Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01280/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01280-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE E. JACOBS IV,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALLEN K. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01280-AWI-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE EXCESSIVE

FORCE, DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE, AND

TORT CLAIMS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff George E. Jacobs IV (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

September 18, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at California State PrisonCorcoran, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden Allen K . Scribner,

Chief Deputy Warden Lonnie A. Watson, Associate Warden David D. Ortiz, Facility Captain R. R.

Lowden, Facility Lieutenant D. J. Ruiz, Correctional Sergeant J. M. Martinez, Correctional Officers

German and Northcutt, and Does 1-14 as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and

injunctive relief.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was transferred from the California Correctional

Institution in Tehachapi to CSP-Corcoran on January 24, 2005, and placed in the HCH Suicidal Unit

until January 26, 2005. On January 26, 2005, defendants Scribner, Watson, Ortiz, and Lowden were

responsible for the issuance and circulation to staff of a memorandum which plaintiff alleges

contained incorrect information about him and led to the creation of an atmosphere of retaliation and

use of excessive force.

On January 26, 2005, defendants Martinez, German, Northcutt, and Does 1 and 2 arrived to

escort plaintiff from the HCH Suicidal Unit to the Security Housing Unit. Plaintiff alleges that

during the escort defendants used excessive physical force against him, including throwing him

against the wall,smashing hisface into the wall, stepping down on the chain between plaintiff’s legs

leaving still-visible scars, twisting plaintiff’s wrist and fingers upward and pulling them in different

directions, and punching plaintiff in the ribs and stomach while he was pinned to the wall. After

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plaintiff was taken to his cell and was down on his knees, he was punched right eye. Plaintiff alleges

that he was not a threat at any time during these events. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Martinez told

him that his past actions would not be tolerated in this unit and plaintiff’s arms were then pulled

through the tray slot beyond what they could comfortably extend. Plaintiff alleges that as a result

of the physical force, he suffered injuries, pain, and nerve damage. Plaintiff alleges the scars are still

visible and twenty-four hours afterward, he began to lose sight in his right eye and began to lose

feeling in his wrists, left thumb, left index finger, right thumb, right index finger, and right pinky.

Plaintiff alleges that the next day, on January 27, 2005, he began calling “man down” and

“emergency” in order to obtain medical assistance. Defendant Martinez came to his cell and then

left after asking, “Jacobs from Tehachapi, right?” (Doc. 1, Comp., 11:19-20.)

Plaintiff alleges that Does 3 and 4 passed by his cell and failed to help plaintiff gain medical

attention for his injuries. Doe 5 examined plaintiff for a psychiatric evaluation on January 28, 2005,

at which time plaintiff was taken to the HCH Suicidal Ward to receive medical attention and have

his injuries documents. Plaintiff alleges that Doe 6 completed the medical form but did not provide

plaintiff with any treatment for his injuries, which were visible. Plaintiff alleges that he remained

there from January 28, 2005, through February 3, 2005, without any treatment for his injuries,

despite coming into contact with Does 7-10 on a daily basis.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2005, he was seen briefly by the facility eye doctor, who

determined plaintiff’s condition to be an emergency. Plaintiff was taken to the University Medical

Center in Fresno for blindness on February 2, 2005, and taken to a specialty medical clinic for eye

problems on February 3, 2005. On February 3, 2005, plaintiff was released back to the SHU without

further medical treatment for his eye and other injuries.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 8, 2005, he appeared before the Institutional Classification

Committee, with his injuries obvious, and complained about the use of excessive force. Defendant

Ruiz responded to the committee room with a video camera and interviewed plaintiff concerning the

incident of force. Defendant Ruiz conducted a second interview with plaintiff on February 9, 2005.

///

///

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On February 19, 2005, plaintiff was escorted to the visiting room by Does 11-13. Plaintiff

alleges that Doe 14, who joined the escort team, harassed him and abused him by twisting the chain

attached to his handcuffs, insulted him, and made verbal threats against him. 

Plaintiff that alleges between January 26, 2005, and February 8, 2005, he was denied bare

essentials. Plaintiff was placed on a management cell for sixteen days without a mattress, blankets,

sheets, a towel, soap, toilet paper, toothpaste, toothbrush, writing material, mail, showers, food, and

clothing. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to wear the same paper jumpsuit without undergarments

for sixteen days, his toilet water was shut off during the night, and his food trays were placed on the

floor in front of his cell where flies and cockroaches crawled into it. 

