Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08209/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elroy Gutierrez,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-18-8209-PCT-DJH (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San Luis, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

September 4, 2018 (Doc. 1). On January 28, 2019, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 

13). Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent Not to Reply on March 8, 2019 (Doc. 15).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

A highway patrol officer parked in the median of Interstate 17 north 

of Cordes Junction one summer afternoon saw Elroy Gutierrez drive 

by with his windows rolled down and noticed Gutierrez slowed below 

the speed limit as he passed. The officer pulled out to follow 

Gutierrez, and stopped him after he saw Gutierrez twice apply the 

brakes for no apparent reason and the car's right tires twice swerve 

across the white fog line. After Gutierrez and his passenger gave 

inconsistent statements, the officer requested a drug canine unit. The 

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dog alerted, and a search of the car revealed two handguns, just under 

a half-pound of heroin, more than four pounds of methamphetamine 

and a black zippered case containing a small quantity of heroin and a 

used syringe. Interviewed following his arrest, Gutierrez admitted he 

used heroin earlier in the day and voluntarily provided a urine sample. 

A drug test revealed metabolites of heroin, methamphetamine and 

marijuana.

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein as “Exh.

___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted on one count of transportation of a dangerous drug for sale 

(methamphetamine); one count of transportation of a narcotic drug for sale; two counts of 

misconduct involving weapons; two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia; and two 

counts of aggravated driving under the influence. (Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 3; Exh A, 

Indictment.) Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial and was acquitted of one count of 

aggravated driving under the influence and transportation of a narcotic drug for sale. At a 

joint trial with his co-defendant, the passenger, he was found guilty of the other DUI 

charge, as well as transportation of a dangerous drug for sale, possession of a narcotic 

drug, possession of drug paraphernalia and misconduct involving weapons. (Exh. G, 

Opinion at ¶ 3; Exh. B, M.E. 3/25/15.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent aggravated terms, the longest of which was 

14 years. (Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 3; Exh. C, Sentence 5/4/15.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal arguing through counsel that: (1) the initial stop was 

unreasonable under the 4th and 14th Amendments; (2) denial of fair trial by failure to sever 

co-defendant; (3) double jeopardy on the weapons offenses; (4) denial of constitutional 

right to trial by retaliatory sentencing after rejection of plea offer; and (5) sentencing error. 

(Exh. D, Opening Brief.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and 

sentences. (Exh. G, Opinion (reported at State v. Gutierrez, 240 Ariz. 460, 381 P.3d 254

(App. 2016).) 

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Petitioner then sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court (Exh. H, PFR), 

which summarily denied review (Exh. J, Order 2/14/17). 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exh. K), counsel was 

appointed, who ultimately filed a “Petition” asserting inability to find an issue for review, 

moving to withdraw, and for leave for Petitioner to file a supplemental pro se petition 

(Exh. L). Petitioner filed a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exh. N), raising 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and PCR counsel on a variety of 

grounds. The PCR court denied the petition. (Exh. Q, Order 12/20/17.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exh. R), asserting ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel (and, in a footnote, of PCR counsel). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

review, and summarily denied relief based on the conclusion that the PCR court had not 

abused its discretion in denying the petition. (Exh. S, Mem. Dec.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 4, 2018 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following seven grounds for relief:

(1) “The abuse of discretion by the trial court by denying 

[Petitioner’s] motion to suppress because the initial stop was 

unreasonable under the 4th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution and Federal law”; 

(2) “The abuse of discretion by the trial court by denying 

[Petitioner’s] motion to sever depriving Petitioner of his right to a 

fair trial under federal law”; 

(3) “Double Jeopardy was attached when 2 counts of misconduct 

with weapons were used although it was a single offense in violation 

of federal law”; 

(4) “The [Petitioner] was penalized for exercising his 

constitutional right to a fair trial when the court imposed an 

aggravated sentence after offering him a mitigated 7.5 year sentence 

if he pled guilty, in violation of federal law”; 

(5) “The trial court abused its discretion by incorrectly 

interpreting A.R.S. § 13-3407 as mandating flat time when in fact 

A.R.S. § 13-3407(f) gives the court discretion to allow earned release 

credits in violation of federal law”; 

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(6) “The ineffective assistance of counsel for their failure to hire 

an investigator to investigate misconduct by law enforcement 

officials in violation of petitioner’s federal constitutional rights, also 

the failure to challenge the completeness of the state’s disclosure 

under federal law”; and 

(7) “The ineffective assistance of appellate and post-conviction 

relief counsel in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments of the 

U.S. Constitution and federal law.” 

(Order 10/17/18, Doc. 4 at 2.) 

Response - On January 28, 2019, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13). 

Respondents argue: (1) Ground 1 is barred by Stone v. Powell; (2) Ground 2 is without 

merit; (3) Grounds 3 and 5 are not cognizable federal claims; (4) Grounds 6 and 7 are 

vague and conclusory, and therefore without merit; and (5) the Arizona Court of Appeals’

resolution of Ground 4 must be upheld under the deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Reply – The Court set a deadline for a reply of March 7, 2019. (Order 1/29/19, Co. 

14.) On March 8, 2019, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Intent to Not File a Reply Brief” 

(Doc. 15). Petitioner reiterates his seven claims, and asserts that his lack of a reply is not 

a concession.

28 U.S.C. § 2248 provides: “The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus 

or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, 

shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that 

they are not true.” While this seems to mandate a reply, Rule 5(e) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases provides: “The petitioner may submit a reply to the respondent's 

answer or other pleading within a time fixed by the judge.” (Emphasis added.) The 

Advisory Committee Notes to the 1976 adoption of Rule 5 observe that the Rules do not 

“contemplate a traverse to the answer, except under special circumstances...where it will 

serve a truly useful purpose,” e.g. where the Answer asserts facts not controverted in the 

Petition. 

Thus, while the Court need not treat Petitioner’s failure to reply as a concession on 

facts or arguments which have been disputed in the Petition, neither must the Court refuse 

to accept facts asserted by Respondents which are not controverted by the Petitioner or the 

record available to this Court, nor invent legal arguments on Petitioner’s behalf that do not 

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arise from a fair review of the briefs and record.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 1 – FOURTH AMENDMENT

1. Parties Arguments

In Ground 4, Petitioner argues that his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments 

were violated because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the 

trial court refused to suppress the resulting evidence. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue this claim is based on the exclusionary rule, and is barred from 

habeas relief under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82, 494 (1976). Respondents argue 

that Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim under Arizona law and 

in the procedures afforded him the trial and appellate courts. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 6-7.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim in his Notice of Intent to Not File a 

Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 

2. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim, 

making the following factual findings concerning the trial court proceedings:

Gutierrez contends the superior court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress the drugs and guns found in the car because the officer did 

not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. At the suppression 

hearing, the officer testified he stopped the car because of concern the 

driver was impaired or sleepy. Based on the officer's testimony, given 

the officer's concern that the driver was impaired, the superior court 

found the officer had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 5.) The appellate court denied the claim, concluding: “the 

unnecessary braking and the weaving out of the traffic lane constituted a sufficient 

objective basis on which the officer could conclude the driver might be impaired” and thus 

“the superior court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the driver's conduct established 

reasonable suspicion to support the stop.” (Id. at ¶ 8, 10.) 

