Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02267/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02267-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jesus Lopez Sauceda and Maria Lopez

Bojorquez, husband and wife; Maria

Soledad Alaniz Gonzalez, a single

woman, and Angel Alaniz Gonzalez, a

single man, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

The United States of America, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries when the vehicle in which they were riding rolled

over near San Luis, Arizona on January 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the

United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs allege that federal

border patrol agents caused the accident. Id. ¶ 12. The complaint asserts negligence and

civil rights claims. Id. ¶¶ 17-25.

Defendant has filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Dkt. ##70, 71.

The motions are fully briefed. Dkt. ##89, 92, 97. No party requests oral argument. For

reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motions in part and deny them in part.

The parties have filed under seal several briefs and statements of facts (Dkt. ##71, 72,

97, 103) that discuss sensitive law enforcement policies subject to protective orders

(Dkt. ##16, 33). As explained more fully below, the Court’s discussion of facts and

arguments relating to those policies will be set forth in a separate sealed order (Dkt. #105).

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I. Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant seeks, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

dismissal of both the negligence claim and the civil rights claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Dkt. #70 at 2, 12. In resolving Defendant’s factual attack on jurisdiction (see

id. at 12 n.4), the Court may review evidence beyond the complaint and resolve factual

disputes where “the jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of the case[.]” Thornhill

Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the question of

jurisdiction and the merits are intertwined, the Court must treat the motion to dismiss as one

for summary judgment. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 & n.3

(9th Cir. 2004).

A. Count Two – Civil Rights Claim.

Count two of the complaint asserts a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 22-25. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights by failing to adequately hire, train, retain, and supervise its employees.

Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over count

two because sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims against the United States.

Dkt. #70 at 15. Defendant also notes, correctly, that § 1983 claims may be brought only

against state actors. Id. at 15 n.5. 

Plaintiffs agree that liability does not attach under § 1983 (Dkt. #89 at 15), and make

clear that they are not asserting a civil rights claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). “Bivens is a judicially created cause of action against federal

officers arising under the United States Constitution.” Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504,

1513 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs have named no federal officers as defendants in this case;

they sue only the United States government. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

constitutional damage claims against the United States, see Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d

948, 951 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court will grant the motion to dismiss count two.

This conclusion does not dispose of Plaintiffs’ count-one claims under the Federal

Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (“FTCA”). “‘While Bivens is a judicially

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created cause of action against federal officers arising under the United States Constitution,

. . . the FTCA imposes liability on the United States government for acts by its employees

that constitute torts in the state where the conduct occurred.” Tekle v. United States, 511

F.3d 839, 850 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ting, 927 F.2d at 1513) (emphasis in Tekle).

Thus, tort claims may be asserted against the United States government under the

circumstances permitted in the FTCA.

B. Count One – Negligence Claim.

Plaintiffs allege in count one that federal border patrol agents negligently caused the

accident by pursuing Plaintiffs’ vehicle at high speeds and throwing a “spike strip,” also

known as a controlled tire deflation device (“CTDD”), in front of the vehicle. Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 12,

17-21. A CTDD is an expandable tray containing small, hollow steel tubes that puncture the

tires of a passing vehicle and cause a gradual release of air. See United States v. GuzmanPadilla, 573 F.3d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs bring their negligence claim under the

FTCA. Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 1-2.

Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over count one

because the claim is barred by the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. Because

the facts at issue in this jurisdictional question implicate the merits of Plaintiff’s negligence

claim, the Court will treat Defendant’s motion to dismiss count one as a motion for summary

judgment.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment.

As the party seeking summary judgment under Rule 56, Defendant “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the [Court] of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is

appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, shows “that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [Defendant] is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome

of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be

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“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Defendant makes several arguments with respect to count one: (i) the claim is barred

by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, (ii) Plaintiffs have not shown that the

United States, if a private person, would be liable under Arizona law, (iii) there is no

evidence of a high-speed pursuit, (iv) Plaintiffs cannot establish causation, and (v) Plaintiffs

are not entitled to an award of future medical expenses or loss of consortium damages. The

Court will address each argument.

