Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02857/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02857-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENNADIY SEVCHUK,

Petitioner,

vs.

MARION SPEARMAN, Warden,

Correctional Training Facility, Soledad,1

Respondent.

No. 2:12-cv-02857-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Gennadiy Sevchuk, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Sevchuk is in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility in

Soledad, California. Respondent has answered, and Sevchuk has replied. Also pending before

this Court is the petition for habeas relief filed by Sevchuk’s co-defendant, Mariya Stepanov, in

Stepanov v. Miller, Case No. 2:12-cv-02644-JKS. Sevchuk’s Petition raises many of the same

issues raised in Stepanov’s case.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On April 3, 2006, Sevchuk, along with co-defendants Stepanov and Maksim Isayev, was

charged with the first-degree murder of Dmitriy Paskar. The information alleged as a special

circumstance that the defendants intentionally killed Paskar while lying in wait. It further

alleged that Isayev personally used and discharged a firearm and that Sevchuk and Stepanov

1 Marion Spearman, Warden, Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, is substituted

for Matthew Cate, former Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c); Rule 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts; Stanley v. Cal. Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994).

Case 2:12-cv-02857-JKS Document 22 Filed 12/09/15 Page 1 of 34
were vicariously armed with the shotgun in the commission of the murder. On direct appeal of

Sevchuk’s conviction, the Court of Appeal recounted the following facts underlying the murder

charge:

The events surrounding this murder began when the victim slept with defendant

Stepanov and then bragged about it. Stepanov was very upset and told defendant Isayev,

her former boyfriend, what had happened. Isayev told his friend, defendant Sevchuk.

Defendant Sevchuk bought ammunition for Isayev’s shotgun and loaded the gun.

Isayev, Sevchuk and others drove to the victim’s home, intending to shoot the victim

when he came out of his house. However, when the victim made his appearance, he was

accompanied by his girlfriend and the assault did not occur because defendants did not

want any witnesses.

Isayev called Stepanov to report this kink in the plans, and told her to call the

victim to make arrangements to meet him late that night at a park. Stepanov did so.

When Isayev and Sevchuk drove up, Isayev saw the victim and Stepanov standing close

to together; the victim reached for Stepanov and groped her. Isayev got out of the car,

retrieved his loaded shotgun from the trunk, and approached the victim, asking Stepanov

if this was “the guy.” When Stepanov nodded, Isayev shot the victim twice and killed

him.

People v. Isayev, No. C055417, 2011 WL 2848584, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2011).

The defendants pled not guilty to the charge and denied the allegations. They were

jointly tried before separate juries. At trial, Isayev admitted shooting the victim, but he asserted

that it was in the heat of passion or due to provocation and he was therefore guilty only of

voluntary manslaughter. Stepanov claimed that she only wanted the victim to apologize and be

punished, and she never intended Isayev to kill Paskar. Sevchuk asserted that, although he was

at the scene of the murder, he was drunk and uninvolved in any plan to kill the victim. The

primary issues at trial were thus: 1) whether the murder was premeditated; and (2) whether

Sevchuk and Stepanov were liable as aiders and abettors for a murder that was the natural and

probable consequence of an intended assault.

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Evidence was presented at trial regarding Isayev’s reputation as a violent and jealous

person. It was also established that Sevchuk and Stepanov knew that Isayev had a gun and had

previously been involved in shooting incidents arising from jealousy. Witnesses described

hearing Isayev brag about the murder and make statements such as “[W]henever I do anything, I

do it 100 percent. I know what I'm doing.” He told one witness that he had aimed for the

victim’s head and killed him to stop him from raping girls.

Mikalai Yarmaliuk, the person who first drove the car to the victim’s house, also testified

for the prosecution. Yarmaliuk described Sevchuk loading the shotgun, the plan to shoot the

victim, the phone conversations between Isayev and Stepanov, and Isayev’s past violent conduct.

Yarmaliuk had suffered head injuries in an earlier accident, and the defendants challenged his

memory, emphasizing the inconsistencies in his testimony and his general credibility.

On March 13, 2007, Sevchuk’s jury found him guilty of second-degree murder and found

true the allegation that he was vicariously armed with a shotgun.2

 The trial court subsequently

sentenced him to 15 years to life imprisonment, enhanced by one year for being vicariously

armed with the shotgun.3

Through counsel, Sevchuk appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the trial court failed

to properly instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of

2 Stepanov’s jury also found her guilty of second-degree murder and found true the

allegation that she was vicariously armed with a shotgun. Isayev’s jury found him guilty of firstdegree murder and found true the allegation that he personally used and discharged a shotgun as

well as the special circumstance that he murdered Paskar while lying in wait.

3 Stepanov was also sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment, enhanced one year

for being vicariously armed with a shotgun. Isayev was sentenced to life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole, enhanced 25 years to life for the personal use and discharge of the

shotgun.

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proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) the court erred by instructing the jury on the natural and

probable consequences doctrine and defining simple assault as a target offense; 3) the trial court

abused its discretion and denied Sevchuk due process when it refused to exclude evidence of

another shooting; 4) the jury was erroneously instructed as to the burden of proof required for the

consideration of prior bad acts; 5) the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesserincluded offense of misdemeanor manslaughter; 6) jurors committed misconduct when they read

a newspaper article during deliberations; and 7) cumulative error warranted reversal of his

conviction. Sevchuk also joined in the arguments raised by his co-defendants, who also

appealed their convictions. On July 19, 2011, the California Court of Appeal struck one fine

levied against Isayev but otherwise affirmed the convictions in all respects in a reasoned,

unpublished opinion. Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *26. Sevchuk petitioned for review in the

California Supreme Court, raising his claims that the trial court erred by using simple assault as a

target offense under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trial court erred by

failing to exclude evidence of a dissimilar shooting, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the

jury on the lesser-included manslaughter offenses, and the jurors committed misconduct during

deliberations. He also joined in the arguments asserted by Stepanov and Isayev. The Supreme

Court summarily denied review with respect to all defendants on October 26, 2011.

