Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00975/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Diana C. Lopez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 

Defendant. 

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No. 05-CV-0975-PHX-NVW

ORDER

[Not for Publication]

The Court has before it Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. # 20,

Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, Doc. # 19, Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

and Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. # 27, Defendant's Statement

of Facts, Doc. # 26, and Plaintiff's Response and Reply to Defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, Doc. # 30. 

Plaintiff Diana C. Lopez ("Lopez") brought this action against the Commissioner of

Social Security ("Commissioner"), alleging that her application for Social Security disability

benefits was erroneously denied. Lopez now moves for reversal of the decision below and

for a remand for a new hearing or an award of benefits. The Commissioner cross-moves for

summary judgment.

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Lopez appears to have received treatment for other ailments, as well; the ailments

listed above are those most frequently mentioned in Lopez's Motion. 

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I. Statement of the Case

In August 1997, Lopez was hospitalized and treated for breathing problems, including

pneumonia. Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts ("PSOF") at 1. Following this initial

hospitalization, Lopez began suffering from various ailments, some related to her asthma

condition and others apparently not. Over the next year, Lopez was treated for pancreatitis,

bronchitis, pneumonia, severe asthma, anemia, irritable bowel syndrome, shortness of breath,

wheezing, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), loin pain hematuria,

gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"), and generalized pain.1

 Lopez did not return to

work after her August 1997 hospitalization. 

Lopez filed an application for disability insurance benefits on January 12, 1998,

alleging that she became disabled on August 12, 1997. On September 16, 1999, an ALJ

denied Lopez's claim, and the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision. On

March 1, 2002, a district court remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings because the ALJ

had improperly (1) failed to consider the combination of all of Lopez's impairments, (2)

disregarded the opinion of Lopez's treating physician, and (3) discredited Lopez's testimony

concerning her symptoms. Following remand, the ALJ held hearings in December 2002 and

June 2003. 

On November 25, 2004, the ALJ issued a Notice of Decision–Partially favorable,

concluding that Lopez was under a disability from February 24, 2000 to August 9, 2001

because of a mental impairment, but not before or after that time period. 

II. Standard of Review 

The court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ's decision.

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001); Bergfield v. Barnhart, 361 F.

Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (D. Ariz. 2005) ("A reviewing federal court will only address the issues

raised by the claimant in his appeal from the ALJ's decision."). In its review, the court "may

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set aside a denial of disability benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or

if it is based on legal error." Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted); see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). "Substantial

evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Such evidence is "more than

a scintilla" but "less than a preponderance." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279 (citations omitted). As

a general rule, "[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld." Thomas

v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. Legal Standard

Part 404.1520 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the five-step sequential

evaluation process used in determining whether a claimant is disabled. The five steps are (1)

whether the claimant is currently working, (2) whether the impairment is severe, (3) whether

the impairment meets or equals an impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of the regulations,

(4) whether the claimant can perform work performed in the past, and (5) whether the

claimant has the ability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The

questions are addressed in order; certain responses to these questions will lead to automatic

eligibility or ineligibility. See id. The ALJ in Lopez's case made her decision at step five of

the analysis. Tr. at 25. 

Although the claimant bears the burden of proving disability during the first four steps

of the sequential evaluation, "the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that

the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289 ("A claimant

establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that her impairment prevents her from

performing her previous occupation.") (citations omitted). Where applicable, the MedicalVocational Guidelines can provide evidence of other jobs so as to allow the Commissioner

to carry that burden. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983). 

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IV. Analysis

Lopez advances three arguments why the ALJ erred as a matter of law: (1) the ALJ

incorrectly characterized several of Lopez's ailments as not severe; (2) the ALJ improperly

disregarded Lopez's treating physician’s medical opinion; and (3) the ALJ improperly

discredited Lopez's testimony regarding the extent of her ailments. 

