Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01262/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01262-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 When petitioner initially filed this habeas petitioner, Jeanne S. Woodford was named as the

respondent in her capacity as warden of the institution where petitioner was incarcerated. However,

petitioner’s place of confinement has changed and, thus, A.K. Scriber has been substituted in place

of Jeanne S. Woodford. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE JERMAINE SHERRORS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05-CV-1262 – IEG (LSP)

ORDER: 

1) REJECTING RESPONDENT’S

OBJECTIONS;

2) ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

3) CONDITIONALLY GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS; and 

4) DENYING MOTION TO

CLARIFY AS MOOT

[Doc. Nos. 46, 47, 51, 54]

vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, Warden,1

Respondent.

On June 20, 2005, petitioner Ronnie Jermaine Sherrors (“petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, file a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging his June 2001 conviction for first degree murder. (Doc. No. 1.) This matter was

referred to United States Magistrate Judge Leo Papas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On

May 24, 2007, Magistrate Judge Papas issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”)

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 The Report took the summary of the facts from the factual background section of the

California Court of Appeal’s written opinion. 

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recommending that the court conditionally grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Respondent filed objections to the Report on June 19, 2007. (Doc. No. 47.) Petitioner filed a

response to respondent’s objections on July 30, 2007. (Doc. No. 54.) 

Following de novo review of petitioner’s claims, the court finds Magistrate Judge Papas’s

Report to be thorough, complete, and an accurate analysis of the legal issues presented in the

petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) adopts in full Magistrate Judge Papas’s

Report; (2) rejects the respondent’s objections; (3) conditionally grants petitioner’s section 2254

petition; and (4) denies petitioner’s motion for clarification as moot.

BACKGROUND

State Proceedings

The Court incorporates by reference Magistrate Judge Papas’s fair and accurate recitation

of the factual and procedural background regarding petitioner’s proceedings in state court.2

(Report at 2-5.) To summarize, the victim, Steve Foth (“Foth”), moved to San Diego in September

of 1999 in an attempt to recover from a cocaine habit. (Id. at 2.) On September 29, 1999, one of

Foth’s friends lent Foth an automobile, a cell phone, and a Visa credit card. (Id.) Foth and his

friends planned to meet for dinner that evening but Foth never showed up. On September 30,

1999, Foth’s body was discovered near a work site in San Diego with over 80 stab wounds. (Id. at

3.) On October 9, 1999, after coaxing from friends, Lena Hixon (“Hixon”) falsely told police that

she had murdered Foth with Benjamin Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen. A few days later, Hixon

retracted her earlier statement and confessed that petitioner and an accomplice, James Hall

(“Hall”), murdered Foth. 

At trial, Hixon testified about the following events that led to Foth’s murder. Foth

approached Hixon late in the afternoon of September 29, 1999, looking to buy drugs. Hixon

connected Foth with Hall and petitioner, who drove away with Foth in his borrowed car. (Id. at 4.) 

About 15 to 20 minutes later, Hall and petitioner drove back to pick up Hixon in Foth’s car, but

Foth was nowhere to be seen. Petitioner, Hall, and Hixon drove to a dirt lot near Lake Hodges. 

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 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hixon pled guilty to conspiracy to sell cocaine and assault with

a deadly weapon. (Report at 5.) Hixon was sentenced to 12 years in prison. 

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Petitioner and Hall opened the trunk of Foth’s car and Foth emerged. At this point, Hixon became

scared and protested but petitioner threatened her. Petitioner then turned towards Foth and stabbed

him with a knife for several minutes. After forcing Hixon to stab Foth, petitioner and Hall

stripped Foth and threw him into the bushes. The threesome drove back to San Diego in Foth’s

car and petitioner told Hixon to keep her mouth shut or he would harm her daughter. At trial,

petitioner’s sister, Trina Walker, testified she saw blood on petitioner’s clothes when petitioner

returned home on the evening of September 29, 1999. Petitioner and Hall were also seen with

Foth’s car in the days following Foth’s murder.3 The police arrested Hall and petitioner on

October 14, 1999. (Id. at 5.) 

