Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00649/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00649-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS KITCHEN, 2:06-cv-0649-GEB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

JOANNE HENDRICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to

Eastern District of California local rules.

On June 7, 2007, Defendant Joanne Hendricks filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing that because Plaintiff’s state habeas

proceedings resulted in a judgment which “addressed and adjudicated the issues contained in

[Plaintiff’s] Amended Complaint . . . , the instant action should be dismissed.” (Def.

Hendricks’s Mot. at 2.) Defendant Hendricks also filed a contemporaneous request that the court

take judicial notice of the earlier state court action and certain documents filed therein. On

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August 17, 2007, Defendant Asa Hambry also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on

collateral estoppel grounds. The remaining Defendant, Officer Padilla, filed an answer to

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on June 15, 2007.

On August 20, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations in

connection with Defendant Hendricks’s motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice, and

recommended that (1) Defendant Hendricks’s request for judicial notice be granted; (2)

Defendant Hendricks’s motion to dismiss be granted; and (3) this action be dismissed in its

entirety, with prejudice. The findings and recommendations were served on the parties and

contained notice that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within

20 days. Timely objections to the findings and recommendations were filed. 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-

304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire

file, the court adopts the recommendation that Defendant Hendricks’s request for judicial notice

be granted, and rejects the recommendation that Defendant Hendricks’s motion to dismiss be

granted and that this action be dismissed, for the following reasons: 

 Defendant Joanne Hendricks argues that this case should be dismissed because

Plaintiff’s state habeas proceedings resolved the issues presented in this action. Specifically,

Defendant Hendricks contends that the state court adjudicated the same issue presented herein

when it rejected Plaintiff’s claim that he was receiving “improper, inadequate and indifferent

medical care” at Placer County Jail. (Def. Hendricks’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, 6.) “The doctrine

of issue preclusion prevents relitigation of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and

necessarily decided in a prior proceeding. In both the offensive and defensive use situations the

party against whom estoppel [issue preclusion] is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier

action. The issue must have been ‘actually decided’ after a ‘full and fair opportunity’ for

litigation.” Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). However, it is unclear from the record before this court that the state

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 The portion of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations recommending 1

that Defendant Hendricks’s request for judicial notice be granted is adopted, and the request is

granted.

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court adjudicated the same precise issues that are presented in this action, or that the issues

presented in this action were fully and fairly adjudicated in the state court proceedings. 

On March 7, 2006, the state court denied Plaintiff’s writ of habeas corpus, which

“allege[d] that petitioner was not receiving proper medical care at the Placer County Jail,” and

determined that, as of that time, “petitioner [was] receiving medical services in accordance with

established standards of medical care [since] [t]he surgery petitioner request[ed], under the

circumstances, [was] considered elective [and] [t]he jail medical staff is not required to perform

elective procedures.” (Ex. G to Req. for Jud. Notice (Mar. 7, 2006 Amended Order Denying 1

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus), at 2.) Although the state court determined that Plaintiff was

receiving adequate medical care, the specific issue addressed in the state court proceedings was

whether the denial of the surgery that Plaintiff requested constituted a violation of Plaintiff’s

rights. (Id.; see also Ex. A to Req. for Jud. Notice (Plaintiff’s State Court Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed Jan. 17, 2006 in Placer County Superior Court), at 8, 17 (alleging that

Defendants’ “refus[al] to treat” Plaintiff’s inguinal hernia violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and requesting that the court “[o]rder

immediate procedures to correct petitioner’s medical complication”); see also Ex. F to Req. for

Jud. Notice (Plaintiff’s Reply to Placer County Jail’s Informal Response to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed Feb. 24, 2006 in Placer County Superior Court), at 3 (stating that Plaintiff

“wish[ed] for the surgery.”).) 

Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this action was filed on March 28, 2006, and

Plaintiff’s amended complaint in this action was filed on April 18, 2006. The amended

complaint alleges that Plaintiff “requested to see a surgeon or other specialist to determine if

hernia repair would end the pain or if there may be another cause for the extreme pain” and that

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the request was denied. (Am. Compl. at 2 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff requests that “the court

order [the correctional institution’s medical group to] schedule a surgeon or expert[] appointment

to determine the true cause for [Plaintiff’s] pain.” (Id. at 3.) The issue presented in the current

action, therefore, is whether the denial of Plaintiff’s request for further consultation constituted a

violation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

Because Plaintiff’s state habeas petition and the state court’s order focused

specifically on whether the correctional institution was required to provide Plaintiff with the

surgery he requested, it is unclear whether that court adjudicated the precise issue presented in

this action. Moreover, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s allegations in the current action are based

on conduct that occurred after the state court decision issued since it is unclear whether the

request for further consultation that Plaintiff references in his amended complaint was made

and/or denied after the state court decision issued (Plaintiff indicates in his Amended Complaint

that he learned that “the request [to see a surgeon] was denied by [Defendant Hendricks] . . . after

[his] initial complaint was filed”) and because it is also unclear whether Plaintiff’s condition

became more serious after the state court decision issued. See In re Universal Life Church, 128

F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that collateral estoppel did not apply since “the issues

presented [were] not in substance the same as those presented in the prior litigation in question,

and a controlling fact [] changed significantly since the prior judgment.”); Harkins Amusement

Enters., Inc. v. Harry Nace Co., 890 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that collateral

estoppel did not bar certain claims since “the plaintiff allege[d] facts which by the defendants’

own concession [were] at least 10 percent different from the facts alleged in [the prior action],

and, of course, the plaintiff allege[d] conduct that occurred in a different time period.”). Plaintiff

now contends that, after being transferred to a different correctional facility, he was “granted a

consultation with a specialist” and that the ultrasound he was given revealed “a lump in his

testicle.” (Pl.’s Obj. to F&R’s at 2.) Plaintiff further indicates that the scrotal sonogram he

received revealed that, in addition to the “mild and uncomplicated” inguinal hernia that he had

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 It is unclear when these conditions developed and/or whether these conditions are more 2

serious than an uncomplicated inguinal hernia.

 Although Plaintiff appears to have already received the primary relief he seeks in this 3

action since he has now seen a specialist and will be receiving surgery to alleviate his pain, this

action is not dismissed because Plaintiff also requests “any other relief deemed just and proper”

and because a plaintiff may be entitled to damages even if a complaint seeks only injunctive and

declaratory relief. Z Channel, Ltd. v. Home Box Office, 931 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1991);

see also Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347-48 & n. 13 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that

courts should construe pro se pleadings liberally).

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been diagnosed with prior to the time of the state court decision and that was the only condition

the state court appears to have been aware of, he also has a “left epididymal head cyst” and the

inguinal hernia is “with peristaltic bowel in the canal.” (Pl.’s Suppl. Filing of Supporting 2

Documents at 2; see also Ex. D to Req. for Jud. Notice (Letter from Dr. David Duncan in

Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed Feb. 1, 2006 in Placer County Superior

Court) (stating that Plaintiff’s “inguinal hernia has remained mild and uncomplicated.”).)

Plaintiff also indicates that “he is [now] scheduled for surgery to alleviate the ongoing pain.” 

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(Pl.’s Suppl. Filing of Supporting Documents at 3.) 

Moreover, it is unclear whether the issues adjudicated in the state court action

were fully and fairly adjudicated therein since the state court based its decision to deny Plaintiff’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus on only Plaintiff’s petition, an informal response by the jail

medical staff to Plaintiff’s allegations, and Plaintiff’s reply to the informal response, and it does

not appear that Plaintiff had an opportunity to conduct discovery in that action. (Ex. G to Req.

for Jud. Notice (Mar. 7, 2006 Amended Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus), at

1.) The “inability to make full use of discovery or evidence in the first forum may justify

subsequent relitigation.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4423; see also

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 n.15 (1979) (“If, for example, the defendant in

the first action . . . was unable to engage in full scale discovery or call witnesses, application of

offensive collateral estoppel may be unwarranted. Indeed, differences in available procedures

may sometimes justify not allowing a prior judgment to have estoppel effect in a subsequent

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 Because the findings and recommendations recommended that this action be dismissed 4

in its entirety, Defendant Hambry’s motion to dismiss has not yet been addressed.

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action even between the same parties, or where defensive estoppel is asserted against a plaintiff

who has litigated and lost.”).

Accordingly, based on the record before this court, it is unclear whether the March

7, 2006 state court decision precludes Plaintiff’s current action. Therefore, the recommendations

that Defendant Hendricks’s motion to dismiss be granted and that this action be dismissed are

rejected, and Defendant Hendricks’ motion to dismiss is denied.4

Dated: December 21, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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