Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16432/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THERESA CAMERANESI; JUDITH

LITEKY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE; U.S. ARMY TRAINING

AND DOCTRINE COMMAND,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14-16432

D.C. No.

4:12-cv-00595-PJH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 13, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 30, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Dissent by Judge Watford

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2 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

SUMMARY*

Freedom of Information Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of plaintiffs, who brought an action under the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) against the United

States Department of Defense seeking the names of foreign

students and instructors at the Western Hemisphere Institute

for Security Cooperation.

The panel held that the disclosure of the names of the

foreign students and instructors would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and was exempt

from disclosure under Exemption 6 of FOIA. The panel held

that the evidence submitted by the Department of Defense

demonstrated that disclosure of the identities of the foreign

students and instructors could give rise to harassment, stigma,

or violence as a result of their association with the United

States – exactly the sort of risks that courts have recognized

as nontrivial.

Judge Watford dissented, and he would affirm the district

court’s summary judgment, because in his view the

Department of Defense did not carry its burden of

demonstrating that the students’ and instructors’ privacy

interests outweighed the strong public interest in disclosures

of their names.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 3

COUNSEL

Steve Frank (argued) and Leonard Schaitman, Appellate

Staff; Melinda Haag, United States Attorney; Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for

Defendants-Appellants.

Duffy Carolan (argued), Jassy Vick Carolan LLP, San

Francisco, California; Kent Spriggs, Spriggs Law Firm,

Tallahassee, Florida; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to determine whether the names of

foreign students and instructors at the Western Hemisphere

Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) are exempt

from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Because we

conclude that the disclosure of these names “would constitute

a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” id., we

reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

plaintiffs.

I

We begin with the factual background regarding the

development of WHINSEC, the Department of Defense’s

adjustments to its disclosure policy in light of the terrorist

attacks of 2001, and the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.

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4 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

A

The United States Army School of the Americas (SOA)

opened in 1946 “for the purpose of providing military

education and training to military personnel of Central and

South American countries and Caribbean countries.” 

10 U.S.C. § 4415(b) (1987). In 1989, during the Salvadoran

Civil War, Salvadoran soldiers gunned down six Jesuit priests

as well as their housekeeper and her 16-year-old daughter. It

was later reported that 19 of the 26 soldiers implicated in

these deaths had attended SOA. These murders sparked

protests against SOA and prompted the formation of School

of the Americas Watch (SOAW), a human rights and

advocacy group dedicated to monitoring SOA graduates and

lobbying for closure of the school.1

As part of these monitoring efforts, SOAW submitted a

FOIA request to the Department of Defense (DOD) seeking

the names of all former and current SOA students and

instructors. The DOD granted the request in 1994, and

disclosed the names of all SOA students and instructors

dating back to the school’s formation in 1946. SOAW used

the names to create a database containing the names,

countries, and courses taken or taught by each attendee.

1 The dissent provides a much lengthier and more detailed discussion

of SOA’s history, relying primarily on newspaper articles and other extrarecord material. Dissent at 35–38. While this further illuminates the

reasonsfor Congress’s decision to address these issues through legislative

enactments, the dissent’s historical research is otherwise not relevant to

the legal question before us: whether the public’s interest in monitoring

the DOD’s performance of its current statutory duties with respect to

WHINSEC outweighs the privacy interest of WHINSEC students and

instructors.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 5

In 1997, Congress sought to improve the human rights

record of SOA by adopting the Leahy Amendments to the

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. See Foreign

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs

Appropriation Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 570, 111

Stat. 2386, 2429 (1997).2 The Leahy Amendments precluded

the DOD from providing congressionally appropriated funds

to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces if there was

credible evidence that the unit “has committed gross

violations of human rights,” unless the Secretary of State

reported to Congress that the foreign government was “taking

2

 Specifically, the Leahy Amendments stated:

None of the funds made available by this Act may be

provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign

country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence

that such unit has committed gross violations of human

rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to

the Committees on Appropriations that the government

ofsuch country is taking effective measures to bring the

responsible members of the security forces unit to

justice: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be

construed to withhold funds made available by this Act

from any unit of the security forces of a foreign country

not credibly alleged to be involved in gross violations

of human rights: Provided further, That in the event

that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this

section, the Secretary of State shall promptly informthe

foreign government of the basis for such action and

shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the

foreign government in taking effective measures to

bring the responsible members of the security forces to

justice.

§ 570, 111 Stat. at 2429.

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6 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

effective measures to bring the responsible members of the

security forces unit to justice.” Id.

Congress reenacted the LeahyAmendments in subsequent

appropriations bills3 until 2008, when the amendments were

codified as part of the DOD appropriations rules, 10 U.S.C.

§ 2249e, and the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et

seq. The provisions pertaining to the DOD, 10 U.S.C.

§ 2249e, state that no funds “made available to the

Department of Defense . . . may be used for any training,

equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security

force if the Secretaryof Defense has credible information that

the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Id.

§ 2249e(a)(1). The law further requires the Secretary of

Defense to consult with the Secretary of State to “ensure that

prior to a decision to provide any training, equipment, or

other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force full

consideration is given to any credible information available

to the Department of State relating to human rights violations

by such unit.” Id. § 2249e(a)(2). The statute does not require

the DOD to continue to monitor the performance of such

units or the careers of individual members of those units after

they leave WHINSEC. The provisions pertaining to the

Secretary of State impose a similar ban on providing

3

See Appropriations 2000 — Department ofDefense, Pub. L. 106-79,

§ 8098, 113 Stat. 1212, 1259 (1999); Foreign Operations, Export

Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-115, § 556, 115 Stat. 2118, 2160 (2002); Department of Defense

Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-87, § 8077, 117 Stat. 1054, 1090

(2003); Department ofDefense, EmergencySupplemental Appropriations

to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza

Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-148, § 8069, 119 Stat. 2680, 2714 (2005);

Department of Defense Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 110-116, § 8062, 121

Stat. 1295, 1328 (2007).

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 7

assistance to a unit believed to have committed human rights

violations. 22 U.S.C. § 2378d.4 As later amended in 2011,

the statute also directs the Secretary of State to “establish, and

periodically update, procedures to . . . ensure that when an

individual is designated to receive United States training,

equipment, or other types of assistance the individual’s unit

is vetted as well as the individual.” Id. § 2378d(d)(5).5

If the

Secretary determines that a particular unit is ineligible for

assistance, the Secretary is required to “make publicly

available, to the maximum extent practicable, the identity of

those units for which no assistance shall be furnished.” Id. 

§ 2378d(d)(7). As with the statute regulating the DOD, there

is no requirement for the Secretary of State to continue

monitoring students for human rights abuses after they

graduate from WHINSEC. In short, the statutes require the

Secretary of State to take the lead in vetting foreign units

receiving United States assistance, and the Secretary of

Defense to consider information from the State Department

before providing training or assistance to foreign military

units, but not to continue such vetting after the assistance has

concluded.

4

22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) states: “No assistance shall be furnished under

this chapter or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security

forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible

information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human

rights.”

5 The requirement that the Secretary of State “establish, and

periodically update, procedures to . . . ensure that . . . the individual’s unit

is vetted as well as the individual” was added to the statute on December

23, 2011, see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-74,

§ 2378d, 125 Stat. 786, 1216 (2011), after the March 1, 2011 FOIA

request in this case. The parties do not argue that this affects our analysis

of the plaintiffs’ FOIA request for information about individual students

and instructors at WHINSEC, and therefore we do not address this issue.

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8 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

B

In conjunction with implementing these laws, Congress

replaced SOA with a new training facility called the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). 

See Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 911, 114 Stat.

1654A-226 (2000) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2166). 

WHINSEC, which opened its doors on January 17, 2001,

provides “professional education and training to eligible

personnel of nations of the Western Hemisphere.” 10 U.S.C.

§ 2166(b). Section 2166 states that one of the purposes of

WHINSEC is “promoting . . . respect for human rights.” Id. 

