Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING 

ORDER AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE A 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” failed to pay them overtime wages, failed to 

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provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages in lieu 

thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. (See

generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 147).) 

Plaintiffs now move to modify the scheduling order and for leave 

to amend their complaint a third time. (Mot. for Leave to Amend 

(Docket No. 174).)

I. Factual Background

Charter is a broadband connectivity company and cable 

operator serving business and residential customers under the 

Spectrum brand, among others. Plaintiffs Harper and Sinclair 

worked as small/medium sized business Account Executives (“AEs”) 

at Charter’s Redding, California location. (SAC at ¶¶ 5-6, 12.) 

Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal worked as Direct Sales 

Representatives (“DSRs”) at Charter’s Irwindale, Bakersfield, and 

Anaheim, California locations, respectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9, 

12.) Plaintiffs allege that Charter classifies AEs and DSRs as 

“exempt” employees. (See id. at ¶ 13.)

Plaintiffs claim that Charter erroneously classified 

them as exempt employees by mistakenly classifying them as 

“outside salespersons.” (See id.; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, 

§ 11070.) Under California law, “outside salespersons” are 

exempt from overtime, minimum wage, meal period, and rest period 

requirements. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1171. Importantly, under 

California case law, employees are only subject to the outside 

salesperson exception if their employer actually had an 

expectation that they spend more than half their time outside the 

office engaged in sales activities, and if that expectation was 

reasonable. See Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 

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790 (Cal. 1999). Plaintiffs’ claim is essentially that Charter 

did not actually expect them to spend 50% of their time outside 

of the office both during and after their training weeks, and 

that even if it did, that expectation was unreasonable given the 

number of tasks Charter expected them to complete that required 

them to be in the office. (See generally SAC (Docket No. 147).)

Plaintiffs’ claims of failure to pay overtime wages, 

failure to provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages 

in lieu thereof), and failure to provide accurate wage statements 

are derivative of their misclassification claim. Because Charter 

misclassified them, plaintiffs contend, Charter necessarily 

failed to pay them overtime and failed to provide necessary rest 

and meal breaks. (See id.) Plaintiffs further claim that 

Charter failed to pay them commission wages to which they were 

entitled and provided them with inaccurate and misleading wage 

statements.1 (Id.) 

Plaintiffs seek to represent two classes of Charter 

employees: (1) all California employees who were classified as 

exempt outside salespersons, and (2) all California employees who 

were in positions eligible to earn commission wages. (See id. at

¶ 19.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Harper filed his initial complaint in Shasta 

1 Plaintiffs also claim that Charter failed to pay them 

all wages owed upon termination, failed to provide them with 

employment records, and violated the California UCL. (See

generally SAC (Docket No. 147).) Plaintiff Harper also brings a 

representative claim under PAGA on behalf of aggrieved employees, 

including plaintiffs, alleging the same aforementioned Labor Code 

violations. (See id.)

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County Superior Court on May 3, 2019. Charter removed the case 

to this court on May 17, 2019. (Docket No. 1.) Harper sought 

leave to amend his complaint and add another named plaintiff, 

Daniel Sinclair, on October 30, 2019. (Docket No. 36.) The 

court granted Harper’s request on December 13, 2019. (See First 

Amended Complaint (Docket No. 45).) The two plaintiffs sought 

leave to again amend their complaint to add three additional 

named plaintiffs, Hassan Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal, 

on April 16, 2021. (Docket No. 121.) The court granted their 

request on June 3, 2021. (Docket No. 146.)

The court issued a pretrial scheduling order on October 

9, 2019. (Docket No. 34.) The parties amended the scheduling 

order via stipulation on seven occasions: on January 29, May 4, 

June 25, September 17, and December 11, 2020, and again on 

January 29 and June 23, 2021. (Docket Nos. 49, 59, 69, 82, 91, 

102, 158.) On December 18, 2020, Charter filed a motion for 

summary judgment. (Docket No. 93.) The court denied most of 

Charter’s motion on February 16, 2021, holding that triable 

issues of fact existed as to the majority of plaintiffs’ claims, 

including whether plaintiffs were misclassified as “outside 

salespersons.” (See Docket No. 111.)

