Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00320/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Federico Aros, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et. al., 

Respondents.

No. cv-09-320-TUC-JGZ (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (“Habeas Petition”). (Doc. 7). Petitioner 

challenges his state court conviction, asserting multiple constitutional violations under 

three broad claims. Respondents answered the Habeas Petition. (Doc. 14). Petitioner did 

not file a reply. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Pyle for a Report and Recommendation. LR Civ 72.1. After considering 

the briefing, exhibits and relevant law, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Habeas 

Petition be denied. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Petitioner’s Criminal Trial 

 A jury found Petitioner guilty of six separate counts for an incident in which 

Petitioner sexually assaulted his sister-in-law and then fled from law enforcement the 

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following day. Petitioner was convicted of one count kidnapping and four counts sexual 

assault for entering his sister-in-law’s house and forcing her to perform various sexual 

acts. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, pp. 3-4; Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 25-30).1

 Petitioner was convicted 

of one count felony fleeing from law enforcement for leading police in a high-speed car 

chase the day after he attacked his sister-in-law. (Id.). 

 Twice during trial, the victim gave “impact testimony” that the trial judge had 

previously excluded. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. B, p. 21; Doc. 14-3, Ex. J, pp. 49, 72). On the stand 

the victim testified that Petitioner was “the biggest loser she’d ever met” and she knew he 

was capable of hurting her; later she testified that she had seen a counselor after the 

sexual assault. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, p. 4). The trial judge sustained all of defense counsel’s 

objections to this testimony, advised the jury to disregard it, and before jury deliberation, 

provided a limiting instruction to the jury. (Doc. 14-3, Ex. J, pp. 49-51, 73). Based on 

these prejudicial statements made by the victim, the defense attorney twice moved for a 

mistrial. (Doc. 14-3, Ex. J, pp. 49-51; Doc. 14-4, Ex. J, p. 11). The trial court denied the 

motions, noting that the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony if an objection was 

sustained and that the judge would give a limiting instruction to disregard any 

information regarding Petitioner’s prior history. (Doc. 14-3, Ex. J, pp. 49-51; Doc. 14-4, 

Ex. J, p. 13). 

 Later in trial, a police detective testifying for the prosecution, testified that 

Petitioner was unwilling to provide a sample of DNA during the investigation. (Doc. 14-

5, Ex. J, p. 19). The defense attorney objected to the detective’s testimony, arguing 

Petitioner had no obligation to give a DNA sample, and the Government’s presentation of 

this testimony to the jury was unduly prejudicial. (Id. at 19-20). During the bench 

conference, defense attorney again asked for a mistrial. (Id. at 21). The court denied the 

motion for a mistrial and stated the jury would be instructed Petitioner had no obligation 

to provide a DNA sample, and the jury should not infer anything from Petitioner’s 

 

1

 The Magistrate Judge cites to the pagination of the Court’s CM/ECF case 

management system. 

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refusal. (Id. at 21). 

 At the conclusion of the testimony, the defense attorney moved for acquittal as to 

count two, digital penetration, and count five, fellatio. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 57-59). 

Defense counsel argued there was insufficient evidence of digital penetration and there 

was insufficient evidence that the oral-penile contact was not a consensual sex. (Id. at 58-

61). Defense counsel argued the victim agreed on cross-examination that she suggested 

oral-penile contact. (Id. at 58-59). In fact, defense counsel was confused on the 

testimony; the victim testified that she may have suggested oral-vaginal contact but only 

because the non-consensual penile-vaginal sex was making her sore and she wanted it to 

stop. (Doc. 14-3, Ex. J, p. 82). The court denied both motions, finding sufficient evidence 

of the acts to go to the jury. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 60-61). 

 On July 18, 2005, the jury found Petitioner guilty of all six counts. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. 

E, pp. 25-30). On August 15, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner. During 

sentencing, the trial judge informed counsel and Petitioner that he interpreted Arizona’s 

criminal statute on sexual assault as requiring him to sentence Petitioner to consecutive 

terms for the four sexual assault convictions. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. B, pp. 23-24). The trial 

court found Petitioner had two prior felony convictions, and sentenced Petitioner to 

slightly mitigated fourteen-year terms for the four sexual assault charges to be served 

consecutively to one another, and prison terms of fourteen years for kidnapping and three 

years for fleeing from law enforcement, to be served concurrently; Petitioner was 

sentenced to 56 years in total. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, p. 3). 

B. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals on January 13, 

2006. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. B, p.13). In his appeal, Petitioner alleged the trial court erred in 

denying Petitioner’s motions for mistrial based upon the introduction of prejudicial other 

acts testimony by the victim and prejudicial testimony by the detective who testified that 

Petitioner refused to provide a DNA sample. (Id. at 24). In arguing the trial judge should 

have granted the motions for mistrial, Petitioner focused on Arizona evidentiary law, 

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specifically Rules 403 and 404 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Id. at 24-26). 

Petitioner also alleged the trial court erred in interpreting Arizona law to require 

consecutive sentences on Petitioner’s four sexual assault convictions, and Petitioner’s 

sentences, imposed to run consecutively, violated Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Petitioner argued that if the Arizona 

statute, A.R.S. § 13-1406, was construed as the trial court found, to require consecutive 

sentences, then the statute “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 2, § 15 of the Arizona 

Constitution.” (Id. at 28-29, 31-32). 

 On June 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict and sentences. (Doc. 

14-1, Ex. A, p.1). The Court of Appeals applied Arizona evidentiary law to determine the 

trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial. (Id. at 5-6). The Court of Appeals 

noted the trial court sustained each of Petitioner’s objections to the victim’s impact 

statements and the detective’s testimony about Petitioner’s refusal to provide a DNA 

sample and the trial court also provided limiting instructions to the jury. (Id. at 4-5). The 

appellate court further held that each of the inadmissible statements did not have any 

significant prejudicial effect on the jury because the state introduced, without objection, 

ample other evidence of Petitioner’s other acts, as well as Petitioner’s undisputed 

attempts to elude law enforcement. (Id. at 6). 

 The Court of Appeals also found A.R.S. § 13-1406 was not ambiguous and the 

trial court did not err in determining the statute required the sentences for Petitioner’s 

sexual assault convictions to run consecutively. (Id. at 8-9). The appellate court further 

held the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences for sexual assaults arising from a 

series of acts committed during a single incident did not violate prohibitions against cruel 

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

(Id. at 10). The Court resolved the issue, finding the “Eighth Amendment analysis 

focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative 

sentence.” (Id. at 11) (quoting United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2nd Cir.1988)). 

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The Court noted Petitioner did not argue that a fourteen-year term is grossly 

disproportionate to the crime of sexual assault and consecutive sentences cannot be a 

basis of a disproportionality argument. (Id. at 11). The Court found Petitioner’s sentence 

was not “grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed.” (Id. at 10). Thus, the 

verdict and sentences were affirmed. (Id. at 12). 

 Petitioner filed a timely petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on April 12, 2007. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. C, p. 35). 

C. Petitioner’s Collateral Appeal 

 On September 24, 2007, Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief (“PCR Appeal”) with the trial court. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, p.1). In his PCR Appeal, 

Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 10-18). Petitioner 

argued his trial counsel was ineffective for three reasons. 

 First, he alleged that in seeking acquittal for two of the sexual assault counts, 

defense counsel inaccurately recalled the evidence and confused which of the sexual acts 

may have been consented to by the victim. (Id. at 10-11). The victim testified that she 

may have suggested oral-vaginal contact. (Id.). Trial counsel mistakenly argued the 

victim testified that she suggested oral-penile contact. (Id.). In his PCR Appeal, Petitioner 

argued if his attorney had not confused the testimony, he could have won acquittal on the 

sexual assault charge for oral-vaginal contact since it was the victim who suggested it. 

(Id.). Petitioner further argued he could have also succeeded on acquittal for the charge of 

digital penetration as he would not have done that act if the victim had not suggested 

oral-vaginal contact. (Id.). 

 Second, Petitioner alleged trial counsel erred in failing to re-urge the motion to 

sever the unlawful flight from law enforcement charge at the conclusion of the state’s 

case. (Id. at 12). Petitioner argued the motion should have been re-urged because the 

charge was unrelated to the accusation of sexual assault and highly prejudicial. (Id. at 12-

13). In his third and final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner alleged his 

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trial counsel erred in failing to request a curative jury instruction as to lack of connection 

between the unlawful flight charge and the other charges against Petitioner. (Id. at 13-14). 

 On February 7, 2008, the trial court denied the PCR Appeal. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. F, p. 

