Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00161/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeremy R. Deiman, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00161-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

Plaintiff Jeremy Deiman seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied 

him disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i), 

223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 

I. Background 

 A. Factual Background

 Deiman, a thirty-five-year-old male, has a General Equivalency Degree. Between 

1999 and 2011, he worked over thirty short-term jobs in which he resigned or was 

terminated due to his inability to get along with coworkers and supervisors. (Doc. 16 at 

2, 6.) He suffers from “mental illness with associated mood swings, anxiety, panic 

attacks, depression, suicide thoughts/attempts, and social interaction problems. (Id. at 2.) 

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B. Procedural History 

 On November 28, 2011, Deiman applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning August 19, 2010. (A.R. 25.)1

 

On July 23, 2013, he appeared with his attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. 

A vocational expert also testified. 

 On September 3, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Deiman was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Deiman’s 

request for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the 

Commissioner’s final decision. On January 30, 2015, Deiman sought review by this 

Court. 

II. Legal Standard 

 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

 

1

 Deiman amended his original alleged onset date during the hearing. (A.R. 47.) 

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the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

At step one, the ALJ found that Deiman meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through March 31, 2012, and that he has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since January 1, 1999. (A.R. 27.) At step two, the ALJ found 

that Deiman has the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, obsessive 

compulsive disorder (OCD) and borderline personality disorder. (Id.) At step three, the 

ALJ determined that Deiman does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 

Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. (Id. at 30.) 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Deiman has the RFC to perform “a full range of 

work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: The 

claimant can interact with coworkers and supervisors, but is precluded from jobs 

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requiring public contact. He is limited to simple, routine and unskilled work.” (Id. at 31-

32.) The ALJ further found that Deiman has no past relevant work. (Id. at 36.) At step 

five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Deiman’s age, education, work experience, and 

RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he 

could perform. (Id.) 

IV. Analysis 

 Deiman argues the ALJ’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence for three 

reasons: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted Deiman’s credibility regarding the severity 

of his symptoms, (2) the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence in the 

record, and (3) the ALJ improperly relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at Step 

Five. (Doc. 16 at 7.) The Court will address each in turn. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Deiman’s Credibility 

 Deiman argues the ALJ erred in evaluating the credibility of his statements 

regarding the severity of his symptoms. (Doc. 16 at 7.) In evaluating credibility, the ALJ 

is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine whether the claimant 

presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected 

to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; and, if so with no 

evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the 

symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the rejection. 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). “In reaching a credibility 

determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and 

his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among other factors.” Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 At the hearing, Deiman testified that he has held approximately twenty-one jobs in 

the past fifteen years due to “issue[s] getting along with [his] bosses, [his] fellow 

employees, and . . . get[ting] really bored easily and distracted.” (A.R. 48-49.) He stated, 

“I get easily distracted. I need something different and new. So I get frustrated in my 

jobs and tend to have issues. And either I walk out or I get fired.” (Id. at 49.) Deiman 

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testified that he has problems with his bosses and coworkers because he “doesn’t take too 

kindly to being talked down to and it would happen pretty much at every job[.]” (Id.) He 

also disliked “having to take on everyone else’s workload because everyone else is lazy.” 

(Id.) 

 The longest job Deiman sustained was eleven months when he worked at 

Blockbuster Video. (Id.) It ended because he disagreed with new management. (Id. at 

50.) Deiman noted that he occasionally has problems getting along with the general 

public, but that “mostly it’s my coworkers.” (Id.) He stated that problems with 

customers generally resulted from “[p]eople’s attitudes when they come in.” (Id.) 

 Deiman testified that he is diagnosed as seriously mentally ill and suffers from 

bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and OCD. (Id.) He experiences “highs and lows” in 

his mood, but experiences more of the “high” end of the spectrum. (Id. at 51.) This 

results in panic attacks, “shaking, sweaty palms, pain in the chest, headaches,” and his 

mind races, which causes difficulty sleeping. (Id.) He experiences a small panic attack 

every three months. (Id. at 54.) During the “high” phases he begins several projects but 

rarely finishes them. (Id. at 52.) His “highs” can last several months, but he will then 

experience a “low” where he is depressed and has attempted suicide. (Id.) These “low” 

periods last for a month or two. (Id.) Deiman has two service dogs that help him with 

his depression and mood swings. (Id. at 53.) He noted that it takes him longer to 

complete tasks due to his OCD. (Id. at 53.) He has lost friends because of his mental 

impairments because he “doesn’t put up with much . . . BS.” (Id. at 54.) 