After withdrawing their initial motion for class 

certification pursuant to the court’s order granting plaintiffs 

leave to file the Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 146), 

plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification on June 

14, 2021. (Docket No. 149.) 

Defendant then filed a motion to compel arbitration 

against plaintiff Harper on July 9, 2021 (Docket No. 162), a 

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partial motion to dismiss on the same day (Docket No. 163), and a 

motion to compel arbitration against plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, 

and Abascal on August 6, 2021 (Docket No. 165).

On August 30, 2021, plaintiffs filed the instant motion 

to modify the scheduling order and for leave to file a Third 

Amended Complaint (“TAC”), (see Mot. for Leave to Amend (Docket 

No. 174)), and the court heard oral argument on October 4, 2021. 

Plaintiffs’ motion seeks to make various changes to the 

complaint, namely adding allegations related to the PAGA claims;

adding plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal as 

proposed PAGA representatives; adding proposed arbitration 

subclasses; adding allegations relating to plaintiffs’ UCL claim; 

and adding allegations relating to tolling and relation back of 

various claims. (See generally id.)

III. Discussion

Once the district court has issued a pretrial 

scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, 

which establishes a timetable for amending pleadings, that rule’s 

standards control the court’s analysis of whether leave to amend 

a pleading should be granted. See Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). Under 

Rule 16, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and 

with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). 

“Unlike [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(a)’s 

liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the 

party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the 

opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily 

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” 

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “If that party was not diligent, the 

inquiry should end.” Id. Although “the focus of the inquiry is 

upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification,” a 

court may also consider prejudice to the opposing party in making 

its determination. Id.

Once a party seeking amendment has shown “good cause,” 

it must also show that the amendment is proper under Rule 15. 

See id. at 608 (citations omitted). Under that rule, “[t]he 

court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Johnson, 975 F.2d 

at 607 (Rule 15 embodies a “liberal amendment policy”). However, 

leave should not be granted under Rule 15 if amendment (1) would 

cause prejudice to the opposing party, (2) is sought in bad 

faith, (3) creates undue delay, or (4) is futile. Chudacoff v. 

Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 

“Because Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ inquiry essentially 

incorporates the first three factors, if a court finds that good 

cause exists, it should then deny a motion for leave to amend 

only if such amendment would be futile.” J & J Sports Prods., 

Inc. v. Maravilla, 2:12-cv-02899 WBS EFB, 2013 WL 4780764, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013); see also Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 

805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Futility alone can justify the denial 

of a motion for leave to amend.”).

A. PAGA Amendments

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the Second Amended 

Complaint to (1) add allegations regarding amended PAGA notices 

they subsequently submitted to California’s Labor Workforce 

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Development Agency (“LWDA”), which they updated to include 

plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal, and add those 

plaintiffs as proposed PAGA representatives in this action; and 

(2) add alleged violations of Labor Code section 432.5, which 

were also submitted to the LWDA through the amended notices. 

(Mot. for Leave to Amend at 2-3 (Docket No. 174); Docket No. 174-

2, Exh. 1.)

Charter opposes plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that 

because plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal joined 

those amended notices after PAGA’s one-year statute of 

limitations had run and this litigation had commenced -- and 

because the amended notices added other claims and allegations 

after the statute of limitations had run -- the amended notices 

cannot serve as predicates for the PAGA allegations plaintiffs 

seek to add to their complaint. (See Opp. to Mot. for Leave to 

Amend at 9-14 (Docket No. 188).) Accordingly, Charter contends, 

plaintiffs’ requested amendments do not demonstrate the requisite 

diligence, are futile, or both. (See id.) For the following 

reasons, the court agrees.

1. PAGA Background and Requirements

California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), 

Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq., was enacted to remedy systemic 

underenforcement of worker protections. Williams v. Super. Ct., 

3 Cal. 5th 531, 545 (2017). To achieve this goal, PAGA allows an 

employee to bring a civil action against an employer for 

violations of the Labor Code. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). 

In doing so, PAGA “deputiz[es] employees harmed by 

labor violations to sue on behalf of the state,” in part for the 

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benefit of “other affected employees.” Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 

545. A deputized employee “act[s] as [a] private attorney[ ]

general, . . . with the understanding that labor law enforcement 

agencies . . . retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.” 

