Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01153/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01153-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff, Jamaal L. Duncan (“Plaintiff”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights 

matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court screens Plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable 

claim for against Nurses Reynoso and Doe for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court recommends that the remaining claims and 

Defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

As Plaintiff seeks redress from governmental employees in a civil action, the Court is required 

to screen his complaint in order to identify any cognizable claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). The 

JAMAAL L. DUNCAN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

DR. WANG, et al.,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01153-AWI-JLT (PC)

ORDER FINDING PLAINTIFF'S EIGHTH 

AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST NURSE 

REYNOSO AND NURSE DOE COGNIZABLE; 

SERVICE OF NURSE REYNOSO APPROPRIATE;

AND DIRECTING THE CLERK TO PROVIDE 

PLAINTIFF WITH SERVICE DOCUMENTS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

DISMISSING ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND 

DEFENDANTS 

(Doc. 9)

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Court shall “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, 

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from 

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(iii).

II. PLEADING STANDARDS 

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

“Pro se documents are to be liberally construed” and “‘must be held to ‘less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “[They] can only be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief.’” Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “[a] pleading that 

states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plaint statement of the grounds for the court’s 

jurisdiction, . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each allegation must be simple, 

concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitlement to relief requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside, accepts all nonconclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those non-conclusory factual 

allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 676-684 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678, (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted “to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has 

complied with his obligation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) in that he clearly delineates his cause of action

and concisely states the factual basis for his claim(s) against these Defendants. 

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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that he 

suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that 

the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 

Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a 

plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, 

or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation 

complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s cause of action arose while he was incarcerated California State Prison – Corcoran 

(“CSP-COR”). (Doc. 9 at 1.) Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants in this matter: 

(1) Dr. Wang, (2) Dr. Kim, (3) Nurse Rouch, (4) Nurse Doe, (5) Nurse Reynoso, and (6) Dr. Moon. 

Id. at 1. Plaintiff’s allegations are summarized as follows: 

On June 19, 2010, Plaintiff dislocated the middle finger of his left hand while playing 

basketball. (Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff immediately reported his injury to prison personnel by 

submitting paperwork to registered nurses in Facility 3A’s medical department. (Id. at 2 ¶ 2.) 

On June 21, 2010, pursuant to Dr. Moon’s directive, prison personnel escorted Plaintiff to the 

Acute Care Hospital Emergency Room (ACH-ER), where x-rays revealed a partially dislocated finger. 

(Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 3.) Dr. Kim then made three unsuccessful attempts to reset the swollen finger. (Id. at 2

¶ 4.) He informed Plaintiff he would need to return the following day when the swelling subsided. 

(Id.) 

On June 22, 2010, Plaintiff experienced excruciating pain and inquired about the follow-up 

visit with Dr. Moon. (Doc. 9 at 2-3 ¶ 5.) Nurse Wilson checked on the appointment and found it had 

not been made. (Id.) Repeatedly, Plaintiff spoke with Nurse Doe and Nurse Reynoso about his 

condition, but they denied he had an appointment on the books, disregarded and belittled his 

complaints of pain, and told him to “man up.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 6.)

Dr. Moon examined Plaintiff approximately three more times after June 22, 2010. (Doc. 9 at 3 

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¶ 7.) Dr. Moon prescribed medication and provided Plaintiff with a “makeshift [finger-splint] made 

up of a tongue depressor and medical tape” but did not again attempt to re-set the finger. (Id.) At 

some point, Dr. Moon told Plaintiff that the injury would heal on its own accord. (Id.) 

Also, during a four-week period, Dr. Wang treated Plaintiff’s injured finger. (Doc. 9 at 3 ¶ 8.) 

Dr. Wang appears to have performed circulation tests on the finger and prescribed medication for 

Plaintiff. (Id.) While aware that Plaintiff’s finger was still dislocated, neither Drs. Moon and Wang 

nor Nurse Rouch attempted to reset it. (Id.) 

On October 19, 2010, surgery was performed on Plaintiff’s middle finger. (Doc. 9 at 5 ¶ 14.)

The joint in Plaintiff’s finger was removed because it had been destroyed and the bones in his finger 

had to be fused together. (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s middle finger remains permanently disfigured

and Plaintiff is unable to completely close his left hand. (Id. at 5.) 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In other words, Plaintiff must show the 

existence of (1) a serious medical need and (2) a deliberately indifferent response by the defendant. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 

1997). Indications that a person has a serious need for medical treatment include: the existence of an 

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of 

a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 

chronic and substantial pain. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (citations omitted). Plaintiff's 

dislocated, painful finger constitutes a serious medical need. Thus, the only remaining issue is 

whether any named Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff. 

A defendant acts with deliberate indifference when he knowingly fails to respond to a serious 

medical need, thereby inflicting harm on the plaintiff. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-42 

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(1994); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may appear when a defendant denies, delays, 

or otherwise interferes with medical treatment. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 

(9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, “[d]eliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 

391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will 

not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). 

i. Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Nurse Doe and Nurse Reynoso.

