Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01704/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01704-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Court notes that the caption in the docket indicates that

Joe McGrath is the named Defendant in his capacity as warden of

Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP). The Clerk of the Court shall

substitute Robert Horel as warden of PBSP. See Rule 25(d)(1) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (if a public officer who is a

party to a lawsuit ceases to hold office or resigns, the officer’s

successor is automatically substituted as a party).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX SOLORIO VALDOVINOS,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT HOREL,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 02-1704 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

On April 10, 2002, Petitioner Felix Solorio Valdovinos, an

inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison located in Crescent City,

California, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his state

conviction and sentence. Respondent Warden Robert Horel filed an

answer to the petition acknowledging that the petition was timely

and that all claims raised had been exhausted.1 Subsequently, this

Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. Upon appointment,

Petitioner's counsel filed a timely traverse. Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the traverse referred to new

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 1 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

facts and new legal theories and, thus, contained unexhausted

claims such that the petition must be dismissed. On December 3,

2004, the Court issued an order ruling that three claims presented

in the traverse were unexhausted and staying the proceedings to

allow Petitioner to exhaust these claims in state court. 

Petitioner did so and filed a motion to lift the stay and amend the

petition to add his newly exhausted claims. On March 20, 2007, the

Court issued an order granting the motion to lift the stay and

amend the petition. On October 10, 2007, Respondent filed an

answer to the new petition and on November 12, 2007, Petitioner

filed his reply. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are taken from the Court's December 3,

2004 Order. On May 11, 1998, at about 1 a.m., Nelson Caballero was

shot to death outside a San Jose nightclub. Caballero had been

conversing with a man outside the nightclub when the man fired two

shots, both at close range, and both from a .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun. One shot was to Caballero's stomach and the

other was to his head. The coroner determined that Caballero was

killed by the combination of the two gunshot wounds. Petitioner

was ultimately charged with the murder. 

At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the prosecution

called four acquaintances of Caballero who were with him at the

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 2 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 At trial, Diaz was impeached with a 1996 felony conviction

involving moral turpitude and a previous conviction for threatening

or dissuading a witness.

3

 The record does not contain the full name of this

individual.

3

time of the shooting: Joaquin Diaz2, Tracy Castro, Kyong "Say"

Miranda, and Caballero’s girlfriend, Blanca Torres. The first

three witnesses identified Petitioner as the killer at the

preliminary hearing and at trial. Torres was unable to do so.

At both the preliminary hearing and the trial, Diaz testified

that he was standing outside the club with Caballero when another

acquaintance, Shalaman3, joined them. Shalaman pointed to three

men coming out of the bar and said they would shoot him if they saw

him. Caballero offered to "back up" Shalaman. The three men, who

were strangers to Diaz, approached Caballero, Diaz, and Shalaman. 

The man who would shoot Caballero wore a black cowboy hat, a black

leather jacket, and a mustache. He was about as tall or a little

shorter than Diaz, who stood five feet six inches. One of the

shooter's companions was also dressed "cowboy style" like the

shooter and wore a hat; however, he was taller than Diaz. The

third man wore no hat, was not dressed "cowboy style" and was

Diaz's height. Diaz identified Petitioner as the shooter by

pointing to him at the defense table.

According to Diaz, the shooter and Caballero suggested they

fight. Diaz then focused his attention on Caballero who proceeded

to unbutton his jacket. As Caballero was unbuttoning his jacket

Diaz heard a shot, turned, and saw Petitioner holding a handgun and

shooting Caballero. When Caballero fell from the first shot,

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 3 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Petitioner walked over to Caballero, shot him again, and then

quickly walked away. Petitioner's two companions took off running. 

Also present outside the nightclub were Castro and Miranda. 

At trial, Castro testified that she knew Caballero as a friend from

the club, and that when she exited the club that night, she saw

Caballero talking to a man. The two men were standing with a group

of men approximately twenty-five feet away from Castro. Castro did

not know the man with whom Caballero was speaking, but said she was

positive he was six feet tall and wore a white cowboy hat, jeans,

and a black waist-length jacket. Castro testified that she

observed the man shoot Caballero in the stomach and then in the

temple. After the shooting, Castro saw the shooter leave with

another person in a gray car. At both the trial and the

preliminary hearing, Castro identified Petitioner as the man who

shot Caballero.

At trial, Miranda testified to the following: she was two or

three feet behind Castro as they left the club, and she heard a

gunshot and saw smoke but did not actually see a gun. Miranda

described the shooter as a Hispanic male wearing a light tan straw

cowboy hat, a short leather jacket and denim. She said he was

tall, on the slender side, and wore a mustache. Miranda identified

Petitioner as the shooter at both the preliminary hearing and

trial. She testified that Petitioner, accompanied by a male

passenger, drove away from the scene in a gray car.

Torres testified at trial that when Caballero was shot, she

was sitting in the driver's seat of her car approximately twenty to

twenty-five feet away from him. Torres had previously seen

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 4 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The record does not contain the full name of this

individual.

5

Caballero conversing with four men, two of whom she recognized as

Triste4 and Shalaman, persons she had met at the nightclub. After

she heard a "pop," Torres turned and saw Caballero grab his stomach

and fall to the ground. At this point, Torres saw only one person,

a Hispanic male, standing over Caballero. The man shot Caballero

again and then ran past Torres. Torres could not identify the man,

but she told the police he was wearing a black hat, a dark jacket,

was a bit muscular, and had a mustache.

In addition to Caballero’s acquaintances, the prosecution

called Isidro Garcia, and read into the record the preliminary

hearing testimony and unsworn police statement of Aurelio Lopez. 

Both Garcia and Lopez lived with Petitioner, and Lopez was also

Petitioner's cousin.

Garcia and Lopez were at the club on the night of the

shooting. Lopez was dressed like Petitioner. Lopez was wearing a

gray cowboy hat, a black leather jacket and boots. Garcia was

wearing a black leather jacket, black pants, and boots, but no hat. 

Garcia and Lopez were leaving the club when Caballero was shot. 

Both Lopez and Garcia claimed to have heard two shots and to have

seen Caballero on the ground. Both men testified that they did not

see who fired the shots and did not see Petitioner. After the

shooting, Garcia and Lopez got into their car and drove home.

Detective Ernesto Alcantar and Police Sergeant Pete Ramirez

investigated the murder. On May 15, 1998, Detective Alcantar

showed Castro a six-person photographic lineup. All of the

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 5 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

pictures depicted Hispanic males with mustaches and short to medium

black hair. Castro did not identify Petitioner but selected

another photograph. About a week after the shooting, Diaz viewed

the lineup. Diaz chose Petitioner but qualified his choice by

saying that he was not sure.

Also on May 15, 1998, Detective Alcantar and Sergeant Ramirez

went to Petitioner's apartment looking for him. He was not there

but Garcia and Lopez were. The police received consent to search

the residence and found an ounce of methamphetamine and a 9-

millimeter gun in Lopez's bedroom. Lopez was arrested on an

outstanding warrant for gun and drug possession, and for the gun

and drugs found in his room. Lopez was not charged with the latter

crimes.

The same day, the detectives interviewed Lopez and Garcia at

the police station. When asked if he saw Petitioner with a weapon

on the night of the shooting, Lopez said he did but did not know

what kind. When questioned further, Lopez stated that the weapon

he saw Petitioner with was a gun. 

At the preliminary hearing, Lopez admitted that he told

Detective Alcantar that Petitioner had a gun, but testified that

his statements to Detective Alcantar were not truthful. He

explained that he told Detective Alcantar what he wanted to hear

because he was afraid to do otherwise. Lopez said he was afraid

that he himself might be a suspect. Lopez testified at the

preliminary hearing that although the police did not say they would

implicate him if he did not talk, they treated him badly before he

gave his statement.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 6 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 In a "blackboard preliminary" a screen of some sort is

placed between the defendant and any witness so as to prevent the

witness from seeing the defendant. 

7

During Garcia's interview with Detective Alcantar, Garcia lied

and said he had not been at the club and had not seen Petitioner. 

