Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02210/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 The facts described herein are taken from the parties’ briefs. Wherever the parties appear to

dispute a particular fact, each party’s interpretation of what occurred is identified as such.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN KONIG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LAWRENCE J. DAL CERRO, ET AL.,

Defendants. /

No. C-04-2210 MJJ 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in this § 1983 lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Alan Konig (“Plaintiff”) opposes the Motion. After careful consideration of the parties’

briefs and after oral argument on the motion, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment for the following reasons.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Konig was employed by the State Bar of California as Deputy Trial Counsel within

the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel (“OCTC”) in San Francisco from May 17, 1999, until October

27, 2004. The Chief Trial Counsel has exclusive jurisdiction over the State Bar’s prosecutorial

decisions. Defendant Robert Hawley is the Deputy Executive Director of the OCTC. The Deputy

Chief Trial Counsel, Defendant Russell Weiner, supervises several Assistant Chief Trial Counsel,

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2

who are each in charge of a unit comprised of Senior Trial Counsel, Deputy Trial Counsel,

paralegals, and investigators. Defendant Lawrence J. Dal Cerro, who serves as Assistant Chief Trial

Counsel, and Defendant Allen Blumenthal, Senior Trial Counsel, both supervised Plaintiff. 

As Deputy Trial Counsel, Plaintiff was charged with litigating matters in the State Bar Court

and State Superior Court related to attorney admission, licensing, regulation, and discipline. 

Through performance evaluations and otherwise, Plaintiff was regularly recognized for his

outstanding work. In the Manager’s Comments section of his 2000-2001 performance review,

however, it was noted that Konig was “very aggressive” and that “he experienced some difficulty

dealing with opposing counsel.” (Declaration of Robert Hawley (“Hawley Decl.”), Ex. C.) Konig

was advised to “consider adopting a less aggressive posture” and that he “may find that a less

confrontational style would benefit the orderly processing of his cases, create an atmosphere more

conducive to settlement and enhance his dealings with both the Court and opposing counsel.” (Id.) 

A. Plaintiff’s 2002-2003 Interaction With, and Complaints About, State Bar Court Judges

In San Francisco, there are only two State Bar Court judges: Judge Patricia McElroy and

Judge Joanne Remke. Beginning in 2002, Plaintiff became increasingly concerned about improper

rulings and orders from the State Bar Court judges. He believed that both judges lacked judicial

decorum and often acted contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics. He began to vocalize his concerns

to his superiors at the OCTC in September 2002. Plaintiff claimed that various State Bar Court

rulings violated the State Bar’s state and federal constitutional rights, violated witnesses’ state and

federal constitutional rights, and disregarded binding precedent. For example, in a September 5,

2002, email to Defendant Dal Cerro, Plaintiff complained that Judge McElroy had engaged in

extensive ex parte communications with opposing counsel when she granted requests for extensions

of time without first consulting Konig. (Declaration of Lawrence J. Dal Cerro (“Dal Cerro Decl.”),

Ex. A.) On September 17, 2002, Plaintiff drafted a memorandum to the file in the Wells matter

threatening to suspend an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENEC”) when Judge McElroy

questioned the factual basis of Plaintiff’s Notice of Disciplinary Charges (“NDC”) and suggested

that the State Bar agree to reduced discipline. (Id., Ex. B.) On another occasion, Plaintiff found

fault with a State Bar Court decision rendered in his own office’s favor. He complained that Judge

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2 After the trial, which the State Bar lost, Defendant Blumenthal was assigned, over Konig’s

objection, to review the Bajaj trial record. In April 2004, Blumenthal recommended that the Bar

withdraw its request for review. He concluded that there was an insufficient legal basis for appeal and

that Konig’s handling of the matter was “disturbing” and unprofessional. He was particularly concerned

that Konig had treated Judge Remke so disrespectfully, that he had engaged in inappropriate

communications with a witness, and that he had delayed propounding discovery in the case until very

late in the discovery period, significantly impairing the case. (Declaration of Allen Blumenthal

(“Blumenthal Decl.”), Ex. K.)

3

McElroy’s decision disbarring an attorney was “so fraught with factual errors and erroneous legal

conclusions” that he was embarrassed to show it to the complaining witnesses and he “wondered” if

McElroy had read the evidence or his brief. (Id., Ex. C.) He urged his supervisors to seek review of

the favorable decision. In May 2003, Plaintiff complained in an email that he had “reached [his]

breaking point” with Judge Remke as well, when she denied his motion to continue a trial. Plaintiff

claims that he urged Defendant Dal Cerro to take action in response to the conduct of the State Bar

Court, and informed Dal Cerro that if he did not do so, Plaintiff himself would report the State Bar

Court’s actions to the California Commission on Judicial Performance (“CJP”). (Id., Ex. D.) 

Defendants took no action.

Defendants contend that due to the “small, ‘repeat player’ nature of this bar and bench, it is

critical that all State Bar prosecutors in San Francisco have a professional working relationship with

both of these judges.” (Motion at 2:13–15.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff began displaying

disrespect for both judges in 2002. Specifically, he repeatedly refused to comply with judicially-set

time limits for witness examinations and complained to the judges about such limits being imposed. 

He accused Judge Remke of bias against him for denying a motion to compel discovery and, during

a trial in 2003 (the Bajaj trial), was apparently so disrespectful in court that Judge Remke warned

him that he would be required to bring his supervisor to court if he continued.2

 A month later,

during the Wells trial, also before Judge Remke, Plaintiff again refused to comply with the time limit

set for conducting a witness examination and behaved contemptuously. When Judge Remke

instructed Plaintiff to summon Dal Cerro to the courtroom, Plaintiff refused, claiming that she did

not have the power to make such an order of the State Bar. Judge Remke then summoned Dal Cerro

herself.

B. Plaintiff’s Conduct At, and Complaints, About the OCTC

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On September 11, 2003, the day after he attended an ENEC in the Kay/Dalton matter with

supervisor Donald Steedman (not a defendant here), Plaintiff delivered an eight-page memorandum

to Defendant Dal Cerro entitled, “State of Office Working Environment.” (Id., Ex. G.) In that

memo, Plaintiff complained about low morale at the office and about feeling betrayed by his

superiors. Specifically, Plaintiff complained that Dal Cerro had “backstabbed” Plaintiff by coming

to court at Judge Remke’s insistence and by allowing Judge Remke to “dress me down.” He also

complained that Steedman had “undercut” him at the September 10 Kay/Dalton ENEC by agreeing

to the other side’s request for an extension of time when Plaintiff did not want to so agree. In the

memorandum, Plaintiff accused Judge Remke of bias and misconduct for: (1) referring to an

Immigration Judge as “Mr. Abrams” instead of “Judge Abrams;” (2) “improperly” allowing a

witness to be questioned about his medical condition; (3) disallowing a line of re-direct examination

she found irrelevant and ruling on an objection without allowing Plaintiff what he felt was sufficient

time to respond to the objection; and (4) disallowing Plaintiff from asking another witness about

unrelated discipline. (Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. G.) Plaintiff said he was tired, angry, frustrated, and no

longer passionate about his job. “I refuse to conduct another ENEC or settlement conference under

the current policy,” Plaintiff wrote. (Id.) He threatened to resign the “next time [he] fe[lt] betrayed

by this office.” (Id.) Soon thereafter, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Judge Anello, the complaining

witness in Kay/Dalton, in which he disclosed that there had been an internal disagreement over

whether and when to file charges. (Id., Ex. J.) He informed Anello that “supervising attorneys”

often do not have complete knowledge of the cases when they attend ENECs and suggested that

Steedman made the wrong decision in agreeing to the respondent’s request for additional time. (Id.) 

According to Defendants, the letter improperly disclosed the Bar’s work product and mocked

Steedman’s authority.

On September 23, 2003, Dal Cerro and Steedman met with Plaintiff and a union

representative. According to Defendants, Dal Cerro attempted to counsel Plaintiff about his anger

and his need to be less confrontational and accusatory. According to Plaintiff, at that meeting, Dal

Cerro made several false allegations against Plaintiff related to his work and his insubordinate

conduct. On October 31, 2003, Dal Cerro delivered a written response to Plaintiff’s memorandum

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 The State Personnel Board rejected Konig’s complaint.

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that he and Defendant Hawley had prepared. The response informed Plaintiff that the OCTC is not a

democracy and that Plaintiff is not a free agent. (Id., Ex. H.) According to Plaintiff, the response

contained numerous vague and unwarranted allegations of misconduct against Plaintiff and included

a “veiled threat that [Konig] either accept the way things are done and stop raising issues of

wrongdoing and malfeasance or [he] would no longer have a job.” (Jan. 18, 2005, Declaration of

Alan Konig (“Konig Decl. - Jan.”), ¶ 15.) Plaintiff responded with another memorandum in

November complaining that the concerns he had raised in the September memo had gone addressed . 

(Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. I.)

Defendants contend that during this same time, they became so concerned about the theories

and facts Plaintiff had included in his draft NDC in the Kay/Dalton matter that Steedman instructed

Konig’s assistant not to file the NDC. Steedman also instructed Konig to cease communicating with

the complaining witness because Plaintiff was creating “all types of pratfalls to [Anello] being a

successful witness in the proceeding by involving him” in the charging decisions. (Dal Cerro Decl.,

Ex. K.) Konig objected saying, “[C]utting me out of this case after I committed significant and

substantial time and energy has created a feeling within me that words cannot adequately describe.” 

On October 24, Plaintiff asked, in writing, that the case be reassigned because he could not “operate

in a cloud of secrecy knowing that conversations about this matter have occurred that I am not privy

to.” (Id., Ex. M.) The case was reassigned to Defendant Blumenthal. On November 10, Plaintiff

sent an email to Dal Cerro complaining about the reassignment and asking for an explanation. (Id.,

Ex. N.) 

On November 3, 2003, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the CJP about Judge Remke’s

lack of judicial decorum, unprompted character attacks on Konig, and general misconduct. 

(Declaration of Emilia Mayorga (“Mayorga Decl.”), Ex. I.) Defendants claim not to have known

about this complaint. Plaintiff, however, alleges that Defendants were aware of the CJP complaint

because he had hinted at it in conversations with Dal Cerro and Blumenthal. In November and

December of 2003, Plaintiff made similar complaints to the California State Personnel Board,3

 the

California Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, and the State Bar Board of Governors’

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 After investigating Konig’s claims, the investigator hired to look into Plaintiff’s complaint,

concluded that Konig’s actions, and not the actions of his supervisors, were the cause of the “workplace

conflicts which form the basis of his complaints.” (Declaration of Charlotte Addington, Ex. A at

56–58.) 

Plaintiff contends, however, that Defendant Hawley was actually in control of the investigation,

and not RAD. He says that Hawley hand-picked Ms. Addington, with whom Hawley used to work and

maintained a friendship, as the independent investigator. (Konig Decl. - Jan., ¶ 51.) To support his

allegation, Plaintiff claims that Hawley telephoned Addington on December 8 and 10. Ms. Addington’s

notes from the December 10, 2003 call state, “Bob [is] contact” and “Konig will question my role.” (Id., ¶ 53.) On December 11, Hawley wrote to Van de Kamp informing him that Charlotte Addington would

conduct an “independent investigation.” 

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Regulation, Admissions, and Discipline Oversight Committee (“RAD”).4

 According to Plaintiff, the

day before he submitted his complaint to RAD, Defendant Hawley emailed John Van de Kamp,

RAD’s Chair, to discuss Konig’s forthcoming complaint. Plaintiff claims that Hawley defended his

and Dal Cerro’s actions and made prejudicial statements about Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff,

Hawley suggested to RAD how Plaintiff’s complaint should be dealt with and hired an investigator,

who was purported to be independent but who was not, to look into Plaintiff’s claims. (See footnote

4, supra.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Hawley also wrote to the legislative committees to

which Konig had complained, and represented that Mr. Van de Kamp was directing an appropriate

investigation into Konig’s complaints. 

On November 14, 2003, Plaintiff met with Steedman to discuss the Mendez NDC. Steedman

gave Konig handwritten comments including edits and the deletion of three of 15 counts. On

November 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed the Mendez NDC without having incorporated Steedman’s

changes. When asked about it, Plaintiff said that Steedman had not specifically instructed him not to

file the NDC without making the changes. On November 20, 2003, Dal Cerro and Steedman met

with Plaintiff and union representative Rob Henderson to discuss Plaintiff’s conduct. Dal Cerro and

Steedman presented Plaintiff with a Disciplinary Notice (Written Warning). (Id., Ex. Q.) The

Written Warning explained that Konig had insubordinately failed to make changes to the draft NDC

in Mendez as had been requested by his supervisor and that he then denied being instructed to make

those changes. The Warning required, among other things, that Plaintiff file an amended NDC by

November 24, 2003. Plaintiff was also warned that if he “continue[d] to fail to follow the direction

of [his] supervisors or otherwise engage[d] in acts of insubordination, disobedience, or disrespect,

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5 Mendez was ultimately found guilty on three counts and was sentenced to a one-year stayed

suspension and one year of probation instead of the 30 days actual suspension and two years probation

requested by the OCTC. On March 23, Blumenthal informed Plaintiff by email that the OCTC had

decided not to appeal the discipline meted out in the Mendez matter. He said, “Alan: I have to go to a

meeting, but I wanted you to know that the office has decided not to appeal the Mendez matter. We

appreciate your efforts in this case.” (Blumenthal Decl., Ex. J.) Konig responded, “Please cease the

patronization.” Blumenthal replied that he was not being patronizing and Konig sent several emails

complaining that management had made the decision not to appeal with no input from him. (Id.) 

6

 In several areas, Plaintiff was rated “Exceeds Requirements.” In all other areas, Plaintiff was

rated “Meets Expectations.” In no areas was he rated “Needs Improvement.”

7

 The parties had agreed to consolidate the first two phases of the grievance process into one

proceeding.

7

[he would] be subject to additional discipline, up to and including termination.” (Id.) Plaintiff

objected to the Written Warning and refused to sign it. Plaintiff never filed an amended NDC in the

Mendez matter and was ultimately issued a second Written Warning for continuing to exhibit

“insubordinate and willfully disobedient behavior.” (Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. V.)5

 

Also on November 20, 2003, Defendant Dal Cerro provided Plaintiff with a written review of

Plaintiff’s performance for the July 2002 through July 2003 time period (the “Performance

Review”). On the whole, the Performance Review was positive, giving Plaintiff an overall rating of

“Meets Requirements.”6

 However, in the Manager’s Comments section, the Review suggested

several areas in which Plaintiff might improve. Specifically, it reported that Mr. Konig had had

“several antagonistic encounters with various individuals, including his supervisors, a State Bar

Court judge, and several opposing counsel.” (Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. S.) The original draft of the

Performance Review had been prepared by Steedman on August 4, 2003. That draft contained the

same ratings but was more critical of Plaintiff than the final version. (Id., Ex. F.) 

On December 4, Plaintiff submitted a grievance concerning the first Written Warning and the

Performance Evaluation. On January 6, Plaintiff, two union representatives, Dal Cerro, Steedman,

and Iola Lee-LaMark from Human Resources conducted Step I and Step II grievance proceedings.7

On January 9, Konig’s grievance was rejected. Instead of requesting a Step III hearing (after which,

if the issues were not resolved, he could proceed to arbitration), Plaintiff abandoned his grievance. 

Plaintiff did not file a grievance regarding his second Written Warning.

In early January, the OCTC in San Francisco reorganized into two teams. According to

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Defendants, the reorganization was designed to promote the filing of more NDCs and reduce case

backlog. On each team, two Deputy Trial Counsel were to be responsible for notice drafting and

pre-filing settlement, and three Deputy Trial Counsel were to be responsible for handling trials. 

Plaintiff was reassigned to the notice-drafting team. According to Defendants, Plaintiff was

reassigned to “temporarily get [him] out of contested courtroom proceedings, where he had been

clashing with both State Bar Court judges and . . . to utilize his skills to help reduce case backlog.” 

(Motion at 9:26–10:1.) Plaintiff wanted to keep his trial matters and objected to his reassignment. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s performance fell short of expectations and his

insubordination escalated in the months after his reassignment. For example, Konig refused to

follow the OCTC’s charging guidelines set forth in the Uniform Charging Standards manual. The

policy required that charges not be filed unless the Deputy Trial Counsel has sufficient evidence to

meet the clear and convincing burden of proof at trial. Konig sent an email to all Deputy Trial

Counsel in the OCTC claiming that the policy was invalid. When he was told he was “required to

comply,” he refused and sent an email to Defendants Blumenthal, Dal Cerro, and Weiner, asserting

that he “cannot legally or ethically follow the ‘guidelines.’” (Blumenthal Decl., Ex. O.) He was

again instructed to follow the charging standard. He admitted in deposition that he had had no

training on the issue and did not discuss the policy with anyone before declaring it “illegal.” 

(Mayorga Decl., Ex. A (Konig Deposition) at 60:8–16, 64:2–23.)

