Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00555/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ricky Lee Sabin, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Ernest Trujillo, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV10-00555-TUC-AWT(JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Michael A. Sabin’s Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Sabin’s conviction, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

Responding to a report of a possible suicide, officers of the Marana 

Police Department were dispatched to the Sabin residence. The first 

officer to arrive, Joshua Corn, immediately encountered two teenagers, 

Ron and Ashley, outside the house. Both of them were “visibly 

distraught and upset.” After Corn entered the house through the patio 

door, he discovered K.’s body in a hallway bathroom and a .357 

revolver in her lap. 

 Detective Richard Palma interviewed both Ron and Ashley a 

few hours later. Ron, who had been K.’s boyfriend since September 

2003, stated that he had been talking to K. on the telephone that 

afternoon when he heard a gunshot and the line went silent. He and 

Ashley, a mutual friend of Ron and K., immediately drove to the Sabin 

residence. When they arrived, Ron entered the house through a rear 

door, called to K., and ultimately found her body in the bathroom. Ron 

called 911. Ron told Palma that he had “no clue why” K. would have 

committed suicide, that their relationship was fine, that K. had not been 

depressed, and that she had not been struggling with difficulties at 

school or at home. When Palma asked Ron if K. had kept a diary, Ron 

responded that it was “possible.” 

 Ashley told Palma that, although she did not know what would 

have immediately precipitated the suicide, K. “had trouble with her 

dad.” When pressed to explain the “trouble,” Ashley said that Sabin 

had “raped” and “sexually molested” K. since she was seven or eight 

years old. 

 The police then searched K.’s bedroom and discovered her 

diary. At trial, Officer Corn read aloud select passages from the diary 

wherein K. stated she had been sexually abused by both her father and 

grandfather and that if she ever found out she was pregnant by her 

father, she would immediately kill herself. Officers did not obtain a 

search warrant until after they had searched K.’s bedroom and had 

discovered the diary. 

 Marana Police Detective John Santoro interviewed Ashley a 

second time a few hours later at the main station of the Marana Police 

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Department. During that interview, Ashley described the details K. had 

divulged to Ashley about the extent of, and manner in which, Sabin had 

chronically abused her. Ashley told Santoro that K. had said she had 

tried to resist Sabin and that the abuse would happen as often as a 

couple of times per week. According to Ashley, K. had stated that 

Denise, K.’s mother, had learned about the abuse the previous fall 

during a “family discussion” and had considered divorcing Sabin. 

During this discussion with Santoro, Ashley confirmed that K. had kept 

a diary although Ashley had never seen it. 

 Several hours later, Detective Santoro and Bradley Roach, a 

deputy county attorney, interviewed Sabin at a police substation. 

Before proceeding, Santoro advised Sabin that he was not under arrest 

and that the police simply wanted to “find out what [had] happened” to 

K. After Santoro read Sabin the Miranda [fn1: Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)] warnings, Sabin agreed to 

continued questioning. Sabin initially told the police that he and K. 

“had a pretty good, great relationship” and that they were “very close.” 

 Santoro then told Sabin that police had discovered K.’s diary 

and “found some things she wrote in it that . . . concerned [them].” 

Sabin responded that K. had recently grown “more and more defiant.” 

But, when Roach asked Sabin about “a real big family discussion 

around like September, October or maybe even November of last year,” 

Sabin admitted he had sexually abused K. since she was seven or eight 

years old. For the next hour, Sabin offered details of the systematic 

abuse that had stared as “fondling” and escalated over the years to 

include masturbatory acts and both oral and vaginal intercourse. The 

officers arrested Sabin at the conclusion of the interview. 

 On May 3, 2004, Ron volunteered to provide a second statement 

to police. Ron revealed that K. had told him Sabin had been molesting 

her for nearly ten years. Ron described the abuse as follows: 

I remember her telling me that he held her, he held her 

down with one hand and he would just forcefully throw 

her down[,] rip her clothes off and just do whatever he 

felt like. He would, he would sexually do these things 

and he would anally do these things . . . [E]verything that 

you could possibly think of . . . was done. 

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When asked if Sabin had “penetrated [K.] with his penis,” Ron 

responded, “Yes . . . I asked her specifically how many times and she 

said over three hundred times.” 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 2-5. 

