Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01446/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01446-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on September 12, 2014. (Doc. 1). A preliminary review of the 

petition, however, revealed that the petition appears to contain only claims that have not been 

exhausted in state court. Accordingly, on September 30, 2014, the Court issued an Order to Show 

Cause requiring Petitioner to file a response within thirty days showing why the petition should not be 

dismissed for lack of exhaustion. (Doc. 4). On October 28, 2014, Petitioner filed his response. (Doc. 

5). In the response, Petitioner does not address the exhaustion issue, but instead he asserts that only 

God has jurisdiction over him and that the Court will suffer God’s wrath if it does not correct the state 

BARRY FRANK WILSON,

 Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01446-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION FOR LACK OF 

EXHAUSTION

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT TO 

ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE

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court’s purportedly erroneous assertion of jurisdiction over him. (Id.). 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

B. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial 

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 

(9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full 

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the 

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

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In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to the highest state court as required by 

the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a 

mixed petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to 

petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, the petition alleges that Petitioner is now charged with an unspecified violation of 

California’s Vehicle Code in the Superior Court of California, County of Tuolomne, Traffic Division. 

(Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner challenges the state court’s authority to regulate his freedom to travel and 

move about. Nowhere in his petition does Petitioner indicate that the state court has convicted him of 

any offense; to the contrary, it appears that Petitioner’s case is still pending in the Superior Court. 

Nowhere does Petitioner allege that he has ever presented his claims to the California Supreme Court.

As mentioned, in Petitioner’s response to the Order to Show Cause, he does not challenge the 

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Court’s conclusion that his claims are unexhausted, nor does he address exhaustion in any way. 

Instead, Petitioner asserts that he is a member of the Kingdom of God and that only God has 

jurisdiction over him. 

From the foregoing, it appears that Petitioner has not presented any of his claims to the 

California Supreme Court as required by the exhaustion doctrine. Because Petitioner has not 

presented his claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the 

petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition that 

is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to assign a 

United States District Judge to this case. 

RECOMMENDTION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

be DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 days 

after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be 

served and filed within ten court days after service of the Objections. The Court will then review the 

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 10, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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