Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02347/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02347-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM LINGAD, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:09-cv-02347-GEB-JFM

)

v. ) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

) EXTEND TIME FOR SERVICE

INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK; MORTGAGEIT, )

INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC )

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; OPTIMUM) 

LENDING GROUP, INC.; FRANK HOI )

CHEUNG WONG; ANTHONY PADUA; DOES ) 

1-20 inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On December 9, 2009, an order issued notifying Plaintiff

that “under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule

4(m)”) . . . Defendants Optimum Lending Group, Inc. and Anthony Padua

could be dismissed as defendants in this action . . . unless Plaintiff

provides proof of service and/or ‘shows good cause for the failure’ to

serve these defendants within Rule 4(m)’s 120 day prescribed period,

in a filing due no later than 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2009.” (Order

Continuing Status Conference 1-2)(emphasis in original); see also Ruiz

Varela v. Sanchez Velez, 814 F.2d 821, 823 (1st Cir. 1987)(stating

that dismissal under predecessor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)

“can be ordered on the court’s initiative only with ‘notice’ to the

plaintiff”). Defendants Optimum Lending Group, Inc. and Anthony Padua

(the “unserved Defendants”) were named in Plaintiff’s initial

complaint filed on August 21, 2009, and have not yet been served. 

Case 2:09-cv-02347-GEB -JFM Document 39 Filed 02/04/10 Page 1 of 5
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Under Rule 4(m)’s 120 day service period, the complaint was required

to have been served on the unserved Defendants by December 19, 2009.

Plaintiff did not file a response to the Court’s Rule 4(m)

dismissal notice by December 21, 2009. Instead, on December 29, 2009,

Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Defendants

Optimum Lending Group, Inc. and Anthony Padua.” The motion is noticed

for hearing on February 22, 2010. In this motion, Plaintiff “requests

the Court grant him an additional 90 days to obtain the current

address of Defendants Optimum and Padua and to perfect service.” 

(Mot. for Enlargement of Time 4:13-14.) Plaintiff’s motion merely

states that “[n]umerous attempts have been made to serve Optimum and

Padua” and that Plaintiff has “made reasonable efforts to serve”

defendants. (Id. 3:14-17, 27.) In support, Plaintiff’s counsel

declares: “Numerous attempts have been made to serve Optimum and

Padua” and “[a]n additional search will be instituted through the

people and business finder services of Lexis/Nexis. Once the new

locations are discovered, the complaint will be sent out for service. 

Inquiry is also be [sic] made through the Secretary of State’s office

for newer public documents and information.” (Lapin Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.)

“Rule 4(m) requires a two-step analysis in deciding whether

or not to extend the prescribed time period for the service of a

complaint.” In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)); see also Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d

1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009)(outlining the “two avenues for relief”

provided by Rule 4(m)). “First, upon a showing of good cause for the

defective service, the court must extend the time period. Second, if

there is no good cause, the court has discretion to dismiss without

prejudice or to extend the time period.” Id. 

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“Good cause to avoid dismissal may be demonstrated by

establishing, at a minimum, excusable neglect.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d

1188, 1198 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d

754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, to bring excusable neglect “to

the level of good cause”“a plaintiff may be required to show the

following factors”: “(a) the party to be served received actual notice

of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice; and (c)

plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were

dismissed.” In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512 (citing Boudette, 923 F.2d

at 756).

Plaintiff argues in his motion, in conclusory fashion, that

Plaintiff has “demonstrated good cause for his inability to serve

defendants within 120 days.” Although Plaintiff supports his motion

with his counsel’s conclusory averments that “[n]umerous attempts”

have been made to serve the unserved Defendants, Plaintiff does not

explain when these “attempts” were made, when he first learned that

the addresses for the unserved Defendants were “no longer good,” or

why his Lexis Nexis search and inquiry with the Secretary of State’s

office were not conducted or made earlier. 

Plaintiff’s counsel made nearly identical conclusory

statements in another case assigned to the undersigned judge, Altmann

v. Indymac Federal Bank, 2:09-cv-02361-GEB-GGH, in which counsel has

also filed a motion requesting additional time to serve unserved

defendants. This suggests Plaintiff’s counsel opines that providing

unverifiable information concerning his attempts to effect service is

a sufficient response to a Rule 4(m) dismissal notice. Providing

verifiable information could aid the Court in its decision of whether

good cause exists, and if so, how long of an extension should be

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granted; and, if it does not exist, whether the court should

nonetheless exercise its discretion by granting additional time to

Plaintiff to perfect service. 

Plaintiff has not provided the Court with sufficient

information to determine whether his failure to effectuate service

resulted from “professional incompetence,” “an easily manufactured

excuse incapable of verification of the court,” “a complete lack of

diligence” or “inadvertence despite counsel’s substantial good faith

efforts towards compliance.” Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d

513, 517 (3d Cir. 1988). “Courts that have considered this issue

 . . . agree that counsel’s inadvertent failure or half-hearted

efforts to serve a defendant within the statutory period does not

constitute good cause.” Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151,

1157 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff clearly has not demonstrated that

good cause justifies his failure to serve the unserved Defendants.

Even though Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause,

the issue remains whether the Court should exercise its discretion and

provide Plaintiff with additional time to serve the unserved

Defendants. See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)

(stating that Rule 4(m) “permits the district court to grant an

extension even in the absence of good cause” (emphasis in original)). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained the scope of the district court’s

discretion under Rule 4(m) as follows:

District courts have broad discretion to extend

time for service under Rule 4(m). . . . On its

face, Rule 4(m) does not tie the hands of the

district court after the 120-day period has

expired. Rather, Rule 4(m) explicitly permits

a district court to grant an extension of time

to serve the complaint after the 120-day

period. However, no court has ruled that the

discretion is limitless. In making extension

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decisions under Rule 4(m) a district court may

consider factors like statute of limitations

bar, prejudice to the defendant, actual notice

of a lawsuit, and eventual service.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a persuasive

reason for why it should exercise its discretion by extending the time

period in which Plaintiff may serve the unserved Defendants. Nor has

Plaintiff suggested that any applicable statute of limitations will

bar his claims, or that either of the unserved Defendants has actual

notice of the lawsuit. Since Plaintiff has not provided sufficient

justification for his inability to timely serve the unserved

Defendants, and has not provided facts persuading the Court to

exercise its discretion in favor of the extension of the service

period Plaintiff requests, the Court declines to exercise its

discretion under Rule 4(m) to extend the time for service.

Therefore, the unserved Defendants - Optimum Lending Group,

Inc. and Anthony Padua - are dismissed without prejudice from this

action. Plaintiff’s motion filed December 29, 2009 and noticed for

hearing on February 22, 2010, is DENIED and the hearing date is

VACATED.

Dated: February 3, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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