Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01921/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01921-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1921 

LAWRENCE J. HESS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

KANOSKI BRESNEY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:09-cv-03334 — Sara Darrow, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2014 — DECIDED MAY 4, 2015

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This breach of contract action is before this court—pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction—a 

second time. As a refresher, Lawrence J. Hess, an attorney, 

had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski & Associates, P.C. (“K&A”),1 ter-

 

1 Per Appellee’s Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement of December 5, 2014, Kanoski & Associates is now Kanoski Bresney. As it is the real party in inCase: 14-1921 Document: 34 Filed: 05/04/2015 Pages: 17
2 No. 14-1921 

minated his employment. Many of these cases settled after 

Hess’s termination, and Hess did not see a penny from the 

settlements. Hess felt cheated. 

So he sued under his employment agreement and under 

the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”) to 

remedy the perceived wrong. He also advanced claims of 

tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, 

and quantum meruit, among others. In 2011, the district 

court dismissed each of Hess’s claims on summary judgment. Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs., No. 09-3334, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 25672, at *35 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2011) (“Hess I”). The 

following year, we affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs., 668 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(remanding IWPCA and breach of contract claims) (“Hess 

II”). We remanded because the issue that is now squarely 

before us—whether Hess is entitled to compensation for 

post-termination settlements under either his employment 

agreement or the IWPCA—was “not fully briefed” at that 

stage of the case. Id. at 454. 

On remand, and with the benefit of additional briefing, 

the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. As a result, the 

district court once again granted summary judgment in favor of K&A. Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs., No. 3:09-cv-03334, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42584, at *25 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014) 

(“Hess III”). Hess appealed, and on December 5, 2014, argued his case on his own behalf. 

 

terest to this lawsuit, we have changed the caption to reflect that fact. For 

the sake of consistency, however, we refer to the firm as Kanoski & Associates or K&A. 

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No. 14-1921 3

After carefully considering the parties’ oral arguments 

and briefing, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND

Lawrence J. Hess is an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Illinois and Missouri. K&A is a personal-injury 

law firm with offices in central Illinois. On May 9, 2001, K&A 

hired Hess to handle medical-malpractice cases—Hess’s specialty. And for nearly six years, Hess did just that. He even 

won a significant jury verdict, which triggered a healthy, renegotiated salary. Then the bottom fell out. On February 14, 

2007, the firm terminated Hess. Ronald Kanoski, K&A’s president and administrator during Hess’s employment, testified 

that he based this decision on “economic reasons.” 

If you ask Hess, the “economic reasons” included the 

firm’s desire to reap a disproportionate share of the fees 

earned from the 170 breast-implant cases that Hess had 

worked on prior to his termination. These breast-implant 

cases stemmed from a nationwide settlement with DowCorning for its silicone-based breast implants. The number 

of cases, coupled with the estimated cost of remedies, induced Dow Corning into bankruptcy. Cf. Editorial, Seeking 

Shelter from a Legal Storm, Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1995, at 

1:10. Hess also seeks to recover fees from five non-breastimplant cases on which he had worked before his termination. 

Hess theorizes that K&A terminated him to avoid paying 

him the fees due on those cases. He asserts that he “successfully completed all the work necessary for the firm to be 

paid fees” on these matters. “Nothing remained to be done,” 

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Hess maintains, “except to wait for the receipt of the 

checks.” 

As an initial matter, the record lends some support to 

Hess’s theory of motive. K&A abruptly terminated Hess 

without any notice, which suggests it was in a rush to get rid 

of him. K&A concedes that this swift termination breached 

the thirty-day-notice provision of their employment agreement. But that breach is of no moment to this appeal. For 

even if the breach gave rise to some sort of equitable, constructive employment lasting thirty days after his actual date 

of termination, that constructive employment would not 

have captured any of the settlements or their resultant bonuses; the subject cases settled outside the thirty-day window.2 As a result, Hess still would have been out of luck. 

But Hess offers a backstop. Because K&A breached the 

notice provision of his employment agreement, he was never 

actually terminated—or so the theory goes. Under this theory, all the income that K&A received for his cases was received while he was still an employee at the firm. So he 

should have been paid the fees. K&A quickly responds with 

waiver. K&A contends that Hess waived this argument because he did not raise it before the district court. We address 

these arguments below. 

