Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02065/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02065-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY LESSIE, Civil

No. 

10-cv-2065-

IEG(RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[ECF NO. 4]

vs.

TIM VIRGA, Warden, 

Respondent.

Tony Lessie ("Lessie"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis with a First Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"), seeks

relief from his November 2006 second degree murder conviction in

San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCN200740, and from the

true findings that he used a firearm in connection with the

murder. He was sentenced to prison for a term of forty years to

life. Respondent filed an Amended Answer, conceding the Petition

was timely filed but opposing any habeas relief. (Am. Answer 6,

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ECF No. 15.)1 Lessie's deadline to file a traverse was

January 27, 2012. (Minute Order, ECF No. 14.) None was filed.

The dispositive issue presented in Lessie's Petition is

whether the Miranda rights of this underage defendant were

violated when he provided incriminating statements during two

custodial interrogations between the time he asked to call his

father and the granting of that request. The Court has reviewed

the pertinent portions of the record. For the reasons discussed

below, it is recommended that the Petition be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In its published opinion affirming the conviction, the

California Supreme Court summarized the underlying facts. People

v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152, 223 P.3d 3, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131

(2010). A presumption of correctness attaches to the state court

determination of factual issues. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West

2006). 

The evidence at trial showed that Rusty Seau died

in a street confrontation on June 9, 2005, in Oceanside. 

Police, acting on information identifying defendant as

the shooter, arrested him at 6:40 a.m. on September 20,

2005, at the home of his aunt and uncle in Hemet as he

attempted to escape through the rear window. Although

defendant formally resided with his father in Vista, his

father had reported him missing some months earlier. 

Defendant was, in his own words, "on the run from

probation." Defendant admitted his role in the shooting

during a custodial interrogation at a police station in

Oceanside and again during a subsequent interrogation at

juvenile hall. Defendant's confessions were generally

consistent with the other evidence admitted at trial,

including his own testimony.

Defendant claimed he had been forced to shoot by

James Turner, with whom he had been living. Turner, who

used the gang moniker "Black Jack" and claimed

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and

Recommendation refer to those imprinted by the Court's electronic case

filing system.

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membership in gangs affiliated with the Crips, forced a

confrontation with Seau and another man over an offense

given earlier in the day. Defendant, who used the

moniker "Blue Devil," denied belonging to a gang but

admitted wanting to join. On the way to the

confrontation, riding in a car with defendant and two

others, Turner gave defendant a pistol and told him he

"better shoot. You got to shoot somebody." Defendant

described the shooting as "like an initiation thing" and

believed he would be beaten or killed as "discipline" if

he did not do as he was told. Upon arriving at the

scene of the confrontation, defendant, Turner and the

others found that Seau and his companion did not want to

fight. Turner nevertheless "banged" on Seau by

announcing his gang affiliation, which Seau in turn

mocked, and Turner and a companion then attacked Seau. 

At this point, Turner shouted at defendant to shoot. As

Seau attempted to run away, defendant shot him fatally

in the back.

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1157, 223 P.3d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

134.

A March 28, 2006 information charged Lessie with the Seau

murder. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 1-3, Mar. 28, 2006.) 

Lessie was sixteen years old at the time, but was tried as an

adult. His October 2006 trial lasted approximately four days. 

(Id., Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 518-31, Oct. 24-27 and 30, 2006.) He

testified on his own behalf. (Id. at 529-530; Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 5, 620-95, Oct. 30, 2006.) The jury deliberated

more than three days before finding Lessie guilty of second degree

murder, a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187(a), with true

findings that he intentionally and personally discharged a handgun

causing bodily injury and death within the meaning of Cal. Penal

Code § 12022.53(d) and personally used a firearm, a violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

2, 452, 532-39, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 2, and 6, 2006.) He was

sentenced on December 15, 2006, to forty years to life in prison. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 6, 919-34, Dec. 15, 2006.)

