Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04481/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Luis Martinez,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-04481-PHX-DGC (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is David Luis Martinez’s (“Petitioner”) “Petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Docs. 1, 2). 

Respondents have filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 13), to which Petitioner has replied

(Doc. 14). For the reasons explained herein, it is recommended that the Court deny 

habeas relief. 

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2015, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on eight counts of 

sexual exploitation of a minor, a class 2 felony. (Bates Nos. 1-4).1 In February 2017, 

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer 

(Doc. 13) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page 

of the record.

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Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in the Superior Court of Arizona in which 

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to three counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a 

minor, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children. (Bates Nos. 8-11). The 

trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas and sentenced Petitioner to a total of nine 

years in prison, followed by lifetime probation. (Bates Nos. 12-18).

In June 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Bates 

Nos. 32-34). Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition in October 2017. (Bates Nos. 35-43). 

The trial court found that Petitioner failed to raise a colorable claim and denied relief. 

(Bates Nos. 59-61). Petitioner sought further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

which denied relief in November 2018. (Bates Nos. 84-86). The Arizona Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Bates No. 99).

In a minute entry filed in July 2018, the trial court stated that it received a Motion

for Request of Counsel that it deemed a timely of-right PCR Notice. (Bates Nos. 100-

01). The trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Id.). In a PCR Petition filed in November

2018, Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was entitled to three additional days of 

presentence incarceration credit and asserted that the order directing Petitioner to pay the

cost of his DNA testing must be vacated. (Bates Nos. 102-06). The State did not oppose 

the PCR Petition. (Bates Nos. 107-08). On January 4, 2019, the trial court vacated its 

prior order requiring Petitioner to pay the cost of his DNA testing and awarded Petitioner

three days of presentence incarceration credit. (Bates Nos. 111-12). 

Petitioner initiated a third PCR proceeding in July 2019. (Bates Nos. 114-16). 

After finding that Petitioner failed to raise a colorable claim that may be raised in a 

successive or untimely proceeding, the trial court dismissed the proceeding. (Bates Nos.

133-36). The trial court denied Petitioner’s request for a rehearing. (Bates No. 140).

In June 2019, Petitioner initiated this habeas proceeding. (Docs. 1, 2). The Court

screened the Petition and ordered Respondents to file an answer. (Doc. 7). In their 

Answer, Respondents note that in addition to the two claims presented in the Petition

(Doc. 1), Petitioner raised a third argument for habeas relief in his Memorandum of 

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Points and Authorities (Doc. 2) filed with the Petition. (Doc. 13 at 1). For the reasons 

explained herein, the undersigned finds that (i) Ground One is without merit, (ii) Ground 

Two fails to adequately state a claim for relief, and (iii) Ground Three is procedurally 

defaulted.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

For over one hundred years, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally 

exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the 

federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. 

Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

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federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

B. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

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relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See Id. at 729-30. An

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

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C. Reviewing the Merits of Habeas Claims

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the 

last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 

2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir.

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2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3553 is 

unconstitutional “by shift[ing] the burden of proof from the State to the Defendant

violating his U.S. and Arizona constitutional rights under Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Respondents concede that Ground One is exhausted. (Doc.

13 at 12-17).

Petitioner raised Ground One to the trial court and Arizona Court of Appeals in his

first PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 35-43, 62-74). In support of his claim, Petitioner cited

May v. Ryan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1158 (D. Ariz. 2017), which held that Arizona’s 

child molestation statute, codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1410, unconstitutionally 

shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. In denying the PCR Petition, the trial court 

found that the claim is meritless, explaining:

Defendant plead guilty to Attempted Sexual Exploitation of a 

Minor, A.R.S., § 13–3553 which is not the subject of May

and is specifically excluded in the May decision. As a result, 

there is no support for Defendant’s contention that “Arizona’s 

burden shifting scheme in its statutes is unconstitutional” or 

“there has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to Defendant’s case would probably 

overturn the Defendant’s conviction or sentence.” (PCR p.2, 

¶¶ 1, 5). There is also no legal support for Defendant’s 

argument that the Court is without jurisdiction.

(Bates Nos. 61). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding 

that

A.R.S. § 13–3553 is not otherwise unconstitutional. The 

statute does not, as Martinez argues, shift the burden to the 

defendant to prove the person depicted was not a minor nor 

does it shift the burden to the defendant to prove he or she did 

not know the person depicted was a minor. As charged in this 

case, the language of A.R.S. § 13–3553(A)(2) requires the 

state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the 

person depicted was a minor, but that the defendant knew the 

person was a minor.

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(Bates No. 85). 

