Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00744/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1 Citations to “Respondents’ Exh.” refer to exhibits A-AAA attached to Respondents’

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc. 10, and to exhibits 1-10 attached to

Respondents’ Notice of Supplemental Exhibits, doc. 12. 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Andrew Turner,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-744-PHX-ROS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1) Respondents have responded to the

motion, doc. 10, to which Petitioner has replied, doc. 11. For the reasons set forth below, the

Petition should be denied and dismissed. 

I. Background

On October 16, 1987, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office filed an

information in CR87-09266 (“the 1987 matter”) charging Petitioner with one count of

attempted child molestation, committed on October 4, 1987, a class 3 felony and dangerous

crime against children. (Respondents’ Exh. A1

) The State further alleged that Petitioner had

a prior felony conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. B) 

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that a defendant may

“voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence

even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).

- 2 -

On January 5, 1988, the State and Petitioner entered into a plea agreement

pursuant to which Petitioner agreed to enter an Alford2

 plea to attempted child molestation. 

In return for Petitioner’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss the allegation of a prior conviction. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C) The plea agreement stipulated that, although the crime carried a

presumptive term of 10 years’ imprisonment, Petitioner would be placed on probation. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C) The trial court accepted Petitioner’s plea. (Respondents’ Exh. D) 

On February 2, 1988, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and ordered

Petitioner to serve 10 years of probation, conditioned upon Petitioner serving one year in

jail. (Respondents’ Exhs. F-G) 

Shortly after Petitioner was released from jail, he again committed child

molestation. (Respondents’ Exh. H at 2) On March 13, 1989, the Maricopa County Grand

Jury indicted Petitioner in CR89-02762 (“the 1989 matter”) on one count of child

molestation, a Class 2 felony and dangerous crime against children, committed between

February 22, 1989 and February 25, 1989. See Turner v. Stewart, 2:97cv2344-ROS (VAM);

Respondents’ Exhs.1, 3 - Exh. A attached thereto) Two days later, the State moved to

revoke Petitioner’s probation in the 1987 matter on the grounds that Petitioner possessed and

used methamphetamine and cocaine, knowingly associated with a person who was on

probation, and committed the crime of child molestation in the 1989 matter. (Respondents’

Exhs. H-I) 

On August 1, 1989, Petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement.

(Respondents’ Exh. 3 -Exh. B attached thereto); Respondent’s Exh. J at 4-6, 13) In the 1989

matter, Petitioner agreed to plead no-contest to the molestation charge, and the State agreed

not to allege any prior convictions. (Id.) In the 1987 matter, the parties stipulated that

Petitioner “will either be reinstated on probation in CR87-09266 or the probation violation

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 3 The Honorable Robert A. Hertzberg presided. 

 4 At the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal in 1989, Arizona law permitted a pleading

defendant to directly appeal following a guilty plea. After September 30, 1992, a petition for

post-conviction relief under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 became the only vehicle for a pleading defendant

to challenge his conviction and sentence in state court. See State v. Soto, 223 Ariz. 407, 224

P.3d 223, 225 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2010) (citing cases). 

- 3 -

in that cause will be dismissed.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 6) That same day, the trial court3

in the 1989 matter, held a change-of-plea hearing during which it accepted Petitioner’s nocontest plea. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 13-21; Exh. K) 

On August 29, 1989, the trial court held a comprehensive sentencing hearing to

resolve both the 1987 and the 1989 matters. (Respondents’ Exhs. L-M; Respondents’ Exh.

3-Exh. C attached thereto) In the 1989 matter, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a

mitigated term of 15 years’ imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 9-10) In the 1987

matter, the trial court ordered Petitioner to serve 10 years of probation to commence upon

his release from custody in the 1989 matter. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 7; Exh. M) 

On direct appeal,4

 defense counsel informed the court that “[n]o arguable

questions of law ha[ve] been found” and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967). (Respondents’ Exh. 3 - Exh. E attached thereto) On January 25, 1990, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. (Id. at Exh. G) Petitioner did not seek further review.

(Respondents’ Exh. 3 - Exh. H attached thereto)

Four years later, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. ZZ) In his petition, prepared with the assistance of

counsel, Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective during the plea negotiations and that

his ineffective assistance rendered Petitioner’s guilty plea involuntary. (Respondents’ Exh.

