Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05787/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05787-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE A. ROSAS,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN RATHMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-05787-HSG (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Before the Court is the above-titled pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by petitioner Jose A. Rosas, challenging the validity of a judgment 

obtained against him in state court. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition.

1

Petitioner has 

filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2009 in San Francisco Superior Court, a jury found petitioner guilty of two counts 

of forcible sexual penetration (Cal. Penal Code § 289(d)(3), (4)), elder abuse (id. at § 368(b)(1)), 

misdemeanor sexual battery (id. at § 243.4(e)(1)), multiple counts of simple assault (id. at § 240), 

and the unlawful dissuasion of a witness (id. at § 136.1(b)(1)). CT at 366-68, 371-76, 386-96.2 

On August 30, 2010, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 10 years and 8 months in state prison. 

 

1

Petitioner initially named Brian Duffy, former warden of California Medical Facility, as the 

respondent in this action. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, John 

Rathman, the current warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility, where petitioner is currently 

incarcerated, is hereby SUBSTITUTED as respondent in place of petitioner‟s prior custodian.

2 All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by respondent in support of the 

answer, unless otherwise indicated. References to “CT” and “RT” are to the Clerk‟s Transcript 

and Reporter‟s Transcript of the state proceedings, Exs. 1 and 2, respectively.

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CT 670-74.

Petitioner filed both a direct appeal and a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal. 

On May 31, 2012, the California Court of Appeal struck the sentences on two of the simple assault 

convictions but otherwise affirmed the judgment. Ex. 6. The court of appeal denied the habeas 

petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. Id. The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied review of the direct appeal on August 8, 2012. Ex. 8. 

Petitioner also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, 

which was summarily denied on December 12, 2012. Ex. 10.3 

On December 13, 2013, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following background facts describing the crime and evidence presented at trial are 

from the May 31, 2012 opinion of the California Court of Appeal4: 

Background

[Petitioner] was charged with various sexual and related offenses against five women: 

Claudia, Maria, Glenda, M., and A. The jury acquitted him of the charges related to M., 

convicted him on the charges related to A., Claudia, and Maria, and deadlocked on the 

charges concerning Glenda. [FN 1] The women gave the following accounts of their 

encounters with [petitioner]. 

FN 1: To protect their privacy, and intending no disrespect, we will refer to the 

patients who testified against [petitioner] by only their first names.

Claudia

Claudia came to the United States from Nicaragua in 1994, when she was in her thirties. 

On July 8, 2002, she went to St. Luke‟s Hospital because she was experiencing intense 

back pain. Her regular doctor was unavailable, so she saw [petitioner] instead. 

[Petitioner] first asked Claudia about her age, family and past surgeries. He told her to 

lie down on the table, unhook her bra and lift her blouse so he could examine her 

 

3

Petitioner represents that he also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Francisco 

Superior Court. See Pet. at 4-5. However, a search of petitioner‟s name on the official 

government website of the San Francisco Superior Court yields no habeas proceedings brought by 

petitioner. And the parties submit no record of any such petition.

4

This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e) (1). 

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breasts. Claudia felt tense and scared. It seemed strange to her that [petitioner] asked 

her to lift up her bra and did not provide her with a gown or drape. Then, after he 

examined her breasts, [petitioner] told Claudia to lower her pants and underwear to her 

knees. He said she had a problem with her spine, instructed her to get on her elbows 

and knees with her buttocks in the air, and said he was going to conduct an anal and 

vaginal examination. Claudia said that her gynecologist had already done this, but 

[petitioner] said he had to do a “complete examination.” He put on gloves, turned on a 

lamp, stuck his fingers into Claudia‟s vagina and touched “all sides” of her vagina. He 

did not touch or palpate her stomach. This continued for some minutes, far longer than 

any pelvic exam Claudia had experienced. It hurt, and Claudia said “ouch.” 

[Petitioner] responded that it must hurt when she had sex because she was very tight. 

No doctor had ever said anything like that to her or examined her in this manner. 

After what felt like a long time, [petitioner] took his fingers out of Claudia‟s vagina, 

changed his gloves, and put his finger or fingers in her anus. Again, this seemed to last 

a “long, long time.” [Petitioner] asked Claudia “whether his fingers come in from 

behind, whether I could feel my vagina.” She did not respond. She was feeling awful 

and wanted to kick [petitioner], but she was unable to react. Finally, [petitioner] 

removed his fingers and wiped Claudia with a tissue; Claudia felt like “a mare, like an 

animal.” Then, with Claudia still in the same position, [petitioner] massaged her back. 

He said he was not a chiropractor, but that the massage would help her. He said he 

“hoped that the complete examination that he had given” her was “better than the one 

[her] gynecologist gave [her].” He also told her that her problem was a compressed 

muscle and that she should return in two weeks.

Claudia was picked up outside the hospital by her friend Maria V. and Claudia‟s son. 

Claudia was crying. As they drove away, Maria asked her what was wrong. Claudia 

did not want to explain what had happened in front of her son, so she lied and said the 

doctor had given her an injection. Then she told Maria to stop the car so they could 

talk. Once outside of the parked car, she told Maria what [petitioner] had done.

The next day Claudia reported [petitioner]‟s actions to St. Luke‟s. She also made a 

report to the police, who escorted her to San Francisco General Hospital for a sexual 

assault exam. The chief of medicine at St. Luke‟s spoke with [petitioner] about 

Claudia‟s complaint the following day. He told [petitioner] the examination had not 

been in keeping with usual and customary practice, and advised him to use the 

conventional lithotomy position and have a chaperone present during future pelvic 

exams.