At trial, Garcia said he lied because Detective Alcantar was

verbally abusing him. He testified that he started telling the

truth after Detective Alcantar said that Lopez was telling a

different story. Garcia said that he was outside the bar during

the shooting and that Lopez was wearing a gray hat like Petitioner.

On August 19, 1998, and August 20, 1998, respectively,

Detective Alcantar showed Castro and Diaz a second photographic

lineup using a different photograph of Petitioner. Again, Diaz

chose Petitioner's photo but said he was not sure and Castro

identified someone other than Petitioner. Detective Alcantar did

not include a photograph of Lopez in either lineup although at

trial he testified that Lopez was similar in size and stature to

Petitioner. 

At the preliminary hearing on August 25, 1998, Petitioner's

defense attorney, in the presence of the prosecutor and Detective

Alcantar, requested a "blackboard preliminary"5 hearing based on a

review of the police reports which indicated that the witnesses

were never presented with a lineup or photo lineup. Although photo

lineups had been conducted, both the prosecutor and Detective

Alcantar stood silent when the defense told the court there had

been no prior identification. The court denied the defense

attorney's request for a blackboard preliminary hearing. At the

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 7 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 The court read the following to the jury:

The prosecution and the defense are required to

disclose to each other before trial the evidence each

8

hearing, Diaz, Castro and Miranda identified Petitioner as the

shooter. 

 On the second day of trial, during his cross-examination of

Diaz, defense counsel first discovered that a photographic lineup

had been conducted. Diaz’s testimony was confirmed by the crossexamination of Detective Alcantar, who admitted that he had

administered two separate photographic lineups. 

Based on the newly discovered information, defense counsel

moved for a dismissal, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to

provide information regarding the misidentification and tenuous

identification of the shooter in the photo lineups substantially

changed the way counsel would have handled the preliminary

examination and argued the case at trial. The trial court

determined that the material was exculpatory material which should

have been turned over to the defense in accordance with Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression by

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or

to punishment). However, the court denied the motion to dismiss

because it found that the prosecution did not intentionally conceal

the exculpatory evidence and therefore did not act in bad faith. 

To remedy the Brady violation, the court offered defense counsel a 

continuance and read to the jury California Criminal Jury

Instruction number 2.28.6 Defense counsel declined the offer of a

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 8 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

intends to present at trial so as to promote the

ascertainment of the truth, save court time, and

avoid any surprise which may arise during the course

of the trial. Concealment of evidence and/or delay

in the disclosure of evidence may deny a party a

sufficient opportunity to subpoena the noncomplying

party's evidence.

Disclosures of evidence are required to be made at

least thirty days in advance of trial. Any new

evidence discovered within thirty days of trial must

be disclosed immediately. In this case, the People

concealed and/or failed to timely disclose the

following evidence: Photo lineups shown to the

following witnesses. One, Joaquin Dias, and two,

Tracy Castro, and the results thereof.

Although the People's concealment and/or failure to

timely disclose evidence was without lawful

justification, the Court has, under the law,

permitted the production of this evidence during

trial. The weight and significance of any

concealment and/or delay and disclosure are matters

for your consideration. However, you should consider

whether the sealed and/or untimely disclosed evidence

pertains to a fact of importance, something trivial,

or subject matter already established by other

credible evidence.

RT at 324-25.

9

continuance.

In addition to withholding evidence related to the

identification of Petitioner, the prosecution failed to disclose

evidence that defense counsel alleged could be used to impeach

Lopez. The prosecutor did not disclose to Petitioner's attorney

before the preliminary hearing that, when arrested, Lopez was found

to be in the possession of a handgun and an ounce of

methamphetamine. Defense counsel learned of the gun and drugs

during his cross-examination of Detective Alcantar. Detective

Alcantar testified that the information regarding Lopez was not

disclosed because Lopez's arrest was considered to be unrelated to

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 9 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

the shooting.

Lopez was scheduled to testify for the prosecution at trial,

but he absconded. Due to his unavailability, the prosecution

requested that the trial court admit Lopez's preliminary hearing

testimony in which he mentioned his post-arrest statement to

Detective Alcantar that Petitioner had a gun the night of the

murder. The trial court granted the prosecution's request over

defense counsel's objection to Lopez being declared unavailable. 

The prosecution also read into the record Lopez's unsworn postarrest statement to police that Petitioner had a gun the night of

the murder. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of

Lopez's out-of-court statement.

Based on his untimely discovery of favorable evidence, defense

counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that Lopez's possession of

the gun and drugs could have been used to impeach his testimony at

the preliminary hearing and that, without this evidence, counsel

had been unable effectively to cross-examine Lopez at the

preliminary hearing. The request for a mistrial was denied. The

trial court found that the prejudicial impact of the untimely

disclosure did not warrant a mistrial. The court, however,

suggested that another remedy might be available. Petitioner's

attorney chose not to pursue an alternative remedy.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 1, 1998, after a seven day trial, the jury

convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and found that in

committing the crime he used a firearm and proximately caused great

bodily injury to the victim by discharging the firearm. On January

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 10 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

8, 1999, Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of fifty years

to life. 

On appeal to the California court of appeal, Petitioner argued

(1) the trial court erred in admitting Lopez's preliminary hearing

testimony because the prosecution's failure to disclose until trial

that the police had found a gun and drugs in Lopez's room prevented

Petitioner from having a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine

Lopez at the preliminary hearing in violation of the Confrontation

Clause; (2) the prosecution's untimely disclosure of exculpatory

evidence, i.e. the photographic line-ups, was contrary to Brady and

violated due process; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed

to answer a jury question critical to the determination of whether

the charged homicide was murder in the first or second degree.

On August 23, 2000, in an unpublished opinion, the California

court of appeal rejected Petitioner's claims and affirmed the

judgment. See People v. Valdovinos, HO19599 (Ct. App. August 23,

2000). 

Petitioner did not seek direct review of the appellate

decision, but filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court on June 29, 2001. (Cal., S098707.) 

Petitioner presented five claims to the California Supreme Court: 

(1) Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation based on

admission of witness' preliminary hearing testimony; 

(2) Confrontation Clause based on admission of unavailable witness'

out-of-court statement; (3) due process violation based on

impermissibly suggestive pretrial photographic identification; 

(4) Brady violation based on prosecutor's nondisclosure of

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 11 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

exculpatory evidence; and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing and the

appointment of counsel; both of his requests were denied. On

December 19, 2001, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's State

habeas corpus petition without citation or comment. On April 10,

2002, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for federal habeas corpus

relief. The federal habeas corpus petition alleged all of

Petitioner's state habeas claims. On August 29, 2002, Respondent

filed an answer to the petition and acknowledged that Petitioner

had exhausted his state remedies, having presented to the

California Supreme Court the claims raised in his federal petition.

After counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner, he filed a

traverse which contained the following unexhausted claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to

object to the admission of Lopez's out-of-court police statement

and failure to seek a continuance; (2) Brady claim based on newly

discovered evidence; and (3) Youngblood claim based on the theory

that the prosecution, in bad faith, destroyed material, exculpatory

evidence. Petitioner brought these claims in a habeas petition to

the California Supreme Court, which denied them without comment. 

The Court now addresses all of Petitioner's claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a

state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

reviewed on the merits in state court only if the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 12 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In

any event, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional

error at issue is structural error or had a "'substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" 

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412 (2000); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir.

2001). “Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412. A state court decision may no longer be

overturned on habeas review simply because of a conflict with

circuit-based law. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th

Cir.), overruled on other grounds in Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct.

