Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-06-04606/USCOURTS-ca3-06-04606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 06-4606

___________

JAMES DOUGLAS CLAUSELL,

Appellant,

v.

LYDELL SHERRER; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

 

______________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(No. 04-cv-03857)

District Court Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman

___________

 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 09, 2009

___________

Before: AMBRO, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 5, 2010)

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-2-

Mary Gibbons, Esquire

600 Mule Road, #16

Toms River, New Jersey 08757

Counsel for Appellant

Robert D. Bernardi, Esquire

Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, Esquire

Burlington County Prosecutor’s Office

49 Rancocas Road

Mount Holly, New Jersey 08060

Counsel for Appellees

___________

OPINION

___________

GARTH, Circuit Judge:

Appellant James Douglas Clausell appeals for a new trial

from the order of the United States District Court for the District

of New Jersey which denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Clausell claims that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to the

prosecutor’s peremptory challenges to Afro-American and/or

Hispanic venirepersons. We will affirm.

I.

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
1

Appellant Clausell is an Afro-American, as was

Atwood.

2

Because the sole issue before us on appeal arises from

the jury selection at Clausell’s 1995 retrial, we supply only a

basic procedural history of the case up until that point.

3

The New Jersey law in effect in 1996 distinguished

between the crimes of first-degree murder and first-degree

capital murder. A person was guilty of first-degree murder if he

was found to have “purposely or knowingly caused death or

participated in one of number of crimes during the commission

-3-

On October 31, 1984, the Burlington County Grand Jury

indicted Clausell for first degree capital murder of Edward Louis

Atwood.1

 At the ensuing trial, a jury convicted Clausell of, inter

alia, first-degree capital murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. §§

2C:11-3(a)(1)&(2).2

 During the penalty phase of the trial,

Clausell was sentenced to death pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c).

Clausell appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and in

1990 Clausell’s conviction was reversed and the case was

remanded for a new trial.

In October 1995, jury selection commenced for

Clausell’s retrial. During the process of jury selection, Clausell

did not object to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges

to excuse five of the eight Afro-American and/or Hispanic

members of the venire. 

Clausell was retried from December 4, 1995, to January

19, 1996. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Clausell

guilty of, inter alia, first-degree murder.3

 He was sentenced to

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
of which death resulted.” State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 203

(1987) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(3)). Defendants

convicted of first-degree murder were sentenced to a prison

term of at least thirty years without parole. Id. In contrast, a

person was guilty of first-degree capital murder only if “he has

been found guilty of purposeful and knowing murder and

committed the murder by his own hand or paid someone else to

do so.” Id. Defendants convicted of first-degree capital murder

“face either death or at least a thirty-year term of imprisonment

without parole, depending on the outcome of the sentencing

proceeding.” Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c) (repealed 2007)).

-4-

life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier.

Clausell appealed his conviction and sentence, but did not

raise any claims regarding the prosecutor’s use of peremptory

challenges during jury selection. On April 1, 1999, the New

Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, denied his appeal.

Clausell thereafter filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief on September 24, 1999, wherein he alleged for the first

time that he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights to effective assistance of counsel “by his attorneys [sic] .

. . [f]ailure to object to [sic] Batson violation . . . .” App. at 172.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court

held that “racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory

challenges by a prosecutor is a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause . . . .” Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 965 (3d Cir. 1993).

On April 11, 2002, the New Jersey Superior Court denied

Clausell’s petition for post-conviction relief. Clausell appealed,

and the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,

affirmed the denial of Clausell’s petition in a decision dated

December 10, 2003. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied

certification on April 26, 2004.

Clausell then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-5-

the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, wherein he raised, inter alia, the

claim that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of

his trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson objection in response

to the State’s use of peremptory challenges during jury selection

for his retrial. The District Court denied Clausell’s petition.

Clausell v. Sherrer, 2006 WL 2846283 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006).

Clausell subsequently submitted a request to this Court

for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1),

which was granted with respect to two independent claims—(1)

a substantive Batson claim; and (2) a Sixth Amendment

ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon the failure

of Clausell’s counsel to raise a Batson objection. Order,

Clausell v. Sherrer, No. 06-4606 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2007).

II.

In Batson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fundamental

principle that “racial discrimination in jury selection offends the

Equal Protection Clause,” 476 U.S. at 85, and further held that

“a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful

discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence

concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges

at the defendant’s trial.” Id. at 96. The Court then addressed the

now-familiar three-step analysis guiding trial courts’

constitutional review of peremptory challenges, which places

the initial burden on the defendant to come forward with a prima

facie case indicating discriminatory purpose by the prosecution

in the exercise of its challenges, id. at 96-97, then shifts the

burden to the prosecution, which must supply race-neutral

explanations for its challenges, id. at 97, and finally tasks the

court with the duty of “determin[ing] if the defendant has

established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98.

