Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00228/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00228-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Petitioner originally filed her Petition in the Central District of

California. That court transferred the case to this District on February 2,

2007. Doc. No. 1 (finding Southern District to be the more convenient forum).

-1- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA MARIE HICKEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DAWN S. DAVISON, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 07cv0228-BEN (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On November 13, 20061, Petitioner Lisa Marie Hickey, a state

prisoner appearing pro se, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. Petitioner challenges

her conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine. Id.

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-2- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

 This Court has considered the Petition (“Pet.”), Respondents’

Answer, and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For

the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentence

The following facts are taken from the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion on direct review in People v. Hickey, No. D046432,

slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. April 20, 2006). See Lodgment 5. This

Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations to be

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn

from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness).

Special agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA) executed a search warrant of a storage unit

Hickey rented. The agents found equipment commonly

used to manufacture methamphetamine, including

glassware, coffee grinders, coffee filters, a funnel,

a mason jar with rubber tubing, an electric hot plate,

two scales, and rubber gloves. The agents later

determined that methamphetamine residue was present on

much of the equipment. In addition, the coffee

grinders contained residue from pseudoephedrine, a

chemical precursor to methamphetamine. Agents found

a bottle that contained 4.8 grams of pseudoephedrine

in liquid solution, and a container of phosphorous

acid—a chemical commonly used in the process of

converting pseudoephedrine into methamphetamine. The

storage unit also contained a cloth bag that had

chemical burns consistent with the presence of red

phosphorous, another chemical commonly used in the

process of converting pseudoephedrine into

methamphetamine. 

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2 Agent Jauch defined the phrase, “washing dope,” as follows: “at a

point in manufacturing methamphetamine, near the end ... it sometimes has a dirty

appearance, and manufacturers like to wash it with a solvent like acetone in

order to give it a shinier, clearer, cleaner appearance.”

-3- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

DEA Agent Andrew Jauch arrested Hickey. After

her arrest, Hickey admitted to Agent Jauch that the

materials found in the storage unit belonged to her.

Hickey told Agent Jauch that she had purchased most of

the items from a man named Terry H.. (sic) Hickey

also told Agent Jauch that she intended to sell or

trade the items to a second person named Fred B., who

was looking to purchase items to use in the

manufacture of methamphetamine. Hickey also admitted

to Agent Jauch that she had “washed some dope”2 for

Fred B.

In March 2005, the People charged Hickey in an

amended information with manufacturing methamphetamine

(§ 11379.6, subd. (a), count 1), possessing

pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine (§ 11383, subd. (c)(1), count 2), and

possessing a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021,

subd. (a)(1), count 3). As to counts 1 and 2, the

People alleged that Hickey had previously been

convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine (§ 11370.2,

subd. (b)). In addition, the People alleged that

Hickey had suffered four prior felony convictions

(Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)) and two prison prior

convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668).

In March 2005, in the first phase of a bifurcated

trial, a jury found Hickey guilty of the charged

offenses. In the second phase of the trial, Hickey

admitted the prior conviction allegations. The trial

court sentenced Hickey to a total prison term of 10

years eight months.

Lodgment 5.

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. Lodgment 2. In an unpublished

opinion filed on April 20, 2006, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the conviction. Lodgment 1. Petitioner then filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court (Lodgment 6),

which was summarily denied without citation of authority on July 19,

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-4- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

2006 (Lodgment 7).

C. Collateral Review

Petitioner did not seek collateral review of her conviction

in the state courts.

On November 13, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1.

Respondent timely filed an Answer on April 4, 2007. Doc. No. 7.

Petitioner did not file a traverse by the May 9, 2007 deadline or

timely request additional time to do so and the Court took the

matter under submission.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets

forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof,

a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by

AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas

corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

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-5- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials do constitute adjudications on

the merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court,

the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law;

or (2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from

a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite

to [the Supreme Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405

(2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies

the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue a writ simply because the

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly . . . . Rather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added)

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-6- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly

established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This Court will

presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct, and

Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner presents two grounds for habeas relief. In ground

one, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated her federal

due process rights by incorrectly instructing the jury on the

elements of manufacturing methamphetamine. Pet. at 5. In ground

two, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated her federal due

process rights by failing to give sua sponte a lesser-included

offense instruction. Id. More precisely, Petitioner contends that

California Health and Safety Code § 11379.6(c), which prohibits

offering to manufacture methamphetamine, is a lesser-included

offense of manufacturing methamphetamine (§ 11379.6(a)). Id. 

