Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00766/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00766-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THOMAS JOHN CARLSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BRIAN DUFFY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-0766 AC P 

ORDER and 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS1 

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner at the California Medical Facility (CMF), who proceeds pro se 

and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5301(a)(1) (establishing non-assignability of Veterans Benefits). Plaintiff challenges payments 

for legal copies withdrawn from Veterans Disability Benefits (VDB) deposited in his Inmate 

Trust Account (ITA). This action proceeds against five defendants: CMF Warden B. Duffy, 

CMF Associate Warden C. Tileston, CMF Accounting Supervisor U. Hill, Appeals Chief J.D. 

Lozano, and Appeals Examiner D. Artis. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement, punitive damages, and 

an order directing the CMF Accounting Office to refrain from making similar withdrawals from 

his VDB deposits in the future. 

 

1

 This action is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 302(c), and Local General Order No. 262. 

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 Defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on the grounds that: (1) the subject withdrawals complied with applicable law; (2) no 

defendant personally participated in the subject withdrawals; and (3) defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), ECF 

No. 23-1. Plaintiff opposes each of defendants’ arguments based on his contention that the 

subject withdrawals were in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), as construed by the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals in Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2011). Memorandum in Support of 

Opposition (Opp’n), ECF No. 27-1. Defendants’ motion was submitted for decision on the 

papers on August 5, 2014, upon the filing of defendants’ reply, ECF No. 28. See Local Rule 

230(l).2 

II. Legal Standards for Rule 56 Motions 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the 

burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Securities 

Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). 

When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

 

2

 Three months later, on November 14, 2014, plaintiff filed an “Amended Memorandum of 

Points and Authorities.” ECF No. 30. The Local Rules do not authorize the filing of a surreply, 

and the court did not request one. Therefore, defendants’ objections, ECF No. 31, are sustained, 

and plaintiff’s “Amended Memorandum,” ECF No. 30, is disregarded. 

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Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate 

that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. 

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1987). 

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). 

“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the 

court draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving 

party.” Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is 

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the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... 

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). 

III. Facts 

 The parties agree that the following facts are undisputed,3 or the record before the court so 

demonstrates. Relevant disputed facts are also noted. 

 • At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was incarcerated at CMF. 

 • Plaintiff previously served in the United States Marine Corps. While incarcerated, 

plaintiff receives monthly VDB which are deposited directly into his ITA. In September 2012, 

these monthly deposits were in the amount of $63.50. MSJ, Ex. A, Carlson Deposition (Pl. Dep.) 

at 24:24-26:4; 26:8-17; 31:12-18. 

 • On September 4, 2012, VDB in the amount of $63.50 was deposited into plaintiff’s 

ITA. Id. at 27:8-28:11; see also MSJ, Ex. B, Plaintiff’s CDCR Inmate Trust Account Statement 

Report (Inmate Statement) (Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt.), ECF No. 28-2 at 34. 

 • After the deposit of September 4, 2012, the balance in plaintiff’s ITA totaled $63.50, 

and consisted entirely of plaintiff’s VDB deposit. At all relevant times in this action, plaintiff’s 

ITA was funded solely by his VDB deposits. Pl. Dep. at 31:19-23; Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., ECF 

No. 28-2 at 34. 

 • On September 5, 2012, plaintiff completed a Trust Account Withdrawal Order/CDC 

Form 193 (Withdrawal Order) authorizing the withdrawal of $44.40 from his ITA for the 

purchase of food items from the CMF canteen. The withdrawal was processed immediately. 

Therefore, as of September 5, 2012, plaintiff had a balance of $19.10 in his ITA. Pl. Dep., 

Exhibit A, at 28:12-29:20: Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., ECF No. 28-2 at 34. 

 

3

 See Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF), ECF No. 23-2 at 1-4 and attached 

exhibits; see also Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed (PSDF) (which contains both undisputed and 

disputed facts), ECF No. 27-2 at 1-5 and attached exhibits. 

