Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EON WALDEN, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

JANE MOFFETT, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-6680 REC DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT.

(Doc. 5)

On June 27, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and for a

more definite statement. Plaintiffs, who are appearing pro se,

did not appear at oral argument. Upon due consideration of the

written and oral arguments of the parties and the record herein,

the motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth below. 

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are Eon Walden (“Plaintiff Walden”) and Corey

Victor (“Plaintiff Victor”), by and through his guardian ad litem

Jumoke Walden (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiff Walden is

Plaintiff Victor’s maternal grandmother and authorized caregiver. 

Plaintiff Victor was ten years old when the FAC was filed. 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Defendants are Jane Moffett, the principal of Sonoma

Elementary School in Modesto, California; Marie Lagos, a second

grade teacher at Sonoma Elementary; James Enochs, Superintendent

of Modesto City Schools; Jim Pfaff, Assistant Superintendent of

Modesto City Schools; Sharon Felix-Rochon, the Director of the

Office of Equal Opportunity for the California Department of

Education; and the California Department of Education.

This case revolves around events occurring at Sonoma

Elementary School in Modesto, where Plaintiff Victor was a

student. Plaintiffs, who are African-American, allege that as

students and parents in the Modesto City School District they are

victims of unfair and unequal religious and racially biased

disciplinary policies and practices at the hands of school

officials, teachers and personnel. Plaintiffs are members of the

Jehovah’s Witness faith and Plaintiff Walden is an ordained

minister within that religion. A primary tenet of the Jehovah’s

Witness religion is the open publication and public preaching of

their faith, a fact which Plaintiffs allege Defendants are aware.

Plaintiff Victor has an “articulation disorder, which is

below what is expected for his chronological age and development

level. This disorder reduces intelligibility and significantly

interferes with communication and attracts adverse attention.” 

FAC ¶ 4. Plaintiff Victor attended Sonoma Elementary School from

kindergarten until the fourth grade and was classified as a

Special Education student. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Lagos, Plaintiff Victor’s

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

second grade teacher, and Moffett forced Plaintiff Victor to

participate in Thanksgiving-related activities and that

unspecified Defendants forced Plaintiffs to recite the Pledge of

Allegiance. Both activities are contrary to the tenets of the

Jehovah’s Witness faith. 

On March 19, 2002, Plaintiff Victor was disciplined for

defending himself in an altercation with a non African-American

student. Plaintiff Victor was sent home with a discipline slip

and warning of a five day suspension while the non AfricanAmerican student was not subjected to any disciplinary action. 

On September 25, 2003, Plaintiff Victor was grabbed by his

ear by an adult yard aid, called “black boy,” and dragged across

the school yard. The incident was reported to Defendant Moffett

but Defendant Moffett failed to act on the information, including

failing to report the “abuse” to law enforcement authorities.

Plaintiffs further allege that on November 19, 2003,

Plaintiff Walden was on school property to “observe lunchtime

recess” because Plaintiff Victor was “repeatedly victimized by

verbal and physical assaults” from other students and an adult

yard aid during that time. FAC ¶ 28. Plaintiff Walden was on

school grounds with the knowledge and consent of Defendant

Moffett. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Moffett instructed

school personnel to monitor Plaintiff Walden. A Jehovah’s

Witness student requested Plaintiff Walden’s assistance in

explaining an illustration in a Jehovah’s Witness publication

that was part of a student-to-student Bible study. Plaintiff

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 At Defendants’ request, the Court hereby takes judicial 1

notice of Plaintiffs’ verified Complaint and FAC. Fed. R. Evid.

201.

 The FAC purports to be a class action. Although a party may 2

appear in propria person on his or her own behalf, that privilege

is personal. See Russel v. United State, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir.

1962); McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 2886, 288 (9th Cir.

1966). A pro se party may not represent a class. 

4

Walden offered a simple explanation regarding the illustration. 

On that same visit Plaintiff Walden “made a calm and respectful

response to an Anglo-American fifth grader” who addressed

Plaintiff Walden using foul and vulgar language and threatened

Plaintiff Victor, who was then in the fourth grade. FAC ¶ 35. 

