Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00031/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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1 09cv31 WQH (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAZARETH RONDINELLI,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 09cv31 WQH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 12]

AND DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO.

15]

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nazareth Rondinelli initially applied for disability insurance

benefits on December 9, 2004, but that application was denied on

February 11, 2005. (Admin. R. 22, 79-83.) Over a year later,

Plaintiff filed his current Application for Disability Insurance

Benefits on January 30, 2006, claiming disability as of October 6,

1996. (Id. Attach. #1, 116-18.) 

Plaintiff’s current claim was denied on April 24, 2006,

because it dealt with issues addressed in his first claim for

benefits. (Admin. R. 87-90.) Rondinelli appealed on May 26, 2006,

but his appeal was denied on June 17, 2006. (Id. at 94-99.) 

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Plaintiff also requested a hearing. (Id. at 95.) Administrative

Law Judge Edward Steinman dismissed Rondinelli’s claim on October

6, 2006, based in part on res judicata. (Id. at 77-78.) 

On December 5, 2007, the Appeals Council issued an order

remanding Rondinelli’s claim to Judge Steinman and finding that res

judicata did not prevent the ALJ from deciding Plaintiff’s claim on

the merits because there was new and material evidence in the

record. (Id. Attach. #1, 113-14.) Administrative Law Judge

Steinman held a hearing on April 18, 2008. (Admin. R. 36-71.) He

issued a written decision on May 13, 2008, finding Rondinelli was

not disabled. (Id. at 22-29.) The denial of benefits became final

when the Appeals Council upheld the decision on July 25, 2008. 

(Id. at 12-14.) 

On January 8, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Judicial

Review & Remedy on Administrative Decision Under the Social

Security Act against Michael J. Astrue, Defendant Commissioner of

Social Security, challenging the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for

Disability Insurance benefits [doc. no. 1]. Defendant filed an

Answer on July 10, 2009 [doc. no. 7] and filed the Administrative

Record three days later [doc. no. 8]. The Court issued an Order

Setting Deadline for Filing Pretrial Motions [doc. no. 9], but on

September 29, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiff an extension of

time to file a motion for summary judgment [doc. no. 11]. 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was timely filed on

October 7, 2009 [doc. no. 12]. On November 17, 2009, the Court

granted the parties’ joint motion to extend the time in which

Defendant could respond to Plaintiff’s Motion [doc. no. 14]. On

December 28, 2009, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

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[doc. no. 15] and an identical Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [doc no. 16] were filed. 

The Court finds this matter is suitable for decision without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). S.D. Cal.

Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment [doc. no. 12], GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN

PART Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. no. 15],

and remanding this matter for further proceedings.

II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Nazareth Rondinelli was born on February 25, 1957. (Admin. R.

Attach. #1, 134.) He claimed to be disabled as of October 6, 1996,

due to back injuries. (Admin. R. 22; id. Attach. #1, 164.) The

date he was last insured and eligible for benefits was December 31,

2000. (Admin. R. 23; id. Attach. #1, 164.)

Dr. Rich Richley performed two laser diskectomies on

Rondinelli shortly after his work injury on October 6, 1996,

although records of these procedures are not contained in the

medical evidence. (Id. Attach. #5, 555.) 

On January 9, 1998, Dr. Theodore Georgis performed a bilateral

lumbar laminectomy and foraminotomy at level L3-4 and L4-5, and an

interbody fusion at level L4-5. (Id. at 554.) The doctor examined

Plaintiff on February 12, 1998, and noted that an X-ray showed the

interbody cage and fusion were stable. (Id. Attach. #2, 242.) He

next examined Rondinelli on April 16, 1998, and found that his

posture and gait were “excellent,” and he had good leg strength and

motor strength. (Id. at 239.) The doctor examined Plaintiff on

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May 28, 1998, and, after reviewing an X-ray, found that there was

no instability. (Id. at 237.) 

Rondinelli saw Dr. Howard Tung on January 18, 1999, and he

complained of severe back pain. (Id. at 263.) The doctor reviewed

a CT scan and found that Plaintiff had disc protrusion and

narrowing at the L3-4 level. (Id.) Nonetheless, Dr. Tung

determined that Rondinelli should be considered permanent and

stationary. (Id. at 268.) 

On July 28, 1999, Dr. Tung performed a lumbar laminectomy and

fusion at the L3-4 level of Rondineli’s back. (Id. at 250.) The

doctor also re-explored the L4-5 level and performed a cage fusion. 

(Id. at 250-51.) Dr. Tung examined Plaintiff after his surgery on

August 5, and September 16, 1999, and found that the cages at L3-4

were “in excellent position” and the cages at L4-5 were “stable.” 

(Id. at 234-36.) On April 18, 2000, Dr. Tung noted that Rondinelli

had good strength in lis lower extremities; his gait was mildly

antalgic; and a straight leg test was negative bilaterally. (Id.

at 257.) 

The doctor completed a permanent and stationary report on May

30, 2000. (Id. at 254.) In his report, Dr. Tung opined that

Rondinelli was partially disabled and could perform semi-sedentary

work, described as sitting half of the workday, and sitting,

standing, or walking the other half. (Id.) He specified some work

preclusions: no repetitive bending or twisting, no repetitive

bending about the lumbar spine, and a weight lifting restriction of

fifteen to twenty pounds. (Id. at 255.) 

Rondinelli saw Dr. Tung again on July 25, 2000, after he was

injured in a motorcycle accident. (Id. at 252.) Dr. Tung tested

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Plaintiff’s strength in his legs and looked for any weakness;

Rondinelli’s range of motion was unchanged; his forward flexion was

sixty to seventy degrees; and his extension was ten degrees. (Id.) 

X-rays showed that Plaintiff’s fusions were not damaged during the

accident, and Rondinelli remained permanent and stationary. (Id.

at 252-53.) 

Dr. Bruce Van Dam completed an agreed medical evaluation

addendum report dated January 2, 2001, which referred to his

earlier November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation. (Id. at 272-

73.) In the addendum report, Dr. Van Dam discussed his review of a

diskography of the L1-2 and L2-3 levels and concluded, “These

findings help to confirm my opinion that Mr. Rondinelli more likely

than not continues to experience symptoms from an injury to the L2-

3 disk and a probable pseudarthrosis at L3-4.” (Id. at 272.) The

doctor also explained, “It remains my opinion that Mr. Rondinelli

is not permanent and stationary unless he elects to defer further

surgical intervention.” (Id. at 273.) 

Dr. Van Dam submitted a second agreed medical evaluation

addendum report dated January 15, 2001, and opined that Rondinelli

was temporarily totally disabled because the fusion at level L3-4

had not healed, and Plaintiff had not undergone surgery on level

L2-3, despite “obvious abnormalities.” (Id. at 274.) Dr. Van Dam

became Plaintiff’s treating physician on January 26, 2001. (Id. at

276.) He operated on Rondineli on April 5, 2001. (Id. at 278.) 

Specifically, Dr. Van Dam explored the L3-4 fusion, noting a

pseudarthrosis and bilateral pars interarticularis fractures; he

performed an interbody fusion at level L2-3 and a posterolateral

fusion at levels L2-4. (Id. at 278-79.)

