Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01750/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01750-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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 In a related action, four environmental nonprofit 1

organizations challenge the 2008 Plan from a roughly opposing

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC LANDS FOR THE PEOPLE,

INC., et al.,

NO. CIV. S-09-1750 LKK/JFM 

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,

O R D E R

Defendants.

 /

In 2008, the United States Forest Service adopted a “Travel

Management Plan” for the Eldorado National Forest (“2008 Plan” and

“ENF”). This plan limits motorized vehicle use of Forest Service

roads and generally prohibits cross-country motorized travel.

Plaintiffs are miners. They challenge the 2008 Plan under

twenty causes of action, most of which invoke several theories of

liability. Broadly speaking, plaintiffs argue that the plan

interferes with access to mining claims in the ENF. Defendants are

the United States Department of Agriculture, its subsidiary the

United States Forest Service, and four federal officials.1

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perspective. Center for Sierra Nevada Conservation v. United

States Forest Service, 2:09-cv-2523-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal.). Although

the court has ordered these cases related, the two cases have not

been consolidated, and neither group of plaintiffs has intervened

in the others’ case.

2

Defendants move for a more definite statement as to

plaintiffs’ first claim, which alleges that defendants violated the

National Environmental Policy Act. Defendants separately move to

dismiss claims II through XVIII and XX. Defendants do not

challenge claim XIX, which is a blanket request for injunctive

relief, and plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of claim XV. For

the reasons stated below, the court grants both of defendants’

motions.

I. Background

A. Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Public Lands for the People is a nonprofit

“nationwide organization of miners.” Compl. ¶ 40. The eight

individual plaintiffs are all members of this organization. Only

four plaintiffs are alleged to own mining claims within Eldorado

National Forest, although a fifth allegedly “uses” the forest and

a sixth allegedly sold a claim on account of the challenged plan.

Compl. ¶¶ 41-47. The last two individual plaintiffs allege that

they have “expressed interest and desire to prospect and mine in

the ENF.” Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. More generally, plaintiffs allege that

there are three hundred and sixty five valid existing mining

estates in the ENF, attributing this figure to the Bureau of Land

Management without citation. Compl. ¶ 30. Plaintiff Randy

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3

Burleson further alleges that he uses the ENF as an “off-road

enthusiast.” Compl. ¶ 45.

B. The 2008 ENF Travel Management Plan

Plaintiffs in this suit challenge the Forest Service’s 2008

Travel Management Plan for the ENF. This plan “regulate[s]

unmanaged public wheeled motor vehicle use by allowing use on

specific National Forest Transportation System (NFTS) roads and

trails and prohibiting cross country travel.” Record of Decision

(“ROD”) at 4. The “National Forest Transportation System” does not

include State, county, and private roads within the ENF, nor does

it include forest service roads “managed for standard four wheel

passenger vehicles.” Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”)

at 2-2, ix; see also ROD at 4 (noting that there are 635 miles of

such roads in the ENF). Thus, the 2008 Plan does not apply to

these roads.

The first step in adoption of the 2008 Plan was taken on

October 16, 2005. On that date, the Forest Service published a

notice of intent to prepare an environmental impact statement in

support of a travel management decision for the Eldorado National

Forest. See FEIS at 1-9. The Forest Service states that it took

this step for two reasons. 

One reason was that in Center for Sierra Nevada Conservation

v. Berry, No. 2:02-cv-00325-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal.) (“Berry”) the

undersigned ordered the Forest Service to reexamine the issue.

Berry concerned a challenge to an “Off-Highway Vehicle Plan” for

ENF that the Forest Service adopted in 1990. On August 16, 2005,

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The August 16, 2005 order required that the new plan be 2

adopted by December 31, 2007. On August 24, 2007, the court

approved the parties’ stipulation continuing this deadline to April

2, 2008. Because of the instant matter’s roots in Berry, the two

cases have been related under E.D. Cal. Local Rule 123.

The statutory authority invoked for this rule was the 3

Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1011 and the Wildfire

Disaster Recovery Act of 1989, 16 U.S.C. § 551. 

4

this court ordered the Forest Service to withdraw the 1990 plan and

to “issue a Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of

Decision on a new ENF [Off-Highway Vehicle] Plan (or site-specific

area plans).”2

The second reason was that in 2005 the Forest Service

published a general rule requiring the Forest Service to designate

a system of roads, trails, and areas for motor vehicle use for all

administrative units of the National Forest System in accordance

with certain criteria. This rule was published on November 9,

2005, subsequent to publication of the notice of intent for the

Eldorado Travel Management Decision. See 70 Fed. Reg. 68,264 (Nov.

9, 2005). It is unclear whether the 2005 Rule was influenced or 3

motivated by the Berry litigation. Nonetheless, the Forest Service

indicates that the notice of intent for the Eldorado Travel

Management Decision was published in anticipation of the November

rule and that the final ENF decision comports with this rule.

After publication of the October 16, 2005 notice, the Forest

Service conducted public meetings and solicited public comments.

The Forest Service then published a draft Environmental Impact

Statement on July 20, 2007. The draft environmental impact

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statement (“DEIS”) considered five alternatives. The Forest

Service ultimately adopted a modification of alternative B for the

2008 Plan, publishing a ROD on March 31, 2008 and a final EIS two

days thereafter, on April 2, 2008. This decision allows motor

vehicle use on 242 miles of NFS trails and 1,002 miles of “ML-2”

roads, which are roads “maintained for high clearance vehicles.”

FEIS at xviii, ix. Plaintiffs allege that “the closure of roads,

rights of way, and haul roads” effectuated by the 2008 Plan

“affects over 50% of the total roads and rights of way in the ENF.”

Compl. ¶ 37.

The parties agree that miners may in some circumstances use

motorized vehicles on roads closed to the general public. Under

Forest Service regulations, travel management decisions do not

restrict “[m]otor vehicle use that is specifically authorized under

a written authorization issued under Federal law or regulations.”

36 C.F.R. § 212.51(a)(8). The Forest Service contends that miners

must secure such authorization by filing a Notice of Intent or Plan

of Operations under 36 C.F.R. § 228.4. The EIS itself explained

that “[i]n the event that ground disturbing activities or the use

of public lands are such to warrant the need for a Plan of

Operations, an environmental analysis will be completed[.] This

Plan of Operations or other authorization may include the use of

specific roads or trails not otherwise open to public wheeled motor

vehicle use.” FEIS at 3-212.

Plaintiffs contend that the 2008 Plan is flawed insofar as it

requires plaintiffs to utilize these procedures. Plaintiffs

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 In United States v. Lex, 300 F. Supp. 2d 951, 961 (E.D. Cal. 4

2003) (Karlton, J.), I held that under 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(2) as

it read at that time, operations were excluded from the notice of

intent requirement when they would not involve “use of mechanized

earthmoving equipment [or] . . . cutting of trees.” While I noted

that this rule was curious, I explained that the appropriate remedy

was for the Forest Service to amend the regulation. The Forest

Service has done so, and the regulation now provides that

operations are exempt when they “will not involve the use of

mechanized earthmoving equipment, such as bulldozers or backhoes,

6

alternatively argue that the 2008 Plan, interpreted in light of the

2005 Rule, does not require miners to do so, and that the Forest

Service’s contrary interpretation of its own plan is flawed.

C. The Notice of Intent/Plan of Operations System

Although the parties disagree as to whether miners must file

a notice of intent and/or plan of operations prior to using roads

not open to the public, there is no dispute as to what the notice

of intent/plan of operations process itself involves. See Park

Lake Resources v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 450

(10th Cir. 1999) (summarizing these regulations). A notice of

intent is the simpler document. The regulation requires a notice

of intent for any operations that “might cause significant

disturbance of surface resources.” 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a) (emphasis

added). “Operations” include the use of “roads and other means of

access.” 36 C.F.R. § 228.3(a). The Forest Service contends that

use of motorized vehicles on roads not designated for such use is

by definition activity that “might cause significant disturbance

of surface resources” because such roads would otherwise remain

undisturbed. Thus, at a minimum, a miner seeking to use such roads

must submit a notice of intent.4

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or the cutting of trees, unless those operations otherwise might

cause a significant disturbance of surface resources.” 36 C.F.R.

§ 228.4(a)(1)(vi) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., United States

v. Russell, No. CR 06-0646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1608 (N.D. Cal.

Jan. 5, 2009) (Patel, J.) (noting this amendment).

7

“[I]f the proposed operations will likely cause” a disturbance

of surface resources a more elaborate plan of operations is

required. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(3) (emphasis added). If a miner

submits a notice of intent, within 15 days of receipt of the notice

of intent the District Ranger will determine whether the proposed

activity crosses the “will likely cause” threshold, such that “a

proposed plan of operations is required before operations may

begin.” 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(2). Alternatively, a miner may

submit a plan of operations initially. If a plan of operations is

submitted under either pathway, operations cannot commence until

the Forest Service affirmatively approves the plan. 36 C.F.R. §

228.12.

Approval of a plan of operations is a federal agency action

subject to the National Environmental Policy Act. See 36 C.F.R.

§ 228.4(f) (“Upon completion of an environmental analysis in

connection with each proposed operating plan, the authorized

officer will determine whether an environmental statement is

required. . . . The Forest Service will prepare any environmental

statements that may be required.”); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v.

