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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2005 Decided March 25, 2005

Reissued May 9, 2005

No. 04-7051

GWENDOLYN REID, AS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF

MATHEW REID, A MINOR,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01611)

Keith A. Noreika argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Carolyn F. Corwin, Jennifer E. Schwartz, and

Robert I. Berlow.

Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Robert J. Spagnoletti,

Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney

General.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit

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Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: When a school district deprives a

disabled child of free appropriate public education in violation

of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a court

fashioning “appropriate” relief, as the statute allows, may order

compensatory education, i.e., replacement of educational

services the child should have received in the first place. This

commonsense proposition—conceded by the school district here

and supported by the Supreme Court’s decision compelling

reimbursement for such services in School Committee of the

Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Education

of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)—led a hearing officer to

award appellant, a sixteen-year-old with severe learning

disabilities, 810 hours of compensatory education, one hour for

each day in the four-and-a-half years during which the school

system denied the student appropriate instruction. Pointing out

that neither reasoning nor evidence supported this hour-per-day

calculation and insisting that hour-per-hour relief was instead

the child’s due, the child and his mother argue that the hearing

officer abused his authority. They also challenge the officer’s

decision to allow the child’s “individualized education program

team” to reduce or discontinue compensatory services “on the

decision of the IEP team that Minor no longer needs or is not

benefitting from this compensatory education.” Because we

agree that the hearing officer’s mechanical calculation merits no

deference and that the IEP team delegation violates the statute,

we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

school district. We reject, however, appellants’ equally

mechanical hour-per-hour calculation and instead adopt a

qualitative standard: compensatory awards should aim to place

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disabled children in the same position they would have occupied

but for the school district’s violations of IDEA.

I.

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(known as “IDEA”), states and territories, including the District

of Columbia, that receive federal educational assistance must

establish “policies and procedures to ensure,” among other

things, that “free appropriate public education,” or “FAPE,” is

available to disabled children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).

Premised on Congress’s expectation that “[w]ith proper

education services, many [disabled individuals] would be able

to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of

being forced to remain burdens,” S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 9

(1975) (discussing predecessor to IDEA), this requirement

furthers “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity,

full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for individuals with disabilities,” 20 U.S.C. §

1400(c)(1). School districts may not ignore disabled students’

needs, nor may they await parental demands before providing

special instruction. Instead, school systems must ensure that

“[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State . . .

regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in

need of special education and related services, are identified,

located, and evaluated.” Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Once such

children are identified, a “team” including the child’s parents

and select teachers, as well as a representative of the local

educational agency with knowledge about the school’s resources

and curriculum, develops an “individualized education

program,” or “IEP,” for the child. See id. §§ 1412(a)(4),

1414(d). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of

Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District,

Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the IEP

must, at a minimum, “provid[e] personalized instruction with

sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit

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educationally from that instruction.” See id. at 203. In addition,

“if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the

public education system, [the IEP] should be reasonably

calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and

advance from grade to grade.” Id. at 204. “If no suitable public

school is available, the [school system] must pay the costs of

sending the child to an appropriate private school.” Jenkins v.

Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

In this case, as two successive administrative hearings

established and as the District of Columbia, appellee herein,

now concedes, the District of Columbia Public Schools

(“DCPS”) failed to meet its IDEA obligations with respect to

appellant Mathew Reid. A sixteen-year-old District of

Columbia resident, Mathew suffers from documented learning

disabilities, including dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, that affect his short-term auditory memory, formation

of grammatical sentences, and articulation of word sounds.

Though Mathew’s mother had noticed by the fall of her son’s

second-grade year that he had difficulty reading, when she

contacted a school district counselor, the counselor refused to

provide the necessary form for requesting a disability

evaluation. The following spring, during a meeting with

Mathew’s teacher and school principal, the teacher

recommended that Mathew be retained in second grade due to

behavioral and academic problems. According to Ms. Reid,

however, the principal told her that “she didn’t believe that

Matthew really needed to be kept back.”

