Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02074/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02074-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

(continued...)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFFORD TRAVIS, and CHRISTINE

TRAVIS, on behalf of their

minor son, BRANDON TRAVIS, as

his next friend,

2:06-CV-02074-MCE-EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FOLSOM CORDOVA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, and STEVE HOWE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

In the present action, Plaintiffs Clifford Travis and

Christine Travis (“Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendants Folsom

Cordova Unified School District (“FCUSD”) and vice-principal

Steve Howe of Folsom Middle School (“Defendants”) have

discriminated against Plaintiffs’ son, Brandon Travis, on the

basis of his race.1

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(...continued) 1

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

Unless otherwise stated, all references to “Rule” or 2

“Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

Plaintiffs’ assert Defendants have so discriminated in

violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VI”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and California Education Code section

220.

Defendants here have moved the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint for failure to comply with a court order. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Clifford Travis and Christine Travis brought the

present action on behalf of their minor son Brandon Travis. 

Brandon Travis was a student at Folsom Middle School, a

subdivision of Folsom Cordova Unified School District, during

2004 and 2005. Defendants are Folsom Cordova Unified School

District and vice-principal Steve Howe of Folsom Middle School.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this matter on August

24, 2006. On November 22, 2006, Defendants moved to dismiss this

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2

Plaintiffs filed a statement of non-opposition to that Motion and

forthwith filed a First Amended Complaint. Again, Defendants

filed a Motion to Dismiss. On January 13, 2007, Plaintiffs filed

an Opposition to that Motion.

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3

Notwithstanding, on April 5, 2007, the Court issued an Order

granting Defendants’ Motion in its entirety with twenty (20) days

leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to timely file a Second

Amended Complaint and the present Motion followed.

STANDARD

Defendants are seeking to have the present matter dismissed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). That Rule

provides in pertinent part as follows:

Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of

the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these

rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for

dismissal of an action or of any claim against the

defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal

otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision

and any dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for

improper venue, or for failure to join a party under

Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

The principles that apply to dismissals for violation of

pretrial orders are well established. Courts are to weigh five

factors in deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to

comply with a court order: “(1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” 

Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987). 

These factors are “not a series of conditions precedent before

the judge can do anything,” but a “way for a district judge to

think about what to do.”

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4

Valley Eng’rs Inc. V. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th

Cir. 1998); see also Allen v. Bayer Corp. (In re :

Phenlpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 460 F.3d 1217,

1228 (9th Cir. 2006). 

ANALYSIS

At the outset, the Court would like to emphasize that

Plaintiffs did not oppose the present Motion. In fact, on May 4,

2007, Plaintiffs filed a Statement of Non-Opposition to the

present Motion but that Statement was limited to Defendant Steve

Howe. Inexplicably, while Plaintiffs expressly chose not to

oppose Defendant Howe’s Motion to Dismiss through the foregoing

Statement, Plaintiffs filed neither an Opposition nor a Statement

of Non-Opposition to Defendant Folsom Cordova Unified School

District’s Motion to Dismiss. On that ground alone, the Court

finds Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend

appropriate. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court

shall address the following alternative ground for its ruling.

1. Expeditious Resolution Of Litigation

As reflected in the first of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the public has an overriding interest in securing “the

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of ever action.” See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Orderly and expeditious resolution of

disputes is a matter of great importance to the rule of law.

///

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5

By the same token, delay in reaching the merits, whether by way

of settlement or adjudication, is costly in money, memory,

manageability, and confidence in the process. Allen, 460 F.3d at

1228.

The Court has provided Plaintiffs a clear directive with

respect to the time they were permitted to amend their Complaint. 

Plaintiffs failed to comply with that directive delaying the

resolution of this matter. Considering the expense of this

matter remaining active when Plaintiffs have failed to amend

their Complaint subsequent to its dismissal, the Court finds this

factor weighs in favor of granting Defendants’ Motion.

