Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08126/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner filed his Petition (docket # 1) pro se. Petitioner filed his reply and subsequent

pleadings with the assistance of counsel. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eugene J. Cofsky, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-8126-PHX-FJM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents have filed an

Answer (docket # 10) to which Petitioner has replied.1

 (docket # 14) The Court

subsequently ordered supplemental briefing, which the parties recently filed. (dockets # 19,

20) Additionally, the State has submitted the entire transcript of Petitioner’s state trial. 

(docket # 16) 

I. Procedural History

A. Factual Background, Charges, Trial and Sentence

The following events gave rise to Petitioner’s challenged conviction and sentence. In

May 2000, David Goldberg and Dennis Schilinski were prisoners in the Mohave County

Jail. (Petitioner’s Exh. C) Robert Olsen, an inmate in the adjoining cell, befriended

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 2 Citations to “Tr. ___” are to the transcripts from Petitioner’s trial which are attached to

Respondents’ Supplemental Exhibits to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket

# 16). 

 3 The courthouse was across the street from the jail, and inmates walked to and from the

courthouse for court appearances escorted by a correctional officer. (Tr. 1/10/01 at 199–204).

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Goldberg. (Tr. 1/10/01 at 86–87, 89–912) Goldberg was a co-defendant with Petitioner,

Eugene Cofsky and his wife Sheri Cofsky in another case. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 139; Tr. 1/18/01,

at 86; Tr. 1/19/01, at 67–68) The Cofskys, however, were out on bond. Olsen repeatedly

overheard Goldberg discussing a plan to break out of jail. (Tr. 1/10/01 at 91, 107) The plan

involved intercepting Goldberg while he was being returned to jail following his court

appearance scheduled before Judge Steven F. Conn at 11:30 a.m. on June 12, 2000 at the 

Mojave County Superior Court in Kingman, Arizona.3

 

According to the plan, Goldberg would be picked up in a van with sliding doors so

that Goldberg, who would be chained, could “hop in.” (Tr. 1/10/01 at 103–04, 113–14,

163–64) Once inside the van, Goldberg would “cut off his chains,”“change his clothes,” and

then drive to a Carl’s Jr. restaurant, where another car was “waiting,” and “switch”vehicles.

(Id.) Goldberg would drive to Lake Havasu, “hide there for a week to two weeks” at a

public campground, then travel to Mexico and ultimately Australia. (Id.) 

The plan included a contingency that, if the guard escorting Goldberg attempted to

thwart the escape, Dennis Schilinski would “kill the guard” by “shoot[ing]” him. (Id. at

93–94, 97, 130) In exchange, Schilinski would receive “a large sum of money.” (Id. at 130) 

Goldberg also told Olsen that several others were involved in the plan, including “Gene

[Cofsky], Ron [Manning], [and] Gene’s wife [Sheri Cofsky].” (Id. at 99) Goldberg told

Olsen that “Gene” or “Eugene” Cofsky was his “business partner and friend.” (Id. at 99-

100) Goldberg discussed his plan with Olsen on a “daily basis,” between “30 and 60 times.”

(Id. at 94, 98–99, 107) 

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Olsen initially thought that Goldberg was “bragging,” but as “days went on” Olsen

realized that the plan was “very serious.” (Tr. 1/10/01 at 94, 98) Concerned that the

conspirators were “going to kill a guard” during the escape attempt, Olsen wrote a letter to

his drug-therapy counselor describing Goldberg’s plan. (Id. at 104–09, 120–24, 164) About

a week before the planned escape attempt, Schilinski was transported to the Clark County

Detention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he had outstanding traffic warrants. (Tr.

1/10/01 at 102; Tr. 1/11/01 at 7–12) Goldberg told Olsen that “Gene” Cofsky had paid

Schilinski’s fines and taken him to Cofsky’s ranch, where he would stay until the jailbreak.

(Respondents’ Exh. FF at 103) Goldberg explained that they “didn’t want to lose track of

[Schilinski] because he was a key figure in this.” (Id.)

Meanwhile, after Schilinski was transported to the Clark County Detention Center in

Las Vegas, but before Cofsky had paid his fines to get him released, Schilinski told fellow

inmate Daniel England about the planned escape attempt. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 7–13) Specifically,

Schilinski told England that he had to “go break somebody out of jail” on “Monday at 11:30

on the 12th of June,” just five days away, and to “watch the six o’clock news” that day. (Id.

at 11, 13–15) Schilinski also told England that the person’s name was “Dave” Goldberg.

(Id.) Schilinski explained that a van with “two” people in it was going to pull over and

“grab” Goldberg as he was being transported “from the court back to the jail” in Kingman,

Arizona. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 16–19, 31, 33, 54–55, 69, 81–82, 91, 94) Schilinski was going to

tell the guard, “don’t be a cowboy,” and if he did anything or “made a move,” he was going

to “shoot him.” (Id. 17, 54) Then they planned to “switch cars,” and eventually travel to

Australia. (Id. at 17-19) A person named “Eugene” (Cofsky) was responsible for the

“placement of the vehicles.” (Id.) Schilinski told England that Goldberg was going to pay

him $150,000 for his participation. (Id. at 18) England alerted Las Vegas Police about the

planned escape attempt. (Id. at 21–26)

On June 8, 2000, the Las Vegas Police Department contacted the Mohave County

Detention Center and advised officials of the planned jailbreak, including the names of

several of the known conspirators— (1) “Dave” (Goldberg); (2) “Schilinski”; (3) “Eugene,”

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with a last name that “ended in a “ski-sounding word” (Eugene Cofsky); and (4) “Cheryl”

(Sheri Cofsky). (Tr. 1/11/01 at 90–93, 98, 134–41) Mohave County jail officials verified

Goldberg’s status as an inmate at the jail and that he had a court appearance scheduled for

June 12, 2000 at 11:30 a.m. at the Mohave County Courthouse. (Id.) They also verified

Schilinski’s status as a former inmate and his relationship with Goldberg. (Tr. 1/11/01 at

140-44) Officials discovered that Eugene and Sheri Cofsky were identified as codefendants

in Goldberg’s case. (Id.) After obtaining the foregoing information, Mojave County Jail

officials contacted the Mohave County Sheriff’s Department. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 134-41)

That weekend, the Mohave County Sheriff’s Deparment, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and the Arizona Department of Public Safety, set up surveillance at the

Cofsky residence, approximately 13 miles outside of Kingman, and throughout Kingman’s

city limits, particularly the Mohave County Courthouse and the Mohave County Detention

Center. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 173–79; Tr. 1/12/01, at 6–7, 16, 125–30, 138–40; Tr. 1/17/01, at

17–24, 117–19, 234–37; Tr. 1/18/01 at 13–17, 49–59) At approximately 6:00 p.m. on June

11, 2000, officers saw co-defendants Tracy Date and Tawanee Barrett arrive together at the

Cofsky residence in a black Mercury Mountaineer. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 130–35; Tr. 1/19/01 at

56–58; Tr. 1/23/01, at 4–7) Officers also noticed a silver-blue Dodge Caravan minivan

parked at the Cofsky residence. (Tr. 1/19/01 at 58)

 At approximately 9:00 a.m. the next morning, Eugene and Sheri Cofsky arrived at

the Cofsky residence in a red pickup truck. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 180; Tr. 1/12/01 at 149; Tr.

1/23/01 at 21) At around 10:00 a.m., officers observed Date, Barrett, and co-defendant

Ronald Manning leave the Cofsky residence in the Mountaineer and drive to a Wal-Mart

store in Kingman. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 143–49,167–70; Tr. 1/17/01 at 245–48; Tr. 1/18/01 at

19–23; Tr. 1/23/01 at 22–25) Date, Barrett, and Manning purchased .38 caliber ammunition

at Wal-Mart. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 167-70; Tr. 1/23/01 at 22-25) They then drove to Auto Zone

and bought a pair of 18-inch bolt cutters. (Id.) They then returned to the Cofsky residence.

(Id.)

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 4 The white Trans Am had been reported stolen earlier that morning in Laughlin, Nevada.

(Tr. 1/17/01 at 72-73). 

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At approximately 11:00 a.m., law enforcement officers observed all three

vehicles—the pickup truck, the minivan, and the Mountaineer—leave the Cofsky residence

and drive to Kingman. (Tr.1/11/01 at 185–90, 194; Tr. 1/12/01 at 150–53, 177) Date and

Barrett were driving the Mountaineer, Manning was driving the minivan, and the Cofskys

were driving the pickup truck. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 29–30, 45–46) Officers followed the vehicles

into Kingman, and watched them drive to an old warehouse parking lot. (Tr. 1/12/01 at

154–55; Tr. 1/23/01 at 30) At the warehouse parking lot, Date and Manning removed the

minivan’s back seat and left it behind the building. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 195; Tr. 1/23/01 at 30)

Date, Barrett, and Manning then drove to a parking lot at Arnold Plaza where Barrett backed

the Mountaineer into a parking space and parked. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 161-63; Tr. 1/23/01 at 30-

31) Barrett remained in the Mountaineer. Date and Manning left in the minivan and headed

towards the courthouse. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 118-19, 125-26; Tr. 1/18/01at 59-64; Tr. 1/23/01 at

30-31) Meanwhile, the Cofskys drove to the courthouse and parked on the street in front of

the courthouse. (Respondents’ Tr. 1/12/01 at 30) Around this same time, officers observed

Schilinski arrive in a white Pontiac Trans Am4

 and park in a parking lot located between the

courthouse and the jail. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 25-31, 238-41; Tr. 1/18/01 at 61-62) Schilinski

exited the vehicle, and began “looking all about, up and down the street in all different

directions” in a “paranoid fashion.” (Id.) Schilinski then walked around the courthouse, 

got back into the Trans Am, and drove away. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 240) Schilinski returned

“[s]everal minutes later,” parked in the same parking lot, and went inside the jail’s

administration office. (Id. at 240-41) Schilinski then returned to his vehicle and left. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, officers saw Schilinski return to the courthouse, still “very, very nervous,

looking around,” and “scanning the area.” (Tr. 1/17/01 at 120-24) Schilinski entered the

courthouse, “rushed through” the security checkpoint, and proceeded to the elevators. (Tr.

1/12/01 at 18-25) An undercover officer followed Schilinski and got on the elevator with

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him. (Id. at 19) Schilinski “blurted out . . . they don’t like it when you’re late,” and stated

that he was expected in court. (Id.) The officer asked Schilinski which courtroom he was

looking for, and Schilinski told him, “Judge Conn’s courtroom.” (Id. at 19-21) Schilinski

then asked the officer if he was a “cop.” (Tr. 1/12/01 at 20) The officer identified himself

as a police officer and asked Schilinski his name. (Id.) Schilinski replied, “Dave Hausen.”

(Id.) Once at Judge Conn’s courtroom, Schilinski approached the doors, “leafed through the

court calendar,” and then left. (Id. at 21-22) The undercover officer looked at the court

calendar, and noticed that Goldberg was scheduled to appear before Judge Conn at 11:30

a.m. (Id. at 22-23) Schilinski’s name was not on the calendar. (Id. at 22) After Schilinski

left the courthouse, the undercover officer observed the Cofskys enter the courthouse and

proceed to Judge Conn’s courtroom. (Id. at 25-29, 74-75) Several minutes later, Eugene

Cofsky left the courtroom, made a brief phone call on a nearby pay phone, and then

reentered the courtroom. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 27-29) Both Eugene and Sheri Cofsky then left the

courtroom, and walked out of the courthouse, where they were immediately arrested. (Id.) 

Police discovered $10,700 in Eugene Cofsky’s pants pocket. (Id. at 31) Police also found a

day planner in Sheri Cofsky’s purse that contained Schilinski’s name, social security

number, and date of birth; Manning’s name and phone number; and the name, “Tracy”

(Date), with a corresponding telephone number. (Id. at 31–35) Officers searched the

Cofskys’ pickup truck parked outside the courthouse, and found a set of California license

plates, which were not registered to the Cofskys. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 181–83, 190) Police

subsequently found Schilinski and arrested him. (Tr. 1/18/01 at 68–69) Meanwhile,

officers outside the courthouse observed the silver-blue minivan drive “right in front” of the

courthouse. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 160-61, 193-94; Tr. 1/17/01 at 125-29; Tr. 1/18/01 at 62-65) 

Believing the conspirators “were going to be carrying out their plan,” officers stopped the

minivan, and ordered Date and Manning to exit the vehicle. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 160-61, 167; Tr.

1/17/01at 125-32, 242-43; Tr. 1/18/01 at 62-69) Manning was in the driver’s seat, and Date

was crouched in the “back cargo area” of the van. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 129-32, 244; Tr. 1/18/01 at

66) Date was wearing “reflective sunglasses,” had seven .38 caliber rounds of ammunition

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 Goldberg weighed approximately 260 pounds and had a beard. (Tr. 1/18/01 at 73)

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in his pocket, and was holding six more rounds in his hand. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 41-42, 131;Tr.

1/18/01 at 66) Officers discovered two handguns in the van, one loaded with two .38 caliber

rounds of ammunition, and a pair of worn surgical gloves. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 132-35, 172-81;

Tr. 1/18/01 at 67) Police arrested Date and Manning and took them into custody. (Tr.

1/17/01 at 133, 244; Tr. 1/18/01 at 11) Officers then detained the Mountaineer, which was

still parked at Arnold Plaza, and arrested Barrett. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 161-67; Tr. 1/12/01 at 157) 

Inside the Mountaineer, officers discovered: (1) two pairs of bolt cutters; (2) five .38 caliber

rounds of ammunition; (3) a pair of plastic gloves similar to the pair found in the minivan;

(4) a bag containing “extra large” men’s clothing and a can of shaving cream;5

 (5) cell

phones; (6) two license plates; and (7) a court document bearing Eugene Cofsky’s name. 

(Tr. 1/17/01 at 143-162, 223; Tr. 1/18/01 at 70-73, 87) The Nevada license plate on the back

of the Mountaineer was covered with a California license plate that was not registered to any

of the conspirators. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 142,144-45, 188-191) Officers also searched the Cofsky

residence and found: (1) $117,500 in cash; (2) a document bearing Eugene Cofsky’s name

which included the notation,“left Fourth, end, park van, white Grand Am”; (3) .38 caliber

shell casings; and (4) a receipt from Wal-Mart for .38 caliber ammunition purchased on June

12, 2000 at 10:20 a.m. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 196–98; Tr. 1/12/01 at 37–41, 161–70) A telephone

calling card taken from Schilinski after his arrest indicated that he called the Cofsky

residence at 8:28 a.m. on June 12, 2000. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 166)

Following his arrest, Manning waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be

interviewed by police. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 33–38) Initially, Manning denied knowledge of a plan

to break Goldberg out of jail, but eventually admitted that he had “heard discussion about a

plan to break Goldberg out of jail,” involving a person named “Dennis” (Schilinski). (Id.) 

Manning admitted removing the minivan’s back seat, but claimed that he did so because he

was picking up “building supplies.” (Id.)

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 6 The Court has spelled the conspirators names in the same manner as they appear in the

Indictment. (Respondents’ Exh. A) In the transcripts, however, Dennis Schilinski’s last name

is spelled “Schilinsky” and Sheri Cofsky’s first name is spelled “Cheri.” 

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Date also waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police. (Tr. 1/17/01 at

40–47; Tr. 1/18/01 at 30–33) Date told police that he had driven to Kingman with his

girlfriend, Barrett, from Utah that weekend to meet Manning, whom he had known for a

“couple of years.” (Tr. 1/17/01 at 40-47; Tr. 1/18/01 at 30-33) Date admitted that: (1) he

had been at the Cofskys’ residence earlier that morning; (2) he helped Manning remove the

minivan’s backseat; (3) the ammunition found in his pocket was the same as the ammunition

loaded in the handgun that was found in the minivan; and (4) he “handled” at least one of

the two handguns found in the minivan. (Tr. 1/18/01 at 30-33) When asked why he and

Manning removed the seat from the van, Date became “upset and agitated” and “no longer

wanted to speak after that.” (Id.) 

Based on the foregoing, on June 22, 2000, the State of Arizona filed an indictment in

Mojave County Superior Court, charging Petitioner and each of his five co-defendants

(Dennis Schilinski, Sheri Cofsky, Ronald Manning, Tracy Date, and Tawanee Barrett6

) with

one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a class 1 felony (Count 1), and one

count of conspiracy to commit first degree escape, a class 4 felony (Count 2). 

Codefendants Eugene Cofsky, Sheri Cofsky, Date, and Manning were tried together

before the Honorable Steven F. Conn. (Respondents’ Exh. BB) 

Date was the only co-defendant who testified at Petitioner’s trial. Date testified that

he and Barrett had traveled to the Cofsky residence to do construction work with Manning. 