Haines, CV. 05-1057, 2006 WL 2252554, *10, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

54884, *32 (D. Or. 2006) (citing Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 796

(9th Cir. 1975)). Within thirty days of receipt of a plan of

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 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires that a complaint provide a “short 5

and plain” statement of the grounds for relief. It is hard to

imagine that the complaint here is the type contemplated by the

Federal Rules. Nonetheless, as the court reiterates several times

below, binding authority compels consideration of jurisdictional

arguments prior to evaluation of the complaint’s compliance with

8

operations, the Forest Service must either approve the plan,

explain that no plan is necessary, “[n]otify the operator of any

changes in, or additions to, the plan of operations deemed

necessary to meet the purpose of the regulations,” or inform the

operator that additional time is necessary to complete review. 36

C.F.R. § 228.5(a)(1)-(5). In determining whether to approve a

plan, the Forest Service must ensure that the plan conforms to

state and federal air and water quality statutes. 36 C.F.R. §

228.8(a)-(b). The regulations further impose a variety of other

environmental standards, which typically require the operator to

take such measures as are “practicable.” 36 C.F.R. § 228.8(c)-(g).

D. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the 2008 Plan on June 24,

2009. Plaintiffs’ complaint is seventy-one pages long, enumerates

twenty causes of action, and argues that the 2008 decision violates

nineteen state and federal statutes, various regulations, two

executive orders, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, and Article 1 § 7 of the California

Constitution. Moreover, when confronted with ambiguity in the

complaint, plaintiffs have in briefing and oral argument embraced

each and every possible construction offered by the court and

defendants.5

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26 the Federal Rules.

9

Defendants timely filed the instant motion to dismiss and

motion to strike on October 2, 2009. These motions are supported

by memoranda of lengths commensurate with the complaint. The

parties stipulated to an extended briefing schedule and several

continuances, after which the court heard the matter on April 19,

2010. Defendants subsequently filed various supplemental exhibits

responding to questions raised at the hearing. Plaintiffs objected

to these exhibits, and defendants replied to these objections.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standards

1. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Challenge to

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal

court has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.

KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936); Assoc.

of Medical Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th

Cir. 2000). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied vary according to the

nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the

defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained

in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.

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10

See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994),

Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990); see

also 2-12 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 12.30 (2009).

If the challenge to jurisdiction is made as a “speaking

motion” attacking the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged by

the plaintiff, a different set of standards must be applied.

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the district court is free

to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue

prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983);

Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. “In such circumstances ‘[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.’” Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (quoting Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733).

However, where the jurisdictional issue and

substantive issues are so intertwined that the

question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the

merits, the jurisdictional determination

should await a determination of the relevant

facts on either a motion going to the merits

or at trial.

Id. (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733-35 and 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, at 558 (1969 & Supp.

1987)). On a motion going to the merits, the court must employ the

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standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Farr v.

United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1023 (1993).

In this case, defendants’ motion is largely of the former

type, in that defendants largely do not dispute plaintiffs’ factual

allegations. On one issue, however, defendants challenge facts.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs had notice, both at the time the

2008 Plan was under consideration and at the time the instant suit

was filed, of which particular roads would be closed. The court

addresses this factual dispute below.

2. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion challenges a complaint’s

compliance with the pleading requirements provided by the Federal

Rules. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint must give

defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal quotation and modification omitted).

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by

factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory

statements are themselves sufficient, and such statements are not

entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. at 1949-50. Iqbal and

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Twombly therefore prescribe a two step process for evaluation of

motions to dismiss. The court first identifies the non-conclusory

factual allegations, and the court then determines whether these

allegations, taken as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” Id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 

“Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not

refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving the

allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusory

factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[] the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A

complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a

cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may look beyond the

complaint itself to judicially noticeable evidence and “documents

whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity

no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

307 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002). The parties agree that these

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 Although ignored by plaintiffs’ opposition, count X alleges 6

violation of the APA separate from the claim that the Forest

Service was arbitrary and capricious. Paragraph 178 of the

complaint alleges that the Forest Service violated the obligation

to disclose “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or

a description of the subjects and issues involved” in conjunction

with a notice of proposed rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).

Plaintiffs’ supporting factual allegations, however, allege failure

13

rules encompass the various official decisions and environmental

impact statements at issue here. Despite the general obligation

to accept the complaint’s allegations as true, the court rejects

allegations regarding these documents’ contents where the

allegations are contradicted by the documents themselves. See

Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987), Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.

1987).

B. Preliminaries Regarding Review under Section 706(2) of

Administrative Procedure Act

Plaintiffs’ claims are largely governed by the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”). Plaintiffs’ tenth claim alleges a violation

of the APA itself, arguing that defendants acted arbitrarily and

capriciously. A claim that an agency acted arbitrarily and

capriciously for purposes of the APA cannot “stand free of any

other law.” Or. Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792,

798 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, the APA provides a mechanism for

enforcing obligations arising under other authority. Id. In

opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs recharacterize

their tenth claim as asserting unspecified violations of the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Because plaintiffs’ 6

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to disclose certain impacts potentially at issue in the NEPA

analysis, rather than a failure to disclose the terms or substance

of the rule itself. Accordingly, assuming that plaintiffs have not

abandoned this theory of liability, the court dismisses this

remaining aspect of the tenth claim as well.

14

first claim already seeks to enforce NEPA through the APA, the

tenth claim is dismissed as wholly duplicative.

As to the other claims, with the possible exception of

plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act claim and plaintiffs’

Fifth Amendment Takings claim, all of plaintiffs’ federal claims

invoke statutes that do not provide separate causes of action. Nor

do the claims themselves specify the source of the private cause

of action. Defendants characterize these claims as arising under

the APA, and plaintiffs do not dispute this characterization,

although defendants argue that certain of these claims should have

been brought under other statutes. See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d

1522, 1528 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (claims that agency actions “were

taken without statutory authority, or that they violate statutory

standards” should be treated as arising under the APA), Compl. ¶

1 (asserting generally that defendants’ conduct is made reviewable

under the APA), ¶ 2 (invoking APA § 10), and part II(C)(3), below.

For these claims, the APA provides statutory limits on

reviewability, the governing standard of review, and limits on the

available remedies. Notably, plaintiffs are not entitled to

monetary damages on these claims. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiving

sovereign immunity only for claims “seeking relief other than money

damages”). Insofar as plaintiffs’ twentieth claim, for “damages,”

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 Defendants have not brought a jurisdictional challenge to 7

plaintiffs’ tenth claim, which the court dismissed in the preceding

section.

15

is properly brought as a separate claim, this claim must be

predicated on plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment takings claim,

plaintiffs’ ADA claim, and plaintiffs’ state law claims.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants make four jurisdictional arguments under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1), each of which challenges many of plaintiffs’

claims. Federal courts must address jurisdictional issues before

addressing the merits. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 7

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Defendants’

jurisdictional arguments concern standing, sovereign immunity,

ripeness, and inability to enforce broad statutory directives.

Defendants begin with standing, asserting that plaintiffs must

offer additional facts to demonstrate standing. Defendants’ other

arguments potentially identify deeper inadequacies unlikely to be

cured by amendment. Accordingly, in hope of avoiding the need to

revisit these latter issues in a subsequent pleading, the court

addresses defendants’ arguments in reverse order. See Tenet v.

Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (when confronted by multiple

jurisdictional questions, a court may address these questions in

any order.). Roughly stated, defendants argue (1) that the

statutory directives invoked by plaintiffs are not judicially

enforceable, such that certain claims cannot be brought at all, (2)

that certain claims are unripe, and cannot be brought yet, (3) that

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 Defendants’ opening memorandum characterized this argument 8

as speaking to the merits under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), whereas

defendants’ reply memorandum frames this as a jurisdictional issue.

Norton was decided on the APA’s statutory language rather than

constitutional limits, although the analysis shows that the

relevant portions of the APA were crafted to navigate underlying

separation of powers and justiciability concerns. While Norton did

not state whether the APA’s limits were jurisdictional, it appears

that they are. Siskiyou Reg’l Educ. Project v. United States

Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 554 (9th Cir. 2009) (assuming that

Norton described a jurisdictional limit), Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (Norton

describes jurisdictional limits), but see Idaho Watersheds Project

v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 829 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the

finality requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 704 is nonjurisdictional, and

suggesting that this was generally true of the APA’s limits on

claims).

16

for certain claims, the United States has waived sovereign immunity

narrowly, requiring claims to be brought under a different statute,

and (4) that plaintiffs lack standing for many claims, such that

plaintiffs must provide additional allegations or evidence

demonstrating that these plaintiffs have standing.

1. Enforceability of Broad Mandates

Defendants argue that claims III, V through VII, XI, and XIV

should be dismissed because they “seek to compel implementation of

broad programmatic directives rather than ‘discrete agency action

that [the Forest Service] is required to take.’” Defs.’ Reply Br.

13 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64

(2004)) (emphases omitted). Defendants concede that the 2008 Plan 8

represents discrete and final agency action reviewable under the

APA. Defendants nonetheless argue that the Plan’s alleged

deficiencies concern policy mandates that are not judicially

enforceable. As the court explains, insofar as Norton holds that

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broad mandates are unenforceable, this holding applies solely to

“failure to act” claims under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) and has no

applicability to the claims at issue here, which challenge

completed agency action under § 706(2).

