Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00781/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00781-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CORPORATE AMERICA CAR WASH 

SYSTEM, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:14-cv-781-RDP

CORPORATE AMERICA CAR WASH 

SYSTEM, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BIRMINGHAM PARKING 

AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:14-cv-866-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on Defendants’1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Case No 

2:14-cv-00781-RDP Doc. # 38; Case No 2:14-cv-00866-RDP Doc. #54). Plaintiff has had an 

opportunity to respond to the Motion and submit evidence, and Defendants have replied. (Case 

No 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Docs. # 45, 46 and 49; Case No 2:14-cv-00866-RDP Docs. 63, 64 and 

68). 

 

1 The moving Defendants are Wanda Knight, Kevin Owens, the Birmingham Parking Authority, the 

Birmingham Parking Authority Board Members, Lynn Thomas, and Larry Warde. (Case No 2:14-cv-00866-RDP 

Doc. #54). However, this court’s memorandum opinion is equally applicable to the claims asserted against 

Defendants the City of Birmingham, Mayor William Bell, Jarvis Patton, and Don Lupo. (Case No 2:14-cv-00781-

RDP Docs. # 1, 38 and 39). 

FILED

 2016 Mar-04 AM 10:49

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 1 of 18
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I. Summary of Relevant Facts2

The Birmingham Parking Authority was created by an act of the Alabama Legislature to 

manage off street parking for the City of Birmingham. The BPA currently manages eight 

parking decks and one parking lot, all of which are owned by the City. Kevin Owens and Larry 

Ward are members of the Board of Directors of the BPA. Lynn Thomas is the Executive Director 

of the BPA, and Wanda Knight is her Executive Assistant.

A. The Agreement

On November 16, 2012, Plaintiff Michael Williams, doing business as Corporate 

America Car Wash, and the BPA entered into an Agreement for Corporate America Car Wash to 

Provide Services to Customers of The Birmingham Parking Authority. (Doc. # 39-1). No 

money was exchanged between Plaintiff and the BPA in connection with the Agreement. (Doc. 

# 39-2). The Agreement was designed to memorialize that Plaintiff would be allowed to clean 

vehicles of his customers who parked in decks managed by the BPA and the terms under which 

he would be allowed to do so. (Doc. # 39-2). 

The Agreement included the following provisions:

1. Corporate America Car Wash (CACW) shall abide by all rules 

posted in City Parking Decks.

...

 

2

If facts are in dispute, they are stated in the manner most favorable to the non-movant, and all reasonable 

doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993); Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). 

These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts that could be 

established through live testimony at trial. See Cox. v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 

1994).

Asserted “facts” that are not facts at all will be disregarded. Carter v. Three Springs Residential 

Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no 

probative value). Conclusory allegations of this type will be disregarded for summary judgment purposes.

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 2 of 18
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3. This agreement may be terminated for breach of the terms 

provided herein. The Authority reserves the right to evaluate the 

continuation of services under this agreement and establish 

additional terms as required by the Board of Directors.

(Doc. # 39-1). 

The Agreement did not authorize Plaintiff to store any equipment in BPA’s parking 

decks, nor did it allow Plaintiff to advertise in the decks, or harass or intimidate members of the 

BPA staff or employees of local businesses. (Doc. # 39-2). 

The Rules and Regulations of the Birmingham Parking Authority, which the Agreement 

required Plaintiff to follow, provided the following:

3. Trespass and Loitering are not permitted. Unauthorized presence 

in the Parking Deck or Lot is not permitted. Persons who engage 

in any unlawful activity in the Deck or Lot will be prosecuted.

(Doc. # 39-3). 

B. The Birmingham Business Alliance’s Complaint and the BPA’s First 

Warning to Plaintiff

On August 2, 2013, the Birmingham Business Alliance (“BBA”) emailed a complaint to 

the BPA about Plaintiff. (Doc. # 39-4, ¶ 4). According to the BBA complaint, Plaintiff entered 

the second floor offices of the BBA on several occasions, seeking publicity in magazines 

published by the BBA. (Id.). The complaint further alleged that, while on BBA premises, 

Plaintiff “exhibited aggressive, rude and threatening behavior. He speaks loudly and in an 

intimidating way to our receptionist and to others who have tried to communicate with him. He 

will not leave us alone.” (Id. at Ex. A). The BBA asked that the BPA tell Plaintiff not to return 

to the BBA. (Id.). The BBA advised that if Plaintiff’s behavior continued, it would request 

assistance from the Birmingham Police Department. (Id.).

