Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00452/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00452-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHERYL PERRYMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

LIFE TIME FITNESS, a Minnesota

company, doing business in the State of

Arizona et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-0452-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Amend of Plaintiff Cheryl Perryman. (Dkt.

## 22, 25.) For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion. 

On March 6, 2009, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Defendant Life Time Fitness

removed this action from the Superior Court of the State of Arizona to this Court. (Dkt. #

3.) The removal was premised upon the diversity of citizenship among Plaintiff and

Defendant Life Time Fitness and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. At the time

the action was commenced, neither party apparently disputed that Plaintiff was a citizen of

Arizona and that Defendant was a citizen of Minnesota. Indeed, in Defendant’s Notice of

Removal, Defendant alleges that “Plaintiff Cheryl Perryman is a citizen of the State of

Arizona.” (Dkt. # 3 ¶ 2.) The parties likewise did not dispute that the amount in controversy

requirement was satisfied. 

Case 2:09-cv-00452-GMS Document 32 Filed 08/27/09 Page 1 of 4
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On March 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that complete

diversity is lacking because potential defendants – managers employed by Life Time Fitness

– were Arizona residents. (Dkt. # 9 at 2.) At that time, however, the potential defendants

were unknown and were named only as Doe Defendants in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court

denied Plaintiff’s motion because, at that time, complete diversity existed among the named

parties. (Dkt. # 10.) Plaintiff now moves to amend her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(a) to assert a negligence claim against John Hanley, a general manager

of Life Time Fitness, who is apparently an Arizona resident. (Dkt. # 25.) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend a complaint “shall

be freely given when justice so requires.” The Supreme Court has instructed that “this

mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In deciding the

motion to amend, the Court “must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 – to

facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Eldridge v.

Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation and citation omitted). “Thus,

Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme

liberality.” Id. (quotation omitted). This liberality “is not dependent on whether the

amendment will add causes of action or parties.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d

183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court may, however, deny a motion to amend if there is a showing of undue delay

or bad faith on the part of the moving party, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility

of the proposed amendment. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Generally, however, “this

determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.”

Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). “The party opposing

amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice,” futility, or one of the other permissible

reasons for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; see Richardson v.

United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988).

In its response brief, Defendant does not argue undue delay, bad faith, undue

prejudice, or futility. Rather, Defendant only argues that John Hanley is not a necessary

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“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand

the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the

statute “is couched in permissive terms and it clearly gives the district court the discretion

to deny joinder.” Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 691. In exercising its discretion, the Court may

consider: 

(1) whether the would-be defendants are necessary for just

adjudication of the controversy, (2) whether the plaintiff still

could bring an action in state court against the putative

defendants, (3) whether there has been any unexplained delay in

joinder, (4) whether it appears the plaintiff is seeking to destroy

jurisdiction, (5) the apparent merit of the claims against the new

parties, and (6) whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice

without the joinder of the defendants. 

Bonner v. Fuji Photo Film, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1119-20 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citations

omitted). To the extent that the joinder of Mr. Hanley may destroy subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court has reviewed these considerations and finds that the joinder of Mr.

Hanley should be permitted.

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party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). (Dkt. # 30 at 3-4.) The Court,

however, need not determine whether Mr. Hanley is an indispensable party. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), Plaintiff may join multiple defendants in the same

action if “any right to relief . . . aris[es] out of the same transaction [or] occurrence” and “any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Here, Plaintiff

seeks to assert a negligence claim against both Mr. Hanley and Life Time Fitness arising out

of an alleged treadmill incident occurring at one of Life Time Fitness’s branches in which

Plaintiff was injured. Because the negligence claims arise out of the same occurrence and

share common questions of law and fact, Plaintiff need not rely on Rule 19 to join Mr.

Hanley. Thus, Defendant provides no justification for denying the motion to amend.1

 Defendant argues, however, that, should the motion to amend be granted, diversity

would remain because Plaintiff, on July 13, 2009, stated that she is presently domiciled in

Brentwood, California. (Dkt. # 30 at 3.) However, “[d]iversity jurisdiction is determined

at the time the action commences.” Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 757

(9th Cir. 1999). Here, it is unclear whether the joinder of Mr. Hanley destroys diversity

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jurisdiction. While the evidence suggests that Plaintiff moved to California before July 13,

2009, it does not indicate whether Plaintiff was a citizen of Arizona at the time the action was

filed, January 28, 2009. Similarly, while Plaintiff states that she resided in Arizona at the

time of the incident on January 29, 2007, this also does not resolve the issue. A district court

must remand a case if it appears before final judgment that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, based upon the evidence and allegations,

Plaintiff’s citizenship as of January 28, 2009, cannot be determined. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Dkt. ## 22, 25)

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed not to file the

lodged Proposed Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 26.) Rather, Plaintiff is granted leave to file

her amended complaint, but she must revise the caption to reflect the correct court in which

the pleading is being filed. Plaintiff is directed to submit her pleading before 5:00 P.M. on

September 2, 2009. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before September 11, 2009, the parties are

directed to present, through declaration or otherwise, evidence relating to the citizenship of

Plaintiff Cheryl Perryman as of January 28, 2009.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2009.

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