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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LESLIE LORN ELLIFRITS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FIL.Gi) Uniled Stat~ Court of App::lb Tenth Cireui~ 

M.~R O 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

STEVEN DAVIES, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF) 

KANSAS, ) 

) 

No. 91-3252 

(D.C. No. 89-CV-3068) 

(D. Kansas) 

Defendants-Appellees . ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate r ecord , this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a) ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Ellifrits, a state inmate, filed a pro se petition for 

habeas corpus relief. The district court denied relief, dismissed 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing t he doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

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the petition and denied Mr. Ellifrits a certificate of probable 

cause. Mr. Ellifrits appeals prose. 

We grant Mr. Ellifrits permission to proceed with this appeal 

in forma pauperis. 

In November 1981, Mr. Ellifrits entered guilty pleas in s t ate 

court to charges of second degree murder and rape. Mr. Ellifrits 

received two c o nsecutive sentences of fifteen years t o life. He 

filed no direct appeal. Mr. Ellifrits unsuccessfully pursued 

post-conviction relief in the Kansas courts. 

In his prose petition to the district court Mr. Ellifrits 

asserted: (1) The consecutive sentences were "abusive"; (2) his 

guilty pleas were not voluntary; and (3) he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. 

The district court wrote a six-page Memorandum and Order 

which carefully, thoroughly and thoughtfully analyzed each of Mr. 

Ellifrits's assertions. The district court concluded the habeas 

corpus petitio n contained no merit, denied relief, and dismissed 

the petition. 

In his prose appeal to this court Mr. Ellifrits raises the 

same arguments made to the district court. Were we to write at 

length we would say nothing different than did the district court. 

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The judgment of the district court is affirmed for 

substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's 

Memorandum and Order filed July 12, 1991, a copy of which is 

attached. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

ENT::RE:' ON 1HE DOCKET 

O,\ TE: 77- I?- 9 , 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURllJL IL 11 OS fi '91 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

LESLIE LORN ELLIFRITS, 

v. 

STEVEN DAVIES, et al., 

) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Respondents. ) ______________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

~/ ! "' .. 

( ~1) t · ;_4-μ_ ~~•~·T y 

~\ I ,, :, S. 

CASE NO. 89-3068-S 

This matter comes before the court on a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, an 

inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility, Lansing, Kansas, was 

convicted in the Jefferson County District Court, Oskaloosa, Kansas, 

in December 1981 and is serving two consecutive sentences of fifteen 

years to life. In this action, petitioner asserts: ( 1) the 

consecutive service of these sentences constitutes an abusive 

sentence; (2) his guilty plea was not voluntary; and (3) he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel. 

Having examined the record, the court makes the following 

findings and order. 

Factual Background 

Petitioner was originally charged with first degree 

murder, rape, and aggravated sodomy. In November 1981, petitioner 

entered a guilty plea to an amended charge of second degree murder 

a nd to the charge of rape. The aggravated sodomy charge was 

dismissed upon the State's motion. After inquiring into 

petitioner's understanding and acceptance of the plea bargain, the 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

trial court accepted petitioner's plea. 

The trial court again questioned the petitioner regarding 

the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the factual basis for the 

plea at petitioner's sentencing in December 1981. No direct appeal 

was taken, and petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction 

relief in the state appellate court prior to commencing this action. 

Discussion 

Abusive Sentence 

Petitioner challenges his consecutive sentences on the 

ground this type of sentence constitutes an "abusive sentence", an 

allegation this court construes as a claim the trial court abused 

its discretion. 

with Kansas law. 

Petitioner's sentence, however, is in conformity 

Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4608 (1), "When separate 

sentences of imprisonment for different crimes are imposed on a 

defendant on the same date ... such sentences shall run concurrently 

or consecutively as the court directs." Petitioner's claim 

presents, at most, an issue of state law and does not present a 

constitutional error that may be properly addressed on habeas corpus 

review. Claims of state procedural error, without more, do not 

raise federal questions cognizable on federal habeas review. 

Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 

U.S. 1047 (1980); see Handley v. Page, 398 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 

1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 935 (1969) (question whether sentences 

were void under state law raised no federal i s sue where defendant 

did not allege state l aw had been applied discriminatorily ). 

Voluntariness of Guilty Plea 

Petitioner next asserts his guilty plea was not 

v oluntarily made. The standa rd for determining compete nc y to enter 

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a guilty plea is whether the accused has sufficient present ability 

to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding and has a rational and factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S . 402 

(1960). Because a guilty plea admits all elements of the crime 

charged, the defendant must understand all the elements as they 

relate to the facts of the case to enter a voluntary guilty plea. 