Sevchuk then filed in the state supreme court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In

that petition, he argued that: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately interpret

unidentified “vital American English words” prior to trial and failing to adequately consult with

him regarding the consequences of rejecting a plea deal; 2) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to inform him that he would be deported if found guilty at trial; and 3) appellate counsel

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was ineffective for failing to raise “several vital issues” on direct appeal. The state supreme

court denied relief without comment on July 5, 2012.

Sevchuk timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on

November 15, 2012. In his Traverse, Sevchuk requests an evidentiary hearing and the

appointment of counsel.

II. GROUNDS/CLAIMS

In his pro se Petition before this Court, Sevchuk argues that: 1) his conviction was

obtained by the trial court’s wrongful use of simple assault as the target offense under the natural

and probable consequences doctrine; 2) the trial court failed to exclude evidence of a dissimilar

shooting; 3) the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of

voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; and 4) the jury committed misconduct during

deliberations; 5) defense counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. He also joins in any

successful arguments raised by his co-defendants on federal habeas review.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”

§ 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that

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are materially indistinguishable from a decision” of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives

at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). 

The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1)

“refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon

the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory

power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where

holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, “it

cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’” 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).

To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are

beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.

Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was

correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary

authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court’s interpretation and

application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state

court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536

U.S. 584 (2002).

In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under the AEDPA, the state court’s

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findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear

and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Erroneous Instructions (Grounds 1-2)

Sevchuk first argues that the trial court made two errors with respect to its charges to the

jury. Because jury instructions in state trial are typically matters of state law, federal courts are

bound by a state appellate court’s determination that a jury instruction was not warranted under

state law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that “a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on

direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”); see

also Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1995). An instructional error,

therefore, “does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.” 

Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

A challenged instruction violates the federal constitution if there is a “reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the

consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380

(1990). The question is whether the instruction, when read in the context of the jury charges as a

whole, is sufficiently erroneous to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Francis v. Franklin, 471

U.S. 307, 309 (1985). This Court must also assume in the absence of evidence to the contrary

that the jury followed those instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000);

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (noting the “almost invariable assumption of the

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law that jurors follow their instructions”); see Francis, 471 U.S. at 323-24 & n.9 (discussing the

subject in depth).

It is well-established that not only must the challenged instruction be erroneous but it

must violate some constitutional right, and it may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at

72. This Court must also bear in mind that the Supreme Court has admonished that the inquiry is

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way

that violates the constitution and that the category of infractions that violate “fundamental

fairness” is very narrowly drawn. Id. at 72-73. “Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in

the Bill of Rights, the Due Process clause has limited operation.” Id. Where the defect is the

failure to give an instruction, the burden is even heavier because an omitted or incomplete

instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than an instruction that misstates the law. See

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). In those cases, the inquiry is whether the trial

court’s refusal to give the requested instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” See id. at 156-57; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Moreover, even if

the trial court’s failure to give the instruction violated due process, habeas relief would still not

be available unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); California v. Roy, 519

U.S. 2, 5 (1996).

1. Natural and probable consequence

Sevchuk first argues that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the natural and probable

consequences doctrine by misstating California law and giving the instruction when it was not

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supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal denied Sevchuk’s claim that the

instruction was contrary to state law for the following reasons:

Defendant Sevchuk contends that the court erred in instructing the jury that aiding

and abetting liability could be predicated on simple assault or battery as well as assault

with a deadly weapon. Defendant Stepanov joins this claim. They assert that if, as the

prosecution argued, defendants should have known that Isayev would use a gun to assault

the victim, the crime defendants intended to aid and abet was assault with a deadly

weapon, not either of the lesser offenses. However, because the court instructed that the

predicate offense could be simple assault or battery, the jury may have convicted

defendants on one of these impermissible theories. There was no error.

Initially, we note that the prosecution argued a natural and probable consequences

theory of liability for defendants Stepanov and Sevchuk. In other words, although

defendants may have intended to aid and abet only an assault or battery, their knowledge

about Isayev gave rise to liability for murder as the natural and probable consequence of

their intent to aid these lesser offenses. Their claim on appeal seems inapplicable on its

face—the predicate offense could in fact have been simple assault or battery, with

liability for the greater crime arising from the application of a natural and probable

consequences theory. The court could therefore properly instruct the jury that simple

assault or battery could be the predicate offense.

Defendants’ arguments are otherwise unpersuasive as well. Citing cases such as

People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053–1054, defendants assert that

instructions on simple assault as a predicate offense are proper only in situations

involving escalating violence, such as in a gang dispute. While a gang situation is indeed

a common context for similar claims, defendants offer no authority for their apparent

belief that assault can be a predicate offense only in these situations. “A reasonably

foreseeable consequence is to be evaluated under all the factual circumstances of the

individual case [citation] and is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.” 

Defendants err in asserting that there was no evidence from which they “could

have portended that a shooting would flow from a simple assault or battery.” As we have

already discussed, the evidence established that a murder was the natural and probable

consequences of an assault on the victim. Even if Sevchuk and Stepanov intended that

Isayev only assault or frighten the victim, both defendants knew of Isayev’s violent

background and how he reacted when jealous. Sevchuk knew that Isayev had a gun in

the trunk and Sevchuk bought the ammunition with which the gun was loaded. Under

these circumstances, there was ample evidence that the murder was a natural and

probable consequence of whatever assault was planned. The trial court’s instructions

were proper. This conclusion also disposes of Sevchuk’s claim that the court erred in

denying his motion for new trial on this issue.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *11-12.

