Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03722/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03722-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY TAMONDONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

MORTGAGEIT, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03722-RS 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Nancy Tamondong seeks an order restraining defendants from proceeding with a 

trustee’s sale of her primary residence. The sale is presently set for July 7, 2016. A request for a 

TRO is evaluated by the same factors that generally apply to a preliminary injunction. See 

Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brushy & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, 

as a form of preliminary injunctive relief, a TRO is an “extraordinary remedy” that is “never 

granted as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain 

preliminary relief, a plaintiff must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 

tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 21-22. The Ninth Circuit 

has clarified, however, that courts in this Circuit should still evaluate the likelihood of success on 

a “sliding scale.” Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[T]he ‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains 

viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”). As quoted in Cottrell, that test provides 

Case 3:16-cv-03722-RS Document 10 Filed 07/05/16 Page 1 of 3
CASE NO. 16-cv-03722-RS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

that, “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious 

questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the 

plaintiff’s favor,” provided, of course, that “plaintiffs must also satisfy the other [Winter] factors” 

including the likelihood of irreparable harm. Id. at 1135.

Here, Tamondong’s claims are brought under legal theories that have ordinarily been

rejected in the past. See, Vasquez v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 5158538, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

2, 2015) (collecting cases). As Vasquez explains, “[b]orrowers commonly attack a lender’s 

standing to foreclose by challenging irregularities in the securitization process” but “[s]uch 

challenges are almost universally dismissed.” Id. at *3. A major underpinning in many of the 

decisions rejecting such claims, however, was a conclusion that borrowers “lack standing to rely 

on defects in the securitization process in order to challenge a foreclosing entity’s authority to 

foreclose.” Id. The continued viability of that conclusion, however, has been called into question 

by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 62 

Cal.4th 919 (2016).

On its face, the holding in Yvanova is limited to post-foreclosure claims. There is at least 

an argument, however, that its reasoning is equally applicable to pre-foreclosure claims. See 

Lundy v. Selene Fin., LP, No., 2016 WL 1059423, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016) (predicting 

that California Supreme Court will extend Yvanova to the pre-foreclosure context).

Even assuming claims challenging alleged securitization defects may no longer be 

routinely rejected for lack of standing, borrowers will not automatically be entitled to relief merely 

be alleging that their loans were “securitized,” of course. Under all the circumstances here, 

though, including the de minimis harm to defendants that will arise from a brief postponement of 

the foreclosure sale, there is adequate cause to grant a temporary restraining order, without bond,

and set a hearing on preliminary injunction, to permit full briefing and due consideration of the 

claims and defenses.

Case 3:16-cv-03722-RS Document 10 Filed 07/05/16 Page 2 of 3
CASE NO. 16-cv-03722-RS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered:

1. Defendants are enjoined from proceeding with the trustee’s sale of the real property 

commonly known as 2911 Sorrento Way, Union City, CA 94587, pending further order of court.

2. Plaintiff shall cause a copy of this order to be served on defendants forthwith, by the 

speediest practicable means.

3. Within 7 days of receipt of this order, defendants shall file any opposition to issuance of 

a preliminary injunction that would enjoin the trustee’s sale during the pendency of this action.

4. Within 3 days of filing of any such opposition, plaintiff may file a reply. The matter 

will then be taken under submission without oral argument, or set for hearing, in the Court’s 

discretion.

5. The parties may meet and confer to negotiate a less compressed briefing schedule, 

provided defendants agree to continue the foreclosure sale to a date at least two weeks beyond the 

time the reply brief is due.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-03722-RS Document 10 Filed 07/05/16 Page 3 of 3