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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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( 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLARK DAVENPORT SNELL; SHARON RUTH ) 

SNELL, individuals, husband and wife; ) 

JIM R. SNELL, an individual; BETH SNELL,) 

a minor child by her next friends and ) 

parents Clark and Sharon Snell; JASON ) 

SNELL, a minor child by his next ) 

friends and parents Clark and Sharo.n ) 

Snell; BRITTANY SNELL, a minor child by) 

her next friends and parents Clark and ) 

Sharon Snell; PATRICIA JEAN TURTLE, by ) 

her next friends and legal guardians ) 

Clark and Sharon Snell; and JESSE ) 

SANDERS, by his next friends and legal ) 

guardians Clark and Sharon Snell, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

vs. 

CONLEY TUNNELL; LISSA VERNON; MARY 

ASBURY; THE HONORABLE SIDNEY D. BROWN; 

and STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. 

The Department)of Human Services, 

Defendants, 

and 

MICHAEL SWEPTSON; BARBARA SIECK; 

BENITA LEVINGSTON; and PAMELA PADLEY, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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FILED 

United Statos Court ()t Appeals Tenth Circuit 

NOV 3 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2879 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-1812-P) 

Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 1 
David A. Brown, Assistant General Counsel (Charles Lee Waters, 

General Counsel, Roger Stuart and Richard L. Freeman, Jr. 

Assistant General Counsel, with him on the brief), Legal Division, 

Department of Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Marjorie Ramana (Allan Devore with her on the brief), The Devore 

Law Firm, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges and SAFFELS, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

We should be careful to get out of an experience 

only the wisdom that is in it--and stop there; lest we 

be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She 

will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again--and that 

is well; but she will never sit down on a cold one any 

more. 

Pudd'nhead Wilson's New Calendar. 

IM. Twain, Following the Equator 

ch. XI at 107 (Harper Bros. ed.). 

Plaintiffs instituted this action seeking injunctive relief 

and damages under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 & 1985 based upon an 

investigation by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) 

concerning allegations of child abuse. The district court denied 

injunctive relief, the§ 1985 claim was dismissed, and only four 

defendants remain after district court proceedings. In this 

appeal, we are required to decide whether these remaining 

defendants, DHS employees, are entitled to absolute or qualified 

immunity for activities which occurred during an investigation of 

* The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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a shelter/home for children operated by plaintiffs-appellees, 

Clark and Sharon Snell. 

Defendants-appellants, Michael Sweptson (County Supervisor; 

Oklahoma County Child Welfare Field Services, Division of Children 

and Youth Services (DCYS)), Barbara Sieck (Social Services 

Supervisor; Oklahoma County Child Welfare Unit), Benita Levingston 

(Social Worker; Oklahoma County Child Welfare Unit), and Pam 

Padley (Assistant General Counsel; DHS) appeal from the district 

court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity. We review the 

denial of immunity de novo as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); McEvoy v. 

Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 465 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Given the facts, we agree with the district court that the 

three non-attorney defendants challenging the denial of absolute 

immunity (Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston) were acting in an 

investigative, rather than a prosecutorial capacity, and 

accordingly, we affirm the denial of absolute immunity for these 

defendants. On narrower grounds, we affirm the district court's 

decision that the defendant DHS attorney (Padley) is not entitled 

to absolute immunity. We determine that defendant Padley, though 

acting in a prosecutorial capacity, did so without authority when 

she applied to the district court for assistance with the 

investigation of the Snells. As to the defense of qualified 

immunity, we agree with the district court that obtaining a court 

order, used to gain entry into the Snell home, based upon 

information known to be false clearly violates the fourth 

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Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 3 
amendment, and a reasonable public official would have known this. 

Thus, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity for such conduct. 

I. 

At the outset, we note that our review of the district 

court's order is limited to deciding whether absolute or qualified 

immunity was properly denied to these four remaining defendants 

given the trial court's decision that the plaintiffs could proceed 

to trial. Snell v. Tunnell, 698 F. Supp. 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1988). 

Although the district court resolved other issues in its lengthy 

opinion, we do not pass on the merits of the issues which 

encompass the grant of summary judgment in favor of other 

defendants, 1 including Mary Asbury (District Supervisor; Child 

Welfare Field Services, DCYS) and Conley Tunnell (Assistant 

Director; DHS; DCYS). We also do not pass on claims involving the 

grant of qualified immunity to the defendants. 

In their brief, the Snells have challenged the district 

court's grant of qualified immunity to the defendants on the 

Snells' due process (liberty) and privacy claims. Brief of 

Plaintiffs-Appellees at 37-39. We have recognized the doctrine of 

pendent appellate jurisdiction to decide otherwise non-appealable 

issues, .2fil! State of Colo. v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 

-_, (10th Cir. 

1 The district court dismissed Judge Brown as a defendant. 

Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1543 n.1. The parties stipulated to the 

dismissal of defendant Lissa Vernon. Id. at 1544. Summary 

judgment was granted in favor of defendants Asbury, id. at 1565, 

and Tunnell, id. at 1544. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 4 
1990) (1990 WL 150137 at 24-25]; Tri-State Generation & 

Transmission v. Shoshone River Power, 874 F.2d 1346, 1351-53 (10th 

Cir. 1989), and have applied the doctrine in cases involving 

claims of immunity to determine that a plaintiff's substantive 

claims were barred, see Petrini v. Howard, No. 88-2204, slip op. 

at 2-3 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1990) [1990 WL 176845 at 2]; Hill v. 

Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 2206 (1990); see also Dube v. State 

Univ., 900 F.2d 587, 598-600 (2d Cir. 1990); 15 C. Wright, A. 

Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 3914.20 (1990 

Supp.). However, even assuming that our jurisdiction could extend 

to a plaintiff's cross-appeal from a defendant's interlocutory 

appeal of a denial of immunity, see Barrett v. United States, 798 

F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1986) (cross appeal of grant of immunity 

permitted where issues same as direct appeal of denial of immunity 

to other defendants), the plaintiffs in this case have not filed a 

cross-appeal. In all of the above cases, the court of appeals 

considered an exercise of jurisdiction to consider otherwise 

non-appealable issues raised by an appellant or cross-appellant. 

Thus, in Idarado, Tri-State, Petrini, Hill, Dube and Barrett, the 

only pendent issues considered were those raised by an appealing 

party. In no case did a court reach out to decide an issue when 

the party adversely affected had not appealed the adverse order. 

Accordingly, we simply do not have jurisdiction over the due 

process and privacy issues. Appellate resolution of those issues 

must await another day. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 5 
A. 

Plaintiffs Clark and Sharon Snell use their private home as a 

foster care environment for children whose natural parents are 

unable to care for them. 2 The Snells' natural and adopted 

children, as well as children the Snells care for under various 

guardianship and custody arrangements, reside in the home. On 

August 26, 1987, defendant Padley applied to the juvenile division 

of the state district court seeking the court's assistance with a 

OHS investigation, after the district attorney, who normally would 

file such an application, refused repeatedly to become involved. 

The supporting grounds of the application provided in part: 

1. OHS has received allegations of neglect, lack of 

supervision, child prostitution and child pornography in 

the Snell's home in violation of 21 O.S. §§ 843-48. 

2. OHS has received allegations that the Snells are 

effectively operating an unlicensed emergency shelter, 

child care facility, or foster home in violation of the 

Oklahoma Child Care Facilities Licensing Act, 10 o.s. 

§ 401 et seq. 

3. OHS has been unable to complete the child abuse 

investigation due to lack of cooperation by the Snells. 

4. Due to the child abuse allegations and reports 

received of numerous children being placed into and out 

of the Snell's home, OHS is concerned regarding the 

health, safety and welfare of the children residing with 

2 The district court has done an admirable job of distilling 

the pleadings into a lengthy set of undisputed facts, and facts 

deemed established for purposes of summary judgment, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs who opposed 

a grant of absolute or qualified immunity, Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). See Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 

1548-56. Our factual summary differs only slightly from that of 

the district court. 

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the Snells. The number and identity of the children 

residing with the Snells is unknown. 

In re Child Abuse and Licensing Investigations of the Clark and 

Sharon Snell Home by the Oklahoma Dep't of Human Serv., 

Application at 1 (Okla. County Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1987), 

reproduced in rec. vol. I, doc. 1, ex. A. Primarily on the 

strength of the allegations of pornography, prostitution and 

denial of access to the children, the state district judge issued 

an~ parte order authorizing DHS personnel, accompanied by the 

police, to enter the Snell residence and investigate these 

allegations. In re Child Abuse and Licensing Investigations of 

the Clark and Sharon Snell Home by the Oklahoma Dep't of Human 

Serv., Ex Parte Order at 1 (Okla. County Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1987), 

reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. A. The ex parte order 

directed that the children in the Snell home be placed in 

protective custody if the Snells could not produce a valid custody 

order for each child or if the welfare of the children was 

endangered. Id. at 1-2. Because the Snells could not produce 

documents evidencing court-ordered custody, seven children were 

removed from the home and placed in a juvenile shelter. At a 

subsequent hearing, the police detective involved in the case 

testified that the only allegations of child pornography came from 

defendants Asbury, Levingston and Sweptson. Rec. vol. III, doc. 

114, ex.Oat 68; see also id., ex.Wat 18-19 (tracing 

pornography and prostitution allegations to defendant Levingston). 

Although two complaints about the lack of supervision and order at 

the Snell residence had occurred, Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1549, the 

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child prostitution and pornography allegations were groundless, 

assuming arguendo that such allegations were ever received. 

B. 

The Snells and certain DHS employees have experienced less 

than an amicable relationship. A variety of alleged complaints 

against the Snells, ranging from improper supervision to failure 

to return children, have been processed by DHS over the years. 

The Snells have complained in turn about various DHS employees and 

custody decisions made by DHS. 

In 1986, the Snells complained to DHS on two occasions 

concerning DHS social workers. First, the Snells complained about 

a DHS worker's "inappropriate visit" to their home and questioning 

of Mrs. Snell. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Pat 3. Second, they 

disagreed with a DHS determination that a child who had been 

placed in the Snell home for over one year should be returned to 

the natural mother. Id. at 4. The Snells were uncertain that the 

mother was capable of taking care of the child and complained that 

a DHS worker had inaccurately reported information furnished by 

them. Id. In February 1987, they complained to the DHS, the 

governor's, the attorney general's and the district attorney's 

offices about a DHS worker handling a case in another county. Id. 

The Snells believed that the case was mishandled and the father 

involved was using AFDC payments to pay restitution rather than 

feed his children. Id. According to the Snells, the children 

were neglected, lacked adequate food and may have been subject to 

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physical abuse. Id. Allegedly, DHS revealed Sharon Snell's name 

to the father and the father threatened her. Id. 

The Snells have had frequent visits from DHS personnel since 

they adopted their first child in 1981. Id. at 1. They list nine 

different DHS workers who have visited the home and state: "We 

have never denied agents of the Oklahoma Department of Human 

Services access to our home." Id. at 1-2. In April 1987, two DHS 

Licensing Division employees (Prins Anderson and Judy Collins) 

made an on-site visit to resolve various complaints about the 

Snells and to determine whether they were in compliance with state 

licensing laws. The DHS employees determined that "the Snells are 

not in violation of the Child Care Facilities Licensing Act." 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. Sat 2. 

DHS social worker David McClain investigated the Snell home 

in July 1987, based upon an anonymous complaint of neglect and 

inadequate supervision. See rec. vol. II, doc. 115, ex. u. 

Plaintiffs' evidence indicates that the report generated by this 

visit did not indicate a problem with care: 

The interior of the home was remarkably clean and 

organized with this many children about the house. The 

worker counted 11 children in the house. The children 

were clean; appeared to be in good physical health and 

appropriately clothed. There was evidence of daily 

housekeeping activity. The older children were assigned 

age appropriate chores to be done on a daily basis. The 

children gave the appearance of being well fed and happy 

to be a part of this household. 