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On September 9, 2002, Maria Zouvas, A.T.C., evaluated

Plaintiff and concluded that he was permanent and stationary, and

he was limited to semi-sedentary work with a lifting limit of no

more than ten pounds occasionally. (Id. at 287, 292.) 

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

On April 18, 2008, the administrative hearing was held before

ALJ Steinman. (Admin. R. 36.) Rondinelli and his attorney, Shanny

Lee, were both present. (Id.) Judge Steinman also heard testimony

from Walter Doren, a medical expert, and Gloria Lasoff, a

vocational expert. (Id. at 36, 50-68.)

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified regarding his medical

condition and pain. (Id. at 44-50.) He explained that in October

of 1996, his back pain, which had been building over time, reached

a level which impeded his ability to move. (Id. at 44.) He went

straight to his primary physician, Dr. Richley, who told him to

stop working. (Id.) The doctor also performed two laser surgeries

on Plaintiff’s back in late 1996. (Id. at 44-45.) About a year

after those surgeries, his condition worsened and he received his

first surgical disc fusion in January 1998. (Id. at 45.)

Rondinelli described the years of 1998 through 1999 as “very

bad” and explained that there had been problems during his surgery,

and although he was doing physical therapy and exercising, his pain

got worse. (Id. at 47-48.) Plaintiff was in “severe, severe pain”

and was “skeptical” of his doctors, so he began seeing Dr. Van Dam. 

(Id. at 48.) The judge asked, “[I]s it essentially your position

between October 6, [1996] and [December 31, 2000], that due to your

surgeries and back pain, you couldn’t do any kind of work

activity?” (Id.) Rondinelli responded that it was. (Id. at 49.) 

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Dr. Doren, the medical expert, testified that there were few

MRIs or CT scans available from the relevant time period, but he

noted that on December 16, 1997, Dr. Georgis found that

Rondinelli’s range of motion was limited, although there were no

neurological abnormalities. (Id. at 51-52.) Dr. Georgis concluded

there was disk protrusion with spondylosis, and he performed

surgery in January 1998. (Id. at 52.) The doctor did not note any

complications during surgery. (Id. at 53.) Immediately after

surgery, Plaintiff was in a significant amount of pain, but he was

fully mobilized and managed with pain pills and a brace. (Id.) 

The medical expert explained that about four months after the

surgery, “[Rondinelli] was distinctively doing quite well.” (Id.) 

On May 10, 1999, about a year and a half after the surgery, an Xray showed that there was no movement at the fusion, and objective

tests showed there were still no neurological abnormalities. (Id.

at 53-54.) 

In July 1999, Plaintiff underwent another back surgery. (Id.

at 54.) About ten months later, Dr. Tung completed his permanent

and stationary findings, and released Rondinelli from ongoing care. 

(Id. at 54-55.) X-rays showed that there was no evidence of

instability. (Id. at 55.) But Plaintiff had some residual back

and sacroiliac pain with spasms. (Id.) Dr. Tung found that

Rondinelli could perform semi-sedentary work, sitting half the time

and standing and walking the other half. (Id.)

Plaintiff continued to experience pain, so he went to Dr. Van

Dam who performed surgery three months after the disability

eligibility period ended. (Id. at 55-56.) The medical expert

noted that there were no CT scans that showed subtle arthrosis at

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that time. (Id. at 55.) Dr. Van Dam also explored a different

fusion and found that it was not completely healed. (Id. at 56.) 

But the medical expert testified that six months earlier there was

enough soft tissue stability to allow Rondinelli perform well on

the flexion and extension tests. (Id. at 56.) 

The medical expert concluded that Plaintiff did not meet or

equal a disability listing for a period lasting one year anytime

between October 6, 1996 through December 31, 2000. (Id.) He also

agreed with Dr. Tung’s analysis of Rondinelli. (Id. at 57.) 

Rondineli’s attorney questioned the medical expert about the

preferred method for objectively diagnosing back injuries. (Id. at

57-61.) Dr. Doren explained that an MRI provides more objective

and specific evidence of back injury than a diskogram. (Id. at

60.) 

The ALJ presented hypothetical questions to the vocational

expert, Gloria Lasoff, based on Dr. Tung’s, Dr. Van Dam’s, and Dr.

Doren’s assessments of Rondinelli. (Id. at 62, 64-65.) The

vocational expert listed three positions that a person with “semisedentary” and “less than a full range of light work” could

perform. (Id.) The occupations were production assembler,

production inspector, and garment folder, which were all light

positions. (Id. at 63-64.) 

The ALJ also posed hypotheticals to the vocational expert

based on Rondinelli’s testimony about his pain and limitations. 

(Id. at 65-66.) The vocational expert testified that there would

be no work available under those circumstances. (Id. at 66.) And

Rondinelli’s attorney asked some questions of the vocational expert

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regarding the residual functional capacity limitation. (Id. at 66-

67.) 

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

After considering the record, ALJ Steinman made the following

relevant findings:

3. Through the date last insured, the

claimant has the following severe impairments:

spinal stenosis and degenerative disc disease of

the lumbar spine; status post three back surgeries

with residual pain (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

. . . . 

4. Through the date last insured, the

claimant did not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that met or medically equaled one

of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),

404.1525 and 404.1526).

. . . .

5. After careful consideration of the

entire record, the undersigned finds that, through

the date last insured, the claimant had the

residual functional capacity to lift or carry 15-

20 pounds; sit for 50 percent of the workday;

either stand or walk for 50 percent of the

workday; minimal demand for physical effort; no

repetitive bending, twisting or bending about the

lumbar spine.

. . . .

10. Through the date last insured,

considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity,

there were jobs that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant

could have performed (20 CFR 404.1560(c) and

404.1566).

(Id. at 24-25, 27.) 

Based on all of the above, Judge Steinman concluded that

Rondinelli was not entitled to disability insurance benefits from

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October 6, 1999, through December 31, 2000, the date he was last

insured. (Id. at 28.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers

from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to

last for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would

result in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant

incapable of performing the work that he or she previously

performed or any other substantially gainful employment that

exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

(2)(A) (West Supp. 2009). An applicant must meet both

requirements to be classified as “disabled.” Id.

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the SSA to seek

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2009). The Court

should affirm the decision unless “it is based upon legal error or

is not supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart,

427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel,

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]

conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It means “‘more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance[]’” of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

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“‘[T]he court must consider both evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .’” Frost

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520 (2010). If an applicant is found to be “disabled” or

“not disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further. 

Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Although the ALJ must assist the applicant in

developing a record, the applicant bears the burden of proof

during the first four steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1098 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). If the fifth step is reached,

however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The

steps for evaluating a claim are as follows:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the

claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the

Social Security Act and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in a

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If

not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s

case cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation

proceeds to step three.

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of

a list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If

the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one

of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four.

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Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that

he or she has done in the past? If so, then the

claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to

disability insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot

do any work he or she did in the past, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the

evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 

If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner

must establish that there are a significant number of

jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. 

There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the

burden of showing that there is other work in

“significant numbers” in the national economy that

claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational

expert, or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. If

the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not

disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the Commissioner cannot meet

this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving

an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 

42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

After a case is remanded and an additional hearing is held, the

Commissioner may modify or affirm the original findings of fact or

the decision. Id. 

