Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01176/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01176-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL BARAKA MASON,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 16-CV-1176 JLS (MDD)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE 

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

(ECF No. 34)

Petitioner Michael Baraka Mason has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

(“Petition,” ECF No. 1), to which Respondent Daniel Paramo has filed a Response, (ECF 

No. 30). Petitioner then filed a Traverse, (ECF No. 33). Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. 

Dembin issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending the Court deny Petitioner’s 

Petition, (“R&R,” ECF No. 34). Judge Dembin ordered objections to the R&R to be filed 

no later than April 13, 2018. Petitioner did not file objections.

Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, as well as the underlying state 

court record, the Court ADOPTS Judge Dembin’s Report and Recommendation, and

DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Judge Dembin’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the factual and 

procedural histories underlying the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (See R&R 

2–11.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

I. Summary of the R&R Conclusion

On May 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

district. Petitioner was convicted in state court and challenges his conviction on two 

grounds: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of Hana 

Jabbar at trial; and (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 

attorney failed to challenge the trial court’s decision to permit the guilty verdict to stand 

and the case to proceed to sentencing when Juror 4 expressed she had reasonable doubt 

after the verdict was given. (Petition 12–13.)1 Respondent previously filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Petitioner’s second claim, which the Court granted pursuant to a previous R&R. 

(See ECF No. 28.) Thus, only Petitioner’s first claim remains.

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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As to his remaining claim, Petitioner’s argues that the Court of Appeal erred by 

finding that the prosecution’s efforts to find Ms. Jabbar demonstrated a good faith attempt 

to produce a witness. (Petition 12; Traverse 7.) Judge Dembin examined the Court of 

Appeal’s conclusion that the prosecution made good faith and diligent efforts to locate 

Hana Jabbar. (R&R 20.) Judge Dembin surveyed the various efforts undertaken by Mr. 

Cahill to locate Ms. Jabbar including attempting to contact her, speaking with people close 

to her, and searching among the homeless population where Ms. Jabbar was reportedly 

residing. (Id.) Petitioner suggested additional, alternative search methods to locate Ms. 

Jabbar, but Judge Dembin found that the prosecution is not required to exhaust every 

possible action. Accordingly, Judge Dembin determined that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent. (Id.)

Alternatively, Judge Dembin concluded that even if the trial court erred in allowing 

Ms. Jabbar’s statement at trial, the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on 

the jury’s verdict. (Id.) There was additional evidence produced at trial include 

Petitioner’s DNA on a cigarette at a crime scene, Mr. Bell admitted taking part in the 

shooting and said that Petitioner was likewise involved, and Petitioner’s photo was twice 

identified on the television program America’s Most Wanted. (See id. at 20–21.) Judge 

Dembin finds any potential error by the trial court to be harmless.

II. Court’s Analysis

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this 

Court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court . . . ; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002).

Under § 2254(d)(1), federal law must be “clearly established” to support a habeas 

claim. Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of 

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[the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 

(2000). A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

[the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Id. at 406. A state court decision does not have to 

demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, provided 

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradict such precedent. 

Early, 537 U.S. at 8.

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court 

precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's 

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An unreasonable application may also be found “if the state 

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a 

new context where it should apply.” Id.; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003);

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and 

only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that 

there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. 

Ct. 1697, 1706–07 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). An 

unreasonable application of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than 

incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). Instead, the state 

court’s application must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id.; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003). Even if a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner must still 

demonstrate a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–22 (2007). With 

this general framework in mind, the Court turns to Petitioner’s claim.

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The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, applied to the States through the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–05 (1965), requires that “[i]n 

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 

witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. There are occasions, however, where 

witness testimony may be presented without the opportunity to confront the witness. There 

are two requirements for presenting testimony without an available witness. First, Barber 

v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968), held that “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes 

of the . . . confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a goodfaith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Second, a court will allow only testimony that 

has sufficient “indicia of reliability” as to be trustworthy for admission. Ohio v. Roberts, 

448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)), abrogated

on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Petitioner only argues 

that the first element was not met; the prosecution failed to meet its good faith burden to 

find Ms. Jabbar. In Roberts, the Supreme Court revisited the good faith requirement and 

reiterated the “lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a 

question of reasonableness.” Id. at 74 (alteration in original) (quoting California v. Green, 

399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).2

Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal without comment, 

(Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 19-64), and the California Court of Appeal issued the last 

reasoned decision, (see Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 19-62). In such cases, federal habeas 

courts apply the presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2018) 

(quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Therefore, the Court evaluates 

the California Court of Appeal’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

 

2 Because Petitioner only contests the first prong of the two-part Roberts’ standard, the Court does not 

address the second prong requiring “indicia of reliability.”

