Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02402/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02402-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RACHEL AKEY, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PLACER COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No.: 2:14-cv-2402-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

 

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss and for 

reconsideration of the court’s previous order. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs oppose the 

motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 22, and defendants have replied, ECF No. 23. This matter is decided 

without a hearing. As explained below, the court GRANTS IN PART the motion to dismiss and 

DENIES the motion for reconsideration. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiffs’ original complaint, filed on October 12, 2014, contained thirty-one 

claims for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. Compl., 

ECF No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the court granted the motion in part, 

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dismissing fifteen claims with leave to amend, including the due process Monell claims against 

defendant Placer County (1-2, 7-8, 13), the common law interference with parent-child 

relationship claims (18-19, 23-24, 26-27), the California Bane Act claims brought by N.D. (21-

22), and the “direct witness to intentional tort” claims brought by Clayton (29-30). Order, ECF 

No. 18. 

 Plaintiffs have filed a first amended complaint, repleading several previously 

dismissed claims. First Am. Compl. (FAC), ECF No. 20. The operative complaint includes 

Monell claims against defendant Placer County (1-2, 7-8, 13), procedural due process and 

unlawful interference claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (3-6, 9-12, 14-15); Bane Act claims under 

California Civil Code section 52.1 (16-17); common law interference with parent-child 

relationship claims (18-19, 21-22); interference with constitutional rights claims (24-25); 

respondeat superior liability under California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and/or 815.6 

(20, 23, 26, 31); and new claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) (27-30). Id. Defendants now move to 

dismiss, arguing the Monell claims (1, 2, 7, 8, 13) and the newly pled NIED/IIED claims (27-30) 

fail to state a claim and that all individual state law claims (claims 18-19, 21-22, 24-25, 27-30) 

are barred by defendants’ immunity under California Government Code sections 821.6, 820.2 and 

820.21. Additionally, they argue defendants are immune from section 1983 liability and seek 

reconsideration of this court’s previous order. ECF No. 21.1

B. Facts 

 The court briefly reviews the allegations of the first amended complaint. ECF 

No. 20. Plaintiff Akey, her minor son N.D., her mother Linda Clayton, and her husband Ryan 

Cornacchioli bring this action against defendants for their investigation of Cornacchioli’s alleged 

abuse of N.D. See FAC at 1. At the time of the investigation, plaintiffs resided together at 

 1 Defendants do not explicitly address the Bane Act, interference with constitutional 

rights, or respondeat superior liability claims (claims 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31) in their 

motion. To the extent they believe state law immunity applies to those claims, the court’s finding 

below that the alleged conduct does not qualify for the immunity exception applies with equal 

force. 

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Clayton’s home. Id. Defendant Placer County operates the Placer County Family and Children 

Services agency (FCS), which implements local, state, and federal laws and regulations 

concerning children’s welfare. Id. ¶ 5. Defendants Sutton and Myers are social workers 

employed by FCS. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 

 On July 9, 2013, the Placer County Superior Court issued an order granting Akey 

primary custody of N.D., and granting N.D.’s biological father, Cameron Dupree, unsupervised 

visits every other weekend and every Tuesday. Id. ¶ 11. On September 11, 2013, FCS received a 

report from N.D.’s school that N.D. had told a teacher “Cornacchioli had chocked [sic] and 

threatened to kill him.” Id. ¶ 20. Defendant Sutton was assigned to investigate the alleged 

incident. Id.

 During defendant Sutton’s investigation, she telephoned Akey on September 12, 

2013. Id. ¶ 23. Akey put her phone on speaker, allowing plaintiffs Cornacchioli and Clayton to 

hear the entire conversation. Id. Sutton told Akey of the allegations, which Akey denied. Id.

¶ 24. Akey explained that Dupree had consistently made false allegations to gain full custody and 

had a drug problem, with prior arrests and convictions. Id. She stated that a “very recent and 

extensive family court litigation and evidentiary trial” had awarded Akey full custody, and that 

Cornacchioli had been away on military duty until the early morning of September 10, 2013. Id.

