Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00021/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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 Attached to Plaintiff’s response, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit indicating that

the opposition was three days late due to an administrative error. Plaintiff was incorrect. The briefing

schedule set by this Court required the opposition to Defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion (Doc. No. 108)

to be filed on or before June 1, 2010. (Doc. No. 111.) The briefing scheduled referred to by

Plaintiff’s counsel in his affidavit was set by Magistrate Judge Major regarding Defendant’s motion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY A. STRASBURG, Individually

and as Trustee of the GREGORY A.

STRASBURG REVOCABLE TRUST,,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08 CV 21 JLS (BLM)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING PETER

BLAIR’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION and (2)

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. No. 108)

vs.

M/Y JUST A NOTION; PETER BLAIR; JIM

SINGLETON; THE YACHT CLUB, LLC;

and WACHOVIA BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

On April 1, 2010, Defendant Peter Blair (“Defendant”), proceeding pro se, filed a motion for

relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) from this Court’s Order dated August 25,

2009 denying Defendant Peter Blair and Yacht Club LLC’s motion for leave to amend. (See Doc. No.

108; see also Doc. No. 65.) Plaintiff Gregory Strasburg filed a response in opposition to the Rule

60(b) motion for reconsideration on May 20, 2010. (Doc. No. 114.) Defendant filed a reply on May

27, 2010. (Doc. No. 115.) The reply incorrectly indicated that Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely,

but did not address the merits of the opposition.1

 (See id.) For the reasons stated below, the Court

Case 3:08-cv-00021-AJB-BLM Document 122 Filed 08/30/10 Page 1 of 6
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for non-compliance (Doc. No. 109). (See Doc. No. 112.) As such, Plaintiff’s opposition to Plaintiff’s

Rule 60(b) motion was timely. 

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HEREBY DENIES Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. 

BACKGROUND

Gregory Strasburg commenced this action on January 3, 2008 against Peter Blair, James

Singleton, and Yacht Club LLC. (Doc. No. 1.) Strasburg asserts nine claims based on fraudulent

inducement to enter into an agreement to transfer title and his continued unlawful possession and

ownership of the vessel. (Id. ¶ 12.) The claims asserted in the original complaint were: (1) petitory

action to establish title pursuant to supplemental admiralty rules D and E(2); (2) fraud by

intentional misrepresentations of fact; (3) fraud by negligent misrepresentation of fact; (4) fraud by

suppression of material fact; (5) fraud by promise without intention to perform; (6) breach of

fiduciary duty; (7) conversion; (8) agent’s wrongful appropriation of property of principal (against

Blair only); and (9) breach of contract (against Blair only). 

On August 18, 2008, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint

without prejudice. (Doc. No. 2008). On September 16, 2008, Strasburg filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) apparently curing the deficiencies. (Doc. No. 38.) The FAC asserts all the

same causes of action, but asserts all the fraud causes of action against Peter Blair only. (Id.) 

Peter Blair and The Yacht Club LLC filed an answer to the FAC on October 16, 2008. (Doc. No.

42.) That same day, James Singleton filed a separate answer as well as a counterclaim against

Strasburg and a crossclaim against Yacht Club LLC. (Doc. Nos. 43 & 44.) 

On June 22, 2009, Defendants Peter Blair and the Yacht Club, LLC filed a motion for leave

to filed an amended answer/counterclaims. (Doc. No. 60.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition

to the motion on July 9, 2009 (Doc. No. 61) and Defendants Peter Blair and the Yacht Club, LLC

filed a reply on July 16, 2009. (Doc. No. 62.) On August 25, 2009, the Court denied Defendants’

motion for leave to amend. (Doc. No. 65.) It is this Order which is the subject of Defendant Peter

Blair’s motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). (Doc. No. 108). 

On March 31, 2010, Peter Blair filed an ex parte motion to substitute himself, proceeding

pro se, in place of Attorney James C. Mitchell. (Doc. No. 103.) After hearing and warning Peter

Blair of the difficulties of proceeding pro se, the Court granted Peter Blair’s ex parte motion on

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April 8, 2010. (Doc. No. 106.) Mr. Mitchell remains counsel of record for Defendant Yacht Club,

LLC. 

On April 1, 2010, Peter Blair filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b)

from this Court’s Order denying leave to amend the answer and assert counterclaims dated August

25, 2009. (Doc. No. 108.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on May 20, 2010 and Peter

Blair filed a reply on May 27, 2010. (Doc. Nos. 114, 115.) The hearing was thereafter taken

under submission without oral argument. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides, in pertinent part: “On motion and just terms,

the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any

other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

District courts also have the inherent authority to entertain motions for reconsideration of

interlocutory orders. Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir.1996) ("[I]nterlocutory

orders . . . are subject to modification by the district judge at any time prior to final judgment."

(quotation omitted)); see also Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.

1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Although a district court may reconsider its decision for any reason

it deems sufficient, generally a motion for reconsideration "is appropriate if the district court: (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust; or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J,

Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hydranautics v.

FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp. 2d 958, 968 (S.D.Cal. 2003). 

Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the sound discretion of the

district court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enter.,

Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000)). “However, a court should generaly

leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or

would work a manifest injustive.” Hydranautics, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (citing Christianson v.

Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). 

//

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 As such, the Court construes Peter Blair’s motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) as a

general motion for reconsideration. 

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DISCUSSION

This Court’s Order denying leave to amend found that Defendants had not shown “good

cause” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which sets the standard for granting leave

to amend after a scheduling order has been issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Specifically,

Defendants sought to amend the answer and assert two additional counterclaims. In the motion for

leave to amend, Defendants’ counsel, Mr. James C. Mitchell, admitted that he did not originally

plead these counterclaims due to his own oversight, his lack of familiarity with the case, and

because it “did not occur to [him] to file a counterclaim with the answer.” (See Doc. No. 65 at 3.) 

The Court concluded that mere oversight on behalf of Defendants’ counsel, despite 3 months lapse

in time between the time he was retained and when he filed the Answer, did not satisfy the

standard of “good cause” sufficient to modify the scheduling order’s deadline for modifying

pleadings and permit leave to amend. (Id.) As such, the Court denied leave to amend. 

Defendant Peter Blair now moves the Court to reconsider that Order and grant leave to

amend. Blair asserts that his counsel “failed to diligently and zealously protect his interests.” 

(Mem. ISO Mot. at 3.) Blair further asserts that almost all documents and pleadings were given to

Mr. Mitchell from his former counsel within a month of his retention and therefore Mr. Mitchell

falsely claimed that Blair failed to provide said documents. (Id.) Thus, Blair argues that Mr.

Mitchell’s inactions should not be imputed onto Blair and Blair should not be prevented from

asserting the breach of contract and damages counterclaims. (Id.) 

As a threshold matter, the Court’s Order denying leave to amend the answer and assert

counterclaims is not a “final order,” as it is not a final judgment nor a directly appealable

interlocutory order. See Corn v. Guam Coral Co., 318 F.2d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1963); see also

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. That the Order was not a final order does not preclude reconsideration,

however, as the Court has inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders at any time prior to

final judgment.2

 See Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1515. Accordingly, the Court considers whether justice

so requires reconsideration of its Order denying leave to amend and finds that it does. 

Specifically, the Court appreciates Blair’s position and finds that justice requires the Court to

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reconsider its Order denying leave to amend in light of Blair’s allegations regarding his counsel,

counsel’s blatant failure to appropriately show good cause for leave to amend, and Blair’s

subsequent motion to proceed pro se, which this Court granted on April 8, 2010. As such, the

Court, in its discretion, GRANTS Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of its Order denying

leave to amend.

However, Blair has not sufficiently shown good cause for permitting leave to amend under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (providing that once a scheduling

order has been issued, it may be modified only for good cause); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15

(providing the standard for granting or denying leave to amend once good cause has been

established); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Blair’s argument for reconsideration and for leave to amend are essentially the same—that his

lawyer’s failures should not be imputed onto him and that Blair should not be penalized for his

lawyer’s “oversight” or lack of diligence. Thus, Blair suggests that the Court should allow him,

proceeding pro se, to correct his lawyers’ errors while he was represented by him. This is not an

appropriate showing of “good cause” to allow Blair to amend the answer and assert counterclaims

which were not originally asserted.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that, when a party voluntarily chooses his

attorney to represent him in an action, “he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or

omissions of this freely selected agent.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)

(holding that court’s dismissal of the action due to plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to appear at a

pretrial conference does not impose an unjust penalty on the client and affirming the dismissal). 

As such, Defendant chose Mr. Mitchell to represent him, Mr. Mitchell failed to originally answer

with counterclaims, and failed to show good cause to amend the scheduling order setting forth the

deadline for amending pleadings and therefore failed to establish why amendment should be

allowed. Though Mr. Mitchell may have failed his client in this regard, the Court finds that

Defendant cannot now “avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of his freely selected

agent” by terminating his relationship with that agent, proceeding pro se, and now seeking to

correct the negative consequences he is already bound by. Defendant makes no indication that he

did not consent to this representation and makes no showing as to why Mr. Mitchell’s actions and

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3

 Further complicating the issue is that Mr. Mitchell remains counsel of record for Blair coDefendant Yacht Club, LLC. Thus, if the Court were to allow Blair to amend his answer and assert

counterclaims, any such doing would be on behalf of Blair, only. Yacht Club, LLC, however would

remain bound by this Court’s previous Order. This is an unfair and unjust result which would

prejudice Yacht Club, LLC and further warrant denying Blair leave to amend. 

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their consequences should not be imputed onto him. To allow a party to “redo” his attorney’s

mistakes for which he was bound would be patently unfair and, as such, is not the “good cause”

required by Rule 16 and under even the liberal standard of granting leave to amend pursuant to

Rule 15.3 To hold otherwise “would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative

litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered

to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Link, 370 U.S. at

633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)). The Court therefore DENIES Peter

Blair leave to amend his answer and assert counterclaims.

CONCLUSION

For those reasons, the Court GRANTS Blair’s motion for reconsideration and DENIES

leave to amend. This Court’s Order dated August 25, 2009 remains in full effect. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 30, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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