 The State initially charged Sabin with one count of continuous sexual abuse of 

a child, one count of sexual abuse of a minor under 15 years of age, two counts of 

sexual conduct with a minor under 15 years of age, and five counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor. Id., p. 5. After the trial court granted Sabin’s motion to suppress K.’s 

diary, the State dismissed all but two of the charges. Id., p. 6. Sabin waived his right 

to a jury trial and stipulated to the admission of the evidence that was not suppressed 

in the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. Id. The trial court found Sabin 

guilty of one count of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of continuous 

sexual abuse of a minor. Id., p. 7. 

 Sabin waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors for sentencing 

and the trial court found that the State had proven two aggravating factors: the 

severe emotional harm to the victim and her family, and the especially cruel nature of 

the offenses. Id. The trial court sentenced Sabin to consecutive, aggravated 

sentences totaling 37 years’ imprisonment. Id. 

 Sabin raised five claims on direct appeal. He asserted that: 

(1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 

statements to police because those statements had been obtained after 

police confronted him with K.’s diary, which had been suppressed, 

rendering his statements the “fruit of the poisonous tree;” 

(2) the admission of K.’s statements to both Ron and Ashley violated 

his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; 

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(3) his convictions must be reversed because the State failed to provide 

sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes; 

(4) his waiver of a jury trial was “insufficient as a matter of law;” and 

(5) the trial court erred by permitting the State to amend the indictment 

at the close of evidence because that resulted in a duplicitous 

indictment. 

Id., Ex. C. In an Opinion filed November 13, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Sabin’s convictions. Id., Ex. A. Sabin then sought review of the decision 

by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review by order dated October 30, 

2007. Id., Ex. F. 

 On April 11, 2008, Sabin filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Id., Ex. G. 

After Sabin’s appointed counsel reported that he could find no tenable issue for 

review, id., Ex. H, Sabin filed a pro se PCR petition in which he raised the following 

claims: 

(1) the trial court erred by failing to properly advise him of his Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before waiving his 

right to a jury trial and therefore the waiver was not knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligently made; 

(2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement 

to police because the trial court misapplied the “inevitable discovery 

doctrine and thus his statements should have been suppressed as “fruit 

of the poisonous tree;” 

(3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 

statements to police because the court had misinterpreted and 

misunderstood the motion; 

(4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statements to 

police because the State failed to establish the appropriate corpus 

delicti for the crime; 

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(5) reversal was required because Sabin did not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily agree to have the trial court conduct a 

bench trial on the stipulated evidence alone; 

(6) the trial court erred at sentencing because it sentenced Sabin under 

the wrong state-law sentencing statute, the State did not properly allege 

the sentencing aggravating factors in the indictment, and the burden of 

proof for the aggravating factors had not been met; and 

(7) the trial court erred by “allowing [Sabin] to be prosecuted for count 

two” because the indictment was duplicitous. 

Id., Ex. I. 

 In a Ruling dated March 19, 2009, the trial court found claims 1-5 precluded 

under state law and denied claims 6 and 7 on the merits. Id., Ex. L. Sabin then 

sought review of his post-conviction petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and by 

Memorandum Decision filed October 1, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted review 

but denied relief. Id., Ex. N. In doing so, the Appeals Court adopted the trial court’s 

orders denying relief, and additionally found that claims 6 and 7 were precluded 

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because they were not raised them on direct 

appeal. Id. p. 5. In a footnote, the court also added that “all of Sabin’s Rule 32 

claims properly were denied because they are precluded” as untimely under 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). Id., pp. 5 n.1 and 6. Sabin sought review of the decision by 

the Arizona Supreme Court, and on April 20, 2010, review was denied. Id., Exs. O 

and P. 

 In the instant petition, Sabin raises nine claims: 

Ground One: the trial court erred by admitting into evidence Sabin’s 

statement to police because it was obtained in violation of his 

constitutional rights. 

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Ground Two: the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Ashley 

and Ron because their admission violated state evidentiary laws and 

Sabin’s right to confront witnesses. 

Ground Three: the trial court erred by denying Sabin’s privilege 

against self-incrimination in violation of the constitution. 

Ground Four: the trial court erred because it “failed to allow the calling 

of witnesses” at the bench trial conducted on stipulated evidence. 