“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Flaten v. Sec’y Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Instead, it

must uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is susceptible

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to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports

the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th

Cir. 2005).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

1. Plaintiff’s Argument

Rondinelli contends that the administrative law judge found

that he had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary

work with some additional limitations, but the jobs identified by

the vocational expert were light jobs. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 4.) “The ALJ finding that Mr. Rondinelli could do

these jobs is [sic] flies in the face of his limitation to

sedentary work.” (Id.) Thus, the findings regarding Plaintiff’s

ability to perform other work are not supported by substantial

evidence. (Id.)

2. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant asserts that the ALJ characterized Plaintiff’s work

residual functional capacity as “semi-sedentary” and “less than a

full range of light” during the administrative hearing. (CrossMot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4.) Judge Steinman’s

residual functional capacity findings are actually “beyond the

requirements of sedentary work consistent with many demands of

light work.” (Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).) Defendant explains,

“Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ asserted Plaintiff was not

capable of the full range of sedentary work[;]” however, the only

aspect of Rondinelli’s residual functional capacity that does not

equal sedentary work is the sitting requirement. (Id.) The jobs

identified by the vocational expert “allow any combination of

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sitting and standing.” (Id.) Thus, there is no error in the

administrative law judge’s decision.

3. Applicable Standards

The claimant bears the burden of establishing his disability

and the medical severity of physical and mental impairments which

prevent him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(b)-(f), 416.920(b)-(f) (2010). At step five of the

disability analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show

that the claimant can perform other gainful work that exists in

substantial numbers in the economy. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d

715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998).

If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence

and properly applied law, it will not be reversed for harmless

error. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.

1990). The ALJ may rely on the testimony of the vocational expert

to make “specific findings showing that the claimant has the

physical and mental capacity to perform specified jobs, taking

into consideration the requirements of the job as well as the

claimant’s age, education, and background.” Hall v. Sec’y of

Health, Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979).

Hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert must include

“‘all of the claimant’s functional limitations, both physical and

mental’ supported by the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562,

570-71 (9th Cir. 1995)); accord Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Where an incomplete hypothetical is posed,

the vocational expert's opinion that the claimant can perform jobs

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in the national economy is not supported by competent evidence. 

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1466 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); see

also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991).

The ALJ may properly limit questioning of the vocational

expert to only physical impairments, if there are no mental

impairments supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. “[A]n ALJ may accept or reject alleged

restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by

substantial evidence.” McHugh v. Astrue, No. C 06-3616 JL, 2008

WL 3876475, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008) (citing Osenbrock, 240

F.3d at 1164-65); accord Bradford v. Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1022-JTL,

2008 WL 2523833, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2008).

4. The ALJ’s Findings

During the administrative hearing, the ALJ presented several

hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, the first was

based on Dr. Tung’s assessment of Plaintiff. (Admin. R. 62.) The

ALJ restated Dr. Tung’s findings that Rondinelli’s condition was

permanent and stationary at a semi-sedentary level limited to “one

half time in sitting position, one half in standing and walking. 

Minimal demands with physical effort. No repeated bending . . .

restricted movement of his back. And the weight restriction was

15 to 20 pounds . . . and that also includes pain . . . .” (Id.

62.) Judge Steinman asked, “[T]his is less than a full range of

light work, correct?” (Id.) The vocational expert agreed and

explained that out of the 1,400 light job titles in the grid,

Rondinelli could perform approximately “50 percent.” (Id. at 63.) 

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Three available light positions were production assembler,

production inspector, and garment folder. (Id. at 63-64.) 

The ALJ’s second hypothetical was based on Dr. Van Dam’s

post-surgery, permanent and stationary report from September 2002. 

Rondinelli was “limited to semi-sedentary, one half the time

sitting, one half time standing and walking with minimal physical

demands whether sitting, standing or walking.” (Id. at 64.) The

vocational explained that Plaintiff could perform the same jobs

that had been identified previously. (Id.) 

The administrative law judge posed another hypothetical,

which was based on Dr. Doren’s assessment of Rondinelli. (Id. at

65.) Dr. Doren agreed with Dr. Tung’s findings, so the vocational

expert responded that the same jobs were available. (Id.)

Rondinelli’s attorney also posed some questions to the

vocational expert regarding the Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity limitation, spending half of the workday sitting and half

of the workday standing. (Id. at 66-67.) The attorney asked,

“What would be the tolerance in terms of switching from one of

those positions to the other?” The vocational expert responded,

“These particular jobs could be done at will.” (Id. at 66.) 

Rondinelli’s attorney stated, “These are probably bench work and

it didn’t matter whether he was sitting or standing.” (Id. at

67.) Judge Steinman asked the vocational expert if that was the

case, and she confirmed that it was. (Id.) 

In his decision, ALJ Steinman made the following findings

regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity:

Through the date last insured, if the claimant had

the residual functional capacity to perform the full

range of sedentary work, a finding of ‘not disabled’

would be directed by Medical Vocational Rule 201.21. 

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However, the claimant’s ability to perform all or

substantially all of the requirements of this level of

work was impeded by additional limitations. To

determine the extent to which these limitations erode

the unskilled sedentary occupational base, through the

date last insured, the Administrative Law Judge asked

the vocational expert whether jobs existed in the

national economy for an individual with the claimants’

age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity. The vocational expert testified

that given all of these factors the individual would

have been able to perform the requirements of

representative occupations such as: a production

assembler (DOT no. 706.687-010) (light/svp-2), with

1,000 regional jobs and 200,000 national jobs;

production inspector (DOT no. 559.687-074) (light/svp2), with 700 regional jobs and 75,000 national jobs;

and garment folder (DOT no. 789.687-066) (light/svp-2),

with 1,500 regional jobs and 300,000 national jobs. 

(Id. 27-28.)

Social Security Rulings define “sedentary work” as including

the following: 

[L]ifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although sitting is

involved, a certain amount of walking and standing is

often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are

sedentary if walking and standing are required

occasionally and other sedentary criteria are

met. . . . ‘Occasionally’ means occurring from very

little up to one-third of the time. Since being on

one's feet is required ‘occasionally’ at the sedentary

level of exertion, periods of standing or walking

should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an

8-hour workday, and sitting should generally total

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Work

processes in specific jobs will dictate how often and

how long a person will need to be on his or her feet to

obtain or return small articles.

Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (1983).

Social Security Rulings define “light work” as follows: 

[L]ifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 

Even though the weight lifted in a particular light job

may be very little, a job is in this category when it

requires a good deal of walking or standing -- the

primary difference between sedentary and most light

jobs. . . . ‘Frequent’ means occurring from one-third to

two-thirds of the time. Since frequent lifting or

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carrying requires being on one's feet up to two-thirds

of a workday, the full range of light work requires

standing or walking, off and on, for a total of

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may

occur intermittently during the remaining time. The

lifting requirement for the majority of light jobs can

be accomplished with occasional, rather than frequent,

stooping.

Id. at **5-6. 

Administrative Law Judge Steinman described Plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity to the vocational expert as less than

the full range of light work but more than sedentary work. The

lifting limitation of twenty pounds placed it above sedentary

work, but the requirement that Plaintiff spend half of the day

sitting and half of the day standing placed it below light work. 

