Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04958/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04958-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MARVIN,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION and ANTHONY KANE,

Warden,

Respondents.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-04958 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Petitioner James Marvin, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at the Correctional

Training Facility in Soledad, California, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

section 2254. Marvin asks that this court direct respondents to: (1) dismiss the prison disciplinary

board’s decision finding him guilty of a disciplinary violation, as well as any reference to the same;

and (2) expunge the associated disciplinary charges. His petition is now before the court for review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

BACKGROUND1

Marvin, currently serving an indeterminate life sentence for first degree murder, is

challenging a prison disciplinary board decision which found he violated California Code of

Regulations (“CCR”) section 3005(a) by attempting to undermine the Catholic Chapel Program

(“CCP”) at the California Men’s Colony where he was incarcerated.

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Marvin, along with several other inmates—David Dutra, Steven Murphy, Benny Ros, and

Gerald Shil (“alleged co-conspirators”)2—were long-term participants in the CCP under the

direction of Father Alphonse Van Guilder. Father Alphonse retired in January 1999. Twenty-two

months later, in November 2000, Father R. Francis Stevenson was hired as the Catholic Chaplain for

the CCP. Marvin had been active in the CCP for eight years as a Prefect, Special Minister of the

Eucharist, choir member, server for special events and volunteer. Nevertheless, soon after Father

Stevenson’s arrival, in early 2001, Marvin quit the CCP.

While volunteering with the CCP, Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators enjoyed

considerable freedom at the chapel office, where they were unsupervised during the approximately

twenty-two month period prior to the arrival of Father Stevenson. See Ans. at 2. Marvin and the

alleged co-conspirators controlled the flow of paperwork in the chapel office, which permitted them

to control which inmates were able to have outside visitors attend family services. Id. Some of the

alleged co-conspirators also used the chapel bathroom for trysts with their wives and stole food from

the family service banquets to sell on the yard. Id.

After his arrival, Father Stevenson prohibited Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators from

using the chapel office without supervision. Id. In response, Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators

became angry and began to agitate other inmates in an effort to decrease participation in the CCP. 

Id. at 2–3. They also began making threatening statements. Id. This behavior persisted over a

period of months, during which time Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators discouraged

participation in the CCP in a coordinated effort to have Father Stevenson removed. Ans., Exh. G at

7. Matters reached a critical point when fellow inmates began to feel that Marvin and the alleged

co-conspirators had “crossed the line” by promising to “take [Father Stevenson] down.” Id.

Marvin contends that Father Stevenson altered the style of the CCP “from a conventional

style that conformed to Catholic tradition and belief to an unorthodox, militaristic program . . .

contrary to Catholic dictates and tradition.” Pet. at 4. Marvin states that his decision to withdraw

from the program was an individualized one made on the basis of personal beliefs and feelings about

the program. Specifically, he quit due to the changes made by Father Stevenson. The alleged coCase 3:06-cv-04958-MHP Document 14 Filed 01/09/08 Page 2 of 13
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conspirators also withdrew from the program during the same period. Marvin states that he “did not

conspire, agree, or even consult with” the other inmates in their individualized decisions to

dissociate themselves with Father Stevenson and the CCP. Id. at 5. To this end, he argues that over

100 other inmates also withdrew from the program during Father Stevenson’s tenure. A little over

two years after his arrival, in February 2003, Father Stevenson was transferred to another prison.

On January 2, 2002 Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators were placed in administrative

segregation and charged with disciplinary violations. They were charged with conspiring to:

(1) dissuade the free participation of the other inmates in the Catholic religious program; (2) make

statements of a threatening nature against Father Stevenson; and (3) negatively affect the

employment of Father Stevenson. Resp’s Exhibits, Exh. B at 1.3

Marvin was assigned an investigative employee (“IE”) who interviewed inmates Miller,

Rayburn, Clifton, Wolff and Bravo. Id. at 2. Prior to his hearing, Marvin was notified that

confidential material was being considered and he was given a summary of the confidential

information. Id. at 1. This material was compiled in a written report based on an internal

investigation conducted by Lieutenant Wiley (“Wiley Report”). Ans. at 2–3. It was based in part on

Wiley’s interviews with staff and inmates. Id. at 2. In his report, Wiley concluded that Marvin had

joined a conspiracy to undermine attendance at the Catholic Chapel service. Id. The report also

found that Marvin and the alleged co-conspirators had threatened Father Stevenson. Id. The Wiley

Report was kept confidential during the disciplinary proceeding because it was determined that the

information, if known to Marvin, would jeopardize the safety of the informants. Resp’s Exhibits,

Exh. B at 1. 

