Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00206/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00206-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1 Defendant Divine Investments, Inc. was dismissed per

the parties’ stipulation of March 24, 2004.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SHERIE WHITE,

NO. CIV. S-04-0206 FCD/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DIVINE INVESTMENTS, INC.;

WALTER B. RICHEY; CAROLYN

D. RICHEY;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Sherie White’s

(“plaintiff”) and defendants Walter and Carolyn Richey’s

(“defendants”)1 cross-motions for summary judgment.2 The motions

present only one disputed issue: whether the subject facility,

defendants’ gas station and convenience store, the River Mart,

has “architectural barriers” within the meaning of the Americans

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3 Plaintiff also moves for damages pursuant to the Unruh

Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq. Said

entitlement to damages is predicated on a finding of a violation

of the ADA.

4 The ADA was enacted by Congress in 1990 “to provide a

clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of

discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101(b)(1). Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by

private entities against persons with disabilities in places of

public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Discrimination

includes “failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in

existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily

achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); Pickern v. Holiday

Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). To

succeed on a claim of discrimination due to an architectural

barrier, plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is disabled; (2) the

subject facility is a place of “public accommodation;” (3) the

existing facility contains an architectural barrier prohibited by

the ADA; and (4) removal of the barrier is readily achievable. 

Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 1065, 1085 (D. Haw.

2000). 

5 Plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ opposition as

untimely, filed September 9, 2005, is DENIED. 

2

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”).3 As to

all other issues under the ADA, namely, whether plaintiff is

“disabled,” whether the River Mart is a place of “public

accommodation,” and whether it is “readily achievable” for any

architectural barriers to be removed, the parties agree

plaintiff can sustain her burden of proof.4 Id. at § 12182(a),

(b)(2)(A)(iv). As such, whether architectural barriers exist at

the River Mart is determinative of who prevails on the motion.

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that

plaintiff lacks standing to challenge a majority of the alleged

barriers, and with respect to the barriers properly raised by

plaintiff, defendants have shown that the so-called “barriers” do

not constitute substantive violations of the ADA and/or have been

remedied.5

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3

BACKGROUND

The River Mart, located at 222 Jibboom Street, Sacramento,

California, was constructed in 1984-85. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’

SUF [“Defs.’ SUF”], filed Sept. 8, 2005, ¶ 1.) In 1996, the

coffee service area at the River Mart was remodeled, which

consisted of moving equipment, installing new base cabinets and

counters, and installing plumbing and electrical work for coffee

and beverage dispensers. (Id. at ¶ 2.)

On December 7, 2003, plaintiff and her father, James Abel,

stopped at the River Mart to purchase gas and food. (Defs.’

Resp. to Pl.’s SUF [“Pl.’s SUF”], filed September 9, 2005, ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff lives in Corning, California, approximately 115 miles

from Sacramento, but makes frequent trips to Sacramento. (Id. at

¶ 4.) Plaintiff is a quadriplegic, who is unable to walk or

stand and has minimal use of her hands. (Id. at ¶s 1-2.) She

uses a wheelchair for mobility, and a wheelchair lift-equipped

van when traveling in public. (Id. at ¶ 3.) During her visit to

the River Mart, plaintiff alleges she encountered numerous

architectural barriers at the facility that prevented her from

enjoying full and equal access to the goods and services offered. 

(Id. at ¶ 6.) Said barriers, totaling 42 in number, are

described in Exhibit A to the first amended complaint. (FAC,

filed April 12, 2005, at ¶ 10 [“To the extent known by White,

attached as Exhibit A to this complaint is a true and accurate

list (with photos) of barriers that denied her access at the

Station.”].) These barriers include such items as an

inaccessible ramp into the store (Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 8) and too narrow

product aisles inside the store (Id. at ¶ 9). 

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4

Some months later, plaintiff again visited the River Mart

and alleges that no barriers had been removed and that the

facility remained inaccessible to her. (Id. at ¶ 13.) She

alleges that as a result, despite her desire to visit the River

Mart on her trips to Sacramento, she has been deterred from doing

so because she believes barriers exist making it not only

“frustrating and humiliating for [her], but also dangerous as

well.” (Id. at ¶ 14; Pl.’s Decl., filed Aug. 22, 2005, ¶ 14.) 

