Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00047/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00047-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SONYA WOLF, individually and

as Guardian Ad Litem for her

minor son NICHOLAS H.,

NO. CIV. S-06-0047 WBS KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, MELISSA

TORRES, individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin, MICHELLE MCDANIEL,

individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin, JENNIFER INDULA,

individually and as an

employee of the County of San

Joaquin, SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY

SHERRIF’S OFFICE, VALERIE

AGBULOS, individually and as

an employee of the County of

San Joaquin, and Does 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Sonya Wolf and Nicholas H. allege several

causes of action against defendants, including violation of

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, and intentional infliction

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The complaint’s caption also lists “False 1

Arrest/Imprisonment” as a basis for plaintiffs’ suit; however,

plaintiffs do not include this claim in the body of the

complaint.

Both sides, including this party’s own attorneys, refer 2

to her alternatively as both “McDaniel” and “McDaniels”

throughout their papers. It is not for the court to discern the

true spelling of her name, so the court will do the same. 

Counsel for the moving defendants does not purport to 3

represent the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department or Jennifer

Indula. Nevertheless, at oral argument, plaintiff asked to

dismiss defendant Indula and accordingly, this order memorializes

that request below.

2

of emotional distress. (Compl.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of 1

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants County of San Joaquin,

Melissa Torres, Michelle McDaniel, and Valerie Agbulos now move 2

for dismissal of these federal and state claims against them.3

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On February 17, 2005, a school employee observed Wolf’s

15-year-old daughter Brittany W. exchanging marijuana with

another individual. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 39.) Brittany was taken to

the principal’s office, where a search of her backpack revealed a

suspected weapon made of stolen school property. (Id. ¶ 39.) 

The school immediately suspended her and contacted her mother. 

(Id.)

While waiting for Wolf to arrive, Brittany disclosed to

a teacher that Wolf’s ex-boyfriend had inappropriately touched

her. (Id. ¶ 43.) The school did not share this information with

Wolf but did notify the Human Services Agency of San Joaquin

County (“the Agency”) of Brittany’s allegations on February 18,

2005. (Id. ¶ 46.) The Agency initially classified Brittany’s

case as a “ten day response,” “meaning that the facts reported

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According to the sheriff’s records, Wolf’s most recent 4

call regarding a violation of the restraining order was made on

September 14, 2004. (Compl. ¶ 93.)

3

did not present an immediate emergency situation.” (Id. ¶ 47);

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin Human Servs. Agency, 363 F. Supp.

2d 1227, 1230 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (quotation omitted). However, by

the time the Agency assigned the case to defendant Torres on

February 22, 2005, the status had changed to “immediate

response.” (Compl. ¶ 47.)

Torres, a case worker for the agency, tried to meet

with Wolf on the 22nd. (Id. ¶ 54.) After making initial contact

with Wolf by phone, however, Torres was unresponsive to Wolf’s

efforts to meet and ascertain why the Agency needed to speak with

her. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) Eventually, Wolf contacted Indula, Torres’

supervisor, and scheduled an appointment for March 1, 2005 at

12:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 56.)

During the course of Torres’ interview on the scheduled

date, mother and daughter told differing stories about conditions

in the home and Brittany’s involvement with older men. Brittany

again alleged that Wolf’s ex-boyfriend had molested her, although

the complaint does not describe when this abuse supposedly

occurred. Wolf explained that she had secured a restraining

order against the ex-boyfriend in October, 2003, and that she had

repeatedly called the sheriff to enforce the order when the exboyfriend showed up at her house. (Id. ¶ 84.) She claimed that

the ex-boyfriend had last been at the house in July or August,

2004. (Id. ¶ 92.) Brittany told Torres that his last 4

appearance was on February 24, 2005. (Id. ¶ 82.)

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Meanwhile, Wolf suggested to Torres that Brittany may

have made up the story about the ex-boyfriend in retaliation for

his having reported to Wolf at the end of 2004 that something was

going on between Brittany and an adult neighbor named Ralph. 