Norton concerned the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”)

regulation of off-road vehicle use in federal “wilderness study

areas.” These areas are federal lands that BLM had identified as

potential wilderness, but which Congress had not yet decided

whether to protect as wilderness. 542 U.S. at 59. Until Congress

reaches a decision, BLM is obliged to manage these areas “‘in a

manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for

preservation as wilderness.’” Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)).

BLM had adopted a “land use plan” (also referred to as a “resource

management plan”) for the areas at issue in Norton, and this plan

contained various provisions regarding regulation of off-road

vehicle use. Id. at 61.

Plaintiffs in Norton brought three claims, only the first of

which is relevant here. Plaintiffs argued “that BLM had violated

its nonimpairment obligation under § 1782(c) by allowing

degradation in certain [wilderness study areas]” under the

challenged plan, thereby “fail[ing] to take action with respect to

ORV use that [BLM] was required to take.” Id. at 60-61. This

claim was brought under section 706(1) of the APA, to “compel

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”

The Court held that the statutory obligation to “‘manage

[wilderness study areas] . . . in a manner so as not to impair the

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suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness,’” was

“mandatory as to the object to be achieved, but it leaves BLM a

great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it.” Id. at

66 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)). The court explained the limits

to enforcement of such a mandate: 

The principal purpose of the APA limitations

we have discussed--and of the traditional

limitations upon mandamus from which they

were derived--is to protect agencies from

undue judicial interference with their lawful

discretion, and to avoid judicial

entanglement in abstract policy disagreements

which courts lack both expertise and

information to resolve. If courts were

empowered to enter general orders compelling

compliance with broad statutory mandates,

they would necessarily be empowered, as well,

to determine whether compliance was

achieved--which would mean that it would

ultimately become the task of the supervising

court, rather than the agency, to work out

compliance with the broad statutory mandate,

injecting the judge into day-to-day agency

management. To take just a few examples from

federal resources management, a plaintiff

might allege that the Secretary had failed to

“manage wild free-roaming horses and burros

in a manner that is designed to achieve and

maintain a thriving natural ecological

balance,” or to “manage the [New Orleans Jazz

National] [H]istorical [P]ark in such a

manner as will preserve and perpetuate

knowledge and understanding of the history of

jazz,” or to “manage the [Steens Mountain]

Cooperative Management and Protection Area

for the benefit of present and future

generations.” 16 USC §§ 1333(a),

410bbb-2(a)(1), 460nnn-12(b). The prospect of

pervasive oversight by federal courts over

the manner and pace of agency compliance with

such congressional directives is not

contemplated by the APA.

Norton, 542 U.S. at 66-67. As this court reads Norton, it

prohibits “general orders compelling compliance with broad

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statutory mandates” and “pervasive oversight . . . over the manner

and pace of compliance” with broad mandates, but Norton did not

hold that broad mandates are absolutely unenforceable. Instead,

Norton recognized concerns raised by judicial enforcement of such

mandates and explained that the limits provided by the APA address

these concerns.

First, only “discrete agency action” may be reviewed under the

APA. Norton, 542 U.S. at 62 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551). Courts may

determine whether particular actions violate broad mandates, but

the APA does not permit courts to oversee agencies wholesale.

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990). Thus,

judicial review under the APA will always be confined to a bounded

set of facts.

Second, the terms of sections 706(1) and (2) provide narrow

standards of review. Section 706(2), which was not at issue in

Norton, directs courts to set aside actions that are, inter alia,

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.” Courts ask whether the evidence before

the agency at the time a discrete decision was made rationally

supports the decision reached by the agency. This deference to the

agency permits judicial enforcement of broad mandates without the

“pervasive oversight” rejected by Norton. Norton, 542 U.S. at 62.

Although Norton may be read as suggesting that it is inappropriate

for a court to ever “determine whether compliance [with a broad

statutory mandate] was achieved,” the language surrounding the

quoted phrase demonstrates that the Court was concerned with such

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determinations only to the extent that they would require excessive

intrusion on the agency. 542 U.S. at 66.

Section 706(1), which permits claims for failure to act, does

not incorporate the arbitrary or capricious standard. It would be

difficult to apply this standard where the agency has neither acted

nor decided not to act, because in such cases there will be no

administrative record underlying an agency decision. Section

706(1) accommodates this concern by specifying a different standard

of review--“unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Norton

interpreted this language to apply only to actions the agency is

legally require to take. Norton at 63, 63 n.1. This

interpretation effectively precludes enforcement of broad statutory

mandates under section 706(1), insofar as a broad mandate typically

is not one that requires discrete agency action. This result,

however, derives from the particular language of section 706(1),

language which does not apply to claims under section 706(2).

Moreover, as explained above, the policy concerns underlying this

limitation are separately addressed through the standard of review

provided by section 706(2). 

In several related contexts, the Ninth Circuit has

distinguished Norton on grounds supporting the above analysis,

recognizing that Norton’s interpretation of section 706(1) was

inapplicable to claims under section 706(2). Oregon Natural Desert

Ass’n v. BLM, 531 F.3d 1114, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008), Northwest Envtl.

Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 681 n.10 (9th

Cir. 2007). Notably, Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n held that a NEPA

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analysis could be arbitrary and capricious under section 706(2) for

failing to analyze specific factors even though the omitted

analysis could not separately be compelled under § 706(1) as an

action that the agency was “required to take.” 531 F.3d at 1140.

In summary, where a statutory directive does not require action,

the statute may be so “broad” that it cannot be enforced under

section 706(1) without being too broad to be enforced under section

706(2).

There are, of course, certain statutory directives that are

so broad that they defy review under the arbitrary and capricious

standard as well. The APA exempts from review “agency action

[that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. §

701(a)(2). “An agency action is ‘committed to [its] discretion by

law’ where a ‘statute is drawn so that a court would have no

meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise

of discretion’ -- i.e., where it is ‘drawn in such broad terms that

in a given case there is no law to apply.’” Pac. Northwest

Generating Coop. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 596 F.3d 1065, 1075

n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830

(1985)). Such statutes are “rare instances,” Heckler, 470 U.S. at

830, and this exception is “very narrow.” Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), abrogated

on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).

Defendants have not sought to invoke this exception here--instead,

defendants erroneously argue that the only action reviewable under

any provision of the APA is action that is legally required.

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Because the court dismisses the challenged claims on other

jurisdictional grounds, the court declines to address § 701(a)(2)

sua sponte. If plaintiffs file an amended complaint curing the

jurisdictional defects identified below, defendants may bring an

argument invoking section 701(a)(2).

In this case, plaintiffs challenge a discrete and final agency

action--publication of the 2008 ENF Travel Management Plan--under

5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Norton presents no barrier to such claims.

2. Ripeness

In the context of review of agency action, the ripeness

doctrine serves “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of

premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the

agencies from judicial interference until an administrative

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way

by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 148-49 (1967). The doctrine is “‘drawn both from Article III

limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for

refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n

v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting Reno v.

Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, n.18 (1993))

(hereinafter “Nat’l Park Hospitality”).

“In deciding whether an agency’s decision is, or is not, ripe

for judicial review, the Court . . . must consider: (1) whether

delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether

judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further

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 Using of the term “fit” to describe only one aspect of the 9

ripeness inquiry may seem to prejudge the issue, in that common

sense suggests that an issue “unfit” for review is “unripe”

regardless of hardship. Having noted this terminological oddity,

the court uses “fit” in accordance with the caselaw, as describing

only one aspect of the ripeness inquiry.

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administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit

from further factual development of the issues presented.” Ohio

Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)

(hereinafter “Ohio Forestry”). Other decisions have combined the

second and third factors from the Ohio Forestry into a single

inquiry, the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision.” See

Nat’l Park Hospitality, 538 U.S. at 808 (citing Abbott Labs, 387

U.S. at 808). Courts may analyze fitness before considering 9

hardship to the parties. Park Lake Resources, 197 F.3d at 450.

Defendants argue that claims II, VI through IX, XI through

XIII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, and XX are unripe. Each of these claims

relates to limits on miners’ vehicle travel. When questioned about

the contours of these claims, plaintiffs have eagerly embraced

every possible construction of these claims suggested by either

defendants or the court. Construing the complaint liberally, the

challenged claims allege four theories of injury. Plaintiffs

contend that all claims challenged on ripeness grounds argue

that(1) the 2008 Plan limits miners’ access to mining sites because

the Forest Service will refuse to grant exemptions even when miners

follow the notice of intent/plan of operations process, (2) even

if the Forest Service will grant exceptions, the burdens involved

in the notice of intent/plan of operations process are so great as

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 To clarify, each claim challenged on ripeness grounds 10

alleges, in a shotgun fashion, numerous theories of liability. It

appears that each such theory depends on at least one of the above

four arguments. For example, Claims II, VI, VII, XI, and XII argue

that the 2008 Plan violates statutory prohibitions on interference

with mining. Claim VII elaborates on this by further arguing that

due process required individualized notice and a hearing prior to

such interference. This added theory does not complicate the

ripeness analysis, however, because if the question of whether

there will be interference is unripe, the question of whether such

interference would violate due process is unripe as well.

