Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00113/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00113-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ANTHONY BAILEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE

CITY OF OAKDALE, OAKDALE

POLICE OFFICER BRIAN SHIMMEL,

individually and in his

official capacity, OAKDALE

POLICE OFFICER BRIAN SHIMMER,

individually and in his

official capacity, OAKDALE

POLICE OFFICER TAYLOR,

individually and in his

official capacity, 

Defendants.

1:05-CV-00113 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

1. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment of Plaintiff Mark Anthony Bailey’s (“Bailey” or

“Plaintiff”) claims. Bailey brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 alleging a pattern and practice of violation of civil rights

by the Oakdale Police Department in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2005, Plaintiff filed a first amended

complaint. (Doc. 9, First Amended Complaint.) On November 18,

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2005 Plaintiff’s attorney withdrew from the case. (Doc. 37,

Motion to Withdraw as Attorney.) On December 13, 2006 Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 46, Motion for

Summary Judgment.) Plaintiff opposed the motion on February 12,

2007. (Doc. 54, Pl.’s Opposition.) Defendants filed their reply

on February 20, 2007. (Doc. 59, Reply to Opposition.) 

A hearing for this motion was scheduled on March 12, 2007. 

At the hearing Mr. Bailey requested additional time to secure an

attorney and obtain an expert witness. Mr. Bailey was given

thirty days to secure an attorney and file an opposition. (Doc.

65, Minutes, Filed March 12, 2007.) 

Bailey engaged an attorney and filed a second opposition on

April 13, 2007. (Doc. 71, Opposition.) On April 27, 2007

Defendants filed a reply to Bailey’s second opposition. (Doc.

77, Reply.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Disputed Facts

i. The Arrest

On February 24, 2004, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Oakdale

Police Officer Shimmel was dispatched to a hit and run call of a

motorcycle hitting a fence. (DSUF, No. 29.) Officer Shimmel was

about to make a call to the reporting party, when, while he was

stopped at the intersection of Orsi Road and Sierra Road, he saw

a motorcycle traveling at a high rate of speed. (DSUF, No. 30.)

Officer Shimmel activated his emergency lights as Bailey passed

his patrol car. (DSUF, No. 31.) Bailey accelerated his

motorcycle to evade the traffic stop. (DSUF, No. 32.) Officer

Shimmel accelerated his patrol car to catch up with Bailey and

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turned northbound on View Point Avenue. (DSUF, No. 33.) Bailey

again looked back at Officer Shimmel and accelerated at a high

rate of speed causing the motorcycle to fishtail. (DSUF, No.

34.) Bailey then accelerated through the intersection of View

Point and East “J” Street. The intersection is controlled by

stop signs. (DSUF, No. 35.)

Officer Shimmel was on the radio with dispatch to notify

them he was in pursuit when Bailey lost control of the motorcycle

in the cul-de-sac at the end of View Point Avenue and Gold Rush

Court. (DSUF, No. 36.) Officer Shimmel saw the motorcycle hit a

parked car in front of a residence and then Bailey jumped up and

took off running on foot leaving the motorcycle at the scene. 

(DSUF, No. 37.) The address of the collision was 1414 Gold Rush

Court. (DSUF No. 38.) Mr. Bailey jumped over a fence at this

location to evade Officer Shimmel and to avoid arrest. (DSUF No.

39.)

Officer Shimmel began to pursue Bailey on foot and

eventually came to a fence that had a fifteen foot drop on the

other side. (DSUF, No. 40.) Mr. Fowler, the owner of the parked

car, advised Officer Shimmel that Bailey jumped the fence. 

(DSUF, No. 41.) Robert Staves, the next door neighbor advised

Officer Shimmel that Bailey was on the ground on the other side

of the fence and it looked like he was hurt. (DSUF, No. 42.) 

Mr. Staves had a flashlight on Bailey. (DSUF, No. 43.) Officer

Shimmel notified dispatch of Bailey’s location. (DSUF, No. 44.)

Officer Shimmel advised Mr. Staves and Mr. Fowler to get on the

phone with the Oakdale Police Department and keep them informed

of Mr. Bailey’s actions. (DSUF, No. 45.) Officer Shimmel drove

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around the residential area to Cottles Wood Park and entered

Oakdale Junior High School from the west side of the school. 