Defendants also contend that in several matters, Plaintiff continued to insubordinately resist

instruction from his superiors and to be confrontational with the State Bar Court judges. For

example, in the Medeiros matter, Blumenthal asked Plaintiff to have a draft NDC in the matter done

by March 22. Konig agreed (“no prob”) and Blumenthal reminded Konig of the deadline on 

March 12 and on March 16. In response to the second reminder, Konig replied that he had not yet

been able to complete the draft but would have it done by the end of the week. Blumenthal

confirmed that he needed the draft by the originally set due date. In response, Konig sent a thirteenparagraph email to Blumenthal accusing management of harassing and criticizing him. Among

other things, he said, “If I could spend less time distrusting management and supervisors, their

motives, and their actions, then I could probably have had the brief done by now.” (Blumenthal

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Decl., Ex. G.) Konig then forwarded the inter-office email exchange to a friend outside the State

Bar. Defendants contend that this breached Konig’s duties of confidentiality. 

Similarly, in the Lowenstein matter, Konig provided a draft ENEC statement and NDC to

Blumenthal on April 1. Blumenthal gave Konig written comments and questions. Konig rejected

Blumenthal’s edits and accused management of harassing him, retaliating against him, and engaging

in unethical and unlawful conduct. (Id., Ex. P.) Dal Cerro then got involved and told Konig his

continuing to be insubordinate for no reason violated his obligation to do as he is told as long as he

works for the State Bar. (Id.) Konig responded with more accusations that his supervisors were

engaging in misconduct. Dal Cerro then removed Plaintiff from the Lowenstein matter. 

Another example of Plaintiff’s insubordination, as described by Defendants, was his conduct

in the Beasley case. Plaintiff sought to have attorney Beasley disbarred for mistakenly faxing a

proof of compliance form to the probation department instead of to the State Bar Court. At a

settlement conference on the matter with Judge McElroy, the Judge commented that Konig was

“unreasonable,” had “no judgment,” and “never [comes] into these things with an open mind.” 

Afterwards, Judge McElroy apologized to Konig for her comments and Konig himself reported that

he responded to the apology as follows: 

I told her that it was unnecessary to engage in a personal attack on my character

especially in front of a respondent because now the respondent sees that and grabs

onto it and uses it in the future to undermine anything I could do in the future. I

told her I did not think it proper for a judge who is to be neutral and unbiased to

engage in a personal attack against a party or its attorney whether that be the State

bar or the respondent. There are ways to express your dissatisfaction but it is not

through a manner in which a judge loses the appearance of impartiality and allows

her personal feelings to affect her role as an unbiased and neutral arbitrator.

(Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. CC.) On May 18, 2004, Defendant Blumenthal instructed Plaintiff to make

three specific changes to the draft NDC in the Beasley case. (Blumenthal Decl., Ex. C.) Konig

disagreed with the changes and Blumenthal repeated his instruction. Konig refused to comply and

again questioned his superiors’ judgment and ethics. (Id.)

C. Performance Improvement Plan and Notice of Disciplinary Action

On May 19, 2004, Defendant Dal Cerro presented Plaintiff with a Performance Improvement

Plan (“PIP”) due to “his failure to satisfactorily fulfill the requirements of [his] position.” The PIP,

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to be effective May 24, 2004, through November 24, 2004, stated that it was intended to “serve as a

non-disciplinary corrective action program designed to monitor, evaluate and improve [his]

performance.” The PIP listed past deficiencies in Konig’s work and provided specific direction for

him to meet with his new team leader, Defendant Blumenthal, on a weekly basis for management

oversight. In response, Plaintiff filed a 25-page memorandum challenging the basis of the PIP and

contending that it was retaliatory and designed to harass. 

On June 14, 2004, Mike Nisperos, Chief Trial Counsel, stated in an email that he intended to

terminate Konig’s employment when the investigation was complete. (Konig Decl. - Jan., Ex. 45.) 

On July 27, 2004, in advance of the next PIP meeting, Blumenthal asked Konig to bring a

draft of the pre-trial statement in the Stevens matter to the meeting and to be prepared to discuss his

trial strategies. At the July 30 PIP meeting, Konig informed Blumenthal that he had not finished

taking Stevens’ deposition and that the pre-trial statement was not done. When asked about his trial

approach, Konig said he did not know what that meant and refused to respond. Blumenthal

instructed Konig to provide a list of witnesses and exhibits, the pre-trial statement, and a short

summary of his planned trial approach by August 11, and to be prepared to discuss the matter at the

next PIP meeting on August 13. On August 12, Blumenthal had not yet received the requested

documents. He emailed Konig about it and Konig responded, “It is highly unlikely that I can

complete a draft pretrial statement by tomorrow morning.” (Blumenthal Decl., Ex. W.) On 

August 18, Dal Cerro held a short PIP meeting with Konig to discuss the Stevens matter. Despite an

August 25 filing deadline, Konig had not yet finished the pre-trial statement for his supervisors’

review. Dal Cerro gave him until August 20 to finalize the statement. Konig did not meet that

internal deadline.

On August 24, 2004, Dal Cerro presented Plaintiff with a Notice of Disciplinary Action for

his failure to comply with the terms of the PIP. Specifically, the Notice identified Konig’s failure to

provide drafts of the Stevens pre-trial statement as requested. The Notice also informed Plaintiff that

he was being removed from the Stevens case and from all other court appearances and that he should

focus his efforts on improving the productivity of his notice drafting. The Notice explained that as a

result of Plaintiff’s insubordination, a three-day suspension would be imposed, and that the Notice

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8

 Plaintiff’s Complaint also included a second cause of action alleging a denial of due process

in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, in its April 6, 2005 Order, the Court granted

partial summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s due process claim. The First Amendment

claim, addressed by Defendants’ present motion, is the only remaining claim.

11

served as a final warning that any further misbehavior could result in termination. The Notice

explained, however, that the suspension would be stayed until a later date when the OCTC was less

busy and Plaintiff could be spared. 

The next day, Plaintiff took a voluntary leave of absence and remained on leave until he

resigned, by email, on October 27, 2004. The three-day suspension was never imposed.

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action against Defendants Dal Cerro, Weiner, Blumenthal, and

Hawley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment right to free speech.8 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that after he

began complaining about the improper conduct of the State Bar Court, Defendants engaged in a

continuous and pervasive campaign of retaliation and harassment directed at Plaintiff. This

harassment included: (1) the thwarting of Plaintiff’s filing and service of the Kay/Dalton NDC on

October 21, 2003, without Plaintiff ever having been told that there was any problem with his

handling of the case, and the eventual reassignment of the case without explanation; (2) the October

31, 2003, Dal Cerro/Hawley memorandum which, according to Plaintiff, contained vague

allegations of misconduct that were unwarranted; and (3) throughout the ensuing year, constant

unwarranted criticism; harassment; removal from cases without justification; punitive reassignment;

false performance evaluations; false written reprimands; a baseless performance improvement plan;

continuous badgering; acts that undermined and sabotaged Plaintiff’s work and ability to perform;

disparate treatment; unwarranted suspension; and interference with his attempts to report the

retaliatory acts to the appropriate government bodies. Plaintiff also claims that he was

constructively discharged on October 27, 2004, and that that discharge was Defendants’ final act of

retaliation.

—

Defendants now move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.

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///

LEGAL STANDARD

The summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 56. The judgment sought will be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “[A]

moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial [ ] may carry its initial burden of

production by either of two methods. The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense

to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz

Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets its burden, the nonmoving

party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual issue for trial. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,

“the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). In opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on his

pleadings. He “must produce at least some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

 The Court does not make credibility determinations with respect to evidence offered, and is

required to draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ). Summary judgment is

therefore not appropriate “where contradictory inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed

evidentiary facts . . . .” Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th

Cir. 1980). 

ANALYSIS

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 The Court agrees with Defendants that Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and its

progeny, and not cases dealing with disclosures of criminal wrongdoing such as Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2001), dictate the outcome of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

13

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has presented no evidence creating a triable issue of fact on

his claim that they unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff for his exercise of protected speech. 

Defendants argue that even if the Court disagrees, they are entitled to qualified immunity because

Plaintiff’s rights were not violated, his alleged rights were not clearly established, and a reasonable

supervisor in each Defendant’s position would have believed his respective conduct was lawful. 

The Court examines these arguments separately. 

I. Standard Governing Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim9

“In order to state a claim against a government employer for violation of the First

Amendment, an employee must show (1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2) that the

employer took ‘adverse employment action;’ and (3) that his or her speech was a ‘substantial or

motivating’ factor for the adverse employment action.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968,

973 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the balancing test established by Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563, 568 (1968), the court must weigh the employer’s legitimate interest in promoting workplace

efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption against the employee’s interest in exercising his First

Amendment rights, or that, under the mixed motive analysis established by Mt. Healthy City School

District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), the employer would have taken the

same adverse actions in the absence of the employee’s protected conduct. See Bd. of County

Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1996). The Pickering balancing test can be employed

even at the first step of determining whether the speech at issue is protected. 

Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff, a public employee, did not engage in speech that is

protected by the Constitution. Defendants argue that even if the speech at issue is protected, their

treatment of Plaintiff, about which he now complains, was motivated not by retaliation for engaging

in the protected speech, but by Defendants’ interest in preventing further insubordination and

disruption in the OCTC, which outweighed Plaintiff’s First Amendment interests. They also

contend that they would have taken the very same actions whether or not he had engaged in the

allegedly protected conduct. The Court first examines whether the speech at issue was protected.

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A. Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Speech.

Plaintiff contends that the following communications were constitutionally protected: 

(1) statements of intent to seek redress from CJP; (2) the September 11, 2003, memorandum; (3)

Plaintiff’s complaint to the CJP; (4) the November 18, 2003, memorandum; (5) Plaintiff’s statement

of intent to seek redress from RAD and the Legislature; (6) Plaintiff’s reports to RAD and the

Legislature; (7) Plaintiff’s report to the State Personnel Board; and (8) Plaintiff’s refusals to comply

with supervisor directives that he believed would have resulted in ethical and legal violations. 

“An employee’s speech is protected under the First Amendment if it addresses ‘a matter of

legitimate public concern.’” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571); see

also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149–50 (1983). “[S]peech that concerns ‘issues about which

information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society’ to make informed decisions

about the operation of their government merits the highest degree of first amendment protection.” 

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973 (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“On the other hand, speech that deals with ‘individual personnel disputes and grievances’ and that

would be of ‘no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies’

is generally not of ‘public concern.’” Id.; see also Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.

2001) (the First Amendment “does not safeguard ‘purely private interest,’ ‘individual disputes,’ or

‘the minutiae of workplace grievances.’”) “The determination of whether an employee’s speech

deals with an issue of public concern is to be made with reference to ‘the content, form, and context’

of the speech.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973–74 (citing Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir.

1987)).

Here, Defendants argue that the speech at issue consists of workplace gripes and is not

protected by the First Amendment. The Court does not entirely agree. Defendants are right that the

record is replete with Plaintiff’s personal complaints, mostly by email, in which he complains about

Defendants’ micro-management, disrespect, and lack of support of him. This type of personal

workplace grousing does not raise matters of public concern. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 148

(morale in the district attorney’s office was not an issue of public concern). However, Plaintiff did,

on several occasions, engage in speech that touched on matters of public concern. Plaintiff’s

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For the Northern District of California

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28 10 Whether or not Defendants knew about the CJP complaint and took adverse employment

action against Plaintiff in retaliation is a separate question and is discussed infra.

15

communications in which he expressed concerns, either internally or to the CJP, the state

Legislature, the Board of Governors’ RAD committee, or the State Personnel Board, about judicial

misconduct at the State Bar Court, were protected by the First Amendment. The appropriate

functioning of the judicial forum in which attorneys are tried for wrongdoing is of vital concern to

the public.10 Whether or not Plaintiff’s concerns were well-founded is irrelevant. Thus, the Court

finds that the following communications, occurring between approximately May 2003 and

November 2003, were protected by the First Amendment: (1) statements of intent to seek redress

from CJP; (2) Plaintiff’s complaint to the CJP; (3) Plaintiff’s statement of intent to seek redress from

RAD and the California Legislature; (4) Plaintiff’s reports to RAD and the Legislature; (5)

Plaintiff’s report to the State Personnel Board. 

More complex questions, however, are presented by Plaintiff’s September 11, 2003, and

November 18, 2003, internal memoranda, and his repeated refusals, between January 2004 and

August 2004, to comply with his supervisors’ directives because he believed that to do so would

have resulted in ethical and legal violations. The Court examines each of these separately.

1. The September 11, 2003 Memorandum

Defendants’ position is that Plaintiff’s September 11, 2003, memorandum is a workplace

gripe about the lack of support and morale at the OCTC that does not constitute speech that is

protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff contends, to the contrary, that because the memo

addresses, at least in part, concerns about the State Bar Court judges’ conduct, fairness, and

propriety – matters of public concern, the entire memorandum constitutes protected speech. The

Court agrees with Plaintiff here.

At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants are right that Plaintiff’s speech should be

considered not “in a vacuum, but in conjunction with the manner, time, and place of the public

employee’s expression and the context in which the dispute arose.” Poole v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d

899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, there is no doubt that Plaintiff’s September memorandum was

written primarily to express his great personal anguish about what he perceived was his supervisors’

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increasing lack of respect for and trust in him professionally. He felt undermined and patronized,

and was dispirited. This sense that he was being treated unfairly is interwoven throughout the memo

and constitutes its overarching theme. Defendants argue, therefore, that the memorandum, as

expression of workplace grousing, is not protected speech.

However, “[i]f some part of the communication addresses an issue of public concern, the

First Amendment’s protections are triggered even though other aspects of the communication do not

qualify as a public concern.” Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992). At issue in

Hyland was whether a memorandum written by a Juvenile Hall employee (against whom adverse

action was taken) and distributed to judges constituted protected speech. The memorandum accused

the current director of Juvenile Hall of incompetence, described a precipitous decline in staff morale,

accountability, and leadership, and cited problems with the living conditions at Juvenile Hall and the

treatment of the children detained there. Id. The court, citing its earlier holding in Roth v. Veteran’s

Administration, 856 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988), held that speech regarding “‘the misuse of

public funds, wastefulness, and inefficiency in managing and operating government entities’

qualifies as a matter of public concern.” Id. The Hyland plaintiff’s memorandum alleged the “inept,

inefficient, and potentially harmful administration of a government entity.” Id. at 1139. Thus, the

court found, the memorandum spoke to a matter of public concern. The court rejected the

defendant’s argument that the speech concerned only an internal personnel dispute, finding that the

“context in which the memorandum was drafted and circulated suggested” otherwise. Id. at 1138

(citations omitted). 

Plaintiff contends that his September 2003 memorandum is analogous to the memo at issue

in Hyland. The Court disagrees. Here, the thrust of Plaintiff’s memorandum, unlike the memo at

issue in Hyland, was Plaintiff’s own personal dissatisfaction with his supervisors and their lack of

support for him, as exemplified by the following excerpts:

I am still speechless when I look back at these hearings and still appalled at the

lack of support and lack of backing I received from this office while enduring the

erroneous rulings, inappropriate comments, unlawful orders, disregard of due

process, and outright bias of Judge Remke.

(Id. at 1.)

I cannot believe this office refuses to support its trial counsel and defend their

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integrity when inappropriately attacked by a judge without basis. I cannot

understand why so much deference is given to a judge here merely because there

is a fear of conflict between this office and a judge despite the judge’s behavior

and actions lacking in judicial temperament [sic] and the judge’s rulings

disregarding and contradicting Supreme Court authority and Review Department

authority.

(Id. at 1–2). 

In no other organization that I have worked [sic] have I ever seen senior attorneys

or management refuse to back their trial attorneys when inappropriately disparaged

or attacked by the judiciary.

(Id. at 2.) However, this difference between Plaintiff’s memo and the Hyland memo is not

dispositive. Plaintiff’s memo touched on matters of public concern by incorporating accusations

that one of the State Bar Court judges was bias and had engaged in repeated misconduct and by

asserting that Plaintiff “truly and sincerely now question[s] the mission of [the OCTC] and its

commitment to its obligation to protect the public, the administration of justice, and former clients.” 

(Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. G at 3.) Judicial misconduct and the proper administration of a government

agency are issues of public concern. In the memorandum, those issues are inextricably intertwined

with Plaintiff’s expression of workplace dissatisfaction. Accordingly, while the Court disagrees

with Plaintiff that the memo is comparable to the Hyland memo, the Court finds that the portions of

the September 11, 2003, memorandum that raise matters of public concern trigger the First

Amendment’s protection and render the entire memorandum protected speech. 

Defendants contend that even if the Court finds that the memorandum is protected speech by

virtue of those aspects of the memo that touch on matters of public concern, Konig’s speech, in the

September 2003 memorandum, so severely damages office harmony and working relationships that

the Government’s interest in promoting a congenial workplace outweighs Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights under Pickering and the memo should not be deemed protected speech. The

Court disagrees. To so find would require a finding that the memorandum disrupted coworker

relationships, impaired discipline or control by superiors, eroded close working relationships,

interfered with performance of duties, or obstructed the routine operation of the office. On this

record, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s memo was so insubordinate or

disruptive to the management of the OCTC that it falls outside the protection of the First

Amendment. Plaintiff’s September 11, 2003, memorandum is protected speech.

