Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00130/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00130-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner did not file a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. 

Because Petitioner did not file a Traverse, the allegations of the

Answer “shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge

finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 U.S.C. § 2248.

07cv0130

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MENDIOLA,

Petitioner,

v.

W.J. SULLIVAN, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-0130 W (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

On January 19, 2007, Michael Mendiola (“Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] On

February 6, 2007, the Court dismissed the Petition without

prejudice and with leave to amend. [Doc. No. 3.] On April 26,

2007 (nunc pro tunc to March 19, 2007), Petitioner filed a First

Amended Petition (hereinafter the “Petition”). [Doc. No. 10.] 

On November 16, 2007, Respondent filed an Answer. [Doc. No. 8.]1

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The Petition raises a single claim for relief and challenges

Petitioner’s San Diego Superior Court sentence in case number

D45024 for one count of felony possession of methamphetamine. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), at 52; Lodgment No.

2, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”), at 21-22.) Petitioner contends

that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have a

jury determine every fact legally essential to his sentence when

the trial court imposed an eight-year upper term sentence based

upon a finding that Petitioner’s performance on probation or

parole for a prior crime was unsatisfactory. (Petition, Ground

One, at 6 & see Exhibit A, at 5; RT at 21.)

Respondent contends that Petitioner has not exhausted his

state court remedies and that relief is precluded by Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Furthermore, Respondent contends the

Court should deny the claim on the merits because the California

Court of Appeal’s decision was reasonable in that it sentenced

Petitioner within the statutory maximum and, even assuming the

trial court erred, the error was harmless. (Answer at 12-17.)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based

upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for

the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition be

DENIED.

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

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U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶] Michael Mendiola entered a guilty plea to possessing a

controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11377, subd.

(a)), admitted two prior strikes (Pen. Code, §§ 667 subds.

(b)-(i), 1170.12, 668) (footnote omitted) and serving two

prior prison terms (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The court

dismissed one prior strike and sentenced him to eight years

in prison: double the three-year upper term for possessing a

controlled substance with a prior strike, enhanced by two 1-

year terms for the prior prison terms. Mendiola contends

the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a

jury trial when it imposed the upper term.

[¶] On December 19, 2003, while a National City police

officer responded to a report of graffiti painting, the

officer searched Mendiola pursuant to a parole waiver of his

Fourth Amendment rights. The officer found .16 grams of

methamphetamine in Mendiola’s pocket. Mendiola admitted a

1992 voluntary manslaughter conviction and a 1993 conviction

of carjacking.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 1-2.)

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a

Felony Complaint charging Michael Mendiola with one count of

felony possession of methamphetamine in violation of California

Health and Safety Code section 11377(a). (CT at 1-4.) The

Complaint alleged that Petitioner had served two prior prison

terms for violation of California Penal Code (hereinafter “Penal

Code”) sections 667.5(b) and 668. (CT at 2.) The Complaint

further alleged that Petitioner had two strike priors within the

meaning of Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i), 1170.12, and 668. (CT

at 3.) 

Petitioner pled guilty to felony possession of

methamphetamine and admitted the priors. (CT at 5; RT at 1-4.) 

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The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an eight-year term

consisting of the upper term of three years, doubled for a strike

prior, plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. 

(CT at 35, 52; RT at 21-22.)

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

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U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74

(2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving claims presented on direct or collateral review. Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

[Supreme Court precedent],” id., the state court decision will

not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

Petitioner initially raised this sentencing claim in his

direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.) The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unpublished opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 3.) The California Supreme Court denied a

subsequent Petition for Review without comment. (Lodgment Nos.

