Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02593/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02593-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Fernando Garcia, 

Petitioner, 

v.

Warden Fizer, et al.,

Respondents.

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No. CV-05-2593-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Luis Fernando Garcia’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus and United States Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss’ Report and

Recommendation (R&R). Dkt. ##1, 14. The R&R recommends that the Court deny the

petition. Dkt. #14 at 9. Petitioner has filed an objection to the R&R. Dkt. #19. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition.

I. Background.

Petitioner was convicted of three counts of armed robbery, three counts of kidnaping,

and one count of unlawful flight from law enforcement. Dkt. #14 at 1. The court sentenced

Petitioner to concurrent 18-year sentences for the armed robbery and kidnaping offenses, and

a consecutive 11⁄2-year sentence for the unlawful flight offense. Id. Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence became final on June 19, 2004. See id. at 2. Petitioner is currently confined

at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson. Dkt. #19 at 1.

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Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. #1. Petitioner asserts four claims for relief: (1) that he

was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, (2) that his

conviction was obtained using evidence gathered pursuant to an unlawful arrest in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, (3) that he did not have legal representation at his restitution

hearing on June 26, 2003, and as a result he was ordered to pay $6,523.00 in restitution, and

(4) that his lawyer failed to show him the evidence that the State intended to use against him.

Dkt. #14. Respondents have filed an answer to the petition arguing that Petitioner’s grounds

for relief are exhausted and procedurally defaulted. Dkt. #13.

II. Standard of Review.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court may

not grant habeas relief unless Petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1); see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996). To exhaust claims properly

in state court, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s highest court in an

appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a

petitioner may exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting his claims to the Arizona Court

of Appeals through the direct appeal process or through appropriate post-conviction relief.

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d. 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). To fairly present the claims, the

petitioner must describe the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim

is based. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bland v. Cal.

Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

Procedural default occurs when a state court finds a claim barred on procedural

grounds that are independent of the merits of the federal claim and that provide an adequate

basis for the court’s decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). A ruling by a state

court that a claim is defaulted under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) based on

failure to raise it on direct appeal is both an independent and adequate reason that a petitioner

has no remedy available in state court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). Thus,

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although the claim is technically exhausted because petitioner has no state court remedy, it

may be procedurally defaulted. If a state court finds that a petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is precluded unless the petitioner can show that

a miscarriage of justice would result if he is not allowed to bring his habeas petition or that

cause and actual prejudice should excuse the default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

753 (1991). In all cases, state court rulings deserve great deference. Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has said that § 2254(d)(1) imposes a

‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333

n.7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

III. Discussion.

A. Petitioner’s Objection to the R&R.

The R&R recommends that all claims be dismissed with prejudice because they were

not properly exhausted and are now procedurally defaulted. Dkt. #14. It asserts that

Petitioner has failed to show cause to excuse his procedural default, actual prejudice, or that

a miscarriage of justice would result from upholding the procedural bar. Id. 

Petitioner’s objection simply reiterates the claims raised in his petition. He restates

that his “lawyer provided ineffective assistance” and that “the trial court erred by refusing

to appoint a different attorney to represent Petitioner at the trial.” Dkt. #19 at 1. Petitioner

also restates “that the evidence used by the state to convict him was obtained pursuant to an

unlawful arrest in violation of the U.S. Const. Amend. 4th.” Id. at 11. Petitioner does not

address the R&R’s conclusions that all claims are procedurally defaulted. See id.

The Court deems Petitioner’s objection ineffective. Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure states that a district judge “shall make a de novo determination . . . of any

portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection has been

made[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Because Petitioner has made no specific objection, the Court

is relieved of any obligation to review the R&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (Section 636(b)(1) “does not . . . require

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any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”); United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

Petitioner does argue that there was “[a]n obvious ‘fundamental miscarriage of

justice,’ when court denied his past trial request to terminate my self representation and

appoint counsel.” Dkt. #19 at 2. But the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception

applies only when a petitioner establishes, “in light of all the evidence, including new

evidence, [that] ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Petitioner has made no such

showing. 

Because Petitioner has failed to provide specific objections to the R&R and has failed

to show that a miscarriage of justice would occur, the Court will accept the R&R and deny

the Petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b) (same).

B. Petitioner’s New Argument.

In his objection, Petitioner advances for the first time the argument that his sentence

was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Dkt. #19 at 10. The

Ninth Circuit has held “‘categorically that an unsuccessful party is not entitled as of right to

de novo review by the [district] judge of an argument never seasonably raised before the

magistrate.’” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Rather, the district judge has discretion, but is not required, to consider an argument raised

for the first time in an objection to the magistrate’s R&R. Id. at 621-22. The Court could

decline to consider Petitioner’s new argument because he had a previous opportunity to raise

it, but failed to do so. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s new argument fails on its merits because

Blakely was decided after Petitioner’s conviction became final, and “Blakely does not apply

retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its publication.” Schardt v. Payne, 414

F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005); see Dkt. #13 Exs. PP & QQ; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a).

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Voss’ R&R (Dkt. #14) is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2006.

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