Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00757/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00757-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

and the exhibits lodged with Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERICK NORWOOD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-0757 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #12]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at Pleasant

Valley State Prison located in Coalinga, California. He is serving a four-year sentence for battery on

a correctional officer by a prison inmate.

On November 15, 2001, while incarcerated at California Correctional Institution located in

Tehachapi, California, Petitioner was found guilty of disrespecting a correctional officer. See Exhibit

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2Although the petition was filed in the Kern County Superior Court on February 19, 2004, the petition was dated

February 3, 2004. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on

the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9th Cir. 2001), citing

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the

petition filed on February 3, 2004, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing. 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

D, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion”). Petitioner was assessed a credit

forfeiture of 30 days. Id.

On December 14, 2001, Petitioner appealed the violation at the Director’s Level. See Exhibit

B, Motion. On May 30, 2002, the administrative appeal was denied thereby exhausting Petitioner’s

administrative remedies. See Exhibit C, Motion. 

Over a year and a half later, on February 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in Kern County Superior Court.2 See Exhibit D, Motion. On February 24, 2004, the Superior

Court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief and as untimely filed. Id. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeals,

Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). See Exhibit E, Motion. The petition was summarily

denied on September 20, 2004. Id. 

On September 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Exhibit F, Motion. The petition was summarily denied on February 23, 2005.

See Exhibit G, Motion.

On May 4, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. 

On October 7, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner did not file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on May 4, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a prison

disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of

limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v. McGrath, 343

F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s

administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered the

commencement of the limitations period). Therefore, the limitations period commenced on May 31,

2002, the day after Petitioner was informed that the Director’s Level appeal had been denied. See

Exhibit C, Motion. Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had one year until May 31, 2003, absent

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner did not

file his federal petition until May 4, 2005, almost two years after the limitations had expired.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

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U.S . District Court

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(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th

Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court petition and the

filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency

of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260

F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between consecutive filings at the same level);

Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001) (holding that the interval between a

motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition in the superior

court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on May 31, 2002, and expired on May

31, 2003. Although Petitioner filed three post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The first collateral challenge was filed on February 3, 2004, over eight months after the

limitations period had expired. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral

challenge had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000)

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). For

the same reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time his subsequent state habeas

petitions were pending. Therefore, the instant petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, -- U.S. –, 188 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at

1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for

the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate."

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U.S . District Court

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Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner does not argue that there were any circumstances beyond his control which

prevented him from timely complying with the limitations period. As there exists no circumstances

sufficient to justify equitably tolling the limitations period, the petition is untimely and must be

dismissed. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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