On February 16, 2002 Marvin received a prison disciplinary hearing. Id. at 1. At the

hearing, Marvin acknowledged that he had received copies of the charges and all pertinent

documents at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. Id. Marvin did not request any additional

materials at the hearing nor did he choose to call any staff or inmate witnesses. Id. at 2. At the

outset, the Senior Hearing Officer advised Marvin that confidential information would be

considered, that the identity of the confidential inmate sources would not be divulged and that the

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confidential information provided had been scrutinized and was determined to be reliable under

CCR section 3321(c). Id. at 1. The purpose of the hearing was explained and the Rules Violation

Report was read aloud. Id. at 2. Marvin stated that he was in good health and ready to proceed with

the hearing. Id. After the hearing, Marvin was found guilty of the disciplinary charge of attempting

to undermine the CCP. Ans. at 2. It was his second significant disciplinary violation while

incarcerated. Ans., Exh. F at 58.

On June 1, 2004 the Board of Parole Hearings (“the Board”) denied Marvin parole. Id. at 63. 

The Board commended Marvin for obtaining his General Educational Development (“GED”)

diploma and a Bachelor of Arts in computer science, his excellent work history in computers, and

his participation in Narcotics Anonymous and the Anger Management Programs. Id. at 59. In

rendering its decision, however, the Board emphasized that the commitment offense had been

“carried out in an especially violent and brutal manner.” Id. at 60. The Board noted that Marvin’s

offense amounted to “an execution-style murder” that was carried out in a “dispassionate and

calculated manner.” Id. at 57.4 Discussing Marvin’s rehabilitation, the Board took account of the

disciplinary violation that is the subject of this petition. Id. at 60. Considering the totality of the

circumstances, the Board determined that “a longer period of observation [was] required before the

Board should find that [Marvin] is suitable for parole.” Id. at 60–61.

Marvin sought relief in the California courts regarding his disciplinary violation. The San

Luis Obispo County Superior Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on January 14,

2004 in a reasoned order. Ans., Exh. G at 8. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition

for review. Marvin then filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent answered

and petitioner filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.

The issue presented is whether Marvin was denied due process when the prison disciplinary

board found him guilty of attempting to undermine the CCP. Marvin asserts that the disciplinary

board’s actions amounted to such a violation because they failed to disclose the confidential Wiley

Report and because the evidence relied upon did not meet the “some evidence” standard.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus made by a person in custody under the judgment and

sentence of a state court of a state which contains two or more federal judicial districts may be filed

in either the district of confinement or the district of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Each of

such districts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the petition; however, the district court

for the district where the petition is filed may transfer the petition to the other district in the

furtherance of justice. See id. Venue lies in this district because Dutra is incarcerated in the

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, which is in the Northern District of California.

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in this petition. 

LEGAL STANDARD

This court is required to analyze state habeas corpus claims under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). AEDPA provides that this court may entertain a

petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) applies to a

habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2006). The petition may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States;” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has

interpreted AEDPA to require a district court to uphold the state court’s decision unless that decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of a clearly established federal law. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Accordingly, this court will review the last reasoned state court opinion under the standards

outlined in AEDPA. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). Here, the last reasoned

state court opinion occurred in the California Superior Court for the County of San Luis Obispo

(“Superior Court”). This court will apply the AEDPA standard to the Superior Court proceeding to

determine whether it was an “objectively unreasonable” denial of parole.

