Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02724/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02724-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shannon Michael Clark, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-2724-PHX-EHC (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (hereinafter “Amended Petition”) (Doc. No. 18).

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge for preparation of a Report and Recommendation. For the following

reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny and dismiss the

Amended Petition.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction and Post-Conviction Proceedings

On November 22, 2002, a grand jury sitting in Maricopa County indicted Petitioner

on the following two counts: (1) Burglary in the Second Degree (Count 1); and (2)

Trafficking in Stolen Property in the Second Degree (Count 2), both of which are class 3

felonies. (Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter

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“Answer”) (Doc. No. 7), p. 2 & Exh. A). The State also alleged that Petitioner had four

historical prior felony convictions. (Answer, p. 2 & Exh. B). 

At trial, the court dismissed the trafficking count on the State’s motion. (Answer, p.2

n. 1 & Exh. G at pp.5-8). The jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree burglary as

charged. (Answer, p.4 & Exh. G at pp. 52-54). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to the

presumptive term of 11.25 years of imprisonment for the Class 3 felony with two historical

prior felony convictions. (Answer, p.4 & Exh. I at pp. 1-2). 

Petitioner, through counsel, appealed his conviction and sentence on the ground that

the trial court abused its discretion and violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to

compulsory process to obtain favorable testimony. (Answer, Exh. K, L). The Arizona Court

of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review. (Answer, Exh. M, N, O).

Petitioner next filed a notice of post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Exh. P.). Petitioner’s counsel on post-conviction

relief avowed that she was “unable to find any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction

relief proceedings” and requested an extension of time so that Petitioner could file a pro se

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer, Exh. Q). The trial court granted the requested

continuance and appointed advisory counsel. (Answer, Ex. R, T) Thereafter, Petitioner’s

advisory counsel filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter “PCR Petition”).

(Answer, Exh. DD). Therein, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for failing to argue that the State had failed to produce evidence that Petitioner

was a trafficker in stolen property and for failing to point out inconsistencies between a

witness’ pre-trial statements and that witness’ testimony. (Id.).

The trial court found that Petitioner had “failed to raise a colorable claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel” and summarily dismissed his PCR Petition. (Answer, Exh.

GG at p.2). Thereafter, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied Petitioner’s Petition

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Respondents correctly point out that the trial court’s November 29, 2005 order

dismissing Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the “last reasoned

decision” of the state court upon which this Court analyzes Petitioner’s federal habeas claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Answer, p.7 n.4) (citations omitted).

2

Respondents’ Second Supplemental Answer was filed in response to the Court’s

order directing further supplementation. (See Doc. No. 17).

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for Review of the trial court’s dismissal of his PCR Petition.1 (Answer, p. 6, Exh. JJ)

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, p.6; Amended

Petition, p.2)

B. Petitioner’s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On November 2, 2006, Petitioner, acting pro se, initiated the instant action. (Doc. No.

1). See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the prison ‘mailbox rule’...a pro se petitioner's petition is

deemed constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded

to the court clerk."). Respondents filed their Answer on February 2, 2007. (Doc. No. 7).

Thereafter, Petitioner was granted leave to file an Amended Petition. (Doc. No. 17 (Order

granting leave); Doc. No. 18 (Amended Petition)). Respondents filed a “Supplemental

Answer” (Doc. No. 19) (hereinafter “Supplemental Answer”) and a Second Supplemental

Answer (Doc. No. 20) (hereinafter “Second Supplemental Answer”).2

 Petitioner filed

Replies to Respondents’ Answers. (TR. 16, 21).

Petitioner raises the following three claims for relief in his Amended Petition:

1. Petitioner’s conviction violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory

process and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense (Ground One);

 2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Witness Steven Joey with

prior inconsistent statements (Ground Two); and

3. Petitioner was denied the right to a fundamentally fair trial under the

Fourteenth Amendment due to the cumulative effects of the errors alleged in

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Grounds One and Two (Ground Three).

Respondents concede that Grounds One and Two have been exhausted. (See Answer;

Supplemental Answer (Doc. Nos. 7, 19)) However, they argue that Grounds One and Two

lack merit. (Id.). With regard to Ground Three, Respondents argue that such claim is

procedurally defaulted and, alternatively, lacks merit. (Second Supplemental Answer (Doc.

No. 20)).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents have addressed Grounds One and Two on the merits. 

A. Standard of Review: Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal

questions resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual

questions resolved by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied 546 U.S. 963 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts. Rice

v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342 (2006). In conducting its review, the federal habeas court

"look[s] to the last reasoned state-court decision." Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the

"unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

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"[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)). Additionally, a state court's

decision is "'contrary to' Supreme Court case law if the state court 'applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme Court cases."3

 Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at

738 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation

of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to

which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929

(emphasis in original) (distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section

(d)(1) with that owed under the "unreasonable application" test).