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Lessie appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial court

committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress

pretrial admissions and admitting into evidence statements he made

during two custodial interviews after he had asked to call his

father. Lessie argued that his incriminating statements were

obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant's Opening Brief at

26-40, People v. Lessie, No. D050019 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 8,

2008).) In its reasoned decision affirming the judgment, the

court of appeal observed: 

Lessie does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the jury's verdict and findings he

fired the gun that killed Rusty Seau on June 9, 2005, in

Oceanside, California. Rather, the facts pertinent to

our discussion of his appellate issues come from the

suppression motion documents, the transcripts of the

custodial interviews on September 20 and 21, 2005, and

the record of the hearing on the matter.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Lessie, No. D050019, slip op. at 3-4

(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008) (footnote omitted).) 

The court of appeal discussed both the "totality of the

circumstances" test of Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728

(1979), and People v. Hector, 83 Cal. App. 4th 228, 99 Cal. Rptr.

2d 469 (2000), as well as the "per se" rule of People v. Burton, 6

Cal. 3d 375, 383-84, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), urged

by Lessie. The Burton court had created a state-law rule. 

Accordingly, we hold that when, as in this case, a

minor is taken into custody and is subjected to

interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his

request to see one of his parents, made at any time

prior to or during questioning, must, in the absence of

evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed

to indicate the minor suspect desires to invoke his

Fifth Amendment privilege. The police must cease

custodial interrogation immediately upon exercise of the

privilege.

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Burton, 6 Cal. 3d at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6;

accord People v. Rivera, 41 Cal. 3d 388, 710 P.2d 362, 221

Cal.Rptr. 562 (1985).

The California Court of Appeal thoroughly summarized the

parties' arguments to the trial court, the conduct and content of

the motions hearing, Lessie's two interviews on September 20 and

21, 2005, and the potential conflict between the federal and state

law standards. It concluded that the trial judge properly denied

Lessie's suppression motion under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477

(1981). (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Lessie, No. D050019, slip op.

at 2-3.) The Edwards Court emphasized that the validity of a

waiver of the right to counsel focuses on whether the defendant

understood his rights and intelligently and knowingly relinquished

them. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 481-82. "[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination

require[s] that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to

the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and

also the right to the presence of an attorney." Id.

Lessie petitioned the California Supreme Court for review,

raising the same challenges he raised in the court of appeal and

arguing for retention of the rule in People v. Burton. He

contended the Fare case did not supersede Burton, and because

there are no other procedural safeguards for juveniles facing

custodial interrogation, even under the totality of the

circumstances test, he had invoked his Miranda rights by asking to

call his father. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Lessie, No. [S163453]

(Cal. [filed May 12, 2008]) (petition for review at 13-27).)

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The court granted the petition for review. (Lodgment No. 8,

People v. Lessie, No. S163453 (Cal. July 23, 2008) (order granting

petition for review).) The state supreme court issued a reasoned

decision on January 28, 2010, superseding the opinion of the court

of appeal but reaching the same result. It summarized Lessie's

claim as follows: 

Defendant Tony Lessie, then 16 years old, was tried

as an adult and convicted of second degree murder. 

(Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Defendant challenges his

conviction, claiming the trial court prejudicially erred

under Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, by admitting into

evidence confessions he made during two custodial

interrogations.

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1157, 223 P.3d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

134. 

In his opening brief, Lessie argued that admissions he made

during the interviews on September 20 and 21, 2005, at the police

station and at juvenile hall, respectively, were obtained in

violation of Miranda; as a result, the evidence should have been

suppressed under California's Burton rule or, alternatively, 

under the federal "totality of the circumstances" test. (Lodgment

No. 9, Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-34, People v. Lessie, 47

Cal. 4th 1152, 223 P.3d 3, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131 (No. S163453).) 

Respondent argued that whether a minor has invoked his or her

Miranda rights must proceed solely under the totality of the

circumstances test, and Lessie fails that test. (Lodgment No. 10,

Respondent's Answer Brief at 10-17, 20-26, People v. Lessie, 47

Cal. 4th 1152, 223 P.3d 3, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131 (No. S163453).) 

