Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00455/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00455-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN MARINE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES INTERNAL 

REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-cv-0455-BTM-LL

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 41, 45]

The United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and Plaintiff American 

Marine LLC, have filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims

under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. (ECF Nos. 

41, 45). For the reasons discussed below, the IRS’s motion will be granted and 

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This is one of five actions filed by related entities against the IRS.1 Each 

case is based on the claim that the IRS failed to comply with its obligations under 

5 U.S.C. § 552 to respond to FOIA requests submitted by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 

 

1 The five actions (including this one) are: Trucept, Inc., fka Smart Tek Solutions Inc. v. United States Internal 

Revenue Service, Case No. 15-cv-0447-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Services, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0449-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Service Solutions Corp. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0452-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Automated Services, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0453-BTM-JMA; and American Marine, LLC v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 

Case No. 15-cv-0455-BTM-JMA.

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contend they submitted their requests after the IRS filed a series of liens against 

them between 2011 and 2013 holding them liable for payroll tax liabilities of other 

corporations under alter ego and/or successor liability theories. 

Plaintiff American Marine, LLC alleges it sent a written FOIA request to the 

IRS on May 12, 2014. Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 10. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), 

an agency has 20 business days following receipt of a FOIA request to determine 

whether to comply with the request and must “immediately” notify the requester of 

its determination. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). On June 26, 2014, the IRS allegedly 

sent a response to Plaintiff in which it acknowledged receipt of the request but 

“failed to make any determination about the request.” Compl. ¶ 11. On February 

27, 2015, having received no further response from the IRS, Plaintiff initiated this 

action. 

On October 7, 2016, the IRS filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 

that it had fully discharged its obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 552 and indicating that 

it had completed its search for records and released 4,723 pages in full and 1,192 

pages in part, of non-exempt documents responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. 

(ECF No. 26). On July 26, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part 

without prejudice the IRS’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 35). The Court 

held that the declarations submitted by the IRS were insufficient to demonstrate 

the adequacy of the IRS’s search because they (1) failed to explain how the IRS 

interpreted Plaintiff’s FOIA request and the scope of documents the IRS 

determined were responsive to the request and (2) failed to provide sufficient 

information about the process by which the IRS reviewed 65 boxes of documents. 

Id. at 7.

The IRS also indicated that it withheld, in full or in part, responsive 

documents pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions: Exemption 3 (in 

conjunction with 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a), (e)(7)), Exemption 5, Exemption 6, 

Exemption 7(A), Exemption 7(D), and Exemption 7(E). The Court granted the 

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IRS’s motion for summary judgment as to the documents withheld under 

Exemption 5, Exemption 7(A), Exemption 7(D) and Exemption 3 in conjunction 

with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7) but not 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). Id. at 12, 13, 15-16, 18.

The IRS has now filed a renewed motion for summary judgment as to the 

remaining issues. (ECF No. 45). Plaintiff has also filed a motion for summary 

judgment. (ECF No. 41).

II. DISCUSSION

A. FOIA Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there 

is no material factual dispute and he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving 

party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts which show a 

genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

District courts are directed to conduct a de novo review of the adequacy of 

an agency’s response to a FOIA request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989). 

Because FOIA cases rarely involve material factual disputes, they “are typically 

and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defenders of 

Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 97 (D.D.C. 2009); see 

Shannahan v. Internal Revenue Serv., 637 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (W.D. Wash. 

2009). Courts “follow a two-step inquiry when presented with a motion for 

summary judgment in a FOIA case.” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 912. 

First, the district court must determine whether the agency has established 

that it fully discharged its obligation under FOIA to conduct an adequate search for 

responsive records. Zemansky v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th 

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Cir. 1985). To meet this burden, the agency must:

demonstrate that it has conducted a “search reasonably calculated to 

uncover all relevant documents.” Further, the issue to be resolved is 

not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive 

to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was 

adequate. The adequacy of the search, in turn, is judged by a standard 

of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of 

each case. In demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the agency 

may rely upon reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted 

in good faith.

Id. (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“Weisberg II”), 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

If the agency satisfies its initial burden, the court proceeds to the second step 

and considers “whether the agency has proven that the information that it did not 

disclose falls within one of nine FOIA exemptions.” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d 

at 912 (quoting Los Angeles Times Commc’ns, LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. 