/ /

/ /

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3. Applicable Law

Petitioner’s claim is one for enforcement of the “exclusionary rule.” 

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” The Amendment says nothing about 

suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this command. That 

rule—the exclusionary rule—is a “prudential” doctrine, created by 

this Court to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.” 

Exclusion is “not a personal constitutional right,” nor is it designed 

to “redress the injury” occasioned by an unconstitutional search. The 

rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth 

Amendment violations. 

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011).

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that habeas 

proceedings are so far removed from the offending conduct that any deterrent effect is 

outweighed by the societal cost of ignoring reliable, trustworthy evidence and the judicial 

burden of litigating collateral issues. Thus, the Court held that “where the State has 

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state 

prisoner may not be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained 

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494. 

The key to the limitation on the exclusionary rule in Stone is the provision of an 

opportunity for full and fair consideration of the exclusionary rule claim. "The relevant 

inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did 

in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided." Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 

81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996).

In deciding whether the state has afforded the petitioner an 

opportunity for full and fair litigation, a federal habeas court must 

determine first whether the state procedural mechanism, in the 

abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. 

Second, there must be a determination whether the presentation of the 

claim in question was in fact frustrated by a failure of that 

mechanism. The presentation of a claim is frustrated by a failure in 

the state procedural mechanism if there has been no “meaningful 

inquiry by the state courts” into the Fourth Amendment claim, either 

because the state courts did not carefully and thoroughly address the 

factual basis of the petitioner's claim or because the state courts did 

not apply the proper constitutional case law to the facts as developed. 

U.S. ex rel. Bostick v. Peters, 3 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

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4. Application to Facts

Here, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he lacked a full and fair opportunity 

to litigate his exclusionary rule claim. As noted by Respondents, Arizona’s Rule 16.2 

permits motions to suppress evidence based on “the lawfulness in all respects of the 

acquisition of all evidence which the prosecutor will use at trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2 

(2015).1 The record further reflects that Petitioner was in fact afforded an opportunity to 

litigate these claims in the trial and appellate court, and there appears no basis to conclude 

that the review afforded was not “meaningful” as described in Bostick, 3 F.3d at 1027. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is barred from relief under Stone.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, Petitioner’s Ground 1 is without merit, and must be denied.

B. GROUND 2 – MOTION TO SEVER

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 2, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process by the refusal to 

sever his case from that of his co-defendant who had an antagonistic defense. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Respondents argue that there is no clearly established Supreme Court Law, as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), requiring severance of antagonistic defenses, citing 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 2012) and Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 

1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2010). (Answer, Doc. 13 at 7-9.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim in his Notice of Intent to Not File a 

Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 

/ /

/ /

 

1 This rule was rewritten as part of a generalized restyling and restating of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective January 1, 2018. The rule now expressly permits 

motions to suppress “evidence that was unlawfully obtained due to a constitutional 

violation.” Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 16.2(a) (eff. 1/1/18.) 

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2. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed this claim on direct appeal, relying on 

state precedent holding that a “defendant seeking severance based on antagonistic defenses 

must demonstrate that his or her defense is so antagonistic to the co-defendants that the 

defenses are mutually exclusive.” (Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Cruz, 137 

Ariz. 541, 545 (1983)).) The court concluded:

Gutierrez and his co-defendant each professed he did not possess the 

drugs and guns, but that they belonged to the other. The jury, 

however, did not need to decide that only one of the defendants 

possessed the drugs and guns; it logically could have attributed any 

combination of guilt or innocence between the two defendants. For 

that reason, Gutierrez and his co-defendant's defenses were not 

mutually exclusive.

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 14.) The court further concluded that Petitioner had failed to show 

the requisite prejudice. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.) The court further noted the ameliorative effect 

of the jury instructions:

The superior court instructed the jurors to consider the charges 

against each defendant separately and that "[e]ach defendant is 

entitled to have the jury determine the verdict as to each of the crimes 

charged based upon that defendant's own conduct and from the 

evidence which applies to that defendant, as if that defendant were 

being tried alone." So instructed, the jury acquitted Gutierrez of some 

of the charges against him.

(Id. at ¶ 17.) 

3. Applicable Law

a. Standard of Review for Legal Error

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. Rather, statutes limiting habeas 

review “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in 

the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through 

appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011). 

Consequently, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that 

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court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] 

incorrectly.”2 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). Rather, to 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

Adjudication on the Merits - The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a petitioner 

has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on its merits, 

then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the restrictive standards 

of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (2013) (adopting 

a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim rejected by a state court without being 

expressly addressed was adjudicated on the merits).

However, even if the state court has not explicitly addressed the federal claim, de 

novo review is not automatically warranted, because a determination of the claim may be 

presumed. “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court 

has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the 

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). That same rule applies not only where the 

state court simply denies relief, but also applies “when a state-court opinion addresses 

some but not all of a defendant's claims.” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 298. Thus, “[w]hen a state 

court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court 

must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption 

can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Id. at 301. For example, the presumption 

is rebutted if the federal claim was not fairly presented to the state court. Id. at 302, n.3. 

Or, if the claim is raised on federal and state grounds, but only addressed by the state court 

 

2 Relief may also be granted based on unreasonable determinations of the facts. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). But Petitioner makes no argument that the Arizona Court of Appeals 

misapprehended the facts, only the legal import of those facts.

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on state standards that are less protective than the federal standard or “quite different from 

the federal standard,” then the presumption may be rebutted. Id. at 301-302. 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court 

looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

b. Federal Law on Severance

Law Applicable in Federal Prosecutions – In Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 

534 (1993), the Court addressed a severance claim based on antagonistic defenses under 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14. The Court observed: 

There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of 

defendants who are indicted together. Joint trials “play a vital role in 

the criminal justice system.” They promote efficiency and “serve the 

interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of 

inconsistent verdicts.” For these reasons, we repeatedly have 

approved of joint trials. But Rule 14 recognizes that joinder, even 

when proper under Rule 8(b), may prejudice either a defendant or the 

Government.

506 U.S. at 537 (citations omitted). The Court opined: “We believe that, when defendants 

properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance under 

Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial 

right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about 

guilt or innocence.” Id. at 539. The Court noted, however that “it is well settled that 

defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of 

acquittal in separate trials.” Id. at 540. 

As examples of circumstances which would mandate severance under the federal 

rules, the Court referenced situations where evidence inadmissible against one defendant 

was admitted against a codefendant or needed to support the codefendant’s defense, or a 

complex case with many defendants where the defendants had varying degrees of 

culpability. Id.at 539-540. Regarding antagonistic defenses, the Court opined: “Mutually 

antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.” Id. at 538. 

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While an important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only 

relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or 

innocence, a fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant 

and competent evidence. A defendant normally would not be entitled 

to exclude the testimony of a former codefendant if the district court 

did sever their trials, and we see no reason why relevant and 

competent testimony would be prejudicial merely because the 

witness is also a codefendant.

Id. at 540 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, it was only where there was something 

more, like the admission of inadmissible evidence or exclusion of admissible evidence, 

that actionable prejudice would occur. 

Moreover, the Court opined that severance was not the only permissible remedy, 

observing that in that particular case the jury instructions “sufficed to cure any possibility 

of prejudice.” Id. at 541. 

