Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01818/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01818-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHARON N. HATTER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,1

 Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case Number: 2:13-cv-01818-JHE 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION2

Plaintiff Sharon N. Hatter (“Hatter”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), § 

205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for widow’s insurance benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (Doc. 1). Hatter timely pursued and exhausted her

administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 

1383(c)(3). The undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons stated 

below, the undersigned recommends the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.

1 Carolyn W. Colvin was named the Acting Commissioner on February 14, 2013. See 

http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colvin.htm (“On February 14, 2013, 

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.”). Under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), “[a]ny action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding 

any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any 

vacancy in such office.” Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Rule 25(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has substituted Carolyn W. Colvin in the case caption 

above.

2 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 12).

 

FILED

 2015 Feb-27 AM 09:50

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 1 of 10
I. Factual and Procedural History

Hatter was a fifty-two old female at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 

decision. (Tr. 8, 53, 159, 176, 183). Hatter has at least a high school education and past relevant 

work as a mailroom clerk, general clerk, and housekeeper/cleaner. (Tr. 54-55, 73, 188-89, 194-

97, 226). 

Hatter filed her applications for widow’s insurance benefits and SSI on October 4, 2010, 

alleging an onset date of August 4, 2010. (Tr. 11, 159-65, 176-82). The Commissioner initially 

denied Hatter’s application, and Hatter requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 92-104). After a 

hearing, the ALJ denied Hatter’s claim on January 10, 2013. (Tr. 8-31). Hatter sought review by 

the Appeals Council, but it declined her request on July 31, 2013. (Tr. 1-6). On that date, the 

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. On September 30, 2013, Hatter

initiated this action. (See doc. 1). 

II. Standard of Review3

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The 

function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by 

substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th 

Cir. 2002). This Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision 

reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 

1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

3

In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks (widow’s) 

Disability Insurance Benefits or SSI. However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist 

for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the 

appropriate parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or 

regulations found in quoted court decisions. 

2

 

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 2 of 10
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance.” Id.

This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. However, it 

reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the 

ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 

531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ 

fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-

46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of 

disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations 

promulgated thereunder.4 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To 

establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or 

mental impairment” which “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

4

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. 

Parts 400 to 499, revised as of April 1, 2013. 

3

 

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 3 of 10
(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; 

(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R. 

section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); 

accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has 

satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed 

impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the 

burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The 

Commissioner must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant 

numbers. Id.

IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation 

process, the ALJ made the following findings:

At Step One, the ALJ noted it was previously found that Hatter is the unmarried widow 

of the deceased insured worker, had obtained the age of 50, and has met the non-disability 

requirements for disabled widow’s benefits set forth in § 202(e). (Tr. 13). The ALJ then found 

the prescribed period ends on January 31, 2017, and that Hatter had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date of August 4, 2010. (Id.). At Step Two, the ALJ found 

Hatter has the following severe impairments: restrictive airway disease and asthma with an 

active tobacco abuse disorder, diabetes mellitus with peripheral neuropathy, and obesity. (Tr. 

4

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 4 of 10
14). At Step Three, the ALJ found Hatter does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16). 

Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Hatter’s residual functioning 

capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined Hatter has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. 404.1567(b and 416.967(b) except she can lift, carry, push, and pull 20 lbs. occasionally 

and 10 lbs. frequently; can sit, stand, and walk 6 hours each intermittently through an 8-hour

workday; limited to work that does not involve the use of foot controls; limited to frequent 

handling, fingering, and feeling bilaterally; must avoid concentrated exposure to respiratory 

irritants such as dusts, gases, fumes, odors, and poorly ventilated areas; and must avoid all 

exposure to operational controls of moving machinery and unprotected heights. (Tr. 17). 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined, Hatter is able to perform her past relevant work as a 

general clerk and a mailroom clerk. (Tr. 26). At Step Five, the ALJ alternatively determined, 

based on Hatter’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy Hatter could perform. (Tr. 27). Therefore, the ALJ determined Hatter has 

not been under a disability and denied her claim. (Tr. 27-28).

V. Analysis

A. Introduction

Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve 

the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether 

substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 

5

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 5 of 10
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). 

The court, however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for 

that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).

