Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-02012/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-02012-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 5:19-cv-05363-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KLARA BESS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUTY JEREMY FOY, #2279, DEPUTY 

CHIRICO, #1887,

Defendants.

Case No.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Plaintiff Klara Bess, proceeding pro se, filed her initial complaint in this action on April 

15, 2019, asserting Constitutional, statutory and common law claims arising out of her arrest on 

December 17, 2017. Original Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. Ms. Bess filed a Corrected First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) on October 8, 2019 and the next day, the Court ruled that filing to be the 

operative complaint. Dkt. Nos. 29, 30. 

Defendants Deputy Jeremy Foy and Deputy Steven Chirico (collectively “Defendants”) 

now move to dismiss the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in the FAC for failure to timely 

present a claim in accordance with the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and California Government Code §§ 905, 945.4, 945.3, and 950.2. 

The Court took the matter under submission for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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I. Background1

On December 19, 2017 at approximately 4:55pm, Ms. Bess was pulled over by Deputy 

Foy on Winchester Boulevard and Kennedy Avenue in Campbell, California. FAC ¶ 1. Deputy 

Foy told Ms. Bess that he had pulled her over for making an illegal U-turn. Ibid. Deputy Foy 

went back to his squad car, then returned to the passenger side of Ms. Bess’s car with a ticket 

citing Ms. Bess for an illegal U-turn, tint on windows, “not obeying signs” and “not obeying law.” 

Ibid. 

Upon receiving the ticket, Ms. Bess requested to speak to Deputy Foy’s supervisor. Id. at 

¶ 2. Deputy Foy stated, “I’m just going to arrest you,” then grabbed Ms. Bess by her right arm 

and attempted to pull her out of the passenger side of the car. Ibid. Deputy Foy released Ms. Bess 

and walked around to the driver’s side of the car. Id. at ¶ 3. Ms. Bess started to get out of the car, 

but Deputy Foy grabbed her and threw her onto the pavement. Ibid. Ms. Bess grabbed her phone, 

which had fallen to the ground, and attempted to dial 911. Deputy Foy grabbed the phone and 

slammed it onto the pavement, breaking it. Ibid. Deputy Foy cuffed Ms. Bess, punched her, and 

kneeing her in the back. Ibid. He grabbed her by her hair and hit her head into the pavement, 

while yelling at her to stop resisting. Ibid. Ms. Bess yelled back at Deputy Foy, saying that she 

was not resisting. Id. at ¶ 4. She yelled that he was attacking her because of the color of her skin

and accused him of being a member of the KKK. Ibid. Deputy Foy then roughly placed Ms. Bess 

in the front seat of the squad car, using his feet to push her inside. Id. at ¶ 6. During this process, 

Ms. Bess accidentally kicked Deputy Foy in the stomach. Ibid. 

Ms. Bess began complaining that her jaw and foot hurt, and Deputy Foy called for 

emergency help. Ibid. A few minutes later, 5 officers, including Deputy Chirico, arrived on the 

scene. Ibid. Deputy Chirico and Deputy Foy began discussing the incident. Ibid. Ms. Bess asked 

whether they could loosen her cuffs, but neither responded. Ibid. An EMT team arrived and 

began asking Ms. Bess about her wounds. Ibid. Ms. Bess began telling the EMT that Deputy Foy 

1 The background provided is a summary of the facts as alleged in the FAC. 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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slammed her to the ground, but Deputy Chirico cut her off and told her not to say another word. 

Ibid. He then roughly put Ms. Bess in the back of the squad car. Ibid. Shortly thereafter, 

Supervisor Quintana, whose full name is not alleged, arrived and told an EMT to examine Ms. 

Bess. Id. at ¶ 7. Ms. Bess told Supervisor Quintana that she was assaulted and he told her he 

would review the video from the dash camera within 48 hours. Ibid. A female officer drove Ms. 

Bess to the County office where she took pictures of Ms. Bess’s wounds and a nurse provided Ms. 

Bess with basic treatment. Ibid.

Ms. Bess later went to the emergency room where she was treated for injuries to her 

forehead, jaw, foot and left elbow. Id. at ¶ 8. She also experienced mental and emotional distress, 

including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, following the incident. Ibid. After the incident, Ms. 

Bess alleges that she went to the Sheriff’s office “almost daily” to report the incident, have more 

pictures taken and to acquire a copy of the police report. Id. at ¶ 18. She states that she did not 

know the Defendants’ positions and that no one at the Sheriff’s office would tell her. Ibid. She 

further alleges that the “clerk” refused to accept her complaint, “even at the department where 

complaints are filed.” Ibid. The clerk told Ms. Bess that she could not file a tort complaint with 

the Sheriff’s office until the criminal proceedings against her had concluded. Ibid. 

