Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03285/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

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Case No.18-cv-03285-NC 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HEADSTART NURSERY, INC., and T 

AND C SUPPLIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JACK PALMERI, and MOTHER 

EARTH ORGANIC FARMS, LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-03285-NC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 

OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE

This case arises out of an unpaid debt for watermelon seedlings grown by Plaintiffs 

and shipped to Defendants’ farm. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs Headstart and T and C 

Supplies (dba and hereinafter “Radicle Seed Company”) of Gilroy, California, are

suppliers of transplants for use in commercial agriculture. Id. at 4. Defendants Palmeri 

and his company Mother Earth Organic Farms (hereinafter “MEO”) own a 500-acre farm 

in Nevada. Id. at 5. Palmeri is a resident of Florida and MEO is incorporated in Florida. 

Id. Headstart claims that it grew, sold, and shipped 500,000 watermelon transplants, 

valued at $203,049.55, to the MEO farm in Nevada.

1

 Id. at 4. No payment was tendered

for the transplants. Id. Interest of $92,254.65 had accrued on that debt as of March 31, 

2018. Id. Plaintiffs seek to enforce this debt by bringing five claims: restitution/unjust 

 

1 Throughout their papers, the parties referred to this land as “Black Stone Farm,” “Black 

Rock Farm,” and “Mother Earth Organic Farm.” This Order will refer to the land as the 

“MEO Farm.”

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enrichment and conversion against both defendants; breach of contract against MEO; and 

promissory fraud and alter ego/veil piercing against Palmeri.

Palmeri and MEO moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction 

or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to a different venue (the District of Nevada). Dkt. 

No. 17. This Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over both defendants and that 

venue in the Northern District of California is proper, and therefore DENIES both motions. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Jack Palmeri and his associate Tom Gonzales formed Mother Earth Organic Farms 

in Florida to farm 500 acres of land in Gerlach, Nevada.2 See Dkt. No. 17 at 22, Palmeri 

Dec. at ¶ 3. In October 2015, Gonzales and Palmeri met with Doug Langum, a farming 

consultant from California. See Dkt. No. 30 at 2, Langum Dec. at ¶ 5. Langum’s company 

is called Forty-Four Organic Farms. Id. Palmeri told Langum that he was interested in 

growing melons at the MEO farm. Id. He asked Langum to prepare an operating budget 

and farming plan to grow melons. Id. Langum provided a projected budget for the farm in 

early November 2015. Id. 

In December 2015, Langum wrote a “Statement of Work” to describe the work that 

he would do for MEO. Id. at ¶ 11. This statement was never signed by any party but 

Langum alleges that Palmeri agreed to its terms. Id. It stated that Forty-Four would 

provide “all of the necessary management to produce 7 million pounds of seedless 

watermelons” at the MEO farm in the 2016 season. Id. at ¶ 11. MEO agreed to pay FortyFour Farms $25,000 per month to manage the Nevada farm. Id. at ¶ 12. Palmeri gave 

Langum the title of “Director of Agriculture” of MEO, as well as MEO business cards and 

an MEO email address with that title. Id. at ¶ 9. Langum hired an employee to live and 

work full-time at the MEO farm in Nevada and traveled there himself every week. Id. at ¶ 

 

2 The manager and member of MEO is Blackstone Realty Investors, LLC, a Nevada 

company of which Palmeri was the manager. Id. Palmeri’s business ventures related to 

the Nevada farm seem to have taken multiple names at different times, including “Palmeri 

Produce.” See Dkt. No. 31, Nelson Decl. Ex. 6. 

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12. Langum also began acquiring the supplies necessary to begin the melon operation at 

the MEO farm. Id. 

In January 2016, Langum contacted Dale Nelson from Robinson Fresh, a produce 

distributor in California with whom Langum had worked in the past. See Dkt. No. 31 at 2, 

Nelson Decl. at ¶ 3. Langum told Nelson that he was the Director of Agriculture of MEO, 

which would be growing watermelons at the MEO farm in Nevada with transplants 

provided by Headstart Nursery. Id. Langum expressed interested in creating a marketing 

agreement with Robinson Fresh for the watermelons. Id. Nelson sent Robinson Fresh’s 

varietal preferences and pricing information so that the harvest schedule could be 

coordinated with Headstart. Id. at ¶ 4; see also Dkt. No. 31 at 6. Langum met with 

Headstart to discuss the varieties and schedule around January 6, 2016. Id. at 4, 7; see also 

Dkt. No. 29 at 2, Clerou Decl. at ¶ 3.

