Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01938/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01938-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. LANIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OFFICIALS 

ASSOCIATION, et al.

Defendants.

14-cv-01938-JAM-GSA

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James M. Lanier (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed a Complaint (the 

“Complaint”) on December 4, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d against the San Joaquin Valley Officials Association and the individual 

members of the Association‟s Board of Directors (collectively, the “Defendants”). Id. The Court 

has screened the Complaint and makes its recommendations herein.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct a review of a complaint to 

determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or 

malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If 

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the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. Leave to 

amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusion are not. Id. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 

allegations in the complaint as true, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff‟s favor. Jenkins 

v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 

Iqbal). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The Complaint explains that Plaintiff is an African-American male who owns and 

operates a company called the “SportsTime Officials Association” (“SportsTime”). SportsTime 

provides officiating services for school sports activities. In July 2013, Plaintiff sought to obtain 

subcontracting work for SportsTime from the San Joaquin Valley Officials Association 

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(“SJVOA”), a nonprofit organization which had contracted with Fresno County to provide 

officiating services for its school sports programs. Plaintiff suggested to Defendants that they did 

not have a history of retaining African-American members and that retaining him would help to 

alleviate that lack of diversity. Plaintiff alleges that he was the most qualified candidate for the 

work for which he applied. 

In August 2013, Plaintiff was informed that his proposal had been rejected by SJVOA‟s 

Board of Directors. Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of disparate treatment because of his 

race and points to SJVOA‟s historical lack of African-American membership and subcontractors 

as evidence. He also suggests that a “glass ceiling” exists within SJVOA with respect to AfricanAmerican contractors with SJVOA, although he does not specify particular practices to support 

this conclusion. 

IV. DISCUSSION

a. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Section 1981 is intended to “forbid all racial discrimination in the making of private as 

well as public contracts.” Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F.Supp. 1377, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 

1987). A claim under § 1981 thus requires a plaintiff to “show intentional discrimination on 

account of race.” Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). Section 1981 can only be 

violated by purposeful discrimination. General Bld. Contractor’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 

U.S. 375, 391 (1982); Evans, 869 F.2d at 1344. “[O]vert acts coupled with some direct evidence 

that the defendants‟ conduct was motivated by racial animus” are sufficient to survive dismissal 

at the pleading stage of litigation. Evans, 869 F.2d at 1345, citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 

828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff explains that he is African-American and applied to enter into a private contract 

with SJVOA. (Complaint ¶ 15(e), ECF No. 1.) He alleges that Defendants have a history of 

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excluding African-Americans from the SJVOA Board of Directors and from contracts with 

SJVOA. (Complaint ¶¶ 15(d), (g), ECF No. 1.) He also alleges that he was the most qualified 

candidate to apply for the contract, although he does not allege that the contract was eventually 

awarded to a non-African-American. (Complaint ¶ 15(f), ECF No. 1.) 

Construing the Complaint liberally for the purposes of a pro se screening, Plaintiff has 

sufficiently stated a claim against Defendants.

b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege a violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 

2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). The complaint must allege 

that every defendant also acted with the requisite state of mind to violate underlying 

constitutional provision. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff does not explain which of his rights was violated by Defendants‟ actions that give 

rise to a § 1983 claim. Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In a section 

1983 action, the plaintiff must establish that Congress created an enforceable statutory right”). 

However, the Complaint fails because the private parties named in the Complaint were not acting 

under color of state law. “[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law,” and 

the mere allegation that a private party was acting under color of state law does not make it so. 

Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 

F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The relationship between the state and the private actor 

which establishes state action must be pled in some detail”). The Complaint explains that 

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Defendants are a private business that contracts with Fresno County to provide sports officiating 

services and individuals associated with that business. A contractual relationship with a state 

actor does not convert a private business into a state actor itself, however. Gauvin, 682 F.Supp. at 

1071 (private defendants who contracted with CalTrans not state actors under § 1983). 

Leave to amend cannot remedy this deficiency. The allegations that Plaintiff has already 

made in the Complaint make clear that Defendants are not state entities. More factual allegations 

will not allow Plaintiff to resolve the inconsistencies he has already established in the Complaint.

c. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

Section 2000d of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 

origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance. 

To state a claim under this statute, “a plaintiff need only allege that (1) the entity involved 

is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial 

assistance.” Clarke v. Upton, 703 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2010), quoting Epileptic 

Found. v. City and County of Maui, 300 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1011 (D. Haw. 2003). Plaintiff has 

pleaded both of these elements. He alleges that he was not retained to provide services for 

Defendants because they had a historical practice against working with any “African-American 

contractor seeking to subcontract or do business” with SJVOA. (Complaint ¶ 15(i), ECF No. 1.) 

He further contends that SJVOA was a recipient of federal financial assistance, albeit indirectly, 

through funds received by Fresno County for its school athletic programs.1(Complaint ¶ 21, ECF 

No. 1.) Construing Plaintiff‟s Complaint liberally (as the Court is required to do), Plaintiff has 

 

1 An entity need not receive federal funds directly to fall within the definition of “receiving Federal financial 

assistance,” although merely benefitting from federal funds is not enough. NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999) 

(“Entities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the 

meaning of Title IX; entities that benefit economically from federal assistance are not”).

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sufficiently stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS the following:

1. Plaintiff‟s claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (First Cause of Action) be 

allowed to proceed;

2. Plaintiff‟s claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Third Cause of Action) 

be allowed to proceed; and

3. Plaintiff‟s claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Second Cause of Action) 

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 

this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‟s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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