3 -Exh. I attached thereto) The post-conviction court denied relief which was affirmed on

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. (Respondents’

Exh. 3 - Exhs. J, L, N attached thereto) 

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5 Commissioner James T. Blomo presided. 

- 4 -

On November 12, 1997, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this Court. (Respondents’ Exh. 1) On March 22, 2001, the Court denied the

petition. (Respondents’ Exh. 8) The Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on

September 17, 2002. (Respondents’ Exh. 10)

On February 27, 2004, Petitioner completed his 15-year prison sentence in the

1989 matter and began serving his 10 years of probation in the 1987 matter. (Respondents’

Exh. N) In May 2004, the State moved to revoke Petitioner’s probation for failing to obtain

approval of residence and other probation violations. (Respondents’ Exh. V; Exh. S at 1-2) 

On July 14, 2004, the trial court5

 held a violation hearing at which Petitioner admitted to

violating the terms of his probation. Thus, the court scheduled a disposition hearing. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. P-R) 

On August 25, 2004, the court held a disposition hearing on Petitioner’s

probation violation in the 1987 matter. (Respondents’ Exhs. T-U) The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated term of 15 years’ imprisonment, for the underlying crime of

attempted molestation of a child. (Respondents’ Exh. T at 14-15; Exh. U at 2) On the

request of counsel, the court ordered that Petitioner’s sentence would be governed by the

laws in effect when he committed the crime on October 4, 1987. (Respondents’ Exh. T at

14-15) Specifically, the court “ordered imposing parole as statutorily required for back on

1987, . . . and that will be up to DOC how to calculate that.” (Respondents’ Exh. T at 14-15) 

On November 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. W) With the assistance of counsel, Petitioner later filed his petition. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. X-Y) The trial court denied post-conviction relief on all matters

except for Petitioner’s Blakely claim. The court found that Petitioner was entitled to be resentenced and set a sentencing hearing which was ultimately held on January 18, 2006.

(Respondents’ Exhs. CC, FF, GG) During the January 18, 2006 sentencing hearing,

Petitioner explained his concerns regarding the calculation of his sentence:

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

The Defendant: The sentencing statutes in 1987 were obviously 

different than they are now, and for a Class 2 attempt I’m eligible

for parole after serving half of the actual sentence day-per-day, and

of course eventually the number — my mandatory release is at twothirds time. Regardless, if I make parole at the initial appearance or 

every six months appearing thereafter is immaterial, it’s two-thirds

time. And I need a specific order for that because DOC for some reason

takes it upon themselves to interpret as a first degree and possibly an 

F2, and unless the Court otherwise notes on the — they go ahead and

calculate as flat time. So we have to be very clear with the order . . .

when I leave here today please. 

(Respondents’ Exh. FF at 11) 

The court re-sentenced Petitioner to the 10-year presumptive term, and again

ordered that the sentence would be calculated under the laws in effect in October 4, 1987

when Petitioner committed the underlying crime. The court stated:

The Court: All right (sic) Based upon the information provided to the

Court and based upon my review of the case, it finds that continued

probation supervision is not appropriate. It is, therefore, ordered 

revoking the defendant’s probation in this matter. He is sentenced

to the Department of Corrections. 

Let the minute entry reflect that this time calculation should be according

to the laws that existed in 1987. He is — the defendant is sentenced to 

the presumptive term of ten years. At this time he is credited for 1148 

days of presentence incarceration. 

Obviously, Mr. Turner, if you feel that’s an error you and your attorney

can certainly submit paper documentation to ask the Court to make that

correction. 

(Respondents’ Exh. FF at 17-18; Exh. GG at 2) 

On March 31, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. HH) After counsel informed the court that he was unable to find any

claims to raise on post-conviction review, Petitioner filed a pro se petition. (Respondents’

Exhs. KK, NN) Petitioner asserted, first, that the trial court erred by sentencing him to a

term of community supervision upon release. (Respondents’ Exh. NN at 1-2) Petitioner next

argued that the Arizona Department of Corrections (“DOC”) erroneously declined to treat

his pre-incarceration credit as time served that would apply toward earned-release credits,

and erroneously denied the application of any earned-release credits at all. (Respondents’

Exh. NN at 2-4) Petitioner conceded that DOC had correctly interpreted the portion of the

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

trial court’s sentencing order indicating that Petitioner was eligible for parole after serving

one half of his 10-year sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. NN at 3) 

In its response to the petition for post-conviction relief, the State agreed with

Petitioner that because the offense occurred in 1987, Petitioner is not subject to community

supervision under A.R.S. § 13-603(I). Accordingly, the court should correct the sentencing

order to delete the reference to community supervision under A.R.S. § 13-603(I). 

