Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01561/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01561-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ernesto Salgado Martinez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-05-01561-PHX-ROS

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on limited remand from the Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration of five procedurally defaulted claims—Claims 4, 11, 

12, 16, and 17 of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition—in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 

132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (“Martinez”). (Doc. 104.) The Ninth Circuit also granted 

Petitioner’s motion for leave to file a renewed request for indication whether the District 

Court would consider a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration of Claim 4 and for 

consideration of a possible claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), in light of newly discovered evidence. (Id.) 

Petitioner has now filed one brief comprising both his renewed request and his 

supplemental Martinez brief, and seeking evidentiary development and an evidentiary 

hearing with respect to both issues. (Doc. 115.) Respondents filed a response, and 

Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs. 121, 126.) For reasons set forth below, the Court declines 

Petitioner’s invitation to entertain a motion under Rule 60(b), and finds that Petitioner has 

failed to overcome the procedural default of Claims 4, 11, 12, 16, and 17, and is not 

entitled to evidentiary development or hearing. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 In 1997, a jury convicted Petitioner of theft, weapons-related charges, and firstdegree murder for the killing of Robert Martin, a Department of Public Safety Officer 

who had stopped Petitioner on the Beeline Highway between Mesa and Payson, Arizona. 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death for the murder conviction and to terms of 

imprisonment on the other counts. The following facts concerning the crime are derived 

from the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. 

 Martinez drove from California to Globe, Arizona in a stolen blue 

Monte Carlo to visit friends and family. After learning that his parents had 

moved to Payson, Arizona, Martinez met his friend Oscar Fryer. Fryer 

asked Martinez where he had been. Martinez told Fryer that he had been in 

California. Fryer then asked Martinez if he was still on probation. Martinez 

responded that he was on probation for eight years and had a warrant out 

for his arrest. Martinez then pulled a .38 caliber handgun with black tape on 

the handle from under his shirt and showed it to Fryer. Fryer asked 

Martinez why he had the gun, to which Martinez responded, “[f]or 

protection and if shit happens.” Tr. Sept. 9, 1997 at 83. Fryer then asked 

Martinez what he would do if he was stopped by the police. Martinez told 

Fryer, “he wasn’t going back to jail.” Id. at 85. 

 Sometime after his conversation with Fryer, Martinez left Globe and 

drove to Payson. On August 15, 1995, at approximately 11:30 a.m., 

Martinez was seen at a Circle K in Payson. He bought ten dollars worth of 

gas and proceeded south down the Beeline Highway toward Phoenix. 

Martinez was driving extremely fast and passed several motorists, including 

a car driven by Steve and Susan Ball. Officer Martin was patrolling the 

Beeline Highway that morning and pulled Martinez over at Milepost 195. 

Steve and Susan Ball saw Officer Martin’s patrol car stopped behind 

Martinez’ Monte Carlo and commented, “Oh, good, he got the speeding 

ticket.” Tr. Sept. 10, 1997 at 32. As they passed by, Susan Ball noticed 

Officer Martin standing at the driver’s side door of the Monte Carlo while 

Martinez looked in the backseat. 

 Shortly after Steve and Susan Ball passed, Martinez shot Officer 

Martin four times with the .38 caliber handgun. One shot entered the back 

of Officer Martin’s right hand and left through his palm. Another shot 

passed through Officer Martin’s neck near his collar bone. A third shot 

entered Officer Martin’s back, proceeded through his kidney, through the 

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right lobe of his liver, through his diaphragm, and lodged in his back. A 

fourth shot entered his right cheek, passed through his skull, and was 

recovered inside Officer Martin’s head. The hand and neck wounds were 

not fatal. The back and head wounds were. 

 After murdering Officer Martin, Martinez took Officer Martin’s 

.9mm Sig Sauer service weapon and continued down the Beeline Highway 

at speeds over 100 mph. Martinez again passed Steve and Susan Ball, 

which they found strange. They began discussing how not enough time had 

passed for Martinez to have received a speeding ticket because it had only 

been a couple of minutes since they had seen him pulled over. They stayed 

behind Martinez for some time and watched him go through a red light at 

the Fort McDowell turnoff. Steve Ball commented, “Yeah, he just ran that 

red light. Something is up here. Something is going on.” Tr. Sept. 10, 1997 

at 69. Steve and Susan Ball continued down the Beeline Highway and lost 

sight of Martinez until they reached Gilbert Road. At the red light on 

Gilbert Road, they caught up to him and took down his license plate. 

 Martinez passed through Phoenix and arrived in Blythe, California at 

around 4:00 p.m. where he called his aunt for money. At 6:00 p.m., 

Martinez called his aunt again because she failed to wire the money he 

requested. Growing impatient, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Martinez 

entered a Mini–Mart in Blythe and, at gunpoint, stole all of the $10 and $20 

bills from the register. Martinez killed the clerk with a single shot during 

the robbery.FN1 A .9mm shell casing was recovered at the Mini–Mart the 

following day. Ballistics reports determined that this shell casing was 

consistent with the ammunition used in Officer Martin’s .9mm Sig Sauer. 

FN1: The trial court excluded evidence of the murder under 

Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid. 

 Later that night, Martinez drove to his cousin’s house in Coachella, 

California, near Indio. Around 12:00 p.m. the next day, August 16, 1995, 

Martinez took David Martinez, his cousin, and Anna Martinez, David’s 

wife, to a restaurant in Indio. After leaving the restaurant, Martinez noticed 

that a police car was following him. David asked Martinez if the car was 

stolen to which Martinez responded, “I think so.” Tr. Sept. 15, 1997 at 146–

47. Martinez turned onto a dirt road and instructed David and Anna to get 

out of the car. They left the car and went to a nearby trailer compound to 

call Anna’s aunt to come and get them. 

 Tommy Acuna,FN2 who lived in his grandmother’s house at the 

compound, was swimming when David and Anna appeared at the fence 

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surrounding the compound. David and Anna asked Tommy if they could 

use his phone but Tommy refused. Tommy did permit Anna to use the 

bathroom. Anna went into the bathroom and came out a couple of minutes 

later. After showing David and Anna out, Tommy went back to the 

bathroom “to see if they left anything in there because she wasn’t in there 

that long.” Tr. Sept. 16, 1997 at 48. He found a towel on the floor with the 

.38 caliber handgun wrapped inside. Tommy took the gun, hid it in his 

pants, and walked outside. He testified that he hid the gun because it was 

his grandmother’s house. By the time Tommy walked outside, the police 

had surrounded the compound. An officer monitoring the perimeter called 

out to Tommy and told him that he was going to search him. Tommy 

walked over to the officer and exclaimed, “I have got the murder weapon.” 

Tr. Sept. 15, 1997 at 192. The officer searched Tommy and found the .38 

caliber handgun. This gun was later identified as the weapon that fired the 

bullets which killed Officer Martin. 

FN2: Tommy’s brother Johnny Acuna was a friend of 

Martinez. 

 After David and Anna got out of the Monte Carlo, Martinez turned 

around on the dirt road. Another police car appeared on the scene and 

headed towards Martinez. Martinez saw this second police car, left the 

Monte Carlo, ran toward the trailer compound, and jumped the fence. He 

then ran into Johnny Acuna’s trailer. 

 The SWAT team evacuated the area and tried to communicate with 

Martinez. After those attempts failed, the SWAT team negotiator threatened 

to use tear gas. Martinez responded, “I am not coming out; you will have to 

come in and shoot me.” Tr. Sept. 17, 1999 at 23. After further negotiations, 

however, Martinez agreed to come out and was taken into custody. 

 While in custody, Martinez called his friend, Eric Moreno, and 

laughingly told Moreno that “he got busted for blasting a jura.” FN3 Tr. Sept. 

15, 1997 at 13. Martinez also told Moreno that a woman on the highway 

might have seen what had happened. They talked about the guns and 

Martinez told Moreno that one of the guns had been “stashed.” Id. at 21. 

After obtaining a warrant, the police searched Johnny Acuna’s trailer and 

found Officer Martin’s .9mm Sig Sauer under a mattress. 

FN3: “Jura” is slang for police officer. Tr. Sept. 15, 1997 at 

13. 

State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 453–55, 999 P.2d 795, 797–99, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 

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934 (2000) (“State v. Martinez”). 

 In 2002, Petitioner initiated state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings 

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court denied 

PCR relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court on May 25, 

2005, and an amended petition on May 23, 2006. Petitioner asserted the following claims 

in the amended petition which are relevant to this motion and supplemental brief: 

Claim 4: the trial court violated Petitioner’s right of confrontation by 

allowing testimonial hearsay of reports of a stolen vehicle and 

license plates to prove the charged offense of vehicle theft, 

and as evidence supporting a finding that Officer Martin’s 

murder was premeditated. 

Claim 11: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ameliorate 

Petitioner’s 1993 prior conviction for aggravated assault. 

Claim 12: (in part) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the 

State expert’s diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder and 

substantiate the defense expert’s diagnosis of post-traumatic 

stress disorder. 

Claim 16: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 

investigate and confront witnesses Eric Moreno and Patricia 

Baker. 

Claim 17: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an 

independent pathologist, properly impeach the state’s 

pathologist, and move for corrective action after presentation 

of undisclosed testimony. 

 (Doc. 30 at 34–40, 86–92, 101–05, 133–43.) 

 This Court denied the amended petition, finding Claims 4, 11, 12, 16, and 17 

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to present them in state court and no 

remedies remained available to exhaust the claims, denied further evidentiary 

development of these claims, and granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on three 

other claims. (Doc. 88 at 27, 44–48, 50, 52, 58–59.) Subsequently, the Court denied 

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Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend the judgment and to expand the COA. (Doc. 91.) 

 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, and, while the appeal was pending, filed a 

request for an indication whether the District Court would consider a Rule 60(b) motion. 

(Docs. 92, 95.) The Court summarily denied the motion. (Doc. 101.) 

 While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, 

holding that where ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims must be raised in an 

initial PCR proceeding, failure of counsel in that proceeding to raise a substantial trial 

IAC claim may provide cause to excuse the procedural default of that claim. 132 S. Ct. at 

1320. Petitioner moved the Ninth Circuit to stay his appeal and remand the case in light 

of Martinez. Petitioner also moved to stay the proceedings and remand based on newlydiscovered evidence supporting a Brady–Napue claim.1

 The Ninth Circuit granted 

Petitioner’s motions and remanded for reconsideration of procedurally defaulted Claims 

4, 11, 12, 16, and 17 in light of Martinez, and for leave to file a renewed request for 

indication whether the district court would consider a Rule 60(b) motion for 

reconsideration of Claim 4 and for consideration of a possible Brady–Napue claim in 

light of newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 121.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner moves this Court to indicate that it will consider a motion for relief from 

judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) on the basis that “such action is appropriate to accomplish 

justice.” (Doc. 115 at 2) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 

847, 864 (1988)). Petitioner also seeks reconsideration based on Martinez for three triallevel IAC claims. (Doc. 115 at 8-9.) Petitioner seeks evidentiary development and an 

evidentiary hearing with respect to both the renewed Rule 60(b) request and the Martinez

claims. (Id. at 45–48, 79.) 

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit construed Petitioner’s motion for remand pursuant to Townsend v. 

Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Quezada v. Scribner, 611 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2010), as a 

motion for leave to file in the district court a renewed request for indication whether the 

District Court would consider a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration of Claim 4 and for 

consideration of a possible Brady – Napue claim in light of newly discovered evidence. 

(Doc. 121.) 