Defendants dispute that any legitimate barriers identified

by plaintiff in the first amended complaint remain at the

facility. (Pl.’s SUF, ¶s 13-14.) Defendants maintain they have

removed all valid barriers to accessibility identified by

plaintiff in the complaint, and that the work was completed in

June 2004. (Id.)

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of the rule is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962). If the moving party does not bear the burden of

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5

proof at trial, he or she may discharge his burden of showing

that no genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating

that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party

meets the requirements of Rule 56 by showing there is an absence

of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case, the burden

shifts to the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

Genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a

finder of fact, because they may reasonably be resolved in favor

of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court

does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The

evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits

and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact

and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v.

City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

ANALYSIS

A. Standing

Preliminarily, the court must determine what alleged

architectural barriers are properly at issue on the motions. 

Defendants argue, on standing grounds, that plaintiff is confined

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6 Plaintiff Martinez was also represented by plaintiff’s

counsel here, Lynn Hubbard, III.

6

to raising only those barriers alleged in Exhibit A to the first

amended complaint. To the contrary, plaintiff alleges that she

may also rely on those barriers not described in Exhibit A but

disclosed by her expert, Joe Card (“Card”), in his expert report

and declaration. (Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 15.) These latter barriers are

described in plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts at

paragraphs 15-38. (Id. at ¶s 15-38; Card Decl., filed Sept. 5,

2005.)

Defendants’ argument does not raise, as suggested by

plaintiff, a question of “notice pleading” under Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather plaintiff’s Article

III standing to assert relief for the alleged barriers. 

Plaintiff’s counsel did not disclose that Judge David Levi, of

this court, recently addressed the precise issue facing the court

in this case and decided the issue contrary to plaintiff.

Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, 2005 WL 2072013 (E.D. Cal., August

25, 2005).6

In Martinez, Judge Levi considered “whether a plaintiff

could have standing where the plaintiff neither encountered nor

knew of a particular barrier prior to filing the complaint.” Id.

at *3. Plaintiff Martinez conceded that with respect to certain

barriers he did not personally encounter them on his visits to

the store, but nonetheless sought recovery for them because his

expert later identified them as barriers in his expert report. 

Id. at *1. Martinez argued that under the Eighth Circuit’s

decision in Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 893-94 (8th Cir.

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7 In Steger, the court held that a blind plaintiff who

attempted, but was unable, to gain access to a first-floor

bathroom had Article III standing to seek removal of all barriers

in the building relating to his disability. 228 F.3d at 893-94. 

The court reasoned that it would be “inefficient” and

“impractical” to limit injunctive relief to those barriers which

the plaintiff actually encountered or had knowledge of at the

time the complaint was filed. Id.

7

2000), whose holding was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Pickern

v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.

2002), he had standing to sue for those later-discovered barriers

by his expert. Judge Levi disagreed. While he found that under

Steger, Martinez would prevail,7 he held that Steger was not the

“law of this circuit” as the Ninth Circuit did not adopt Steger

in Pickern. Id. at *3.

The Pickern court was faced with a very different

factual scenario than that presented in Steger and

the present case. The plaintiff in Pickern

actually encountered all of the barriers that he

sought to remedy in his suit. The question for the

court was whether he had to personally encounter

the barriers within the year prior to filing his

complaint in order to show a concrete and 

particularized injury. The court held that the

plaintiff could establish an injury in fact by

demonstrating that he knew of the barriers and

was deterred from visiting during the statute of

limitations period. The court discussed Steger

only by way of general comparison.

Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted). As such, Judge Levi

considered the issue anew, ultimately rejecting Steger as

“fundamentally incompatible with . . . constitutional standing

principles.” Id. at *4. This court finds Judge Levi’s analysis

and holding persuasive and applies it here. Id. (“In short, a

plaintiff in an ADA action does not, by the mere filing of a

lawsuit alleging one violation, obtain the right to perform a

wholesale audit of the defendant’s premises.”) As such, 

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8 For example, with respect to alleged barriers present

near defendants’ gas pumps, plaintiff testified at deposition

that she had her father “pump the gas and do all that.” (White

Dep., 9:22.) Therefore, by her own admission, she did not

encounter and/or have any knowledge of her expert’s claimed

barriers in the fuel pump area. Likewise, plaintiff testified

she never visited or used defendants’ restroom because her father

told her “it would be impossible for [her] to get back there and

use it.” (White Dep., 10:21-22.) Consequently, plaintiff cannot

raise alleged barriers inside the restroom (items 4r-4x of the

Card Declaration). Finally, with respect to alleged barriers

that certain items within the store were out of reach (item 4m of

the Card Decl.), plaintiff testified that the checkout counter

was too high for her and she had to wait for her father to come

and pay for her in line, but she never testified that the items

she selected were too difficult to reach. As such, plaintiff

also lacks standing to allege the barriers claimed in item 4m of

the Card Declaration.

8

[While] [c]onstutional standing principles do not

require that a plaintiff actually encounter every

barrier he seeks to remove, . . . [he] must, at a

minimum, know of, or have reason to know of, and

be deterred by, the barrier at the time the complaint

is filed in order to allege an injury from that

barrier.

Id.

Here, defendants are correct that plaintiff has standing to

sue only for those barriers identified in Exhibit A to the first

amended complaint because it is only those barriers which she

actually encountered and/or had reason to know of at the time of

the filing of the complaint. The alleged barriers later

discovered by her expert were not known by her at the time of the

filing of the complaint, nor are they sufficiently similar or

related to barriers identified in Exhibit A, and therefore she

lacks standing to sue for them.8 Id. at *4 n. 6 (recognizing

that knowledge of a barrier need not be direct, but can be

circumstantial or inferential provided a plaintiff has a

“reasonable belief” that other like barriers are present in

similar features of the facility). 

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9 Said barriers include: (1) “No separate van accessible

sign” (Item 4 in Exh. A); (2) “No accessible route of travel”

from the parking area (Item 10 in Exh. A); (3) “No exterior route

of travel from the property border” (Item 11 in Exh. A); (4)

“Public telephone has no ISA [International Symbol of

Accessibility]” (Item 15 in Exh. A); (5) “Floor mats are not

attached” (Item 16 in Exh. A); (6) “Entrance door ISA not mounted

60 inches center line from the floor (Item 17 in Exh. A); (7) “No

accessible route through store” (Item 21 in Ex. A); and (8)

“Toliet tissue center [in restroom] not mounted below grab bar”

(Item 36 in Exh. A).

10 Plaintiff’s expert does not opine in his declaration

has to any other alleged barriers identified in Exhibit A.

Moreover, plaintiff has not disputed that those other barriers

described in Exhibit A and not raised by her expert in his

declaration, were indeed remedied by defendants. Instead,

plaintiff bases her motion largely on the later-discovered

barriers revealed by her expert. As stated above, as to those

barriers, plaintiff lacks standing to seek relief.

9

Accordingly, the court reaches the merits of only those

barriers raised by the parties on the instant motion which were

identified by plaintiff in Exhibit A to the first amended

complaint. In that regard, eight such barriers are at issue9 as

they are the only barriers identified in Exhibit A that

plaintiff’s expert asserts remain in violation of the ADA. (Card

Decl. at 2-5.)10 As to all other alleged barriers raised by

plaintiff, for the first time, through her expert’s report and

declaration, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of defendants.

B. Subject Barriers

The ADA does not provide a definition of what constitutes an

architectural barrier. Rather, the text of the ADA sets out only

broad principles for the elimination of discrimination against

persons with disabilities. The United States Department of

Justice, however, is charged by statute with the implementation

of Title III of the ADA and Congress empowered it to issue

specific regulations for compliance. 42 U.S.C. 12186(b). In

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11 Here, plaintiff primarily relies on the ADAAG to

establish the presence of barriers at the River Mart. However,

she also relies on California Building Code (“CBC”) standards

(Cal. Code of Regs., Part 24), as additional evidence of barriers

to accessibility. Plaintiff has alleged a claim for statutory

damages under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled

Persons Act; under these Acts, any violation of the ADA also

establishes violation of these state statutes. As such, the

court’s analysis focuses on the purported ADAAG violations.

