Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-03335/USCOURTS-ca6-14-03335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0619n.06

No. 14-3335/14-3387

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GERLING & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

GEARHOUSE BROADCAST PTY. LTD.,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

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ON CROSS-APPEAL FROM 

THE UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

Before: KETHLEDGE and DONALD, Circuit Judges; McCALLA, District Judge.

*

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Gerling & Associates (“Seller”) sold a media trailer to 

Gearhouse Broadcast (“Buyer”), but delivered the trailer late and in defective condition. Buyer 

repaired the trailer, rented substitute trucks to broadcast a series of soccer games, and then sued 

Seller for breach of contract. After a trial, the jury awarded damages to Buyer for the repairs and 

truck rentals. Seller appeals, arguing among other things that the district court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury that Buyer had a duty to mitigate damages. We agree with that argument, vacate 

the award for repair damages, and remand for a new trial on those damages. We otherwise

affirm.

I.

Seller, an Ohio corporation, makes custom-built trailers that media companies use to 

broadcast events from remote locations. In February 2010, an Australian media company, 

 

*

The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

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Buyer, sought to purchase such a trailer. Buyer’s CEO, Graham Elliot, saw an advertisement on 

Seller’s website for a trailer that could be “ready . . . within 45 days.” R. 181-3 at 4396. Elliott 

contacted Seller’s president, Fred Gerling, to ask for details. Gerling responded that Seller could 

have the trailer “ready for [Buyer’s] acceptance within 55 working days,” and assured Elliott that 

the trailer would comply with traffic regulations in New South Wales, Australia. R. 181-4 at 

4398-99; R. 176 at 3505-06. Elliot explained that his company needed the trailer to broadcast a 

series of soccer and rugby games. R. 176 at 3511-13. 

During further negotiations, Seller proposed a different delivery date, but Buyer replied

that Seller’s proposed timetable was unacceptable: Buyer needed to begin installing equipment 

on the trailer by July 1 so that it could broadcast games in the fall. R. 181-5 at 4401-03. Seller

then offered to have the trailer ready by May 17, 2010, to deliver the trailer to Australia by July 

1, and to sell the trailer for $450,000. R. 181-5 at 4400. Buyer accepted and the parties signed a 

contract on March 17, 2010. The contract itself did not identify a completion date, but stated that 

“[t]he completion date quoted is the promised date upon which the unit will be completed[.]” 

R. 181-1 at 4391. 

In late March, Elliot emailed Gerling to express concerns about the width of the trailer: 

some of the trailer’s drawings showed that it would be wider than 2.5 meters, which was too 

wide for roads in New South Wales. Gerling responded that the problem would be addressed “in 

a timely manner.” R. 181-9 at 4411. 

The trailer arrived in Australia in early September—about three months late—at which 

point Buyer discovered that the trailer was still too wide. Buyer also noticed that the trailer’s

metal work and paint finish were shoddy, that the expanding sides of the trailer did not fully 

retract, and that the “[g]eneral build quality” was “very poor.” R. 181-17 at 4434. Buyer

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contacted an Australian company, Varley Group, which provided a quote for the repairs. After 

Varley completed the repair work, Buyer received an invoice for the repairs and other work

performed on the trailer. Buyer paid the invoice in full.

Around the same time, Buyer rented trucks to broadcast the soccer games. Buyer also 

needed to cover a professional-cycling event, so Buyer purchased and modified a shipping 

container to serve as a mobile-production facility at the event.

Seller thereafter sued Buyer in the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a declaratory 

judgment stating that Buyer had breached the terms of the contract’s limited warranty when 

Buyer hired Varley to repair the trailer, and that Buyer was therefore not entitled to damages. In 

response, Buyer filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract and seeking damages incurred in 

repairing the trailer, renting trucks to broadcast the soccer games, and modifying the shipping 

container to broadcast the cycling event. 

The case proceeded to trial. After the close of evidence, Seller moved for judgment as a 

matter of law, which the district court granted as to the cycling-event claim, but otherwise 

denied. The jury awarded Buyer 107,793.90 Australian dollars for the repairs and 244,204.40 

Australian dollars for the truck rentals. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II.

