Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02364/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02364-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIO SEVILLA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-02364-BAS-DHB

ORDER: 

(1) OVERRULING 

DEFENDANTS’ 

OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R 

[ECF No. 14];

(2) ADOPTING THE R&R IN ITS 

ENTIRETY [ECF No. 13]; 

AND

(3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF 

No. 9]

v.

A. MALDONADO, et al., 

Defendants.

Plaintiff Julio Sevilla, incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, 

has filed a Complaint against prison officials Maldonado and Nelson alleging they 

used excessive force against him in violation of his Eight Amendment right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants move to dismiss 

arguing that Sevilla’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), because Sevilla was found guilty at a disciplinary hearing of resisting a peace 

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officer as a result of the incident described in the Complaint. (ECF No. 9.) 

Magistrate Judge Louisa Porter issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss pointing out that 

“a holding in [Sevilla’s] §1983 case that the Defendants used excessive force to 

subdue [Sevilla] would not ‘negate the unlawfulness of [Sevilla’s] attempt to resist 

it.’” (ECF No. 13 at 11, quoting Hooper v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133 

(9th Cir. 2011).) Defendants now file Objections to this R&R. (ECF No. 14.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe 

them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Courts may not usually consider material outside the complaint when ruling 

on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds. However, 

documents specifically identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not 

questioned by parties may also be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 

1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute on other grounds. 

B. Objections to the R&R

The Court reviews de novo those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). 

The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. “The statute [28 U.S.C. 

§636(b)(1)(c)] makes it clear,” however, “that the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but 

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not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc) (emphasis in original). “Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a 

district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties 

themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Since neither party 

objects to the facts detailed in the R&R, this Court adopts and does not repeat the 

“Background” section detailing the allegations in the Complaint.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant 

to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). The Court disagrees.

Under Heck, a civil rights claim is disallowed if rendering a judgment for a 

plaintiff would necessarily imply that a previous conviction or sentence is invalid.

512 U.S. at 489. This rule has also been invoked for prison disciplinary hearings 

involving loss of good-time credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). 

However, when a civil rights claim does not necessarily implicate the underlying 

disciplinary action, it may proceed. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 

(2004). 

In Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002), cited by Defendants 

in their Motion to Dismiss, the Ninth Circuit found that Heck barred a prisoner, 

convicted of felony murder and resisting arrest, from bringing his civil rights 

excessive force claim because his underlying conviction required proof of an 

“intentional provocative act” which was defined as “not in self defense.” 

Cunningham, 312 F.3d at 1152. Essentially, a finding that the police used 

unreasonable force while effecting the plaintiff’s arrest, the court held, would “call 

into question” the validity of factual disputes which had necessarily already been 

resolved in the criminal action against him. Id. at 1154.

However, in Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth 

Circuit considered whether a prisoner’s excessive force allegations were barred by 

Heck after pleading guilty to resisting arrest pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §148(a)(1). 

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The Smith court reasoned:

A conviction based on conduct that occurred before the officers 

commence the process of arresting the defendant is not “necessarily” 

rendered invalid by the officers’ subsequent use of excessive force. . . . 

Similarly, excessive force used after a defendant has been arrested may 

properly be the subject of a §1983 action notwithstanding the 

defendant’s conviction on a charge of resisting an arrest that was itself 

lawfully conducted.

Id. at 696 (emphasis original). Accordingly, the Smith court found that 

“Smith’s §1983 action is not barred . . . because the excessive force may have been 

employed against him subsequent to the time he engaged in the conduct that 

constituted the basis for his conviction.” Id. at 693. Under the circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit held that Smith’s §1983 action “neither demonstrated nor necessarily 

implied the invalidity of his conviction.” Id.; see also Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 

1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If [the officer] used excessive force subsequent to the 

time Sanford interfered with [the officer’s] duty, success in her section 1983 claim 

will not invalidate her conviction. Heck is no bar.”)

The core judicial inquiry in a §1983 excessive force claim is “‘whether force 

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 

and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “When prison officials maliciously and 

sadistically use force to cause harm,” the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, 

“contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 

“[T]he test for whether force is reasonable or excessive is ‘whether the officers’ 

actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.’” Hooper v. Cty. of 

San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

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In this case, a fact finder could find that Officers Maldonado and Nelson used 

excessive force and that Sevilla resisted a peace officer. One finding does not 

necessarily invalidate the other, as required for Heck to apply. Both the Complaint

(ECF No. 1) and the report submitted by Defendants (ECF No. 9-1 at 9−10) detail a 

series of exchanges between inmate and officials including Sevilla’s refusal to follow 

orders to step outside the office, exchanges of insults, Maldonado allegedly taking 

Sevilla down to his stomach and hitting Sevilla’s head on the concrete floor. Similar 

to Smith, the finding that Sevilla resisted a peace officer could have been based on 

his conduct before the officers allegedly used excessive force. 

Furthermore, although Sevilla was found to have resisted a peace officer, a 

fact finder could find that the force used to quell the resistance was applied, not in a 

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm. The fact that Sevilla admitted in his disciplinary proceeding that “I did 

resist. The force was justified,” (id. at 14), although it may cause him some credibility 

problems at trial, is not dispositive. It is not clear from this statement which force at 

which point in time he was admitting was justified. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Objections to 

the R&R (ECF No. 14), ADOPTS IN ITS ENTIRETY the R&R (ECF No. 13) and 

DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2017

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