10

accordance with this mandate, the Department developed its Final

Rule implementing Title III of the ADA, codified at 28

C.F.R. Pt. 36. Attached as Appendix "A" to that Final Rule is

the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines

("ADAAG"), promulgated by the United States Access Board as

guidelines for construction of new facilities or the remodeling

of existing facilities. The Final Rule, with ADAAG attached,

therefore, is the controlling building code/access standard for

implementation of Title III requirements. Indeed, courts have

held that the ADAAG provides the standard to determine if a

facility has a barrier.11 D’Lil v. Anaheim Hotel Partnership, 43

Fed. Appx. 96, 97 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Access Now. Inc. v.

South Florida Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (S.D.

Fla. 2001); D'Li1 v. Stardust Vacation Club, 2001 WL 1825832, 

*4-*5 (E.D. Cal., December 21, 2001); Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn

Restaurant, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1086 (D. HI 2000).

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 36.304, architectural barriers must

be removed where removal is “readily achievable.” “Readily

achievable” is defined as “easily accomplishable and able to be

carried out without much difficulty or expense.” Id. at 

§ 36.304(a). As applied to this case, the facility was

constructed in 1984-85, prior to the ADA’s enactment in 1990. To

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11

the extent any aspects of the facility are unchanged from the

original construction, any “barriers” as determined by the ADAAG

must be removed to the extent “readily achievable.” In 1996, the

counters and cabinets in the beverage dispenser area of the

facility were remodeled; said remodeling was required to be

compliant with the ADAAG. Finally, as to defendants’ removal

efforts since the filing of this action, those efforts had to

comply with the ADAAG (with the exception of the “path-of-travel”

standards discussed below).

As to the eight alleged barriers at issue (Items 4, 10, 11,

15, 16, 17, 21, and 36 of Exhibit A), Items 4, 11, 15-17 and 36

remain in the same condition as at the time of the filing of the

complaint. Defendants contend those claimed barriers do not, in

fact, constitute substantive violations of the ADA. Items 10 and

21, defendants concede were “architectural barriers” under the

ADA, but they maintain the barriers have been properly corrected.

1. “No separate van accessible sign” (Item 4)

Despite the words “Van Accessible” plainly appearing below

the ISA on the parking signage, plaintiff asserts an ADAAG

violation because the “Van Accessible” wording does not appear on

a separate sign from the ISA depicting a person in a wheelchair. 

(Ex. A to FAC, Photo #3 [depicting the relevant sign].) ADAAG

4.6.4 provides:

Accessible parking spaces shall be designated as 

reserved by a sign showing the symbol of accessibility

. . . . Spaces complying with 4.1.2(5)(b) shall have

an additional sign “Van-Accessible” mounted below the

symbol of accessibility. Such signs shall be located

so they cannot be obscured by a vehicle parked in the

space.

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12

Plaintiff reads the requirement of an “additional” sign as

mandating a physically separate sign from the ISA sign. As

support, plaintiff cites to the Department of Justice’s Design

Details: Van Accessible Parking Spaces (Aug. 1996) (Pl.’s Reply

Appendix, filed Sept. 16, 2005, at 22-24.) However, said

document, while depicting an example sign for a van accessible

parking space with two separate signs (one with the ISA depicting

a wheelchair and one with the words “Van Accessible”), it does

not mandate two such signs. Indeed, one reference in the

document is to a “sign with [ISA] and ‘van accessible’ [which]

designates van accessible parking.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added).

As the photograph of the sign at issue here clearly demonstrates,

the creation of a separate sign containing the words “van

accessible” would add nothing to the clarity of the signage. 

Defendants’ sign complies with the ADAAG, by providing

“additional” signage with the words “van accessible,” and is not

contrary to Design Details; therefore, defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on this issue.

