Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANTHONY RENDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, et al.,

Defendants.

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1:05-CV-00661 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. 30) 

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to

dismiss portions of pro se Plaintiff David Rendon’s first amended

complaint. Rendon alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when Fresno Police Department (“FPD”) officers

unlawfully entered his parents’ home during a party and used

excessive force against him and others. 

Defendants concurrently filed a motion to consolidate this

case with Rodriguez v. Fresno, 1:05-CV-1017. (See Doc. 32, fild

Sept. 22, 2005.) That motion is addressed in a separate order. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 20, 2005, naming as

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1 The unlawful entry claim was dismissed with leave to

amend because Plaintiff had not established standing to allege a

claim of unlawful entry into his parent’s home. (Id. at 11-12.) 

At the hearing on the previous motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

clarified that he in fact owns the home and Plaintiff so alleges

in his first amended complaint. 

2 Plaintiff stated in his opposition to the first motion

to dismiss that he would “waive a ‘false arrest’ claim at this

point, but will reserve that claim since Counsel has opened the

2

Defendants the City of Fresno (“the City”), the FPD, Sergeant

Mike Manfredi (“Manfredi”), Officer Marcus Tafoya (“Tafoya”), and

a number of unnamed defendants. (Doc. 1.) The initial complaint

alleged that FPD officers violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights by unlawfully entering the home of Plaintiff’s parents and

using excessive force in arresting Plaintiff. The complaint also

sought to allege that FPD officers violated Plaintiff’s rights by

conspiring to falsify a police report. (Id.) 

Defendants moved to dismiss and, in the alternative, for a

more definite statement. (Docs. 14 & 17.) In an August 11, 2005

order, the district court dismissed as redundant the FPD as a

defendant and the claims against Defendand Manfredi in his

official capacity. (Doc. 28 at 8-9.) Plaintiff’s claims of

unlawful entry and/or use of excessive force against the City

were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Monell.

1

(Id. at 9-10.) However, Plaintiff failed to properly allege a

conspiracy claim, as such claims are subject to a heightened

pleading standard. (Id. at 13-14.) In addition, Plaintiff

appeared to “waive” any false arrest claim that might have been

stated in the initial complaint. (See Doc. 22. at 16.) Any

false arrest claim was also dismissed. (Id. at 19.2) The claims

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door.” Doc. 22 at 16. Despite Plaintiff’s stated intent to

“reserve” the claim, he offered no legal or factual authority to

oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim. Accordingly,

the district court dismissed the claim. Because Plaintiff made

no attempt to re-plead any such claim in the first amended

complaint, he is not entitled to bring up such a claim now. 

3

for declaratory or injunctive relief were dismissed. (Id. at 16-

18.)

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed August 29, 2005,

alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya, along with other FPD officers,

unlawfully entered Plaintiff’s home; and used excessive force in

the course of arresting Plaintiff. (Doc. 29 at ¶¶12-24) Second,

Plaintiff claims that the City of Fresno (“City”) negligently

hired, trained, staffed, and supervised the officers involved in

the allegedly unlawful entry and use of force. (Id. at ¶¶25-29). 

Plaintiff’s third claim is that that Defendants Manfredi and

Tafoya “conspir[ed] to violate [his] constitutional [] rights by

falsifying [a] Police Report.” (Id. at ¶33) Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that all Defendants are liable under California Civil

Code sections 52 and 52.1, for violating his civil rights. (Id.

at ¶41-44).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss challenges only the conspiracy

claim brought against Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya. (Doc. 30,

filed Sept. 8, 2005.) Defendants first argue that the conduct

alleged in the third cause of action does not amount to a

constitutional violation. Alternatively, Defendants maintain

that Plaintiff still has not satisfied the heightened pleading

requirements applicable to a conspiracy claim. 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW IN A MOTION TO DISMISS

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’ third cause of action,

which alleges a “Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law;

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the

United States; Art. I §§ 7 and 13 [of the California

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Constitution]; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; and Cal Penal Code §§

118.1 and 181,” brought “Against Defendants Sgt. Manfredi and

Tafoya for conspiring to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional [sic]

secured rights by falsifying the Police Report.” (Doc. 29 at

13.) In this cause of action, Plaintiff sets forth the

following: 

35. [] [I]t is unlawful to falsify a Police Report and

to commit perjury in the State of California. §§ 118.1

and 181(a), Cal Penal Code. Defendants Sgt. Manfredi

and Tafoya falsified the Police Report [#50AL3386 -

attached to the Appendix marked Exhibit “A”]. By

reading said Police Report - the Defendants alleged

that Plaintiff committed an assault. Had Plaintiff

committed the assault described by the Defendants in

their Police Report - Plaintiffs would not be before

this Court seeking redress.

36. Defendants Sgt. Manfredi and Tafoya conspired

together by falsely creating the allegations of the

Police Report in order to justify their unlawful acts

and conduct. 

37. [] [I]t is a violation of state law to falsify a

Police Report and commit perjury in and from that

process. It is also a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment, to conspire to violate a

citizens’ right by falsifying a Police Report. Cf.

