Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02978/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02978-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 08-2978

_______________

Terrick Terrell Nooner, * 

*

Appellant, *

*

Don William Davis; *

Jack Harold Jones, Jr., *

*

Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, in his official capacity *

as Director, Arkansas Department of *

Correction; Gaylon Lay, in his official *

capacity as Warden, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, Cummins *

Unit; Wendy Kelly, in her official *

capacity as Deputy Director for Health *

and Correctional Programs, Arkansas *

Department of Correction; John Byus, *

in his official capacity as Administrator, *

Correctional Medical Services, *

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Does, 1-50, unknown executioners, *

in their official capacities as employees *

and/or agents of the Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

* 

Appellees, *

------------------------------ 

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Frank Williams, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Larry Norris, in his official capacity *

as Director, Arkansas Department of *

Correction; Gaylon Lay, in his official *

capacity as Warden, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, Cummins *

Unit; Wendy Kelly, in her official *

capacity as Deputy Director for Health *

and Correctional Programs, Arkansas *

Department of Correction; John Byus, *

in his official capacity as Administrator, *

Correctional Medical Services, *

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Does, 1-50, unknown executioners, *

in their official capacities as employees *

and/or agents of the Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

* 

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: September 24, 2009

Filed: February 8, 2010

___________

Before MELLOY, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Terrick Terrell Nooner, Don William Davis, Jack Harold Jones and Frank

Williams, Jr. (collectively, “the Inmates”) were each convicted of capital murder in

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The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Arkansas. Their convictions have been affirmed, their petitions for post-conviction

relief have been denied, and they await execution by the State of Arkansas. In this 42

U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Larry Norris, Director of the Arkansas Department of

Correction, and other corrections employees (collectively, “the ADC”), the Inmates

challenge the constitutionality of Arkansas’s protocol for execution by lethal injection.

The district court1

 granted the ADC’s motion for summary judgment, and the Inmates

now appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Nooner filed his lawsuit on May 1, 2006. Davis and Jones filed motions to

intervene as party plaintiffs, which the district court granted on May 26, 2006, and

December 1, 2006, respectively. On August 9, 2007, the district court ordered the

case consolidated with a similar lawsuit filed by Williams on July 11, 2007.

On June 26, 2006, the district court granted Davis a preliminary injunction,

staying his execution. The ADC appealed, and on July 9, 2007, we vacated the

preliminary injunction and stay of execution. Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d 804, 806

(8th Cir. 2007). The next day, the Inmates sought discovery for the first time by filing

a motion for expedited discovery. The district court denied the Inmates’ motion for

expedited discovery on August 9, 2007, but the ADC nevertheless produced more than

300 pages of documents in response. The ADC moved for summary judgment,

arguing that the Inmates had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about

the constitutionality of Arkansas’s lethal injection protocol. The Inmates sought

shelter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), claiming that they lacked access

to the facts necessary to oppose the ADC’s motion for summary judgment and that

they needed further discovery. 

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Before the district court ruled on the ADC’s motion for summary judgment, the

Supreme Court granted certiorari in Baze v. Rees, 552 U.S. 945 (2007), a case

challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. Accordingly,

the district court denied the ADC’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice

and stayed and administratively terminated the Inmates’ lawsuit pending the outcome

in Baze. 

The Supreme Court issued its decision in Baze on April 16, 2008, upholding

Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. 553 U.S. 35, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). The

Inmates successfully moved to reopen their case on May 15, 2008. The ADC

amended its lethal injection protocol on May 22, 2008, and moved for summary

judgment on June 4, 2008. The Inmates opposed this motion but did not renew their

request for a continuance to obtain further discovery under Rule 56(f). On August 5,

2008, the district court granted the ADC’s motion for summary judgment. 

Under Arkansas law, the Director of the ADC is responsible for determining the

policies and procedures followed by the ADC to execute prisoners by lethal injection.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617(a)(4). The parties refer to the set of execution instructions

he has developed—and revised—as the Arkansas lethal injection protocol. 

 Ray Hobbs, Chief Deputy Director of the ADC, submitted an affidavit (“the

Hobbs affidavit”) dated July 28, 2008, stating that he was authorized to make

statements about the protocol on behalf of the ADC. The Inmates have not argued

that Hobbs acted ultra vires in submitting this affidavit, and the ADC specifically

stated at oral argument that it considers the statements in the Hobbs affidavit to be

binding on the ADC. Because the ADC may amend the protocol at the Director’s

discretion, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617, we accept the Hobbs affidavit as a written

addendum to the May 22, 2008 protocol. 

