Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-03026/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-03026-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

JESSE FRANK OGLESBY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS [ECF No. 21]

vs.

LELAND MCEWEN, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(1) of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court RECOMMENDS the Motion To Dismiss be GRANTED. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jesse Frank Oglesby (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Lancaster Prison in Lancaster, California. (ECF No. 6). 

On December 27, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was housed

at Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”) in 2010. (ECF No. 1). On

- 1 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

February 21, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis but dismissed the Complaint without prejudice for failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 3). On

April 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4). 

On June 7, 2012, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 5). 

On July 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint naming

nine defendants. (ECF No. 6). On January 31, 2013, Defendants Perez,

Finder, and Ortiz answered. (ECF No. 20). Also on January 31, 2013,

Defendants Gray, Belavich, Crow, Banaga-Bugarin, Zamora, and

McEwen (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 21). 

After numerous extensions, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss on May 1, 2013. (ECF No. 33). On May 25, 2013,

Plaintiff moved to withdraw his Opposition and requested leave to amend

and re-file. (ECF No. 35). The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and set a

deadline of June 24, 2013, for Plaintiff to file an amended Opposition. 

(Id.). Plaintiff did not meet this deadline. On July 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed

a “Motion for Reconsideration” requesting another extension of the

deadline for his amended Opposition. (ECF No. 43). On July 10, 2013, a

Mandatory Settlement Conference was held and Plaintiff participated

telephonically. No settlement was reached, however the parties used the

opportunity to discuss matters before the Court, including Plaintiff’s

request for an extension. On July 12, 2013, the Court issued an order

setting a new deadline of July 26, 2013. (ECF No. 45). In its order, the

Court warned Plaintiff that if it did not receive an amended Opposition

by this new deadline, the Court would construe Plaintiff’s previously filed

Opposition as the operative pleading. (Id.). Plaintiff did not meet this

deadline. Instead, on July 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed yet another motion to

- 2 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

extend the deadline. (ECF No. 50). Due to the numerous deadlines

Plaintiff has already missed, the Court is disinclined to grant another

extension. Thus, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s previously filed

Opposition as the operative pleading and take Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss under submission. (See ECF Nos. 33, 45). Plaintiff should note

that he has the opportunity to file an objection to this Report and

Recommendation within 14 days of being served with a copy. (Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2)). 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint and are not to be construed as findings of fact by the Court. 

In this civil rights action, Plaintiff makes two claims. First, Plaintiff

alleges that the Defendants engaged in cruel and unusual punishment

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment by demonstrating

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (ECF No. 6). Second,

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants conspired to commit this

constitutional violation. (Id.). 

On an unspecified date in 2010, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Perez, a licensed vocational nurse at Calipatria, provided him the wrong

medication in the morning medication line at the “A-Yard Clinic.” (ECF

No. 6 at 5). Plaintiff claims he was incorrectly provided with another

inmate’s medication which included doses of Robaxin, Neurontin, Tylenol

#3, and Toradol (hereinafter the “medication incident”). (Id.). After

receiving the medication, Plaintiff returned to his cell. (Id.). 

Two hours later, a guard allegedly came to Plaintiff’s cell and asked

him to return to the A-Yard Clinic because he had been “administer[sic]

the wrong medication in overdose.” (Id.). At this time, Plaintiff claims

he was feeling sluggish. (Id.). Upon returning to the A-Yard Clinic,

- 3 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Perez told him he was “high.” (Id. at 6). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Perez explained that she and her

supervisor, Defendant Ortiz, a Registered Nurse at Calipatria, wanted to

check Plaintiff’s vitals. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that after checking his

vitals, Defendant Perez went into an office to speak with Defendant

Ortiz. (Id.). Plaintiff claims they returned together and again told

Plaintiff that he was “high.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Perez and Ortiz

explained they could send him to get his stomach pumped, but they were

sure Plaintiff did not want that. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Perez and

Ortiz did not take any additional steps to address Plaintiff’s adverse

reaction at that time. (Id.). Instead, Plaintiff claims he was sent back to

his cell. (Id.). 