Ground Five: the trial court erred by finding that the State had 

established the corpus delicti of the crime because the court’s findings 

were based on uncorroborated hearsay statements. 

Ground Six: the trial court erred because the bench trial was based on 

stipulated evidence without additional witnesses. 

Ground Seven: the trial court erred under state law when sentencing 

him because he was sentenced under the wrong state-law statute. 

Ground Eight: the indictment was duplicitous and the trial court erred 

by imposing consecutive sentences. 

Ground Nine: post-conviction counsel was ineffective and the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying Sabin’s motion for new counsel. 

Answer, pp. 6-30 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is timely.

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus 

petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

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U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the limitations period is tolled during the 

pendency of a properly filed state post-conviction proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 

 In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court denied direct review on October 30, 

2007, and direct review was complete 90 days later, on January 28, 2008. Bowen v. 

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, absent tolling, Sabin was 

required to file the instant petition by January 28, 2009. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Sabin initiated his post-conviction proceedings 74 days later, on April 11, 

2008. Answer, Ex. G. PCR proceedings were pending until May 13, 2010, when the 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its final mandate. Id., Ex. Q. Respondents contend 

that Sabin filed the instant Petition almost a year after his PCR proceedings became 

final, on May 11, 2011, and that when the 74 days that elapsed between the close of 

direct review and the commencement of PCR proceedings are added, the total is well 

beyond the year allowed for filing under the AEDPA. However, May 11, 2011, is 

the date on which Sabin filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 8). Respondents make no 

mention of the original filing date, but implicitly contend that the one year statute of 

limitations ran unabated from September 14, 2010, until May 11, 2011, when Sabin 

filed the Amended Petition now pending before the Court. 

 The Court notes however, that the relation back doctrine under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(c) is applicable in federal habeas actions. See Mayle v. Felix, 

545 U.S. 644 (2005). The court finds relation back particularly appropriate under the 

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circumstances of this case where the Court dismissed the original petition without 

prejudice and the claims raised were replied in the Amended Petition. See Garcia v. 

Yates, 2010 WL 5582901 (S.D.Cal. Oct. 12, 2010). When the Amended Petition is 

allowed to relate back to the original Petition, the filing falls well within the one-year 

limitations period and the Amended Petition is therefore timely. 

B. Exhaustion/Preclusion

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

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circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the 

federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 

36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court 

found his claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims 

in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 

693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack 

his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 A habeas petitioner's claims may be procedurally defaulted and precluded 

from federal review in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

federal court if it was actually raised in state court, but found by that court to be 

defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 

(1991). Arizona courts have been consistent in their application of procedural default 

rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 

1000, 1026 (9th Cir.2008); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir.1998)). 

Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if petitioner failed to 

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present it in state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the 

state courts' procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration 

of the claim. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 

F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). This type of procedural default is known as 

“technical” exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state 

court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. at 732. 

 1. Application 

As a threshold note, in ruling on Sabin’s appeal of the denial of his PCR 

petition, the State Court of Appeals expressly affirmed the trial court’s finding that 

the first five claims presented in the PCR petition had already been addressed by the 

Court of Appeals on direct review. Then, citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3), the Court 

of Appeals concluded that Sabin’s failure to raise the remaining two claims alleging 

sentencing error and double jeopardy on direct appeal resulted in a waiver of these 

claims. Answer, Ex. N., p. 5. As all of the claims raised in Sabin’s PCR petition 

were found to be precluded from review on procedural grounds, they cannot serve as 

a basis for establishing exhaustion. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 

Accordingly, the Court will look solely to the record of Sabin’s direct appeal to 

determine if his claims have been exhausted.

 a. Grounds One and Two 

 In Ground One, Sabin asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into 

evidence Sabin’s statement to police because it was obtained in violation of his 

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constitutional rights. In Ground Two, Sabin argues that the trial court erred by 

admitting the testimony of Ashley and Ron because their admission violated state 

evidentiary laws and Sabin’s right to confront witnesses. Petition, pp. 6-11. Sabin 

raised these claims on direct appeal as Issues One and Two and they were addressed 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals in its Opinion denying Sabin relief. Answer, Ex. A, 

8-18. These claims are exhausted.

 b. Grounds Three, Four and Six 

 Grounds Three, Four and Six of the Amended Petition all relate to Sabin’s 

claim that the trial court improperly conducted a bench trial based entirely on 

stipulated evidence. The Respondents contend that each of these three claims is 

defaulted because, although Sabin raised variants on them in his direct appeal, he did 

not raise these precise claims. However, a fair reading of the claims Sabin raised on 

appeal encompasses the assertions made in these three claims and they will be 

considered together on the merits. 

