Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02257/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EARL EUGENE HAYNES, 

CDCR #H-23481, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Dr. JOHN CHAU, Physician & Surgeon; 

Dr. D. ROBERTS, Chief Medical 

Executive; Sgt. M. ARTEGA, 

Correctional Sergeant, 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-02257-JAH-KSC 

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2] 

2) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS AND 

CLAIMS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 

3) GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND 

AND DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER [ECF Nos. 6, 8] 

AND 

4) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL 

TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON 

DEFENDANT CHAU PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 

 

 Earl Eugene Haynes (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil 

rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff seeks 

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to sue his1

 treating physician at RJD, Dr. John Chau, RJD’s Chief Medical Executive, Dr. 

D. Roberts, and Correctional Sergeant M. Artega, alleging they all failed to provide him 

adequate medical care and/or accommodations for a ventral hernia he developed 

sometime between June and September 2019. See id. at 10‒16. 

 Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has 

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

See ECF No. 2. He has also submitted another document entitled “Order to Show Cause 

& Temporary Restraining Order,” which the Court accepted for filing in light of his pro 

se status despite its non-compliance with Local Civil Rules 7.1.b and 7.1.f.1, and 

construes as a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65. See ECF Nos. 5, 6; Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se 

motions as well as complaints.”). Plaintiff has since filed an additional Motion seeking 

leave to amend his previous Motion for TRO. See ECF No. 8. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

                                               

1

 The medical records Plaintiff attaches and incorporates by reference to his Complaint indicate he is a 

male to female transgender inmate and they use both male and female pronouns when referring to him/her. 

However, Plaintiff uses only male pronouns in the body of his pleading; therefore, the Court will do the 

same until he requests otherwise. See Compl. at 12, 15‒16‒17. 

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629. 

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by an accounting officer at 

RJD. See ECF No. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. These statements show Plaintiff maintained an average monthly balance of 

$254.23, and had $163.28 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. His available balance as 

of November 26, 2019, however, was only $22.53. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $50.84 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

Because his available balance at the time of filing was insufficient to cover this initial fee, 

however, the Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect it 

only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order is 

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executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

 A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

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accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A 

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 

426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may 

be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations 

 On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff was admitted to Alvarado Hospital from RJD for a 

hiatal hernia3

 surgery performed by Justin King, M.D. See Compl. ¶¶ 9‒10. While in 

post-op recovery at Alvarado, and still under Dr. King’s care, Plaintiff developed a 

“fascial dehiscence within the incision site,” which required a second surgery on June 4, 

2019. Id. ¶ 13. On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff was discharged from Alvarado to RJD’s 

Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”), where he remained in post-op recovery and 

                                               

3

 “A hiatal hernia occurs when part of the stomach pushes upward through the small opening (hiatus) 

through which the esophagus passes on its way to the stomach.” Alvarez v. Hashemi, No. 1:16‒CV‒

00203‒AWI‒JLT PC, 2019 WL 1099838, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019). 

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under the care of Dr. D. Clayton. Id. ¶¶ 15‒16.4

 On June 20, 2019, he was returned to 

RJD’s E-Facility for further post-op “recovery, wound care, & monitoring” by Dr. Chau. 

Id. ¶ 17. 

 On June 25, 2019, Plaintiff continued to experience abdominal pain and “noticed 

the first signs of swelling & distension.” Id. ¶ 19. He was examined by Dr. Chau who 

noted Plaintiff’s complaints of “mild abdominal discomfort,” but “no fever or chills.” See

Pl.’s Ex. F, ECF No. 1 at 21. Dr. Chau’s progress notes also included an “Assessment 

Plan” indicating a “follow‒up with surgery” had been scheduled in 2 days. Id. at 22.5

Plaintiff claims, however, that “27 June 2019 came & went with no follow up.” See 

Compl., ¶ 20. 