Maria

Maria was born in Brazil in 1936. [Petitioner] was her family doctor. On March 21, 

2005 she went to see him about shoulder pains. [Petitioner] suggested a PAP smear. 

Maria told him her gynecologist in Brazil had given her a PAP smear just two years 

before, but she was willing to have another if it was necessary. Without providing a 

gown or drape, [petitioner] lifted Maria‟s blouse and bra and examined her breasts and 

belly. He commented that plastic surgery on both areas was well done.

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[Petitioner] then had Maria lower her pants and underwear and put her feet up in 

stirrups for the examination. He touched her clitoris very lightly with his bare hand. 

Then he put on gloves, put his finger or fingers in her vagina, and moved them around 

and back and forth inside of her. It was very uncomfortable. Maria was “shocked” and 

“dying of shame.” 

[Petitioner] then told Maria to lie face down on her knees and forearms with her 

buttocks in the air. She complied because he was her doctor, and she trusted him. 

[Petitioner] inserted a finger or fingers in her vagina and moved them around and back 

and forth as before. This lasted at least two minutes, and it was painful. Maria was “in 

a state of shock.” After [petitioner] touched her “many times,” Maria turned onto her 

side, put her legs together and said “no.” [Petitioner]‟s gloves were “full of blood.” 

Maria said “that‟s not right.” Seeing that she was upset, [petitioner] checked her pulse 

and told her everything was fine. He did not use a speculum, perform a PAP smear or 

collect any samples for laboratory analysis.

Maria was “very scared” as she left [petitioner]‟s office. When she arrived home she 

was cramping and there was blood on her underwear. The next morning, still in some 

pain, she went to St. Luke‟s emergency room to find out what had happened to her. She 

asked to see a female gynecologist, but because none were available she agreed to meet 

with Dr. Marc Snyder. Maria asked Dr. Snyder to conduct a gynecological 

examination, but told him she would not explain why she wanted the exam until he 

finished. This examination was notably different than [petitioner]‟s. Maria was 

covered with a cloth, a nurse put her in the standard lithotomy position on the 

examination table, and Dr. Snyder sat in front of her as two nurses held her hands to 

calm her. Unlike [petitioner], he used a speculum to look in her vagina and did not 

insert his fingers. It was over very quickly. 

Maria then told the doctor about her experience with [petitioner] the previous day. Dr. 

Snyder brought in a female gynecologist, Dr. Nicol, who also briefly examined Maria. 

Dr. Nicol noted a two centimeter laceration in the posterior of Maria‟s vulva, blood 

clots, and bruises on both sides of her periurethral area. This was highly unusual and 

would not be caused by an ordinary pelvic examination, particularly since Maria‟s 

vagina was able to accommodate a normal-size speculum. Dr. Nicol opined it would 

require the insertion of three or four fingers to cause this type of injury. 

After some initial reluctance, Maria agreed to make a police report and was given a 

sexual assault (or “SART”) examination. The nurse practitioner who conducted the 

exam noted four areas of injury in Maria‟s vaginal area, including bruises, redness, and 

a laceration. 

St. Luke‟s suspended [petitioner]‟s medical privileges pending investigation of Maria‟s 

complaint. On March 24, during an interview with San Francisco Police Inspector 

Frank Lee, [petitioner] wrote a letter of apology to Maria. He wrote: “I want to 

apologize for the inappropriate exam, and I feel very sorry that you felt humiliated at 

this time. I am crying the same that you. I learned from what happened that I am going 

to be a better person from today. I want you to forgive me for what I have caused. I 

want you to be as before and give me the lesson of my life. Sincerely, Jose Rosas.” 

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Dr. William Miller, the chairman of St. Luke‟s Department of Medicine, was involved 

in the hospital‟s internal investigation of Maria‟s complaint. On March 27, [petitioner] 

asked to meet with Dr. Miller and said he wanted to provide information he had 

previously withheld. [Petitioner] told Dr. Miller that the reason Maria‟s examination 

had taken so long was “„because it had become a sexual experience‟” for her, and then 

for him, and that he had continued the exam to bring her to orgasm. Dr. Miller asked 

why [petitioner] had not stopped the exam when he perceived it was becoming sexual. 

[Petitioner] responded, “„I don‟t know what came over me. I just lost my mind.‟” Dr. 

Miller also asked about the earlier matter with Claudia. [Petitioner] denied that it had 

also been sexual and said it was a different situation because he had not known Claudia 

as long. Dr. Miller then read [petitioner] his notes of the interview and [petitioner] 

affirmed they were correct.

[Petitioner] was later arrested. The police issued a press release about the charges 

against him in an effort to locate other possible victims.

A.

A. was born in Guatemala in 1940. [Petitioner] treated her for stomach pains in 2006. 

In May 2007 she made an appointment with him because she was having intense 

headaches. [Petitioner] said her blood pressure was very high, that she was too tense, 

and that he needed to examine her. He had A. unbutton her blouse and examined her 

breasts. Without providing her with a gown, [petitioner] told her to remove her pants 

and underwear. When she asked if this was necessary, [petitioner] insisted it was and 

that she would feel better after he examined her ovaries.

The next thing A. knew, [petitioner] “had already put his finger inside of me.” It did 

not feel like a normal examination. [Petitioner] was “touching everything inside of me, 

but that was hurting, he was doing it really hard.” When she said it hurt, [petitioner]

told her to hold his hand so she “wouldn't feel it so much.” [Petitioner] “was moving 

[his finger] in the same way that a man moves it when he‟s masturbating a woman.” 

