Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01226/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01226-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NHIA KAO VANG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STEVEN DECKER, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-01226-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this action, Plaintiffs Nhia Kao Vang, Chao Xiong, David Vang, Chong 

Yang, Chue Hue Vang and Pang Her (collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege violations of federal 

law arising out of the 2007 criminal investigation and prosecution of Plaintiffs Chue Hue 

Vang, Nhia Kao Vang and David Vang (collectively “the Vang Plaintiffs”) for an alleged 

plot to obtain military weapons to overthrow the government of Laos. Plaintiffs allege 

violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiffs also allege 

state law tort claims for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest, wrongful imprisonment

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, Plaintiffs request declaratory and 

injunctive relief. 

.///

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On January 28, 2013, Defendant Decker filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)1 and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). (ECF 

No. 32.) Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition. (ECF No. 34.) For the reasons set forth 

below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.2 

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs are three Hmong couples residing in West Sacramento and Fresno, 

California. Plaintiffs contend that the Hmong people who remain in Laos are subject to a 

genocide carried out by the Laotian government. Plaintiffs further contend that the 

United States, which called on the Hmong people to fight on its behalf against 

pro-communist forces during the Vietnam War, has failed to aid the Hmong people in 

their plight in Laos. Plaintiffs were involved in efforts to bring about a peaceful solution 

to the Hmong genocide in Laos. 

Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang served as secretary to an individual identified as General 

Vang Pao, who was interested in producing a documentary film concerning the Hmong 

plight, and was generally interested in raising money and increasing the overall support 

for aiding the Hmong people in Laos. Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was told by an individual 

named Locha Thao that a meeting to discuss documentary film production was going to 

be held in Sacramento. Locha Thao received this information from Defendant Decker. 

On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang met at a Sacramento restaurant with 

other Hmong elders and Defendant Decker. 

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted 

on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 78-230(g).

3 Unless otherwise noted, the following recitation of facts is derived, sometimes verbatim, from 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (ECF No. 2.)

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3

At the meeting, the group gave Defendant Decker maps that they had created, which 

showed the locations of Hmong people trapped in the jungles of Laos. Plaintiff Chue 

Hue Vang primarily served as an interpreter at the meeting. Defendant Decker later 

asked the group to follow him across the street to a mobile trailer, where weapons of 

various kinds were on display. Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang understood the meeting and the 

display of weapons to mean that the United States was interested in assisting the 

Hmong people in escaping from Laos. At no time during this meeting was there any 

discussion, plan, or agreement regarding a military takeover of Laos, nor did Plaintiff 

Chue Hue Vang make any agreement regarding the purchase, possession, or 

transportation of weapons.

Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang attended a second meeting on February 18, 2007, where 

a documentary film was discussed. After the meeting, Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was 

invited to go to a new location at the Doubletree Hotel in Sacramento. He understood 

the meeting at the hotel to be connected to the documentary film project. However, at 

the hotel, Defendant Decker showed Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang and other Hmong elders 

several AK 47s. Defendant Decker led a discussion about a military-backed effort to 

save the trapped Hmong people in Laos. Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was confused by the 

conversation, as he knew that General Vang Pao did not have the money to fund the 

type of effort Defendant Decker was discussing. According to Plaintiffs, the discussion 

focused on using weapons as a means to help the Hmong people in Laos defend 

themselves and escape; an overthrow of the Laotian government was never mentioned. 

Again, Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang inferred that the United States supported this plan.

Plaintiff Nhia Kao Vang was also asked to attend a meeting to discuss helping the 

Hmong people in Laos. He was asked to attend the meeting “with an American 

government person,” and was asked to drive a Hmong doctor to the meeting. The group 

went to a hotel, where Defendant Decker showed Plaintiff Nhia Kao Vang and others a 

display of weapons. At no point was a military takeover of Laos discussed. Plaintiff Nhia 

Kao Vang was also asked to go on a trip to Washington, D.C. 

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4

He agreed to go on the trip, with six other individuals. Plaintiffs allege that this trip was 

simply for tourism and “had nothing to do with any kind of fundraising effort” as

Defendant Decker later claimed.