Supp. 2d 880, 894 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). Agencies seeking to withhold documents 

pursuant to a FOIA exemption “have been required to supply the opposing party 

and the court with a ‘Vaughn index,’ identifying each document withheld, the 

statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized explanation of how disclosure of 

the particular document would damage the interest protected by the claimed 

exemption.” Wiener v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 943 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 

1991); see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). “The purpose 

of a Vaughn index ‘is . . . to afford the requester an opportunity to intelligently 

advocate release of the withheld documents and to afford the court the opportunity 

to intelligently judge the contest.’” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (quoting 

Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979). 

Finally, “even if the agency satisfies the two-part test, it generally must still 

disclose any reasonably segregable portions of the withheld documents.” Id.; 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided 

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to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 

exempt under this subsection.”). “The burden is on the agency to establish that all 

reasonably segregable portions of a document have been segregated and 

disclosed.” Id. (quoting Pac. Fisheries Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 

(9th Cir. 2008)). 

B. Reasonableness of Search 

The IRS contends it has conducted an adequate search for records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. To fulfill its obligations under FOIA, “the 

agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the 

requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce 

the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). The agency must show “[w]hat records were searched, by whom, 

and through what process.” Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). An agency can meet its burden by submitting a “reasonably 

detailed, nonconclusory” affidavit “in good faith.” Id. at 551 (quoting Weisberg II, 

745 F.2d at 1485). Agency affidavits that “do not denote which files were searched 

or by whom, do not reflect any systematic approach to document location, and do 

not provide information specific enough to allow the plaintiff to challenge the 

procedures utilized” are insufficient to fulfill the agency’s burden. Weisberg v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In determining whether an 

agency has met its burden to prove an adequate search, “the facts must be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the requestor.” Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571 (citing 

Weisberg II, 745 F.2d at 1485). 

In support of its contention that it conducted an adequate search for records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, the IRS submits the declarations of Delphine 

Thomas and Jacqueline Queener. (ECF No. 45). Thomas is a Disclosure 

Specialist whose duties include responding to FOIA requests for IRS records, 

which requires her to “have knowledge of the types of documents created and 

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maintained by the various divisions and functions of the [IRS] and an 

understanding of the provisions of FOIA.” Thomas Decl. ¶ 1. Queener is an

attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS who was assigned to 

Plaintiff’s case and “personally reviewed and [is] familiar with all documents at 

issue in this lawsuit.” Queener Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3. 

On June 23, 2014, the IRS received a FOIA request from Plaintiff seeking “a 

complete copy of the administrative file” for Plaintiff “for tax forms 940, 941, 1120, 

and 1065 for years 2007-2014.” Thomas Decl. ¶ 4. Disclosure Specialist Athena 

Amparano was initially assigned to Plaintiff’s request. Id. ¶ 6. “[C]onsistent with 

Disclosure Office procedures,” Amparano entered Plaintiff’s Taxpayer 

Identification Number (“TIN”) into the Integrated Data Retrieval Service (“IDRS”). 

Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. IDRS is an electronic system that “manages data that has been 

retrieved from the Master File System enabling [IRS] employees to take specific 

actions on taxpayer account issues, track status, and post transaction updates 

back to the Master File.” Id. ¶ 7. The Master File System is the IRS’s “nation-wide 

electronic information system containing permanent taxpayer account 

information.” Id. ¶ 8. Amparano entered the following codes into IDRS in 

conjunction with Plaintiff’s TIN: BMFOLI (to retrieve an index of all the tax modules 

of the input TIN), BMFOLZ (to retrieve all amounts, dates, audit history, and posted 

transactions pertaining to tax years 2007-2014), and CC SUMRY (to display a 

summary of a taxpayer’s account by taxable year, including status, outstanding 

balance, and various other indicators). Id. ¶ 9. 

From the IDRS record, Amparano learned that Plaintiff’s collection case file 

was in the possession of IRS Revenue Officer John Black. Id. ¶ 11. The IRS 

construed Plaintiff’s request for “administrative file” as a request for the “case file 

maintained by a Revenue Officer who is assigned to that taxpayer’s collection 

case(s).” Thomas Supp. Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff “accepts the IRS’s interpretation of its 

request.” (ECF No. 47 at 2). 

