Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00238/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00238-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:160(1) National Labor Relations Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN B. REICHARD, Regional

Director of the Thirty-Second

Region of the National Labor

Relations Board, for and on

behalf of the National Labor

Relations Board,

 Petitioner,

 v. 

FOSTER POULTRY FARMS,

 Respondent.

1:06-CV-0238 OWW LJO

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

(29 U.S.C. § 160(j)) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Alan B. Reichard (“Petitioner”), Director of the

Thirty-Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board, on

behalf of the Board petitions for a temporary injunction under

Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(j), requiring Respondent Foster Poultry Farms

(“Respondent”) to recognize and bargain with the League of

Independent Workers (“the League”) during the time the National

Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) considers the

pending unfair labor practice complaint against Respondent. 

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Respondent opposes the motion. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On February 24, 2006, the Board unanimously authorized

Petitioner to seek a 10(j) injunction against Respondent pending

the NLRB’s decision in the administrative hearing case. Doc. 2,

Mem. in Supp, 2. The petition and memorandum in support were

filed on March 1, 2006. Doc. 1, Pet.; Doc. 2, Mem. in Supp. The

memorandum in opposition was filed by Respondent on March 15,

2006. Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp. The reply was filed on March 17,

2006. Doc. 38, Reply. 

III. BACKGROUND

Respondent is a family-owned-and-operated business engaged

in the production of poultry products. Respondent was founded in

1939 and has been headquartered in Livingston, California since

the 1950s. Over 2,400 employees work at the Livingston facility. 

In 2003, Respondent’s Livingston employees were represented by

the United Food and Commercial Workers. In 2003, the bargaining

unit employees voted to decertify the UFCW. 

The League of Independent Workers was formed in 2004 to

represent Respondent’s workers. Ralph Meraz is the League’s

primary spokesman. 

On or about November 7 and 8, 2004, the League and the UFCW

participated in an election to represent various employees of

Respondent at the Livingston facility. Two thousand four of

2,303 eligible voters cast ballots in the November 2004

representation election. Of the 2,004 votes cast in the

election, 1,151 employees cast ballots for the League and 142

employees for the UFCW. Seven hundred six employees voted

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against union representation of any kind. The Board certified

the League as Respondent’s employees’ bargaining representative 

shortly thereafter in 2004. 

Respondent recognized the League and began labor

negotiations. The parties met on at least a dozen occasions over

the next six months. Meraz negotiated on behalf of the League. 

Negotiations reached impasse in early May 2005. No contract was

in place. 

The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers (“IAM”) is an international organization with over

730,000 members across North America. District Lodge 190 of the

IAM represents over 14,000 workers in California and Nevada who

perform craft and trade work. District Lodge 190 has assets

totaling over $500,000 and is governed by its own constitution

and bylaws as well as the IAM constitution and bylaws. 

The League conducted an affiliation vote on September 11,

2005, to determine whether it would affiliate with the IAM. Any

current employee at the Livingston plant was allowed to vote. 

Aff. & Ex., 3, 25. Of the roughly two thousand eligible voters,

id., 21, 25, nine hundred forty-three employees voted, id., 25. 

Nine hundred eighteen votes were cast in favor of affiliation,

twenty-one against, and there were four blank ballots. Id., 25,

51. After the affiliation vote, the IAM sent a letter to

Respondent seeking to re-start negotiations. Respondent replied

that it did not recognize the League as having properly

affiliated with IAM, and would not engage in negotiations. Doc.

32, Mem. in Opp., 3-8. 

On or about January 9, 2006, Petitioner issued a complaint

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alleging that Respondent violated the National Labor Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by declining to negotiate with and

provide certain information to the League. Petitioner now

requests an injunction to require Respondent to recognize and

bargain with the League during the pendency of the administrative

proceedings and Board decision which are represented to last two

to three years. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Title 29, Section 160, of the United States Code provides in

relevant part:

The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a

complaint as provided in subsection (b) of this section

charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging

in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United

States district court, within any district wherein the

unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have

occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts

business, for appropriate temporary relief or

restraining order. Upon the filing of any such

petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be

served upon such person, and thereupon shall have

jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary

relief or restraining order as it deems just and

proper.

29 U.S.C. § 160(j).

To secure relief under section 10(j), the Regional Director

must show “either (1) a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable harm or (2) the

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existence of serious questions going to the merits, the balance

of hardships tipping sharply in its favor, and at least a fair

chance of success on the merits.” Miller v. California Pacific

Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9 Cir. 1994) (quoting Senate of th

Cal. v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir.1992)). This

formulation reflects the traditional “sliding scale” of equity

jurisprudence where “the required degree of irreparable harm

increases as the probability of success decreases.” United

States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174 (9th

Cir.1987); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 398

(9th Cir.1992) (“where the government can make only a colorable

evidentiary showing of a violation, the court must consider the

possibility of irreparable injury”). In Miller, this traditional

formulation was modified in one respect. In the context of a

section 10(j) petition, the court must evaluate the traditional

equitable criteria “through the prism of the underlying purpose

of section 10(j), which is to protect the integrity of the

collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board's

remedial power while it processes the charge.” Miller, 19 F.3d

at 459-60. The Board's ability to meaningfully adjudicate

disputes arising within its jurisdiction must be balanced against

the respondent’s showing of hardship. Id. at 460. Scott ex rel.

