Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00834/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00834-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Craig Clay Thornton,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-0834-PHX-SPL (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckeye, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on April 21, 2014 (Doc. 1). On January 14, 2015, Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 18). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual back ground as follows: 

In January 2009, Defendant and four accomplices unlawfully 

entered the victim's residence, intending to burglarize the residence, 

which defendant and accomplices believed contained $200,000 cash 

and a large quantity of marijuana. Defendant and another 

accomplice were armed. When defendant and accomplices entered 

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the home, the victim stood up from the couch and said, "Don't hurt 

me. You can have everything, don't hurt me." Defendant and the 

other armed accomplice both shot at the victim. Defendant and 

accomplices then fled the residence, taking nothing. The victim 

sustained multiple gunshot wounds, which were determined by the 

medical examiner to have caused his death. 

(Exhibit HH, Mem. Dec. at 3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 18, are referenced herein 

as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In an Indictment (Exhibit A) filed March 13, 2009 in Maricopa County Superior 

Court, naming Petitioner and 3 accomplices, Petitioner was charged with one count of 

first degree murder, one count of attempted armed robbery, and one count of burglary in 

the first degree. Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial and was convicted on all counts. 

(Exhibits E, F, G, Verdicts.) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence in prison with the possibility 

of parole after twenty-five years for count one, a presumptive sentence of seven-and-ahalf years in prison for count two, and a presumptive sentence of ten-and-a-half years in 

prison for count three, with all sentences to be served concurrently. (Exhibit L, 

Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal (Exhibit I, Not. Appeal), and counsel filed a brief 

(Exhibit GG) pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related statue 

authorities, asserting an inability to find an issue for appeal. Counsel requested review at 

Petitioner’s request on errors relating to failure to severe, insufficient evidenc e, 

instructional error, a racially disparate jury, and failure to call Petitioner’s alibi 

witnesses. Petitioner was given leave to, but did not, file a brief in propria persona. 

(Exhibit HH, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

In a Memorandum Decision filed June 7, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

conducted a search for error, rejected Petitioner’s assertions, found no error, and 

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affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 4-5.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding – During the pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal, 

Petitioner commenced his first post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceeding on June 14, 

2010, by filing a PCR Petition dated May 31, 2010. (Exhibit II.) Counsel was 

appointed (Exhibit JJ, M.E. 6/16/10), but on June 8, 2011 (one day after the appellate 

court’s decision), the PCR court dismissed the PCR proceeding without prejudice on the 

basis of the pending direct appeal (Exhibit KK, M.E. 6/9/11.) 

Second PCR Proceeding – One month later, Petitioner commenced his second 

PCR proceeding on July 12, 2011, by filing a PCR Notice dated July 8, 2011. (Exhibit 

LL.) Counsel was appointed (Exhibit MM, M.E. 1/31/12), but counsel eventually filed 

a Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit NN) evidencing an inability to find an issue 

for review. Petitioner then filed a pro per PCR Petition (Exhibit QQ) and Motion for 

New Counsel (Exhibit TT). On January 17, 2013, the PCR court denied the motion for 

new counsel. (Exhibit UU, M.E. 1/17/13.) On March 28, 2013, the PCR court denied 

the PCR Petition with respect to the asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

and dismissed the other claims as “precluded.” (Exhibit VV, M.E. 3/28/13.) 

Third PCR Proceeding – Over one year later, Petitioner commenced his third 

PCR proceeding on April 21, 2014, by filing a PCR Notice (Exhibit WW), and PCR 

Petition (Exhibit XX), dated April 18, 2014 Following briefing (Exhibits ZZ and 

AAA), the PCR court denied the Petition on July 8, 2014 for failure to state a colorable 

claim. (Exhibit BBB M.E. 7/8/14.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

(Exhibit CCC), which was denied on September 8, 2104 (Exhibit DDD, M.E. 9/8/14). 

Petitioner then sought (Exhibit EEE) and obtained an extension through 

November 5, 2014 to file a petition for review. (Exhibit FFF, M.E. 10/16/14.) As of 

January 12, 2015, Petitioner had not filed a petition for review. (Exhibit GGG, Docket.) 