The California Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the

[trial] court erred in admitting defendant's confessions into

evidence." Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1158, 223 P.3d at 5-6, 104 Cal.

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Rptr. 3d at 135. The court expressly intended "to reexamine

People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal. 3d 375 (Burton) in which this court

fashioned a special rule to govern the application of Miranda v.

Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 426 (Miranda) to minors." Lessie, 47

Cal. 4th at 1156, 223 P.3d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 133. The

state supreme court acknowledged that whether Burton "remains

valid depends on whether it is compelled by federal constitutional

law." Id. at 1164, 223 P.3d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.

Lessie observed that in Fare, the United States Supreme Court

reversed the California Supreme Court. The state court had

"unjustifiably extended" Miranda "by treating a suspect's request

to speak with someone other than an attorney [his probation

officer] as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.

at 1165, 223 P. 3d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140. The

California Supreme Court determined it was compelled to hold that

the federal totality-of-the-circumstances test applied to a

minor's claim that his statements were elicited in violation of

Miranda. Id. at 1167, 223 P.3d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

141-142. The state court relied on the analysis in Fare,

equating, for Miranda purposes, "a minor's request to see a parent

with a request to see a probation officer." Id. at 1166, 223 P.

3d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 141. Fare "leaves the rule of

Burton . . . (concerning parents) with no more basis in federal

law than the rule of In re Michael C. (concerning probation

officers), which the court in Fare expressly disapproved." Id.

(internal citation omitted).

Lessie did not pursue collateral review in the state courts. 

(See Am. Pet. 3-4, ECF No. 4.) On October 4, 2010, he filed his

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pro se federal Petition, followed by a First Amended Petition on

November 15, 2010 ("Petition") [ECF Nos. 1, 4]. Lessie's Petition

raises the same two grounds for relief that the state courts had

rejected. Ground one alleges a "violation of his Fifth Amendment

rights under Miranda." (Id. at 6.) Ground two alleges a

violation of his "statutory rights to two completed phone calls

within an hour of confinement." (Id. at 8.) Respondent filed an

Answer to the original Petition, then an Amended Answer in

response to the Court's order to respond to the operative pleading

[ECF Nos. 13, 14, 15].

The trial court disposed of Lessie's ground two state-law

claim by concluding that "the police had committed at least a

technical violation of the statute but found no authority for

excluding defendant's statements as a remedy." Lessie, 47 Cal.

4th at 1161, 223 P.3d at 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 137 (footnote

omitted). The court of appeal similarly concluded:

We agree and find, as the trial court did, that Lessie's

responses to [Detective] Deveney's questions of who else

he wanted notified and whether he wanted to be the one

to call his father, were merely circumstantial evidence

of Lessie's intent to have his father notified about his

arrest and not an invocation of his Miranda rights.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Lessie, D050019, slip op. at 18

(footnote omitted) (discussing technical violations of section

627(b) of Welfare and Institutions Code).) 

The California Supreme Court subsequently noted that

"Defendant no longer maintains that Welfare and Institutions Code

section 627, subdivision (b), requires the exclusion of his

statements to police. Indeed, the only relevant authority rejects

exclusion as a remedy." Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1161 n.2, 223 P.3d

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at 7 n.2, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 137 n.2. Accordingly, the court

discussed the merits of Lessie's Miranda claim but did not address

the statutory violation any further.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006). The Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") controls review

of Lessie's Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23

(1997). AEDPA imposes a "'highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,'" requiring "that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333

n.7). 

"By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim

'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the

exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). Federal habeas

relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court result "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)

(West 2006). "[R]eview under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. __, __, 131

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S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Relief is available under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2) only if the state court result "was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(d)(2) (West 2006).

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary, and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a

state court and based on a factual determination will

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceeding.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citations

omitted); see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). 

