Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03573/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03573-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson presided over the proceedings in the Superior Court for the

State of Arizona, Maricopa County.

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adan Tavizon-Jimenez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-05-3573-PHX-JAT (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents filed an Answer to the

Petition. (docket # 16) Petitioner has not filed a Reply, and the time to file a Reply has passed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2000, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with three counts

of sexual abuse, three counts of sexual conduct with a minor, one count of molestation of a

child, one count of kidnapping, and two counts of child abuse. (Respondents' Exh. A at 1) The

charges stemmed from Petitioner's alleged conduct with his stepdaughter, who was a minor

during the relevant period. 

After a jury trial, on October 12, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of

sexual conduct with a minor, one count of molestation of a child, and one count of kidnaping.1

(Respondents' Exhs. A, K.) On November 28, 2001, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

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consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment for the sexual conduct convictions. (Respondents'

Exh. L) The court sentenced Petitioner to 17-year prison terms on the child molestation and

kidnaping convictions. The court ordered that the latter sentences run concurrent with each

other but consecutive to the sentences for the sexual conduct convictions. (Respondents' Ex.

L; Exh. T at 4-5)

On March 29, 2002, counsel for Petitioner requested leave to file a delayed appeal

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.5. (Respondents' Exh. O.) The State did not object to the request

and the trial court granted Petitioner leave to file a delayed notice of appeal. (Respondents' Exh.

P; Exh. Q.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and an opening brief raising the

following claims: (1) the trial court erred by barring evidence that the victim had knowledge of

sex from a source other than from the acts allegedly committed by Petitioner; (2) the trial court

erred by finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421 barred evidence that the victim had engaged in sexual

activity with persons other than Petitioner; and (3) the trial court imposed an improper sentence.

(Respondents' Exh. R) 

On May 27, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions,

but modified the sentences for molestation and kidnapping to make them concurrent to those

imposed for sexual conduct with a minor. (Respondents' Exh. T at 12-20.)

On August 21, 2003, Petitioner file a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents' Exh. V.) On May 3, 2004, appointed counsel filed a petition

for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under state law based on

counsel's failure to "impeach [the victim] as permitted and planned" with her statement to school

officials regarding her concern about being pregnant. (Respondents' Exh. W) The trial court

denied the petition on February 16, 2005. (Respondents' Ex. Y.) Petitioner filed a petition for

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 31, 2005. (Respondents' Ex. Z.)

Petitioner's only allegation for relief was ineffective assistance of counsel under Arizona law.

(Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on December 8, 2005. (Respondents' Ex.

BB.)

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Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising

the following claims:

1. The trial court misapplied Arizona law and abused its discretion

by barring evidence of the victim's prior knowledge of sexual

activity;

2. The trial court abused its discretion and misapplied Arizona law

by barring evidence of the victim's sexual history;

3. The trial court erred by sentencing Petitioner to a consecutive

sentence for the child molestation and sexual conduct charges and

the child molestation and kidnaping charges;

4. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to

"impeach the victim with a statement she allegedly made to school

authorities regarding possibly being pregnant;" and 

5. Petitioner was denied a fair trial because the prosecution failed promptly

to disclose an alleged conversation between a prospective juror and the 

prosecutor regarding false reporting in sexual molestation cases. Although the

juror was struck from the jury panel, the defense was denied timely information

regarding the prospective juror's comments. 

(docket # 1)

DISCUSSION

Respondents assert that Petitioner's claims are either procedurally defaulted or lack

merit. Petitioner has not filed reply in support of his claims. 

I. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents assert that Petitioner's claims are unexhausted because he failed to

present any of his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents argue that under Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004), to exhaust claims in state court, an Arizona prisoner must

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, the highest discretionary court of appeals in

Arizona. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondents argue that

Baldwin overturns the holding in Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) that

Arizona state prisoners need not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to exhaust state

remedies. The Court need not decide this issue because in addition to failing to present his claims

to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claims either to the

trial court or the Arizona Court of Appeals and, alternatively, his claims lack merit. 

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A. Relevant Law

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state court,

every claim raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the opportunity to rule

upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting" them to the state courts

in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary

'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby

alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.").