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 21, 2014 (Doc. 1). The Petition is 

dated April 17, 2014 (id. at 11), and the postage stamp on the envelope reflects a date of 

April 17, 2014 (Doc. 1-1). Liberally construed, NEED CITE, Petitioner’s Petition 

asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) Insufficient Evidence - Petitioner was convicted on insufficient evidence 

of his intent to commit murder or knowing participation in murder, in 

violation of his rights under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments (Petition, 

Doc. 1at 6);

(2) Brady Disclosures – the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 

see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (id. at 7);

(3) Prosecutorial Misconduct – the prosecutor pursued the prosecution 

without sufficient evidence of guilt and by pursuing a joint trial to convict 

Petitioner based upon inferences from his co-defendant’s prior bad acts (id.

at 8); and

(4) Apprendi Right to Jury Trial – Petitioner was denied his right to a jury 

trial on the issue of dangerousness used to enhance his sentence, see 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), (id. at 9).

Petitioner explains any untimeliness by asserting: “By rule, Petitioner has been 

exhaustion his state remedies.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.)

Response - On January 14, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 18). Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, Grounds 2, 3 and 4 are 

procedurally defaulted, and all of Petitioner’s claims are without merit.

Reply – The Court’s service Order, filed October 20, 2014 (Doc. 10), set a 

deadline for a reply within 30 days of service of an answer. Thus, a reply was due 

February 17, 2015. That time passed, and Petitioner did not file a reply. 

On May 26, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Status (Doc. 19) indicating he had 

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not received a response to his Petition. In response, Respondent asserted that a copy had 

been mailed upon filing of the Answer, but that a second copy was being served (Doc. 

20). On June 4, 2015, the Court “advise[d] Petitioner that in the absence of any reply by 

Petitioner or timely assertion of failing to receive the Answer, the Court is finalizing a 

Report & Recommendation founded upon the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondents’ 

Answer (Doc. 18).” (Order 6/4/15, Doc. 21.) To date, Petitioner has not filed a reply, 

nor sought an extension of time to do so.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).1 

Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through June 7, 2011, when the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal. (Exhibit HH.) 

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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Arizona's rules require that petitions for review to the Arizona Supreme Court be 

filed within “30 days after the filing of a decision.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a). Arizona 

applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to extend “the time to file an appeal by 

five days when the order appealed from has been mailed to the interested party and 

commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 

106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). The undersigned presumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that 

the Memorandum Decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was mailed to Petitioner on 

its filing date (rather than being delivered by some other means), and that Petitioner thus 

had 35 days from June 7, 2011, or until Tuesday, July 12, 2011, to seek review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. 

Petitioner did not seek such review, and thus his conviction became final on July 

12, 2011. Respondents concur with this calculation. (Answer, Doc. 18 at 11.)

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period began running on July 

13, 2011, and without any tolling expired on July 12, 2012. 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc.1) was filed on April 21, 2014. 

However, the Petition is dated April 17, 2014, and the postage stamp on the 

envelope reflects mailing on that date. “In determining when a pro se state or federal 

petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the 

date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 

F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner proffers nothing to show that his Petition was 

delivered to prison officials for mailing. Because it would be reasonable to assume that 

Petitioner did deliver his petition to prison officials for mailing, and because it does not 

affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that his Petition was 

delivered to prison officials for mailing on the date it was signed, and that it should be 

deemed “filed” as of that date, April 17, 2014.

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

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habeas limitations period expired no later than July 12, 2012, making his April 17, 2014 

Petition over 22 months delinquent.

4. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Properly Filed - Statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only results 

from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005). On the other hand, the fact that the application may contain procedurally barred 

claims does not mean it is not “properly filed.” “[T]he question whether an application 

has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims 

contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Artuz v. 

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000). 

Even if the state court provides alternative grounds for disposing of the state 

application, a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it from being “properly 

filed” and tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002).

If the state court summarily disposes of a state application without identifying if it was 

on timeliness grounds, or otherwise fails to give a clear indication wehther it has deemed 

the application timely or untimely, the federal habeas court “must itself examine the 

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to 

timeliness.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006).

Mailbox Rule - For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), the federal 

prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed 

“filed” (and tolling thus commenced) when they are delivered to prison officials for 

mailing. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted: 

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[I]n Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2000), we squarely 

held that the mailbox rule applies with equal force to the filing of 

state as well as federal petitions, because "[a]t both times, the 

conditions that led to the adoption of the mailbox rule are present; 

the prisoner is powerless and unable to control the time of delivery 

of documents to the court." Id. at 1091. 

Id. at 575. 

Similarly, the “mailbox rule” applies to determining whether an Arizona 

prisoner’s state filings were timely. Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox 

rule does not apply to filings in its court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 

(9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. 

Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); 

State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State 

v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to 

Arizona Supreme Court).

Application to Petitioner - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running 

on July 13, 2011. Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was concluded on June 9, 2011, 

before his limitations period began running. (Exhibit KK, M.E. 6/9/11.) 

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was commenced July 12, 2011, when 

Petitioner filed his second PCR petition. At that time, his one year had not yet begun to 

run. That proceeding remained pending until at least March 28, 2013, when the PCR 

court denied the Petition. (Exhibit VV.) However, the minute entry was not filed until 

April 2, 2013 (id. at 1.). Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned 

presumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that the second PCR proceeding remained pending until 

April 2, 2013. 

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s PCR petition was not pending thereafter, 

despite the fact that he had the opportunity to seek further review by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Answer, Doc. 18 at 11.) See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (30 days to petition 

for review). That view is contrary to the mainstream.

In cases where the petitioner does not seek state appellate review of 

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a state habeas court's ruling on collateral review, and state law 

provides a definite time period in which to seek appellate review of 

a lower court's ruling on collateral review, the one-year AEDPA 

limitations period is statutorily tolled for the period in which the 

petitioner could have filed an appeal or application for review with a 

higher state court.

Means, Postconviction Remedies § 25:23 (2014). 

Courts of appeals have unanimously held that even if the petitioner 

does not actually seek review of the lower court's decision denying 

post-conviction relief, he is entitled to statutory tolling for the 

period in which he could have filed an appeal or application for 

review with a higher state court. 

Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 9A:57.

Indeed, although the Ninth Circuit has yet to directly address this issue explicitly, 

a number of other circuits have held that statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) also 

continues through the time that further state review could have been sought on a state 

post-conviction relief petition, even though it was not sought. See e.g. Drew v. 

MacEachern, 620 F.3d 16, 21 (1

st Cir. 2010); Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 119-20 

(2

nd Cir.1999), aff'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 4, (2000); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 

417, 420-24 (3

rd Cir.2000); Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th

 Cir.1999); Williams v. 

Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 310 (5

th Cir. 2000) (adopting Third Circuit’s reasoning in Swartz); 

Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2002); Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 

1181 (10th Cir.2004); and Cramer v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 461 F.3d 1380, 

1383 (11th Cir. 2006).

The Seventh Circuit has reserved the issue. See Williams v. Buss, 538 F.3d 683, 

685 (7th Cir. 2008).

To be sure, there are arguments against the approach. “But arguably this result is 

inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in Saffold, Pace, and Evans.” Means, 

Federal Habeas Manual § 9A:57. But the arguments are by no means clear. See 

Holemen v. Ryan, CV12-02350-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 3716603, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 15, 

2013) (analyzing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408 (2005), and 9th Circuit decisions in Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th 

Cir.2005), amended on other grounds by 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2006) and Thorson v. 

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Palmer, 479 F.3d 643 (9th Cir.2007), and concluding that tolling did not apply for 

unsought review). 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has cited approvingly the Second Circuit’s formulation, 

that “a state petition is ‘pending’...until...further appellate review is unavailable.” Saffold 

v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Carey v. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (quoting Bennett, 199 F.3d at 120). But see Hines v. 

Bartos, 2007 WL 1381655, *1 (D.Ariz.,2007) (CV 06-697-PHX-JAT) (concluding that “ 

an appeal that is never filed cannot be considered timely and Petitioner cannot reap the 

benefit of statutory tolling without actually filing a petition for review of the postconviction relief denial”). 

Respondents rely upon Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074-1076 (9the Cir. 

2007) for the proposition that Arizona post-conviction proceedings ceased to toll 

AEDPA’s limitation’s period on the date that they were summarily dismissed by the 

Arizona trial court. Indeed, in Hemmerle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hemmerle’s 

limitations period was tolled “at least until [the PCR petition] was summarily dismissed” 

by the PCR Court. Id. at 1074. However, Hemmele did not address whether the 

opportunity for further review extended the time when a PCR petition was “pending.” 

Rather, the question before the Ninth Circuit was whether Hemmerle was entitled to 

“gap tolling” between the conclusion of his first PCR proceeding and the filing of his 

second, on the basis that the second petition was an attempt to cure the first petition, and 

thus a continuation of the first proceeding. Indeed, it appears the issue of an opportunity 

for further review on the first proceeding was not even addressed in the parties’ briefs. 

Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed by the undersigned in the Report & 

Recommendation under consideration in Holemen v. Ryan, CV12-02350-PHX-SRB, 

2013 WL 3716603, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2013), the undersigned reluctantly concludes 

that the clear pattern in the Ninth Circuit, as demonstrated in cases such as Hemmerle, 

Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1149, and Thorson, 479 F.3d 643, is to deny tolling for the time for 

further review, when further review is not timely sought. 

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Thus, because Petitioner did not timely seek review from the denial of his second 

PCR petition, Petitioner’s limitations period was tolled from its inception only until 

April 2, 2013. Thereafter, Petitioner’s one year continued to run, and expired on April 2, 

2014.

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was commenced April 21, 2014, when 

Petitioner filed his third PCR notice (Exhibit WW) and petition (Exhibit XX). Those 

filings were dated April 18, 2014. Because it does not affect the outcome, the 

undersigned presumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that these filings were delivered to prison 

officials for mailing on that date, and thus should be deemed filed as of April 18, 2014. 

As of that date, Petitioner’s one year had expired. Once the statute has run, a subsequent 

post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year 

statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition, assumed to be deemed filed as of 

April 17, 2014, was at least 15 days delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstance s 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

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omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

Petitioner does protest, as a basis for avoiding his untimely filing, that he was 

attempting to exhaust his state remedies. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) However, the 

Supreme Court has observed that “A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might 

avoid this predicament [of litigating in state court to find his federal petition barred], 

however, by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the federal court to 

stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Pace, 

544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). Petitioner proffers no reason why he did not avail himself of 

this approach.

It is true that upon filing the instant proceeding, Petitioner asked the Court to stay 

consideration of this Petition to permit him to exhaust his state remedies.2 (Motion to 

Stay, Doc. 3.) At that time, however, Petitioner’s one year had already expired. 

Moreover, this indicates that Petitioner was capable of pursing such an approach.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling of the limitations 

period.

/ /

 

2

This court denied that motion as premature, given the lack of clarity whether the 

Petition was a “mixed petition” and because the state proceedings at least facially 

appeared to have concluded. (Order 10/20/14, Doc. 10 at 2-3 and n. 1.) 

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6. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

It is true that Ground One of the Petition asserts that there was insufficient 

evidence to convict him, based upon a lack of proof of intent to commit murder or 

knowing participation in the murder. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) However, a finding of 

"actual innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support 

the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See 

U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank 

robbery case, without evidence that insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish 

actual innocence).3 Petitioner asserts no such affirmative evidence. 

Accordingly, the actual innocence exception does not apply.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

 

3 Respondents argue that Petitioner was convicted of felony murder and in Arizona, 

“felony murder does not require proof of specific intent to kill”; the “mens rea is 

satisfied by the intent required for the underlying felony.” (Answer, Doc. 18 at 22 

(quoting State v. Schackart, 858 P.2d 639, 644 (Ariz. 1993)).)

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limitations period was tolled from its inception until April 2, 2013, commenced running 

on April 3, 2013, and expired on April 2, 2014, making Petitioner’s Petition assumed to 

be deemed filed as of April 17, 2014, at least 15 days delinquent. Petitioner has shown 

no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual 

innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed 

with prejudice.

Nonetheless, because the undersigned concludes that the statute of limitations bar 

to Petitioner’s Petition (although factually plain) is not legally plain, the undersigned will 

proceed to address the Respondents’ other defenses.

B. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that, with the exception of Ground One, Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted his state remedies on the claims in his Petition and thus they are 

barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

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1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

18 at 16.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

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Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve -

person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

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the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

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application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims and insufficient 

evidence claims Petitioner asserts in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

/ /

/ /

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4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Here, Petitioner’s one foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals was on direct appeal. 

There, although counsel filed an Anders brief, that brief did raise claims regarding: 

failure to severe defendants; insufficient evidence; improper jury instructions regarding 

separate consideration of defendants; improper response to a jury question; the jury panel 

was not a fair cross-section of the community with no afro-Americans on the panel; and 

Petitioner’s alibi witnesses were not called. (Exhibit GG at 8.) In contrast, in his habeas 

Petition, Petitioner asserts grounds for relief based on: (1) insufficient evidence; (2) the 

prosecution’s failure to make Brady disclosures; (3) prosecutorial misconduct based on 

insufficient evidence of intent and improper joinder; and (4) failure to provide a trial on 

the dangerousness of offenses for sentencing. Thus, the only common claims are those 

relating to the sufficiency of the evidence.