To summarize the other claims, Claim XIII argues that the 2008

Decision violates the Americans with Disabilities Act by limiting

disabled persons’ ability to mine. Claims XVI and XVII argue that

the Decision violated easements, implied rights of use, or

unspecified property rights related to mining claims. Claim XVIII

is a generalized claim for “takings,” and claim XX is a general

claim for “damages.” Finally, claims VIII and IX argue that the

2008 Plan closed public rights of way recognized under Revised

Statute 2477, in violation of FLPMA and the Omnibus Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 108, respectively. R.S. 2477 is described

in detail in Kane County Utah v. Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th

Cir. 2009). Although R.S. 2477 provides a right of access to the

general public, rather than to miners in particular, plaintiffs

explicitly predicate their R.S. 2477 claims on miners’ rights.

See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 165, 173. 

Although these four theories encompass the challenged claims,

for each individual claim it is unclear which theories that claim

implicates. Moreover, plaintiffs provide contradictory indication

as to whether they intend to proceed under the fourth theory at

all. Plaintiffs state, in opposition to dismissal of count XVIII,

that plaintiffs “do not allege that the Forest Service has to

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to amount to a de facto prohibition on mining, and (3) the Forest

Service has no authority to require miners who seek to use roads

to comply with the notice of intent/plan of operations process.

Beyond these substantive arguments, in opposing defendants’

sovereign immunity argument (discussed below), plaintiffs contend

that a subset of the challenged claims present a procedural theory

of liability, arguing that the Forest Service was required to

determine whether the 2008 Plan would affect easements and other

rights of way before adopting the plan.10

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identify every R.S. 2477 road in the ENF. . . . Plaintiffs allege

that if a road is a R.S. 2477 road, then the Forest Service cannot

close it to miners and prospectors, prohibiting them from accessing

their mining claims.” Opp’n at 27. At oral argument, however,

plaintiffs appeared to embrace the fourth theory. For purposes of

the present motion, the court assumes that plaintiffs intended to

bring all four theories, and the court need not determine which

theories may be supported by the allegations and arguments included

in particular causes of action.

 Other cases have rejected the third and fourth theories on 11

the merits. As to the third, the Ninth Circuit has held that the

Forest Service has authority to require miners to comply with the

notice of intent and plan of operations procedures. See Siskiyou

Reg’l Educ. Project v. United States Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545,

549 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock

Co., 480 U.S. 572, 585 (1987)) (stating in dicta that the National

Forest Management Act provides the Forest Service with authority

to regulate surface activities associated with mining), United

States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding

application of the notice of intent/plan of operations process to

miners). As to the fourth, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs

presenting such a claim had failed to identify any authority

imposing such a procedural obligation. Kane County Utah v.

Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077, 1086-88 (10th Cir. 2009).

25

The ripeness of each of these theories of liability must be

considered separately. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social

Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56–65 (1993), Freedom to Travel

Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1434–36, (9th Cir. 1996). As

explained below, the latter two theories are ripe, but the first

two are not.11

a. Fitness of the Issues for Judicial Decision

Defendants rely on three cases in which courts held that

challenges to broad agency decisions would need to await factspecific applications of the decisions. In Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S.

at 729, plaintiffs challenged a Land and Resource Management Plan

adopted by the Forest Service. Plaintiffs argued that the plan

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favored logging and clearcutting in national forests in violation

of various statutory duties. The Court explained that 

immediate judicial review directed at the

lawfulness of logging and clearcutting

[pursuant to the challenged plan] could hinder

[the Forest Service’s] efforts to refine its

policies: (a) through revision of the Plan,

e.g., in response to an appropriate proposed

site-specific action that is inconsistent with

the Plan, or (b) through application of the

Plan in practice, e.g., in the form of

site-specific proposals, which proposals are

subject to review by a court applying purely

legal criteria.

523 U.S. at 735 (internal citation omitted). Thus, the issue was

unfit for review.

In Nat’l Park Hospitality, plaintiffs challenged an

interpretive rule published by the National Parks Service, which

held that contracts with concessioners were outside the scope of

the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. The

Court concluded that “[a]lthough the question presented . . . is

a purely legal one and [the challenged action] constitutes final

agency action within the meaning of § 10 of the APA, 5 USC § 704,

. . . further factual development would significantly advance our

ability to deal with the legal issues presented.” Nat’l Park

Hospitality, 538 U.S. at 812 (quotation and other citations

omitted). The majority based this conclusion on the potential for

case-specific refinement of the stated policy. While the

government “generally argue[s] that [the National Park Service] was

correct to conclude that the [Contract Disputes Act] does not cover

concession contracts, [it] acknowledge[s] that certain types of

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concession contracts might come under the broad language of the

[Act]. Similarly, while [the two concessioners] present a facial

challenge to [the interpretation], both rely on specific

characteristics of certain types of concession contracts to support

their positions.” Id. Because, in the majority’s view, all

parties agreed that the agency might adjust its position in light

of the facts of specific contracts and that these facts would bear

on the lawfulness of the agency’s position, the abstract, facial

challenge was not fit for review. Justices Stevens (concurring)

and Breyer and O’Connor (dissenting) disagreed with the underlying

conclusion that case-specific agency action was forthcoming or

pertinent. These justices’ opinions thereby illustrated

application of the same rule to alternative facts. They would have

held that the agency had adopted a blanket policy not subject to

case-specific deviations, and therefore fit for review. Id. at

814-15 (Stevens, J., concurring), id. at 819-20 (Breyer, J., joined

by O’Connor, J., dissenting).

Finally, in the case that is perhaps the closest factual

analogue to the present dispute, the Tenth Circuit has reviewed a

challenge to a Forest Service decision that potentially limited

miners’ access to mine sites in a national forest. Park Lake

Resources, 197 F.3d 448. The Forest Service had designated nearly

700 acres as a “Research Natural Area” pursuant to 36 C.F.R. §

251.23 (1998). Such areas must be “retained in a virgin or

unmodified condition,” and in accordance with this designation, the

Forest Service prohibited motorized vehicle use except when

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necessary to provide research or educational access. Id. at 449.

The Tenth Circuit held that the miners’ challenge to this

designation was not fit for judicial review because the miners had

not presented a plan of operations seeking approval of a particular

mining proposal. Id. at 451. Had plaintiffs filed a plan of

operations, the Forest Service could have approved it despite the

Research Natural Area designation. If the Forest Service instead

denied the proposal or required modifications thereto, such action

could be predicated on a range of statutory and regulatory

authorities, and judicial review of such an action would turn on

the particular authority invoked. Id.; see also Tex. v. United

States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998), Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163 (1967) (issue unfit for review because

“[a]t this juncture we have no idea whether or when such an

inspection will be ordered and what reasons the Commissioner will

give to justify his order.”). Moreover, the Forest Service could

modify the Research Natural Area designation in light of proposed

mining. The Tenth Circuit held that these facts were

indistinguishable from those in Ohio Forestry, and that the claim

was therefore not yet fit for review. Park Lake Resources, 197

F.3d at 452.

These cases demonstrate that insofar as the claims here argue

that the 2008 Plan prohibits access to mining sites, the claims are

not fit for judicial decision. When presented with projectspecific notices of intent or plans of operation, the Forest

Service may approve such plans, with or without modification. Nor

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can the court yet review the argument that the burden imposed on

miners by the notice of intent/plan of operations process amounts

to a prohibition on mining. The regulations themselves contemplate

that the weight of this burden will vary greatly from proposal to

proposal. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(g) (“The public reporting burden for

this collection of information is estimated to vary from a few

minutes for an activity involving little or no surface disturbance

to several months for activities involving heavy capital

investments and significant surface disturbance, with an average

of 2 hours per individual response.”). The precise amount of time

required is at least in part under the control of the Forest

Service. It remains to be seen how often the Forest Service will

require a plan of operations, how long such a plan will take to

prepare or review, and what expense will be involved therein.

Plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are fit for review. As to

the claim that Forest Service lacks the authority to require miners

to submit a notice of intent or plan of operations at all, the

Forest Service has already determined that a notice of intent is

required for any operation that would use roads not open to the

general public. FEIS 3-212, 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4, 212.55(d). Miners

are prohibited from such use of roads prior to Forest Service

approval. Defendants effectively concede that there will be no

case-specific determination as to whether a notice of intent is

required. In this regard, this theory of liability is distinct

from the claims discussed in Ohio Forestry, Nat’l Park Hospitality,

and Park Lake Resources; this theory of liability is instead the

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type of “blanket” decision that Justices Stevens, Breyer and

O’Connor held was fit for judicial review on a facial challenge in

Nat’l Park Hospitality. Rather than argue that further agency

action or factual development is necessary with regard to this

theory of liability, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not

shown that valid rights of way exist, that the Forest Service’s

regulations do not otherwise exempt miners from notice of intent

requirement, and that the Forest Service has the authority to

impose this requirement. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply at 7-8. Although

defendants characterize these arguments as jurisdictional, they

instead speak to the merits. Notably, defendants argue that “[t]o

the extent Plaintiffs allege that they hold pre-existing rights-ofway even without approval of a plan of operations, Plaintiffs

cannot allege ripe challenges to the Decision prior to carrying

their burden of proving the validity of the rights-of-way they

claim.” Defs.’ Mem. at 23 (citing S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.

BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 768 (10th Cir. 2005)). The cited case held

that, in reviewing the merits of a claim asserting rights to an

R.S. 2477 roadway, the party asserting the right bore the burden

of proof. Ripeness was not an issue in that case. While

plaintiffs here may fail to meet the burden of proof on the R.S.

