Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01862/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01862-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORIANO MILLARE,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CDCR, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2: 22-cv-1862 DJC KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s third amended complaint. (ECF No. 

11.) 

 For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff is granted thirty days to file a fourth amended 

complaint. If plaintiff does not file a fourth amended complaint, the undersigned will order 

defendants Reynolds, Woods and Chavarria to file a response to the potentially colorable Eighth 

Amendment claim raised in the third amended complaint. 

Background 

 On October 19, 2022, defendants removed this action from the San Joaquin County 

Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) On November 7, 2022, defendants requested that the court screen 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF No. 4.) 

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On April 3, 2023, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations and an order 

addressing plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) The undersigned recommended 

dismissal of the following claims: 1) claim alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“ADA”) against all defendants based on alleged confiscation of plaintiff’s Dual Medical 

Equipment (“DME”) pillow; 2) Eighth Amendment claims against defendant California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); 3) claims pursuant to California Civil 

Code § 1427 against all defendants; and 4) negligence claims against defendant CDCR. (Id. at 

11.) The undersigned dismissed, with leave to amend, the Eighth Amendment and negligence 

claims against defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods based on the alleged confiscation of 

plaintiff’s DME pillow. (Id.) The undersigned ordered that defendants shall not respond to the 

third amended complaint until ordered by the court. (Id.) 

 On May 1, 2023, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff’s 

third amended complaint raises some of the claims the undersigned recommended be dismissed in 

the April 3, 2023 findings and recommendations. 

On May 31, 2023, defendants filed an answer to the third amended complaint. (ECF No. 

11.) 

 On August 7, 2023, the Honorable Daniel J. Calabretta adopted the April 3, 2023 findings 

and recommendations. (ECF No. 14.) 

 On August 8, 2023, defendants filed a request to withdraw their answer to the third 

amended complaint. (ECF No. 15.) Defendants state that the answer to the third amended 

complaint was filed in error because the April 3, 2023 order directed them not to respond until 

ordered by the court. (Id.) Good cause appearing, defendants’ request to withdraw the answer is 

granted. 

Although the third amended complaint raises claims that are now dismissed, these claims 

are not barred by the law of the case doctrine because they were not decided at the time plaintiff 

filed the third amended complaint. The dismissed claims were decided on August 7, 2023, when 

Judge Calabretta adopted the April 3, 2023 findings and recommendations. Southern Oregon 

Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The law of the case 

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doctrine ordinarily precludes a court from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same 

court or a higher court in the same case.”). Accordingly, the undersigned herein addresses all 

claims raised in the third amended complaint. 

Legal Standard for Screening

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 

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Plaintiff’s Claims

 Named as defendants are CDCR, T. Reynolds, A. Chavarria, J. Woods and several doe 

defendants. (ECF No. 11 at 2-4.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he is a mobility impaired inmate who suffers from multi-level 

cervical spine spondylosis, multi-level thoracic spine spondylosis, multi-level lumbar 

degenerative disc disease, post-traumatic injury to his left femur and tibia, and deterioration in his 

right knee. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges that he was provided with a cane for mobility support 

and a DME cervical pillow for his disabilities. (Id. at 6.) 

 On January 7, 2020, plaintiff was transferred from Deuel Vocational Institution (“DVI”) 

to the California Training Facility (“CTF”) (Id.) The Northern Transportation Hub (“NTH”) 

officers transported plaintiff in a vehicle without a lift. (Id.) Plaintiff could not complete the high 

climb onto the transportation bus “without hardship.” (Id.) The NTH officers “manhandled” 

plaintiff aboard the transportation bus while plaintiff was shackled and clenching his cane. (Id.) 

 Before plaintiff was placed on the transportation bus, a CDCR officer seized plaintiff’s 

DME pillow. (Id.) Plaintiff saw the CDCR officer talk to the NTH officers before placing his 

DME pillow into a bag and tossing it in a compartment on the right side of the transportation bus. 

(Id.) The NTH offices did not document plaintiff’s NTH pillow. (Id.) 

 When plaintiff arrived at CTF, he observed some of his property being unloaded from the 

transportation bus by NTH officers. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff did not see the NTH officers unload the 

bag containing his DME pillow from the schedule Q transportation bus. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s 

DME pillow was not included with the property plaintiff received. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asked the CTF Receiving and Release (“R & R”) Sergeant to locate the bag 

containing his DME pillow. (Id.) The R & R Sergeant informed plaintiff that the NTH 

transportation officers did not document or deliver to CTF R & R plaintiff’s DME pillow. (Id.) 

