Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_13-cv-01368/USCOURTS-alnd-7_13-cv-01368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

MARILYN RHONE, }

 }

Plaintiff, }

 } CASE NO. 7:13-CV-01368-SLB

v. }

 }

CENLAR AGENCY, INC. , }

 }

Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Marilyn Rhone has moved to remand this case to the Tuscaloosa Circuit

Court because defendant, Cenlar Agency, Inc., failed to timely file its Notice of Removal

and because prior to removal, defendant litigated the case on the merits in state court. (Doc.

4.) Upon review of the record, the argument of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is 1

of the opinion that plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is due to be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was removed from the circuit court of Tuscaloosa County on July 23, 2013 

on the basis of federal diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed her complaint on 2

November 26, 2012 in state court alleging conversion of insurance proceeds. (Doc. 1-1 at 7-

12.) The original complaint contained one count for conversion of $24,122.28 in insurance

funds “which caused more damage and for . . . rent payments in the amount of $1,800

 Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each 1

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

The fact that diversity jurisdiction exists is not contested by the plaintiff. 2

FILED

 2014 Mar-24 AM 10:56

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:13-cv-01368-SLB Document 12 Filed 03/24/14 Page 1 of 7
incurred by the delay in disbursing plaintiffs funds.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11.) Defendant foreclosed

on the subject property and purchased it at auction on February 28, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 67.)

Defendant filed an answer in state circuit court on March 5, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 28-31.) 

On April 16, 2013 defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, (doc 1-1 at 33-

45); oral argument was heard in state court and the motion for summary judgment was denied

on June 4, 2013, (doc 4 at 4). On June 5, 2013, at defendant’s request, plaintiff emailed

defendant a copy of its proposed Second Amended Complaint. (Doc 1-3 at 5.) Plaintiff

requested that defendant state whether defendant would oppose the Motion to Amend. (Doc.

4-1 at 3.) This amended complaint included new claims of unjust enrichment, wrongful

foreclosure, and estoppel, and also requested punitive and mental anguish damages and a

preliminary injunction. (Doc. 1-2 at 53-68.) On June 14, plaintiff emailed defendant a

settlement demand that was based on the proposed Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 4-1

at 3.) On June 25, 2013, defendant notified plaintiff that it would oppose the Motion to

Amend. (Id.) On June 27, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc 1-2 at 51-52.) A hearing was set for July 15, (doc. 4-1 at 3), but on July 11

defendant withdrew its opposition, (doc. 1-2 at 71). 

The circuit court granted plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on July 12. (Doc. 1-2 at 76.) On

July 23, 2013, the defendant filed a Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc 1.) Defendant cited the plaintiff’s Second Amended

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Complaint and the settlement demand based thereon to support its contention that the amount

in controversy requirement was satisfied. (Doc. 1 at 5-7.)

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely and that

defendant waived its right to remove when it argued a summary judgment motion in state

circuit court. Plaintiff also requests attorney fees for opposing the allegedly improper

removal. The court will address these claims in turn.

A. Timely Removal

Plaintiff contends that defendant’s Notice of Removal is time barred under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(3) which states that when a civil action is not removable upon the initial pleading,

“a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through

service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. 

Plaintiff claims that defendant should have been aware of the removable nature of the

case, and therefore the 30 day window should have began to run, on either June 5, 2013,

when the plaintiff emailed defendant a proposed copy of the Second Amended Complaint,

or June 14, 2013, when plaintiff emailed defendant a detailed settlement demand exceeding

$75,000. (Doc. 4-1 at 2-3). Plaintiff argues that either of these documents satisfy the “other

paper” section of § 1446(b)(3).

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The court disagrees. Here the state court did not approve the filing of the Second

Amended Complaint until July 12, 2013. (Doc. 1-2 at 76.) In Holloway v. Morrow the

court held that “the 30-day removal period prescribed by § 1446(b) commences running

as soon as a defendant is able to ascertain intelligently that the action is removable.”