Arias v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980 (2009); see also Kim v. 

Reins Int’l Cal., Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 86 (2020) (“The 

Legislature’s sole purpose in enacting PAGA was to augment the 

limited enforcement capability of the [LWDA] by empowering 

employees to enforce the Labor Code as representatives of the 

Agency. Accordingly, a PAGA claim is an enforcement action 

between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting 

on behalf of the government.”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted, alterations in original). 

The LWDA safeguards this primacy through PAGA’s notice 

requirement. “First, . . . the employee must give ‘written 

notice . . . to the [LWDA] and the employer of the specific 

provisions . . . alleged to have been violated, including the 

facts and theories to support the alleged violation.’” Alcantar 

v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(1)); see Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 981 

(same). Then, if the LWDA notifies the employee and employer 

within 60 days that it does not intend to investigate the alleged 

violation(s), or if no notice is provided within 65 days, the 

employee may bring a PAGA action to recover civil penalties. 

Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699.3(a)(2)(A), 2699(a).

PAGA’s notice requirement was implemented to “allow[ ] 

the [LWDA] to act first on more serious violations such as wage 

and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure 

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less ‘serious’ violations.” Dunlap v. Super. Ct., 142 Cal. App. 

4th 330, 338-39 (2d Dist. 2006) (quoting Cal. S. Rules Comm., 

Off. of S. Floor Analyses, Bill Analysis for SB1809, at 5-6 (Aug. 

27, 2004)); see also Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1057 (notice 

requirement exists “to allow the [LWDA] to intelligently assess 

the seriousness of the alleged violations” and “permit the 

employer to determine what policies or practices are being 

complained of so as to know whether to fold or fight”); Williams, 

3 Cal. 5th at 545-46 (purpose of LWDA notice requirement “is to 

afford . . . the LWDA[ ] the opportunity to decide whether to 

allocate scarce resources to an investigation, a decision better 

made with knowledge of the allegations an aggrieved employee is 

making and any basis for those allegations”). To effectuate 

these goals, courts adjudicating PAGA claims require that 

plaintiffs serving as PAGA representatives have “compl[ied] with 

the statute’s notice requirements” before bringing suit. See

Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1056; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 28 Cal. 

App. 5th 824, 834-36 (2d Dist. 2018); Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp., 

19 Cal. App. 5th 804, 808-810 (2d Dist. 2018).

2. Addition of PAGA Representatives

As noted above, an aggrieved employee bringing a PAGA 

claim does so on behalf of the state and for the benefit of other 

aggrieved employees. (See also SAC at ¶¶ 98-99 (establishing 

that plaintiff Harper seeks to pursue “representative PAGA 

claims” “on behalf of all class members who are also aggrieved 

employees under PAGA”) (Docket No. 147).) Accordingly, and as 

counsel for plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, it would be 

redundant to have multiple employees serve as PAGA 

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representatives here, given that doing so would not expand the 

PAGA action’s scope. At the outset, this indicates that 

plaintiffs lack good cause to amend the complaint to add 

plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal as PAGA 

representatives.2

Further, although neither the parties nor the court 

have identified precedent addressing whether plaintiffs may add 

PAGA representatives to an existing action based on late-filed 

amendments to another, current representative’s original LWDA 

notice, available precedent and the legislative intent behind

PAGA’s notice requirement suggest that they cannot. 

“Proper notice under [Labor Code] section 2699.3 is a 

‘condition’ of a PAGA lawsuit,” Brown, 28 Cal. App. at 835 

(quoting Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 545), i.e., a requirement that

must be satisfied before a plaintiff may bring a civil PAGA 

action. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. at 841 (noting “the intent of 

the Legislature to require compliance with administrative 

procedures as a condition to filing an action” under PAGA); 

Mazzei v. Regal Ent. Grp., SACV 13-1284-DOC (AGRx), 2013 WL 

6633079, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013) (describing “PAGA’s 

administrative exhaustion requirements” as a “condition 

2 Plaintiffs argue that the court should grant their 

motion because, among other reasons, PAGA allows multiple 

employees to serve as PAGA representatives in one action. (See

Pl.’s Reply at 11-12 (citing Julian v. Glenair, Inc., 17 Cal. 

