Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00289/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00289-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sentinel Insurance Company Limited,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Head to Toe Therapy Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-22-00289-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

Plaintiff Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd. brought this interpleader action to have 

the Court resolve disputed claims to the proceeds of an insurance policy issued by Plaintiff 

to Head to Toe Therapy, Inc. (“HTT”), Policy No. 59 SBA BC2122 SC (“Policy”). The 

proceeds, $779,999.96, represent the amount due under the Policy for fire loss that occurred 

at HTT’s business personal property on February 25, 2021. Defendants Sunflower Bank, 

N.A. (“SBNA”) and Jazi Kat LLC (“Jazi Kat”) claim respective interests in the disputed 

funds.

1 On March 14, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to deposit the 

funds into the Registry of the Court. (Doc. 90.) Then, on April 3, 2023, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion for discharge of further liability and dismissed Plaintiff with prejudice 

1

Jazi Kat’s counsel is also representing Defendants HTT, Bridget O’ Brien (“O’ 

Brien”), and Jazi Kat 4649 Rockridge LLC (“Jazi Kat 4659”). At a telephonic oral 

argument on March 28, 2023, Jazi Kat’s counsel indicated to the Court that both HTT and 

Jazi Kat are making claims to the disputed funds. (Doc. 99 at 3–4.) However, counsel’s 

pending motion only argues that Jazi Kat is entitled to the funds. (Docs. 109-1, 109-2.) 

Given there are no arguments before the Court that HTT, Jazi Kat 4649, or O’Brien are

entitled to the funds, this order will address only the dispute between SBNA and Jazi Kat. 

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from the case. (Doc. 95.)

Pending before the Court are SBNA’s and Jazi Kat’s cross motions for summary 

judgment, which are fully briefed.2(Docs. 91, 101, 109-1, 109-2, 110, 111.) For the

following reasons, the Court grants SBNA’s motion for summary judgment and denies Jazi 

Kat’s motion.3

I. BACKGROUND

Bridget O’Brien was the sole shareholder of HTT. (Doc. 91–1 at 5.) In October

2019, O’Brien sold and transferred all HTT shares to Vickie Simpson. (Id. at 10–24.) To 

fund this sale, HTT obtained a $3,000,000 loan from SBNA. (Id. at 3, 12–18.) On 

October 31, 2019, HTT and SBNA executed a Business Loan Agreement, a Promissory 

Note, and a Commercial Security Agreement. (Id. at 12–32.) Under the Security

Agreement, HTT granted SBNA a security interest in all of HTT’s assets, including “[a]ll 

inventory, equipment, accounts . . . , all insurance refunds relating to the foregoing property 

. . . whether now existing or hereafter arising . . . and all products and proceeds (including 

but not limited to all insurance payments) of or relating to the foregoing property.” (Id. at 

3, 24.) The Security Agreement further clarified that SBNA’s security interest in the HTT’s 

“collateral” includes “all insurance proceeds and refunds of insurance premiums.” (Id.)

Both the Security Agreement and the Loan Agreement affirmed that SBNA had a 

lien priority over HTT’s collateral. The Security Agreement provided that HTT “holds 

good and marketable title to the Collateral, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances 

except for the lien of this Agreement.” (Id. at 26.) And the Loan Agreement stated that 

2

Jazi Kat’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 109-1) is untimely since it was 

filed after the Court-ordered deadline for dispositive motions and without leave to do so. 

Generally, the Court will strike untimely motions; however, the Court declines to do so in 

this instance for three reasons. First, Jazi Kat’s arguments for why the Court should deny 

SBNA’s motion for summary judgment are substantively the same arguments for why the 

Court should grant summary judgment in Jazi Kat’s favor. Second, even if Jazi Kat had not 

moved for summary judgment, the Court could grant summary judgment sua sponte. 

Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 654–55 (9th Cir. 2016). Third, 

Defendant SBNA was afforded two replies to Jazi Kat’s motion (see Docs. 110, 111) and 

is not prejudiced by the Court declining to strike Jazi Kat’s motion. 