After returning to his cell, Plaintiff claims he experienced

drowsiness and shortness of breath. (Id. at 7). At some point thereafter,

Plaintiff’s cellmate went to the A-Yard Clinic to inform Defendant Perez

that Plaintiff was unable to walk, was complaining of drowsiness, and

was extremely sleepy. (Id.). Prison guards came to help Plaintiff out of

his cell and transport him to the “Trauma Center” which appears to be

another medical facility at Calipatria. (Id.). At the Trauma Center,

Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Estock who is not a Defendant in this suit. 

(Id.). Dr. Estock allegedly informed Plaintiff that her supervisor did not

want to send him to an outside hospital. (Id.). Although Plaintiff does

not provide further factual detail, he was presumably treated at the

Trauma Center and later released. As a result of the medication

incident, and the alleged failure to treat his subsequent overdose,

Plaintiff contends he suffers seizures and chronic anxiety. (Id.). Plaintiff

reports that he continues to suffer from muscle control and speech issues. 

(Id.). 

- 4 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff also alleges there was a conspiracy to deny him adequate

medical care and to cover up the medication incident altogether. (Id.). 

Plaintiff claims that after the incident, his medical records were altered

to falsely reflect he had a history of seizures when, in fact, he did not

experience seizures until after the incident occurred. (Id.). Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Crow, the Chief Medical Executive at

Calipatria, conspired to violate his constitutional rights by allowing his

medical records to remain incorrect. (ECF No. 6 at 8). Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendant McEwen, the Warden of Calipatria, failed to

ensure the prison employees provided adequate medical care to

prisoners. (Id. at 7). 

Plaintiff claims to have completed the administrative appeal

process challenging his treatment. (ECF No. 6). During this process,

Plaintiff alleges that the prison appeals staff also conspired to deny him

adequate medical care. (Id.). The alleged conspiracy consisted of

allowing his medical records to incorrectly reflect he had a history of

seizures prior to the medication incident. (Id. at 3). Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Banaga-Bugarin, the Health Care Appeals

Coordinator at Calipatria, “acted to protect the ongoing conspiracy.” 

(Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Zamora, the Chief of

California Prison Health Care Services for healthcare appeals,

participated in the conspiracy when she too allowed his medical records

to remain incorrect and failed to find actionable misconduct by other

defendants. (Id. at 8).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 ((9th

Cir. 2001). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires only “a short and plain statement

- 5 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts

are not necessary; the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct,. 99 (1957). However,

the Supreme Court has explained that the ‘plain statement’ must possess

enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557 (2007). Thus, while specific detail is not required, every

complaint must, at a minimum, plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 500 U.S. at 556). 

The court must assume the truth of the facts which are presented

and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A pro se party’s pleadings should be construed liberally. Id. However, the

court is not required to “accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal citation omitted). The court may not “supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a civil rights violation pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 6). Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of

- 6 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct

deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by

the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 642 (2004). 

A. Eighth Amendment Violation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights when they provided him the incorrect medication and then failed to

provide adequate medical care to treat his alleged subsequent overdose. 

“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him

there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding

duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” 

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200

(1989). Medical care is one of the responsibilities placed on the State

because a prisoner “must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical

needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In order to assert a

claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts which are

sufficient to show that each person sued was “deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993);

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. 

A prisoner must satisfy two components to demonstrate an Eighth

Amendment violation, an objective component and a subjective

component. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). First, the

objective component requires the Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to show

an objectively “serious” medical need. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37

F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, the subjective component requires

the Plaintiff allege facts that, if true, demonstrate a “sufficiently culpable”

state of mind on the part of each individual Defendant. See Wilson, 501

U.S. at 299.