Mathew spent the next year in California and then returned

to D.C. By that time, test scores placed him in the bottom one

percent of his age group for reading comprehension and the

bottom five percent for reading overall. Nonetheless, without

performing any disability evaluation, the school district placed

Mathew in a regular fourth-grade class. Only after a full school

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year of unsatisfactory grades did DCPS recognize Mathew’s

disability and develop an IEP.

Under this IEP, Mathew was retained in fourth grade and

attended ten hours per week of special education instruction plus

twice-weekly half-hour language therapy sessions and one half

hour per week of counseling. In accordance with IDEA’s

preference for avoiding separate instruction “[t]o the maximum

extent possible,” see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5), Mathew spent the

remainder of the school day mainstreamed in regular classes, but

received accommodations such as preferential seating and

extended time for assignments. Two years later, DCPS revised

Mathew’s IEP to provide seventeen-and-a-half hours of special

education services per week. Despite these services, testing in

November of Mathew’s sixth-grade year revealed him reading

at a second-grade level, even though six months earlier he had

been reading at a third-grade level. Mathew’s overall

intellectual ability placed him in the ninth percentile for his age.

Despite further testing confirming these results, Mathew’s

IEP team made no change in his program until April of that

school year. At that point, presumably because Mathew’s math

skills had risen from low fourth-grade level to low sixth-grade

level (though at the time Mathew was entering seventh grade

and was old enough to be entering eighth), the team eliminated

250 minutes per week of math tutoring while adding 200

minutes per week of reading instruction and fifteen extra

minutes per week of counseling.

Objecting to this new IEP, Mathew’s mother exercised her

statutory right to demand an “impartial due process hearing,” see

20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (e)(1), (f)(1). She argued that “the IEP

is inappropriate because Mathew requires a full-time special

education program and the IEP calls for a part time special

education program.” The hearing officer agreed. Based on “the

student’s serious and extensive needs and the glaring

inappropriateness of the IEP in terms of placing Mathew in a

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part-time program when he requires a full-time program,” the

officer ordered the school district to place Mathew in “a fulltime special education program with a low student teacher ratio

and intensive work in reading with the other related services,”

designating one such program, the Accotink Academy, as

Mathew’s placement “at least on an interim basis.” “This is a

student who is capable of doing better,” the hearing officer

wrote, “and as he approaches adolescence, the likelihood of his

remaining interested in staying in school will decrease if his

reading level stays at a second grade level.”

To make up for deficiencies in Mathew’s prior education,

Ms. Reid also sought extra instruction beyond his Accotink

Academy IEP—in other words, “compensatory education.” In

separate proceedings related to that claim, a second hearing

officer heard expert testimony indicating, among other things,

that in struggling to read, Mathew had “learned compensatory

strategies that are counterproductive,” that “there was a gap in

between what [Mathew] was capable of, and actually what he

was performing,” and that because of academic and

interpersonal difficulties, Mathew had grown “significantly

depressed.” Three experts—a psychologist, a speech language

pathologist/audiologist, and an educational consultant—all

testified that the school district should have known Mathew was

disabled in second grade or earlier. Based on this evidence, and

building on the earlier hearing, the hearing officer concluded

that DCPS had denied Mathew FAPE for roughly four-and-ahalf years, from midway through second grade until the

Accotink placement at the end of sixth grade (skipping

Mathew’s year in California and counting both fourth-grade

years).

As a remedy, the officer ordered 810 hours of compensatory

education, a figure he derived by awarding “1 hour for each day

of special education services not provided.” Indicating neither

why he chose this formula nor what specific services should be

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provided, the officer empowered Mathew’s IEP team to

“direct[]” implementation of the award. “The services are to be

reduced or discontinued,” he added, “on the decision of the IEP

team that Minor no longer needs or is not benefitting from this

compensatory education. The team’s decision that Mathew no

longer needs or is not benefitting from this award of

compensatory education services will terminate this award. The

team decision and reasoning in this regard are to be fully

explained in the IEP meeting notes.”