¶ 15. Sutton asked Akey to consent to Dupree’s taking custody of N.D.; when told of Dupree’s 

drug history, Sutton told Akey that Dupree would be drug tested every day. Id. ¶ 23. Akey 

refused, and Sutton responded she would obtain a warrant to take custody of all of Akey’s 

children. Id. Akey was “stunned, hurt, and confused,” but refused to consent. Id. Akey asked 

for Sutton’s supervisor, and Sutton gave Akey defendant Myers’ name and number. Id. ¶ 27. 

Myers called Akey first, again asked for her consent, and explained when Akey would be 

interviewed in person and when the investigation would be complete. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Myers 

repeated Sutton’s statement that the FSC had decided to give immediate custody to Dupree, and 

that if she did not consent to the change in custody, they would obtain a warrant and take all of 

her children away from her. Id. Akey again refused to give consent. Id. Clayton and 

Cornacchioli could hear this conversation as well. Id. 

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 Despite Akey’s refusal, Sutton directed Dupree to pick N.D. up from school that 

day. Id. ¶ 22. Dupree retained custody until March 2014, when the Placer County Superior Court 

restored custody to Akey after finding no evidence of neglect, failure, or abuse by Akey or 

Cornacchioli. Id. ¶ 35. Akey’s other children were ages one and two at the time, and the court 

infers they remained in her custody for the duration of the investigation. Id. ¶ 1. 

 Regarding the investigation itself, on or about September 25, 2013, Sutton and 

Myers prepared a “Child Abuse Or Severe Neglect Indexing Form” and a “Notice of Child Abuse 

Central Indexing” that reported a “substantiated” claim of physical abuse by Cornacchioli. Id. ¶¶ 

30, 31. Cornacchioli alleges that these forms were submitted to the State of California the same 

day. Id. Plaintiffs allege that by law, Sutton, Myers and the FCS were obligated to send these 

forms promptly to Cornacchioli to trigger a thirty-day period for Cornacchioli to challenge them 

with a grievance hearing. Id. ¶ 32. Cornacchioli alleges Sutton, Myers and FCS failed to provide 

him that copy. Id. 

 During the subsequent custody proceeding, Sutton was asked at deposition if 

Dupree had been drug tested every day as Sutton had promised Akey in their phone conversation. 

Id. ¶ 34. Sutton answered under oath that Dupree had been tested. Id. However, when asked 

why the drug test results were not in the FCS Report, Sutton said that “maybe I forgot to put it 

in.” Id. No test results for Dupree have ever been produced. Id. ¶ 48. Further, Sutton admitted 

during her deposition that Dupree had told her on September 12, 2013 that he had only been off 

“Norcos,” a common name for a mixture of hydrocodone and acetaminophen, for three months. 

Id. ¶ 34. Sutton also admitted that, contrary to the FCS Report describing Sutton’s assessment 

visit of Dupree’s home, Sutton had never conducted a home inspection. Id. ¶ 47. Finally, Sutton 

admitted in the deposition that she had not run a criminal history on Dupree prior to taking N.D. 

from Akey’s custody. Id. 

 Plaintiffs filed suit after Akey regained custody of N.D. They allege defendants 

Sutton and Myers failed to make a good faith investigation, ignored relevant evidence, fabricated 

evidence in their FCS report, and suppressed exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose Dupree’s 

drug test results, if they exist, or the FCS Investigative Report. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Motion to Dismiss 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may dismiss 

“based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to 

dismiss, this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something 

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . . ’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the 

interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the 

action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict 

matters properly subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference 

into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

B. Motion for Reconsideration 

 Reconsideration is appropriate upon a change in controlling law, when new 

evidence is available, or it is necessary to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Cachil 

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Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. California, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 

School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cnty. v. AC & S Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). A party 

should “not use a motion for reconsideration to raise arguments or present new evidence for the 

first time when it could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation,” id., nor should the 

party “ask the court to rethink matters already decided.” American Rivers v. NOAA Fisheries, 

No. CV–04–00061, 2006 WL 1983178, at *2 (D. Or. July14, 2006) (citing Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. 

Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003)). 

 Under Local Rule 230(j), the party moving for reconsideration must set forth: 

(1) when and to what [j]udge . . . the prior motion was made; 

(2) what ruling . . . was made thereon; (3) what new or different 

facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or 

were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds 

exist for the motion; and (4) why the facts or circumstances were 

not shown at the time of the prior motion. 

L.R. 230(j). 

 “To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to 

induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Knight v. Rios, No. 09–cv–00823, 2010 WL 

5200906, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010). Because they “are generally disfavored,” Am. Rivers, 

2006 WL 1983178, at *2 (citing Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991)), 

such motions are properly granted only in “highly unusual circumstances,” 389 Orange St. 

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Monell Claims (Claims 1-2, 7-8, 13) 

 Plaintiffs Akey and N.D. assert essentially identical Monell claims (1-2, 7-8) 

against Placer County. Plaintiffs allege the County has repeatedly failed to follow applicable 

procedures, FAC ¶ 53, failed to adequately train or supervise employees about its policies, 

practices, and procedures, id. ¶ 61, and that these failures amount to “deliberate indifference,” id. 

¶ 60. Specifically, plaintiffs allege a failure to train “about what constitutes exigent 

circumstances . . . that permit the removal of a child from the custody of a parent without the 

procedural due process requirement for a hearing and prior judicial approval.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff 

Cornacchioli asserts his Monell claim (claim 13) based on 1) defendants’ failure to follow the 

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established policy, practice and procedure for reporting suspected abusers to the California 

Department of Justice; and 2) Sutton’s failure to conduct a good faith investigation in compliance 

with established FCS policies and procedures. Id. at 39-41. 

 Defendants argue the first amended complaint does not sufficiently allege Monell

claims against Placer County because it lacks factual allegations detailing that a regular practice 

or custom existed. Defs.’ Mot. at 9. 

 To sufficiently plead a Monell claim and withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

Plaintiffs Akey and N.D. state their Monell claims under both a theory of “failure to train” and 

“failure to enforce,” Opp’n at 10-13, and Cornacchioli states his under a failure to enforce theory, 

seeking injunctive relief and punitive damages. FAC at 47–48. 

1. Pleading Failure to Train (Claims 1, 2, 7, 8) 

 A plaintiff “must demonstrate a ‘conscious’ or ‘deliberate’ choice on the part of a 

municipality in order to ultimately prevail on a failure to train claim.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 

2008)). Under this standard, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the County “disregarded 

the known or obvious consequence that a particular omission in [its] training program would 

cause [municipal] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Id. (citations and internal 

quotations omitted, alteration in original). A “pattern of similar constitutional violations by 

untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of 

failure to train,” though there exists a “narrow range of circumstances [in which] a pattern of 

similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 

563 U.S. 51, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011). This “narrow range of circumstances” may exist only 

when (1) “the need for more or different training is so obvious”; and (2) the inadequacy of 

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training is “so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights.” City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). 

2. Pleading Failure to Enforce (Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 13) 

 To impose liability against a county for its inaction when enforcement is called 

for, a plaintiff must show (1) that a county employee violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; 

(2) that the county has customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that 

these customs or policies were the moving force behind the employee’s violation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). 