Constitutional Requirement - The U.S. Supreme Court has not found a 

constitutional violation based on refusal to grant a severance based, whether on 

antagonistic defenses, or otherwise. 

In Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit 

declined to find Supreme Court law establishing a constitutional rule on severance for 

antagonistic defenses under Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) or United States 

v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n. 8 (1986). See also Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Collins). The circuit court concluded Lane offered only dicta on 

the issue, and that “[b]y its own wording, Zafiro only applies to federal and not state court 

trials.” Collins, 603 F.3d at 1131–32. 

However, there is a body of federal circuit court law addressing when the denial of 

severance violates due process. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(evaluating severance claim based on general standard of whether trial was rendered 

“fundamentally unfair”); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). 

More recently, unpublished decisions of the Ninth Circuit have applied the 

reasoning in Zafiro. “Denial of a motion to sever trial violates due process ‘only if there 

is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific right of one of the 

defendants, or prevent a jury from making a reliable judgement about guilt or innocence.’” 

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Reay v. Scribner, 369 Fed. Appx. 847, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (quoting 

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). See also Lee v. Jacquez, 406 Fed. Appx. 148, 149 (9th Cir. 

2010) (unpublished) (“A failure to sever does not rise to the level of a due process violation 

unless it creates a serious risk of ‘compromis[ing] a specific trial right of one of the 

defendants,’ or of ‘prevent[ing] the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 

innocence.’”) (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). 

4. Application to Facts

Unclear Whether De Novo Review Required - Here, because the Arizona 

Supreme Court summarily denied review (Exh. J, Order 2/14/17), the last reasoned 

decision on Petitioner’s severance claim was that by the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

Petitioner’s direct appeal. Plaintiff asserted to the Arizona Court of Appeals that the denial 

of his motion to sever resulted in the denial of a “fair trial as guaranteed by the 5th 

Amendment Due Process clause of the United States Constitution.” (Exh. D, Open. Brief 

at 19.) However, he also argued this claim based on state standards applicable under 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 13.4 (Id. at 18.) 

In addressing this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals made no reference to the 

federal nature of Petitioner’s claim, and cited no federal constitutional provisions or 

federal authorities. (See generally, Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 11-17.) Instead, in disposing of 

the severance claim, the state court cited only state rules (Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure 13.3 and 13.4) and state cases, including: State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25 

(1995); State v. Blackman, 201 Ariz. 527, 537 ¶ 39 (App. 2002); State v. Laird, 186 Ariz. 

203, 206 (1996); State v. Flythe, 219 Ariz. 117, 120, ¶ 9 (App. 2008); State v. Cruz, 137 

Ariz. 541, 544-545 (1983); State v. Turner, 141 Ariz. 470, 473 (1984); State v. VanWinkle,

186 Ariz. 336, 339 (1996); and State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 446, ¶ 67 (2016), as 

amended on denial of reconsideration (July 5, 2016). (Id.) 

None of these state cases purported to apply federal constitutional law. At most, 

they referenced federal cases arising under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 

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e.g. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25, 906 P.2d 542, 558 (1995) (citing United States v. 

Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1976)). Indeed, in State v. Cruz, the Arizona 

Supreme Court reviewed a string of federal circuit court cases addressing severance claims 

based on antagonistic defenses in federal prosecutions and adopted the same “approach.” 

Cruz, 137 Ariz. at 543–45, 672 P.2d at 472-74. 

Thus, this Court is faced with a federal constitutional argument fairly presented, but 

not explicitly decided by the state court, who instead addressed the claim solely on state 

law grounds. Assuming this Court can (for purposes of applying Johnson) view the 

antagonistic defense standard under Zafiro or even the circuit court’s general severance 

standards under Grisby, etc. as establishing the applicable federal standard, those standards 

are arguably “quite different from,” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301-302, the “mutually exclusive 

defense” standard applied by the state court. If that is the case, the presumption of a 

decision on the merits must be rejected, and the deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

would not apply.

Merits – Even so, Petitioner fails to show that the failure to sever amounted to a 

denial of due process. 

Although Zafiro may not have adopted a constitutional rule, more than one panel 

of the Ninth Circuit has looked to that case for a general standard on due process challenges 

to failure to sever. See Reay, 369 Fed. Appx. at 848–49; Lee, 406 Fed. Appx. at 149. 

Under Zafiro, antagonistic defenses were not considered problematic per se. 

Rather, they required severance only with something more. Here, Petitioner points to 

nothing more. At most, he argued to the appellate court that the defendants’ stories (the 

other was guilty) were mutually exclusive. While that may have reduced Petitioner’s 

chances of acquittal, co-defendants’ allegations of Petitioner’s guilt would have remained 

admissible against Petitioner had Petitioner been tried separately. Thus, trying them 

jointly did not alter the evidence available to the prosecution for presentation to the jury, 

and did not prejudice Petitioner. 

If the general severance standard applies, Petitioner fails to show that his trial was 

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rendered fundamentally unfair. The mere fact that Petitioner and co-defendant pointed the 

finger at each other does not establish fundamental unfairness. Such finger-pointing did 

not introduce inadmissible evidence. Nor did it preordain the jury’s verdict. The jury 

could, in the face of such finger-pointing, have chosen to believe either defendant, both 

defendants, or neither defendant. The Arizona Court found the jury “did not need to 

decide that only one of the defendants possessed the drugs and guns; it logically could 

have attributed any combination of guilt or innocence between the two defendants.” (Exh. 

G., Mem. Dec. at ¶ 14.) 

Moreover, the Zafiro Court acknowledged that any prejudice could be avoided by 

means other than severance, including jury instructions. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-541. 

Similarly, in Davis, when applying a generalized due process analysis, the Ninth Circuit 

held that prejudice had been limited through a jury instruction. Davis, 384 F.3d at 639

(citing Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 n. 13). Here, as the state court observed, the trial court 

instructed the jury that any conviction was to be “based upon that defendant's own conduct 

and from the evidence which applies to that defendant, as if that defendant were being 

tried alone.” (Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 17.) Petitioner fails to suggest why this instruction, 

which is presumed to be followed, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), was 

not sufficient to dissipate any prejudice sufficiently that his trial was not fundamentally 

unfair. 

5. Conclusion

Petitioner’s claim in Ground 2, even if considered de novo, is without merit and 

must be denied. 

C. GROUND 3 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 3, Petitioner argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy when 

he was charged with two counts of weapons misconduct when there was only one offense. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

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Respondents argue that Petitioner may only obtain review on federal law issues and 

this ground asserts a state law claims because it “essentially amounts to” a disagreement 

with the state court’s determination of state law. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 9-11.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim in his Notice of Intent to Not File a 

Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 

2. State Court Decision

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background to Ground 3 as 

follows:

Gutierrez was convicted of two counts of misconduct 

involving weapons in violation of A.RS. § 13-3102(A)(8) (2016) 

based on the two handguns found in the vehicle. The statute provides, 

in pertinent part, that a person commits misconduct involving 

weapons by knowingly "[u]sing or possessing a deadly weapon 

during the commission of any felony offense included in chapter 34 

of [the criminal code]." A.R.S. § 13- 3102(A)(8). 