As the Social Security Ruling explains, “[T]he primary difference

between sedentary and most light jobs” is the frequency of walking

and standing. Id. at *5. The vocational expert testified that a

claimant with the residual functional capacity described by the

judge could perform “less than the full range of light work.” 

(Admin. R. 62.) The vocational expert identified three jobs that

could be performed. (Id.) The ALJ relied on the vocational

expert’s testimony. See Hall v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare,

602 F.2d at 1377. 

The ALJ describes Rondinelli’s residual functional capacity

as sedentary work with some additional limitations. (Admin. R.

28.) Judge Steinman relied on the testimony of the vocational

expert that, with Rondinelli’s background and capacity, Plaintiff

could perform certain representative occupations: production

assembler, production inspector, and garment folder. (Id.) Other

than state that the expert’s testimony was consistent with the

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Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the ALJ did not reconcile his

finding that Plaintiff had a semi-sedentary residual functional

capacity with the conclusion that Rondinelli could perform three

light work positions.

B. Development of the Record 

1. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff argues that ALJ Steinman failed in his duty to

develop the record because there was a January 2, 2001 report from

Dr. Van Dam which refers to his earlier November 27, 2000 report,

that was not included as evidence in the medical record. (Id.

Attach. #3 Mem. P. & A. 5.) Plaintiff also argues that because

the ALJ did not have the November 27, 2000 report, he rejected the

doctor’s opinion without reviewing the evidence. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff concludes, “[The ALJ’s] rejection of Dr. Van Dam’s

opinion is not supported by substantial evidence and is based on

an error of law.” (Id.)

2. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant asserts that it is undisputed that Plaintiff

suffers from degenerative spinal problems. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5.) Defendant notes that Dr. Van Dam’s

November 27, 2000 report was created for a Workers’ Compensation

examination held a month before Plaintiff’s disability insurance

status expired. (Id. at 6.) Defendant argues that the doctor’s

opinion that Rondinelli was temporarily disabled “has no bearing

on the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .” (Id.) “Workers’ Compensation

examinations are geared toward a claimant’s existing employer and

job and it is also not in dispute that Plaintiff could not return

to any of his past work.” (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

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attorney was satisfied with the medical record because he

“expressly stated he had no objection to the record as it

existed.” (Id.)

3. Applicable Standards

Rondinelli has the duty to prove that he is disabled. Mayes

v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42

U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 331 (9th

Cir. 1990)). In Social Security cases, “[a]n individual shall not

be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such

medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the

Commissioner of Social Security may require.” 42 U.S.C.A. §

423(d)(5)(A). 

Rondinelli was responsible for “bring[ing] to [the Social

Security Administration’s] attention everything that shows that

[he was] blind or disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (2010)

(noting that the Social Security Administration will only consider

the impairments the claimant says he has or those about which it

receives evidence); see also Fullerton v. Astrue, No.

CV-07-3074-CI, 2008 WL 5102344, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2008)

(explaining that the claimant bears the burden of notifying the

ALJ of a condition that impacts the disability decision through

submission of objective evidence, not by simply making isolated

and unsupported assertions). The Social Security Administration

assists the claimant in developing the medical record based on the

information provided. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d) (“Before we

make a determination that you are not disabled, we will develop

your complete medical history . . . . We will make every

reasonable effort to help you get medical reports from your own

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medical sources when you give us permission to request the

reports.”). 

But “[t]he ALJ always has a ‘special duty to fully and fairly

develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are

considered . . . even when the claimant is represented by

counsel.’” Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citations omitted)). There is a greater responsibility to

develop the record when a claimant is not represented by counsel. 

Id.; see also Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir.

1992) (“[T]he ALJ is not a mere umpire at such a proceeding, but

has an independent duty to fully develop the record . . . .”) 

“[I]t is incumbent upon the ALJ to scrupulously and

conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the

relevant facts. He must be especially diligent in ensuring that

favorable as well as unfavorable facts and circumstances are

elicited.” Higbee, 975 F.2d at 561 (citing Cox v. Califano, 587

F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978)) (referring to the ALJ’s duty to

conduct an adequate hearing and develop the administrative

record). But see Cisco v. Astrue, 288 F. App’x 342, 344 (9th Cir.

2008) (finding that the ALJ did not have a duty to develop the

record where claimant was unresponsive to requests for updated

medical records and evaluations, and had previously waived his

right to appear and testify at the hearing). 

The ALJ’s duty to develop the record is triggered when there

is “[a]mbiguous evidence, or the [ALJ finds] that the record is

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence . . . .” 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

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Smolen 80 F.3d at 1288; Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998)) (quotations omitted); see also

Baghoomian v. Astrue, 319 F. App’x 563, 566 (9th Cir. 2009)

(agreeing that the ALJ need not take additional steps to develop

the record even though the treating physician’s opinion was not

supported objective evidence because the record as a whole was not

ambiguous or inadequate); Lusardi v. Astrue, No. 08-35712, 2009 WL

3497739, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2009) (finding that the ALJ did

not err in failing to develop the record because the evidence that

claimant’s mental impairments were not severe was not ambiguous or

inadequate).

The ALJ decides whether the evidence is inadequate in light

of the record as a whole. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. If

needed, the ALJ can develop the record by subpoenaing or

questioning claimant’s physician, continuing the administrative

hearing, or keeping the record open so it may be supplemented. 

Id. (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998);

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e)-(f)

(2010). 

Courts have found error when the administrative law judge

fails to request additional records if the ALJ, or a doctor or

medical expert on whose testimony he relies, has indicated that

further evidence is important to assessing the disability claim. 

See Struck v. Astrue, 247 F. App’x 84, 86 (9th Cir. 2007); accord

Coleman v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-1722-JM (JMA), 2009 WL 861864, at

**10-11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009). Additionally, it is error not

to develop the record where the medical evidence is ambiguous

because of the “obvious vicissitudes” in claimant’s health. Webb

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v. Barnhart, 433 F. 3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that

claimant’s “conditions improved and worsened as a result of [his]

afflictions and their treatments[]”); see also Hornbeck v. Astrue,

248 F. App’x 790, 791 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the ALJ

erred by failing to accept records claimant presented at the

administrative hearing because they could have helped resolve

“ambiguities as to the vicissitudes” in claimant’s health) (citing

Webb, id.). The ALJ has a duty to request medical source

statements about what the claimant can still do when the submitted

opinions are not sufficiently clear and raise an ambiguity. Lewis

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 293 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2008);

Ireland v. Astrue, 256 F. App’x 79, 82 (9th Cir. 2007).

4. The Medical Record

A disability report was completed for Rondinelli on December

9, 2004, shortly after he first applied for disability benefits. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #1, 134, 136.) He alleged a disability onset

date of October 7, 1996. (Id. at 134.) On January 16, 2005,

Plaintiff submitted a pain questionnaire and identified Dr. Bruce

Van Dam as his primary physician. (Id. at 145, 148.) He noted

that Dr. Van Dam had prescribed pain medications for him. (Id. at

146.) 

On February 2, 2005, in connection with his prior claim for

benefits, Rondinelli completed a second disability report in which

he asserted that he first visited Dr. Van Dam in 1999 and received

surgery on his back from the doctor in 2001. (Id. at 149, 152-53,

154.) In another disability report, Plaintiff indicated that he

first visited Dr. Van Dam on January 1, 2000. (Id. at 156, 160-

61.) 