To accomplish this goal, Congress required that the

WHINSEC curriculum “include mandatory instruction for

each student, for at least 8 hours, on human rights, the rule of

law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role

of the military in a democratic society.” Id. § 2166(d)(1).

To ensure that WHINSEC complies with its statutory

obligations, Congress established an independent WHINSEC

Board of Visitors charged with “inquir[ing] into the

curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs,

and academic methods of [WHINSEC].” Id. § 2166(e)(4)(A). 

Under this statute, the Board of Visitors must hold an annual

public meeting and “submit to the Secretary of Defense a

written report of its activities and of its views and

recommendations pertaining to the Institute.” Id.

§§ 2166(e)(3), (5). Pursuant to these obligations, the Board

of Visitors maintains an updated database containing details

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 9

on its annual meetings from 2002 to the present.

6 The

minutes reflect that the Board closely oversaw the

development of WHINSEC’s human rights curriculum, see

Board of Visitors WHINSEC, Minutes of Annual Meeting

(Jun. 3–4, 2002),7 and ultimately concluded that WHINSEC

“is a success story, in terms of its diligent pursuit of its

mission of teaching professional military values, including

human rights and democracy,” Board of Visitors WHINSEC,

Minutes of Annual Meeting (Dec. 1–2, 2004).8

In executing

its ongoing duty to monitor WHINSEC’s fulfillment of its

human rights mission,9

the Board has formed a curriculum

subcommitteewhich has “observed classes, reviewed selected

lesson plans and reference material, and visited training

facilities,” as well as interviewed students and faculty. 

Memorandum from Matthew D. Anderson & Robert C.

Morlino, WHINSEC BoV, on Curriculum Review of

WHINSEC (July 13, 2007) (Annex 3 in Sec’y of Def.,

Annual Report to Cong. on the Activities of the Western

Hemisphere Institute for SecurityCooperation 19 (2007)). In

2007, the Board’s curriculum subcommittee concluded that

6 The minutes for each Board of Visitors meeting may be found online

under the link for the relevant year. See Committee History 2002–2015,

Board of Visitors WHINSEC, online at <https://database.faca.gov/

committee/histories.aspx?cid=1860&fy=2002>.

7 Online at <https://database.faca.gov/committee/

historymeetingdocuments.aspx?flr=96919&cid=1860&fy=2002>.

8 Online at <https://database.faca.gov/committee/

historymeetingdocuments.aspx?flr=96910&cid=1860&fy=2005>.

9

See, e.g., Board of Visitors WHINSEC, Annual Organizational

Meeting 2015 (Nov. 21, 2014), online at <https://database.faca.gov/

committee/historymeetingdocuments.aspx?flr=132290&cid=1860&fy=

2015>.

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10 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

WHINSEC had made “enormous strides in inserting human

rights and democracy education into the curriculum, and is

reported to have exceeded minimum required hours of

instruction.” Memorandum from the Curriculum Review

Sub-Committee, WHINSEC BoV, on Review of WHINSEC

Curriculum (May 30, 2007) (Annex 3 in Sec’y of Def.,

Annual Report to Cong. on the Activities of the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 25 (2007)).10

Based on this report, the Board of Visitors concluded that

WHINSEC “was meeting and in some cases exceeding its

congressional mandate in the area of promoting human rights

and democratic values.” Memorandum from Matthew D.

Anderson & Robert C. Morlino, WHINSEC BoV, on

Curriculum Review of WHINSEC (July 13, 2007) (Annex 3

in Sec’y of Def., Annual Report to Cong. on the Activities of

theWestern Hemisphere Institute for SecurityCooperation 19

(2007)).

While the State Department, rather than WHINSEC, is

responsible for vetting the individuals designated to attend

the school, the Board has reviewed the vetting process in

response to public comments. Letter from Ambassador Jose

S. Sorzano, Immediate Past Board Chairman, WHINSEC

BoV & Bishop Robert C. Morlino, Board Chairman,

10 According to the Annual Report to Congress, WHINSEC’s human

rights curriculum “consisted of nine integrated parts: Democracy and

Human Rights Class, Democracy and Human Rights Week, the

Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Electives, Human Rights Instructor

Course, Engagement Skills Training Facility, Human Rights Subject

Matter Expert Exchanges, HumanRights NGO Roundtables, and the Field

Studies Program.” Sec’y of Def., Annual Report to Cong. on the

Activities of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

3 (2007). The report included a detailed description of this curriculum. 

Id. at 4–6.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 11

WHINSEC BoV, to School of Americas Watch 1–2 (Feb. 15,

2007) (Annex F in Sec’y of Def., Annual Report to Cong. on

the Activities of the Western Hemisphere Institute for

Security Cooperation (2006)). On one occasion, in response

to charges by SOAW that “several alleged human rights

violators had participated in WHINSEC programs,” theBoard

requested an investigation into the vetting process and

reported that “effort and care” went into making the vetting

process “rigorous, labor intensive, layered, and multiagency.” Id. at 1–2.11

 As part of its oversight effort, despite

having neither funds nor legal authority “to follow the

subsequent military careers of former [WHINSEC] students

on an organized basis,” the Board of Visitors nevertheless

employed analysts to conduct external evaluations, used a

survey tool developed by the United States Southern

Command, and made efforts through contacts in foreign

countries to obtain ongoing information regarding former

WHINSEC students. Board of Visitors WHINSEC, Minutes

of Annual Meeting 4 (Dec. 1–2, 2004).

Each report by the Board of Visitors is ultimately sent to

the Secretary of Defense, who is then required to submit a

detailed annual report to Congress. 10 U.S.C. § 2166(i). In

its 2007 report, the Secretary noted that the “WHINSEC

Democracy and Human Rights Program is a very successful

and innovative program” that “is woven into every aspect of

the curriculum.” Sec’y of Def., Annual Report to Cong. on

the Activities of the Western Hemisphere Institute for

Security Cooperation 3 (2007). With respect to the student

selection process, the Secretary stated that after the

11 The Board also noted that according to the State Department, there

was “no evidence to verify the very serious charges” that were made

against these individuals. Id.

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12 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

participating foreign countries nominate individuals to attend

WHINSEC, the American Embassy in each country conducts

a background check, which is “followed up by thorough

vetting at the Department of State, in accordance with the

Leahy Amendment.” Id. at 7. The nominees “are scrutinized

for records of human rights abuses, corruption, or criminal

activities that would render them ineligible or inappropriate

for U.S. training programs.” Id.

C

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which

occurred just nine months after WHINSEC began operations,

heightened the DOD’s concerns regarding protecting its

personnel. On November 9, 2001, the DOD issued a

memorandum instructing all DOD components to “ordinarily

withhold lists of names and other personally identifying

information of personnel . . . in response to requests under the

FOIA.” The memorandum also reemphasized the DOD’s

longstanding policy of refusing to disclose identifying

information of American service members. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(3). In 2006, the DOD promulgated regulations to

formalize this policy, mandating that “Army components

shall ordinarily withhold lists of names (including active duty

military, civilian employees, contractors, members of the

National Guard and Reserves, and military dependents) and

other personally identifying information” in response to

FOIA requests. 32 C.F.R. § 518.13(f)(2).

The DOD’s November 9, 2001 memorandum regarding

American military personnel did not immediately impact

WHINSEC’s privacy policies. The DOD continued

disclosing the names of WHINSEC students and instructors

through 2004, and SOAW incorporated each new set of

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 13

names into its database. SOAW’s database included some

60,000 names, which it used to identify individuals who have

allegedly engaged in human rights abuses.

In 2005, however, the Army’s General Counsel

determined that international personnel should be accorded

the same right to privacy as U.S. personnel. Following this

decision, the DOD ceased its annual public disclosure of

WHINSEC students and instructors and began to redact the

names of WHINSEC students from all publicly released

documents. The DOD continued to comply with the Leahy

Amendment requirements to disclose the names of

WHINSEC students and instructors to Congress in a

classified format. In 2010, Congress amended the National

Defense Authorization Act to require the Secretary of

Defense to “release to the public, upon request . . . the entire

name . . . [of] each student and instructor at the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation,” but the

statute allowed the Secretary to “waive the [disclosure]

requirement . . . if the Secretary determines it to be in the

national interest.” National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1083, 123 Stat. 2190,

2482 (2009). The Secretary exercised his authority to waive

disclosure in both 2009 and 2010. This disclosure

requirement was not included in subsequent appropriations

bills.12

12 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.