DISCUSSION

Before the Superior Court, Marvin asserted multiple claims in support of his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. The Superior Court, however, considered only three of Marvin’s claims,

stating that “[s]ince these were the only bases on which [Marvin] exhausted [his] administrative

remedies, these are the only bases [he] may pursue on habeas corpus.” Ans., Exh. K at 4. This court

agrees. Marvin now asserts only two of those claims.5

 Specifically, the court will address Marvin’s

claims that his right to due process was violated because: (1) the Senior Hearing Officer failed to

disclose the confidential Wiley Report; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the

committee’s decision. 

Pursuant to AEDPA, the issues presented are whether the state court’s decision was either:

(1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the

United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court considers each argument in turn. 

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I. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law

A state court’s denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is “contrary to” federal

law when it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court]

cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the U.S.

Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result].” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (citations

and internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, a state court’s finding is an “unreasonable

application” of federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S.

Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 75 (internal citation and quotations omitted). “It is not enough that a federal habeas

court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm conviction that the state

court was erroneous.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Instead, a reversal of the state

court’s determination of a legal question is only appropriate where the state court’s application is

found to be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 76. 

 Before the Superior Court, Marvin argued that his disciplinary violation should be

expunged and the charges dismissed because the Senior Hearing Officer’s decision was based on the

testimony of unreliable confidential informants. Addressing Marvin’s reliability argument, the state

court cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) for the

proposition that “punishment of an inmate based on information that is not completely disclosed

may occur in prisons.” Ans., Exh. G at 5. In Wolff, the Court established a set of procedural

safeguards designed to ensure that prison officials comply with the mandates of due process when

conducting prison disciplinary hearings. 418 U.S. at 564–70. One such safeguard was the provision

that “there must be a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons

for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 564 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Yet, the Wolff

Court also warned that “there will be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so implicated

that the statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence . . . .” Id. In those circumstances,

the Court required that the factfinder’s written statement “should indicate the fact of the omission.” 

Id.

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Here, the Superior Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. First,

the record contains no indication, and Marvin has not suggested, that the Superior Court reached a

different result than the U.S. Supreme Court did when facing materially indistinguishable facts. 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. Second, the Superior Court did not apply Wolff so as to “contradict[] the

governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases.” Id. Indeed, the Superior Court’s decision

was entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Wolff because the Senior Hearing

Officer’s written statement complied with Wolff’s mandates. The Senior Hearing Officer produced

a written statement summarizing the evidence relied upon, including the Rules Violation Report

dated January 28, 2002 and the Wiley Report dated January 23, 2002. Resp’s Exhibits, Exh. B at 2. 

The written statement also explained that the Wiley Report met the requirements for confidentiality

because the information, if known to the inmate, “would endanger the safety of [the confidential

informants] and would jeopardize the security of the institution.” Id. The written statement further

complied with Wolff’s requirement that omissions be stated within the report by noting that the

evidence relied on included “the confidential memorandum, written and submitted by Lieutenant

M.H. Wiley . . . .” Id. The Superior Court applied federal law faithfully and correctly cited Wolff to

establish that prison officials are, in appropriate circumstances, permitted to punish an inmate “based

on information that is not completely disclosed . . . .” Ans., Exh. G at 5. Accordingly, the Superior

Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law.

The Superior Court’s decision also did not involve an unreasonable application of federal

law. As an initial matter, the state court primarily relied on California law, and did not specifically

apply Wolff, when determining that the informant’s statements were reliable. The state court cited

Wolff to establish that the mere usage of confidential information in a prison disciplinary hearing is

not a violation of due process. See Ans., Exh. 10 at 5. Nevertheless, the Superior Court did not err

in the manner described in Lockyer by “identif[ying] the correct governing legal principle . . . but

unreasonably appl[ying] that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” 538 U.S. at 75. In Wolff,

the Supreme Court expressly provided that confidential information may be withheld from the

committee’s written statement where institutional or personal safety is implicated, so long as the fact

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of the omission is noted in the written statement. 418 U.S. at 565. The Senior Hearing Officer’s

report clearly noted the omission of the confidential report due to safety concerns. Exhibits, Exh. B

at 2. The question, therefore, is whether the Superior Court unreasonably determined that

institutional or personal safety was implicated by the confidential information in the Wiley Report. 