66). Applying Strickland, the trial court found Petitioner did not suffer prejudice on any 

of the three alleged trial counsel errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); 

(Id. at 67). The trial court noted defense counsel did confuse which act of oral sex the 

victim testified suggesting to Petitioner. (Id. at 68). The court, however, found it would 

have denied Petitioner’s motion for acquittal based on a consent theory for any of the 

sexual assault charges. (Id.). The trial court found the victim testified that she suggested 

oral sex in an effort to stop the non-consensual penile-vaginal sex that was making her 

sore and that the victim made it clear that she did not voluntarily agree to any sexual 

activity with Petitioner and that she feared for her safety. (Id. at 68). The trial court, 

therefore found, Petitioner suffered no prejudice from defense counsel’s confusion about 

the victim’s testimony. (Id. at 69). 

 As to the second claim, failure to re-urge a motion to sever the felony flight 

charge, the court found defense counsel did not err and Petitioner was not prejudiced by 

defense counsel’s decision not re-urge the motion, as there is no requirement to re-urge a 

motion previously preserved and Petitioner’s flight from law enforcement the day after 

the sexual assault was probative and thus, joinder was not prejudicial. (Id. at 69). 

 Analyzing the third claim, the court found trial counsel did not err in failing to 

seek a curative instruction and Petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure 

to seek a curative instruction on the allegation that Petitioner fled from law enforcement 

because the allegation was relevant to the sexual assault charges, and therefore curative, 

limiting instructions would not have been given. (Id. at 70). Having found Petitioner 

received “highly competent representation from an experienced trial attorney” the trial 

court denied the PCR Appeal. (Id. at 70). 

 On May 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for review of his PCR Appeal with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. G, p. 71). In his petition for review, Petitioner 

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argued that the trial court erred in failing to find trial counsel ineffective for: (1) trial 

counsel’s error in confusing the victim’s testimony about the type of oral sex she 

suggested; and (2) trial counsel’s failure to request a curative instruction as to the 

connection between the unlawful flight charge and the other charges, causing prejudicial 

impact to Petitioner. (Id. at 74, 78, 82). 

 On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

(Doc. 14-2, Ex. H, p. 93). The Court of Appeals cited the trial court’s reasons for denying 

relief, and noted that Petitioner merely repeated the allegations of his PCR Appeal, 

“without explaining why or how the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.” 

(Id. at 97). Petitioner then filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 7, 2009. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. I, p. 98) 

D. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Corpus Petition 

 Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 on June 5, 2009. (Doc. 1). 2 On August 27, 2009, that Habeas Petition was 

dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend within thirty days. Petitioner then 

timely filed an Amended Habeas Petition on September 28, 2009. (Doc. 7).3

 In his 

Amended Habeas Petition, Petitioner asserts multiple constitutional violations under three 

broad claims. 

 The claims include: (1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Petitioner’s motions for mistrial based on 

prejudicial testimony elicited from the victim and a detective; (2) the trial court 

misinterpreted state sentencing law and violated Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth 

 

2

 Respondents state the Habeas Petition appears to be timely. (Doc. 14, p. 3). Because the Habeas Petition appears to be timely and the Court is not required to raise the statute of limitations sua sponte, the Magistrate Judge will not further address the 

timeliness of the Habeas Petition. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). 

3

 An amended habeas petition relates back to the date of filing of the original petition. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). The relevant date for determining whether the petitioner timely filed a petition is the original petition filing date. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 

656-664 (2005) (“So long as the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied 

to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.”). 

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Amendment rights by running his sentences consecutively, not dismissing two counts of 

sexual assault based on the victim’s alleged consent, and not informing Petitioner of his 

rights when Petitioner told the court he wanted to plead guilty to the felony flight charge; 

and (3) Petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for a number of reasons including failing to 

make certain objections at trial, failing to ask for jury instruction on unlawful flight 

charge, failing to advise Petitioner of rights given up in pleading guilty, confusing the 

victim’s testimony about suggesting an act of oral sex when arguing for a Rule 20 

acquittal, failing to request a jury instruction on the flight charge, and generally failing to 

adequately prepare for trial. (Id. at 6-13). 