L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011); National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013); National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 113-66, 127 Stat.

672 (2013); Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 113-291, 128 Stat. 3292

(2014).

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14 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

In March 2010, the House of Representatives Committee

on Armed Services convened a hearing to receive testimony

from U.S. Air Force General Douglas Fraser, Commander of

the United States Southern Command, and U.S. Air Force

General Victor Renuart, Jr., Commander of the North

American Aerospace Defense Command. See Hearing on

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 and

Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the H.

Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 1 (2010). Among

other issues, the generals addressed questions regarding a

proposed amendment to the appropriations act that would

authorize publication of personal information of WHINSEC

students. General Fraser spoke against public disclosure of

the names of WHINSEC students and urged Congress to

respect the “rights and desires of the nations who provide

[WHINSEC students]” by protecting their privacy. Id. at 16. 

He further stated that disclosure would threaten the privacy

of the United States citizen instructors and staff. Id. General

Renuart agreed with General Fraser regarding “the

importance of maintaining the security of the individuals

attending [WHINSEC], as well as the faculty.” Id. In

explaining the risks of disclosure, General Renuart described

an event that, while not involving a WHINSEC attendee, was

“an example of what can happen when information is in fact

released.” Id. The event involved the Mexican navy’s

successful raid on Arturo Beltran Leyva, the alleged leader of

a Mexican drug cartel. One of the naval officers involved in

the raid was killed, and his name was subsequently released

to the public. As a result, his mother, wife and children were

killed. According to General Renuart, the DOD could not

“afford to have the information that is held in WHINSEC

released because it will have that kind of effect potentially for

the individuals who are extremely valuable to us.” Id. at 19.

Accordingly,GeneralRenuart advised the representatives that

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 15

“we need to be very careful about the release of that

information, and we would oppose that.” Id. Congress

ultimately decided not to include the disclosure requirement

in the appropriations act.

D

On March 1, 2011, two members of SOAW, Theresa

Cameranesi and Judith Liteky, sent a FOIA request to the

DOD (specifically, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command) for “the names, ranks, branches, countries of

origin, lists of courses taken or taught, and/or dates and years

of attendance of students, instructors, and guest instructors at

[WHINSEC]” in fiscal years 2005 to 2010. A few weeks

later, the plaintiffs amended their FOIA request to request

information on the units of WHINSEC students and

instructors. The DOD partially denied the request on April 5,

2011. It disclosed some responsive records but withheld the

names or units of WHINSEC attendees under FOIA

Exemption 6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The plaintiffs filed

an administrative appeal, which the DOD denied on June 8,

2011.

Following the denial of their administrative appeal, the

plaintiffs filed suit in district court, claiming that DOD

violated FOIA by failing to disclose the requested records. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its

motion, the DOD argued that it was entitled to withhold the

identifying information regarding students and instructors

under Exemption 6 to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and

submitted two affidavits from Lee A. Rials, the Public Affairs

Specialist for WHINSEC, in support. Rials’s affidavits stated

that “[t]here are a number of risks associated with releasing

the names of WHINSEC students, instructors, and guest

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16 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

instructors,” because these students “are directly involved in

conflicts with criminal gangs, drug cartels, and other violent

individuals.” Rials then stated that assessments prepared by

the Defense Intelligence Agency (which had not been

approved for public release) “indicate that the public

disclosure of WHINSEC’s records may increase the threat to

Latin American students from: (1) the intelligence and

security apparatuses of countries hostile to U.S. interests and

to U.S. partner nations in the Western Hemisphere;

(2) terrorist organizations operating in the Western

Hemisphere; and (3) drug trafficking organizations operating

in the Western Hemisphere.” As an example, Rials stated

that in some countries “security personnel and their families

have been attacked after being identified in the media,” and

referenced the 2010 testimony of General Renuart before the

House Armed Services Committee. Finally, Rials stated that

foreign nations participating in the WHINSEC program

opposed “public disclosure of personally identifying

information of students and instructors” and that such

disclosure “may have adverse effects on future participation

in training programs at WHINSEC.”

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the plaintiffs. It held that DOD had not established that

WHINSEC students and instructors had “a substantial privacy

interest in their names” because they had not been promised

confidentiality and their names had been routinely provided

to the public before 2004.13 The DOD timely appealed.

13 The district court separately addressed the plaintiffs’ request for

WHINSEC unit information in an order issued July 29, 2013. This issue

is not before us.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 17

II

In the past, we employed a standard unique to FOIA cases

for reviewing a district court’s summary judgment. See

Yonemoto v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 686 F.3d 681, 688

(9th Cir. 2011) (holding that in reviewing a grant of summary

judgment in a FOIA case, we first review de novo whether

there is an adequate factual basis to support the district

court’s decision, and if there is, we then review the district

court’s conclusions of fact for clear error). We have now

overruled this FOIA-specific summary judgment standard,

and instead apply our usual summary judgment standard. See

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No.

13-17131, 2016 WL 4578362, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2016)

(en banc). Accordingly, we now review the district court’s

grant or denial of motions for summary judgment de novo. 

Id. “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, determine whether there are any genuine

issues of material fact, and decide whether the district court

correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. at *1. “If

there are genuine issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the

district court should proceed to a bench trial or adversary

hearing.” Id. at *2. In this case, the facts are undisputed and

the decision turns on the legal issue whether disclosure of the

names of foreign students and instructors at WHINSEC

“would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy” for purposes of Exemption 6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of

summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III

FOIA requires federal agencies to disclose records that

are requested by a member of the public. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 

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18 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

The statute provides that “each agency, upon any request for

records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii)

is made in accordance with published rules . . . and

procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly

available to any person.” Id. § 552(a)(3)(A).14 FOIA’s

disclosure obligations extend to all agency records except the

nine categories of records listed in § 552(b) as exempt from

disclosure. “[A]s a general rule, when documents are within

FOIA’s disclosure provisions, citizens should not be required

to explain why they seek the information” because

information about government functions “belongs to citizens

to do with as they choose.” Nat’l Archives &Records Admin.

v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). But when disclosure

affects the types of information protected by the exemptions,

“the usual rule that the citizen need not offer a reason for

requesting the information must be inapplicable.” Id.

At issue here is Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA

“does not apply to . . . personnel and medical files and similar

files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(6). 

In order to withhold information from disclosure under

Exemption 6, the agency must specifically invoke the

exemption and must carry the burden of proving that

disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy.” See Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 693. A

person requesting information protected by privacy interests

“must show that the public interest sought to be advanced is

a significant one, an interest more specific than having the

14 FOIA defines “agency” as “each authority ofthe Government ofthe

United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another

agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). There is no dispute that the DOD is an

agency subject to FOIA.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 19

information for its own sake,” and must also show that “the

information is likely to advance that interest.” Favish,

541 U.S. at 172. “Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is

unwarranted.” Id.

When evaluating an agency’s invocation of an exemption

to FOIA, we “balance the public interest in disclosure against

the interest Congress intended the [e]xemption to protect.” 

Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487,

495 (1994). Our cases establish a two-step test for balancing

individual privacy rights against the public’s right of access.

First, we evaluate the personal privacy interest at stake to

ensure “that disclosure implicates a personal privacy interest

that is nontrivial or . . . more than [] de minimis.” Yonemoto,

686 F.3d at 693 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). Second, if the agency succeeds in showing that the

privacy interest at stake is nontrivial, we then “employ a

balancing approach: We place the privacy interests identified

at the first step on one end of the balance, and the public

interest favoring disclosure on the other.” Id. at 694.