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state court or that a "somewhat similar" state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28

(stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal

nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific

constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d

982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made "a general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee," such as a naked reference to "due process," or to a "constitutional error"

or a "fair trial"). Similarly, a mere reference to the "Constitution of the United States" does not

preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of

a federal claim is "self-evident" or if the claim would be decided "on the same considerations"

under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim "explicit either

by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . ." Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state

prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the petition

or brief filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

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Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be "exhausted." This type of

exhaustion is often referred to as "procedural default" or "procedural bar." Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two categories of

procedural default.

First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner attempted to

raise the claim in state court. Nummemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. If the state court also addressed

the merits of the underlying federal claim, the "alternative" ruling does not vitiate the independent

state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel claims

"barred under state law," but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en banc court

held that the "on-the-merits" discussion was an "alternative ruling" and the claims were

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher court's subsequent summary

denial of review affirms the lower court's application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

at 803. 

Second, the state prisoner may not have presented the claim to the state courts, but

pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state court would be "futile." Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim not previously presented to the Arizona

courts is procedurally barred from federal review because any attempt to return to state court to

properly exhaust a current habeas claim would be "futile." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916

P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9

(stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state

post-conviction action is futile where it is time barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from

preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

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In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish cause,

a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded her efforts

to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing

that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. To establish prejudice, a prisoner

must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension." United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). 

The Court will discuss Petitioner's claims below and consider whether federal review

is procedurally barred. 

II. Petitioner's Claims

A. Claim 1 - Exclusion of Evidence

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly precluded

Petitioner from inquiring about the victim's sexual history. (docket # 1 at 5) Specifically,

Petitioner sought to introduce evidence that the victim "had learned about sex from watching her

classmates engage in sex." (docket # 1 at 5) Petitioner claims that such evidence was relevant to

the victim's chastity and would have established that she had knowledge of sex from a source

other than from Petitioner's alleged conduct with her. 

At trial, defense counsel made an offer of proof that the victim's school principal could

confirm that the victim had "walked in on" two classmates who were engaged in sexual activity.

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(Respondents' Exh. J at 124) The trial court ruled that such evidence was not relevant.

Specifically, the court ruled that:

The fact that [the victim] had viewed her girlfriend and her boyfriend engage

in some sort of sexual activity, whether or not that in and of itself can 

reasonably be assumed to impart sexual knowledge is a serious question. 

And, even if it did, I guess the question I would have would be so what.

In light of the allegations of this case, if she learned something about a 

sexual encounter by viewing others, I don't see where the relevance to this

case comes in at all to these allegations. I don't think it's relevant. Furthermore,

it would be prejudicial under 403 to allow the jury to speculate as to what this

whole situation may infer as to [the victim's] circle of friends and her activity

with those friends.

(Respondents' Exh. J at 125-26) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by ruling that Arizona's

Rape Shield Law, A.R.S. § 13-1421, barred the offered evidence. (Respondents' Exh. R at 7-10)

He further argued that to the extent that A.R.S. § 13-1421 barred such evidence, it was

"unconstitutional in violation of the right to due process, the [right to] present a defense and to

confront witnesses according to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution" and the Arizona Constitution. (Id. at 10) The Arizona Court of Appeals found that

Petitioner waived any challenge regarding the trial court's application of A.R.S. § 13-1421

because he did not raise that issue during trial. (Respondents' Exh. T at 7) The appellate court

further found that Petitioner similarly waived any constitutional challenge to A.R.S. § 13-1421.

(Id. n. 3)

The Arizona Court of Appeals' finding of waiver is an independent and adequate state

law ground for denying the claim and bars federal habeas relief. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 799-

801(stating that the appellate court's dismissal of a claim on the ground that it could not be "raised

for the first time on appeal" operated as a procedural bar to habeas review). Based on the State

court's application of a procedural bar to deny Plaintiff's claim, his first ground for relief is

procedurally barred. Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004)(finding claim

procedurally barred where state appellate court found it waived). 

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B. Claim Two - Exclusion of Evidence

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred by finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421 barred

evidence regarding the victim's prior sexual activity. (docket # 1 at 8)

1. Procedural Bar

Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence under

A.R.S. § 13-1421. (Respondents' Exh. B) Petitioner responded that he should be permitted to

cross-examine the victim on the following topics: (1) the victim's allegations against Petitioner

were made after a classmate accused the victim of having sex with her boyfriend; (2) the victim

told a school official that she might be pregnant; (3) the victim had written a sexually explicit

letter; (4) the victim talked on a telephone "chat-line" called "The Loop;" and (5) the victim

received phone calls from men. (Respondents' Exh. C) Petitioner further noted that the victim

had tested positive for Chlamydia, but he had not. (Id. at 1-2) The State, however, did not attempt

to exclude evidence regarding the sexually transmitted disease either before or during trial.

