Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04273/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04273-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:7413(b) Clean Air Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, STEPHEN L.

JOHNSON, Administrator of the

United States Environmental

Protection Agency,

Defendants. 

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No. C-06-4273 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Environmental Defense ("Plaintiff") brought this

action against the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(the "EPA") and its Administrator Stephen L. Johnson (the

"Administrator"; collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges

two causes of action: (1) the EPA failed to comply with its

nondiscretionary duty to meet statutory deadlines contained in

Section 213(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a),

and Public Law 108-199, Div. G, Title IV, § 428(b); (2) the

Administrator violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5

U.S.C. § 555(b), by unreasonably delaying in carrying out the

nondiscretionary duty to propose and publish new regulations for

certain small spark-ignition engines. 

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings, Plaintiff's Opposition, and Defendants' Reply.

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Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court will treat the

documents as cross-motions for summary judgment on liability. See

Docket No. 22. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby

GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on liability and

DENIES Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on liability.

 

II. BACKGROUND

The Clean Air Act is intended "to protect and enhance the

quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public

health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." 

42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). Title II of the CAA provides the

Administrator with the authority to institute national emission

standards for mobile sources of air pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7521-

7590. In 1990, Congress added Section 213, 42 U.S.C. § 7547,

which authorizes the EPA to study and implement emission standards

for new nonroad engines and vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7547. In a

2004 appropriations bill ("Section 428(b)"), Congress set

deadlines for the EPA to propose and publish regulations under

Section 213(a) for new nonroad spark-ignition engines of less than

50 horsepower. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No.

108-199, Div. G, Title IV, § 428(b), 118 Stat. 3, 418 (Jan. 23,

2004). The relevant provision states: 

(b) Not later than December 1, 2004, the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency shall propose regulations

under the Clean Air Act that shall contain standards to

reduce emissions from new nonroad spark-ignition engines

smaller than 50 horsepower. Not later than December 31, 2005,

the Administrator shall publish in the Federal Register final

regulations containing such standards. 

Section 428(b). In 2005, Congress directed the EPA not to publish

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the Section 428(b) regulations until it had completed and

published a safety study:

None of the funds provided in this Act or any other Act may

be used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to

publish proposed or final regulations pursuant to the

requirements of section 428(b) of division G of Public Law

108-199 until the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency, in coordination with other appropriate

Federal agencies, has completed and published a technical

study to look at safety issues, including the risk of fire

and burn to consumers in use, associated with compliance with

the regulations. Not later than 6 months after the date of

enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete and

publish the technical study. 

Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-54, Title II, § 205, 119

Stat. 499, 532 (Aug. 2, 2005) ("Section 205"). On March 17, 2006,

the Agency published the technical study required by Section 205,

which concluded that "new emission standards would not increase

the risk of fire and burn to consumers in use." EPA Technical

Study on the Safety of Emission Controls for Nonroad SparkIgnition Engines > 50 Horsepower, # EPA420-R-06-006 (March 2006),

at p. 3, available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/equip-ld.htm#regs. 

To date, the EPA has not published the proposed or final

regulations as required by Section 428(b). Plaintiff notified

Defendants of its intent to sue, Compl. ¶ 18, and filed the

present action on July 12, 2006. Compl., Docket No. 1.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, (1986). 

IV. DISCUSSION

In this case, there is no dispute that the EPA has not

published the proposed or final regulations containing emission

standards for new nonroad spark-ignition engines smaller than 50

horsepower, nor as to any other material facts. Since the only

issue raised is a question of statutory interpretation, it is

appropriate to decide the issue on summary judgment. See Cal.

Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 317

F.Supp.2d 1188, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

1. Plaintiff's nondiscretionary duty claim

Plaintiff's first claim alleges that the EPA violated its

nondiscretionary duty to propose and finalize emission standards

for nonroad spark-ignition engines as prescribed in Section

428(b). See Compl. at ¶¶ 15-20. Plaintiff's claim arises under

42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2), which authorizes individual civil suits

when the Administrator has failed to perform a nondiscretionary

duty. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). For the Court to find a

nondiscretionary duty, the statute must "'categorically mandate'

that all specified action be taken by a date-certain deadline." 

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(emphasis in original). In other words, courts must determine

"whether the agency failed to comply with a date-certain statutory

deadline." Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 888 F.Supp. 1005,

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1008 (D. Ariz. 1995). However, "statutory provisions which do not

set bright-line deadlines fall outside the reach of a citizen's

suit." Id.

The parties do not dispute that Section 428(b) mandated

specific EPA action by date-certain deadlines, giving rise to a

nondiscretionary duty. Rather, the key point of dispute is

whether Section 205 repealed the deadlines in Section 428(b),

eliminating the Administrator's nondiscretionary duty to publish

the regulations.

Defendants contend that the deadlines in Section 428(b) were

nullified by the Congressional mandate in Section 205. Defs.'