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All references to Baze, unless otherwise indicated, are to the plurality opinion

written by Chief Justice Roberts.

3

The protocol identifies the label and contents of each syringe as follows:

SYRINGE

LABELED/

MARKED CONTENTS

 #1/#2 Sodium Pentothal, 3.0 grams (two (2) syringes

of 1.5 grams in 60 cc)

 #3/#6 Normal Saline, 50 cc each

 #4/#5 P a n c u r o n i u m B r o m i d e , 1 0 0 m g ( t w o ( 2 )

syringes of 50 mg in 50 cc)

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Under the protocol, the ADC’s Deputy Director for Health and Correctional

Programs is primarily responsible for supervising executions. The Deputy Director

must be “healthcare trained, educated, and/or experienced in matters related to the

establishment and monitoring of IVs, the mixing and administration of lethal

chemicals, and assessing the presence or absence of consciousness.” The protocol

allows a designee to perform the functions of the Deputy Director, but the designee

must meet the same qualifications. If needed, the Deputy Director provides an

orientation for the executioners before each execution. She also selects the IV team,

which is responsible for establishing intravenous infusion sites in condemned

prisoners. Each member of the IV team must have at least two years of professional

experience as an emergency medical technician, nurse, physician assistant or

physician. 

Arkansas administers the same combination of lethal chemicals to execute

prisoners that at least thirty other states use: sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide

and potassium chloride. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527 (plurality opinion).2

 Before

each execution, the Deputy Director is responsible for ensuring that the lethal

chemicals are mixed properly and transferred to conspicuously numbered syringes that

are secured in a carrying case.3

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 #7/#8 Potassium Chloride, 240 mEq (two (2) syringes

of 120 mEq in 60 cc)

Backup Syringes 

 #B1/B2 Sodium Pentothal, 3.0 grams (two (2) syringes

of 1.5 grams in 60 cc)

 #B3 Normal Saline, 50 cc

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Arkansas executes condemned prisoners in an execution chamber that is

adjoined by a witness room and a control room. There is a large window between the

execution chamber and the witness room that can be covered by a curtain. From the

control room, the executioners can see into the execution chamber through a one-way

mirror. The protocol directs the Deputy Director to bring the condemned prisoner into

the execution chamber strapped to a gurney, which is positioned directly in front of

the one-way mirror so that the Deputy Director and the executioners can observe the

IV infusion sites and the prisoner’s face throughout the execution. The Deputy

Director affixes cardiac monitor leads to the prisoner and then summons the IV team.

The IV team establishes two independent IV infusion sites, preferably one in

each of the prisoner’s arms. If two sites cannot be established, the protocol directs the

Deputy Director to dismiss the IV team and “summon trained, educated, and

experienced person(s) necessary to establish a primary IV line as a peripheral line or

as a central venous line.” After the infusion sites are established, the IV team

connects the IV lines to the control room with extension tubing, allowing the

executioners to administer the lethal chemicals from the control room. When the

warden authorizes the executioners to begin injecting the lethal chemicals, the curtain

between the execution chamber and the witness room is opened. 

The executioners first inject two syringes containing three grams of sodium

pentothal, a barbiturate, into the primary IV line. The protocol requires the Deputy

Director to wait at least three minutes after the executioners begin the injection of

sodium pentothal before directing the executioners to administer the contents of the

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remaining syringes. During this time, the protocol instructs the Deputy Director to

use standard medical techniques, “such as checking for movement, opened eyes,

eyelash reflex, and response to verbal commands and physical stimuli,” to verify that

the prisoner has been rendered completely unconscious. After three minutes have

elapsed and the Deputy Director verifies that the prisoner is completely unconscious,

the protocol instructs the executioners to inject a syringe of normal saline to flush the

IV line, followed by two syringes containing 100 mg of pancuronium bromide, which

paralyzes the prisoner’s muscles and stops respiration. After injecting another syringe

of saline, the executioners administer two syringes containing 240 mEq of potassium

chloride, which induces cardiac arrest. 

The protocol requires the Deputy Director to monitor the primary IV infusion

site continuously and to reduce the flow of lethal chemicals or redirect them to the

alternate infusion site if she suspects a problem. The curtain between the witness

room and the execution chamber is closed if an infusion problem develops but

otherwise remains open during the administration of lethal chemicals. After the

cardiac monitors display a flat-line, a coroner is summoned to pronounce death.

Prison officials then close the curtain to the witness room and escort the witnesses

from the building. 

