Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02211/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02211-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Plaintiff states that the requested documents are responsive to his Document

Request Nos. 10, 22, 26, 30, 44, 45 and 59.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

QUEDILLAS RICARDO WALKER, MYRTLE

VIVIAN WALKER and WILLIAM BERKELEY

WALKER,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA,

GERALD EGGE, EARL PENNINGTON, GAIL

DAVIS, JOHN SCHON, RANDY DANTO and

DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

/

No. C04-02211 RMW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF

QUEDILLAS RICARDO WALKER’S

MOTION TO COMPEL DISTRICT

ATTORNEY DOCUMENTS

[Re: Docket No. 54]

Plaintiff Quedillas Ricardo Walker (“plaintiff” or “Walker”) moves to compel the production of

documents from the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office.1

 The County opposed the motion. 

Pursuant to this court’s interim order, the County submitted the disputed documents for an in camera

review. Upon consideration of the papers submitted, as well as the arguments presented at the May

24, 2005 hearing, the court issues the following order.

In this civil rights action, plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendants’ misconduct, he was

wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for the 1991 murder of Lisa Hopewell. He was released twelve

*E-FILED ON 12/2/05*

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For the Northern District of California

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years later upon issuance of a writ habeas corpus, which was supported by the District Attorney’s

Office.

District Attorney George Kennedy (“Kennedy”) asked Assistant District Attorney Karyn

Sinunu (“Sinunu”) to review and evaluate the investigation and prosecution of Walker. Although the

date of Kennedy’s request is not entirely clear, the record presented suggests that it may have been

made sometime around December 2002. Sinunu’s evaluation culminated in an August 18, 2003

memorandum (“August 18, 2003 Memo”) to Kennedy. That memo was also copied to Assistant

District Attorney John Schon (“Schon”), who prosecuted Walker’s case, and Chief Assistant District

Attorney Paul Kuty (“Kuty”), who is identified as having responsibility for managing civil litigation

against the District Attorney’s Office. Sinunu says that she prepared three other documents which she

used as an aid in preparing her August 18, 2003 Memo: (1) “Draft: People v. Rahsson Germaine

Bowers and Quedillio [sic] Ricardo Walker Santa Clara Docket 149554”; (2) “People v. Rahsson

Germaine Bowers and Quedillio Ricardo Walker Santa Clara Docket 149554”; and (3) “Follow-up

Investigation.” For convenience, the court refers to these documents as the “Sinunu Documents.”

As part of her work responsibilities, Sinunu also made statements to the media about the

investigation which were printed in a June 22, 2003 San Jose Mercury News article. Among other

things, the article indicates that the District Attorney’s Office would “analyze ways to avoid future

mistakes.” (Harris Decl., Ex. A). Schon requested that the statements be retracted, and Sinunu

refused. The discourse between Sinunu and Schon as to the media statements is documented in three

internal memoranda: (1) Sinunu’s July 7, 2003 memorandum to Schon; (2) Sinunu’s July 15, 2003

addendum to Schon; and (3) Schon’s August 1, 2003 memorandum to Sinunu, Kennedy and Kuty,

which apparently was sent by email to Kennedy on September 10, 2003. Sinunu’s July 7, 2003 and

July 15, 2003 memos were also copied to Kennedy and Kuty. For convenience, the court refers to

these documents as the “Media Memos.”

Walker does not seriously dispute that the August 18, 2003 Memo is privileged, but he

contends that the Sinunu Documents and the Media Memos are not. The County contends that the

documents are shielded from disclosure by several privileges, namely, the deliberative process

privilege, the attorney-client privilege, the official information privilege and the self-critical analysis

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privilege. It maintains that all of the disputed documents were generated for the purposes of (1)

identifying any shortcomings in the prosecution of plaintiff, (2) aiding Kennedy in a decision as to

whether any personnel or institutional policy changes were warranted; and (3) conferring with County

counsel about the instant lawsuit.

I. DISCUSSION

A. The Deliberative Process Privilege

As noted above, plaintiff does not seriously dispute that Sinunu’s August 18, 2003 Memo to

Mr. Kennedy is protected by the deliberative process privilege. However, he argues that the Media

Memos are not covered by the privilege because they were generated outside of the decision-making

process. The County argues that all of the documents at issue are covered by the deliberative process

privilege because they are part and parcel of the underlying investigation into the conduct of plaintiff’s

prosecution.

The deliberative process privilege is one of the recognized exemptions to disclosure under the

Freedom of Information Act. Carter v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1088-

89 (9th Cir. 2002). “The purpose of this privilege is ‘to allow agencies freely to explore possibilities,

engage in internal debates, or play devil’s advocate without fear of public scrutiny.’” Id. at 1089

(quoting Assembly of California v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th

Cir. 1992)). The government bears the burden of proving that the documents in question are exempt

from disclosure. Id. at 1088. The privilege has been described as a narrow one, to be “‘strictly

confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principles.’” North

Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Sanchez

v. Johnson, No. C00-01593, 2001 WL 1870308 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2001)).

