Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-02989/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-02989-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARRIUS LIKES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DHL EXPRESS,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:10-CV-2989-VEH 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Darrius Likes(“Mr. Likes”) initiated this employment dispute arising

under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-

2109 (“WARN”) against Defendant DHL Express (“DHL”) on November 5, 2010.

(Doc. 1). On December 21, 2012, the court denied Mr. Likes’s request to have his

lawsuit certified as a class action with him serving as the class representative under

Rule 23(b)(2) or (3) (Doc. 44) and, since then, the case has proceeded as an individual

liability one only.

1

Mr. Likes’s complaint contains only one count. (Doc. 1 at 11-12 ¶¶ 50-59).

On February 27, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit denied Mr. Likes’s Petition for Permission to 1

appeal this court’s Rule 23 decision. (Doc. 49).

FILED

 2014 Jun-10 PM 04:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 1 of 18
More specifically, Mr. Likes contends that “DHL Express violated the WARN Act

with respect to the plaintiff . . . by failing to give 60 days advance notice as required

prior to a mass lay-off or plant closing.” (Doc. 1 at 11 ¶ 51).

Pending before the court is DHL’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56)

(the “Motion”) filed on January 6, 2014. On January 6, 2014, DHL also filed several

evidentiary materials in support of its Motion. (Docs. 57-61).

After obtaining multiple extensions of time, Mr. Likes filed his opposition

(Docs. 66-68) to the Motion on March 11, 2014. On April 25, 2014 (and also after

securing an extension), DHL followed with its reply. (Doc. 71). Finally, on April 25,

2014, Mr. Likes filed a corrected version of his opposition brief. (Doc. 72).

Accordingly, the Motion is now under submission, and, for the reasons explained

below, is due to be granted in part and otherwise termed as moot.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

DHL’s Business Model And Operations

DHL provides shipping services through a global network of gateways, hubs,

Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment the court must view 2

the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

the court provides the following statement of facts. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer

Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing that, in connection with summary

judgment, a court must review all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party).This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d

1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court has provided this statement simply to place the

court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy. 

2

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 2 of 18
warehouses, and terminals to administer customer needs. AF No. 1.1 Express

3

delivery is one of DHL’s many business lines. AF No. 1.2. Based on the demands

within its express delivery business, DHL engages independent contractors to

facilitate parcel pick-up and delivery in specifically defined geographic territories. Id.

Those companies with whom DHL contracts have no corporate affiliation, no

common owners, no common officers or directors, and no common decision-makers

with DHL. AF No. 4. 

Up until roughly the first part of 2009, DHL offered express delivery services

within the United States. As a result of economic losses totaling an estimated eleven

billion dollars experienced over an approximate five-year span from 2003 to 2008

The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by DHL that Mr. 3

Likes has admitted in his written submissions on summary judgment, in his deposition testimony,

or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of his case. Under appendix II of the court’s

uniform initial order (Doc. 5) entered on February 14, 2011, “[a]ll statements of fact must be

supported by specific reference to evidentiary submissions.” (Id. at 16). For Mr. Likes, more

specifically, this means that “[a]ny statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving partymust

be followed bya specific reference to those portions of the evidentiaryrecord upon which the dispute

is based.” (Id. at 17). Consequently, whenever Mr. Likes has inadequately asserted a dispute over

a fact that DHL has otherwise substantiated with an evidentiary citation, the court has reviewed the

cited evidence and, if it in fact fairly supports DHL’s factual assertion, has accepted DHL’s fact. On

the other hand, whenever Mr. Likes has adequately disputed a fact offered by DHL, the court has

reviewed the evidence cited by Mr. Likes and, if it in fact fairly supports Mr. Likes’s factual

assertion, has accepted Mr. Likes’s version. The court’s numbering of admitted facts (e.g., AF No.

1) corresponds to the numbering of DHL’s statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Doc. 56 and

responded to by Mr. Likes in Doc. 72. A number following a decimal point corresponds to the

particular sentence within the numbered statement of facts. For example, (AF No. 1.2) would

indicate the second sentence of paragraph 1 of the DHL’s Statement of facts is the subject of the

court’s citation to the record. 