3. Discussion 

 Plaintiffs argue they have alleged with specificity, based upon Placer County’s 

own documents, that Placer County had pertinent policies, but failed to train its employees in 

these policies or was deliberately indifferent to them. Opp’n at 10. As noted, both theories 

require a plaintiff to plead some pattern, custom, or general practice. Plaintiff’s allegations show 

only that Placer County had policies and practices that were not followed with respect to the 

removal of N.D. and the reporting of Cornacchioli to the California Department of Justice. FAC 

at 12–14. Plaintiffs do not allege a pattern of similar behavior other than to allege that plaintiffs 

are “informed and believe[], and on that basis allege[], that Placer County has also failed to 

adequately train or supervise its employees about its policies, practices, or procedures.” FAC 

¶ 61. Plaintiffs also have not sufficiently alleged a failure to train because “isolated incidents of 

criminal wrongdoing” by one actor are not sufficient to put a defendant on “notice that a course of 

training is deficient in a particular respect,” or that the absence of such a course “will cause 

violations of constitutional rights.” Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159; see also Case v. Kitsap County 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts have dismissed Monell claims 

where there is no allegation of a pattern of constitutional violations, or where the allegations do 

not show that more training would have prevented the violation. See, e.g., Hanna ex rel. 

Henderson v. Cnty. of Fresno, No. 1:14-CV-00142, 2014 WL 6685986, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 

26, 2014); E. G. by & through Lepe v. Maldonado, No. 5:14-CV-01053, 2014 WL 5472654, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014). 

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 Similarly, plaintiffs do not allege a claim under a failure to enforce theory because 

there are no allegations of a common practice or custom of failing to adhere to the policies and 

procedures, but only a conclusory statement that “similar conduct has occurred on multiple 

occasions.” See FAC ¶¶ 53, 61. 

 In sum, the allegations lack specificity and are insufficient to put defendants on 

notice so that they might appropriately investigate and respond. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently 

pleaded facts giving rise to a Monell claim under either theory. Because plaintiffs indicate that 

they can these factual deficiencies, Opp’n at 12, the claims are dismissed with leave to amend. 

B. Individual State Law Claims (claims 18-19, 21-22, 24-25, 27-30) 

 Defendants argue these allegations fail to state claims for relief under state law 

because the individual defendants are immune under California Government Code sections 821.6, 

820.2 and 820.21. Defs.’ Mot. at 10. Plaintiffs argue immunity is waived because they have 

sufficiently alleged that defendants fabricated and suppressed relevant evidence, and should be 

permitted to conduct discovery to further support these allegations. Opp’n at 15. Defendants 

further argue that plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled the fabrication of any material evidence, so 

no fraud exception to immunity applies. Defs.’ Mot. at 13. 

1. Immunity 

 “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting 

any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts 

maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. However, immunity is not 

available for any employee who commits one or more of the following with malice: (1) perjury; 

(2) fabrication of evidence; (3) failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence; or (4) obtaining 

testimony by duress. Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21(a). Social workers in particular have absolute 

immunity when they make “discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court 

dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents,” but “are not entitled to absolute 

immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false 

statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury, because 

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such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute.” Beltran v. 

Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008). 

2. Fraud Exception 

 While defendants do not expressly invoke the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

Rule 9(b) requires that when alleging fraud, including fabrication or failure to disclose evidence, 

plaintiffs must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Here, 

plaintiffs allege that defendants (a) suppressed Dupree’s drug test results (FAC ¶ 37); (b) 

suppressed facts about Dupree’s history of drug abuse and felony convictions (id.); (c) fabricated 

the portion of the FCS Report stating that Akey gave her consent to the termination of her custody 

of N.D. (id. ¶¶ 25, 27); (d) fabricated the portion of the FCS Report that stated “Sutton was able 

to assess the home of Cameron Dupree” and that the home was “neat and nicely furnished” (id. ¶ 

34); (e) filed a false report with the California Department of Justice stating that Cornacchioli was 

a perpetrator of physical abuse on N.D. (id. ¶¶ 31–2); and (f) suppressed or prevented the FCS 

investigative report from being given to plaintiffs (id. ¶ 50). 

