Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01008/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01008-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LISA WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-13-S-1008-NE

)

BIG LOTS STORES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Lisa Wilson, asserts claims against her employer, Big Lots Stores,

Inc. (“Big Lots”), for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation,

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.

1 The case currently is before the court on defendant’s motion

for summary judgment.

2 Upon consideration of the briefs and evidentiary

submissions, the court concludes that the motion is due to be granted in part and

denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

See doc. no. 17 (Amended Complaint). The amended complaint also included claims

against BigLots bythree other current and former employees: i.e., Sondra Keaton; Rhonda Simpson;

and Gina Fulton. The court severed those claims on October 18, 2013, and ordered that new case

files be opened for each of the individual plaintiffs. Doc. no. 18. The civil action number stated in

the caption applies only to the claims of plaintiff Lisa Wilson.

2

 Doc. no. 25. 

FILED

 2014 Dec-19 AM 10:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 1 of 31
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In

other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

“In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v.

City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the nonmoving party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is

only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but

is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d

1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

2

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 2 of 31
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”).

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS3

A. Plaintiff’s Employment History

Plaintiff, Lisa Wilson, began working for Big Lots in 1991. She transferred to

the Florence, Alabama store, where she continues to work, in 1996.

4 She was

promoted to Assistant Manger of the Florence store in 2006. As Assistant Manager,

plaintiff was primarily responsible for merchandising, including overseeing the

unloading of trucks, and the stocking and presentation of merchandise. Plaintiff

reported directly to the Store Manager, Gary Pagan.

5

3

In her response brief, plaintiff did not respond, paragraph-by-paragraph, to any of the

proposed findings of facts stated by defendant in its brief. See doc. no. 28 (response brief). 

Accordingly, all of defendant’s proposed facts are deemed admitted for summaryjudgment purposes. 

See doc. no. 6 (Uniform Initial Order), at 15-16. Additionally, many of the proposed undisputed

facts in plaintiff’s brief discuss behavior Collingsworth directed at another employee, Rhonda

Simpson. See doc. no. 28 (plaintiff’s brief), at 5-10 (Proposed Facts 15-29). Ms. Simpson also filed

a case in this court against Big Lots, but her claims were dismissed on July 8, 2014. See Rhonda

Simpson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:13-cv-1924-IPJ, doc. no. 22. The alleged

harassment suffered by Ms. Simpson is not relevant to the claims asserted by plaintiff in this case. 

4

 Doc. no. 27-1 (Deposition of Lisa Wilson), at 16-17. 

5

Id. at 19-22.

3

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 3 of 31
B. Defendant’s Harassment-Free Environment Policy

The Big Lots Associate Handbook contains the company’s Harassment-Free

Environment Policy. That policy states:

We intend to maintain an environment in which all associates can

perform their duties free of harassment and discrimination. If you

believe you have been the subject of harassment, you should report the

alleged act to your Manager or to your Regional Human Resources

manager (RHRM) immediately so the problem can be corrected. Some

states have different requirements for anti-harassment policies. This

policy does not apply where state law requires otherwise.

TheBig Lots Harassment-Free Environment Policy complies with

all local, state, and federal laws dealing with unlawful discrimination

and/or harassment. 

Each manager isresponsible for maintaining a work environment

that is free of harassment, both sexual and otherwise. This includes

communicating this Policy to all associates and making sure that no one

is subjected to insulting, degrading, or exploitative behavior.

Likewise, it’s the responsibility of every associate to comply with

this Policy and report any violations. Please be assured that you will not

be penalized in any way for reporting inappropriate behavior. As per

our Open Door Policy, honest two-way communication is essential to

the successful operation of our business.

All reports of inappropriate conduct or discrimination will be

promptly investigated under the direction of the Human Resources

Department. All investigations will be conducted with the utmost

concern for the confidential and personal nature of the allegation and

with a high degree of sensitivity to the individuals involved. If you are

found to have engaged in discriminatory or harassing behavior, you will

receive Disciplinary Counseling up to and including termination of

employment. Retaliation against anyone reporting acts of harassment

4

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 4 of 31
will not be tolerated.

6

The Policy also states that Big Lots has “zero tolerance” for any type of

harassment, including sex-based harassment. The Policy defines harassment as

including

unwelcome verbal, visual, or physical conduct creating an intimidating,

offensive, or hostile work environment that interferes with work

performance. Harassment [also] can be verbal (including slurs, jokes,

insults, epithets, gestures, or teasing), graphic (including offensive

posters, symbols, cartoons, drawings, computer displays, or e-mails), or

physical conduct (including physically threatening another, blocking

someone’s way, etc.) that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion

toward an individual because of any protected characteristic. Such

conduct violates this policy, even if it is not unlawful. Because it is

difficult to define unlawful harassment, associates are expected to

behave at all times in a professional and respectful manner.7

An employee who believes she has observed any violation of the HarassmentFree Environment Policy isinstructed to inform her Manager or the Regional Human

Resources Manager. If the employee is not satisfied with the response at that level,

she is directed to contact Big Lots’ “Vice President of Associate Relations

6 Doc. no. 27-3 (January 2008 Associate Handbook), at ECF 8. Note: “ECF” is the acronym

for “Electronic Case Filing,” a system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically. 

See Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 2009 WL4723547, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). 

Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 permits citations to the “page numbers generated by the ECF header.” Wilson

v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 257 n.5 (D. D.C. 2011) (citing The Bluebook: A Uniform System

of Citation R. B. 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al., 19th ed. 2010)). Even so, The

Bluebook recommends “against citation to ECF pagination in lieu of original pagination.” Wilson,

772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless stated otherwise, this court will cite the original pagination

in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, however,

it will, as here, precede the page number with the acronym “ECF.” 

7

 Doc. no. 27-3 (January 2008 Associate Handbook), at ECF 9 (alteration supplied). 

5

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 5 of 31
immediately or call the GET REAL HOTLINE at 1.866.834.REAL (7325).”

8

Employee also are advised that they can make a report to an appropriate government

agency, including the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC).9

Plaintiff received a copy of the Associate Handbook when she was hired, and

additional copies over time, as the policies were updated. She also had access to the

Handbook online and, after becoming an Assistant Manager, she received computerbased training for managers every two years.

10 As part of that training, plaintiff

viewed an anti-harassment video in May of 2012. It was not until then thatshe began

to suspect that she had been subjected to unlawful sexual harassment.

11

C. The Alleged Harassment

The entire time plaintiff worked in the Florence store, a man named W.C.

Collingsworth also was an Assistant Manager in charge of Operations. His duties

included hiring, paperwork, and maintenance of the Florence facilities.

12 After

plaintiff became an Assistant Manager in 2006, she and Collingsworth were equals:

8

Id. (emphasis in original). 

9

Id. at ECF 9-10. 

10

 Wilson Deposition, at 45-46, 72-74. 

11

Id. at 24, 44, 45.

12

Id. at 18-19, 113. 

6

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 6 of 31
in other words, neither was in a supervisory position over the other.13

Plaintiff felt that Collingsworth was unproductive at work, and spent too much

time talking on the telephone and to others.

14 One topic he talked about at least once

a week was his sex life and past sexual conquests.

15 For example, Collingsworth

alleged that he: had sex with a woman under an oak tree by the highway; had sex with

a woman in a pineapple field in Hawaii; had sex in a car with a woman who bumped

into the gear shift, causing the car to roll near the edge of a cliff; met a

nymphomaniac in New Orleans who had an orgasm when he nibbled on her ear;

previously owned a dressshop and traded dressesto customersfor sexual favors; was

caught by a manager at a different job having sex on the roof; was pushed into a

closet by a woman at a Christmas party who wanted to have sex with him; visited a

“whorehouse” in Vietnam where the prostitutes would offer him “suckie suckie” for

two dollars; was in bed with a woman in Vietnam when the building was bombed; let

an older girl “rub on him” at a bus stop when he was thirteen; and got a “hard-on”

when a girl “rubbed on him” during a movie. Collingsworth also said that he caught

a customer in his dress shop masturbating to a mannequin, that he (Collingsworth)

was uncircumcised, and that he knew he would be okay after having a stroke in 2002

13

Id. at 79. 

14

Id. at 25, 53, 58. 

15

Id. at 54. 

7

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 7 of 31
because he woke up with an erect penis.

16 The words used by Collingsworth that

plaintiff found offensive included “hard-on,” “titties,” “suckie suckie,”

“whorehouse,” “erect,” “penis,” “orgasm,” “get off,” and “fuck.”17 Sometimes, when

Collingsworth told his boorish stories, he would prop up his leg and grab his crotch,

although plaintiff acknowledged during her deposition that Collingsworth may have

just been “adjusting himself.”18 Collingsworth also once said, “You know how a

good pair of Levi’s feels when you’re young.”

19

 

Collingsworth “told everybody the same stories” and jokes — including

plaintiff, other male and female employees, customers, and the man who delivered

bread to the store.20

Plaintiff testified that Collingsworth also told inappropriate jokes “all the

time,” but, during her deposition, she could only recall the basic outlines of two of

the jokes. The first was the so-called “Frito Lay” joke about a dead woman who had

a tag on her toe and was called a “free-toed-lay.”21 The second was about two people

in a jail, one of whom had a larger anus (he said “asshole”) than the other. She could

16

 Wilson Deposition, at 31-35, 137-38, 150-55. 