 A decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedents

if it "'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in our cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.'" 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the "contrary to"

standard from the "unreasonable application" standard). An

"unreasonable" application of precedent under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) "must have been more than incorrect or erroneous"; it

"must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citations omitted). Federal habeas

courts apply AEDPA standards to "the last reasoned decision" by a

state court addressing the merits of the federal constitutional

claims raised by state prisoners seeking relief from their

convictions or sentences. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170

(9th Cir. 2005); see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

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In deciding whether relief from an unconstitutional trial

error is warranted, federal reviewing courts apply the standard

from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993), "uniformly in

all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254." Bains v. Cambra,

204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000); see Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S.

112, 121-22 (2007). The error must have had "a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 

Bains, 204 F.3d at 977-78.

B. The California Supreme Court Decision

1. Circumstances of Lessie's interrogation

The California Supreme Court carefully re-examined the

totality of the circumstances of Lessie's interrogation and the

trial court's hearing on the matter.

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude both

confessions from evidence, and the People moved to admit

them. The evidence at the hearing on the motions

consisted of the testimony of Detective Kelly Deveney,

who participated in defendant's interrogation, and the

transcripts, recordings and videotapes of the

interrogations.

Detective Deveney testified she spoke with

defendant about half an hour after he was taken into

custody. She identified herself, told defendant that he

was under arrest on a juvenile detention order and that

he could, upon arrival in Oceanside, "make as many phone

calls as he wanted to whomever he wanted." "And then I

told him," Deveney continued, "I understand your aunt

and uncle know that you're in custody; is there anyone

else we need to notify? And he said yes, his father." 

Defendant did not, however, have his father's phone

number. The drive to Oceanside took about an hour and a

half. Upon arriving at the police station, defendant

waited 10 minutes alone and was then given breakfast. 

After another 10 minutes, Detective Deveney entered with

another officer, Detective Gordon Govier. After some

small talk about food and the weather, the following

exchange occurred:

"DEVENEY: Okay, we're getting that warrant

confirmed now. I got the information, your dad's phone 

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number. Do you want to make a call to him? Or did you

want us to?

"LESSIE: I'd like to call him.

"DEVENEY: You would?

"LESSIE: M-hm.

"DEVENEY: Okay. So in the meantime, we've just got

to fill out these papers. You go by Tony Lessie, right?"

A series of routine booking questions followed,

after which Deveney read defendant his rights under

Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436:

"DEVENEY: Okay. Tony because you're under age,

you're only sixteen, and because you're in our facility,

I have to read you your rights. Alright. So it's no

big deal but I have to by law. You have the right to

remain silent. Do you understand that? Can you say

yes?

"LESSIE: Yeah.

"DEVENEY: Any statements you make may be used as

evidence against you. Do you understand that?

"LESSIE: Yeah.

"DEVENEY: Okay. You have the right to the presence

of an attorney, either retained or appointed free of

charge, before and during questioning. Do you

understand that?

"LESSIE: Yeah.

"DEVENEY: So you understand those rights?

"LESSIE: Yeah."

After more booking questions, the detectives asked

defendant about his reasons for leaving his father's

house, his prior commitment to juvenile hall, his

relationship with Turner, Turner's involvement in

identity-theft crimes and gangs, and defendant's own

knowledge of gangs. Eventually the detectives mentioned

the killing and told defendant that multiple witnesses

and members of his own family had identified him as the

shooter. After briefly denying involvement, defendant

candidly confessed: "Well to just scratch everything,

to just come clean with it: I was there, I was, I was

there and I was the shooter. But the thing that

happened was that if I didn't shoot, I was going to, you

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know what I'm saying, get hurt by the other people." A

detailed confession followed.

After defendant had confessed, Detective Deveney

asked defendant whether he was "alright" or "need[ed] a

little break." Defendant replied, "I would like to talk

to my dad." The following exchange occurred:

"DEVENEY: Let me go talk to Gordon for a minute,

you can compose yourself. I'll be right back. Knock on

the door if you need anything.

"LESSIE: Can I make a phone call to my dad?

"DEVENEY: Yes, you can. I'm going to bring a cell

phone in to you and you can use it. In fact you can use

it while we're taking the break okay. Do you have the

number or do you want me to bring you the number Tony?

"LESSIE: No, I need it.