Langum put Palmeri in touch with Nelson from Robinson Fresh. See Dkt. No. 30, 

Langum Decl. at ¶ 10. Between January and March 2016, Palmeri negotiated a marketing 

agreement with Robinson Fresh to distribute MEO’s watermelons. See Dkt. No. 31. They 

met in person in February 2016. Id. at 13. A contract was executed between Robinson 

Fresh and Jack Palmeri, as MEO’s Chief Executive Officer, on April 26, 2016. See Dkt. 

No. 31 at 25. 

On April 21, 2016, Headstart sent Langum a proposed watermelon schedule 

including prices and delivery dates which were coordinated with Robinson Fresh. See Dkt. 

No. 26 at 2, Clerou Decl. at ¶ 4. Because Langum via Forty-Four Farms was a former 

customer of Headstart, “Forty Four Farms” was listed on multiple Headstart documents 

relating to the MEO farm in Nevada. See id. at 2, Clerou Decl. at ¶ 5; see also Dkt. No. 30 

at 6, Langum Decl. ¶ 17. Langum contacted Headstart to correct this error and indicated 

that the correct billing entity for the order was Mother Earth Organic Farms. Id. Headstart 

requested that Langum complete a standard “Customer Profile Update” and “Terms of Sale 

Agreement” because Mother Earth Farms was a new customer of Headstart’s. Id. at ¶ 6; 

see also Dkt. No. 29 at Ex. 2. Langum completed these forms as the Director of 

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Agriculture of Mother Earth Organic Farms. Id. at ¶ 7. 

In the spring and summer of 2016, Langum contracted with multiple companies in 

preparation for the upcoming melon season at the MEO farm. Id. at ¶¶ 14–15. He 

contracted with an electrical company in Nevada, who sent invoices to Mr. Palmeri in 

Florida. Id. He also contracted with an irrigation company in California and presented 

that bill to Mr. Palmeri, who wrote a check for the irrigation supplies. Id. He contracted 

with a labor company in California for farm labor crews who later planted the watermelon 

transplants; again, Mr. Langum sent these invoices to Mr. Palmeri. Id. at ¶ 20. He also

purchased industrial insecticide from a California supplier for the MEO farm. Id. at ¶ 21.

Watermelon transplants were shipped from California to the MEO farm in Nevada 

in May and early June 2016. See Dkt. No. 27 at 6; see also Clerou Decl. at ¶ 9–10. 

Palmeri visited the farm for one day around the time that the shipments were received. See 

Dkt. No. 17 at ¶ 13. While there, he photographed the boxes that contained the transplants. 

Id. He did nothing further with the boxes. Id. He left the next day. Id. He does not know 

what was planted or what otherwise happened to the transplants. Id. Langum states that 

labor crews worked for one week in early June to plant the watermelon transplants and that 

Palmeri has been invoiced for these labor services. See Dkt. No. 30, Langum Decl. at ¶ 20. 

Soon after the transplant delivery, the relationship between MEO and Forty-Four 

Farms dissolved. Id. at ¶ 22. Langum alleges that MEO was delinquent in payment for his 

services beginning in late March 2016, and that when Palmeri refused to pay him in July 

2016, their business relationship ended. Id. Palmeri describes that the contractual 

relationship between MEO and Forty-Four Farms ended “soon after” May 2016 and claims 

that Forty-Four Farms “abandoned” the farm, such that “operations ceased” and “no 

watermelons were raised or sold.” Dkt. No. 17 at 24, Langum Decl. at ¶ 18.

Headstart sent a customer statement dated May 31, 2016 to Palmeri, invoicing MEO 

for about $100,000 for the watermelon transplants. See Dkt. No. 27 at 7; see also Palmeri 

Decl. at ¶ 16. Palmeri received the invoice sometime after May 31. Id. On July 1, 2016, 

Palmeri emailed Headstart to contest the statement. Id. Specifically, his email stated that:

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(a) the invoice was incorrect, (b) MEO had no account with Headstart, (c) “no third-party 

vendor has any right to bind us to any Invoice with [Headstart],” and (d) Forty Four 

Organic Farms c/o Doug Langum was the correct customer to be billed. See Dkt. No. 28 at 

5. Headstart’s Sales Manager Lisa Branco replied that she would void the erroneous 

account. See id. at 2–3. She soon learned from Headstart employee Daniel Clerou that 

MEO was indeed the correct customer for that shipment. Id. She then sent another invoice 

to MEO on August 31, 2016.3 Id. 

B. Procedural History

Headstart filed this suit on June 1, 2018. Id. at 9. Neither defendant in this action 

has been served with process. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to change venue. See Dkt. Nos. 16, 17. All 

parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(c). Dkt. 

