Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05301/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2016 Decided July 5, 2016

No. 14-5301

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY,

ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

ABIGAIL ROSS HOPPER, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. BUREAU OF

OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 14-5303

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01073)

(No. 1:10-cv-01067)

(No. 1:10-cv-01079)

(No. 1:10-cv-01238)

Benjamin S. Sharp argued the cause for appellant Alliance

to Protect Nantucket Sound. With him on the briefs were

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Donald C. Baur, Jennifer A. MacLean, W. Eric Pilsk, and

Charles Alan Spitulnik.

Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for appellants Public

Employees for Environmental Responsibility, et al. With him

on the briefs was William S. Eubanks II.

Todd D. Lochner was on the brief for amici curiae Cape

Cod Marine Trades Association, Inc. and Massachusetts

Fishermen’s Partnership, Inc. in support of appellants.

J. David Gunter II, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on the brief

were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Luther L.

Hajek, Attorney.

Christopher H. Marraro argued the cause for intervenor

Cape Wind Associates, LLC. With him on the brief was

Geraldine E. Edens.

Before: MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: The Cape Wind Energy

Project is a proposal to generate electricity from windmills off

the coast of Massachusetts. It calls for the “construction,

operation and maintenance . . . of 130 wind turbine generators”

in the Horseshoe Shoal region of Nantucket Sound. The

turbines have an estimated life-span of twenty years, and during

that time they are expected to generate up to three-quarters of

the electricity needs for Cape Cod and the surrounding islands. 

The project’s “underlying purpose” is to help the region achieve

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Massachusetts’s renewable energy requirements, which

“mandate that a certain amount of electricity come from

renewable energy sources, such as wind.” See MASS. GEN.

LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F.

Offshore energy providers like Cape Wind must comply

with a slew of federal statutes designed to protect the

environment, promote public safety, and preserve historic and

archeological resources on the outer continental shelf.1

 They

must also go through “several regulatory and administrative

procedures” to satisfy regulations promulgated under these

statutes. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25

F. Supp. 3d 67, 85 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed sub nom.

Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Cruickshank, No.

14-5117, 2014 WL 3014869 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2014).

Cape Wind first sought government approval for its project

in 2001 when it filed a permit application with the United States

Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency then regulating

outer continental shelf wind energy projects. See All. to Protect

Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 398 F.3d 105, 107

(1st Cir. 2005); 33 U.S.C. § 403. Four years later, the Energy

Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 388(a), 119 Stat. 594,

744, amended the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, see 43

U.S.C. § 1337(p), and transferred primary regulatory authority

1

 “Outer Continental Shelf . . . means all submerged lands lying

seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters . . .

whose subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are

subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 30 C.F.R. § 585.112; see 43

U.S.C. § 1301(a) (defining “lands beneath navigable waters”). The

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a), grants the

United States jurisdiction over this area. See United Ass’n of

Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus.,

AFL-CIO v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1134, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

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over offshore renewable energy projects to the Bureau of Ocean

Energy Management,2

 an agency within the Department of the

Interior. See id. § 1337(p)(1)(C); 76 Fed. Reg. 64,432, 64,434,

64,459 (Oct. 18, 2011). Since then, this Bureau has promulgated

regulations governing the development of “renewable” energy

production on the outer continental shelf. See 30 C.F.R.

§ 585.100 et seq. (“Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of

Existing Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf”). The

regulations require the Bureau both to collect information about

projects and to “consult with relevant [f]ederal agencies,”

including inter alia the United States Coast Guard and the Fish

and Wildlife Service. Id. § 585.203; see id. § 585.600. 

Although Cape Wind submitted its application before the

regulations issued, the Bureau decided that the regulations

would nonetheless “be applicable as the Cape Wind Energy

Project moves forward through the construction, operation, and

decommissioning phases.”

Plaintiffs are the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound,

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, and others. 

They claim that the government violated half a dozen federal

statutes in allowing Cape Wind’s project to move through the

regulatory approval process. See Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at

77-79. The Bureau allegedly violated the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), the

Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p), the National Historic

Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 306108, and the Migratory Bird

Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). The Bureau and the United

States Coast Guard allegedly violated the Coast Guard and

Maritime Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 414, 120

2

 The Bureau replaced the Minerals Management Service in

October 2011. See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d

1123, 1126 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Stat. 516, 540 (2006). The Fish and Wildlife Service allegedly

violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538.

