Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00240/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Ricardo Buelna, 

Defendant/Movant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CR 02-00155-PHX-JAT

CV 09-00240-PHX-JAT (MEA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are (1) Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. # 1) as amended (Doc.

# 5) (the “habeas petition”); (2) Government’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. # 11); (3) Movant’s Reply

in Support of his Motion to Vacate (Doc. # 13); (4) The Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation to the Court (Doc. # 17); (5) Movant’s Objections to the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. # 19); (6) Government’s Response to Movant’s Objections to the

Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 20); and (7) Movant’s Motion to Expand the Record

(Doc. # 21). 

The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. # 17) which recommended that the habeas petition be

denied. Movant has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. # 19). The Court “may accept, reject,

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court “must review de novo the portions of the

[Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.” Klamath Siskiyou

Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Movant asserts that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel. The Magistrate

Judge has identified four theories of ineffective assistance raised by Movant. These theories

are as follows: 1) Movant’s Counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of going to trial

rather than pleading guilty; 2) Movant’s Counsel failed to advise him to plead guilty and

failed to make adequate efforts to obtain a plea offer; 3) Movant’s Counsel failed to object

to his sentence being enhanced from ten years to twenty years, based on his prior conviction

in a different state and did not require the Government to prove that conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt; and 4) Movant’s Counsel failed to inform him that he was proceeding with

two invalid defenses and erred in proceeding with an entrapment defense. Movant’s

objections (Doc. # 19) are presented in a narrative form and are not organized into four

separate theories of ineffective assistance. In addressing these objections, the Court will

construe the objections liberally and assume that Movant intended to object to the R&R on

all four theories of ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the Court will review the entire R&R

de novo.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, “[a]n

ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To establish

deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation ‘fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)

(internal citations and quotation omitted). A deficient performance is one that is “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To

demonstrate prejudice, Movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Id. at 694. Without specifics that cause the court to have such doubts, a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel must be denied. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)

(noting that “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts

do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

II. DISCUSSION

Movant first argues that his Counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of going

to trial rather than pleading guilty. The Court is satisfied that Movant was fully aware of the

consequences of proceeding to trial rather than pleading guilty. The record demonstrates that

Movant’s counsel informed him that if he was convicted as charged, he would be subject to

a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years incarceration. (Doc. # 17 at 5; Doc. # 11,

Attach. A at 1). Further, Movant’s counsel reviewed a Criminal Settlement Conference

Report with Movant which stated the mandatory minimum sentence if convicted was “not

less than 20 years.” (Doc. # 11., Attach. A at 1–2 & Attach B. at 3). In an August 28, 2002

Motion Hearing, the Government explained to the Court and Movant that he was facing a

mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years if he proceeded to trial. (Doc. # 213 in CR02-

155 at 13–14). The Court then engaged in the following exchange with Movant:

The Court: Mr. Buelna, did you understand what Mr. Pimsner was saying, that

you face the potential of life in prison and a mandatory minimum of 20 years?

The Defendant: Yes, I understand that.

The Court: So you understand the consequences of a conviction or convictions

in this matter. Is that correct? 

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

(Id. at 14). At the Final Pretrial Conference of November 13, 2002, Defendant, in trying to

explain to the Court the importance of his ability to research in the library at CCA, reiterated

that he knew he was facing a sentence of “20 to life.” (Doc. # 214 in CR02-155 at 16).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Movant was fully aware of the consequences of proceeding

to trial. Therefore, this Objection is overruled. 

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 To support this argument, Movant has filed a Motion to Expand the Record (Doc.

# 21). Through this motion, Movant seeks to add a portion of a transcript (Doc. # 46 in

CR02-1000) to prove his assertion that he was offered a plea agreement that his Counsel did

not communicate to him. The transcript that Movant seeks to add only supports his Counsel

and the Government’s claim that, at a settlement conference, he communicated to them that

he was unwilling to accept the type of offer contained in the proposed plea agreement. (Id.

at 3–4). Accordingly, Movant’s assertion that there was a plea agreement that was never

communicated to him is unsupported by this additional transcript and the Motion to Expand

the Record is denied as futile. 

