Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05336/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 1997 Decided April 11, 1997

No. 95-5336

WALTER WOODBURN EUBANKS,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON,

APPELLEE

No. 95-5387

TOMMY SHAW,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON,

APPELLEE

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 82cv00400)

-

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Jeanne Goldberg and Alan D. Strasser argued the cause 

for appellants, with whom Victor M. Glasberg and Stephen R. 

Smith were on the briefs.

Madelyn E. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee Billington, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence and John O. Birch, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Marc L. Fleischaker, David L. Kelleher and Joseph M. 

Sellers were on the brief for appellees Howard R.L. Cook, et 

al. David E. Mills entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Appellants Walter Woodburn Eubanks and Tommy Shaw appeal an order denying their 

motions to opt out of a settlement agreement in a class action 

alleging discriminatory employment practices by the Library 

of Congress. Appellants, who contend that they were denied 

promotions on account of their race, seek to opt out of the 

class, which was certified pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), 

so that they can pursue individual claims that they are 

entitled to promotions and back pay. They contend that the 

district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that it lacked 

discretion to permit opt-outs from the (b)(2) class, and abused 

its discretion in ruling, alternatively, that appellants had 

failed to show that they were entitled to opt out. We agree 

with appellants that the district court erred in ruling it lacked 

discretion to permit appellants to opt out of the class, but we 

find no abuse of discretion by the court in denying their 

motions to do so.

I.

In 1975, Howard Cook, David Andrews, and the Black 

Employees of the Library of Congress ("BELC") filed an 

administrative complaint with the Library of Congress alleging that it had engaged in discriminatory employment practices in violation of § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

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1 The name of the subclass refers to § 4(a) of the Library's 

regulations. Section 2 of Library Regulation 2010-14 provides, in 

relevant part that "[a]ll vacancies within the Library, except those 

noted in Section 4 below, shall be posted...." Section 4 provides, 

in relevant part:

It is the policy of the Library to keep exceptions to the 

foregoing to a minimum. Exceptions shall be permitted only in 

the following cases:

(a) Positions for which, because of their unusual or special 

character, the Librarian may determine that the posting of 

notice of a vacancy is impractical or undesirable. The 

Librarian will report to the staff contemporaneously on 

any appointments made under this exception, either in a 

Special Order or in the Information Bulletin.

U.S.C. § 2000e-16. In 1982, after the Library rejected their 

administrative complaint, Cook and the BELC filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that the Library systematically discriminated against African American professional and administrative employees in promotion and advancement decisions. 

After permitting six new employees, including appellant 

Shaw, to intervene as plaintiffs, the court denied intervention 

by thirty-one additional employees and they appealed. This 

court reversed, holding that the thirty-one employees were 

entitled to intervene as a matter of right. Cook v. Boorstin,

783 F.2d 1462, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In remanding the case, 

this court suggested that the district court reconsider its 

denial of class certification in light of the large number of 

employees to be granted intervention as a matter of right. 

Id. at 1471. The court noted that the district court had 

denied the plaintiffs' request for certification of a class action 

and instead had created six subclasses to match the facts 

alleged by the six named plaintiffs, but subsequently decertified all but one subclass, the Shaw 4(a) subclass, which 

consisted of black employees allegedly not promoted because 

of the Library's failure to post certain job openings, and did 

not include any of the Cook appellants.1Id. at 1465.

On remand, while the plaintiffs' renewed motion for class 

certification was pending, the Library conceded liability as to 

the Shaw 4(a) subclass, but not as to any individual, non-class 

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2 The award of back pay was intended to compensate the 

subclass members for lost wages for the period from 1973, two 

years before the administrative complaint was filed, to 1987, when 

the Library conceded liability. The award of "front pay" was 

intended to compensate subclass members for lost wages incurred 

after the concession of liability, and "for the fact that the wrongs for 

which they are entitled to receive back pay cannot be righted 

without delay." Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 292 (D.C. Cir. 

1982). 

claims. The district court enjoined the Library from making 

new appointments pursuant to § 4(a), assessed monetary 

damages in the amount of $805,264.01 for front pay and back 

pay,2and awarded $10,000 to appellant Shaw as the subclass 

representative. The money damages were to be allocated 

among class members on the basis of individual hearings 

before a magistrate judge.

Meanwhile, in 1988, the district court certified a class 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) of:

All past, present, and future black employees at the 

Library of Congress who possess the minimum objective 

qualifications necessary to be eligible under valid, nondiscriminatory standards for selection or promotion to any 

professional or administrative position at the Library of 

Congress, and who have been, are being, or may in the 

future be, denied equal employment or promotional opportunities as a result of defendant's discriminatory practices....

