Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00359/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00359-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YVONNE COTTA, individually and as a 

representative of the ESTATE OF JOHN 

COTTA, and MADISON COTTA, a minor 

represented by guardian ad litem YVONNE 

COTTA,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF KINGS and SGT. SHARI 

HENDERSON, Does 1 through 30,

 Defendants.

1:13-cv-359-LJO-SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 76)

OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 71)

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants County of Kings (“the County”) and Sgt. Sheri 

Henderson’s (“Henderson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for reconsideration (Doc. 76) of this 

Court’s order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Doc. 71, 

Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 106362 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015) (“the MSJ Order”).

Specifically, Defendants request that the Court reconsider its decision concerning Plaintiffs’1second 

cause of action against the County for Monell2liability and Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for 

violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 1. 

The Court did not set a hearing for the motion and the parties did not request one. The Court 

finds it appropriate to rule on the motion without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the 

 

1

Plaintiffs are Yvonne Cotta, individual and as the personal representative of John Cotta (“Decedent”), as well as Madison 

Cotta and Kaylianna Cotta, who are Decedent’s children and heirs.

2 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A full recitation of the facts and procedural history of the case is contained in the MSJ Order. See

Cotta, 2015 WL 106362, at *2-5. Only a brief recitation of the pertinent facts and procedural history

necessary to resolve Defendants’ motion for reconsideration follows.

Plaintiffs are relatives of Decedent, who was killed by his cellmate, Heath Parnell (“Parnell”), 

while incarcerated at the Kings County Jail (“the jail”). Id. at 5. Decedent and Parnell were codefendants and were convicted by a jury for the crimes with which they were charged. Id. at 4. Parnell 

killed Decedent the night before he and Decedent were to be sentenced. The alleged reason Parnell 

killed Decedent was because Decedent’s defense at trial was adverse to Parnell. Id. at 5. 

During the trial, Decedent’s attorney, Christopher Caine (“Caine”), spoke with County bailiffs at 

the County court cell where Decedent and Parnell were housed during their trial. Id. at 26-27. As 

explained in the MSJ Order,

Caine expressed his concern about Decedent’s being housed with Parnell to the court bailiffs at 

the County court cell. He “expressed the belief that [Decedent and Parnell shouldn’t” be housed 

together because Parnell posed a threat to Decedent’s safety due to “what happened in the 

vehicle involved in the commission of [Parnell’s and Decedent’s] crimes.” According to Caine, 

he talked with the bailiffs that “there was something missing, something loose with [Parnell],” 

and “[i]t’s for that reason that the bailiffs wouldn’t have them in the same cell.” Caine discussed 

with court bailiffs his belief that Parnell posed a danger to Decedent’s safety “on a few 

occasions.” Caine does not recall expressing his concern about Decedent and Parnell being 

housed together to any other County staff. 

Id. (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs filed this case on March 12, 2013. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on 

August 4, 2013 (Doc. 26) and a second amended complaint (“the SAC”)—currently the operative 

complaint—on May 28, 2014. Doc. 47. In the SAC, Plaintiffs alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(“§ 1983”) for violation of their civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, among other 

claims. See SAC at 1. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is a Monell claim against the County and their 

fourth cause of action is for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 9, 11. 

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As noted in the MSJ Order, “neither the SAC nor Plaintiffs’ opposition with regard to [their 

Monell claim] is a model of clarity,” but the claim “appears to contain two theories of County liability.” 

Cotta, 2015 WL 106362, at *20. At issue here is one of those apparent theories of County liability under 

Monell. Based on the SAC, Plaintiffs’ pleadings, and Plaintiffs’ discussion of the evidence, it appeared 

that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim was premised on a theory that “the jail exhibited deliberate indifference by 

failing to implement a policy to ensure that information relevant to the decision to house co-defendants 

together is communicated to the appropriate housing authorities at the jail.” Id. at 31.3

The Court found that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the County is liable 

under that theory of Monell liability. Id. Specifically, the Court found that a genuine issue of material 

fact exists as to whether the County is liable under Monell because the County bailiffs did not relay 

Caine’s concern about Decedent’s being housed with Parnell to appropriate housing authorities at the 

jail or any other appropriate County authorities. See id. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on the claim. Based on that finding, the Court likewise denied 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim against the 

County as the Court found it to be contingent on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. See id. at 28. 