The privilege requires that documents be both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Carter, 307

F.3d at 1089. “‘A document may be considered predecisional if it was prepared in order to assist an

agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.’” Id. (quoting Assembly, 968 F.2d at 921)). 

Material which chronologically predates a decision, but which does not contribute to that decision, is

not “predecisional.” Id. The key question underlying the deliberative process privilege is “whether the

disclosure of materials would expose an agency’s decision-making process in such a way as to

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discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform

its functions. . . .” Id. at 1090. Thus, predecisional materials are privileged insofar as they reveal the

mental processes of decisionmakers. Id.

1. Sinunu’s August 18, 2003 Memo and the Sinunu Documents

This court’s review of the August 18, 2003 Memo confirms that the memorandum is both

predecisional and deliberative. Although it appears to summarize factual data pertaining to Walker’s

prosecution, that data is not severable from deliberative content and therefore is also protected. See

North Pacifica, LLC, 274 F. Supp.2d at 1122 (“[F]actual material that ‘is so interwoven with the

deliberative material that it is not severable’ is protected”) (quoting Federal Trade Comm’n v.

Warner Communications, 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984)). While the exhibits attached to the

memorandum appear to be purely factual, the County’s counsel represents that those documents have

already been produced to plaintiffs.

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that the Sinunu Documents – the drafts and notes used to

prepare the August 18, 2003 Memo – are not protected by the deliberative process privilege. To the

contrary, the privilege “covers recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other

subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the

agency.” Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

Nevertheless, having reviewed these documents, this court finds that a considerable portion of these

documents merely recite facts learned in the investigative process. Purely factual data that does not

reflect the underlying deliberative process are not protected. North Pacifica, LLC, 274 F. Supp.2d

at 1122. 

Walker argues that even if the privilege applies to these documents, the privilege has been

waived because they were disclosed to Schon, and not solely to the claimed decisionmaker, Kennedy. 

However, the case Walker relies upon, Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Cal.

2003), is inapposite. In Kintera, Inc., defendants voluntarily and publicly disclosed portions of a

privileged document. In finding that work product protection had been waived, the court reasoned

that the defendants could not selectively disclose self-serving information from a protected document,

while claiming that the doctrine nonetheless shielded the full substance of the document. Id. at 512. In

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the instant case, this court declines to find that there has been a waiver by virtue of the disclosure to

Schon.

Walker argues that his need for the documents overrides the privilege in any event. There is

no dispute that the deliberative process privilege is qualified and may be overcome if a litigant’s need

for the information outweighs the government’s interest in non-disclosure. See FTC v. Warner

Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). In balancing these interests, courts

consider several factors including: (1) the relevance of the evidence; (2) the availability of evidence

from other sources; (3) the government’s role in the litigation; and (4) the extent to which disclosure

would hinder frank and independent discussion about policies and decisions. Id. at 1161. Other

factors that courts may consider include: (5) the interest of the litigants and of society in accurate

judicial fact-finding; (6) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved; (7) the presence of

issues concerning governmental misconduct; and (8) the federal interest in the enforcement of federal

law. See North Pacifica, LLC, 274 F. Supp.2d at 1122 (citing Irvin v. United States v. Irvin, 127

F.R.D. 169, 173 (C.D. Cal. 1989)).

In the instant case, the federal interest in enforcement of federal constitutional rights weighs in

favor of disclosure. Moreover, there is no dispute as to the seriousness of plaintiff’s claims in this

action, and litigants and the public always have an interest in accurate judicial fact-finding. Further,

plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated due to the alleged misconduct of the

government.

Insofar as Schon remains a defendant in this action, the documents are relevant or reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence of plaintiff’s claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

26(b)(1). Nonetheless, to the extent plaintiff’s stated interest in the documents is their claimed

relevance to his Monell claims and to the conduct of the County and the District Attorney’s Office,

plaintiff’s arguments are less compelling. In its September 30, 2005 order granting defendants’ motion

to dismiss, the District Court concluded, among other things, that (1) the County is not subject to

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of the district attorney and Schon; and (2) plaintiffs’

claims against the district attorney are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. (See

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28 2 Plaintiff has filed a Second Amended Complaint again naming the County and the

District Attorney’s Office as defendants.

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Docket No. 72).2

 He further argues that individual defendants Schon and public defender Randy

Danto will not have the same information the County possesses. Here, however, defense counsel

represents that factual data are not being withheld. Moreover, the court finds that disclosure of the

documents would compromise the government’s ability to conduct thorough and frank investigations.

