Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01723/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01723-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMAS PEREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01723-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 6.) Plaintiff has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action.

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at California State Prison – Corcoran (“CSP-COR”), where 

the acts giving rise to his complaint occurred. He names the following Defendants in their 

individual and official capacities: (1) Jeffrey Beard, Director of the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, (2) Connie Gipson, CSP-COR Warden, (3) S. Wilson, 

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CSP-COR Materials and Stores Supervisor II, (4) D.M. Sing, Correctional Business 

Manager I, and (5) Rawland K. Swift, Chief Deputy Warden – Administration. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff is subject to an indefinite term in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”). 

Plaintiff, other inmates, and prison staff know that a majority of the SHU buildings have 

leaking roofs. Plaintiff has been in the SHU at CSP-COR for 17 years. He has been in 

Facility 4B for ten years and has been housed in six of the eight buildings in 4B. All six 

buildings have leaking roofs. Staff routinely offers Plaintiff bars of soap to patch up 

cracks and holes each time it rains. The soap does not stop the leaks. 

In heavy rain, Plaintiff has nowhere to put his mattress to keep it dry. During the 

rains, Plaintiff uses one of his two allowed towels to mop up rain water in his cell. Each 

morning after a rain, staff leaves the tier flooded, passes out bars of soap, and states

that they have submitted a work order. Plaintiff must anticipate rain and move his 

property accordingly to avoid damage.

Prison officials and maintenance have been aware of these conditions since at 

least 2006.

In November 2005, Plaintiff was temporarily transferred out of CSP-COR. When 

he returned, he was placed in a holding cell awaiting housing. He discussed his future 

cell with the correctional officers. One of the officers stated that the cell they intended to 

place Plaintiff in, Cell #62 in Building 4 Right on Facility 4B, was “red flagged,” meaning 

not to be used by inmates. Yet, Plaintiff was placed in that cell in February 2006. Upon 

entering the cell, Plaintiff noticed that the floor and both bunks were covered in dried dirt 

and sand. The roof had huge holes with missing caulking and chunks of dried up soap. 

There were water and soap stains along the back wall in streaks from the roof to the 

floor.

Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff woke to find his cell was flooding. He and the back 

of his bunk were being splashed with rain water. There was one inch of water on the 

floor and his bunk was flooded. Plaintiff asked the night officer to move him to another 

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cell. The officer stated, “Wow! You can’t be in there, your cell is an indoor waterfall.” A 

few minutes later, Plaintiff was moved next door to Cell #61. Cell #61 also was flooded 

but one bunk was 70% dry. Plaintiff remained in Cell #61 under these conditions for two 

years.

In June 2012, Plaintiff was moved to Cell #55 in Building 2 Left on Facility 4B. 

During the rainy season, rain water leaked into the cell from the back wall, dripped from 

the roof, and splashed Plaintiff, his property, and his mattress. Rain water filled both 

bunks on opposite sides of the cell and flooded the cell floor and the tier with dirty rain 

water mixed with insulation and other “crud and gunk.” 

Also in June 2012, Plaintiff and other inmates noticed that they were receiving old, 

thin, worn clothing. Plaintiff received the clothes two to three months after requesting 

them. This went on until December 2012, after which all clothing requests went 

unanswered. Plaintiff was forced to endure the entire winter with worn clothing with holes 

in it. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal. In the first level response, Defendant Wilson 

told Plaintiff that the clothing was “serviceable.” Defendant Wilson told Plaintiff that there 

previously had been no laundry supervisor for Plaintiff’s facility, but that the new 

supervisor was instructed to grant Plaintiff’s appeal in full. Plaintiff’s appeal was, in fact, 

granted. Plaintiff nevertheless was dissatisfied with the response regarding procedures 

for laundry requests and distribution. Defendant Wilson disagreed with Plaintiff’s further 

complaints. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issue further, but was not permitted to do so 

because his first level appeal was purportedly granted in full.

On December 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal regarding the 

leaking roof. He was interviewed by A. Gomez.1 Gomez informed Plaintiff that several 

other buildings – but not Plaintiff’s – had been repaired. Gomez stated that he did not 

receive funding to permanently repair Plaintiff’s building but had made temporary fixes. 