2477 claims, this is a merits analysis separate from ripeness and

other justiciability inquiries.

As to the claim that the Forest Service was required to

evaluate impacts on existing property rights prior to adopting the

2008 Plan, the Ninth Circuit has held that procedural, rather than

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substantive, challenges to agency action are fit for decision and

ripe once the action is complete. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

342 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003), Citizens for Better Forestry

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 341 F.3d 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2003),

Kern v. BLM, 284 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2002), West v. Sec’y

of Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 930 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000),

Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.1 (9th Cir.

1999).

b. Hardship to Plaintiffs

In assessing whether delayed review will impose a hardship on

plaintiffs, the core inquiry is the nature of the challenged

action. The Court has held that there is no hardship where the

challenged actions “do not command anyone to do anything or to

refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify

any formal legal license, power or authority; they do not subject

anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they create no legal

rights or obligations.” Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733 (citing

United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U.S. 299,

309-10 (1927) (Brandeis, J.)). In contrast, the Court has found

hardship when a challenged rule required plaintiff drug

manufacturers to either “change all their labels, advertisements,

and promotional materials; . . . destroy stocks of printed matter;

and . . . invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies” or

to “risk serious criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful

distribution of ‘misbranded’ drugs.” Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 152-

53.

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By focusing on changes in legal right or obligation, the

ripeness doctrine’s hardship inquiry excludes certain harms from

consideration. For example, Ohio Forestry recognized that it would

be cheaper and more expedient for plaintiffs to litigate a single

facial challenge to the disputed land use plan than to challenge

individual applications thereof. 523 U.S. at 734. Litigation

expense and inconvenience, however, were not the type of hardship

“sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that would

otherwise be unripe.” Id. at 735. Similarly, in Nat’l Park

Hospitality, because the challenged interpretation pertained solely

to how contractual disputes would be resolved, the rule did not

affect the concessioners’ “primary conduct,” and the concessioners

were “free to conduct [their] business as [they] saw fit.” 538

U.S. at 810. As such, the interpretation was not a command, a

prohibition, or a license. Id. at 809 (citing Ohio Forestry).

Although the concessioners argued that the interpretation created

uncertainty as to whether the concessioners would be able to invoke

the cost-saving dispute resolution provisions of the Contract

Disputes Act, the Court held that this type of harm was irrelevant.

Id. at 811. The mere fact that “business transactions could be

priced more accurately if . . . a small portion of existing legal

uncertainties were resolved” was inadequate to create a hardship

pertinent to the ripeness inquiry. Id. The Court further observed

that the challenged interpretation was a “general statement of

policy” rather than a “legislative regulation with the force of

law.” Id. at 808-09. 

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Here, although the challenged plan does not conclusively

prohibit miners’ motorized travel on formerly open roads, the plan

commands the miners to refrain from such travel absent application

for and receipt of a grant of permission, and subjects the miners

to criminal and civil liability should they proceed without such

authorization. See Bator v. United States, No. Cr. S-09-424, 2010

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57705 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2010) (affirming criminal

conviction for mining operations conducted in a national forest

without authorization). Thus, miners must either refrain from

using roads or pay the as-yet uncertain cost of filing a notice of

intent or plan of operations.

Although Ohio Forestry and Nat’l Parks Hospitality held that

certain costs incident to agency action were not hardships

pertinent to the ripeness analysis, the Ninth Circuit has held that

costs directly commanded by agency action are relevant. Sayles

Hydro Ass’n v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1993). In

Sayles, plaintiffs had the requisite federal licenses to construct

a hydroelectric power project, but the California State Water

Resources Control Board had not issued a required permit.

Plaintiff challenged the process imposed by the Board, and the

Board argued that because this process was not complete, the

challenge was unripe. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]f a

federal licensee must spend years attempting to satisfy an

elaborate, shifting array of state procedural requirements, then

he must borrow a fortune to pay lawyers, economists, accountants,

archaeologists, historians, engineers, recreational consultants,

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environmental consultants, biologists and others, with no revenue,

no near-term prospect of revenue, and no certainty that there ever

will be revenue.” Id.

Defendants argue, without discussion of Sayles, that the

burdens of compliance with administrative procedures cannot

constitute a hardship for purposes of ripeness. The decisions 12

cited by defendants concerned a separate question: whether agency

action is final for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act.

FTC v. Std. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980), Ukiah Valley Medical

Center v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1990). These two cases

concerned challenges to issuance of administrative complaints, and

held that although the agency action obliged plaintiff to incur the

“expense and disruption of defending itself in protracted

adjudicatory proceedings,” such injury was insufficient to render

the action “final agency action” under the APA. Std. Oil, 449 U.S.

at 244; see also Ukiah Valley Med. Center, 911 F.2d at 264. In

this case, plaintiffs do not rely on the cost of proceedings to

demonstrate the finality of agency action. The administrative

complaints at issue in Standard Oil and Ukiah Valley marked the

beginning of the administrative process, but here, the challenged

decision was reached at the culmination of the NEPA process and

is undoubtedly a “final agency action” within the meaning of the

APA. Accordingly, the statutory limit recognized by Standard Oil

and Ukiah Valley is absent here.

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cases have squarely addressed whether ripeness may require a

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c. Weighing Hardship against Fitness for Review

Accordingly, the court concludes that two of the issues are

unfit for judicial review, two of the issues are fit, and that the

plan (and hence delayed review thereof) imposes some hardship on

the plaintiffs. Abbott Labs, Ohio Forestry, Nat’l Park

Hospitality, and Park Lake Resources provide no direct guidance for

situations in which the fitness and hardship aspects of the

ripeness inquiry point in opposing directions. Indeed, neither

party has cited a case discussing synthesis of these factors or,

more specifically, how to approach situations in which the ripeness

factors provide contrary indications.

Beginning with the two theories of liability that are fit for

review, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that where an issue

is fit for review, the ripeness doctrine imposes no independent

“hardship” requirement beyond the requirement of injury sufficient

to convey Article III standing. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349

F.3d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2003), Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United

States, 837 F.2d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Neither the Ninth

Circuit nor the Supreme Court have explicitly addressed this

question, but the court is not aware of any decision holding to the

contrary. Put differently, no binding authority has concluded that

an issue was fit for review, that the plaintiff had demonstrated

injury sufficient to convey standing, but that the lack of further

hardship demonstrated that the issue was unripe. Because the 13

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showing of hardship beyond that required by standing. C.f. Nat’l

Park Hospitality, 538 U.S. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring). In

Nat’l Park Hospitality, Justice Breyer’s dissent characterized the

majority as having concluded that plaintiffs had standing

notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a

hardship for the ripeness inquiry.

The D.C. Circuit has explicitly reached such a conclusion,

holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring a claim which was

nonetheless unripe, basing the ripeness conclusion both on the

unfitness for judicial resolution and the lack of hardship. Nat’l

Treasury Emples. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 855 (D.C. Cir.

2006).

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D.C. Circuit’s rule properly reflects the concerns underlying the

ripeness doctrine, the court follows this rule here. Accordingly,

although the amount of hardship is uncertain and potentially

minimal, these two theories of liability are ripe so long as the

hardship is sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing. The

court postpones the standing question until part II(C)(6), below.

As to the two theories of liability that are unfit review, the

question is whether a sufficient showing of hardship may render the

issues ripe notwithstanding the determination of unfitness, and if

so, whether such a hardship has been shown here. The court assumes

that a severe hardship may outweigh a showing of unfitness,

although the court is not aware of any decision finding a claim

ripe for this reason. The Supreme Court has stated in dicta that

the converse is possible, i.e., that a claim may be unripe despite

a showing of definite hardship. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers

Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 300 (1979) (quoting Reg’l Rail

Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974)) (“Even though

a challenged statute is sure to work the injury alleged, however,

adjudication might be postponed until ‘a better factual record

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might be available.’”). In this case, the minimal hardship

plaintiffs will suffer does not warrant immediate judicial

adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims that the Plan will prohibit

mining.

Accordingly, claims II, VI through IX, XI through XIII, XVI,

XVII, XVIII, and XX are dismissed as unripe insofar as they argue

that the 2008 Plan will result in de jure or de facto prohibition

of motorized vehicle access to mining claims. All of these claims

are ripe insofar as they involve the third and fourth theories of

liability discussed above.

3. Sovereign Immunity and The Quiet Title Act

Suits against the United States are barred absent a waiver of

sovereign immunity. Block v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983).

Where claims “challenge the United States’ title to real property,”

the United States has provided a narrow waiver, consenting only to

those suits that may be brought under the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2409a. Block, 461 U.S. at 286; see also Leisnoi, Inc.

v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999). If an

adverse claim to title to real property cannot be brought under the

QTA, it cannot be brought at all. Leisnoi, 170 F.3d at 1191

(citing Alaska v. Babbitt, 75 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Alaska II”). Where a claim involves a title dispute, a plaintiff

cannot circumvent this bar by, for example, posturing the claim as

one against a federal official or as a claim that a government

agency action was ultra vires. Alaska II, 75 F.3d at 453.

Here, defendants argue that claims II, VI through IX, XVI, and

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grounds. The court summarized each of these claims in note 10,

above.

