Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01070/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BIKRAM SHARMA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SITOA BOARD MEMBERS (ASIF 

MEHMOOD, FARHAD MUHAIUDIN, 

MOHAMMAD HAWARNEH, MUSHTQ 

A. KING, ZAHID KHAN), 

Defendants. 

No. 2:19-cv-1070-JAM-EFB PS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 This case was before the court on August 28, 2019, for hearing on defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 4) and plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court 

(ECF No. 6).1

 Attorney Sierra Vierra appeared on behalf of defendants, and plaintiff appeared 

pro se. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion must be granted and plaintiff’s motion 

denied.2 

///// 

 1

 Plaintiff’s motion, which was styled as a motion to transfer venue, was previously 

construed by the court as a motion to remand. See ECF No. 8. 

2

 This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, is before the undersigned pursuant to 

Eastern District of California Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

I. Motion to Remand 

 On June 12, 2019, defendants timely removed this action from the California Superior 

Court for the County of Sacramento under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff moves to 

remand the case to state court, arguing that he did not consent to the removal of the case and that 

the state court is better suited to handle the case because it has already adjudicated related actions. 

Id. at ECF No. 6, at 1 - 2. Defendants respond that plaintiff’s complaint asserts a federal claim 

and removal was proper. ECF No. 10 at 3-5. 

 A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action brought in a State court of 

which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” City of Chicago v. Int'l 

College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts are vested with original jurisdiction over cases “arising under 

the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “In determining the 

presence or absence of federal jurisdiction, [courts] apply the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ 

which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the 

face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Calif. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F. 

3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). 

Federal question jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under the Constitution or federal 

statute, (2) allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the 

Constitution, or (3) be authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter 

and confers federal jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 

 Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants terminated his membership with the 

Sacramento Independent Taxi Owners’ Association (“SITOA”) in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a)(1), a claim predicated on a 

federal statute. ECF No. 1-1 at 6. Accordingly, removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 

and plaintiff’s motion to remand must be denied. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim under Title VII because it does not allege facts showing that defendants were 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 2 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

plaintiff’s “employer,” as defined by Title VII. ECF No. 4-1 at 4-5. They further argue that 

individuals, such as defendants, cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII. ECF No. 4-1 

at 5. 

 A. Background 

 Liberally construed, the complaint alleges that plaintiff worked as a taxi driver providing 

services to the Sacramento International Airport as a member of SITOA. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. 

SITOA is a taxi association, and its members own and operate their own taxi businesses. Id. 

Plaintiff was allegedly a member of SITOA from 2006 until his membership was 

terminated in April 2018. Id. at 4. The stated reasons for the termination was plaintiff’s alleged 

failure to abide by the association’s rules as well as offering assistance to a competing taxi 

company to obtain the contract for providing services to the Sacramento International Airport, a 

contract SITOA has held for over twenty years. Id. at 4, 10-12. Plaintiff claims that his 

membership was wrongfully terminated in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because each 

of the defendants are Muslim and they hate plaintiff “for being a strict Hindu.” Id. at 6. As 

addressed below, the core problem with plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that he is not an employee 

and Title VII has no application to his association membership. It is clear that he challenges a 

termination of his membership in an association, not a termination of his status as an employee. 

To the contrary, plaintiff has confirmed that he owns and controls his own taxi business. 

 B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards 

A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a 

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 

requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 3 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 

theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 

at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 

claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the Court need not accept as 

true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual 

allegations. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 

F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 C. Discussion 

 Fundamentally, plaintiff’s Title VII claim fails because he does not allege facts 

demonstrating that defendants were his employer, as defined by Title VII. 

 Title VII prohibits unlawful employment practices by employers, employment agencies, 

and labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Pursuant to Title VII, an “employer” is 

defined as “a person engaged in an industry effecting commerce who has fifteen or more 

employees . . . and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). To determine whether 

there is an employee-employer relationship, courts must apply the common-law agency test. U.S. 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Horizons, Inc., 915 F. 3d 631, 639 (9th 

Cir. 2019). “[T]he principal guidepost” under that test is the element of control, meaning “the 

extent of control that one may exercise over the details of the work of the other.” Clackamas 

Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

///// 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 4 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

 Here, plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that there was no agency relationship between 

himself and defendants. Significantly, he alleges that SITOA members own and operate their 

own taxi businesses and have equal status. ECF No. 1-1. Indeed, he confirms in his opposition 

that he “never claimed that [he] was an employee of SITOA.” ECF No. 7-1.3 Accordingly, 

defendants did not control the manner in which plaintiff owned and operated his own taxi 

business. See Murray v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 

that plaintiff was not an employee of defendants because the defendants did not control the 

manner and means by which plaintiff sold their financial products). 

 The same allegations also demonstrate that defendants (who are all individuals) are not 

employment agencies or labor organizations. Pursuant to Title VII, a labor organization is any 

organization of any kind . . . in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in 

whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of 

pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d). An employment 

agency is defined under Title VII as procuring work opportunities for its employees. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e(c). Again, plaintiff specifically alleges that SITOA is a membership association and that 

each member independently owns and operates his or her own taxi business. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. 

Thus, SITOA and its board members do not act as a labor organization dealing with employee 

grievances or an agency providing employees with work opportunities. Accordingly, defendants 

are not a covered entity subject to liability under Title VII. 

 Additionally, plaintiff cannot establish a Title VII claim against defendants in their 

individual capacities. Individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages pursuant to Title 

VII. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. Of Tech., 339 F. 3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We have 

consistently held that Title VII does not provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors 

or employees.”); see also Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l., 991 F. 2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 

that Title VII liability does not extend to individuals). 

 3

 Plaintiff did not file a copy of his own opposition with the court. However, he did serve 

defendants with a copy of his opposition, which they submitted as an exhibit to their reply brief. 

See ECF No. 7-1. 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 5 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

Accordingly, plaintiff complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.4 The 

dismissal should be without leave to amend since plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate defendants 

are not subject to liability under Title VII. Furthermore, at the August 28 hearing, plaintiff was 

unable to identifying any other federal statutes that defendants violated. Accordingly, granting 

leave to amend would be futile. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (while 

the court ordinarily would permit a pro se plaintiff to amend, leave to amend should not be 

granted where it appears amendment would be futile). 

III. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 6) be denied; 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) be granted and plaintiff’s complaint be 

dismissed without leave to amend; and 

3. The Clerk be directed to close the case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

///// 

///// 

 4

 Plaintiff also alleges that he was not afforded “a due chance” to challenge his 

termination. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. In his opposition he also claims that defendants “cancelled [his] 

membership without giving a due process hearing.” ECF No. 7-1 at 2. To the extent plaintiff 

intended to allege a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such a claim fails for 

failure to allege that defendants are state actors. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Plaintiff also alleges that “[m]embership of SITOA is protected under Business and Professions 

Code Section 17200 . . .” ECF No. 1-1 at 3. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege a state 

law claim under Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 1720, et seq., the court should decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. See Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 

351 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 

balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims.”). 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 6 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 4, 2020. 

Case 2:19-cv-01070-JAM-EFB Document 14 Filed 02/05/20 Page 7 of 7