Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-320(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JUDI JACKSON,

NO. CIV. S-05-79 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, a political

subdivision of the State of

California, et al., 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for

certification of this court’s May 15, 2007 order, granting

partial summary judgment in favor of defendants, for

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b). For the reasons

set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.1

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Case 2:05-cv-00079-FCD-KJM Document 128 Filed 07/24/07 Page 1 of 9
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2 Relating to the seizure of her property, plaintiff

brought a procedural due process claim, an unlawful search and

(continued...)

2

BACKGROUND

 On November 6, 2000, defendant Placer County Animal Control

seized twenty-eight horses, along with a number of other small

animals and a filing cabinet, from plaintiff. (Mem. & Order,

filed May 15, 2007 (“M&O”), at 6.) The seizure followed a number

of interactions between Placer County Animal Control

representatives and plaintiff regarding the perceived poor health

and treatment of plaintiff’s horses. (See M&O at 4-6.) Criminal

charges of animal cruelty, perjury, and presenting false evidence

in an administrative hearing were filed against plaintiff in

criminal proceedings that, in their entirety, lasted from

December 5, 2000 to March 15, 2004. (M&O at 9-10.) While the

horses were in defendants’ possession, four of the horses died of

natural causes or were euthanized, and two of the horses were

transferred to other parties. (M&O at 11-12.)

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on January 13,

2005. (M&O at 16.) The gravamen of plaintiff’s claims relate to

the seizure of her horses in November of 2000 and the subsequent

transfer of two of her horses to other individuals while the

horses were in defendant Placer County’s custody. On May 15,

2007, the court granted partial summary judgment against

plaintiff. 

The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for relief brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to the seizure of her

property in November 2000. The court found that these claims2

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2(...continued)

seizure claim, and a claim for failure to supervise or train. 

(M&O at 17.) 

3 Section 945.3 provides, in pertinent part: “Any

applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting [an

action against a peace officer or the public entity employing a

peace officer based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to

the offense for which the accused is charged] shall be tolled

during the period that the charges are pending before a superior

(continued...)

3

are barred by California’s statute of limitations for personal

injury torts. (M&O at 15.) The dismissed claims were premised

upon the alleged violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process rights, relating to her failure to receive

pre-seizure notice or a hearing before her horses were seized,

and violation of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unlawful search and seizure. (See M&O at 15-17.) 

 Plaintiff’s claims relating to the transfer of ownership of

two of her horses by Placer County survived. As to this conduct

by defendants, plaintiff withstood summary judgment on her claim

for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

rights brought pursuant to Section 1983, as well as her state law

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. (M&O

at 38.)

Despite failing to raise the argument in opposition to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff now argues

that the statute of limitations for the dismissed Section 1983

claims should have been tolled during the pendency of the

criminal proceedings, pursuant to California Government Code 

§ 945.3.3 Plaintiff contends that by application of the tolling

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3(...continued)

court.”

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provision in Section 945.3, she meets the one-year statute of

limitations for these claims. For this reason, plaintiff seeks

certification to authorize an interlocutory appeal from the order

granting summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

STANDARD

The general rule is that an appellate court should not

review a district court ruling until after entry of a final

judgment. Coopers & Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978);

In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.

1982), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S.

1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is, however, an

exception to this general rule:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal for the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking certification of an

interlocutory appeal has the burden to show the presence of those

exceptional circumstances. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-

75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to

be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An issue

is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on appeal could

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materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district

court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing

U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). 

Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of

opinion on that issue. A party’s strong disagreement with the

court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a “substantial

ground for difference;” the proponent of an appeal must make some

greater showing. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F.

Supp. 656, 667 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Third, an

interlocutory appeal must be likely to materially speed the

termination of the litigation. This factor is linked to whether

an issue of law is “controlling” in that the court should

consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the

management of the case. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that “whether the statute of limitations

applicable to claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 was tolled

during the pendency of the related criminal prosecution” is a

controlling issue of law for the purposes of certification for

interlocutory appeal. (Pl.’s Motion, filed June 8, 2007

(“Mot’n”), 2:14-16.) Defendants disagree and argue that

permitting an interlocutory appeal will not materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation. (Opp’n, filed June

25, 2007, at 3-4). 

The court agrees with defendants that the statute of

limitations issue does not present a “controlling issue of law”

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because resolution of that issue on appeal will not materially

affect the issues that remain to be litigated in this court. 

