Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16709/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16709-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIS LAVONE CREECH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-16709

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-03670-CRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 11, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed August 31, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez, Circuit

Judges and Frederic Block,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of California

state prisoner Willis Lavone Creech’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas corpus petition challenging his convictions for assault

with a firearm and child endangerment. 

The panel held that it was not unreasonable for the

California Court of Appeal to conclude that there was

sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to convict

Creech of the assault with a firearm and child endangerment

charges.

The panel also held that it was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court law to conclude that California’s revised determinate

sentencing law, which provides trial courts with discretion to

decide among three sentences, is constitutional under

Apprendi v. New Jersey.

COUNSEL

Paul McCarthy (argued), and Robert J. Beles (argued), Law

Offices of Robert J. Beles, Oakland, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 3

Jill M. Thayer (argued), DeputyAttorneyGeneral, Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General of California, Gerald A. Engler,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Gregory A. Ott,

Deputy Attorney General, California Attorney General’s

Office, San Francisco, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Willis Lavone Creech appeals the district court’s denial

of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his

convictions for assault with a firearm and child

endangerment. He challenges his convictions on the basis of

alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

rights. Creech also challenges his sentence under California’s

determinate sentencing law as a violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial. We hold that it was not

unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude

that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to

convict Creech of the assault with a firearm and child

endangerment charges. We also hold that it was not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court law to conclude that California’s revised

determinate sentencing law, which provides trial courts with

discretion to decide among three sentences, is constitutional

under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

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4 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

I. Facts and Procedural History

A. Events and Convictions at Issue1

Creech and his wife, Reanna, have a four-year-old

daughter, Sofia, and a three-year-old son, Zachary.

2 One

evening in September 2007, Creech and Reanna had an

argument because Creech told Reanna he had obtained a

shotgun. Reanna decided to leave him that night. A few

weeks later, she took the kids to her father’s house in Napa. 

Several days later, Creech and Reanna spoke on the phone. 

She told him the kids were at her father’s and suggested that

they talk another time to arrange for Creech to see them.

Later that night, Creech went to Reanna’s father’s house

and asked him if he could see the children. Creech’s fatherin-law said “no.” When Reanna returned to her father’s home

later that night, she saw Creech waiting there and drove away. 

He followed her. A highway patrol officer stopped Reanna

for “driving 15 miles an hour in a 45.” Reanna, who had

been crying, explained to the officer the circumstances with

Creech and their kids. At the time she was pulled over,

Reanna was on the phone with the sheriff’s department. 

Creech had contacted the police department and explained

that he was trying to get in contact with his children, and that

he had been “threatened off [his father-in-law’s] property.” 

The patrol officer told Reanna that, because Creech was the

only custodial parent at her father’s house, she had to go back

 

1

 The factual background is drawn from the testimony given at trial.

 

2

 To avoid confusion, we refer to members of Creech’s family by their

first names.

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 5

to her father’s, otherwise Creech would be allowed to take the

children. Reanna decided to return to her father’s house.

Creech testified at trial that he was angry with his fatherin-law for not allowing him to see his children. So, he

decided to return the following morning to shoot at and

damage his house. He grabbed bird shot ammunition because

“shooting through things. . . wasn’t [his] intent.”

Late that morning, Reanna, who was at her father’s house,

heard a “solid thud.” She looked outside and saw Creech

holding a shotgun about fifteen to twenty feet away from the

house. Reanna shouted to her stepsister, Jennifer Curry, to

grab Sofia. Jennifer saw glass flying everywhere. Jennifer

also looked out of a window and saw Creech standing about

fifteen to thirty feet away, aiming his shotgun and tracking

her and Sofia with the barrel of the gun. Reanna grabbed

Zachary and went to the downstairs bathroom, and Jennifer

and Sofia joined them. Juliane Rush, Reanna’s stepmother,

heard a “very loud pop” from the front of the house. She saw

Creech standing about fifteen feet away from the front door.