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Black informed the IRS Disclosure Office that documents responsive to 

Plaintiff’s requests were located within the commingled files maintained by Black 

on Plaintiff and over twenty related entities. Thomas Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12. The 

commingled documents resulted in 65 boxes of documents, with the number of 

pages per box ranging from a low of 600 pages to a high of around 4000 pages. 

Id. ¶ 13. The total number of pages in the 65 boxes was around 141,000. Id. The 

65 boxes of records were then scanned into electronic format and reviewed by 

Disclosure Specialists Thomas, Amparano, and Ed Pullman. Thomas Supp. Decl. 

¶¶ 13, 15. The Disclosure Specialists conducted their review by selecting a box of 

scanned records and “viewed every document on a page-by-page basis, and 

identified the taxpayer’s name(s) and/or taxpayer identification number(s) (‘TIN’) 

on each document.” Thomas Supp. Decl. ¶ 13. “By identifying the taxpayer name 

and TIN on each document, the [IRS] was able to search [Black’s] entire 

commingled administrative file once and locate all of the records within the file 

responsive, in whole or in part, to each of the seven (7) related FOIA requests.” Id.

¶ 14. 

Documents containing only the Plaintiff’s taxpayer return information were 

marked as responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. Id. ¶ 18. Some boxes contained 

documents pertaining to Plaintiff as well as other taxpayers. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

submitted a Form 2848 “authorizing its attorney in fact to receive all and only the 

return and return information of plaintiff within [Black’s] commingled administrative 

file.” Queener Supp. Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff “ha[d] not provided the [IRS] with the 

authorization required by the FOIA Treasury regulations and derived by section 

6103 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit the [IRS] to disclose third party 

taxpayer ‘return’ or ‘return information’ to plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 8. Therefore, if a document 

contained Plaintiff’s return information as well as the return information of one or 

more of the other FOIA requesting entities, it was marked as partially responsive 

to Plaintiff’s FOIA request and partially responsive to each of the other FOIA 

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requesting entities whose return information was included on the document. 

Thomas Supp. Decl. ¶ 19. If a document contained Plaintiff’s return information but 

also the return information of other taxpayers who did not submit FOIA requests, 

it was marked as partially responsive to Plaintiff’s request only. Id. ¶ 20. 

“Documents that did not contain any of plaintiff’s return information were marked 

as nonresponsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request.” Id. ¶ 21. Copies of responsive 

documents were uploaded to the IRS’s Automated Freedom of Information Act 

(“AFOIA”) system. Id. ¶ 23.

Upon completion of the search, the IRS located 5,960 pages responsive to 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request. Queener Decl. ¶ 13. “Of these, 4,723 pages were 

released in full, 1,192 pages were released in part, and 45 pages were withheld in 

full.” Id.

The IRS has submitted “reasonably detailed, nonconclusory” affidavits that 

show “what records were searched, by whom, and through what process.” See 

Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552. The IRS’s declarations indicate how the IRS interpreted 

Plaintiff’s FOIA request and its criteria to determine which documents from the 65 

boxes were responsive to Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff argues that the IRS’s search 

was unreasonable because documents containing Plaintiff’s taxpayer information 

were commingled with documents containing other taxpayers’ information and the 

IRS “mark[ed] any document as non-responsive merely because it did not contain 

Plaintiff’s taxpayer information.” (ECF No. 47 at 3). The Court finds the IRS’s 

approach of marking documents as non-responsive if they did not contain Plaintiff’s 

taxpayer information to be reasonable because Plaintiff’s FOIA request only 

requested its own, and not any other taxpayers’ administrative file. The IRS has 

conducted an adequate search in response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. The IRS’s 

motion for summary judgment is granted as to this issue.

//

//

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C. Withholding of Responsive Documents Pursuant to FOIA Exemptions

The IRS indicates it withheld all, or portions of, responsive documents

pursuant to FOIA exemptions. 

1. Exemption 3 in Conjunction with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)

Pursuant to Exemption 3 and § 6103(a), the IRS withheld 17 pages in full 

and 913 pages in part because the pages contained information that was “the 

return information of taxpayers other than plaintiff.” Queener Decl. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff argues that because the IRS has determined for tax liability purposes 

that Plaintiff and other taxpayers are alter egos, and therefore one entity, the IRS 

cannot withhold documents on the basis that they belong to other taxpayers. (ECF 

No. 41-1 at 11; ECF No. 47 at 6). Plaintiff further contends that § 6103 no longer 

bars its request for certain return information because the names of its alleged 

alter egos were publicly disclosed in tax liens and a footnote in Goldberg v. United 

States, a related case. See 2015 WL 4656361, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2015); 

ECF No. 41-1 at 9.