App. 5th 853, 873 (2d Dist. 2017)) (Docket No. 190).) Even if 

multiple employees may jointly file a PAGA action, however, in 

determining whether to grant plaintiffs leave to file a Third 

Amended Complaint, the operative question is whether they have 

good cause to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; Johnson, 975 F.2d 

at 608-10.

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precedent” to suit) (citation omitted). To enable the LWDA to 

decide whether to investigate alleged violations itself, and as a 

condition of the LWDA’s delegation of enforcement authority to 

individual employees, “proper notice” under PAGA requires that 

employees seeking to serve as PAGA representatives in civil 

actions first notify the LWDA within one year of an alleged Labor 

Code violation. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 839.

Plaintiffs Sinclair, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal did 

not do so. Rather, although their terms of employment with 

Charter ended in April 2017, October 2018, March 2020, and 

January 2020, respectively, (SAC at ¶¶ 6-9 (Docket No. 147)), 

Sinclair did not join plaintiff Harper’s LWDA notice via 

amendment until September 2020, (see id., Ex. 1), and Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal did not do so until June 2021, (see Mot. for 

Leave to Amend, Ex. 2 (Docket No. 174-2)), well after this PAGA 

action had commenced. None filed a notice prior to these 

amendments. (See SAC (Docket No. 147).)

Accordingly, these plaintiffs have not satisfied PAGA’s 

administrative exhaustion requirements, and therefore amending 

the Second Amended Complaint’s PAGA claim to add them as 

additional PAGA representatives would be futile. This conclusion 

receives support from prior decisions by courts in California, 

which have repeatedly dismissed PAGA claims or denied amendments 

thereto where plaintiffs had not notified the LWDA within one 

year of the violations they sought to challenge in court and 

before bringing a PAGA action. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 

839-44; Briggs v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, LA CV18-08457 JAK (AFMx), 

2020 WL 6260001, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020); Mazzei, 2013 WL 

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6633079, at *5; Wong v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, CV 10-8869-GW 

(FMOx), 2012 WL 8527485, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012).

Plaintiffs argue that, notwithstanding these 

deficiencies, equitable tolling and relation back principles 

allow them to tether the amended notices to the original notice 

Harper submitted, such that they too may be considered to have 

given timely and proper notice to the LWDA. (See Mot. for Leave

to Amend at 12-14 (Docket No. 174).) While Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15 allows plaintiffs to amend pleadings in civil suits 

when the amendment “relates back” to the date of the original, 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), California courts have made clear that 

the relation-back doctrine cannot be used as an end-run around 

PAGA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, nor can equitable 

tolling. See Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 62-

63 (2019); Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 840-42. Although Williams 

v. Veolia Transportation Services, Inc., upon which plaintiffs 

rely, (see Pl’s Reply at 8-9 (Docket No. 190)), applied equitable 

tolling to an LWDA notice, see CV 08-2582-GW(AGRx), 2012 WL 

12960640, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), the California Court 

of Appeal has since specifically rejected that decision’s 

approach, noting its failure to “consider the legislative intent” 

behind PAGA’s notice requirement. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 

841.3

3 In seeking leave to amend the complaint to add these 

plaintiffs as PAGA representatives, plaintiffs also cite a 

provision in the PAGA statute enabling plaintiffs to amend 

complaints to add causes of action under PAGA as a matter of 

right. (See Pl’s Reply at 12 n.9 (citing Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 2699.3(a)(2)(C)) (Docket No. 190).) However, that provision 

specifically provides that such amendments must be made “within 

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Moreover, even if plaintiffs could properly add 

additional PAGA representatives via plaintiff Harper’s amended 

notices, they have already foregone at least one opportunity to 

do so. Plaintiff Sinclair was named in plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Notice, submitted to the LWDA on September 9, 2020. (See SAC, 

Ex. 1 (Docket No. 147).) After accounting for the mandatory 65-

day post-notice waiting period before a plaintiff may bring a 

PAGA action, see Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(A), nearly seven 

months passed before plaintiffs filed the Second Amended 

Complaint, in which they did not include Sinclair as a proposed 

PAGA representative. (See SAC (Docket No. 147).) Plaintiffs had 

ample opportunity to add him as one at that time, which would 

have obviated the need for another amendment. Because the 

instant motion fails to explain why they did not, it fails to 

show the requisite diligence to justify further leave to amend.