Creech’s account of the shooting differed in material

respects. He testified at trial that, when he arrived at his

father-in-law’s house, the gate was locked, which he thought

meant nobody was home. He did not see any cars that he

recognized, but he did see an SUV and a silver Jetta. He did

not hear or see anyone inside the house. He testified that he

was forty or fifty feet away from the house while he was

shooting. Creech did not see or hear anything while he was

shooting. Creech testified that he has “horrible” vision, and

that he did not wear his glasses that day. After the shooting,

he went to his parents’ house, ingested a bottle of pills, and

was taken to the hospital.

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6 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

Officers arrived at the Napa house minutes after the

shooting, but Creech had left. They found three shells in

front of the house. There were many very small perforations

in the front door, and the outer pane of the double-paned

window in the upper portion of the door was broken. Both

layers of a double-paned window in the study were also

broken.

Creech was tried and convicted in Napa County Superior

Court of multiple counts of assault with a firearm, Cal. Penal

Code § 245(a), shooting at an inhabited dwelling, Cal. Penal

Code § 246, and felony child endangerment, Cal. Penal Code

§ 273a(a).

A forensic expert, Dr. John Thornton testified at trial. 

Among other tests, he performed ballistic gelatin testing “to

mimic the behavior expected from human flesh . . . if a

human body was shot with that projectile.” He performed

these tests “without glass at a distance of 45 feet . . . [his] best

approximation of the distance between the cluster of shotgun

shells in front of the door and the door.” From this test, he

opined that “there would be a minimum of an inch and a half

of penetration into flesh.” With dual-paned glass, no pellets

permeated the gel from 45 feet. Dr. Thornton did not perform

tests at any other distance.

In addition to the gelatin testing results, Dr. Thornton also

stated other opinions based on the location of the shell

casings and particle dispersion. First, he opined that the shots

to the door were fired from between forty and fifty feet away,

while the shot to the window was fired from twenty feet

away. Second, he opined that there were lead pellets in the

debris collected from the study. Third, he explained that the

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 7

bullet “we’re speaking of is on the small side. It’s intended

for small birds.”

Dr. Norris, a forensic science consultant, also testified at

trial. He estimated that Creech shot the door and the window

from the same distance, about fifty feet away at all times.

Ultimately, the jury convicted Creech of multiple counts

of assault with a firearm, child endangerment, and shooting

at an inhabited dwelling, with firearm use enhancements, Cal.

Penal Code § 12022.5.3 At the sentencing hearing in July

2008, the trial court explained that, in determining prison

time, it was required to “select[] [among] the upper, middle

or lower term” available. It stated that it must “exercise its

discretion” and “consider circumstances in aggravation and

mitigation when making that decision.” The court found

“numerous circumstances in aggravation,” including “threat

of great bodily harm and a high degree of cruelty and

callousness,” particularly vulnerable victims, “planning and

sophistication,” and “violent conduct.” Further, the trial court

found very few mitigating circumstances, although it did find

satisfactory probation performance and a limited prior

criminal record. The court, in exercising its discretion,

imposed the upper term on the child endangerment and

assault with a firearm convictions.4 After applying statutory

enhancements for use of a firearm and determining that the

3 Creech’s convictions for shooting at an inhabited dwelling are not at

issue here.

 

4

 The court classified the child endangerment charge as to Sofia as the

principal count of conviction, and all the other counts of conviction as 

subordinate. See People v. Neely, 176 Cal. App. 4th 787, 797–98 (2009)

(explaining the sentencing protocolfor multiple offenses with determinate

terms under California Penal Code section 1170.1).

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8 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

sentence for several counts should be served consecutively

and others concurrently, the court imposed an effective

sentence of thirty-one years and four months.

B. Court of Appeal Opinion

Creech appealed. The California Court of Appeal

addressed both questions at issue here, namely Creech’s Due

Process challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict him of assault with a firearm and child endangerment,

and his Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence. In

affirming Creech’s convictions, the court reasoned that the

inquiry for assault with a firearm focuses on the ability to

inflict injury, rather than whether, given the circumstances,

injury could have been the “instantaneous result of the

defendant’s conduct.” Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, it held that the jury could

“reasonably infer from the evidence that Creech had the

present ability to inflict injury on Jennifer, Sofia and Juliane.” 

Regarding the child endangerment convictions, the court of

appeal found “substantial evidence that Creech’s conduct

endangered his children under circumstances likely to

produce great bodily harm or death.” In so concluding, the

court rejected Creech’s argument that the prosecution failed

to proffer evidence that the shotgun pellets could have

penetrated Sofia’s and Zachary’s skin.

