Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05453/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1All dates in this order are in 2004, unless otherwise specified.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAYNE CANDLER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J.S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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No. C 04-5453 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE; DIRECTING

DEFENDANTS TO FILE

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR

INDICATE THAT SUCH MOTION IS

NOT WARRANTED; DENYING

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Docket No. 3)

Keith Wayne Candler, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated in Salinas Valley

State Prison (“SVSP”), filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

various SVSP officials, alleging they used excessive force against him and then failed to treat

his injuries properly. In a separate order filed concurrently herewith, plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint. On October 10, 2003,1

defendants J. Pacheco (“Pacheco”), R. Machuca (“Machuca”) and J. Abuyen (“Abuyen”), all

correctional officers, escorted him back to his cell from the showers. After plaintiff entered

his cell, defendant M. Banuelos (“Banuelos”), a correctional officer in charge of opening and

closing the cell doors, did not close plaintiff’s cell door. Abuyen followed plaintiff into the

cell and punched him in the head and face with his fists while Pacheco and Machuca watched

from just outside the cell. When plaintiff began “swinging wild” to protect himself, Pacheco

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and Machuca rushed in and began hitting plaintiff in the face and head until he fell to the

ground. Abuyen sat on his lower back , while Pacheco and Machuca kept punching him in the

face. Plaintiff was then handcuffed, and Banuelos set off the alarm. Abuyen resumed punching

plaintiff in the head and face, splitting open plaintiff’s lip, after which he scraped plaintiff’s

forehead along the cell floor. Plaintiff was bleeding; a spit net was placed over plaintiff’s head,

preventing him from breathing properly; and he was placed in leg irons. 

Plaintiff was next taken to an outside holding cell, where he was handcuffed to a steel

ring. Defendants J. Vasquez (“Sgt. Vasquez”) and two other guards who had responded to the

alarm, defendants H. Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) and D. Rocha (“Rocha”), were present while

plaintiff was in the outside cell. Plaintiff complained to these three guards that the handcuffs

were too tight, but they refused to loosen them. Plaintiff thereafter lost consciousness for two

hours. After he awoke, defendant M. Starr (“Starr”), a nurse, came to the holding cell and

wrote down the injuries to plaintiff’s face and head. When plaintiff told Starr about the injuries

to his wrists and ankles from the tight handcuffs and the leg irons, Starr responded that they

weren’t serious enough to write down. Sgt. Vasquez, Gonzalez, Rocha and Starr did not provide

plaintiff access to medical care during the approximately five hours he was in the outside

holding cell. After that time, plaintiff was taken to the office of Lieutenant Ortiz (“Ortiz”),

where plaintiff related his version of the incident on videotape, and also wrote it down. Ortiz

had plaintiff escorted to the medical clinic, where plaintiff received treatment for his injuries,

including stitches in his lip. 

Plaintiff was disciplined for committing battery on a peace officer in connection with

the above-described events. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. §

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

B. Legal Claim

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.

25, 31 (1993). "'After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . .

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Whenever prison officials stand accused of using

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). In making this

determination, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between

that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a

forceful response. Id. at 7. Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that Pacheco, Machuca

and Abuyen participated in a beating of plaintiff both before and after he was handcuffed, and

that Banuelos made such actions possible by leaving plaintiff’s cell door open, state a

cognizable claim that each of said defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from the use of excessive force. 

Plaintiff also claims that Sgt. Vasquez, Gonzalez, Rocha and Starr failed to provide him

with access to medical care to treat his injuries, and that Vasquez, Gonzalez, and Rocha refused

his request to loosen his handcuffs. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates

the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97,

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104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that

need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A claim of mere negligence in connection with

medical conditions is not enough to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614,

617 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding isolated occurrences of neglect may constitute grounds for

medical malpractice but do not rise to level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). 

Here, according to plaintiff’s allegations, he was given medical care after he provided

his statement to Lieutenant Ortiz. There is no allegation that the medical treatment he received

was inadequate or insufficient, or that the delay in his receiving medical care rendered the

treatment he received less effective. To the extent any failure to act on the part of the four

above-referenced defendants caused plaintiff’s treatment to be delayed for a period of hours,

such inaction, without more, does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

medical needs. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in

claims stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose

and providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence);

see also Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding delay of two days

for treating dental emergency not an 8th Amendment violation); compare McGuckin, 974 F.2d

at 1060, 1062 (finding delay of seven months in providing medical care sufficient to present

colorable § 1983 claim). On the other hand, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that

Vasquez, Gonzalez and Rocha refused to loosen his handcuffs over the course of five hours,

and that this resulted in cuts and scars to his wrists, does state a cognizable claim under the

Eighth Amendment for use of excessive force.

//

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

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1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshall shall

serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint in this matter, all attachments

thereto, and a copy of this order upon Correctional Officers J. Abuyen, R. Machuca, J.

Pacheco, M. Banuelos, D. Rocha, H. Gonzalez and Sergeant J. Vasquez at Salinas Valley

State Prison. The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on plaintiff and the California

Attorney General’s Office.

2. The claims against defendant Starr are DISMISSED for failure to state a

cognizable claim for relief. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be

supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56, including all of the medical records relating to the allegations in the

complaint. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that

this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior

to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’

motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to

plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment

by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party

opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of

material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file

an opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by

plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. 

See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18

F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

4. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants,

or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely

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fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

7. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be

granted. However, any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline

sought to be extended.

8. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED for want of

exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff has been able to adequately present his claims, which do

not appear to be especially complex. Should the circumstances of this case materially change,

the Court may reconsider plaintiff’s request sua sponte. 

This order terminates Docket No. 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

_________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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