 

2 In Hess II, we noted that at least one case settled within the thirty-day 

window. 668 F.3d at 453. We then held that Hess “is entitled to press his 

argument that the contract gave him the right to bonuses in connection 

with that settlement ... .” Id. On remand, however, Hess conceded that 

all cases had, in fact, settled outside the thirty-day window. He therefore 

abandoned this path to recovery. We’ll return to this point later. For 

now, we add only that it is undisputed that K&A paid bonuses to Hess 

for all cases that were resolved during his employment at the firm. 

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No. 14-1921 5

Before we do, our focus turns to two provisions of the 

employment agreement. These provisions—one found in the 

original employment agreement and one found in a subsequent modification letter—are ultimately dispositive. They 

address matters related to compensation, and we introduce 

them now. 

Section 4 of the employment agreement is titled “Compensation.” It states that Hess will receive bonus pay in the 

amount of fifteen percent of all fees “generated over the base 

salary (or $5,000 per month) ... .” It further states that the 

“[b]onus shall increase” to twenty-five percent “on all fees 

received annually in excess of $750,000.00.” We emphasize the 

words “generated” and “received” because the parties spend 

much of their time debating their meaning. 

According to K&A, the words “generated” and “received” are used interchangeably. Under this view, they are 

synonymous. “Years of work can go into a case,” K&A contends, “and yet, there is no fee generated unless or until 

there is a recovery for the client ... .” Hess disagrees. He argues that one can generate—i.e. create—something without 

ever receiving it. Under that common-usage view, the terms 

are not synonymous, and Hess would be entitled to bonuses 

or fees for his work that generated the fees, regardless of 

when the firm received them. 

In Hess II, we flagged this issue for remand. 668 F.3d at 

453. Noting the utility of extrinsic evidence in determining 

the meaning of the term “generate,” we offered Hess a second path to recovery: production of extrinsic evidence to 

prove his definition is the correct one. Hess supplied no extrinsic evidence. To be sure, he submitted his deposition testimony that detailed his performance at the firm. But that 

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deposition testimony provided no extrinsic evidence on the 

meaning of the term “generate.” No evidence did, in fact. In 

failing to supply extrinsic evidence on this key point, Hess 

abandoned a second path to recovery offered by our mandate. 

Left with no extrinsic evidence, and understanding that 

no cases settled thirty days after his termination, the district 

court resorted to the parties’ briefs and the terms of the contract. It sided with K&A. Those terms, coupled with the contingency-fee nature of the cases at K&A, informed its analysis: 

[Hess’s] interpretation of “generated” ignores fundamental principles underlying these arrangements. An 

attorney is not contractually entitled to a fee unless 

and until her client wins, and, therefore, always bears 

the risk of loss. ... When Hess was terminated by 

K&A, there was no guarantee that any of his efforts 

would result in contingency fees accruing in the cases 

at issue. Therefore, the fees could not yet have been 

generated. 

Hess III, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42584, at *13-14. Impliedly, 

then, the district court read the terms “generate” and “received” synonymously, which it believed “accords with the 

basic structure of contingency fee arrangements ... .” Id. at 

*14. Different meanings of the terms would have resulted in 

two “messy” bonus schemes, it held, depending on how 

much money the firm received in a given year. Id. The district court further observed that Hess offered no evidence 

that the parties intended different meanings of the relevant 

terms. Id. at *14-15. And Hess conceded as much at oral argument on appeal. 

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Hess nevertheless takes issue with the district court’s 

analysis. He points to the modification letter of June 21, 2002, 

wherein Ronald Kanoski confirmed to Hess the result of 

their “recent salary and bonus negotiations ... .” Although 

Hess did not sign this letter, he treats it as a binding 

amendment to the employment agreement. Given that the 

terms of the letter governed his compensation from 2002 until 2007, we accept Hess’s treatment. Cf. Hess II, 668 F.3d at 

452–53 (“The critical signature is that of the party against 

whom the contract is being enforced, and that signature was 

present.”). 

“[E]ffectively immediately,” Kanoski wrote, “you will be 

eligible to receive as a bonus” forty percent “of all fee revenue generated ... .” (emphasis added). Hess places significant 

weight on the fact that this modification foregoes usage of 

the term “received.” Because the modification does not use 

that word, it follows that a fee need not be “received” before 

a “generated” bonus “can be allotted to the employee,” or so 

his argument goes. We discuss both the original provision 

and its modification in our analysis section below. 

Before we do, a third provision is worth mentioning. Section 8 of the employment agreement, entitled “Covenant 

Limiting Competition,” addresses competition and client relationships. It provides that, “where the Corporation retains 

clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has 

no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is 

to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for 

all work done while an Employee of the Corporation” (emphasis added). 