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2. The November 18, 2003 Memorandum

Plaintiff’s November 18, 2003, memorandum, a defensive reply to Dal Cerro’s October 2003

response to the September memorandum, incorporates the September memo. Specifically, Plaintiff

criticizes Defendants’ failure to address the issues set forth in his September 11 memorandum,

which he attached thereto. As discussed above, some of the issues raised in the September memo

were of public concern, rendering that memo protected speech. Thus, the November memo must

also be deemed protected speech.

3. Plaintiff’s Refusals to Comply With Directives That He Believed Would

Have Resulted in Ethical and Legal Violations

Plaintiff contends that his recurring refusals to follow his supervisors’ instructions

constituted protected speech because he believed if he complied with their directives, he, himself,

would be violating the law and the code of ethics. Plaintiff cites a California Supreme Court case –

General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164 (1994) – to support his argument. In

that case, an in-house attorney alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for spearheading an

investigation into company-wide drug use, protesting the company’s failure to investigate the

criminal bugging of the office of the chief of security, and advising the company that its salary

policy might violate federal labor law. The court held that a terminated in-house attorney can sue

his former employer for retaliating against him for raising legitimate legal and ethical concerns. 

However, the court was explicit that the “contested ethical requirement must be clearly established

by the ethics code or statutory provision” and “disagreements over policy are not actionable.” Id. at

1189–91. In the case at bar, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that his refusal to follow instructions

by, inter alia, dropping certain charges from NDCs or making routine edits to his drafts would have

violated clearly established ethics provisions or law. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

not demonstrated that this speech was protected.

—

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s stated intention to seek redress from the CJP, RAD,

and the California Legislature beginning in May 2003, his complaints to those bodies and to the

State Personnel Board in November and December 2003, and his internal complaints, in September

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11 The court in Coszalter addresses whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to adverse actions

and whether those actions were motivated by the plaintiff’s protected speech together. This Court will

address these issues separately. Defendants’ adverse employment action only constitutes retaliation if

Plaintiff can demonstrate that it was if motivated by Plaintiff’s protected speech. The causation issue

is addressed in the next section.

19

and November 2003, about judicial misconduct and the poor administration of the OCTC,

constituted protected speech. 

///

B. Adverse Employment Actions

An adverse employment action is an action that is “reasonably likely to deter” the employee

from engaging in protected speech. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 976. “To constitute an adverse

employment action, a government act of retaliation need not be severe and it need not be of a certain

kind. Nor does it matter whether an act of retaliation is in the form of the removal of a benefit or the

imposition of a burden.” Id. at 975. “In some cases, the would-be retaliatory action is so

insignificant that it does not deter the exercise of First Amendment rights, and thus does not

constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the First Amendment retaliation

cases.” Id.; see also Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1987) (“bad-mouthing” an

employee who engaged in protected speech is not an adverse employment action). In Coszalter, the

Ninth Circuit held that a whole host of employer conduct, including assigning an employee to new

duties, conducting an unwarranted disciplinary investigation, ongoing verbal harassment and

humiliation, suspending the employee from work, threatening disciplinary action, withholding

customary public recognition, and special reviews of work quality, when taken together, amounted

to “a severe and sustained campaign of employer retaliation that was ‘reasonably likely to deter’

plaintiffs from engaging in speech protected under the First Amendment.” 320 F.3d at 976–77.11 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took the following adverse actions against him: (1)

harassing and humiliating Plaintiff both verbally and in writing; (2) micro-managing Plaintiff’s

work; (3) sabotaging Plaintiff’s work; (4) bad-mouthing Plaintiff; (5) withholding positive

comments about Plaintiff’s work; (6) issuing false written reprimands in November and December

2003; (7) conducting biased grievance proceedings; (8) retaining a biased investigator to look into

Plaintiff’s RAD complaint; (9) reassigning Plaintiff in December 2003/January 2004 to new job

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12 This list is gleaned from Plaintiff’s less comprehensible list on pages 12 and 13 of his

opposition.

13 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not separately analyze each Defendant’s actions against

him. However, to survive summary judgment on his claims against each Defendant, he must present

evidence that each Defendant took an adverse action against him in retaliation for protected speech. See

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645–46 (9th Cir. 1989) (no vicarious liability under § 1983).

Accordingly, the Court separates out by Defendant, as best it can, the conduct Plaintiff alleges amounted

to adverse action against him.

20

responsibilities; (10) conducting unwarranted disciplinary investigations; (11) failing to fully

investigate allegations against him by speaking with witnesses who would refute the allegations;

(12) threatening disciplinary action; (13) removing Plaintiff from matters on which he was working;

(14) imposing the PIP in the summer of 2004; (15) imposing the three-day suspension in August

2004; (16) constructively terminating Plaintiff’s employment.12 Plaintiff contends that Defendants’

treatment of him was, like the actions at issue in Coszalter, a severe and sustained campaign of

conduct that was reasonably likely to deter him from engaging in any further protected speech. The

Court addresses, under the Coszalter standard, whether each Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff

amounted to an adverse action.13

1. Defendant Dal Cerro

According to Plaintiff, the following actions taken by Defendant Dal Cerro constitute

adverse employment actions:

• On September 23, 2003, Defendant Dal Cerro and Donald Steedman (not a defendant here)

met with Plaintiff and a union representative. At that meeting, Dal Cerro allegedly made

several false allegations against Plaintiff related to his work and his conduct.

• On October 31, 2003, Dal Cerro delivered a memorandum that he and Defendant Hawley

had prepared in response to Plaintiff’s September 11, 2003, memorandum. According to

Plaintiff, the response contained numerous vague and unwarranted allegations of misconduct

against Plaintiff and included a “veiled threat that [Konig] either accept the way things are

done and stop raising issues of wrongdoing and malfeasance or [he] would no longer have a

job.”

• In November 2003, Defendant Dal Cerro reassigned the Kay/Dalton matter to Blumenthal.

• On November 20, 2003, Dal Cerro and Steedman presented Plaintiff with a Written Warning,

explaining that Konig had insubordinately failed to make changes to a draft NDC which had

been requested by his supervisor and that he then denied being instructed to make those

changes. The Warning admonished Plaintiff that if he “continue[d] to fail to follow the

direction of [his] supervisors or otherwise engage[d] in acts of insubordination, disobedience,

or disrespect, [he would] be subject to additional discipline, up to and including

termination.”

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28 14 Again, the Court addresses Defendants’ motivation for taking adverse action in the next

section.

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• Also on November 20, 2003, Defendant Dal Cerro provided Plaintiff with his Performance

Review for the July 2002 through July 2003 time period. On the whole, the Performance

Review was positive, giving Plaintiff an overall rating of “Meets Requirements.” However,

in the Manager’s Comments section, the Review suggested several areas in which Plaintiff

might improve. Specifically, it reported that Konig had had “several antagonistic encounters

with various individuals, including his supervisors, a State Bar Court judge, and several

opposing counsel.”

• In December 2003, Dal Cerro issued Plaintiff a second Written Warning for continuing to

exhibit “insubordinate and willfully disobedient behavior.” 

• In April 2004, following a battle between Plaintiff and Defendant Blumenthal over

Blumenthal’s edits and suggestions for Plaintiff’s draft NDC in the Lowenstein matter, Dal

Cerro got involved and told Konig that continuing to be insubordinate for no reason violated

Plaintiff’s obligation to do as he is told as long as he works for the State Bar. Ultimately,

Dal Cerro removed Plaintiff from the Lowenstein matter. 

• On May 19, 2004, Defendant Dal Cerro presented Plaintiff with a PIP due to Plaintiff’s

“failure to satisfactorily fulfill the requirements of [his] position.” The PIP stated that it was

intended to “serve as a non-disciplinary corrective action program designed to monitor,

evaluate and improve [Plaintiff’s] performance.” The PIP listed past deficiencies in Konig’s

work and provided specific direction for him to meet with his new team leader, Defendant

Blumenthal, on a weekly basis for management oversight. 

• On August 18, 2004, Dal Cerro held a short PIP meeting with Konig to discuss Plaintiff’s

ability to meet deadlines in the Stevens matter.

