Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01418/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01418-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TONY MARTINEZ,

CASE NO. CIV. S-05-1418 WBS PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

DEL TACO INC. dba DEL TACO

#178; CT RETAIL PROPERTIES

FINANCE V, LLC.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Tony Matinez alleges that defendants Del Taco

Inc. and CT Retail Properties Finance V, LLC, violated Title III

of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§

12101-12300, and various California statutes in the course of

operating a restaurant. Having closed the facility at issue,

defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56.

///

///

///

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2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this suit on July 14, 2005, alleging

that “barriers (both physical and intangible) . . . interfered

with--if not outright denied--his ability to use and enjoy the

goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at”

defendants’ Del Taco #178, located at 6021 Mack Road, Sacramento,

California. (Compl.¶¶ 1, 10.) A paraplegic who “requires the use

of a wheelchair and mobility equipped vehicle when traveling

about in public,” plaintiff identified several “elements and

areas of the Restaurant [that] were inaccessible” and sought

injunctive relief under the ADA and damages under state law. 

(Id. ¶¶ 8, 13.)

 However, on December 7, 2005, defendants shuttered Del

Taco #178 and consequently rendered plaintiff’s ADA claim moot. 

(Albright Decl. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 2

(conceding that this fact is undisputed).) Additionally,

defendants do not plan to reopen the restaurant. (Albright Decl.

¶ 6.) Arguing that the only obvious federal question in this

case (plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under the ADA) is

no longer at issue, defendants now urge the court to decline to

continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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At least in his first opposition brief, plaintiff 1

seemed to take this position. However, on January 30, 2006,

plaintiff filed a “supplemental” opposition brief in which he

presented several counter-arguments that he failed to make in his

original opposition brief. Among these arguments, plaintiff

included a request for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). 

“Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), if affidavits needed to

support an opposition to a summary judgment motion are

unavailable at the time of the motion for summary judgment, the

court may refuse to issue the judgment or may order a continuance

to allow such affidavits or depositions as are needed to be

taken.” Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d

1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff contends that further

discovery is necessary to respond to defendants’ arguments that

removal of barriers at Del Taco #178 was not “readily

achievable.”

Now that the business has closed, for purposes of ADA

injunctive relieve, whether removal of barriers was readily

achievable is completely irrelevant. Because a continuance under

Rule 56(f) is only warranted when the evidence sought through

additional discovery will be “essential” to the non-moving

party’s ability to resist a motion for summary judgment,

plaintiff is not entitled to such relief here. Terrell v.

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a

continuance is warranted only when “essential facts that would

defeat the summary judgment motion” are thought to be

discoverable). 

As an aside, the court notes that this is the second

time in just as many weeks that plaintiff’s counsel has filed

3

56(c). Significantly, the ADA only charges the operators of

public accommodations with a duty to “remove architectural

barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable” and

further provides only one remedy for private plaintiffs:

injunctive relief. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Consequently, when

a defendant is no longer interested in or involved with a place

of public accommodation, the plaintiff’s ADA claim becomes moot

and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See Wander v.

Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

The parties do not dispute that summary judgment on

plaintiff’s ADA claim in favor of defendants is warranted.1

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additional briefs not permitted by the court’s standard motion

practice, which, as a reminder, allows for a moving brief, an

opposition, and a reply. Counsel would be well advised to adhere

to the proper etiquette of motion practice in the future.

California’s Unruh Act and its Disabled Persons Act 2

both incorporate the federal law prohibiting discrimination

against disabled persons. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A violation

of the right of any individual under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also

constitute a violation of this section.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c)

(“A violation of the right of an individual under the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) also

constitutes a violation of this section.”).

4

Having ceased operations, defendants are not required to make

structural changes to a site that no longer accommodates the

public. Plaintiff’s ADA claim will therefore be dismissed. 

Because plaintiff’s only remaining claims arise from state law

provisions, the court ordinarily would next dismiss plaintiff’s

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing a

district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction . . . .”); Ballard v. Equifax Check

Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 599 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see also Acri

v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]

federal district court with power to hear state law claims has

discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions

set out in § 1367(c).”).

Anticipating this outcome however, plaintiff argues

that the court should consider whether California’s disability

discrimination laws, which incorporate standards from the ADA,

present civil claims that “arise under” the laws of the United

States. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 1 (“Plaintiff 2

is . . . well aware that this Court will decline supplemental

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jurisdiction if original federal jurisdiction is lost.”).) 

Although the Ninth Circuit definitively rejected plaintiff’s

position in Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2002),

plaintiff urges the court to reconsider that decision in light of

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &

Manufacturing, 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005).

B. Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claims

1. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have

original jurisdiction over all claims arising under laws of

United States. Clear examples of such “federal question” cases

include those “in which federal law creates a cause of action.” 