Gutierrez argues the two convictions violate double jeopardy 

principles because § 13-3102(A)(8) constitutes a single offense 

regardless of the number of weapons used or possessed during the 

commission of a drug crime.

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 18-19.) The court rejected the claim, finding no support for the 

“contention that the unit of prosecution under A.RS. § 13-3102(A)(8) sweeps together into 

a single offense the use or possession of any number of deadly weapons while committing

a drug felony.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) Thus “the allowable unit of prosecution for a violation of 

A.RS. § 13-3102(A)(8) is each deadly weapon used or possessed during the commission 

of a felony drug offense. Accordingly, no double jeopardy violation occurred when 

Gutierrez was convicted and sentenced on two counts of misconduct involving weapons.” 

(Id. at ¶ 25.) 

3. Applicable Law

Cognizable Claims – The federal statutes permit habeas relief to a state prisoner 

“only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, habeas relief may not be 

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granted when the claim asserted arises under state law. 

Double Jeopardy / Multiple Punishments - In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 

(1969) the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 

jeopardy is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. A Double 

Jeopardy violation may occur where a court imposes unauthorized multiple punishments 

in the same proceeding. “A second punishment for the same offense violates the double 

jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment.” Smith v. U.S., 287 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 

1961) (internal citations omitted). However, for double jeopardy purposes, a single act 

may constitute multiple offenses so long as each offense “requires proof of a different 

element.” Blockberger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 

 State Law - A state court determination of state law is not subject to review in a 

federal habeas court. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) ("federal court 

is bound by the state court's interpretations of state law").

4. Application to Facts

Petitioner’s claim is cognizable because it asserts a violation of the protections 

afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents 

conflate the merits of the claim with its nature. That the merite of the claim may ultimately 

turn on a question of state law does not prevent it from being a federal claim. 

Indeed, the claim is without merit. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the 

statute under which Petitioner was convicted made each hand gun a separate offense. This 

federal habeas court is bound by that state court determination of state law. And, Count 4 

charged Petitioner with using or possessing a .22 caliber handgun, and Count 4 charged 

him with using or possessing a .40 caliber handgun. The jury found him guilty of both. 

They each required proof a different element, i.e. Count 3 required proof of a .22 caliber 

handgun, and Count 4 required proof of .40 caliber handgun. Thus, the separate element 

test under Blockberger, 284 U.S. at 304, was met, and no double jeopardy violation 

occurred. 

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5. Conclusion

Ground 3 is a cognizable federal claim, but is without merit. 

D. GROUND 4 – VINDICTIVE SENTENCING

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 4, Petitioner argues that his right to a trial was violated because he 

had been offered a mitigated 7.5 year sentence if he pled guilty, and instead received an 

aggravated sentence after trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that the rejection of this claim by the Arizona Court of Appeals 

was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 14-19.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim in his Notice of Intent to Not File a 

Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 

2. State Court Decision

In disposing of this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals made the 

following factual findings:

¶27 During a settlement conference held just before the 

hearing on the motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop in 

this case, the State offered to dismiss the other charges and 

recommend a sentence of no more than 10 years if Gutierrez would 

plead guilty to transportation of methamphetamine for sale and 

aggravated DUI. See A.RS. § 13-3407(E) (2016) (presumptive 

sentence for first-time offense of transportation of dangerous drug for 

sale is 10 years). Speaking directly to Gutierrez in the presence of 

counsel, the trial judge initially observed that an appropriate sentence 

for the two charges in the plea offer would be no more than eight and 

a half years. The judge said, "Certainly I would think, under the plea,

that a mitigated term would be appropriate. Again, how mitigated, 

I'm not sure .... But I could probably see a cap, based on purposes 

[sic] of the plea negotiations, of no more than eight and a half. I could 

go less than that; I'm just trying to give myself a little bit of a range 

under this plea." 

¶28 After a break to allow Gutierrez to confer with counsel, 

the judge returned to the bench and said that after giving it more 

thought, a shorter sentence would be appropriate under the proposed 

plea. She acknowledged that Gutierrez might defend the drug charge 

by arguing he knew nothing about the methamphetamine in the car, 

but pointed out that defense would still leave the aggravated DUI 

charge (based on Gutierrez's admitted use of heroin the morning of 

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the traffic stop). The judge told Gutierrez the maximum term on the 

aggravated DUI charge, by itself, would be 7.5 years. The court 

continued, "So it seems appropriate to me that [under the plea] I 

should make it a maximum of 7.5 rather than the 8.5 I told you. Again, 

I don't know if that makes any difference to you, but I want to let you 

know that I would - if you were interested in the plea, I would 

maximize my sentence at 7.5, which is the maximum that you could 

get after trial if you were just convicted of the aggravated DUI and 

not the drug charges, so for what it's worth .... [I]f you take the plea, 

I wouldn't impose more than 7.5, which is the maximum you could 

get at trial, even if you won on all the drug charges." 

¶29 Ultimately, Gutierrez declined to accept the plea, and 

the jury convicted him of seven charges. The court imposed a term of 

14 years' incarceration on the charge of transportation of 

methamphetamine for sale; each of the other sentences the court 

imposed were for shorter terms, and all were ordered to run 

concurrently. (The court imposed a term of seven years on the 

aggravated DUI conviction).

* * * *

¶32 Although the State had alleged aggravating factors before the 

settlement conference, it had not yet proven them and in fact, the State 

took the position that it would recommend sentences of no longer 

than the presumptive if Gutierrez would accept the plea offer. After 

convicting Gutierrez of each of the seven charges, however, the jury 

found two aggravating factors, presence of an accomplice and that 

the crimes were committed for pecuniary gain. See A.R.S. § 13-

701(D)(4), (6) (2016). The aggravating factors allowed the judge to 

impose a term of 14 years on the charge of transportation of 

methamphetamine for sale. A.RS. § 13-3407(E) (range of five to 15 

calendar years for first-time offense).

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶¶ 27-29, 32.) (Cf. Exhibit T, R.T. 2/24/16 at 8 (judge commits to 

maximum sentence of 7.5 years).) 

The state court opined:

Contrary to Gutierrez’s argument, there is no automatic 

presumption of unconstitutional vindictiveness whenever a judge 

imposes a greater sentence after trial than the judge offered during 

pretrial plea negotiations. The Supreme Court has held that a 

presumption of unconstitutional vindictiveness applies only when 

"there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the increase in sentence is the 

product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing 

authority." Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794,799 (1989) (citation 

omitted).

(Id. at ¶ 30.) The state court found that the mere increase in sentence from plea discussions 

to after trial did not establish actual vindictiveness. (Id. at ¶ 31-33.) 

/ /

/ /

/ /

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3. Applicable Law

a. Limits on Habeas Relief

As discussed above regarding Ground 2, to justify habeas relief, a state court’s 

decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” before relief may 

be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

The Supreme Court has instructed that a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law 

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 

arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 

(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To show an unreasonable application, “a state prisoner must show that the state 

court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

b. Vindictive Sentencing

A defendant has a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be 

subjected to vindictive sentencing after successfully attacking a conviction or sentence. 

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled in part by Alabama v. 

Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989). “To punish a person because he has done what the law 

plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort....” Bordenkircher 

v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977). 