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 • Plaintiff testified at his deposition that the September 5, 2012 withdrawal of $44.40 

from his ITA, though taken from his VDB, was proper because it reflected plaintiff’s intent as set 

forth on his completed Withdrawal Order and was taken from available funds deposited on 

September 4, 2012. Pl. Dep. at 29:3-17, 31:24-32:13. 

 • Plaintiff avers that, on September 14, 2012, he submitted a Withdrawal Order 

requesting that a check in the amount of $19.10 be sent to a Mr. Thomas Allread.4 See PSDF at ¶ 

9; Pl. Dep. 38:9-14; ECF No. 27-2 at 98.) Plaintiff believed that the submission of this request 

would deplete the balance of his ITA to zero on the date requested, September 14, 2012. PSDF at 

¶ 11. 

 • On September 21, 2012, the CMF Accounting Office issued the $19.10 check requested 

by plaintiff, which then reduced the amount in plaintiff’s ITA to zero. See Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., 

ECF No. 28-2 at 34. 

 • Meanwhile, on September 19, 2012, plaintiff went to the law library where he signed a 

Withdrawal Order to pay for legal copies. MSJ, Ex. C (Withdrawal Order dated Sept. 19, 2012), 

ECF No. 23-2 at 37; Carlson Dep. at 32:17-24, 33:6-34:10. Plaintiff avers that he left the amount 

blank, see PDF ¶ 8; defendants state that plaintiff signed the Withdrawal Order in the amount of 

$6.80, DSUF ¶ 8; in any case, the submitted Withdrawal Order was in the amount of $6.80, see 

MSJ, Ex. C (Withdrawal Order dated Sept. 19, 2012). 

 • Plaintiff testified that, when he went to the law library on September 19, 2012, he 

believed that the balance in his ITA would be zero by virtue of his September 14, 2012 request 

for issuance of the $19.10 check to Mr. Allread. On that basis, plaintiff believed that he would be 

exempt from charges for the legal copies under 38 U.S.C. § 5301, and Nelson, supra, 271 F.3d 

891. Pl. Dep. at 38:9-40:16. 

 • On September 26, 2012, plaintiff again went to the law library where he signed a 

Withdrawal Order to pay for legal copies in the amount of $9.30. MSJ, Ex. C (Withdrawal Order 

 

4

 A copy of this Withdrawal Order was submitted to the court for the first time as an attachment 

to plaintiff’s opposition. See Opp’n, Ex. G, ECF No. 27-2 at 98. In their Reply, defendants 

acknowledge the belated submission of the exhibit but do not dispute its authenticity. See ECF 

No. 28 at 3. 

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dated Sept. 26, 2012), ECF No. 23-2 at 37. Plaintiff testified that, when he went to the law library 

on September 26, 2012, he believed that the balance in his ITA remained zero by virtue of his 

September 14, 2012 request for issuance of the $19.10 check to Mr. Allread, and that plaintiff 

would be exempt from charges for the legal copies he requested that day. Pl. Dep. at 38:9-40:16. 

 • On October 3, 2012, VDB in the sum of $63.50 was deposited into plaintiff’s ITA. See 

Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., ECF No. 28-2 at 34; Pl. Dep. at 41:24-42. 

 • On October 4, 2012, the CMF Accounting Office processed withdrawals from 

plaintiff’s Trust Account in the amounts of $6.80 and $9.30, for payment of legal copies 

requested, respectively, on September 19, 2012 and September 26, 2012. Pl. Dep. at 41:18-23; 

Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., ECF No. 28-2 at 34. 

 • On October 15, 2012, and again on October 28, 2012, plaintiff submitted an 

administrative grievance challenging the $6.80 and $9.30 withdrawals from his ITA. The 

grievance, summarized below, was denied at the Third Level in March 2013. 

 • On December 10, 2012, the amount of $9.30 was refunded to plaintiff’s ITA. Pl. Dep. 

at 47:14-17; Pl.’s Trust Acct. Stmt., ECF No. 28-2 at 34. 

 • On April 19, 2013, plaintiff commenced this action by filing the operative complaint. 