This went on for much longer than any pelvic exam A. had experienced before. Then 

[petitioner] told A. to turn over so he could check her spine. When she complied he 

kissed her buttocks, put his chin in the middle of her buttocks just below her lower back 

and moved it back and forth. Then he told A. that everything was fine, and that 

“doctors sometimes have to do things to help their patients.” He said A. was “a very 

ardent woman” and hugged her after she got dressed. A. felt embarrassed and “really 

terrible.”

A. left [petitioner]‟s office and went straight to her job in Pacific Heights to prepare for 

a dinner party her employer was hosting that night. “I overcame the feelings that I was 

having and I went to do what I had to do. I had to do my duty.” She did the shopping 

and cooked and served the dinner, trying to “erase from my mind what was happening 

to me . . . I had to concentrate on what I had to do.” The party ended around 10:30 or 

11:00 that night. A. did not feel strong enough to drive all the way to her home in 

Contra Costa County, so she drove to her friend Raquel C.‟s house in Daly City to 

spend the night. While she was driving A. spoke to another friend, Rhina O., on the 

phone for about an hour.

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When A. arrived at Raquel‟s she felt too ashamed to say what had happened. She had 

difficulty sleeping, and the next morning she called Rhina, who insisted she report what 

[petitioner] had done. Eventually A. agreed, and after work she and Rhina went to the 

police. After she spoke with police officers A. was taken to San Francisco General 

Hospital for a SART examination, still wearing her clothes from the previous day.

DNA testing indicated a high likelihood that a substance collected from the inside of 

A.‟s underwear was [petitioner]‟s saliva.

[Petitioner] phoned A. several times the following weekend, but she did not answer his 

calls. On June 2 he called Raquel C., who was a former patient. He said he had been 

unable to reach A. and asked Raquel to locate her for him. Raquel agreed to call her. 

About 20 minutes later [petitioner] called back and explained that A. had left his office 

upset or angry a few days earlier. He said it was urgent that he talk to A. “because he 

had done something that wasn't right. That there had been a misunderstanding. And 

that [A.] had gone to file a complaint with the police, and that wasn‟t good for him. 

Because he was just now coming out of a trial due to some people who had accused him 

unfairly. And that he could give her some monetary compensation or help her 

financially in whatever way she wanted. And that if she didn‟t want to talk to him that 

she could talk to his lawyer, that they could reach an agreement. And that he would do 

whatever she wanted.” Raquel discussed the call with A., who said she wanted nothing 

to do with [petitioner] or his lawyer.

[Petitioner] called Raquel again a couple of days later and asked whether she had 

spoken to A. When Raquel told him what A. had said he “begged” her to ask A. to 

contact his attorney. He said he was “very sorry.” He wanted to apologize, and would 

do whatever A. wanted. [Petitioner] asked Raquel to try to “convince [A.] so that they 

could reach an agreement.”

Glenda

Glenda was born in El Salvador in 1980. In 2004 she went to see [petitioner] because 

she was experiencing headaches. [Petitioner] gave her a referral for an MRI and told 

her to return to his office to go over the results. When she returned, [petitioner] told her 

the MRI did not show anything was wrong and that he needed to examine her. Glenda 

told him that she had had a pelvic examination and PAP smear the previous month, but 

he said as her doctor he had to examine her. [Petitioner] told Glenda to lower her pants 

and reached for the waist of her pants to unbutton them, so she unbuttoned them herself. 

She felt embarrassed and “dirty,” but she continued with the exam “because he was the 

doctor.”

[Petitioner] did not give Glenda a robe or drape. After she lowered her clothing to her 

knees, [petitioner] stuck his fingers in her vagina “really hard” for three or four minutes.

He did not use a speculum. Glenda complained it was painful. Rosas said her ovaries 

were hurting, and that he wanted to “do [her] front.” He said that doctors “aren't just 

doctors, we‟re friends,” and that Glenda could tell him her problems. Glenda felt 

“horrible” and “dirty.” When the exam was over she left the office quickly and never 

went back. 

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Glenda drove home to Daly City, where she lived with her sister Sonja. She was crying 

and felt awful. She told Sonja she had only gone to [petitioner] for her test results, but 

that he “touched me down there.” Sonja suggested she call the police, but Glenda 

thought that they would not believe her.

In 2005, Sonja told Glenda she had seen on the news that other women had complained 

about [petitioner]. About four days later Glenda told her boyfriend what had happened, 

and with his encouragement she reported her experience with [petitioner] to the police.

M.

M. was born in El Salvador in 1951. In 2001 she went to see [petitioner] because she 

had the flu. [Petitioner] first checked M.‟s ears, nose and throat. Then he told her to lie 

face down on his table, lowered her pants and, without asking permission or telling her 

what he was going to do, inserted a finger into her anus. M. said, “What's going on?” 

[Petitioner] withdrew his finger and told her she had hemorrhoids. M. pulled her pants 

up and the examination ended. M. has never had hemorrhoids and was not experiencing 

any anal discomfort before the examination.