Hatter argues the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 13 

at 6). However, upon review of the evidence and the ALJ’s decision, the undersigned has 

determined substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination Hatter failed to demonstrate a 

disability and the ALJ applied the proper standards to reach this conclusion. Accordingly, the 

Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Residual Functioning Capacity 

(“RFC”) Finding and the Finding Hatter is Not Disabled

A claimant’s RFC is the most she can do despite her limitations and is based on an 

evaluation of all the relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 

404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3); 416.920(e); 416.945(a)(1), (a)(3); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 

61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996). Contrary to Hatter’s arguments, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s assessment of her RFC. (Tr. 17). The ALJ thoroughly evaluated the relevant 

evidence, including Hatter’s subjective complaints, the medical records, and the opinions from 

medical sources. (Tr. 14-25). 

As the ALJ discussed, records from Timothy Eller, M.D., at the Simon-Williamson 

Clinic provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC finding and undermine Hatter’s 

allegations of disabling limitations. (Tr. 234-42, 247-77). Hatter visited Dr. Eller on August 4, 

2010, the alleged onset date, complaining of some shortness of breath with exertion and 

coughing in the morning. (Tr. 237). Despite her complaints, Hatter continued to smoke, 

undermining her allegations she was limited due to her respiratory condition. (Tr. 19-22, 237). 

On examination, Dr. Eller noted Hatter’s neck was without bruit, her chest was clear without 

6

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 6 of 10
wheezing, her heart was regular without obvious gallops, her extremities had no significant 

edema, and she had no peripheral bruits. (Tr. 237). Hatter’s complaints in August 2010 were 

substantially the same as they had been in April 2010, when it appears she last visited Dr. Eller. 

(Tr. 241-42). On August 4, 2010, Dr. Eller diagnosed Hatter with hypertension and ongoing 

tobacco and alcohol abuse, and he advised her to continue her hypertension medication, 

encouraged her to cut-back or stop smoking and drinking, reviewed her diet for her diabetes, and 

advised her to get a glucose meter. (Tr. 237). 

Although Dr. Eller advised Hatter to return in three weeks, she did not return until March 

25, 2011, when she complained of a twenty-four hour history of right-side facial numbness and 

weakness. (Tr. 237, 274). Dr. Eller diagnosed Hatter with Bell’s palsy and prescribed natural 

tears for her eyes and prednisone. (Tr. 274). Dr. Eller mentioned Hatter’s prior history of 

hypertension, tobacco abuse, and diabetes, but noted her diabetes was managed with Metformin 

and her hypertension was benign, and he did not indicate she had any other complications or 

complaints. (Tr. 274-75). Hatter sought refills of her medication from Dr. Eller in May 2011, 

July 2011, and January 2012, but the record does not indicate Hatter returned for an examination 

before the ALJ issued his decision on January 10, 2013. (Tr. 276).

Dr. Eller’s objective clinical findings support the ALJ’s assessment of Hatter’s RFC. Dr. 

Eller’s findings do not establish or even suggest Hatter had limitations beyond those the ALJ 

found. (Tr. 17). Dr. Eller’s minimal findings also undermine Hatter’s subjective complaints of 

disabling pain and other symptoms, supporting the ALJ’s finding that Hatter’s allegations of 

disabling limitations were not credible. Hatter’s limited treatment history also undermines her 

allegations of disabling limitations.5

 (Tr. 19-23). 

5 Although Hatter alleged she could not afford treatment, there is no other evidence her 

7

 

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 7 of 10
Hatter underwent a consultative examination with Abiodun Badewa, M.D., in December 

2011. (Tr. 243-47). Hatter alleged she had been exposed to chemical toxins, but complained of 

only intermittent coughing and shortness of breath, and she admitted she smoked. (Tr. 245). 

Hatter reported she had diabetes and hypertension, but that she had only mild associated 

symptoms. (Tr. 245). Hatter also alleged paresthesia in her right foot, but she denied other 

complaints such as back pain or weakness. (Tr. 245-46). Objectively, Dr. Badewa noted Hatter 

was in no acute distress, and an examination of her respiratory condition revealed no rhonchi, no 

wheezing, and no rales. (Tr. 246). Dr. Badewa also noted Hatter had a full range of motion in 

her neck, back, and all extremities, and a normal gait, normal strength, and normal muscle tone. 

