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Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

J. GARRISON THOMPSON, as 

Administrator and Personal 

Representative of the 

Estate of Kay Latham 

Holbrook, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

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vs. : CIV. ACTION 2:14-0295-CG-M

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HANKOOK TIRE AMERICA 

CORP.,a foreign 

corporation; et al.,

Defendants.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the Magistrate Judge for 

issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b), on the motion to dismiss filed by 

Defendant Hankook Tire Company, Ltd. (Docs. 57, 51). 

Plaintiff has responded to Defendant’s motion (doc. 56), 

and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully 

considering the foregoing pleadings and other relevant 

material in the record, it is recommended that Defendant 

Hankook Tire Co., Ltd.’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 57) be

denied.

I. BACKGROUND.

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Decedent, Kay Latham Holbrook, was working as a cement 

truck driver for Holbrook Ready Mix when he was involved in 

a fatal single vehicle accident on July 30, 2011. (Doc. 36

at 4). The Holbrook Ready Mix cement truck involved in the 

crash had been purchased approximately a month and a half 

earlier, on June 10, 2011, from Shelby Concrete, Inc. (Doc.

1-13 at 21). Plaintiff claims that the cement truck’s left 

front tire “suddenly and without warning detreaded causing 

the driver[, Mr. Holbrook,] to lose control of his vehicle, 

crashing into a bridge railing, which then caused the 

vehicle to overturn.” (Doc. 36 at 4). The tire subject to 

the blowout was a Hankook AH10 425/65R22.5 tire 

manufactured by Defendant Hankook Tire Co., Ltd. (“Hankook 

Tire”) and was mounted on the vehicle at the time of 

purchase from Shelby Concrete, Inc. (Id.). Plaintiff 

details that the tire in question had been retreaded or 

recapped by GCR Tire Center and mounted on the truck prior 

to Shelby Concrete, Inc. selling the vehicle to Holbrook 

Ready Mix. (Id.). 

On June 28, 2013, Plaintiff, the administrator and 

personal representative of the Estate of Kay Latham 

Holbrook, brought suit against multiple defendants, 

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including Defendant Hankook Tire, for the wrongful death of 

Mr. Holbrook.1

II. DISCUSSION.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a 

complaint on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the 

legal sufficiency of a complaint (or portions of a 

complaint); therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual 

allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S. Ct. 

1267, 113 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 

1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, all factual 

allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 

U.S. 593, 598, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).

 1 This suit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of 

Dallas County, Alabama against ten defendants. (Doc. 1-13 

at 16). The case was removed to the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Alabama on June 26, 

2014, and six defendants remain: Hankook Tire America 

Corp., Hankook Tire Company, Ltd., Bridgestone Bandag, 

L.L.C., Bridgestone Retail Operations, L.L.C., GCR Tire 

Centers; Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, L.L.C. 

(Doc. 36). 

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The complaint alleges that Hankook Tire:

. . .[D]esigned, engineered, manufactured, 

advertised, tested, inspected, sold, distributed, 

or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce 

the Hankook AH10 425/65R22.5 tire . . . in a 

defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. . 

. .

[Hankook Tire] reasonably expected that the 

Hankook tire would reach the ultimate consumer, 

or user, in the condition they were in at the 

time of the occurrence, made the basis of this 

lawsuit. . . .

The Hankook tire was unreasonably dangerous and 

defective and the defects existing therein 

subjected the Plaintiff’s decedent to an 

unreasonably risk of harm in that the tire, as 

designed, had a substantial propensity to 

deteriorate, experience tread separation, blowout or otherwise experience failures before the 

useful life of the tire had expired. . . .

