Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00606/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00606-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JUAN ROCHA, 

Petitioner,

v. 

NEIL MCDOWELL, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-00606-GPC-NLS 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED PETITION 

[Dkt. No. 20]; and 

(2) GRANTING MOTION TO HOLD 

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION IN 

ABEYANCE [Dkt. No. 14.] 

 Petitioner Juan Rocha, proceeding with counsel, filed a motion for leave to file his 

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (SAP). Along with the claims 

added to his First Amended Petition (FAP), he asks to add a newly exhausted claim and 

two unexhausted claims to his original claims. He also seeks to hold the SAP in 

abeyance while he exhausts the remaining two claims. Respondent opposes both 

motions. For the following reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that the district judge 

GRANT the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and GRANT the 

motion for stay and abeyance. 

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I. Procedural Background. 

On March 10, 2016, Rocha, represented by attorney Carl Fabian—who served as 

Rocha’s appointed counsel on direct appeal—filed his original Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Petition). It was given case number 16cv606-GPC. The Petition 

contained four exhausted claims and one unexhausted claim. 

Meanwhile, on March 14, 2016, Rocha, proceeding pro se, filed a different habeas 

petition containing four of the same claims as in the Petition filed by counsel. That 

petition was given case number 16cv638 and was constructively filed on March 9, 2016. 

On April 1, 2016 the ‘638 case was low-numbered to the ‘606 case. On April 6, 

2016, Charles Khoury substituted in as counsel on the ‘606 case. On May 11, 2016, 

Respondent filed an answer to the Petition in the ‘606 case. 

Rocha’s counsel asked for an extension of time to respond to the answer or 

otherwise file an appropriate pleading, such as a FAP accompanied by a motion for stay 

and abeyance. Rocha’s counsel said “opposing counsel has graciously stated he does not 

oppose this extension” to file the FAP and motion to stay and abey. The court granted 

the extension. Rocha, through counsel, filed a FAP on August 1, 2016, along with this 

motion for stay and abeyance. The FAP consisted of seven claims - the original five 

claims in the ‘606 case plus two new unexhausted claims. Respondent opposes the 

requested stay on the grounds that the new claims are untimely. 

On August 12, 2016 this court issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) for an 

order sua sponte consolidating the two habeas petitions because they attack the same 

criminal conviction, involve the same parties, and except for the new claims in the ‘606 

case, involve common questions that call for the same determinations of fact and law. 

That R&R is still under consideration by the district judge. 

On September 2, 2016, Rocha filed a motion for leave to file the SAP, which 

contains one unexhausted additional new claim. Respondent opposes the motion for 

leave to amend because it would be futile to add the eighth claim, as it is untimely. 

Respondent also asks the court to reconsider its allowance of the filing of the FAP. 

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II. Discussion. 

A. Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition. 

1. Legal Standard. 

A habeas corpus petition “may be amended or supplemented as provided in the 

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15, a party may amend the pleading once as a matter of right; all other 

cases require written consent of the opposing party or leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). While amendment should be granted freely, a court may deny a motion to 

amend if it is made in bad faith, there was undue delay, prejudice would result to the 

opposing party, it would be futile, or it would delay the proceedings. See Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Futility alone is a sufficient basis to deny a motion to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 

815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Discussion. 

Rocha says his state appellate counsel only filed a form petition with five claims 

on March 10, 2016 to meet the AEDPA time limit. The FAP filed on August 1, 2016 

consisted of seven claims - the original five claims plus two new claims for ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Then, 33 days later—on September 2, 2016—Rocha sought leave 

to file the SAP that contains an eighth claim, in the form of an additional claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent opposes, arguing that claims six and seven 

from the FAP and claim eight in the SAP are all untimely. 1 Opp’n to Mtn. for Leave, 

                                               

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 In asking the court to reconsider its order allowing the filing of the FAP, counsel argues 

that leave of court was required. The court took Mr. Khoury’s declaration of June 20, 

2016 to mean that in consenting to the extension of time to file the FAP and the motion 

for stay and abeyance, opposing counsel also consented to the actual filing of the FAP. It 

seems that Respondent’s attorney is now saying that he only consented to the extension 

of time and not to the actual pleading itself. Instead of reconsidering the August 12, 2016 

order separately, for the sake of judicial efficiency, the court construes the motion for 

leave to file the SAP as applying to the filing of both the amended petitions. 

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p.2. Respondent argues that Rocha does not show how his claims are not futile because 

they are late and Rocha does not address equitable tolling. Id. 

Rocha explains that claims six, seven and eight were not included in the original 

petition because Rocha’s appellate counsel (1) only protectively filed the original petition 

so that Rocha could later add new claims and then move to stay and abey; and (2) had no 

tactical reason for failing to raise them in the direct appeal. 

 Nothing in the papers indicates that Rocha seeks to make this amendment in bad 

faith, or in the context of these proceedings he acted with undue delay, or the amendment 

would significantly delay these proceedings, or Respondent would be prejudiced by the 

amendments. The real issue is whether the additional unexhausted claims would be futile 

to add because they would be late under the statute of limitations. 