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3 In her federal habeas petition, Petitioner asserted two very short,

vague and conclusory grounds for relief. Pet. at 5. Because Petitioner did not

provide any support or explanation for the alleged due process violations, this

Court looked to her state court pleadings for elucidation on her claims and

allegations. 

-7- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

Respondent counters that the Petition should be denied

because the claims are questions of state law, which this Court

cannot address on federal habeas review. Resp’t Mem. P. & A. Supp.

Answer (“Resp’t Mem.”) at 8-16. Alternatively, Respondent argues

that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s

decision rejecting her claims on the merits was objectively

unreasonable. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d)). Respondent does not

dispute that Petitioner raised her claims for relief in a petition

for review before the California Supreme Court and that these

claims, therefore, are exhausted. See Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d

828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6

(1982) and Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)) (for

exhaustion purposes, Petitioner must have “fairly presented” her

federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to

consider it). 

A. Jury Instruction Regarding Manufacturing Methamphetamine

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated her due

process rights by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements

of manufacturing methamphetamine under § 11379.6(a). Pet. at 5.

Specifically, Petitioner argued in the state courts3 that

§11379.6(a) should not “be interpreted to encompass the initial and

intermediate steps in the manufacturing process, but only the actual

act of manufacturing.” Lodgment 2 at 12; Lodgment 6 at 31. In

instructing the jury, the trial court utilized California Jury

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-8- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

Instruction - Criminal 12.09.1, as follows:

Every person who manufactures or offers to

manufacture methamphetamine, a controlled substance,

either directly or indirectly by chemical extraction

or independently by means of chemical synthesis is

guilty of a violation of Health and Safety Code

11379.6, subdivision (a), a crime. 

The crime of manufacturing a controlled substance

and the term “manufacture” as used in this

instruction, does not require proof or mean that the

process of manufacturing be completed. Rather, the

crime is committed when a person knowingly

participates in the initial or intermediate steps to

carry out (sic) to process a controlled substance.

Thus, it is unlawful for a person to engage in the

synthesis, processing, or preparation of a chemical

used in the manufacture of a controlled substance,

even if the chemical itself is not or is not (sic)

itself a controlled substance, provided the person

knows that the chemical is to be used in the

manufacturing of a controlled substance.

In order to prove this crime, each of the

following elements must be proved:

1. A person manufactured or offered to

manufacture either directly or indirectly, by means of

chemical extraction, or independently by means of

chemical synthesis, a controlled substance, namely

methamphetamine; and

2. That person knew that the substance to be

manufactured had the character of a controlled

substance. 

Lodgment 8 at 460-61; see also Lodgment 1 at 50 (CALJIC 12.09.1).

In evaluating the merits of Petitioner’s claim, this Court

must look through to the last reasoned state court decision. See

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Here, because the California Supreme

Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition (Lodgment 7), the last

reasoned state court decision came from the California Court of

Appeal. Lodgment 5.

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim on the

following grounds:

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4 Methamphetamine is one of the controlled substances identified in

section 11055. (§ 11055, subd. (d)(2).)

-9- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 11379.6, subdivision (a) prohibits

participation in any stage of the process of

manufacturing methamphetamine

Hickey claims there is insufficient evidence that

she manufactured methamphetamine pursuant to section

11379.6, subdivision (a) because that statute does not

prohibit the initial or intermediate steps necessary

to manufacture methamphetamine. “The interpretation

of a statute’s meaning is a question of law that is

reviewed de novo.” (People v. Germany (2005) 133

Cal.App.4th 784, 789.)

Section 11379.6 provides in relevant part:

“(a) Except as otherwise provided by law,

every person who manufactures, compounds,

converts, produces, derives, processes, or

prepares, either directly or indirectly by

chemical extraction or independently by

means of chemical synthesis, any controlled

substance specified in Section 11054,

11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state

prison for three, five, or seven years and

by a fine not exceeding fifty thousand

dollars ($50,000). (sic)

[¶]...[¶]

“(c) Except as otherwise provided by law,

every person who offers to perform an act

which is punishable under subdivision (a)

shall be punished by imprisonment in the

state prison for three, four, or five

years.”4

In People v. Lancellotti (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th

809, 813 (Lancellotti), the court held that section

11379.6, subdivision (a) criminalizes participation in

the initial and intermediate stages of the

methamphetamine manufacturing process. The defendant

in Lancellotti stored chemicals used to manufacture

methamphetamine at a commercial storage facility.