1166 (2003). Nonetheless, circuit decisions may still be relevant

as persuasive authority to determine whether a particular state

court holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court

precedent or to assess what law is "clearly established." Id.;

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 13 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

grant the writ if the State court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the State

court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: "A state court's decision can

be 'contrary to' federal law either 1) if it fails to apply the

correct controlling authority, or 2) if it applies the controlling

authority to a case involving facts 'materially indistinguishable'

from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a

different result." Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150 (citing Williams,

529 U.S. at 405-07). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the State court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the

claim resulted in a decision that "was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13). The "clearly erroneous" standard of

unreasonableness that applies in determining the "unreasonable

application" of federal law under § 2254(d)(1) also applies in

determining the "unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence" under § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 1107-08 (citing Van

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 14 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54). To grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a

federal court must be "left with a firm conviction that the

determination made by the state court was wrong and that the one

[petitioner] urges was correct." Id. at 1108 (quoting Van Tran,

212 F.3d at 1153-54) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

district court must presume correct any determination of a factual

issue made by a State court unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

In determining whether the state court's decision was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04

(1991); LaJoie v. Thompson, 201 F.3d 1166, 1172 n.9 (9th Cir.

2000). If the state court only considered state law, the federal

court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state court,

is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where

the highest state court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, a review of the

record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's

decision was objectively reasonable. Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d

1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028

(9th Cir. 2001); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 15 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

should conduct “an independent review of the record” to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law. Id. The federal court need not otherwise

defer to the state court decision under AEDPA: "A state court's

decision on the merits concerning a question of law is, and should

be, afforded respect. If there is no such decision on the merits,

however, there is nothing to which to defer." Greene, 288 F.3d at

1089. In sum, "while we are not required to defer to a state

court's decision when that court gives us nothing to defer to, we

must still focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding

whether the state court's resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." 

Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on

other grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 944 n.1 (9th Cir.

2002). A summary decision by a state court does not “implicitly”

make any factual findings in support of the decision. Id. at 913

(refusing to infer factual findings from state court summary denial

of habeas petition). 

Here, the only reasoned state court decision is the appellate

court's decision on direct review. Because the California Supreme

Court issued a summary denial of all of Petitioner's claims

presented in his two habeas petitions, this Court must undertake an

independent review of the record regarding the claims presented in

the petitions to determine whether the state supreme court clearly

erred in its application of controlling federal law. 

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Aurelio Lopez

Petitioner argues that he was denied the right to confront and

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 16 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The parties agree that Crawford does not apply to this case

because is was decided after the events at issue occurred. 

17

cross-examine Aurelio Lopez effectively at the preliminary hearing,

the only time Lopez appeared as a witness, because the prosecution

failed to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defense

counsel in time for him to use it in his cross-examination of

Lopez. Respondent argues that the state appellate court's denial

of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

established Supreme Court precedent.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that

in criminal cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with

witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal

confrontation right applies to the States through the Fourteenth

Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 

The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure

reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a

substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61

(2004). It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that

reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the

crucible of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-

16 (1974).

Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral

review. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007).7

 For

the cases governed by pre-Crawford law, the basic rule is:

[A]n out-of-court statement against a criminal defendant [i]s

admissible at trial if two conditions [are] met. First, 'in

order to introduce relevant statements at trial, state

prosecutors [must] either produce the declarants of those

statements as witnesses at trial or demonstrate their

unavailability.' [Citations.] Second, even if prosecutors

succeed in demonstrating unavailability, the statements are

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 17 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

only admissible if they bear 'adequate indicia of

reliability.' The 'indicia of reliability' requirement is met

if the statements fall within a 'firmly rooted hearsay

exception' or contain 'particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.'

Bockting v. Bayer, 505 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted).

Before Crawford, prior preliminary hearing testimony was

admissible at trial where the declarant was unavailable. 

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970) (where defendant

had opportunity to cross examine declarant at preliminary hearing,

no Confrontation Clause violation in admitting statements at trial

when declarant professed loss of memory).

The government must show that the witness is “unavailable.” 

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1988) (dead

witness); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). 

This requires that the prosecutor make a good faith effort to

obtain the witness’s presence. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-

25 (1968). 

 A Confrontation Clause claim is subject to harmless error

analysis. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.

2004). In the context of reviewing a state court conviction under

28 U.S.C. § 2254, this means that relief is in order only if the

evidence at issue “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623.

The state appellate court summed up the facts relevant to this

claim as follows.

At the preliminary hearing, Lopez testified that Shalaman

and appellant had had a fistfight at the nightclub a

month earlier but that their disagreement was settled by

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 18 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

the time of the shooting. He also said that appellant

appeared to have a gun but that Lopez was not sure and

that Caballero also had "something on him" though Lopez

did not see Caballero display a weapon. Lopez heard

Caballero say something like, "Do you have a problem with

me" but did not see whether Caballero was getting ready

to fight. Lopez never testified that appellant shot

Caballero. 

On the second day of the prosecution's case, the trial

court held a hearing on the question of whether Lopez was

an unavailable witness. The defense argued that the

prosecution did not act diligently in pursuing Lopez and

had therefore failed to show that he was unavailable. 

The court ruled that the prosecution had exercised

reasonable diligence and, hence, that the witness was

unavailable. 

The next day, Detective Alcantar testified that on May

15, Detective Ramirez found methamphetamine and a gun in

Lopez' bedroom in the apartment Lopez shared with

appellant, among others. This information was previously

unknown to both the prosecution and the defense. Defense

counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the late

disclosure was a discovery violation, that it prejudiced

the defense at trial, and that if the information had

been timely disclosed, it would have affected Lopez's

credibility at the preliminary hearing, and counsel's

cross-examination of Lopez at that hearing.

Detective Alcantar stated that Ramirez wrote a report

under a different case number about the discovery of the

gun and drugs but failed to mention it in his report on

this case because the information was unrelated to it. 

Both the prosecution and defense knew from police reports

made available before the preliminary hearing that on May

15 the police arrested Lopez on an outstanding warrant

for gun and weapon possession charges, that he was

convicted of them, and was released on probation. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, explaining

that "prejudice doesn't amount to that level where it

warrants that type of remedy."

People v. Valdovinos, HO19599, *10-11.

The state appellate court denied Petitioner's Confrontation

Clause claim, reasoning as follows:

In deciding this claim, the critical question is whether

a preliminary hearing cross-examination of Lopez that had

included such information would have affected the trial. 

As we explain, we conclude that it would not have. 

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 19 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

First, Lopez had a motive to shift blame to appellant

that was far more powerful than avoiding prosecution on

weapon and drug charges: he wanted to avoid being

prosecuted himself for the murder. During closing

argument, defense counsel raised this matter when, after

reminding the jury that Lopez was present at the

shooting, and that drugs and a gun were found in his

room, counsel suggested that Lopez might be the killer. 

Counsel said that the murder stemmed not merely from a

fistfight, but from "a drug deal gone bad." Second, if

Lopez was falsely accusing appellant at the preliminary

hearing, he was doing so none too directly. Lopez failed

to say definitively even that he saw appellant with a

gun, much less that he saw appellant shoot Caballero. 

Defense counsel pointed these facts out in closing

argument. Indeed, Lopez's evasive and conflicting

statements, both to the police and at the preliminary

hearing, suggested that he was trying to cover for

appellant, rather than falsely accuse him. In view of

the fact that Lopez was evidently trying to avoid

incriminating appellant, counsel would not have succeeded

by developing relatively mild additional evidence of

Lopez's motive for incriminating appellant. Thirdly,

defense counsel made full use of the belatedly disclosed

information to argue that Lopez was telling the

authorities what they wanted to hear in order to avoid

prosecution for the later weapon and drug offenses. 

Accordingly, defense counsel made every conceivable

argument to the jury based on the belatedly disclosed

information. Thus, appellant fails to demonstrate how

the defense would have fared any better if Lopez had been

cross-examined at the preliminary hearing on this most

recent drug and weapon possession. Similarly, appellant

fails to demonstrate how the state's belated disclosure

of the evidence deprived him of an opportunity for

effective cross-examination of Lopez at the preliminary

hearing.

Id. at *12-13.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court incorrectly applied

established Supreme Court precedent because it improperly relied

upon the defense counsel's argument to the jury as the source of

the information for the jury to use in evaluating Lopez's

testimony. 

The appellate court properly addressed the prejudice analysis. 