The IRS argues it need not disclose the return information of alter ego 

taxpayers because Plaintiff did not request such information, and even if Plaintiff 

had, such a request would “be invalid on its face” because Plaintiff failed to secure 

the requisite authorization for the disclosure of third party documents. (ECF No. 

45-1 at 11-12; ECF No. 51 at 6). The IRS asserts it did not itself disclose taxpayer 

identities in the Goldberg case, and to the extent a tax lien constitutes public 

disclosure, the withheld documents are nevertheless protected return information. 

(ECF No. 45-1 at 13-17). Finally, the IRS contends that a rule requiring disclosure 

upon assertion of alter ego liability contradicts how the IRS treats separate 

taxpayers and would lead to “absurd results.” (ECF No. 46 at 7-8). The Court 

agrees with the IRS in part. 

FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), protects from disclosure matters 

“specifically exempted by statute.” Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, 

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26 U.S.C. § 6103, is one such statute. Long v. U.S., 742 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th 

Cir. 1984). Section 6103 provides that returns and returns information “shall be 

confidential,” subject to certain exceptions. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). “If § 6103 

forbids the disclosure of material, it may not be produced in response to a 

request under the FOIA.” Church of Scientology of California v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 

9, 11 (1987). FOIA requesters are generally not entitled to information identifying 

another taxpayer. See, e.g., Willamette Indus., Inc. v. United States, 689 F.2d 

865, 867-69 (9th Cir. 1982) (treating another taxpayer’s identifying information as 

exempt from FOIA request but requiring IRS to provide reasonable segregable 

portions of record); DeSalvo v. I.R.S., 861 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(“Individuals are . . . not entitled to the tax returns or return information of others 

unless a specific exception within the statute applies.”); Linsteadt v. I.R.S., 729 

F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating a FOIA requester “is not entitled to access 

to the tax return or return information of other taxpayers”) (citing Fruehauf Corp. 

v. I.R.S., 566 F.2d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1980)). 

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not actually request the 

return information of alter ego entities. Plaintiff requested “a complete copy of 

the administrative file” for Plaintiff “for tax forms 940, 941, and 1120 for years 

2007-2014.” (ECF No. 26-5 Thomas Decl. at ¶ 4). The request fails to specify 

that it seeks the identities and information of other taxpayers connected with 

Plaintiff’s administrative file. Id. The Court further notes that the 35 day window 

in which to resubmit or amend the request has since expired. See 26 C.F.R. § 

601.702(c)(1)(i). 

Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently stated the scope of its request, 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6103 specifically protects a taxpayer’s identity as confidential “return 

information.” See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (“Returns and return information shall be 

confidential . . . .”); 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (b)(2)(A) (including “a taxpayer’s identity” in 

the definition of “return information”). “Return information” also encompasses 

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“whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other 

investigation.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (b)(2)(A). IRS regulations require that requests 

for another taxpayer’s return information, which includes their identity, be 

accompanied by “a properly executed power of attorney, Privacy Act consent, or 

tax information authorization, as appropriate.” 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(c)(5)(iii)(C). 

Plaintiff failed to obtain such consent here, despite its receipt of a tax lien listing 

nineteen alleged alter egos. (See ECF 41-2, Bonar Decl. Exh. A). 

Plaintiff’s relies on Lampert v. United States to support its assertion that the 

taxpayers’ identities are public information as a result of the tax lien and Goldberg

footnote, and therefore not subject to § 6103(a)’s disclosure prohibitions. 854 F.2d 

335 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s reliance is not entirely misplaced. In Lampert, 

taxpayers alleged that government press releases detailing tax evasion charges 

against the taxpayers constituted unauthorized disclosures of their return 

information under 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Id. at 336. The Ninth Circuit rejected the 

taxpayers’ arguments, reasoning that that “once information is lawfully disclosed 

in court proceedings, ‘§ 6103(a)’s directive to keep return information confidential 

is moot.’ ” Id. at 338 (quoting Figur v. United States, 662 F.Supp. 515, 517 (N.D. 

Cal. 1987)). The Ninth Circuit held that “once return information is lawfully 

disclosed in a judicial forum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not 

violate [the statute].” Id.

