Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01414/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01414-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RICHARD STIEFEL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1414-H

(WMC)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT

vs.

BECHTEL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

On May 29, 2007, defendant Bechtel Corporation (“Defendant”) filed a motion

to dismiss plaintiff James Richard Stiefel’s (Plaintiff) second amended complaint

(“SAC”). (Doc. Nos. 44-45.) On July 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition to

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 49.) On July 6, 2007, Defendant filed a

reply. (Doc. No. 50.) 

The Court exercises its discretion to decide this motion on the papers, without

oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the

Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311 of California’s Labor Code, as those claims

are barred by the federal enclave doctrine. 

Background

Plaintiff began working for Defendant at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating

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Station (“SONGS”) on or about May 1, 2004 in the facilities department. (SAC ¶ 8.)

On or about March 6, 2006, Defendant laid off Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendant

performs services at SONGS pursuant to a contract it has with Southern California

Edison. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

In June 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior Court for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, failure to accommodate a disability

in violation of California’s Fair Employment Housing Act, section 12940 et seq. of

California’s Labor Code (“FEHA”), retaliation in violation of FEHA, violations of

California’s Labor Code, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-74.) Defendant removed the suit to federal court. (Notice

Removal, at 1-6.) On December 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint

(“FAC”) adding claims for failure to accommodate a disability in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and retaliation in violation of the ADA.

(FAC ¶¶ 1-75.) 

On February 26, 2007, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. At the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney Marcus Jackson stated that

he did not have a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) regarding his ADA claims. On April 10, 2007, the Court filed

an order dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s disability discrimination and

retaliation claims based on the ADA, Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim under

the Rehabilitation Act, and Plaintiff’s claims for violations of sections 6310 and 6311

of California’s Labor Code. (Doc. No. 41.) The court dismissed with prejudice

Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, disability

discrimination and retaliation pursuant to FEHA, violations of sections 98.6, 1102.5,

132a, 6402, 6403, and 6404 of California’s labor code, negligent supervision, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) 

On May 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a SAC, in which he alleged Defendant violated

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sections 6310 and 6311 of California’s Labor Code. On May 29, 2007, Defendant filed

a motion to dismiss both claims. (Doc. Nos. 44-45.) 

Discussion

A. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss

Defendant has moved to dismiss both claims in Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

section 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a claim either

where that claim lacks a cognizable legal theory, or where insufficient facts are alleged

to support plaintiff’s theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive

a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement

to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1964-65 (2007). Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if

doubtful in fact. See id. at 1965. 

Dismissal is proper if a complaint is vague, conclusory, and fails to set forth any

material facts in support of the allegation. See North Star Intern. v. Arizona Corp.

Com'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, a court may not “supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). If a complaint is found to fail

to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Doe v.

United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As a general matter, a court may only consider the pleadings and judicially

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noticed facts in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly attached

to the complaint may properly be considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See id. at 1555 n.19.

Also, a court may consider documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and

whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

plaintiff’s pleading. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). This

doctrine extends to situations in which the plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of

a document and the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, even

though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the

complaint. See id.

B. Federal Enclave Doctrine

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311 of

California’s Labor Code are barred by the federal enclave doctrine. 

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution provides that

Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation over all places

purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be. This

constitutional provision grants federal courts federal question jurisdiction over tort

claims that arise on federal enclaves. See Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d

1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006); see also William W. Schwarzer, et al., California Practice

Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial,¶ 2:89.10, p. 2B-30 (2005). Furthermore, the

enclave clause permits the continuance of those state laws existing at the time of the

surrender of sovereignty, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the laws of the

United States or with the governmental use for which the property was acquired, unless

they are abrogated by Congress, so that no area may be left without a developed legal

system for private rights. See Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of Cal.,

318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100

(1940). Because the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, such laws become

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federal laws, although having their origin in the laws of the state. See James Stewart

& Co., 309 U.S. at 100; Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1952); see also

91 C.J.S. United States § 15 (2006). 

Only state laws in effect at the time of cession or transfer of jurisdiction,

however, can continue in operation. See James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100. Once

a state cedes jurisdiction to the federal government, “an authorization of state

regulation is found only when and to the extent there is ‘a clear congressional

mandate,’ ‘specific congressional action’ that makes this authorization of state

regulation ‘clear and unambiguous.’” Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976).

