Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00533/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patricia A. Piccarreta, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Harmony Hospice of Scottsdale LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-00533-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff brought an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for 

failure to provide reasonable accommodations, retaliation, and constructive discharge. 

Doc. 1 at 1-2. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 26. The 

motion is fully briefed and no party has requested oral argument. For the following 

reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion. 

I. Background Facts. 

 Defendants are hospice providers licensed by the Arizona Department of Health 

Services and the U.S. Social Security Administration. Plaintiff was hired by Harmony 

Hospice as a weekend coverage nurse and community liaison on October 28, 2009, and 

was employed through November 11, 2010. During her employment, Plaintiff informed 

Defendant of her disability, described in Plaintiff’s complaint as rheumatoid arthritis, 

bilateral lower extremity 4+ lymphatic edema, chronic severe pain, and hypo thyrodism. 

 Defendant transferred Plaintiff to Legacy Hospice on February 15, 2010, to serve 

as a part time weekend on-call nurse at a rate of $750 per weekend plus $1.50 per hour 

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for on-call time and mileage reimbursement. On August 5, 2010, Defendant suspended 

Plaintiff’s clinical weekend work and reduced her assignment to 20 hours per week. 

Later in August 2010, Defendants assigned Plaintiff transfer and admissions duties. 

Early in September 2010, Plaintiff was reassigned to patient admissions. 

 On September 27, 2010, Plaintiff was offered a position as a personal assistant. 

This offer was witnessed by a social worker – Carol Martich – who stated that Plaintiff 

was given an opportunity to express any concerns and that she did not allege any failure 

to accommodate her disability. On September 29 and October 1, 2010, Plaintiff sent 

emails accepting the new position as a personal assistant. On October 3, 2010, Plaintiff 

informed management that she was looking for another part time job to supplement her 

income that had been reduced as a result of her decreased pay scale and hours worked. 

 Staff reported to CEO Lizabeth Stephens that Plaintiff had been complaining that 

the hospice was a hostile working environment. On October 7, 2010, Ms. Stephens met 

with Plaintiff in the presence of Carol Martich to determine what Plaintiff considered to 

be hostile. Plaintiff resigned on November 16, 2010. Plaintiff began this action under 

the ADA on March 13, 2012. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A. Summary Judgment. 

A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed 

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

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B. Failure to Accommodate. 

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination based on failure to 

accommodate, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) he is qualified with a 

disability, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), 1630.3; and (3) the employer failed in its duty to make 

reasonable accommodation for the employee’s disability or he suffered an adverse 

employment action because of his disability, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. See Fuller v. Frank, 

Postmaster General, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & 

Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1996). If the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the employer to show: (1) the accommodation requested was 

unreasonable or would impose an undue hardship on the employer, 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.15(d); or (2) a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason prompted the employment 

action in question. See Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990); Steckl v. 

Motorola, 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). Once the employer offers an acceptable 

explanation for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that 

the reasons proffered are merely pretextual. Smith, 914 F.2d at 1340. 

 C. Retaliation. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he 

engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer subjected him to adverse employment 

action as a result of the protected activity; and (3) there was a causal link between the 

protected activity and the employer’s action. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. 

and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The same burden shifting analysis 

employed in failure to accommodate claims applies in retaliation claims. Payne v. 

Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997). 

III. Analysis. 

 A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Response. 

Defendants request that the Court disregard the Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment because it was filed one business day after the filing 

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deadline. Doc. 38 at 1-2. Although Plaintiff presents no valid excuse for failing to 

comply with the filing deadline, the Court will not grant Defendants’ request. The Rules 

of Civil Procedure are “to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of 

seeing that cases are tried on the merits.” Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 

1983). The Court will consider Plaintiff’s response. 

 B. Evidentiary Objections. 

The Court may consider only evidence that would be admissible at trial in ruling 

on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Orr v. Bank of 

America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff challenges the 

admissibility of evidence proffered by Defendants in support of their motion for summary 

judgment. Defendants likewise challenge the admissibility of Plaintiff’s evidence. 

 Defendants’ exhibit 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, and 27 are hearsay. Each 

exhibit is a writing offered to prove the truth of the matters it asserts. Defendants have 

not argued that these documents are excepted or excluded as non-hearsay under any of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor have they provided an affidavit showing that these 

documents would be admissible under Rule 803(6) or some other hearsay exception. As 

a result, these exhibits may not be considered on this motion for summary judgment. 

 Defendants’ exhibits 17 and 23 are also hearsay. These written statements by 

Carol Martich are not signed under oath or made under penalty of perjury, and therefore 

do not qualify as affidavits or unsworn declarations under 28 U.S.C. § 1746. They are 

offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted. No argument has been 

made by Defendants to except or exclude these exhibits from the hearsay rule, and they 

cannot be considered on this motion for summary judgment. 

 The affidavits of Marcia Villa (Doc. 26-2 at 22), Carol Martich (Doc. 26-3 at 38), 

and Edward Slattery, Jr. (Doc. 39-1 at 2) may be considered on a motion for summary 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The affidavits of Plaintiff (Doc. 34-1 at 2), Beverly 

Kosierowski (id. at 10), and Mary Carlson (id. at 14) may be considered as well. Id. The 

Court will also consider documents submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants to which no 

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objection has been made. 