- 7 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Serious Medical Need

The objective component requires Plaintiff’s allegations be sufficient

to demonstrate, if proven, a serious medical need. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at

297. A serious medical need is demonstrated by a showing that the

“failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” Jett v. Penner,

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was provided the wrong medication in the

morning medication line and experienced adverse effects shortly

thereafter. (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff claims that he suffered from a drug

overdose which made him drowsy, sluggish, and gave him shortness of

breath. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that on the day of the medication incident,

he lost control of his muscles, vision, and speaking ability. (Id.). As a

result of the incident, and the Defendants’ alleged failure to provide

subsequent adequate medical care, Plaintiff contends that he has seizures

and suffers from chronic anxiety. (Id.). Plaintiff also reports that he

continues to suffer from muscle control and speech issues. (Id.). 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a serious medical need to satisfy the

objective component of his Eighth Amendment allegation. 

2. Deliberate Indifference

The subjective component requires Plaintiff’s allegations be

sufficient to demonstrate, if proven, that each defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Wilson, 501 U.S. at

299. Defendants Perez, Finder, and Ortiz, who were directly involved in

the medication incident, have answered Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint and are not subject to the motion to dismiss. (See ECF Nos.

20, 21). Plaintiff does not allege that the subject Defendants were directly

involved in the administration of the incorrect medication or the failure to

- 8 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treat his alleged subsequent overdose. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the

Defendants are vicariously liable based on their various positions of

authority within the prison system. 

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she

denies, delays, or interferes with the treatment of a prisoner’s serious

medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “This is true whether the

indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the

prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once

prescribed.” Id. “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more

blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835

(1994). Thus, prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond

to a plaintiff’s pain or medical needs; neither an inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care, nor mere negligence or medical

malpractice constitutes a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105-106. 

A plaintiff must show personal involvement by the defendant in the

alleged incidents forming the constitutional injury. Milton v. Nelson, 527

F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1975). A defendant cannot be liable under 

§ 1983 unless the defendant caused or participated in conduct violating a

plaintiff’s federal rights. Monnell v. Dept. of Social Service of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. For a

supervisor to be liable for constitutional violations, a plaintiff must show

that the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional

deprivation or that there is a “sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v.

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

- 9 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a. Defendants Gray and Belavich

Plaintiff identifies Defendant Gray as a Senior Registered Nurse at

Calipatria. (ECF No. 6 at 2). Plaintiff identifies Defendant Belavich as

the Chief Medical Executive Officer at Lancaster State Prison. (Id. at 3). 

Notably, Defendant Belavich does not work at Calipatria where Plaintiff

alleges the deliberate indifference occurred. (Id.). The only mention of

Gray and Belavich in the Second Amended Complaint is in Plaintiff’s list

of named Defendants. (ECF No. 6 at 2, 3). Under each of their names,

Plaintiff provides a short explanation of how they acted under color of

law. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gray and Belavich “violate

the Plaintiff Health & Safety under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment’s. With Deliberate Indifference.” (Id.). 

 Plaintiff fails to provide any additional factual allegations regarding

either Defendant’s involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. 

Neither Defendant, nor their alleged role, is mentioned in Plaintiff’s

statement of facts. (Id. at 5-9). Plaintiff does not explain how either

Defendant was personally involved in administering the incorrect

medication or the alleged denial of subsequent treatment. There are no

factual allegations suggesting that either Defendant “caused” or

“participated in” the conduct that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting the

contention that Defendants Gray or Belavich purposefully denied,

delayed, or interfered with the treatment of his serious medical needs. 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth

Amendment claim against either Defendant Gray or Defendant Belavich.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims against Defendants Gray and Belavich. 

- 10 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

b. Defendant Crow

Plaintiff identifies Defendant Crow as the Chief Medical Executive

at Calipatria. (ECF No. 6 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Crow

“[v]iolate the Plaintiff Health & Safety under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment’s. With Deliberate Indifference.” (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Crow allowed Plaintiff’s medical records to falsely

reflect he had a history of seizures prior to the medication incident. (Id.

at 8). As a result, Plaintiff claims he is now dependent on “seizure

medication and other medication to prevent recurrence.” (Id.). 

