord preclusive effect in the Fisher Action to judicial determinations made in this action would

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 6 of 11
5 In response to the Ciba Entities’ arguments about the obvious inapplicability of

principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to any determinations in this action vis a vis the

Fisher Action, Intervenors complain that the Ciba Entities have already resorted to issue/claim

preclusion arguments in the Fisher Action, such that they cannot be trusted to eschew a similar

tack here. (Reply Brief, at 4-5.) Specifically, Intervenors protest that in the Fisher Action, the

Ciba Entities have invoked judicial determinations made in yet a third set of proceedings relating

to McIntosh contamination, captioned Carrie Jean LaBauve, et al. v. Olin Corporation, et al.,

and bearing Civil Action No. 03-567-WS-B (the “LaBauve Action”), seeking preclusive effect of

same in Fisher. But the posture of the Fisher Action relative to this case is substantially and

materially different than its posture relative to the LaBauve Action. Fisher and LaBauve were

filed contemporaneously by the same counsel, alleging related theories of liability on behalf of

overlapping putative classes against neighboring industrial defendants in McIntosh, Alabama. 

Whatever the ultimate merits of invoking preclusion between those two actions (which this

Court expressly declines to decide here), there is at least a colorable basis for articulating a

preclusion argument in the Fisher Action based on determinations in the LaBauve Action. No

comparable parallels exist between Fisher and the case at bar. Notably, Tensaw/Palamar are

represented by different counsel than the Fisher plaintiffs and are litigating narrow, isolated

issues specific to their property, rather than broad issues concerning dozens (if not hundreds) of

property owners in and around McIntosh. As mentioned supra, the lack of identity or privity

between the Fisher plaintiffs and Tensaw/Palamar would plainly bar any application of res

judicata or collateral estoppel here. That the Ciba Entities might seek to invoke preclusion in the

Fisher Action based on events in the LaBauve Action in no way suggests that preclusion might

reasonably be argued in Fisher based on events occurring in this case. Intervenors’ expressed

fears in that regard are unfounded. Besides, the Ciba Entities have taken a forceful stand that res

judicata and collateral estoppel cannot permit findings in this action to carry over to the Fisher

Action. See, e.g., Opposition Brief (doc. 26), at 4 (“Likewise, a determination favorable to [Ciba

Entities] in this case would have no collateral estoppel effect in the Fisher Matter.”). Having

thus unequivocally staked themselves to a position that there can be no preclusive effect in the

Fisher Action of any determinations made here, the Ciba Entities would expose themselves to

judicial estoppel and, worse, the risk of sanctions if they nonetheless argue the reverse position

in the Fisher Action should it become expedient to do so. The Ciba Entities cannot flip-flop on

this question where they have bound themselves to the position that there can be no collateral

estoppel or res judicata effect of decisions in this case in the Fisher Action. The Court expects

the Ciba Entities scrupulously to honor and observe the position to which they have committed

themselves in this litigation, such that Intervenors’ fears otherwise will never materialize.

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be fatally flawed.5

 To allow intervention as of right based on such a slender reed would expand

Rule 24(a)(2) jurisprudence beyond the scope of any authorities cited by Intervenors. See

generally Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1513 (opining that intervenor’s “interest in the collateral estoppel

effect of the jury’s verdict in this case is too collateral, indirect and insubstantial to support

intervention as of right”).

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 7 of 11
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In a final effort to secure intervention as of right, Intervenors cite the line of authority

deeming a potential stare decisis effect to supply a practical disadvantage that may confer a right

to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Such precedents are well documented in the Eleventh Circuit. 

For example, in Stone v. First Union Corp., the panel cited earlier decisions for the proposition

that “[w]here a party seeking to intervene in an action claims an interest in the very property and

very transaction that is the subject of the main action, the potential stare decisis effect may

supply that practical disadvantage which warrants intervention as of right.” 371 F.3d at 1310

(citations omitted). The Stone court hastened to add that “the potential for negative stare decisis

effects does not automatically grant plaintiffs the right to intervene” unless the practical

impairment facing them is “significant.” Id. Thus, where intervenors were claiming that a bank

policy violated the ADEA and injured them, and where a plaintiff brought an individual suit

against the bank claiming that the same policy violated the ADEA and injured him, the Eleventh

Circuit deemed intervention as of right warranted. Id. (explaining that “one court’s ruling on

whether the bank’s policy, as a matter of law, was in violation of the ADEA could influence later

suits” and “would have significant persuasive effects”); see also Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 229 F.R.D. 669, 672 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (recognizing that stare decisis effects may

provide impetus to justify intervention as of right).

But Stone and its progeny are readily distinguishable here. This action does not involve

“the very property and very transaction” being litigated in the Fisher Action, but manifestly

concerns different property and different transactions. Moreover, unlike in Stone (where a

finding in one case that the bank’s policy violated the ADEA as a matter of law would directly

conflict with a finding in the other that it did not), there is no inherent tension or incompatibility

between a finding in this case that, for example, Tensaw/Palamar’s property is not contaminated

with DDT from the Ciba facility in McIntosh, and a finding in Fisher that Intervenors’ property

is so contaminated. Because the property is different, the facts are different, and the proof is

different, no ruling by this Court on that point in this action “would have significant persuasive

effects” in the Fisher Action. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that the potential for an

adverse ruling to Tensaw/Palamar in this action creates no significant practical impairment for

Intervenors in the Fisher Action; therefore, the “stare decisis” series of cases does not favor

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6 One district court considering the stare decisis impact on intervention as of right

formulated the test this way: If resolution of the main action in a manner adverse to the

intervenor would render “worthless for all practical purposes” an interest claimed by the

intervenor in an ancillary action, then the requisite practical harm warranting intervention as of

right exists. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1578

(N.D. Ga. 1996). Measured by this yardstick, nothing the Court could say or do in this litigation

would make Intervenors’ claims in the Fisher Action “worthless” because any findings here

would be specific to the Tensaw/Palamar properties, and not readily extrapolated to embrace

Intervenors’ own unique circumstances.