(Respondents' Exh. B)

 At the pretrial hearing, Petitioner argued that the first three of the aforementioned

topics were relevant to whether the victim's physical injuries or disease could have been caused

by someone else. (Respondents' Exh. F at 13-14) In response, the prosecutor noted that the girl

who had made the accusations against the victim could not be located. (Respondents' Exh. F at

13-14) Additionally, the letter had been destroyed and the only person who had seen the letter

was the victim's mother who had "assumed" that the victim had written the letter. (Id.) The

prosecutor, however, agreed that the victim could be questioned directly regarding any alleged

prior sexual activity. (Respondents' Exh. F at 17) The trial court then asked whether there was

evidence of any specific instances of prior sexual conduct by the victim. Defense counsel

responded that:

Your Honor, a possible solution to this is to do exactly as the Court suggested,

just call or ask [the victim] directly is she — has she had sex with other 

people other than the defendant. However, if the Court is willing to allow

that, the defense would also like to ask her about her statement or ask directly

if she felt on December 8th that she might be pregnant. 

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(Respondents' Exh. F at 18) The trial court agreed that defense counsel could ask the victim

whether she had ever had sexual relationships with anyone other than Petitioner. If she said,

"no," counsel could impeach the victim with her statement to school officials that she thought she

might be pregnant. (Id. at 19-20) The trial court did not make any further ruling on the foregoing

evidentiary issues. (Id.) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by finding that evidence

of the victim's prior sexual activity was barred by A.R.S. § 12-1421. (Respondents' Exh. R at 11)

Petitioner argued that the standard for review for the admissibility of evidence was "abuse of

discretion" and cited to the Arizona case law and the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Respondents'

Exh. R at 11) Petitioner did not cite federal law. However, at the conclusion of his discussion of

the erroneous application of state law, Petitioner added the following statement:

To the extent that A.R.S. § 13-1421 bars evidence of [the victim's] unchastity,

the statute is unconstitutional in violation of the rights to due process, to 

present a defense and to confront witnesses according to the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Art. 2, §§ 4

and 24 of the Arizona Constitution. 

(Respondents' Exh. R at 13) 

Although Petitioner mentioned the United States Constitution in his state court

pleading, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such a due process, equal protection,

and the right to a fair trial, are not sufficient to fairly present a federal claim to the state court.

Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that "[p]etitioner's mere

mention of the federal Constitution as a whole, without specifying an applicable provision, or an

underlying federal legal theory, does not suffice to exhaust the federal claim . . . [n]or is a federal

claim exhausted by a petitioner's mention, in passing, of a broad constitutional concept, such as

due process."); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that "petitioner's

must plead their claims with considerable specificity before the state courts in order to satisfy the

exhaustion of requirement . . . In addition to requiring specificity in pleading the federal nature

of a claim, we also require a petitioner to articulate the substance of the alleged violation with

some particularity."); Galvan v. Alaska Dep't. of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir.

2005)(stating that "[i]f a party wants a state court to decide whether she was deprived of a federal

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constitutional right, she has to say so . . . If she does not say so, she does not fairly present the

federal claim to the state court."). Additionally, a petitioner cannot "transform a state law issue

into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process." Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d

573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Petitioner merely tacked a citation to the United States Constitution on to the

end of his discussion of his state-law claim. "Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citations,

detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory." Castillo v. McFadden, 399

F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner's bald assertion that the State court's exclusion of

certain evidence regarding the victim violated the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment

was not sufficient to fairly present such federal claims to the state court. Petitioner did not

provide any factual or legal support for the alleged violations of the United States Constitution.

 Gray, 518 U.S. at 162-63 (stating that a state prisoner must "include reference to a specific

federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to

relief.") Petitioner did not fairly present a federal claim to the State courts. Accordingly, Claim

Two is procedurally defaulted. 