Under the second test, "'[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application

of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle...but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Van Lynn, 347 F.3d

at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the "'unreasonable application clause...a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be objectively

unreasonable.'" Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).

When evaluating whether the state court decision amounts to an unreasonable application of

federal law, "[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of

federal law...." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. 

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Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The "AEDPA spells out what this

presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and

convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of

correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once the

state-court’s fact-findings survive any intrinsic challenge; they do not apply to a challenge

that is governed by the deference implicit in the ‘unreasonable determination’ standard of

section 2254(d)(2)." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

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Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not second-guess a state court's factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.") Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted).

When examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues... [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's

findings of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis and bracketed text in original). Once the

federal court is satisfied that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where

the petitioner does not challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a

presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based on

extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court."4

 Taylor, 366

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F.3d at 1000. See also 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e). 

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review; the state

court's ultimate conclusion is reviewed under [section] 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under [sections] 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393

F.3d at 978.

1. Introduction: Pertinent State Record for Grounds One and Two

Petitioner was discharged on September 1, 2002 from the Arizona Department of

Corrections after completing a seven-year prison sentence. (Amended Petition, p. 5-a). Upon

his release, he resided at 4730 N. 19th Avenue, Apt. 117, Phoenix, Arizona with his mother.

(Id.) In October 2002, Petitioner moved in with one Robert Kane at 5110 N. 19th Avenue,

Apt. 308, Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.) The incident date giving rise to the charges against

Petitioner occurred on November 7, 2002. (Answer, Exh. A). Petitioner was arrested six days

later on November 13, 2002 at 4730 N. 19th Avenue, Apt. 237, Phoenix, Arizona. (Amended

Petition, p. 5-f).

Petitioner was indicted on November 22, 2002 by a Maricopa County Grand Jury for

burglary committed on November 7, 2002 at the apartment of Petitioner’s neighbor, Ms.

Kathy Higgins (hereinafter “Victim”), located at 5110 N. 19th Avenue, Apt. 310, Phoenix,

Arizona (Count 1); and for recklessly trafficking in property stolen from the Victim (Count

2). (Answer, Exh. A). Property taken by Petitioner from the Victim were a television and/or

computer and/or stereo. (Id.)

While residing at 5110 N. 19th Avenue, Apt. 308, Petitioner Shannon Clark had

introduced himself to the Victim as “Shane” (Answer, Exh. E at p.79) or was known as

“Sean” to another neighbor, Mr. Steven Joey (hereinafter “the Witness” or “Witness

Joey”)(Id. at p.99), who observed Petitioner on November 7, 2002 in the Victim’s patio

backyard with items later found and determined to have been stolen (Id. at pp.102-103).

Petitioner’s list of defenses at trial did not include the defense of mistaken identity. (Answer,

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The patio backyard has also been described as having a wall around it. (Answer, Exh.

E at pp. 113, 106).

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Exh. EE at p. 9); see also Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15.2(b). Nonetheless, Petitioner’s basis for his

claim to having been misidentified as the person who committed the burglary of the Victim’s

residence and later trafficking in the Victim’s stolen property is: (1) that one “Sean” Last

Name Unknown (hereinafter “LNU”) was seen frequenting the Witness’ apartment

(Amended Petition at p. 5-a); and (2) the Witness’ description of “Sean” was one of a person

with shoulder-length curly blond hair. (Answer, Exh. E at p.115). 

At Petitioner’s trial on March 3, 2003, the Witness testified that Petitioner looked

different from when he had observed Petitioner on November 7, 2002: he now had short and

darker hair. (Id. at p.119). What is unequivocal is that the Witness: (1) knew Petitioner

Shannon Clark sitting before him at trial as the Defendant, as the same Sean whom he knew

lived next door to him with Mr. Kane (Id. at p. 97-98); (2) he saw Petitioner most every day

(Id. at p.99); and (3) had no doubt that Petitioner was one and the same. (Id. at p. 105).

What is also unequivocal is that the Victim: (1) knew Shane resided with Mr. Kane in Apt.

308 (Id. at p.79); (2) that the Shane she knew to have resided with Mr. Kane was one and the

same Petitioner Shannon Clark sitting before her at trial as the Defendant. (Id. at p.79-80);

and (3) she, too, had no doubt about this. (Id. at p. 95).

The Victim had moved into 5110 N. 19th Avenue, Apt. 310 in September of 2002. (Id.

at p. 75). Up to November 7, 2002, the incident date, Petitioner, aka Shane, had been in the

Victim’s apartment several times to visit or simply to watch television. (Id. at pp. 80-81). On

November 7, 2002 the Victim and her two daughters left for work and school respectively

at approximately 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. (Id. at pp. 78-79). Between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00

a.m. on November 7, 2002, the Witness, whose Apt. 309 overlooked the patio backyard of

the Victim, awoke and upon opening his door, saw Petitioner aka Sean in the Victim’s patio

backyard coming over the her fence5

 carrying a small TV or computer. (Id. at pp, 96, 102-

104, 106).