Under IDEA, parties aggrieved by an administrative

decision may sue in either state or federal court. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A). The court then “(i) shall receive the records of

the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional

evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on

the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the

court determines is appropriate.” See id. § 1415(i)(2)(B).

Seeking such review in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia, Mathew and his mother challenged both the number

of hours awarded as compensatory instruction and the allowance

for reduction or termination by the IEP team. On cross-motions

for summary judgment, the district court rejected the Reids’ two

claims (as well as a third argument not renewed here) and

affirmed the administrative award. See Reid v. District of

Columbia, 310 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.D.C. 2004). The Reids now

appeal.

II.

We begin with our standard of review. Though conceding

that judicial review under IDEA is more rigorous than in typical

agency cases, the school district argues that both our review of

the district court and the district court’s review of the hearing

officer should be deferential. We disagree on both counts.

To start with the standard applicable in the district court, it

is true that under our precedent “a party challenging the

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administrative determination must at least take on the burden of

persuading the court that the hearing officer was wrong, and that

a court upsetting the officer’s decision must at least explain its

basis for doing so.” See Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884,

887 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Kerkam I”). But we have also made

clear that given the district court’s authority to “hear additional

evidence at the request of a party” and “bas[e] its decision on the

preponderance of the evidence,” see 20 U.S.C. §§

1415(i)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), IDEA “plainly suggest[s] less deference

than is conventional” in administrative proceedings. See

Kerkam I, 862 F.2d at 887. Moreover, a hearing decision

“without reasoned and specific findings deserves little

deference.” SeeKerkam v. Superintendent,D.C. Pub. Schs., 931

F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Kerkam II”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In this case, although the hearing officer made express

findings regarding DCPS’s four-and-a-half-year denial of FAPE,

he set forth the 810-hour award in a one-sentence ipse dixit. “At

rate of 1 hour for each day of special education services not

provided,” he wrote, “DCPS is to provide 810 hours (4.5

multiplied by 180 school days) of compensatory education

services to Mathew as his IEP team directs.” The officer’s order

contains neither reasoning to support this hour-per-day formula

nor factual findings showing that the 810-hour result satisfied

Mathew’s needs. Accordingly, the district court, obligated by

IDEA to ensure that relief set forth in the administrative award

was “appropriate,” could not simply rely on the hearing officer’s

exercise of discretion. Instead, the court had to examine the

record itself. Nor, regarding the other issue in this case, could

the court defer to the officer’s decision to delegate authority to

the IEP team, for the officer’s implicit ruling on that issue—that

IDEA permits such delegations—raises an issue of statutory

construction, a pure question of law that courts review de novo.

Thus, on neither issue in this appeal could the district court

presume the validity of the hearing officer’s action.

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We reach a similar conclusion regarding the standard

governing our review of the district court’s decision. As noted

above, trial judges in IDEA cases may “hear additional

evidence” and fashion “appropriate relief.” See 20 U.S.C. §§

1415(i)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). These powers of fact-finding and

remedy-crafting, the Supreme Court has explained, entail “broad

discretion” and implicate “equitable considerations.” See

Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15-16

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, had the district

court actually exercised those powers, our review would be

deferential—clear error as to any factual findings and abuse of

discretion as to the remedy. See Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of

Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 466-67 (7th Cir. 2000) (fact-finding);

Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d

1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1994) (remedial discretion). In this case,

however, the district court granted summary judgment based

simply on the administrative record. Applying the familiar Rule

56 standard, the court took no additional evidence, but viewed

the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and concluded

that the administrative award was appropriate. See Reid, 310 F.

Supp. 2d at 144-45, 153 (applying standard of review based on

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). On appeal, therefore, we find ourselves in

exactly the same position as the district court. Accordingly, we

review its decision de novo as in an ordinary summary judgment

case,see, e.g.,Maydak v. United States, 363 F.3d 512,515(D.C.

Cir. 2004), and apply the same non-deferential standard the

district court should have applied to the hearing decision.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the disputed

issues: the compensatory education amount and the IEP team

delegation.