On March 14, 2014, the district court rejected most of these

claims and granted partial summary judgment to the government

agencies. See Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 130. On November

18, 2014, the court rejected plaintiffs’ remaining claims, granted

summary judgment, and dismissed the case. We “review de

novo the district court’s grant[s] of summary judgment,” and

“apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. [§ 706]” to determine

whether the government complied with federal law. WildEarth

Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see

CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d 105, 113 (D.C. Cir.

2006); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 13

(D.C. Cir. 2005); Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 102 (D.C. Cir.

2001), superseded by statute on other grounds, Migratory Bird

Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 143, 118 Stat. 2809,

3071-72 (2004); Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92

F.3d 1248, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

I

Plaintiffs challenge the Bureau’s decision to issue the lease

for Cape Wind’s project without first obtaining “sufficient sitespecific data on seafloor and subsurface hazards” in Nantucket

Sound. Alliance Br. at 26-27. They argue that the Bureau

violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332, by relying on inadequate “geophysical and

geotechnical” surveys. Alliance Br. at 21. We agree.

Under NEPA, an agency must “consider every significant

aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.” Balt.

Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); see 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2). The agency must then “inform the public that

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it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its

decisionmaking process.” 462 U.S. at 97. In other words,

agencies must “take a ‘hard look’ at [the] environmental

consequences” of their actions, and “provide for broad

dissemination of relevant environmental information.” 

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350

(1989) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21

(1976)). This “hard look” requirement applies to the

“authorization or permitting of private actions” like the Cape

Wind Project. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

803 F.3d 31, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

The principal way the government informs the public of its

decisionmaking process is by publishing environmental impact

statements. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Agencies must

“prepare and make publicly available” these statements for all

“major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment . . ..” Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 37. Among

other things, impact statements must describe a proposed

“action’s anticipated direct and indirect environmental effects.” 

803 F.3d at 37.

In 2004, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a draft impact

statement for the Cape Wind project. After the Bureau assumed

authority, it reviewed the Corps’s draft statement, “identified

information requirements and/or issue areas that [were]

incomplete,” and announced that it would issue its own impact

statement. See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental

Impact Statement, 71 Fed. Reg. 30,693 (May 30, 2006). The

Bureau published draft and final impact statements in 2008 and

2009, respectively. See 73 Fed. Reg. 3,482 (Jan. 18, 2008); 74

Fed. Reg. 3,034 (Jan. 16, 2009).

Plaintiffs argue that the Bureau’s 2009 impact statement is

arbitrary and capricious because it does not adequately assess

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the seafloor and subsurface hazards of the Sound.3 They claim

that the statement relies on inadequate geological surveys,which

according to the Bureau’s internal guidance, help determine

whether “the seafloor [is] able to support large structures,” and

whether “important archaeological and prehistoric features [can]

be protected.” In support, plaintiffs refer to a series of internal

Bureau emails describing “the dearth of geophysical data over

the entire area” of the proposed wind farm. For example, in

December 2006, Richard Clingan, the Bureau geologist

overseeing the impact statement’s geophysical data section,

emailed a list of concerns to the Bureau’s “Cape Wind Project

Manager,” Rodney Cluck, including that “[t]here is no

indication that [Cape Wind] ha[s] adequate data to address”

various geological hazards, and that Cape Wind’s surveys “don’t

seem to conform (even loosely) to the ‘Guidance Notes on Site

Investigations for Offshore Renewable Energy Projects’ . . ..” 

His emails referred to three surveys conducted for Cape Wind

between 2001 and 2005 that the Bureau concedes were

“insufficient” to “support approval to construct the project . . ..” 

Defendants Br. at 41. In June 2007, Clingan repeated his

“geophysical data concerns,” and Rodney Cluck forwarded to

the Bureau’s “NEPA Coordinator” Clingan’s conclusion that

3

 Plaintiffs also argue that the 2009 statement is arbitrary and

capricious because its “Oil Spill Response Plan” “ignores the . . . risk

of an oil tanker collision with a turbine or another vessel,” and does

not adequately explain the estimated oil spill response time. See 30

C.F.R. § 254 et seq. Plaintiffs have made markedly different

arguments on this issue, first to the district court and later to this court,

and have therefore forfeited most of those arguments. See Potter v.