A

We generally begin with an evaluation of the privacy

interests at stake, which must be “some nontrivial privacy

interest in nondisclosure.” Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,

510 U.S. at 501 (emphasis omitted). A showing that the

interest is more than de minimis will suffice. See Lahr v.

Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“The personal privacy contemplated by Exemption 6, as well

as its law-enforcement counterpart, Exemption 7(C), . . . is

not some limited or cramped notion of that idea.” Yonemoto,

686 F.3d at 693 (internal citation and quotation marks

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20 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

omitted).15 Rather, a disclosure implicates personal privacy

if it affects either “the individual’s control of information

concerning his or her person,” Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989),

or constitutes a “public intrusion[] long deemed

impermissible under the common law and in our cultural

traditions,” Favish, 541 U.S. at 167.16

Disclosures that would subject individuals to possible

embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment

constitute nontrivial intrusions into privacy under Exemption

6. See Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1991);

see also Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1025–28 (9th Cir. 2008); Painting

Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Air

Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994). In Ray, for

instance, immigration attorneys made a FOIA request for the

names of deported Haitian nationals who had been

interviewed by the U.S. government to determine whether

15 Exemption 7(C) allows withholding “records or information

compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the

production of such law enforcement records . . . could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). As we explained in Yonemoto, because both

Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 “require balancing the public interest

with personal privacy, cases interpreting the interest in personal privacy

with regard to one of the two exemptions are useful in the context of the

other.” 686 F.3d at 693 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If a

nontrivial privacy interest is at stake, however, Exemption 7(C) requires

a somewhat higher showing of public interest to overcome it than does

Exemption 6.” Id.

16 Although bothReportersCommittee andFavish concernExemption

7(C), we have previously relied on them to define what makes a privacy

interest “nontrivial.” See Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 693.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 21

they had been persecuted upon their return to Haiti. 502 U.S.

at 168–69. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that

“any invasion of privacy from the mere act of disclosure of

names and addresses would be de minimis and little more

than speculation.” Id. at 170 (internal quotation omitted). 

Rather, the Court held that disclosing the interviewees’names

was a “significant invasion of their privacy” because it “could

subject them or their families to embarrassment in their social

and community relationships,” expose them “to possible

embarrassment and retaliatory action,” or put them at “risk of

mistreatment.” Id. at 176–77 & n.12 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

We have similarly held that the potential for harassment

from third parties gives rise to a cognizable privacy interest. 

In Forest Service Employees, we considered a public interest

group’s FOIA request for the names of 23 firefighters who

had participated in fighting a wildfire in which two

firefighters died. 524 F.3d at 1023. We concluded that the

employees had nontrivial privacy interests in the disclosure

of their names because Exemption 6 protected against the

“potential for harassment” that “would be presented by the

media, curious neighbors, and the [public interest group]

itself,” which might try to make unwanted contacts with the

employees. Id. at 1026. In so holding, we explained that

“[t]he avoidance of harassment is a cognizable privacy

interest under Exemption 6,” even when the harassment at

issue is merely “unwanted commercial solicitations.” Id.

(citing Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1483); see also Prudential

Locations LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev.,

739 F.3d 424, 432 (9th Cir. 2013). Similarly, Lahr noted that

“protection from . . . unwanted contact [by third parties]

facilitated by disclosure of a connection to government

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22 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

operations and investigations is a cognizable privacyinterest”

under Exemption 6. 569 F.3d at 976.

An agency may carry its burden of establishing a

nontrivial privacy interest by submitting affidavits showing

that the requested disclosure has “[t]he potential” to result in

the sorts of harassment described in our cases. Lahr,

569 F.3d at 976. Although “a threat to privacy [that] is

conceivable on some generalized conjectural level is not

sufficient to justify invoking Exemption 6,” Yonemoto,

686 F.3d at 694, “the invasion of a personal privacy interest

may be ‘clearly unwarranted’ even when the invasion of

privacy is far from a certainty,” Prudential Locations,

739 F.3d at 432. The Supreme Court has relied on an

agency’s reasonable assessment that disclosure “could

subject” the affected individuals “to possible” invasion of

privacy, Ray, 502 U.S. at 176 & n.12 (emphases added), and

we have regularly done the same, see Prudential Locations,

739 F.3d at 432 (disclosure “would likely” result in an

invasion of privacy); Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977 (disclosure

“could” result in an invasion of privacy); Forest Serv. Emps.,

524 F.3d at 1026 (disclosure “may” result in an invasion of

privacy). Particularly in cases involving foreign policy and

national security issues, “any affidavit or other agency

statement of threatened harm to national security will always

be speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a

potential future harm.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d

612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, an agency carries its burden if the affidavit

provides a justification for invoking a FOIA exemption that

“appears logical or plausible.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 23

B

If the agency succeeds in showing a nontrivial privacy

interest at step one, we then proceed to step two. At this step,

we balance the individual’s right of privacy against the public

interest in disclosure.

For purposes of FOIA, the pertinent public interest is the

interest in understanding “the operations or activities of the

government” and in monitoring an agency’s action. Forest

Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1025–27. Said otherwise, “the only

relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis is the

extent to which disclosure of the information sought would

she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties

or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up

to.” Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 694 (quoting Bibles v. Or. Nat.

Desert Assn., 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam)). 

We do not give weight to the FOIA requester’s personal

interest in obtaining information “[b]ecause Congress clearly

intended the FOIA to give any member of the public as much

right to disclosure as one with a special interest.” Fed. Labor

Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 496 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In order to determine the weight of the public interest at

issue, we must evaluate whether the person requesting the

information has shown “sufficient reason for the disclosure.” 

Favish, 541 U.S. at 172. Favish developed a standard for

determining whether a requester has shown such a reason in

cases where the requester is seeking information “to show

that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise

improperly in the performance of their duties.” Id. at 174. 

Although noting that there is generally a “presumption of

legitimacy accorded to the Government’s official conduct,”

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24 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

and “clear evidence is usually required to displace” that

presumption, Favish adopted a less stringent standard in the

FOIA context: “the requester must produce evidence that

would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged

Government impropriety might have occurred.” Id. 

Although it is easier for a requester to meet this “reasonable

belief” standard than a “clear evidence” standard, a court

must still “insist on a meaningful evidentiary showing” by the

requester because “[a]llegations of government misconduct

are easy to allege and hard to disprove.” Id. at 175. “Only

when the FOIA requester has produced evidence sufficient to

satisfy this standard will there exist a counterweight on the

FOIA scale for the court to balance against the cognizable

privacy interests in the requested records.” Id. at 174–75.17

17 Contrary to the dissent’s implication, Favish’s holding is not

limited to cases where the FOIA request seeks “materials related to the

alleged mishandling of an investigation into one isolated incident.” 

Dissent at 42. In Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., for instance, the

Second Circuit considered a FOIA request for detainee-identifying

information in the records of DOD’s investigation of allegations of

detainee abuse at Guantanamo Naval Bay. 554 F.3d 274 (2nd Cir. 2009). 

In response to the requester’s public interest argument that the information

was needed to determine whether DOD “responded differently to

allegations of abuse depending on the nationalities or religions of the

abused detainees,” the court held that the argument was “squarely

foreclosed by Favish,” because “there is no evidence of government

impropriety in that regard.” Id. at 289; see also Union Leader Corp. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 749 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that

there was a public interest in disclosing the identities of arrested aliens to

determine whether the government had been negligent in handling its

removal duties, because evidence that the “aliens . . . had been convicted

of crimes and/or ordered removed from the United States as long as 23

years before their 2011 arrests” was “at least enough to warrant a

reasonable belief ‘that the alleged Government impropriety might have

occurred’”) (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174). Indeed, Favish stated that

it intended to give courts general direction for balancing categories of

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 25

Even when the requester’s evidence has met the standard

of showing “more than a bare suspicion” that responsible

officials acted negligently, id. at 174, the requester must still

show that “the requested information is likely to advance” a

significant public interest, id. at 172. Consequently, if the

information sought does not “add significantly to the already

available information concerning the manner in which [the

agency] has performed its statutory duties,” we do not give

the public interest much weight. Prudential Locations,

739 F.3d at 433. When the FOIA requester seeks information

about whether an agency properly performed a statutory duty,

and the government has already investigated this issue and

revealed information relating to its investigation, we deem the

public interest in obtaining additional information to be less

weighty unless the “marginal additional usefulness of [the

sought] information” is significant. See Forest Serv. Emps.,

524 F.3d at 1027–28.

IV

We now apply this two-step test to determine whether

disclosing the names of foreign WHINSEC students and

instructors “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy” for purposes of Exemption 6. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6).

privacy interests against categories of public interest, so that courts would

not be “left to balance in an ad hoc manner with little or no real guidance.” 