N.L.R.B. v. Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241 F.3d 652, 661 (9th

Cir. 2001).

V. ANALYSIS

1. Likelihood of success on the merits

As an irreducible minimum, the moving party must demonstrate

a fair chance of success on the merits. Where the moving party

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shows only a “fair” chance of success on the merits, in contrast

to “probable” success on the merits, the party also must show

there are serious questions going to the merits of the case and

that the balance of the hardships tips decidedly in its favor. 

Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. 

In assessing whether the Board has met its burden, it is

necessary to factor in the district court’s lack of jurisdiction

over unfair labor practices, and the deference accorded to NLRB

determinations by the courts of appeals. See NLRB v. City

Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829, 104 S.Ct. 1505, 1510, 79

L.Ed.2d 839 (1984) (“[O]n an issue that implicates [the Board's]

expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by the

Board is entitled to considerable deference[.]”); Ford Motor Co.

v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849, 60 L.Ed.2d 420

(1979) (“Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to

judicial review; but if its construction of the statute is

reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because

the courts might prefer another view of the statute.”). While

the district court is not required to defer to the Board in

deciding whether interim relief is “just and proper,” it should

evaluate the probabilities of the complaining party prevailing in

light of the fact that ultimately, the Board’s determination on

the merits will be given considerable deference. By the same

token, because it is the Board and not the district court which

has primary responsibility for declaring federal labor policy,

even on an issue of law, the district court should be hospitable

to the views of the General Counsel, however novel. In short,

the Board can make a threshold showing of likelihood of success

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by producing some evidence to support the unfair labor practice

charge, together with an arguable legal theory. Miller, 19 F.3d

at 460.

If the respondent concedes the substance of the unfair labor

practice charge, or if the Board demonstrates that it is likely

to prevail on the merits, the court presumes irreparable injury. 

If the charge is disputed, or if the Board has only a fair chance

of succeeding on the merits, the court must consider the

possibility of irreparable injury. Id. 

An employer has an obligation to bargain with a successor

union where an affiliation vote is conducted with adequate due

process safeguards and where the organizational changes are not

so dramatic that the post-affiliation entity lacks substantial

continuity with the pre-affiliation union. Sullivan Bros.

Printers, 317 N.L.R.B. 561, 562 (1995), enf’d 99 F.3d 1217 (1st

Cir. 1996). Respondent has the burden of proof on each of these

factors, Ridgewell’s, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 37, 42 (2001), by a

preponderance of the evidence, J. W. Fergusson & Sons, 299

N.L.R.B. 882 n. 2 (1990) (due process), Whitewood Maintenance

Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1209 (1989) (continuity). 

Although most union mergers/affiliations result in some

degree of change to the union’s organizational structure, the

Board will intervene in such internal union matters only where it

finds that the affiliation raises a question concerning

representation and, consistent with this approach, the Board will

interject itself only in the most limited of circumstances

involving such internal changes. Sullivan Bros., 317 N.L.R.B. at

562. Here, the Board has made such a decision and seeks to

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preserve bargaining representative status for the League pending

the outcome of a Board decision on the merits. 

a. Due Process

Regarding the due process factor, the Board focuses on

whether the members received adequate notice of the vote, whether

there was adequate opportunity for discussion before the vote,

and whether the vote was conducted by secret ballot. 

Ridgewell’s, 334 N.L.R.B. at 42. 

The evidence establishes that the League conducted a general

membership meeting and vote on September 11, 2005, to determine

whether to affiliate with the International Association of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”). Doc. 2, Mem. in Supp.,

2. Approximately ten days before the September 11 meeting and

vote, League leaders distributed flyers to the employees at

Respondent’s facility concerning the proposed affiliation and the

meeting. The flyers included translations into Punjabi and

Spanish. At the same time, the League mailed employees postcards

concerning the September 11 affiliation meeting. At the meeting,

information regarding the proposed affiliation was provided in

two sessions. One session was conducted in English and Punjabi,

and the other in Spanish and Portuguese. League leaders

explained the details of the proposed affiliation and gave

employees the opportunity to discuss and ask questions about the

proposed affiliation. Many questions were asked about the dues

structure and benefits and pensions. All unit employees were

entitled to vote on the affiliation. The vote used voting

booths, secret ballots, election monitors, and a sealed ballot

box. The result was 918 for affiliation, 21 against, with 4 void

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ballots, for a total of 943 voters. Aff. & Ex. in Supp. of Pet.