 On July 11, 2019, Plaintiff was summoned or “ducated” to see Dr. Chau for a postop consultation “initiated by Dr. King, who supervised [his] suture removal.” Id. ¶ 21. 

Plaintiff claims he again renewed his complaints of pain, discomfort, swelling and 

“noticeable” distension, but Dr. Chau “did nothing,” except reschedule him for a later 

appointment, and “instruct[] [him] to use an abdominal binder at all times.” Id., see also

Pl.’s Ex. H, ECF No. 1 at 25.6

/// 

                                               

4

 Neither Dr. King nor Dr. Clayton are named as Defendants. 

5

 The Court notes that in addition to Plaintiff’s “large hiatal hernia status post open surgery and 

fundoplication 5-29-19,” Dr. Chau’s July 11, 2019 Progress Notes also describe Plaintiff as a “71 yearold male to female transgender, morbidly obese,” and cites a “Problem List” of “Past Medical History 

Ongoing” concerns including more than a dozen other medical conditions, including avascular necrosis 

of the hip, chronic GERD, constipation and lower back pain, degenerative disc disease, diabetes mellitus 

type 2, dyslipidemia, foraminal stenosis of the lumbar region, gender dysphoria, BPH, COPD, 

hypertension, major depressive disorder, mild sleep apnea, acute chest pain, and “noncompliance with 

medical treatment and regimen.” See Pl.’s Ex. H, ECF No. 1 at 25. 

6

 An abdominal binder or truss “is a supportive undergarment that physicians recommend as non-surgical 

way to ease discomfort or pain from a hernia because it applies gentle pressure on the hernia and keeps it 

in place.” Wilkins v. Magat, No. 15-CV-01706-YGR (PR), 2018 WL 4638699, at *15 n.31 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 25, 2018) (citing https://www.webmd.com/digestive-disorders/qa/what-are-nonsurgical-treatmentsfor-a-hernia (last visited September 4, 2018)). 

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 On September 4, 2019, Plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Chau who noted he 

had tolerated the May 29, 2019 procedure well, but “unfortunately now ha[d] a ventral 

hernia.” See Compl. ¶ 23 & Ex. I at 28.7

 Dr. Chau reported the new hernia was “soft and 

redu[c]ible,” told Plaintiff “not to worry about it,” and recommended he “use an 

abdominal truss on a trial basis.” Compl. ¶ 25 & Ex. I at 28. 

 Plaintiff continued to experience pain, discomfort, and anxiety due to “the 

worsening incision area manifesting swelling, tenderness, and redness,” see Compl. ¶ 28, 

and claims Dr. Chau “was completely aware [that] the incision scar had separated a 

second time in 60-days, allowing [Plaintiff’s] small bowel to protrude.” Id. ¶ 29. 

Therefore, Plaintiff submitted a “Health Care Service Request” or CDCR Form 7362, 

“explaining the dire circumstances that were becoming worse with pronounced 

abdominal distension.” Id. ¶ 30. 

 On September 26, 2019, Plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Chau, who reported 

that Plaintiff “now present[ed] with [a] large ventral hernia,” and complaining of 

“discomfort” and a “burning sensation over [the] area” that “bother[ed] him throughout 

the night.” See Compl. ¶ 31, Pl.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 1 at 32. Dr. Chau’s Progress Notes 

taken during the September 26, 2019 consult further indicate Plaintiff “wish[ed] to 

consider possible surgery for ventral hernia repair,” and they include an order requesting 

that Plaintiff be referred for “general surgery.” See Pl.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 1 at 32. Plaintiff 

claims Dr. Chau’s Progress Notes “grossly distort the tenor [of] the consultation,” fail to 

describe it as “contentious,” and “downplay the severity of [his] hernia.” Compl. ¶¶ 31‒

32. 

/// 

                                               

7

 “A ventral hernia is a bulge of tissues through an opening of weakness within [the] abdominal wall 

muscles. It can occur at any location on [the] abdominal wall. Many are called incisional hernias because 

they form at the healed site of past surgical incisions. Here abdominal wall layers have become weak or 

thin, allowing for abdominal cavity contents to push through.” See https://www.healthline.com/ 

health/ventral-hernia (last visited March 4, 2020). 