A. The Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA.

Plaintiffs claim that Border Patrol Agent Aguilar negligently deployed a CTDD in

front of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant argues that the claim is barred by the discretionary

function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The Court concludes that factual

issues preclude summary judgment on this argument. Because the Court’s conclusion

necessarily involves sensitive border patrol policies subject to protective orders (Dkt. ##16,

33), the Court will explain its reasoning in a separate sealed order (Dkt. #105). See

Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (judicial

records relating to dispositive issues may be sealed for compelling reasons); Pintos v. Pac.

Creditors Ass’n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).

B. Negligence Under Arizona Law.

Because liability under the FTCA is to be determined in accordance with the law of

the place where the alleged tortious acts occurred, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), Arizona law

applies to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the United States. See Garcia v. United States,

826 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1987). To prevail on that claim, Plaintiffs must show that,

under circumstances similar to those alleged in this case, Arizona law would “make

a ‘private person’ liable in tort.” United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (quoting

28 § 1346(b)(1)) (emphasis in original); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (the United States may be

liable in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like

circumstances”). This “private person” standard must be met even where, as in this case, the

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alleged tortious conduct entails “‘uniquely governmental functions.’” Id. at 46 (quoting

Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955)); see Rayonier Inc. v. United

States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1957).

To establish a claim for negligence under Arizona law, the plaintiff must prove four

elements: a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care, a breach

of that standard, a causal connection between the breach and the alleged harm, and actual

damages. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc). Defendant

argues that summary judgment is appropriate on count one because Plaintiffs have not shown

that Arizona law would impose liability for negligence on a private person in the

circumstances alleged in the complaint. Dkt. #70 at 17. In support of this argument,

Defendant cites Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007), in which there was

no majority opinion on the proper application of the FTCA’s private person standard.

Defendant notes that Judge Tashima, in his separate opinion, applied state law governing

purely private individuals without looking to any special law enforcement privileges in

evaluating the federal agents’ conduct during the execution of warrants. See 511 F.3d at

850-56. Defendant asserts that this view of the private person standard should apply, and

Agent Aguilar’s conduct is therefore “subject to the standard of care for a citizen taking the

same actions, rather than a comparable public employee like a police officer.” Dkt. #70

at 17.

Plaintiffs agree that a purely private person standard applies (Dkt. #89 at 7, citing

Tekle, 511 F.3d at 852), and argue that the deployment of the CTDD in this case, if done by

a private person rather than a border patrol agent, would constitute a breach of the general

duty to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Id. at 11; see Dkt. #1 ¶ 20.

Plaintiffs also analogize the facts of this case to violations of Arizona traffic and criminal

laws (id. at 7-8), the law of trespass (id. at 10-11), the shopkeeper’s privilege to arrest or

detain a suspected thief (id. at 11-2), and the torts of assault and battery (id. at 13).

Defendant asserts that those analogies are misplaced because Plaintiffs have not alleged

intentional tort claims (Dkt. #92 at 4-7), but Defendant provides no apt analogy of its own.

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The parties have cited, and the Court has found, no case in which a private person

deployed a CTDD in front of a passing vehicle. The Court agrees that, under Judge

Tashima’s interpretation of the FTCA and Olson, see Tekle, 511 F.3d at 850-54, the alleged

actions of Agent Aguilar, if taken by a private person, could support a finding of negligence.

Arizona law imposes a duty on every person “‘to avoid creating situations which pose an

unreasonable risk of harm to others.’” Ontiveros, 667 P.2d at 209 (citation omitted); see

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302, cmt. a (1965). At least one Arizona court has found

that the throwing of an object at a fast-moving vehicle “constitutes a gross deviation from

the standard of conduct a reasonable person would exercise,” and the resulting spontaneous

evasive action places the occupants of the vehicle in “grave peril[.]” Navajo County Juvenile

Delinquency Action, 793 P.2d 146, 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming delinquency finding

where juvenile threw water balloons at passing vehicles).

