Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05215/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05215-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDC, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-5215-LJO DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 75)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s complaint filed October 22, 2004 against defendants

in their official capacties for violation of the Americans with Disabilties Act (“ADA”) and medical

malpractice. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights under the ADA by failing to provide

a wheelchair and failing to accommodate his disabilties in institutional housing. Plaintiff also claims

that defendants Viravathana, Friedman and Kim’s treatment of his chronic pain constituted medical

malpractice. On May 11, 2007, defendants filed a motion forsummary judgment. Plaintiff filed an

opposition on July 16, 2007. 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

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file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th

Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the

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pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C Undisputed Facts

1. Plaintiff is a California state prisoner serving a term of life without the possibility of

parole for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder with special

circumstances in violation of Penal Code Section 187 and 190.2 and solicitation of

murder in violation of Penal Code Section 653f(b). 

2. On April 6, 1992, a doctor issued a medical chrono that plaintiff was totally disabled

for purposed of participation in the inmate work/training program and that this

disability was permanent. The chrono was limited to work assignments and did not

state that plaintiff was mobility impaired and in need of any assistive device to help

him walk.

3. Plaintiff’s disability status was reviewed in subsequent years and through 1999,

physicians continued to find that he was disabled for purposes of work assignments

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but did not find that he was in need of an assistive device to help him walk.

4. On November 7, 2000, Dr. Mitchell updated plaintiff’s disability verification and

noted that he was mobility impaired because he could not walk 100 yards or up a

flight of stairs without pausing with the use of aids (crutches, prothesis, or walker).

Dr. Mitchell approved a lower bunk and use of a cane. Plaintiff was interviewed a

week later and stated that these accommodations were adequate.

5. A month later a doctor wrote a medical chrono, noting plaintiff had multiple medical

conditions, including diabetes with Kimmelstiel-Wilson syndrome, which caused him

problems with mobility and vision and impacted his placement. 

6. On August 1, 2001, a classification committee referred plaintiff to a doctor for an

update on his disability verification, noting that he used a cane and required lower

bunk/lower tier housing. 

7. In February 2002, a neurologist diagnosed lumbar-spinal disc herniation and referred

plaintiff to a neurosurgeon for consultation.

8. On February 28, 2002, plaintiff complained that he could not walk or stand for long

periods or distances, could not sit on hard surfaces without pain and difficulty and

could not use a cane or walker because of other injuries. As a result, plaintiff claimed

he could not go to the recreation yard or move outside his housing unit. Plaintiff

asked for a wheelchair to use going from his cell to the recreation yard and other areas

of the prison.

9. About three weeks later, Dr. Mensink, a consulting neurosurgeon, saw plaintiff and

noted that he was obese at 5'10" tall with a weight of 225. Plaintiff complained that

he had severe low back pain, 24 hours a day,seven days a week, and that his right leg.

had been “dead” for 20 years. Plaintiff asked Dr. Mensink to order a wheelchair and

narcotic medications. Following examination and review of MRI’s, Dr. Mensink’s

diagnosis was obesity; hypertension; lumbar mechanical low back pain, for which

radiculopathyshould be ruled out; and cervical disc disease. He recommended weight

loss, flexion-extension X-rays of the lumbar spine, lumbar epidurals and high dose

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nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications. Dr. Mensink did not recommend use of

narcotic medications or a wheelchair.

10. On March 29, 2002, Dr. Hasadsri denied plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair as a

disability accommodation request, stating that physicians had not found physical

abnormalities that required use of a wheelchair.

11. Dr. Hasadsri saw plaintiff on June 24, 2002 for follow-up on his hypertension and

back pain and noted that he ambulated without difficulty.

12. In late May 2003, staffin the Pain Management Clinic noted that plaintiff walked into

the clinic without use of a cane or wheelchair and in no apparent distress.

13. In a disability verification form dated, June 4, 2003, Dr. Kim stated that plaintiff’s

disability was not verified. He stated there was no objective evidence that plaintiff

had an ambulatory dysfunction or impairment of vision. 

