Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01278/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Lavance Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-1278-PHX-DGC (DKD) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Joseph Lavance Smith, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Eyman (ASPC-Eyman), has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The 

Court will order Defendants Musachio and Woods to answer Counts One and Two of the 

Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $4.50. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to 

Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Complaint 

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in his two-count Complaint: Arizona 

Department of Corrections (ADOC) Director Charles L. Ryan; “SD Handler” 

Correctional Officer II Musachio; Assistant Deputy Warden Woods; Correctional 

Officers II Godlevsky and Streadman; Northern Region Director Ron Credio; Unknown 

Nurse; Deputy Warden of Operations Lee; Unknown Facility Health Administrator at 

ASPC-Eyman; and Unknown Health Services Regional Operations Director at ASPCEyman. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 

Defendant Musachio used excessive force on him. Plaintiff claims that on July 15, 2013, 

he was returning to his cell when Defendant Musachio and his canine exited the control 

room passage. Plaintiff states that as he was walking through the passage, Defendant 

Musachio and the canine “closed in on the Plaintiff, at which time the Plaintiff politely 

asked [Defendant Musachio] to keep the dog from behind him, for his fear of its 

closeness and being bit.” Plaintiff claims Defendant Musachio came closer and told 

Plaintiff to “shut the fuck up and hurry up and get to his cell.” Plaintiff went to his 

assigned cell as directed, but claims “the verbal assault initiated by CO 2 Musachio 

continued as both parties hurled profanities.” Plaintiff was then locked in his assigned 

cell. 

 Plaintiff claims Defendant Musachio left Plaintiff’s cell for two to four minutes 

and then returned and resumed his verbal abuse. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Musachio then yelled to Defendant Streadman to open Plaintiff’s cell door. Defendant 

Musachio then ordered Plaintiff to close the cell door behind him. Plaintiff complied. 

Plaintiff claims “the argument continued as CO 2 Musachio ordered the Plaintiff to come 

closer, saying ‘you want to fight motherfucker, come on.’” Plaintiff claims he refused 

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the officer’s challenge and took a non-threatening posture against the wall directly next to 

his cell. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Musachio continued with his hostilities while 

removing the canine’s muzzles and leash, and threw the restraints in the general direction 

of Defendant Godlevsky, who was about 10 feet away and looking on. Plaintiff asked 

Defendant Godlevsky to call a sergeant, but she did not respond. 

 Defendant Musachio ordered Plaintiff to the floor. Plaintiff states he “refused and 

remained in the same non-threatening posture against the wall, out of fear of being bit.” 

An unknown officer approached and repeated the order and Plaintiff again refused. The 

officer then sprayed Plaintiff with a chemical agent, and Defendant Musachio took hold 

of Plaintiff’s right wrist, and pinned Plaintiff to the wall. Defendant Musachio then 

shook Plaintiff’s right arm and the unleashed canine attacked Plaintiff and bit into 

Plaintiff’s right arm. Plaintiff states that the canine shook his arm two or three times, 

causing intense pain, before Defendant Musachio commanded the canine to release 

Plaintiff. The canine released and then immediately bit Plaintiff’s right hip and groin 

region before releasing again. Plaintiff was then taken to the floor and put in restraints. 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Musachio’s behavior constitutes excessive force 

because Plaintiff was locked in his cell, and posed no danger to staff or other inmates, 

before the physical confrontation with the dog began. Plaintiff further contends 

Defendant Musachio’s actions violated ADOC policy relating to canines and were 

“malicious and sadistically designed for the purpose of causing harm, out of and for 

retaliation all of which horrific physical and psychological trauma.” 

 Plaintiff claims Defendant Godlevsky violated his constitutional rights by failing 

to intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Streadman violated his 

constitutional rights by “allowing further access to the Plaintiff and not intervening on the 

Plaintiff’s behalf.” 

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 Plaintiff claims Defendants Woods, Lee, Credio, and Ryan violated his 

constitutional rights because they are responsible for the actions of Defendants Musachio, 

Godlevsky, and Streadman. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 

he was denied adequate medical treatment for his wounds resulting from the dog bites. 

Plaintiff claims that after the incident, he was taken to medical where Defendant 

Unknown Nurse took photos and measured the diameter of Plaintiff’s wounds. 

Defendant Nurse informed Defendant Woods “that the Plaintiff would need to be taken 

for outside medical care because she wasn’t equipped to handle the sutures necessary for 

the injuries–the nurse stated ar[r]angements had been made.” Plaintiff claims Defendant 

Woods had a brief conference with Defendant Lee and then “directed the nurse to clean 

and gauze the Plaintiff’s wounds because ‘they’re not that bad.’” Plaintiff claims that as 

a result of not receiving the proper treatment, his wounds bled for seven days. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Woods violated his constitutional rights by 

refusing Plaintiff “a community standard of health care” and by “abusing her authority to 

personally direct the medical care given, which resulted in unnecessary 

disfigurement/scarring, pain and suffering.” Plaintiff further claims Defendant Unknown 

Nurse violated his constitutional rights by “not providing health care substantial to the 

injuries (i.e. sutures or [tetanus] shot).” 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee violated his constitutional rights by “not 

maintaining control of the situation, not intervening when he witness[ed] A.D.W. Woods 

overstepping her authority.” Plaintiff contends Defendants Facility Health Administrator 

and Health Services Regional Operations Director violated his constitutional rights 

because they are responsible for the actions of the Rynning Unit medical staff. 

