Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02487/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02487-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William J. Howard, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

General Electric Capital Business Asset

Funding Corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-03-2487-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s May 31, 2006 order

denying Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim. Doc. #166; see Doc. #164. Defendant moves for reconsideration on the ground that

the Court did not address an argument Defendant made for the first time in a footnote in

its reply brief. Doc. #166 at 1. Defendant argued in that footnote that the parties’ alleged

oral agreement extending the funding cut-off date under the loan commitment was not

supported by adequate consideration because Plaintiff did not pay an additional commitment

fee. Doc. #159 at 11 n.4.

“Valid consideration consists of either a benefit to the promisor or detriment to the

promisee. Monetary compensation is not needed; any benefit to the promisor or detriment

to the promisee is sufficient.” USLife Title Co. of Ariz. v. Gutkin, 732 P.2d 579, 584 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted); see Hill v. Chubb Life Am. Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 701, 707

Case 2:03-cv-02487-DGC Document 167 Filed 04/26/06 Page 1 of 2
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(Ariz. 1995) (“Consideration for a promise does not have to be monetary.”); Stovall v.

Williams, 409 P.2d 711, 713 (Ariz. 1966) (“We have held that any detriment to the promisee,

or benefit to the promisor, constitutes a valid and sufficient consideration for a new promise

which would in effect modify terms of the original agreement.”).

Plaintiff argued in his response to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment

that his assumption of the risk that the loan’s interest rate would increase during the

extension period constituted adequate consideration. Doc. #155 at 9-10 (citing Stovall, 409

P.2d at 713). Defendant does not address this argument in its motion for reconsideration.

See Doc. #166. Nor has Defendant provided any legal authority to support its assertion that

the possibility of an interest rate increase cannot constitute a detriment to Plaintiff sufficient

to provide consideration. See Doc. #159 at 11 n.4. “Moreover, . . . any challenge to the

adequacy of consideration is a fact question.” Hill, 894 P.2d at 707 (emphasis in original);

see USLife Title Co. of Ariz., 732 P.2d at 586 (“[C]hallenges to the adequacy of consideration

are determined as issues of fact in breach of contract lawsuits.”); Dunlap v. Fort Mohave

Farms, Inc., 363 P.2d 194, 198 (Ariz. 1961) (stating that the question of whether

consideration existed “definitely raises factual matters for the jury to determine and is not

open to disposition on summary judgment”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for reconsideration

(Doc. #166) is denied.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-02487-DGC Document 167 Filed 04/26/06 Page 2 of 2