Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00518-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Appendix A is a copy of petitioner’s Central File.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN HERMAN PIRTLE, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-0518 FCD KJM P

vs.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PRISON

TERMS, et al., ORDER AND

 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2002 denial of parole. He alleges that the

Board of Prison Terms arbitrarily and capriciously denied parole and that it failed to consider the

uniformity clause of California Penal Code § 3031. 

I. Background

On September 10, 1980, petitioner was sentenced to a term of seventeen years to

life following his conviction of second degree murder and use of a gun. Answer, Ex. A.

Petitioner told the probation officer who prepared the report for sentencing that “he would serve

whatever time is necessary as quietly as possible and attempt to live with what he did to his

former wife, his family and friends.” Answer, Appendix A (App. A) at 452.1

 

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2

 Appendix B is a compilation of transcripts of petitioner’s hearings before the Board of

Prison Terms. 

2

In 1987, an evaluation was prepared for a lifer documentation hearing. The

psychiatrist mentioned petitioner’s tendency to minimize his problems with alcohol and

recommended transfer to an institution with appropriate programs, but observed “[a]t the present

time, there are no psychiatric reasons why this subject should remain incarcerated.” Id. at 381. 

A report prepared for petitioner’s initial parole hearing noted that petitioner had

not pursued vocational training nor participated in Alcoholics Anonymous, as had been

recommended, and suggested that petitioner “address and deal with his alcoholism” before

release. The correctional counselor noted, however, that petitioner “would probably pose a

relatively low degree of threat to the public at this time provided that he abstains from the use of

alcohol.” Id. at 343. 

A psychiatric evaluation prepared for the initial hearing noted its agreement with

“the previous examiner’s opinions that there is no applicable psychiatric diagnosis on AXIS I, no

diagnosis on AXIS II.” Id. at 377. 

Petitioner appeared before a panel of the Board of Prison Terms on March 21,

1990. Answer, Appendix B (App. B) at 262.2 The panel granted petitioner a parole date,

“concluding that the prisoner is suitable for parole and would not pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.” Id. at 306. Its findings

were:

Number 1. The prisoner committed the crime as a result of

significant stress in his life, namely a stormy marital relationship

over a two year period . . . with the victim . . . prior to fatally

shooting her. The prisoner shows signs of remorse. Immediately

after the crime he surrendered himself and the weapon and

confessed. He has indicated he understands the nature and the

magnitude of the offense. He accepts responsibility for the

criminal behavior and has a desire to change . . . .

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Secondly, the prisoner had a stable social history prior to the two

year marriage to his wife and the victim as exhibited by stable

relationships as a father and a good worker.

Number 3. The prisoner has no juvenile nor adult convictions for

felony nor assaultive behavior. His prior record of convictions

consists of six misdemeanors between the age of 27 and 32.

Number 4. While imprisoned, he has enhanced his ability to

function within the law upon release through participation in

institution job assignments as an excellent worker, and by being a

model inmate.

Number 5. At age 42 years old, the prisoner has matured, grown,

developed understanding, and his advanced age has reduced the

possibility of recidivism.

Number 6. All of the psychiatric reports have indicated

improvement and readiness for release.

Number 7. The prisoner has realistic parole plans which include

family support and job prospects in his hometown of Gridley. He

has maintained close family relationships. The panel notes that a

letter from the Chief of Police of Gridley supports his release and

return to the prisoner’s hometown.

Id. at 306-307. 

The panel determined his term to be 158 months, with a release date of December

30, 1994, with a special condition that petitioner abstain from alcohol and attend Alcoholics

Anonymous throughout the rest of his stay in prison and while on parole. Id. at 306-308.

In January 1993, petitioner had another psychiatric evaluation, which again noted

petitioner’s unblemished disciplinary record, his attendance at AA, his above average work

habits, and his “history of episodic alcohol abuse.” App. A at 375. The writer added that

petitioner “is not an impulsive man and demonstrated no antisocially-oriented traits typical of the

average inmate.” Id. at 375. He, too, listed no diagnosis on either Axis I nor Axis II and

concluded that “it is felt he will be successful on parole.” Id. at 376.

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At a progress hearing in April 1993, the panel reviewed petitioner’s laudatory

work chronos, positive programming, and attendance at AA, granted petitioner four months of

good-time for the three years since the prior hearing, which adjusted his parole date to December

1993. App. B at 258-260.

Nevertheless, in March 1994, a panel of the Board of Prison Terms held a hearing

to rescind petitioner’s parole. App. B at 159. The panel noted that one of the reasons for

rescission was that the prior panel did not give “appropriate consideration” to petitioner’s

extensive history of alcohol abuse and “his failure to participate in AA and other self-help

programs to address his alcohol addiction.” Id. at 209. The panel seemed skeptical of

petitioner’s earlier assertion that he would not drink because “I wouldn’t stick my hand in a jar

of rattle snakes, so drinking would be parallel to the same thing . . . .” Id. Petitioner responded

that he did not think he needed to attend and he didn’t “buy the higher power and the step thing.” 

Id. at 210. He added that he believed in the concept of “alcoholics getting together and helping

each other through the program,” but did not agree with the idea that “you got to have this higher

power or you won’t be successful in the program.” Id. at 213. 

The panel rescinded petitioner’s parole date. Among other things, it found that

the granting panel had not “given sufficient weight to the circumstances which preceded the

murder of the victim,” including the fact that petitioner “assaulted and battered his wife on

numerous occasions prior to the murder” and on the evening of the crime, “had time to cool off

after he had battered her, and instead, returned to the bar.” Id. at 245-246. The panel also found

that the granting panel had not given sufficient weight to the fact that petitioner “was and is an

alcoholic who had refused to participate in self-help.” Id. at 247. 

A subsequent report, prepared in June 1994, provided an Axis I diagnosis of

“alcohol abuse, by history only, in remission,” but found no Axis II diagnosis. App. A at 373. 

