Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03973/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03973-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 13-3973 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMM. J.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

*E-Filed 3/25/15*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

JOHN RICHARD MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

R.K. SWIFT, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 13-3973 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this federal civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he claims that his jailors at Pelican Bay State Prison violated his

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by withholding incoming mail they deemed obscene

and sexually explicit. Defendants have filed a combined motion to dismiss and for summary

judgment (Docket No. 11) on several grounds, including that plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit. Defendants have presented evidence in support of

their motion, and provided plaintiff with the required warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff has not shown evidence precluding

summary judgment. Accordingly, defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to all claims against

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No. C 13-3973 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMM. J.

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all defendants.

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are undisputed unless specifically noted otherwise. 

In October 2012, fifteen photographs, a photograph catalog and an order form from “South

Beach Singles” were mailed to plaintiff, and inspected upon receipt by Pelican Bay

Correctional Officer Healy, who deemed the images obscene and sexually explicit. He

confiscated the items, initiated the formal process to determine what would happen to the

items, and sent the appropriate form to Correctional Officer R.K. Swift, who also found the

items obscene and approved Healy’s formal determination. Swift formally informed plaintiff

that the items had been “disapproved” and were being withheld. Plaintiff asked that the

prison hold the items pending an appeal of Swift’s decision. The items were then reviewed

by Harlan, a correctional officer, who later interviewed plaintiff as part of the appeal process. 

Plaintiff alleges, and defendants dispute, that during this interview, Harlan agreed that the

photos were not obscene, but he (Harlan) could not “go against the squad.” Plaintiff further

alleges that Harlan told him to debrief so that he could then receive the photos. 

In the current action, plaintiff alleges claims against Swift, Harlan, and the warden of

Pelican Bay, Greg Lewis. He asserts that they violated his First Amendment right to possess

the material and his due process rights in the formal proceedings to confiscate the material. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those

which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

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No. C 13-3973 RS (PR)

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The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where

the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an

issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial the

moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “factual disputes

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not

the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v.

Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of

identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. 

Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Exhaustion of Claims Against Harlan

Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff did not administratively exhaust his

claims against Harlan before filing suit. Prisoners must properly exhaust their administrative

remedies before filing suit in federal court. “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and is no longer

left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). The PLRA exhaustion requirement requires

“proper exhaustion” of all available administrative remedies. Id. at 93. 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively “any

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the [CDCR] or its staff that the inmate . . .

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can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or

welfare.” 15 CCR § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within

this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review,

submitted on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (2) first formal level appeal, to an institution

appeals coordinator; (3) second formal level appeal, to the institution warden; and (4) third

formal level appeal, to the Director of the CDCR. See id. § 3084.7; Brodheim v. Cry, 584

F.3d 1262, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 2009). An inmate’s obligation to exhaust persists as long as

some remedy is available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need not further

pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). To grieve an

issue against an individual, the grievance must list all staff members involved and their

involvement. See 15 CCR § 3084.2(a)(3). 

Plaintiff did not exhaust his claims against Harlan before filing suit. It is undisputed

that between October 2012 and August 2013, plaintiff filed thirteen inmate grievances on a

variety of matters. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”), Townsend Decl. ¶ 17.) Of these,

only four reached the final level of review. (Id., Zamora Decl. ¶ 9.) Only one of these four

grievances was about the interception and disapproval of the photographs. (Id., Townsend

Decl. ¶¶ 16–17, Exs. A–C.) This grievance does not mention Harlan, or describe with any

specificity his actions or words. Rather, the grievance related to an unnamed gang

investigator’s disapproval of photographs plaintiff ordered from a catalogue. (Id., Ex. B.) 

Because it fails to mention Harlan, or provide a specific description of his actions or words,

this grievance cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See 15 CCR § 3084.2(a)(3). 

According to Supreme Court authority, in order to exhaust administrative remedies properly,

inmates must comply with the applicable procedural rules — here, the naming of the specific

individuals whose actions gave rise to the grievance — because administrative exhaustion is

governed by the prison grievance process itself, not by the PLRA. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 218 (2007); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88. 

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Plaintiff does not discuss or even mention exhaustion in his opposition to the motion

for summary judgment, except to say that he “does not oppose Defendant Harlan being

dismissed from this action.” (Opp. at 7.) In his complaint, he says without elaboration that

he exhausted his administrative remedies. (Compl. at 4.) This undetailed assertion is not

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. On this record, he has offered no

evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies before bringing this civil rights

action, and he offers no reason that the exhaustion requirement should be excused. He has

not, then, shown evidence that precludes summary judgment. Accordingly, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Harlan as to all claims. 

III. First Amendment Claim

In his complaint and in his opposition, plaintiff claims that he does not challenge the

constitutionality of the regulation under which defendants seized the materials. (Compl. 

