Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OBESITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 

LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 15-cv-595-BAS(MDD) 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

EXCLUDE ORI’S NONRETAINED EXPERT 

WITNESSES 

[ECF No. 192]

 v. 

FIBER RESEARCH 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 

 On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff Obesity Research Institute, LLC (“ORI”) filed a 

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Defendant Fiber Research International, 

LLC (“FRI”) asking the Court to declare that it has no liability under either the 

Lanham Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”), California’s 

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”). 

(ECF No. 1.) On April 13, 2015, FRI filed its Answer and Counterclaims. (ECF No. 

16.) 

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 Presently before the Court is FRI’s Motion to Exclude ORI’s Non-Retained 

Expert Witnesses. (ECF No. 192.) FRI argues that the witnesses are unqualified and 

their testimony is not based on sufficient facts and data to help the trier of the fact 

determine relevant issues in the case. ORI opposes. 

 The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the 

following reasons, the Court GRANTS FRI’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On March 10, 2015, FRI sent a letter to ORI claiming ORI was in violation of 

the Lanham Act and the FFDCA. (Ferrell Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 24-4.) FRI alleged 

that the glucomannan used in ORI’s trademarked Lipozene is not equivalent to the 

grade of glucomannan used in Shimizu Chemical Corporation’s (“Shimizu”) 

trademarked Propol.1

 (Ferrell Decl. Ex. 1.) ORI allegedly relied on studies of the 

effectiveness of glucomannan in Propol as a basis for marketing the effectiveness of 

Lipozene.2

 (Id.) FRI contends that the results of Lipozene are not comparable to the 

results in the studies because the glucomannan in Lipozene has a lower viscosity than 

the glucomannan in Propol. (Id.) Due to the purported differences between the 

glucomannan in Lipozene and Propol, FRI asserts that ORI has substantially harmed 

FRI’s business. (Id.) 

 In response to FRI’s letter, ORI filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, 

which resulted in FRI responding with Counterclaims on May 28, 2015. (ECF No. 1, 

24.) ORI contends that the studies it relied upon never mentioned what grade of 

glucomannan was used and that Lipozene contains the same active ingredients as the 

 

1 FRI has the right to sell Shimizu glucomannan products in the United States, including 

Propol. (Ferrell Decl. Ex. 1.) 2 ORI references scientific studies on its website that supposedly “confirm Lipozene’s active 

ingredient, Glucomannan, is safe and effective for weight loss and fat loss.” (Answer & Countercl. 

Ex. 1.) FRI contends that these studies do not support the effectiveness of Lipozene, rather they 

only confirm the effectiveness of Propol. (Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 33-35.)

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products used in the aforementioned studies. (Non-Retained Expert Witness 

Designations (“Witness Designations”) 3:25-4:1-2, ECF. No. 220-5, Ex. 1.) Further, 

ORI takes the position that “Propol is nothing more than a trade mark” under which 

Shimizu sells glucomannan. (Witness Designations 4:24–25.) 

 In this case, ORI designated three non-retained expert witnesses—Brian 

Salerno, Henny den Uijl, and Jim Ayres—to testify on various matters involved in 

the case. Mr. Salerno is the President of Nutralliance, the raw-material supplier of 

konjac glucomannan used for Lipozene. (ORI’s Opp’n 5:8-16.) Mr. den Uijl is ORI’s 

manager and has had experience in horticulture. (Id. at 4:9-23.) And Mr. Ayres was 

the account manager for ORI when he worked for Natural Alternatives International, 

Inc. (“NAI”), but after he left NAI, he continued to work with ORI as their global 

sales manager. (Id. at 4:24-5:7.) 

 Although none of the witnesses has educational qualifications to testify as an 

expert, ORI contends that each is qualified to testify as an expert witness because of 

his experience. (ORI’s Opp’n 7:15-18.) In response, FRI argues that ORI fails to meet 

its burden of showing that the non-retained experts’ testimony is admissible. (FRI’s 

Reply 2:9-11, ECF No. 233.) While FRI concedes that witnesses do not need to be 

qualified through education alone, FRI maintains that ORI fails to meet its burden of 

demonstrating admissibility. (Id. at 3:1-8.) Further, FRI argues that ORI fails to 

demonstrate that the expert witnesses are qualified, their testimony is relevant, or that 

their methods are reliable. (Id. at 4:15-17.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert witnesses. 

Expert witnesses can testify to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” 

that will assist the “trier of the fact [in] understand[ing] the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

// 

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 Expert testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 702 if it is both relevant and 

reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Evidence 

is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Reliability requires that an 

expert’s testimony “have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his 

discipline.” Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)). 

 The inquiry into the admissibility of an expert witness’ testimony does not 

“require a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its persuasiveness.” Ellis v. 

Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011). A trial court will not 

weigh the correctness of an expert witness, rather the court must determine if the 

expert’s testimony is reliable. Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702, 2000 

Amendments (proponents do not have show by the “preponderance of the evidence 

that the assessments of their experts are to correct, they only have to demonstrate to 

the judge by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable . . . . the 

requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness”) (quoting 

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)). 

 A witness is qualified to give expert testimony by her “knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. If an expert witness is qualified 

through her experience, the offering party must explain how that experience led to 

the expert opinion, why the experience is sufficient, and how the experience was 

reliably applied to the facts. Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702, 2000 

Amendments; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151 (“[I]t will at times be useful to 

ask even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume 

tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a 

kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.”).