 Plaintiff fails to provide any additional factual allegations regarding

Defendant Crow’s involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant Crow was personally involved in

administering the incorrect medication or the alleged denial of subsequent

treatment. There are no factual allegations suggesting that Defendant

Crow “caused” or “participated in” the conduct that allegedly violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff alleges his medical

records were falsified, he does not identify who falsified his medical

records. Nor does Plaintiff explain how or when Defendant Crow learned

that Plaintiff’s medical records were incorrect. Further, Plaintiff fails to

explain how the alleged inaccuracies demonstrate a deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs by Defendant Crow. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting the contention that

Defendant Crow purposefully denied, delayed, or interfered with the

treatment of his serious medical needs. Thus, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant Crow. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Crow.

- 11 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

c. Defendant Banaga-Bugarin

Plaintiff identifies Defendant Banaga-Bugarin as the Health Care

Appeals Coordinator at Calipatria. (ECF No. 6 at 3). Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Banaga-Bugarin “[v]iolate the Plaintiff Health & Safety

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment’s . . . With Deliberate

Indifference . . .” (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Banaga-Bugarin worked with the other named defendants to prevent the

Plaintiff “from receiving Adequate Medical Care.” (Id. at 8). Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendant Banaga-Bugarin allowed Plaintiff’s medical

records to falsely reflect he had a history of seizures prior to the

medication incident. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff fails to provide any additional factual allegations regarding

Defendant Banaga-Bugarin’s involvement in the alleged constitutional

violation. Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant Banaga-Bugarin was

personally involved in administering the incorrect

medication or the alleged denial of subsequent treatment. There are no

factual allegations suggesting that Defendant Banaga-Bugarin “caused”

or “participated in” the conduct that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff alleges his medical records were

falsified, he does not identify who falsified his medical records. Nor does

Plaintiff explain how or when Defendant Banaga-Bugarin learned that

Plaintiff’s medical records were incorrect. Further, Plaintiff fails to

explain how the alleged inaccuracies demonstrate a deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs by Defendant Banaga-Bugarin. 

 Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting the contention that

Defendant Banaga-Bugarin purposefully denied, delayed, or interfered

with the treatment of his serious medical needs. Thus, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against

- 12 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant Banaga-Bugarin. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Banaga-Bugarin.

d. Defendant Zamora

Plaintiff identifies Defendant Zamora as the Chief of California

Prison Health Care Services, Office of Third Level of Appeals in

Sacramento, California. (ECF No. 6 at 4). Notably, Defendant Zamora

does not work at Calipatria where Plaintiff alleges the deliberate

indifference occurred. (Id.). However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Zamora “[v]iolate the Plaintiff Health & Safety under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments; With Deliberate Indifference . . .” (Id.). 

Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Zamora

demonstrated deliberate indifference to his medical needs when she

denied Plaintiff’s internal prison appeal. (Id. at 8). 

Plaintiff fails to provide any additional factual allegations regarding

Defendant Zamora’s involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant Zamora was personally involved

in administering the incorrect medication or the alleged denial of

subsequent treatment. There are no factual allegations suggesting that

Defendant Zamora “caused” or “participated in” the conduct that allegedly

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Zamora should have ruled there was

actionable misconduct by other defendants when she reviewed his

internal prison appeal. (Id.). Prisoners do have a First Amendment right

to file prison grievances. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.

2003). However, there is no constitutional right to a particular outcome of

that grievance process. Plaintiff does not explain how denial of his

internal appeal demonstrates a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

- 13 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medical needs by Defendant Zamora. Plaintiff fails to allege facts

suggesting that Zamora denied his appeal in an effort to deny, delay, or

interfere with the treatment of his serious medical needs. Thus, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Zamora.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendant Zamora.

e. Defendant McEwen

Plaintiff identifies Defendant McEwen as the Warden of Calipatria

State Prison. (ECF No. 6 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McEwen

“[v]iolate the Plaintiff Health and Safety under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments . . . With Deliberate Indifference . . .” (Id.).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McEwen failed to ensure

that the prison employees provided prisoners with adequate medical care. 

