Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01249/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JDN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Herring, a.k.a. George Devon

Herring, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV 08-1249-PHX-GMS (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Jorge Herring brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

various officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC): (1) former ADC

Director Schriro; (2) Facility Health Administrator Richard Pratt; (3) former Deputy Warden

Romweber; (4) Lewis Complex Warden David Rivas; and (5) Dr. Ronolfo S. Macabuhay

(Doc. #1). Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #37), to

which Plaintiff did not respond.

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion and terminate the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim arose during his confinement at the Lewis Prison Complex in

Buckeye, Arizona (Doc. #1 at 1). In Count I of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that as a

result of inadequate security staffing, he was attacked and severely beaten by another inmate

(id. at 4). Plaintiff claimed that Schriro, Rivas, and Romweber had knowledge that Plaintiff’s

housing unit was understaffed and were aware of the safety risks, yet they failed to

adequately staff the unit and “turned a blind eye” to the known risk of harm (id. at 4b-4i).

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Defendants submit the declaration of Schriro; however, it is unsigned and therefore

will not be considered (Doc. #38, Ex. F).

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In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that he was denied a medical procedure to repair and

realign his nasal passages and, consequently, he suffers from restricted breathing, insufficient

air intake, severe migraine headaches, and continuous pain (id. at 5). He asserts that Schriro,

Pratt, and Macabuhay were aware of Plaintiff’s medical problems but denied the corrective

procedures for purely economic reasons (id. at 5b-5f). 

Plaintiff sued each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacity, and he

requested money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief (id. at 2-2b, 6).

The Court screened the Complaint and ordered Defendants to respond (Doc. #5).

Defendants filed their Answer (Doc. ##15, 20), and discovery commenced (Doc. #23).

Defendants then submitted their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #37).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Defendants’ Contentions

1. Facts

Defendants submit a separate Statement of Facts (DSOF) (Doc. #38), which is

supported by the declarations of each Defendant,1

 a copy of Plaintiff’s Arizona Inmate

Management System report, and the declaration of Quency Owens, former Associate Deputy

Warden at the Lewis Complex (id., Exs. A-E, G). The DSOF sets out the following facts:

At the relevant time, Plaintiff was housed in the close-custody Rast Unit, a protective

segregation (PS) unit where inmates are double-bunked, two to a cell (DSOF ¶¶ 16-18).

There are 25 cells in a pod, and 8 pods in the Rast Unit (id. ¶ 14). The inmates walk to

recreation and chow together (id. ¶ 16). A floor officer is assigned to each pod and has direct

contact with the inmates in their cells, and a control officer overlooks the pods from a

“bubble”; the control officer operates the opening and closing of cell doors (id. ¶¶ 18-19).

The floor officer and the control officer positions are considered “core” posts that must be

filled; if they are not filled and staff cannot be moved around to cover these two core posts,

then inmate activities are canceled (id. ¶ 24). If an incident arises and additional officers are

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needed, an Incident Management System (IMS) is initiated and backup officers arrive

quickly to assist (id. ¶ 20).

According to ADC reports, on May 8, 2007, when inmates were returning from

recreation to the Rast Unit, inmate Dean went into Plaintiff’s cell and hit Plaintiff in the face

(DSOF ¶ 12). In response, Plaintiff grabbed an ink pen and stabbed Dean several times (id.).

Correctional Officer (CO) II Roberts observed “tussling and punches” between the two

inmates and therefore activated the IMS (id.). After the IMS was activated, Dean threw

Plaintiff to the ground, kicked him a few times, and then ran up the stairs and into his

assigned cell (id). Plaintiff’s face was bloody, and upon Macabuhay’s order, he was taken

to Maricopa Medical Center by ambulance (id.). 

Romweber believes that the Rast Unit was at core posting on May 8, 2007, because

the inmates were able to go to recreation (id. ¶ 27). 

Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance claiming that lack of security led to his assault (id.

