Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01482/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEVEN L. OWENS,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, et al.,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-1482 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Docket Nos. 28, 31

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Steven L. Owens, a California state prisoner who is proceeding pro se, filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a decision by the

California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) that he is unsuitable for parole. The Court issued an

order directing respondent to show cause why the cognizable claims should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition, and petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the Court concludes that petitioner

is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and will deny the petition.

*E-FILED - 5/13/08*

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United States District Court

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28 1 California Penal Code section 261.2 is now California Penal Code section 261(a)(2). 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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BACKGROUND

The charges against petitioner arose from his kidnapping and rape of a woman in 1988. An

Alameda County Superior Court jury found petitioner guilty of kidnapping with the intent to commit

robbery (Cal. Pen. Code § 209(b)) and rape (Cal. Pen. Code § 261.2).1 Ans., Ex. 1 (Abstract of

Judgment) at 1. The superior court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate life term for the first

count, with an eleven year sentence for the other count to run concurrently. Id. 

The facts of the case are as follows. On March 2, 1988, at 1 a.m. in Alameda County,

California, the victim, a female, walked to a grocery store. Ans., Ex. 2 (Probation Officer’s Report)

at 2. Three men in a car, petitioner and co-defendants Taylor and Gort, offered her a ride, an offer

she declined. Id. Gort and Taylor chased her and dragged her into the car, and took some of her

belongings. Id. Petitioner drove to the Lake Merritt Boathouse. Id. Gort took a walk while

petitioner and Taylor undressed and forced the victim to do the same. Id. Both men raped her

vaginally and orally. Id. Gort returned to the car and the men drove to East Oakland as petitioner,

in the backseat, again raped the victim. Id. The men stopped at a hotel and returned the victim’s

clothing to her. Id. Joined by another man, purportedly Taylor’s brother, the men checked into a

room and smoked cocaine and then left the victim in the hotel room. Id. Taylor’s brother walked

the victim to the hotel office to call her fiancé. Id. The Oakland Police Department obtained a

description of the car, which they stopped within an hour of receiving the information. Id.

 In November 2003, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole because he would pose

an unreasonable danger to society if released, citing as its reasons that the offense “was carried out

in an especially cruel and callous manner,” and appeared to be “calculated” and “dispassionate.” 

Ans., Ex. 3 (Transcript of Nov. 4, 2003 parole hearing) at 55. The Board also cited that fact that the

“offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

another human being,” for an “inexplicable” motive, and the fact that petitioner had a history of

violent and assaultive behavior. Id. 

In response, Petitioner filed state habeas petitions, both later summarily denied, in the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 As articulated in the petition, petitioner’s contentions are nearly incomprehensible.

Respondent “is unable to decipher [petitioner’s] claims.” Ans. at 2. The court will rule on the relevant

issues it can identify. 

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California superior and supreme courts. Ans., Exs. 12, 14; Pet., P. & A. at 1. Petitioner filed the

instant federal habeas petition in 2005. This court dismissed the petition because it appeared that

petitioner did not pay the filing fee. Docket No. 4. The court later reopened the case, vacated the

judgment, and directed respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Docket Nos.

8, 9. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which this court denied. Docket Nos. 13, 17. 

Respondent filed an answer and then petitioner filed a traverse. Docket Nos. 26, 27. 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner alleges that the Board’s violated petitioner’s

right to due process because its decision was not supported by “some evidence.”2

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal habeas court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). The court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. § 2254(d)(1). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. (Terry) Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

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of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court

unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, in this case the

opinion of the California Court of Appeal. See Nunnemaker 501 U.S. at 801-06; Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned

explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court

decision on the claim, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state

court’s decision was objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court should conduct “an independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Id.

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that the Board’s decision violates his right to due process because it is

not based on “some evidence.” Pet., P. & A. at 6-12. 

The Board complies with due process provided that there is “some evidence” to support its

decision. The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record,”

or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.

2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002)

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3. The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the

commitment offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;”

(2) previous record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; 

(5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to

the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The

circumstances tending to show suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed as a result of stress

which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7)

age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including

development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate ability to

function within the law. Id. § 2402(d).

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(same). Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board’s decision must have some indicia of

reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Accordingly, if the Board’s determination of parole

suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability,

to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306

F.3d at 904.

In assessing whether there is “some evidence” to support the Board’s denial of parole, this

Court must consider the regulations that guide the Board in making its parole suitability

determinations. The Board is to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). “The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable

for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Id. § 2402(a). The regulations enumerate various

circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Id. § 2402(c)-

(d).3

Applying this law to the instant case, petitioner’s claim is without merit. The court finds

that there was some evidence to support the Board’s parole decision, based not only on the

circumstances of the commitment offense, but also on other relevant considerations. After a full

hearing, the Board concluded that petitioner was not suitable for parole and “would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety if released from prison.” Ans., Ex.

