Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02858/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02858-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRI CONTRERAS, individually and )

as guardian ad litem for minor )

plaintiff D.C., )

) 2:06-cv-2858-GEB-EFB

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

J.D. ORNELAS, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant J.D. Ornelas (“Defendant”), a California Highway

Patrol officer, moves for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff Terri

Contreras’s (“Plaintiff” or “Contreras”) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is not

viable since Defendant had probable cause to arrest Contreras for

driving under the influence of a drug. Contreras and Plaintiff D.C.

(“D.C.”) oppose the motion, arguing Defendant did not have probable

cause to arrest Contreras.

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Plaintiff indicates that she disputes that her eyes were red 1

and watery and that her pupils were dilated, but presents no specific

evidence controverting Defendant’s showing. (See SDUF ¶ 7.)

2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of September 7, 2004, Contreras and D.C. were

sitting in their vehicle, which had broken down and was parked by the

side of a highway in a desolate area. (Def.’s Reply to Pls.’ Sep.

Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts (“SDUF”) ¶ 1;

Decl. of Joseph Ornelas in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Ornelas

Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Plaintiff had been released from the hospital the day

before after being hospitalized for more than a week due to stomach

ulcers. (SDUF ¶ 2.)

Defendant, who is a certified Drug Recognition Evaluation

Expert, noticed Plaintiff’s vehicle and stopped his vehicle near

Plaintiff’s vehicle on the side of the road. (Id. ¶ 9; Ornelas Decl.

¶ 3.) Defendant approached Plaintiff’s vehicle and Plaintiff said she

needed to call for a tow service since she had no cell phone. (Id. 

¶ 11.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff had multiple visible needle

marks on both arms, and that Defendant observed that Plaintiff’s eyes

were red and watery and her pupils were dilated. (Decl. of Benjamin 1

Nisenbaum in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Nisenbaum Decl.”),

Ex. A (“Contreras Dep.”) at 39:3, 41:13; Ornelas Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff told Defendant that she had been in the hospital, which is

why she had needle marks on her arms, and that documentation regarding

her hospital stay was in her vehicle’s glove compartment. (Contreras

Dep. at 41:12-15.) Defendant did not examine the documentation. (Id.

at 42:1-2.)

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3

The parties dispute the facts concerning Plaintiff’s speech,

demeanor and behavior. Defendant testified that Plaintiff’s speech

was “garbled” and “slurred,” and that her demeanor was “very

lethargic” and “dazed.” (Id. at 49:5-9.) Plaintiff disputes that her

speech or demeanor were abnormal. (Contreras Dep. at 87:3-7;

Nisenbaum Decl., Ex. D at 15:22-24.) Defendant declares that when

Plaintiff exited her vehicle upon his request, she was unsteady on her

feet. (Ornelas Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff denies that she was unsteady on

her feet. (Contreras Dep. at 90:10-16, 92:17-21.)

The parties also dispute the facts concerning the

administration of field sobriety tests. Defendant testified that he

had Plaintiff perform the “nystagmus” test, which required her to

follow his finger with her eyes, and testified that this test did not

reveal that Plaintiff was under the influence of a drug. (Ornelas

Dep. at 93:11-94:8.) Defendant declares that he then asked Plaintiff

to perform a second field sobriety test during which she lost her

balance. (Ornelas Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff testified that Defendant

first asked her to touch her nose, then handcuffed her, and

subsequently asked her to perform the “nystagmus” test. (Contreras

Dep. at 90:10-16, 92:17-21.) Plaintiff denies that any other field

sobriety tests were administered at that time or that she lost her

balance. (Id. at 59:6-8, 90:10-13, 92:17-21.) Defendant declares he

asked Plaintiff to perform further field sobriety tests after

Plaintiff lost her balance, but Plaintiff refused. (Ornelas Decl. ¶

10.) Plaintiff testified that she was not asked to perform further

tests at that time. (Contreras Dep. at 45:14-18.)

Defendant arrested Plaintiff for violation of California

Vehicle Code section 12152(a) for driving under the influence of a

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The summary judgment standards are well known and need not be 2

repeated.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim also alleges violations of her Fourth 3

Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, her Fourteenth

Amendment due process right, her Fourth Amendment right against

excessive force, her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection right, and

her right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. (See Compl. ¶ 24.)