 Moreover, in the pending § 2254 Petition, Petitioner cites mainly to state law and

appends a citation to the United States Constitution to his otherwise state-law claim. The

essence of the claim is that the trial court violated State law in precluding certain evidence about

the victim. Petitioner’s claim is based on application of state law which is not subject to review

by this Court. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(explaining that “it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”). The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error renders the trial fundamentally unfair in violation

of the due process clause. Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). A state prisoner

can obtain federal habeas relief only if his conviction violates the Constitution or the laws and

treaties of the United States. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982). Failure to comply with

state evidentiary rules does not warrant habeas relief on due process grounds. Jammal v. Van de

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, federal habeas relief does not lie for alleged

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violations of state law or procedure or for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of

state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 67-68 (1991); Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th

Cir. 1994). Thus, Petitioner's claim that the trial court improperly applied state law in disallowing

certain evidence fails. Finally, Petitioner's claim lacks merit as discussed below. 

2. Merits of Claim Two

As previously discussed, Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly prohibited

evidence regarding the victim's sexual history. The record reflects that defense counsel agreed

to question the victim directly about specific instances of prior sexual conduct. If she denied such

previous conduct, the trial court would permit defense counsel to impeach the victim with her

prior statement to school officials regarding her belief that she might be pregnant. (Respondents'

Exh. F at 17-20) Based on defense counsel's agreement to proceed in this fashion, the trial court

did not make a ruling regarding the State's motion to preclude evidence of the victim's sexual

history. (Respondents' Exh. F) Thus, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the trial court did not

preclude the evidence at issue in Claim Two and no Sixth Amendment or Due Process violation

occurred. Robbins v. Cardwell, 618 F.2d 581, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1980)(finding that Confrontation

Clause claim was waived where defendant agreed to procedures which made the trial court's

initial ruling on the issue irrelevant); Poole v. Fitzharris, 396 F.2d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1968)(finding

no Sixth Amendment confrontation clause violation where defense counsel agreed to waive

production of prosecution witnesses and proceeded via transcript testimony.) 

Furthermore, even if the trial court did preclude certain evidence regarding the victim,

Petitioner has not established a constitutional violation. The exclusion of evidence alone does

not violate the Constitution. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996)(stating that "the

proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to introduce all relevant evidence

is simply indefensible.") Rather, a defendant arguing that the court improperly precluded certain

evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause, "must sustain the usual heavy burden that a due

process claim entails." Id. 

Similarly, not every limitation on cross-examination violates the Sixth Amendment

right to confront witnesses. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)(noting that trial

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 2 Petitioner also cites the Fifth Amendment in support of his second claim for relief. (docket # 1

at 10) However, Petitioner does not provide any discussion supporting such a claim and the Court finds

not reason to provide a separate analysis under the Due Process Clause. United States v. Gill, 58 F.3d

1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1995)(concluding that cross-examination restrictions "violated neither the Due

Process Clause nor the Confrontation Clause.") 

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courts have discretion to limit "cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant.") The fact that a "defendant's ability to confront adverse

witnesses and present a defense" has been affected does not mean there has been a constitutional

violation. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991). The Supreme Court has held that the

trial court may restrict a defendant's cross-examination of a witness "based on concerns about,

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Id. (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

679); see also, Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004)(stating that a "state

passing a rape shield law makes a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve

heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of

privacy)(internal citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment2

 right to

present a defense and confront witnesses, a reviewing court must determine whether: "(1) the

excluded evidence was relevant; (2) there were other legitimate interests outweighing the

defendant's interest in presenting the evidence; and (3) the exclusion of evidence left the jury with

sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness." United States v. Beardslee, 197

F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court will consider these factors to determine whether a Sixth

Amendment violation occurred in this case. 

a. Relevance

Here, Petitioner asserts that the trial court precluded evidence which suggested that

there was another source of the victim's injury and sexually transmitted disease. (Respondents'

Exh. F at 14) The evidence which Petitioner sought to offer, however, did not include any

evidence of specific instances of previous sexual encounters that could explain either the victim's

injury or disease. (Respondents' Exh. C; Exh. F at 12-20) Rather, the evidence which Petitioner

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sought to introduce only suggested that the victim might have some interest in men or sex. For

example, evidence that the victim had possibly written a sexually explicit letter and talked with

men on a "chat-line", at best suggests that the victim was curious about sexual issues and does

not establish that she had engaged in a previous sexual encounter. The evidence which Petitioner

sought to introduce was not relevant. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, In and For Mohave

County, 545 P.2d 946, 953 (Ariz. 1976)(finding that evidence of prior sexual activity is

admissible if "directly refutes physical or scientific evidence, such as the victim's alleged loss of

virginity, the origin of semen, disease, or pregnancy.") Because the evidence was not relevant,

there was no constitutional violation. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 856

(9th Cir. 2005)(finding that "because [defendant's] line of inquiry was not relevant to the facts of

his case, the district court's restriction of cross-examination did not violate the Confrontation

Clause.") 

b. Other Legitimate Interests 

In addition to the evidence not being relevant, there were other legitimate interests

that outweighed Petitioner's interest in presenting the evidence. Beardslee, 197 F.3d at 383.