A.

Seller challenges the award of repair damages on two grounds. First, Seller argues that 

the district court should have granted judgment as a matter of law because, according to Seller,

Buyer’s evidence of the repair damages was only speculative. We review the district court’s

decision de novo. Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2014). To prevail on a 

breach-of-contract claim under Ohio law, which the parties agree applies here, a buyer must 

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provide a “reasonable basis on which [the jury] could calculate” the amount of damages that the 

seller’s breach caused. World Metals, Inc. v. AGA Gas, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Ohio Ct. 

App. 2001). But a buyer need not prove the amount of damages with “mathematical precision.” 

Bobb Forest Prods., Inc. v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 560, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

To show how much Buyer paid to repair the trailer, Buyer provided a quote from Varley 

indicating that the repair work would cost 123,335.10 Australian dollars, as well as Buyer’s bank 

records showing that Buyer paid 349,664.10 Australian dollars for those repairs and for other 

work performed on the trailer. R. 159-9 at 2888; R. 181-21 at 4448. These two documents gave 

the jury a reasonable basis on which to calculate damages: the bank records showed the total 

amount that Buyer paid; the Varley quote showed approximately what portion of the total

amount was for the repairs. 

Seller responds that the district court should not have considered the Varley quote when 

deciding whether Buyer presented sufficient evidence as to the repair damages. Specifically, 

Seller says that the quote was inadmissible hearsay. To answer that argument on its own terms, a 

document is hearsay only if it is admitted “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 801(c)(2). The district court made clear that the quote was not offered for that purpose. 

R. 178 at 3922 (“[The quote] is not in evidence for the truth of the matter stated therein[,] but 

just to demonstrate that this quote was communicated from Varley to [Buyer].”). Hence the 

Varley quote was not hearsay. 

Moreover, the quote was admissible under the business-records exception to the hearsay 

rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Seller contends that the quote was inadmissible under this rule 

because Buyer failed to present a “qualified witness” who was “familiar with [Varley’s] recordkeeping system.” Seller Br. at 48. But Buyer did not need to present such a witness to admit the 

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quote. A document is admissible by a company under Rule 803(6)—even if someone else

created that document—so long as a witness testifies that it was “integrated into [the] company’s 

records and relied upon in [the company’s] day-to-day operations.” United States v. Adefehinti, 

510 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hollie, 25 F.3d 

1051, at *3 (6th Cir. 1994) (table decision). One of Buyer’s employees, Adrian Young, testified 

as to both of those things. Hence the quote was admissible under Rule 803(6) as well.

Second, Seller argues that the district court should have instructed the jury that Buyer had 

a duty to mitigate damages. We reverse if “the omitted instructions are a correct statement of the 

law[,] the instruction is not substantially covered by other delivered [instructions], [and] the 

failure to give the instruction impair[ed] the requesting party’s theory of the case.” Webster v. 

Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 197 F.3d 815, 820 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Under Ohio law, a plaintiff must use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages, but the 

defendant bears the burden to show that the plaintiff failed to mitigate. Frenchtown Square 

P'ship v. Lemstone, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ohio 2003). Here, Seller asked for a jury 

instruction that in relevant part provided:

A party is required to exercise reasonable care to avoid loss and to minimize the 

consequences of damages. If a party fails to exercise such care, then its recovery 

is limited to damages that would have arisen even if he mitigated damages . . . If 

you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [Buyer] has failed to mitigate its 

damages, then you may only award damages it would have suffered, if any, had it 

exercised reasonable care and diligence to avoid or minimize its damages. 

R. 142 at 2711. That proposed instruction nowhere states that Seller had the burden to show that 

Buyer failed to mitigate damages. “The requested instruction, although correct, was therefore 

not a complete statement of the law and [might] have misled the jury.” Webster, 197 F.3d at 820. 

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That said, if a party requests a flawed instruction that nevertheless “raises an important 

issue of law,” then the court has a duty “to frame a proper instruction on the issue raised.” Id. 