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Petitioner did not testify at his trial nor did he call any witnesses. Petitioner does

concede having made a phone call on November 7, 2002. However, he claims that the phone

call was to a friend “Marie LNU” whom he asked to come over to pick him up. She arrived

fifteen minutes later and Petitioner went with her to her apartment “a block or so away.”

(Amended Petition, p.5-c).

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The Witness went outside to get a soda which took about two minutes. (Id. at p. 105).

Upon returning to his apartment, the Witness saw Mr. Kane and Petitioner, aka Sean,

standing in front of their own Apt. 308. (Id. at p.106). The Witness left for work at

approximately 12:30 p.m. on November 7, 2002 and returned from work at 4:00 a.m on

November 8, 2002 at which time he spoke to the manager about what he had seen. (Id. at

pp.112-113, 121). The Witness later spoke to police officers at approximately 6:00 a.m. and

7:00 a.m. on November 8, 2002. 

On November 7, 2002 the Victim came home from work at approximately 3:00 p.m.

to 4:00 p.m. and after discovering that her apartment had been burglarized and items had

been taken, called the police. (Id. at pp. 82-84). Police Officer Christopher Parese of the

Phoenix Police Department responded at approximately 6:24 p.m. to the Victim’s apartment

and spoke to her about the burglary and theft at her apartment. (Id. at pp. 131,133-140).

Police Officer Charles Baber of the Phoenix Police Department responded to the 5110

N. 19th Avenue apartments the next day and spoke to the apartment manager, Mr. Jerry

Patton. (Id. at p. 150). Officer Baber determined that on November 7, 2002 Sean had come

to Mr. Patton’s office twice that afternoon and made two phone calls6

 and a short time later

a female called asking to speak with Sean. (Answer, Exh. DD (Doc. No. 7-6, p. 66)). The

female phone caller’s phone number was obtained from the apartment manager’s caller ID.

(Id.)

Based on information obtained from Mr. Patton, Officer Baber returned the next day

and spoke to the Witness. (Answer, Exh. E at p. 151). Based on the information obtained

from the Witness, Officer Baber went to Apt 308 and spoke to Mr. Kane. (Id. at p. 153).

Petitioner was not there at that time. (Id.) Found inside Apt. 308 that Petitioner shared with

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Mr. Kane were some of the stolen items from the Victim that she later identified as her own.

(Id. at p. 154). Mr. Kane stated to Officer Baber that he had not removed anything from the

Victim’s apartment but it was Sean who brought the stolen items to their apartment. (Answer,

Exh. DD (Doc. No.7-6. pp. 66)). Mr. Kane also stated that Sean called a female named “TK”

who later came to their apartment and picked up stolen items. (Id.). Mr. Kane was asked to

call “TK”, later determined to be Ms. Joy Dennis, and have her come over to his and

Petitioner’s apartment. (Answer, Exh. E at pp. 157-158). Items belonging to and taken from

the Victim’s apartment were later retrieved from Ms. Dennis’ apartment with her consent.

(Id. at 158).

2. Ground One: Compulsory Process Denial

Petitioner argues that he was convicted in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense. Petitioner’s claim involves Ms. Dennis.

The State by Maricopa County Attorney Ms. Jacki Ireland, extended to Ms. Dennis

use immunity for her testimony at Petitioner’s trial on the charges of burglary and trafficking

in stolen property. (Answer, Exh. D). It was specifically agreed between Ms. Dennis and the

State that Ms. Dennis would be truthful in her testimony regarding possession of narcotic

drugs, the transfer/sale of narcotic drugs, or trafficking in stolen property on November 7,

2002. (Id.). 

The trial court was clear in instructing the jury that what the attorneys said in opening

statements was not evidence. (Answer, Ex. E at p. 63). However, the State in opening

statement outlined the testimony Ms. Dennis would give. (Id. at pp.72-73). It was

anticipated that Ms. Dennis would testify that on November 7, 2002, Petitioner, whom she

knew, called her to ask if she wanted to buy some property. (Id. at p. 72) She inquired of

Petitioner what he had and he explained. (Id.) Petitioner asked Ms. Dennis if she could get

crack cocaine in exchange for the property.(Id. at pp.72-73). Ms. Dennis obtained crack

cocaine, drove to Petitioner’s apartment, met with Petitioner and his roommate Mr. Kane and

exchanged the crack cocaine for a TV, stereo, and computer. (Id. at p. 73). Ms. Dennis,

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Although not clear from the record before this Court, common sense dictates that Ms.

Dennis would not identify Petitioner at trial as the individual whom she traded drugs for

stolen property on November 7, 2002. It would not have served the State’s burden of proof

to call her as a witness.

