Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00076/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00076-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JEFFREY SCOTT HANCOCK, :

AIS 193290,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 07-0076-KD-C

:

JOHN F. CUMMINS,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jeffrey Scott Hancock, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the

entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that the instant petition be

dismissed as time barred under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act’s one-year limitations provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Hancock was convicted in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County,

Alabama on March 16, 1997 of two counts of felony murder and one count of

bringing stolen property into the state. (Doc. 10, at 1-2) On April 24, 1997,

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petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences on the murder

charges and a consecutive ten-year sentence for bringing stolen property into

the state. (Id. at 2) 

2. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Hancock’s

convictions and sentences in a twenty-eight (28) page memorandum opinion

entered on June 18, 1999. (Doc. 8, Exhibit E) In affirming petitioner’s

convictions and sentences, the appellate court set forth the relevant facts of the

case as developed at trial, as follows:

From October 15, 1995, through October 22, 1995, Hancock, his

younger brother, Joey [], and their friend John Roberts engaged

in an eight-day, multistate crime spree involving robbery, theft,

burglary, and the commission of the murders of Gilman and

Susan Smythe. There was testimony indicating that on October

15, 1995, Hancock, Joey, and Roberts were in Biloxi,

Mississippi, where they stole a credit card from Joey’s

girlfriend, Brenda Steder. Steder immediately reported to

Bioloxi police that the three men had stolen her credit card.

Later that day, Hancock, Joey, and Roberts went with Dixie

Cruthirds to a jewelry store in a Biloxi mall, and attempted to

charge approximately $4500 in merchandise to the stolen credit

card. Cruthrids presented the credit card to the store manager,

who ascertained that the card had been stolen. He called mall

security, who detained Cruthrids. Hancock, Joey, and Roberts

managed to leave the mall without being detained, driving away

in Cruthrids’s green 1995 Mitsubishi Galant. Cruthrids was

arrested and charged with credit card fraud. After her arrest, she

told Biloxi police that Hancock, Joey, and Roberts had taken her

car without her permission. Arrest warrants, on charges of

embezzlement-by-trust, were issued for the three men.

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At approximately 5:30 a.m. on the following morning,

October 16, Hancock, Joey, and Roberts arrived unannounced

at the residence of Diane and Joe McClendon, Hancock and

Joey’s aunt and uncle, in Rabun (Baldwin County), Alabama.

The three men were asleep in Cruthrids’s car when Joe

McClendon found them parked outside his house. After a brief

visit, the three men left the McClendons’ house at about 9:00

a.m. on October 16. A short while later, they stopped at a

country store in Baldwin County, where, without having

obtained prior permission, they charged gas and food items to

the McClendons’ account with the store. The men then drove to

Magnolia Springs in Baldwin County, stopping at about noon,

for less than half an hour, for a brief visit with Hancock and

Joey’s cousin and sister.

Testimony indicated that at around 8:00 p.m. on October

16, the three men arrived at the Dallas, Georgia, residence of

Tammy Turner, Hancock and Joey’s aunt. The men stayed at

Turner’s residence for the next two days, leaving at about

midday on October 18. On October 20, Turner discovered that

a 12-gauge shotgun that belonged to her was missing. She

notified police of the theft. At trial, Turner stated that she

suspected Joey had taken the shotgun, based on what she said

was his “infatuation” with guns and his particular interest in her

shotgun. (R.1672.)

At around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, Hancock, Joey, and

Roberts, still in Cruthrids’s car, arrived in Gulfport, Mississippi,

at the home of Rhonda Breaux, where they visited Breaux and

her daughter. Later that morning, after Breaux had left for work

and her daughter had gone shopping, the three men left Breaux’s

house. When Breaux returned home later that day, she

discovered that her Viper .22 caliber rifle and scope and

approximately 500 bullets were missing. Breaux reported the

theft to law enforcement officials. At trial, Breaux testified that

Joey knew where she kept the rifle because he had helped her

move into her house. She stated that Joey was “fascinated” by

the rifle and that “he always had a fascination with guns.” (R.

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938.)