Rec. vol. II, doc. 115, ex. V (Form CWS 14-A). The Snells would 

not identify the children in their care and McClain raised several 

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Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 9 
questions about this in his report. 3 While McClain was present, 

the Snells were in telephonic contact with their counsel. The 

Snells maintain that McClain indicated such disclosure was 

voluntary. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. Pat 5, ,r 6. They told 

McClain that the children in the home were adopted or were wards 

pursuant to legal guardianship or were there by parental consent. 

Id. McClain's report, also signed by defendant Sweptson, 

indicates that the investigative findings were uncertain and that 

a copy of the report would be provided for information only to the 

district attorney for Oklahoma County Juvenile Court. Rec. vol. 

II, doc. 115, ex. v. The report's recommendation to the district 

attorney for the Oklahoma County Criminal Court was that 

additional investigation concerning possible criminal prosecution 

3 The report contains the following questions: 

1) 

2) 

3) 

4) 

5) 

6) 

How many of these children were legally adopted by 

the Snells' [sic]? 

How many children reside in this home by actual 

parental agreement or a guardianship order? 

Are Mr. and Mrs. Snell continuing to provide short 

term/long term care for children in the absence of 

their parents? 

Is the Snell home an actual extension of the Jesus 

House thereby requiring a certificate of need and 

other licensing requirements as set forth by the 

State of Oklahoma? 

Are the donations received by Mr. and Mrs. Snell 

going directly to provide for these children's 

needs? 

Are the lives of these children in jeopardy because 

this home appears to be exempt from 

all-City-County-State-Federal licensing 

requirements as well as prudent judicial review 

concerning issues of custody and placement of minor 

children in the absence of their parents? 

Rec. vol. II, doc. 115, ex. V. 

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of "non-accidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or 

neglect appears indicated." Id. This recommendation is 

paradoxical given that the report makes no mention of such 

allegations. 4 

The Snells maintain that during his investigation, McClain 

made derogatory comments concerning them to neighbors and told one 

that the Snells had been "run out of Bethany." See rec. vol. I, 

doc. 63 at 9; id. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. D at 42. This prompted 

a July 20, 1987 meeting between Clark Snell and DHS officials in 

which Snell aired his complaints about DHS. These complaints were 

referred to Lissa Vernon, the supervisor of Child Welfare Field 

Services, DCYS, who in turn referred them to Mary Asbury, the 

district supervisor in Child Welfare Field Services. Rec. supp. 

vol. II, doc. 150, ex. A at 24-25. 

Vernon also referred a complaint about the Snells to Asbury. 

In a memo dated July 23, 1987, Asbury discussed various 

allegations against the Snells: 1) they misled unnamed parents 

into granting them custody of children as an alternative to child 

welfare services (CWS), 2) they frequently complained about DHS 

personnel, 3) the Snells' reporting of abuse and neglect to CWS 

"was more like harassment as the Snells called demanding an 

investigation be done immediately, several times in a short period 

of time," 4) various neighbors complained about the number of 

4 Plaintiffs have provided evidence which indicates that the 

CWS 14-A report produced for discovery differs from the original 

and omits allegations of child abuse, child pornography and child 

prostitution. See rec. vol. II, doc. 115, ex. J at 39-41. 

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children in the Snell home and the quality of care, 5) Mr. Snell 

was "vague" about the source of his financial assistance to 

operate his home, 6) although Mr. Snell claimed that his principal 

source of income was from an appliance repair business, a business 

listing appeared only in the white pages of the telephone 

directory without an address, 7) the assessor's office did not 

list Mr. Snell as an owner of his home, which was valued at 

approximately $150,000, and 8) after a complimentary article about 

the Snells ran in the newspaper, CWS received a call from the Warr 

Acres police alleging that they were known drug dealers. Rec. 

vol. II, doc. 115, ex. Il. The tenor of Asbury's report is best 

described in its concluding paragraph: 

In conclusion, we have .a couple who on the surface 

appear to be wonderful philanthropic people who only 

want to care for children with no bureaucratic red tape. 

However, legitimate questions can also be raised 

regarding their ability to care for this number of 

children; the actual facts regarding these children 

coming into their care; the quality of the care and the 

source of funding. 

Id. OHS continued its investigation, concentrating on complaints 

about the Snells, rather than complaints !2Y the Snells about OHS. 

c. 

OHS received three adverse reports concerning the Snells in 

late-July and early-August 1987. A neighbor complained that 

children from the Snell home lacked adequate supervision when 

playing. Id. ex. z at 1. An in-law of Mrs. Snell's son 

complained that the Snell house was dirty and the children were 

neglected. Id. at 2-3 and Fails depo. at 40. A retarded 

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eleven-year old boy, G.H., whose mother could no longer cope with 

his severe emotional disorders, was the source of another 

complaint. G.H. alleged that during a temporary stay at the Snell 

home, Mr. Snell struck and kicked him and told him he could either 

go to jail, stay with the Snells, or be killed. Rec. vol. II, ex. 

Bl (CWS 14-A report). Mr. Snell and his housekeeper indicated 

that G.H. 's mental problems, including sexual and physical 

aggressiveness, and physical problems, including encopresis, were 

beyond what the Snells could handle given their responsibilities 

to the other children in the home. 

Asbury assigned the investigation of these complaints to 

defendant Sieck, rec. vol. I, doc. 93, ex. 1 at 2, who in turn 

assigned the investigation to defendant Levingston, id. ex. 6 at 

1. However, action on investigating these complaints was 

deferred, contrary to OHS policy concerning these types of 

allegations. See OHS Child Welfare Services-Child 

Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 622.4 (10/1/84), reproduced 

in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. Two days later, on August 12, 

1987, a OHS meeting was held between Asbury, Vernon, defendant 

Padley and licensing division employees Collins and Anderson to 

discuss a variety of topics concerning the Snells, including: 1) 

the large number of children in and out of the home, 2) claims by 

Jesus House5 clients that the Snells threatened to call OHS if the 

parents did not release their children, 3) Clark Snell's criminal 

5 Jesus House is a shelter for the homeless. The Snells have 

worked there as volunteers and remain in contact with the 

personnel who operate the shelter. 

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conviction and subsequent incarceration (1974-75) and his failure 

to disclose this in adoptive home studies, 4) Clark Snell's income 

and the likelihood that it could be derived f · •m his appliance 

repair business given that the business was listed only in the 

white pages of the telephone directory, 5) Asbury's incorrect 

belief that DARE (Drug Addict Recovery Enterprises, Inc.) did not 

exist and therefore could not be providing support to the Snells, 

6) whether the Snells could be named guardians based upon a signed 

and notarized parental statement, and 7) Clark Snell's refusal to 

identify the children in his care when asked by social worker 

McClain. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex. D at 201-24. A 

decision was made to refer these matters to the police for 

investigation and to contact assistant district attorney Rebecca 

McNeese for her assistance. Id. at 223-24. 

At the request of defendant Levingston, detective J.M. 

Einhorn met with defendants Sweptson and Asbury on August 14, 

1987. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex. G at 49-50. The 

defendants expressed concern that: 1) a large number of children 

and adults were entering and leaving the house at all hours, 2) 

the Snell home was not licensed, 6 3) the Snells had ref~sed to 

disclose the identity of all the children to DHS and 4) Clark 

Snell had not disclosed his criminal record to DHS. Id. at 51-57. 

The lower court viewed this meeting as "the genesis of the 

6 Detective Einhorn testified on deposition that his department 

did not routinely investigate licensing violations. Rec. supp. 

vol. II, doc. 150, ex. G at 54. 

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pornography and prostitution suspicions." Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 

1550. 

Detective Einhorn's testimony concerning the source of the 

pornography and prostitution allegations is inconsistent. At the 

hearing held the day after the seven children were removed from 

the Snell home, he testified that these allegations were first 

made by OHS, specifically Asbury, Sieck and Sweptson, rec. vol. 

III, doc. 114, ex. Oat 68; at a later deposition, he testified 

that the allegations were generated during a discussion between 

Sweptson, Asbury and himself. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex. G 

at 106-07. He could not say who initiated the allegations. Id. 

Einhorn indicated also that suspicion concerning child 

prostitution and pornography arose once he and DHS were informed 

that Clark Snell was sought for questioning by FBI special agent 

Leslie Treece. Id. at 53. 

Agent Treece sought Clark Snell merely to comply with a 

request for information from another FBI district concerning a 

child prostitution investigation. The FBI was investigating a 

person suspected of using his children for child prostitution, and 

this person had stayed at Jesus House for a short time. The FBI 

merely wanted to ask Clark Snell some questions about the suspect. 

As DHS was well aware, Clark Snell never was a subject of that 

investigation. 

According to agent Treece, some time prior to August 26, 

1987, detective Einhorn asked her to contact defendant Levingston 

based upon "complaints regarding possible child pornography or 

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prostitution, or something unusual going on at the Snells' house." 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Wat 16. Agent Treece met with 

Asbury and defendant Levingston. Rec. vol. I, doc. 160, ex. 7 at 

242-44. Asbury understood that agent Treece was seeking to 

interview Clark Snell in connection with a man from out-of-state 

who had passed through Jesus House, but that Clark Snell was not 

the subject of inquiry. Id. at 244. 

Agent Treece indicated that this was the first time she had 

heard about allegations concerning child pornography or 

prostitution in relation to the Snells. She spoke to defendant 

Levingston who indeed made such allegations in the context of 

discussing complaints received by DHS against the Snells. Rec. 

vol. III, doc. 114, ex. W at 17-19. When the order authorizing 

police intervention into the investigation finally was obtained 

from Judge Brown, defendant Levingston invited agent Treece to be 

present when the order was enforced. Id. at 24-25. However, 

Treece declined as there was no evidence of any violation of 

federal law. Id. 

D. 

Rebecca McNeese, assistant district attorney and the team 

leader of the juvenile division at the district attorney'.s office, 

was familiar with the DHS investigation of the Snells because DHS 

repeatedly sought to involve the juvenile division. McNeese 

indicated that her division viewed seizure of children from a 

caretaker as appropriate only when there is a showing of imminent 

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or actual harm to the child. Rec. vol. II, ex. J at 7-11, 14. 

Normally, DHS would first contact police so the police could 

determine whether a child needed to be placed in custody. Id. at 

11-12. If the DHS worker decided to pursue a court order through 

the juvenile division, the DHS worker would complete a report of 

the investigation (Form CWS-14A) and forward it to the juvenile 

division for review. Id. at 11. McNeese indicated that for 

strong policy reasons the division would not seek a pick-up order 

based upon a representation of a DHS worker that parents or 

guardians were uncooperative without some evidence of abuse or 

neglect. Id. at 15. On August 18 or 19, 1987, McNeese was 

approached by defendant Padley for a "favor" regarding the Snells. 

Id. at 29. McNeese cut the .conversation off abruptly and did not 

learn what favor was sought. Id. 

Plaintiffs' evidence in this case tends to show that the DHS 

searched for a statute upon which to base their investigation of 

the Snells. Thus, DHS expressed concern with whether the Snells 

had guardianship of more than five unrelated children, see Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 773 (West 1965) (renumbered as tit. 30, 

§ 4-101 (1990 Supp.)). 7 For reasons hardly clear, Asbury and 

7 Okla Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 773 (West 1965), then provided: 

No person shall be appointed guardian of any minor 

or minors, or other person or persons who is, at the 

time of the hearing of the application for appointment, 

the guardian of as many as five persons, other than his 

or her own family or relatives; provided that the 

provisions of this Section and Section 774 of this 

Title [58] shall not apply to boards of control and 

superintendents of eleemosynary or charitable 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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defendant Levingston also were concerned with the words "upon 

conviction" as used in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 410 (West 

1987), 8 insofar as those words might apply to the Snells. See 

rec. supp. vol. II, ex.Kat 110. 

About a week before Judge Brown entered the order authorizing 

investigation and conditional temporary custody, defendant 

Sweptson arranged a meeting with Clark Snell. Snell states that 

he was told to come without counsel, and that Sweptson was 

concerned about leaks to the press. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. 

El at 13. Sweptson then discussed the allegations of abuse made by 

G.H. against the Snells. Id. at 12-14. According to Snell, 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

institutions, under the control and charge of the State, 

where under the law such boards of control and 

superintendents may be appointed as guardians of the 

estates, or of the persons, of those committed to their 

charge or safekeeping; provided, the provisions of this 

Act [Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, §§ 773, 774] shall not 

prohibit the appointment of officers or managers of 

fraternal or benevolent orders or homes and church 

orphanages as to inmates of such institutions. 