(Lancellotti, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 812.) The

storage unit also contained most of the equipment

needed to manufacture methamphetamine. (Ibid.) On

appeal from his conviction for manufacturing

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-10- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

methamphetamine (§ 11379.6, subd. (a)), the defendant

claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction because the storage unit lacked a certain

piece of equipment and a reducing agent that were

necessary to complete the methamphetamine

manufacturing process. (Lancellotti, supra, 29

Cal.App.4th at p. 811.)

The Lancellotti court rejected this argument,

stating:

“The evidence in this case clearly

establishes that appellant was in the

middle of the manufacturing process for

methamphetamine, because ‘... the conduct

proscribed by section 11379.6 encompasses

the initial and intermediate steps carried

out to manufacture, produce or process [a

controlled substance].’ [Citation.] (sic)

[¶]...[¶]

“The cumulative nature of the evidence in

appellant’s case, including the contents of

the locker which all taken together are

only used in manufacture of methamphetamine, the presence of chloropseudoephedrine, a substance which cannot

be purchased and is used only in the

manufacture of methamphetamine, and the

odor emanating from the locker, provide

substantial evidence that the manufacture

of methamphetamine, an incremental and not

instantaneous process, was in progress.”

(Lancellotti, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p.

813.)

In People v. Coira (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868 (Coira),

the Supreme Court cited Lancellotti for the

proposition that, “The conduct proscribed by ...

section [11379.6, subd. (a)] encompasses the initial

and intermediate steps carried out to process a

controlled substance.” (Coira, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

p. 874.) The Coira court explained, “[T]he statute

makes it unlawful to engage in the chemical synthesis

of a substance as one part of the process of

manufacturing a controlled substance.” (Ibid.)

Numerous other courts have reached the same

conclusion. (See, e.g., People v. Heath (1998) 66

Cal.App.4th 697, 705 [section 11379.6, subdivision (a)

“criminalize[s] all acts which are part of the

[methamphetamine] manufacturing process”].)

...

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-11- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

We conclude that section 11379.6, subdivision (a)

criminalizes participation in any stage of the

methamphetamine manufacturing process, and that there

is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding

that Hickey manufactured methamphetamine pursuant to

that section.

B. The trial court properly instructed the jury

regarding the offense of manufacturing

methamphetamine

...

Incorporating the arguments from her brief that

we rejected in part III.A., ante, Hickey claims this

instruction was “overly broad” because it defined the

crime of manufacturing methamphetamine to include the

preliminary steps necessary to accomplish this task.

For the same reasons we concluded in part III.A.,

ante, that the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine

includes any stage of the manufacturing process, we

conclude that the trial court properly instructed the

jury regarding the offense of manufacturing

methamphetamine.

Lodgment 5 at 4-9. 

To the extent Petitioner’s claim contains an underlying

challenge of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that § 11379.6(a)

encompasses initial and intermediate steps of manufacturing,

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

ground one because the claim challenges the state court’s

determination of a state law issue and, therefore, is not cognizable

on federal habeas review. Resp’t Mem. at 8. Respondent is correct

that federal habeas corpus relief is not available to correct

alleged errors in a state court’s application or interpretation of

state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 71-72 (1991)

(“the fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect under state

law is not a basis for habeas relief”); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 783 (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (b)(2). Here, the

Court of Appeal applied California Supreme Court precedent and

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-12- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

“conclude[d] that section 11379.6, subdivision (a) criminalizes

participation in any stage of the methamphetamine manufacturing

process” (Lodgment 5 at 8) and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court

of Appeal’s decision (Lodgment 7). While Petitioner may not agree

with this conclusion, this Court does not have authority on habeas

review to evaluate a state court’s interpretation of state law. See

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, __, 126 S.Ct. 602, 604 (2005) (“We

have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state

law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”);

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 783.