The murder victims, Gilman Smythe and his wife Susan,

lived in Magnolia Springs, Alabama. Kim Miller, who rented a

trailer on the Smythes’ property, located approximately 150 feet

from the Smythe’s house, testified that at around 6:15 p.m. on

October 19, 1995, Gilman Smythe left her trailer, after having

repaired Miller’s clothes dryer. Dory Price, a longtime friend of

the Smythes, testified that she spoke on the telephone with

Susan Smythe from 6:40 p.m. to 7:22 p.m. on October 19. Price

stated that she left Smythe holding on the phone while she went

to the restroom, but when she returned to the phone, she heard

only a dial tone. She stated that she immediately redialed the

Smythes’ phone number, but got no answer. 

Raymond Croston testified that sometime before 7:00

p.m. on October 19, he spoke on the telephone with Susan

Smythe about some bulldozing work he was to do on the

Smythes’ property the following day. He arrived at the Smythes’

residence sometime between noon and 1:00 p.m. on October 20.

Croston testified that when he approached the Smythes’ house,

he could see Gilman Smythe’s body lying in the front doorway,

a pool of blood around his head. Croston left immediately and

called the police.

Investigators from the Baldwin County sheriff’s office

were called to the Smythes’ residence, where they discovered

that both Gilman and Susan Smythe had been shot to death.

Gilman Smythe’s body lay in the front doorway, where Croston

had discovered it. The door would not close, because Smythe’s

body was in the way. Susan Smythe’s body lay inside the house,

approximately 10 feet from her husband’s body. Forensic

testimony indicated that the shootings had occurred sometime

during the evening of October 19. Both victims had been shot

twice -- once in the mouth, from a distance, and once in the back

of the head, with a contact gunshot. Sheriff’s investigators found

four .22 caliber rifle shell casings near the bodies. Lt. Huey

Mack of the Baldwin County sheriff’s office was one of the

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investigators called to the crime scene. Based on the position of

the bodies and the manner in which they had been shot, Lt.

Mack stated that it appeared that Gilman Smythe had come to

the front door, where he had been shot in the mouth, and had

fallen in the open doorway, his prone body preventing the door

from closing. At some point in time, a second shot was fired

from contact range into the back of Smythe’s head. Lt. Mack

surmised that Susan Smythe was shot only seconds after her

husband fell in the doorway. Like her husband, she was shot

once in the mouth and once, from contact range, in the back of

the head.

The medical examiner who performed the Smythes’

autopsies testified that it was his opinion that Gilman Smythe

was shot first in the mouth and then in the back of the head. He

stated that the gunshot wounds to the victims’ mouths were

potentially survivable. However, he said, the close-range shots

to the backs of the victims’ heads, which tore through their

brains, resulted in injuries likely to cause rapid death.

The state presented evidence that the master bedroom in

the Smythes’ house had been ransacked. Investigators

determined that Gilman Smythe’s billfold, containing credit

cards and cash, had been taken. Also missing were Smythe’s .38

caliber revolver and his .25 caliber pistol.

On October 21, 1995, two days after the shooting,

Gilman Smythe’s billfold and credit cards were found by a

motorist who had stopped at a rest area on Interstate 10 near

Marianna, Florida. The items were turned over to law

enforcement officers. Subsequent fingerprint analysis revealed

that Joey’s fingerprint was on one of Gilman Smythe’s credit

cards.

Testimony indicated that on October 21, Hancock, Joey,

and Roberts checked into the Flamingo Motel in Magnolia,

Arkansas. Hancock signed the motel’s registration card, giving

his address as Magnolia Springs, Alabama. At around 3:30 a.m.

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on October 22, the three men robbed the motel manager at

gunpoint. The motel manager reported the robbery to Magnolia

police, describing the car they had left in. A BOLO (“be on the

lookout”) report went out to area law enforcement officers,

advising them that three white males in a Mitsubishi Galant had

just robbed a motel in Magnolia and were last seen heading east

on Highway 82. Shortly thereafter, Matt Means, a police officer

in El Dorado, Arkansas, a town 20 to 25 miles down Highway

82 from Magnolia, spotted the Mitsubishi speeding through an

El Dorado intersection. Driving the Mitsubishi was Hancock.