At a subsequent appointment with her gynecologist, Dr. Alvarado, M. mentioned that 

she had not felt comfortable when [petitioner] examined her. Dr. Alvarado said M. had 

a right to tell her doctor she didn‟t like something if it didn‟t feel right, and that she 

could change doctors. Later M. saw a television news report about [petitioner]. The 

next day she went to Dr. Alvarado‟s office and told the doctor‟s assistant, Sylvia, that 

she was considering contacting the police about [petitioner]. She ultimately decided 

against it because “in our country, we‟re not accustomed to doing that sort of thing.” A 

few days after M. spoke with Sylvia, investigators from the police and medical board 

came to her home and questioned her about [petitioner].

The Defense Case 

[Petitioner]‟s wife and office manager, Norma Watanabe, testified that A. appeared 

“normal” when she left the clinic after her appointment with [petitioner]. Ana Guillen, 

[petitioner]‟s medical assistant between July 2001 and October 2006, testified that none 

of [petitioner]‟s patients ever complained of inappropriate behavior. Dr. Alvarado 

testified that in February 2002 M. commented that her examination with [petitioner] 

had been different and uncomfortable because he had her lie face down, but Dr. 

Alvarado did not think the information triggered her duties as a mandatory reporter. In 

2004 Dr. Alvarado diagnosed M. with a minor case of internal hemorrhoids.

Three of [petitioner]‟s long-term female patients praised him as a doctor and member of 

the community and testified that he never touched them inappropriately. Lillian Paloma 

went to [petitioner] for medical care in December 2004 after Glenda, a colleague of 

Paloma‟s husband, referred her to him. Around Christmas that year Glenda asked 

Paloma how her appointment with [petitioner] had gone, but she never told Paloma or 

her husband that [petitioner] had acted inappropriately with her.

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The Verdict

The jury found [petitioner] guilty of unlawful sexual penetration of Maria and A. with 

an on-bail allegation as to A., unlawful touching as to A., four lesser included 

misdemeanor assaults against Claudia, one lesser included misdemeanor assault against 

Maria, and attempting to prevent and dissuade a witness as to A. [Petitioner] was 

acquitted of unlawful sexual penetration, assault and simple battery as to M., elder 

abuse as to A., sexual penetration and sexual assault by means of force likely to produce 

great bodily injury as to Claudia, and assault by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury as to Maria. The jury deadlocked on the sexual penetration as to Glenda, 

and that count was subsequently dismissed. 

People v. Rosas, No. A129711, 2012 WL 1955717, at *1-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPAˮ). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state courts adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 

constitutional error at issue “„had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury‟s verdict.‟” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court‟s] cases,” or if it 

“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

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Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06. “Under the „unreasonable application‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court‟s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court‟s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 

(2003).

Petitioner‟s claims in this action were presented to the California Supreme Court only in 

petitioner‟s state petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was summarily denied. When presented 

with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a federal court 

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court decision is 

objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This 

“[i]ndependent review . . . is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only 

method by which [a federal court] can determine whether a silent state court decision is 

objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Where a 

state court‟s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner‟s burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to 

procure a defense medical expert; (2) failing to investigate and call petitioner‟s office assistant as 

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the primary custodian of the patient–victims‟ medical records; (3) failing to call a defense forensic 

DNA expert and to effectively cross-examine the prosecutor‟s DNA expert; (4) failing to call 

Inspector Kidd and Dr. Yap regarding Claudia; (5) failing to call medical board investigator Moya 

regarding his investigation tactics; and (6) failing to call and effectively cross-examine Inspector

Lee. Pet. at 10.5

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 

counsel‟s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686. In order to prevail on a claim of 

ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must establish two factors. First, he must establish that 

counsel‟s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms, id. at 687-88, “not whether it deviated from 

best practices or most common custom,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a 

„strong presumption‟ that counsel‟s representation was within the „wide range‟ of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel‟s deficient performance, i.e., 

 

5 On June 30, 2015, subsequent to filing his traverse, petitioner filed documents from his resentencing, for which he was appointed new counsel. The documents show that he was resentenced to 8 years in state prison on September 10, 2012, but that a corrected abstract of 

judgment was filed on April 2, 2014, giving petitioner a 12 year sentence, i.e., a term longer than 

his original sentence. See Dkt. No. 31. Petitioner states, “I don‟t know if this is another form of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” See id. at 2. Petitioner is advised that he cannot now amend his 

petition to add a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the actions of his new 

counsel at re-sentencing. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-56 (2005) (after AEDPA‟s oneyear statute of limitations has run amendments can be made only when the original and amended 

pleadings “„ar[i]se out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.‟”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(c)(2)). Petitioner may, however, attempt to bring a separate habeas action asserting a new 

ineffective assistance counsel claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254‟s restrictions on second or successive 

habeas petitions are not applicable to a challenge to a new sentence after an earlier sentence was 

vacated. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 342 (2010) (finding challenge to new sentence 

after subsequent sentencing hearing not second or successive under § 2244(b)); see Wentzell v. 

Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1126-27, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that petition was not “second or 

successive” under AEDPA because it was the first petition to challenge a new, intervening 

judgment of conviction that was entered after the initial, partially successful habeas petition led to 

a new, amended judgment).

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that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. “The likelihood of a different 

result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112 (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 693). It is unnecessary for a federal court considering an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim on habeas review to address the prejudice prong, i.e., the second factor of the Strickland test, 

if the petitioner cannot establish incompetence, as required under the first prong. Siripongs v. 

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

The standards of both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland are “highly deferential, and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel‟s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland‟s 

deferential standard.” Id.

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. “In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 

judgments.” Id. at 691.

