Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01277/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ~U.k!!l~ Temh Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHARLES BOWDRY, CRIST ELLIS, NORMA 

WONG LARKIN, BOB BURGER, PAUL HART, 

RICH KENNON, MILTON HOWARD, NORMAN 

RANKIN, 

Plaintiffs, 

and 

GLENN MULLINS, DANE VANNICE, LOREN 

MACH, RUSSELL ESTILL, RALPH ESTILL, 

JAMES HARTZER, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant - Appellee. 

CHARLES BOWDRY, CRIST ELLIS, NORMA 

WONG LARKIN, PAUL HART, GLENN 

MULLINS, DANE VANNICE, LOREN MACH, 

RUSSELL ESTILL, RALPH ESTILL, JAMES 

HARTZER, MILTON HOWARD, NORMAN 

RANKIN, 

Plaintiffs, 

and 

BOB BURGER and RICH KENNON, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant - Appellee. 

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JUN 2 U 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-1150 

No. 94-1277 

Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 1 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-S-1997) 

Elisa Moran (John Mosby with her on the briefs) 1 Denver/ Colorado 1 

for Appellants. 

Kris J. Kostolansky (Michael D. Nesler and Susan L. Strebel 1 with 

him on the brief) 1 Rothgerber 1 Appel 1 Powers & Johnson 1 Denver/ 

Colorado 1 for Appellee. 

Before MOORE 1 ANDERSON 1 and TACHA1 Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON 1 Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-appellants/ eight former employees of the defunct 

Frontier Airlines ( 11 employees 11 ) 1 brought this suit against United 

Airlines/ Inc. ( 11 United 11 ) 1 contending that United breached its 

statutory duty under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (the 

11 ACt 11 ) I when it failed to give them preferential hiring treatment 

as mandated under section 43(d)1 of the Act.2 The district court 

dismissed the suit on United 1 S motion for summary judgment/ 

reasoning that as a matter of law the employees had breached their 

duty to notify United that they were claiming their rights under 

the Act. 

1 Originally codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 15.52 (d) (1978) 

(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 42103 (a) (Supp. 1995)). 

2 Both parties refer to appellants as 11 employees 1 11 which also 

accords with terminology under the Act. Therefore 1 we also refer 

to appellants as employees/ although in fact they are not 

employees of United 1 but rather job applicants. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 2 
The employees appeal that decision3 as well as the court's 

ruling that they are not entitled to a jury trial. Among other 

things, they contend that the question of their discharge of their 

duty, and the fulfillment by United of its duty under the Act, is 

a question of fact in this case, and that, therefore, summary 

judgment was improper. We agree, and reverse and remand this case 

to the district court for further proceedings. However, we affirm 

the district court's striking of the employees' jury demand. 

BACKGROUND 

When Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978, its 

enactment included an employee protection program to assist longterm airline employees who might lose their jobs in the resulting 

industry adjustments. Specifically, employees who have been 

working for a covered airline since October 24, 1974, or earlier, 

and who are subsequently terminated due to their employerairline's bankruptcy, are granted preferential hiring by other 

covered air carriers.4 

Although the parties disagree on the manner by which 

protected employees must claim their rights under the Act, they 

agree that the appellants meet the Act's threshold qualifications; 

that is, they had been regularly employed for the required period 

3 Six of the employees appealed immediately, and two of the 

employees appealed following certification pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b). We have consolidated the two appeals. 

4 The Act further provides that this protection applies only to 

employees terminated before October 23, 1988. Act§ 43(d) (1). 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 3 
as ramp service workers for Frontier Airlines, and they were 

terminated due to Frontier's bankruptcy in August 1986. 

Shortly after Frontier ceased operating, United invited all 

former Frontier employees to an open house. Apparently, six of 

the appellant employees attended and either filled out and 

submitted an application form with "Frontier" stamped on the 

front, or were given a card stamped with "Frontier" which they 

were told to mail in for an application form. See Appellants' 

App. at 94, 140, 266-68, 303, 322; see also id. at 158-61, 170-73. 

All appellant-employees claim that the application forms which 

they submitted contained all requested information, including 

complete work histories that indicated employment qualifying them 

for protected status and termination due to Frontier's bankruptcy. 

However, the application form did not ask whether the employees 

were "covered," "protected," or "designated" under the Act, and 

none of the employees expressly referenced the Act or its specific 

terms. 

United filed a motion for summary judgment on the notification issue, contending that the employees had failed to present 

any evidence that they notified United of their protected status 

during the application process. The district court agreed and 

granted United's motion. 