¶ 41). The response to Plaintiff’s grievance concluded that staff were present and responded

appropriately to the incident (id. ¶ 42). Plaintiff appealed this response, and Romweber

answered that Plaintiff failed to submit an achievable resolution (id. ¶ 44). Plaintiff appealed

to Schriro, who delegated authority to respond to the appeal to Susan Rogers, ADC legal

counsel (id. ¶ 46). Rogers concluded that Plaintiff’s allegation that staff was responsible for

the attack was unsubstantiated and she noted that the disciplinary ticket that Plaintiff received

for his involvement in the incident was upheld (id. ¶ 46).

As to the medical-care claim, Macabuhay saw Plaintiff on May 8, 2007, and

transferred Plaintiff to the hospital emergency room (id. ¶ 48). The hospital physician noted

that Plaintiff’s nose was slightly displaced to the right side and he had a nasal fracture and

left jaw swelling (id. ¶ 49). The physician recommended that Plaintiff follow-up in the

plastics clinic in 2-3 weeks after the swelling subsided, and he recommended Motrin for the

pain (id.). 

Plaintiff was returned to ADC and on May 9, 2007, Macabuhay saw Plaintiff for a

follow-up appointment; Plaintiff complained of headaches, a sore nose, and the inability to

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breathe through his nose (id. ¶ 51). Macabuhay also noted the abnormal shape to Plaintiff’s

nose (id.). That same day, pursuant to the hospital physician’s recommendation, Macabuhay

submitted an Outside Consult Request for evaluation for plastic surgery of Plaintiff’s nasal

fracture; however, Macabuhay did not think that Plaintiff needed surgery (id. ¶ 52). The

Request was reviewed by Pratt and forwarded to Central Office, which denied the Request

on May 24, 2007 (id. ¶¶ 52-53). In its denial, the Central Office noted that surgery may not

be necessary unless Plaintiff’s problem does not improve and that a consult for surgery may

be submitted at a later time if needed (id. ¶ 53). Macabuhay never resubmitted a surgery

consult request because he did not feel that it was necessary since the deviation was just a

half centimeter and not enough to cause breathing difficulties (id. ¶ 54). Macabuhay found

that allergies and asthma caused Plaintiff’s breathing problems and those maladies were

treated with appropriate medications (id.). 

Macabuhay saw Plaintiff on May 30, July 30, October 9 and 23, and July 15, 2008,

in response to Plaintiff’s complaints about breathing problems, frequent headaches,

wheezing, nose pain, and a subsequent hit on the nose (id. ¶¶ 55, 57, 59, 61, 63). In October

2007, Macabuhay ordered x-rays, which showed a fracture site on the nasal bones (id. ¶ 60).

All of Plaintiff’s later appointments with Macabuhay concerned medical issues unrelated to

his nose (id. ¶ 64).

In June 2007, Plaintiff grieved the denial of surgery and requested a return to the

Maricopa Medical Center for follow-up treatment on his nose (id. ¶ 71). Pratt responded to

Plaintiff’s grievance by advising him to submit a health needs request for treatment of his

current condition and that after further examination, a recommendation for follow-up at the

hospital would be considered (id. ¶ 72). Plaintiff appealed Pratt’s response to Romweber,

and then to the Director’s level; Schriro delegated authority to Deputy Director Dona Marie

Markely to respond to the appeal (id. ¶ 74). The appeal response concluded that surgery to

repair a deviated septum is elective and not medically necessary (id.). 

2. Legal Arguments

Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff was not housed

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in conditions that posed an intolerable risk of serious harm, (2) Defendants were not

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety, (3) Defendants were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s medical needs, (4) Plaintiff cannot establish liability for the named Defendants,

(5) Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages, and (6) Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity (Doc. #37).

B. Plaintiff’s Response

On November 17, 2009, the day after Defendants’ filed their Motion for Summary

Judgment, the Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the

motion (Doc. #39). See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998). To date,

Plaintiff has not filed a response to the summary judgment motion, and the time for

responding as expired. 

Although there is no response memorandum, Plaintiff’s Complaint is verified;

therefore, it is treated as an affidavit opposing summary judgment (see Doc. #1 at 5). See

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1987). 