3 Oral argument is denied because the issues are adequately briefed, and oral 

argument will not assist the Court in reaching its decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv. 

7.2(f).

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HTT “has not entered into or granted any Security Agreements or permitted the filing or 

attachment or any Security interests on or affecting any of the Collateral directly or 

indirectly . . . that would be prior or that may in any way be superior to [SBNA’s] Security 

Interests and rights in and to such Collateral.” (Id. at 13.) To perfect its security interest in 

HTT’s collateral, SBNA filed a Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statement 

with the Arizona Secretary of State on November 7, 2019. (Id. at 34.) The Financing 

Statement listed the same collateral as listed in HTT and SBNA’s Security Agreement. 

(Id.)

HTT is the named insured under the Policy at issue here. (Id. at 8.) Before SBNA’s 

loan funded to HTT, the Policy listed Jazi Kat and First Fidelity Bank as “Loss Payees” 

and Western State Bank under the “Lender’s Loss Payable” endorsement. (Id.) As part of 

the Loan Agreement with SBNA, however, HTT was required to provide insurance 

coverage on its collateral and to name SBNA under the “Lender Loss Payable” 

endorsement on the Policy. (Doc. 91-1 at 42.) Insurance coverage had to be in place by the 

loan closing date of October 31, 2019. (Id.) In anticipation of the loan’s closing date, HTT’s 

accountant emailed Summit Insurance Advisors (an entity-agent of Plaintiff) on October 

28, 2019, requesting Summit name SBNA as the lender loss payee for HTT’s Business 

Personal Property and issue a certificate of insurance reflecting this change to the Policy. 

(Id. at 8; Doc. 91-2 at 32–35.) Summit internally approved this request and, on October 29, 

2019, emailed HTT an ACORD Certificate of Liability Insurance, designating SBNA as 

the “Certificate Holder,” “Additional Insured,” and “Lender Loss Payee” on the Policy.

(Id. at 32–35, 38.) 

Despite approving HTT’s request that SBNA be designated as the lender loss payee 

on the Policy and despite issuing a certificate of insurance reflecting this, Summit 

discovered in 2021 that the Policy had not been officially changed back in October 2019. 

(Id. at 45.) In a deposition, a Summit representative testified that HTT’s Policy should have 

been changed in October 2019 to identify SBNA as the lender loss payee. (Id. at 44–45.) 

However, Summit discovered in April 2021 that its employee had failed to make the 

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appropriate change back in October 2019. (Id.) As a result, Summit enacted “a policy 

change to reflect what should have been done back in October of 2019.” (Id. at 45.) The

April 2021 policy change replaced Western State Bank with SBNA under the “Lender’s 

Loss Payable” endorsement. (Id. at 29.) The change also deleted First Fidelity Bank as a 

loss payee.

4

(Id.) This change did not, however, alter Jazi Kat’s listing as a “loss payee” 

under the Policy. (Id.)

HTT ultimately defaulted on its loan with SBNA, resulting in SBNA initiating a 

collection action in the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id. at 5–6.) On March 15, 2022, 

the court entered judgement in SBNA’s favor in the principal amount of $3,444,588.14 

plus interest accruing thereon. (Id.)

On February 25, 2021, fire loss occurred at HTT’s business personal property. (Doc. 

6 at 4.) Plaintiff acknowledged coverage for the fire damage under the Policy. (Doc. 6.)

After adjusting HTT’s claim under the Policy for the fire loss, Plaintiff filed this 

interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserted that the defendants, including SBNA and Jazi Kat, have conflicting 

claims to the $779,999.96 in insurance proceeds. (Id.; Doc. 79 at 2.) On April 10, 2023, 

Plaintiff deposited the disputed funds into the Court’s registry. (Doc. 98.) Although this 

interpleader names numerous defendants, only SBNA and Jazi Kat have submitted 

competing claims to this Court. (See Docs. 91, 109-1.) SBNA contends that it is entitled to 

the funds because both Plaintiff and HTT represented, as well as intended, that SBNA be 

the “Lender Loss Payee” for HTT’s business personal property under the Policy. SBNA 

also argues that separate from its status as the Lender Loss Payee under the Policy, SBNA 

is the sole secured creditor with a perfected lien on and security interest in HTT’s insurance 

proceeds. (Doc. 91.) Jazi Kat contends that it is entitled to the funds because, at the time of 

the fire loss, Jazi Kat was the first named loss payee under HTT’s Policy and SBNA was 

not yet added as a loss payee. (Doc. 109-1.)