A violation of the above statute is a misdemeanor. 

Ann. tit. 58, § 774 (West 1965) (renumbered as tit. 

(West Supp. 1990)). 

Okla. Stat. 

30, § 4-102 

8 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 410 (West 1987), part of the 

Child Care Facilities Licensing Act provides: 

Any person or agent, representative, or officer of any 

child care facility who violates any of the provisions 

of this act shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of 

a misdemeanor and punished in accordance with the 

provisions of 21 O.S. 1961, § 10. Whenever any agent, 

representative, or officer of any child care facility 

shall be convicted under authority of this act, such 

conviction shall be sufficient ground for the revocation 

of the license of said licensee. 

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Sweptson told him, "'You know, anything could happen with that.'" 

Id. at 14. Snell then said: "'You know we haven't done anything 

wrong. And why can't we have these other people at the meeting at 

the State Office like we did before.'" Id. To which Sweptson 

allegedly replied: "'You don't have to do anything wrong out 

here. All we have to do is shuffle some papers around, and we can 

make anything fit.'" Id. 

E. 

The events of August 19, 1987 as portrayed by plaintiffs' 

evidence represent the first attempt to enter and remove the 

children from the Snell home so as to proceed with the 

investigation. Upon the instructions of Asbury, defendant 

Levingston went to the police station and talked with Captain 

Griffith about the guardianship statute, supra note 7, and the 

allegations against the Snells. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex. 

Kat 53, 56-57. Defendant Levingston voiced her belief that the 

statute in view of the allegations justified police assistance 

with the investigation in the form of picking up the children. 

Id. at 58. Captain Griffith wanted to see the statute before 

intervening; later that day, Hilde Lillegaard of the DHS licensing 

division and defendants Sieck and Levingston returned to the 

police station with a copy of the statute, but the sergeant on 

duty told them that he would need a court order before he could 

pick up the children. Id. at 54-55, 59. Defendant Sieck then 

informed Asbury of this turn of events. Rec. vol. I, doc. 160, 

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ex. 7 at 264. About 6:30-7:30 p.m., defendant Sieck telephoned 

Asbury requesting the telephone number of Judge Brown. Id. at 

264-65. Asbury and defendant Sieck were unable to reach Judge 

Brown; however, Asbury did reach Judge Wilson of the juvenile 

division. Id. at 265. Judge Wilson wanted to speak to them in 

person before intervening. Id. 

Lillegaard and defendants Sieck and Levingston apparently 

made a field visit to the Snell neighborhood on the evening of 

August 19. From the home of one of the Snells' neighbors, 

defendant Sieck then called Judge Brown and advised him that the 

Snells might be moving. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex.Kat 

77. She told Judge Brown of the allegations against the Snells, 

of the suspected violation of the guardianship statute and that 

the police sergeant on duty would not pick up the children without 

a court order. Id. at 79. Judge Brown advised that he would 

issue an order if she thought it was an emergency, but that he 

would need the number of the police station. Id. at 80-81. 

Although defendant Sieck viewed the situation as constituting an 

emergency, defendant Levingston told the judge that they would get 

back to him with the number of the police station if they decided 

in favor of a removal order. Lillegaard and defendants Sieck and 

Levingston then called defendant Padley to update her on the 

evening's events; Padley indicated that she did not agree that a 

violation of the guardianship statute warranted removal of the 

children. Id. at 84-85. 

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Apparently, assistant district attorney McNeese later was 

contacted by Judge Brown concerning this DHS attempt of August 19 

to obtain a removal order; she indicated to the judge that DHS 

simply had no evidence of abuse or neglect. 9 Rec. vol. II, ex. J 

at 26. McNeese understood that the judge was willing to consult 

with the police, but not authorize a removal order. Id. 

The next day, August 20, 1987, assistant district attorney 

Steve Sullins was approached by defendant Sieck for a pick-up 

order based upon the Snells' alleged violation of the guardianship 

statute. Id. at 28. Sullins communicated this to McNeese, who 

wrote a memo to the DHS court liaison, Kathy O'Malley, expressing 

her displeasure with the DHS attempt to "shop" for a DA who would 

cooperate in obtaining a removal order given DHS' lack of written 

evidence. Id. at 27-28. 

F. 

Around August 24, 1987, Asbury gave defendant Levingston a 

copy of a statute contained in the Child Care Facilities Licensing 

9 DHS policy concerning the preparation of a case for court 

provides: 

All observable information is recorded precisely and 

quantitatively. In recording evidence designate where, 

who, how long, what time, and how many. If impressions 

are recorded, they are designated as such and related to 

observed activities. 

DHS Child Welfare Services-Child Abuse/Preventive Services 

Procedures§§ 623.6(D) (10/1/84), reproduced in rec. vol. III, 

doc. 114, ex. I. This procedure obviously was not followed 

concerning the allegations of child prostitution and pornography 

which form the basis of this case. 

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Act, supra note 8, which used the words "upon conviction." Rec. 

( supp. vol. II, doc. 150, ex.Kat 107. Defendant Levingston then 

sought an interpretation of the statute's applicability to the 

Snells from several sources including another assistant district 

attorney, Mary (Mimi) Smith. Id. at 107-08. When the DHS court 

liaison learned that the Levingston's inquiry involved the Snells, 

the liaison indicated that the inquiry should not be made because 

of McNeese's directive. Id. at 108-09. Defendant Levingston, 

with the approval of defendants Sweptson and Sieck, then 

approached Judge Brown for an interpretation of the statute and 

ostensibly learned that the "upon conviction" language "did mean 

that it was a misdemeanor and that the parents could be arrested." 

Id. at 114. 

To defendant Levingston, this meant that the Snells could be 

( arrested, but on August 26, 1987 she asked detective Einhorn to 

call the judge and confirm her understanding of the judge's 

interpretation. Id. at 116-17, 118-119. Between 9:00 and 9:30 

a.m., defendant Levingston learned from Einhorn that Judge Brown 

was inclined to issue a pick-up order. Id. at 118. Detective 

Einhorn called Padley indicating that Einhorn had talked with 

Judge Brown. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Cat 157. The judge 

initially had indicated that the order would be issued to the 

police, but now, at least according to Einhorn, the judge wanted 

an application from DHS, rather than the district attorney. Id. 

Einhorn wanted defendant Padley to file an application which would 

provide the basis for entry of such an order. Id. Defendant 

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Padley testified on deposition that she was reluctant to do so 

( without checking with the district attorney first. Id. at 158. 

She instructed Einhorn to check with the district attorney; 

Einhorn checked and reported that the assistant district attorney 

considered the Snells "a DHS problem and the DA's office is not 

going to get involved." Id. at 159. Defendant Padley felt that 

Einhorn "was attempting to put some pressure on me to take an 

action." Id. at 158. 

According to defendant Padley, she then recounted to Einhorn 

her understanding of the Snell situation to date: 

I told him that I knew we had pending child abuse 

allegations in the Snell household, both neglect and 

abuse, and that I knew the FBI has contacted us in 

reference to the Snells and had indicated they wanted to 

contact Mr. Snell in connection with an investigation 

they were doing in child prostitution and pornography, 

but that there were no allegations that the Snells were 

involved in child prostitution, pornography, trafficking 

of children. 

I then asked him if he knew of anything I didn't 

know .. 

He [Einhorn] indicated yes, there was, that he had 

information that led him to believe and that he was 

investigating an allegation of child prostitution and 

pornography as to the Snell home ..•. 

He [Einhorn] indicated to me that he had been in 

touch with an out-of-state police department, and that 

there was some connection between a person that this 

out-of-state police department was investigating in 

connection with child prostitution, pornography, 

trafficking in children, and the Snells, and that this 

person was traveling back and forth between the states 

into the Snell household. 

Id. at 160-163. According to defendant Padley, Einhorn "said that 

he had allegations that the Snells were involved in child 

prostitution, pornography and trafficking children." Id. at 164. 

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Defendant Padley would later learn that there were no such 

allegations. 

Defendant Padley may not have been the only one who was led 

by Einhorn to believe that there was more information concerning 

the Snells and child prostitution and pornography; Judge Brown 

"was really taken aback" by the limited nature of Einhorn's 

testimony after the children were picked up, given Einhorn's 

earlier representations which led to the issuance of the removal 

order. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. Dl at 44; see also id. at 

46.10 

G. 

The day of August 26, Judge Brown contacted defendant Padley, 

and she returned his call to find that he was on the bench, but 

that he wanted to set up an appointment. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, 

ex.Cat 159, 165. At some point during the day, defendant Padley 

contacted Judy Collins in the DHS licensing division. Rec. vol. 

III, doc. 114, ex.Cat 187. According to Collins, defendant 

Padley discussed the idea of "getting an order to force the Snells 

10 Judge Brown testified on deposition: 

Q: 

Judge Brown: 

If Detective Einhorn [at the later 

hearing] had denied relating any 

allegations involving nefarious sexual 

activity like child prostitution, child 

pornography, or child trafficking while 

he was under oath, that would be in 

direct contradiction to what he told you 

wouldn't it? 

That's correct. 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. Dl at 46. 

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to cooperate as it relates to licensing and looking at papers and 

things like that," and asked her opinion. Rec. vol. III, doc. 

114, ex.Nat 47. Collins expressed her view that if it was 

solely a licensing issue, another field visit to the Snells was in 

order to request documentation on the children. Id. at 49-50. 

Later in the day, defendant Padley spoke with Judge Brown. 

He wanted her to file an application so that the court could 

assist in the investigation and protect the children. Id., ex. C 

at 169. Judge Brown relied upon defendant Padley to coordinate 

the factual information in the case. Id., ex. D1 at 41-42. She 

told Judge Brown that she would get back to him. Id., ex. C at 

169. Defendant Padley then attempted to contact DHS personnel 

including Charles Waters, Conley Tunnell, Lissa Vernon, Prins 

Anderson and Mary Asbury, but was unable to reach them. Rec. vol. 

I, doc. 96, ex. 3 at 184. Tunnell, Vernon and Asbury have stated 

affirmatively that they were not involved in the events of August 

26. Id. ex. 1 at 7, ex. 9 at 2, ex. 10 at 2-3. Defendant Padley 

did talk with defendants Sweptson, Levingston and Sieck and 

someone in the licensing division before preparing the application 

and walking it over to the judge's office. Rec. vol. III, doc. 

114, ex.Cat 187. The judge looked at the application and began 

dictating his order. Id. at 188. 

Defendant Padley delivered the application and order to 

defendant Levingston, who reviewed the order along with defendants 

Sieck, Padley and perhaps defendant Sweptson. Rec. vol. I, doc. 

96, ex. 6 at 2. Lillegaard and defendants Sieck and Levingston 

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took the order to the police station and presented it to Sergeant 

George Johnson for enforcement. Id. at 3. On August 26 at about 

5:30 or 6:00 p.m., Lillegaard and defendants Sieck and Levingston 

accompanied the police to the Snell residence and seven children 

were removed based upon lack of custody documents. Id. at 3. The 

housekeeper reported to Mrs. Snell that the group led by the DHS 

social workers just barged in without knocking or ringing the 

doorbell and proceeded to gather the children. Rec. vol. III, 

doc. 114, ex. D at 50-51. In gathering the children, Sergeant 

Johnson "observed that the house was generally clean and neat" and 

he "saw no obvious indications of child abuse or neglect." Id. 

ex. Eat 2. Defendants Sieck and Levingston actively assisted in 

the police investigation in -the home. 

Plaintiff Sharon Snell (Mrs. Snell) arrived at home about 

thirty minutes after the police and DHS social workers arrived. 

Id. ex. D at 3. She was presented with a document which included 

allegations that the children were unsupervised while riding 

bicycles and were left at the neighbors for extended periods. Id. 

at 14-15. According to Mrs. Snell, defendant Levingston attempted 

to talk to her, but Mrs. Snell went into her bedroom and attempted 

to phone her husband at work and Sister Ruth at Jesus House. 

