Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05845/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05845-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

On February 12, 2007, Michael J. Astrue replaced Jo Anne B.

Barnhardt as the Commissioner of Social Security. Accordingly, he

is substituted as the defendant in this action pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1).

2

Plaintiff has not filed a reply.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRA MARTINELLI,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-5845 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND REMAND

Plaintiff Myra Martinelli moves for summary judgment or, in

the alternative, for remand. Defendant Michael Astrue1, in his

capacity as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(SSA), opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment.2

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES

Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and remand.

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BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On July 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed an application for

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social

Security Act alleging disability beginning on June 16, 2004. 

(Transcript 107-109.) The application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. (Tr. 74, 83.) On March 27, 2006, after a

hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision

finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 11-17.) This became the

final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 4-6.) Plaintiff then sought

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Factual History

A. Educational and Work History

Plaintiff was born in 1982. (Tr. 12.) She was twenty-two

years old at the onset of her alleged disability. (Tr. 12.) She

completed the eighth grade and, at the time of the hearing, was

enrolled in classes to obtain a GED. (Tr. 12.) In the six months

prior to the hearing, Plaintiff worked part-time, on-call as a

security guard. (Tr. 12.) For two to three weeks, Plaintiff was a

contract worker at the United States Post Office. (Tr. 12.) 

Plaintiff has also worked as a store clerk, a bus-person and a

waitress. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff worked at her

mother's mail business about nine hours per week. (Tr. 12, 131.)

B. Medical History

On December 2, 1996, a school psychologist, Marsha Thibodeaux,

conducted a Psycho/Educational Case Study of Plaintiff. (Tr. 177.) 

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3Prozac is indicated for the treatment of major depressive

disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder. Physicians' Desk

Reference 4600-3430 (2007).

4Celexa is indicated for the treatment of depression. 

Physicians' Desk Reference 3060-0140 (2007). Wellbutrin is

indicated for the treatment of major depressive disorder. Id. at

3270-4625.

3

Ms. Thibodeaux noted that Plaintiff reported that she felt

depressed approximately two times per week. (Tr. 178.) Ms.

Thibodeaux administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for

Children III (WISC-III) test. (Tr. 177.) She noted that

Plaintiff's below average test scores on the WISC-III could not "be

considered a true measure of her cognitive abilities due to her

state of apparent depression . . . ." (Tr. 178.) 

In a letter to Ms. Thibodeaux dated January 13, 1997, Dr.

Nathan H. Thuma, M.D., of the Silverado Psychiatric Center,

corroborated Plaintiff's reports of depression. After seeing

Plaintiff twice, Dr. Thuma diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from a

"malignant combination of depression, oppositional defiance

disorder, and low IQ" and prescribed Prozac3

. (Tr. 181.) 

Plaintiff's mother reported that the Prozac helped considerably. 

(Tr. 181.)

In May, 2001, Plaintiff saw Dr. Daniel Bouwmeister, M.D. (Tr.

251.) Dr. Bouwmeister diagnosed Plaintiff with depression and

prescribed Celexa and Wellbutrin.4 (Tr. 251.)

From April to August, 2004, Plaintiff was treated at the

Mendocino Community Health Clinic. The clinic diagnosed Plaintiff

with depression and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and

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5Lexapro is indicated for the treatment of major depressive

disorder. Physicians' Desk Reference 3060-0371 (2007). Valium is

indicated for the management of anxiety disorders. Id. at

6920-2950. 

6

Xanax is indicated for, among other things, the management of

anxiety disorder. Physicians' Desk Reference WL 24114482 (2003).

4

prescribed Lexapro, Valium and Wellbutrin.5 (Tr. 208-212.) 

Plaintiff's mother reported that Plaintiff was less obsessive when

she was treated with a double dose of Lexapro. (Tr. 208.)

Between April and August, 2004, Plaintiff saw Dr. Bouwmeister

again. (Tr. 251.) Dr. Bouwmeister described Plaintiff as "quite

functionless and unpredictable relative to day to day

responsibilities." Dr. Bouwmeister prescribed Lexapro to help

Plaintiff's depression and OCD and transferred her care to a nurse

practitioner. (Tr. 251.)

On October 18, 2004, as a referral from the Social Security

Administration, Plaintiff was examined by psychologist Albert

Kastl, Ph.D. (Tr. 213-316.) Dr. Kastl administered a variety of

tests to evaluate Plaintiff's cognitive ability, memory skills and

visual-motor functions, including the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt

Test, the Trail Making Test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

- III, and the Wechsler Memory Scale - III. (Tr. 213.) Dr. Kastl

reported that Plaintiff suffered from a learning disorder and mild

anxiety, for which she was taking Xanax6, Valium and Lexapro. (Tr.