For the reasons discussed in Mintz v. Ryan, CV-13-1543-PHX-SLG J, 2014 WL 

8772953, at *11 et seq. (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2014) report and recommendation adopted in 

part, 2:13-CV-01543-PHX, 2015 WL 2152793 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2015), the undersigned 

concludes that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ review under Anders did not amount to 

actual consideration and thus exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies on any 

unpresented claims.

Respondents concede that, based upon the assertion of insufficient evidence in the 

Opening Brief on direct appeal, Ground One was before the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Answer, Doc. 18 at 16.) Apart from that concession, the undersigned would find that 

the claim was not exhausted, and that it is now procedurally defaulted. 

Before the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s Opening Brief simply asserted: 

“Evidence consisting primarily of co-Defendant Dewone Lee Hurd was insufficient to 

support Appellant’s convictions.” (Exhibit GG at 8.) Arguably, this was insufficient to 

assert a federal claim, since it references no federal law or constitutional principles. “In 

this circuit, the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by 

specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to 

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federal case law.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005). See also

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Full and fair presentation 

additionally requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, 

including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee “).

It is true that a state court's actual consideration of a claim satisfies exhaustion. 

See Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) ("[t]here is no better 

evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of the relevant 

constitutional issue"); see also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th 

Cir.1990) (state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies exhaustion). 

However, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not address Petitioner’s claim under any 

federal law. At best, that court conducted a review for error under Anders. Although 

here Petitioner raised the factual underpinnings of his federal insufficient evidence claim, 

the undersigned finds no reason to reject the reasoning of Mintz, supra, where the federal 

nature of the claim was not asserted, thus directing the state court to that particular claim.

Nonetheless, Respondents have conceded that Ground One is exhausted. 

“Procedural default, like the statute of limitations, is an affirmative 

defense...[and]should be raised in the first responsive pleading in order to avoid 

waiver.” Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005). It is true that, 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) provides: “A State shall not be deemed to have waived the 

exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the 

State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.” But that explicit waiver 

requirement only applies where the federal court might find the state remedies on the 

claim unexhausted, and has no application where the federal court would find them 

procedurally defaulted. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, the undersigned deems Petitioner’s state remedies on Ground One to 

have been exhausted, and not procedurally defaulted.

However, none of Petitioner’s other habeas claims were ever asserted to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and for the reasons discussed in subsection (2) hereinabove, 

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the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s state remedies on those claims are 

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review. 

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues in his Petition (Doc. 1) that this Court should excuse his 

procedural defaults because: (1) with regard to Ground Two (disclosures), Petitioner had 

no knowledge of the law at the time of trial, and counsel did not move to suppress 

evidence (id. at 7); (2) with regard to Ground Three (prosecutorial misconduct), 

Petitioner had been told prior to trial by the prosecutor and defense counsel that there 

was no time to sever the trials, and no hearing was conducted (id. at 8); and (3) with 

regard to Ground Four, trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to 

maintain a record to support post-conviction relief (id. at 9). 

Deficiencies at Trial - Petitioner’s complaints about the conduct of counsel and 

the prosecutor and his own lack of knowledge at the time of trial had nothing to do with 

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and thus provide no cause to excuse Petitioner’s failure to present his federal claims to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, whether on direct appeal or in post-conviction relief. 

Ineffectiveness of Trial and Appellate Counsel - The only relevant argument is 

Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel failed to preserve issues for review and appellate 

counsel failed to present them. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for 

failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. 

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, “[t]o constitute cause for 

procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must first have been presented to the state courts as an independent 

claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has not 

properly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals any federal claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Accordingly, he may not now rely upon such 

arguments to excuse his procedural defaults.

Ineffectiveness of PCR Counsel - To the extent that Petitioner’s arguments could 

be liberally construed to assert ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, such arguments are 

not cognizable. "There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 

proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 

(1991) (citations omitted). Where no constitutional right to an attorney exists (e.g. in a 

PCR proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state 

procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to that principle, neither of 

which is applicable here. 

The first involves abandonment. In Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), the 

Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when post-conviction counsel was not 

merely negligent (and under the law of agency, that negligence being chargeable to the 

petitioner) but had abandoned the representation without notice to the petitioner, 

resulting in the loss of his state remedies. Petitioner proffers nothing to show a complete 

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abandonment by PCR counsel, as opposed to routine ineffectiveness. The mere fact that 

PCR counsel ultimately unable to find an issue for review (see Exhibit NN, Not. Compl. 