4 First Fidelity Bank was deleted as a loss payee because a portion of SBNA’s loan

to HTT was used to fully payoff HTT’s obligations to First Fidelity. (Doc. 91-2 at 18.)

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

When parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider 

each motion on its own merits. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside 

Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will grant summary judgment when, 

viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a case, and a 

dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” for 

the other side. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

In interpleader actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, federal district courts are 

“required to apply the substantive law that a court of the forum state would apply.” 

Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S. v. McKay, 837 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, Arizona substantive law governs this interpleader action. 

III. ANALYSIS 

SBNA contends that it is entitled to all of the disputed funds because it is the rightful 

“Lender Loss Payee under the Policy, and because SBNA is the only lender holding a 

perfected security interest in HTT’s [business personal property] or the proceeds thereof, 

which includes the insurance proceeds [here].” (Doc. 91 at 2–3.) Jazi Kat concedes that 

SBNA is entitled to $300,000 of the disputed funds because of “SBNA subrogation.” 

However, Jazi Kat contends that it is entitled to the remaining $479,999.96 because Jazi 

Kat was the first listed “loss payee” on the Policy, whereas SBNA was not named on the 

Policy at the time of the loss. (Doc. 109-1 at 2–3, 5.) For the following reasons, the Court 

finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that SBNA is entitled to 

entirety of the disputed funds as a matter of law. 

A. SBNA has a first position perfected security interest in HTT’s insurance 

proceeds. 

The Court first finds that there is no genuine dispute of fact that SBNA has a 

perfected first position security interest in all of HTT’s assets, which includes insurance 

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proceeds. Jazi Kat admits that “SBNA has a security interest in the assets of [HTT].” (Doc. 

109-2 at 3.) Under Arizona law, “[t]he attachment of a security interest in collateral gives 

the secured party the rights to proceeds.” A.R.S. § 47-9203(F). Proceeds include “insurance 

payable by reason of . . . damages to the collateral.” Id. § 47-9102 (A)(64)(e). “A security 

interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original 

collateral was perfected.” Id. § 47-9315(C). And a security interest in collateral is perfected 

upon the filing of a financing statement. Id. § 47-9310(A). 

Under Article Nine of Arizona’s UCC, a security agreement “is effective according 

to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.” 

Id. § 47-9201(A). “The effect of this section is to give the Article Nine secured party, upon 

a debtor’s default, priority over ‘anyone, anywhere, anyhow’ except as otherwise provided 

by the remaining [UCC] priority rules.” See Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cotton Growers 

Hail Ins., Inc., 747 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Griffin v. Continental 

Am. Life Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 671, 673 (11th Cir. 1984)). 

Here, SBNA’s perfected first position interest in HTT’s collateral, including any 

insurance proceeds, is evidenced by SBNA’s UCC financing statement, which SBNA filed 

with the Arizona Secretary of State’s office. Jazi Kat neither disputes SBNA’s perfected 

interest nor points to evidence demonstrating that Jazi Kat has a conflicting perfected 

security interest. Indeed, Jazi Kat proffers no evidence that it has a security interest at all 

or that it even is a creditor of HTT. Instead, Jazi Kat makes a bald claim that although 

SBNA has a security interest in HTT’s assets, the disputed funds at issue here “are the asset 

of Jazi Kat, not HTT.” (Doc. 109-2.) Not so. It is undisputed that the interpleaded funds 

represent the amount due under the Policy for the fire loss that occurred at HTT’s business 

property in February 2021. It is further undisputed that the insured on the Policy is HTT. 