215-216.) He found no signs of other mental problems such as

"gross mental confusion, loss of lines of thought, or profound

depression." (Tr. 215.) 

On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff was treated at the Lucerne

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7

Seroquel is indicated for the treatment of acute manic

episodes associated with bipolar I disorder. Physicians' Desk

Reference 0402-1380 (2007).

5

Community Clinic. (Tr. 222.) She reported trying multiple

medications for depression and anxiety. (Tr. 224.) Plaintiff was

diagnosed with paranoia, possible attention deficit disorder and

panic attacks. (Tr. 223.) The clinic prescribed Seroquel.7 (Tr.

224.)

In a letter dated July 23, 2005, Dr. Bouwmeister described

Plaintiff's condition as "quite debilitating relative to ordinary

matters of work, relationships and like responsibilities." (Tr.

251.)

C. Disability Report

On Plaintiff's disability report, she indicated that she was

independent in self-care, could do the laundry, run the dogs and do

yard work once or twice a week without help or encouragement. (Tr.

123-124.) Plaintiff further indicated that she was able to work on

her truck, to drive, shop, and ride a dirt bike, and that she

played pool on a regular basis. (Tr. 125-126.) Plaintiff also

indicated that she had difficulty completing tasks, getting along

with others, dealing with authority and handling stress. (Tr. 127-

128.)

Plaintiff's mother declared that Plaintiff was obsessed with

her appearance. (Tr. 139.) She listed Plaintiff's hobbies as

listening to music, watching movies, swimming and wood carving. 

(Tr. 142.) She stated that Plaintiff helped out in her mail

business. (Tr. 145) She explained that Plaintiff was able to

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learn the business step-by-step, because she learned better when

the pressure of school was removed. (Tr. 145.)

D. Hearing Testimony

At the time of her hearing, Plaintiff was twenty-four years of

age. Plaintiff was represented by her mother Madelyn Martinelli, a

non-attorney. Plaintiff testified that she attended GED classes,

talked to her friends on the phone and worked as an on-call

security guard at a local concert venue. (Tr. 28, 29, 37.) She

stated that her anxiety and panic disorder induced her depression. 

(Tr. 42, 45.) Plaintiff explained that she never had to leave work

because of a panic attack and that her anxiety was reduced by

medication. (Tr. 45-46.)

III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision

In his decision denying Plaintiff's claim, the ALJ applied the

five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 16, 2004. (Tr.

12.)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from a

learning disability and an anxiety disorder that were severe in

combination. (Tr. 12.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's

complaints of depression and OCD were "without abnormal clinical

signs and symptom cluster to establish the disorders." (Tr. 15.)

At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's

impairments either individually or in combination met or equaled in

severity and duration the criteria of any listed impairment. (Tr.

12.)

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At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no relevant

past work experience because her reported work activities were not

consistent with gainful employment. (Tr. 15.) He found

Plaintiff's physical capacity for work to be unlimited. (Tr. 12.) 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff's status as a younger individual

indicated that she was not expected to have difficulty adjusting to

other work and concluded that there would be no issue with respect

to transferrable skills. (Tr. 15.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's

intermittent need for medical care supported a finding that she is

better suited for work that does not involve high quotas or

production expectations. (Tr. 14.)

At step five, the ALJ relied on the Vocational Expert's

testimony to find that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform

the job of automotive detailer, with 69,000 jobs in the national

economy and 4,700 jobs in the local economy. Therefore, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F. 3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

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 To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

ALJ's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez v. Heckler,

807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

 If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Sec'y of Health,

Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If

supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to

any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris,

637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981).

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

To determine whether a plaintiff is disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations

set out a five-step sequential process. Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The burden of

proof is on the plaintiff in steps one through four. Sanchez v.

Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 

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In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limit his or her ability to work. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1290 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant does

not, he or she is not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues

to step three for a determination of whether the impairment meets

or equals a "listed" impairment which the regulations acknowledge

to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 

Yuckert v. Bowen, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 

If this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

DISCUSSION

I. Dr. Bouwmeister's and Dr. Kastl's Opinions

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in granting more weight

to examining-psychologist Dr. Kastl's opinion than to treatingphysician Dr. Bouwmeister's opinion.