In rejecting Creech’s Sixth Amendment challenge to his

sentence, the court noted that in response to the Supreme

Court’s 2007 decision in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.

270 (2007), the state legislature had revised the determinate

sentencing law to give trial judges discretion in selecting

among three possible prison terms. It further noted that the

California Supreme Court held in People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 9

4th 825 (2007), that the change in the law corrected the Sixth

Amendment deficiencyaddressed in Cunningham. Although

Creech argues that the post-Cunningham sentencing system

under which he was sentenced did not comply with Apprendi

and its progeny, he acknowledged before the court of appeal

the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval. Noting

that it was bound by Sandoval, the court of appeal did “not

further address th[e] issue.”

The California Supreme Court denied Creech’s petition

for review.

C. District Court Proceedings

Creech next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He again raised the same two

federal constitutional claims that he litigated in state court:

1) evidentiary insufficiency in violation of his due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) improper

judicial fact finding at sentencing in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial.

The district court denied Creech’s habeas petition. In

rejecting the evidentiary sufficiency claims, the district court

concluded that Creech could not meet the “twice-deferential

standard” applied to such claims under Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (1979), and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The court held that

it was not unreasonable for the court of appeal to conclude

that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Creech had the present ability to inflict injury, or that

Creech’s perceptions would have alerted a reasonable person

to the presence of people in the home. The court therefore

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10 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

rejected Creech’s challenge to his convictions for assault with

a firearm and child endangerment.

Turning to Creech’s Sixth Amendment claim, the court

noted that it had previously addressed and rejected “an

identical habeas argument” in McCowan v. Marshall, No.

C 10-0473 CRB PR, 2011 WL 1544490 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25,

2011), and that it continued to adhere to that decision.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254

habeas petition. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir.

2014). A petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under AEDPA

only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or if it was based

an “unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–09 (2000). 

Here, Creech challenges his convictions and sentence under

AEDPA’s “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”

prongs. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

We analyze the court of appeal’s decision because it is the

last reasoned state court decision. See Van Lynn v. Farmon,

347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Due Process Claims

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of

every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The

inquiry for such a claim is whether “upon the record evidence

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 11

adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 324; see also Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th

Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has labeled this standard a

“twice-deferential standard” under AEDPA. Parker v.

Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2152 (2012) (per curiam); see

also Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2011)

(explaining that Jackson’s standard is deferential, and the

state court’s application of Jackson must be “objectively

unreasonable” to grant habeas relief). And, “[a]lthough our

sufficiency of the evidence review is grounded in the

Fourteenth Amendment, we undertake the inquiry with

reference to the elements of the criminal offense as set forth

by state law.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275.

Here, based upon the evidence presented at trial, it was

not unreasonable for the state court to determine that a

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt of Creech’s assault and child

endangerment convictions. Thus, the state court decision was

not contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of

Jackson.

A. Assault Convictions

Creech was convicted of assault with a firearm under

California Penal Code section 245(a)(2): “Any person who

commits an assault upon the person of another with a firearm

shall be punished . . . .” The Code defines assault as “an

unlawful attempt, coupled with present ability, to commit a

violent injury on the person of another.” Id. § 240.

Present ability to injure under California law exists when

a defendant “has attained the means and location to strike

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12 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

immediately.” People v. Chance, 44 Cal. 4th 1164, 1174

(2008). An intended victim’s “effective steps to avoid injury

ha[ve] never been held to negate this present ability.” Id.; see

also People v. Raivart, 93 Cal. App. 4th 258, 267 (2007)

(holding that “the fact that [the target] may have been

sheltered, in whole or in part, by [a] building did not preclude

[a] jury from finding defendant had the present ability to

injure him”). Further, present ability does not require

actually pointing the weapon in someone’s direction, as

“[t]hat degree of immediacy is not necessary.” Chance,

44 Cal. 4th at 1176. However, “[a]bsent any evidence that

the gun was loaded, or that [a defendant] attempted or

threatened to use it as a bludgeon, there [i]s no proof of

assault with a firearm.” People v. Beleke, 33 Cal. App. 4th

1457, 1463 (1995), disapproved of on other grounds by

People v. Rodriguez, 20 Cal. 4th 1, 13–14 (1999).