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 3 of 18
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On August 2, 2013, Defendant Lynn Thomas, the executive director of the BPA, sent a 

warning letter to Plaintiff advising him of the BBA’s complaint. (Doc. # 39-5). Thomas’s letter 

noted that Plaintiff had acted in a similar manner in BPA’s office several times C demanding to 

advertise, and that he had been told no. (Id.). Thomas further reminded Plaintiff that he had 

been given permission to wash cars only, and that if this type of behavior continued, the 

Agreement to provide car wash services would be terminated. (Docs. # 39-5, 39-2). 

C. Additional Incidents Involving Plaintiff

Tony Blackerby, a cashier supervisor at the BPA, first noticed strange behavior by 

Plaintiff when Plaintiff placed a sign on the sidewalk advertising that Plaintiff’s business was for 

sale for $25 million. (Doc. # 39-6, ¶ 4). Blackerby also heard Plaintiff speaking loudly and 

harshly to James Merkerson, the BPA maintenance supervisor. (Doc. # 39-6, ¶ 5). Plaintiff was

apparently upset that Merkerson had told him he could not put fliers on the cars in the deck. 

(Id.). After that incident, Blackerby heard Plaintiff say he was going to buy the BPA and 

everyone would work for him, except for Merkerson, whom he would fire. (Doc. # 39-6, ¶ 6).

Plaintiff also placed a sign in front of the BPA office stating that he would pay $1 million to 

anyone who could inform him of investors to purchase the BPA. (Id.).

Another BPA employee, Sonja Mitchell witnessed Plaintiff come to the BPA office on 

several occasions with a “strong and unprofessional, aggressive attitude.” (Doc. # 39-7, ¶ 4). 

Plaintiff asked to speak to Merkerson, who explained to Plaintiff the rules and regulations for the 

BPA decks. (Id.). This appeared to anger Plaintiff. (Id.). 

On September 20, 2013, at approximately 6:40 a.m., Judy Butler, a cashier supervisor at 

the BPA, was in an office and overheard Plaintiff say “when I buy this place the n*** in the back 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 4 of 18
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ain’t going to have nothing to say. The n*** in the back don’t know that I talked to the board 

president and he’s going to meet me here to walk the deck. I ain’t studying Lynn Thomas and 

that n*** in the back.” (Doc. # 39-8, ¶ 4). Later that day, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff 

placed a sign in front of the BPA office offering $1 million for help finding investors to buy the 

BPA. (Doc. # 39-8, ¶ 5). Plaintiff had a long stick, was waiving it around, and banged on the 

door of the BPA. (Id.). Butler was concerned because Plaintiff “had been bombarding BPA 

employees all morning and cussing, walking around with the big stick.” (Doc. # 39-8, ¶ 6). 

Other BPA employees asked Plaintiff to leave and called the police. (Doc. # 39-8, ¶ 6). 

The police arrived and spoke with Plaintiff. (Doc. # 39-8, ¶ 7). The police later told the 

BPA “that they had experienced problems with [Plaintiff] in the past” and that his demeanor 

“was escalating.” (Id.). Notably, Plaintiff had been arrested for First Degree Burglary and 

Assault and was indicted on May 23, 2013. (Docs. # 39-12 – 39-14). Plaintiff also had multiple 

prior felony convictions in his past. (Id.).

The September 20, 2013 incident was also observed by Mitchell, who felt that Plaintiff’s 

behavior showed that he was becoming “extremely unraveled.” (Doc. # 39-7, ¶ 6). Mitchell 

believed that Plaintiff presented a danger to both BPA employees and individuals who parked in 

the decks managed by the BPA. (Id.). 

D. Removal of Plaintiff’s Property by Personnel of the City of Birmingham

On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff placed signs in front of the BPA office and in front of the 

Wells Fargo office building, advertising that Plaintiff was looking for investors to buy the BPA. 

(Docs. # 39-9, ¶ 5 and 39-6, ¶ 8). Matt McCombs, the Special Event Supervisor at the BPA, and 

Blackerby observed Jarvis Patton, the Chief Operating Officer for the City of Birmingham, 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 5 of 18
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speaking with a downtown patrol officer about the signs. (Docs. # 39-9, ¶ 4 and 39-6, ¶ 8). 

