Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02263/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL STANLEY GALLEGOS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-02263 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 17) on July 11, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims in

the state courts and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply

to Respondents’ answer to his petition on September 12, 2008.

See Docket No. 20. 

I Procedural History

In 1998 Petitioner was charged with ten crimes, inter

alia, one count of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of

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attempted molestation of a child. See Answer, Exh. A & Exh. B.

On July 31, 1998, Petitioner entered into a written plea

agreement with regard to these charges, providing that he would

plead guilty to two counts and that the other eight counts would

be dismissed. See id., Exh. B. The plea agreement provided

Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of sexual conduct

with a minor and one count of attempted child molestation. See

id., Exh. B. The plea agreement waived Petitioner’s right to a

jury trial. Id., Exh. B. The plea agreement states that the

sentencing court would impose a sentence within the minimum and

maximum range provided for in the plea agreement, noting a

presumptive sentence of 10 to 20 years imprisonment and a

maximum sentence of 15 to 27 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. B at

2.

On October 23, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to an

aggravated term of 22 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for sexual conduct with a minor and to a consecutive

term of lifetime probation pursuant to his conviction for

attempted chid molestation. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner filed a timely action seeking state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on November 5, 1998. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner was

appointed counsel, who averred to the state court that he could

find no meritorious grounds for relief. Id., Exh. E. Although

allowed extra time to do so by the state court, Petitioner did

not file a pro se brief in this Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. F &

Exh. G. The state trial court dismissed the action for

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Petitioner’s failure to prosecute on September 3, 1999. See

id., Exh. G.

Petitioner filed another state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 in June of 2005. Id.,

Exh. C. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief from his

sentences based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. H. The state trial court

dismissed the Rule 32 action on June 30, 2005, concluding the

action was not timely filed. Id., Exh. H. The state court

concluded Blakely did not apply to Petitioner’s case because it

was not retroactive to cases on collateral review and,

accordingly, that Petitioner’s Rule 32 action did not fall

within an exception to the state’s timeliness rule. Id., Exh.

H.

Petitioner belatedly sought review of this decision by

the Arizona Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition for

review as untimely on January 19, 2006. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

declined review on April 12, 2007. See id., Exh. K. 

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because his right to meaningful access to the

courts has been violated. Petitioner states that prison

officials are not helping inmates prepare and file legal

pleadings with regard to illegal sentences or illegal probation

laws. Petitioner also asserts his sentence was improperly

aggravated based on facts found by a judge rather than a jury.

Petitioner also argues his sentence of lifetime probation

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violates his right to due process because it is not authorized

by Arizona state statutes. 

II Analysis

Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2008). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed 77 U.S.L.W. 3058 (July

15, 2008) (No. 08-76).

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final upon the completion of any timely action seeking

state post-conviction relief from his convictions and sentences.

See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007)

(holding that, in Arizona, the statute of limitations began to

run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and

review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the time

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for seeking such proceeding or review.”). 

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s action for

state post-conviction relief for Petitioner’s failure to

prosecute any specific claim for relief on September 3, 1999.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner had one year from

that date, i.e., until September 3, 2000, to seek federal habeas

relief, not counting any time during which the statute of

limitations was statutorily tolled by the pendency of a

properly-filed state action for post-conviction relief. Bunney

v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001).

 Petitioner did not file any action for state or federal

post-conviction relief after September 3, 1999 and before

September 3, 2000. Petitioner’s second state action for state

post-conviction relief could not and did not re-start the

expired statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas

action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir.

2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

A state-court petition that is filed after the expiration of the

statute of limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the

running of the limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135,

1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408

(6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the untimely-filed state

petition for post-conviction relief did not toll the statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action because a

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state petition that is not filed within the state’s required

time limit is not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005). 

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Harris,

515 F.3d at 1053-54 & n.4; Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

determined that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a

federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055-56

(discussing standard and holding equitable tolling was warranted

when the petitioner had relied on prior Circuit Court of Appeals

precedent regarding the timely filing of his petition); Malcom

v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055 (stating a

petitioner’s “oversight, miscalculation,” or “negligence” would

not warrant equitable tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling

must also act with “reasonable” diligence throughout the period

he seeks to toll. See e.g., Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen.,

499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007); Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d

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111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d

Cir. 1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that

equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See Bryant, 499

F.3d at 1059-60 (holding the petitioner must establish a causal

connection between the cause of his delay and the delay itself).

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

asserts the plea agreement was unconstitutional because, as a

result, Petitioner was “twice convicted & sentenced to illegally

enhanced multiple sentences for same offense committed, on July

31, 1998.” Docket No. 20 at 2. Petitioner further contends his

counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel

“participated in this scheme, to the Petitioner’s prejudice.”

