Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00024/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL S. GRANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEISOL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:17-cv-00024-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 6, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff‟s 

complaint is before the Court for screening. He has consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6.) No other parties have appeared.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

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which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an 

individual of federally guaranteed rights “under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A 

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not 

required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California,. However, his claims stem from events that 

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began at the Sierra Conservation Center (“SCC”), a state prison in Jamestown, 

California, and carried over to Plaintiff‟s subsequent institutions. He names Correctional 

Officers Heisol, G. Wright, and J. Delgado, and psychiatrist Dr. Maddox as Defendants. 

However, insofar as he refers to everyone identified in the complaint as a “Defendant”, it 

appears he seeks to sue each of them individually.

Plaintiff‟s allegations are at times difficult to follow, but, as best the Court can 

determine, he seeks to allege the following:

On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff was sent to the administrative segregation unit 

(“ad-seg”) of SCC because of enemy concerns. Defendant Heisol was Plaintiff‟s tier 

officer before Plaintiff went to ad-seg. Heisol somehow got the impression that Plaintiff 

told Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”) officials that Heisol had drugs. Heisol was caught 

with a controlled substance and was disciplined. Plaintiff never knew that Heisol had 

drugs, and never reported Heisol to ISU officers. 

On February 18, 2016, an officer came to ad-seg to move Plaintiff to another cell. 

When Plaintiff left his cell, four inmate assailants and Heisol met him in a side hallway out 

of view of other prisoners. An assault took place and continued into the main medical 

building. As the assault went on, Defendants watched and did not intervene. One of the 

inmates grabbed a medical knife and stated, “You snitchin‟, I‟ll cut yo dick off.” Heisol 

stated, “I will have you killed, if you tell anyone. I have your family addresses.” 

Defendants Delgado and Wright used an unreasonable amount of force to shackle 

Plaintiff, and Officer Bartholomew assisted. Plaintiff suffered scuffed knees and scars on 

his left shin. Plaintiff “appeared” to experience chest pains after Defendants injected 

Plaintiff with methamphetamines. Rather than send him for medical attention, Defendants 

subjected Plaintiff to more excessive force and threw him in a holding cell for several 

hours. Plaintiff was later transported to Sonora Regional Hospital “for a false medical 

reason.” Prison custody staff and medical staff said Plaintiff was smoking “spice” (a form 

of synthetic marijuana), even though Plaintiff was examined upon his arrival in ad-seg on 

February 16, 2016.

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On February 21, 2016, Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and returned to 

SCC. He was housed in “OHU,” which is in the main medical area. On February 22, 

2016, Plaintiff was returned to ad-seg. That day, an officer telephoned Defendant Dr. 

Maddox. Dr. Maddox arrived in ad-seg and told Plaintiff he was there because an officer 

called him and he wanted to ask Plaintiff some questions. Based on the questions Dr. 

Maddox asked, Plaintiff believed Dr. Maddox was there to help Plaintiff. Plaintiff told Dr. 

Maddox about the assault, the methamphetamines, and the verbal abuse. Dr. Maddox 

manipulated Plaintiff into thinking Plaintiff would be going to a program to escape the 

harm caused by Defendants. Plaintiff signed a paper for this program.

On February 23, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the Pelican Bay State Prison 

(“PBSP”) Mental Health/Suicide Program unit. The next day, Plaintiff was seen by a 

psychiatrist (it is unclear if this was Dr. Maddox or another individual) who told Plaintiff he 

would have to stay in the unit for five days before he could be cleared. However, Plaintiff 

remained in the unit for ten days, because officers told lies to keep Plaintiff. While 

Plaintiff was housed at PBSP, officers at PBSP denied Plaintiff showers and logged that 

Plaintiff had refused showers. Hall, Burke, and an unnamed Sergeant also called Plaintiff 

a snitch. The Sergeant was Heisol‟s uncle, and Hall was Heisol‟s cousin. Plaintiff believes 

these family relationships are the reason he was sent to PBSP.