Nos. 14, 22.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Legal Standard

Traditional bases for conferring a court with personal jurisdiction include a 

defendant’s consent to jurisdiction, personal service of the defendant within the forum 

state, or a defendant’s citizenship or domicile in the forum state. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. 

v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011). Absent one of these bases, the Due Process 

Clause requires that the defendant have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state 

“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

i. Specific Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction or specific 

 

3 This invoice was for transplants provided by Radicle Seed; Headstart did not have 

sufficient transplants available for the MEO farms order when it was placed and 

supplemented with some watermelon seedlings from Radicle Seed. 

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jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant is domiciled in the 

forum state or his activities in the forum are “substantial” or “continuous and systematic.” 

Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). A a three-prong test determines whether the court has specific jurisdiction 

over a party. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2015). The prongs are:

(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 

some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 

i.e., it must be reasonable. 

Id. at 1211. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

burden then shifts to the defendant to “set forth a compelling case that the exercise of 

jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc. 653 F.3d 

1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011).

ii. Purposeful Availment

The purposeful availment test applies in a contract case like this one. 4 Boschetto v. 

Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). Executing or performing a contract in a 

forum state typically indicates that the defendant purposefully availed himself of the 

privilege of doing business in that state. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. When a 

contract is at issue, the court must “use a highly realistic approach that recognizes that a 

 

4

In a tort case, a “purposeful direction” test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 793 

(1984) typically applies instead. See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Here, the 

Court focuses on the purposeful availment test because though tort claims are included in 

the complaint, the case primarily sounds in contract and the torts at issue arise out of the 

contract dispute. The plaintiffs’ claims are for promissory fraud, breach of contract, 

restitution/unjust enrichment, conversion, and alter ego/veil piercing. 

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contract is ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations 

with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business transaction.” 

Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985). Therefore, the court must look to 

the contract’s “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the 

terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing” in determining whether to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Id.

This analysis exists to ensure that “a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction 

solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts,” which would surely offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 475; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 

316. 

iii. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(2), a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems 

Technology Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). Allegations of the 

plaintiff’s complaint that are uncontested “must be taken as true, and conflicts between the 

facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Rio 

Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1019. However, the court “may not assume the truth of 

allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand 

Technologies, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2011). Finally, “mere ‘bare bones’ 

assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions unsupported by 

specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading burden.” Swartz v. KPMG 

LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007).

B. Analysis

Here, Headstart proffers three grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendants: 

first, consent to personal jurisdiction based on a forum selection clause in the Terms of 

Sale agreement between Headstart and Langum dated May 5, 2016; second, consent to 

personal jurisdiction based on another forum selection clause in an invoice from T&C; and 

finally, based on sufficient purposeful availment of the forum to subject the defendants to 

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specific personal jurisdiction.5 The Court finds that the third basis presented – purposeful 

availment sufficient to create specific jurisdiction – is satisfied, and therefore does not 

address the other two arguments regarding the defendants’ consent to personal jurisdiction

via the forum selection clauses.

6

 

i. The Defendants Purposely Availed Themselves of the Forum 

The first prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis asks whether the defendant has 

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. 

See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (2015). Executing a contract in the forum state is one activity 

that may give rise to purposeful availment of that forum. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 

802. A single visit to a forum may not be adequate to find purposeful availment. Glob. 

Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio De Arroz Choloma, S.A. 2017 Dist. LEXIS 

131718 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017). However, the inquiry is not limited simply to a 

defendant’s physical presence in the forum state but more generally to contacts that 

proximately result from the defendant’s actions. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 74. 

First, Palmeri and MEO contracted with Langum at Forty-Four Organic Farms for 

Langum to manage the MEO farm in Nevada for an ongoing $25,000 per month. See id. 

Langum and Forty-Four are residents of California. See id. This contract required regular 

communication with Langum in California. See id. Next, Palmeri communicated both via 

email and in person with Robinson Fresh representatives to arrange their purchase of the 

future watermelon harvest. See id. These communications contemplated future 

 

5

In its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs also add a fourth theory: general 

jurisdiction over Mother Earth Organic Farms. See Dkt. No. 27 at 14. The Court rejects 

this theory because Mother Earth is neither incorporated in nor has its principal place of 

business in California. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 

915, 924 (2011). Further, Headstart has failed to show that MEO’s activities in California 

are “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” because Headstart provided inadequate 

facts regarding factors such as “longevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical 

presence, and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets.” Mavrix Photo, 

Inc. v. Brand Techs, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011). 

6 Both parties extensively briefed issues of (a) agency theory and (b) the validity of forum 

selection clauses in their pleadings. These issues are relevant only to the consent bases for 

jurisdiction, not to the specific jurisdiction analysis, and therefore are not addressed in this 

Order.