[hereinafter, Aff. & Ex.], 3, 15, 16, 21, 49-51, 101-108, 110-22. 

Respondent argues that the court cannot find that due

process was adequate on the existing record. Respondent first

points out that the League has not provided attendance sheets for

the discussion sessions. The League has provided affidavits that

state that more than 800 employees attended the discussion

sessions. Aff. and Ex., 3 (“800+”), 21 (“950"). Respondent has

not challenged this evidence.

Respondent also states that Petitioner has not established

exactly how many employees received advance notice. “For

example, although the League claims to have purchased over 2,000

mailing labels to mail notices to employees about the affiliation

vote, [Petitioner] supplied no evidence to corroborate that these

were actually mailed to employees, or to show how many employees

actually received notices. Likewise, [Petitioner] fails to

provide any evidence showing how many employees actually received

the handbills it claims were distributed on or about August 29

and September 1, 2005.” Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 19 n. 10.

Petitioner has provided evidence that handbilling regarding

the September 11 meeting was conducted at the plant gate on both

August 29 and September 1, 2005, before and after shift changes. 

Aff. & Ex., 3, 21. The flyers were printed in English and

Spanish, and handwritten in Punjabi. Ralph Meraz, the League’s

“lead”, states that “[t]he Union also mailed a card to the

membership’s homes.” Aff. & Ex., 22. The card announces “Our

Next Meeting,” states the venue, “Livingston Portuguese Hall,”

and gives the date and times of the information sessions, all in

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both English and Spanish. Aff. & Ex., 30 (Ex. 2 to 10/13/05 Aff.

of Ralph Meraz). 

At oral argument before the court on March 22, 2006,

Respondent questioned due process on the grounds that less than

half the unit employees voted in the affiliation election. 

Respondent does not present evidence that any unit employee was

prevented from voting or was denied notice of the meeting. In

Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative, 311 N.L.R.B. 942 (1993), the Board

held that the due-process requirements were met by providing the

entire unit with an opportunity to vote. In doing so, the Board

rejected the employer’s arguments that the entire membership of

the union must be permitted to vote and that a majority of those

eligible to vote rather than those voting is necessary. MinnDak, 311 N.L.R.B. at 945-47; see also, National Labor Relations

Board, An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases,

§ 11-100 (July 2005). 

In affiliation cases . . . the Board faces the

difficult task of reconciling the two partly

inconsistent goals of guaranteeing employees their free

choice of bargaining representative and fostering

stable collective bargaining relationships. . . . [T]he

Board requires, consistent with the policy of free

choice, that the election procedure be conducted in

accordance with minimal standards of “due process,” so

that the outcome accurately reflects the employees’

true desires. 

Note, Union Affiliations and Collective Bargaining, 128 U. Pa. L.

Rev. 430, 433 (1979).

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As in CPS, there is no evidence that the voters were not

adequately apprised of the issues before them, that anyone

objected to the voting procedures, or that the result did not

accurately reflect the votes cast or the true sentiments of the

members. CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1019. Respondent has failed to

show that the affiliation vote was conducted in derogation of the

employees’ due-process rights, nor has Respondent provided legal

authority that less than one half of all eligible workers cannot

lawfully approve an affiliation. If a majority vote of all

employees is required to approve an affiliation, it is

Respondent’s burden to provide such legal authority. Minn-Dak is

to the contrary. 

b. Continuity

Corresponding to the concern with stability [of the

collective bargaining relationship] is a test for

“continuity of representation,” by which the Board

seeks to determine whether replacement by the successor

union disrupts the bargaining relationship established

by its predecessor. 

Note, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 433. 

To prevail, Respondent must demonstrate that the affiliation

resulted in changes that are sufficiently dramatic to alter the

identity of the League, and thus in the substitution of an

entirely different union as the employees’ representative. CPS,

324 N.L.R.B. at 1020 (citing Western Commercial Transport, 288

N.L.R.B. 214, 217-18 (1988)). The Board reviews such claims

under a “totality of the circumstances” standard and takes into

consideration several factors, including: continued leadership

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responsibility by existing union officials; continuation of the

manner in which contracts are negotiated; perpetuation of

membership rights and duties; eligibility for membership;

qualifications to hold office; oversight of executive council

activity; the dues/fees structure; authority to change provisions

in its governing documents; frequency of membership meetings; and

preservation of the prior union’s physical facilities, books, and

assets. Mike Basil Chevrolet, 331 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1045-46. 

