Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02156/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02156-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY FLETCHER

Plaintiff,

v.

c/o QUIN et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-2156-GPC-NLS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) 

DISMISSING THE CLAIMS WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (3) 

EXTENDING THE TIME TO 

EFFECT SERVICE UNDER FED. R. 

CIV. P. 4(m) 

(Dkt. No. 22)

Gregory Fletcher (“Plaintiff”), an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendant G. Galvan’s 

(“Galvan”) and F. Quinn’s (“Quinn”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff did not file an Opposition. For the reasons 

explained below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED, 

that Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, that Plaintiff be 

GRANTED an extension of time to effect service, and that service be directed through 

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the Deputy Attorney General.

I. Factual Allegations and Procedural Background1

On September 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint that the Court dismissed for 

failure to pay filing fees. On December 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed the operative First 

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 6.) 

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges three counts against eight prison 

officials employed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, 

California. (Id. at 2.) First, Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 9, 2014, Officer 

Romero physically pushed him multiple times, and that both Officer Romero and Officer 

Grisson failed to summon medical care for his broken thumb, a result of that physical 

incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Romero and Officer Grisson then told him that 

“no one mess[es] with” Officers Romero, Grisson, and Galvan. (Id.) Plaintiff further 

alleges that these officers, including Galvan, “are part of the Greenwall Officer Mafia 

Group,” are dangerous, corrupt, and cover up murders and beatings. (Id.)

Second, Plaintiff alleges claims of sexual assault and battery against Officer Lopez, 

and that Lopez denied his right to medical care. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that on 

September 24, 2015, Sergeant Stricklin signed a false statement concerning Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Lopez. (Id.)

Third, Plaintiff alleges various claims against Captain Sanchez, which he labels as 

cruel and unusual punishment and denial of his First Amendment rights of free speech 

and freedom of religion. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims he submitted a petition for a writ of 

Habeas Corpus to the U.S. or State Supreme Court, in which he disclosed assertions of 

murder and conspiracy to commit murder against numerous officers. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Captain Sanchez, Lieutenant Williams, and Officer Quinn “wanted [Plaintiff] 

dead.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff requests an injunction or restraining order against all defendants, along 

 

1 These factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint. 

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with monetary damages.

On May 9, 2016, defendants Galvan, Quinn, and Sanchez filed the presently 

pending Motion to Dismiss. They move to dismiss Galvin and Quinn from this case on 

the ground that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against them.2 Plaintiff did not file an 

opposition to the motion, and the Court took the matter under submission. 

Based on a review of docket, the other defendants—Lopez, Romero, Stricklin, 

Grisson, and Sorrano—have not yet been served, and the time permitted to do so under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) expired on or about May 3, 2016. Plaintiff filed a notice with the 

Court regarding his attempts to serve the remaining defendants. (See Dkt. No. 24.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert, by motion, the 

defense that the opposing party failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

 

2 Defendants do not move to dismiss the claims against Sanchez. 

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Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts have an 

“obligation . . . where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe 

the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted), it may not “supply essential 

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University 

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

III. Discussion

a. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Officer G. Galvan

Defendant Galvan argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him. (Dkt. No. 

22-1 at 23.) Plaintiff’s first count is an Eighth Amendment claim for failure-to-protect 

and deliberate indifference to medical needs. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) Galvan contends that 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff fails to 

allege the personal involvement of Galvan in the underlying event. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3.) 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits inflicting cruel and unusual punishments and 

“embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and 

decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). To violate the Eighth Amendment, “a prison official must have a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). “[T]o show an Eighth Amendment violation a prisoner must 

typically show that a defendant acted, not just negligently, but with ‘deliberate 

indifference.’” Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625 (2012). Moreover, to establish 

liability under section 1983, the plaintiff must show personal participation by the prison 

official. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

i. Failure-to-Protect Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Romero physically harmed him by pushing and 

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punching him, and that both Officer Romero and Officer Grisson failed to stop the 

continued attack.3(Dkt No. 6 at 3.) Plaintiff also alleges that Romero and Grisson told 

him that nobody messes with them and Officer Galvan. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that all of 

these officers “are part of the Greenwall Officer Mafia Group,” are dangerous and 

corrupt, and “have covered up murders and beatings.” (Id.) 