- 4 -

In his next claim of ineffective assistance, Movant argues 1) that he was offered a plea

agreement that his Counsel did not communicate to him,1

 2) that his Counsel failed to make

adequate efforts to obtain a plea offer, and 3) that his counsel failed to advise him to plead

guilty. These assertions are contradicted by the record. The record shows that despite

Counsel’s efforts to obtain a plea offer for Movant, the Government was only willing to offer

Movant a sentence below the statutory minimum of twenty years if he chose to cooperate in

the prosecution of his co-defendants. (Doc. # 11, Attach. A at 2). On more than one occasion,

Counsel advised Movant that cooperation against his co-defendants was in his best interest,

but Movant persistently indicated that he did not want to cooperate and wanted to proceed to

trial. (Id.). Because the record entirely contradicts Movant’s assertions with regard to this

claim, these Objections are overruled. 

Movant further argues that his Counsel failed to object to his sentence being enhanced

from ten years to twenty years, based on Movant’s prior conviction in a different state.

Movant’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A).

This statutory enhancement is mandatory and would have been enforced whether or not

Movant’s counsel objected to the enhancement. Movant also argues that his Counsel was

ineffective because he did not require the Government to prove Movant’s prior conviction

beyond a reasonable doubt. Movant does not contest that he did have a prior conviction in

another state, but merely argues that his attorney did not require the Government to prove the

prior conviction. The Court is satisfied that Movant’s prior conviction was properly proved

to the trial court. The record reflects that the Government attached a certified copy of the prior

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

conviction to its Information filed July 1, 2002 (Doc. # 54 in CR02-155) and admitted a

certified copy of the prior conviction to the record during Movant’s sentencing hearing on

April 14, 2003 (Doc. # 225 in CR02-155 at 11–12). At a status hearing held on February 24,

2003, Movant’s counsel explained to the court that Movant was unwilling to admit the prior

conviction, but that Counsel was unable to find any basis in objecting to the conviction. (Doc.

# 224 in CR02-155 at 4–5). Counsel went on to request an extension from the Court so that

he could further investigate the matter “out of an abundance of caution.” (Id. at 7).

Thereafter, at the April 14, 2003 sentencing hearing, Movant’s counsel explained that despite

his further investigation, he had no evidence with which to attack the admittance of the prior

conviction. (Doc. # 225 in CR02-155 at 12). Thus, it would have been futile for Counsel to

make any objection to the admittance of the prior conviction, since he had no basis for such

an objection. Counsel’s failure to take a futile action can never constitute deficient

performance. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, this theory

of ineffective assistance fails and this Objection is overruled.

Finally, Movant asserts that his Counsel failed to inform him that he was proceeding

with two invalid defenses and erred in proceeding with an entrapment defense. Counsel’s

tactical decisions with which Movant disagrees cannot be the basis for an ineffective

assistance claim. See Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991); Gustave v.

United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that “[m]ere criticism of a tactic or

strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation.”) (internal

citation omitted). Courts “need not determine the actual explanation” for counsel's actions

so long as they fall within the range of reasonable representation. Morris, 966 F.2d at 456.

Movant has the burden of demonstrating that “the challenged action could not be viewed as

sound trial strategy.” Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 664 (9th Cir. 2009). Movant has

not met his burden. Movant has provided no evidence to show that his Counsel’s actions were

outside the range of reasonable representation. As a result, this Objection is overruled.

Based on the foregoing,

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 17) is accepted and

adopted, Movant’s objections (Doc. # 19) are overruled and the Motion to Vacate (Doc. # 1)

as amended (Doc. # 5) is DENIED and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Movant’s Motion to Expand the Record (Doc. #

21) is DENIED;

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section

2255 Proceedings, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a

certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 17th day of March, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-00240-JAT Document 22 Filed 03/18/10 Page 6 of 6