Mot. at 5. Section 205 did not explicitly repeal the deadlines

for proposing and publishing the new emission standards, however,

the deadlines may be repealed by implication. "There can be no

doubt that Congress could suspend or repeal the authorization

contained in [its prior legislation]; by an amendment to an

appropriations bill, or otherwise." United States v. Dickerson,

310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940). 

Implied repeals are only available in two situations: "where

the provisions in two statutes are in 'irreconcilable conflict,'

or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier

one and 'is clearly intended as a substitute.'" Branch v. Smith,

538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank,

296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). However, "absent a clearly expressed

congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored." 

Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. at 273 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

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The disfavor for repeals by implication "applies with even

greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an

Appropriations Act." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.

153, 190 (1978) (emphasis in original). However, "Congress

nonetheless may amend substantive law in an appropriations

statute, as long as it does so clearly." Robertson v. Seattle

Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992). Moreover, because this

case involves a conflict between two appropriations acts, not

between an appropriations act and a piece of substantive

legislation, Tennessee Valley Authority is distinguishable. 

Section 205 stated that the EPA could not use any funds "to

publish proposed or final regulations pursuant to the requirements

of section 428(b)" until it "has completed and published a

technical study to look at safety issues . . . associated with

compliance with the regulations." Section 205, 119 Stat. at 532. 

Congress ordered the EPA to complete and publish the technical

study within 6 months, meaning by February 2, 2006. Id. The

plain language of Section 205 indicates that the EPA could not

publish emission standards until the technical study was

completed. Congress gave the EPA until February of 2006 to issue

the study, at which point both deadlines contained in Section

428(b) would have already passed. By setting the date for the

technical study after the dates for the proposed and final

regulations in Section 205, Congress created an irreconcilable

conflict between the appropriations bills and demonstrated its

intent to modify the specific deadlines in Section 428(b). As the

Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen the plain import of a later

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statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later

enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlierenacted requirement of an express reference. . . ." Lockhart v.

United States, 546 U.S. 142, 126 S.Ct. 699, 704 (2005) (J. Scalia,

concurring) (emphasis in original). Thus, the deadlines contained

in Section 428(b), the earlier appropriations bill, were

implicitly repealed by Section 205, the subsequent appropriations

bill. 

Although there is a sound basis for finding congressional

intent to implicitly repeal the deadlines in Section 428(b)

through Section 205, the framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) is

also useful for resolving this issue. See e.g., San Francisco

Baykeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (using

the Chevron analysis for a nondiscretionary duty claim against the

EPA). In Chevron the Supreme Court stated, "if the statute is

silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the

question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on

a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843. Well-accepted rules of statutory construction instruct that

provisions should be read in relation to one another and in the

context of the entire statute in which they appear, with a sense

of their place within the overall statutory structure. See Davis

v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). In this

case, the EPA contends that "when read together, sections 428(b)

and 205 specify no operative deadlines for issuing proposed and

final emission standards and instead give EPA discretion over the

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timing of its rulemaking." Defs.' Reply at 5. 

The Court agrees that the EPA's interpretation of Section 205

is a permissible construction as it relates to the elimination of

the deadlines in Section 428(b). In Section 205, Congress

directed the EPA to complete the technical study by February of

2006 before the EPA could use any funds to publish the proposed or

final regulations. Section 205, 119 Stat. at 532. Thus, Congress

effectively eliminated the specific dates in 428(b), and a

thorough search of the legislative history provides nothing to the

contrary. Without bright-line deadlines, the statute in question

cannot be reached by a citizen's suit. See Defenders of Wildlife,

888 F.Supp. at 1008. Once Section 205 removed the bright-line

deadlines, the EPA no longer had a nondiscretionary duty of

timeliness with respect to the emissions regulations for small

spark-ignition engines. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at

791 ("In the absence of a readily-ascertainable deadline,

therefore, it will be almost impossible to conclude that Congress

accords a particular agency action such high priority as to impose

upon the agency a 'categorical mandate' that deprives it of all

discretion over the timing of its work."). 

Even though the deadlines are no longer in force, the EPA's

substantive duty to set emissions regulations for small sparkignition engines remains. See e.g., Environmental Defense Center

v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1995) (the appropriations

rider, which withheld funding, prevented the Agency from complying

with the Act "until a reasonable time after appropriated funds are

made available").

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2. Plaintiff's unreasonable delay claim

The parties agree that Plaintiff's second cause of action,

unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act, fails

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Def.'s Mot. at 9,

Pl.'s Opp'n at 10. Jurisdiction arises under the APA only when

"there is no other adequate remedy in court." 5 U.S.C. § 7604;

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1997). Because the Clean

Air Act's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), grants

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's first cause of action, jurisdiction

pursuant to the APA is inappropriate and unnecessary. See Sierra

Club v. Leavitt, 355 F.Supp.2d 544, 547 (D. D.C. 2005). Under

Section 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), Plaintiff may file an action

for unreasonable delay in the District Court for the District of

Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described herein, the Court GRANTS

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2007

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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