(DSUF, No. 46.) 

Officer Taylor entered the school from the east side. 

(DSUF, No. 47.) Officer Taylor ran through the walkway entrance

because all the driveway entrances were locked up. (DSUF, No.

13.) When Officer Taylor first came upon Bailey, he was laying

on his stomach with his arms underneath him and his legs straight

out. (DSUF, No. 17.) Officer Taylor then took his gun and

pointed it at Bailey while waiting for backup. (DSUF, No. 18.) 

A few moments later, Officer Shimmel, Sergeant Semore, Detective

Savage and Detective Perez arrived. (DSUF, No. 19.)

Officer Shimmel asked Bailey if he was hurt but Bailey’s

speech was slurred. (DSUF, No. 48.) When Officer Shimmel rolled

Bailey over to pat him down, he could smell alcohol on his

breath. (DSUF, No. 49.) 

Officer Shimmel immediately called an ambulance to be

dispatched to the officers’ location because Bailey was not

moving and he had complained of pain in his right leg. (DSUF,

No. 50.) 

At the hospital, Officer Shimmel had a nurse draw blood from

Bailey for a blood alcohol test. (DSUF, No. 51.) Ultimately,

Officer Shimmel was informed the blood alcohol was .22. (DSUF,

No. 52.) While the nurse was drawing Bailey’s blood, Officer

Shimmel noticed that Bailey’s right knee was swollen. (DSUF, No.

53.) 

Defendants argue that at the time an ambulance was requested

Bailey was limping, but was not complaining of any pain. (DSUF,

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No. 22.) Defendants claim that at no time did the officers know

of, nor did they have reason to believe the extent of plaintiff’s

injury was anything other than a sprain or twist type injury. 

(DSUF, No. 24.) The officers state that they did not believe nor

did they have reason to believe the injury was serious. (DSUF,

No. 25.) 

On the date of the incident, Sergeant Semore was in his

patrol unit when he heard a call on the radio that officer

Shimmel was in pursuit with a motorcycle. (DSUF, No. 61.)

Sergeant Semore could actually hear the motorcycle over the

radio. (DSUF, No. 62.) Sergeant Semore then drove towards the

area of Cottles Wood Park. (DSUF, No. 63.) Sergeant Semore then

exited his patrol unit and ran towards the pedestrian entrance. 

(DSUF, No. 64.) Sergeant Semore asked officer Shimmel what was

going on and officer Shimmel advised him that he had chased Mr.

Bailey, that Mr. Bailey jumped over the fence, and that Mr.

Bailey had injured his leg. (DSUF, No. 66.) Sergeant Semore

could see no visible signs of injury such as swelling or blood

through the jeans. (DSUF, No. 69.) Sergeant Semore asked Bailey

if he could walk but Bailey did not answer. (DSUF, No. 70.) 

Because Bailey seemed very intoxicated, Sergeant Semore asserts

he told Bailey to focus and Bailey responded that he could walk. 

(DSUF, No. 71.)

According to Defendants, Sergeant Semore ordered officers to

assist Bailey to the ambulance. (DSUF, No. 73.) While the

officers were assisting Bailey to the ambulance, Sergeant Semore

walked behind him and shined his flashlight on Bailey’s legs and

feet to again see if there were any visible signs of injuries to

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his legs. (DSUF, No. 74.) Sergeant Semore did not see any

visible signs of injury to Bailey’s legs but he did see Bailey

walking with a limp. (DSUF, No. 75.) Defendants claim the

officers supported Bailey’s weight while they assisted him. 

(DSUF, No. 76.) 

After the officers walked about 1 to 20 yards while

assisting Mr. Bailey and holding most of his weight so that it

was not upon his leg, Sergeant Semore then took over for an

officer and assisted Mr. Bailey to the ambulance. (DSUF, No.

77.) Sergeant Semore only walked about 20-25 yards when he was

relieved by Detective Perez (DSUF, No. 78.)

Sergeant Semore continued to walk with the officers until

they were through the entrance of the park area where Bailey was

laid down. (DSUF, No. 79.) The ambulance arrived just as the

officers got to the entrance and Bailey was then transported by

ambulance to Oak Valley Hospital. (DSUF, No. 80.) 

