Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00290/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:3604(f)(3)(c) Fair Housing Amendments Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HARBOR VIEW ASSOCIATES LP, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 16-cv-290-BAS(JLB) 

ORDER: 

(1) REMANDING ACTION TO 

STATE COURT FOR LACK 

OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION; AND 

(2) TERMINATING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 

MOOT 

 v. 

REGINALD HAYWOOD,

 Defendant. 

On December 16, 2015, Plaintiff Harbor View Associates LP commenced this 

unlawful-detainer action under California Civil Procedure Code § 1161a against 

Defendant Reginald Haywood in the San Diego Superior Court. On February 3, 

2016, Defendant removed this action to federal court and concurrently filed a motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis. The stated basis for removal is federal-question 

jurisdiction, which involves a defense based on allegations of discrimination under 

the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). 

For the following reasons, the Court finds Defendant’s Notice of Removal is 

deficient and REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized 

by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited 

jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow 

Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 

566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); 

O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong 

presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the 

burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also 

Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); 

O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any 

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United Investors Life 

Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may 

consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an 

‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo 

Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States 

v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). 

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II. ANALYSIS 

In order to invoke this Court’s federal-question jurisdiction, the defendant 

must demonstrate that the civil action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Only state-court action that 

originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by 

the defendant.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “It is settled 

that the answer to this jurisdictional question must be determined solely from the face 

of the complaint unaided by the answer, petition for removal or other papers.” 

Farmco Stores, Inc. v. Newmark, 315 F. Supp. 396, 397 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (citing 

Gully v. F. Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936); Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 

967 (9th Cir. 1950)). 

There is no federal question apparent on the face of the complaint, which only 

asserts a simple unlawful-detainer cause of action. See Wescom Credit Union v. 

Dudley, No. CV 10-8203 GAF(SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 

2010) (“An unlawful detainer action does not arise under federal law.”; IndyMac Fed. 

Bank, F.S.B. v. Ocampo, No. EDCV 09-2337 PA(DTBx), 2010 WL 234838, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (remanding an action to state court for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction where plaintiff’s complaint contained only an unlawful-detainer claim). 

Furthermore, there is no merit to Defendant’s contention that federal-question 

jurisdiction exists because he “withheld rent due to Plaintiff discriminating against 

[him] . . . by refusing to permit[] reasonable modification of the premises necessary 

to afford full enjoyment of the premises” for Defendant’s physical disability under 

the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). (See Removal Notice ¶ 5.) This 

assertion is only contained in Defendant’s removal notice, but he cannot create a 

federal question in his removal notice. See Farmco Stores, 315 F. Supp. at 397; see 

also THR Cal. L.P. v. Porter, No. CV 16-00433 RGK(RAOx), 2016 WL 335843, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (“Federal question jurisdiction does not exist because 

there is a federal defense to the claim or a counterclaim arising under federal law.”). 

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Consequently, Defendant’s reliance on this potential defense based on federal law 

cannot serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. 

In order to invoke the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must 

prove that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To determine whether 

the amount in controversy has been met on removal, “[t]he district court may consider 

whether it is facially apparent’ from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount is 

in controversy.” Singer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th 

Cir. 1997). Though Defendant does not explicitly invoke diversity jurisdiction, it is 

easy to determine that the jurisdictional minimum is not met because Plaintiff 

explicitly limits its demand for damages to no more than $10,000. (See Removal 

Notice Ex. A.) Therefore, the Court also cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction in this 

case. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

Because Plaintiff does not assert a claim that presents a federal question as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and because he fails to allege facts necessary to 

establish diversity jurisdiction as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court 

REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears 

that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 

Additionally, the Court TERMINATES AS MOOT Defendant’s motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 8, 2016 

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