Although the appellate court pointed out that defense counsel's

arguments to the jury included all the impeachment material, it did

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 20 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

not have to rely on this fact to conclude that the jury verdict

would not have been different even if defense counsel had been able

to impeach Lopez at the preliminary hearing. This is because, as

the appellate court discussed, Lopez's testimony at the preliminary

hearing did not particularly incriminate Petitioner as the

murderer. 

The relevant testimony on direct examination at the

preliminary hearing is as follows:

Q: Did you see the shooting when it started?

A: No, I didn't see that.

Q: Where were you?

A: I was outside also, but I wasn't looking at that.

. . . 

Q: Now, the day of the shooting, did you see who the 

shooter was?

A: I didn't see exactly who it was.

Q: Did you see anybody with a handgun in their hand?

A: Well, I didn't see exactly what it was, you know.

Q: Okay. Did you see something that kind of looked like 

a handgun?

A: Yeah, but the other guy also had something on him, 

also with him. . . . Well, I don't know if it was 

a gun, or a beer, I don't know but I saw something.

Q: And who had the gun, or the beer?

A: We, I don't know. I really didn't see who it was.

. . .

Q: Did you see people running away from that body?

A: Well, only that. Yes.

Q: And that was within seconds of the shooting?

A: Yes.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 21 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

Q: And did you see that one of these people running away was 

Felix [Petitioner]?

A: Yes, because I did, everybody ran.

Q: You would agree, and tell me if you would not, that the 

person that shot the victim had to be somebody within a small group

that was next to him?

A: Well, but I don't know. I don't know. I wasn't looking 

over there.

Q: Did you ever see Felix with something that appeared to be a

gun?

A: Yes, but I don't know if it was a gun.

. . .

Q: Did you ever tell this detective seated next to me that you

saw Felix with a gun?

A: Well, okay. Well, he asked me that, and he was treating me

very badly also, and it wasn't a gun. I don't know what

it was. I just said –-. In reality, I didn't see that

it was a gun.

Q: My question is, did you tell the detective that it was a 

gun?

A: Well, well –- Well, I just said that, because he asked me.

Q: So, you did say it?

A: Well, yeah.

Q: And it was the truth?

A: Well, I don't know. I don't know. I'm not sure.

Clerk's Transcript (CT), Preliminary Hearing Transcript (PHT) at

93-99.

The relevant testimony on cross-examination is as follows:

Q: And did they [the detectives] tell you they were going to 

implicate you in the murder if you didn't talk?

A: Well, not so much like that, but they did treat me badly.

. . .

Q: Now, were you afraid you might be a suspect in the murder 

when you were answering questions?

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 22 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

A: Yes.

Q: And you knew that they were investigating Felix Solorio 

Valdovinos; right?

A: Yes.

Q: And did you make things up to implicate Solorio Valdovinos 

to try to save yourself?

A: Well, no, only what they asked me.

Q: Well, when they asked you, did you see Felix 

Solorio Valdovinos with a gun, what did you answer when

they asked you that?

A: Well, they asked me if I had seen Felix Valdovinos with a 

gun, and I don't remember –- I don't remember exactly. 

I don't remember what –- what I said.

Q: If I tell you that you gave a statement to Sergeant Ramirez

and Sergeant Alcantar saying that you saw Felix with a

gun, would that help you remember what you told the

sergeants when they were interviewing you?

A: Well, yeah. I remember saying that, yeah.

Q: Why did you say that, if it wasn't true?

A: Well, they were asking me, did he have something on him, 

and did he carry something with him.

Q: And did you give them that answer, because you thought that

was the answer that they wanted to hear?

A: Well, yeah.

Q: And it was also because you were in custody, and you were 

afraid of what might happen to you, if you didn't answer

that way?

A: Yes.

. . . 

Q: I note that you're here testifying in custody today, and 

you're wearing trustee type clothing, have you resolved

your case that you were arrested on?

A: Yes.

Q: You plead guilty?

A: Yes.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 23 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

CT, PHT at 100-04.

This testimony shows that it was not unreasonable for the

state court to find that "Lopez's evasive and conflicting

statements, both to the police and at the preliminary hearing,

suggested that he was trying to cover for appellant, rather than

falsely accuse him." 

The state court's decision, that the lack of the additional

impeachment evidence that the police had found a gun and drugs

under Lopez's bed when they arrested him did not prejudice

Petitioner, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law.

II. Showing that Lopez was Unavailable

Petitioner argues that the release of Lopez on probation, and

the failure to keep track of him after his release shows that the

prosecution did not exercise sufficient diligence in ensuring

Lopez's presence at trial.

The California appellate court addressed this issue as

follows:

Appellant contends that the release of Lopez on probation

defeats the prosecution's showing that it used reasonable

diligence to locate Lopez. We disagree.

The facts reveal that on August 25, when he testified at

the preliminary hearing, Lopez was in custody on charges

set forth in the arrest warrant. Lopez pleaded guilty

and, between August 25 and October 26, he was released on

probation. A few days before October 26, which was

scheduled to be the first day of trial, Lopez called the

prosecutor and agreed to be on phone standby as a

witness. In a subsequent telephone call, Lopez told the

prosecutor that he had a new address. The prosecutor

kept in telephone contact with Lopez every three or four

days. However, when the case was assigned to a judge for

trial, the prosecutor was unable to contact or subpoena

Lopez. His telephone was disconnected, and he had quit

his job without saying where he had gone. Efforts to

find him at his residence, jails, and hospitals failed. 

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 24 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

His family did not know where he was.

When Lopez was arrested on the arrest warrant, he

possessed a gun and narcotics yet he was not charged with

those crimes, and then, after pleading guilty to the

arrest warrant charges, he was released on probation. 

Given these circumstances, appellant claims the

prosecution did not do all it could have done to secure

Lopez's presence at trial.

This case is distinguishable from People v. Louis, 42

Cal. 3d 969 (1986). In Louis, the prosecution released a

crucial witness from jail and he disappeared before

trial. By contrast, in this case, Lopez was released

upon probation, after pleading guilty to weapon and drug

charges. The release upon probation gave the prosecution

good reason to believe that Lopez would not abscond. 

Further, the record shows that the prosecutor kept in

touch with Lopez by telephone, and Lopez had agreed to

cooperate. Given these circumstances, there was no abuse

of discretion.

People v. Valdovinos, HO19599, *13-14.

Petitioner cites Ohio v Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980), for

the proposition that the prosecution did not adequately show that

it made diligent efforts to locate Lopez before he was declared

unavailable as a witness.

In Roberts, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally

requires a showing that he is unavailable. 

A witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the . . .

exception to the confrontation requirement unless the

prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort

to obtain his presence at trial.

Id. at 66, 74 (emphasis in original).

The state court found that the prosecution had good reason to

believe that Lopez would not abscond when he was released on

probation and that the prosecutor kept in touch with Lopez by

telephone after he was released. Furthermore, after Lopez

absconded, the prosecution attempted to locate him by contacting

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 25 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

his place of employment, his family, hospitals and jails. Based

upon this record, the state court did not unreasonably apply

Supreme Court authority in finding that the prosecution had made a

good faith effort to obtain Lopez's presence at trial.

Therefore, habeas relief based on this claim is DENIED.

III. Admission of Lopez's Out-of-Court Statement to Police

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right to crossexamine Lopez was violated by the admission of Lopez's statement to

the police that Petitioner had a gun on the night of the shooting. 

The prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective Ramirez that 

Lopez had told the detectives during his interrogation that he had

seen a small pistol in Petitioner's hand the night of the shooting. 

RT at 547. On cross-examination, Detective Ramirez testified that,

when asked to describe what he saw in Petitioner's hand, Lopez

said, "Listen, one becomes scared, you see, I can't tell you. I

only saw that he had something but I can't tell, tell you, I don't

know." RT at 550. Detective Ramirez testified that this was

Lopez's first response, and it was only after further questioning

by detectives that he responded that what Petitioner had in his

hand appeared to be a pistol. RT at 550.

The appellate court ruled that this claim was waived because

Petitioner did not object to Detective Ramirez's testimony at

trial. 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to

support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 26 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and

adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the California

contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial of a federal

petition on grounds of procedural default where there was a

complete failure to object at trial. Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420

F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083,

1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58

(9th Cir. 1999). 