Means, who had received the BOLO about the suspects, pursued

the Mitsubishi in his patrol car, reaching speeds of 100 miles per

hour. Hancock[] refused to pull over[] and[,] instead[,] led

Means on a high-speed chase. The chase ended when Hancock

lost control of the Mitsubishi on a turn in the road, struck a

telephone pole, and rolled the car several times, coming to a stop

on the front porch of a house. The Mitsubishi then burst into

flames. In the crash, Roberts had been thrown from the car,

dying instantly. As Means and other police officers approached

the wrecked and burning car, Joey shot himself in the head; he

died soon after. Hancock survived the crash, having been

protected by the driver’s airbag. He was pulled from the vehicle

and taken to a hospital emergency room.

Investigators verified that the wrecked Mitsubishi was

Dixie Cruthirds’s. From inside the vehicle, police recovered a

sawed-off shotgun; a .22 caliber rifle; a .38 caliber revolver; and

a camera bag containing another shotgun, a number of .22

caliber bullets, and a letter in Hancock’s handwriting. Also

recovered from the vehicle were several duffel bags, full of

items of clothing. Found outside the wrecked car were a .25

caliber automatic pistol and the shell casings from some .25

caliber bullets. 

The state presented testimony from Richard Carter, a

forensic scientist specializing in firearm examination. Carter

examined the four .22 caliber bullets recovered from the heads

of Gilman and Susan Smythe. All four bullets were badly

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damaged by impact; however, Carter was able to determine that

one of the bullets recovered from Gilman Smythe had the same

rifling characteristics as bullets that were test-fired from the .22

caliber rifle that was found in the Mitsubishi that Hancock had

crashed in Arkansas. Carter also testified that the four shell

casings investigators found near the Smythes’ bodies had been

fired from the same .22 caliber rifle found in the Mitsubishi.

Testimony revealed that the .22 caliber rifle police found

in the Mitsubishi was the same Viper .22 caliber rifle that was

missing from Rhonda Breaux’s house after she was visited by

Hancock, Joey, and Roberts on the morning of October 19,

1995. Testimony also revealed that the .38 caliber revolver

found in the Mitsubishi was the one stolen from Gilman

Smythe’s house on the evening of October 19. Additional

testimony revealed that the sawed-off shotgun found in the

Mitsubishi was the one missing from Tammy Turner’s house

after she was visited by Hancock, Joey, and Roberts. Turner

stated that the shotgun’s barrel had been sawed off since its

theft.

Forensic scientist Deborah Dodd testified that she

conducted DNA analysis of a bloodstain discovered on a pair of

blue jeans found inside a duffel bag recovered from the

Mitsubishi that Hancock had crashed in Arkansas. Dodd

compared the bloodstain’s genetic structure to the genetic

structure of blood samples taken from the bodies of Gilman and

Susan Smythe. Dodd determined that the DNA of the bloodstain

on the jeans “matched” the DNA of Gilman Smythe. She

testified that the probability of randomly finding another person

with the same DNA as that of the bloodstain and of Gilman

Smythe was 1 in 4,650 among Caucasians and 1 in 3,542,000

among African Americans.

The state presented testimony indicating that the

bloodstained blue jeans were the same size -- 30-inch waist/32-

inch inseam [--] as other blue jeans belonging to and worn by

Hancock. Evidence was introduced showing that the pants Joey

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and Roberts were wearing at the time of their deaths were

30/31s and 30/32s, respectively. 

Jerry Digman, an investigator with the Arkansas state

police, testified that he interviewed Hancock at the hospital

approximately six hours after the crash in El Dorado, Arkansas.

At that time, Digman questioned Hancock about the crash and

about the robbery of the Flamingo Motel in Magnolia. After

Hancock was Mirandized, he gave Digman two statements about

the robbery. Digman testified that in the first statement,

Hancock maintained that he and Roberts had remained outside

in the Mitsubishi while Joey had gone inside the motel and

robbed the manager. In his second statement, which was given

the following day after he was re-Mirandized, Hancock told

Digman that all three men had decided together to rob the motel,

and he admitted that all three men participated in the robbery,

with Joey holding a .25 caliber pistol on the manager.

Danielle Cochran testified that Hancock and Joey had at

one time stayed with her and her family for a few months in the

trailer located on the Smythes’ property in Magnolia Springs,

Alabama. Testimony indicated that in August 1995, the

Smythes[] ordered the Cochrans to vacate the trailer upon their

belief that a member of the Cochran family had stolen several

thousand dollars worth of jewelry from the Smythes’ house.

