Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00395/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lizette Valenzuela, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Pima County, et al, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-395-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, both motions are

denied.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and material facts are those "that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is

"essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there

is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either

way." Id. Thus, the "mere scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's claim

is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 252. However, in evaluating a motion for

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summary judgment, "the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

II. Background

On July 7, 2003, a Tucson Police Department ("TPD") officer initiated a traffic stop;

Plaintiff, Lizette Valenzuela, was a passenger in the car and she initially said her name was

Lizette Majalca. Thereafter, Plaintiff was taken to the Pima County Jail (the "Jail") on

charges of possession of marijuana and false reporting. 

According to Defendants, upon arriving at the Jail, Plaintiff fell out of the car. Plaintiff

was then taken into the Jail to speak with a nurse; while being escorted in, Defendants allege

that Plaintiff stated: "I'm going to throw up on you fucking cops." Thereafter, Defendants

allege that Plaintiff refused to answer the nurse's questions, that Correctional Officers ("CO")

had to hold her up to prevent her from falling over, and Plaintiff's uncooperative and

unpredictable behavior caused them to remove her from the pre-booking area. While

escorting her to the ID area, Defendants allege that Plaintiff tried to turn her head and body

towards CO Keebler. In light of the alleged previous threat to vomit on the officers, CO

Keebler grabbed the back of Plaintiff's head and hair to prevent her from turning towards her.

Thereafter, CO Keebler placed Plaintiff in "hard" metal four-point restraints at approximately

2:50 a.m. and she was allegedly examined by a nurse immediately thereafter. At

approximately 5:10 a.m., CO Keebler entered Plaintiff's cell to remove the four-point

restraints; however, Defendants allege that Plaintiff was still uncooperative and intentionally

coughed in CO Keebler's face. As such, Plaintiff's hard metal four-point restraints were

removed, but she was then immediately placed in "soft" four-point restraints which are made

out of leather and have padding on the portions of the restraints that touch the detainee's skin.

Immediately after Plaintiff was placed in the soft restraints, Defendants allege that she was

again checked by a nurse. At 6:42 a.m., Defendants allege that Plaintiff was checked by

medical and Jail staff, and she was released from her four-point restraints at 7:00 a.m. CO

Keebler's immediate supervisor, Sergeant Suddath, approved the use and duration of the fourpoint restraints as carried out by CO Keebler. Due to Plaintiff's alleged conduct, Defendants

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stress that Plaintiff could not complete the dress out process (i.e., undressed, placed in Jail

clothes, and searched for drugs, weapons, etc.) which meant that she could not be safely

placed in the general population. Defendants allege that their actions were justified as her

conduct and non-compliance presented a risk to the Jail and staff.

In contrast to the evidence introduced by Defendants to support the above facts, Plaintiff

has also introduced admissible evidence painting a different picture of the circumstances in

question. Plaintiff alleges that upon arrest for the misdemeanor charges which were later

dismissed, she was placed in the back of a patrol car that lacked any air conditioning for an

extended period of time. As such, she alleges that as a result of these warm conditions, she

felt overheated and sick by the time she arrived at the Jail. Thus, due to her feelings of

sickness, when she was allegedly pulled out of the vehicle by the TPD officer, she fell out

of the backseat onto the ground. As CO Keebler began escorting her towards the Jail,

Plaintiff allegedly told CO Keebler that she felt sick from the heat, dizzy, needed air, and that

she felt like she might have to vomit. However, Plaintiff denies saying: "I'm going to throw

up on you fucking cops." Plaintiff alleges that she was taken to the nurse, but due to her

feeling ill, she could not stand on her own; as such, she alleges that officers quickly took her

away from the nurse in less than a minute thereby denying her the opportunity to speak with

the nurse. Further, Plaintiff alleges that she never refused to answer the nurse's questions.