A. Severity of the Impairments

At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant has

a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his

ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). "An impairment is not

severe if it is merely 'a slight abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has

no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.'" Webb v. Barnhart,

433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing S.S.R. No. 96-3(p) (1996)). "Step two, then, is a

de minis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims, and an ALJ may find that

a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments only when

his conclusion is clearly established by the medical evidence." Id. at 687 (alterations,

citations, and quotation marks omitted). An ALJ’s decision to reject a claimant's complaints

at step two must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 

Lopez argues that the ALJ improperly concluded that several of Lopez's medical

conditions did not rise to the level of severe impairments. As the ALJ made clear, see Tr. at

480, Lopez put forth medical evidence demonstrating that she suffered from obesity, anemia,

irritable bowel syndrome, and hematuria secondary to loin pain. The ALJ, however,

concluded that those impairments were not severe. The ALJ explained:

The undersigned finds that none of these impairments, upon adherence to prescribed

treatment, impose more than a minimal impact on the claimant' capacity to perform

basic work activities and are, therefore, not severe under the Regulations. In support

of this conclusion the undersigned cites to the testimony of Dr. Harris in which he

indicates that the claimant's primary physical problem is her COPD and that the other

physical impairments are incidental and not significant with regard to a consideration

of the functional limitations.

Tr. at 480. 

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 Defendant seeks to proffer additional reasons why the ALJ correctly disregarded Dr.

Parkin's opinion. However, because the ALJ did not rely on those reasons in her decision,

the court will disregard them here.

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The ALJ relied entirely on a non-examining, non-treating doctor's conclusion that the

above-listed impairments did not amount to severe disabilities. Merely adopting a nonexamining, non-treating doctor's conclusion does not satisfy the clear and convincing

standard applied in Webb. The ALJ was required to provide a more detailed analysis for why

Lopez's anemia, obesity, hematuria secondary to loin pain, and irritable bowl syndrome were

not severe conditions. 

B. Treating-Physician Rule

There are three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, those who treat the

plaintiff; (2) examining physicians, those who examine but do not treat the plaintiff, and (3)

nonexamining physicians, those who neither examine nor treat the plaintiff. Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Case law establishes:

As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than

to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. At least where the treating

doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for

"clear and convincing" reasons. We have also held that "clear and convincing"

reasons are required to reject the treating doctor's ultimate conclusions. Even if the

treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not

reject this opinion without providing "specific and legitimate reasons" supported by

substantial evidence in the record for so doing.

Id. (citations omitted). 

Dr. Parkin, Lopez's treating physician, stated at three different times during 1998 that

Lopez's conditions rendered her unable to work. Tr. at 485. The ALJ rejected Dr. Parkin's

medical opinion because (1) Dr. Parkin had based his medical opinion on Lopez's pneumonia

and wheezing condition, which subsided, rendering his medical opinion no longer applicable

and (2) his opinion was inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. Harris, who was a medical expert

on contract with the Social Security Administration. Tr. at 485.2

 

Because Dr. Parkin's medical opinion was contradicted by that of Dr. Harris, the ALJ

needed to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for her

decision to disregard Dr. Parkin's medical opinion. 

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1. Dr. Parkin's Treating Notes

In May, April, and November 1998, Dr. Parkin opined that Lopez's medical conditions

rendered her unable to work. Tr. at 485. The ALJ disregarded Dr. Parkin’s opinion on the

ground that it was based on Lopez's pneumonia condition, which subsided with treatment.

Specifically, the ALJ stated: 

It is noted that Dr. Parkin's opinion in April, 1998, was based upon the diagnosis of

pneumonia with wheezing. The treating source's notes in 1998 show that the

pneumonia resolved, the claimant quit smoking, and the wheezing subsided (Exhibit

12F, p.8). Thus, it appears the opinion was based upon symptoms during an acute

illness, symptoms which diminished with time and treatment, after the pneumonia

resolved. 

Tr. at 485. 

The ALJ’s explanation is factually inaccurate. Nowhere in Dr. Parkin’s treatment

note–which is Exhibit 12F–does Dr. Parkin state that Lopez's wheezing condition had

subsided. The note mentions wheezing only once, noting "[r]ecently she has had some

difficulty breathing, wheezing, and she had pneumonia in the past." Tr. at 277. 

2. Dr. Harris's Medical Opinion

The ALJ relied heavily on the medical opinion of Dr. Harris, a doctor who did not

treat and did not examine Lopez. "The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an

examining physician or a treating physician." Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Because the ALJ has

not provided any other legitimate reason for disregarding Dr. Parkin's medical opinion, the

medical opinion of Dr. Harris cannot alone suffice.

