Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIS W. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER PETERSON, 

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-CV-01062 AWI LJO P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL

COMPLAINT, AND ALLOWING PLAINTIFF

THIRTY DAYS TO FILE AMENDED

COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 

(Docs. 1 and 11)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK’S OFFICE TO

SEND COMPLAINT FORM TO PLAINTIFF,

SCAN PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL

COMPLAINT LODGED ON OCTOBER 16,

2006, AND RETURN ORIGINAL TO

PLAINTIFF 

(Doc. 12)

I. Order

A. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

1. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Francis W. Davis (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on August

14, 2006, against Correctional Officer Peterson for allegedly violating his rights under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The incident giving rise to plaintiff’s

claims allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility and State Prison

in Corcoran. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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 Under California law, false imprisonment is the “‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.’” 1

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15

Cal.4th 744, 757 (1997)). “There are two bases for claiming false imprisonment: imprisonment pursuant to a false

arrest and unreasonable delay in bringing the arrested person before a judicial officer.” Estate of Brooks v. United

States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff’s confinement to his cell does not give rise to a false

imprisonment claim under California law. Although plaintiff does not allege a separate tort claim, because plaintiff

uses the phrase “false imprisonment” more than once, the court deems it necessary to clarify that plaintiff may not

pursue a tort claim on that basis. 

3

2. Plaintiff’s Claims

a. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Peterson arise from defendant’s decision to confine

plaintiff to his quarters on May 30, 2005, for failing to report to work, thereby depriving plaintiff of

his ability to participate in day room privileges. Plaintiff was subsequently found not guilty of the

charge of failing to report to work. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Peterson violated his rights under

the Eighth Amendment by punishing him prior to conviction at a disciplinary hearing, and of falsely

imprisoning him in his cell.1

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). To constitute cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801

F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a

prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be

held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

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28 “C status” inmates have broken prison rules and are being punished, and may be confined to quarters 2

during day room time. (Comp., Court Record pg. 6, lns. 12-14.)

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must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health orsafety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). “Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id.

(quotations and citations omitted). 

In this instance, plaintiff was charged with failing to report to work and confined to his cell,

which caused him to be unable to participate in day room activities. Plaintiff’s claim that his rights

under the Eighth Amendment were violated by this event is frivolous. Plaintiff is a convicted

prisoner. The confinement to his cell and hisinability to participate in privileges he would ordinarily

be able to participate in is not an extreme deprivation that denies plaintiff “the minimal civilized

measure of life necessities . . . .” Id. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law.

b. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff was in the A1A privilege group, and alleges he should have been allowed to

participate in day room activities with the rest of the group. Plaintiff alleges that because other

inmates who were not on “C status” were allowed day room privileges, he was discriminated against

in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

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School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates which

included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal protection

claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740

(9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1010 (9th Cir. 1985). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an

individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

Plaintiff’s allegations and exhibits establish that defendant Peterson confined him to quarters

because he was charged with failing to report to work. It is irrelevant that plaintiff disputes that he

failed to report to work or that he was ultimately found guilty. The facts as alleged do not support

a claim that plaintiff was intentionally discriminated against by defendant Peterson. Plaintiff’s equal

protection claim fails as a matter of law. 

c. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that he was punished by defendant Peterson without fair procedures, in

violation of his right to due process. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived

of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to

state a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of

a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create

liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in avoiding confinement to quarters, as the

deprivation complained of does not rise to the level of atypical and significant hardship. Id.; see also

May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails

because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and

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administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a

sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s

placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates

in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest

in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). Without establishing the existence

of a protected liberty interest, plaintiff may not pursue a claim based on denial of procedural due

process. Accordingly, plaintiff’s due process claim fails as a matter of law.

3. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983. Ordinarily, the court would recommend dismissal of this action with prejudice at this

juncture, as plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law and are not amenable to good faith amendment.

However, as discussed in the following subsection, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to

supplement his complaint on October 16, 2006. Because plaintiff is entitled to amend once as a

matter of right under Rule 15(a), the court will allow plaintiff the opportunity to exercise this right

to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint

On October 16, 2006, plaintiff filed his second motion seeking leave to supplement his

complaint and submitted a proposed supplement. Plaintiff seeks to add a claim against Lisa Smith

and a claim against Correctional Officer T. Valles.

1. Addition of Claim Against Defendant Smith

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading to add a claim against Lisa Smith

must be denied for two reasons. First, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion must

occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). The

section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter

v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), and “[a]ll ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those

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remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter,

534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 n.5 (2001)). Prisoners must complete

the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of

the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can provide some sort of relief

on the complaint stated. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741.

In light of section 1997e(a), plaintiff may not add a new claim that arose after this suit was

filed. In a “conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the PLRA, the rule would have

to yield to the later-enacted statute to the extent of the conflict.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 982

(11th Cir. 2000). Rule 15 “does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or restriction

contained in a statute (especially a subsequently enacted one).” Id. at 983; see also Cox v. Mayer,

332 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Harris for this proposition with favor). Plaintiff filed this

action on August 14, 2006, and the event giving rise to his claim against defendant Smith did not

occur until September 6, 2006. Allowing plaintiff to pursue the claim against defendant Smith in

this action would allow plaintiff to thwart the mandate of section 1997e(a), which requires that claim

exhaustion occur prior to filing suit and not during the pendency of the suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d

at 1199-1201. 

Second, defendant Smith’s decision to screen out plaintiff’s inmate appeal as a request rather

than an appeal does not give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983. (Supp. Comp., Exhibit 1.)

Despite plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, he does not have a constitutionally protected right to

have his appeal processed. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not

confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.

1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement

to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence

of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640

(9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10;

Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Likewise, plaintiff’s allegations do not

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give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. Rhodes, 452 U.S.

at 347; Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. 

2. Addition of Claim Against Defendant Valles

Plaintiff alleges that Valles retaliated against him on January 1, 2006, when Valles

confiscated and destroyed plaintiff’s two statues constructed of paper and bread. Plaintiff alleges

that Valles retaliated against him because of his pursuit of civil suits against Valles’ co-workers.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief against Valles under section 1983 for

retaliation. However, they do not support claimsfor relief for violation ofthe Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments, as plaintiff asserts. The destruction of plaintiff’s two statues does not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment and any assertion to the contrary is frivolous. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

Further, the unauthorized destruction of personal property such is at issue here does not violate the

procedural Due Process Clause, as plaintiff has remedies available under state law. Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Rule 15(d) provides that “upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and

upon such terms as are just, permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth

transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought

to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s claim against Valles

accrued before plaintiff filed this suit. Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 15(d) to supplement

is misplaced and his motion shall be denied. If plaintiff wishes to add a retaliation claim against

defendant Valles, he must file an amended complaint that is complete within itself. Local Rule 15-

220. 

C. Order

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed August 14, 2006, is dismissed for failure to state any

claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file a supplemental complaint, filed October 16,

2006, is DENIED;

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3. Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date ofservice of this order within

which to file an amended complaint as a matter of right under Rule 15(a);

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within thirty days, this action shall be

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983; and 

5. The Clerk’s Office shall (1) send plaintiff a section 1983 complaint form; (2) scan

plaintiff’s entire proposed supplemental complaint lodged on October 16, 2006, to

make complete the court’s record, and (3) return the original proposed supplemental

complaint to plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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