Holloway v. Morrow, 2008 WL 401305 (S.D. Ala 2008). Defendant here could not

ascertain that the case was removable until the state court granted plaintiff’s motion to

file the Second Amended Complaint, which increased the amount in controversy above

the threshold required by § 1332(a). Defendant then filed its Notice of Removal on July

23, well within the 30 day window required under § 1446(b)(3). (Doc. 1.) 

To hold otherwise would create a difficult situation for defendants and would go

against precedent requiring documents supporting removal to “unambiguously establish

federal jurisdiction.” Exum v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 821 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1291

(M.D. Ala., 2011). The receipt by the defendant of a proposed and unfiled amended

complaint and a settlement demand based off that complaint cannot be said to

“unambiguously establish” the amount in controversy required for removal. The proposed

complaint might never be filed or the court could deny leave to amend. However, the

amendment of a complaint in court records is exactly the kind of “unambiguous” event that

removal could be based on. 

The June 14, 2013 settlement demand also did not start the 30 day window for

removal. Until the court granted leave to plaintiff to file her amended complaint, the

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proposed settlement was based on claims not yet in front of the court. There is no reason to

expect defendant to have considered the settlement offer as part of the amount in controversy

until the claims it was based on were actually part of the litigation. The demand letter, based

on claims not yet filed, can be compared to a pre-suit demand letter, which has been held to

not constitute “other paper” for the purposes § 1446(b)(3). See Saberton v. Sears Roebuck

and Co., 392 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Defendant’s pre-suit demand letter

will not be considered as “other paper” for the purpose of satisfying the amount in

controversy requirement.”); Depina v. Iron Mountain Information Mgmt, Inc., 2005 WL

1319231 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (Declining to expand “other paper” to include pre-suit settlement

demand letter). Therefore the settlement demand could not affect defendant’s understanding

of the amount in controversy until the amended complaint was filed on July 12, 2013. 

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely fails because

defendant filed the Notice within 30 days of July 12, 2013, the date when the action first

became removable.

B. Waiver of Right to Remove

Plaintiff also argues that defendant waived its right to remove by arguing a motion for

summary judgment in state court on June 4, 2013. In Franklin v. City of Homewood the court

stated that “[A]lthough waiver of the right is possible, the defendant’s intent (to waive) must

be clear and unequivocal.” Franklin v. City of Homewood, 2007 WL 1804411 (N.D. Ala.

2007)(internal quotations omitted).Clearly,there could be no “clear and unequivocal” waiver

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of the right to remove if that right was not available to defendant. One cannot give awaywhat

one does not have. The right had not arisen at the time of the motion for summary judgment 

because the Second Amended Complaint had not been filed and the amount in controversy

requirement was not satisfied. In other words, the right to remove could not have been

waived because it did not then exist. Defendant’s Notice of Removal on July 23, 2013 was

not rendered improper due to previous waiver of the right to remove.

C. Attorney Fees

Attorney fees are not appropriate in this case. They are only appropriate pursuant to

28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) when the removing party lacked an “objectively reasonable basis” for

removal. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Other courts have

awarded attorney’s fees in remand cases where the defects have been egregious: where the

defendant was up against the forum defendant rule, Wolf v. Kennelly, 574 F.3d 406, 411 (7th

Cir. 2009), or where defendant removed pursuant to federal question jurisdiction because the

plaintiff’s complaint merelymentioned the word “overtime” and “federal,” Devine v. Prison

Health Servs., Inc., 212 Fed. App’x 890, 891 (11th Cir. 2006). In this case, it was objectively

reasonable for defendant to think that the Notice of Removal was timely filed and that its

right to remove had not been waived. Indeed, as set forth above, the court finds that removal

was proper. Therefore, plaintiff’s request for attorney fees will be denied.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Remand and Attorneys fees will

be denied. An Order in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered. 

DONE, this 23rd day of March, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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