 In his direct appeal, Sabin’s issue four was set-forth as follows: 

Whether Mr. Sabin’s waiver of his “right to a jury trial” was 

insufficient as a matter of law because he was not informed that he was 

substantially waiving his right to a trial where he stipulated to all the 

evidence. 

Answer, Ex. C, p. 12. Grounds Three, Four and Six in the Amended Petition are each 

intertwined with Sabin’s claim that his waiver of his jury trial rights was insufficient. 

Each of these three grounds allege that his constitutional rights were violated as a 

result of the allegedly defective waiver: in Ground Three Sabin alleges his rights 

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against self-incrimination were violated; in Ground Four his right to call witnesses; 

and in Ground Six his right to a trial. 

 The Court finds that each of claims was raised and addressed in the Opinion 

by the Court of Appeals. In the Opinion, the court lists a number of rights Sabin 

agreed to waive, including his right to a trial, his right to testify on his own behalf, 

and his right to call an confront witnesses. Answer, Ex. A, p. 20. The Court 

explained why it believed that Sabin had waived each of these rights. Id., pp. 19-22. 

The Opinion establishes that the state courts had a "fair opportunity to act" upon 

these claims, see O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 844, and they are therefore 

exhausted. 

 c. Ground Five 

In Ground Five, Sabin asserts that the trial court erred by finding that the State 

had established the corpus delicti of the crime because the court’s findings were 

based on uncorroborated hearsay statements. Sabin raised this claim as his Issue 3 on 

direct appeal, Answer, Ex. C, and it was addressed and denied in the Court of 

Appeals’ Opinion, id., Ex. A. However, Sabin made no mention of any federal 

authority or theory in support of this claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004) (a claim is “fairly presented only if a petition described the federal legal 

theory). Because this claim alleges only state law error, they are barred from habeas 

review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 

F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal 

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habeas corpus relief only if it renders the state proceeding so fundamentally unfair as 

to violate due process.”). 

 Ground Five is thus procedurally defaulted because Sabin failed to present it 

in state court, and returning to state court to present it would be futile. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on appeal or in 

prior petitions for post-conviction relief), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for 

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). The operation of 

these rules precludes Sabin’s return to state court and, absent cause and prejudice, 

procedurally bars federal habeas review of the claim. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 

860 (2002); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 d. Grounds Seven, Eight and Nine 

 In Grounds Seven and Eight, Sabin alleges that the trial court committed 

sentencing error and that double jeopardy resulted from the imposition of consecutive 

sentences. As part of Ground Nine, Sabin alleges that the trial court erred by denying 

him new counsel. Sabin first raised these claims in his PCR proceeding and the 

Arizona Court of Appeals expressly found them defaulted on state procedural ground 

and precluded because they were not raised on direct appeal. Answer, Ex. N, p. 5 

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). As such, they cannot serve as a basis for 

establishing exhaustion and Grounds Seven, Eight and Nine are precluded from 

federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722. 

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 Additionally, in Ground Nine, Sabin asserts that his PCR counsel was 

ineffective. However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in state collateral 

review proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. Additionally, Congress has 

expressly stated that such claims are not cognizable: “The ineffectiveness or 

incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction 

proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 

2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner can establish cause for his noncompliance and resulting prejudice, or that a 

miscarriage of justice would result. To show “cause,” a petitioner must show that 

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the 

state's procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393–94 (2004); Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1986). To establish 

“prejudice,” a petitioner must suffer actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). See also 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim if the petitioner demonstrates that the failure to consider the merits of 

his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a 

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constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent. Id. 

Respondents contend that Sabin cannot meet the requirements for having these 

defaulted claims evaluated on their merits. Answer, pp. 14-15. In reply, Sabin 

reargues his claims, but offers nothing directly relevant to the inquiry into cause and 

prejudice. Thus, there is no basis in record upon which the Court can excuse Sabin’s 

default of Grounds Five, Seven, Eight and Nine. 

C. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

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law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Sabin asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into 

evidence his confession to Santoro and Roach because it was obtained in violation of 

his constitutional rights. Petition, pp. 6-8. The confession, Sabin contends, was 

induced by material the police had obtained from K.’s diary (which was seized in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment), and thus was the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” 

Id., p. 6. In denying this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

identified the correct legal authority and reasonably applied it to the facts. 

 To guide its inquiry, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on Wong Sun v. U.S., 

371 U.S. 471 (1963), where the Supreme Court held that “evidence seized during an 

unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. The 

exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such 

invasions.” Id. at 484. Under this rule, evidence may be subject to suppression if it is 

the “fruit” of an illegal search or seizure. For evidence to be considered the “fruit” of 

an illegal search, “the illegality [must be] at least the ‘but for’ cause of the discovery 

of the evidence.” Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984). However, as the Arizona 

Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he Court has never held that evidence is ‘fruit of the 

poisonous tree’ simply because ‘it would not have come to light but for the illegal 

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actions of the police.’” Id. Thus the “but for” relationship is a necessary but not 

sufficient condition for evidence to be the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 

 Rather, the connection between the illegality and the evidence must be such 

that the “primary taint of the unlawful invasion” is not purged by intervening 

circumstances. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 

(2003). Thus, where a confession would not have occurred “but for” illegal conduct, 

it may still be admitted if “that confession was ‘an act of free will [sufficient] to 

purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’ ” Id., quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 

at 486. 

 Here, the Arizona court found that intervening circumstances purged the taint. 

The court noted that two statements from Santoro and Roach preceded Sabin’s 

confession. Santoro told Sabin that he found some portions of the diary troubling, 

and Roach asked about a family meeting that had occurred some months before K.’s 

suicide. Answer, Ex. A, pp. 13-14. The court noted, however, that it was only when 

Roach asked about the family meeting that Sabin became emotional and began to 

disclose details of the abuse. Id., p. 15. The court noted that Roach’s knowledge 

about the meeting came from Ashley’s second statement, which was prompted by the 

acquisition of the diary. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that “logic dictates the 

detective [Santoro] would have pursued a second interview with Ashley under any 

circumstances, given that during her first interview she had provided evidence that K. 

had been raped by her father.” Id. In fact, the court reasonably noted that, “had the 

police not discovered the diary, they would have had more of an incentive to talk 

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with Ashley, the only other source of information about the abuse, rather than less.” 

Id., pp. 15-16. The court then summarized: 

From Ashley’s first statement, Roach and Santoro already knew that K. 

had made statements accusing her father of sexually abusing her. And, 

the trial court correctly found, the information in the diary was nothing 

more than another statement by K. to that same effect. Thus, even had 

the state not improperly searched Sabin’s residence and seized the 

diary, it would have known about the abuse from K.’s statement to 

Ashley. 

Id., p. 17. 

 Trying to convince the Court that the Arizona Court of Appeals assessment 

was factually incorrect, Sabin suggests that the diary prompted Ashley’s first 

statement to police. Petition, p. 7. However, that assertion is not supported by the 

record. Looking back to Sabin’s Opening Brief on direct appeal, he noted in his 

factual statement that on the day of the suicide, Ashley disclosed to police that K.’s 

father and grandfather had abused K. Answer, Ex. C., p. 7. The factual rendition in 

that brief also recognizes that detectives were aware of “possible sexual misconduct 

between K. and her father,” before the bedroom was searched and the diary found. 