A petitioner may show cause for a procedural default by

establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel,

but attorney error short of constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel does not constitute cause. Id. at 494. To establish

good cause on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must show that (1) counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 644

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984)).

Accordingly, this issue will be addressed below with

Petitioner's other ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

IV. Identification Procedures

Petitioner argues that the photo line-up identification

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 27 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

procedures used by the police were irreparably suggestive. This

claim was presented only to the California Supreme Court which

issued a postcard denial. Therefore, this Court independently

reviews the record to determine if the state court's denial was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority.

Procedures by which a defendant is identified as the

perpetrator must be examined to assess whether they are unduly

suggestive. "It is the likelihood of misidentification which

violates a defendant's right to due process." Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188, 198 (1972). Unnecessarily suggestive pretrial

identification procedures alone do not require exclusion of incourt identification testimony, however; reliability is the

linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification

testimony. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 100-14 (1977). 

Identification testimony is inadmissible as a violation of due

process only if (1) a pretrial encounter is so impermissibly

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification, and (2) the identification is not

sufficiently reliable to outweigh the corrupting effects of the

suggestive procedure. Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

An identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive when

it emphasizes a single individual, thereby increasing the

likelihood of misidentification. Foster v. California, 394 U.S.

440, 443 (1969); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th

Cir. 1985).

In determining whether in-court identification testimony is

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 28 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

sufficiently reliable to outweigh a suggestive pretrial procedure,

courts consider five factors: (1) the witness' opportunity to view

the defendant at the time of the incident; (2) the witness' degree

of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description;

(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time

of the identification procedure; and (5) the length of time between

the incident and the identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114;

Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200; see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 84

F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1996) (although drive-by

identification by witnesses was suggestive, it was permissible

because there was not a substantial likelihood of

misidentification); United States v. Wang, 49 F.3d 502, 505 (9th

Cir. 1995) (identification of defendant in photographs reliable

where witness had ample opportunity to view defendant and actually

spoke with him). 

Petitioner argues that the two photo line-ups shown to Diaz

and Castro were impermissibly suggestive because Petitioner's photo

was the only one in both line-ups. He also argues his

identification by Castro, Diaz and Miranda at the preliminary

hearing was impermissibly suggestive because he was clothed in jail

garb and had his legs and hands shackled so that "the tentative

nature of [the witness'] identifications was destroyed by the

prosecution when it exposed Castro and Diaz to Valdovinos at the

preliminary hearing." Before the trial, Diaz coincidentally saw

Petitioner in the hall in prisoner garb and recognized him there. 

Petitioner argues this pre-trial viewing of him by Diaz was also

impermissibly suggestive. 

The photo line-ups were not unduly suggestive. The

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 29 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

photographs of Petitioner in the two line-ups were described as

being very different from each other and from how Petitioner looked

at trial. In the first lineup, the photograph of Petitioner was

from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and

Petitioner had curly hair. RT at 411, 442. All the photographs in

the first lineup were also DMV photos of Hispanic males, with a

mustache and short to medium hair. RT at 444. In the second

lineup, the photograph of Petitioner was different than in the

first lineup because his hair was shorter. RT at 333, 445. In

fact, Diaz was not sure that the photos he picked in the two

lineups were of the same man. RT at 334. At the trial, Petitioner

did not have a mustache like he did in the two photographs. RT at

332. Petitioner's argument that the lineups were overly suggestive

because his photo was the only one that appeared in both, is belied

by the fact that his appearance in the two photos was different.

However, even if impermissibly and unnecessarily suggestive

pretrial identification procedures were used, the in-court

identification need not necessarily be excluded as tainted. In

order to analyze the in-court identifications under the factors set

out in Manson and Neil, the specific circumstances of each witness'

opportunity to view the shooter on the night of the murder must be

considered.

A. Diaz 

Diaz, a twenty-five year old Mexican male, testified that, on

the night of the shooting, he went to the El Rancho nightclub by

himself. RT 254-55. He was acquainted with Caballero, the victim. 

RT 256. Just before the shooting, Diaz went by himself outside the

club into the parking lot. RT 258. Caballero saw Diaz and came

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 30 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

On cross-examination, Diaz agreed with defense counsel that

it was dark. RT 327.

31

over to greet him. RT 258. Then another man named Shalaman came

over. RT 259. Shalaman said there were three men who would shoot

him if they saw him. RT 261. Diaz saw the three men Shalaman was

talking about, but he didn't know who they were. RT 261. The

three men came over to where Diaz was standing with Caballero and

Shalaman. RT 262. Diaz had no trouble seeing the three men when

they walked over to them. RT at 266. The door for exit and entry

into the nightclub was lit up.8 RT 266. One of the men had on a

black cowboy hat and was wearing a black leather jacket. RT 263-

64. Caballero asked the men whether any of them had a problem with

his friend. RT 268. The man in the black hat and leather jacket

said he did have a problem with him. RT 268. Then Caballero said,

"let's fight," and he started to unbutton his jacket when Diaz

heard a shot. RT 269-70. The man in the black jacket started to

take his jacket off. RT 271. Diaz was glancing back and forth

between Caballero and the man in the black jacket. RT 271. Then

Diaz heard another shot. RT 271. He turned and saw that the man

with the black jacket and black hat was shooting. RT 271. Diaz

didn't look at the gun and couldn't describe it. RT 272. Diaz

thought the man was going to shoot him and Shalaman also. RT 272. 

After the first shot, two of the men with the shooter took off

running. RT 273. The man with the black hat stayed, went over to

Caballero who was on the ground, shot him again, and then he went

running. RT 273. The two groups of men were within a pace or two

of one another. RT 275. Diaz looked directly into the face of the

shooter. RT 277. Diaz identified Petitioner in the courtroom as

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 31 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Both Diaz and Petitioner are about five foot, six inches

tall.

32

the shooter. RT 278. When he was asked if he was sure Petitioner

was the shooter, Diaz responded, "Yes, yes. The only thing is,

that he had a mustache the day that that happened." RT 278.

Applying the Manson and Neil factors, it is apparent that

Diaz's in-court identification of Petitioner was sufficiently

reliable to be admitted, even if prior identification procedures

had been suggestive. First, Diaz had an excellent opportunity to

view the shooter at the time of the incident. Second, Diaz's

degree of attention was high because after the shooter shot

Caballero, Diaz thought he was to be shot also. Third, Diaz's

description to the detectives was accurate in that the shooter was

a Mexican male who was about Diaz's height9 and who was wearing a

black cowboy hat, a black leather jacket and had a mustache. 

Fourth, Diaz was very certain of his identification of Petitioner

in court as the shooter. Fifth, the length of time between the

incident and the first photo line-up was only a few days. There

were a few months between the time Diaz viewed the first and second

line-ups and another few months until the identification at the

trial. However, given that the first four factors demonstrate a

strong indicia of reliability, the fifth factor does not detract

from the reliability of Diaz's in-court identification. The fact

that Diaz identified Petitioner at the preliminary hearing and in

the hall before the trial does not detract from Diaz's reliability

as a witness.

Therefore, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal

law in rejecting Petitioner's claim regarding Diaz's

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 32 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

identification.

B. Castro

On the night of the murder, twenty-six year old Tracy Castro

was driving around with her friend, Say Miranda. RT at 336. They

stopped at El Rancho bar so that Castro could use the bathroom. RT

at 337. On her way into the bar, Castro ran into Caballero, an

acquaintance. RT at 339. Castro and Miranda went into the bar. 