On June 21, 2000, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an Amended Information

charging petitioner with one count of murder. The Amended Information also alleged the use of a

deadly weapon (California Penal Code §12022(b)(1)) and commission of the murder during a

robbery (California Penal Code §190.2(a)(17)). Following a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty

of murder in the first degree on June 7, 2001. (Lodgment No. 15 at 299-300.) The jury also found

the two additional allegations (i.e., use of a deadly weapon and murder during the commission of a

robbery) true. (Id. at 329-330.) On September 28, 2001, the trial court sentenced petitioner to life

in prison without the possibility of parole, plus one year. (Id.)

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction on

July 16, 2003. (Lodgment No. 4.) On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, which denied his petition on October 1, 2003. (Lodgment Nos. 5, 6.) 

On October 25, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in San Diego Superior

Court raising fifteen claims. The court denied his petition on December 9, 2007. (Lodgment Nos.

9-10.) Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal. The

Court of Appeal denied his petition on February 24, 2005. (Lodgment Nos. 11, 22.) On March 8,

2005, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment

No. 13.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition on March 15, 2006. (Lodgment No.

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14.) 

Federal Proceedings

On June 20, 2005, petitioner filed the instant habeas petition alleging fourteen different

grounds for relief. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on September 12, 2005. 

(Doc. No. 8.) The court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss on March 23, 2006. (Doc. No.

23.) Respondent filed answer to the petition on June 30, 2006, (Doc. No. 29), and petitioner filed

a traverse on October 25, 2006. (Doc. No. 42.) 

On May 24, 2007, Magistrate Judge Papas issued an eighty-eight page Report

recommending the Court deny the petition as to thirteen claims but recommending the Court

conditionally grant the petition as to Ground Nine. (Doc. No. 45.) Respondent filed objections to

the Report on June 18, 2007. (Doc. No. 46.) Petitioner filed a response to respondent’s objections

on July 30, 2007. (Doc. No. 54.) Petitioner did not file objections to the Report. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The magistrate judge set forth the appropriate standard of review with regard to the

petition. (Report at 6-8.) Where, as here, the California Supreme Court summarily denied

petitioner’s request for review, the Court analyzes the California Court of Appeal's opinion as the

“last reasoned decision” on the merits of petitioner's case. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th

Cir.2004). A petition under § 2254 can be granted only if the Court determines that the California

courts decided petitioner’s case in a manner that was either “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States,” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403, 412-13 (2000). 

The Court will review de novo those portion of the Report to which respondent has

objected, to wit Grounds 7-9. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022

(9th Cir. 2004). As to the remaining grounds for relief, to which no party objected, the Court finds

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the Report to be well reasoned and adopts it in full without further discussion. 

B. Grounds Seven and Eight 

Although Magistrate Judge Papas recommends that the Court deny relief based upon on

Grounds 7 and 8 of the petition, respondent argues Magistrate Judge Papas erred in his findings

regarding each of those claims. With regard to Ground 7, respondent argues Magistrate Judge

Papas erred in finding CALJIC 8.81.17, as given, improperly told the jury it could convict

petitioner of murder if it found “a defendant” was engaged in the commission of the robbery,

rather than “the defendant.” With regard to Ground 8, respondent argues Magistrate Judge Papas

erred in finding the language of the verdict form “troubling” because it omitted an essential

element of the special circumstances allegation. 

With regard to Ground 7, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Papas accurately analyzed the

instruction and found it to be erroneous as given. The state court itself was troubled by the fact

counsel failed to notice the error in the instruction and the potential for prejudicial error. [Resp’t

Lodgment No. 4, at 12-14.] The instruction telling the jury they could find a petitioner guilty if

they found “a defendant” was engaged in the commission of robbery, rather than “the defendant”

(i.e. petitioner), incorrectly stated the legal standard. Magistrate Judge Papas correctly concluded

the instruction, as given, was erroneous.

With regard to Ground 8, respondent correctly points out that under state law the fact the

murder was “committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the robbery” is not an

“element” of the special circumstance allegation. People v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 4th 73, 113-14 (2004). 

However, Magistrate Judge Papas understood the significance of the missing portion of the verdict

form and, like the state court, used the term “element” in a non-technical sense. Although the jury

instructions told jurors they had to find “the murder was committed in order to carry out or

advance the commission of the crime,” the verdict form did not require the jurors to make any

such finding. The California Court of Appeal, itself, stated “it certainly is preferable that the

elements of a special circumstance allegation be completely stated in the special verdict form.” 

Upon review, Magistrate Judge Papas correctly concluded the verdict form erroneously failed to

include the “in order to carry out or advance the commission of the robbery” language.