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 

Having reviewed the state court record, this court finds 

that the guilty plea entered by petitioner was made knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. The record reflects that, before 

accepting petitioner's plea, the district court judge reviewed with 

petitioner and his co-defendant the factual basis for the charges, 

the right to trial, their rights as defendants in a criminal trial, 

the possible penalties for the counts charged, and the possibility 

of consecutive sentencing. During the colloquy, petitioner both 

expressed his guilt and acknowledged his decision to enter a guilty 

plea to avoid possible conviction on the charge of first degree 

murder and the charge of aggravated sodomy. Petitioner's responses 

throughout the entry of his plea on November 30, 1981, and at the 

time of sentencing on December 21, 1981, illustrate a comprehension 

of the statements of the court and counsel, and thus the record 

supports a finding that the plea was valid. 

In reaching this conclusion, the court has carefully 

considered an exchange that took place during the sentencing 

proceeding. During the proceeding, petitioner's co-defendant and 

his counsel were excused to confer after the co-defendant expressed 

some reservations about his plea. 

3 

After they left the courtroom, 

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the following exchange occurred between petitioner, his counsel, and 

the court: 

Counsel:(addressing petitioner) If you have any questions 

like he does and have any misgivings about anything we 

have done any time along the way, we have discussed it 

many times, now is the time to bring it up. 

The Court: Well, he doesn't. They are both in this 

together ... and they know it. The point is they did 

counsel, aid and abet each other and that is clear from 

what they have already told me. Isn't that true? 

Counsel: Yes. 

Counsel: Isn't that true, Mr. Ellifritz? 

Petitioner: Yes. 

The Court: Both in the rape and the stabbing? 

Petitioner: Yes. 

Counsel: What he is saying, you don't have to do the stabbing 

or raping as long as you counsel, if you counsel, aid and 

abet you are as guilty as the one who did it. 

Following this, the co-defendant and his counsel returned 

to the courtroom, and the sentencing proceeding resumed. During the 

remainder of the proceeding, petitioner was given an opportunity to 

make a statement regarding the sentence or any other subject but 

made none. 

Clearly, the better course for the trial court would have 

been to refrain from interrupting the conversation between 

petitioner and his counsel. However, viewing the record as a whole, 

this court cannot find that this alone resulted in such a 

miscarriage of justice as would render relief appropriate. 

Petitioner was given an opportunity to respond to the court 

regarding any doubts, and there is no indication that petitioner 

actually had any inclination at that time to withdraw his plea. 

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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner's final contention in this action is that he 

received inadequate legal representation. To establish his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must meet the standard 

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 

two-part test set forth in Strickland requires (1) a showing that 

counsel committed errors so serious that the defendant did not 

receive the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) a 

showing that counsel's performance was so deficient that the 

defendant did not receive a fair trial. The Strickland test is 

applicable to a claim that a guilty plea is invalid due to the 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 

(1985). In this situation, the defendant must show that absent 

counsel's errors, he would not have entered a guilty plea and would 

have insisted upon a trial. Id. at 59. 

The record in this matter does not establish that 

petitioner's plea was involuntary due to inadequate representation. 

Petitioner claims only that his counsel stressed the lengthy 

sentence he might receive if convicted on the original charges and 

his counsel's report that the prosecutor believed the evidence 

against petitioner was strong. Further, while petitioner's counsel 

may have estimated petitioner would receive a shorter sentence than 

was imposed, neither an attorney's incorrect estimate of a sentence 

nor his client's erroneous expectation operates to render a guilty 

plea involuntary. Laycock v. State of N.M., 880 F.2d 1184 (10th 

Cir. 1989); Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970). 

It is clear petitioner's counsel negotiated a favorable 

plea agreement on behalf of his client and conferred with him 

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DES :RL 

AO 72A 

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numerous times prior to the entry of petitioner's guilty plea. 

Counsel's assistance to petitioner at the entry of his guilty plea 

was also reasonable. This court finds petitioner's counsel 

exercised the skill of a reasonably competent attorney in this 

matter and concludes petitioner is entitled to no relief on this 

claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is hereby 

dismissed and all relief denied. The clerk of the court is directed 

to transmit a copy of this Memorandum and Order to petitioner and to 

the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Kansas. 

DATED: This /~ day of July, 1991 at Topeka, Kansas. 

e 

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