District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For

example, in their motion for summary judgment they argued that “8

to 12 hours” is too slow a response time, but in their appellate briefs

they challenged a change in the estimated response time between the

draft and final response plans. To the extent any arguments have

survived, the impact statement comprehensively addresses them.

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Cape Wind “has not acquired sufficient geophysical data and

information to adequately delineate in detail geologic hazards

and conditions in the vicinity (1000m radius) of even one

proposed turbine location . . ..”

The Bureau downplays the significance of its geologist’s

concerns, attributing them to “a robust internal debate,” and

claiming that there was at least sufficient data “to support [the

Bureau’s] initial decision . . . to offer a lease,” if not to justify

final construction of the windmills. Defendants Br. at 41-42. 

The Bureau also disputes whether Clingan actually harbored

such serious concerns, noting that his email “acknowledge[s]

that the data . . . constitute[s] ‘an informative reconnaissancelevel survey of the project area . . ..’” Defendants Br. at 40.4

We do not think the Bureau has “fulfilled its duty to take a

‘hard look’ at the geological and geophysical environment” in

Nantucket Sound. Defendants Br. at 40. NEPA requires federal

agencies to prepare impact statements for all “major [f]ederal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.” Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 37. The Bureau does

not contest that issuing a renewable energy lease constitutes a

major federal action. Compare Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at

126; Alliance Mot. Summ. J. at 80-83, No. 1:10-cv-01067-RBW

(D.D.C. June 14, 2013), ECF No. 283. Therefore, the question

is whether the Bureau “consider[ed] every significant aspect of

the environmental impact” of the project, including the

subsurface environment. Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 97. The Bureau

distinguishes between the “initial decision” to issue a lease and

4

 The Bureau’s quotation is a bit misleading. Clingan’s full email

says that “[a]t first impression, [Cape Wind] conducted an informative

reconnaissance-level survey of the project area,” but “[u]nfortunately,

[Cape Wind] has not acquired sufficient geophysical data” on

Nantucket Sound. Joint Appendix 1635 (italics added).

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the consequences of that decision. Defendants Br. at 42. Cape

Wind also points out that the impact statement required

“additional geophysical . . . surveys” once the project was

authorized, and claims these surveys were completed in 2012. 

See Cape Wind Intervenor Br. at 6. But there is no evidence the

Bureau relied on any additional surveys in its impact statement,

and NEPA does not allow agencies to slice and dice proposals

in this way. Agencies must take a “hard look” at the

environmental effects of a major federal action “and

consequences of that action.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352

(italics added). The impact statement must therefore look

beyond the decision to offer a lease and consider the predictable

consequences of that decision. By relying solely on data so

roundly criticized by its “own experts,” the Bureau failed to

fulfill this duty. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632

F.3d 472, 493 (9th Cir. 2011). Of course, an agency need not be

clairvoyant. In some cases it may be appropriate for an impact

statement to provide for ongoing monitoring in order to gather

more data. See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v.

Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But that does not

excuse the Bureau from its NEPA obligation to gather data

about the seafloor. Without adequate geological surveys, the

Bureau cannot “ensure that the seafloor [will be] able to

support” wind turbines.

The Bureau therefore violated NEPA, but that does not

necessarily mean that the project must be halted or that Cape

Wind must redo the regulatory approval process. See, e.g., Pit

River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1080-81 (9th

Cir. 2010); Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp.

2d 1009, 1019 (D. Alaska 2010). To decide whether “the

project should be halted pending completion of an [impact

statement],” we must perform a “particularized analysis of the

violations that have occurred,” “the possibilities for relief,” and

“any countervailing considerations of public interest,” including

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“the social and economic costs of delay . . ..” NRDC v. U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir.

1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jones v. D.C.

Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512-13 (D.C. Cir.

1974). Delaying construction or requiring Cape Wind to redo

the regulatory approval process could be quite costly. The

project has slogged through state and federal courts and agencies

for more than a decade. See, e.g., All. to Protect Nantucket

Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.