Defendants move for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on the ground the Court 

mischaracterized Plaintiffs’ theory of the County’s liability for Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.

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See Doc. 76-1 

at 4-5. Defendants claim that “the theory of [Monell] liability addressed by the Court was never alleged 

in Plaintiffs’ SAC or discovery responses.” Id. Defendants assert that “[n]owhere [in the SAC] . . . do 

Plaintiffs mention inadequate jail policies requiring County staff to relay information that may affect 

inmate safety to the jail’s housing authorities,” and “nowhere in Plaintiffs’ discovery responses do they 

 

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For clarity, the Court will refer to this theory of Monell liability as “the jail housing policy theory.” 

4 Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, Defendants’ request for leave to file a supplemental 

motion for summary judgment in the alternative, see Doc. 76-1 at 2, is DENIED as moot. 

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allege any issue with respect to a lack of any policy requiring County personnel to alert jail staff of a 

perceived risk to inmate safety that is explicitly brought to their attention.” Id. at 4. Defendants argue 

that “[t]he portions of Defendants’ motion that were denied were based on allegations that had never 

been raised in either the Plaintiffs’ SAC or discovery responses” and, therefore, “they were not 

addressed in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Id. In support, Defendants provide a series of 

Plaintiffs’ contention interrogatory responses served in March 2014. Doc. 76-2. Accordingly, 

“Defendants contend the Court committed clear error in denying Defendants’ motion [for summary 

judgment] on the grounds that it did” and that “the Court’s decision was manifestly unjust.” Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. See Doc. 81. The thrust of Plaintiffs’ 

opposition is that the SAC and Plaintiffs’ contention interrogatory responses put Defendants on notice of 

the basis for Plaintiffs’ Monell claim (as the Court construed it), which satisfies the requirements of Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8. See id. at 2.5Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that paragraphs 19 through 23 of the SAC put 

Defendants on notice of the basis for the claim. See id. In particular, Plaintiffs cite to paragraphs 19 and 

22, which read in full:

19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the defendants were deficient in their customs, 

policies and practices, and also in their supervision of both inmates and line staff regarding 

recognizing impending conflict and preventing acts of violence. These failures are directly 

attributable to the failures and misconduct of Kings County, Sgt. Henderson, and the other 

defendants. Plaintiffs further contend that the above facts put the defendants, particularly Sgt. 

Henderson, on notice of the risk that Cotta was placed at by continuing to be housed with Parnell 

after their joint trial with adverse defenses resulted in a conviction. Despite those risks, Parnell 

and Cotta were not separated, they were not put in protective housing, and they were not subject 

to increased monitoring or other safety measures. Nor were any other safety measures, such as 

increased staffing or widespread communication of the very discernible potential for violence, 

undertaken.

22. The Kings County jail personnel were inadequately trained because they were not taught to 

evaluate and monitor the risks inherent in permitting codefendants, and even convicted

codefendants who both went to trial and whose defenses were adverse, to remain housed together 

both through trial and post-trial. Moreover, as the foregoing alleged facts showed, there was a 

clear lack of supervision and review/reconsideration of these risky placements, even in cases 

such as the one at issue, where the codefendants’ repeated incidents and lengthy potential

 

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Plaintiffs provide no argument concerning their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim in their opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. See Doc. 81 at 1-5. Rather, Plaintiffs address only their Monell claim. See id.

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sentences indicated an even greater risk of harm.

Doc. 81 at 2 (quoting SAC at ¶¶ 19, 22) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs assert “there is no 

impermissible disconnect between [these] allegations . . . and the Court’s finding[s]” in the MSJ Order. 

Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants were on notice of their Monell claim because they 

incorporated their pleading allegations by reference in their contention interrogatory responses and 

reiterated their position that the County failed to place Decedent and Parnell on higher security alerts, 

yet Defendants’ only objection to the contention interrogatories was that they sought early disclosure of 

expert opinions. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiffs claim that subsequent discovery “reinforced and amplified 

Plaintiffs’ contention interrogatory responses.” Id. at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert subsequent witness 

deposition testimony put Defendants on notice of the basis for Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. Id. Plaintiffs 

note that Caine’s deposition, in which he explained his interactions with the County bailiffs, did not take 

place until months after they had filed the SAC and submitted their contention interrogatory responses, 

but Plaintiffs assert they were not required to supplement their earlier contention interrogatory responses 

to reflect Caine’s testimony. See id. at 4 n.1. In summary, Plaintiffs maintain that the Court did not 

commit clear error in denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and permitting that decision 

to stand would not constitute manifest injustice. Id. at 5.6

III. STANDARD OF DECISION

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is 

an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & 

Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). “A party 

seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and 

 

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Plaintiffs alternatively argue that Defendants should not be allowed to file a second summary judgment motion because 

doing so would require a showing of manifest injustice. Doc. 81 at 5. Because the Court will not permit a second summary 

judgment motion, the Court need not address that argument.

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recapitulation” of that which was already considered by the Court in rendering its decision. United 

States. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). To succeed, a party must 

set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See 

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and 

rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally, pursuant to this Court’s 

Local Rules, when filing a motion for reconsideration, a party must show what “new or different facts or 

circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what 

other grounds exist for the motion.” Local Rule 230(j).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that it committed clear error in denying Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. Because Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim is contingent on 

their Monell claim, see Cotta, 2015 WL 106362, at *27-28, the Court also committed clear error in 

denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim.

Plaintiffs maintain that the SAC’s allegations and evidence obtained during discovery put 

Defendants on notice of the basis for their supposed jail housing policy theory of Monell liability. To the 

extent Plaintiff relies on the SAC as providing Defendants notice of the nature for their claim, the Court 

finds that the pertinent allegations (i.e., paragraphs 19 through 23 of the SAC) are too vague to have 

provided Defendants fair notice of the jail housing policy theory.7 As Plaintiffs effectively acknowledge 

in their opposition to Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, the SAC does not contain any allegations 

concerning Caine, the County bailiffs, or their conversations with one another. Nor does the SAC 

contain any allegations concerning a County policy (or lack thereof) that would require the County 

bailiffs (or other County employees) to relay information bearing on inmate safety to the appropriate 

housing authorities at the jail. 

 

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Plaintiffs do not point to other allegations in the SAC to support their assertion that Defendants were on notice of the jail

housing policy theory, and the Court does not find any other allegations to be relevant to that theory. 

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At best, the SAC vaguely alleges that no “safety measures, such as increased staffing or 

widespread communication of the very discernible potential for violence, [were] undertaken” at the jail. 

SAC at ¶ 19. But the Court cannot permit Plaintiffs to “make vague and generic allegations in [their]

complaint and simply add facts as discovery goes along without amending the complaint because to do 

so ‘would read the ‘fair notice’ requirement out of Rule 8(a) and would seriously undermine the rule’s 

goal of encouraging expeditious resolution of disputes.’” Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, No. 2:05-1510 

WBS EFB, 2010 WL 760826, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010) (quoting Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), 

Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004)), aff’d, 457 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2006). Simply 

put, the SAC’s allegations are too vague to have put Defendants on fair notice of the jail housing policy 

theory. Although the SAC indisputably provided fair notice to Defendants that they were pursuing a 

Monell claim, the SAC’s allegations were insufficient to put Defendants on notice of that theory or its 

underlying factual bases, and Plaintiffs may not pursue the theory at the summary judgment stage. See 

Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur precedents make clear 

that where, as here, the complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to state a claim, 

raising such claim in a summary judgment motion is insufficient to present the claim to the district 

court”); Patel v. City of Long Beach, 564 Fed. App’x 881, 882 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Allowing a plaintiff to 

proceed on a new theory [at the summary judgment stage] would prejudice defendants”).