The evaluating psychologist observed that petitioner’s “violence level in the past as well as

currently is well below average and . . . the instant offense marks an atypical or out of character

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 The Category X program is “designed to produce specialized diagnostic reports for . . .

the Board of Prison Terms . . . The final evaluation is used by the Board of Prison Terms

primarily to determine treatment needs and as a resource tool to assist in determining parole

suitability. . . . The completed reports will address both the behavioral and psychological aspects

of each case, emphasizing special problem areas.” Wasko v. California Department of

Corrections, 211 Cal.App.3d 996, 1003 (1989). 

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incident for him.” Id. He explained that “the history of domestic abuse occurs within the

context of a two year period preceding the instant offense and was not present during his prior

two marriages . . . indicating a rather unique characteristic of that situation rather than

highlighting chronic behavioral dynamics of this individual.” Id. The evaluator concluded that

petitioner “is not . . . in need of psychotherapy or clinical intervention.. . . From a clinical point

of view, Mr. Pirtle is found to be suitable for parole. . . .” Id. at 374. 

In February 1995, petitioner returned to the Board, which found that he was not

suitable for parole because the offense was carried out “in an especially cruel and calloused

manner;” petitioner has “an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and violence” and an

“unstable social history”; petitioner has “failed to profit from society’s previous attempts to

correct his criminality;” he “needs therapy in order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with

stress in a non-destructive manner.” App. B at153-154. The panel recommended that petitioner

upgrade vocationally and educationally, participate in self-help and therapy programs, and

cooperate in a Category X program3 to explore his potential for violence and the significance of

alcohol in his criminality, among other things. Id. at 155. 

In May 1995, petitioner consulted clinical psychologist Jack Fleming, “with

respect to any justification or need for a Category X evaluation, and/or involvement in

psychotherapy.” Dr. Fleming concluded, “To involve this man in any type of psychotherapy, or

to request a Category X evaluation is a needless and profligate waste of professional effort more

wisely extended to emotionally unstable prisoners, or to those who pose a likely danger to

society.” App. A at 181. 

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Petitioner returned to the Board in May 1996. He explained that although

“drinking is not an issue” with him, he quit attending AA meetings because his date was

rescinded even though he had faithfully attended meetings before then. App. B at 103-104. He

insisted that he had not “roll[ed] over and give[n] up. I still maintain my own integrity in here.” 

App. B at 105. 

Commissioner Baker questioned petitioner about why he had not pursued a

Category X or stayed with AA. App. B at 106. Petitioner responded that he could not learn the

twelve steps because “if you don’t believe in a higher power you can not do the 12 steps, and I

don’t believe in a higher power.” Id. Commissioner Baker retorted that “the Board believes in

the 12 steps because that’s a proven program.” Id. 

The panel denied parole because the commitment offense “was carried out in a

manner which exhibits a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another;” petitioner has an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct; petitioner has “programmed in a limited manner . . .

specifically, the prisoner has not participated in any beneficial self-help or therapy programs

during this past year as recommended by the Board, specifically, that being AA.” Id. at 113-114. 

The Board commended petitioner for remaining disciplinary free and for maintaining satisfactory

job performance, but found these factors did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability. Id. 

The next hearing was held on December 9, 1998. App. B at 56. The panel once

again denied parole for the following reasons:

The offense was carried out in an especially cruel and callous

manner and the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner. . . . The prisoner has an escalating pattern of

criminal conduct, a persistent pattern of tumultuous relationships

and criminal behavior which commenced at an early age. He has

failed previous grants of probation. He has failed to profit from

society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality . . . . He has

failed to develop a marketable skill that can be used upon release. 

He has failed to upgrade vocationally, and he has not participated

in any beneficial self-help programs. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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A recent psychological/psychiatric report . . . authored by Dr.

Albert Shnaider . . . indicates a need for a longer period of

observation and evaluation for treatment and he recommended

therapy. . . . If there isn’t an AA program that you want to be

involved in, there’s nothing else, then we recommend that you go

to the AA. If there’s something equivalent to that, instead of AA,

that’s acceptable.

Id. at 86-88.

On March 25, 2002, petitioner returned to the Board. Id. at 3. Before the hearing,

a “Life Prisoner Evaluation” was prepared by two correctional counselors, who concluded that: 

Considering the commitment offense, the minimal criminal history

and the positive prison adjustment, this writer believes the prisoner

would probably pose a low degree of threat to the public at this

time if released from prison.

Factors considered are the lack of a juvenile criminal history, a

minimal adult arrest history, only one State Prison conviction, and

the fact that Pirtle was previously found suitable for parole by the

Board of Prison Terms and has maintained an exemplary program

since that time.

App. A at 315.

In addition, a psychological evaluation was prepared in September 2001 by

Corinne Giantonio, Ph.D. as background for the subsequent parole hearing. Answer, Ex. D. The

report summarizes prior reports, which were largely favorable. Id., Ex. D at 4-5. Dr. Giantonio

found petitioner’s Axis I diagnosis to be “alcohol abuse, by history, in remission,” but found no

Axis II diagnosis. Id., Ex. D at 6. She concluded:

In this case, there are multiple factors indicating a lower risk of

recidivism. These include Mr. Pirtle’s consistent and long-term

employment history, his lack of major mental illness, his

documented personal growth and insight, his generally positive

attitude in the face of legal and emotional adversity, and the

maintenance of personal support and family relations over the

period of his incarceration . . . His ability and willingness to accept

authority and the direction of the authorities and supervision also

argue in favor of his ability to cooperate with supervisory aspects

of parole. A stable childhood history also argues in his favor. His

insight into his episodic use of alcohol and its role which he

regards as interfering with good judgment and self-control also

argue in his behalf.

