Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01077/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01077-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO YATES,

Plaintiff,

v.

WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-01077-MEJ 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

AMEND COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 50

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Fernando Yates (“Plaintiff”) requests leave to file a Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”). Mot., Dkt. No. 50; see Proposed SAC, Dkt. No. 52. In the Proposed SAC, 

Plaintiff includes additional factual allegations to support his claim for disability discrimination 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. See id. 

Defendant West Contra Costa Unified School District (“Defendant”) filed an Opposition. See

Opp’n, Dkt. No. 54. Plaintiff filed a Reply, which he styled as a second motion to amend. See

Reply, Dkt. No. 56. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES

the January 26, 2017 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the 

parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Pleadings for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as a teacher in one of Defendant’s schools. He alleges Defendant

discriminated against him on the basis of his deafness, and because it perceived him as having a 

physical or mental impairment after he had brain surgery. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 17-23, 

Dkt. No. 25. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant retaliated against him after he objected to being 

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demoted due to his disability. Id. ¶¶ 24-28. Plaintiff now seeks to add factual allegations that 

primarily pertain to an October 2014 request for accommodation, namely, a request to arrange his 

classroom to provide more space between himself and his students. See Mot. at 3-4; Proposed 

SAC ¶ 10; see also Opp’n at 5-6 (describing proposed revisions). Plaintiff asked Defendant to 

stipulate to the filing of the SAC. See Mot. at 3-4. Defendant agreed to do so, on the condition 

Plaintiff remove from the Proposed SAC the same request for punitive damages that exists in the 

operative complaint. See Opp’n at 2; Decl. of T. Murphy (“Murphy Decl.”) ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 54-1; 

see FAC at 4 (Demand for Relief). Defendant explained punitive damages are not recoverable 

against a public entity, and that it would be forced to move to strike the request if Plaintiff filed 

the Proposed SAC as written. Murphy Decl., Ex. C. Plaintiff declined to remove the request for 

punitive damages because Defendant had not previously objected to it. Id.. ¶ 10 & Ex. C. As a 

result, Defendant declined to stipulate to the filing of the SAC, and Plaintiff filed the present 

Motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course within (1) 21 days after serving 

the pleading or (2) 21 days after the earlier of service of a responsive pleading or service of a Rule 

12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Outside of this timeframe, “a party may amend its 

pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” though the court 

“should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although the rule 

should be interpreted with ‘extreme liberality,’ leave to amend is not to be granted automatically.” 

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Plaintiff 

moves for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2).

A court considers five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 

faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 

whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas 

Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Not all of the factors 

merit equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the 

opposing party that carries the greatest weight. Prejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under 

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Rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [] factors, there 

exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis 

in original). “Denials of motions for leave to amend have been reversed when lacking a 

contemporaneous specific finding by the district court of prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith 

by the moving party, or futility of amendment.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

186-87 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

A. Bad Faith

Bad faith may be shown when a party seeks to amend late in the litigation process with 

claims which were, or should have been, apparent early. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Defendant does not argue, nor does the Court find any suggestion, that Plaintiff has 

acted in bad faith.

B. Undue Delay 

“[D]elay alone no matter how lengthy is an insufficient ground for denial of leave to 

amend.” United States v. Webb, 665 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Morongo Band of 

Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). However, undue delay combined 

with other factors may warrant denial of leave to amend. See, e.g., Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387-89

(holding that prejudice and undue delay are sufficient to deny leave to amend); Morongo Band of 

Mission Indians, 893 F.2d at 1079 (“delay of nearly two years, while not alone enough to support 

denial, is nevertheless relevant”).

A moving party’s inability to sufficiently explain its delay may indicate that the delay was 

undue. Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1388. Whether the moving party knew or should have known the 

facts and theories raised in the proposed amendment at the time it filed its original pleadings is a 

relevant consideration in assessing untimeliness. Id. “[L]ate amendments to assert new theories 

are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking 

amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 

Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986). “At some point, . . . a party may not 

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respond to an adverse ruling by claiming that another theory not previously advanced provides a 

possible [ground] for relief and should be considered.” Ascon Prop., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 

F.2d 1149, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff knew the facts he now seeks to use to amend the pleadings 

no later than October 2014, when he participated in a conversation with his employer, and that 

Plaintiff has not explained the reason for his delay. See Opp’n at 7. Plaintiff explains “this claim 

that [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] investigated I did not realize that it was 

part of my Complaint until October 2016. As soon as I realized I sent an email to Defendant’s 

counsel” to seek his agreement to amend the operative complaint. Mot. at 4. The failure to earlier 

assert a failure to accommodate claim might constitute undue delay if Plaintiff was represented by 

counsel, but he is representing himself. See Judan v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2016 WL 4411817, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2016) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se pleadings 

are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”)). Under these 

circumstances, the Court cannot find Plaintiff’s failure to include these allegations earlier 

constitutes undue delay.