(Respondents’ Exh. OO at 5-6) On the issue of earned-release credits, the State argued that:

(1) Petitioner was seeking relief beyond the scope of Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, because he did

not allege that he was being held in custody after his sentence had expired; (2) the

calculation of earned-release credits lies within the sole discretion of the DOC, not the court;

and (3) Petitioner’s claim failed as a matter of law because the law in effect in 1987, when

Petitioner committed the crime, excluded earned-release credits for time served in county

jails. (Respondents’ Exh. OO at 6-10)

In his reply, Petitioner conceded that his request for an order directing DOC to

apply earned-release credits to his sentence was not yet ripe for review. (Respondents’ Exh.

PP at 2) He also conceded that he was not statutorily entitled to good time credits for his

“county jail” presentence incarceration. (Respondents’ Exh. PP at 2) Petitioner, however,

continued to assert that “the State has not presented any argument or evidence that

Defendant is not eligible to earn release good time credits pursuant to the 1987 ‘old code’

version of A.R.S. § 41-1604.07 in effect at that time.” (Respondents’ Exh. PP at 2-3) 

On April 18, 2007, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to delete the

sentencing order’s reference to community supervision, finding that community supervision

was not applicable to Petitioner’s case because he committed the offense in October, 1987

before Arizona adopted community supervision. (Respondents’ Exh. QQ) The court denied

post-conviction relief on the issue of earned-release credits because the issue was not ripe

for review:

On the second issue, the Court agrees with the State that the Defendant 

fails to state a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief and seeks 

relief beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. 

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

A defendant may make a claim for relief under Rule 32.1(d) only if he is 

being held in custody after his sentence has expired. “Mere challenges to 

the Department of Corrections computation of good time credit are not

cognizable under Rule 32 unless they result in the Defendant remaining in

custody when he should otherwise be free.” State v. Davis, 48 Ariz. 62, 64, 

712 P.2d 975, 977 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1985). Defendant concedes in his Reply 

that is not the case here. 

(Respondents’ Exh. QQ) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s ruling. 

(Respondents’ Exh. ZZ; Doc. 1 at 5) 

Rather, on April 1, 2009, Petitioner filed another petition for post-conviction

relief, arguing that DOC was improperly confining him beyond his “earned release credit

day on March 31, 2009. (Respondents’ Exh. RR) 

Also on April 1, 2009, Petitioner filed his second habeas corpus petition in this

Court, Turner v. Ryan, 2:09cv675-ROS (LOA). (Respondents’ Exh. SS) In his Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner asserted a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process rights based on his claim that his sentence had expired and he was

“being held by State prison officials when he should otherwise be free.” (Respondents’ Exh.

SS at 6) Noting that a federal court may not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus

unless every issue has been exhausted, on May 22, 2009, the Court dismissed the petition as

premature because Petitioner still had a post-conviction proceeding pending in the state

court. (Respondents’ Exh. TT at 2-4) The Court dismissed the petition without prejudice

for Petitioner to exhaust any available state-court remedies. (Id.) 

Thereafter, on July 14, 2009, the Arizona trial court denied post-conviction relief

on the grounds that the court lacked “authority to determine earned release credits, release

date, or eligibility for release” which were matters “for the Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections, who is not a party to this criminal case.” (Respondents’ Exh.