• On August 24, 2004, Dal Cerro presented Plaintiff with a Notice of Disciplinary Action for

his failure to comply with the terms of the PIP. Specifically, the Notice identified Konig’s

failure to provide drafts of the Stevens pre-trial statement as requested. The Notice also

informed Plaintiff that he was being removed from the Stevens case and from all other court

appearances and that he should focus his efforts on improving the productivity of his notice

drafting. The Notice explained that as a result of Plaintiff’s insubordination, a three-day

suspension would be imposed, and that the Notice served as a final warning that any further

misbehavior could result in termination. The Notice explained that the suspension would be

stayed until a later date when the OCTC was less busy and Plaintiff could be spared. 

Under Coszalter, the Court finds that Defendant Dal Cerro’s reassignment of Plaintiff’s cases

and issuance of two Written Warnings, a PIP, and a Notice of Disciplinary Action constitute adverse

employment actions. If undertaken in response to Plaintiff’s protected speech,14 these actions were

reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from engaging in further protected speech. To avoid summary

judgment, however, Plaintiff must demonstrate that his protected conduct was a substantial or

motivating factor for Defendant Dal Cerro’s adverse actions. That question is addressed in section

3(c), infra.

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2. Defendant Blumenthal

Plaintiff claims that the following actions taken by Defendant Blumenthal constitute adverse

employment actions: 

• On March 23, 2004, Blumenthal informed Plaintiff by email that the OCTC had decided not

to appeal the discipline meted out in the Mendez matter. He said, “Alan: I have to go to a

meeting, but I wanted you to know that the office has decided not to appeal the Mendez

matter. We appreciate your efforts in this case.” Konig interpreted the email as patronizing

and alleges that it was an adverse action against him to make the decision not to appeal with

no input from him.

• In the Medeiros matter, Blumenthal asked Plaintiff to have a draft NDC done by March 22,

2004. Blumenthal then reminded Konig of the deadline on March 12 and again on March 16. 

Plaintiff alleges that Blumenthal was unduly harassing, criticizing, and micro-managing him.

• In the Lowenstein matter, Konig provided a draft ENEC statement and NDC to Blumenthal

on April 1, 2004. Blumenthal gave Konig written comments and questions which Konig

alleges amounted to harassment and retaliation.

• On May 18, 2004, Defendant Blumenthal instructed Plaintiff to make three specific changes

to the draft NDC in the Beasley matter. Plaintiff contends that this was more micromanagement and harassment.

• On July 27, 2004, in advance of the next PIP meeting (scheduled for July 30), Blumenthal

asked Konig to bring a draft of his pre-trial statement in the Stevens matter to the meeting

and to be prepared to discuss his trial strategies. At the July 30 PIP meeting, Konig informed

Blumenthal that he had not finished taking Stevens’ deposition and that the pre-trial

statement was not done. When asked about his trial approach, Konig said he did not know

what that meant and refused to respond. Blumenthal then instructed Konig to provide a list

of witnesses and exhibits, the pre-trial statement, and a short summary of his planned trial

approach by August 11, and to be prepared to discuss the matter at the next PIP meeting on

August 13. On August 12, Blumenthal had not yet received the documents. He emailed

Konig about it. Konig alleges that Blumenthal’s conduct around the Stevens matter

amounted to micro-management and harassment.

Defendant Blumenthal’s attempts to supervise Plaintiff by checking in with him about trial

strategy and deadlines, and by providing edits and suggestions to drafts may amount to adverse

actions. Plaintiff, generally asserts that Defendant Blumenthal’s attempts to supervise Plaintiff by

checking in with him about trial strategy and deadlines, and by providing edits and suggestions to

constitute adverse actions. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how

Blumenthal’s supervisory behavior was reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from speaking out about

judicial misconduct at the State Bar Court. The court finds on this record that it is a close question

as to whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine factual dispute

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regarding whether Blumenthal’s conduct constitutes an adverse action. Assuming, without finding,

that Plaintiff has established that Blumenthal’s conduct constitutes an adverse action, to avoid

summary judgment Plaintiff must establish that Blumenthal’s actions were undertaken in retaliation

for Plaintiff’s protected speech. This issue is addressed in section 3(c), infra.

3. Defendant Hawley

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hawley manipulated the internal investigation into Plaintiff’s

RAD complaint in November and December 2003 and that that manipulation constituted an adverse

action against him. Plaintiff alleges that one day before Konig sent his complaint to RAD – the

committee that oversees the OCTC, Hawley emailed John Van de Kamp, RAD’s Chair, to discuss

Konig’s forthcoming complaint. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Hawley suggested to RAD how

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dealt with and hired an investigator – Charlotte Addington – who

was purported to be independent but who Plaintiff alleges was not independent, to look into

Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff also claims that Hawley made prejudicial statements about Plaintiff in

the email to Van de Kamp. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hawley wrote to the legislative

committees to which Konig had complained, and represented that Mr. Van de Kamp was directing

an appropriate investigation into Konig’s complaints. Plaintiff asserts that this, too, amounted to an

adverse action. Finally, Plaintiff claims that the October 2003 memorandum prepared by

Defendants Dal Cerro and Hawley in response to Plaintiff’s September 2003 memo contained

numerous vague and unwarranted allegations of misconduct against Plaintiff and included a “veiled

threat that [Konig] either accept the way things are done and stop raising issues of wrongdoing and

malfeasance or [he] would no longer have a job,” amounting to adverse action. 

With respect to the RAD investigation, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented any

evidence that Defendant Hawley’s role in that investigation was improper or that he manipulated the

investigation in the OCTC’s favor such that it could constitute an adverse employment action. It

may be true that where an employee complains about his organization to its supervisory board and

the board’s investigation of the complaint is rigged by the employee’s manager to result in a positive

outcome for the organization, the manager’s manipulative conduct may be reasonably likely to deter

the employee from complaining again. The employee presumably would not bother to file a

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complaint because he would know that the complaint would not be taken seriously. But Plaintiff has

not shown this to be the case here. Here, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to support a

finding that Defendant Hawley’s email to Van de Kamp suggests that he was manipulating the

investigative process. The email, attached to Plaintiff’s April 5, 2005, Declaration as Exhibit 16,

only alerts Van de Kamp that Konig’s complaint will be filed soon, presents the OCTC’s side of the

story and its current battle with Konig over his refusal to follow his superiors’ directives, and

suggests that he will contact Charlotte Addington, an investigator with whom he had worked in the

past, to investigate the complaint. There is no suggestion, in that email, that Defendant Hawley

intended to manipulate the findings in his (or the OCTC’s) favor. Similarly, Plaintiff presents no

evidence that Ms. Addington was in any way instructed by Hawley to manipulate the investigation

in the OCTC’s favor. Her notes, upon which Plaintiff heavily relies here, say only that Konig is

likely to question her role. This, alone, does not suggest that her role was questionable or, more to

the point, that Hawley was rigging the investigation. Accordingly, the Court finds, after a very

careful examination of the record, here, that Plaintiff has not created a triable issue of fact with

respect to whether Hawley’s role in the RAD investigation was an adverse action.

With respect to Hawley’s alleged letters to CJP, to the California State Personnel Board, and

to the California Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, to whom Plaintiff had submitted

written complaints, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Hawley actually wrote letters to CJP or to the

legislative committees. Plaintiff does provide evidence, and Defendants admit, that Hawley wrote a

letter to the State Personnel Board, informing the Board, correctly, that it did not have jurisdiction

over the State Bar (and the Board agreed and did not pursue Plaintiff’s complaint). The Court finds

that this act does not constitute an adverse action against Plaintiff.

Finally, with respect to the memorandum prepared by Defendants Hawley and Dal Cerro in

response to Plaintiff’s September memo, the Court finds that that there was no adverse action. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the responsive memo was disciplinary in nature nor has he

presented any evidence demonstrating that the memo, which specifically addressed Plaintiff’s

insubordination, would be reasonably likely to deter him from engaging in protected speech. 

Accordingly, under Coszalter, the Court finds that the memorandum written by Hawley and Dal

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Cerro does not, alone, constitute an adverse action. 

4. Defendant Weiner

Plaintiff makes no specific allegations of adverse employment actions taken against him by

Defendant Weiner. Instead, Weiner is mentioned in passing as one of the supervisors who directed

Plaintiff to conform his practice to the guidelines set by the OCTC. Plaintiff refused to do so on the

ground that the guidelines were unethical; however, he points to no evidence that would support a

finding that this instruction amounted to an adverse action reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from

engaging in protected speech.

5. Generalized Allegations of Adverse Action – No Identified Actor

Plaintiff alleges that the decision, in January 2004, to reassign him to the team designated to

draft notices (and away from the trial team), constituted an adverse action taken against him by

Defendants. Plaintiff does not name a specific actor. The evidence in the record demonstrates that

the entire office was reorganized such that some counsel were assigned to notice drafting and others

were assigned to trial work, and that the reassignment was not unique to Plaintiff. However, the

decision to assign Plaintiff to notice drafting and to take him off of his cases was, even if not unique

to Plaintiff and even if justified by Defendants (a question that the Court will examine in the next

section), an adverse action against Plaintiff that might be likely to deter him from further engaging

in protected speech. 