14. In June 2003, Dr. Hasadsri noted that plaintiff walked without difficulty.

15. On July 21, 2003, plaintiff requested an accommodation, claiming that Dr. Kim’s June

2003 finding that he did not have a verifiable disability or ambulatory dysfunction was

false and should be removed from themedical file. Dr. Hasadsriresponded on August

8, stating that doctors had not noted his mobility impairment in the medical records,

that plaintiff was observed that day walking without difficulty and that the disability

form prepared by Dr. Kim would not be removed from the file. Plaintiff’s appeal was

denied on that ground that, since the November 2000 finding that he was mobilityimpaired in the lower extremities, medical staff had not noted difficulty walking.

16. In June 2005, a doctor provided a medical chrono for a cane for six months, with

evaluation by a doctor 30 days before the chrono expired. 

17. A note in plaintiff’s chart dated approximately three months later states that plaintiff

had a steady ambulatory gait without an assistive device and had been observed

walking across the yard without the assistive device, with a steady, swift gait.

18. In October 2005, another doctor signed a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono

that plaintiff was to have barrier free/wheelchair accessible housing and a ground floor

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cell for one year, back brace with lumbar support, a cane and a wheelchair for one

year. The chrono also imposed physical limitations on job assignments of no lifting

more than five pounds and no walking more than 100 feet and no standing more than

15 minutes.

19. On November 25, 2005, plaintiff complained that it was difficult and painful for him

to walk from his housing unit in Facility 4A to the Acute Care Hospital for his

medical appointments. He asked to be provided some kind of wheeled transportation

to the appointment. Staff verified that plaintiff had a disability verification that

limited the distance he could walk. Plaintiff was told that he would not be assigned

a wheelchair for full time use, but that when he was to be escorted distance beyond his

walking limitations, staff would obtain an appropriate assistive device for his

temporary use. Dr. Hasadsri approved a disability verification for a cane and

intermittent use of a wheelchair.

20. In November 2006, plaintiff was noted to be disabled and an intermittent wheelchair

user. 

E. Discussion

1. Claims against Defendants in their Official Capacities.

Citing Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9 Cir. 2001) th , defendants argue the

Title II claims against defendants Alameida, Scribner, Bhatt, Friedman, Kim, Hasadsri, Miranda,

Thirakomen and Viravathana in their official capacities should be dismissed because their employer,

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is also a defendant and is liable under Title

II as a public entity for the discriminatory acts of its employees.

In Duvall, a hearing impaired litigant sued a state court judge, the county and county officials

alleging they violated the ADA by refusing to provide real time transcription of hearings held during

his marriage dissolution proceedings. The court found that factual issues precluded summary

judgment for the county and county officials on plaintiff’s ADA claims. In doing so, the court stated:

Duvall sues the County directly under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act, and also indirectly, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

When a plaintiff brings a direct suit under either the Rehabilitation

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Act or Title II of the ADA against a municipality (including a

county), the public entity is liable for the vicarious acts of its

employees. We have held that, under § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act (upon which the ADA was explicitly modeled), we apply the

doctrine of respondeat superior to claims brought directly under the

statute, in part because the historical justification for exempting

municipalities from respondeat superior liability does not apply to

the Rehabilitation Act, and in part because the doctrine “would be

entirely consistent with the policy of that statute, which is to

eliminate discrimination against the handicapped.” Bonner, 857

F.2d at 566-567. These same considerations apply to Title II of the

ADA. See Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045 n. 11 (holding that, under 42

U.S.C. 12133, the “remedies, procedures, and rights” available

under Title II of the ADA are equivalent to those available under §

504). The County is therefore vicariously liable for the actions of

the two County employees, Razey and Richardson.

The Court rejects defendants’ argument that because CDCR is vicariously liable for the

discriminatory acts of its employees, the individual defendants should be dismissed. Suing

defendants in their officals capacities is an alternative way of pleading an action against the entity;

however, defendants have provided no authority suggesting that plaintiff cannot name both the

individual defendants in their official capacity and the public entity.