Bailey was drinking white russians but does not remember how

many. (DSUF, No. 106.) Mr. Bailey does not recall saying

anything to the officers. (DSUF No. 122.) 

ii. Policy Pattern or Practice of Discrimination

As Chief of Police, Chief Hampton is aware of all policies

and practices at the time of this incident, in February 2004. 

(DSUF, No. 84.)

According to the Defendants, the City of Oakdale Police

Department has never had a policy, practice or custom, written or

otherwise, authorizing or condoning unlawful seizures of persons

including the use of unlawful force in violation of the United

States Constitution. (DSUF, No. 85.) Furthermore, the police

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department has never had a policy, practice or custom to deny

persons in the custody of police personnel immediate medical

attention. (DSUF, No. 86.)

In addition, the City does not have a custom, policy and

practice that encourages, tolerates, or ratifies the employment,

deployment and retention of persons and peace officers who search

or seize persons in an unlawful manner. (DSUF, No. 87.)

Prior to hiring of a police officer, there is an extensive

background investigation of applicants pursuant to the Commission

on Peace Officer Standards of Training guidelines (hereinafter

“P.O.S.T.”), including a psychological examination and

evaluation. (DSUF, No. 88.) The City requires extensive and

lawful training of police officers at certified academies. 

(DSUF, No. 89.)

All Oakdale police officers attend P.O.S.T. certified

academies which provide training that complies with the laws of

the State of California and the standards set by the Commission

on Peace Officer Standards and Training. (DSUF, No. 90.)

The Commission on P.O.S.T. is the entity that establishes

the standards that must be met by law enforcement agencies and

peace officers in California. (DSUF, No. 91.) Once employed by

the City of Oakdale, all sworn officers are required to complete

at least 24 hours of P.O.S.T. certified training every 24 months. 

(DSUF, No. 92.)

The Department regularly offers current P.O.S.T. courses as

part of the ongoing training provided to all employees. (DSUF,

No. 93.) In addition, continuous in-house training is provided

which includes legal law enforcement updates provided by the

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Office of the local District Attorney, dissemination of the

monthly training bulletins from the FBI and other legal updates

from the California Peace Officers’ Association, California

Chiefs of Police Association and the International Chiefs of

Police Association. (DSUF, No. 94.)

In addition, supervisors at the Oakdale Police Department

provide continuous training in briefings through discussions of

current cases and issues involving law enforcement. (DSUF, No.

95.) With regard to this incident addressed in this litigation,

the City of Oakdale, by and through its police department, did

not set in motion, a series of acts by others, or knowingly

refuse to terminate a series of acts by others, which it knew or

reasonably should have known or was plainly obvious, would cause

others to inflict constitutional injury. (DSUF, No. 96.)

In summary, the City undertakes a number of measures to

monitor and ensure that unlawful acts or other misconduct does

not occur. (DSUF, No. 97.) These include the following: a)

review procedure when there is an allegation of misconduct; b)

close monitoring, review and supervision of police officers; c)

administrative inquiries; d) internal affairs investigations; e)

citizen complaint procedures; f) disciplinary proceedings and

measures; g) extensive basic academy training and continuous in

service training of officers; h) compliance with P.O.S.T.

standards. (DSUF, No. 98.) No evidence exists to show Police

Chief Gary Hampton (“Chief Hampton”) had any knowledge of the

incident. 

Chief Hampton was not present during the arrest of

plaintiff, nor did he direct others who were involved in the

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incident. (DSUF, No. 99.) There is no evidence chief Hampton

had any subsequent participation in the case and no allegation or

evidence exists to show that before this claim was asserted that

any notice was provided to him of the incident. 

iii. Dr. Blaisdell

F. William Blaisdell, M.D. (“Dr. Blaisdell”) cannot provide

the exact number of popliteal artery injuries he has seen. He

believes through a lifetime of practice, he has examined and

treated more popliteal artery injuries than any surgeon in the

United States. (DSUF, No. 129.) Dr. Blaisdell has reviewed

Bailey’s medical records. These include the admitting and

discharge summary notes from Oakdale Hospital and Doctors’

Medical Center in Modesto as well as the x-rays and operative

notes. (DSUF, No. 130.) In addition to this, Dr. Blaisdell has

only relied on his own personal knowledge of this injury. In

this regard, he can also state that this injury commonly results

in limb amputation, primarily in young, active men. (DSUF, No.