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In evaluating Petitioner’s witness unavailability claim, the California Court of 

Appeal cited People v. Herrera, 49 Cal. 4th 613, 622–23 (2010), which in turn explicitly 

relies on both Barber and Roberts. (Lodgment No. 6, at 15.) In Herrera, the California 

Supreme Court recognized that the California Evidence Code demands a similar 

requirement for establishing a witness’s unavailability as Barber and Roberts. 49 Cal. 4th 

at 622. Thus, the Court of Appeal correctly identified the controlling Supreme Court 

precedent to evaluate witness unavailability. The only remaining question is whether the 

court unreasonably applied the precedent to the facts of Petitioner’s case. Williams, 529 

U.S. at 407.

The Court agrees with Judge Dembin that the California Court of Appeal’s

application of the holding to the facts in Petitioner’s case was reasonable. Because this 

case falls under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d), Petitioner may prevail

“if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts 

that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at

1706–07 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103). 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts is instructive. There, the prosecutor 

attempted for four months to locate an unavailable witness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75. The 

prosecutor spoke to the witness’ mother, who stated she did not know of her daughter’s 

whereabouts and had no way to contact her. Id. The prosecutor served five subpoenas on 

the witness at her parents’ home in the four months prior to trial. Id. The Court determined 

that the State had met its “duty of good faith effort” to establish witness unavailability. Id. 

In Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 71–72 (2011) (per curiam), the Supreme Court 

reiterated that “the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every 

avenue of inquiry, no matter how uncompromising.” The Supreme Court applied that 

standard to the facts in Hardy where the Seventh Circuit faulted the prosecution for failing 

to contact the witness’s current boyfriend, failing to make inquiries at the cosmetology 

school where the witness had once been enrolled, and neglecting to serve the witness a 

subpoena after she expressed fear about testifying at trial. See id. at 70–71. The Supreme 

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Court disagreed that these additional, incremental steps were required. The Court 

concluded that “the deferential standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not 

permit a federal court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of unavailability 

merely because the federal court identifies additional steps that might have been taken.” 

Id. at 72. 

Here, the Court of Appeal surveyed the undisputed facts proffered by the prosecution 

to meet the good faith duty to find Ms. Hana Jabbar:

[T]he facts surrounding the prosecution’s efforts to secure 

Hana’s attendance at trial are essentially undisputed. Cahill, the 

prosecution’s investigator, spoke with Hana prior to Mason’s 

trial and told her her testimony would be required. Later, Cahill

attempted to contact Hana by cell phone, but she did not respond.

Cahill spoke with the people closest to Hana about her 

whereabouts and determined she was homeless. Cahill went to 

the area where she was reportedly staying and showed her picture 

to other homeless people in an effort to find her. Cahill himself 

drove through the area multiple times looking for her. Cahill also 

reviewed a database of contacts with law enforcement and

emergency personnel and found no mention of Hana.

(Lodgment No. 6, at 16.) The court also recognized that Ms. Jabbar’s closest friends were 

not in contact with her and did not know her location. (Id.) The court concluded that the 

prosecution’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. 

