Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06173/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY LONNELL RAMSEY, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAILLIE, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 6173 REC LJO P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 10.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND BLANK FORM TO PLAINTIFF

Tommy Lonnell Ramsey, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in this action arose out of High Desert State Prison (HDSP) where

plaintiff was incarcerated before his transfer to Corcoran State Prison (COR). Plaintiff names

Correctional Officer R. Baillie, Cpt. J.M. Briddle, Sergeant K. Clement, Correctional Officer D.

D. Shaver, Correctional Counselor K. Baughman, Associate Warden M. Evens, Lieutenant S.

Kerts, Special Agent D.T. Hawkes, Appeals Coordinator H. Wagner, Associate Warden V.

Yamamoto, and Lieutenant J.F. Norlin. 

Plaintiff has provided the Court with a detailed narrative of the events surrounding his

validation as a Black Guerrilla Family (BGF) gang member that span almost a year. Rather than

repeat word for word the narrative, the Court will briefly summarize the relevant facts. 

Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendant Baillie fabricated information that was used to

ultimately validate Plaintiff as a gang member and that other Defendants named knew this and

relied on the information. Plaintiff alleges generally that he was denied an Employee Assistant at

a “disciplinary” hearing but the facts do not make clear whether Plaintiff is really referring to the

gang validation and not a separate disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he is

not a gang member and that Defendants wrongfully attempted to force Plaintiff to debrief. 

Plaintiff was detained in the debriefing building which placed him in danger. 

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C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution. . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant

with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attempted to remedy the linkage requirement. 

However, some of the events at issue remain unclear. For example, it is clear that Plaintiff is

making claims surrounding gang validation hearing but it is unclear when this hearing occurred,

what rights were denied at this particular hearing and who was involved in the denial of those

rights. Plaintiff indicates that certain rights were denied him at a hearing by Defendants Clement

and Shaver and then states that the same or similar rights were denied by Defendants Norlin and

Hawkes. The Court will provide Plaintiff the relevant law where it can and provide Plaintiff

with yet another opportunity to amend his complaint and make the claims more clear. Plaintiff

should note that the fact that the Court requires more specific information or facts from Plaintiff

does not mean that Plaintiff should make his Complaint longer. Plaintiff should be able to state

briefly and specifically who did what, on which day and how that violated a certain specific right. 

2. Due Process

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer

on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of

segregation. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472 (1995), the Supreme Court abandoned earlier case law which had held that states created

protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. Id. at 481-84. 

Instead, the Court adopted an approach in which the existence of a liberty interest is determined

by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Id. In doing so, the Court held that liberty interests

created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Where a protectable liberty interest exists, the Supreme Court has set out the following

procedural due process requirements for disciplinary detention of a prisoner: (1) written notice of

the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the

time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the

fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of

the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where

the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was placed in administrative segregation or in

the debriefing holding area does not establish a liberty interest entitling him to procedural due

process. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process

claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence

imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally

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expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no

protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

Similarly, Plaintiff is not entitled to an Employee Assistant or written explanation as to why he

was not provided these things. 

Assuming that confinement in the SHU for an indeterminate period pursuant to gang

validation implicates a liberty interest, Plaintiff may have sufficient facts to allege a violation of

due process in that he contends he was not afforded the opportunity to be heard. Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (Plaintiff is entitled to adequate notice, an

opportunity to be heard, and periodic review.); Morris v. Cambra, No. C 96-0334 SI, 1997 WL

811774, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1997); Hart v. Cambra, No C 96-0924 SI, 1997 WL 564059, at

*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1997). However, because Plaintiff does not state with any specificity

whether he is challenging a disciplinary proceeding, a gang validation proceeding, or gang

rehearing, the Court cannot state with certainty that Plaintiff sufficiently states a cognizable claim

for relief. 

In addition, there must be “some evidence in the record” to support the decision to

segregate the inmate, and this evidence “must have “some indicia of reliability.” Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). Plaintiff’s contentions that the evidence relied on was

insufficient in that it was fabricated may also be sufficient to give rise to a due process claim,

however, Plaintiff does not indicate specifically the roles any of the Defendants played in the

gang validation process. Although Plaintiff states that certain individuals relied on fabricated

evidence, it is unclear at which proceeding such evidence was relied on. 

3. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must allege

and show that defendants acted to retaliate for his exercise of a protected activity, and

defendants’ actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31

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F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807. The injury asserted in retaliation cases is the

retaliatory conduct’s chilling effect on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See Hines v.

Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his First Amendment right to be free from

retaliation. However, the First Amendment makes no such guarantee. Other than this assertion,

Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable retaliation claim under the First

Amendment. 

4. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his placement in “debriefing” for a period of twenty-one days where

he was encouraged to undergo debriefing constituted deliberate indifference

Plaintiff raised this same allegation in the initial complaint and was provided with the

relevant law. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison

official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. Thus, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for

denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk

of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 835. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked

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knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to

the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not

sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d at 1128; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-32 (1986). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

Plaintiff again alleges no facts that would give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim for

being subjected to the debriefing process. Plaintiff’s contention that being held in the debriefing

building put him at risk of retaliation by other inmates who might think he was a snitch. 

However, this does not rise to the level of an “extreme deprivation” sufficient to raise an Eighth

Amendment claim. 

5. Inmate Appeals Process 

Plaintiff next complains that defendants Wagner and Kerts denied him his right to a new

investigation even though they knew that certain information was fabricated. 

There is no constitutional right to an inmate appeals process. The Ninth Circuit has held

that Prisoners do not have a "separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance

procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855

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F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). The non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly

implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise

constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). See also, Buckley

v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.1991); Azeez

v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill.1982) ("[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural

right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise

to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth

amendment"). A failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley,

supra. State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the

federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to "freedom from restraint" that "imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). 

Further, Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in having his grievances

investigated at the level of thoroughness that he desires; thus, he cannot assert a due process

claim as to such failures. Under the applicable standard set forth in Sandin above, the failure to

conduct an extensive investigation into Plaintiff’s charges does not impose an "atypical and

significant hardship" upon Plaintiff sufficient to create a protected liberty interest. 

6. Conspiracy

In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, such a complaint

must “allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” 

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that

defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance

of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy between

Defendants. Plaintiff states only that the Defendants conspired to violate his rights, this

statement, however is a conclusion. Plaintiff does not state specifically how they conspired, what

right the Defendants conspired to violate or what actions were taken. 

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D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not contain any claims upon

which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide

Plaintiff with time to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above

should he wish to do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Second Amended Complaint how the conditions

complained of resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The Second Amended Complaint must specifically state how each

Defendant is involved. Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this Order, or

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b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a Second

Amended Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary

dismiss the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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