3

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 3 of 18
(Doc. 66-2 at 47 at 185), DHL decided to cease its domestic express delivery 4

services, which winding down process played out over the course of a number of

months. AF No. 23. When domestic delivery was still a component of its express

delivery business, DHL utilized independent contractors in over 86% of its delivery

areas within the United States. AF No. 1.2; (see also Doc. 67-3 at 3 (DHL’s

substantive response to interrogatory No. 3)).5

Separate but, for the most part, uniformly worded, cartage agreements(“CAs”)

govern the commercial relationship between DHL and its contractors. Such contracts

require that all contractors: (i) wear DHL branded clothing consistent with DHL’s

trademark guidelines; (ii) drive vehicles with DHL branded logos when delivering

DHL packages; and (iii) refrain from making any non-DHL deliveries when wearing

DHL branded clothing or driving DHL branded trucks. (Doc. 59-1 at 5 § 3.5.3; id. at

6 § 3.14). Bill Talon (“Mr. Talon”), DHL’s current head of Ground Operations for 6

the Americas Division, recalled that, prior to ceasing its domestic express delivery

operations, DHL only permitted two out of its three hundred contractors to make nonThe first page references to Doc. 66-2 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering 4

system and the second page references correspond with the numbering of the deposition transcript.

All page references to Doc. 67-3 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 5

All page references to Doc. 59-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 6

4

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 4 of 18
DHL deliveries. (Doc. 66-3 at 12 at 43-44).7

In addition to the CAs, domestic contractors were asked to execute termination

and transition agreements (“TTAs”) when DHL was winding down its express

delivery services within the United States. (Doc. 57-1 at 2-8). These TTAs subsumed 8

the CAs as the governing document between DHL and its domestic contractors and

included provisions for funding to the contractors for courier wages, returning DHL

branded products, covering insurance payments, and protecting DHL’s brand. Id.

DHL’s Birmingham Contractors

and Mr. Likes’s Employment

Mr. Likes was employed as a delivery courier by Wood Air Freight, Inc.

(“WAF”), one of DHL’s domestic contractors that operated out of a facility located

in Birmingham. AF No. 5. DHL contracted with two other independent

companies–Sky Land Express, Inc. (“SkyLand”) and TerritoryReps, Inc. (“Territory

Reps”)–who operated out of the same Birmingham facility as WAF. AF No. 8.1. 

WAF began operations in 1981 and had its own set of employee policies and

procedures in place for much of that time. AF No. 7.2. WAF’s owner and president

was Thomas Wood (“Mr. Wood”) who, in addition to overseeing the company’s

The first page references to Doc. 66-3 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering 7

system and the second page references correspond with the numbering of the deposition transcript.

All page references to Doc. 57-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 8

5

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 5 of 18
day-to-day operations, wasthe person solely responsible for negotiating the terms of

all contracts between WAF and DHL. AF No. 7.1. WAF first contracted to provide

pick-up and delivery services for DHL in 2005, and their contractual relationship

lasted until early 2009. AF No. 7.3. During this time period, 100% of WAF’s

revenues came from its relationship with DHL. (Doc. 61-1 at 13 at 47).

9

DHL never employed Mr. Likes and his limited base of knowledge concerning

WAF’s commercial dealings with DHL derives exclusively from his employment

with WAF as a delivery courier. AF Nos. 6.1, 6.2. In his position, Mr. Likes spent 

90 % of his day alone in his delivery vehicle. AF No. 6.2. Further, Mr. Likes had no

responsibility related to any contract negotiations between WAF and DHL, did not

supervise other WAF employees, spent “limited time” interacting with other WAF

employees, and expended “even less time” coming into contact with employees of

other independent contractors. AF No. 6.3. 