As she was being escorted away from the nurse, Plaintiff alleges that CO Keebler stated that

she did not like Plaintiff's attitude, was giving her a hard time, and that CO Keebler painfully

grabbed the back of her hair as she was being pushed towards a cell. Plaintiff alleges that

she was handcuffed behind her back at this time, and that she was not threatening, physically

resisting, or otherwise not cooperating with officers at the time. Thereafter, Plaintiff was

placed in hard four-point restraints in her cell, and she alleges that she remained in restraints

for three hours. After three hours, Plaintiff alleges that CO Keebler checked on her and then

placed her in the soft restraints. Plaintiff alleges that she cooperated with CO Keebler while

she was checking on her, and that she did not cough in CO Keebler's face. After Plaintiff

was released from her restraints at 7:00 a.m., she alleges that she felt severe pain in her wrists

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff misconstrues certain facts and submits inconsistent

or incorrect evidence. See Reply at 2-6. The Court disagrees. For the most part, a review

of the relevant evidence submitted by the parties simply shows valid disputes of fact,

differing views of the relevant facts, or Plaintiff's permissible elaboration or clarification of

the facts. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1157-1158 (1999)(noting the difference

between a "sham" affidavit, and a affidavit further elaborating, explaining or clarifying facts

which is permissible); Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-267 (9th Cir.

1991)(same). 

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A sentenced inmate may be punished, but it can not be cruel and unusual punishment.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979)

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and shoulders. When she was released on July 8, 2003, Plaintiff alleges that she went to the

emergency room at St. Mary's hospital, and hospital staff determined that she had a fractured

wrist, rib contusions, right shoulder contusions, and numerous bruises on her body; Plaintiff

alleges that these injuries occurred while in the custody of the Pima County Jail. Arising

from these allegations, Plaintiff asserts federal civil rights violations and state law claims

against Defendants.1

III. Discussion

A. Federal Civil Rights Violations

1. Legal Standards Regarding Excessive Force and Punishment

Plaintiff claims that Defendants used excessive force and otherwise punished her without

justification while a pretrial detainee. As a threshold matter, the Court notes that because

Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and obviously had not been convicted of a crime during the

time in question, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

does not apply. See Pierce v. Multonomah Courty, Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1996).

Rather, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies

only after one has been convicted and sentenced. Id. Under the alleged facts of this case,

the Fourth Amendment is the applicable constitutional standard regarding the treatment of

Plaintiff who was a pretrial detainee at the time in question. Id. at 1043. Thus, the Fourth

Amendment's objective reasonableness standard regarding the use of force applies in this

case. Id. As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff could not be constitutionally punished2

 and

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excessive force could not be used against her while in the custody of Defendants. Id. at

1042-43; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979). 

 An alleged constitutional violation based on excessive force is subject to the constraints

of the Fourth Amendment. See Monroe v. City of Phoenix, Arizona, 248 F.3d 851, 861 (9th

Cir. 2001). "Under the Fourth Amendment, police may only use such force that is

objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Id. (quoting Cunningham v. Gates, 229

F.3d 1271, 1288 (9th Cir. 2000). A police officer's use of force is excessive and, thus,

violates the Fourth Amendment when balancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" with "the countervailing governmental interests

at stake," the finder of fact determines the force used was unreasonable. Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Because of the necessary balancing of interests, "summary

judgment . . . in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly." Santos v. Gates, 287

F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). In relation to these issues, the Ninth Circuit has held that

overly tight handcuffing of an individual and continued detention in tight handcuffs can

constitute excessive force. See Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th

Cir.2004); LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v.

County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d

1433, 1436 (1993); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit

has also stated that "the force that was applied must be balanced against the need for that

force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of the [excessive force determination]."

Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). Further,

the Ninth Circuit has found that where is no need for force, any force used is objectively

unreasonable for constitutional purposes. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 & n.4 (9th Cir.

1996); Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir.

2000), vacated by 534 U.S. 801, and aff'd on remand, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As to Plaintiff's claim of punishment, although due process dictates that a pretrial detainee

may not be punished, not "every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts" to

punishment for constitutional purposes. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-41. Where a condition or

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restriction imposed on a pretrial detainee is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective, it does not amount to punishment. Id. at 539. "The Government . . . has legitimate

interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained .

. . the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution

and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably

related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute

unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the

detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial . . . the

effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid

objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and

dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment." Id. at 540. However,

"if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is arbitrary or

purposeless--a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is

punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees . . ." Id. 539.

2. Individual Liability CO Keebler and Sergeant Suddath

To establish individual liability in a §1983 case, a plaintiff must show that the individual

officers personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. See Jones

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Monnell V. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658 (1978)). As to the individual liability of those in supervisory positions, they can

be held liable only if they were either personally involved in the alleged constitutional

deprivation or there was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisors conduct and

the alleged violation. See id. 