1. Facts

In his pleading, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:

On May 8, 2007, there were no COs the pod floor when inmates were returning from

recreation (Doc. #1 at 4-4b ¶¶ 2, 5). The unit was understaffed and all the officers were

outside of the building (id. at 4b ¶¶ 4-5). There was just one CO in the control room opening

cell doors (id. at 4b ¶ 5). The officer in the control room was either unobservant, distracted,

or simply not present (id. at 4 ¶ 2). Consequently, an inmate was able to walk into Plaintiff’s

cell and assault Plaintiff for 3-5 minutes (id. ¶ 3). Plaintiff was severely beaten and he

suffered a broken nose, a deviated septum, two black eyes, and numerous contusions and

abrasions (id. at 5 ¶ 2). 

Plaintiff was transported to the Maricopa County Medical Center, where the treating

physician recommended follow-up care and surgery to repair the deviated septum (id. at 5

¶ 4). That recommended follow-up care, however, was denied, and Plaintiff’s breathing

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problems were and continue to be treated with a nasal spray and medication (id. at 5b-5c

¶¶ 8, 11). These treatments are ineffective, and Plaintiff continues to suffer breathing

problems, severe headaches, and sleep deprivation (id. at 5c ¶ 13).

2. Legal Arguments

Plaintiff contends that his assault and injuries were a direct result of understaffing at

his PS unit (id. at 4b ¶¶ 4, 7). He states that PS units house known targets in the prison

population, including homosexuals, transsexuals, and young or other vulnerable inmates (id.

at 4c ¶ 10). Plaintiff asserts that PS units are therefore required to have adequate funding to

staff the unique security needs for these inmates (id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff maintains that

Defendants were aware of the special security needs and aware of the risk of harm to inmates

absent sufficient security, yet they refused to adequately fund and staff the PS units and to

adequately allocate personnel and resources within the prison to maintain security (id. at 4c4h).

With respect to his medical-care claim, Plaintiff claims that the denial of surgery

contradicted the surgeon’s recommendations and is based solely on costs (id. at 5d ¶¶ 14-15).

He argues that the treatment provided to him by ADC and Macabuhay is wholly ineffective,

and Macabuhay simply monitors Plaintiff’s continued suffering (id. at 5f ¶ 26).

III. Summary Judgment Standard 

A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment

practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Even where the nonmovant fails to

respond to a summary judgment motion, the movant must still affirmatively show the

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absence of genuine issue of material fact. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th

Cir. 2003).

If the movant meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then

shifts to the nonmovant to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The nonmovant need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). By affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, the nonmovant must designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings’ mere

allegations and denials, but must present evidence of specific disputed facts. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. 

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249. In

its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and draw all inferences in the

nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. 

IV. Count I-Failure to Protect

A. Legal Standard

“[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotations omitted). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff

must demonstrate facts that satisfy a two-part test that shows the defendant was deliberately

indifferent. First, the plaintiff must prove that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious

deprivation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Then, he must prove the subjective

element; that the defendant had a culpable state of mind—was deliberately indifferent—in

allowing the deprivation to occur. Id. at 299. 

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A prison official has a sufficiently culpable mind only if he “knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the

official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2002). Where an inmate’s

claim is based on the alleged failure to prevent harm, the inmate may satisfy the “sufficiently

serious” requirement by showing the existence of “conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm” to him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. And to prove knowledge of the risk, the

prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may

be sufficient to establish knowledge. See id. at 840-41; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074,

1077 (9th Cir. 1995). 

B. Analysis

Defendants’ initial argument is that Plaintiff was not housed under conditions that

posed an intolerable risk of serious harm; therefore, there was no objectively, sufficiently

serious deprivation (Doc. #37 at 7-8). Defendants submit that they previously recognized

a potential harm to Plaintiff and that is why he was placed in a PS unit (id. at 7). They argue

that while the prison setting is unpredictable and potentially dangerous given the nature of

those housed in a prison, there is no evidence that there existed a known danger to Plaintiff

from inmate attacks (id. at 7-8).

Rivas avers that in May 2007, while she was Warden at the Rast Unit, CO staffing

was adequate and there were very few vacancies (Doc. #38, Ex. B, Rivas Decl. ¶ 4).

