Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02018/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02018-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DOYLE EUGENE CHAMPLAIN,

NO. CIV. S-03-2018 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FOLSOM, a public entity,

and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant City of

Folsom’s (“defendant”) motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b). Plaintiff Doyle Eugene Champlain (“plaintiff”)

resigned from his position as an Infrastructure Supervisor with

defendant, on November 11, 2002. Plaintiff then filed this

action on September 25, 2003, alleging claims for relief against

defendant under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (“Title VII”); (3)

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 The factual background underlying this case is more

fully outlined in the court’s previous order granting summary

judgment to defendant. See Memorandum and Order, filed Dec. 6,

2005.

2

(“ADA”); and (4) state law for constructive termination.1 On

October 7, 2005, defendant moved for summary judgment; the court

granted defendant’s motion on December 6, 2005. For the reasons

set forth below, the court denies defendant’s motion for fees.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by defendant from 1996 to 2002 as a

supervisor for the Sewer Division in defendant’s Public Works

Department.2 Beginning in 2000, plaintiff alleged that he began

reporting defendant’s water quality violations to the California

Regional Water Quality Control Board. Plaintiff submitted a

declaration against defendant in September of 2002 in the case of

Laurent v. City of Folsom, 2:00-cv-1804-LKK, Memorandum and

Order, Oct. 10, 2002 (entering summary judgment in favor of

defendant), regarding environmental violations by defendant. 

Shortly after testifying, defendant was assigned to a

different job position after his return from a disability leave. 

Defendant also faced a disciplinary hearing stemming from his

actions in responding to a sewage spill in November of 2001. 

After the hearing, defendant withdrew the disciplinary charges

against plaintiff but reassigned plaintiff to another position

within the department. 

After the disciplinary charges were withdrawn and plaintiff

returned to work, plaintiff accepted a job offer from the City of

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Lincoln and formally resigned his position with defendant in

October of 2002. 

Defendant filed this action on September 25, 2003. After

more than two years of discovery, summary judgment in favor of

defendant was granted on December 6, 2005. Defendant, as the

prevailing party, now seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b). 

STANDARD

Section 1988(b) states in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 

. . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part

of the costs . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Under § 1988 jurisprudence, a prevailing

defendant is treated differently from a prevailing plaintiff and

fees are not awarded routinely or simply because defendant

succeeds. See Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988). To be awarded fees, a prevailing defendant must

demonstrate “plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or

without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad

faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Empl. Opp. Comm’n,

434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). This standard is “stringent,” Hughes

v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980), and the Ninth Circuit repeatedly

has recognized that attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases

“‘should only be awarded to a defendant in exceptional

circumstances.’” Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.

1990)); see also Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169

F.3d 636, 645 (9th Cir. 1999); Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048,

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

1055 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In assessing whether to award attorneys’ fees, the Ninth

Circuit instructs courts to “consider the financial resources of

the plaintiff in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant” because

“the award should not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin.” 

Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th

Cir. 1987); see also Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379

(9th Cir. 1988) (applying the Miller standard to a case in which

plaintiff was represented by counsel).

ANALYSIS

During the summary judgment proceedings, plaintiff conceded

that his Title VII and ADA claims were without merit and asked

that those claims be dismissed. While those claims were found to

be without merit by the court (and the court must consider that

finding in its analysis here), the gravamen of plaintiff’s

complaint in this action was that his free speech rights under

the First Amendment were violated by defendant. While plaintiff

also asserted his § 1983 claim based on other alleged violations

of his constitutional rights, including his procedural and

substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments and his right to be free from unreasonable search and

seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the central focus of his

complaint was clearly his allegation of retaliation by defendant

because of his speaking out on defendant’s environmental

violations.

Indeed, with respect to all his § 1983 theories, plaintiff

characterized himself as an environmental “whistle-blower” and

maintained that defendant retaliated against him for exposing

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The court noted in its previous order granting summary

judgment in favor of defendant that plaintiff’s papers were

nearly unintelligible even though plaintiff was represented by

counsel. 

5

defendant’s violation of numerous environmental laws. (Pl’s.

Compl., filed Sept. 18, 2003, at ¶¶ 1, 14-21.) However,

plaintiff failed to develop or support any of his § 1983 theories

in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In

particular, his First Amendment theory.3 On that issue, he had

alleged a cogent theory of his case. Nevertheless, because of

the failure of proof by plaintiff, the court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendant. 

 However, the court’s does not mandate an award of fees in

favor of defendant; contrary to defendant’s arguments, the

court’s order did not make a finding that the instant action was

“wholly without merit,” only that plaintiff’s showing in response

to the motion for summary judgment was insufficient. Patton,

supra, 857 F.2d at 1381 (defeating a claim on summary judgment,

by itself, does not entitle a defendant to an award of fees).

With respect to the motion for summary judgment, defendant

specifically argues that plaintiff’s failure to prove that a

particular policy, practice, or procedure of defendant caused the

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Monell v.