17

Id. at 15. 

18

Id. at 31-32. 

19

Id. at 30. 

20

Id. at 26, 65, 82, 89. 

21

Id. at 99.

8

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 8 of 31
not recall exactly when she heard those jokes, only that it was sometime within the

last five to ten years.

22

Collingsworth engaged in other inappropriate behavior. He sometimes

commented on customers’ breast sizes. When plaintiff responded that she did not

look at the breasts of other women, Collingsworth elaborated by comparing the

customer’s breast size to plaintiff’s.

23 There is no indication in the record how often

such comments were made. Additionally, on an unspecified date, after returning from

a trip to New Orleans for Mardi Gras, Collingsworth brought to work pictures of a

naked midget and a woman exposing her breasts.

24

 

The entire time plaintiff knew Collingsworth, he called her names like

“Dream,” “Love Boat,” “Dear Heart,” and “Love.”25 He also told plaintiff that he

wanted to put her in hissuitcase and take her with him on vacation. Those comments

continued through 2012.

26 Anytime Collingsworth was out of work for an extended

period of time, he would hug plaintiff and kiss her on the cheek when he returned.

27

Plaintiff did not know how many times Collingsworth had hugged or kissed her over

22

 Wilson Deposition, at 99-100. 

23

Id. at 36. 

24

Id. at 25. 

25

Id. at 30, 101.

26

Id. at 101. 

27

Id. at 24, 35-36. 

9

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 9 of 31
the years, or the date on which that last occurred.

28 Collingsworth grabbed plaintiff’s

arm “all the time,” or “almost every day,” and pulled her close to him, in order to

whisper in her ear, or move her closer when she was talking. He said that he did so

because he was hard of hearing. Plaintiff testified that the touching of her arm and

whispering in her ear occurred as recently as 2012.

29

 

Collingsworth never threatened plaintiff, propositioned herforsex,touched her

breasts or other private parts, exposed himself to her, or called her any derogatory

names, like “whore” or “bitch.”30 Plaintiff testified that she tried to avoid being

around Collingsworth as much as possible, but she did not identify any specific way

in which Collingsworth’s behavior negatively affected her job performance. In fact,

plaintiff consistently received positive performance reviews from her supervisors.

31

D. The 2006 Investigation 

In 2006, Bruno Lijoi, who then was District Manager for Big Lots, conducted

an investigation into a complaint about Collingsworth’s offensive behavior that had

been lodged by another employee, Lisa King, who then was the store’s Furniture

Manager.32 Plaintiff was asked to provide a statement on April 12, 2006. While

28

 Wilson Deposition, at 24, 35-36.

29

Id. at 24, 35-36, 101. 

30

Id. at 23-24, 34, 90-91.

31

Id. at 23, 25, 90-91. 

32

 Doc. no. 27-3 (Declaration of Rick Saenz) ¶ 6.

10

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 10 of 31
plaintiff was contemplating what to say, Gary Pagan, the Store Manager, told her,

“Just remember that you’re part of the management team now, and we need to stand

beside each other.”33 Plaintiff wrote: “I[,] Lisa Wilson[,] have nothing to comment

about W.C. Collingsworth.”34 She “wanted to say more,” butshe had just been made

an Assistant Manager of the Florence store, and she “didn’t want to jeopardize . . .

didn’t want to get into . . . didn’t want to get involved really with everything, trying

to be assistant manager at the time.”35 As a result of the investigation, Collingsworth

was issued a written Disciplinary Counseling on April 26, 2006, for violating Big

Lots’ standards of conduct.

36 The Counseling document stated that Collingsworth

had, indeed, made some inappropriate commentsto female associates. Collingsworth

was cautioned to behave in a professional manner at all times, and that any further

policy violations would “result in further disciplinary action up to and including

termination.”37

E. Other, Unspecified Complaints

At some unspecified time after 2006, plaintiff personally confronted

33

 Wilson Deposition, at 28. 

34

Id. at Exhibit 4. 

35

Id. at 28. 

36 Doc. no. 27-3 (Declaration of Rick Saenz) ¶ 6 and Exhibit 6 (April 26, 2006 Disciplinary

Counseling). 

37

Id. 

11

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 11 of 31
Collingsworth about his behavior. She was tired of other employees complaining to

her about things Collingsworth had done or said to them, so she “sat him down” in

the office and told him, “Look, I’m sick of it. I’m sick of hearing all this. I’m sick

of hearing you telling dirty stories, and I’m sick of you talking this way.”38 After that

conversation, Collingsworth’s offensive behavior “stopped for maybe a week or two,

and then it was just right back.”39

Plaintiff also complained “numerous” times about Collingsworth’s behavior

to Gary Pagan, the Store Manager, but she could not be more specific about the

number and timing of her complaints.