On August 14, 1992, the district court granted the plaintiffs' 

motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that as to the 

(b)(2) class plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of both 

disparate treatment and disparate impact in the competitive 

promotion process, and that the Library had failed to present 

any legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its employment selection procedure. Thereafter the parties entered 

into a settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement set new procedures for competitive selections and required non-competitive personnel actions 

to be based on "legitimate, nondiscriminatory job-related 

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3 Paragraph 31 provided that:

The terms of this Agreement shall constitute full and complete satisfaction of all claims of Class Members against the 

defendant concerning racial discrimination in violation of Title 

VII ..., resulting in non-selection, either competitively or noncompetitively, in or into Professional and Administrative positions within the Library that arise out of events occurring up to 

final District Court approval of the Agreement. Upon Final 

Court Approval of this Agreement, the class as a whole and 

each Class Member shall be bound by the doctrines of res 

judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to all such claims.

4 The $8.5 million settlement fund was distributed as follows: 

First, the Settlement Committee made various payments to class 

representatives, named plaintiffs, and intervenors, in recognition of 

the time and energy they contributed to the lawsuit. Included 

among these payments was the $10,000 previously awarded to 

appellant Shaw by the district court. Second, the Committee 

allocated $805,264.01 to the members of the 4(a) subclass, an 

amount equal to that previously awarded by the district court, to be 

distributed according to a formula whereby no class member could 

receive more than $20,000. Third, of the remaining funds, the 

Committee allocated one-half to members of the main class who 

were in professional or administrative positions, and divided the 

other half between members of the main class who were in professional or administrative positions, and those who were not in such 

positions, but who believed they would have been if nondiscriminatory standards had been used for promotions; the latter division 

was proportional to the total number of class members in each 

group. These funds were allocated among the members of each 

group according to a formula based upon length of employment and 

number of competitive promotions received. 

criteria." It also called for equal employment opportunity 

training of Library supervisors, and required the Library to 

provide plaintiffs' counsel with access to records to monitor 

compliance. In addition, the settlement agreement required 

the Library to pay $8.5 million "in full and complete satisfaction of all claims for back pay," and provided that "[t]he 

payment of this sum shall resolve all claims for monetary 

relief that are or could have been claimed in actions barred by 

the preclusive effect of this Agreement as provided in Paragraph 31, except for claims for attorneys' fees, costs, and 

interest on fees and costs."3 The settlement included the 

$805,264.01 previously awarded by the district court to the 

Shaw 4(a) subclass. Further, the Library agreed to promote 

40 class members and to reassign laterally up to 10 class 

members. All issues of class membership and the allocation 

or distribution of relief under the agreement were to be 

decided by a Settlement Committee of up to thirteen class 

members, subject to review by the district court.4

The settlement agreement made no provision for class 

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5 Eubanks asserts that the Settlement Committee subsequently 

increased his monetary award to $6,963.84 to remedy a calculation 

error. 

members to opt out of the settlement to pursue individual 

claims against the Library. In a separate letter to the 

Library's counsel, class counsel agreed to refrain from advocating opt-outs to class members, and to advise the court that 

the settlement was fair and reasonable to the class as a 

whole. Class counsel also agreed not to advise on the fairness or legality of opting out for individual class members 

and, if asked by the court, to state that the law appeared to 

give the court discretion to allow opt-outs in certain circumstances.

Appellant Eubanks, an economist who has a doctoral degree and has worked for the Library since 1984, holds a 

Senior Level II (GS-16 equivalent) position with the Congressional Research Service Economics Division. On January 7, 

1993, he filed an administrative complaint with the Library, 

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, alleging that the Library had 

chosen a new chief of the Economics Division without competitive posting or other notice, in violation of Library regulations and the district court's order enjoining the use of § 4(a). 

Although the Library investigated the complaint, it took no 

final action. Eubanks subsequently submitted a claim form 

in the class action and was notified that he would receive 

$6,842.32, but no promotion, as his share of the settlement.5

Eubanks thereafter moved for leave to opt out of the settleUSCA Case #95-5336 Document #265082 Filed: 04/11/1997 Page 6 of 23
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ment so that he could pursue an individual Title VII claim 

against the Library.

Appellant Shaw, who has a doctorate in personnel and 

industrial psychology, has worked for the Library since 1974. 

In 1980, he filed an administrative complaint alleging that the 

Library had "systematically excluded" him from consideration 

for the position of Director of Personnel, selecting a white 

male instead. Shaw maintains that the Library failed to 

conduct any competitive selection process, and selected the 

new Director without posting notice pursuant to § 4(a). In 

1981, Shaw filed a second administrative complaint. While 

these complaints were pending, Shaw intervened in the instant case and was certified as the sole representative of the 

4(a) subclass. See Cook, 764 F.2d at 1465. Shaw asserts that 

under the settlement agreement, he would receive $25,791.74, 

and an increase in salary from the GS-14 to the GS-15 level. 