 Respondents contest the Habeas Petition, arguing Grounds I, II, and all claims in 

Ground III, except one, are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 14, pp. 7-9). Respondents argue 

the one ineffective assistance of trial counsel sub-claim not procedurally defaulted, trial 

counsel’s inaccurate recall of the victim’s testimony in the Rule 20 acquittal argument, 

fails on the merits. (Id. at 14-17). Alternatively, Respondents argue Petitioner’s sub-claim 

in Ground I that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after the detective’s prejudicial 

testimony about Petitioner’s refusal to provide a DNA sample and Petitioner’s sub-claim 

in Ground II that his consecutive sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment also 

fail on the merits. (Id. at 8 n. 2, and 13-14). 

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, dismiss as procedurally defaulted all claims in Grounds I, II, and III except for 

three sub-claims. The three remaining sub-claims should be denied on the merits and they 

include: (1) the sub-claim in Ground II that Petitioner’s consecutive sentences violate the 

Eighth Amendment; (2) Petitioner’s sub-claim in Ground III that his trial counsel was 

ineffective when confusing the victim’s testimony while arguing for a Rule 20 acquittal; 

and (3) Petitioner sub-claim in Ground III that his trial counsel failed to ask for a jury 

instruction on the unlawful flight charge. 

II. ANALYSIS 

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A. Exhaustion

 A state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies before a federal 

district court can grant a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Duckworth v. 

Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). To exhaust, a claim must be fairly presented in the proper 

forum. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals by properly pursuing those claims through the state’s direct appeal process or 

through appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th 

Cir.1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.1994). This requirement of 

exhaustion is designed to give the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 

(1971). 

 A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner describes both the operative facts and 

the federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th 

Cir.2007). The petitioner must have “characterized the claims he raised in state 

proceedings specifically as federal claims.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th 

Cir.2000) (emphasis in original), as modified, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001). “If a 

petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional 

claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in 

state court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir.1996). “Moreover, general 

appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the 

right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 

1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-163 (1996)). 

Ground I – Trial Court’s Denial of Motions for Mistrial 

 In Ground I, Petitioner argues his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated when the trial judge denied motions for mistrial based on prejudicial 

testimony elicited from the victim and a detective in the case. Petitioner alleges the trial 

judge erred in denying the motions for mistrial when (1) the victim testified about 

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Petitioner’s character and (2) a detective testified that Petitioner refused to submit a DNA 

sample. Neither of these sub-claims is cognizable on federal habeas review because 

Petitioner did not present these claims to the state courts as federal claims. In his direct 

appeal, Petitioner raised these issues under state evidentiary law. (Doc. 14-1, pp. 24-28). 

 Citing Rules 404 and 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, Petitioner argued the 

testimony from the victim and the detective unfairly prejudiced the jury against him. 

Petitioner did not cite any federal cases nor did he alert the state courts to any federal 

constitutional issue. Petitioner’s single broad reference to “his right to a fundamentally 

fair trial” in each claim was insufficient to alert the state courts that he was asserting a 

claim under the United States Constitution. Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 (“general appeals 

to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a 

fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion”) (internal citation omitted). In analyzing 

the claims, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on state law governing mistrials and the 

prejudicial effect of improper testimony. (Doc. 14-1, pp. 5-8). Petitioner failed to exhaust 

these claims as federal claims at the state court level. 

 This Court’s conclusion is unchanged by Petitioner’s citation in his direct appeal 

to State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz.1993). (Doc. 14-1 at 25). Bible does 

discuss a number of issues related to a right to fair trial. In his brief, Petitioner argued the 

prejudicial testimony from the victim is the “sort of evidence [that] is generally 

inadmissible, State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, cert. denied 511 U.S. 1046 

(1993), and, in this case, deprived [Petitioner] of his right to a fundamentally fair trial.” 

(Doc. 14-1 at 25). A petitioner’s citation to a state case that analyzes a federal 

constitutional issue can be sufficient to exhaust the claim. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 

1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). A citation to a state case discussing federal 

constitutional issues does not unconditionally exhaust the federal claim. Ultimately, the 

federal court must determine whether the petitioner fairly presented the federal 

constitutional claim to the state courts such that the state courts had a fair opportunity to 

act on the claim. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). 