 With his friends, Deiman watches movies, plays video games, goes to the dog 

park, and sometimes “just hang[s] out and talk[s] for hours about music and world 

events.” (Id.) He takes medication for his mental impairments, and the medications help 

his symptoms. (Id. at 55.) They also help him get along with other people and he has 

“learned to take a lot more stuff in stride . . . being on medication.” (Id. at 56.) Deiman 

uses medicinal marijuana to help with sleeping and mood. (Id. at 57.) 

 The ALJ provided four reasons for discounting Deiman’s credibility regarding the 

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severity of his symptoms. First, the ALJ noted that Deiman engaged in work activity 

after the alleged onset date, which indicates that his “daily activities have, at least at 

times, been somewhat greater than the claimant has generally reported.” (Id. at 34.) 

Second, the ALJ noted that Deiman’s reported daily activities are inconsistent with his 

allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms. (Id.) Third, treatment and 

medication have been generally successful in controlling his mental symptoms. (Id.) 

Fourth, Deiman has made statements suggestive of poor work motivation. (Id. at 35.) 

 “Evidence of work after the onset date is relevant to a claimant’s credibility.” 

Defrees v. Colvin, No. CV-15-00339-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 5675282, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 28, 2015); see also Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (evidence 

that claimant performed work “under the table” after the date of last insured is a clear and 

convincing reason for discrediting claimant testimony). Here, the ALJ noted that Deiman 

reported beginning a new job in July 2012, (A.R. 717), and that he worked as a rickshaw 

driver in November 2012 and January 2013, (Id. at 867). Deiman claims these jobs 

corroborate his testimony because they evidence his inability to maintain the jobs. (Doc. 

16 at 12.) But Deiman provides no evidence that he quit these jobs because of his 

symptoms, and his own testimony demonstrates that he generally could not maintain 

work because he does not get along with his coworkers and is easily distracted. (A.R. 

50.) The ALJ reasonably relied on Deiman’s ability to work after the onset date as 

evidence that his daily activities are “somewhat greater than normal,” and thus this reason 

for discounting Deiman’s testimony is sufficient. 

 “[W]hether the claimant engaged in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged 

symptoms” is relevant to a claimant’s credibility. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even where those activities suggest 

some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” 

Id. at 1113. The ALJ noted that Deiman engages in “daily activities consistent with good 

mental functioning, including cooking, hiking, swimming, skateboarding, woodworking, 

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shopping for groceries, working out, walking his dog[s] and lifting heavy furniture.” 

(A.R. 34.) Deiman also worked part-time as a rickshaw driver, which involves contact 

with the general public, worked on the computer, read, and socialized with friends. (Id.) 

Deiman argues that merely referencing these activities is insufficient, and that the ALJ 

failed to find these activities were inconsistent with Deiman’s claimed limitations. (Doc. 

16 at 13-14.) He also claims the ALJ ignored his history of aggression and anger-control 

issues. (Id. at 15.) The Court disagrees. 

 Deiman alleges that he cannot perform basic work-related activities, but his ability 

to perform his daily activities of living without difficulty, as well as his ability to 

socialize with friends, undermines his claims that his mental impairments render him 

unable to work at all. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that “[m]ental status examinations 

revealed infrequent anxiety, polite demeanor, good eye contact, cooperative behavior and 

positive attitude.” (A.R. 34.) This undermines Deiman’s claim that he cannot interact 

with coworkers and supervisors. Again, Deiman’s own testimony suggests he does not 

get along with coworkers because he is not satisfied with his job duties, which makes him 

disinterested. In fact, when asked why he has held so many short-term jobs, he does not 

cite his mental impairments, but rather his boredom, distraction, and dislike of being 

“talked down to.” (Id. at 48-49.) This reason for discounting Deiman’s testimony is 

sufficient. 

 An ALJ may discount a claimant’s credibility if the “statements at [his] hearing do 

not comport with objective evidence in [his] medical record.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227. 