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The Court of Appeal similarly rejected Sevchuk’s and Stepanov’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support the theory that Paskar’s murder was the natural and probable

consequence of the planned assault:

Defendant Stepanov knew Isayev owned a shotgun, told others that Isayev had

previously shot at one of her former boyfriends out of jealousy, that Isayev had

previously killed someone. Defendant Sevchuk also knew that Isayev could be violent

when jealous. Sevchuk participated with Isayev in the Kutsenko shooting, loaded the

shotgun on the night of the murder and actively participated in the plan to shoot the gun

at the victim outside of the victim's house. Sevchuk drove to the park with Isayev, asked

if he needed assistance, and saw Isayev go to the trunk of the car, where Sevchuk knew

Isayev kept his shotgun. Given this evidence, the jury could conclude that even if

defendants Sevchuk and Stepanov intended to abet only an assault, the murder of the

victim was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that act. Defendants’ claims to the

contrary are unavailing.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *8.

As an initial matter, to the extent Sevchuk renews his claim that the court erred in

instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences theory of liability because it was

not warranted under California law, such claim is not reviewable by this Court. This Court is

bound by the state court’s determination that the natural and probable consequences doctrine

may be circumscribed by simple assault or battery if the charged offense of murder was a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the commission of the simple assault or battery. See

Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. Likewise, to the extent such claim is reviewable based upon a

potential denial of due process, it lacks merit as Sevchuk has not shown that the trial court

committed error under state law, much less an error of constitutional magnitude. See Spivey v.

Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1999) (court’s instruction on the natural and probable

consequences theory of liability was consistent with California law and did not otherwise violate

the defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial); see also Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092,

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1104 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The jury was properly instructed that if it was persuaded beyond a

reasonable doubt that [petitioner] was guilty as an aider and abettor of the contemplated

felonious assaults that were committed against members of a rival gang, he would also be liable

for the natural and probable consequences of those acts. The trial court did not err in reading

CALJIC 3.02 to the jury.”).4

The thrust of Sevchuk’s instructional error claim is that there was insufficient evidence to 

warrant a natural and probable consequences instruction, and thus insufficient evidence to

convict him of murder, because he could not have reasonably foreseen that Isayev would shoot

the victim. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson, the federal constitutional standard

for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the

original); see McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2010) (reaffirming this standard). This

Court must therefore determine whether the California court unreasonably applied Jackson. In

making this determination, this Court may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering

how it would have resolved any conflicts in the evidence, made the inferences, or considered the

evidence at trial. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. Rather, when “faced with a record of historical

4 The Court additionally notes that Sevchuk was convicted on an aiding and

abetting, and not a felony-murder, theory. As the Court of Appeal has explained, “[a]iding and

abetting is a distinct theory of homicide. Unlike the felony-murder theory, the question of guilt

as an aider and abettor is one of legal causation. ‘Thus, the ultimate factual question is whether

the perpetrator’s criminal act, upon which the aider and abettor’s derivative criminal liability is

based, was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ or the probable and natural consequence of a criminal act

encouraged or facilitated by the aider and abettor.’” People v. Escobar, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 883,

894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal.

2000).

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facts that supports conflicting inferences,” this Court “must presume–even if it does not

affirmatively appear in the record–that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

prosecution, and defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326.

It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the States possess primary authority

for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). 

Consequently, although the sufficiency of the evidence review by this Court is grounded in the

Fourteenth Amendment, it must take its inquiry by reference to the elements of the crime as set

forth in state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. A fundamental principle of our federal system

is “that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76

; see West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final

arbiter of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal

courts as defining state law . . . .”). “Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state

judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.” 

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345 (2006) (quoting Smith v. Philips, 455 U.S. 209,

221 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Jackson, this Court’s role is simply to determine whether there is any evidence, if

accepted as credible by the trier of fact, sufficient to sustain conviction. Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 330 (1995). The United States Supreme Court has recently even further limited a

federal court’s scope of review under Jackson, holding that “a reviewing court may set aside the

jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have

agreed with the jury.” Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam). Jackson “makes

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clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should

be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Id. at 3-4. Under Cavazos, “a federal court may not

overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because

the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the

state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.

766, 773 (2010)).

In this case, determination of whether a crime is the natural and probable consequence of

a target crime involves an objective, factual analysis. People v. Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1039

(Cal. 1996). The following factual analysis by the Court of Appeal is both reasonable and fully

supported by the record: 

Defendant Sevchuk also knew that Isayev could be violent when jealous. Sevchuk

participated with Isayev in the Kutsenko shooting, loaded the shotgun on the night of the

murder and actively participated in the plan to shoot the gun at the victim outside of the

victim's house. Sevchuk drove to the park with Isayev, asked if he needed assistance, and

saw Isayev go to the trunk of the car, where Sevchuk knew Isayev kept his shotgun.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *8.

A jury could have reasonably concluded that, based on Sevchuk’s knowledge and action,

it was objectively foreseeable that Isayev would shoot Paskar. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s

determination that “there was ample evidence that the murder was a natural and probable

consequence of whatever assault was planned,” id. at *12, was not unreasonable or contrary to

federal law. Sevchuk is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim in any event.

2. Lesser-included offenses

Sevchuk additionally contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on

lesser included offenses. Specifically, he renews his argument made on direct appeal that the

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trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor

manslaughter predicated on aiding and abetting Isayev’s brandishing of the firearm. The Court

of Appeal rejected this claim as follows:

Isayev testified that he was upset when he arrived at the park and saw the victim

with Stepanov, and was not thinking when he took the shotgun from the trunk of his car.

As he walked toward the pair, he asked Stepanov, “Is this the guy?” and Stepanov

nodded. Isayev was carrying the gun straight down at his side, pointing it toward the

ground. He yelled at Stepanov to move away, and as soon as she did, he leveled the gun

and shot the victim. After the victim fell to the ground, he immediately reloaded and shot

the victim a second time.

