Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03168/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03168-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 This action is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1

§ 636(b)(1)(B), Local General Order No. 262, and E.D. Cal. L.R. (“Local Rule”) 302. Although

petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge for all purposes (Dkt. No. 5),

respondent has not.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR LOPEZ, 

Petitioner, No. 2:10-cv-3168 KJN P

vs.

 S.M. SALINAS, Warden, ORDER &

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, based on claims that his federal constitutional rights were

violated by a 2009 decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings. 

Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 4,

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. “Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 in the United States District Courts explicitly allows a district court to

dismiss summarily the petition on the merits when no claim for relief is stated.” O’Bremski v.

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 See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 2

which provides in pertinent part: “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and

direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”

 Petitioner’s parallel claims premised on state law are not cognizable in his federal petition. 3

Federal habeas corpus relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of some

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[W]e reemphasize that it

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the

basis of a perceived error of state law.”); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972) (“The writ

of habeas corpus has limited scope; the federal courts do not sit to re-try state cases de novo but,

rather, to review for violation of federal constitutional standards.”).

2

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Given

the clear merits of the motion, and the court’s independent authority to dismiss a petition that fails

to demonstrate entitlement to relief, the court issues these findings and recommendation that this 2

action be dismissed before awaiting petitioner’s response to the pending motion.

II. Background

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Deuel Vocational Institution, serving a life

sentence that commenced in 1993. Petitioner challenges the December 11, 2009 decision of the 

California Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) denying petitioner parole, and deferring for a

period of three years petitioner’s next parole hearing. Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision

is not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the deferral of his next parole hearing for a period

three years violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies in

pursuing his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause. Following the 3

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___ (2011), No. 10-333, 2011

WL 197627, at *2 (Jan. 24, 2011), respondent, on February 11, 2011, filed the instant motion to

dismiss. 

III. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a due

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process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest

protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the

deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490

U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). 

A protected liberty interest may arise from the Due Process Clause of the United

States Constitution either “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an

expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221

(2005) (citations omitted). The United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a

protected liberty interest in a parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S.

14, 17-21 (1981); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is “no

constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence.”). However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory

language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain

designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (a

state’s use of mandatory language (“shall”) creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted when the designated findings are made.). 

California’s parole statutes give rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the

federal due process clause. Swarthout v. Cooke, supra, 2011 WL 197627, at *2. In California, a

prisoner is entitled to release on parole unless there is “some evidence” of his or her current

dangerousness. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002). However, in Swarthout the United States Supreme Court held that

“[n]o opinion of [theirs] supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive

federal requirement.” Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, at *3. In other words, the Court specifically

rejected the notion that there can be a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for

insufficiency of evidence presented at a parole proceeding. Id. at *3. Rather, the protection

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afforded by the federal due process clause to California parole decisions consists solely of the

“minimal” procedural requirements set forth in Greenholtz, specifically “an opportunity to be

heard and . . . a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Swarthout, at *2-3. 

Here, the record reflects that petitioner was present, with counsel, at the December

11, 2009 parole hearing, that petitioner was afforded access to his record in advance, that he

participated in the hearing, and that he was provided with the reasons for the Board’s decision to

deny parole. (Dkt. No. 1 at 39-166.) According to the United States Supreme Court, the federal

due process clause requires no more. 

IV. Ex Post Facto Clause

Petitioner contends that the Board’s application of the recently enacted “Marsy’s

Law” (adopted by the voters pursuant to Proposition 9, the “Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008:

Marsy’s Law”) to delay for three years his next parole hearing, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

of the United States Constitution. Under the statute as it existed prior to the enactment of

“Marsy’s Law,” indeterminately-sentenced inmates, like petitioner, were denied parole for one

year unless the Board found, with stated reasons, that it was unreasonable to expect that parole

could be granted the following year, in which case the subsequent hearing could be extended up 

to five years. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). (Cf. Dkt. No. 167-179 (excerpts of

petitioner’s November 20, 2001 parole hearing, which deferred the next parole hearing for a

period of only one year).) At the December 2009 parole hearing, petitioner was subject to the

terms of the amended statute, which authorizes denial of a subsequent parole hearing for a period

up to fifteen years. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3) (2010). The shortest interval that the Board

may set is three years, applied to petitioner herein (Dkt. No. 1, at 165), based on a finding that the

prisoner “does not require a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . than seven additional years.” 

Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3)(C).

Petitioner asserts that application of the extended deferral period violates the Ex

Post Facto Clause because it “will prolong his incarceration and will result in him being barred

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from parole consideration even though he no longer is currently dangerous.” (Dkt. No. 1, at 28.). 