 Because plaintiffs allege defendants Sutton and Myers fabricated evidence in their 

report, and point to that evidence with sufficient particularity, their allegations are sufficient for 

the actions of Sutton and Myers to fall within the exception to immunity. See Gonzalez v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, No. 08-02177, 2008 WL 2951272, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2008) (allegations 

that defendants reported information they knew to be untrue sufficient); Masoud v. Cnty. of San 

Joaquin, No. 06-1170, 2006 WL 3251797, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (finding even 

“generalized pleading is sufficient to invoke the exception to the general grant of governmental 

immunity”). The motion to dismiss these claims is denied. 

C. NIED/IIED (Claims 27–30) 

 As noted, plaintiff Clayton asserts claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress against defendants Sutton and Myers. Plaintiffs allege that during Sutton’s 

phone call with Akey, plaintiff Clayton was physically present and heard Sutton deliver the news 

that Akey had lost custody of her son. FAC ¶¶ 23-24. Further, Clayton allegedly directly 

witnessed Sutton’s intentional effort to coerce Akey’s consent to giving sole custody of N.D. to 

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Dupree by threatening to take all of Akey’s children away, and Myers’ subsequent phone call 

delivering the same message. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. 

1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claims 27, 28) 

Under California law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) 

requires a prima facie showing of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) with 

the intention of causing emotional distress or reckless disregard of the probability of causing 

emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering of severe emotional distress; and (4) actual and 

proximate causation of plaintiff’s emotional distress by defendant’s conduct. See Christensen v. 

Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991); see also Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 

(9th Cir. 1996). Sufficiently outrageous conduct rises to a level exceeding the bounds usually 

tolerated in civilized society. Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, Sw. 

Dist. Council, 322 F.3d 602, 622 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To state an IIED claim, a plaintiff must allege a defendant’s conduct specifically 

directed at the plaintiff or conduct that recklessly occurred in the presence of a plaintiff of whom 

the defendant is aware. Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 130 (2002). 

Sufficient allegations of intentional conduct convey “the most extreme cases of violent attack,” 

where there is an increased likelihood of severe emotional distress. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 

905. Sufficient allegations of reckless conduct do not require that the defendant have specifically 

directed his or her conduct at the plaintiff. Rather, the complaint must allege that the defendant 

was aware of the plaintiff’s presence and acted with reckless disregard of the probability that his 

or her conduct would cause severe emotional distress. Id.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges only that Clayton was at home with Akey at 

the time of the phone calls from Sutton and Myers and could hear the full conversations. It does 

not allege that defendants were aware they were on a speaker phone or that Clayton was listening. 

Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants’ conduct was specifically directed at Clayton or that 

defendants conducted themselves with any awareness of her presence. The motion to dismiss the 

IIED claims, is granted with leave to amend, in the event plaintiff can amend while satisfying 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 

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2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claims 29, 30) 

Plaintiffs allege negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under a theory of 

bystander liability. FAC ¶¶ 269–274, 277–282. The elements of a claim for bystander liability 

are articulated in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647 (1989), and require that the bystander: 

(1) be closely related to the injured victim; (2) be present at the injury-producing event and aware 

that it was causing injury to the victim; and (3) suffer serious emotional distress beyond that 

typically anticipated in a disinterested witness. Thing, 48 Cal. at 667–78. “Serious” emotional 

distress is a less exacting standard than the “severe” standard required of IIED claims. Graves v. 

City of Stockton, No. S040430, 2006 WL 768831, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006). While 

physical injury is no longer required, the emotional distress must be of such a nature that “a 

reasonable [person], normally constituted,” would be unable to endure it. Molien v. Kaiser 

Found. Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 928 (1980). 

Here, plaintiff Clayton’s claims satisfy Thing’s first and second elements. Clayton 

is Akey’s mother and was present at the time of Akey’s phone conversations with Sutton and 

Myers and aware of their injury-producing content. Plaintiffs have not, however, sufficiently 

alleged the requisite level of seriousness for an NIED claim. 

