Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01709/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01709-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

07cv1709

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID AVILA,

Petitioner,

v.

L. E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 07cv1709-L(NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND

REJECTING IN PART REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION AND

REMANDING THE CASE TO THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR A

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner David Avila, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). He claims that his due process rights

were violated because he was denied parole and that his due process and Eighth Amendment

rights were violated by delay in the parole proceedings. The case was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation, recommending the Petition be denied in its entirety. Petitioner timely

objected. Respondent did not respond. For the reasons which follow, the Report and

Recommendation is ADOPTED as modified herein insofar as it addresses Petitioner’s claims. 

Petitioner’s claims that denial of parole violated his due process rights and that the delay in the

parole proceedings violated his Eighth Amendment rights are DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

The recommendation to deny the Petition in its entirety is REJECTED. The case is

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 07cv1709

REMANDED with respect to Petitioner’s due process claim based on the delay in parole

proceedings, which was not addressed in the Report and Recommendation.

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz.

2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). Petitioner objects to the recommendation to

deny the Petition and to several of the Magistrate Judge’s findings in support of that

recommendation. Upon performing the requisite de novo review, the court concurs with Judge

Stormes’ recommendations to deny the claims addressed in the Report and Recommendation. 

The case is remanded with respect to the claim which was not addressed.

In 1986 Petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder and received a sentence of 25 years

to life. He became eligible for parole on July 6, 2004. (Pet. Ex. A at 1.) At his first parole

hearing on July 16, 2003 parole was denied for two years. (Pet. Ex. D at 53.) After two years

and six months, on January 10, 2006, parole was denied again for two years. (Pet. Ex. A at 92.) 

Despite Petitioner’s progress while incarcerated and other factors tending to indicate suitability

for parole, the denial was based on several unsuitability factors: (1) the crime had been carried

out in an especially cruel and violent manner; (2) escalating pattern of criminal conduct prior to

the commitment offense; (3) unstable social history and drug abuse at a young age; (4) prison

disciplinary history, including violence, until 1998, with the last two offenses being mutual

combat and possession of contraband; (5) significant risk factors noted in the mental health

evaluation from 2003; and (6) the relatively recent nature of Petitioner’s gains during

commitment. (Id. at 82-89.) Petitioner was denied parole again on January 16, 2008. 

(Objections at 8.) Only the denial of parole in 2006 is the subject of the Petition before the

court. (See Pet. at 1.)

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 07cv1709

The Supreme Court has “clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process with respect to [his liberty interest in parole], if the board’s decision is

not supported by some evidence in the record or is otherwise arbitrary.” Irons v. Carey, 505

F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at

850. The relevant inquiry is whether any evidence supports the board’s decision to deny parole. 

See Superintendent of the Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); Sass v. Cal. Bd.

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing

of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the . . . board. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. This standard “does not require evidence that logically precludes any

conclusion but the one reached by the . . . board.” Id. at 477. However, “[t]he evidence

underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability” and “continued reliance 

. . . on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Irons,

505 F.3d at 854.

Petitioner first objects to the Report and Recommendation arguing that denial of parole

was based only on unchanging factors. (Objections at 3-10.) The argument is based on the

premise that any factor which occurred in the past is considered unchanging for purposes of the

due process analysis. The relevant case on this point, Biggs v. Terhune, identified “the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment” as “unchanging.” 334 F.3d at

917; see also Irons, 505 F.3d at 854 (inmate’s commitment offense); In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th

1181, 1221 (2008) (circumstances of the offense and criminal history). The court is not aware of

any binding federal authority for the proposition that a prisoner’s post-incarceration disciplinary

record or mental health evaluations are also considered unchanging. In this case, in addition to

the unchanging factors of his commitment offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, the

decision to deny parole is supported by Petitioner’s disciplinary record in prison, the 2003

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 To the extent the Report and Recommendation suggests otherwise (see Report and

Recommendation at 11), it is rejected.

4 07cv1709

mental health evaluation, and the relatively recent nature of his rehabilitative gains. Petitioner

does not dispute his disciplinary record, the contents of the 2003 evaluation or the time line

pertaining to his gains while incarcerated. 

Assuming arguendo, that, as Petitioner contends, the denial were based primarily on the

circumstance his commitment offense, a finding of a due process violation does not follow in

this case. The inquiry whether the board’s suitability determination was supported by “some

evidence,” as required by clearly established federal law, is “framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505 F.3d at

851 (“we must look to California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a

prisoner unsuitable for parole”).1

In California, “the denial of parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s commitment offense

only where the Board can ‘point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which

the inmate was committed’ that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability

hearing, present a danger to society if released.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 852 quoting In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071 (2005); see also Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181. Specifically, 

The Board's parole decisions are governed by section 3041 and Title 15, section

2402 of the California Code of Regulations. Pursuant to statute, the Board shall

normally set a parole release date one year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible

parole release date, and shall set the date in a manner that will provide uniform

terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the

public. Subdivision (b) of section 3041 provides that a release date must be set

unless the Board determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting. 