The IRS contends that because another party — not the IRS — publicly 

disclosed taxpayers’ identities during the related Goldberg litigation, and because 

the IRS actively asserted the privilege throughout discovery, the IRS did not waive 

§ 6103 protections in a court proceeding. (ECF No. 45-1 at 15-17). But the Court 

need not reach this argument, as Lampert seems to at a minimum allow the IRS 

to confirm that the entities listed on the public federal tax lien are among those 

whose documents are included in the commingled file. See Bonar Decl. Exh. A. 

The identities of Plaintiff’s alleged alter-egos have been “made a part of the public 

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domain” through legal process and the creation of a public record. Lampert, 854 

at 338. It therefore follows that the identities of taxpayers named in the public tax 

lien are no longer privileged under § 6103. See id. The IRS even concedes as 

much. (ECF No. 45-1 at 14). However, the Court agrees with the IRS that the 

documents containing the taxpayers’ other return information remain protected. 

See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b) (enumerating other protected return 

information). That the IRS named other taxpayers publicly in connection with 

Plaintiff does not entitle Plaintiff to those taxpayers’ undisclosed, non-public 

documents through the FOIA.

Plaintiff’s alter ego argument is also unavailing. The Internal Revenue Code 

treats taxpayers as separate entities for tax assessment purposes irrespective of 

whether they are designated alter egos for collection purposes. See Portsmouth 

Ambulance, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.3d 494, 501 (6th Cir. 2014) (reasoning 

“the mere application of an alter-ego appellation does not transform separate 

individuals or companies into a single entity”). By arguing that alter egos are 

entitled to one another’s tax returns, Plaintiff would in fact merge the entities into 

one taxpayer and render itself liable for the tax obligations of another taxpayer. 

Plaintiff cites to an unreported district court case, George v. Internal Revenue 

Service, 2007 WL 1450309 at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal., May 14, 2007), as evidence that 

the IRS has previously treated a FOIA requester and its alter ego as a single entity 

for both tax liability and disclosure purposes. (ECF No. 41-1 at 11). But George is 

neither binding nor does it hold that there is in fact an alter ego exception to § 

6103. See id. And although Plaintiff could in theory achieve disclosure of alter ego 

return information in a tax administration proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4), 

Plaintiff cannot do the same through a FOIA proceeding. See 26 U.S.C. § 

6103(h)(4) (providing “[a] return or return information may be disclosed in a Federal 

. . . proceeding pertaining to tax administration but only . . . if such return or return 

information directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is 

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party to the proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an 

issue in the proceeding”); Safeway, Inc. v. I.R.S., 2006 WL 3041079 at *7-8 (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (holding FOIA litigation not a proceeding within the meaning of 

§ 6103(h)(4)). See also Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.3d 827, 838 (5th Cir. 1979)

(going further to state “[n]othing in the legislative history of section 6103 suggests 

that subsection (h)(4) was intended to govern disclosures of information to the 

taxpayer himself” and noting pertinent committee reports “discuss only disclosure 

to third party law enforcement officials”). 

Finally, a rule providing that putative alter egos are entitled to one another’s 

tax return information would, as the IRS argues, yield paradoxical results. (ECF 

No. 46 at 8). If the IRS discloses another taxpayer’s information pursuant to such 

a rule, only so that the requester can use that information to disprove alter ego 

status, the disclosure automatically violates § 6103(a) and conflicts with its core 

purpose of protecting taxpayer privacy. See Church of Scientology of California v. 

I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (“Congress did not intend [§ 6103] to allow the 

disclosure of otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of 

identifying details.”); Cause of Action v. I.R.S., 125 F.Supp.3d 145, 163 (D.D.C. 

2015) (“The core purpose of section 6103 is to protect taxpayer privacy.”) (internal 

quotations and alterations omitted). Plaintiff’s suggested approach runs counter 

to the purpose of § 6103 and is untenable.

For the foregoing reasons, the IRS’s motion for summary judgment is 

granted as to Exemption 3. 

2. Exemption 6

Exemption 6 restricts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and 

similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 

of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). “The Supreme Court has adopted a 

broad view of Exemption 6, stating: ‘we do not think that Congress meant to limit 

Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal 

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information. Rather, “[t]he exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government 

records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.’ ” 

Ireland v. I.R.S., 2017 WL 1731679 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of 

State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). To determine whether 

information has been properly withheld under Exemption 6 requires a court to 

“balance the privacy interests or personal nature of the information sought against 

the public interest that would be served by disclosure.” Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 

F.2d 827, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1979); see Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 278 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). 