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C. Ground Nine

Respondent also objects to Magistrate Judge Papas’s finding that the use of CALJIC 2.15

was prejudicial constitutional error requiring relief under § 2254. Relying on California Jury

Instruction Criminal (“CALJIC”) 2.15, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 

If you find that a defendant was in possession of recently stolen property, the fact of

that possession is not by itself sufficient to prove an inference that the defendant is guilty

of the crime of murder. Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence

tending to prove a defendant’s guilt. However, this corroborating evidence need only be

slight and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt. 

As corroboration, you may consider the attributes of possession, time, place and

manner; that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime charged; the

defendant’s conduct; his false or contradictory statement, if any; and other statements that

may have been made with reference to the property. (Lodgment No. 15 at 233; Lodgment

No. 17 at 1932-33.) 

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in instructing the jury

with CALJIC 2.15, which is inapplicable to a murder charge under a California Supreme Court

case decided after petitioner’s trial, People v. Prieto, 30 Cal.4th 226 (2003). (Lodgment No. 4 at

11.) Nevertheless, the court found the error was not prejudicial because CALJIC 2.15 is a

permissive instruction that informs jurors they may infer guilt of murder from petitioner’s

possession of stolen property if there is any other corroborating evidence. (Id. at 11-12.) The

California Court of Appeal reasoned the other jury instructions on the elements of murder, felony

murder, and murder during the commission of a robbery demonstrated that the jury accepted

Hixon’s damning testimony. (Id. at 12.) Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood the jury would

have rendered a more favorable verdict if the court had not given the instruction. (Id.) 

1. Magistrate Judge’s Findings

In Ground 9 of the habeas petition, petitioner argues his due process rights were violated

because the trial court misinstructed the jury that “it could infer [petitioner’s] guilt of murder [sic]

from his alleged possession of the victim’s car plus ‘slight corroborative evidence,’” which

“lightened” the state’s burden of proof. (Petition at 9.) Petitioner also claims his attorney’s failure

to object to this instruction resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel. (Id.)

 The Report correctly identified the legal standard and analytic steps applied in a federal

habeas petition for determining whether a jury instruction is constitutionally defective. To obtain

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federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, (1991). Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the trial record and the overall charge

to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. Id.; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

169 (1982). Even if the court determines the instruction violated the petitioner's right to due

process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction resulted in actual

prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). Actual prejudice exists if

the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict. Id. 

First, Magistrate Judge Papas found CALJIC 2.15 created a permissive inference, rather

than a mandatory presumption. (Report at 80.) A jury instruction creates a permissive inference

where the jury is allowed, but not required, to infer a specified conclusion if the government

proves certain predicate facts. Schwedeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 1992). 

While generally disfavored, Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1996), a permissive

inference is constitutionally sound if “the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the

proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Schwedeman, 971 F.2d at 315; see County Court of

Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 162-67 (1979). Applying this standard and relying on

Prieto, the Report found that CALJIC 2.15 was not constitutionally sound because the inferred fact

(i.e. petitioner committed the murder) is not “more likely than not” to flow from the proved fact

(i.e. petitioner possessed Foth’s vehicle). (Report at 80.) Thus, Magistrate Judge Papas found

petitioner’s due process rights were violated. 

Magistrate Judge Papas noted the California Court of Appeal similarly reached the

conclusion the utilization of CALJIC 2.15 in this context was erroneous. However, the Report

concluded the California Court of Appeal applied the incorrect standard of review in determining

the harmfulness of the error. The California Court of Appeal applied the “trial error” harmlessness

standard and asked whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing

party would have been reached in the absence of the error” under People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d

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4

 The Report did not address petitioner’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel because it recommended the petition be granted because CALJIC 2.15 created constitutional

error. (Report at 86-87.) 

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818 (1956). (Id. at 81) However, because the error was constitutional, the state court should have

asked whether “the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” under Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967). (Id.) (citing Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Magistrate Judge Papas recognized that despite the state appellate court’s failure to apply

the correct standard, this Court is obligated to apply the harmless error standard articulated in

Brecht on federal habeas review. In other words, having found the existence of constitutional

error, the Court must determine whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence” on the jury’s verdict. (Report at 81-82.) Magistrate Judge Papas concluded there was

actual prejudice because the testimonial evidence tying petitioner to the murder was weak while

the evidence tying petitioner to Foth’s vehicle was strong. (Id. at 81-84.) The instruction

improperly allowed the jury to convict petitioner of murder solely because the jury determined

petitioner possessed the stolen car.4 Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Papas expressed grave doubt

as to the outcome of the trial and recommended the court grant the petition on Ground Nine. 