This conclusion is supported by the fact that Caine’s deposition, which was the source of the 

information concerning his discussion with the County bailiffs, did not occur until August 2014—

toward the end of discovery, approximately three months after Plaintiffs filed the SAC, and 

approximately five months after Plaintiffs submitted their contention interrogatory responses. See Doc. 

81 at 4 n.2. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ contention interrogatories were served prior to Caine’s 

deposition, there is no indication in any of them that Plaintiffs were proceeding on a Monell claim based 

on Caine’s discussion with the County bailiffs, which was a factual predicate underlying the Court’s 

understanding of the jail housing policy theory. And, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, their contention 

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interrogatory responses do not contain any allegations or information concerning a County policy (or 

lack thereof) regarding County employees’ duty (if any) to relay information pertinent to inmate safety 

to appropriate housing authorities if and when it comes to their attention. See Doc. 81 at 3-4.

Moreover, Plaintiffs obtained information from Caine concerning his discussions with the 

County bailiffs approximately three months before Defendants filed their motion for summary 

judgment, yet Plaintiffs made no effort to incorporate that information into their Monell claim. If 

Plaintiffs were proceeding on a Monell claim premised on Caine’s discussions with the County bailiffs, 

Plaintiffs reasonably would have (or should have) incorporated his deposition testimony by, for 

example, moving to amend the SAC. See Pickern, 457 F.3d at 969 (“Although the new allegations were 

not part of the original complaint, [the plaintiff] might have proceeded by filing a timely motion to 

amend the complaint.”). Plaintiffs, however, did nothing between August 2014, when they deposed 

Caine, and November 2014, when Defendants moved for summary judgment. See Docs. 56-60.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were on notice of the basis for the jail housing policy 

theory because “in response to several contention interrogatories regarding their Monell theories, the 

plaintiffs also reiterated that [the] County did not place [Decedent] . . . and Parnell on higher security 

alerts.” Doc. 81 at 3. Plaintiffs claim that “‘alert’ can include a message that tells people there is some 

danger or problem” and, therefore, the County’s “policies were found deficient by the Court precisely 

because they did not require any staff member to issue an alert.” Id. at 3 n.3. Again, this assertion is too 

vague to support Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants were on notice of the jail housing policy theory.

Given these facts, the Court concludes that, in construing the nature and bases for Plaintiffs’ 

Monell claim, as iterated in the SAC and Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, the Court misinterpreted and mischaracterized Plaintiffs’ theory of the County’s Monell

liability. The Court incorrectly perceived Plaintiffs to be asserting the jail housing policy theory as the 

partial basis for their Monell claim. In doing so, the Court committed clear error. 

At this stage in the litigation—after discovery has closed, after Defendants have moved for 

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summary judgment, after almost six months have passed since Plaintiffs discovered evidence that 

apparently altered their theory of liability (i.e., Caine’s deposition), and with trial set to begin in less 

than two weeks—permitting Plaintiffs to assert a theory of liability of which Defendants had no fair 

notice would prejudice Defendants. See Adobe Lumber, 2010 WL 760826, at *5; Patel, 564 Fed. App’x 

at 882. Even if the Court were to construe the jail housing policy theory to be an argument solely on new 

facts (as opposed to a new theory of Monell liability), the Court finds “an argument based on new 

factual bases, akin to one based on new legal theories, to be improperly raised on summary judgment.” 

Pena v. Taylor Farms Pac., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1281-KJM-AC, 2014 WL 1330754, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Marc. 

28, 2014).

The Court finds that Defendants therefore are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

Monell claim and, in turn, are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due 

process claim. See Cotta, 2015 WL 106362, at *27-28. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion for reconsideration. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for reconsideration (Doc. 76);

2. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim and 

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (Doc. 60) in Defendants’ favor and against 

Plaintiffs;

3. VACATES all pending deadlines in this case; and

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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