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from 

physical abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982). To establish an 

Eighth Amendment claim on failure to protect, the prisoner must show that prison 

officials were “deliberately indifferen[t]” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To establish deliberate indifference to a serious threat to the 

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must demonstrate that “the official [knew] of and 

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Accordingly, a 

showing of lack of knowledge of the risk may preclude a prison official from liability. Id.

at 844.

Plaintiff fails to assert sufficient facts indicating that Galvan violated Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from physical abuse. Plaintiff alleges 

no facts showing that Galvan knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s 

safety. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) Plaintiff does not allege that Galvan was present at the scene in 

which his injury took place, nor does he allege that Galvan had reason to know of the 

physical confrontation that occurred. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) The conclusory allegations that 

Galvan is dangerous, corrupt, covers up murders and beatings, and is part of the 

Greenwall Officer Mafia Group without further factual basis is insufficient to state a 

claim for relief. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that a complaint that offers labels, 

 

3 The Court notes Defendants interpreted Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim as alleging that Romero and 

Grisson failed to protect Plaintiff from an attack by another inmate. (See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 2.) Either way, 

Plaintiff’s allegations as currently pled do not implicate Galvan in the underlying event.

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conclusions, and naked assertions “devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not

overcome a motion to dismiss) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Plaintiff’s allegation that two other officers told him not to mess with Galvan 

similarly fails to state a claim for relief. Again, Plaintiff’s assertion does not relate to the 

failure-to-protect claim, as it does not allege any personal acts or omissions by Galvan. 

See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true . . . that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”). Plaintiff’s bare assertions and 

conclusions fail to state a failure-to-protect claim against Galvan for which relief can be 

granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

ii. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the physical attack by Officer Romero, Plaintiff 

broke his thumb and told Officers Romero and Grisson that he needed medical attention. 

(Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) He claims that in response, Romero and Grisson told him that “they 

didn’t care if [Plaintiff] died” and that he would not receive medical attention. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Romero and Grisson added: “no one mess[es] with [Romero], 

Grisson, Galvan, Sorrano [and inmate] King,” and that all of these officers “are part of 

the Greenwall Officer Mafia Group.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Galvan is dangerous 

and corrupt, and has “covered up murders and beatings.” (Id.)

“Denial of medical attention to prisoners constitutes an [E]ighth [A]mendment 

violation if the denial amounts to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of the 

prisoners.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). To establish 

deliberate indifference to medical needs, the plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or 

failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by 

the indifference.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). “A ‘serious’ 

medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Factors for 

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consideration are whether a reasonable doctor would believe the condition warrants 

addressing, whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities, and 

whether the condition is chronic and substantially painful. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Doty v. City of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60). 

While Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a serious medical injury (see Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a fractured thumb constitutes a serious 

medical condition)), he fails to adequately allege a claim that Galvan acted deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that Galvan knew of 

his medical condition or purposely failed to respond to his medical needs. (Dkt No. 6 at 

3.) The claim that other officers told Plaintiff he would not receive medical attention does 

not sufficiently state a claim against Galvan for deliberate indifference to medical needs. 

See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that the plaintiff must allege facts indicating 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” to state a claim for 

which relief can be granted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1055 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(requiring personal participation by a prison official to establish liability under section 

1983). Plaintiff does not allege sufficient actions or omissions by Galvan to state an 

Eighth Amendment claim against him. 

b. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Officer F. Quinn

Defendant Quinn argues that Plaintiff’s third count fails to assert a claim against 

him for which relief can be granted. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 4.) Plaintiff describes his third 

count as containing claims for cruel and unusual punishment, and violation of his 

freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. (Dkt. No. 6 at 5.) In 

support of this count, Plaintiff alleges Captain Sanchez “lock[ed] [him] up for no reason, 

prevented him from speaking to anybody, and expressed indifference to his religion. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that he petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus, disclosing “murder, 

conspiracy to commit murder,” and Sanchez’s engagement in sexual relations in 

exchange for leverage in the department. (Id.) Plaintiff next alleges that Sanchez, 

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Williams, and Quinn “wanted [him] dead.” (Id.) 

A prison official deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right “within the meaning 

of section 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 

1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “A 

plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was the ‘moving force,’” and “the actual and 

proximate cause of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Valencia v. 

Ruiz, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69427, at *24 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (citing Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Although Plaintiff does not label it as such, his allegations appear to suggest a 

retaliation claim against Sanchez. It is unclear whether Plaintiff also alleges such a claim 

against the other defendants. A retaliation claim in a prison context consists of five 

elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005); see also Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). “[P]urely 

retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for having exercised [First Amendment] rights

. . . violate the Constitution.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567.

