Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05846/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05846-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

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Magistrate Judge, and by a September 27, 2004 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence

J. O’Neill for all further proceedings.

Plaintiffs are Leroy Edwards, Kenneth Edwards and Roxanne Ayala and will be referred to collectively 2

as “plaintiffs.”

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROXANNE AYALA, et. al, CASE NO. CV F 02-5846 LJO

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY FEES

vs. (Doc. 122.)

KC ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

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After this Court granted them summary judgment, defendants City of Bakersfield (“City”) and

City code enforcement officer Terry Buss (“Mr. Buss”) seek a $71,835 award of attorney fees to defend

plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of malicious prosecution. This Court considered the City and Mr. 2

Buss’ 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“section 1988(b)") motion for attorney fees on the record and without the

March 10, 2006 hearing or oral argument, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h). For the

reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES the City and Mr. Buss’ motion for attorney fees. 

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BACKGROUND

The Parties

Plaintiff Leroy Edwards (“Leroy”) is the father of plaintiffs Kenneth Edwards (“Kenneth”) and

Roxanne Ayala (“Ms. Ayala”). Ms. Ayala owns and operates Action Sewer Pumping (“ASP”), a septic

pumping business. ASP’s sewer pumping trucks pump contents of residential and commercial septic

tanks into containers on the trucks and transport the contents to a disposal site. ASP also rents and

maintains portable chemical toilets. During 1999-2001, Leroy and Kenneth performed work for ASP,

including driving ASP trucks. 

As a code enforcement officer, Mr. Buss enforces the City municipal code and California Health

& Safety Code and Code of Regulations and investigates related wrongdoing. Defendant Kern County

Environmental Health Services Department (“EHS”) is a Kern County agency with authority to regulate

businesses such as those of plaintiffs. Defendant William O’Rullian (“Mr. O’Rullian”) is an EHS health

specialist and solid waste program supervisor. Defendant Terry Gray (“Mr. Gray”) is an EHS

environmental health technician.

Underlying Criminal Action

In May 2000, based on information from Mr. Gray, Mr. Buss suspected that plaintiffs operated

an illegal junk yard and sewage transfer station on plaintiffs’ properties. In June 2000, Mr. Buss, several

other City code enforcement officers, and other law enforcement officers executed a warrant for

plaintiffs’ properties and observed what they believed constituted illegal disposal, treatment, storage and

transport of hazardous wastes. EHS initiated proceedings to revoke plaintiffs’ sewage pumping vehicle

and toilet rental agency health permits (“health permits”). In November 2000, Mr. Buss conducted

further inspections of plaintiffs’ properties and observed what he characterized as further hazards and

permitted use violations.

On April 12, 2001, the Kern County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s office”) initiated a Kern

County Superior Court criminal action (“criminal action”) to allege that plaintiffs violated California

Health and Safety Code and Penal Code sections regarding disposal, treatment, storage and

transportation of hazardous wastes and conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses from two of

plaintiffs’ customers. On May 7, 2001, the Kern County Superior Court granted a motion to severe the

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criminal action against Ms. Ayala. On May 8 and 9, 2001, the criminal action proceeded to a

preliminary hearing where the presiding judicial commissioner found there was sufficient cause and

evidence to believe that Leroy and Kenneth had violated California Health and Safety Code and Penal

Code sections regarding hazardous waste handling and conspiracy to defraud by false pretenses (the

charges subject to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims in this action). A Kern County Superior

Court judge denied Leroy and Kenneth’s appeal of the probable cause determination. Leroy and

Kenneth pursued no further appeal.

On July 17, 2001, trial in the criminal action commenced against Leroy and Kenneth. The

prosecuting assistant district attorney voluntarily dismissed two counts regarding handling of hazardous

waste and conspiracy to defraud by false pretenses (the charges subject to plaintiffs’ malicious

prosecution claims). At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the trial court granted Leroy and

Kenneth’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to several charges on grounds of insufficient evidence.

The prosecution dismissed remaining charges. Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, all criminal charges

were dismissed against Ms. Ayala on July 27, 2001, prior to a preliminary hearing.

Plaintiffs’ Malicious Prosecution Claims

On July 12, 2002, plaintiffsfiled their initial complaint to allege civil rights violations to initiate

this action. The parties engaged in extensive law and motion to culminate in plaintiffs’ operative fifth

amended complaint (“complaint”), filed July 14, 2004. The complaint pursues malicious prosecution

claims against EHS, Mr. Buss, Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray. Although the complaint’s paragraph 6

notes the City is “(not a defendant),” the complaint’s caption includes the City as a defendant, and this

Court has construed the complaint to pursue claims against the City.

