Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01970/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01970-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT BISCHOFF, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SANDRA BRITTAIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:14-cv-01970-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

Plaintiffs Scott Bischoff, Leron Dempsey, and Project Sentinel, Inc. request 

reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s February 26, 2016 discovery order (ECF No. 88) under 

28 US.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), and Local Rule 303(c). Req. 

Recons., Mar. 11, 2016, ECF No. 96. Specifically, they seek to modify the order to award 

expenses in the amount claimed by their counsel. See Pls.’ Statement of Fees, ECF No. 84. 

Defendants do not oppose the request. The court decided the matter without a hearing. As 

explained below, the court grants plaintiffs’ request to reconsider the February 26, 2016 order, but 

refers the matter back to the magistrate judge to recalculate the award in the first instance in 

accordance with this order. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On January 20, 2016, plaintiffs moved for the imposition of sanctions against 

defendants Sandra Brittain, Keith Johnson, RZM Investments Enterprise, LLC, and J.A. Brittain, 

Limited and their counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) for their failure to 

comply with the magistrate judge’s October 15, 2015 order (ECF No. 54) granting plaintiffs’ 

motion to compel discovery. Pls.’ Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 67. Defendants opposed the motion. 

Opp’n Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 71. 

On February 9, 2016, the magistrate judge ordered defendants to produce all 

discovery required under the court’s October 15, 2015 order. Order 1, ECF No. 83 (“Feb. 9, 2016 

Order”). The magistrate judge denied without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions but 

awarded plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in connection with the motion. Id. at 1–

2. The judge directed plaintiffs’ counsel to submit a statement of attorneys’ fees and expenses 

incurred, “including time spent on briefing the motion for sanctions, meeting and conferring on 

the issues raised therein, and appear[ing] at the court hearing on the motion.” Id. at 2. 

On February 19, 2016, plaintiffs’ counsel, Todd Espinosa, filed a statement 

requesting fees for 48.6 billable hours at an hourly rate of $375, as well as $1,424.40 in ediscovery and travel expenses incurred in connection with the motion, together totaling 

$19,649.40. Pls.’ Statement of Fees 1–4. In the face of such a request, district courts generally 

calculate attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar,” the product of the number of hours reasonably 

expended and a reasonable hourly rate. See, e.g., Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 

973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008); True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-02219, 2015 

WL 3453459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015). Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted the following 

breakdown of hours: 

(a) 1.5 hours spent conferring with Defendants’ counsel by 

telephone regarding Defendants’ incomplete discovery production 

and responses and preparing a written summary of that telephone 

conference; 

(b) 19.5 hours spent conducting legal research, drafting Plaintiffs’ 

initial motion papers and supporting declaration and reviewing and 

summarizing Defendants’ further document production for those 

papers and declaration; 

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(c) 5.1 hours spent reviewing metadata for Defendant Sandra 

Brittain’s skb1610@aol.com e-mail account and consulting with 

Plaintiffs’ e-discovery vendor, Espy Case Litigation Solutions, 

regarding the compilation and summary of that metadata; 

(d) 12.0 hours spent reviewing Defendants’ opposition papers and 

evidentiary objection, conducting legal research and further 

document review and drafting Plaintiffs’ reply brief and the reply 

declaration; 

(e) 6.5 hours spent preparing for and attending the hearing on 

Plaintiffs’ motion; and 

(f) 4.0 hours spent traveling to and from Sacramento to attend the 

hearing. 

Statement of Fees 1; Espinosa Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 84-1. Espinosa argued that $375 is a 

reasonable hourly rate because he has fifteen years of experience, primarily in the areas of 

housing law, fair housing, and consumer protection; he has a regular billing rate of $480 in the 

Bay Area market; and the court has awarded fees based on an hourly rate of $375 in comparable 

Sacramento-area civil rights cases for counsel with fewer years of experience. Statement of Fees

2–3; Espinosa Decl. ¶¶ 1–8. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel also requested the following expenses: $1,177.20 paid to Espy 

Case Litigation Solutions for its metadata compilation and summary; $127.32 for one night of 

lodging in Sacramento before the February 3, 2016 hearing on the motion; and $119.88 for 

mileage based on the 222-mile round-trip to Sacramento to attend the motion hearing. Statement 

of Fees 3–4; Espinosa Decl. ¶ 12. 

In response, defendants argued that the requested award should be reduced by onehalf or two-thirds. Resp. to Statement 2, ECF No. 86. As to the hourly rate, they argued that 

Espinosa’s rate should be reduced from $375 to $250. Id. at 5–6. As to the claimed hours, they 

argued that certain tasks, such as document review and summarizing, should be excluded as 

duplicative of “regular” discovery work. Id. at 3. Defendants argued that the 6.5 hours claimed 

to prepare for and attend the hearing was “simply breathtaking” and “excessive by at least a factor 

of 2,” and that plaintiffs’ counsel should not be awarded any fees or expenses arising from their 

need to travel to Sacramento from their office in Redwood City. Id. at 3–4 & 4 n.1. Finally, they 

argued the 5.1 hours “reviewing metadata for Defendant Sandra Brittain’s e-mail account and 

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consulting with Plaintiffs’ e-discovery vendor” should be excluded, because that work was not 

connected to the sanctions motion and would have been performed regardless of whether 

defendants had produced the required documents. Id. at 4–5. They likewise sought exclusion of 

the requested Espy metadata expenses. Id. at 5 n.1. Overall, defendants contended the claimed 

amount of 48.6 hours was “facially excessive” and unreasonable. Id. at 2. 