The state presented testimony from Winifred Morrisroe,

who had worked as a clerk in “Easy D’s” convenience store,

located approximately three miles from the Smythes’ residence

in Magnolia Springs. Morrisroe testified that sometime around

dark on the evening of October 19, 1995 (the night of the

Smythes’ murders), a man she identified as Hancock came into

the convenience store. Morrisroe stated that Hancock walked

around the store nervously, picking up food items and looking

out the window. She stated that Handcock left after purchasing

some of the items. 

(Id. at 10-13) Hancock’s application for rehearing was overruled on August 6,

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1999 (Doc. 8, Exhibit G) and his petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama

Supreme Court was denied (see Doc. 8, Exhibit I). The certificate of final

judgment of affirmance was issued by the Alabama Supreme Court on

December 30, 1999. (See id.)

3. On December 6, 2001, Hancock filed a Rule 32 petition in the

Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama, collaterally attacking his

convictions and sentences. (See Doc. 8, Exhibit M, at 1-2) Following an

evidentiary hearing, the Rule 32 petition was denied by the trial court on April

5, 2005. (Id. at 5) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s denial of the collateral petition by memorandum opinion dated January

27, 2006. (Doc. 8, Exhibit M) 

On appeal, Hancock argues (1) that the circuit court erred

in determining that no testimony at the Rule 32 evidentiary

hearing indicated that perjured testimony had been presented at

trial; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

withdrawing from his representation of Hancock at trial and

testifying about the alleged perjured testimony given by

Danielle Cochran; (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective for

not ensuring that his hearing on his motion for a new trial was

continued beyond the sixtieth day after sentencing by express

agreement of the parties on the record so that he could present

affidavits from a witness and from jurors; (4) that his trial

counsel was ineffective for not stating specific grounds of

objection for the trial court’s refusal to give certain jury

instructions; and (5) that the circuit court erred in refusing to

require the State to produce evidence of the ownership history

of two firearms involved in the offenses.

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I.

Hancock first argues that the circuit court erred in

determining that there was no testimony presented at the

evidentiary hearing on Hancock’s Rule 32 petition which

indicated that Danielle Cochran gave perjured testimony at trial

or that trial counsel was aware of the alleged perjury and,

further, that his trial counsel was ineffective for not withdrawing

as counsel and taking the stand at trial to offer testimony

refuting the witness’s testimony.

A.

To the extent that Hancock attempts to raise as a

substantive issue that the admission of the testimony itself at

trial was violative of due process, that claim was not raised in

Hancock’s Rule 32 petition and is therefore not properly before

this Court.

B.

Hancock also argues that one of his attorneys at trial,

Frank Hollon, should have withdrawn from representing

Hancock at trial so that he could testify that certain testimony

given by Danielle Cochran was false.

Hancock never raised this specific contention in his Rule

32 petition or at the evidentiary hearing on his petition. In his

petition, Hancock argued specifically that trial counsel was

ineffective “when counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s

knowledgeable use of perjured testimony during trial.” (C.9.) At

the evidentiary hearing, the only mention of Hollon testifying

was offered by Hollon during his testimony regarding his

thought process and his reasons for not questioning Danielle

further as to her testimony at trial.

C.

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To the extent that Hancock attempts to argue, as he did

in his Rule 32 petition, that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to Cochran’s testimony, Hollon testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he was not aware that Cochran was

going to testify differently than what she had represented to him

prior to trial. He further stated that

“When she perjured herself, when she lied

right there in the courtroom, and that put me in a

position immediately of having been the only

person there when I interviewed her, and I was

turning into a witness immediately. She sits there

and lies. If I had had any idea that she was going

to turn like that, we would have had Mr.

McCormack or some other person go interview

her so I could have attacked her credibility with

that other witness. She is on the witness stand, lies

right in the middle, and you’ve got to make a split

second decision, you know, do I immediately

scream that’s not what you told me in Biloxi and

put myself in the position where Mr. Whetstone

says that we call Mr. Hollon to the stand to

testify, or do I stop the examination immediately

and try not to bring any more attention to it and

then try to decide to deal with it later in the trial

somewhere? That’s how we decided to do it.