Plaintiff Walden’s on-campus visitation privileges were revoked

following these encounters.

Plaintiff Walden’s visitation privileges were eventually

reinstated. Plaintiff Walden was warned that her privileges

would again be revoked if she was caught “sharing words of faith

with any student or having verbal contact of any kind with any

student” at the school. Plaintiffs allege that the visitation

restrictions were based on Plaintiff Walden’s race and religion.

Plaintiffs allege that the school district’s practice of

placing students at schools far away from their school of

residence and the school district’s failure to respond to the

complaints of harassment against African-American students forced

them to move to a “more racially tolerant environment.”

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 10, 2004 and

their FAC on December 17, 2004. The FAC alleges thirteen 1 2

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

causes of action. The first claim is for violation of

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to religious freedom and is

based on Plaintiff Victor’s being forced to say the Pledge and

participate in Thanksgiving activities and on Plaintiff Walden’s

visitation privileges being revoked following her response to the

students regarding the religious illustration. The second claim,

which is also based on the revocation of Plaintiff Walden’s

visitation privileges, is for violation of Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment rights to free speech.

The third claim is for “racial profiling” based on Defendant

Moffett’s instruction to school staff to monitor Plaintiff

Walden’s actions on campus. The fourth claim is for defamation

based on a statement allegedly made by Defendant Moffett that

Plaintiff Walden had “various (disruptive) encounters with yard

duty, teachers, students and parents” and that parents had

complained about Plaintiff Walden. The fifth claim is for

slander based on “defamatory comments, false accusations and

felonious reports.”

The sixth claim is for violation of due process based on a

denial of fair hearings before Plaintiffs’ rights were revoked. 

The seventh claim is an equal protection claim based on the

incident occurring on March 19, 2002. The eighth claim is a

section 1983 claim based on Defendants’ holding African-American

students and parents to higher standards than those set forth in

district policies.

The ninth claim is for violation of the Equal Educational

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants Sharon Felix-Rochon and the California Department 3

of Education have not made appearances in this case or joined in

the instant motion.

6

Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., based on the

alleged practice of Modesto City Schools to transfer AfricanAmerican students to schools that are farther away from their

residence and failure of District personnel to respond to

complaints from African-American parents. The tenth claim is for

wrongful use of a civil proceeding based on “unwarranted and

malicious disciplinary hearings.” The eleventh, twelfth and

thirteenth claims are negligence claims based on the school

district’s practices regarding disciplining African-American

students more harshly than Anglo-American students and not taking

measures to protect African-American students from harassment as

well as negligent supervision of school district personnel. 

Defendants Moffett, Lagos, Enochs and Pfaff have moved to 3

dismiss the FAC, with the exception of claim nine, for failure to

state a claim and failure to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act. Defendants have moved in the alternative for a more

definite statement. 

Plaintiffs’ opposition focuses primarily on the lenient

dismissal standard and raises little substantive opposition. It

does, however, assert that Plaintiffs complied with the Tort

Claims Act, an allegation that is missing from the FAC.

///

///

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

III. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80,

78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” North Star Int’l

v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The

Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). 

Also, the pleadings of pro se litigants “are held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 101 S. Ct. 173

(1980) (quotation omitted).

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Rule 12(e) allows for a motion for a more definite statement

if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). Motions for a more definite statement are

disfavored, but are within the Court’s discretion and may be

appropriate in certain situations. If a deficiency in a

complaint is “not so material that the pleading should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is

appropriate.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew

Bender 3d ed.). However, “where the information sought by the

moving party is available and/or properly sought through

discovery the motion [for a more definite statement] should be

denied.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.

Supp. 940, 950 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

IV. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims (Claims 1-2 & 6-9)

1. Freedom of Religion (Claim One)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “violated plaintiffs’

religious beliefs” by their actions. Plaintiffs specifically

allege that Defendants Moffett and Lagos forced Plaintiff Victor

to participate in a Thanksgiving activity, the coloring of a

picture of a turkey, and in “flag pledging ceremonies.” 

