Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04222/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04222-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Farzan Roohparvar,

Plaintiff,

 v.

Fairchild Semiconductor of California,

Kirk Miklavic.

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 05-04222 JW 

ORDER GRANTING MIKLAVIC’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) in this case is Farzan Roohparvar, a former employee of Fairchild

Semiconductor Corporation. Defendants (“Defendants”) are Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation

of California (“Fairchild”) and Kirk Miklavic (“Miklavic”), Fairchild’s Director of Human

Resources for the Analog Products Group, the Standard Products Group and the Sales Department. 

In February 1999, Plaintiff began employment with Fairchild. The employment was pursuant to an

oral and written employment agreement where it was agreed that Plaintiff’s annual salary would be

$188,531.00. Plaintiff’s lawsuit arises out of changes made to his salary schedule. The parties

allegedly came to several agreements whereby Plaintiff would be paid an hourly rate for a maximum

set of hours, yet he would actually continue to work his normal fifty to sixty hours per week. In

return, Fairchild allegedly agreed to pay the remainder of Plaintiff’s unpaid wages at an unspecified

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For the Northern District of California

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later date, but failed to do so. Plaintiff’s complaint contains primarily claims for breach of contract

and fraud. 

Presently before the Court is Miklavic’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,

failure to state a claim, and motion to strike. Miklavic contends that he is a resident of Maine, and

that his contact with the forum state is insufficient for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction

over him. The motion was scheduled for hearing on December 5, 2005. The Court finds it

appropriate to take the motion under submission for decision based upon the papers filed by the

parties, without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Based upon all the papers filed

to date, the Court grants the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

II. BACKGROUND

In February 1999 Plaintiff began employment with Fairchild. (Complaint, hereinafter

“Complaint,” ¶ 7.) The employment was pursuant to an oral and written agreement under which

Plaintiff would receive $188,531.00 annually. (Complaint ¶ 7.) 

In June 2001, Defendants entered into an oral agreement whereby Plaintiff would work his

normal fifty to sixty hours per week, but would be paid for only 10 hours a week, on an hourly basis. 

(Complaint ¶ 8.) The remainder of the wages were to be paid at an unspecified later date. 

(Complaint ¶ 8.) Between July 8, 2001 and October 8, 2001, Fairchild paid Plaintiff for ten hours

per week at a rate of $90.64 per hour while he continued to work fifty to sixty hours per week. 

(Complaint ¶ 9.) 

On October 8, 2001, Fairchild modified the agreement and began paying Plaintiff for eleven

hours instead of ten hours of work per week. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Fairchild never paid Plaintiff for the

hours worked over eleven hours per week. (Complaint ¶ 11.) On December 15, 2002, Fairchild

restored Plaintiff to his annual income of $188,531.00. (Complaint ¶ 12.) 

Around June 2, 2003, both parties entered into a new oral agreement, whereby Plaintiff

would work fifty to sixty hours per week, but would receive pay for only two weeks of every month. 

(Complaint ¶ 13.) Between June 2, 2003 and December 19, 2003, Fairchild failed to pay Plaintiff

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1

 Plaintiff is a California resident. Fairchild is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delware and its

principle place of business is in Maine. Miklavic is a citizen of Maine.

3

any amount for the fourteen week period that he worked. (Complaint ¶ 14.)

Between January 2, 2001 and December 31, 2004, Fairchild required several employees,

including Plaintiff, to take “shut down” days, where employees did not work and were not paid. 

(Complaint ¶ 15.) Fairchild gave Plaintiff 101 “shut down” days. (Complaint ¶ 15.) The parties

agreed that Plaintiff would continue to work on his “shut down” days but would receive

reimbursement at a later date. (Complaint ¶ 15.) 

Between June 2001 and July 26, 2005, Fairchild and Miklavic reassured Plaintiff that they

would reimburse him for the hours that he worked unpaid. (Complaint ¶ 17.) The last affirmation

was by Miklavic on July 26, 2005. (Complaint ¶ 17.) 

Around August 8, 2005, Fairchild, through its managing agent Joel Pond, informed the

Plaintiff that Fairchild would not pay Plaintiff for unpaid wages, salary, and earnings. (Complaint ¶

18). Around August 16, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily ended his employment with Fairchild. 

Plaintiff’s complaint contained nine claims: (1) breach of oral contract, (2) breach of written

contract, (3 through 5) breach of oral contract, (6) fraud, (7) negligent misrepresentation, (8) failure

to pay earned income and overtime compensation, (9) injunctive relief and treble damages. 

