Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02125/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02125-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAYLOR SMART, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 

ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant.

No. 2:22–cv–2125–WBS–KJN

(ECF Nos 49, 50.) 

JOSEPH COLON, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 

ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant.

No. 1:23–cv–425–WBS–KJN

(ECF Nos. 58, 59.) 

ORDER

On November 7, 2023, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to compel and the 

parties’ motion to resolve discovery issues and process. For the reasons discussed at the hearing: 

(I) the court declines to set limits on the Rule 30(b)(6) topics at this time; (II) plaintiffs are limited 

to 10 depositions for each case; (III) plaintiff’s class certification expert report is due alongside 

their briefing, with defendant’s rebuttal due alongside their opposition; and (IV) plaintiffs’ motion 

to compel member schools’ communications, volunteer coach names, and pay data is denied. 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 1 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Background 

Plaintiffs in these related cases were “volunteer coaches” for NCAA Division 1 schools 

who allege antitrust claims as class representatives (a class of baseball coaches in Smart; a class 

of coaches across many other sports in Colon). (ECF No. 1.) The assigned district judge related 

the cases and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss in part, finding plaintiffs’ Sherman Act and 

UCL claims stated a claim (that the NCAA’s bylaw requiring member schools to retain volunteer 

coaches alleges a restraint of trade). Relevant here, the district judge applied a “quick look” 

framework to plaintiffs’ anticompetitive claims, noting that the Supreme Court does not allow a 

per se anticompetitive framework against the NCAA, but finding “no elaborate industry analysis 

is required” to show that paying coaches $0 is less beneficial to plaintiffs. (ECF No. 29.) 

After the pleadings were settled, the district judge entered a scheduling order. Relevant 

here, the schedule requires plaintiffs to move for class certification by August 2, 2024. The 

parties had requested differing schedules about expert deadlines for the class certification motion, 

but the district judge declined to order this. Under the schedule, the parties’ expert disclosures 

are due by January of 2025, rebuttals by February, and fact discovery is to close by March of 

2025. The district judge informed the parties to notice any remaining discovery or scheduling 

matters before the assigned magistrate judge. (ECF No. 38.) 

Plaintiffs propounded discovery on the NCAA, including requests for production of 

documents and interrogatories seeking (as is relevant here): the names of Division 1 schools’ 

volunteer coaches, individualized pay data for these schools’ assistant coaches, and NCAA board 

members’ communications regarding a recent change in the ‘volunteer coach’ bylaw. (See ECF 

49.) Defendant objected to these requests, asserting that while the information appeared relevant 

to plaintiffs’ claims, the NCAA does not possess or regularly collect this information, nor does it 

have any authority over its member schools to require them to produce the information. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs disagreed, noting various provisions of the NCAA’s bylaws that they argue give the 

unincorporated association control. (Id.) The parties submitted this dispute to the undersigned 

for resolution. (Id.) The parties also requested the undersigned resolve certain scheduling and 

discovery matters. (ECF No. 50.) 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 2 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

Discussion

Alongside the parties’ disputes raised here, the parties submit to the court a number of 

modifications to the standard discovery rules. These include the number of interrogatories and 

requests for admissions the parties may serve, procedures for expert and authentication 

depositions, the time limits and time divisions for each deposition, and the number of depositions 

allowed defendant. (ECF No. 50 at 3-4.) The parties have stipulated to these modifications. To 

the extent the parties seek the court’s blessing for their stipulation, it is so ordered. 

I. Limitations on Topics for Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) grants a party the power to depose “one or more officers, 

directors, or managing agents” of an organization “[or] other persons who consent to testify on its 

behalf,” as designated by the organization. The Rule requires the organization “set out the 

matters on which each person designated will testify,” and also requires the parties to confer 

about the matters for examination. Defendants request plaintiffs be required to coordinate on one 

30(b)(6) deposition limited to 8 topics; plaintiffs contend this request is premature. The court 

agrees with plaintiffs, and so no limits (beyond what the Rules require) will be set at this time. 