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A. Renewed Request for Indication Whether This Court Would Consider a Rule 

 60(b) Motion 

 Petitioner seeks an indication that the Court will consider a motion for relief from 

judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on the suppression of material exculpatory evidence 

at trial by the Maricopa County Attorney, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), and the Arizona Attorney General’s subsequent failure, in this federal habeas 

proceeding, to inspect the Maricopa County Attorney’s files for Brady material. 

Additionally, Petitioner seeks authorization to conduct further evidentiary development in 

support of a related claim that the Maricopa County Attorney knowingly elicited false or 

misleading testimony from Detective Douglas Beatty, or failed to correct such testimony, 

in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 

 According to Petitioner, a Rule 60(b) motion is the appropriate vehicle for 

vindicating the rights he alleges were violated under Brady and Napue because the new 

evidence demonstrates that the earlier federal habeas proceedings lacked integrity. 

 Respondents contend that the Court should deny Petitioner’s renewed request 

because Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is really a second or successive petition, which is 

barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Respondents also assert that Petitioner cannot show 

extraordinary circumstances warranting reopening of the habeas proceeding because no 

Brady or Napue violation occurred. 

 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Petitioner’s motion does not 

establish a defect in the integrity of these proceedings, but rather, seeks to raise new 

substantive claims. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims 

absent authorization from the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 

1. Applicable Law 

 a. Rule 60(b) 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “allows a party to seek relief from a final 

judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances.” Jones 

v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 

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528 (2005)). Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of 

jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from judgment. See Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 

of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). In such a case, it is appropriate for a 

petitioner to ask the district court whether it wishes to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion, and, 

if the request is granted, to then move in the appellate court for remand of the case. See 

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 A claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the “catch-all” provision of the rule on 

which Petitioner relies, must be brought “within a reasonable time,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

60(c)(1), and requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” that justify reopening 

a judgment. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535–36 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 

U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). “Such circumstances ‘rarely occur in the habeas context.’” Jones, 

733 F.3d at 833 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535). 

 For habeas petitioners, a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used to “make an end-run 

around the requirements of AEDPA or to otherwise circumvent that statute’s restrictions 

on second or successive habeas corpus petitions” set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Jones, 

733 F.3d at 833 (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). This statute has three relevant provisions: First, § 2244(b)(1) requires 

dismissal of any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous habeas petition. 

Second, § 2244(b)(2) requires dismissal of any claim not previously adjudicated unless 

the claim relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or on new facts 

demonstrating actual innocence of the underlying offense. Third, § 2244(b)(3) requires 

prior authorization from the court of appeals before a district court may entertain a 

second or successive petition under § 2244(b)(2). Absent such authorization, a district 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a second or successive petition. United 

States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011); Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 

1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 There is no “bright-line rule for distinguishing between a bona fide Rule 60(b) 

motion and a disguised second or successive [§ 2254] motion.” Jones, 733 F.3d at 834 

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(quoting Washington, 653 F.3d at 1060). In Gonzalez, the Court held that a Rule 60(b) 

motion constitutes a second or successive habeas petition when it advances a new ground 

for relief or “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” 545 

U.S. at 532. “On the merits” refers “to a determination that there exist or do not exist 

grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and (d).” 

Id. at 532 n. 4. A legitimate Rule 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal 

court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal 

habeas proceedings.” Id. at 532; accord United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 722 

(9th Cir. 2011) (observing that a defect in the integrity of a habeas proceeding requires a 

showing that something happened during that proceeding “that rendered its outcome 

suspect”). For example, a Rule 60(b) motion does not constitute a second or successive 

petition when the petitioner “merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a 

merits determination was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to 

exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar”—or contends that the habeas 

proceeding was flawed due to fraud on the court. Id. at 532 nn. 4–5; see, e.g., Butz v. 

Mendoza–Powers, 474 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “where the district court 

dismisses a petition for failure to pay the filing fee or to comply with the court’s orders, 

the district court does not thereby reach the “merits” of the claims presented in the 

petition and a Rule 60(b) motion challenging the dismissal is not treated as a second or 

successive petition”). The Court reasoned that if “neither the motion itself nor the federal 

judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting 

aside the movant’s state conviction,” there is no basis for treating it like a habeas 

application. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 533. 

 On the other hand, if a Rule 60(b) motion “presents a ‘claim,’ i.e., ‘an asserted 

federal basis for relief from a . . . judgment of conviction,’ then it is, in substance, a new 

request for relief on the merits and should be treated as a disguised” habeas application. 

Washington, 653 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530). Interpreting 

Gonzalez, the court in Washington identified numerous examples of such “claims,” 

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including: 

a motion asserting that owing to excusable neglect, the movant’s habeas 

petition had omitted a claim of constitutional error; a motion to present 

newly discovered evidence in support of a claim previously denied; a 

contention that a subsequent change in substantive law is a reason 

justifying relief from the previous denial of a claim; a motion that seeks to 

add a new ground for relief; a motion that attacks the federal court’s 

previous resolution of a claim on the merits; a motion that otherwise 

challenges the federal court’s determination that there exist or do not exist 

grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief; and finally, an attack 

based on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions. 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). If a Rule 60(b) motion includes such 

claims, it is not a challenge “to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a 

second chance to have the merits determined favorably.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n. 5. 

 b. Brady and Napue

 Due process requires a prosecutor to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the 

defendant before trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. This duty extends to evidence “that could 

be used to impeach one of the prosecution’s witnesses or undermine the prosecution’s 

case,” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2013), and arises regardless of 

whether the defendant makes a request for the evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 

U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 

(1995) (“[R]egardless of request, favorable evidence is material.”). Moreover, a 

prosecutor has an affirmative duty to learn of and disclose exculpatory or impeachment 

evidence known to other government agents, including any agents involved in the 

investigation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 

 Evidence is “material” if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the 

evidence would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. A 

“reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 678. When assessing materiality, the court must take into account the 

cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence in light of other evidence, not merely the 

probative value of the suppressed evidence standing alone. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 

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(explaining that materiality under Bagley is evaluated in distinct, cumulative analysis in 

which “suppressed evidence [is] considered collectively”). 

 Thus, to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: 1) the evidence at 

issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is 

impeaching, 2) the evidence was suppressed either willfully or inadvertently, and 3) 

prejudice resulted, meaning there is a reasonable probability that disclosing the evidence 

to the defense would have changed the result. Andrews v. Davis, 798 F.3d 759, 793 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Bagley, 473 U.S. 

at 682). 

 A Napue violation occurs when prosecutors “knowingly use false evidence, 

including false testimony” or “allow[ ] it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue, 360 

U.S. at 269. To prevail on a Napue claim, a petitioner must show that (1) the testimony or 

evidence was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the 

testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material. United States v. 

Zuno–Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269–71). 

2. Relevant facts 

 Petitioner asserts that the Maricopa County Attorney has suppressed material 

exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady. The Court considers the new evidence 

Petitioner proffers in support of his Rule 60(b) motion and Brady and Napue claims for 

purposes of making this determination. See e.g., Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1203 

(9th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, ––– F.3d ––––, 2015 

WL 9466506, (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). The new evidence consists of, primarily, a photograph of an intact 

ignition in the 1975 Chevrolet Monte Carlo (“Monte Carlo”) driven by Petitioner before 

his arrest, and disclosed to Petitioner in 2012 as part of court-ordered discovery in his 

prosecution in California for the murder of a convenience store clerk in Blythe, 

California. (Doc. 115, Ex. 1.) Petitioner submits this photograph cannot be reconciled 

with Detective Beatty’s testimony during his trial, and, had it been disclosed at trial, 

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would have undermined proof of premeditation, an element of first-degree murder (the 

“Beatty Brady claim”). 

 Petitioner also asserts that Respondents suppressed a report by California 

Department of Justice Senior Criminalist Ricci Cooksey, identifying other matters of 

evidentiary significance with respect to the Monte Carlo, but failing to note a missing 

ignition, which, Petitioner contends, implies that the ignition was intact. (Doc. 115, Ex. 

2.) The report also indicates that Cooksey attempted telephonic contact with Detective 

Beatty and the prosecutor prior to trial, which Petitioner contends demonstrates a possible 

Napue violation because it implies that Cooksey informed Detective Beatty and the 

prosecutor that the ignition was intact when he inspected the vehicle. 

 To place Petitioner’s argument and new evidence into context, the Court will 

summarize the evidence offered during the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial relevant to the 

determination that the Monte Carlo driven by Petitioner was stolen and that Officer 

Martin’s murder was premeditated, and the new evidence proffered in this habeas 

proceeding. 

 a. Guilt Phase Evidence 

 i. Officers Rochelle Carlton and Owen Krings 

 Rochelle Carlton, a community service officer for the Indio Police Department, 

testified that she took a call on July 29, 1995, from Herman Hines, who reported his 

California license plate, number 1 CUK 259, stolen. (Doc 121, App. C at 87–91.) Officer 

Owen Krings, with the Cathedral City Police Department, testified that he took a stolen 

car report on July 29, 1995, from Sonia Tison. (Doc. 121, App. D at 149–50.) Tison 

described the car as a 1975, white over blue Chevy Monte Carlo, and provided the 

vehicle identification number for the vehicle. (Id. at 151.) It was later determined that the 

VIN number matched the number of the Monte Carlo being driven by Petitioner. (Doc. 

115, App. 12 at 100–101.) 

 In Claim 4 of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner argued that the trial court 

denied his federal constitutional right of confrontation by allowing the prosecution to 

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introduce testimonial hearsay through the officers’ testimony to prove the vehicle driven 

by Petitioner at the time of the crime, and the license plate on the vehicle, were stolen. 

(Doc. 30 at 34–40.) Because the claim was procedurally defaulted, the Court considered 

Petitioner’s argument that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the claim 

was not heard on the merits because “the exclusion of the purported theft of the Monte 

Carlo greatly weakens the prosecution’s case for motive and premeditation.” (Doc 50 at 

31.) Based on habeas counsels’ discovery that the ignition switch was in two pieces under 

the passenger seat, and the parts were not listed in the vehicle inventory, Petitioner’s 

counsel sought additional discovery to establish that the ignition was intact at the time the 

vehicle was impounded. The Court considered the evidence and concluded that Petitioner 

had failed to establish that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of 

premeditated first-degree murder, declined to review the claim on the merits, and denied 

further evidentiary development. 

 ii. Oscar Fryer 

 Oscar Fryer testified he saw Petitioner in Globe, Arizona, in the days before 

Officer Martin’s murder. (Doc. 115, App. 8 at 75.) Fryer testified Petitioner was driving a 

blue Monte Carlo with a white top, and that Petitioner showed him a .38-caliber handgun 

with black tape around the handle, which he had for protection and if “shit happens.” (Id.

at 78-86.) Fryer further testified that Petitioner told him he was on probation and 

indicated that he had a warrant for his arrest, that he was on the run, and that he was not 

going back to jail if stopped by the police. (Id.) 

 Defense counsel impeached Fryer at trial with two prior felony convictions. (Id. at 

88.) Defense counsel also elicited from Fryer that prior to trial he had violated his 

probation, that he was on the run, and that he would not agree to cooperate or turn 

himself into authorities until he had negotiated and had in his possession a written plea 

agreement dealing with charges of assault on a police officer, domestic violence, resisting 

arrest, and escape. (Id. at 88-93.) Defense counsel introduced Fryer’s plea agreement into 

evidence, which provided that if Fryer cooperated and testified for the prosecution, his 

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three felony charges would be reduced to one misdemeanor assault charge and he would 

be sentenced to probation. (Id.) 