Plaintiff avers that he sought medical assistance from Nurses Doe and Reynoso on several 

occasions. (Doc. 9 at 3 ¶ 6.) Aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and significant pain, Nurses Doe 

and Reynoso disregarded and belittled Plaintiff’s complaints, refused Plaintiff medical treatment 

because his appointment was not “in the medical books,” and failed to take steps to ensure he obtained 

an appointment so he could receive medical treatment. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff states a cognizable 

deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment against Nurses Doe and Reynoso. 

ii. Plaintiff fails to states a cognizable claim against Dr. Kim

Dr. Kim treated Plaintiff on June 21, 2010, but was unable to reset the finger after three 

attempts. (Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 3.) There are no facts alleged to suggest the inability to re-set the finger was 

deliberate. Rather, Dr. Kim told Plaintiff that he would set an appointment for the following day

“after the swelling had gone down.” (Id. at 2 ¶ 4.) While Plaintiff avers that Dr. Kim failed to 

schedule that appointment, such an allegation demonstrates negligence at best, but is insufficient to 

state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim. See Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 

460 (9th Cir.1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th 

Cir.2004). Further, it appears that both Dr. Moon and Dr. Wang followed-up with Plaintiff subsequent 

to his appointment with Dr. Kim. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Kim is not cognizable and should 

be dismissed.

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iii. Plaintiff fails to state cognizable claims against Dr. Wang, Dr. Moon, and Nurse 

Rouch1

Plaintiff avers that Dr. Moon, Dr. Wang, and Nurse Rouch were deliberately indifferent to his 

medical condition because they failed to timely schedule treatment for Plaintiff. (Doc. 9.) However, 

the factual allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint demonstrate otherwise. 

The First Amended Complaint indicates that Dr. Moon treated and examined Plaintiff on at 

least three occasions. First, Dr. Moon ordered an x-ray shortly after the initial injury. There is no 

indication that Dr. Moon knew Plaintiff dislocated his finger until after the results of the x-rays were 

known, when he provided medication and a splint. At some point, Dr. Moon indicated that the finger 

would “heal itself.” (Doc. 9, at 4 ¶ 12) (emphasis in original). While Plaintiff may object to Dr. 

Moon’s medical assessment and treatment, there is no factual support that this assessment was made 

with deliberate indifference and even if, ultimately, it was incorrect, this does not state a constitutional 

claim because “differences of opinion between prisoner and prison doctors fails to show deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Thus, 

Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Moon is not cognizable and should be dismissed. 

Next, Plaintiff avers that Dr. Wang treated him over the course of four weeks. (Doc. 9 at 4 ¶ 

8.) Plaintiff, for the first time, indicates that Dr. Wang performed circulation tests and “prescrib[ed] 

meds [sic] for pain after he had discontinued [the] pain meds prescribed by Doctor Moon.” (Id.) There 

is nothing about these allegations that rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Discontinuance of a 

one pain medication for a prescription of another is a medical decision with which Plaintiff apparently 

disagreed. However, this disagreement does not suffice to state a cognizable deliberate indifference 

claim. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there exists more than a sheer possibility that Dr. Wang acted 

with deliberate indifference. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Kim is not 

 

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Plaintiff may have a California medical malpractice action against these individuals. The Court, however, again 

declines to address this issue given Plaintiff’s failure to indicate that he complied with the California Tort Claims Act 

(“CTCA”). Under the CTCA, a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages against a public employee unless he has 

presented a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board within six months of accrual of 

the action. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 

1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). In pleading a state tort claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he has complied 

with CTCA’s presentation requirement. State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243-44 (2004). 

Failure to allege compliance constitutes a failure to state a cause of action and will result in the dismissal of plaintiff’s state 

law claims. Id.

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cognizable and should be dismissed. 

Finally, Plaintiff's only allegation regarding Nurse Rouch is that Nurse Rouch informed him 

that he “had been scheduled (sic) for an off-site hospital appointment.” (Doc. 9, at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff 

does not allege that he was seeking any treatment or services that were not provided by Nurse Rouch. 

While Plaintiff indicates in that same paragraph that he was ignored by his facility’s medical staff 

between June and October of 2010 (see id.), the Court cannot assume that Nurse Rouch had any 

interaction with Plaintiff beyond the factual allegations provided and declines to reach so far as to 

implicate a nurse as the cause of an entire medical facilities alleged lapse in care. Thus, Plaintiff's 

claim against Nurse Rouch is not cognizable and should be dismissed. 

V. CONCLUSION

Despite being advised of the legal standards needed to state a claim of deliberate indifference 

under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is nearly identical to his original 

pleading. Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims only against Nurses Reynoso and Doe, but again 

failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the other defendants. Thus, the Court finds that it 

would be futile to grant further leave to amend. Plaintiff states in the First Amended Complaint that 

he has not yet ascertained the identity of Defendant, "Nurse Doe." The inclusion of Doe defendants 

under these circumstances is permissible, as plaintiff may amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure once the identity of "Nurse Doe" is known through discovery or 

other means. Merritt v. Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989); see Swartz v. Gold Dust 

Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981).

ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Service of the First Amended Complaint is appropriate for Plaintiff’s cognizable claims of 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

against Defendant Reynoso;

2. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff one USM-285 forms, one summons, a “Notice of 

Submission of Documents” form, an instruction sheet, and a copy of the First Amended Complaint, 

filed September 6, 2013 (Doc. 9);

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, Plaintiff shall complete the attached 

“Notice of Submission of Documents” form and submit the completed form to the Court with the 

following documents:

a. One completed summons form for Defendant Reynoso;

b. A completed USM-285 form for Defendant Reynoso; and

c. Two copies of the endorsed First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9).

4. Plaintiff need not attempt service on the defendant and need not request waiver of service. 

Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to 

serve the above-named defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 without payment of 

costs; and

5. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to comply with this order will result a 

recommendation of the dismissal of this case.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS dismissal of the remaining claims and 

Defendants without leave to amend.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 30 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendations." Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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