The Hankook tire, which is the subject matter of 

this lawsuit, was defective in the following 

respects:

(a) Improper design of the tire from a 

handling, durability instability 

standpoint;

(b) Improper design and manufacture of 

the tire so as to create an 

unreasonable and dangerous 

propensity to separate under 

normal and foreseeable 

circumstances; 

(c) Failure to provide a reasonable 

and adequate warning to suppliers 

and users of the tire about the 

tire’s propensity to separate in 

various circumstances and 

conditions;

(d) Marketing the tire in such a way 

as to mislead consumers as to the 

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safety, stability, maneuverability 

and roadworthiness of the tires;

(e) Improper and inadequate testing of 

the tire and its components;

(f) Hiding from the public the true 

nature of the tire and its 

propensity to separate and cause a 

driver to lose control, experience 

rollover wrecks or otherwise be 

involved in potentially fatal 

wrecks;

(g) Failing to properly train its 

employees in the proper 

inspection, manufacturing, and 

servicing of the tires;

(h) Failing to design a tire which 

would not detread under normal 

driving conditions;

(i) Failing to properly monitor 

detreading causes in its tires and 

warn the public of dangerous 

propensities;

(j) Failing to conduct tests on the 

tire to determine how vehicles 

using the tire would react in the 

event of a tire tread separation;

(k) Failing to design and manufacture 

the tire in accordance with 

specifications provided by vehicle 

manufacturers or failing to design 

specifications to meet the 

intended use of the tire. . . .

As a direct and proximate result of the defective 

tire, the decedent, Kay Latham Holbrook, was 

caused to suffer fatal injuries in this wreck. 

Plaintiff makes a claim for wrongful death on 

behalf of his estate. 

(Doc. 36 at 5-6.). In order for Plaintiff to hold 

Defendant liable for a claim brought under the Alabama 

Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (“AEMLD”), 

Plaintiff must show:

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(1) he suffered injury or damages to himself or 

his property by one who sells a product in a 

defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 

plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if 

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 

selling such a product, and 

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 

consumer without substantial change in the 

condition in which it is sold. 

(2) Showing these elements, the plaintiff has 

proved a prima facie case although 

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in 

the preparation and sale of his product, and 

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 

product from, or entered into any contractual 

relation with, the seller.

Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128, 132-133 (Ala. 

1976). 

In the case at hand, Plaintiff has pleaded the 

necessary elements of an AEMLD claim, but has admitted that 

the tire in question under went a change from the time it 

was manufactured by Defendant. Defendant argues, and urges 

this Court to accept, that the admitted retreading or 

recapping of the Hankook tire at issue represents a 

“substantial” change in the condition of the tire, thereby 

automatically relieving Hankook Tire of the possibility of 

liability, negating discovery and determining the proximate 

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cause of injury.2 In sole support of its theory, Defendant 

cites Williams v. Michelin Tire Corp., 496 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 

1986).

Plaintiff Williams was injured while driving a UPS 

truck equipped with a retreaded tire that blew out. 

Williams and his wife brought suit against several 

defendants, including Michelin Tire Corporation, the 

manufacturer of the tire, and Fleet Tread Service, Inc., 

the entity responsible for retreading the tire, alleging 

the tire was defective. The evidence before the court 

revealed that an experienced tire inspector had examined 

the faulty tire at issue and determined the blowout was due 

to the retreading of the tire, not from a “defect in the 

material, workmanship, or design of the tire.” Id. The 

record also contained Williams’ statement that he saw no 

foreign objects in the road on the day of the accident, 

which was supported by the statement of an eye witness to 

the accident who affirmed he walked up and down the road 

following the accident but saw no large objects or potholes 

 2 On August 14, 2013, prior to the transfer of this suit 

to federal court, codefendant Hankook Tire America Corp. 

(“Hankook America”), Defendant Hankook Tire’s subsidiary, 

filed an identical motion to dismiss in state court. (See

Doc. 1-13 at 184). The court denied Hankook America’s 

identical motion to dismiss based on Williams v. Michelin 

Tire Corp. (doc. 1-14 at 408; doc. 56-1) and denied 

Hankook America’s motion to certify the order for an 

interlocutory appeal. (Doc. 1-14 at 467). 

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that would have caused the blow out. Id. Additionally, a 

professional engineer knowledgeable in stress analysis of 

tires opined that the cause of the accident was due to the 

casing, tread, or faulty recapping process. The trial 

court dismissed the claim against Michelin Tire Corp. based 

upon the AEMLD, and subsequently granted summary judgment 

in favor of Fleet Tread Service, Inc. and the remaining 

defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed arguing that there 

was “at least a scintilla of evidence to support their 

claims.” Williams, 496 So. 2d at 745. In regards to the 

dismissal of the defendant tire companies, the Alabama 

Supreme Court concluded that to establish a claim under the 

AEMLD,

the product must reach the consumer without 

substantial change in condition. Since the tire 

that Michelin put into the stream of commerce had 

undergone a substantial change in condition due 

to being recapped, Michelin cannot be held 

liable. Therefore, the court's dismissal of this 

claim against Michelin was correct. However, 

plaintiffs introduced expert testimony that the 

blow-out could have been caused by either the 

tire casing or the tread or the recapping 

process. Thus, plaintiffs have offered at least a 

scintilla of evidence that the recapping process 

was faulty, and, therefore, the summary judgment 

in favor of the recapper, Fleet Tread Service, 

Inc., should not have been granted.