(Tr. 1/17/01 at 3-7, 47) Date stated that he was going to help with a septic system and

mentioned that the Cofskys were digging a pool. (Tr. 1/23/02 at 48) Date testified that

around 3:00 a.m. on June 12, 2000, he and Barrett drove to Wal-Mart to steal tools by hiding

them in suitcases. (Tr. 1/23/01at 13-17) He testified that he placed the suitcases containing

the tools by an emergency exit but he abandoned them when Barrett said she did not want to

be involved. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 16-18) He further testified that he covered the Nevada license

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plate on his Mountaineer with a California plate. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 16-18, 36) Date and

Barrett returned to the Cofskys’ ranch around 7:00 a.m. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 18-23) At around

10:00 or 11:00 a.m., Date, Manning and Barrett returned to Wal-Mart to retrieve the tools. 

(Tr. 1/23/01 at 22) Date testified that they split up at Wal-Mart and that Manning purchased

ammunition. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 23, 35) Date testified that he did not retrieve the previously

abandoned tools. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 23) Date testified that they proceeded to Auto Zone and

purchased bolt cutters needed to make a fence and to “wire all the rebar” for the Cofskys’

pool that was being installed. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 24-25, 35) Thereafter, they returned to the

Cofskys’ residence. (Id. at 23-25) 

Date testified that he subsequently realized he was not going to get paid for his work,

so he stole two revolvers from the Cofsky residence and hid them in the van. (Tr. 1/23/01 at

10, 19-21, 26-28) Date acknowledged his post-arrest statement to police that he had helped

remove the van’s rear seat but explained that he and Manning needed space to pick up

construction materials. (Tr. 1/23/01 at 25-28) He also explained that he was in the area of

the courthouse on June 12, 2000 because he and Manning were on their way to a nearby

elementary school to steal bicycles to “fence.” (Id. at 11, 27-28, 30-32) He also testified

that the bolt cutters would be used to steal the bikes. (Id.)

On January 26, 2001, a jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit first

degree murder (Count 1) and conspiracy to commit first degree escape (Count 2).

(Respondents’ Exh. LL) On February 16, 2001, the trial court sentenced Petitioner on

Count 1, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, to life imprisonment without possibility

of release until having served 25 calendar years plus an additional two years for commission

of the offense while on release from another felony charge. (Respondents’ Exh. D) The

court imposed a 3-year term of imprisonment on Count 2, conspiracy to commit escape. (Id.

at 18)

B. Direct Appeal

On March 1, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely appeal raising the following claims:

A. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion 

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 7 A.R.S. § 13–1003(C) (2001), states: “A person who conspires to commit a number of

offenses is guilty of only one conspiracy if the multiple offenses are the object of the same

agreement or relationship and the degree of the conspiracy shall be determined by the most

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by refusing to grant [Petitioner’s] Rule 20 motion.

1. The State did not present sufficient evidence to convict

[Petitioner] - or anyone else - of conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. 

2. The State did not present sufficient evidence to convict

[Petitioner] of participation in any escape plot.

B. The trial court erred and violated [Petitioner’s] rights under the Fifth

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . . by allowing Daniel England to 

repeat what conspirator Dennis Schilinski told him.

C. The trial court erred and violated [Petitioner’s] due process rights 

under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by not recusing 

itself sua sponte.

1. The court erred and injected itself into the case when it knew

but refused to tell counsel why a large number of law enforcement

personnel was present before a four-day recess.

2. The court erred by not recusing itself when it appeared that the

judge was a de facto witness.

D. The trial court knowingly erred as a matter of law when it refused to 

give a proper jury instruction on a single conspiracy to commit multiple

events and when it imposed two sentences for one conspiracy that included

both counts. 

E. The trial court erred as a matter of law and violated [Petitioner’s] 

Constitutional rights by forcing the defense to use its limited peremptory 

challenges to strike a juror who should have been excused for cause. 

F. The lack of a contemporaneous record, a sentencing transcript, deprived

[Petitioner] of his Due Process Rights and his constitutional right to appeal

from the enhanced, aggravated sentences imposed. 

(docket # 1-3 at 1-5) 

On October 29, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and vacated his conviction and

sentence for conspiracy to commit escape. (docket # 1-2 at 1-21) The appellate court found

that the indictment was multiplicatus because it charged a single conspiracy in two counts,

in violation of Arizona Revised Statute § 13–1003(C).7

 (Id. at 17–18) The court vacated

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Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit escape because the trial court

had not given a jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to decide whether the

evidence demonstrated one conspiracy with multiple offenses or two separate conspiracies. 

(docket # 1-2 at 17) The appellate court found that there was only one conspiracy and “that

the most serious offense conspired to was first-degree murder.” (Id. at 16-17) In vacating

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit escape, the less serious of the

two convictions, the appellate court noted that “[t]his action eliminates any prejudice that

the defendant may have . . . suffered by being convicted more than once for a single

conspiracy.” (Id. at 17-18) To determine the propriety of the two years added to Petitioner’s

sentence of life imprisonment, the appellate court remanded the case for a jury

determination of whether Petitioner committed the offense while on felony release. (docket

# 1-2 at 20-21) On remand, the trial court granted the State’s motion to withdraw the

allegation that Petitioner committed the offense while on felony release. (Respondents’

Exh. F at 23-25) 

On January 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court. (docket # 1-4 at 28-40) On June 30, 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review without comment. (docket # 1-2 at 22)

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On July 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’

Exh. G) The court appointed counsel and, in the subsequently filed petition for

post-conviction relief, Petitioner raised the following claims:

1. There is insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s intent to conspire to 

commit first degree murder. (docket # 1-5 at 11)

a. Petitioner’s conviction violates Evanchyk v. State, 47 P.3d

1114 (Ariz. 2002) because there is “no proof” that “Petitioner 

intended to kill nor that he ever entered into an agreement with a coconspirator to commit the crime of murder.” (docket # 1-5 at 13, 14) 

2. “In the alternative, Petitioner is entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(a)

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where he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 

assistance of counsel on his appeal by failure to cite Evanchyk.”

(docket # 1-5 at 15)

On May 6, 2005, the trial court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief, finding that Petitioner “failed to present any claim raising a material issue of fact or

law which would entitle him to relief under Rule 32,” and that Petitioner had “presented no

colorable claim for relief justifying the setting of an evidentiary hearing.” (docket # 1-2 at

25)

On May 23, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the State and

the trial court had “miss[ed] the point of the Petition completely,” because “[t]here was no

proof of any intent (conditional or otherwise) by Petitioner to conspire to commit murder.” 

(docket # 1-5 at 18-19) Petitioner also re-urged his claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, arguing that “appellate counsel made the wrong argument” by arguing

only “that conditional intent was not sufficient,” rather than asserting that “there was no

proof at all of Petitioner’s intent [to conspire to commit first degree murder], conditional or

otherwise.” (docket # 1-5 at 18-20) On June 17, 2005, the trial court denied Petitioner’s

motion for rehearing on the grounds that the Arizona Court of Appeals had “addressed and

decided against” Petitioner his claim “that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to

conspire to commit murder.” (docket # 1-2 at 26) 

On July 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review from the trial court’s denial

of post-conviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (docket # 1-5 at 22-46) Petitioner

presented the following claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s intent to

conspire to commit first-degree murder; and (2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of

counsel because appellate counsel failed to cite Evanchyk. (Id. at 35, 41) The appellate

court summarily denied review on July 10, 2006. (docket # 1-2 at 28) Petitioner sought

review in the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied on December 12, 2006. (docket #

1-5 at 47-69; docket 1-2 at 29)

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 8 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely under the ADEPA. (docket # 10 at 10-12)

 9 Petitioner’s supporting memorandum is buried amongst the exhibits attached to his Petition

(docket # 1-2 at 30-70) 

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D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, Petitioner timely8

 filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

raising the following five claims: 

1. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated 

because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

conspiracy to commit first degree murder;

2. Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and

due process were violated because a jury instruction lowered the State’s

burden of proof;

3. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate

counsel was violated because appellate counsel did not cite Evanchyk v. State, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. 2002) in support of Petitioner’s claim that insufficient 

evidence supported his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder;

4. Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confront witnesses

was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement by an alleged

co-conspirator; and

5. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated by 

the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself.

(docket # 1) 

In Petitioner’s Supporting Memorandum,9

 Petitioner also asserts that the trial court

improperly gave a jury instruction based on a Pinkerton theory of liability which is not

recognized in Arizona. (docket # 1-2 at 15, 20) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.

640 (1946)). In his Reply, Petitioner expands his Pinkerton claim and argues that the

“flawed jury instruction diluted the State’s burden of proof, because it did not require the

jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner possessed the requisite intent to

commit murder.” (docket # 14 at 11) Because Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton jury

instruction was not articulated in his Petition, was only alluded to in his Supporting

Memorandum in relation to other substantive claims, and was not more fully developed

until his Reply, the Court gave parties the opportunity to address this claim in supplemental

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briefing which both parties submitted. (dockets # 18 - 20) Consistent with the parties’

supplemental briefing, the Court refers to Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton jury

instruction as Ground VI.

Respondents assert that Grounds 2, 5 and 6 are procedurally defaulted and barred

from federal review. (dockets # 10, # 19) Petitioner disputes these assertions. (dockets 

# 14, # 20) The Court will discuss the law regarding exhaustion, procedural bar, and the

standard of review and will then apply that law to Petitioner’s claims.

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When

seeking habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly exhausted

each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The

exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 

The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of

the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts

one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of

the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete

round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the

ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. State prisoners may skip a

procedure occasionally employed by a state’s courts to provide relief only if a state law or

rule precludes use of the procedure, or the “State has identified the procedure as outside the

standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for purposes of

exhaustion.” Id. at 848, 850. 

In this case, Respondents argue that because Petitioner, who received a sentence of

life imprisonment, did not present several of his federal claims to the Arizona Supreme

Court, those claims are unexhausted. (docket # 10 at 12-13 n. 8) As discussed below,

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Petitioner was not required to present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court to satisfy

the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b). 

A. Proper Forum

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s

“highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State

with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each

appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to

death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Relying on Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) and Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27 (2004), Respondents argue that to properly exhaust federal claims, a Petitioner

who received a life sentence is required to present those claims to the Arizona Supreme

Court. (docket # 10 at 12 n. 8) Swoopes does not support this assertion. Although less

than a life sentence had been imposed in Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit broadly stated that

“Arizona state prisoners need not appeal an Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of postconviction relief to the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust their state remedies for

federal habeas corpus purposes, except in capital cases or cases involving the imposition of

a life sentence.” 196 F.3d at 1008. In support of this conclusion, Swoopes included undated

citations to A.R.S. §§ 120.21(A)(1), 12-120.24, and 13-4031, and citations to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), and Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205

(1989). Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009-10. As the court noted in Crowell v. Knowles, 483

F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (D.Ariz. 2007), “none of those authorities — either at the time of

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Swoopes or now — support the proposition that Arizona Supreme Court review remains

part of the standard review process necessary for exhaustion in cases carrying life

sentences. Id. (emphasis in original). Rather, to the extent those authorities mentioned life

imprisonment, it was in reference to outdated versions of A.R.S. § 12-201.21(A)(1) and 13-

4031. In 1989, years before Swoopes was decided, A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) and § 13-

4031 were amended to omit the phrase, “or life imprisonment.” “The effect of this change

was to give the Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal convictions carrying

life sentences and eliminate the [Arizona] Supreme Court’s exclusive and mandatory

jurisdiction.” Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 928. 

The erroneous statement of the law included in dictum in Swoopes was repeated in

dictum in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 1994) and several district cases. 

See, Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 930 and n. 4 (compiling cases). These cases, however,

“present a tale of zombie precedent. A rule definitively extinguished by statutory

amendment in 1989 continues to prowl, repeatedly re-animated by mistaken citation and

dicta.” Id. at 931. 

Accordingly, in Crowell, the court found that “[s]ince 1989, the Arizona Supreme

Court has not had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases carrying life sentences, and

petitioners who have received a life sentence have not had a right to State Supreme Court

review.” Id. The court went on to hold that:

In sum, the language of Swoopes on life sentences was dictum unnecessary

for the correct disposition of that case. The subsequent repetition of that

dictum as dictum in other cases does not change its character. Nor do any of

the dicta undercut the clarity of the pronouncement by the Arizona Supreme 

Court, together with the 1989 enactments of the Arizona Legislature, that 

discretionary review in non-capital cases is ‘unavailable’ for purposes of 

federal habeas exhaustion. 

Id. at 933. The Crowell court found that petitioner, who had received a life sentence, had

exhausted his federal claims by presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. The

court further noted that the Swoopes decision supported its conclusion. Id. The court

explained that, “[a]pplying O’Sullivan, Swoopes held that ‘Arizona has declared that its

complete round [of appellate review] does not include discretionary review before the

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Arizona Supreme Court.’” 483 F.Supp.2d at 933 (quoting Swoopes, 940 F.3d 1308). The

Crowell court concluded that “there is no longer any basis for distinguishing among noncapital sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) in light of the 1989 amendments to A.R.S. §

12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4031.” Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 933. 

In accordance with Arizona law and the thorough discussion in Crowell, to properly

exhaust his federal claims, Petitioner was not required to present his claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court. Rather, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied by fair presentation to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) does not

require a different conclusion. Respondents argue that pursuant to Baldwin, non-capital

defendants must exhaust their claims in the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents’

argument hinges on the following language in Baldwin, “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ [to rule on his claims] the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim

in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of

discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.”

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Respondents latch onto a

single phrase, “including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review,” to

support their argument and ignore the basis for this statement. In O’Sullivan, the Supreme

Court explained that proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete

round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the

ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. (emphasis added). 

As previously stated, “Arizona has declared that its complete round [of appellate

review] does not include discretionary review before the Arizona Supreme Court.”

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 10 In support of their assertion that discretionary review by the Arizona Supreme Court is part

of the appeals process in Arizona, Respondents cite State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 117, 770 P.2d

1159, 1163 (1989). (docket # 10 at 12-13 n. 8) Ikirt was decided before the April 1989

amendments to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) and § 13-4031which omitted the phrase “or life

imprisonment” and effectively gave the Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal

convictions carrying life sentences. 

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Swoopes, 940 F.3d 1308.10 Thus, contrary to Respondents’ assertion, Baldwin does not

require a non-capital prisoner in Arizona, such as Petitioner, to present his claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court.

B. Fair Presentation 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present those claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Fair presentation

requires a petitioner to describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory to the

state courts. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to

support the federal claim were before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law

claim was raised. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance

of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas

petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional guarantee upon which he

bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a

federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000),

amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d

982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional

error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United

States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63

(1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be

decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make

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the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the

federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a

claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to

discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum,

(2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for

the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

C. Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501

U.S. at 729-30. Thus, a state prisoner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did

not preserve in state court by making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal,

or when seeking post-conviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights

during state trial constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court

of Appeals held that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct

appeal or in first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the

merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989);

Carringer v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found

ineffective assistance of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and

rejected the claims on the merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion

was an “alternative ruling” and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from

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federal review). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower

court’s application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a state prisoner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because

the state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of

the previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d

1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are

no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

D. Excusing Procedural Default

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Cook v.

Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 827-29 (9th Cir. 2008); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94,

(2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish “cause,” a petitioner

must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to

comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may

constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance

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of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings

does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral

proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby

v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v.

Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the

court need not reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if petitioner asserts a

claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default, federal habeas relief may not be

granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation occurring in the state

criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94.

III. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

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Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner “whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in

state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003). Thus, a state prisoner is

not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court’s adjudication of his claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application, of United States Supreme Court precedent. 

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine whether a state court

ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts

must look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the

state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-15 (2003); Yarborough v.

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it

cannot reverse a state court decision merely because it conflicts with Ninth Circuit

precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.

2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Ninth Circuit

precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cites United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court

precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

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even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, “contrary to,” or “unreasonable

application of” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the

“contrary to” test, the state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of

law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court]

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003)(citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application of” test, a state court decision involves an

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405;

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect application of federal law does

not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating

that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court’s decision is objectively

unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of

the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that the state court ruling was

“erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner must establish that the

state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433

(2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a habeas petitioner may also be entitled to relief if the state

court’s adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether the reviewing court

“could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). See also, Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999

(9th Cir. 2004) (stating that a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding

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process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was

not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”) Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges that state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence, . . . that the process employed by the state court is defective, . . . or that

no finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted). 

When reviewing the record under § 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to [its] state court colleagues . . . [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state

court’s findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to

whom the defect [in the state court’s fact-finding] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000). 

If petitioner does not challenge the state court’s factual findings, or if the federal

court has determined that the state’s determination of the facts was reasonable, the state

court’s factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A presumption of

correctness applies to factual determinations, as well as credibility determinations, made by

either the state trial or appellate court. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

2001) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981)). A habeas petitioner carries

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1087. Additionally, the habeas court is bound

by the state court’s interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, or involves an unreasonable determination of

the facts, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits

of petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7

(9th Cir. 2000). Where the state courts supply no reasoned decision on some or all of a

petitioner’s claims, the federal court independently reviews the record to determine whether

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the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Himes v. Thompson,

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, (see docket # 14 at 8),

“[f]ederal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for

its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the

state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). In other words, although the federal court independently

reviews the record, it still defers to the state court’s ultimate conclusion. 