Most affiliations or mergers change a union’s organizational

structure to some extent, but the natural and foreseeable

consequences of such a combination does not automatically raise a

question concerning representation. As the Supreme Court in

N.L.R.B. v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 1182 (Seattle-First

National Bank), 475 U.S. 192 (1986), recognized, change is the

natural consequence of ordinary, valid reasons for union

affiliations and mergers, such as increased financial support and

bargaining power. Seattle-First, 475 U.S. at 199 n. 5. “The

notion that an organization somehow loses its identity and

becomes transformed . . . because it acquires more clout and

becomes better able to do its job is an absurdity and flies in

the face of a clearly stated congressional objective.” CPS, 324

N.L.R.B. at 1020-21 (citing Insulfab Plastics, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B.

817, 823 (1985)). 

Petitioner’s evidence shows that the League retained all of

its officers, all of whom perform the same duties they previously

performed. Aff. & Ex., 4; see CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1022 (“[t]his

retention of the [union’s] president as CPS group leader

establishes substantial continuity of leadership”). The League

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will also continue to choose its own officers, shop stewards,

negotiating committee members, and executive committee members. 

Aff. & Ex., 5. Meraz continues as lead negotiator, Aff. & Ex. 26

(“[m]y duties after the affiliation have not changed at all; my

responsibility as a decision-maker is still the same”), together

with an IAM official as co-lead negotiator. Id. “The League,

its officers, and members will continue to determine how it wants

to proceed in negotiations and its positions on issues that are

up for negotiation.” Id. 

There is no evidence that [the larger union’s co-lead

negotiator] will serve as more than a valued source of

expertise in negotiations and arbitrations, and

certainly none that he will act inconsistently with the

CPS employees’ desires in either context. It is

precisely to gain the benefit of such expertise that

independent unions often affiliate with stronger

internationals[.] 

CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1023; Aff. & Ex., 23 (“[Meraz] explained

that [IAM] would assist [the League] in legal areas because they

have more experience in negotiation”). This means the League

bargainers are the same and the history of collective bargaining

with the employer remains intact. 

Under the Affiliation Agreement, all current dues-paying

members of the League will be entitled to all rights and

privileges of IAM membership and will have their years of goodstanding membership in the League recognized and credited by the

IAM in accordance with the IAM constitution. Aff. & Ex., 7. 

The League has retained control over its property after the

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affiliation, Aff. & Ex., 5, and has acquired a new office with

computer and phone systems to replace the trailer that served as

the League’s old office, Aff. & Ex., 46-47. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot on this record show

that the League and IAM are “sufficiently alike” to permit their

affiliation. Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 12. However, it is

Respondent’s evidentiary burden to show the converse. Respondent

characterizes the changes which the League will ultimately be

required to undergo as “sweeping.” Id., 16. Specifically,

Respondent alleges, citing the IAM constitution, that the League

must: (1) Forbid Meraz and any other representative of the League

from serving as an officer within the IAM until he or she has

attained at least one year of tenure; (2) forbid Meraz and any

other representative of the League from serving as an officer of

a local lodge until he or she has attained at least one year of

tenure; (3) require each member to pay monthly dues of at least

two times the weighted average hourly earnings; (4) require each

member to pay a monthly per capita tax to the Grand Lodge “equal

to the weighted average on a union-wide basis of one hour’s

earnings of each Local Lodge member”; (5) obtain the approval of

the Executive Committee or the International President of the IAM

before declaring a strike; (6) resume work and relinquish strike

benefits if the Executive Committee of the IAM orders the

League’s members to do so, regardless of the members’ desire to

continue striking; (7) obtain the approval of the International

President before making any changes to the League’s bylaws. Doc.

32, Mem. in Opp., 16-17.

The focus of the continuity inquiry is whether after the

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affiliation the Respondent faces an entity entirely different

from before affiliation. The first and second factors advanced

by Respondent indicate that the League has not been subsumed into

IAM. See CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1020. The size difference between

IAM and the League does not per se indicate discontinuity. CPS

points out that the Board “has consistently rejected such

reasoning; so have most courts.” CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1021 & n.

21 (citations). The third and fourth factors do not indicate

discontinuity, because in CPS, the respondent also emphasized the

post-affiliation dues increases and per-capita tax. These facts

did not indicate discontinuity:

Local 8-397 intends to phase in the dues increase

gradually over a five-year period. Thus, the full

effect of the increase will not be felt all at once. 

CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1023. 

Here, the increase from five dollars per month to $20.26 (subject

to increase) will be phased in over ten years. Aff. & Ex., 5. 

This will have much lesser impact. 

Moreover, the greater financial commitment asked of

OCAW members undoubtedly reflects to some extent the

fact that a large international union can provide more

extensive services than a small independent like the

Association. It is unlikely that the employees would

expect to get stronger representation from OCAW

absolutely free. 

Id. IAM has waived the per-capita tax. Aff. & Ex., 5, 10. 

Though IAM has the authority to veto a strike or order the

League to return to work, Respondent has not provided any

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evidence of how often, if ever, IAM actually exercises these

powers. It is actual practice rather than theoretical policy

which is controlling. CPS, 324 N.L.R.B. at 1023 & n. 34.