2003), aff’d, 398 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005); All. to Protect

Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 858

N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 2006). Meanwhile, Massachusetts’s

renewable energy requirements continue to increase. See MASS.

GEN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F. Allowing the project to move

forward could help meet these requirements. On the other hand,

it would be imprudent to allow Cape Wind to begin construction

before it can “ensure that the seafloor [is] able to support” its

facilities. Cape Wind has “no prior experience

developing/operating offshore wind farms,” and the construction

site “lie[s] in the frontier areas of the [outer continental shelf,]

where detailed geological, geophysical, and geotechnical data

and information is generally lacking.” Therefore, we will vacate

the impact statement and require the Bureau to supplement it

with adequate geological surveys before Cape Wind may begin

construction.5

 We will not, however, vacate Cape Wind’s lease

or other regulatory approvals based on this NEPA violation.

Plaintiffs argue that Cape Wind’s failure to complete the

surveys dooms the project for another reason. They say that

Bureau regulations require Cape Wind to complete the surveys

5

 If the Bureau believes that Cape Wind’s 2012 surveys

adequately address the geological concerns discussed above, it may

refer to them in its revised impact statement. See Cape Wind

Intervenor Br. at 6.

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before the Bureau can approve Cape Wind’s “Construction and

Operations Plan.” 30 C.F.R. § 585.620. The Bureau concedes

that it would ordinarily require Cape Wind to “submit the results

of” geological surveys with its construction plan, but that the

Bureau granted a regulatory departure to provide Cape Wind

with more time to secure financing. 30 C.F.R. § 585.626; see id.

§ 585.103. Plaintiffs respond that the Bureau “cannot ‘depart’

from or waive [the surveys] because doing so [would] deprive[]

the agency of information required to comply with” NEPA, the

Shelf Lands Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and 30

C.F.R. § 585.103(b)(2), which requires any departure to

“[p]rotect the environment and the public health and safety to

the same degree as if there were no approved departure.” 

Alliance Br. at 37. Alternatively, they claim that even if the

Bureau can grant this departure, the Bureau did not actually do

so because the departure was not in writing. We find neither

argument persuasive.

Bureau regulations require offshore energy providers to

submit “detailed information” with their construction plans to

“assist [the Bureau] in complying with NEPA and other relevant

laws.” 30 C.F.R. § 585.627(a). This includes information about

“geology[] and shallow geological . . . hazards.” Id.

§ 585.627(a)(1). Plaintiffs interpret these regulations to mean

that “those statutes require” energy providers to submit

geological surveys before the Bureau can approve a construction

plan. Alliance Br. at 36. Their interpretation adds a timing

requirement that does not exist in the regulations or the statutes. 

Section 585.627(a) says only that the information will “assist

[the Bureau] in complying with” federal statutes. Similarly, the

federal statutes plaintiffs invoke do not discuss the construction

plan approval phase at all. For example, the Shelf Lands Act

requires the Bureau to “provide[] for . . . safety” and “protection

of the environment” when overseeing the project, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1337(p)(4)(A)-(B); see also 30 C.F.R. § 585.103(b)(1)-(2); the

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Preservation Act requires the Bureau to “take into account the

effect of the [project] on any historic property,” 54 U.S.C.

§ 306108; and NEPA requires the Bureau to assess “the

environmental impact of the [project].” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C)(i). Although these statutes may require Cape

Wind to obtain subsurface data before beginning construction,

they do not independently require geological surveys before the

Bureau can approve a construction plan. The departure delayed

the surveys, but the Bureau still required Cape Wind to complete

them before “commencing construction or otherwise disturbing

the seafloor . . ..” Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 107. That is

enough to satisfy the federal statutes and 30 C.F.R.

§ 585.103(b)(2).6

 Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the Bureau violated its

own regulations because “[t]here is no written departure in the

record.” Alliance Br. at 37; see 30 C.F.R. § 585.103(b)(4). That

is not so. In a 2010 letter to Cape Wind, the Bureau explained

that it was willing to grant additional time “to obtain the

financing” for the surveys, which were projected to cost

“approximately $30 million,” and that as long as the

construction plan was “otherwise satisfactory,” the Bureau

“would approve a departure from its regulations . . ..” Plaintiffs

claim that this letter did not represent an actual departure, but

rather an invitation to Cape Wind to request one. Their

interpretation is overly formalistic. The Bureau may “prescribe

or approve departures” in order to facilitate “appropriate

activities” on an offshore energy lease. 30 C.F.R.

