Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01738/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARSHA D. SKELLY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; 

FEDERAL STUDENT AID 

COMMISSION; FEDLOAN 

SERVICING, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 17cv1738-MMA (NLS) 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

[Doc. No. 2] 

SUA SPONTE DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2); AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[Doc. No. 3] 

Plaintiff Marsha D. Skelly, proceeding pro se, has filed the instant action against 

Defendants U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Commission, and 

FedLoan Servicing. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff also moves for leave to proceed in this 

action in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and moves for appointment of counsel. See Doc. Nos. 

2, 3. 

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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in 

forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 

1965). A party need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis. Adkins v. 

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). Plaintiff’s IFP application 

details her net monthly income and her monthly expenses, with her net monthly expenses 

exceeding her net monthly income. Based thereon, the Court concludes that Plaintiff 

should be allowed to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) because her 

submission demonstrates that she lacks the financial resources to pay the costs of 

commencing this action. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. See Doc. No. 2. 

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B) 

A. Legal Standard 

When a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the complaint is subject to mandatory screening and 

the Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, 

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from 

a defendant immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 

254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 

not limited to prisoners.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a 

court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 

2000). In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s 

pleadings. See id. In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the 

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court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” See Ivey 

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if, taking all wellpleaded factual allegations as true, it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 

1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted). 

B. Analysis

 Plaintiff Marsha Skelly states that she incurred $16,000 in debt by way of federally 

guaranteed student loans while she was obtaining a Bachelor of Science degree while in 

college from 1983 until 1988. Plaintiff states that due to physical ailments, she was 

rendered unable to work, and applied for social security disability benefits in 1994. She 

states that she also filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and some of her debts were 

discharged as a result of those proceedings. The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff 

believed that she was no longer required to make payments on her outstanding student 

loans, but that the “[United States Department] of Education and Treasury persisted to 

hound [her] for decades.” See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that “treasury offsets began + 

ended in 2010,” then began again for a period in 2013, and then recently began again in 

2017. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff states that “it is [her] sincere belief that [she is] entitled 

to forgiveness of this debt due to extreme financial hardship.” See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff 

requests that the Court enjoin any future attempts at collecting Plaintiff’s debt and order 

full reimbursement and refund of certain treasury offsets which were “involuntarily 

collected from [Plaintiff’s] social security benefits and IRS refunds.” See Doc. No. 1. 

 While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s circumstances, the Court is unaware 

of any authority that would allow the Court to forgive Plaintiff’s debts under the 

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circumstances described in her Complaint, and Plaintiff does not cite to any. Further, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory of liability or right to relief. 

Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief. “As a general matter, ‘declaratory and injunctive 

relief are not causes of action; rather, they are remedies.’” Mendez v. Selene Fin. LP, No. 

216CV09335ODWFFM, 2017 WL 1535085, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017) (quoting 

Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2010)); 

see also Tater-Alexander v. Cty. of Fresno, No. 1:10CV01050-AWI-SMS, 2010 WL 

2555185, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (stating that a request for injunctive relief “is 

not a cause of action but a form of relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled based on his 

establishing one or more cognizable claims”). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately provide a basis for the Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Because federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction, it is presumed that federal courts do not have jurisdiction unless the party 

asserting jurisdiction demonstrates otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Without subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court is 

without “power” to hear or adjudicate a claim. See Leeson v. Transamerica Disability 

Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. For this reason, 

“[w]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 

Generally, subject matter jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal 

question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or on complete diversity of citizenship between the 

parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A federal question is one “arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under the well-pleaded 

complaint rule, the existence of a federal question must appear “on the face of the 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 

(1987). Diversity jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff has pled (1) the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000, and (2) no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any 

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defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not indicate that the Court 

has federal question jurisdiction over this action because it does not delineate any 

cognizable causes of action. Also, the Complaint does not indicate that the Court would 

have diversity jurisdiction over this action, as Plaintiff only seeks reimbursement of 

approximately $7,000, and her original debt amounted to $16,000. 

 Lastly, the United States may not be sued unless it has waived its sovereign 

immunity. See Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). 

“Sovereign immunity is an important limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of 

federal courts.” Id. Courts may not imply the government’s waiver; rather, the 

government must have unequivocally expressed it. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 

535, 538 (1980). The Complaint does not indicate that the United States has waived its 

sovereign immunity in these circumstances. 

 As such, despite liberally construing Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court finds Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim for relief. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP; 

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as set forth above; 

3. DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot and without 

prejudice. 

The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff file an amended complaint, if any, on or before

September 18, 2017. Any amended Complaint must be complete without reference to 

the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1(a). IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: August 31, 2017 ___________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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