Noting that the “existence of a retaliatory motivation would, of course, be 

extremely difficult to prove in any individual case,” the Supreme Court in Pearce crafted 

a prophylactic measure whereby vindictiveness is presumed “whenever a judge imposes a 

more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial,” and the reasons for the 

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enhancement do not “affirmatively appear.” Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. 

The Supreme Court has since limited the applicability of the Pearce presumption 

to cases “in which there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is the 

product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Alabama v. 

Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989). “Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the 

burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 

had held that no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists unless there is some 

“triggering event,” such as a reversal and remand. Bono v. Benov, 197 F.3d 409, 417-18 

(9th Cir.1999).

In Smith, the Court found no reason to presume vindictiveness where the defendant 

had successfully overturned a guilty plea, was then convicted at trial and sentenced to a 

longer term than allowed under the plea agreement. The court noted that “in the course of 

the proof at trial the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the 

crimes charged... insights into [defendant’s] moral character and suitability for 

rehabilitation..[and] the factors that may have indicated leniency as consideration for the 

guilty plea are no longer present... the court is not simply ‘do[ing] over what it thought it 

had already done correctly.’” Smith, 490 U.S. at 801–02. See also Taylor v. Kincheloe, 

920 F.2d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 1990) (no presumption of vindictiveness where the defendant’s 

“increased sentence was imposed after he was convicted of a greater crime than the one to 

which he had earlier pleaded guilty,” albeit by a judge other than the one who had earlier 

sentenced him). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that, although sentencing harsher than that 

portended by a rejected plea does not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness, the 

same is not true where the court has actually participated in the plea bargaining process, 

discussing a tentative sentence. See United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187-88 

(9th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 508, 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1986). In 

such instances, the presumption of vindictiveness applies, the record must affirmatively 

reflect legitimate reasons for the harsher sentence. But, Petitioner cites to no Supreme 

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Court authority adopting this reasoning. 

4. Application to Facts

Petitioner fails to show that the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

The state court identified the proper law, citing to and analyzing the facts under 

Alabama v. Smith. The court’s conclusion was not contrary to Smith, but in line with it. 

Nor was the state court’s application of Smith unreasonable. Petitioner fails to show 

that under the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood that the higher post-trial 

sentence resulted from vindictiveness, such that the presumption of vindictiveness should 

apply. As in Smith, the proposed sentence under the plea offer was made before the 

evidence came in at trial. Moreover, sentences based on plea agreements are routinely 

sentenced more leniently than those after trial, not to punish those who proceed to trial, 

but to reward those who accept responsibility for their conduct, admit their guilt, and 

thereby avoid the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the government, witnesses, jurors, 

etc. of proceeding through trial. “A genuine admission of guilt may properly result in a 

lighter sentence than would be appropriate for an intransigent and unrepentant 

malefactor.” Stockwell, 472 F.2d at 1187. 

It is true that the First Circuit has applied a presumption of vindictiveness to 

sentences after trial following a rejected plea, at least where pleading co-defendants 

received substantially lower sentences than a defendant who proceeded to trial. See United 

States v. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450, 457 (1st Cir. 1989). But the majority of other circuits, 

including the Ninth Circuit, have not followed suit. See Kurtis A. Kemper, J.D., Propriety 

of Sentencing Judge's Imposition of Harsher Sentence than Offered in Connection with 

Plea Bargain Rejected or Withdrawn Plea by Defendant—Federal Cases, 200 A.L.R. 

Fed. 591 at § 2. (Originally published in 2005). Indeed, even in United States v. Hayes, 

83 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished decision), the Ninth Circuit reasoned: “A 

presumption of vindictiveness does not arise where a sentence imposed after a trial is 

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greater than the sentence offered in a plea agreement. In such a case, the burden is on the 

defendant to make a showing of actual vindictiveness.”

3

 Thus, even if this Court could 

conclude that the state court’s refusal to apply a presumption of vindictiveness was in 

error, this Court could not conclude that “the state court's ruling ...was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

It is also true that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a separate line of reasoning creating 

a presumption of vindictiveness where the sentencing judge actually participated in the 

plea bargaining process. See Stockwell, 472 F.2d at 1187-88; and Carter, 804 F.2d at 510. 

But this habeas court can only look to Supreme Court law, and this approach has not been 

adopted by the Supreme Court. 

Nor can it be said that the facts underling these cases and Petitioner’s case of plea 

negotiation participation are materially indistinguishable from that in Smith or other 

Supreme Court authority such as Pearce. By participating in the plea negotiations, and 

affirmatively offering to a defendant a lower sentence for pleading guilty, the judge loses 

the appearance of disinterestedness, and instead of simply determining a sentence based 

upon the facts as developed at sentencing, he gathers the same personal stake that creates 

a likelihood of vindictiveness after a judge has been reversed on appeal.4 In so doing, the 

judge creates the appearance that he is “us[ing] the sentencing power as a carrot and stick 

to clear congested calendars.” Stockwell, 472 F.2d at 1187. While these additional facts 

might lead this Court to concluded on de novo review that a presumption of vindictiveness 

 

3 This unpublished memorandum decision, issued before January 1, 2007, is not cited as 

precedent, but solely to show that, as a factual matter, the state court’s decision was not 

unreasonable because a similar decision had been reached by a panel of this circuit’s court 

of appeals. See U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 36-3(c)(ii) (citation “for factual purpose”). 

4 Although the courts have been loathe to enunciate the factors which create a reasonable 

likelihood that a judge would be vindictive after reversal on appeal, the things that come 

to mind are the additional workload of re-doing a trial or sentencing, and the injury to pride 

of being determined wrong. Cf. Carter, 804 F.2d at 513 (discussing cases where the ire at 

the additional work was made explicit by the judge). Similar forces would seem to be at 

play after a defendant rejects a favorable plea, e.g. the additional work of proceeding 

through trial, and the prideful desire to gild the lily of being right. 

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should apply, under the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it cannot grant habeas relief 

based on such a determination.

Moreover, even under the plain rubric of Smith, the particular facts of this case (as 

pointed out by the Arizona Court of Appeals) preclude a finding of a reasonable likelihood 

of vindictiveness because the increased sentence came after trial when the trial court was 

possessed of jury findings of aggravating factors, including presence of an accomplice and 

commission for pecuniary gain. (Exh. G, Opinion at ¶ 32.) 

Nor does Petitioner point to any evidence of actual vindictiveness, such as 

statements by the trial judge that indicate the higher sentence was because of having 

proceeded to trial. 

5. Conclusion

The state court’s rejection of Ground 4 was not contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court law, and thus is without merit. 

E. GROUND 5 – SENTENCING ERROR

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 5, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated federal law by 

referencing the incorrect statute when sentencing him to flat time. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

10.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner simply argues this claim is a violation of federal 

law and that the claim is functionally a state law claim and thus not cognizable on habeas 

review. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 11-12.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim in his Notice of Intent to Not File a 

Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2.)

2. State Court Decision

In disposing of the underlying state law claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals made the following factual findings and summaries of the underlying state law 

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argument:

¶35 The court ordered that Gutierrez was not eligible for 

early release on the 14-year sentence it imposed on his conviction for 

transportation of methamphetamine for sale; rather, it ordered that 

sentence must be "flat time." Relying on language in A.R.S.§ 13-

3407(F), Gutierrez argues the court erroneously did not believe it had 

discretion to give him the benefit of early release. 