// 

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 Proponents of the expert witness have the burden of demonstrating the 

admissibility of the testimony. See Lust ex rel. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 89 F.3d 

594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996). The offering party must prove beyond a preponderance of 

evidence that its expert witness’ testimony is admissible. See Stambolian v. Novartis 

Pharm. Corp., No. CV 12-0437,2013 WL 6345566, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) 

(citing Lust ex rel. Lust, 89 F.3d at 598). Failure to show admissibility of an expert 

witness will result in the exclusion of the witness. See Mesfun v. Hagos, No. CV 03-

02182, 2005 WL 5956612, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2005) (holding expert witness 

is excluded because offering party failed to show how opinion was more than 

“rank speculation”). 

 When considering the admissibility of an expert witness, the court acts as a 

“gatekeeper” rather than a fact finder. Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 596). Shaky but admissible evidence can be 

attacked by “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 

careful instructions on the burden of proof.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Where the 

expert witness meets the criteria of Rule 702, the trial court has broad discretion 

whether to admit the evidence. Id. (finding juries should be given leave to act as a 

fact finder on the conclusions of an expert witness). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Though ORI argues that each witness is qualified as an expert through his 

experience, ORI entirely misses its burden of demonstrating “how that [witness’] 

experience leads to the conclusions reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis 

for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Advisory 

Committee Notes to Rule 702 (2000). ORI attaches designations of facts and opinions 

that the non-retained expert witnesses are expected to testify on, but it fails to 

demonstrate that the witnesses are adequately qualified to testify on each issue. Thus, 

ORI fails to meet its burden of demonstrating by the preponderance of the evidence 

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that the non-retained expert witnesses’ testimonies are admissible. See Lust ex rel. 

Lust, 89 F.3d at 598; see also Stambolian, 2013 WL 6345566, at *3. 

 ORI provides general qualifications of its experts but fails to explain how these 

qualifications will help the “trier of the fact [in] understand[ing] the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.” See Fed. R. Evid. 702. For example, ORI states: 

Mr. Salerno, Mr. den Ujil, and Mr. Ayres each have at least 

15 years of experience in the nutritional or dietary 

supplement industry and draw on that as the basis for their 

expertise. Mr. Salerno, for example, testified that he has 

been in the nutritional ingredient business, sourcing and 

distributing ingredients, since 1989. 

(ORI’s Opp’n 7:19–19.) Although this statement discusses the general qualifications 

of the three witnesses, ORI does not tie these qualifications to the designated facts 

and opinions to show how their experiences led the witnesses to either understand 

the evidence or determine a fact in issue. See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702. 

It is insufficient for ORI to merely state the general qualifications of an expert witness 

without any further explanation and expect the Court to draw inferences from those 

statements about the admissibility of the ultimate conclusions. See Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We’ve been presented with 

only the experts’ qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of 

reliability. Under Daubert, that’s not enough.”). ORI’s incomplete attempt to justify 

qualification applies to all three of its non-retained expert witnesses, who all have 

very different experience but are designated to testify on the same issues. See Lust ex 

rel. Lust, 89 F.3d at 598. 

 Even if the Court overlooks the inadequacies regarding qualification, ORI also 

fails to explain why the experts are able to draw their designated conclusions. It 

designates all three non-retained expert witnesses to testify on ten identical facts, and 

designates four more identical facts for Mr. den Ujil and Mr. Ayres. But again, ORI 

fails to explain why each witness is qualified to testify as to the particular facts 

identified. For example, while Mr. Salerno may have experience in sourcing and 

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distributing “nutritional ingredients,” ORI fails to explain to the Court why he is 

qualified to testify on the differing viscosities between the glucomannon in Lipozene 

and the glucomannon sourced by Shimizu. (ORI’s Opp’n 7:18-23; Witness 

Designations 8:24-26.) Similarly, Mr. Ayres has worked as ORI’s account manager 

and its global sales manager, but that experience does not demonstrate how Mr. Ayres 

is qualified to opine on whether “Lipozene contains Konjac Glucomannan which is 

substantially similar/equivalent to the Konjac Glucomannan tested in . . . . [the] Kaats 

Study.” (ORI’s Opp’n 5:1-5; Expert Witness Designations 6:10-14.) Simply put, ORI 

does not show the connection between each witnesses’ experience and his expected 

testimony. 

 Although this Court finds the expert opinions of ORI’s non-retained witnesses 

should be excluded, these may be facts these witnesses can still testify to as percipient 

witnesses. For example, ORI designates them to testify that ORI sponsored and paid 

for the Kaats Study. (Expert Witness Designations 3:16-18, 4:24-25, 5:4, 6:1-3, 7:8-

9, 15, 8:10-12, 9:19-20.) This is not an expert opinion but percipient witness 

testimony. See United States ex rel. Technica LLC v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., No. 08-

CV-01673-H, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51766, at *14-15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012) 

(witnesses may testify on knowledge gained from experience in his field without 

being classified as an expert witness). 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS FRI’s Motion to Exclude 

Obesity Research’s Non-Retained Witnesses because ORI fails to meet its burden of 

demonstrating that its non-retained expert witnesses’ opinions are admissible. (ECF 

No. 192.) With the exclusion of Messrs. Salerno, den Uijl, and Ayres, the basis for 

FRI’s designation for Dr. George Fahey as a rebuttal witness to the non-retained 

expert witnesses no longer exists; Dr. Fahey no longer has any witnesses to rebut. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES AS MOOT ORI’s motion to exclude the report and 

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testimony of Dr. Fahey. (ECF No. 217.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2017 

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