541 U.S. at 173. Here, the public interest asserted falls within the same

category as the public interest at issue in Favish: in both cases, there is a

public interest in the question whether “responsible officials acted

negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties.” 

Id. at 174.

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26 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

A

We first consider whether disclosure of the names and

units of foreign WHINSEC students and instructors

implicates a nontrivial privacy interest. See Yonemoto,

686 F.3d at 693. We give little weight to the district court’s

ruling that DOD failed to establish that WHINSEC students

and instructors had “a substantial privacy interest in their

names and military units” because the district court applied

the wrong legal standard; it should have considered whether

nontrivial privacy interests, rather than substantial privacy

interests, were at stake.

Here, the evidence submitted by the DOD demonstrated

that disclosure of the identities of foreign WHINSEC students

and instructors could give rise to harassment, stigma, or

violence as a result of their association with the United

States—exactly the sorts of risks that courts have recognized

as nontrivial in previous cases. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 176–77;

Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975–76; Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at

1025–28; Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1483. The DOD

submitted sufficient evidence to substantiate this nontrivial

risk, see Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1987),

including Rials’s affidavits and the testimony of two United

States generals.

The plaintiffs argue that the evidence of risks faced by the

WHINSEC students and instructors should be disregarded as

overly speculative. We disagree. We have never held that an

agency must document that harassment or mistreatment have

happened in the past or will happen in the future; rather, the

agency must merely establish that disclosure would result in

a “potential for harassment.” Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at

1026. Here, the government’s affidavits set forth its

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 27

conclusion that foreign military and law enforcement

personnel who are publicly associated with the United States

could be subject to mistreatment or attack. See Ray, 502 U.S.

at 176. The same concerns rationally underlay the DOD’s

decision to protect the identity of U.S. law enforcement and

military personnel from FOIA requests. See 32 C.F.R.

§ 518.13(f)(2); see also 32 C.F.R. § 286.12(f)(2) (providing

that DOD will not disclose the “names and duty addresses” of

United States “military and civilian personnel who are

assigned to units that are sensitive, routinely deployable, or

stationed in foreign territories” because such disclosure “can

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy”). Because the government’s determination that

foreign law enforcement and military personnel would face

similar risks if their identities were revealed is logical and

plausible, it is sufficient to establish that WHINSEC students

and instructors have a nontrivial privacy interest. See ACLU

v. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d at 619; see also Prudential

Locations, 739 F.3d at 432; Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977; Forest

Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1026.

The district court also erred in holding that the

WHINSEC students and instructors lacked a nontrivial

privacy interest because the DOD had not promised

confidentiality. As a legal matter, “an assurance of

confidentiality from the government” is not a necessary

condition “for the existence of a cognizable personal privacy

interest under Exemption 6.” Prudential Locations, 739 F.3d

at 431–32. Moreover, the court’s conclusion that WHINSEC

students and instructors do not have a reasonable expectation

of privacy is not supported by the record. The DOD has not

disclosed the names of WHINSEC students since 2004 and

likewise redacts the names of WHINSEC students from

public documents. Any disclosures are now made only with

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28 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

the consent of the students or the sending nation. A majority

of foreign countries that send students to WHINSEC rely on

the DOD’s current disclosure practices and oppose public

disclosure of the identities of their students and instructors. 

Further, the DOD exercised its discretion to ensure that no

disclosures would be made in response to Congress’s

requirement that the DOD disclose the names of WHINSEC

students in 2009 and 2010, and Congress chose not to reenact

this requirement. Under these circumstances, students and

instructors at WHINSEC could reasonablyconclude that their

identities would not be disclosed without their permission.

Accordingly, we conclude that the affidavits and other

evidence submitted by the DOD are sufficient to carry the

DOD’s burden to establish that disclosure of the requested

information gives rise to a nontrivial risk of harassment and

mistreatment.

B

At step two, we balance the privacy interests identified at

the first step against the public interest favoring disclosure. 

In order to conduct this balancing, we begin by identifying

the public interest at issue, focusing on the “only relevant

public interest under Exemption 6,” which is “the extent to

which the information sought would she[d] light on an

agency’s performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let

citizens know what their government is up to.” Forest Serv.

Emps., 524 F.3d at 1027 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs argue that their request for the identities of

the WHINSEC students and instructors bears directly on two

statutory duties of the DOD. First, the DOD is required to

deny assistance, including WHINSEC training, to any “unit

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 29

of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has

credible information that the unit has committed a gross

violation of human rights.” 10 U.S.C. § 2249e(a). Second,

plaintiffs argue that the DOD must “ensure that when an

individual is designated to receive United States training,

equipment, or other types of assistance [includingWHINSEC

training] the individual’s unit is vetted as well as the

individual.” 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(d)(5). But this second

statutory obligation is imposed only on the Secretary of State,

who was not the recipient of the plaintiffs’ FOIA request, and

Congress assigned the DOD only the correlative obligation to

consult with the State Department regarding information on

units that have committed human rights violations. 10 U.S.C.

§ 2249e(a). Nevertheless, we will assume for the sake of

argument that the DOD’s obligation to consult with the State

Department is analogous to the State Department’s obligation

to screen potential students at WHINSEC, and that both

obligations are meant to ensure that members of a foreign

security unit that has engaged in human rights abuses (and by

extension, individuals who have themselves engaged in

human rights violations) are not allowed to participate in

WHINSEC training.

Plaintiffs contend that obtaining the identities of the

WHINSEC students and instructors will allow them to

discover deficiencies in the vetting process, and they submit

an affidavit identifying two instances where the Secretary of

State mistakenly allowed individuals who had allegedly

participated in human rights abuses to attend the school.18

18 One individual allegedly commanded a unit that beat and shot 16

members of an indigenous organization in 1983 and then was allowed to

attend WHINSEC in 2003. Asecond individual was allegedly responsible

for the kidnapping and torture of a human rights organizer in 1997 and

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Although we agree there is a public interest in identifying

even isolated instances of government error in performing its

statutory duties, we deem the interest to be small in this

context. Even assuming SOAW has identified two errors

among the thousands of students that trained at WHINSEC

from 2001 through 2004, this does not amount to a

“meaningful evidentiary showing” that “responsible officials

acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance

of their duties.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. Moreover,

information regarding the effectiveness of the Department of

State’s procedures for vetting prospective trainees is available

to the public through the Board of Visitors’ public reports. 

See 10 U.S.C. § 2166(e)(5). Given the ongoing governmental

review of DOD compliance and the absence of a meaningful

showing of noncompliance, the disclosure of the names of all

students and instructors at WHINSEC would not have

significant “marginal additional usefulness,” Forest Serv.

Emps., 524 F.3d at 1027–28, or contribute “significantly to

public understanding of the operations or activities of the

government,” Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495

(emphasis omitted).

Second, plaintiffs contend that they can use the names of

WHINSEC students to track their conduct after they have

received their training. According to plaintiffs, if WHINSEC

attendees violate human rights once they return to their

service in foreign governments, it shows that WHINSEC

human rights training is not effective. We disagree. While

Congress required WHINSEC to provide mandatory

instruction on human rights, § 2166(d)(1), the reports from

then attended WHINSEC in 2002. SOAW also points to three students

who attendedWHINSEC while under official investigation for corruption,

which is not alleged to be a human rights abuse.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 31

the Board of Visitors and Secretary of Defense make clear

that WHINSEC is exceeding congressional requirements in

this area. The Board of Visitors regularly monitors, reports

on, and makes recommendations for improvements to

WHINSEC’s curriculum. 10 U.S.C. § 2166(e)(4)(A); see

also Memorandum from Matthew D. Anderson & Robert C.

