Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02541/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02541-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL W. GIBBS III,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-2541 DMS (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY,

Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego’s motion to 

dismiss. Plaintiff Samuel W. Gibbs III filed an opposition,1 and Defendant filed a 

reply. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is granted.

I.

BACKGROUND

On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initially filed a Complaint 

against the San Diego Child Support Services and Shari Kugler. After a series of 

motions and hearings, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against 

San Diego County on May 2, 2017, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 

 1 Plaintiff has also filed a surreply, which the Court considered in resolving the 

present motion.

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§§ 1981 & 1985. On September 20, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 

FAC for failure to state a claim, which the Court granted with leave to amend. On 

November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). 

Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss the SAC on December 11, 2017. 

II.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss the SAC on grounds that Plaintiff has failed to 

allege a short and plain statement showing he is entitled to relief under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8(a), has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), and has failed to file a timely claim under California 

Government Code § 945.4.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 

claims asserted in the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires only “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a 

minimum, a complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide “fair notice” of 

both the particular claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 pleading standard 

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations of the 

complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 

them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, 

however, need not accept all conclusory allegations as true. Rather, it must 

“examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as 

alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) 

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(citation omitted); see Benson v. Ariz. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d 272, 275–

76 (9th Cir. 1982) (court need not accept conclusory legal assertions). A motion to 

dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings 

by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se plaintiff’s 

complaint must be construed liberally to determine whether a claim has been stated. 

See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a pro se 

litigant’s pleadings still must meet some minimum threshold in providing the 

defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong. See Brazil v. U.S. 

Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 

52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro 

se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.”).

The Court previously advised Plaintiff as to the deficiencies in the FAC and

has liberally granted leave to amend. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to cure the 

noted deficiencies. For example, like the FAC, the SAC does not satisfy the minimal 

notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 as it fails to give Defendant a short and plain 

statement as to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has also failed to sufficiently state a 

legally cognizable claim upon which relief could be granted as the SAC is almost 

entirely devoid of factual allegations. Moreover, although the SAC purports to assert 

civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1985, the factual allegations 

pertain to a prior child support order issued by the Superior Court of California, 

County of San Diego in 1996. The Court, however, informed Plaintiff in the prior

order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC that to the extent Plaintiff 

seeks to challenge the prior state-court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 

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such action. See Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Rooker–Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court 

judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federalcourt plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.”). 

The Court has cautioned Plaintiff that if the SAC does not cure the pleading 

deficiencies, his claims will be dismissed with prejudice and without further leave 

to amend. Because Plaintiff has not been able to provide a short and plain statements 

of the claims or to state a claim, the Court finds that any amendment would be futile. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted without leave to amend. See, e.g., 

Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (no need to 

prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment where the “basic flaw” in the 

underlying facts as alleged cannot be cured by amendment); Lipton v. Pathogenesis 

Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because any amendment would be 

futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further 

amendment.”). 

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted without 

leave to amend. This case is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2018

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