II. Number of Depositions for Plaintiffs

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 states that “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any person, 

including a party, without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2).” However, Rule 

30(a)(2) states that a party must obtain leave of court if a deposition “would result in more than 

10 depositions being taken.” Defendant contends that because these cases were related and 

involve a similar set of facts, plaintiffs should be limited to 8 additional depositions beyond the 

one, coordinated Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Plaintiffs contend the facts differ for their two cases, 

as the proposed classes are different, and note that the district judge declined to consolidate the 

cases; thus, plaintiffs argue they should be allowed the standard 10 depositions in each case. 

Given the operation of the Federal Rules and the fact that these cases have been related

only, plaintiffs in each case are allowed the standard 10 depositions without needing leave of 

court. Plaintiffs are cautioned that this should not be read as a license to take 20 depositions just 

because the rules allow. The parties should continue to work together to resolve any disputes, 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 3 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

and eliminate or minimize any redundancy. 

III. Expert Report Deadlines for Class Certification Motion/Opposition

In the parties’ joint statement submitted to the district judge, defendant requested a 

bifurcated schedule to accommodate plaintiffs’ forthcoming motions for class certification. 

Defendant argued that because Sherman Act claims often require a detailed examination of 

market power, typically supported by expert testimony, the parties should be required to submit 

their expert reports, rebuttals, and replies prior to the start of class certification briefing. Plaintiffs 

contend the district judge rejected this request, and so plaintiffs’ expert reports should be due 

alongside their motions. Plaintiffs note the district judge found that a “quick look” approach was 

appropriate for this case, so a less-extensive analysis is required for their Sherman Act claims at 

class certification. Plaintiffs also cite to the district judge’s approval of the parties’ agreement to 

allow for an extended briefing schedule for the motion (that defendant be allowed six weeks to 

depose plaintiffs’ experts, generate its own expert report, and file its points and authorities in 

opposition of class certification). 

On this point, the undersigned agrees with plaintiffs. The district judge declined to enter a 

bifurcated schedule, and given the parties’ cooperation so far, defendant could request (and 

should receive) the amount of time necessary to complete its expert discovery on class 

certification prior to submitting its opposition. The undersigned encourages the parties to submit 

stipulations to the district judge regarding their briefing schedule and reaffirms the district judge’s 

note on this matter. (See ECF No. 38 at 5, fn.1.) 

IV. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel 

Plaintiffs seek a court order compelling the NCAA to produce: (a) the names of member 

schools’ volunteer coaches; (b) individualized pay data for member schools’ assistant coaches; 

and (c) NCAA governance board members’ communications regarding a recent change in the 

‘volunteer coach’ bylaw at issue in this case. The parties do not dispute the relevance of this

information, nor do they dispute that the NCAA does not possess or have custody over this 

information. Rather, the parties dispute whether the NCAA has “control” over the information 

for Rule 34 purposes, or that the information is otherwise “available to” it for Rule 33 purposes, 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 4 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

such that the court could compel the NCAA to collect and produce the information.

Legal Standards 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, a party’s obligation to produce documents 

extends to relevant non-privileged documents in its “possession, custody, or control.” “Control is 

defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand.” In re Citric Acid Lit., 191 F.3d 

1090, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 

870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that proof of “theoretical 

control is insufficient; a showing of actual control is required.” Int'l Union, 870 F.2d at 1453–54; 

see also Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1107 (rejecting the “practical ability” test because the non-party 

entity “could legally—and without breaching any contract—continue to refuse to turn over such 

documents”). “The party seeking production of the documents . . . bears the burden of proving 

that the opposing party has such control.” Int'l Union, 870 F.2d at 1452. 