Where a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts, the reviewing court must next determine whether it resulted in constitutional

error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). Habeas relief is

warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a

constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving

“substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court

recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fry

v. Pliler, ___ U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis

also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,

145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in

capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug.

18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was

insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s consideration of those convictions

because the trial court found four other prior convictions which would have supported

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 11 Petitioner also argues that he was “convicted of . . . conspiracy to commit murder because

of the jury instruction explaining that a conspirator is liable for all criminal acts committed by

a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (docket # 1-2 at 46) (citing Tr.

1/24/01 at 18) This statement refers to the jury instruction based on Pinkerton v. United States,

328 U.S. 640 (1946). Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton jury instruction is a separate claim

that will be considered in Petitioner’s sixth ground for relief. 

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petitioner’s sentence.) The Court will review Petitioner’s claims that are properly before it

under the applicable standard of review. 

IV. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner presents six grounds for relief. (dockets # 1, # 1-2 at 30-70, # 14, # 20) 

Below, the Court will determine whether Petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion

requirement and will consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims that are properly before the

Court.

A. Ground One - Sufficiency of the Evidence

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his conviction for conspiracy to commit first

degree murder violates the Fourteenth Amendment and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979) because there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

he intended to commit first-degree murder. (docket # 1 at 6; docket 1-2 at 45) In a lengthy,

rambling narrative, Petitioner argues that there was no proof of his agreement to commit

first degree murder and that “proof that [Petitioner] had no more than the requisite intent to

aide, promote, or commit the underlying felony is insufficient to convict of conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder.” (docket # 1-2 at 46) He argues that the evidence

demonstrated there was never an agreement between any conspirator to commit the offense

of murder and, therefore, the State failed to prove the “statutory requirements” beyond a

reasonable doubt and his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder violates

the Fourteenth Amendment.11 (docket # 1-2 at 45-48)

Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted his claim that the State

presented insufficient evidence to find him guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree

murder. (docket # 10 at 20) 

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1. Relevant Background 

During trial, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 20 on the

charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. He argued that there was no proof

offered that there was a conspiracy to kill anyone. (Respondents’ Exh. AA at 408) The

trial court denied the Rule 20 motion concluding that “if there is a conspiracy that if certain

circumstances occur, then a person will be murdered, . . . that is a conspiracy to commit

first degree murder. ” (Respondents’ Exh. AA at 421-22) The court further stated that,

“[a]s far as the evidence to support any one person’s involvement in this case, there has

been a lot of evidence cross-referencing these four defendants with each other and with Mr.

Schilinsky and with Mr. Goldberg . . . [T]here is the least amount of evidence against Sheri

Cofsky, and there is a higher level of evidence against Mr. Cofsky . . . .” (Respondents’

Exh. AA at 422) “[T]he evidence is sufficient to establish” conspiracy to commit first

degree murder or conspiracy to commit escape “as to all four of the defendants.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. AA at 423) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his Rule 20

motion because “[t]he only evidence . . . of a murder conspiracy was that any killing was

contingent on whether other events intervened,” and thus the evidence failed to show

specific intent to kill and premeditation required for a conviction of conspiracy to commit

first-degree murder. (docket # 1-3 at 28-29) Petitioner argued that the State “presented no

evidence of an agreement involving” Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. AA at 408) The

Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims. (docket # 1-2 at 1-21) The court

noted that Petitioner argued that, “at most, the evidence showed that he and the other

conspirators had a conditional intent to kill the guard, if it became necessary, [and] that this

is not the kind of specific intent needed for a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder.” 

(docket # 1-2 at 11-12) (emphasis in original). The Arizona Court of Appeals also noted

that Petitioner asserted that the State failed to present evidence of premeditation to commit

first-degree murder. The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claims relying on United

States v. Holloway, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), where the Supreme Court found that conditional

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intent satisfied the intent requirement in the federal car jacking statute. (docket # 1-2 at 11) 

The Court of Appeals specifically relied on the Supreme Court’s statement in Holloway

that “a defendant may not negate a proscribed intent by requiring the victim to comply with

a condition the defendant has no right to impose; an intent to kill, in the alternative, is

nevertheless, an intent to kill.” (docket # 1-2 at 12) (citations omitted) The appellate court

concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. And that the evidence was sufficient to show

both intent – that Petitioner intended to kill a guard – and premeditation – that Petitioner

entered into an agreement with at least one other person to kill a guard – because “the

conspirators intended to kill a deputy, if the deputy lawfully resisted their unlawful attempt

to break Goldberg out of jail.” (docket # 1-2 at 12) 

On post-conviction review, Petitioner again challenged the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. (docket # 

1-5 at 11-16) Petitioner argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Evancyk v.

Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. 2002), issued while Petitioner’s case was

pending on direct appeal, invalidated his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder. (docket # 1-5 at 13) Petitioner specifically argued that, under Evanchyk,

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a specific intent crime and that “in order to

convict, the State must prove as an element of the offense that the defendant intended to kill

and entered into an agreement with a co-conspirator to commit the crime of murder.” 

(docket # 1-5 at 13) Petitioner argued that the facts found by the appellate court did not

prove that he was involved in any plan or that he had the intent to kill anyone. (Id. at 15) 

The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claims. (docket # 1-2 at 23-25) 

On May 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the trial court

misunderstood his argument in his petition for post-conviction relief. (docket # 1-5 at 17-

21) Petitioner conceded that “it is sufficient in a conspiracy case to prove conditional

intent,” but argued that his “Rule 20 motion should have been granted” because “the State

has failed to demonstrate the requisite intent necessary to convict [Petitioner] of conspiracy

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to commit murder.” (docket # 1-5 at 18-19) Citing Evanchyk, Petitioner argued that

“Arizona conspiracy law now requires proof of a defendant’s intent to participate in the

particular crime charged, not just a generic intent to participate in the overall conspiracy.” 

(docket # 1-5 at 19) Petitioner argued that his Rule 20 motion should have been granted

because the State failed to present “proof of any intent (conditional or otherwise) by

Petitioner to conspire to commit murder.” (Id.) 

On June 17, 2005, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for rehearing explaining

that:

In reviewing [Petitioner’s] Petition, the Court notes now as it did 

before entering its ruling that the first paragraph of the Petition asserts that

[Petitioner] is entitled to post-conviction relief because of a significant change 

in the law. Because the Court had already ruled on that specific issue when 

raised under Rule 32 by a co-Defendant in this case, the Court’s Order denying 

post-conviction relief focused on that issue.

The Court realizes upon reading the Motion for Rehearing and re-reading

the original Petition that [Petitioner] is also making a slightly different and

more factually-related argument, that there was insufficient evidence of his 

intent to conspire to commit murder. The Court feels that this issue was 

addressed and decided against [Petitioner] by the Court of Appeals on direct

appeal. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on October 29, 2002, and

presumably was aware at that time of the Evanchyk decision which had been 

decided by the Arizona Supreme Court on May 24, 2002. Cases in Arizona

repudiating the Pinkerton doctrine of liability for crimes committed by a 

coconspirator were decided many years ago and [Petitioner’s] guilt in this 

case was not based upon the Pinkerton doctrine anyway.

(docket # 1-2 at 26-27) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals and

Arizona Supreme Court which both summarily denied relief. (docket # 1-5 at 22-46, 47-60;

docket # 1-2 at 28-29) 

2. Merits Review of Ground One

a. The Evanchyk Decision 

In Ground One, Petitioner claims that there is insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder because there was no proof of his

agreement to commit first degree murder and that “proof that [Petitioner] had no more than

the requisite intent to aide, promote, or commit the underlying felony is insufficient to

convict of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.” (docket # 1-2 at 46) Petitioner

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argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that sufficient evidence supported his

conviction “is contrary to federal law” because, by failing to apply rule announced by the

Arizona Supreme Court in Evanchyk, the court required “no evidence at all of Petitioner

agreeing to any murder.” (docket # 1-2 at 46-47) He argues that the evidence

demonstrated there was never an agreement between any conspirator to commit the offense

of murder and, therefore, the State failed to prove the “statutory requirements” beyond a

reasonable doubt and his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder violates

the Fourteenth Amendment. (docket # 1-2 at 45-48)

In support of Ground One, Petitioner asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

decision in Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114 (2002), decided while

Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, constitutes a significant change in the law pertaining

to conspiracy to commit first-degree murder which would probably have changed the

outcome of his case. (docket # 1-2 at 48) In Evanchyk, the State charged petitioner with

first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2003). The trial court gave the following

instruction regarding the elements of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder:

The crime of conspiracy to commit first degree murder requires proof of 

the following things:

1. That the defendant agreed with one or more persons that one of them or

another person would engage in certain conduct; and

2. That the defendant intended to promote or assist the commission of such 

conduct; and 

3. That the intended conduct would constitute a crime [whether known or 

unknown by defendant to be a crime].

340 F.3d at 936 (modification in original). The jury instructions in Evanchyk defined the

crime of first-degree murder as either of the following alternatives: 

(1) when ‘defendant intended or knew that he would cause the death of

another . . . with pre-meditation” or (2) when someone ‘commits or attempts

to commit burglary and in the course of, and in furtherance of such offense,

or imediate (sic) flight from such offense, such person, or other person,

causes the death of any person. This type of murder requires no mental state

other than that which required for (sic) the commission of the offense of

burglary.

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Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 936-37. The jury instructions “explicitly reiterated that a conviction

for first-degree murder could be based on a felony murder theory that did not require the

jury to find an intent to kill, only an intent to commit burglary.” 340 F.3d at 937. The jury

found Evanchyk not guilty of first-degree burglary and first-degree murder, but guilty of

second degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 340 F.3d at 937.

After being denied relief in state court, Evanchyk filed a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 340 F.3d at 938. Because Arizona law was not clear on whether conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder could be based on the felony-murder type of first-degree

murder, the district court certified to the Arizona Supreme Court the following questions:

Whether, in Arizona, conspiracy to commit first degree murder may be based

on felony murder?

Or in other words,

Under Arizona law, if the intended criminal conduct of an alleged conspiracy

is first degree murder, must an alleged conspirator have possessed an intent

to kill or is it sufficient for the conspirator merely to have had the requisite

intent for the underlying felony?

Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Arizona Supreme Court answered the certified questions as follows:

1. Under Arizona law, a defendant may not be convicted of conspiracy

to commit first-degree murder when that conviction is based only on the

commission of felony murder.

2. Under Arizona law, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy to commit

first-degree murder if the state proves the defendant possessed an intent to

kill or to promote or aid in killing and made an agreement to kill. The state

need not prove the completed offense nor, for that matter, any other offense.

3. Under Arizona law, a defendant may not be convicted of conspiracy to 

commit first-degree murder if he had merely the requisite intent to commit

the underlying felony. 

Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 938 (citing Evanchyk v. Stewart, 47 P.3d 1114, 1119 (Ariz. 2002)

(Evanchyk III)). 

The Arizona Supreme Court further explained that:

because conspiracy to commit first-degree murder cannot be proved without

establishing that the defendant premeditated by forming an intent to promote

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or aid in killing and making an agreement to kill, proof that the defendant had

no more than the requisite intent to aid, promote, or commit the underlying 

felony is insufficient to convict of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 938 (quoting Evanchyk III, 47 P.3d at 1119). 

The Arizona Supreme Court held that because “conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder is a specific intent crime ... the state must prove as elements that the defendant

intended to kill and entered into an agreement with a coconspirator to commit the crime of

murder.” Evanchyk III, 47 P.3d at 1118-19. After the Arizona Supreme Court answered the

certified questions, the federal district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and the Ninth

Circuit affirmed in Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.2003). The Ninth Circuit

held that the jury instructions on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder violated due

process because the instructions omitted the element of intent to kill. Id. at 939-40. The

court noted that “[n]owhere does the instruction say that intent to kill or premeditation is

required. Rather, it refers to the conspired crime as ‘conduct’ which constitutes ‘firstdegree murder.’” 340 F.3d at 939. The court explained that, “[b]y defining ‘first-degree

murder’ as either premeditated murder or felony murder, and then, in the separate

conspiracy instruction, defining ‘conspiracy to commit first-degree murder’ in generic

terms as a conspiracy to engage in ‘conduct’ which constitutes ‘first-degree murder,’ the

instructions could cause a jury to rely upon felony murder as the predicate offense for the

conspiracy conviction.” 340 F.3d at 939. 

Petitioner correctly asserts that Evanchyk announced a new rule of law to the extent

that for the first time the Arizona Supreme Court held that a conviction for conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder cannot be based on a theory of felony murder. Evanchyk III,

202 Ariz. at 480-81, 47 P.3d at 1118-19. However, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion,

Evanchyk’s holding does not apply in this case because the State did not assert a theory of

felony murder, the jury was not instructed under a theory of felony murder, and, thus,

Petitioner was not convicted under a felony-murder theory. Unlike the jury instructions in

Evanchyk, in this case, the court specifically instructed the jury on “First Degree Murder”

under a theory of premeditation. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 127) The court defined “First

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Degree Murder” as premeditated murder. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 127) In a separate

conspiracy instruction, the court defined “Conspiracy to Commit First Degree murder” as

an agreement to engage in “conduct” which constitutes “First Degree Murder” with

“intent” to promote or aid the crime of “First Degree Murder.” (Respondents’ Exh. Q at

123, 127) Unlike Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933-940 (9th Cir. 2003), the jury

instruction on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder in this case included the element of

intent to kill.

Moreover, the Evanchyk court’s statement, conspiring to commit first-degree murder

is a specific intent crime, was not new law. Rather, at the time of Petitioner’s trial

(December 2000 - January 2001), first-degree murder under A.R.S. § 13–1105 was

considered a “specific intent” crime, requiring the specific intent to kill another person. See

State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 32, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995); State v. Fisher, 176 Ariz. 69,

79, 859 P.2d 179, 189 (1993); see generally A.R.S. § 13-1105. The trial court in this case

instructed the jury that first-degree murder required that one act intentionally or knowingly

and with premeditation. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 127) Evanchyk did not require a

different jury instruction. 

Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, in finding that sufficient evidence

supported Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, the Arizona

Court of Appeals relied on a theory of premeditated murder, not felony-murder as

Petitioner suggests. (docket # 1-2 at 46) The appellate court identified the elements of

“first-degree premeditated murder;” (1) a person causes the death of another; (2) with

premeditation; (3) by conduct that such person intends or knows will cause death. (docket

# 1-2 at 11) The Court of Appeals then applied the facts to those elements and concluded

that “a defendant who enters [into an agreement to cause the death of another person with

premeditation by conduct that such person intends or knows will cause the death]

premeditates a killing, even though a conviction for conspiracy does not require an actual

murder occur.” (docket # 1-2 at 11) Applying the law of conspiracy to commit

premeditated first-degree murder, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that, “evidence

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that the conspirators intended to kill a deputy, if the deputy lawfully resisted their unlawful

attempt to break Goldberg out of jail,” was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit first degree murder. (docket # 1-2 at 12) Contrary to Petitioner’s

suggestion, the Court of Appeals’ separate finding that sufficient evidence supported

Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit escape, was unrelated to its finding that

sufficient evidence supported his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

(docket # 1-2 at 9-10) 

As the appellate court found, sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to

commit first degree murder, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13–1003 and 13–1105. Under A.R.S. §

13–1105 (2000), a person commits first degree murder if “[i]ntending or knowing that the

person’s conduct will cause death, the person causes the death of another with

premeditation.” A person commits conspiracy if, “with the intent to promote or aid the

commission of an offense, such person agrees with one or more persons that at least one of

them or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and one of the

parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense, except that an overt act shall not

be required if the object of the conspiracy was to commit any felony upon the person of

another.” A.R.S. § 13–1003. Thus, the “state must prove as elements that the defendant

intended to kill and entered into an agreement with a coconspirator to commit the crime of

murder.” State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 111 P.3d 369, 387 (Ariz. 2005). The appellate

court found that the evidence showing “the conspirators intended to kill a deputy, if the

deputy lawfully resisted their unlawful attempt to break Goldberg out of jail, was sufficient

to support [Petitioner’s] conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.” (docket

# 1-2 at 12) Petitioner has not established that the appellate court’s determination was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, or that the appellate court’s

determination was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 

When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the court must

determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). If no rational trier-of-fact could

find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must

issue. Payne v. Borg, 982 F. 2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1993).

A federal habeas corpus petitioner “faces a heavy burden when challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process

grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to grant the writ,

the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected an objectively

unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275. 

“In considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court is required to

‘make its determination as to the sufficiency of the state court findings from an independent

review of the record or otherwise grant a hearing and make its own findings on the

merits.’” Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Turner v.

Chavez, 586 F. 2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The reviewing court must respect the

province of the fact-finder to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the factfinder resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Walters, 45 F.3d at

1358. If the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the reviewing

court relies on the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469

(9th Cir. 1994). “The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every

hypothesis except guilty, but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict.” 