Both parties claim that this provision supports their arguments; they just emphasize different parts of the proviCase: 14-1921 Document: 34 Filed: 05/04/2015 Pages: 17
8 No. 14-1921 

sion. K&A, for example, emphasizes “no propriety interest 

in fees to be earned.” It claims that this language imposes a 

categorical ban to post-termination compensation. Hess, by 

contrast, emphasizes “the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done 

while an Employee.” Because he maintains that all the work 

for the breast-implant cases was complete before his termination, he claims that this language entitles him to the fees. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where the 

admissible evidence reveals no genuine issue of any material 

fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 

916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). A fact is “material” if it is one 

identified by the law as affecting the outcome of the case. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An 

issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). We construe all facts and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 735 

F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). 

In diversity cases, we apply federal procedural law and 

state substantive law. Allen v. Cedar Real Estate Grp., LLP, 236 

F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 

U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Rules of contract interpretation are 

substantive. Allen, 236 F.3d at 380. So our interpretation of 

this contract—the employment agreement—must be 

according to state law. The parties agree that the applicable 

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No. 14-1921 9

state law is the law of Illinois. We examine Hess’s breach of 

contract claim first. 

A. Breach of Contract Claim 

Under Illinois law, a breach of contract claim has four elements: “(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; 

(2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the 

defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff.” Hess II, 

668 F.3d at 452 (quoting Henderson-Smith & Assocs. v. Nahamani Family Serv. Ctr., 752 N.E.2d 33, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Our focus throughout 

this four-element inquiry “is to give effect to the parties’ intentions.” Henderson-Smith & Assocs., 752 N.E.2d at 43. In 

conducting this task, we review the employment agreement 

and the district court’s holding de novo. C.A.M. Affiliates v. 

First Am. Title Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1999). 

We also hold the plaintiff to his burden: i.e. persuading 

the court that he should prevail. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 

49, 57 (2005) (“[P]laintiffs bear the burden of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims.”). As noted 

above, when we first addressed this case, we provided Hess 

with two paths to recovery on remand: (1) press his argument that he is entitled to recover for the one case that settled within thirty days of his termination; and (2) offer extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the term “generate.” Hess 

II, 668 F.3d at 453. Hess did neither. 

Instead, Hess conceded to the district court that none of 

his cases actually settled within thirty days of his termination. So that path—option one—is out. As for the second 

path, Hess’s depositions did not address the meaning of the 

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10 No. 14-1921 

term “generate.” So option two is out as well. The result: 

Hess failed to meet his burden. And we cannot rule in his 

favor. 

Hess’s arguments to the contrary cannot save this result. 

Although we might have used different language, we nevertheless find that the parties intended a simple, straightforward plan for bonus compensation. See FCC v. Airadigm 

Commc’ns, Inc., 616 F.3d 642, 657 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] court 

should provide the most plausible reading of an ambiguous 

contract where parties do not point to extrinsic evidence at 

summary judgment.”). That plan does not require K&A to 

pay Hess fees for cases that settled after his date of termination—even if he worked on those cases before his termination. Because we hold that the employment agreement does 

not require such a payment, Hess cannot prove breach. And 

because he cannot prove breach, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment in favor of K&A on this claim. 

Our de novo inquiry of the contract starts with the term 

“generate.” While we agree with Hess that “generate” has a 

common-usage definition that is different from the term “received,” compare Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 945 (1986) (defining generate as “to cause to be: bring into existence”), with id. at 1894 (defining receive as “to take 

possession or delivery of: to knowingly accept”), the employment agreement deploys these terms interchangeably. 

As a result, the most plausible reading is that they are synonymous: fees are not generated until they are received. 

Some background on this point is helpful. 

Section 4, where both terms first appear, presents a twotier bonus system. This system incentivizes firm profits by 

triggering larger bonuses for Hess once annual fees cross a 

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certain threshold. The K&A promise is clear: the more money Hess brings in, the more money Hess takes home. Section 

4 states in relevant part: 

Corporation hereby acknowledges that Employee’s 

starting salary shall be $60,000. Corporation further 

acknowledges that Employee will receive bonus pay 

as follows: 15% of all fees generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month) with a guarantee of One 

Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand ($125,000). Bonus 

pay shall increase to 25% on all fees received annually 

in excess of $750,000.00. 

