Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01355/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01355-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS JONATHAN EPPERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CODIFICATION ORDER 497, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01355-JLT-BAM

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

(Doc. 4)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Chris Jonathan Epperson (“Plaintiff”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil action. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that this action 

be dismissed for failure to obey a court order and for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on November 6, 2024. (Doc. 1.) On November 8, 2024, the 

Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and determined that the 

complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 

and failed to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Court granted Plaintiff leave 

to amend within thirty (30) days of service of the Court’s order. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff was expressly 

warned that if he failed to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order, then 

the Court would recommend dismissal of this action. (Id. at 5.) 

The deadline for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint has passed and Plaintiff has not 

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complied with the Court’s order. Instead, Plaintiff filed a single-page document on November 18, 

2024. (Doc. 5.) This document cannot be construed as an amended complaint because it lacks 

basic information, including the name of any defendant or any factual allegations. It states only 

the following:

No.24-1355 Mississippi Cross-Judgment 4855.

Sllybus Amicus Brief 

Chris Jonathan Epperson V. Abbreviate Appendix

Footnotes Title 50 U.S.C. app. (a).

Chapter 51 Section 1111

They trading secrets espionage them her/she anticipated predicted dont even like 

you messing with their powers.

50 U.S.C. app.(a)

Federal dont cross state 1yr imprisonment prison sentence either or fine.

Section 4

Federal dont cross state.

(Doc. 5.) The Court therefore will recommend dismissal of this action.

II. Failure to Allege Jurisdiction

A. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma 

pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to 

dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff drafted his complaint using the form provided by this Court. The caption of the 

complaint names the “Codification Order 497 U.S. Supreme” as defendant. (Doc. 1.) However, 

the complaint form lists the following defendants: (1) simon; (2) people; (3) george; and (4) 

douglas. (Id. at 2.) He later names “Pavillion Verdome” as a defendant. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 

identifies the basis for jurisdiction as both federal question and diversity of citizenship. In the 

section in which he is asked to indicate which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory 

rights have been violated, he lists the following: “497 U.S. 479-90, 18 L. Ed. 88 (1907),” “70 

U.S. 478, 479-90, 18 L. Ed. 88 (1951),” and 478 U.S. 479-90, 18 L. Ed. 88 (1962).” (Id. at 4.) 

In the section in which he asked the basis for diversity of citizenship, Plaintiff identifies himself 

and Defendant Pavillion Verdome, a citizen of Moscow, Russia. (Id.) Plaintiff specifies that the 

amount in controversy is “One Hundred Bullion each fiscal year under the operations of the U.S. 

Mint. The Great Seal of United States of America.” (Id. at 5.) The statement of claim section 

states as follows: “Judiciary Order of 1758 obligated [illegible] public contract of the Tarrif Act 

of 1798.” (Id. at 5.) 

C. Discussion

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases 

authorized by the United States Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 

appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Without 

jurisdiction, the district court must dismiss the case. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 

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California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, there are 

two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and (2) federal question 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. As pled, the complaint fails to allege this Court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

1. Diversity Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil 

actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and where the 

matter is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not establish diversity jurisdiction. First, Plaintiff does not 

allege that the parties’ citizenship is completely diverse. Plaintiff’s complaint provides little 

information regarding the citizenship of the defendants identified as “simon,” “people,” 

“george,” or “douglas.” However, Plaintiff provides the same Zip Code in California for 

himself and these defendants: “93706.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) Thus, as pled, Plaintiff's amended 

complaint does not establish diversity jurisdiction.

Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s November 18, 2024 filing as an amended 

complaint, he fails to establish diversity jurisdiction because he does not identify a defendant or 

allege an amount in controversy. (See generally Doc. 5.) 

2. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil 

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “A case ‘arises 

under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the vindication 

of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Republican 

Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. 

v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). The presence or absence of 

federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction 

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded 

complaint.” Id. 

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Plaintiff’s complaint does not clearly allege any violation arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States. Plaintiff does not cite any particular federal statute or 

constitutional provision that would be applicable to the allegations in his complaint. The 

apparent case law citations in his complaint, without more, are not sufficient, nor is his reference 

to a judiciary order from 1758. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint does not establish federal question 

jurisdiction.

Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s November 18, 2024 filing as an amended 

complaint, he fails to establish federal question jurisdiction. As previously indicated, Plaintiff 

does not identify a defendant in that filing, nor does he clearly allege any violation arising under 

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Plaintiff’s citations, without more, are 

insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. 

III. Failure to Obey a Court Order 

A. Legal Standard

Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 

any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 

within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 

dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 

appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 

failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 

46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order 

requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 

1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) 

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 

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779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint is overdue. The action cannot proceed without 

Plaintiff’s cooperation and compliance with the Court’s order. Moreover, the Court cannot hold 

this case in abeyance awaiting compliance by Plaintiff. The Court additionally cannot 

effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds that 

both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

The third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, as a 

presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 

Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs 

against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 

291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 

responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 

progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. 

Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s November 8, 2024

screening order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply would result in a 

recommendation for dismissal of this action. (Doc. 4 at 5.) Plaintiff had adequate warning that 

dismissal could result from his noncompliance. 

Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 

would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 

unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status in this action 

indicates that monetary sanctions are of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is 

likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

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based on Plaintiff’s failure to obey the Court’s order and for lack of jurisdiction. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 

file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 

fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 

number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 

limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 

findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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