Creech argues that there was insufficient evidence to

satisfy the present ability element because his gun was loaded

with bird shot, which could not have injured anyone inside

the house. He argues that there was no evidence that the bird

shot entered the house, and no evidence that, if the pellets

entered the house, they would have carried enough force to

strike a person.

California’s appellate courts have encountered arguments

similar to Creech’s. In People v. Valdez, the defendant shot

at a gas station attendant who was not hit by the bullet

because he was behind bulletproof glass. 175 Cal. App. 3d

103, 107 (1985). Valdez argued that the bulletproof glass

negated his present ability to apply physical force required for

assault with a firearm. Id. at 108. The court explained that

“[o]nce a defendant has attained the means and location to

strike immediately he has the ‘present ability to injure.’” Id.

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 13

at 113. Further, “the fact an intended victim takes effective

steps to avoid injury has never been held to negate this

‘present ability.’” Id.; see also Chance, 44 Cal. 4th at

1173–74 (adopting this interpretation as “sound”). Because

Valdez had a loaded gun that was fully operational, because

he actually fired three times in the victim’s direction, and

because the victim was “easily within striking distance,” the

court had “no difficulty finding what appellant did indeed

satisfied this element.” Valdez, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 113.

The court of appeal’s discussion of Creech’s actions is

consistent with Valdez and Chance. The court held that there

was sufficient evidence to convict Creech of assault with a

firearm. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, the court noted that Creech had attained the

means and location “to inflict serious injury . . . when he fired

his shotgun at his father-in-law’s home while he was standing

45 feet from the door.” It reasoned that all those who were

inside the house were in harm’s way during the shooting, and

it was “providential,” rather than determinative, that no one

was hurt. Further, there was evidence that bird shot is

capable of penetrating human tissue, and therefore the court

rejected the analogy to the unloaded gun cases. See, e.g.,

Chance, 44 Cal. 4th at 1172 n.7 (stating that “assault cannot

be committed with [an] unloaded gun, unless the weapon is

used as bludgeon”). Creech, the court concluded, had the

present ability to injure Jennifer, Sofia, and Julianne. Thus,

it was not objectively unreasonable for the court of appeal to

conclude that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to

prove present ability. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Parker,

132 S. Ct. at 2152.

Creech also argues that there was insufficient evidence to

show that “[w]hen [Creech] acted, [he] was aware of facts

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14 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

that would lead a reasonable person to realize that [his] act by

its nature would directly and probably result in the

application of force to someone.” Judicial Council of Cal.

Crim. Jury Insts. No. 875 (“CALCRIM”);5see also People v.

Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th 776, 779 (2010) (explaining this

“reasonable person” requirement). He points to the locked

gate, the absence of cars that were normally there, and the

lack of any movement in or near the home. However, he

testified that he saw cars at his father-in-law’s home on the

morning of the shooting. Further, as the district court noted,

he took “no steps to ascertain that the house was

unoccupied.” Failing to take any such steps may have been

particularlyunreasonable given that Creech knew he had poor

vision and did not wear his glasses that day. Therefore, it was

not unreasonable for the court of appeal to conclude that there

was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that a

reasonable person would have been alerted to the presence of

people in the home.6

In sum, it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law for the

court of appeal to hold that there was sufficient evidence for

a rational factfinder to convict Creech on each count of

assault with a firearm.

5 The jury instructions given at trial conform with CALCRIM 875

(2015).

6 Creech also argues that, because no one was actually injured, there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of assault with a firearm. One may

commit assault, however, even where a victim suffers no physical injury. 

People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal. 4th 1023, 1028 (1997).

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 15

B. Child Endangerment Convictions

California Penal Code section 273a(a) defines child

endangerment as follows:

Any person who, under circumstances or

conditions likely to produce great bodily harm

or death, wilfully causes or permits any child

to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable

physical pain or mental suffering, or having

the care or custody of any child, willfully

causes or permits the person or health of that

child to be injured, or willfully causes or

permits that child to be placed in a situation

where his or her person or health is

endangered, shall be punished . . . .