The complaint alleges that Mr. Buss, Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray spent substantial time on

plaintiffs’ properties, knew of the contents thereon and had personal knowledge that the charges at issue

here were untrue. The complaint further alleges defendants conducted no scientific testing to support

the presence of hazardous waste on plaintiffs’ properties. As to the City, the complaint alleges that the

City embarked on a policy, created by Mr. Buss, to cause injury and to enjoin plaintiffs to operate. As

damages, the complaint alleges plaintiffs’ legal expenses in connection with the criminal action, injury

to personal and business reputations, anxiety, fear and apprehension.

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Summary Judgment For Mr. Buss And The City

On December 9, 2005, after what Mr. Buss and the City characterize as “considerable” discovery,

they filed their summary judgment motion on grounds that plaintiffs are unable to establish, and

evidence negates, elements of plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. Mr. Buss further claimed that

he is subject to absolute and qualified immunity to bar plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims.

Under this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(c), December 30, 2005 was the deadline to serve and file

plaintiffs’ opposition papers. After this Court received no timely opposition, a staff member of this

Court telephoned plaintiffs’ counsel on January 3, 2006 to inquire as to the status of plaintiffs’

opposition. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that he planned to file a motion to extend the opposition

deadline.

On January 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed papers which this Court construed as plaintiffs’ ex parte

request to extend plaintiffs’ opposition deadline up to January 13, 2006, if not later. Plaintiffs sought

an extension on grounds that: (1) Mr. Buss and the City’s moving papers were lengthy; (2) Mr. Gray had

not been deposed until December 14, 2005; (3) several pressing matters, including other summary

judgment motions and a habeas corpus writ, diverted plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare opposition papers;

(4) plaintiffs’ counsel is trial counsel in two homicide cases; (5) plaintiffs’ counsel had not had a

vacation in more than five years and cleared December 21, 2005 to January 1, 2006 for a vacation, which

plaintiffs’ counsel took; and (6) plaintiffs’ counsel is a sole practitioner with limited resources and

federal court experience. In his declaration, plaintiffs’ counsel admitted “I errantly failed to request an

extension earlier, but felt that I was not required to do so.”

After Mr. Buss and the City filed papers to oppose plaintiffs’ requested extension, this Court

issued its January 6, 2006 order (“January 6 order”) to deny plaintiffs’ belated request for an extension

to oppose the summary judgment motion. This Court concluded that plaintiffs violated F.R.Civ.P. 6(b)

by improperly seeking ex parte a postdeadline extension without a noticed hearing and failed to

demonstrate good cause or requisite excusable neglect to warrant an extension. This Court deemed Mr.

Buss and the City’s summary judgment motion submitted on the then current, pending record.

This Court issued its January 10, 2006 decision to grant Mr. Buss and the City summary

judgment and to find, among other things, that:

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1. The DA’s office, not Mr. Buss, initiated the criminal action against plaintiffs;

2. The record revealed no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Buss attempted to deceive

the DA’s office to wrongfully prosecute plaintiffs;

3. The criminal action was not terminated in plaintiffs’ favor;

4. The collateral estoppel effects of the of the probable cause determination at the criminal

action’s preliminary hearing negated the absence of probable cause element of plaintiffs’

malicious prosecution claims;

5. The record lacks evidence that Mr. Buss acted with malice toward plaintiffs;

6. Mr. Buss is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims;

and

7. The record lacks evidence to support Monell liability against the City.

On February 8, 2006, plaintiffs filed papers which this Court construed as plaintiffs’ ex parte

request to hear the next day a motion to vacate the January 6 order and to consider papers to oppose Mr.

Buss and the City’s summary judgment motion. This Court issued its February 8, 2006 order to note

that plaintiffs’ ex parte papers failed to comply with this Court’s Local Rule 6-144. As such, this Court

denied plaintiffs’ requested ex parte relief and vacated the hearing improperly set by plaintiffs.

Moreover, this Court concluded that if plaintiffs had complied with ex parte shortening time

requirements, their papers demonstrated plaintiffs’ continuing untimeliness, failed to substantiate

grounds for requested relief, and presented the same or similar points which were raised in plaintiffs’

prior papers and on which this Court has ruled.

On February 8, 2006, plaintiffs filed their notice to appeal summary judgment in favor of Mr.

Buss and the City and this Court’s February 8, 2006 order to deny plaintiffs’ ex parte request to vacate

the January 6 order and to consider plaintiffs’ belated summary judgment opposition papers. The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has processed plaintiffs’ appeal and set a May 2006 deadline to complete

briefing.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Mr. Buss and the City calculate their requested $71,835 award on:

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1. 456.1 hours multiplied by $150 attorney hourly rate ($68,415);

2. 11.7 hours multiplied by $100 law clerk hourly rate ($1,170); and

3. 15 hours multiplied by $150 attorney hourly rate to prepare for and attend the hearing on the

attorney fees motion ($2,250).