§ 585.103(a)(1). Although departures must be “in writing,” id.

§ 585.103(b)(4), Bureau regulations “impose no particular

requirements for the form or disclosure” of departures. 

6

 Of course, NEPA requires the Bureau to include these surveys

in its environmental impact statement; but we need not vacate the

construction plan on that basis. See pp. 9-10 supra.

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Defendants Br. at 48. The regulations require only that “the

supporting rationale” for the departure be “documented in

writing by the [Bureau].” 74 Fed. Reg. 19,638, 19,717 (Apr. 29,

2009). The Bureau’s letter meets this requirement by offering

a rationale that is “consistent with the facilitation of ‘appropriate

activities on a lease.’” Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 106

(quoting 30 C.F.R. § 585.103(a)(1)).

II

Plaintiffs next argue that Coast Guard and the Bureau

violated the Maritime Transportation Act by failing to include

adequate terms and conditions in Cape Wind’s Renewable

Energy Lease. See 120 Stat. 516, 540. Cape Wind’s lease

“authoriz[es] the use of [the Horseshoe Shoal],” 30 C.F.R.

§ 585.112, and specifies “terms, conditions, and stipulations” for

the construction and operation of Cape Wind’s renewable

energy facilities there. Id. § 585.201; see id. § 585.200 et seq.

(“Issuance of [Outer Continental Shelf] Renewable Energy

Leases”). Before issuing a lease, the Bureau must consult with

relevant federal agencies and “respond to findings of those

agencies . . ..” Id. § 585.203. One such agency is the Coast

Guard, which has the authority and responsibility under § 414 of

the Maritime Transportation Act to “specify the reasonable

terms and conditions the [Coast Guard] determines to be

necessary to provide for navigational safety with respect to the

proposed lease” and to “each alternative to the proposed

lease . . . considered by the [Bureau].” 120 Stat. 516, 540,

§ 414(a).7

 The Bureau must then incorporate the Coast Guard’s

7

 Section 414 applies exclusively to “offshore wind energy

facilit[ies] in Nantucket Sound,” 120 Stat. 516, 540, and was “passed

in large part” as a response to the Cape Wind Project, Pub. Emps., 25

F. Supp. 3d at 95 (citing 152 CONG. REC. S6439 (daily ed. June 22,

2006) (statement of Senator Stevens)).

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terms into any lease it issues. See id. § 414(b). Plaintiffs claim

that the Coast Guard and the Bureau violated § 414 by including

terms that do not sufficiently “ensure navigational safety,” and

by failing to include terms “for each alternative” to the proposed

lease. Alliance Br. at 10, 19. We do not think either claim

requires the Coast Guard to reissue its terms.8

The Coast Guard released its terms and conditions for the

Cape Wind Project on August 2, 2007. The terms required Cape

Wind to satisfy several immediate conditions, such as devising

a turbine “marking scheme” to aid in navigation through the

wind farm, some ongoing reporting obligations, like filing

monthly “construction status” reports, and some future research

requirements, including examining whether the turbines “would

interfere in any way with marine communications or navigation

systems . . ..” According to the Coast Guard, its terms would

sufficiently “provide for navigational safety” in Nantucket

Sound.

Plaintiffs argue that the Coast Guard’s terms requiring

ongoing reporting and research violate § 414. They say that

§ 414 requires the Coast Guard to “assure navigational safety

before the [p]roject is approved,” and that these forward-looking

terms mean that the Coast Guard will be able to do so “only

after various analyses . . . are completed.” Alliance Br. at 9, 11. 

The district court disagreed. It compared § 414’s requirements

to the licensing scheme in § 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16

U.S.C. § 797(e), which requires license conditions to be

“reasonably related to [the agency’s statutory] goal[s] . . ..” 

Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d. at 97 (quoting Escondido Mut.

Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765,

8

 Similarly, we do not think the Bureau violated the Maritime

Transportation Act by incorporating the Coast Guard’s terms into

Cape Wind’s lease.

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778 (1984)); see 152 CONG. REC. at S6439 (explaining that

§ 414 “has preceden[t] in the procedure for granting

hydroelectric licenses under the Federal Power Act”). The court

reasoned that the forward-looking terms here were “reasonably

related to the Coast Guard’s goal to provide navigational safety”

and therefore did not violate § 414. Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d

at 97.

We agree with the court that the Coast Guard’s terms

comply with § 414, but for somewhat different reasons. Section

414 requires the Coast Guard to “specify the reasonable terms

and conditions the [Coast Guard] determines to be necessary to

provide for navigational safety” in Nantucket Sound. 120 Stat.

516, 540, § 414(a) (italics added). The Coast Guard stated that

its terms met this requirement, and we are hesitant to second

guess that determination “given the Coast Guard’s expertise” in

“maritime safety . . ..” Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351

F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Section 414 also

contemplates the possibility that the terms might have

informational gaps that can be filled in later. After all, this

section requires the Coast Guard to issue its terms at least “60

days before” the Bureau publishes its draft environmental

impact statement. 120 Stat. 516, 540, § 414(a). In addition,

§ 414 applies only to projects covered by § 8(p) of the Shelf

Lands Act, which requires “inspection, research, [and]

monitoring” of renewable energy projects, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1337(p)(4)(L). The Coast Guard’s research and reporting

terms complement § 8(p) nicely. In short, the Coast Guard

believed that its terms would provide for navigational safety,

and the fact that some of those terms are forward-looking is not

enough to disregard this expert judgment.

Plaintiffs also claim that the Coast Guard violated § 414 by

failing to issue terms for the “alternative [project] sites under

consideration.” Alliance Br. at 19. They point to § 414’s

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requirement that the Coast Guard issue terms for “each

alternative to the proposed lease,” 120 Stat. 516, 540, § 414(a),

and interpret this to mean that the Coast Guard must provide

terms for each “NEPA alternative.” Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d

at 100. NEPA requires agencies to analyze all “reasonable” or

“feasible” alternatives to proposed actions, which plaintiffs say

includes alternative project locations. Citizens Against

Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1991);

see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In contrast, the Coast Guard

interprets § 414 “to require only the issuance of terms and

conditions for alternative proposals” submitted by Cape Wind. 

Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 101.9 The Coast Guard claims

that plaintiffs’ interpretation is “illogical” because the Coast

Guard must issue terms before the Bureau publishes its draft

impact statement, so the Coast Guard would have to issue terms

for NEPA alternatives “before they [a]re even defined.” 

Defendants Br. at 34.

We need not decide this question of interpretation because

any error by the Coast Guard was harmless. While the Bureau

was conducting research for its impact statement, it learned that

the alternative sites were “not technically feasible,” not

“economically viable,” or would have greater “[e]nvironmental

impacts” than the Horseshoe Shoal site.10 Therefore, the Coast

9

 On appeal, the Coast Guard also argued that its general terms

“were relevant to any alternative that the [Bureau] might consider.” 

Defendants Br. at 33. However, as plaintiffs point out, that position

is “contradicted by the Coast Guard’s prior position[]” that § 414

alternatives refer only to “sites proposed by [Cape Wind].” Alliance

Reply Br. at 9, 9 n.4. Therefore, we will not consider this argument. 

See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943).

10 The Bureau found that two other sites would have had less impact

“on visual resources” than the Horseshoe Shoal, but choosing those sites

would still have caused greater harm to various environmental resources

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Guard’s failure to issue terms for alternative sites did not affect

the Bureau’s ultimate decision to choose the Horseshoe Shoal. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of

prejudicial error.”). We do not see any point in requiring Cape

Wind to go back now and issue “navigational safety” terms for

otherwise inferior sites. 120 Stat. 516, 540, § 414; see Pub.

Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 100-01 (“[I]t would be odd to require

the Coast Guard to provide terms and conditions for each NEPA

alternative, given that several alternatives were jettisoned

without detailed consideration for various reasons.”).

