Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02282/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02282-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 07:499 Agricultural Commodities Act

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1 The Court also ordered Plaintiff to show cause with respect to the factual basis

for asserting subject matter jurisdiction exists in this action. The Court shall rule on that

aspect of the Order to Show Cause following the hearing on August 26, 2005.

2 Based on the response to the Order to Show Cause, it is clear to the Court that

Plaintiff’s counsel, not Plaintiff itself, should be held accountable for any violation of the

Court’s order regarding service of the TRO.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHET & LEO PRODUCE CO., d/b/a C&L

PRODUCE, a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CASSANDRA, LLC d/b/a CENTRAL PARK

RESTAURANT, a California Limited Liability

Company, TIMOTHY M. CASS, an individual,

and SANDRA R. FREEMAN, an individual,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02282 JSW

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER

TO SHOW CAUSE RE

CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO

SERVE FORTHWITH

On June 20, 2005, at the request of Defendants, this Court issued an Order to Show

Cause directing Plaintiff to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for, inter alia,

failing to comply with this Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”), in which the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Defendants

“forthwith.”1 The Court has received Plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause,

Defendants’ response thereto, and Plaintiff’s reply. Having considered these pleadings, relevant

legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court discharges the Order to Show Cause

regarding service. The Court does not condone counsel’s behavior.2 However, the Court cannot

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28 3 The Court, of course, has the inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct. 

See Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991).

2

find by clear and convincing evidence that counsel violated the Court’s order beyond substantial

compliance and or that he acted in bad faith.3

To hold plaintiff’s counsel in contempt for this alleged violation, the Court must find by

clear and convincing evidence that he disobeyed “a specific and definite court order by fail[ing]

to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” In re Dual-Deck Video

Cassette Recorder Antitrust Lit., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). “The contempt need not be

willful, and there is no good faith exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order. ...

But a person should not be held in contempt if his action appears to be based on a good faith and

reasonable interpretation of the court’s order.” Id. (internal citations, quotation marks and

brackets omitted). Even if a party has engaged in a few technical violations of a court’s order, a

defense of substantial compliance will not be vitiated “where every reasonable effort has been

made to comply.” Id. 

In this case, counsel asserts that although he sought the extradordinary remedy of an ex

parte temporary restraining order freezing Defendants’ bank accounts, because in his experience

it can take “anywhere from a few hours to a few days” for a court to rule on such a request, he

did not think to inquire about the status of the case approximately a week after he filed his

application. Counsel assumed that if the Court had ruled before that time, he either would have

been notified by the Court’s electronic filing system of a ruling or that he would have heard

from this Court regarding the scheduling of a hearing. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to OSC, ¶¶ 9-10.) 

Not having heard from the Court, counsel states he asked an associate to check the Court’s

docket on June 14, 2005, and that he did not receive any email messages from the Court

regarding reassignment or the TRO. 

The Court’s records indicate, however, that the Order was served via the Court’s

electronic filing system on June 7, 2005, and that there were no returned messages from

counsel’s email account to the Court’s electronic filing system. While the Court will take

counsel at his word that the first he learned of the Court’s order was on June 14, 2005, in the

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future, when filing requests for extraordinary relief such as that requested in this case, the Court

expects counsel to monitor his case more diligently, especially when counsel knows the case is

to be reassigned. Counsel’s failure to do so in this instance contravened the directives of

General Order 45, which states that “the parties are strongly encouraged to check the docket in

their case on the electronic filing system at regular intervals,” and shows a lack of due diligence. 

The Court also finds counsel’s explanation as to why Defendants were not served with

the TRO at or about the same time as Defendants’ bank was served to be unsatisfactory. 

Counsel claims that in his experience, with cases like these it is necessary to serve a bank first to

avoid the dissipation of funds and that it takes time for a bank to implement the terms of the

TRO. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to OSC, ¶¶ 17, 31.) If Defendants were served at the exact same

time as the bank, Defendants would have acted at their peril by violating the terms of the TRO. 

Thus, the Court does not find that counsel’s explanations persuasively explain why Defendants

were not served either simultaneously or immediately after the bank was served with the TRO,

i.e. on the same day, rather than waiting an additional day as plaintiff’s counsel did in this case. 

Counsel further defends his actions by claiming that the process server did not attempt to

serve Defendants at their homes and that this was a “unilateral” decision on the process server’s

part. (Id., ¶ 21.) As to the individual defendants, the process server was provided with

Defendants’ home addresses, and Plaintiff’s counsel does not aver that he directed the process

server to attempt service on those defendants at home and that the process server ignored this

directive. It was Plaintiff’s responsibility to ensure that every effort was made to serve all

Defendants and if the process server made a “unilateral” decision not to serve the individual

defendants at home, Plaintiff’s counsel should have countermanded that decision. As to the

corporate defendant, the record demonstrates that once the process server began to attempt

service on June 15, 2005, it made repeated attempts to effect service but was unsuccessful. (See

Meuers Aff., Ex. A.) Although the Court does not find that any of the Defendants were evading

service, as counsel contends, it does note that both Mr. Cass and Ms. Freeman declare they were

present at Central Park Restaurant on the days the process server attempted service at the

restaurant. 

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The Court also concludes that it is not clear from the record that it was, in fact, Plaintiff

counsel’s conduct that caused the alleged harm to Defendants and which forms the basis of their

request for a finding of contempt. Defendants submitted evidence from two of their employees

stating that these could not cash their checks on Monday, June 13, 2005. (See Atreaga and

Caranza Declarations.) Plaintiff’s counsel, however, puts forth evidence demonstrating that his

office did not contact the Defendants bank or provide the bank with the TRO until the next day,

June 14, 2005. (See Reardon Decl., Cordes Decl., Ex. A.) Thus, there is no clear link in the

record between the alleged violation of the Court’s order and the alleged harm caused. 

Considering all of this evidence, the Court cannot find by clear and convincing evidence

that Plaintiff’s counsel did not make every reasonable effort to comply with the Court’s

directive to serve Defendants “forthwith.” Accordingly, the Court discharges the Order to Show

Cause with respect to service. The Court does not, however, condone counsel’s conduct and, if

a lesser burden were applicable, the Court would impose sanctions. As such, counsel is hereby

put on notice that if he appears before this Court again upon a similar application, “forthwith”

means, as it states in Black’s Law Dictionary, “immediately” and “without delay.” 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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