While Batson discussed the analysis of a defendant’s

objection to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges, the

Court expressly “decline[d] . . . to formulate particular

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-6-

procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection

to a prosecutor’s challenges,” id. at 99 (emphasis added),

explaining that “[i]n light of the variety of jury selection

practices followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make

no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our

holding today.” Id. at 99 n.24.

Just a few months after Batson was issued, the New

Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150

(1986), accepted the implicit invitation to “spell out the contours

of [Batson’s] Equal Protection holding,” Batson, 479 U.S. at 103

(White, J., concurring), and proceeded to “formulate the

procedures to be followed by trial courts when a defendant

alleges that a prosecutor is improperly using peremptory

challenges,” Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1163. Though the Gilmore

court expressly “base[d] [its] decision on the New Jersey

Constitution, which protects fundamental rights independently

of the United States Constitution,” id. at 1157, it clearly

intended its holding to conform to the parameters set forth in

Batson. See id. (“We observe that under Batson’s interpretation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .

. . the United States Constitution would compel the result that

we reach on independent state grounds.”). Gilmore effectively

added flesh to the framework discussed in Batson by setting

forth the precise standards applicable to each step of the

analysis. Id. at 1164-67. 

Of particular significance to the instant case is Gilmore’s

discussion of the first step of the analysis, which states that, in

order to establish a prima facie claim, “[t]he defendant . . . must

show that there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory

challenges resulting in the exclusion were based on assumptions

about group bias rather than any indication of situation-specific

bias.” Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). The “substantial

likelihood” standard for establishing a prima facie claim

remained controlling law in New Jersey for more than two

decades, and had been in place for nine years at the time of

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
4

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1291 and 2253. Because the District Court ruled on

Clausell’s habeas petition without conducting an evidentiary

hearing, we conduct a plenary review. McMullen v. Tennis, 562

F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009).

-7-

Clausell’s 1995 retrial. 

In 2009, nearly twenty-three years to the day after it

decided Gilmore, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged

in State v. Osorio, 973 A.2d 365 (2009), that the “substantial

likelihood” standard set forth in Gilmore as the threshold for

establishing a prima facie claim of improper race-based

peremptory challenges by the prosecution was in tension with

the Supreme Court’s holding in Batson. 973 A.2d at 375-76.

Taking its cue from Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005),

where the Supreme Court clarified that “a defendant satisfies the

requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence

sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that

discrimination has occurred,” id. at 170 (emphasis added), the

New Jersey Supreme Court in Osorio modified Gilmore’s

“substantial likelihood” standard to the less-onerous “inference”

standard announced in Johnson. Osorio, 973 A.2d at 375-76.

Having supplied the relevant jurisprudential backdrop,

we direct our attention to Clausell’s claims.4

 

 III. 

As an initial matter, we can dispose of Clausell’s

substantive Batson claim, because in failing to raise an objection

at trial to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges,

Clausell forfeited his right to raise a Batson claim on appeal.

See Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Abu

Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated on

other grounds sub nom. Beard v. Abu Jamal, ___ S.Ct. ___,

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-8-

2010 WL 154862 (2010)). Accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 100

(specifically noting that defendant made a “timely” objection);

Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1164 (“As a threshold matter, we

emphasize that the defendant must timely object to the

prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges – during or at the

end of the jury selection, but before the petit jury is sworn. This

requirement will facilitate the development of as complete a

record of the circumstances as is feasible, as well as enabling the

trial court to make a fairer determination.”).

IV.

We now turn to Clausell’s Sixth Amendment claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel. Clausell makes no secret of

the fact that the ineffective assistance claim is his primary claim

on appeal, stating in his brief that he is “not asking for

consideration of the substantive Batson claim, but rather, the

Sixth Amendment claim based on ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 29, Clausell v. Sherrer,

No. 06-4606 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2009). This conforms with the

contents of Clausell’s petition for post-conviction relief, where

he raised an ineffective assistance claim premised upon his

counsel’s failure to raise a Batson objection, but did not raise an

independent Batson claim. See App. at 171-72. 

In order to obtain habeas relief from the New Jersey

Superior Court’s denial of his ineffective assistance claim,

Clausell must satisfy the standards set forth by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 et seq. McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.

