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Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2015*

Decided May 11, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3035

DEBRA A. FOSTER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF

THE CITY OF CHICAGO and

AMANDLA CHARTER SCHOOL,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 3427

Matthew F. Kennelly,

Judge.

O R D E R

Debra Foster contends that her daughter was denied special‐education services

at her former school. Foster filed this lawsuit, principally claiming violations of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1418. On the

defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed the action with the explanation that

without an attorney Foster cannot litigate claims belonging to her daughter and that she

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3035    Page 2

fails to state a claim of her own. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Foster appeals. We conclude

that she does state a claim for relief, and we vacate the dismissal in part and remand for

further proceedings.

For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the factual account in Foster’s

amended complaint and its attachments. See Fox v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 757 F.3d 680, 681

(7th Cir. 2014); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013). Foster’s daughter,

who is now in high school elsewhere, attended middle school at Amandla Charter

School, an open‐enrollment, free public school that is part of the Chicago school system.

Foster had first requested via a note in January 2010 that Amandla evaluate her

daughter for an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). That summer, the girl

began receiving special‐education services pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

see 29 U.S.C. § 794, but she was not evaluated for an IEP. A year later, Foster gave

Amandla an updated medical report so the school could continue the § 504 services,

and once more she requested that her daughter be evaluated for an IEP. School

administrators finally responded in November 2011 (nearly two years after Foster’s first

request) by telling Foster that she must give informed and written consent before her

daughter could be evaluated to create an IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1);

105 ILCS 5/14‐8.02(b). But Amandla did not send Foster a consent form, so that same

month she wrote a school administrator requesting a “full IEP” and “case study.”

Amandla waited another year to schedule an IEP meeting, which Foster, after

attending, derided as a sham. At that point Foster requested a due‐process hearing.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

Several persons testified at that December 2012 hearing before the Illinois State

Board of Education. A clinical psychologist stated that Foster had retained her in

September 2011 to evaluate the girl, and she had recommended a full case study

including a speech and language evaluation. A speech and language pathologist

testified that he, too, had been retained by Foster in September 2011 to evaluate her

daughter and had discovered a significant memory disorder involving difficulty with

word and symbol retrieval. Subsequently he conducted 25 “intensive sessions” to

improve the girl’s “working memory and other issues,” after which her short‐term

memory retrieval progressed from “severe” to “low average.” Multiple case managers

from Amandla testified that they had known the girl was struggling in classes and at

some point had a § 504 plan. Foster requested that the school district provide speech

and language evaluations, reimbursement for the evaluations she had procured, a new

school placement, and “compensatory education” to include various reading, speech,

and language services.

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The hearing officer determined that, since at least November 2011, the school had

possessed “ample evidence” that Foster’s daughter needed special‐education services

but, he speculated, her paperwork likely “fell through the cracks.” Therefore, the

hearing officer concluded, the school district had “substantially impeded” the student’s

right to a “free appropriate public education” and had violated IDEA.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). But the hearing officer also faulted Foster for not doing more

to assure that the school received the informed written consent necessary to evaluate

her daughter, see id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I), though the hearing officer did not say what

else Foster might have done to prod Amandla to take action. In any event he ordered

Amandla to give Foster a consent form and explained to Foster that the school couldn’t

evaluate her daughter if she failed to return the completed form. The hearing officer

noted that the student should receive “compensatory education” for the period dating

back to March 2012, by which time, he thought, Amandla should have evaluated the

girl and implemented an IEP. He concluded that, since that time, the girl had made

significant gains during her sessions with the speech and language pathologist but still

required “an additional 25 intensive sessions” to achieve the level that “she would have

occupied but for the denial” of special‐education services under IDEA. After this ruling

Amandla apparently gave Foster a consent form, but she never signed and returned it.

Instead, a new school year was starting, and Foster enrolled her daughter at a different

public charter school. The girl, who is still a minor, was evaluated and given an IEP for

her high‐school program at the new school.