The ALJ therefore improperly disregarded Dr. Parkin's medical opinion. The ALJ did

not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for her

conclusion that Lopez was not disabled. 

C. Credibility Determination

 "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical

testimony and ambiguities." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). In weighing

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a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider various factors, including the claimant's daily

activities, the claimant's reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in her testimony

or between her testimony and her conduct, her work record, and testimony from physicians

and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he

complains. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). If the ALJ finds particular

testimony of the claimant not credible, he must provide clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting it. Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A]bsent affirmative

evidence of malingering, an ALJ cannot reject a claimant's testimony without giving clear

and convincing reasons." (citations omitted)). The ALJ also "must specifically identify the

testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the

testimony." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

"General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not

credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). "The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial." Id.

(citations omitted). 

The ALJ did not find Lopez's testimony credible. Lopez stated that her conditions

allow her to walk for fifteen minutes, sit in a hard chair for thirty minutes, and stand for

fifteen minutes. Tr. at 483. In addition, Lopez characterized her daily pain as an 8 on a scale

of 1-10. Tr. at 483. The ALJ discredited Lopez's testimony because (1) the objective

medical evidence regarding Lopez's physical conditions and mental impairments

demonstrated a higher degree of functioning than Lopez alleged she was capable of, (2)

Lopez's medical conditions have responded positively to treatment, and (3) Lopez's daily

activities are inconsistent with the functional limitations alleged. 

1. Objective Medical Evidence

While objective medical evidence is relevant to a claimant's credibility, it alone cannot

be used to discredit a claimant's testimony. See 20 CFR § 404.1429(c)(2) ("We must always

attempt to obtain objective medical evidence and, when it is obtained, we will consider it in

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reaching a conclusion as to whether you are disabled. However, we will not reject your

statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the

effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective

medical evidence does not substantiate your statements."). See also Rollins v. Massanari,

261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) ("While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on

the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical

evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its

disabling effects."). 

The ALJ cited numerous pieces of objective medical evidence to undermine Lopez's

testimony regarding her functional capabilities. It appears that the ALJ attempted to separate

the medical evidence into two categories: evidence undermining the severity of Lopez's

physical impairments and evidence undermining the severity of Lopez's mental conditions.

Some of the medical evidence cited by the ALJ supports her conclusion while other evidence

cited appears to have little probative value. A piece by piece analysis of the objective

medical evidence cited by the ALJ is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which

the medical evidence undermines Lopez's testimony. 

a. Medical Evidence Addressing Lopez's Physical Impairments

i. Dr. LaHood's Letters

The ALJ stated that "[t]he results of a pulmonary function test in October 1997 reflect

that the claimant experienced remarkable improvement with bronchodilator treatment.

(Exhibit 7F, page 5)." Tr. at 483 (citing a letter written by Dr. Nabeeh N. LaHood after he

examined Lopez). The ALJ referred to a specific portion of the letter in which Dr. LaHood

stated that he tested Lopez's breathing before and after she used a bronchodilator, and he

noticed an improvement in Lopez's breathing after she used the bronchodilator. Elsewhere

in that letter, however, Dr. LaHood emphasized the severity of Lopez's asthma. Dr. LaHood

stated that his "impression is that Mrs. Lopez has severe asthma and allergic rhinitis." Tr.

at 248. He also stated that "Mrs. Lopez's asthma is very unstable and fluctuates a lot in

severity." Tr. at 249. It appears that the ALJ extracted a portion of Dr. LaHood's letter

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without evaluating the letter in its entirety. The fact that Lopez's breathing improved after

she used a bronchodilator is minimally relevant to an evaluation of her credibility. 

The ALJ also cited Dr. LaHood's January 2, 1998 letter for the proposition that Lopez

was not experiencing breathing difficulties. Tr. at 483. This letter states, in part, that "Ms.

Lopez stated that she has been feeling better with no difficulty breathing." Tr. at 245. This

statement, which Lopez made to Dr. LaHood, does undermine Lopez's testimony regarding

the severity of her breathing impairment. 

ii. Dr. Givre's Treatment Report

The ALJ stated that "[t]reatement notes from January 1998 reflect only occasional

coughing, rare wheezing, and fair air entry[.]" Tr. at 483 (emphasis in original) (citing

Exhibit 20F, pages 1-2). In support of this conclusion, the ALJ referred to a report prepared

by Dr. Givre following Lopez's hospitalization for pneumonia. 