The ALJ must give more weight to the opinions of treating

medical sources than to either examining or non-examining medical

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sources because treating sources usually provide "a detailed,

longitudinal picture" of a claimant's medical impairments. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761

(9th Cir. 1989). Treating source means the claimant's physician,

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides, or

has provided, the claimant with medical treatment or evaluation and

who has, or who has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. In order to reject the

uncontradicted opinion of a treating source, the ALJ must set forth

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923

F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991). Where there are contradictions between

the opinion of the treating source and others, the ALJ must detail

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence

to reject the opinion of the treating source. Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The ALJ gave two reasons for giving Dr. Bouwmeister's opinion

minimal weight. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Bouwmeister had only

treated Plaintiff for five months. (Tr. 12.) A five month period

may not be sufficient to provide a "a detailed, longitudinal

picture" of a plaintiff's medical impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1502. Second, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Bouwmeister's

conclusion that Plaintiff suffered from debilitating emotional

symptoms was contradicted by the large number of Plaintiff's

reported daily activities and the absence of ongoing medical

attention.

Because the ALJ detailed specific and legitimate reasons for

giving minimal weight to Dr. Bouwmeister's opinion, his

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determination was not error. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

II. The ALJ's Step Two Determination

Plaintiff argues that, at step two of the sequential process,

the ALJ improperly excluded Plaintiff's depressive disorder and OCD

as medically determinable severe impairments.

At step two of the five-step sequential inquiry, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments, defined as "significantly limit[ing]

[the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). Basic work activities

include: "[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple

instructions" and "[r]esponding appropriately to supervision,

co-workers and usual work situations . . . ." 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.921(b)(3),(5). 

The step two severity determination is intended to identify

those claimants whose impairments are so slight that they are

unlikely to be found disabled even when the variables of their age,

education and experience are taken into account. Carrao v.

Shalala, 20 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1994)(citing Yuckert, 482 U.S.

at 153). 

Here, the ALJ ruled in Plaintiff's favor at step two, finding

that she suffered from learning and anxiety disorders that were

severe in combination. (Tr. 12.) Any error in the way he reached

this favorable determination is moot. As to step three, Plaintiff

does not argue that her condition, even considering depression and

OCD, met or exceeded a listed impairment. The ALJ again found in

favor of Plaintiff at step four, that she had no past relevant

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work. Thus, any error on the ALJ's part in properly evaluating

Plaintiff's depression and OCD affected only his determination at

step five that she was not disabled.

A plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing

disability. See Sanchez v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 812

F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). Symptoms alone "are not enough to

establish that there is a physical or mental impairment . . . ." 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. The impairment "must be shown by medically

acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques . . . ." Id. Moreover,

"[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively with medication

are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for

SSI benefits. Warre v. Comm'r of the SSA, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th

Cir. 2006).

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's learning disability and

anxiety were not disabling and that depression and OCD were not

adequately medically established. This determination is supported

by substantial evidence. As previously discussed, the ALJ properly

relied on the opinion of examining psychologist Dr. Kastl in

assessing Plaintiff's impairments. (Tr. 13.) After conducting a

variety of tests, Dr. Kastl diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety and

learning disorders, but stated that Plaintiff showed no signs of

profound depression. (Tr. 215.) Dr. Kastl made no mention of OCD.

Plaintiff's work history demonstrates that, despite her

depression and OCD, she was able to understand, carry out, and

remember simple instructions and respond appropriately to

supervision, co-workers and usual work situations. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.921(b)(3),(5).

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Furthermore, Plaintiff's depression and OCD improved with

treatment. Warre, 439 F.3d at 1006. Dr. Bouwmeister, Plaintiff's

mother and Plaintiff reported that her condition improved in

response to prescribed medication. (Tr. 251, 181, 45-46.)

Finally, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff did not

provide acceptable medical evidence to prove her depression and

OCD. Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 511. The record shows that Plaintiff

has been diagnosed and treated for depression and OCD several

times. However, these diagnoses were based on Plaintiff's reported

symptoms rather than clinical diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1528.

Because it was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ's

determination was not error.

III. Failure to Develop the Record Fully

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record

fully by not adequately exploring the subjects and concerns raised

by her mother at the hearing.

Because disability hearings are not adversarial in nature, the

ALJ has a special duty in social security cases fully and fairly to

develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a

claimant's entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). The ALJ's

responsibility to develop relevant evidence takes on heightened

significance when the claimant is mentally impaired. Deblois v.

