Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00380/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00380-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CINDY THAO 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, 

 Respondent. 

 No. 2:16-cv-00380 WBS GGH P 

 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

Introduction and Summary

 Petitioner pled guilty to first degree felony murder in 2007 and was sentenced in that year 

as well. It is undisputed that her conviction was final for AEDPA purposes on June 8, 2008. The 

federal petition at issue was filed in February 2016. It would be the rare case in which the 

AEDPA statute of limitations would not require that the petition be dismissed. Although there 

are a few twists here to the ordinary AEDPA limitations analysis, including what specific 

subsection for the commencement of the AEDPA limitations applies, or whether a claim for 

actual innocence obviates the AEDPA limitations preclusions altogether, this ultimately is not one 

of those rare cases. Drilling down through the layers of tolling analysis set forth in the Motion to 

Dismiss, petitioner ultimately asserts that the claims brought in her federal petition demonstrate 

that she was actually innocent of the first degree murder to which she pled guilty, because the law 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 1 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

of California pertinent to those claims changed making her substantively innocent. However, to 

pass through the actual innocence gateway for AEDPA limitations purposes, petitioner must 

demonstrate a strong showing of actual innocence. Because she is incorrect on the state law on 

which she bases her argument, the petition should be dismissed as having been filed beyond any 

permissible time period. 

28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) Analysis

 Most AEDPA limitations issues commence with a discussion of this section (1 year 

limitation period from date of finality of conviction). Respondent has set forth the entire history 

of plaintiff’s direct and habeas review (9 petitions) in state courts with a thorough review of 

possible tolling provisions. It serves no purpose to repeat, or simply retype here, that clear, 

concise, complete and correct analysis. Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11 at pp 2-10. Suffice it to 

say that at the end of the day, petitioner’s federal petition was filed over six years past the 

expiration of the one year limitations period. 

 Moreover, petitioner does not disagree whatsoever with the nuts and bolts of the analysis; 

she tacitly concedes that on the face of it, the limitations period expired. See Opposition, ECF 

No. 15. Nor does she argue any reason for equitable tolling (impediment to filing external to 

petitioner’s diligent efforts) except as it inferentially has to do with actual innocence—discussed 

below. To overcome these problems, she first erroneously asks this court to apply a “cause and 

prejudice” analysis, appropriate as if the issue here were procedural default of an independent and 

adequate state law bar, but it is not.1 There is no cause and prejudice analysis applicable to 

AEDPA limitations issues except to the extent those concepts have been incorporated into federal 

equitable tolling law. Moreover, there were no external impediments imposed on plaintiff to 

//// 

 

1

 Petitioner interprets the Motion to Dismiss based on untimeliness as being based upon state law 

on the timely filing of petitions in state court. However, it is the federal limitations statute for the 

filing of federal habeas petitions which is at issue here. Title 28 U.S.C. section 2244. The denial 

of state petitions based on untimeliness and successiveness under state law plays a role in the 

tolling analysis for the federal statute, section 2244(d)(2), i.e., whether such state petitions would 

be considered “properly filed” for purposes of federal tolling analysis, but it is not state law which 

ultimately governs whether the federal petition was timely filed. 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 2 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

filing a federal habeas corpus petition, and she does not argue any; indeed, she filed nine habeas 

petitions in the state courts throughout the years. 

 What are left of petitioner’s possible arguments to avoid the AEDPA limitations 

expiration are discussed in the next section. 

The Remainder of The AEDPA Limitations Sections and Actual Innocence.

 A quick review of the claims in the petition is necessary to discuss the remaining possible 

bases petitioner may have for a timely petition. The petition, filed February 22, 2016 contains 

two claims: (1) People v. Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th 155 (2014) (aider and abettor cannot be found guilty 

of first degree murder under the “natural and probable consequence” theory) must have its 

holding applied to petitioner’s case final in 2008; (2) People v. Banks, 61 Cal. 4th 788 (2015) 

(special circumstance felony murder may not attach to a defendant in the underlying felony, e.g., 

robbery, unless the defendant was a “major participant” in the underlying felony. Petitioner 

asserts that these cases render her first degree murder conviction invalid. These cases, of course, 

post-dated petitioner’s conviction herein, and were not claims in petitioner’s direct review or 

earliest habeas petitions. 

 On the face of it, petitioner might argue that section 2244(d)(1)(C) applies—one year 

limitations period commences upon constitutional right recognized retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court. However, as pointed out by respondent, the “Supreme 

Court” referenced is the United States Supreme Court and not the supreme court of the individual 

states. 

