Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06136/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The Court recognizes that the only claim against Rockport 1

is a state law battery claim. The Court exercises its

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) in

deciding this matter.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

JUSTIN EDWARDS PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 04-6136

CITY OF ROCKPORT, ARKANSAS

a Municipal Corporation;

MIKE HOLLINGSWORTH, in His 

Individual Capacity DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Mike Hollingsworth (hereinafter

“Hollingsworth”). Plaintiff further alleges a state law claim of

battery against Hollingsworth and his employer, Separate Defendant

City of Rockport (hereinafter “Rockport”). Currently before the

Court is Defendant Rockport’s motion for partial summary judgment

in the state law claim. (Doc. 17). 1

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of events surrounding the arrest of

Plaintiff on the evening of August 13, 2004, in Hot Springs County.

Plaintiff alleges that he and three friends were driving following

a visit in Hot Springs County. Plaintiff states that during the

visit he engaged in recreational shooting using a gun licensed to

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his mother. Plaintiff states that the car in which he was a

passenger was stopped by Hot Springs County Deputy Sheriff Jimmy

Shearin (hereinafter “Shearin”) on Highway 270 in Rockport for

failure to have an operational license plate light and for failure

to utilize the turn signal device. Shearin determined the driver

also had a suspended license. 

Hollingsworth, a Rockport Police Officer, arrived to assist

Shearin. Hollingsworth observed one of the passengers trying to

conceal something and all four men were asked to exit the vehicle.

Officers determined Plaintiff possessed a gun. Hollingsworth

contends that the handgun fell from the pant leg of the Plaintiff

as he was exiting the vehicle. Plaintiff was taken to the ground

by Hollingsworth and handcuffed. Hollingsworth contends

Plaintiff’s upper forehead sustained a bump, a small laceration and

pebble imprints. Plaintiff, however, argues he was not injured at

that time. The other three men were ordered to the ground and

handcuffed. Officers took possession of the Plaintiff’s gun. 

Plaintiff alleges his head rested on the paved median strip

while most of his body was in the grass. Plaintiff states he told

Shearin that ants were biting and then Hollingsworth lifted him up

by his hair, told him to shut up, and slammed his head into the

pavement twice, causing his head to bleed. Hollingsworth contends

he told Plaintiff to stop talking to his friends, but denies he

slammed Plaintiff’s head into the pavement. Plaintiff was

transported to the Hot Springs County Sheriff’s Department where he

received a ticket for carrying a prohibited weapon and paid a fine

of $300.

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 Rockport further contends it cannot be held liable for a 2

42 U.S.C. §1983 claim. Hollingsworth contends he is entitled to

qualified immunity for the claim that Plaintiff was placed in an

ant bed. Plaintiff contends his complaint does not present those

two claims. As such, the Court will not address those issues.

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Rockport has a use of force policy in place that prohibits use

of excessive force, (Doc. 16, Ex. A, p. 4). Rockport further

alleges that there were no prior complaints regarding Hollingsworth

using excessive force. (Doc. 16, Ex. B). 

Plaintiff contends that Hollingsworth was acting within the

scope of his employment with Rockport when he injured Plaintiff so

that Rockport is liable for a state law claim of battery under the

theory of respondeat superior. Rockport contends it cannot be held

vicariously liable for an intentional tort committed by an employee

acting within the scope of his employment when the act was neither

expectable nor foreseeable. Rockport moves for summary judgment. 2

II. Discussion

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122

F.3d 559, 562 (8 Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden th

of establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the

record and of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). Once the moving party has met this

burden, the non-moving party may no longer rest on the allegations

in its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit

and other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

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Plaintiff correctly notes that even though the Court in 3

Porter cites the Restatement, Torts (2d), 245 (1958), it is the

Restatement, Agency (2d), 245 (1958).

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exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In this case then, Plaintiff

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, (1986)

rather, he must convince the court that there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor. See Nat’l. Bank

of Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 607

(8 Cir. 1999). If a plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient th

to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and

on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, then the

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and all other

facts are rendered immaterial. See Thelma D. By Delores A. v. Bd.

of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 932 (8 cir. 1991).

th

Arkansas courts have analyzed employer liability for acts

committed by an employee under the theory of master-servant

liability since 1910. Porter v. Harshfield, 329 Ark. 130, 136

(1997). The master is subject to liability for his servant’s

intentional tort “if the act was not unexpectable in view of the

duties of the servant.” Life & Cas. Ins. Co. Of Tenn. v. Padgett,

241 Ark. 353, 355 (1966) (citing the Restatement, Agency (2d), 245

(1958). The test, commonly referred to as the respondeat superior 3

doctrine, is that an employer may be held liable for punitive

damages for the acts of his employee if the employee was acting

within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the

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incident. Porter, 329 Ark. at 137. Whether the employee’s action

is within the scope of the employment depends on whether the

individual is carrying out the “object and purpose of the

enterprise,” as opposed to acting exclusively in his own interest.

Id. It is not necessarily dependent on the situs of occurrence.

See Razorback Cab of Fort Smith, Inc. v. Lingo, 304 Ark. 323

(1991).

Plaintiff contends Hollingsworth was acting within the scope

of his employment with Rockport during the time period in which he

subjected Plaintiff to the conduct describe in the complaint. (Doc.

1, ¶ 20). Rockport admits Hollingsworth was employed by the

Rockport Police Department at all relevant times. (Doc. 4, ¶ 6).

We therefore address whether Hollingsworth was carrying out the

“object and purpose of the enterprise.” 

Rockport argues an intentional tort by Hollingsworth was not

expectable nor foreseeable. Rockport contends that no one had

previously lodged a complaint against Hollingsworth for the

unlawful use of force, or for a harmful or offensive physical

touching. Rockport further contends the use of excessive force and

the commission of an intentional tort were not within the assigned

duties of Hollingsworth because the use of excessive force was

prohibited. 

Plaintiff argues an intentional tort was to be expected

because the nature of the employment of a police officer involves

the use of force. Plaintiff contends that the force used by an

officer is determined at his discretion. Plaintiff argues officers

are expected to confront difficult situations where they use their

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own discretion as to the use of force in the accomplishment of the

authorized purpose.

It is not disputed that some use of force is expected by a

police officer when performing his duties such as effecting an

arrest or pursuing a suspect. The Rockport Use of Force policy

specifically states that “law enforcement officers shall use only

that force that is reasonably necessary to effectively bring an

incident under control, while protecting the lives of the officer

or another.” (Doc. 16, Ex. A, p. 4). The Plaintiff alleges he was

handcuffed and lying face down on the pavement along with three

individuals. Officers had possession of the gun. With all parties

handcuffed and the weapon secured, the situation was resolved for

the moment. It is not foreseeable by Rockport that Hollingsworth

would then commit a battery upon Plaintiff. Accordingly, we find

that Rockport would not be liable under a respondeat superior

theory for the battery allegedly committed against Plaintiff by

Hollingsworth.

Based on the foregoing, the Separate Defendant Rockport’s

motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and Separate

Defendant Rockport is DISMISSED as a Defendant from this matter.

The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and state law battery claim against

Separate Defendant Hollingsworth remain set for trial on October 6,

2005. 

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 29 day of September 2005. th

/S/Robert T. Dawson

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge 

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