III

Plaintiffs’ final contention is that the Fish and Wildlife

Service violated the Endangered Species Act. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538. Under the Act and its regulations, agencies must

determine whether approved actions “may affect,” 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.14(a), any “endangered [or threatened] species of . . .

wildlife,” and if so, must consult with the Service, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1). See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21, 402.14(a). The Service

must then provide the agency with a written statement

“explaining how the proposed action will affect th[ose] species”

and recommending “reasonable and prudent” measures to

minimize any harm. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158

(1997); see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)-(i). The

Service must include its recommendations in what is known as

an “incidental take statement,” 520 U.S. at 158, and must base

them on the “best scientific and commercial data available,” 50

C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8). See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (c)(1). 

Plaintiffs argue that the Service’s incidental take statement for

the Cape Wind Project is arbitrary and capricious because it is

including “avifauna, subtidal resources, non-[endangered] mammals, fish

and fisheries, [and] essential fish habitat[s]. . ..”

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not based on the best available scientific data, and because it

excludes a particular mitigation measure.

The Bureau began consultations with the Service in

November 2005 to determine whether the project could harm

any endangered or threatened species. On October 31, 2008, the

Service estimated that although Cape Wind’s activities would

not “jeopardize the continued existence” of any listed species,

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), the turbines would nonetheless kill 80-

100 endangered roseate terns and ten threatened piping plovers

over the life of the project.11 See id. § 17.11(h) (“List of

11 These are two species of migratory birds, and plaintiffs also

argued that the Bureau violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act by not

requiring Cape Wind to obtain a Migratory Bird permit before

harming these species. See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). The Ninth Circuit

recently considered a similar issue in Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v.

Jewell, No. 14-55666, 2016 WL 3165630 (9th Cir. June 7, 2016). We

need not address this claim because, unlike the situation recounted in

the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Cape Wind intends to get a permit before

beginning construction. At oral argument, the Bureau explained that

the lease requires Cape Wind to comply with all federal laws and that

the Bureau’s “official position” is that Cape Wind is “obligated under

federal law to get a [migratory bird] permit.” The Bureau concedes

that failure to do so “will violate the lease.” Cape Wind agreed,

stating “unequivocally that the lease requires that Cape Wind comply

with all laws,” and that because the Bureau concedes that “a

[migratory bird] permit is required,” Cape Wind “will apply” for one.

Although such permits are typically issued for actions intended

to harm migratory birds, like hunting, the Service’s “longstanding

position” has been that the Act also applies to harm that “occurs

incidental to, and which is not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful

activity . . ..” 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032, 30,034 (May 26, 2015). The

Service is currently considering new regulations to authorize

incidental take. Id. Cape Wind may be able to secure the necessary

authorization through the new regulatory framework before beginning

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Endangered and Threatened Wildlife”). The Service therefore

issued a draft incidental take statement recommending measures

to minimize harm to roseate terns and piping plovers in

Nantucket Sound. One recommendation was to temporarily turn

off the windmills during poor visibility periods to “reduce the

risk of collision” by birds flying through the wind farm – a

process ironically called “feathering” the turbines.12 Cape Wind

and the Bureau objected to this recommendation because they

were concerned it would shut down the turbines for too long. 

The Service heeded these concerns. On November 21, 2008, it

published a final version of its incidental take statement that did

not recommend feathering. The Service explained that it had

excluded the measure because the Bureau and Cape Wind had

“determined” that feathering would “modif[y] the scope of the

project in a manner that is adverse to the project’s stated purpose

and need,” “have a deleterious [e]ffect on anticipated revenues,

financing, and power purchasing agreements,” and ultimately

have a steep enough “economic cost” to make the measure “not

feasible.”

construction, which is currently suspended until July 24, 2017. If not,

Cape Wind may still be eligible to apply for a permit under 50 C.F.R.

§ 21.27, which authorizes “special purpose permit[s]” for activities

“outside the scope of the standard form permits . . ..” Either way, we

take the defendants at their word that the lease requires a migratory

bird permit and that Cape Wind will apply for one.

12 “Feathering” involves shutting the turbines down and turning

the blades “into the wind to present a narrower face for collision.” In

its draft statement, the Service recommended feathering twice per year

for about three-to-four weeks at a time, and only when “climatic

factors reduce visibility at turbine height . . ..” These periods were

calculated to coincide with the migration, commuting, and foraging

times of piping plovers and roseate terns. The Service stated that

“feathering is the only operational change” that would “actually

reduce the level of [incidental take]” of these birds.

