Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02424/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02424-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2424

___________

PALANI KARUPAIYAN; P.P.; R.P.,

 Appellants

v.

WIPRO LTD.; THIERRY DELAPORTE, individually and in his official 

capacity as MD, CEO of Wipro; ABIDALI NEEMUCHWALA, individually 

and in his official capacity as MD, ex-CEO of the Wipro; T.K. KURIEN, individually 

and in his official capacity as ex CEO of the Wipro; AZIM HASHIM PREMJI, 

individually and in his official capacity as owner, promoter, chairman of the Wipro; 

WIPRO ENTERPRISE LTD; IDC TECHNOLOGIES; PRATEEK GATTANI, 

individually and in his official capacity as CEO of the IDC

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-02005)

District Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 7, 2024

Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 14, 2025)

_________

OPINION*

_________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

Palani Karupaiyan appeals1 from the order of the District Court denying his 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissing his complaint 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. We will affirm in part, 

vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Karupaiyan submitted to the District Court a motion to proceed IFP along with a 

complaint against Wipro Limited and related defendants. Most of his complaint accused 

Wipro of non-actionable misconduct and sought fanciful relief. But he also alleged that 

Wipro refused to hire him as a software engineer for numerous discriminatory reasons, 

including his diabetes and his age. 

In that regard, Karupaiyan asserted claims for (1) disability discrimination in 

violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and (2) age discrimination in 

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). In support of his 

ADA claim, he alleged that he told a “Wipro employee” that he needed the job because 

he was diabetic and that the employee responded “Wipro is not place for sick people’s 

employment.” (ECF No. 1 at 21 ¶ 98.) And in support of his ADEA claim, he alleged 

that he is 48 years old (id. at 7 ¶ 2) and that a “Wipro employee” told him “Wipro did not 

1 Karupaiyan purported to sue and then appeal on behalf of his minor children. Our Clerk 

notified him that he cannot litigate pro se on their behalf. See Osei-Afriyie by OseiAfriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). He then filed a motion for 

various forms of relief from that order but a motions panel denied his requests (as we 

have done in at least 10 of his prior cases). Thus, Karupaiyan is the only appellant.

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want[] to give [him] employment opportunity” because “Plaintiff is old US citizen and 

Wipro team members were under 30 years old” (id. at 20 ¶ 96). 

By single order, the District Court denied Karupaiyan’s IFP motion and dismissed 

his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. The court 

did so without prejudice to his ability to pay the filing fee or submit a proper IFP motion 

and to amend his complaint as to certain claims. Karupaiyan filed this appeal instead.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2

 

II.

We will affirm the dismissal of most of Karupaiyan’s claims for the reasons that 

the District Cort explained, but we will vacate and remand as to his ADA and ADEA 

claims. We limit our discussion to those two claims.

First, the District Court dismissed the ADA claim on the sole ground that 

Karupaiyan did not adequately allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies with 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC”). We disagree. There might 

be some tension in our caselaw regarding whether a Title VII or ADA plaintiff must 

affirmatively allege exhaustion in order to state a claim.3

 But we need not address the 

2 Orders denying IFP status or dismissing a complaint without prejudice typically are not 

final under § 1291, see Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam), 

but they can become final if the plaintiff stands on his filings, see Oakwood Labs. LLC v. 

Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 903 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2021). Karupaiyan did that here. We exercise 

plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, see Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), but we review the denial of IFP status only 

for abuse of discretion, see Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985).

3 Compare, e.g., Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997) (treating Title 

VII exhaustion as part of the claim for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), with, e.g., 

Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the lack of Title VII 

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issue in this case because Karupaiyan adequately alleged exhaustion under the 

circumstances presented here. Karupaiyan alleged that he timely filed a complaint 

regarding Wipro with the EEOC, and he provided the charge number. (ECF No. 1 at 26 ¶ 

134.) He also later submitted an EEOC right-to-sue letter bearing that charge number. 

(ECF No. 12.) Although that letter was not before the District Court when it dismissed 

Karupaiyan’s complaint, it reinforces our conclusion that his pro se complaint alleged 

enough to avoid dismissal on this ground. Cf. Webb v. DOJ, 117 F.4th 560, 568 (3d Cir. 

2024) (reversing dismissal of a pro se complaint where “the complaint raises enough 

uncertainty about exhaustion [under the Prison Litigation Reform Act] to preclude 

dismissal at the screening stage”).4

Second, the District Court did not require Karupaiyan to allege exhaustion of his 

ADEA claim. Instead, the court dismissed it because “the Complaint does not elaborate 

on the factual basis of the ADEA claim with specificity as required by Rule 8.” (ECF 

No. 5 at 8.) But Rule 8 does not require factual pleading “with specificity.” See In re 

Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “to require pleading 

facts with specificity . . . is not the federal notice pleading standard”). Instead, Rule 8 

requires only enough facts to state a plausible claim. See Martinez v. UPMC 

Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2021). The court acknowledged that 

exhaustion is an affirmative defense that the defendant bears the burden of pleading). 