Seller’s proposed instruction did raise “an important issue of law,” namely that Buyer had a duty 

to mitigate damages. Thus, the district court should have “frame[d] a proper instruction” on that 

issue. Id.

As for whether Seller’s requested instruction was “substantially covered by other 

delivered [instructions],” Buyer argues that the court’s general damages instruction—that the 

jury could award only “reasonable” damages—was enough. But we rejected the same argument 

in Webster. There, we held that a similar instruction—“it is your duty to determine the amount 

of money which reasonably . . . compensates [plaintiff] for his damages”—did not “substantially 

cover[]” the proposed instruction that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages. Id. We reach 

the same conclusion here. 

Finally, the court’s failure to give that instruction impaired Seller’s theory of the case. 

Seller presented evidence that the trailer could have been repaired for 16,000 Australian 

dollars—much less than the 107,000 that the jury ultimately awarded Buyer for those same 

repairs. R. 175 at 3299. Given that evidence, a properly instructed jury might have found that 

Buyer failed to use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Thus, we must vacate the award for 

repair damages and remand for a new trial on those damages. See Webster, 197 F.3d at 821.

B.

Seller challenges the award of rental damages on five grounds. First, Seller argues that 

the rental fees for the trucks were “cover damages” to which Buyer was not entitled. If a seller 

fails to deliver a good on time, the buyer may reject the good and seek cover damages, i.e., the 

cost of “any reasonable purchase of . . . goods in substitution for those due from the seller.” 

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Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.86(A). If the buyer accepts the good, however, he may not seek cover 

damages. Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.85(A)(1); id. § 1302.88. This limitation on cover damages 

prevents a buyer from receiving a windfall by keeping the original good while buying another on 

the seller’s tab. See, e.g., Int'l Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Int'l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 

546 (1st Cir. 1988) (interpreting an identical provision of New Hampshire law). Here, Buyer 

accepted the trailer. Thus, Seller says, the truck-rental fees were “cover damages” that Buyer 

could not lawfully recover.

The problem with that argument is that the rental fees were not cover damages in the first 

place. To seek “cover damages,” a buyer must “purchase . . . goods in substitution for those due 

from the seller.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.86(A). Here, Buyer did not “purchase” a substitute 

trailer but merely rented the trucks for a total of seven days while waiting for Seller’s trailer 

finally to arrive. Rather than cover damages, therefore, the rental fees were consequential 

damages, which are “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 

which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.” Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 1302.89(B)(1). Here, Seller in fact knew that Buyer needed the trailer to broadcast the soccer 

games. Moreover, recovery of the rental fees would merely put Buyer in the same position it 

would have been in had Seller delivered the trailer on time. Thus, Buyer was entitled to recover

the fees as consequential damages.

Second, Seller argues that its warranty expressly disclaims any liability for the rental 

fees. The warranty provides in relevant part:

[This] Warranty is limited to [Seller] construction defects only and the service 

required to resolve those structural issues. [Seller] will not be responsible for any 

costs or lost revenue related to the [trailer] being out of service for any reason. 

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R.121-1 at 2447 (emphasis added). According to Seller, the truck rentals were “related to the 

trailer being out of service” and thus “costs” that the Warranty specifically disclaims. By its 

plain terms, however, the warranty’s scope is limited to “construction defects only[.]” The 

warranty therefore does not disclaim costs that result from other forms of breach, e.g., late 

delivery. And the jury awarded rental damages only on the basis that Seller “failed to timely 

deliver the trailer.” R. 159-2 at 2804 (Jury verdict form). Thus, the warranty did not preclude 

Buyer from recovering the rental costs.

Third, Seller argues that, because Buyer did not have a contract to broadcast the soccer 

games, Buyer could not recover the costs of renting trucks to broadcast those games. But 

whether Buyer had a contract to broadcast the games is beside the point. Under Ohio law, a 

buyer may recover any costs “resulting from . . . requirements and needs of which the seller at 

the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented.” Ohio 

Rev. Code § 1302.89(B)(1). And Seller admits that, at the time of the contract, Seller knew that 

Buyer needed the trailer to broadcast the games. 

