Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02219/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02219-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC INC, et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MCKESSON CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-02219-HSG 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

MTI'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

AN AMENDED ANSWER

Re: Dkt. No. 353

On May 15, 2013, Plaintiff True Health Chiropractic Inc. (“True Health”) filed its 

complaint against Defendant McKesson Corporation. Dkt. No. 1. After filing a First Amended 

Complaint on June 20, 2013, True Health sought leave from the Court to file a Second Amended 

Complaint. Dkt. No. 69. The Court granted Plaintiff’s request and it filed its Second Amended 

Complaint on July 18, 2014, where it added McKesson Technologies, Inc. (“MTI”) as a 

Defendant. Dkt. No. 90. MTI filed its answer on August 22, 2014. Dkt. No. 104. On February

12, 2020, MTI filed this motion for leave to file an amended answer, to change paragraph 20: its 

admission that Exhibit C to the Second Amended Class Action Complaint “appears to be a true 

and correct copy of a document received by MTI” from the Federal Communications Commission 

(‘FCC’). Dkt. No. 353 (“Mot.”) at 2. True Health filed its opposition to this motion on February

26, 2010, Dkt. No. 357 (“Opp.”), and MTI filed its reply on March 4, 2020, Dkt. No. 359

(“Reply”). 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Amendment of Pleadings

Generally, under Rule 15(a)(2), “leave to amend shall be freely granted ‘when justice so 

requires.’” Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 369 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

P. 15(a)(2)). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 

“[o]nce the district court ha[s] filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 16 which established a timetable for amending pleadings that rule’s standards control.” 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16 provides 

that the Court 

must issue a scheduling order [that] limit[s] the time to join other 

parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions

. . . .

A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 

consent.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The “good cause” requirement of Rule 16 “primarily considers the 

diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

If the Court finds that the good cause requirement of Rule 16 is met, the moving party 

“must then demonstrate that the motion is also proper under Rule 15.” Rodarte v. Alameda Cty., 

No. 14-cv-00468-KAW, 2015 WL 5440788, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015). The five factors 

relevant to determining proper amendment under Rule 15 are (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) 

prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) previous amendments. Foman 

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, 

676 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2012) (same factors). The Court weighs prejudice to the opposing 

party most heavily. See Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent prejudice, 

or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. 

II. ANALYSIS

MTI argues that Rule 16’s “good cause” standard does not apply because the “Court never 

set a scheduling order deadline to amend the pleadings.” Mot. at 4. However, contrary to this 

statement, the December 3, 2014 scheduling order specifically stated that “[f]urther amendment of 

the pleadings would require a showing of good cause.” Dkt. No. 142. Although the Court 

subsequently amended some of the deadlines after the case was reassigned, appealed, and 

remanded, see Dkt. Nos. 177, 286, it did not vacate the good cause requirement for amendment of 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 369 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

pleadings. Accordingly, MTI must meet the good cause standard.

MTI argues that it meets the standard because it does not seek “to add a new theory to the 

case, necessitate further discovery, or delay any dispositive motion, pretrial, or trial deadlines.” 

Mot. at 7 (citing rom Earth Island Inst. v. Elliott, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1170–71 (E.D. Cal. 2018), 

appeal dismissed as moot, 775 F. App’x 312 (9th Cir. 2019)). This case, however, is 

distinguishable. In Earth Island, “[o]nce Federal Defendants pointed out that the operative 

Complaint did not cite one of the CEs at issue, Plaintiffs promptly sought to amend the Complaint 

to bring it into conformance with the issues the parties have briefed both in the present motion and 

in prior rounds of motions practice.” 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. Here, MTI seeks to change an 

admission that has been consistently pointed to by Plaintiffs in motions practice throughout the 

life of the case. See e.g., Dkt. Nos. 209, 244, 248, 292. Although MTI points to some evidence 

indicating that that admission was in error, this is hardly the circumstance faced in Earth Island, 

where the party seeking amendment acted quickly once becoming aware of the error. 

Importantly, the good cause requirement “primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. The Court granted MTI’s request to 

substitute counsel on February 18, 2015. Dkt. No. 161. By at least October 2015, if not sooner, 

new counsel became aware of the apparent error in MTI’s answer—Plaintiffs filed a supplemental 

brief in support of its initial motion for class certification on October 16, 2015 where they 

specifically cited paragraph 20 of Defendants’ answers. See Dkt. No. 244 at 4 (“The FCC 

attached a copy of 47 U.S.C. § 227 and § 64.1200 and warned Defendants that in the event of a 

complaint or dispute, the burden rests with the fax sender to demonstrate that it either obtained 

prior express invitation or permission to send the facsimile advertisement or satisfied all the 

criteria necessary to invoke the established business relationship exemption. Both Defendants 

admit they received this document. (Docs. 103 & 104, ¶ 20).”) (internal citation omitted). MTI 

and counsel have been aware of this apparent error for over four years, but only now bring this 

motion to amend their answer to “align with sworn testimony.” Mot. at 4. Defendant MTI should 

have done so sooner. Instead, as it has been doing in motions practice, MTI will have the 

opportunity to present evidence at trial putting this admission into question. As MTI suggests, 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 369 Filed 03/16/20 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

discovery on this point has been completed, and it has testimony that it may permit to show that 

this point is in dispute, despite any previous pronouncements.

Because MTI fails to show good cause for leave to file its amended answer, the Court 

DENIES its motion. However, as MTI notes, “a motion to amend is not necessarily required to 

retract a judicial admission asserted in a prior pleading.” Schwartz v. Adams Cty., No. CV 09-019-

SEJLCWD, 2010 WL 2011582, at *4 (D. Idaho May 20, 2010) (citing Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 

51 F.3d 848, 859–60 (9th Cir. 1995)). MTI has already laid a foundation to find that it has 

retracted its judicial admission through its briefs opposing both the original and renewed class 

certification motions, see Dkt. Nos. 247, 302, and the evidentiary support submitted with this 

motion, see Dkt. Nos. 353-3, 353-4, 353-5, 353-6. Thus, there remains no concern that the 

Court’s denial of MTI’s motion would result prejudice to MTI “on the basis of [ ] technicalities.” 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/16/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 369 Filed 03/16/20 Page 4 of 4