Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01836/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01836-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE K. COLBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

M. CARRASCO,

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-01836-AWI-DLB (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS 

[Doc. 11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND1

On October 2, 2008, Petitioner was found guilty of violating of violating California Code

of Regulations, title 3005(c)-battery on a peace officer and assessed a credit forfeiture of 150

days. 

On March 24, 2009, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court for the County of Kern. On May 26, 2009, the superior court denied

the petition in a reasoned decision. 

Petitioner then filed a state petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, which was denied on July 2, 2009, for lack of available documentary evidence. 

This information is derived from the state court records attached to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, which

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are not subject to dispute.

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Petitioner also filed a state petition in the California Supreme Court, which was

summarily denied.

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 20, 2009. 

 Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 15, 2010, and Petitioner filed an

opposition on July 22, 2010.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12. Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the

Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Judicial Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

th

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

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wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

because the hearing officer was biased, he was not allowed to call witnesses at the disciplinary

hearing, and Lieutenant Noyce violated his due process rights by not allowing him to attend the

disciplinary hearing. Log number 08-09-0412 refers to the disciplinary action for battery on

Officer Flores, and the Court assumes that Petitioner’s claims pertain to the October 2, 2008

disciplinary hearing. Respondent argues that Petitioner did not raise the claim in the instant 2

petition to the California Supreme Court, and the Court agrees. In the California Supreme Court

petition, Petitioner alleged he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws because

the cell extraction and resulting disciplinary action were a cover up for a sexual assault. 

Petitioner failed to alert the California Supreme Court to the fact that he was seeking relief

because the hearing officer was biased or that he was not given the opportunity to present

Petitioner claims there were two separate disciplinary actions in 2008 and cites “log number 08-09-0412

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and log number 08-09-0325.” However, there is only one 2008 disciplinary action-log number 08-09-0412. Log

number 08-09-0325 is the crime/incident report that is associated with the disciplinary action (Log Number CCIFA4A-08-09-0325).

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witnesses at the 2008 disciplinary hearing. In fact, the only reference to a biased hearing officer

and exclusion of witnesses is made in relation to whether he sought institutional administrative

review. Petitioner did not present these claims as grounds for state habeas corpus relief, and he

therefore did not fairly present them to the California Supreme Court for review and such claims

are not exhausted. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim regarding Lieutenant Noyce is factually

flawed. Lieutenant Noyce was not the senior hearing officer at the 2008 disciplinary hearing;

rather, he was the hearing officer for the subsequent disciplinary hearing held on January 17,

2009, because of Petitioner’s battery on another peace officer (Log No. AS-08-04-002R), which

is unrelated. In any event, Petitioner did not present this claim to the California Supreme Court,

and it too is unexhausted. Therefore, all of the claims raised in the instant federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus are unexhausted and the petition must be dismissed without prejudice.

C. Failure to State Cognizable Claim Under Section 2254

Notwithstanding the failure to exhaust the state court remedies, Petitioner’s challenge to

the 2009 disciplinary action- Log No. AS-08-04-002R-is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On January 16, 2008, Petitioner was charged with battery on a peace officer without

serious injury. The original disciplinary decision was modified and a new disciplinary hearing

was ordered. On January 17, 2009 (Log No. AS-08-04-002R-unrelated to Log No. AS-08-09-

0412), Petitioner was found guilty of battery on Officer Gallegos but was not assessed a credit

forfeiture. As a consequence, a favorable decision regarding the disciplinary action would have

no effect on the duration of Petitioner’s confinement. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-

878 (9th Cir. 1990). A habeas corpus petition is only proper to challenge the “legality or

duration” of the inmate’s confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Badea v.

Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). However, a habeas petition is not proper if the fact or

duration of confinement is not implicated. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). 

Therefore, there is no relief that Petitioner can obtain by way of section 2254, and this claim

should be dismissed. 

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition be GRANTED; and

2. The Court of Clerk be directed to dismiss the petition without prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 4, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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