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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

IN RE: MAGIC CIRCLE ENERGY CORPORATION, 

Debtor. 

MAGIC CIRCLE ENERGY 1981-A DRILLING 

PROGRAM; MAGIC CIRCLE ENERGY 1982-83 

OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT PARTNERSHIP; 

MAGIC CIRCLE ENERGY 1981-B DRILLING 

PROGRAM; MAGIC CIRCLE ENERGY 1982-83 

PRIVATE DRILLING PROGRAM; OLYMPIA 1980 

DRILLING PROGRAM; and MAGIC CIRCLE 

ENERGY 1982 DRILLING PROGRAM, 

Petitioners-Appellants/Cross Appellee, 

v. 

PAUL B. LINDSEY, UNITED STATES 

BANKRUPTCY JUDGE, WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

OKLAHOMA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

Creditor-Appellee/Cross Appellant. 

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FI LED 

United Staccs 0-....utt of Appeals ~r en, th i c· .1r.::u1t · 

NOV 171989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 87-2626 & 

88-1075 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(CIV-87-1717-R) 

David A. Cheek of McKinney, Stringer & Webster, P.C., Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

Michael Paul Kirschner (Jackie 

Hastie and Kirschner, Oklahoma 

. Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

L. Hill, Jr. on the briefs) of 

City, Oklahoma, for CreditorBefore TACHA, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 1 
This case, a bankruptcy matter, comes before us on appeal 

from the district court's denial of a writ of prohibition, cross 

appeal of the district court's assumption of original 

jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss the appeal. 

The Magic Circle Energy 

(Partnerships) applied to 

1981-A Drilling Program, et al. 

the District Court for the Western 

District of Oklahoma to assume original jurisdiction over the 

voluntary bankruptcy proceeding filed in bankruptcy court by Magic 

Circle Energy Corporation (Magic Circle). The Partnerships 

petitioned the district court for a writ of prohibition to 

prohibit the bankruptcy court from exercising in personam 

jurisdiction over the partnerships. The district court granted 

the application to assume original jurisdiction but denied the 

writ of prohibition. The Partnerships appeal the denial of the 

writ. Wells Fargo, principal secured creditor of Magic Circle, 

filed a motion to dismiss the Partnerships' appeal and then filed 

its own notice of appeal from the district court's order assuming 

jurisdiction. Finding that we lack jurisdiction of this matter, 

we dismiss. 

I. FACTS 

This action arises from two interim orders issued by the 

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in the 

matter of Magic Circle Energy Corporation's voluntary bankruptcy 

petition. The appellants, certain limited partnerships of which 

Magic Circle is the sole general partner of each, filed special 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 2 
appearances and objections to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction 

on the ground that compliance with its third interim order would 

affect the Partnerships' property and contractual rights, although 

the bankruptcy court had never obtained personal jurisdiction of 

the Partnerships. On May 18, 1987, the bankruptcy court issued 

its fourth interim order and overruled the Partnerships' 

objections to jurisdiction. The Partnerships did not appeal this 

order, but filed a motion for new trial on May 28, 1987. On July 

16, the bankruptcy court issued an order denying the Partnerships' 

motion for a new trial. The Partnerships also failed to perfect 

an appeal of this order. Instead, on August 25, 1987, the 

Partnerships filed an application to the district court to assume 

original 

prohibit 

jurisdiction and a petition for-a writ of prohibition to 

the bankruptcy court from exercising personal 

jurisdiction over the Partnerships. 

On October 

assuming original 

prohibition. The 

14, 1987, the district court issued an order 

jurisdiction but denying the writ of 

Partnerships appealed this order to this court 

on October 26, 1987, and Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the 

appeal on November 16, 1987. Subsequently, Wells Fargo filed its 

cross appeal. 

The Partnerships claim essentially that the bankruptcy court 

and the district court have ignored the distinction between Magic 

Circle the debtor and Magic Circle the general partner in these 

partnerships. The Partnerships argue that they have never 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 3 
voluntarily subjected themselves to the bankruptcy court's 

jurisdiction in the Magic Circle· action, nor have they been sued 

in any adversary action arising out of Magic _Circle's bankruptcy 

petition. Yet they claim that the bankruptcy court's orders 

require Magic Circle and Wells Fargo to take certain actions that 

will affect their (the limited partners') rights in oil and gas 

properties and that such orders exceed the court's jurisdiction. 