Plaintiff David Vang was told by Locha Thao to prepare a document called “the 

Popcorn document.” Defendant Decker told Locha Thao to ask Plaintiff David Vang to 

do so. The Popcorn document detailed a plan for a military coup of Laos. Locha Thao 

also told Plaintiff David Vang that Defendant Decker had stated that the United States 

not only supported the coup described in the Popcorn document, but was going to fund 

the operation and provide arms and special forces for it. Plaintiff David Vang was also 

told that the United States would pay him $5,000 for preparing the document. Plaintiff 

David Vang thus prepared the Popcorn document with the understanding that the 

operation detailed therein was a government-backed military operation.

The Criminal Case4

As a result of the above listed facts, a criminal complaint was filed before this 

Court on June 4, 2007, charging the Vang Plaintiffs, among others, with conspiracy to 

violate the Neutrality Act and conspiracy to receive and possess missiles, among other 

things. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Decker intentionally deceived the grand jury, as 

Defendant Decker knew that the Vang Plaintiffs did not have any criminal intent to enter 

into an illegal conspiracy to overthrow the Laotian government, or to possess military 

equipment unlawfully. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) 

Arrest warrants were returned executed on June 4, 2007, for Plaintiff Chue Hue 

Vang, and on June 5, 2007, for Nhia Kao Vang. An arrest warrant was returned 

executed on June 14, 2007, for Plaintiff David Vang. 

///

///

 4 The facts regarding the criminal case against the Vang Plaintiffs are taken from reference to the 

docket in that case unless otherwise stated. (ECF No. 10-1). The Court may consider documents 

referenced in a complaint, or which a complaint in some way depends on, in a motion to dismiss without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2005).

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5

On June 14, 2007, the Vang Plaintiffs were charged with numerous counts arising from 

the alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government of Laos. Plaintiffs were held in 

custody, until they were released on bond on July 13, 2007.

On March 9, 2009, the Vang Plaintiffs, among others, filed a Motion to Dismiss for 

Outrageous Government Conduct. Plaintiffs alleged that both the undercover agents 

and the prosecutors engaged in misconduct throughout the prosecution and the 

underlying investigation. (ECF No. 10-3.) The Court denied the motion on May 11, 

2009, but provided that Plaintiffs could renew the motion after further discovery.

Ultimately, a Second Superseding Indictment was returned on June 24, 2010. 

Plaintiffs filed numerous motions to dismiss, including a renewed Motion to Dismiss for 

Outrageous Government Conduct. On November 12, 2010, the Court granted in part 

and denied in part motions to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four and Five. The Court

dismissed Counts Four and Five on the grounds that the Second Superseding 

Indictment “fail[ed] to put each defendant on notice of the nature of charges against him 

in order to allow him to prepare a defense or to ensure he is being prosecuted on the 

basis of the facts presented to the grand jury” and “fail[ed] to apprise each defendant of 

the specific conduct he engaged in the allegedly violates the [Neutrality] Act.” (ECF 

No. 10-6.)

Subsequently, on January 10, 2011, the Government moved to dismiss all 

charges against the Vang Plaintiffs “in the interests of justice.” (ECF No. 10-8.) The 

Court granted the motion that same day.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 2011, Plaintiffs Nhia Kao Vang, Chao Xiong, David Vang and Chong 

Yang served FTCA claims on the United States. On July 29, 2011, Plaintiffs Chue Hue 

Vang and Pang Her served their FTCA claims on the United States. 

///

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On July 18, 2011, and August 11, 2011, respectively, the Government acknowledged 

receipt of the claims. More than six months have passed since the submission of 

Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims, and the Government has neither accepted nor denied the claims.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action on May 7, 2012, against the 

United States; B. Todd Jones, the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms; and special agent Steven Decker. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiffs sued Defendant 

Jones in his official capacity, but named Defendant Decker in his individual capacity. 

(Id.) 

On July 31, 2012, Defendants Jones and the United States filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 9.) At that time, Defendant Decker had not yet been served, and 

so did not join in the motion to dismiss. On October 17, 2012, the Court granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, giving leave to amend within twenty days. 