Compensatory Award

Under the theory of “compensatory education,” courts and

hearing officers may award “educational services . . . to be

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provided prospectively to compensate for a past deficient

program.” See G. ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs.,

343 F.3d 295, 308 (4th Cir. 2003). Embraced in some form by

several circuits, see, e.g., id. at 308-09; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.

v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 1999); Bd. of

Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. 200 v. Ill.

State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7thCir. 1996); Parents of

Student W., 31 F.3d at 1496; Pihl v.Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d

184, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1993); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749,

753 (8thCir. 1986); see also Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319

F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2004), this theory builds on the

Supreme Court’s holding in Burlington that “appropriate” IDEA

relief may include reimbursement for parents who place children

in private school rather than accept a deficient public school

IEP, see 471 U.S. at 369. If IDEA permits reimbursement for

educational services, courts have reasoned, then it must also

allow awards of the services themselves. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ.

of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch., 79 F.3d at 655-56; Pihl,

9 F.3d at 188-89; Miener, 800 F.2d at 753. Based on such logic,

courts have upheld awards requiring, among other things,

special programs to make up for prior deficiencies, see, e.g.,

Diatta, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 65; Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 273, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135-36, 1137 (D. Minn. 1998);

cf. G. ex rel. RG, 343 F.3d at 299, 309 (remanding claim of

eleven-year-old), and instruction beyond age twenty-one

(ordinarily the limit of IDEA coverage, see 20 U.S.C. §

1412(a)(1)(A)), see, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at

249; Pihl, 9 F.3d at 189-90.

In our view, this extension of Burlington to cover services

as well as payments makes eminent sense. Given the

availability of reimbursement for compensatory instruction,

were it impossible to obtain an award of the instruction itself,

children’s access to appropriate education could depend on their

parents’ capacity to front its costs—a result manifestly

incompatible with IDEA’s purpose of “ensur[ing] that all

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children with disabilities have available to them a free

appropriate public education,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)

(emphasis added). Even worse, students who remained in public

school would lack any effective redress for FAPE denials, even

those extending over many years, as in Mathew’s case. To be

sure, such students could seek prospective correction of a

deficient IEP, as the Reids did in the first administrative

proceeding described above. But because the Rowley standard

requires only that schools provide “some educational benefit,”

see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200—a standard that looks to the child’s

present abilities—an IEP conforming to that standard carries no

guarantee of undoing damage done by prior violations. As this

case demonstrates, moreover, that damage may be quite severe:

according to expert testimony, Mathew not only failed to keep

pace with his peers under the school district’s IEP, but actually

learned “counterproductive” compensatory techniques that he

must now unlearn before he can advance. Consistent with

Congress’s stated aim of “ensur[ing] that the rights of children

with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” see

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B), we therefore join our sister circuits

and hold that compensatory education awards fit comfortably

within the “broad discretion” of courts fashioning and enforcing

IDEA remedies, see Carter, 510 U.S. at 15-16.

That said, we part company with the Reids regarding how

such awards are calculated. They urge us to adopt a

presumption that each hour without FAPE entitles the student to

one hour of compensatory instruction, a standard apparently

embraced by several courts. See, e.g., M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch.

Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391-92, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that

when “a school district . . . knows or should know” that a

disabled child’s educational program is deficient yet fails to

correct the problem, the child “is entitled to compensatory

education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but

excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to

rectify the problem”); Westendorp, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1137

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(holding that “where [plaintiff] was denied his IDEA rights for

six academic years, the court will presume that he is entitled to

six academic years of compensatory relief”). In our view, this

cookie-cutter approach runs counter to both the “broad

discretion” afforded by IDEA’s remedial provision and the

substantive FAPE standard that provision is meant to enforce.