The facts of this case, of course, are quite different from those in Navajo County. This

was not a private person throwing an object at a passing vehicle. Plaintiffs were suspected

of entering the United States illegally. Agent Aguilar was a Border Patrol agent and had a

reasonable basis for detaining and arresting Plaintiffs. In Arizona, a private person may

make a citizen’s arrest “[w]hen a felony has been in fact committed and he has reasonable

ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it.” A.R.S. § 13-3884(2); cf.

State v. Goldberg, 540 P.2d 674, 676 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc) (federal agents have “the power

to make arrests for violations of state laws as private citizens”). Where a citizen’s arrest is

made with unnecessary force, the arresting person is liable in tort. See Crimmins v. Super.

Ct., 668 P.2d 882, 887 (Ariz. Ct. 1983) (Feldman, J., concurring).

In this case, the trier of fact reasonably could conclude that the actions of Agent

Aguilar, if taken by a private person in an attempt to make a citizen’s arrest, would constitute

the use of unreasonable force. The evidence, construed in Plaintiffs’ favor as required at this

summary judgment stage, shows the following: Plaintiffs were riding in a large, late-model

Chevy Suburban. The Suburban was overloaded and was speeding at more than 60 miles per

hour on an unimproved dirt road surrounded by a soil berm. While Plaintiffs may have

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entered the United States illegally, they were trying to return to Mexico and were very close

to the border. Agent Aguilar deployed a CTDD in front of the vehicle, causing it to overturn

and injure Plaintiffs. A private person’s deployment of a CTDD under these circumstances

could be found to constitute an unreasonable use of force creating an excessive risk of harm

to Plaintiffs. See Tekle, 511 F.3d at 854 (concluding that there was a triable issue as to

whether the force used to detain the plaintiff was reasonable).

Under Arizona law, the use of physical force is legally justified in certain

circumstances, see A.R.S. §§ 13-401 et seq., and civil liability is precluded where

justification is established, see A.R.S. § 13-413. Defendant contends that Agent Aguilar’s

conduct was justified under A.R.S. § 13-404 because he used the CTDD in self-defense when

the Suburban was heading toward him on the right side of the road. Dkt. #70 at 22; see

Dkt. #64 at 9, ¶¶ 34-35. Plaintiff Jesus Lopez Sauceda has testified that at no time did the

Suburban driver turn toward Agent Aguilar and the Suburban “was going straight down the

road” when Aguilar threw the CTDD across the road. Dkt. #64-11 at 17. Plaintiff Angel

Alaniz Gonzalez similarly testified that “the driver of the Suburban never goes for [Agent

Aguilar].” Dkt. #64-12 at 23. Whether Agent Aguilar acted in self defense is a factual

question that must be resolved at trial. The Court will deny summary judgment with respect

to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Arizona law would make a

private person liable for negligence under circumstances similar to those in this case.

In its reply (Dkt. #92 at 8), Defendant cites Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in

Tekle, which addressed the tension between the FTCA’s private person standard and other

federal law which grants law enforcement officers “special privileges.” 511 F.3d at 857.

Judge Fisher noted that these privileges, among other things, authorize federal law

enforcement officers to use reasonable force in arresting suspects without committing a tort,

and yet that same act, if done by a private party, would often not be privileged from civil tort

liability under state law. Id. The Court shares Judge Fisher’s concern, and agrees that

because Olson did not involve special law enforcement privileges, and because the FTCA’s

text does not clearly foreclose their availability, the United States should not be precluded

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from raising them as a defense to tort liability. See id. 

Defendant, however, has not identified any applicable privilege in its summary

judgment papers. Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the privileges

accorded to law enforcement officers” (see Dkt. #92 at 8), but Defendant has not shown that

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on this issue. See Tekle, 511 F.3d at 852 n.10 (noting that

the government failed to raise privilege issue).

