Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01009/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01009-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON FAVOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01009-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Brandon Flavor (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 30, 

2015, and it was transferred to this Court on July 6, 2015. Plaintiff names Kern Valley State Prison

(“KVSP”) Correctional officer K. Falconer as the sole Defendant.

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 

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fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or 

omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that on May 14, 2012, he was moved to another cell. Inmate Walker was in 

the dayroom area. Once Plaintiff returned, Inmate Walker immediately began fighting with him. 

Plaintiff states that he was addressed earlier regarding another exchange, and he is at odds with an 

inmate in the pod where he was moved from.

Plaintiff was placed in Administrative Segregation after a guilty finding for battery. He was 

directed to appeal the finding. On June 14, 2012, Plaintiff received a “hold, 2 month mitigated SHU 

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term” for battery on an inmate. ECF No. 1, at 4. Plaintiff contends that a medical report showed 

that only he had an injury.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause and the 

Eighth Amendment.

C. DISCUSSION

1. Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and KVSP

Plaintiff names the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and KVSP in the caption of the

complaint, but he does not include any allegations against them. 

In any event, Plaintiff is notified that he cannot maintain an action against a state prison. The 

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting 

state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation 

omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico 

Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. 

Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies 

as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense 

Council v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons 

was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community 

College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Because KVSP and the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility are part of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which is a state agency, they are entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity from suit.

2. Defendant Falconer

Plaintiff lists Defendant Falconer as a Defendant, but he does not include any factual 

allegations against him. As noted above, Plaintiff must link the actions or omissions of each named 

defendant to a violation of his rights. 

He therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Falconer.

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3. The Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 

S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often 

are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. 

Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of 

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 

F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 

2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in 

prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To 

maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 

(9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 

1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim appears to be based on his placement in Administrative 

Segregation. However, “[e]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-ofconfinement claim,” and there is nothing about placement in Administrate Segregation, alone, that is 

extreme. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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4. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the 

procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 

221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from 

state law. Id. The Due Process Clause does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more 

adverse conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by 

prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue. 

Id. at 221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation 

marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom 

from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) 

(quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

With respect to placement in Administrative Segregation, due process requires only that 

prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is 

segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for considering segregation, 

and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995); accord Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Prisoners are not entitled to detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel 

substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for 

placing the prisoner in administrative segregation. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (quotation marks 

omitted). As to retention in administrative segregation, prison officials must engage in some sort of 

periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Annual reviews 

do not sufficiently protect the prisoner’s liberty interest. Id.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff disagrees that his actions warranted placement in 

Administrate Segregation, his claim fails under the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff’s allegations do 

not suggest that he was denied the process he was due. 

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Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for violation of due process.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff does not state any cognizable claims. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the 

opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified 

deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff 

amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the mere 

theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th 

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations 

must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; 

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, and 

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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