 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

 

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IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count One 

 1. Failure to Intervene 

An Eighth Amendment claim requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind by the 

Defendants, known as “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. To state a claim of deliberate indifference, 

plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. “First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, 

objectively, sufficiently serious”; and the “official’s act or omission must result in the 

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (internal 

quotations omitted). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state 

of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the 

Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 Prison officials “can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to 

intervene.” Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). To be liable for 

failing to take reasonable steps to protect the inmate from harm from another officer’s use 

of excessive force, the defendant must have had a “realistic opportunity” to prevent the 

attack. Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994); Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 

919 (5th Cir. 1995). 

 Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendants Godlevsky 

or Streadman were both actually aware that Defendant Musachio was using excessive 

force on Plaintiff, i.e. that both Defendants believed the force being used was excessive, 

and that they had a realistic opportunity to intervene. To the extent Plaintiff claims 

Defendant Streadman allowed Defendant Musachio into Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff has not 

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alleged Defendant Streadman did so while also being aware Defendant Musachio 

intended to use excessive force on Plaintiff. With respect to Defendant Godlevsky, 

Plaintiff has alleged only that that she was nearby during the incident; he has not alleged 

facts showing she had a realistic opportunity to intervene. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims 

against these Defendants will be dismissed. 

 2. Defendants Woods, Lee, Credio, and Ryan 

 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 

(9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious 

liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff alleges only that Defendants Woods, Lee, Credio, and Ryan are liable as 

supervisors of Defendant Musachio. Plaintiff has not alleged that these Defendants 

personally participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, were aware of 

a deprivation and failed to act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against Defendants Woods, Lee, Credio, and 

Ryan in Count One. 

B. Count Two 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

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medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate 

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a 

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the 

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

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“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 1. Defendant Unknown Nurse 

 Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendant Unknown Nurse was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff states that 

Defendant Nurse informed Defendant Woods she did not have sufficient ability to suture 

Plaintiff’s wounds and that she had arranged for Plaintiff to receive outside care, but that 

Defendant Woods overrode this decision. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Nurse 

had any authority to obtain outside care for Plaintiff after it was denied by Defendant 

Woods, and his facts indicate she treated the wounds as well as she was able to at the 

facility. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against Defendant Unknown Nurse. 

2. Defendants Lee, Facility Health Administrator, and Regional 

Operations Director 

 With respect to Defendant Lee, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Lee failed to 

maintain control of the situation and failed to intervene to countermand Defendant 

Woods’ instructions. Plaintiff’s only factual allegations regarding Defendant Lee are that 

Defendant Lee and Defendant Woods had a brief conversation before Defendant Woods 

instructed the nurse not to send Plaintiff for outside treatment. Plaintiff does not describe 

the content of the conversation, does not allege that Defendant Lee was actually aware of 

the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries, or allege that Defendant Lee participated in any way in 

the decision to treat Plaintiff at the facility. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

Defendant Lee. 

 With respect to the Facility Health Administrator and the Regional Operations 

Director, Plaintiff alleges these Defendants are liable as the supervisors of medical staff. 

As noted above, there is no supervisory liability in § 1983. Plaintiff has therefore failed 

to state a claim against these Defendants. 

 

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V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has adequately stated an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim against Defendant Musachio in Count One and an Eighth 

Amendment medical claim against Defendant Woods in Count Two. The Court will 

require these Defendants to answer the Complaint. 

VI. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

 O July 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4). 

There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). In proceedings 

in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to 

afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to 

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Plaintiff is in no different position than many pro se prisoner litigants. The Court will 

therefore deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 

VII. Warnings

A. Release

 If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not 

been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court 

that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or 

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(2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may 

result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in an Arizona Department of Corrections 

unit subject to General Order 14-17, Plaintiff is not required to serve Defendants with a 

copy of every document he files or to submit an additional copy of every filing for use by 

the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 and 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a unit other than one 

subject to General Order 14-17, he will be notified of the requirements for service and 

copies for the Court that are required for inmates whose cases are not subject to General 

Order 14-17. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $4.50. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4) is denied. 

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(4) Defendants Ryan, Godlevsky, Streadman, Credio, Unknown Nurse, Lee, 

Unknown Facility Health Administrator, and Unknown Health Services Regional 

Operations Director are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (5) Defendants Musachio and Woods must answer Counts One and Two. 

 (6) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff this Order, and a copy of the 

Marshal’s Process Receipt & Return form (USM-285) and Notice of Lawsuit & Request 

for Waiver of Service of Summons form for Defendants Musachio and Woods. 

 (7) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (8) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (9) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (10) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

 1

If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

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returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (11) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 

the Plaintiff.

 (12) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (13) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 

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 (14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 10th day of August, 2015. 

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