Plaintiff spoke with CTF R & R medical staff regarding the location of his DME pillow. 

(Id.) CTF R & R medical staff informed plaintiff that the NTH officers did not document or 

deliver to CTF R & R plaintiff’s DME pillow. (Id.) 

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 On January 9, 2020, plaintiff filed grievance no. TUN 20 00008 grieving the deprivation 

of his DME pillow. (Id.) On January 17, 2020, plaintiff filed an ADA request CDCR 1824 log 

no. CTF S 20-00222. (Id.) On January 22, 2020, an officer interviewed plaintiff regarding 

CDCR 1824 log no. CTF S 20-00222. (Id. at 8.) During the interview, plaintiff stated that he 

was being deprived of sleep without his DME pillow. (Id.) 

 On January 23, 2020, the Reasonable Accommodations Panel granted plaintiff’s request 

for reasonable accommodation. (Id.) The Reasonable Accommodations Panel did not provide 

plaintiff with any accommodation. (Id.) 

 On or about April 9, 2020, plaintiff received a CDCR First Level Response to appeal no. 

TUN 20 00008. (Id. at 9.) The response included a document described as “Statewide Bus 

Schedule for the week of January 06, 2020.” (Id.) The schedule identified the NTH Schedule 2 

officers as defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods. (Id.) The schedule stated that NTH staff 

were interviewed regarding plaintiff’s claim and recalled taking possession of plaintiff’s DME 

pillow. (Id.) 

 On April 20, 2020, plaintiff filed an appeal against defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and 

Woods for their failure to use a vehicle lift when they put plaintiff on the transportation bus. (Id.) 

Plaintiff raises three legal claims. In claim one, plaintiff alleges that all defendants 

violated the ADA. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges violations of the ADA based on the confiscation 

of his DME pillow on January 7, 2020, the failure of defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods 

to use a vehicle lift, and plaintiff’s failure to receive a DME pillow on January 22, 2020, and 

January 23, 2020. (Id. at 11-12.) In claim two, plaintiff alleges that all defendants violated the 

Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations based on his 

alleged transport in a vehicle without a vehicle lift, the alleged confiscation of his DME pillow 

and the alleged manhandling of plaintiff onto and off the schedule Q transportation bus. (Id.) 

In claim three, plaintiff alleges a negligence claim against defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and 

Woods. (Id. at 15.) 

 As relief, plaintiff seeks money damages and an order directing defendants to provide 

plaintiff with a definitive diagnosis. (Id. at 11.) 

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ADA Claims

Defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods

Plaintiff’s official capacity ADA claims against defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and 

Woods are redundant of the ADA claims against defendant CDCR. Although a plaintiff may 

pursue ADA claims against defendants in their official capacities, “[w]hen both a municipal 

officer and a local government entity are named, and the officer is named only in an official 

capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a redundant defendant.” Center for Bio-Ethical 

Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008). This 

reasoning applies equally to state entities and their officers. Welks v. California Department of 

Corrections, 2019 WL 4745272, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 

473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits...generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).) Thus, because plaintiff names CDCR as a defendant, plaintiff’s 

official capacity ADA claims against the individual defendants are dismissed. 

CDCR

 To show a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show the following: “(1) he is 

a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or 

denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 114 

F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

 “The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for 

disability.” Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on 

other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

Failing to attend to the medical needs of a disabled person does not violate the ADA. See

Figueira by and through Castillo v. County of Sutter, 2015 WL 6449151, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 

2015). “The lack of medical treatment or the failure to provide an accommodation for [a 

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plaintiff’s] medical condition does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the 

ADA.” Mixon v. Tyson, 2017 WL 5998231, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) (citing Simmons, 609 

F.3d at 1022; Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

 In the instant case, plaintiff alleges violation of the ADA based on the alleged confiscation 

of his DME cervical pillow and the failure of the Reasonable Accommodations Panel to provide 

him with a DME pillow. The undersigned finds that plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of the DME 

pillow relates to medical care and is not related to discrimination against plaintiff because of his 

disability. “The lack of medical treatment or the failure to provide an accommodation for his 

medical condition does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the ADA.” 