Jazi Kat’s legally and factually unsupported claim that the insurance proceeds are not 

among HTT’s assets is unpersuasive. See Valley Nat. Bank, 747 P.2d at 1228 (holding that 

insured’s interest in the insurance proceeds at the time loss occurs is sufficient to allow 

bank’s security interest to attach). Given that SBNA is an Article Nine secured party and 

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that HTT has defaulted on its loan in excess of the disputed funds at issue here, SBNA has 

priority over any other party to the insurance proceeds. Jazi Kat fails to point to a UCC 

priority rule that would preclude this result. Nor does Jazi Kat point to evidence 

establishing that its claim to the disputed funds is superior to SBNA’s perfected security 

interest. 

B. SBNA is entitled to reformation of the Policy as a matter of law. 

Jazi Kat repeatedly emphasizes that at the time of the loss, Jazi Kat was listed as the 

first loss payee on the Policy, whereas SBNA was not listed on the Policy at all. (Doc. 109-

1 at 2–4.) Jazi Kat points to the holding in Zaghi v. State Farm General Insurance Co. to 

assert that a creditor—like SBNA—that is not named in an insurance policy on the date of 

the loss cannot recover insurance proceeds under that policy. 77 F. Supp. 3d 974, 975 (N.D. 

Cal. 2015). Jazi Kat also points to Zaghi for the proposition that a creditor cannot 

retroactively add himself to the policy. Id.

Jazi Kat’s argument and reliance on Zaghi is unpersuasive. In Zaghi, the court held 

that the creditor could not recover the insurance proceeds because the creditor failed to 

allege sufficient facts that the insurer intended to list the creditor on the Policy before the 

date of the loss. Id. In this case, it is undisputed that both Summit (the insurer) and HTT

(the insured) intended for SBNA to be listed on the Policy back in October 2019. This is 

demonstrated by Summit both internally approving HTT’s request to designate SBNA as 

the lender loss payee on the Policy and by Summit issuing a Certificate of Insurance in 

October 2019, listing SBNA as the certificate holder, additional insured, and lender loss 

payee on the Policy. It is also undisputed that but-for Summit’s employee failing to process 

the policy change in October 2019, SBNA would have been listed on the Policy as the 

lender loss payee at the time of the fire loss. Jazi Kat even concedes that the reason SBNA 

was not listed on the Policy at the time of the loss was “due to the insurance company’s 

administrative error.” (Doc. 109-1 at 3.) The Court finds Zaghi’s facts distinguishable from 

the facts in this case and thus the reasoning is inapposite. 

Moreover, as the court in Zaghi notes, reformation of an insurance contract is proper 

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where the insured and the insurer both intended for the creditor to be named in the insurance 

policy. Id.; see also A. I. D. Ins. Servs. v. Riley, 541 P.2d 595, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) 

(“Where the party applying for insurance states the facts to the agent and relies on him to 

write the policy which will protect his interests, and the agent so understands, but fails by 

mistake to so write the contract, the mistake is considered mutual and the insured is entitled 

to reformation.”). Given that Summit and HTT intended to name SBNA as the lender loss 

payee on the Policy in October 2019, SBNA is entitled to reformation of the Policy as a 

matter of law. Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Bank of Ariz., 94 P.2d 437, 442 (Ariz. 1939) 

(“[T]he equitable remedy of reformation will not only be allowed as against original parties 

and their heirs, but will also be granted as against the assignees, creditors, purchasers with 

notice, and all others standing in privy.”) (internal quotation omitted). 

C. Any claim Jazi Kat has to the disputed funds is inferior to SBNA’s claim. 

Jazi Kat contends that “[e]ven if the insurance policy is reformed, [it] is still the first 

loss payee, first in time, and therefore, superior to a later added loss payee.” To support its 

“first in time, first in right” argument, Jazi Kat directs the Court’s attention to three 

Supreme Court cases: United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 384 U.S. 

323 (1966); United States v. Pioneer American Insurance Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); and 

United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81 (1954). As Jazi Kat correctly 

notes, these cases hold that a federal tax lien is superior to other liens not choate at the time 

the federal tax lien is filed. Jazi Kat argues that although “first in time, first in right” 

doctrine originally arose in the tax-lien context, it has been extended to non-tax lien areas 

such as in Connecticut-Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Carter. 446 F.2d 136, 138–39 (5th

Cir. 1971) (holding that federal government’s lien remained subordinate to private lien 

because “[government], operating as a private lender, voluntarily took a second mortgage 

fully aware . . . of the then existent attorneys’ fees clause in the first mortgage.”). 