Under Rule 33(b)(1)(B), an interrogatory addressed to a party must be answered by an 

officer or agent, “who must furnish the information available to the party.” For Rule 33 purposes, 

courts have held that information “readily obtainable” from a third-party is discoverable through 

an interrogatory. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation (“O’Bannon”), 

2012 WL 161240 *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan 17, 2012) (citing Hitachi, Ltd. v. AmTran Tech. Co., Ltd., 

2006 WL 2038248 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2006). “Rule 33 requires that a corporation furnish 

such information as is available from the corporation itself or from sources under its control.” In 

re ATM Fee Antitrust Lit., 233 F.R.D. 542, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. 

Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 96 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Wis. 1983). Thus, courts have found a parent 

corporation must respond to an interrogatory with information from a subsidiary, or where the 

subsidiary is participating in the litigation. Id. However, other courts have found control lacking 

where: (i) no evidence supports an agency-principal relationship, particularly where the ‘parent’ 

organization is an unincorporated association; (ii) individual institutions have not “actively 

participated” in the litigation; or (iii) member institutions have done nothing more than 

“voluntarily cooperate in response to the discovery demands.” O’Bannon, 2012 WL 161240, at 

*4. 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 5 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

Analysis 

a. Volunteer Coach IDs

To demonstrate control, plaintiffs point to a number of the NCAA’s Bylaws that, they 

argue, give defendant the legal right to obtain the names of the volunteer coaches who worked for 

each of the Division 1 schools (in the relevant sports and times). Primarily, plaintiffs cite to 

Bylaw 11.7.1, which reads: “An individual who coaches and either is uncompensated or receives 

compensation or remuneration of any sort from the institution ... shall be designated as a head 

coach, assistant coach, volunteer coach, graduate assistant coach or student assistant coach by 

certification of the institution.” (See ECF No. 49-2 at Ex. E (the “Bylaws”) at 49.) Plaintiff 

argues that because this Bylaw requires each school to certify the position of each coach, 

including the volunteer coaches, it gives the NCAA the right to obtain from the schools the names 

of these coaches. Defendant disagrees, noting this Bylaw only requires the schools to designate 

and certify the information to itself, not to the NCAA. Defendant notes other provisions in the 

Bylaws with similar self-reporting procedures, contrasting these with other Bylaws that explicitly 

require the school “notify” or “report to” the NCAA. Defendant supports this argument not only 

by a plain read of the text but through the declaration of Kevin Lennon, the Senior VP of Policy 

and Governance for the NCAA. (See ECF No. 49-3 at ¶¶ 1; 19-22.) 

On the whole, defendant has the better read of the Bylaws. The undersigned notes the 

difference between Bylaw 11.7.1 and, for example, 12.1.1.1.2.2: the former merely requires 

certification by the institution (as if to say “Mrs. X, we designate you as Assistant Coach”), while 

the latter expressly requires reporting of information to the NCAA on certain conditions. (Cf.

Bylaws at 49, with Bylaws at 55-56.) Plaintiffs argue this interpretation is absurd, as there would 

be no way for the NCAA to obtain this information if a school failed to follow Bylaw 11.7.1. 

However, the court notes there are other provisions of the Bylaws that allow the NCAA to open 

an investigation during an enforcement action, during an infractions proceeding, or other 

inquiries—thus leaving the NCAA with options to investigate certifications if the NCAA believed 

a school was out of compliance. (See Bylaws 8.01.3, 19.2.3, 20.10.1.5.) 

Regarding the NCAA power to investigate, plaintiffs argue these give the NCAA the legal 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 6 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

right to the information so it should open an investigation. However, these investigatory Bylaws 

are not meant to provide a discovery mechanism for plaintiffs to utilize; rather, they allow for the 

NCAA to investigate if a Bylaw has not been adhered to. No one has asserted schools failed to 

follow the volunteer coach Bylaw—to the contrary, plaintiffs’ case is founded on the premise that 

member schools did follow the Bylaw in hiring coaches on a $0 salary. What’s more, other 

courts dealing with similar issues have found unpersuasive the argument that an organization’s 

bylaws can be cobbled together to provide for express legal control over the sought-after 

information. See O’Bannon, 2012 WL 161240 at *3 (“Furthermore, the fact that the NCAA can 

take enforcement action against member institutions that violate NCAA rules does not mean that 

the NCAA has power to compel members to produce the documents sought in this litigation.”) 