United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Mares,

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940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991)). A federal court must determine the sufficiency of the

evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16. 

The record contains sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Both Robert Olsen and Daniel England testified

in detail about their conversations with Goldberg and Schilinski, and their plan to help

Goldberg escape. (Tr. 1/10/01 at 89–124, 163–64; Tr. 1/11/01 at 7–94) Olsen and England

specifically identified Schilinski, the Cofskys, and Manning as participants in the scheme. 

(Id.) Goldberg told Olsen that Cofsky, his friend and business partner, frequently updated

Goldberg in telephone conversations on the plan to break Goldberg out of jail. 

(Respondents’ Exh. V at 175-76, 184-185, 190) In addition to being friends and business

partners, Goldberg and Cofsky were co-defendants in another case. (Respondents’ Exh. V

at 175-176, 184-85; Exh. W at 254; Exh. Z at 399) Olsen and England further testified

regarding the details of the plan which Goldberg and Schilinski had described to them. (Tr.

1/20/01 at 89-124, 163-64; Tr. 1/11/01 at 7-94) 

The attempted jail break was planned for June 12, 2000, at 11:30 a.m., when

Goldberg was being transported back to jail after an appearance in Judge Steven F. Conn’s

court. Upon Goldberg’s arrival, “two” people in a van with sliding doors were going to

drive by and “grab” Goldberg. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 173-74, 187-88, Exh. W at 214-

222; Tr. 1/20/01 at 89-124, 163-64) If the guard escorting Goldberg interfered with the

escape attempt, Schiliski was to kill the guard. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 170, 172-74, 197-

98; Exh. W at 216-222, 239-41, 254-55) 

Schilinksi was assigned the task of “actually kill[ing] the guard if necessary.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. V at 170, 172-74, 197-99, Exh. W. at 216-222, 239-41, 254-55) While

in jail in Las Vegas jail, Schilinski described the jail break plot in detail to inmate England. 

Schilinski confirmed that he was going to shoot the guard escorting Goldberg if he resisted

or “made a move.” (Respondents’ Exh. W at 211-220) 

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While Schilinski’s role in the conspiracy was to shoot the guard escorting Goldberg

(Respondents’ Exh. V at 173; Exh. W at 220, 239-41), one of Petitioner’s assignments was

“to keep a close eye” on Schilinski to make sure he was available to participate in the 

scheme. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 178) In early June, Mohave County officials transferred

Schilinski to a jail in Las Vegas where he had outstanding traffic warrants. (Respondents’

Exh. V at 177; Exh. W at 211-215) Because he was responsible for keeping track of

Schilinski, Cofsky “paid [Schilinski’s] fines in Las Vegas to spring him out of the Las

Vegas jail.” (Respondents’ Exh. V at 177-78, 195-96) Petitioner argues that there in

insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there is contrary evidence in the

record indicating that “Dave’s girlfriend was supposed to pay Schilinki’s bond.” (docket # 

14 at 9) (citing Respondents’ Exh. W at 237-38) On review of a sufficiency of the

evidence claim, the reviewing court must respect the province of the fact finder to

determine the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicting evidence. Walters, 45 F.3d

at 1358. Additionally, where the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the

evidence, the reviewing court relies on information that supports the conviction. McMillan,

19 F.3d at 469. Thus, testimony that someone other than Petitioner might also have been

“supposed to pay Schilinski’s bond,” does not undermine a finding that sufficient evidence

supported Petitioner’s conviction. 

Cofsky also “babysat” Schilinski at the Cofskys’ ranch until the day of the attempted

jail break. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 178-79) Cofsky and Goldberg “didn’t want to lose

track of [Schilinski] because he was a key figure” in the plan. (Respondents’ Exh. V at

178) In addition to keeping track of Schilinski, Cofsky and “Dave’s [Goldberg]

girlfriend,” would assist in the placement of the vehicles. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 230-

231) 

The evening of June 11, 2000, police observed Date and co-defendant Tawanee

Barrett arrive at the Cofsky residence. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 130–35; Tr. 1/18/01 at 56–58; Tr.

1/23/01 at 4–7) The next morning, June 12, 2000, Date, Barrett, and conspirator Manning

drove to Wal-Mart and purchased .38 caliber ammunition. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 143–49, 167–70;

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Tr. 1/17/01 at 245–48; Tr. 1/18/01 at 19–23; Tr. 1/23/01 at 22–25) They proceeded to Auto

Zone, and purchased a pair of 18-inch bolt cutters. (Id.) At approximately 11:00 a.m.,

officers observed Date, Barrett, Manning, and the Cofskys drive towards Kingman in three

different vehicles, a red pickup truck, a blue van, and a black Mountaineer SUV. (Tr.

1/11/01 at 185–90; Respondents’ Exh. X at 285-86) Officers followed the vehicles to

Kingman where they drove to an old warehouse parking lot. At the warehouse parking lot,

Date and Manning removed the back seat of the minivan, and “stash[ed]” it behind the

building. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 195, 154–55; Tr. 1/17/01 at 140; Tr. 1/18/01 at 76; Tr. 1/23/01 at

30) After driving to another location where Barrett remained with one of the vehicles, Date

and Manning left in the minivan, and drove towards the courthouse. (Tr. 1/11/01 at

161–63; Tr. 1/17/01 at 118–19, 125–26; Tr. 1/18/01 at 59–64; Tr. 1/23/01 at 30–31) 

Meanwhile, police observed Schilinski and the Cofskys “casing” the courthouse and

jail in Kingman. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 18–35, 74–75; Tr. 1/17/01 at 25–31, 120–24, 181–83, 190,

238–41; Tr. 1/18/01 at 61–62) At approximately 11:00 a.m., Officers observed Schilinski

walk nervously to Judge Conn’s courtroom, where Goldberg was scheduled to appear, read

the court’s calendar, and then leave in a white Grand Am. (Respondents’ Exh. X at 257-67,

280-81; Exh. Y at 311-320, 338-346, 385-87) About thirty minutes later, Petitioner and

his wife entered Judge Conn’s courtroom, even though their court proceeding was not

scheduled until 1:30 p.m. that day. (Respondents’ Exh. X at 268-71, 279-82) Petitioner

argues that there in insufficient evidence to support his conviction because there is contrary

evidence in the record indicating that the Cofksys’ court appearance had been rescheduled

to an earlier time. On review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the reviewing court

must respect the province of the fact finder to determine the credibility of witnesses and to

resolve conflicting evidence. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. Additionally, where the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the reviewing court relies on

information that supports the conviction. McMillan, 19 F.3d at 469. Thus, evidence that

Cofskys’ court time might have been changed does not undermine a finding that sufficient

evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction. 

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When police officers outside of the courthouse observed the minivan drive “right in

front” of the courthouse, they initiated a traffic stop. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 160–61, 193; Tr.

1/17/01 at 125–32, 242–43; Tr. 1/18/01 at 62–69) Manning was in the driver’s seat, and

Date was crouched in the “back cargo area” of the van wearing “reflective sunglasses,” had

seven .38 caliber rounds of ammunition in his pocket, and was holding six more rounds in

his hand. (Tr. 1/17/01 at 41–42, 129– 32, 244; Tr. 1/18/01 at 66; Respondent’s Exh. Y at

321-325, 347-49, 372-76) Officers found two handguns in the van, one loaded with two

.38 caliber rounds of ammunition, and a pair of worn surgical gloves. (Tr. 1/17/01 at

132–35, 172–81; Tr. 1/18/01 at 67) Inside the vehicle which Barrett was driving when she

was arrested, police found: (1) two pairs of bolt cutters; (2) five .38 caliber rounds of

ammunition; (3) a pair of rubber gloves similar to the pair found in the minivan; (4) a bag

containing “extra large” men’s clothing and a can of shaving cream (Goldberg weighed

approximately 260 pounds, and had a beard) (Tr. 1/18/01, at 73); (5) cell phones; (6) two

license plates; and (7) a court document bearing Eugene Cofsky’s name. (Tr. 1/17/01 at

143–162, 223; Tr. 1/18/01 at 70–73, 87; Respondents’ Exh. Y at 350-371, Exh. Z at 389-

393)

After arresting the Cofskys, police found, among other items, a day planner in Sheri

Cofsky’s purse which contained Schilinski’s name, social security number, and date of

birth, Manning’s name and phone number, and the name, “Tracy” [Date], with a

corresponding telephone number. (Id.) Petitioner was carrying $10,700 in cash at the time

of his arrest. (Respondents’ Exh. X at 272-73) 

At the Cofskys’ residence, officers found $117,500 in cash, .38 caliber shell casings,

and a receipt from Wal-Mart for .38 caliber ammunition purchased on June 12, 2000 at

10:20 a.m. (Tr. 1/11/01 at 196–98; Tr. 1/12/01 at 37–41, 161–70) Police also found a

document with Eugene Cofsky’s name and the notation, “left Fourth, end, park van, white

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 12 The minivan was seen driving north on Fourth Street towards the courthouse. (Tr. 1/17/01

at 125; Tr. 1/18/01 at 62–63) The courthouse is located at the intersection of Fourth Street and

Spring Street. (Id.) The minivan turned east on Spring Street and then north on Fifth Street,

which borders the courthouse’s east side. (Id.) The minivan then drove through the intersection

of Pine Street, and then made a U-turn back towards the courthouse before being stopped. (Id.)

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Grand Am,” apparent driving directions to the courthouse for Petitioner and Manning.12

(Id.) A telephone calling card taken from Schilinski after his arrest indicated that he called

the Cofsky residence at 8:28 a.m. on June 12, 2000. (Tr. 1/12/01 at 166; Tr. 1/17/01 at 48,

184–85; Respondents’ Exh. Y at 326-337, 337-381)

Additionally, while in jail on the charges at issue, co-defendant Manning wrote a

letter addressed to “EC,” which detailed a possible defense to the pending charges and

stated:

Look, EC, we were under surveillance from at least the 8th. Think about 

it, Bro. This story may need work, but it’s the right one. You’re the one 

who needs to slow down, and get your lawyer to get your dates back with

our. EC . . . you may have a good case. But until you show me a better 

defense, this is the one I’m going with. So either show me or get with it.

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 396-97) This letter was found in the cuff of Cofsky’s pants when

he was in jail on the instant offense. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 206-09; Exh. Z at 394-97.)

Petitioner also contends that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

sufficient evidence supported his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, because “[t]here was no physical

evidence seized from Petitioner to link him with the conspiracy,” and there was no

evidence that he specifically intended to kill a guard or agreed with another person to kill a

guard. (docket # 1-2 at 47-49) 

The Court disagrees with Petitioner’s assertion. As set forth above, there was

sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder. Surveillance of Petitioner’s residence and the Kingman courthouse on June 12,

2000, in addition to physical evidence found in the cars used in the attempted jail break,

physical evidence found at Petitioner’s residence, physical evidence recovered from

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Petitioner while he was in jail, linked Petitioner to co-conspirators Schilinski, Manning,

Date, and Barrett. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 206-09, Exh. X at 257-282, 285-296; Exh. Y at

311-87, Exh.Z at 389-98) Additionally, the evidence established that Petitioner had several

different tasks: (1) keeping Goldberg up-to-date on the plans (Respondents’ Exh. V at 175-

76, 184-85, 190-92); (2) sitting inside the courtroom during Goldberg’s hearing and

signaling the conspirators when the proceeding was almost over (Respondents’ Exh. W at

247-251, Exh. X at 268-271, 279-282); (3) assisting with the placement of the vehicles

(Respondents’ Exh. W at 227-231); and (4) keeping track of Schilinski whose task was to

shoot the guard if necessary. (Respondents’ Exh. V at 170-73, 177-79, 195-98; Exh. W at

211-222, 227-231, 239-41, 254-55) 

Petitioner argues that the “Court of Appeals made an unreasonable determination of

facts because the only suspicious movements by the Petitioner were his presence in the

courtroom where he was scheduled to be, at the time he was told to be there by his attorney,

and his using the phone to call his late attorney.” (docket # 1-2 at 47) As previously

stated, when a habeas court reviews the sufficiency of evidence, it court views the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; McMillan, 19 F.3d

at 469 (stating that if the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence,

the reviewing court will assign the inference that favors conviction.) Here, the evidence

supports a reasonable inference that Petitioner was in Judge Conn’s courtroom on June 12,

2000 because he was responsible for signaling his co-conspirators when Goldberg’s hearing

was almost over and that he used the phone to inform the co-conspirators that the hearing

did not take place.

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner fails to establish that the state courts’

rulings rejecting his sufficiency of the evidence claim were either contrary to, or based on

an unreasonable application of, federal law or involved an unreasonable determination of

the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on

Ground One. 

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 13 The extent Ground Two can be construed as challenging a jury instruction which was based

on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), that issue

has been deemed Ground Six and will be addressed in the Court’s analysis of Ground Six. (see

dockets # 19, # 20)

 14 The “Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offense” instruction provides, “A person who

conspired to commit multiple offenses is guilty of a single conspiracy if each offense which was

the object of the conspiracy arose out of the same agreement or relationship.” (docket # 1-3 at

39)

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B. Ground Two 

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to give a “Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple

Offenses” jury instruction.13 (docket # 1-2 at 51) Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s

error: (a) violated his rights to a fair trial and due process by lowering the prosecution’s

burden of proof; and (b) violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination

because the Court of Appeals, not a jury, determined the scope of the conspiracy by

vacating Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit escape, rather than his conviction

for conspiracy to commit murder. (docket # 1-2 at 51-52) 

1. Exhaustion Analysis

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground Two are procedurally

defaulted and barred from habeas corpus review. The Court agrees. As discussed below,

the record reflects that Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground 2(a) because he did not

fairly present that federal claim to any Arizona court. See, Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). The record also reflects that Petitioner did not properly exhaust

Ground 2(b) because he never presented that claim to the trial court or the Court of

Appeals, rather he presented it for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court. See,

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. 

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner argues that the trial court’s failure to give a “Single

Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offenses” jury instruction14 in accordance with R.A.J.I.

10.033 and 10.034, violated his right to a fair trial and due process by lowering the

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prosecution’s burden of proof. Petitioner claims that failure to give this instruction

permitted the State to obtain a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder without any

evidence of Petitioner’s intent to commit murder. (docket # 1-2 at 51-52) 

At trial, Petitioner did not object to any of the conspiracy instructions.

(Respondents’ Exh. AA at 427-29) Accordingly, on direct appeal, Petitioner argued only

that the court’s failure to give a “Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offenses” jury

instruction constituted fundamental error and did not assert a federal claim. (docket # 1-3

at 38-40) The appellate court resolved Petitioner’s jury instruction claim solely on the basis

of state law. (docket # 1-2 at 16-18) 

Petitioner argues that his citation to in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) in his

appellate brief was sufficient to exhaust a federal claim. (docket # 14 at 11, n. 13) In

support of this assertion, Petitioner cites page 19 of his Opening Brief. (Id.) Although that

page cites Winship, it is in support of Petitioner’s claim, labeled Issue A, that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree

murder. (docket # 1-3 at 28) Petitioner’s jury instruction claim, labeled Issue D, appears

on pages 29-31 of his Opening Brief, (see docket # 1-3 at 38-40), and includes no citation

to Winship or to any other federal authority. Petitioner’s citation to Winship in support of

his sufficiency of the evidence claim in his Opening Brief, did not alert the appellate court

that he also raised a federal challenge to the jury instructions in a separate claim that

appeared ten pages later. 

Similarly, in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner again

failed to raise the federal jury instruction claim he presents in Ground 2(a) of the pending

petition. (docket # 1-4 at 28-40) Rather, Petitioner joined in co-defendant Manning’s

petition for review and argued, for the first time, that the Arizona Court of Appeals violated

his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine “any fact on which the legislature

conditions an increase in their maximum punishment,” by vacating his conviction for

conspiracy to commit escape rather than requiring a jury to decide whether “the most

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serious offense conspired to was first degree murder.” (docket # 1-4 at 37-38,

Respondents’ Exh. N at 99)

 Although Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on a single conspiracy with multiple offenses, he did not base that claim on 

federal law. (Respondents’ Exh. AA at 427-29, docket # 1-2 at 16-18, docket # 1-3 at 38-

40, docket # 1-4 at 8-24, 37; Respondents’ Exh. N. at 99) See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999

(stating that to properly exhaust a federal claim, petitioner “must have characterized the

claims he raised in state proceedings specifically as federal claims.”) (internal citations

omitted) Because Petitioner did not raise the jury instruction claim raised in Ground 2(a) of

the pending petition as a federal claim before the state courts, he did not properly exhaust

that claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (stating that it is not enough that all

the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a

“somewhat similar state law claim was made.”) As discussed below in Section IV.B.2,

infra, Petitioner’s claim raised in Ground 2(a) is procedurally barred.