Thus, Hess’s bonus jumps from fifteen percent to twenty-five 

percent when annual fees received exceed $750,000. 

By reading “generated” synonymously with “received,” 

this formula for bonus compensation is straightforward and 

easy to apply. It is so easy, in fact, that even a group of lawyers could figure it out. Cf. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“Innumerable are the lawyers who explain 

that they picked law over a technical field because they have 

a ‘math block ... .’”). 

But if Hess has his way, giving distinct meaning to each 

term, this simplicity is abandoned. For example, by insisting 

on a definition of “generate” that means “to create” rather 

than “to receive,” Hess requires the firm to adopt an approach that measures what he created. This approach is presumably weighted by unknown quantities and qualities of 

work, proportionate to the associates or partners who are 

doing the work. 

We quickly can think of many factors that would need to 

be examined before K&A could determine how much of a 

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given fee Hess helped to create: time spent on a matter, type 

of matter worked on, ultimate work product, research, writing, editing, travel time, correspondence, meetings, and so 

on. And that is before the firm adjusts the bonus for any 

work done by another attorney on the same case. It is telling 

that the employment agreement does not mention any of 

these guideposts. 

As a result, Hess’s interpretation of the agreement is not 

as plausible as K&A’s. Given there is no extrinsic evidence to 

compel a different result, we find in favor of K&A. This interpretation conforms to the “fundamental principles” that 

underlie contingency-fee arrangements at K&A. Hess III, 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42854, at *14. Hess has no right under 

the employment agreement to fees received from cases that 

settled after his termination. 

The June 21, 2002, modification letter does not mandate a 

different result. That modification states, in relevant part: 

Your annual salary will, starting immediately, be adjusted to $100,000. Also effective immediately you will 

be eligible to receive as a bonus 40% of all fee revenue 

generated except as follows: a) no bonus will be paid 

on the first $100,000 of annual fee revenue generated; 

and, b) if it is otherwise eligible, only a 10% bonus 

will be paid for fees generated on the Robert Thompson file. 

Hess argues that this modification supports his position. 

Specifically, Hess argues that “generated” and “received” 

cannot be synonymous because the last-in-time document—

the modification—does not deploy them interchangeably. 

We reject this argument. 

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To be sure, the modification foregoes usage of the term 

“received.” But it does not follow that Hess’s definition of 

“generate” springs into effect. Section 2 of the original employment agreement has never been modified, and it deploys the term “received” in the same manner as Section 4. 

Entitled “Establishment of Employment,” Section 2 provides 

in relevant part, “All proceeds received by [Hess] for professional services rendered for Corporation clients shall be the 

property of the Corporation” (emphasis added). 

Consistent with the rest of the contract, “generated” 

could be substituted with the term “received,” and the overall meaning of the provision would remain the same. Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1999) (noting that courts should harmonize provisions of a 

contract to avoid conflict). Hess cannot overcome this fact. In 

sum, fees are not “generated” at K&A until they are “received.” 

What is more, although the numbers are different, the 

bonus formula presented in the modification letter is consistent with the original formula presented in Section 4 of the 

agreement: cross a certain threshold of fee revenue and receive a certain percentage of bonus compensation. In this 

case, once the generated fee revenue exceeds $100,000, then 

the forty-percent bonus is triggered. 

If anything, this latter formula is even simpler than the 

original formula because it consists of only one tier, albeit 

with a caveat—the Thompson file. It is probative, moreover, 

that this modification—like the employment agreement—

does not explain the complex rubric that would result from 

adopting Hess’s interpretation of the term “generate.” In the 

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end, K&A’s interpretation of the contract is the most plausible one. We adopt it today. 

 Attempting to save his case, Hess argues that the district 

court acted outside our mandate from Hess II by failing to 

consider extrinsic evidence. But what was the district court 

supposed to consider? Hess offered no extrinsic evidence on 

the meaning of the key term—“generate.” His depositions 

did not speak to that issue. Hess cannot attack the district 

court for failing to consider evidence that he never offered. 

Consequently, we reject this argument. 

Hess finally contends that K&A never effectively terminated him because it breached the thirty-day-notice provision of the employment agreement. As a result, Hess argues, 

he remained an employee at K&A when the firm received all 

the income from his remaining cases, which entitles him to 

compensation. As we noted above, K&A contends that Hess 

waived this argument by not briefing it before the district 

court. 