2009). AEDPA provides that, where, as here,

a habeas petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the

merits in state court, the petition may not be

granted unless the state court decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
5

Although Clausell, in his petition for post-conviction

relief, grounded his ineffective assistance claim regarding his

counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s use of

peremptory challenges upon Batson, which articulates a

defendant’s rights vis-á-vis race-based peremptory challenges

-9-

States or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. Under the

§ 2254 standard, a district court is bound to

presume that the state court’s factual findings are

correct, with the burden on the petitioner to rebut

those findings by clear and convincing evidence.

Simmons v. Beard, 581 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) & (e)(1)) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). 

A state court decision “fails the ‘contrary to’ prong of

AEDPA if the state court reaches a conclusion opposite to the

Supreme Court's own conclusion on a question of law or decides

the case differently where the Supreme Court was confronted by

a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” McMullen, 526 F.3d

at 236. “Similarly, a state court ruling is considered an

‘unreasonable application’ if the state court unreasonably

applies the correct legal rule to the particular facts, unreasonably

extends a legal principle to a new context, or unreasonably

refuses to extend the principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Id.

In denying Clausell’s ineffective assistance claim, the

New Jersey Superior Court concluded that the evidence

submitted by Clausell—namely, the fact that the prosecutor used

peremptory challenges to strike five of the eight Afro-American

and/or Hispanic members of the venire—would not have

succeeded in satisfying Gilmore’s “substantial likelihood”

threshold for establishing a prima facie claim.5

 App. at 190.

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
under the U.S. Constitution, see App. at 172, the New Jersey

Superior Court evaluated his claim through the lens of Gilmore,

which rested upon the rights provided by the New Jersey

Constitution. See Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1157. This is not

surprising, given that New Jersey courts viewed the protection

provided by Gilmore pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution

as not only equal to, but in fact greater than, that provided by

the U.S. Constitution under Batson. See Gilmore, 511 A.2d at

1157 (“We previously have construed our state constitution as

providing greater protection to our citizens’ individual rights

than accorded them under the federal constitution. We do so

here as well.”); accord State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1141-42

(2004).

6

Clausell points out that a self-prepared chart he

submitted in state court not only identifies the races of the jurors

who were struck, but also the racial composition of the entire

venire. He concedes that there is no record evidence

substantiating his assertions of the racial composition of the

venire, or that of the venirepersons who were struck by the

State. Clausell relied only upon his memory of the jury

selection process—which had occurred almost six years

earlier—to identify the races of the venirepersons. Under the

circumstances, we can find no error by Clausell’s counsel in

failing to object to the prosecution’s use of peremptory

challenges, given that such an objection would have been

judicially futile and overruled, as it did not meet Gilmore’s

-10-

The court noted that “[t]his statistic alone does not prove that

the strikes were discriminatory in nature,” and thus, “[w]ithout

further proof of this claim[,] . . . the argument fails.” Id. The

court reasoned that since Clausell failed to assert sufficient

evidence to establish a prima facie claim under the prevailing

Gilmore standard, ipso facto his trial counsel was not ineffective

in failing to raise what would have been a meritless claim.6

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
demanding “substantial likelihood” standard, which was firmly

entrenched in New Jersey’s jurisprudence at the time of

Clausell’s re-trial.

-11-

We find this logic sound. “The Sixth Amendment

entitles criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel

– that is, representation that does not fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional

norms.” Bobby v. Van Hook, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 13, 16

(2009) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984)) (quotation marks omitted). The

“prevailing professional norms” standard is temporally sensitive,

determined in each instance by “the professional norms

prevailing when the [allegedly ineffective] representation took

place.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (emphasis

added). In addition, a court evaluating an ineffective assistance

claim must do so “[i]n light of the variety of circumstances

faced by defense counsel and the range of legitimate decisions

regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant”; thus “the

performance inquiry necessarily turns on whether counsel’s

assistance was reasonable considering all of the circumstances.”

Wong v. Belmontes, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 383, 384 (2009)

(per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89) (quotation

marks and alteration omitted). Moreover, “[t]he benchmark for

judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a

just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Finally, it bears noting

that “[a]t all points, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential.” Wong, 130 S.Ct. at 384-85

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (quotation marks and

alteration omitted).

At the 1995 retrial, when Clausell was allegedly the

victim of ineffective representation, the governing and

controlling law in New Jersey regarding the standard for

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-12-

asserting a prima facie claim of improper peremptory challenges

by the prosecutor was the “substantial likelihood” standard

prescribed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gilmore. An

objection by Clausell’s counsel in the face of that

standard—when all Clausell could show was the unadorned fact

that five out of eight Afro-American and/or Hispanic

venirepersons had been excused by peremptory

challenges—would have been rejected by all courts and thus

utterly futile, given the precedent set by Gilmore.