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 The Court finds Petitioner’s general citation to Bible is insufficient to fairly 

present a federal claim about his right to a fair trial. Petitioner did not expound on any 

potential fair trial issues raised in Bible. In fact, Petitioner did not pin cite to any specific 

legal discussion in Bible, a case that is approximately 100 pages long and addresses at 

least seven separate right to fair trial issues. Bible, 858 P.2d at 1166, 1169-1170, 1201-

1204 (Considering whether defendant’s right to fair trial was violated, the Arizona 

Supreme Court analyzed whether the trial court erred in refusing to change the venue, 

whether the defendant was prejudiced by the extensive media coverage in a smaller 

Arizona county, whether the atmosphere at trial coupled with the pretrial publicity 

prevented a fair trial, whether voir dire procedures were fundamental error, whether the 

trial judge’s statements during trial caused prejudice, whether there was fundamental 

error when certain clothing was admitted as evidence and whether there was prosecutorial 

misconduct for a variety of reasons.). In citing Bible, Petitioner did not discuss any of 

these specific right to fair trial issues. Petitioner’s claim focused, instead, on whether the 

trial court’s evidentiary ruling, based on state law, was error. Petitioner failed to alert the 

Arizona Court of Appeals to a specific claim that his right to a fair trial was denied. 

 Likewise, Petitioner failed to federalize his claim about the detective’s testimony. 

In his direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial judge’s denial of his motion for 

mistrial was error after the detective testified that Petitioner refused to submit a DNA 

sample. Analyzing it as a state evidentiary issue, the Arizona Court of Appeals agreed 

that the detective should not have testified about Petitioner’s refusal but found the error 

was harmless. Federal constitutional law was not implicated. 

 Petitioner’s citation to State v. Wilson, 914 P.2d 1346 (Ariz.App.Div.1,1995) does 

not change this Court’s conclusion. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. B, p. 27). Wilson was cited for the 

contention that Petitioner’s invocation of his right to refuse a search should not have been 

used against him in trial. In Wilson, the Arizona Court of Appeals held a defendant’s 

exercise of his Fourth Amendment right to refuse a search cannot be evidence, by itself, 

that a defendant was uncooperative. 914 P.2d at 1351. In its discussion, the Wilson court 

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cited a Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th 

Cir.1978), which held that it is generally inadmissible to use a defendant’s invocation of 

his Fourth Amendment rights as evidence of criminal wrongdoing. In Prescott, the Ninth 

Circuit analyzed the evidentiary value of a defendant’s invocation of her constitutional 

rights. The Court did not analyze a constitutional question. At issue was an evidentiary 

law question. Citing Wilson was insufficient to federalize this claim because any state 

case used to federalize a claim must explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional 

claim. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). Furthermore, 

Wilson did not refer to any “clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Petitioner failed to fairly 

present either of his sub-claims in Ground I as federal constitutional claims in his state 

court appeal. These claims are not exhausted. 

Ground II – Multiple Alleged Errors by the Trial Court 

 In Ground II, Petitioner alleges multiple errors made by the trial court. Except for 

one properly exhausted federal claim, all of the alleged trial court errors in Ground II are 

either state law claims not cognizable in federal habeas review or they are federal claims 

that were not fairly presented in state court. (Doc. 7, pp. 8-10). In his state appeal, the 

only federal claim of trial court error raised by Petitioner was an Eighth Amendment 

violation for the trial court’s decision to sentence Petitioner to consecutive terms for the 

sexual assault convictions. (Doc. 14-1, pp. 28, 31-32). 

 Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Arizona 

sentencing law is a state claim not cognizable on federal habeas review. Lewis v. Jeffers, 

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state 

law.”). Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not dismissing the two sexual assault 

counts of oral-vaginal contact and digital penetration because the victim consented to 

these acts is a claim that is both not clearly a federal constitutional issue and also not 

raised on direct appeal; this claim is not cognizable and not exhausted. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 

780; Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. Also not exhausted is 

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Petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims that the trial court failed to inform 

Petitioner of his rights in a plea colloquy.4

 

 Petitioner’s claim that imposing mandatory consecutive sentences for the sexual 

assaults convictions arising from a series of acts committed during a single incident 

violates the Eighth Amendment is exhausted and will be addressed on the merits. All 

other claims in Ground II are either not cognizable or not exhausted. 