We agree with K&A. It is well settled that arguments not 

developed before the district court are deemed waived on 

appeal. Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 

2014). And even if it was not waived, Hess still could not 

prevail under this theory. Taken to its logical conclusion, it 

would mean that Hess remained an employee of K&A for a 

period of time lasting well after his termination. Given the 

time spent away from the firm, and considering his employment elsewhere, under this theory, Hess might find 

himself defending, rather than advancing, claims against 

K&A. Surely Hess does not desire this result. 

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In sum, the district court adopted the most plausible interpretation of the contract. Having conducted our own de 

novo review, we agree with that interpretation. Because we 

find Section 4 and the modification letter to be on point, we 

need not examine Section 8, addressing competition. We 

turn, instead, to Hess’s remaining claim under the IWPCA. 

B. IWPCA Claim 

The IWPCA is designed “to provide employees with a 

cause of action for the timely and complete payment of 

earned wages or final compensation, without retaliation 

from employers.” Byung Moo Soh v. Target Mktg. Sys., Inc. 817 

N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). It states that final 

compensation “shall be defined as wages, salaries, earned 

commissions, earned bonuses and the monetary equivalent of 

earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other 

compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant 

to an employment contract ... .” 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/2 

(emphasis added). 

Because the IWPCA does not define the term “earned 

bonuses,” Illinois courts analogize them to “earned 

vacation.” See Camillo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 729, 

734 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“’[E]arned vacation’ and ‘earned 

bonus’ should be interpreted similarly... .”). Where there is 

an unequivocal promise that a bonus will be paid, at least 

one court has awarded a pro rata share of that bonus to the 

terminated employee. See Camillo, 582 N.E.2d at 731–35. 

Where, by contrast, there is no unequivocal promise that a 

bonus will be paid, three courts have denied recovery under 

the IWPCA. See McLaughlin v. Sternberg Lanterns, Inc., 917 

N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re Comdisco, Nos. 02 

C 7030 & 02 C 7031, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2982, at *17 (N.D. 

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Ill. Feb. 27, 2003); Tatom v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99 C 683, 2000 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16720, at *26-27(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2000). 

These decisions are consistent with regulations 

promulgated by the Illinois Department of Labor, which 

define “earned bonuses” under the IWPCA: 

An employee has a right to an earned bonus when 

there is an unequivocal promise by the employer and the 

employee has performed the requirements set forth in 

the bonus agreement between the parties and all of the 

required conditions for receiving the bonus set forth in the 

bonus agreement have been met. 

56 Ill. Adm. Code § 300.500 (2014) (emphasis added). Under 

Illinois law, this regulation is entitled to “substantial weight 

and deference.” McLaughlin, 917 N.E.2d at 1071. 

Here, Hess’s claim under the IWPCA fails for two 

reasons. First, there is no unequivocal promise that a bonus 

will be paid. On this point, we look to the terms of the 

modification letter, which, despite not having been signed 

by Hess, both parties agree governs the terms of Hess’s 

compensation from June 21, 2002, until the date of his 

termination on February 14, 2007. The modification states 

that Hess “will be eligible to receive as a bonus” a certain 

percentage of all fee revenue generated over $100,000 

(emphasis added). 

Eligibility, of course, is no guarantee. Hess might very 

well be eligible for a bonus, but due to a host of factors, not 

receive one. As a result, we do not find this bonus provision 

to be the kind of unequivocal promise that is required under 

applicable Illinois law. McLaughlin, 917 N.E.2d at 1071 (“If no 

such unequivocal promise was made, then the employee is 

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No. 14-1921 17

not entitled to any part of the bonus pursuant to section 2 of 

the Wage Act [IWPCA].”). So on this ground alone, Hess’s 

claim under the IWPCA for post-termination settlement fees 

fails. 

But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 

parties intended eligibility to equate to a guarantee, Hess 

still would not be entitled to recovery under the IWPCA. For 

as we have already found, the employment agreement only 

provides for bonuses once a certain amount of fee revenue is 

received. Here, Hess acknowledges that K&A did not receive 

the settlement fees from his medical-malpractice cases until 

after his termination. That means not “all of the required 

conditions for receiving the bonus set forth in the bonus 

agreement have been met.” 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 300.500 

(2014). This second reason, then, independently denies relief 

to Hess under the IWPCA. As there exists no genuine issue 

of material fact on which to proceed to trial, summary 

judgment was appropriately granted in favor of K&A on 

Hess’s IWPCA claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Hess cannot recover any fees 

from the post-termination settlements. The judgment of the 

district court is AFFIRMED. 

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