Morlino, WHINSEC BoV, on Curriculum Review of

WHINSEC (July 13, 2007) (Annex 3 in Sec’y of Def.,

Annual Report to Cong. on the Activities of the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 19 (2007)). 

The relationship between WHINSEC’s obligation to provide

human rights training to WHINSEC students and the

subsequent conduct of foreign law enforcement or military

personnel, perhaps years after their training at WHINSEC, is

tenuous at best. Even if individual attendees are later alleged

to engage in human rights abuses, such subsequent incidents

are unlikely to shed light on what the government is currently

“up to” at WHINSEC. Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 694. Given the

Board of Visitors’s responsibility for monitoring and

reporting on WHINSEC’s curriculum, the disclosure of the

names of all foreign students and instructors at WHINSEC

would not “add significantly to the already available

information concerning the manner in which [the agency] has

performed its statutory duties,” Prudential Locations,

739 F.3d at 433, or “appreciably further the public’s right to

monitor the agency’s action,” Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d

at 1027. The Supreme Court has ruled that the purposes of

FOIA are not fostered by disclosure of information about

private individuals that “reveals little or nothing about an

agency’s own conduct.” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of

Press, 489 U.S. at 773.

Having defined the public interest at stake, we now weigh

it against the privacy interest of the WHINSEC students and

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32 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

instructors. DOD has presented evidence that disclosing the

names of WHINSEC students and instructors would put them

at risk of harassment, retaliation, or even death. Where

serious privacy risks are present on one side of the balance,

strong public interests are required in order to tip the scales

toward disclosure. Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1027. 

Because any incremental value stemming from the disclosure

of the identities of WHINSEC students and instructors is

small, the public interest in this case is not significant

compared to the risk of disclosure. We therefore conclude

that disclosure would give rise to a “clearly unwarranted”

invasion of privacy and that the information requested by

plaintiffs is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of

FOIA.

The dissent disagrees with our application of the FOIA

balancing test because it is not persuaded by the

government’s reasons for instituting a new policy to withhold

the names of students and instructors in 2005. The dissent

argues that because the DOD disclosed the names of SOA

and WHINSEC students and instructors until 2004, it must

“provide a satisfactory explanation” for its change in policy

in order to invoke Exemption 6. Dissent at 45.

The dissent’s analysis is wrong for several reasons. Most

important, FOIA does not impose a duty on the government

to provide a satisfactory explanation of a change in its policy;

rather, it merely requires us to decide on the record before us

whether disclosure of the requested information would give

rise to a “clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6). Here, the government’s assertion that disclosure

would do so is both logical and plausible. Applying simple

common sense, there is no question that there are many

groups in foreign countries that would seek to harm those

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 33

who are publicly associated with the United States military. 

And it is equally plausible that the risks facing WHINSEC

students and instructors are sufficient to justify withholding

under Exemption 6. Even the dissent concedes that these

risks are real. Dissent at 34, 45.

But even if we were to evaluate the government’s

explanation of its policy decision, we disagree with the

dissent’s view that the government did “not provide a

satisfactory explanation.” Dissent at 45. The government

explained that the DOD circulated an internal memorandum

changing its policies regarding disclosure of the names of

defense personnel two months after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, and realized that international personnel

should be accorded the same protection some years later. In

our view, a government bureaucracy’s failure to demonstrate

speed and efficiency in applying a policy issued in one

context to a related but different context does not raise the

inference that the government is hiding the true reasons for

that policy. Indeed, it took the DOD five years to formalize

its policy regarding American military personnel after it

circulated its informal memo. See 32 C.F.R. § 518.13(f)(2);

see also The Freedom of Information Act Program, 71 Fed.

Reg. 9222, 9232 (Feb. 22, 2006).19

19 The dissent also speculates that the threats facing WHINSEC

students and instructors were “undoubtedly” present during the decade

from 1994 to 2004, and so infers that it would be unreasonable for the

government to change its nondisclosure policy starting in 2005. Dissent

at 45. There is no support in the record for this speculation, and it is

equally likely that escalating violence influenced the government’s

decision to change its nondisclosure policy in 2005. See, e.g., Mary

Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Border Police Chief Only Latest Casualty in

Mexico Drug War, Wash. Post, June 16, 2005 (reporting on Mexico’s

“worst barrage of drug-related violence in years” and noting that an

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34 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

Because disclosing the names of WHINSEC students and

instructors would give rise to a “clearly unwarranted”

invasion of privacy, those names are therefore exempt from

disclosure under Exemption 6 of FOIA.

REVERSED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Department of Defense has shown that the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation’s foreign

students and instructors have a non-trivial privacy interest in

keeping their identities secret. Disclosing their names to the

public would reveal their affiliation with the Institute, which

might expose them to the risk of harassment or violence when

they return to their home countries. But the question remains

under Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) whether that invasion of privacy would be “clearly

unwarranted.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). To answer that

question, we must balance the privacy interests at stake

against the public interest in disclosure protected by

FOIA—namely, “the citizens’ right to be informed about

‘what their government is up to,’” which encompasses

“[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency’s

“increasing number” of victims of drug violence are “public servants” who

“stood up to organized crime”); Ginger Thompson & James C. McKinley,

Jr., Mexico’s DrugCartels Wage Fierce Battle for Their Turf, N.Y. Times,

Jan. 14. 2005 (noting that while in “the last four years” Mexico had made

advances in its fight against drug cartels, a new wave of drug related

killings showed that cartel leaders had begun to regroup, and noting that

at least 34 people, including three federal agents and two journalists, had

been assassinated in the last six months of 2004).

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 35

performance of its statutory duties.” Department of Justice

v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.

749, 773 (1989). In my view, on the thin evidentiary record

presented here, the Department of Defense did not carry its

burden of demonstrating that the students’ and instructors’

privacy interests outweigh the strong public interest in

disclosure of their names.

I

Let’s start with the public interest in disclosure, which

requires a little bit of background. The Institute is operated

by the Army at Fort Benning, Georgia. It was established in

2001, but it is actually a continuation of the School of the

Americas (SOA), which opened its doors under a different

name in 1946 and moved to Fort Benning in the 1980s. SOA

became the subject of considerable controversy after the 1989

massacre of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador during that

country’s civil war. It turned out that 19 of the soldiers

involved in the massacre had received training at SOA.

That incident was not an anomaly. After the Army began

releasing the names of former SOA students and instructors

in 1994 as a result of FOIA requests, human rights activists

linked the school’s attendees to a host of notorious crimes. A

few examples: SOA graduates were implicated in additional

atrocities committed during the civil war in El Salvador,

including the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the

execution of four American churchwomen, and the massacre

of hundreds of civilians in the village of El Mozote. A

Guatemalan colonel who attended SOA was accused of

murdering, six months after graduating, an American

innkeeper in Guatemala in 1990. Six Peruvian SOA

graduates were connected to the killings of nine students and

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36 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

a professor in Peru in 1992. In addition, SOA counted among

its alumni Salvadoran death-squad leader Roberto

D’Aubuisson; Bolivian strongman Hugo Banzer Suarez;

Panamanian dictator and convicted drug-trafficker Manuel

Noriega; Argentine dictators and “dirtywar” culprits Roberto

Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri; and Ecuador’s Guillermo

Rodriguez and Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado, both of whom

toppled democratically elected governments. See H.R. 732,

106th Cong. (1999); Richard F. Grimmett & Mark P.

Sullivan, Congressional Research Service, U.S. ArmySchool

of the Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns

3–4 (2001); Eric Schmitt, School for Assassins, or Aid to

Latin Democracy?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1995, at A8.