RT at 341. When they came out the back door into the parking lot,

Castro immediately spotted Caballero. RT at 342. He was with a

group of men, and was engaged in conversation with one of them. RT

at 342. Castro did not know any of the men with Caballero. RT at

342. The man who was talking to Caballero was wearing a cowboy

hat, jeans and a black leather waist jacket. RT at 343. The man

in the cowboy hat pulled a gun out of his waistband and started

firing. RT at 343. Castro was close enough to see the spark from

the gun. RT at 343. The distance was about twenty to twenty-five

feet. RT at 343-44. Castro is an emergency medical technician;

even though she was scared, she walked toward Caballero and the man

in the cowboy outfit to see if she could help Caballero. RT at

344. After Caballero fell, the shooter looked at Castro and

Miranda, made eye contact with them, then turned around and shot

Caballero in the temple. RT at 345. After this shot, the man in

the cowboy outfit stepped over Caballero and walked away, went to

his car and drove slowly out of the parking lot. RT at 345-46. 

Castro acknowledged that she picked photos of men other than

Petitioner from two photo lineups she was shown. RT at 353. She

said, "Looking at pictures of somebody and seeing somebody's coldblooded face, you know the difference." RT at 354. Then she

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 33 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10At the time of the trial, Petitioner was estimated to weigh

about 150 pounds.

34

identified Petitioner sitting in the courtroom as the shooter. RT

at 355. 

On cross-examination, Castro stated that she had twenty-twenty

vision and that she got a pretty good look at the man who shot

Caballero. RT at 366. She admitted that she described to the

police a man who was six feet tall. RT at 369. She explained that

anyone wearing a cowboy hat and cowboy boots looks quite tall. RT

at 368-69. Castro admitted that at first she described the shooter

as not having a mustache, but later described him as having a

mustache. RT at 371. On re-cross, Castro admitted she had

described the shooter as weighing 180 to 190 pounds.10 Castro also

said the shooter was wearing a white cowboy hat. RT at 373. She

maintained that she was still sure that the shooter was Petitioner

who she had identified in court. RT at 380. 

Applying the Manson and Neil factors, Castro's in-court

identification of Petitioner was sufficiently reliable to be

admitted, even if prior identification procedures had been

suggestive. First, like Diaz, Castro had an excellent opportunity

to view the shooter. She knew Caballero and saw him talking to the

shooter. After the first shot she walked toward the two men, and

the shooter looked directly into her eyes. Therefore, like Diaz,

she saw the shooter close up. Second, her degree of attention was

high. Third, even though she incorrectly told the police the

shooter was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds, other details of

her description of the shooter were accurate. Fourth, even though

Castro did not select Petitioner in the two photo lineups, she was

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 34 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

very certain of her identification of him in court.

Furthermore, Castro twice failed to identify Petitioner in

photo line-ups as the shooter. Thus, it seems unlikely that they

would have "tainted" her in-court identification of Petitioner. 

Therefore, the state court's decision was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law. 

V. Brady Claims

Petitioner argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose

the following exculpatory evidence is a constitutional violation

under Brady v. Maryland: (1) the gun and methamphetamine discovered

in Lopez's possession; (2) the favorable treatment received by

Lopez in return for his testimony; and (3) Castro's

misidentifications and Diaz's tentative identification in the photo

lineups. With his traverse, Petitioner filed four pieces of newly

discovered evidence that is part of his Brady claim. The first is

an anonymous letter purportedly sent to Caballero's family, found

in the prosecutor's case file, and never disclosed to the defense. 

The writer of the letter claims that Caballero's murder was a

contract killing ordered by Ramon Balemos over a debt. Chayra

Dec., Ex. A. The second is a written statement from Juan Ledezma

stating that Lopez had told Ledezma that (a) Lopez had two guns, a

.380 and a 9mm; (b) Lopez had killed someone at a bar in San Jose

and placed the blame on Petitioner; and (c) Lopez told his brother

to throw out the gun that he used in that killing. Boyle Dec., Ex.

A. The third piece of newly discovered evidence consists of police

documents concerning the drugs and gun found in Lopez's possession.

Boyle Dec., Exs. C-F. The fourth is a photograph found in the

police file of Jose Mongia, a Hispanic male who is dressed in a

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 35 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

black hat and black leather jacket, the same clothing believed to

have been worn by the shooter. 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court

held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. The

Supreme Court later made clear that the duty to disclose such

evidence applies even when there has been no request by the

accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that

the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory

evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability'

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome." Id. at 682. 

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because

it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Prejudice will be found if

the suppressed evidence was "material" under state law to the

accused's guilt or punishment. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d

1053, 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000).

Neither the prosecutor's good faith nor actual unawareness of

exculpatory evidence in the government's hands is determinative of

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 36 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

the prosecution's disclosure obligations. Carriger v. Stewart, 132

F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States v. Kearns, 5

F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1993). 

A defendant need only demonstrate a reasonable probability

that the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1993). The

question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not

have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in

its absence he received a fair trial. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434;

United States v. Golb, 69 F.3d 1417, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).

A "reasonable probability" may not be based on mere

speculation without adequate support. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516

U.S. 1, 6-8 (1995); see, e.g., Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037

(9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting as speculative argument that withheld

material might have led to some admissible evidence which might

have been sufficiently favorable to meet the Bagley standard).

As noted, impeachment, as well as exculpatory, evidence falls

within the Brady rule. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). "Brady information

[therefore] includes 'material . . . that bears on the credibility

of a significant witness in the case.'" United States v. BrumelAlvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States

v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489

U.S. 1032 (1989)); see, e.g., Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1210

(9th Cir. 2002) (conviction reversed where undisclosed letters

would have been valuable to the defense in impeaching "make-orbreak" witness' credibility before the jury); Singh v. Prunty, 142

F.3d 1157, 1161-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (petitioner entitled to habeas

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 37 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

relief where prosecution suppressed evidence of agreement to

provide benefits to key witness in exchange for his testimony, and

reasonable probability existed that had evidence been disclosed one

or more members of jury would have viewed the testimony

differently). 

The materiality of suppressed evidence is considered

collectively, not item by item. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436;

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Delay in disclosure does not deprive an accused of due process

where disclosure is made during trial if the disclosure, though

tardy, is still of value to the accused. United States v. Vgeri,

51 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d

760, 765 (9th Cir. 1987). Due process requires only the disclosure

of exculpatory material in sufficient time to permit defendant to

make effective use of the material. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d

622, 625 (9th Cir. 1987).

A. The Photo Line-ups

This is the only Brady claim that was included in the reasoned

decision of the state appellate court.

The facts, as set forth by the appellate court, are

While cross-examining Diaz, defense counsel discovered

that the police had shown photo lineups to both Diaz and

Castro. Relying upon the untimely disclosure, defense

counsel moved immediately for a dismissal of the charges

against appellant. Although the trial court denied the

motion, it noted that the ruling might have been

different had the untimely disclosure occurred after the

trial. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial and

argued that he would have handled the preliminary hearing

differently had the information been disclosed when it

should have been. Counsel did not specify what he would

have done differently. Without formally denying the

motion, the trial court said it would read an instruction

to the jury that explained the situation. The court

noted that it had found no willful violation and that

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 38 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

defense counsel could pursue the matter in his argument,

could call additional witnesses, and could have

additional time to prepare. The court then read the jury

instruction. (CALJIC No. 2.28)

People v. Valdovinos, HO19599, *16.

Defense counsel did a thorough cross-examination of both Diaz

and Castro about the photo lineups and their identifications and

emphasized in his closing argument that the non-disclosure of two

eyewitness lineups was either negligence or deliberate concealment

on the part of the police and prosecutor. RT 661. He also argued

that the non-disclosure of the exculpatory evidence prevented the

defense from investigating further and developing any defense

theories based on it. RT 662.

The appellate court analyzed this claim as follows:

Appellant relies upon Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88

(1963) but it does not apply here since in this case the

prosecution did disclose the evidence, it just did so in

an untimely manner. Accordingly, the question is not

whether the evidence was material but whether the

untimely disclosure was material. Thus we must decide

how learning of the evidence later rather than sooner

prejudiced the defense. (See e.g. United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 

With respect to this issue, appellant merely states that

"if counsel for defendant had been provided the

information . . . in time to employ that information in

cross-examination of the various witnesses, it cannot be

said with certainty that the jury would then have

[convicted]."

Review of the record discloses that there was no

prejudice. Defense counsel was able to cross-examine

both Diaz and Castro about their identifications. 