ECF No. 1. Pursuant to this action, plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) an order directing the 

CMF Accounting Office to “stop attaching future V.A. Benefits;” (2) an order directing the CMF 

Accounting Office to “replace the $6.80 that was removed from [plaintiff’s] future V.A. 

Benefits;” and (3) a punitive damages award “in the amount of $600.00 with the daily 

compounded interest to the $6.80 from the date it was taken until paid full along with the punitive 

damages.” Id. at 4. 

 • In May or June 2013, the amount of $6.80 was refunded to plaintiff’s ITA.5 Pl. Dep. at 

47:21-24; 48:12-13. 

 

5

 The precise date of this refund has not been provided. Although defendants cite to plaintiff’s 

ITA Statement, see DSUF ¶ 25 (citing Ex. B), this refund is not included in the portion of the 

statement that was submitted. Nevertheless, plaintiff concedes that the refund was made in May 

or June 2013. Pl. Dep. at 47:21-24; 48:12-13. 

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IV. Plaintiff’s Administrative Grievance 

 In October 2012, plaintiff submitted an administrative grievance (Log No. CMF-12-M2727) challenging the withdrawal of funds from his ITA to pay for the legal copies he requested 

on September 19, 2012 and September 26, 2012. Cmpl., ECF No. 1 at 5-8, 14. Citing Nelson v. 

Heiss, supra, 271 F.3d 891, and CDC Financial Information Memo (FIM) No. 2002-03, plaintiff 

asserted that the withdrawals were illegal because plaintiff had been denied the use of his 

anticipated VDB, and sought “the payment of two hundred dollars of canteen items of [plaintiff’s] 

choosing for CMF’s negligent deprivation of V.A. Disability Compensation Benefits.” Id. at 7. 

 On November 26, 2012, plaintiff was interviewed by defendant Hill, CMF Acting 

Accountant I Supervisor, who conducted an investigation of the pertinent transactions and related 

documents in plaintiff’s ITA. Defendant Hill’s findings were reviewed by defendant Tileston, 

CMF Associate Warden for Business Services, who partially granted plaintiff’s grievance in a 

First Level Appeal Response. See MSJ, Ex. D (Hill Decl.), ECF No. 23-2 at 39-40; and id., Ex. E 

(Tileston Decl.), ECF No. 23-2 at 42-3. Tileston found that the October 4, 2012 withdrawal of 

$6.80 was authorized by plaintiff’s September 19, 2012 Withdrawal Order, and the withdrawal 

“was within the 30-day time frame for funds to be taken from the appellant’s Trust Account.” 

Cmpl., ECF No. 1 at 9 (First Level Appeal Response to Log No. CMF-12-M-2727). Tileston 

relied on the following authority: 

Pursuant to FIM Number 2002-03: Nelson v. Heiss, it also states 

“If funds from the exempt deposit are already on the inmate’s trust 

account, and you receive an inmate authorized charge, you may 

deduct the charge from the trust account balance.” 

However, Tileston ordered a refund of the October 4, 2012 withdrawal of $9.30 for legal copies 

made September 26, 2012, due to the lack of documentation (at that time) that plaintiff had 

completed a Withdrawal Order.6

 Id. 

 Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the First Level Appeal Response. He asserted that 

his September 14, 2012 request for issuance of a check to Mr. Allread depleted the funds in his 

 

6

 Defendants subsequently located a copy of the September 26, 2012 Withdrawal Order, as it is 

an exhibit to their Motion for Summary Judgment. See MSJ, Ex. C, ECF No. 23-2 at 37. 

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account to zero. Hence, he argued, there were no funds available to pay for his requested legal 

copies, and the withdrawal of funds on October 4, 2012 to pay those expenses was improper 

because taken from plaintiff’s “future benefits.” Id. at 8. 