UU at 2) The trial court concluded that Petitioner was not being held in custody beyond the

expiration of his sentence and denied post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. UU) 

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. VV) Petitioner asserted that: (1) the trial court abused its

discretion and violated Petitioner’s state and federal due process rights by requiring him to

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

serve his sentence as “flat” time, when he should be released from custody based on his

earned-release credits; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by immediately ruling on

Petitioner’s Rule-32 petition, the same day it was assigned by the presiding judge, as

retaliation for Petitioner having filed a formal complaint against the trial judge; (3) the trial

court abused its discretion, and violated the terms of the plea agreement, by ruling that

Petitioner’s sentence had not yet expired relying on a flat-time formula, rather than finding

that Petitioner had reached his statutory release date; and (4) the trial court abused its

discretion by denying its own authority under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) to consider a challenge

to the calculation of Petitioner’s sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. VV at 3) 

In response, the State argued that Petitioner sought relief beyond the scope of

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 because he had failed to allege that he was being held in custody after the

expiration of his sentence and merely sought release on parole. The State further argued that

DOC, not the court, has the authority to grant parole. (Respondents’ Exh. WW) Petitioner

replied that the State misunderstood his claims and he was not seeking release on parole, but

was alleging that the proper calculation of his sentence would yield a statutory expiration of

his sentence that would require his immediate release. He further argued that he sought the

application of earned release credits to his sentence, not release on parole. (Respondents’

Exh. XX)

On September 21, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals designated the case “at

issue” and filed documentation establishing that the appellate court had received the record

from the trial court. (Respondents’ Exh. YY) 

On April 2, 2010, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

with this Court. (Doc. 1) Petitioner alleges the same four claims for relief that he asserts in

his petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (compare Respondents’ Exh. VV

and Doc. 1) The record reflects that the petition for review remains pending in the Arizona

Court of Appeals as of July 9, 2010, the date Petitioner filed his Reply, doc. 11. 

(Respondents’ Exh. YY) 

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

II. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before the court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must

exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must describe both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory so that the state courts have a “fair opportunity”

to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Kelly

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2003). In cases not carrying the death penalty,

claims are exhausted once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. See Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999).

A petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies if he has a state appeal or

post-conviction proceeding pending at the time he files a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in federal court. Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983); Schnepp v.

Oregon, 333 F.2d 288, 288 (9th Cir. 1964) (stating that state prisoner did not exhaust state

remedies where post-conviction proceeding was pending in state courts); Martineau v.

Elliot, 2008 WL 3582811, * 1 (D.Ariz., August 13, 2008) (denying habeas corpus petition as

premature where petitioner presently had a Rule-32 petition pending in the Maricopa County

Superior Court).

A. Whether Petitioner’s Claims are Exhausted 

Here, the petition for review which Petitioner filed in the Arizona Court of

Appeals contains the same claims for which he seeks federal habeas corpus review in this

Court. (Doc. 1; Respondents Exh. VV) In his Petition and his Reply, Petitioner concedes

that he has a petition for review from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief

pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 5, 16; Doc. 11) Even if the Arizona

Court of Appeals resolves the petition for review while the § 2254 petition is before this

Court, Petitioner’s claims remain unexhausted because the determination of whether a

petitioner has exhausted available remedies on a particular claim is made on the date the

habeas corpus petition was filed, not when the Court rules on the § 2254 petition. See

Brown v. Maas, 11 F.3d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[t]he appropriate time to

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

assess whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies is when the federal habeas

petition is filed, not when it comes on for a hearing in the district court or the court of

appeals.”). Because Petitioner’s petition for review was pending in the Arizona Court of

Appeals when he filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to § 2254,

his claims are unexhausted. 

B. Exception to the Exhaustion Requirement

Petitioner argues that he should be excused from § 2254’s exhaustion

requirement because he satisfies the “statutory exhaustion exception.” (Doc. 1 at 11)

Petitioner’s argument is based on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides that a

federal habeas corpus petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if

“circumstances exist that render [the State corrective] process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” Id. 

Petitioner has not shown that Arizona’s post-conviction procedures are

ineffective to protect his rights. Petitioner argues that he has raised the earned-release credit

issue to the Arizona trial court three times. (Doc. 1 at 6) Petitioner correctly asserts that he

has raised the earned-release credit issue to the Arizona trial court three different times. 

However, Petitioner did not raise that issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals until he filed the

petition for review on August 3, 2009, Respondent’s Exh. VV, which is the petition that was

pending when he initiated this § 2254 Petition. In other words, the pending petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals is the only opportunity that Petitioner has given the

state appellate court to consider his earned-release credit/sentence calculation claim. Thus,

contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, this is not a situation where he has repeatedly attempted to

exhaust his claims. Rather, he has only recently presented his claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. 

