Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01484/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOSES CLARK

CDCR #F-99760,

Civil No. 09cv1484 L (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); and

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO

OPPOSITION

[Doc. Nos. 18, 26]

vs.

LARRY SMALL; R. MADDEN, 

Defendants.

In this prisoner civil rights case, Moses Clark (“Plaintiff”), is proceeding in pro se and

in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Defendants

Small and Madden have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 18]. Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to both

Motions to which Defendants have filed a Reply. Because Defendants’ Reply was filed one day

late, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply” [Doc. No. 26].

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I. Factual Background

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) in 2008. (See FAC at 6.)

On September 16, 2008, a race riot occurred on Facility “C” between the African American and

Caucasian inmates. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff, a Muslim, practices his faith during Ramadan every

year. (Id. at 6.) Due to the race riot, the prison was placed on lockdown status from September

25, 2008 to October 2, 2008 which disrupted Plaintiff’s ability to practice his faith during

Ramadan. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants interfered with his religious practice that

requires him to “break his spiritual fast” with other Muslims. (Id. at 8.) 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply

Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply to Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss.” [Doc. No. 18]. Plaintiff claims that this Reply was untimely by four days. While the

Reply is untimely by one day, its untimeliness is not prejudicial to Plaintiff. Thus, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendants Small and Madden seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on

the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a religious claim under the First

Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”);

(2) Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim; (3) Plaintiff has

failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim; (4) Plaintiff’s claim for monetary

damages against all the Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment; and (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s

complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled

to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement

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 need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) .

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s damages claims to the extent they are based on

acts taken in their official capacities. While the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s section

1983 claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58,

66 (1989), it does not bar damage actions against state officials in their personal or individual

capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th

Cir. 1992). When a state actor is alleged to have violated both federal and state law and is sued

for damages under section 1983 in his individual or personal capacity, there is no Eleventh

Amendment bar, even if state law provides for indemnification. Ashker v. California

Department of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff clearly indicates

an intent to sue Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. (See FAC at 5-6.)

Thus, the Court GRANTS all Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds,

with prejudice, only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against them in their

official capacities.

/ / /

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 Defendants, while stating that they are seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment

religious claims, offer no analysis with respect to this claim. Instead, their motion is focused entirely

on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claims remain

in this action.

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C. First Amendment and RLUIPA claims

Defendants purportedly seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, as well as

Plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to RLUIPA.1 Defendants contend that they are entitled to

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims that his religious beliefs were substantially burdened in violation

of RLUIPA. 

Specifically, RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule

of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person – [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and [¶] (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added). See also San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill,

360 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004).

RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); San Jose

Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034. See also Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of

Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[t]his definition reveals Congress’s

intent to expand the concept of religious exercise contemplated both in decisions discussing the

precursory RFRA [. . . .] and in traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.”), cert. denied, 124

S.Ct. 2816 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has had that “RLUIPA claims need only satisfy the

ordinary requirements of notice pleading.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that “[u]nder this pleading standard, it is sufficient that the complaint, alone or

supplemented by any subsequent filings before summary judgment, provides the defendant fair

notice that plaintiff is claiming relief under RLUIPA as well as the First Amendment.”).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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While RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious

exercise, the Ninth Circuit has defined the term according to its plain language. In San Jose

Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034, the Court looked to the “ordinary, contemporary, common

meaning,” to define the term by referring to dictionary definitions describing a “burden” as

“something that is oppressive,” and “substantial” as “‘considerable in quantity’ or ‘significantly

great.’” Id. Thus, a substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a “significantly great

restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Id.

Thus, the question is whether Plaintiff’s has alleged facts to show that his religious beliefs

were substantially burdened by the Defendants’ actions. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) . Here, Plaintiff claims he was unable to celebrate Ramadan, an

important component of his religious faith, due to the actions taken by the Defendants. These

facts are sufficient to state a claim under RLUIPA. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) is

DENIED.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims.

The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

Prisoners are protected by the Equal Protection Clause from intentional discrimination on the

basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997).

However, conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss, unless they are supported by facts that may prove invidious discriminatory intent or

purpose. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).

Therefore, when an equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff must plead facts to show

that the defendant “acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was

intentional.” FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

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 Plaintiff claims due process violations under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

However, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s due process claims as arising under the Fourteenth

Amendment. “Where an amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection

against a particular sort of government behavior,’ it is that Amendment, that ‘must be the guide for

analyzing the complaint.’” Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion)). 

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 “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of

consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course

of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon

an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

Here, Plaintiff’s only claims are conclusory in that he makes generalizations that prison

officials are “racially biased” but there no specific facts to show that any of the named

Defendants acted with intentional discrimination. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims is GRANTED.

E. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process

claims.2

 The Due Process Clause prohibits states from “depriving any person of life, liberty,

or property, without the due process of law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. The procedural

guarantees of due process apply only when a constitutionally-protected liberty or property

interest is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). In order to invoke

the protection of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court “refocused the test for determining the existence of

a liberty interest away from the wording of prison regulations and toward an examination of the

hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action relative to the ‘basic conditions’ of life as a

prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484);

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Sandin abandons the

mandatory/permissive language analysis courts traditionally looked to when determining

whether a state prison regulation created a liberty interest which required due process

protection). 

/ / /

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/ / /

Thus, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of

a protected, state-created liberty interest is avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not

the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions

themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221

(quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) The Sandin test requires a case-by-case examination of both

the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and the duration of the deprivation at issue. Sandin,

515 U.S. at 486. 

Accordingly, under Sandin, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has alleged facts

sufficient to show that the ramifications of the eight days the prison was in lockdown “imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Id. at 484. Here, Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to show that the eight days he was

confined to his cell while the entire prison was on lockdown was “atypical and significant.” Id.

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claims.

F. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on qualified immunity

grounds. Even if the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional claim

against Defendants, Defendants seek qualified immunity on the grounds that they “reasonably

believed their actions were lawful.” (Defs. Mot. at 11-12.) “Government officials enjoy

qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Jeffers v.

Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). When presented with a qualified immunity defense, the central questions for the court

are: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate that

the Defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether the right

at issue was “clearly established” at the time it is alleged to have been violated. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Although Saucier originally required the Court to answer these

questions in order, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that “while the sequence set forth

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there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Pearson v.

Callahan,__U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 

If the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do not make out a statutory or constitutional

violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201. Similarly, if the Court determines that the right at issue was not clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, the court may end further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity without determining whether the allegations in fact make out a

statutory or constitutional violation. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818.

In this case, the Court has found that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a constitutional

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants and thus, need not decide whether

these Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to those claims. Saucier, 522 U.S. at 201.

However, the Court will address whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and First Amendment claims.

A right is “clearly established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202. This does not

mean “that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Instead,

“in the light of pre-existing law[,] the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. The “salient

question” is whether the state of the law at the time gives officials “fair warning” that their

conduct is unconstitutional. Id. at 740. “This inquiry ... must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202;

Crowell v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846 (9th Cir. 2003).

In 2005, several years before the allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint took

place, the Ninth Circuit decided Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). In

Warsoldier, the Ninth Circuit held that if a prisoner is challenging a regulation as a violation of

their rights under RLUIPA, the prison officials must actually have “considered and rejected the

efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Id. at 999. Here,

at this stage of the proceeding, there are no facts from which the Court could find that 

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Defendants considered something less restrictive than the lockdown they imposed which

Plaintiff claims interfered with his religious practices. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on qualified immunity grounds is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply to Opposition [Doc. No.

26];

(2) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on

Eleventh Amendment grounds, with prejudice, only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages

against them in their official capacities; 

(3) DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant

to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims;

(4) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims;

(5) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

claims;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

Defendants Small and Madden shall file and serve their Answer to the First Amendment

and RLUIPA claims that remain in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14)

days of the date this Order is “Filed” pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(4)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 15, 2010

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. JAN M. ADLER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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