Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00572/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00572-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TADEUSZ KSIENIEWICZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv572-LAB (DHB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; AND

ORDER SCREENING AND

DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT

vs.

CITY OF LA MESA, et al.,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Tadeusz Ksieniewicz, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint on March 12,

2013, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). On March 18, the Court

denied his IFP motion without prejudice, noting that it was incomplete. In the same order,

the Court noted that, assuming Ksieniewicz filed a complete IFP motion and was granted

leave to proceed IFP, the Court would be required to screen his complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

is also required to examine its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary. and to dismiss the

complaint if jurisdiction was lacking. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d

939, 954 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc).

The Court’s order of dismissal pointed out that Ksiewicz was bringing only one federal

claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unlawful towing of his car, and the remaining

claims were supplemental claims arising under state law. The order mentioned two serious

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obstacles, and directed Ksiewicz to address them in his amended complaint. Those

obstacles were, first, the statute of limitations, and second, a case pending in state court in

which Ksieniewicz was bringing the same or similar claims. The order explained that any

amended complaint Ksieniewicz filed should show why he is entitled to tolling on his

otherwise time-barred claim, and explain the status of any state court proceeding. 

Ksieniewicz then submitted a renewed IFP motion, and an amended complaint. By

an order issued April 8, the Court accepted these for filing.

Ksieniewicz’s renewed IFP motion shows he is unable to pay the filing fee and still

provide the necessities of life for himself. His motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. The Court

is again required to screen the complaint and to dismiss it if it fails to state a claim, or if the

Court lacks jurisdiction.

The amended complaint does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 in that it does not

state a cause of action or explain why the Court has jurisdiction. Instead, it is a brief on the

issue of tolling, and addresses the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which the Court’s order did not

mention. In this order, however, the Court will focus on the problems already pointed out to 1

Ksieniewicz, which he has had an opportunity to address. Although the issues raised in the

state court proceedings were unknown, the amended complaint appears to concede that

they are the same, and that they are still pending. Ksieniewicz’s complaint is that the state

courts ought to have given him a hearing instead of deciding his appeal on the written

pleadings, and that they are dragging their feet in deciding his appeal. The documents

attached to the amended complaint, however, show that he had at least the opportunity to

present written briefs to the California court of appeals. The same documents show he is

proceeding pro se in state court.

Because the state court action was apparently still pending, it appeared Rooker- 1

Feldman would not be applicable. Instead, the Court cited Janopaul + Block Companies,

LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 830 F. Supp. 2d 976 (S.D.Cal., 2011) for the principle

that, where a federal court action involved substantially the same parties and issues as in

state court proceedings, the federal court would apply the doctrine announced in Colorado

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) and abstain pending

resolution of appeals by state court.

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Under these circumstances, the Court would ordinarily go through Colorado River

abstention analysis. Here, however, it is not possible to do so because Ksieniewicz

addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine instead of abstention. But in any event, abstention

analysis is necessary, because Ksieniewicz’s only federal claim is time-barred.As discussed

in the Court’s order of March 18, Ksieniewicz’s claim accrued in the fall of 2010 and is

subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Ksieniewicz does not argue that a different statute

of limitations applies, only that he is entitled to tolling. His argument is that Defendants

delayed his state court case, hoping the statute of limitations would expire, and also that

Defendants’ attorney on March 29, 2011 wrote him a letter urging him not to appeal his loss

in the trial court. And, as mentioned, Ksieniewicz has referred to state courts’ foot-dragging. 

None of these, however, provide any reason for tolling. If Ksieniewicz had a federal

claim, he could have filed it in this Court from the start. Any delays he encountered while

litigating in state court did not prevent him from filing his complaint in this Court. Ksieniewicz

is suing the City of La Mesa, and no exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. 

Because he is not entitled to tolling, his § 1983 claim must be dismissed. Because the

parties are not diverse, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claims.

The amended complaint attempts to add another federal claim, this time arising under

the Americans with Disabilities Act. The only mention of Ksieniewicz’s disability in either the

amended complaint or the original complaint is the fact that he told police he was entitled to

leave his car parked in the street without moving it because he had a blue disability placard.

This claim arose from the same events as did his § 1983 claim, and accrued at the same

time. Even assuming the ADA claim is not also time-barred, see St. Amand v. Block, 472

Fed. Appx. 807, 808 (9 Cir. 2012) (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d th

1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002)) (holding that California’s statute of limitations for personal

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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injury actions applies to claims brought under Title II of the ADA), the incident he describes

2

does not give rise to an ADA claim.

The original complaint said Ksieniewicz’s car was singled out and marked because

it was left parked on the street and had not been moved within 72 hours. He alleges police

came back later and marked his car again, but not other cars, even though those other cars

had been there longer. He does not allege a reason for their singling him out; instead, he

merely predicts that the answer, when it is revealed, will shock everyone. The complaint

does not allege whether any of the other cars were displaying the same disability placards

as Ksieniewicz’s car. The complaint alleges that at different times, other cars were not

marked or towed even though they had not been moved and exhibited other violations, such

as expired registrations and being in inoperable condition. It alleges that, after Ksieniewicz’s

car was towed, he went to the police station and found out they had towed it. He argued to

the police that under Cal. Vehicle Code § 22511.5, he was entitled to park on the street

indefinitely, but alleges they told him they didn’t care what the law said.

Though the complaint doesn’t say which title of the ADA Ksieniewicz thinks would

apply, claims for adequate parking on public streets are properly analyzed under Title II,

which addresses discrimination by public entities in the use of the entity’s services,

programs, or activities. See, e.g., Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D.Cal.,

2011). See also Jones v. City of Monroe, MI, 341 F.3d 474 (6 Cir. 2003). The complaint

th

doesn’t allege Ksieniewicz needs to park for days at a time in the same space because of

his disability, nor that he was treated worse than a non-disabled person would have been.

See O'Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (giving

elements for a Title II ADA claim). Rather, his chief complaint is that he was not given the

extended parking benefits that California law creates for persons whose vehicles display

disabled placards or license plates. These extended parking privileges he claimed are

At the time the plaintiff in St. Amand brought his claim, the statute of limitations for 2

personal injury actions in California was one year. It is now two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 335.1.

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available only to disabled persons. See Cal. Vehicle Code § 22511.5(a) (providing that

disabled persons whose vehicles display disabled plates or placards are not bound to obey

certain generally applicable restrictions on parking). They are also created by state law, not

by the ADA.

The only remedy available under title III of the ADA is injunctive relief, Wander v.

Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002), but the complaint doesn’t attempt to show why that

would be appropriate, nor does it even request it. Although Ksieniewicz owns a car, the

complaint does not allege he has had any trouble with police ticketing or towing it since

2010. Bearing in mind the limitations period issue, if police or the city were continuing to

ticket and tow his car, he would certainly have mentioned it.

The Court therefore concludes Ksieniewicz’s federal claim is now time-barred, that

he cannot state any other claims over which the Court could exercise jurisdiction, and that

further amendment would be futile. The complaint is therefore DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 9, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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