(Tr. 243-44, 246-47). Hatter displayed some sensory abnormalities in her right foot, but 

otherwise Dr. Badewa indicated her neurological examination was normal. (Tr. 247). 

Dr. Badewa diagnosed Hatter with diabetes without complaints/complications and not 

uncontrolled; anxiety state, unspecified; benign essential hypertension; and idiopathic peripheral 

neuropathy. (Tr. 247). Dr. Badewa did not state Hatter had any functional limitations, and his 

objective medical findings do not indicate any noteworthy functional limitations. (Tr. 243-47). 

Dr. Badewa’s findings further support the ALJ’s RFC assessment. 

Hatter argues the evidence from Dr. Eller should be “immediately eliminated” because 

the records do not include an opinion regarding her ability to work. (Doc. 13 at 7-8). Hatter also 

summarily dismisses Dr. Badewa’s report because he did not provide an opinion regarding the 

effect of her condition on her ability to work. (Id. at 8, 10). To eliminate or summarily dismiss 

medical evidence on this basis is contrary to applicable regulations, rulings, and case law. 

minimal treatment was due to financial reasons. In fact, the medical records, including objective 

medical findings, indicate Hatter’s minimal treatment was due to her condition not being as 

severe as she now alleges and the undersigned is not relying on the limited medical treatment to 

discredit Hatter. (Tr. 20). 

8

 

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 8 of 10
Applicable law establishes an ALJ must consider medical reports in assessing a claimant’s RFC 

as well as the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints; there is no requirement these 

medical sources offer an opinion regarding ability to work. See C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 

404.1513, 404.1529(c)/(d), 404.1545(a)(1)/(a)(3), 416.912(b), 416.912(b), 416.913, 

416.929(c)/(d), 416.945(a)(1)/(a)(3); SSR-96-8p; SSR 96-7p; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-26. 

Hatter essentially argues the ALJ should base his assessment of her RFC on the opinion 

of Jack Zaremba, M.D., a consultative examiner who examined Hatter at her attorney’s request. 

(Doc. 13 at 8-11). The opinions on some issues, including a claimant’s RFC, “are not medical 

opinions . . . but are instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are 

administrative findings that are dispositive of the case; i.e., that would direct the determination or 

decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); see SSR 96-5-p; see also 

Robinson v. Astrue, 365 F. Appx. 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he task of determining a 

claimant’s residual functioning capacity and ability to work is within the province of the ALJ, 

not of doctors.”). Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little 

weight to Dr. Zaremba’s other opinions (those on issues not reserved to the Commissioner). (Tr. 

24-45). As a one-time consultative examiner, Dr. Zaremba’s opinions are not entitled to any 

special deference or consideration. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2), 416.902, 

416.927(c)(2); Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1160. 

Futhermore, Dr. Zaremba’s findings do not support the extreme limitations he included in 

his opinion, and he failed to explain how his findings could support his opinion. (Tr. 265-71). 

Dr. Zaremba noted Hatter was in no acute distress, her lungs were clear with no wheezing or 

rhonchi, and she exhibited some decreased sensation in her feet, findings that do not indicate she 

had disabling limitations. (Tr. 266). Dr. Zaremba also noted Hatter has or displayed spasm, 

9

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 9 of 10
tenderness, reduced range of motion, and locomotor and neurological abnormalities; (tr. 266, 

270-71), however, Hatter had not exhibited these signs/symptoms during previous examinations 

or even complain of back pain when she saw Dr. Eller or Dr. Badewa, (tr. 236-47). Given the 

record as a whole, substantive evidence supports the decision to discount Dr. Zaremba’s opinion. 

Hatter failed to meet her burden of proving she has disabling limitations. The ALJ 

properly considered the relevant evidence and properly performed his duty as the trier of fact of 

weighing and resolving any conflicts in the evidence. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

RFC assessment, and Hatter failed to prove she had additional limitations. Hatter also failed to 

meet her burden of proving she could not perform her past relevant work or the jobs identified by 

the vocational expert. (Tr. 26-27, 73-74). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 

conclusion Hatter is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative 

record and memoranda of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for widow’s insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income be AFFIRMED and this action is due to be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

A separate order will be entered. 

DONE this 27th day of February 2015. 

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

Case 2:13-cv-01818-JHE Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 10 of 10