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In his disability report-appeal, completed on April 17, 2006,

after his current application for benefits, Rondinelli again

asserted that he first saw Dr. Van Dam on January 1, 2000. (Id.

at 174-75, 183.) He also submitted another disability report

dated April 19, 2006, and explained that his first visit to Dr.

Van Dam was on January 1, 2000. (Id. at 190, 194, 196.) 

Plaintiff’s attorney completed a final disability report appeal

dated September 20, 2006, and noted that Rondinelli first saw Dr.

Van Dam on January 1, 2000. (Id. Attach. #2, 208, 209, 215.) 

Thus, although Rondinelli provides inconsistent dates for when he

first visited Dr. Van Dam, Plaintiff alleges that he was examined

by the doctor before his eligibility for disability insurance

benefits expired on December 31, 2000. 

On February 16, 2006, Plaintiff’s attorney submitted medical

evidence from Dr. Van Dam to the Social Security Administration. 

(Id. Attach. #3, 386.) The additional documents included a lumbar

spine impairment questionnaire, dated December 2, 2005, and

medical records dated June 24, 2005, and February 4, 2006. (Id.) 

Rondinelli’s attorney also provided medical records from Sharp

Health Care from August 23, 2005 through April 7, 2006, to the

Office of Hearings and Appeals on August 1, 2006. (Id. at 397.) 

But the November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation by Dr. Van

Dam, which is the subject of the current dispute, was not

provided.

Also contained in the medical records was a letter from Dr.

Van Dam to Plaintiff’s attorney dated October 28, 2005, in which

the doctor stated, “This is to confirm that I have evaluated and

treated Mr. Rondinelli for the same lumbar spine injury since the

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year 2001.” (Id. Attach. #4, 494.) In a letter from Dr. Van Dam

to Rondinelli’s attorney on February 4, 2006, the doctor wrote,

“Mr. Rondinelli was referred to me for an Agreed Medical

Evaluation on May 10, 1999 . . . . Eventually the insurance

carrier and applicant’s attorney designated me primary treating

physician on January 26, 2001.” (Id. Attach. #7, 717.) Thus, the

information provided by Dr. Van Dam was conflicting as to whether

he treated Rondinelli before December 31, 2000, the last date

Plaintiff was eligible for disability insurance benefits. 

On August 11, 2006, Rondinelli’s attorney submitted medical

records to the Social Security Office of Hearings and Appeals. 

(Id. Attach. #2, 216.) Among the documents provided were notes

from Plaintiff’s visits to Dr. Van Dam on September 9, and October

28, 2005. (Id.) The attorney again did not provide the November

27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation. (Id.)

On March 31, 2008, Plaintiff’s attorney submitted more

medical information to Administrative Law Judge Steinman in

advance of the hearing scheduled for April 18, 2008. (Id. at

217.) The November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation by Dr. Van

Dam was not included. (Id. at 218-20.) 

Rondinelli’s attorney submitted a prehearing statement of the

case on April 11, 2008. (Id. at 221-28.) He explained that

Plaintiff had been treated by Dr. Van Dam from May 10, 1999

through March 13, 2008. (Id. at 224-25.) But the November 27,

2000 agreed medical evaluation by Dr. Van Dam was not produced or

specifically referred to. (Id.) Plaintiff provided 32 pages of

medical records from Dr. Van Dam, and 153 pages of records from

the doctor had previously been provided. (Id. at 272-300; id.

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Attach. #3, 301-04, 386-96; id. Attach. #4, 493-94; id. Attach.

#5, 578-719.) 

Among the additional documents was an agreed medical

evaluation addendum from Dr. Van Dam dated January 2, 2001, that

referred to his November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation. (Id.

Attach. #2, 272-73.) In the January 2, 2001 addendum, Dr. Van Dam

stated, “Please recall that in the report of November 27, 2000 I

expressed the opinion that Mr. Rondinelli more likely than not has

a pseudarthrosis at L3-4 . . . and persistent abnormalities

. . . .” (Id. at 272.) He opined, “It remains my opinion that

Mr. Rondinelli is not permanent and stationary unless he elects to

defer further surgical intervention.” (Id. at 273.)

On April 18, 2008, a hearing was held before Administrative

Law Judge Steinman; both Rondinelli and his attorney were present. 

(Admin. R. 36.) The judge described the documents contained in

the medical record and asked Plaintiff’s attorney if he had any

objections; he had none. (Id. at 38-39.) 

During the hearing, Rondinelli explained that he first went

to see Dr. Van Dam “[s]ometime, I believe late ‘99.” (Id. at 48.) 

The medical expert interjected, “It was –- Dr. [Van Dam], you saw

him in 2001, Your Honor.” (Id.) The ALJ added, “So it seems that

you [Rondinelli] have some of your dates confused and the doctor

has the advantage of having the medical records.” (Id.) After

discussing his pain during that period of time Rondinelli asked,

“Then it was April 5 of 2001 that I had the surgery with Dr. [Van

Dam][?]” (Id. at 48-49.) The ALJ answered, “right.” (Id. at

49.)

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During the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney was questioning the

medical expert regarding myelograms and diskograms when Rondinelli

interjected, “And in 2000 I had some digital scan in Dr. [Van

Dam]’s office.” (Id. at 59.) The ALJ did not attempt to clarify

the date during this exchange. 

After the vocational expert answered the ALJ’s hypothetical,

Plaintiff testified that after his 1999 visit with one of his

other doctors, he went to Dr. Van Dam. (Id. at 69.) Rondinelli

claimed that Dr. Van Dam reviewed his medical records, took a

“digital format x-ray,” and diagnosed him with an “unhealed

fusion.” (Id.) Judge Steinman stated, “You’re talking about in

2001?” (Id.) Rondinelli responded that he was. (Id.) 

ALJ Steinman concluded the hearing by asking Rondinelli’s

attorney whether there were any other issues to discuss. (Id. at

71.) Counsel raised no other matters, so Judge Steinman closed

the record and concluded the hearing. (Id.) ALJ Steinman, the

medical expert, the vocational expert, Rondinelli, and

Rondinelli’s attorney did not specifically mention Dr. Van Dam’s

January 2, 2001 addendum or the November 27, 2000 agreed medical

evaluation during the administrative hearing. 

Attached to Plaintiff’s October 7, 2009 Motion for Summary

Judgment is the agreed medical exam that Dr. Van Dam performed on

November 27, 2000. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Ex. A at 1-6.) Dr.

Van Dam notes that he last evaluated Rondielli on May 10, 1999,

and opined that he was not permanent and stationary as of that

date. (Id. at 1-2.) As part of his November 27, 2000 evaluation,

the doctor found that Plaintiff had “persistent abnormalities at

L2-3 as well as probable pseudarthrosis at L3-4.” (Id. at 5.) 