Mixon, 2017 WL 5998231, at *5; see also McKinnon v. Nikula, 2021 WL 6118742, at *12 (W.D. 

Wash. Nov. 17, 2021) (denial of request for knee brace, medical mattresses and wedge pillow 

alleges claim for inadequate medical treatment, which does not constitute discrimination under 

the ADA). Accordingly, plaintiff’s ADA claims based on plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of the 

DME pillow are without merit. 

Plaintiff alleges that his transport in a vehicle without a lift violated the ADA. A claim 

alleging denial of safe travel based on a disability may state an ADA claim. See Atcherley v. 

California Department of Corrections, 2022 WL 3648272, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2022) 

(“Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly suggest that he was ‘denied the benefits [] of a prison service’—

safe transportation—'on the basis of his physical handicap.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 

F.3d 1019, 1023 (1997); see also Lewis v. Gipson, 2020 WL 11232596, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 

2020) (holding that plaintiff stated ADA and RA claims based on allegation that “he was denied 

safe travel because he is wheelchair bound and the prison lacked a van that could safely 

accommodate a wheelchair.”); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(under Title II of the ADA, entity defendant is liable for the vicarious acts of its employees). 

 For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff does not state a potentially 

colorable ADA claim based on his transport in a vehicle without a lift. Plaintiff’s claim that he 

could not complete the high climb onto the bus “without hardship” is vague and conclusory. 

Plaintiff does not explain why boarding the bus without the lift was a hardship. Plaintiff also 

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appears to allege that he was placed on the bus by the NTF officers, who allegedly manhandled 

plaintiff. However, these allegations are also vague and conclusory. Plaintiff does not describe 

how these officers assisted him onto the bus or describe the alleged manhandling. Without 

additional information regarding how plaintiff boarded the bus, the undersigned cannot determine 

whether plaintiff states a potentially colorable ADA claim based on the denial of safe travel. 

Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. 

Eighth Amendment Claims

Defendant CDCR

 Claims for damages against the state, its agencies, or its officers for actions performed in 

their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, unless the state waives its 

immunity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment bars a 

damages action against a State in federal court); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing a 

Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against a state, its agencies 

(such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid congressional 

override....” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999); Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear ... that in the absence of consent a suit 

in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed 

by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 

 For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claims against defendant CDCR are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by transporting him in a vehicle without a vehicle lift, confiscating his DME 

pillow and by manhandling him onto and off the schedule Q transportation bus. 

Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods confiscated his 

DME pillow states a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim. 

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For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s claim alleging that 

defendants manhandled him onto and off the schedule Q transportation bus does not state a 

potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim. It is well established that whenever prison 

officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core 

judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 

(1992). 

Plaintiff’s claim that defendants manhandled him is vague and conclusory. Plaintiff does 

not describe the alleged manhandling in any detail and nor does he specifically allege any injuries 

caused by the alleged manhandling. While plaintiff alleges a variety of injuries that he suffered 

as a result of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations, see ECF No. 11 at 14, plaintiff does not 

specifically allege which of these injuries were caused by the alleged manhandling. For these 

reasons, these allegations do not state a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claim. See Mayberry v. Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, 2021 WL 6102434, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 

May 17, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of being ‘manhandled’ and being treated 

‘roughly,’ combined with conclusory assertions of excessive force, are not sufficient to state a 

claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment excessive force standards.”); Alphonisis 

v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 2018 WL 11215119, at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 

13, 2018) (“[Plaintiff] does not explain what ‘manhandled’ means, or why she believes that their 

use of force was excessive. These are just two examples of the ‘labels and conclusions’ with 

which the FAC is replete and which are not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.”) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that “a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”)). 

Plaintiff also appears to claim that his transportation in a vehicle without a lift violated the 

Eighth Amendment. The undersigned finds that plaintiff is alleging an Eighth Amendment claim 

based on the denial of adequate medical care. 

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“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 

to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 

(2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc)). A plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 

Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). 