40 Pagan typically responded to her complaints

by asking, “When is he going to retire? Why does he do this? Does he know how

much trouble he’s going to get in?” Then Pagan would tell plaintiff he would “take

care of it,” so plaintiff believed that Pagan was addressing the issue with Pagan “all

those years.”

41 Each time plaintiff complained to Pagan, Collingsworth’s behavior

would stop for “a week or so here and there,” but “then he would just go right

back.”

42

Big Lots also set up a 1-800 number that employees could use to lodge

38

 Wilson Deposition, at 37. 

39

Id. 

40

Id. at 41. 

41

Id. 

42

Id. at 42.

12

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 12 of 31
anonymous complaints harassment or other issues in the workplace. Plaintiff never

placed a call to that number, but when another employee did atsome unspecified time

during plaintiff’s employment, Store Manager Gary Pagan became upset and

instructed the employees never to call the number again.

43

F. 2012 Complaints and Defendant’s Responses

At some unspecified point during 2012, a new employee named Amanda

Nichols told plaintiff that Collingsworth had “touched her breast and moved it up and

down.”44 Nichols did not want plaintiff to report the incident, but plaintiff told her

she wasrequired to inform Anthony Thomas, the District Manager. Thomas directed

plaintiff to obtain a written statement from Nichols, but Nichols refused to provide

one.45 Plaintiff also told Gary Pagan about the incident. Pagan told plaintiff to make

sure she informed Thomas, and directed her to “do what you need to do.”46 Nichols

quit her job the next day, however, and plaintiff did not hear anything else from her. 

Without a written statement from Nichols, the investigation did not proceed.

47

Gina Fulton, another female employee who now is deceased,

48

complained to

43

Id. at 38-39. 

44

 Wilson Deposition, at 54.

45

Id. at 54-55. 

46

Id. at 56. 

47

Id. at 54-55. 

48 Gina Fulton also filed a case in this district, Fulton v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., Civil Action

No. 5:13-cv-1926-CLS. Her complaint was dismissed without prejudice, at the request of her estate,

13

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 13 of 31
Pagan that Collingsworth brushed up against her with an erect penis while they were

in the office counting down their registers on April 14, 2012.

49 Pagan issued

Collingsworth a written Disciplinary Counseling on April 20, 2012, for violation of

the Big Lots Standards of Conduct. Specifically, the Counseling document cautioned

Collingsworth that “[n]o inappropriate comments are to be made to offend associates

about his or their personal life.”50 

Approximately two weeks later, Fulton told plaintiff that, after making her

complaint to Pagan, she overheard Pagan discussing the complaint with

Collingsworth. Pagan said: “What if Anthony [Thomas] had found out?”

51 That

comment caused plaintiff to believe that Pagan had not been reporting any of the

incidents involving Collingsworth to Thomas, so she decided to relay Fulton’s

complaint directly to Thomas herself.52 Plaintiff called Thomas on May 4, and also

forwarded him the following written statement from Fulton:

Friday April 13th at approx 4:00 pm, I wasin the office with W.C.

Collingsworth counting my till at the table when he came up behind me

& started to rub my shoulders. At this point, I hurried to finish & leave. 

As I went to stand up, he brushed his — what felt to be an erect penis

against my low back 2 times. I hurried & left for the day. Later I

on October 29, 2013. Doc. no. 6 in Civil Action No. 5:13-cv-1926-CLS. 

49

 Wilson Deposition, at 46-47, 75. 

50

 Saenz Declaration, Exhibit 7 (Disciplinary Counseling) (alteration supplied). 

51

 Wilson Deposition, at 46-47, 75 (alteration supplied). 

52

Id. 

14

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 14 of 31
reported it to Gary Pagan & he said he would talk to him, & had just

dealt with him 2 weeks prior about another situation similar in nature.53

The Big Lots Ethics and Compliance Hotline also received an anonymous

report on May 4, 2012, alleging that “an Assistant Manager has been sexually

harassing the female employees and customers.”54 The summary of the call stated:

The anonymous caller, an employee from Store 33 (1700 Darby

Dr., Florence, AL), reported that W.C.Collinsworth (spelling provided),

Assistant Manager, has sexually harassed the female employees(names

withheld by the caller). The caller explained that the situation has been

ongoing for the past 15 to 16 years. Collinswoth has made filthy jokes

and told at least “90 percent” of the female employeesthat his penis was

uncircumcised.

According to the caller, Collinsworth gropes the female

employees’ breasts and brushes up against the female employees with

an erect penis. The caller added that Collinsworth also has attempted to

hug and kiss the female employees in an attempt to feel their breasts. 