Finally, the fact that authority to approve changes in the

League’s governing documents has shifted to IAM weighs against

continuity. Mike Basil Chevrolet, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1046.

Respondent relies heavily on the Board’s decisions in

Western Commercial Transport, 288 N.L.R.B. 214 (1988), and

Garlock Equipment Company, 288 N.L.R.B. 247 (1988), in contending

that continuity of representation has been lost. Doc. 32, Mem.

in Opp., 13-15. 

In Western Commercial Transport, the smaller union’s

officers were unable to continue to have any major role in

representing their fellow members; they were to be replaced by

employees of the larger district lodge who had no prior

connection to the unit. Western Commercial Transport, 288

N.L.R.B. at 216. Here, Petitioner’s evidence shows that the

League retained all of its officers, all of whom perform the same

duties they previously performed, and the lead negotiator is

identical. Aff. & Ex., 4. 

In Garlock Equipment, the Board found that the larger

district lodge had veto power over the smaller union’s formerly

exclusive authority to contract with the company. Garlock

Equipment, 288 N.L.R.B. at 248. Here, the League will continue

to choose its own officers, shop stewards, negotiating committee

members, and executive committee members. Aff. & Ex., 5. Meraz

continues as lead negotiator, Aff. & Ex., 4, 26. “The League,

its officers, and members will continue to determine how it wants

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to proceed in negotiations and its positions on issues that are

up for negotiation.” Aff. & Ex., 4 (James Beno, IAM Directing

Business Representative); compare Garlock Equipment, 288 N.L.R.B.

at 248 (ALJ properly did not credit Woltz’s testimony regarding

post-affiliation negotiation arrangements because Woltz had never

been a business representative). 

Respondent’s evidence does not show that the League postaffiliation is an “an entirely different union.” CPS, 324

N.L.R.B. at 1020 (citing Western Commercial Transport, 288

N.L.R.B. 214, 217-18 (1988)). The League’s leadership will

continue in their roles, Aff. & Ex., 4, 5, 26; members of the

League are entitled to all benefits of IAM membership, Aff. &

Ex., 7; contracts will continue to be negotiated by Meraz and

other League leaders, Aff. & Ex., 26; and the League has kept its

property after the affiliation, Aff. & Ex., 5. See Modjeska &

Modjeska, Federal Labor Law: NLRB Practice [hereinafter, Modjeska

& Modjeska] § 9:11 & n. 46. Since Respondent has also failed to

show lack of due process, Petitioner has demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits based on the continuity of

the League’s functioning pre- and post-affiliation. See

Overstreet v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of

America, Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9 Cir. 2005) th

(deference to Board’s interpretation of labor statute allows a

finding of likelihood of success on merely “some evidence to

support the unfair-labor-practice charge together with an

arguable legal theory”) (citing Miller, 19 F.3d at 460).

2. Irreparable Harm

The court must take into account the probability that

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declining to issue the injunction will permit the allegedly

unfair labor practice to go unredressed and thereby render

meaningless the Board’s remedial authority, leaving the employees

of Respondent without representation. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. 

If the Board demonstrates that it is likely to prevail on the

merits, the court presumes irreparable injury. See Miller, 19

F.3d at 459 (passage of statute an implied finding by Congress

that violations harm public). If the charge is disputed, or if

the Board has only a fair chance of succeeding on the merits, the

court must consider the possibility of irreparable injury. 

Miller, 19 F.3d at 460.

Here, Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success. 

Even if such likelihood were not present, Petitioner’s evidence

shows a possibility of irreparable harm. 

Federico Avila, a League coordinator, states:

The Employer’s refusal to recognize and bargain with

the Union is really causing a lot of problems for

employees and hurting the Union’s relationship with

employees. For example, we haven’t been able to get a

contract and the Union can’t help defend employees if

they get into trouble at work or are fired.

. . . Because of this, . . . [m]any employees have told

me that they are scared to show their support for the

Union and don’t want to attend Union meetings because

the Employer might find out that they support the

Union. [A]ttendance at Union meetings has dropped

somewhat since the Employer stopped recognizing the

Union. 

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Aff. & Ex. 239-40. 

Ralph Meraz states:

The Union is not able to represent employees if they

have complaints or disciplinary problems with the

Employer. . . . It is hard to estimate how much

attendance has dropped because it has fluctuated,

however it is down from its peak when more than 1000

people attended the meetings, which was in the Summer

and Fall of 2005 prior to the Employer’s withdrawal of

recognition from the Union. 

Aff. & Ex. 47-48.

The courts have long recognized that harm of this kind,

withdrawal of recognition inflicted on a union, is often

irreparable. In Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702

(1944), the Supreme Court stated,

Out of its wide experience, the Board many times has

expressed the view that the unlawful refusal of an

employer to bargain collectively with its employees’

chosen representatives disrupts the employees’ morale,

deters their organizational activities, and discourages

their membership in unions. 