131.) 

B. Undisputed Facts

Upon arrival at the scene, Sergeant Semore looked at

Bailey’s leg with a flashlight. (DSUF, No. 67.) Bailey was

wearing jeans and boots. (DSUF, No. 68.) 

It was determined that Bailey required emergency surgery for

internal bleeding on his right leg. (DSUF, No. 54.) Bailey was

transported to Doctors Medical Center in Modesto for surgery. 

(DSUF, No. 55.) 

Mr. Bailey has been convicted of felonies. (DSUF. No. 100.) 

Mr. Bailey has been convicted for Marijuana and transportation of

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Methamphetamine (DSUF. No. 101.) He was convicted in 1999. 

(DSUF. No. 102.) 

On the night of the incident, Mr. Bailey had some drinks at

a place called Whiskey River. (DSUF. No. 103.) Mr. Bailey

arrived at the Whiskey River at about 5:00 p.m. (DSUF. No. 104.) 

Mr. Bailey left the bar at about 7:30 p.m. (DSUF. No. 105.) 

When Mr. Bailey got home his girlfriend was physically and

verbally angry at him for being late. (DSUF. No. 107.) Mr.

Bailey left on his motorcycle. (DSUF. No. 108.) Mr. Bailey was

driving, missed a turn, and went up on the curb. (DSUF. No.

109.) He then turned on to Orsi and went down Sierra Street. 

(DSUF. No. 110.) Mr. Bailey was not sure he was going over the

speed limit. (DSUF. No. 111.) 

Mr. Bailey saw a patrol car, got scared because he thought

he might be arrested. (DSUF. No. 112.) He knew the police were

following him and wanted him to pull over. He saw that the

police car lights were activated. (DSUF. No. 113.) So he parked

his motorcycle and ran because he was scared. (DSUF. No. 114.) 

Mr. Bailey then jumped a fence and ran in someone’s backyard. 

(DSUF, No. 115.) He then jumped another fence and hurt his knee. 

(DSUF. No. 116.) He estimates that the fence was six foot on the

side he jumped from and 12 to 13 foot drop on the other side. 

(DSUF. No. 117.) He could not run anywhere. So, he in effect

gave up at that point. (DSUF. No. 118.) The police came. 

(DSUF. No. 120.) He was handcuffed. (DSUF. No. 121.) He does

not recall which officers took him to the ambulance. (DSUF. No.

123.) Once Mr. Bailey passed through the gate, he was placed on

a gurney and then put into the ambulance. (DSUF. No. 124.) His

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knee hurt. It felt like it was sprained and twisted. He did not

think it was broken. (DSUF. No. 125.) 

Gary Hampton is the Chief of Police for the City of Oakdale

at the time of this incident. (DSUF, No. 81.) He is currently

the Chief of Police for the Turlock Police Department. (DSUF,

No. 82.) As the Chief of Police, Chief Hampton was responsible

for the Oakdale Police Department’s policies and practices and

for all aspects of police administration and conduct. (DSUF, No.

83.) 

Dr. Blaisdell is a professor of Surgery and Chair of Surgery

at UC Davis School of Medicine. (DSUF, No. 126.) Dr.

Blaisdell’s qualifications include Vascular Surgery. (DSUF, No.

127.) 

4. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

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rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

B. Summary Judgment in a Qualified Immunity Case

In this case, Defendants assert the defense of qualified

immunity on behalf of all the individual defendants. Deciding

qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a court

must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. If

the answer to this question is yes, the court must then inquire

whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking

whether a reasonable officer could believe that the defendant’s

actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). 

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the second

step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal one,

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where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that his conduct

was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed issues of

fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring).) 

C. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The

rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

(1991). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff may bring a

civil action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

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 Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 1

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was

more broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass

v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 2

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530

(1890)).

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not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District

of Columbia. 

D. The Monell Doctrine

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 1

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 2

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) (also

finding the fact that “local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of

1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend

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 In Brass v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit 3

followed evolution of municipal liability from Monroe to

Monell: 

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [](1961), the

Supreme Court held that municipal corporations

were not subject to liability under § 1983. In

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, the Court, based upon

its “fresh” review of the legislative history of

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the statutory

predecessor to § 1983), “overrule[d] Monroe v.