On March 26, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially vacated the 

district court’s decision in May. May v. Ryan, 766 F. App’x 505 (9th Cir. 2019). The 

Ninth Circuit “reach[ed] the same conclusion as did the state court with respect to May’s 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the constitutionality of the 

child molestation statute.” Id. at 506. The Ninth Circuit explained:

Given the long-standing status of the law in Arizona that the 

State is not required to prove sexual intent to successfully 

prosecute a defendant for child molestation, see State v. 

Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 898 P.2d 483, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1995), which provided the background for the “prevailing 

professional practice at the time of the trial,” Bobby v. Van 

Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) 

(per curiam),[ ] we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s failure 

to object to the constitutionality of the statute placing the 

burden of proving lack of intent on the defendant fell “below 

an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The district court erred in holding 

otherwise.

Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that “[t]wo Arizona decisions issued after May’s trial

confirmed that Arizona courts approved of the approach taken by the statutory scheme

under which May was prosecuted, which required the defendant to prove any affirmative

defense by a preponderance of the evidence, including lack of sexual intent.” Id. at 506 

n.1 (citing State v. Holle, 379 P.3d 197, 202 (Ariz. 2016); State v. Simpson, 173 P.3d 

1027, 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)). 

The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’

rejection of Ground One is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner also has failed to show that

the decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the 

record. It is recommended that the Court deny Ground One.

B. Ground Two

The Petition is written on the court-approved form. In the form’s preprinted space 

for “Ground Two,” Petitioner merely states “ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 

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at 7). In the Supporting Facts section, Petitioner states “The Defendant’s counsel was 

ineffective in his representation of the Defendant and violated his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment Rights and his 5 and 14 Amendment rights to due process.” (Id.). Petitioner

then states “See: Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached herein.” (Id.). The

Memorandum is filed at Doc. 2. However, as Respondents note (Doc. 13 at 11-13), the

Memorandum does not discuss any specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel 

and instead argues that the indictment was insufficient and that ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-

3553 is unconstitutional. 

To plead a cognizable federal habeas claim, a petitioner must set forth in his or her 

petition the facts supporting the specific ground upon which relief is sought. Rule 2(c), 

foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected 

to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Advisory Committee 

Note to Rule 4, foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (noting that the rules governing pleading 

for Section 2254 habeas petitions are “more demanding” than the notice pleading allowed 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir.

1979) (concluding that a habeas petitioner “failed to satisfy the specificity requirement 

of § 2254 pleadings or to show that there is a ‘real possibility’ of constitutional error” by 

“merely alleg[ing] that he ‘. . . was not informed of the consequences of his plea 

. . . .’”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are 

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”); Greenway 

v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ursory and vague claim[s] cannot 

support habeas relief.”). It is recommended that the Court dismiss Ground Two as it is 

too vague and conclusory to support habeas relief. Further, Respondents correctly argue 

that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief even if Petitioner intended to raise the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented in certain state court filings. (Doc. 13 

at 21-22).

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dependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). “As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged 

instance [ ] of counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.”

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original); see Carriger 

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that 

an ineffective assistance claim for failure to vigorously cross-examine a witness did not 

exhaust ineffective assistance claims directed to other independent omissions by 

counsel); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Petitioner’s 

assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one set of facts, does not 

exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different facts”).

“Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair 

opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to 

the federal courts, [the Supreme Court has concluded] that state prisoners must give the 

state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by 

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). PCR claims of “Arizona state 

prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals 

has ruled on them.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, a 

petitioner generally cannot exhaust a habeas claim by circumventing a state’s lower 

courts and going directly to the state’s higher courts. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 

915-18 (9th Cir. 2004) (habeas claim presented by petitioner to state supreme court was 

unexhausted because the petitioner did not fairly present the claim to the state’s court of

appeals); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (“[W]here the claim has been 

presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be 

considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons therefor,” . . . . Raising the 

claim in such a fashion does not, for the relevant purpose, constitute ‘fair presentation.’”); 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Submitting a new claim . . . in a

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procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special circumstances 

does not constitute fair presentation.”); Childers v. State of Arizona, No. 05–2010–PHX–

ROS, 2006 WL 1543986, *5 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2006) (claim not raised in petitioner’s PCR 

Notice but raised in petition for review filed with the Arizona appellate court was not 

properly exhausted). 

In his first PCR proceeding, Petitioner argued that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the constitutionality of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3553. (Bates Nos. 37-

38). The trial court denied relief. (Bates Nos. 59-61). In his Petition for Review filed in 

the Arizona Court of Appeals on June 15, 2018, Petitioner presented a different 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which alleged that his counsel failed to 

adequately present mitigating circumstances with respect to sentencing. (Bates No. 68). 

In his third PCR Petition filed in the trial court, Petitioner asserted that his counsel 

was ineffective for (i) failing to “seek suppression of illegally obtained evidence” and (ii)

failing to seek discovery concerning the software the State used to discover child 

pornography on Petitioner’s computer. (Bates Nos. 120-23). The trial court dismissed 

the PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 133-36). Petitioner did not seek further review by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Because Petitioner failed to exhaust the above ineffective assistance of counsel

claims by presenting them to both the trial court and Arizona Court of Appeals, the

claims are procedurally defaulted for the same reasons that Ground Three is procedurally 

defaulted, as discussed below.