After Patton left, two officers spoke with one of the car wash helpers who worked for 

Plaintiff. (Docs. # 39-9, ¶ 5 and 39-6, ¶ 9). The helper removed the signs. (Id.). Plaintiff later

appeared and returned the signs to the front of the BPA office and the Wells Fargo building. 

(Id.). 

After a period of time, Plaintiff and his helper hid the signs in an alley stairwell on BPA 

property. (Docs. # 39-9, ¶ 6 and 39-6, ¶ 10). McCombs then went and moved the signs into the 

alley and off BPA property. (Doc. # 39-9, ¶ 7). McCombs was later notified that Plaintiff had 

placed his signs in a reserved parking area on the basement level, together with carts that 

Plaintiff used in his business. (Doc. # 39-9, ¶ 8). 

Patton later returned, along with Don Lupo, the Director of the Mayor’s Office of 

Citizens Assistance. (Doc. # 39-9, ¶ 9). McCombs spoke with Patton, who told him that they 

were there to have Plaintiff’s signs removed. (Id.). McCombs showed Patton where Plaintiff had 

stored the signs and carts on BPA property. (Id.). McCombs, Patton, and Lupo waited on a 

Public Works truck to arrive, as well as several police officers in case they were needed. (Doc. # 

39-9, ¶ 10). 

Patton sent the officers to Wells Fargo to ask if they had a problem with the signs. (Doc. 

# 39-9, ¶ 11). Wells Fargo reported they did not like the signs either. (Id.). Therefore Patton 

instructed that all equipment and signs were to be removed from the area. (Id.).

E. Termination Letter and Plaintiff’s Response

On October 7, 2013, LaVeeda Battle, corporate counsel for the BPA, sent a letter to Jay 

Smith, an attorney who had previously “helped” Plaintiff concerning the BPA. (Docs. # 39-10 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 6 of 18
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and 39-11). The letter stated that the BPA was terminating the Agreement with Plaintiff, 

effective immediately. (Doc. # 39-10). In the letter, Battle reported that complaints had been 

made about Plaintiff’s behavior, Plaintiff had been warned about his behavior, and that Plaintiff 

had posted false, deceptive and misleading signs seeking regarding a sale of the BPA. Battle 

further advised that Plaintiff’s signs violated Municipal Ordinance 12-1-1 and demanded that 

Plaintiff cease and desist his conduct. (Doc. # 39-10). Mayor William Bell, city attorney 

Thomas Bentley, and police chief A.C. Roper were copied on the termination letter. (Doc. # 39-

10). This termination letter is made the basis of Plaintiff’s slander claims. (Doc. 1-1 ¶29.)

F. Plaintiff’s Incarceration for Violent Behavior

On August 14, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested for, and on April 23, 2014, he was convicted 

of, First Degree Burglary and Assault. Plaintiff had entered the dwelling of a female with whom 

he had previously had a relationship and hit and choked her. (Docs. # 39-12, 39-13, and 39-14). 

Plaintiff was sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison in light of multiple prior felony 

convictions. (Doc. # 39-13). Plaintiff’s criminal conviction in this case has been affirmed by the 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. # 39-14). He remains in prison. (Doc. # 24). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 7 of 18
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filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, the Rule requires the non-moving party 

to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. 

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts 

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of 

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving 

party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere 

allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc. teaches, Rule 56(c) “does not allow the plaintiff to simply rest on his

allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof of trial, he 

must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at 

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Mere allegations” made by a plaintiff are insufficient. Id.

Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be 

granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 8 of 18
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Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D.Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 250-51). 

“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the 

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue 

for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a 

sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so onesided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Sawyer, 243 F. Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 

(“The law is clear ... that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment.”).

III. Analysis

In Count One (which appears in both of the Complaints in these cases) Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by (1) removing Plaintiff’s car wash 

supplies and related materials from the decks managed by the BPA without affording Plaintiff 

due process of law, and (2) breaching Plaintiff’s “contract” with the BPA or depriving him of the 

opportunity to continue his business in the BPA-managed parking decks. (Case No 2:14-cv00781-RDP Doc. # 1; Case No 2:14-cv-00866-RDP Doc. # 1). Count Two of the Complaint in 

Case No 2:14-cv-00866-RDP also asserts that Defendants slandered Plaintiff. (Case No 2:14-cv00866-RDP Doc. # 1). The court addresses these claims below.