In a case raising similar issues out of this district, airport officers detained and 

arrested a traveler in view of his wife and children when a background check produced an 

outstanding misdemeanor for a man with the same name but dissimilar appearance, residency 

status, and fingerprints. Garcia ex rel. v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. S-11-3317, 2012 WL 

1605056, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). The man’s family members based their NIED claims on 

having been “subjected to the specter of seeing their husband and father being paraded away in 

handcuffs.” Id. at *5. The court in Garcia noted that while California courts have allowed 

recovery absent physical injury to a bystander, they have not extended recovery to cases in which 

the bystander did not at least witness a physical injury. Id. at *6. Because the man himself did 

not suffer any physical harm, the court dismissed the family’s bystander claims. Id. Even when 

physical injury is inflicted, California courts have been skeptical of bystander claims where the 

emotional distress claimed was not sufficiently serious. See, e.g., Mealy v. B-Mobile, Inc., 195 

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Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1266 (2011) (husband could not recover NIED damages against manufacturer 

after witnessing wife’s fall from wheelchair and resulting hip fracture); see also Sanchez v. 

United States, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (reducing damages award because 

plaintiff’s nightmares and depression from witnessing his sister being struck by car were “mostly 

the product of caring for [his sister], not the product of experiencing the collision”). 

This court has located another instance in which a court found a complaint 

sufficiently alleged serious emotional distress without describing physical injury to the bystander 

or otherwise involved in the incident. In Haddox, a court found the complaint alleged that the 

bystander overheard a police officer say, “If you drop your hands you will be shot” to her minor 

children through a friend’s cell phone. Haddox v. City of Fresno, No 107-00241, 2008 WL 

53244, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 

914 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2012). The court held this allegation stated a bystander claim for 

NIED. Id. at *13. 

This case, however, is distinguishable from Haddox because plaintiffs allege no 

threat of imminent physical injury. Rather, this case more closely resembles Garcia in that 

plaintiff Clayton alleges emotional distress “caused by the loss of familial relations with her 

grandson,” and then only vaguely. FAC ¶¶ 273, 281. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the 

NIED claims is granted, but here as well with leave to amend if possible. 

D. Motion for Reconsideration 

1. Warrantless Removal 

Defendants argue the court’s previous ruling denying their motion to dismiss was 

based improperly on “standards applied to warrantless taking of children by social workers, when 

the standard should have been for situations where the social worker threatened to pursue a 

warrant.” Defs.’ Mot. at 20. “The court’s decision to conclude that a warrantless taking had 

occurred and apply the exigent circumstances test was clear error that is subject to 

reconsideration.” Id. “Defendants purportedly said they would seek a warrant, not that they 

would perform a warrantless taking.” Id. at 9 (quoting Original Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27) (“if you don’t 

comply, then I am going to get a warrant . . .”). Defendants argue specifically the court denied 

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their first motion to dismiss “on the basis [of] a clear factual error . . . when the court determined 

that defendants removed N.D. from the home without a warrant.” Id. at 1. 

The court, however, did not “determine[]” that defendants removed N.D. from the 

home without a warrant; it is undisputed that a warrant was never issued or sought in this case. 

Id. at 15. A warrantless taking, when not justified by exigent circumstances, is a well-settled 

constitutional violation. The Fourth Amendment has been found to protect children and families 

from warrantless removal of a child from the family home. See Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 827 

n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). If the allegations in the complaint were that defendant social workers 

threatened to pursue a warrant, and plaintiff then submitted to the change in N.D.’s custody, the 

court’s inquiry would be limited to whether that threat was impermissibly coercive in nature. See

Sangraal v. City and County of San Francisco, 2013 WL 3187384, at *27–28 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 