 In Claim 9 of his amended federal habeas petition, Petitioner argued that the 

prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose that Fryer would receive other benefits 

in exchange for his testimony, that he was using drugs at the time of trial but the 

prosecution did not move to revoke his probation, and that the prosecution did not charge 

Fryer with making a false report to law enforcement when he lied to a police officer 

about a suspect’s location (the “Fryer Brady claim”). Because the claim had been 

procedurally defaulted, the Court considered whether the prosecution’s withholding of 

material exculpatory evidence established cause for the default. The Court considered the 

evidence proffered by Petitioner in his motion for evidentiary development in support of 

the alleged Brady violation and denied the Fryer Brady claim, concluding the withheld 

impeachment information was not material, and that “Fryer’s testimony was not the 

linchpin evidence of premeditation portrayed by Petitioner.” (Doc. 88 at 37–38.) 

 iii. Elizabeth Martin 

 Elizabeth Martin testified that she knew Petitioner and had seen him in Globe, 

Arizona, driving a white and blue Monte Carlo with California license plates, two or 

three days before Officer Martin was shot on the Beeline Highway. (Doc. 115, App. 8, at 

44–47.) After Elizabeth Martin informed Petitioner that his parents were living in Payson, 

Arizona, Petitioner indicated he would go to Payson to visit them. (Id. at 50.) On the day 

Officer Martin was shot, Elizabeth spoke by phone with Petitioner’s mother, who 

indicated that her son was returning to Indio, California. (Id. at 54.) After hearing about 

the shooting, Elizabeth provided the police department with information about Petitioner, 

the car he was driving, and where she thought he would be going. (Id. at 52–54.) 

 iv. Detective Beatty 

 Detective Beatty, with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, was the case agent 

assigned to Officer Martin’s homicide. (Doc. 115, App. 1 at 4, 8–9.) In the course of his 

investigation, Detective Beatty received information that a California license plate, 1 

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CUK 259, on a blue and white Monte Carlo had been reported lost or stolen. (Doc. 115, 

App. 1 at 23.) Detective Beatty testified that when he was a uniform patrol officer 

investigating car thefts, thieves would commonly change the plate on a stolen car to make 

it more difficult to determine that it was stolen. (Id. at 5–6.) Detective Beatty also 

received information that Petitioner had been in Globe driving a blue and white Monte 

Carlo with California license plates. (Id.) Detective Beatty determined that an arrest 

warrant for Petitioner for a felony violation had been issued on April 13, 1995, from the 

Superior Court in Globe, Arizona. (Id. at 24, 33.) 

 Detective Beatty was present at the execution of the search warrant on the Monte 

Carlo on August 17, 1995. (Doc. 115, App. 1 at 23, 65.) Detective Beatty identified 

Exhibit 198 as a photo of the Monte Carlo taken where it was abandoned just before 

Martinez’ arrest. (Id. at 48–49; Doc. 115 Ex. 14.) The photograph shows an intact trunk 

lock. 

 After the state rested, the trial court granted the state’s motion to reopen to allow 

the prosecution to question Detective Beatty regarding the condition of the ignition on the 

Monte Carlo. Detective Beatty gave the following testimony which Petitioner now argues 

cannot be reconciled with the recently discovered evidence that the ignition was intact: 

Q. Now, with regard to the Monte Carlo with the license plates 1 CUK 259, 

at some point in this investigation did you try to determine if there were any 

keys found in that Monte Carlo? 

A. Yes, sir. After we left the search warrant, the trailer -- after I went to the 

Riverside County District Attorney’s Office I went to the location where 

the search warrant was still being served on the Monte Carlo, and there 

were some keys found in the Monte Carlo during the search warrant. 

Q. Where were keys found, if you know? 

A. The keys were found in the glove compartment, I believe. 

Q. At a later time did you try to determine if those keys accessed the 

ignition on that car? 

A. Yes, sir, I did. 

Q. And what did you determine? 

A. Well, I took the keys out of evidence out of our property room and I 

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went to the Monte Carlo, and actually there was really no need because the 

ignition switch to the Monte Carlo was missing. It is a hollow cavity in 

there, and then you can stick some sort of instrument in there, and then turn 

what would have been the ignition without a key. 

Q. Okay. Would a screwdriver be able to turn that? 

A. Yes, sir. 

(Pet. App. 1 at 64–65.) 

 v. Anna Martinez 

 Anna Martinez testified that she was riding in Petitioner’s car, the blue Monte 

Carlo, on August 16, 1995, with her husband, her son, and Petitioner. (Doc. 121, App. C 

at 140–41.) Anna saw a police car driving behind them, and her husband asked if the car 

was stolen. (Id. at 142–45.) Petitioner smiled and said, “I think so” and told Anna to 

“[g]et out of the car.” (Id. at 148.) 

 vi. Officer Robert Whitney 

 City of Blythe Police Officer Robert Whitney interviewed Petitioner after his 

arrest. (Doc. 115, App. 12 at 104, Doc. 121, App. B at 119–20.) When asked if the car 

was stolen, Petitioner indicated to Officer Whitney that “he found it parked in the barrio 

in Indio and took it there to Arizona and back.” (Doc. 121, App. B at 120.) 

 b. New Evidence 

 Petitioner’s counsel in these habeas proceedings, the Federal Public Defender 

(“FPD”), received permission to inspect the Monte Carlo at the Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s impound lot in Phoenix in June 2007. (See Doc. 74, Ex. 29.) FPD investigator 

John Castro inspected the Monte Carlo and discovered a chrome bezel and ignition 

cylinder on the vehicle’s passenger front floor, but was not allowed to test keys that had 

been seized from Petitioner when he was arrested and from the Monte Carlo when it was 

impounded. (Id.) Petitioner argued in his supplemental motion for evidentiary 

development that the two ignition parts were not listed on three separate inventories of 

the Monte Carlo’s contents, supporting an inference that the ignition was still intact at the 

time of Petitioner’s arrest, but was later punched out by law enforcement. (See Doc. 74, 

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at 7.) Petitioner sought discovery of documents concerning the Monte Carlo’s chain of 

custody, the depositions of Detectives Beatty and Colbert, and production of three sets of 

keys seized as well as permission to test the keys in the ignition cylinder. (Id. at 9–10.) 

Petitioner also sought to expand the record to include the three inventories, photographs 

of the ignition bezel and cylinder, and the declarations of two witnesses who drove or 

rode in the Monte Carlo in Globe, Arizona, before the shooting of Officer Martin. (Id. at 

10.) The witnesses recalled that the keys were in the ignition, the ignition was intact, and 

no screwdriver or ice pick was needed to start the car. (Id. at 10–11.) 

 The Court considered the new evidence proffered by Petitioner in his motion for 

evidentiary development in the context of a claim of actual innocence sufficient to 

overcome the procedural default of Claim 4 of the amended petition—a claim that the 

trial court denied Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to confrontation by allowing the 

prosecution to introduce testimonial hearsay to prove that the vehicle and the license 

plate were stolen. (Doc. 88 at 25–26.) The Court determined that Petitioner had not made 

the requisite showing of actual innocence, finding that “whether the ignition was intact at 

the time Petitioner was arrested does not negate the fact that the owner had reported it 

stolen.” (Id. at 26–27.) The Court denied evidentiary development and habeas relief on 

this claim. (Id. at 27, 59.) 

 In Petitioner’s first motion requesting an indication that the Court would consider 

a Rule 60(b) motion, Petitioner asserted that he had uncovered new evidence supporting 

his motion for evidentiary development, the denial of which affected the integrity of the 

federal habeas corpus proceeding by depriving the Court of all evidence necessary to 

determine the merits of Claim 4 and a potential related Brady claim. (Doc. 95.) 

According to Petitioner, the new evidence, and that for which evidentiary development 

was sought with respect to Claims 4, 9, and 17, undercuts “motive” and calls into 

question the finding of “premeditation,” an element of first-degree murder the 

prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) The Court denied the 

motion. (Doc. 101.) 

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 In July 27, 2010, Petitioner was ordered extradited to Riverside County, 

California, to stand trial on charges arising from the shooting death of a convenience 

store clerk in Blythe. Petitioner asserts that, as a result of discovery ordered by the 

Superior Court of Riverside County, two critical pieces of Brady evidence have now been 

unearthed: the investigative notes of criminalist Cooksey (Doc. 115, Ex. 2) and the 

photograph of the intact ignition (Doc. 115, Ex. 1). 

 Petitioner asserts that this recent disclosure of Cooksey’s notes included 13 pages 

(see Ex. 2, Bates numbers 1854, 1857–68) that were not disclosed to Petitioner until so 

ordered by the Riverside County Superior Court. Petitioner asserts that these notes are 

quite detailed with respect to the contents and condition of the Monte Carlo, but fail to 

note anything unusual with respect to the ignition switch. Petitioner also submits the 

declaration of Randall Hecht, Petitioner’s court appointed California investigator. (Doc. 

115, Ex. 29.) Hecht declares Cooksey told him that although he did not recall the 

investigation, he would normally record information about the condition of the vehicle’s 

ignition switch, but needed to review his notes before he could answer any questions 

about his investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) Hecht asserts that, after reviewing his notes, 

Cooksey stated that he would have noted it in his report if the vehicle ignition switch had 

been removed from the steering column and had been lying on the floor of the vehicle, 

and also stated conclusively that the vehicle’s ignition switch had not been removed and 

was not missing from the steering column at the time he processed the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 

10, 11.) Cooksey later signed a declaration disavowing that he made those statements to 

Hecht. (Doc. 115, Ex. 20.) 

 Petitioner asserts that other critical facts are evident from Cooksey’s disclosure. 

First, Cooksey’s notes include the names and phone numbers of “Doug Beatty” of the 

“Maricopa County Sheriff” and “Bob Shutz (sic) D.A.”—the prosecutor at Petitioner’s 

trial—and that Cooksey attempted to call Shutts and left a message more than six months 

prior to the start of the jury selection in Petitioner’s Maricopa County trial. (Doc. 115, 

Ex. 2 at 1867) Cooksey’s notes also contain a hand-drawn diagram of the driver front 

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door of the Monte Carlo, showing “exceptional detail” and including matters thought to 

be of evidentiary value, including the mirror, keyhole, handle, trim, and paint scrapings 

with notations that there may be paint transfer on the door. (Id. at 1863.) 

 Petitioner also cites the newly disclosed report of Riverside County District 

Attorney Investigator Thomas Gleeson, who transferred the Monte Carlo to officers of 

the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. The report, dated October 24, 1995, indicates that 

the trunk lock was “missing” and had been “punched out.” (Doc. 115, Ex. 13 at 1776, 

1778.) A photo of the trunk lid taken at the time of Petitioner’s arrest shows the trunk 

lock intact. (Doc. 115, Ex. 14.) 

 Petitioner’s trial counsel have executed sworn declarations that, to the best of their 

recollections, the photograph of the intact ignition was not produced at trial. (Doc. 115, 

Ex. 17 ¶ 10; Ex. 18, ¶ 10.) Petitioner’s PCR counsel has also executed a declaration 

stating that he has no memory of seeing the photo in prior counsel’s files. (Doc. 115, Ex. 

10, ¶ 8.) An FPD records custodian has also executed a declaration that the trial files of 

prior counsel do not contain the photograph. (Doc. 115, Ex. 19, ¶ 4.) 

 In September, 2012, Deputy District Attorney Haringsma traveled to Phoenix and 

took photocopies of all of the pictures and documents that were used at trial. (Doc. 115, 

Ex. 30 at 386.) Petitioner moved for disclosure of the photographs taken of the Monte 

Carlo by technician Tom Fisher, “at the time it was taken into custody,” which included 

photos of the “steering column.” (Id. at 399–400.) Petitioner received more than 900 

photographs as part of the disclosure, including the photograph of the intact ignition. 