(Id. at 7-8). To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant

McEwen is based on a theory of respondeat superior, this is insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. See Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 676. 

“[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.” Id. “[A]

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. 

“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has developed a theory of direct liability based on the

supervisor’s “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,

or control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a

- 14 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” See Starr v. Baca,

652 F.3d 1202, 1206-1207 (9th Cir. 2011). A defendant may be held liable

as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation.” Id. 

Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant McEwen was personally

involved in administering the incorrect medication or the alleged denial of

subsequent treatment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant McEwen

generally failed to ensure that the prison employees provided prisoners

with adequate medical care. Plaintiff provides no factual allegations to

support that contention. Plaintiff does not identify a specific wrongful act

by Defendant McEwen, nor does he allege a causal connection between a

wrongful act and the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not

allege any facts supporting the contention that Defendant McEwen

purposefully denied, delayed, or interfered with the treatment of his

serious medical needs. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant McEwen.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant McEwen.

B. Conspiracy

Plaintiff also broadly claims that each Defendant conspired to

commit a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff states, without any factual support, that they engaged in a

conspiracy “to cover up the fact that Plaintiff was indeed put in harm.” 

(ECF No. 6). 

“Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” Lacey v.

- 15 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012). However, an alleged

conspiracy can demonstrate a particular defendant’s causal relationship

to an underlying constitutional tort. Id. To plead a conspiracy under §

1983, a plaintiff must first allege “an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’

to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865

F.2d 1539, 1540-1541 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege an

actual deprivation of a constitutional right. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059,

1071 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must state specific facts to support the

existence of the claimed conspiracy. See Burns v. County of King, 883

F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are

insufficient to support a claim under section 1983. See Aldabe v. Aldabe,

616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging a

conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights must include in his

complaint nonconclusory allegations containing evidence of unlawful

intent. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). To be

liable, each participant in the alleged conspiracy need not know the exact

details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common

objective of the conspiracy. Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441. A conspiracy can

be shown by circumstantial evidence. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster,

177 F.3d 839 at 857-858 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the ability and

opportunity to conspire are insufficient, without more, to prove the

existence of a conspiracy. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge

Corp. 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-1541 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has failed to plead any specific facts to support the

existence of this claimed conspiracy. Plaintiff makes a conclusory

allegation that the Defendants conspired “to cover up the fact that

- 16 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff was indeed put in harm.” (ECF No. 6 at 9). Plaintiff simply

states that each Defendant “conspired to violate the Plaintiff Health &

Safety under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment’s. With Deliberate

Indifference.” (See id. at 2-4). Plaintiff does not assert that any of the

Defendants met, that they discussed Plaintiff’s medical needs, or that the

Defendants made an agreement to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff also fails to allege that the Defendants acted with unlawful

intent or had a shared objective. Plaintiff provides no factual detail that

would support a claim of conspiracy against any Defendant. Thus, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a conspiracy claim that is

plausible on its face. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Conspiracy claims against

Defendants Gray, Belavich, Crow, Banaga-Bugarin, Zamora, and

McEwen.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

Claims against Defendants Gray, Belavich, Crow, Banaga-Bugarin,

Zamora, and McEwen be GRANTED, and Plaintiff given leave to amend

those claims.

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claims

against Defendants Gray, Belavich, Crow, Banaga-Bugarin, Zamora, and

McEwen be GRANTED, and Plaintiff given leave to amend those claims.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than August 21, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

- 17 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall

be filed with the Court and served on all partied no later than August 28,

2013. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 31, 2013

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

- 18 - 11-cv-3026-DMS-MDD

Case 3:11-cv-03026-DMS-MDD Document 51 Filed 07/31/13 Page 18 of 18