Specifically, the State of Arizona has a legitimate interest in excluding certain evidence under its

rape-shield law. Arizona's rape-shield law is designed to "protect victims of rape from being

exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning any past sexual behavior." State

v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 400-01, 998 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2000). Arizona's rapeshield law "provides procedural safeguards to admit evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity

when that evidence has substantial probative value . . . ." Id. at 403. One such procedural

safeguard is the requirement that there be "clear and convincing" evidence of relevant sexual

activity before it is admitted into evidence. A.R.S. 13-1421(B). This requirement serves the

State's legitimate interest in protecting victims from harassing or irrelevant questions. 

In this case, Petitioner wanted to inquire about accusations that the victim's classmate,

Daisy, had made against the victim even though Daisy could not be located. (Respondents' Exh.

C at 2, Exh. F at 13-14) Petitioner also wanted to introduce evidence of a sexually explicit letter

that the victim had allegedly written and about a phone chat-line which the victim called. This

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evidence does not constitute "clear and convincing" evidence of a specific instance of relevant

sexual activity. 

The Court finds that Arizona's "clear and convincing" standard advances the State's

legitimate interest of protecting victims from being asked irrelevant or harassing questions

regarding prior sexual activity. 

c. Sufficient Information

Finally, there is no Sixth Amendment violation because the "exclusion of the evidence

left the jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness." Beardslee, 197

F.3d at 383. As previously noted, the trial court did not exclude any evidence of specific

instances of prior sexual activity. (Respondents' Exh. F at 17-20) Thus, Petitioner was permitted

to inquire as to whether the victim had any prior sexual experiences. (Id. at 19) The trial court

also permitted Petitioner to impeach the victim with her prior statement that she thought she

might be pregnant. (Id.) 

The record also included other information which would assist the jury in assessing

the victim's credibility, including: 

(1) the victim's testimony and demeanor on direct (Respondents' Exh H at 108-58);

(2) the victim's testimony on cross-examination regarding her motive in 

making the accusations, her prior inconsistent statements, her bias against

Petitioner, and the physical evidence;

(3) testimony of the victim's mother that she was never concerned about 

Petitioner's behavior around the victim, she did not believe her daughter's

allegations, and the victim had problems with girls at school;

(4) cross-examination of the examining pediatrician who stated that the victim

was taking oral contraceptives before the alleged abuse; she was uncertain as

to the actual cause of the victim's injury, the victim was sexually developed 

enough to engage in consensual sexual activity;

(5) cross-examination of the child-abuse accommodation expert who stated

that: children are capable of lying; older children are more sophisticated and

better able to maintain false allegations; older children may have their own

agenda; post-pubescent and adolescent children may be sexually active; 

and adolescent females are most likely to make false allegations;

(6) cross-examination of the school social worker who stated that the victim

reported having problems with other girls in school;

(7) cross-examination of the school nurse who confirmed that the victim did 

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not report her allegations against Petitioner until the day of a school meeting

regarding the victim's problems with her peers;

(8) cross-examination of the school principal who stated that the victim made

the allegations against Petitioner at a meeting regarding the victim's problems

with her peers and that the other girls were very angry with the victim;

(9) cross-examination of a police detective who stated that there was no 

physical or biological evidence, and that he had worked on cases where 

children have lied about sexual abuse;

(10) the testimony of one of Petitioner's friends who stated that the victim 

did not want her mother and Petitioner to continue their relationship;

(11) Petitioner's testimony that he did not inappropriately touch the victim;

the victim was rebellious; the victim wanted to break up his relationship 

with her mother; and he never contracted Chlamydia, but the victim did. 

(Respondents' Exh. J at 89-109) 

The foregoing evidence constitutes "sufficient information" from which the jury could

assess the victim's credibility. Thus, Petitioner's inability to inquire about vague, speculative

evidence about Petitioner's time spent on chat-line, having written a sexually explicit letter, and

unsupported accusations made by a classmate did not violate the Sixth Amendment. 

C. Claim Three - Improper Sentence 

Petitioner next alleges that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences.