(Doc. 115, Ex. 1, Ex. 31 at 404.) On October 17, 2012, Petitioner’s investigator emailed a 

copy of the photo to habeas counsel. (Doc. 115, Ex. 1.) 

3. Analysis 

 Petitioner argues that both the Brady and Napue violations require that the writ 

issue in this habeas proceeding, and that he is entitled to seek evidentiary development in 

support of the claims. (See Doc. 115 at 37-45.) Applying the analysis in Gonzalez, the 

Court concludes that Petitioner’s Beatty Brady and possible Napue claims are properly 

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characterized as second or successive claims because Petitioner is asserting new bases for 

relief from the underlying convictions. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (motion seeking to 

add a new ground for relief qualifies in substance as a successive habeas petition); In re 

Pickard, 681 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2012) (claims that prosecution violated its 

Brady/Giglio duties at trial are certainly second-or-successive claims because they assert 

a basis for relief from the underlying convictions). Absent a certification by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot consider these claims for relief from the 

underlying conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). Petitioner recognizes this limitation to 

consideration of his claims, but asserts that he is not foreclosed from seeking relief 

pursuant to Rule 60(b) because he is attacking the integrity of the earlier proceedings. 

 Petitioner raises three challenges to the integrity of the earlier proceedings: (1) the 

suppression of the Beatty Brady material by the Maricopa County Attorney and the 

Arizona Attorney General thwarted Petitioner’s ability to file a petition including all 

known claims; (2) without the suppressed material, the Court could not properly assess 

the Fryer Brady claim in the aggregate; and (3) had Petitioner been aware of a possible 

Napue violation, he would have moved to amend his federal petition. (Doc. 115 at 25–

26.) In assessing whether Petitioner has established that the integrity of these proceedings 

has been undermined by the alleged Brady and Napue violations, the Court has 

considered the evidence proffered by Petitioner in his Rule 60(b) motion, (Doc. 115, Exs. 

1–38). The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish a defect in the integrity 

of these proceedings “that rendered its outcome suspect.” See Buenrostro, 638 F.3d at 

722. 

 Assuming for purposes of this analysis that the evidence proffered by Petitioner 

establishes conclusively that the Maricopa County Attorney suppressed evidence which 

would have established that the ignition switch was intact at the time of Petitioner’s 

arrest, Petitioner cannot establish that this undermined the Court’s ability to properly 

assess the Fryer Brady claim. When this Court considered the allegation that the 

prosecution withheld evidence that would have impeached Fryer’s testimony, it found: 

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Fryer was thoroughly impeached at trial. His plea agreement was 

introduced, he was cross-examined about all of the favorable treatment he 

obtained as a result of the agreement, and was impeached with the factual 

basis of his prior felony convictions. The fact that he tested positive for 

drugs two weeks prior to his testimony would not likely have affected the 

jury’s verdict. Similarly, the fact that Fryer continued to engage in criminal 

activity even after working out a plea to testify against Petitioner does not 

put his credibility in a whole new light given all of the other impeaching 

evidence brought out at trial. 

Second, the additional impeachment evidence would have had little effect 

on Fryer’s already impeached credibility because his testimony was 

corroborated by other evidence. Consistent with Fryer’s testimony, 

Petitioner was driving a blue Monte Carlo with a white top, had a warrant 

out for his arrest, had violated his probation and was on the run from 

authorities, and had possession of a .38-caliber revolver with black tape 

around the handle of the gun. Moreover, his fingerprint was found on the 

tape, and it was this revolver that was later identified as the murder weapon 

(RT 9/22/97 at 114). See [State v.] Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 453–55, 999 P.2d 

at 797-99. 

Finally, Fryer’s testimony was not the linchpin evidence of premeditation 

portrayed by Petitioner. Fryer relayed a conversation with Petitioner that 

took place prior to the shooting. Although damaging, it was less relevant 

than the fact that Petitioner was driving a stolen car when pulled over, that 

he had absconded from law enforcement and there was an outstanding 

warrant for his arrest, and that he shot Officer Martin not once, but four 

times. 

In addition, after his arrest Petitioner bragged about “blasting” a police 

officer. (RT 9/15/97 at 13.) This was more than enough evidence from 

which the jury could find that Petitioner acted with premeditation. 

(Doc. 88 at 37-38) (emphasis added). 

 Thus, even assuming Petitioner could conclusively establish that the ignition 

switch was punched out after Petitioner’s arrest or that the keys in Petitioner’s possession 

would have started the car, this additional evidence, considered together with the Fryer 

Brady material2

, does not call into question the integrity of the habeas proceedings 

 

2

 Including Petitioner’s claim raised for the first time in the supplemental brief, that Fryer recanted his statement and admitted he was using methamphetamine both when questioned by police and when he testified at trial. (See Doc. 115, Ex. 22, ¶ 20) 

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because it does not change the pivotal fact relied on by the Court that Petitioner was 

driving a stolen car when pulled over. The new evidence also does not call into question 

any of the critical facts the Court relied on in reaching a conclusion that Fryer’s 

testimony was not the “linchpin evidence of premeditation”—Petitioner was driving a 

stolen car, had absconded from law enforcement, had an outstanding warrant for his 

arrest, shot Officer Martin four times, and bragged about the murder. (Id. at 38.) 

 Petitioner’s assertion that suppression of the Beatty Brady and Napue evidence 

prevented him from complying with the Court’s order that he file a petition containing all 

of his claims, or from amending his petition to include those claims, is not a proper basis 

for attacking the integrity of the proceedings. “Rule 60(b) is properly applied when there 

is some problem going to the integrity of the court process on the claims that were 

previously asserted.” Jones, 733 F.3d at 836. In Jones, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 

petitioner’s attempts to circumvent the limitations on second or successive petitions by 

alleging that he did not have a “fair shot” at raising three IAC claims in his first habeas 

corpus proceedings because his habeas corpus counsel, who was also his state PCR 

counsel, operated under a per se conflict of interest. 733 F.3d at 835–36. The Court 

explained that “the rule announced in Gonzalez, that a valid Rule 60(b) motion ‘attacks . . 

. some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,’ . . . must be understood 

in the context generally to mean the integrity of the prior proceeding with regard to the 

claims that were actually asserted in this proceeding.” Jones, 733 F.3d at 836 (internal 

citation omitted). Rule 60(b) does not permit a petitioner to assert entirely new claims for 

relief by contending those claims “were required to ensure those proceedings’ integrity.” 

Id. Thus, because Petitioner is not challenging the integrity of the process on a claim 

previously asserted, he cannot utilize Rule 60(b) to bring these new claims before the 

Court. See id. 

 To the extent Petitioner asserts that a defect in the integrity of these proceedings is 

established by Respondents’ failure to discover and disclose the alleged exculpatory 

material during these federal habeas proceedings, Respondents were under no duty to 

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disclose the alleged exculpatory material. See Jones, 733 F.3d at 837 (“[T]he Brady right 

of pretrial disclosure available to defendants at trial does not extend to habeas corpus 

petitioners seeking post-conviction relief.”) (citing Dist. Atttorney’s Office for Third 

Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009)). Because there was no duty of 

disclosure in these proceedings, any failure by Respondents to comply with Brady did not 

undermine the integrity of the proceedings. 

 Petitioner points to the holdings in Pickard, 681 F.3d at 1206-06, and Douglas v. 

Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009), to support his claim that Respondents 

are not entitled to rely on the restrictions in filing a second or successive habeas petition 

because they have continued to suppress Brady material in these habeas proceedings. 

(See Doc. 126 at 7.) Petitioner’s reliance on Pickard and Douglas is misplaced. 

 In Pickard, the Tenth Circuit held that claims of prosecutorial misconduct during 

trial, based on the prosecution’s denial that agencies other than the DEA were involved in 

the investigation, were properly considered a second or successive claim, but petitioner’s 

claim that the prosecution committed fraud in habeas proceedings by falsely denying 

other agencies were involved, was a proper Rule 60(b) claim. In re Pickard, 681 F.3d at 

1204. Similarly, in Douglas, the Tenth Circuit permitted Douglas to supplement his 

habeas petition with an untimely Brady claim after it found the prosecutor took 

affirmative actions to conceal his tacit agreement with the state’s key witness until it was 

too late to bring a Brady claim in his first habeas petition. 560 F.3d at 1190-91. The Ninth 

Circuit has explained that “[f]raud on the court must involve an unconscionable plan or 

scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Buenrostro, 

638 F.3d at 722 (quoting Abatti v. Comm’r, 859 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

 In this case Petitioner points to two arguments made by Respondents in opposing 

discovery related to Claim 4 that he asserts demonstrate a defect in the integrity of these 

habeas proceedings. Respondents objected to discovery of evidence “which may not even 

exist to refute ‘[t]he implication . . . that the car [Martinez was driving] was stolen and 

that [he] would have feared being arrested for the theft when stopped on the Beeline 

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Highway’” (Doc. 66 at 31), and asserted that “[t]here is no evidence that the State knew 

about the broken ignition switch lodged under the passenger seat” (Doc. 77 at 6). 

 First, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Respondents’ assertions in opposing 

discovery are false, nor are the assertions evidence of “an unconscionable plan or scheme 

. . . designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” See Buenrostro, 638 at 

722. Even if Petitioner could demonstrate the assertions were false and part of such a 

scheme, he cannot demonstrate a defect in the integrity of the proceedings because the 

assertions had no effect on the outcome of the proceedings. The Court found Claim 4 

procedurally barred and denied further evidentiary development of Petitioner’s theory 

that the ignition was intact at the time the vehicle was impounded. The Court considered 

the evidence proffered in support of Claims 9, 16, and 17, and assumed that Petitioner’s 

new evidence would demonstrate that “the ignition was intact at the time Petitioner was 

arrested,” but nonetheless concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that no reasonable 

juror would have found him guilty of premeditated first degree murder because “whether 

the ignition was intact at the time Petitioner was arrested does not negate the fact that 

the owner had reported it stolen.” (Doc. 88 at 26-27) (emphasis added). 

 The Court agrees with Respondents’ contention that this finding demonstrates that 

the Court has in essence already concluded that Petitioner failed to show that any 

evidence regarding the alleged intact ignition undermines the integrity of these 

proceedings relevant to the claims raised in the petition. The Court has already 

determined that evidence of an intact ignition would not change its procedural or 

evidentiary rulings on Claim 4, and would not call into question the jury’s finding of 

premeditation. The Court’s decision was not based on the strength of Petitioner’s 

evidence—in reaching its decision the Court assumed Petitioner’s evidence was 

conclusive. Consequently, additional or stronger evidence in support of Petitioner’s 

allegation that the ignition was intact does not change this Court’s previous analysis. 

Because the Court’s procedural and evidentiary rulings are not rendered “suspect” as a 

result of Respondents’ allegations, regardless of the veracity of the assertions, Petitioner 

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cannot demonstrate a defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings. See Buenrostro, 

638 F.3d at 722. 

 In sum, Petitioner has not demonstrated any defect in the integrity of these habeas 

proceedings, but instead seeks to raise new substantive claims that his rights under Brady

and Napue were violated. It is therefore a second or successive petition, and this Court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider the Brady and Napue claims absent authorization from the 

court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 

4. Motion for Evidentiary Development 

 In his request for evidentiary development, Petitioner seeks discovery and an 

evidentiary hearing in support of his Rule 60(b) motion and his request for relief based on 

Brady and Napue violations. As determined above, however, Petitioner’s motions for 

Rule 60(b) relief and for consideration of a possible Brady or Napue claim are denied as a 

second or successive petition filed without authorization. Therefore, the Court finds no 

basis for evidentiary development or an evidentiary hearing and denies Petitioner’s 

request. 