Wander, 304 F.3d at 858. However, the presence of a federal

issue in a state law claim can also, under the right

circumstances, present a federal question. See Franchise Tax Bd.

of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463

U.S. 1, 13 (1983).

 The Supreme Court has historically resisted pressure to

create a bright line test for courts to use to identify state law

claims that present federal questions. Grable, 125 S. Ct. at

2368, 2370 (discussing Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478

U.S. 804 (1986)). Recently, however, the Court at least provided

a clearer framework for making such determinations. In Grable &

Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,

the Court directed lower courts to consider (1) whether the

federal aspect of the claim is actually in dispute, (2) whether

the federal issue is “a substantial one, indicating a serious

federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be

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inherent in a federal forum”, (3) whether the exercise of federal

jurisdiction will disrupt federal jurisdiction by flooding

federal courts with state claims, and (4) whether there is

evidence that Congress did not intend to provide a federal cause

of action for violation of the incorporated federal statute. Id.

at 2367-68, 2370. Applying this framework, the Court determined

in Grable that a landowner’s quiet title claim against a tax sale

purchaser, which alleged that the IRS, pursuant to federal law,

provided inadequate notice to the owner before the sale, involved

“an important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a

federal court.” Id. at 2368. In evaluating the particular

statute at issue in Grable, significant considerations included

that the entire outcome hinged on the meaning of the incorporated

federal statute, that the federal government had a significant

interest in the particular dispute, and that only a limited

number of quiet title cases will actually raise a contested

matter of federal law. Id. at 2358.

Despite the fact that Grable did not purport to

overrule any of its prior precedents on federal question

jurisdiction, plaintiff insists that the decision worked a major

change in Ninth Circuit law. Specifically, plaintiff argues that

Grable implicitly overruled Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d at 857

(holding “that there is no federal-question jurisdiction over a

lawsuit for damages brought under California’s Disabled Persons

Act, even though the California statute makes a violation of the

[ADA] a violation of state law.”). Plaintiff seems to draw this

conclusion from the mere fact that the losing party in Grable

cited to Wander in its briefs and the Court failed to adopt

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In Merrell Dow, the alleged misbranding of a drug in 3

violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)

was expected to be relevant in an analysis of a plaintiff’s state

law negligence claim. However, the Court held that the fact that

the federal definition of misbranding would be at issue did not

transform a state law cause of action into a federal question,

especially in light of Congress’ decision to deny a private,

federal right to sue for a violation of the statute. 478 U.S. at

819.

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petitioner’s position. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.

8-9.)

In Wander, the defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s

case against them, which was based on allegations that the

business complex they owned included structural barriers that

discriminated against the disabled. 304 F.3d at 857. The

defendants had sold the complex and consequently, as in this

case, injunctive relief under the ADA was no longer at issue;

only California state law claims, including claims under the

Disabled Persons Act, remained. Id. at 858. Affirming the

district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court focused on

Congress’ intentional provision of only injunctive relief under

the ADA and “the nature of the federal interest at stake.” Id.

at 858-59. Largely by way of analogy to the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Merrell Dow, the Wander court concluded that “the 3

exercise of federal question jurisdiction under these

circumstances would fly in the face of clear congressional

intent.” Id. at 859.

Simply put, Grable did not overrule Wander. The clear

message of Grable is that there is still no bright line rule

capable of identifying federal jurisdiction in a case based on

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state law claims. Both before and after Grable, the inquiry was,

and remains, a contextual one that is sensitive to the particular

statute at issue. 125 S. Ct. at 2371. As the Court noted,

“federal issue” is not “a password opening federal courts to any

state action embracing a point of federal law.” Id. at 2368.

Plaintiff’s argument also ignores the Court’s

conclusion that Merrell Dow, the authority primarily relied on in

Wander, was not at odds with Grable. Although Merrell Dow could

have been read to support the proposition that Congress’ failure

to provide a federal cause of action means that state law, by

incorporating the federal standard and providing a cause of

action, cannot create federal jurisdiction, Grable pointed out

that when read as a whole, the rule in Merrell Dow is more

nuanced. Id. at 2369-70. Significantly, the Court observed that

Merrell Dow also examined “the federal interest at stake and the

implications of opening the federal forum.” Id. at 2369. Thus,

while Grable may have tempered Merrell Dow in some respects by

noting that the absence of a federal cause of action is “evidence

relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive judgments

about congressional intent,’” the Court in no way overruled its

prior decision. Id. at 2370; see also Id. at 2371 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (noting that the Court had “faithfully applie[d]

[its] precedents interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1331” and that “[i]n

this case, no one . . . asked us to overrule those precedents”).