2. “No accessible route of travel from parking [area]”

(Item 10)

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that there was no

accessible route provided from the parking lot to the store. In

response, defendants repaired the curb ramp from the parking lot

to the sidewalk in front of the store to make it ADAAG-compliant

(ADAAG § 4.7.3 [requiring said ramp to be a minimum of 36 inches

wide]). (Defs.’ SUF, ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff cannot dispute that the ramp is now ADAAGcompliant, in that it is, according to her own expert, 44 inches

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12 If plaintiff is attempting to allege in Item 11, that a

separate path of travel must be furnished for wheelchairs that

does make use of any vehicle ways, her claim is unavailing. The

advisory notes to ADAAG § 206.1 make clear that: “Access from

site arrival points may include vehicular ways.” Finally, the

court notes that plaintiff has not established that either the

interior alterations in 1996, nor the removal of barriers work by

defendants in 2004, triggered the “path of travel” requirements

of 28 C.F.R. § 36.403 with regard to the whole property. 28

C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1); 36.402(a)(1) and (b)(2).

13

wide. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on this issue.

3. “No exterior route of travel from the property border”

(Item 11)

In Item 11 in Exhibit A, plaintiff alleges “[n]o exterior

route of travel from the property border.” However, it is not

apparent, from the photographs attached to Exhibit A or

plaintiff’s expert’s report, to what this description refers. 

The photographs attached to Exhibit A do not show an inaccessible

route from the border of the property, and Card’s report shows

only a photograph of the public sidewalk. Because there is no

discernable relevant “barrier” at issue, defendants’ motion must

be granted as to this issue; plaintiff has not sustained her

burden of proof.12

4. “Public telephone has no ISA” (Item 15)

Relying on ADAAG § 4.30.7, plaintiff claims that the River

Mart’s public telephone must have an ISA. Section 4.30.7,

however, requires only that “Facilities and elements required to

be identified as accessible by 4.1 shall use the international

symbol of accessibility.” Section 4.1.1 in turn provides that

4.1 applies only to “[a]ll areas of newly designed or newly

constructed buildings and facilities and altered portions of

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14

existing buildings and facilities.” 

Here, plaintiff offers no evidence that the telephone is

part of any new construction or altered area of the existing

facility; accordingly, there is no requirement that it have an

ISA. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

5. “Floor mats are not attached” (Item 16)

Plaintiff argues that none of the “carpeted floor mats”

inside the store are securely attached, violating ADAAG § 4.5.3. 

Said section deals with “carpeting.” It provides:

If carpet or carpet tile is used on a ground or floor

surface, then it shall be securely attached; have a firm

cushion, pad, or backing, or no cushion or pad; and have a

level loop, textured loop, level cut pile, or level

cut/uncut pile texture. The maximum pile thickness shall be

1/2 in (13 mm) (see Fig. 8(f)). Exposed edges of carpet

shall be fastened to floor surfaces and have trim along 

the entire length of the exposed edge. Carpet edge trim

shall comply with 4.5.2.

Thus, the section has no application to “floor mats.” See Access

Board, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.accessboard.gov/adaag/about/FAQ.htm. Question 1 under section 4.5 of

that document reads, along with its answer:

Q: Are the mats placed on the floor of my office lobby

during wet weather considered carpet that must be firmly

attached (ADAAG 4.3 Accessible route)

A: No, such mats are “furnishings” not covered by ADAAG.

However, section 36.211 of the [DOJ] rule requires that

accessible features be maintained so such furnishings

cannot degrade the accessible route. [A]s long as [socalled “walk-off mats”] are stable and do not pose a

tripping hazard, they may actually improve the accessibility

of a surface. On the other hand, loose throw rugs, for

example, could decrease the accessibility of a surface.

The mats at issue, depicted in photographs in plaintiff’s

expert’s report, are clearly not “carpet” of any sort, but are

mats placed on the linoleum floor and thus “furnishings” not

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13 Plaintiff objects on the grounds of “untimeliness” to

defendants’ expert’s opinion (provided in his declaration

submitted on the motions), that the floor mats were “heavy,”

“rubber-backed” mats, not carpeting, that “improve[d] traction.” 