B. Supplemental Martinez Brief 

 The Ninth Circuit remanded this case for the reconsideration of five claims that 

this Court previously found procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to present 

them in state court and no remedies remained available to exhaust the claims. Petitioner 

now seeks reconsideration based on Martinez for three claims alleging counsel 

ineffectiveness in the guilt phase for failing to retain an independent pathologist when the 

State’s expert pathologist changed his opinion as to the sequence of shots that struck 

Officer Martin (Claim 17); and in the sentencing phase proceedings for failing to mitigate 

a 1993 conviction admitted as a statutory aggravating factor at sentencing (Claim 11) and 

for failing to rebut testimony that Petitioner suffered from antisocial personality disorder 

(“APD”) (Claim 12). (Doc. 115 at 8–9.) 

1. Evidentiary Development & Martinez v. Ryan

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Section 2254 Cases, to include all of the Exhibits (Exs. 1–38) cited in his supplemental 

Martinez brief in support of Claims 11, 12, and 17. (Doc. 115 at 79.) Petitioner also 

requests that the Court grant an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual disputes 

regarding the evidence submitted in support of his Martinez claims. Respondents object 

to expansion of the record to determine if Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief, but do not 

object to the Court considering the evidence, with one exception,3

 for the limited purpose 

of evaluating cause and prejudice. (Doc. 121 at 68–69.) Respondents object to 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 68.) 

 The evidentiary limitations described in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 

(2011),4

 do not apply to Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance claims 

because they were not previously adjudicated on the merits by the state courts. See 

Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1320–21. Furthermore, the Court is not restricted, under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)5

, from holding an evidentiary hearing for Petitioner to show cause and 

prejudice under Martinez because Petitioner is not asserting a constitutional “claim” for 

relief. See Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1320–21. Accordingly, the Court considers the new 

evidence Petitioner proffers in support of his Martinez claims for the limited purpose of 

evaluating Petitioner’s cause and prejudice arguments. 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, habeas review of a defaulted 

 

3

 Respondents object to expansion of the record to include Attorney Gregory J. Kuykendall’s opinion (Doc. 115, Ex. 38) on the standard of care, even for the limited 

purpose of evaluating cause and prejudice. Respondents assert the opinion is irrelevant to the ineffectiveness inquiry. Because the Court resolves the ineffectiveness claims strictly on the basis of Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate prejudice, without addressing the quality of counsel’s performance, Respondents objection is moot. 

4

 Limiting a federal court’s consideration of evidence in support of a claim to the evidence that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. 563 U.S. at 180–81. 

5

 Limiting the court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim for relief where the petitioner “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 

proceedings.” 

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claim is barred unless a petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Ordinarily, “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can 

demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts 

to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Id. at 753. In Coleman, the Court held that 

ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings does not establish cause 

for the procedural default of a claim. Id.

 In Martinez, however, the Court established a “narrow exception” to the rule 

announced in Coleman. The Court explained: 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural 

default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim 

of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 

ineffective. 

132 S. Ct. at 1320; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (noting that 

Martinez may apply to a procedurally defaulted trial-phase ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim if “the claim . . . was a ‘substantial’ claim [and] the ‘cause’ consisted of 

there being ‘no counsel’ or only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding” (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320). 

 Accordingly, under Martinez, a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural 

default of an ineffective assistance claim, “where the state (like Arizona) required the 

petitioner to raise that claim in collateral proceedings, by demonstrating two things: (1) 

‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . 

(1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has 

some merit.’ ” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. 

Ct. at 1318); see Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014) overruled on 

other grounds by McKinney, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 9466506; Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1319–

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20; Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 

 In a series of recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has provided guidance for applying 

Martinez. The most recent case, Clabourne, summarizes the court’s Martinez analysis. 

To demonstrate cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default, a 

petitioner must make two showings. “First, to establish ‘cause,’ he must establish that his 

counsel in the state post-conviction proceeding was ineffective under the standards of 

Strickland. Strickland, in turn, requires him to establish that both (a) post-conviction 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable probability that, 

absent the deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would 

have been different.” Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (citations omitted). Determining 

whether there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome “is necessarily 

connected to the strength of the argument that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective.” 

Id. at 377–78. Second, “to establish ‘prejudice,’ the petitioner must establish that his 

“underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to 

say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id.

 Under Martinez, a claim is substantial if it meets the standard for issuing a 

certificate of appealability. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322 (2003)). According to that standard, “a petitioner must show that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been 

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 336). 

 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674. To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. 

 The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

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counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 

the time.” Id. at 689; see Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (per curiam); Bobby v. 

Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam); Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 

2010). To satisfy Strickland’s first prong, a defendant must overcome “the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy.” Id. “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. 

Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether 

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense 

counsel acted at trial.” Id. at 687–88. 

 With respect to Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove 

prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 As discussed below, the Court has determined that Petitioner was not prejudiced 

by trial counsel’s performance. Accordingly, Petitioner’s attempt to excuse the default of 

these claims under Martinez fails because the underlying ineffectiveness claims are not 

substantial, and thus PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. Because 

the claims are both defaulted and meritless, expansion of the record will be denied. 

 For the same reason, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Having 

reviewed the entire record, including the evidence presented by Petitioner in his 

supplemental Martinez brief, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not 

warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (“[I]f the record refutes 

the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is 

not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”); Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. Whether Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are 

“substantial” under Martinez is resolvable on the record. Cf. Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321 

(explaining that “a district court may take evidence to the extent necessary to determine 

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whether the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial 

under Martinez”) (emphasis added). 

2. Claim 4 

 The Ninth Circuit ordered this court, on remand, to address whether Claim 4 falls 

within the Martinez exception for procedurally defaulted claims because Petitioner 

referred in his first amended petition to ineffective assistance of trial counsel as to Claim 

4. (Doc. 104 at 2.) Respondents contend that Martinez does not apply to Claim 4 and, 

moreover, that Petitioner abandoned the claim by failing address it in the supplemental 

brief, thus waiving any argument that Martinez excuses the procedural default. (Doc. 121 

at 50.) The Court agrees. 

 In Claim 4 of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner argued that the trial court 

violated his constitutional right of confrontation by allowing testimonial hearsay to prove 

the Monte Carlo and the license plate were stolen. (Doc. 30 at 34.) While the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has expanded Martinez’s scope to include procedurally 

defaulted claims of ineffective appellate counsel, Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 

1287, 1294–96 (9th Cir. 2013), it has also recognized that only the Supreme Court could 

expand the application of Martinez outside the context of ineffective assistance claims, 

and has declined to extend Martinez to claims of trial error. See Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 

F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to extend Martinez to cover claims of trial 

error); Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that 

only the Supreme Court may extend the scope of Martinez). Because Petitioner’s claim 

that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of testimonial hearsay is not an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it does not fall within the Martinez exception, and 

PCR counsel’s deficient performance may not serve as cause to excuse the procedural 

default. See Pizzuto, 783 F.3d at 1176–77. 

 Respondents assert that, to the extent Claim 18 of the amended petition raised an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim related to Claim 4, Petitioner withdrew this 

claim in the traverse. In Claim 18 of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner argued that 

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PCR counsel’s performance was deficient, in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right 

to due process and effective representation, because Petitioner failed, among other things, 

to raise an argument that trial and appellate counsel failed to adequately litigate his 

confrontation claim or assert error regarding the admission of hearsay to prove that the 

Monte Carlo was stolen. (Doc. 30 at 143–152, 157.) Subsequently, however, Petitioner 

withdrew Claim 18 from his amended petition. (See Doc. 57 at 1, 92.) Thus, Petitioner 

has abandoned any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to Claim 4. 

 Finally, by failing to address Claim 4 in his supplemental Martinez brief, 

Petitioner has further abandoned the claim. See Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1014, n. 

5 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting 

failure to raise or brief an issue in a timely fashion may constitute waiver on appeal)). 

 In conclusion, the Court finds that Martinez does not apply to Claim 4. 

Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel related 

to Claim 4, he abandoned this argument by withdrawing the claim, and waived any 

argument that Martinez excuses his procedural default of Claim 4 by failing to raise it in 

his supplemental Martinez brief. 

3. Claim 11 

 In Claim 11 of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition, Petitioner argues that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to mitigate Petitioner’s 1993 Gila County aggravated 

assault conviction which was admitted during the penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial as a 

statutory aggravating factor. To excuse the default of Claim 11, Petitioner argues PCR 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present this trial IAC 

claim in state proceedings. Because this trial-level IAC claim lacks merit, Petitioner has 

failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result had PCR counsel raised it 

in the state PCR petition. Therefore, he has failed to establish cause under Martinez to 

excuse the procedural default of Claim 11. 

 a. Facts 

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Petitioner’s conviction in Gila County for aggravated assault in 1993, and a minute entry 

from Maricopa County sentencing Petitioner on two counts of dangerous or deadly 

assault by a prisoner in 1996. (Doc. 115, App. 18 at 53–54.) Without objection, the trial 

court admitted both minute entries. (Id.) The trial court found that Petitioner conceded 

that the 1993 conviction qualified as a previous conviction for a “serious offense,” a 

statutory aggravating factor under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (“(F)(2)”). See State v. 

Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 461, 999 P.2d at 805. Petitioner argued that the 1996 convictions 

did not qualify as “serious offenses” under (F)(2), but the trial court rejected this 

argument, finding they constituted a previous conviction of a serious offense under (F)(2) 

and had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The Arizona Supreme Court 

agreed with the trial court. (Id. at 461–62, 999 P.2d 805–06.) The trial court also found 

that Officer Martin was an on duty police officer killed in the course of performing his 

duties, thus satisfying the A.R.S. 13-702 (F)(10) (“(F)(10)”) statutory aggravating factor. 

(Doc. 121, Ex. G at 9.) This finding was not challenged on appeal. See Martinez, 196 at 

462, 999 P.2d at 806. 

 During sentencing, the court made the following observation regarding the (F)(2) 

aggravating circumstance: 

 The (F)(2) aggravating circumstance here is strong not only because 

of the number of serious offenses, but because the later serious offenses 

cast doubt on whether defendant could be imprisoned for many years 

without endangering the safety of others in the prison system. The (F)(10) 

aggravating circumstance also carries significant weight. The unprovoked 

murder of a peace officer, so the defendant can avoid his obligation under 

the law, is really no less than a personal declaration of war against a 

civilized society. In sum, the aggravating circumstances are strong. The 

mitigating circumstances are not. 

(Doc. 115, App. 19 at 30.) 

 Because Petitioner had raised a challenge to the 1996 convictions, for purposes of 

appellate review, the sentencing court went on to address whether the aggravating 

circumstances would still outweigh the mitigating circumstances if the (F)(2) aggravating 

factor were based solely on the 1993 conviction, and found “that the mitigating 

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circumstances in this case, individually and cumulatively, are just not sufficiently 

substantial to outweigh the (F)(2) and (F)(10) circumstances.” (Id.) 

 b. Analysis 

 In Claim 11 of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner alleges IAC at sentencing 

for counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence to rebut the “serious offense” 

aggravating factor. (Doc. 30 at 86-91.) Petitioner asserts that trial counsel ignored police 

reports regarding the 1993 conviction that indicated that Petitioner may have been guilty 

of no crime at all, and suggested that it appeared trial counsel did not know they could 

challenge this factor. (Id. at 87-88.) 

 The charging instrument in the 1993 assault alleged that there were two victims, 

Saul Salas and Guillermo Garcia, that Petitioner intentionally placed each in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury, and that he committed the offense while using 

a deadly weapon—a “hand gun.” (Doc. 115, Ex. 3.) The police reports underlying 

Petitioner’s 1993 aggravated assault consist of statements from two witnesses, one of 

whom noted he saw Petitioner had a gun during the assault. (Doc. 115, Exs. 4, 5.) 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the offense. (Doc. 115, Ex. 6.) 