Ground III – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Ground III of his Habeas Petition, Petitioner alleges a number of trial counsel 

errors in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. In his state court 

PCR Appeal, Petitioner only exhausted two of these sub-claims. Appealing to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) 

inaccurately recalling the testimony of the victim resulting in Petitioner failing to win 

acquittal on the sexual assault charges for oral-vaginal contact and digital penetration and 

(2) failing to request a curative jury instruction on the unlawful flight charge. (Doc. 14-2, 

Ex. G, pp. 71). Petitioner’s list of other alleged trial counsel errors in his Habeas Petition 

including but not limited to trial counsel failing to make certain objections at trial, failing 

to advise Petitioner of rights given up in pleading guilty, and generally failing to 

adequately prepare for trial are all unexhausted claims. Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to re-urge the motion to sever the unlawful flight from 

law enforcement charge was a claim raised to the trial court but not raised to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. F, p. 66, Doc. 14-2, Ex. G., p. 71). In Arizona, 

Petitioner was required to present this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Because he 

failed to present this claim to the appellate court in his petition for review, it is not 

exhausted. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

B. Procedural Default of Unexhausted Claims 

 

4

 The Magistrate Judge notes Petitioner did not take a plea on any of the counts. At one point Petitioner did consider a plea on the felony flee charge but he did not take a 

plea or have a plea colloquy before trial. Petitioner was found guilty of this charge by the jury. (Doc. 14-2, p. 25). 

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 The purpose of requiring petitioners to make their federal claims known to the 

state courts is to give the state courts the first opportunity to correct the alleged errors. 

Because the Court concludes that all of Ground I, all of Ground II, except Petitioner’s 

Eighth Amendment consecutive sentencing claim, and all of Ground III, except the two 

sub-claims identified above, are unexhausted, the Court must now determine if Petitioner 

can go back to state court to exhaust those claims. 

 Under Arizona law, Petitioner cannot exhaust his claims. Direct appeal is no 

longer available for Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. See 16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., 

Rule 31.3. A subsequent PCR petition is also unavailable. Petitioner's claims would be 

barred by Rule 32.4(a), which requires a petition for post-conviction relief to be filed 

within 90 days after entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days after issuance of 

the order and mandate in the direct appeal. 16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 32.4(a). 

Petitioner would also be barred from filing other PCR claims by Rule 32.2(a), under 

which a defendant is precluded from relief based upon any ground that has been waived 

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. 16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., 

Rule 32.2(a). None of the limited exceptions permitting subsequent PCR claims apply to 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 32.2(a). Petitioner 

failed to exhaust these claims and under Arizona procedural rules, he is now procedurally 

barred from doing so. “[W]here a petitioner did not properly exhaust state remedies and 

‘the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred,’ the 

petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th 

Cir.2007) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 fn. 1 (1991)). 

 When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims, federal habeas review 

occurs only in limited circumstances. “A prisoner may obtain federal review of a 

defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal 

law.” Martinez v. Ryan, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012), referencing Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 750. “Cause” requires a showing of “some objective factor” which impeded 

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compliance with a procedural rule, such as “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a 

claim was not reasonably available to counsel” or that there was “some interference by 

officials.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 

Prejudice requires “showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

170 (1982) (emphasis in original). 

 In its Response to the Habeas Petition, the State argued Petitioner failed to offer 

any cause or prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse his procedural 

default. In his Habeas Petition, Petitioner did not address cause for the default or 

prejudice from a violation of federal law. After the State filed its Response pointing out 

this deficiency, Petitioner did not file a reply. When a petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted and the petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice, “the district court 

dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court.” 

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). The 

Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after independent review, dismiss with 

prejudice all the unexhausted claims. 

C. Merits 

 This Court’s analysis of the merits of Petitioner's remaining claims is constrained 

by the applicable standard of review. A state prisoner “whose claim was adjudicated on 

the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the 

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003).5

 In 

short, AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997), and “demands that state court decisions 

be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per 

 

5

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Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) effective date of April 24, 1996, its provisions apply. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 205-207 (2003). 

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curiam). Under AEDPA, this Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court 

decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or 

was (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

 Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may not issue a writ, unless the state 

court decision was either: (1) “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable 

application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II) (emphasis in 

original). A state court decision will be contrary to clearly established federal law if the 

state court applied the wrong legal rule or applies the correct precedent but on facts 

indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, reaches a different result. Id. at 405-406, 

412. A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law when that decision “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it 

unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-408, 412. 