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XVII all present adverse claims to title to real property, that

none of these are brought under the QTA, and that these claims are

therefore barred by the United States’ sovereign immunity.14

Defendants separately argue that sovereign immunity bars counts

XIV, XVIII, and XX for reasons other than the QTA. The court

discusses these claims in parts II(C)(4) and (5), below.

To determine whether a cause of action presents an adverse

claim to real property, the court must look to the particulars of

the cause of action. The court reiterates that the complaint in

this case is such that these particulars are difficult to discern.

As noted in the prior section, these challenged claims advance two

ripe theories of liability: the substantive argument that the

Forest Service lacks authority to require miners to receive

approval for a notice of intent or plan of operations before using

closed roads, and the procedural argument that the Forest Service

should have identified pre-existing rights of way prior to adoption

of the 2008 Plan.

a. Whether These Claims’ Substantive Theory Rests on

Adverse Claims of Title to Real Property

Plaintiffs argue that the challenged claims need not be

brought under the QTA because “[t]he primary issue in this lawsuit

is not a question of ‘title.’ The primary issue is ‘closure,’ and

the Forest Service’s right to do so.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at

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13. The distinction plaintiffs attempt to draw collapses, however,

where plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service lacks the right to

close a road because of an easement or other property interest in

the road.

i. R.S. 2477 Roads (Claims VIII and IX)

Some of plaintiffs’ claims are clearly predicated on property

interests. Claims VIII and IX argue that the Forest Service lacked

the authority to close certain roads because public highways had

been established thereon pursuant to R.S. 2477. Compl. ¶¶ 165-174.

Under R.S. 2477 and the related statutes, establishment of a

highway created a right of way, which is an easement and thus a

property right. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 (10th

Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Los Ranchos De

Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

This property right vests in the local county. Id. The plan did

not recognize R.S. 2477 rights on closed roads, demonstrating that

the United States disputes plaintiffs’ contention that such rights

exist. Two lines of caselaw, when combined, demonstrate that the

plaintiffs here cannot bring suit to vindicate disputed R.S. 2477

rights. 

First, as noted above, where a claim disputes the United

States’ title, the claim cannot be brought under the APA. Alaska

II, 75 F.3d at 453. The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that

a claim under the APA is barred by sovereign immunity where the APA

claim sought a determination that would, in effect, vest in a third

party property rights adverse to the United States. Metropolitan

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Water Dist. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 143 (9th Cir. 1987)

(per curiam), aff’d sub nom. California v. United States, 490 U.S.

920 (1989); see also Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“Alaska I”) (The QTA governs “suits involving

plaintiffs who, while not seeking to quiet title in themselves,

might potentially affect the property rights of others through

successfully litigating their claims.”). The Seventh Circuit has

rejected claims similar to those at issue here, largely on the

basis of Metropolitan Water Dist. Shawnee Trail Conservancy v.

USDA, 222 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 2000). In Shawnee Trail

Conservancy, plaintiffs argued that designation of areas of a

National Forest as Research Natural Areas, and concomitant closure

of roads and trails, violated easements and rights of way owned by

third party public and private entities. Id. The Seventh Circuit

held that the QTA precluded plaintiffs’ APA claim, despite the fact

that plaintiffs did not themselves seek title in any property

interest. Id. at 387-88 (citing Metropolitan Water Dist., 830 F.2d

at 143-44). Thus, plaintiffs’ claims predicated on the existence

of R.S. 2477 rights not acknowledged by the Forest Service cannot

be brought under the APA.

A second line of cases holds that plaintiffs cannot bring

their substantive R.S. 2477 claims under the QTA either. “Courts

which have addressed whether a plaintiff, as a member of the

public, can assert a title under the Quiet Title Act for access to

routes established pursuant to R.S. 2477 have ruled that there is

no subject matter jurisdiction.” Friends of Panamint Valley v.

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Kempthorne, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (O’Neill,

J.) (following Sw. Four Wheel Drive Ass’n v. BLM, 363 F.3d 1069

(10th Cir. 2004), Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236

F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2001), and Kinscherff v. United States, 586

F.2d 159, 160 (10th Cir. 1978)); see also Hazel Green Ranch, LLC

v. United States DOI, No. 07-CV-00414, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87367,

10-11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (Wanger, J.) (following Panamint),

Alleman v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1225 (D. Or. 2005).

These cases have reasoned that the right to use a public road is

not itself a right or interest in property. The QTA requires the

plaintiff to set forth “the nature of the right, title, or interest

which the plaintiff claims in the real property.” 28 U.S.C. §

2409a(d) (emphasis added), see also McMaster v. United States, 177

F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (for suit to be available under the

QTA, the “dispute . . . must concern the quality of title between

the plaintiff and the United States and not the quality of title

between the United States and a third party.”). Thus, a suit

seeking to assert an R.S. 2477 right must be brought by “the

governmental entity that owns the easement.” Long, 236 F.3d at

915).

The court recognizes that plaintiffs claim an interest (albeit

not a real property interest) in use of disputed R.S. 2477 roads.

The United States has not chosen to waive sovereign immunity in a

way that permits plaintiffs to seek to vindicate this interest.

As the Ninth Circuit has explained in discussing another context

in which plaintiffs were barred from seeking relief, “[t]he QTA’s

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limitations on actions challenging the United States’ assertions

of title apply without regard to the ultimate validity of those

assertions. . . . [T]he immunity of the government applies whether

the government is right or wrong.” Alaska II, 75 F.3d at 452

(internal quotations omitted). Insofar as plaintiffs’ eighth and

ninth claims assert that the Forest Service’s authority to require

notices of intent or plans of operation is substantively limited

by the existence of disputed R.S. 2477 rights, those claims are

barred by sovereign immunity.

ii. Private Easements (Claim XVI)

Plaintiffs’ sixteenth claim alleges that plaintiffs’ mining

claims and mineral estates give rise to “implied easements by

necessity over the roads, trails, and rights of way in the ENF,”

and that the Forest Service’s actions violate these easement

rights. Compl. ¶¶ 210-212. Such easement rights are property

rights within the scope of the QTA. Alaska I, 38 F.3d at 1074

(collecting cases). Although claim XVI does not invoke a

particular cause of action, the parties agree that this claim, as

pled, is not brought under the QTA. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at

35-36. 

Although it is unclear whether the United States disputes the

existence of such easements, the parties at a minimum dispute such

easements’ scope. The EIS and Forest Service regulations recognize

that miners have existing rights of access, and this may be a

recognition of easement rights. Plaintiffs’ only ripe claim

regarding easements, however, asserts the Forest Service lacks any

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authority to restrict plaintiffs’ use of these easements, whereas

defendants contend that whatever the nature of plaintiffs’ rights,

plaintiffs do not have a right so broad as to prohibit such

regulation. Disputes about the scope of an easement, like disputes

about whether an easement exists at all, must be brought under the

QTA. Kane County, 562 F.3d at 1088-89. 

Insofar as plaintiffs contend that easement rights owned by

plaintiffs deprived the Forest Service of authority to regulate

certain roads, this claim can only be brought under the QTA.

Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 228-229

(D.C. Cir. 2009), Kane County, 562 F.3d at 1088, Duval Ranching Co.

v. Glickman, 965 F. Supp. 1427, 1444-45 (D. Nev. 1997).

iii. Claims Asserting other “Rights-of-Way” (Counts

II, VI, VII, and XVII)

Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ second, sixth,

seventh, and seventeenth claims are similarly barred. Each of

these claims similarly argues, at least in part, that the Forest

Service lacked authority to close roads because of rights of way

across Federal Land, whether enjoyed by the public in general or

by miners in particular. See Compl. ¶¶ 106, 154, 158, 214.

The nature of these purported rights of access is unclear.

Mining claims, whether patented or not, are real property. United

States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). This

suggests that any right of access existing as a result of the

mining claim is also a real property interest. See Duval Ranching

Co., 965 F. Supp. at 1445 (claims asserting that road closures

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violated miners’ “inherent rights” must be brought under the QTA).

Insofar as plaintiffs invoke statutory protections of miners’

rights, however, it is not immediately apparent whether these

statutes direct the Forest Service to protect miners’ property

rights, or whether these statutes somehow create an independent

obligation to leave the National Forest open to mining generally.

Nor is it clear whether the latter would be a property right.

Similarly, it is not clear that a statute providing the public with

access to the National Forests creates a property right in such

access or a cloud on the United States’ title. No party has

confronted these questions.

The court declines to reach these issues on the present

motion. Instead, the court dismisses these claims for the reasons

explained in the remainder of this order. If plaintiffs are able

to cure the other jurisdictional defects, doing so will present a

more complete context in which to revisit these issues.

b. Claims Arguing That The Forest Service Must

Consider Whether Rights-of-Way Are Present Need Not

Be Brought under the QTA

As discussed above, the court construes plaintiffs’ complaint

as arguing that the Forest Service was obliged to determine whether

rights of way existed prior to adopting the 2008 Plan. In Kane

County, the Tenth Circuit held that such a claim did not challenge

the United States’ title. There, plaintiffs sought to compel the

federal defendants to “determine [p]laintiffs’ valid existing

rights before asserting or taking any action in enforcement or

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implementation of [the challenged plan]” and to “remove any

physical barriers placed upon any right-of-way or road within the

[subject lands] until such time as it has been determined that such

actions will not impair valid existing rights.” 562 F.3d at 1082;

see also id. at 1088. Thus, rather than arguing that defendants

had substantively interfered with plaintiffs’ property rights,

plaintiffs argued that defendants have a procedural, ‘stop and

think’ obligation prior to acting. 