 To determine whether a habeas claim is late under the statute of limitations, the 

court must examine whether statutory or equitable tolling applies. See Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010) (stating the one-year limitations period under AEDPA 

is subject to equitable tolling”). Rocha did not raise the issue of equitable tolling in his 

moving papers. Respondent raised the issue and points out that Rocha did not bring it up. 

Opp’n Mtn. for Leave, p.3. Rocha then briefly addressed the issue in his reply brief. 

 The court is accustomed to reviewing this issue in the context of a motion to 

dismiss for failure to comply with the statute of limitations, where the subject of tolling is 

the focus of the motion and is fully fleshed out. While the petitioner holds the burden of 

proving that equitable tolling is appropriate, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005), the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that respondent has the burden 

to raise, see Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 208 (2006), see also Mayfield v. Scribner, 

2008 WL 789926, *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008). In ruling on such a defense “a court 

must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day, 

547 U.S. at 208. 

It seems the parties did not fully address the issue of equitable tolling as they 

would in the context of a motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with the statute of 

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limitations under AEDPA. Because the court finds that more focused briefing on this 

issue would be helpful and would provide fair notice and an opportunity to the parties to 

sufficiently present their respective positions, it is premature to determine whether the 

proposed amendments are futile. Further, at this point in the litigation and in the context 

of the motion to amend, the court finds that even though the new claims arise from the 

original set of facts and rest on new theories, Rocha, through the declarations of trial and 

appellate counsel, provided a “satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his 

contentions originally.” See Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845. 

Thus, this court finds that leave to amend is appropriate here, without prejudice to 

Respondent seeking to dismiss the newly-added claims via a motion to dismiss that fully 

addresses the issue of whether Rocha is entitled to any tolling for the newly-added 

claims. 

B. Motion for Stay and Abeyance. 

1. Legal Standard. 

Habeas petitioners in federal court must first exhaust their state judicial remedies. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987). Ordinarily, to 

achieve exhaustion, a petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest 

state court with jurisdiction to consider it . . .or . . .demonstrate[] that no state remedy 

remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 

omitted). When a petitioner files a “mixed” petition (one that contains both exhausted 

and unexhausted claims), a district court may grant a stay and abeyance of the mixed 

petition if “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted 

claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). But 

a “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 277. 

 The Supreme Court did not define the good cause standard in Rhines. The Ninth 

Circuit considers it a standard less stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances” 

standard for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 

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654, 661-662 (9th Cir. 2005). More specifically, it stated that “a reasonable excuse, 

supported by evidence to justify a petitioner's failure to exhaust,” will demonstrate good 

cause under Rhines. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding good 

cause where petitioner alleged specific arguments about his post-conviction counsel and 

supported them with extensive evidence, including psychological evaluation reports, a 

declaration by the private investigator who worked briefly for his post-conviction 

attorney, and 13 declarations from family and friends). 

2. Discussion. 

Here, one of the three new claims has already been exhausted. Counsel says that a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus has already been filed on the other claims. Mtn. Stay 

and Abey, p.4. Considering that the two unexhausted claims are already awaiting an 

order from the California Supreme Court, and petitioner employed counsel to work on 

this habeas petition, this court finds that the petitioner has not engaged in intentionally 

dilatory tactics. 

The court also finds that Rocha’s assertion of good cause for his previous failure to 

exhaust is supported by the record. Rocha attached declarations from both trial and 

appellate counsel that state they had no strategic reasons for failing to raise the three 

issues at the trial or appellate levels. He also attaches the dissent from the appellate 

court’s ruling on his direct appeal, which reads that the jury should have been instructed 

with an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Justice MacDonald’s eight-page dissent, 

along with the declarations of two attorneys that point to the ineffective assistance of 

counsel, constitute good cause to hold the petition in abeyance. 

Finally, given the reasoning in the dissent from the direct appeal, and the 

California Supreme Court’s June 30, 2016 decision in People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665

that overruled the use of hearsay testimony by police officers used by the prosecution to 

secure convictions of gang members in violation of the sixth amendment right to 

confrontation—upon which one of Rocha’s IAC claim is based—this court finds that 

Rocha’s unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious. 

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In sum, this court finds that good cause exists to hold this petition in abeyance 

while Rocha continues to exhaust the last two claims in state court. 

III. Conclusion. 

 For the foregoing reasons, this court RECOMMENDS that the district judge: 

A. GRANT the motion for leave to file the SAC without prejudice to Respondent 

filing a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and DEEM Docket 

No. 20-1 to be the operative petition in this case; 

B. GRANT the motion for stay and abeyance and STAY the case; 

C. ORDER Petitioner to file a notice to lift the stay within 10 days of the 

California Supreme Court ruling on the unexhausted claims; 

D. LIFT the stay when appropriate; and 

E. ORDER Respondent to file a responsive pleading within 30 days of the stay 

being lifted. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted 

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 29, 2016, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed with 

the court and served on all parties no later than December 6, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 14, 2016 

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