The IRS withheld 7 pages in full and 536 pages in part pursuant to Exemption 

6. Queener Decl. ¶ 24. According to Queener, “this exemption is claimed only to 

protect personally identifying information of plaintiff and of third parties.” Queener 

Supp. Decl. ¶ 16. The information being withheld consists of the “social security 

numbers of plaintiff’s employees, the bank account, credit card, or driver license 

numbers of any individual taxpayer, the home addresses, telephone numbers, or 

email addresses of individual taxpayers other than plaintiff, or taxpayer 

identification numbers, Federal and state, of plaintiff or any other third party.” 

Queener Supp. Decl. ¶ 16. 

The Court finds the referenced information was properly withheld under 

Exemption 6, because it consists of personal information of individuals that falls 

within the ambit of information typically subject to privacy protection, and the 

privacy interests of the individuals involved outweigh any public interest that might 

be served by disclosure. See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 841-42; Akin, Gump, 

Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 

(D.D.C. 2007) (“When the material in the government's control is a compilation of 

information about private citizens, rather than a record of government actions, 

there is little legitimate public interest that would outweigh the invasion of privacy 

because the information reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.”). 

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The Court also finds that the IRS complied with its duty to reasonably segregate 

and produce all non-exempt information. Queener Supp. Decl. ¶ 14. Accordingly, 

the Court grants the IRS’s motion for summary judgment as to its withholding of 

information pursuant to Exemption 6. 

3. Exemption 7(E)

Exemption 7(E) protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes 

from disclosure to the extent it “would disclose techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be 

expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). To establish 

this exemption, “the Government must show that the technique that would be 

disclosed under the FOIA request is a technique unknown to the general public.” 

Pully v. Internal Revenue Serv., 939 F. Supp. 429, 438 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing 

Malloy v. Dep’t of Justice, 457 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.D.C. 1978)); see Wilkinson v. 

Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 633 F. Supp. 336, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (to justify 

withholding under Exemption 7(E), “the government will have the burden of proving 

that these techniques are not generally known to the public”). 

The IRS indicates it withheld two pages pursuant to Exemption 7(E).

Queener Decl. ¶ 29. The IRS relies on the declaration of Queener, who states the 

redacted information relates to Plaintiff’s “Risk Score,” “which is a technique used 

by the [IRS] to prioritize case assignments given the [IRS’s] resource constraints. 

The Risk Score is a technique utilized by the [IRS] to ensure the effective 

enforcement of the nation’s tax law, and is a technique unknown to the general 

public.” Queener Supp. Decl. ¶ 18. 

The Court finds the IRS’s evidence sufficient to show that disclosure of the 

referenced information would disclose techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations that could reasonably be expected to risk 

circumvention of the law. The Court also finds that the IRS complied with its duty 

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to reasonably segregate and produce all non-exempt information. See Queener

Decl. ¶ 14. Accordingly, the IRS’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to 

its withholding of information under this exemption.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court concludes with the reminder that “FOIA is not designed ‘as a 

substitute for civil discovery.’ ” Shannahan v. I.R.S., 672 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14 (1982)). As another 

district court reasoned, if the Court were to “hold [Plaintiff] was entitled to the 

third-party return information [it] seeks, [the Court] would have to disclose that 

same information to the general public too.” Greenberger v. I.R.S., 283 

F.Supp.3d 1354, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (citing Forest Serv. Emps. For Envtl 

Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“FOIA provides 

every member of the public with equal access to public documents and, as such, 

information released in response to one FOIA request must be released to the 

public at large.”)). 

Finally, Plaintiff’s appeal to fairness in light of the I.R.S.’s assertion of alter 

ego liability for third parties’ unpaid taxes is unavailing. Even the I.R.S. 

recognizes that in an action challenging the imposition of liability Plaintiff will 

probably obtain the third party information it seeks. (ECF No. 46 at n.3). But this 

FOIA action is not an action challenging the liens.

For the reasons discussed above, the IRS’s motion for summary judgment 

is GRANTED (ECF No. 45) and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED (ECF No. 41). The Clerk shall enter final judgment for the I.R.S.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2018

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