He filed an objection to the proposed settlement agreement, 

alleging that it was "unfair, inadequate and unreasonable" 

because the promotions and monetary relief for Shaw 4(a) 

subclass members were not commensurate with their losses 

as a result of discrimination. He also filed a "motion for a 

separate hearing on damages," asking the district court to 

exercise its "discretion to allow Dr. Shaw (or any other 

Plaintiff, for that matter) to have an individual hearing on the 

issue of damages, or even to opt out of the settlement entirely 

and proceed with a full blown hearing on the merits."

The district court denied the motions of four class members, including appellants, to opt out of the settlement agreement. The court ruled that "there is no right to opt out of 

this class certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and, 

alternatively, that, even if such a right existed, the movants 

have not demonstrated an entitlement to the relief requested...." With respect to appellants' claims that they were 

uniquely situated, the court found that:

None of the movants has demonstrated a right to relief 

or presented circumstances that so distinguish his or her 

claims from those of the main class that would permit 

him or her to opt out. Indeed, this action is one in which 

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6 All proposed classes must satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 

23(a): that the class is so numerous as to make joinder impracticable, that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, that 

the claims or defenses of the representative parties typify those of 

the class, and that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(b) provides, in 

relevant part:

An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 

individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, 

or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of 

the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of 

the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 

appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 

relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 

to the members of the class predominate over any questions 

"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds generally applicable to the class." Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(b)(2). This is not a case in which individual 

class members have alleged or demonstrated that they 

have suffered in any unique way, necessitating that the 

right to opt out be provided when the parties have failed 

to establish it in their agreement.... [T]he movants 

have failed to show special circumstances requiring that 

they be permitted to opt out.

The district court subsequently approved the settlement 

agreement. Appellants appeal the order denying their motions to opt out, but not the order approving the settlement 

agreement.

II.

The 1966 amendments to Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure created three distinct categories of class 

actions that may be maintained: the (b)(1) action, the (b)(2) 

action, and the (b)(3) action.6 The three categories are not 

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affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of the controversy.... 

7 Rule 23(c)(2) provides:

In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the 

court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 

practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 

to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. 

The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will 

exclude the member from the class if the member so requests 

by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or 

not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and 

(c) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the 

member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.

mutually exclusive, and a class may be certified under more 

than one category. 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 

FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.31[2], at 23-235 (2d ed. 1996); 1 

HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 4.01, at 4-4 to 4-5 (3d ed. 1992). However, there are 

important procedural distinctions between the (b)(1) and 

(b)(2) actions and the (b)(3) action. Rule 23(c)(2) provides 

that all class members in a (b)(3) action are entitled to notice 

and an opportunity to exclude themselves from the class and 

the preclusive effect of any judgment by "opting out" of the 

lawsuit.7 The rule has no comparable provision for (b)(1) and 

(b)(2) classes.

Title VII and other civil rights class actions are frequently 

certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). See generally 7A

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1776 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966). Although the defining characteristic of the 

(b)(2) class is that it seeks declaratory or injunctive relief 

applicable to the class as a whole, it is not uncommon in 

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8 But see Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1182 n.37 

(D.C. Cir. 1976) (dictum), aff'd 431 U.S. 864 (1977). 

employment discrimination cases for the class also to seek 

monetary relief in the form of back pay or front pay. Courts 

have generally permitted (b)(2) classes to recover monetary 

relief in addition to declaratory or injunctive relief, at least 

where the monetary relief does not predominate. See Probe 

v. State Teachers' Retirement System, 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir. 1983); Alexander 

v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372 (6th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978) WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 1775, 

at 463-67; MOORE ET AL., supra, ¶ 23.40[4], at 23-278; NEWBERG & CONTE, supra, § 4.14, at 4-48 to 4-49.

Appellants do not contend that the instant lawsuit was 

improperly certified as a (b)(2) class action but only that the 

district court erred in not permitting them to opt out of the 

class action so they could pursue individual claims for monetary relief. Relying on Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 

85-86 (D.D.C. 1981), the Library responds that because the 

class was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and the settlement agreement did not provide for opt-outs, appellants had 

no opt-out right. In effect, the Library contends that the 

district court lacked discretion to permit opt-outs. The Library responds, alternatively, that even if the district court 

had discretion to grant appellant's motions to opt out, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions.

The availability of opt-out rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class 

actions is an unsettled question in this circuit.8 A number of 

courts have held that, as a general matter, due process does 

not require that (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members be given an 

opportunity to opt out. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litigation,

90 F.3d 963, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 101 F.3d 368 

(5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, (March 3, 1997) (No. 