In light of the material disputed facts in this case, neither side is entitled to summary

judgment pertaining to whether there was a violation of Plaintiff's civil rights. According to

Defendants, Plaintiff was immediately hostile, uncooperative, and otherwise disruptive as

soon as she came into contact with CO Keebler and other officers. They allege that she

appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was stumbling, threatened to vomit

on officers, refused to answer questions, engaged in actions that prevented officers from

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searching her, and otherwise exhibited behavior that presented safety concerns for officers

and the Jail in general. As such, Defendants argue that they used reasonable force and did

not punish Plaintiff as their actions in restraining her were necessary to the legitimate

government objective of ensuring safety and order in the Jail. In contrast, Plaintiff alleges

that she was sick upon arrival at the Jail due to her detention in a hot patrol car, that she

never made any threats to officers, she never refused to answer questions, and that she

cooperated with officers the entire time at the Jail; thus, under Plaintiff's version of the facts,

she was entirely cooperative and never presented any danger to the safety or order of the Jail

such that the four-point restraints and accompanying injuries were totally unjustified. In light

of these differing facts, summary judgment is inappropriate as to the individual liability of

CO Keebler and Sergeant Suddath who were both personally involved in the alleged

constitutional deprivations. Furthermore, as the law was clearly established pertaining to the

alleged civil rights violations in question, and a reasonable officer clearly would be aware

of the constitutional violations, the individual officers in this case are not entitled to qualified

immunity under the facts alleged. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)(officers are

entitled to qualified immunity where "it would [not] be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted . . ."); Drummond v. City of Anaheim,

343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the law excessive force was clearly

established by 1999); LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 960; Alexander, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (9th Cir.

1995); Palmer, 9 F.3d at 1436; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 645; P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d at 1303-04

& n.4; Headwaters Forest Defense, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 534 U.S.

801, and aff'd on remand, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).

3. Liability of Pima County and Sheriff Dupnik in His Official Capacity

To establish liability against Pima County and Sheriff Dupnik in his official capacity, a

plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional violation was attributable to some official

policy or custom of the government entity. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,

645 (9th Cir. 1991). In Monnell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), the Court held that local governmental entities could be held liable under §1983 for

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deprivations of federal rights. However, municipalities can not be held liable pursuant to the

doctrine of respondeat superior. See id. at 691. Municipal liability therefore can not be

imposed "vicariously on government bodies solely on the basis of an employer-employee

relationship with a tortfeasor." Id. at 692. A municipality may be held liable only if the

constitutional violation was caused pursuant to an "official policy" of the municipality. This

requirement is "intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the

municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which

the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 480

(1986)(emphasis in the original). Generally:

A Plaintiff suing under §1983 may establish municipal liability in the following ways:

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the alleged constitutional

violation pursuant to a formal longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the

standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity . . . Second, the plaintiff

may establish that the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official

with final policy-making authority and that the challenged action itself thus constituted

an act of official governmental policy . . . Third, the plaintiff may prove that an official

with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or

action and the basis for it.

See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-1347 (9th Cir. 1992)(citations and internal

quotes omitted); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996); Christie v. Iopa, 176

F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999). Further, a municipality can be held liable based on inadequate

training of its officers reflecting deliberate indifference to constitutional violations. See City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). 

Plaintiff has failed to introduce any admissible evidence creating an issue of fact as to the

liability of Pima County or Sheriff Dupnik. In her Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Pima

County and Sheriff Dupnik are liable for the civil rights violations in question due to their

role in "developing, implementing, and maintaining policies or customs which exhibit

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons . . . incarcerated in the Pima

County Jail . . ." See Complaint at ¶48. However, a review of Plaintiff's Response/CrossMotion for Summary Judgment shows that Plaintiff has no actual evidence of policies

exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights at issue. See Responsive Brief

at 10-11. Rather, Plaintiff simply argues that the Jail has applied restraints (beyond routine

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This "up the chain of command" assertion is based on comments made by Sergeant

Suddath in his deposition. Sergeant Suddath made clear that he reported these incidents to

only his immediate supervisor, but he had no personal knowledge as to how far these daily

reports actually go up the chain of command.