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), demonstrates

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was “frivolous.” In support, defendant

selectively quotes from the court’s prior order. In opposing

defendant’s motion, plaintiff argued, in part, that he was not

required to establish a particular policy or practice under

Monell because defendant had a “general” policy of violating

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 In Flowers, the court awarded defendant’s attorneys’

fees after a doctor’s staff privileges were denied by a hospital,

allegedly on the basis of his race. Plaintiff filed a § 1981

contractual claim, survived summary judgment and went to trial

but presented no evidence at trial that race was a motivating

factor in the denial of privileges. Id. at 392.

6

constitutional rights. While the court found that plaintiff’s

argument was “wholly without merit,” again, said finding does not

establish that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was “frivolous” for 

purposes of § 1988(b).

In support of its position, defendant relies primarily on

Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Assoc., 49 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 1995). 

The Flowers case,4 however, is factually dissimilar and does not

comport with the Ninth Circuit’s more exacting interpretation of

§ 1988(b) as set forth in Miller. See Miller, supra, 827 F.2d

617 (applying Christianburg, supra, 434 U.S. at 421); Patton,

supra, 857 F.2d 1379. There, the Ninth Circuit overturned the

district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant. 

Miller, 827 F.2d at 621. Although Miller involved a pro se

plaintiff, several of the court’s observations are relevant to

this matter. See Patton, supra, 857 F.2d at 1382. Specifically,

the Miller court noted that a grant of attorneys’ fees to a

defendant might be appropriate in cases where: (1) the

underlying claim was previously adjudicated by a court or an

administrative agency and found to be frivolous, (2) where the

same claim was brought repeatedly into court after dismissal, or

(3) the claim was brought in bad faith. 827 F.2d at 620. The

Ninth Circuit also emphasized that courts should be particularly

wary of granting attorneys’ fees to defendants after adjudication

of civil rights claims when the fee request is sizable and would

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

“subject the plaintiff to financial ruin.” Id. at 621; Patton,

supra, 857 F.2d at 1382. The Patton court cautioned, however,

that courts should not refuse to grant attorneys’ fees awards to

a prevailing defendant “solely on the ground of the plaintiff’s

financial situation.” Id. at 1382. 

These principles guide the court’s analysis here. 

Preliminarily, the court emphasizes that an award of attorneys’

fees to a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 case must be granted

with exceeding caution so as not to unduly chill civil rights

litigation. While § 1988(b) serves as a deterrent against

frivolous litigation, the Congressional policies which underlie 

§ 1983 include “vigorous prosecution of civil rights violations.” 

Miller, supra, 827 F.2d at 619. The court is also cognizant of

the fact that it is often difficult for deserving plaintiffs to

find competent lawyers willing to bring civil rights actions. 

The Supreme Court teaches that civil rights plaintiffs often

secure important social benefits beyond the individual remedy. 

Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 (U.S. 1986). Thus,

attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in civil rights

litigation should be awarded only in extraordinary circumstances

so as not to conflict with settled precedent and Congressional

policy.

Additionally, as emphasized in Miller, district courts may

consider a plaintiff’s financial resources in deciding whether to

award a defendant attorneys’ fees. Although plaintiff in this

case has not proffered evidence as to his financial situation,

this court can assume, based on the facts of this case, that an

award of more than $140,000.00 in fees to defendant would unduly

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

burden virtually any civil rights plaintiff. While the court

recognizes that this factor alone cannot justify the denial of

fees, coupled with the possible chilling effect of such an award

on future civil rights cases, it significantly supports denial

of defendant’s fees motion.

Finally, in deciding whether to award fees, the court

considers defendant’s own conduct over the course of this

litigation. First, defendant did not file a motion to dismiss. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If defendant believed plaintiff’s

claims were truly frivolous, from the inception of this

litigation, defendant may have garnered dismissal, or at a

minimum, narrowed the issues via such a motion. Defendant did

not do so. Instead, it was only after a year of discovery that

defendant asked plaintiff to dismiss some of his claims,

including the § 1983 claim, arguing that the claims were

frivolous. While defendant did make this informal dismissal

request to plaintiff, when it was rejected, defendant did not

move for summary judgment at that time. Rather, defendant

continued to engage in further discovery for almost a year

thereafter. Only once discovery closed did defendant file a

motion for summary judgment, just two months before the

dispositive motion deadline. From these facts, it appears

defendant litigated this case as if it had merit. 

In short, defendant seeks to hold plaintiff responsible for

attorneys’ fees incurred over more than two years defending what

defendant now alleges was a frivolous suit. If the case and in

particular the § 1983 claim was actually lacking in merit,

defendant could seemingly have brought a motion to dismiss and/or

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

a motion for summary judgment much earlier. Attorneys’ fees to

defendants in § 1983 cases are only awarded when the plaintiff’s

civil rights claims are demonstrably frivolous. This is not such

an exceptional case as to warrant a grant of attorneys’ fees to

defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendant’s

motion for attorneys’ fees under § 1988(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02018-FCD-DAD Document 76 Filed 02/23/06 Page 9 of 9