Was Clausell’s counsel reasonable in not objecting to the

prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, given the lack of

evidence pointing to prejudice, juxtaposed with Gilmore’s

demanding “substantial likelihood” standard? Pursuant to the

Gilmore precedent, we can confidently answer this question in

the affirmative. 

Thus, our “effort[s] . . . to eliminate the distorting effects

of hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at that time,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, lead us to

conclude that the failure of Clausell’s trial counsel to raise what

would have been a rejected Batson objection under the

prevailing law in New Jersey at that time does not “fall[] below

an objective standard of reasonableness, given the particular

circumstances of the case at hand.” Hodge v. U.S., 554 F.3d

372, 379 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 688 (1984)) (quotation marks omitted). Clausell’s

ineffective assistance claim fails to meet the first prong of the

Strickland standard—i.e., to show that the assistance of counsel

was deficient.

V.

In evaluating Clausell’s Sixth Amendment claim pursuant

to the guidelines set forth in AEDPA, our inquiry is limited to

determining whether the state court reasonably applied

established federal law regarding Sixth Amendment ineffective

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-13-

assistance claims—which, we conclude, it did. The New Jersey

Superior Court’s reasoning in denying Clausell’s Sixth

Amendment ineffective assistance claim was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial

of Clausell’s petition for habeas relief on his Sixth Amendment

ineffective assistance claim. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,

237 (2000).

VI.

The District Court correctly denied Clausell’s substantive

Batson claim and his Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance

claim, and we will affirm its judgment.

James D. Clausell v. Lydell Sherrer

No. 06-4606

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring

I agree with my colleagues that Clausell has forfeited

his substantive Batson claim by failing to raise a

contemporaneous objection at trial. Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
7

 Although the venire initially had 50 potential jurors,

three were excused by the trial court before the parties began

exercising their peremptory strikes.

-14-

F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

Beard v. Abu-Jamal, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2010 WL 154862 (2010). 

While I would also affirm the dismissal of Clausell’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, I would do so on

narrower grounds, and write separately to address another

matter, not necessary to the outcome of this case, that I

nonetheless deem of concern.

In state post-conviction review proceedings, Clausell

submitted a self-prepared chart purporting to identify the

racial composition of the venire from his 1995 retrial. 

Clausell’s chart reflects that (1) the venire consisted of 47

individuals,7

 eight of whom were minorities (five AfricanAmericans and three Hispanics); (2) one African-American

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
8

 According to Clausell’s chart, his own counsel struck

the third Hispanic venireperson, and the State used its remaining

6 peremptory strikes against white venirepersons. 

9

 As we explained in Abu-Jamal, “[t]he strike rate is

computed by comparing the number of peremptory strikes the

prosecutor used to remove black potential jurors with the

prosecutor’s total number of peremptory strikes exercised. This

statistical computation differs from the ‘exclusion rate,’ which

is calculated by comparing the percentage of exercised

challenges used against black potential jurors with the

percentage of black potential jurors known to be in the venire.”

Id. at 290. 

-15-

and one white venireperson were excused by the trial court;

and (3) out of 11 peremptory challenges, the State used three

against the four remaining African-American venirepersons,

and two against the three Hispanic venirepersons.8

 On appeal,

Clausell emphasizes that his chart reveals a “strike rate” of

45%, and an “exclusion rate” of 71%.9 Accordingly, he

argues that trial counsel could have made out a prima facie

Batson claim based on a “pattern” of strikes, which, as our

Court recently explained, requires evidence of “both the strike

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-16-

rate and the racial composition of the venire.” Id. at 290. 

Trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson challenge based on

these statistics—resulting in the failure to trigger the threestep Batson inquiry—is the basis of Clausell’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim. 

Clausell concedes, however, that the trial record itself

does not indicate the racial composition of the venire or the

races of the venirepersons who were struck by the State. 

Lacking any record evidence to corroborate Clausell’s chart,

we cannot rely on it or the racial makeup it purports to

disclose, as it is apparently based solely on his memory of

jury selection in a trial that occurred six years prior. See

Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (petitioner’s

allegations that the prosecutor “exercised eight peremptory

strikes against African American potential jurors and four

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-17-

against white potential jurors,” and that he was “tried . . . by

an all-white jury,” failed to establish a prima facie Batson

claim, where petitioner “d[id] not cite to any record support,

nor d[id] he offer other support outside the record, to

substantiate [his] bare allegation[s]”); Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at

291–92 & n.18 (although record showed that prosecution used

10 out of 15 peremptory strikes to remove black

venirepersons, “[t]here [was] no factual finding at any level of

adjudication, nor evidence from which to determine the racial

composition . . . of the entire venire—facts that would permit

the computation of the exclusion rate and would provide

important contextual markers to evaluate the strike rate”). 