Plaintiffs further allege that their right to freedom of religion

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

was abridged when Plaintiff Walden’s visitation privileges were

revoked after her response to the students in the Bible study.

To establish a violation of the Free Exercise clause of the

First Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the challenged state

action “has a coercive effect that operates against the

litigant’s practice of his or her religion.” Grove v. Mead Sch.

Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 826 (1985). Three factors are relevant to the analysis

of the state action at issue: “(1) the extent of the burden upon

the exercise of religion, (2) the existence of a compelling state

interest justifying that burden, and (3) the extent to which

accommodation of the complainant would impede the state’s

objectives.” Id. 

a. Thanksgiving Activities & the Pledge

Defendants did not specifically address the free exercise

claim as it relates to the pledge and the Thanksgiving crafts. 

Defendants’ counsel conceded at oral argument that there is no

challenge at this time to Plaintiff Victor’s claims on this

basis. Although there may be some question whether having to

participate in Thanksgiving activities runs afoul of the First

Amendment, see Palmer v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 466 F. Supp.

600, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1979), there is no question that school

officials cannot require a child to participate in the recitation

of the Pledge of Allegiance. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. V.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178

(1943). To the extent Plaintiffs allege that Defendants required

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 California law also tolls the statute of limitations for 4

minors in certain cases. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352.

10

Plaintiff Victor to say the pledge, this could be a coercive

effect on the practice of Plaintiff Victor’s religion. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this portion of claim one is

DENIED.

As to Plaintiff Walden on this aspect of claim one,

Plaintiff Walden, as Plaintiff Victor’s guardian, has a right to

control the religious upbringing of Plaintiff Victor. Wisconsin

v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526, (1972);

see also Grove, 753 F.2d at 1531. The pledge allegation is

sufficient at this point to state an interference claim, and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this aspect of claim one is DENIED.

In moving for a more definite statement as to Plaintiff

Victor’s claims, Defendants note that Ms. Lagos was Plaintiff

Victor’s second grade teacher and postulate that, because

Plaintiff Victor is now at least in the fourth grade, this claim

is barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing

section 1983 claims in California. Defendants argue that

“Plaintiff Corey Victor should not be allowed to avoid an early

disposition of his time-barred claims through intentionally vague

and uncertain pleadings.” Defs.’ Mot. at 8. 

Defendants are not entitled to a more definite statement as

to this aspect of claim one. Dates are properly a matter for

discovery; a party is not required to plead around a statute of

limitations. See Jacobsen v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d 4

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Although the allegations are sufficient, it would be proper 5

for Plaintiffs to separate claim one into two claims in the SAC,

one on behalf of Plaintiff Victor, and one on behalf of Plaintiff

Walden. 

11

1198, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2004). The lack of dates does not deprive

Defendants of the ability to frame a responsive pleading and the

motion for a more definite statement is DENIED as to this claim.5

b. Revocation of Plaintiff Walden’s Visitation

Rights

The question as to this allegation is whether Defendants’

revocation of Plaintiff Walden’s campus visitation privileges had

a coercive effect that operated against Plaintiff Walden’s

practice of religion. It did not. Defendants are not alleged to

have told Plaintiff Walden that she could not practice her

Jehovah’s Witness faith, but rather than she could not discuss

religious issues with students during recess. Not allowing

Plaintiff Walden to espouse her religious beliefs on the

playground is not a burden on her free exercise of religion. 

DiLoreto v. Bd. of Educ., 74 Cal. App. 4th 267 (1999) (applying

First Amendment principles to determine whether action violated

California Constitution). This is, if anything, a free speech

issue, which will be addressed in the next section. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claim one is

GRANTED with leave to amend to the extent claim one is based on

the revocation of Plaintiff Walden’s visitation rights and DENIED

to the extent it is based on Plaintiff Victor’s being required to

participate in the Pledge of Allegiance and holiday activities.