Pape...insofar as it holds that local

governments are wholly immune from suit under §

1983.” Id. at 663 (footnote omitted). The

Court, however, upheld Monroe “insofar as it

holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior

is not a basis for rendering municipalities

liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts

of their employees.” Id. at 663 n.7. It stated

that “the language of § 1983, read against the

background of the same legislative history,

compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id.

at 691.

Brass, 328 F.3d at 1198. 

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municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. “Local

governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional, implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or

for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. 690-91. 3

A local government’s liability is limited. Although a local

government can be held liable for its official policies or

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customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “[T]he

language of § 1983, read against the background of the same

legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort. In particular,...a municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The statute’s

“language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under

color of some official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an employee to

violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

Therefore, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Id. at 694.

E. Suits Against Government Officials: Official Capacity

and Individual Capacity Suits

Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants both in their

official and individual capacities. “1983 claims against

government officials in their official capacities are really

suits against the governmental employer because the employer must

pay any damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66

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(1985)); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d

836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “a suit against a state

official in his official capacity is no different from a suit

against the [official’s office or the] State itself”)(citing Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In

such suits, the real party in interest is the entity for which

the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A

federal action for monetary damages against an individual state

official acting in his official capacity is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action against a State

is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836,

839 (9th Cir. 1997). “As the Supreme Court has stated,

‘official-capacity suits...generally represent only another way

of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 165). “‘As long as

the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to

respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.’” Ruvalcaba,

167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.)

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a § 1983 or § 1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

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 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he 4

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.’” Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). “‘Section 1983 imposes liability for

violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for

violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Brass,

328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 146).

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quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

5. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Monell Liability

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1)

The official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and 4

may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the

specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-92. There are three ways to show a policy or

custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local

government entity; 

(2) By showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of

decision or 

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(3) By showing that an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).

A municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. 

Id.

According to Defendants City of Oakdale Police Department

has never had a policy, practice or custom, written or otherwise,

authorizing or condoning unlawful seizures of persons including

the use of unlawful force in violation of the United States

Constitution. Defendants’ evidence establishes that the police

department has never had a policy of denying persons in custody

immediate medical attention nor has Plaintiff adduced any such

evidence. In addition, the City does not have a custom, policy

and practice that encourages, tolerates, or ratifies the

employment, deployment, and retention of persons and peace

officers who search or seize persons in a unlawful manner. 

Plaintiff points to no instances that support a finding of the

existence of such policy. 

According to Defendants, prior to hiring of a police

officer, an extensive background investigation of applicants is

conducted pursuant to the P.O.S.T. standards, including a

psychological examination and evaluation. The City requires

extensive and lawful training of police officers at certified

academies. 

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All Oakdale police officers attend P.O.S.T. certified

academies which provide training that complies with the laws of

the State of California and the standards set by the Commission

on Peace Officer Standards and Training. Once employed by the

City of Oakdale, all sworn officers are required to complete at

least 24 hours of P.O.S.T. certified training every 24 months. 

Also, the Department regularly offers current P.O.S.T.

courses as part of the on-going training provided to all

employees. Continuous in-house training is further provided,

which includes law enforcement updates, as to the law provided by

the Office of the local District Attorney, dissemination of the

monthly training bulletins from the FBI and other legal updates

from the California Peace Officers’ Association, California

Chiefs of Police Association and the International Chiefs of

Police Association. 

Defendants argue that as to Bailey’s arrest, the City of

Oakdale, by and through its police department, did not set in

motion, a series of acts, or knowingly refuse to terminate a

series of acts by others, which it knew or reasonably should have

known or was plainly obvious, would cause others to inflict

constitutional injury. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that the City undertakes a number

of measures to monitor and ensure that unlawful acts or other

misconduct does not occur. These measures include: a) review

procedures when there is an allegation of misconduct; b) close

monitoring, review and supervision of police officers; c)

administrative inquiries; d) internal affairs investigations; e)

citizen complaint procedures; f) disciplinary proceedings and

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measures; g) extensive basic academy training and continuous in

service training of officers; h) compliance with P.O.S.T.

standards. Plaintiff has provided no Monell evidence as to the

City of Oakdale. He has not identified prior similar instances

where allegedly known medical needs of a suspect were ignored or

where an injured suspect was required to exacerbate a known

injury. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement is GRANTED as to

the City of Oakdale. 