96-1394) ((b)(1)(B) actions); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) ((b)(2) 

actions); Laskey v. United Auto. Workers, 638 F.2d 954, 957 

(6th Cir. 1981) ((b)(2) actions); Robertson v. National Basket

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9 Title VII cases seeking individual monetary damages as well 

as classwide injunctive relief may be equally amenable to certification as (b)(3) actions, and "the arguments supporting certification 

exclusively under subdivision (b)(2) are surprisingly weak." Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and Preclusion, supra, 69 VA. L. REV. at 24. 

To the extent that the preference for (b)(2) certification reflects 

concern about the burden of the mandatory notice requirements 

applicable under (b)(3), see MOORE ET AL., supra, ¶ 23.31[3], at 23-

237, that concern is somewhat less pressing where, as in the instant 

case, individual notice will ultimately be required to distribute the 

settlement fund. 

ball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1977) ((b)(1)(B) 

actions). But see Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 

(9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). Professors Wright and Moore suggest in their treatises that where 

a lawsuit meets the requirements for certification under 

either (b)(1) or (b)(2) as well as (b)(3), a court should order 

that the case be certified under (b)(1) or (b)(2), thereby 

avoiding the often burdensome and costly notice requirements applicable to (b)(3) classes. WRIGHT, supra, §§ 1772, 

1775, at 425-26, 491-92; MOORE ET AL., supra, ¶ 23.31[3], at 

23-236; but see also id. ¶ 23.40[4]. A number of courts have 

adopted this view. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 

728 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Aetna 

Cas. Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989); First Federal of Michigan 

v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989); Kyriazi v. 

Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981); Laskey,

638 F.2d at 956; Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 

F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson, 556 F.2d at 685.

The rigidity of this position has not escaped criticism, 

however. For, as one commentator has noted, "[a]s has 

become increasingly apparent since 1966, these amendments 

created an awkward mismatch between the subdivisions under which class actions are certified and the procedural 

protections to which a class is entitled." George Rutherglen, 

Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 260 

(1996). This commentator has observed that "[t]he Advisory 

Committee foresaw neither the surge in filings of Title VII 

class actions nor decisions that award individual compensatory relief based on findings of classwide discrimination." 

George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and Preclusion in Title 

VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11, 25 (1983).9 Consequent

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10 See also Gerald E. Rosen, Title VII Classes and Due Process: To (b)(2) or Not to (b)(2), 26 WAYNE L. REV. 919, 951-54 

(1980). 

ly, this commentator concludes, the Advisory Committee did 

not address the need for notice in Title VII class actions 

seeking compensatory as well as injunctive relief. Id.; see 

also WRIGHT, supra, § 1776, at 495. The Advisory Committee's lack of foresight in this regard may also explain Rule 

23's failure to address the possible need for opt-out rights in 

non-(b)(3) actions. Several commentators have suggested 

that, despite the absence of any such requirement in Rule 23, 

where class members seek individual compensatory relief in 

addition to broad classwide injunctive relief, it is appropriate 

for a court to afford them the procedural protections of notice 

and an opportunity to opt out. NEWBERG & CONTE, supra,

§ 4.14, at 4-51 to 4-52; Rutherglen, Notice and Opt-Out, 

supra, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 274.10

Although the cases permitting opt-outs in (b)(1) and (b)(2) 

actions are few, see, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island 

Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); Holmes, 706 F.2d 

1133, a number of circuits recognize that district courts have 

discretion to permit them. See Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 

485, 487 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 832 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 

U.S. 991 (1988); Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F.2d 

989, 994 (5th Cir. 1981). In Suffolk, the Second Circuit found 

no abuse of discretion in permitting an opt-out right in a 

(b)(1)(B) "limited fund" class action. 907 F.2d at 1305. Suffolk County and ratepayers of an electric utility had filed a 

RICO action against the utility and its officers. Initially, the 

district court denied a motion for class certification, and tried 

Suffolk's claim before a jury, thereafter granting judgment 

for the defendants despite a verdict in Suffolk's favor. Id. at 

1300-01. Subsequently, the court certified a class pursuant 

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11 Rule 23(d) provides, in pertinent part, that the district court:

may make appropriate orders ... (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair 

conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as 

the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step 

in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of 

the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider 

the representation fair and adequate ... [or] (5) dealing with 

similar procedural matters....