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In June 2010, Plaintiffs challenged the incidental take

statement on the grounds that the Service had “improperly

delegat[ed] to Cape Wind and to the [Bureau]” its duty to

independently evaluate and recommend mitigation measures. 

Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 107. The district court initially

agreed, explaining that the Endangered Species Act requires the

Service to “make an independent determination” whether

feathering “was a reasonable and prudent measure . . ..” Id. at

130. The court therefore remanded the case on March 14, 2014,

for the Service to “make the required independent determination

on this point.” Id.

On remand, plaintiffs submitted scientific and economic

data to the Service that argued feathering “would have, at most,

a minuscule economic impact on the project,” and that the

government has previously required other wind projects to

“make comparable operational adjustments to minimize [harm

to] protected species.” PEER Br. at 17-18. The Service ignored

these submissions. In July 2014, the Service filed a letter with

the district court claiming that it had complied with the remand

order and had made an “independent evaluation of the initially

proposed feathering [measure] . . ..” The Service explained that

after consulting with its “in-house economist,” it had

“conclude[d] that the draft feathering [measure] should not be

included” in the incidental take statement. The letter added that

“[b]ecause the [c]ourt did not vacate the [incidental take

statement]” or order “the reopening of the administrative

record,” the Service had limited its determination to “the

information available” at the time the statement was issued in

2008. Therefore, according to the Service, it did not need to

consider plaintiffs’ 2014 submissions.

Plaintiffs argued that because the Service considered its

economist’s 2014 analysis, the Service was required to

considered plaintiffs’ submissions as well. Plaintiffs also

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challenged the merits of the Service’s decision to exclude

feathering. In November 2014, the district court dismissed these

challenges on the grounds that they were either “waived or were

already dismissed by the [c]ourt.” Although the court’s March

2014 order required the Service to “make the required

independent determination,” Pub. Emps., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 130

(italics added), in November the court interpreted its order to

require only that the Service “clarify[] that it made an

independent determination in 2008 . . ..” Joint Appendix at 777-

78 (italics added). Therefore, according to the court, the Service

was not “required to consider the materials that the plaintiffs

sought to have included in the record.” The court also found

that because plaintiffs “challenge[d] only whether the

determination itself was independently made by the [Service]

and not the bases of [that] determination,” they had waived their

right to challenge the merits of the incidental take statement.

Plaintiffs may be correct that the district court’s remand

order required the Service to “make” a new independent

determination, and therefore reopened the record. PEER Br. at

26. On the other hand, the Service may be correct that the

court’s remand order required the Service to only “clarify” that

it made an independent determination in 2008. Defendants Br.

at 61; see AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1095,

1099 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The court is generally the authoritative

interpreter of its own remand . . ..”). We need not decide who

is right. Even if the district court’s order did not reopen the

administrative record, the Service did so on its own. The

Service decided to exclude feathering based on “[t]he expert

opinion of [its] in-house economist,” which he communicated to

the Service on May 28, 2014. That he reviewed information

available in 2008 is beside the point. He analyzed the

information in 2014. He did so “in response” to the court’s

2014 remand order. The Service concedes that his opinion

“reflected an additional analysis of the decision” to exclude

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feathering, Defendants Br. at 63, and that the Service then relied

upon this opinion “[i]n particular” to “find that the draft

feathering [measure] would not be reasonable.” By doing so,

the Service reopened the record and was required to consider

plaintiffs’ submissions.

We therefore hold that the Service’s decision to disregard

plaintiffs’ submissions was arbitrary and capricious, and we

vacate the incidental take statement. Because we vacate the

statement, we need not decide whether the district court erred by

denying plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge its merits.

IV

We reverse the district court’s judgment that the Bureau’s

environmental impact statement complied with NEPA and that

the Service’s incidental take statement complied with the

Endangered Species Act, and we vacate both statements. See 5

U.S.C. § 706(2). We affirm the district court’s judgment

dismissing plaintiffs’ remaining claims, and remand the case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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