Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00138/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS McMANUS SR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15cv0138 JM(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; CITY OF

SAN DIEGO; POLICE OFFICER

ERNESTO LUNA; POLICE

OFFICER MARI KONG; SGT.

THOMAS SULLIVAN; POLICE

OFFICER ANTONIO JOHNSON;

DETECTIVE DAN BUROW; 

LT. A. SMITH; SGT. WILLS;

JENNIFER MORK; WANJIRU

GOLLY; and CHARLES COX SR.,

Defendants.

Defendants Wanjiru Golly, Jennifer Mork and County of San Diego (“County”)

move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the

motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants the motion to dismiss and grants Plaintiff 15 days leave to

amend from the date of entry of this order.

BACKGROUND

The FAC, filed on May 19, 2015, alleges five claims for relief: violation of

42 U.S.C. §1983, a Monell claim, child abduction, intentional infliction of emotional

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distress, and negligence. The parties’ submissions indicate that the events giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims concern investigationsinto possible child abuse. Plaintiff’s claims

arise from the following generally described allegations.

Plaintiff alleges that his 14 year-old minor son, C. M., was removed from his

care on two separate occasions. On or about January 23, 2013, Defendant CharlesCox,

a private party, allegedly removed C. M. from Plaintiff’s home against Plaintiff’s

wishes. (FAC ¶29). Believing that Defendant Cox abducted C. M., Plaintiff reported

the incident to Defendant City of San Diego Police Department. After the police

officers obtained physical custody of C.M., they transported him to the Polinsky

Children’s Center (“Polinisky”). (FAC ¶31). At Polinsky, C. M. was interviewed by

social workers and medical professionals conducted a medical examination of C. M.

and found no signs of physical injury or abuse. (FAC ¶35-36). 

On April 9, 2013, Defendant San Diego Police Officer Antonio Johnson

allegedly requested that Defendant Jennifer Mork, a social worker employed by

County, assist in removing C. M. from Plaintiff’s custody and transporting him to

Polinsky. (FAC ¶42). Plaintiff alleges that Mork, and other Defendants, 

interviewed, questioned, interrogated, and/or examined C.M. This

interview and examination was performed without Plaintiff’s knowledge

or consent, without notice to the Plaintiff, without a warrant or court order

authorizing the examination, and in the absence of exigent circumstances.

In addition, the Plaintiff was completely excluded from C.M.’s interview

and examination, and was not permitted to be in close proximity or

another nearby area. 

Id. Also, on April 9, 2013, Defendant Golly, a social worker employed by County,

interviewed C.M. without Plaintiff’s approval, obtaining a warrant, or exigent

circumstances. (FAC ¶49). On April 11, 2013, Golly also allegedly made an

unannounced visit to C. M.’s school and interviewed him “without notice to Plaintiff,

without a warrant or court order authorizing the examination, and in the absence of

exigent circumstances.” (FAC ¶51).

/ / /

/ / /

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DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

General Pleading Requirements

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

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Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

Pleading Civil Rights Claims

Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, “a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more

than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir.2007). In

addressing the impact of Iqbal and Twombly on the pleading standards for civil rights

cases, the Ninth Circuit recently stated:

we can at least state the following two principles common to all of them.

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action,

but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.

Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued

litigation.

AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631,637 (9 Cir. 2012) (quoting th

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.2011)). 

Defendants’ Mork and Golly

An action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 has two elements: “(1) the defendants acted

under color of law, and (2) their conduct deprived [the plaintiff] of a constitutional

right.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.1985). A public official

is immune from an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations

state a claim of violation of clearly established law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (1985); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (qualified

immunity applies if official's conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). In order to

determine whether the defendants are immune from an action, the court must answer

two questions: (1) whether Plaintiff alleges the violation of a constitutional right, and

(2) whether that right was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009) (leaving the courts to decide, in their sound discretion, which question to

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answer first). A right is “clearly established” if its contours are “sufficiently clear that

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Mork and Golly fail for three reasons. 

First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks compensation for alleged wrongs to his son, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim. Constitutional rights are personal and cannot be asserted on

behalf of other individuals. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). 

Second, Plaintiff failsto allege how his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated. Plaintiff broadly alleges that his due process rights to parenthood were

violated when C.M. was interviewed by Mork and Golly. While Plaintiff repeatedly

alleges that C.M. was interviewed without Plaintiff’s consent, a court order, or exigent

circumstances, Plaintiff cites no legal authority for the proposition that a suspected 14

year old victim of child abuse cannot be interviewed by state actors absent parental

consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances. 

Finally, the limited arguments and legal authorities cited by Plaintiff fail to

address whether it is clearly established under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

that parental rights are violated whenever a 14 year-old minor child is interviewed in

the course of a child abuse investigation without the parent’s consent, a court order, or

exigent circumstances. To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court

evaluates the specific contours of the constitutional right, not at the general but at the

more specific level: 

“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This

is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but

it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.”

