Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01689/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCES JIMENEZ, et. al., CASE NO. CV-F-07-1689 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMSSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND 

vs.

SULLIVAN, et. al.,

Defendant.

 /

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Frances Jimenez, who is proceeding in propria persona, has submitted a complaint

which purports to be a complaint on behalf of herself and also on behalf of two named plaintiffs who

did not sign the complaint. Plaintiff, a lay person, cannot represent other party in an action. Fed. R.

Civ.P. 11(a) requires that every paper filed in an action shall be signed by an attorney of record or by the

party if not represented by an attorney. Further, Local Rules 7-131(b) provides that all pleadings and

non-evidentiary documents shall be signed by the individual attorney for the party presenting them or

by the party involved if that party is appearing in propria persona; the name of the person signing the

document shall be typed underneath the signature. 

In the interest of the efficient administration of justice, the court construes plaintiff’s complaint

as pertaining only to her, DISREGARDS the other names identified in the caption.

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DISCUSSION

Standards For Screening

“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal

may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service,

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9 Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9 Cir. 1981). This th th

Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid, shall dismiss a case at any time if the

Court determines the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima

& Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2003) Attacking the

Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-61 – 9-62. 

General Deficiencies

F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall

contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction

depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.

. . .

(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 

(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.

A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v.

United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need not th

outline all elements of a claim, “[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these elements

exist.” Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. ACB th

Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6 Cir. 1998). Despite the flexible pleading policy of th

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the

claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). th

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A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged

in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. The complaint lacks a short, plain statement

of plaintiff’s claim. Based on the defendants named, it appears that plaintiff is alleging that she was

assaulted while visiting an inmate in prison. However, this is not clear from the actual allegations. 

Plaintiff’s ability to bring such a claim arises under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides redress for violations of federally protected rights committed by persons acting under color of

law. At a minimum, in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)

a person was acting under color of state law at the time the act complained of was committed; and (2)

that person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). To warrant relief under the

Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that defendant’s acts or omissions caused the

deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993).

Thus, the statute plainly requires that there be an actual causal connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 

Plaintiff names numerous defendants in the caption of the complaint but she fails to link each

defendants with an alleged deprivation of her rights. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, the requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct personal participation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by other which

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id.

This standard of causation “...closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate

cause.” Arnold v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has

therefore failed to link alleged deprivations with the Defendants and has failed to state a claim against

them. 

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Insofar as Plaintiff names the Department of Corrections, she may not sustain an action against

a state agency. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against

an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico

Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.,

939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well

as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d

198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the Department of Corrections is a state agency, it is entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 

Insofar as plaintiff names particular defendants, such as Wardens Sullivan and Evans based on

their supervisorial positions, plaintiff is advised that under section 1983, liability may not be imposed

on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When

the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941

(1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 forsupervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is

‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)

(internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure these deficiencies identified

in this order, if she wishes to do so. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she is advised that

the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule

15-220 requiresthat an amended complaint be complete in itself withoutreference to any prior pleading.

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This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is HEREBY DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may

file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order. Plaintiff’s

complaint should be clearly titled, “First Amended Complaint,” and shall refer to the case number

assigned to this action. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within this time frame, the Court

will issue a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 16, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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