"GOVIER: Okay, we'll be right back.

"(long pause)

"DEVENEY: I'm sorry did you need something?

"LESSIE: I need to use the bathroom.

"DEVENEY: Bathroom. Well, our sergeant is getting

you a Nextell, a phone, we're charging it up so you can

call your dad in privacy. Okay.

"GOVIER: We're going to go out, straight out this

door.

"(pause)

"DEVENEY: Well [sic] they're getting that phone

Tony, we're just going to ask you another couple of

quick questions, alright. And then we'll leave you

alone in here and you can have whatever conversation you

want with him."

The detectives then asked defendant additional

questions about the persons involved in the

confrontation and their gang affiliations. Eventually a

telephone was brought to the interrogation room, the

detectives left, and defendant unsuccessfully attempted

to call his father. Defendant left this message: "Hey

man, what's up? Dad is [ sic ] me, I'm in jail. So,

see if you can, as soon as you get this, call back at

this number."

\\

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Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1158-60, 223 P.3d at 5-7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 134-36.

2. Application of federal law to claim one

 The California Supreme Court noted that the state

Constitution was amended eleven years after the Burton case "to

limit the courts' power to exclude relevant evidence" from any

criminal proceeding, "including pretrial and post conviction

motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for

a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court." 

Id. at 1163, 223 P.3d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 138. The state

supreme court construed the amendment as forbidding courts from

excluding, "on the authority of the state Constitution, selfincriminatory statements made during custodial interrogation." 

Id. at 1163-64, 223 P.3d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.

Of course, the high court's decisions excluding

self-incriminating statements under the authority of the

federal Constitution, such as Miranda, and its progeny,

continue to bind the state courts under the federal

Constitution's supremacy clause (U.S. Const., art. VI,

cl.2) despite the Truth-in-Evidence provision (Cal.

Const., art. I § 28, subd. (f)(2). Accordingly, whether

the holding in Burton . . . remains valid depends on

whether it is compelled by federal constitutional law.

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1164, 223 P.3d at 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 139 (internal citation omitted). "The Truth-in-Evidence

provision permits the courts of this state to exclude a

defendant's self-incriminatory statements only under the

compulsion of federal law." Id. at 1168, 223 P.3d at 13, 104 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 143.

The Lessie court explained: 

We conclude Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, is no

longer good law. The Burton court based its holding on

the United States Constitution, but Burton's special

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rule for minors is inconsistent with the high court's

subsequent decision in Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442

U.S. 707, (Fare), which requires courts to determine

whether a defendant--minor or adult--has waived the

Fifth Amendment privilege by inquiring into the totality

of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.

(Fare, at pp. 724–725.)

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1156-57, 223 P.3d at 4-5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 133-34. It also disapproved "the dictum in People v. Rivera

(1985) 41 Cal.3d 388, to the effect that the rule of Burton,

supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, survives the high court's holding in Fare,

supra, 442 U.S. 707, as a 'component of the state constitutional

privilege against self-incrimination.'" Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at

1168 n.10, 223 P.3d at 13 n.10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 143 n.10

(citation omitted).

 The California Supreme Court applied the federal standard

from Fare to Lessie's custodial interrogations and found no basis

"for construing [Lessie's] request to speak with his father as an

invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 1170, 223 P.3d

at 14, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 145. "[T]he totality of the relevant

circumstances support[ed] the trial court's conclusion that

[Lessie] knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment

privilege." Id. 

There is no basis to disturb the state court decision unless

the California Supreme Court either applied the "totality of the

circumstances" rule from Fare, 442 U.S. 707, in an "objectively

unreasonable" manner or made objectively unreasonable factual

findings from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Fare describes the familiar rule of Miranda and its progeny. 

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this

Court established certain procedural safeguards designed

to protect the rights of an accused, under the Fifth and

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Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from compelled

self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. The

Court specified, among other things, that if the accused

indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent

or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and

any statement obtained from him during interrogation

thereafter may not be admitted against him at his trial.

Id., at 444–445, 473-474.

Fare, 442 U.S. at 709.