The Inmates argue that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the

case is ripe for summary judgment. They also argue that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to the ADC because the record establishes genuine issues

of material fact about whether Arkansas’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional.

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II. DISCUSSION

The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment, prohibits cruel and unusual execution procedures. See Baze, 128 S. Ct.

at 1530. Challenges to the constitutionality of a state’s lethal injection procedures are

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006).

“We begin with the principle . . . that capital punishment is constitutional.”

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (plurality

opinion)). “It necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.” Id.

“[T]he Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out

executions.” Id. To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an execution

procedure must be “‘sure or very likely to cause . . . needless suffering,’ and give rise

to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’” Id. at 1531 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993)). “[T]o prevail on such a claim there must be a ‘substantial risk

of serious harm,’ . . . that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were

‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 and n.9 (1994)). “The mere fact ‘an

execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable

consequence of death,’ does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Baze, 128 S. Ct.

at 1531). The Supreme Court “has never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for

carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530. 

In Taylor v. Crawford, we reviewed a facial challenge to the constitutionality

of Missouri’s lethal injection protocol. 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, 553 U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 2047 (2008). We determined that the constitutionality

of Missouri’s protocol “depends upon whether the protocol as written would inflict

unnecessary pain, aside from any consideration of specific intent on the part of a

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particular state official.” Id. at 1081. Accordingly, we focused on the written protocol

to determine whether it “presents a substantial risk of inflicting unnecessary pain,” id.

at 1080, and we held that Missouri’s protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment,

id. at 1085. 

After our decision in Taylor, the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s lethal

injection protocol in Baze. 128 S. Ct. at 1526. The Court’s opinion was fractured,

and no opinion commanded a majority of the Justices. However, a three-Justice

plurality concluded, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, that a lethal

injection protocol must create a “substantial risk of serious harm” to be

unconstitutional. Id. at 1531 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). Following Baze, no

federal appellate court has invalidated a lethal injection protocol under the Eighth

Amendment. Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 221 (6th Cir. 2009) (collecting

cases). 

In Clemons v. Crawford, we relied on Baze to hold that eight condemned

prisoners in Missouri could not “support an Eighth Amendment claim” because they

had not “alleged a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm” in challenging

Missouri’s implementation of its protocol. 585 F.3d at 1127-28; see also Harbison

v. Little, 571 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion

[in Baze] is controlling.”), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S.L.W. --- (U.S. Nov. 23,

2009) (No. 09-7777); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 298 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008)

(concluding that the plurality opinion “represents the controlling opinion of the

Court”). In this case, we are called on to decide whether the Arkansas lethal injection

protocol violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment by subjecting the Inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm. 

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A. Ripeness of Summary Judgment Motion

As a preliminary matter, however, the Inmates argue that their case is not ripe

for summary judgment. We review the district court’s determination that a case is ripe

for summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983,

986 (8th Cir. 2008). 

“Discovery does not have to be completed before a court can grant summary

judgment, but summary judgment is proper only after the nonmovant has had adequate

time for discovery.” In re TMJ Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1489-90

(8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). The record shows that the Inmates had

adequate time to conduct discovery. This lawsuit was initially filed on May 1, 2006,

but the Inmates did not request discovery for more than fourteen months, when they

sought expedited discovery. The Inmates attribute this fourteen-month delay to the

district court’s failure to enter a scheduling order, which they assert is normally the

starting point for discovery in Arkansas. As the district court correctly noted,

however, the “lack of a scheduling order did not prevent counsel from conferring and

developing a discovery plan as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f);

nor did it prevent Nooner from requesting that the Court enter a scheduling order.”

Nooner v. Norris, No. 5:06-cv-001100, 2007 WL 2301221, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9,

2007) (unpublished) (footnote omitted) (citing Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 971

(8th Cir. 1980)). 

In any event, the Inmates sought shelter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(f) on July 30, 2007, claiming that without discovery they lacked the facts necessary

to oppose the ADC’s initial motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, the ADC

voluntarily produced more than 300 pages of documents to the Inmates. On

November 9, 2007, the district court stayed and administratively terminated the

lawsuit pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze. After the district court

reopened this case on May 21, 2008, the ADC filed a second motion for summary

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The district court granted the Inmates a thirty-day extension to file their

response in opposition to the ADC’s motion for summary judgment, but they did not

argue that they needed the time to conduct discovery or that they lacked access to the

facts needed to oppose the ADC’s motion.