Rev.) does not mean counsel abandoned Petitioner.

The second involves ineffectiveness in failing to assert claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court 

recognized that because courts increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel to post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of 

counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception 

to Coleman’s ruling on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse a 

procedural default on such a claim. But here, Petitioner has not asserted any claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel as claim for relief, only as cause to excuse a 

procedural default. Therefore, Martinez has no application.

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Actual Innocence as Cause

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

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innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

As discussed in connection with the actual innocence exception to the statute of 

limitations, Petitioner makes no assertions of actual innocence, only claims of 

insufficient evidence. 

Thus, Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would have 

found him guilty. Accordingly his procedurally defaulted claims in Grounds Two, Three 

and Four must be dismissed with prejudice. 

C. MERITS OF GROUND ONE

In his Ground One, Petitioner argues he was convicted on insufficient evidence of 

his intent to commit murder or knowing participation in murder, in violation of his rights 

under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments (Petition, Doc. 1at 6). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant 

against conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 

to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 

(1970). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power 

to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable 

doubt every element of the charged offense.” Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 

(1989) (citation omitted). 

Here, Petitioner contends there was not proof of element of the requisite mens rea

to support his murder conviction, e.g. intent to commit the murder, or the knowing 

participation in the murder.

The trial court instructed the jury on the murder charge as follows:

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In Count 1, the State has charged both Defendants with the 

crime of First-Degree Murder. The crime of First-Degree Murder 

requires the State to prove that:

1. Defendants and other persons committed or attempted to 

commit armed robbery and/or Burglary in the First Degree; and 

2. In the course of and in furtherance of this crime or 

immediate flight from this crime, Defendants or another person 

caused the death of [the victim].

(Exhibit CC, R.T. 4/21/10 at 12.)4 

As argued by Respondents, Petitioner misapprehends the nature of felony murder. 

Indeed, Arizona’s first degree murder statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105, provides for 

felony murder. “A person commits first degree murder if...the person commits or 

attempts to commit...burglary under § 13-1506...and, in the course of and in furtherance 

of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes 

the death of any person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105(A)(2). “It is well established that 

no lesser included offense to felony murder exists because the mens rea necessary to 

satisfy the premeditation element of first degree murder is supplied by the specific intent 

required for the felony.” State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 30, 734 P.2d 563, 572 (Ariz. 

1987). “Homicide is murder if the death results from the perpetration or attempted 

perpetration of one of the specific offenses listed...[t]he specific intent for the felony, in 

this instance burglary, supplies the necessary element of malice or premeditation.” State 

v. Ferrari, 112 Ariz. 324, 328, 541 P.2d 921, 925 (1975). 

Accordingly, to fully prove the offense of felony murder, the prosecution was not 

required to prove that Petitioner intended to commit a murder, or even that he knowingly 

participated in a murder. The only mens rea required was that Petitioner intended to 

commit a burglary. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest there was insufficient evidence 

to show he intended to commit a burglary. 

 

4

The copy of the Indictment (Exhibit A) provided by Respondents omits the page(s) 

containing the charge of first degree murder, making it unclear whether the count was 

specifically alleged as felony murder, or as an undesignated first degree murder. 

Nonetheless, constitutionally adequate notice of felony murder may be provided during 

trial, even when the charging document has not charged the defendant with either felony 

murder or the predicate crime. Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Therefore Ground One is without merit.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Met in Part - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in 

the district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in 

part on the merits. 

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Merits Decisions - Under the reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims 

disposed of on the merits are plainly without merit. 

Procedural Decisions - With regard to the statute of limitations defense, the 

undersigned finds that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the Petitioner 

should be denied tolling for the time for unsought review from his second PCR 

proceeding, rendering the Petition timely. Thus, assuming a valid claim has been 

presented, to the extent that the district court’s judgment depends upon the denial of such 

statutory tolling, then a certificate of appealability should issue on this portion of the 

decision.

As to the remaining procedural decisions, the undersigned finds that jurists of 

reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling.

Assertion of Facially Valid Claims – To grant a certificate of appealability on a 

procedural decision, the Court must also find that Petitioner states a valid claim. The 

valid claim determination for procedural rulings does not require the Court to make a 

“definitive” determination of the merits of the claims, but rather only a “preliminary” 

one. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). It requires only “a general 

assessment of their merits,” id. at 336, and not a “certainty of ultimate relief,” id. at 337. 