Petitioner contends, however, that she has raised a federal

claim because the trial court’s alleged failure to correctly

instruct the jury relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove

all of the elements of section 11379.6 and violated Petitioner’s due

process rights. Pet. at 5. Federal habeas relief is warranted

where a petitioner establishes that the ailing instruction by itself

“so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72; see also Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (explaining that the

challenged instruction cannot merely be “undesirable, erroneous, or

even ‘universally condemned’” — it must violate some constitutional

right). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation,

rather, it must be considered in the context of both the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 72. When reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, courts

are required to inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that

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5 Petitioner conceded in her opening brief before the Court of Appeal

that:

... under People v. Lancelloti (sic), People v. Heath, People v.

Stone, and People v. Jackson, her conviction for manufacturing a

controlled substance in violation of section 11379.6, subdivision

(a), can be affirmed. Each of those cases interpreted section

11379.6, subdivision (a), to encompass all initial and intermediate

steps in the manufacturing process. People v. Lancellotti involved

the discovery of equipment necessary to manufacture a controlled

substance in a commercial storage unit, and is therefore most

similar to the instant case. 

Lodgment 2 at 11. 

-13- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

violates the Constitution. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380

(1990); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (same). 

Estelle presupposes that the jury instruction was somehow

faulty under state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. In this

case, the only challenge Petitioner raises to the validity of the

jury instruction is that construing § 11379.6(a) as encompassing the

preliminary and intermediate steps in the manufacturing process

reads § 11379.6(c), which prohibits offering to manufacture

methamphetamine, out of the statute. Lodgment 6 at 14. More

precisely, Petitioner submits that an offer to manufacture

methamphetamine necessarily constitutes a preliminary step in the

manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. at 15. 

The Court finds no support for Petitioner’s argument. As

Petitioner concedes, no California legal precedent supports this

interpretation.5 Moreover, Petitioner’s reading of § 11379.6 does

not yield a logical conclusion. As the Court of Appeal pointed out,

a person can manufacture a controlled substance, or undertake any

step of the manufacturing process, without first offering to do so.

See Lodgment 5 at 7. Thus, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the

threshold requirement of demonstrating that the jury instruction was

incorrect. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

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6 Though Petitioner did not raise this argument before the state courts

or in the instant petition, this Court notes that the CALJIC 12.09.1 instruction

read to the jury by the trial judge instructed the jury that a person can be

found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine if the person “manufactures or

offers to manufacture” methamphetamine. CALJIC 12.09.1; Lodgment 8 at 460

(emphasis added). In other words, the instruction, as given by the trial court,

suggests that the jury could have found Petitioner guilty of manufacturing

methamphetamine (§ 11379.6(a)) because they believed she offered to manufacture

methamphetamine for someone (§ 11379.6(c)). This distinction is significant

because § 11379.6(c) involves a lower sentencing range. When reviewing an

allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court first must inquire “whether there is

a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in

a way” that violates the Constitution. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380; Coleman, 525 U.S.

at 146. Here, the government did not allege in the amended information that

Petitioner offered to manufacture methamphetamine. Lodgment 1 at 5-6. Nor did

it pursue this theory in its opening or closing statements to the jury. See

Lodgment 8 at 87-96, 463-73. Moreover, the Court has reviewed the record as a

whole and finds no evidence that Petitioner offered to manufacture

methamphetamine for anyone. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. While there is

evidence that Petitioner offered to sell equipment to Bostic and that Terry H.

asked Petitioner for money or methamphetamine, there is no evidence that

Petitioner offered to manufacture methamphetamine for either individual. See

Lodgment 8 at 159-62. Accordingly, this Court finds that it is not reasonably

likely that the jury applied CALJIC 12.09.1 in an unconstitutional way by

convicting Petitioner of § 11379.6(a) (manufacturing) based on evidence that

supported a conviction under § 11379.6(c) (offering to manufacture).

-14- 07cv0228-BEN (BLM) 

Apart from this challenge to the Court of Appeal’s legal

determination on a state law issue, Petitioner alleges no other

factual or legal grounds to support her assertion that the

methamphetamine manufacturing instruction violated her

constitutional rights.6 See id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643)

(internal quotations omitted) (“[I]t must be established not merely

that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally

condemned, but that it violated some [constitutional right]”). Nor

does Petitioner argue what specific, adverse impact the jury

instruction had on the trial or the jury’s determination in light of

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the evidence presented. Having reviewed both the jury instructions

provided and the record as a whole, this Court finds no evidence

suggesting that the trial court’s failure to provide sua sponte an

instruction that excluded the preliminary steps of manufacturing

methamphetamine affected the fundamental fairness of Petitioner’s

trial or deprived Petitioner of her right to due process of law.