1. Claim Arising From Issuance of Memorandum

The memorandum which plaintiff claims violated his federal rights was issued on January

26, 2005. (Comp., pg. 26.) It sets forth that plaintiff attacked and stabbed a correctional officer at

Tehachapi, that plaintiff has a history of such incidents, and that plaintiff hides, pretends to be

unconscious, and slips his handcuffs to the front. (Id.) The memorandum then sets forth the

procedures for rendering services to plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s allegation that the memorandum violated his federal rights is without merit.

Defendants have every right to internally document information and set forth guidelines for dealing

with plaintiff. The memo was issued to staffto notify them of the applicable procedures. Regardless

of whether or not plaintiff agrees with the characterization of his actions in the memo, the issuance

of the memo does not violate plaintiff’s rights. The allegation that the memo somehow created an

atmosphere that led to the violation of plaintiff’s is utterly unsupported. The court has reviewed the

memo and its contents simply do not impinge on any of plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

2. Excessive Force Claim

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

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 Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1

1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and threats do not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, plaintiff’s allegations that Doe

14 also insulted and harassed him do not support a claim for relief.

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contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Martinez, German, Northcutt, and Does 1 and 2 based on the incident of January 26, 2005.

However, plaintiff’s allegation that Doe 14 yanked his handcuff chain on February 19, 2005, does

not give rise to a claim for relief. The allegation simply does not support a claim that defendant Doe

14 acted sadistically and maliciously toward plaintiff. 

1

3. Denial of Medical Care

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

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U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s allegations that his injuries were visible and that defendants were aware of his

need for medical care but failed to assist him are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under

section 1983 against defendants Martinez and Does 3, 4, and 6-10. However, plaintiff’s allegations

do not support a claim that defendant Doe 5 acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs,

as plaintiff’s allegations establish that after he was interviewed by Doe 5, he was taken to the HCH

Suicidal Unit for care.

4. Condition of Management Cell

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.

1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison

officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

///

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The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

With the exception of the deprivation of mail, writing material, and water flow to the toilet

at night for sixteen days, which are not conditions that rise to the level of Eighth Amendment

violations, plaintiff adequately alleges conditions sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim

with respect to the management cell he was placed in for sixteen days. However, plaintiff has not

alleged any facts linking one or more of the named defendants to the conditions complained of. For

this reason, plaintiff fails to state a claim based on the conditions he was subjected to while housed

in the management cell. 

5. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken against him were retaliatory in nature. Allegations of

retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition the government may

support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th

Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts supporting a claim that any named defendant took

adverse action against him because of his engagement in activity protected under the First

Amendment. To the extent that plaintiff’s claim is premised on retaliatory acts taken against him

///

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for allegedly stabbing a correctional officer, this is not a protected activity and provides no basis for

the imposition of liability for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

6. Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to violate his rights. In the context of conspiracy

claims brought pursuant to section 1983, such a complaint must “allege [some] facts to support the

existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791,

794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.

1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt

act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th

Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy between

defendants to violate his rights. 

7. Defendants Ruiz and Does 11-13

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

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is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking defendant Ruiz or defendants Does 11-13 to any

act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s rights under federal law. Accordingly,

plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against any of these defendants. 

8. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also alleges claims for assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress under California law. “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to

commit a violent injury on the person of another” and “[a] battery is any willful and unlawful use

of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 240, 242 (West 2006); 5 B. E.

Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 346 (9th ed. 1988). 

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and

(3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct.

Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing to Christensen v. Superior Court,

54 Cal.3d 868 (1991)) (quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to state law tort claims for assault and battery

and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants Martinez, German, Northcutt, and

Does 1 and 2 arising from the incident of excessive force on January 26, 2005. However, plaintiff’s

allegations are not sufficient to give rise to tort claims against any other defendants. 

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims for relief against

defendants Martinez, German, Northcutt, and Does 1 and 2 for use of excessive physical force,

assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against defendants Martinez

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 The Marshal cannot initiate service on unknown defendants. Plaintiff will need to seek leave to amend to 2

substitute the true names of the Doe defendants once he learns who they are. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999); Merritt v. Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989); see Swartz v. Gold Dust

Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981).

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and Does 3, 4, and 6-10 for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

However, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any other claims upon which relief

may be granted. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint,

if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

against defendants Martinez, German, Northcutt, and Does 1-4 and 6-10, plaintiff may so notify the

court in writing. The court will then issue Findings and Recommendations recommending that the

remaining claims and defendants be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff three

summonses and three USM-285 forms to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these

documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on

defendants Martinez, German, and Northcutt.

2

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only against defendants Martinez, German, Northcutt,

and Does 1-4 and 6-10 on his cognizable excessive force, denial of medical

care, and tort claims; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 9, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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