At no time did Isayev threaten the victim with the gun; he simply aimed and fired.

Because there was no evidence that Isayev brandished the weapon, there was no basis for

the trial court to instruct sua sponte on misdemeanor manslaughter, nor was there a basis

for defendant Sevchuk’s attorney to request such an instruction.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *16.

Sevchuk also asserts, as he and Stepanov did on direct appeal, that the trial court should

have instructed his jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal

rejected Sevchuk’s and Stepanov’s claims, reasoning:

Defendant Isayev argued that he shot the victim out of provocation and heat of

passion, and the court therefore instructed his jury on voluntary manslaughter. 

Defendants Stepanov and Sevchuk assert “[t]here is no reason why [defendants’] jurors

should not have been given the option of finding her guilty of voluntary manslaughter

also.” But there is: there was no evidence that defendants Stepanov or Sevchuk aided

and abetted Isayev out of provocation or heat of passion. While Stepanov was angry with

the victim and Sevchuk was drawn into a plan to extract revenge for the perceived

damage caused to Stepanov’s reputation, nothing occurred at the time of the shooting to

constitute provocation or heat of passion for either of these defendants. Isayev asserted

that he acted out heat of passion when he saw the victim grope Stepanov, but neither

Stepanov nor Sevchuk testified that they had the same reaction. Thus, while Isayev was

entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, there was no evidence that Stepanov

or Sevchuk acted out of heat of passion or provocation. Without this evidence, the court

had no obligation to instruct the Stepanov and Sevchuk juries on voluntary manslaughter.

Defendants’ argument is essentially a reframing of their claim that there was

insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that murder was a natural and probable

consequence of an assault. We have already rejected that claim and for the reasons

stated, reject their claim here as well.

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In a similar vein, defendants suggest that their juries should have been instructed

on involuntary manslaughter because an assault or battery, or conspiracy to commit these

crimes, can be a misdemeanor as well as a felony. This argument is again predicated on a

claim that defendants could not have foreseen that Isayev would be armed. As noted,

however, that predicate is faulty. This is not a situation like People v. Woods, supra, 8

Cal.App.4th at page 1588 in which we held that “in determining aider and abettor

liability for crimes of the perpetrator beyond the act originally contemplated, the jury

must be permitted to consider uncharged, necessarily included offenses where the facts

would support a determination that the greater crime was not a reasonably foreseeable

consequence but the lesser offense was such a consequence.” (Italics and underlining

added.) Here, the murder was a natural and probable consequence of an assault.

In short, if defendants Stepanov and Sevchuk were guilty at all, they were guilty

of murder. There was no evidence to support a voluntary or involuntary manslaughter

theory, and no basis for the trial court to instruct on these lesser included offenses.

Moreover, even if we were to assume otherwise, any error was harmless. The

evidence overwhelmingly established that defendants set up the confrontation between

Isayev and the victim at the deserted park and that defendants Stepanov and Sevchuk

knew of Isayev’s past history and violent reactions when jealous. There was no

reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had the

court included instructions on voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *16-17.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on a lesser included

offense in a capital case is constitutional error if there was evidence to support the instruction.

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, has not decided

whether to extend this rationale to non-capital cases. The Ninth Circuit, like several other

federal circuits, has declined to extend Beck to find constitutional error arising from the failure to

instruct on a lesser included offense in a non-capital case. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922,

929 (9th Cir. 2000); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he failure of

a state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in a non-capital case does not present a

federal constitutional question.”); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Failure of

a state court to instruct on a lesser offense fails to present a federal constitutional question and

will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”). Accordingly, the decision of the

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California courts denying Sevchuk relief as to this claim was not contrary to United States

Supreme Court authority as set forth in Beck. 

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the refusal by a court to instruct a

jury on lesser included offenses, when those offenses are consistent with defendant’s theory of

the case, may constitute a cognizable habeas claim” under clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent. Solis, 219 F.3d at 929. Here, however, as the Court of Appeal noted,

Sevchuk did not defend this case on a theory that he aided and abetted Isayev out of provocation

or heat of passion. Because an instruction on the lesser included offenses was not consistent

with Sevchuk’s defense and, as discussed by the Court of Appeal, was not supported by the

evidence, no due process violation arose from the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser

included offenses. See Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-1101 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

federal due process violation where defendant’s request for instruction on the only theory of

defense was denied); Solis, 219 F.3d at 929.

In addition to the possibility of demonstrating a due process violation based on the failure

to instruct on a theory of the defense, clearly established federal law provides that, in order to

establish a violation of his federal due process rights by the failure to give a requested jury

instruction, Sevchuk must demonstrate that the instruction should have been given, and that its

omission “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154. Here, Sevchuk has not carried this heavy burden because, as the

Court of Appeal noted, “[t]he evidence overwhelmingly established that the defendants set up

the confrontation between Isavey and the victim at the deserted park and that defendants

Stepanov and Sevchuk knew of Isayev’s past history and violent reactions when jealous.” 

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Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *17. It is thus clear that the failure to instruct in this regard could

not have had any adverse effect whatsoever on the jury’s decision, much less the “substantial and

injurious effect” required to show the error was harmful.5 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Accordingly,

Sevchuk is not entitled to relief on this instructional error claim.

B. Prior Bad Act (Ground 3)

Sevchuk additionally contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Isayev

committed a drive-by shooting at the home of Roman Kutsenko, an unrelated victim, in the

presence of Sevchuk. The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible as to Sevchuk

because it “[wa]s relevant, at a minimum, to show . . . knowledge of Isayev’s intent when they

went looking for Paskar, that is, that Isayev meant to shoot Paskar.” 