DHL and WAF had a CA in place until that agreement (Doc. 59-2 at 1-24)

10

was subsumed by their TTA dated November 20, 2008. (Doc. 57-1 at 2-8).Through

the CA, DHL and WAF expressly intended to and did enter an independent contractor

relationship. AF No. 11.1. During its relationship with DHL, WAF’s handling of its

The first page references to Doc. 61-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering 9

system and the second page references correspond with the numbering of the deposition transcript.

All page references to Doc. 59-2 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 10

6

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 6 of 18
obligations under the CA was in WAF’s sole discretion although the CA did contain

detailed terms regarding compliance with certain contract performance measures

applicable to the use of DHL branded uniforms and vehicles. AF No. 15; (see also

Doc. 59-1 at 3 § 3.1 (referencing DHL requirementsregarding contractor’s provision

of cartage services)).

Under the CA, WAF was solely responsible for hiring its own workforce and

for handling all other employment-related issues,including disciplining its employees

and processing payroll checks. (See Doc. 61-1 at 4 at 12 (Mr. Wood’s answering

affirmatively that he chose who WAF hired, decided how many WAF hired, and

determined how to assign any WAF hirees); id. at 5-6 at 16-17 (Mr. Wood’s

confirming that he set the rates of compensation and ensured the processing of payroll

for all WAF employees)). WAF also addressed any customer complaints. AF No. 19.

However in contrast to the CA, under the TTA, DHL assisted in the attrition

of employees, established a formula for payment of wages, and required proof of

couriers’ termination for contractors to collect their payments. (Doc. 57-1 at 4 ¶ 6.d;

see also Doc. 66-2 at 65 at 256 (“As a result of that, we decided to think about some

compensation model to allow themthe opportunity to continue their business moving

forward, as well as qualify a plan to help them attrit their staff, their couriers from the

organization, their organization, as they saw fit.”)).

7

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 7 of 18
As part of the TTA, WAF identified that its workforce included 20 full-time

employees and 1 part-time employee. AF No. 25. One component of the TTA wasthe

ContractorEmployeeRetention Program(“CERP”). AF No. 27.1. Through theCERP,

DHL sought to protect its customer relationships and its brand name by ensuring that

independent contractor companies did not lose focus on their DHL contracts during

such a period of uncertainty. AF No. 27. The CERP resulted from negotiations with

independent contractor companies who approached DHL to identify a mutually

beneficial solution to concerns related to the restructuring of DHL’s domestic express

delivery services. AF No. 28. Based on information provided by WAF to DHL in

March 2009, WAF made CERP payments to a total of 19 employees, including Mr. 11

Likes. AF No. 30; (Doc. 57-3 at 4). Based upon the applicable CERP payment

12

schedule, 1 of the 19 employees paid was a part-time worker, leaving 18 full-time

compensated positions. (See Doc. 57-3 at 4 (reflecting 1 employee receiving $1,200

CERP payment signifying compensation for part-time labor)). 

While Mr. Likeslacks direct knowledge of how many employees were laid off

by DHL’s other Birmingham-based contractors during the domestic express delivery

The documentation provided byWAF as part of the TTA reflects that, as of November 20, 11

2008,WAF had 18 full-time employees, 2 management employees, and 1 part-time employee who

were scheduled to receive CERP payments. (Doc. 66-1 at 9). 

All page references to Doc. 57-3 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 12

8

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 8 of 18
winding down process (see Doc. 66-1 at 3 ¶ 6 (“Including the drivers from the other

contractors, and the DHL station agents, I estimate there were in excess of 50 persons

working in the Birmingham terminal in the handling of packages exclusively for

[DHL].”) (emphasis added)), the CERP documentation applicable to Sky Land

13

showsthat 26 Birmingham-based full-time employees and 3 management employees

were scheduled to receive wind-down payments. (Doc. 66-1 at 6, 8). Additionally, the

documentation applicable to Territory Reps reflects that 17 Birmingham-based fulltime employees and 5 management employees were eligible to receive CERP

compensation. (Doc. 66-1 at 7). Aggregating those anticipated full-time employees

of other Birmingham-based contractors with those full-time ones actually laid off by

WAF equals 69 (29 + 22 + 18 = 69). (See also Doc. 66-1 at 11-12 (substantiating

DHL’s “CARTAGE PAYABLES” for WAF, Sky Land, and Territory Reps)).14

III. STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R . Civ. P.

56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved

All page references to Doc. 66-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 13

Unlike with WAF, the court does not see where actual CERP payments applicable to the 14

employees of Sky Land and Territory Reps are substantiated in the record.