The Court is not persuaded. First, it is not clear how any of the cases Jazi Kat cites 

support its claim to the disputed funds. It is true that these cases refer to the principle of 

“first in time, first in right,” but that doctrine was used in the context of competing liens.

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Here, only SBNA has established a lien in HTT’s assets and insurance proceeds; Jazi Kat, 

on the other hand, has proffered no evidence that it has a competing lien in HTT’s assets 

or the insurance proceeds. Second, even assuming Jazi Kat has a competing lien, Jazi Kat 

has proffered no evidence that such a lien was perfected or that it was perfected first in 

time. A.R.S. § 47-9322(A)(2) (“A perfected security interest . . . has priority over a 

conflicting unperfected security interest.”). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that 

SBNA not only has a perfected interest in HTT’s insurance proceeds, but that SBNA 

perfected this interest first in time. Take, for example, the undisputed warranties HTT made 

to SBNA when it granted SBNA an interest in its assets. HTT warranted that it held good 

and marketable title to the collateral “free and clear of all liens” and that HTT had not 

granted any security interests affecting the collateral that would be prior or superior to 

SBNA’s interest. Jazi Kat fails to rebut any of this. So even under the “first in time, first in 

right” doctrine for competing liens, SBNA is entitled to the funds. 

Moreover, Arizona case law supports the finding that SBNA’s interest as lender loss 

payee under the Policy is superior to Jazi’s Kat’s interest as loss payee. As Arizona courts 

have explained, a loss payee is defined as “a mere appointee to receive the proceeds to the 

extent of his interest . . . dependent upon the existence of an insurable interest in such 

appointee . . . [I]f the policy is not collectible by the insured, the appointee, likewise, 

cannot recover thereunder.” Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 836 P.2d 425, 

428 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Granite State Ins. Co. v. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co., 609 P.2d 

90, 91–93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)). In contrast, a lender loss payable clause “is, in effect, an 

independent agreement with the mortgagee, creating an independent contract between the 

[insurance] company and the mortgagee for the latter’s benefit.” Id. Consequently, “in a 

loss payee context, the loss payee’s rights are derivative [of the insured’s rights], while in 

a [lender loss payable] context, there is a separate contract between the insurer and 

mortgagee which is independent from the insurer-named insured relationship.” Id. Here, 

Jazi Kat is the loss payee, whereas SBNA, as the mortgagee, is the lender loss payee. Any 

interest Jazi Kat has in the insurance proceeds is derivative of HTT’s interest. Given the 

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default judgment against HTT and given SBNA’s perfected security interest in HTT’s 

insurance proceeds on its collateral, HTT has no right to collect the proceeds. In turn, 

because HTT cannot collect the insurance proceeds, Jazi Kat likewise cannot collect. 

In sum, the Court finds that there is no issue of any material fact and that SBNA is 

entitled to the entirety of the disputed funds as a matter of law. A rational trier of fact, 

taking the record as a whole, could not find that Jazi Kat’s claim to the disputed funds is 

superior to SBNA’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding 

that summary judgment may be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”). Accordingly, the Court grants 

SBNA’s motion for summary judgment and denies Jazi Kat’s motion. The Court also 

denies without prejudice SBNA’s request for attorneys’ fees because it does not comply 

with LRCiv 54.2.

IT IS ORDERED that SBNA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91) is 

GRANTED and Jazi Kat’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 109-1) is 

DENIED. SBNA is hereby entitled to the entirety of the interpleaded funds amounting to 

$779,999.96, which Plaintiff deposited into the Court’s Registry on April 10, 2023, and 

any accrued interest or any earned interest. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that SBNA’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied 

without prejudice. If SBNA so chooses, it may move for attorneys’ fees and costs in a 

manner that complies with LRCiv 54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate 

the case.

Dated this 17th day of November, 2023.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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