 Under § 2254(d)(2), the federal court reviews purely factual questions that were 

resolved by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir.2004). “[T]he 

question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of 

appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” 

Id. Subsection (d)(2) “applies most readily to situations where petitioner challenges the 

state court's findings based entirely on the state record. Such a challenge may be based on 

the claim that the finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence, ... that the process 

employed by the state court is defective ... or that no finding was made by the state court 

at all.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 

 “When applying [AEDPA] standards, the federal court reviews the ‘last reasoned 

decision’ by a state court ....” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004) 

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(internal citations omitted). The Court will consider Petitioner's claims in view of the 

above standards. As Petitioner does not allege the state courts erred in ruling on any 

factual questions, the Court will confine its analysis to § 2254(d)(1). 

Mandatory Consecutive Sentences for the Sexual Assault Convictions 

 In the exhausted sub-claim in Ground II, Petitioner alleges the trial court violated 

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by running his 

sentences for the sexual assault convictions consecutively. The Eighth Amendment 

proscribes the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. 

The Court reviews noncapital sentences for violations of the Eighth Amendment under a 

“narrow proportionality principle” that prohibits sentences that are “grossly 

disproportionate” to the crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 23 (2003) (internal 

citation omitted).6

 

 For a sentence to violate the Eighth Amendment there must be a threshold 

showing of gross disproportionality through a comparison of “the gravity of the offense 

[to] the harshness of the penalty.” Id. at 28. If gross disproportionality is shown, the court 

can conduct a comparative analysis “by considering the sentences the state imposes on 

other crimes” and the sentences other jurisdictions impose for the same crime. Id. at 23-

24. Strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence is not required and a 

comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is not mandated or appropriate 

absent any showing of gross disproportionality. Id., see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 

263, 281 (1980). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals decision that Petitioner’s sentence did not violate 

the Eighth Amendment was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law. Petitioner claims that his sentence of fifty-six years is excessive and violates his 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner does not argue that the term of 

 

6

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fourteen years for each sexual assault conviction violates the Eighth Amendment, rather 

he argues the consecutive terms for the four sexual assault convictions arising from one 

encounter with the victim and totaling fifty-six years violate the Eighth Amendment. 

(Doc. 7, p. 8). 

 In analyzing the Eighth Amendment issue, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly 

noted that “only in ‘exceedingly rare’ cases will a sentence to a term of years violate the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, 

p. 10, quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22 (2003)). The Court of Appeals further 

explained a “prison sentence is not grossly disproportionate ... if it arguably furthers the 

State’s penological goals and thus reflects ‘a rational legislative judgment, entitled to 

deference.’” (Id., quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. at 30). Finally, the Court of 

Appeals explained that as a general rule, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a 

sentence will not be held to be disproportionate due to its consecutive nature, because the 

“Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, 

not on the cumulative sentence.” (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A, p. 11, quoting United States v. Aiello, 

864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d. Cir.1988)). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals used the correct legal principle and did not 

unreasonably apply that principle in analyzing Petitioner’s claim. The fourteen-year 

sentence for each count of sexual assault was not grossly disproportionate to Petitioner’s 

crime. While a fifty-six year cumulative sentence may be harsh for a perpetrator who 

commits a series of acts as part of one incident involving one victim, it was the province 

of the state legislature to determine the appropriate punishment to be imposed for the 

criminal acts and the punishment is not grossly disproportionate to the crime. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Petitioner’s sentence is not grossly 

disproportionate is not contrary to federal law or an unreasonable application of federal 

law. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (where “the governing principle gives 

legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope of the 

proportionality principle-the precise contours of which are unclear” it is not objectively 

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unreasonable for a state court to conclude these contours permit affirming a sentence). 

The Court recommends denying this claim. 

Exhausted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

 The Court addresses the two exhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 

Ground III. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a convicted 

defendant must show: (1) deficient performance by counsel; and (2) that such deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 

(1984). To show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel’s 

performance was objectively unreasonable, i.e., “outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.” Id. at 688, 690. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance “must 

be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered 

adequate assistance.” Id. at 690. Courts reviewing counsel's performance “evaluate the 

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time" to “eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight.” Id. at 689. Strategic choices made by counsel after thorough investigation are 

“virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate 

there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” A reasonable probability is a “probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 Because a petitioner must prove both prongs of Strickland, a court need not decide 

one prong if the petitioner fails on the other prong. “[A] court need not determine 

whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by 

the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness 

claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 

course should be followed.” Id. at 697. 