Accordingly, the court concludes that, on balance, the privilege is not overcome by plaintiff’s

asserted need for the documents.

2. Media Memos

As for the Media Memos, the County contends that these documents are also covered by the

deliberative process privilege because they are part and parcel of Sinunu’s August 18, 2003 Memo

evaluating the District Attorney’s investigation of Walker’s prosecution. Here, it emphasizes that the

Media Memos contain some of the same analysis contained in the August 18, 2003 Memo.

It is true that the Media Memos were copied to Kennedy and that they also predate the

August 18, 2003 Memo to him. Nevertheless, this court concludes that the Media Memos are not

“predecisional.” Based upon the court’s in camera review, it appears that the Media Memos were

not created as part of the deliberative process for which the August 18, 2003 Memo was generated. 

Defense counsel acknowledged at the hearing that unlike the August 18, 2003 Memo, the Media

Memos were not generated at Kennedy’s behest. Rather, it appears that the Media Memos were

generated as part of an internal dialogue between Sinunu and her colleague, Schon, about Sinunu’s

refusal to seek a retraction of the statements printed in the San Jose Mercury News. Indeed, the

court’s in camera review reveals that the Media Memos (specifically, Sinunu’s July 7, 2003 memo

and the July 15, 2003 addendum) were expressly not directed to the post-trial investigation of

Walker’s prosecution. That Sinunu chose to document her refusal to seek a retraction based upon the

same information which she ultimately transmitted to Kennedy in her August 18, 2003 Memo does not

bring these documents within the scope of the deliberative process privilege. See Carter, 307 F.3d at

1089 (“‘Material which predates a decision chronologically, but did not contribute to that decision, is

not predecisional in any meaningful sense.’”) (quoting Assembly of California, 968 F.2d at 921); see

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also Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868 (“[I]f document are not part of a clear ‘process’ leading to a

final decision on the issue, . . . they are less likely to be properly characterized as predecisional . . ..”).

Having determined that the August 18, 2003 Memo is not discoverable and that the Sinunu

Documents are not discoverable (except as to the purely non-privileged factual data), the remainder of

this order addresses only whether the Media Memos are protected by any of the other privileges

asserted by the County.

B. The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege applies “(1) [w]hen legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a

professional legal adviser in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that

purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are, at the client’s instance, permanently

protected (7) from disclosure by the client or by the legal adviser (8) unless the protection be waived.” 

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002). The party asserting the privilege

has the burden of establishing that the privilege applies. The privilege, even if established, is strictly

construed. North Pacifica, LLC, 274 F. Supp.2d at 1126 (citing Martin, 278 F.3d at 999-1000)). 

“Because the attorney-client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the

factfinder, it is applied only when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of encouraging full and frank

disclosure by the client to his or her attorney.” Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974

F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992).

For purposes of the instant motion, the first three of the above-listed elements warrant

particular attention. There is no apparent attorney-client relationship between the authors of the

documents (Schon and Sinunu) and the stated recipients (Schon, Sinunu, Kennedy and Kuty). 

Although the Media Memos were eventually given to County counsel in this action some five months

after they were created, the documents were, at their inception, internal memoranda generated as part

of the discourse between Schon and Sinunu. As such, they do not appear to have been prepared by a

“client” for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from an attorney in her professional capacity as a

legal advisor. Merely transmitting documents to an attorney does not bring them within the scope of

the privilege. See generally Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962).

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Nonetheless, the County argues, in essence, that the Media Memos are protected by the

attorney-client privilege because the documents reflect or contain the same information as that

contained in Sinunu’s August 18, 2003 memo to Kennedy – i.e., information which Kennedy states

“served to advise [him] about the handling of the prosecution so that [he] could consult with counsel

about [the] Office’s position on the merits of the litigation.” (Kennedy Decl., ¶ 9). The County relies

upon dicta in United States v. Chevrontexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp.2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2002) in

which the court observes, as a general principle, that “internal communications that reflect matters

about which the client intends to seek legal advice are protected.” Id. at 1077. The underlying

rationale is that such communications “are comparable to notes a client would make to prepare for a

meeting with her lawyer – notes which could serve as an agenda or set of reminders about things to

ask or tell counsel.” Id.

Here, by contrast, the Media Memos were not created or generated for the purpose of

obtaining legal advice from counsel, but rather, to document Sinunu’s refusal to seek a retraction from

the San Jose Mercury News and Schon’s response to Sinunu. This court is unpersuaded that the fact

that the exchange between Sinunu and Schon concerned the subject matter of the instant lawsuit

automatically immunizes these documents on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, the

court concludes that the privilege does not apply.