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watermelon sales in the state of California. See id. The MEO farm operation contracted 

with multiple California vendors throughout 2016, including an irrigation supply company 

for whom Palmeri wrote a check for over $100,000 (in response to an invoice listing 

“Mother Earth Organic Farms” as both the billing and shipping recipient). See Dkt. No. 30 

at 6, Ex. 11. 

It is clear that Palmeri and MEO did business with California vendors in preparing 

the Nevada farm, intended to later sell their watermelons within California, and contracted

with California citizens to manage and provide labor for the farm. Indeed, though the farm 

was located in Nevada, its related business operations seem to have predominantly taken 

place in California. Palmeri’s contacts with California were anything but “random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated” – instead, they were purposeful, strategic, and direct. Burger 

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. 

The plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that the defendants purposely availed 

themselves of the forum of the state of California.

ii. The Claim Arises Out of Defendants’ Forum-Related Activities 

 The second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis requires that the claims arise 

out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. The Ninth Circuit 

frames this prong as a “but-for” test: but for the defendant’s activities in the forum state, 

would this case arise? Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 

1990). The execution or performance of the contract which is the basis of the relevant 

dispute will typically satisfy this requirement in a contract case. Schwarzenegger, 374 

F.3d at 802. However, as noted above, the Court must also consider the context of that 

contract with the understanding that it is but one portion of a broader business transaction. 

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. The “prior business negotiations” and “contemplated 

future consequences” of the contract must also be taken into account. Id. 

Here, Defendants contend because neither Palmeri nor MEO signed any contract

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with the plaintiffs, the second prong is not satisfied in this case.7 However, Palmeri – as 

the CEO of MEO – negotiated and executed at least one contract in California which

contemplated future consequences including the contract with Headstart. See Dkt. No. 1 at 

3. Specifically, Palmeri arranged to sell watermelons to Robinson Fresh. See id. These 

watermelon seedlings were to be purchased from Headstart. See Nelson Decl. at ¶ 6. 

Multiple affidavits support the plaintiffs’ claim that the Headstart order was 

intended by all parties to fulfill the Robinson Fresh contract. The affidavit from Dale 

Nelson at Headstart states that he coordinated the transplant delivery schedule and 

preferred watermelon varieties with Headstart, and that doing so was common practice in 

his role at the fruit marketing company. Id. at ¶ 4. The transplant varieties shipped by 

Headstart match the varieties that Nelson requested. Id. at 7; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 20 

(both listing “Fascination” among other watermelon varieties). Headstart employee Daniel 

Clerou stated that he “coordinated” the schedule with Robinson Fresh. Dkt. No. 29, 

Clerou Decl. at ¶ 4. Langum’s declaration states that he informed Palmeri about the 

Headstart transplants and that the two discussed the order before it was placed due to 

Headstart’s inability to source particular varietals requested by Robinson. See Dkt. No. 30, 

Langum Decl. at ¶ 10. Langum states that Palmeri required this information throughout 

Palmeri’s negotiations with Robinson. Id. 

The only evidence that Palmeri was not involved with the Headstart contract is his 

own affidavit, which states that he “did not communicate with” the plaintiffs, did not meet 

with the plaintiffs, and “made no attempt to order transplants from” the plaintiffs. See Dkt. 

No. 14 at 23, Palmeri Decl. at ¶ 9. It is entirely possible that even without his direct 

communication with or ordering from Headstart, Palmeri was aware of and approved of 

the transplant order from Headstart for MEO. However, as noted above, insofar as these 

affidavits conflict, at this stage in the proceedings the Court resolves any such conflicts in 

the plaintiffs’ favor. Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1019. 

 

7 This statement sets aside for the moment the issue of whether Langum was MEO’s 

authorized agent.

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Defendants emphasize that the invoices and shipping labels and other paperwork 

associated with the Headstart contract included “Forty Four Farms” rather than “Mother 

Earth Organic Farms,” and name Langum rather than Palmeri as a customer. However, the 

plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence that this designation was merely a mix-up with 

Headstart’s internal organization based on their prior work with Langum. See Clerou 

Decl. at ¶¶ 5–9. In fact, Langum immediately corrected that error and clarified on multiple 

occasions with Headstart that the order was for MEO’s Nevada farm. Id. He completed 

the required paperwork to set up MEO as a new Headstart customer. Id. The internal 

confusion at Headstart that resulted in a paperwork error is not grounds for defendants to 

now claim having had no knowledge of or responsibility for the Headstart contract. 

