Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02302/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

SUMMER RUSSO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PAYROLL SERVICES, LLC, 

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-02302-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendant,

Payroll Services, LLC.1 Defendant seeks dismissal of Count III of plaintiff’s

complaint, “Post-Employment Retaliation in Violation of Title VII,” pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Upon consideration of the pleadings and

briefs, this court concludes that the motion should be denied.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

claim for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that

1

 Doc. no. 8 (Motion to Dismiss).

2

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 11.

FILED

 2015 May-15 PM 02:44

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-02302-CLS Document 23 Filed 05/15/15 Page 1 of 7
pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at

557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

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Case 5:14-cv-02302-CLS Document 23 Filed 05/15/15 Page 2 of 7
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (alterations in citations and emphasis supplied).

II. DISCUSSION

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of her postemployment retaliation claim:

After Plaintiff received her notice of right-to-sue from the EEOC

[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], she began receiving

harassing texts, e-mails[,] and Facebook messages from Defendant’s

AssistantManager, Amanda Martin, stating things like “did you actually

think you would win?” and “good girls get married and bad girls get

what you got.” Additionally, Amanda Martin began making false

statements about Plaintiff to several of their mutual acquaintances,

including telling others Plaintiff was under an ongoing investigation by

[the Department of Human Services] and was going to have her children

taken away from her[,] and that they should not let their children play

with Plaintiff’s children[. Amanda Martin told] others that Plaintiff

worked [for defendant] only to try and make money from [defendant]

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Case 5:14-cv-02302-CLS Document 23 Filed 05/15/15 Page 3 of 7
and to take over the business.

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 38 (alterations supplied).

Defendant contends that those allegations “are too vague and conclusory to

meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards.”3 Specifically, defendant contends that

plaintiff failed to plead “when the alleged statements were made, the substance of the

alleged statements, or with respect to statements made to third parties, to whom the

statements were made.”4 Defendant further contends that plaintiff “pleads no facts

that show any causal connection between the alleged negative statements and the

Plaintiff’s EEOC” charge.5

This court concludes that plaintiff has pleaded facts that plausibly could

support her post-employment retaliation claim. Defendant’s contention that plaintiff

must allege the exact dates of the communications at issue, as well as the identities

of the third-party recipients of such communications, in order to meet the standards

set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, is without merit. Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts

in support of her post-employment retaliation claim that, taken as true, could entitle

her to relief.

Defendant next contends that plaintiff’s post-employment retaliation claim

3

 Doc. no. 8 (Motion to Dismiss) ¶ 5.

4

Id.

5

Id.

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should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

with regard to that claim.

6 According to plaintiff’s complaint, the factssupporting her

post-employment retaliation claim arose after the EEOC already had dismissed her

charge of discrimination.

7 Plaintiff has not alleged that she filed a new charge of

discrimination regarding the alleged post-employment retaliation.

Ordinarily, “[a] plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the

EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir.

2000) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration supplied), overruled on other

grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Even so, this Circuit has carved out an exception to that rule for retaliation claims. 

As the former Fifth Circuit held in Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654 F.2d

411 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981), “it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to urging a retaliation claim growing out of an earlier

charge; the district court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear such a claim when it grows

out of an administrative charge that is properly before the court.”8Id. at 414; see also

Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988) (same). The

6

Id. ¶ 6.

7

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 54.

8

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the close of

business on September 30, 1981.

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court in Gupta explained:

There are strong practicalreasons and policy justificationsfor this

conclusion. It is the nature of retaliation claims that they arise after the

filing of the EEOC charge. Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would

mean that two charges would have to be filed in a retaliation case — a

double filing that would serve no purpose except to create additional

procedural technicalities when a single filing would comply with the

intent of Title VII.

Gupta, 654 F.2d 414.

Plaintiff alleges that her post-employment retaliation claim grew out of her

earlier EEOC charge.9 Further, defendant has failed to show that the earlier EEOC

charge is not properly before this court. Thus, this court finds that it has ancillary

jurisdiction over CountIII of plaintiff’s complaint, and that, accordingly, defendant’s

motion to dismiss is due to be denied.

Before closing this opinion, the court pausesto note that none of the principles

discussed above are new law, as evidenced by the age of the Gupta opinion cited

above. They should have been well-known to reasonably competent counsel. 

Consequently, defendant’s attorney is placed on notice that this court will not tolerate

meritless pleadings. Sanctions will be imposed liberally if similar pleadings should

be filed in the future.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

9 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 56 (“Such communications and statements were made because

of Plaintiff’s protected activity in filing an EEOC charge for discrimination and retaliation.”).

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Case 5:14-cv-02302-CLS Document 23 Filed 05/15/15 Page 6 of 7
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2015.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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