As to the remedial provision, the Supreme Court has

emphasized that IDEA relief depends on “equitable

considerations.” See Carter, 510 U.S. at 15-16; Burlington, 471

U.S. at 374. Accordingly, “compensatory education is not a

contractual remedy, but an equitable remedy, part of the court’s

resources in crafting ‘appropriate relief.’” Parents of Student

W., 31 F.3d at 1497. More specifically, as the Fourth Circuit has

explained, “[c]ompensatory education involves discretionary,

prospective, injunctive relief crafted by a court to remedy what

might be termed an educational deficit created by an educational

agency’s failure over a given period of time to provide a FAPE

to a student.” G. ex rel. RG, 343 F.3d at 309. Overlooking this

equitable focus, the Reids’ hour-for-hour formula in effect treats

compensatory education as a form of damages—a charge on

school districts equal to expenditures they should have made

previously. Yet “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction” is “to do

equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the

particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished

it.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). In keeping

with that principle of case-specific flexibility, we agree with the

Ninth Circuit that “[t]here is no obligation to provide a day-forday compensation for time missed. Appropriate relief is relief

designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated

within the meaning of the IDEA.” Parents of Student W., 31

F.3d at 1497.

Reinforcing this conclusion, the substantive FAPE

standard—the rule of law the Reids seek to enforce—also

carries a qualitative rather than quantitative focus. As IDEA

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itself states, the statute’s aim is to guarantee disabled students

“specialized education and related services designed to meet

their unique needs.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis

added). Hence, as the Supreme Court explained in Rowley, “the

basic floor of opportunity provided by the Act consists of access

to specialized instruction and related services which are

individually designed to provide educational benefit to the

handicapped child.” See 458 U.S. at 201 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (emphasis added). We think it would be highly

incongruous if this qualitative focus on individual needs gave

way to mechanical hour-counting when past rather than current

violations of the FAPE standard were at issue. Accordingly, just

as IEPs focus on disabled students’ individual needs, so must

awards compensating past violations rely on individualized

assessments.

Unlike the Reids’ one-for-one standard, this flexible

approach will produce different results in different cases

depending on the child’s needs. Some students may require

only short, intensive compensatory programs targeted at specific

problems or deficiencies. Others may need extended programs,

perhaps even exceeding hour-for-hour replacement of time spent

without FAPE. In addition, courts have recognized that in

setting the award, equity may sometimes require consideration

of the parties’ conduct, such as when the school system

reasonably “require[s] some time to respond to a complex

problem,” M.C., 81 F.3d at 397, or when parents’ refusal to

accept special education delays the child’s receipt of appropriate

services, Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1497. In every case,

however, the inquiry must be fact-specific and, to accomplish

IDEA’s purposes, the ultimate award must be reasonably

calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would

have accrued from special education services the school district

should have supplied in the first place.

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Given this standard, neither party in this case is entitled to

summary judgment. As to the Reids, because we reject the onefor-one formula they advocate, the amount of compensatory

education appropriate in Mathew’s case cannot be determined

as a matter of law. Rather, designing Mathew’s remedy will

require a fact-specific exercise of discretion by either the district

court or a hearing officer. As to the school district, although 810

hours certainly seems like a significant award, without grounds

for deference to the hearing officer we may conclude at

summary judgment that this remedy was correct as a matter of

law only if our review of the record reveals that any greater

remedy would amount to an abuse of discretion. We cannot

reach that conclusion because, drawing all inferences in

Mathew’s favor, as we must at summary judgment, see, e.g.,

Maydak, 363 F.3d at 515, we have no basis for concluding that

810 hours—barely more than half of a single academic

year—would suffice to make up for Mathew’s four-and-a-half

years without FAPE, especially considering that during that

period he developed “counterproductive” reading habits.

The district court appears to have granted summary

judgment to the school district simply because it assumed that

compensatory awards need only provide “some benefit” going

forward, as in an ordinary non-compensatory IEP under Rowley.

Applying this standard and assuming that it could defer to the

hearing officer, the district court faulted Mathew for “fail[ing]

to offer proof regarding why the hearing officer’s award is

‘inappropriate’ to achieve what is required by the Act, i.e., a

basic floor of opportunity and ‘access to specialized instruction

and related services which are individually designed to provide

educational benefit to [Mathew].’” See Reid, 310 F. Supp. 2d at

150 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201) (alteration in original).