 On December 28, 2012, defendant Tileston, acting on behalf of defendant Duffy, CMF 

Warden, issued a Second Level Appeal Response, partially granting plaintiff’s grievance. The 

response noted that, on December 10, 2012, plaintiff was refunded the $9.30 for his September 

26, 2012 copy expenses, due to the lack of supporting documentation. Id. at 10. Defendant 

maintained that the $6.80 charge was appropriate, reasoning that, at the time plaintiff completed 

his Withdrawal Order on September 19, 2012, he had sufficient funds to cover the requested 

charge, specifically, a balance of $19.10, which was not withdrawn from plaintiff’s ITA until 

September 21, 2012, despite plaintiff’s September 14, 2012 request. Id. 

 Plaintiff objected to the Second Level Appeal Response, again emphasizing that the 

withdrawals from his ITA in October to pay September expenses were improperly taken from his 

“future benefits.” Id. at 6. 

 On March 4, 2013, a Third Level Appeal Decision was issued by defendant D. Artis, 

CDCR Appeals Examiner, and defendant J.D. Lozano, Chief, CDCR Office of Appeals. 

Plaintiff’s grievance was denied on the following grounds: 

Acting Accounting I Supervisor U. Hill . . . concluded that a hold 

was never placed upon the appellant’s account and at the time of 

the appellant’s approval of the CDC 193 to remove the funds from 

his account, he had sufficient funds. . . . CMF did not take future 

funds from the appellant but on October 4, 2012, the appellant’s 

CDC 193 was processed and the funds were deducted. This 

transaction was not in violation of the court case Nelson v. Heiss, 

which holds that VA benefits like Social Security Benefits cannot 

be used by this Department to recover court order[ed] restitution or 

any other holds.” 

Id. at 12-3. 

V. Governing Legal Principles 

 Section 5301(a)(1), U.S.C., Title 38, provides in pertinent part: 

Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law 

administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the 

extent specifically authorized by law, and such payments made to, 

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or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall 

be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to 

attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable 

process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. 

38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1). An alleged violation of federal statutory rights under 38 U.S.C. § 

5301(a)(1) may be pursued as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Higgins v. Beyer, 

293 F.3d 683, 689-90 (3rd Cir. 2002) (New Jersey statute authorizing collection of victims’ 

restitution assessments from inmate trust accounts void to the extent that it allowed deduction of 

funds from inmates’ veteran’s disability benefits). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, Section 5301(a)(1) has been construed to preclude prisons from 

placing insufficient-fund “holds” on a prisoner’s trust account when the only anticipated funds for 

satisfying the prison’s Withdrawal Order are Veterans Benefits. In Nelson v. Heiss, supra, 271 

F.3d 891, Nelson, a state prisoner, funded his ITA solely with VDB deposits. Nelson submitted 

two Withdrawal Orders which sought, respectively, payment for copies of his medical records 

($11.70, submitted Sept. 25, 1996), and payment for dental appliances ($193.20, submitted Oct. 

31, 1996). “At the time, he did not have funds in the account to cover those purchases, but the 

prison did not ‘bounce’ his withdrawal orders. Rather, it granted what it saw as a kind of 

overdraft protection, provided the goods and services, and placed a hold on the account so that it 

could be repaid when funds did arrive.” Nelson, 271 F. 3d at 893. As characterized by the Court 

of Appeals, “[e]ven though Nelson himself had asked for the goods and services and authorized 

the withdrawal, he complained that the prison could not legally accommodate him in that way 

because the funds in question came from veteran’s benefits.” Id. 

 Construing similar protections accorded Social Security benefits, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that Nelson could not “consent” to the withdrawal of anticipated funds. “[T]o the 

extent that the Prison Officials consider Nelson’s drawing on his account when it has insufficient 

funds to be consent to a hold on, and assignment of, future veteran’s benefits, they cannot deflect 

his disavowal of that by chanting ‘overdraft protection.’” Nelson, 271 F.3d at 895. Accordingly, 

the Court of Appeals held that “§ 5301(a) precludes the Prison Officials from placing holds on 

Nelson’s account,” but “does not preclude Nelson from directing that payments be deducted from 

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funds which exist in his account at the time that he issues the direction. Nothing we say here 

precludes him from currently spending the benefits he has received.” Id. at 896 (fn. omitted). 

Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded, based on the prior lack of clear authority, that 

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s damages claim. Id. 

 On September 3, 2002, in response to Nelson, CDCR (then California Department of 

Corrections (CDC)) issued CDC Financial Information Memo (FIM) No. 2002-03, entitled 

“Government Benefit Payment Checks Exempt From Restitution, Holds, Liens, and 

Attachments,” which was based on “Legal Opinion No. 2002-00-0259,” issued by CDC’s Legal 

Affairs Division. The Memo was authored by Wendy Still, Deputy Director of the Financial 

Services Division, and directed, inter alia, to CDCR Institution Accounting Office Managers and 

Institution Trust Offices. See Cmpl., ECF No. 1 at 15-8. CDC FIM No. 2002-03 provides in 

pertinent part: 

As a result of inmate litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

has ruled that the Department of Corrections (CDC) is in violation 

of Title 38 [§] 5301. The court held that CDC cannot enforce 

inmate trust account holds against future payments from the 

Veterans Administration (VA). . . . Accordingly, any prohibited 

deductions made from these benefit deposits will be refunded when 

requested by the inmates. 

. . . Please use transaction code D202, Exempt Deposit, when 

depositing funds from these sources. . . . [T]hese types of deposits 

cannot be used to pay or cover existing holds, liens or attachments. 

This means that if a hold is on an inmate trust account and the 

inmate receives VA benefit payments checks, the hold cannot be 

deducted from the VA benefit payment deposits. . . . If funds from 

the exempt deposit are already on the inmate’s trust account, and 

you receive an inmate authorized charge, you may deduct the 

charge from the trust account balance. . . . 

Id. at 16. 

VI. Analysis 

 As previously noted, plaintiff seeks a refund of the October 4, 2012 debit to his account in 

the amount of $6.80, which was deducted in response to plaintiff’s September 19, 2012 

Withdrawal Order7

; interest on that amount from the date of debit (October 4, 2012) until the date 

 

7

 This aspect of plaintiff’s claim is moot, plaintiff having received a refund. 

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of refund (May or June 2013); punitive damages; and permanent injunctive relief directing the 

CMF Accounting Office to “stop attaching future V.A. Benefits.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that no defendant personally participated 

in the conduct challenged by plaintiff; the challenged conduct complied with applicable law; and 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

 A. No Personal Participation 

 A claim under Section 1983 will not survive summary judgment if the non-moving party 

presents no evidence supporting a reasonable inference that there was an actual connection or link 

between the defendants’ challenged conduct and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 

(9th Cir. 1988). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within 

the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). The 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the 

actor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the injury. Id. at 743–

44. When an inmate seeks money damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, the inquiry into 

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. See 

Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent summary 

judgment. Id. at 634. 

 In the present case, plaintiff challenges the processing of deposits and withdrawals in his 

ITA by the CMF Accounting Office. He has named the defendants in this action only because 

they responded to plaintiff’s subject administrative grievance. Specifically, in the First Level 

Appeal Response to plaintiff’s grievance, defendant Hill, CMF Accounting Supervisor, 

investigated the relevant transactions in plaintiff’s ITA and advised defendant Tileston, CMF 

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Associate Warden for Business Services, that the subject withdrawals complied with CDC FIM 

No. 2002-03 and Nelson. Thereafter, defendant Tileston, acting on behalf of defendant Duffy, 

CMF Warden, issued a Second Level Appeal Response, again partially granting plaintiff’s 

grievance on the same grounds. Finally, defendant D. Artis, CDCR Appeals Examiner, and 

defendant J.D. Lozano, Chief, CDCR Office of Appeals, denied plaintiff’s grievance in a Third 

Level Appeal Decision. 

