Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01028/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Stuart Burris, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1028 PHX MHM (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

John Stuart Burris ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

presents three grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp.

5-7 and Attachments). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 11).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted child

molestation on September 26, 1997 (Counts II and IV of the

original indictment). (Doc. 11, Exhibit A at 18; Exhibit B at 19

(p. 2)). A pre-sentence report recommended that petitioner be

sentenced to a presumptive 10-year term in light of the guilty

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pleas. (Doc. 11, Exhibit A, Doc. 22 at pp. 11-12). 

On December 30, 1997, following a hearing, and after

receiving additional evidence, the Court sentenced petitioner to a

13-year aggravated term on Count II and lifetime probation on

Count IV, finding that petitioner previously molested other

children in addition to the victims in this case. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit E at 80-82). Petitioner was informed by the Court at

sentencing and in writing that he had 90-days to file a petition

for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.1, Ariz.R.Crim.P.,

challenging his guilty pleas and sentences. (Id. at 82-83). 

Petitioner signed a notice of right of review after conviction,

dated December 30, 1997, acknowledging he received written

notification of his right to seek post-conviction relief. (Doc.

11, Exhibit A at Doc. 24). 

On December 10, 1998, nearly one year later, petitioner filed

a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in CIV 98-2220-PHXRGS (VAM) in the District Court. On February 17, 1999, the Court

dismissed the petition without prejudice "to allow Petitioner to

return to the state trial court to present his claims in a

petition for post-conviction relief and if relief is denied, to

seek all review required by federal law to properly exhaust those

claims in the state appellate courts ..." (CIV 98-2220, Doc. 4).

On July 7, 2003, more than four years after dismissal of his

federal petition in CIV 98-2220, petitioner filed a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit A at 30). Petitioner contended, pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a), that the tardiness of the Rule 32 was not

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his fault and should be excused in light of "new evidence ... the

aggravated sentence was based on improper and inaccurate

information in a letter written by Deanna Flanders that referred

to alleged crimes that may not be true and no charges were filed

..." (Doc. 11, Exhibit A at 30 (p. 3)). On July 17, 2003, the

trial court dismissed the Notice as untimely, specifically stating

"Defendant's claim does not constitute newly discovered evidence

..." (Doc. 11, Exhibit B at 32). Petitioner sought review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. On August 5, 2004, the Arizona Court of

Appeals denied the petition for review without comment. (Doc. 11

at Exhibit I). On October 19, 2004, the Arizona Supreme Court

also denied review without comment. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit J). 

On April 6, 2005, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition raising the following grounds for relief:

GROUND I: PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

WAS IMPROPERLY DISMISSED IN VIOLATION OF THE 5TH AND

14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

GROUND II: THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY AGGRAVATED THE

PETITIONER'S SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 5TH, 6TH AND

14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

GROUND III: THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT WAS IN ERROR

DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW IN

VIOLATION OF THE 5TH, 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE

U.S. CONSTITUTION.

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-7 and Attachments).

II. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, respondents argue that the petition is

untimely by 4 years and 355 days. (Doc. 11 at p. 9).

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

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of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

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States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Review of the record reveals that petitioner's state court

convictions and sentences became final on December 30, 1997, when

the trial court sentenced petitioner and advised him of his postconviction rights. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit E at pp. 80-83); see

also A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) (prohibiting direct appeals in

convictions based on guilty pleas in non-capital cases). 

Petitioner had one year, or until December 30, 1998, to file a

federal habeas petition. 

Petitioner did file a habeas petition during that period

(December 10, 1998). However, this petition was dismissed without

prejudice on February 17, 1999, because the Court concluded the

claims were not exhausted in state court. (See Burris v. Stewart,

CIV 98-2220-PHX-RGS (VAM), Doc. 4). In spite of this dismissal

for failure to exhaust, petitioner states in his own outline of

the procedural history of his case that he had nothing pending in

state court until he filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 on July 7, 2003, nearly 4 and 1/2

years after his first federal habeas petition was dismissed. 

(Doc. 1 at p. 2; Doc. 11, Exhibit A at 30). This proceeding ended

on October 19, 2004, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied his

petition for review. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit J). Although a state

Rule 32 proceeding may toll the running of the limitations period,

see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), petitioner's Rule 32, filed on July 7,

2003, had no tolling effect because the limitations period already

expired. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

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2003)("we hold that section 2244(d)(2) does not permit the

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed"). As a result, petitioner's habeas

petition filed on April 6, 2005 (the signature on the petition is

dated April 4, 2005) is barred by the statute of limitations

unless petitioner can present a sufficient basis for statutory or

equitable tolling. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides several statutory bases for

tolling the limitations period, including: (1) the time during

which the State impeded the filing of a petition; and (2)

allowance for filing otherwise time-barred petitions if the claims

are based on newly discovered evidence which could not have been

discovered sooner in the exercise of due diligence. 

In addition, equitable tolling of the limitations period may

be available to toll the limitations period. However, "equitable

tolling is 'unavailable' in most cases, ..., and is appropriate

only if 'extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time." See Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S.