Unable to reach them, Mrs. Snell finally reached Eloise Harris, a 

DHS social worker. Id. at 11-13 Again, according to Mrs. Snell, 

defendant Levingston grabbed the telephone, slammed it down and 

said: "'If you don't let me--If you don't talk to me, I will get 

the police in here and they will make you talk to me.'" Id. The 

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social workers then insisted on seeing the paperwork on the 

children "and if I did not cooperate, .•. the police would force 

me to cooperate. That's what they were there for." Id. at 15. 

Mrs. Snell then went from the bedroom to a desk in the living 

room which had the files on the children. According to Mrs. 

Snell, upon seeing the first court order on one of the children, 

defendant Sieck said: '"That is not a legal document because it 

was rubber stamped [by the Oklahoma County District Court 

Clerk].'" Id. at 16. In the presence of defendant Levingston, 

defendant Sieck then directed the police: "To load up these kids, 

this lady does not have any legal documents on these kids." Id. 

Mrs. Snell then returned to her bedroom and gave the housekeeper 

permission to show the records to the social workers and police. 

Id. at 18. During this time, Mrs. Snell tried to call Hilde 

Lillegaard at DHS, not realizing that Lillegaard was present and 

making repeated apologies. Id. at 18, 34. Over an hour later, 

after the police and social workers had gone through all of the 

Snells' files, the police had a list of seven names for which no 

court custody documents had been found. Id. at 23; id. ex. Eat 

4. Sergeant Johnson asked defendants Sieck and Levingston if the 

seven children could be left with the Snells overnight because the 

Snells were likely to get the matter taken care of the next day. 

Id. ex. Cat 24; id. ex. D at 4. Defendant Sieck responded: 

"'They could run with the kids. It's happened before.'" Id. ex. 

Cat 25. According to the sergeant, he was told by DHS workers 

that the court's order directed removal of the children in the 

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absence of valid court orders concerning custody and that the 

circumstances in the home would not allow for interviews with the 

children. Id. ex. D at 4. Accordingly, Sergeant Johnson decided 

to take the children into custody. 

All during this time, the children had been placed in groups. 

Id. Defendant Levingston inquired about Patricia Turtle, a child 

with medical problems. According to Mrs. Snell, defendant 

Levingston then told a nearby police officer that, "'no Indian 

tribe would ever leave a child in this home.'" After the decision 

had been made to take the children, Mrs. Snell asked defendants 

Sieck and Levingston if two of the seven children could remain 

because efforts were being made to contact their natural mother. 

Id. ex.Cat 30. This request was denied by both defendants with 

the comment that the natural mother could see her children at the 

shelter. Id. 

As the DHS workers gathered the seven children, one of the 

children ran upstairs in an effort to hide and was retrieved 

forcibly by defendant Sieck. Id. at 31-32. At approximately 7:30 

p.m., the seven children were taken in the rain, without blankets, 

without car seats for the very young and without necess~ry 

medicine, 11 to the Oklahoma County Juvenile Center. Id. ex. D at 

35, ex.Eat 5, ex. F. When one of the bystanders asked if 

11 Defendant Levingston indicates that Mrs. Snell and other 

adults at the Snell home refused to cooperate in getting the 

children ready to leave and became somewhat abusive. Rec. vol. I, 

doc. 96, ex. 6 at 3. This is corroborated by Sergeant Johnson, 

who indicated that the situation deteriorated as the children were 

removed. Id. at ex. 7 at 5. 

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blankets would be used to cover the children given the rain, 

defendant Levingston reportedly said: "'Children of this culture 

are used to the elements.'" Id., ex. D at 35. 

H, 

The next day, the Snells learned from counsel of the·damaging 

child prostitution and pornography allegations. Id. at 53-54. 

Not revealing these damaging allegations earlier is directly 

contrary to the spirit, and the letter, of DHS regulations 

concerning mandatory disclosure by social workers in the course of 

child abuse investigations. See DHS Child Welfare Services-Child 

Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§§ 622.4, 623.7(A) 12 (10/1/ 

84), reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. At the hearing 

of August 27, 1987, detective Einhorn testified that the 

allegations of child prostitution and pornography arose in DHS 

through Asbury13 and defendants Levingston and Sweptson. Rec. 

12 Under the title of "Due Process Procedures," the OHS manual 

provides: 

A. Right to Be Informed of Allegation. Parents must 

receive a clear, precise explanation of allegations that 

have been presented. The explanation of allegations 

must occur immediately upon initial contact with the 

parent(s)/guardian. The worker also advises them of the 

agency's role in relation to the allegation, and of the 

statutes that exist to protect children in Oklahoma. 

DHS Child Welfare Services-Child 

Procedures§ 623.7(A) (10/1/84), 

114, ex. I. 

Abuse/Preventive Services 

reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 

13 The federal district court appears not to have considered 

this evidence linking Asbury to the ultimate issuance of the 

order. 

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vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Oat 68. On cross-examination, he denied 

having any other information. The allegations of child 

prostitution and pornography were not even colorable, and all 

involved concede that a removal order plainly would be unwarranted 

merely to learn the identities of the children in the Snell 

household, their relationship to the Snells, and to conduct 

another review of the licensing situation. See rec. vol. III, 

doc. 114,; ex. Cat 277-78 (Padley); ex.Nat 60 (Collins); ex. Dl 

at 43 (Judge Brown). 

II. 

Defendants first contend that they are entitled to absolute 

immunity in this§ 1983 action because their activities as social 

workers are intimately associated with the judicial process. 

According to defendants, "[r]esponding and investigating reports 

of child abuse or neglect, requesting assistance from the court in 

making that response, and accompanying police officers executing 

orders of the juvenile court are functions intimately associated 

with the judicial phase of the juvenile court's jurisdiction." 

Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 29. We reject this broad 

proposed standard as out of step with absolute immunity precedent. 

A. 

The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute 

immunity from civil rights suits in several well-established 

contexts involving the judicial process. A judge acting in his 

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judicial capacity is absolutely immune from such suits, unless the 

judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction. 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 

386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). A prosecutor is absolutely immune 

for activities which are "intimately associated with the judicial 

process" such as initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution. 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). However, the same 

immunity traditionally does not extend to a prosecutor's actions 

which may be classified as administrative or investigative. Id. 

at 430-31; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n.16 (1982). 

Witnesses, including public officials and private citizens, are 

immune from civil damages based upon their testimony. Briscoe v. 

La Hue, 460 U.S. 325, 341, 345-46 (1983). In deciding questions 

of immunity, the Court'has taken a functional approach after 

considering the history of common law immunity. Thus, in Butz v. 

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 515-17 (1978), the Court determined 

that agency officials who initiate and prosecute enforcement 

proceedings subject to agency adjudication are entitled to 

absolute immunity. 

The rationale for according absolute immunity in the civil 

rights context is to incorporate traditional common law 

immunities 14 and to allow functionaries in the judicial system the 

latitude to perform their tasks absent the threat of retaliatory 

§ 1983 litigation. Because the judicial system often resolves 

14 These immunities were present in 1871 when§ 1983 was enacted 

as§ 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13. 

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disputes that the parties cannot, the system portends conflict. 

Win or lose, a party may seek to litigate the constitutionality of 

circumstances which required him to endure a lawsuit or suffer 

defeat. Such suits by dissatisfied parties might target judges, 

see Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 

1989), prosecutors and witnesses. Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 523. 

Though such suits might be satisfying personally for a plaintiff, 

they could jeopardize the judicial system's ability to function. 

Absolute immunity has its costs because those with valid 

claims against dishonest or malicious government officials are 

denied relief. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289. 

Still, the Court has determined that the smooth functioning of the 

judicial system takes precedence over those meritorious claims 

which will be foreclosed by granting absolute immunity. Such 

claims may find partial resolution through other means, however. 

The opportunity for subsequent judicial review of decisions made 

by prosecutors and for subsequent appellate review of lower court 

decisions provides a check upon actions clothed with absolute 

immunity. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522-23. And the grant of 

absolute immunity does not insulate an official from the criminal 

process or professional discipline. Imbler 424 U.S. at 429. 

Thus, "[a]bsolute immunity is .•. necessary to assure that 

judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective 

functions without harassment or intimidation." Butz, 438 U.S. at 

512. A judge must be free to make decisions, often controversial, 

without concern about possible personal repercussions. Stump, 435 

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U.S. at 363-64. In deciding which cases to pursue and how they 

should be pursued, a prosecutor should not be distracted by the 

threat of subsequent and time-consuming and duplicative civil 

rights actions. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-26. Likewise, a witness 

must be free to testify without fear of a later civil action, so 

as not to deter witnesses or influence their testimony. Briscoe, 

460 U.S. at 333. 

The more distant a function is from the judicial process, the 

less likely absolute immunity will attach. Thus, in Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed 

that an officer applying for a warrant is not absolutely immune 

from suit, just as a complaining witness would not be entitled to 

such immunity. The Court reasoned that applying for a warrant 

"while a vital part of the administration of criminal justice, is 

further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings 

than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment." Id. The· 

Court viewed a prosecutor's seeking an indictment as "the first 

step in the process of seeking a conviction," id. at 343; 

application for a warrant often precedes this first step and 

serves a different function. 

B. 

Several lower courts have considered whether those involved 

in child protection and advocacy, including social workers and 

guardians ad litem, are entitled to absolute immunity. Consistent 

with Supreme Court precedent, the courts have taken a functional 

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approach rather then one based purely on the status of the 

defendant involved. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 

(1988). The courts have looked to the particular task a defendant 

was performing and its nexus to the judicial process rather than 

deciding that social workers or guardians ad litem as a class are 

entitled to absolute immunity. Although child dependency 

proceedings are civil in nature, they occur against a backdrop of 

potential criminal prosecution of the abusive parent or caretaker. 

A social worker's investigation may result in the removal of 

children from the home and a referral to the district attorney for 

potential prosecution of a parent or caretaker. Thus, the civil 

nature of child dependency proceedings, per se, has not been a bar 

to absolute immunity for social workers. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 

F.2d 1512, 1532-33 n.18 (10th Cir. 1988) (extending absolute 

immunity to duty to initiate civil complaint after applying 

functional analysis). 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule of absolute immunity for 

child and dependency proceedings from origination until 

conclusion. In Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social 

Serv., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 

(1987), the court held that "social workers are entitled to 

absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions 

connected with the initiation and pursuit of child and dependency 

proceedings." However, absolute immunity did not extend to a 

social worker's ordering a father to stay away from his home prior 

to a scheduled court hearing because such a function was not 

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quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial. Id. at 1157-58. Such 

conduct was not that of an advocate, but rather unilateral action 

prior to the operation of the judicial process. Id at 1157. 

Relying upon Meyers, the Ninth Circuit has held that a social 

worker seeking a court order for immediate apprehension of a 

newborn from her natural mother is entitled to absolute immunity 

for such quasi-prosecutorial conduct. Coverdell v. Department of 

Social & Health Serv., 834 F.2d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 1987). In 

Coverdell, the social worker completed an affidavit used by the 

prosecutor in obtaining custody of the child. Id. at 760. Under 

a theory of quasi-judicial immunity, the court determined that the 

social worker was entitled to absolute immunity for executing the 

order by obtaining custody of the child and removing her from the 

hospital. Id. at 764-65. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit 

determined that absolute immunity for a social worker extends 

beyond the adjudication of dependency to final disposition of the 

case. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990). Accordingly, social workers who 

had placed two children in a home where they were sexually abused 

were afforded absolute immunity. Id. 

The Sixth Circuit also has decided a trilogy of cases which 

help define the limits of absolute immunity for social workers 

handling child protection and advocacy matters. In Kurzawa v. 

Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1457-58 (6th Cir. 1984), the court 

determined that social workers involved in prosecuting neglect and 

delinquency petitions in the Michigan courts were entitled to 

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absolute immunity, along with a guardian ad litem who participated 

in proceedings leading to the removal of a child from his parents' 

home. Id. at 1457-58; see also Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 

144-46 (3rd Cir. 1989) (guardian ad litem who testifies in court, 

prosecutes custody or neglect petitions, or makes reports and 

recommendations to court entitled to absolute immunity). Thus, 

social workers filing a juvenile abuse petition which resulted in 

a temporary emergency custody order were entitled to absolute 

immunity. Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 1989); 

accord Vosburg v. Department of Social Serv., 884 F.2d 133, 135 

(4th Cir. 1989). However, opening a child abuse case, 

investigating it and placing a parent's name in a central registry 

concerning child abuse are not quasi-prosecutorial activities for 

which absolute immunity applies. Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 

826, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, these activities are 

administrative or investigative. Id. 

Several cases applying a functional·approach have declined to 

grant absolute immunity to social workers investigating child 

abuse allegations. In Spielman v. Hildebrand, ~73 F.2d 1377, 

1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), we declined to grant absolute immunity 

to a Kansas social worker and her supervisor based upon a decision 

to remove two children in preadoptive status from the home of the 

potential parents without an agency hearing. Applying a 

functional approach, we noted that the defendants' actions "in no 

way related to advocacy before a judicial body," and were not 

otherwise integral to the judicial process. Id. at 1383. Rather, 

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the defendants' decision to remove the children from the home was 

unilateral and occurred before the judicial process intervened; 

accordingly, only qualified immunity was appropriate. Id. 

An important prerequisite of absolute immunity in this 

context is that the defendant social worker "act as an actual 

functionary of the court, not only in status or denomination but 

in reality." Gardener, 874 F.2d at 146. When the activity of the 

social worker is not integral to the judicial process, absolute 

immunity is not warranted. Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1383. In 

Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1988), the court 

determined that the seizure of children in the absence of a court 

order under Texas law would not be protected by absolute immunity. 

The court reasoned that 

seizure without a court order in the face of an 

immediate danger seems to us more akin to the function 

of police than prosecutors. Policemen, not prosecutors, 

investigate dangerous situations and are charged with 

the duty, if necessary, to intervene to prevent injury. 

But policemen, like most other executive officials, are 

ordinarily not protected by absolute 

immunity ..• unless they are engaged in a function 

integral to the judicial process, such as testifying as 

witnesses .•.• 

Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, in Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 

1356, 1361-63 (5th Cir. 1987), the court determined that the 

filing of an allegedly false verified complaint, which under 

Louisiana law initiated temporary custody of a child, but did not 

initiate the judicial process concerning need of care proceedings, 

was not entitled to absolute immunity. The court analogized the 

filing of a verified complaint by a child abuse worker to the 

seeking of an arrest warrant by a police officer; because absolute 

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immunity would be inappropriate in the latter case, so too would 

it be inappropriate in the former. Austin, 830 F.2d at 1362. 

c. 

We next consider the authority of the DHS in this matter. 

DHS has the authority to investigate complaints concerning whether 

a child care facility is required to be licensed under the Child 

Care Licensing Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 401-410 (West 

1987). Id. § 401(b)(necessity of license),§ 402(2) (child care 

facility defined),§ 403(b) (Act applies to private child care 

facilities), § 405(b) (prior to issuance of license, DHS "shall 

investigate the activities and standards of care of the 

applicant"); DHS Division of Child Welfare Services-Policy and 

Procedure-Licensing§§ 661 & 689 (3/15/79) (investigation of 

complaints), reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. M. DHS is 

granted authority to investigate the conditions of a licensed 

child care facility and to require information concerning the 

children being cared for by the facility. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

10, § 406 (West 1987). DHS also has authority to investigate 

complaints of child abuse and neglect. 15 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

15 As we understand this case, DHS seems to have been 

investigating allegations that the children in the Snells' care 

were "deprived children" within the meaning of Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 10, § 1101(4) (West Supp. 1990). A deprived child includes 

"a child who does not have the proper parental care or 

guardianship or whose home is an unfit place for the child by 

reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of his 

parents, legal guardian, or other person in whose care the child 

may be •... " Id.; see also DHS Child Welfare Services-Child 

Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 623.5(B)(2) (10/1/84), 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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21, §§ 845, 846 (West Supp. 1990); DHS Child Welfare 

Services-Child Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 621 (10/1/ 

84), reproduced in, rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. 

Under Oklahoma law, a preliminary inquiry shall precede the 

filing of a petition to adjudicate the status of an allegedly 

deprived child. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1101(10), 

1103(A) & (C) (1987 & 1990 Supp.). The purpose of the preliminary 

inquiry is to determine whether court action is necessary and to 

allow for informal adjustment. See id. & id. 

§§ 1101(1) & 1103(B). In Oklahoma County, where the events in 

this case took place, this function is accomplished by the 

Juvenile Bureau. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 602(1), 

1201(A), 1204(A) (West 1987). Thereafter, "(a] petition in a 

juvenile proceeding may be filed by the district attorney or the 

person who is authorized to make a preliminary inquiry to see if 

further action is necessary." Id. § 1103(B). "The petition is 

the first formal legal document filed with the court and initiates 

Juvenile Court proceedings." DHS Child Welfare Services-Child 

Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 624.11 (10/1/84), 

reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. When the petition 

is filed, the district court obtains jurisdiction over the child 

alleged to be deprived. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1102(A) (West 

Supp. 1990). 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. A dependent and 

neglected child is a deprived child. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, 

§ 1101(4) (West 1990). 

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Frequently, however, a child may be taken into custody before 

a preliminary inquiry is completed or a petition is filed. When a 

child is taken into custody before the filing of a petition, a 

petition generally must be filed and a summons issued within five 

judicial days. Id.§ 1104.l(A) (West 1987); DHS Child Welfare 

Services-Child Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 624.11 (10/ 

1/84), reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. If a child 

is taken into custody as a deprived child,~ Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 10, § 1104(d) (West Supp. 1990), the "child shall be taken 

immediately before a judge of the district court for the purpose 

of obtaining an order for protective custody." Id. § 1107(B). 

The parents or guardians are entitled to a hearing within 

forty-eight hours. Id. § 1104.l(C) (West 1987); DHS Child Welfare 

Services-Child Abuse/Preventive Services Procedures§ 623.7(c) 

(10/1/84), reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I; see also 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1107(C) (West 1990) (detention hearing 

must be held within one or two judicial days, otherwise child 

shall not be detained). 

In this case, an application was filed and an order for 

conditional protective custody issued before a preliminary inquiry 

or petition. Judge Brown indicated that in practice an order for 

protective custody frequently precedes a petition. Rec. vol. I, 

doc. 131, ex. 17 at 75. Other courts have determined that social 

workers filing pleadings for temporary custody in advance of a 

formal petition are entitled to absolute immunity. Vosburg, 884 

F.2d at 134; Salyer, 874 F.2d at 378. We think that this case 

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requires a different outcome for two reasons. First, the 

application which resulted in the pick-up order was 

pre-adjudicatory and sought information which would be developed 

in other pre-adjudicatory procedures such as court intake or a 

preliminary inquiry that occur prior to the filing of a petition. 

See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1101(8) & (10), 1102(A) (West 

Supp. 1990) ("Upon the filing of a petition, the district court 

shall have jurisdiction of any child who is alleged to be 

deprived. . . . II ) . In this respect, the statutory scheme in 

Oklahoma, insofar as DHS is concerned, is similar to the Louisiana 

scheme construed by the Fifth Circuit in Austin; we think that the 

Austin approach is equally applicable to this case. See 830 F.2d 

at 1361-63. A social worker seeking a pre-petition order for 

protective custody functions like a police officer seeking an 

arrest warrant; a functional approach to immunity requires that 

those performing like functions receive like immunity. Austin, 

830 F.2d at 1362. 

The second reason why absolute immunity is not appropriate is 

that DHS policy indicates that DHS child welfare workers normally 

are to report findings of neglect or abuse, even those which might 

indicate a need for immediate intervention, to other authorities 

for further investigation or advocacy in the form of initiation of 

court proceedings. 16 All of the challenged actions of defendants 

16 See DHS Child Welfare Services-Child Abuse/Preventive 

Services Procedures§ 622.2 (district attorney may make 

determination as to need for further investigation or prosecution 

based on findings of DHS), § 622.31 (contact local law enforcement 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston pertain to a DHS investigation of 

the Snells, an attempt to create a factual basis to justify 

intervention and confirm allegations predominantly, if not wholly, 

the product of speculation and conjecture. The defendants 

unsuccessfully sought police participation in their investigation 

before Judge Brown issued his order. Moreover, defendants Sieck 

and Levingston assisted with the investigation made possible by 

the court's order--a function associated with police work, not 

advocacy. 

We agree with the district court that child welfare workers 

investigating claims of child abuse are analogous to law 

enforcement officers who are entitled only to qualified immunity. 

Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1557 .. We also reject the defendants' 

arg-μment that public policy requires absolute immunity because 

claims of child abuse are involved. See Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 

913, 919-20 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting absolute immunity for child 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

authorities if immediate attention required), § 622.4 (same), 

§ 622.4(B) (if cannot complete report due to lack of cooperation, 

contact law enforcement or complete report with information 

obtained),§ 622.41(B) (DHS investigation is an "official 

inquiry," not a police investigation); § 622.43 (report of 

investigation sent to district attorney with recommendation); 

§ 623.3 (emergency placement and shelter care requests presented 

through district attorney or Juvenile Bureau; only when these 

sources cannot be reached may DHS worker contact district judge 

directly; peace officer or court employee is empowered to take 

child into immediate protective custody, if necessary), ~ 623.4 

(district attorney has discretion whether to file petition or 

pursue criminal charges), § 623.7(D) (same), § 624.11 (generally 

district attorney will decide whether there is sufficient evidence 

to proceed with a petition; d_istrict attorney or Juvenile Bureau 

prepares all pleadings and DHS workers do not sign petitions 

except in unusual or emergency situations with prior approval) 

(10/1/84), reproduced in rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. I. 

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abuse investigations on policy grounds and accepting "strong" 

argument for qualified immunity). We do so for two reasons. 

First, immunity is strictly construed; we do not function as a 

' 

legislature in enacting immunity grounds. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 

811; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421. Second, as stated by the district 

court: 

While the tasks of social workers who investigate child 

protection matters are clearly matters of compelling 

interest and importance to the public, how can it be 

said that when these investigators allegedly violate a 

citizen's constitutional rights they are entitled to 

absolute immunity, when highly trained FBI, DEA and 

Treasury agents facing identical allegations are 

entitled to only qualified immunity? 

Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1557. To this we might add that police 

officers engaged in the same conduct alleged in this case would 

not be entitled to absolute immunity. Austin, 830 F.2d at 1362. 

Thus, we overrule Oklahoma federal district court decisions which 

have determined that absolute immunity is appropriate for DHS 

social workers, to the extent that these decisions are 

inconsistent with the rule we announce today. See,~, Snook v. 

Lunsford, No. 87-C-550-B unpub. order (N.D. Okla. Mar. 24, 1988) 

[1988 WL 142120]; Guest v. Moore, 706 F. Supp. 786, 787-88 (W.D. 

Okla. 1987). 

The actions of defendants Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston 

cannot be said to be integral to the judicial process, rather the 

DHS activity was more akin to police work. The licensing issue 

had been resolved in the Snell's favor by DHS licensing division 

personnel in April 1987; however, DHS elected to reexamine the 

factual basis of the issue shortly thereafter and needed more 

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information. The three subsequent referrals concerning neglect 

and abuse in the Snell home were investigated by DHS, and the DHS 

brought the results of that investigation to the attention of the 

district attorney's office, as normal procedure envisions. When 

the district attorney refused to become involved, the DHS 

defendants pursued the investigation further by contacting the 

police, who would not assist the investigation without a court 

order, and the district attorney, who again would not pursue the 

investigation because of a lack of evidence. Viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiffs, the summary judgment evidence 

indicates that these defendants assisted or acquiesced in the use 

of information known to be false concerning the Snells, i.e., 

involvement in child prostitution and pornography, in order to 

f th th 1 . · · t" t" 17 

ur er e 1cens1ng inves iga ion an d re t a 1· 1a t e agains . t th e 

Snells. The use of that false information, as conveyed to Judge 

Brown, was undoubtedly responsible for the furtherance of the 

investigation by use of a court order to gain entry into the Snell 

home and custody of the seven children for which the Snells could, 

not produce court custody documents. Accordingly, defendants 

17 It seems strange indeed for the DHS to have obtained an order 

authorizing detention of only those children for which the Snells 

lacked court custody documents, given purported allegations of 

child prostitution and pornography. If any foundation existed for 

such allegations, one would expect all of the children at the 

Snells to be in jeopardy. The order that was issued was 

consistent with the licensing investigation. 