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 On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff claims he consulted with Dr. R. Zhang,8

 the 

“physician[n] on duty.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff repeated his complaints of pain, swelling, and 

discomfort, but Zhang also noted his hernia remained “soft and reducible,” and that 

Plaintiff “seem[ed] comfortable throughout the interview.” Zhang informed Plaintiff of a 

“pending surgical consultation at the end of the month,” and Zhang’s Progress Notes 

indicate Plaintiff “agreed with the plan.” Id. at 35; cf. Pl.’s Ex. K, ECF No. 1 at 35‒36. 

However, Plaintiff claims Dr. Zhang’s description of the October 15, 2019 exam, like Dr. 

Chau’s, are “mislead[ing],” “self-serving,” and a “complete distortion of the truth,” since 

he “has no option to disagree & is at the professional mercy of medical staff regarding 

any scheduling.” Id. ¶¶ 35-36. 

 At the time he filed his Complaint no surgery had yet to be scheduled. Id. ¶ 37. 

Plaintiff contends his “new hernia is a medical emergency requiring immediate medical 

intervention,” “irrespective of Dr. Chau’s blasé attention.” Id. ¶ 33. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 

D. Supervisory Liability – Defendant D. Roberts 

In addition to Dr. Chau, who served as the E‒Facility’s treating physician 

responsible for providing Plaintiff with post-operative “recovery, wound-care & 

monitoring,” see Compl. ¶¶ 17‒33, Plaintiff also names D. Roberts, RJD’s Chief Medical 

Executive, as a Defendant. Id. at 2. Plaintiff identifies Roberts by his title, and contends 

he is liable for failing to “oversee the operations of the Medical Department to ensure 

                                               

8

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prisoners receive proper medical care.” Id. at ¶¶ 6, 46‒48. However, Plaintiff does not 

mention Roberts again in the body of his pleading, and does not explain the role he or she 

may have played in any decisions Dr. Chau is alleged to have made regarding his medical 

care or need for a second hernia surgery. “[A] defendant may not be held liable under 

§ 1983 merely because he had certain job responsibilities.” Hernandez v. Aranas, No. 

218CV00102JADBNW, 2020 WL 569347, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

In short, Plaintiff fails to include any “further factual enhancement” to show how, 

or to what extent, Dr. Roberts may be held personally liable for any constitutional injury. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Jones v. Comm’ty Redev. Agency of City of Los Angeles, 

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some 

degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

Plaintiff does claim Roberts is responsible to “hire & employ doctors for the operation of 

State Prisons,” see Compl., at 2, but “[v]icarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 

suits, [and] a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through [his] 

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution,” in order to plead a plausible claim 

for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (supervisor may be held liable under Section 1983 only if there is “a sufficient 

causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 

858, 862 (9th Cir.1979) (when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the 

causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged); Victoria v. City of San Diego, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1013 (S.D. 

Cal. 2018) (“Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation 

by the defendant.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is simply devoid of any factual allegations sufficient to show 

Dr. Roberts “participated in or directed [Dr. Chau’s alleged] violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 

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Cir.1989); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Starr, 652 F.3d 

at 1207–08 (“A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable 

action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or 

callous indifference to the rights of others.”). 

For these reasons, the Court dismisses Dr. Roberts as a party to this action sua 

sponte based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a plausible claim for relief against him pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

E. ADA Claims‒Sgt. M. Artega 

Plaintiff also names Sgt. M. Artega as a Defendant, and claims Artega is the “ADA 

Coordinator for E-Facility.” See Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff does not specify what role Artega 

played with respect to his medical care or his accommodations, but he concludes Artega 

is “responsible” for ensuring disabled prisoners receive “services, programs & activities” 

under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and 

contends “medical care falls under ‘services,’” and therefore, Artega may be held liable 

for failing to meet his “disability-related needs.” Id. ¶ 52. 