Likewise, Grable in no way overruled Wander, where the

Ninth Circuit found the situation materially indistinguishable

from Merrell Dow. 304 F.3d at 859. Admittedly, Wander primarily

focused on Congress’ intent to bar from the federal forum ADA

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Given the substance of the ADA, it is not surprising 4

that the Ninth Circuit gave such weight to congressional intent

in Wander. Because the statute specifically allows the Attorney

General to pursue civil penalties and nowhere provides private

plaintiffs with a similar right, it is obvious that Congress

sought to limit the damages available under the ADA. 42 U.S.C.

12188(b)(2)(B) (monetary damages available only “when requested

by the Attorney General”). Morever, the legislative history

could not be any clearer: under the ADA “[t]he court does not

have authority to award monetary damages in situations where such

relief is not requested by the Attorney General.” H.R. Rep. No.

101-485 (III), at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,

491. In the case of the ADA, Congress not only failed to provide

a private right to recover damages, but rather explicitly

rejected this proposal. Recognizing a federal question based on

state laws that provide such a right would be an affront to

congressional intent.

This position is not, as plaintiff contends, contrary

to Congress’ stated goal for the ADA: “to assure equality of

opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic

self-sufficiency for . . . individuals [with disabilities].” 42

U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). Specifically regarding Title III of the

ADA, Congress’ goal, to assure equal access to public

accommodations, can be fully accomplished through injunctive

relief that requires compliance with certain structural and

procedural standards. Congress determined that punishment,

through an award of damages, is only necessary in the most

egregious cases. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III), at 67 (1990),

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 490 (noting that action by

the Attorney General, who is authorized to sue for damages, is

appropriate if someone engages in a “pattern or practice of

resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by

this title . . . [or] if such denial raises an issue of general

public importance.”). 

9

actions for damages. But Wander also cited to a discussion from 4

one of this court’s prior orders, opining that the ADA issues in

California law “are not ‘substantial’ enough in the context of a

claim for damages to confer federal question jurisdiction.” 

Pickern v. Best W. Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 194 F. Supp.

2d 1128, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2002); see also Wander, 304 F.3d at 860

(quoting Pickern: “[T]he question of damages [under California

law] becomes the tail that wags the dog of the ADA issues.”).

Furthermore, it seems clear to this court that treating

state disability claims under laws that incorporate the ADA as

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federal questions would have a significant effect on the federalstate division of labor. 125 S. Ct. at 2368. In Grable, a

limited number of state title cases, those where the Government

seeks “to vindicate its own administrative action” based on

federal tax proceedings, were classified as federal questions. 

Id. Plaintiff’s proposal here is not nearly so limited. 

Plaintiff would have this court establish that all suits under

state laws incorporating the ADA present federal questions. Such

a rule could significantly expand federal jurisdiction over

disability law and would certainly disrupt the balance between

federal and state courts in addressing this problem. See H.R.

Rep. No. 101-485 (III), at 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493 (recognizing that section 501 of the ADA

allows states to develop alternative laws with greater remedies). 

Moreover, as this court has already noted, “[s]uch a rule would

have the impermissible effect of allowing state legislation to

expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Pickern, 194 F.

Supp. 2d at 1133.

In sum, although the state law claims in the instant

case may involve a dispute regarding whether defendants violated

plaintiff’s rights under federal law, this court has held, and

the Ninth Circuit has implicitly recognized, that the role of the

ADA in California’s disability laws is not significant. 

Moreover, to assume federal jurisdiction over damages claims

based on a violation of the ADA would flout congressional intent. 

In addition, such action would disrupt the distinctions between

federal and state jurisdiction over disability discrimination

issues. Consequently, while the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in

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Wander, in light of Grable, perhaps should have been more

comprehensive, its holding remains good law. See Miller v.

Gammie 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[To overrule circuit

precedent,] the relevant court of last resort must have undercut

the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in

such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.”). 

Accordingly, there remains “no federal-question jurisdiction over

a lawsuit for damages brought under California’s Disabled Persons

Act, even though the California statute makes a violation of the

[ADA] a violation of state law.” Wander, 304 F.3d at 857.

 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The court is now free to consider whether to decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law

claims. As noted, Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law

claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Factors for the court to consider in deciding whether to dismiss

supplemental state claims include judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976

F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). “[I]n the usual case in which

federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Reynolds v.

County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996) overruled

on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d at 1000. On prior occasions,

this court has noted that some circuits have gone even further

and held that, absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances,

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federal courts should not retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., Musson

Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th

Cir. 1996); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.

1993).

While litigation of a new suit in state court may

somewhat inconvenience plaintiff, plaintiff has made no showing

of extraordinary or unusual circumstances here. Accordingly, the

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) as to the remaining state law claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s remaining state

law claims be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

DATED: February 14, 2006

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