Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00697/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00697-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cory Allen Hughes, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jospeh M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-697-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

On April 2, 2012, Plaintiff Cory Allen Hughes, who was then confined in the

Maricopa County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On April 17,

2012, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating that he was no longer in

custody. In an April 27, 2012 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and,

because Plaintiff was no longer in custody, gave him 30 days to either pay the full filing fee

or show good cause why he could not pay. 

On May 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion (Doc. 7), seeking an extension of time to

pay the filing fee because he is indigent and seriously mentally ill. He states that he needs

an extension so doctors can stabilize him and, once that happens, he can work and then pay

the filing fee.

On June 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address, indicating that he is

again confined in the Mariciopa County Fourth Avenue Jail.

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I. May 29, 2012 Motion

The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s May 29, 2012 Motion. Because Plaintiff is

again confined, he can avail himself of the partial payment provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). The statutory filing fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the

previous month’s income each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

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allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

III. Complaint

In his one-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Maricopa County

Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Maricopa County Jail

Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff, Dr. Friedman, and Correctional Health Services.

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment regarding to his medical care. He contends that an orthopedic surgeon

ordered Plaintiff to be returned quickly for a surgery on his broken clavicle, but “[j]ail

officials went against” the surgeon’s orders and waited seven weeks before returning Plaintiff

for the surgery. Plaintiff asserts that not only did he have to suffer with a broken bone for

seven weeks, he also suffered excessive trauma because, during the surgery, the surgeon had

to “scoop away” bone growth. Plaintiff also alleges that he was given ibuprofen, rather than

the pain reliever prescribed by the surgeon, and that ibuprofen is toxic to his liver because

he has Hepatitis-C.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Friedman was indifferent to his medical needs because

he did not enforce the surgeon’s order for a quick return for a surgery, permitted Plaintiff to

walk around for seven weeks with a bone that needed to be set, and refused to order the

medications prescribed by the surgeon. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Friedman works for

Defendant Correctional Health Services and that Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office are named as Defendants because of “any delays in transportation they

caused.”

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

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IV. Failure to State a Claim

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Improper Defendants

Defendant Correctional Health Services is an improper Defendant. Municipalities and

other local governing bodies are included among those “persons” who may be sued under

§ 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91

(1978). Because Correctional Health Services is an administrative subdivision of Maricopa

County and not a municipal corporation, a local governing body or a private corporation, it

is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Maricopa County is responsible for

providing medical care to county jail inmates. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-291(A). Any actions

concerning a county policy must be brought against the county itself and not against an

administrative subdivision of the county. Thus, Defendant Correctional Health Services is

an improper defendant and will be dismissed from this action.

Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant. In Arizona,

the responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply

an administrative creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties

and not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Moreover, it is the county, not the

county sheriff, that is responsible for providing medical care to county jail inmates. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-291(A). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Defendant Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office.

B. Defendant Maricopa County Jail Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

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injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). Conclusory allegations that a group of Defendants have violated a constitutional

right are not acceptable and will be dismissed.

To the extent Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “jail officials” could be construed as a

reference to Defendant Maricopa County Jail Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff, Plaintiff’s

allegations are nothing more than vague and conclusory allegations against a group of

unnamed individuals. This is insufficient. Therefore, the Court will dismiss without

prejudice the Defendant Maricopa County Jail Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff.

C. Defendant Arpaio

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally

denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to

the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

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Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference

must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegation that Defendant Arpaio may have caused

“delays in transportation” is insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim against him.

Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Arpiao.

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against Defendant Friedman. The Court will require Defendant Friedman

to answer the Complaint.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

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relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s May 29, 2012 Motion (Doc. 7) is denied as moot.

(2) Defendants Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Maricopa County Jail

Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff, and Correctional Health Services are dismissed without

prejudice.

(3) Defendant Friedman must answer the Complaint.

(4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendant Friedman.

(5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the filing

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of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action

may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of this

action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver

of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by Defendant

within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(9) If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint, he

must return the signed waiver form to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(10) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

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(11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant to

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 21st day of June, 2012.

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