 Petitioner argues he cannot be put to death since his prior conduct, as described by 

the witnesses, is insufficient to establish the aggravating factor. (Doc. 30. at 89.) 

Petitioner also argues that even if the facts support the aggravated assault conviction, the 

presentation of the mitigating evidence alone could reasonably have been expected to 

result in a sentence of life. (Id. at 90–91) 

 This Court previously found the claim was procedurally defaulted, and would not 

be considered on the merits absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Petitioner argued as cause that Respondents failed to disclose the 

police reports underlying his 1993 Gila County conviction. (Doc. 57 at 74–77.) These 

reports, he argued, would have mitigated the weight of the aggravating factor by showing 

that although a witness said Petitioner had a gun in his hand, there was no allegation that 

he discharged or pointed it at anyone. (Id. at 77.) The Court found this insufficient to 

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establish cause for Petitioner’s failure to pursue Claim 11 in his state PCR proceedings 

because Petitioner’s assertion that he did not point the gun at the victims or discharge it 

“hardly mitigates the fact that he was convicted of aggravated assault and says nothing of 

the two 1996 prior offenses for dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner that were also 

found by the Court to satisfy the (F)(2) aggravating factor.” (Doc. 88 at 43–44.) The 

Court found that the police reports, consisting of the witness statements from both 

victims, were not necessarily mitigating and were not material because they “fall far short 

of being favorable to the defense.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner now asserts that PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing 

to investigate and present the trial IAC claim and he was prejudiced by the failure 

because the sentencing court placed tremendous significance on the admission of the Gila 

County aggravated assault conviction. (Doc. 115 at 53, 61.) However, there is no 

reasonable probability that the mitigating evidence would have negated a finding of the 

(F)(2) aggravating circumstance. There is also no reasonable probability that the evidence 

related to the 1993 convictions would have affected the sentencing outcome had it been 

presented at trial because the evidence was not necessarily mitigating, and the sentencing 

court unquestionably found the 1996 convictions carried more weight than the 1993 

conviction. Accordingly, the Court finds no reasonable probability that Petitioner would 

have obtained post-conviction relief had PCR counsel raised Claim 11 in the PCR 

petition. Petitioner has failed to establish cause under Martinez, and Claim 11 remains 

procedurally barred. 

 Clearly established federal law establishes that, in preparing for the sentencing 

phase of a capital trial, a defendant’s attorney is “bound to make reasonable efforts to 

obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as 

evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 

374, 377 (2005). 

 In this case, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel admitted they were not aware that 

statutory aggravators admitted at capital sentencing could be mitigated, and that PCR 

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counsel had no reason for failing to raise the IAC claim. (Doc. 115 at 58; Ex. 8 ¶ 6; Ex. 9, 

¶ 6.) The Court need not address counsel’s performance, however, because even if 

counsel performed deficiently, Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697 (“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 

alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground 

of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 

followed.”). 

 In Rompilla, the Supreme Court found counsel deficient in failing to examine the 

court file on Rompilla’s prior conviction. 545 U.S. at 383. In addressing the prejudice 

prong of Strickland, the Court found that if counsel had examined the file, they would 

have found a range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up including 

evidence pointing to organic brain damage, fetal alcohol syndrome, a traumatic 

childhood, and intellectual disability. Id. at 391–93. The mitigating evidence “‘might well 

have influenced the jury’s appraisal’ of [Rompilla’s] culpability . . . and the likelihood of 

a different result . . . [is] ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ actually 

reached at sentencing.” Id. at 393 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003); 

Strickland 466 U.S. at 694). 

 Unlike the mitigating evidence discovered in Rompilla, the mitigating evidence 

Petitioner asserts counsel should have uncovered here—that Petitioner was “not guilty of 

any crime” with regard to one witness, and “it is highly questionable that [Petitioner] was 

guilty of the aggravated assault” of the other—is not sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome reached at sentencing. 

 First, as Respondents note, the 1993 conviction was only one of three convictions 

used to establish the (F)(2) aggravating factor. Each of the two 1996 convictions were 

also found to establish the (F)(2) factor, and though challenged, were not found invalid. 

See State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 462, 999 P.2d at 806. Thus, there is no reasonable 

probability that even if the 1993 conviction had been challenged in state court and found 

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to be legally insufficient to establish the (F)(2) circumstance,6 the trial court would not 

have found the (F)(2) factor established based on the 1996 convictions. 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s attempt to portray the 1993 conviction as crucial to the 

trial court’s decision to impose the death penalty is simply not supported by the record. 

The trial court found that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Martin 

was an on duty police officer killed in the course of performing his duties, thus 

establishing the (F)(10) factor. While the trial court placed great weight on the 1993 

conviction, the trial court placed even greater weight on the (F)(10) factor and the later 

serious offenses committed while Petitioner was in custody because they cast doubt on 

whether Petitioner could be imprisoned without endangering the safety of others and 

indicated that Petitioner had “declare[d] war against a civilized society.” (Doc. 115, App. 

9 at 30.) Thus, even if the evidence established that the 1993 conviction was insufficient 

by itself to establish the (F)(2) factor, given the substantial weight of the remaining 

aggravating factors there is no reasonable probability that the trial court would have 

imposed a life sentence. 

 Finally, this Court previously found, and reiterates here, that the facts underlying 

Petitioner’s claim fall far short of being favorable to the defense. Even if Petitioner did 

not point the gun at the victims, or discharge the weapon, the facts still clearly establish 

that Petitioner assaulted the victims with a weapon in his hand. There is no reasonable 

probability that the evidence related to the 1993 convictions would have affected the 

sentencing outcome had it been presented at trial. Because the trial-level IAC claim has 

no merit it is not a substantial claim under Martinez and PCR counsel was not ineffective 

 

6

 The 1993 conviction is conclusively valid and Petitioner has not demonstrated 

circumstances that would demonstrate he could have overcome the conviction’s validity if he had raised the issue during trial. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 

U.S. 394 (2001) (holding that “once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid”). The exceptions to that rule, for prior convictions “obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the 

Sixth Amendment,” id. at 404, or where equitable tolling or actual innocence would avoid the bar to the consideration of the earlier conviction, id. at 405, do not apply here. 

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for failing to raise it. See Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377. Thus, Petitioner has failed to 

establish cause under Martinez, and Claim 11 remains procedurally barred. 

4. Claim 12 

 In Claim 12 of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition, Petition argues that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to recall the defense psychologist, Dr. Susan Parrish, 

to rebut the sentencing hearing testimony of the prosecution’s psychologist, Dr. Michael 

Bayless. To excuse the default of Claim 12, Petitioner argues PCR counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present this trial IAC claim in state 

proceedings. Because this trial-level IAC claim lacks merit, Petitioner has failed to 

establish a reasonable probability of a different result had PCR counsel raised it in the 

state PCR petition. Therefore, he has failed to establish cause under Martinez to excuse 

the procedural default of Claim 12. 

 a. Facts 

 In the penalty phase of trial, Petitioner sought to establish that his “capacity to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 

of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to 

prosecution.” A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) (“(G)(1)”). Both Petitioner and Respondents 

presented testimony from mental health experts who opined about his mental condition. 

(Doc. 115, Apps. 5, 6.) 

 Psychologist Susan Parrish, Ph.D., specializing in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 

(“PTSD”) and neuropsychology, testified on behalf of Petitioner during his mitigation 

hearing. (Doc. 115, App. 6 at 5–8.) Due to Petitioner’s traumatic upbringing, which 

included chronic violence inside the home by his father battering his mother, Dr. Parrish 

opined that Petitioner suffers from PTSD. (Doc. 115, App. 6. at 16, 30.) Dr. Parrish 

described PTSD as an anxiety disorder, a response to trauma; specifically in Petitioner’s 

case, a response to “a prolonged situation that’s ongoing, such as . . . exposure to an 

environment in which there was physical abuse, an unsafe environment.” (Id. at 17.) She 

testified that Petitioner met the diagnostic criteria of PTSD as set out in the Diagnostic 

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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (“DSM-IV”). (Doc. 115, App. 6 

at 18-24.) Dr. Parrish also diagnosed a personality disorder not otherwise specified (Doc. 

115, App. 7 at 12),7

 and explained that Petitioner exhibited characteristics of antisocial 

personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder. 

(Doc. 115, App. 6 at 30–34.) She also noted that characteristics of those personality 

disorders occur with frequency in people who suffered trauma as children. (Id. at 31–34.) 

 Dr. Parrish explained that, according to the DSM-IV, APD is a pervasive pattern 

of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others after the age of 15, and opined that 

Petitioner displayed characteristics of APD, including impulsivity or failure to plan, 

irritability and aggressiveness, and reckless disregard for safety of self and others. (Doc. 

115, App. 6 at 30–31.) She stated that these characteristics are also not unusual in 

someone suffering from PTSD “who comes from an environment where there was a 

prolonged exposure to violence.” (Id.) Dr. Parrish described Petitioner as “a product of 

his environment and his nature. . . . [G]iven the environment that he had . . . the decision 

that . . . is the most salient is that he’s going to survive.” (Id. at 51.) Dr. Parrish explained 

that survival is the first thing that anyone with PTSD considers. A stressful event 

becomes a “life-and-death situation.” (Id.) She testified that when Officer Martin stopped 

Petitioner on the Beeline Highway, Petitioner “saw that as a survival situation in which it 

was Officer Martin or himself. There was going to be one person who survived that.” (Id.

at 73.) Dr. Parrish believed Petitioner’s response was reactive: “I’m not going back to 

prison. This man intends to put me in prison. It’s me or him.” (Id. at 75). Dr. Parrish 

concluded in her report that “if [Petitioner] shot Officer Martin, he was in a dissociative 

state.” (Doc. 115, App. 7 at 14.) 

 The state’s mental health expert, psychologist Michael Bayless, Ph.D., opined that 

Petitioner does not suffer from a mental disease or defect but does suffer from an 

antisocial personality disorder. (Doc. 115, App. 5 at 5–6, 16.) Dr. Bayless, who 

 

7

 Dr. Parrish’s report submitted with Petitioner’s supplemental Martinez brief is 

missing page 12. The complete report can be found attached to Petitioner’s amended 

habeas corpus petition (Doc. 30) at Ex. E-4. 

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conducted his own clinical evaluation of Petitioner and reviewed the results of the 

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) administered by Dr. Parrish, 

opined that the results very clearly indicated a classic anti-social personality profile. (Id.

at 9–11, 18.) Dr. Bayless described Petitioner as a young man with a “basic absence of 

anxiety and guilt” and a lack of remorse and empathy. (Id. at 16-17.) Dr. Bayless 

disagreed with Dr. Parrish’s diagnosis of PTSD for several reasons, explaining that there 

was an absence of expected PTSD symptoms in the historical and clinical data from Dr. 

MacDonald and others, there was an absence of anxiety regarding Petitioner’s recall of 

the traumatic events from his childhood, and Dr. MacDonald predicted Petitioner was 

moving towards a full-blown anti-social personality disorder. (Id. at 19-21.) Dr. Bayless 

also opined that Petitioner’s actions in calling Eric Moreno, and explaining to him what 

had happened, was the type of behavior you would see in somebody who understood the 

nature and quality of his acts. (Id. at 33.) 

 The sentencing court considered all of the mental health evidence presented and 

concluded that Petitioner did not establish that his capacity to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

significantly impaired at the time of the crime by his personality disorder, the traumatic 

effect of his exposure to domestic violence, and any PTSD-like symptoms he might have. 