Child endangerment “can occur in a wide variety of

situations: the definition broadly includes both active and

passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child

endangering by extreme neglect.” People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.

4th 778, 784 (2002). This statute is “intended to protect a

child from an abusive situation in which the probability of

serious injury is great,” but there is no requirement that great

bodily injury actually result. Id.

Creech’s primary argument regarding the child

endangerment convictions is that it is harder to prove “great

bodily harm or death” than it is to prove the elements of

assault, which he maintains the prosecution failed to do. As

we rejected his challenge to the firearm assault convictions,

this argument does nothing to advance his challenge to the

child endangerment convictions. Additionally, Creech argues

that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the bird shot

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16 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

could have penetrated the house to reach the children. As

with the assault charges, it was not necessary to prove that the

children were actually injured; all that the prosecution had to

establish was a likelihood of great bodily harm. We agree

with the court of appeal that the evidence was sufficient to

establish this element of the offense. As the state court

explained, the prosecution was not required to offer evidence

that the pellets could have penetrated Sofia’s or Zachary’s

skin. Sofia was “in the study when Creech shot out its sevenfoot wide window.” As to Zachary, the jury could

“reasonably infer that [he] could have been seriously injured

had one of the shotgun blasts broken the sidelight window of

the front door.”

Thus, we conclude that it was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court law for the court of appeal to conclude that there was

sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to convict Creech

of child endangerment.

IV. Sixth Amendment Claim

Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, “any fact

[except for a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Under Apprendi, the statutory

maximum is “the maximum sentence a judge may impose

solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original). But, “when a trial

judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence

within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 17

determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.” 

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).

In Cunningham, the Supreme Court addressed whether

California’s then existing determinate sentencing law

satisfied the requirements described in Apprendi, Blakely, and

Booker. Under California’s pre-Cunningham determinate

sentencing system, the Penal Code prescribed lower, middle,

and upper term sentences for most crimes. Cunningham,

549 U.S. at 277 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 288.5(a) (West

1999) (stating that a person convicted of continuous sexual

abuse of a child “shall be punished by imprisonment in the

state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years”)). California

Penal Code section 1170(b) (West Supp. 2006) and California

Judicial Council Rule 4.420(a)7required a court to impose the

middle term unless there were aggravating or mitigating

circumstances, which the court would determine based on

consideration of enumerated factors. Cunningham, 549 U.S.

at 277. Rule 4.405(d) stated that “[c]ircumstances in

aggravation” are “facts which justify the imposition of the

upper prison term.” Id. at 278. Those facts were required to

“be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

(quoting Rule 4.420(b)).

The Supreme Court held that California’s system violated

the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 293. The Court explained that

themiddle term was California’s “maximum” underApprendi

because the middle term reflected the sentence to be imposed

based on a jury’s verdict without additional facts. Id. at 288. 

Therefore, California’s determinate sentencing regime

7 As in Cunningham, we reference the Judicial Council Rules that were

in place before they were amended on January 1, 2007 to describe the preCunningham sentencing scheme. 549 U.S. at 278 n.5.

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violated the requirements outlined in Booker, Blakely, and

Apprendi because the judge, not the jury, found the

aggravating facts necessary to impose the upper term. Id. at

288–89. The Court recognized that other states allowed

judges to “exercise broad discretion . . . within a statutory

range,” a solution that “encounters no Sixth Amendment

shoal.” Id. at 294. However, the Court also stated that

California could “otherwise alter its system, so long as the

State observes Sixth Amendment limitations declared in this

Court’s decisions.” Id.

California responded to Cunningham by passing SB 40,

which amended California Penal Code sections 1170 and

1170.3.8See 2007 Cal. Stat. 93. The legislature retained the

three-option scheme, but “provide[d] that the choice of the

appropriate term would rest within the sound discretion of the

court.” Id. The amended statute instructs sentencing judges

to “select the term which, in the court’s discretion, best serves

the interests of justice,” and to “state the reasons for its

sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing.” Id.;

9

8 The initial legislative response was intended to “maintain stability in

California’s criminal justice system while the criminal justice and

sentencing structures in California sentencing [we]re being reviewed.” 

5 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 4th (2012) Crim Trial, § 520(3) (quoting Stats.