After this trial was over -- and I can’t tell you

whether she called me or I called her or how we

got in touch with each other, but I spoke again

with her, and she admitted to me that she lied and

that she lied because her mother asked her to do

it.”

(R. 112-13.) According to Hollon, he then prepared an affidavit

which Cochan signed admitting that portions of her testimony

at trial had been false. In that affidavit, Cochran stated that she

did not believe that Hancock was aware that one of the guns had

been stolen, that she had never seen Hancock with any gang

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members other than his brother, and that she had told Hollon

prior to trial that she had no knowledge that Hancock had any

involvement in gangs, but averred that her step-mother

pressured her to testify differently at trial. During a series of

questions as to whether Hollon’s trial strategy would have been

different had he been aware that Cochran or other witnesses

were going to implicate Hancock in gang activity, the following

exchange occurred:

“[Hollon]: Maybe so. If all the witnesses

we were talking to and his NCIC showed that he

had a criminal background and propensity

towards violence and a fascination with guns, a

fear of being put back in prison, the same

motivation that [Hancock’s brother who was also

involved in the offenses but died during the

pursuit by law enforcement which resulted in

Hancock’s capture] had, we could have had a

completely different defense, perhaps. But that’s

a whole other set of circumstances.

“[Defense counsel]: But when you went

into this trial, you didn’t expect any testimony

like that to be put in the record?

“[Hollon]: Did not, no, sir.

“[Defense Counsel]: So your first

opportunity to try to correct that was at the new

trial motion?

“[Hollon]: That’s correct.”

(R. 178.)

...

It is clear from the testimony that Hollon concluded that

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the best course of action as a matter of trial strategy was to

abandon the questioning of Cochran regarding Hancock’s

alleged gang affiliations so as [to] attempt to limit the damage

from that testimony. “Trial counsel should have the broadest

discretion in all matters of trial strategy.” Having reviewed the

record, we cannot say that Hancock has met his burden of

pleading or proving that trial counsel was ineffective with regard

to this claim. 

II.

Hancock argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

allowing his motion for a new trial to be denied by operation of

law by failing to ensure that the record reflected an express

agreement by the parties to continue the hearing on the motion

to a certain date beyond the sixtieth day after sentencing.

Hancock contends that the denial by operation of law resulted in

four affidavits which he had intended to introduce into evidence

at the hearing on his motion for a new trial being precluded from

review. The circuit court denied Hancock relief as to this claim,

finding that Hancock had failed to show that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different.

The four affidavits which form the crux of Hancock’s

assertions as to this issue were as follows: Danielle Cochran’s

affidavit wherein she admitted to giving false testimony at trial;

affidavits from two jurors wherein they averred that they

believed that the trial court placed undue emphasis on the jury

instructions regarding accomplice liability; and an affidavit from

a juror asserting that she was threatened by another juror and

that she believed that the trial court placed undue emphasis on

the accomplice liability jury instructions.

Initially, we note that Hancock requests that this Court

remand the case “for a new hearing on his motion for a new

trial.” However, we note that the trial court did purport to

conduct a hearing on the motion for a new trial, albeit after the

motion was deemed denied by operation of law, at which the

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trial court, based on the assertions of the parties at the Rule 32

hearing, considered the affidavits and declined to allow them to

be admitted into evidence. Hancock has presented no argument,

either in his Rule 32 petition, at the evidentiary hearing on his

Rule 32 petition, or in his appellate brief, as to why the

affidavits would be admissible at a new hearing.

Further, it is well-settled that a new trial will be granted

due to recanted testimony only in extraordinary circumstances

where there is independent evidence corroborating the testimony

that the witness seeks to recant. Here[,] a second witness,

Danielle Cochran’s step-mother, also testified at trial. Although

defense counsel believed her testimony to be false, there is no

indication in the record that that witness had also recanted her

testimony. Thus, Danielle’s recanted statements were

corroborated by independent evidence. Further, the testimony

was ancillary to the offenses and went to Hancock’s character,

rather than his culpability for the offenses.

Thus, for these reasons, the circuit court’s finding that

Hancock had failed to show that the outcome of his proceedings

would have been different had the motion for a new trial not

been denied by operation of law [was correct]. Therefore,

Hancock is not entitled to any relief on this claim.

III.