Counsel also stressed the belatedness of the disclosure

during his cross-examination of Alcantar. During closing

argument, defense counsel emphasized the issue when he

stated: "Let me comment a little bit on the lineups. 

Okay. I'm appalled: I'm absolutely appalled. In the 10

years I've been a P.D., I've never gone through and in

the middle have this issue of lineups come up all of a

sudden. Here's an eyewitness, Tracy Castro, who's shown

a lineup before we go to preliminary examination, and

twice she couldn't ID my client whose picture is in the

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 39 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

lineup. At . . . best, it's sloppy police work. At

worst, it's deliberate concealment. It's not fair. It's

not fair due process. It doesn't allow us to investigate

the case. Let me point another thing out. The police,

when they showed that lineup to Joaquin Diaz, they know

who they're looking for. They know who their suspect is. 

They've got this lineup okay. They've got a lineup and

they're presenting it to Joaquin Diaz, the convicted

felon who's on probation, who wants to do whatever he can

to help the police to stay out of trouble. He wants them

out of his face, out of his hair. I wasn't there. I

submit to you that it's just human nature to try to help

you get the job done, that perhaps it's conveyed or

communicated somehow as to who the police are looking

for, who the suspect is when they're showing that lineup. 

In any event, . . . it's again, at best . . . just sloppy

police work. At worst, it's deliberate concealment of

evidence. And they know perhaps, if we had that

evidence, which is exculpatory evidence, we would then

follow up, and we would develop our defense based on that

exculpatory evidence."

Defense counsel never asked for a continuance to allow

him to "follow up" nor has he suggested what such follow

up would have been. Appellant does not suggest how the

witnesses could have been more effectively cross-examined

had he been able to explore their lineup identifications

with them at the preliminary hearing. Having failed to

show prejudice, appellant's argument must be rejected.

People v. Valdovinos, HO19599, *16-17.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court used a legal

standard that was contrary to federal law because it said Brady was

inapplicable to Petitioner's claim because he had received the

information during the trial. Petitioner is correct that a late

disclosure of exculpatory evidence at trial is a Brady violation if

the defense cannot effectively use it at trial. Nonetheless,

although the appellate court stated that the late disclosure took

the claim out of the realm of Brady, it used the correct standard

in analyzing the claim. See LaMere, 827 F.2d at 625 (due process

requires only disclosure of exculpatory material in sufficient time

to permit defendant to make effective use of the material). 

Therefore, the appellate court's decision was not contrary to or an

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 40 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

Petitioner argues that the appellate court's factual analysis

was unreasonable because, "although evidence of the photo lineups

was discovered during defense cross-examination of Diaz before

trial was over and the defense was able to cross-examine Castro and

Diaz about their identifications of Valdovinos, the defense was not

able to use that evidence to test their recollections of the

shooter before the witnesses had been exposed to Valdovinos at the

preliminary hearing. . . . the witnesses' identifications of

Valdovinos at trial were undoubtedly affected by their repeated

exposure to Valdovinos' photographs at the photo lineups and to his

physical presence at the preliminary hearing and trial. Defense

counsel was unable to prepare to pursue this issue, since he was

unaware until cross-examining Joaquin Diaz that any witnesses had

ever viewed photo lineups, an opinion the prosecution did nothing

to correct at the preliminary hearing." Traverse at 46-47. 

Petitioner also argues that if defense counsel had known the

witnesses had been exposed to Petitioner's photographs, counsel's

strategy would have significantly changed in that he could have

consulted a memory expert to explore the potentially corrupting

effect of the witnesses' exposure to the photo lineups or he could

have more effectively argued for a blackboard preliminary hearing.

Petitioner does not state how he could have more effectively

cross-examined either Diaz or Castro than he did at the trial. His

cross-examination succeeded in showing that Diaz took approximately

twenty minutes to decide which photo to select at each of the two

photo lineups and even then his identification was conditional. 

Castro admitted that she had picked out the wrong person in both

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 41 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

photo lineups she had been shown by the police. In his closing,

defense counsel emphasized the problems with Castro's and Diaz's

eyewitness testimony.

Petitioner does not say how a memory expert would be able to

further impeach Castro and Diaz's testimony. Petitioner also does

not explain how knowing of the photo lineups would have helped him

obtain a blackboard preliminary hearing; his argument for the

blackboard hearing was based upon his assumption that neither

Castro nor Diaz had seen a photo lineup. 

Further, Petitioner's argument that the witnesses'

identifications of him at the preliminary hearing were tainted by

the undisclosed photo lineups is belied by the evidence. Castro

had not been able to identify Petitioner in the photo lineups;

therefore, her memory could not have been tainted by viewing them. 

Diaz only tentatively identified Petitioner in the photo lineups.

He did not even know if the two photos he chose were of the same

person. 

Therefore, neither the appellate court's finding of facts nor

its conclusion that no prejudice was caused by the late disclosure

of the photo lineups was unreasonable.

B. Lopez Impeachment Information

During Petitioner's trial, after Lopez's preliminary hearing

testimony had been read to the jury, Detective Alcantar testified

that, on May 15, 1998, Detective Ramirez found methamphetamine and

a gun in Lopez's bedroom in the apartment Lopez shared with

Petitioner. This information was previously unknown to the

defense. Detective Alcantar stated that Detective Ramirez wrote a

report under a different case number about the discovery of the gun

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 42 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

and drugs and failed to mention it in his report on Petitioner's

case because the information was unrelated to it. The defense knew

that, on May 15, the police arrested Lopez on an outstanding

warrant for gun and weapon possession charges, and that he was

convicted and released on probation. 

Petitioner argues that the nondisclosure of the fact that

Lopez possessed a gun and methamphetamine several days after the

shooting delivered a critical blow to the defense because it could

not confront and cross-examine Lopez about it at the preliminary

hearing. He also argues that the fact that Lopez was not charged

with these crimes is exculpatory information because counsel could

have shown that Lopez was biased in his testimony at the

preliminary hearing in that he implicated Petitioner in exchange

for not being charged with two crimes. 

As discussed above, although Lopez testified at the

preliminary hearing for the prosecution, his testimony did not

particularly incriminate Petitioner as the shooter. Therefore, any

lost opportunity to impeach or cross-examine Lopez does not raise a

reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been different. 

Furthermore, defense counsel knew that Lopez was arrested on older

gun and drug charges; therefore, any impeachment of Lopez based on

guns or drugs could have been undertaken given the evidence known

to the defense. Also, the defense knew that Lopez was going to be

released on probation on the pending gun and drugs charge. Any

inference that Lopez was testifying for the prosecution in order to

get a good deal could have been drawn from that fact. 

Therefore, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal 

law in rejecting this claim.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 43 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

C. Undisclosed Letter

Associate habeas counsel Kathleen Boyle describes a letter

found in the police file addressed to Eulalio Caballero, the

victim's relative: "The letter appeared to be typed on a

typewriter which did not print out the typed letters as the

typewriter carriage moved toward the right of the page. However,

the imprints of these letters were visible on the original and I

copied them onto the copy that I made at the Police Department; all

of the handwriting on Exhibit A to the Declaration of Thompson

Sharkey is mine." Boyle Dec. at 2. Petitioner also submits the

declaration of Sonny Chayra, a Spanish-speaker who was hired by

habeas counsel as an investigator, translating the letter to the

victim's relative:

I have come to my decision

To say this

I did not do this (meaning, I was not the shooter who

killed Nelson) and I do not know who the shooter is?

I worked w/ Ramon Balemas (could also be last name of

Ramon [referencing that he socialized w/Ramon, as well as

a business associate w/Ramon])

So send this letter to all your cousins (La Familia?)

This man (referring to Ramon) is very bad, and this man

is the person who paid to have "Nelson" killed (take the

life of your cousin)

That Ramon gave someone (?) a pistol, an ounce of powder

(polbo could also refer to the cartridge-bullets, or to

powder, "coke" or "meth", however, meth is not usually

referred to as "powder") and also $800.00 to kill Nelson.

