Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03239/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03239-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAYLOR RUSSELL, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-3239 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

TO INTERVENE, TO

TRANSFER VENUE, AND

TO CERTIFY CLASS

INTRODUCTION

After a successful class action against the United States involving military credit cards,

the same counsel commenced the present proposed class action as a sequel against the United

States. This action also involves military credit cards but concerning a different practice. The

details of the two claims asserted in the instant action were set forth in a previous order filed on

March 30, 2010 (Dkt. No. 61). In brief, AAFES credit cards targeted in both this action and in

the previous action, Briggs v. United States of America, offered two types of repayment plans

for credit card purchases: (1) the Uniform Clothing Deferred Payment Plan (“UCDPP”), which

applied to purchases of military uniforms, and (2) the Deferred Payment Plan (“DPP”), which

applied to purchases of other goods. Both claims asserted in the instant action involved

allegedly excessive interest charges imposed by the AAFES on debt incurred under these two

payment plans. By contrast, the claims in the related Briggs action involved AAFES credit card

debt.

Case 3:09-cv-03239-WHA Document 105 Filed 06/22/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

This order resolves a motion to intervene as class representative, a motion for class

certification, and a motion to transfer venue. For the reasons explained below, all three motions

are DENIED.

STATEMENT

The two interest-overcharge claims asserted in the instant action were originally asserted

in the related Briggs action. In Briggs, however, the credit-card interest claims were dismissed

as moot approximately four months into the litigation, after the AAFES voluntarily “removed

the disputed interest charges” prior to class certification (Dkt. No. 34 at 12–13 in CV 07-5760

WHA). Over a year later, class counsel in Briggs filed a motion to intervene in an attempt to

revive the mooted interest-related claims (Dkt. No. 92 in CV 07-5760 WHA). Since the Briggs

action had already been litigated to an advanced stage, the motion to intervene was denied (Dkt.

No. 104 in CV 07-5760 WHA). Final approval of the class action settlement in Briggs was

granted on April 30, 2010.

The instant case was borne from the failed motion to intervene in Briggs. Indeed, the

proposed intervenor in Briggs — Taylor Russell — was the named plaintiff and proposed class

representative in the instant action. In November 2009, however, approximately four months

after the instant action was filed, plaintiff Russell’s claim pertaining to interest charged on his

UCDPP credit-card debt was dismissed as moot (Dkt. No. 29). The remaining claim pertaining

to DPP interest charges was also dismissed as moot in an order filed on March 30, 2010 (Dkt.

No. 61). For both these claims, the government had simply (and voluntarily) adjusted the credit

card accounts of plaintiff Russell and over 30,000 other putative class members prior to class

certification and had issued full refunds based upon the adjustments.

The March 30 order also denied, without prejudice, plaintiff’s motion for class

certification and left the question of plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees for another day. It

left open “the possibility that another plaintiff, whose account has not been adjusted, to come

forward, to intervene, and assume the role of lead plaintiff so long as this is done before the

resolution of the lingering attorney’s fees issue” (id. at 7). This window of opportunity was

provided due to counsel’s view that the government’s voluntary refunds had not been given to

Case 3:09-cv-03239-WHA Document 105 Filed 06/22/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the entire putative class. With respect to the attorney’s fees issue, the April 23 order stated that

“if counsel wishes to pursue this issue, a motion — noticed on the normal 35-day track — must

be filed no later than May 6, 2010.” No such motion has been filed.

Two days after the March 30 order, counsel filed a motion to intervene by class member

Charles Davidson. On April 23, 2010, Davidson’s motion to intervene was denied (Dkt. No.

82). While the March 30 order clearly stated that any proposed intervenor must be an

individual “whose account has not been adjusted” by the AAFES, Davidson’s account had been

adjusted by the AAFES in September 2009 to the minimum 12% interest rate specified by his

credit agreement. This adjustment was made in 2009 because Davidson was a member of the

certified class in the earlier Briggs class action. Davidson also filed an untimely motion to opt

out of the Briggs settlement, which was denied on the grounds that his declaration made it clear

that it was counsel’s affirmative acts of manipulation, not Davidson’s inadvertence, mistake or

carelessness, that caused him to file the untimely request to opt out.

On May 3, 2010, counsel filed the instant motion to intervene, this time on behalf of 

Foster Franks. On May 6, this was followed by another motion for class certification and a

motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of Ohio. A hearing on these motions was held

on June 16, 2010.

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that intervention is improper in this instance because Franks cannot

assert his claims in this venue. Generally, intervenors in certified class actions are not held to

jurisdictional requirements, provided the district court initially had jurisdiction over the matter.

See 7C Wright, Miller, Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1917 (3rd ed. 2010). Venue

follows jurisdiction (7C Wright, Miller, Kane, supra, § 1918), and permissive intervention in a

class suit does not normally force intervenors to independently satisfy the venue requirements.

But where no class has yet been certified and when the original plaintiffs upon whose

claims jurisdiction and venue are based are dismissed from the case, plaintiffs must offer

independent grounds for venue. Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the

Case 3:09-cv-03239-WHA Document 105 Filed 06/22/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

dismissal of the original named plaintiff requires Franks as intervenor to provide some basis for

venue, which he has failed to do.

In this case, Franks cannot assert his claims in the Northern District of California

because venue would be improper. The special venue provision in 28 U.S.C. 1402(a)(1) for the

Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, requires that every named plaintiff reside in the district

where a suit is brought, as previously held by the undersigned in Briggs, 2009 WL 113387 at *6

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that “the named plaintiffs must satisfy the applicable venue

requirements but that unnamed plaintiffs need not satisfy those requirements”). Because Franks

seeks to intervene and become the sole remaining named plaintiff, he must independently

satisfy this venue requirement. But Franks resides in the Southern District of Ohio.

Franks argues that he does not need to independently satisfy the applicable venue

requirements because venue remains proper for plaintiff Russell as long as Russell’s claim for

attorney’s fees remains viable. But as noted above, any motion on that attorney’s fees claims

was due by May 6, and none was filed. Russell’s substantive claims in this action have all been

dismissed. Therefore, Franks must independently satisfy the venue requirements. Because he

cannot do this, the motion to intervene is DENIED. Because there is still no plaintiff in this

action with justiciable claims, counsel’s motions for transfer of venue and for class certification

must also be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff counsel’s motions are DENIED. Counsel have had ample and fair opportunity to

cure the gaps and deficiencies in his framing of this action. This case is now ready for any

appeals. Judgment shall be entered in favor of defendant, and the Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2010. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-03239-WHA Document 105 Filed 06/22/10 Page 4 of 4