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judgment. In opposing the ADC’s motion, the Inmates did not renew their request for

a continuance to obtain further discovery under Rule 56(f).4

 Under these

circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the case is

ripe for summary judgment. See In re TMJ Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d at

1490 (“If a party opposing a summary judgment motion does not seek shelter under

Rule 56(f) or otherwise ask for a continuance, a court generally does not abuse its

discretion in granting summary judgment based on the record before it.” (citing

Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Se., Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988))); Ballard v.

Heineman, 548 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The district court does not abuse

its discretion by denying further discovery ‘where the nonmoving party is not

deprived of a fair chance to respond to the summary judgment motion.’” (quoting

Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2008))). 

B. Summary Judgment

Turning to the merits, “[w]e review a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, using the same standards applied by the district court.”

Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Iowa Coal

Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 257 F.3d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 2001)). “Summary

judgment is proper where the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Davison v. City of

Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454

F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2006)). We must affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment unless a reasonable fact finder, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Inmates, could return a verdict in their favor. See Prosser v. Ross, 70

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F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 1995). The Inmates contend that summary judgment was

improper with respect to eight issues. We examine each in turn.

1. The Risk of Remaining Conscious

The combination of lethal chemicals that Arkansas and at least thirty other

states use to execute prisoners has been designed to cause as little pain as possible.

See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527 n.1 (noting that “in moving to lethal injection, the States

were motivated by a desire to find a more humane alternative to then-existing

methods”). “The proper administration of [sodium pentothal] ensures that the prisoner

does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused

by the [pancuronium bromide] and [potassium chloride].” Id. at 1527. In this case,

the Inmates have not challenged the opinion of the ADC’s expert witness, Dr. Mark

Dershwitz, that within sixty seconds of the injection of all three grams of sodium

pentothal “more than 99.9999999% of the population would be unconscious.”

However, it is also undisputed that if the other chemicals were administered to a

prisoner while still conscious, he would feel “an excruciating burning sensation as [the

potassium chloride] travels through his veins to induce a heart attack, and yet he

would be unable to indicate that he is experiencing pain due to the paralyzing effects

of the second chemical, pancuronium bromide.” See Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1074.

The Arkansas protocol contains several safeguards to ensure that the sodium

pentothal is administered properly and that the prisoner has been rendered fully

unconscious before the pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride are injected.

The protocol requires the Deputy Director to wait three minutes after the injection of

sodium pentothal before directing the executioners to administer the remaining

chemicals. During this time, the Deputy Director must verify that the prisoner is

unconscious by using “standard procedures for assessing consciousness as required

by medical paraprofessionals, such as checking for movement, opened eyes, eyelash

reflex, and response to verbal commands and physical stimuli.” If the prisoner

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remains conscious after the injection of the sodium pentothal, the protocol requires the

Deputy Director to direct the executioners to inject the back-up doses of sodium

pentothal into the secondary IV line. Finally, the protocol requires the Deputy

Director to continuously monitor the IV infusion sites throughout the execution and

to suspend the flow of lethal chemicals if she suspects a problem. 

The Inmates argue that evidence about four previous executions in Arkansas

establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the protocol creates a

substantial risk of serious harm. In particular, they assert that the ADC “botched” the

executions of Ronald Gene Simmons on June 25, 1990; of Rickey Ray Rector on

January 24, 1992; of Steven Douglas Hill on May 7, 1992; and of Christina Riggs on

May 2, 2000. In the light most favorable to the Inmates, the record shows that each

of these condemned prisoners exhibited signs of consciousness within three minutes

of the injection of sodium pentothal. Thus, according to the Inmates, these executions

create a genuine issue of material fact about whether the current protocol sufficiently

ensures that they will be fully unconscious before the pancuronium bromide and

potassium chloride are administered. 

We emphasized in Taylor that when reviewing the constitutionality of a state’s

lethal injection protocol we review the current protocol as written. See 487 F.3d at

1080 (“The focus of our inquiry is whether the written protocol inherently imposes a

constitutionally significant risk of pain.”). Moreover, we held that if the written

protocol is not unconstitutional on its face, “any risk that the [lethal injection]

procedure will not work as designated in the protocol is merely a risk of accident,

which is insignificant in our constitutional analysis.” Id. The plurality in Baze

similarly stated that “an isolated mishap alone does not give rise to an Eighth

Amendment violation, precisely because such an event, while regrettable, does not

suggest cruelty.’” 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 

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The Inmates point to the plurality’s suggestion in Baze that a “series of

abortive” execution attempts “would present a different case,” id., to claim that their

evidence of problems during previous executions creates a genuine issue of material

fact about the constitutionality of the Arkansas protocol. These four executions were

not carried out under the current protocol, however. As discussed above, the current

protocol contains numerous safeguards designed to prevent the ADC from

administering pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride to a prisoner who is not

fully unconscious. Thus, even if the ADC engaged in a “series of abortive” execution

attempts under previous protocols, the record does not establish a genuine issue of

material fact about whether the Inmates will remain conscious during the injection of

the pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride under the current protocol. 