The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it: (1) punishes as criminal an

act that was not criminal when it was committed; (2) makes a crime’s punishment greater than

when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a person of a defense available at the time the

crime was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). The Ex Post Facto Clause

is also violated if: (1) state regulations have been applied retroactively to a defendant; and (2) the

new regulations have created a "sufficient risk" of increasing the punishment attached to the

defendant's crimes. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003). Not every law that

disadvantages a defendant is a prohibited ex post facto law. In order to violate the Clause, the law

must essentially alter “the definition of criminal conduct” or increase the “punishment for the

crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1997); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 620 (9th

Cir. 2002).

California Penal Code section 3041.5 has been amended several times since the

date of petitioner’s conviction to allow for longer periods of time between parole suitability

hearings. Ex post facto challenges to those amendments have all been rejected. See e.g.

California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995) (1981 amendment to

Section 3041.5, which increased maximum deferral period of parole suitability hearings to five

years did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it simply altered the method of setting a

parole release date and did not create a meaningful “risk of increasing the measure of punishment

attached to the covered crimes”); Watson v. Estelle, 886 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (not a

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply Section 3041.5(b)(2)(A) to prisoners sentenced to

life imprisonment prior to the 1977 implementation of California’s Determinate Sentence Law);

Clifton v. Attorney General Of the State of California, 997 F.2d 660, 662 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993)

(same); see also Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000) (upholding Georgia’s change in the

frequency of parole hearings for prisoners serving life sentences, from three to eight years).

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Recently the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court decision granting preliminary

injunctive relief to plaintiffs in a class action seeking to prevent the Board from enforcing the

amended deferral periods established by Marsy’s Law. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger,___F.3d___,

2011 WL 198435 (9th Cir., Jan. 24, 2011). The court found it unlikely that plaintiffs would

succeed on the merits of their underlying challenge premised on the Ex Post Facto Clause. The

court initially compared and contrasted Marsy’s Law with existing Supreme Court precedent:

Here, as in Morales and Garner, Proposition 9 did not increase the statutory

punishment for any particular offense, did not change the date of inmates’

initial parole hearings, and did not change the standard by which the Board

determined whether inmates were suitable for parole. However, the

changes to the frequency of parole hearings here are more extensive than

the change in either Morales or Garner. First, Proposition 9 increased the

maximum deferral period from five years to fifteen years. This change is

similar to the change in Morales (i.e., tripled from one year to three years)

and the change in Garner (i.e., from three years to eight years). Second,

Proposition 9 increased the minimum deferral period from one year to three

years. Third, Proposition 9 changed the default deferral period from one

year to fifteen years. Fourth, Proposition 9 altered the burden to impose a

deferral period other than the default period. . . . Neither Morales nor

Garner involved a change to the minimum deferral period, the default

deferral period, or the burden to impose a deferral period other than the

default period.

Gilman, 2011 WL 198435, at * 5. The Ninth Circuit found these distinctions insignificant due to

the availability of advance parole hearings at the Board’s discretion (sua sponte or upon the

request of a prisoner, the denial of which is subject to judicial review), reasoning that, “as in

Morales , an advance hearing by the Board ‘would remove any possibility of harm’ to prisoners

because they would not be required to wait a minimum of three years for a hearing.” Id. at *6,

quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 513. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a

significant risk that their incarceration would be prolonged by application of Marsy’s Law, and

thus found that plaintiffs had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their ex post

facto claim.

In addition to these preliminary conclusions by the Ninth Circuit that Marsy’s Law

does not appear to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, at least one district court has dismissed a

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petitioner’s challenge to the law on the ground that it improperly duplicates the class action claim

still pending on the merits in Gilman. See e.g. Bryant v. Haviland, 2011 WL 23064, *2-5,15

(E.D. Cal., Jan. 4, 2011). That court noted that petitioner therein, as here, appears to be a member

of the Gilman class "of prisoners convicted of murder and serving a sentence of life with the

possibility of parole with at least one parole denial . . . challeng[ing] the state procedures denying

class members parole as well as their deferred parole suitability hearings following a finding of

parole unsuitability." Id. at *5. Relying on established precedent precluding a member of a class

action from seeking, in an individual action, equitable relief that is also sought by the class, see

e.g. Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 8990, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979), the court dismissed petitioner’s

claim. 

In light of these cases, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to relief in this

action on his ex post facto claim.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign

a district judge to this action; and

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 11) be granted; and

2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections,

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to

which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 22, 2011

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

lope3168.157 

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