Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06144/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06144-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

---

t 

FILED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir-::uit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 3 0 1991 

GEORGE L. MOTHERSHED, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SOUTHWESTERN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 

POST OAK OIL CO., CARRILEE A. BELL, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

GEORGE L. MOTHERSHED, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CARROLL E. GREGG, GARY L. BROOKS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 89-6144 

) (D.C. No. 88-1871-W) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-6314 

) (D.C. No. 88-1504-W) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. 

* 

B. Sparr, District Judge, United States 

the District of Colorado, sitting by 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 1 
/ 

After examining the briefs and appellate records, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

The facts governing these appeals are as follows: In 1975, 

plaintiff, an attorney proceeding here prose, acquired one-half 

ownership of an oil and gas lease from Post Oak Oil Co., a 

defendant in No. 89-6144. At that time, plaintiff and Carrilee A. 

Bell, also a defendant in No. 89-6144, were married. In 1981, 

plaintiff conveyed a mortgage interest in the lease to 

Southwestern Bank, the third defendant in No. 89-6144, as security 

for a promissory note. 

In 1982, plaintiff and Bell were divorced. The divorce 

decree awarded one-half of plaintiff's interest in the lease to 

Bell. Plaintiff's retained counsel, defendants in No. 89-6314, 

represented him in various actions including his divorce from 

early 1982 through early 1986. In 1982, counsel established a 

revocable trust with plaintiff's children as beneficiaries. The 

trust encompassed the proceeds from plaintiff's interest in the 

lease. That trust was revoked in 1983 in order to prevent a 

foreclosure action by Southwestern Bank. A new trust was 

established with counsel as the beneficial owners. Plaintiff, 

Southwestern Bank, and counsel then entered into an agreement by 

which forty percent of the proceeds in the lease after operating 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 2 
' 

expenses would be paid to Southwestern Bank towards the retirement 

of plaintiff's debt and sixty percent would be paid to counsel for 

payment of their fees. 

In 1985, Post Oak Oil Co. and Bell released all their claims 

against plaintiff. The nature of these claims is unknown. At the 

same time, plaintiff executed a release of all his claims against 

Post Oak Oil Co. and Bell in consideration for which he received 

$110,000. 

No. 89-6144 

In his complaint in this case, plaintiff alleged that Post 

Oak Oil Co. and Bell had refused to surrender possession of the 

lease, but rather continued to drill new oil and gas wells on 

"lands which have been pooled and/or unitized with the [lease]." 

Plaintiff alleged that these defendants were trespassers on the 

lease. He requested (1) that title to the lease be quieted in 

him, (2) an accounting of the proceeds, (3) damages for 

conversion, (4) an injunction placing him in possession of the 

lease, and (5) exemplary damages. 

Defendant Southwestern Bank filed an answer to the complaint. 

Defendants Post Oak Oil Co. and Bell filed motions to dismiss. 

All defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff 

filed various motions and briefs in opposition. 

The district court granted Post Oak Oil Co. and Bell's 

motions for summary judgment and denied Southwestern Bank's motion 

for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed from this order. After 

plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, he moved in district court 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 3 
for certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). That motion 

was granted. Therefore we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988); 

Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 

1988). We also note that the district court has since granted 

plaintiff's motion to dismiss Southwestern Bank, and final 

judgment has therefore been entered. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants' motions to 

dismiss and motions for summary judgment were, in effect, answers, 

and, therefore, the district court erred by allowing defendants to 

file two answers. He argues that because defendants did not raise 

affirmative defenses in their motions to dismiss, they were 

estopped from asserting such defenses in their motions for summary 

judgment. He also argues that affirmative defenses can only be 

raised in a motion for summary judgment when that motion is filed 

prior to the filing of an answer; defendants' "second answers" 

(the motions for summary judgment) should be stricken; and because 

defendants failed to defend, equity attached and, therefore, 

plaintiff should be granted complete relief. Finally, plaintiff 

argues that the district court erred in granting the motions for 

summary judgment prior to discovery. 