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Assessment of dangerousness within the controlled setting of the

institution is seen as definitely below average in comparison with

other inmates. Assessment of dangerousness, if released to the

community, is also seen as definitely below average. His current

gains are expected to be maintained as they have been self-directed

and self-incorporated.

Id., Ex. D at 7-8. Dr. Giantonio recommended that petitioner become involved with an AA-type

program for atheists, noting that “many people have historically been unable to advantage

themselves of the 12-Step Program because of its integrative belief system that is religious in

nature. . . .” Id. She concluded that: 

Mr. Pirtle is competent and responsible for his behavior with no

primary mental health disorder. Any decision for prerelease

planning can be made on the record of his successful

programming. There are no further psychological

recommendations.

Id.

At the hearing, the panel began by surveying petitioner’s stint in the Air Force

and his honorable discharge in 1969, his first two marriages and his contact with his daughter,

the child of his first marriage. App. B at 16-17. The panel also noted that petitioner first began

to abuse alcohol at the age of fifteen and that both his and the victim’s alcohol abuse had

contributed to the problems in that marriage. Id. at 17. Petitioner told the panel that his drinking

was sporadic: he could go for years without drinking but then drink for a few months. Id. at 19. 

The panel also reviewed the six instances that Gridley police were called because of domestic

incidents–some physical and others verbal–between petitioner and the victim. Id. at 17-18. In

response to a question from the District Attorney of Butte County, petitioner denied ever pulling

a knife on the victim, as had been suggested in the probation report. Id. at 37.

The panel noted that petitioner had not upgraded vocationally, although prior

panels had recommended that he do so, but noted that he has “several skills already . . .

[m]echanic, welder, small equipment operator, heavy duty equipment operator.” App. B at 21,

44. Petitioner told the Board he had an offer of employment were he to be paroled, doing ranch

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 The list itself is not in the record in this case.

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work with Giovannetti and Sons in Live Oak, and would live with his sister. App. A at 240;

App. B at 27, 32. 

The panel acknowledged his disciplinary-free record and “excellent work record,”

including laudatory chronos from his supervisor at the inmate canteen and his favorable

evaluation from his current job in the library. App. A at 173; App. B at 21, 34-35. 

Petitioner told the panel that he had attended AA after the 1990 hearing, when he

was given a parole date, but maintained his basic unease with the program because of its focus

on God. App. B at 26-27. However, as noted in the life prisoner evaluation report, petitioner

agreed to “involve himself in any . . . secular program that is available in his area of parole and

his family . . . has apprised him of substance abuse programs in the area that meet that criteria.” 

App. A at 315. Petitioner presented the panel with a list of secular sobriety programs in

Northern California.4

 App. B at 31. 

The Board of Prison Terms denied him a parole date for the following reasons:

The Panel reviewed all information received from the public and

relied on the following circumstances in concluding that the

prisoner is not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison. The offense was carried out in an especially cruel and

callous manner. The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

calculated manner. The offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. The motive for the crime was inexplicable or very

trivial in relationship to the offense. The conclusion was drawn

from the Statement of Facts where on March 8, 1980 at

approximately 1:17 a.m. the Gridley . . . Police Department was

notified of a shooting at The Moose Lodge. Upon arrival, they

found the victim, Diane, the prisoner’s wife . . . was lying on the

floor with a gunshot wound to her upper chest area. The

circumstances around the shooting is that the prisoner went into

The Moose Lodge, and observed his wife dancing with another

person. He went into (inaudible). He walked up and put his arms

around her and used a 25 caliber weapon to shoot her. He placed it

to her chest and shot her in the chest, and that penetrated her heart

and her liver, and she succumbed to her wounds. The prisoner has

an escalating pattern of criminal behavior. He’s failed previous

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grants of probation and cannot be counted upon to avoid

criminality. . . . He’s failed to profit from society’s previous

attempts to correct his criminality. Such attempts include adult

probation and county jail. The prisoner’s unstable social history

would primarily be centered around his alcohol abuse . . . . His

prior criminality includes arrests for disorderly conduct, escape

from a county farm, speed contest and a DWI, driving while under

the influence. Also, it’s noted that an unstable social history, I

guess we should also note the prisoner’s domestic encounters. His

escalating pattern of domestic encounters where the police

department was frequently called because of domestic allegations

that the prisoner was being abusive to his wife, for fights withe the

prisoner and his wife. So, we had an escalating pattern of

domestic violence conduct. The prisoner has failed to upgrade

vocationally as previously recommended by other Panels. The

prisoner got a good psychiatric report. The psychiatric report by

Dr. Giantonio was a supportive report. The prisoner’s parole

plans, the prisoner has made parole plans. They could use some

tightening up, but overall, the prisoner has made some effort to

develop parole plans (inaudible) has been in prison for over 20

years. So, he did put some effort into that. The Hearing Panel

notes that in response to Penal Code 3042 notices indicate an

opposition to a finding of parole suitability. And specifically, . . .

the District Attorney . . . Butte County spoke in opposition of a

finding of suitability at this time. The Panel makes the following

findings. The prisoner needs to be able to face, discuss,

understand and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner. 

Until progress is made, the prisoner continues to be unpredictable

and a threat to others. Nevertheless, there are some things that the

prisoner should be commended for. The prisoner did take an

Alternatives to Violence program. He gets good work reports. . . –

And he got a good psychiatric report from the doctor. However,

these positive aspects of his behavior does [sic] not outweigh the

factors of unsuitability. Parole is denied for two years. In a

separate decision, the Hearing Panel finds that it’s not reasonable

to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the

following two years. Specific reasons for these findings are as

follows. The prisoner committed the crime in an especially cruel

manner. His wife was at a Moose Lodge. She was dancing. The

prisoner went there previously and . . . slapped his wife. He left.