(Id. ¶ 63.) Wolf was suspicious of Ralph for some time, but did

not know the extent of his relationship with Brittany until

February 19, 2005, when Brittany confessed to her mother that she

had been exchanging oral sex with Ralph for marijuana. (Id. ¶

38.) By that time, however, Ralph had moved away. (Id. ¶¶ 33,

38.) 

Wolf further alleges that Brittany was reluctant to

turn in Ralph and that Wolf did not immediately report the abuse

because she wanted to give Brittany a chance to report it

herself. (Id. ¶ 34.) But when given the opportunity to tell

Torres about Ralph, Brittany adamantly denied any involvement

with the man. (Id. ¶ 90.) 

Brittany’s story changed dramatically when she realized

that Torres and Agbulos, a sheriff’s deputy called by Torres for

assistance, intended to remove her from her mother’s home. 

(Id. ¶ 104, 110.) She recanted her allegations against the exboyfriend and admitted that she had a relationship with the

neighbor Ralph. (Id. ¶ 104, 110.) But despite the fact that

Brittany and Wolf’s stories were more or less the same at this

point, Torres and Agbulos continued to insist that Wolf “admit”

that her ex-boyfriend had recently been by the house. (Id. ¶

109.) Wolf, “having been now brow beat for several hours, and

fearing there was no other means by which to keep her children

from being removed . . . shouted, ‘O.k., fine, he was here.’” 

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(Id. ¶ 114.)

“Agbulos and Torres then both shook their heads and

said we have to take the kids, we can’t leave them here, ‘It’s

just not safe.’” (Id. ¶ 115.) Wolf suggested alternatives to

removing the children from her custody and offered to take them

to her father’s house in Palo Alto. (Id. ¶ 117.) But Agbulos

and Torres had already decided to forcibly take custody of

Brittany and Nicholas. (Id. ¶ 118.) Accordingly, the children

were loaded into separate cars and transported to a local shelter

facility. (Id. ¶ 120-21.) The ultimate reason for removing the

children appears to have been “the disclosure of sexual molest

[sic] and the mother’s failure to protect her daughter . . . .” 

(Id. ¶ 129.) “[A]llegations of general neglect were found to be

inconclusive . . . .” (Id.)

Defendant McDaniels assumed responsibility for the

subsequent juvenile detention proceedings. (Id. ¶ 131.) On

March 3, 2005 she filed a Detention Report and Juvenile

Dependency Petition, which was prepared based on Torres’ now

unavailable case notes. (Id. ¶ 130.) Wolf alleges that these

documents included “completely false statements of fact, all of

which were either made with knowledge of their falsity, or

reckless disregard and deliberate indifference as to the truth or

falsity thereof . . . .” (Id. ¶ 129.) For example, although,

according to the complaint, Brittany at most claimed that the exboyfriend had touched her inappropriately, McDaniels’ report

stated that the two had sex. (Id.) Wolf further alleges that

McDaniels failed to perform any investigation of her own and

relied entirely on the information supplied by Torres, which

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omitted several exculpatory facts. (Id. ¶ 133.)

The County returned Nicholas to Wolf’s care on or about

May 16, 2005, pursuant to a stipulated dismissal of his

dependency case. (Id. ¶ 9.) Brittany was also returned

following the denial of the Agency’s dependency petition,

although the complaint does not state when she was released. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs Wolf and Nicholas subsequently filed this suit,

which alleges three causes of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

(1) violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to

familial association, (2) violation of plaintiff Nicholas’ Fourth

Amendment right to be free of in-home warrantless seizure, and

(3) further violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights

to familial association through continued, unjustified detention

of the children. (Id. ¶¶ 139-46.) Plaintiffs also raise state

law claims based on California Civil Code § 52.1 and Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Id. ¶¶ 147-52.) They seek an

assortment of damages, including compensation for resulting

medical expenses and damage to reputation. (Id. ¶¶ 136-37.) 

They also seek exemplary/punitive damages pursuant to California

Civil Code § 3294. By this motion and based on several sources

of immunity for government officials, defendants County of San

Joaquin, Torres, McDaniel, and Agbulos move to dismiss all

claims.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

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232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Dismissal is

appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to allege facts

that support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests”).