(ECF No. 17.) The Order specifically stated that if Plaintiffs did not file an amended 

complaint within twenty days, the causes of action dismissed by virtue of the Order 

would be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 17 at 19.) Plaintiffs did not file an 

amended complaint within twenty days of the Court’s order. Rather, Plaintiffs filed a 

Statement Re Non-Filing of First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiffs stated to 

the Court that they would not file an amended complaint as they have no further facts to 

allege. (ECF No. 25 at 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States and 

Jones were dismissed with prejudice.

On October 25, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the Court’s permission to 

serve Defendant Decker by publication pursuant to Rule 4(e) and requesting an 

extension of time to complete service on Defendant Decker. (ECF No. 22.) The Court 

denied Plaintiffs’ motion. (ECF No. 28.) The United States Attorney’s Office then 

stipulated with Plaintiffs to receive the Summons and Complaint on behalf of Defendant 

Decker. (ECF No. 29.) Defendant Decker was thus deemed served on November 28, 

2012. (ECF No. 29.)

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7

STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant a fair notice 

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (1997) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed 

factual allegations. Id. However, “a plaintiff’s obligations to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading 

must contain something more than a “statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion 

[of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). 

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A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line 

from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “a wellpleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those 

facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 

any point during the litigation through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l Union of Operating 

Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). Lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. 

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts have an independent 

obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of 

a challenge from any party.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to 

dismiss the action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack, and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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Thus, a party may either make an attack on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in 

the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may challenge the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal sufficiency of the pleadings. Id.

When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 

by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to 

dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 

nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

However, in the case of a facial attack, district courts “may review evidence beyond the 

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist, and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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ANALYSIS

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant Decker requests that the Court take judicial notice of certain 

documents, namely documents from the criminal case against the Vang Plaintiffs and 

the certification of the Attorney General stating that Defendant Decker was acting within 

the scope of his employment when he engaged in the conduct at issue. (ECF No. 32-1.) 

“As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings 

in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, 

when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take into 

account materials which are the proper subject of judicial notice. Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. 

Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 

201, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 

either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable 

of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Pursuant to Rule 201, courts may take 

judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. 

Defendant Decker requests that the Court take judicial notice of eight documents 

from the criminal case against the Vang Plaintiffs (the “Jack case”). (ECF No. 32-1.) A 

federal court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” 

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial 

notice of Exhibits A through H to Defendant Decker’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF 

Nos. 32-2-9.) The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of these filings, and not the 

truth of any facts or allegations included therein.

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Defendant Decker also requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 

certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) which certifies that Defendant Decker was 

acting within the scope of his federal employment “with reference to all matters alleged in 

the suit.” (ECF No. 32-10.) However, judicial notice of the Attorney General’s 

certification is not a prerequisite to the Court accepting the certification as prima facie 

evidence that Defendant Decker acted within the scope of his employment. See, e.g., 

Desfosses v. Keller, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Idaho 2009) (finding that scope of 

employment certification establishes that defendant was operating within scope of 

employment without judicially noticing the certification). Thus, the Court declines to 

judicially notice the § 2679(d) certification (ECF No. 32-10) at this time.

B. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs bring several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs’ First 

Cause of Action alleges that Defendant Decker violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right 

to freedom of speech and right to petition the government for redress of grievances, as 

well as their Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. (ECF 

No. 2 at 22.) Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendant Decker violated 

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights by interfering with their 

spousal relationships. (ECF No. 2 at 56.) 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under the color of 

state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To act under state law, a defendant must “exercise 

power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer 

is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). 

“There is no valid basis for a claim under § 1983” brought against a federal official acting 

under color of federal law. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). 

///

///

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In the present case, while Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Decker is liable under § 1983 

for violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs make no allegation that Defendant 

Decker acted under the color of state law. Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendant 

Decker is a federal law enforcement officer who acted “under color of legal authority in 

connection with his position as an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms.” (ECF No. 2 at 3.) Defendant Decker is clearly a federal actor and acted 

under the color of federal, rather than state, law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to 

state a cognizable claim against Defendant Decker under § 1983. Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is therefore granted.

C. Bivens Violations

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action alleges violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to Bivens. (ECF No. 2 at 26 (citing 403 U.S. 