A. Plaintiff Did Not Have a Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest to 

Support his Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that 

deprives “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 9 of 18
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Amend. XIV. To establish a due process violation, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of 

an interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause, and that the procedures attendant upon that 

deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky v. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 

490 U.S. 454 (1989); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). 

The Due Process Clause encompasses two components: a substantive component and a 

procedural component. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects only 

“fundamental” rights. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Palko 

v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Fundamental rights “are protected against certain 

government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” 

McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556. In contrast, “areas in which substantive rights are created only by 

state law ... are not subject to substantive due process protection ... because substantive due 

process rights are created only by the Constitution.” Id. Such state law-based rights can be 

rescinded “so long as the elements of procedural–not substantive–due process are observed.” Id. 

Property interests are created and defined by state law rather than the Constitution. See 

Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “[N]on-legislative deprivations of statecreated rights ... cannot support a substantive due process claim, not even if the plaintiff alleges 

that the government acted arbitrary [sic] and irrationally.” Greenbriar Vill., 345 F.3d at 1263. 

State created rights are not fundamental rights, and thus are not entitled to substantive due 

process protection. See id. at 1262–63 (“[N]on-legislative deprivations of state-created rights ... 

cannot support a substantive due process claim.”); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 

474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“While property interests are protected by 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 10 of 18
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procedural due process even though the interest is derived from state law rather than the 

Constitution ... substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution.”). 

With respect to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, “no procedural due 

process claim exists until a sufficiently certain property right under state law is first shown.” 

Greenbriar Vill., 345 F.3d at 1265. Moreover, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that an 

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state actor does not constitute a violation of 

the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a 

meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 

517, 533 (1984).

1. Plaintiff Had No Property Right to Maintain Car Wash Supplies and 

Related Materials in the Parking Decks Managed by the BPA 

Plaintiff had no right to maintain his signs and equipment within the BPA decks. 

Nothing contained in Plaintiff’s Agreement with the BPA allowed him to store any equipment 

within the parking decks managed by the BPA. (Doc. # 39-1). Therefore, removal of his 

equipment from the parking decks did not deprive Plaintiff of any right, and certainly did not 

involve a protected property interest sufficient to support a procedural due process claim. The 

Agreement merely set forth the terms under which Plaintiff was allowed to operate his business 

within the BPA decks. 

Nor are there any state laws which grant Plaintiff a property interest in either washing 

cars in the decks managed by the BPA, or in storing materials in the BPA deck. Indeed, the 

court is unaware of any decision wherein a court has determined that an individual has a property 

interest in operating a business or storing materials on property managed by a state actor, such as 

the BPA. In Ford v. Bentley, 580 Fed. Appx. 701, 711 (11th Cir. 2014), the plaintiffs asserted 

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claims arising from their alleged property right in owning, operating, and maintaining a bingo 

business in Macon County, Alabama. Id. at 707. The court recognized that the plaintiffs’ rights 

in bingo licenses were “created and defined by state law” and noted that the “uncertainty of the 

Plaintiffs’ right, if any, to operate the games in question at least arguably renders that right 

unprotectable as a matter of federal procedural due process.” Id. at 711-712 (citations and 

punctuation omitted); see also Kinsey v. City of Opp, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 

1999)(“First, the court notes that Plaintiff fails to cite, and the court has not found, a single case 

wherein the Supreme Court, any court in the Eleventh Circuit, or any Alabama state court has 

addressed whether failure to allow [the conduct prohibited in this case] constitutes a 

constitutional violation. This evidences a finding that no clearly established constitutional right 

was violated.”)

At best, Plaintiff and the BPA had an at-will Agreement which could be terminated at the 

discretion of either party, including the BPA. This Agreement did not create a protected 

property interest that entitled Plaintiff to due process. For example, if the BPA had hired 

Plaintiff as an at-will employee to wash cars in the parking decks, Alabama law is clear that the 

BPA could have terminated Plaintiff’s employment without due process. See Ex parte Moulton, 

116 So. 3d 1119, 1134 (Ala. 2013) (“Alabama recognizes an employer's right to terminate an atwill employee for any reason...Employment-at-will is not a property interest that requires due 

process upon termination of the employment.”). Thus, Defendants were well within their rights 

to remove Plaintiff’s signs and equipment from their property and terminate his Agreement 

without due process.