Id., pp. 7-8. In the Amended Petition, Sabin points to no evidence which might cause 

the Court to question the Court of Appeals’ determination, which was consistent with 

his factual statement in his Opening Brief on direct appeal. The Arizona court’s 

analysis of this claim cited the correct law, correctly applied it to the facts, and is 

convincing in its conclusion. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 2. Ground Two

 In Ground Two, Sabin argues that the trial court erred by admitting the 

testimony of Ashley and Ron about what K. had told them because the testimony 

violated state evidentiary laws and Sabin’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 

witnesses. Petition, pp. 9-11. The Arizona Court of Appeals, citing State v. Comer, 

165 Ariz. 413, 799 P.2d 333 (1990), and State v. Kling, 212 Ariz. 372, 132 P.3d 311 

(App. 2006), correctly applied harmless error analysis to this claim. The standards 

set-forth in those cases are the same as those under federal law, which allows for 

harmless error analysis of Confrontation Clause errors. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Applying harmless error analysis in the habeas context, a petitioner is entitled to 

relief only if the improperly admitted statements had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 

1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 

Factors to consider in determining whether a Confrontation Clause error was 

harmless include “the importance of the testimony, whether the testimony was 

cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 

testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of the 

prosecution's case.” Ocampo, 649 F.3d at 1114 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The error is harmless unless there is “grave doubt” about whether a constitutional 

error substantially influenced the verdict. Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th 

Cir.2004). “Grave doubt” exists when “the record is so evenly balanced that a judge 

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feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error[.]” Merolillo v. 

Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 

435 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 3. Grounds Three, Four and Six

 As noted above, the outcome of Grounds Three, Four and Six depends on the 

validity of Sabin’s waiver of his trial rights. Specifically, he alleges that his waiver 

was not knowing and voluntary and resulted in the violation of his rights against selfincrimination, his right to call witnesses, and his right to a trial. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ determination that Sabin’s waiver was effective involved neither an 

unreasonable application of federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 

 In its Opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals listed several trial rights, 

including those at issue here, and cited Arizona authority for the proposition that an 

effective waiver of those rights must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 20 (citing State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21, 25, 617 P.2d 1137, 1139 

(1980)). The standards are the same under federal law, where an effective waiver of 

a constitutional right must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent, Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), and the right to a jury trial can be waived, as long 

as the waiver includes the consent of the prosecutor, the approval of the court, and 

the “express and intelligent consent of the defendant.” See Crosby v. Schwartz, 678 

F.3d 784, 788 (2012), citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), 

overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 (1970). 

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 In the Amended Petition, Sabin argues that his waiver was not made 

knowingly because, although he agreed to a bench trial, he did not know it would be 

based on stipulated evidence and that he would not be permitted to call witnesses. In 

denying this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the record demonstrated 

that Sabin knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently agreed to submit the case to the 

trial court on stipulated evidence. Answer, Ex. A, p. 21. In support of its conclusion, 

the court found: 

First, [Sabin’s] counsel proposed the idea and itemized the evidence to 

be considered in Sabin’s presence. Next, still in the presence of Sabin, 

the court and counsel thoroughly discussed each piece of that evidence. 

The trial court then placed Sabin under oath and ascertained from Sabin 

that he was clear-headed and not under the influence of any 

medications. Thereafter, the court directed Sabin to review and sign a 

form that specified the rights he was foregoing by waiving his right to a 

jury trial. Then the court itself advised Sabin of the rights he would be 

giving up and the sentencing ranges he faced if the court found him 

guilty. In response to the court’s questions, Sabin confirmed that his 

decision to forego a jury trial was voluntary and intelligent. Although 

the court did not focus on the distinction between a bench trial with live 

testimony and a bench trial on stipulated evidence at every step of the 

colloquy, the trial court made it clear to Sabin that the questions the 

court was asking Sabin related to his waiver of the right to a jury trial 

in the context of the latter procedure. 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 21. In support of its finding that Sabin was made aware of the 

nature of the proposed trial, the court quoted a portion of the trial court’s colloquy 

with Sabin: 

 I understand that you intend to waive your right to a jury and to 

submit this case for my decision based on the evidence that counsel 

discussed here in court, stipulated to provide me a list of; is that 

correct? 

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Id., n. 11. Responding to this question, Sabin stated, “That’s correct, Your Honor.” 

Id. 

 On this record, the Court finds that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision was 

reasonable. Sabin was informed of the procedure and assented to a bench trial based 

on stipulated evidence. The waiver was confirmed in writing and Sabin was 

addressed by the trial court, which found that his waiver was made knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. See, e.g., Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“An examination of the record indicates that Hensley was fully aware of the 

scope of the right he was waiving and did so as a strategic decision.”) 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the 

following case number: CV10-00555-TUC-AWT. 

 Dated this 21st day of February, 2013. 

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