Here, the ALJ concluded that treatment and medication have been successful in 

managing Deiman’s symptoms. (A.R. 34.) Indeed, while using his medication and 

attending counseling, Deiman’s mental status examinations “were predominately 

unremarkable and the severity of his symptoms was described as mild-to-moderate.” 

(Id.) Deiman argues his treatment was not successful, citing medical reports and records 

from 2003, 2004, 2009, and 2010 documenting suicidal thoughts and attempts. (Doc. 16 

at 9.) He also points to the August 2010 SMI determination and accuses the ALJ of 

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relying on a “few isolated records.” (Id. at 8-9.) But, as the ALJ noted, the medical 

evidence indicates that Deiman began to improve in October 2010. (A.R. 33.) In May 

2011, Deiman reported that his medications were “working well” and denied side effects. 

(Id.) In October 2011, his mental status exam was unremarkable, and he was noted as 

being stable and improved. (Id.) He exhibited positive behavior at his examinations and 

in February 2013, he reported “feeling fine” and that he was having trouble finding a job, 

not because of his mental symptoms, but because “he has a felony 3 charge against him.” 

(Id. at 856-58.) In May 2012, he stated he is “doing well and is spending more time with 

his girlfriend.” (Id. at 840.) The ALJ noted that although Deiman “has a long history of 

mental illness . . . with treatment, his mental symptoms were no more than mild-tomoderate and did not preclude him from engaging in good daily activities and 

maintaining an active social life.” (Id. at 33.) The ALJ’s finding is reasonable in light of 

the medical records, see Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”), and thus this reason for discounting 

Deiman’s testimony is sufficient. 

 The ALJ may also rely other evidence such as poor work history in evaluating a 

claimant’s credibility. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. Here, the ALJ concluded that 

Deiman made statements suggestive of poor work motivation. (A.R. 35.) For example, 

in February 2013, a therapist recommended that Deiman seek a telemarketing job, but 

Deiman stated that “[h]e wasn’t really looking for that type of work.” (Id.) In addition, 

Deiman noted that he was having trouble finding a job because of his felony conviction, 

not because of his mental impairments. Furthermore, Deiman’s testimony suggests that 

he does not respond well to being told what to do, which leads to problems with his 

supervisors and coworkers. In fact, he told his consulting psychologist that he “does not 

like supervision or following direction” and that he “has ‘walked off’ several jobs[.]” (Id.

at 758.) The Court finds the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence is reasonable, and this 

reason for discounting Deiman’s testimony is sufficient. 

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 In conclusion, the Court finds the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for discounting Deiman’s credibility regarding the severity of his symptoms, and 

that those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591.2

 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating the Medical Source Evidence 

 Deiman argues the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Dr. Safdar Ali and Dr. 

Ronn Lavit. He also argues the ALJ erred in affording significant weight to the opinion 

of Dr. Susan Dougherty. The Court disagrees. 

 1. Legal Standard

 In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit 

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat 

the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and 

(3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight should be given to the 

opinion of a treating physician than to the opinions of non-treating physicians. Id. A 

treating physician’s opinion is afforded great weight because such physicians are 

“employed to cure and [have] a greater opportunity to observe and know the patient as an 

individual.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Where a treating 

physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for 

“clear and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected 

without “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Moreover, the Commissioner must give weight to the treating 

 

2

 Deiman also claims the ALJ improperly discredited his mother’s testimony. (Doc. 16 at 7.) Deiman’s mother, Candi Devereaux, submitted a Third Party Adult Function Report describing Deiman’s symptoms, daily activities of living, social activities, and other information regarding his condition. (A.R. 154-63.) An ALJ must 

provide germane reasons for rejecting lay witness testimony. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. 

Here, the ALJ noted that Devereaux’s “statements appear to be mere extensions of the claimant’s own allegations,” and thus the ALJ rejected her testimony for the same reasons he rejected Deiman’s testimony. (A.R. 35.) An ALJ may rely on the same clear and convincing reasons cited for rejecting a claimant’s testimony to reject a family member’s testimony that appears to be a restatement of the claimant’s testimony. See 

Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). Because the 

ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Deiman’s testimony, he did not err in rejecting Devereaux’s testimony. 

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physician’s subjective judgments in addition to his clinical findings and interpretation of 

test results. Id. at 832-33. 

