Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01573/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01573-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL P. LOGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 

COUNTY OF NAPA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01573-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 

COUNTY OF NAPA'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 7

On May 1, 2015, Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Napa (“Superior 

Court”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Darrell P. Logan Jr.’s complaint on the grounds that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, such that 

the action must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Additionally, 

Defendant seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the state court’s judicial 

immunity precludes relief.

Upon review of the parties’ papers, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and, for the reasons set forth below, 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend, because any amendment would 

be futile.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darrell Logan Jr. owned a Kawasaki Ninja Motorcycle. (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 10 

at 1.) On September 4, 2013, the motorcycle, driven by Plaintiff's brother, was involved in an 

accident with a driver insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"). 

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff’s brother was deemed at fault, but Plaintiff’s motorcycle was 

not covered by a valid insurance policy, so Liberty Mutual paid a claim for property damage to its 

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insured in the amount of $10,015.77. (Compl. at 11; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 65.)

On September 20, 2013, Liberty Mutual hired Defendant Jeffrey W. Parks (“Parks”) as 

counsel to recover the monies paid to its insured. (Def.’s Mot. at 2.) On April 16, 2014, Liberty 

Mutual filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Napa against Plaintiff, as 

the legal owner (according to the California Department of Motor Vehicles), and his brother. 

(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) Thereafter, Parks’ office building experienced an electrical fire, and his law 

practice moved to a temporary location. (Compl. at 4.) Parks claims to have made arrangements 

with the United States Postal Service to pick up his mail from the post office so that his mail 

service was not interrupted. (Def.’s Mot. at 3.)

On February 9, 2015, Superior Court Judge Rodney Stone presided over a bench trial, 

where Liberty Mutual prevailed, and entered judgment against Plaintiff1, as the legal owner, in the 

amount of $10,015.77, plus court costs of $1,305.34, for a total judgment of $11,321.11. (Compl. 

at 11; 2/9/15 Minute Order, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 68.) The Court ordered Parks to prepare the judgment. 

(Compl. at 11; 2/9/15 Minute Order at 68.)

On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed an appeal in the Napa County Court Appellate Division. 

(Compl. at 6.) On April 13, 2015, before it could be heard, Plaintiff filed an abandonment of 

appeal. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14 at 2.)

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff Darrell P. Logan Jr. filed a complaint against the Superior Court 

and Jeffrey W. Parks alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 U.S.C. § 554, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 

201, 242, 1341, 1342, and 1510. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff attached filings from the state court case 

as exhibits to his complaint, as well as his account of what transpired during the state court trial. 

(Compl. at 8-13.)

On May 1, 2015, the Superior Court filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 7.) On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 16.) On May 22, 2015, the Superior Court filed its reply. 

(Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 19.)

 

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Plaintiff’s brother was dismissed as a defendant at the conclusion of trial, because he was not 

properly served with the complaint and summons. (2/9/15 Minute Order, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 68.)

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On May 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant(s) 

Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Down Defendant(s) Motion to Dismiss,” in which 

Plaintiff claimed that he was not seeking to vacate a ruling, but was “asking this court to examine 

the Crimes committed by the Defendant(s) against the U.S. Postal Services and The Constitution 

of the Unites States of America....” (Pl.’s Surreply, Dkt. No. 24 at 2.) The Court will construe this 

as a surreply. While Plaintiff did not seek leave of court to file the surreply, the Court will take it 

under submission.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether a complaint 

alleges grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction will be granted if the complaint on its face fails to allege facts sufficient to 

establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 

1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court “is not restricted to the 

face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve 

factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 

558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. 

See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or 

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there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate "more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 

the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 

Eleventh Amendment, and the fact that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring claims against the 

Superior Court. (Def.’s Mot. at 2.) The Court will address each argument below.

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A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars the instant case.

Defendant argues that the Rooker-Feldman2doctrine serves as a complete bar to Plaintiff’s 

federal lawsuit, because it is a de facto appeal of the state court judgment such that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that the allegations 

against Defendant are not barred by Rooker-Feldman, because his complaint is about “[e]vidence 

and finding out the [t]ruth.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear direct 

appeals from the judgments of state courts. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The purpose of the doctrine is to “protect state judgments from collateral federal attack.” Doe & 

Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only 

over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal,” but also “the de facto equivalent of such an 

appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether an action 

functions as a de facto appeal, we “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal court 

plaintiff.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). An action functions as a forbidden de facto appeal when the plaintiff is: “[1] 

assert[ing] as his injury legal errors by the state court and [2] see[king] as his remedy relief from 

the state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). Here, Plaintiff seeks to vacate the state court judgment due to the state 

court’s alleged “errors in the administration of Administrative Justice....” (Compl. at 3, 7.) Since 

Plaintiff alleges as his legal injury an erroneous decision by the state court, and seeks as his 

remedy relief from that judgment, this is a de facto appeal.

In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined 

with the state court judgment. (Def.’s Mot. at 5.) In Feldman, the Supreme Court held that “[i]f 

the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined 

 

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two United States Supreme Court cases: 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity 

Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

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with the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application for 

admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state 

court decision.” 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16. In opposition, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Parks 

and Judge Stone engaged in various forms of misconduct and criminal acts during the state court 

trial, including conspiracy and racketeering. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, 5.) Even if Plaintiff had standing 

and a private right of action to enable him to bring these causes of action, the district court would 

be required to review the state court decision, which it is unable to do. See Worldwide Church of 

God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1986). Indeed, Plaintiff’s only available avenue 

was to maintain an appeal with the California Court of Appeal, which he appears to have

abandoned. (Pl’s Opp’n at 2.)

Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the district court of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

B. Governmental immunity under the Eleventh Amendment

Even if the lawsuit was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Defendant contends 

that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit, because it is a state entity for the purposes of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity and, therefore, no relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mot. 

at 7, 11.) “[A] suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be 

paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Quern v. 

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1143 (1979). State courts are state entities for the 

purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. 

Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The only way this action could be sustained against the Superior Court would be if it

waived its sovereign immunity. Waiver of a state’s eleventh amendment immunity can be found 

only when evidenced “‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from 

the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 

U.S. 651, 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). Here, there is 

no allegation that Defendant waived its sovereign immunity. Thus, absent waiver, the instant 

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lawsuit against the Superior Court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.3

C. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring any claims, because 

there is no legal controversy between Plaintiff and the Superior Court. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.) 

Generally, a plaintiff must have standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to 

pursue relief in federal court. Article III standing requires the demonstration of three elements: (1) 

the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 

by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). If these 

requirements are not satisfied, the action must be dismissed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998). In light of the immunity enjoyed by the Superior Court and 

Judge Stone, Plaintiff’s alleged injury cannot be redressed, because his suit is barred, so the third 

element is not met.

Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims because the Superior Court is 

immune from suit.

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3 Any lawsuit against Judge Stone would also be barred, because judicial officers are entitled to 

unqualified immunity from civil suits arising out of the exercise of their judicial functions. Mireles 

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Furthermore, “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of 

bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in 

discovery and eventual trial.” Id. Therefore, even though Judge Stone is accused of engaging in 

misconduct, he enjoys judicial immunity, and Plaintiff cannot obtain any relief from him in this 

instance.

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IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Superior Court’s motion to dismiss is granted without leave to 

amend, because the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine, and the Superior Court enjoys immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 

These defects cannot be cured by amendment. 

The Clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2015

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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