Similarly, plaintiffs first sought leave to add Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal as plaintiffs to this action on April 16, 

2021, 49 days before they filed the Second Amended Complaint. 

(Docket Nos. 121, 147.) Given that Harper and Sinclair 

undoubtedly knew of their intention to seek leave to add the 

other plaintiffs to this action in advance of doing so, it is not 

clear why plaintiffs could not have filed an amended notice with 

60 days of the time periods specified in [section 2699.3],” a 

requirement plaintiffs have not satisfied here. See Cal. Lab. 

Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(C); see also, e.g., Hoang v. Vinh Phat 

Supermarket, Inc., 2:13-cv-704 WBS GGH, 2013 WL 4095042, at *6-8 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (finding plaintiffs cured failure to 

notify LWDA before filing suit by doing so ten days after filing 

and by amending complaint within statutory period provided by 

section 2699.3(a)).

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the LWDA seeking to add them at that time, such that plaintiffs 

could then have added them as proposed PAGA representatives in 

the Second Amended Complaint as well. Notwithstanding the 

futility issues discussed above, this suggests that plaintiffs 

were insufficiently diligent to warrant a third round of 

amendments, which would further delay resolution of pending 

motions. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (noting that parties’ 

failure to adhere to the scheduling order “undermine[s] the 

court’s ability to control its docket” and “disrupt[s] the 

agreed-upon course of the litigation”).

Because plaintiffs have not shown the good cause 

required to gain leave to amend to add plaintiffs Sinclair, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal as PAGA representatives, and because 

such amendment would be futile, the court will not grant leave to 

do so.

3. Addition of Labor Code Section 432.5 Allegations

Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend the complaint to 

add alleged violations of Labor Code section 432.5 to Harper’s

PAGA claim. (See Mot. for Leave to Amend at 10 (Docket No. 

174).) They do so to challenge Charter’s assertion of an 

arbitration agreement against them in May 2021, relying on an 

amended notice from June 11, 2021, which notified the LWDA of 

these alleged violations. (See id.; Pl’s Reply at 11 (Docket No. 

190).)

Whether or not this amendment was timely submitted 

within PAGA’s statute of limitations, a point on which the 

parties disagree, (see Opp. to Mot. for Leave to Amend at 12-13 

(Docket No. 188); Pl.’s Reply at 11 (Docket No. 190)), it was not 

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submitted prior to commencement of this PAGA suit. As discussed 

above, “proper notice” under PAGA requires that an employee 

notify the LWDA of an alleged Labor Code violation before

commencing a civil PAGA suit in which they assert that claim. 

See Esparza, 36 Cal. App. 5th at 62-63; Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th 

at 840; Wong, 2012 WL 8527485, at *2. Because plaintiffs did not 

do so here, the court concludes that the amendment they seek to 

make would be futile, and therefore denies them leave to amend to 

add the alleged section 432.5 violations to their PAGA claim.

The court recognizes that plaintiffs allege that the 

section 432.5 violations occurred in June 2021, well after 

plaintiff Harper initiated this PAGA action, meaning it was 

impossible for them to have notified the LWDA of these alleged 

violations prior to the current action. However, “PAGA claims 

are different from conventional civil suits,” Kim, 9 Cal. 5th at 

86, and unlike private causes of action created by other Labor 

Code provisions, it is not a vehicle by which an employee may 

freely challenge any alleged Labor Code violation they have 

experienced. See id. (“[C]ivil penalties recovered on the 

state’s behalf are intended to ‘remediate present violations and 

deter future ones,’ not to redress employees’ injuries.”) 

(quoting Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 546).

Rather, as discussed above, proper compliance with 

PAGA’s notice requirements, including the requirement that such 

notice be given before filing suit, is an express condition of 

the LWDA’s grant of authority to aggrieved employees to enforce 

the Labor Code on the state’s behalf. See Brown, 28 Cal. App. 

5th at 835; Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 545; Kim, 9 Cal. 5th at 86. 