DISCUSSION 

We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standards as the trial court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 

46 F.3d 1005, 1007 (lOth Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 4 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We therefore must view the factual record 

and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing summary judgment. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 

1475 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

A. 

In relevant part, the Act provides: 

(d) Duty to hire protected employees 

(1) Each person who is a protected employee of [a 

covered] air carrier . . . who is . . . terminated . . . 

(other than for cause) . . . shall have first right of 

hire, regardless of age, in his occupational specialty, 

by any other air carrier hiring additional employees 

. . . . Each such air carrier hiring additional 

employees shall have a duty to hire such a person before 

they hire any other person, except . . . any of its own 

furloughed employees . 

49 U.S.C. App. § 1552(d) .5 

The final regulations which the Department of Labor ("DOL") 

issued to implement the Act define a protected employee who is 

involuntarily terminated, other than for cause, as a "designated 

employee. 11 29 C.F.R. §§ 220.01(f), 220.10 (1994). In addition to 

requiring airlines to follow specific criteria for listing and 

filling vacancies, the regulations require each covered airline to 

compile a list of all protected employees, to forward the list to 

5 In 1994 Congress amended and recodified this provision. See 

49 U.S.C. § 42103(a). The amendment, however, effected no 

substantive change. See H.R. 180, 103d Cong., 2d Bess. 5, 

reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 822. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 5 
the Secretary of Labor, to notify its protected employees that 

they were so listed, and to issue notice of rights letters to 

designated employees. Id. § 220.22-220.25, 220.27(a) .6 

The regulations also set out the following employee 

responsibilities: 

It is the responsibility of each designated employee to: 

(a) Make application to any covered air carrier for 

whom the designated employee desires to work in the time 

and manner required by such carrier. 

(b) To insure that an application previously submitted 

to a covered air carrier which currently lists a vacancy 

is in an active status so as to be considered for such 

vacancy; 

(c) To provide a copy, if requested, of the notice of 

rights to a potential employing air carrier; and 

(d) To retain the original of notice of rights for 

future use. 

Id. § 220.30. 

1. 

Noting the Act's express language regarding the airline's 

duty, and its silence respecting employee duties, the employees 

place the burden on United. With respect to the discharge of 

duties under the Act, the employees postulate that the duty to 

hire necessarily imposes the choice of means to satisfy that duty 

upon the carrier. Thus, they emphasize the ease with which United 

could have ascertained an applicant's status in order to fulfill 

6 The regulations also require the Secretary of Labor to 

maintain a comprehensive listing of all vacancies, and to 

distribute a composite list of protected employees to all 

carriers. 29 C.F.R. §§ 220.40(a), 220.41 (1994). 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 6 
its duty. For example, United could have asked about status on 

the application, or it could have requested a notice of rights 

letter, or it could have checked applicants against the DOL master 

list which contained the names of all protected employees.7 

Appellants' Br. at 9. 

Moreover, pointing to the above DOL regulations, the 

employees argue that section 220.30(a) limits their initial 

application responsibility strictly to the form, i.e., 11 time and 

manner required by [the] carrier, 11 and that United's application 

form did not ask if they were protected or designated. Further, 

relying on section 220.30(c), the employees assert that they were 

required to give formal notice of rights only 11 if requested, 11 and 

that United never requested such notice. 

Finally, the employees contend that, in any event, United had 

actual or constructive notice of their protected status by virtue 

of the fact that they listed qualifying work history and cause of 

termination. Thus, they urge that, at the very least, whether 

they fulfilled any duty to notify United is a question of fact, 

and that the district court erred by requiring specific reference 

or terminology under the Act as a matter of law. 

7 The DOL distributed the master list in April 1987. At that 

time, seven of the employees' applications were still in United's 

active file, and the eighth application was submitted 

subsequently. Appellee's Br. at 16-17. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 7 
2. 

United contends that its duty to hire only arises after an 

applicant expressly informs it that the Act applies or that he or 

she is protected. See Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines. Inc., 940 F.2d 

1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1991), and Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, 

Inc., 696 F. Supp. 685, 693 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 

49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Additionally, United relies on a DOL opinion letter written 

to Northwest Airlines stating that, "[i]ndividuals are not 

assigned designated employee status, they claim the status." 

Letter from H. Charles Spring, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Labor, to Mary P. Weir, Northwest Airlines, Inc. 

(June 20, 1991), Appellants' App. at 186-87. 

Finally, United argues that by requiring airlines to list and 

notify protected and designated employees, the regulations intend 

to place the ultimate burden of claiming any rights upon the 

informed employee who "is in the best position to protect his 

rights." Appellee's Br. at 13. 

3. 