(Doc 121, App. G at 13–14.) The sentencing court rejected a diagnosis of post-traumatic 

stress disorder, finding instead that Petitioner suffers from a personality disorder with 

predominantly anti-social features and also with borderline and narcissistic features. (Id. 

at 12.) The court found ample support for this finding within the evidence that showed: 

Petitioner killed Officer Martin because he did not want to return to prison; three days 

before the murder he told Fryer he had a warrant for his arrest and he was on the run; he 

told Fryer he had a gun in case something happened; he took Officer Martin’s service 

weapon after the murder; and other choices he made after the murder, including the 

robbery and shooting in Blythe, as well as decisions he made at the time he was 

apprehended. (Id. at 12–13.) These choices, the sentencing court found, “belie the notion 

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that the homicide of Officer Martin was the result of being in a dissociative state or a 

mere impulsive reaction” (id. at 13), and demonstrate Petitioner’s “ability to reflect, to 

calculate and to make choices.” (Id. at 13, n.1.) The trial court acknowledged that 

Petitioner’s personality disorder and other conditions “undoubtedly affect his conduct and 

behavior,” but, significant to this analysis, that he “has not proved by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his capacity to inform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

significantly impaired.” (Id. at 14) (emphasis in original). 

 In addressing a related claim, the Arizona Supreme Court, disregarding Fryer’s 

testimony, disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that taking Officer Martin’s gun, robbing 

the Mini-Mart and shooting the clerk are consistent with the “it’s me or him” line of 

thought: 

[W]e think Martinez’ actions speak louder than Fryer’s words. Even if we 

were to disregard Fryer’s testimony, Martinez still emptied his .38 caliber 

handgun into Officer Martin. Using his “superior” intellect and after 

recognizing that he had just murdered an Arizona police officer, Martinez 

stole Officer Martin’s .9mm Sig Sauer and drove to Blythe, California 

where he robbed a Mini–Mart and shot the clerk. Although Martinez 

alleges that the clerk “threatened” him with a chair or weapon, this does not 

support Dr. Parrish’s PTSD diagnosis. Martinez could not have reasonably 

felt that it was “me or him.” In fact, any threat Martinez may have feared 

was self-induced. He drove to Blythe and ran out of gas. He then called his 

aunt for money. After she failed to send the needed funds, he called her 

again. Losing his patience, he eventually robbed the Mini–Mart with 

Officer Martin’s service weapon. The record does not suggest that the clerk 

randomly came up to Martinez in the parking lot, noticed the stolen car and 

threatened to call the police. Rather, Martinez’ robbery and subsequent 

murder created any threat he may have felt.9

 FN9: Martinez also created the threat of being caught by Officer 

Martin when he excessively sped down the Beeline Highway. 

Martinez’ actions in Indio also demonstrate his systematic thought 

processes and “superior” intelligence. At the first sight of the Indio police, 

Martinez didn’t simply open fire even though he had two guns in his 

possession. Rather, he tried to flee after leaving the .38 caliber handgun 

with David and Anna. Once Martinez reached Johnny Acuna’s trailer and 

the police surrounded the compound, Martinez did not “come out 

shooting.” He still had Officer Martin’s .9mm Sig Sauer. This conflicts 

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with Dr. Parrish’s diagnosis. This was the ultimate “me or him” situation. 

 The trial court’s finding that Martinez did not suffer from PTSD is 

supported by the evidence. His actions are not consistent with Dr. Parrish’s 

diagnosis. He knew right from wrong. His IQ was well-above average. He 

consciously decided that “he wasn’t going back to jail” and carried the .38 

caliber handgun “[f]or protection and if shit happens.” Tr. Sept. 9, 1997 at 

83, 85. Without more, we believe that Martinez’ personality disorder does 

not qualify as a statutory mitigating circumstance. 

Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 464, 999 P.2d at 808. 

 b. Analysis 

 In Claim 12 of the amended habeas petition (Doc. 30 at 101–104), restated with 

more specificity in Petitioner’s supplemental Martinez brief (Doc. 115 at 66), Petitioner 

asserts that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the erroneous 

testimony of the state’s mental health expert through presentation of his own mental 

health evidence. Petitioner asserts that there is a reasonable probability that, had Dr. 

Parrish observed or been informed of Dr. Bayless’ testimony, and been called to rebut it 

at sentencing, the court would have found the (G)(1) mitigating factor proven, or that 

there was, otherwise, sufficient mitigating evidence to call for leniency. (Doc. 115 at 69.) 

 Petitioner relies on an affidavit from Dr. Parrish (Doc. 30, Ex. E-6), which has 

been resubmitted in support of his supplemental Martinez brief. (Doc. 115, Ex. 11.) Dr. 

Parrish criticizes Dr. Bayless’ work, including his failure to generate a report, failure to 

take into account the warning in the DSM-IV that an APD diagnosis may be misapplied 

when antisocial behavior is part of a protective survival strategy, failure to consider 

Petitioner’s upbringing, extended family or culture in making a diagnosis, failure to 

conduct objective testing to assess the appropriateness of an APD diagnosis, reliance on 

Dr. MacDonald’s report, and reliance on subjectively graded testing instruments when 

objective ones were available. (Id. at ¶ 17-23.) Dr. Parrish also notes that Dr. Bayless was 

inaccurate in reporting an absence of evidence of anxiety when Dr. MacDonald noted that 

Petitioner had substantial and considerable anxiety. (Id. at ¶ 24; see Doc. 115, App. 21 at 

4.) Dr. Parrish states that had she been consulted regarding the merits of Dr. Bayless 

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testimony and opinion, she “could have provided a clear means of challenging/rebutting 

the reliability of his work,” observing that “a much fuller and deeper review of his 

evaluation (e.g. access to all inquiries and responses) may bring to light equal and or 

greater reasons to disregard his opinions.” (Doc. 115, Ex. 11 at ¶ 34.) 

 The Court did not address Dr. Parrish’s affidavit in its earlier order because the 

IAC claim was found to be procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 88 at 45.) Petitioner argued as 

cause for the default that direct appellate counsel should have raised the issue. (Doc. 57 at 

79.) Because Petitioner did not exhaust the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise the issue, the Court found that Petitioner failed to establish cause and 

found the claim procedurally barred. (Doc. 88 at 45–46.) 

 Petitioner now asserts that PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing 

to investigate and present the trial IAC claim and that he was prejudiced by the failure 

because had trial counsel called Dr. Parrish to rebut Dr. Bayless’ testimony, the 

sentencing court would have found the (G)(1) statutory mitigating factor proven or found 

sufficient mitigating evidence to call for leniency. (Doc. 115 at 53, 61.) See Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 524 (“The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence 

‘should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and 

evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor’ ” 

(quoting 1989 ABA Guideline 11.4.1.C; emphasis in original)). As discussed above in 

Claim 11, the Court need not address counsels’ performance because, even if counsel 

performed deficiently, Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697. 

 To establish prejudice for counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence, 

Petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that the [sentencer] would have rejected a 

capital sentence after it weighed the entire body of mitigating evidence . . . against the 

entire body of aggravating evidence.” Wong, 558 U.S. at 20. Petitioner cannot meet this 

burden. There is no reasonable probability that if Petitioner had submitted the evidence 

he now contends should have been offered in rebuttal at sentencing, it would have 

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changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances. Accordingly, the Court finds no reasonable probability that Petitioner 

would have obtained post-conviction relief had PCR counsel raised Claim 11 in the PCR 

petition. Petitioner has failed to establish cause under Martinez, and Claim 11 remains 

procedurally barred. 

 In these proceedings, Petitioner has submitted a declaration expanding on Dr. 

Parrish’s 1998 report and 2006 affidavit, and addressing how her substantial criticisms of 

Dr. Bayless’ methodology and diagnoses would be affected by the promulgation of the 

DSM-V in 2013. (Doc. 115, Ex. 12.) Dr. Parrish states that, had she been asked to rebut 

Dr. Bayless’s testimony, she “would have pointed out that he did not explain how he 

dismissed the notion that, in general, Mr. Martinez’s behavior constituted an adaptation 

to a violent environment.” (Id. ¶ 47.) 

 There is no reasonable probability that such testimony would have had any effect 

on the outcome of sentencing. In the penalty phase, Dr. Parrish explained how Petitioner 

met the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for establishing a PTSD diagnosis, and how he also 

exhibited characteristics of antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality 

disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder—characteristics which are not uncommon 

in people who suffer trauma as a child. Although the trial court rejected a PTSD 

diagnosis, the court accepted that Petitioner exhibited PTSD-like symptoms, and 

concluded that Petitioner’s personality disorder was related to the chaotic and violent 

family life during his formative years, and that his “personality disorder and other 

conditions undoubtedly affect his conduct and behavior.” (Doc. 115 App. 19 at 20; Doc. 

121, App. G at 12.) Nonetheless the court rejected both Dr. Parrish’s conclusion that 

Petitioner was in a dissociative state or acted impulsively at the time he killed Officer 

Martin, and Petitioner’s assertion that his capacity to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of law was significantly impaired. In rejecting the assertion that Petitioner 

had PTSD or that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

significantly impaired by his personality disorder, the court relied heavily on the evidence 

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of actions Petitioner took shortly before and after the murder. (Doc. 115, App. 19 at 18-

20.) The trial court further noted that while Dr. Parrish’s opinions were based on her 

clinical interview with Petitioner, she had not discussed either the murder or events 

occurring shortly thereafter with Petitioner. (Id. at 16). The court found that Petitioner’s 

actions surrounding the murder demonstrated “abundant evidence of [Petitioner’s] ability 

to plan, to think rationally and to make choices even when ‘threatened’ as he would have 

been when he was confronted and subsequently apprehended by law enforcement officers 

after the murder.” (Id. at 18.) 

 In affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting the impaired capacity statutory 

mitigating factor and finding Petitioner’s personality disorder insufficient to warrant 

substantial weight as a non-statutory mitigating factor, the Arizona Supreme Court also 

relied heavily on the evidence of Petitioner’s conduct in shooting Officer Martin to 

“further his goal” of not going back to jail. Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 463–65, 999 P.2d at 

807-09. Petitioner’s actions were simply “not consistent with Dr. Parrish’s diagnosis.” Id.

at 464, 999 P.2d at 808. Thus, even if Petitioner had been able to effectively rebut Dr. 

Bayless’s testimony, and establish that Dr. Parrish’s PTSD diagnosis was correct, this is 

not a critical determination. In light of the aggravating evidence and the evidence 

demonstrating that at the time Petitioner shot Officer Martin he was not acting 

impulsively or reflexively, but rather had the ability to reflect, calculate and make choices 

to further his goals, there is no reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court would have 

imposed a life sentence. Because the trial-level IAC claim has no merit it is not a 

substantial claim under Martinez and PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise 

it. See Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish cause under 

Martinez, and Claim 12 remains procedurally barred. 

