Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01808/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01808-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE WALLACE, CDCR #P48941,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-01808-BAS-PCL

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 22]

AND

(2) DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

v.

R. OLIVARRIA; B. SELF; R. 

ARMENDARIZ; J. MCNEIL; D. 

ARGUILEZ,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Tyrone Wallace, a state prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this 

case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. Procedural History

On October 21, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but simultaneously denied his 

Motion for Appointment of Counsel and dismissed his First Amended Complaint sua 

sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim.

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(ECF No. 19). The Court provided Plaintiff with notice of his Complaint’s pleading 

deficiencies and granted him 45 days leave in which to amend. (Id. at 10-11.)

On November 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

(ECF No. 20), and thereafter, a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF No. 22).

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

Plaintiff has renewed his request that the Court appoint him counsel due to his 

“bad handwriting,” and a diagnosed “learning disability.” (ECF No. 22 at 3-4.) 

As the Court noted in its October 21, 2016 Order (ECF No. 19 at 3-4), all 

documents submitted by any pro se litigant, no matter how “inartfully pleaded” are 

held to “less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 3 (quoting 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). But there is no constitutional right to 

counsel in a civil case; and nothing in Plaintiff’s latest filings suggest the Court 

should exercise its limited discretion to request that an attorney represent him pro 

bono pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 

U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

To date, Plaintiff has filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1), a First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 9), a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20), three Motions 

for Appointment of Counsel (ECF Nos. 3, 13, 22), and a Motion for Reconsideration 

(ECF No. 6), all of which contain factual allegations, legal arguments and exhibits in 

support. These pleadings together and alone demonstrate that while Plaintiff may not 

be trained in the law, he is capable of legibly articulating the facts and circumstances 

relevant to his access to courts claims, which are typical, straightforward, and not 

legally “complex.” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Moreover, for the reasons discussed 

below, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s latest Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 22) 

is DENIED.

III. Screening of Second Amended Complaint

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A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Second 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20) also requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

“The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 

suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 

920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same 

as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A 

“incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Thus, in deciding whether Plaintiff 

has stated a plausible claim for relief, the Court may consider exhibits attached to his 

Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an 

exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered” 

in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. 

Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).

B. Religious Allegations

Once again, Plaintiff claims that Defendants McNeil and Armendariz are 

violating his right to practice his religion by changing his schedule for his prison job. 

(SAC at 3-4.) However, Plaintiff provides very little factual allegations that would 

indicate how the change in his work hours would have any impact on the practice of 

his religion. While Plaintiff indicates that his religious beliefs require him to 

“meditate day and night,” there are no allegations that it has to be a specific time or 

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why the need to mediate would necessarily interfere with his ability to retain a prison 

job. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim under the First 

Amendment or RLUIPA, he fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. 

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the 

prison door.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 

In order to implicate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Plaintiff 

must show that his belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” See 

Shakur v. Schiro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (citing Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1994)). 

In addition to First Amendment protections, the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et. seq., provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if 

the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the 

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person –

[¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and [¶] 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added); see also San Jose Christian College v. 

Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (“RLUIPA . . . prohibits the 

government from imposing ‘substantial burdens’ on ‘religious exercise’ unless there 

exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means 

of satisfying the governmental interest.”). 

RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, 

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A); San Jose Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034. The party alleging 

a RLUIPA violation carries the initial burden of demonstrating that a governmental 

practice constitutes a substantial burden on his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000cc-1(a); 2000cc-2(b) (“[T]he plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on 

whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by 

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the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”). Here, Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations are insufficient on which to base either a First Amendment or 

RLUIPA claim. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s religious claims for failing to 

state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

C. Access to Courts

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, 

habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the 

courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to 

be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now 

be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 

(2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: those involving 

prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to 

litigate without active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to 

any access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An 

“actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, 

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. 

at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual 

injury as the “inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to 

allege an actual injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“Failure to show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is 

fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.4).

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may 

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be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint still fails to allege the actual injury 

required to state an access to courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 

F.3d at 1104. He fails to allege any plausible facts to show that any of the Defendants 

he seeks to sue in this case caused him “actual prejudice with respect to ... existing 

litigation.” Plaintiff further fails to allege that any of Defendants’ alleged failures to 

either properly log, screen, or process the CDC 602 appeals he either filed or 

attempted to file to challenge his housing status, rendered him unable to meet a filing 

deadline, or to present his state habeas claims. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348.

Because the “[f]ailure to show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim ha[s] been 

frustrated’ is fatal” to any First Amendment access to courts claim, Alvarez, 518 F.3d 

at 1155 n.1 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353), and Plaintiff has already been notified 

of this critical pleading deficiency as well as the deficiencies found in his religious 

claims, yet has failed to correct any of these claims, the Court DISMISSES this civil 

action sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and 

without further leave to amend. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1121; Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) 

(quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 22);

2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failing state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A(b);

3) DENIES Plaintiff further leave to amend as futile. See Cahill v. Liberty 

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an 

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abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); Gonzalez, 759 F.3d 

at 1116 (district court’s discretion in denying amendment is “particularly broad” 

when it has previously granted leave to amend);

4) CERTIFIES that an appeal of this final Order of dismissal would be 

frivolous and therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 

F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on 

appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous); and

5) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to terminate this civil action and close the 

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 8, 2017

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