2. ADA Claim for Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages must be dismissed because

punitive damages are not available under Title II of the ADA. 

In Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189-190 (2002), the Court held that because punitive

damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under the Civil Rights Act, it follows that

they may not be awarded in suits brought under § 202 of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation

Act. Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages must therefore be dismissed. 

3. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim for Compensatory Damages

Defendants argue plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages on is ADA claim

because they were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s needs. Defendants contend that

plaintiff cannot show that CDCR physicians denied him full-time use of a wheelchair to

discriminate him because of his disability. 

Plaintiff argues defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs because CDCR did

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not provide or furnish a reasonable accommodation to him until Dr. Reynolds examined him and

verified his serious medical needs in 2005. DUF 18, 19. 

In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9 Cir. 2001) th , the Ninth Circuit stated that

“[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff

must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall, at 1138 (citing

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9 Cir. 1998) th (footnote omitted)). The Court

held that deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard to use in determining whether

intentional discrimination occurred. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a

harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the

likelihood.” Id. at 1138 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988)). In order to

meet the second element of the deliberate indifference test, a failure to act must be the result of

conduct that is more than negligent and involves an element of deliberateness. Id. at 1139.

Here, it is undisputed that defendants had notice of plaintiff’s request for accommodation

in that they agree that plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair was denied. DUF 15, 16. Defendants

present evidence, which plaintiff does not dispute, that in February 2002, a neurologist diagnosed

lumbar-spinal disc herniation and referred plaintiff to a neurosurgeon for consultation. DUF 7. In

March 2002, Dr. Mensink, a consulting neurosurgeon saw plaintiff. DUF 9. Following

examination and review of MRI’s, Dr. Mensink’s diagnosis was obesity; hypertension; lumbar

mechanical low back pain, for which radiculopathy should be ruled out; and cervical disc disease. 

Id. He recommended weight loss, flexion-extension x-rays of the lumbar spine, lumbar epidurals

and high dose nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications. Id. Dr. Mensink did not recommend

use of narcotic medication or a wheelchair. Id. Consequently, on March 29, 2002, Dr. Hasadsri

denied plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair stating that Dr. Mensink and other physicians who had

seen him, had not found physical abnormalities that required use of a wheelchair. DUF 10. 

The evidence does not demonstrate deliberate indifference but rather plaintiff’s

disagreement with the treatment provided to him by defendants, including defendants’ failure to

provide plaintiff with a wheelchair. Defendants did not ignore plaintiff’s condition nor his

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request. The record reveals that plaintiff was treated by numerous doctors and his health issues

were addressed by prison staff, although plaintiff was not happy with the results. Plaintiff’s

disagreement with the treatment he was provided does not constitute deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff’s own lay opinion that the treatment provided by defendants was inadequate is

insufficient to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Further, a difference of opinion

between medical personnel regarding treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference. 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

There is no evidence of intentional discrimination and defendants are entitled to judgment

as a matter on law on the issue of compensatory damages. 

4. Retaliation Under Section 12203

Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. However, this

claim was dismissed by the court’s prior order. See Document Nos. 15, 16 and 18.

5. State Law Claim

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under §

1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

In the instant case, the court has found that defendants are entitled to summary

adjudication on all of plaintiff’s federal claims against them, and the court has recommended that

defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on these claims be granted. As a result, the only

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claims left in this action are state law medical malpractice claims. The court therefore

recommends that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law

claims, and that the claims be dismissed from this action, without prejudice.

F. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed May 11, 2007, be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as

follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s ADA claims against

the defendants in their official capacity be DENIED; 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s claims for punitive

damages as to his ADA claim be GRANTED;

3. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s compensatory damage

claims as to his ADA claim be GRANTED; and 

4. The Court recommends to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims, and that the claims be dismissed from this action,

without prejudice.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fifteen (15) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 10, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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