That an attorney might have conducted a more thorough investigation does not establish 

deficient performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). “[T]he duty to investigate 

does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; 

reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further 

investigation would be a waste.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). The question is 

not what the best lawyer or even what most good lawyers would have done, but whether a 

reasonable lawyer could have acted as defense counsel did. Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 

1113 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not 

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what trial counsel could have done, but whether counsel‟s actions were reasonable. Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998).

To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call a favorable witness, a 

federal habeas petitioner must identify the witness, provide the testimony the witness would have 

given, show the witness was likely to have been available to testify and would have given the 

proffered favorable testimony, and demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had such testimony 

been introduced, the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to the petitioner. See 

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner‟s mere speculation that 

the witness would have given helpful information if interviewed by counsel and called to the stand 

is not enough to establish ineffective assistance. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th 

Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

In Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit denied a petitioner‟s 

claim that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate and call a witness, where the 

petitioner only provided his own “self-serving affidavit” and no other evidence, such as “an 

affidavit from [the] alleged witness,” that the witness would have given helpful testimony. Id. at 

486-87; cf. Alcala, 334 F.3d at 872 & n.3 (distinguishing, inter alia, Dows; finding ineffective 

assistance of counsel where petitioner submitted interviews reflecting testimony missing witnesses 

would have provided).

The Court next addresses each ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

1. Decision Not to Obtain a Defense Expert

Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to procure a 

defense medical expert. Petitioner contends that a defense expert could have reviewed the medical 

records of Glenda and Claudia and testified that they were fabricating their claims that petitioner

had sexually assaulted them during their examinations. Petitioner further contends that a defense 

expert could have testified that it is a “normal medical [] procedure for a doctor to externally 

examine a patient‟s sacrum area without gloves,” thereby undermining the incriminating nature of 

the evidence of petitioner‟s DNA found in the sacrum area of A.‟s underwear. Pet. at 11-14.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim because counsel could have 

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reasonably believed that obtaining an expert for the purposes proposed by petitioner would have 

been unsuccessful. First, an expert‟s review of petitioner‟s medical files had little to no probative 

value. The medical records of petitioner‟s examination of Claudia and Glenda prepared by 

petitioner were nothing more than self-serving statements. See Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 

738-39 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the state court was not unreasonable in finding that the selfserving statements of petitioner did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Moreover, the proposed defense expert testimony would not have been admissible to prove 

the untruthfulness of Glenda‟s or Claudia‟s testimony. Under California law,

If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is

limited to such an opinion as is:

(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the

opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and

(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and 

education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or 

before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be 

relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony 

relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his 

opinion.

Cal. Evid. Code § 801. “[A]n expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth 

[or not], for the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common 

experience that the expert‟s opinion would assist the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally 

is as well equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful.” People v. 

Coffman, 34 Cal. 4th 1, 82 (2004). Defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

introduce inadmissible testimony. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 

failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance.”).

Regarding petitioner‟s claim that an expert could have testified on the normal medical 

procedure for conducting a pelvic examination, such evidence was not relevant. Under California 

law, “„[r]elevant evidence‟ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a 

witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Cal. Evid. Code § 210. Here, the DNA 

evidence found on the inside of A.‟s underwear was presumptive for petitioner‟s saliva. RT at 

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1539-40, 1552, 1572, 1585-87, 1594, 1603, 1609. Consequently, whether it was “normal” for a 

doctor to examine a patient‟s sacrum area without gloves had no tendency to discredit the 

evidence, as it clearly is not “normal” for a doctor to take any action that would result in saliva 

being found in that area.

Turning to Strickland‟s second prong, petitioner cannot show prejudice. First, petitioner 

has offered no evidence that a defense medical expert would have provided favorable testimony at 

trial. He fails to offer a declaration from an expert setting forth the testimony to be offered, which 

is fatal to any showing of prejudice. Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2009) (where 

petitioner contended he might have some type of organic brain dysfunction but offered no expert 

declaration that he in fact suffered from it, “This speculation is not sufficient to establish 

prejudice.”); Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (petitioner argued “that 

if tests had been done, and if they had shown evidence of some brain damage or trauma, it might 

have resulted in a lower sentence. Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice.”); 

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could 

have said is not enough to establish prejudice.”).

Further, petitioner cannot show prejudice from the absence of a defense medical expert 

because, even with such an expert, the evidence against him was overwhelming. Each victim 

testified as to how petitioner had sexually assaulted her. See RT at 1131-34, 1167-69 (Claudia‟s 

testimony regarding petitioner‟s penetration of her vagina and anus after he put her in the kneechest position); RT at 1206-31 (Maria‟s testimony that petitioner touched her clitoris, put her in a 

knee-chest position, sexually penetrated her vagina “pushing in and going around,” and caused her 

to bleed and have pain); RT at 1377-79, 1381 (Glenda‟s testimony regarding petitioner‟s hard 

penetration of her vagina causing her pain); RT at 1478-82 (A.‟s testimony regarding petitioner‟s 

penetration and masturbation of her vagina and his kissing of her buttocks).6 This evidence was 

 

6 Although petitioner was ultimately not convicted of the charges against Glenda, and in this claim 

does not appear to challenge his conviction relating to Maria, under California law, “[i]n a 

criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant‟s 

commission of another sexual offense or offenses [is admissible].” Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a). 

Thus, evidence of each assault was admissible to prove the other assaults.

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sufficient by itself to convict petitioner of the various charged offenses. See CALCRIM No. 1190 

(“Conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining witness 

alone.”).