(docket # 1 at 11) Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal and the appellate court granted

relief. (Respondents' Exh. T at 12-20) The Court of Appeals modified Petitioner's sentence so

that the sentences on both of the sexual conduct and the kidnaping charges run concurrently with

the sentences on the child molestation charges. (Id.) Accordingly, this claim is moot. 

Moreover, Petitioner did not raise a federal challenge to his sentence to the State

courts. Thus, he did not exhaust any federal challenge to his sentence and, therefore, such a

challenge would not be properly before this Court. 

D. Claim Four - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because trial counsel failed to impeach the victim with her statement to school officials that she

might be pregnant. (docket # 1 at 15) 

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1. Procedural Bar

On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel based on State law because trial counsel did not impeach the victim "as permitted and

planned" with her statement to school officials concerning pregnancy. (Respondents' Exh. W

at 4) Petitioner, however, did not raise a federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Because Petitioner did not cite to federal law, he did not fairly present a federal claim. Casey,

386 F.3d at 911. Similarly, Petitioner did not raise a federal claim of ineffective assistance on

appellate review. (Respondents' Exh. Z) Thus, Petitioner did not fairly present a federal claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel and he is barred from returning to state court to raise such a

claim. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. 

2. Merits of Claim Four

Moreover, even if Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel were properly

before the Court, it lacks merit. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner

must satisfy the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hart v.

Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the petitioner. 466 U.S. at 687; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069. To be deficient, counsel’s

performance must be “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When reviewing counsel's performance, the court engages a strong

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional

judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's

perspective at the time." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995). Review of

counsel's performance is "extremely limited." Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th

Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that "might be

considered sound trial strategy" do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689. 

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In addition to showing that counsel's performance was deficient, to prevail on a claim

of ineffective assistance, petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of

counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. To show prejudice, petitioner

must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong.

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel's allegedly deficient

performance. 211 F.3d at 1155. 

In this case, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the

victim with her statement to school officials that she thought she might be pregnant. Petitioner

raised this claim to the state court based on state law. (Respondents' Exh. W) Specifically,

Petitioner argued that even though the trial court had ruled that defense counsel could impeach

the victim with her statement regarding pregnancy to school officials, defense counsel failed to

do so. (Respondents' Exh. W) Petitioner, however, conceded that on direct examination, the

victim had admitted making such a statement to school officials. (Id.) The State court found

that Petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test because "once the

[victim] admitted that she talked to the counselor about her concern of pregnancy and disease,

the impeachment issue was essentially moot." (Respondents' Exh. Y) Petitioner fails to establish

that the state court decision is contrary to, or rests on an unreasonable application of, state law.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

As the State court found, because the victim had previously admitted to her statement

regarding pregnancy, the need to impeach the victim with this statement was diminished.

Because the victim's statement regarding pregnancy was already in the record, Petitioner cannot

establish that counsel's failure to impeach the victim with that same statement was prejudicial.

Because Petitioner fails to allege specific facts showing prejudice, the reasonableness of counsel's

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representation is inconsequential, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985), and Petitioner's claim

of ineffective assistance fails. 

E. Claim Five

Petitioner also includes a fifth ground for relief in his Petition. Petitioner alleges that

he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution failed to promptly disclose an alleged

conversation between a prospective juror and the prosecutor regarding false reporting in sexual

molestation cases. Although the juror was struck from the jury panel, Petitioner claims that the

defense was denied timely information regarding the juror's comments. This claim is

procedurally barred because Petitioner never presented it to the state court and he cannot return

to state court to present that claim. Id. Moreover, because the prospective juror was struck from

the jury panel, Petitioner fails to establish how the alleged conversation resulted in prejudice. 

F. Cause and Prejudice or Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Because Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred, the Court need not reach the

merits of those claims unless Petitioner either establishes cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. 

Proof of cause "ordinarily turn[s] on whether the prisoner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded" his compliance with the state rule. Id. at 72. In

this case, Petitioner does not assert any basis to overcome the procedural bar. Petitioner’s pro

se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice

resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof regarding cause and prejudice.

Petitioner also fails to establish that failure to consider his claims would result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. Accordingly, Petitioner's

claims are barred from review.

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CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted or fail on the merits, his petition

should be denied. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The parties

shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Fed. R.

Civ. P. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response to the objections.

Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further

review. United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.

 DATED this 10th day of October, 2006.

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