2007, Chap. 3, § 1).

 

9 The law was set to expire on January 1, 2009, id., but the state senate

passed another bill in 2008, extending the expiration date to January 1,

2011. Sen. Bill 1701, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (2008); 2008 Cal. Stat. 97. 

The Legislature declared “that the elimination of disparity and the

provision of uniformity of sentences can be best achieved by determinate

sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the seriousness of the offense

as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with specified

discretion.” Id. In 2013, this scheme was extended, and is now set to

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 19

Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.420(e) (“The reasons for selecting

one of the three authorized prison terms . . . must be stated

orally on the record.”). In selecting one of the three terms,

“the sentencing judge may consider circumstances in

aggravation or mitigation, and any other factor reasonably

related to the sentencing decision.” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

4.420(b).10

Creech was sentenced under this discretionary threeoption scheme.11 He argues that the court of appeal acted

contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established

Supreme Court law when it concluded that the trial court did

not violate Creech’s Sixth Amendment rights.12

expire on January 1, 2017. 5 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 4th (2015 Supp.)

Crim Trial, § 520(3).

10

In response to the legislative change, the Judicial Council revised the

rules, effective May 23, 2007, that govern how to apply determinate

sentences, recognizing that a judge is to exercise his or her discretion. Id.

11 Assault with a firearm “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state

prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than six

months and not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten

thousand dollars ($10,000) and imprisonment.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 245(a)(2). Child endangerment “shall be punished by imprisonment in

a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four,

or six years.” Id. § 273a(a).

12 Although we have discussed Cunningham before, this is the first time

we have analyzed whether a sentence imposed under California’s postCunningham sentencing scheme warrants habeas relief under AEDPA. 

See United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding on

direct appeal that Cunningham does not render unconstitutional

procedures relating to revocation of supervised release); Butler v. Curry,

528 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Cunningham did not announce

a “new rule” and could be applied retroactively in the habeas context,

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20 CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM

The California Court of Appeal did not discuss whether

the regime under which Creech was sentenced comported

with the Sixth Amendment because, as it stated, it was duty

bound to follow the California Supreme Court’s decision in

Sandoval, 41 Cal. 4th 825. There, the court held that

affording the trial court “‘broad discretion’ in selecting

among the three terms specified by the statute for the offense

. . . cure[s] the constitutional defect in the statute.” Id. at

843–44. It reasoned that, in line with Cunningham, such a

solution would constitute “exercis[ing] broad discretion in

imposing a sentence within a statutory range” for which “the

defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that

the judge deems relevant.” Id. at 844 (quoting Booker,

543 U.S. at 233, and citing Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 294). 

Further, in discussing the post-Cunningham sentencing

scheme, the court explained that the trial court “will be

required to specify reasons for its sentencing decision, but

will not be required to cite ‘facts’ that support its decision

. . . .” Id. at 846–47; see also Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

4.420(d)–(e).

The state court’s determination that California’s postCunningham revision did not violate Creech’s Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of Cunningham, Booker, Blakely,

and Apprendi. The Supreme Court stated that permitting a

trial judge to exercise “discretion to select a specific sentence

within a defined range” would avoid a Sixth Amendment

where the petitioner was sentenced under California’s pre-Cunningham

scheme); Wright v. Dexter, 546 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that,

in light of Butler, Cunningham cannot form the basis of an application for

a second or successive habeas petition). These post-Cunningham cases do

not impact our decision here.

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CREECH V. FRAUENHEIM 21

problem. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. This is precisely what the

California legislature did. Further, the California Supreme

Court’s conclusion in Sandoval that the three possible choices

constitute a “range” is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court law. Finally, whereas the trial

court was previously permitted to elevate a sentence to the

upper term based on “facts,” which violated the Sixth

Amendment, see Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 274, California

now calls those factors “reasons,” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

4.420(d)–(e), a distinction the California Supreme Court

endorsed in Sandoval, 41 Cal. 4th 846–47. We therefore hold

that it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established Supreme Court law for the state court

of appeal to conclude that Creech’s Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial was not violated when the trial court, in an

exercise of discretion, selected the upper term for Creech’s

convictions for assault with a firearm and child

endangerment.

AFFIRMED.

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