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Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston are not entitled to absolute 

. ·t 18 1mmun1 y. 

18 We recognize that this circuit has granted absolute immunity 

to probation officers who allegedly made false statements in a 

pretrial bond report and a presentence report. Tripati v. United 

States INS, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988). And some courts have reached 

results in which both social workers involved in child protection 

and probation officers were accorded the same type of immunity, 

whether it be absolute or qualified. Hodorowski, 844 F.2d at 1214 

(qualified immunity); Austin, 830 F.2d at 1361 (qualified 

immunity); Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1159 (absolute immunity); Myers v. 

Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 

828 (1987) (absolute immunity; private social worker). Our 

decision in Tripati is in no way inconsistent with the result 

reached here. 

Absolute immunity for the probation officer in Tripati 

extended to the preparation of the pretrial bond or presentence 

report, not to every activity that a probation officer may 

undertake. 784 F.2d at 348. Tripati is in keeping with a 

functional approach to absolute immunity because the court 

requires pretrial bond and presentence reports in handling the 

criminal docket. Id. These functions of the probation officer 

are integrally related to the judicial function. 

The cases relied upon in Tripati do not purport to establish 

a broader rule or suggest a different rule in this case. Hughes 

v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) (absolute 

immunity for preparation and submission of presentence report); 

Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 & 729 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979) 

(same); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970), 

cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (absolute immunity for probation 

officer preparing and submitting a probation report in a criminal 

case); see also Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(absolute immunity for preparation of presentence report). In 

contrast to the preparation of pretrial bond or presentence 

reports, other decisions involving the revocation of probation or 

parole by a probation or parole officer warrant only qualified, 

not absolute, immunity because such decisions are farther removed 

from the judicial process and are not initiated by courts. 

Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1987); Nelson v. 

Balzaic, 802 F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 1986); Ray v. Pickett, 

734 F.2d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1984); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 

215 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949 (1984). It is 

these latter cases that the courts in Hodorowski and Austin relied 

upon in determining that social workers involved in child 

protection were not entitled to absolute immunity. We also find 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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D. 

The issue of absolute immunity is more difficult with respect 

to defendant Padley, the assistant general counsel of DHS who 

compiled the information and presented the application to Judge 

Brown. We note that the Second Circuit granted absolute immunity 

to a child protective services department attorney who initiated 

and prosecuted child protective orders. Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 

F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1984). In that case, the attorney had 

taken steps to compel a witness to attend a hearing to terminate 

parental rights. Id. at 150. 

In this case, the federal district court denied defendant 

Padley absolute immunity on two grounds: 1) she was acting in an 

investigative capacity, and .2) even if she was acting in a 

quasi-prosecutorial capacity, she ventured outside her duties to 

perform a quasi-prosecutorial task. Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1558. 

The district court relied heavily upon defendant Padley's 

admissions. Padley stated that "[t]he whole purpose of the 

application was to obtain the assistance of the [state] court to 

complete an investigation as to allegations." Rec. vol. III, doc. 

114, ex. c·at 172. Padley also was aware that normally such 

applications would be filed by the district attorney or attorney 

general's office; indeed she had never drafted an application of 

this type before. Id. at 169-71. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

these latter cases analogous to the situation presented in this 

case. 

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We would have no problem affirming the district court's 

decision concerning the investigative nature of some of defendant 

Padley's activities had the plaintiffs come forward with evidence 

indicating that defendant Padley only engaged in the "preliminary 

gathering of evidence that may ripen into a potential 

prosecution." Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th 

Cir. 1989). For we have held that a prosecutor who interrogates a 

suspect in the first instance is fulfilling an investigative, 

rather than a prosecutorial, function. Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 

840, 844 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985). 

Moreover, the Second Circuit in Robinson, 821 F.2d at 918-19, has 

held that an attorney who assists a police officer in 

investigating a child abuse .complaint is merely part of the 

"preliminary investigative process," and is not entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity. 

In this case, the rule concerning absolute immunity for 

prosecutorial functions and not for investigative or 

administrative functions is easier to state than apply. Although 

absolute immunity applies to initiating and presenting a 

prosecution, the Supreme Court has recognized that some duties 

prior to the initiation of a prosecution are also protected. 

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. Preparing to initiate a prosecution 

may necessitate obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence; 

absolute immunity may attach when these functions are necessary so 

that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an officer of the 

court. See id.; Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th 

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Appellate Case: 88-2879 Document: 01019956504 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 47 
Cir. 1989) (decision of prosecutor to investigate a criminal 

charge entitled to absolute immunity); Gobel, 867 F.2d at 1204 

{actions undertaken as part of the preparation of the prosecutor's 

case are absolutely immune, even if such actions could be 

characterized as "investigative" or "administrative"); Auriemma v. 

Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 {7th Cir. 1988) {extra-judicial 

investigation by government attorneys not entitled to absolute 

immunity); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 792 (11th Cir. 1988) 

{prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for investigation 

necessary to prepare case such as interviewing witnesses before 

presenting them to a grand jury or interviewing the victim of a 

crime). 

We have held that a critical factor for absolute 

prosecutorial immunity "involves a prosecutor's acts as an 

advocate before a neutral magistrate." Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 

F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1983). Thus, a prosecutor who 

participates in an illegal search, issues a libelous press 

release, assists with an unlawful sale of seized property or 

orders a warrantless arrest ordinarily will not be entitled to 

absolute immunity. Id. at 437. On the other hand, a prosecutor 

who performs functions within the continuum of initiating and 

presenting a criminal case, such as filing charges, seeking an 

arrest warrant or advocating conditions of release, ordinarily 

will be entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 439. "Although 

identifying those acts entitled to absolute immunity is not always 

easy, the determinative factor is 'advocacy' because that is the 

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prosecutor's main function and the one most akin to his 

quasi-judicial role." Rex, 753 F.2d 843. 

Here, some'evidence indicates that Judge Brown told defendant 

Padley to prepare an application based, at least in part, upon 

earlier ex parte representations concerning the Snells that were 

made to the judge by detective Einhorn. Rec. vol. I, doc. 96, ex. 

2 at 31-32 (Brown depo.); id. vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Cat 169 

(Padley depo.). We have found no summary judgment evidence 

indicating that Padley directed Einhorn to Judge Brown. Rather, 

it appears that Einhorn contacted the judge by telephone before 

defendant Padley was sought out by the judge. Rec. vol. I, doc. 

96, ex. 2 at 30-31. The judge now says that he was willing to 

issue a detention order based on his conversation by Einhorn, but 

he did not have it prepared when Einhorn appeared in person an 

hour later. Id. at 31. When Einhorn appeared and the order was 

not prepared, Judge Brown requested that Padley coordinate the 

supporting information. 

Thus, Padley appeared before a neutral judge at the judge's 

express suggestion; she was not acting unilaterally. 19 She was 

19 For two reasons, defendant Padley is not entitled to absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity on a theory that she merely acted at the 

direction of Judge Brown in preparing the application. First, 

there is no evidence that Judge Brown ordered Padley to file the 

application containing the false allegations. See Turney v. 

O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1990) (absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity applied to execution of judicial order of 

confinement); Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 

1288 (10th Cir. 1989) (officers arresting and confining plaintiff 

on judge's contempt order entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 

immunity). Second, defendant Padley's conduct involved more than 

a ministerial act pursuant to a judge's directive, see Valdez, 878 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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directed to coordinate existing information, not pursue further 

investigation. Indeed, Judge Brown testified on deposition that 

he would have issued the order based upon the oral representations 

of Detective Einhorn. Rec. vol. I, doc. 96, ex. 2 at 62-63. 

However, that is not what happened. In the application she 

prepared, Padley matched the existing allegations with citations 

to the statutes concerning child abuse and neglect, deprived 

children, and licensing, and then she requested relief: that the 

court "provide whatever assistance ... the Court deems 

appropriate in order to protect children and assist DHS in 

completing child abuse and licensing investigations of the Snell[] 

home." Id. ex. 4 at 2. Under current Rules of Professional 

Conduct, Padley might have an obligation to make a more complete 

presentation; 20 however, that issue goes to the merits of Padley's 

conduct, not to its function. Thus, we characterize Padley's 

conduct in preparing and presenting the application before the 

judge as advocacy by an officer of the court, not police 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

F.2d at 1289, rather her·decision to prepare 

application was a product of legal judgment. 

and file the 

20 Padley indicated that she did not know whether the 

allegations concerning the Snells contained in the application 

were true or false; the purpose of the investigation was to so 

determine. Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex. Cat 273-74. Padley 

might have disclosed that the Snells were in no way sought as 

suspects by the F.B.I. Rule 3.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of 

Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making "a 

false statement of fact or law to a tribunal." Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (West Supp. 1990). Rule 3.3(d), now in 

effect, requires that a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding inform 

the court of all material facts necessary to make an informed 

decision, "whether or not the facts are adverse." Id. 

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investigation. Any investigation done by defendant Padley was 

incident to her filing the application. Even viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiffs, the summary judgment evidence 

simply does not show that defendant Padley originated or augmented 

the false information which was contained in the application for 

an order. Accordingly, we reject the district court's 

characterization of Padley's conduct as investigative which would 

deprive her of absolute immunity. 

The district court held in the alternative that Padley would 

not be entitled to absolute immunity because she "ventured outside 

her normal duties to perform a quasi-prosecutorial function." 

Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1588. A judge may act in excess of his 

subject matter jurisdiction and still retain absolute judicial 

immunity; only in the unusual circumstances of complete and clear 

absence of all jurisdiction is absolute immunity inappropriate. 

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. We have relied upon this analogous 

concept to discuss the contours of absolute prosecutorial 

immunity. Lerwill, 712 F.2d at 439. While a prosecutor might 

lose absolute immunity when he acts with a complete and clear 

absence of authority, such a condition does not occur when a 

prosecutor has an arguable basis of authority grounded in a 

statute. Id. at 440. In Lerwill, we determined that a part-time 

city attorney was entitled to absolute immunity for initiating a 

prosecution based on state felony statutes, although he was only 

authorized to prosecute under city misdemeanor ordinances. Id. at 

, 436. We held that 

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a prosecutor who initiates a prosecution under statutes 

he is not authorized to invoke is immune from a section 

1983 suit for damages when two conditions are satisfied: 

1) the prosecutor is arguably empowered to prosecute the 

alleged conduct under some statute, and 2) the statute 

he incorrectly invokes also arguably applies to the 

criminal defendant's alleged conduct. 

Id. at 440 (footnote omitted). Because both conditions were 

satisfied, absolute immunity applied. 

The district court stated that "Oklahoma law and long 

established practice envisions that the District Attorney shall 

perform such [prosecutorial] acts on behalf of DHS." Snell, 698 

F. Supp. at 1558. Given the various allegations in this case, we 

find the matter slightly more complicated. Padley, as assistant 

general counsel of DHS, may represent the department in some 

matters given the statute empowering the DHS legal division. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 56, § 236 (West 1969); City of Sand Springs 

v. Department of Public Welfare, 608 P.2d 1139, 1150 (Okla. 1980). 

With respect to proceedings concerning licensing under the 

Child Care Facilities Act, however, DHS is to be represented by 

the attorney general or the district attorney. Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 10, § 408 (West 1987) (in legal proceedings, attorney general 

represents DHS), § 409 (when injunction is sought by DHS, suit is 

brought by the attorney general or district attorney); see also 

DHS Division of Child Welfare Services-Policy and 

Procedure-Licensing§§ 667.23 (3/15/79), reproduced in rec. vol. 