Petitioner next argues that he “reached his statutory sentence expiration date on

March 31, 2009 and should otherwise be free.” (Doc. 1 at 6) Petitioner also argues that he

is “cumulatively suffer[ing] irreparable injury to this point, already being unconstitutionally

confined in excess of one year[,]” and thus “[a]dditional delay by the State Appellate Court

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

for whatever reason(s) — i.e., caseload or budget constraints — causes Petitioner to suffer

further, irreparable injury for each additional day [h]e is being held in custody by the Dept.

of Corrections when [h]e ‘should otherwise be free.’” (Doc. 1 at 6) Petitioner does not

explain what makes Arizona’s post-conviction procedures ineffective or deficient. Rather,

he merely reiterates the merits of his underlying claims. (Doc. 1 at 6) Petitioner’s

conclusory allegations are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). See Santiago-Melendez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 405 F.Supp. 2d

196, 198-99 (D. Puerto Rico 2005) (finding that habeas corpus petitioner’s “bare allegations

are not sufficient to place him under the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).”). 

Petitioner asserts that the Court should consider whether Arizona’s postconviction procedure is effective to protect his rights by applying the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1990). In Coe, the Ninth Circuit

considered appellate delay in state court under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, and

held that “since excessive delay in obtaining an appeal may constitute a due process

violation, a prisoner need not fully exhaust his state remedies if the root of his complaint is

his inability to do so.” Coe, 922 F.2d at 530-32. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit applied a

four-factor test: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the petitioner’s

assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to petitioner. Id. Although Coe considered appellate

delay, rather than the effectiveness of post-conviction procedures, the Court will apply the

test articulated in Coe to this case because the situations are similar. 

The first factor, length of the delay, weighs in favor of the State. Coe, 922 F.2d

at 531. Here, Petitioner’s petition for review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction

relief has been pending for less than a year. This is far shorter than the multi-year delays

found to compel relief. See Coe, 922 F.2d at 531 (citing cases). The second factor, the

reason for the delay, appears to be the appellate court’s own docket. This factor weighs in

favor of Petitioner. Coe, 922 F.2d at 531 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531) (delay stemming

from the court’s docket must be charged against the government). The third factor,

petitioner’s assertion of his right, also weighs in Petitioner’s favor because he has “diligently

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

and continuously asserted his rights.” Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. The fourth factor, prejudice to

Petitioner, weighs in favor of Respondents. The prejudice factor must be considered in light

of the merits of the underlying federal claims. Here, review of the merits of Petitioner’s

claims indicates it is unlikely that he will prevail on his claims. Absent meritorious claims,

Petitioner’s continued incarceration is lawful and any delay in resolving his claims in not

prejudicial. 

 In conclusion, the appellate court’s delay in resolving Petitioner’s petition for

review is “not extreme, unusual or attributable to the ineffectiveness of the state courts.” 

Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1998). “The mere passage of time,

without more, does not constitute a due process violation.” Cummins v. Barnhart, 460

F.Supp.2d 1112, 1121 (D.Ariz. 2006) (citing Coe, 922 F.2d at 531). Petitioner has not

shown that he is entitled to an exception to the exhaustion requirement. 

Additionally, there is no basis for this Court to stay the pending § 2254

proceeding to await the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision because Petitioner does not

meet the conditions for “stay and abey” procedure discussed in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269 (2005). In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that “it would likely be an abuse of

discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner

has good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,

and there is no indication that petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” 

Id. The stay-and-abey procedure does not apply in this case because it is limited to mixed

petitions, those containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and all of the claims in

the pending § 2254 petition are unexhausted. 

In accordance with the foregoing, Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and he

does not satisfy the requirements for excusing the exhaustion requirement set forth in 28

U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). In view of the pending proceeding in state court, which could

affect Petitioner’s release and which could also ultimately affect these proceedings, it is

inappropriate for this Court to rule on Petitioner’s claims at this time. Sherwood, 716 F.2d at

634 (stating that even where claim to be challenged has been finally settled in state courts,

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

petitioner must await outcome of his appeal in state court before remedies are exhausted);

Schnepp v. Oregon, 333 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.1964) (per curiam ) (pending post-conviction

proceedings precluded grant of writ of habeas corpus). Accordingly, the Court declines to

consider Respondents’ alternative arguments addressing the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 18th day of August, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-00744-ROS Document 13 Filed 08/18/10 Page 13 of 13