In reaching this finding, the court did not credit Petitioner’s argument, renewed in 

his habeas petition, that the prosecution could have secured Ms. Jabbar as a material 

witness pursuant to California Penal Code § 1332.3 (Id. at 17.) The court reasoned that 

 

3 Section 1332 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) [W]hen the court is satisfied, by proof on oath, that there is good cause 

to believe that any material witness for the prosecution or defense . . . will 

not appear and testify unless security is required, at any proceeding in 

connection with any criminal prosecution . . . , the court may order the 

witness to enter into a written undertaking to the effect that he or she will 

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Mr. Cahill reached out to Ms. Jabbar after Morris’s trial and Ms. Jabbar did not explicitly 

resist Cahill’s admonition that she would have to testify at Petitioner’s trial. (Id.) The 

Court of Appeal recognized that confining a witness, who had not committed a crime, is a 

drastic measure that should be used sparingly. (Id. (citing People v. Cogswell, 48 Cal. 4th 

467, 477 (2010)).) The court determined that Petitioner had not demonstrated that a drastic 

measure, such as confining Ms. Jabbar, would be warranted. (Id.)

Petitioner renews his argument that the prosecution could have taken additional 

available measures to secure Ms. Jabbar’s presence at trial. (Traverse 8.) According to 

Petitioner, the prosecution should have issued a material witness warrant for Ms. Jabbar’s 

arrest. (Id. (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1332; and People v. Roldan, 205 Cal. App. 4th 969, 

978 (Ct. App. 2012)).) Petitioner would apply the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Daboul v. 

Craven, 429 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1970), which addressed a situation where the 

prosecution failed to use the Uniform Act to produce a witness. (Traverse 8.) Petitioner 

admits that the Uniform Act does not apply directly to his case, but argues the reasoning is 

persuasive. (See id.)

Daboul is distinguishable. That case relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 

Barber and stated “if the prosecution fails to make use of the Uniform Act [to Secure the 

Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings], it has not made 

the required ‘good faith effort’ and cannot use the prior testimony.” Daboul, 429 F.3d at 

167 (citing Barber, 390 U.S. at 723–24). Yet, Barber’s holding does not require that the 

per se failure to use the Uniform Act (or a similar statute) is a constitutional violation. In 

 

appear and testify at the time and place ordered by the court or that he or 

she will forfeit an amount the court deems proper.

(b) If the witness required to enter into an undertaking to appear and 

testify . . . refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the court may 

commit the witness, if an adult, to the custody of the sheriff . . . until the 

witness complies or is legally discharged.

Cal. Penal Code § 1332(a)–(b).

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Barber, the Supreme Court noted the witness was in federal custody and the prosecution 

could have issued a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to compel the prisoner to testify 

at trial. 390 U.S. at 723–24. Instead, the prosecution “made absolutely no effort to obtain 

the presence of [the witness] at trial other than to ascertain he was in a federal prison outside 

Oklahoma.” Id. at 723. Thus, Barber only held that the prosecution had to show a good 

faith effort to obtain a witness’s personal appearance at trial and failed to do so because it 

made no effort to obtain the witness. Justice Marshall’s opinion summarized the relevant 

inquiry and result as follows:

In short, a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the 

foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the 

prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain 

his presence at trial. The State made no such effort here, and, so 

far as this record reveals, the sole reason why Woods was not 

present to testify in person was because the State did not attempt 

to seek his presence. The right of confrontation may not be 

dispensed with so lightly.

Id. at 724–25. Daboul relied on the Barber court’s dicta to support its conclusion, but this 

Court is only bound by Supreme Court holdings. As Roberts recognized, the relevant 

inquiry is one of reasonableness, not a per se rule that failure to use the Uniform Act (or 

similar measures) necessitates an unreasonable application of law.

Petitioner also cites People v. Roldan, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 978. There, the witness 

was held in custody for several months before a preliminary hearing and was the key 

witness for the prosecution. Id. at 980, 982. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the State’s 

good faith requirement to produce a witness for trial included “the duty to use reasonable 

means to prevent a present witness from becoming absent.” Id. at 980 (quoting People v. 

Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 991 (1986)); and citing United States v. Tirado–Tirado, 563 F.3d 

117, 124 (5th Cir. 2009)). Thus, Roldan rests on the fact that the key witness was in 

custody, the government knew the witness was material, and released the witness rather 

than continuing the detention until trial. 

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The dispositive fact here is that Ms. Jabbar, unlike the witnesses in Barber and 

Roldan, was not in custody. Moreover, the prosecution had no indication that she might 

not testify until she failed to appear for Morris’s trial. Her failure to appear at Morris’s 

trial was the earliest instance where the prosecution could have been on notice that Ms. 