 2. Dr. Safdar Ali 

 Dr. Safdar Ali, a psychiatrist, treated Deiman for his mental conditions for several 

years and submitted two opinions in his regard. Deiman argues the ALJ erred in (1) 

disregarding one of Dr. Ali’s opinions entirely, and (2) failing to “identify specific 

records and provide his interpretation of how they were at odds with Dr. Ali’s assessed 

limitations.” (Doc. 16 at 19.) Deiman also argues, without analysis, that the ALJ’s 

finding that Dr. Ali’s opinions were inconsistent with the evidence in the record is 

unfounded. (Id.) Dr. Ali’s opinions were contradicted by the opinions of Dr. Ronn Lavit 

and Dr. Susan Daugherty, both of whom assessed lesser mental limitations. Therefore, 

the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for discounting Dr. Ali’s opinions. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

 In support of Deiman’s claim, Dr. Ali submitted two medical opinions. The first, 

dated July 2011, is a “Certification of Disability for Eligibility Purposes” form. (A.R. 

658-59.) The form contains three definitions of disability, including the definition 

prescribed under the Social Security Act, and contains a section entitled “Certification of 

Disability” with the following sentence: “In my professional opinion, the application 

DOES/DOES NOT meet the definition of a Disabled Person, as defined above.” (Id. at 

659.) Dr. Ali circled “DOES” and signed and dated the form. But the form contains no 

explanation, clinical evidence, or observations to support the conclusion. Nor does it 

specify, at a minimum, whether Deiman suffers from a physical, mental, or emotional 

impairment. This opinion is simply not probative as to whether Deiman is disabled, and 

therefore the ALJ did not err by disregarding it. See Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 

739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that An ALJ need not discuss all of the 

evidence in the record, only “significant probative evidence”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 The second opinion, dated July 2013, is a “Medical Assessment of Claimant’s 

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Ability to Perform Work Related Activities (Mental).” (A.R. 875-77.) Therein, Dr. Ali 

indicated that Deiman’s mental impairments severely impacted his ability to relate to 

other people; his ability to understand, carry out, and remember instructions; and his 

ability to respond to customary work pressures. (Id. at 875.) Dr. Ali indicated that 

Deiman had “moderately severe” limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to 

supervision and respond appropriately to co-workers. (Id.) Dr. Ali further noted that 

Deiman was “moderately” limited in his ability to sustain work pace due to his 

impairments. (Id. at 876.) In the “comments” section, Dr. Ali wrote: “Patient suffers 

from chronic serious mental illness.” (Id.) 

 The ALJ assessed reduced weight to this opinion because “inconsistent with 

[Deiman’s] work activity after his alleged onset date, good daily activities, active social 

life, positive response to medication management and treatment notes documenting 

predominately mild-to-moderate symptoms.” (A.R. 35.) Inconsistency with the 

claimant’s daily activities and work activity is a sufficient reason to discount medical 

opinion testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). Here, the ALJ noted 

that Deiman reported that he worked as a rickshaw driver, a job that requires significant 

interaction with the general public, in June 2012. (Id. at 33.) Deiman also reported an 

active social life and good daily activities, such as spending time with his girlfriend, 

hiking, skateboarding, spending time with friends, and walking his dogs. (Id.) These 

activities are inconsistent with Dr. Ali’s July 2013 conclusions that Deiman has severe or 

moderately severe limitations in relating to other people, co-workers, and supervisors. 

 In addition, an ALJ may reject opinion testimony that is contrary to demonstrated 

improvement with medication and medical treatment. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Deiman 

claims the ALJ failed to set forth his own interpretations of the evidence and failed to 

acknowledge the positive medical findings that supported a finding of disability. (Doc. 

16 at 9.) But the ALJ thoroughly summarized Dr. Ali’s treatment notes on the preceding 

page and specifically referred to notes that favored Deiman’s case. For example, the ALJ 

states that “[i]n January 2012 and April 2012, [Deiman’s] mental symptoms were 

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moderate due to increase[d] anxiety symptoms. (A.R. 33.) The ALJ then notes that, “by 

May 2012, his mental symptoms improved; he exhibited polite behavior, pleasant 

demeanor and good grooming.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted that in February 2013, Deiman 

reported “feeling fine” and “denied symptoms of mania, psychosis, depression and 

anger.” (Id.) Dr. Ali’s unsupported conclusions conflict with Deiman’s self-reported 

improvement, and thus the ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Ali’s opinion was 

inconsistent with Deiman’s positive response to treatment. 