Secretary of Health & Human Services, 686 F.2d 76, 81 (1st Cir.

1982); DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 849. In such instances, the ALJ must

be "especially diligent in ensuring that favorable as well as

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unfavorable facts and circumstances are elicited [at the hearing]." 

Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978).

The ALJ's duty to develop a full and fair record exists even

when the claimant is represented by counsel. Brown v. Heckler, 713

F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983); Padilla v. Heckler, 643 F. Supp.

481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). When a claimant is not represented by

counsel, however, the ALJ must "scrupulously and conscientiously

probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts" in

order to afford the pro se litigant an impartial decision based

upon an adequately developed record. Thompson v. Schweiker, 665

F.2d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Gold v. Secretary of HEW,

463 F.2d 38, 43 (2nd Cir. 1972).

Although Plaintiff's mother did not testify as a witness, the

ALJ did fully elicit her views in her capacity as Plaintiff's

representative. (Tr. 20.) At the outset of the hearing, the ALJ

gave Plaintiff's mother a chance to make an opening statement,

during which she extensively detailed Plaintiff's mental health

history. (Tr. 23-27.) At the conclusion of her opening statement,

the ALJ asked her if she had anything more to say. (Tr. 26.) 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ was restrictive with her mother. 

At various points throughout the hearing when the ALJ asked

Plaintiff a question, Plaintiff's mother tried to interject her own

views regarding Plaintiff's mental health. (Tr. 23.) At these

times, the ALJ prevented Plaintiff's mother from interjecting her

own views and asked her to permit Plaintiff herself to answer the

questions. (Tr. 35, 37, 38.)

Plaintiff claims that if the ALJ had pursued the mother's

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testimony more fully, she could have served as an important source

of information regarding Plaintiff's mental health condition,

treatment, and functional abilities. However, Plaintiff's mother

had already documented these issues when she filled out Plaintiff's

disability report form and in her opening statement. (Tr. 24-27,

111-37.)

IV. Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to apply the proper

credibility analysis to her subjective symptom testimony.

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth

Circuit developed a threshold test to determine the credibility of

a claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Under Cotton, a

claimant "must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

or other symptoms alleged.'" Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-

08); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Cotton requires "only that the causal relationship be a reasonable

inference, not a medically proven phenomenon." Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1282. Therefore, a claimant is not required to produce objective

medical evidence of the pain itself or its severity. Id. (citing

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 347-48). 

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant

is malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the

claimant's testimony must be 'clear and convincing.'" Lester, 81

F.3d at 834 (quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th

Cir. 1989)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. In determining whether a

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plaintiff's testimony concerning the severity of his or her

symptoms is credible, the ALJ may properly consider: (1) ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the plaintiff's

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the

symptoms, and other testimony by the plaintiff that appears less

than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to

seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and

(3) the plaintiff's daily activities. Id. at 1273.

Assuming that Plaintiff meets the Cotton threshold test, the

ALJ has produced clear and convincing reasons for questioning

Plaintiff's credibility. Although the ALJ did not explicitly

discuss the Smolen credibility factors, he noted that Plaintiff's

reported daily activities, during the time she claimed to be

disabled, were inconsistent with the alleged intensity, persistence

and functionally limiting effects of her alleged symptoms.

For example, Plaintiff reported responding favorably to

follow-up care. (Tr. 15.) When Dr. Thuma started Plaintiff on

Prozac, Plaintiff's mother said that it helped considerably. (Tr.

181.) Plaintiff and her mother both testified that Xanax and

Lexapro "work good for her." (Tr. 69.) Dr. Bouwmeister's nurse

noted that, with increased medication, Plaintiff's "obsessing [was]

better." (Tr. 208-209.) These statements indicate that

Plaintiff's emotional state improved when taking her medication.

Plaintiff testified to having friends, socializing at clubs,

playing pool, riding dirt bikes and working on her truck. (Tr.

15.) Plaintiff also testified to working on a part-time basis and

pursuing a GED. (Tr. 15.) Finally, although Plaintiff testified

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to experiencing panic attacks, she denied any having episodes when

she was with her boyfriend. (Tr. 15.) These statements run

counter to Plaintiff's allegation that the intensity and

persistence of her condition prevents her from working.

Because the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for

discounting the subjective complaints of Plaintiff, his

determination on credibility was properly decided. Lester, 81 F.3d

at 834.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary

judgment is granted and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment

and remand are denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/13/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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