Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01334/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELICA RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1334 JLS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; AND (2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH

RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

(ECF No. 2)

vs.

ROADONE WEST, INC.,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Angelica Rodriguez’s (“Plaintiff”) motion

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff, a non-prisoner

proceeding pro se, has submitted a complaint alleging that Defendant Roadone West,

Inc. (“Defendant”) has wrongfully detained Plaintiff’s property and seeking a Writ for

Replevin and $5,000 in compensatory damages. (Compl. 2–3, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff

has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but rather has

filed a motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). For the reasons stated

below, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

1. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a petitioner’s failure

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to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A

plaintiff seeking IFP status must “demonstrate his indigence with ‘some particularity,

definiteness, and certainty.’” Lewis v. Ball Auto. Grp., No. 10CV2297 BEN (WVG),

2010 WL 5056023, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010) (quoting United States v. McQuade,

647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP lacks sufficient specificity to establish her

indigence. Plaintiff states that she relies on her spouse’s income for her day-to-day

expenses. (IFP Mot. 3, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff, however, fails to disclose the amount of

income received from her spouse. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff lists two automobiles,

a 2003 Cadillac CTS and a 1999 Nissan Sentra GXE, as other assets, but she fails to

state the value of the Cadillac.1

 (Id.) Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s application does

not give an adequate statement of her finances or expenses, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s request for IFP status.

2. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed

by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory

sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent that the petition is “frivolous,

malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking

monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court

to dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Courts should

construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, particularly in civil rights cases. Am.

1

The value of the 1999 Nissan, $2,400, is alleged in the complaint. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.)

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Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,526 U.S. at 1209 (citations omitted).

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts to show that (1) a person acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct

in question, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity

protected by the Constitution or other federal law. See Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp.

2d 1196, 1210 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986)). “Under color of state law” means that the conduct

cannot be “merely private . . ., no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Rather, the defendant must

exercise power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” (West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49

(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action under

§ 1983. While Plaintiff satisfies the second element of a § 1983 claim by alleging that

she was deprived of possession of her 1999 Nissan Sentra GXE (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1)

and by providing a copy of her certificate of title for the chattel in question (Id. at Ex.

A), she fails to allege facts tending to establish that Defendant acted “under color of

state law.” While Plaintiff claims that she was “under false arrest” when Defendant

took her property (Id. at 2) and that Defendant has been holding her property for

“ransom” (Id. at 3), she fails to establish that Defendant is a proper party for a § 1983

action because she does not allege that Defendant took her property under purported

state authority. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed

IFP. Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

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Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order to either:

(1) pay the entire $350 filing fee, or (2) file a new motion to proceed IFP with

additional documentation regarding her economic status.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2013

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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