Plaintiff did not return to SCC until March 4, 2016. When Plaintiff arrived at SCC, 

he began arguing with Dr. Maddox and accusing Dr. Maddox of sending him to PBSP to 

cover up the other Defendants‟ actions. Dr. Maddox was so enraged by Plaintiff‟s 

accusations that he sent Plaintiff to the California State Prison in Folsom, California. 

Plaintiff was never suicidal, and in fact had been cleared by five doctors at PBSP on 

February 29, 2016. Dr. Maddox misused his authority to cover up the abuses of other 

Defendants.

Several months later, on July 23, 2016, Plaintiff was housed at the Correctional 

Training Facility (“CTF”). Several black inmates told Plaintiff that he needed to leave the 

central yard because one of the officers told them Plaintiff had arrived from SCC. During 

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unlock, Plaintiff told the tier officer that he was not safe on the central yard. The officer 

said to Plaintiff, “You don‟t have to go!” as if it were a joke. Plaintiff spoke to a lieutenant 

and explained that he had safety concerns on the yard. While Plaintiff was in the room 

with the lieutenant, he heard a familiar voice, and realized Heisol was in the room as well. 

Plaintiff was placed in ad-seg. While there, he was verbally threatened, and 

Plaintiff believes officers did something to his food.

On August 10, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the Salinas Valley State Prison 

(“SVSP”) ad-seg for temporary housing. Eight days later, he was released from ad-seg 

into the level 3 “SNY,” or protective custody yard. Plaintiff did not want to be released 

from ad-seg, and he states his placement in a level 3 yard was inconsistent with his point 

level, which was only a level 2.

On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff made several calls to 911 on his cell phone because 

of inmates outside of his cell. Plaintiff‟s cellmate kept saying, “You can‟t beat CDC, you 

need to throw away yo‟ paperwork.” Defendants continued to enlist inmates to threaten 

and intimidate Plaintiff. Eventually, Plaintiff was placed back in ad-seg pending his 

transfer to CSATF.

Beginning on September 11, 2016, Plaintiff was subjected to countless incidents of 

retaliation from a large number of Defendants. First, Plaintiff requested to go to the 

library, but an officer never called him down. Another time, Plaintiff was escorted across 

the yard in handcuffs, and when he asked Officer M. Pilkerton why he was being 

escorted in cuffs, she replied, “Someone read the 602 wrong[], they jumped the gun.” On 

a third occasion, Plaintiff was sent to mental health and asked questions, but Plaintiff 

refused to answer them because he knew the questions were just a mental game.

Defendants threatened to place Plaintiff on suicide watch if he did not answer the 

questions. The mental health interviews continued on January 4, 2017. On December 7, 

2016, Plaintiff was called from his cell as if to go to medical, however ISU officers came 

for him. Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs, which he viewed as an intimidation tactic. 

Plaintiff was also embarrassed in front of the other inmates. 

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Plaintiff was denied his mail in October 2016, when the CSATF mailroom sent it 

back bearing the words “insufficient address” even though the address was correct.

Plaintiff alleges violations of First and Eighth Amendments. He states that in 

addition to the injuries he suffered as a result of the excessive force, he suffered 

emotional damage such as fear and humiliation. He seeks nominal, compensatory and 

punitive damages.

IV. Discussion

For the reasons below, Plaintiff‟s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

A. Allegations Against Non-Parties and Doe Defendants

Defendants Heisol, G. Wright, J. Delgado, and Dr. Maddox of SCC are the only 

individuals named as Defendants in the complaint. However, Plaintiff‟s complaint 

contains allegations against non-parties Bartholomew, Hall, Burke, and Pilkerton, as well 

as several unnamed officers and medical professionals. 

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each defendant be 

named in the caption of the complaint. A complaint is subject to dismissal if “one cannot 

determine from the complaint who is being sued, [and] for what relief. . . .” McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court will not herein address 

any allegations made against individuals not named in the caption. If Plaintiff wishes to 

pursue such allegations, he may amend his complaint and include these additional 

parties in the caption. If he does not know a party‟s name, he may proceed against him or 

her as a Doe defendant.

The use of Doe defendants generally is disfavored in federal court. Wakefield v. 

Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 

637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Court cannot order the Marshal to serve process on any 

Doe defendants until such defendants have been identified. See, e.g., Castaneda v. 

Foston, No. 1:12-cv-00026 WL 4816216, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). Plaintiff may, 

under certain circumstances, be given the opportunity to identify unknown defendants 

through discovery prior to service. Id. (plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to identify 

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unknown defendants through discovery unless it is clear that discovery would not 

uncover their identities). However, in order to proceed to discovery, Plaintiff must first 

state a cognizable claim.

Furthermore, Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must 

“set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant‟s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Plaintiff must distinguish between Doe defendants by, for 

example, referring to them as “John Doe 2,” “John Doe 3,” and so on, and describe what 

each did or failed to do to violate Plaintiff‟s rights. See Ingram v. Brewer, No. 1:07-cv00176-OWW-DLB, 2009 WL 89189 (E.D. Cal. January 12, 2009) (“In order to state a 

claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some 

affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff‟s federal rights.”).

B. Verbal Abuse and Threats

Allegations of name-calling, verbal abuse, or threats fail to state a constitutional 

claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Verbal 

harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983”) (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Gaut v. 

Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (mere threat does not constitute constitutional 

wrong). To the extent Plaintiff seeks recompense based purely on the fact that hurtful 

statements were made, those claims are dismissed.

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from both excessive uses of force and 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted).

a. Excessive Force

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 

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(1992) (citations omitted). For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, 

the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 

37 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is contextual and responsive to 

contemporary standards of decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted), and although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the 

malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary 

standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Wilkins,

559 U.S. at 37-8 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff claims that on February 18, 2016, Defendants Delgado and Wright 

used “an unreasonable amount of force” when they shackled Plaintiff. These allegations 

are insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff must state with a degree of specificity what each 

Defendant did that amounted to an excessive use of force and describe in detail the facts 

leading up to the use of force..

Likewise, Plaintiff‟s claim that Defendants injected methamphetamines into Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim. He does not state who injected him, under what circumstances, or 

even how Plaintiff knew that he was administered methamphetamines. Plaintiff‟s 

excessive force claims will be dismissed with leave to amend.

b. Conditions of Confinement

1. Legal Standard

To allege an Eighth Amendment claim for inhumane conditions of confinement, a 

prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk 

of harm to his health or safety. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 

611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010). “Deliberate indifference describes a state of 

mind more blameworthy than negligence” but is satisfied by something “less than acts or 

omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Plaintiff must demonstrate first that the seriousness of the risk 

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was obvious or provide other circumstantial evidence that Defendants were aware of the 

substantial risk to his health, and second that there was no reasonable justification for 

exposing him to that risk. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078 (citing Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 

1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted).

To make out a claim for failure to protect, the prisoner must establish that prison 

officials were “deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate's safety. Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834. To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a 

serious threat to the inmate's safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of 

and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware 

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of 

Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). However, to prove knowledge of the risk, the 

prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk 

may be sufficient to establish knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

Finally, for Eighth Amendment claims arising out of medical care in prison, Plaintiff 

“must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] 

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)).

2. Analysis

Turning to Plaintiff‟s complaint, he first contends that on February 18, 2016, he 

was removed from his cell in ad-seg and escorted to a side hallway, where he was 

assaulted by four inmates in view of Defendants. He provides no details about the 

alleged assault, does not identify the inmates responsible or specify who was responsible 

for which act, and he does not identify which Defendants were present or what they did or 

did not do to protect him. These allegations fail to state a claim for failure to protect, 

however Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. 

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Plaintiff next contends that after Defendants injected him with methamphetamines, 

he “appeared” to experience chest pains, but Defendants failed to seek medical attention

for several hours. While Plaintiff claims he was in serious need of medical attention, he 

does not detail how his condition was serious, nor does he allege that Defendants knew 

of his medical need and deliberately failed to address it. Furthermore, it appears that 

Plaintiff was in fact transferred to Sonora Regional Hospital that same night, albeit for an 

unspecified medical reason. Thus, it does not appear that Defendants disregarded 

Plaintiff‟s need for medical attention. Plaintiff‟s claims in this regard will also be dismissed 

with leave to amend.