The Inmates correctly point out that the record does not contain the lethal

injection protocols in place at the time Simmons, Rector, Hill and Riggs were

executed. According to the Inmates, this creates a genuine issue of material fact about

whether the ADC has engaged in a “series of abortive” execution attempts despite the

safeguards required by the current protocol because it is possible the previous

protocols contained the same safeguards. Although the record does not identify or

describe the protocols in place at the time of the four previous executions, it does

contain lethal injection protocols dated May 23, 1996, and November 23, 2005. These

protocols lacked many of the safeguards required by the current protocol. For

instance, the 1996 protocol did not require ADC officials to monitor the IV infusion

sites, and it did not contain a contingency plan for addressing infusion problems.

Neither the 1996 nor the 2005 protocol required ADC officials to pause between the

administration of sodium pentothal and pancuronium bromide to determine whether

the prisoner is unconscious, nor did they require the preparation or administration of

back-up syringes of sodium pentothal. The current protocol is much more thorough

than these earlier protocols and, as discussed above, contains procedures that

sufficiently protect prisoners from remaining conscious during the injection of the

pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Cf. Harbison, 571 F.3d at 536-37

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(upholding the Tennessee lethal injection protocol despite the state’s decision to reject

a review committee’s recommendation to adopt procedures for assessing

consciousness after the administration of sodium pentothal). 

The Inmates urge us to ignore the safeguards in the current protocol and find

that there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the protocols that governed

the executions carried out in 1990, 1992 and 2000 contained safeguards that were not

part of the 1996 and 2005 protocols. We reject this argument. The possibility that the

ADC removed significant safeguards in 1996 and 2005, only to reinstate them in the

May 22, 2008 protocol, is so unlikely that it amounts to little more than pure

speculation. See Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009)

(“[S]ummary judgment will not be reversed on the basis of speculation, conjecture,

or fantasy.” (citing Potman v. Unity Health Sys., Inc., 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir.

2003))). Under the current protocol, “any risk that [Arkansas’s lethal injection]

procedure will not work as designated . . . is merely a risk of accident, which is

insignificant in our constitutional analysis.” Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1080.

We hold that the Inmates’ evidence of previous executions does not establish

that the Arkansas protocol creates a substantial risk of serious harm that the Inmates

will remain conscious after the administration of the sodium pentothal. 

2. Intracardiac Infusion

The Inmates argue that the record establishes a genuine issue of material fact

about whether the ADC plans to use “intracardiac infusion” in future executions. In

this context, intracardiac infusion refers to a potentially painful procedure whereby

lethal chemicals are injected directly into a chamber of the heart with a large needle.

The November 23, 2005 version of the protocol authorized this procedure as a last

resort, but the May 22, 2008 version does not mention it. Nevertheless, the Inmates

claim that the ADC plans to use this procedure under the current protocol based on a

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July 18, 2008 newspaper article in which ADC spokeswoman Dina Tyler is reported

to have said that the ADC could start a line directly to a condemned prisoner’s heart

if necessary. The ADC argues that this article is hearsay and cannot be relied on to

oppose summary judgment.

We have held that “only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be

relied upon to counter a motion for summary judgment.” Sokol & Assocs., Inc. v.

Techsonic Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 605, 611 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Shaver v. Indep.

Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Inmates argue that Tyler’s

statement is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) as a non-hearsay

admission of a party opponent. This argument fails to distinguish Tyler’s statement

from the newspaper article containing the statement. Newspaper articles are “rank

hearsay.” See Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir.

1991). Even if Tyler’s statement is viewed as a non-hearsay admission of a party

opponent, the newspaper article reporting the statement is offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted and is not covered by any hearsay exception. Therefore, the

article’s description of Tyler’s statement about intracardiac infusion “cannot be

admitted for its truth.” See United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 878-79 (8th

Cir. 2007).