—

In sum, the Court finds that the following actions taken against Plaintiff were adverse: 

Defendant Dal Cerro’s issuance of Written Warnings, the PIP, and the Notice of Disciplinary

Action, as well as the removal of Plaintiff from various matters on which he was working (e.g.

Kay/Dalton, Lowenstein, Stevens); Defendant Blumenthal’s alleged micro-management of Plaintiff

from January 2004 through August 2004; Plaintiff’s reassignment to notice drafting in January 2004;

and the decision, in August 2004, to discipline Plaintiff by suspending him. Because Plaintiff has

not presented any evidence that Defendant Weiner took an adverse action against Plaintiff, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claims against Defendant Weiner.

C. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated that His Protected Speech Was a Substantial or

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15 Having dismissed Defendant Weiner, the term “Defendants” as used in the remainder of this

Order refers only to Defendants Dal Cerro, Blumenthal, and Hawley.

16 In his opposition, Plaintiff does not analyze the question of motive separately for each

Defendant and instead makes very generalized contentions about retaliatory motive. For example,

Plaintiff appears to argue, as will be discussed infra, that the log of Plaintiff’s conduct maintained by

Defendant Blumenthal demonstrates that all Defendants’ adverse conduct against Plaintiff was

motivated by retaliation. He does not specifically tether the log to Blumenthal’s actions. While the

Court found it useful, in section I(B) above, to break out by Defendant the various actions Plaintiff

alleged constituted adverse employment actions, the Court declines to follow that pattern here. 

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Motivating Factor For Defendants’ Adverse Employment Actions.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants15 took adverse action against him in retaliation for engaging

in protected speech. Defendants contend, to the contrary, that each action Plaintiff contends was

retaliatory was actually disciplinary in nature and was prompted, in each instance, by Plaintiff’s

insubordination and refusal to be supervised, not by his protected speech. Defendants also contend

that even assuming Plaintiff has shown that his protected speech was a substantial or motivating

factor for the adverse actions taken against him, the same decisions would have been reached in the

absence of any protected conduct. The Court agrees with Defendants.16

A plaintiff can show that retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind a

defendant’s adverse employment actions in three different ways. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 (citing

Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. District, 265 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2000)). First, a plaintiff can

point to evidence demonstrating that the proximity in time between the protected action and the

allegedly retaliatory employment decision could prompt a jury logically to infer that the plaintiff

was terminated in retaliation for his speech. Second, a plaintiff can point to evidence that his

employer expressed opposition to his speech, either to the plaintiff or to others. Third, a plaintiff

can point to evidence that his employer’s proffered explanations for the adverse employment action

were false and pre-textual. Id. Here, Plaintiff argues that he has submitted evidence demonstrating

that he has made a prima facie case for retaliation and that he has shown that Defendants’ proffered

justifications for their adverse employment actions are actually a pretext for a retaliatory motive. 

1. Expressed Opposition

Plaintiff contends that various communications from Defendants constituted expressed

opposition to his attempts to engage in protected speech such that he has established a prima facie

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17 In neither his Opposition nor in the supplemental brief he filed providing citations to the record

(that were utterly lacking in his original Opposition) does Plaintiff cite to anything in the record that

supports the portion of his opposition claiming that during the spring and summer of 2003, “when

Plaintiff stated his intent to notify the CJP of judicial misconduct within the State Bar, Defendant Dal

Cerro repeatedly attempted to dissuade or discourage Plaintiff from doing so by stating to him words

to the effect of ‘you don’t want to do that,’ and that the CJP ‘won’t do anything’ anyway.” (See

Opposition at 18:2–5; Plaintiff’s Response to Evidence Interposed by Defendants.) Plaintiff also fails

to provide evidentiary support for his contention that, “In Defendant Dal Cerro’s notes from his

meetings with Plaintiff on September 23 and 24, he has made specific references to Plaintiff making

reports of internal misconduct to outside agencies and notes to the effect that Plaintiff was not to make

such reports without first obtaining the approval of his supervisors.” (See Opposition at 18:6–9;

Plaintiff’s Response to Evidence Interposed by Defendants at 3:24–25.) Plaintiff did provide citations

to the record to support that statement (in his supplemental brief), but neither citation actually supports

Plaintiff’s claims. First, Plaintiff cites to a portion of his own declaration, which says nothing about Dal

Cerro’s alleged notes suggesting that Plaintiff discuss possible CJP complaints with supervisors before

making them (see Plaintiff’s April 5, 2005, Declaration at 14–15). Second, he cites to Exhibit 16 to his

April 5, 2005, Declaration, which is an email from Defendant Robert Hawley to RAD that says nothing

about Dal Cerro’s notes regarding Plaintiff’s CJP complaints. The Court has located nothing else in this

very full record to support Plaintiff’s factual claims here.

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case of retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Dal Cerro’s advice to Plaintiff not

to file a complaint with CJP because CJP “won’t do anything” anyway and Dal Cerro’s personal

notes suggesting that Plaintiff should not make reports of judicial misconduct to outside agencies

without first discussing it with his supervisors amounts to opposition that supports a finding that the

actions Dal Cerro took were motivated by retaliation. Plaintiff fails, however, to cite to any

competent evidence in the record establishing that Dal Cerro made the dissuasive comment or wrote

the note.17 Assuming evidence of this conduct were before the Court, Dal Cerro’s comments might

suffice to support Plaintiff’s prima facie case, as to Defendant Dal Cerro, of retaliation here. With

no evidentiary support, however, Plaintiff has not shown that Dal Cerro expressed opposition to his

protected speech.

Plaintiff’s second example of “expressed opposition” fairs no better than the first. He

contends that the first Written Warning he received, just 17 days after he submitted his complaint to

the CJP, contained the following directive regarding “corrective action to be taken:”

You will seek and receive the approval of your team leader (or his designee) as to

final form and content of each of your pleadings before they are filed, and other

written documents related to your cases and other assigned tasks directed to

individuals outside of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel before they are sent.

(Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. Q.) Plaintiff contends that the “plain language of this directive, without any

attempt to distinguish between purely private speech and that done as an employee of the office, . . .

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18 Defendants also contend that they did not all know about all of the complaints Plaintiff had

filed; thus, their subsequent actions could not have been taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints

of judicial misconduct. While that may be true (and the record suggests that it is), the Court is not

persuaded that this absolves Defendants here. If each Defendant was aware that Plaintiff had raised

issues regarding judicial decorum with outside agencies, it is irrelevant that each did not know of every

instance of protected communication. That each knew he had engaged at all in protected speech

provides a basis for retaliation. 

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makes the intent of the directive clear. Plaintiff will cease the outside reports.” (Opposition at

18:20–23.) The Court is at a loss as to how Plaintiff or his counsel could reasonably read the

language of the Written Warning to suggest that Plaintiff stop filing complaints about judicial

misconduct with outside agencies. The directive clearly states that it applies only to “pleadings,”

“other written documents related to your cases,” and “other assigned tasks.” (Dal Cerro Decl., Ex.

Q (emphasis added).) Even a liberal reading of the language would not accommodate the meaning

Plaintiff assigns. 

2. Temporal Proximity

Plaintiff also contends that the temporal proximity between the protected speech in which he

engaged and the adverse actions Defendants took supports, under Coszalter, an inference that his

speech was a substantial or motivating factor for their actions. It is true that many of Defendants’

actions took place not long after Plaintiff engaged in protected speech. For example, Plaintiff filed

his CJP complaint in early November and was issued a Written Warning a few weeks later. 

Defendants argue, however, that the temporal proximity of their actions to the protected conduct

does not alone demonstrate retaliatory motive.18 

Defendant’s argument is somewhat persuasive in that Plaintiff has failed to link the discrete

acts of harassment committed by each defendant to an instance of protected speech so that the Court

could determine whether the record supports an inference than an employment decision was

retaliatory. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the record does

evince that several instances of asserted retaliatory conduct took place not long after Plaintiff

engaged in protected speech. For example, Plaintiff filed his CJP complaint in early November and

was issued a Written Warning a few weeks later. As such, the Court proceeds as if the proximity of

the adverse consequences identified herein were sufficient to establish that Defendants acted with

the requisite motivation. Id.