to Rule 23(b)(1)(B), but allowed Suffolk to opt out of the class 

so that it could appeal the court's decision to set aside the 

jury verdict. Id. at 1302. The Second Circuit rejected the 

utility's contention that the district court lacked discretion to 

permit Suffolk to opt out. Id. at 1305. Focusing on Rule 

23(d),11 the court held that "a district court, in a proper case 

and in the exercise of sound discretion, may allow a class 

member to opt out of a limited fund class action under Rule 

23(b)(1)(B) in order to facilitate "the fair and efficient conduct 

of the action.' " Id. at 1304-05 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 

advisory committee's note (1966)). Under the somewhat unusual facts of Suffolk, the Second Circuit found no abuse of 

discretion by the district court inasmuch as "basic fairness" 

supported the court's conclusion because Suffolk, having already litigated its claims before a jury at great expense, and 

obtained a favorable jury verdict, was in a different position 

than other class members. Id. at 1035. Because the jury 

verdict placed a ceiling on Suffolk's potential recovery, moreover, permitting the county to opt out could not jeopardize 

the interests of the class. Thus, the opt-out did not undermine the fundamental basis for certification of a (b)(1)(B) 

class action: that recovery by some class members might 

effectively preclude other class members from recovery. See 

id. at 1304. The court concluded that "[c]ombined, these two 

determinations provided a strong basis for permitting Suffolk 

to opt out." Id. at 1305.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court 

abused its discretion in not permitting opt-out rights in 

Holmes, 706 F.2d 1144. Like the instant case, Holmes was 

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an employment discrimination class action certified under 

Rule 23(b)(2), in which the class sought monetary damages as 

well as injunctive relief. Prior to class certification, the 

parties entered into a settlement agreement, providing for a 

$43,775 lump sum back pay award. Id. at 1146. Under the 

distribution formula adopted by the class representatives, the 

eight named plaintiffs were to receive approximately one-half 

of the award, with the other half divided between the remaining 118 class members. The district court certified the class 

and approved the settlement agreement over the objection of 

thirty-nine class members. Id. at 1146-47. The Eleventh 

Circuit determined that the record was insufficient to justify 

the allocation of half of the back pay award to the named 

plaintiffs, and that the district court abused its discretion by 

not allowing class members to opt out. Id. at 1148-52. 

Acknowledging that absent class members have no "automatic right" to opt out of a (b)(2) class action, id. at 1153, the 

court opined that "a district court may mandate such a right 

pursuant to its discretionary power under Rule 23." Id. at 

1154 (quoting Penson, 634 F.2d at 993). Where (b)(2) class 

members seek monetary relief as well as damages, the court 

observed, conflicts of interest may emerge, and the assumptions of homogeneity and class cohesiveness that underlie 

(b)(2) certification can begin to break down. Id. at 1155. In 

particular, when a Title VII class action reaches the monetary 

relief stage, it may begin to resemble a (b)(3) action. Agreeing that "the assumption of monetary relief class cohesiveness 

may be justified in many Title VII actions brought under 

subsection (b)(2)," the court reasoned that it was not justified 

in Holmes because the merits of the back pay claims were 

"uniquely individual to each class member." Id. at 1159. 

Consequently, "the right to opt out of the class, normally 

accorded only to (b)(3) class members, must be extended to 

all members of this (b)(2) class," and the district court's 

failure to allow opt-outs was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 

1160.

We join those circuits holding that the language of Rule 23 

is sufficiently flexible to afford district courts discretion to 

grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. The 

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rule itself does not expressly preclude opt-outs in non-(b)(3) 

actions, and the procedural flexibility suggested in subsection 

(d) is consistent with the view of Professor Moore that within 

the basic framework of Rule 23, "the supportable range of 

judicial choice appears quite wide." MOORE ET AL., supra,

¶ 23.40[4], at 23-283. Although, as a general matter, courts 

should not permit opt-outs when doing so would undermine 

the policies behind (b)(1) or (b)(2) certification, where both 

injunctive and monetary relief are sought, the need to protect 

the rights of individual class members may necessitate procedural protections beyond those ordinarily provided under 

(b)(1) and (b)(2). As the Eleventh Circuit observed in 

Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1156-57, the underlying premise of (b)(2) 

certificationthat the class members suffer from a common 

injury that can be addressed by classwide reliefbegins to 

break down when the class seeks to recover back pay or other 

forms of monetary damages to be allocated based on individual injuries. In that situation, an employment discrimination 

case will implicate the concerns that led to the adoption of 

more stringent procedural protections in (b)(3) actions, and 

the potential for conflicts of interest may necessitate measures, such as permitting opt-outs, that safeguard the due 

process rights of individual class members. Id. at 1154-57; 

Penson, 634 F.2d at 994. That back pay is characterized as a 

form of "equitable relief" in Title VII cases, see Sparrow v. 

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 949 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1211 (1992), does not undercut the 

fact that variations in individual class members' monetary 

claims may lead to divergences of interest that make unitary 

representation of a class problematic in the damages phase. 

See Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion, supra, 69 VA.