B. Qualified Immunity of the Oakdale Police Officers

Qualified immunity grows out of the policy concern that few

individuals would enter public service if they risked personal

liability for their official decisions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The immunity protects "all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991), and "spare[s] a

defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands

customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out

lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 

Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits; it is an

“entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens of

litigation” that may be overcome only by a showing that (1) a

constitutional right was in fact violated and (2) no reasonable

officer could believe defendant’s actions were lawful in the

context of fact-specific, analogous precedents. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001). 

Plaintiff alleges that the individual Oakdale Police

Officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights based on their

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alleged use of excessive force during his arrest, by forcing to

walk on his obviously injured leg. Merging the Fourth Amendment

standard with the qualified immunity presumption results in a two

step inquiry in which Plaintiff must establish that (1) the

officers in fact lacked probable cause to believe that there was

a threat and (2) that it would have been clear to a reasonable

officer, confronting the same circumstances, that the actions of

the officers were unlawful. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

i. A Dispute Exists as to Whether Defendants’ Had

Probable Cause to Require Bailey to Walk to the

Ambulance

The initial question under Saucier is whether there was any

type or amount of force inflicted on Bailey as a result of

Defendants’ response to his arrest without probable cause. 

In his complaint, Bailey alleges that Defendants used

excessive force in seizing and arresting him when they forced

Bailey to stand on a severely dislocated knee, and forcing him to

attempt to walk, then “dragging him approximately 100 yards to an

ambulance.” (Doc. 9, FAC, Filed February 7, 2005.) Bailey

further argues that as a proximate result of the officers’

treatment of him during the arrest, Bailey’s leg was amputated. 

It is undisputed that immediately prior to his arrest,

Bailey was voluntarily intoxicated and involved in a high risk,

high speed motorcycle chase with the officers that he initiated. 

Bailey admits he consumed a number of alcoholic drinks in the

span of two hours prior to operating his motorcycle. Defendants

argue that Bailey’s blood alcohol level was .22, substantially

above the legal limit. Bailey claims that he does not have

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sufficient information to determine the accuracy of that

statement at this time, although the case has been pending two

years. It is undisputed that the chase came to an end when

Bailey abandoned his motorcycle and attempted to escape on foot. 

This lawless and highly hazardous course of conduct set into

motion the events which caused Bailey’s injury. Bailey admits he

voluntarily jumped over a fence to evade arrest. The six foot

fence had approximately a thirteen foot drop on the other side. 

Upon landing, Bailey injured his knee and was unable to continue

running away. 

However, Bailey disputes the decisions Defendant Officers

made at the point after he was handcuffed and immobile. 

Defendants argue that Bailey was not complaining of any pain and

that at no time did the Officers know or have reason to believe

the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries beyond a common sprain. 

Bailey asserts that he was visibly in pain, holding his knee

while laying on the ground prior to being handcuffed. Bailey

also claims that he informed Officers that he was unable to walk. 

Bailey states that he was screaming in pain as he was dragged

away towards the ambulance. Bailey claims that the ambulance

could have been driven to where Plaintiff was located, but that

instead the Defendant Officers suggested the ambulance wait at

its location for the Officers to drag the Plaintiff to it. 

Dr. Blaisdell’s testimony that Bailey’s injury commonly

results in limb amputation is not dispositive. Dr. Blaisdell did

not himself examine Bailey’s injury and did not express his

medical opinion based on Plaintiff’s version of the facts. On

this record it is unknown what effect the Officers’ allegedly

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making Bailey walk towards the ambulance had, or whether bringing

the ambulance to Bailey would have saved his leg.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorably to the non

moving party, triable issues of fact arise as to whether

Defendant Officers had probable cause to believe Bailey posed

such a threat or as to how seriously he was injured, that it was

necessary to escort him to the ambulance rather than have the

ambulance drive to his location, where Bailey was handcuffed.

ii. Reasonableness

In determining the reasonableness of a seizure effected by

non-deadly force, the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is balanced against the

countervailing government interests at stake. Miller v. Clark

County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal quotations

omitted). The analysis proceeds in three steps. Id. First, an

assessment is made into the gravity of the particular intrusion

on Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the type and amount

of force inflicted. Id. Second, we assess the importance of the

government interest at stake by evaluating: (1) the severity of

the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether

the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight. Id. Third, the gravity of the intrusion on

the individual is balanced against the government’s need for the

intrusion to determine whether it was constitutionally

reasonable. Id. 