Williams, 496 So. 2d at 746.

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It appears to be undisputed that the Hankook tire in 

the current case was retreaded as the tire in Williams, 

thereby altering it from its original condition. However, 

it is unclear at this stage of the case whether or not the 

cause of the accident and Mr. Holbrook’s death was in fact 

due to the alteration of the tire, as was opined in 

Williams, or whether or not the alteration was foreseeable, 

or whether or not the alteration was substantial. See 

Bullen v. Roto Finishing Systems, 435 So. 2d 1256, 1258 

(Ala. 1983) (adding a catwalk and platform to an 

embossing/printing machine did not relieve the manufacturer 

of liability when there was evidence that the nip point was 

unsafe as originally designed); Banner Welders, Inc. v. 

Knighton, 425 So. 2d 441, 451 (Ala. 1982) (adding grounding 

blocks to a shuttle welder would not relieve the welder's 

manufacturer of liability when the blocks merely increased 

the frequency of malfunctions); Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 

339 So. 2d 992, 996 (Ala. 1976) (removing blades from a 

paper-making machine would not relieve the manufacturer of 

the machine of liability when the blades would not have 

prevented the accident); Clarke Industries, Inc. v. Home 

Indemnity Co., 591 So. 2d 458, 462 (Ala. 1991) (replacing 

the disposable dust collection bag on floor sander with a 

bag not manufactured by the seller was a foreseeable 

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alteration that would not relieve the manufacturer of 

liability for injuries caused by spontaneous combustion of 

the dust collection bag attached to the sander); but cf.,

Fenley v. Rouselle Corp., 531 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala. 1988) 

(removing the safety devices from a machine press 

constituted a superseding cause of employee's accident that

relieved the press's manufacturer of liability); Burkett v. 

Loma Machine Manufacturing, Inc., 552 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 

1989) (modifying the blade guard on a billet saw to expose 

an additional 15 inches of the blade was a substantial 

change that relieved the manufacturer of liability);

Morguson v. 3M Co., 857 So. 2d 796, 801 (Ala. 2003)(when 

not foreseeable, an "alteration amounts to an intervening 

and superseding cause of the injury and relieves the seller 

of liability under the AEMLD").3

 3 Notably, these cited cases are factually distinct from 

the case at hand, as none of them involve an original tire 

manufacturer’s liability after the tire has been retreaded, 

like Williams v. Michelin Tire Corp. Interestingly, 

however, Plaintiff nor Defendant cite any other cases 

involving a manufacturer’s exception from liability purely 

because a tire has been retreaded, and the Court was unable 

to locate any either. Despite the factual similarity 

regarding the retreaded tire in Williams, Williams is 

easily distinguishable from the current case in that 

Williams contains evidentiary proof of the proximate cause 

of harm to its plaintiff. For this reason, the Court 

determines that it must follow the abundance of case law 

reasoning the alteration of a product must be the proximate 

cause of injury in order to relieve a manufacturer of 

liability, versus the single case of Williams v. Michelin 

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While Defendant relies exclusively on Williams to 

support its motion to dismiss, the Alabama Supreme Court 

has pronounced in case after case that the mere fact that a 

product has been altered subsequent to its sale does not 

necessarily relieve the seller of liability. Johnson v. 

Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 555 So. 2d 88, 91 (Ala. 

1989); see also Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton, 425 So.

2d 441, 451 (Ala. 1982) (citing Annotation, Products 

Liability: Alteration of Product After It Leaves Hands of 

Manufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liability for ProductCaused Harm, 41 A.L.R. 3d 1251, 1253 (1972)).

An essential element of an AEMLD claim is proof 

that the product reached the consumer without 

substantial change in the condition in which it 

was sold. Clarke Indus., Inc. v. Home Indemn. 