This Court can only surmise that Ms. Dennis’ reconsidered testimony vis a vis the

State’s opening statements and “prior information from [Ms. Dennis]..., and in speaking with

the police and/or witnesses in [the] case” (Answer, Exh. E at p. 125), seriously undermined

the State’s ability to prove Petitioner’s reckless trafficking in the Victim’s stolen property

(Count 2). The State, no longer having the benefit of Ms. Dennis’ testimony as a percipient

witness to Petitioner Shannon aka Shane aka Sean Clark’s trafficking in stolen property,

moved to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment. (Answer, Exh. G at pp. 5-8). Ms. Dennis was

not a percipient witness to Petitioner Shannon aka Shane aka Sean Clark’s commission of

burglary of the Victim’s residence on November 7, 2002.

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believing that the property was “legitimate”, took such items back to her apartment and set

the items up. (Id.). Police met with and arrested Ms. Dennis. (Id. at p.158). Drugs were

recovered from her purse. (Id.). She gave them consent to search her apartment and retrieve

the items obtained from Petitioner and Mr. Kane and such were ultimately determined to be

items taken from the Victim. (Id. at p. 73).

At Petitioner’s trial, the court addressed Ms. Dennis regarding her obligations

pursuant to the use immunity agreement she had entered into with the State. (Id. at pp. 122-

125). Ms. Dennis was represented by counsel, Ms. Pat Shaler. The trial court then

adjourned. (Id. at p. 125). The trial court convened ten minutes later. (Id.). The State then

informed the trial court that it believed that Ms. Dennis was not going to testify truthfully7

and that the State would not be calling her as a witness. (Id. at pp.125-126). Petitioner’s trial

counsel asked the trial court to keep the use immunity agreement in effect anticipating that

Ms. Dennis would describe the individual, with whom she had traded crack cocaine for

stolen items on November 7, 2002, as having dirty blond hair (Id. at p. 126) and, this Court

presumes, argue Petitioner’s different trial appearance. 

The trial court ordered that the use immunity agreement was no longer in effect given

that the State had requested it and then decided not to call Ms. Dennis as a witness. (Id. at

p. 127). Moreover, Petitioner was not precluded from calling Ms. Dennis as a witness

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Specifically, the trial court stated:

...I find that Miss Dennis would not be giving complete

testimony, and therefore, it would be improper to have her

testify to some things but not others, to show what the full

transaction was.

Therefore, Miss. Dennis will not be used as a witness

with use immunity. She can testify as long as she does not take

the 5th Amendment to certain questions, but Miss Shaler already

informed us that she would.

(Answer, Exh. E at p.129).

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provided that she not selectively invoke her 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination

as to certain questions. (Id. at pp. 127, 129). Ms. Dennis’ counsel, Ms. Shaler, informed the

trial court that if Ms. Dennis did testify, Ms. Dennis would be advised not to answer

questions that could criminally implicate her for offenses of drug possession and/or

trafficking in stolen property on November 7, 2002.8

 (Id. at pp. 127-129). Ultimately, Ms.

Dennis was not called as a witness. (Answer, Exh. M at p.4).

On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling regarding Ms.

Dennis’ testimony as follows:

“The Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to

present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the

adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as

a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth.”

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975). “While the

government’s interest in cross-examining defense witnesses is

not rooted in the Constitution, one of the legitimate demands of

the adversary system is the right of cross-examination.” United

States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 309 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation

omitted). “Courts have not permitted defendants to call

witnesses to the stand who have indicated that they will refuse

to answer the government’s questions on cross-examination with

respect to non-collateral matters.” Id.; see e.g., United States v.

De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1312-14 (1st Cir. 1993); Denham v.

Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1503-05 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.

Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1991); United

States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1987);

United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (2d Cir. 1975).

Where the witness’ claim of privilege shields material

testimony from cross-examination, the balance weighs against

the defendant. Gary, 74 F.3d at 310. In this case, after

inquiring into the proposed questioning, the trial court properly

determined that the issue was material and appropriate for crossexamination. Given the trial court’s “extensive knowledge of

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the case” and its determination “that the Fifth Amendment

would be properly invoked in response to...relevant questions[,]”

we find no abuse of discretion [State v.] McDaniel, 136 Ariz.

[188] at 194, 665 P.2d. [70] at 76 [(1983)], and affirm Clark’s

conviction and sentence.

(Id. at pp. 9-10).

a. Ethical Considerations

The gravamen of Petitioner’s Claim is that his right to compulsory process under the

6th Amendment was denied because the State would not bind itself to an agreement with a

witness unwilling to abide by the agreement’s terms. 

The use immunity statute states in pertinent part:

In any criminal proceeding before a court..., if a person refuses

to answer a question or produce evidence of any other kind on

the ground that he may be incriminated thereby and if the

prosecuting attorney, in writing, requests the court to order that

person to answer the question or produce the evidence, the court

may so order and that person shall comply with the order....After

complying, such testimony or evidence, or any information

directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or evidence,

shall not be used against the person in any proceeding or

prosecution for a crime or offense concerning which he gave

answer or produced evidence under court order. However, he

may nevertheless be prosecuted...for any perjury, [or] false

swearing....