He had a lot of time to think about it. He encountered a police

[officer] who told him to go home and get some sleep. He went

home to get some sleep, and he retrieved a weapon. He came back

to the lodge, and he shot his wife down on the dance floor. The

offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. 

The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. The motive

for the crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the

offense. The prisoner had a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others. He had been married three times, and his

last marriage he characterized as turbulent. The prisoner has not

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completed necessary programming, which is essential to his

adjustment, and he needs additional time to gain such

programming. He’s not participated in the vocational programs

that’s available at the different institutions. He’s failed to

participate in substance abuse programming. Now, let it be clear

that the Board does not advocate any one type of substance abuse

program over another one, that is a faith based program over a

non-faith based program. But, certainly, with the prisoner’s

history of substance abuse and alcohol use, he should be involved

in some kind of substance abuse program, and it should not only be

a substance abuse program while incarcerated, but it should be a

commitment. In your parole plans, sir, there should be (inaudible)

substance abuse planning that you’re committed to being involved

in some type of substance abuse program, especially with your

prior record (inaudible) where people were injured. So, you have

to get involved in some type of substance abuse program. 

Therefore, the Panel recommends that you remain disciplinary

free, that if available, you upgrade vocationally, and that you

participate in some type of substance abuse program or self-help

program. For that matter, any other type of self-help program that

deal [sic] with anger management, stress management, those type

of things. Mr. Pirtle, it seems like you want to do it your way in

terms of getting a parole date. . . .We can’t just take your word that

you’re not going to get involved in any type of substance abuse

once you get out. You’ve been in prison. The Boards have told

you to participate in vocational kinds of programs, and during our

deliberation we talked about whether you would get involved and

try to become a bartender or not. But, sir, as long as you’ve been

in prison you’ve had the opportunity to get a vocation, certainly as

long as you’ve been in prison you’ve had the opportunity to get

involved in some type of substance abuse program. And with your

record, you must realize that there is an awesome responsibility for

this Board to try to determine a parole date for you when you have

not made a lifelong commitment to a substance abuse program. . . .

It’s too much of a risk to The People of Butte County and The

People of California to sit here and take your word because when

you went to that other (inaudible) for substance abuse problem,

you didn’t stay there. You escaped. And you went out and still

got involved in alcohol. And it appears that your alcohol abuse

had something to or related to – had something to do with a direct

correlation between the crime that you committed. So, that’s why

you’re [sic] parole was denied two years, sir. 

Answer, Ex. B, Board Decision 1-7. 

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s challenge to his denial on

December 10, 2003. Answer, Ex. F.

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5

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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II. Standards Under The AEDPA

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore

did not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).5 Courts are not required to

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

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§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

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 Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5 establishes procedural requirements for Board hearings.

14

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law

has been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Parole In California

In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1979), the United

States Supreme Court found that an inmate has “no constitutional or inherent right” to parole,

even when a state establishes a system of conditional release from confinement. The Court

recognized, however, that the structure of parole statutes might give rise to a liberty interest in

parole that would, in turn, mean an inmate was entitled to certain procedural protections. Id. at

14-15. In Greenholtz, the Court found that the “mandatory language and the structure of the

Nebraska statute at issue” created such a liberty interest. Board of Pardons v. Allen (Allen), 482

U.S. 369, 371 (1987). 

In McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit used

the Greenholtz-Allen framework to determine whether California statutes created a liberty

interest in parole. The critical statute at issue in McQuillion is California Penal Code section

3041, which provides in relevant part:

(a) In the case of any prisoner sentenced pursuant to any provision

of law, other than [the determinate sentencing law], the Board of

Prison Terms shall meet with each such inmate during the third

year of incarceration for the purposes of reviewing the inmate's

file, making recommendations, and documenting activities and

conduct pertinent to granting or withholding post-conviction

credit. One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole

release date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of the

Board of Prison Terms shall again meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5.6

The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform

terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to

their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing

rules that the Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing

information relevant to the setting of parole release dates. The

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board shall establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates

and in doing so shall consider the number of victims of the crime

for which the prisoner was sentenced and other factors in

mitigation or aggravation of the crime....

(b) The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines

that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole

date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

The Ninth Circuit found that subdivision (b) was like the statutes in both Greenholtz and Allen: 

California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty

interest in release on parole. The scheme "'creates a presumption

that parole release will be granted'" unless the statutorily defined

determinations are made.

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901-02. Again in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003),

the Court of Appeals reiterated its holding that the California parole scheme created a liberty

interest in parole, noting that “California Penal Code § 3041(b) controls” the resolution of the

question because its “language clearly parallels the language” under consideration in Greenholtz

and Allen. See also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980

(2003) (discussing § 3041(b), the California Supreme Court noted “parole applicants . . . have an

expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds . . . that they are unsuitable in

light of the circumstances specified by statute and regulation”). 

The existence of a liberty interest means that a decision to deny parole must be

supported by some evidence and not be otherwise arbitrary. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985); Jancsek v. Oregon Board of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). The

test is “not whether some evidence supports the reasons . . . for denying parole, but whether

some evidence indicates a parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public safety.” In re Lee,

143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408 (2006) (emphasis in original). The evidence must have some

indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The “some evidence” requirement is a “minimally

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stringent” standard and does not require the court to reweigh the evidence or examine the entire

record. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994); Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.

[The] analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing

parole suitability determinations . . . . [W]e must look to California

law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole, and then must review the record in order to

determine whether the state court decision holding that these

findings were supported by “some evidence” . . . and then must

review the record in order to determine whether the state court

decision holding that these findings were supported by “some

evidence” [] constituted an unreasonable application of the “some

evidence standard” principle articulated in Hill.

Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Board's regulations for setting parole release dates are found in title 15 of the 

California Code of Regulations. Section 2401 of this title provides:

A life prisoner shall be considered for parole for the first time at

the initial parole consideration hearing scheduled as provided in

Section 2268. A parole date shall be denied if the prisoner is found

unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A parole date shall be

set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section

2402(d). A parole date set under this article shall be set in a

manner that provides uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity

and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public.

In setting the parole date the panel shall consider the Sentencing

Rules for the Superior Courts. The panel shall also consider the

criteria and guidelines set forth in this article for determining the

suitability for parole and the setting of parole dates, considering

the number of victims of the crime for which the prisoner was

sentenced and any other circumstances in mitigation or

aggravation.

The terms in this article are guidelines only. The suggested terms

serve as the starting point for the board's consideration of each

case on an individual basis. The board may establish a term above

or below the guidelines when warranted and reasons are stated on

the record. A prisoner shall not be released before the minimum

eligible parole date.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401.

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Section 2402 provides:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length

of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information

available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability

for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances of the

prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past

criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after

the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone

may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to

a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.

(c) Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following

circumstances each tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These

circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the importance

attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances

tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

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(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually

assaulted another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or

fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious

misconduct in prison or jail.

(d) Circumstances Tending to Show Suitability. The following

circumstances each tend to show that the prisoner is suitable for

release. The circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the

panel. Circumstances tending to indicate suitability include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the

result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of

the crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome,

as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior

was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

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(7) Age. The prisoner's present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402.

Once the Board determines that an inmate is suitable for parole, it proceeds to set

a date for the inmate's release, based on numerous factors provided in sections 2403 through

2411. The paramount concern in determining parole suitability is public safety. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1080, 1084, 1085, 1086 (“the overriding statutory concern” is for

public safety; purpose of the statutes is to “guarantee that the Board has fully addressed the

public safety implications” of the release determination).

IV. Arbitrary Denial Of Parole

Petitioner argues that his “crime . . . is . . . not an evidential reason for finding him

unsuitable” because it is not especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Pet., Memorandum of Points

and Authorities (Mem. P. & A.) at 7. He also argues that his minor criminal history should be

deemed a suitability, rather than an unsuitability, factor under the regulations and that his

“criminal record has not changed during his incarceration,” making reliance on it arbitrary. Id. at

9. Next, he argues that his failures to pursue self-help programs and vocational programs “are

not valid reasons” for the denial of parole. Id. at 10. Finally, he contends that he is being

penalized for not attending Alcoholics Anonymous despite his objections to its religious basis,

and his stale history of alcohol abuse is not a sufficient basis for the denial of parole. Id. None

of the Board’s reasons for the denial, in petitioner’s view, has any bearing on public safety and

ignore the two reports prepared for the hearing, which found his violence potential to be low. Id.

at 11. 

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A. The Crime

The Board found that the crime was committed in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner because it was carried out in a dispassionate, calculated and cruel

manner with an exceptionally callous disregard for suffering and because the motive was

inexplicable or trivial in relationship to the offense. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(B),

(D)-(E). 

1. Cruel and Callous Disregard For Suffering

In In re Smith, 114 Cal.App.4th 343 (2003), the California Court of Appeal for

the Sixth Appellate District considered the question when a second degree murder can be

deemed cruel and callous to human suffering so as to demonstrate an inmate’s nonsuitability for

parole. The court in Smith observed that :

[I]t can reasonably be said that all second degree murders by

definition involve some callousness–i.e., lack of emotion or

sympathy, emotional insensitivity, indifference to the feelings and

suffering of others. 

Id. at 366 (emphasis in original). As with petitioner, Smith had been convicted of second degree

murder for killing his wife after learning that his disintegrating marriage was beyond repair as a

result of his wife’s unfaithfulness. When the victim told Smith she “did not want anything

further to do with [him],” he took a gun and shot her once in the head and then twice more as she

fell. Id. at 351. The court found that the crime was not cruel or callous to the suffering of

others:

There is no evidence that Smith acted with cold, calculated dispassion; or

that he tormented, terrorized, or injured Garner before deciding to shoot

her; or that he gratuitously increased or unnecessarily prolonged her pain

and suffering. . . . Was the crime callous? Yes. However, are the facts of

the crime some evidence that Smith acted with exceptionally callous

disregard for Garner’s suffering; or do the facts distinguish this crime

from other second degree murders as exceptionally callous? No.

Id. at 367; see also In re Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1409 (“measure of atrociousness is not general

notions of common decency or social norms. . . . Rather, the inquiry is whether among murders

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the one committed by Lee was particularly heinous, atrocious or cruel”); In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th at 1095 (a murder is “particularly egregious” if there is violence or viciousness beyond

what is minimally necessary for conviction). 

In this case, the day before the shooting, petitioner and his wife had a lengthy

discussion about their marital problems and decided to make a further attempt to repair their

marriage. App. B at 12. The next day, his wife told him she wanted to stay in town to drink

after work; when he later found her at the Moose Lodge, she was with another man. Upset, he

slapped her and left, drank some more and then returned home and went to bed. App. B at 11,

13. When he woke up, his wife was not home, so he returned to the Moose Lodge and found her

dancing with another man. He ordered a drink, waited for the music to stop, and then asked if

she was ready to go home. Id. When his wife said she was going to go home with Ron, her

dancing partner, he put his arm around her and shot her in the chest. Id. at 12, 13; App. A at 490

(Court of Appeal opinion reports that the bartender at the Moose Lodge testified that the victim

said “I finally left him tonight”). 

As in Smith, the facts underlying petitioner’s conviction do not support a finding

that the crime was cruel or callous and, by extension, a finding that petitioner remains a danger

to society. Petitioner did not torment or terrorize his wife; his earlier slap, while inappropriate,

did not appear to have an effect on the victim, who continued to drink and dance. There is

nothing to suggest that he gratuitously caused her to suffer; nothing in the record suggests that

she lived for long after the single bullet penetrated her heart. 