Any party “aggrieved” by an IDEA hearing officer’s “findings and decision”

may seek judicial review. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch.,

668 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2012); S. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S., 773 F.3d 344, 349

(1st Cir. 2014); E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill‐Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 513–14

(4th Cir. 2014). Amandla and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago did nothing

to challenge the hearing officer’s decision, but Foster did. Foster, purporting to

represent her daughter as well as herself, filed this action alleging that Amandla and the

Board had violated IDEA by not providing the girl with a free appropriate public

education. (Like all Illinois public schools, charter schools must comply with IDEA,

see 105 ILCS 5/27A‐5(g), and the Board, as the “local educational agency” for all public

schools in Chicago, is a proper defendant, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a), 1401(19)(A); Stanek v.

St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. # 303, No. 14‐3012, 2015 WL 1570155, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr.

9, 2015).) Foster also asserted related claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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In granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the district court first recognized

that Foster cannot litigate her daughter’s claims under IDEA (or the other statutes she

cites) without a lawyer. Those claims the district court dismissed without prejudice to

the daughter’s right to pursue them in the future. That ruling significantly limited

Foster’s bases for recovery under IDEA and ruled out entirely a claim under the

Rehabilitation Act, since Foster is not disabled and thus has no discrimination claim of

her own under § 504. The court further concluded that Foster’s complaint fails to state a

claim under § 1983 because it makes no allegations that a policy or custom of these

corporate defendants was the moving force behind the claimed injuries to Foster.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).

On the other hand, the district court acknowledged that Foster, as the parent of a

child with a learning disability, would have enforceable rights under IDEA

independent of her daughter. The defendants had argued that Foster could not proceed

with any claims of her own because, they contended, she did not sign a consent form

after the hearing officer’s decision and thus could not claim that she was “aggrieved” by

that decision. The district court rejected that reasoning; the court concluded that what

Foster did or didn’t do after the hearing officer’s decision was irrelevant to whether she

was aggrieved by the hearing officer’s disposition of her complaints about events

occurring before the hearing. The district court, though, offered its own reasons for

concluding that Foster had not been aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision. Most

significantly, the court said, Foster’s federal complaint seeks reimbursement for the cost

of her daughter’s sessions with the speech and language pathologist, which, the court

asserted, is not among the relief she requested from the hearing officer. It followed, the

court reasoned, that Foster was not aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision. And

since that decision did give Foster other relief, the court added, she has no claim under

IDEA.

In this court the defendants first argue that we lack appellate jurisdiction because

the district court dismissed the daughter’s claims without prejudice. This contention

misunderstands the meaning of a “final” decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The

district court dismissed without prejudice the claims belonging to Foster’s daughter in

order to make clear that the girl, who is not even a proper plaintiff, is not forced to counter

a meritless defense of claim preclusion should she ever decide to pursue those claims.

See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008); Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966,

970–71 (7th Cir. 1998). But for purposes of § 1291, finality simply means that nothing

remains to be decided and the district court is finished with the case. See Gelboim v. Bank

of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 186

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(7th Cir. 2011). Here the district court terminated the lawsuit, rendering its dismissal

final. See Gelboim, 135 S. Ct. at 902; Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. &

Nw. Ind., No. 14‐1729, 2015 WL 2151851, at *3 n.2 (7th Cir. May 8, 2015); Luevano v.

Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1020–21 (7th Cir. 2013). Secure in our jurisdiction,

we turn to the merits.

Foster does not develop challenges to the district court’s dismissal of her § 504

and § 1983 claims. She does continue to maintain that, as the hearing officer concluded,

the defendants violated IDEA by denying her daughter a free appropriate public

education. But Foster misses the district court’s point that it’s necessary to distinguish

between violations of the girl’s rights under IDEA and Foster’s own statutory rights.