On February 26, 2016, the magistrate judge found that plaintiffs reasonably 

incurred expenses for twenty-five hours of work at an hourly rate of $250 in connection with the 

sanctions motion. Order 1, ECF No. 88 (“Feb. 26, 2016 Order”). Specifically, the order 

provided, in relevant part: 

Plaintiff’s [sic] claimed number of hours incurred in connection 

with the sanctions motion is excessive, as is the hourly rate. The 

claimed expenses were not reasonably incurred in connection with 

the motion. The court finds that 25 hours at the hourly rate of $250 

were reasonably incurred in connection with the motion. Expenses 

are therefore awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $6,250 against 

defendants; said expenses shall be paid within fourteen days from 

the date of this order. 

Id. at 1–2. 

On March 11, 2016, plaintiffs filed the instant request for reconsideration of the 

magistrate judge’s February 26, 2016 order. Req. Recons., ECF No. 96. They argue the order 

“constitute[d] an abuse of discretion because it [did] not articulate its reasoning and is contrary to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C).” Id. at 1. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides in pertinent 

part that when a party fails to comply with a court order, “the court must order the disobedient 

party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 

attorney’s fees, caused by the failure . . . .” Although the magistrate judge did not expressly cite 

Rule 37(b)(2)(C), plaintiffs assume from the circumstances that the award was made under that 

provision. They argue the magistrate judge misapplied the law by limiting the expenses awarded 

to those incurred in connection with the sanctions motion, rather than those incurred as a result of 

defendants’ failure to comply with the October 15, 2015 discovery order. Req. Recons. 13–14. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Courts review requests to reconsider a magistrate judge’s nondispositive pretrial 

order under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(A); see also Local Rule 303(f). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although 

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. 

Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 

333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly 

deferential . . . .” Id. at 623. 

“The ‘contrary to law’ standard allows independent, plenary review of purely legal 

determinations by the magistrate judge.” Estate of Stephen E. Crawley v. Robinson, 

No. 13-02042, 2015 WL 3849107, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2015). “An order is contrary to law 

when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Id. 

(quoting Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Minn. 2008)). 

In reviewing a request for reconsideration, the district court “may not simply 

substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 

236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). “To succeed [on a request for reconsideration], a party must set forth 

facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” 

Enriquez v. City of Fresno, No. 10-0581, 2011 WL 1087149, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A court abuses its discretion to award attorneys’ fees if it does not articulate the 

reasons behind the award. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1147–50 (9th Cir. 

2001); Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (court should provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for 

the fee award”). Here, the magistrate judge did not provide reasons for the determinations that 

the claimed hours and hourly rate were “excessive” or that the requested electronic discovery 

vendor, lodging, and mileage expenses “were not reasonably incurred.” Feb. 26, 2016 Order 1–2. 

Accordingly, the order reflects an abuse of discretion as that term is understood in a court of law. 

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In addition, if the magistrate judge awarded the expenses under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C), she misapplied that provision by limiting the expenses awarded to 

only those incurred “in connection with” plaintiffs’ sanction motion. See True Health 

Chiropractic, Inc., 2015 WL 3453459, at *2 (“The critical question [under Rule 37] is not 

whether Plaintiffs’ requested fees are related to their motion for sanctions, but whether they were 

‘caused by the [Defendants’ unjustified] failure’ to obey this courts’ prior discovery order.” 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C))). Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that the court “must” order the 

disobedient party and/or attorney to pay the reasonable expenses “caused by the failure [to 

comply with the court’s discovery order], unless the failure was substantially justified or other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” See Clear-View Techs., Inc. v. Rasnick, 

No. 13-02744, 2015 WL 2251005, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) (“[W]here there is no 

substantial justification or injustice . . . Rule 37 sanctions are mandatory and must be applied 

diligently . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The magistrate judge here 

improperly limited any expenses awarded based on the rule without showing that an award of all 

reasonable expenses would be unjust.

Because the magistrate judge did not explain the legal authorities or factual 

findings upon which her determination relied, the court is unable to meaningfully assess the 

reasonableness of the expenses awarded. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1400. The court is left guessing 

how the magistrate judge determined a reduction in the amount claimed by plaintiffs and which 

items she in fact eliminated. 

The magistrate judge has adjudicated all discovery motions in this case, including 

the underlying motions for sanctions and to compel discovery, so she is in the best position to 

calculate in the first instance the reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees caused by defendants’ 

failure to comply with her October 15, 2015 discovery order. Cf. Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148 

(remanding for the district court to recalculate the award); McGrath v. Cty. of Nevada, 67 F.3d 

248, 253 (9th Cir. 1995) (if a district court fails to provide a clear explanation for an award, the 

Ninth Circuit remands the award for the court to provide an explanation). For example, it is not 

apparent to this court whether plaintiffs’ requested e-discovery costs were caused by defendants’ 

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failure to comply with the order or would have been incurred regardless. It is also not clear 

whether any circumstances exist that would make an award of all reasonable expenses unjust. 

Rather than recalculate the reasonable expenses, as requested by plaintiffs, the undersigned will 

refer the matter back to the magistrate judge to recalculate the award in accordance with this 

order. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The court GRANTS plaintiffs’ request to vacate that portion of the magistrate 

judge’s February 26, 2016 order (ECF No. 88) awarding attorneys’ fees and expenses. This 

matter is REFERRED back to the magistrate judge to recalculate the award in the first instance in 

accordance with this order, providing explanations for her reasons and identifying the 

circumstances, if any, justifying a departure from a full award of reasonable expenses under Rule 

37(b)(2)(C). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 15, 2016. 

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