A.R.S. § 13-4064 (2003) (emphasis added). The State’s use immunity agreement with Ms.

Dennis stated in pertinent part that she:

shall at all times tell the truth and nothing other than the truth on

the witness stand when she is called to testify. It is further

understood that Joy Ann Dennis shall be subjected to

prosecution for perjury or false swearing should she knowingly

provide false testimony or information.

(Answer, Exh. D)(emphasis in original). The State was under the distinct impression that Ms.

Dennis could identify Petitioner as the individual trafficking in the Victim’s stolen property

and, by extension, as the same individual who burglarized the Victim’s residence wherein

he obtained the Victim’s property. Thus, use immunity was extended to Ms. Dennis. During

a ten minute recess the State determined that if Ms. Dennis testified she would not identify

Petitioner as the person whom she traded drugs for stolen property on November 7, 2002.

Consequently, the State withdrew its proffer of use immunity. Petitioner moved the trial court

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to order the State bound, nevertheless, to the use immunity agreement. 

Mere invocation of the right to compulsory process by Petitioner does not trump the

State’s ethical obligations. A prosecuting attorney is held to a higher standard of conduct

than an ordinary attorney. State v. Noriega, 690 P.2d 775, 142 Ariz. 474 (1984), overruled

on other grounds, State v. Burge, 804 P.2d 754, 167 Ariz. 25 (1990). A prosecutor’s duty is

to seek justice and not merely to convict. State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 141 Ariz. 227 (1984).

In fulfilling a higher standard of conduct and duty to seek justice, the Maricopa County

Attorney herein, like any attorney be she civil or criminal, is bound by the Arizona Rules

of Professional Conduct. 

An attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal or fail to

correct such. 17A A.R.S. Supreme Court Rules, Rule 42, Rules of Professional Conduct, ER

3.3(a)(1) (2003). Prior to adjourning for a brief recess the trial court addressed Ms. Dennis

regarding the use immunity agreement and established that: (1) she reviewed it with her

attorney; (2) her questions were answered by her attorney; (3) she read the agreement; (4)

she signed it; and (5) she understood her obligation to tell the truth or be subject to perjury

charges. (Answer, Exh. E at pp.122-124). An attorney shall not knowingly offer evidence

that the lawyer knows to be false and shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if

necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. ER 3.3(a)(4) (2003). After a ten minute recess, the State

informed the trial court that Ms. Dennis would not be called as a witness because it was the

State’s belief that Ms. Dennis would testify falsely. (Id. at p. 125). “[T]he court, as well as

the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the pollution of

perjured testimony.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417 (1988).

An attorney shall not falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely. ER

3.4(b) (2003). Petitioner proposes that the State should have nonetheless called Ms. Dennis

to the stand to testify falsely as the State believed she would. The State would have been: (1)

forced to impeach its own witness, see Ariz. R.Evid. 607; (2) by cross-examining Ms. Dennis

before the jury as an unwilling, hostile, or biased witness, see Ariz.R.Evid. Rule 611(C); (3)

with use of her pretrial prior inconsistent statements, see Ariz.R.Evid. 613(a), 801(d)(1)(A)

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and/or (C). By so testifying Ms. Dennis would have subjected herself to prosecution for

perjury as well as criminal charges she had previously admitted. The State’s withdrawal of

use immunity was for Ms. Dennis’ own protection and in conformity with the highest

standards of conduct expected of prosecutors.

A prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the

prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause and shall make timely disclosure to the

defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt

of the accused or mitigates the offense. ER 3.8(a),(d) (2003). The State herein believed Ms.

Dennis would testify falsely if called to the stand and so apprised Petitioner when the trial

court convened after a ten minute recess. (Id. at p.125). At this point in the proceedings it is

questionable probable cause existed. Furthermore, the State lacked substantial evidence to

warrant a conviction for trafficking in stolen property and would not overcome a motion for

judgment of acquittal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 20 The Petitioner/Defendant is not the architect

of the State’s case. The State, consistent with the high standard of conduct expected of

prosecutors seeking justice rather than a conviction, properly dismissed Count 2 of the

indictment charging the Petitioner with trafficking in stolen property.

b. Fifth Amendment Considerations

A.R.S. 13-4064 is quite clear that use immunity extended is between only a prosecutor

and a prospective witness. Moreover, upon request by the prosecutor in writing, the trial

court may order the prospective witness to answer questions or produce evidence and the

witness shall so comply. The trial court herein questioned Ms. Dennis and queried her trial

counsel regarding which questions would and would not be answered were she to testify. (Id.

at pp. 127-129). The trial court correctly ruled that Ms. Dennis’ selective invocation of her

5th Amendment right against self-incrimination would not lend itself to ascertainment of the

truth and a just determination of the proceedings. (Id.); see also Ariz.R.Evid. 102.

It is well-established that the 6th Amendment does not “provide[] a defendant with a

right to demand use immunity for defense witnesses who invoke their privilege against selfincrimination.” United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled

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9

This right is applicable in state as well as federal prosecutions. Washington v. Texas,

388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).