Plaintiff further claims that after he was discharged from the hospital and returned 

to SCC, Dr. Maddox convinced him to go to a mental health program at PBSP. Plaintiff 

remained in the program for ten days rather than the promised five. When Plaintiff finally 

returned to SCC and confronted Dr. Maddox, the psychiatrist sent Plaintiff to the state 

prison in Folsom. These allegations fail to state a claim. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that 

Dr. Maddox‟s actions in sending him to a mental health program demonstrated deliberate 

indifference to a serious medical need. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the goingson at PBSP or elsewhere were attributable to Dr. Maddox or any other named Defendant, 

nor does Plaintiff describe what, if anything, actually occurred at these other institutions 

that violated Plaintiff‟s rights. Plaintiff‟s claims pertaining to the administration of mental 

health treatment will be dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff also complains of his treatment while he was housed at PBSP, alleging 

that he was denied showers and called a snitch. These vague allegations fail to state a 

claim. 

Plaintiff next complains of his treatment while at CTF, stating he was verbally 

threatened and that he thinks someone did something to his food. Again, these 

allegations are too vague and non-specific to state a claim.

Finally, Plaintiff complains that he was placed in a level 3 SNY yard at SVSP, and 

that officers enlisted other inmates to threaten Plaintiff. Once again, Plaintiff fails to 

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provide sufficient facts to state a claim for inhumane conditions of confinement.

D. Housing Assignment

Plaintiff complains that he was placed in a level 3 yard at SVSP when he was in 

fact a level 2 inmate. He also takes issue with the fact that he was removed from ad-seg 

involuntarily. It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to make a Due Process claim; 

regardless, an inmate does not have a due process or liberty interest in remaining 

housed in a particular facility or institution. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 

(1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not, in and of itself, protect a duly 

convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another . . . [even if] life in one 

prison is much more disagreeable than in another.”) Only if Plaintiff were subjected to “an 

atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” would 

Due Process be implicated. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-223 (2005); Sandin 

v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). There is no such allegation here.

In any case, Plaintiff has not alleged how any named Defendant was responsible 

for Plaintiff‟s housing assignment at SVSP. Plaintiff‟s claims relating to his housing at 

SVSP will be dismissed.

E. Mail

Prisoners have a “First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. 

Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). The censorship of outgoing prisoner mail is 

justified if the following criteria are met: (1) the regulation furthers “an important or 

substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and (2) “the 

limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or 

essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier v. 

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (limited by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–

14 (1989), only as test relates to incoming mail).

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that the CSATF mailroom returned his mail as 

undeliverable. There are no facts from which the Court can conclude that any individual 

wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff‟s mail. Furthermore, any issues Plaintiff experienced 

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with his mail while at CSATF are completely unrelated to the actions of Defendants 

Heisol, Wright, Delgado, and Maddox at SCC. If Plaintiff believes he can make a 

constitutional claim for interference with his mail, he is advised to bring those claims in a 

separate suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (a plaintiff may only sue multiple defendants in the 

same action if at least one claim against each defendant arises out of the same 

“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and there is a 

“question of law or fact common to all defendants.”); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 

1351 (9th Cir.1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 

1375 (9th Cir.1980). 

F. Retaliation

It is well-settled that § 1983 provides for a cause of action against prison officials 

who retaliate against inmates for exercising their constitutionally protected rights. Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]etaliatory actions by prison officials 

are cognizable under § 1983.”) Within the prison context, a viable claim of retaliation 

entails five basic elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his constitutional rights, and (5) the action did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114-15; Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1269. 

The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a 

“„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the defendant‟s conduct.” Id. (quoting 

Sorrano‟s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can 

be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on 

circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 

a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials‟ retaliatory motives 

by raising issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 

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F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“timing can properly be 

considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”). 

In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a complaint or grievance is constitutionally 

protected. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to the fourth prong, the correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official‟s acts “could chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the 

protected activity[].” Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively allege that “„the prison 

authorities‟ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d at 532.

