Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05280/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05280-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed October 16, 1998

No. 96-5280

Clarence E. Blair-Bey,

Appellant

v.

Margaret Quick, Chairperson,

District of Columbia Board of Parole, et al.,

Appellees

---------

On Petition for Rehearing

---------

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: Appellees' petition for rehearing

raises an issue with respect to Blair-Bey's ex post facto claim.

We remanded that part of his case to allow him to attempt to

make out his claim that the District of Columbia's current

parole system, which was adopted after he committed his

crimes, amounts to an ex post facto law as applied to him

because it more strictly constrains the District of Columbia

Board of Parole's ("DCBOP" or "Board") discretion to release

prisoners by providing for the use of "salient factor scores"

which give particular weight to certain factors. We said that

"the circuit caselaw poses something of a problem for BlairBey" in that Warren v. United States Parole Commission,

659 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981) rejected a similar challenge to a

1976 federal parole system revision. We held, however, that

on remand Blair-Bey might be able to distinguish his case

from Warren "in any of three ways," by showing (1) that the

Board's revisions "impose a sufficiently great risk of disadvantaging a particular category of inmates" to which BlairBey belongs, citing California Dep't of Corrections v.

Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995); (2) that the 1987 revision

was motivated by a punitive desire to punish a certain type of

prisoner, see Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1987);

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #389551 Filed: 10/16/1998 Page 1 of 5
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

or (3) that the Board "does not in practice ever ignore its own

guidelines" so that they effectively exercise no discretion at

all. One or a combination of these factors, we said, "could

suffice to establish that Blair-Bey has been deprived of his

'entitlement to have [the Board's] discretion exercised,' " but

we were careful to refrain from "decid[ing] now what kind of

showing would suffice." Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036,

1049 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Warren, 659 F.2d at 196)).

Because Blair-Bey's petition had been dismissed sua sponte

without any opportunity on his part to develop arguments or

present evidence, we remanded for reconsideration of his

claim.

Appellees argue that we underestimated the precedential

effect of Warren, which based its dismissal of the ex post

facto claim against the federal guidelines independently on

the retention of the discretion in the Board to deviate from

the guidelines in worthy cases:

Thus, while it is uncertain that the guidelines in fact

work to Warren's detriment, and while the functional

basis of the ex post facto clause is not substantially

implicated in Warren's case, we do not rest our decision

on those grounds alone. What clinches the case is that

Warren was sentenced to be held in federal prison at the

discretion--howsoever exercised--of the parole authorities, so that guidelines which merely rationalize the

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #389551 Filed: 10/16/1998 Page 2 of 5
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

exercise of that discretion do not offend the ex post facto

clause.

Warren, 659 F.2d at 195.

Announcing that "[a] change merely in the manner in which

the Board, now the Commission, exercises its discretion ...

cannot offend the ex post facto clause," Warren still insisted

that "[i]t is important to point out that, precisely because

Warren was sentenced to be held at the discretion of the

parole authorities, under the ex post facto clause he is

entitled to an opportunity to have that discretion exercised;

anything less would impermissibly augment his penalty." Id.

at 195-96. In Warren, however, the court dismissed the

petition without affording the petitioner a chance to develop

any record on lack of discretion in the DCBOP, stating that

"we deem counsel's oblique references to inflexible application

of the guidelines, unaccompanied by any profession of ability

to produce at least some acceptable evidence thereof, insufficient ground for a remand...." Id. at 197 n.57. Then-Judge

Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented on the ground that the

prisoner's claim of "rigid decisionmaking" should be explored

on remand; she would "await the development of some kind

of record ... before reaching the merits of Warren's claim."

Id. at 199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

In sum, appellees would have us now declare that Warren

conclusively bars any ex post facto claim based upon the

DCBOP guidelines unless sufficient facts are alleged in the

original petition to demonstrate that no discretion was being

exercised by the Board in making parole decisions.

At this point in time--almost 20 years after Warren was

decided--we tend to agree with Judge Ginsburg's comment

that "the shut out comes too soon." Id. at 198. This is not to

say, however, that the appellees do not make out a fair case

that we have not hewn close enough to the grounds for

Warren's holding on the ex post facto claim. Although we

cautioned that "If the 1987 revision [of the DCBOP guidelines] undertook to codify past parole practices, in the way

that the 1976 federal guidelines revision did, and if the

DCBOP in practice retains discretion to ignore the guidelines,

then his case will fall under Warren," 151 F.3d at 1049, we

take the opportunity now to reinforce our caution that in

order to prevail Blair-Bey would have to demonstrate on

remand at a minimum that the DCBOP's discretion under the

guidelines is totally or very substantially circumscribed in law

or in fact, and yields results materially harsher than those

ordinarily occurring under the prior regime.

Unlike Warren, however, we do not believe that he should

be denied that opportunity altogether. There is no doubt his

burden is a heavy, if not a near-impossible one, but there

is no federal precedent to bar his attempt. Cf. Davis v.

Henderson, 652 A.2d 634, 636 (D.C. 1995) (DCBOP guidelines

"merely formalize the manner in which the Board exercises

the discretion" previously conferred on it). Since Warren

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #389551 Filed: 10/16/1998 Page 3 of 5
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

was decided, the Supreme Court has said that, given the

possible res judicata effect of dismissing a complaint as

frivolous, "a court of appeals reviewing a s 1915(d) disposition

should consider whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without

leave to amend." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34

(1992). The factual allegations Blair-Bey makes are not

"fantastic," id. at 33, and, although they may be lacking in

detail, they are not so obviously legally inadequate as to

foreclose any possibility that Blair-Bey could submit a nonfrivolous amended complaint. See Nietzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319 (1989) (holding that the test for legal frivolity is less

stringent than that applied under Rule 12(b)(6)). Thus, we

think it is appropriate to allow Blair-Bey leave to amend his

complaint on remand, despite Warren's contrary approach.

Thus, although we acknowledge Warren's requirement of a

lack of discretion in the DCBOP as a sine qua non of an ex

post facto claim is a stricter one than our original opinion may

have suggested, we do not alter our decision that Blair-Bey

should be allowed to present his case on remand. If he fails

to do so, and his claim is rejected, the District will have its

precedent and be adequately protected from any onslaught of

future frivolous petitions based on the same grounds.

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #389551 Filed: 10/16/1998 Page 4 of 5
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #389551 Filed: 10/16/1998 Page 5 of 5