Though Palmeri did not personally execute the contract with Headstart, he did so 

with Robinson Fresh. The Headstart contract to provide the watermelons that Robinson

Fresh would purchase – watermelons which were not sourced by Palmeri elsewhere – was 

a “contemplated future consequence” of the Robinson Fresh agreement. Burger King 

Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. Therefore, the claims here arise out of the defendants’ contacts 

with the forum of California. But for Palmeri and MEO’s availment of the forum via 

contracts with vendors including Forty-Four Farms, Robinson Fresh, and the irrigation 

company, this dispute would not have arisen. The plaintiffs have satisfied the second 

prong of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis. 

iii. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Finally, the Court must consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice. This 

determination involves evaluating “the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest 

in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 

relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 

substantive social policies.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 

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These considerations can bolster the reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction where 

the showing of minimum contacts is less strong. Id. The court must always weigh the

facts of each specific case in determining whether exercising personal jurisdiction 

comports with fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 486. It is the defendants’ burden to 

set forth a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable once 

the plaintiff has met the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Picot, 780 

F.3d at 1212; see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477. 

Here, the defendants do little to present a compelling case that exercise of personal 

jurisdiction by this District would offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. 

Defendants argue that they did not consent to jurisdiction in this District. See Dkt. No. 17 

at 21. They point out that MEO and Palmeri are both domiciled in Florida and that the 

MEO farm was located in Nevada. Id. at 6. These facts are insufficient to make a 

“compelling case” that exercise of jurisdiction in this District is unreasonable. Though the 

MEO farm was located in Nevada, the events surrounding this dispute primarily took place 

in California. The Headstart and Robinson Fresh contracts both originated in California, 

and relevant witnesses from each company are therefore located in California. The 

contract with Forty-Four Farms is also based in California, where Langum resides. Of the 

six affidavits submitted in support of these pleadings, all but two – Palmeri’s and his 

attorney’s – are from residents of this District. Palmeri admits that the Nevada farm 

operation has been abandoned entirely. No identified witnesses nor alleged evidence 

remains in Nevada. No alleged events related to this dispute took place in Florida. 

The judicial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of this controversy, 

and this forum’s interest in the adjudicating the dispute, is best reached through this 

District’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court finds that such exercise is 

reasonable in this case.

III. VENUE

A. Legal Standard

When a federal court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship as in this 

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case, venue is proper in “(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all 

defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that 

is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which the defendants are 

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in 

which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). A district court may 

transfer venue for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of 

justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of such a transfer is to “prevent the waste of 

time, energy, and money” and “protect the litigants, witnesses, and the public against 

unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 

(1964). 

B. Analysis

In the alternative to the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

Defendants request that venue for this action be transferred to the District of Nevada. 

Venue is proper where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(a). A district court may transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In doing 

so, the court considers traditional private and public interest factors as in the earlier 

doctrine of forum non conveniens. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 

F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 

(1981)). These factors can include the availability of evidence and witnesses, the practical 

costs of trial, a court’s familiarity with the law, and the local interest in having localized 

controversies decided at home. Id. at 843. The location of counsel is a factor typically 

given little weight. See Kawamoto v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 

(D. Haw. 2002). The plaintiff’s initial choice of forum usually receives some weight, and 

is given “substantial deference if the plaintiff is a resident of the district in which the action 

is brought.” Id. at 1216; see also Miracle Blade, LLC. V. Ebrands Commerce Group, 

LLC., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1155 (D. Nev. 2002). 

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Here, Defendants fail to show that transferring venue is warranted for the 

convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As

discussed above, a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in 

California. Though the piece of property at issue is located in Nevada, the farm has been 

abandoned. Furthermore, the property itself is less at the heart of this case than the contract 

with Headstart in California. Witnesses seem to be predominantly located in California 

and, to a lesser extent, Florida; nevertheless, none seem to be located in the District of

Nevada, the defendants’ requested forum. Defendants argue that litigating in this District 

“would require Mother Earth to spend more than the amount T&C claims merely for extra 

litigation costs incurred by its Nevada counsel in travel time and expenses.” Dkt. No. 17 at 

17. However, convenience of counsel is given less weight than convenience of witnesses, 

evidence, and parties. See Kawamoto, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. Because the plaintiffs 

reside in this District, their initial venue choice is given additional weight. See id. at 1216. 

The Court acknowledges that litigating in this District is inconvenient for the 

Florida defendants and their Nevada counsel. However, on balance, it finds that due to the 

other factors weighing in favor of venue in this District, venue is proper here.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over both defendants and that venue 

is proper in the Northern District of California. Therefore, both the Motion to Dismiss for 

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and the Motion to Transfer Venue are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2018 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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