Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-04368/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-04368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARY MARTINEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 04-04368 JF

ORDER1 DENYING CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

[Docket Nos. 13 and 14]

Plaintiff Mary Martinez (“Martinez”) filed this action on October 15, 2004, seeking

reversal of the decision by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) to

deny her supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits based on disability. Martinez filed a

motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2005. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment on April 11, 2005. The matter was submitted without oral argument. 

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2

 Martinez’s education level is reported inconsistently in the record.

3

 The ALJ noted at the hearing that he would not consider the dish-washing job. TR 365.

4

 In her motion for summary judgment, Martinez notes that “[s]he had not worked since

2000.” However, she does not list specific place(s) of employment through 2000.

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

I. BACKGROUND

Martinez was born in Colorado on August 7, 1946. TR 62 and 346. She attended school

until the third, fourth, or fifth grade.2 TR 144 and 346. She has testified that she cannot read or

write. Id. She required assistance in completing the application forms for SSI. See, e.g., TR 80,

99, and 117. From about 1980 to 1990, Martinez was employed in an electronics assembly job

and, on the weekends, for eight hours per week washing dishes at a restaurant.3 TR 82 and 363-

64. The records of Martinez’s employment during the 1990s are inconsistent. She reported that

she worked in machine shops for three different companies from 1990 to 1991, 1991 to 1993,

and 1996 to 1998. TR 82. However, according to a document entitled “DISCO DIB Insured

Status Report,” she had no earnings in 1990 through 1997, and earned approximately $8,900,

$18,700, and $17,750 in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively.4 TR 67. Martinez was a “wrapper”

in the machine shop, where she was responsible for wrapping parts and packaging them in boxes. 

TR 348 and 366. 

On December 11, 2001, at the age of 55, Martinez applied for SSI. Id. She claimed

disability based on arthritis in her hands and knees, eye problems including blurred vision,

difficulty walking, standing, and sitting, a problem with her kidneys, diabetes, and nausea. TR

69. The claim was denied on March 28, 2002, and denied again after reconsideration on January

3, 2003. TR 15. The Social Security Administration conducted an administrative hearing on

October 8, 2003. Id. On May 18, 2004, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision

determining that Martinez is not eligible for SSI. TR 15-22. The ALJ found that Martinez had

“not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability,” and that her

“mild osteoarthritis, and history of obesity, diabetes, and high blood pressure without end organ

damage or significant ongoing neuropathy are considered ‘severe’ . . .” TR 21-22. However, the

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

ALJ did not find Martinez’s allegations of disability entirely credible. TR 22. Concluding, that

Martinez’s impairments did not meet one of the listed impairments and that she could perform

her past relevant work, the ALJ determined that Martinez is not eligible for SSI. Id. On

September 9, 2004, the Social Security Appeals Council denied Martinez’s request for review. 

TR 5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits. The Commissioner’s decision (here the

decision of the ALJ) will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is

based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523

(9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the

term “substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it

is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court examines the administrative

record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support

more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the ALJ. Moncada,

60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th

Cir. 1984). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for

determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The burden of proof is on the claimant as

to steps one through four. Id. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. If a

claimant is found to be “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequence, the

Commissioner need not consider subsequent steps. Id. The five steps are:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, the

claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and is not entitled to

disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity,

then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. 

Id.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled and

is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s impairment is severe, the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. Id. 

Step 3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments described

in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and therefore entitled to disability insurance

benefits. If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in

the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation

proceeds to step four. Id. 

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If so, then

the claimant is not disabled and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant

cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step

four and the evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step. Id. at 1099.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is disabled

and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is able to do other work,

then the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of

showing that there is other work in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can

do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled and therefore

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5 Citing Merck Research Laboratories, Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Treatment [sic]

(17th ed. 1999), Martinez notes that the Phalen’s and Tinel’s signs are used to diagnose carpal

tunnel syndrome, and the Finkelstein test is used to diagnose tenosynovitis. However, Martinez

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, the

claimant is disabled and therefore entitled to disability benefits. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

a. Treating physicians

Martinez argues that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the opinions of her treating

physicians. Martinez identified Dr. Marcie Levine as her treating physician. TR 71. 

Additionally, on January 27, 2004, Dr. Kwan Pun completed an assessment form describing

Martinez’s physical limitations. TR 316-20. The ALJ presumed Dr. Pun to be an associate of

Dr. Levine’s, as both doctors share the same business address. TR 19, 71, and 320. Pursuant to

the Social Security Administration regulations, the opinions of an applicant’s treating physicians

are given more weight than those of other physicians, “since these sources are likely to be the

medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the applicant’s]

medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot

be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual

examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2). The Social Security Administration “will always give good reasons in [its]

notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source’s opinion. Id. 