The Armycautioned, rightly, that these incidents were not

representative of the vast majority of SOA attendees,

although it did not disclaim them entirely. A spokesman for

the school responded to the criticism in 1995 by observing

that “[o]ut of 59,000 students who have graduated from a

variety of programs, less than 300 have been cited for human

rights violations like torture and murder, and less than 50

have been convicted of anything.” Schmitt, School for

Assassins, at A8. However, the controversy escalated in 1996

when the Pentagon released excerpts of training manuals

previously used at SOA that provided instruction on torturing

and executing insurgents. See Dana Priest, U.S. Instructed

Latins on Executions, Torture, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1996, at

A1.

In 1997, Congress began imposing legislative restrictions

on the school’s operations. It enacted what became known as

the Leahy Amendment, which barred the military from

assisting any foreign security unit credibly believed to have

committed human rights abuses unless that unit’s government

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 37

had taken steps to bring the responsible parties to justice. See

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-

118, § 570, 111 Stat. 2386, 2429 (1997). Congress also

barred funding for SOA unless the Secretary of Defense

certified that the training provided at the school was

consistent with that provided to U.S. personnel at other

military institutions, “particularly with respect to the

observance of human rights.” Id. at 2401. The intended

effect of these provisions was to preclude Latin American

military and law-enforcement personnel from attending SOA

if their units had engaged in past human rights abuses, and to

ensure that the school’s attendees were not trained in ways

that might contribute to human rights abuses after they

returned to their home countries. The LeahyAmendment and

the certification requirement did not quiet the outcry over

SOA. In 1999, the House of Representatives passed an

amendment by a vote of 230–197 that would have closed

SOA altogether. See 145 Cong. Rec. 18716–26, 18737

(1999).

In response to this congressional action, the Army

pledged curricular changes and increased civilian

participation at the school, and these proposed changes

succeeded in staving off the school’s closure. In 2000, rather

than close SOA, Congress decided to impose reform

measures. Congress required the school to include instruction

for all students on respect for human rights and principles of

democratic governance, and mandated oversight of the school

by a Board of Visitors composed primarily of civilians and

civilian-designees. See National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 911, 114 Stat.

1654, 1654A-226–28 (2000) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2166). 

To avoid association with SOA’s controversial past, it was

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38 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

thought best to rename the school going forward. Beginning

in early 2001, the school began operating under its new name:

the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.

That background is relevant to understanding the strength

of the public interest in disclosure involved here. Disclosing

the names of the Institute’s foreign students and instructors is

necessary to allow citizens to remain informed about “what

their government is up to.” For example, without the names,

the public has no way of determining whether the issues that

led to the school’s near closure have been adequately

addressed. Is the Army in fact barring attendance of foreign

military and law-enforcement personnel who belong to units

with records of human rights abuses? Or are such individuals

continuing to receive training at the Institute at taxpayer

expense? Have the new curricular requirements been

effective in instilling the importance of respect for human

rights and democratic values? Or are students trained at the

Institute continuing to commit human rights abuses upon

returning to their home countries? These are not idle

questions given the school’s checkered history. Because the

Institute remained in operation only after Congress mandated

reforms designed to fix the problems that formerly plagued

the school, the public has a strong ongoing interest in

assessing whether those measures are working.

Beyond advancing this more general interest, disclosing

the names of the Institute’s foreign students and instructors

would also shed light on how well the Departments of

Defense and State are performing their statutory duties. See

Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773. Under the current

version of the Leahy Amendment, the government may not

train, equip, or otherwise assist any “unit” of a foreign

security force if the unit has committed “a gross violation of

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 39

human rights.” 10 U.S.C. § 2249e(a)(1); 22 U.S.C.

§ 2378d(a). This restriction imposes specific duties upon the

Departments of Defense and State. The Defense Department

is expressly barred from spending funds on the proscribed

foreign assistance, and prior to aiding a foreign security unit,

the Secretary of Defense must consult with the Secretary of

State regarding “any credible information available to the

Department of State relating to human rights violations by

such unit.” 10 U.S.C. § 2249e(a). In turn, the Secretary of

State must “ensure that when an individual is designated to

receive United States training, equipment, or other types of

assistance the individual’s unit is vetted as well as the

individual.” 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(d)(5). Disclosure of the

names of the Institute’s foreign students would allow the

public to assess the State Department’s performance of its

vetting functions, as well as the Defense Department’s

performance of its duty to consult with the State Department

and to refrain from training any units with suspect human

rights records.

II

The strength of the public interest in disclosure is what

distinguishes this case from the cases on which the

Department of Defense relies to justify its invocation of

Exemption 6. In those cases, the courts struck the balance in

favor of protecting privacy interests because the public

interest in disclosure was either non-existent or exceptionally

weak.

In the first set of cases, there was simply no cognizable

public interest in disclosure at all. See Bibles v. Oregon

Natural Desert Association, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997)

(per curiam); Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487,

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40 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

497–98 (1994); Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 774–75. 

The requested information revealed “little or nothing” about

the relevant government agencies or their activities, and

therefore could not “appreciably further the citizens’ right to

be informed about what their government is up to.” FLRA,

510 U.S. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the

reasons just explained, the same cannot be said about the

information requested by the plaintiffs in this case.

In the second set of cases, the courts held that although a

cognizable public interest in disclosure existed, it was

adequately served by the wealth of information the

government had already made publicly available. See

Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178 (1991);

Prudential Locations LLC v. HUD, 739 F.3d 424, 433 (9th

Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Forest Service Employees for

Environmental Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service, 524 F.3d 1021,

1028 (9th Cir. 2008). In those cases, obtaining the additional

information sought by the requesters (the names of particular

individuals) would not have shed any light on the operations

or activities of the government. Here, by contrast, without

obtaining the foreign students’ and instructors’ names, the

public cannot exercise its right to remain informed about the

Army’s operation of the Institute or assess how well the

Departments of State and Defense are performing their

statutory duties.

The majority asserts that annual reports produced by the

Institute’s Board of Visitors, as well as those issued by the

Department of Defense itself, are adequate for these purposes,

see Maj. op. at 30, 30–31, 31, but in truth the reports are

utterly useless in this regard. They merely provide general

conclusions about the Army’s operation of the Institute and

the government’s vetting of its attendees, not the underlying

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 41

information necessary to determine whether those

conclusions are correct.1 Without knowing the actual names

of those allowed to attend the Institute, the public has no way

of independently verifying whether students are properly

vetted before enrolling at the Institute, or whether after

graduating they engage in human rights abuses in their home

countries. As the majority would have it, the public must

simply take the government’s word for it that the reform

measures mandated by Congress have been effective. This

fox-guarding-the-henhouse notion is, of course, completely

antithetical to FOIA’s core purpose.

Finally, in the last set of cases, the requesters alleged that,

in the course of investigating an isolated incident, the

government had either engaged in a cover-up or conducted an

insufficiently thorough investigation. See National Archives

and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160–61

(2004) (requester alleged that Vince Foster’s death was not

actually a suicide); Lahr v. National Transportation Safety

Board, 569 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (requester alleged

that TWA Flight 800 did not crash; it was shot down by the

military); Lane v. Department of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128,

1131–33 (9th Cir. 2008) (requester alleged that her former

supervisor had in fact threatened a fellow employee with a

gun, contrary to the conclusion reached by investigators). In

that narrow context, when the asserted public interest rests on

showing that “the investigative agency or other responsible

officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the

performance of their duties,” the requester must produce at

least some evidence of government impropriety to

1 The Board of Visitors’ reports are available at

https://database.faca.gov/committee/histories.aspx?cid=1860&fy=2002.

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42 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

substantiate the public interest claim. Favish, 541 U.S. at

173–74.