The ADA applies to prisons and jails. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); U.S. v. 

Georgia 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006). In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, 

however, Plaintiff must allege: 

(1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise qualified to 

participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either excluded from participation in or 

denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or 

was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;’ and (4) ‘such 

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] 

disability.’ 

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thompson v. 

Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). 

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Even assuming Plaintiff’s ventral hernia is a qualified disability, and that he is 

otherwise entitled to participate or benefit from some RJD service, program, or activity, 

Plaintiff does not allege that Sgt. Artega, or any other named Defendant, discriminated 

against him because of his hernia. O’Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1060; see also Weinreich v. Los 

Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978-79 (1997) (requiring plaintiff to 

plead and prove the defendant’s actions supporting a Rehabilitation Act claim were taken 

“solely by reason of disability.”). Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the 

basis of disability.” Lowell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Medical 

treatment, the lack of treatment, an alleged misdiagnosis, or allegations of inadequate 

care alone do not support an ADA claim. See e.g., Marlor v. Madison County Idaho, 50 

Fed. App’x 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the ADA prohibits discrimination because 

of disability, not inadequate treatment for a disability, as Plaintiff appears to allege here 

with respect to his post-operative care and/or alleged need for a second hernia surgery, 

his purported ADA claim fails. See Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1022, overruled on other 

grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016); see also 

Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Act would not be violated 

by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners....The 

ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”). Inadequate treatment or lack 

of treatment for Plaintiff’s medical condition does not in itself suffice to create liability 

under the ADA. Tandel v. Cty. of Sacramento, 2015 WL 1291377, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

20, 2015); Bryant, 84 F.3d at 249 (“No discrimination is alleged; Bryant was not treated 

worse because he was disabled. His complaint is that he was not given special 

accommodation.”). 

Finally, Plaintiff may not pursue an ADA claim for damages against any of the 

individually named Defendants, including Sgt. Artega, because there is no individual 

liability under Title II. See Heinke v. County of Tehama Sheriff’s Dept., No. CVI S-12-

2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug.1, 2013). The ADA’s 

definition of “public entity” does not include individuals. See Hardwick v. Curtis 

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Trailers, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1037, 1038-39 (D. Or. 1995) (individual liability is precluded 

under ADA Title II) (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern., Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 

1993)); see also Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999); 42 

U.S.C. § 12131(1); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff 

cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in [his or] her 

individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA ...”); Weathers v. 

Hagemeister-May, No. 1:13-CV-01932-AWI, 2014 WL 309444, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 

2014). 

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim for 

relief under the ADA, and also dismisses Sgt. Artega as a party to this action sua sponte

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

F. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Claims ‒ Dr. Chau 

With respect to the gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint and his Eighth Amendment 

inadequate medical care claims against Dr. Chau, however, the Court finds his Complaint 

contains plausible Eighth Amendment allegations sufficient to surpass the “low 

threshold” set for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 

See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

104 (1976) (prison officials’ deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 

While it is well established that “a mere difference of medical opinion ... [is] 

insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference,” Toguchi v. Chung, 

391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (citation omitted), in some 

cases a prisoner may state a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs based on a 

difference of medical opinion. See, e.g., Gould v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 

No. 2:18-CV-1981-JAM-EFB P, 2020 WL 704000, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2020). To 

do so, the prisoner must allege that “the course of treatment the doctors chose was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances,” and that they “chose this course in 

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conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Under this standard, “denying an 

inmate a surgery without performing an honest or sufficient medical evaluation of the 

patient might constitute deliberate indifference.” Gould, 2020 WL 704000, at *3 (citing 

Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332). “Deliberate indifference ‘may appear when prison officials 

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown in the 

way in which prison physicians provide medical care.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 

1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) ((quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th 