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Although this may mean that in certain cases employees are unable 

to add new alleged violations to existing PAGA claims in a 

previously filed case, California has imposed these notice 

requirements so that it may “retain primacy over private 

enforcement efforts,” Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 980, a goal that 

would be undermined were these requirements not enforced.

B. Arbitration Subclasses

Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend the Second Amended 

Complaint to add proposed arbitration subclasses, which would 

include members of each proposed class whom “Charter contends are 

bound by a JAMS and/or Solution Channel arbitration agreement.” 

(Mot. for Leave to Amend at 2 (Docket No. 174); Proposed TAC 

Redline at ¶ 19 (Docket No. 174-3).)

It is unclear to the court what plaintiffs think they 

would accomplish by such an amendment. However, in their motion, 

plaintiffs acknowledge that “amending a complaint to plead 

updated proposed class and subclass definitions is unnecessary.” 

(Mot. for Leave to Amend at 7 n.1 (Docket No. 174).) By doing 

so, they concede that they lack the good cause required to obtain 

leave to make these amendments. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(4). 

Accordingly, the court will deny the motion as to the proposed 

arbitration subclasses.

C. Tolling and Relation Back

Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend the Second Amended 

Complaint to add allegations regarding tolling and relation back 

principles with respect to various claims, including plaintiff 

Harper’s PAGA claim. (Mot. for Leave to Amend at 2 (Docket No. 

174).) The inapplicability of these doctrines in the PAGA 

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context is discussed above, rendering these amendments futile to 

the extent that they are intended to support Harper’s PAGA claim. 

To the extent that the amendments are intended to 

support other claims, plaintiffs do not contend that they were 

unable to include these allegations in the recently filed Second 

Amended Complaint. Rather, they simply contend that they assumed 

their original allegations were adequate because Charter did not 

challenge their sufficiency until its recent motion to dismiss, 

and they indicate that the proposed amendments are intended to 

preempt that motion. (Id. at 9-10; see Mot. to Dismiss (Docket 

No. 163).)

To allow plaintiffs leave to amend each time a 

defendant alleges a deficiency in the most recent amended

complaint, before the court can evaluate that alleged deficiency, 

would be to set up “a continually moving target.” Kane v. 

Chobani, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014), 

vacated on other grounds sub nom. Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 645 F. 

App’x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2016). The court has already granted 

plaintiffs leave to file the Second Amended Complaint -- after 

deciding a motion for summary judgment, and after plaintiffs 

filed a motion for class certification -- and barely four months 

have elapsed since then. Plaintiffs cannot continue to amend 

their complaint indefinitely, particularly this late in this 

case. “[A]t some point, the litigation must be resolved.” Id.

Because plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend to 

include these allegations does not demonstrate diligence, the 

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court will deny the motion as to these amendments.4

D. UCL Claim

Lastly, plaintiffs seek to amend the Second Amended 

Complaint to allege, for purposes of their UCL claim, that they 

lack an adequate remedy at law for wages owed for a period prior 

to the expiration of the Labor Code’s statute of limitations, as 

well as for violations of Labor Code provisions that do not 

create a private right of action. (Mot. for Leave to Amend at 2 

(Docket No. 174); Proposed TAC Redline at ¶ 98 (Docket No. 174-

3).) Again, plaintiffs admit that these proposed amendments are 

in response to Charter’s motion to dismiss, which they here seek 

to preempt. (Mot. for Leave to Amend at 9 (Docket No. 174).)

As indicated above, the court will not grant plaintiffs 

leave to amend so that they may evade an already filed motion to 

dismiss, particularly where they have not shown that it was not 

possible or practicable to include such amendments in the Second 

Amended Complaint. At this late stage, the time to cure any 

deficiencies challenged in defendant’s motion would be after 

resolution thereof, if the court permits plaintiffs to do so. 

Because plaintiffs have not shown good cause for leave to amend 

their UCL claim, the court declines grant it at this time.

4 Moreover, as with their request to amend to add 

arbitration subclasses, plaintiffs here also admit that the 

amendments are unnecessary. (See Mot. for Leave to Amend at 10 

(Docket No. 174).) If that is plaintiffs’ position, it is hard 

to see how Rule 16’s “good cause” requirement is satisfied.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to 

modify the scheduling order and for leave to file a Third Amended 

Complaint (Docket No. 174) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: October 12, 2021

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