Ms. Bess filed a claim with the County of Santa Clara (the “County”) on November 8, 

2018, approximately eleven months after the traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 11. The FAC includes a number 

of allegations regarding circumstances that Ms. Bess believes explain or excuse her delay in filing 

a claim with the County. Id. at ¶¶ 14-21. Ms. Bess had moved to Campbell, California in 

November 2017, one month before her arrest, after experiencing domestic violence throughout 

2015-16. Id. at ¶ 14. She was working two jobs at the time. Id. at ¶ 15. After the incident, her 

car was impounded, she lost one of her jobs, and she was forced to battle felony charges of assault 

arising out of the incident. Id. at ¶ 16. She fell into a deep depression and began taking anxiety 

medication. Id. at ¶ 17. Within two weeks of the incident, Ms. Bess reviewed “literature provided 

in the District Attorney’s office about pursuing a claim” and later filed several complaints with 

various public agencies. Id. at ¶ 19. On April 6, 2018, she filed a citizen complaint with the 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Campbell Police Department. Id. at ¶ 20. On June 14, 2018, she filed a claim against the City of 

San Jose. Ibid. On November 13, 2018, she filed a claim against the Santa Clara Valley 

Transportation Authority. Id. at ¶ 20. 

Ms. Bess now brings this action against Deputy Foy and Deputy Chirico, both employees 

of the County. The FAC asserts claims for excessive force and unlawful seizure/arrest under the 

Fourth Amendment, as well as state claims for battery, assault and violation of the Bane Act (Cal. 

Civ. Code § 52.1 et seq.). Defendants Foy and Chirico brought this motion to dismiss Ms. Bess’s 

state claims, arguing that she did not timely present a claim to the County in accordance with the 

CTCA. Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Motion”), Dkt. No. 33, p. 3. Ms. Bess 

opposes the motion.2

II. Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may seek dismissal of a suit 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the 

court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 

Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Dismissal “is proper only 

where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

In her opposition to the Motion, Ms. Bess raised additional allegations about her attempts to file 

a complaint with the County that do not appear in the FAC. Opp., pp. 2-5. While the Court 

considers Ms. Bess’s arguments in opposition, the Court will not consider the new allegations she 

raises. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘new’ 

allegations contained in the . . . opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”).

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“Before a plaintiff can seek money damages from a government entity or its employees on 

a tort claim, [the CTCA] requires the plaintiff to file an administrative claim form with the 

relevant government entity no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.” Johnson v. 

Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 5:18-CV-06264-EJD, 2020 WL 870933, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2020) 

(citing Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950). This statute “serves several purposes: (1) 

to provide the public entity with sufficient information to allow it to make a thorough investigation 

of the matter; (2) to facilitate settlement of meritorious claims; (3) to enable the public entity to 

engage in fiscal planning; and (4) to avoid similar liability in the future.” Westcon Constr. Corp. 

v. Cty. of Sacramento, 152 Cal. App. 4th 183, 200 (2007). Claims under the Bane Act are subject 

to the presentment requirement of Section 911.2. See, e.g., Inman v. Anderson, 294 F. Supp. 3d 

907, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 

“Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is a condition 

precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant, and thus an element of the 

plaintiff’s cause of action.” A.M. v. Ventura Unified Sch. Dist., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 238 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2016), as modified (Oct. 19, 2016) (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). The 

California Supreme Court has held that “a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing 

compliance with the claim presentation requirement” or the complaint will have failed to state a 

claim. State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243 (2004). 

Plaintiff does not contest the fact that she did not timely comply with the claim 

presentation requirement in the CTCA. Rather, she argues that the County should be equitably 

estopped from raising the presentation requirement as a defense. FAC ¶¶ 11-12. “It is well settled 

that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its 

agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative 

act.” City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 744 (2007) (citations and quotations 

omitted); see also State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245 (stating that “a plaintiff 

may arguably be able to satisfy the claim presentation requirement by alleging an appropriate 

excuse, such as equitable estoppel”). A party raising equitable estoppel against the government 

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must first “establish affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence,” and “even then, 

estoppel will only apply where the government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and 

the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability.” Watkins v. U.S. 

Army, 875 F. 2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotations and citation omitted). “Affirmative 

misconduct requires an affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact 

by the government . . . although it does not require that the government intend to mislead a party.” 

Bilbo v. Cty. of Alameda, California, No. 17-CV-00932-JST, 2017 WL 4024649, at *10 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 13, 2017) (citing United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F. 2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).

Here, Ms. Bess argues that the Defendants should be estopped from asserting the claim 

presentation requirement because; (1) someone at the County refused to accept her complaint and

told her that she could not file a claim until after her criminal proceedings concluded (FAC ¶ 18); 

(2) she filed complaints in numerous local government entities in the absence of accurate 

information and in an attempt to preserve her claim (Id. at ¶ 20); and (3) circumstances in her life 

after the incident made it difficult for her to file a claim (Id. at ¶¶ 14-21). 