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handcuffing) on a daily basis for many years, restraining of inmates is reported "up the chain

of command,"3

 that it is "inconceivable" that Sheriff Dupnik is unaware of relevant use of

restraints at the Jail, and that the non-routine use of restraints such as four-point restraints is

a standard practice at the Jail. See id. There is no evidence that the daily practice of nonroutine restraining of inmates that has occurred over many years is objectively unreasonable

or is not done for a legitimate government purpose such as maintaining safety and order at

the Jail. Further, there is no evidence that any of the actual policies at the Jail, or any action

or inaction of Sheriff Dupnik or Pima County contributed to the alleged constitutional

violations at issue. Rather, the admissible evidence only reflects isolated, alleged

unconstitutional acts of non-policy making employees (CO Keebler and Sergeant Suddath);

this is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to the liability of Pima County or Sheriff

Dupnik. See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1989); City of

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)(plurality opinion). Thus, summary

judgment is granted as to the liability of Sheriff Dupnik and Pima County.

B. State Law Claims

Lastly, Plaintiff asserts various state law claims for assault and battery, negligent infliction

of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment.

Defendants argue that A.R.S. §12-821 bars these claims; this statute states: "All actions

against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause

of action accrues and not afterward." Plaintiff experienced and was aware of the alleged

violations at issue in this case on July 7, 2003; however, Plaintiff did not file this suit until

August 6, 2004. As such, Defendants argue that these claims are barred by the statute of

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The Court notes that Plaintiff submitted this evidence in an untimely manner. Instead

of addressing this issue in her response, Plaintiff waited to submit this evidence after

Defendants filed their Reply brief. Nonetheless, the Court will consider this evidence for

purposes of the pending summary judgment motions; Defendants' Motion to Strike this

untimely filing is denied.

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limitations. However, Plaintiff submitted evidence4

 indicating that equitable estoppel applies

in this case. See Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 432, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990)(statute

of limitations period as applicable to claims against public entities is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling).; Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 189 Ariz. 462, 469-70,

943 P.2d 822, 829-30 (Ct. App. 1997)(same); Pike v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., 1998 WL

30531, *7 (Ct. App. 1998)(same). 

Plaintiff attached a letter, dated July 7, 2004, from a Casualty Claims Officer from Pima

County Risk Management. The Claims Officer sent the letter to Plaintiff's previous attorney,

and it stated in relevant part: "As we discussed, I will agree to extend the statute of

limitations by 30 days to August 7, 2004 so that you can review this case." Obviously

relying on this letter, Plaintiff filed her suit on August 6, 2004. Nevertheless, Defendants

now assert the statute of limitations. As Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants assurances

to her detriment, Defendants are estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a

defense; further, the Court notes that is clear that allowing Defendants to assert the statute

of limitations under these circumstances would work an injustice and the government's

interests are not unduly damaged by applying estoppel in this case. See, e.g., Roer v.

Buckeye Irr. Co., 167 Ariz. 545, 547, 809 P.2d 970, 972 (Ct. App. 1990)("A defendant will

be estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations if by its conduct the

defendant induces the plaintiff to forego litigation . . . "); Cheatham v. Sahuaro Collection

Service, Inc., 118 Ariz. 452, 455, 577 P.2d 738, 741 (Ct. App. 1978)("Where the facts

warrant, an Arizona court may apply . . . equitable estoppel to avoid the bar of the statute of

limitations."); Carlson v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., 184 Ariz. 4, 6, 906 P.2d 61, 63

(Ct. App. 1995)("Equitable estoppel is [applicable where there is]. . .(1) conduct by which

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one induces another to believe in certain material facts; and (2) the inducement results in acts

in justifiable reliance thereon; and (3) the resulting acts cause injury . . . The doctrine will

apply to the state if the government's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice

and if the public interest would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel . . . the

imposition of estoppel must not unduly affect the state's exercise of its governmental powers

and sovereignty."). Accordingly, summary judgment as to the state law claims based on the

statute of limitations defense is denied.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in part and granted in part;

(2) Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

(3) The parties shall submit their joint proposed Pretrial Order and any motions in limine (if

any) within 30 days of the filing date of this Order.

DATED this 15th day of November, 2005.

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