Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00654/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00654-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victoria Ogonna Ofoedu, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

J. Schomig, 

Respondent. 

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CIV-09-654-PHX-JWS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(SECOND)

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2009, Petitioner Victoria Ogonna Ofoedu has filed a pro se Motion

Challenging Removal Order, Request for Stay of Removal and Reconsideration of

Adjustment of Status (Doc. #19). Respondent has filed a Response on September 17, 2009

(Doc.#24). Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria. On July 25, 1987, the former Immigration

and Naturalization Service (“INS”) admitted her at New York City, New York, with

authorization to remain in the United States until January 24, 1988. She remained beyond

that date without INS authorization. (Doc. #24, Exhs. 1-2.) On January 29, 1992, INS

placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings pursuant to an Order to Show Cause. (Id., Exh.

3.) On March 3, 1993, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s pro se asylum

application, but granted her application for voluntary departure, advising Petitioner that she

had until September 3, 1993, to depart the United States or the order would covert to an order

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of deportation to Nigeria. (Id., Exhs. 4, 6.) Specifically the IJ found that Petitioner’s fear of

returning to Nigeria because of the turmoil existing in that country, the sole basis for her

request for asylum, was not sufficient to qualify for relief. (Id., Exh. 6.) Petitioner filed a

pro se appeal of the IJ’s decision. (Id., Exh. 5.)

Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on

November 30, 1998, and Petitioner was given thirty days to voluntarily depart the United

States. (“Final Order of Removal”). (Doc. #24, Exh. 6; Doc. #19, at 25.) Petitioner, through

counsel, filed a Petition for Review of the BIA decision and Motion for Stay of Removal

with the Ninth Circuit on December 21, 1998. (Id., Exh. 7.) While that matter was pending,

Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to Reopen Deportation Proceedings for Reconsideration, to

Withhold Removal, and to Stay Removal Pending Decision Based on Article 3 of the United

Nations Convention Against Torture. (Id., Exh. 8.) On March 16, 2000, the BIA denied

Petitioner’s motion, finding that she had “failed to submit any type of evidence in support

of her motion . . ,” and that “[s]he [had] not demonstrate[d] the likelihood ord severity of the

treatment she claim[ed] to fear as a result of being deported from the United States . . ,” or

“that the mistreatment she fears amounts to torture.” (Id., Exh. 9.) On August 15, 2000,

the Ninth Circuit in a Memorandum Opinion, denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Id.,

Exh. 10.) 

On September 11, 2008, the Arizona Fugitive Operations team arrested Petitioner at

her residence during Operation Return to Sender, and she was brought to the Eloy Detention

Center in Eloy, Arizona. (Doc. #24, Exh. 11.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2241 on March 30, 2009, challenging her confinement while

awaiting removal. (Doc. #1.) That petition was dismissed as moot, as Petitioner had been

released on an order of supervision on July 15, 2009 (Doc. #22). Pending at the time of

dismissal was the motion being considered by this order. Petitioner requests a stay of

removal for medical and humanitarian reasons, and additionally asserts that she was denied

effective assistance of counsel during the removal proceedings. (Doc. #19.) 

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MERITS

The issuance of a stay of removal is “not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury

might otherwise result. . . . It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety

of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder,

___U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009) (citations omitted). In considering a request for

a stay of removal, the court should “consider[] four factors:(1) whether the stay applicant has

made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant

will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially

injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)where the public interest lies.”

Nken, ___ U.S. ___; 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770

(1987)). The party requesting a stay “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances

justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. 

(1) Success on the Merits

(a) Jurisdiction of this Court.

This court lacks authority to conduct a review of Petitioner’s final order of removal

and eligibility for adjustment of status, pursuant to Section 106(a) of the REAL ID Act of

2005, which provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),

including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas

corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for

review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this

section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of

removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act . . .

18 U.S.C. §1252(a)(5).

See Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the Act eliminated

habeas jurisdiction, including jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2241, over final orders of

deportation, exclusion, or removal”); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.

2006) (“the REAL ID Act amends the [INA], by eliminating federal habeas corpus

jurisdiction over final orders of removal . . . .”).Where Petitioner’s claim “directly challenges

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the merits of her final order of removal,” the court is “without jurisdiction. . . .” Villajin v.

Mukasey, 2008 WL 2705144, *2 (D.Ariz. 2008).