III, doc. 114, ex. M (if owner or operator of child care facility 

continues to operate after adverse final decision on licensing, 

"the State Director may request the Attorney General or the 

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appropriate District Attorney to secure a civil injunction or 

initiate criminal proceedings."). 

The criminal statutes prohibiting child abuse and neglect, 

Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21, §§ 843 & 843.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 

1990), are enforced by the district attorney, id. tit. 19, § 215.4 

(West 1988 & Supp. 1990). The district attorney and Juvenile 

Bureau have the authority to file a petition seeking an 

adjudication of an alleged deprived child. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

10, §§ 1103(B), 1204(a) (West 1987). Defendants contend that 

"[t]here is no statutorily prescribed procedure for securing 

juvenile court orders prior to the filing of an adjudicatory 

petition under Oklahoma law, although the juvenile court clearly 

may issue such orders." Appellants' Reply Brief at 8 (citing 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1104(d), 1104.1 & 1107(B)(West 1987 & 

Supp. 1990)). Former assistant district attorney McNeese 

testified on deposition that the "policies and procedures 

regarding pick-ups changed" as the presiding judge of the juvenile 

division changed. Rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 115, ex. J at 12. 

Based upon our review of the statutory scheme, we are 

inclined to agree that the procedure for obtaining a pick-up order 

was not entirely clear. However, at the time of the events in 

question, it is uncontroverted that normal procedure resulted in 

this, function being handled by the police or the district 

attorney, not DHS. Rec. vol. II, ex. J at 11 (McNeese depo.). As 

noted previously, DHS policy envisions that other agencies will 

determine what steps should be taken when allegations of abuse and 

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neglect cannot be fully investigated by DHS child welfare workers. 

In very unusual circumstances, such as when it would be impossible 

to contact the appropriate authorities (e.g., district attorney, 

Juvenile Bureau, police), DHS policy apparently allows an 

application directly to the district court for emergency 

placement. See DHS Child Welfare Services-Child Abuse/Preventive 

Services Procedures§ 623.3 (10/1/84), reproduced in rec. vol. 

III, doc. 114, ex. I. However, there are no circumstances in this 

case which would justify DHS assuming this authority. 

We need not decide the difficult issue of if and when DHS 

counsel has authority to apply directly to the court for emergency 

investigative assistance or custody, because DHS clearly lacked 

authority in this case. The record is uncontroverted that DHS 

repeatedly approached the district attorney's office to take 

action and that office exercised its prosecutorial discretion not 

to proceed. DHS even contacted the police, who refused to 

intervene without a court order. Defendant Padley had never 

prepared or filed such an application before, and she was unaware 

of any previous DHS precedent for such an application. Rec. vol. 

III, doc. 114, ex.Cat 271-72. In these circumstances, we do not 

believe that the statutory schemes concerning licensing and 

alleged deprived children envision an end-run by DHS to override 

the prosecutorial discretion exercised by the offices of the 

district attorney or even the attorney general. Granted, DHS has 

express authority to investigate licensing matters, Okla. Stat. 

Ann. tit 10, § 405 (West 1987), and the DHS is charged with 

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( ' 

l 

investigating reports of child neglect and abuse, id. tit. 21, 

§ 846(A) (West Supp. 1990). Even so, this general authority did 

not justify an end-run around the district attorney so as to take 

legal action. 

Absolute immunity is "strong medicine" and government 

officials "who seek exemption from personal liability have the 

burden of showing that the exemption is justified by overriding 

considerations of public policy." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, 

230. In this case, defendant Padley has not made that showing. 

The purpose of absolute prosecutorial immunity would be ill-served 

by granting it in cases when the defendant acts without colorable 

authority. Moreover, the very attribute that absolute 

prosecutorial immunity is meant to protect--prosecutorial 

discretion--would not be served were we to grant absolute immunity 

here because defendant Padley's activities were an attempt to 

supersede the very prosecutorial discretion vested in the district 

attorney's office. We conclude that although defendant Padley was 

functioning as a prosecutor, she did so without color of authority 

in these circumstances and absolute immunity is not warranted. 

III. 

The issue of whether defendants Sweptson, Sieck, Levingston 

and Padley are entitled to qualified immunity remains. In 

evaluating the .defense of qualified immunity, we compare the 

"objective reasonableness" of the conduct complained of with the 

state of the law at the time of the alleged violation. Harlow, 

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457 U.S. at 818. "[G)overnment officials performing discretionary 

functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known." Id. For plaintiffs to defeat a claim of 

qualified immunity, the "contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 

that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, 

the plaintiffs must "come forward with facts or allegations to 

show both that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law 

and that law was clearly established when the alleged violation 

occurred." Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 

642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988). The defendant prevails unless such a 

showing is made on both elements; 21 however, even if the plaintiff 

makes such a showing, the defendant still may prevail if he can 

establish "extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he 

neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal 

standard." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. 

The qualified immunity standard serves to minimize 

interference with government officials performing discretionary 

governmental functions and "provides ample protection to all but 

21 If the plaintiff is unable to marshal evidence indicating 

that the conduct complained of violated the law as presently 

interpreted, it is unnecessary to consider whether the law was 

clearly established at the time such conduct occurred. McEvoy v. 

Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 465 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 

( 

1 Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Qualified immunity is a legal, not a 

factual, issue which must be resolved in the first instance by the 

trial court. Pueblo, 847 F.2d at 646 .. On appeal, the issue is 

straightforward, even it its resolution often is not: Do the 

facts alleged by the plaintiffs support a violation of clearly 

established law of which a reasonable person would have known? 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9; Davis v. Scherer, 468 

U.S. 183, 191 (1984). This is an objective legal inquiry, though 

fact-specific. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. We have recognized 

that when a plaintiff can point to specific facts of defendant's 

improper motivation, qualified immunity may be inappropriate due 

to "a conflict sufficiently .material to defendant['s] claim of 

immunity to require [him] to stand trial." Devargas v. Mason & 

Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 (10th Cir. 1988); 

Pueblo, 847 F.2d at 649-50; Wright v. Southern Ark. Regional 

Health Ctr., 800 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1986) (cited in 

Devargas). 

As an initial matter, we note that several cases arising 

under a variety of constitutional theories have granted qualified 

immunity to those investigating claims of child abuse or neglect 

when there were circumstances which made it appear that the 

children were in danger and there was evidentiary support for such 

an assessment. See,~, Landstrom v. Illinois Dep't of Children 

& Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 674-78 (7th Cir. 1990) (fourth and 

fourteenth amendment claims; complaint by child of soreness); Doe 

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v. Hennepin, 858 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1988) (fourteenth 

( 

\ amendment claim for deprivation of liberty and property interest; 

informant alleged that father engaged in sexual abuse of child), 

cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 3161 (1989); Hodorowski, 844 F.2d at 1217 

(family integrity claim; anonymous report that father chased 

children in yard with chain; social workers saw bruises and were 

told of more bruises by children); Robinson, 821 F.2d at 921-22 

(due process and excessive force; two schoolmates gave 

descriptions of ongoing sexual abuse by stepfather of one child, 

one schoolmate indicated the other child had been beaten, both 

children appeared to fear reprisal upon inquiry and mother did not 

appear able to protect children); see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 

566 F.2d 817, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1977) (due process; emergency 

custody appropriate because mother in psychiatric ward and 

children left unattended). The case before us, however, lacks 

circumstances indicative of an emergency and there are claims of 

retaliatory motive which must be considered. 

A. 

In the claims brought under§ 1983, plaintiffs rely upon the 

first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments. Rec. vol. I, doc. 

56 (amended complaint), doc. 38 at 2, doc. 130 at i (unnumbered). 

As we understand the plaintiffs' claims as refined by the record, 

see,~, rec. vol. I, doc. 130, they are: 1) interference with 

liberty and privacy interests based upon the foster care 

relationship with the seven children removed from the home, 2) 

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interference with a liberty interest in plaintiffs' good names 

which occurred with the dissemination of the false child 

prostitution and pornography allegations, 3) interference with a 

reasonable expectation of privacy which occurred when police and 

the DHS entered and searched plaintiffs' home without probable 

cause and a warrant, on the authority of an order procured with 

allegations known to be false, and 4) retaliation due to the 

Snells' outspoken nature and refusal to be intimidated by DHS 

pressure, see id., doc. 63 ,r 13 at 8; rec. supp. vol. II, doc. 150 

at 11. As previously noted, we consider only a portion of the 

third issue as it relates to the denial of qualified immunity to 

the defendants. Concerning the third issue, we do not have 

occasion to decide whether a search of a private home without a 

warrant or probable cause violates the fourth amendment. Courts 

have reached differing results concerning the difficult issue of 

the scope of the fourth amendment protection in the context of a 

child abuse investigation. Compare Daryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 

893, 901-02, 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1986) (on preliminary record, 

visual inspection of child's nude body for signs of child abuse 

does not require probable cause or a warrant, but state's 

procedures did not insure reasonableness in every case) with Good 

v. Dauphin County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3rd Cir. 

1989) (warrantless search of home to investigate alleged child 

abuse unconstitutional absent consent or exigent circumstances). 

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B. 

The touchstone of the fourth amendment is reasonableness. 

What differentiates this case from others in which qualified 

immunity has been granted on fourth amendment claims is that the 

plaintiffs have come forward with evidence indicating deliberate 

and willful conduct, specifically, that the defendants knew that 

any allegations concerning child sexual abuse and the Snells were 

false, yet they persisted in their attempts to intervene on that 

very basis. In a due process context, the Eighth Circuit has 

determined that defendant social workers investigating suspected 

child abuse were entitled to qualified immunity "unless evidence 

of malice or improper motives on the part of the defendants is 

proved." Doe, 858 F.2d at 1329; id. at 1330 (Henley, J., 

concurring). The court relied upon Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d at 

1457-58, in which the court determined that various police 

officers investigating suspected child abuse were entitled to 

qualified immunity based upon a claim of judicial deception. 

Essentially, the plaintiffs in Myers contended that the officers, 

in seeking arrest warrants, swearing to complaints and arresting 

the plaintiffs had deceived judicial officers who found probable 

cause. Id. at 1454. 

The claim of judicial deception in Myers is similar to the 

claim in this case. The court in Myers was careful to explain 

that subjective bad faith of an officer will not defeat qualified 

immunity if the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable. Id. 

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at 1457. But at some point, an officer's knowledge of false 

information may defeat a finding of objective reasonableness: 

Construed liberally, the allegations of judicial 

deception may state a claim that the deputies 

deliberately or recklessly incorporated known falsehoods 

into their reports, criminal complaints and warrant 

applications. If this claim were true, then the 

deputies' sworn representations as to the existence of 

probable cause would be perjury, or close to it, and 

perjury is not objectively reasonable conduct. 

Id. For this theory to survive qualified immunity, a plaintiff 

must make a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or 

reckless disregard for truth, such that would be needed to 

challenge the presumed validity of an affidavit supporting a 

search warrant under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). 

Myers, 810 F.2d at 1457-58. Likewise, in a§ 1983 claim for 

judicial deception there must be "a specific affirmative showing 

of dishonesty by the applicant," i.e., knowledge of a plaintiff's 

innocence or that a witness was lying. Id. Equally important, a 

plaintiff must establish that, but for the dishonesty, the 

challenged action would not have occurred. See Franks, 438 U.S. 

at 171-72 ("[I]f when material that is the subject of the alleged 

falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains 

sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding 

of probable cause, no hearing is required."); United States v. 

Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 

u.s. 918 (1987). 

As applied to this case, we think that the plaintiffs have 

demonstrated that the fourth amendment's prohibition against 

unreasonable searches and seizures is implicated in these 

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circumstances. We need not decide the precise contours of the 

fourth amendment standard that would apply, however, because the 

conduct alleged in these cases would violate the most minimal 

standard of which we can conceive, given that the defendants in 

this case proceeded on a basis of individualized suspicion. See 

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). The 

plaintiffs have come forward with specific evidence tending to 

show that the allegations of child abuse were fabricated and that 

the defendants knew that such allegations were untrue. Plaintiffs 

also have evidence which tends to show that, but for the 

allegations of child prostitution and pornography, Judge Brown's 

order would not have been entered. Allegations of criminal 

wrongdoing known to be false may not provide the sole basis for 

probable cause or a warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 168. Nor may 

they constitute a reasonable basis to suspect wrongdoing which 

might justify a warrantless search at its inception. See T.L.O., 

469 U.S. at 341-42. The evidence is sufficient to indicate that 

the defendants engaged in a deliberate course of conduct, complete 

with false information, designed to gain entry into the Snell 

home. Such information was essential to persuade the juvenile 

judge to issue the order which the defendants relied upon. 

