Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03117/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03117-39/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABBOTT DIABETES CARE INC.

And ABBOTT LABORATORIES,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS CORP.,

ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS

OPERATIONS, INC., and BAYER

HEALTHCARE LLC,

Defendant(s).

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No. C05-3117 MJJ (BZ)

Related Cases: 04-2123 MJJ

04-3327 MJJ

04-3732 MJJ

ORDER DENYING ROCHE’S MOTION

TO COMPEL AND GRANTING

ABBOTT’S MOTION TO QUASH

Before me is a motion by defendants Roche Diagnostics

Corp. and Roche Diagnostics Operations, Inc. (collectively

“Roche”) to compel discovery of a settlement agreement

between plaintiff Abbott Laboratories and non-party LifeScan,

Inc. Also before me is a motion by Abbott Diabetes Care,

Inc. and Abbott Laboratories (collectively “Abbott”) to quash

a subpoena duces tecum issued by defendant Bayer Healthcare

LLC to LifeScan or, in the alternative, to preclude the

Case 3:05-cv-03117-WHA Document 481 Filed 08/03/07 Page 1 of 4
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1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c) allows a party

to file a motion to quash a third-party subpoena so long as

the party demonstrates some right or interest in the documents

requested. See G.K. Las Vegas Ltd. Partnership v. Simon

Property Group, Inc., 2007 WL 119149, at *3 (D. Nev.); In re

Ashworth, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2002 WL 33009225, at *2

(S.D. Cal); see also Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633,

636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“A party cannot object to a subpoena

duces tecum served on a nonparty, but rather, must seek a

protective order or make a motion to quash.”). In addition,

Rule 26(c) provides for the issuance of a protective order

“[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery

is sought, . . . and for good cause shown . . . .”

2 Abbott mistakenly argues that the following general

objection preserved its relevancy objection: “Abbott objects

to the Interrogatories to the extent that they would require

Abbott to provide information beyond the scope of discovery

obligations imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

the Local Rules, including the Patent Local Rules, of this

Court.” See McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v.

Ouarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (boilerplate

objections that requests were overly broad, burdensome,

oppressive, and irrelevant were insufficient to meet party's

burden); see also E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Store, Inc., 2002 WL

31947153 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Walker v. Lakewood

Condominium Owners Association, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal.

1999)).

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discovery via a protective order.1 For the reasons discussed,

Roche’s motion is DENIED, and Abbott’s motion is GRANTED. To

the extent they are before me, LifeScan’s objections are

sustained consistent with this Order.

1. While Abbott waived its relevancy objection to

Roche’s discovery request by not raising it in a timely

fashion, Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959

F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992),2

 it is undisputed that it

properly preserved its confidentiality objection. Moreover,

Abbott properly raised relevancy and confidentiality

arguments in its motion to quash, and LifeScan has objected

on the same grounds. 

2. LifeScan and Abbott held a legitimate expectation

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that their settlement agreement resolving litigation

pertaining to Abbott’s U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (the “‘551

patent”) would remain confidential. The agreement includes a

confidentiality provision. Courts may utilize protective

orders to protect confidential settlement agreements. See

Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307

F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002). And, in light of the Federal

Circuit’s stated policy of encouraging settlement by

shielding settlement documents and negotiations from use as

evidence at trial, see Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., v.

Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001), both

parties could reasonably presume the agreement would be kept

confidential.

3. After reviewing the agreement in camera, I conclude

that the agreement is not relevant to the parties’ claims and

defenses. Contrary to defendants’ speculation, the agreement

contains no discussion of royalty payments or a licensing

arrangement. I find the discovery of the agreement, its

various drafts, and the related documents is not reasonably

calculated to lead to relevant, admissible evidence. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(1). When I weigh the confidentiality

expectation of Abbott and LifeScan and the policy of

encouraging settlement against the questionable relevance of 

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the documents, the scale tips decidedly against disclosure.

Dated: August 3, 2007

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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