 

1

Plaintiff identifies Gomez as a Defendant in the body of his complaint, but does not list him as a 

Defendant in the caption.

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At the same time, prison officials and maintenance were doing other superficial work like 

painting. 

Plaintiff alleges this conduct violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. He also alleges Defendants were negligent in failing to assign a laundry 

supervisor and that this failure violated the California Code of Regulations, the 

Department Operations Manual, and CSP-COR operating procedures. Lastly, he states 

this conducted violated “mandatory duties” under federal and state law.

He seeks declaratory relief and money damages.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). “A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

1978). 

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 

(9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

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Plaintiff has failed to link the named Defendants to any of his claims. He does not

allege facts to show that any of the named Defendants knew of, but disregarded, risks 

associated with the leaking roof. Nor does he allege that any of the named Defendants 

were aware that Plaintiff was provided worn clothing, or aware of any risks associated 

with such clothing. Although Plaintiff discussed his laundry concerns with Defendant 

Wilson in the course of his administrative appeal, he alleges no facts to indicate that 

Defendant Wilson was aware of the laundry issues while they were ongoing but failed to 

act.

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he must set forth 

facts explaining how each defendant personally participated in or directed the violation of 

his rights, or knew of the violations and failed to act. It is not enough for Plaintiff to simply 

allege that all of the Defendants knew of the violations. He must allege facts to support 

this contention.

B. Improper Joinder 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative 

claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” “Thus multiple claims 

against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined 

with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple 

claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the 

required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of 

frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required 

fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); 

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as 

defendants if . . . any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 

transactions or occurrences . . . .”)

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Plaintiff’s claims regarding laundry and leaking roofs do not arise out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Plaintiff may not join 

these unrelated claims against different defendants in a single action. 

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he must decide 

which transaction or occurrence he wishes to pursue in this action. 

C. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff complains of leaking roofs at CSP-COR for over a decade. 

No statute of limitations is set out in 42 U.S.C § 1983. Instead, California’s two 

year statute of limitations on personal injury claims applies. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 

§ 335.1. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir 2004); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 

486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007); Maldonado v Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 

2004). Under federal law, a civil rights claim like this accrues when plaintiff knows or has 

reason to know of the injury giving rise to the claim. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 

363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004); Lukovsky v. City of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 

1050-51. 

However, state law may toll the running of the statute of limitations on cases 

arising in that state and filed in Federal court. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543 

(1989). Federal courts apply a forum state’s law regarding tolling when not inconsistent 

with federal law. Id. at 537-39. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 352.1 tolls the 

running of California’s statute of limitations for two years while the Plaintiff is imprisoned 

for a term less than life in prison. Under this tolling provision, Plaintiff had a maximum of 

four years from the date his claims accrued to file suit, unless that period was extended 

by equitable tolling. 

Under California law, equitable tolling applies where “an injured person has 

several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” Elkins v. Derby, 

525 P.2d 81, 84 (Cal. 1974). Thus, it may apply where one action “stands to lessen the 

harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where administrative remedies 

must be exhausted before a second action can proceed; or where a first action, 

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embarked upon in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason.” McDonald v. 

Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 P.3d 1026, 1032 (Cal. 2008). Equitable tolling is 

available where there is timely notice, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and 

reasonable, good faith conduct on the part of Plaintiff. Id. However, equitable tolling

generally does not apply where Plaintiff pursues successive claims in the same forum. 

Martell v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1998).

Plaintiff initiated this action on November 3, 2014. He has not alleged any facts to 

indicate equitable tolling applies. Accordingly, under the statute of limitations, any claims 

that accrued prior to November 2010 are time-barred. 

Plaintiff complains generally of leaking roofs going back a decade, but also 

complains of more specific instances in 2006 and 2012. Plaintiff is advised that he may 

not pursue claims predating November 2010 unless he also alleges facts to support 

equitable tolling. 

D. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk 

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

A conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective 

component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be . . . 

sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) “[E]xtreme 

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

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Second, the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate 

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish 

liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a plaintiff must 

show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Id.