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3. The Government’s Proffered Justification and Pretext

 Under Ninth Circuit law, Defendant can escape liability by showing that it would have

taken the complained of action even in the absence of the protected speech. Keyser v. Sacramento

City Unified School Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2000). Assuming, without deciding, that

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation here by demonstrating temporal proximity,

the Court now examines the justifications for the adverse employment actions proffered by

Defendants and whether Plaintiff has presented any evidence to support a finding that the neutral

justifications are actually pretext for retaliation.

Defendants contend that each disciplinary action taken against Plaintiff was actually meted

out in response to Plaintiff’s acts of insubordination, and not in retaliation for Plaintiff’s engaging in

protected speech. For example, Defendant Dal Cerro’s reaction to the September 11, 2003, memo

was to call a meeting with Plaintiff, twelve days afterwards, to counsel him on improving his honeyto-vinegar ratio at the office. Defendants contend that Dal Cerro merely responded, at that meeting,

and in writing a month later, to Plaintiff’s invectives about his supervisors’ failure to support him

properly. Other examples are: (1) Dal Cerro’s decision to remove Plaintiff from the Kay/Dalton

matter after Plaintiff had written a letter to the complaining witness in the case (Judge Anello) and

disclosed that there had been an internal disagreement at the OCTC over whether and when to file

charges and suggesting that Plaintiff’s supervisor (Steedman) had made an incorrect decision by

granting the respondent an extension of time; (2) Dal Cerro’s issuance of a Written Warning after

Plaintiff filed the Mendez NDC without making the changes his supervisor (Steedman) had

instructed him to make; (3) Dal Cerro’s issuance of the second Written Warning after Plaintiff failed

to comply with the first Written Warning (which required him to file an amended NDC in the

Mendez matter); (4) the decision to reassign Plaintiff to notice drafting and away from court

appearances, where he, of late, had repeatedly treated both State Bar Court judges contemptuously;

(5) Dal Cerro’s decision to remove Plaintiff from the Lowenstein case after he refused to incorporate

Blumenthal’s changes; (6) Blumenthal’s micro-management of Plaintiff’s work after discovering

that Plaintiff had failed to timely propound discovery in the Bajaj matter, had failed to comply with

internally set deadlines, and was refusing to follow his supervisors’ directives; (7) Dal Cerro’s

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19 In his opposition, Plaintiff does not analyze, Defendant by Defendant, whether the evidence

supports a finding that each Defendant’s adverse action was motivated by retaliation. Instead, he makes

only very generalized arguments that various actions taken by some Defendants supports a finding that

all engaged in unlawful retaliation. For example, as is discussed infra, Plaintiff generally asserts that

the fact that Blumenthal maintained a log of Plaintiff’s insubordinate conduct evidences a retaliatory

motive on the part of all Defendants. However, as noted in footnote 13, supra, to survive summary

judgment on his claims against each Defendant, Plaintiff must present evidence that each Defendant’s

adverse action was motivated by retaliation for protected speech. See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 645–46 (no

vicarious liability under § 1983). Defendants, for their part, also do not engage in separate analyses of

motive as to each Defendant. Thus, rather than analyze this question in a manner wholly different from

that employed by the parties, the Court addresses pretext in the same manner. 

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decision to implement a PIP so that Plaintiff could be coached back on track; (8) Dal Cerro’s

decision to remove Plaintiff from the Stevens case after he failed to comply with his supervisor’s

directives regarding drafts and deadlines; and (9) Dal Cerro’s issuance of the Notice of Disciplinary

Action, informing Plaintiff that he would be suspended for three days (to be implemented at a later

date) for insubordination.19 

Plaintiff suggests that Defendants’ proffered explanations for the adverse employment

actions taken against him are false and pretextual. To support this argument, Plaintiff cites very

generally to the entire factual record and then more specifically, to a log maintained by Defendant

Blumenthal which documented Plaintiff’s activities, to Mike Nisperos’ June 14, 2004, email stating

his intent to terminate Plaintiff once the investigation into his RAD complaint was complete, and to

Defendant Hawley’s failure to conduct an impartial investigation into Plaintiff’s complaints of false

allegations and retaliation. (See Opposition at 20:5–24.) The Court finds that the record does not

support Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants’ actions were motivated by retaliation. Plaintiff has

not presented evidence that demonstrates that Defendants’ proffered justifications are pretext for

retaliation. 

With respect to Defendant Blumenthal’s log, attached to Konig’s April 5, 2005, Declaration

as Exhibit 17, Blumenthal’s first entry was not until March 2004, and the contents of the log

evidence only an attempt to document Plaintiff’s insubordinate behavior. Plaintiff has presented no

evidence indicating that the log was maintained in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints to the CJP or

for engaging in other protected speech or how the log supports a finding that any of Blumenthal’s

contemporaneous adverse actions (e.g. micro-managing Plaintiff’s work) were actually motivated by

retaliation. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown how Defendant Blumenthal’s log could support a

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28 20The Court has already found that Defendant Hawley’s role in the RAD investigation does not,

on its own, amount to an adverse action. 

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finding that Defendants Dal Cerro’s or Hawley’s adverse actions were motivated by retaliation. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Blumenthal’s log does not support a finding of pretext here.

With respect to Defendant Hawley’s involvement in the investigation of the RAD complaint

the Court has already found that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendant Hawley

took any adverse action against him.20 (See discussion supra.) Plaintiff must present evidence of an

adverse action to survive summary judgment on his retaliation claim and with respect to Defendant

Hawley, he has failed to do so. Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that the other

Defendants’ adverse actions against him were actually motivated by retaliation cannot find support

in Defendant Hawley’s conduct. Thus, the Court finds that Hawley’s role in the RAD investigation

does not support a finding of pretext here.

With respect to Nisperos’ email statement that he intended to fire Plaintiff regardless of the

outcome of the RAD investigation, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the email is evidence of

retaliatory motive. Mr. Nisperos’ expressed desired to terminate Plaintiff regardless of what the

investigation uncovered does not provide evidence that Plaintiff would be fired because he filed the

complaint that prompted that investigation. Moreover, Nisperos is not a defendant here. Plaintiff

has not explained how Defendants are liable for the alleged conduct and motivation of a different

employee at the OCTC.

Defendants contend that they disciplined Plaintiff, changed his work assignments, imposed a

PIP, and suspended him in response to his insubordination, not in retaliation for his speech. As

supervisors to Plaintiff at the OCTC, Defendants had a strong interest in promoting the efficiency of

the public services their office performs through its employees and in managing its employees

appropriately, particularly where employee conduct hinders the efficient operation of the office. See

Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. The PIP explained to Konig as follows:

You have had a recurring history of performance problems related to

insubordination, lack of professional detachment, and disrespect of judicial

officers and other persons of authority. Additionally, you have taken positions in

drafting legal documents and presenting matters at trial that are ill-advised and

unlikely to result in positive outcomes. Finally you have not diligently performed

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the duties and responsibilities of your legal advisor/notice drafting assignment.” 

(Dal Cerro Decl., Ex. HH.) The evidentiary record before the Court does not support a finding that

the reasons offered by Defendants for taking the actions they did were pretext for retaliation. (See,

e.g., Blumenthal Decl., Exs. C, D, G, K, N, O, P; Dal Cerro Decl., Exs. J, DD.) Plaintiff offers only

generalities to support his pretext argument, claiming that because he was treated poorly around the

time he submitted complaints about judicial misconduct, the events must be connected. In light of

the totality of the record, as discussed above, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to marshal

significant and probative evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment. T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court finds, based on the totality of the evidence, that Plaintiff has not raised a triable

issue of fact with respect to the motive behind Defendants’ actions against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has

provided no evidence to suggest that Defendants’ contention that taking such adverse actions as

issuing warning letters for insubordinate behavior, which followed closely on the heels of the filing

of his CJP complaint, were actually taken in retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected

speech. In short, Plaintiff has not shown pretext here.

—

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether any adverse employment action Defendants took was motivated by Plaintiff’s protected

speech. “When evidence to refute the defendant’s legitimate explanation is totally lacking, summary

judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff may have established a minimal prima facie case of

unlawful discrimination or retaliation.” Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680–81 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted).

II. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had presented a genuine issue

of material fact with respect to his First Amendment claim, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a triable issue of fact on

his First Amendment claim, the Court need not reach Defendants’ qualified immunity argument.

///

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CONCLUSION

“In some cases, the totality of the facts may form such a clear picture that a district court

would be justified in granting summary judgment, either for or against a plaintiff, on the issue of

retaliatory motive.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978. Having carefully examined the very full record in

this case, the Court finds that this is one of those cases and accordingly GRANTS Defendants’

motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action as to each Defendant. 

This Order terminates docket entry no. 24. The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2005 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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