Petitioner also failed to properly exhaust the Ground 2(b) in which he argues that the

trial court’s failure to give a “Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offenses” jury

instruction denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination because the

Court of Appeals, not a jury, determined the scope of the conspiracy by vacating

Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit escape, rather than his conviction for

conspiracy to commit murder. (docket # 1-2 at 51-52)

Petitioner did not present this federal claim to the trial court or the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Rather, he raised this claim for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court in a

petition for discretionary review. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 99, docket # 1-4 at 37-38)

Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting a

federal claim to the appropriate state courts in the proper manner. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at

257. In Castille, the Supreme Court noted that petitioner had raised only state law claims

to the intermediate state appellate court, and held that “where the [federal] claim has been

presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be

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considered unless there are special and important reasons . . . [r]aising the claim in such a

fashion does not . . . constitute fair presentation.” Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. 

 Based on Castille, Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground 2(b) because he

raised that claim for the first time in a petition for discretionary review to the Arizona

Supreme Court. (docket # 1-4 at 37; Respondents’ Exh. N at 99) Petitioner never

presented Ground 2(b) to the trial court or the Arizona Court of Appeals. (docket # 1-3 at

38-40, docket # 1-4 at 8-24) As discussed below, Ground 2(b) is procedurally defaulted

because Petitioner cannot now return to state court to properly exhaust that claim. 

2. Ground Two - Procedural Default Analysis

Petitioner did not properly present his federal claims raised in Ground Two to the

state courts and any attempt to return to state court to present those claims would be futile

because they would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. First, Petitioner is

time-barred under Arizona law from raising these claims in a successive petition for postconviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long

expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be

filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although

Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in

Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions

apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409,

410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or

in any previous collateral proceeding. See Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised

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limited number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did

not); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are

precluded from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could

have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction

relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994)

(defendant’s claim that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was

precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal). The aforementioned

unexhausted claims could have, and should have, been properly raised either on direct

appeal or on post-conviction review. Accordingly, the State court would find Petitioner’s

claims raised in Ground Two procedurally barred. 

Because Petitioner’s claims raised in Ground Two are procedurally defaulted, they

are barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference

by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not articulate any basis to overcome the procedural bar. As a general

matter, Petitioner’s pro se status at any time during his state post-conviction and federal

proceedings and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d

1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” which precluded him from properly exhausting his

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state remedies. Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the issue of prejudice. Engle, 456

U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim

if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

described the gateway showing in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995) as a less

stringent standard than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v.

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a

freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must

affirmatively prove that he is innocent.”). If petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway,

the court is only permitted to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d

at 807. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of

cases” in which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was

probably convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 231

(1995). To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a

constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. To establish the requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with

new reliable evidence that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. New

evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may include

“exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324; see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518

(2006)(stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence

that the trial jury did not have before it). 

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Petitioner does not assert that failure to consider his claims raised in Ground Two

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the record does not

establish that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup,

513 U.S. at 324, 327.

In accordance with the foregoing, Petitioner’s claims raised in Ground Two are

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. Moreover, those

claims lack merit as discussed below. 

3. Merits Review of Ground Two

In Ground Two Petitioner argues that, in view of the court’s failure to given a

“single conspiracy to commit multiple offenses” instruction in accordance with RAJI

10.033 and 10.034, the indictment was multiplicatus because it charged multiple counts for

a single offense. (docket # 1-2 at 51) Petitioner claims that the State charged “two separate

conspiracies and present[ed] evidence of one conspiracy with multiple events. . .” and that

the failure to give an Single Conspiracy with Multiple Offenses instruction permitted the

State “to divid[e] one conspiracy into two thereby increasing Petitioner’s exposure to

conviction.” (docket # 1-2 at 51) 

“An indictment is multiplicatus when it charges multiple counts for a single offense,

producing two penalties for one crime and thus raising double jeopardy questions.” United

States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir.2005). Multiplicity is a defect in the

indictment; therefore, a conviction will not be reversed unless the defendant was

prejudiced. See United States v. Severino, 316 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir.2003). Here,

although the indictment was multiplicatus, any prejudice Petitioner may have suffered was

cured when the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on

conspiracy to commit escape. See United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008)

(finding that offense of possessing child pornography was lesser included offense of receipt

of child pornography, and thus entering judgment against defendant on separate counts for

receiving child pornography and possessing child pornography was multiplicatus, in

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violation of Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of double jeopardy and remanding to the

district court to vacate defendant’s conviction on one of the two counts and allowing that it

be reinstated without prejudice if his other conviction should be overturned on direct or

collateral review). 

Liberally construing the Petition, Petitioner also argues that, under the Fifth

Amendment’s double jeopardy clause, he cannot be subject to multiple punishment on

multiplicatus charges. (docket # 1-2 at 52, citation to cases) Petitioner cites Braverman v.

United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942), in which the Supreme Court stated that “one agreement

cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it

envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one . . . . The single agreement is the

prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute . . . .

For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed.” Id.

at 53-54. See also United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.1994) (holding

that indictment is multiplicatus if it charges multiple conspiracies when there is only a

single conspiracy to violate two statutes); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 771 (9th

Cir.1978) (per curiam) (holding that consecutive sentences imposed on multiplicatus

counts, two counts of conspiracy for one drug smuggling enterprise, violated the Double

Jeopardy Clause).

In this case, the Court of Appeals found that “the record reflects that there was only

one conspiracy and that the most serious offense to which the defendant conspired was

first-degree murder.” (docket # 1-2 at 17) The Arizona Court of Appeals, therefore,

vacated the less serious of the two convictions, conspiracy to commit escape, and the

related sentence. (Id.) (noting that “[w]hen it is obvious which of two multiplicatus

conspiracy counts cannot stand, an appellate court need not remand the conviction to be

vacated but may simply do so itself.”) 

In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit

recognizes that when a defendant has been convicted and sentenced on multiplicatus

charges, “[t]he conviction as well as the sentence on one of the two multiplicatus counts

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must be vacated, to ‘avoid both the punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as

well as the direct effects of multiple sentences.’” United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230,

1239 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 850 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) and

quoting United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Rutledge v.

United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (holding that “[a] guilty verdict on a § 848 charge

necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative

of § 846; conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense. . . . we adhere to the

presumption that Congress intended to authorize only one punishment. Accordingly, ‘one

of [petitioner’s] convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized punishment

for a separate offense’ and must be vacated.’”) (internal citation omitted).

Here, because the Arizona Court of Appeals already vacated one of Petitioner’s

convictions and the related sentence, he has been afforded the relief to which he is entitled

and, therefore, is not entitled to further relief based on his challenge to the indictment or

based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding a single conspiracy with

multiple offenses. 

C. Ground Three - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In his third ground for relief, Petitioner argues that counsel on direct appeal was

“ineffective for failing to cite the Evanchyk [v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz.

2002)] case in support of issue I,” in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

(docket # 1-2 at 53) Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted this claim

and that is properly before this Court on habeas corpus review. (docket # 10 at 38; docket #

1-5 at 15, 44, 58)

1. Background

On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that pursuant to Evanchyk, his

conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder is invalid and that counsel’s failure

to cite that case on direct appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel. (docket # 1-5 at 15) 

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The trial court first analyzed and rejected Petitioner’s claim that Evanchyk “was a

significant change in the law which would probably have changed the outcome of his case

if applied thereto.” (docket # 1-2 at 23-24) The court explained that:

The issue in Evanchyk was whether a defendant could be guilty 

of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder where it was asserted 

that he conspired to commit the crime only under the felony-murder

theory as opposed to the premeditation theory. The Arizona Supreme

Court held that he could not and held that in Arizona there is no such

crime as conspiracy to commit felony-murder, first degree murder. The

Court went on to affirm that one can be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit 

First Degree Murder if one intended to kill or promote or aid in killing

and made an agreement to kill. In reaching the latter conclusion, the 

Arizona Supreme Court relied on appellate opinions dating back as far

as 1981.

The holding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit a first 

degree murder based solely on a felony-murder theory could not stand

was new law in Arizona . . . [Petitioner] in this case, however, was not

convicted under such a theory. The only theory the jury was instructed

on in this case was the premeditation theory. To the extent that Evanchyk

was new law regarding conspiring to commit first degree murder under

a felony-murder theory, it is not applicable to the facts of this case and

would have no impact on the outcome of this case. 

The holding in Evanchyk that conspiring to commit first degree

[murder] is a specific intent crime is not new law and is not inconsistent

with the instructions given in this case . . . . The jury was instructed that

[Petitioner] had to intend to promote or aid the commission of First Degree

Murder. The jury was instructed that First Degree Murder required that 

one act intentionally or knowingly and with premeditation . . . . The jury 

in this case would have been instructed no differently had Evanchyk

already been decided. It was not a decision which would have affected 

the outcome of this case. The Court determines that Evanchyk v. Stewart

is not new law which would have applied to and changed the outcome of

this case. [Petitioner] is not entitled to post-conviction [relief] on such claim.

(docket # 1-2 at 23-24) 

The trial court then specifically addressed, and rejected, Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel which was based on Evanchyk. 

[Petitioner’s] second claim for relief is that his appellate attorney

was ineffective for failing to cite Evanchyk. That case was decided on 

May 24, 2002. The Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals was

not issued until October 29, 2002. The Court has already ruled that 

Evanchyk was not new law that would have affected the outcome of this case. 

There is no need to repeat the Court’s prior analysis of this issue. Failure to 

bring this case to the attention of the Court of Appeals could not have been

ineffective because the appellate court would have recognized its lack of

relevance to the proceedings in this case. [Petitioner] is not entitled to relief

on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the 

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Evanchyk decision to the attention of the appellate court. 

(docket # 1-2 at 25) 

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner again argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel because appellate counsel failed to cite Evanchyk. (docket # 

1-5 at 44, 58) The appellate court and the Arizona Supreme Court both summarily denied

review. (docket # 1-2 at 28, 29) Thus, the trial court’s decision on post-conviction review

is the last reasoned decision of the state courts. See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669

n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Merits Review of Ground Three - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate

Counsel 

As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claim

that appellate counsel was ineffective because he has not shown the state court’s decision

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

the clearly established federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687–94 (1984)). To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

petitioner must establish that: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an “objective standard

of reasonableness” under the prevailing professional norms; and (2) that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–94. To establish prejudice,

petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The Strickland

test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In such a case,

petitioner establishes prejudice by showing that, but for counsel’s deficient performance,

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the outcome of his appeal would have been different. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259

(2000).

When analyzing Strickland’s performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable

professional judgment in making decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Review of

counsel’s performance under Strickland is “extremely limited. The test has nothing to do

with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers

would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have

acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150

F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Petitioner must satisfy both the performance and the

prejudice prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,

285 (2000) (burden is on defendant to show prejudice). A court need not determine

whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether prejudice resulted

from the alleged deficiencies. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Even assuming appellate counsel’s failure to cite Evanchyk on direct appeal

constituted deficient performance, Petitioner must also show that, but for counsel’s failure

to cite that case, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of Petitioner’s appeal

would have been different. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259. 

As previously discussed, in Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003),

the federal court certified to the Arizona Supreme Court the issue of whether the felony

murder rule applies to a charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Evanchyk, 47

P.3d 1114, 1115-16. The Arizona Supreme Court described the issue as “whether one can

be convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder when the state does not prove

that the killing was committed with premeditation but only that it occurred in the course

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and furtherance of committing one of the underlying felonies.” Evanchyk, 47 P.3d at 1117,

1119. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that proof of intent to commit the underlying

felony in a case of felony murder is not sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder. Evanchyk, 47 P.3d at 1117, 1119. In reaching that conclusion,

the court relied on Arizona precedent to articulate the elements of conspiracy to commit

premeditated first-degree murder as: “the state must prove that the defendant had the intent

to promote the offense of murder and an agreement with another one that will do the actual

killing.” 47 P.3d at 1117.

Unlike the petitioner in Evanchyk, Petitioner was charged and convicted of

conspiracy to commit premeditated first-degree murder, not felony murder. The State did

not assert a felony-murder theory of conspiracy against Petitioner or his co-defendants. 

Likewise, the trial court did not instruct the jury that an unintentional killing during the

commission of a felony could support a conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder. Rather, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the statutory elements of

conspiracy to commit first degree murder, including the requirement that the jury find that

Petitioner intended to “cause the death of another person” “with premeditation.”

(Respondents’ Exh. Q at 123, 127; Respondents’ Exh. JJ ) The court also defined

“premeditation” as defined as acting with “either the intention or the knowledge that he or

she will kill another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the killing

by any length of time to permit reflection.” (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 129) The court

instructed the jury that it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner

intended to kill another human being and agreed with at least one other conspirator to kill. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Q at 123, 127, 129) The jury instructions required the jury to find

both a specific intent to kill and an agreement to kill. Under the facts of this case, the

principle stated in Evanchyk - that proof of intent to commit the underlying felony in felony

a murder case is not sufficient for a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder - does not

apply. Because Evanchyk does not apply to Petitioner’s case, appellate counsel’s failure to

cite that case did not constitute ineffective assistance. 

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On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that sufficient evidence

supported Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder applying the

elements of premeditated first-degree murder: (1) a person causes the death of another; (2)

with premeditation; (3) by conduct that such person intends or knows will cause death. 

(docket # 1-2 at 11) Based on the elements of premeditated murder, the appellate court

reasoned, a defendant who enters into an agreement to cause the death of another

“premeditates a killing, even though a conviction for conspiracy does not require an actual

murder occur.” (docket # 1-2 at 11) Applying the law regarding conspiracy to commit

first-degree, premeditated murder, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the State

presented sufficient evidence of Petitioner’s intent to kill and of his agreement with at least

one other co-conspirator to kill. (docket # 1-2 at 12) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction

for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was not based on Petitioner’s intent to

commit felony escape. 

Petitioner further argues that the Arizona courts “made an unreasonable

determination of the facts” and “an unreasonable application of federal law” by rejecting

his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because (1) Evanchyk “clearly does

address conspiracy to [commit] first-degree premeditated murder;” (2) “the Evanchyk case

was used by the Court of Appeals in two co-defendants’ case[s];” and (3) appellate

“counsel did recognize Evanchyk’s importance and did try to have it applied.” (docket # 1-

2 at 54) Petitioner’s arguments lack merit. 

First, although Petitioner is correct that Evanchyk discusses the crime of conspiracy

to commit first-degree premeditated murder, it merely summarizes Arizona law regarding

the elements of that crime and does not articulate any new law applicable to conspiracy to

commit premeditated first-degree murder. Evanchyk, 47 P.3d at 116-17. Second,

Petitioner has not presented evidence in support of his assertion that “the Evanchyk case

was used by the Court of Appeals in two co-defendants’ case[s].” (docket # 1-2 at 54) 

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defendants’ convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Rather, the

appellate court’s decision in co-defendant Date’s appeal does not cite Evanchyk and affirms

Date’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. (Respondents’ Exh. K at

38, 51-55) Likewise, the appellate court affirmed co-defendant Manning’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit first degree murder and cited Evanchyk for the proposition that “a

person can be convicted as a conspirator on proof that he or she intended a specific offense

and agreed to promote that offense even if the offense was never completed.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L at 64-65) Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that

the state court’s factual determinations are unreasonable. See Woodford v. Viscotti, 537

U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) (stating that petitioner bears the burden of proving state

court’s factual determinations are unreasonable in light of the evidence.). 

Finally, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel attempted to bring the Evanchyk

decision to the appellate court’s attention, but filed a notice of supplemental authority in the

wrong case. The record supports Petitioner’s assertion that appellate counsel filed a

supplemental citation of authority in the wrong case. (docket # 1-2 at 68-69) However,

because Evanchyk does not apply to Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit

premeditated first degree murder, appellate counsel’s failure to cite that case on appeal and

her failure to file the supplemental citation of authority in the correct case, do not give rise

to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273

(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim). 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his

claims raised in Ground III.

D. Ground Four - Confrontation Clause

In his fourth ground for relief, Petitioner argues that “[a]dmission of out of court

statements by an alleged co-conspirator violated [his] right to confront witnesses under the

6th and 14th Amendments.” (docket # 1 at 9, docket # 1-2 at 55) Respondents concede that

Petitioner properly exhausted this claim and that it is properly before this Court on habeas

corpus review. (docket # 10 at 44)

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1. Relevant Background

Before trial, Petitioner moved to preclude England’s testimony about statements

made to him by co-conspirator Schilinski regarding the escape/murder. (Respondents’ Exh.

R at 151, Exh. S at 153-54) Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in

limine explaining that:

My feeling is that aside from the confrontation issue, that I have heard 

avow[als] made during various hearings in this case that would suggest

to me that the State is going to be able to establish the existence of a 

conspiracy short of statements that were necessarily made by Mr. Schlinisky

to Mr. England. Granted these are going to be circumstantial, but I believe

that at least from what I’ve heard that there would be sufficient evidence that 

would eventually be presented in this case to allow the statements made by 

Mr. Schilinksy to Mr. England to be admissible as statements made by a 

co-conspirator during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

(Respondents’ Exh. U at 161-62; Exh. T at 155-56)

Petitioner challenged this ruling on direct appeal arguing that the trial court erred by

permitting England to testify regarding Schilinksi’s statements because they were hearsay

and were not admissible under any hearsay exception or as non-hearsay statements of a

coconspirator. (docket # 1-3 at 33-35; docket # 1-4 at 22) 

The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim finding that:

Statements made by a co-conspirator in the course or furtherance of a 

conspiracy are not hearsay. Ariz.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 506, 815 P.2d 869, 875 (1991). When inquiring into whether

a statement by a co-conspirator was made in furtherance of a conspiracy, we

focus on the intent of the declarant in advancing the goals of the conspiracy,

rather than whether the statement had the actual effect of advancing those

goals. State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 458, 930 P.2d 518, 535 (App. 1996). 