Collinsworth has also done this with several female customers (names

unknown to the caller).

The situation has been reported to Gary Pagan (spelling

provided), Store Manager, on several occasions. Pagan does not help

the female employees, he tells them not to “rock the boat” and that the

“situation could get Big Lots into a lot of trouble.”

The caller stressed that s/he has quit as of May 4, 2012, because

s/he could no longer tolerate Collinsworth’s behavior. The caller

disclosed that if s/he goes back into Store 333 to shop and Collinsworth

attempts to touch his/her breasts s/he will spray him with mace.55

53

 Wilson Deposition, at 75, 131 and Exhibit 5 (emphasis in original). 

54

 Doc. no. 27-6 (Declaration of Anthony Thomas), Exhibit 3, at 1. 

55

Id. 

15

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 15 of 31
The report indicated that Collinsworth’s behavior was “ongoing” and had occurred

“daily” for fifteen to sixteen years.

56

 

District ManagerAnthonyThomas began investigating both Fulton’s complaint

and the anonymous complaint on May 7 and 8, 2012. He interviewed Fulton,

potential witnesses Fulton had identified, and several female employees. He also

interviewed Collingsworth, who denied all of the allegations against him.

57 Thomas

interviewed plaintiff on May 8. During her deposition, plaintiff could notspecifically

recall what she told Thomas.

58 Thomas testified, however, that plaintiff reported to

him that Collingsworth had told sexual jokes in the workplace, commented on the

size of customers’ breasts, and told inappropriate stories about his past sexual

encounters. Plaintiff told Thomas that Collingsworth had never touched her

inappropriately or directed inappropriate commentstoward her specifically. Thomas

asked plaintiff to provide specific examples of situations where Collingsworth had

said inappropriate things, but she did not provide any examples. She also did not

identify any witnesses to Collingsworth’s behavior.59

At the completion of Thomas’s investigation, he and Regional Human

56

Id. at 2. 

57

 Thomas Declaration ¶ 3. 

58

 Wilson Deposition, at 51-52.

59

 Thomas Declaration ¶ 4.

16

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 16 of 31
Resources Manager Rick Saenz concluded that Collingsworth had made inappropriate

jokes, told inappropriate stories about his personal life, and occasionally hugged or

patted other employees on the arm. Even so, they could not verify that Collingsworth

had brushed up against Fulton with his penis. Moreover, no other witnesses stated

that Collingsworth had ever groped them, brushed his penis against their body, or

touched them in any other way than occasional hugs or pats on the arm.

60

Collingsworth was issued a Final Disciplinary Counseling on July 17, 2012, for

violations of Big Lots’ Standards of Conduct. The Counseling document stated:

On various occasions WC has hugged associates, talked about his

personal life, and made inappropriate jokes. Many associates have

complained and are not comfortable with conversations about his day to

day life. Although some associates believe he is not threatening, and

does not mean to upset anyone, his comments and stories are

inappropriate in the workplace. WC must understand our policy on a

Harassment free environment. He cannot joke about his ex-girlfriends

or touch associatesin any way. Thisincludes hugging or just putting his

arm around someone’s shoulders. This issue has been addressed with

WC in the past.

61

Collingsworth was cautioned that “[f]urther inappropriate conduct such as what is

mentioned above may include disciplinary counseling up to and including

termination.”62

 

60

Id. ¶ 5. 

61

Id. at Exhibit 5 (Big Lots Disciplinary Counseling form). 

62

Id. (alteration supplied). 

17

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 17 of 31
A few weeks after Thomas had completed his investigation, he called plaintiff

and told her that she should inform him if there were any further problems with

Collingsworth. Plaintiff did not report any further incidents to Thomas, and she

testified that, after Thomas had completed his investigation, Collingsworth did not

tell her any more sexual stories or jokes, or direct any more unprofessional behavior

toward her.63

Even so, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment

OpportunityCommission on August 29, 2012, alleging retaliation and discrimination

based on her sex.

64 She complained that Collingsworth had sexually harassed her,

and stated that she had reported the harassment to her superiors. She alleged that,

throughout her employment at Big Lots, she was “subjected to sexually provocative

stories, sexual jokes, lewd gestures and unwanted physical contact from W.C. I am

continuously sexually harassed and made to work in a hostile work environment. To

my knowledge, W.C. has not been disciplined and his actions continue.”65 She also

stated that “[t]he harassment byW.C. and management’s unwillingnessto investigate

my complaints, hasforced me to endure harassment and retaliation,”66butshe did not

63

 Wilson Deposition, at 64-67. 

64

 Wilson Deposition, at Exhibit 8 (EEOC Charge).

65

Id. 

66

Id. (alteration supplied). 