Because we cannot rely on Clausell’s allegations regarding

the racial composition of the venire, we need not reach the

question whether an objection based on statistics consistent

with his chart would have been sufficient to establish a prima

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
10 I do not understand my colleagues to be holding that

evidence of a “pattern” of strikes against minority

venirepersons, without more, would have been insufficient as a

matter of law to establish a prima facie case under Gilmore.

Indeed, the Gilmore Court emphasized that determining whether

there is a “substantial likelihood” of group bias requires

-18-

facie Batson claim. That is, even under a less “demanding”

standard than that announced in State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d

1150 (N.J. 1986), Maj. Op. at 10 n.5, Clausell’s allegations

are insufficient to show that trial counsel was deficient for

failing to raise a Batson objection. 

Although they also discredit the reliability of

Clausell’s chart, id. at 10 n.6, my colleagues conclude that

Clausell’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails

because a Batson challenge by trial counsel, based on the

“unadorned fact” that five out of eight minorities were struck,

“would have been rejected by all courts and thus utterly futile,

given the precedent set by Gilmore.”10 Id. at 12. However, I

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
consideration of “all relevant circumstances,” including whether

(1) the prosecutor struck “‘most or all of the members of [an]

identified group from the venire,’” or (2) the prosecutor used a

“‘disproportionate number’” of peremptory strikes against

members of that group. Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1165 (quoting

People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 764 (Cal. 1978)). 

-19-

am troubled by portions of the majority opinion that could be

read to imply that Gilmore’s “substantial likelihood” standard

itself is not “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application

of,” Batson. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

My colleagues first suggest that the Supreme Court

only recently “clarified” in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.

162 (2005), that a standard similar to Gilmore’s “substantial

likelihood” standard—i.e., California’s “more likely than not”

test—is inconsistent with Batson. Maj. Op. at 7. I have

doubts about this characterization of Johnson. Although the

Supreme Court reaffirmed in Johnson that “a defendant

satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
11 I note that Gilmore’s “substantial likelihood” standard

was “based on the reasoning in” People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d

748 (Cal. 1978)—the California Supreme Court decision that

established the “more likely than not” standard the Supreme

Court rejected in Johnson. State v. Osorio, 973 A.2d 365, 376

(N.J. 2009) (“[T]he ‘more likely than not’ standard on which

Gilmore is premised is the very standard the Supreme Court of

the United States condemned as being ‘at odds with the prima

facie inquiry mandated by Batson.’”) (quoting Johnson, 545

U.S. at 173). 

-20-

evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an

inference that discrimination has occurred,” 545 U.S. at 170

(emphasis added), the Batson Court itself used the term

“inference” to describe the requisite prima facie showing, and

held that a “pattern” of strikes against minority jurors “might

give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). Indeed, the Johnson Court

concluded that California’s “more likely than not” standard

found “no support” in Batson.

11 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169.

The Majority also appears to suggest that Gilmore is

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-21-

not contrary to Batson because Batson “decline[d] . . . to

formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a

defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges,”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 99, and the “substantial likelihood”

standard was New Jersey’s answer to the Batson Court’s

“implicit invitation.” Maj. Op. at 5–6. I do not read this

language from Batson as authorizing states to impose a more

onerous burden to establish a prima facie case, however. 

Rather, the Batson Court seemed to be referring to the

“particular procedures” to be followed after a finding of

discrimination had been made. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99

n.24 (“[W]e express no view on whether it is more

appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of

discrimination . . . , for the trial court to discharge the venire

and select a new jury . . . , or to disallow the discriminatory

challenges and resume selection with the improperly

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-22-

challenged jurors reinstated on the venire.”) (internal citations

omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected a similar

argument in Johnson, reasoning that although states “have

flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply

with Batson,” California’s “more likely than not” standard

was “an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the

sufficiency of a prima facie case.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168;

but see id. at 173–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that

California’s “more likely than not” standard fell “comfortably

within its broad discretion to craft its own rules of criminal

procedure,” and arguing that Batson had “disclaimed any

intent to instruct state courts on how to implement its

holding”). 

In any event, our Court has never addressed whether

the Gilmore “substantial likelihood” standard is contrary to or

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/05/2010
-23-

an unreasonable application of Batson, and we are not

required to answer that question in this case. With this

qualification, I join my colleagues in concluding that Clausell

has not met his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), of showing that trial counsel was deficient

for failing to raise a Batson objection.

Case: 06-4606 Document: 003110011920 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/05/2010