Title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations sets forth the factors

to be considered by the Board in carrying out the mandate of the statutes. This

regulation is designed to guide the Board's assessment of whether the inmate poses

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison, and thus whether

he or she is suitable for parole.

In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1256 (2008) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, brackets,

citations, and footnotes omitted, emphases in original).

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 07cv1709

One of the circumstances enumerated in the regulations tending to show unsuitability is

whether “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). In Petitioner’s case, the board made this finding. 

(Pet. Ex. A at 82, 88.) 

The factors to be considered in making this determination include, in pertinent part,

whether “the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense;” the offense

“was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering;” or “[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(C)-(E). 

The board found that Petitioner’s offense met these factors. (Pet. Ex. A at 82, 83-84, 86-

87, 88.) It noted that Petitioner stabbed and killed an unarmed man for what appeared to be his

wallet, or possibly just for change. (Pet. Ex. A at 82.) At the time of the offense, Petitioner was

intoxicated and on drugs. (Id. at 82, 86.) He and an associate were “hanging around” a liquor

store prior to the victim’s arrival. (Id. at 83.) When the victim left the store and went to open

his car door, Petitioner’s associate or Petitioner demanded money. (Id.) A fight ensued shortly

thereafter. (Id.) Petitioner was seen entering the struggle with a knife and stabbing the victim

once in the chest area. (Id.) Petitioner and his associate were then seen leaving the area with the

victim’s wallet. (Id.) The victim drove to his girlfriend’s home, collapsed in the driveway, and

bled to death. (Id. at 83-84.) 

Based on these facts, the board found that the motive for the offense was trivial in relation

to the offense itself because “some aspect of minor thievery ended up in the death and murder of

an individual” (id. at 83; see also id. at 86-87, 88); the victim was abused (id. at 88); and “the

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrated certainly an exceptional callous

disregard for human suffering [and life] as the man lived for a while as he bled to death 

. . .” (id. at 88). 

The facts as found by the board and adopted by the state court provide support for the

board’s finding. Petitioner argues that he “refutes in part” the board’s factual basis for the

/ / / / /

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 07cv1709

findings. (Objections at 11.) He points to his version of the events contained in the Correctional

Counselor’s Life Prisoner Evaluation from 2005. (Id.; Pet. Ex. C at 1.) 

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not met this burden.

However, even if Petitioner’s version of the events were accepted at face value, the

board’s findings are not refuted. According to Petitioner, he approached the victim to get

change for a dollar. (Pet. Ex. C at 1.) The victim responded to him in a derogatory manner,

Petitioner became upset and started arguing with the victim, the victim kicked him, and they

started to fight. (Id.) When Petitioner realized the victim was getting the advantage, he swung

his knife in the victim’s stomach area “to scare him off.” (Id.) The victim let out a cry and

drove off in his car. (Id.) Under this version of the events, the board’s factual findings pursuant

to section 2402(c)(1) factors regarding the egregiousness of the commitment offense remain

supported by some evidence.

However, “the aggravated nature of a commitment offense does not, in every case,

provide relevant evidence that an inmate remains dangerous,” Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th at 1254;

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1213, 1217. The denial of parole decision may be based “upon the

circumstance of the offense, or upon other immutable facts such as an inmate’s criminal history,

but some evidence will support such reliance only if those facts support the ultimate conclusion

that an inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.” Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th at

1255 (emphases in original); see also Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214, 1221. For example, in

cases where “the inmate . . . has continued to engage in criminal conduct postincarceration . . .,

the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense may well continue to provide ‘some

evidence’ of current dangerousness even decades after commitment of the offense.” Lawrence,

44 Cal.4th at 1228. 

In this case the board found that for more than ten years after incarceration Petitioner

engaged in serious disciplinary violations in prison, including violence. In addition, the 2003

mental health evaluation noted significant risk factors. Petitioner does not dispute the factual

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 07cv1709

accuracy of these factors. When viewed in light of these factors, the circumstance of the offense

continues to be probative of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at

1228. In light of the foregoing, the board’s decision to deny parole was supported by some

evidence.

Furthermore, federal precedent supports a finding of no due process violation. Like

Petitioner here, the petitioner in Biggs v. Terhune was serving a first-degree murder sentence of

25 years to life. 334 F.3d at 912. He had been incarcerated for fifteen years at the time of the

parole haring. Id. Unlike Petitioner, Mr. Biggs had been a model inmate throughout his period

of incarceration and the only factors for denial of parole which were supported by the record

were the circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment. Id. at 912, 915-16. 

Nevertheless, the court found his due process rights were not violated when parole was denied. 

Id. at 913, 916. Similarly, in Irons v. Carey, the petitioner was serving a seventeen-years-to-life

sentence for a second degree murder. 505 F.3d at 849. Again, unlike Petitioner, Mr. Irons had

no prior criminal history and had been an exemplary inmate throughout his incarceration. Id. A

parole release date had been denied him five times. Id. At the time of the sixth denial, he had

served sixteen years. Id. at 849-50. The only ground for denial of parole which was supported

by any evidence was the nature of the commitment offense. Id. at 852. Nevertheless, the Ninth

Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of relief and found no due process violation. Id. at 852-

53. 