The undersigned finds that plaintiff has not stated a potentially colorable Eighth 

Amendment claim based on his alleged transportation in a vehicle without a lift because plaintiff 

alleges no harm caused by this alleged deprivation. While plaintiff alleges a variety of injuries 

that he suffered as a result of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations, see ECF No. 11 at 14, 

plaintiff does not specifically allege whether any of these injuries were caused by his transport in 

the vehicle without a lift. For these reasons, plaintiff does not state a potentially colorable Eighth 

Amendment claim for violation of his right to adequate medical care based on his transport in a 

vehicle without a lift. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (deliberate indifference requires a showing that harm 

was caused by the defendant’s actions). 

Negligence Claims Against Defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods 

 For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s negligence claims against defendants Reynolds, 

Chavarria and Woods are dismissed. 

The California Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or 

its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims 

Board no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905.2, 910, 

911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim 

are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior Ct. of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 

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1239 (Cal. 2004). The “failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity 

bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” Id. at 1239; Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police 

Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Further, to state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must also allege 

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.6; Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 

1244. “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement 

subjects a complaint to [dismissal] for failure to state a cause of action.” Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 

1239. The requirement that a plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with the Government 

Claims Act applies to state law claims brought in federal court. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 627. 

The undersigned reviewed plaintiff’s third amended complaint and finds that it fails to 

allege compliance with or excusal for his failure to comply with the Government Tort Claims 

Act. Accordingly, plaintiff’s negligence claims are dismissed.

Conclusion 

 As discussed above, plaintiff’s third amended complaint states one potentially colorable 

claim for relief: defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods violated the Eighth Amendment by 

allegedly confiscating/depriving plaintiff of his DME pillow. 

 As discussed above, the following claims alleged in the third amended complaint are not 

potentially colorable: 1) all claims alleging violation of the ADA by defendants Reynolds, 

Chavarria and Woods; 2) claims alleging violation of the ADA by defendant CDCR based on 

deprivation of DME pillow and plaintiff’s transport in a vehicle without a lift; 3) all claims 

alleging Eighth Amendment violations against defendant CDCR; 4) claims against defendants 

Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods alleging inadequate medical care and excessive force in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment; and 5) plaintiff’s negligence claims against defendants Reynolds, 

Chavarria and Woods. 

 Based on Judge Calabretta’s August 7, 2023 order, the following claims raised in the third 

amended complaint are now barred by the law of the case doctrine: 1) claims alleging ADA 

violation by defendant CDCR based on the deprivation of DME pillow; 2) Eighth Amendment 

claims against defendant CDCR; and 3) all claims alleging ADA violations by defendants 

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Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods. 

 In an abundance of caution, plaintiff is granted thirty days to file a fourth amended 

complaint addressing the pleading defects as to his claims that are not barred by the law of the 

case doctrine: 1) ADA claim against defendant CDCR based on his alleged transport in a vehicle 

without a lift; 2) Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods 

alleging inadequate medical care and excessive force; and 3) negligence claims against 

defendants Reynolds, Chavarria and Woods. Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint shall not 

include those claims that are now barred by the law of the case doctrine. 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 

v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 

supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 

omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

 If plaintiff does not file a fourth amended complaint, the undersigned will order 

defendants to respond to the potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim against defendants 

Reynolds, Woods and Chavarria based on the alleged confiscation of plaintiff’s DME pillow. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Within thirty days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall return the attached Notice of 

Election Form; plaintiff may file a fourth amended complaint within that time; 

2. Defendants’ request to withdraw the answer (ECF No. 15) is granted; the answer is 

ordered stricken from the record; and

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3. Defendants shall not respond to the fourth amended complaint until ordered by the 

court. 

Dated: August 21, 2023

Mill1862.ame

Case 2:22-cv-01862-DC-CSK Document 19 Filed 08/21/23 Page 13 of 14
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORIANO MILLARE,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CDCR, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2: 22-cv-1862 DJC KJN P

NOTICE OF ELECTION

Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows: 

 ______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claim alleging that 

defendants Reynolds, Woods and Chavarria violated the Eighth Amendment by 

confiscating/depriving plaintiff of his DME pillow; plaintiff consents to the dismissal of all other 

claims raised in the third amended complaint.

OR

_____ Plaintiff opts to file a fourth amended complaint and delay service of 

process. The proposed fourth amended complaint is attached. 

DATED: 

 _______________________________ 

 Plaintiff

Case 2:22-cv-01862-DC-CSK Document 19 Filed 08/21/23 Page 14 of 14