18

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 18 of 31
elaborate on what kind of retaliation she had allegedly suffered. Plaintiff also

referenced an “attached statement which sets out recent, specific instances where I

have complained of sexual harassment to upper management and specific instances

of sexual harassment I was made to endure,”67

but the court could not locate a copy

of that statement anywhere in the record. 

Rick Saenz, the Regional Human Resources Manager, traveled to the Florence

store on an unspecified date to investigate the allegations in plaintiff’s EEOC

charge.68 Plaintiff could not recall the details of her conversation with Saenz because

she was “caught off guard” when she learned that Saenz was at her store.69 Saenz

testified, however, that plaintiff told him that Collingsworth “had never said or done

anything to her because he knows that if he did then I would knock him out and he

would be taken to court.”70 At some point, plaintiff refused to talk to Saenz any

longer, telling him that he would need to speak to her attorney instead.

71 Saenz also

met with Collingsworth, who once again denied any wrongdoing. 

At some point during Saenz’s investigation, Collingsworth stated that he

wanted to resign his employment. He submitted a letter on September 14, 2012,

67

Id. (emphasis in original). 

68

 Saenz Declaration ¶ 9; Wilson Deposition, at 105.

69

 Wilson Deposition, at 105.

70

 Saenz Declaration ¶ 10.

71

 Wilson Deposition, at 106-08.

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stating, “I, W.C. Collingsworth, have decided to retire at this time effective

September 26, 2012. This decision is made freely and from my own schedule for the

future. I stand firmly by any and all statements I have made pertaining to recent

events.”72

G. Facts Related to Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

When Collingsworth resigned, plaintiff took over his position as Assistant

Manager over Operations, and an employee named Josh Flanagan took over

plaintiff’s previous position as Assistant Manager over Merchandising.

73 As

Assistant Manager over Operations, plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that the

restroomsstayed clean, although she could delegate the actual cleaning tasks to other

employees. Plaintiff did not ask for or expect the reassignment to Assistant Manager

over Operations.

74

GaryPagan retired as Store Manager approximately one week before plaintiff’s

March 11, 2014 deposition.

75

 When plaintiff learned about Pagan’s retirement, she

called District Manager Anthony Thomas to tell him that she was interested in

applying for the position. Thomas informed her that he had already awarded the

72

 Saenz Declaration, at Exhibit 12. 

73

 Wilson Deposition, at 21. 

74

Id. at 113.

75

Id. at 63.

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position to Joey Bell, who previously had served as Manager of the Tupelo,

Mississippi Big Lots store. Bell had approximately twenty years of experience in

retail management, and Thomas considered him the best candidate for the position.

76

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserted separate claims for “sexual

harassment” and “hostile work environment” under Title VII.77 Because plaintiff has

not alleged that she suffered a tangible adverse employment action as a result of

Collingsworth’s harassment, there is no actual distinction between the two claims. 

See Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“Generally, sexual harassment claims are argued as either hostile work environment

claims or quid pro quo claims. The difference between the two is that the former do

not result in tangible employment actions, while the latter do.”) (citing Burlington

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-63 (1998)). 

1. Timeliness of plaintiff’s claim

A plaintiff must satisfy a number of administrative prerequisites before filing

a suit based upon Title VII. Foremost among these is the requirement that a charge

76

Id.; see also Thomas Declaration ¶ 7. 

77

See doc. no. 17 (Amended Complaint), at Counts One and Two.

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of discrimination be submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). In hostile work environment cases, however, the claim can

be timely even if the first instance of harassment “occurred” more than 180 days

before the charge was filed. The Supreme Court has recognized that a hostile work

environment claim based upon racial or sexual harassment “is composed of a series

of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” 

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). For that reason, “[a] charge alleging a hostile work

environment claim . . . will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the

claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls

within the [180 day] time period.” Id. at 122 (alterations supplied).

Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete

acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. See 1 B. Lindemann

& P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 348-349 (3d ed.1996)

(hereinafter Lindemann) (“The repeated nature of the harassment or its

intensity constitutes evidence that management knew or should have

known of its existence”). The “unlawful employment practice”

therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over

a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts,

a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. See Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“As we pointed out in

Meritor [Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986),] ‘mere

utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a[n]

employee,’ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), does notsufficiently

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 22 of 31
affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII”). Such

claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.

. . . .

In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment

claim exists, we look to “all the circumstances,” including “the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” [Harris, 510 U.S.] at 23, 114 S. Ct. 367. To assess

whether a court may, for the purposes of determining liability, review all

such conduct, including those acts that occur outside the filing period,

we again look to the statute. It provides that a charge must be filed

within 180 or 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred.” A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series

of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful employment

practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The timely filing provision only

requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a certain number

of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for

purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile

work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that

an act contributing to the claimoccurs within the filing period, the entire

time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for

the purposes of determining liability. 