Citing United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009), Defendant

contends that the use of a CTDD by border patrol agents is reasonable as a matter of law, and

that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim must fail because the United States would otherwise be

liable in tort every time a border patrol agent deploys a CTDD. Dkt. #92 at 6-7. The finding

of reasonableness in Guzman-Padilla, however, was made not as a matter of law, but based

on the specific facts of the case. See id. at 887-88 (noting that the factual record “amply

supports the district court’s conclusion that the use of the CTDD was safe”). Moreover,

Plaintiffs do not challenge the use of CTDDs in general; they allege that the use of the CTDD

in this case was negligent. See Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 12, 20.

Defendant further asserts that Custom and Border Protection (“CBP”) policies

regarding the use of CTDDs are irrelevant given the FTCA’s “private person” standard, and

the opinions of Plaintiff’s “police tactics” expert, D.P. Van Blaricom, should be excluded

because they are based those policies. Dkt. #70 at 16-18. Plaintiffs contend that CBP

policies are relevant and present a factual issue as to the applicable standard of care.

Dkt. #89 at 12-13. The Court need not resolve this dispute on summary judgment given its

conclusion, made without reference to CBP policy, that there is a triable issue as to whether

the use of the CTDD in this case constitutes negligence under Arizona law.

C. High-Speed Pursuit.

Defendant argues that to the extent the negligence claim is based on Agent Prieto’s

alleged high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff’s vehicle, the claim fails for lack of evidence.

Dkt. ##71 at 8-10, 92 at 1. The Court agrees.

Agent Prieto testified that at no time while he was following Plaintiffs’ vehicle did he

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exceed the posted speed limit. Dkt. #64 at 8, ¶ 28; Dkt. #64-7 at 33. Plaintiffs do not dispute

this evidence, asserting only that “Agent Prieto had ‘no idea’ how fast the Suburban was

going when it passed Agent Aguilar’s truck.” Dkt. #102 at 8, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs have not testified as to Agent Prieto’s speed. Their expert, Mr. Van Blaricom, has

stated that he has “no way of knowing” the speed at which Agent Prieto was traveling.

Dkt. #72-2 at 47. The Court will grant summary judgment to the extent the negligence claim

is based on an alleged high-speed pursuit of Plaintiffs’ vehicle (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 12, 20). See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

D. Causation.

Defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Joseph Perles, has concluded that

several conditions contributed to the rollover accident: the Suburban was traveling on a lowfriction road surface, the high friction soil berm on the edge of the road was a rollover

hazard, the Suburban was overloaded and was traveling about 60 miles per hour, and the

driver likely performed a classic pre-rollover maneuver by making a hard steering correction

to the right after initially swerving to the left. Dkt. #64-13 at 9, ¶ 12. Dr. Perles opines that

none of these conditions was the result of any actions by border patrol agents, and that

because the Suburban driver safely could have straightened out the vehicle after initially

swerving to the left, the rollover ultimately “was caused by the unnecessary rightward

overcorrection taken by the [Suburban driver].” Id. at 11, ¶ 16. Defendant argues that

Plaintiffs have no evidence of causation sufficient to overcome Dr. Perles’ opinion.

To establish causation under Arizona law, the plaintiff “must show some reasonable

connection between defendant’s act or omission and plaintiff’s damages or injuries.”

Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc). “The

defendant’s act or omission need not be a ‘large’ or ‘abundant’ cause of the injury; even if

defendant’s conduct contributes ‘only a little’ to plaintiff’s damages, liability exists if the

damages would not have occurred but for that conduct.” Id. (quoting Ontiveros, 667 P.2d

at 205).