As stated above, Plaintiff has failed to link any of the named Defendants to his 

claims. Accordingly, he has failed to establish that any named Defendant knew of, but 

disregarded a risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety arising from the leaking roof or worn 

clothing. He has failed to meet the subjective prong for a conditions of confinement 

claim. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the leaking roof also are insufficient to show 

deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the Court to determine 

whether the conditions caused by the leaking roof were sufficiently serious to constitute 

an Eighth Amendment violation. Although Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to 

these conditions during the rainy seasons for over a decade, it is unclear whether 

Plaintiff’s exposure to these conditions at any given time was prolonged or merely

infrequent. Further, the facts alleged do not explain what, if any harm to Plaintiff’s health 

or safety was presented by the leaking roof. Although prison officials must provide 

prisoners with shelter, Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), prisons 

need not be comfortable, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Unless the 

leaking roof endangered Plaintiff’s health or safety, it cannot support an Eighth 

Amendment claim. 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding worn clothing do not state an Eighth 

Amendment claim. Plaintiff alleges he was forced to endure the winter in worn clothing 

with holes, but does not explain how or why this clothing presented a risk to his health 

or safety. 

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If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege facts to show an objectively serious 

risk to his health or safety, and must show that the named Defendants knew of, but 

disregarded this risk. 

E. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process rights. Plaintiff does not specify the basis for this claim. 

The Due Process clause entitles prisoners to certain processes before they are 

subjected to administrative or disciplinary hearings and classifications. The Due Process 

Clause also protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of 

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not involve the loss of either liberty or property. The 

Court is unable to discern any cognizable basis in Plaintiff’s complaint for a due process 

claim. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must set forth facts to explain why he believes 

his due process rights were violated.

F. State Law Negligence

Plaintiff alleges Defendants were negligent in failing to hire a laundry supervisor 

for his facility. 

Under California law, a public employee is liable for injury to a prisoner 

“proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 844.6(d). The elements of negligence under California law are: “(1) defendant’s 

obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against 

unreasonable risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard (breach of duty); (3) a 

reasonably close connection between the defendant’s conduct and resulting injuries 

(proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 

572 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 (2008)).

The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in any civil 

action in which it has original jurisdiction, if the state law claims form part of the same 

case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The district courts may decline to exercise 

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supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The 

Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . 

the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 

U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable federal claims, the Court will not 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law negligence claim. Plaintiff may 

amend this claim, but if he fails to allege a viable federal claim in his amended complaint, 

the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law negligence claim. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

G. California Regulations and Department Operations Manual

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the California Code of Regulations, the 

Department Operations Manual, and CSP-COR operating procedures. The existence of 

Title 15 regulations, an operations manual, and operating procedures governing the 

conduct of prison officials does not necessarily entitle an inmate to sue civilly for their 

violation. The Court has found no authority to support a finding of an implied private right 

of action under these authorities, and Plaintiff has provided none. Several district court 

decisions hold that there is no such right. See e.g., Vasquez v. Tate, No. 1:10-cv-1876-

JLT (PC), 2012 WL 6738167, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. 

Supp. 2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012).

Plaintiff may not bring an independent claim solely for violation of prison 

regulations or procedures. 

H. Declaratory Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. However, because his 

claims for damages necessarily entail a determination whether his rights were violated, 

his separate request for declaratory relief is subsumed by those claims. Rhodes v. 

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Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, his claim for declaratory 

relief will be dismissed.

I. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff names each defendant in their individual and official capacities. 

“Official capacity” suits require that a policy or custom of the governmental entity 

is the moving force behind the violation. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 783 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Plaintiff has not alleged what custom or policy, if any, motivated Defendants’ 

conduct. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot recover money damages from state officials in their 

official capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Official capacity suits may seek only prospective relief. See Wolfson 

v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Because Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and damages (and his claim for 

declaratory relief is herein dismissed), his official capacity claims also must be 

dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim. The Court will grant Plaintiff an 

opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted 

in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each 

named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his Complaint, filed November 3, 2014;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure 

to comply with a court order subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01723-MJS Document 8 Filed 03/30/15 Page 13 of 13