Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01533/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01533-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 The two unexhausted claims alleged that restitution was never discussed with Petitioner at the time he 1

entered his no contest plea, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Claims Three & Four of Petition.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL GIBSON,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK,

Respondent.

 /

1:07-cv-01533 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR DISCOVERY

[Doc. 28]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 22, 2007. On

January 22, 2008, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition because it contained both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. (Court Doc. 16.) Specifically, Respondent argued that only

two of Petitioner’s four claims were exhausted. 

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Now pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for discovery, filed February 19,

2008. (Court Doc. 28.) Respondent filed a response on March 21, 2008. (Court Doc. 29.) On

February 27, 2008, the undersigned granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss and directed

Petitioner to either delete the unexhausted claims and proceed solely on the exhausted claims, or

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dismiss the entire petition to return to state court to complete the exhaustion requirement. (Court

Doc. 27.) 

Now pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for discovery, filed on February 26,

2008, just one day prior to issuing the order addressing Respondent’s motion. (Court Doc. 28.) 

Petitioner requests discovery and inspection of (1) “any written or recorded statements made by

Petitioner” and, (2) “any written record containing the substance of any oral statements made by

the Petitioner, either before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by the respondent, by any

person then known to the Petitioner to be a government agent.” (Motion, at 1-2.) 

Although discovery is available pursuant to Rule 6, it is only granted at the Court’s

discretion, and upon a showing of good cause. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997);

McDaniel v. United States Dist. Court (Jones), 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9 Cir. 1997); Jones v. Wood, th

114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9 Cir. 1997); Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254. Good cause

th

is shown “where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner

may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.”

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. at 908-09 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 287 (1969). Discovery

will not be allowed so that the petitioner can “explore [his] case in search of its existence,”

looking for new constitutional claims. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9 Cir. th

1999). If good cause is shown, the extent and scope of discovery is within the court’s discretion. 

See Habeas Rule 6(a). The Court’s duty in a habeas proceeding is to determine whether or not

petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated in the course of the conviction. 

As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner cannot seek discovery in relation to claims

three and four which are unexhausted, as those claims are subjected to dismissal. Thus, the only

claims Petitioner may seek discovery is in relation to either claim one or two (or both). It appears

that Petitioner is seeking discovery in the form of police reports or other records regarding

statements he made at or near the time of his arrest in an attempt to demonstrate that he lacked

the requisite criminal intent for the crime of burglary. 

Petitioner’s request for discovery must be denied. As Respondent submits, Petitioner’s

conviction arises from a no contest plea, therefore, any statements Petitioner may have made at or

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near the time of his arrest simply did not implicate or invalidate the voluntariness of his no

contest plea. As Petitioner clearly admitted to committing the burglary of an inhabited dwelling,

he cannot now seek discovery to show that he lacked the requisite intent. Petitioner is, in

essence, claiming that he is innocent of the crime of burglary to which he plead “no contest”;

however, Petitioner chose in open court and under penalty of perjury to plead “no contest” to the

crime of burglary. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the

guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). As the Ninth Circuit has stated,

“[W]e have repeatedly held that criminal defendants are bound by the admissions of fact made by

their counsel in their presence and with their authority.” United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,

431 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9 Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9 th th

Cir. 1980). Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion for discovery is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 31, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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