4 To be clear, we do not hold that Karupaiyan exhausted this claim or that the court 

cannot revisit exhaustion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or at summary judgment as 

circumstances might warrant. Instead, we hold only that he alleged enough to survive 

dismissal at the screening stage under the circumstances presented here.

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5

standard earlier in its opinion, but it did not address whether or how this claim fell short 

of that standard. Nor did it otherwise identify any specific deficiency on this claim.

Nevertheless, we agree that Karupaiyan failed to state an ADEA claim on the 

merits, and we reach the same conclusion as to his ADA claim. Although Karupaiyan 

made some direct allegations of discrimination as noted above, those stray allegations 

buried in the middle of his largely fanciful complaint5 do not raise a plausible inference 

of discrimination under the circumstances presented here. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim” is “a 

context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.”); Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) 

(looking to “[t]he circumstances surrounding the particular pleading, including the nature 

of the action, the sort of relief being sought, the availability of information, and other 

practical considerations”). 

Karupaiyan, for example, has not alleged material facts bearing on his claims that 

one would expect to be within his knowledge, such as the specific position or positions 

for which he applied, or when. Nor has he alleged any identifying information about the 

“Wipro employee” or employees who allegedly made the statements referenced above or 

any other employee with whom he may have spoken or who might have been involved in 

the alleged decision not to hire him. Cf. Martinez, 986 F.3d at 267 (summarizing details 

5 Karupaiyan’s allegations of discrimination occupy only about two pages of his 41-page 

complaint. The rest of the complaint accuses Wipro and other defendants of nonactionable misconduct (such as violation of various criminal statutes) and requests plainly 

fanciful relief (such as an order transferring ownership of Wipro to him). 

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6

that were enough to put the defendant on notice of an ADEA claim). Such details are all 

the more important here because Karupaiyan alleges that Wipro’s decision not to hire 

him was the product of numerous separate forms of discrimination. 

In sum, Karupaiyan has not stated an ADA or ADEA claim (or any other 

discrimination claim). But as to his ADA and ADEA claims only,6 we will remand for 

the District Court to give him another chance to amend his complaint. We take that step 

because the court did not reach the merits of his ADA claim and did not identify any 

specific deficiency with his ADEA claim.7

 For similar reasons, we conclude that 

Karupaiyan has not waived or forfeited the ability to amend his complaint as to these 

claims by standing on his compliant for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Cf.

Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2000).

6 Karupaiyan also asserted his claims of disability and age discrimination under the New 

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). (ECF No. 1 at 26 ¶¶ 302, 304.) The 

District Court did not identify those claims, but our discussion of Karupaiyan’s ADA and 

ADEA claims and our remand applies equally to them.

7 In noting several deficiencies ourselves, we do not intend to provide a checklist of 

specific matters that Karupaiyan must allege or that will suffice to state a claim. Instead, 

if Karupaiyan files an amended complaint, and if the District Court screens it under § 

1915(e)(2)(B), see note 9, infra, then the court can consider whether the amended 

complaint as whole states plausible claims to relief. 

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Thus, we will vacate the dismissal of these claims and will remand for further 

proceedings. On remand, the court should provide Karupaiyan with another chance to 

cure his IFP application8 and another chance to amend his complaint.9

III.

For these reasons, we will affirm in part but will vacate the order of dismissal in 

part and remand for further proceedings as to Karupaiyan’s claims under the ADA and 

ADEA and his related claims under the NJLAD. Karupaiyan’s motion to enjoin a Wipro 

“outsourcing deal” is denied. To the extent that any of Karupaiyan’s filings on appeal 

can be construed to request any other relief, such relief is denied as well.

8 Karupaiyan has argued on appeal that he need not show indigence in order to proceed 

IFP because this suit is in the “bests interest” of the United States. That argument lacks 

merit because the IFP statute requires a showing of indigence, see Walker v. People 

Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989), which in turn requires 

“particularized information with regard to the party’s financial status,” id. at 602 n.5. 

And we agree with the District Court that Karupaiyan failed to make that showing for the 

reasons the court explained. But in light of our ruling, the court should give Karupaiyan 

another chance to make that showing on remand.

9 When a plaintiff submits an IFP motion and a complaint, courts can address IFP status 

and dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) “in either order or even simultaneously.” Brown v. 

Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc). The District Court in this case 

addressed the issues simultaneously, but nothing in this opinion prevents the court from 

taking a different approach on remand after giving Karupaiyan another chance to cure his

IFP application and amend his compliant.

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