 Plaintiff does not allege, and has presented no evidence supporting a reasonable inference, 

that any of the defendants personally participated in the challenged withdrawal of $6.80 from 

plaintiff’s ITA. Nor does the evidence support a reasonable inference that defendants Hill, 

Tileston or Duffy directed the withdrawal, although each held supervisory positions. Hence, 

plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the challenged withdrawal was made as a result of any 

defendant’s conduct or failure to act. See Johnson, supra, 588 F.2d at 743 (Section 1983 liability 

requires that defendant’s affirmative act or omission caused the alleged injury). Rather, plaintiff 

has named these defendants only because they each responded to plaintiff’s administrative 

grievance. However, because prisoners are not entitled to prison grievance procedures as a matter 

of course, a claim that prison officials failed to resolve a particular grievance in a favorable 

manner is not cognizable under Section 1983. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). 

 In the absence of evidence that any defendant personally participated in the conduct 

challenged by plaintiff , this court finds that summary judgment should be granted on behalf of all 

defendants on plaintiff’s damages claims. Even if plaintiff’s allegations could reasonably be 

construed to state a cognizable Section 1983 damages claim against any defendant, qualified 

immunity would preclude recovery, for the reasons set forth below. 

The court further notes that plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that cannot be had from the 

named defendants. At no time has plaintiff named a defendant capable of systemically addressing 

the alleged statutory violation. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (inmate seeking injunctive relief must name as defendant, in his or her 

official capacity, the state official who can appropriately provide the relief requested); Nelson, 

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271 F.3d at 897 (CDC Director must be named as defendant in order to challenge the alleged 

“system-wide problem”).8 

 B. Qualified Immunity 

 Alternatively, defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that their conduct 

complied with applicable law and/or that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Because 

neither the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) nor the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nelson 

clearly prohibits the action complained of here, and because the defendants acted in conformity 

with the Legal Opinion of the CDCR’s Legal Affairs Division, the undersigned concludes that the 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

 Qualified immunity “balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Government officials are immune from civil damages 

“unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

 By its terms, 38 U.S.C. § 53(a)(1) provides that Veterans Benefits “shall be exempt from 

the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy or seizure. . .” The Ninth 

Circuit has interpreted this language to prohibit the placement of insufficient-funds holds on 

inmate trust accounts funded exclusively with Veteran’s Benefits. Nelson, 271 F.3d 893. In the 

present case, unlike in Nelson, there were no express overdrafts or holds in plaintiff’s account. 

The CMF Accounting Office did not pay out a requested withdrawal despite insufficient funds, 

 

8

 The undersigned does not recommend leave to amend to name the Director, because such 

amendment would be futile. The injunctive relief that plaintiff seeks is an order prohibiting the 

prison Accounting Office from “attaching future V.A. benefits.” ECF No. 1 at 4. The undisputed 

facts of this case demonstrate that plaintiff has not been subjected to an “attachment” of benefits. 

The processing of plaintiff’s various Withdrawal Orders does not implicate 38 U.S.C. § 

5301(a)(1), which permits prison officials to process withdrawals of V.A. benefits as long as the 

inmate’s account has a sufficient balance when the withdrawal is directed and when the funds are 

withdrawn. Nelson, 271 F.3d 896. 

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or, as in Nelson, place a hold on plaintiff’s account to ensure repayment of an “overdraft” with 

anticipated deposits. Rather, it appears that the Accounting Office merely processed deposits and 

withdrawals in plaintiff’s ITA as they were submitted. A reasonable person would not have 

construed this conduct to constitute an attachment, levy or seizure of plaintiff’s Veterans Benefits. 

 The Ninth Circuit emphasized in Nelson itself that “we are dealing with the overdraft 

issue only.” Nelson, 271 F.3d at 895 n.5. The narrow scope of Nelson’s holding was 

subsequently restated as follows: 

[R]ecently, we decided Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 

2001), holding that prison officials could not use veterans’ benefits 

to satisfy overdrafts on an inmate’s prison trust account. . . . [W]e 

rejected the notion that Nelson had consented to using his veterans’ 

benefits to pay for an overdraft by the mere act of drawing on his 

account when it had insufficient funds. 