¶36 As noted, Gutierrez was convicted of transportation of 

methamphetamine for sale under A.R.S.§ 13-3407(A)(7). Subpart (F) 

of§ 13-3407 provides that a person convicted of violating§ 13-

3407(A)(7) for transporting methamphetamine for sale "is not 

eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or release from 

confinement on any basis until the person has served the sentence 

imposed by the court, the person is eligible for release pursuant to § 

41-1604.07 or the sentence is commuted." Gutierrez argues that the 

reference to release credits in this statute - "the person is eligible for 

release pursuant to § 41-1604.07" - grants the superior court authority 

to sentence a defendant to flat time or early release if deemed eligible 

by the Department of Corrections pursuant to A.RS. § 41- 1604.07 

(2016). In other words, Gutierrez asserts a flat-time sentence is not 

mandatory.

(Exh. G, Opinion at ¶¶ 35-36.) 5 The court then rejected Petitioner’s state law arguments, 

and concluded that under the Arizona statutes “the court had no discretion to make 

Gutierrez eligible for early release.” (Id. at ¶ 38.)

3. Construction of Claim

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable federal claims, but 

are instead purely state law claims. 

a. Cognizable Claims

Indeed, the applicable federal statutes permit habeas relief “only on the ground that 

[a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, if Petitioner’s claim were explicitly only under state 

 

5 On appeal, Petitioner did not assert any federal basis in connection with this issue. (See 

Exh. D, Opening Brief at 31-36; Exh. F. Repy Brief at 10-12.) Respondents, having 

construed this claim as arising only under state law, have failed to address exhaustion or 

procedural default issues. Because the federal claim is plainly without merit, the 

undersigned declines to do so sua sponte, and instead addresses the merits. See Boyd v. 

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (habeas court may raise procedural default sua 

sponte, but need not always do so). 

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law, or so construed, it would have to be dismissed.

b. Pleading of Legal Theories Not Required 

Respondents point out that Petitioner makes only the general reference to “federal 

law.” But the law does not mandate pleading legal theories.

The rules governing habeas corpus cases require that the petition must “specify all 

the grounds for relief available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each 

ground.” Rule 2(c), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (emphasis added). Neither the Rules 

nor the Advisory Committee Notes define what constitutes a “ground.” But there is no 

authority for the proposition that it mandates a specific legal theory, as opposed to simply 

laying the kernel of events that justify relief.

The standard of pleading civil complaints focuses on facts. “[A] complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. But the requirement of sufficiency does not require 

pleading of legal theories or authorities. “Federal pleading rules call for “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 

8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the 

legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S.Ct. 

346 (2014) (per curiam). “[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need 

not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 

521, 530 (2011). “Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims 

for relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 

1157 (9th Cir. 2008). “The ‘form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon 

which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal theory giving 

rise to the claim.’” St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 434-45 (5th Cir. 

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2000) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 604 (5th Cir.1981)). 

But plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories, even in the new 

world of pleading that is developing in the wake of the Supreme 

Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal. Instead, the complaint must simply “contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” 

Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 909 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

It is true that the pleading requirements in habeas proceedings are heightened over 

those normally applicable in civil cases. But the heightened standard is one of facts, not 

law. The Supreme Court has observed:

Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a 

complaint need only provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is 

more demanding. It provides that the petition must “specify all the 

grounds for relief available to the petitioner” and “state the facts 

supporting each ground.” See also Advisory Committee's Note on 

subd. (c) of Habeas Corpus Rule 2, 28 U.S.C., p. 469 (“In the past, 

petitions have frequently contained mere conclusions of law, 

unsupported by any facts. [But] it is the relationship of the facts to 

the claim asserted that is important ... .”); Advisory Committee's Note 

on Habeas Corpus Rule 4, 28 U.S.C., p. 471 (“ ‘[N]otice’ pleading is 

not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).

c. Liberal Construction

Further, where a petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court is obligated to liberally 

construe his Petition. "We must construe pro se habeas filings liberally, and may treat the 

allegations of a verified complaint or petition as an affidavit." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 

F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). A pro se pleading, “however inartfully pleaded,” is held to 

“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and can only be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

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That liberal construction requires the Court to read a claim as asserting legal 

theories suggested by the facts alleged.

Moreover, the liberal construction rule means that a judge should 

apply the relevant law regardless whether a self-represented litigant 

has mentioned it by name. Although a court cannot create a claim or 

a defense for a self-represented litigant where none exists, a judge 

should interpret a self-represented litigant's papers to raise the 

strongest arguments they suggest and to give effect to a pleading in 

conformity with the general theory that it was intended to follow.

Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented 

Litigants, 27 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 97, 124-125 (2007). “We believe that this 

[liberal construction] rule means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state 

a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's 

failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax 

and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall v. 

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “Once again, we must liberally construe 

the pro se litigant's pleadings, and we will apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether 

he has mentioned it by name.” Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373 (3rd Cir. 2003). 

See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (liberally construing pro se 

complaint to assert claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, even though only § 1983 cited).) 

“At the same time, we do not believe it is the proper function of the district court 

to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 

Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are 

not, however, without limits...It does not require those courts to 

conjure up questions never squarely presented to them. District 

judges are not mind readers. Even in the case of pro se litigants, they 

cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence 

fragments.

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). 

d. Construction of Claim

Here, Petitioner is proceeding pro se, and the Court must liberally construe his 

pleading. His reference to “federal law” makes clear that he intends to assert a federal 

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claim. Under the facts alleged by Petitioner, the strongest argument suggested is that the 

purported violation of the state’s sentencing law amounted to a denial of due process. See

Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

While the Petitioner may be wrong in such legal argument, that does not alter the 

nature of the claim made. If claims that went beyond the confines of prior decisions could 

never be asserted, the law would be stagnant. That is not the nature of American 

jurisprudence, nor is it a mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The statue only requires that a 

habeas claim be based upon allegations of a violation of the Constitution or other federal 

law. 

4. Due Process and State Law Errors

Egregious Errors - An error of state law may be “sufficiently egregious to amount 

to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To sustain such a due process 

claim founded on state law error, a habeas petitioner must show that the state court "error" 

was "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process." Jammal 

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v. Christensen, 789 

F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). To receive review of what otherwise amounts to nothing 

more than an error of state law, a petitioner must argue “not that it is wrong, but that it is 

so wrong, so surprising, that the error violates principles of due process”; that a state 

court’s decision was “such a gross abuse of discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks 

v. Zimmerman, 712 F.Supp. 496, 498 (W.D.Pa.1989). 

Thus, to make out such a due process claim, a petitioner must show: (1) that an 

error of state law occurred; and (2) that the error was egregious.

No Exception for Sentencing Errors - Respondents cite a series of cases (Jeffers, 

Cardwell, and Morgan) for the proposition that state sentencing errors are never ripe for 

federal habeas review. But these cases do not impose such a blanket prohibition. Jeffers

simply recognized that state law errors do not automatically result in constitutional error. 

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“[F]ederal habeas review of a state court's application of a constitutionally narrowed 

aggravating circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court's 

finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth

Amendment violation. Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 643[ ] (1974) 

(absent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas review of trial error is limited to 

whether the error “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 

a denial of due process”).” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990).

In Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979) the court simply 

acknowledged that presentence jail time credit is a legislative grace and not a constitutional 

mandate, and thus the lack of such credit did not amount to a constitutional violation. 

Indeed, this case does not even suggest that the denial was a state law error.6

To the extent that Magistrate Judge Fine reached a contrary conclusion in Morgan

v. Ryan, No. CV 15–01142–PHX–ROS (DMF), 2016 WL 7745030 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 

2016), that conclusion is not binding precedent. 

Nor is the reasoning persuasive. Judge Fine cited to cases (Estelle and Poland)

which simply acknowledge that habeas relief is not available for state law errors. See 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated many times that ‘federal 

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”) (quoting Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 

780); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Federal habeas courts lack 

jurisdiction, however, to review state court applications of state procedural rules.”) (citing 

Estelle and Jeffers). Judge Fine also cited to Cardwell, which is inapposite for the reasons 

discussed above. The other cases cited by Judge Fine (Souch, Christian, and Johnson) 

place no blanket prohibition on claims arising from sentencing errors. In Souch v. Schaivo, 

 

6

Indeed, it appears that Arizona law did not provide for presentence credit at the time of 

Cardwell’s 1971 conviction. See State v. San Miguel, 132 Ariz. 57, 59 (App. 1982) (“Prior 

to the enactment of A.R.S. s 13-709(B), there was no statutory authority requiring the 

crediting of presentence incarceration time.”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(B) (mandating 

presentence credit) and Credits (“Added as § 13-905 by Laws 1977, Ch. 142, § 57, eff. 

Oct. 1, 1978. Renumbered as § 13-709 by Laws 1978, Ch. 201, § 104, eff. Oct. 1, 1978. 

Renumbered as § 13-712 by Laws 2008, Ch. 301, § 27, eff. Jan. 1, 2009.”). 

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289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002), the court merely concluded that the state law errors 

alleged did not provide a basis for habeas relief because (apart from a meritless Ex Post 

Facto claim) the petitioner had “not alleged any other violation of Federal law.” In 

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 1994), the court in fact recognized the potential 

for due process challenges, holding: “Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state 

court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” 

Id. at 469 (emphasis added). Similarly, although more cryptically, in Johnson v. State of 

Ariz., 462 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1972), the court observed: “The district court is correct in 

stating that ordinarily matters of rules of sentencing adopted by the State courts do not 

raise constitutional issues which may be reached by habeas proceedings.” Id. at 1353 

(emphasis added). The court then went on, however, to evaluate an equal protection 

challenge to a retroactivity decision at sentencing. Id. at 1354.

No State Law Error - Nonetheless, Petitioner fails to meet the first requirement

for his due process claim: state law error. Although Petitioner has asserted in his state 

filings various legal arguments why he was entitled to a release-eligible sentence under 

Arizona law, the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled to the contrary. This federal habeas 

court is not free to second guess that determination. “We have repeatedly held that a state 

court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the 

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s due process claim is without merit.

5. Conclusion

Petitioner’s Ground 5, liberally construed to assert a violation of due process based 

on error in imposing a flat sentence, is without merit.

/ /

/ /

/ /

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F. GROUND 6, 7 – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 6, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

hire an investigator to investigate the omissions from the state’s disclosure and the law 

enforcement officers’ intentional outrageous misconduct. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.)

In his Ground 7, Petitioner argues that appellate and PCR counsel were ineffective 

for failing to: (1) investigate the outrageous government conduct; (2) challenge the use of 

inadmissible and irrelevant evidence; and (3) challenge a change during jury deliberations. 

He further argues PCR counsel was ineffective for incorrectly filing an “Anders brief.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 12.) 

Respondents argue that these claims are vague and conclusory, and fail to state a 

federal constitutional claim. Respondents further argue that Petitioner fails to show how 

the state PCR court’s rejection of these claims justifies habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). (Answer, Doc. 13 at 12-13.) 

Petitioner reiterates the basics of his claim (as set out in the Petition) in his Notice 

of Intent to Not File a Reply. (Doc. 15 at 2-3.)

2. State Court Decision

In his pro per PCR petition, Petitioner raised claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on: (a) failure to investigate the completeness of the state’s disclosures and 

failure to seek to suppress evidence, based on the officer finding additional drugs in the 

car after driving it to the station (Exh. N at 4); (b) failure to challenge the admissibility 

and relevance of the evidence (id.); (c) failure to investigate outrageous government 

conduct in planting drugs on Petitioner (id. at 4-5); (d) failure to raise an insufficient 

evidence defense (id. at 5); (e) failure to investigate that would have revealed inconsistent 

statements (id. at 6); (f) counsel had a conflict of interest during plea negotiations (id. at 

7). The State responded by arguing inter alia that Petitioner had asserted only conclusory 

claims devoid of facts to support them. (Exh. O.) In reply, Petitioner argued that the state 

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had the burden of showing an investigation would not have been productive (Exh. P at 4), 

that appellate counsel failed to address the police misconduct (id.), and PCR counsel’s 

conflict of interest could be inferred from his failure to pursue claims (id. at 5).7 

In disposing of the PCR petition, the PCR court concluded that Petitioner failed to 

state colorable claims of ineffective assistance. The court further described counsel’s 

representation:

In this case, trial counsel challenged the Defendant's detention and 

the subsequent search of the vehicle. He cross-examined the officer 

both in the hearing and at trial. Appellate counsel raised five issues 

of concern on appeal. The Court of Appeals did not find them to have 

merit.

(Exh. Q, Order 12/20/17 at 1.) The court then concluded:

Petitioner's remaining complaints relate to completely unsupported 

allegations that have no basis in fact or would have had little effect 

on the outcome. The Court has searched the record for any basis for 

post-conviction relief and finds none.

(Id.) 

3. Applicable Law

a. Vague and Conclusory Claims

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance are vague and 

conclusory. Cursory allegations that are purely speculative cannot support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.

1989). Thus, for example, a defendant cannot satisfy the Strickland standard by "vague 

and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have 

established his defense." Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir. 1991). 

Similarly, a petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony, but must 

adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 

 

7

 To the extent that Petitioner did not fairly present his claims of ineffectiveness in his 

PCR petition or petition for review therefrom, Respondents have not asserted a procedural 

default defense. Because the claims of ineffectiveness are all plainly without merit, the 

undersigned does not raise the issue sua sponte. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 

(9th Cir. 1998) (habeas court may raise procedural default sua sponte, but need not always 

do so).

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(9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must generally be 

presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot 

simply state that the testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will 

not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 

1991).

However, the undersigned notes that both the court and Respondents are often faced 

with evaluating a Petition which asserts claims in few words, and thus struggle to discern 

the import of the words. This is often the result of not only the petitioner’s pro se status, 

the limited space provided on the required form,

8

and the expanse of facts normally 

underlying most claims, but because the claims usually (and necessarily because of the 

exhaustion requirements) raise issues which have long been litigated by the petitioner and 

the state. Ordinarily, respondents will construe the claim to reassert the previously argued 

claims, with all the associated factual allegations raised in the state court, and respond 

accordingly. Of course, where there is no such prior record, and the essential facts are not 

alleged in the petition, then a “vague and conclusory” defense is most appropriate.