 Deiman claims that the ALJ’s reasons are unsupported by the evidence. However, 

Deiman offers no explanation, points to no inconsistencies, and fails to cite a single piece 

of contradictory medical evidence in the record. In contrast, the ALJ thoroughly 

summarized all of the key medical evidence, offered his interpretation, and set forth 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Dr. 

Ali’s medical opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

 3. Dr. Ronn Lavit 

 In December 2012, Dr. Ronn Lavit, a consultative psychologist, examined Deiman 

and assessed his capacity for mental work-related activities. (A.R. 758-64.) Dr. Lavit 

opined that Deiman was unimpaired in his ability to “understand and remember simple 

and complex instructions;” may be impaired in his ability to “sustain a normal routine 

without special supervision due to mood swings, depression, anxiety/panic attacks and 

not respecting authority figures;” may be impaired in his ability to “get along with cworkers, respond appropriately to supervision and maintain socially appropriate 

behavior;” would most likely “require a smaller work environment with limited 

interaction with others;” and “may have limitations in his ability to respond appropriately 

to heightened stresses/changes in the workplace.” (Id. at 764.) The ALJ gave 

“significant weight to Dr. Lavit’s opinion regarding [Deiman’s] ability to perform simple 

and complex instructions because it is consistent with his daily activities and mental 

status examinations documenting good intellect, intact cognition and good 

concentration.” (Id. at 35.) Significant weight was also afforded to the conclusion that 

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Deiman had the ability “to avoid normal hazards because it is consistent with [his] work 

activity as a rickshaw driver and mental status examinations documenting intact insight 

and intact judgment.” (Id.) The rest of Dr. Lavit’s opinion was afforded reduced weight 

“because it is somewhat vague and overly reliant on [Deiman’s] subjective complaints, 

which are inconsistent with treatment notes documenting an active social life, good daily 

activities, work activity in a public setting and mild-to-moderate symptom severity.” 

(Id.) The ALJ also noted that “Dr. Lavit’s opinion is overly restrictive considering 

[Deiman’s] infrequent anxiety, good concentration, intact memory, polite demeanor, 

good eye contact, cooperative behavior and positive attitude.” (Id.) 

 Deiman argues the ALJ should have given greater weight to Dr. Lavit’s opinion 

regarding social interaction because it found several areas of limited ability based on 

Deiman’s self-reports, medical records, and examination findings. (Doc. 16 at 21.) 

Deiman also claims Dr. Lavit found Deiman credible, and that the record as a whole 

demonstrates Deiman’s “extensive history of ongoing serious mental illness, including 

multiple suicide attempts; repeated episodes of suicide ideation; mood fluctuations; 

aggressive behavior; anger-control issues; difficulty interacting with others; and limited 

judgment, insight, and impulse control.” (Id. at 22.) But the ALJ set forth several 

specific reasons for discounting part of Dr. Lavit’s opinion, and the ALJ’s interpretation 

of the evidence is reasonable. Dr. Lavit’s report indicates that Deiman “takes medication 

and the medications work[s] a 8 out of 10 scale.” (A.R. 758.) The report documents an 

extensive list of social activities, including spending time with several friends, girlfriend, 

and interacting with over 375 Facebook friends. (Id. at 759.) In addition, Dr. Lavit’s 

findings regarding Deiman’s ability to interact with others appear to based solely on 

Deiman’s reports, as the report documents that Deiman had appropriate hygiene, good 

eye contact, was cooperative with Dr. Lavit, exhibited normal trust, exhibited warmth 

during the exam, had appropriate mood, exhibited normal range of emotions, and was 

otherwise personable during the exam. (Id. at 760-61.) Indeed, several other medical 

records corroborate Deiman’s stable emotional state. (Id. at 35.) Furthermore, the ALJ 

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found Deiman’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms not credible, which 

undermines Dr. Lavit’s reliance on Deiman’s self-reported symptoms. In sum, the ALJ’s 

interpretation of the evidence is reasonable given the evidence in the record, see Batson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the 

Commissioner’s findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from 

the record, and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, we 

must defer to the Commissioner’s decision”), and the Court finds the ALJ set forth 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting part of 

Dr. Lavit’s opinion. 