Baldwin v. Placer County, 405 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2005). 

38. Plaintiff is submitting the Declarations of

Witnesses who witnessed the incident, attached to the

Appendix marked Exhibit “B,” to establish the

allegations of the Police Report to be false. 

Plaintiff never assaulted any Police Officer. 

39. As a direct and proximate result of the abovereferenced unlawful acts and unlawful conduct by

Defendants committed under color of law and under their

authority as police officers, Plaintiff was deprived of

his rights secure [sic] under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution of the United States;

Article I, §§ 7 and 13 of the California Constitution;

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; and Cal Penal Code §§ 118.1

and 181(a). 

//

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3 Although Plaintiff cites California Penal Code 181(a)

in his complaint, no such provision exists. California Penal

Code 181, which makes it unlawful to hold a person in involuntary

servitute, contains no subsection (a). It appears that this was

a typographical error and that Plaintiff was attempting to cite 

§ 118(a), which concerns the crime of perjury. 

6

40. As a further direct and proximate result of the

malicious and outrageous conduct of the Defendants,

Plaintiff has suffered special damages in the form of

loss of job and wages and will suffer additional

special damages in the future, an amount of which

cannot yet be determined. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 35-40.)

Plaintiff invokes numerous provisions of federal and state

as grounds for this claim: the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution; Article I, §§ 7 and 13 of the

California Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; and Cal Penal

Code §§ 118.1 and 181(a)3. 

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff cannot pursue a damages

claim directly under any provision of the California Penal Code.

Plaintiff also cannot bring a damages claim directly under

Sections 7 or 13 of the California Constitution, in part because

alternative statutory and/or common law causes of action are

available to redress his grievances. Cf. Katzberg v. Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 303 (2002). For example,

California Civil Code § 52.1(b), which Plaintiff cites in his

fourth cause of action, provides that “any individual whose

exercise or enjoyment of rights secured...by the Constitution or

laws of [California]...has been interfered with... may

institute...a civil action for damages....” Plaintiff does not,

however, invoke this provision in the context of his conspiracy

allegation.

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7

Similarly, Plaintiff cannot bring this suit directly under

the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, because Congress has created an alternative legal

remedy. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (no cause of

action directly under constitutional provision where “Congress

has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared

to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution

and viewed as equally effective.”). Here Plaintiff, who claims

his constitutional rights have been violated by a state actor,

may file suit under one of the federal civil rights statutes. 

E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does invoke sections 1983 and

1988 in support of this conspiracy claim. Section 1988 allows

for the recovery of attorneys fees by a prevailing party in a

civil rights suit, but does not provide an independent

substantive basis for Plaintiff’s damages claim. The only ground

upon which Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim may stand is section

1983. There is no independent claim for damages for civil

conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy is a legal theory under which

vicarious liability may be imposed upon all those involved in the

conspiracy. See Hall v. Clinton, 285 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir.

2002). 

Defendants argue (1) that the third cause of action fails to

state a claim under section 1983; and (2) that Plaintiff still

has not satisfied the heightened pleading standards applicable to

conspiracy claims. 

//

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8

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding the

Falsification of a Police Report.

As explained in prior orders in this case, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under

color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under

the Constitution.” Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d

1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 1983, provides in pertinent

part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States...to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.... 

Plaintiff has already met the minimal pleading standard for two

claims brought under section 1983: (1) the first cause of action

for individual liability against Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya

for unconstitutional entry and excessive use of force under cover

of state law; and (2) the second cause of action for municipal

liability against the City for failure to supervise, train, etc.,

its officers. 

The third cause of action attempts to allege that Defendants

conspired to violate his civil rights. A section 1983 conspiracy

is defined as “a combination of two or more persons acting in

concert to commit an unlawful act,... the principal element of

which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong

against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in

damages.” Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted). To allege a conspiracy under section 1983,

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4 Baldwin, cited by Plaintiff in the first amended

complaint, is distinguishable from the conspiracy claim Plaintiff

attempts to set forth here, where there is no allegation that

police used false information to obtain a search warrant.

9

Plaintiff must allege that the conspiracy deprived him of a civil

right protected by section 1983. A conspiracy is not, by itself,

a violation of section 1983. See, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). For example, if a plaintiff alleges

that a police officer unlawfully secured a search warrant for his

home by giving false testimony to a magistrate judge, this may

state a claim under section 1983. See, e.g., Liston v. County of

Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1997). If a plaintiff

further alleges that several police officers met together and

agreed to falsify police reports and/or give false testimony to

the magistrate, this might state a conspiracy claim under section

1983. See Baldwn v. Placer County, 405 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.

2005)(opinion amended and superceded on denial of rehearing, 2005

WL 1863322)(Section 1983 conspiracy claim properly pled where

plaintiff alleged that police officers conspired to submit a

false affidavit to a magistrate in order to obtain a search

warrant).

