Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00633/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00633-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LASHAWN BAREFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF

THE CALIFORNIA STATE

UNIVERSITY, BAKERSFIELD, JIM

GEORGE, DIANE HENDRICKSON,

MARK MURIE, DOES 1 through 50,

inclusive,,

Defendants.

_________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV-F-05-0633 AWI TAG

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Defendants have made a motion to reconsider the court’s order denying Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim with

respect to the individual defendants. Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

I. History

The facts of the case are familiar to all parties. The court refers to the detailed history set

forth in the August 1, 2007 Order. Doc. 105. That order granted summary judgment for

Defendants on the retaliation claim and denied summary judgment for Defendants on the race

discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims. Plaintiff’s

discrimination claim was understood to be against Defendant CSUB only; a racial discrimination

claim will lie against an employer only, not against supervisory employees. Defendants now

Case 1:05-cv-00633-AWI-TAG Document 116 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

seeks reconsideration, arguing that summary judgment should be granted on the IIED claims in

favor of Defendants George, Hendrickson, and Murie. Doc. 106. Defendants do not seek

reconsideration of the IIED ruling with respect to Defendant CSUB. Plaintiff opposes the

motion. The court asked for additional briefing, which was provided by both parties. The matter

was then taken under submission.

II. Legal Standards

Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(e), any motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no

later than ten days after entry of judgment. A motion for reconsideration of summary judgment

is appropriately brought under Rule 59(e).” Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.

1985). “Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order,

the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and

conservation of judicial resources. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted,

absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered

evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law. A

Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when

they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop,

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000), citations and quotations omitted.

III. Discussion

Defendants seek reconsideration of the IIED claim against George, Hendrickson, and

Murie. “Because Plaintiff’s discrimination claim cannot be asserted against the individual

defendants, neither can her IIED claim.” Doc. 162, Part 2, Defendants’ Brief, at 3:10-11. In the

original briefing on the summary judgment motion, Defendants did argue “the alleged conduct is

not sufficiently ‘extreme or outrageous,’ beyond that tolerated in a civilized society, to support an

IIED claim.” Doc. 77, Part 10, Defendants’ Brief, at 16:7-8. The issue of whether supervisor’s

actions in discriminating against a worker is sufficient to support an IIED claim was implicitly

raised in the original summary judgment briefing. 

Case 1:05-cv-00633-AWI-TAG Document 116 Filed 11/02/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

In the previous order, the court relied on the California Supreme Court’s holding:

“Employment discrimination may, of course, result in injury entitling an employee to damages in

a civil action under the act. The same conduct, however, may also simultaneously cause

additional injury outside the ambit of statutory protection. For example, as alleged in this case, an

employer’s discriminatory actions may constitute assault and battery or outrageous conduct

redressable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.

3d 65, 81 (Cal. 1990), citations omitted. The defendant in that case was a doctor: a sole

practitioner who was simultaneously the employer and supervisor. The plaintiffs alleged

harassment and discrimination. The California Supreme Court discussed both under the term

“discrimination” due to the fact that, “regulations and [Fair Employment and Housing]

Commission decisions recognize that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in

employment.” Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 73 n.4 (Cal. 1990). 

In discussing IIED when there is no identity between employer and supervisor, a clearer

distinction must be made. A California Court of Appeal has said,

The FEHA prohibits both harassment and discrimination. Case law has generally found

little reason to distinguish clearly between the type of allegations that support a claim of

harassment versus the type of allegations that support a claim of discrimination. The

Legislature, although clearly indicating an intended distinction between the two different

types of conduct by treating them differently in the wording of the FEHA, has not

provided any express definitions. Based upon the language used by the Legislature, we

conclude in part III below that it was the intent of the Legislature to place individual

supervisory employees at risk of personal liability for personal conduct constituting

harassment, but that it was not the intent of the Legislature to place individual supervisory

employees at risk of personal liability for personnel management decisions later

considered to be discriminatory. We conclude that the Legislature’s differential treatment

of harassment and discrimination is based on the fundamental distinction between

harassment as a type of conduct not necessary to a supervisor’s job performance, and

business or personnel management decisions--which might later be considered

discriminatory--as inherently necessary to performance of a supervisor’s job. As a

foundational step in our analysis, therefore, we distinguish harassment from

discrimination.

Janken v. Gm Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 62-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Based on the

distinction, the court concluded,

The allegations in the complaint here fail to plead facts which, if true, could legally

constitute harassment. All the actions alleged here are within the realm of properly

delegated personnel management authority. The personnel management actions alleged

here would be unlawful only if motivated by prohibited discriminatory considerations.

This alleged conduct, if first proven true and if then proven motivated by prohibited

Case 1:05-cv-00633-AWI-TAG Document 116 Filed 11/02/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

considerations, would constitute discrimination, not harassment. Since we have

concluded that only employers--and not individual supervisory employees--are at risk of

liability for discrimination, and since only discrimination is alleged here, the trial court

was correct in dismissing the individual supervisory employees. The intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim fails for similar reasons. An essential element of such a claim

is a pleading of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency. Managing

personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather

conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel

management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management

decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for

discrimination.

Janken v. Gm Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 79-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Janken’s

holding that discrimination without harassment can not subject supervisory employees to an IIED

claim has been cited by several federal courts. See, e.g., Kopelk v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc.,

2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8479, *2 (9th Cir. 2007) (in age discrimination case, “wrongful

termination is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to make out [an IIED] claim”); Howard v.

AMTRAK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34478, *34-35 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (in race discrimination

wrongful termination case, “defendants’ actions, even to the extent that they might be considered

discriminatory, are not sufficient to allow recovery for intentional infliction of emotional

distress”); Belliveau v. Thomson Fin., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88233, *8 (E.D. Cal. 2006);

Walker v. Boeing Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Terminating an

employee for improper or discriminatory reasons, like many other adverse personnel

management decisions, is insufficiently extreme or outrageous to give rise to a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress”). 

In this case, Barefield argues “the individually named Defendants collectively worked

together to ensure that Barefield did not receive the Director of Student Activities position. The

conduct that the Defendants engaged in was avoidable and unnecessary to job performance.

Specifically, the Defendants worked together to reclassify the Director of Student Activities

position to ensure Plaintiff would not be able to reapply for the position.” Doc. 114, Barefield’s

Supplemental Brief, at 2:13-19, citation omitted. The referenced actions may constitute job

discrimination, but not harassment. Defining the qualifications and duties of a position is

“inherently necessary to performance of a supervisor’s job” in contrast to harassment, which

Case 1:05-cv-00633-AWI-TAG Document 116 Filed 11/02/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

“includes, but is not limited to, verbal epithets or derogatory comments, physical interference

with freedom of movement, derogatory posters or cartoons, and unwanted sexual advances.”

Janken v. Gm Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The IIED

claims against George, Hendrickson, and Murie must fail as a matter of law. 

As IIED was the only remaining cause of action against those defendants, the case now

moves forward with CSUB as the sole defendant. The IIED claim against CSUB survives since

“a claim for IIED [against the employer] is possible even if the alleged wrongdoing by the

employer consists only of personnel management activity such as a termination.” Jelincic v.

Xerox Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20523, *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. James George’s, Dianne

Hendrickson’s, and Mark Murie’s motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00633-AWI-TAG Document 116 Filed 11/02/07 Page 5 of 5