 Kane County held that “nothing in the Quiet Title Act

necessarily preclude[d]” this claim. Id. at 1088; accord Duval

Ranching Co., 965 F. Supp. at 1445. The court agrees. In the same

breath, however, Kane County dismissed the claim on the merits,

explaining that plaintiffs had “failed to point to any provision

of federal law that would require the BLM to perform the actions

they are seeking (i.e., the non-binding administrative

determination of their purported rights-of-way). In other words,

Quiet Title Act aside, the County plaintiffs’ APA-based claims lack

merit.” 562 F.3d at 1088 (footnote omitted). The court postpones

evaluation of the merits of these claims.

c. Summary of the QTA and Sovereign Immunity

Defendants argue that the counts II, VI through IX, XVI and

XVII exceed the limited waiver of sovereign immunity embodied by

the QTA. The court addresses this argument only insofar as these

claims were found to be ripe. The court concludes that counts

XVIII, IX, and XVI are barred by sovereign immunity insofar as they

involve the ripe substantive argument. The court does not

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determine whether sovereign immunity bars the substantive argument

as advanced by counts II, VI, VII and XVII, instead dismissing this

aspect of these claims on other jurisdictional grounds. Sovereign

immunity does not bar the procedural argument at all.

4. Sovereign Immunity and Plaintiffs’ Takings and Damages

Claims (Counts XVIII and XX)

Count XVIII of the complaint alleges that the 2008 Plan

effectuated a taking for which plaintiffs have not received

compensation. Count XX is a general claim for “damages.” These

claims are ripe only insofar as they allege that the Forest Service

lacked any authority to regulate miners’ use of roads or that the

Forest Service was required to inventory rights of way.

Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks “such damages as are proven at trial,”

without specifying an amount. Compl. at 71.

As noted, claims against the United States are barred absent

a waiver of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs have identified no

waiver applicable to these claims. Defendants argue that the only

potential waivers are those found in the Tucker Act and Little

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1) and 1346(a)(2), respectively.

Both waive sovereign immunity for claims for money damages against

the United States “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act

of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.” The

Little Tucker Act, however, solely conveys jurisdiction over claims

for $10,000 or less, and the Tucker Act solely conveys jurisdiction

on the Federal Court of Claims. See Christopher Vill., L.P. v.

United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing E.

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Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520 (1998)).

If plaintiffs seek to proceed before this court, and if

plaintiffs identify no waiver of sovereign immunity other than the

Little Tucker Act, plaintiffs must waive the right to recover

greater than $10,000 in damages per claim. Smith v. Orr, 855 F.2d

1544, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing, inter alia, United States v.

Johnson, 153 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1946)); see also Clouser, 42

F.3d at 1539-40 (“Since plaintiffs in their complaint allege

damages in excess of $ 10,000, . . . they are disqualified from

suing in the [District of Oregon].”). 

Defendants argue that such a waiver must appear in the

complaint itself. The court need not decide this issue. Even if

defendants are correct, the court must examine the remaining

jurisdictional challenges to these claims, so as to determine

whether the Federal Court of Claims would have jurisdiction if this

court were to transfer the case. Because plaintiffs lack standing

to bring these claims, no federal court has jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs are cautioned, however, to be prepared to respond to the

above issues if plaintiffs file an amended complaint.

5. Sovereign Immunity and Plaintiffs’ Regulatory

Flexibility Act Claim

Count XIV of the complaint alleges that the Forest Service

violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act by failing to prepare an

“initial regulatory flexibility analysis” for the 2008 Plan in

purported violation of 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)-(c). Defendants argue

that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with

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accordingly) be waived. Defendants’ present motions do not argue

that plaintiffs failed to exhaust any of their other claims, and

the court need not consider this issue sua sponte.

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respect to this claim. The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff

challenging administrative action by the Forest Service must

exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Native

Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 704, 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e)). 

Defendants assert, without citation to authority, that this

exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. The Ninth Circuit has

explicitly held to the contrary, although the issue is one that has

engendered significant confusion among the courts. McBride Cotton

& Cattle Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (7

U.S.C. § 6912(e) is non-jurisdictional); Idaho Watersheds Project

v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 828 n.5, 830 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a suit

against the Forest Service, holding that “5 U.S.C. § 704 [is] a

non-jurisdictional statutory exhaustion requirement”), but see

Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. v. Morton, 608 F.2d 1255, 1257

(9th Cir. 1979) (in reviewing a claim against the Department of

Interior, holding that “When the regulations governing an

administrative decision-making body require that a party exhaust

its administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review, the

party must do so before the administrative decision may be

considered final and the district court may properly assume

jurisdiction.”) (citing, inter alia, 5 U.S.C. § 704).15

Nonetheless, as a practical matter, because defendants raise

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exhaustion and make no other purported jurisdictional challenges

to this claim, it does not matter whether exhaustion is

jurisdictional; it suffices to note that under Native Ecosystems

Council, etc., the requirement is mandatory absent exceptions not

relevant here. 304 F.3d at 899. 

Defendants concede that some plaintiffs invoked administrative

remedies by commenting on the draft EIS and by filing some appeals

of the decision. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 47.

Nonetheless, defendants contend that no person invoked the

Regulatory Flexibility Act in these proceedings.

In determining how specific plaintiffs must be during

administrative proceedings in order to exhaust an issue, the Ninth

Circuit has explained that “[t]he plaintiffs have exhausted their

administrative appeals if the appeal, taken as a whole, provided

sufficient notice to the Forest Service to afford it the

opportunity to rectify the violations that the plaintiffs alleged.”

Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir.

2002). In Native Ecosystems Council, the Ninth Circuit held that

plaintiffs’ administrative appeals were “less refined” than the

judicial complaint, in that the administrative appeals failed to

argue that an EIS was required for a proposed Forest Plan amendment

or that the Forest Service was required to consider the cumulative

significance of all road density amendments. Id. at 898. The

administrative appeals nonetheless objected to the road density

amendments generally and argued that the process by which the

amendments were adopted violated NFMA’s procedural requirements,

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the source of the EIS requirement in that case. Id. at 899. The

court held that plaintiffs’ administrative filings were sufficient

to put the Forest Service on notice of the disputed issues, and

that plaintiffs had exhausted their claims.

In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff had

failed to exhaust claims in Buckingham v. Sec’y of the USDA, 603

F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff had a permit to graze cattle

in a national forest, the Forest Service cancelled this permit, and

plaintiff challenged this cancellation under the APA. Id. at 1076.

During administrative proceedings, plaintiff argued that other

ranchers’ non-compliance with their permit obligations precluded

plaintiff from complying with the terms imposed by his permit. Id.

at 1081. The court held that under Native Ecosystems Council, this

was insufficient to exhaust plaintiff’s argument that the terms of

his own permit were vague. Id. 

Here, plaintiff Hobbs argued during the administrative process

that “[c]los[ing] the roads to small miners and prospectors” would

impose an economic hardship on said miners. Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot.

Dismiss, 33. This argument plainly challenges the substance of the

decision to close roads. Plaintiffs’ Regulatory Flexibility Act

claim concerns administrative burdens, rather than access to the

roads themselves. Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service was

required to describe the “projected reporting, recordkeeping and

other compliance requirements of the proposed rule” and other

“relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict

with the proposed rule.” Compl. ¶ 198. Plaintiffs’ apparent

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 Put differently, defendants do not challenge plaintiffs’ 16

standing to bring claims I, X, XIV, XV, and XIX. Plaintiffs

stipulate to dismissal of claim XV, and the court has dismissed

claims X and XIV on the merits. Thus, the only surviving claims

as to which defendants do not challenge standing are I, for

violation of NEPA, and XIX, a general prayer for injunctive relief.

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failure to even mention this sort of administrative burden during

the administrative process demonstrates that plaintiffs failed to

put the Forest Service on notice of the basis for plaintiffs’

Regulatory Flexibility Act claim, and this claim is therefore

unexhausted.

Separate from the Regulatory Flexibility Act argument, count

XIV of the complaint further asserts that defendants have violated

43 U.S.C. § 1732(b), which provides that “the Secretary shall, .

. . regulate, through easements, permits, leases, licenses,

published rules, or other instruments as the Secretary deems

appropriate, . . . the development of small trade or manufacturing

concerns.” See Compl. ¶ 200. The court agrees that “Secretary,”

as used in this section, refers solely to the Secretary of the

Interior, such that this statute does not apply to the defendants

in this suit. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 625

(9th Cir. 1981), 43 U.S.C. § 1702(g).

6. Standing

Defendants’ final jurisdictional argument is that plaintiffs

lack standing to bring claims II through IX, XI through XIII, XVI

through XVIII, and XX. To demonstrate Article III standing, 16

a plaintiff must show that he is under threat

of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete

and particularized; the threat must be actual

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 It appears that other injuries are possible. The court does 17

not inquire into these possible injuries, leaving it to plaintiffs

to assert these injuries as a basis for standing, if appropriate,

in a future filing. Nor does the court look beyond plaintiffs’

implicit concession that interference with the ability to access

particular mining claims is necessary to convey standing for

plaintiffs’ procedural theories of liability regarding

identification of R.S. 2477 claims. 