Here, Plaintiff only provides factual allegations against Sanchez in support of his 

third count. He does not allege sufficient factual detail to state a claim against Quinn for 

which relief can be granted. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any act or omission by 

Quinn; he only states that Quinn “wanted [him] dead” without further factual detail. (Dkt. 

No. 6 at 5.) This bare assertion and conclusory statement without any factual support will 

not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff fails to tie any action or omission by Quinn to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

rights. (Dkt. No. 6 at 5.) While Plaintiff’s alleged petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus is 

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constitutionally protected conduct (see Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009)), Plaintiff fails to allege facts indicating any adverse action taken by Quinn (Dkt. 

No. 6 at 5.) If Plaintiff is attempting to make a retaliation claim, he fails to sufficiently 

link Quinn to his retaliation claim. (Id.) Plaintiff thus does not sufficiently state a claim 

against Quinn under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

c. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his complaint unless it is 

“absolutely clear” the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. 

Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). “Under Ninth Circuit case law, 

district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be 

saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit 

entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This Court recommends Plaintiff be granted an opportunity to amend his complaint 

to address the deficiencies as noted in this report. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his 

complaint, Plaintiff should be notified that he must specifically state what each named 

defendant did that deprived him of his constitutional or other federal rights. To state a 

cognizable claim, Plaintiff must plead facts as to each named defendant sufficient to raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

d. Extension of Time to Effect Service

The Court previously directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service on Plaintiff’s 

behalf. (Dkt. No. 11 at 5, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).) On or 

about April 5, 2016, the U.S. Marshal returned the unexecuted summons and complaint 

as to defendants Lopez, Romero, Stricklin, Grisson, and Sorrano because the litigation 

coordinator was unable to identify these individuals without their first initials. (Dkt. Nos. 

13-18.)

On May 12, 2016, Plaintiff constructively filed a letter describing and identifying 

each unserved defendant according to the limited information available to him. (See id. at 

2.) Plaintiff claims these individuals would not give him their first initials, but that

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Sorrano (or perhaps spelled Sorranno or Sorreano) and Grisson were assigned to BFacility, Building 8 in 2014 and 2015. (Id.) He further identifies that Romero was 

assigned to C-Facility, and Stricklin (or perhaps spelled Strickland or Striclin) was a 

Sergeant at B-Facility. (Id.) Plaintiff also emphasizes that he identified Lopez’s first 

initial as “M” various times in his complaint. (Id.)

“At the plaintiff’s request, the court may order that service be made by a United 

States marshal or deputy marshal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedures further provides that:

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the 

court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss 

the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be 

made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the 

failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The court enjoys broad discretion under Rule 4(m) to extend time 

for service, even without a showing of good cause. In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 513 (9th

Cir. 2001); Mann v. American Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

district court may, under the broad discretion granted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), extend 

time for service retroactively after the service period has expired).

Given that this Court recommends Plaintiff be provided leave to amend his 

complaint, this Court also recommends granting Plaintiff an extension of time to serve 

the un-served parties with the summons and complaint should Plaintiff include those 

parties in his amended complaint. It appears the only reason the U.S. Marshal was unable 

to effect service on these defendants is because Plaintiff could not identify their first 

initials. (Dkt. No. 24, at 3.)

The Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case should contact the Litigation 

Coordinator at RJD. The Deputy Attorney General should provide the Litigation 

Coordinator with the description and identifying information contained in Plaintiff’s

letter to U.S. Marshal Deputy or Clerk, P. Smith (see Dkt. No. 24), for the purpose of

ascertaining the first initials of the unserved defendants. The Deputy Attorney General 

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should then provide the U.S Marshal, in a confidential memorandum if necessary, the 

first initials of defendants Lopez, Romero, Stricklin, Grisson, and Sorrano, presuming the 

Litigation Coordinator is able to identify them using the information from Plaintiff’s

letter. (See id.) The memorandum should instruct that the information is to be used for 

purposes of service only.

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be GRANTED; 

2. The claims against Galvan and Quinn be dismissed WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND; 

3. Plaintiff be GRANTED an extension of time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) as 

to the un-served parties; and 

4. For service of the summons and any amended complaint to be re-directed 

through the Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case as to the unserved 

defendants.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned 

to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 21, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed and 

served on all parties no later than August 4, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2016

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