Romweber, who was Deputy Warden at the Rast Unit, explains that in the close-custody PS

Rast Unit, inmates are not in solitary confinement and they walk as a group to chow and

recreation (id., Ex. C, Romweber Decl. ¶ 21). The floor officer on duty assists in bringing

inmates back from chow and recreation and moves inside and outside—back and forth—until

all inmates are in their cells (id. ¶ 18). Romweber avers that the shift roster for May 8, 2007,

reflects that there were two CO II floor officers—Burston and Escobedo—who accompanied

Plaintiff to the hospital after the assault (id. ¶ 17). She further avers that if a problem occurs,

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an IMS is called and backup officers arrive quickly; in this case, an IMS was initiated by the

control officer at approximately 10:33 a.m. and back-up officers arrived on the scene at 10:35

a.m. (id. 22; Ex. B, Rivas Decl. ¶ 9).

Although Plaintiff alleges the Defendants failed to adequately fund staffing and

security for the PS units, he fails to proffer any evidence regarding inadequate funding or to

connect the lack of additional officers or security to the assault on May 8, 2007. As

Defendants demonstrate, in the close-custody unit where Plaintiff was housed, inmates were

not isolated, and they walked in groups to and from chow and other activities. Even if more

that 1-2 floor officers were on duty on May 8, there is no evidence to suggest that the assault

on Plaintiff could have been anticipated or prevented. Plaintiff does not allege that he was

subjected to a specific risk of harm; for example, he does not assert that he had a history of

violence with the inmate who attacked him. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that all PS inmates are

subject to a risk of harm because they are known targets within the prison population (Doc.

#1 at 4c 10). But to meet the objective requirement, Plaintiff must allege that he is actually

at a substantial risk of harm; his belief that he is at risk or even the “mere threat” of future

bodily harm may not provide a basis for a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. See Gaut

v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). 

On this record, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a disputed issue of fact concerning an

objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Without a

showing to satisfy the objective prong in the deliberate indifference analysis, Plaintiff cannot

withstand summary judgment on his failure-to-protect claim.

Even assuming that the first, objective component was met, Plaintiff has not set forth

any specific facts demonstrating deliberate indifference by any Defendant. See Leer v

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (“prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each

individual defendant’s deliberate indifference”). Plaintiff’s general allegations—that

Defendants knew about staffing and security problems that posed a serious risk to vulnerable

inmates and refused to remedy the situation—are insufficient to establish a material factual

dispute. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings . . . and

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designate specific facts showing” a material factual dispute). Further, there is no evidence

that Plaintiff complained about a general lack of security or warned any officer or Defendant

that the inmate who assaulted him posed a specific threat. Cf. Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42

(inference that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference where they knew that a

group of Muslim inmates had previously committed a violent attack against the plaintiff but

left the plaintiff unsupervised with those inmates); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460-61

(9th Cir. 1986) (material factual dispute whether prison official acted with deliberate

indifference where inmate told the official that his life was in danger if he reported for work,

but the official ignored the inmate’s complaint and sent him to work where he was beaten

and raped). 

To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacity for a policy of

understaffing PS units and improperly allocating resources such that security needs were not

met, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the alleged understaffing and May 8, 2007 assault

stemmed from a policy or custom. “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on

isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,

frequency, and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out

policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (the practice or custom must be so

“persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled policy”).

Plaintiff references other court filings as evidence that Defendants knew of a staffing

problem, and he refers to “Class Action John Does #1-5 v. Terry Stewart 1995-2000” (Doc.

#1 at 4e ¶ 18). But without more specific facts or allegations, Plaintiff cannot show that the

conditions or policies at issue in any other lawsuits were the same as those in May 2007

when he was assaulted. 

In sum, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact concerning either

the objective or subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment claim, nor can he

demonstrate liability on the part of any Defendant either personally or in their official

capacity. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants on the failure-to-protect claim

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in Count I.

V. Count II-Medical Care

A. Legal Standard

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, a prisoner must demonstrate

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a

“serious medical need” and (2) that the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted).

A “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citation

omitted). 

