Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01816/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01816-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEODORE A. PINNOCK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv1816 BTM (JMA)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

vs. MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. #17]

SOLANA BEACH DO IT YOURSELF

DOG WASH, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and to decline supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES

Defendants’ motion.

I. Dismissal of Claims for Injunctive Relief as Moot

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) have been rendered moot. They claim that 4 of the 6 access issues

specifically identified in the complaint relate to a property believed to be owned by the City

of Solana Beach, but definitely not owned by any named Defendant. In addition, they claim

that the remaining 2 access issues (steps at the front door and interior aisle clearance) either

no longer, or never did, exist. Based on these allegedly undisputed facts, they contend that

there is no meaningful injunctive relief that this Court could award to Plaintiffs against these

Defendants, rendering Plaintiffs’ claims moot.

Case 3:06-cv-01816-BTM-JMA Document 22 Filed 07/03/07 Page 1 of 5
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Plaintiffs counter that dismissal of the complaint at this early stage in the litigation

would be entirely unjust and inappropriate. They claim that they are unable to respond to

Defendants’ factual allegations because discovery in this matter was stayed just days after

Defendants answered the complaint. They ask that discovery be permitted before any

dismissal is granted based upon factual allegations not contained within their complaint.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ request for discovery is appropriate and that granting

Defendants’ motion for dismissal would be premature at this time. See Laub v. United States

Dept. of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although a refusal to grant discovery

to establish jurisdiction is not an abuse of discretion when ‘it is clear that further discovery

would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction,’ discovery should

be granted when, as here, the jurisdictional facts are contested or more facts are needed.”)

(citation omitted). It is clear that the relevant facts are not undisputed at this time. As the

Ninth Circuit has explained: “A court may not resolve genuinely disputed facts where ‘the

question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.’

In such a case, the district court assumes the truth of allegations in a complaint . . . unless

controverted by undisputed facts in the record.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177

(9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

In addition, Defendants’ own declarations implicitly indicate that access issues may

exist at the present time, even if Defendants’ fully intend to eliminate them through ongoing

renovations. For example, the declaration provided by Defendants’ architect states that the

property will comply with disabled access requirements, once renovations are complete:

The plans I prepared and the guidance I provided for the renovations at the

subject property were based on my best understanding of disabled access

requirements; I have handled a number of disabled access renovations in

commercial property and believe that the plans and guidance I have

provided, if faithfully implemented, will fully comply with all applicable

disabled access standards. More significantly, because I understand that the

property owners have agreed to have the finished work inspected by a

qualified disabled access inspector and to make all other and further changes

identified by such inspector to be appropriate for disabled access, I believe

each of these measures will collectively operate to cause the Property to

meet or exceed all applicable disabled access standards when the work is

finished.

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(Declaration of Architect Damian Baumhover in Support of Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 5;

emphasis added.) Assurances of future compliance do not render the present controversy

moot.

For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that these issues would more

appropriately be considered on a motion for summary judgment, after some discovery has

been allowed. See Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1178 (“If a district court cannot determine

jurisdiction on the basis of a threshold inquiry analogous to a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may

assume jurisdiction and go on to determine the relevant jurisdictional facts ‘on either a motion

going to the merits or at trial.’”) (citation omitted). Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

is DENIED.

However, the Court finds that discovery in this matter should proceed forthwith, as it

has the potential to eliminate all remaining issues expeditiously. The parties are directed to

meet with Magistrate Judge Adler, at a time specified by his court, for the purpose of

developing a streamlined discovery process that will allow Plaintiffs to quickly determine

whether Defendants’ relevant factual allegations remain in dispute. Plaintiffs’ ADA claims for

injunctive relief may not be totally moot, even if all access issues have been adequately

addressed, because the ADA allows the award of attorney fees for successful prosecution

of a claim. However, the Court cautions that unnecessary delay in resolving this matter will

not be rewarded with increased fees. The aims of the ADA are served once impediments

to disabled access have been eliminated, and continued legal work beyond that point does

not further those aims.

II. Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

In addition, Defendants argue that this Court should decline to assert jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims because, with the ADA claims mooted, they substantially

predominate over the federal claims. Defendants also argue that the other reasons for

declining jurisdiction set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) are applicable, including considerable

uncertainty about the standard for awarding financial damages under California law as a

result of a 2006 decision of a California Court of Appeal. In particular, Defendants argue that

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the proper interpretation of California’s Unruh Act and California Civil Code § 52 is greatly

unsettled in the wake of the decision in Gunther v. Lin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Ct. App. 2006).

Gunther specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lentini v. Calif. Center for the Arts,

370 F.3d 837 (2004), which allowed for the award of damages under the Unruh Act

regardless of whether a Plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination.

The Court has already discussed above how Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are

not found to be moot at this point. Thus, Defendants’ first argument for declining

supplemental jurisdiction, the substantial predominance of state law claims, is inapplicable.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Turning to the other 3 possible reasons identified in § 1367(c)

for declining supplemental jurisdiction, the Court finds each of these unavailing as well.

The Gunther decision does present a situation in which the pendent state law claims

raise a novel or complex issue of state law. However, the Court must still determine whether

the exercise of its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction would comport with the

underlying objective of “‘most sensibly accommodating’ the values of ‘economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States

District Court for the Central District of California, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted). Here, the Court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would best advance

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. At this early stage, the state and federal claims

are so intertwined that it makes little sense to decline supplemental jurisdiction. To do so

would create the danger of courts rushing to judgment, increased litigation costs, and wasted

judicial resources.

In addition, while § 1367(c)(3) references the dismissal of all federal claims as a

reason to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims, this

Court has denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal claims at this juncture. If, at a

future date, the ADA claims are resolved, Defendants may make another motion to dismiss

the state law claims. See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)) (“[I]n the usual case in which

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward

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declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”)

Finally, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that this case presents “exceptional

circumstances” in which “compelling reasons” exist for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(4). For now, this Court’s jurisdiction is properly invoked to remedy alleged violations

of the ADA. Therefore, Defendants’ claim that “this case is no longer about access – just

money,” which is only available for the state law claims, is simply unavailing.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims without prejudice to their ability to

renew this request in the event that the circumstances of this Court’s jurisdiction should

change.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons expressed above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion without

prejudice [Doc. #17].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 3, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01816-BTM-JMA Document 22 Filed 07/03/07 Page 5 of 5