6-7.) Because the California Supreme Court did not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” this Court must look through to the

reasoning of the underlying decision of the California Court of

Appeal. See Nunnemaker, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The

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California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s sentencing claim,

stating:

[¶] Relying primarily on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530

U.S. 466 and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296

[sic], Mendiola argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt

whether aggravating factors exist that justify imposition of

the upper term. However the California Supreme Court

recently held “the judicial factfinding that occurs when a

judge exercises discretion to impose an upper term sentence

. . . does not implicate a defendant’s [Sixth Amendment]

right to jury trial.” (People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th

1238.) Mendiola does not have a Sixth Amendment right to

have a jury determine whether aggravating factors supported

the upper term.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2.)

B. Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

Generally, a petitioner must exhaust all state remedies

before a federal court may entertain the issues presented. 28

U.S.C. § 22554(b) and (c); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275

(1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). “For

reasons of federalism, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires federal courts

to give the states an initial opportunity to correct alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Kellotat v. Cupp,

719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1983). To satisfy the exhaustion

requirement, petitioners must fairly present their contentions to

the highest court of the state. Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225,

228 (9th Cir. 1979). A claim has not been fairly presented

unless the petitioner has described in the state court

proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which his claim is based. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S.

4, 6 (1982); Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983).

///

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2 On December 7, 2006, Petitioner sought state collateral review

by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the superior court. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) On January 2, 2007, the superior court denied the

petition because Petitioner failed to raise new facts or law

justifying reconsideration. (Lodgment No. 9 at 2.)

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“The appropriate time to assess whether a prisoner has

exhausted his state remedies is when the federal habeas petition

is filed, not when it comes on for a hearing in the district

court or court of appeals.” Brown v. Maass, 11 F.3d 914, 915

(9th Cir. 1993)(per curium). In the event there is an

intervening change in federal law that casts the legal issue in a

fundamentally different light, a petitioner must present the

claims once again to the highest court. Connor, supra, 404 U.S.

at 276; Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 743-44 (9th Cir.

1965). Thus, “a state prisoner who believes that some decision

of the United States Supreme Court subsequent to the state court

decision in his case requires that his conviction or sentence be

set aside should first pursue any state remedy which may be

available to present that contention before applying for a

federal writ of habeas corpus.” Blair, supra, 340 F.2d at 745. 

On April 26, 2005, Petitioner raised his sentencing claim in

his direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 3 at 7.) The California Court

of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument relying on People v.

Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238 (2005) (overruled in People v. Black, 41

Cal.4th 825 (2007)). (Lodgment No. 5 at 2.) On September 6,

2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court contending that Black was wrongly decided. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) On October 14, 2005, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition without comment. (Lodgment No. 7.)2

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Thus, because Petitioner presented his state sentencing claim to

the California Supreme Court, he has exhausted available state

remedies regarding the claim.

On January 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. [Doc. No. 1.] On January 22, 2007,

the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cunningham v. California, _ U.S.

_, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860, 970-71 (2007). On February 6, 2007, the

Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice and with leave to

amend. [Doc. No. 3.] The dismissal was based, in part, on

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust several claims. [Doc. No. 3.] 

On April 26, 2007 (nunc pro tunc to March 19, 2007), Petitioner

filed a First Amended Petition which included only the present

sentencing claim. [Doc. No. 10.] 

Because the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cunningham before

Petitioner filed the present Petition in federal court, it

initially appears that Petitioner must resubmit his sentencing

claim to the California state courts in order to fulfill the

exhaustion requirement. Blair, supra, 340 F.2d at 745. However,

the U.S. Supreme Court has held that where a state court has had

a fair opportunity to determine the constitutional validity of a

state statute at issue, a petitioner is not required to resubmit

his constitutional claim to the state court for reconsideration

based on an intervening change of law. Francisco v. Gathright,

419 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1974). Thus, while the present Petition was

filed after the Cunningham decision, Petitioner need not resubmit

his claim to the state courts because the state courts have

already had a fair opportunity to determine the constitutional

validity of California’s sentencing laws. 