2. The Court’s Need To Manage Its Docket

“District courts have an inherent power to control their

dockets. In the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions

including, where appropriate, default or dismissal.” Thompson v.

Hous. Auth. Of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)

(per curiam). Rule 16, the central pretrial rule, authorizes a

court to manage cases so that disposition is expedited, wasteful

pretrial activities are discouraged, the quality of the trial is

improved, and settlement is facilitated. Allen, 460 F.3d at

1228. Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure of the plaintiff

to prosecute or to comply with any order of court. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b).

///

///

/// 

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6

The Supreme Court has also recognized that dismissal “must

be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not

merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant

such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such

conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.” Nat’l Hockey League

v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per

curiam). 

Management of this Court’s docket is of vital significance

to the proper and timely resolution of matters before it. 

Consequently, the Court finds dismissal of this action for

failure to comply with the Court’s Order serves to facilitate the

management of the docket. Accordingly, this factor weighs in

favor of granting Defendants’ Motion.

3. Risk Of Prejudice To The Defendant

“A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions

impair the defendant’s ability to go to trail or threaten to

interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l

Corp. V. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). The law

presumes prejudice from unreasonable dely. Mooneymaker v. CoBen

(In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9 th Cir.

1991) (as amended) (presuming from elapsed time that defendants’

ability to defend a case has been prejudiced).

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/// 

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7

A plaintiff may proffer an excuse for delay that, if

“anything but frivolous,” shifts the burden of production to the

defendant to show at least some actual prejudice; if it does, the

plaintiff must persuade the court that the claims of prejudice

are illusory or relatively insignificant in light of his excuse. 

Moneymaker, 31 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Nealey v. Transp. Maritima

Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1980)); Hernandez

v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998)

(reiterating that the burden of production shifts to the

defendant to show at least some actual prejudice only after the

plaintiff has given a non-frivolous excuse for delay). 

In this circumstance, prejudice, delay, and excuse all

influence the district court’s discretion. Prejudice normally

consists of loss of evidence and memory. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at

1453. However, it may also consist of costs or burdens of

litigation. That the case is “an involved, complex case

increases the prejudice from the delay. Early preparation and

participation are essential in such circumstances.” Anderson,

542 F.2d at 525. Here, the risk to Defendants given the

unreasonable delay to proceed by Plaintiffs tips this factor in

favor of granting Defendants’ Motion.

4. Disposition On The Merits

It has often been said that the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits strongly counsels against

dismissal. See, e.g., Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399.

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8

Conversely, a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed

by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines and discovery

obligations cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits. 

Thus, courts have recognized that this factor lends little

support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case

toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes

progress in that direction. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1454;

Morris, 942 F.2d at 652. While it is clear there is public

policy favoring disposition of this case on its merits,

Plaintiffs failure to comply with the Court’s Order to amend its

Complaint leans this fourth factor in favor granting Defendants’

Motion.

5. Availability Of Less Drastic Sanctions

“‘The district court abuses its discretion if it imposes a

sanction of dismissal without first considering the impact of the

sanction and the adequacy of less drastic sanctions.’” Malone,

833 F. 2d at 131-32 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Med. Enters.,

Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1986)). Factors that indicate

whether a district court has considered alternatives include: (1)

Did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic

sanction and explain why alternative sanctions would be

inadequate; (2) Did the court implement alternative methods of

sanctioning or curing the malfeasance before ordering dismissal;

and (3) Did the court warn the plaintiff of the possibility of

dismissal before actually ordering dismissal. Malone, 833 F. 2d

at 132.

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While helpful and encouraged, explicit discussion of

alternatives is not necessary for a dismissal order to be upheld. 

Id. Warning that failure to obey a court order will result in

dismissal can itself meet the “consideration of alternatives”

requirement. Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS

10697, 15-16 (9th Cir. 2001); Malone, 833 F.2d at 132. The Court

believes it has satisfied its obligation to consider alternative

sanctions and hereby finds the sanction of dismissal appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds dismissal

proper. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Dated: June 22, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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