Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_15-cv-00237/USCOURTS-alnd-6_15-cv-00237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

BRANDY LEIGH DYE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 6:15-CV-00237-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Brandy Leigh Dye (“Ms. Dye”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a final

adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”), who denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”).Ms.Dye timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies available

before the Commissioner. The case is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

For the following reasons, the court AFFIRMS.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Dye was forty years old at the time of her hearing before the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Compare Tr. 171 with Tr. 43 . She has completed

FILED

 2016 Jul-26 PM 04:43

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:15-cv-00237-VEH Document 12 Filed 07/26/16 Page 1 of 19
the ninth grade. Tr. 50. Her past work experience includes employment as a grinder

and furniture sander. Tr. 88. She claims she became disabled on August 1, 2011, due

to back and neck problems. Tr. 171, 102. Her last period of substantial work ended

in August 2008, though she continues to clean offices on a part-time basis. Tr. 218,

68-69. On July 10, 2012, Ms. Dye protectively filed a Title II application for a period

of disability and DIB. Tr. 28. On August 28, 2012, the Commissioner initially denied

her application. Id. Ms. Dye timely filed a written request for a hearing on October

5, 2012. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on June 5, 2013. Id. On July

24, 2013, she issued her opinion concluding Ms. Dye was not disabled and denying

her benefits. Tr. 25. Ms. Dye timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the

decision on August 6, 2013. Tr. 24. On January 9, 2015, the Appeals Council issued

a denial of review on her claim. Tr. 1. 

Ms. Dye filed a Complaint with this court on February 9, 2015, seeking review

of the Commissioner’s determination. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner answered on June

18, 2015. (Doc. 8). Ms. Dye filed a supporting brief (Doc. 10) on August 12, 2015,

and the Commissioner responded with her own (Doc. 11) on September 1, 2015. With

the parties having fully briefed the matter, the court has carefully considered the

record and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’sreview of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

issupported by substantial evidence and whether proper legalstandards were applied.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id

This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial

evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no

presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal

standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the

court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide

the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

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STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a

period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act

and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.1 The Regulations define “disabled” as

“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to

disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental

impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508

TheRegulations provide a five-step processfor determining whether a claimant

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

1 The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts

400 to 499, revised as of March 26, 2015 

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(3) whether the claimant’simpairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable

C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-

63 (7thCir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11thCir. 1986).

The sequential analysis goes as follows:

Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be

found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment If the claimant does not

have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the

[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy

in significant numbers. Id

FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. Ms. Dye met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2011. Tr. 30.

2. She had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2011,

the alleged disability onset date, through her last insured date of

December 31, 2011. Id.

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3. She had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of

the cervical and lumbar spine, history of acute episodes of bronchitis,

and anxiety disorder. Tr. 31

4. She did not have an impairment or combination of impairmentsthat met

or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.

5. She had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to occasionally lift

and carry up to twenty pounds and frequently lift and/or carry up to ten

pounds. She can stand and/or walk in combination, with normal breaks,

for at least six hours during an eight hour workday and sit, with normal

breaks, for up to eight hours during an eight hour workday. She can

occasionally climb ramps and stairs and should never climb ladders,

ropes or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently balance, occasionally

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She should not be required to perform

push/pull movements or operate foot controls. She should avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme cold and working in areas of

vibration. She should avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary

irritants. She should avoid exposure to industrial hazards. She can

perform simple routine tasks requiring no more than short simple

instructions and simple work related decision making with few workplace changes. She can have frequent interactions with co-workers and

supervisors and members of the general public. Tr. 32. 

6. She was unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 36.

7. She was 39 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-

49, on the date last insured. Id.

8. She has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. Id.

9. Transferability of job skills was not material to the determination of

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework

supported a finding that she was “not disabled,” whether or not she had

transferable job skills. Id. 

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10. Considering her age, education, work experience, and residual

functioning capacity, there were jobsthat existed in significant numbers

in the national economy that she could perform. Id. 

11. Ms. Dye had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social

Security Act, from August 1, 2011, through the date last insured. Tr. 37.

ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION

The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is notsupported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its

responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th

Cir. 1980)).2 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or

substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted). 

Ms. Dye urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny her

benefits on three grounds. First, she claims that the ALJ improperly discounted her

personal testimony of her pain level. (Doc. 10 at 11-12). Second, she claims that the

hypothetical questions posed to the VE were improper because they failed to take into

2

 Strickland is binding precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981). 

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account her back brace and her bladder problems. (Doc. 10 at 13-14). Third, Ms. Dye

claims that the ALJ failed to develop the record by not ordering an additional

consultative examination before making her decision to exclude Ms. Dye’s claimed

bladder impairment in the hypothetical questions. (Id. at 14).

