Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00973/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00973-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JAMES D. NIX, )) Plaintiff, ) 2:10-cv-00973 JWS ) vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION ) HUDSON BAYLOR CORPORATION, ) [Re: Motions at Dockets 40 & 45]

et al., )) Defendants. ))

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 40, defendant Hudson Baylor Corporation (“defendant”) moves to

dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) and 16(f)(1)(C). 

Pro se plaintiff James D. Nix (“plaintiff”) opposes the motion at docket 41. Defendant’s

reply is at docket 43. Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s reply (a sur-reply) at

docket 44. 

At docket 45, defendant moves to strike plaintiff’s sur-reply.

Oral argument was not requested with respect to either motion and would not

assist the court.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion at Docket 45

Defendant correctly argues that plaintiff improperly filed a sur-reply. It is not

necessary to strike the document, however, because the court will not consider

plaintiff’s sur-reply in resolving the motion at docket 40.

B. Motion at Docket 40

In the court’s scheduling and planning order of August 1, 2011, the parties were

advised that final witness lists were to be filed not later than February 6, 2012. The

parties were warned that “[o]nly those witnesses disclosed in a timely filed witness list

[would] be permitted to testify at trial.”1

 Defendant filed its final witness list on

February 6, 2012. Plaintiff did not file his witness list until April 30, 2012, when he

responded to the present motion. Plaintiff’s witness list contains only one name: Shelly

Kirker.

Rule 16(f) provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may issue any just

orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv), if a party . . . fails to obey

a scheduling . . . order.”2 Among other sanctions, Rule 37(b)(2) contemplates

“dismissing the action . . . in whole or in part.”3

 However, to determine whether a case

dispositive sanction is appropriate, a court must consider “(1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the

risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition

of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”4

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Doc. 33 at 5.

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C).

3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).

4

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2007).

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The first two factors will always weigh in favor of dismissal when a scheduling

order is violated. That is so here. However, the final three factors weigh against

dismissal. The risk of prejudice to defendant is slight because plaintiff’s late-filed

witness list contains only one name. The public policy favoring disposition of cases on

their merits also weighs against dismissal. In considering the availability of less drastic

sanctions, a court should evaluate “whether [it] has considered lesser sanctions,

whether it tried them, and whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of

case-dispositive sanctions.”5 Here, the court has not had occasion to consider or

impose lesser sanctions because plaintiff has not been recalcitrant. Lesser sanctions

are available. In light of plaintiff’s explanation that he thought a joint scheduling and

planning memorandum that listed Shelly Kirker as a person to be deposed would be

sufficient,6

 the court concludes that sanctions are not necessary.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, defendant’s motion to strike at docket 45 is DENIED as

moot. Defendant’s motion to dismiss at docket 40 for failure to follow the scheduling

and planning order is DENIED.

DATED this 11th day of June 2012.

 /s/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Id.

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Doc. 32 at 2.

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