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Dr. Van Dam stated, “[I]t is my opinion that Mr. Rondinelli is not

permanent and stationary. . . . [H]e is temporarily totally

disabled.” (Id. at 5.) 

a. Rondinelli’s Burden 

Rondinelli and his attorney have failed to satisfy the

claimant’s burden to produce medical evidence. See generally, 42

U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A); Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459; Clem, 894 F.2d at

331. Rondinelli inconsistently described the date of his first

visit to Dr. Van Dam. His attorney supplemented the record

several times before the hearing, but failed to submit the

November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation. Plaintiff’s attorney

also did not inform Judge Steinman that medical records were

missing. And there is no evidence that Judge Steinman or the

medical expert believe they needed additional records for the

disability determination. See generally, Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1150; Coleman, 2009 WL 861864, at *10; Fullerton, 2008 WL 5102344,

at *3. 

b. Duty to Obtain Dr. Van Dam’s November 27, 2000

Agreed Medical Evaluation

Although Rondinelli did not produce the November 27, 2000

agreed medical evaluation from Dr. Van Dam to support his claim of

disability, Plaintiff contends that the January 2, 2001 addendum,

which refers to the previous exam, triggered a duty to seek

additional medical records from the doctor, and the ALJ’s failure

to do so was error. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6.)

As noted above, the ALJ’s duty to develop the record is not

triggered by mere notice that medical records are missing. It is

triggered when there is “[a]mbiguous evidence, or the [ALJ has

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found] that the record is inadequate to allow for proper

evaluation of the evidence . . . .” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150;

Coleman, 2009 WL 861864, at *10. Whether the evidence is

inadequate is decided by the administrative law judge in light of

the record as a whole. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150.

In addition to Dr. Van Dam’s January 2, 2001 addendum to his

agreed medical evaluation and other medical records, ALJ Steinman

had been provided with (1) the medical records of Dr. Theodore

Georgis for December 16, 1997, through November 4, 1999, (2) an

operation report from Scripps Memorial Hospital dated July 28,

1999, (3) Scripps medical records from January 30, 1998, through

June 24, 2005, (4) Dr. Howard Tung’s medical records from November

4, 1999, through July 25, 2000, (5) a plan of treatment from

InCare Health Services dated April 10, 2001, (6) medical records

from Dr. John Qian for October 6, 2003, through January 20, 2005,

and May 23, 2006, through June 16, 2006, (7) a residual functional

capacity assessment completed by Dr. David Haaland on February 7,

2005, (8) medical records from Sharp Health Care for August 23,

2005, through April 7, 2006, (9) Dr. Sam Maywood’s medical

evaluation dated December 12, 2000, (10) medical records from Dr.

Robin Vaughan for March 16 and April 9, 2001, and (11) medical

records from Dr. David Smith for September 12, 2001, through April

29, 2002. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 233-71; id. Attach. #3, 302-85,

397-400; id. Attach. #4, 401-92, 498-500; id. Attach. #5, 501-77.)

Judge Steinman determined that Rondinelli had severe

impairments based on Plaintiff’s history of back pain beginning in

1991, three back surgeries, a 1997 MRI which “showed degenerative

disc disease of the lumbar spine with mild stenosis but no frank

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disc herniation[,]” and a lumbar diskogram from December 12, 2000,

that was “negative at L1-2 and positive at L2-3 with an intact

disc at that level.” (Admin. R. 25 (citations omitted).) 

ALJ Steinman also found the following:

During the period in adjudication, the claimant

has been consistently neurologically intact. His

opinion of spinal instability is inconsistent with Xray studies and MRI scans after the surgeries that show

no signs of instability of the spine. Even after the

date last insured, Dr. Van Dam’s progress notes are not

consistent with his limits. By July 12, 2002, the

claimant was off all medications and Dr. Van Dam

recommended that the claimant initiate a one year

membership at a fitness facility. In his permanent and

stationary report dated September 11, 2002, Dr. Van Dam

noted that the claimant was not taking any analgesic

medications and exam was unremarkable except for the

elimination in flexion on to 30 degrees and extension

to 10 degrees. Indeed, Dr. Van Dam concluded that the

claimant was limited to semi-sedentary work with a

limit to performing work that involves one-half sitting

and one-half standing or walking with minimal demands

whether sitting, standing or walking. Dr. Van Dam’s

permanent and stationary opinion is much more

consistent with the overall record and is given more

weight as it was closer in time to the period in

adjudication than the 2008 opinion that was rendered

eight years after the date last insured. 

I have given greater weight to the well-supported

opinion of Dr. Tung contained in his permanent and

stationary report that the claimant is limited to semisedentary work with the ability to sit for 50 percent

of the time and stand or walk for 50 percent of the

time which the minimum of demands for physical effort

whether standing, walking or sitting; lift or carry 15-

20 pounds; and avoid repetitive bending, twisting, or

bending about the lumbar spine. Dr. Tung’s opinion is

consistent with his progress notes that show clinical

findings supportive of his functional assessment.

 

(Id. at 26-27 (citations omitted).) The ALJ concluded that

Rondinelli had the residual functional capacity to perform the

full range of sedentary work. (Id. at 25.) 

At the administrative hearing, Rondinelli testified regarding

his medical condition and pain. (Id. at 43-50.) The judge found

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that claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the

extent they were inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment. (Id. at 25.)

Judge Steinman also heard testimony from a medical expert and

vocational expert. (Id. at 50-68.) Although the medical expert

noted the absence of any MRIs or CT scans before the end of 2000,

there is no indication that the record was ambiguous or

inadequate. (Id. at 51-52); see also Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1150; Coleman, 2009 WL 861864, at *10. The November 27, 2000

agreed medical evaluation indicates that x-rays were taken on that

day. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Ex. A at 3.) 

The ALJ performed a thorough and detailed evaluation of

Plaintiff’s disability claim based on the medical evidence

submitted by several doctors and hospitals. The ALJ did not fail

in his duty to develop the record. See Cisco v. Astrue, 288 F.

App’x at 344 (stating that the record was neither ambiguous nor

inadequate because it showed the “absence of any significant workrelated functional limitations”). Judge Steinman cannot be

faulted for Rondinelli’s failure to ensure that all of his medical

records were provided or, at the very least, clearly inform the

ALJ that an additional relevant agreed medical evaluation from Dr.

Van Dam was missing from the record.

Although Plaintiff complains that Dr. Van Dam’s November 27,

2000 report was not part of the record, its contents are reflected

in correspondence from Dr. Van Dam dated January 2, 15, and 26,

2001. (Compare Admin. R. Attach. #2, 272-77, with Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2 Ex. A.) Dr. Van Dam’s opinions were before the ALJ. 

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The evidence as a whole was sufficient for a proper evaluation of

Plaintiff’s claim. Cisco, 288 F. App’x at 344. Judge Steinman

did not see was a need for additional evidence from Dr. Van Dam,

and neither did any other doctor or expert. See Struck, 247 F.

App’x at 86 (“[B]oth the ALJ and the medical expert who testified

at the ALJ’s request concluded that inpatient treatment records

from two recent hospitalizations of Struck were important to

assessing her claim.”); Coleman, 2009 WL 861864, at **10-11

(holding that ALJ failed to develop the record when he failed to

give the MRI submitted by plaintiff to the doctor and request

supplemental testimony). 

Rondinelli’s condition was not marred by intermitted setbacks

and periods of stability indicating that additional records could

explain “obvious vicissitudes” in his health. See Webb 433 F. 3d

at 687; see also Hornbeck, 248 F. App’x at 791. Thus, looking at

the record as a whole, the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s

impairments was not ambiguous or inadequate. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d

at 1150. 