Martinez argues that the ALJ erroneously disregarded the opinion of her treating

physician that she had carpal tunnel syndrome. The ALJ relied on the opinion of a consulting

physician, Dr. Gable, who conducted an in-person exam of Martinez on December 7, 2003. He

concluded: “I think she could lift, push or pull 30 lbs. occasionally and 20 lbs. frequently. I don’t

see any limitation on fine finger and hand movement.” TR 312. Martinez points out that Dr.

Levine’s records include positive Phalen’s, Tinel’s, and Finkelstein tests on August 11, 1995 and

a positive Phalen’s test on May 15, 2003, all of which are suggestive of carpal tunnel syndrome.

5

 

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did not submit to the Court the relevant portions of the Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy. 

Noting the prominence of the Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, the Court takes judicial

notice of the online version of this manual, available at http://www.merck.com/mrkshared

/mmanual/home.jsp. Chapter 61 of the Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, “Common

Hand Disorders,” includes the following description of carpal tunnel diagnosis: “Diagnosis is

indicated by a positive Tinel’s sign, in which the tingling (paresthesia) is reproduced by tapping

with a reflex hammer at the volar surface of the wrist over the site of the median nerve and carpal

tunnel. Additional tests include wrist flexion maneuvers (eg, Phalen’s sign).” See

http://www.merck.com/mrkshared/CVMHighLight?file=/mrkshared/mmanual/section5/chapter6

1/61b.jsp%3Fregion%3Dmerckcom&word=phalen's&domain=www.merck.com#hl_anchor.

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

TR 292 and 306. She argues that because Dr. Gable’s opinion does not demonstrate that he used

any particular tests for carpal tunnel syndrome, his opinion should be disregarded. Martinez

construes the regulations to require that the medical opinion be supported by particular medical

signs or laboratory findings. In fact, the cited regulation merely gives guidance with respect to

how much weight a particular medical opinion will be given: “The more a medical source

presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory

findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). It is the role of

the ALJ to weigh the evidence, and it is not the role of this Court to second-guess a finding of

fact made by the ALJ. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Where the

opinion of the claimant’s treating physician is contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating

source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from those of the treating physician,

the opinion of the non-treating source may itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely the

province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict.”).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “an ALJ may not reject treating physicians’ opinions

unless he ‘makes findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on

substantial evidence in the record.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989)). At the point in the ALJ’s

decision where he rejects the allegation that Martinez “would be unable to lift or carry more than

5 lbs. occasionally and would be unable to perform frequent manipulative hand or finger

movements,” it is not clear that the ALJ is rejecting the opinion of a treating physician. TR 20.

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

To the extent that he is, the Court presumes that he is rejecting the opinion of Dr. Pun, which

includes specific statements about Martinez’s lifting capacity and hand or finger movements. TR

319. The ALJ set forth legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record for giving

“more weight to the unanimously less restrictive medical opinions” of the non-treating physicians

than to the opinion of Dr. Pun. TR 19. The ALJ concluded Dr. Pun’s opinion that Martinez

“would be unable to perform at least some degree of light work” was “not supported by objective

medical signs and laboratory findings sufficient to support such limitations.” Id. The ALJ also

noted that there was a conflict in the opinion of Dr. Pun: “on the same page, Dr. Pun opined that

the claimant would be restricted to sitting for ‘less than 2 hours’ and then ‘more than 2 hours.’” 

Although the ALJ set forth legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record

for disregarding Dr. Pun’s opinion generally, it is troubling to this Court that the ALJ noted

further that he found “no objective evidence of ongoing problems with carpal tunnel since 1995.”

TR 20. Treating physician Dr. Levine’s medical notes include a positive Phalen’s test on May

15, 2003. TR 306. While this test may not have been pointed out to the ALJ—and it is very

unlikely that someone without medical training would have noticed it in the record without it

having been pointed out—it nonetheless is present in the record. It is at least possible that the

ALJ’s conclusions with respect to Martinez’s hand and finger capabilities were not based on

substantial evidence in the record.

Martinez also argues that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinion of her treating

physicians that her depression and anxiety are disabling. As to this point, the ALJ properly

weighed the conflicted evidence in the record. While Dr. Levine’s medical notes include

indications that Martinez suffered from anxiety and depression, see, e.g., TR 215, 224, 227, 236,

and 265, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s decision to consider

Martinez’s mental impairments “non-severe.” Based on a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation,

Dr. Antoinette Acenas found “[n]o psychiatric diagnosis.” TR 283. This Court must defer to the

ALJ’s weighing of the conflicting evidence.