Significantly, the victims‟ testimony was consistent with the complaints that they made to 

others about petitioner‟s sexual assaults. See RT at 1181-82, 1184, 1198-99 (Maria V.‟s testimony 

regarding Claudia‟s statement made immediately after the assault); RT at 1320-21 (Dr. Snyder‟s 

testimony regarding Maria‟s statement made the day after the assault); RT at 1291-93 (the SART 

nurse‟s testimony regarding Maria‟s statement made the day after the assault); RT at 1638-44 (Dr. 

Nicol‟s testimony regarding Maria‟s statement made the day after the assault); RT at 1415-17 

(Glenda‟s sister‟s testimony regarding Glenda‟s statement immediately after the assault); RT at

1510-11, 1514, 1517 (Rhina O.‟s testimony regarding A.‟s statement on the evening following the 

assault). These prompt, consistent reports to others of the sexual abuse strengthened the 

credibility of the victims‟ claims.

There was also a significant amount of corroborating evidence. This included petitioner‟s 

own admission to Raquel C. that he “had done something that wasn‟t right” to A. and his attempts 

through Raquel C. to silence A. in exchange for money. RT at 1522-26. There was also evidence

of a prior uncharged sexual offense against another female patient (Audelia) in 2002. RT at 1453-

57, 1460, 1466-67. Furthermore, in the case of A., petitioner‟s DNA was found on the back inside 

rear panel of her underwear and it was “highly likely” that the DNA came from petitioner‟s saliva. 

RT at 1539-40, 1552, 1572, 1585-87, 1594, 1603, 1609. In addition, Dr. Nicol testified that it is 

never appropriate for a doctor to masturbate his patient, keep his fingers inside her vagina for an 

extended period of time, or kiss his patient. RT at 1668-72. In the case of Claudia, Dr. Nicol 

opined that it is uncommon for a general practitioner to give a new patient a pelvic examination on 

her first visit while he is still getting to know the patient and her medical history. RT at 1657-59. 

Dr. Nicol added that the knee-chest position would have been painful to Claudia, who had 

reported to petitioner that she was experiencing back pain. RT at 1660. 

In Maria‟s case, the swelling, laceration, redness, and bruising in her vaginal area, along 

with her complaint of vaginal pain, corroborated her claim that petitioner had sexually assaulted 

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her. RT at 1291, 1294-99, 1318-20, 1644, 1732. The evidence included petitioner‟s apology letter 

to Maria for having given her an “inappropriate exam.” RT at 1532-35. Petitioner also admitted 

to Dr. Miller that his examination of Maria was sexual and said that he did not stop because he 

“lost [his] mind” while he was examining her. RT at 1346, 1365-66. The evidence showed that 

petitioner was well aware that his misconduct could lead to a report to the state medical board and 

eventually end his career as a doctor. RT at 1347-48. In sum, given the overwhelming evidence 

against petitioner, the admission of defense expert testimony would likely not have yielded a more 

favorable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Decision Not to Call Petitioner’s Office Assistant

Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call his office 

assistant as the primary custodian of the patient–victims‟ medical records so that the complete 

medical records of the patient–victims could be introduced to show that no sexual abuse had 

occurred during their examinations. Pet. at 14-17.

This claim fails because the state court could have reasonably concluded that counsel 

reasonably decided to forgo introducing the complete medical records. As discussed above, the 

medical records were prepared by petitioner and thus were nothing more than self-serving 

statements made by petitioner to suggest that he had not abused his patients. See Bray, 640 F.3d at 

738-39. Additionally, although the patient–victims‟ medical records documented no assaultive

behavior, another reason counsel may have decided not to introduce them was because some of the 

records did support the prosecutor‟s theory. This is because many of the records showed that 

petitioner had conducted anal and vaginal examinations of patient–victims who had come to see 

him for ailments (such as headaches, back pain, the flu, and shoulder pain) that did not require 

such examinations for purposes of treatment. See Pet. Exs. A-B, D-F. Thus deciding not to 

introduce the medical records does not demonstrate incompetence, but was instead a rational 

tactical choice. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20 (2009) (per curiam) (habeas court must 

consider “all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if [counsel] had pursued 

the different path,” and it is reasonable for counsel to limit introduction of evidence that would 

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assist the prosecution); Richter, 562 U.S. at 109 (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 

(2003) (“There is a „strong presumption‟ that counsel‟s attention to certain issues to the exclusion 

of others reflects trial tactics rather than „sheer neglect.‟”).

Finally, the state court could have reasonably concluded that no relief was warranted 

because petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. As discussed above, the evidence tying 

petitioner to the crimes was strong enough that admission of the medical records would likely not

have yielded a more favorable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

3. The Cross-Examination of the Prosecutor’s DNA Expert and the Decision Not 

to Call a Defense DNA Expert

Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call a defense 

DNA expert and by not effectively cross-examining the prosecutor‟s DNA expert, Ms. Boland. 

Specifically, petitioner claims that had defense counsel effectively cross-examined Ms. Boland, he 

would have been able to elicit her testimony that the DNA test performed on A.‟s underwear was 

“presumptive” for saliva and not conclusive. Petitioner further claims that had his counsel 

obtained a defense DNA expert, that expert would have been able to undermine the testimony of 

Ms. Boland whom he claims gave misleading testimony. Pet. at 17-20.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. First, contrary to petitioner‟s 

claim, Ms. Boland did not provide misleading testimony regarding the DNA found on A.‟s 

underwear. To the contrary, the record shows that Ms. Boland made it clear that A.‟s underwear 

tested “presumptively” for saliva. In doing so, Ms. Boland initially explained that amylase is an 

enzyme that is found in high concentrations in saliva, but is also found in low levels in other body 

fluids such as blood, sweat, tears, fecal matter, and the pancreas. RT at 1565. Ms. Boland 

specifically stated that the DNA found on A.‟s underwear tested positive for the presence of 

amylase in the first test and “presumptively” positive for saliva in the second test. RT at 1566-67. 