10The record is clear to this Court that trial counsel: (1) interviewed Ms. Dennis one

week before trial and was aware of her intent to testify contrary to a previous statement made

to police; (2) was present and heard the State prosecutor in opening statement commit and

outline what the State understood would be Ms. Dennis’ testimony consistent with a previous

statement made to police; (3) was present and heard the trial court explain to Ms. Dennis the

use immunity agreement requiring her to testify, it is safe to say, favorably for the State and

consistent with a previous statement made to police; and (4) after a ten-minute recess

wherein the State prosecutor determined Ms. Dennis’ intent to change her testimony and

withdrew the use immunity agreement, trial counsel moved the trial court to order the State

bound to the use immunity agreement. “[T]he inference that [trial counsel] was deliberately

seeking a tactical advantage is inescapable. Regardless of whether prejudice to the

prosecution could have been avoided in this particular case, it is plain that the case fits into

the category of wilful misconduct in which the severest sanction is appropriate. After all, the

court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the

pollution of perjured testimony.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417. The trial court went on and ruled

correctly in disallowing Ms. Dennis from testifying to selective information.

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on other grounds recognized by United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner “does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is ..., privileged,....”

Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410. Petitioner does not provide any evidence that the State coerced or

prompted Ms. Dennis to invoke her 5th Amendment privilege. “Nor is an accused entitled

to compel a prosecutor to grant immunity to a potential defense witness to get [her] to

testify.” United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987). The trial court properly

exercised its statutory discretion and denied Petitioner’s request that the use immunity

agreement be enforced. (Id.).

The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor....[9]

U.S. Const. Amend VI. Petitioner, through trial counsel, was aware one week before trial of

Ms. Dennis’ intent to testify differently from her previous statement to the prosecution.10 (Id.

at p. 126). The trial court did not bar Ms. Dennis’ testimony provided she not invoke her 5th

Amendment right against self-incrimination selectively. (Id. at p.129).

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[T]he Compulsory Process Clause...is dependent entirely on the

defendant’s initiative. Most other Sixth Amendment rights arise

automatically on the initiation of the adversary process and no

action by the defendant is necessary to make them active in his

or her case. While those rights shield the defendant from

potential prosecutorial abuses, the right to compel the presence

and present the testimony of witnesses provides the defendant

with a sword that may be employed to rebut the prosecution’s

case. The decision whether to employ it in a particular case rests

solely with the defendant. The very nature of the right requires

that its effective use be preceded by deliberate planning and

affirmative conduct.

Taylor 484 U.S. at 410 (footnote omitted). Petitioner could have subpoenaed Ms. Dennis to

appear at his trial in anticipation that she would testify favorably for him. Petitioner would

still be confronted with the dilemma of Ms. Dennis’ selective invocation of her 5th

Amendment right against self-incrimination and the trial court would preclude her

testimony for the same reason: The jury should hear Ms. Dennis’ full testimony rather than

a truncated portion favorable to Petitioner. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241

(1975). Ms. Dennis’ testimony regarding a complete accounting of what transpired on

November 7, 2002 was not collateral but necessary to prove whether Petitioner trafficked in

stolen property or not.

On the instant record, the state court’s ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding result in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the evidence presented.

3. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues herein that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach

Witness Joey “with his prior inconsistent statements and false statements.” (Amended

Petition, p.6-a). According to Petitioner, the Witness’ “ability and opportunity to observe

what he claimed to have observed was hindered in his prior statements [sic], so he changed

them in his trial testimony.” (Id. at p.6-b). Petitioner also contends that the Witness’

statements implicated the Witness’ brother in the burglary of the Victim’s apartment. (Id.).

In rejecting such claim raised in Petitioner’s PCR Petition, the state court, applying

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) held:

As to the claim that counsel failed to impeach the state’s

witness, Steven Joey, with a statement he made to the police that

was not consistent with his trial testimony, that also was a

reasonable tactical decision in that both statements implicated

Defendant. Counsel chose to focus on misidentification as a

defense rather than pointing the finger at the person Joey said

was with Defendant during the burglary. Counsel also

attempted to focus guilt on the witness’ brother rather than

Defendant.

As the State points out in its Response, even if there were

a determination of ineffectiveness on the above issues, the Court

finds nothing that was done by counsel as to her argument or the

lack of impeachment prejudiced Defendant since that result

would have been the same, based on all the circumstances and

facts presented. Steven Joey’s identification of the Defendant

was very credible.

(Answer, Exh. GG at p.2).

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists “in order to protect the fundamental

right to a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986)

(The “benchmark” of the right to counsel is the “fairness of the adversary proceeding....”);

United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). Thus: 

 the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not

for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of

the accused to receive a fair trial. Absent some effect of

challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the

Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated.

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).

In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court formulated the test for determining

whether counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.