In fact, neither the Act nor the regulations are as rigid or 

as antiseptic as either party asserts. 

Thus, we agree with the general proposition that protected 

employees have an obligation to alert prospective employers of 

their protected status under the Act. See Gonzalez, 940 F.2d at 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 8 
1314i Crocker, 696 F. Supp. at 693.8 However, that obligation is 

only a subset of the employer's express statutory duty to hire 

protected employees preferentially. The Act clearly applies to 

all employees who meet its status requirements. The employer's 

duty to hire is not, therefore, triggered by what the employee 

does, but by what the employer knows.9 

Whether a prospective employer is sufficiently on notice that 

a particular applicant is a protected employee under the Act is a 

question of fact to be determined after analyzing all the facts 

8 Significantly, we note that neither case determined the 

method by which an employee must inform the airline that the Act 

applies. Moreover, regarding the applicant's duty to keep his 

application active, Crocker specifically noted that the meaning 

which the parties themselves attached to their correspondence was 

more relevant than abstract interpretations of the regulations. 

Crocker, 696 F. Supp at 693-94. 

9 Thus, contrary to United's argument, we conclude that the DOL 

opinion letter to Northwest Airlines, stating that applicants must 11 claim their status 11 under the Act, does not imply a DOL interpretative policy to place the onus entirely upon the employee. 

Notably, Northwest Airlines stated that it specifically asked 

whether an applicant was a designated employee. Responding to 

that limited query, the DOL correctly concluded that applicants 

who fail or refuse to answer a direct question regarding their 

designated employee status are expressly negating any intention to 

assert or claim their rights of first hire. Under such circumstances, the carrier has no duty to accord them such rights. See 

Letter from H. Charles Spring, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Labor, to Mary P. Weir, Northwest Airlines, Inc. 

(June 20, 1991), Appellants' App. at 186-87. 

This conclusion that an applicant must affirmatively respond 

to a carrier's precise question does not, however, compel the 

conclusion that the protected employee must make an initial, 

formal declaration. In fact, the DOL material in the record 

suggests otherwise. For example, a few months after the 

regulations became effective, the DOL sent a letter to all 

carriers which explained various aspects of the rehire program. 

Appellants' App. at 489-90. Among other things, the DOL enclosed 

a suggested form for the Notice of Rights letter that the carriers 

were required to give to designated employees. Id. at 491. In 

its form, the DOL suggested only the following relevant direction 

to such employees, 11 To exercise your rights, you must apply for 

work in the time and manner required by the carrier. 11 Id. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 9 
and circumstances surrounding the job application. On the one 

hand, mere possession by the airline of the DOL list of all 

covered individuals is too disconnected from a particular job 

application to place the airline on notice. On the other hand, a 

formal declaration by the applicant is not essential. 

Here, as indicated above, United invited former Frontier 

employees to a job related open house, and handed out job 

application forms or cards to mail in for application forms. The 

forms and cards were stamped "Frontier." Furthermore, the 

applications requested details of the applicant's work history 

which the employees claim they filled out showing the previous 

employment with Frontier and termination due to Frontier's 

bankruptcy. At the very least these facts preclude summary 

judgment in favor of United. 

B. 

Asserting that they are entitled to a jury trial, the 

employees contend that the district court erred in striking their 

jury demand. 

1. 

United has moved to dismiss this portion of the appeal, 

arguing that we lack subject matter jurisdiction. As background, 

United recites the following facts and chronology: The district 

court entered its original order striking the employees' jury 

demand on January 18, 1991. In addition to striking the jury 

demand, that order also dismissed the action of Dane Vannice as 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 10 
well as two other plaintiffs, Paul Hart and Milton Howard.10 All 

three appealed the dismissal, although they did not appeal the 

order striking the jury demand. We reversed and remanded. Bowdry 

v. United Airlines. Inc., 956 F.2d 999 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 97 (1992). 

On January 7, 1994, United filed for summary judgment on the 

issue of notification. On February 9, 1994, the plaintiffs filed 

a 11Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order of January 18, 

1991, Denying a Jury Trial. 11 After oral argument, on March 3, 

1994, the district court denied the motion for reconsideration. 

On March 18, 1994, the district court entered summary 

judgment against the eight employees herein. The employees then 

filed their notice of appeal, and United moved to dismiss, because 

the judgment appealed from was not final. Following our Show 

Cause Order, the employees obtained Rule 54(b) certification as to 

the summary judgment order. 

