Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00985/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00985-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jamie L. Commack, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00985-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Jamie L. Commack which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 21.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND 

 Commack applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income in September 2008. (R. at 14.) Her claims were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. (R. at 73–76.) She then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). (R. at 101–02.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on July 16, 2010. 

(R. at 38–72.) 

 In evaluating whether Commack was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 At step one, the ALJ determined that 

 

1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing 

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Commack had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. 

(R. at 16.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Commack had the following severe 

physical impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, a history of 

dislocation of the right shoulder, a history of degenerative joint disease of the bilateral 

knees, asthma, and obesity. (Id.) However, the ALJ found that Commack did not suffer 

from any severe mental impairments. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determine that none of 

these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the Social 

Security Administration’s listed impairments. (R. at 17.) 

 At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Commack’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that she could perform a limited range of light exertion 

with various limitations including that she would need a sit/stand option. (Id.) At step 

four, the ALJ determined that Commack could perform her past relevant work as a 

 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant's residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96–8p (July 2, 1996). 

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telemarketer and that there were also other jobs in significant numbers in the national 

economy that she could perform. (R. at 26–27.) At step five, the ALJ determined that 

Commack was not disabled. (R. at 28.) 

 The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (R. at 2–7.) 

 Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on May 13, 2013, seeking a 

review of benefits.3

 (Doc. 1.) The matter is now fully briefed. (Docs. 19, 22, 25.) 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court “may not 

reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment for the Secretary’s, or give vent to 

feelings of compassion.” Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1987) 

 

3

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

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(internal citation omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Commack does not appeal based on the ALJ’s determinations under the first 

three steps. She challenges the ALJ’s determination of the work capacities and the 

evidence that the ALJ relied upon to reach it. Specifically, Commack argues that the 

ALJ erred by: (A) improperly discounting the assessment of her treating physicians, 

George Armendariz and Dieter Eckart; (B) rejecting Commack’s symptom testimony; 

and (C) determining Commack’s work capacities without substantial evidence in the 

record. The Court will address each argument in turn. 

 A. The Assessments of Dr. George Armendariz and Dr. Dieter Eckart 

 Commack first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the assessments by 

treating physicians George Armendariz and Dieter Eckart. “The medical opinion of a 

claimant’s treating physician is entitled to special weight.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 

759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is because 

the treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and 

observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040–41 (9th 

Cir. 1995). 

 The regulations impose a hierarchy for medical opinions offered by licensed 

physicians. The opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than non-treating 

and non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). When the 

treating doctor’s opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those conclusions only for 

“‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). If another doctor counters the treating physician’s 

opinion, “the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

632 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ can meet 

this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

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clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Here, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Commack’s medical records and 

summarized her medical treatment history from the time of the alleged onset through 

the time of the hearing. (R. at 21–25.) Although Dr. George Armendariz and Dr. Dieter 

Eckart did offer restrictive views of Commack’s ability to work and pain level, other 

treating physicians, such as Dr. Waldtrip, had contradictory opinions. The ALJ also 

noted that the restrictive assessment forms completed by George Armendariz and Dieter 

Eckart were unsupported by their own treatment and diagnostic history of the patient. 

The fact that Dr. Waldtrip described Commack’s issues using adjectives like “mild,” did 

not recommend surgery or further pain medication, and actually recommended that 

Commack start an active exercise program, all contradict the idea that Commack is 

medically limited from performing the limited range of light exertion on a job that the 

ALJ indicated in the RFC. (R. at 467–69.) 

 The opinions of George Armendariz and Dieter Eckart are countered here and 

therefore the ALJ needed to provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Here, the ALJ met “this 

burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” See Embrey, 

849 F.2d at 421. The ALJ reviewed all of the medical history and Commack has not 

alleged that anything was left out that should have been considered. The ALJ also laid 

out an interpretation of the conflicting clinic evidence and made findings. Commack 

disputes the findings and the weight assigned to the less restrictive assessments, but this 

Court “may not reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment for the Secretary’s, 

or give vent to feelings of compassion.” Winans, 853 F.2d at 644–45. 

 Because a reasonable mind could conclude on the basis of the evidence of record 

that Commack was not disabled, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision to discount the assessments of Dr. George Armendariz and Dr. Dieter 

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Eckart. See Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 B. Symptom Testimony

 Commack next contends that the ALJ improperly rejected her symptom testimony. 