Therefore, a “federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded from

direct state regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private

contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such state regulation.” Goodyear

Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988). 

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Pursuant to Sections 6310 and 6311 of California’s

Labor Code

The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the fact that SONGS is located

within the federal enclave of Camp Pendleton, which was acquired by the federal

government no later than December 31, 1942. (Order Granting Mot. Dismiss at 3-5.)

Defendant argues that sections 6310 and 6311 of California’s Civil Code were enacted

after the transfer of jurisdiction of the area encompassing SONGS to the federal

government, and therefore Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to those sections must be

dismissed. Plaintiff counters that Congress has approved the enforcement of these

statutes on federal enclaves.

Sections 6310 and 6311 of California’s Labor Code were enacted as part of the

California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (“Cal/OSHA”). See Cal. Stats.

1973, ch. 993, §§ 40, 59, 61, p. 1927, 1930; see also Division of Labor Law

Enforcement v. Sampson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 893, 895 (1976) (“Labor Code section 6310

is a part of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973.”) Section 6311

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was derived from former section 6604 of the Labor Code, adopted by the California

Legislature in 1949. See Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 1060, § 1, p. 1968. Therefore, both of

these California statutes are inapplicable in SONGS because of the federal enclave

doctrine unless they come within a reservation of jurisdiction or were adopted by

Congress. See James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S.

245, 268 (1963); 91 C.J.S. United States § 15.

Plaintiff, relying on Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472

(2000), argues that Congress has authorized the enforcement of sections 6310 and 6311

of California’s Labor Code in federal enclaves. In Taylor, the state appellate court held

that a plaintiff was able to bring a claim for alleged violations of the whistleblower

provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 6310 of California’s Labor Code

occurring on an Air Force base. See Taylor, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 483-85. The Taylor

court reasoned that the U.S. Secretary of Labor’s approval of the Cal/OSHA plan,

which provided for a private right of action against employers, “is the equivalent of

congressional action” for the purpose of permitting a plaintiff to assert a claim for relief

underCal/OSHA against a federal enclave contractor, and allows state safety regulation

of federal enclaves when the responsible federal agency does not claim “exclusive

jurisdiction.” See id. at 483-85 (citing Cal. Labor Code § 6303 (defining “place of

employment” within California as “any place, and the premises appurtenant thereto,

where employment is carried on, except a place the health and safety jurisdiction over

which is vested by law in, and actively exercised by, any state or federal agency . . . .”);

29 C.F.R. § 1952.172(b)(4) (providing “[t]he U.S. Department of Labor will continue

to exercise authority, among other things, with regard to: [¶] . . . . (4) Private

contractors on Federal installations where the Federal agency claims exclusive Federal

jurisdiction, challenges State jurisdiction and/or refuses entry to the State . . . .”). Since

the federal agency responsible for the federal enclave, the United States Air Force,

allowed inspectors from California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health to

investigate the plaintiff’s complaint that his termination from a civilian contractor

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operating on the Air Force base was racially motivated and was in retaliation for a

previous complaint regarding safety equipment, the Taylor court concluded that the

federal agency did not claim exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore California’s

occupational safety laws applied since the federal agency was not actively exercising

its jurisdiction. See id. Plaintiff argues that this Court should similarly conclude that

29 U.S.C. § 667(b), which creates a process whereby states may enact laws regarding

occupational safety or health issues to preempt federal standards, and 29 C.F.R.

1952.172(4), permit Plaintiff to bring his claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311

of California’s Labor Code because no federal agency is actively exercising exclusive

jurisdiction over SONGS.

Defendant argues that Taylor incorrectly concluded that approval of Cal/OSHA

by the U.S. Secretary of Labor permits, under certain circumstances, enforcement of

Cal/OSHA within a federal enclave, because such approval does not constitute the clear

and unambiguous congressional approval required to permit state regulation within a

federal enclave. See Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 180; Hancock, 426 U.S. at

179. Rather, Defendant argues, the Court should adopt the reasoning of Department

of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt & Aggregrate, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 49 (1992), in which the

Washington Supreme Court concluded that a status agreement between the state and

the Secretary of Labor did “not constitute a specific and unambiguous grant of

authority” to the state to enforce state laws in a federal enclave. See Department of

Labor & Indus., 120 Wash. 2d at 54 (“Absent a specific provision, [an] attempt to

imply a grant of authority from general language in OSHA is simply not sufficient to

support state regulation.”). The Department of Labor & Indus. court added that “[i]t

is highly questionable that the [U.S.] Secretary of Labor has the power to

independently allow states to enforce workers’ safety laws within a federal enclave.”