Plaintiff’s surviving claims concern the transfer of ownership of

plaintiff’s two horses while in the County’s custody. These

claims are factually independent of the dismissed Section 1983

claims, which pertain to the initial seizure of plaintiff’s

property. The sufficiency of process preceding the seizure of

plaintiff’s property is an independent issue from the alleged

mishandling of plaintiff’s property after it was under the

control of Placer County Animal Control. The two issues can

therefore be litigated independently. Because the applicability

of the tolling provision in Section 945.3 does not have any

bearing on the outcome of the remaining claims, it is not a

controlling issue of law such that it “materially affect[s] the

outcome of litigation in the district court.” In re Cement

Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. 

Because plaintiff cannot meet her burden as to this initial

requirement for interlocutory appeal, her motion is properly

denied on this basis alone. However, the court finds that

plaintiff also cannot sustain her burden on the other requisite

elements. 

Plaintiff argues that interlocutory appeal will materially

advance the ultimate determination of the litigation because, if

overturned on appeal, the dismissed Section 1983 claims will

require a jury trial. Thus, plaintiff contends the resources of

the court and the parties are better utilized on one trial rather

than the possibility of two trials. (Mot’n at 4.) However, the

applicable requirement is that the appeal must materially advance

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the termination of litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As

noted above, plaintiff’s dismissed Section 1983 claims are

factually independent from the remaining claims, which pertain to

the transfer of plaintiff’s horses. For this reason, the extant

claims in this case would not need to be retried even if the

partial summary judgment is overturned on appeal. The dismissed

Section 1983 claims could be litigated separately at that time. 

Because the dismissed Section 1983 claims are independent of the

claims that remain in this case, plaintiff has not met her burden

to show that interlocutory appeal will materially advance the

termination of this litigation. See Coopers & Lyband, 437 U.S.

at 474-75. 

Finally, as to the requirement of substantial ground for

difference of opinion on the issue, plaintiff cites Torres v.

City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224 (9th Cir. 1997), and Harding v.

Galceron, 889 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1989), to support her argument

that California Government Code § 945.3 operates to toll the

limitation period for a Section 1983 claim in a federal district

court during the pendancy of a related criminal case. (Mot’n at

3). While said statute and case law may provide some support for

tolling the statute of limitations in this case, plaintiff’s

citation to Section 945.3 and reliance on these cases is, at this

juncture, procedurally improper. In opposition to defendants'

motion for summary judgment on the issue of the statute of

limitations, "plaintiff [failed to] cite to any legal precedent."

(M&O at 16.) Instead, the entirety of plaintiff's argument in

response to defendants’ assertion of a statute of limitations

defense was as follows:

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Plaintiff does not dispute defendants [sic] statement

of the statute of limitations in this action. 

Plaintiff further agrees that federal law determines

when a civil rights claim accrues. [Citation omitted.]

As a general rule claims for deprivation of procedural

due process rights accrue when plaintiff would have

notice of the allegedly wrongful acts being challenged.

[Citation omitted.] However, each of the cases cited by

defendants address the issue of statute of limitations

and the accrual of a due process claim in cases which

did not also involve an ongoing criminal prosecution

which in this case, would in and of itself give rise to

additional issues regarding the process which was due

the plaintiff at the time of the alleged wrongdoing by

the defendants. 

Defendants have presented no facts, or evidence, which

definitively support the statement, “Therefore, this

claim accrued on November 6, 2000 and the failure to

file suit on or before November 7, 2001 bars the

claim.” [Citation omitted.]

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, filed March 9, 2007, at 12-13). 

Plaintiff's argument was barely intelligible and clearly did not

proffer any legal authority to support application of a tolling

provision. It was not incumbent on the court to find the law for

plaintiff. Summary judgment was thus properly granted in

defendants favor on the issue. 

Because plaintiff did not raise this argument for

application of Section 945.3 to her claims in opposing

defendants’ motion, she cannot now argue that said statute

provides her grounds for interlocutory appeal of the court's

order. If plaintiff has a remedy at all, said remedy would lie

in a motion for reconsideration, asking this court to consider

whether its order dismissing her claims was in "clear error" in

light of these authorities. Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b);

School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). However, while the court cannot

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preclude plaintiff from bringing such a motion, it does not

invite plaintiff to do so. Based on plaintiff's factual showing

on the motion for summary judgment, it is not apparent that she

could demonstrate Section 945.3's applicability. Nevertheless,

in assessing whether there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion as to the court’s determination that plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the court cannot

find that plaintiff has met her burden on this element either, as

she raises arguments and legal authority now which were never

presented to the court in issuing its order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for

certification of the court’s May 15, 2007 order, granting partial

summary judgment in favor of defendants, for interlocutory appeal

is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2007 

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