(citing Int'l Union, 870 F.2d at 1452 (finding that International Union did not have “control” over 

local union documents even though International had power to dissolve local union, revoke 

charter, and remove recalcitrant leaders under certain circumstances)).

Plaintiffs also contend that the names of the volunteer coaches should be “readily 

obtainable” and “available” to the NCAA for purposes of a Rule 33 interrogatory. However, 

plaintiffs’ argument here falls short for the same reasons as with its Rule 34 argument: they have 

not shown the NCAA has the legal right to obtain this information. Similar to O’Bannon, this 

case differs from, for example, Hitachi, Ltd. v. AmTran Tech. Co., Ltd., 2006 WL 2038248 at *2 

(N.D. Cal. July 18, 2006). There, the court relied on the agent-principle relationship between the 

parties; here, no such relationship is apparent. See O’Bannon, 2012 WL 161240 at *3-5. 

 Beyond this fact, plaintiffs generally cite to Rule 1 (for the “just, speedy, and inexpensive 

determination of every action”), note the incredible burden placed on them in having to issue over 

300 subpoenas to member schools, and cite as persuasive a 10th Circuit case where, when the 

“rubber met the road,” the NCAA successfully obtained and produced the information sought in 

discovery. See Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 167 F.R.D. 464 (D. Kan. 1996). 

However, as defendant correctly notes, the 10th Circuit expressly overruled a portion of the 

district court’s order in Law (that the member schools were the “real parties in interest”), thus 

calling into question its central holding. Further, as noted in Int'l Union, the Ninth Circuit has 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 7 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

rejected a more flexible “practical ability” test used in Law. 870 F.2d at 1454. Bigger picture, 

plaintiffs have not indicated what action the court might take if it were to issue an order 

compelling member schools to produce the information but the member schools refuse.1 See

O’Bannon, 2012 WL 161240 at *5 (“And the Court is not convinced that if it were to order the 

NCAA to survey its members for more information that there would be any remedy if the 

member institutions refused to comply.”). For these reasons, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel defendant to obtain and produce the names of each schools’ volunteer coaches. 

b. Individualized Data on Assistant Coach Pay 

Much for the same reason, plaintiffs’ argument fails in its request for an order compelling 

the NCAA to produce individualized salary data for each member schools’ assistant coaches. 

Plaintiffs’ strongest argument is its reliance on Bylaw 20.2.4.17, which states that member 

schools must “submit financial data ... to the NCAA on an annual basis in accordance with the 

financial reporting policies and procedures, [including] [s]alary and benefits data for all athletics 

positions.” (See Bylaws at 60-61.) Defendant states that, pursuant to this Bylaw, it regularly 

collects the aggregate salaries for all assistant coach positions (e.g. “We, X School employ two 

assistant coaches with a salary of $200,000 in total.”). Defendant has offered to produce this 

information in the form it receives it. Plaintiffs argue this text plainly gives the NCAA control 

over the individualized salary data, and so the NCAA should obtain it from each school. Despite 

plaintiffs’ arguments, the Bylaw makes this reporting duty subject to certain “financial reporting 

policies and procedures.” These procedures define the salaries category as “[i]nput 

compensation, bonuses and benefits paid to all coaches . . . .” (ECF No. 49-3 at 7 (emphasis 

added).) The courts read here aligns with defendant’s read of the Bylaw and attached procedures. 

1

 The court discussed at length the parties’ options regarding plaintiffs’ ability to obtain the 

sought-after information. One option could be for the NCAA to voluntarily solicit this 

information from its member schools and produce to plaintiffs whatever it obtains. Coupled with 

an agreement that the parties might rely on a random sample of evidence to support their class 

certification/opposition motions, this might reduce the costs—and attorneys’ fees—that the 

NCAA may be liable for in any settlement or loss at trial. However, the court’s “mediator’s 

suggestions” herein are different from its power to compel member schools to produce the 

information. 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 8 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1107. 