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal laid out the state law governing the admission of

such evidence:

[California] Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) provides that evidence

of other crimes is admissible to prove “some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge identity, absence of mistake or accident . . . ) other than his

or her disposition to commit such an act.” The admissibility of other crimes evidence

falls along a continuum depending on the purpose for which it is offered. Distinctive

common marks between the charged and uncharged offenses are required to prove

identity, “[a] somewhat lesser degree of similarity is required to show a common plan or

scheme and still less similarity is required to show intent.” A trial court’s ruling under

5 Other courts have admonished that harmless error review should not be confused

with the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry required under Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. See, e.g.,

Jensen v. Clements, 800 F.3d 892, 902 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015) (“Time and time again, the

Supreme Court has emphasized that a harmless-error inquiry is not the same as a review for

whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to support a verdict.”). The Court’s reliance on the

overwhelming evidence against Sevchuk in finding that any error was harmless does not simply

focus on the sufficiency of the other evidence, but rather properly “look[s] at the influence the

improperly admitted [evidence] had on the verdict,” in light of a “host of factors,” including the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id. at *11.

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Evidence Code section 1101 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. The same

standard applies to rulings under Evidence Code section 352.

. . . .

“‘“We have long recognized ‘that if a person acts similarly in similar situations,

he probably harbors the same intent in each instance’ [citations], and that such prior

conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The

inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the

inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second

event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution.”’” The same is true

of evidence relating to motive.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *4 (citations omitted).

The appellate court subsequently denied Sevchuk’s claim that the evidence of the

Kutsenko shooting should have been excluded because the two events were not sufficiently

similar to be probative on the issues of intent and motive and the evidence was unduly

prejudicial and inflammatory:

Defendants focus on the factual differences between the charged offense and the

Kutsenko shooting, but fail to recognize the overarching similarities between the events.

In each case, a jealous Isayev used a gun to attack someone who had made advances to a

former girlfriend. Notwithstanding the different particulars of each shooting, Isayev

reacted the same way in each case. His violent behavior under the same general

circumstances was sufficiently similar to warrant admission under Evidence Code section

1101.

In a related argument, defendants contend that the probative value of this

evidence was minimal because the witnesses who testified about the Kutsenko shooting

were unreliable and gave conflicting and contradictory accounts of what occurred. But

witness credibility is a matter for the jury’s determination. Defendants challenged the

witnesses and emphasized the discrepancies in their testimony. The fact that the juries

resolved these credibility issues against defendants does not equate to error.

Defendants also contest the admissibility of the Kutsenko shooting under

Evidence Code section 352. For the reasons just explained, we reject the claim that the

witnesses were so unreliable that their testimony should have been excluded.

Equally unavailing is the contention that evidence of the Kutsenko shooting was

highly inflammatory and unduly prejudicial. This evidence, involving a drive-by

shooting at a residence in which no one was injured, is far less inflammatory than the

charged offense involving the close range shooting and murder of the victim.

In arguing otherwise, defendants note that Yarmaliuk identified Sevchuk as the

shooter in the Kutsenko incident, and assert that the jury was likely to be influenced “to

punish Sevchuk because of their emotional reaction to his earlier misconduct.” Thus,

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they argue, the evidence was inflammatory. We must disagree. The jury knew that

Sevchuk was involved in the Kutsenko shooting one way or the other and the jury

certainly would not be more inclined to hold the incident against him if he was the

shooter than if he was not. This bit of testimony does not change our analysis of the

admissibility of the evidence against him.

“ ‘[All] evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the

defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice”

referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to

evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little

effect on the issues. In applying section 352 “prejudicial” is not synonymous with

“damaging.”’”

The trial court acted well within its discretion in rejecting defendants’ challenges

and admitting evidence of the Kutsenko shooting.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *4-5 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has acknowledged its “traditional reluctance to impose constitutional

restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,

689 (1986). The Supreme Court has further made clear that federal habeas power does not allow

granting relief on the basis of a belief that the state trial court incorrectly interpreted the state

evidence code in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). On direct appeal, the appellate court determined that, in line with the

California Evidence Code and state case law, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the

Kutsenko shooting. This Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of California state

law. Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. 

Moreover, the United State Supreme Court has left open the question of whether state

law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of prior crimes evidence to

show propensity to commit a charged crime. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (“[W]e express no

opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of

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‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.”); Mejia v. Garcia, 534

F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008). As such, the Ninth Circuit has routinely found federal habeas

relief to be foreclosed by § 2254(d)(1) for claims challenging the admission of evidence of prior

bad acts or crimes. See, e.g., Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008); Alberni

v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006). 

While habeas relief may be warranted for the admission of prejudicial evidence if the

admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a denial of due process, Estelle, 502 U.S. at

72, Sevchuk fails to make such a showing. The Ninth Circuit has upheld the admission of prior

crimes or bad acts where (1) there is sufficient proof that defendant committed the prior act; (2)

the prior act is not too remote in time, (3) the prior act is similar (if admitted to show intent); (4)

the prior act is used to prove a material element; and (5) the probative value is not substantially

outweighed by prejudice. See Walters v. Maas, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1995)

(upholding state admission of prior bad acts on federal habeas review). 

These factors are all present in this case. As the Court of Appeal noted in its opinion, the

incidents occurred a couple of weeks apart, and numerous witnesses identified both Isayev and

Sevchuk in the drive-by shooting. The Court also agrees with the state court that the degree of

similarity was sufficient to show intent (and, on Sevchuk’s part, knowledge of Isayev’s intent). 

Moreover, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, California Evidence Code § 352 requires the trial

judge to balance the probative value of proffered evidence with its potential prejudicial effect. 