In particular, based on the additional assumption that the

Accotink Academy IEP already compensated Mathew to some

degree, the court faulted the Reids for “fail[ing] to provide the

Court with a copy of Mathew’s current IEP,” a lapse the court

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believed left it “unable to assess whether the services [Mathew]

is already receiving are inadequate to compensate for the prior

denial of FAPE, which might justify a larger compensatory

education award.” Id. at 152.

As we have explained, however, whereas ordinary IEPs

need only provide “some benefit,” compensatory awards must

do more—they must compensate. Accordingly, the district court

should not have assumed that the Accotink Academy placement,

based as it was only on Rowley, provided compensation. If

anything, at summary judgment the court should have assumed

the opposite, requiring DCPS to offer proof that the placement

compensated for prior FAPE denials in addition to providing

some benefit going forward. Nor should the district court have

assumed the adequacy of the 810-hour award, for that award, as

we have also explained, deserved “little deference,” Kerkam II,

931 F.2d at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure,

as the “party challenging the administrative determination,” the

Reids “must at least take on the burden of persuading the court

that the hearing officer was wrong,” Kerkam I, 862 F.2d at 887,

but given the minimal deference owed to the hearing award in

this case, they could satisfy that burden simply by pointing to

the award’s evident arbitrariness. Thus, with the district court’s

incorrect assumptions stripped away, the Reids’ failure to

present evidence beyond the administrative record provides no

justification for awarding summary judgment to the school

district.

Offering yet another theory for affirming the hearing award,

the school district argues that because the Reids based their

challenge to the compensatory education award on their favored

one-for-one standard, reversing the district court’s grant of

summary judgment would require us to accept that mechanical

approach. We disagree. Although the Reids focus on the onefor-one theory here, as they did in the district court, the relevant

claim in their complaint states not that Mathew was entitled to

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hour-for-hour relief, but rather that the hearing officer erred by

“limit[ing] relief to one hour for each day that defendants denied

a free public education to Mathew Reid.” See Compl. at 6.

Moreover, based on that theory, Mathew sought not just an

injunction directing defendants to provide an amount of

compensatory education consistent with the hour-for-hour

formula, but also a declaration that the administrative award

“did not adequately compensate Mathew Reid for defendants’

denial of a free appropriate education to Mathew Reid.” See id.

at 7. Far from waiving their claim to the latter relief, the Reids

assert here, again as they did in the district court, that “[t]he

absence of any explanation or support in the record before the

hearing officer itself would be enough to require reversal of the

district court’s decision.” Appellant’s Br. at 19; see also Reid,

310 F. Supp. 2d at 146 n.7 (discussing Reids’ argument that “the

hearing officer ‘fail[ed] to acknowledge the appropriateness

standard, fail[ed] to explain why one hour of compensatory

education for each day of FAPE denied is “appropriate,” and

fail[ed] to explain why a lump sum award of five years . . . is not

appropriate’” (quoting plaintiffs’ memorandum) (alterations and

ellipsis in original)). Because this claim to relief based solely on

the hearing award’s inadequacy is entirely consistent with our

analysis here, we see no reason why our disagreement with the

Reids’ favored one-for-one formula should compel us to endorse

the hearing officer’s equally flawed hour-per-day approach.

Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s denial of the

Reids’ motion but reverse its grant of summary judgment to the

school district. On remand, the district court may solicit

additional evidence from the parties and fashion an appropriate

compensatory education award based on the principles outlined

in this opinion. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Alternatively,

in light of the absence of pertinent findings in the administrative

record and given that both parties previously filed cross-motions

for summary judgment rather than exercising their right to

“request” consideration of additional evidence, the district court

USCA Case #04-7051 Document #885764 Filed: 03/25/2005 Page 16 of 20
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may determine that the “appropriate” relief is a remand to the

hearing officer for further proceedings. See, e.g., JH ex rel. JD

v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 198 (4th Cir. 2005)

(remanding IDEA suit to district court with instructions to

remand to hearing officer); Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified

Sch. Dist.No. 69, 152 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) (ordering

district court to stay proceedings and remand to hearing officer).

