Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01623/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01623-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BARKACS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RATTAN BHARAT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-01623-JDP (PC)

ORDER 

THAT PLAINTIFF INDICATE HIS 

INTENT TO PROCEED ONLY WITH THE 

CLAIMS DEEMED COGNIZABLE IN 

THIS ORDER OR FILE ANOTHER 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

ECF No. 10

RESPOND DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleges that defendants violated his rights under the Eighth 

Amendment by failing to provide adequate medical care for a wound on his back and by using 

excessive force against him. ECF No. 10 at 4-6. After reviewing the complaint, I find that it 

states viable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against 

defendants Wei, Rattan, Amaral, Gonsalves, Jones, Magsayo, and an unspecified number of 

“Doe” defendants—who cannot be served until they are enumerated and identified. The 

complaint also states a viable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against an unknown 

number of “Doe” correctional officers who applied unnecessary force to plaintiff’s body after he 

blacked out from lack of treatment. I also find, however, that plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim against these officers is insufficient to proceed.

Case 2:23-cv-01623-JDP Document 11 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 4
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Screening Order

I. Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 

claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that, in late January 2021, he began to complain about a painful growth on 

his tailbone. ECF No. 10 at 4. He claims that Wei, Rattan, Amaral, and an unknown number of 

unidentified “Doe” medical staffer and correctional officers were aware of the issue and its 

Case 2:23-cv-01623-JDP Document 11 Filed 01/17/24 Page 2 of 4
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severity, but failed to offer any treatment. Id. at 4-5. These allegations are sufficient to state 

Eighth Amendment claims for want of medical care against these defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges that, on February 2, 2021, he blacked out from pain. Id. He claims that 

he awoke to an unspecified number of “Doe” correctional officers applying unnecessary force to 

his body and telling him to stop moving. Id. at 6. Given plaintiff’s allegation that he was 

unconscious and, presumably, incapable of resisting, I find that this excessive force claim is 

cognizable. The issue of whether it is sufficiently related to the inadequate medical care claims to 

proceed in the same suit is a close call, but I find that it arises from the same nucleus of operative 

facts. Plaintiff also alleges that this excessive force was undertaken in retaliation for demanding 

medical attention, but he offers no specific allegations to bolster that claim or to explain how he 

would have such information. Indeed, there is no allegation that the “Doe” officers who allegedly 

used excessive force overlapped with the “Doe” officers who were aware of his condition and 

denied him treatment. Thus, his retaliation claim is inadequate to proceed.

After plaintiff was subdued, an unknown member of the medical staff allegedly 

recognized the severity of his condition and told him that he would be sent to the emergency 

room. Id. at 6. Plaintiff does not describe that visit or confirm that it occurred and, instead, skips 

to April 1, 2021, when he underwent surgery on his tailbone. Id. at 7. After surgery was 

completed at an outside hospital, plaintiff was sent back to prison with instructions that he be 

given medication for pain and to prevent infection. Id. Plaintiff claims that defendants Gonsalves 

and Jones, both nurses, ignored the medication orders and refused to help coordinate with unit 

physicians to ensure that plaintiff received the necessary drugs. Id. at 7-8. Consequently, 

plaintiff’s wound became infected. Id. at 8. He alleges that he presented this infection to 

defendant Magsayo and an unnamed “Jane Doe”—another pair of nurses—and both declined to 

offer him treatment. Id. at 8-9. These claims for inadequate post-surgical care also state viable 

Eighth Amendment claims. 

Plaintiff may proceed with the claims and defendants identified as viable in this order. Or

he may delay serving any defendant and file another amended complaint. He is advised that the 

amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F. 3d 

Case 2:23-cv-01623-JDP Document 11 Filed 01/17/24 Page 3 of 4
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896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended complaint should be titled “Second 

Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff may either indicate his intent 

to proceed only with the Eighth Amendment claims deemed cognizable in this order or he may 

delay serving any defendant and file another amended complaint. If he fails to do either, I may 

recommend this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

2. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a section 1983 complaint form with this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:23-cv-01623-JDP Document 11 Filed 01/17/24 Page 4 of 4