 1. Trial Counsel’s Inaccurate Recall of Victim Testimony 

 Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for inaccurately recalling the 

testimony of the victim (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 10-13). Petitioner asserts that if trial 

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counsel had not confused the testimony of the victim, his motion for acquittal would have 

been granted on two of the sexual assault charges. 

 Trial counsel did inaccurately recall which type of oral sex was suggested by the 

victim. Trial counsel argued the sexual assault charge based on oral-penile contact should 

have been dismissed based on consent, when, in fact, the victim had testified that she 

suggested oral-vaginal contact. Without ruling that this error was deficient performance 

by trial counsel, the state courts found the error was not prejudicial. The state courts 

application and conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland was not 

clearly contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

 This Court reviews the analysis of the Arizona trial court as that was the last 

reasoned decision of the state courts. The trial court determined Petitioner suffered no 

prejudice from trial counsel’s confusion of the testimony because the trial court would 

have denied any motion for acquittal on any of the four sexual assault charges. (Doc. 14-

2, Ex. F, pp. 67-68). The trial court noted the victim testified that she did not voluntarily 

agree to any sexual activity with Petitioner and that she feared for her safety. (Id.). The 

trial court found the victim’s suggestion of oral-vaginal contact because “the nonconsensual penile-vaginal sex was making her sore” was not the equivalent of consensual 

sex and the accompanying digital penetration was also not consensual such that acquittal 

“based on a consent theory would have been inappropriate.” (Id.). The Court of Appeals 

found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. H, p. 97). 

 This Court finds the Arizona courts’ application of the Strickland standard and its 

conclusion that Petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective is not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of the clearly established federal law. Significant testimony 

from the victim supported the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for acquittal on any 

of the sexual assault counts. The victim testified that she did not consent to any of the 

sexual activity with Petitioner and that she feared for her safety. There is no reasonable 

probability that but for trial counsel’s confusion about the victim’s testimony Petitioner 

would have won acquittal on the two sexual assault charges at issue. This Court 

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recommends denying Petitioner’s claim. 

 2. Trial Counsel’s Alleged Error on the Unlawful Flight Charge 

 Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a curative jury 

instruction on the unlawful flight charge. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. E, pp. 10-13; Doc. 14-2, Ex. G, 

p. 71). Petitioner contended there was no connection between the unlawful flight charge 

and the sexual assault charges. He stated evidence of the unlawful flight was prejudicial 

because Petitioner appeared to be fleeing from charges of the sexual assault. Petitioner 

argued without a limiting instruction, the jury would believe he was fleeing from police 

because of the sexual assault, when, in fact, Petitioner claimed he was fleeing because of 

other charges deriving from an incident in Maricopa County. 

 Analyzing these claims, the trial court found there was no attorney error and 

Petitioner was not prejudiced. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. F, pp. 69-70). At trial the victim was 

permitted to testify about statements Petitioner made to her during the assault, which 

included him telling her that he was going to be sent away to prison for charges pending 

in Maricopa County. These statements made by Petitioner were permitted as evidence 

because they completed the story of the crime and the statements suggested a possible 

motive for the sexual assault. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. F., p. 69). The trial court reasoned because 

the flight evidence was cross-relevant to the sexual assault charges, a limiting instruction 

would not have been given. (Id. at 70). The Court of Appeals found no abuse of 

discretion by the trial court. (Doc. 14-2, Ex. H, p. 97). 

 This Court finds the state courts application of Strickland was not contrary to 

federal law and the courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland to Petitioner’s claims. 

The record shows substantial evidence connecting the unlawful flight charge to the sexual 

assault. Petitioner made statements to the victim about the pending charges in Maricopa 

County and this evidence was relevant and permitted during trial. A limiting jury 

instruction was not necessary as the trial court had determined the testimony on unlawful 

flight was relevant to the sexual assault charges and therefore, would not have given a 

limiting instruction. The Court recommends denying this sub-claim. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, 

after independent review, enter an order DISMISSING with prejudice all of Grounds I, II, 

and III, except sub-claim in Ground II challenging under the Eighth Amendment, the trial 

court’s imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences for the sexual assault convictions 

and the two exhausted sub-claims in Ground III alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the sub-claim in Ground II challenging the 

consecutive sentences and the two exhausted sub-claims in Ground III alleging 

ineffective counsel be denied on the merits. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The 

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case 

number: cv-09-320-TUC-JGZ. 

 Dated this 8th day of August, 2012. 

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