In deciding whether the law was clearly established at the 

time of the incident, there must be some factual correlation 

between then-existing law and the circumstances confronting the 

public official. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 

1987) (relying on People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear 

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Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3rd Cir. 1984)), cert. 

denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). "If the law at that time was not 

clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected 

to anticipate subsequent legal developments, not could he fairly 

be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 

identified as unlawful." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. However, in 

this circuit, precise factual correlation between the 

then-existing law and the case at-hand is not required, Eastwood 

v. Dep't of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1988); thus, 

a then-existing case "on all fours" with the case at hand is not 

essential. Melton, 879 F.2d at 729 n.37. While government 

officials are not required to anticipate developments in the law, 

they are expected "'to relate established law to analogous factual 

settings,'" Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 630 (quoting Three Mile Island, 

747 F.2d at 144), and "apply general, well developed legal 

principles." Three Mile Island, 747 F.2d at 144. This represents 

"a broad view of what constitutes an established right of which a 

reasonable person would have known." Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 

F.2d 1094, 1103 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1032 

(1987). 

Was the law clearly established in 1987 that an entry and 

search of a residence on the basis of known false allegations 

violated the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable 

searches and seizures? The text of the amendment provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

house$, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 

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by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized. 

U.S. Const. am. IV. Regarding the probable cause requirement for 

a warrant, there is an "'obvious assumption. that there will 

be a truthful showing.'" Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 

1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, No. 31369 (2d Cir. Jun. 12, 1967))• 

In Franks, the Court explained: 

This does not mean "truthful" in the sense that every 

fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily 

correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay 

and upon information received from informants, as well 

as upon information within the affiant's own knowledge 

that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it 

is·to be "truthful" in the sense that the information 

put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the 

affiant as true. 

438 U.S. at 165. Likewise, even assuming that the entry and 

search in this case need be judged only by a reasonableness 

standard, equally implicit in the concept of reasonableness is 

that the information on which the social worker proceeds upon is 

not known to be false. 

We proceed to consider the situation confronting the OHS and 

the information which defendants possessed. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 

641. This case does not involve "[a]llegations of negligence or 

innocent mistake," which plainly would not be sufficient to 

impeach a probable cause or reasonableness determination. See 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Rather, plaintiffs have made detailed 

allegations of "deliberate falsity or reckless disregard" 

concerning the child pornography and prostitution allegations 

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which appear to be the sole reason behind the issuance of the 

pick-up order. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. The evidence 

indicates that nine OHS social workers had dealt with the Snells 

since 1981, there were several home visits, the latest occurring 

in July 1987. That visit resulted in a favorable report, although 

the Snells would not disclose the identity of the children being 

cared for in the absence of more justification. OHS, for a 

purpose not entirely clear, sought information concerning the 

identity of the children. Even giving special consideration to 

the facts and circumstances confronting OHS, we are unable to 

fashion an erroneous, though justifiable, link between the need 

for the identity information and the procuring of a court order on 

known false allegations. Although developed in the warrant 

context, the principles of Franks apply to the information used in 

this case. We conclude that even in the context of a child abuse 

investigation, a reasonable public official would have known that 

using known false information to secure an order to justify entry 

and search of a private home would violate the fourth amendment's 

proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures. As we discuss 

further, plaintiffs have presented "a genuine, material. factual 

issue concerning whether the defendants' conduct violated that 

right." See Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

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C. 

Defendants Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston contend that the 

district court erred in denying them qualified immunity because 

they "did not prepare, review, present, direct or encourage 

presentation of the application to Judge Brown." Appellants' 

Reply Brief at 12. For supervisory liability, plaintiffs must 

demonstrate an affirmative link between the supervisor's conduct 

and the constitutional deprivation; liability based upon 

respondeat superior will not do. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371 (1976); Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 736 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffs must show that a supervisory defendant, expressly or 

otherwise, authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct 

which caused the constitutional deprivation. D.T. by M.T. v. 

Independent School Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 s. Ct. 213 (1990); Kaiser, 874 F.2d at 736; Meade v. 

Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1988); Kite v. Kelley, 

546 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976). Concerning a defendant acting 

in a non-supervisory capacity, there must be cause in fact between 

the conduct complained of and the constitutional deprivation. See 

Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 864 (10th Cir. 1989); 

Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1322 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Bennett 

v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976). But, as 

· stated by the Seventh Circuit: 

For liability under section 1983, direct participation 

is not necessary. Any official who "causes" a citizen 

to be deprived of her constitutional rights can also be 

held liable. The requisite causal connection is 

satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of 

events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have 

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known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her 

constitutional rights. 

Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 

488 U.S. 856 (1988). 

Applying these standards, sufficient evidence establishes a 

causal link between these defendants and the constitutional 

deprivation alleged. 

1. In the nature of personal participation, defendant 

Sweptson signed an allegedly altered CWS-14A report recommending 

prosecution of the Snells based upon sexual abuse. Defendant 

Sweptson met with Asbury and detective Einhorn on August 14, 1987 

to discuss the investigation of the Snells. Detective Einhorn, at 

least initially, identified the source of the child prostitution 

and pornography allegations as defendant Sweptson, along with 

Asbury and defendant Levingston. Clark Snell testified on 

deposition that he was threatened with retaliation by defendant 

Sweptson when he complained about OHS. Defendant Padley indicated 

that she visited with defendant Sweptson, along with defendants 

Sieck and Levingston, immediately prior to preparing the 

application and delivering it to Judge Brown. Defendant Sweptson 

may have reviewed the order issued by Judge Brown with defendants 

Padley, Sieck and Levingston before it was enforced. 

2. Defendants Sieck and Levingston were assigned to the 

investigation of the Snells which culminated in the entry and 

search of the Snell residence. FBI agent Treece met with Asbury 

and defendant Levingston prior to August 26, 1987, and indicated 

that this was the first time she had heard of the allegations of 

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child prostitution and pornography. Asbury and defendant 

Levingston attempted to convince others to intervene based upon 

various theories. Defendant Sieck visited with Judge Brown on 

August 19 and informed him that the Snells might be moving (a 

baseless allegation) in an attempt to get the judge to intervene. 

The next day, defendant Sieck attempted to shop for a district 

attorney that would issue a removal order based upon an alleged 

violation of the guardianship statute. Defendant Sieck and 

Levingston participated in the entry and search of the Snell 

residence, all the while not reporting the serious child 

prostitution and pornography allegations to Sharon Snell. 

3. Finally, defendant Padley prepared the application 

knowing of an absence of circumstances which might justify 

bypassing the district attorney's office, which repeatedly had 

refused to prosecute the same allegations. Although defendant 

Padley indicated in the application that DHS had received 

allegations concerning child pornography and prostitution, there 

were no facts, regardless of whether those facts later were 

determined to be erroneous, to support such a statement at the 

time the application was prepared. 22 

22 Padley responded on deposition as follows: 

Mr. Sherwood: At this point, then, when you filed this 

pleading, your testimony will be when 

this case goes to trial that you did not 

have any idea whether those allegations 

were true or false? 

Ms. Padley: That's correct. 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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IV. 

Although the district court had serious doubt about the 

plaintiffs' conspiracy claim, Snell, 698 F. Supp. at 1563-65, we 

do not share the same hesitation at this stage. We recently 

discussed the parameters of a§ 1983 conspiracy claim in Dixon v. 

City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1990), and indicated that 

"a conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of a constitutional or 

federally protected right under color of state law" was 

actionable. We noted, however, that to prevail on such a claim, 

"a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also 

an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without 

the other will be insufficient." Id. at 1449; Earle v. Benoit, 

850 F.2d 836, 844-46 (1st Cir. 1988). In this case, plaintiffs 

argue forcefully for the preservation of their conspiracy claim 

because, "[p)rovided that there is an underlying constitutional 

deprivation, the conspiracy claim allows for imputed liability; a 

plaintiff may be able to impose liability on one defendant for the 

(footnote continued 

Mr. Sherwood: 

from previous page) 

You did not--then you would agree with me 

that, at that point, you had no 

reasonable basis to assume that these 

allegations were true? 

Ms. Padley: We had no way to know. 

Mr. Sherwood: You had no reasonable basis to know 

whether the allegations were true? 

Ms. Padley: That's what the investigation would 

reveal, hopefully. 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 114, ex.Cat 273. 

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actions of another performed in the course of the conspiracy." 

Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1449 n.6. 

We have determined that the defendants are not entitled to 

qualified immunity on plaintiffs' fourth amendment claim 

concerning a search of the Snell home on the basis of known false 

information. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to 

present this constitutional claim to a jury. Concerning whether 

there is sufficient evidence to find an agreement among these 

participants to deprive the plaintiffs of a constitutional right, 

the district court erroneously limited its focus to the date on 

which the application and resultant search of the home occurred, 

August 26, 1987. Given that the relationship between DHS and the 

Snells was ongoing and there were repeated attempts to harass and 

gain entry into the Snell's home (e.g. August 19, 20, 24 and 26, 

1987) we think that the district court's focus was too narrow. 

While a deprivation of a constitutional right is essential to 

proceed under a§ 1983 conspiracy claim, proof of an agreement to 

deprive often will require examination of conduct occurring prior 

to the deprivation. Cameo Convalescent Ctr. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 

836, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) 

(court examined retaliatory conduct and events preceding). In 

this case, the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence of a 

single objective by these defendants to retaliate against them 

which culminated in Judge Brown's order and the resultant search 

of their home. The fact that some of the participants might not 

have forseen the exact nature of the deprivation is of no moment: 

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A plaintiff seeking redress need not prove that 

each participant in a conspiracy knew the "exact limits 

of the illegal plan or the identity of all the 

participants therein. " Hof fman-LaRoche, Inc. [v. 

Greenberg], 447 F.2d [872] at 875 [(7th Cir. 1971)]. An 

express agreement among all the conspirators is not a 

necessary .element of a civil conspiracy. The 

participants in the conspiracy must share the general 

conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the 

details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or 

possess the same motives for desiring the intended 

conspiratorial result. To demonstrate the existence of 

a conspiratorial agreement it simply must be shown that 

there was "a single plan, the essential nature and 

general scope of which [was] know to each person who is 

to be held responsible for its consequences." Id. 

Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in 

part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); see also Cameo 

Convalescent Ctr., 738 F.2d at 841. Frequently, a conspiracy must 

be proven with circumstantial evidence because 

"[r]arely will there be direct evidence of an express 

agreement among all the conspirators to conspire. 11 • Bell v. City 

of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1260 (7th Cir. 1984). 

Applying these standards, we think that the plaintiffs on 

summary judgment have adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence 

from which a trier of fact could conclude that these defendants 

and others reached an agreement to deprive the Snells of a 

constitutional right based upon the Snells' refusal to identify 

the children in their care and Clark Snell's complaints about DHS. 

Referrals to DHS concerning the Snells were singled out and 

grouped together for special treatment. Asbury indicated that she 

viewed the complaints made by the Snells as harassment. According 

to Clark Snell, defendant Sweptson threatened him with arbitrary 

and capricious governmental action should he not cooperate. 

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( 

Several DHS meetings occurred in which extraneous topics, 

such as Clark Snell's income and his appliance repair business, 

were discussed. And Asbury and defendants Sieck and Levingston 

made repeated attempts, be they ex parte communications with 

various judges or contacts with the police department, to create a 

climate ripe for intervention. Plaintiffs' evidence reflects a 

dogged determination born of concerted effort to take action 

against the Snells, whatever the means, knowing that the district 

attorney would not become involved because of a lack of evidence. 

Whether the plaintiffs can prove their allegations at trial given 

defendants' contrary evidence is another matter, but that is left 

for a trial consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 

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