As long as some reasonable basis exists for concluding that the statement

furthered the conspiracy, the “in furtherance” requirement is satisfied. Id. When it has been shown both that a conspiracy exists and that the defendant

and the declarant are parties to the conspiracy, such statements are

admissible. Id. Under this co-conspirator rule, there is no Confrontation

Clause requirement that the declarant be unavailable to testify. United States

v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-96 (1986). 

[Petitioner] does not contend that Schilinsky was not a party to a

conspiracy to break Goldberg out of the Kingman jail. Rather, he contends

that Schilinsky’s statements amounted to mere bragging not meant to further

the conspiracy. It does appear that Schilinsky was boastful and something of

a braggart. After arriving at the Las Vegas jail, he mysteriously told England

to “watch the six o’ clock news.” Nevertheless, the record is clear that

Schilinsky disclosed the actual details of the escape plan, the timing, the

location, and the names of two of the men involved, in order to enlist

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England’s help in making bail. We hold that the statements were made in

furtherance of the conspiracy and were, therefore, admissible.

(docket # 1-2 at 13-14) Following the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s

claim, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court which denied review without

comment. (docket # 1-4 at 29, docket # 1-2 at 22) Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision is the last reasoned decision of the state courts. 

2. Merits Review of Ground IV - Confrontation Clause Claim

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on Ground Four because he

has not established that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The

state court’s conclusion that Schilinski’s statements to England were non-hearsay

statements made by a co-conspirator in the course or furtherance of a conspiracy was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner has also failed to

show that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right “to be confronted with

witnesses against him.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (quoting the Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution). “The central concern of the Confrontation

Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting

it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).

The Confrontation Clause, however, may yield where an unavailable declarant’s

out-of-court statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability. In Mattox v. United States, 156

U.S. 237 (1895), the Supreme Court recognized that the framers of the Constitution

“obviously intended to . . . respec[t]” certain unquestionable rules of evidence in drafting

the Confrontation Clause. 156 U.S. at 243. Relying on Mattox, courts have permitted the

admission of out-of-court statements which fall within a firmly rooted exception to the

hearsay rule. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Where a declarant’s statement falls

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under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Sixth Amendment’s residual “trustworthiness”

test allows the admission of the declarant’s statements. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820

(1990) (stating that “if a declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding

circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the

hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial.”) 

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court redefined the

test, that it had previously articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), for the

admissibility of a testimonial statement by an unavailable hearsay declarant. Id. The

Crawford Court held that the government cannot introduce out-of-court testimonial

evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable at trial

and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36,

68. Although the term “testimonial” is central to the Crawford Court’s decision, it left “for

another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” Id. The

Court, however, referred to the definition of testimony as “‘[a] solemn declaration or

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” Id. (quoting 1 N.

Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Crawford Court

also suggested that testimonial statements can be defined as “ex parte in-court testimony or

its functional equivalent — that is material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior

testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that

declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-

52. The Court also referred to Justice Thomas’ earlier definition of “testimonial

statements” as “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials,

such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’” Id. at 52 (quoting White v.

Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)(Thomas, J., concurring)). Finally, the Court gave several

specific examples of obviously testimonial statements with which the Sixth Amendment is

concerned — namely “prior testimony [given] at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,

or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id at 52. The Supreme Court noted that

“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed [is the] civil-law mode

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of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte communication as evidence

against the accused.” Id. at 51. The Court agrees with Respondents’ assertion that

Crawford does not apply to this case. (docket # 10 at 47). First, the Supreme Court has

specifically held that Crawford does not apply retroactively to convictions that were

pending on collateral review at the time Crawford was issued. Whorton v. Bockting, 549

U.S. 406 (2007). Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 28, 2003, several

months before Crawford was issued on March 8, 2004. (see docket # 10 at 10-12) 

Additionally, Crawford only applies to testimonial evidence and Schilinski’s

challenged statements are not testimonial. See Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 22

(9th Cir. 2004). Crawford specifically explained that “statements in furtherance of a

conspiracy” are “by their nature” not testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56; see also

United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “co-conspirator

statements are not testimonial and therefore beyond the compass of Crawford’s holding.”);

Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (stating that co-conspirator statements are not “hearsay”);

Ariz.R.Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) (same). As discussed below, Schilinski’s statements pertain to

the logistics and details of the jailbreak/murder plan and were made in furtherance of that

plan, therefore, they are not testimonial. 

Because Crawford does not apply to Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim, the

Court will consider that claim under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the

Supreme Court established guidelines for determining whether out-of-court statements

satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Under Roberts, an out-of-court

statement is admissible if the prosecution demonstrates both the unavailability of the

declarant and that the out-of-court statement has an “indicia of reliability.” Roberts, 448

U.S. at 66. The Roberts requirements are less stringent when the out-of-court statement is

made by a co-conspirator. First, when the declarant is a co-conspirator, the party offering

the statement need not demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. United States v. Inadi,

475 U.S. 387, 395-400 (1986). Additionally, the reliability requirement can be inferred

where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497

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U.S. 805, 815 (1990). The co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is “firmly enough

rooted in [its] jurisprudence that . . . a court need not independently inquire into the

reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). 

In this case, Petitioner aruges that the “Court of Appeals made an unreasonable

determination of the facts when it determined that [Schilinski’s statements] were made in

furtherance of conspiracy” because the statements at issue “were idle bragging.” (docket #

1-2 at 55-56) The Court disagrees. As set forth below, the record indicates that the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that Schilinski’s statements were made in

furtherance of the conspiracy was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in view of

the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

In early 1999, England and Schilinski were in jail together in Mohave County,

Arizona. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 212) Both were subsequently transferred to jail in Las

Vegas. Because England worked as a “module trustee” in the Las Vegas Jail, he had

“extra” telephone privileges. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 213) England was working the day

Schilinski arrived in the Las Vegas jail and saw him walk by with the “new guys” who

were “coming in.” (Respondents’ Exh. W at 212-213) Within Schilinski’s first 24 hours

in the Las Vegas jail, he got in trouble with an officer and was placed in lockdown. 

(Respondents’ Exh. W at 211-214) Because of his lockdown status, Schilinski asked

England to call someone for him to arrange Schilinski’s release from jail. (Respondents’

Exh. W at 214-15, 231-32) Schilinski explained that he needed England’s help to secure

his release quickly because he was supposed to help “break somebody out of jail” in

Kingman, Arizona at 11:30 a.m. on June 12, 2000. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 214-19, 236-

37) Schilinski told England the details of the plan including the date and time, the

sequence of events, the location, the amount of money Schilinski would receive for his

participation, the names of two of the men involved (Goldberg and “Eugene” whose last

name rhymed with “ski”), and that the plan included Schilinski shooting the guard

escorting Goldberg if necessary. (Respondents’ Exh. W at 216-224, 239-41, 245-46) After

Schilinski told England about the plan, England tried to telephone a woman whose

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telephone number Schilinski had given him, but got an answering machine. (Respondents’

Exh. W at 223, 237-238) 

Schilinski’s statements to England were made to facilitate his release from jail so he

could participate in the conspiracy. Thus, those statements were made in furtherance of the

conspiracy and were properly admitted at trial. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180 (stating that

a co-conspirator’s statements can, by themselves, be probative of the existence of a

conspiracy and the participation of both petitioner and the declarant in the conspiracy.) The

Court of Appeals’ resolution of the facts was not unreasonable in view of the foregoing

evidence. 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ resolution

of Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim was either contrary to or rested on an

unreasonable application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The State presented

evidence that Schilinski and Petitioner were co-conspirators. The State also presented

evidence that Schilinski’s statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy, which

included a plan to kill a guard if necessary. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175 (stating that

before admitting co-conspirator’s statements as an exception to the hearsay rule, there must

be evidence that there was a conspiracy and that the statement was made during the course

of an in furtherance of the conspiracy.) 

Petitioner argues that the appellate court’s decision affirming the admission of

Schilinski’s statements was “contrary to federal law,” because “[t]here is no record of

Schilinski being unavailable to testify” and “England was not invited to join the

conspiracy.” (docket # 1-2 at 55) Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. The Supreme Court has

held that the admission of out-of-court statements made by a non-testifying co-conspirator

does not violate the Confrontation Clause and that, in such a case, the unavailability

requirement does not apply. See Wright, 497 U.S. 814-15; Inadi, 475 U.S. 394-400. 

Additionally, the admissibility of co-conspirator statements does not depend on whether the

statements were made between co-conspirators. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2); Ariz.R.Evid.

801(d)(2). 

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 15 Judge Conn was assigned to preside over Goldberg’s change-of-plea hearing on June 12,

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The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s denial of

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim was contrary to, or an reasonable application of,

applicable federal law. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s

determination was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground Four. 

E. Ground Five - Recusal 

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that the Honorable Steven F. Conn’s failure to

recuse himself sua sponte from Petitioner’s trial violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights

to a fair trial and due process. (docket # 1 at 10, docket # 1-2 at 57-58) Specifically,

Petitioner contends that Judge Conn should have recused himself because: (A) he saw

Petitioner enter the courtroom on June 12, 2000, the morning of the planned

jailbreak/murder;15 and (B) “Judge Conn’s court reporter of 14 years [testified at trial as] a

state witness.” (docket # 1-2 at 57-58) 

Respondents argue that both Ground 5(a) and 5(b) are unexhausted and procedurally

defaulted because Petitioner failed to present those claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(docket # 10 at 53-54) As previously discussed, Petitioner was not required to present his

federal claims to the Arizona Supreme Court to exhaust those claims. See Section II.A,

supra. The Court finds that Petitioner’s failure to present Grounds 5(a) and (b) to the

Arizona Supreme Court did not result in a procedural bar to those claims. 

Respondents alternatively argue that federal habeas review of Grounds 5(a) and 5(b)

is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not fairly present those claims to the state

courts. The Court will discuss this issue below. 

1. Exhaustion/Procedural Bar

In Ground 5(a), Petitioner argues that Judge Conn’s failure to recuse himself sua

sponte violated Petitioner’s due process rights because he witnessed Petitioner enter the

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courtroom on June 12, 2000, the morning of the planned jailbreak/murder. (docket # 1-2 at

57-58) He further argues that the Court of Appeals considered Petitioner’s act of “entering

the courtroom” proof of Petitioner’s involvement in the conspiracy. (docket # 1-2 at 57) As

discussed below, Petitioner did not exhaust this claim because he never raised this federal

claim to the state courts. In Ground 5(b), Petitioner argues that Judge Conn’s failure to

recuse himself violated Petitioner’s due process rights because his court reporter testified as

a State’s witness at Petitioner’s trial and her status as Judge Conn’s court reporter

“bolstered her testimony” and “made the State and the court appear as one.” (docket # 1-2

at 58) As discussed below, Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim because he did not

present this legal theory - improper bolstering - to the state courts. 

 Petitioner neither moved for a change of judge for cause nor otherwise requested

that Judge Conn recuse himself at any time during trial. On direct appeal, Petitioner

asserted that Judge Conn’s failure to recuse himself sua sponte violated his right to due

process because Judge Conn “stated that he was ‘familiar with the procedural relationship’

between [Petitioner’s] current and prior felony charges” and Judge Conn’s “court reporter

of many years was called to testify about the court’s calendar on the day of the attempted

escape.” (docket # 1-2 at 15-16, docket # 1-3 at 35-38, docket # 1-4 at 22) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected these claims explaining that:

Although a judge is required to ‘disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding

in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’ we do not

believe that this is such a case. See Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 81, Canon 3(E) (specifying

situations in which judges must recuse themselves). First, a trial court’s

knowledge of the ‘procedural relationship’ between two cases does not render

that court biased. Second, the reporter’s testimony regarding undisputed 

calendar matters could not have possibly resulted in court bias. A trial judge

is presumed to be free of bias and prejudice. [State v.] Medina, 193 Ariz. 504,

510, ¶ 11, 975 P.2d 94, 100 (1999). [Petitioner] has failed to present evidence

to rebut this presumption. 

(docket # 1-2 at 16) 

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (docket # 1-4 at 37) He

argued, on the basis of state law, that the Judge Conn “should have recused himself.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 100) Petitioner did not present the same factual allegations or

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legal theory to the State courts that he presents in Grounds 5(a) and (b) of the pending

petition.

Although Petitioner challenged Judge Conn’s failure to recuse himself in state court,

he did so based on factual allegations other than those asserted in Ground 5(a) and based on

a legal theory other than that asserted in Ground 5(b). Accordingly, federal habeas review

of those factual assertions is procedurally barred. See Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6-7; Gray, 518

U.S. at 162-63 (stating that “for purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief in

habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well

as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.”); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d

1063, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel and

prosecutorial misconduct claims were specific instances of ineffectiveness and misconduct

asserted in federal petition were neither in the California Supreme Court petition nor

discussed by the Court of Appeals), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481

F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007); Gauf v. Ontiveres, No. CV-06-804-PHX-DGC (JCG), 2007 WL

1713287, * 5 (D.Ariz. June 12, 2007) (noting that presentation of one set of operative facts

in support of a federal claim does not properly exhaust the same federal claim based on a

different set of facts); Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6-7 (petitioner does not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement if he presents new legal theories or factual claims in a federal petition for writ

of habeas corpus); Beard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the

exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if petitioner presents new legal theories or factual

claims for the first time in his federal petition.) 

Petitioner did not properly present any of the federal claims raised in Ground Five to

the state courts and any attempt to return to state court to present those claims would be

futile because they would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. First, Petitioner

is time-barred under Arizona law from raising these claims in a successive petition for postconviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long

expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be

filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after

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the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although

Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in

Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions

apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409,

410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or

in any previous collateral proceeding. See Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised

limited number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did

not); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are

precluded from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could

have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction

relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994)

(defendant’s claim that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was

precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal). The aforementioned

unexhausted claims could have, and should have, been properly raised either on direct

appeal or on post-conviction review. Accordingly, the State court would find Petitioner’s

claims raised in Ground Five procedurally barred. 

As set forth above, Petitioner’s claims raised in Ground Five are procedurally

defaulted and barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice”

or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the

state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1)

interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

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not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not articulate any basis to overcome the procedural bar. As a general

matter, Petitioner’s pro se status at any time during his state and federal proceedings and

ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988); Martinez-Villareal, 80 F.3d at 1306. Petitioner offers no legitimate

“cause” which precluded him from properly exhausting his state remedies. Accordingly,

the Court declines to reach the issue of prejudice. Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim

if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. This gateway “actual

innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466

F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court described the gateway showing in

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard than a substantive claim of actual

innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997)(suggesting that a

“habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating

doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that he is innocent.”). If Petitioner

passes through the Schlup gateway, the court is only permitted to review his underlying

constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in which a petitioner makes the

extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably convicted due to a

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constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 231 (1995). To demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. To

establish the requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. New evidence presented in support of a

fundamental miscarriage of justice may include “exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not presented at

trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence that the trial jury did not have

before it). Petitioner does not assert that failure to consider his claims raised in Ground

Five will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the record does not

establish that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup,

513 U.S. at 324, 327. Thus, Petitioner has not established any basis to overcome the

procedural bar to federal review of the Ground Five. Moreover, Petitioner’s claims raised

in Ground Five do not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. 

2. Merits Review of Ground 5(a)

In Ground 5(a), Petitioner argues that Judge Conn’s failure to recuse himself sua

sponte violated his due process rights because Judge Conn witnessed Petitioner enter the

courtroom on the morning of the planned jailbreak, a fact the Court of Appeals relied on in

finding sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit

escape. (docket # 1-2 at 57) Petitioner also argues that Judge Conn was biased against

him based on Judge Conn’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion. (docket # 1-2 at 57-58) 

 Most issues regarding a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional

ones. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333

U.S. 683, 702 (1948) (stating that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not

rise to a constitutional level.”). “Rather, these questions are, in most cases, answered by

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common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (citing Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820-821; 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,

455; ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(a) (1980)). However, “the . . Due

Process Clause requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal’ . . . before a judge with no actual bias

against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Bracy, 520 U.S at

904-05 (citations omitted). See also, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 

The determination of judicial bias is a factual question to which the federal courts

defer on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632

(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that state court’s finding of lack of judicial bias was entitled to a

presumption of correctness.) To succeed on a judicial bias claim, a petitioner must

“overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.”

