Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00078/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00078-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAFONZO R. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. D. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00078-KAW(PR) 

ORDER SERVING COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS AND DISMISSING 

NONCOGNIZABLE CLAIMS

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Lafonzo Turner, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State Prison in 

Sacramento has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation 

of his constitutional rights by Warden G.D. Lewis, Sergeants Love and R. Butcher, and 

Correctional Officers Staint-Lois and Montanez, employees of Pelican Bay State Prison, where 

Plaintiff was previously incarcerated. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned 

United States Magistrate Judge over this action. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis is granted in a separate order. The Court now reviews Plaintiff’s complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Review of Complaint

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 1 of 9
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Cir. 1988).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation, 756 

F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City 

of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional 

right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's 

affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the 

deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Under no circumstances is 

there respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Lemire, 756 F.3d at 1074. Or, in layman's 

terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 1983 solely because one is 

responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). 

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the 

constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). It is insufficient for a plaintiff 

only to allege that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation and that they generally 

created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific policy” or “a 

specific event” instigated by them that led to the constitutional violations. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 2 of 9
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

Leave to amend should be granted only if the pleading “deficiencies can be cured with 

additional allegations that are consistent with the challenged pleading and that do not contradict 

the allegations in the original complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 

995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

The following is a summary of the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. On May 28, 2012, 

Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance about correctional officers damaging his television. On 

June 1, 2012, Sgt. Love told Plaintiff that, in response to Plaintiff’s grievance, he wanted to repair 

Plaintiff’s television. Officer Montanez then took Plaintiff’s television and gave him a form 

indicating it was sent for repairs. Officer Staint-Lois was also present when Plaintiff’s television 

was taken. Two weeks later, Plaintiff asked Sgt. Love when his television would be returned to 

him. Sgt. Love told Plaintiff to stop filing administrative appeals or he would never get his 

television back. When Plaintiff asked Officer Montanez when his television would be returned, 

Officer Montanez laughed and said, if Plaintiff had not filed a grievance, he would still have his 

television. 

On June 21, 2012, Sgt. Butcher told Plaintiff he had investigated Plaintiff’s claim about his 

television but he found no record of the television being repaired. On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff told 

Sgt. Butcher he thought his television was taken in retaliation for his administrative grievance. 

Sgt. Butcher said that no one broke Plaintiff’s television and “you will not be getting your T.V. 

back. This is our house.” 

Warden Lewis denied Plaintiff’s administrative appeal about the retaliatory taking of his 

television and, thus, was aware that Plaintiff had been unlawfully deprived of his property.

Warden Lewis also was responsible for the policy and regulations requiring the removal of 

speakers from electronic appliances and musical instruments. Because prison staff could check on

the proper functioning of the electronic appliance out of the presence of the property owner, 

defective equipment could be returned to the owner. The policy subjected Plaintiff to the

retaliatory taking of his television because it caused his television to malfunction, which caused 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 3 of 9
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

him to file a grievance, which motivated Defendants to retaliate against him.

Plaintiff’s television was never returned to him nor did he receive any compensation for it.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims for taking his property without due process and without just 

compensation.

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper. See Mt. 

Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). “Within the prison 

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted).

Although the allegations do not state how Defendants’ retaliatory acts chilled the exercise 

of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, they fulfill the four other requirements of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. This is sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the claim against 

them. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Therefore, liberally construed, the allegations appear to state 

a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

1. Due Process

Neither the negligent nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim 

under section 1983 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 

527, 535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner's hobby kit), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 

517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate's property). The availability of an adequate 

state post-deprivation remedy, e.g. a state tort action, precludes relief because it provides adequate 

procedural due process. King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986). California law 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 4 of 9
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations. Barnett v. Centoni, 

31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895). 

Plaintiff's allegations involve an intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property, the sort 

of claim that is not cognizable under §1983, and so it is dismissed. Dismissal is without leave to 

amend because amendment would be futile. See Corinthian Colleges, 655 F3d at 995 (dismissal 

with prejudice appropriate where amendment would be futile).

2. Taking Without Just Compensation

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be 

taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It applies to the states 

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. California Dep't Of 

Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the allegations do not state that 

Plaintiff’s property was taken for public use, they are sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the 

claim against them. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Therefore, liberally construed, the allegations 

appear to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim based on Defendants’ taking Plaintiff’s 

television without compensating him for it.

C. Claim Based on Regulations

The allegations that Lewis violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by creating prison 

regulations for the removal of speakers from electronic instruments fail to state a cognizable claim

because there is an insufficient causative relationship between the regulations and the alleged 

retaliatory taking of the television. Plaintiff attempts to provide the causative relationship by 

alleging that the removal of the speakers set in motion a process that caused him to file his first 

grievance about his television not working which, in turn, caused the retaliatory taking. However, 

this alleged chain of events leading to the retaliatory taking is too attenuated to show an actual and 

proximate causative relationship. See Lemire, 756 F.3d at 1074 (liability may be imposed only if

plaintiff can show defendant’s actions caused the deprivation of a federally protected right). Any 

claim based on the challenged regulations is dismissed with prejudice because amendment would 

be futile.

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 5 of 9
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against all Defendants is dismissed. The 

claim based on regulations against Warden Lewis is dismissed. Dismissal of these claims is with 

prejudice because amendment would be futile.

2. Plaintiff states a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim and a Fourteenth 

Amendment takings claim against all Defendants. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

(docket no. 1) and all attachments thereto, a copy of this Order and a copy of the form “Consent or 

Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction” to Pelican Bay State Prison Defendants Warden 

Lewis, Sgts. Love and Butcher and Officers Montanez and Staint Lois. This form can also be 

found at www.cand.uscourts.gov/civilforms. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint 

and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco, and a copy of 

this Order to Plaintiff.

4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 

them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant 

to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on behalf of 

Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of 

such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver forms. If 

service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the 

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve 

and file an answer before sixty days from the date on which the request for waiver was sent. (This 

allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of summons is 

necessary.)

Defendants are advised to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that 

more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of service of the 

summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 6 of 9
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

been personally served, the answer shall be due sixty days from the date on which the request for 

waiver was sent or twenty days from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

5. Defendants shall file their Consent or Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction on or 

before the date their answer is due.

6. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than thirty days from the date their answer is due, Defendants shall file 

a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants file a motion for 

summary judgment, it shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in 

all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case 

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date the 

summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on 

Plaintiff. 

At the time of filing the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, 

Defendants shall comply with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th 

Cir. 2012), and provide Plaintiff with notice of what is required of him to oppose a summary 

judgment motion. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive 

motion shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight days after 

the date on which Defendants’ motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice 

should be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have 

your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material 

fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your 

case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 

which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary 

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot 

simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in 

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as 

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 7 of 9
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not 

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be 

entered against you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the defendants], your 

case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Before filing his opposition, Plaintiff is advised to read the notice that will be provided to 

him by Defendants when the motion is filed, and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come 

forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his 

claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving his allegations in this 

case, he must be prepared to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files his 

opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Such evidence may include sworn 

declarations from himself and other witnesses to the incident, and copies of documents 

authenticated by sworn declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply 

by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen days after the date 

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

7. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 

depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants, or 

Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.

9. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court informed 

of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion.

10. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. Any 

motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen days prior to the deadline 

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 8 of 9
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2015 ______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:15-cv-00078-KAW Document 13 Filed 09/04/15 Page 9 of 9