In addition, consideration of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

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make split second judgments in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001). They are entitled

to be mistaken if reasonable and in good faith.

It is undisputed that Bailey was driving under the influence

of alcohol at excessive speeds, presenting a high risk to public

safety. It is also undisputed that Bailey resisted arrest by

fleeing from police to avoid arrest. When officers first

approached Bailey he was laying on his stomach with his arms

underneath him and his legs straight out. Bailey posed no

immediate threat to the Officers at that time. 

Defendants argue, that Officer Shimmel asked Bailey if he

was hurt but Bailey’s speech was slurred. When Officer Shimmel

rolled Bailey over to pat him down, he could smell an odor of an

alcoholic beverage on his breath. Officer Shimmel immediately

called an ambulance to be dispatched to the officers’ location

because Bailey was not moving and he had complained of pain in

his right leg. Bailey disputes these factual allegations. 

Defendants further claim that Sergeant Semore inspected

Bailey’s leg with a flashlight at the scene. Bailey was wearing

jeans and boots. Sergeant Semore could see no visible signs of

injury such as swelling or blood through his jeans. Sergeant

Semore asked Bailey if he could walk, but claims that Bailey did

not answer him. Bailey disputes Defendants’ version that Semore

had to tell Bailey to focus and Bailey responded that he could

walk.

Defendants also claim that Sergeant Semore ordered officers

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to assist Bailey to the ambulance. According to Defendants,

Bailey was helped up and was assisted to the fence area to meet

the ambulance and was transported to Oak Valley Hospital. 

Defendants contend that Bailey was limping but was not

complaining of any pain. While the officers were assisting

Bailey to the ambulance, Sergeant Semore walked behind him and

shined his flashlight on Bailey’s legs and feet to again see if

there were any visible signs of injuries to his legs. Sergeant

Semore did not see any visible signs to his legs but he did see

Bailey walking with a limp. The officers claim to have been

bearing most of the weight while they were assisting Bailey.

Bailey, disputes Defendants’ account. Bailey states that he

was visibly in pain and that he did in fact inform the Officers

that he was in pain. Bailey also claims that he screamed in pain

when escorted towards the ambulance. Bailey maintains that there

was no need for the Officers to require him to walk towards the

ambulance while in such pain. Bailey has offered evidence

through Shelly Thomas, the day custodian of Oakdale Junior High

School who declares that it was feasible for the gate to be

opened for an ambulance to be driven to the Plaintiff’s location

on the night of the arrest. Bailey also offers evidence from

Shawna Higgins, a retired locomotive engineer for Union Pacific

who heard the police phone call to the ambulance. Higgins

recalls that the Officers deliberately instructed the ambulance

not to come towards the place of arrest and that they would bring

Bailey to the ambulance. Accordingly, Bailey argues that

Defendants’ conscious decision to escort him to the ambulance

rather than have the ambulance drive towards the scene was

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 The text of Rule 56(f) states: 5

Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the

party’s opposition, the court may refuse the

application for judgment or may order a

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unreasonable and with the intent to cause him to exacerbate his

injury. 

Bailey offers the declaration of Mr. Kenny Wright who was a

witness to the incident. (Doc. 73-2, Declaration of Kenny

Wright, Filed April 13, 2007.) According to Mr. Wright Bailey

was screaming out in pain. Whether the Officers were reasonably

mistaken that Bailey could walk, or they acted intentionally to

wantonly inflict pain is in dispute. Whether Bailey’s

intoxicated state justified the officers’ actions and whether

Bailey was screaming is disputed. 

Viewing the facts most favorably to Bailey, the non moving

party, a dispute exists as to whether Defendants’ conduct was

reasonable in making Bailey walk to the ambulance after his

injury. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim

for excessive force is DENIED.

6. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits

the court, in the interests of justice, to grant a continuance to

allow further discovery or to deny summary judgment if it appears

from the affidavits of the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment that the party cannot present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the party’s opposition. Where a party 5

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continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or depositions to be taken or

discovery to be had or may make such other

order as is just.

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believes that additional discovery is required to oppose a motion

for summary judgment, that party must submit an affidavit

pursuant to rule 56(f) stating what information will be obtained

and how that information will preclude summary judgment. Barona

Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Amer. Mgt.

& Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1987). 

To gain a continuance, the plaintiff must show the evidence

to be uncovered through further discovery is reasonably likely to

exist and adequate cause for not conducting discovery earlier. 

Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir.

1978). A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying

a party’s motion to reopen discovery where the party has failed

to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f). Ashton-Tate Corp.

v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1990).

Bailey requests additional discovery for a short period of

time to depose his treating surgeon in order to determine the

condition of the artery at the time his leg was amputated. 

Bailey argues that this information will further inform his

expert Doctor’s expert opinion about the extent of arterial

damage from the fall and the likelihood that the delay in

immobilizing the knee and the impact of walking further damaged

the artery. According to Bailey, even though his attorney

withdrew over a year ago, he did not sit idle. Bailey argues

that he was diligent in continuing to use an investigator and

pursue witnesses. Bailey claims that he was unable to secure an

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attorney partly because his old attorney withheld his file for

six months. Bailey has now secured an attorney. 

Defendants oppose Bailey’s request for a continuance. 

Defendants argue that Bailey had ample time to diligently

prosecute this matter and failed to do so. Defendants also claim

that Bailey should not be allowed to reopen discovery merely

because he has once again obtained counsel. 

After the May 7, 2006 hearing on this matter, when new

counsel appeared and argued, Plaintiff’s motion for continuance

was granted. Discovery shall be reopened for 90 days to

facilitate the adjudication of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(f). Counsel for the parties shall

meet and confer in order to facilitate a discovery schedule and

complete depositions of percipient witnesses and expert witnesses

in order to specifically address the issues in Defendants’

Motion. 

7. RULE 36 ADMISSIONS

Bailey also requests that the court allow his responses to

requests for admissions to be served on Defendants. Rule 36 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve

upon any other party a written request for the admission... of

the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) set

forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of

fact or the application of law to fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a);

Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook County Creamery

Ass’n, 465 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006). The effect of the

admission is such that “[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is

conclusively established” unless the court grants a motion to

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waive or amend.” Id. at 1111-1112. “As the district court

noted, the court and parties are bound by such admissions, which

cannot be ‘ignored by the district court simply because it finds

the evidence presented by the party against whom the admission

operates more credible.’” Id. at 1112. 

Defendants oppose Bailey’s request to allow the admissions

to be served. Defendants argue that Bailey failed to timely

serve his response to RFA’s within the 30 days after he was

served with the request. Requests for admissions were served on

Plaintiff on January 12, 2006 and his responses were due on

February 15, 2005. Because of Bailey’s failure to serve his

responses, Defendants argue that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)

Bailey’s responses are admitted and are binding. Defendants

claim that there is no reason to set the admissions aside because

Bailey has failed to provide evidence to the contrary and because

great prejudice will result to Defendants if the admissions do

not remain intact. 

Bailey seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) and requests

that the court allow his responses to be served on Defendants. 

Bailey claims that he was unable to provide responses because the

request for admissions was served six days after his attorney

withdrew as counsel of record, and the request for admissions was

served at Bailey’s previous address at 1049 A Street, Oakdale,

California. Bailey was no longer residing at this address when

the requests were served. The requests for admissions undermine

every element of Bailey’s claims and Bailey argues that it would

be unjust to allow the responses to be admitted. 

To avoid prejudice from an errant mailing and to serve the

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policy favoring trial on the merits, Plaintiff’s motion for

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 360(b) is GRANTED. Defendants have

not shown specific prejudice. 

8. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s Monell claim. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Bailey’s Fourth

Amendment claim is DENIED. 

Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(f) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) to

not deem his responses to Plaintiff’s request for admissions as

failed is GRANTED. 

Discovery has been extended and reopened for 90 days as

specified by the Court’s Order issued on May 16, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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