Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01606/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALLY INGMANSON,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 11cv1606 BTM (WMc)

ORDER REMANDING CASE

v.

AVON PRODUCTS, INC., et al.,

Defendant.

On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff Sally Ingmanson filed a complaint against Defendant Avon

Products, Inc., bringing claims of negligence, strict products liability, failure to warn, and

breach of implied warranty based on chemical burns allegedly suffered as a result of using

Defendant’s skin product. Defendant was served on June 21, 2011, and timely filed a Notice

of Removal on July 21, 2011, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, San Diego

County.

The defendant seeking removal bears the burden of proving the facts to support

jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Where it is not facially

evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the

jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090

(9th Cir. 2003). In determining whether it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court

Case 3:11-cv-01606-BTM-WMC Document 24 Filed 10/25/11 Page 1 of 4
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Mraz, et al. v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., Case No. BC332487, 2007 WL 1039295 (Super.

Ct. Los Angeles Mar. 5, 2007); Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Case No. 438144, 2006 WL

2547862 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Jul. 11, 2006); Dean v. Chrysler Corp., Case No.

782213, 38 Trials Digest (TD) 09378, 1986 WL 795015 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Aug. 1,

1986).

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may consider facts contained in the removal petition, as well as “summary-judgment-type

evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal." Abrego Abrego v.

The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006). The amount in controversy may

include punitive damages where, as here, they are recoverable as a matter of state law. See

Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In support of its removal petition, Defendant submits a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel,

sent to Defendant before the initiation of this litigation, “requesting $10,000 for compensation

for [Plaintiff’s] injuries.” (Donohue Decl. Ex. A.) Defendant urges that the Court add an

additional $10,000 in estimated accrued attorneys’ fees and a maximum punitive damage

award of $90,000 to the amount in controversy. (Def. Mem. at 3.) The Court assumes

without deciding that Defendant’s estimates of $10,000 in compensatory damages and

$10,000 in attorneys’ fees are accurate. Even so, Defendant fails to carry its burden.

To support its assertion that the claim for punitive damages pushes the amount in

controversy over $75,000, Defendant cites to four “jury awards in personal injury and

products liability actions[.]” (Def. Mem. at 2.) These four cases, however, do not appear to

be analogous. The first, second, and fourth1 all involve multi-million dollar punitive damage

awards in cases where the juries found (or evidence was presented) that the defendants had

actual or constructive knowledge of grave danger posed by their products and failed to

prevent the harm. There are no facts presently before the court suggesting that Defendant

had actual or constructive knowledge that the skin product at issue caused chemical burns,

or that the chemical burns were likely to result in grave injury or death. In the third case cited

by Defendant, Mary C. v. Confidential, 3 Trials Digest 9th 22, 2005 WL 3677226 (Super. Ct.

San Diego Dec. 1, 2005), the parties reached a pre-verdict settlement agreement pursuant

to which Defendant paid $100,000 in punitive damages and no compensatory damages at

all–a highly unusual result, as Plaintiff’s counsel commented that “this is the first time he has

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ever seen a product manufacturer pay [a] punitive damages settlement pre-verdict.” 3 Trials

Digest 9th at 22. In sum, these cases are not directly analogous to the case at bar, and

“[D]efendant has made no effort to compare the facts of [its] cases with the alleged facts of

this case.” Conrad Associates v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 944 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D.

Cal. 1998) (granting plaintiff’s motion for remand, where defendant argued that punitive

damages satisfied jurisdictional amount, because Defendant’s case citations failed to support

likelihood of large punitive damages award in the case before the court). As stated by the

district court in Haisch v. Allstate Insurance Co., 942 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (D. Ariz.1996):

It would be inherently speculative for this Court to conclude that the amount in

controversy requirement can be met by simply asserting that large punitive

damage awards have been awarded in the past against insurance companies

faced with allegations of fraud. As Plaintiff points out, Defendant has failed to

articulate why the particular facts that are alleged in the instant case might

warrant extraordinary damages. 

(Emphasis added.)

The Court holds that Defendant’s speculative assertion that Plaintiff could recover

$90,000 in punitive damages on a $10,000 compensatory damages claim is insufficient to

carry Defendant’s burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff’s

claims exceed the jurisdictional minimum, particularly in light of Defendant’s failure to point

to facts supporting the likelihood of a large punitive damages award in this case. “To find

otherwise would in effect automatically transform every state claim where punitive damages

are requested into a federal claim when diversity of citizenship exists.” McFadden v. State

Farm Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 99-1214, 1999 WL 715162, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1999)

(remanding removed case for failure to satisfy amount in controversy requirement where

plaintiff sought $16,550 in compensatory damages, and defendant argued that punitive

damages claim covered the balance of amount in controversy requirement).

Defendant argues in the alternative that the Court should permit limited jurisdictional

discovery, citing “procedural barriers” to establishing the amount in controversy prior to

remand. Any perceived procedural barriers are of Defendant’s own making, since Defendant

elected to “remove[] the case prior to the opportunity to request” a “statement of damages”

under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11. (Def. Mem. at 3.) The type of

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See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Once in federal court, Dow failed to present to the district court any pleading, evidence, or

admission that establishes that it is more likely than not that jurisdiction lies. On these facts,

it is well within the court's discretion to remand to state court rather than ordering

jurisdictional discovery, with the knowledge that later-discovered facts may prompt a second

attempt at removal. Doing so avoids encouraging the sort of premature removal presented

to us here.”); Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) ("By

assuring that removal occurs once the jurisdictional facts supporting removal are evident, we

also ensure respect for the jurisdiction of state courts.").

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jurisdictional discovery Defendant seeks is clearly available at the state court level, and the

proper procedure for Defendant is to seek evidence supporting jurisdiction prior to attempting

removal.2

Lastly, Defendant claims that remanding Plaintiff’s case “prior to Avon’s ability to

discover additional evidence in support of its removal would unduly prejudice Avon.” (Def.

Mem. at 4.) Defendant’s claim of prejudice is unsupported. Defendant can conduct

jurisdictional discovery in state court, and may file a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b) “within thirty days after the receipt [of any] paper from which it may first be

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may

not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 . . . more than 1 year

after commencement of the action.” In other words, Defendant has until June 2012 to

conduct discovery in state court, to attempt to find evidence that this case is removable, and

to file a second notice of removal, if appropriate.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior

Court of California, San Diego County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2011 

HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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