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C. Application of the Teague Doctrine

Because Petitioner is seeking to benefit from a new rule of

constitutional law, this Court must first decide whether the

doctrine of Teague, supra, 489 U.S. 288, is implicated before

considering the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Caspari v. Bohlen,

510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271

(2002). The Teague doctrine is a “nonretroactivity principle”

that “prevents a federal court from granting habeas relief to a

state prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and

sentence became final.” Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at 389. There

are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The Teague bar does

not apply to (1) new rules forbidding certain primary, private

individual conduct which is “beyond the power of the criminal

law-making authority to proscribe;” or (2) new “‘watershed rules

of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and

accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at

307; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).

In conducting a Teague analysis, the Court must engage in a

three-step inquiry. See Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at 390(setting

out the three-step process). First, the Court must determine the

date on which Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final. 

Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004). A conviction and

sentence is final when all direct appeals have been exhausted and

the time for filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the

U.S. Supreme Court has lapsed or that court has denied a timely

filed petition. Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at 390. Second, the

Court must survey the “legal landscape” as it appeared at the

time the conviction became final and ask whether, under the U.S.

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3

 See Som v. Evans, 2008 WL 171010, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18,

2008); Jordan v. Evans, 2007 WL 2703118, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14,

2007); Beyett v. Yates, 2007 WL 2600745, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,

2007); Zimmeth v. Hernandez, 2007 WL 2556771, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept.

4, 2007); Lopez v. Campbell, 2007 WL 2500424, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug.

30, 2007); Marquez v. Evans, 2007 WL 2406867, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

20, 2007); Bouie v. Kramer, 2007 WL 2070330, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 13,

2007).

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Constitution as interpreted by the precedent then existing, the

rule is “new.” Banks, supra, 542 U.S. at 411. A determination

that the rule is “new” is not constitutionally compelled if the

survey shows that “reasonable jurists” could differ about the

outcome. Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at 395. Lastly, if the rule is

“new,” the Court must consider whether it falls into one of the

two narrow exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle. Banks,

supra, 542 U.S. at 411. 

Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

Petition for Review on October 14, 2005. (Lodgment No. 7.) 

Petitioner’s conviction became final 90 days later in January,

2006, well in advance of the January, 2007 Cunningham decision. 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Contrary

to Respondent’s contentions, federal courts have found that the

Cunningham decision announced a “new rule” within the meaning of

Teague. Flores v. Hickman, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079-80 (C.D.

Cal. 2008); Fennen v. Nakayema, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155-56

(E.D. Cal. 2007). Thus, the only remaining inquiry is whether

the new rule falls into one of Teague’s exceptions.

District courts in the Ninth Circuit have uniformly

determined that neither of the Teague exceptions applies so as to

make Cunningham retroactive.3 With respect to the first

exception, Cunningham’s rule does not affect what type of conduct

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may be punished. Thus, the Cunningham decision is considered

procedural. Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (2005) (noting

that Cunningham heavily relied on the new procedural rule

announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)); see

also, e.g., Flores, supra, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.

With respect to the second exception, a “new” procedural

rule cannot be applied on collateral review of a conviction that

became final before the rule was announced unless it is a

“watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure implicating the

fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 

Parks, supra, 494 U.S. at 495. The Ninth Circuit has determined

that Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296, was not retroactive because it

did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 

Schardt, supra, 414 F.3d at 1027; see also Flores, supra, 533 F.

Supp. 2d at 1080 (stating that “requiring a jury to make factual

findings on which an upper sentence is based, rather than a trial

judge, does not announce a watershed rule.”). Likewise, the

Cunningham decision does not announce a watershed rule of

criminal procedure and is thus not retroactive. Schardt, supra,

414 F.3d at 1027 (noting that Cunningham heavily relied on the

rule announced in Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296 ). Ultimately,

the nonretroactivity principle in Teague bars Petitioner from

benefitting from Cunningham on collateral review in this Court.