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court must elaborate upon the application of AEDPA’s standard of

review to the constitutional error in this case. Under AEDPA, a federal court “must defer to the

state court’s harmless error ruling unless it is ‘contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable

application of’ Supreme Court precedent.” Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). As Magistrate Judge Papas found, the state court’s harmless

error determination in this case was “contrary to” clearly established Federal law because the state

court failed to apply the Chapman harmless error standard. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-

16 (2003). 

Because the state court’s harmless error was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, “no

deference is owed” and this court’s review “revert[s] to the independent harmless error analysis

that we would apply had there been no state court holding.” Inthavong, 420 F.3d at 1059. The

Supreme Court defined that harmless error standard in Brecht: “errors are harmless if they do not

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have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’.” Id.

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

In his objections, respondent argues the Report incorrectly concluded CALJIC 2.15

violated petitioner’s due process right. Specifically, respondent argues the felony-murder doctrine

provides a legitimate basis for the instruction, in the context of the entire set of instructions. 

Petitioner’s liability depended on the fact that petitioner stabbed Foth during the commission of a

robbery. Thus, respondent argues, petitioner’s possession of Foth’s vehicle supported the

conclusion that petitioner committed robbery as well as the inference that petitioner committed

murder during the robbery. The Court finds respondent’s argument that CALJIC 2.15 was not

erroneous, and was instead merely an ambiguous instruction, to be unpersuasive. 

As Magistrate Judge Papas correctly noted, permissive inferences are constitutional “so

long as it can be said with substantial assurance that the inferred fact is more likely than not to

flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Schwendeman, 971 F.2d at 316

(quotation and citation omitted). In Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th at 248-49, the California Supreme Court

specifically noted that CALJIC 2.15 should not be used in non-theft offenses, such as murder and

rape. The court in Prieto held that while the inference that a defendant committed theft “naturally

and logically” flow from the possession of stolen material and corroborating evidence, the

inference that a defendant committed murder does not “logically and naturally flow” from the

possession of stolen material. Id. at 249; see also Barker v. California, 91 Cal. App. 4th 1166,

1176 (2001). As such, the use of CALJIC 2.15 in the context of a murder prosecution is

erroneous. Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th at 248-49. 

The rationale applied by the court in Prieto mirrors the standard used by the Ninth Circuit

in Schwendeman to analyze permissive jury instructions. The court agrees with the court in Prieto

and Schwendenman, as well as Magistrate Judge Papas’s conclusion that murder is not a fact

“more likely than not to flow” from the possession of stolen material. Francis v. Franklin, 471

U.S. 307, 316 (1985) (stating a jury instruction is unconstitutional where “the suggested

conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the

jury”). The Court rejects respondent’s argument that CALJIC 2.15 as given in this case was

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5

 Petitioner’s citation to a number of cases for the proposition that the felony-murder doctrine

justifies use of CALJIC 2.15 in the instant case is unpersuasive. In Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S.

837, 844 (1973), the Court upheld a jury instruction that permitted the inference that the defendant was

guilty of robbery if the jury found the defendant possessed stolen goods. That is not the type of

instruction at issue in the instant case, but the type of instruction generally found acceptable because

the inference naturally flows from the proven fact. In a 1896 case, Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.

613 (1896), the Court simply concluded that the challenged instruction was permissive inference and

not a mandatory presumption, but did not discuss due process implications, which is the relevant

inquiry in the instant case. The court in Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1995) held

the instruction did not create an irrational inference without any exposition or analysis. 

6

 Moreover, the fact the jury found true the special allegation that the murder occurred during

the commission of a robbery does not demonstrate the jury utilized the felony-murder doctrine in

reaching their conclusion. The trial court instructed the jury to make the special allegation

determination once it had already determined defendant was guilty of first degree murder. (Lodgment

No. 17 at 1950.) By that point, the jury already relied on the improper jury instruction to determine

petitioner’s guilt of the underlying murder offense. 