The Court also finds no basis in the record for concluding that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the trial court’s

instruction on § 11379.6 did not “so infect[] the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 71-72. The Court, therefore, finds that the Court of Appeal’s

decision upholding Petitioner’s conviction for manufacturing

methamphetamine was not contrary to the clearly established federal

law set forth in Estelle, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, and

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition be DENIED on ground one.

B. Failure to Provide A Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated her due

process rights by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included

offense of offering to manufacture methamphetamine under

§11379.6(c). Pet. at 5. Respondent argues that Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim because the claim

does not present a federal question. Resp’t Mem. at 12.

Alternatively, Respondent urges that the state court’s decision was

not objectively unreasonable and that Petitioner has failed to show

that the claimed error had a substantial and injurious effect on the

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jury’s verdict. Id. 

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied

Petitioner’s petition (Lodgment 7), the Court once again must “look

through” to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion (Lodgment 5).

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Applying California law, the Court of

Appeal concluded:

Hickey has cited no authority to support her

assertion that offering to manufacture methamphetamine

is a lesser included offense of manufacturing

methamphetamine, and we are aware of no such

authority. As we stated in part III.A, ante, a person

can manufacture a substance without first offering to

do so. Therefore, the offense of manufacturing

methamphetamine may be completed without committing

the offense of offering to manufacture

methamphetamine. 

We conclude that offering to manufacture

methamphetamine is not a lesser included offense of

manufacturing methamphetamine, and thus, that the

trial court did not err in failing to instruct the

jury sua sponte on the offense of offering to

manufacture methamphetamine.

Lodgment 5 at 10.

Respondent argues that this Court should defer to the state

court’s determination that offering to manufacture methamphetamine

under § 11379.6(c) is not a lesser-included offense of manufacturing

methamphetamine under § 11379.6(a). Resp’t Mem. at 14. As

previously noted, federal habeas corpus relief is not available to

correct alleged errors in a state court’s application or

interpretation of state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Lewis,

497 U.S. at 783; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (b)(2). However,

because Petitioner has alleged a federal due process violation and

because federal courts are obligated to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, see Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir.

2004), this Court finds that Petitioner has alleged a federal

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violation sufficient to enable review of her claim.

Petitioner challenges the Court of Appeal’s decision to

uphold her conviction despite the trial court’s failure to instruct

on the lesser-included offense of offering to manufacture

methamphetamine. Pet. at 5. This Court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Here, as Respondent correctly points out, the United States Supreme

Court has not “clearly established” that defendants in noncapital

cases have a right to lesser-offense instructions. Resp’t Mem. at

13. Although the Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,

637-38 (1980), held that the Due Process Clause entitles a defendant

to an instruction on a lesser-included offense in a capital case,

there is no “clearly established” Supreme Court law that requires

that the court give a lesser-included offense instruction in a

non-capital case. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.

2000); see also Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.

1984) (quoting James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976))

(“the failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense [in

a non-capital case] fails to present a federal constitutional

question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding”). As such, this Court cannot say that the Court of

Appeal’s decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

law. 

///

///

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Even if Petitioner had a constitutionally-recognized right to

a lesser-included offense instruction, the Court of Appeal did not

err in finding that offering to manufacture methamphetamine is not

a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine. “Under

California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a

greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater

offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading,

include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the

greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.”

People v. Birks, 19 Cal. 4th 108, 117 (1998). As discussed in the

previous section, a defendant can commit the offense of

manufacturing methamphetamine without ever having offered to

manufacture methamphetamine. As such, contrary to Petitioner’s

assertion, offering to manufacture methamphetamine is not a lesserincluded offense of the conviction offense. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Petition be DENIED on ground two. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

present any evidence suggesting that the California Court of

Appeal’s decision as to her claims was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has Petitioner made any argument that

further factual development is necessary, such that an evidentiary

hearing would be warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (exceptions

where an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate). As such, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED and the case dismissed with prejudice.

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For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be

entered denying the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than July 13, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

August 3, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 21, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO:

HONORABLE ROGER T. BENITEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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