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To be clear, even though they had the right to do so, Defendants did not remove 

Plaintiff’s materials and terminate his Agreement without warning or due process. Plaintiff was 

informed that the BPA had received a formal complaint about Plaintiff’s behavior and warned 

that if he continued that type of behavior, his Agreement may be terminated. Moreover, at least 

as to Plaintiff’s signs, he was aware that Defendants did not want them on their property or that 

of nearby businesses. Not only had he been told to remove them, Defendants had previously 

removed the signs to property not managed by the BPA. 

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert here that he had any protectable interest in the 

Agreement. Nor can he claim that he was not provided any due process with regard to the 

removal of his signs or the termination of his Agreement. As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot 

maintain a Due Process claim.

2. Breach of Plaintiff’s “Contract” with the BPA 

Plaintiff had no contractual right to continue to operate his business within BPA decks. 

First, there is a substantial question as to whether the Agreement signed by Plaintiff is even a 

binding contract. It merely specified the conditions under which Plaintiff would be allowed to 

offer his services to customers parking in the decks. 

“The requisite elements of a contract include: an offer and an acceptance, consideration, 

and mutual assent to terms essential to the formation of a contract.” Hardy Corp. v. Rayco 

Industrial Inc., 143 So.3d 172, 180 (Ala. 2013)(citations and punctuation omitted). The Rule 56 

record does not contain substantial evidence indicating that the BPA actually received any 

consideration (i.e., anything of value) in return for entering into the Agreement. Consideration is 

an essential element of any contract formation claim. Plaintiff did not pay the BPA for 

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permission to wash cars in the parking decks and did not share profits from his business with the 

BPA. Plaintiff was given the right to provide car wash services to existing customers of the 

BPA, under certain rules and requirements; however, the BPA did not receive any benefit from 

these services provided by Plaintiff. 

But even assuming this was an agreement between the parties, it was at best, an at-will 

Agreement which the BPA could terminate at its discretion. And despite the at-will nature of the 

Agreement, Defendants actually gave Plaintiff a warning before terminating the Agreement.

Plaintiff did not have any enforceable contractual rights in maintaining his signs and 

equipment in BPA’s decks, or continuing to offer his services in the decks. Accordingly, his 

contract claim fails as a matter of law. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s due process claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Slander Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff’s slander claim alleges that the Defendants made slanderous allegations against 

Plaintiff when they copied Mayor Bell, City Attorney Bentley, and Chief Roper on a letter 

accusing Plaintiff of trying to sell the BPA and of engaging in conduct that violated the 

conditions under which he was allowed to operate in the BPA decks. (Case No 2:14-cv-00866-

RDP Doc. # 1-1, ¶¶29-30).

There are two types of defamation: libel, which involves the use of print media to publish 

a defamatory comment; and slander, which involves the oral expression of a defamatory 

comment. Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So. 2d 386, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). “To 

sustain an action for slander, plaintiff must show that the ‘alleged defamatory matter was 

published,’ § 6–5–182, Ala.Code 1975, ‘by proof of communication of the defamatory matter to 

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someone other than himself.’” Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1093 (Ala.

1988). Because Plaintiff’s slander claim is based on a written communication, his claim is in 

reality one for defamation, not slander. To prove a communication was defamatory, a plaintiff 

must present evidence establishing the following elements: 1) a false and defamatory statement 

concerning the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) 

fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of 

the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the 

publication of the statement. McCaig v. Talladega Pub. Co., Inc., 544 So.2d 875, 877 

(Ala.1989) (citing Restatement (2d) of Torts § 558 (1977)). 

Importantly, however, “[t]ruth is an absolute defense” to a defamation claim. Foley v. 

State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 491 So.2d 934, 937 (Ala.1986) (citation omitted). Whether 

the statements at issue in a defamation case are reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning is a 

question of law. Harris v. School Annual Publ'g Co., 466 So.2d 963, 964 (Ala. 1985). 