The majority’s reliance on this last set of cases is

misplaced for two reasons. First, the standard established in

those cases does not apply here. The plaintiffs are not

seeking materials related to the alleged mishandling of an

investigation into one isolated incident, the only context in

which the Supreme Court and our court have applied the

Favish standard. Rather, they are seeking information

relevant to assessing government activities of a programmatic

nature, a context in which the Supreme Court has held that a

strong public interest in disclosure exists without any

showing of government impropriety. See Department of the

Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 368 (1976). But even under

the majority’s reading of Favish, the standard established in

that case does not apply here because the plaintiffs are not

merely seeking “information about whether an agency

properly performed a statutory duty.” Maj. op. at 25. They

are also seeking information necessary to determine whether

students who attend the Institute commit human rights abuses

or other misconduct after returning to their home countries. 

As the majority itself acknowledges, that interest is in no way

tied to the narrower interest in determining whether

“responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise

improperly in the performance of their duties.” Maj. op. at 25

n.17 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174), 30.

Second, even if the plaintiffs were required under Favish

to make a threshold evidentiary showing, they have done so. 

The plaintiffs would merely need to establish “more than a

bare suspicion” of impropriety—in other words, “evidence

that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the

alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” 

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 43

Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. The plaintiffs have easily satisfied

that standard by pointing to the troubled history of SOA,

which led Congress to acknowledge a need for new vetting

and oversight procedures. The majority simply ignores the

relevance of this pre-2001 history. Yet it is precisely because

of the problems that plagued the Institute’s predecessor that

the public has such a strong interest in determining whether

or not the reforms implemented to correct those problems

have been effective.2

III

What I have shown thus far, I hope, is that the public

interest in disclosure is much stronger than the majority is

willing to allow. But what about the privacy interests at

2 The majority makes one additional mistake in evaluating the

strength of the public interest in disclosure. The majority assumes that

FOIA does not protect the public’s interest in learning whether the

students who attend the Institute commit human rights abuses after

graduating because the public’s interest is limited to “monitoring the

DOD’s performance of its current statutory duties with respect to

WHINSEC.” Maj. op. at 4 n.1, 31. That assumption is wrong. The

public interest in disclosure protected by FOIA encompasses (but is not

limited to) “information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its

statutory duties.” Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773. FOIA also

protects, more broadly, “the citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what

their government is up to,’” which reflects FOIA’s core purpose of

“open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Id. at 773, 774

(quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372). Here, that broader interest encompasses

information necessary to assess whether the Institute continues to train

students who later commit human rights abuses upon returning to their

home countries after graduation. Contrary to the majority’s view, the

post-graduation conduct of the Institute’s attendees does shed light on the

Army’s own conduct in running the Institute—which is why the

revelations about SOA’s graduates in the 1990s nearly led to the school’s

closure.

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44 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

stake? Are they strong enough to outweigh the public interest

in disclosure? That depends on how grave we believe the risk

of harm to the foreign students and instructors might be if

their names are disclosed. Ordinarily, I would be inclined to

give considerable deference to the judgment of military

officials about the gravity of the risks posed by disclosure of

potentially sensitive information. The reason I think we

should be more skeptical here is that the military itself

determined for a decade, from 1994 to 2004, that the risks of

disclosure were not sufficiently compelling to justify

withholding the names under Exemption 6. During this

period, the Army disclosed not only the names of all foreign

students and instructors who attended the Institute each year,

but also the names of all foreign students and instructors who

had attended the Institute and its predecessor dating back to

1946—some 60,000 names in all.

It would be one thing if the Department of Defense had

informed us that its risk assessment changed in 2005 because

a foreign student or instructor had been targeted for

harassment or violence due to his affiliation with the Institute. 

That would make it easy to understand the Department’s

about-face. But here, the Defense Department pointed to no

such event, and indeed, so far as the record discloses, none of

the 60,000 individuals whose names have been publicly

released has ever been the target of harassment or violence

based on their having attended the Institute or its predecessor.

The Department of Defense is certainly correct in arguing

that it is not required to show some past incident of harm in

order to invoke Exemption 6 as a basis for non-disclosure. 

But in light of the history involved here, I think we are

entitled to demand from the Department some explanation for

why it is now saying that the risks of disclosure are too great

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 45

when apparently it did not believe that to be true before. 

Otherwise, we are simply rubber-stamping the government’s

decision.

The declarations submitted by the Department of Defense

do not provide a satisfactory explanation (or frankly any

explanation at all). The Department provided just two short

declarations from a public affairs staffer at the Institute

named Lee Rials. Attached to one of his declarations is a

transcript of testimony given by two generals at a 2010

congressional hearing devoted to other subjects during which

the generals answered a single question about the Institute. 

(This is the congressional testimony to which the majority

refers. See Maj. op. at 14–15.) The Rials declarations assert,

based on “Defense Intelligence Agency assessments” which

the government chose not to submit, that disclosure of the

foreign students’ and instructors’ names would increase the

risk of retaliation from three sources: (1) “the intelligence and

security apparatuses of countries hostile to U.S. interests”;

(2) “terrorist organizations operating in the Western

Hemisphere”; and (3) “drug trafficking organizations

operating in the Western Hemisphere.” But the risks of

retaliation from these sources were undoubtedly present

during the 1994–2004 time period as well. They did not just

pop up beginning in 2005. Rials’ declarations offer no

explanation for why the military has determined that those

risks had increased sufficiently by 2005 to warrant striking a

different balance between privacy interests and the public

interest in disclosure.3

3

 The majority’s only response to this point is to speculate that “it is

equally likely that escalating violence influenced the government’s

decision to change its nondisclosure policy in 2005.” Maj. op. at 33 n.19. 

The problem with this response is just that—it is predicated entirely on

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46 CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

At oral argument, the government’s lawyer asserted that

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, caused the

Department of Defense to reassess its prior policy of

disclosing the names. The main problem with that

explanation: It appears nowhere in the declarations the

government submitted. Neither the Rials declarations nor the

testimony from the two generals mentions the September 11

attacks. The government did submit a copy of a November

2001 Defense Department memo that announced, in light of

the recent attacks, a new policy with respect to “DoD

personnel” of withholding “lists of names and other

personally identifying information.” However, Rials did not

cite this memo in explaining the Department of Defense’s

2005 decision to stop disclosing the names of the Institute’s

foreign students and instructors, and the government failed to

offer any other declaration—let alone one from a military

officer—explaining the memo’s role in the 2005 decisionmaking process.

The link between the November 2001 memo regarding

“DoD personnel” and the Army’s 2005 decision to stop

disclosing the names of foreign military personnel attending

the Institute is not so obvious that we can assume a

connection without any supporting evidence. For one thing,

it is not by any means clear that the memo was intended to

apply to foreign students and instructors at a U.S. military

training school; the memo’s focus appears to be on protecting

speculation. The majority cannot identify any evidence in the record of

escalating violence that would justify the Defense Department’s

withholding decision in 2005 because the Department submitted no such

evidence. And because the government bears the burden of establishing

a basis for withholding under Exemption 6, that dearth of evidence is fatal

to its claim. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 173.

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CAMERANESI V. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 47

the identities of U.S. military personnel, who would be

obvious targets for attack in the wake of September 11. Had

the memo also been intended to cover foreign students and

instructors at the Institute, it is inconceivable that the Army

would have continued to disclose their names in response to

FOIA requests for more than three years after the memo’s

issuance, which is what happened here. For another thing,

the November 2001 memo relied on an Exemption 6

balancing analysis (under which privacy interests were

deemed to prevail), but that analysis is quite different for the

two groups of personnel. The public interest in knowing

which foreign students our government chooses to train

militarily and what comes of that training is much stronger

than any public interest that might exist in the disclosure of

the identities of U.S. military personnel.

* * *

Under FOIA, Congress has established a “strong

presumption in favor of disclosure,” and it has placed “the

burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any

requested documents.” Ray, 502 U.S. at 173. Had the

government provided a sturdier evidentiary foundation for its

decision to withhold the requested information, I would have

readily agreed with my colleagues’ resolution of this appeal. 

On this record, though, I think we are compelled to reject the

government’s invocation of Exemption 6. I would therefore

affirm the district court’s decision.

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