388).) Bivens created a remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed by 

federal officers acting in their individual capacities. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de 

Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Bivens, 

403 U.S. 388)). Thus, to state a Bivens claims, a plaintiff must allege that persons acting 

under the color of federal law violated his constitutional rights. Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 

774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

An action under Bivens is therefore identical to one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

except for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under 

Bivens. Id.

Defendant Decker asserts that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ Bivens

claims for retaliation for free speech, due process violations, false arrest, suppression of 

evidence, fabrication of evidence, interference with property rights, interference with 

familial or spousal relationship and equal protection. 

///

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The statute of limitations for a Bivens claim is determined by the forum state’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims. See Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 

(9th Cir. 2002). In California, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. See Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Yasin v. Coulter, 449 F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1). Federal law, however, determined when the claim 

accrues. Lukovsky v. City of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Under federal 

law, a Bivens claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action.” Id.; Yasin, 449 F. App’x at 689.

In early June of 2007, the Vang Plaintiffs were arrested and charged with counts 

arising from an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government of Laos. (ECF No. 

10-1.) Thus, at the earliest, Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest accrued in June 2007, and 

the statute of limitations for those claims expired in early June 2009. Alternatively, 

Plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of Defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct, 

and their injuries arising therefrom, at the very latest by March 9, 2009, when the Vang 

Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct. (ECF 

No. 10-3.) Under this view, Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims, except for Plaintiffs’ claim for 

malicious prosecution in violation of the Fifth Amendment, accrued at the latest in March 

2009, and the statute of limitations for those claims expired in March of 2011. However, 

Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint in the instant action until May 2012—over a year 

after the statute of limitations expired. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims, except for the 

claim for malicious prosecution, are time barred.

The two-year statute of limitations does not, however, bar Plaintiffs’ malicious 

prosecution claim. An action for malicious prosecution under Bivens requires the plaintiff 

to show tortious conduct under the elements of state law, and the intent to deprive the 

individual of a constitutional right. See Madrigal v. California, 2006 WL 3834284, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2006). 

///

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Under California law, an action for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to establish 

that “the underlying prosecution: (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the 

defendant and terminated in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (2) was brought without probable 

cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 (1989)). 

A malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying prosecution 

terminates in the plaintiff’s favor. Geiche v. City of S.F., No. C 08-3233 JL, 2009 WL 

1948830, *3 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2009) (citing Babb v. Sup. Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846 (1971)); 

see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1994). “The theory underlying the 

requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the 

accused, and coupled with the other elements of lack of probable cause and malice, 

establishes the tort, that is, the malicious and unfounded charge against an innocent 

person.” Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150 (1941). The California Supreme Court has

indicated that “if . . . the dismissal is on technical grounds, or for procedural reasons, or 

for any other reason not inconsistent with [the plaintiff’s] guilt, it does not constitute a 

favorable termination.” Id. Importantly for Plaintiffs’ case, California courts have held 

that a dismissal “in the interests of justice” is not a favorable termination for purposes of 

a malicious prosecution claim, as it “does not necessarily imply factual innocence, but 

rather may reflect the result of a negotiated or pragmatic disposition of the case.” 

People v. Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1056 (1992) (citing People v. Glimps, 

92 Cal. App. 3d 323-24 (1979)). While the Ninth Circuit has held that “dismissal in the 

interests of justice satisfies [the favorable termination] requirement if it reflects the 

opinion of the prosecuting party of the court that the action lacked merit or would result 

in a decision in favor of the defendant." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 

1068 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the prosecution of 

the Vang Plaintiffs terminated in their favor. The charges against the Vang Plaintiffs 

were dismissed in part on Plaintiffs’ own motion and in part “in the interests of justice.” 

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As to the charges that were dismissed on Plaintiffs’ own motion, these charges were 

dismissed on the grounds that the Second Superseding Indictment “fail[ed] to put each 

defendant on notice of the nature of charges against him in order to allow him to prepare 

a defense or to ensure he is being prosecuted on the basis of the facts presented to the 

grand jury” and “fail[ed] to apprise each defendant of the specific conduct he engaged in 

that allegedly violates the [Neutrality] Act.” (ECF No. 10-6.) Dismissal on such grounds

does not “necessarily imply” the Vang Plaintiffs’ “factual innocence.” Matthews, 

7 Cal. App. 4th at 1056.

As to the charges that were dismissed “in the interests of justice,” Plaintiffs have 

alleged no facts plausibly suggesting that the dismissal of these charges reflected the 

opinion of the United States Attorneys or the Court that the action lacked merit. See