4 The critical element in this hypothetical conspiracy

claim is that the conspiracy led to the underlying violation of

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful

search and seizure. It is not enough to allege that a

conspiracy caused plaintiff harm; the harm must be to one’s

constitutional rights. See Hullett v. Smiedendorf, 52 F. Supp.

2d 817, 824 (W.D. Mich. 1999)(no deprivation of rights protected

by section 1983 where plaintiff alleged that false information in

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a police report “humiliated, defamed, and generally vilified” him

and that investigation of the incident was delayed because of the

alleged conspiracy to falsify the reports, causing him

“substantial emotional distress”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Sgt. Manfredi and

Tafoya conspired together by falsely creating the allegations of

the Police Report in order to justify their unlawful acts and

conduct.” (Doc. 29 at ¶36.) (Plaintiff waived his false arrest

claim in the prior round of motions to dismiss and has not restated that claim in the first amended complaint, nor has he

attempted to state a claim for malicious prosecution.) 

Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants agreed to create a

false police report to cover up alleged civil rights violations

that took place prior to any acts allegedly taken to falsify the

reports or to violate his civil rights. This conspiracy

allegation is arguably just an extension of the allegations set

forth in the second cause of action (for unconstitutional entry

and excessive use of force). Nevertheless, Defendants may infer

from the complaint that the alleged falsification of police

reports contributed to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights to be

free from an unlawful search and seizure. This allegation is

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

2. The Heightened Pleading Standard for a Conspiracy.

As previously explained, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard in the Ninth Circuit. See Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). To survive a

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging the existence of a

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conspiracy must meet a standard that is more demanding than that

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

Plaintiff’s opposition simply ignores the existence of this

heightened pleading standard, (see Doc. 33 at 3), but the

district court must nevertheless determine whether it has been

satisfied. 

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs

alleging a conspiracy to deprive them of their

constitutional rights must include in their complaint

nonconclusory allegations containing evidence of

unlawful intent or face dismissal prior to the taking

of discovery. These allegations may be supported by

either direct or circumstantial evidence. This standard

is not intended to be difficult to meet as it serves

the limited purpose of enabling the district court to

dismiss insubstantial suits prior to discovery and

allowing the defendant to prepare an appropriate

response, and where appropriate, a motion for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. 

Id. at 1195. In Harris, the complaint alleged that the defendant

law enforcement officers “met separately and apart from the other

[officers], and constructed a false story about what had happened

in the gunfight, which false story was designed to conceal their

own and [others’] criminal, civil, and moral responsibility for

[two] deaths....” The Harris complaint also alleged that the

defendant officers repeated the false story in official

documents, reports, and under oath in court proceedings. 

Finally, the plaintiff in Harris alleged that the falsehoods led

“ultimately to the bringing of false charges against him that

resulted in the federal murder trial at which he was acquitted on

all counts [and] caused him to serve time in jail awaiting trial

on the federal charges.” The Ninth Circuit held that this

complaint satisfied the heightened pleading standard. 

Critically, the complaint in Harris explained “which defendants

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conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a

deprivation of his constitutional rights....” Id. at 1196

(emphasis added).

The first amended complaint in this case alleges that

Manfredi and Tafoya falsified a police report by falsely alleging

that Plaintiff committed an assault. (Doc. 29 at ¶35.) 

Plaintiff alleges generally that “Manfredi and Tafoya conspired

together by falsely creating the allegations of the Police Report

in order to justify their unlawful acts and conduct.” An overt

act allegation can be inferred from this language -- that

Manfredi and Tafoya communicated with one another to create a

false police report in order to justify their deprivation of his

civil rights. Although Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim could have

been crafted with greater clarity, it is comparable to the simple

allegation in Harris, insofar as it puts Defendants on sufficient

notice as to “which defendants conspired, how they conspired and

how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional

rights....” Defendants’ motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim

is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff’s Assertions that Defendants have Waived

Various Affirmative Defenses. 

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants

have “waived any defense under Rule 12(c)... which could be

raised against the First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action.” 

(Doc. 33 at 2.) Defendants concede that they have waived certain

defenses under Rule 12, specifically the defenses enumerated in

Rule 12(h)(1): lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue,

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insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process.

(See Doc. 35 at 2.) However, other defenses listed in Rule

12(h)(2), including the defense of failure to state a claim, may

be asserted at later stages of the litigation. See Rule

12(h)(2).

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have “waived any Rule

12(c) defense and have waived any kind of immunity defense before

this Court and on appeal.” (Doc. 33 at 2-3.) This is not

correct. When a defendant chooses to file a motion to dismiss

prior to the filing of an answer, any defense enumerated in Rule

12(h)(1) is waived if defendant fails to raise that defense in

its motion to dismiss. Once the court rules on the motion to

dismiss, defendant then has ten days (unless a different deadline

is set by the court) to file its “responsive pleading” (e.g., an

answer to the complaint). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). 

Defendants may raise any additional defenses, including immunity

defenses, in its answer.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the third cause of action (conspiracy) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED

Dated: November 23, 2005

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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