Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04238/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04238-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVANCE M. WILSON, V05878, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, Chief

Justice of California,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 15-4238 CRB (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, a state prisoner on death row at San Quentin State Prison, has

filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a federal court

order directing the Supreme Court of California to appoint private counsel to

represent him in his state capital appeal and habeas proceedings. According to

plaintiff, “the shortage of attorneys” at the state’s Public Defender’s Office

(PDO) and Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC), and resulting unlawful

delays, require that the state high court “bypass the []PDO and the HCRC and

appoint private attorneys.” Dkt. #1 (Compl.) at 6. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable

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claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint

“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claim & Analysis

Under the law of the circuit, plaintiff’s request for an order directing the

Supreme Court of California to appoint him private counsel to represent him in

his state capital appeal and habeas proceedings in order to expedite the

adjudication of his capital sentence was properly brought in a § 1983 action. See

Blair v. Martel, 645 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2011) (“request for an order

directing a state court to hasten its consideration of an appeal belongs in a § 1983

complaint, not a habeas petition”). But the merits of plaintiff’s claim is less clear. 

See id. at 1158 n.3 (“We express no view on the merits of such a § 1983 claim or

on what relief, if any, might be available if the claim were pleaded in the proper

place and at the proper time.”). Regardless, the court should abstain from

interfering with California’s capital post-conviction review process.

Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not

interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or

declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). The rationale of Younger applies throughout state

appellate proceedings, requiring that state appellate review of a state court

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judgment be exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted. See

Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994).

Younger requires that federal courts refrain from interfering with ongoing

state criminal proceedings where three conditions are met: (1) state judicial

proceedings are ongoing; (2) state proceedings implicate important state interests;

and (3) the plaintiff has the opportunity to raise his federal constitutional

concerns in the ongoing proceedings. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. 

Here, all three prongs of the abstention test are met. First, plaintiff’s state capital

appeal is ongoing in the Supreme Court of California – a review of the state high

court’s docket (People v. Wilson, No. S118775) shows that plaintiff’s final reply

brief is due by January 20, 2016. Second, the appeal unquestionably involves

important state interests. See Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 73-74 (9th Cir.

1980) (acknowledging California’s interest in ensuring the fairness of its capital

convictions through automatic appeal process). Third, plaintiff can present his

request for appointment of private counsel in order to avoid unlawful state

appellate and habeas review delays to the Supreme Court of California. See, e.g.,

People v. Holt, 15 Cal. 4th 619, 708-09 (Cal. 1997) (addressing claim that delay

in appointment of counsel for capital appeal violated due process).

Plaintiff may avoid application of the abstention doctrine if he can show

that he would suffer “irreparable harm” that is both “great and immediate” if the

federal court declines jurisdiction, that there is bad faith or harassment on the part

of the state prosecuting him, or that the state tribunal is biased against the federal

claim. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25

(1975); Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. But plaintiff makes no plausible nonconclusory allegation of irreparable harm, bad faith, harassment or bias of the

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tribunal. Cf. id. at 46, 53-54 (cost, anxiety and inconvenience of criminal defense

is not the kind of special circumstance or irreparable harm that would justify

federal intervention). After all, the Supreme Court of California appointed OPD

counsel to represent plaintiff on his ongoing capital appeal (albeit after some

initial delay) and a final reply brief is due to be filed by counsel by January 20,

2016. Appointment of a new private counsel to represent plaintiff on his capital

appeal at this point in the proceedings would more likely delay than expedite

plaintiff’s appeal. And although the Supreme Court of California has not yet

appointed counsel to represent plaintiff on his yet-to-be-filed state capital habeas

proceedings (generally filed before the end of the capital appeal), plaintiff has not

shown that appointment of HCRC counsel, rather than private counsel, will

necessarily result in excessive delay and irreparable harm. Under the

circumstances, Younger’s factors and considerations weigh against interfering

with California’s capital post-conviction review process. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Younger abstention is

warranted and that this action accordingly must be DISMISSED. See Juidice v.

Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 348 (1977) (if district court finds Younger abstention

warranted, it must dismiss action). 

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all

pending motions as moot, and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Jan. 6, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.15\Wilson, J.15-4238.dismissal.wpd

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