9

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 9 of 18
in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th

Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). “Once the moving party

has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to ‘come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270,

1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).

Finally “[i]f the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a

defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no

genuine issue of material fact asto any element of that defense.” International Stamp,

456 F.3d at 1274 (citing Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353 F.3d 409,

412 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

IV. ANALYSIS

DHL’s Motion presents three primary contentions: (i) Mr. Likes is precluded

from pursuing his WARN claim against DHL because another district court has

previously concluded that DHL was not his employer under the Fair Labor Standards

10

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 10 of 18
Act (Doc. 56 at 17); (ii) even if the res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines do 15

not apply, summary judgment still is appropriate because the evidence shows that

DHL was not Mr. Likes’s employer under 20 C.F.R. § 639(a)(2) (id. at 28); and (iii) 16

regardless of DHL’s status as Mr. Likes’s employer, Mr. Likes still cannot make a

prima facie showing under WARN. (Id. at 44). For the reasons explained below,

DHL’s Motion is due to be granted as to its third ground and otherwise termed as

moot. 

A. WARN Prima Facie Elements

In International Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 

6 F.3d 722 (11th Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit described the nature of a WARN

All page references to Doc. 56 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 15

Regarding separate versus unified employing entities under WARN, 20 C.F.R. §

16

639.3(a)(2) provides:

Under existing legal rules, independent contractors and subsidiaries which arewholly

or partially owned by a parent company are treated as separate employers or as a part

of the parent or contracting company depending upon the degree of their

independence from the parent. Some of the factors to be considered in making this

determination are (i) common ownership, (ii) common directors and/or officers, (iii)

de facto exercise of control, (iv) unity of personnel policies emanating from a

common source, and (v) the dependency of operations.

Id. At least one court of appeals has concluded that the presence of corporate parental or other shared

ownership is not essential for § 639.3(a)(2) to apply. See Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247

F.3d 471, 494-95 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he DOL factors are an appropriate method of determining

lenderliability as well as parental liability, and therefore [we] hold that, regardless of whether GECC

took on the status of ‘parent’ in addition to its status of ‘lender’ when it foreclosed on the stock, its

involvement with CompTech will be tested by reference to those factors.”).

11

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 11 of 18
claim as:

WARN requires that an employer provide sixty days notice to

workers before ordering a mass layoff. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). JWR argues

that the layoff in question was not a mass layoff and, therefore WARN

does not apply. WARN defines a mass layoff as a reduction in force that

(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of

employment during any 30-day period for-

(i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees

(excluding any part-time employees); and

(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any

part-time employees); or

(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any

part-time employees); 

. . . 

29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B). The Union contends that JWR violated

section 2101(a)(3)(B)(ii) because JWR laid off at least 500 employees

from a single site of employment. The Union can satisfy the statutory

requirement that at least 500 workers be laid off from a single site of

employment only by aggregating the layoffs from three of the four

mines.

Jim Walter Resources, 6 F.3d at 724 (emphasis added). Thus, the crux of the

summary judgment appeal in Jim Walter Resources turned upon the definition of the

term “single site of employment” and its application in the context of mining

operations. See id. at 727 (“The Union fails to demonstrate that any combination of

three of the four mine sites should be considered together as a “single site of

12

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 12 of 18
employment” under WARN.”). 

B. Mr. Likes Cannot Show That A Mass Layoff, Triggering

WARN Notice Requirements, Occurred.