L. REV. at 25-26.

The government has expressed concern that under a flexible approach class members with individual monetary claims 

found to merit additional procedural protection would routinely opt out of class-wide settlements, and "defendants would 

not be inclined to settle where the result would likely be a 

settlement applicable only to class members with questionable 

claims, with those having stronger claims opting out to pursue 

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12 The Library is committed to the settlement agreement regardless of whether appellants are permitted to opt out. In a 

motion filed in this court on October 16, 1996, seeking issuance of a 

separate judgment and mandate so that implementation of the 

settlement agreement could proceed notwithstanding the pendency 

of the instant appeals, the plaintiff class stated that the Library had 

consented to the relief requested, and authorized counsel to make 

known to the court its position that resolution of the opt-out issue 

would not affect the settlement agreement as a whole. At oral 

argument, the Library did not take issue with this representation. 

Only four members of the class sought to opt out. 

their individual claims separately." Kincade v. General Tire 

& Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1981). Mindful that 

in the Title VII context as elsewhere public policy favors 

settlement of claims, we do not treat this concern lightly. Cf. 

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 

(1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Yet, while the availability of 

opt-out rights may influence litigants' assessment of appropriate terms for settlement, there is no reason to believe that it 

will always weaken the incentive to settle. For example, the 

parties might commit themselves to a settlement agreement 

that includes an adjustment in the total dollar amount depending on the number of opt-outs.12 Where there are clear 

disparities in the nature or magnitude of the relief sought by 

individual class members that might inhibit settlement, the 

district court can evaluate not only whether injunctive or 

monetary claims predominate, but which type of class certification, or a "hybrid," would best accommodate needed protection for individuals and the opportunity for settlement. To 

minimize the government's concern that permitting opt-outs 

in (b)(2) class actions will impede settlement, the district 

court also could address the question of opt-outs early in the 

litigation so that any settlement discussions would proceed 

with an understanding of who would be bound and could avoid 

disruption due to opt-outs. Where the parties negotiate a 

class settlement on the assumption that it will be mandatory 

and binding on all class members, a court cannot permit 

members to opt out without giving the parties an opportunity 

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13 This problem did not arise in Suffolk because the court 

notified the parties that Suffolk would be permitted to opt out when 

it certified the class. 907 F.2d at 1301. 

14 Newberg and Conte suggest that a district court may provide 

opt-out rights to a (b)(2) class in four different ways:

First, ... the court could limit the Rule 23(b)(2) certification to 

certain issues only. Second, the court could certify the injunction claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages claims under 

Rule 23(b)(3). Third, the court could certify the entire class 

initially under Rule 23(b)(2), bifurcate the trial so that the 

defendant's liability potentially for both forms of relief is 

determined initially, and reconsider the class certification category if the plaintiffs and the class are successful at the liability 

stage. Finally, the court could certify special claims or issues 

under Rule 23(b)(2) and treat all the nondesignated claims or 

issues as individual or incidental ones to be determined separately after liability to the class has been adjudicated.

NEWBERG & CONTE, supra, § 4.14, at 4-51 to 4-52. For our 

purposes here, we need not analyze the distinctions between these 

approaches. 

to renegotiate the settlement.13 See Holmes, 706 F.2d at 

1161. By giving early notice, and requiring individual class 

members to make known their intentions to opt out, the 

district court would further minimize the possibility that 

settlements would have to be reopened.

With these considerations in mind, we conclude that when a 

(b)(2) class seeks monetary as well as injunctive or declaratory relief the district court may exercise discretion in at least 

two ways.14 The court may conclude that the assumption of 

cohesiveness for purposes of injunctive relief that justifies 

certification as a (b)(2) class is unjustified as to claims that 

individual class members may have for monetary damages. 

In such a case, the court may adopt a "hybrid" approach, 

certifying a (b)(2) class as to the claims for declaratory or 

injunctive relief, and a (b)(3) class as to the claims for 

monetary relief, effectively granting (b)(3) protections including the right to opt out to class members at the monetary 

relief stage. See Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1154-60; NEWBERG & 

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15 We note that the district court afforded all class members 

substantial procedural protections. The settlement agreement provided that prior to its final approval, individual notice of the 

proposed settlement would be mailed to all potential class members 

of which the Library was aware or who could reasonably be 

identified. In addition, notice would be published in area newspapers and publications of the Library of Congress. Individuals who 

submitted claim forms received follow-up notices, advising them of 

the Settlement Committee's determination of the relief they were 

entitled to receive, and that they could contest any aspect of the 

award at a "fairness hearing" before the district court prior to the 

court's final approval of the settlement agreement. Of course, as 

we understand their argument, appellants seek to be compensated 

independently of the settlement fund, rather than simply to claim a 

larger share of that fund. Although the procedural protections they 

received may not have been precisely equivalent to the rights 

accorded to (b)(3) class members, appellants point to nothing that 

would indicate that they did not have a meaningful opportunity to 

present the merits of their individual claims. See Williams, 832 

F.2d at 104. Hence, the court has no occasion to parse more finely 

the minimal procedural rights that must be afforded to a (b)(2) class 

member seeking permission to opt out. 