Next, Martinez argues that the ALJ erroneously disregarded test results showing that she

is mentally retarded. The Court agrees. On February 28, 2002, Dr. Ubaldo Sanchez conducted a

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

psychological evaluation of Martinez, from which he concluded:

Ms. Martinez obtained a Verbal IQ score of 69, a Performance IQ score of 75, and

a Full Scale IQ score of 69 on the WAIS-II. This indicates that she is currently

functioning in the mentally retarded range of measured intelligence.

TR 146. The ALJ noted that Dr. Sanchez cautioned that “Ms. Martinez’ scores must be viewed

with caution since her cultural background varies from the population the WAIS-II was normed

on.” TR 16 and 146. However, it is not clear what precisely motivated the ALJ to discredit the

medical evidence of retardation. Later in his decision, the ALJ wrote: 

[T]he undersigned finds it highly unlikely that a morbidly intellectually limited or

mentally retarded individual would be able to work as a shipping and receiving

clerk or sustain another job as an electronics assembler for 10 years (Exh. 9-F, p.

2), in fact, earning more than $17,000 for both 1999 and 2000 (Exh. 3-D., p. 2). 

The claimant was able to pass the written DMV driver’s examination.

TR 21. The ALJ appears to have reached a medical conclusion based on his own personal

impressions of whether a mentally retarded person could perform at a certain level. As Martinez

argues in her reply, the ability to work is not dispositive. Pursuant the Social Security

Administration regulations, someone can be deemed mentally retarded when he or she has “[a]

valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental

impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation or function.” 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05(C) (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible that

Martinez might not have been considered mentally retarded during the time period that the ALJ

considered dispositive, but later developed a physical or other mental impairment such that she

became mentally retarded under the Social Security Administration regulations. Additionally,

the ALJ provides no basis in the record for his implied finding that possession of a driver’s

license indicates that she passed the written DMV driver’s examination. It is entirely possible

that Martinez did not take a written examination; in fact, Martinez’s prior counsel stated in her

brief to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council that Martinez was given an oral

drivers examination. TR 336. Thus, it is entirely possible that the ALJ’s conclusions with

respect to Martinez’s mental retardation were not based on substantial evidence in the record.

b. Vocational expert testimony

Martinez argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the testimony of the Vocational

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

Expert that Martinez’s past relevant work was “unskilled medium work.” TR 21 and 366. 

Martinez argues that the ALJ’s description of her past work as “light” was based on the way the

work was “generally performed,” not on Martinez’s own work experience. Martinez cites 20

C.F.R. § 404.1565 for the proposition that the ALJ must consider only Martinez’s own work

experience, not how it was generally performed. While this regulation does note that the Social

Security Administration will “need to know about the amount of walking, standing, sitting,

lifting and carrying [the applicant] did during the work day, as well as any other physical or

mental duties of [the applicant’s] job,” the regulation does not restrict the evidence the ALJ may

consider in determining the level of the applicant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565. 

Rather, the regulation describes what the Social Security Administration will consider when it

decides “whether [the applicant] is able to do work that is different from what [the applicant has]

done in the past.” Id. (emphasis added).

Moreover, the ALJ also based his determination that Martinez’s past relevant work was

“light” on Martinez’s own description of her work: “the undersigned notes that she earlier

described it closer to light work in her Disability Report.” TR 21. In her disability report,

Martinez noted how many hours per day she could walk, stand, sit, climb, stoop, kneel, crouch,

crawl, handle, grab or grasp big objects, and write, type or handle small objects in her job as a

wrapper. TR 70. She also noted the amounts that she would lift and how frequently she would

lift them. Id. Based on his determination that Martinez had “residual functional capacity to

perform light work,” and that her job as a wrapper, as self-described, was “light work,” the ALJ

concluded that Martinez was able to return to past relevant work. TR 21. 

Martinez also argues that the ALJ did not ask enough questions, or the right questions, of

the Vocational Expert with respect to alternative work in the national economy is not relevant. 

Because of these concerns and the possibility that the ALJ may make a different disability

determination on remand, the ALJ may choose to consider additional questioning of the

Vocational Expert on remand.

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment are DENIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

DATED: March 20, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 04-04368 JF

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING TO THE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Tom F. Weathered

Law Office of Tom Weathered

999 16th St #7

San Francisco, CA 94107-2468 

Leo Rufino Montenegro

333 Market St

Suite 1500

San Francisco, CA 94105

Sara Winslow

United States Attorney's Office

Northern District of California

450 Golden Gate Avenue

10th Floor, Box 36055

San Francisco, CA 94102 

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