Hancock further argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for not moving for a judgment of acquittal on felony

murder as a lesser-included offense of capital murder and for not

moving for a judgment of acquittal on the charged offense of

bringing stolen property into the State.

With regard to the felony-murder convictions, this Court,

although noting the lack of a specific challenge to those charges,

addressed the merits of Hancock’s challenge to those

convictions on direct appeal and specifically determined that

there was sufficient evidence to sustain the felony-murder

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convictions. Thus, Hancock has failed to prove that he was

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to move for a motion for

judgment of acquittal as to felony murder.

With regard to the offense of bringing stolen property

into the State, contrary to the assertion in Hancock’s brief, trial

counsel did not admit at the postconviction evidentiary hearing

that he had failed to move for a judgment of acquittal on this

charge. Rather, the line of questioning on the pages cited in

Hancock’s brief (R. 52-53) indicates that trial counsel moved for

a judgment of acquittal as to the capital-murder charges, but

conceded that he did not move for a judgment of acquittal as to

any lesser offenses. Taken in the context in which it was given

at the evidentiary hearing, it is apparent that defense counsel’s

remarks were intended to convey that he did not make a motion

for a judgment of acquittal as to any lesser-included offenses of

capital murder. However, it is apparent from the transcript of the

evidentiary hearing and from our memorandum opinion on

direct appeal that trial counsel actually made a motion for a

judgment of acquittal as to all of the charges in the indictment,

which clearly encompassed the bringing-stolen-property-intothe-State charge. “Trial counsel is not ineffective for having an

objection overruled or a motion denied.”

For these reasons, Hancock is not entitled to any relief on

this claim.

IV.

Hancock also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

for not stating specific grounds of objection to the trial court’s

jury instructions. Although not specifically enumerated in his

brief on appeal, we limit our review to requested jury

instructions 6, 7, 8, and 14, as those are the instructions Hancock

challenged in his Rule 32 petition. (C. 31.)

The circuit court’s written order indicates that “Petitioner

acknowledged [in the evidentiary hearing] that the failure to

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object to Jury Charges 6, 7, 8, and 14 was considered on direct

appeal.” (C. 7.) In our memorandum opinion on direct appeal,

this Court found that, even if a challenge to those requested

instructions had been preserved, Hancock would not have been

entitled to any relief on that claim because those jury

instructions pertained to accomplice liability and were contained

in the trial court’s oral instructions to the jury regarding

accomplice liability substantially covered the same rule of law

as the requested charges. Thus, we cannot say that counsel was

deficient for not objecting to the trial court’s refusal to give the

requested instructions and instead instructing the jury pursuant

to the pattern jury instructions on the same rule of law. Further,

Hancock was not prejudiced by the lack of a specific objection

and, therefore, he has failed to prove either prong of the

Strickland test to show that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel.

V.

Finally, Hancock argues that the circuit court erred “in

not requiring the State to produce records evidencing the true

ownership of handguns offered into evidence at Mr. Hancock’s

trial.” 

Initially, we question whether Hancock’s brief contains

sufficient argument and citation to the record and relevant legal

authority to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10),

Ala.R.App.P. In any event, because Hancock’s request for

discovery involves an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence

used by the State for conviction, Hancock’s claim is precluded

from review because it is a claim that should have been raised

at trial or on direct appeal. Accordingly, because Hancock’s

claim was procedurally barred he cannot establish the “good

cause” necessary to entitle him to post-conviction discovery.

Therefore, Hancock is entitled to no relief on this claim.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court

is affirmed.

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(Id. at 5-13 (internal citations and footnotes omitted)) Petitioner’s application

for rehearing was overruled on February 24, 2006 (Doc. 8, Exhibit N) and his

motion for an extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari was

denied on March 14, 2006 (Doc. 8, Exhibit O). The certificate of judgment of

final order of affirmance was issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on April 5, 2006. (Doc. 8, Exhibit P)

4. Hancock filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief in this

Court on January 31, 2007. (Doc. 1)