The United States Supreme Court issued the writ of certiorari

in Fare "[b]ecause the California judgment [in In re Michael C.,

21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978)] extending

the per se aspects of Miranda presents an important question about

the reach of that case . . . . [T]he judgment of the California

Supreme Court rests firmly on that court's interpretation of

federal law." Fare, 442 U.S. at 716-17. The California court had

extended its 1971 Burton rule and reversed the judgment against a

minor who had confessed to a crime while in police custody after

his request to speak with his probation officer was refused; the

state court construed the request as a "call for help" that

demonstrated that the minor intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment

rights. See Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1164, 223 P.3d at 10, 104 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 139-40. The Fare Court rejected the state court's

construction of the Fifth Amendment. 

The rule the Court established in Miranda is clear. 

In order to be able to use statements obtained during

custodial interrogation of the accused, the State must

warn the accused prior to such questioning of his right

to remain silent and of his right to have counsel,

retained or appointed, present during interrogation. 

384 U.S., at 473. "Once [such] warnings have been

given, the subsequent procedure is clear." Ibid. . . . [¶] Any statements obtained during custodial

interrogation conducted in violation of these rules may

not be admitted against the accused, at least during the

State's case in chief.

Fare, 442 U.S. at 717-18 (citations omitted).

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A valid waiver of the constitutional right to counsel must

"not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and

intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or

privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the

particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,

including background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" 

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted). Fare held that "the

California Supreme Court erred in finding that a juvenile's

request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of the

juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda." Fare, 442 U.S.

at 727-28. A request to see one's probation officer is not a

request for an attorney. See id. at 728.

[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is

adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver

even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We

discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is

required where the question is whether a juvenile has

waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has

done so. The totality approach permits — indeed, it

mandates — inquiry into all the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation

of the juvenile's age, experience, education,

background, and intelligence, and into whether he has

the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the

nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the

consequences of waiving those rights.

Id. at 725 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)).

"After rejecting the argument that probation officers should

be treated like attorneys for purposes of Miranda, the high court

in Fare painstakingly reiterated the rule that only a request for 

an attorney constitutes a per se invocation of a suspect's Fifth

Amendment privilege." Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1165, 223 P.3d at

11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140 (internal citation omitted). In

finding it "clear that respondent voluntarily and knowingly waived

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his Fifth Amendment rights," the Fare Court considered such

factual evidence from the record as the juvenile's ability to

understand the nature of his actions, his age, his prior

experience with the police, his probation status, and whether he

was "worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy

questioning or by trickery or deceit." Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27. 

The California Supreme Court applied those considerations to

Lessie's interrogations.

As Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707, 725, requires, we inquire

"into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact

knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to

remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel." 

Because defendant is a minor, the required inquiry

"includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience,

education, background, and intelligence, and into

whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings

given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and

the consequences of waiving those rights." The

prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating that the

challenged waiver is valid by a preponderance of the

evidence. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 731, 751,

95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 209 P.3d 1.)

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1169, 223 P.3d at 13, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

143-44.

Lessie, like the juvenile in Fare, was sixteen at the time of

the police interrogations. He, too, had previous experience with

the police and with the criminal justice system. 

Nothing in the record suggests defendant was unable

to understand, or did not understand, the meaning of the

rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of

counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 

Defendant was, at the time of his interrogation, 16

years old and, while no longer in school, had completed

the 10th grade and held jobs in retail stores. While no

evidence was offered that defendant had, or had not,

previously been advised of his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, he was no stranger to the justice

system. Defendant had been arrested twice before, once

for burglary and making criminal threats, and once for

fleeing police after a traffic stop and possessing

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marijuana. Both sets of charges led to proceedings in

juvenile court, and the second resulted in a commitment

to juvenile hall. Nothing in this background, or in the

transcript of defendant's interrogation, suggests his

decision to waive his Miranda rights was other than

knowing and voluntary. Asked by detectives to confirm

that he understood each right as read to him, he

answered affirmatively four times. While defendant did

not expressly waive his Miranda rights, he did so

implicitly by willingly answering questions after

acknowledging that he understood those rights. (People

v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 636, 667–668.)