Such a balancing requirement safeguards due process vis-à-vis the admission of uncharged

offenses under Cal. Evid.Code § 1008. See, e.g., Mejia, 534 F.3d at 1047 n.5. The record shows

that the trial judge conducted that balancing analysis pursuant to § 352 before admitting the

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challenged evidence. Finally, the court instructed the jurors with CALCRIM No. 375, which

told jurors they could consider the prior uncharged act only for a specific purpose and not

generally on the question of whether Sevchuk had criminal propensities or was a person of bad

character. For the foregoing reasons, Sevchuk cannot prevail on this claim.

C. Juror Misconduct (Ground 4)

Sevchuk also contends that he did not receive a fair trial because certain members of his

jury learned that Stepanov had been convicted before his jury returned a verdict. In this case,

there was a joint trial, but Sevchuk, Stepanov, and Isayev all had different juries. This was done

so that certain evidence could be introduced against one or two defendants while the jury for the

defendant or defendants to whom the evidence was not relevant could be excused. Notably, as a

result of this procedure, the juries presumably understood that the evidence against each of the

defendants differed and that each of the defendants defended their case on different theories. 

The Court of Appeal considered and rejected Sevchuk’s juror misconduct claim on direct appeal

as follows:

Defendant Sevchuk contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

mistrial after the jurors in his case, while still in deliberations, read a newspaper article

about the Stepanov verdict.

The Sevchuk jury began its deliberations on February 26, 2007. On Saturday,

March 10, 2007, the Sacramento Bee ran a story on the front page of its “Metro” section

reporting that the Stepanov jury had convicted Stepanov of second degree murder. The

article included a photograph of Stepanov and the headline, “Woman convicted of

revenge killing.”

On the following Monday (March 12), the Sevchuk jury asked the court to clarify

its instructions on second degree murder. Defendant Sevchuk made a “pending mistrial

motion,” and asked to have the court question the jurors to see if they had seen or been

influenced by the newspaper article. The court noted that earlier questions from the jury

had also related to second degree murder issues, but it agreed to grant defendant

Sevchuk’s request to poll the jury.

The court questioned each juror individually. Juror No. 1 saw the headline in the

article and the word “convicted” but did not read the article. No one else on the jury tried

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to discuss the article with her. Juror No. 2 did not know that there had been an article or

a verdict, but was aware that the Isayev and Stepanov juries were no longer in the

courthouse. Juror Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 heard someone in the courthouse mention

the article and/or that Stepanov's jury had reached a verdict. They knew nothing about

the substance of the article, and none of them thought their limited knowledge would

affect deliberations in any way. Juror No. 8 reported that a coworker saw him with the

newspaper, warned him not to read the Metro section and took that section from him.

Juror No. 9 said that someone riding light rail mentioned the article but did not relate the

substance of the article.

Juror No. 12 informed the court that she saw a friend over the weekend who told

her that there had been an article in the paper and that Stepanov had been found guilty.

Juror No. 12 replied that she “wasn’t supposed to know anything,” and there was no

further conversation. Juror No. 12 told her fellow jurors that morning that a friend had

told her there had been an article in the paper, but did not give any further details.

Apparently, this disclosure was made after jurors wondered why they were being called

individually into the courtroom. Juror No. 12 said the jurors had noticed that the juries

from the other two defendants were no longer in the courthouse. Juror No. 12 said that

her limited knowledge about the article would not affect her deliberations.

Defendant Sevchuk moved for a mistrial based on jury misconduct. The trial

court denied the motion, ruling, “There has been no showing of misconduct. I know . . .

that you are inferring something from their comments that is of concern to you; but I

don’t make that inference. I felt the jurors were forthright and honest. [¶] I don’t

believe that the mere fact that a couple of them know that there was a verdict in the

Stepanov case, a guilty verdict, is going to contain [sic] whatever verdict, if any, that this

jury reaches, so your motion for mistrial is denied.”

[Sevchuk] challenges this ruling on appeal.

“While it is well settled that it is misconduct for a juror to read newspaper

accounts of a case on which he or she is sitting, and that receiving impressions from

sources other than evidence received at trial raises a presumption of prejudice, this

presumption of prejudice may be rebutted.” A verdict will be set aside only if there is

substantial likelihood of juror bias, either because the extraneous material is inherently

likely to have influenced the juror, or the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding

circumstances establish it is substantially likely that a juror was actually biased against

the defendant.

Here, we question whether any misconduct occurred. One juror inadvertently saw

the headline and a few others reported being told of a verdict in the Stepanov case. None

of the jurors read the article itself. One juror mentioned to others that an article had

appeared, but the details were not divulged (and were not known to that juror). Two of

the jurors knew that Stepanov had been convicted, but nothing more. If there was any

misconduct, the presumption of prejudice was rebutted as there was no likelihood of juror

bias. The jurors had extremely limited information about the article and all of it related

to a codefendant, not Sevchuk. The jurors asserted that their passing knowledge of the

article would not affect their deliberations or their ability to be fair. Under these

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circumstances, the court acted well within its discretion in denying defendant Sevchuk’s

motion for mistrial.

Isayev, 2011 WL 2848584, at *20-21.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a “fair trial by a panel

of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see Dyer v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.1998). “In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a

criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against a

defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial

protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.” 

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965); see also Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227,

1238 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury

verdict to be based on the evidence produced at trial.” (citing Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484,

1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d

383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc))).

Thus, the Ninth Circuit has “consistently recognized that the Sixth Amendment prohibits

jurors from introducing matters into the deliberations not present during the trial.” Fields v.

Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 793 (9th Cir. 2007); see Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.

1980) (explaining that a jury’s consideration of extrinsic material is a constitutional violation). 