C. Prejudice to the Opposing Party

“The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, 

833 F.2d at 187. “A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a 

district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.” Lockheed 

Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Solomon v. North 

Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998)). However, “[n]either delay 

resulting from the proposed amendment nor the prospect of additional discovery needed by the 

non-moving party in itself constitutes a sufficient showing of prejudice.” Tyco Thermal Controls 

LLC v. Redwood Indus., 2009 WL 4907512, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009).

Defendant argues it will be prejudiced because it will incur the “expense for filing a 

responsive pleading to the amended pleading . . . and the need for additional discovery.” Opp’n at 

8; see also Murphy Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. C (additional expenses required to respond to Plaintiff’s 

request for legally-unavailable punitive damages). Defendant further argues the proposed 

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amendments and the necessary discovery will unduly delay the proceedings. Id. These arguments 

are insufficient to show Defendant will suffer “substantial” prejudice as a result of the proposed 

amendment. SeeTyco Thermal Controls, 2009 WL 4907512, at *3. The lack of substantial 

prejudice is underscored by the fact the Court-imposed deadline for amending the pleadings has 

not yet expired, the discovery cut-off is May 23, 2017, and Defendant’s deadline for filing a 

dispositive motion is not until June 22, 2017. See Case Mgmt. Order at 2, Dkt. No. 41. Defendant 

thus has sufficient time to conduct any additional discovery. The Court finds that any prejudice to 

Defendant is minimal.

D. Futility of Amendment

“A motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally 

insufficient. However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under 

the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim[.]” Miller v. 

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). While Defendant 

argues Plaintiff’s “purported disability has nothing to do with the fact that he separated from 

employment with the school district” and that discovery taken to date demonstrates Plaintiff 

resigned after being directed to return to the classroom (Opp’n at 6), Defendant does not 

demonstrate Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile. 

Defendant argues punitive damages are not recoverable against a public entity (Opp’n at 2) 

and asks the Court to order “that any amended complaint not contain a prayer for punitive 

damages” (id. at 8). If Plaintiff were moving to amend the complaint to add a request for punitive 

damages, Defendant’s request might be well-taken on the ground such an amendment would be 

futile. But Plaintiff included a request for punitive damages in his earlier pleading. See FAC,

Demand for Relief. Defendant responded to that pleading without addressing the request for 

punitive damages. Answer, Dkt. No. 26. To the extent Defendant finds it necessary to address 

Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages at the pleading stage, it may do so by moving to strike that 

portion of the SAC. 

E. Previous Amendments

Courts have broader discretion in denying motions for leave to amend after leave to amend 

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has already been granted. Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999). In Chodos, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend when the party knew of the factual basis for 

the amendment prior to a previous amendment. 292 F.3d at 1003. Further, a party that contends it 

learned “new” facts to support a claim should not assert a claim that it could have pleaded in 

previous pleadings. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 2008 WL 913328, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 2, 2008) (citing Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003).

Plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. As discussed above, Plaintiff knew the 

factual basis for the amendment no later than October 2014, but did not understand the legal 

import of the facts until recently. For the same reason the Court declined to find undue delay, the 

Court declines to find that the prior amendment, under the circumstances of this case, precludes 

Plaintiff’s request to file the Proposed SAC. 

F. Defendant’s Additional Arguments

In its Opposition, Defendant argues the Proposed SAC does not conform with the 

applicable local rules because it is not accompanied by a proposed order, and is not on paper with 

numbered lines. Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff submitted a proposed order with his Reply. See Reply at 1. 

The Court will not deny the Motion simply because this pro se party did not use the correct 

numbered lines. Defendant also contends Plaintiff’s failure to provide the required factual and 

legal support for his motion to amend prejudices Defendant. Opp’n at 4-5. The Court finds 

Plaintiff sufficiently states the legal and factual bases for adding a failure to accommodate claim

under the ADA. Finally, if the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend, Defendant asks the Court to 

(1) order Plaintiff to pay all costs Defendant incurred as a result of the delay, and (2) limit the 

proposed amendment to minimize prejudice to only those allegations that bear on legal theories 

asserted. Opp’n at 8. The Court denies these requests: Plaintiff’s amendment is discrete and 

timely, and any prejudice to Defendant is minimal and can be cured by additional discovery. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds no bad faith and no undue delay on Plaintiff’s part; only minimal 

prejudice to Defendant; and no indication the proposed amendment would be futile, the Court

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GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. The Proposed SAC will become the operative 

complaint; Plaintiff need not re-file the document. Defendant shall respond to the SAC no later 

than February 2, 2017 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 5, 2017

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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