Ms. Boland made it clear that the San Francisco crime laboratory does not use the second test as a 

“confirmatory test for saliva.” RT at 1567. Ms. Boland explained: “There have been documented 

reports in the forensic community that breast milk, as well as fecal material, will react . . . so just 

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to be very conservative we say it‟s a presumptive test, although the manufacturer still says it is a 

confirmatory test for human saliva.” RT at 1567.7

Further, the record demonstrates that defense counsel did effectively cross-examine

Ms. Boland. Defense counsel specifically asked and Ms. Boland confirmed that the tests used by

the San Francisco crime laboratory constituted a screening, not a confirmatory test for saliva,

adding, “we call it a presumptive test.” RT at 1595. Defense counsel also asked whether anything

was done to differentiate between a possible DNA mixture of saliva and urine on the underwear.

RT at 1596. Ms. Boland made it clear that the San Francisco crime laboratory had not done

anything to make such a distinction, explaining that she expected A.‟s skin cells, not urine, to be

on the inside back panel of A.‟s underwear and reiterated that the manufacturer indicated there

was “no cross reactivity with urine.” RT at 1596. Trial counsel did not demonstrate incompetence 

by deciding to address the accuracy of the DNA testing through cross-examination, rather than 

through defense expert testimony. Defense expert testimony was not guaranteed to be helpful to 

the defense, especially after it was subjected to cross-examination. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 111

(“Strickland does not enact Newton‟s third law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for 

every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense. In many instances crossexamination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert‟s presentation.”); Bonin v. Calderon, 

59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (“while the Constitution requires that a criminal defendant 

receive effective assistance of counsel, the presentation of expert testimony is not necessarily an 

essential ingredient of a reasonably competent defense”).

Finally, petitioner again fails to establish prejudice. He provides no declaration from any 

expert stating how he or she would have testified at trial, which is fatal to his claim. See Dows, 

211 F.3d at 486; Grisby, 130 F.3d at 373 (noting “[s]peculation about what an expert could have 

said is not enough to establish prejudice”). And as discussed above, the evidence of petitioner‟s 

guilt was so overwhelming that, even assuming a defense expert had been retained, it cannot be 

 

7 Ms. Boland was referring to the manufacturer of the test employed by the San Francisco crime 

laboratory. See RT at 1566-67.

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said that his or her testimony would likely have yielded a more favorable result. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694.8

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

4. Decision Not to Call Inspector Kidd and Dr. Yap as Witnesses

Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call

Inspector Kidd of the San Francisco Police Department and Dr. Yap of the Medical Board of 

California regarding their earlier investigation of Claudia‟s claims of sexual assault by petitioner 

in 2002, which led to no charges being filed and no revocation of petitioner‟s medical license at 

that time. Pet. at 20-22.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. Contrary to petitioner‟s claim, 

the record shows that defense counsel did in fact highlight the fact that petitioner was not arrested 

in 2002 following Claudia‟s 2002 report of sexual abuse. Specifically, defense counsel elicited 

Inspector Lee‟s testimony on cross-examination that no arrest warrant was issued in 2002 in 

relation to Claudia‟s claims against petitioner and that the case was “closed” later in 2002. RT at 

1543.

Furthermore, defense counsel‟s decision not to introduce evidence of the initial 

investigation into Claudia‟s claims of sexual abuse by petitioner in 2002 was a reasonable tactical 

decision. The record shows that when Claudia initially reported the sexual abuse, the chief of 

medicine at St. Luke‟s Hospital thereafter reprimanded petitioner, advised him to use the 

conventional lithotomy position with his female patients, and advised him to have a chaperone 

present during future pelvic exams of his female patients. RT at 1750-51. Further, Dr. Yap‟s 

memorandum finding insufficient evidence to support the 2002 allegations includes admissions by 

 

8

Petitioner tacks on an argument that defense counsel failed to request the processing of DNA 

taken from vaginal swabs during a May 31, 2007 gynecological examination of A. Pet. at 8; 

Traverse at 10. Petitioner offers only his own conclusory statements and fails to provide a factual 

showing that his trial counsel in fact failed to request the testing or that the evidence to be gleaned 

therefrom was even exculpatory. Petitioner thus fails to show ineffectiveness on the part of 

defense counsel. See United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 

petitioner must make sufficient factual showing to substantiate ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim). In any event, the state court had reasonable grounds to deny this claim for lack of 

prejudice.

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petitioner that could have hurt his case. See Pet. Ex. K. Specifically, petitioner admitted to 

examining Claudia without a chaperone and without providing her a gown. Id. Petitioner also 

admitted placing Claudia in a genupectoral (knee-chest) position for the purpose of examining her 

rectum and vagina. Id. This was a position that would have caused Claudia discomfort as she was 

already complaining of back pain. See RT at 1660. Defense counsel may well have reasoned that 

it was not helpful to focus on the 2002 events given that they opened the door to evidence that 

would have helped the prosecution. See Wong, 558 U.S. at 20.