(Defs.’ SUF, ¶ 14.) However, the court does not rely for its

decision on defendants’ expert’s opinion. The nature of the mats

at issue is apparent, without reference to expert opinion, from

the photographs taken by plaintiff’s expert.

14 See ADAAG 4.1.2(7)(c); 4.30.6; 4.30.7.

15 It is noteworthy that signage in this instance is not

required at all by the ADAAG (§ 4.1.2(7)); defendants simply

elected to provide such signage.

15

covered by the ADAAG. Moreover, plaintiff has not provided any

evidence that said mats are unstable or loose or that they

provide a tripping hazard. Indeed, they do not appear to degrade

the accessible route but rather are used to increase traction on

the floor.13 As such, there is no basis for plaintiff’s ADA

claim regarding this issue. Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment.

6. “Entrance door ISA not mounted 60 inches center line

from the floor” (Item 17)

Plaintiff concedes that the ADAAG does not contain a height

requirement for such signage (Defs.’ SUF, ¶ 15),14 but argues

nonetheless an ADA violation on the basis of the CBC (CBC § 2-

1720(g) (1984 version) in effect at the time of the River Mart’s

construction).15 Plaintiff’s reliance on the CBC is

inappropriate. First, plaintiff raised the 1984 CBC provisions

for the first time in her reply, and as such, the argument is not

properly considered herein. Second, her expert does not address

the 1984 provisions or provide an opinion regarding how those

regulations apply to the River Mart’s construction; instead,

Card’s citation to the CBC, if at all, is to the 2001 CBC. 

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16 Card’s additional citation to CBC § 1133B.6.2

(requiring a minimum width of 44 inches) is inapposite; the

citation is to the 2001 CBC which would be inapplicable to this

facility constructed in 1984-85 and remodeled in 1996 only with

respect to the beverage dispenser area.

17 In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff concedes

the facility is in compliance with the ADAAG but argues

nonetheless a violation of the ADA because the facility,

according to plaintiff, is still specifically inaccessible to her

due to the type of wheelchair she uses (which she describes is 

akin to a small “go-cart”). (Pl.’s Supp. Decl., filed Sept. 9,

2005, ¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing; the law does

not require defendants to make their facility accessible to the

specific needs of a particular disabled person. Rather, the

ADAAG sets the reasonable standard of care which has been

16

Finally, even if the court considered said provisions, like the

ADAAG, while the CBC may require such signage, it does not

contain a specific height requirement. (Pl.’s Appendix in Supp.

of Reply, filed Sept. 16, 2005, at 35.) Thus, for these

alternative reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on this issue.

7. “No accessible route through store” (Item 21)

Plaintiff maintains that the access aisles between shelving

inside the River Mart are too narrow (ADAAG § 4.3.3 requires a 36

inch minimum). Plaintiff’s argument, however, ignores her

expert’s own report, which identifies at least three aisles

within the store that are more than 36 inches wide. Defendants

correctly point out that ADAAG 4.3.2(2) requires only that “at

least one accessible route [exist to] connect accessible

buildings, facilities, elements, and spaces that are on the same

site.” Here, by plaintiff’s expert’s own findings, more than one

such route exists and therefore, there is no issue of fact

regarding compliance with the ADAAG.16 Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on this issue.17

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complied with in this case.

18 Defendants moved for summary judgment as to this item

on two alternative grounds: (1) standing (despite plaintiff’s

identification of the item in Exhibit A) and (2) the

inapplicability of ADAAG § 4.17.3 (arguing that said section

applies to interior toilet stalls, not “water closets,” like the

restroom at issue here which is a complete, single toilet

restroom with no stalls or partitions of any kind).

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8. “Toilet tissue center not mounted below grab bar” (Item

36)

Plaintiff does not oppose an award of summary judgment in

favor of defendants on this issue.18 In her reply, “she agrees

that she lacks standing regarding the placement of the toilet

dispenser, and doesn’t oppose summary judgment on this issue.”

(Pl.’s Reply, filed Sept. 16, 2005, at 10:4-5.) As such,

defendants prevail on this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary

judgment is accordingly DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to close this file.

DATED: October 7, 2005

 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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