Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00474/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00474-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area,

Inc., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Gary LaRance, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV08-0474-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On March 12, 2008, Plaintiffs Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. and Robert

Johnson filed an Emergency Application and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (“TRO Application”). Dkt. #8. Plaintiffs have been sued for eviction

in an action pending in the Tribal Court of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (“CRIT”).

Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin Defendants – a judge and clerk of the Tribal Court – from

adjudicating the eviction action. Plaintiffs argue that the Tribal Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In particular, Plaintiffs

ask the Court to enjoin Defendants from proceeding with a hearing today – March 14, 2008

– in the eviction action. 

Defendants filed an opposition to the TRO Application and Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Dkt. ##14, 15. The Court held a telephone hearing with the parties on March 13, 2008.

Following the hearing, the Court entered a text-only order advising the parties of the Court’s

decision. Dkt. #16. This order explains the decision.

Case 2:08-cv-00474-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/14/08 Page 1 of 5
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I. Background.

Water Wheel operates a property for recreational vehicles on the west bank of the

Colorado River near Parker, Arizona. Water Wheel entered a lease for the property in 1975.

The lease, which is attached as Exhibit A to the TRO Application, identifies CRIT as the

lessor, but was entered under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The lease had a

32-year term and was set to expire in July of 2007. Prior to the expiration date, the parties

disagreed on the rental rate demanded by CRIT for the property. Plaintiffs sought to invoke

federal dispute resolution procedures under Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations;

CRIT brought the eviction action in Tribal Court to evict Plaintiffs from the property.

Several hearings have been held in Tribal Court and on appeal from Tribal Court. It

is clear from orders provided to this Court, however, that the Tribal Court has not made a

final decision on whether it can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs. That

issue is scheduled to be heard on March 14, 2008. Because Plaintiffs believe that the Tribal

Court clearly lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction action, they ask this Court

to enter a TRO preventing Defendants from proceeding with the hearing or any other aspect

of the eviction action.

II. Exhaustion.

“Ordinarily . . . a federal court should stay its hand until after the Tribal Court has had

a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.

438, 449 (1997) (quotation and citations omitted). Stated differently, parties generally are

required to exhaust their jurisdictional arguments in Tribal Court before seeking federal court

intervention. 

Courts have recognized four exceptions to this exhaustion requirement: “exhaustion

is not required where (1) an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass

or is conducted in bad faith, (2) the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional

prohibitions, (3) exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of adequate opportunity to

challenge the court’s jurisdiction, or (4) it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal

governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana’s main rule.” Burlington

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Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs rely on

the fourth exception, arguing that the Tribal Court clearly lacks jurisdiction over the eviction

action. The Court will address this argument. If it is not “plain” that the Tribal Court lacks

jurisdiction under Montana, the Court must require Plaintiffs to exhaust their arguments in

Tribal Court before invoking the powers of this Court.

Under Montana, a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction over a nonmember of

the tribe where the nonmember has entered into a “consensual relationship” with the tribe or

its members. 450 U.S. at 557. Plaintiffs argue that they have entered into no such

relationship with the CRIT. 

Plaintiffs first contend that they have not entered into a Montana-type consensual

relationship because the land they lease is owned by the federal government in fee title, not

by the CRIT. Plaintiffs argue that the land could be transferred to the CRIT only by an act

of Congress and that a 1964 federal statute expressly declined to make such a conveyance.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Supreme Court has held that CRIT’s ownership of the property

could be determined only by litigation, which has not occurred. 

In response, Defendants note that the Solicitor of the Department of Interior opined

in 1969 that the property leased by Plaintiffs is owned by the CRIT. The Secretary of the

Department of Interior entered an order confirming this position, and the Department has

followed the order for more than 35 years. In addition, the lease in this case – which was

signed by Plaintiff Water Wheel – specifically identifies the CRIT as the lessor of the

property, and Plaintiffs have paid rent to the CRIT, either directly or through the Bureau of

Indian Affairs, for more than 30 years. 

The Court cannot decide from its brief review of these issues whether Plaintiffs or

Defendants are correct. Such a decision will require a close examination of the lease, the

statutes in issue, the Solicitor’s opinion, the history of the parties’ dealings, and the decision

of the Supreme Court – more matters than the Court has had time to review in ruling on the

TRO Application. The Court can say today, however, that the correctness of Plaintiff’s

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1

Plaintiffs argue that the Tribal Court in any event does not have subject matter

jurisdiction over Robert Johnson because he is not signatory to the lease. Because the Court

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argument is not “plain.” The argument therefore does not relieve Plaintiffs of the duty to

exhaust their jurisdictional arguments in Tribal Court. 

Plaintiffs next argue that the express terms of the lease exempt them from the

jurisdiction of the Tribal Court in the eviction action. Plaintiffs point to paragraph 34 of the

addendum to the lease and argue that the ordinance applicable in the eviction action is not

binding on them because they did not consent to its application in writing. Paragraph 34

seems to suggest, however, that Plaintiffs’ consent is required only when a law passed by the

CRIT is contrary to an express provision of the lease. Plaintiffs have identified no express

provision of the lease that is contrary to the eviction ordinance. They argue that the dispute

resolution provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations are incorporated into the lease and

that the eviction ordinance is contrary to those provisions, but the Court does not find this

argument to be plainly correct. To determine whether paragraph 34 or any other provision

of the lease defeats the “consensual relationship” basis for Tribal Court jurisdiction under

Montana, the Court will be required to conduct a careful analysis of the lease, its history, the

dispute resolution provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations, and the eviction ordinance.

The Court cannot say today that Plaintiffs’ position is plainly correct.

Because the lack of Tribal Court jurisdiction is not “plain” as required by the fourth

exception to the exhaustion requirement, Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065, Plaintiffs must exhaust

their remedies in Tribal Court before invoking the powers of this court. The Court will

therefore deny Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO that prohibits the Tribal Court from proceeding

with the eviction action. If the Tribal Court decides that it does have jurisdiction under

Montana to hear the eviction action, Defendants must afford Plaintiffs a period of 15 days

to seek review of their Montana arguments in this Court before entering an order that will

empower the CRIT to evict Plaintiffs from the property or take other action to interfere with

Plaintiffs’ occupancy of the property.1

 

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is not familiar with what Mr. Johnson may have done to enter into a consensual relationship

with the CRIT, it cannot at this point conclude that this argument is plainly correct.

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. The TRO Application (Dkt. #8) is denied to the extent it asks this Court to

enjoin Defendants from proceeding with the March 14, 2008 hearing or the

eviction action.

2. If the Tribal Court decides that it does have jurisdiction under Montana to hear

the eviction action, Defendants must afford Plaintiffs a period of 15 days to

seek review of their Montana arguments in this Court before entering an order

that will empower the CRIT to evict Plaintiffs from the property or take other

action to interfere with Plaintiffs’ occupancy of the property.

DATED this 14th day of March, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00474-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/14/08 Page 5 of 5