B. Section 1983 Claims

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified

and, in some instances, absolute immunity for the removal of the

children and their subsequent detention. The Ninth Circuit has

held that social workers enjoy absolute immunity for

“discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court

dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents.” 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d

1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, the scope of this immunity

is “extremely narrow.” Id. Thus, while social workers may claim

absolute immunity for decisions to institute dependency

proceedings and for submissions made to a court, they are not

similarly protected when they take actions to detain juveniles

prior to any dependency proceedings. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d

820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2003); Miller, 335 F.3d at 898; Cf. Broam

v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that

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prosecutorial immunity, on which social worker immunity is based,

does not extend to investigatory or administrative functions

separate from a prosecutor’s role as judicial a advocate).

When absolute immunity is unavailable, government

officials still have the possibility of qualified immunity. See

Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d

1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting that “qualified immunity

is the general rule and absolute immunity the exceptional case”). 

The applicability of qualified immunity is determined through a

two-step inquiry where the court asks: “(1) whether, ‘taken in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the

facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right’; and, if a violation of a constitutional

right [can] indeed be found, (2) ‘whether the right was clearly

established.’” Sissoko v. Rocha, 412 F.3d 1021, 1038 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). In

other words, qualified immunity shields government officials from

liability for a violation of plaintiffs’ rights if “the

official[s] objectively could have believed the conduct was

lawful.” Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997)

(involving the qualified immunity of a social worker and a police

officer); see also Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The question, in a

qualified immunity legal analysis, boils down to ‘Should they

have known better?’”).

Plaintiffs describe three bases for their § 1983 claims

that defendants argue are barred by the immunity doctrines. 

First, plaintiffs allege that defendants County, Torres, Agbulos

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Defendants do not address whether the Fourteenth 5

Amendment right to family association can be claimed by a child

(as opposed to a parent) when his or her sibling is removed. 

Because they have failed to discuss this distinction, the court

assumes for the purposes of this motion that both Wolf and

Nicholas can assert a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment

rights regarding Brittany’s removal. 

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and Indula violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to

“familial association with one another” when the minor children,

Brittany and Nicholas, were removed from their home “without

consent, probable cause, a protective custody warrant, or exigent

circumstances . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 139.) Second, Nicholas

individually claims a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to

be free of unreasonable seizure, a violation he attributes to the

actions of the Agency, Torres, and Indula. (Id. ¶ 141.) 

Finally, plaintiffs claim that the continued detention of the

children, from March 1st until mid-May, 2005, further violated

their Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association. (Id.

¶ 143.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity for all three claims and that they are additionally

entitled to absolute immunity with respect to claim three.

1. Deprivations at the Time of Removal

Plaintiffs’ first and second claims both target

defendants’ actions on March 1, 2005, when, after over five hours

of investigation, Torres and Agbulos forcibly removed Brittany

and Nicholas from Wolf’s home. Such steps can violate the rights

of parents under the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with

their substantive due process right to family association.5

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000). They

can likewise violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the children

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Plaintiffs allege, and defendants do not dispute, that 6

Torres and Agbulos acted without a court order authorizing

removal. 

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actually seized. Id. “Officials may remove a child from the

custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only

if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is

such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in

imminent danger of serious bodily injury . . . .” Id. at 1138

(emphasis added).

Defendants discuss in detail the factual predicates

that established “reasonable cause to take the children into

custody . . . .” (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 8.) Noticeably absent

from their arguments, however, is any serious contention that

either Brittany or Nicholas was in imminent danger, such that

there was no time to secure a court order before taking them into

custody. See Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1108 (finding no justification 6

for the removal of a child believed to have been sexually abused

in the past when a warrant could be obtained within a few

hours); Rogers, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (“[A]n official must

consider not only the severity of the threat to the child but

also whether the harm is so imminent that no delay can be

countenanced.”).

Indeed, it does not appear, given the facts alleged,

that exigent circumstances existed here. The agency initially

classified Brittany’s allegations of abuse as a “ten day

response” and waited four days to assign a caseworker to her

file. Then, after a caseworker was assigned and the case was relabeled as an “immediate response”, a week went by before Torres

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The circumstances discussed above largely address 7

whether the warrantless removal of Brittany was reasonable in

light of clearly established law. The removal of her six-yearold brother Nicholas, apparently simply because his teenage

sister had alleged sexual abuse, was even more questionable. 