3 at 55. As its reasons for this decision, the Board stated that “the offense was carried out in an

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especially cruel and callous manner” which was also “dispassionate” and “calculated.” Id. The

circumstance of the commitment offense indicate “an exceptionally callous disregard for another

human being.” Id. “[T]he victim was abused and defiled,” having been put through “an ordeal of

rape and oral copulation repeatedly.” Id. The Board also found that “[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable.” Id. 

In addition to the nature and circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board

considered other parole suitability factors, such as petitioner’s criminal history and his behavior in

prison. The Board noted that petitioner “had a record of violence [and] assaultive behavior . . . an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct.” Id. According to the record, petitioner has a lengthy and

violent criminal history, which “in summary consists of numerous narcotic related offenses,

weapon offenses, auto theft, strong arm robbery, assault to commit mayhem battery [sic], and

loitering when children are present.” Ans., Ex. 8 (Life Prisoner Evaluation Report, September

2003 Parole Consideration Calendar) at 3. Other notable incidents include an assault to commit a

specific sex offense, an arrest for locking himself in a women’s bathroom stall and looking

through a hole in the stall in order to observe women using the bathroom, and charges of

absconding and child stealing. Id. Petitioner also has been cited for several infractions while in

prison, including possession of dangerous property, conspiracy to commit battery, and possession

of inmate- manufactured alcohol. Ans., Ex. 7 (Disciplinary Sheet). 

Other stated reasons on which the Board based its decision were that petitioner had an

unstable social history and that his most recent psychological report stated that he “showed poor

insight into his commitment offense” and “his violence potential is estimated to be slightly above

that of the average citizen in the community.” Ans., Ex. 9 at 2, 3. According to the Board, “[u]ntil

enough progress is made, [petitioner] continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.” Ans.,

Ex. 3 at 57. Because some evidence exists to support the Board’s fining of parole unsuitability,

the Board’s decision has complied with the requirements of due process, and therefore, petitioner’s

claim fails.

As stated above, petitioner’s claims are not clearly articulated. In addition to the central

claim just addressed, the petition does raise, however, two ancillary issues the court will address

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4. “[W]e conclude that the Board, exercising its traditional broad discretion, may

protect public safety in each discrete case by considering the dangerous implications of a

life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually. While the Board must point to factors beyond

the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in

no further comparative analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense

make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for the prisoner’s release.” In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1071. 

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briefly. First, petitioner contends that the Board violated his right to equal protection by its failure

to use California’s sentencing matrix to determine a parole date proportional to other similarly

situated prisoners. Simply put, the Board, according to the California Supreme Court, is under no

such duty after it has determined that a prisoner is unsuitable for parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1069, 1071 (Cal. 2005). “The Legislature has not disturbed the Board’s long-standing formal

policy that a determination of individual suitability must precede the setting of a “uniform” parole

release date.”4

 Id. “The BPT acts properly in determining unsuitability, and the inmate receives

all constitutional process due, if the Board provides the requisite procedural rights, applies relevant

standards, and renders a decision supported by “some evidence.” Id. 

Likewise, petitioner’s federal equal protection claim is without merit. Rather than meting

out different treatment to allegedly similarly-situated prisoners, the Board, according to its

statutorily assigned duty, looks at prescribed factors and applies these factors in its individualized

assessment whether a prisoner is suitable for parole. Title 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2281, 2404. 

Each case presents an idiosyncratic set of facts. Because the Board makes an individualized

assessment of each particular set of facts, petitioner’s claim that he is not receiving equal treatment

is simply not tenable. 

Second, the petition raises the issue that the Board’s continued reliance on the

circumstances of the commitment offense can, over time, result in a deprivation of petitioner’s

right to due process. Pet., P. & A. at 8. The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that “[t]he Parole Board’s

decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered . . . A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by

the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

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916-17 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the Ninth Circuit has not set a standard as to when a complete

reliance on unchanging circumstances would amount to a due process violation. 

This court, as detailed above, finds some evidence to support the Board’s finding,

consonant with due process and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Biggs, that petitioner was unsuitable

for parole. While the circumstances of the commitment offense are long past, they provide at this

time some evidence to support the Board’s decision. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(d)(1), (2). 

PENDING MOTIONS

Petitioner has filed two requests to the court to take judicial notice of various documents. 

Docket Nos. 28, 31. These documents include judicial decisions from the Santa Clara Superior

Court involving prisoners other than petitioner and letters from one of these other prisoners to his

trial counsel. Respondents have filed an opposition, contending that these submissions are not

adjudicative facts within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Docket. No. 32. 

Rule 201(a) clearly states that the rule relates to the admission of adjudicative facts. 

“Adjudicative facts,” as defined by the notes following the rule “are simply the facts of the

particular case.” Petitioner’s submissions do not qualify as adjudicative facts because they do not

relate to the facts of the instant case, but to other cases. Accordingly, petitioner’s requests to the

court to take judicial notice are DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

The court finds that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal constitutional

rights in the underlying state court proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ ______________________________ 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge 

5/9/08

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