Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01755/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01755-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORDAN FAGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; and 

DOES 1–20,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-01755-GEB-KJN

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant County of Sacramento (“County”) seeks 

dismissal of Plaintiff Jordan Fagan’s Complaint, under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), “for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Notice of Mot. and 

Mot. to Dismiss Compl. 1:22–23, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s Complaint 

alleges a single claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the 

County and Doe defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–29, ECF No. 1.)

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following factual allegations in the Complaint 

concern the motion:

On July 24, 2014, while being detained at 

Sacrament[o] County Jail, Plaintiff was 

handcuffed and being transferred from one 

room to another by two Sheriff Deputies. A 

third Sheriff’s deputy then came and swept 

Plaintiff[’]s feet from underneath him. 

Plaintiff hit the ground face first causing 

him to break three of his front teeth, along 

with a large laceration underneath his bottom 

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lip. As a result, Plaintiff received eleven 

stitches to the close up the laceration 

underneath his bottom lip and is undergoing 

multiple dental treatments to fix his three 

broken teeth. 

(Compl. ¶ 9) “Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Sheriff’s 

Department immediately following the incident and after being 

informed by a Sherriff’s Department employee that filing a 

complaint was the proper procedure. Plaintiff received a letter 

from the Sherriff’s Department, dated December 2, 2014, 

sustaining his complaint.” (Compl. ¶ 10.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. 

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires 

the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common 

sense.” Id. at 679. Further, “the court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, nor make unwarranted deductions or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Secs. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

Specifically, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [a 

§ 1983 municipal liability claim], ‘a bare allegation that 

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government officials’ conduct conformed to some unidentified 

government policy or custom’ is insufficient; instead, 

plaintiffs’ complaint must include ‘factual allegations 

that . . . plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that 

it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to 

the expense of discovery and continued litigation.’” Shelley v. 

Cty. of San Joaquin, 954 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 

637 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The County argues Plaintiff’s Complaint should be 

dismissed, arguing, inter alia, “[t]here is no respondeat 

superior liability for municipalities under Section 1983” and 

“the [C]omplaint alleges no factual material showing the 

existence of a County policy or custom that was deliberately 

indifferent to [P]laintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Mem. P. & 

A. ISO Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 2:6–7, 2:26, 3:16–17, ECF 

No. 5-1.)

Plaintiff agrees the County’s “legal analysis appears 

to have merit” and “[a]t present, Plaintiff cannot articulate 

additional facts to support the culpability of the moving party.” 

(Pl.’s P.&A. ISO Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”) 1:23, 3:12–14, ECF 

No. 7.) However, Plaintiff argues, inter alia, the County’s 

“motion to dismiss should be denied until Plaintiff has had 

reasonable time to conduct discovery.” (Opp’n 4:2–4.)

The Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of 

Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that 

“[m]unicipalities are considered ‘persons’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

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and thus may be liable for a constitutional deprivation.” Waggy 

v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). However, “it is only when 

execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury 

that the municipality as an entity is responsible.” Id.

(alteration removed) (citation omitted). “[A] municipality cannot 

be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, that 

is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Anderson v. Warner, 

451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Therefore, “[Plaintiff] must [plausibly allege] (1) 

that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was 

deprived; (2) that the [County] had a policy; (3) that the policy 

amounts to deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff’s] 

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Id. (emphasis added) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint: “The Defendants to 

this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting pursuant to 

municipal/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation, 

widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining 

to [Plaintiff].” (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations “simply recite the elements of 

a [Monell] cause of action, . . . [and do not] contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable 

the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Hernandez, 666 

F.3d at 637. 

///

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IV. CONCLUSION

Since Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim 

against the County, the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint against it is granted. Plaintiff is granted fourteen 

(14) days from the date on which this order is filed to file a 

First Amended Complaint addressing the referenced deficiencies.

Plaintiff is notified that this action may be dismissed with 

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) if 

Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the 

prescribed time period.

Dated: January 6, 2016

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