Finally, because Petitioner’s claim in Ground One challenging the constitutionality 

of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3553 is without merit, any claim alleging that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3553

also is without merit.

2

 See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 

1996) (defense counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument or to take a futile action does 

2 Respondents state that Petitioner exhausted this ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in state court. (Doc. 13 at 17-20).

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not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); James, 24 F.3d at 27 (“Counsel’s failure to 

make a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Toomey v. 

Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[P]etitioner must further show a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. . . . In short, we find the prospects of success . . . too remote for counsel’s failure 

to have pressed [the issue] to have constituted a [S]ixth [A]mendment violation.”).

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the indictment. (Doc. 2). 

Petitioner contends that:

In the indictment submitted by the State the elements missing 

are: (1) the location the alleged office occured [sic] at; (2) 

what was used to allegedly transmit the images; (3) to whom 

or where the alleged offense occured [sic] at and was 

transmitted to; and (4) the most glaring and important 

omission being that the indictment did not identify who the

alleged victims were.

(Id. at 3). Respondents are correct that Petitioner did not present Ground Three to the

trial court in his PCR proceedings. Respondents construe Petitioner’s June 15, 2018 

Petition for Review filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals as presenting the claim 

contained in Ground Three. (Doc. 13 at 21; see Bates No. 67). 

To reiterate, a petitioner generally cannot exhaust a habeas claim by 

circumventing a state’s lower courts and going directly to the state’s higher courts. See 

Casey, 386 F.3d at 915-18; Castille, 489 U.S. at 351; Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38; Childers, 

2006 WL 1543986 at *5. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust 

Ground Three.

If Petitioner returned to state court and presented Ground Three in another PCR 

Petition, the PCR Petition would be untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1and 32.4 (a 

petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate 

in the direct appeal, whichever is later”). Although Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.4 does not bar untimely PCR claims that fall within the category of claims specified 

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in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted 

that any of these exceptions apply to him and the undersigned does not find that any of 

the exceptions would apply. A state post-conviction action is futile where it is timebarred. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 

116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct 

from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)).

Further, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1) and (3), a defendant 

is precluded from raising claims that were adjudicated or could have been raised and 

adjudicated on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. State v. Curtis, 912 

P.2d 1341, 1342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Berryman, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1994). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) would preclude Petitioner from 

returning to state court to exhaust his unexhausted habeas claims.

For the above reasons, the undersigned finds that Grounds Three is procedurally 

defaulted. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1).

D. Petitioner’s Procedural Defaults are Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). In order to establish cause for a procedurally defaulted claim, 

“a petitioner must demonstrate that the default is due to an external objective factor that 

cannot fairly be attributed to him.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1146 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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1. Petitioner has Not Satisfied the “Cause and Prejudice” Exception

Under Ninth Circuit case law, Petitioner’s status as an inmate with limited legal 

resources cannot constitute cause to excuse his procedural defaults. See Hughes v. Idaho 

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner's lack 

of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. 

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his 

mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). 

The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to establish that his procedural 

defaults are “due to an external objective factor that cannot fairly be attributed to him.”

Smith, 510 F.3d at 1146 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a petitioner 

fails to establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the petitioner has shown 

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to excuse his procedural defaults.

2. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception Does Not Apply

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual 

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (citing Calderon v. 

Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). The Ninth Circuit, however, has explained that 

another “way a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence is to show in light of 

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subsequent case law that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed the alleged crime.” 

Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 

616-24) (emphasis added). In Vosgien, the Ninth Circuit held that a habeas petitioner 

could establish his actual innocence where the State conceded that the petitioner could 

not, in light of state case law issued after his conviction, have committed the 

alleged crime of compelling prostitution based on the facts under which he was 

convicted. See Vosgien, 742 F.3d at 1136 (“Under Oregon law, as clarified by Oregon 

courts after Vosgien pled guilty, Vosgien is actually innocent of compelling prostitution. 

His untimely filing of his federal habeas petition is therefore excused for these counts.”). 

Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is 

factually innocent of his convictions. In addition, Petitioner has not shown that Arizona 

case law issued after his convictions rendered his conduct non-criminal. See Vosgien, 

742 F.3d at 1134. 

The undersigned recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass 

through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse his procedural defaults. See 

Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through the 

Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

forward with ‘new reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground Three

as procedurally defaulted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Ground One of the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED 

and Grounds Two and Three be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

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to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to Ground One and the

dismissal of Grounds Two and Three is justified by a plain procedural bar.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file 

timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey,

481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 6th day of July, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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