However, Dr. Givre's overall assessment of Lopez was that she had "bronchial asthma

and likely COPD, underlying." Tr. at 398. Thus, it appears that the ALJ again relied

improperly on certain out-of-context phrases and sentences from the report, instead of

considering the report in its entirety. Accordingly, Dr. Givre’s treatment report provides only

minimally persuasive support for the ALJ’s credibility determination. 

iii. Chest X-Ray

On July 7, 1998, Lopez had an x-ray taken of her lungs and heart, which revealed no

evidence of active cardiopulmonary disease. Tr. at 261. The ALJ cites this X-ray as

evidence undermining Lopez's credibility. Tr. at 484. It is unclear why the ALJ believes that

this evidence is relevant, as Lopez has not alleged any disabling cardiopulmonary disease.

iv. Dr. Spratling's Medical Report

 The ALJ twice cited Dr. Spratling's medical report as medical evidence undermining

Lopez's credibility. 

First, the ALJ cited Dr. Spratling's medical report for the proposition that Lopez had

no difficulty ambulating, that there was no evidence of edema or cyanosis, that Lopez’s chest

x-ray was unremarkable (with the exception of a suggestion of hyperinflation and increased

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bronchial markers), and that Lopez's airflow was only mildly restricted and improved

following bronchodilator treatment. Tr. at 484. Upon reading the report, it is clear that the

ALJ parsed through Dr. Spratling's medical report and extracted favorable language. Indeed,

Dr. Spratling concluded that Lopez suffered from (1) asthma with mild airflow obstruction,

which improved following bronchodilator, (2) chronic bronchitis, (3) irritable bowel

syndrome, and (4) obesity. Tr. at 259. Dr. Spratling ultimately concluded that Lopez "has

the possibility of returning to work," especially if she intensified her medical treatment. Tr.

at 260. In other words, Dr. Spratling opined that Lopez could not return to work in her

present medical state. Contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, this report does not undermine

Lopez's credibility. 

Second, the ALJ cited Dr. Spratling's report as demonstrating that "claimant could

return to work with only environmental restrictions." Tr. at 484. Yet, as discussed above,

Dr. Spratling did not state that Lopez could return to work. At most, Dr. Spratling opined

that it was possible that Lopez could return to work, with environmental restrictions, if

certain remedial steps were taken. Furthermore, when the district court remanded this case

to the ALJ in 2002, it addressed this exact issue. See Lopez v. Halter, Civ 00-2181, slip op.

at 5 (D. Ariz. March 1, 2002) ("This statement and the rest of Dr. Spratling's report

demonstrate that he agreed with Dr. Parkin that at the time of the consultation Plaintiff was

unable to work. Dr. Spartling's expectation of Plaintiff's further improvement cannot form

the basis for rejecting Plaintiff's treating physician's opinion."). As stated above, Dr.

Spratling's report does not undermine Lopez's credibility. 

v. Blood Tests

The ALJ cited Lopez's blood tests from August-December 1999 and October 2002 as

evidence undermining Lopez's credibility. Tr. at 484. The results of those blood tests were

unremarkable. Tr. at 484. Furthermore, the ALJ has not attempted to explain why the blood

tests are relevant. Presumably, they are intended to undermine Lopez's credibility regarding

her anemia condition. Without a more detailed explanation, the blood tests are only

minimally relevant to Lopez's credibility. 

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The ALJ’s reliance on this medical record is puzzling, as the ALJ ultimately

concluded that Lopez did suffer a severe mental impairment between February 2000 and

August 2001.