Lopez v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, 302 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 In this case, defendants did not permit an overdraft of plaintiff’s ITA, then place a hold on 

the account to recoup those funds from future Veterans Benefits deposits. On September 19, 

2012, when plaintiff signed the Withdrawal Order authorizing the $6.80 withdrawal, there was a 

$19.10 balance in plaintiff’s account.9 Plaintiff’s benefits were thereafter deposited on October 3, 

2012, the day before the Accounting Office processed the challenged Withdrawal Order. Because 

there were sufficient funds in the account to cover the withdrawal at the time it was authorized, 

and the funds were already in plaintiff’s account when the withdrawal was processed, there was 

no violation of the statute. See Nelson, 271 F.3d at 896 (statute “does not preclude Nelson from 

directing that payments be deducted from funds which exist in his account at the time that he 

issues the direction. Nothing we say here precludes him from currently spending the benefits he 

has received.”). 

 Plaintiff contends that CMF improperly waited to process his September 19, 2012 and 

September 26, 2012 Withdrawal Orders until October 4, 2012, the day after his “future” VDB 

//// 

 

9

 There were sufficient funds at this time only because plaintiff’s September 14, 2012 request had 

not been promptly processed. This point is addressed below. 

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were deposited. 10 On September 14, 2012, when plaintiff requested that a check be issued to Mr. 

Allread in the amount of $19.10, he thought this would bring the balance in his account to zero. 

Plaintiff accordingly believed that he would not be responsible for the cost of any legal copies 

that he requested before his next VDB deposit. In this deliberate manner, plaintiff sought to 

exercise control over his VDB expenditures, including the strategic exhaustion of his VDB 

deposits in order to obtain “free” legal copies. However, plaintiff’s September 14, 2012 request 

for issuance of the $19.10 check was not processed until September 21, 2012. As a result, there 

were sufficient funds in plaintiff’s ITA on September 19, 2012, when plaintiff signed the subject 

Withdrawal Order for $6.80; there were also sufficient funds in plaintiff’s ITA on October 4, 

2012, when the subject Order was processed. Although plaintiff accuses defendants of 

manipulating the accounting system in order to evade Nelson, it is plaintiff who attempted to 

manipulate the accounting system in order to avoid paying for copying. Nothing in the language 

of the statute or in Nelson gives plaintiff a right to do so. 

 To the extent (if any) that plaintiff raises a non-frivolous issue, unaddressed in Nelson, 

regarding the application of 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) to prison trust accounts in light of CMF’s 

practice of processing withdrawal orders out of sequence and/or subject to delay, the ambiguity in 

the law redounds to defendants’ benefit in the qualified immunity context. See Harlow, 457 U.S. 

at 818 (qualified immunity applies unless defendants’ conduct violates ‘clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”). In the 

present case, defendants responded to plaintiff’s grievance both reasonably and consistently 

within the statutory requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), as construed by the Ninth Circuit in 

Nelson and by CDCR’s Legal Affairs Division as set forth in Legal Opinion No. 2002-00-0259. 

 

10 Review of plaintiff’s Inmate Statement demonstrates that the processing dates of those 

Withdrawal Orders do not coincide with the dates that plaintiff signed them, and the processing of 

the Orders was not completed in chronological order (e.g., the September 26 Withdrawal Order 

was processed before the September 19 Withdrawal Order, albeit on the same date). Moreover, 

defendant Tileston has informed plaintiff and the court that the Accounting Office operates within 

a thirty-day processing window. Defendants do not explain the sequence or time frame in which 

the Accounting Office receives and processes inmate Withdrawal Orders, and the court has 

located none, other than defendants’ implicit suggestion that the Office relies on generally 

accepted accounting principles. 

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No liability can attach to defendants for conforming to existing law. See Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 910. 

VII. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to randomly 

assign a district judge to this action. 

 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, ECF No. 23, be granted, and judgment be entered for defendants. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court, which shall be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Due to exigencies in the court's calendar, no extensions of time will 

be granted. A copy of any objections filed with the court shall also be served on all parties. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 3, 2015 

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