Co., 591 So. 2d 458, 462 (Ala. 1991); see also 

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d 854 

(Ala. 1981). However, the mere fact that a 

product has been altered or modified does not 

necessarily relieve the manufacturer or seller of 

liability. Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool 

Works, 555 So. 2d 88, 91 (Ala. 1989). A 

manufacturer or seller remains liable if the 

alteration or modification did not in fact cause 

the injury, Johnson, 555 So. 2d at 91 (quoting 

Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Hartford 

Acc. & Indemn. Co., 475 So. 2d 472, 476 (Ala. 

1985); Bullen v. Roto Finishing Systems, 435 So. 

2d 1256 (Ala. 1983); Brown v. Terry, 375 So. 2d 

457 (Ala. 1979), or if the alteration or 

modification was reasonably foreseeable to the 

manufacturer or seller. Clarke Indus., 591 So. 2d 

at 462; Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So. 2d 992 

(Ala. 1976)."

 

Tire Corp. 

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Halsey v. A.B. Chance Co., 695 So. 2d 607, 608 (Ala. 1997)

(citing Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d 1018, 

1027 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1128, 128 L. Ed. 

2d 865, 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994)) (emphasis added). 

Defendant appears to maintain that Williams proposes a 

bright line rule - that anytime a tire is retreaded and 

that same tire suffers a blowout, that the manufacturer is

automatically relieved of liability due to the fact that 

the original product was altered after being set into the 

stream of commerce. The Court cannot go against the weight 

of legal authority that resists this reasoning. Instead, 

it is more sound to declare that, if the evidence shows the 

retreading of a tire is the proximate cause of a 

plaintiff’s injury, then the original tire manufacturer 

cannot be found liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. 

However, in the case at hand, unlike Williams, Plaintiff, 

nor any party, has yet to submit evidence detailing the 

cause of the fatal accident.

The burden of proving the AEMLD claims ultimately 

rests with “the injured consumer to prove that the product 

left the defendant's control in an unreasonably dangerous 

condition not fit for its expected use, and that which 

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rendered the product in such an unfit condition in fact 

caused the injury. The plaintiff's burden will not be 

sustained without evidence to support the conclusion that 

the product is defective.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven 

Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1981)(citing 

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402 A, Comment g.). 

Plaintiff must show that the injury was not caused by the 

change, in this case the retreading. Williamson v. Tyson 

Foods, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Ala. 1993); Verchot v. 

GMC, 812 So. 2d 296, 301 (Ala. 2001)("The Plaintiff must 

prove that the product was substantially unaltered when 

used by him and must also prove causation in fact, 

including proof that the defect caused the injury and that 

the defect is traceable to the Defendant."). 

The problem is that this case is at the pleadings 

stage, not the summary judgment stage.4 Plaintiff is not 

required to "prove" ultimate facts or "produce" an 

evidentiary foundation for its claims to satisfy Rule 

12(b)(6). Instead, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion merely questions 

 4 The discovery process has been stalled in this case 

due to Plaintiff’s difficulty in successfully serving 

Hankook Tire Co., Ltd. (See Doc. 46). On March 13, 2015, 

the Court suspended the dates for expert disclosures until 

Defendant Hankook was served and appeared. (Doc. 48). To 

date, the scheduling order has not been modified as 

Defendant Hankook was served and filed this motion to 

dismiss, but has not filed a formal appearance. (Doc. 51, 

53).

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the legal sufficiency of a complaint. United States v. 

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 113 L. Ed. 2d 

335 (1991). And at this juncture, "[w]e take the factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Edwards v. 

Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010); see also 

Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (similar). Defendant Hankook is entitled to 

challenge these factual allegations and demand proof of the 

same in discovery and at trial, assuming that genuine 

disputes of material fact exist. But Defendant cannot 

preempt the discovery process via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in 

which it essentially urges the Court to reject the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint for want of proof, or 

to force Plaintiff to meet a summary judgment-type burden 

of proof today.

III. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended 

that Defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied.

The instructions that follow the undersigned's 

signature contain important information regarding

objections to the report and recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge.

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. L.R. 72.4. The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the 

court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in 

the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to 

be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

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incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 8th day of July, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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