 Based on an in camera review of the Wiley Report and, in consideration of the Superior

Court’s analysis, this court cannot conclude that the state court’s application was objectively

unreasonable. Petitioner Marvin was convicted of murdering his victim by luring him to a secluded

location, firing an arrow into his back execution-style, and leaving his body abused and mutilated. 

Ans., Exh. F at 57–58. While in custody, Marvin’s behavior, while commendable in many regards,

became erratic after Father Stevenson’s arrival. After being denied unsupervised access to the

chapel office, Marvin abruptly ended his eight year association with the CCP. Pet. at 4. For a

substantial period of time thereafter, Murphy and the alleged co-conspirators made threatening

remarks about Father Stevenson and discouraged other inmates from participating in the CCP. Ans.

at 2. Based on Marvin’s violent history and erratic behavior, the Senior Hearing Officer reasonably

determined that Marvin posed a threat to institutional safety and the safety of the unidentified inmate

informants. Thus, the Superior Court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. 

II. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

In assessing whether there has been an unreasonable determination of the facts, the court will

address the following two issues: (1) whether “some evidence” supports the disciplinary board’s

determination of the facts; and (2) whether that evidence was reliable.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985),

provides that “the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision

by [a] prison disciplinary board.” This standard is met so long as there is “some evidence from

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” Id. at 455 (citations

omitted). The “some evidence” standard “does not require examination of the record, independent

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assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. This is because “the

fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside

decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” Id. at 456. 

Some evidence supports the Senior Hearing Officer’s determination of the facts. In finding

Marvin guilty of attempting to undermine the CCP, the Senior Hearing Officer relied on the

information contained in the Wiley Report, the IE Report and the Rules Violation Report. Resp’s

Exhibits, Exh. B at 2. After an in camera review of the Wiley Report, the Superior Court found that

there was “absolutely no question that there was ‘some evidence’ that . . . [Marvin and the alleged

co-conspirators] attempted to weaken Father Stevenson’s control by denouncing his programs and

making verbal threats that they would ‘take him down.’” Ans., Exh. G at 7. This court agrees. 

After an in camera review of the Wiley Report, this court is satisfied that “some evidence” supports

the conclusion reached by the Senior Hearing Officer. Specifically, the Wiley Report contained

several firsthand accounts of Marvin’s behavior which described how Marvin and the alleged coconspirators used the chapel as a hangout, denied certain inmates access to the family services

program, sold food designated for the family services program on the yard and used the chapel

bathroom for trysts with their wives. Ans. at 2. The Wiley Report also relates that Marvin and the

alleged co-conspirators made threatening statements, including a promise to “take [Father Stevenson

] down” and actively discouraged other inmates from participating in the CCP. Ans., Exh. G at 7. 

The information in the Rules Violation Report supports these findings.

Moreover, the above cited evidence is reliable. It is well established that “there must be

some indicia of reliability of the information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions.” 

Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). A prison disciplinary committee’s reliance on

the statements of “an unidentified inmate informant satisfies due process when: (1) the record

contains some factual information from which the committee can reasonably conclude that the

information was reliable, and (2) the record contains a prison official’s affirmative statement that

safety considerations prevent the disclosure of the informant’s name.” Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831

F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

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First, the record contains sufficient detail to establish the reliability of the confidential

informants. Reliability is established by: (1) oath of the investigating officer; (2) corroborating

testimony; (3) a statement on the record by the chairman of the committee indicating that he has

firsthand knowledge of the sources of the information and that he considered them reliable based on

the informant’s record; or (4) in camera review of the documentation from which informant

credibility was determined. Id. at 186–87. Here, the reliability of information provided was

established in three distinct ways. First, the three unidentified inmate informants who provided most

of the information had proven reliable in the past. Ans. at 9. Second, the information provided by

these informants was further corroborated by four other confidential sources who independently

provided the same information. Id. Third, part of the information provided by these informants was

later corroborated by prison officials in an independent investigation of the matter. Id.