Believing the bankruptcy court's denial of their objections to 

jurisdiction was not a final, appealable order, the Partnerships 

applied to the district court to assume original jurisdiction in 

the matter and for a writ of prohibition against the bankruptcy 

court. They asserted they would be irreparably harmed if they 

were required to wait until some uncertain date in the future to 

appeal a final judgment in the case. 

The district court granted the application to assume original 

jurisdiction, finding that its authority to issue a writ of 

prohibition under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 could be exercised to protect 

its prospective appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 

See District Court's Order at 15 (citing In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 

710, 716 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1185 (1985); 

Erie Bank v. United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado, 362 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1966), abrogated in part on 

other grounds sub. nom., Liberty Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme 

Tool Div. of the Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 

1976)). Applying the guidelines adopted in this circuit for 

determining when an extraordinary writ· should issue, the district 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 4 
court determined that the Partnerships had not met their heavy 

burden of qualifying for the writ. See District Court Order at 

16-28 (citing guidelines adopted in In re Dalton, 733 F.2d at 716-

17). 

The Partnerships appeal this order of the district court, 

maintaining that the bankruptcy court's orders exceeded its 

jurisdiction with respect to them. Wells Fargo, on the other 

hand, maintains that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

entertain the motion for the writ of prohibition, that in any 

event the Partnerships are not entitled to this extraordinary writ 

because they failed to pursue their adequate remedies at law, and 

that because the lower court lacked jurisdiction this court should 

dismiss the appeal. We agree we lack jurisdiction but for reasons 

other than those espoused by Wells Fargo. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 the circuit courts 

of appeals had jurisdiction of appeals from both interlocutory and 

final orders of the district courts in bankruptcy proceedings. 

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), the courts of appeals now have 

jurisdiction of appeals only from final orders of the district 

courts. 1 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted "final order'' for 

l 28 u.s.c. § 158 provides: 

(a) The district courts of the United States shall 

have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, 

orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from 

interlocutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges 

entered in cases and proceedings referred to the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 5 
purposes of § 158(d) in traditional finality terms, see In re 

Commercial Contractors, Inc., 771 F.2d 1373, -1375 (10th Cir. 

1985); In re Glover, Inc., 697 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1983), rather 

than according to the more flexible standard adopted by other 

circuits for identifying "final orders" of bankruptcy judges. 

See,~, In re Sun Valley Foods Co., 801 F.2d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 

1986); In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc., 796 F.2d 1435, 1437-38 

(11th Cir. 1986); In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1986); 

In re Barrier, 776 F.2d 1298, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985); In re 

Teleport, 759 F.2d 1376, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Amatex Corp., 

755 F.2d 1034, 1039-41 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Leimer, 724 F.2d 744, 

745 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 

443-46 (1st Cir. 1983). We have held that adhering to the more 

traditional view of finality for our review of district court 

orders, i.e., that "[t]o be final and appealable, the district 

court's order must end the litigation and leave nothing to be done 

except execute the judgment," In re Glover, 697 F.2d at 909 

(citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)), 

furthers the policy underlying the finality doctrine by 

controlling piecemeal adjudication and eliminating delays caused 

by interlocutory appeals. In re Commercial Contractors, Inc., 771 

F.2d at 1375. These results are "in keeping with 

bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title ..•• 

(d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction 

of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, 

and decrees entered under [subsection (a)] of this 

section. 

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the 

Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 6 
Congressional intent to narrow bankruptcy appeals" implicit in the 

elimination of our jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals by the 

1978 Act. Id. Consequently, if the district court's order 

denying a writ of prohibition is not a "final order" within the 

meaning of § 158(d) and our opinions construing that section, we 

have no jurisdiction of this appeal. 

Denial of an application for writ of prohibition cannot be 

seen as an adjudication of a claim on the merits, at least where 

there is any other ground for the denial. See Pitchess v. Davis, 

421 U.S. 482, 488 (1975) (citing People v. Medina, 6 Cal.3d 484, 

491, 492 P.2d 686, 690 (1972)). Here, the Partnerships sought a 

writ of prohibition on the ground that the bankruptcy court lacked 

jurisdiction of them. A writ of prohibition is an 

remedy and its issuance is highly discretionary. 

extraordinary 

A petitioner 

must show that his right to the writ is "clear and undisputable." 

