Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00706/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00706-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ADAMS,

CDCR #F-92755,

Civil No. 10cv0706 MMA (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING

FEE AND GARNISHING BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[Doc. No. 2]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b);

AND

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR

COURT TO SERVE SUMMONS AS

MOOT 

[Doc. No. 3]

vs.

DR. ARAB; AL LOPEZ; K. BALL;

D. HJERPE; J. WALKER; LARRY

SMALL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

UNITED STATES FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT; DOES 1-20, 

Defendants.

Paul Adams (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison

located in Calipatria, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant

Case 3:10-cv-00706-CAB-BLM Document 6 Filed 05/06/10 Page 1 of 7
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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for Court to Serve

Summons Upon the Defendants.” [Doc. No. 3]

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [DOC. NO. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee

in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), further

requires that each prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP submit a “certified copy of [his] trust

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). The institution having custody

of the prisoner must collect payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any

month in which his account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his prison trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account

currently indicates that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Thus, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and assesses

no initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, Plaintiff is

required to pay the full $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(b)(1), by

subjecting any future funds credited to his prison trust account to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

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of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

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other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

First, Plaintiff names the State of California as a Defendant in this matter. The State of

California is entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages actions under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); see also Hale v. State of Arizona,

993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is not a

“person” within the meaning of § 1983). In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must

identify a “person” who, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution or a federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the State of California are

DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

Based on the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears that he suffered from

a gunshot wound in 1997 and the “bullet was left in on the left side of [Plaintiff’s] neck.”

See Compl., Ex. 1, Interdisciplinary Progress Note dated May 6, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that the

pain from the bullet worsened over time and he was scheduled for surgery to remove the bullet.

See Id. at 4. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Arab, who was to perform the surgery, on three

occasions. Id. However, Plaintiff believes that Dr. Arab refused to answer his questions and

that he was “mean and moody and hated being in the prison office helping people.” Id. Plaintiff

then sought assistance from Dr. Lopez who informed Plaintiff that his questions regarding his

surgery were “irrelevant.” Id. at 5. 

 In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege facts which

are sufficient to show that each person sued was “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). Prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff’s pain or medical

needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient

to show both: (1) an objectively “serious” medical need, i.e., one that a reasonable doctor would

think worthy of comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is

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chronic and accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546

(9th Cir. 1994); and (2) a subjective, and “sufficiently culpable” state of mind on the part of

each individual Defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). In other words,

Plaintiff must plead facts that show Defendants knew of his “serious” need for medical attention

and that each one nevertheless disregarded his need despite the excessive risk posed to his

health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, a mere

difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate

medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim.

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations and the

documents attached to his Complaint indicate that prison officials did offer to perform surgery

for his medical condition. Plaintiff rejected the surgery because he did not believe that Dr. Arab

was answering his questions in a satisfactory manner. The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint reflect

a disagreement between his prison doctors and Plaintiff, and thus, these claims simply do not

rise to the level of “deliberate indifference.” Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

inadequate medical care claims are DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A.

Plaintiff also names a number of Defendants that he appears to seek to hold liable in their

supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

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issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pled,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against any of the supervisory defendants.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

/ / /

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the State of California are

DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

5. The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for

seeking monetary damages against immune defendants and for failing to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff

is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a

First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Serve Summons Upon the Defendants [Doc. No.

3] is DENIED as moot.

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: May 6, 2010

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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