Franks Bros. Co., 321 U.S. at 704. 

In Scott ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241

F.3d 652 (9 Cir. 2001), the Board argued that, th

absent an interim bargaining order, support for the

Union will continue to wane. When the Board finally

does grant relief, the union may find that it

represents only a small fraction of the employees. 

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With only limited support, moreover, the Union will be

unable to bargain effectively regardless of the

ultimate relief granted by the Board. 

Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241 F.3d at 667. The court stated

that it must consider seriously the possibility that the union

could not recover. Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241 F.3d at 668. 

See also Asseo v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc., 900 F.2d 445,

454 (1 Cir. 1990). st

Petitioner presents evidence that Respondent is using the

situation to further depress union support:

The Employer has told employees that they do not have a

Union and they are not represented by a Union. I have

heard this from more than 20 employees who reported

that they were told this by Human Resources personnel

and their supervisors. 

Aff. & Ex. 47 (Ralph Meraz). 

The Employer has told employees that we don’t have a

union and that we don’t have to pay dues. . . .

Supervisors are also telling employees that since we

don’t have a Union, the Company can do whatever it

wants. 

Aff. & Ex., 239 (Federico Avila). 

Petitioner’s evidence also shows that a normally high

employee turnover rate compounds the risk of irreparable harm to

the League. In order to maintain support, the union must recruit

continually, and its apparent powerlessness vis-a-vis Respondent

makes this task more difficult. Doc. 2, Mem. in Supp., 35. 

The courts have also recognized that new unions like the

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League are especially vulnerable to an employer’s unfair labor

practices. Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 367,

373 (11 Cir. 1992). th

Respondent does not answer Petitioner’s argument regarding

irreparable harm to the League. Respondent argues first that the

Board’s five-month delay in filing this action indicates that it

does not consider the harm truly irreparable. Doc. 32, Mem. in

Opp., 20 (citing Maydanis v. Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 1994 WL

739897, *4 (D. Nev. 1994); Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F.Supp.

385, 388 (D. Mass. 1973)); see Kobell v. Suburban Lines, Inc.,

731 F.3d 1076, 1091 n. 27 (3 Cir. 1984) (“the district court may rd

legitimately think it suspicious that the party who asks to

preserve the status quo through interim injunctive relief has

allowed the status quo to change through unexplained delay”). At

oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel explained that the suitauthorization process is lengthy and took a number of months. 

Delay in the federal bureaucracy is an unfortunate ramification

of the operation of government. The Board unanimously authorized

Petitioner to undertake this action, Doc. 2, Mem. in Supp., 2,

and Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates continuing harms. 

Petitioner took timely action to obtain authorization for this

judicial proceeding. Respondent has not presented any evidence

of harm that it has suffered or will suffer to support a defense

of laches. See N.L.R.B. v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887,

893-94 (7 Cir. 1990) (delay that causes harm is required for th

laches). 

Respondent further claims that Petitioner’s argument is

based on speculation. Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 21. Respondent

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ignores Petitioner’s evidence that the employees have no

bargaining representative after withdrawal of recognition, the

loss of union support, and evidence of employer efforts to chill

employee union participation. 

Respondent attempts to distinguish Stephen Dunn & Associates, stating that there was no dispute about the identity of

the bargaining representative in that and other cases relied upon

by Petitioner. Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 21. This argument assumes

that where there is any doubt concerning who the bargaining

representative is, preliminary injunctive relief is improper no

matter how grave the possible harm to the union and the

employees. Respondent has not provided legal authority for this

proposition. 

Respondent argues there is no harm because Respondent

voluntarily abided by its final offer proposal to increase unit

employees’ pay in November and December 2005, and consequently

unit employees are receiving all the benefit of union

representation. Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 22. Even if valid, this

argument ignores other facets of union representation, such as

grievance resolution, employee education, as to employment

rights, and union-negotiation benefits. Petitioner’s evidence

and argument regarding the continuing harms to the union itself

and the employees caused by Respondent’s withdrawal of

recognition are not addressed.

Respondent argues that “[t]he only party who may be

irreparably harmed if an injunction issues is the nearly 1,500

unit employees who, by [Petitioner’s] own count, did not approve

the League’s affiliation with the District Lodge and the IAM. 

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These employees comprise approximately two-thirds of the

bargaining unit.” Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 22. Respondent does

not contest that the affiliation vote manifested overwhelming

support for affiliation among the 943 employees who voted, or

present its own evidence that any employee was prevented from

voting or opposed affiliation. If the remaining unit employees

had opposed affiliation, they could have voted against it. While

it is possible that the same level of support for the union would

not be manifest now, Petitioner’s evidence shows that this is

attributable to the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition, its

attempts to take advantage of the situation to further discourage

union support of which Petitioner has supplied evidence, and the

reality of a high employee turnover rate which further puts the

union at a disadvantage in an unstable membership. Equity does

not allow a wrongdoer to profit by his wrong. Petitioner has

provided evidence of tangible harm to employees in the loss of

bargaining representation. Moreover, Section 10(j) orders are

enforceable without regard to whether the union has lost its

majority support in the interim. Modjeska & Modjeska, § 9:11 &

n. 58. 