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

2. Freedom of Speech (Claim Two)

Plaintiff Walden alleges that her right to freedom of speech

was violated by Defendants when her visitation privileges were

suspended following her exchange with the Bible study students

and her encounter with the fifth-grader who used vulgar language

toward her. Plaintiffs also allege that the restriction placed

on future visits that Plaintiff Walden not have verbal contact of

any kind with students violates Plaintiff Walden’s free speech

rights. Plaintiffs assert that this is an “attempt at abridging

the free speech of African-American and non-mainstream religion

parents who wish to exercise their right to have a high profile

presence on school campuses in order to ensure the Constitutional

Rights of their children are not being abridged.” FAC ¶ 38.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ conduct is not protected

and that, because Sonoma Elementary School is a non-public forum

during school hours, Plaintiff Walden’s speech may be regulated.

“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by

conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner

restrictions.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468

U.S. 288, 293, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984). The

burden is on the person “desiring to engage in assertedly

expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even

applies.” Id. at 294 n.5. 

As an initial matter, “[r]eligious educators may not come

into the school during the course of the school day in order to

provide religious instruction to the students.” Ronna Greff

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

Schneider, 1 Education Law: First Amendment Due Process and

Discrimination Litigation § 1:17 (West 2004) (citing Illinois ex

rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist No. 71, 333 U.S.

203, 92 L. Ed. 649, 68 S. Ct. 461 (1948)). Because Plaintiff

Walden had no right to provide religious instruction in any form,

it was not a violation of her First Amendment rights to revoke

her visitation privileges or to advise her that she could not do

so in the future. This claim could likely be dismissed on this

basis alone, however Defendants have provided an alternate basis

for dismissal which merits discussion.

In Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 98

L. Ed. 2d 592, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988), the Supreme Court held that

“school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if

school authorities have ‘by policy or practice’ opened those

facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public’ or by

some segment of the public, such as student organizations.” 

Where no public forum has been created, school officials are free

to “impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,

teachers, and other members of the school community.” Id. 

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Modesto City School

District has opened up its campuses for indiscriminate use by the

general public. Nor do Plaintiffs challenge the authority of the

school or its officials to issue or revoke visitation privileges.

Rather, Plaintiffs object to the reason behind the revocation,

Plaintiff Walden’s speech. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that

Plaintiff Walden’s visitation rights were reinstated but were

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

subject to a speech restriction.

In the case of a non-public forum, access may be controlled

“based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the

distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served

by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” Cornelious v. NAACP

Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). “Although

a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to

address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum,

or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose

especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates

the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to

suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible

subject.” Id. In the case of school non-public forums, the test

is whether the restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate

pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.

Plaintiffs’ contention that parents have a “right to have a

high profile presence on school campuses” in order to safeguard

the rights of their children in unsupported by citation. Absent

authority for this “right,” refusing Plaintiff Walden’s

visitation privileges does not constitute an abridgement of

speech; the only speech-related right alleged is to discuss

religion, and, as mentioned, there is no such right on school

campuses. Even if Plaintiff Walden did have such a right, there

is no allegation that other individuals were allowed to speak to

students regarding religion during the recess periods, and thus

there is no allegation that Plaintiff Walden was excluded based

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

on her viewpoint. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff Walden’s

purpose in being at the school was to “observe” the recess, not

to discuss religion with students. It follows that because

religion is not a topic encompassed within the purpose of the

school, a nonpublic forum, Plaintiff Walden may properly be

excluded therefrom if she wishes to address such topics. 

In sum, Plaintiff Walden does not have a right to engage in

religious speech at the school and there is no allegation that

Plaintiff Walden was discriminated against based on viewpoint,

i.e. that other parents were allowed to discuss religious issues

with children during recess. As such, Plaintiff cannot state a

claim based on a free speech violation. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second claim for violation of the