5. In response to the respondent’s argument in his answer that the

instant petition is barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, Hancock

makes the following argument: “[T]his petitioner would concede that if the

core of his claims were not jurisdictional and unconstitutional to such a degree

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted by his illegal conviction,

then the respondent may have a valid argument.” (Doc. 10, at 3) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) was enacted on April 24, 1996 and, pertinent to this case, added

a new subdivision to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 providing for a one-year period of

limitations within which state prisoners must file their habeas corpus petitions

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18

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158

F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998) cert. denied sub nom. Wilcox v. Moore, 531

U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 103, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of— 

 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

2. Subsections (B), (C), and (D) of § 2244(d)(1) clearly do not

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19

apply to petitioner’s case and therefore, the timeliness of Jones’ petition must

be calculated under § 2244(d)(1)(A) based upon the date on which his firstdegree robbery conviction became final. “For prisoners whose convictions

became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute

of limitations instituted by the AEDPA began to run on its effective date, i.e.,

April 24, 1996.” Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d

683 (2000). This rule from Guenther is obviously not applicable in this case

since Hancock’s convictions became final in 2000.

3. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) specifically provides that the one-year

limitations period will run from “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such

review[.]” In Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770 (2002) and Jackson v. Secretary

for the Department of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347 (2002), the Eleventh

Circuit joined the majority of circuits regarding the meaning of subsection (A)

and held that the statute of limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d) does not begin to run “until the 90-day window during which

Appellant could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ

of certiorari expired.” 309 F.3d at 771; see also id. at 774 (“Appellant was

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20

entitled to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court within 90 days of the entry of the judgment against him by the Florida

Supreme Court. Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. The statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d) should not have begun to run until this 90-day window had expired.

Appellant’s state judgment became final on December 13, 1996, when the

Florida Supreme Court denied Appellant’s motion for a rehearing. The statute

of limitations should have begun to run, therefore, on March 13, 1997.”);

Jackson, supra, 292 F.3d at 1348-1349 & 1349 (“While we have not directly

dealt with the issue in the context of a section 2254 petition, we indicated in

dicta that, under the AEDPA, a state prisoner may have the benefit of the 90-

day window before his conviction is considered final. . . . In the instant case,

the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida [] affirmed Jackson’s

conviction on October 17, 1997. Giving Jackson the extra 90 days in which

he could have filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Jackson’s conviction

became final at the latest on January 15, 1998.”); see Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d

1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Under the statute, a petitioner’s conviction is

not final and the one-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition

does not begin to run until--following a decision by the state court of last

resort--‘after the United States Supreme Court has denied review, or, if no

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21

petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for filing a petition for certiorari

with the Supreme Court has passed.’”); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283

(6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run

until the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari for direct review in

the United States Supreme Court has expired. A criminal complaint has only

ninety days following the entry of judgment by the ‘state court of last resort’

in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.”); United States v. Torres,

211 F.3d 836, 839-840 (4th Cir. 2000) (“In § 2244, Congress specifically

stated that the one-year limitation period will run from the time that a state

judgment becomes final ‘by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review.’ . . . In using this phrase, Congress

offered two dates from which its one-year limitation period can begin

running: (1) at the conclusion of direct review or (2) at the expiration of time

in which further direct review could have been sought, but was not.

Congress, therefore, expressly provided an alternative starting date for its

limitation period in the circumstance where a state defendant fails to seek

further direct review of his conviction. The language Congress used, ‘by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review,’ expands the period of time before the start of the limitation period for

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1 Beyond this language, Torres is of no significance regarding the proper

disposition of this case since Torres involved a federal prisoner collaterally attacking his

conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Fourth Circuit held that “for purposes of

§ 2255, the conviction of a federal prisoner whose conviction is affirmed by this Court and who

does not file a petition for certiorari becomes final on the date that this Court’s mandate issues in

his direct appeal.” 211 F.3d at 837.

22

filing a habeas petition beyond the date that marks the conclusion of direct

review of that judgment.”)1

; Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th

Cir. 1999) (“We hold that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition

for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not

the petitioner actually files such a petition. Therefore, when a petitioner fails

to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires.”). 

4. In this case, on direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed Hancock’s convictions and sentences by memorandum

opinion on June 18, 1999 (Doc. 8, Exhibit E); his application for rehearing

was overruled on August 6, 1999 (Doc. 8, Exhibit G) and his petition for

certiorari review of his convictions and sentences was denied on December

28, 1999 (Doc. 8, Exhibit I). The Alabama Supreme Court issued a certificate

of judgment on December 30, 1999. Adding to December 30, 1999 the 90-day

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23

period during which Hancock could have petitioned the Supreme Court of the

United States for writ of certiorari, petitioner’s convictions became final on

March 30, 2000.

