Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01959/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01959-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JUI-HSIANG FAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS 

INCORPORATED, 

Defendant. 

 Case No.: 19cv1959 JM (WVG) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND 

Plaintiff Jui-Hsiang Fan (“Plaintiff”) moves to remand this action to the Superior 

Court of California for the County of San Diego based on a lack of diversity jurisdiction. 

(Doc. No. 6.) Defendant Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated (“Defendant) opposes. 

(Doc. No. 16.) The motion has been briefed and the court finds it suitable for submission 

without oral argument in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the below 

reasons, the motion is DENIED. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a 

particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated 

Tribes of Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Civil cases not arising 

under federal law are removable to federal court only if each plaintiff’s citizenship is 

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different from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 

373 (1978). A corporation’s citizenship is based on its state of incorporation as well as its 

“principal place of business,” which the Supreme Court has referred to as its “nerve center, 

usually its main headquarters,” where “a corporation’s officers direct, control, and 

coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). 

The defendant bears the burden of proving removal jurisdiction. Leite v. Crane Co., 

749 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2014). Any doubt regarding removal jurisdiction is 

construed against the defendant and in favor of remanding the case to state court. Hunter 

v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he court resolves all 

ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.”). 

II. DISCUSSION 

In support of removal based on diversity jurisdiction, Defendant submitted a 

declaration by Karen Sylvester, Human Resource Business Partner Director. (Doc. No. 1-

3 ¶ 2.) Ms. Sylvester states that she has knowledge of Defendant’s business operations and 

information regarding the overall direction, control, and coordination of Defendant’s 

business activities. (Id.) She states that Defendant is incorporated in Massachusetts and 

Defendant’s principal place of business and headquarters are in Boston, as they were at the 

time of filing the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Finally, Ms. Sylvester states that the corporate 

officers located in Boston direct, control, and coordinate activities, which include matters 

related to financing, marketing, advertising, directing general business strategy, 

accounting, financial reporting, litigation management, mergers and acquisitions, and the 

size of the Defendant’s workforce. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

For several reasons, Plaintiff argues Ms. Sylvester’s declaration is insufficient to 

show diversity. First, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Sylvester’s averments are “very 

conclusory,” do not lay a proper foundation, and are “legalistic” in tenor. (Doc. No. 6 at 

5.) Plaintiff points out that Ms. Sylvester does not identify a single high-level director by 

name, indicates that she observed any particular high-level employee at work, or explain 

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how she may have acquired personal knowledge of high-level decisions. (Id.) Plaintiff 

also points out that, according to her online LinkedIn profile, Ms. Sylvester is located in 

San Diego. (Id. at 6.) Second, Plaintiff points out that a June 18, 2018 online press release 

titled “Vertex Opens Expanded Research Site in San Diego” states that Defendant opened 

a 170,000 square foot research facility in San Diego. (Id.) The press release states “[t]he 

San Diego site is one of Vertex’s three global research hubs[.]” (Doc. No. 6-1 at 34.) 

Third, Plaintiff argues Defendant did not sufficiently investigate its own business because 

it failed to disclose, as it did in a 2016 case, that T. Rowe Price was an owner of more than 

10 percent of Defendant’s stock. (Id. at 7.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues the case should be 

remanded because Defendant failed to attach Plaintiff’s summons to its Notice of Removal 

and because Defendant failed to attach additional copies of all exhibits to its Notice of 

Filing in state court. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff states that she was inconvenienced in 

assessing the timeliness of the removal. (Id.) 

Ms. Sylvester’s declarations as to Defendant’s citizenship are not “very conclusory” 

and do not lack a proper foundation. They are statements under oath by an employee with 

personal knowledge as to a corporate defendant’s citizenship that are typical of those 

commonly used to show diversity. The “legalistic tenor” of her declaration serves more to 

support its veracity than to cast any doubt on Defendant’s Massachusetts citizenship. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff cites no authority, and the court is aware of none, requiring those 

testifying as to a corporation’s citizenship to identify high-level directors by name, observe 

high-level employees at work, or explain how they acquired personal knowledge of highlevel decisions. The fact that Ms. Sylvester, who is not an officer or director, works in San 

Diego instead of Boston provides minimal, if any, support for Plaintiff’s claim that 

Defendant’s principal place of business is in San Diego. The fact that Defendant operates 

one of its three “global research hubs” in San Diego also provides minimal, if any, support 

for Plaintiff’s claim, especially given that the same press release upon which Plaintiff relies 

states that, as of June 18, 2018, “Vertex’s headquarters is now located in Boston’s 

Innovation District.” (Doc. No. 6-2 at 34.) Finally, in response to Plaintiff’s motion, 

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Defendant provided a declaration from Damian Wilmot, Senior Vice President, who was 

formerly the Defendant’s chief litigation counsel, stating that Defendant’s principal place 

of business and state of incorporation is Massachusetts. (Doc. No. 19-3.) Mr. Wilmot 

states that he is located in Boston and has personal knowledge of Defendant’s executive 

directors. (Id.) 

With respect to the procedural deficiencies identified by Plaintiff, Defendant 

concedes that it failed to initially disclose that T. Rowe Price owned more than 10 percent 

of Defendant’s stock, (Doc. No. 16 at 5), but filed an amended corporate disclosure 

statement curing this defect, (Doc. No. 15). Defendant also concedes that it inadvertently 

failed to attach a copy of the summons to its Notice of Removal, (Doc. No. 16 at 5), but 

subsequently cured that defect as well, (Doc. No. 10). Other courts have found the same 

or similar defects to be curable. See Koklich v. California Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 

1:11cv1403 DLB, 2012 WL 653895, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012) (listing cases). 

Plaintiff concedes that she was still able to assess the timeliness of the removal. (Doc. No. 

17 at 7.) Finally, Plaintiff cites no binding authority, and the court is aware of none, finding 

that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) required Defendant to attach copies of all exhibits to its Notice of 

Filing with the state court, or that the failure constituted an incurable jurisdictional defect. 

Plaintiff concedes that “caselaw is unclear as to whether failing to attach all documents 

served with the complaint is, by itself, a jurisdictional defect that requires remand.” (Doc. 

No. 6 at 8.) Accordingly, none of the procedural defects identified by Plaintiff amount to 

a jurisdictional defect that has not or could not be cured. With respect to the instant motion, 

Defendant met its burden of showing federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 22, 2020 JEFFREY T. MILLER 

United States District Judge 

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