First Amendment is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs may amend the FAC

to allege viewpoint discrimination if such allegation may be

included within the strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

3. Racial Profiling (Claim Three)

The FAC does not cite a statutory basis for Plaintiffs’

claim entitled “racial profiling.” To the extent Plaintiffs

assert claims based on disparate treatment because of race, these

should be addressed within Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

Accordingly, because this claim is unsupported by any cognizable

legal theory, Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

/// 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

4. Due Process (Claim Six)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ due process claim is

deficient as currently alleged. Although Plaintiffs’ claim is

entitled “substantive due process,” the FAC alleges that

Plaintiffs were denied their due process rights when “Modesto

City School District officials and the California Department of

Education denied plaintiffs the right to fair hearings conducted

in a competent manner.” FAC at ¶ 54. The FAC further alleges

that Plaintiffs “were denied basic procedural rights when

defendants failed to provide legitimate evidence and/or witnesses

to present appropriate evidence and justification for the

revocation of and the denial of certain students’ and parents’

rights.” FAC at ¶ 54. Defendants correctly argue that

Plaintiffs’ claim is, if anything, a procedural due process one.

To plead an action for a violation of procedural due process

a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest and a denial of adequate

procedural protections. Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085

(9th Cir. 2003). The first inquiry in a procedural due process

claim, as in any section 1983 claim, is whether the plaintiff has

been deprived a right secured by the Constitution or federal

laws. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433, 99

S. Ct. 2689 (1979). The adequacy of the procedures used is only

considered after it is determined that a protected interest was

involved. “In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by

state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life,

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is

unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without

due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126, 108

L. Ed. 2d 100, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”)

was meant to “ensure that all children with disabilities have

available to them a free appropriate public education that

emphasizes special education and related services designed to

meet their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that the rights of

children with disabilities and parents of such children are

protected.” Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40, 308 F.3d 1047,

1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)). Here,

although the pleadings are not perfect, Plaintiffs do allege that

they were denied a fair hearing relevant to Plaintiff Victor’s

schooling. At this stage in the litigation, the existence of a

protected right and the allegation that the processes used were

inadequate is sufficient. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for a more

definite statement of claim six is DENIED.

5. Equal Protection (Claim Seven)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Victor’s equal protection

claim is time-barred. Section 1983 claims are subject to the

forum states’ statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 

Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Until

January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations was one year in

California. Id. at 1014. Effective January 1, 2003, personal

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

injury actions in California became subject to a two-year statute

of limitations period. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 335.1. The two

year limitation period does not apply retroactively to acts or

omissions occurring or causes of action accruing before the

effective date of section 335.1. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d

945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). 

While state law determines the length of the limitations

period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. 

Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013. Under federal law, a “claim accrues when

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff Corey Victor’s allegations

regarding disparate disciplining on the basis of race is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations.” Defs.’ Mot. at 14. 

The altercation took place at Sonoma Elementary School on March

29, 2002, and the date of accrual would be on or near that date. 

Defendants assert that this allegation is outside the two-year

statute of limitations. 

First, a claim that accrues prior to 2003 is subject to a

one year statute of limitations. Second, despite the one-year

limitation period, California law provides a tolling provision

for the claims of minors. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352(a). The FAC

alleges that Plaintiff Victor was a minor as of the filing date

in 2004, and it appears that the provision applies. Moreover,

there are other allegations within the FAC that are relevant to

the equal protection issue and sufficient to state a claim,

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

particularly given the lesser standard governing the pleadings of

pro se plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 15, 17-18, 42-47, 66-71, 86-91.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claim seven is

DENIED. Additionally, the allegations are sufficient to allow

Defendants to frame a responsive pleading. Defendants’ motion

for a more definite statement as to this claim is DENIED. 

6. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Claim Eight)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege which

provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et

seq., was violated. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ broad

allegation that “defendants hold African-American students and

parents and other students and parents of color accountable to

higher standards than those set forth in District policies and

procedures,” and hold Anglo-American students and parents to less

stringent standards, is insufficient to state a claim. 

There is a possibility, on the facts alleged, that

Plaintiffs may be able to state a legally cognizable claim under

the Civil Rights Act. This makes dismissal with prejudice

inappropriate. However, even applying the lenient standard for

the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, this claim is insufficient to

enable Defendants to frame a responsive pleading. Defendants’

motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED, however Defendants’

motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED as to this claim. 

Plaintiffs must, at a minimum, specify the provision of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 under which their claim arises and the

corresponding facts if not already alleged.