Although California law provides for the removal of a child based

on the abuse of his or her sibling, there must be “a substantial

risk that the child will [likewise] be abused or neglected . . .

.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(j). In making this

determination, the court should consider the age and gender of

each child and the nature of the abuse. Id. Accordingly, absent

any allegations that either of Brittany’s alleged attackers had

homosexual tenancies, Torres and Agbulos had no reason to suspect

that Nicholas was likewise in imminent danger. Compare In re

Rubisela, 85 Cal. App. 4th 177, 198-99 (2000) (abuse by

heterosexual male perpetrator justified removal of an abused

girl’s sister but not brothers), with In re Jason L., 222 Cal.

App. 3d 1206, 1217 (1990) (removal of brother justified when

sister alleged abuse because investigation suggested that the

accused perpetrator was interested sexually in both males and

females). Significantly, neither party suggests that any portion

of the over five hour investigation focused on the imminent

danger that Nicholas may have faced. Based on the facts alleged,

his warrantless removal was even more obviously unjustified.

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conducted her in-home investigation. See Rogers, 363 F. Supp. 2d

at 1236 (holding that abuse was not imminent, “particularly in

light of the delay that had already occurred after the

referral”). Finally, the perpetrators of the alleged sexual

abuse were not immediately present in the home or surrounding

area. Wolf had a restraining order against the ex-boyfriend and

the neighbor had moved away several weeks prior to the social

worker’s visit. 

In light of the case law existing at the time, and

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, no

reasonable officer or social worker could have believed that

removal was justified based on the facts alleged. Government 7

actors need more than simple probable cause before they can

remove a child without a court order. This rule has been clearly

established in this circuit for some time and is additionally

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Although the moving defendants do not limit their 8

arguments for qualified immunity to a given subset of the

movants, a municipality, like the County, cannot assert a defense

based on qualified immunity, even though the acting employee is

entitled to it. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,

650-52 (1980) (holding that individual officers’ entitlement to

qualified immunity does not immunize municipalities from Monell

liability); Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1186

n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “a municipality may be liable if

an individual officer is exonerated on the basis of the defense

of qualified immunity”). Likewise, the County cannot

derivatively claim absolute immunity. Municipal liability is not

founded on a respondeat superior theory, whereby the County, as

an employer, is vicariously responsible for the acts of its

employees. Rather, local governments face liability when a

constitutional violation results from a policy or custom

promulgated by the County itself. Accordingly, the County avoids

liability by showing that no constitutional right was violated or

that, if such a right was indeed violated, the County’s policy

was not the cause. See Atkins v. County of Alameda, No.

C-03-3566, 2004 WL 941212, at *4 n.8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2004)

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codified in California state law. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 305

(permitting peace officers to take a minor into temporary custody

without a warrant based on reasonable cause and if “the minor is

in immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse”); Mabe, 237 F.3d

at 1108 n.2 (noting that “a showing of probable cause does not

[likewise show that a child] was in imminent danger of serious

physical injury [or] justify a warrantless removal”). Cf. Hatch

v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 21

(1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach and holding

that a mere “objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse justifies

protective measures”). Because defendants’ actions, as alleged,

were not reasonable in light of clearly established law, they are

consequently not entitled to qualified immunity regarding claims

one and two at this stage.

2. Post-Removal Deprivations

In contrast, defendants Torres and McDaniels are 8

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(“This rule keeps municipal liability under section 1983 largely

symmetric. Municipal entities cannot claim-or derive-immunity

from individual employees, but they cannot be held liable under

‘the doctrine of respondeat superior under [section] 1983 for the

constitutional torts of their employees,’ either.”). Defendants

have not made the appropriate arguments to secure dismissal of

the County and consequently, the court does not here consider

whether claim three can be dismissed as to the County defendant.