In both cases “the [parole board’s] decision was made before the inmate had served the

minimum number of years required by his sentence.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. The court noted

that “given the particular circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due process was not

violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their

minimum terms.” Id. at 853-54. Same is true in Petitioner’s case. When parole was denied in

2006, Petitioner had served twenty of the 25 minimum number of years required by his sentence.

Neither Biggs nor Irons found a due process violation under circumstances more

conducive to parole than Petitioner’s. This precludes the court from accepting Petitioner’s due

process argument. See id. at 853. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s due

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 07cv1709

process claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner also objects on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge erred when she did not

find fault with the parole board’s factual finding that Petitioner’s offense was sufficiently grave

under California Penal Code Section 3041(a) to support denial of parole. (Objections at 10-12.) 

He argues that the circumstances of his crime were not particularly egregious when compared to

other first degree murders. Specifically, relying on California Penal Code § 3041(a), he

maintains that in denying parole, the board must evaluate the egregiousness of his crime by

comparing it to other offenses of the same class. (Objections at 11.) 

Aside from being irrelevant because the board relied on factors in addition to the gravity

of the offense, this argument was rejected by California Supreme Court:

Nothing in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case

under standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a continuing public

danger.

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1070 (emphases in original).

When the time comes to evaluate the individual life inmate’s suitability for release

on parole, the [Board] is authorized – indeed, required – to eschew term

uniformity, based simply on similar punishment for similar crimes, in the interest

of public safety in the particular case.

Id. at 1083 (emphases in original); see also Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1217 (“comparative analysis

is incompatible with our decision in Dannenberg”); Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th at 1254 (“the

determination whether an inmate poses a current danger is not dependent upon whether his . . .

commitment offense is more or less egregious than other, similar crimes”).

Last, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended finding that the delay

between his first and second parole hearings did not violate his constitutional rights. Although

parole was denied in 2003 for two years, the next parole review hearing was not held until two

years and six months later. Petitioner claims that the six-month delay, for which he did not

/ / / / /

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 07cv1709

receive any type of credit, violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights. (Mem. of

P.&A. in Supp. of Pet. at 35-38; Traverse at 2, Objections at 13-17.) 

As relevant to the context of this case, the Eighth Amendment forbids punishment grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003);

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). Under this standard, the Eighth Amendment is violated only

in extraordinary cases. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73, 77. 

Petitioner committed the commitment offense when he was 22. (Mem. of P.&A. in Supp.

of Pet. at 3.) Nevertheless, he had already accumulated a track record with the police. As a

juvenile he was twice arrested, once for vehicle theft and once for receiving stolen property, but

was counseled and released each time. (Pet. Ex. A at 39.) Later, his father reported him to the

police for stealing his pistol, for which Petitioner spent ninety days at juvenile hall. (Id.) As an

adult he was arrested for possession of a toxic substance such as glue or paint thinner with intent

to cause intoxication or similar condition, see Cal. Penal Code § 381, and spent thirty days in

jail. (Id. at 40.) Subsequently, he was arrested on a drug charge, was directed to a drug

diversion program and placed on probation without serving any time. (Id. at 40-41.) After that,

he was arrested pursuant to California Health and Safety Code Section 11378.5 for sniffing glue,

but the charge was rejected for lack of probable cause. (Id. at 41.) Petitioner admitted that his

commitment offense, first degree murder, which he committed while intoxicated (id. at 29), was

the culmination of his substance abuse problems (id. at 42). 

Even with a six month delay in consideration for parole, Petitioner’s sentence of 25 years

to life for first degree murder is not grossly disproportionate. A sentence of two consecutive

terms of 25 years to life under California’s Three Strikes Law was not found to violate the

Eighth Amendment for a petitioner convicted of petty theft for stealing videotapes valued at less

than $200. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66-68, 77. Prior to this sentence, Mr. Andrade was convicted

twice of misdemeanor theft, twice of transportation of marijuana and once of residential

burglary. Id. at 66-67. Based on the foregoing, the court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation to deny Petitioner’s delay claim to the extent it is based on the Eighth

Amendment.

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 07cv1709

Petitioner argued, initially and in his objections, that the six month delay without notice

or showing of good cause violated his due process rights. (Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. of Pet. at

35-38; Traverse at 2, Objections at 13-17.) The Magistrate Judge did not address the due

process grounds for the delay claim. To the extent the delay claim is based on due process, the

case is remanded to the Magistrate Judge for a supplemental report and recommendation.

Based on the foregoing, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED as modified

herein to the extent it recommends denial of Petitioner’s claims that denial of parole violated his

due process rights and that the six-month delay in the parole proceedings violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. The recommendation to deny the Petition in its entirety is REJECTED. 

The case is REMANDED to the Magistrate Judge for a supplemental report and

recommendation regarding Petitioner’s delay claim, but only to the extent the claim is based on

due process.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 22, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:07-cv-01709-L-NLS Document 18 Filed 12/22/08 Page 10 of 10