For all of these reasons, ALJ Steinman did not err by failing

to request the November 27, 2000 agreed medical evaluation from

Dr. Van Dam, because the record as a whole was not ambiguous or

inadequate. See Baghoomian, 319 F. App’x at 566; Lusardi, 2009 WL

3497739, at *2. 

c. Rejecting Dr. Van Dam’s Opinion 

Plaintiff argues that it was error for the ALJ to reject Dr.

Van Dam’s opinion without reviewing all the evidence. (Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6.)

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According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), a treating physician’s

opinion must be accorded controlling weight if it is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in [the] case record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2) (2010). If the treating physician’s opinion is not

given controlling weight, the following factors are applied in

determining what weight to give the opinion: (1) the length of

the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, (2)

the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the

supportability of the opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion

with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating

physicican, and (6) any other factors brought to the attention of

the ALJ which tend to support or contradict the opinion. Id. §

404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii), (d)(3)-(6). 

Opinions of treating physicians may only be rejected under

certain circumstances. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). “Cases in [the Ninth

Circuit] distinguish among the opinions of three types of

physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating

physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor

treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The standard for determining whether an ALJ properly rejected

the opinion of a treating physician varies. If the treating

doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, the ALJ

must give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. Thomas

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v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Spelatz

v. Astrue, 321 F. App’x 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); Lester, 81 F.3d

at 830.

On the other hand, if the treating physician’s opinion is

contradicted, “[t]he ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons

for disregarding the opinion of the treating physician.’” Batson,

359 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019

(9th Cir. 1992); see also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028,

1042 (9th Cir. 2007). An ALJ may discredit opinions “that are

conclusory, brief, and unsupported by . . . objective medical

findings.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. 

“The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled

to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician.” 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908

F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450,

1454 (9th Cir. 1984)). Similar to the standard for treating

physicians, if the examining doctor’s opinion is not contradicted,

the ALJ must give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. 

Id. “[T]he opinion of an examining doctor, even if contradicted

by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in

the record.” Id. at 830-31 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Prior to December 31, 2000, the date Rondinelli was last

eligible for disability benefits, Dr. Van Dam was Plaintiff’s

examining physician, not his treating physician. (Admin. R.

Attach. #7, 717.) At the time of the hearing, ALJ Steinman had

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Dr. Van Dam’s agreed medical evaluation addendum report dated

January 2, 2001, which stated: 

Please recall that in the report of November 27, 2000 I

expressed the opinion that Mr. Rondinelli more likely

than not has a pseudarthrosis at L3-4 (the site of a

stand-alone interbody cage fusion) and persistent

abnormalities at L2-3 (not addressed at the time of the

last surgery July 28, 1999).

(Id. Attach. #2, 272.) The doctor reviewed a diskography of L1-2

and L2-3 and assessed, “These findings help to confirm my opinion

that Mr. Rondinelli more likely than not continues to experience

symptoms from an injury to the L2-3 disk and a probable

pseudarthrosis at L3-4.” (Id.) Dr. Van Dam also explained, “It

remains my opinion that Mr. Rondinelli is not permanent and

stationary unless he elects to defer further surgical

intervention.” (Id. at 273.) 

In his decision, ALJ Steinman stated the following:

I have given little weight to the opinions of Dr.

Van Dam contained in the forms, ‘Spinal Impairment

Questionnaire’ dated February 4, 2006; and dated

January 18, 2008.

His opinion regarding the claimant’s functional

capacity is well after the period in adjudication. He

had been referred for an Agreed Medical Evaluation on

May 19, 1999. It was not until January 26, 2001 (after

the date last insured) that he became the claimant’s

attending physician. 

(Admin R. 26 (citations omitted).) Judge Steinman did not

specifically address Dr. Van Dam’s earlier opinions contained in

his January 2, 2001 addendum. 

As discussed above, the administrative law judge found that

between October 6, 1996, and December 31, 2000, Rondinelli

suffered from the severe impairments of “spinal stenosis and

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; status post three

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back surgeries with residual pain.” (Id. at 24 (citations

omitted)). The ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s three back surgeries

and a December 12, 2000 diskogram to support that finding. (Id.

at 25.) 

Judge Steinman also considered other evidence from Dr. Van

Dam and concluded that Rondinelli had been “consistently

neurologically intact.” (Id. at 26.) The judge found that Dr.

Van Dam’s opinion that Plaintiff’s spine was not stable was

inconsistent with x-rays and MRIs performed after his surgeries

and inconsistent with the doctor’s progress notes. (Id.) 

Additionally, Rondinelli was not using pain medication by July 12,

2002, and Dr. Van Dam recommended he join a fitness facility. 

(Id.) The ALJ found that “Dr. Van Dam’s permanent and stationary

opinion [dated September 11, 2002] is much more consistent with

the overall record and is given more weight as it was closer in

time to the period in adjudication than the 2008 opinion that was

rendered eight years after the date last insured.” (Id. at 26-

27.) The report noted that Rondinelli was not taking analgesic

medication and his exam was unremarkable, except for a slight

limitation in flexion and extension. (Id. at 26.) “Dr. Van Dam

concluded that the claimant was limited to semi-sedentary work

with a limit to performing work that involves one-half sitting and

one-half standing or walking with minimal demands whether sitting,

standing or walking[.]” (Id. at 27.)

The ALJ explained that he gave greater weight to the opinion

of Dr. Tung because his findings were well-supported by the

record. (Id.) Dr. Tung had concluded “that the claimant is

limited to semi-sedentary work with the ability to sit for 50

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percent of the time and stand or walk for 50 percent of the time

with the minimum of demands for physical effort whether standing,

walking or sitting; lift or carry 15-20 pounds; and avoid

repetitive bending, twisting, or bending about the lumbar spine.” 

(Id.) Judge Steinman found that Dr. Tung’s opinion was

“consistent with his progress notes that show clinical findings

supportive of his functional assessment.” (Id.)

But Judge Steinman did not gave specific and legitimate

reasons for rejecting the opinions contained in Dr. Van Dam’s

January 2, 2001 agreed medical evaluation addendum, which restated

his opinion from November 27, 2000, that Plaintiff likely had a

pseudarthrosis at L3-4 and persistent abnormalities at L2-3 and

that Rondinelli was not permanent and stationary. (Id. Attach.

#2, 272-73.) The doctor’s addendum contained his opinions from

January 2001, just after the disability period ended, and

reiterated his opinions from November 2000, just before the

disability period ended. (Id.) He restated these opinions on

January 15, and 26, 2001. (Id. at 274-77.) Although the ALJ gave

specific and legitimate reasons for giving little weight to Dr.

Van Dam’s opinions from 2006 and 2008, well beyond the disability

period, he provides no explanation regarding the doctor’s opinions

during and immediately after the disability period. “[I]f the ALJ

rejects significant probative evidence, he must explain why.” 

Lusardi v. Astrue, No. 08-35712, 2009 WL 3497739, at *2. “The ALJ

is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record.” 

Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2008). For these reasons, a remand is in order to address

Dr. Van Dam’s opinions contained in the January 2, 15, and 26,

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2001 addendum and correspondence. If on remand the judge

concludes that the record is inadequate to allow him to properly

evaluate the physician’s opinion, he may consider including Dr.

Van Dam’s agreed medical evaluation, dated November 27, 2000, in

the analysis. See Ireland, 256 F. App’x 82.