The remainder of plaintiffs’ arguments on this point (NCAA’s general investigatory 

powers, Rule 33 availability, Rule 1 efficiencies, citation to Law, reliance on a “practical ability” 

test, and the court’s ability to enforce any order against nonparties) are similar to those with the 

volunteer coaches, and so are rejected for the same reasons as above. Thus, plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel individualized salary data for the assistant coaches is denied. Defendant shall produce the 

information as it has in its possession, and if plaintiffs wish to obtain more granularized data, they 

may subpoena the member schools. 

c. Division 1 School Communications re: Bylaw Changes 

Finally, plaintiffs seek an order compelling production of communications from members 

of the NCAA Governance Board as related to changes made to the ‘Volunteer Coaches’ Bylaw 

over the last few years. Defendant has offered to produce communications on this topic to the 

extent that its employees participated in these conversations and have copies of them. However, 

defendant notes that almost all individuals on this board are employees of the member schools, 

including university presidents, conference commissioners, and other high-ranking officials at 

those schools. These individuals use their own communications portals (email accounts and the 

like) which are not under the NCAA’s control. (ECF No. 49-3 at ¶¶ 35-42.) Plaintiffs counter 

that these individuals do business on behalf of the NCAA and so are, in effect, defendant’s 

agents; thus, the court can find defendant has control over these individuals’ communications. 

See S. California Edison Co., et al. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5506018, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 

July 17, 2023) (“[A] party responding to a Rule 34 production request is under an affirmative 

duty to seek that information reasonably available to it from its employees, agents, or others 

subject to its control.”). 

Again, plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive. The court notes plaintiffs’ citation to cases 

where courts have found such control between an association and its members. However, these 

cases present situations where, for one reason or another, there was some explicit authority 

granting this control. Miniace v. Pac. Martime Ass’n, 2006 WL 335389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 

2006) (compelling production of documents from association board members’ accounts where a 

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 9 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

state statute gave the power to remove the current, non-employee board members); Adidas Am., 

Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 2019 WL 7630793, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2019) (compelling 

search and production of documents of company board members where control might be 

established through “a term of sale or . . . some other mechanism”); Royal Park Invs. SA/NV v. 

Deutsche Bank, 2016 WL 5408171, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2016) (same, using a “practically 

available” test that the 9th Circuit rejects). At the hearing, plaintiffs argued defendant’s failure to 

cite to any supporting cases should render this argument in their favor. While true, defendant’s 

briefing in this section of the joint statement did not cite persuasive cases contrary to plaintiffs’, 

the court reads defendant’s argument as part and parcel with its argument regarding the volunteer 

coach identities and individualized pay data. That is: no Bylaw exists giving control to the 

NCAA over the email accounts of university presidents, conference commissioners, and the like. 

Thus, for the same reasons as above, plaintiffs’ motion to compel communications from the 

NCAA Governance Board Members is denied.

ORDER

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. The parties’ agreed upon procedures for discovery, as outlined above and at ECF No. 50-

1, 3-4, is ADOPTED;

2. Defendant’s request to limit the topics of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is DENIED; 

3. No limits on the number of depositions allowed plaintiffs are ordered aside from those 

outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30; 

4. Plaintiff’s timeline for the deadline to submit expert reports related to their class 

certification motion is ADOPTED. Plaintiffs shall submit their expert report alongside 

their class certification motion, currently due by August 2, 2024. Defendant’s rebuttal 

expert report is due alongside its opposition to the class certification motion; 

////

////

////

////

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

5. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 49) is DENIED IN FULL. Defendant shall 

produce the information in its possession. Plaintiffs may subpoena the member schools 

for additional information as needed, and the parties are counseled to continue working 

toward a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution to these cases.

Dated: November 9, 2023

smar.2125 and colo.425

Case 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK Document 55 Filed 11/09/23 Page 11 of 11