D. The Merits

Even if this Court applied Cunningham retroactively,

Petitioner’s claim would still fail because the California Court

of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme

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Court law. Respondent correctly contends that Petitioner’s claim

should be denied on the merits because the trial court sentenced

Petitioner within the statutory maximum and, even assuming the

trial court erred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. (Answer at 12, 15.)

Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the law with respect to fact-finding

determinations by the trial court for purposes of sentencing has

undergone an evolution. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded

a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to

include fact-finding determinations which would be used to

enhance sentences. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 490. Any fact,

other than the fact of a prior conviction, which increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at

490, 491-97; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 

The “statutory maximum” is the maximum sentence that a judge may

impose without making any additional findings of fact. Blakely,

supra, 542 U.S. at 303-04. Only “[w]hen a judge inflicts

punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, . . .

[does] the judge [exceed] his proper authority.” Id.

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that California’s

former determinate sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment

because it allowed a judge to impose an elevated sentence based

on aggravating factors it found to exist by a preponderance of

the evidence. Cunningham, supra, _ U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. at 860,

970-71. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the middle term

specified in California’s statutes, not the upper term, was the

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4 At the time Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final,

Penal Code § 1170(b) controlled the trial judge’s decision whether to

impose the upper or lower prison term. The judge was to impose the

middle term, unless there were circumstances in aggravation or

mitigation of the crime. (Penal Code § 1170(b); Cal. Rule of Court

4.420(a).) Such circumstances were to be “established by a

preponderance of the evidence.” (Cal. Rule of Court 4.420(b).) The

judge was allowed broad discretion in finding facts relating to

mitigation and aggravation. (See e.g., Cal. Rules of Court 4.421(a)

(facts relating to the crime), 4.421(b)(facts relating to the

defendant), and 4.421(c)(any other facts relating to aggravation).)

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relevant statutory maximum.4 Id. at 856, 871. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two

exceptions under which the upper term becomes the statutory

maximum and does not require a Sixth Amendment finding of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the trial court may use a fact

admitted by a defendant to select the upper term. Blakely,

supra, 542 U.S. at 303. Second, the trial court may select the

upper term if the defendant had a prior conviction. Id. at 301. 

Thus, it follows that, as long as Petitioner was eligible for the

upper term based on one of these two aggravating factors, the

statutory maximum for Cunningham purposes is the upper term, not

the middle term. Accordingly, the only issue before this Court

is whether the trial court could impose the upper term for

possession of methamphetamine without any further findings

admitted by the defendant or found by the jury to be true beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner was arrested for possession of methamphetamine

while he was on parole for a car-jacking conviction. (CT at 11-

12; Lodgment No. 5 at 1.) Petitioner pled guilty to felony

possession of methamphetamine. (CT at 5-7; RT at 3.) Petitioner

admitted two prison prior convictions (CT at 47; RT at 3-4) and

also admitted two strike priors under Penal Code sections 667(b)-

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(i), 1170.12, and 668. (CT at 47; RT at 3.) The strike priors

included a 1992 conviction for voluntary manslaughter and a 1993

conviction for car-jacking. (CT at 3, 11.) The plea was not

negotiated with the prosecutor. (CT at 5, 9; RT at 2; Answer at

5.) Rather, sentencing was left up to the trial court with no

limitation on the possible sentence. (CT at 6; RT at 2; Answer

at 5.)

Possession of methamphetamine is punishable by 16 months,

two years, or three years in state prison. (Cal. Health & Saf.

Code §§ 18, 11377(a); CT at 1.) A judge must impose a one-year

consecutive sentence for each prison prior. (Pen. Code §

667.5(b).) Additionally, if a defendant has one strike prior,

the determinate term for the offense may be doubled. (Pen. Code

§ 667(e)(1).) If a defendant has two strike priors, the term may

be set at 25 years to life. (Pen. Code § 667(e)(2)(A)(ii); CT at

7.) Hence, under the terms of the plea, Petitioner acknowledged

that he faced a maximum sentence of a 27-years-to-life term. (CT

at 15-16; RT at 2-3.) 