A claim that arises independent of the final order of removal, such as ineffective

assistance of counsel after a final order preluding appellate review, is within the court’s

jurisdiction. Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2007). To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, in the absence of clear error, aliens generally must first satisfy the

requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I & Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). Singh, 499 F.3d at 979,

n.12. To comply with the requirements of Lozada, an alien must: (1) provide an affidavit

setting forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to the

actions to be taken, and what representation counsel did or did not make to the alien in this

regard, (2) ensure that counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned is informed

of the allegations leveled against him and given the opportunity to respond, and (3) identify

whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to

any violation of counsel’s ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not. Melkonian

v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2003).

Second, the alien must show prejudice, which is presumed when counsel’s error

deprives the alien of the appellate proceeding entirely, although the presumption is

rebuttable. Villajin, 2008 WL 2705144, *4 (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,

826 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Petitioner’s only reference to ineffective assistance of counsel in her petition is the

following statement: “I did not received effective assistance of counsel during my

immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals trial because that challenge arose

independently of my removal order.” (Doc. #19, at 1.) Nowhere else in her four page

petition, or attached exhibits, does she explain at what point in the process her counsel was

ineffective, or describe what action/inaction on the part of her counsel constitutes ineffective

assistance. Although the Ninth Circuit does not require rigid compliance with the Lozada

factors, it does require substantial compliance. Singh, 499 F.3d at 979 n. 12; Villajin, 2008

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WL 2705144, *4. Petitioner does not establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

and therefore this Court is without jurisdiction to consider her challenge to the removal order.

(b) Exhaustion of Remedies.

Petitioner is required to exhaust her statutory administrative and judicial remedies for

her claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and adjustment of status. Petitioner

never raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or requested an adjustment of status

before the BIA in either her appeal or in her motion to reopen (Doc. #24, Exhs. 5-9). These

failures deprive the court of jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. §1252(d)(1); Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d

1118 (9th Cir. 2004). This administrative exhaustion requirement is statutory and

jurisdictional. Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2004). In analyzing the

exhaustion provision at 8 U.S.C. §1252(d)(1), the Ninth Circuit concluded that, when

administrative remedies are available as a matter of right, a failure to exhaust those remedies

precludes subsequent review in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Sun, 370 F.3d at 940.

Petitioner’s failure to raise her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before the IJ or the

BIA on direct appeal constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and may not be

raised for the first time in federal court. Singh, 499 F.3d at 974

Petitioner also failed to exhaust her judicial remedies as she did not raise a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, or adjustment of status in her petition for review before the

9th Circuit. (Doc. #24, Exhs. 7, 10.) As a prudential matter, habeas petitioners must exhaust

judicial remedies before seeking relief under Section 2241. Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d

1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548

U.S. 30 (2005). As Petitioner did not exhaust her judicial remedies, and has not established

any overriding interest that warrants disregarding jurisprudential exhaustion, relief pursuant

to Section 2241 is precluded.

Petitioner nonetheless requests that this court relieve her from the order of removal

for humanitarian reasons. Petitioner claims that on December 5, 1996, she was injured on

the job lifting a heavy patient, and had to have four surgeries. ( Doc. #19, at 2.) As a result

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she developed hypertension and depression in 1997. (Id.) If she is deported to Nigeria,

Petitioner claims that she will “loose [her] medical coverage; [she] will not be able to pay for

medical treatment and medications.” (Id.) She receives “$780.00 a month from the

insurance company and also [] can work part time to substitute [her] income. . . .” (Id.) She

asserts that she “would not be able to find work back in Nigeria and no company will hire

[her] because of [her] disability.” (Id.) Petitioner also provides evidence that she is involved

in community service helping the homeless and senior citizens in the San Diego area. (Id.,

at 35-38, 42-47.) 

Petitioner never presented these claims to an IJ or the BIA. On June 15, 1999,

Petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen Deportation Proceedings for Reconsideration, to

Withhold Removal, and did not raise her medical concerns at that time. (Doc. #29, Exh. 8.)

As Petitioner has not previously presented her request for humanitarian relief to the IJ or

BIA, this Court has no authority to review her claim of entitlement to relief from deportation.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not established entitlement to a stay of removal. She has not established

any likelihood of success on the merits of her challenge to the final order of removal or

decision on adjustment of status, as this court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s final

order of removal, and Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative or judicial remedies.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion Challenging

Removal Order, Request for Stay of Removal and Reconsideration of Adjustment of Status

(Doc. #19) be DENIED;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

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response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 16th day of November, 2009.

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