2. Calculated And Dispassionate

In defining a “calculated and dispassionate” murder, the regulation refers to an

execution-style murder as an example. The dictionary definitions support the connection

between this factor and an execution-style killing: “dispassionate” means “free from or

unaffected by passion; devoid of personal feeling or bias; impartial; calm,” while “calculated

means “carefully thought out or planned.” See www.dictionary.com <accessed 3/7/07>. 

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The instant record does not support the finding that the murder was calculated and

dispassionate. Personal feeling and emotion is what fueled the crime, for petitioner acted in the

knowledge that his attempts to salvage his marriage had failed and after his wife had told him

she was going home with another man. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates the killing was

carefully thought out or planned: petitioner killed his wife in full view of witnesses after being

rejected by his wife.

3. Inexplicable or Trivial Motive

In In re Scott, 119 Cal.App.4th 871 (2004), the Court of Appeal for the First

Appellate District considered the meaning of these terms as they relate to the parole decision. In

that case, the inmate killed a man who had threatened him, cuckolded him and supplied his wife

with drugs. The Board of Prison Terms denied him parole on the ground, among others, that the

motive was inexplicable or trivial. The court disagreed:

The epistemological and ethical problems involved in the

ascertainment and evaluation of motive are among the reasons the

law has sought to avoid the subject. . . . An “inexplicable” motive,

as we understand it, is one that is unexplained or unintelligible, as

where the commitment offense does not appear to be related to the

conduct of the victim and has no other discernible purpose. A

person whose motive for a criminal act cannot be explained or is

unintelligible is therefore unusually unpredictable and dangerous.

Id. at 892-93. Moreover,

[t]he reference in Board regulations to motives that are “very

trivial in relationship to the offense” therefore requires

comparisons; to fit the regulatory description, the motive must be

materially less significant . . . than those which conventionally

drive people to commit the offense in question, and therefore more

indicative of a risk of danger to society if the prisoner is released .

. . .

Id. at 893. The court found that Scott’s motive was neither trivial nor inexplicable, for “the

emotional pain caused by the departure or infidelity of a loved one is often seen by juries as

diminishing self-control. . . .” Id. at 894. It concluded that the finding that the motive was

inexplicable or trivial “ignores . . . human nature and experience.” Id. 

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 The court cannot help but be reminded of the universal themes expressed in William

Shakespeare’s Othello, despite multiple distinctions in plot as between that great tragedy and

petitioner’s story. See especially Othello, Act 5, sc. 2

23

The same reasoning applies to this case. The motive was not inexplicable,

because it was related to the conduct of the victim in the context of petitioner’s shaky marriage;

as Dr. Sprick observed in 1994, the instability of this third marriage was “a rather unique

characteristic of that situation rather than . . .chronic behavioral dynamics of this individual.” 

App. A at 373. The motive was not trivial because it was related to “emotional pain caused by

the . . . infidelity” of petitioner’s wife.7

 The panel that granted petitioner parole in 1990 found

that the circumstances relating to petitioner’s shooting of his wife suggested that the crime was

committed as a result of significant stress in petitioner’s life. App. B at 306. 

B. Escalating Pattern Of Criminal Behavior; Failure To Profit From Society’s Attempts

 To Correct His Criminality

The panel recognized that petitioner has no record of juvenile arrests, but had

volunteered the fact that he had been arrested at age fourteen for forging a check on his uncle’s

account, had served seven days in juvenile hall and thereafter been placed on probation. App. B

at 15. The lack of a juvenile record of violent or assaultive behavior is a factor suggesting

suitability for parole, which the panel appears not to have recognized. 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 2402(d)(1); see also Life Prisoner Evaluation, App. A at 315 (“the minimal criminal history” is

one factor suggesting that petitioner would pose a “low degree of threat to the public” if

paroled). 

Petitioner’s record as an adult consists of one felony--a 1975 drunk driving with

injury--, and several misdemeanors—drunk driving, disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct,

and escape from the county honor farm. App. B at 15; App. A at 450. 

To “escalate” is “to increase in intensity, magnitude, etc.” See

www.dictionary.com <accessed 3/7/07>. A record consisting of a string of misdemeanors and a

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single felony does not fit neatly within the definition of escalation; indeed, petitioner’s lack of

“any significant history of violent crime” is a factor suggesting suitability for parole. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(d)(6). There is not substantial evidence supporting the panel’s conclusion

that petitioner’s twenty-five year old criminal record shows that he would pose a danger to the

public if released. 

The panel also relied on petitioner’s failure to profit from society’s attempts to

correct his criminality, which included grants of probation, which he failed, and county jail. 

App. B at 48. The probation report prepared for petitioner’s Butte County sentencing in 1980

listed his criminal record and the punishment for each conviction; there is no indication that

petitioner was put on probation, much less that he failed a grant of probation. App. A at 450. 

Petitioner did serve two jail terms in 1976, a nine month sentence for the drunk driving with a

consecutive six month sentence for the escape from the honor farm. App. A at 450. This does

not qualify as some evidence that petitioner “cannot be counted on to avoid criminality,” for the

predictive power of this old record has been dissipated through the passage of time and

petitioner’s unblemished prison record; its minor nature is actually a factor favoring suitability

under the regulations. As the California Court of Appeal has recognized, this factor must be

viewed “within the context of the other factors [the panel] must consider to see if some evidence

shows [the inmate] continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.” In re Lee, 143

Cal.App.4th at 1409. 

C. Unstable Social History

The 1990 panel that granted parole found petitioner’s social history to be stable

apart from his two year marriage to the victim. App. B at 306. The panel that considered

petitioner’s application for parole in 2002 found that his social history was unstable because of

his alcoholism and the instances of domestic violence during petitioner’s marriage to the victim. 

Id. at 48-49. 