Fourth, Seller argues that the district court should have excluded parol evidence as to

when the trailer was scheduled to be completed, i.e., the delivery date that Seller’s executives 

quoted during pre-contract negotiations. Under Ohio’s parol-evidence rule, the terms set forth in 

a final agreement “may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a

contemporaneous oral agreement[.]” Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.05. Such terms “may be explained 

or supplemented,” however, “by evidence of consistent additional terms.” Id. § 1302.05(B).

Here, the sales contract provided that “[t]he completion date quoted is the promised date 

upon which the unit will be completed[.]” R. 181-1 at 4391. But the contract nowhere identifies 

that “promised date.” Nor does the contract contain an integration clause. Parol evidence 

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identifying the promised date therefore did not “contradict” the terms of sales agreement, but 

rather “explained or supplemented” those terms with “consistent additional” ones. Ohio Rev. 

Code § 1302.05(B).

Seller responds that the district court should have excluded this evidence nonetheless 

because Ohio law imposes a “reasonable time” for delivery if a contract fails to include a 

delivery date. But this case is not one where the contract fails to speak to the delivery date at all. 

Instead, the contract does refer to a delivery date—“the promised date upon which the unit will 

be completed[.]” R. 181-1 at 4391. And since the contract itself does not identify what the 

“promised date” was, the district court did not err in admitting parol evidence to allow the jury to 

identify it.

Finally, Seller argues that Buyer provided no factual basis on which the jury could 

reasonably calculate how much Buyer spent to rent the substitute trucks. Specifically, Seller

says that, in Buyer’s damages estimates, Buyer included costs that it would have incurred even if 

Seller had delivered the trailer on time, e.g., the cost of fueling the trucks, the cost of paying the 

camera crew, and so forth. Thus, Seller contends, the jury had no basis to calculate the amount 

Buyer spent to rent the trucks alone. 

The record refutes that contention. To show how much Buyer paid to rent the trucks, 

Buyer presented a series of invoices that included only the cost of renting the trucks and hiring 

“core crew,” i.e., engineers who were familiar with how the rented trucks worked. And Young

provided undisputed testimony that, if Buyer wanted to rent the trucks, it had “no choice but to 

take [the core] crew.” R. 178 at 3971. The cost of paying the crew, then, was in fact a cost of 

renting the trucks themselves. The invoices therefore provided a factual basis on which the jury 

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could reasonably calculate how much Buyer paid to rent the trucks. The district court correctly 

denied Seller’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the rental damages. 

C.

On cross-appeal, Buyer argues that the district court should not have granted judgment as 

a matter of law to Seller as to Buyer’s claim for damages related to the cycling event. Buyer

contends that the cycling-event damages were “consequential damages” caused by Seller’s 

breach. To recover consequential damages, a plaintiff must show that the damages “were within 

the contemplation of both parties at the time of the making of the contract.” The Toledo Grp., 

Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added). Here, 

Buyer admitted that it did not tell Seller about the cycling event until a month after the parties 

signed the contract. R. 176 at 3513; R. 64-1 at 987. And there is no other evidence suggesting

that Seller had reason to contemplate damages related to that event. Thus, neither party

contemplated the cycling event or any damages related to it when they signed the contract. As a 

matter of law, therefore, Buyer was not entitled to damages related to that event.

Buyer responds that it “made a commitment to broadcast the [cycling] event based on 

[Seller’s] specific representations about when the trailer would be completed.” Buyer Br. at 49. 

But the question is not whether Buyer reasonably relied upon Seller’s representations when 

Buyer agreed to broadcast the cycling event. Rather, the question is whether Seller contemplated 

damages related to that event when it agreed to sell the trailer. And Seller had no reason to 

contemplate those damages. Buyer’s argument is meritless. 

* * *

We vacate the jury’s award as to the repair damages and remand to the district court for a 

new trial on those damages. We otherwise affirm the district court’s judgment.

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