Cir. 1988)). To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from a delay in 

providing care, the prisoner must allege the delay was harmful. See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 

F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

Here, Plaintiff claims Dr. Chau was aware of his pain, discomfort, swelling, and 

“noticeable” distention as early as July 11, 2019, see Compl. ¶ 21, that he had developed 

a ventral hernia by September 4, 2019, id. ¶ 25, and “was completely aware [that] the 

incision scar had separated a second time in 60-days, allowing [Plaintiff’s] small bowel to 

protrude” when he examined him on that day. Id. ¶ 29. Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends 

Dr. Chua failed to address his complaints of pain, discomfort, burning, and anxiety, and 

instead “downplay[ed] the severity of [his] hernia” until September 29, 2019, when it had 

then become “large,” his incision area had worsened, and he presented with a 

“pronounced abdominal distention,” and a “red, open, & raw” incision “showing what 

appear[ed] to be bowel underneath the skin.” See id. ¶¶ 28‒32. 

These allegations, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are sufficient to 

support a reasonable inference that Dr. Chau’s actions and/or inactions went beyond mere 

difference in medical opinion and rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. 

 Therefore, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Dr. J. Chau 

on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and 

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serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he 

court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if 

the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).9

III. Motion to Amend and Motion for TRO 

 Finally, in both his original Motion for TRO and his Motion to Amend, Plaintiff 

requests immediate injunctive relief “requiring Defendants to arrange for emergency 

treatment by an outside medical clinic or facility,” and to “schedule ventral hernia repair” 

surgery. See ECF No. 6 at 7; ECF No. 8 at 3‒4.

 A. Standard of Review 

Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if 

it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the 

lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) 

(noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that 

capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the 

time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The court may not attempt 

to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. 

Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 

1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 961 

(M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster 

v. Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 

U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give only the relief 

to which plaintiffs are entitled”). An injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” 

their “officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in 

active concert or participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(A)-(C). 

                                               

9

 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a 

substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. 

Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

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 The substantive purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a 

preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed 

merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. 

v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). But the 

legal standard that applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a 

preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Substantively, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never 

awarded as of right, and the grant of a preliminary injunction is a matter committed to the 

discretion of the trial judge[.]” Epona v. Cty. of Ventura, 876 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 

2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “‘A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, 

__ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736-37 (2015) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish 

that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary 

injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

 In addition, the PLRA requires prisoners to satisfy additional requirements when 

seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials: 

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than 

necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and 

be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall 

give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation 

of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect 

the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any 

preliminary relief. 

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

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Section 3626(a)(2) places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant 

preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, and “operates simultaneously to restrict the 

equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison 

administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that binds prison 

administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the 

State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Case 

First, the Court notes Plaintiff’s case is still in its preliminary screening stage, the 

United States Marshal has yet to effect service upon Dr. Chau on his behalf, and Plaintiff 

has not “certified in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should 

not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). Indeed, the Court has no personal 

jurisdiction over any Defendant at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Murphy Bros., 

Inc., 526 U.S. at 350; Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. 

Second, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over Dr. Chau, Plaintiff has 

failed to establish “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint [to] clearly show 

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to [him] before the 

adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A); Winter, 555 U.S. 

at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. “The fact that plaintiff has met the 

pleading requirements allowing him to proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, 

entitle him to a preliminary injunction.” Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 

2011 WL 3875892, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). 

 Instead, to meet the “irreparable injury” requirement, Plaintiff must do more than 

plausibly allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., 

Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires Plaintiff to 

demonstrate by specific facts and evidence that there is a credible threat of immediate and 

irreparable harm. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “Speculative injury does not constitute 

irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Carribbean 

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Marine Servs. Co., 844 F.3d at 674-75. 