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Mr. Buss And The City’s Attorney Fees Motion

On February 2, 2006, Mr. Buss and the City filed their motion for a $71,835 attorney fees award 3

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) as prevailing parties on what they characterize as plaintiffs’ frivolous

malicious prosecution claims. Mr. Buss and the City argue that plaintiffs “failed to adduce any evidence

to support their claims” in the absence of opposition to summary judgment. (Italics in original.)

According to Mr. Buss and the City, they are entitled to attorney fees in that plaintiffs relitigated in this

action the probable cause issue which was resolved against them in the criminal action. Mr. Buss and

the City note that this Court determined that the collateral estoppel effects of the probable cause

determination at the criminal action’s preliminary hearing negated the absence of probable cause element

of plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. 

On February 24, 2006, plaintiffs timely filed and served papers to oppose Mr. Buss and the City’s

attorney fees motion. Plaintiffs argue that their malicious prosecution claims are not frivolous and were

brought in good faith. Plaintiffs raise again points to address their acknowledged failure to timely

oppose Mr. Buss and the City’s summary judgment motion and which this Court rejected in its prior

rulings. Plaintiffs take issue with the collateral estoppel effects of the probable cause determination at

the criminal action’s preliminary hearing.

DISCUSSION

Section 1988(b) Attorney Fees Award

Section 1988(b) provides that in “any proceeding to enforce a provision” of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs.” The standard to award section 1988(b) attorney fees depends on which side prevails:

The authorization of an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 applies

differently to prevailing defendants than to prevailing plaintiffs. . . . [A] prevailing

defendant should not routinely be awarded attorney’s fees simply because he has

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succeeded, but rather only where the action is found to be “unreasonable, frivolous,

meritless, or vexatious” . . . Thus, the mere fact that a defendant prevails does not

automatically support an award of fees.

Vewrnon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000, 115 S.Ct. th

510 (1994). 

The Ninth Circuit has further held that “[a]ttorneys’ fees in civil rights cases should only be awarded to

a defendant in exceptional circumstances.” Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9 Cir. 1991); Barry th

v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9 Cir. 1990); see also Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434, n. 8 (9

th th

Cir. 1989)(defendants’ attorney’s fees request denied although summary judgment for defendants).

A defendant may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff “only if the District Court finds ‘that

the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in

subjective bad faith.’ . . . The plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or

without foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173 (quoting Christiansburg Garment

Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421,98 S.Ct. 694 (1978)). Furthermore, a defendant may recover attorney

fees if the plaintiff continued to litigate after a claim “clearly became” frivolous, unreasonable or

groundless. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15, 101 S.Ct. 173.

Under section 1988(b), the prevailing party “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless

special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,

390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964 (1968); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933

(1983).

Mr. Buss and the City correctly note that they prevailed at summary judgment and that plaintiffs

did not oppose the motion prior to this Court’s ruling. As noted above, this Court denied plaintiffs’

belated postdeadline extension request to file opposition papers based on the request’s untimeliness and

absence of good cause. Without plaintiffs’ summary judgment opposition, this Court reviewed the

record and determined that Mr. Buss and the City’s motion was well supported based on evidence to

negate elements of plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. Nonetheless, the record does not

conclusively demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims were unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

The record of the criminal action, without the benefit of discovery in this action, suggests a

minimal basis to test plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. The probable cause determination at the

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This Court is aware that plaintiffs, without authorization, attempted to submit summary judgment opposition

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papers on February 8, 2006, two months after Mr. Buss and the City filed their motion and 41 days after plaintiffs’ papers

were due. The papers failed to comply with this Court’s Local Rules and were rambling and difficult to comprehend.

Plaintiffs’ submission of the papers highlights their disregard and disobedience of this Court’s orders, rules and procedures

and discourtesy to this Court and opposing counsel. 

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criminal action’s preliminary hearing does not conclusively reveal frivolity of plaintiffs’ claims,

especially given that the prosecutor voluntarily dismissed the charges at issue here prior to jury

resolution. The circumstances here differfrom those in the non-binding authority cited by Mr. Buss and

the City. Although the lack of effort of plaintiffs’ counsel may have contributed to summary judgment,

the absence of a summary judgment opposition does render plaintiffs’ claims entirely groundless or

without foundation to warrant shifting fees to plaintiffs. That is not to say that this Court would have

denied summary judgment had plaintiff properly filed opposition papers. In sum, the circumstances at 4

hand render an attorney fees award unjust. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES Mr. Buss and the City’s section 1988(b)

motion for attorney fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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