Plaintiffs have presented evidence of causation sufficient to survive summary

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judgment. Plaintiff Jesus Lopez Sauceda has testified that the driver of the Suburban lost

control of the vehicle when he swerved to the left to avoid the CTDD thrown by Agent

Aguilar. Dkt. #64-11 at 17-21. A causal relationship between Agent Aguilar’s actions and

the rollover reasonably may be inferred from this testimony. In short, whether the rollover

was caused at least “a little” by Agent Aguilar’s deployment of a CTDD in front of the

Suburban and a spontaneous swerve to the left by the driver (Robertson 789 P.2d at 1047),

or by the driver’s “overreaction back to the right” as Dr. Perles opines (Dkt. #103-4 at 3), is

a factual question to be resolved at trial. See Ontiveros, 667 P.2d at 208 (the issue of

causation “should ordinarily be a question of fact for the jury under usual principles of

Arizona tort law”). The Court will deny summary judgment with respect to Defendant’s

causation argument.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not disclosed an accident reconstruction expert

(Dkt. #70 at 18), but Defendant does not argue that expert testimony is required to establish

causation. Defendant further asserts that Plaintiffs may seek to rely on Mr. Van Blaricom’s

opinion that the actions Agent Aguilar was a “proximate cause” of the accident, and that this

opinion should be excluded as an impermissible legal opinion. Dkt. #70 at 21-22. The Court

need not address this issue on summary judgment given its conclusion, made without

reference to Mr. Van Blaricom’s “proximate cause” opinion, that there is a triable issue as

to causation.

E. Future Medical Expenses.

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the claims for future

medical expenses by Plaintiffs Maria Soledad Alaniz Gonzalez and Angel Alaniz Gonzalez

(see Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 15-16) because they have disclosed no supporting evidence. Dkt. #70 at 23

n.11. Plaintiffs do not refute this argument in their response. The Court will grant summary

judgment with respect to this issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Plaintiff Jesus Lopez Sauceda suffered a spinal cord injury as a result of the accident.

In support of his claim for future medical damages, he has disclosed a life care plan (“LCP”)

prepared by clinical nurse specialist Betty Scira. Defendant argues that the LCP lacks the

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necessary foundation for admission (Dkt. #70 at 23-26), but Defendant does not provide the

LCP for the Court to review. The Court cannot, on summary judgment, conclude that

Plaintiff Lopez Sauceda has presented no evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably

could award him future medical expenses. See Saide v. Stanton, 659 P.2d 35, 38 (Ariz. 1983)

(whether future medical expenses are reasonably probable is determined “from all the

relevant circumstances” which are before the trier of fact). The Court will deny summary

judgment with respect to this issue.

F. Loss of Consortium Damages.

Loss of consortium damages are intended to compensate an injured person’s spouse

for the loss of love, affection, companionship, and other aspects of a marital relationship.

See DeBinder v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. CV 06-1804-PCT-PGR, 2009 WL 57096, at *10

(D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 2009) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs Maria Soledad Alaniz Gonzalez and

Angel Alaniz Gonzalez concede that they do not have proper loss of consortium claims. Dkt.

#89 at 3. The Court will grant summary judgment in this respect.

Plaintiffs Jesus Lopez Sauceda and Maria Lopez Bojorquez, husband and wife,

assert that they have “mutual” loss of consortium claims. Id. Defendant argues that while

Mrs. Lopez may have a loss of consortium claim based on Mr. Lopez’s injuries, he has

presented no evidence showing that Mrs. Lopez sustained injuries that have affected the

marital relationship. Dkt. ##70 at 26, 92 at 10. Plaintiffs do not address this argument in

their response. The Court will grant summary judgment with respect to Mr. Lopez’s claim

for loss of consortium damages. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

III. Conclusion.

The Court will dismiss the civil rights claim asserted in count two of the complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will grant summary judgment in

Defendant’s favor to the extent the negligence claim asserted in count one is based on an

alleged high-speed pursuit of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The Court also will grant summary

judgment (i) on the claims for future medical expenses asserted by Plaintiffs Maria Soledad

Alaniz Gonzalez and Angel Alaniz Gonzalez and (ii) on the claims for loss of consortium

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damages asserted by Plaintiffs Maria Soledad Alaniz Gonzalez, Angel Alaniz Gonzalez, and

Jesus Lopez Sauceda. Summary judgment will otherwise be denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment (Dkt. ##70,

71) are granted in part and denied in part as set forth in this order and the

separate sealed order (Dkt. #105).

2. The Court will set a final pretrial conference by separate order.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2009.

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