C. The Official Information Privilege

Further, the court is unpersuaded that the Media Memos are protected by the official

information privilege. The County acknowledges that Kennedy’s affidavit does not address the Media

Memos. It argues that Sinunu’s affidavit is nevertheless sufficient to establish the privilege as to these

documents. Plaintiff first argues that Ms. Sinunu is not qualified to provide an affidavit on this privilege

because she is not an “agency head.” While “[i]t is essential that the affidavit come from an official in

the affected agency,” the affiant must also have “personal knowledge of the principal matters covered

by the affidavit.” Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Because

Sinunu purportedly has personal knowledge of her comments to the Mercury News, the court is less

concerned about whether or not she might be considered an agency “official.” Nonetheless, the court

agrees that Sinunu’s affidavit is insufficient to invoke the privilege.

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Sinunu’s affidavit does not supply all of the information required by Kelly – namely, (1)

specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests that would be threatened by disclosure

of the material to plaintiff or his lawyer; (2) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully

crafted protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy

interests; and (3) a projection of how much harm would be done to the threatened interests if the

disclosure were made. See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670. Accordingly, the official information privilege

does not apply.

D. The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

The validity of the so-called “self-critical analysis” privilege has not been officially recognized

by the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court. Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d

423 (9th Cir. 1992). In Dowling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that to the extent the privilege exists,

“voluntary routine pre-accident safety reviews are not protected.” Id. at 427. However, in so holding,

the Ninth Circuit did not recognize the validity of the privilege, noting that “[t]he Supreme Court and

the circuit courts have neither definitively denied the existence of such a privilege, nor accepted it and

defined its scope.” Id. at 426 n.1. In a subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that it “has not

recognized this novel privilege.” Union Pac. R.R. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir.

2000).

Even if the privilege exists, this court is disinclined to apply it to the Media Memos here. 

Courts that recognize the privilege requires that the information satisfy several criteria: (1) the

information must result from a self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2) the public

must have a strong interest in maintaining the flow of information; (3) the information must be of a type

whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed; and (4) the document was prepared with

the expectation that it would be kept confidential, and has in fact been kept confidential. Dowling,

971 F.2d at 425-26.

In this case, the Media Memos in question did not result from “self-analysis.” Rather, as noted

above, they were generated as a result of an apparent exchange between Schon and Sinunu over

Sinunu’s refusal to retract her statements to the media about Schon’s conduct. Accordingly, the court

concludes that the “self-critical analysis” privilege does not apply.

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II. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED as to the August 18, 2003 Memo.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to

the Sinunu Documents. These documents should be produced, but the court finds that portions of

those documents may be redacted as follows:

a. “Draft: People v. Rahsson Germaine Bowers and Quedillio [sic] Ricardo Walker

Santa Clara Docket 149554”:

• Page 4 – The last sentence under “New Evidence,” first bullet point, may be

redacted.

• Page 6 – To the extent this page appears to reflect Sinunu’s internal notes and

thoughts about the investigation, the text on this page may also be redacted.

b. “People v. Rahsson Germaine Bowers and Quedillio Ricardo Walker Santa Clara

Docket 149554”

• Page 4 – Under “New Evidence,” first bullet point, the last two sentences may

be redacted.

• Page 5 – In the carry-over paragraph at the top of the page, the last sentence

that begins “There is . . .” may be redacted.

c. “Follow-up Investigation”

• Page 1 – Under the third bullet point, the last sentence that begins “No . . .” may

be redacted.

• Page 2 – The sentence between the paragraph numbered “10” and the first

bullet point may be redacted.

3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED as to the Media Memos (i.e., Sinunu’s July

7 and 15, 2003 memos, Schon’s August 1, 2003 memo, and Schon’s September 10, 2003 email). 

These documents shall be produced no later than December 16, 2005. To the extent defendants

believe that these documents warrant particular protection, they may designate them as appropriate 

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For the Northern District of California

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under the stipulated protective order entered in this action.

Dated:

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

December 2, 2005

/s/ Howard R. Lloyd

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5:04-cv-2211 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Erik T Atkisson eatkisson@reedsmith.com, dkelley@reedsmith.com 

Winifred Botha winifred_botha@mail.cco.co.santa-clara.ca.us 

Matthew D. Davis mdavis@walkuplawoffice.com 

My-Le Jacqueline Duong Jacqueline.duong@cco.sccgov.org 

Aryn Paige Harris aryn_harris@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

Richard H. Schoenberger rschoenberger@walkuplawoffice.com, 

Gregory J. Sebastinelli gregory.sebastinelli@cco.co.scl.ca.us

Counsel are responsible for distributing this document to co-counsel who have not registered for e-filing

under the court’s CM/ECF program.

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