5. In light of the foregoing, Hancock’s one-year period of

limitations under AEDPA began to run on March 30, 2000 and expired on

March 30, 2001. Petitioner did not collaterally attack his convictions and

sentences in state court until December 6, 2001, some eight plus months after

the one-year period of limitations had expired. Therefore, petitioner cannot

take advantage of the tolling period set forth in the statute. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this section.”); Guenther, supra, 173 F.3d at 1331 (“‘The

time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation in [subsection

(d)].’”). 

6. Accordingly, as even petitioner implicitly concedes (Doc. 10,

at 3), the instant federal habeas corpus petition was not timely filed in this

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24

Court. Hancock argues, however, that since his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are jurisdictional, the one-year limitations period does not bar

this Court’s consideration of his habeas petition. (See id.) Petitioner does not

cite this Court to any authority, nor can this Court find any, for the

proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are jurisdictional

claims which toll the running of the limitations period. Moreover, for such a

theory to hold water petitioner would need to establish that counsel’s

ineffectiveness interfered with his ability to file a § 2254 petition within his

one-year limitations period, cf. Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir.)

(“Ineffective assistance of counsel generally does not warrant equitable

tolling. . . . Counsel’s false representation that a habeas petition has been filed

may warrant equitable tolling.”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 933, 123 S.Ct. 2590,

156 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003); M.P. v. Perlman, 269 F.Supp.2d 36, 39 (E.D. N.Y.

2003) (“[Petitioner] argues that his failure to seek leave to appeal the

affirmance of his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals was due to

appellate counsel’s failure to obey his directive to file a leave request.

Equitable tolling is unwarranted on such grounds, since counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness did not interfere with petitioner’s timely filing of a habeas

application within the one-year period following the finality of his

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25

conviction.”); Hancock has not carried his burden in this regard. 

7. Recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit have clearly embraced

the doctrine of equitable tolling with regard to the one-year limitations period

at issue: “Equitable tolling is to be applied when ‘”extraordinary

circumstances” have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from

timely filing his petition.’ . . . Thus, the petitioner must show both

extraordinary circumstances and due diligence in order to be entitled to

equitable tolling.” Diaz v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 362 F.3d

698, 700-701 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Section 2244 is a statute of

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable tolling

‘when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that

are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.’” Steed v.

Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Thus, the oneyear limitations provision need not be equitably tolled unless there is evidence

that “extraordinary circumstances” beyond petitioner’s control made it

impossible for him to file his petition on time. See Miller v. New Jersey State

Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-619 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“[E]quitable

tolling is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid

application [of a limitation period] unfair.’ . . . Generally, this will occur when

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26

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way . . . been prevented from

asserting his or her rights.’ . . . The petitioner must show that he or she

‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.’ .

. . Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.”); Calderon v. United States

District Court for the Central District of California, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997) (“Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, 118 S.Ct. 899, 139 L.Ed.2d 884 (1998) and cert.

denied sub nom. Beeler v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 1061, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140

L.Ed.2d 648 (1998). 

8. Hancock has not established that extraordinary circumstances

and due diligence counsel equitable tolling of the limitations period. See

Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (“‘The burden of

establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the

petitioner[.]’”). Tellingly, petitioner makes no argument that he was ignorant

of the one-year limitations period or that he was unaware of the fact that this

time period had run by the time he collaterally attacked his convictions and

sentences in state court on December 6, 2001. It is apparent to the

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27

undersigned that nothing other than petitioner’s own lack of due diligence is

responsible for the untimeliness of the filing of the instant petition. This is

simply not one of those rare cases in which principles of equitable tolling can

save petitioner from AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. 

 9. Hancock’s present federal habeas corpus petition, filed January

31, 2007, almost six years after the one-year limitations period expired, is due

to be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the instant petition be

dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 31st day of August, 2007.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A), by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation’ within ten days after being served with a copy of the

recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting

party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection,

a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief

may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support

of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may

be deemed an abandonment of the objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay

the cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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