Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00692/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00692-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MGD 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher J. Soto, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Matt Ritter, 

Defendant. 

No. CV 13-00692-PHX-DGC (MEA) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Christopher J. Soto, Sr., who is confined in the Pinal County Jail in 

Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). Plaintiff has also 

filed what appears to be a request to consider Plaintiff’s case in conjunction with another 

pending case, Cleveland v. Voyles, CV 13-0265-PHX-DGC1

 (Doc. 5) (“Request”); a 

“Motion to Submit” (Doc. 13) (“Motion”); and numerous documents advising the Court 

of documents he has filed in a pending case in Pinal County Superior Court, case 

CR2012-02485 (Doc. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12) (“Notices”). The Court will dismiss the 

Complaint and this action. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks any relief in his Request, 

Motion or Notices, such relief will be denied. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. The statutory fee will be collected 

 

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 Plaintiff does not allege that his case is related to CV 13-0265-PHX-DGC or that 

he is a party in that case. 

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monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount in the 

account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order 

requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to 

the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

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 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of 

advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. 

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to 

decide whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend, because 

the defects cannot be corrected. 

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges two counts in his Complaint. Count I alleges a violation of 

Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and “access to the court.” Count II alleges 

a violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and liberty because he 

was not indicted. Plaintiff sues only his “private” criminal defense attorney, Matt Ritter. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and “hedonic damages.” 

 Plaintiff alleges the following facts: A summons for Plaintiff to appear at a 

hearing on November 14, 2012 was sent to an Arizona City address. Because Plaintiff 

did not receive mail at that address, he never received the summons and did not appear at 

the hearing. 

 On March 29, 2013, Ritter, who had been appointed to represent Plaintiff three 

days after Plaintiff’s January 2013 arrest, told Plaintiff that a summons for the November 

14, 2012 hearing in case CR2012-02485 had been sent to him at the Arizona City 

address. Plaintiff appears to contend that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 

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violated where counsel did not represent him at the November 14, 2012 hearing or two 

hearings held in December 2012. On January 11, 2013, Ritter informed Plaintiff of a plea 

agreement offered by the prosecutor that would result in Plaintiff being sentenced to three 

years’ probation. Plaintiff appears to assert that Ritter failed to ascertain that Plaintiff 

had never been properly summoned for the November hearing or been indicted in case 

CR2012-02485. Plaintiff asserts that case CR2012-02485 has not been processed “in a 

judicial manner” where there was no arraignment, indictment, initial hearing, “colloquy,” 

or grand jury transcripts. (Doc. 1 at 4.) 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state 

law who have violated rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and federal 

law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 

1995). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that 

he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he 

must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

The “under color of state law” component is the equivalent of the “state action” 

requirement under the Constitution. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928 

(1982); Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rendell-Baker 

v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). “Acting 

under color of state law is a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action.” Gritchen v. 

Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 46). Whether an 

attorney representing a criminal defendant is privately retained, a public defender, or 

court-appointed counsel, he or she does not act under color of state law. See Polk County 

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v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 

465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Here, Plaintiff sues only his criminal defense attorney, Ritter. As stated above, a 

criminal defense attorney does not act under color of state law. Therefore, Plaintiff fails 

to state a claim against Ritter under § 1983. Because Plaintiff cannot amend his 

complaint to state a claim against Ritter, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and 

this action. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

(Doc. 2.) 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee. 

(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. (Doc. 

1.) 

 (4) Plaintiff’s Request, Motion or Notices are denied as moot, to the extent that 

any relief is sought therein. (Doc. 5-13.) 

 (5) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

(6) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

Dated this 17th day of May, 2013. 

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