Id. In his reply Petitioner discusses his right to due process

of law and the doctrine of procedural default of habeas claims.

Petitioner further alleges that the State of Arizona has

“constructed a vague, complex, unconstitutional sentencing

scheme that is bias[ed] & prejudice[d] towards ‘Indigent Sex

Offenders.’” Id. at 7. Petitioner also argues that he is

entitled to the benefit of the Blakely decision, citing Teague

v. Lane. Id. at 8-9. Petitioner further alleges 

Rule 32 is unconstitutional for the fact that

it denies the Petitioner’s right for access

to the courts by rejecting claims of illegal

sentences imposed, allowing the Public

Defenders Office to client shop; diluting the

effectiveness of counsel, the probability

exists rather than not for the Attorney

General’s office to prosecute selectively &

vindictively....

Id. at 10. 

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Petitioner also contends his right to double jeopardy

and equal protection were violated, and that the state committed

a “Crawford Rule violation,” citing Arizona Revised Statutes §

13-801. Id. at 13-14. Petitioner further maintains that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, i.e.,

that his criminal and plea proceedings counsel had a conflict of

interest and that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise his double jeopardy and Sixth Amendment

claims in his first Rule 32 action. Id. at 16. Petitioner asks

the Court “to review claims presented in this case on the merits

in the interest of justice & ends of justice...,” asserting

there has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice in his case.

Id. at 20.

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S.

Ct. at 1814-15. Petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing that there were extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control which made it impossible for him to file a timely

federal habeas petition, or that any state action was the “but

for” cause for his failure to timely file his federal habeas

action. See Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir.

2008) (holding the petitioner has a strong burden to plead

specific facts supporting their claim of extraordinary

circumstances). See also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, 125 S. Ct.

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at 1815 (concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to

equitable tolling because he was not misled or confused about

the exhaustion of his state remedies and filing his federal

habeas petition). Petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing that there were extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control which made it impossible for him to file a timely

federal habeas petition, or that any state action was the cause

for his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See

Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each

of the cases in which equitable tolling has been applied have

involved wrongful conduct, either by state officials or,

occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare Sanchez

v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

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1

 Prior to 2006, the Sixth, Seventh, Eight and Tenth

circuits had adopted either a full or restricted actual innocence

exception to the limitations period. “We have recently decided that

‘[p]risoners claiming to be innocent, like those contending that other

events spoil the conviction, must meet the statutory requirement of

timely action.’” Araujo v. Chandler 435 F.3d 678, 680 (2005), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 39 (2006), quoting Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d

868, 872 (7th Cir. 2005); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.

2005) (holding that “equitable tolling of the one-year limitations

period based on a credible showing of actual innocence is

appropriate.”). The First and Fifth Circuits had rejected or found

irrelevant any claim of actual innocence in consideration of whether

a habeas petition is time-barred, an approached modified by the Second

Circuit. See Whitley v. Senkowski, 317 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 2003)

(requiring that the district court determine whether there is, in

fact, a showing of actual innocence); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343,

347-48 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding no miscarriage of justice exception

to the AEDPA statute of limitations in case where the petitioner did

not make even a predicate showing of innocence).

-10-

In 2006 the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari from a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals concluding federal habeas petitioners were not entitled

to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations based

on a claim of actual innocence, thereby resolving a split among

the Circuit Courts of Appeal on this issue. See Araujo v.

Chandler, 435 F.3d 678, 680 (2005) (noting the contention that

actual innocence is a freestanding exception to the AEDPA’s

limitations period is “an argument which has caused the courts

a good deal of consternation.”), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 39

(2006).1 See also Lisker v. Knowles, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1008,

1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (delineating the positions adopted by

the various Circuit Courts of Appeal). 

However, the Court has previously determined that a

petitioner’s claim of actual innocence should be examined to

determine if the petitioner has stated a colorable claim which

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might provide for equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations “because serious constitutional questions involving

the Due Process Clause, Suspension Clause, and Eighth Amendment

could arise from preventing a petitioner who may be actually

innocent from pursuing untimely habeas claims.” Lindley v.

Schriro, 2007 WL 2320535, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

Petitioner does not assert his actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction, but asserts he was improperly sentenced

and that the plea agreement violated his right to due process

and was completed in violation of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. Petitioner, in essence, provides the

Court with an argument regarding any procedural default of his

claims, rather than a basis for the equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gallegos’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 16th day of September, 2008.

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