Here, Plaintiff claims he suffered many instances of allegedly retaliatory conduct at 

several different institutions. For each retaliatory action, however, the Court cannot 

determine what, if any, protected conduct Plaintiff engaged in prior to each instance of 

retaliation, or that the actions alleged were in fact adverse in nature, motivated by 

Plaintiff‟s protected conduct, and were not in furtherance of a legitimate penological 

purpose. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. Should Plaintiff choose to amend, he 

must limit his claims to those that relate back to the underlying events at SCC or involve 

the same Defendants. Unrelated instances of retaliation at other institutions involving 

unrelated individuals belong in a separate suit.

G. Conspiracy

Based on Plaintiff‟s allegations, he may intend to state a claim for conspiracy. 

Should Plaintiff believe he can make such a claim, the standard is below.

A conspiracy claim brought under Section 1983 requires proof of “„an agreement 

or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,‟” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 

441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 

F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of 

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constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “„To be 

liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but 

each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.‟” Franklin,

312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the Court may not apply a 

heightened pleading standard to Plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City 

and County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of 

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true, the 

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the 

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, 

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation that Defendants conspired 

to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim 

under section 1983.

K. California State Tort Claims

Plaintiff accuses Defendants of assault and battery, which are state tort claims. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 

jurisdiction, the district court Ashall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in 

the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III [of the Constitution],@ except as provided in subsections (b) 

and (c). A[Once judicial power exists under ' 1367(a), retention of supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.@ ACI v. Varian Assoc., 

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has cautioned that Aif the 

federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as 

well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

California=s Tort Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its 

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employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims 

Board (“the Board”), formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six 

months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Govt. Code '' 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 

950-950.2 (West 2009). Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the 

claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 90 P.3d 

116, 124 (2004); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm=n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 

1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance 

with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Super. Ct., 90 P.3d at 124; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). An action 

must be commenced within six months after the claim is acted upon or is deemed to be 

rejected. Cal. Govt. Code ' 945.6; Moore v. Twomey, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2004). Should Plaintiff believe he can allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act, the 

standards for the tort claims of assault and battery are below.

1. Assault and Battery

Under California law, “[a]n assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present 

ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another” and “[a] battery is any willful 

and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 

240, 242 (West 2005); 5 B. E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 346 (9th ed. 

1988). For an assault claim under California law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 

defendant threatened to touch him in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) it reasonably 

appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the 

plaintiff did not consent to the conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the 

defendant‟s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Tekle v. United States,

511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For battery, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) the defendant intentionally did an act that resulted in harmful or offensive contact 

with the plaintiff‟s person; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the 

contact caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to the plaintiff. Id. (citation and quotations 

omitted).

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H. Damages for Emotional Injury

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) dictates that a prisoner may not recover 

damages for alleged emotional injuries suffered while in custody without first showing he 

suffered physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). While the physical injury need not be 

significant, it must be more than de minimus. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626-27 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiff primarily claims that Defendants‟ actions caused him emotional 

harm. The only physical injury Plaintiff suffered, however, was as a result of the February 

18, 2016 assault and excessive force incident; even there, Plaintiff suffered only “scuffed 

knees” and “scars.” At this juncture, the Court offers no opinion as to whether scuffs and 

scars constitute more than de minimus injury. However, Plaintiff is advised that to the 

extent he intends to recover damages for his alleged emotional suffering, such relief is 

barred by the PLRA absent a showing of physical injury.

V. Conclusion 

Plaintiff‟s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court will 

provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff amends, his 

complaint must be short and may only present the facts necessary to support his claims. 

Furthermore, he may only allege claims that (a) arise out of the same transaction, 

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (b) present questions of law or 

fact common to all Defendants named therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Plaintiff must file 

individual actions for unrelated claims against unrelated Defendants. 

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but 

under section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

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Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff‟s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a 

copy of the complaint filed January 9, 2017;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

b. File a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action for

failure to state a claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to 

prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2017 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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