13

entitled to absolute immunity for at least some of their behavior

described in claim three. As noted, absolute immunity attaches

when social workers are engaged in activities “connected with the

initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.” Meyers,

812 F.2d at 1157. Consequently, defendants are immune from

liability for the portions of claim three that deal with the

detention of the children based on a court order issued on “the

presentation of false facts and the exclusion of exculpatory

facts and information . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 144.) Defendants’

submissions to a court in relation to a dependency proceeding

cannot serve as the source for § 1983 liability, even if the

presentation was based on an inadequate investigation of the

allegations or included false evidence. Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 823

(citing Mabe for the proposition that “where there [are]

allegations that social workers did not conduct their

investigation properly and submitted false evidence during

juvenile court proceedings, . . . social workers [are] entitled

to absolute immunity because their actions were part of the

initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings”).

However, claim three also alleges violation of

plaintiffs’ rights based on the detention of the children prior

to the initial detention hearing. As defendants note, their

actions during this period could be covered by qualified

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immunity. Id. at 823. Unfortunately, their argument for

qualified immunity on these aspects of claim three relies

entirely on the arguments they make for qualified immunity with

respect to claims one and two (that their conduct was

reasonable). Because the court has rejected qualified immunity

for claims one and two based on a determination that defendants

failed to show that, based on the allegations in the complaint,

the children were in imminent danger, it follows that it must

reject defendants’ arguments for qualified immunity on claim

three.

C. State Law Claims

Defendants also argue that they are immune from

plaintiffs’ state law claims based on statutorily provided

immunity that is arguably broader than the federal immunity

doctrines discussed above. Significantly, pursuant to state law,

“[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his

instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative

proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts

maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6;

see also Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2 (immunity for discretionary

acts). This immunity also covers the investigatory stage of

judicial proceedings. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 28 Cal.

App. 4th 1205, 1209-10 (1994); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212

Cal. App. 3d 278, 283-84 (1989). Additionally, by operation of §

815.2(b), the county enjoys derivative immunity. Cal. Gov. Code

§ 815.2(b) (“[A] public entity is not liable for an injury

resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability.”); see also

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Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“California . . . has rejected the Monell rule and imposes

liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior

for acts of county employees; it grants immunity to counties only

where the public employee would also be immune.”).

However, “California Government Code § 820.21 provides

that immunity for social workers does not extend to conduct that

includes perjury, fabrication of evidence, failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence and obtaining testimony by duress, if

committed with malice.” Parkes v. County of San Diego, 345 F.

Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2004). “Malice” as defined in

this section as “conduct that is intended . . . to cause injury

to the plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on . . .

with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of

others.” Cal. Gov. Code § 820.21(b). This provision was

designed to provide an “effective check upon the arbitrary power 

or absolute immunity of social workers,” who, at the time of the

bill’s passage, enjoyed “a civil immunity which surpasse[d] the

civil immunity of anyone else in our nation . . . .” Comm. Rep.,

A.B. 1355, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (noting that “even presidents,

legislators and prosecutors are accountable to the political

process and the consent of the governed”).

Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that the social workers

involved with Brittany’s and Nicholas’ cases failed to disclose

what plaintiffs have cast as exculpatory evidence. (See, e.g.,

compl. ¶ 127.) They also suggest that admissions, notably Wolf’s

concession that the ex-boyfriend had been at the house as

recently as February 24, 2005, were obtained through duress. 

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(Id. ¶ 23.) Finally, in claim five, plaintiffs allege that

defendants actions were “intended to cause plaintiffs severe

emotional distress.” (Id. ¶ 151.) Accordingly, given the

liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a), which govern state law claims in federal court, plaintiffs’

complaint qualifies at this stage for the social worker exception

to California’s general grant of governmental immunity. Nathan

v. Boeing Co., 116 F.3d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1997) (Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure govern state law claims over which courts have

supplemental jurisdiction); New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.

Supp. 2d 1090, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (same); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of

mind of a person may be averred generally.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss claim three with

respect to defendants McDaniels and Torres for conduct related to

the instigation of dependency proceedings be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED.

(2) pursuant to plaintiff’s stipulation at oral

argument, defendants’ motion to dismiss the action with respect

to defendant Indula be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

(3) with respect to all other defendants and/or claims,

defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: April 25, 2006

Case 2:06-cv-00047-WBS -KJM Document 21 Filed 04/28/06 Page 16 of 16