Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02078/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02078-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOUA XIONG,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-02078 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by Daniel 

B. Bernstein, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, upon being 

convicted by a jury on March 29, 2011 of first degree murder, felon in possession of a 

firearm, and various sentencing enhancements. (See Lodged Doc. 1.) On April 27, 2011, 

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Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of life without the 

possibility of parole. (Id.) 

On April 30, 2013, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed

the judgment, but ordered the abstract of judgment to be amended to correct a clerical 

error. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Review was denied by the California Supreme Court on August 

28, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 4-5.)

Petitioner did not file any state post-conviction challenges to his conviction.

On December 29, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in this Court.1 On February 19, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14.) Petitioner filed objections on March 

12, 2015.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 101 L. Ed. 2d 

245 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner did not date the petition. The Court cannot determine on what date the 

Petitioner was mailed, and is unable to afford Petitioner an earlier filing date based on the mailbox rule. 

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Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on December 29, 2014 and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner’s direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on August 28, 

2013. The state appeal process became final ninety days later, on November 26, 2013, 

when the time for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. U.S. 

Supreme Court rule 13; Bowen v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA 

statute of limitations began to run the following day, on November 27, 2013. Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner had one year from November 27, 2013, absent applicable tolling, in 

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in 

filing the instant petition until December 29, 2014, a month after the statute of limitations 

period expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any 

applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

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a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

Here, Petitioner did not file any state post-conviction applications, and therefore is 

not entitled to statutory tolling. Accordingly, the limitations period commenced on 

November 27, 2013, and expired on November 26, 2014. Petitioner filed the instant 

petition on December 29, 2014, over a month after the limitations period expired. The 

petition is untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). In his opposition, Petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitations period based on abandonment of counsel and his ignorance of the law. 

1. Abandonment of Counsel

In his opposition, Petitioner asserts that he should be granted equitable tolling 

because his appellate counsel was late in sending him his federal petition to file. (ECF 

No. 17.) Specifically, he asserts that his appellate attorney mailed Petitioner a copy of 

the federal petition on December 2, 2014, nearly a week after the limitations period 

expired. (Id.) As Petitioner received the petition after the limitations period expired, he 

argues that he is entitled to tolling based on the actions of counsel. 

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Sufficiently egregious attorney misconduct may provide sufficient grounds for 

equitable tolling. See Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011); Maples v. 

Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924, 181 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2012) ("We agree that, under agency 

principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 

abandoned him."); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564, 177 L. Ed. 

2d 130 (2010); Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12925 (9th 

Cir., June 25, 2012) (holding abandonment of counsel as equitable grounds to allow 

petitioner to file an untimely appeal from the district court's denial of his habeas 

petition.).

However, the evidence presented to the Court does not reflect egregious 

misconduct on the part of counsel. Petitioner submits only that counsel was untimely in 

preparing and providing a copy of the petition to Petitioner. The Supreme Court has held 

that attorney negligence and miscalculation of the limitations deadline does not 

constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. 

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085, 166 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2007) ("[a]ttorney 

miscalculation simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the 

postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel"); Miranda 

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (attorney's miscalculation of limitations 

period did not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 

1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an attorney's general negligence and miscalculation of 

limitations deadline did not constitute extraordinary circumstances that warranted 

equitable tolling in a non-capital habeas case).

Petitioner has not shown that that he was abandoned by counsel based on 

counsel's late presentation of the petition for filing. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable 

tolling for abandonment of counsel.

2. Ignorance of the Law

Petitioner also claims he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he is 

uneducated and does not have knowledge of the law. This claim for equitable tolling 

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must also fail. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se lack of 

legal sophistication is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling); 

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999), (inmate's lack of legal training, a 

poor education, or illiteracy does not give a court reason to toll the limitations period); 

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Petitioner's circumstances are no different than the majority of 

incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, 

his ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary circumstance entitling Petitioner to 

equitable tolling.

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for habeas corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is not 

entitled to the benefit of statutory or equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, this Court 

recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

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Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to 

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's 

order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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