1. The Communication was Privileged

Plaintiff’s defamation claim is based on the BPA’s notification to Bell, Bentley, and 

Roper that Plaintiff had posted false and misleading signs seeking to sell the BPA. (Case No 

2:14-cv-00866-RDP Doc. # 1-1, ¶¶29-30). “A defendant is entitled to the affirmative defense of 

qualified privilege if she can demonstrate that the communication was ‘prompted by duty owed 

either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an 

interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest.’” Camp v. Correctional 

Medical Services, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1338, 1363 (M.D. Ala. 2009)(quoting Ex parte Blue Cross 

& Blue Shield of Ala., 773 So. 2d 475, 478-79 (Ala. 2000)). 

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Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by 

duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in 

which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding 

interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual 

malice. The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication 

need not be one having the force of legal obligation, but it is sufficient if it is 

social or moral in its nature and defendant in good faith believes he is acting in 

pursuance thereof, although in fact he is mistaken.

Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co., 510 So. 2d 176 (Ala. 1987) (quoting Willis v. Demopolis Nursing 

Home, Inc., 336 So.2d 1117, 1120 (Ala.1976) (in turn quoting Berry v. City of New York Ins. 

Co., 210 Ala. 369, 371, 98 So. 290, 292 (1923))) (punctuation omitted.)

Here, the BPA was created in order to manage off street parking for the City of 

Birmingham. The parking decks and lots managed by the BPA are owned by the City of 

Birmingham. The BPA entered into the Agreement with Plaintiff to allow him to operate his car 

wash business in parking decks owned by the City and managed by BPA. Upon learning of 

Plaintiff’s violations of the conditions under which he had been allowed to do business in the 

decks, BPA had a duty to make the City aware that it was terminating Plaintiff’s right to conduct 

his business on City property and the reason for the termination. Therefore, any communication 

between the BPA and Bell, Bentley, and Roper regarding the operation of the decks is protected 

by qualified privilege. This includes the communications made the basis of Plaintiff’s 

defamation claim. The communication at issue is not actionable.

2. The Communications was Truthful

Additionally. because the statements in the BPA’s letter to Bell, Bentley, and Roper were 

true, Plaintiff’s defamation claim fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ 

characterization of his conduct, but he simply cannot dispute (1) his objective conduct or (2) the 

fact that Defendants received complaints about Plaintiff’s conduct. Whether Plaintiff intended 

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 16 of 18
17

his conduct to be aggressive, rude, or threatening is not the issue; that is, his intent does not alter 

the fact that Defendants had a good faith belief that Plaintiff acted in an aggressive, rude, and

threatening manner. Also, the record contains a photograph of the sign which Defendants 

reported as Plaintiff seeking to sell the BPA. That sign states:

Corporate America Car Wash

Paying $1 Million Dollars Cash

Commission to Any Man Or

Woman Who Can Find Investors

So Corporate America Car Wash

System Can Purchase The

Birmingham Parking Authority.

(Doc. # 39-10 at 7). 

3. Plaintiff Suffered No Harm as a Result of the Communication

Finally, “[f]or a communication to be considered defamatory, it must tend to so harm the 

reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 

from associating or dealing with him.” Clark v. America’s First Credit Union, 585 So. 2d 1367, 

1370 (Ala. 1991)(citation omitted). Plaintiff was not harmed by the communications at issue 

because BPA had already made the decision to terminate the Agreement. The communication 

merely informed representatives of the City of that decision and the reasons for the decision. 

Therefore the record does not support the conclusion that the communication to Bell, Bentley,

and Roper of that decision caused any additional harm. 

Moreover, the record contains no evidence that any of the allegedly false statements by 

Defendants caused Plaintiff’s reputation to have been lowered in the “estimation of the 

community” or that third persons were deterred “from associating or dealing with him.” The 

court can certainly not say that this communication by Defendants deterred persons from dealing 

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with Plaintiff, particularly in light of the complaints Defendants received about Plaintiff’s

conduct. On this record, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was damaged by Defendants’ 

allegedly defamatory communication.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of the claims 

set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaints. A separate order will be entered.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the following:

Michael D. Williams, # 133193

Fountain Correctional Facility 

3800 Fountain 

Atmore, AL 36503

DONE and ORDERED this March 4, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00781-RDP Document 66 Filed 03/04/16 Page 18 of 18