As stated, to act with deliberate indifference a prison official must both know of and

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In the medical

context, deliberate indifference may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d

at 1096. Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs if

they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. Wood v. Housewright,

900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). But a delay in providing medical treatment does not

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation unless the delay was harmful. Hunt v. Dental

Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). To establish deliberate

indifference, a prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. See Hallett v. Morgan,

296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“[A] mere ‘difference of medical opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to

establish deliberate indifference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). Therefore, to prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative

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courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was

medically unacceptable in light of the circumstances and that it was chosen in conscious

disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332

(9th Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis

Defendants make no argument that the injury to Plaintiff’s nose did not constitute a

serious medical need, thereby satisfying the first prong of the deliberate indifference test.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Thus, the summary judgment analysis turns on whether Defendants’

response to Plaintiff’s serious medical need was deliberately indifferent. See Jett, 439 F.3d

at 1096.

Defendants submit that they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical need (Doc. #37 at 11). In support, they submit copies of Plaintiff’s medical records

documenting his treatment at the Maricopa Medical Center and his follow-up care at ADC

(Doc. #38, Ex. E, Attachs.). According to these records and Macabuhay’s declaration,

Plaintiff received immediate emergency treatment for his injury and regular follow-up care

upon his return to prison (id., Ex. E, Macabuhay Decl. ¶¶ 3-6). As mentioned, the

emergency-room physician diagnosed a fractured nose and recommended that Plaintiff

follow-up in plastics, which refers to surgery to repair the nose (id. ¶ 4, Attach. 1 at 2-5).

The records show that Macabuhay filed an Outside Consult Request for a plastic surgery

evaluation pursuant to that recommendation; however, Macabuhay avers that he did not think

that surgery was necessary (id., Macabuhay Decl. ¶ 7). The records reflect that the denial

of surgery was based on information suggesting that surgery was not necessary unless

problems persisted (id. ¶ 8). And Macabuhay explains that he did not resubmit a request for

surgery later because, in his opinion, the fracture was not causing Plaintiff health problems

and therefore surgery was not required (id. ¶ 9).

As to Plaintiff’s breathing problems, Macabuhay avers that he found those problems

to be caused by allergies and asthma, and he prescribed appropriate medication and an

inhaler (id. ¶¶ 9, 12). The Health Needs Requests and medical records show that each time

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Plaintiff complained about nose pain or breathing problems, he was seen by Macabuhay for

evaluation, which included x-rays and renewed prescriptions (id. ¶¶ 11-18). 

Plaintiff disagrees with Macabuhay’s view that surgery was not required; however,

he produces no evidence to show that the surgery was medically necessary. See Hutchinson

v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1988) (in medical cases where the plaintiff

contests the type of treatment he received, an expert opinion will almost always be necessary

to establish deliberate indifference). The emergency-room physician’s recommendation to

follow-up in plastics does not represent a medical conclusion that surgery was required; that

is, it does not establish that the failure to provide surgery was medically unacceptable. It

merely reflects a difference in opinion between two medical professionals, which is

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. Plaintiff also

fails to submit any medical evidence to support his claim that his ongoing medical problems

stem from his deviated septum and not from his asthma and allergy conditions (see Doc. #1

at 5).

In short, Plaintiff falls well short of demonstrating that the course of treatment he

received following the injury to his nose was medically unacceptable in light of the

circumstances and that it was chosen in conscious disregard of a risk to his health. See

Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Thus, there is no material factual dispute concerning Macabuhay’s

liability for deliberate indifference.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s alleges liability by Schriro and Pratt for inadequate

medical care, the Court has found that the care he received was not deliberately indifferent.

Regardless, Plaintiff has not sufficiently set forth facts as to either Defendant’s deliberate

indifference. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407; see also Leer, 844

F.2d at 634. The undisputed evidence shows that Pratt is not a licensed medical professional

and he had no role in providing medical care or prescribing medical treatment to Plaintiff

(Doc. #38, Ex. D, Pratt Decl. ¶¶ 3-4). And as the ADC Director, Schriro cannot be liable for

the inadequate medical care of her subordinates without actual direction or participation in

the treatment. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Finally, Schriro’s

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and Pratt’s roles in denying Plaintiff’s grievances are insufficient to establish liability. 

For the above reasons, summary judgment is appropriate on the medical-care claim

in Count II. Defendants’ motion will therefore be granted, and the Court need not address

the remaining arguments concerning damages and qualified immunity.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. #37).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) is granted. 

(4) The Clerk of Court must dismiss this action and enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2010.

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