Even assuming the newspaper article is admissible evidence, the Inmates would

still fail to establish a genuine issue of material fact about whether the ADC plans to

use intracardiac infusion in future executions. The Hobbs affidavit flatly states that

“intracardiac infusion will not be performed during any future lethal-injection

execution carried out by the ADC.” The affidavit is dated July 28, 2008, ten days

after the newspaper account of Tyler’s statement. Because we treat the Hobbs

affidavit as a binding written addendum to the protocol, we conclude that it supersedes

Tyler’s statement. 

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5

We need not consider whether a central venous line may constitutionally be

established by someone other than a licensed physician. 

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3. Central line placement

If the IV team cannot establish IV access through traditional methods, the

protocol authorizes the Deputy Director to summon “trained, educated, and

experienced person(s)” to establish a central venous line by inserting a catheter in the

femoral, jugular or subclavian vein. The Inmates argue that this “vague, standardless

provision . . . places no meaningful restrictions whatsoever upon who may perform

this dangerous procedure” and that the protocol therefore authorizes unqualified

personnel to establish such lines. We reject the Inmates’ argument. “[I]t is imperative

for the State to employ personnel who are properly trained to competently carry out

each medical step of the [lethal injection] procedure.” Clemons, 585 F.3d at 1128

(quoting Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1084). The protocol’s requirements satisfy this standard.

Moreover, the Hobbs affidavit clarifies that any attempt to place a central venous line

will be performed by “a licensed physician who is credentialed to establish” such

lines.5

 The Inmates have not established a genuine issue of material fact about

whether they face a substantial risk of serious harm from the placement of central

venous lines by unqualified ADC personnel. 

4. Cut-down procedure

The Inmates argue that the protocol authorizes ADC personnel to use a “cutdown” procedure if they are unable to obtain intravenous access by other methods.

They define a cut-down as “an incision into the prisoner’s flesh deep enough to

expose the vein for direct insertion of the needle and catheter.” The Inmates

characterize the procedure as “brutal, agonizing” and “barbaric.” They point to the

1992 execution of Rickey Ray Rector as evidence that future prisoners will be

“subject to the procedure that led to [his] torturous death.” In that instance, ADC

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6

The protocol provides:

EVERY EFFORT WILL BE EXTENDED TO THE CONDEMNED

INMATE TO ENSURE THAT NO UNNECESSARY PAIN OR

SUFFERING IS INFLICTED BY THE IV PROCEDURE.

STANDARD PRACTICE OF USING A LOCAL ANESTHETIC WILL

BE ACCOMMODATED AS NECESSARY. 

-18-

personnel were unable to establish infusion sites through traditional methods and

eventually made a two-inch incision in Rector’s arm. Rector reportedly groaned

periodically during the ADC’s attempts to establish intravenous access. The Inmates

argue that this evidence suggests that they face a substantial risk of serious harm from

a cut-down procedure.

Although the current protocol does not expressly authorize a cut-down

procedure, the ADC acknowledges that it might be necessary to make incisions on

some prisoners to establish IV access. However, the Hobbs affidavit clarifies that any

such incision would be made by a licensed physician who is properly qualified to

carry out the procedure. Moreover, the protocol states that all attempts to obtain IV

access must avoid unnecessary pain by using local anesthetic as necessary.6

 The

Inmates have not argued, nor does the record establish, that an incision made under

these conditions rises to the level of serious harm. Accordingly, we conclude that the

Inmates have failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about whether they

face a substantial risk of serious harm from a cut-down procedure. Cf. Cooey, 589

F.3d at 228 (noting that the Sixth Circuit upheld Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol

even though it expressly authorizes a physician to use a cut-down procedure to gain

IV access as a contingency plan).

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7

The Inmates assert that the Baze plurality found that the daily experience of the

IV team members was equally significant. This argument mischaracterizes Baze. The

opinion states: 

Kentucky has put in place several important safeguards to ensure that an

adequate dose of sodium thiopental is delivered to the condemned

prisoner. The most significant of these is the written protocol’s

requirement that members of the IV team must have at least one year of

professional experience as a certified medical assistant, phlebotomist,

EMT, paramedic, or military corpsmen.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533 (emphasis added). 