5. Claim 16 

 In Claim 16 of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner argues that counsel was 

ineffective at trial and sentencing for failing to properly investigate and prepare for the 

testimony of Eric Moreno and Patricia Baker. (Doc. 30 at 133–38.) Petitioner did not 

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allege, in his amended petition or traverse, that PCR counsel’s failure to raise this claim 

should excuse the procedural default. Petitioner also failed to address Claim 16 in these 

supplemental proceedings. Therefore, he has waived any claim that he can establish cause 

and prejudice, under Martinez, to excuse the procedural default of this claim. See Cook, 

538 F.3d at 1014, n. 5 (citing Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d at 1157). 

6. Claim 17 

 In Claim 17 of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition, he argues that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to take corrective action and to retain an independent 

pathologist to refute the testimony of Dr. Phillip Keen regarding the sequence of shots 

that struck and killed Officer Martin. To excuse the default of Claim 17, Petitioner argues 

PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present the 

trial-level IAC claim. Because this IAC claim lacks merit, Petitioner has failed to 

establish a reasonable probability of a different result had PCR counsel raised it in the 

state PCR petition. Therefore, he has failed to establish cause under Martinez to excuse 

the procedural default of Claim 17. 

 a. Facts 

 Dr. Phillip Keen, the Maricopa County Chief Medical Examiner, testified at trial 

that the autopsy of Officer Martin revealed four gunshot wounds to his right hand, neck, 

back, and head. (Doc. 115, App. 4 at 44, 47–49.) Two of the wounds, to the back and 

head, were fatal injuries. (Id. at 53–54.) Dr. Keen opined, based on his review of another 

medical examiner’s evaluation of the body, the wounds, the scene, and the photographs, 

that the head shot was the last among the four shots, and may have been inflicted while 

Officer Martin was lying on the pavement. (Id. at 56, 59.) Dr. Keen based this opinion on 

evidence of a “pivot mark” found on Officer Martin’s left boot. (Id. at 56–57.) Because 

Dr. Keen determined that the mark on the boot was a result of a deliberate spinning 

move, and since the shot to the head would have caused immediate unconsciousness, he 

opined that the head wound would necessarily have occurred last. (Id.) Dr. Keen also 

testified there was evidence Officer Martin was lying on his left side when he was shot in 

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the head based on the blood stain pattern from the cheek, streaming in both directions. 

(Id. at 59.) 

 Dr. Keen agreed on cross-examination that the opinion he gave in his testimony 

conflicted with the one he gave in a pretrial interview in which he said he could not 

determine the sequence in which Officer Martin was struck with four bullets but the shot 

to the back was the last shot fired. (Id. at 63–65; see also Doc. 115, Ex. 34 at 28.) Dr. 

Keen attributed his change of opinion to his further reflection on the immediate 

consequences of the head injury, i.e., immediate paralysis. (Doc. 115, App. 4 at 64.) 

 During closing argument, the prosecution argued that the number and sequence of 

shots supported a finding of premeditation: 

Four times he pulled this trigger, and four times he struck Bob Martin each 

time in the location designed to murder this police officer. In the neck, in 

the hand area, and then as the police officer spun, as he gets to the back of 

his car and perhaps to safety he shot him in the back. And then when he 

was down -- and we have scuff marks on both of Bob Martin’s knees -- 

when he was down he pulled that trigger again. That’s four, four times he 

shot this man. Premeditation each time he pulls that trigger he’s thinking 

what I am doing to this man in the uniform? I am trying to kill him so I can 

get out of here. Four times. And then after he was dead or shortly before he 

died, he shot at him twice more and missed. Six times. 

. . . 

[W]e know that when he fell on his left side there was no possible way for 

any of those other shots to impacted [sic] his body other than the one in the 

head. 

(Doc. 115, App. 2 at 18–19.) 

 The prosecution addressed the issue of premeditation again in the rebuttal closing: 

 So in this particular case, regardless of the sequence of the shots, 

what ended up happening is that Mr. Martinez took this handgun and took a 

total of 60 pounds for him to empty the gun into Officer Martin. That’s 

exactly what happened in this case. And what’s important about it, too, is if 

you look at it, we don’t have to tell you which one of these holes. And, 

again, they were talking about conjecture and about how you don’t have to 

guess at anything. We don’t have to prove this case for you to perfection. 

We don’t have to tell you which one of these little holes the bullet was in 

that killed him. . . . 

. . . 

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 And what’s important about this to show that this was premeditation 

is that he didn’t stop at the first shot. And we don’t know the sequence as to 

any of the shots other than the one that killed him was the one to the 

forehead, and that’s the last shot. It had to be the last shot based on 

everything we know about this case. So we do know about that. But in 

terms of premeditation, again, he’s got the gun. Could have let him go after 

the first shot, but he didn’t let him do that, did he? He could have let him go 

after the second shot. And, again, that’s where the premeditation, the 

thought process comes in. We are not saying he hit him in the hand first, 

not saying he hit him in the back first or in the throat first. We really don’t 

know. But what we are saying is we do know that the shot to the face, to 

the near the right eye which is what Bob Martin saw, the last thing he saw 

was the muzzle of this gun, the last shot. This last shot was to the face, and 

that means that this defendant thought about it. Thought about it as this 

officer was on the ground. Why? He could have already left. Why did he 

have to go over there and shoot him? And that goes to premeditation. He 

had already wounded him in the arm. He had already wounded him in the 

throat. He had already shot him in the back. Why did he have to shoot the 

coup de grace? Why did he have to go up to him when he was down? Or 

even if he was standing. He didn’t. So the premeditation in this case is right 

here in the gun. 

. . . 

 The other aspect that we have is the actual distance. It wasn’t -- it 

wasn’t like he shot him right there and that was the end of it. Because of the 

scuff marks on the boots, it is clear that the officer moved away. It is clear 

at that point that he was not a danger. It is not that he ever was, but at that 

point it was clear that the encounter was over that he was going to let him 

go by the defendant and, again, we can’t go into his mind, perform a 

lobotomy and look inside, but we know from the surrounding 

circumstances that he then thought, hey, he is going away. He is not dead 

yet. I better stop him. How do I do that? Well, I shoot him and I shoot him, 

and then I have some more bullets. That’s the coup de grace right to the 

face, and that takes care of it. Everybody knows it’s coming down now if 

you shoot somebody in the head they are going to die, especially if they are 

out in the middle of nowhere, and that’s exactly what he did in this case. 

(Doc. 115, App. 3 at 72–74, 77.) 

 b. Analysis 

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an 

independent pathologist, effectively impeach the testimony of the prosecution’s 

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pathologist, and move for relief after the prosecution presented undisclosed expert 

testimony at trial. (Doc. 30 at 138; Doc. 115 at 73–79.) Petitioner asserts that Dr. Keen’s 

testimony allowed the prosecution to argue premeditation from the sequence of shots, 

thus portraying Petitioner’s actions in a more incriminating light. (Doc. 30 at 139-140, 

Doc. 115 at 73.) Petitioner supports this claim with the Affidavit of Dr. Eric Peters, M.D., 

a Pima County medical examiner. (Doc. 115, Ex. 35.) Dr. Peters concluded that Dr. Keen 

had been correct in his pretrial interview that the last shot fired was to Officer Martin’s 

back. (Doc. 115, Ex. 35, ¶ 6(A)–(D).) 

 The Court found Claim 17 procedurally defaulted, and rejected Petitioner’s 

assertion that the default should be excused because the prosecution violated Brady by 

failing to inform defense counsel before trial that Dr. Keen’s opinion regarding the shot 

sequence had changed. (Doc. 88 at 50–51.) The Court found the factual basis for the 

claim should have been evident to PCR counsel, but PCR counsel did not present the 

claim. (Id. at 51.) The Court also considered whether a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

would occur if Claim 17 was not heard on the merits, and concluded that Petitioner’s 

proffer of Dr. Peter’s affidavit fell short of establishing reliable new evidence to support 

his claim of actual innocence: “The best that Dr. Peter’s affidavit does is to make it a 

closer factual question whether the head or the back shot was last.” (Id. at 51–52.) 

 Petitioner now asserts that PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to investigate and present the trial IAC claim and that he was prejudiced by the failure 

because had trial counsel retained an independent pathologist to rebut the guilt phase 

testimony of Dr. Keen, there is a reasonable probability the jury would not have found 

premeditation. (Doc. 115 at 74, 78.) As discussed above in Claims 11 and 12, the Court 

need not address counsel’s performance because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he 

was prejudiced thereby. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

 Respondents assert that there is no reasonable probability that failing to present 

testimony consistent with Dr. Peter’s affidavit would have changed Petitioner’s 

conviction for premediated murder because the prosecutor did not argue that the sequence 

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of shots evidenced premeditation. Although the Court disagrees with Respondents’ 

portrayal of the prosecutor’s argument—the prosecutor did in fact suggest the sequence 

of shots evidenced premeditation—the Court agrees that there is no reasonable 

probability such testimony would have changed the verdict in the face of the 

overwhelming evidence of premeditation. See Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 

(9th Cir. 1995) (no prejudice established by failure to introduce evidence of diminished 

capacity, where other evidence of defendant’s intent to kill and reflect on his actions was 

overwhelming); Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (no prejudice 

demonstrated by counsel’s failure to assert a stronger impulsivity defense “in the face of 

the overwhelming evidence of premeditation”). 

 Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Peter’s affidavit conclusively establishes that the 

back shot was last, and Dr. Keen’s opinion on this fact was wrong, Petitioner cannot 

establish prejudice for failing to present testimony consistent with Dr. Peter’s affidavit 

because considerable evidence of Petitioner’s premeditation was introduced at trial. First, 

as the prosecutor emphasized during closing argument, the number of shots alone 

supported a finding of premeditation each time Petitioner pulled the trigger—a total of 

six shots all together. Other substantial evidence of premeditation includes his statements 

to Fryer which “explained why [Petitioner] acted as he did, and showed [Petitioner’s] 

motive for murdering Officer Martin. He had a warrant out for his arrest and knew that if 

he were caught, he would be sent back to prison,” Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 459, 999 P.2d at 

803, and the fact that Petitioner waited for the Balls to pass by him on the road before 

shooting Officer Martin, id. at 453–54, 999 P.2d at 797-98. Even if Fryer’s testimony 

were excluded, the Court previously found other evidence of premeditation was more 

relevant: “Petitioner was driving a stolen car, had absconded from law enforcement, had 

an outstanding warrant for his arrest, shot Officer Martin four times, and bragged about 

the murder.” (Doc. 88 at 38.) Given this evidence, a reasonable juror could have found 

him guilty of premeditated murder. Because the trial-level IAC claim has no merit it is 

not a substantial claim under Martinez and PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

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raise it. See Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish cause 

under Martinez, and Claim 17 remains procedurally barred. 

CONCLUSION 

 Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s directive on remand, the Court has reconsidered 

five claims in light of Martinez and Petitioner’s Renewed Request for Indication Whether 

District Court Would Consider a Rule 60(b) Motion. Because Petitioner failed to raise 

any argument in this brief regarding Claims 4 and 16, the Court finds these claims remain 

procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability 

of a different result had Claims 11, 12, and 17 been raised in state PCR proceedings, the 

Court finds that he has not demonstrated cause and prejudice under Martinez and those 

claims remain procedurally barred. Because Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion does not 

demonstrate any defect in the integrity of these habeas proceedings but instead seeks to 

raise new substantive claims, it is a second or successive petition, and this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider it absent authorization from the court of appeals pursuant to § 

2244(b)(3). 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability (“COA”) may 

issue only when a petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” This showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been 

resolved in a different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For 

procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the court’s 

procedural ruling was correct. Id.

 For the reason stated in this order, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not 

debate its application of Rule 60(b) to Petitioner’s renewed request for reconsideration, or 

to the Court’s finding that Claims 4, 11, 12, 16 and 17 are procedurally barred. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED Petitioner’s Renewed Request for Indication Whether the 

District Court Would Consider a Rule 60(b) Motion (Doc. 115) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Claims 4, 11, 12, 16, and 17 are DENIED as 

procedurally barred. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Petitioner’s request to expand the record, for 

evidentiary development, and for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED except as to the 

Court’s consideration of the expanded record for the purpose of evaluating cause and 

prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. 

 Dated this 30th day of March, 2016. 

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

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