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION TO DISCOUNT MS. DYE’S SUBJECTIVE

LEVEL OF PAIN AND OTHER SYMPTOMS IS SUPPORTED BY

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

In determining whether to credit a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain or

other symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit pain standard requires:

(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective

medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising

from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical

condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give

rise to the alleged pain.

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Holt v. Sullivan, 921

F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)). 

A claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms do not alone establish

disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (“[T]here must be medical signs and

laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which,

when considered with all of the other evidence . . . would lead to a conclusion that

you are disabled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (same). However, “[a] claimant’s

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subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard

is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561 (citing

Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223). When an impairment that could reasonably be expected to

produce the symptom(s) alleged has been shown, the intensity and persistence of the

symptom(s), such as pain, will be evaluated based on all the evidence. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(c) (setting forth factors that can be used in evaluating pain); 20

C.F.R. § 4016.929(c) (same). Further, “[i]f the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s

testimony as to her pain, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing

so.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62.

Ms. Dye reportedly suffered from chronic cervical and lumbar pain. (Tr. 255,

259). In applying the Eleventh Circuit pain standard, the ALJ confirmed the existence

of degenerative disc disease that would cause some degree of cervical and lumbar

pain, but concluded that objective medical evidence did not confirm the alleged

severity of Ms. Dye’s pain and her other subjective symptoms. See Tr. 33 (“The

objective medical evidence . . . is inconsistent with allegations of disabling levels of

pain and other subjective complaints prior to the expiration of her insured status.”). 

The ALJ discounted Ms. Dye’s claimed disabling pain level on several

different grounds. One factor she relied upon was medical evidence that contradicted

the degree of Ms. Dye’s subjective symptoms. For example, on December 7, 2011,

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a nerve connection test was performed by Farouk Raquib, M.D. (“Dr. Raquib”) (Tr.

288-94, 259) and the results were “essentially . . . normal” for Ms. Dye’s upper

extremities. See Tr. 33 (ALJ’s relying upon results of nerve connection study); see

also Tr. 308 (Dr. Raquib’s indicating on August 16, 2012, that “[n]erve conduction

study was essentially unremarkable on December 7, 2011”). When physically

examined by Dr. Raquib on November 29, 2011, Ms. Dye had a tenderness in her

lumbar muscles, but generally was not “in distress” and the review of her neck was

“unremarkable.” Tr. 254;see Tr. 33 (ALJ’sreferencing physical examination results).

In fact, in contrast to Ms. Dye’s pain testimony during her June 2013 hearing,

the record reveals a downward trend in Ms. Dye’s pain intensity as reported to Dr.

Raquib. Ms. Dye’s self-evaluation of her pain was a 6 of 10 on August 6, 2012 (Tr.

310), improved to a 4 of 10 on October 8, 2012 (Tr. 326), and improved to a 3 of 10

on March 29, 2013. Tr. 357. See also Tr. 34 (ALJ’s inclusion of Ms. Dye’s selfevaluation of pain in decision). Though unmentioned by the ALJ, on December 4,

2012, Dr. Raquib reported that Ms. Dye had “increased cervical muscle tone” and

“full range of neck movement without significant pain.”3 Tr. 336. All of this medical

evidence substantially supports the ALJ’s discounted pain determination. 

3 Despite this observation concerning Ms. Dye’s insignificant level of pain in her neck, Dr.

Raquib nonetheless conclusorily indicated on this same report that her “[p]ain is disabling[.]” Tr.

336.

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Evidence of other inconsistencies supports the ALJ’s application of the

Eleventh Circuit pain standard as well. For example, Ms. Dye testified during her

hearing in 2013 that she was able to work for at least 1.5-2 hours per day cleaning

offices for a lumber yard, including dusting and emptying garbage cans. Tr. 58, 68-

69, 182; see Tr. 34 ([T]he claimant testified at the hearing that she was able to start

cleaning offices for 9-10 hours per week starting in April 2013 . . .”)4 Though not

constituting substantial gainful employment, this part-time work is still a relevant

factor to consider in evaluating Ms. Dye’s reported level of pain. See Wolfe v. Chater,

86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (cleaning mobile homes part of substantial

evidence supporting decision to discount subjective pain evidence).