CONTE, supra, § 4.14, at 4-51 to 4-52; Rutherglen, Notice, 

Scope, and Preclusion, supra, 69 VA L. REV. at 30. Alternatively, the court may conclude that the claims of particular 

class members are unique or sufficiently distinct from the 

claims of the class as a whole, and that opt-outs should be 

permitted on a selective basis. Like the Second Circuit, we 

view Rule 23(d)(5) to be broad enough to permit the court to 

allow individual class members to opt out of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) 

class when necessary to facilitate the fair and efficient conduct of the litigation. See Suffolk, 907 F.2d at 1304.

III.

The question remains whether the district court abused its 

discretion in denying appellants' motions to opt out. This 

means, simply, whether the denial fell within the range of 

permissible alternatives available to the district court, not 

whether this court might have decided the motions differently. See generally Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 

1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Because the plaintiffs did not seek 

certification as either a (b)(3) or a "hybrid" class, the court 

has no occasion to address whether the district court should 

have extended full (b)(3) protections to all (b)(2) class members.15 Ever since this court suggested in Cook, 763 F.2d at 

1471-72, that the district court reconsider the issue of class 

certification, the plaintiffs have treated this as a (b)(2) action. 

Thus, our inquiry focuses solely on whether the district court 

abused its discretion by denying appellants an opportunity to 

opt out. As our analysis in Part II indicates, the relevant 

question for the district court was whether permitting the 

opt-out was necessary to "facilitate the fair and efficient 

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16 Because appellants have not raised the issue, the court has 

no occasion to decide whether opt-out rights in (b)(2) actions may 

ever be required under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 

See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994) (dismissing 

writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 

conduct of the action."16 Suffolk, 907 F.2d at 1305.

Eubanks' primary contention is that "basic fairness" requires that he be permitted to opt out of the lawsuit because 

he is "uniquely situated" relative to the rest of the class. He 

is unique, he maintains, because he filed a timely administrative complaint in 1993 to challenge the Library's denial of a 

promotion on December 21, 1992, more than four months 

after the district court entered partial summary judgment 

against the Library. Although the Library completed its 

investigation of his complaint by mid-November 1993, it never 

took final action on the complaint. Consequently, Eubanks 

contends, the Library deliberately left his claim in "procedural limbo" so that it would ultimately be barred by the class 

action settlement.

Had Eubanks pursued a separate lawsuit against the Library, his situation would present similarities to Suffolk, 907 

F.2d at 1302-05, where the district court permitted Suffolk to 

opt out because it had already litigated an individual action at 

great expense. The procedural posture of the instant case is 

significantly different: Eubanks has no favorable jury verdict 

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to defend, nor, so far as the record shows, has he taken any 

steps or expended any resources to pursue an individual 

lawsuit, apart from the necessary first step of filing an 

administrative complaint. Even if, as Eubanks contends, the 

Library deliberately refrained from acting on his complaint, 

he could have filed an employment discrimination lawsuit in 

federal court at any time after 180 days from the filing of his 

administrative complaint on January 7, 1993. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(c); see Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 166 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). Having failed to avail himself of a statutory 

remedy for persons "aggrieved ... by the failure [of an 

employer] to take final action on his complaint," 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(c), Eubanks' contention that basic fairness requires that he be permitted to opt out rings hollow.

Shaw contends that "basic fairness" dictates that he should 

be permitted to opt out because the district court and class 

counsel had previously represented that he would receive a 

"separate hearing" on his individual damages. In 1988, after 

the Library conceded liability with respect to the Shaw 4(a) 

subclass, the district court awarded front and back pay, with 

the funds to be distributed after individual hearings before a 

magistrate judge. While noting in its order that Shaw had 

asserted that he was entitled to lost wages of $110,000 and 

fringe benefits as a result of being denied promotion to the 

position of Director of Personnel, the court ruled that it "need 

not resolve this dispute at present, as Dr. Shaw may litigate 

his back pay claim along with the other class members before 

the Magistrate."

We do not interpret the district court's order as a promise 

that Shaw would be allowed to pursue his individual claim 

separately from the other class members. Rather, the district court treated Shaw like the other members of the Shaw 

4(a) subclass, allowing him to present an individualized claim 

for a share of the settlement fund to the magistrate judge. 