Here, the undersigned interprets the facts alleged by Petitioner in light of the 

background of facts asserted in raising the same claims in the state court. As discussed 

hereinafter, this still results in the conclusion that many of the claims remain vague and 

conclusory. 

b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

 

8 The District of Arizona’s required form and instructions, available at 

http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/2254-instructions-form.pdf, last 

accessed 5/1/19, may exacerbate the risk of inappropriate brevity. The form alerts 

petitioners that they may attach additional pages, but only does so “if you have more than 

four grounds.” Id., Form, at 5, ¶ 12. The Instructions twice similarly counsel that 

additional pages may be attached, but this immediately follows the instruction that “All 

questions must be answered clearly and concisely in the appropriate space on the form.” 

Id., Instructions, at 1, ¶ 2, and at 3 (Final Note). A reasonable, pro se, petitioner could 

interpret these as limiting each ground to a single page and that conciseness is paramount.

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, Petitioner 

must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the objective 

standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his 

claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed 

error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 

(9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made reasonable judgments 

and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th 

Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances. 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 679 

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F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 

572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

c. Deficient Performance by PCR Counsel

"There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations 

omitted). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) specifically provides: “The ineffectiveness or 

incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings 

shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.”

9

Consequently, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel are 

without merit, and to the extent that the PCR court rejected such claims on the merits, its 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

4. Application to Facts

a. Investigator re Disclosures

In Ground 6, Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an 

investigator to investigate the omissions from the state’s disclosures. 

 A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “[C]ounsel has a duty 

to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to 

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying 

 

9

Ineffectiveness of PCR counsel has been found to be a basis for establishing cause to 

excuse the procedural default of some claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See 

Martinez v. Schriro, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). And, as discussed hereinafter, PCR counsel may 

be the functional equivalent of appellate counsel. See Pacheco v. Ryan, CV-15-2264-

PHX-DGC-JFM, 2016 WL 7423410, at *29 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2016), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7407242 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2016). But neither of 

those situations apply here.

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a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

“Absent an account of what beneficial evidence investigation into any of these issues 

would have turned up, [the defendant] cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland

test.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Nowhere in this proceeding or in the state PCR has Petitioner suggested what 

information would have been disclosed by such an investigation or how it would have 

altered the outcome of trial. He simply presumes that there were omissions, but fails to 

offer anything to show there were, nor what they were, nor how an investigator would 

have discovered them, nor how the omissions prejudiced his defense. Accordingly, this 

claim is vague and conclusory, and without merit. 

Consequently, to the extent that the PCR court rejected this claim on the merits, its 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

b. Investigator re Officer Misconduct

In Ground 6, Petitioner also argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain 

an investigator to investigate the officers’ misconduct. In Ground 7, he makes the same 

allegations regarding appellate counsel. In light of the arguments presented to the PCR 

court, the undersigned understands this to refer to Petitioner’s allegations that drugs were 

“planted” in his car after his arrest. However, Petitioner proffers no evidence that such an 

event occurred, nor how an investigator would have discovered proof of such conduct. 

Perhaps Petitioner relies upon his own knowledge that he had not put the referenced 

drugs in the car, or even that they were not in the car prior to his arrest. But, such 

information would have been known to Petitioner and thus otherwise available to counsel. 

Moreover, Petitioner proffers no reason to believe that an investigator would have 

unearthed evidence, beyond Petitioner’s testimony, to support the contention.

Petitioner suggested to the state court that the planting of drug evidence, 

particularly at the location of Petitioner’s arrest, was common place. But, again, Petitioner 

proffers no evidence of such misconduct. Nor does he suggest how an investigator would 

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have uncovered such evidence. 

Accordingly, this claim is vague and conclusory, and without merit. 

Consequently, to the extent that the PCR court rejected this claim on the merits, its 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

c. Evidence

In Ground 7, Petitioner argues appellate and PCR counsel were ineffective for 

failing to challenge the use of inadmissible and irrelevant evidence. But Petitioner fails 

to suggest what evidence he refers to, why it was inadmissible or irrelevant, or how it 

would have altered the outcome of the appeal. Accordingly, this claim is vague and 

conclusory, and without merit. 

To the extent that Petitioner intends to refer to the evidence he asserts in Ground 1 

was inadmissible because of the lack of probable cause, Petitioner cannot show deficient 

performance, because appellate counsel did argue this issue on direct appeal. (Exh. D, 

Opening Brief at 10, et seq.) Nor can he show prejudice, because the claim was ultimately 

rejected, indicating raising it was futile. See Rupe, supra, 93 F.3d at 1445.

In addition, as discussed above, PCR counsel could not be constitutionally 

ineffective. 

Consequently, to the extent that the PCR court rejected this claim on the merits, its 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

d. Change During Jury Deliberations

In Ground 7, Petitioner argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge a “change” during jury deliberations. Petitioner fails to suggest what that 

“change” was, the basis on which counsel could have challenged it, or how the failure to 

raise it prejudiced him (i.e. that the challenge would have been successful).10

 

10 The only “change” in the jury reflected in the limited record before this Court is the 

selection of alternates after final instructions, and their being excused. (See Exh. B, M.E. 

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Accordingly, this claim is vague and conclusory, and without merit. 

In addition, as discussed above, PCR counsel could not be constitutionally 

ineffective. 

Consequently, to the extent that the PCR court rejected this claim on the merits, its 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

e. Anders Brief

In his Ground 7, Petitioner argues that PCR counsel was ineffective for incorrectly 

filing an “Anders brief.” 

As discussed above, because not constitutionally required, PCR counsel could not 

be constitutionally ineffective. 

Moreover, an Anders brief is only required on a first, direct appeal. See Anders v. 

State of California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The only time Anders has application in a PCR 

proceeding is when it is the functional equivalent of direct appeal because it is a 

defendant’s only opportunity to obtain review of his conviction. See Pacheco v. Ryan, 

CV-15-2264-PHX-DGC-JFM, 2016 WL 7423410, at *29 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2016), report 

and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7407242 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2016) (and cases 

cited therein). But in Arizona, that is only true in an of-right PCR proceeding brought by 

a defendant who pled guilty. Id. Here, Petitioner did not plead guilty, and he had a 

traditional direct appeal. 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit, and to the extent that the PCR court 

rejected this claim on the merits, its decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court law. 

5. Conclusion

All of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are vague and 

 

3/25/15 at 2.) Petitioner does not suggest how this routine process could have been 

successfully challenged. 

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conclusory, or otherwise without merit. Accordingly, Grounds 6 and 7 are without merit. 

G. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s exclusionary rule claim in Ground 1 is barred from relief under Stone 

v. Powell. Petitioner’s due process challenge to the failure to sever in Ground 2 is without 

merit. Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim in Ground 3 is a cognizable federal claim, but 

is without merit. The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s vindictive sentencing claim in 

Ground 4 was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, and 

thus is without merit. Petitioner’s Ground 5, liberally construed to assert a violation of 

due process based on error in imposing a flat sentence, is without merit. Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance claims in Grounds 6 and 7 are without merit. 

Because all of the grounds for relief are without merit, the Petition must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

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straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth 

herein, jurists of reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed September 4, 2018 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: May 10, 2019

18-8209r RR 19 04 25 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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