Whichever path the court chooses, the parties must have some

opportunity to present evidence regarding Mathew’s specific

educational deficits resulting from his loss of FAPE and the

specific compensatory measures needed to best correct those

deficits.

The IEP Team

The Reids’ second challenge raises a straightforward

question of law: may IDEA hearing officers authorize IEP

teams to “reduce or discontinue” compensatory education

awards? Disagreeing with the district court, we answer no.

As the Reids point out, IDEA due process hearings “may

not be conducted by an employee of the State educational

agency or the local educational agency involved in the education

or care of the child.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3). The award at

issue runs afoul of this prohibition, for Mathew’s IEP team, like

any other, must include “a representative of the local educational

agency,” see id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv)—presumably an employee

of that agency—and when modifying an award set by the

hearing officer the IEP team would in effect exercise the

officer’s powers. It makes no difference that the IEP team also

includes non-employees such as Mathew’s mother. Under the

statute, the hearing officer may not delegate his authority to a

group that includes an individual specifically barred from

performing the hearing officer’s functions.

Nor does it make any difference that IDEA affords

“procedural safeguards” to protect parents and students from

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arbitrary action by IEP teams. See Reid, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 153.

To be sure, if Mathew’s team reduced his award, his mother

could again seek a due process hearing and even judicial review.

Yet as IDEA makes plain, hearing awards “shall be final” unless

modified through administrative appeal or judicial action.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A). Consistent with that

requirement, once a parent challenges an IEP and obtains final

relief, as Ms. Reid has done, preservation of that relief requires

no further action on the parent’s part. To the contrary, before

any reduction in an adjudicated award of compensatory

instruction may take effect, the school district—the party whose

failures, after all, necessitated awarding relief in the first

place—must initiate new proceedings before a hearing officer.

Cf. Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1981) (“To

appoint an officer to conduct the hearing but then to treat his

report only as a recommendation violates the Act’s requirement

that the decision of the hearing officer be final unless

appealed.”). By the same token, of course, any increase sought

by Ms. Reid over the school district’s objection must be justified

to a hearing officer. The point is that absent a new hearing, the

existing award is binding on both parties.

In sum, while the IEP team certainly must monitor

Mathew’s progress and coordinate compensatory relief with his

current IEP, a delegation that permits the team to reduce or

terminate his awarded amount of compensatory education

exceeds the statute’s bounds. We will therefore reverse the

district court’s ruling on this issue.

III.

Neglected by the school system charged with affording him

free appropriate education, Mathew Reid is entitled to

compensatory instruction. He is not entitled, however, to an

amount of such instruction predetermined by a cookie-cutter

formula, but rather to an informed and reasonable exercise of

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discretion regarding what services he needs to elevate him to the

position he would have occupied absent the school district’s

failures. Accordingly, the district court’s award of summary

judgment to the school district is reversed and the matter

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Any modified award may not delegate authority to the IEP team

to reduce or discontinue the prescribed compensatory

instruction.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-7051 Document #885764 Filed: 03/25/2005 Page 19 of 20
Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I

agree that this case should be remanded because the district

court relied on an inadequate administrative record to support

the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) award of 810 hours of

compensatory education to Mathew Reid. Nevertheless, I write

separately to emphasize my view that, despite the district court’s

equitable authority under the Individuals with Disabilities Act

(IDEA), see Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471

U.S. 359, 374 (1985), to “hear additional evidence at the request

of a party” and “grant such relief as the court determines is

appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii), the record in

an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but

primarily at the administrative level, where the parties and the

school authorities, sometimes with input from other

professionals, can tailor an individualized education plan (IEP)

to the student’s needs. Id. at § 1415(f)(1)-(2) & (h). Denying a

party’s request to hear additional evidence is a valid exercise of

the district court’s discretion that should be upheld except

where, as here, the administrative record is deficient. Had the

ALJ made a sufficient record, I would not have hesitated to

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment without

additional proceedings.

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