¶ 21; Opp. to MSJ at 3.) Rather, he contends that the materials do not qualify as sexually

explicit or obscene under the regulations. (Id.) He asserts that the photographs, order form,

and photograph catalog “do not show frontal nudity, including the exposed female breast

and/or genitalia of either gender.” (Opp. at 3.) Nor do these materials show “actual

penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact between the mouth and the genitals in a patently

offensive way.” (Id. at 5.) 

Defendants assert that the photographs qualify as sexually explicit and obscene

because they “display representations of explicit sexual acts and positions, including

simulations of sexual penetration.” (Reply at 6.) The order form and brochure are prohibited

because “they alert inmates as to where they can obtain obscene and sexually explicit

materials.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3006(c)(15).

California inmates are barred from possessing material that is obscene and sexually

explicit. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 3006. Obscene materials are those which to the average

person applying contemporary statewide standards appeals to the prurient interest. Id. 

§ 3135(d). It is also material “which taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct,

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and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. §§ 3135(d), 3006(c)(15),

3006(c)(15)(A), 3006(c)(17). This standard applies to sexually explicit material that shows

frontal nudity including personal photographs, drawings, and magazines and pictorials that

show frontal nudity or portrays, displays, describes, or represents penetration of the vagina or

anus, or contact between the mouth and genitals. Id. §§ 3135(d)(1)–(2), 3006(c)(17). 

Summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants. The Court has reviewed

the materials, which were submitted under seal, and concludes that the photographs do show

representations of penetration of the vagina and anus, and other simulated sexual positions

and acts, and therefore are prohibited by the prison regulations. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§§ 3135(d)(1)–(2), 3006(c)(17). Representation of such acts is sufficient. Therefore,

plaintiff’s contention that they do not show frontal nudity or actual penetration is unavailing. 

Because the photographs are obscene and sexually explicit, the order form and catalogue,

which alert inmates where they can obtain more such materials, are also prohibited by prison

regulations. Id. § 3006(c)(15). 

Plaintiff claims that he is not challenging the constitutionality of the regulations,

which he would be foreclosed from doing under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 

Although prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail, prison officials

may adopt regulations or practices that impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights if the

regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. Turner sets

forth four factors to be balanced in determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether there is a “‘valid, rational connection’

between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify

it”; (2) whether there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison

inmates”; (3) whether “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right” will “impact . . .

guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4)

whether there is an “absence of ready alternatives” versus the “existence of obvious, easy

alternatives.” Id. at 89–90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). A

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plaintiff challenging the law or regulation bears the burden of proving the prison policy is

invalid. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Also, federal courts must accord

substantial deference to prison administrators because they “bear a significant responsibility

for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most

appropriate means to accomplish them.” Id.

The regulations satisfy the first Turner factor. Prohibiting inmates from possessing

and receiving obscene and sexually explicit materials furthers the prison’s interest in

protecting staff from sexual harassment and assaults, which can be encouraged by such

materials. Prison security and reducing sexual harassment are legitimate governmental

interests. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188

F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The regulations also satisfy the second Turner factor because they allow prisoners an

avenue to exercise their First Amendment right. The regulations allow educational, medical,

scientific, or artistic materials containing sexually explicit material acquired by prison

officials for use in libraries and other educational centers. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3006(c)

(17)(B)(1). Also, the regulations permit inmates to purchase such material (such as National

Geographics or medical or art books), though possession of such materials must be approved

by prison officials on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 3006(c)(17)(B)(2). Because inmates have

an alternative means available, regulations banning frontal nudity, for example, have been

found constitutional. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061. 

The regulations also satisfy the third Turner factor by taking into account the effect on

guards and inmates of accommodating the right. Allowing unlimited access would come at

the cost of less liberty and safety of others because it would encourage sexual harassment of

employees, and the bartering of such materials among inmates. Id. at 1062. 

Regarding the fourth Turner factor, plaintiff bears the burden to show that the prison’s

response is exaggerated and that there are “obvious, easy alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at

90. Plaintiff offers no such alternatives because he does not challenge the constitutionality of

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1

 It is doubtful, however, that plaintiff had a possessory right in the materials that would

require that he receive due process after confiscation. (MSJ at 14.) Even if he had such a right,

due process was satisfied, as noted above. 

No. C 13-3973 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMM. J.

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the regulations. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the First

Amendment claims is GRANTED.

IV. Due Process Claim

Summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants as to plaintiff’s due process

claim. Plaintiff admits that he received notice of the confiscation of the materials, was given

an opportunity to be heard on the matter, and was given an interview following the filing of

an inmate grievance about the withheld materials. (Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, 13–14.) Because he

was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, plaintiff’s due process rights were not

violated.1

 Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynnwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 984 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 11) is GRANTED. The

Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of R.K. Swift, J. Harlan, and Greg Lewis as to all claims,

terminate Docket No. 11, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 25, 2015 

 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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