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simply ambiguous and should be analyzed accordingly under the test articulated in Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (stating that for ambiguous instructions courts should ask

whether there is a “reasonable likelihood the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way

that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence”).5

Because of the nature of the inference created by CALJIC 2.15, that instruction may only

be used in felony-murder prosecutions where it is specifically limited in application to establishing

the inference of the theft alone. It would have been appropriate for the trial court to instruct the

jury, pursuant to CALJIC 2.15, that they could infer petitioner committed a felony theft crime

because he was in possession of the stolen property. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Yates, 2006 WL 516661,

at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006). After the prosecution demonstrated, based upon the

inference, that petitioner committed the felony theft crime, the prosecution could have then

proceeded to establish petitioner committed murder in connection with that felony. See, e.g.,

People v. Harden, 110 Cal. App. 4th 848, 858-59 (2003). However, CALJIC 2.15, as the trial

court used it in this case, did not limit the jury’s inference to the underlying felony alone. Instead,

the court specifically instructed the jury that if they found petitioner was in possession of recently

stolen property they could make the unwarranted deductive leap that petitioner was guilty of

murder.6

Reviewing the evidence, the Court finds the conclusion suggested by the challenged

instruction (i.e., defendant committed murder) “is not one that reason and common sense justify in

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light of the proven facts before the jury.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 316 (1985); Hanna,

87 F.3d at 1038 (finding that while substantial evidence supported petitioner’s conviction,

conflicting evidence at trial showed that inference of recklessness was not justified by the facts);

United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 898 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, there was no concrete physical

evidence connecting petitioner to the murder itself, including the absence of petitioner’s DNA or

other identifying items at the crime scene. The prosecution’s star witness, Hixon, offered

conflicting recollections of the events of September 29, 1999 throughout the course of the

investigation and trial. (See Lodgment 4 at 2-10; Lodgment 17 at 1020-1623.) Hixon’s testimony

also conflicted with other objective evidence in the record, including cell phone call records and

the discovery of Foth’s property in Hixon’s possessions. (Lodgment 17 at 1036, 1567, 1671.) In

sum, the record demonstrates the proven facts do not reasonably support the inferential leap that

CALJIC 2.15 permitted the jury to make. 

Even taken in context of the remaining jury instructions, CALJIC 2.15 was not appropriate

as given in this case. While other instructions told the jury to consider all the evidence and

clarified the government’s burden of proof, none of these instructions constrained the jury from

relying upon petitioner’s possession of Foth’s vehicle to reach the ultimate conclusion that

petitioner murdered Foth. Hanna, 87 F.3d at 1038 (“However, ‘[a] passing reference to consider

all evidence will not cure [a] defect’ where a jury is entitled to convict by ‘focusing on a few

isolated facts.’”) (quoting Warren, 25 F.3d at 899). To the contrary, the instruction allowed the

jury to focus solely on evidence, direct and corroborating, relating to petitioner’s possession of the

car, and then convict petitioner of murder based on that evidence. 

Lastly, respondent claims the strength of the physical evidence tying petitioner to the

murder renders any alleged error harmless. Respondent, however, fails to specify what physical

evidence in the record dissipates doubt that CALJIC 2.15 had a substantial and injurious effect on

the jury’s verdict. As noted above and discussed in the Report, there was no direct physical

evidence linking petitioner to Foth’s murder. The government relied heavily on Hixon’s

testimony, which was contradicted by her own previous statements and undermined by the

objective evidence. The government also relied on the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner’s

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sister, whose credibility was seriously impeached by her own family. (Lodgment No. 17 at 1581,

1714.) In contrast, the evidence tying petitioner to Foth’s vehicle was overwhelming. 

The trial court’s use of CALJIC 2.15 allowed the jury to infer petitioner murdered Foth,

based upon the strong evidence tying petitioner to Foth’s vehicle, and despite the extremely weak

evidence directly tying petitioner to Foth’s stabbing. Based thereon, the Court finds the trial

court’s use of CALJIC 2.15 had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, such that

petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2254.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby: (1) adopts in full Magistrate Judge

Papas’s Report; (2) rejects the respondent’s objections; (3) conditionally grants petitioner’s

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; and (4) denies petitioner’s motion for clarification as moot. 

Judgment shall be entered conditionally granting the writ unless the State decides to retry

petitioner within a reasonable time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:05-cv-01262-IEG-LSP Document 56 Filed 11/02/07 Page 12 of 12