With respect to Ms. Bess’s first argument, the Defendants acknowledge that California 

Government Code § 945.3 forbids individuals charged with crimes from filing civil actions against 

an involved officer while criminal charges are pending, but argue that it “does not extend the time 

within which a claim is required to be presented pursuant to Section 911.2.” Motion, p. 6 (citing

Ross v. Santa Clara Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., No. 14-01770, 2014 WL 6706550, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 26, 2014)). Thus, they argue that Ms. Bess was required to present her claim to the County 

within six months of the incident that gives rise to her claim, regardless of her criminal 

proceedings. While this may be true, it is beside the point. Ms. Bess concedes that she was 

misinformed about the effect that her criminal proceedings had on her time limits to file a tort 

complaint. Opp., p. 5. Indeed, her argument is that someone in the “department where complaints 

are filed” gave her misleading information and that this misleading information prevented or 

deterred her from filing a complaint. FAC at ¶ 18. 

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Nevertheless, the Court finds this allegation alone insufficient to adequately allege that the 

County affirmatively prevented Ms. Bess from filing a claim. In Jefferson v. City of Fremont, the 

plaintiff alleged that the defendant gave him incorrect information about the claim form he was 

required to complete, which led him to not fill out the form at all. No. 12-CV-0926-EMC, 2013 

WL 1747917, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). The Court found that there was “insufficient 

information in the complaint” to support this argument. Ibid. Specifically, “[t]here [were] no 

allegations about what exactly [plaintiff] was told about the claim forms and by whom.” Ibid. 

The court, therefore, rejected the plaintiff’s equitable estoppel argument and dismissed his state 

claim for failure to comply with the CTCA. Ibid. 

Just as in Jefferson, Ms. Bess does not allege who she spoke to, what that person said, or 

even that she was at the right location to file a complaint. The fact that an employee at a County 

office gave her incorrect information on its own does not establish the “affirmative misconduct 

going beyond mere negligence,” necessary to equitably estop the County from raising the CTCA

as a defense. Cf. John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 446 (1989) (finding 

allegations of equitable estoppel sufficient where a teacher in the defendant school district 

threatened to retaliate against plaintiff to prevent plaintiff from disclosing alleged molestation until 

the time for filing a claim against the district had elapsed). Moreover, the fact that Ms. Bess filed 

a complaint with the Campbell Police Department in April 2018, within the CTCA’s six-month 

time frame, undercuts her argument that she was truly misled by the incorrect information she 

received. See FAC ¶ 20. 

Ms. Bess’s second argument focuses on her own actions, rather than the actions of the 

County. Although the complaints she filed at the Campbell Police Department, the City of San 

Jose, and the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority demonstrate her intent to file a claim, 

such intent is not sufficient to satisfy the presentation requirement. The complaints Ms. Bess filed 

at other public agencies do not establish any affirmative act by the County that prevented or 

deterred her from filing a claim in the correct location. See Sternberg v. Town of Danville, No. 15-

CV-01878-SI, 2015 WL 9024340, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s equitable 

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estoppel argument and dismissing claims for failure to comply with the CTCA where plaintiff 

filed complaint against Danville instead of the county because defendants had represented 

themselves to be “Danville police officers” even though they were actually county deputies 

assigned to Danville).

Similarly, Ms. Bess’s third argument focuses on the circumstances in her life that 

prevented her from filing a timely claim, rather than alleging any affirmative act by the County 

that prevented her from doing so. Such circumstances cannot serve as the basis for a claim of 

equitable estoppel against the County. Martinez v. Scott, No. 18-CV-8133-PA (PJW), 2019 WL 

4391133, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-08133-

PA (PJW), 2019 WL 6825742 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (rejecting plaintiff’s equitable estoppel 

argument where plaintiff did not comply with relevant exhaustion requirements due to his 

“psychotherapy, fear of retaliation, and lack of access to the agency’s information”). 

The Court concludes that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to establish equitable 

estoppel and that Ms. Bess’s state claims must be dismissed for failure to present a timely claim 

under the CTCA. Ms. Bess included additional allegations in her Opposition that, even if added to 

the complaint, would not change the Court’s analysis. As discussed above, even if she could add 

allegations demonstrating that the County provided incorrect information, other allegations in the 

FAC undercut her argument that she was misled by that information. Thus, the Court finds that it 

would be futile for Ms. Bess to amend her complaint again. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court 

should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The third, 

fourth, and fifth causes of action in the FAC are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court 

encourages Plaintiff to utilize the free services of the Federal Pro Se Program. The contact 

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information for the Program is provided below.

Kevin Knestrick

Asian Law Alliance

Federal Pro Se Program

United States District Court

280 South 1st Street

2nd Floor, Room 2070

San Jose, CA 95113

Hours: Monday to Thursday 9:00 am – 4:00 pm

Phone: 408-297-1480

Email: kknestrick@asianlawalliance.org

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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