Prior to this part-time cleaning work, Ms. Dye testified thatshe applied for and

received unemployment compensation until exhausting it in June 2011. Tr. 83. The

ALJ pointed out that, in applying for unemployment benefits, Ms. Dye was required

under Alabama law to certify that she “was ‘physically and mentally able to perform

work of a character which [s]he is qualified to perform by past experience or training

and [s]he is available for such work . . . ’” Tr. 35. As this court has previously held,

4 The ALJrelied on Ms. Dye’s hearing testimony to note that she worked at least “9-10 hours

per week” (Tr. 34, 35), but at other points in the record it appears that Ms. Dye may have been

working more. At different points, she reported to Dr. Raquib that she was working 20 hours per

week (Tr. 353) and 50 hours per week. See Tr. 266 (“She is having more breakthrough pain as she

is now working 50 hours a week.”). The court’s conclusions are based on the lower amount that the

ALJ used.

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while receipt of unemployment benefits standing alone is not sufficient to discredit

a claimant’s subjective complaints about pain and other symptoms, it is a relevant

factor “if unemployment compensation is not the only reason supporting the ALJ’s

negative credibility finding.” Sasnette v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-0362-VEH (Doc. 13

at 17) (N.D. Ala. July 21, 2015) (emphasis omitted). 

Ms. Dye also took care of her three-year old granddaughter. Tr. 62; see Tr. 34

(ALJ’s observing that Ms. Dye “has been the primary caregiver for her infant

granddaughter”). Evidence that Ms. Dye performed household chores such as

laundry, shopped for groceries and household items weekly, and experienced no

problems with handling her personal care also supports the ALJ’s pain conclusion.

See Tr. 208-210 (detailing daily activities); see Tr. 34 (ALJ’s pointing out that Ms.

Dye “was able to live independently in her own residence and care for her personal

needs without assistance”). It is reasonable to conclude, as the ALJ does, that if her

level of pain was as high as she claimed, Ms. Dye would not have been able to

perform these physically-demanding tasks on a sustained basis. See Tr. 34 (“The

claimant’s daily activities are . . . inconsistent with disabling levels of pain and other

subjective complaints.”). Though such daily actions–in short duration–are not

sufficient evidence alone to discount a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, Lewis

v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11thCir. 1997), they can still be considered as part

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of the overall substantial evidence inquiry. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1226-27 (using

daily activities, with other factors, as sufficient evidence to discount subjective

evaluation of pain). Thus, considering both the medical and non-medical evidence,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discrediting of Ms. Dye’s claimed level of

pain and other subjective symptoms.

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION TO EXCLUDE THE BACK BRACE AND

BLADDER PROBLEMS IN HER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS TO

THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE.

In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence,

the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question that comprises all of the claimant’s

impairments. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). An ALJ, however, is “not

required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ ha[s] properly rejected

as unsupported.” Crawford v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir.

2004); see also Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th

Cir. 2007) (“The characteristics that the administrative law judge omitted are among

those that Ingram alleged to suffer but were either not supported by her medical

records or were alleviated by medication.”).

Ms. Dye reported on her functional assessment signed on August 6, 2012, that

she was prescribed a back brace “about 6 months ago” or in February 2012. Tr. 213.

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Ms. Dye’s medical record reflects that the back brace was actually prescribed by Dr.

Raquib on November 6, 2012 (Tr. 333), nearly a year after her date last insured of

December 31, 2011. Tr. 30. When the ALJ questioned Ms. Dye about the brace, she

indicated that it was prescribed after she fell in the latter part of 2012. Tr. 70. While

Ms. Dye was not wearing the brace during her hearing, she testified that she wears it

when she “wash[es] a load of clothes” or “when [she] work[s]in the evening.” Tr. 70. 

The ALJ appropriately omitted any reference to a back brace from the

hypothetical questions asthismedical evidence fallssignificantlybeyond the date last

insured, including even the apparent triggering event resulting in Ms. Dye’s need for

the back brace. Cf. Saxon v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-782-VEH, 2015 WL 4999700, at

*6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2015) (finding no error in ALJ’sforegoing request for medical

records post-dating period of disability by five years); id. (“Mrs. Saxon has. . . failed

to give any explanation of how testing conducted in 2011 would have yielded

information about her mental condition five to ten years prior (i.e. in the period

between her alleged onset of disability and her date last insured).”); cf. also Leiter v.

Astrue, No. 5:08-CV-1453-VEH, (Doc. 16 at 15) (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2009) (“While

these records [post-dating the ALJ’s decision] may impact any future claims to

benefits by Ms. Leiter, they are not chronologically relevant to her previously filed

DIB and SSI claims.”).

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Ms. Dye does not cite to any record evidence establishing that a medical

provider considered possibly fitting her for a back brace prior to her date last insured

or at any other time until it wasformally prescribed by Dr. Raquib in November 2012.