-19-

5. IV Team Qualifications

The Inmates argue that the ADC does not require its IV team members to have

qualifications and experience comparable to those required by the Kentucky protocol

upheld in Baze. The Baze plurality stated that Kentucky has instituted “important

safeguards” to ensure that the lethal chemicals used in its executions are properly

administered. 128 S. Ct. at 1533. Specifically, Kentucky’s protocol requires each

member of its IV team to have at least one year of professional experience as a

phlebotomist, emergency medical technician, paramedic, certified medical assistant

or military corpsman. Id. The plurality noted that the current members of Kentucky’s

IV team insert IV catheters on a daily basis and that the Kentucky protocol requires

the IV team to engage in at least ten practice sessions each year. Id. at 1533-34. But

the plurality made clear that the “most significant” of Kentucky’s safeguards was the

requirement that each member of the IV team have at least one year of professional

experience. Id. at 1533.7

 

The Arkansas protocol goes even further than the Kentucky protocol by

requiring IV team members to have at least two years of professional experience as

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8

We reject the Inmates’ assertion that John Byus, the Administrator of Medical

and Dental Services for the ADC, is unqualified to supervise the IV team. The record

reveals that Byus is an experienced healthcare professional with more than thirty years

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an emergency medical technician, nurse, physician assistant or physician. The record

does not show how often the current members of the IV team establish IV lines, but

the two-year professional experience requirement ensures that IV team members are

qualified and competent to insert IV catheters. Moreover, the Inmates are wrong to

suggest that “no training of the IV Team members whatsoever is conducted” in

Arkansas. The protocol does not include a specific schedule for practice execution

sessions, but that does not mean such practice sessions do not take place. Indeed, the

protocol outlines a procedure for conducting practice execution sessions and requires

the IV team to “initiate intravenous infusion devices” during each practice session.

We conclude that the required qualifications for IV team members in Arkansas under

the current protocol are substantially similar to the requirements of the Kentucky

protocol upheld in Baze. See 128 S. Ct. at 1537 (observing that a state “with a lethal

injection protocol substantially similar to” Kentucky’s protocol would be

constitutional). 

The Inmates also argue that the Deputy Director is not qualified to supervise the

IV team. They argue that the protocol’s requirement that the Deputy Director be

“healthcare trained, educated, and/or experienced” is vague. This argument ignores

other relevant language in the same sentence, which in full states that the Deputy

Director must be “healthcare trained, educated, and/or experienced in matters related

to the establishment and monitoring of IVs.” (Emphasis added.) The Inmates also

argue that the Deputy Director must hold the same “credentials, qualifications and

competencies” as the members of the IV team. We reject this argument. The Deputy

Director supervises the IV team and monitors the infusion sites, but she does not

personally establish any of the IV lines and is not a member of the IV team. The

qualifications required by the protocol ensure that the Deputy Director is sufficiently

competent to perform her supervisory role.8

 

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of experience as an emergency room technician, licensed practical nurse, Assistant

Infirmary Administrator, Supervisor of Medical Services, and Administrator of

Medical and Dental Services. 

-21-

Because the Inmates have not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine

issue of material fact about whether they face a substantial risk of serious harm as a

result of any deficiencies in the training or experience of the ADC’s IV team or its

Deputy Director, summary judgment was proper on this issue.

6. Infusion Site Monitoring

The Inmates contend that the Arkansas protocol subjects them to a substantial

risk of serious harm by failing to provide for adequate monitoring of the IV infusion

sites. The sole piece of evidence they provide in support of this argument is a postmortem photograph of Steven Hill, which shows his entire body—except his head and

hands—covered with a sheet. The Inmates argue that this photograph creates a

genuine issue of material fact about whether the protocol prevents adequate

monitoring of the IV infusion sites by authorizing the ADC to cover condemned

prisoners with sheets during their executions. 

The Baze plurality noted that in Kentucky “the presence of the warden and

deputy warden in the execution chamber with the prisoner allows them to watch for

signs of IV problems.” 128 S. Ct. at 1534 (emphasis added). The Kentucky protocol

does not specifically require anyone to monitor the infusion sites, however. See

Appellants’ App. at 528-44; see also Harbison, 571 F.3d at 538 (concluding that

visually monitoring IV lines “by video camera and through a one-way window” does

not violate the Constitution). 

The Arkansas protocol expressly requires the Deputy Director to “directly

observe the . . . IV infusion site(s)” and to “closely monitor” these sites “throughout

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9

We also note that Charles Carpenter, Hill’s former attorney, submitted a

declaration in which he described seeing the IV insertion point at Hill’s elbow as well

as a wide belt covering Hill’s chest during the execution. Carpenter’s observation is

also consistent with nine post-mortem photographs of prisoners (including one of Hill)

in the record. In each of these photographs, the prisoner is strapped to the gurney

uncovered and the infusion sites are visible.