. . . .

It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment

encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not hold

. . . that the plaintiff may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred

outside the statute of limitations unlessit would have been unreasonable

to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on such conduct. The

statute does not separate individual acts that are part of the hostile

environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely filing and

liability. And the statute does not contain a requirement that the

employee file a charge prior to 180 or 300 days “after” the single

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unlawful practice “occurred.” Given, therefore, that the incidents

constituting a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful

employment practice, the employer may be liable for all actsthat are part

of this single claim. In order for the charge to be timely, the employee

need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of

the hostile work environment.

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-18 (footnotes omitted) (all alterations in first paragraph in

original, other alterations and ellipsessupplied). See also Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc.,

324 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that, in Morgan, “the Supreme

Courtsimplified the limitationsinquiry in hostile work environment cases. The Court

instructed that a hostile work environment, although comprised of a series of separate

acts, constitutes one ‘unlawful employment practice,’ and so long as one act

contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, ‘the entire time period of the

hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining

liability.’”) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117).

Defendant asserts that the allegedly sexually harassing acts identified by

plaintiff outside the 180-day filing period are not sufficiently related to the allegedly

harassing acts that occurred within the 180-day fling period for any of the earlier acts

to be considered part of plaintiff’s claim.

78 This court disagrees. All of the allegedly

78 Plaintiff did not directly respond to this argument in her brief, but she did repeatedly assert

arguments based on facts that occurred outside the 180-day period. Therefore, in a generous effort

to construe plaintiff’s briefs in the light most favorable to her, the court will assume that plaintiff has

opposed defendant’s timeliness argument. 

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harassing acts about which plaintiff complains are part of the same pattern of

offensive behavior byCollingsworth. Stated differently, all of the allegedly harassing

acts collectively form part of the cause of action. Accordingly, all of the behavior

about which plaintiff complains — even that which occurred more than 180 days

before plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on August 29, 2012 — can be considered part

of her hostile work environment claim. 

2. Merits of the claim

To succeed on her hostile work environment claim, plaintiff must show that:

(1) she belongsto a group protected by Title VII; (2) she wassubjected to unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon her sex; (4) the harassment was

sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her

employment; and (5) there is a basis for holding defendants responsible under a

theory of either vicarious or direct liability. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751; Johnson v. Booker T.

Washington Broadcasting Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 508 (11th Cir. 2000). The first

two elements cannot be disputed. As a female, plaintiff belongsto a protected group. 

See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Asin other cases

of sexual discrimination this[element]requires a simple stipulation that the employee

is a man or a woman.”) (alteration supplied). Plaintiff also has testified that she was

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 25 of 31
subjected to boorish comments and offensive behavior that she found unwelcome.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is clear that she has

created genuine issues of material fact regarding the final elements. A reasonable

jury could find that the harassmentshe complains of was based upon her sex, and that

it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to satisfy the prima facie case. Finally, a

reasonable jury could conclude that Big Lots had constructive notice of

Collingsworth’s harassing behavior, but failed to take prompt and appropriate

remedial action, thereby providing a basis for holding Big Lots liable for

Collingsworth’s behavior.79 Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be denied on

plaintiff’s sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims.

B. Retaliation 

79 Because Collingsworth was plaintiff’s co-worker, not her supervisor, Big Lots can be held

liable for Collingsworth’s actions if it either knew, or should have known, of the alleged harassment,

but failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799

(collecting cases); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (“Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer

liability under Title VII.”); Watson, 324 F.3d at 1259 (“When . . . the alleged harassment is

committed byco-workers or customers, a Title VII plaintiff must show that the employer either knew

(actual notice) or should have known (constructive notice) of the harassment and failed to take

immediate and appropriate corrective action.”). “Constructive notice . . . is established when the

harassment was so severe and pervasive that management reasonably should have known of it.” 

Watson, 324 F.3d at 1259 (citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.

2002)). “[A]n employer need not act instantaneously, but must act in a reasonably prompt manner

to respond to the employee’s complaint.” Frederick v. Sprint/United Management Co., 246 F.3d

1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th

Cir. 2000)) (alteration supplied). Similarly, an employer’s remedial measure is adequate if it is

“reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring.” Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of

Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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“Retaliation is a separate violation of Title VII.” Gupta v. Florida Board of

Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff generally must prove three

elements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation: (1) she engaged in statutorily

protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there

was a causal linkage between the protected conduct and the adverse employment

action. See, e.g., Shannon v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715

(11th Cir. 2002).

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of retaliation] by proving

only that the protected activity and the negative employment action are

not completely unrelated, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer

a legitimate reason for the adverse action . . . . The burden then shifts

back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

“legitimate” reason is merely pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct.

Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corporation, 216 F.3d 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted) (alteration supplied). 

Plaintiff arguesthat her failure to receive the Store Manager position after Gary

Pagan retired in March of 2014 was an act of unlawful retaliation. Her entire

argument on that claim consists of the following:

Once the Plaintiff learned that [Pagan] wasretiring, she advised Thomas

that she was interested in [Pagan’s] position. Thomas immediately told

her that the position had been given to someone else. . . . Plaintiff was

not afforded the right to apply for the position inasmuch as the position

was improperly awarded to another individual even though the Plaintiff

was more qualified and experienced having worked in thatstore location

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 27 of 31
alongside Collingsworth for years.

80

Although the denial of a promotion would be considered an adverse

employment action, plaintiff failed to identify the protected activity that precipitated

the retaliatory denial. Perhaps it was her EEOC charge, which was filed on August

29, 2012. Perhaps it was the filing of this lawsuit on May 28, 2013.81 Regardless of

which event plaintiff alleges as the trigger for the claimed retaliation, she cannot

establish a causal connection between that event and her failure to receive the Store

Manager position. As an initial matter, she did not even express interest in the

position until after it had been filled. Further, the Store Manager position was

awarded to Joey Bell in early March of 2014. That was more than eight months after

plaintiff’s most recent protected activity. When a plaintiff attempts to satisfy the

causal connection element through the use of temporal proximity evidence alone, the

temporal gap between the protected activity and the adverse action must be very

close. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“But

80 Dc. no. 28 (plaintiff’s brief), at 27-28 (alterations supplied). Plaintiff actually states in her

brief that it was Collingsworth’s position for which she stated an interest. See id. at 27 (“Once the

Plaintiff learned that Collingsworth was retiring, she advised Thomas that she was interested in

Collingsworth’s position.”) (emphasis supplied). In an effort to construe all of plaintiff’s pleadings

in a light most favorable to her, the court concludes this must have been a typographical error —

albeit a quite serious one — by plaintiff’s attorney. The record clearly reflects that plaintiff did

receive Collingsworth’s position as Assistant Manager over Operations after his retirement. Wilson

Deposition, at 21, 113. Moreover, plaintiff testified during her deposition that it was Pagan’s job

as Store Manager about which she inquired to Thomas during the Spring of 2014. Id. at 63. 

81

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 

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mere temporal proximity, without more, must be ‘very close.’”) (quoting Clark

County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). “A three to four

month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse

employment action is not [close] enough.” Id. (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273)

(alteration supplied). Finally, there is no other evidence suggesting a causal

connection between any protected activity and the alleged retaliatory denial of a

promotion. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. 

Even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case, defendant has articulated

a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for awarding the Store Manager position to Joey

Bell — i.e., that Bell was the best candidate because he previously had served as the

Store Manager at a different Big Lots store, and he had approximately twenty years

of experience in retail management. Thus, plaintiff can survive summary judgment

on her retaliation claim only if she comes “forward with evidence, including the

previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit

a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not

the realreasonsfor the adverse employment decision.” Combs v. PlantationPatterns,

106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). Plaintiff’s burden at this step of the analysis is that of

“cast[ing]sufficient doubt on the defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasonsto

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 32 Filed 12/19/14 Page 29 of 31
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate

reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct . . . .’” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538

(quoting Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir.

1994)) (alteration supplied); see also Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. Plaintiff

shoulders that burden by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasonsfor its action that a reasonable factfinder could find themunworthy

of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours

&Company, 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, a plaintiff must produce “sufficient evidence to demonstrate the

existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered

reasons for its challenged action.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529 (emphasis supplied). 

Plaintiff has offered no reason why defendant’s proffered legitimate reason

should be discredited. She states that she was “more qualified and experienced,” but

the record does not support that assertion. Even though plaintiff had worked at the

Florence store for many years, and Bell had not, she had only served as an Assistant

Manager, not a Store Manager. Bell, on the other hand, had served as the Store

Manager at a different Big Lots store. It was reasonable for Big Lots to value Bell’s

previous experience as a Store Manager over plaintiff’sfamiliarity with the Florence

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store. Plaintiff also has not offered any evidence to indicate pretext based on the fact

that she was not permitted to apply for the Store Manager position. There is no

evidence in the record concerning how the position was advertised and how Pagan’s

replacement was selected. Absent any such information, the court is not persuaded

that the selection process was pretextual.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s claim for

retaliation (Count Three of her Amended Complaint) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Her claimfor sexual harassment/hostile work environment (encompassed within both

Counts One and Two) will remain pending. A pretrial conference and trial on the

remaining claim will be set by separate order. 

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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