There is a potential for prejudice when a juror “interjects into deliberations ‘objective extrinsic

facts’ regarding the accused because that juror becomes an unsworn witness who is not subject

to either confrontation or cross-examination.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). No bright line exists for determining whether a petitioner has suffered

prejudice from juror misconduct; therefore, reviewing courts “place great weight on the nature of

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the extraneous information that has been introduced into deliberations.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“The inquiry into a jury’s consideration of extrinsic evidence does not end at whether

misconduct occurred; upon a finding of misconduct, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice

applies.” Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The United States Supreme Court has “long held that the remedy for allegations of juror

partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1954)

(remanding case to district court to “hold a hearing to determine whether the incident

complained of was harmful to the petitioner”). 

While Sevchuk may be complaining that the inquiry was done by polling the jurors in a

manner less formal than a full-fledged hearing, the United States Supreme Court does not require

the partiality hearing to be conducted in a specific manner. Smith, 455 U.S. at 217-18. The

Ninth Circuit has applied the Smith hearing requirement to a variety of situations and concluded

that “[a]s long the fact-finding process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented,

the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of

correctness.” Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 807 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Dyer, 151 F.3d at 974-

75). 

Here, the record shows that the trial court questioned each juror individually, after which

Sevchuk was able to argue that he was prejudiced by extraneous information. The Court finds

that the trial court’s handling of the allegations of juror bias and Sevchuk’s motion for a new

trial were reasonable and in accordance with clearly established federal law. The trial court’s

fact finding process was “objective and reasonably explored the issues presented [and,

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therefore,] the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a

presumption of correctness.” Hedlund, 750 F.3d at 807. Sevchuk did not establish actual bias,

that is “a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person [did] not act with entire

impartiality.” Olsen, 704 F.3d at 1189. Because Sevchuk was given an opportunity to establish

actual bias and the trial court’s factual determinations were reasonable and supported by the

record, the appellate court’s decision to deny Sevchuk’s claim was not contrary to, and did not

involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of fact. Sevchuk is therefore not entitled to relief on this ground.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Ground 5)

Sevchuk further alleges that his trial counsel did not adequately convey a plea offer and

failed to advise him that he could be deported if found guilty after trial. According to Sevchuk:

On at least three separate occasions prior to trial, Petitioner was brought to court

for purposes of negotiating possible plea agreements. Petitioner’s trial attorney obtained

a Russian-speaking interpreter for Petitioner during the plea proceedings. However, the

interpreter visibly struggled while trying to translate to Petitioner everything that was

being said during the proceedings. The judge, the prosecutor, and Petitioner’s attorney

spoke too rapidly for the interpreter to be able to keep up and/or with more complexity

than the interpreter could adequately convey to Petitioner.

Not until getting to prison and meeting another Russian-speaking inmate did

Petitioner finally become fully made aware that the prosecution and/or the trial court had

offered him a sentence of between 5-11 years if he would have pled guilty and not taken

his case to trial.

Had Petitioner’s attorney properly conveyed to Petitioner the potential length of

time in prison he would face if he were to lose at trial, Petitioner would have been much

more inclined to seriously consider and accept the idea of pleading guilty in exchange for

the offered terms of 5-11 years rather than what potentially could be the remainder of his

life upon getting convicted by a jury.

Petitioner’s attorney also did not advise or otherwise inform Petitioner in any

manner whatsoever that if he took his case to trial and lost, rather than accept the plea

offers of 5-11 years, he would face being deported back to Russia upon completing his

resulting term.

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Sevchuk raised this claim in his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which

was summarily denied.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, a

defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one

in which “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.

The Supreme Court has explained that, if there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome might have been different as a result of a legal error, the defendant has established

prejudice and is entitled to relief. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012); Glover v.

United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Williams, 529 U.S. at 393-95. Where a habeas

petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the Strickland prejudice

standard is applied and federal courts do not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht

harmlessness standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n.7 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Musalin

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this rubric, in reviewing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in a federal habeas proceeding:

The question “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination” under the Strickland standard “was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” And, because the

Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Runningeagle v.

Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 775 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Thus, Sevchuk must show that his trial counsel’s representation was not within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and there is a reasonable probability

that, but for either counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result would have been different. See Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied if

the petitioner fails to make a sufficient showing under either of the Strickland prongs. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (courts may consider either prong of the test first and need not

address both prongs if the defendant fails on one).

The Strickland standard also applies to claims of ineffective assistance during the plea

bargain process. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (“During plea negotiations, defendants are

‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson,

397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Specifically, “a defendant has the right to make a reasonably

informed decision whether to accept a plea offer.” See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880

(9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty

to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that

may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); see also

United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n attorney’s failure to

communicate the government’s plea offer to his client constitutes unreasonable conduct under

prevailing professional standards.”). To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel

“where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, [a

petitioner] must demonstrate a reasonable probability” (1) he “would have accepted the earlier

plea offer”; and (2) “the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the

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trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state

law.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.

In this case, Sevchuk relies solely on his own statement in his Petition to establish the

existence of a formal plea offer. According to Sevchuk, another Russian-speaking inmate

somehow later informed him that Sevchuk had been offered a plea deal that, he alleges, would

have carried no deportation consequences. He does not indicate in either his Petition or Traverse

that he undertook any investigation into whether there was a formal plea offer, of which he was

not earlier aware.

Sevchuk has thus failed to make the requisite showing of deficient performance based on

trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately convey a formal plea offer. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at

1408 (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the

prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” 

Sevchuk does not cite any evidence from the trial record to establish that a 5- to 11-year plea

offer was actually conveyed to the defense. Nor does he proffer sworn statements from the

district attorney or trial counsel regarding the existence of the alleged offer. Sevchuk’s

self-serving statements in his Petition and Traverse consist of multiple layers of hearsay and fail

to identify the specific terms of a plea bargain. See id. at 1409 (“[T]he fact of a formal offer

means that its terms and its processing can be documented so that what took place in the

negotiation process becomes more clear if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier

pretrial negotiations.”). Indeed, Sevchuk’s vague reference to an offer of a 5- to 11-year

imprisonment term if he pleaded “guilty” fails to indicate the charge to which he would have

pleaded guilty.