 4. Dr. Susan Daugherty 

 In January 2013, Dr. Susan Daugherty, a non-examining State agency 

psychologist, reviewed Deiman’s medical records and submitted a Mental Residual 

Functional Capacity Assessment. (A.R. 769-86.) Dr. Daugherty opined that Deiman “is 

able to perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental to work performed, e.g. 

assembly work; complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote, few variables, little 

judgment; supervision required is simple, direct and concrete (unskilled).” (Id. at 772.) 

The ALJ afforded great weight to Dr. Daugherty’s opinion “because it is consistent with 

[Deiman’s] occasionally anxious mood, diagnosis of borderline personality disorder with 

positive response [to] treatment, active social life, good daily activities and mild-tomoderate mental symptom[s].” (Id. at 36.) 

 Deiman argues Dr. Daugherty failed to link her assessment to specific evidence in 

the record, and thus the ALJ erred in affording her opinion great weight. (Doc. 16 at 23.) 

Deiman also argues the ALJ failed to explain how Dr. Daugherty’s opinion is consistent 

with the record. (Id. at 24.) He further argues that Dr. Daugherty’s opinion is not 

consistent with the record, and the ALJ failed to reconcile inconsistencies between his 

assessment and Dr. Daugherty’s assessment of the evidence. (Id.) The Court disagrees. 

 Dr. Daugherty provided an explanation of her findings and cited medical evidence 

in the record, (A.R. 772), and the ALJ adequately explained that Dr. Daugherty’s 

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assessment was consistent with the record medical evidence and cited several of those 

records, (Id. at 36). The ALJ’s assessment need not exactly mirror the assessment of the 

medical source opinion. It must take into account all relevant evidence, which the ALJ 

must then weigh, interpret, and offer his own conclusions. Moreover, Deiman challenges 

only one of the reasons cited by the ALJ: consistency with the medical evidence. But 

Deiman fails to explain how Dr. Daugherty’s assessment is inconsistent with the medical 

evidence. He merely states that these “limitations did not adequately account for Mr. 

Deiman’s impairments.” (Doc. 16 at 25.) Deiman also argues that he cannot work 

because he dislikes following supervision and following directions, which leads to 

confrontations with his supervisors. But Deiman does not connect his problem with 

authority to his mental condition. And the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Daugherty’s opinion is 

consistent with the medical record is reasonable. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in 

affording great weight to Dr. Daugherty’s assessment. 

C. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Five 

 Deiman argues the ALJ erred in relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines 

(the “grids”) in determining that he could perform other work. (Doc. 16 at 25.) The grids 

“relieve the Secretary of the need to rely on vocational experts by establishing through 

rulemaking the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy.” Heckler v. 

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1952). They are a matrix of the claimant’s qualifications, 

including RFC, which correspond with jobs requiring certain combinations of the 

qualifications. Id. “Where a claimant’s qualifications correspond to the job requirements 

identified by a rule, the guidelines direct a conclusion as to whether work exists that the 

claimant could perform.” Id. “When the grids do no match the claimant’s qualifications, 

the ALJ can either (1) use the grids as a framework and make a determination of what 

work exists that the claimant can perform, or (2) rely on a vocational expert when the 

claimant has significant non-exertional limitations.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[w]hen a claimant’s non-exertional limitations are 

sufficiently severe so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the 

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claimant’s exertional limitations, the grids are inapplicable.” Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 

F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Deiman asserts the RFC contains severe non-exertional limitations not accounted 

for in the grids; specifically that he was limited to “simple, routine and unskilled work” 

with no public contact. (Id.) But the ALJ found that the occupational base of work at 

any exertional level is not significantly eroded where the claimant is precluded from 

public contact and limited to simple, routine and unskilled work. (A.R. 36.) In other 

words, the limitations are no so severe as to limit the types of jobs Deiman can perform. 

Deiman fails to challenge these findings. As such, the ALJ reasonably relied on the grids 

as a framework in determining whether Deiman could perform other work. See Hoopai, 

499 F.3d at 1075. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 27th day of April, 2016.

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge

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