 Here, Plaintiff claims Dr. Chau has failed to adequately address his medical needs 

by downplaying his complaints, inaccurately documenting his condition, and by failing to 

arrange or ensure he would be scheduled for a ventral hernia surgery on an “emergency” 

basis. See Compl. ¶¶ 33‒34. In his Motion to Amend his TRO, Plaintiff contends his pain 

level has increased, he is unable to function at a prison job assignment, and remains 

wheelchair bound despite an “obvious need for repair surgery.” See ECF No. 8 at 3. 

Plaintiff concludes that “[t]he lack of diligent monitoring ... is not only disconcerting, but 

could be life-threatening possibly causing irreparable harm.” Id. 

While the Court must construe the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint in the light 

most favorable to him in order to determine whether he has sufficiently pleaded a 

plausible claim for relief against Dr. Chua under the Eighth Amendment, see Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679, these claims alone do not establish that he currently faces the type of 

immediate and credible threat of irreparable injury necessary to justify extraordinary 

injunctive relief at this stage of the case. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102; Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 

375–76; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (“Under Winter, plaintiff[ ] must 

establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible.”); Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. 

Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury 

does not constitute irreparable injury.”). Rigsby v. State, No. CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC, 

2013 WL 1283778, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying prisoner’s TRO based on fear 

of potential future injury based on past assaults); Chappell v. Stankorb, No. 1:11-CV01425-LJO, 2012 WL 1413889, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012) (denying injunctive relief 

where prisoner’s claims of injury based on current or future housing decisions were 

nothing “more than speculative.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV01425-LJO, 2012 WL 2839816 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012). A presently existing actual 

threat must be shown, even though injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio 

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 

F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997); Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. 

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 “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)); see also Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 

784 F.3d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 2015) (movant “bears the heavy burden of making a clear 

showing’ that it [i]s entitled to a preliminary injunction”). At this early stage of the case, 

while Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a plausible claim for relief with respect to Dr. 

Chau, neither his Complaint, the medical records he has attached as exhibits, nor his 

Motion for TRO, make the clear showing necessary to justify the “drastic remedy” of 

immediate injunctive relief. See Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072; 11A Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2949 (3d ed. 2019) (“Evidence that goes beyond 

the unverified allegations of the pleadings and motion papers must be presented to 

support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction.”); see also Herb Reed 

Enterprises, LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1251 (9th Cir. 2013) (a party 

seeking injunctive relief “must proffer evidence sufficient to establish a likelihood of 

irreparable harm”); see also Tilei v. California Dep’t of Correction & Rehab., No. 3:19-

CV-1708-WQH-KSC, 2020 WL 819094, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020) (finding claims 

that prisoner was “likely to suffer ‘more’ irreparable harm or even death” after a 

traumatic spinal injury speculative, not clearly supported by the record, and therefore 

insufficient to warrant emergency injunctive relief). 

Therefore, while the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Motion for 

TRO (ECF No. 8), it must DENY his Motion for TRO (ECF No. 6) without prejudice 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. 

IV. Conclusion and Orders 

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2). 

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2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $50.84 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full 

$350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s 

account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE 

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION. 

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

4. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Motion for TRO (ECF No. 8), 

but DENIES his Motion for TRO without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (ECF 

No. 6). 

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s supervisorial liability and ADA claims sua sponte

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and DIRECTS

the Clerk of the Court to terminate the action with respect to Defendants D. ROBERTS 

and M. ARTEGA. 

 6. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1) upon Dr. J. CHAU and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal 

Form 285 for this Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified 

copy of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1), and a summons so that 

he may serve Dr. J. CHAU. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete 

the USM Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where 

Dr. J. CHAU may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., 

and return it to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides 

in the letter accompanying his IFP package. 

 7. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) 

and summons upon Dr. J. CHAU as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285 provided 

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to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 

 8. ORDERS Defendant, once he has been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone 

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 

required to respond). 

 9. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendant’s 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been served on Defendant 

or his counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any document 

received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or which fails to 

include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendant, or his counsel, may be disregarded. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 16, 2020 

 Hon. John A. Houston 

United States District Judge 

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