Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06156/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH . FILED 

United States Court or Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 1 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

MONICA SKRZYPCZAK, 

an Oklahoma citizen, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff- Appellant, 

v. 

YVONNE KAUGER, ROBERT E. 

LA VENDER, ROBERT D. SIMMS, 

HARDY SUMMERS, JOSEPH M. 

WATT, RALPH B. HODGES, 

RUDOLPH HARGRAVE, ALMA 

WILSON, and MARIAN P. OPALA, in 

their official capacities as Justices of the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 95-6156 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D. Ct. No. CIV-94-1236L) 

Michael Minnis (David McCullough with him on the briefs), Michael Minnis & Associates, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for the Appellant. 

Scott D. Boughton, Assistant Attorney General (W .A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General 

of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for the 

Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 95-6156 Document: 01019278994 Date Filed: 08/12/1996 Page: 1 
TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

In 1993, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a proposed initiative restricting 

abortion, State Question 642 ("SQ 642"), could not be placed on the ballot because it was 

unconstitutional. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Okla. 1992), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993). Monica Skrzypczak, who was not a party to that action, filed this 

suit against the justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court alleging that the court's refusal to 

place SQ 642 on the ballot constituted a prior restraint on speech. The district court granted 

the Oklahoma Supreme Court's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on 

the ground that a federal district court does not have the authority to review final decisions 

of state supreme courts. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the 

decision of the district court, but on a different ground. We hold that Skrzypczak lacks 

standing to bring this suit because she failed to allege injury in fact. 

BACKGROUND 

The Oklahoma Coalition to Restrict Abortion, Inc., and Fred W. Sellers, Jr. ("the 

proponents") filed initiative petition pamphlets with the Oklahoma Secretary of State on June 

29, 1990. The proposed initiative, SQ 642, criminalized abortion, allowing it only in four 

circumstances: (1) where continuing the pregnancy would cause grave impairment of the 

woman's physical or mental health; (2) in cases of rape, as defined by Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 

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1111 (West 1988); (3) in cases of incest, as defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 885 (West 1988); 

and (4) in cases of grave physical or mental defect of the fetus. Two individuals, Nancy 

Feldman and Kim Little, filed a protest challenging the constitutionality of SQ 642. They 

later withdrew their claim. 

On July 14, 1992, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sua sponte ordered the proponents, 

as well as Feldman and Little, to brief the impact ofPlanned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 

2791 (1992), on the constitutionality ofSQ 642. The proponents conceded in their brief that 

SQ 642 was unconstitutional, but argued that the Oklahoma Supreme Court should allow the 

initiative to go forward as an exercise in political advocacy. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 

held that SQ 642 was unconstitutional and thus could not be placed on the ballot. In Re 

Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 7-8. The Oklahoma Supreme Court further held that 

pre-submission review of the constitutionality of initiative petitions is appropriate, and 

rejected the proponents' argument that pre-submission review violates their free speech 

rights. Id. at 8-10. The proponents petitioned for certiorari, arguing that pre-submission 

review of the initiative petition constitutes a prior restraint on speech. The United States 

Supreme Court declined to review the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision. Oklahoma 

Coalition to Restrict Abortion. Inc. v. Feldman, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993). 

On August 3, 1994, Skrzypczak filed this suit against the justices ofthe Oklahoma 

Supreme Court. She alleged that she was neither a party nor the agent of any party involved 

in In re Initiative Petition No. 349, but that she would advocate the passage or defeat of SQ 

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642 if it were placed on the ballot. She sought both a declaration that pre-submission content 

review of initiative petitions constitutes a prior restraint on core political speech and an 

injunction compelling the Oklahoma Supreme Court to complete the initiative petition 

process for SQ 642 and refrain from performing pre-submission reviews in the future. The 

Oklahoma Supreme Court moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, noting that Skrzypczak advanced the 

same arguments that had been submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the United 

States Supreme Court. The court further stated that Skrzypczak's complaint, in effect, asked 

the court to overrule the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in In re Initiative Petition No. 

349. The court reasoned that because a federal district court does not have authority to 

directly review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings, District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), it consequently lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the case. 

DISCUSSION 

Although neither side raises the issue, we must determine whether Skrzypczak has 

standing to raise her claims. We are obliged to address standing sua sponte because it 

involves a constitutional limitation on a federal court's jurisdiction, Bangerter v. Orem City 

Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1497 (lOth Cir. 1995), and "federal courts are under an independent 

obligation to examine their own jurisdiction," FW/PBS. Inc. v. City ofDallas, 493 U.S. 215, 

231 ( 1990). The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and 

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controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 

United for Separation of Church and State. Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). The case-orcontroversy limitation requires, among other things, that a plaintiff have standing. Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). A party has standing when (1) she has 

suffered an injury in fact, (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 

complained of, and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 

Id. A plaintiff must support the elements of standing "with the manner and degree of 

evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." I d. "At the pleading stage, 

general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for 

on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[ e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts 

that are necessary to support the claim .... "' I d. at 2137 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife 

Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). We must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and 

construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hackford v. 

Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (lOth Cir. 1994); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 

(1975). 

We hold that Skrzypczak lacks standing because her complaint fails to allege an injury 

in fact. Injury in fact requires invasion of a legally-protected interest. Defenders of Wildlife, 

112 S. Ct. at 2136. Skrzypczak asserts that her legally-protected interest in free speech is 

infringed by pre-submission content review of initiative petitions. Thus, she appears to claim 

that her right to free speech depends upon SQ 642 going forward to a popular vote. 

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Skrzypczak mistakenly conflates her legally-protected interest in free speech with her 

personal desire to have SQ 642 on the ballot. In removing SQ 642 from the ballot, the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court has not prevented Skrzypczak from speaking on any subject. She 

is free to argue against legalized abortion, to contend that pre-submission content review of 

initiative petitions is unconstitutional, or to speak publicly on any other issue. Her right to 

free speech in no way depends on the presence of SQ 642 on the ballot. Moreover, she cites 

no law, and we find none, establishing a right to have a particular proposition on the ballot. 

Because she has failed to assert a legally-cognizable interest, we hold that Skrzypczak lacks 

standing to assert her claim. 

The Supreme Court's holding in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), does not 

undercut our conclusion. In Meyer, the Supreme Court held that a Colorado law forbidding 

initiative proponents from paying people to circulate petitions violated the First Amendment. 

The Court described the speech involved in circulating initiative petitions as "core political 

speech." Id. at 421-22. The Court noted that Colorado's prohibition against paying petition 

circulators imposed two restrictions on political expression: ( 1) it limited the number of 

messengers and thus limited the size of the audience that could be reached and (2) it 

diminished the likelihood that the petitioners would gain the number of signatures necessary 

to place the measure on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to promote statewide discussion 

of the issues raised by the initiative petition. I d. at 422-23. The Court also held that the 

state's power to ban initiatives entirely does not include the power to limit political speech 

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regarding issues raised in initiative petitions. Id. at 424-25. 

The Meyer case is inapposite because the law at issue in that case curtailed free 

speech--proponents of an initiative were forbidden to pay anyone to disseminate their 

message and gather signatures for their petition. In this case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

has done nothing to restrict speech: neither Skrzypczak nor anyone else has been silenced by 

pre-submission content review. Moreover, there is nothing in Meyer suggesting that there 

is a protected right to have a particular initiative on the ballot. 

Reading the complaint liberally and construing all reasonable allegations in 

Skrzypczak's favor, we hold that she has failed to identify a legally-protected interest that 

has been invaded and thus has failed to allege an injury in fact. For this reason, the judgment 

of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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