C. Credibility

1. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s reasons [for finding his

allegations of pain and limitation not credible] are not specific

to Mr. Rondinelli.” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Judge Steinman’s reasons “are nothing more

than general reasons for rejecting credibility.” (Id.)

2. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant contends that the judge properly “noted [that] the

weight of the objective evidence did not support the degree of

limitation Plaintiff has alleged.” (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 6.) Defendant also argues:

Instead of explaining why the ALJ’s multiple

reasons for finding Plaintiff not credible were

erroneous in any manner, Plaintiff lists the ALJ’s

reasons and then claims he does not need to be “utterly

incapacitated” to be eligible for disability benefits

and also that the ALJ’s reasoning was not specific to

him.

 

(Id. at 7-8 (citation omitted).) Defendant asserts that because

the ALJ did not find that Rondineli was not credible due to his

daily activities, the reference to case law regarding activities

of daily living, Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1270, 1284 (9th Cir.

1996), is inapposite. (Id. at 8.) Defendant concludes, “[T]he

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ALJ most certainly made credibility findings specific to

Plaintiff.” (Id.)

3. Judge Steinman’s Credibility Findings

ALJ Steinman held that Rondinelli’s impairments could be

expected to produce the alleged symptoms of pain and limitations,

but “claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the

extent they were inconsistent with that residual functional

capacity.” (Admin. R. 25.) He wrote:

The weight of the objective evidence for the

period in adjudication does not support the claims of

the claimant’s disabling limitations to the degree

alleged. While exams show some reduced range of motion

of the lumbar spine, the claimant has been consistently

neurologically intact. He has a normal gait and does

not need any assistive devices to ambulate, except when

recovering from surgeries. Straight leg raise testing

has been negative.

The record does not show that the claimant

requires any special accommodations (e.g., special

breaks or positions) to relieve his pain or other

symptoms.

In contrast to the allegations of the claimant’s

disabling fatigue and weakness, he does not exhibit any

significant disuse muscle atrophy, loss of strength, or

difficulty moving that are indicative of severe

disabling pain. 

Although the claimant has been prescribed and has

taken appropriate medications for the alleged

impairments, which weighs in his favor, the objective

medical evidence shows that the medications have been

relatively effective in controlling the claimant’s

symptoms. Moreover, the claimant has not alleged any

side effects from the use of medications. 

There is no evidence of loss of weight due to loss

of appetite due to pain.

There is no evidence of sleep deprivation due to

pain.

Consequently, the claimant’s allegations are not

credible to establish a more restrictive residual

functional capacity than that found above. 

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(Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).) 

 4. Clear and Specific Reasons 

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective pain or symptom

testimony entirely if the claimant fails to produce any objective

medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be

expected to cause the claimed symptoms or pain. Cotton v. Bowen,

799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute on

other grounds as recognized by Bunnell v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1149,

1154 (9th Cir. 1990); accord Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). The severity of pain need

not be proven by objective medical evidence; the medical evidence

must only show that it “could reasonably have caused some degree

of the symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1282 (citing Orteza

v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1994); Fair v. Bowen,

885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)).

The level of pain experienced from a given physical

impairment varies from person to person. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282

(citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 601). “Unless there is affirmative

evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must

be ‘clear and convincing.’” Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 722

(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir.1995). The ALJ must provide specific, cogent reasons for not

believing a claimant’s subjective complaints. Rashad v. Sullivan,

903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). There

must be specific findings “stat[ing] which pain testimony is not

credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not

credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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Social Security Ruling 96-7p provides the standard.

It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a

single, conclusory statement that "the individual’s

allegations have been considered" or that "the

allegations are (or are not) credible." It is also not

enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors

that are described in the regulations for evaluating

symptoms. The determination or decision must contain

specific reasons for the finding on credibility,

supported by the evidence in the case record, and must

be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual

and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the

reasons for that weight.

Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). 

It is not enough to merely list multiple factors to discredit

pain testimony without explaining how those factors affected the

claimant’s credibility. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1158

n.13 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ’s finding must be specific enough

to allow a reviewing court to conclude that the finding is based

on permissible grounds and is not arbitrary. Byrnes v. Shalala,

60 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Steele v. Barnhart, 290

F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the ALJ must build

an accurate and logical connection between the evidence and the

decision).

“[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be

premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the severity of

his pain.” Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834;

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407 (explaining “‘[e]xcess pain’ is, by

definition, pain that is unsupported by objective medical

findings[]”)); see also Soc. Sec. Ruling, No. 96-7p, 1996 WL

374186, at *5-6 (stating that in evaluating credibility, the

entire record, including the claimant’s pain testimony and the

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absence of objective medical evidence substantiating pain, must be

considered).

In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may

consider his reputation for truthfulness,

inconsistencies either in his testimony or between his

testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his

work record, and testimony from physicians and third

parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of

the symptoms of which he complains.

Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (citations omitted). “The ALJ can

disregard a claimant’s self-serving statements if they are

unsupported by objective findings.” Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d

1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 

Questions of credibility are left to the ALJ to resolve. 

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing

Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)). But

the ALJ “cannot insulate ultimate conclusions regarding disability

from review by turning them into questions of ‘credibility.’” 

Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff does not fault any of Judge Steinman’s particular

reasons for discrediting Rondinelli’s credibility. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. &. 7.) Instead, he attacks the conclusions as

general and not specific. (Id.) Plaintiff’s contention is

undermined by a review of the ALJ’s decision and the record. 

ALJ Steinman referred to objective medical evidence, such as

the straight leg test, range of motion test, and neurology

findings, in making his credibility finding. (Admin. R. 25-26);

see Maounis, 738 F.2d at 1034. He also commented on Rondinelli’s

ability to walk unassisted and his lack of special accommodations. 

(Admin. R. 26.) The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s claim of

disabling fatigue and weakness by noting he had not lost muscle

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mass or strength, and he did not have a loss of appetite or sleep

deprivation. (Id.); see Cooper, 880 F.2d at 1158 n.13. Judge

Steinman noted that Plaintiff was taking prescribed medications

for his impairments, but at the same time, they had effectively

controlled Rondinelli’s symptoms. (Admin. R. 26.) 

ALJ Steinman did not simply list reasons for discrediting

claimant’s subjective disability without an explanation, his

reasoning is sufficiently specific. Where the ALJ has made

specific findings, “supported by substantial evidence in the

record, our role is not to second-guess that decision.” Fair, 885

F.2d at 604. Thus, the ALJ did not err in evaluating Rondinelli’s

subjective pain and limitation allegations. 

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

“The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v. Massanari,

250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the AlJ’s decision is

not supported by substantial evidence, remand or reversal is

appropriate. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir.

1984). 

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends GRANTING

IN PART and DENYING IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [doc. no. 12], GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. no. 15]. The

Court recommends affirming the decision of the administrative law

judge, with a limited remand. On remand to the Social Security

Administration, the administrative law judge should explain how

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Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity would allow him to

perform work classified as “light” and explain his reasons for

rejecting Dr. Van Dam’s opinions contained in the agreed medical

evaluation addendum and correspondence dated January 2, 15, and

26, 2001.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before June 3, 2010. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before June 17, 2010. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 20, 2010 ____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

All Parties

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