If plaintiff had determined that discovery was necessary in 

order for him to present facts essential to oppose defendants' 

motions for summary judgment, he could have moved for a 

continuance pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). See Weir v. 

Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1082 (10th Cir. 1985). This he did 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 4 
not do. We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and 

hold they are without merit. 

No. 89-6314 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants exercised 

undue influence over him and threatened to abandon 

representation of him unless he paid their fees. This 

allegedly forced him to enter into the 1983 trust agreement. 

their 

threat 

Plaintiff also alleged that defendants misrepresented both 

the value of the lease and the fact that Southwestern Bank was 

threatening to foreclose on its note in order to force him to 

enter into the 1983 trust agreement. Plaintiff alleged that 

defendants gave him "dishonest, false, untrue" "information, 

advice and counsel" in order to serve defendants' own interests. 

Plaintiff claimed unjust enrichment and fraudulent conversion. He 

also requested that title to the lease be quieted in him, an 

accounting, imposition of a constructive trust, injunctive relief, 

exemplary damages, and damages for negligence. Plaintiff later 

amended his complaint to add a RICO claim. 

On August 17, 1989, the district court entered an order 

denying plaintiff's motion for 

Gregg's request for leave to 

default and granting defendant 

file an answer out of time. On 

September 5, 1989, the court entered an order granting defendants' 

motion to dismiss the RICO claim and denying plaintiff's motion to 

file a motion for summary judgment out of time. On September 13, 

1989, a jury trial was held. The court granted defendants' motion 

to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's case in chief. On 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 5 
September 14, 1989, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the 

court's orders of August 17 and September 5. Judgment was entered 

on the docket September 28, 1989. 

Initially, defendants question our jurisdiction over this 

appeal. Although plaintiff denominated his appeal as being taken 

from interlocutory orders, he filed his notice of appeal after the 

court announced final judgment. Fully consummated decisions which 

are but steps towards final judgment merge into that judgment and, 

therefore, all stages of the proceedings can be reviewed on appeal 

from final judgment. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 

U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Further, a notice of appeal filed after the 

announcement of final judgment, but prior to its entry on the 

docket, will be considered to have been filed after the entry on 

the docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). Therefore, we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that attorney negligence or 

clerical error are not grounds for relieving defendants of a 

default judgment. Default judgment was not entered against 

defendants, therefore, the district court could not and did not 

relieve defendants of any such judgment. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion for default 

judgment. See Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th 

Cir. 1987). Defendants did not fail "to plead or otherwise 

defend" this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, emphasis added. 

Plaintiff also argues that he was substantially prejudiced by 

the district court's refusal to permit him to file a late motion 

for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed his motion thirteen days 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 6 
. . 

prior to trial. The district court acted within its discretion in 

denying this motion. Cf. Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far 

West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

his RICO claims. We agree with the district court that plaintiff 

failed to allege the elements necessary to establish a RICO 

violation. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 

(1981). 

Finally, plaintiff argues that because Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

requires the signature of prose parties on pleadings filed in 

district court, defendant Gregg's unsigned pleadings should be 

stricken. Rule 11 requires an attorney or pro se party's 

signature as certification that the pleading is not frivolous. 

See Rule 11; White v. General Motors Corp.,Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 679 

(10th Cir. 1990). There is no indication that sanctions should be 

awarded when the signature is missing, but the pleading, as here, 

is not frivolous. 

After the entry of final judgment, the district court awarded 

defendants attorney's fees in the amount of $27,571.75. Plaintiff 

has filed a motion in this court to vacate that order. We are 

without jurisdiction over this order. Plaintiff's proper remedy 

was either to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in 

district court within ten days pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 

or to file a notice of appeal from that order within thirty days. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). Plaintiff did neither. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 7 
.. ( ... 

The judgments of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma are AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's motion to 

vacate is DENIED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6144 Document: 010110083627 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 8