In re Dalton, 733 F.2d at 716 (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 

v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953)). 

In order to deny the writ, the District Court need not have 

held, nor indeed did it hold, that the bankruptcy court properly 

exercised jurisdiction of the Partnerships. Instead, the court 

found the Partnerships had failed to demonstrate that the 

bankruptcy court had "clearly exceeded" its jurisdiction in 

entering the fourth interim order. District Court's Order at 26. 

In fact, the court 

satisfy even the 

held that the Partnerships had failed to 

"threshold burden" of establishing they owned 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 7 
property or property rights over which the bankruptcy court had 

exercised jurisdiction. Id. Given that finding, it was 

unnecessary to determine the scope or propriety of the bankruptcy 

court's exercise of jurisdiction. The district court's denial of 

the writ, then, was not an adjudication of the merits of the 

Partnerships' claim and thus not a final order subject to appeal 

at this time. 

Even if the district court's order could be considered an 

adjudication of Appellants' jurisdictional claim (and we do not 

hold that it was), it is nevertheless not a final order subject to 

immediate appeal. Denial of the writ in this case was analogous 

to a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. As 

Appellants themselves recognize, "denial of a motion to dismiss, 

even when the motion is based upon jurisdictional grounds, is not 

immediately reviewable." Appellants' Brief in Chief at 12 

(quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 236); see also Erie Bank, 362 F.2d at 

540. Appellants' remedy is to challenge the bankruptcy court's 

exercise of jurisdiction by bringing an appeal from the final 

judgment ultimately rendered by that court. The district court 

recognized this when it held that the Partnerships had failed to 

demonstrate they had suffered any harm not correctable on appeal. 

District Court's Order at 24-25. 

The district court's denial of the requested writ can also be 

seen as a remand to the bankruptcy court. By denying the writ the , 

district court was refusing to interfere in the ongoing bankruptcy 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 8 
proceedings and in effect was remanding to that court to proceed 

with its adjudication of Magic Circle's bankruptcy petition. 

Viewed this way, and in light of our opinions in In re Commercial 

Contractors and In re Glover, the district court's order was nonfinal. As we held in In re Glover, "an order remanding a matter 

to the bankruptcy court for further consideration ••. requires 

further steps to be taken to enable the court below to adjudicate 

the cause on the merits. Therefore, it is not final." 697 F.2d 

at 910. 

Thus, whether viewed as a denial of an extraordinary writ on 

grounds other than the merits of the underlying claim, see 

Pitchess, 421 U.S. at 4~8, or as a denial of a motion to dismiss 

within the meaning of Catlin, 324 U.S. at 236, or as a remand to 

the bankruptcy court, see In re Glover and In re Commercial 

Contractors, the district court's order was not "final" in the 

conventional sense. Accordingly, under 28 u.s.c. § 158(d} we have 

no jurisdiction of this appeal. 

Nor is the district court's order appealable under the 

collateral order eiception to the final judgment rule. Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). To 

qualify for this limited exception, the order must conclusively 

determine the disputed question (here, the. question of the 

bankruptcy court's jurisdiction), resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action, and be 

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Coopers 

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Appellate Case: 87-2626 Document: 010110089248 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 9 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see also Blondin 

v. Winner, 822 F.·2d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 1006 (1988); In re Glover, 697 F.2d at 910. Because a party 

seeking to appeal on this basis must show that all three 

requirements of the doctrine are satisfied, we need not address 

each if any one is not met. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors 

in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375 (1987). 

We have already held that the district court's denial of the 

writ of prohibition was not an adjudication on the merits of the 

Partnerships' jurisdictional claim, but that even if it were the 

decision is subject to appellate review. Under the strict 

standards established by the Supreme Court, where the denial of 

immediate review does not render impossible any review whatsoever, 

i.e., where rights will not be irretrievably lost in the absence 

of an immediate appeal,• collateral review is not available. See 

Blondin, 822 F.2d at 973 (citing Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. 

Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985); Firestone Tiri & Rubber Co. 

v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981)). Thus, the district court's 

order is not appealable under Cohen and its progeny. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court's 

order denying a writ of prohibition was not a ''final order" under 

28 u.s.c. § 158(d); hence, we have no jurisdiction of this appeal 

and no occasion to address the other contentions raised by the 

parties. Accordingly, we DISMISS. 

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