(safety plan may be impermissibly coercive “when a state agency lacks legal authority to remove 

the child but coerced parents into agreeing to a safety plan by threatening to remove the child 

anyway”). But here, plaintiffs originally alleged that Akey did not submit to the “safety plan” 

even after the warrant was threatened. This allegation is included again in plaintiffs’ first 

amended complaint, which says that “Akey remained steadfast and refused to agree to any 

custody change for N.D.” and “Akey was even more shocked, hurt, and angered by the repeated 

threat, but she again stood her ground and refused to give consent.” FAC ¶¶ 25, 27.2 

 Defendants cite the district court’s decision in Olvera in support of the motion for 

reconsideration, as they did in their original motion to dismiss. That case is distinguishable in 

that there the juvenile court issued a protective custody warrant for removal. Olvera v. Cnty. of 

 2 It is unclear on what basis defendants argue consent was obtained; the original complaint 

and first amended complaint are consistent in stating that Akey never agreed to the change in 

custody. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 25; ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 25, 27. Defendants state in their motion that Sutton 

and Myers “obtained an agreement from a reluctant Ms. Akey that N.D. could remain with his 

biological father, Cameron Dupree, until the conclusion of the investigation,” Defs.’ Mot. at 1, 

“[t]he safety plan was an agreement that plaintiffs grudging [sic] agreed to . . . ,” id. at 11, and 

Akey “allegedly told Ms. Sutton about Dupree’s drug history and Sutton allegedly responded that 

Dupree would be drug tested every day. [citation omitted] This suggests that Ms. Akey had 

grudgingly consented to the safety plan.” Id. at 9. The court disagrees that Sutton’s statement 

that Dupree would be drug tested can be read as Akey’s consent to give custody to Dupree. 

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Sacramento, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2013). While defendants argue that “a 

warrantless taking and a social worker pursuing a warrant are factually distinct,” Defs.’ Mot. at 

19, here there is no allegation, or anything presented to the court, to show any social worker 

pursued a warrant. Defendants concede that “assuming arguendo that [plaintiffs’] allegation is 

true, Ms. Sutton cannot accomplish [removal] without either an order from the court, or the 

consent of Ms. Akey and Mr. Dupree.” Id. at 4. They are silent as to the third possibility, which 

is what plaintiffs allege: removal accomplished through a warrantless taking. The court must take 

the allegations as pled. 

The motion for reconsideration is denied. 

2. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants also seek reconsideration of the court’s finding that qualified immunity 

does not insulate Sutter and Myers from liability. The qualified immunity inquiry has two 

prongs: whether a constitutional violation occurred, and whether the violated right was “clearly 

established” at the time of the violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009). A court 

may consider either prong at the outset, in the interest of efficiency and conservation of judicial 

resources, based on the individual case’s factual context. Id. at 236. 

Because defendants premise their argument on the assertion that the Ninth Circuit 

has not yet articulated a standard to apply where social workers are alleged to coerce consent to a 

safety plan, and therefore there is no “clearly established” constitutional right, Defs.’ Mot. at 17, 

the court addresses the second prong first. A right is clearly established if it was “sufficiently 

clear [at the time of the conduct at issue] that every reasonable official would have understood 

that what he is doing violates that right.” Taylor v. Barkes, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 

(2015). The Supreme Court does “not require a case directly on point” for the law to be clearly 

established, although precedent “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). In cases that remain 

viable, the Court also has noted “[c]learly established” does not require that “the very action in 

question has previously been held unlawful,” but only that “in the light of pre-existing law the 

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Hope 

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v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (actors “can still be on notice that their conduct violates 

established law even in novel factual circumstances”). As set forth above, the alleged facts are 

that plaintiff never consented to the removal of N.D., and a warrant was never obtained for his 

removal. The law against warrantless taking is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment. 

Dismissing on qualified immunity grounds at this stage is not warranted. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend as to plaintiffs’ Monell

Claims (Claims 1–2, 7–8, 13) and IIED/NIED claims (Claims 27–30), and DENIED in all other 

respects. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This order resolves ECF No. 21. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 1, 2015. 

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