. . . The trial court specifically found there was

no connection between defendant's request to speak with

his father and his decision to waive his Fifth Amendment

rights. We see no reason to reject this finding.

Defendant did not say, for example, that he wanted to

speak with his father before answering questions or

wanted his father to call an attorney on his behalf. 

Nor did defendant hesitate at any point to answer the

detectives' questions. 

Under these circumstances, we see no basis for

construing defendant's request to speak to his father as

an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, and for the additional reasons discussed

above, the totality of the relevant circumstances

supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment

privilege. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707, 725.) That his

confessions were properly admitted into evidence

necessarily follows.

Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1169-70, 223 P.3d at 13-14, 104 Cal. Rptr.

3d at 144-45; see also id., n.11, n.12.)

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court decision

denying Lessie relief on the federal constitutional claim alleged

as ground one in his Petition comports with controlling United

States Supreme Court authority, and the record reflects his

custodial admissions and confession were made voluntarily after

proper Miranda admonishments he understood and validly waived, as

reasonably found by the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, the Court should DENY habeas relief on the basis

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alleged in ground one. Lessie is not in custody in violation of

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

3. Violation of statutory rights

Lessie's Amended Petition contains two claims. (Am. Pet. 6,

7, ECF No. 4.) In his second ground for relief, he alleges that

his "statutory rights to two completed phone calls within an hour

of confinement" were violated. (Id. at 8.) Respondent describes

the two claims as interrelated and states that the California

Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's claims. (Am. Answer 6, ECF

No. 15.) "In Ground Two, Lessie claims that his statements should

also have been suppressed due to the trial court's finding of a

technical violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code

section 627(b). Lessie presented a similar claim in his opening

brief in the California Supreme Court." (Id. at 15.)

Lessie's opening brief, however, makes only passing reference

to section 627(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (See

Lodgment No. 9, Appellant's Opening Brief at 14-15, 26, 32, People

v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152, 223 P.3d 3, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131

(No. S163453).) Furthermore, in his reply brief, Lessie describes

the officers' refusal to let him make a phone call within an hour

of his arrest as a "violation of state law." (Lodgment No. 11,

Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, People v. Lessie, No. S163453.) In

this context, the California Supreme Court wrote, "Defendant no

longer maintains that Welfare and Institutions Code section 627,

subdivision (b), requires the exclusion of his statements to the

police." People v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1161 n.2, 223 P.3d at 7

n.2, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 137 n.2.

\\

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Respondent does not contend that ground two in Lessie's

Petition is unexhausted. (See Am. Answer 15, ECF No. 15.) 

Nevertheless, "[a] State shall not be deemed to have waived the

exhaustion requirement . . . unless the State, through counsel,

expressly waives the requirement." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(b)(3) (West

2006). Lessie has not fairly presented his statutory rights claim

to the California Supreme Court. He has not described the federal

legal theory on which the claim is based. See Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

In any event, Lessie is alleging a violation of state law,

which is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Because his unexhausted claim does

not raise a federal constitutional claim, the exhaustion of state

law remedies does not apply. See Goode v. Smelosky, No. 08-8308-

PSG (DTB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99453, at *17 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Aug.

10, 2009) (citing Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (9th 

Cir. 1983); see also Tillett v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 106, 108 (3d

Cir. 1989); Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 1986). 

Lessie's statutory rights claim would not be cognizable even if he

returned to state court to assert the claim. The Court

accordingly recommends that habeas relief on the basis stated in

ground two be summarily DENIED because the claim is not cognizable

on federal habeas review. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (federal

habeas relief is unavailable for errors of state law).

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

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the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing

reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED this habeas Petition be DENIED

on the ground that Petitioner is not in custody in violation of

any federal right. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation

and (2) directing that judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than July 6, 2012, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections

to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than July

20, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan,

158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 8, 2012

 _______________________________ 

 HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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