Finally, petitioner again fails to establish prejudice. Petitioner presents no declaration 

from either Inspector Kidd or Dr. Yap stating that they were available to defense counsel in 

preparation for trial and that they would have testified in the manner petitioner now claims. Allen, 

395 F.3d at 1002 n.2; Dows, 211 F.3d at 486. Nor is there a reasonable probability that their 

testimony would have resulted in a different verdict. The jury had already heard from Inspector 

Lee that charges were not filed against petitioner when Claudia first reported to authorities

petitioner‟s assault. RT at 1543. And there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‟s verdict 

with respect to Claudia.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

5. Decision Not to Call Investigator Moya as a Defense Witness

Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call

Medical Board of California Investigator Moya regarding his investigation tactics, which

purportedly changed after he learned that a new complaint of sexual assault had been made against 

petitioner by Maria. Specifically, petitioner claims that despite Dr. Yap‟s determination in 2003 

that Claudia‟s 2002 complaint against petitioner was insufficient to support an allegation, 

Investigator Moya used “rogue investigations” and “tainted taped interviews” to later substantiate 

Claudia‟s complaint after Maria lodged her complaint in 2005. Petitioner also alleges that 

Investigator Moya conducted “tainted taped interviews” of Claudia‟s friend Maria V., Glenda, and 

M. and that Investigator Moya used “biased investigative tactics” and “suspicious interrogation 

techniques.” Pet. 22-24. 

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The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. There is no evidence that 

Investigator Moya sought out any of the victims before they made their reports to the hospital and 

police, and there is no evidence that Investigator Moya used any improper tactics to persuade any 

victim to make false claims against petitioner. Petitioner thus fails to make a sufficient factual 

showing to substantiate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Schaflander, 743 F.2d at 

721.

Petitioner points to the testimony of Dr. Margarita Alvarado, a St. Luke‟s gynecologist

with whom M. discussed her 2001 examination by petitioner, mentioning that it was not 

comfortable. RT at 1846-51. At trial, Dr. Alvarado testified that she felt threatened by some 

comments Inspector Moya made after she told him that she had received no other complaints 

about the way petitioner had been conducting his examinations. RT at 1848-50. Notwithstanding 

Dr. Alvarado‟s reaction to the comments, her testimony did not in any way establish that 

Investigator Moya used investigatory techniques that should have been subjected to further 

scrutiny by defense counsel at trial.

Indeed, had the defense called Investigator Moya as a witness, the prosecutor would have 

had the opportunity to elicit the following additional incriminating evidence against petitioner on 

his cross-examination of Investigator Moya: during an unannounced visit at petitioner‟s medical

office, Investigator Moya saw a female patient exit an examination room with petitioner with no

chaperone in violation of the court‟s order that petitioner conduct all physical examinations of his

female patients with a chaperone present. RT at 10-12. Thus, defense counsel made a sound 

tactical decision not to call Investigator Moya as a defense witness. See Wong, 558 U.S. at 20.

Further, petitioner again fails to establish prejudice. The jury heard the testimony of the 

victims themselves and the friends and doctors to whom they reported the assaults. This evidence, 

along with abundant other evidence, supported the verdicts. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

6. Decision Not to Call Inspector Lee as a Defense Witness 

Petitioner claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call and 

effectively cross-examine Inspector Lee to show that he pressured petitioner to write an apology 

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letter to Maria, which was later used as evidence against him, and used “suspicious” tactics in his 

investigation of the accusations made by Glenda. Pet. at 24-26.

The state court had a reasonable basis to deny this claim. There is no evidence that 

Inspector Lee pressured petitioner to write a letter of apology to Maria when Lee interviewed him 

on March 24, 2005. RT at 1532-35. To the contrary, the evidence shows that petitioner 

voluntarily met with Inspector Lee, cooperated during the interview, wrote a letter of apology to 

Maria voluntarily in both Spanish and English, was free to leave after the interview, and did so. 

RT at 1532-35, 1541.

Regarding the investigation of Glenda, petitioner attaches transcripts of Inspector Lee‟s 

interviews with Glenda. There is nothing in the transcripts showing that Inspector Lee used any 

improper tactics to persuade Glenda to make false claims against petitioner. Petitioner argues that 

Inspector Lee failed to re-interview Glenda after reviewing her medical records, even though these 

records contradicted her interview statements. As noted above, however, the medical records were 

prepared by petitioner and were therefore nothing more than self-serving statements with no 

tendency to discredit Glenda‟s own statements. Regarding petitioner‟s argument that counsel 

should have highlighted the fact that Glenda did not file a complaint until eight months after her 

examination, the jury likely would have understood that she did not feel comfortable reporting the 

incident until she had learned in the news that other women were complaining of sexual assault by 

petitioner. 

Further, petitioner again fails to establish prejudice. There was not a reasonable 

probability that the jury would have reached a different result had defense counsel questioned 

Inspector Lee differently. As indicated above, there was no evidence to indicate that Inspector 

Lee had coerced or pressured petitioner or Glenda in any way. In addition, the evidence against 

petitioner was overwhelming.9

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

 

9 With respect to Glenda, it is significant that petitioner was not convicted of the sexual assault 

(count 6). The jury deadlocked on this count, which was subsequently dismissed at the 

prosecutor‟s request. CT at 445, 673. Thus, it is evident that no prejudice ensued as to this count.

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C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court‟s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

Additionally, the Clerk is directed to substitute Warden John Rathman on the docket as the 

respondent in this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

11/17/2015

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