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1. Tumultous Relationships

Dr. Giantonio’s report contains a summary of petitioner’s social history. It

examined petitioner’s stable upbringing despite his parents’ divorce, his two uneventful

marriages to two women before his marriage to the victim, his role as custodial parent to his

children from his first marriage, followed by his turbulent marriage to the victim, who engaged

in extramarital affairs and essentially left petitioner to be a parent not only to his two children,

but to her own two children. Answer, Ex. D at 2-4. 

In In re Scott, 119 Cal.App.4th at 896, the court examined a finding similar to that

of the 2002 panel and found that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. In Scott, the

psychologist’s report prepared for the panel noted that the inmate had an “exemplary family

history,” no substance abuse or psychological problems apart from the brief adjustment disorder

occasioned by his wife’s drug abuse and infidelity. The court concluded, therefore, that even

though the inmate had had an “unstable or tumultuous” relationship with the victim, that was not

sufficient evidence to support the panel’s finding in light of his otherwise stable social history. 

The Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District reached a similar conclusion

in In re Smith, supra. In Smith, the Governor overturned a grant of parole in part because of the

inmate’s “‘deep-rooted pattern’ of social instability, drug use and violence against the victim.” 

Smith, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 368. In that case, as here, the psychologist found that the inmate’s

violence “was focused on only one person and manifest for only two years” and that there was

no violence in his other relationships or in prison. Id. at 369. 

Here, the record reflects petitioner’s single unstable relationship was with the

victim of the commitment offense; the only reports of domestic violence flowed from this single

relationship. Nothing in the record contradicted the psychologist’s reliance on petitioner’s

“stable childhood,” and “the maintenance of personal support and family relations” to determine

that petitioner poses a “below average” risk of danger upon release. Answer, Ex. D at 8.

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8

 Perhaps it is significant or perhaps it is an oversight, but the panel did not base its

denial on petitioner’s failure to attend AA or its secular counterpart. It did, however, mention

petitioner’s need for further treatment or self-help in making the “separate decision” that it was

not likely that parole would be granted in the next two years. App. B at 51-52. To the extent

that this can be deemed to be part of the denial, as in Smith, there is nothing in the record

suggesting that treatment in prison would render petitioner less dangerous than if he received

treatment in the community after release. 

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2. Alcohol Abuse8

The psychologist considered petitioner’s history of alcohol abuse, which includes

“sporadic and periodically heavy usage of alcohol from time to time,” and his recognition that he

can “never return to its use.” Answer, Ex. D at 4. She described his “insight into his episodic

use of alcohol and its role which he regards as interfering with good judgment and self-control.” 

Id. at 8. His Axis I diagnosis was “alcohol abuse, by history, in remission.” Id., Ex. D at 6. 

It is not disputed that petitioner attended Alcoholics Anonymous only until his

parole date was rescinded in 1994. However, the psychologist observed only that “should a

parole date be offered, it is recommended that Mr. Pirtle advantage himself of these AA

programs for Atheists.” Id., Ex. D at 8. 

There also is no dispute that petitioner’s abuse of alcohol was a factor in his

drunk driving convictions and the commitment offense. However, there is nothing in the record

to contradict the diagnosis of “alcohol abuse, by history, in remission” or suggest that petitioner

would be prone to returning to alcohol, and by extension, to instability, when released. 

Again, a similar situation was addressed in In re Smith, supra. In that case, the

inmate had a lengthy history of substance abuse which, the court found, did not directly lead to

the murder of his wife. The Governor had reversed the finding that the inmate was suitable for

parole in part because of a perceived need for further drug treatment. The Court of Appeal

rejected this rationale:

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There is no evidence that Smith denies he had a drug problem or

denied he had a problem for some period of his incarceration. 

There is no evidence that he refused, failed, or did poorly in drug

treatment programs. And there is no evidence that Smith ever used

any type of illicit substance during his incarceration. Nor does the

record support a reasonable belief that without further drug

treatment in prison, Smith might start taking drugs again.

Id. at 371 (emphasis in original). In this case, petitioner attended Alcoholics Anonymous when

the Board made that a condition of release, but then stopped after his date was rescinded because

of his disagreement with the program’s focus on religious principles. Cf. Turner v. Hickman,

342 F.Supp.2d 887, 896 (E.D. Cal. 2004). More fundamentally, however, in light of the

diagnosis of alcohol abuse in remission and the psychologist’s and counselor’s opinions that

petitioner’s potential for violence upon release was below average, the record does not support

the panel’s determination that petitioner’s abuse of alcohol up to 1980 rendered him dangerous

in 2002.

D. Failure To Upgrade Vocationally

While petitioner had not, perhaps, upgraded vocationally, he had maintained

steady employment while in the institution, building an employment record characterized as

“exceptional.” App. A at 317-318. Moreover, as petitioner told the panel, he had job skills and

an offer of employment on release. App. B at 21, 27, 44. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth

Appellate District observed in the case of DeLuna:

The Board stated that defendant had failed to upgrade his

vocational training, apparently dissatisfied with defendant’s

training in landscape and gardening. While there is evidence that

defendant has concentrated in prison on certain vocational skills,

we do not perceive any connection between his gardening skills . .

. and the Board’s conclusion that “he would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” Nothing in the record indicates that defendant’s

criminality or ability to support himself was affected by any

limitation of his vocational . . . skills.

In re DeLuna, 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 597 (2005). In this case as well, there is no connection

between what the panel perceived as petitioner’s limited vocational skills and his life crime, and

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nothing to suggest that his failure to secure other job skills renders him dangerous.

E. Need For Therapy To Cope With Stress

Dr. Giantonio found:

Mr. Pirtle evidences signs of maturity, personal insight and

personal growth. He admits to feelings of discouragement and

hopelessness during which period he tends to withdraw and isolate.