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

1. California Tort Claims Act

a. Failure to Allege Compliance

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims fail

because the FAC does not allege compliance with California Tort

Claims Act, Cal. Govt. Code section 810, et seq.. 

Government Code section 945.4 provides that “no suit for

money or damages may be brought against a public entity” until

after a written claim for damages has been presented to the

public entity. A claim relating to “injury to the person” must

be filed within six months of accrual. Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2. 

Compliance with the claim procedure is an integral part of a

plaintiff’s cause of action and must be pleaded and proved. 

State of California v. Sup. Ct. of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.

4th 1234, 1239 (2004). Failure to allege compliance with the

Tort Claims Act is fatal to a plaintiff’s state law claims.

While a claim is not required in order to maintain an action

against a public employee for injury resulting from an act or

omission in the scope of the public employee’s employment, Cal.

Govt. Code § 950, if an action against the employing public

entity is barred, so is an action against any employee thereof. 

Cal. Govt. Code § 950.2. A school district, such as Modesto City

Schools, is a public entity under the Tort Claims Act. Cal.

Govt. Code § 811.2; Wright v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 46 Cal.

App. 3d 177, 181-82 (1975). Accordingly, if an action against

the school district is barred, the action against individual

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendants also point out that Plaintiffs’ naming of 6

Defendants in both their individual and official capacities does

not alter the outcome because, where the purpose of the conduct is

within the official duties of the defendant, it is within the

course and scope of the employment. Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577,

583 (1957). This is correct. So long as the end to be

accomplished is within the employee’s express or implied authority,

the employee’s acts are deemed to be within the scope of employment

irrespective of the nature of those acts. White v. Towers, 37

Cal. 2d 727, 733 (1951). All of the alleged acts were within the

scope of Defendants’ various positions within the school district.

21

Defendants is likewise barred.6

The FAC does not allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. 

Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that the state law claims

should not be dismissed because Plaintiffs did in fact comply

with the Tort Claims Act. As proof, Plaintiffs attached a copy 

of the notice of dismissal issued by the Modesto City Schools to

their opposition. See Pls.’ Opp’n (Doc. 14) Ex. A. However, as

mentioned, compliance with the claims requirement be included in

the complaint. Accordingly, because the FAC fails to allege

compliance with the Tort Claims Act, dismissal on this basis is

appropriate. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law

claims is GRANTED.

As to the issue of an amendment, Plaintiffs have already

amended once as of right, and thus must have leave of court to

amend again. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The standard for allowing

amendment under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

is a lenient one, however a court may decline to allow amendment

where amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 83 S. Ct. 227 (1962). 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ exhibit, the

rejection notice, conclusively demonstrates that Plaintiffs state

law claims will fail. The notice is dated March 2, 2004. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are timebarred because, under the California Government Code, a party has

six months from the date of a rejection of a claim to file suit. 

The notice provided to Plaintiffs states that:

Subject to certain exceptions, you have six (6) months

from the date this notice was personally delivered or

deposited in the mail to file a court action on this

claim. (Govt. Code Section 945.6).

 

This requirement is codified in section 945.6 of the California

Government Code. Plaintiffs’ filed their original complaint on

December 10, 2004, approximately nine months after the date on

the notice. Defendants thus argue that Plaintiffs’ state law

claims are time-barred, which would make allowing amendment of

the FAC futile as to the state law claims.

Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations for the

state law claims of Plaintiff Victor was tolled because he is a

minor. As discussed, supra, section 352 of the California Code

of Civil Procedure provides for the tolling of the statute of

limitations for minors. However, section 352 expressly states

that it “does not apply to an action against a public entity or

public employee upon a cause of action for which a claim is

required . . ..” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 352(b). The legislative

history of subsection (b) is illustrative. The exception was

added so that section 352 . . . 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

will not apply to the causes of action against a public

entity or public employee described in this

subdivision. Such actions are governed by the period

of limitations specified in [section 945.6(a)]. To

safeguard the minor or incompetent from an inadvertent

reliance on the tolling provision of Section 352,

notice of rejection of his claim in the form provided

in Government Code Section 913 is required to be given

by the public entity. If notice is not given, the

claimant has two years from the accrual of his cause of

action in which to sue. . . . 