One of your cousins told me that Nelson (cousin) owed $

for "purchases" and Nelson had yet to pay Ramon to

fulfill a debt Nelson owed.

However, Ramon had to wait until Nelson was working to

pay a debt of approx. $3K. In December 16 (?) 1996,

Ramon paid $1K, from the sale of "merchandise" (possibly

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 44 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

45

drugs) more merchandize (sic) to be sold later.

Well, my friend, until later, don't talk with anyone (no

make comments to anyone)

Remember, Ramon tells "untruths" or "lies" ("marrundias"

is "a very old term for telling bad things, stories,

'bullshit' etc") also meaning that Ramon cannot be

trusted.

Chayra Dec. at 2-3.

Chayra explains the meaning of the letter as follows:

The general gist of this letter is to advise Eulalio

Caballero that Nelson owed Ramon a lot of money, that

Ramon gave someone a gun, money and paid someone to do

the "hit" on Nelson. This is a letter from a possible

member of the Nuestra Familia and or Mexican Mafia ("La

Familia") warning that Ramon is very dangerous and to put

the word out to La Familia that I (the writer) had

nothing to do with the hit on Nelson. . . . The writer

wants to clear the air that he was not the shooter and

that Ramon was the man who put a contract out on Nelson.

Chayra Dec. at 3.

The copy of the letter in Spanish does not include parentheses

or brackets; thus, it can be assumed that the words in parentheses

and brackets are Chayra's remarks. Petitioner's trial attorney

states in a declaration that he never saw the letter before Chayra

showed it to him on May 13, 2004.

Respondent points out that the trial attorney does not state

that the information in the letter was not known to him. Nor does

he indicate what investigation he made prior to trial and how that

investigation would have been different had he been given the

letter. 

The letter was Brady material in that it raised questions

about the prosecution's theory of the motivation for Caballero's

killing. It should have been disclosed to the defense. However,

like the other Brady claims, this one also fails because its

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 45 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

46

disclosure would not have raised a reasonable doubt that would not

have otherwise existed. 

The meaning of the letter is questionable because many words

have been filled in by Chayra. Because the letter is ambiguous and

anonymous, it would not have been admissible at trial. There is no

reason to believe the letter would have led to any admissible

exculpatory evidence. There was sufficient other evidence

introduced at trial for the defense to argue that the killing may

have been related to a drug deal. In his closing argument, defense

counsel made use of the drug evidence by arguing to the jury:

What could the motive be? Well, you know Mr. Caballero

is a drug dealer. You'll have proof of that, and you can

take a look at it when you go back in the jury room. You

know he's a drug user. He's been using coke, and he's

been using meth. You know Aurelio Lopez is there

present. You know that Aurelio Lopez –- when the cops go

to search him or question him, he's got a warrant out for

drugs and guns, and also they find an ounce of

methamphetamine which is a sales type of amount and a 9

millimeter handgun. You know that much. 

RT at 663-64.

The letter does not cast a reasonable doubt on the jury's

verdict.

D. Photograph of Mongia

Petitioner argues that the photograph of Jose Mongia wearing a

moustache and cowboy hat would have undermined the state appellate

court's prejudice analysis because the court relied upon the fact

that only Petitioner was identified as wearing a cowboy hat. 

Although Boyle states that Mongia was a witness to the shooting,

there is no admissible evidence that he was. It cannot be

concluded that the photograph would have affected Petitioner's

trial.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 46 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

47

Therefore, the state court's decision was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law.

E. Ledesma Statement

John Ledesma is an individual found and interviewed by Boyle

on January 23, 2004. Boyle had Ledesma write a letter in Spanish

for which a translation is not provided. Boyle declares that

Ledesma told her that Aurelio Lopez had told him that Lopez had two

guns, that he had killed someone at a bar in San Jose and had

placed the blame on Petitioner, and that he had told his brother to

throw the gun away. However, this is not a Brady claim because

Petitioner does not indicate that the prosecutor or police knew of

Ledesma or this statement.

F. Brady Material Considered Collectively

Even together, the exculpatory evidence fails to raise a doubt

about the outcome of the trial. The eyewitnesses' testimony was

strong. The shooter's getaway car was similar to Petitioner's car. 

And, immediately after the shooting, Petitioner left California for

Oregon where he was arrested.

VI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his original petition, Petitioner presented numerous

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. However, in his reply,

Petitioner states that counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to

object to Ramirez's testimony about Lopez's out-of-court statement,

which put a gun in Petitioner's hand; and (2) failing to ask for a

continuance after learning that the prosecutor had not disclosed

evidence of the photo lineups, that a gun and drugs were found in

Lopez's bedroom when he was arrested and that Lopez may have

received leniency in exchange for his preliminary hearing

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 47 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48

testimony.

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. The court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689.

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. It is unnecessary for a federal

court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot

establish incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v.

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Conversely, a court

need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 48 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

49

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the

result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is considered to be "clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for

the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). 

A. Lopez's Out-of-Court Statement

The state court found as follows:

Appellant cannot satisfy this test [Strickland standard]. 

Review of the record discloses that at the preliminary

hearing defense counsel elicited from Lopez the part of

his statement to the police that was most significantly

inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony: that

appellant did have a gun. In his preliminary hearing

testimony Lopez said only that appellant had what

appeared to be a gun and that Lopez was not sure what it

was. Further, during closing argument, the prosecution

never refuted appellant's contention that Lopez had good

reason to tell the police what they wanted to hear. It

follows that the jury based its conviction not upon

Lopez's testimony or statements but on all the other

evidences that pointed toward appellant. To summarize

that evidence, only appellant was consistently identified

as wearing a cowboy hat, only appellant was identified

several times and by several witnesses as the killer,

only appellant had the killer's car, and only appellant

fled the state immediately after the murder, absconding

so hurriedly that he left behind a paycheck. 

Accordingly, even if we assume that counsel had no

rational tactical basis for failing to object, there was

no prejudice. 

People v. Valdovinos, HO19599, *14-15.

The appellate court's finding that there was no prejudice from

counsel's failure to object to Lopez's out-of-court statement was

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Lopez's testimony was internally contradictory and did not strongly

incriminate Petitioner. Therefore, habeas relief cannot be granted

on this claim.

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 49 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

50

B. Failure to Ask for a Continuance

Petitioner argues that, once trial counsel learned that the

prosecution had not disclosed certain exculpatory evidence, he

should have asked for a continuance to search the prosecution file

to see if it contained other nondisclosed exculpatory evidence. 

When defense counsel learned during his cross-examination of

Diaz that, unbeknownst to him, Diaz and Castro had been shown two

photo lineups, he moved to dismiss the case against Petitioner on

the ground of a Brady violation. RT at 303; 316. When the court

denied the motion to dismiss, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.

RT at 318-19. However, the court ruled that the concealment could

be remedied by reading CALJIC 2.28 to the jury. Therefore, defense

counsel's representation of Petitioner at the time he learned of

the withheld evidence, did not fall below the professional standard

of conduct. Furthermore, there is no showing that a continuance

would have resulted in anything that would have changed the result

of the trial.

The state court's rejection of the claim that defense counsel

was ineffective for failing to request a continuance was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

VII. Youngblood Claim

Petitioner contends that the format of the photo lineups shown

to Diaz and Castro and the prosecutor's failure to disclose the

fact of the photo lineups caused the witnesses' memories to become

corrupted. Petitioner argues that this amounts to a bad faith loss

of material exculpatory evidence in violation of Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 

The government has a duty to preserve material evidence, i.e.,

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 50 of 51
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

51

evidence with exculpatory value that was apparent before it was

destroyed and that is of such a nature that the defendant cannot

obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); see also

Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004); Youngblood, 488

U.S. at 58.

These arguments are variants on Petitioner's suggestive

identification and exculpatory information arguments addressed

above, and are more appropriately analyzed as such.

Therefore, the state court's rejection of Petitioner's

Youngblood claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of federal law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/12/08

Dated: CLAUDIA WILKEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:02-cv-01704-CW Document 69 Filed 03/12/08 Page 51 of 51