However, Defendant argues that none of these claims are viable if

Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Mot. at 1:9-18.)

4

drug. (Ornelas Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff underwent further testing at a

hospital, and subsequently at a California Highway Patrol station. 

(SDUF ¶ 19; Ornelas Decl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was incarcerated overnight

and released the next day. (SDUF ¶ 23.) A blood test conducted at

the hospital ultimately revealed Plaintiff had not been under the

influence of any drugs. (SDUF ¶ 5.)

DISCUSSION2

I. Section 1983 Claim

Defendant seeks summary judgment, arguing that he had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving under the influence of

a drug. (Mot. at 10:3-13:22.) The essence of Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim is that Defendant violated her Fourth Amendment rights by

falsely arresting her without probable cause. (See Opp’n at 9:24- 3

26.)

“Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have

knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a

person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is

being committed by the person being arrested.” United States v.

Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “‘Mere suspicion . . . or even strong reason to

suspect are not enough’ to establish probable cause.” Rodis v. City

and County of San Francisco, 499 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(quoting Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1498

(9th Cir. 1996)).

Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant possessed the following

information at the time he arrested Plaintiff: Plaintiff passed the

“nystagmus” test, Plaintiff did not lose her balance and was not

unsteady on her feet, Plaintiff’s speech was not slurred, Plaintiff’s

pupils were dilated, Plaintiff’s eyes were red and watery, Plaintiff

had needle marks on her arm, Plaintiff said she had been released from

the hospital the day before, and Plaintiff’s vehicle was inoperative. 

(SDUF ¶¶ 1-2; Ornelas Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Contreras Dep. at 59:6-8, 90:10-

13, 92:17-21.) Defendant argues these facts were sufficient to give

him probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Mot. at 11:3-12:10.) 

Plaintiff counters that these facts are insufficient, and since she

told Defendant that she had been in the hospital she provided him with 

a reasonable explanation for the needle marks on her arm, which

Defendant could have verified by checking the hospital papers that

were in the glove compartment of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Opp’n at 11:1-

14:18; Contreras Dep. at 41:12-15.) Plaintiff has demonstrated

genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether she lost her

balance, whether she was unsteady on her feet, whether she refused to

take further sobriety tests, whether her demeanor was “dazed or

lethargic,” and whether her speech was “slurred.” (Ornelas Dep. at

49:5-9; Contreras Dep. at 45:14-18, 59:6-8, 87:3-7, 90:10-13,

92:17-21; Ornelas Decl. ¶ 10.) These factual issues preclude

Defendant’s summary judgment motion.

Notwithstanding these factual issues, Defendant argues his

qualified immunity defense shields him from liability for Plaintiff’s

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§ 1983 claim. (Mot. at 16:10-18:27.) This defense is decided by

determining whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right at issue was

“clearly established,” and whether “a reasonable [official] would have

understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Meredith v.

Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2003).

It is clearly established that “the Fourth Amendment . . .

prohibits an officer from making an arrest without probable cause.”

Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995). The

summary judgment record reveals genuine issues of material fact exist

as to whether Plaintiff lost her balance, whether she was unsteady on

her feet, whether she refused to take further sobriety tests, whether

her demeanor was “dazed or lethargic,” and whether her speech was

“slurred.” (Ornelas Dep. at 49:5-9; Contreras Dep. at 45:14-18,

59:6-8, 87:3-7, 90:10-13, 92:17-21; Ornelas Decl. ¶ 10.) Since

genuine issues of material fact exist concerning Defendant’s qualified

immunity defense, Defendant’s motion on this ground is denied. See

Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (“If a

genuine issue of fact exists preventing a determination of qualified

immunity at summary judgment, the case must proceed to trial.”). 

III. State Law Claims

Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state

law claims, which is predicated on the argument that he lawfully

arrested Plaintiff. (Mot. at 14:11-16:9.) Since genuine issues of

material fact exist as to the lawfulness of the arrest, this motion is

denied.

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CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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