Id. at 55 n.4. Additionally, the court concluded that even if a state intends its safety

and health statutes to apply to federal enclaves, under the supremacy clause, federal

law preempts conflicting state legislation. See id. at 56.

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It appears to the Court that the Department of Labor & Indus. court’s conclusion

that the approval of the U.S. Secretary of Labor of a state occupational safety and

health statute is not the equivalent of the clear and unambiguous congressional

approval required to permit plaintiffs to bring claims pursuant to state law for actions

occurring at a federal enclave is correct. See Association of Public Agency Customers,

Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[S]tates do not

have the power, absent absolutely clear congressional direction to the contrary, to

regulate transmission lines owned by . . . a federal agency.”); Parola v. Weinberger, 848

F.2d 956, 960-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that federal installation was required to

comply with local exclusive garbage collection arrangement for solid waste collection

and disposal because 42 U.S.C. § 6961 “unambiguously subjects federal

instrumentalities to state and local regulation”); see also Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486

U.S. at 181-83 (clear congressional authorization for application of state statute was

provided by 40 U.S.C. § 290 to allow states to apply workmen’s compensation laws to

federal premises to same extent as such laws are applied to private facilities). 

It is not necessary, however, for this Court to decide whether a federal agencies’

failure to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over an occupational safety and health issue

in California could ever permit a plaintiff to bring suit pursuant to Cal/OSHA at a

federal enclave. Rather, the Court concludes that, even under Taylor’s permissive

standard, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his theory that the

federal agency responsible for SONGS has failed to exercise exclusive jurisdiction

such that Plaintiff may bring his claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311 of

California’s Labor Code. The Taylor court relied on the fact that it was undisputed that

Air Force officials allowed California Division of Occupational Safety and Health

inspectors to come onto the base to investigate the plaintiff’s complaints in concluding

that the Air Force was not actively exercising exclusive jurisdiction such that plaintiff

could pursue his § 6310 claim regarding activities on the federal enclave. See Taylor,

78 Cal. App. 4th at 484. Therefore, Plaintiff’s general allegations that no federal

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agency has exercised exclusive jurisdiction over SONGS and that the California

Division of Occupational Safety and Health has authority over private sector employers

and employees at SONGS and has issued citations and conducted investigation as

SONGS (SAC ¶ 5) fails to allege a failure by the federal agency responsible for

SONGS to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaints of retaliation to

allow Plaintiff’s 6310 and 6311 claims to escape being barred by the federal enclave

doctrine. Furthermore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is

unable to cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the Court grants with prejudice

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311

of California’s Labor Code as they are barred by the federal enclave doctrine. 

C. Other Arguments

Since the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to sections

6310 and 6311 of California’s Labor Code should be dismissed because they are barred

by the federal enclave doctrine, the Court declines to address Defendant’s arguments

that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his section 6311 claim, or

that Plaintiff’s jury demand and prayer for a permanent injunction, special damages,

noneconomic damages, general damages, and punitive damages should be stricken.

Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that SONGS is not located on a federal

enclave based on the retrocession of certain lands formerly a part of Camp Pendleton

(Pl.’s Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 1 n.1; Pl.’s Req. Judicial Notice Supp. Opp. Ex. A)

the Court concludes that the document submitted by Plaintiff supports, rather than

contradicts, the conclusion that SONGS is located on a federal enclave. The document,

minutes from California’s State Land Commission, discusses the retrocession of

property from the federal government to California that borders the property on which

SONGS is located. (Pl.’s Req. Judicial Notice Supp. Opp. Ex. A, at 699 (defining land

retroceded as “extending southeasterly a distance of eighteen thousand, two hundred

twenty feet (18,220) from the southeast boundary of an easement for construction and

operation of a nuclear generating station, granted to Southern California Edison

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Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company . . . .”).) Therefore, the Court

again takes judicial notice that SONGS is located within a federal enclave.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to sections 6310 and 6311

of California’s Labor Code, as those claims are barred by the federal enclave doctrine.

Since Plaintiff has no further claims before the Court at this time, the Clerk of Court

should close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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