Petitioner has shown more than a possibility of irreparable

harm. 

3. Balance of Hardships

In considering the balance of hardships, the court must

consider the probability that declining to issue the injunction

will permit the allegedly unfair labor practice to render

meaningless the Board’s remedial authority. Miller, 19 F.3d at

460. Where the Board and the Respondent each make a showing of

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hardship, the court must exercise its sound discretion to

determine whether the balance tips in the Board’s favor. Miller,

19 F.3d at 460-61. 

Petitioner’s evidence of continuing harm centers on the

absence of union representation, employer discouragement of union

representation, employee perceptions (fostered by the Respondent)

that union activities are disfavored, and the loss of members and

chilling effect on employee union participation. Respondent

repeats its argument that issuing an injunction would harm the

unit employees who did not participate in the election. Doc. 32,

Mem. in Opp., 24. This concern is uncorroborated by evidence. 

This argument has been addressed. 

Respondent argues that the court should allow the Board’s

processes to work, since the underlying complaint will be heard

before the ALJ on March 28. Id. The Section 10(j) injunction

was provided by Congress in order to preserve the status quo

while the Board considers and decides the underlying N.L.R.B.

complaint about whether the employer lawfully withdrew union

recognition. The law provides for appeal directly to the United

States Courts of Appeal, further extending the process, normally

a two- or three-year period. The courts have recognized that

withdrawal of union recognition and refusal to bargain create a

real possibility that delay will render meaningless any relief

ultimately granted:

Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has

demonstrated that by reason of lengthy hearings and

litigation enforcing its orders, the Board has not been

able in some instances to correct unfair labor

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practices until after substantial injury has been done. 

Since the Board’s orders are not self-enforcing, it has

sometimes been possible for persons violating the act

to accomplish their unlawful objective before being

placed under any legal restraint and thereby to make it

impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the

status quo pending litigation. 

H.R. Rep. No. 80-245 (1947), reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor

Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d. Cong., Legislative

History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 292, 433.

Here, Petitioner’s evidence shows that the Respondent’s

employees had a certified local union that subsequently

affiliated with an international union. Respondent’s withdrawal

of recognition of any bargaining representative; its

representations to the employees that the union is powerless to

help them; together with the high employee turnover rate in the

poultry-processing business which forces the union to continually

recruit, all tend to chill employee union participation. 

Petitioner has demonstrated a real danger that if Respondent

continues to withhold recognition, employee support will erode to

such an extent that the employees will be without any

representation. At that point, any final remedy that the Board

may impose would be ineffectual. See Asseo, 900 F.2d at 454. 

Respondent claims that it “only now has access to hundreds

of pages of documents and other evidence that [Petitioner], the

League, and IAM have had all along, and which [Respondent’s]

counsel requested from [Petitioner] months ago.” Doc. 32, Mem.

in Opp., 24. The only evidence offered is the declaration of

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Michael J. Hogan, Esq., which states in relevant part:

I have had several discussions with Amy Berbower,

[Petitioner’s] attorney assigned to investigate the

League’s charge, concerning the League’s allegations

and [Respondent’s] position with respect to its

bargaining obligations. In or around October 2005, I

asked Ms. Berbower to supply me with a copy of the

purported affiliation agreement (“Agreement”) between

the League and the District Lodge and/or the IAM. Ms.

Berbower refused to provide me with a copy of the

Agreement.

Decl. of Michael J. Hogan, ¶ 5. The Affiliation Agreement is

eight pages long. Aff. & Ex., 7-14. The citation does not

support Respondent’s assertion. 

At oral argument, Respondent alleged that Petitioner had

“stonewalled” requests for documents, including the IAM

constitution and bylaws. Counsel for Petitioner represented that

she told counsel for Respondent that these documents were

available on the Department of Labor website. The IAM does not,

in fact, allow its constitution or bylaws to be posted on any

public website, including that of the Department of Labor. 

Petitioner’s counsel stated that discovery was not available in

actions before the NLRB, and she could not give Respondent a copy

of the IAM’s constitution and bylaws. Respondent does not argue

that this information will not be available in the Board hearing

of the complaint.

The balance of hardships can be stated succinctly. The

original local union affiliated with an international. The

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structure of the affiliated union vis-a-vis the employer

bargaining and employee representation has not materially

changed. The employer’s refusal in response to recognize the

League or to bargain, leaving the employees without

representation and abrogating the bargaining unit, is a

significant hardship that greatly outweighs that of Respondent

having to recognize and negotiate with the affiliated League,

pending administrative determination of the N.L.R.B.’s complaint. 