Boulware v. Department of Ins., No. CV 09-4325-R(E), 2009 WL 3271060, at *9 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 8, 2009); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to 

state a claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, 

Defendant Decker’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims is granted.5

D. Federal Tort Claims Act

Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action alleges state law tort claims for malicious 

prosecution, wrongful arrest and wrongful imprisonment. (ECF No. 2 at 40.) Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Cause of Action asserts that Defendants are liable for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. (ECF No. 2 at 53.) As noted above, while Plaintiffs do not 

specifically bring suit under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1), 2679(d)(1), the FTCA is 

Plaintiffs’ only potential route for their claims to defeat sovereign immunity. 

///

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 5 Because Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Decker are dismissed, the Court need not

determine at this time whether Defendant Decker is entitled to qualified immunity. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2679. The FTCA specifies that the “United States shall be liable . . . to tort 

claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 

circumstances.” Id. § 2676. The terms of the FTCA create liability for the government if 

the act is a tort in the state where the conduct occurred. Id. § 2671. The FTCA is the 

exclusive remedy for any tort claim resulting from the act or omission of a government 

employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, with the exception of Bivens

remedies for constitutional tort claims. See id. § 2679. The FTCA waives sovereign 

immunity for claims against the federal government arising from torts committed by 

federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. Id.

§§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(d)(1). 

When a federal employee is sued for a wrongful or negligent act, the Federal 

Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as 

the Westfall Act, empowers the Attorney General to certify that the employee “was acting 

within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the 

claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Upon such certification, the federal employee is 

dismissed from the action and the United States is substituted as the defendant. Id. 

If a defendant acts within the scope of his employment, he enjoys immunity from 

suit; if he acted outside the scope of employment, “he is personally answerable.” 

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 423 (1995). Thus, the preliminary 

issue pertaining to Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims is whether Defendant Decker acted within the 

scope of his employment. 

As set forth above, Defendant submitted the certification stating that Defendant 

Decker was acting within the scope of his employment. (ECE No. 32-10.) The 

certification states that Joann Swanson, the Chief of the Civil Division of the United 

States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, was directed by Melinda 

Haag, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, to certify that 

Defendant Decker was acting within the scope of his federal employment “with reference 

to matters alleged in the suit.” (Id.) 

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Attorney Haag authorized Attorney Swanson to exercise this power pursuant to the 

power vested in Attorney Haag by the Attorney General, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 15.4. 

The Attorney General’s certification is prima facie evidence that the conduct of the 

federal employee was in the scope of his or her employment, and is conclusive unless 

challenged. Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995); Green v. Hall, 

8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff has objected to the submission of this 

certification (ECF No. 35), and thus bears the burden of disproving the certification by a

preponderance of the evidence, 57 F.3d at 800.

A scope of employment certification is reviewed de novo. Pelletier v. Fed. Home 

Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc. v. 

United States, 939 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 827 (2002). 

Faced with a challenge to the scope of employment certification, a district court is 

authorized but is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve disputed 

factual questions. Id. at 874 (citing Meridian, 939 F.2d at 745); see also McLachlan v. 

Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2001).

In conducting a de novo review of a scope of certification, the district court applies 

the “principles of respondeat superior of the state in which the alleged tort occurred.” 

Pelletier, 968 F.2d at 876 (citations omitted); see also Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 

1076 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1142 (1997). In the present case, California 

law applies. Under California law, an employee acts within the course or scope of his 

employment where: “(1) the act performed was either required by or ‘incident to his 

duties,’ or (2) the employee’s misconduct could reasonably be foreseen by the employer 

in any event.” Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist, 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 139 (1981) 

(quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503, 520 (1979)). A risk is a 

“foreseeable consequence” of an employer’s business if, “in the context of the particular 

enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem to 

include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.”

Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1004 (1995) (internal 

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quotations omitted) (quoting Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 968

(1986)).

“California courts have interpreted the respondeat superior doctrine broadly to 

hold employers vicariously liable for a wide range of their employees' tortious activities. 

