Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01947/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01947-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

John Garcia,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 03-1947 MCE PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Mule Creek State Prison, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action against prison officials. Plaintiff claims

defendant Dr. Wong at Salinas Valley State Prison and defendant

Dr. Smith at Mule Creek State Prison misdiagnosed plaintiff’s

condition as pink eye, resulting in improper treatment and

causing the loss of the eye, in violation of plaintiff’s rights

under the Eighth Amendment. 

February 25, 2005, Drs. Smith and Wong moved for summary

judgment. Plaintiff opposed June 1, 2005, and defendants replied

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July 7, 2005. (December 17, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of

the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035

(1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).)

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

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Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment . . . .” McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth

Amendment occurs when prison officials deliberately are

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold

for a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

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Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted).

“Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197

(acknowledging a plaintiff may demonstrate that officers “must

have known” of a risk of harm by showing the medical need was

obvious and extreme). Delay in medical treatment can amount to

deliberate indifference if (1) the delay seriously affected the

medical condition for which plaintiff was seeking treatment, and

(2) defendants were aware the delay would cause serious harm. 

Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d

404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).

The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff arrived at Mule

Creek State Prison September 13, 2001, and Dr. Smith examined his

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right eye September 19, 2001. Dr. Smith diagnosed

conjunctivitis, prescribed an antibiotic ointment and referred

plaintiff to the Eye Clinic where he was examined by a contract

optometrist, Dr. Col, September 20, 2001. Dr. Col referred

plaintiff to Dr. Tesluk, an opthalmologist, who examined

plaintiff September 21, 2001. Dr. Tesluk found that part of

plaintiff’s eye was hemorrhaging and some of the vasculature of

the eye was inflamed, secondary to plaintiff’s diabetes. Tesluk

also found partial retinal detachment stemming from a penetrating

injury in plaintiff’s childhood. Tesluk treated plaintiff over

the ensuing months, eventually removing his right eye and

inserting a prosthesis.

There is nothing to suggest Dr. Smith gave plaintiff

deficient treatment. Smith’s referrals enabled plaintiff to

receive extensive opthalmological treatment commencing within two

days. Indeed, plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment claims

no misconduct by Smith. Dr. Smith is entitled to judgment in his

favor.

Defendant Wong’s declaration in support of summary judgment

states as follows. Plaintiff came to Wong as a walk-in patient

January 22, 2001, complaining of tenderness and a burning

sensation in his right eye. Wong noted in the medical chart that

plaintiff suffered insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus and there

was no prior chart “available” for him. Wong diagnosed 

conjunctivitis of the right eye and prescribed Cortisporin. Wong

decl. para. 5. February 1, 2001, Wong examined plaintiff’s

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finger and athlete’s foot; plaintiff did not complain about his

eye. Wong decl. para. 6. April 16, 2001, plaintiff visited Wong

in the clinic and asked to resume Dilantin, a seizure medication. 

Plaintiff said nothing about his eye. Wong decl. para. 7. May

14, 2001, plaintiff visited Wong in the clinic and complained his

right eye hurt and was “tearing” excessively. Dr. Wong found no

conjunctivital infection (viz., redness) in either of plaintiff’s

eyes, diagnosed ocular allergy and prescribed Naphazoline, an

antihistimine. Wong decl. para. 8. May 21, plaintiff visited

Wong in the clinic stating his right eye had not improved. Dr.

Wong observed there was a tiny infection, diagnosed bacterial

conjunctivitis and eczema, and ordered Tobradez, an antibiotic. 

Wong decl. para. 9. June 8, 2001, plaintiff visited Dr. Wong in

the clinic complaining of skin ulcers on his chest, left thigh

and right buttocks but said nothing about his eye. Wong decl.

para. 10. July 2, 2001, plaintiff visited Dr. Wong in the clinic

for additional treatment of his skin infection and complained of

no eye problems. Wong decl. para. 11. August 20, 2001,

plaintiff visited Dr. Wong in the clinic complaining of a skin

infection on his leg and requesting pain medicine but did not

complain about his eye. Wong decl. para. 12. September 5, 2001,

Dr. Wong ordered insulin for plaintiff. Wong decl. para. 13.

Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment includes his

declaration that January 22, 2001, he told Dr. Wong his right eye

was bloodshot, constantly watering and caused such pain plaintiff

could not sleep, his eyesight was failing and an ophthomologist

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had ordered a “B-Scan” after examining him August 15, 2000. Dr.

Wong said he knew of the prior examination and plaintiff would

see an ophthalmologist and get the B-Scan. Opposition page 3. 

Plaintiff avers he saw Dr. Wong again February 1, 2001, and told

him he had gone completely blind, the pain was worse, his

condition was deteriorating and the medicine was not working but

that Dr. Wong said to give the medicine more time to work. 

Opposition page 3. Plaintiff avers that when he saw Dr. Wong 

April 16, 2001, plaintiff complained of eye pain, burning, and

blindness. Opposition page 3. Plaintiff avers that when he saw

Dr. Wong May 14, 2001, plaintiff was in unbearable pain and his

eye was swollen, closing, watering and burning; he told Wong the

Naphazaline was not working and asked to see a specialist. Dr.

Wong promised plaintiff would see a specialist and prescribed

Motrin in the meantime. Plaintiff told Dr. Wong May 21, 2001,

that the treatments were not working, the pain was worse, and he

could not eat or sleep. Plaintiff’s eye burned and watered more

and was completely bloodshot. Dr. Wong changed plaintiff’s

medication to Toberdex and promised plaintiff would see an

opthalmologist. Opposition page 4. Plaintiff filed a grievance

June 10, 2001, addressed to Dr. Wong at the informal level,

claiming Dr. Wong was not properly treating plaintiff’s eye but

Dr. Wong never responded. Opposition page 4. When plaintiff saw

Dr. Wong July 2, 2001, plaintiff asked why Dr. Wong did not

respond to the grievance. Dr. Wong said there was nothing he

could do because plaintiff was already partially blind from his

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childhood accident. Dr. Wong allegedly said that all he could do

was have plaintiff transferred to Administrative Segregation for

“protected custody.” Plaintiff asked if that was a threat and

Wong laughed. Opposition page 5. August 10, 2001, plaintiff

filed another grievance requesting examination by an

opthalmologist or eye specialist for severe pain, blindness, and

a swollen, bloodshot and watering eye. Dr. Wong examined

plaintiff August 20, 2001. Plaintiff again asked Dr. Wong why he

did not answer the grievance requesting an opthalmological

examination. Plaintiff again mentioned the need for a B-Scan and

Wong said he would receive one. Plaintiff told Dr. Wong

plaintiff soon would be transferred to another prison and

plaintiff was transferred to Mule Creek September 13, 2001. 

Opposition page 6.

Plaintiff also presents Dr. Wong’s response to an

interrogatory stating “[a]lthough the medical record entry for

February 1, 2001, does not reflect that plaintiff presented

complaints of the right eye on that day, it is my normal practice

to see how the inmate/patient was doing from the last visit.” 

Plaintiff also submits a copy of the consultation notes from the

August 2000 opthalmology examination, which reflects the need for

a B-Scan.

There are factual disputes and they would be material to a

negligence claim, but they are not material to resolving the

Eighth Amendment claim. Dr. Wong consistently examined

plaintiff, provided treatment and made a record of the treatment;

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he may have been wrong but there is no evidence of willfulness. 

Defendant Wong is entitled to summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendants’

February 25, 2005, motion for summary judgment be granted.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 4, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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