Assuming without deciding that neither resjudicata, nor collateral estoppel, nor

the absence of sufficient evidence to support DHL’s status as Mr. Likes’s employer

under a single employer liability theory, precludes Mr. Likes from pursuing his

17

WARN claim, summary judgment in favor of DHL is still, nevertheless, appropriate.

In particular, Mr. Likes lacks evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that 50 or more full-time employees were let go from a single site. Based solely upon

the 18 full-time WAF employees that actually received CERP payments, Mr. Likes

cannot satisfy WARN’s mass layoff definition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)

(defining mass layoff to mean an “employment loss” totaling “at least 50 employees

(excluding any part-time employees)”).

In an effort to overcome thisstatutory numerical obstacle, Mr. Likes urges this

court to permit him to aggregate all the adversely affected employees working for

DHL’s Birmingham-based contractors as a WARN-covered “single site of

For the purposes of this Motion only, the court, as indicated above, has assumed that Mr. 17

Likes is able to benefit from the unified employer approach pursuant 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) and,

therefore can meet WARN’s requirement that a covered employer employ 100 employees by

combining WAF’s workforce with that of DHL. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (defining “employer”

to mean “any business enterprise that employs–(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time

employees[.]”). 

13

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 13 of 18
employment.” WARN does not statutorily clarify what “single site of employment”

means.

DHL counters that, in the absence of a statutory definition for that term:

[T]he DOL’s interpretative regulations are informative asto what should

and should not be considered a single site of employment. See 20 C.F.R.

§639.3(i). Specifically, the regulations provide that “[t]here may be

several single sites of employment within a single building, such as

an office building, if separate employers conduct activities within such

a building. For example, an office building housing 50 different

businesses will contain 50 single sites of employment. The offices of

each employer will be its single site of employment.” 20 C.F.R.

§639.3(i)(2). This illustration—directly from the DOL

regulations—applies here. Indeed, in interpreting this regulation, the

Sixth Circuit confirmed that two plants only steps away from one

another which were operated by the same employer did not constitute a

single site of employment. See generally Salyer v. Universal Concrete

Products, 940 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Circuit endorsed

the reasoning in Salyer that “separate management, produc[tion of]

different products, and [] separate workforces” is central to separate sites

of employment. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter

Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 725 (11th Cir. 1993).

Applying the DOL illustration and case law to the present

circumstance confirms that much more than operating out of the same

facility is necessary to aggregate employees of different corporate

entities into a single site of employment for purposes of WARN. Here,

each of the three independent contractors had separate management,

separate workforces, and serviced different delivery territories. See

Likes Depo., 63:7–64:4. . . .

Plaintiff can offer no evidence to dispute that each of the DHL

independent contractors in Birmingham operated autonomously.

Accordingly, there is little doubt that each independent contractor

constituted its own “site of employment” under WARN, and not one

14

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 14 of 18
large “single site” made up of all three independent contractors.

(Doc. 56 at 47-49 (emphasis in original)).

In Jim Walter Resources, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s

decision on summary judgment that “none of JWR’s four mine sites should be

considered together as a ‘single site of employment under WARN.’” 6 F.3d at 726.

As supporting evidence, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out:

First, the mines are managed independently with a different Mine

Manager, Assistant Mine Manager, Industrial Relations Supervisor,

Safety Supervisor, and Strata Control Engineer at each mine. Second,

the mines do not ordinarily share employees. While some exceptions

exist, employees do not rotate among mine sites, nor do they work

regularly at more than one mine. The hourly employees at the four mine

sites are represented by four different union locals. Also, employees at

one mine may not bid on a job vacancy at another mine; they may only

bid on job vacancies at the mine in which they presently work. Third, 

.... Finally, each mine has its own gate, parking lot, office building and

bathhouse.

Id. at 726 (footnote omitted). 

Additionally, in rejecting the Union’s shared “operational purpose” contention,

the Eleventh Circuit reasoned:

While the phrase “operational purpose” is vague and undefined, it may

imply that non-contiguous sites—at the very least—share some

management and personnel. It clearlymust mean more than “produce the

same product.” The mines at issue all produce coal, but they do so

independently of one another. Each mine’s tonnage requirements are

different, and the production of coal at one mine does not depend on the

production of coal at another mine. Their “operational purposes,”

beyond the production of coal, are not coextensive.