Defendants removed the case to this Court based upon diversity jurisdiction.1

 Presently before the

Court is Miklavic's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Miklavic contends that he

resides in Maine and lacks sufficient contacts with California for this Court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over him. Miklavic also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and to strike

certain allegations. 

III. STANDARDS

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)

Under Rule 12(b)(2), FED.R.CIV.P., a defendant may seek dismissal of an action based upon

lack of personal jurisdiction. Once a defendant challenges jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden

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of establishing that the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Rio Properties, Inc. v.

Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Unocal Corp. , 248 F.3d 915, 923

(9th Cir. 2001). “In a diversity case, the court must first inquire whether the assertion of jurisdiction

satisfies California state law as well as due process requirements.” Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc.,

854 F.2d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988). Under California's long-arm statute, a court may exercise

personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process. See CAL. CIV. CODE 410.10

(California restriction on due process is limited to that imposed by the United States Constitution);

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the defendant must have

minimum contacts with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1194, quoting Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945). General jurisdiction over

defendant constitutionally comports with due process if defendant has "minimum contacts" in the

forum state. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158. Specific jurisdiction is appropriate

when a foreign defendant's less substantial contacts with the forum give rise to the causes of action

in the suit. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958). A three part test dictates whether a court

may exercise specific jurisdiction over a party: (1) the defendant must have performed some act or

consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed itself of the

privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim must arise out of or result from the

defendant's forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. See Cybersell,

Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F. 3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).

In evaluating jurisdiction in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court need only determine

whether the facts, as alleged, are sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(2). Uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be

taken as true and conflicts between the facts in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor. See Rio Properties, Inc., 284 F.3d at 1019. 

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IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not contend that personal jurisdiction exists under the traditional bases for

exercising personal jurisdiction, e.g. service within the state, domicile in the forum state, or consent

to jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610-611, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2110-2112 (1990);

see Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63, 61 S.Ct. 339, 341-342 (1940); see Carnival Cruise

Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 1525-1526 (1991). Rather, Plaintiff argues

that personal jurisdiction exists over Miklavic because the complaint contains an allegation that

Miklavich had sufficient contacts with California. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. 

The Complaint contains only one allegation regarding Miklavic’s contact with California:

between June 2001 and July 26, 2005, agents of Fairchild, including Miklavic, affirmed Fairchild’s

commitment to reimburse him. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Miklavic allegedly made the last affirmation on

July 26, 2005. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Conspicuously absent from the Complaint are allegations

regarding when, where, and how often Miklavic “affirmed” Fairchild’s commitments.

Although even a single act may suffice to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant, there must be a "substantial connection" with the forum. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.

355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201 (1957). In McGee , the Supreme Court found that an insurance

company had a “substantial connection” to California because (a) the insurance contract at issue was

delivered in California, (2) the premiums for the insurance contract were mailed from California;

and (3) the insured was a California resident. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. In the present case, the

connection between Miklavic and California is far more attenuated. 

Moreover, any contact between Miklavic and Plaintiff was done solely in Miklavic’s

corporate capacity. (Complaint ¶¶ 3 and 5.) For jurisdictional purposes, acts performed by

individuals in their corporate capacities are acts of the corporation and immaterial for establishing

minimum contacts as to the individual. See Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy Enterprise, 75 F. Supp. 2d

1104, 1111 (1999). The purpose of the minimum contacts requirement is to ensure that it is

reasonable to hale a party into litigation in a distant and inconvenient forum. See World-Wide

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Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980). As previously

discussed, the Complaint contains only one allegation regarding Miklavic’s contact with California. 

In light of the nature of Miklavic’s contact with California, the exercise of jurisdiction over

Miklavic, a resident of Maine, would be patently unreasonable. Therefore, the motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Because the

Court finds that there is no personal jurisdiction over Miklavic, the Court finds it is unnecessary to

discuss Miklavic’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motion to strike. 

Dated: February 9, 2006

05cv4222miklavich

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN MAILED TO:

Gerald A. Emanuel jemanuel@hinklelaw.com

Joel P Waelty jwaelty@hinklelaw.com

Michael Mayron mmayron@hinklelaw.com

Sharon S. Kirsch skirsch@mfmlaw.com

Dated: February 9, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:__/s/JW Chambers______

Melissa Peralta

Courtroom Deputy

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