Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02355/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02355-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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28 1 03CV2355-B (WMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIMCORE CORPORATION, a California

Corporation, ROMER INC., a California

Corporation, HOMER EATON, an

individual, and HEXAGON

METROLOGY AB,

Plaintiff,

v.

FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Florida

Corporation,

Defendant.

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Civil No: 03 CV 2355-B(WMC)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A

NEW TRIAL

Defendant Faro Technologies, Inc. (“Defendant” and “Faro”) moves the Court for a

new trial on the issue of patent invalidity. For the reasons herein, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The litigation between Cimcore Corp., Romer Inc., Hexagon Metrology, and Homer

Eaton (collectively “Plaintiffs” and “Romer”) and Faro concerns claims 1, 2, and 3 of U.S.

Patent No. 5,829,148 (“the ‘148 patent”) directed to a coordinate measuring arm. 

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Beginning on October 30, 2006, the case was tried before a jury. Faro had the burden to

prove by clear and convincing evidence its affirmative defense of invalidity based on

obviousness and indefiniteness. The jury began deliberations on November 29, 2006,

considering Plaintiffs’ infringement case as well as Defendants’ invalidity claims. On

December 1, 2006, the jury found unanimously that the claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ‘148 patent

were not invalid. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on infringement. The Court

entered Judgment that the ‘148 patent was not invalid on December 7, 2006. Faro now

moves for a new trial on invalidity. 

II DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides for the grant of a new trial. The

grant of a new trial is “confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of

the trial court.” Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Allied Chemical Corporation v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Hard v. Burlington

N.R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 483 (9th Cir. 1987)). A trial court may grant a new trial if the

verdict is “contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is

false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, a miscarriage of justice.” 

Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. 868 F.2d 1226, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In general, a court

should grant a new trial only when the judge “is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833

F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Analysis

Faro moves for a new trial on three grounds: (1) new evidence, based on a recent

office action in the reexamination proceedings of the ‘148 patent in the United States Patent

and Trademark Office (USPTO); (2) the jury determined invalidity based on an erroneous

claim construction; and (3) admission of alleged prejudicial evidence consisting of

evidence related to the preferred embodiments of the ‘148 patent. The Court is unpersuaded

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that a new trial is warranted on any of these grounds.

For new evidence to form the basis for a new trial, a party must demonstrate that

“(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the exercise of due diligence would not

have resulted in the evidence being discovered at an earlier stage and (3) the newly

discovered evidence is of such magnitude that production of it earlier would likely have

changed the outcome of the case.” Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 929 (9th

Cir. 2000).

Faro’s “new evidence” is the discovery of U.S. Patent No. 4,990,839 (“the Schonlau

patent”) by the USPTO cited in the December 7, 2006 office action in the reexamination of

the ‘148 patent. While this evidence was brought to the attention of Faro after the trial, the

Court finds that it does not merit consideration as “new evidence.” The Schonlau patent

issued on February 5, 1991; it has been publicly available for over fifteen years. Schonlau

is of public record, available on a searchable database maintained by the USPTO and

accessible on the internet. 

Moreover, Faro has failed to explain why with due diligence it could not have

discovered this evidence prior to trial. Although Faro asserts that neither party nor the

USPTO found this document before trial, Faro offers no evidence of the extent or nature of

its search efforts that would attest to due diligence on its part. Furthermore, it does not

appear that Schonlau was hidden or difficult to discover. Its title, abstract and claims all

contain key words that are intimately related to the subject matter of the instant litigation

and that may be employed in a search on the public USPTO database. Thus, without a

more substantial showing of diligence, the evidence does not meet the threshold

requirements to warrant a new trial. 

Faro’s second basis for a new trial also is unpersuasive. Faro argues error with

respect to the claim construction, in particular, the Court’s construction of the terms

“transfer member” and “joint assembly.” With respect to transfer member, Faro argues that

the construction given to and used by the jury was too broad and lacking in structural detail

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so that it could include too many parts of the articulated arm. In regard to joint assembly,

Faro argues that the Court’s construction of this term confused the jury and was

inconsistent with dictionary definitions of the word. Faro also argues that the Court’s

construction is inconsistent with the USPTO’s most recent office action in the

reexamination of the ‘148 patent.

Faro’s arguments here are simply yet another motion for reconsideration of the

Court’s claim construction, an issue which Faro has raised on multiple occasions with the

Court, including during trial. Faro has presented no relevant evidence here that is any

different than the Court has previously considered. As regards the recent office action in

the ‘148 reexamination, this information is not ripe for consideration. The office action is a

first office action, not a final rejection by the USPTO. Even if it were a final rejection, until

the patentee addresses the rejections with argument or claim amendments and the

reexamined patent issues, the prosecution history is incomplete and estoppel has yet to be

determined. Finally, Faro has not demonstrated why the jury’s invalidity verdict would

have been different if the terms “joint assembly” and/or “transfer member” had been

construed differently. 

Faro’s third basis for a new trial contends that the Court improperly allowed

introduction of evidence and testimony related to the preferred embodiment of the ‘148

patent. In the instant case, the Court permitted demonstrative evidence of the preferred

embodiment to assist the jury in understanding the technology of the patent and the

visualization of particular claim terms. 

“Although claims are not necessarily restricted in scope to what is shown in a

preferred embodiment, neither are the specifics of the preferred embodiment irrelevant to

the correct meaning of claim limitations.” Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Inc.,

133 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Moreover, in permitting the use of this evidence, the

Court did not prejudice the jury towards the preferred embodiment. The Court took

specific steps to alert the jury to the limited purpose of this evidence. The Court issued

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several relevant jury instructions including instructions on how to analyze infringement and

obviousness (Instruction Nos. 17, 25, 26), as well as a specific caution on the use of

preferred embodiments (Instruction No. 20). The Court also cautioned the jury during the

trial in relation to witness’s testimony on the preferred embodiment. (See e.g., testimony of

Dr. Dornfeld, Transcript Nov 21, 2006 at 101-105.) Additionally, Faro had the

opportunity to explore and challenge the testimony on the preferred embodiments, an

opportunity Faro chose to pursue with some witnesses but not others. (See e.g., testimony

of Dr. Hocken, Transcript Nov 21, 2006 at 225-232; testimony of Dr. Sidman, Transcript

Nov 21, 2006 at 269-270.). Finally, all of the testimony cited by Faro concerned the

experts’ opinions in the context of the infringement analysis; Faro has not shown how this

evidence could have resulted in error with regard to the jury’s determinations on the

questions of invalidity.

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the reasons herein, the Court finds that Faro has not offered any

grounds that warrant a new trial. Therefore, Faro’s motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: March 12, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Court Judge

cc: Hon. William McCurine Jr.

 United States Magistrate Judge

 All Counsel of Record

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