15

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 15 of 18
Id. at 727;see also 20 C.F.R. § 939.3(i) (1992) (“For example, assembly plants which

are located on opposite sides of a town and which are managed by a single employer

are separate sites if they employ different workers.”) (emphasis added).

While admittedly Jim Walter Resources addresses the application of WARN

to a solitary employer working within the mining industry as opposed to multiple

employers operating the same type of service-related businesses and sharing a

common commercial venue provided by their shared unified employer, such as is the

situation here, the precedent still provides useful insight into those factors which the

Eleventh Circuit found to be particularly illustrative when evaluating a single site of

employment theory, i.e., separate management, distinct workforces, and independent

aspects of operations. See also id. (“The undisputed facts confirm that the day-to-day

management and employee structures at the four mines are fundamentally distinct.”)

(emphasis added). Further, when considering all these categories, only one outcome

is apparent–DHL’s Birmingham-based independent contractors without any

management or workforce overlap, simply by virtue of entering into similarly 18

worded contractual agreements designed to protect DHL and its brand and utilizing

Cf., e.g., Davis v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding 18

single site of employment when “sharing of staff between the yard and annex was not merely

occasional but in fact regular, with certain employees maintaining offices at both buildings, regular

visits by personnel from one facility to the other, and use of the same security, payroll, and other

staff”).

16

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 16 of 18
the same DHL package facility, do not constitute a single site of employment under

WARN. 

Therefore, consistent with DOL interpretative regulations that separate

employers conducting activities within a common area should not constitute a single

site of employment, 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(2), persuasively guided by the Eleventh 19

Circuit’s reasoning in Jim Walter Resources and, in the absence of any countervailing

binding precedent suggesting that employees who were hired and then laid off by

separate delivery contractors that are geographically based out of the same facility

provided by a shared secondary employer is a single site of employment to trigger

WARN notice-related liability for that common employer, DHL’s Motion is granted

20

While § 639.3(i)(6) makes it clear that the “home base” for all of WAF’s couriers is

19

appropriately classified as a “single site of employment,” none of the DOL interpretative guidelines 

provides that employees who work exclusively for separate primary employers, but who also report

to a common work-related location that is furnished by the same unified employer are collectively

considered to be a “single site of employment.”

The court acknowledges that the DOL interpretative guidelines do provide for a “truly 20

unusual organizational situation” as another way to meet the single site of employment definition,

20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(8), but finds that extending that particular provision to allow for the aggregation

of employees with different primary employers to meet WARN’s notice threshold is beyond the

reach of what Congress intended with WARN. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained:

Under this exception, two or more apparently separate sites may be deemed

a “single site” if other criteria set out by the DOL do not reasonably apply. The case

which best defines this exception is Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores,

15 F.3d 1275, 1290 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126, 115 S. Ct. 933, 130

L. Ed. 2d 879 (1995). In Carpenter’s Dist. Council, the court held that two separate

locations were a “single site” when employees, housed together, were split off into

a different building due to space considerations yet continued to perform the same

17

Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 17 of 18
on prima facie grounds.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Motion is due to be granted

on the basis that Mr. Likes is unable to prima facially establish his WARN claim.

Further, the remainder of the Motion is due to be termed as moot. The court will enter

a separate final judgment order dismissing Mr. Likes’s complaint with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of June, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

functions. In the situation at hand, there is nothing unusual about the organization of

the St. Louis and St. Charles County sites. Any connection between the two sites is

nothing more than that present in most large corporate organizations.

Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir. 1996). There is no intra-company

space-driven workforce splitting issue involved here or anything else “truly unusual” from an

organizational standpoint to warrant coverage under § 639.3(i)(8).

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Case 2:10-cv-02989-VEH Document 73 Filed 06/10/14 Page 18 of 18