Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02519/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02519-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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- 1 - 09CR2481 [Related Civ. Case 10CV2519]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CR-2481 MMA

[Related Civ. Case. No. 10-CV-2519]

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

REDUCE SENTENCE

[Doc. No. 27]

vs.

RAUL RUBIO-BERNAVE,

Defendant.

On December 12, 2010, Raul Rubio-Bernave (“Petitioner”) filed a Motion to Reduce Federal

Sentence, presumably pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255 or 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2). [Doc. No.

27.] Petitioner requests a downward departure based on his cultural assimilation. For the following

reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Reduce Federal Sentence is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On August 5, 2009, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 1 of

the Information charging him with knowingly and voluntarily re-entering the United States after

previously being deported as an alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1326. [See Plea Agreement,

Doc. No. 13.] This Court sentenced Petitioner on August 3, 2009, to 37 months imprisonment, and

3 years of supervised release. [See Judgement, Doc. No. 25.]

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-02519-MMA Document 2 Filed 04/04/11 Page 1 of 4
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- 2 - 09CR2481 [Related Civ. Case 10CV2519]

DISCUSSION

A sentencing court is authorized to “vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” of a federal

prisoner if it concludes that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Claims for relief under section 2255 must be based on

constitutional error, jurisdictional defect, or an error resulting in a “complete miscarriage of

justice” or “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v.

Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979). Additionally, the scope of collateral attack is much more

limited than on direct appeal. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-85 (1979). 

Under section 2255, if a petitioner’s motion, file, and records “conclusively show that the

movant is entitled to no relief,” the court summarily may dismiss the motion without sending it to

the United States Attorney for response or holding an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. §

2255(b). Also, where a petitioner’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief or “are so palpably

incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal,” the court is not required to hold

an evidentiary hearing. See Id.; United States v. Meija-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir.1998). 

Moreover, a defendant may waive his right to file a section 2255 motion to challenge his sentence,

if he does so expressly. United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Petitioner’s plea agreement states in relevant part:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement, defendant

waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the

guilty plea, conviction and sentence including any restitution order, unless the Court

imposes a custodial sentence above the greater of the high end of the guideline range

recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing

or statutory mandatory minimum term, if applicable.

[Plea Agreement ¶ 12, Doc. No. 13.]

In his written plea agreement, Petitioner expressly waived his right to appeal or collaterally

attack his conviction and sentence. The Ninth Circuit approves such waivers on public policy

grounds, reasoning that finality is “perhaps the most important benefit of plea bargaining.” United

States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts will generally enforce a

defendant’s plea agreement waiver of his right to appeal if: (1) “the language of the waiver

encompasses the defendant’s right to appeal on the grounds claimed on appeal,” and (2) “the

Case 3:10-cv-02519-MMA Document 2 Filed 04/04/11 Page 2 of 4
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- 3 - 09CR2481 [Related Civ. Case 10CV2519]

waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71

(9th Cir. 1998). The record demonstrates both of these requirements are met in this case. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion is barred and must be dismissed because of his plea agreement

waiver. 

Even if Petitioner had not expressly waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his

sentence, his petition would fail on the merits. Petitioner argues that based on cultural

assimilation, this Court should reduce his sentence. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that

downward departures based on cultural assimilation are only appropriate in “extraordinary

circumstances.” See United States v. Rivas-Gonzalez, 384 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004)

(finding no grounds for downward departure based on cultural assimilation where defendant first

came to the United States at age twenty-one and had economic rather than cultural motives). 

Here, Petitioner's ties are insufficiently “extraordinary” to warrant a downward departure. 

Petitioner first entered the United States at age sixteen. Similar to the defendant in RivasGonzalez who also entered the United States well after his childhood years, Petitioner “has known

another home outside the United States.” Id. (emphasis in original). Although Petitioner resided

in the United States for eleven years, he has extensive ties to Mexico because almost all of his

family lives in Mexico including his parents, former wife and daughter, siblings, and extended

family. He concedes he was deported after committing two driving under the influence incidents,

and a felony conviction for domestic violence in violation of Penal Code section 273.5(A). 

Petitioner contends he re-entered the United States to visit a son who lives in California. When he

made the decision to re-enter the United States, however, he decided he would “stay and earn a

little money by working in the construction business.” [Doc. No. 27.] Petitioner’s decision to stay

in the United States to earn money creates an inference that he was motivated in part by economic

reasons. Petitioner’s circumstances do not amount to “extraordinary circumstances” of cultural

assimilation. Accordingly, even if Petitioner had not waived his right to attack his sentence, a

downward departure would not be warranted here. 

To the extent Petitioner’s motion seeks a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section

3582(c)(2), no grounds for reduction are available here. “The [Sentencing Reform Act] charges

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- 4 - 09CR2481 [Related Civ. Case 10CV2519]

the Commission both with deciding whether to amend the Guidelines, [28 U.S.C.] § 994(o), and

with determining whether and to what extent an amendment will be retroactive, § 994(u).” Dillon

v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2691-91 (2010). Therefore, a court’s power to reduce a sentence under

section 3582(c)(2) “depends in the first instance” not only on whether the Guidelines have been

amended, but on whether the Sentencing Commission has made the amendment retroactive. Id.

(footnote omitted). 

Here, Petitioner’s motion is based upon an amendment under Sentencing Guidelines

section 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States). The Commission added

an amendment to the section 2L1.2 Commentary Application Note (“Note”) to address when a

downward departure may be appropriate based on the defendant’s cultural assimilation to the

United States. The amendment provides that, in addition to the list of non-exhaustive factors a

court should consider, a departure based on cultural assimilation may be appropriate if: 

(A) the defendant formed cultural ties primarily with the United States from having

resided continuously in the United States from childhood, (B) those cultural ties

provided the primary motivation for the defendant's illegal reentry or continued

presence in the United States, and (C) such a departure is not likely to increase the risk

to the public from further crimes of the defendant. 

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. app. n. 8. (2010).

The Commission provided the additional considerations to “promote uniform consideration of

cultural assimilation by courts.” See id. The amendment does not reduce a sentencing guideline

range, nor is it retroactive. Accordingly, insofar as Petitioner’s motion seeks a sentencing

reduction under section 3582(c)(2), the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Reduce Federal

Sentence. [Doc. No. 27.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 4, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02519-MMA Document 2 Filed 04/04/11 Page 4 of 4