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). The Supreme Court has stated that “opinions

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the

current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality

motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

Petitioner has offered no evidence to overcome the “presumption of honesty and

integrity” that is accorded the determinations of a judge. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. 

Although Judge Conn had knowledge of the planned escape attempt, there is no evidence

that this knowledge resulted in “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s

suggestion, Judge Conn did not offer any evidence at Petitioner’s trial and the Court of

Appeals did not rely on any actions or statements of Judge Conn to support its conclusion

that sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals’ decision

does not state that Judge Conn witnessed Petitioner enter his courtroom on the day of the

planned escape attempt. (docket # 1-2 at 14-15) Rather, the Court of Appeals relied on

Officer Severson’s testimony that Petitioner and “his wife entered the courtroom where

Goldberg was scheduled to appear.” (docket # 1-2 at 6-7, 10) 

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Additionally, although Judge Conn made rulings which were unfavorable to

Petitioner, such as denying his Rule 20 motion, bias can “almost never” be demonstrated

solely on the basis of a judicial ruling. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Rather, a judge’s remarks

or opinions will not demonstrate bias unless they “reveal such a high degree of favoritism

or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id.

Petitioner’s allegation that Judge Conn “received information from the extrajudicial

source of a murder conspiracy,” (docket # 1-2 at 57), also fails to establish that Judge

Conn’s failure to recuse himself gave rise to a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

The record contains no evidence that Judge Conn’s ruling on Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion

was based on any information other than the evidence presented at trial. (Respondents’

Exh. AA at 401-26) Judge Conn’s ruling on Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion reflects that he 

considered the factual and legal issues and does not reveal any bias. (Respondents’ Exh.

AA at 420-23) 

Finally, even if Judge Conn appeared biased because law enforcement officers

informed him that Goldberg would not be brought to court on the day of the planned

jailbreak/murder, and Judge Conn saw Petitioner enter his courtroom that same day, the

mere appearance of bias does not violate the Due Process Clause. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at

46; Aetna Life Insurance, 475 U.S. at 821-22; Sewer Alert Committee v. Pierce County, 791

F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that recusal not required merely

because of judge’s prior acquaintance with defendants). 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claim in Ground 5(a) that

Judge Conn’s failure to recuse himself sua sponte violated the Due Process Clause. 

3. Merits Review of Ground 5(b)

In Ground 5(b), Petitioner argues that Judge Conn erred in failing to recuse himself

sua sponte because Petitioner was “prejudiced” by the testimony of Judge Conn’s court

reporter at his trial. (docket # 1-2 at 58) 

During Petitioner’s trial, Judge Conn’s court reporter, Sandra Brice, testified that

Goldberg and the Cofskys were scheduled to appear on June 12, 2000 before Judge Conn. 

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(Respondents’ Exh. EE, Tr. 1/12/01 at 210-216) Petitioner claims that Brice’s status as

Judge Conn’s court reporter, “bolstered her testimony . . . and made the State and the court

appear was one.” (docket # 1-2 at 58) 

The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim that Judge Conn should have

recused himself because his court reporter testified about the court’s calendar on the day of

the attempted escape. (docket # 1-2 at 16) On the basis of Arizona law that trial judges are

“presumed to be free of bias and prejudice,” the Court of Appeals determined that Ms.

Brice’s “testimony regarding undisputed calendar matters could not have possibly resulted

in court bias.” (docket # 1-2 at 16) The appellate court’s ruling that Petitioner must show

actual bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Conn was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. See Aenta Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-

22 (1986) (stating that Due Process Clause requires a fair trial before a judge with no actual

bias against defendant or an interest in the outcome of his particular case). Additionally,

the appellate court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence at trial because the record confirms that Ms. Brice’s testimony

regarding Judge Conn’s June 12, 2000 calendar was undisputed. (Respondents’ Exh. X at

297-309) 

Additionally, Petitioner’s claim that Ms. Brice’s testimony was “bolstered” by her

position as Judge Conn’s court reporter and “made the State and the court appear as one,”

does not warrant habeas corpus relief. (docket # 1-2 at 58) The Supreme Court has never

held that actual bias is shown simply because a member of the judge’s staff presents

undisputed evidence as a State’s witness. See, Aetna, 475 U.S. at 821-22. Petitioner’s

contention that Ms. Brice’s testimony was bolstered by Judge Conn’s directive that she

“stick around for the hearings we still have to do,” (Respondents’ Exh. EE, Tr. 1/12/01 at

221), does not constitute improper bolstering of Ms. Brice’s testimony because the jury had

already been informed that Ms. Brice was Judge Conn’s court reporter. (Respondents’

Exh. X at 297-309) Finally, Petitioner does not contend that Ms. Brice’s testimony

regarding Judge Conn’s calendar on June 12, 2000 was not disputed. (docket # 1-2 at 16) 

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The defense presented no evidence to dispute Brice’s testimony that Goldberg was

scheduled to appear in Judge Conn’s courtroom at 11:30 a.m. on June 12, 2000. (Tr.

1/12/2001 at 214-16) Thus, even if Ms. Brice’s testimony was in some way “bolstered,”

Petitioner would not have been prejudiced because her testimony was undisputed. 

F. Ground VI - Pinkerton Jury Instruction

In Ground VI (see dockets # 18-20), Petitioner contends that his due process rights

were violated by the trial court’s jury instruction that “a conspirator is liable for all criminal

acts committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy” (the

Pinkerton instruction) because this instruction lowered the State’s burden of proof and

permitted the jury to convict Petitioner of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder without

finding that Petitioner himself had the requisite intent to support a conviction for

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Respondents assert that this claim is

procedurally barred or, alternatively, lacks merit. (docket # 19) 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Respondents have not conceded exhaustion

with respect to Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton jury instruction. Petitioner’s

Petition, drafted pro se, did not specifically challenge the Pinkerton jury instruction. 

(docket # 1) Rather, in Ground I Petitioner presented a sufficiency of the evidence claim

arguing that the State “presented insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to

find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit [first-degree] murder beyond a reasonable

doubt in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (docket # 1 at

6) In their Response, Respondents conceded that Petitioner had exhausted this claim. 

(docket # 10)

In his Reply, drafted by counsel, Petitioner recast Ground I as follows: The state

court violated Petitioner’s Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution by giving a jury instruction that invited the jury to find Cofsky

guilty based upon insufficient evidence.” (docket # 14 at 4) Contrary to Petitioner’s

assertion in his Reply, Respondents did not concede that Petitioner had properly presented

this claim. Indeed, Respondents could not have conceded anything with respect to

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Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton jury instruction because that claim was not clearly

raised in his Petition. (see dockets # 1, # 18) Having found that Respondents have not

waived the exhaustion defense to Ground VI, the Court will next consider that claim.

1. Exhaustion/Procedural Bar Analysis

The record reflects that Petitioner did not properly present his jury instruction claim

raised in Ground VI to the state courts. Near the end of trial, the court and counsel

discussed jury instructions. (docket # 16, Exh. HH at 146-84; Exh. II at 68-88) The trial

court stated that it would instruct the jury that “a conspirator is liable for all criminal acts

committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy” (the Pinkerton

instruction). (docket # 16, Exh. HH at 146-184, Exh. II at 68-88. Petitioner did not object.

(Id.) 

Petitioner concedes that he did not challenge the Pinkerton jury instruction on direct

appeal. (docket # 20 at 3) The record confirms this fact. (see docket # 1-3 at 20; docket #

1-2 at 9-12) However, Petitioner argues that he properly exhausted his Pinkerton jury

instruction claim by presenting it to the state courts on post-conviction review. (docket #

20 at 3) The record does not support this contention. On post-conviction review,

Petitioner argued that Evanchyk v. Stewart represents a significant change in the law

applicable to his case. (docket # 1-5 at 11-13) Petitioner conceded that conditional intent

was sufficient to satisfy the “intent to kill” element required to prove conspiracy to commit

first-degree murder. (docket # 1-5 at 18) However, Petitioner argued that the appellate

court erred in concluding that the State’s evidence was sufficient to support his conviction

for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder because the facts cited by that court failed to

demonstrate Petitioner’s “involvement with any plan or intent to kill anyone.” (docket # 1-

5 at 15) Petitioner argued that the appellate court overlooked Evanchyk v. Stewart, 47 P.3d

1114 (2002), in which “the Arizona Supreme Court specifically rejected the Pinkerton

doctrine,” and, thus, his “conviction in this matter violates Evanchyk and denies him Due

Process of Law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.” (docket # 1-5 at 12-13) Petitioner specifically argued that the facts relied

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upon by the Court of Appeals “in support of its decision on the sufficiency of the evidence”

“are insufficient to prove any intent on Petitioner’s part to commit all of the crimes

contemplated by his co-conspirators.” (docket # 1-5 at 14) Although Petitioner mentioned

Pinkerton in his post-conviction pleadings, he did so in the context of his argument that the

Arizona Court of Appeals applied an improper standard in determining that the State

presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. (docket # 1-5 at 14) (arguing that the “continued application” of the

Pinkerton doctrine to Petitioner’s case “denied him Due Process of Law.”); (docket 1-5 at

12-13) (arguing that the Arizona Court of Appeals overlooked Evanchyk, in which “the

Arizona Supreme specifically rejected the Pinkerton doctrine,” and, thus, his “conviction in

this matter violates Evanchyk and denies him Due Process of law.”) Petitioner neither

mentioned the jury instructions generally nor the Pinkerton instruction specifically. 

(docket # 1-5 at 1-14) Petitioner simply did not challenge the trial court’s Pinkerton jury

instruction in his petition for post-conviction relief. Rather, he raised a sufficiency of the

evidence claim based on the Court of Appeals’ decision that the evidence was sufficient to

support his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

None of Petitioner’s post-conviction pleadings presented the Pinkerton jury

instruction claim that Petitioner asserts in his federal petition. Rather, Petitioner disputed

the sufficiency of the evidence. In fact, in his Motion for Rehearing of the trial court’s

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner stated that:

The jury instructions are of no significance to the error in this case. The 

crux of Petitioner’s argument is that his Rule 20 motion should have been 

granted. Arizona conspiracy law now requires proof of a defendant’s intent 

to participate in the particular crime charged, not just a generic intent to 

participate in the overall conspiracy. 

(docket # 1-5 at 19) (emphasis added). 

Likewise, in his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner again

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. (docket # 1-5 at 22-21) Petitioner argued that

insufficient evidence supported his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

(docket # 1-5 at 35) Petitioner cited Pinkerton in the context of his sufficiency of the

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evidence argument, (docket # 1–5 at 36-38), but did not challenge the jury instructions. 

Indeed, Petitioner again stated that “[t]he jury instructions are of no significance to the error

in this case.” (docket # 1-5 at 39) Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme

Court raised the same arguments that he had presented to the trial and appellate courts. 

(docket # 1-5 at 47-60) Petitioner did not challenge the Pinkerton jury instruction. 

In summary, Petitioner did not present his current challenge to the Pinkerton jury

instruction to the state courts either on direct appeal or during post-conviction proceedings. 

Because Petitioner did not fairly present his Pinkerton claim to the state courts, that claim

is unexhausted. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (stating that “[i]t is not enough . . . that a somewhat similar state-law claim

was made.”) Moreover, because Petitioner cannot now return to state court to present his

jury instruction claim raised in Claim VI, that claim is technically exhausted and

procedurally barred. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, 32.4(a); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939

(9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner fails to demonstrate cause and prejudice, or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, to excuse his procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 

Moreover, Claim VI fails on the merits as discussed below. 

2. Merits Review of Ground VI - Jury Instruction Claim 

a. Relevant Background

On post-conviction review, the trial court considered Petitioner’s related, but

separate, claim that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the Pinkerton theory of

conspiracy liability in affirming Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. In rejecting this claim, the post-conviction court found that the jury was

properly instructed on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under a premeditation

theory:

[Petitioner’s] first claim for relief is Evanchyk v. Stewart was a significant

change in the law which would probably have changed the outcome of the 

case if applied thereto. The issue in Evanchyk was whether a defendant 

could be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder where it was

asserted that he conspired to commit the crime only under the felony-murder 

theory as opposed to the premeditation theory. The Arizona Supreme Court 

held that he could not and held that in Arizona there is no crime such as 

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conspiracy to commit felony-murder first degree murder. The court went on

to affirm that one can be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder

if one intended to kill or promote or aid in killing and made an agreement to

kill. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on

appellate opinions dating back as far as 1981.

The holding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder 

based solely on a felony-murder theory could not stand was new law in

Arizona. . . . [Petitioner] in this case, however, was not convicted under such

a theory. The only theory the jury was instructed on in this case was the 

premeditation theory. To the extent that Evanchyk was new law regarding 

conspiring to commit first degree murder under a felony-murder theory, it is

not applicable to the facts of this case and would have no impact on the 

outcome of this case. 

The holding in Evanchyk that conspiring to commit first degree [murder] is

a specific intent crime is not new law and is not inconsistent with the instructions

given in this case. The jury was instructed that [Petitioner] had to intend to

promote or aid the commission of First Degree Murder . . . . The jury was 

instructed that First Degree Murder required that one act intentionally or

knowingly and with premeditation. The Arizona Court of Appeals on direct

appeal in this case addressed the issue of whether the conspirators had merely

a conditional intent to kill. The appellate court held that conditional intent is

sufficient where the condition is one the defendant imposes but has no right

to impose. The conspirators in this case had no right to impose upon the 

corrections officer the condition that they would refrain from killing him as

long as he peaceably surrendered his prisoner. The jury in this case would have

been instructed no differently had Evanchyk already been decided. It was not 

a decision which would have affected the outcome of this case. The Court 

determines that Evanchyk v. Stewart is not new law which would have applied

to and changed the outcome of this case. [Petitioner] is not entitled to

post-conviction [relief] on such claim. 

(docket # 1-2 at 22-25) 

On May 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing, arguing that the trial

court misunderstood his petition for post-conviction relief. (docket # 1-5 at 17) Petitioner

conceded that “it is sufficient in a conspiracy case to prove conditional intent,” but argued

that “his Rule 20 motion should have been granted” because “the State has failed to

demonstrate the requisite intent necessary to convict [Petitioner] of conspiracy to commit

murder.” (docket # 1-5, at 17-19) Relying on Evanchyk, Petitioner argued that “Arizona

conspiracy law now requires proof of a defendant’s intent to participate in the particular

crime charged,” and the State failed to present “proof of any intent (conditional or

otherwise) by Petitioner to conspire to commit murder.” (docket # 1-5 at 19)

On June 17, 2005, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing:

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In reviewing [the] Petition, the Court notes now as it did before entering

its ruling that the first paragraphs of the Petition asserts that [Petitioner] 

is entitled to post-conviction relief because of a significant change in the

law. Because the Court had already ruled on that specific issue when raised

under Rule 32 by a co-Defendant in this case, the Court’s order denying 

post-conviction relief focused on that same issue.

The Court realizes upon reading the Motion for Rehearing and rereading

the original Petition that [Petitioner] is also making a slightly different 

and more factually-related argument, that there was insufficient evidence

of his intent to conspire to commit murder. The Court feels that this issue

was addressed and decided against [Petitioner] by the Court of Appeals on

direct appeal. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on October 29, 2002,

and presumably was aware at that time of the Evanchyk decision which had

been issued by the Arizona Supreme Court on May 24, 2002. Cases in 

Arizona repudiating the Pinkerton doctrine of liability for crimes committed

by a coconspirator were decided many years ago and [Petitioner’s] guilt in 

this case was not based upon the Pinkerton doctrine anyway. 

(docket # 1-2 at 16-27) After the trial court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief and for rehearing, Petitioner presented the same insufficiency of the evidence claim

to the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court. Both courts summarily

denied relief.

b. Merits Review of Pinkerton Claim

As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the

jury instruction claim raised in Ground VI. In Ground VI, Petitioner argues that trial court

erred by giving a jury instruction based on a Pinkerton theory of liability which is not

recognized in Arizona. He argues that giving such an instruction permitted the jury to

convict him of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder without finding that Petitioner

himself had the requisite intent to support a conviction for first-degree murder. (docket #

1-2 at 15; docket # 14 at 6-8) Petitioner argues that the “flawed jury instruction diluted the

State’s burden of proof, because it did not require the jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Petitioner possessed the requisite intent to commit murder.” (docket # 14 at 11;

docket # 1-2 at 52) 

Pinkerton Instruction was Improperly Given

Ground VI is based on the following jury instruction, “A conspirator is liable for all

criminal acts committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

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(Respondents’ Exh. Q at 137, docket # 1-2 at 15, citing Tr. 1/24/01) This instruction is

based on Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), in which the Supreme Court held

that “a conspirator may be found responsible for crimes committed by a co-conspirator, as

long as the acts making up the crimes are reasonably foreseeable and are carried out in

furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the conspirator did not participate in their

commission.” State ex rel. Woods v.Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151 (Ariz. 1992) (discussing

Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645-48). Pinkerton was the law in Arizona until the enactment of

Arizona’s 1979 Criminal Code. That Code provides that a conspirator is responsible for a

co-conspirator’s acts only if the conspirator is an accomplice or principal. Cohen, 844 P.2d

at 1151. To be considered an accomplice, a conspirator must aid, counsel, agree to aid, or

attempt to aid in the commission of the substantive crime. State v. Portillo, 876 P.2d 1151,

1153 (Ariz. App. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds, 898 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1995). The

Pinkerton jury instruction given in this case incorrectly suggests that under Arizona law, a

conspirator is criminally responsible even if the conspirator did not aid, counsel, agree to

aid, or attempt to aid in the substantive crime. The Arizona Supreme Court has expressly

rejected a Pinkerton jury instruction similar to the one at issue in this case. Portillo, 876

P.2d at 1153-54. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s assertion that the Pinkerton instruction

was improperly given in this case. However, it did not result in a Due Process violation. 