To prevail on any ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show two

components: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the range of competence demanded of

counsel in criminal cases; and (2) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result of

counsel’s incompetence. Id. at 690-693. 

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that counsel made errors

so serious “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

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is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather, whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

In considering this component, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to

be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the

circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.’”). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment

of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects

of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability

that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for trial counsel’s deficient

performance. Id. at 691-695. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. However, “an analysis focusing solely on mere

outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369

(1993). Moreover, the rule of contemporary assessment of counsel’s conduct is not

implicated in the prejudice component under Strickland. Rather, the focus is on “the question

whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the

proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 372 (emphasis added) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687; Kimmelman. 477 U.S. at 393)).

Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice

defeats the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700. The court need not address both factors

where one is lacking. Id.

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Matters of strategy and tactics by counsel are given deference and will not support

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Mancuso v. Olivarez,

292 F.3d 939, 954-955 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Beaty, 762 P.2d 519, 537 (Ariz. 1988).

Counsel has a duty to assist a defendant. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980). As

a defendant’s assistant, counsel has a duty to advocate for the defendant in general and in

particular “to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant

informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty

to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing

process.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

Defendant at trial is presumed to be innocent of the charges. Defendant has no

obligation to testify at trial nor to present evidence. Petitioner did not testify nor present

evidence at his trial. Petitioner’s defense at trial was that an individual with long, curly blond

hair burglarized the Victim’s apartment and that he was misidentified as that individual. The

crux of his misidentification was that at trial he had short dark hair. The Witness testified that

on November 7, 2002 Petitioner had long blond hair. Though the Victim and the Witness

knew Petitioner by slight variations of his true name, both were firm that Petitioner at trial

was one and same individual known to them on November 7, 2002. The Victim and the

Witness testified that Petitioner lived at Apt. 308 with Mr. Kane. The Witness testified that

on November 7, 2002 Petitioner was seen in the Victim’s patio backyard with a screened

item, either a TV or a computer. The Witness testified that a few minutes later he saw

Petitioner and Mr. Kane standing in front of Apt 308, Petitioner’s and Mr. Kane’s residence.

Officer Baber testified that some of the Victim’s stolen items were found at Apt. 308,

Petitioner’s apartment. The line of logic and link of proof is not convoluted.

The record amply supports Petitioner’s trial counsel’s efforts to establish

misidentification of Petitioner despite the paucity of evidence available to sustain such. Trial

counsel did not ask the Victim questions regarding Petitioner’s appearance on November 7,

2002 and this was tactically reasonable given that she was not present when the burglary of

her apartment occurred. Trial counsel did elicit from the Victim that she did not see

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11This line of cross-examination included:

Q.[trial counsel]: How did you learn that your brother was

connected to this case, your brother

Anthony?

A.[the Witness]: How was he connected?

Q: Did you learn that he was connected?

A: I don’t know.

Q. All right. Did you talk to anyone among

the police officers about your brother

Anthony buying a tape from Robert

[Kane]?

[the prosecutor]: Objection; hearsay.

[the court]: You can answer yes or no, whether you

did talk to the police officers? [sic]

***

Q. [trial counsel]: You haven’t talked to the police about

your brother?

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Petitioner go into her apartment and take her property. (Answer, Exh. E at p. 94). 

That the Witness in a prior statement stated that Petitioner was seen through blinds

vis a vis his trial testimony that he saw Petitioner when he went to the door of his apartment

is a distinction without merit. The two are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive and

trial counsel was reasonable in not addressing the two. Not knowing how the Witness might

reconcile the two, there was a plausible possibility that the Witness saw Petitioner through

the blinds and from his door, bolstering the strength of the Witness’ identification of

Petitioner, had trial counsel asked. As it was, the Witness was unequivocal that, having seen

Petitioner “mostly every day” (Id. at 99), he knew Petitioner, observed Petitioner, recognized

Petitioner, and identified Petitioner at trial as the same individual committing a burglary on

November 7, 2002. 

Trial counsel when cross-examining the Witness alluded to the Witness’ brother as

perhaps being involved in the burglary and inferentially that the Witness was trying to protect

his brother. (Id. at pp.108-109). The Witness was simply unaware and did not know (Id.)

and trial counsel was bound to the Witness’ responses. Trial counsel also unsuccessfully

sought responses based upon objectionable hearsay regarding the Witness’ brother.11 (Id.)

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A. [the Witness]: No.

Q. Did you ever see your brother with the

tape?

A. No.

(Answer, Exh. E at pp.108-109) (emphasis added).

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Moreover, had trial counsel continued efforts to focus guilt on the Witness’ brother because

the brother had purchased stolen video tapes, such effort would have only served to focus

guilt more acutely on Petitioner as the source, and his apartment as the location, of stolen

items. Trial counsel ceased this line of questioning while she was ahead.