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Here, Plaintiff simply fails to cite any legal authority

recognizing a parent’s constitutional right to have their 14 year-old minor child

interviewed by governmental agentsin relation to a child abuse investigation only with

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the parent’s consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances. As noted in Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc):

[T]here is no constitutional due process right to have child witnesses in

a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed in a particular manner, or

to have the investigation carried out in a particular way. Interviewers of

child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse must be given some latitude in

determining when to credit witnesses' denials and when to discount them,

and we are not aware of any federal law—constitutional, decisional, or

statutory—that indicates precisely where the line must be drawn.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss the civil rights claim against

Defendants Mork and Golly. The court also grants Plaintiff 15 days leave to amend

from the date of entry of this order, and advises him that the failure to state a claim in

a Second Amended Complaint may result in the dismissal of this claim against

Defendants Mork and Golly with prejudice.

The Monell Claim

County claims that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability. Under 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person” who acts under color ofstate law may be sued. The

term “person” has been interpreted broadly, even to include cities, counties, and other

local government entities. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). Municipalities, their agencies and their supervisory personnel cannot

be held liable under section 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability. They can, however, be held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights

resulting from their formal policies or customs. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-693;

The court denies without prejudice County’s motion to dismiss based upon the

1

argument that the new allegations contained in the FAC do not relate back to the

original complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B) and are therefore time-barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. County argues that the new allegations in the FAC - -

to the effect that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when a medical

examination was conducted on C. M. - - arise from different transactional conduct or

occurrences. Here, the medical examination allegations are sufficiently related to the

overall conduct alleged in the original complaint in the sense that Defendants were

concerned for C.M.’s welfare in light of Plaintiff’s claim that C.M. was abducted and

potentially suffered abuse. C.M. was transported to Polinsky for further investigation

into the potential mistreatment of C.M. Viewing these allegations in the best light for

Plaintiff, the medical examination of C.M. must be seen in light of the broader

investigation of potential abuse. In this sense, the claims are transactionally related. 

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Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); Shaw v. California

Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1986).

Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality “is held liable only for those

deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of

those officials whose acts may be fairly said to be those of the municipality.” Board

of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04

(1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a

“custom” which has not been “formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may

fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so

widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691); see

also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (holding that municipal

liability under §1983 may be shown if Plaintiff proves that employee committed

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a “longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity.”). 

In Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397 (1997) the Supreme Court made the causal prerequisite clear: “it is not

enough for a §1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the

municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is,

a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of

culpability and must demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 404 (italics in original).

“To bring a § 1983 claimagainst a local government entity, a plaintiff must plead

that a ‘municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's

constitutional rights.” Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff must show (1) he possessed a

constitutional right of which he was deprived, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the

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policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right, and (4)

the policy is the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Anderson v.

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). “For a policy to be the moving force

behind the deprivation of a constitutional right, the identified deficiency in the policy

must be closely related to the ultimate injury,” and the plaintiff must establish “that the

injury would have been avoided had proper policies been implemented.” Long v. Cnty.

of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the FAC’s allegations are too generalized and conclusory to state a claim. 

Plaintiff does nothing more than parrot the requirements for municipal liability. 

Plaintiff alleges that the County had “the regularly established customs and practices

. . . carried out by Defendants [Mork and Golly] to remove children from their family

without” Plaintiff’s consent, a court order, exigent circumstances, or prior adequate

investigation. (FAC ¶70). Further, the FAC then identifies that County had additional

policies, customs, or practicesto carry out medical examinations of minors without the

parent’s consent, judicial authorization, or a showing of immediate risk of harm, (FAC

¶70(e)); to act with “deliberate indifference to the rights of children and parents,” (FAC

¶(f)); “to investigate violations of constitutional rights by social workers,” (FAC

¶70(g)); and to permit social workers to assist the San Diego Police Department in

seizing minors from their homes. (FAC ¶70(h)). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that County

had the policy, practice, or custom to fail to properly select, supervise, train, control,

and review its agents and employees as to their compliance with Constitutional

safeguards. (FAC ¶74).

These allegations, the court concludes, fail to establish a claim beyond the

speculative level. “[T]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Iqbal, 56 U.S. at 662. 

The boilerplate municipal liability allegations are insufficient to state a claim and to

provide notice to County of official conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. In large

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part, the court notes the circularity of the allegations. For example, Plaintiff alleges

that County had a policy, custom, or practice to carry out medical examinations of

minors because certain Defendants conducted a medical examination ofC. M. Plaintiff

does not identify the identity of any official policymaker who adopted the challenged

“policies” or how County was the moving force behind allegations of unconstitutional

conduct. The court grants the motion with leave to amend.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss with 15 days leave to amend from

the date of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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