Under California law, so long as an employee's tortious acts arise out of or concern the 

employment, they may fall within the scope of the employment.” Gaytan v. United 

States, No. C 05-4621 MHP, 2006 WL 408562, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2006) (citing 

Farmers Ins. Grp., 11 Cal. 4th at 1004). However, if an employee engages in malicious 

or tortious conduct that “substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal 

purposes,” the conduct falls outside the scope of employment, and the employer is not to 

be held vicariously liable. Farmers Ins. Grp., 11 Cal. 4th at 1005 (citations omitted). 

This rule applies even if: (1) the misconduct occurred at the place of employment during 

business hours; and (2) the employee was engaged in employment activity either before 

or subsequent to the misconduct. Id.

Plaintiffs present absolutely no evidence to substantiate their position that 

Defendant Decker acted outside of the scope of his employment at the time of the 

incidents out of which Plaintiffs’ claims arise. Plaintiffs cite only to their complaint as 

evidence to refute the certification. (See generally ECF No. 35.) The complaint is not 

evidence that creates factual questions. In light of this negligible evidence, Plaintiffs 

have failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Similarly, because 

Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence calling into question whether Defendant 

Decker acted within the scope of his employment, the Court declines to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the issue. In short, because the certification is prima facie 

evidence, and because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence 

standard, the Court must find that Defendant Decker was acting within the scope of his 

employment. 

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Because Defendant Decker was acting within the scope of his federal 

employment, he is dismissed from the action. The United States is substituted as the 

defendant for Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). 

However, Defendant Decker correctly points out that the Court has already 

dismissed Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims against the United States with prejudice. 

(ECF No. 17 at 16, 17.) Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States, with the exception of 

malicious prosecution, were dismissed as time barred. (ECF No. 17 at 16.) Plaintiffs’

claim for malicious prosecution against the United States was dismissed because 

Plaintiffs failed to allege facts adequate to show that the prosecution terminated in 

Plaintiffs’ favor. (ECF No. 17 at 17).) The Order dismissing these claims specifically 

stated that if Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint within twenty days, the causes 

of action dismissed by virtue of the Order would be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF 

No. 17 at 19.) Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint within twenty days of the 

Court’s order. Instead, Plaintiffs submitted a document specifically informing the Court 

that they had no further factual allegations to add. (ECF No. 25 at 1.) Thus, the United 

States was dismissed with prejudice from this action on November 6, 2012, twenty days 

after the Court’s memorandum and order issued. 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to the FTCA can be brought neither 

against Defendant Decker—because he was acting within the scope of his 

employment—nor against the United States—because the United States has been 

dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims are dismissed from this 

action with prejudice. 

E. Requests for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In each cause of action, Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin Defendant Decker 

from retaliating against Plaintiffs for bringing suit and committing an act in retaliation for 

Plaintiffs’ previous attempts to bring justice for the Hmong people in Laos. 

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Plaintiffs seek an affirmative injunction and ask that the Court require Defendants to 

issue a declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights, and the Plaintiffs are 

factually innocent of the criminal charges brought against them.

As established above, neither § 1983 nor Bivens affords Plaintiffs relief in the 

present case. See supra. Accordingly, Defendant Decker’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

requests for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to both § 1983 and Bivens is 

granted.

To the extent that Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 

the FRCA, these claims also fail. The FTCA provides federal jurisdiction only for civil 

claims against the United States “for money damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The 

FTCA does not provide for injunctive relief. Id. Thus, Defendant Decker’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the FTCA is also 

granted.

F. Leave to Amend

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the 

complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 

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Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re 

Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 

866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment 

of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

In this case, Plaintiffs have submitted a statement that “Plaintiffs do not have 

further facts to allege, and thus will NOT be filing a First Amended Complaint.” In light of 

this statement, Plaintiffs have represented to the Court that the complaint cannot be 

saved by any amendment and that leave to amend would constitute an exercise in 

futility. See Intri-Plex Techs., 499 F.3d at 1056. As such, Plaintiffs will not be given

leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims (ECF No. 32) is 

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims (ECF No. 32) is 

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims brought 

pursuant to the FTCA is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. (ECF 

No. 32.) These claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against all 

Defendants.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 8, 2013

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