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352 comment.

Because the tolling provision is inapplicable and because

notice of the rejection was provided, Plaintiffs’ had six months

in which to file their complaint. Accordingly, because

Plaintiffs’ failed to file their complaint within six months of

the rejection notice, even if they were allowed to amend the FAC

to allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act, the state law

claims would be barred by Government Code section 945.6, making

amendment futile. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims -

claims four, five, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen - are

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Alternate Bases for Dismissal

a. Defamation & Slander (Claims Four & Five) 

Section 340(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure

provides that an action for libel or slander must be brought

within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Code

Civ. P. § 340(c); Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4th 1230, 1246

(2003) (recognizing applicability of one year statute of

limitations to defamation). A cause of action for defamation

accrues at the time the defamatory statement is “published.” 

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

Shively, 31 Cal. 4th at 1246-47. Publication occurs when the

defendant “communicates the defamatory statement to a person

other than the person being defamed.” Id. 

Here, the alleged defamatory and slanderous statements were

made by Defendant Moffett on November 19, 2003. The Complaint

was filed on December 10, 2004, which is more than one year

later. Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims four and five on

this bases is GRANTED and these claims are DISMISSED. 

b. Wrongful Use of Civil Proceeding (Claim Ten)

Defendants correctly argue that no claim for “wrongful use

of a civil proceeding” exists and construe Plaintiffs’ tenth

claim as one for abuse of process. Defendants argue that it

nonetheless fails because such claims are only viable in the case

of legal, not administrative, proceedings. Abuse of process is

the “use of the machinery of the legal system for an ulterior

motive . . ..” Trear v. Sills, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1341, 1359

(1999). The tort of abuse of process does not extend to the

misuse of administrative proceedings; it requires the misuse of

the judicial process. Stolz v. Wong Communications LP, 25 Cal.

App. 4th 1811, 1822-23 (1994).

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that any civil action has

been filed against them. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that they

have been subjected to “unwarranted and malicious disciplinary

hearings.” Absent an allegation that the court system has been

used against them, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for abuse of

process. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claim ten on

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 24 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

this bases is GRANTED and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Defendant’s Remaining Requests for More Definite

Statements

Defendants take issue generally with the fact that, in

alleging their federal claims, Plaintiffs use the term

“defendants” rather than specifying which allegations are against

which Defendants. Defendants cite a district court case from

Wisconsin, Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F. Supp.

277 (E.D. Wis. 1975), in support of the assertion that a

complaint that refers generally to “Defendants” is subject to a

more definite statement.

Van Dyke Ford, in addition to being non-binding authority,

is dissimilar to the instant case. There, the court granted one

defendant’s request for a more definite statement where written

agreements were involved and where the allegations did not

specify to which of the five plaintiffs or nine defendants the

allegations referred. Van Dyke Ford, 399 F. Supp. at 284. In

contrast, here there are two closely related plaintiffs and

Defendants have not argued that it is difficult to discern which

plaintiffs allege which claims. Nor are there numerous separate

and independent defendants as was the case in Van Dyke Ford. 

Defendants are all employees of the same public entity. 

Accordingly, given the notice pleading required by Rule 8 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the liberal standard

governing the pleadings of pro se litigants and the disfavored

status of motions for a more definite statement, Defendants’

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 25 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

26

request on the this basis is DENIED. Except as specified herein

as to claim eight, the allegations are sufficient to enable

Defendants to frame a responsive pleading.

ACCORDINGLY IT IS ORDERED THAT, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and for a more definite statement is hereby GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth herein.

FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ state law claims (claims

four, five, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen) and claim three are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs must submit a more definite

statement as to claim eight. This may be done via a second

amended complaint (“SAC”); in the interests of justice,

Plaintiffs may amend any claims not dismissed with prejudice

above. Such amendment is subject to the strictures of Rule 11. 

FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ SAC shall be filed on or

before October 24, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06680-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/07/05 Page 26 of 26