United contends that we lack subject matter jurisdiction for 

the following reasons: (a) Neither the order striking the jury 

demand nor the order denying the motion to reconsider was 

certified under rule 54(b) or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and an 

order striking a demand for a jury trial is not subject to 

certification in any event; (b) There is no appellate court 

jurisdiction over the denial of a motion to reconsider; the 

employees are really seeking a review of the January 18, 1991, 

10 The current summary judgment did not include Hart and Howard, 

so neither are involved in this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 11 
order striking the jury demand, which is untimely under Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a); (c) The order denying the motion to reconsider is 

not a collateral order; and, (d) The issue is not subject to 

pendent jurisdiction. 

In support, United relies on cases involving appellants who 

still had claims pending before the trial court. Such reliance is 

misplaced inasmuch as the summary judgment in this case disposed 

of these appellants' only remaining claim, completely terminating 

their action. Once certified under Rule 54(b), that judgment was 

final. All prior interlocutory judgments affecting these 

appellants merged into the final judgment and became appealable at 

that time.ll See Bankers Trust Co. v. Lee Keeling & Assocs., 

Inc., 20 F.3d 1092, 1096 (lOth Cir. 1994); 9 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2322, 

at 175 (1995) (A "party may have review of the denial of a jury on 

an appeal from the final judgment") (citing King v. United Benefit 

Fire Ins. Co., 377 F.2d 728 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 

857 (1967)). 

11 For the seven appellant-employees who were not dismissed by 

the first summary judgment, the original striking of the jury 

demand was interlocutory and did not become appealable until the 

subsequent final judgment which disposed of their actions. Therefore the current appeal of this issue is timely under Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a). Moreover, it is immaterial that the employees' docketing 

statement designates the denial of the motion to reconsider rather 

than the original order, since a notice of appeal which "'names 

the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier 

orders that merge in the final judgment.'" Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. 

Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting 16 Charles 

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice 

& Procedure: Civil 2d § 3949, at 440 (Supp. 1994)). 

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Appellate Case: 94-1277 Document: 01019279879 Date Filed: 06/28/1995 Page: 12 
2. 

Entitlement to a jury trial is a question of law which we 

review de novo. Towe Antique Ford Found. v. I.R.S., 999 F.2d 

1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993). When a statute is silent on the right 

to a jury trial, we look to the Seventh Amendment to determine 

entitlement. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 & n.3 

(1987); Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 1386 

(lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982). The Seventh 

Amendment preserves the right to jury trial for 11 suits at common 

law,n where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. This 

entitlement extends to all suits where legal rights are involved. 

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). However, the Seventh 

Amendment does not apply to actions which involve only equitable 

rights or which traditionally arose in equity.12 Granfinanciera 

v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989). 

In their opening brief, the employees argue that they are 

entitled to a jury trial because their action resembles an action 

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 11 ADEA 11 ), 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 621-634, which provides for a jury trial. 

United correctly counters that the employees cannot base 

their jury right upon the ADEA, since the right under the ADEA 

arises from express provisions in that statute. Specifically, the 

12 A court determines whether a statutory action involves legal 

rights, rather than equitable rights, by examining the nature of 

the issues involved and the remedies sought. Wooddell v. IBEW 

Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) (citing Teamsters Local No. 391 

v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990)). However, the employees' 

argument does not address this analysis. 

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ADEA provides for enforcement in accordance with the "powers, 

remedies, and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see 29 

U.S.C. § 626(b), which includes the well-established right to a 

jury trial. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 

Additionally, the ADEA authorizes the recovery of "legal or 

equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see Lorillard, 484 U.S. at 

583. In this context, "legal relief" is a term of art which 

indicates Congress's intent that such actions be triable to a 

jury. Id. 

By contrast, the Airline Deregulation Act has no provision 

regarding the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the mere fact 

that the Act indicates that age may not be considered in according 

hiring preference does not compel the conclusion that this action 

is an age discrimination action. A first-hire action under the 

Airline Deregulation Act "is not, at its -core, an antidiscrimination suit." Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 746 

(D.C. Cir. 19 9 5) . 13 

In their reply brief the employees further argue that they 

are entitled to a jury trial because their complaint seeks legal 

relief in the form of monetary damages such as back pay. However, 

the employees failed to raise this argument in their opening brief 

on appeal. Therefore, they abandoned or waived the argument, and 

we will not address it on the merits. State Farm Fire & Casualty 

Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1994) (citing 

13 Ultimately, Crocker did find a right to a jury trial under 

the Act. However, that conclusion was based on an argument which 

was not made in the employees' opening brief. 

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Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (lOth Cir. 

1994)); Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 724 (lOth 

Cir. 1993). 

For the reasons stated, the summary judgment of the district 

court is REVERSED; the order striking the jury demand is AFFIRMED, 

and this matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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