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vi. Medical Evidence Relevant to Lopez's Pain

The ALJ cited several medical records that discussed the extent of Lopez's cervical

pain. See Tr. at 484 (citing Exhibit 29F). In addition, the evidence demonstrated that Lopez

responded favorably to pain medication and treatment. These medical records are relevant

to Lopez's testimony regarding the pain that she was experiencing. 

vii. August 2000 Medical Record

The ALJ cited to a medical record in which Dr. Parkin stated that Lopez was "doing

much better. Her asthma is under excellent control . . . ." Tr. at 633. This medical record

undermines Lopez’s testimony concerning the severity and pervasiveness of her asthmatic

condition. 

b. Medical Evidence Regarding Lopez's Mental Condition

The ALJ cited to four medical reports and stated that Lopez experienced no more than

a mild mental condition before February 2000 and after August 2001. Tr. at 484. First, the

ALJ cited to a report in which a State Agency employee concluded on September 1, 1998

that Lopez suffered from a non-severe adjustment disorder. Tr. at 328. Second, the ALJ

cited a medical record in which a State Agency consulting physician opined on February 5,

2001 that Lopez had no more than a mild mental limitation between May 2000 and February

2001. Tr. at 669.3

 Third, the ALJ cited and adopted Dr. Jansinski's opinion that Lopez

experienced only moderate impairment from the period before February 2000 and after

August 2001. Fourth, the ALJ cited the report in which Lopez was discharged from mental

health treatment in August 2001 because all treatment goals had been achieved. Tr. at 484.

 These reports are relevant to the question of Lopez's testimony regarding the severity

of her mental disability. To the extent that she has alleged more than a mild or moderate

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impairment before February 2000 and after August 2001, these medical reports are relevant

to Lopez's credibility. 

 2. Lopez's Response to Treatment

The ALJ stated that Lopez's positive response to prescribed medication and treatment

undermines her testimony regarding her pain and functional limitations. The ALJ pointed

to medical evidence demonstrating that Lopez's breathing improved after receiving

bronchodilator treatments and that she experienced relief from pain after receiving trigger

point injections and nerve blocks. Tr. at 484. This is simply objective medical evidence,

which was discussed above, and not an additional reason supporting the ALJ's conclusion

that Lopez's testimony was not credible. 

3. Lopez's Daily Activities

The ALJ stated that Lopez's daily activities undermine her testimony regarding the

limitations caused by her medical conditions. See Tr. at 484 ("Although not dispositive on

the issue of the claimant's residual functional capacity, it is another element that is

inconsistent with an allegation of impairment so sever[e] as to preclude all sustained work

activity."). Specifically, in Lopez's Daily Activities Questionnaire, Lopez stated that she

lives alone and cares for herself. 

It is proper for an ALJ to consider a claimant's daily activities. Burch v. Barnhart,

400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The ALJ was permitted to consider daily living activities

in his credibility analysis."). However, the fact that a claimant can perform some daily

activities does not mean that she is not disabled. Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050

(9th Cir. 2001) ("This court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has

carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking

for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability. One

does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled." (citations omitted)).

In this case, while not overly probative on the question of Lopez's credibility, the fact

that Lopez lives independently and cares for herself supports the ALJ's conclusion to

discredit Lopez's testimony. 

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4. Clear and Convincing Evidence

In sum, in determining that Lopez was not credible, the ALJ cited (1) objective

medical evidence questioning the severity of Lopez's breathing condition, Lopez's claims of

pain, and Lopez's mental impairment, and (2) the fact that Lopez cares for herself. Case law

is clear that objective medical evidence alone is insufficient to discredit a claimant's

testimony. See 20 CFR § 404.1429(c)(2). The fact that Lopez lives alone and cares for

herself does not tip the scale. By merely citing objective medical evidence and the fact that

Lopez cares for herself, the ALJ has not provided clear and convincing evidence that Lopez

was not credible. However, it is not clear that Lopez would be disabled even if all of her

testimony of subjective symptoms were taken as true. 

V. Remand

"The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award

benefits is within the discretion of the court." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). "If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original

administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded." Lewin v. Schweiker,

654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The ALJ erred (1) by determining that several of Lopez's impairments were not severe

without providing an adequate explanation, (2) by improperly disregarding Lopez's treating

physician's opinion, and (3) by discrediting Lopez's testimony regarding her pain and

limitations without providing clear and convincing reasons. However, it cannot be concluded

at this time that Lopez is entitled to benefits. The case is therefore remanded to the ALJ for

further consideration consistent with this order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc.

# 20 is denied in part and granted in part. Plaintiff's request for an award of benefits is

denied, but Plaintiff's request for a remand to the ALJ is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,

Doc. # 27, is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment remanding

this action to the ALJ for further proceedings. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-00975-NVW Document 32 Filed 03/17/06 Page 14 of 14