 Next, petitioner might argue that section 2244(d)(1)(D) applies which commences the one 

year limitations period on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of diligence.” If the “factual 

predicate” were the date of issuance of these fairly recent state court decisions, the petition might 

be timely. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the “factual predicate” only applies to the 

facts of a substantive claim, e.g., date of revelation of Brady violations, not the date a substantive 

right became legally recognized in another case. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 

(9th Cir. 2005). See also Torres v. Johnson, 2015 WL 5025524 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 3 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

 Finally, “actual innocence” is an exception to all section 2244(d) provisions under which a 

claim would otherwise be barred because of untimeliness. McQuiggin v. Perkins, __U.S._, 133 

S.Ct. 1924 (2013). That is, a credible actual innocence claim is not barred because of 

untimeliness. And, a change in the law subsequent to one’s conviction rendering the entirety of a 

conviction, or an aspect of the conviction, non-actionable is a claim of actual innocence. Vosgien 

v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Miller v. Arnold, 2016 WL 

1068381 (C.D. Cal 2016). If a change in California law was in fact applicable to the substance of 

petitioner’s conviction, her federal petition could not be barred by section 2244. 

 But, neither Chiu nor Banks apply to petitioner’s conviction. Although the abstract of 

judgment simply provides that petitioner was adjudged guilty of first degree murder, ECF No. 12, 

respondent has set forth the factual findings of the Superior Court that petitioner pled to-- nonspecial circumstance felony murder, and was sentenced thereon. 

[P]etitioner was not convicted of first degree murder based solely on the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine. Rather, petitioner pleaded no contest to a 

charge of first degree felony murder. The record reflects that at the outset of the 

change of plea hearing held on February 1, 2007, the prosecutor stated that 

petitioner’s “plea to first degree murder that was committed in the course of 

robbery is appropriate,” and that due to petitioner’s age and lack of prior criminal 

record that dismissal of the special circumstance would be appropriate so as to 

render her eligible for parole. Petitioner’s counsel then informed the court that 

“it’s the felony murder rule,” that he had “gone over it numerous times” and “had 

another judge explain the felony murder rule” to petitioner; that he had actually sat 

down with the jury instructions and “gone over how an attempted robbery would 

lead to a murder charge with life without possibility of parole”; and that he had 

read cases to petitioner “as to how the law applies and how it basically came from 

common law and [he could not] break it in the California system.” The prosecutor 

then stated the factual basis of the plea, which was that petitioner and her 

codefendants went to a motel with a plan to commit a robbery, that the 

codefendants demanded a wallet from the intended victim, that the victim said he 

did not have a wallet, that a codefendant then shot the victim, killing him, that 

petitioner had been the driver to and from the motel and had discussed the robbery 

plan with the codefendants before coming to the motel; in addition, it was stated 

she had given a revolver to a codefendant who used it during the commission of 

the attempted robbery. There was no objection to the recitation of the factual basis 

of the plea, and petitioner thereafter pleaded no contest to the murder. Clearly, 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 4 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

petitioner understood that she was being prosecuted on a felony-murder theory; at 

no point in time did either counsel, the prosecutor, or the court make mention of 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, even if Chiu were 

found to apply retroactively to cases already final, such as petitioner’s, petition 

would not be entitled to any relief based on that decision because the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine was not the basis for her murder conviction. 

ECF No. 12, Lodged Doc 14; see also Lodged Doc 19. 

 Findings of fact by the state courts carry a presumption of correctness, even when the 

factual issue relates to procedural matters (here the murder to which petitioner pled.) Wainwright 

v. Sykes, 469 U.S. 412, 428-429 (1985). Moreover, although petitioner alleges that the natural 

and probable consequence doctrine was a part of her plea, petitioner does not demonstrate 

through record evidence this specific basis for her conviction.2 Accordingly, actual innocence 

cannot be a basis herein upon which to find that section 2244(d)(1), the AEDPA limitations 

statute, does not apply. 

Conclusion

 Petitioner’s federal petition, filed February 22, 2016 is untimely, and the petition should 

be dismissed on that basis. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are 

//// 

 

2

 Although aiding and abetting can be a concept in felony murder where a co-participant in a 

robbery or burglary etc. commits the actual killing, see bracketed alternative in CALCRIM 540B, 

it is not a required basis for conviction on felony murder. People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal 4th 187, 197-

199 (2004). In any event, the potential for aiding and abetting in a felony murder conviction is 

not based on the aider and abettor committing actions with the natural and probable consequence 

of murder, which was, until Chiu, a theory of conviction for aider and abettor first degree murder 

unto itself. Felony murder was expressly held outside the ambit of its ruling. Chiu at 166. 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 5 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 10, 2017 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:16-cv-00380-WBS-GGH Document 20 Filed 02/13/17 Page 6 of 6