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Likewise, although Sevchuk avers that his poor English comprehension interfered with

his understanding of the proceedings, the record suggests otherwise. That record indicates that

Sevchuk rejected the assistance of an interpreter for most of the trial, and he stated to law

enforcement during an interview that, while he was most comfortable speaking in Russian, he

spoke and understood both Russian and English. Indeed, Sevchuk had at least two lengthy

conversations with law enforcement on record, the transcripts of which do not reflect that

Sevchuk had difficulty understanding the conversation.

Moreover, even assuming that the prosecutor did make such a plea offer and that trial

counsel failed to adequately apprise Sevchuk of that offer, Sevchuk fails to show prejudice

because he has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the trial court would have

approved a 5- to 11-year plea agreement with no immigration consequences in light of the firstdegree murder charge and vicarious armed with a shotgun enhancement that Sevchuk was

facing. See id. at 1410 (“a defendant has no right to be offered a plea, . . . nor a federal right that

the judge accept it”) (citations omitted); see In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 758 (Cal. 1992) (the

trial court’s approval of a plea agreement “must represent an informed decision in furtherance of

the interests of society” that must not be “arbitrarily abdicate[d]”).

Sevchuk thus has failed to meet his burden of showing that “there was no reasonable

basis” for the state court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and he is not

entitled to habeas relief on that claim either.

E. Joinder (Ground 6)

Finally, Sevchuk “joins and incorporates by reference all arguments that inure to his

benefit which have been or are to someday be raised by Maksim Isayev and/or Mariya Stepanov

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in any federal habeas corpus or other petition(s) which already are or in the future will be filed

with and heard by this Court.” Respondent contends that this pleading is improper because it

“does not allege the kind of harm federal habeas is designed to redress.” In his Traverse,

Sevchuk argues that a federal court has wide discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy, and

the Court should exercise this discretion to prevent a miscarriage of justice in the event that his

co-defendants are granted relief, which would result in Sevchuk “being more severely punished

or held more accountable than the actual killer(s) of Dmitriy Paskar.”

In California state courts, appellants are permitted to join in, or adopt by reference, all or

part of the appellate arguments raised by another party in the same or a related appeal. See CAL.

CT. R. 8.200(a)(5). The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

Courts, however, do not permit such joinder arguments. Rather, a federal habeas “petition must:

(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; [and] (2) state the facts

supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c)(1)-(2), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts. Pleadings from pro se prisoners are meant to be liberally construed. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). “Despite this liberal construction, pro

se petitioners are nevertheless bound by the most basic rules of procedure with respect to their

pleadings.” Cortez v. Clark, No. 10-cv-0147, 2011 WL 883019, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14,

2011) (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1987)). “By joining in and adopting

‘any’ arguments that might be beneficial to him, Petitioner fails to articulate a claim, and

underlying supporting facts, specific to himself.” Id. Accordingly, Sevchuk’s joinder claim fails

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to state facts sufficient to allege a federal constitutional violation, and he is not entitled to relief

on it.6

F. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Traverse, Sevchuk further requests an evidentiary hearing for all of his claims. A

district court may not hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim for which a petitioner failed to

develop a factual basis in state court unless the petitioner shows that: (1) the claim relies either

on (a) a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on

collateral review, or (b) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence, and (2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact

finder would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Where the failure to develop the factual basis for the claim in the state court proceedings is not

attributable to the petitioner, to receive an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must make a

colorable claim for relief and meet one of the factors set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293

(1963). Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2005). In Townsend, the

Supreme Court concluded that a federal habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on

his factual allegations if: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state

hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and

6 It should also be noted that the only co-defendant before this Court is Stepanov,

and in its decision issued contemporaneously with Sevchuk’s decision, she was not granted

relief. It appears that Isayev has filed a petition for relief in the Eastern District of California,

see Case No. 2:12-cv-02551-JAM-KJN, but his case is not before this Court.

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fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material

facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears

that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at

670 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1 (1992).

As discussed above, Sevchuk has failed to assert a colorable claim for relief as to any of

his claims. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding an evidentiary

hearing is not required on issues which can be resolved on the basis of the state court record).

Because he does not cite to new laws or underlying facts that were not developed on the record

before the state courts with respect to those claims, he has also failed to satisfy his burden of

proof under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). And with respect to his claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to convey an alleged plea offer, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required

on allegations that are ‘conclusory and wholly devoid of specifics.’” Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d

662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 589

(9th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nsupported, unsworn, and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient

basis for an evidentiary hearing”). Sevchuk’s request for an evidentiary hearing must therefore

be denied. 

G. Appointment of Counsel

Sevchuk also moves in his Traverse for the Court to appoint him legal counsel. While

this Court is not unmindful of the plight of unrepresented state prisoners in federal habeas

proceedings, there is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. See

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

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756-57 (1991)). Appointment of counsel is not required in a habeas corpus proceeding in the

absence of an order granting discovery or an evidentiary hearing. See Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts, Rule 6(a), 8(c). This Court may under the Criminal

Justice Act appoint counsel in this case if it determines that the interests of justice so require. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(h); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); see Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th

Cir. 1983) (“In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court

must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.”). Because

this case has been fully briefed, and the Court has now considered and adjudicated it on the

merits and determined that no Certificate of Appealability should be granted, this Court does not

so determine. Sevchuk’s request for counsel is therefore also denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Sevchuk is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition, and he is not entitled

to an evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Sevchuk’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and 

appointment of counsel are denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) (“To obtain

a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must ‘demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree

with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the

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issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” (quoting Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 327)). Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); 9TH CIR. R. 22-1.

The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.

Dated: December 8, 2015.

 /s/James K. Singleton, Jr. 

 JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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