Nor, more importantly, can Shaw plausibly claim prejudice 

from the fact that the district court never implemented these 

procedures. Although the district court's back and front pay 

awards to the Shaw 4(a) subclass were subsumed in the 

settlement, the Settlement Committee awarded $805,264.01 of 

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the $8.5 million settlement to Shaw 4(a) subclass members, an 

amount equivalent to the back and front pay awards ordered 

by the court. In addition, the Settlement Committee awarded Shaw the $10,000 he was entitled to receive as the subclass 

representative. Although the magistrate judge never conducted individualized hearings, Shaw had an opportunity to 

file an individual claim with the Settlement Committee, and to 

challenge the Committee's determination at the fairness hearing before the district court. In due process terms, this 

procedure was equivalent to the "individualized hearings" 

that the court had previously contemplated. See A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 745.

To the extent that Shaw contends that he is entitled not 

only to an individual hearing on damages, but also to opt out 

and recover damages from outside the $8.5 million settlement 

fund, his argument, like Eubanks', would be stronger had he 

taken any steps between 1980 and 1995 to prosecute his 

individual claim. Instead, Shaw chose to wait while the class 

action proceeded. Indeed, Shaw's request that the district 

court now treat his claim as "distinguished" from those of the 

other class members is somewhat ironic in view of his service 

as the sole representative of the 4(a) subclass. The district 

court, in certifying the subclass, was required to find that 

Shaw's claims were typical of the claims of the subclass 

members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Nothing prevented Shaw 

from pursuing an individual lawsuit during the past seventeen 

years, and yet he chose to treat his claim as part of the class 

claim.

This is not to suggest that filing an individual lawsuit is a 

necessary prerequisite to preserving opt-out rights that may 

be available under subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2). Rather, our 

discussion must be read in the context of whether fairness 

concerns in favor of allowing appellants to opt out outweighed 

concern about the efficient conduct of the lawsuit. Suffolk is 

one example in which the balance weighed in favor of optouts, based on the fact that one member of the class had 

litigated an individual suit at great expense and that there 

was no potential prejudice to the prospects for classwide 

recovery. 907 F.2d at 1305. Another situation might be 

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17 The statistics cited by appellants indicate that of 10,872 

African American applicants to the Library from 1979 through 1988, 

less than 300 (289) were for positions higher than the GS-13 level. 

Similarly, of the 4,783 employees of the Library who applied for 

promotion during that period, only 83 applicants sought positions 

above the GS-13 level. 

presented, as in Holmes, where the monetary claims of the 

class members were insufficiently cohesive to warrant collective treatment. 706 F.2d at 1160. Although the range of 

fairness considerations that may enter into a determination of 

whether opt-out rights are required may be broad, none of 

appellants' contentions demonstrates such an entitlement.

Insofar as appellants' uniqueness claims are concerned, 

they have not shown that the district court failed to give 

sufficient consideration to the fact that they were among the 

highest ranking members of the main class, in Eubanks' case, 

and of both the main class and the 4(a) subclass, in Shaw's 

case. Essentially, as two of the few high ranking African 

American employees of the Library, they contend that their 

opportunities for promotion are much more limited than those 

of other class members, and that the damages they suffered 

as a result of not being appointed to the positions for which 

they were qualified are correspondingly greater. Accepting 

their assertions as true, however, does not demonstrate an 

abuse of discretion by the district court in denying them 

permission to opt out. Under the distribution formula in the 

settlement agreement, class members who were in professional or administrative positions received a greater share of the 

settlement funds than class members who were not in such 

positions. Neither Eubanks nor Shaw appealed the district 

court's order determining that this distribution represented a 

fair allocation of the funds. While appellants cite statistics 

showing that the number of African Americans employed or 

applying for positions at their level is minuscule in comparison to the numbers at lower levels, they offer no data to 

suggest that the relief they received under the settlement 

agreement was unfair in comparison to the relief received by 

other class members.17 That both appellants received less 

under the settlement agreement than they might have expect

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ed to receive had they prevailed in individual lawsuits cannot 

alone justify an opt-out, as no party can reasonably expect to 

receive in a settlement precisely what it would receive if it 

prevailed on the merits. See EEOC v. Hiram Walker &

Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 

U.S. 1004 (1986). To the extent that appellants claim that the 

settlement is unfair or that class counsel did not adequately 

represent their interests in negotiating the settlement, any 

remedies they may have lie elsewhere.

Accordingly, given the plaintiffs' consistent position that 

the lawsuit was properly certified as a (b)(2) class action, we 

conclude, in light of the opportunities afforded to appellants 

to present evidence and upon review of that evidence, that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

they failed to show that "basic fairness" required that they be 

permitted to opt out of the settlement agreement, and we 

affirm the denial of their motions to opt out of the class 

settlement.

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