Jabbar might not be available for trial. But, the State did not know her whereabouts. Even 

if the State issued a warrant for her arrest pursuant to California Penal Code § 1332, 

Petitioner does not explain how using section 1332 would have allowed the prosecution to 

find Ms. Jabbar. Mr. Cahill could not find Ms. Jabbar; he put her name in to the Officer 

Notification System and searched the “ARJIS” system, which would have indicated that 

Ms. Jabbar had contact with law enforcement or medical personnel. (See Lodgment No.

1-21, ECF No. 19-21, at 194–95 (trial transcript).) Neither was successful. If Ms. Jabbar 

had no police contact how could have the prosecution detained her pursuant to § 1332?

Petitioner’s theory does not explain this question. Nor can it. This is not an instance where 

Ms. Jabbar was in a known location and the State failed to secure her—no one knew where 

she was. Thus, Daboul and Roldan’s logic is inapplicable here.

Petitioner’s only other suggestion would be for Mr. Cahill to visit homeless shelters 

and contact operators of homeless shelters whether they saw Ms. Jabbar. (Traverse 9.) 

Petitioner contends that contacting homeless shelters would have required minimally more 

effort and there is a possibility that such a minimal but affirmative measure might have 

produced Ms. Jabbar. (Id.) Petitioner concludes that this further measure “is what the 

federal standard unquestionably requires.” (Id.) Yet, Mr. Cahill testified that “[e]very day 

on my way in I’ll swing through the East Village area, go up and down the streets, get out

every now [sic] and talk to people, show her photo, see if any of the other homeless people 

recognize her or see her down there.” (Lodgment No. 1-21, at 195.) Petitioner faults Mr. 

Cahill for not reaching out to homeless shelters, but not even Ms. Jabbar’s own family 

knew her whereabouts. Petitioner’s contention that the federal standard unquestionably 

required Mr. Cahill to contact homeless shelters is simply not supported by the law. As 

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Hardy makes clear, “the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust 

every avenue of inquiry, no matter how uncompromising.” 565 U.S. at 71–72.

Mr. Cahill’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Cahill repeatedly 

tried to reach Ms. Jabbar using the means he had previously used to contacted her. He 

reached out to her friends and family, searched areas where she was likely to be, and 

surveyed law enforcement databases. Mr. Cahill drove through the area where Ms. Jabbar 

was reported to be every day on his way to work. Of course, there will always be some 

further step the State possibly could have taken, but the prosecution is not required to 

“exhaust every avenue of inquiry.” Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71–72. 

Furthermore, a federal habeas court is not merely reviewing the reasonableness of 

the State’s actions in a vacuum—this Court is reviewing the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal, which must be given further deference. “As a condition for obtaining 

habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling 

on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was 

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Petitioner has not demonstrated such 

an error. In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Petitioner’s 

remaining habeas claim.

III. Evidentiary Hearing

The Court briefly addresses the issue of an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner’s habeas 

Petition does not explicitly move for an evidentiary hearing. “In habeas proceedings, an 

evidentiary hearing is required when the petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would establish 

the right to relief.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Campbell 

v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 

(1963)). “However, an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved 

by reference to the state court record.” Id. (citing Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679; and United 

States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 211 (9th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 

846, 849 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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The parties generally do not dispute the facts and Petitioner’s arguments were for 

legal, not factual error. Accordingly, the issues Petitioner raised may be resolved to the 

state court record and an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.

IV. Certificate of Appealability 

Petitioner does not request a certificate of appealability. When a district court enters 

a final order adverse to a petitioner in a habeas proceeding, it must either issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability, which is required to appeal a final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus 

has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, but may only 

appeal in certain circumstances. Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 335–36. The federal rules 

governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court that dismisses or 

denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of appealability in its ruling. See Rule 

11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. For the reasons set forth 

above, Petitioner has not shown “that reasonable jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 743, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, (ECF No. 18), and 

DENIES each claim of Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 1). Because this 

Order concludes litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2018

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