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intervention as of right here.6

For all of these reasons, the undersigned finds that Intervenors have failed to establish a

direct, substantial legally protectable interest in these proceedings, much less that disposition of

this action will, as a practical matter, substantially impair their ability to vindicate such interest

in the Fisher Action. Intervenors are not entitled to intervene in this matter as of right. 

B. Permissive Intervention Pursuant to Rule 24(b).

In the alternative, Intervenors request leave of Court to intervene permissively pursuant

to Rule 24(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. Simply put, permissive intervention is appropriate “where a

party’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common and the

intervention will not unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication of the rights of the original

parties.” Mt. Hawley, 425 F.3d at 1312 (citing Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 302

F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002)). It is beyond cavil that Rule 24(b) intervention is discretionary

with the district court, and that permissive intervention may properly be denied even if there are

common questions of law or fact and the other requirements of Rule 24(b)(2) are otherwise

satisfied. See, e.g., Davis v. Butts, 290 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002); Purcell, 85 F.3d at

1513; Acceptance Indem., 209 F.R.D. at 701 (explaining that it lies “within the discretion of the

court to allow such intervention, taking into consideration whether the intervention will unduly

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties”).

In their briefs, Intervenors argue at some length that common questions of law and fact

link this action to the Fisher Action. Be that as it may, Intervenors make no pretense of

establishing that the requested intervention “will not unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication

of the rights of the original parties.” Mt. Hawley, 425 F.3d at 1312. To the contrary, Intervenors

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 9 of 11
7 Intervenors impute collusion and villainy to the fact that negotiations are

occurring “under seal” and not “in the light of day.” (Reply Brief, at 6 & n.2.) But parties

conduct private, confidential settlement negotiations all the time, and there is absolutely no

evidence to support Intervenors’ reckless speculation that these “discussions may be less than

arms-length.” (Id.) Intervenors would make much of the facts that the Complaint and Amended

Complaint have been temporarily sealed and that defense counsel has not appeared in this case. 

(Reply Brief, at 1-2.) Neither fact raises an inference of perfidy or treachery on the part of the

litigants in this action. The temporary sealing of the pleadings was ordered only after a

telephonic hearing before then-Magistrate Judge DuBose, in which she satisfied herself of the

legitimacy of the requested relief. The pleadings have not been and will not be permanently

sealed, so Intervenors will have ready access to their contents in due course. And surely there is

nothing unusual, much less improper, in defense counsel’s failure to appear in a two-month old

action. As Intervenors’ counsel is undoubtedly aware, it is altogether commonplace for a

defendant to avoid appearing or otherwise incurring unnecessary litigation expense when

settlement is believed to be imminent.

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tacitly admit that their inclusion in this case will impede resolution of this action, given the

imminent finalization of a settlement between the Ciba Entities and Tensaw/Palamar. (See

Reply Brief, at 7 (recognizing that intervention will yield “delay of the resolution of this

matter”).) Indeed, a fair reading of Intervenors’ submissions suggests that they wish to inject

themselves in this litigation precisely for the purpose of disrupting the nearly-concluded

settlement negotiations between the parties. (See Reply Brief, at 7 (imminent settlement “is the

very reason Intervenors’ Motion should be granted”).) The Court is at a loss to understand the

Intervenors’ position that their interests will be adversely affected if a private, confidential

settlement is reached between the Ciba Entities and Tensaw/Palamar for alleged contamination

of the Tensaw/Palamar properties. Obviously, any such settlement will have no binding effect

on Intervenors, as nonparties to same, and in the absence of some judicial imprimatur which the

Ciba Entities and Tensaw/Palamar have not requested, this “off-the-books” settlement cannot

possibly prejudice Intervenors in the Fisher Action.7

The Eleventh Circuit has lauded the “public policy values that are furthered by permitting

parties to settle a case without the interference of interlopers.” Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1513. This

consideration looms large here. For strategic reasons apparently unrelated to any prejudice they

might sustain in the Fisher Action, Intervenors seek to disturb and upset a virtually completed

settlement between private interests in this case. The undersigned will not allow permissive

Case 1:05-cv-00569-WS-C Document 35 Filed 12/30/05 Page 10 of 11
8 To be clear, the undersigned’s denial of Rule 24(b)(2) intervention is predicated

on the Ciba Entities’ representations that settlement is imminent in this action, and the nearcertainty that intervention would unduly delay or prejudice adjudication of the parties’ rights

herein without conferring any legitimate countervailing benefit to Intervenors. That said, if the

parties do not consummate their settlement within a reasonable time, the balance of equities may

well shift. In that event, the Court will entertain a renewed motion for permissive intervention

under Rule 24(b)(2) should Intervenors wish to pursue it.

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intervention to vindicate such an improper purpose that cuts against public policy, not to mention

both the letter and spirit of Rule 24(b).8

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Intervenors’ Motion to File Petition of Intervention (doc.

24) is denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 2005.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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