Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01049/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01049-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The petition was actually filed in the state trial court on December 13, 2007, but

under the prison mailbox rule the petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison

authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karen Sanchez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-1049-PHX-MHM (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Karen Sanchez. Doc. #1. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Petitioner pled guilty on December 21, 2004, to one count of second degree murder, a class

one dangerous felony under Arizona law. Doc. #11, Exh. C, D and E. On February 3, 2005,

pursuant to a stipulated sentence in the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to an

aggravated term of 20 years in prison, flat time. Doc. #11, Exh. C, G and H.

On December 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.1

 Doc. #11, Exh. J. In a minute entry filed

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 The court need not address the alternative defenses presented by Respondents.

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on January 16, 2008, the trial court found that the notice was untimely and that Petitioner

failed to provide a meritorious reason for the untimely filing. Doc. #11, Exh. K. The trial

court found no merit to Petitioner’s contention that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004) constituted a significant change in the law justifying the late filing. Id. The court

explained that Blakely was decided before Petitioner’s plea agreement and sentencing, and

that Petitioner waived her right to a jury determination of aggravating factors in the plea

agreement. Id. The court therefore dismissed the notice of post-conviction relief. Id.

Nearly a year later, on January 5, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Doc. #11, Exh. L. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as

untimely on January 26, 2009. Doc. #11, Exh. M. Petitioner did not seek review in the

Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. #1 at 5, 6.

On May 11, 2009, Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court.

Doc. #1. Petitioner alleges one ground for relief. She contends that the trial court’s

determination of aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence at her sentencing

hearing violated Blakely. Judge Murguia screened the petition and directed Respondents to

file an answer. Doc. #4. On October 9, 2009, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. #11. Petitioner did not file a reply. 

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that the habeas petition should be dismissed because it was not

filed within the statute of limitations period. Alternatively, Respondents contend that

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, and that Petitioner waived her right to raise a

Blakely claim in her plea agreement. Because the information presented establishes that the

habeas petition was filed after the statute of limitations expired, the court finds that the

petition is barred and recommends that the petition be denied on that basis.2

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A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

An "of-right" petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of "direct

review" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is "clearly

pending after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition."

Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review

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is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed even though the petition is not filed

until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).

An application for post-conviction relief is also pending during the intervals between a lower

court decision and a review by a higher court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). However, the time

between a first and second application for post-conviction relief is not tolled because no

application is "pending" during that period. Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe,

340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The petitioner was "not entitled to tolling during the interval

between the completion of one round of state collateral review and the commencement of a

second round of review."). Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does

not reinitiate a limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under AEDPA may be subject to equitable tolling. Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). However, as a general rule, equitable tolling is

not available in most cases and may be applied only when "extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

B. Application

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on February 3, 2005. Petitioner

had 90 days to file an "of-right" petition for post-conviction relief under the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). She did not file a petition within that time

period. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on May 5, 2005, the day after the 90-day

period expired. The statute of limitations then expired one year later on May 5, 2006.

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on December 5, 2007, one year and

seven months after the statute of limitations expired. Because the statute of limitations

deadline had passed by the time Petitioner filed her notice of post-conviction relief, the notice

did not toll the limitations period. Petitioner then filed her habeas petition in the federal court

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on May 11, 2009, a little more than three years the limitations period expired. The petition

is therefore untimely.

Petitioner addresses the timeliness issue in her petition and attempts to explain why

the statute of limitations should not bar the petition. Doc. #1 at 8. She contends that her

defense lawyer failed to produce the plea agreement and sentencing hearing transcripts to her

and that she has limited access to legal materials in the prison. These factors do not rise to

the level of extraordinary circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control that made it impossible

for her to file a petition on time.

She further contends that Blakely and “State v. Booker” were decided after she was

sentenced. Petitioner’s sentencing occurred on February 3, 2005. Blakely, however was

decided on June 24, 2004 and Booker was decided on January 12, 2005. Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Thus,

Petitioner’s contention is inaccurate and does not warrant the application of equitable tolling.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Petitioner's habeas petition is barred by

the statute of limitations. The court will therefore recommend that the petition be denied and

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 14th day of April, 2010.

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