Foster acknowledges the distinction, but she reads Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma

City School District, 550 U.S. 516 (2007), as holding that a pro se parent can litigate a

minor child’s claims under IDEA. That reading is incorrect. Winkelman confirms that

parents of a child with a learning disability have their own enforceable rights under

IDEA, see id. at 531–33, but the decision specifically leaves open the question whether

IDEA allows a parent to litigate the child’s claims without counsel, see id. at 535. And

we have repeatedly held that the rule prohibiting a nonlawyer from representing

another person extends to a parent attempting to represent her minor child pro se.

See Georgakis v. Ill. State. Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013); Elustra v. Mineo, 595

F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010); Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); Mosely v.

Bd. of Ed. of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2006); Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270

F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus the district court properly dismissed Foster’s

daughter’s purported claims.

The district court erred, however, in dismissing Foster’s own claims. Foster

alleges that the defendants kept her from participating in special‐education procedures

by repeatedly ignoring her requests to evaluate her daughter for an IEP and that she

had to pay for her daughter’s sessions with the speech and language pathologist from

September 2011 to May 2013. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that

Foster’s parental rights under IDEA were violated. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (b); Stanek,

2015 WL 1570155, at *4. And IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private

special‐education services when a school district fails to provide a free appropriate

public education. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009); Florence

Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–14 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Town of

Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985); Stanek, 2015 WL

1570155, at *4; Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bowens, 762 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2014);

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Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 760 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2014); Batchelor v. Rose

Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 277 (3d Cir. 2014).

The defendants insist that Foster does not state a claim because she still does not

explain how she was aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision. But we read Foster’s

pro se filings more generously. Notably, the defendants do not attempt to defend the

district court’s determination that Foster was not aggrieved because she did not

specifically request from the hearing officer reimbursement for her daughter’s previous

sessions with the speech and language pathologist. This reasoning is unsupported by

authority and we conclude that it is unsound. Foster requested several forms of

“compensatory education,” including speech and language services, which the hearing

officer acknowledged had been helpful and thus ordered the defendants to pay for 25

more sessions with the same pathologist. The hearing officer’s failure to explicitly order

the defendants to also pay for the 25 prior sessions—even though he calculated an

appropriate compensatory‐education period to begin in March 2012—does not mean

that Foster did not intend such reimbursement to be part of the requested relief.

Moreover, IDEA authorizes a district court to grant “such relief as [it] determines

is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 277; Bowens, 762

F.3d at 1246. Indeed, “compensatory education” is a judicially created equitable remedy

available “to compensate for a past denial of a free appropriate public education.”

Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 489; see Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. 200 v.

Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1996). And the term has been defined in

various ways by our sister circuits. See, e.g., R.L. v. Miami‐Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 757 F.3d

1173, 1178 (11th Cir. 2014) (court may order “extra educational services designed to

compensate for a past deficient program”); Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 277–78 (compensatory

education may include reimbursement for tutoring or other financial losses); D.C. v.

Ijeabuonwu, 642 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (compensatory education is “the belated

provision of educational services the child should have received in the first place”); R.P.

ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (compensatory

education is an equitable remedy to account for educational services the school should

have been providing); Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008)

(compensatory education is “prospective equitable relief” and a school district must

even “fund education beyond the expiration of a child’s eligibility as a remedy for any

earlier deprivations in the child’s education”). We have said that “reimbursement for

out‐of‐pocket educational expenses” is one type of compensatory education, Brown v.

Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2006), and thus Foster’s

request for compensatory education must be read to include a request for

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reimbursement. A parent who unilaterally places her child in private tutoring assumes

the risk that she may not be reimbursed if the public school did not violate IDEA or the

placement is inappropriate, see M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Se. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 864

(7th Cir. 2011), but here the defendants do not challenge the hearing officer’s findings

that they had denied Foster’s daughter a free appropriate public education and that her

sessions with the speech and language pathologist had been an appropriate—although

not entirely sufficient—alternative.

Accordingly, as to Foster’s own claims under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, the judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this decision. In all other respects the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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