1003 (2002). The determination of whether equitable tolling is

warranted is a "fact-specific inquiry" and "the threshold

necessary ... is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule." 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).

In his attachments in support of his habeas petition,

petitioner for the first time states his failure to file a timely

PCR, and presumably, a timely habeas petition, was the fault of

his attorney. Petitioner also cites a failure to obtain "legal

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assistance." (See Doc. 1 at p. 4b). With respect to the latter

claim, petitioner has no constitutional right to an attorney in a

state Rule 32 and cannot rely on the excuse he failed to file a

timely Rule 32 due to any failure to obtain "legal assistance." 

See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993).

As noted, petitioner also appears to contend that his

attorney's shortcomings impeded his ability to file a timely state

Rule 32. He cites the attorney's failure to turnover files to him

until "mid-June 2003." (Doc. 1 at p. 4b,4f). In this argument,

petitioner implies that his failure to file a timely Rule 32 is

the reason he failed to file a timely habeas petition. 

The Magistrate Judge concludes petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling. First, petitioner claims that attorney

misconduct resulted in his failure to file a timely Rule 32

(resulting in his failure to file a timely habeas petition). 

However, petitioner provides no details to support this claim. 

Petitioner fails to explain what steps, if any, he took in the

five-plus years between the end of his original proceedings (in

which he pleaded guilty) and the filing of his Rule 32 to obtain

the files from his lawyer. Petitioner does not explain gaps of

time where presumably he did nothing. In short, petitioner has

not reached the high plateau required to show entitlement to

equitable tolling based on alleged attorney malfeasance and/or

misconduct.

Petitioner also argues he has newly discovered evidence which

he could not present prior to his 2003 Rule 32. (See Doc. 1 at

pp. 4e - 4g). Specifically, he contends he has evidence by way of

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certain individuals who would discredit a letter written to the

sentencing court by Deanna Flanders. Although not one of the

victims, Deanna wrote the trial court a letter stating that

petitioner likewise sexually abused her and the trial court took

this into account in giving petitioner a 13-year aggravated

sentence. (See Doc. 1, Exhibit A at pp. 67, 81-82; see also Doc.

11, Exhibit A at 22 (pp. 6-10)). Petitioner asserts these

witnesses (James Burris, John Burris III and Christine Seeley)

could have testified that Deanna Flanders' letter was

"disingenuous." By not hearing their testimony, petitioner

contends the trial judge relied on the inaccurate and erroneous

information in Deanna Flanders letter to "aggravate [his] sentence

beyond the presumptive." (Doc. 1 at p. 4g).

This is not a sufficient basis for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner utterly fails to explain why, with due diligence, he

could not have known that James Burris, John Burris III and

Christine Seeley could testify or provide information to discredit

the letter written by Deanna to the sentencing court prior to

July, 2003. Although petitioner contends he did not receive

information about Deanna Flanders' letter until he received the

case file around "mid-June 2003," (see Doc. 1 at p. 4f), it is

clear on the record at sentencing and from the pre-sentence report

that petitioner knew of the letter at sentencing. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit E at p. 67). The Pre-Sentence report noted that

petitioner discussed his sexual abuse of Deanna, including

touching her at least once on her vagina. (Doc. 11, Exhibit A at

22 (pp. 6-10)). Petitioner does not refute this. The PreCase 2:05-cv-01028-MHM Document 13 Filed 02/01/06 Page 9 of 11
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Sentence Report also discloses other children who were molested by

petitioner in addition to Deanna. Petitioner did not deny these

other molestations at sentencing. 

In addition, petitioner admitted in a hand-written letter

dated March 12, 2002, that he was handed a copy of the presentence report shortly "after sentencing." (Doc. 11, Exhibit A

at 29). Moreover, petitioner was present at the December 30, 1997

sentencing hearing during which witnesses were questioned about

petitioner's abuse of Deanna Flanders and the prosecution argued

he should be sentenced to prison for abuse of Deanna and her

sisters. (Doc. 11, Exhibit E at pp. 8-9, 31-33, 41-43, 48, 51,

67-68, 71-72, 74 and 77). Finally, at sentencing itself, the

court noted Deanna Flanders statements and cited his abuse of her

in handing down the 13-year aggravated sentence. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit E at pp. 81-82). For all these reasons, petitioner's

contention that he was not aware of Deanna Flanders allegations

until he received the case record in mid-June, 2003, is refuted by

the clear record. 

Finally, the fact that petitioner previously filed a timely

habeas petition within the 1-year period (on December 10, 1998 in

CIV 98-2220) but had this petition dismissed for failure to

exhaust, is not a basis for equitable tolling. Although the Court

dismissed the petition without prejudice to allow petitioner to

exhaust his claims in state court, and although this petition was

timely by only about three weeks (his state proceeding concluded

on December 30, 1997), petitioner did not pursue his state

remedies in a timely way. 

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C. Procedural Default

In light of the fact the Magistrate Judge believes

petitioner's habeas claims are barred by the statute of

limitation, it is not necessary to address respondents contention

that Ground II of the habeas petition is procedurally barred. 

(See Doc. 11 at pp. 24-25, 28-34).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied as untimely. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

order and judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the

date of service of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in and order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2006.

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