Petitioner asked the trial court to strike the two strike

priors. (CT at 18-22.) The trial court exercised its discretion

and dismissed one of Petitioner’s strike priors, thus eliminating

the possibility of imposing a 25-years-to-life term. (CT at 52;

RT at 21.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eight years,

which consisted of the upper term for possession of

methamphetamine (three years doubled to six for the remaining

strike prior), plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prior

prison sentences. (CT at 52; RT at 21-22.) The trial court

stated that it selected the upper term pursuant to Rule

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 Rule 4.421(b) of the California Rules of Court provides that

aggravating circumstances include factors relating to the defendant

such as: “(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct that

indicates a serious danger to society; (2) The defendant’s prior

convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency

proceeding are numerous or of increasing seriousness; (3) The

defendant has served a prior prison term; (4) The defendant was on

probation or parole when the crime was committed; and (5) The

defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was

unsatisfactory.” (Cal. Rule of Court 4.421(b).)

6

 Respondent argues that a finding of unsatisfactory performance

on probation or parole falls within the “prior conviction” exception. 

(Answer at 13.) The U.S. Supreme Court has never defined the scope of

the prior conviction exception. (Id.) While Respondent sets out

several arguments as to why unsatisfactory performance on probation or

parole should be included in “prior convictions,” this Court is not

persuaded by Respondent’s argument. The U.S. Supreme Court has made

clear that only facts admitted by the defendant and prior convictions

may be used in selecting the upper term without a finding beyond a

reasonable doubt. Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at 301, 303. While other

circuits have found that “prior conviction” encompasses factors such

as length of sentence and type of sentence, the circuits have not

extended “prior conviction” to performance during the sentence. 

(Answer at 13-14.) Moreover, California distinctly treats prior

convictions and performance on probation or parole separately. (See

Cal. Rule of Court 4.421(b)(2) & (5).)

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4.421(b)(5) because Petitioner’s prior performance on probation

or parole was unsatisfactory.5 (RT at 21.) Petitioner never

admitted that his performance on probation or parole was

“unsatisfactory.” (Lodgment No. 3 at 28.)

 Petitioner correctly contends that the trial court did not

use a fact admitted by Petitioner in selecting the upper term,

nor did the trial court select the upper term because of a prior

conviction. Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at 301, 303. The trial

court explicitly stated that its basis for selecting the upper

term was because Petitioner’s prior performance on probation or

parole was unsatisfactory. (RT at 21.) Thus, although the trial

court could have selected the upper term based on Petitioner’s

prior convictions, the trial court erred under Blakely in

selecting the upper term based on the ground it utilized.6

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Even though the trial court’s reliance on this ground was

improper, Petitioner’s criminal history establishes an

aggravating factor sufficient to make Petitioner eligible for the

upper term. Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at 301; (CT at 47; RT at 3-

4.) Thus, Petitioner was not legally entitled to the middle

term, and his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not

violated by imposition of the upper term sentence even if

Cunningham were applied retroactively, which it properly is not. 

Because Petitioner was eligible for the upper term and was

sentenced within that term, it is irrelevant that the trial court

based its decision to impose the upper term on its finding that

Petitioner’s performance on probation or parole was

unsatisfactory beyond a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,

Petitioner has failed to establish the requisite harm even if

Cunningham were applied in his case. Washington v. Recuenco, 548

U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2550 (2006) (holding that Blakely

errors are subject to the harmless error analysis). Ultimately,

as Respondent correctly contends, the error was harmless.

After a thorough review of the record, this Court finds the

California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s Apprendi/

Blakely sentencing claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as

determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor was the decision based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)-(2). Thus, the claim should be denied.

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

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that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Thomas J. Whelan, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than May 27, 2008, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than June 10, 2008. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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