-22-

the lethal chemical infusion process.” This requirement necessarily precludes ADC

personnel from fully covering condemned prisoners with sheets before they are

pronounced dead. Moreover, the post-mortem photograph of Hill is not probative of

whether the IV infusion sites were visible during his execution. Thus, the Inmates

have failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about the adequacy of

infusion-site monitoring under the protocol. See Gregory v. Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006,

1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to avoid summary

judgment.” (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986))).9

7. Contingency Plan

If the Deputy Director suspects there is a problem with an infusion site, the

protocol requires her to “direct reduction of lethal chemical flow rate or redirect lethal

chemical to the secondary or alternative site.” The Inmates argue that this

contingency plan creates a substantial risk of serious harm because the Deputy

Director might order the executioners to administer the syringes of pancuronium

bromide and potassium chloride to the secondary IV site without injecting additional

doses of sodium pentothal and normal saline. In other words, the Inmates contend that

the protocol authorizes the Deputy Director to administer pancuronium bromide and

potassium chloride to a prisoner who is not fully unconscious. This argument

erroneously assumes that pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride are the only

two “lethal chemicals” administered under the protocol. The Inmates’ own expert

asserted that “[t]wo grams of sodium thiopental is a massive, and potentially lethal,

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10Sodium pentothal is also known as thiopental. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527.

-23-

dose”;10 the Arkansas protocol calls for the injection of three grams of sodium

pentothal. Cf. Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d at 216, 219 (upholding the Ohio lethal

injection protocol, which relies exclusively on a five-gram dose of sodium pentothal

to execute prisoners). Indeed, the protocol clearly lists sodium pentothal among the

“lethal chemicals” used during executions. The ADC’s decision to characterize

sodium pentothal as a lethal chemical indicates that it intends all of the chemicals

listed in the protocol to be redirected to the secondary IV site. 

The Inmates’ argument again ignores the protocol’s requirement that the

Deputy Director ensure the prisoner is fully unconscious before directing the

executioners to administer the pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. The

protocol also requires her to administer the back-up doses of sodium pentothal if

necessary to render the prisoner completely unconscious. These requirements

necessarily prohibit injecting pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride into the

secondary IV line before the prisoner is fully unconscious. Moreover, the Hobbs

affidavit clarifies that the ADC interprets the protocol to require “the back-up syringes

of sodium pentothal and saline flush to be administered before the administration of

any remaining pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride,” if the need arises for

the Deputy Director to redirect the flow of lethal chemicals during an execution. We

conclude that the Inmates have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about

whether the protocol’s contingency plan subjects them to a substantial risk of serious

harm. Cf. Emmett, 532 F.3d at 306 (upholding Virginia’s lethal injection protocol

despite the lack of an explicit requirement to administer a back-up dose of sodium

pentothal if it is necessary to inject additional doses of pancuronium bromide or

potassium chloride).

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-24-

8. The Adequacy of the Execution Facility

The Inmates argue that the ADC’s execution facility subjects them to a

substantial risk of serious harm because the execution chamber is poorly lit, the

control room is too small, the syringes are inadequately labeled, and the executioners

are not positioned to properly observe the IV infusion sites. The Inmates rely on

eleven photographs in the record to support this argument, none of which create a

genuine issue of material fact about the adequacy of the execution facility. The

photographs show that the syringes are clearly labeled with large numbers and

arranged in the carrying case in numerical order. The photographs reveal little, if

anything, about the size of the control room, the viewpoint of the executioners, or the

adequacy of the lighting. Based on these photographs alone, no reasonable fact finder

could conclude that the ADC’s execution facility subjects the Inmates to a substantial

risk of serious harm, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. See Dush v.

Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To avoid the entry of

[summary] judgment, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to support its case

with ‘more than a scintilla of evidence.’” (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258, 263

(8th Cir. 1997))).

C. Summary

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the

Inmates’ case is ripe for summary judgment. Based on our review of Arkansas’s

lethal injection protocol, we conclude that it is designed “to avoid the needless

infliction of pain, not to cause it.” See Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Workman,

486 F.3d at 907). Moreover, it is substantially similar to—and perhaps even more

thorough than—the Kentucky protocol upheld by the Supreme Court in Baze, see 128

S. Ct. at 1537, and the Missouri protocol we upheld in Taylor, see 487 F.3d at 1085.

The Inmates have failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact about whether the

Arkansas protocol subjects them to a substantial risk of serious harm. On this record,

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we hold that the protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment and that the district

court appropriately granted the ADC’s motion for summary judgment. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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