Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01016/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and 1

that the ALJ applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief

without quotation or citation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

BETTY A. LARUE, 

Plaintiff

v. Case No. 06-1016

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration, Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Betty A. Larue (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial

review of the Commissioner’s denial of her request for child’s

insurance benefits as a disabled adult child under Sections

202(d) and 223 of the Social Security Act, as amended.

Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and

therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review is

appropriate. After reviewing the record, the Court AFFIRMS the

decision of the Commissioner.1

I. Background

The complete facts and arguments are presented in the

parties’ briefs, and will be duplicated only to the extent

necessary. Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

decision within the administrative record sets forth his

findings and it will not be repeated except to the extent

necessary to address Plaintiff’s arguments.

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II. Standard of Review

The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether the

Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.

1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support the

Commissioner’s conclusion. See Warburton, 188 F.3d at 1050. In

making this determination, the Court considers evidence that

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence

that supports it. See id. The Court may not reverse the

Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence

supports a different result. See Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704,

706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if the Court might have

weighed the evidence differently and reached a different result

if a de novo review were applied. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).

To receive child’s benefits on the earnings record of an

insured person who is entitled to old-age or disability benefits

or who has died, a claimant must show: (1) she is the insured

person’s child; (2) she is dependent on the insured; (3) she

applied; (4) she is unmarried; and (5) she is under age 18; she

is 18 years old or older and have a disability that began before

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she became 22 years old; or she is 18 years or older and

qualifies for benefits as a full-time student. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.350(a). The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine

whether the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s implementing

regulations, which set out the five requirements which must be

met to qualify for child’s insurance benefits as a disabled

adult child under Sections 202(d) and 223 of the Social Security

Act. 

III. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges one point of error by the ALJ.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not fully and

fairly develop the record for appeal. Plaintiff alleges there

are dates that were omitted from the record are crucial in the

determination of eligibility for child’s insurance benefits.

The ALJ’s determination was that Plaintiff was not entitled

to child’s insurance benefits as a disabled adult child of her

father, Mr. Fincher, because she was married at the time she

applied for benefits. On appeal, the Plaintiff did not dispute

that she was married at the time she applied for benefits, but

rather argued that she was entitled to benefits because her

husband was disabled and receiving disability benefits. (Tr. 4-

9, 80-81). The Appeals Council informed the Plaintiff that her

marriage to a disability beneficiary would only serve to “not

terminate” entitlement to child’s insurance benefits. (Tr. 5).

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Plaintiff’s marriage does not, however, entitle her to benefits.

In order to be eligible for benefits, the Plaintiff must have

been unmarried when she applied for the benefits. It is

undisputed from the record that the Plaintiff was married when

she applied for child’s insurance benefits and therefore

ineligible for such benefits. 

Plaintiff further alleges that certain dates are missing

from the record which might have proved she could have been

entitled to benefits before she was married. This argument is

of no avail for even if Plaintiff had been entitled to benefits

before she married in 1983, she had not met all the requirements

for such benefits as she did not apply for benefits until

February 15, 2003. To be eligible for child’s insurance

benefits, a person is required to apply while unmarried. There

is no dispute and it is clear the Plaintiff did not apply for

such benefits while she was unmarried. Upon reviewing the

record and the ALJ’s determination, this Court finds the record

was fully and fairly developed to allow a determination to be

made as to the Plaintiff’s eligibility for child’s insurance

benefits. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is

supported by the substantial evidence of the record as a whole

and is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: November 20, 2006

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

HONORABLE ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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