The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether a claimant’s 

testimony is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ must first “determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the 

pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036. If the claimant has, and the ALJ has found 

no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony “only by 

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. If an ALJ finds that a 

claimant’s testimony relating to the intensity of his pain and other limitations is 

unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination citing the reasons why the 

testimony is unpersuasive. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines 

the claimant’s complaints. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 

(9th Cir. 1999). These findings, properly supported by the record, must be sufficiently 

specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the testimony on 

permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding 

pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, at the first step, the ALJ concluded that Commack’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. 

(R. at 19.) At the second step, the ALJ concluded that Commack’s “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effect of these symptoms are not 

entirely credible.” (Id.) After reviewing the contradictory medical history, the ALJ also 

found that “the claimant’s reliability is highly suspect based on inconsistent statements 

and a diagnosis of malingering.” (R. at 26.) This conclusion was in part based on an 

examination by John Prieve, in which he noted that Commack gave a “mostly very poor 

effort.” (R. at 290.) The government admits that John Prieve had a suspended medical 

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license at the time he examined Commack, but argues that the ALJ did not rely on 

Prieve’s medical diagnosis, and only considered the examination for purposes of 

establishing malingering. (Doc. 22 at n.9.) Commack agrees that the ALJ did not rely on 

Prieve’s opinion in determining work capacities. (Doc. 19 at 10.) The ALJ also noted 

that the intensity of the pain and debilitating effect described was contradicted by Dr. 

Waldtrip. As discussed above, Dr. Waldtrip did not recommend surgery or continued 

pain medication and actually recommended that Commack begin exercising. 

 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that not all of the symptom testimony 

was credible. The ALJ identified evidence of malingering and discussed specific ways 

in which the medical record contradicts Commack’s symptom testimony. 

 C. Work Capacities and Residual Functional Capacity 

 Finally, Commack argues that the ALJ’s determination of work capacities was 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Commack’s primary argument is that 

the ALJ did not specifically identify the source of each of the limitations and capacities 

spelled out in the RFC. In terms of specific objections, Commack questions the RFC 

finding that she could lift ten to twenty pounds occasionally and would need a sit/stand 

option throughout an eight-hour workday. (Doc. 19 at 29.) Commack then contrasts 

those findings with those of Dr. Prieve and the initial state agency reviewer. (Id.) Both 

of those individuals found that Commack could lift no more than ten pounds. An RFC 

finding that Commack can lift ten to twenty pounds is not inconsistent with the 

assessments which say she can lift ten pounds. Although the RFC gives a higher 

possible upper limit of twenty pounds, Commack does not appear to dispute that she 

could lift the ten pounds at the bottom of the range. In fact, Commack testified she 

could lift five to ten pounds with either hand alone. (R. at 51.) It was reasonable for the 

ALJ to find that she might be able to lift somewhat more with both hands together. 

 Commack also questions the sit/stand option and eight-hour work day. However 

the only contradictory assessment that Commack points to is that of Dr. Prieve, who had 

a suspended medical license. The state agency reviewer did mention a sit/stand option 

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and an eight-hour work day. 

 Commack also seems to question why the RFC said she should never stoop when 

Dr. Prieve, who again did not have an active medical license, said that she could 

occasionally stoop. (Doc. 19 at 29.) The ALJ noted earlier that “the functional 

limitations adopted herein generously consider the claimant’s weight and its effect on 

the claimant’s ability to ambulate as well as the claimant’s other body systems.” (Id. at 

17.) Even if the Court were to determine that the ALJ was mistaken and that the RFC 

should have allowed occasionally stooping, that would be a harmless error as it would 

not affect the determination that Commack was not sufficiently disabled to qualify for 

benefits. There is no reason that a less restrictive RFC would have led to a conclusion 

that Commack could not perform at least the same jobs if not more jobs. 

 Beyond these specific objections, Commack’s primary complaint is that the ALJ 

did not adequately explain its RFC or draw enough connections between the medical 

history that was presented and the specific limitations of the RFC. However, there is 

enough in the opinion to show that the ALJ considered all of the record and came up 

with an RFC based on the ALJ’s findings. The Court finds that the RFC is based on 

substantial evidence in the record, even if the ALJ could have done a better job of 

explaining the conclusions reached. 

 D. Discretionary Remand

 Commack’s request for remand is predicated on this Court finding reversible 

error. None has been found, and the request for remand is therefore moot. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action. 

 Dated this 14th day of February, 2014. 

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