. . . . [H]e remains cooperative with prisoner programming and

continues his impeccable record with no CDC-115s at any time

during his incarceration. He is an avid reader and utilizes both

fiction and nonfiction to help him cope with his more difficult

days.

Answer, Ex. D at 6. She continued:

Mr. Pirtle is competent and responsible for his behavior with no

primary mental health disorder. Any decision for prerelease

planning can be made on the record of his successful

programming. There are no further psychological

recommendations.

Id., Ex. D at 8. As the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held on a similar

psychologist’s report:

[T]he Board lacked even “some evidence” to support the finding

that [t]he prisoner needs therapy in order to face, discuss,

understand and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner.

In re Ramirez, 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 571 (2001), disapproved on other grounds, In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal.4th 1061 (2005). The finding in this case similarly lacks evidentiary support. 

F. Other Considerations

In Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916, the Ninth Circuit suggested that

[o]ver time. . . should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct

would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in

parole.

See also Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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9

 The court did not explain why the arbitrary nature of continued reliance on unchanging

factors may violate due process only after the minimum sentence has been served. 

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However, in Irons, the court said:

We note that in all the cases in which we have held that a parole

board’s decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on

the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process,

the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum

number of years required by his sentence. . . . All we held in those

cases and all we hold today, therefore, is that, given the particular

circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due process was not

violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole

prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.

479 F.3d at 665.9 

In California, an inmate has a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD), which is the

earliest date a “life prisoner may legally be released on parole.” 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 2000(b)(67). At the time petitioner was sentenced, this date was computed by applying

postsentence good time and work time credits to the minimum term of fifteen years for second

degree murder. See In re Dayan, 231 Cal.App. 3d 184, 186 (1991). Petitioner’s MEPD was

August 6, 1989. App. A at 24. 

If the minimum term of fifteen years is the Irons triggering point for second

degree murder, then petitioner reached this date long ago: his minimum term of seventeen years,

even without considering any credits, was September 12, 1997. App. A at 23.

Petitioner appeared before the Board in 1998 and 2002, both times after his

minimum term had already run. Each time, the Board relied on factors no longer within

petitioner’s control--the nature of the crime and his prior history, both criminal and social, while

barely acknowledging petitioner’s clean institutional record, steady work history, maturity and

introspection--rendering the decision to deny him parole arbitrary and a violation of his liberty

interest in parole. 

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V. Uniformity Under Penal Code § 3041(a)

In Dannenberg, the California Supreme Court noted:

Our conclusion that California’s parole statutes allow the Board to

find unsuitability without engaging in a comparative analysis of

other offenses or applying “uniform term” principles, and that the

Board adhered to state law in Dannenberg’s case, also disposes of

his contention that he was denied federal due process rights arising

from his protected liberty interest, and expectation, in a “uniform”

parole release date.

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1098 n.18. In the case, the state supreme court resolved the “tension

between the commands in subdivisions (a) and (b)” of Penal Code section 3041, and the question

whether “the public-safety provision of subdivision (b) takes precedence over the ‘uniform

terms’ principle of subdivision (a).” Id. at 1081-82. To answer the question, the court examined

related legislation, statutory language, case law and agency interpretations. It noted that

[s]o long as the Board’s finding of unsuitability flows from

pertinent criteria, and is supported by “some evidence” in the

record before the Board, the overriding statutory concern for

public safety in the individual case trumps any expectancy the

indeterminate life inmate may have in a term of comparative

equality with those served by other similar offenders. Section

3041 does not require the Board to schedule an inmate’s release

when it reasonably believes the gravity of the commitment offense

indicates a continuing danger to the public, simply to ensure that

the length of the inmate’s confinement will not exceed that of

others who committed similar crimes.

Id. at 1084 (internal citation omitted). The court recognized the Board’s broad discretion in

determining an inmate’s suitability for parole, but also recognized that “the current statute

requires the Board to act in each case, either by setting a parole release date, or by expressly

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declining to do so for reasons of public safety.” Id. at 1098. Its ultimate holding is this:

We therefore hold that the Board proceeded lawfully when,

without comparing Dannenberg’s crime to other second degree

murders, to its base term matrices, or to the minimum statutory

prison term for that offense, the Board found him unsuitable to

receive a fixed and “uniform” release date by pointing to some

evidence that the particular circumstances of his crime . . .

indicated exceptional callousness and cruelty with trivial

provocation, and thus suggested he remains a danger to public

safety.

Id. What Dannenberg did, then, was to find that the provisions of section 3041(a), which appear

to require the Board to set a minimum, uniform term, did not create a liberty interest in parole,

because the parole board was required to undertake the public safety inquiry of subdivision (b)

before setting a uniform term. In this case, because the Board failed to find petitioner suitable,

there is no independent due process violation flowing from its failure to set a uniform term for

him. 

VI. Request For Judicial Notice

Petitioner has asked the court to take judicial notice of subsequent denials of

parole, which are based on essentially the same reasons given by the panel in 2002 and has

attached copies of parole board decisions from 2004 and 2006. This motion is granted. Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b)(2). 

The 2004 and 2006 hearings show that the Board continues to rely on the

“callous” circumstances of the crime, petitioner’s criminal record, his unstable relationships, his

failure to upgrade vocationally and to pursue self-help programs, particularly those for

alcoholics. Mot. For Judicial Notice, Ex. A at 1-4 & Ex. B at 1-4.

VII. The Remedy

In 2002 the Board relied on factors not supported by the requisite “some

evidence”; it has continued to rely on those factors to deny petitioner parole. In these

circumstances, directing the Board to hold another hearing would be futile.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Federal Defender’s Office be appointed to represent petitioner; and

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on David

Porter, Assistant Federal Defender. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of

habeas corpus be granted and the Board of Prison Terms set a parole date for petitioner within

thirty days of any order adopting these findings and recommendations. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 16, 2007.

2

pirt0518.157

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