The Ninth Circuit has taken a particularly broad view of this standard, at least in 

comparison to some other circuits. See David Goodwin, An Appealing Choice: An 

Analysis of and A Proposal for Certificates of Appealability in "Procedural" Habeas 

Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 791, 821 (2013) (comparing circuits). The Ninth 

Circuit has concluded: “we will simply take a ‘quick look’ at the face of the complaint to 

determine whether the petitioner has ‘facially allege[d] the denial of a constitutional 

right.’ ” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jefferson v. 

Welborn, 222 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 2000)). Thus, in resolving the instant issue, the 

Court need not evaluate whether Petitioner’s claims are ultimately substantiated by the 

record, but simply whether the Petition has made out a constitutional claim.

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Moreover, circuit court precedent is not determinative in deciding whether a claim 

is substantial. “Even if a question is well settled in our circuit, a constitutional claim is 

debatable if another circuit has issued a conflicting ruling.” Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 

946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Neither is the court bound by the deference normally required for review of 

claims of state prisoners under the AEDPA. See Camargo v. Ryan, CV-13-02488-PHXNVW, 2015 WL 2142711, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2015). 

Here, the undersigned has concluded that Ground One is without merit. 

Nonetheless, the allegation that a conviction is based upon insufficient evidence is 

sufficient to facially allege the denial of a constitutional right under the Ninth Circuit’s 

“quick look” standard. That it may be deemed by the undersigned to be without merit 

after examining the state law and facts of the case does not alter the facial validity of the 

claim.

Petitioner’s Ground Two asserts that the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence

regarding the death of an accomplice, Camion Williams, after the fact. Petition, Doc. 1 at 

7.) Respondents assert Williams “escaped apprehension and later met a violent death in 

Victorville, California. (Answer, Doc. 18 at 3 (citing Exhibit AA, R.T. 4/20/10 at 30 -31). 

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution 

of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 

faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Petitioner fails to allege, however, how 

this information was exculpatory. He alleges Williams would have provided exculpatory 

testimony, and thus his death denied Petitioner that evidence, but Petitioner proffers 

nothing to explain how Williams’ death itself was exculpatory. Accordingly, Ground 

Two fails to set out a facially valid constitutional claim.

Petitioner’s Ground Three argues that the prosecutor pursued the prosecution 

without sufficient evidence of guilt and by pursuing a joint trial to convict Petitioner 

based upon inferences from his co-defendant’s prior bad acts. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

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Although prosecutors enjoy almost unfettered discretion in their charging decisions, the 

courts have recognized that prosecutions pursued “in bad faith without hope of obtaining 

a valid conviction” may qualify as a constitutional violation. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 

82, 85 (1971). See Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:70 (2nd ed.). In the context 

of a convicted defendant, however, it is unclear how Petitioner would show prejudice. 

The undersigned has not identified, however, any cases precluding relief on such a 

violation solely by virtue of ultimate conviction. 

With regard to joinder, the discretion lies with the court not the prosecutor. Thus, 

cases on improper joinder have focused on the trial court’s actions in allowing joinder. 

See e.g. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner proffers 

nothing to suggest, even assuming bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, that would 

make the prosecution’s pursuit of a joint trial grounds for relief. Indeed, the burden is on 

the defendant to oppose joinder. See United States v. Parson, 452 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th 

Cir. 1971) (waiver of right to severance by failing to oppose joinder prior to trial). 

Nonetheless, under the “quick look” standard, the portion of Ground Three 

relating to bad faith prosecution states a facially valid constitutional claim.

Petitioner’s Ground Four argues that Petitioner was denied his right to a jury 

trial on the issue of dangerousness used to enhance his sentence, see Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Indeed, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466 (June 26, 2000), the Court interpreted the constitutional due -process and 

jury-trial guarantees to require that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. In Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (June 24, 2004), the Court extended Apprendi, by holding that 

"the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 

impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 

defendant." 542 U.S. at 303. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702 (normal sentencing 

ranges) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704 (dangerous offender sentencing). Accordingly, 

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Ground Four states a facially valid constitutional claim.

Conclusion - Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & 

Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability on the tolling issue 

should be granted.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed April 21, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be GRANTED as to the issue of statutory tolling for the time to pursue 

unsought review.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 23, 2015

14-0834r RR 15 05 21 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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