Trial counsel representation did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. The tactical decisions regarding questions asked as well as not asked of the

percipient Witness to the burglary, were reasonable in light of the lack and quality of

evidence then available to support Petitioner’s defense of misidentification, which was little

or none. Great deference is given to trial counsel’s efforts to make a silk purse from a sow’s

ear. Petitioner having failed to show deficient performance, the Court need not address

prejudice. Consequently, the state court’s ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding result in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the evidence presented.

B. Standard: Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents argue that Ground Three is procedurally defaulted and, alternatively,

lacks merit.

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

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before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim is

exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available state

corrective process or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed] his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. See also

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a

claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2200). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

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12Although the Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are

exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available

for claims that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver see Cassett v. Stewart,

406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006), this Court need not address

such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised by Petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

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not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on

the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear

the state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. The

procedural bar provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and

sentence and, thus, prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim in the state proceedings. Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-

495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine

prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by allowing the time to run on

available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking review. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.12 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263

n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing postconviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies when a petitioner

may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal constitutional challenges to

convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have

been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

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13Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his

sentence has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts

probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the

petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his

part; (4) there has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn

petitioner's conviction if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and

convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that

no reasonable fact-finder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b) (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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claims13 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default...the district court dismisses the petition because the

petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id. at 1231.

1. Ground Three: Cumulative Effect 

Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to a fundamentally fair trial in light of

the cumulative effects of the errors asserted in Grounds One and Two of his Amended

Petition. Respondents contend that Petitioner never presented such claim to the state court

and, therefore, the claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas review. 

Respondents are correct that Petitioner did not present this argument to any level of

the state court. “If [Petitioner]... were to return to state court now, the claim would be found

waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to Arizona’s rule of preclusion. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, [Petitioner’s Ground Three]...is ‘technically’

exhausted but procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer has an available state

remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1.” Lee v. Schriro, 2009 WL 32743 at *8

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28 14CV 01-2178-PHX-EHC and CV 01-2179-PHX-EHC.

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(D.Ariz. January 6, 2009)14 (finding petitioner’s claim of cumulative effect of errors

procedurally barred).

Where “‘a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an

independent and adequate state procedural rule [as in the instant case], federal habeas review

of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538

F.3d 1000, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). 

Generally, “cause” sufficient “to excuse a default exists if the petitioner ‘can show

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with

the State’s procedural rule.’” Id. at 1027 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). 

Petitioner argues that because “Arizona courts do not recognize the cumulative-error

doctrine, which Respondents readily acknowledge...”, the state corrective process is

inadequate and it would have been futile for him to assert such a claim. (Petitioner’s Reply

to Respondents’ Second Supplemental Response”, pp. 3-4 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§

2254(b)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized an exception to the exhaustion requirement if

exhaustion in state court would be futile. Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981).

However, the Supreme Court subsequently “criticized the futility doctrine, ruling that it does

not excuse the failure to exhaust a habeas claim in state court proceedings.” Lee, 2009 WL

32743 at *8 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982)). In rejecting the argument that

exhaustion would have been futile in light of then-existing state law, the Engle Court stated:

We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an objection

to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for a failure to

object at trial. If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and

believes it may find favor in the federal courts, he may not

bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be

unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has

previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon

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reflection, that the contention is valid. 

Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 (footnote omitted). See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

623 (1998) (“As we clearly stated in Engle v. Isaac,.... ‘futility cannot constitute cause if it

means simply that a claim was ‘unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time...’

Therefore, petitioner is unable to establish cause for his default.”) (internal citations omitted).

“Following Engle, the Ninth Circuit rejected the futility doctrine and held that apparent

futility of presenting habeas claims to state courts does not constitute cause to overcome a

procedural default.” Lee, 2009 WL 32743 at *9 (citing Roberts v. Arave, 847 F.2d 528, 530

(9th Cir. 1988). Consequently, Petitioner’s futility argument does not constitute cause to

excuse the default of his third ground for relief. Id. See also Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d

922, 924-925 (10th Cir. 2002).

A habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he can

show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). See also Majoy

v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-777 (9th Cir. 2002)(analyzing this exception in a non-capital case).

This exception to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can

establish that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who

is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (citation omitted). See also Murray, 477 U.S.

at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028. “The miscarriage of justice exception is limited to those

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes that the court

cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933,

937 (9th Cir. 2008). “‘To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was

not presented at trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). On the

instant record, Petitioner has not argued that the failure to consider Ground Three “on the

merits may result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Lee, 2009 WL 32743 at *9

(finding claim procedurally barred). Nor has Petitioner presented any evidence that would

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support a finding that, in light of such alleged errors, the Court cannot have confidence in

the finding of guilt or that the alleged errors occurring during his trial have probably resulted

in the conviction of someone who was actually innocent of the offense. 

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s Grounds One and Two raised in his Amended Petition are without merit.

Additionally, Ground Three is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review

because Petitioner cannot excuse his procedural default.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 18).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 06-2724-PHX-EHC.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 31st day of March, 2009.

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