Whether Pinkerton Instruction Violated Petitioner’s Right to Due Process 

As discussed below, the erroneously given Pinkerton instruction did not “so infect

the entire trial” that Petitioner’s conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1991); Masoner v. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1993).

The Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]n a criminal trial, the State must prove every

element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to

that requirement.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (citing Sandstrom v.

Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-521 (1979)). However, “not every ambiguity, inconsistency,

or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.” Middleton,

541 U.S. at 437. The issue is “‘whether the ailing instruction ... so infected the entire trial

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that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72

(1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). “‘[A] single instruction to a

jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the

overall charge.’” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at

146-147). If the jury instructions as a whole are ambiguous, the issue is whether there is a

“‘reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that

violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).

Analysis of Petitioner’s challenge to the Pinkerton instruction requires consideration

of the jury instructions as a whole. Here, the trial court gave the following jury instructions

related to conspiracy: 

The crime of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder has two elements. In 

order to determine that the Defendant committed the crime of Conspiracy to

commit first degree murder, you must find that, number one, the Defendant

agreed with one or more persons that at least one of them or another person

would engage in conduct constituting the crime of first degree murder, and 

number two, the Defendant did so with the intent to promote or aid in the

commission of the crime of first degree murder. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ at 6-7) 

* * * 

In order to find any Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit either first

degree murder or escape in the first degree, it is not necessary to

find that the Defendant actually committed either crime, only that there was

a conspiracy to commit such crime. 

The crime of first degree murder has the following three elements: Number one,

the person caused the death of another person, and number two, the person 

did so with premeditation, and number three, the person intended or knew that his

or her conduct would cause death. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ at 8)

* * * 

Conduct is the cause of a result when, but for the conduct, the result in question

would not have occurred. 

“Premeditation” means that the Defendant acts with either the intention or the

knowledge that he or she will kill another human being, when such intention or

knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection. 

Proof of actual reflection is not required, but an act is not premeditated it if is 

the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 

“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” means, with respect to a result or to 

conduct, that a person’s objective is to cause that result or to engage in that 

conduct. 

“Knowingly” means, with respect to conduct or to a circumstance, that a person

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 16 Respondents’ Exhibit JJ, attached to docket # 16, is the January 24, 2001 trial transcript.

Page 9 of that transcript is out of sequence. Rather than following page 8, page 9 of the January

24, 2001 transcript appears between pages 40 and 41. 

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is aware or believes that his or her conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance

exists. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ at 9)16

* * *

One may become a member of the conspiracy without full knowledge of all the 

details of the conspiracy. On the other hand, a person who has no knowledge

of a conspiracy but happens to act in a way which furthers some object of 

the conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator.

Before you find that any Defendant or other person was a member of a conspiracy,

the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant or other

person claimed to have been a member knowingly participated in the unlawful

plan with the intent to promote or assist the carrying out of the conspiracy. 

A person understanding the unlawful character of a plan who knowingly 

encourages, advises or assists the undertaking thereby also becomes a 

conspirator. 

One who knowingly joins an existing conspiracy is charged with the same

responsibility as an originator or instigator of the conspiracy. In determining

whether a conspiracy exists, you should consider the actions and statements 

of all the alleged participants. However, in determining whether a particular

Defendant was a member of the conspiracy, you should consider only that 

person’s acts and statements. A person cannot be bound by the acts or statements 

of another participant[] until it is established that a conspiracy existed and that 

that person was one of its members. 

To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the State need not show the making of

an express or formal agreement. The State must only prove the elements of 

conspiracy as defined in the previous instruction. A conspirator is liable for all

criminal acts committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Acts or statements of any conspirator which do not further the

conspiracy and which occur before its existence or after its termination may be

considered as evidence only against the person making them. A statement to 

further a conspiracy may include statements made to induce enlistment or further

participation in the group’s activities or statements made to prompt further action 

on the part of the conspirators. A statement to further a conspiracy need not 

necessarily be made to a person who is an actual conspirator. Whether a statement

was made to further a conspiracy depends on the declarant’s intent and not the 

actual effect of the statement. Mere knowledge or approval of the object of a

conspiracy without agreement to cooperate in achieving it is not enough to make

one a party to a conspiracy. The fact that persons conduct themselves in a similar

manner or associate with each other or assemble together or discuss common

aims does not alone prove a conspiracy.

The guilt of either Defendant cannot be established by that Defendant’s mere 

presence at a crime scene or mere association with another person at a crime

scene, even if that Defendant had knowledge that a crime was being committed

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there. The fact that either Defendant may have been present does not in and of

itself make that Defendant guilty of the crimes charged. . . . 

(docket # 16, Respondents’ Exh. JJ at 12-24; docket # 10, Exh. Q. at 123, 127-29, 134-41) 

In addition to the foregoing conspiracy instructions, the court have the following

general instructions:

I will now tell you the rules you must follow to decide this case. I will 

instruct you on the law. It is your duty to follow the law . . .You must take

account of all my instructions on the law. 

You are not to pick out part of one and disregard the others. However, after 

you have determined the facts, you may find that some instructions do not apply. 

You must then consider the instructions that do apply, together with the facts as

you have determined them. Decide the case by applying the law in these 

instructions to the facts.

* * *

There are four defendants. You must consider the evidence in the case as a whole.

However, you must consider the charge against each Defendant separately. 

You must not be prejudiced against one Defendant simply because you determine

that the State has proved its case against another Defendant. 

(docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 3, 16; docket # 10, Exh. Q. at 113, 149) 

Considered as a whole, the jury instructions are not ambiguous. See Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72. The court accurately instructed the jury on the elements of conspiracy to

commit first-degree, and instructed the jury that, to convict Petitioner of conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder, it could not merely find that he acted in furtherance of the

conspiracy to commit escape, as Petitioner argues. (docket # 14 at 6-7) Specifically, the

court instructed the jury that it could convict Petitioner of conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder only if it found: (1) that Petitioner agreed with at least one other person that one of

them or another person would commit first degree murder; and (2) that Petitioner made that

agreement with the intent to promote or aid the crime of first-degree murder. (docket # 16,

Exh. JJ at 6-7; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 123) In addition to instructing the jury on the

elements of first-degree murder, the court defined “premeditation,” “knowingly,” and “with

the intent to,” which were relevant to the jury’s assessment of the elements it had to

consider in determining whether Petitioner was guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 9; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 127, 129-30) 

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The court also defined the elements necessary to convict Petitioner of conspiracy to

commit escape and defined the elements of “escape.” (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 7-9; docket #

10, Exh. Q at 124, 127-28) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (docket # 14 at 6-7), the

separate jury instructions regarding conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, first-degree

murder, conspiracy to commit escape, and escape made it clear that the jury could not

convict Petitioner of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based only on a finding that

he was a member of a conspiracy to commit escape and that the other conspirators acted in

furtherance of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. 

Several other jury instructions are also contrary to a finding that the jury relied on

acts or statements of co-conspirators in determining whether Petitioner had the requisite

intent to be found guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. First, the trial court

instructed the jury that, in determining whether the elements of conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder were satisfied, the jury was required to find (1) “beyond a reasonable doubt”

that a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was “knowingly formed;” and (2) that

Petitioner “knowingly participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to promote or assist

the carrying out of the conspiracy” to commit first-degree murder by, for example,

“knowingly encourag[ing], advis[ing] or assist[ing] the undertaking.” (docket # 16, Exh. JJ

at 12, docket # 10, Exh. Q at 134) 

The court also instructed the jury that it could “consider only [Petitioner’s] acts and

statements” in determining whether he was a member of a conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. The court then gave the improper Pinkerton instruction - that, once it was

shown that Petitioner was a member of the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, he

could be liable for all criminal acts (not for all other conspiracies to which his conspirators

belonged, as Petitioner argues) committed by his co-conspirators during and in furtherance

of the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 12-13, docket #

10, Exh. Q at 134, 137) Immediately before giving the erroneous Pinkerton instruction,

however, the court advised the jury that “[t]o prove the existence of a conspiracy” to

commit first-degree murder, the State was required to “prove the elements of conspiracy as

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defined in the previous instruction.” (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 13, docket # 10, Exh. Q at

136). 

There is no dispute that the Pinkerton jury instruction, (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 13,

lines 11-13), is improper under Arizona law. However, the jury instructions as a whole

were not ambiguous. The jury instructions as a whole made it clear that the jury could not

find that Petitioner was a member of a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based only

on its finding that Petitioner was a member of a conspiracy to commit escape. Moreover,

because Petitioner was only charged with conspiracy and was not charged with any

substantive crimes, the Pinkerton jury instruction did not apply to him and did not result in

prejudice. 

The trial court’s general jury instructions also clarified the Pinkerton instruction by

explaining that the jury could not find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder if it only found that Petitioner was a member of the conspiracy to commit escape. 

Specifically, the court instructed the jury that it must “consider each charge against each

defendant separately.” (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 16; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 149) The court

also instructed that the jury “must not be prejudiced against one defendant simply because

you determine that the State has proved its case against another defendant.” (Id.) 

Additionally, the jury was instructed that it could not select one, or part of one, instruction,

and disregard the others. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 3, docket # 10, Exh. Q at 113) Rather,

the court instructed the jury that, after determining the facts, it was required to apply all of

the instructions to the facts. (Id.) 

Morever, even assuming the jury instructions as a whole were ambiguous, there is

no “‘reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that

violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380). 

Petitioner argues that a jury could have understood the Pinkerton instruction to mean, “if

the jury determined that Petitioner was guilty of conspiracy to commit escape, or that he

shared that specific intent to aid the escape, the . . . jurors [could] also find him guilty of the

separate conspiracy to commit murder, based upon the actions or statements of other

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conspirators.” (docket # 14 at 6-7) As discussed below, the Court disagrees with

Petitioner’s assertion. 

First, the trial court instructed the jury that to find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following

elements: (1) that Petitioner agreed with at least one person that one of them or another

person would commit first-degree murder; and (2) that Petitioner made such agreement

with the intent to promote or aide the crime of first-degree murder. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at

8-9; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 127, 129) As set forth above, the court defined the elements of

first-degree murder and the terms “with the intent to,” “premeditation,” and “knowingly.” 

(docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 8-9, docket # 10, Exh. Q at 127, 129) The jury was specifically

instructed that it could not find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder unless it found (1) beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder was knowingly formed; and (2) that Petitioner knowingly participated in

that unlawful plan with the intent to promote or assist the carrying out of the conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 12; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 134-35) 

In view of the specific instructions defining the elements required to find Petitioner guilty

of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury

disregarded this instructions and only applied the Pinkerton instruction to find Petitioner

guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Thus, the Pinkerton instruction did not

give rise to a Due Process violation.

Second, in view of several other jury instructions, it is not reasonably likely that the

jury improperly concluded that, based on Petitioner’s status as a member of the conspiracy

to commit escape, he could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder

based on his co-conspirators’ actions and statements. The court gave separate instructions

defining the elements of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to

commit to escape. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 6-9, docket # 10, Exh. Q at 136) The court also

instructed that jury that it could not “pick out one instruction or part of one and disregard

others.” (docket # 10, Exh. Q at 113, docket # 16, Exh. JJ) The court instructed the jury

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that it “must consider the charge against each defendant separately”, (docket # 10, Exh. Q

at 149), and that “in determining whether a particular Defendant was a member of a

conspiracy, you should consider only that person’s acts and statements.” (docket # 16,

Exh. JJ at 12-13; docket # 10, Exh. Q at 134) Finally, the court instructed the jury that it

could not “find that [Petitioner] . . . was a member of a conspiracy” unless the evidence

showed “beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy was knowingly formed and that

[Petitioner] . . . knowingly participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to promote or

assist the carrying out of the conspiracy.” (docket # 16, Exh. JJ at 12; docket # 10, Exh. Q

at 134) Based on these instructions, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury could

have improperly concluded that, simply because Petitioner was a member of the conspiracy

to commit escape, he could also be found guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder based on his co-conspirators’ actions and statements. 

Third, the Pinkerton instruction itself does not support Petitioner’s claim that, “if the

jury determined that Petitioner was guilty of conspiracy to commit escape, or that he shared

that specific intent to aid the escape, the . . . jurors [could] also find him guilty of the

separate conspiracy to commit murder, based upon the actions or statements of other

conspirators.” (docket # 14 at 6-7) 

The Pinkerton instruction at issue stated that a conspirator “is liable for all criminal

acts committed by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (docket #

16, Exh. JJ at 13) (emphasis added) The instruction does not state that a defendant who

belongs to one conspiracy is a member of all criminal conspiracies. (docket # 16, Exh. JJ

at 13) The language of the Pinkerton instruction together with the jury instructions which

(1) defined the distinct elements of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and

conspiracy to commit escape; (2) advised that the State must separately prove each

conspiracy based on the applicable elements; (3) required the jury to find that Petitioner

knowingly participated in the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder with the intent to

promote or assist carrying out the conspiracy; and (4) required the jury to consider the

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instructions as a whole, demonstrate that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury

applied the Pinkerton instruction in the manner Petitioner suggests. 

Finally, during closing argument, Petitioner’s counsel emphasized that “[i]n order to

be guilty of conspiracy, you have to enter into an agreement, you have to agree to be part of

the conspiracy, you have to knowingly participate with the intent to promote it.” (docket # 

16, Exh. JJ at 97) 

Considering the record and the jury instructions as a whole, the Court finds that the

erroneous Pinkerton jury instruction did not give rise to a due process violation because

there is no “‘reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at

380).

Harmless Error Analysis

Even assuming that giving a Pinkerton jury instruction resulted in a due process

violation, Petitioner is not “entitled to relief unless [he] can establish that the error resulted

in ‘actual prejudice.’” Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). “Actual prejudice” means that the error “had a

‘substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2,

4-6 (1996) (per curiam) (holding that, on habeas review, Brecht’s harmless error standard

applies to jury instructions that omit an element of the crime). In § 2254 proceedings, the

federal court assesses the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court

criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect”

standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 2321,

2328 (2007). The Supreme Court recently clarified that Brecht’s harmless error analysis

applies to instructional error. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, ___ S.Ct.___, 2008 WL 5055738 (Dec. 2,

2008). 

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Even assuming the challenged Pinkerton instruction violated Petitioner’s due

process rights in this case, any error was harmless because the Pinkerton instruction did not

have “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. First, a Pinkerton instruction does not define the crime of

conspiracy, but rather defines the scope of a defendant’s criminal liability for the

substantive offenses committed by his co-conspirators. See Cohen, 844 P.2d at 1150-51

(distinguishing the crime of conspiracy from the substantive offenses committed by coconspirators). A conspiracy conviction is distinct from a conviction for the substantive

offenses. See State v. Olea, 678 P.2d 465, 478 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1983) (stating that “the

commission of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct

offenses.”). The Pinkerton instruction pertains only to culpability for the substantive

offenses. Portillo, 876 P.2d at 1153-54 (stating that “[t]he Pinkerton theory of culpability

does not concern conspiracy, but culpability for a substantive offense.”). 

In this case, co-defendants Manning and Date were charged with conspiracy to

commit escape, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and substantive offenses (theft

and misconduct involving weapons). (docket # 10, Exh. A) Petitioner, on the other hand,

was charged with conspiracy to commit escape and conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder and was not charged with any substantive offenses. (docket # 10, Exh. A)

Accordingly, the Pinkerton instruction did not apply to Petitioner. The court specifically

instructed the jury that although it had to “take account of all [the] instructions on the law,”

it may “find that some instructions do not apply.” (docket # 16, Respondents’ Exh. JJ at 3) 

Because the Pinkerton instruction did not apply to Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder, that instruction could not have had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Additionally,

as previously discussed, the Pinkerton instruction did not lower the State’s burden of proof

on the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder charge. (see Section IV.A, supra.)

In view of the evidence presented at trial, the detailed jury instructions regarding

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the comments made by Petitioner’s counsel

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during closing argument which emphasized the elements of conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, the Pinkerton instruction did not have a substantial and injurious effect on

the jury’s verdict. The State presented sufficient evidence that Petitioner intended and

agreed with at least on co-conspirator to commit first-degree murder.

V. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket # 1) should

be denied. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(1), should not be filed until the District Court enters judgment. The parties shall have

ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72,

6(a), 6(e). Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2008.

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