Ms. Dye also does not explain why the prescription for the brace–tied to a fall

occurring around thatsame time–isindicative of a declining lumbar condition before

her date last insured nearly one year earlier. Cf. Ward v. Astrue, No. 300-CV-1137-JHTS, 2008 WL 1994978, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2008) (“Evidence post-dating an

individual’s insured status may be relevant and properly considered if it bears upon

the severity of the claimant’s condition before the expiration of his or her insured

status.”) (emphasis added); cf. also Tr. 35 (ALJ’s pointing out that “there is little to

any evidence of a significant deterioration in the claimant’s medical condition since

that layoff and the claimant’s date last insured of December 31, 2011.”). Therefore,

the record does not substantiate that Ms. Dye’s back brace is relevant to the period

before her date last insured and the ALJ did not err when she omitted it from her

hypothetical questions.

The ALJ also found that Ms. Dye had not shown that she was suffering from

a prolapsed bladder at any time and, therefore, certainly not by the date last insured.

Tr. 31. Assuch, the ALJ was not required to include a diagnosis of prolapsed bladder

in her hypothetical questions. Her decision to omit it is supported by substantial

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evidence; more accurately, it is supported by the complete lack of medical evidence

within the record that confirms its existence. Though Ms. Dye reported that her

bladder had “fallen” (Tr. 77), the ALJ found that no doctor in her medical record had

diagnosed this or found any problem with Ms. Dye’s bladder. In fact, prior to her

administrative hearing, Ms. Dye routinely reported the absence of any urinary

problems. See, e.g., Tr. 270 (“patient denies frequency, urgency. . .”); see also 254,

258, 262, 266, 274 (other examples of similar reports to her doctors); but see Tr. 77

(Ms. Dye’s testimony before ALJ about having urinary issues). Further, when Ms.

Dye was examined by Wilton R. Holman III, M.D. (“Dr. Holman”), he expressly

found her “bladder [to be] unremarkable.” Tr. 319. Therefore, in the absence of any

medical documentation indicating that Ms. Dye had a prolapsed bladder, especially

during the period before the date last insured, the ALJ did not err by excluding this

claimed but undiagnosed condition from her hypothetical questions to the VE.

IV. THE ALJ DID NOT NEGLECT HER DUTY TO DEVELOP THE

RECORD BY NOT ORDERING AN ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIVE

EXAMINATION.

Ms. Dye alternatively argues that even if the ALJ did not err by failing to

include a prolapsed bladder in the hypothetical questions, the ALJ still should have

sent her for an additional consultative examination to determine the validity and

vocational impact of her claimed bladder condition. (Doc. 10 at 14). The ALJ has a

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duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422-23(11thCir. 1997)). In order

to be supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ must have before her sufficient facts

upon which to make an informed decision. Ford v. Sec. of Health & Human Serv.,

659 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1981). 

The Regulations permit the ALJto order a consultative examination when the

claimant’s medical sources cannot or will not give sufficient medical evidence

regarding the claimant’s impairment to make an informed decision about disability.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. Further, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[i]t is

reversible error for an ALJ not to order a consultative examination when such an

evaluation is necessary for him to make an informed decision.” Reeves v. Bowen, 841

F.2d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Ford, 659 F.2d at 69); see also Caulder v.

Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring the ALJto order a consultative

examination when it is recommended by a physician and fills a gap in the material

facts). However, the Eleventh Circuit also has held that the ALJ’s duty to develop the

record does not include ordering a consultative examination when the record contains

sufficient evidence upon which the ALJ can make an informed decision. Ingram, 496

F.3d at 1269.

For the same reasons the ALJ did not err in omitting Ms. Dye’s claimed

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prolapsed bladder in her hypothetical questions, there was no duty to develop the

record concerning this dubious condition. There wassufficient evidence in the record

that the ALJrelied on to make an informed decision about Ms. Dye’s disability claim,

including specifically the ALJ’s finding that the record did not substantiate “the

claimant’s allegations of a prolapsed bladder to be a medically determinable

impairment . . . .” Tr. 31. Prior to her date last insured, Ms. Dye denied having any

urinary issues on several different doctor visits. See, e.g., Tr. 270. Further, a doctor

examining Ms. Dye’s bladder prior to the date last insured found that it was

“unremarkable.” Tr. 319. In sum, the record is devoid of a prolapsed bladder

diagnosis or even confirmation of any bladder difficultiesfroman acceptable medical

source. Given this unambiguous medical information already in the record, the ALJ

was under no obligation to order a further medical examination to make an informed

decision.The record was developed sufficiently and the ALJ’s disability decision was

based on substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties’

submissions, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by

substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it.

Accordingly, the decision will be affirmed by separate order.

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DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of July, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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