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and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

it must be fairly traceable to the challenged

action of the defendant; and it must be likely

that a favorable judicial decision will

prevent or redress the injury.

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1142,

1149 (2009) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)); see also Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

Defendants solely challenge plaintiffs’ showing of injury.

The parties’ dispute on this issue is narrow. Defendants

characterize the challenged claims as resting on the injury of

interference with access to particular mining claims. Plaintiffs

embrace this interpretation of the injury at issue. The parties 17

further agree that to demonstrate such an injury, plaintiffs will

ultimately be required to specify particular mining claims and

particular road closures that limit plaintiffs’ ability to access

those claims. Plaintiffs have not done so.

The evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs could provide these

specific facts now, although plaintiffs contend to the contrary.

At the time the FEIS and ROD were issued, around March 31, 2008,

the Forest Service made available a map showing all roads open for

public use under the 2008 Plan. Decl. of Lester Lubetkin dated

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Apr. 20, 2010, at ¶¶ 3, 8, and Ex. 1. This map was made available

online, at meetings which plaintiffs Bunting and Burleson signed

in as attending, and was mailed to Bunting, Burleson, and all

others who submitted comments on the earlier draft EIS. Id. ¶ 8.

The Forest Service subsequently produced “Motor Vehicle Use Maps”

in March 2009, which pertain to each district within the ENF, and

which have been freely available online and at district offices

since that time. Because the 2008 Plan prohibits the general

public from using roads not explicitly designated as open, these

maps should enable plaintiffs to determine whether the roads needed

to access specific mining claims are open to public use.

Plaintiffs respond to this evidence by arguing that the Forest

Service should have provided a map indicating specifically which

roads were closed, in addition to a map showing which roads remain

open. Plaintiffs provide no logical argument as to why such a map

would be necessary, nor do plaintiffs identify any legal obligation

to produce such a map. Moreover, the FEIS map showing roads open

under the 2008 Plan was accompanied by a map showing all roads in

the ENF of which the Forest Service was aware, including previously

unauthorized roads. Id. Ex. 2. This second map was also

distributed to plaintiffs Bunting and Burleson. Comparison of this

map with the others reveals which roads were closed.

Plaintiffs further argue that these maps are vague in that

they “lack information such as context [and] landmarks,” that the

maps are “often broken up where the route crosses private land,”

and that they “assume that users can tell the difference between

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a route on the map, or a spur omitted from the map.” Plaintiffs

have not identified how any of these purported difficulties apply

to the roads needed to access any particular claim.

The only remaining dispute is plaintiffs’ contention that they

“are not required to plead the name and location of every road

closed in the ENF that causes them harm; that awaits discovery.”

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, 36:4-6; see also, e.g., id. at 13:08-11,

16:07-08. Courts have held that when standing is challenged “at

the pleading stage, ‘general factual allegations of injury

resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice,’ because we

‘”presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts

that are necessary to support the claim.”’” Or. v. Legal Servs.

Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). The court is

furthermore sensitive to the need to avoid imposition of heightened

pleading requirements. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power

Co., 582 F.3d 309, 333 (2d Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, in this case,

it is appropriate to require greater specificity at this stage.

The caselaw permits the defendants to challenge the truth and

sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in a 12(b)(1) motion

on a standard similar to that used for summary judgment. Farr, 990

F.2d at 454. On such a challenge the plaintiff is entitled to the

procedural protections afforded at the summary judgment stage. Id.

at 454 n.1. One such protection is the right to postpone

adjudication pending necessary discovery. Id. at 454, see also

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). In this case, however, plaintiffs have

not identified any need for discovery on this jurisdictional

question. Nor have plaintiffs identified any other factor

preventing plaintiffs from providing this specificity now. Rule

56(f) provides that a motion for summary judgment may be postponed

or denied where opposing party shows “that, for specified reasons,

it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs have not provided such reasons here.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing to

bring claims II through IX, XI through XIII, XVI through XVIII, and

XX.

D. Remaining Merits Arguments

The above analysis fully disposes of defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Plaintiffs abandon claim XV, the court dismisses claims

X and XIV on the merits, and defendants do not seek dismissal of

claims I and XIX. The remaining claims are dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, on the basis of a number of jurisdictional defects.

The court emphasizes that it has not reached the merits of the

jurisdictionally defective claims. In order to guide future

litigation of this case, the court has noted various cases

potentially pertinent to the merits of these claims, but the court

has not determined that these cases provide the controlling rules

or apply to this case. Conversely, plaintiffs should not take the

court’s silence on merits arguments raised by defendants as an

indication that those arguments have been rejected.

////

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III. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) provides in pertinent part that

A party may move for a more definite

statement of a pleading to which a responsive

pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably

prepare a response. The motion must be made

before filing a responsive pleading and must

point out the defects complained of and the

details desired.

Because of the liberality of the notice pleading system, such a

motion will be granted only in rare circumstances. The Ninth

Circuit has held that the federal rules ordinarily do not require

the pleader to set forth “the statutory or constitutional basis for

his claim, only the facts underlying it.” McCalden v. California

Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion); but see Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699

(complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where complaint

fails to support “a cognizable legal theory.”). “A motion for a

more definite statement is used to attack unintelligibility, not

mere lack of detail, and a complaint is sufficient if it is

specific enough to apprise the defendant of the substance of the

claim asserted against him or her.” San Bernardino Pub. Employees

Ass’n v. Stout, 946 F. Supp. 790, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1996). A motion

for a more definite statement should be denied “where the

information sought by the moving party is available and/or properly

sought through discovery.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). “Thus, a motion for

a more definite statement should not be granted unless the

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defendant literally cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Bureerong

v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Boxall

v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1114

(N.D. Cal. 1979)).

In this case, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ first claim

must be more definitely stated not because the allegations are too

scant, but because the allegations are so plentiful and

unstructured as to be unintelligible. Plaintiffs’ first claim, as

labeled by plaintiffs, alleges that defendants violated NEPA, and

plaintiffs’ opposition to the present motion acknowledges that such

claims are brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Belying this

simple summary, the complaint as pled consists of twenty-four

lengthy paragraphs covering eleven pages, with more than thirty

citations to various legal authorities that do not clearly relate

to any recognizable claim under NEPA. Defendants accurately

summarize these issues:

it is unclear whether Plaintiffs are alleging

a single claim or multiple claims under NEPA

through Claim I. Plaintiffs have pled that

the Decision violates NEPA under a single

Claim in their Complaint, but appear to assert

several violations of NEPA. For example, some

paragraphs seem to relate to the alternatives

analysis required under NEPA, see e.g., id. at

¶84, ¶91, and ¶98, while other paragraphs seem

to relate to the cumulative impacts analysis

required by NEPA, see e.g., id. at ¶89, ¶95 -

96. As a third potential claim, Plaintiffs

seem to assert the novel concept that the

Forest Service failed to produce a

supplemental environmental impact statement

(“SEIS”) before completing the FEIS. . . . 

The unreasonableness of having to develop a

responsive pleading is underscored by the

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inclusion of several paragraphs that make

little or no reference to NEPA, and it is

unclear whether Plaintiffs intend for some of

these allegations to present new non-NEPA

related claims, or whether Plaintiffs intend

these paragraphs to serve some other purpose.

See e.g., Complaint at ¶85 (alleging violation

of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act

of 1997), ¶89 (alleging violations of

Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, and ¶92

(alleging statutory rights to mine and

prospect in the ENF). While Plaintiffs may or

may not have a purpose in including such

paragraphs under Claim I, it clearly does not

serve the purpose of a pleading according to

Rule 8 and is amenable to relief under Rule

12(e). Any amended complaint should be more

concise, and identify only those factual

allegations truly relevant to Plaintiffs’ NEPA

claim(s). 

Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for More Definite Statement, 6-7. The court

agrees that defendants cannot frame a response to this claim. The

Ninth Circuit has held that “even though a complaint is not

defective for failure to designate the statute or other provision

of law violated, the judge may in his discretion, in response to

a motion for more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(e), require such detail as may be appropriate in the

particular case.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.

1996). McHenry described the complaint at issue as “argumentative,

prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant.” Id. at

1177. The allegations here are argumentative, prolix, and

redundant, and neither the court nor defendants can determine

whether they are irrelevant.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for a more definite statement

is granted. Plaintiffs are ordered to file an amended complaint,

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splitting the allegations currently contained in Count I into

separate causes of action for each theory of liability. In these

separate causes of action, plaintiffs must identify the challenged

aspect of the plan or conduct of defendant, the right offended, and

the source of that right. Where plaintiffs contend that a right

is protected under multiple sources of authority or has been

violated in multiple ways, these arguments should be laid out in

separate causes of action.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for a more

definite statement (Dkt. No. 28) and motion to dismiss (Dkt. No.

29) are GRANTED. The Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Claim I is dismissed with leave to amend, as explained

above.

2. Claim XV is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, in light of

plaintiffs’ non-opposition to dismissal thereof.

3. Claims X and XIV are DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM. Dismissal of these claims is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108

(9th Cir. 2003) (Initial dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) should ordinarily be without prejudice).

4. Claims II through IX, XI through XIII, XVI through

XVIII, and XX are DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint

seeking to cure the jurisdictional deficiencies

identified above.

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5. Plaintiffs are granted twenty-eight (28) days from the

date of this order to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 5, 2010.

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