Upon these facts, the Superior Court determined that the informants’ information was

reliable. To ascertain the reliability of the informant testimony and the nature of the risk, the

Superior Court undertook a sua sponte review of the Wiley Report to assess “whether the hearing

officer reasonably could have determined that the information was reliable, and whether the

information, if reliable, [was] sufficient to support the guilty finding.” Ans., Exh. G at 6. The

Superior Court was persuaded of the veracity of the information documented in the Wiley Report. 

The court noted that Lieutenant Wiley interviewed seven inmate witnesses and one staff witness in

addition to Father Stevenson and the four accused inmates. Id. Lieutenant Wiley, the court noted,

memorialized his findings in a fifteen page, single spaced, type written report. Id. Lastly, the court

recognized that all eight nonparty witnesses provided some firsthand information. Id. This court is

convinced by the Superior Court’s rationale finding the Senior Hearing Officer’s reliance on the

unidentified informants to be reasonable. Accordingly, the first prong of Zimmerlee is met.

To comply with the mandates of due process, however, the prison officials were also

required to meet the second prong of Zimmerlee by making an affirmative statement that safety

considerations prevented disclosure. The Rules Violation Report explained that the prison’s

investigation included information from confidential informants. Resp’s Exhibits, Exh. B at 1–2. 

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The Report described how the information met “the criteria for reliability per [CCR] Section

3321(c) . . . .” Id. at 2. It explains that the confidential information couldn’t be provided to Marvin

because to do so would endanger the confidential informants and jeopardize institutional security. 

Id. The Report was signed by Lieutenant Wiley. Thus, Zimmerlee’s second prong is met. 

Both prongs of Zimmerlee have been met; the information provided by the undisclosed

informants was reliable. Accordingly, having determined that some evidence supports the state

court’s adjudication of Marvin’s petition and that the evidence relied upon satisfies all the

requirements of due process, this court is satisfied that the Superior Court’s denial of Marvin’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper. In sum, Marvin has failed to establish his

entitlement to relief under either section 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2008 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts are taken from Marvin’s petition.

2. For purposes of brevity, the court will refer to the group of inmates encompassing David

Dutra, Steven Murphy, Benny Ros, and Gerald Shil as Marvin’s “alleged co-conspirators.” This

usage, however, is not intended to be suggestive of the ultimate legal questions at issue in this

petition.

3. Respondents mistakenly attached alleged co-conspirator Steven Murphy’s Rule Violation

Report as Exhibit B to their answer. Consequently, all citations to Marvin’s Rule Violation Report

will be to Exhibit B of the Exhibit list submitted in case number CV 06-00323 MHP.

4. The Board expressed concern that the offense demonstrated “a callous disregard for human

suffering.” Ans., Exh. F at 60. Specifically, the Board noted that petitioner and his four crime

partners “lured” the victim to a secluded area of Huntington Beach under the pretext that they were

going rabbit hunting. Id. The Board described the abuse and mutilation of the victim’s partially

nude body, including multiple stab wounds, a crossbow arrow wound through the victim’s eye that

penetrated the brain and a separate arrow wound to the back that severed his spinal cord. Id. at 58.

5. Marvin asserts that his regulatory and statutory due process protections were abrogated when

he was: (1) deprived of his right to present requested witnesses who would have provided

exculpatory evidence; (2) deprived of his right to receive copies of crucial non-confidential

documents that were to be relied on by the Hearing Officer; (3) deprived of effective assistance of

the investigative employee; and (4) not informed of crucial facts explaining the “when, where, and

to whom” of the alleged misconduct or what statements or actions constituted it. Pet. at 2. Not all

of these claims were exhausted before the state courts. Consequently, like the Superior Court, this

court addresses only claims that petitioner has exhausted.

ENDNOTES

Case 3:06-cv-04958-MHP Document 14 Filed 01/09/08 Page 13 of 13