Respondent suffers no other hardship, and is not qualified to

speak for “other non-voting employees.” The balance of hardships

strongly favors Petitioner. 

The balance of hardships favors issuing an injunction.

4. The Public Interest

The public interest is to ensure that an unfair labor

practice will not succeed because the Board takes too long to

investigate and adjudicate the charge. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. 

Petitioner’s evidence supports its contention that without a

Section 10(j) injunction the union may not be able to benefit

from any relief ultimately granted by the Board. Respondent

repeats its argument that the unit employees are not suffering

harm in the absence of an injunction because Respondent has

granted them wage increases pursuant to its final contract offer. 

Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 25-26. Even if true, this argument does

not address the continuing harm to the League itself or the

absence of representation on workplace and other issues a union

provides employees. 

Respondent offers “protecting employers from the imposition

of sanctions based on unfounded unfair-labor-practice charges” as

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a countervailing public interest. Id., 26. In determining

whether to issue an injunction, the court considers the merits

only to the extent of probability of final success. Petitioner

has demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. See

Miller, 19 F.3d at 460 (“Board can make threshold showing of

likelihood of success by producing some evidence to support the

unfair labor practice charge, together with an arguable legal

theory”) (emphasis added). 

Respondent argues that “a bargaining representative” should

not be “imposed by judicial fiat on a group of over 2,400

employees.” Doc. 32, Mem. in Opp., 26. The injunctive relief

requested is not “judicial fiat,” but rather is specifically

authorized by Congress under Section 10(j). Respondent ignores

Petitioner’s evidence that the status quo was union

representation, voting on the issue of affiliation was open to

all unit employees, and support among those voting was

overwhelming for affiliation. Respondent’s statement that “most

of the employees did not vote in favor of” the affiliation, while

technically accurate, is misleading because “most” employees did

not vote at all. The First Circuit rejected a similar argument

in Asseo:

[T]he danger that the Union would lose support because

of unfair labor practices committed by the employer,

leading to irreparable injury to the employees and to

the bargaining unit, clearly outweighs any harm which

granting injunctive relief would inflict on the

defendant. Indeed, the only argument which Turabo

seriously advanced at the district-court level was that

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“granting the interim bargaining order will be

tantamount to imposing an unwanted Union on the

employees, which will create labor unrest and adversely

affect the Employer’s prospects of obtaining necessary

financing to continue its operations.” We, like the

district court, fail to find merit in this contention. 

Asseo, 900 F.2d at 454-55. 

Respondent points to the apparent decline in voter turnout

between the elections held in November 2004 and those for

affiliation in September 2005, which it characterizes as “ad

hoc.” Id. This suggests that Respondent infers diminished

employee interest in union representation because fewer employees

voted. However, there is no issue here of an injunction

“nullify[ing] majority choice.” Respondent’s claims of what

employees “want” are unsupported speculation as it has submitted

no evidence of employee preference. See Eisenberg v. Hartz

Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 1975). 

Based on the reduction in overall employee voter turnout,

Respondent argues that the court should not “rush to judgment and

force [Respondent] to bargain with an organization that has not

yet demonstrated that it is the legitimate bargaining

representative of the appropriate bargaining unit.” Doc. 32,

Mem. in Opp., 26. Petitioner’s unrebutted evidence that

Respondent is taking advantage of present circumstances to

eliminate union representation, discourage employee participation

in a union, and hinder the union’s recruitment effort greatly

weakens this argument. A stay of proceedings would perpetuate

the alleged unfair labor practices, not alleviate the continuing

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harms which Petitioner’s evidence establishes. 

Respondent claims that because an injunction would “merely

require [Respondent] to meet and bargain in good faith with” the

League, the relief would in fact have little impact. Id., 26-27. 

However, Respondent’s union-suppression efforts, according to

evidence supplied by Petitioner and not rebutted by Respondent,

gain their leverage from Respondent’s position that no union

represents its employees. Requiring Respondent to recognize the

League pending the N.L.R.B. decision and to cease its anti-union

conduct will most fairly maintain the status quo to serve the

N.L.R.A. purposes of not damaging union representation or the

bargaining unit.

Respondent’s unpersuasive delay argument has already been

addressed above. 

5. Bond

Because Petitioner represents an agency of the United

States, no bond is required. See Rule 65(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.;

Squaxin Island Tribe v. State of Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 723

(9 Cir. 1986). th

 

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, having fully considered the

evidence, probable success on the merits, irreparable harm,

balance of hardships, and the public interest, the petition for

Section 10(j)injunction is GRANTED. Petitioner shall submit a

proposed form of injunction consistent with the law and this

decision. Petitioner shall file that order with the court within

two (2) days following electronic service of this decision. 

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SO ORDERED

DATED: March _28, 2006.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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