 C. Failure to Accommodate. 

 Defendants and Plaintiff present dramatically different narratives of Plaintiff’s 

employment history and Defendants’ accommodation of Plaintiff’s disability. Plaintiff 

has provided admissible evidence to satisfy her prima facie case: (1) it is undisputed that 

Plaintiff suffered from rheumatoid arthritis; (2) it is undisputed that Defendants were 

aware of the disability when Plaintiff was hired and that both parties believed she was 

qualified for her position; and (3) Plaintiff has cited and submitted evidence that 

Defendants failed to accommodate her disability by refusing her requests to work from 

home on some occasions and by refusing to allow her to put her feet up at work 

(Docs. 26-2 at 14, 34-1 at 6, 11). Plaintiff has also produced evidence – specifically, the 

statement made by a supervisor that Plaintiff “had to go” – that Defendants’ explanation 

for adverse employment action against Plaintiff was pretextual. Evaluating the facts in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact that 

precludes summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. 

D. Retaliation. 

 Plaintiff argues that her protected activity consisted of requests to work at home 

and requests to elevate her feet when she was at work. Doc. 35 at 6. In short, she argues 

that her protected activity consisted of mere requests for accommodation. Protected 

activity generally involves actions necessary to “[p]ursu[e] one’s rights under the 

ADA[.]” See Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2004); McAlindin v. 

Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “vigorously 

asserting [one’s] rights” under the ADA constituted protected activity); Hashimoto v. 

Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that meeting with an Equal 

Employment Opportunity counselor to discuss sex and race discrimination constituted 

protected activity). Requests for accommodation combined with complaints about 

perceived discrimination can constitute protected activity. See Connor v. Quest 

Diagnostics, Inc., 298 Fed.Appx. 564, 565-66 (9th Cir. 2008). Many courts have also 

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held that requests for accommodation unaccompanied by complaints of discrimination 

constitute protected activity. See Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 35-

36 (1st Cir. 2010) (“It is well established that requesting an accommodation, without 

filing a formal charge or engaging in other specific behaviors listed in § 12203(a), is 

nonetheless behavior protected from an employer’s retaliation.”) (quotation omitted); 

Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907-08 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough it 

is questionable whether an employee who merely requests a reasonable accommodation 

fits within the literal language of the statute . . . we are bound . . . to conclude that making 

such a request is protected activity for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).”) (quotation 

omitted). The requests identified by Plaintiff therefore constitute protected activity 

within the contemplation of the ADA.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate adverse employment action. 

Doc. 38 at 8. To demonstrate such action, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable 

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this 

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation omitted). “Whether a particular reassignment is 

materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and should be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering 

all the circumstances.” Id. at 71.1

 

Plaintiff cites four separate employment actions that she claims were materially 

adverse. All four involved a transfer, and each effectively amounted to a demotion in pay 

and responsibilities. Doc. 35 at 6. Courts have found similar actions to be materially 

adverse. See White, 548 U.S. 53 (concluding that a change in work assignment 

constituted adverse employment action); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (noting that dissemination of a negative employment reference, issuance of an 

 

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 Defendants argue that Plaintiff must demonstrate retaliatory motive as part of the second prong. Doc. 38 at 8; Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). To 

the extent Ray requires retaliatory motive, it has been overruled by White. 

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underserved negative performance review, and refusal to consider for promotion 

constitute adverse employment actions). Defendants present evidence suggesting that the 

employment actions were motivated by Plaintiff’s faulty job performance, but Plaintiff 

has proffered evidence that Defendants’ justifications were pretextual. The Court 

concludes that the parties’ evidence creates a genuine dispute of fact, and that a 

reasonable jury could find that the transfers amounted to adverse employment actions. 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a causal link because 

“Defendants received no indication of Plaintiff’s conduct which would constitute 

protected activity until after the alleged adverse action.” Doc. 26 at 15. This argument 

relies on the faulty assumption that Plaintiff’s only protected activity involved her 

consultation with an lawyer. Because Plaintiff’s requests for accommodation may 

constitute protected activity, and Plaintiff has presented evidence that she was subjected 

to four adverse employment actions within a year after she engaged in such protected 

activity, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of causation to survive summary 

judgment. See Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 

507 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that retaliatory intent may be inferred when adverse 

employment decisions are taken within a reasonable period of time after a plaintiff has 

engaged in protected activity); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 

869-70 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that evidence based on timing can be sufficient to let the 

issue of retaliatory motive go to the jury, even in the face of alternative reasons proffered 

by the defendant). 

E. Constructive Discharge. 

 “Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to 

resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for 

remedial purposes.” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

doctrine requires the factfinder to conduct an objective inquiry and answer the question: 

“did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s 

position would have felt compelled to resign?” Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 

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129, 141 (2004). A constructive discharge occurs when the working conditions 

deteriorate, as a result of discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently 

extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, 

and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his 

employer. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000). The bar is set 

higher for a claim of constructive discharge because federal and state antidiscrimination 

policies are better served when the employee and employer address discrimination within 

their employment relationship rather than when the employee walks away and later 

litigates whether his employment situation was intolerable. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 

802 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Tidwell v. Meyer’s Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 

490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996) (“An employee who quits without giving his employer a 

reasonable chance to work out a problem has not been constructively discharged.”). 

 When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court 

concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the claim of constructive 

discharge. Plaintiff was an experienced nurse and administrator who was hired by 

Defendants to perform clinical and administrative duties. Over time, she was steadily 

demoted to increasingly menial tasks, her pay was reduced, and at least some of her 

requests for accommodations were denied. When Plaintiff resigned, she had been 

reduced from a full-time nurse and administrator to a part-time personal assistant to the 

very person who was responsible for her demotions. A jury must decide whether these 

working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position 

would have felt compelled to resign. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 26) is denied. 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 41) is denied as moot. 

 3. The Court will set a final pretrial conference by separate order. 

 Dated this 21st day of November, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-00533-DGC Document 43 Filed 11/21/13 Page 8 of 8