Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02419/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02419-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2419

___________

Edward Allen Moore, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Jim Moore; Larry Rowley; Douglas *

Prudden; Mary Riorden; Michael *

Dempsey; Jack Sims; Dale Riley; *

George A. Lombardi; Steve Long; *

Dora Schriro; Gary B. Kempker; * Appeal from the United States

Chantay Godert; Jim Burgess; Troy * District Court for the

Steele; Regina Brehm; K. Bergner; * Eastern District of Missouri.

Unknown Bailey; Unknown Roed; *

Unknown Riley; Unknown Ledbetter; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Pamela Elliott; Robert W. Hopper; *

Carlos Sampson; Maggie George; *

Unknown Green; Gary Nichols; *

Don Ziese; Unknown Kitner, *

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

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Submitted: August 5, 2004

Filed: August 27, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

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The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

2

Moore filed suit against twenty-eight individuals. The district court

immediately dismissed four individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and later

dismissed another for lack of timely service.

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Missouri inmate Edward Moore appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of

summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against several officials of the

Missouri Department of Corrections (“DOC”).2

 We affirm.

On March 28, 2000, Moore began his incarceration in the Northeast

Correctional Center (“NECC”), located in Bowling Green, Missouri. Moore has

advanced osteoarthritis in his back. Like all NECC inmates, Moore was required to

work six hours per day. NECC allows an inmate to be exempted from work if he has

received a medical “lay-in” from the prison medical unit or declares a “medical

emergency” due to an acute medical problem, serious illness, injury, or trauma. If an

inmate declares a medical emergency, he is sent to the prison medical unit for

treatment.

For the first year of his incarceration at NECC, Moore had no work restrictions.

However, on March 28, 2001, Moore’s duty status was reclassified, and he was

restricted to no more than twenty-five pounds of lifting and two hours of standing.

On June 14, 2001, Moore’s duty status was further reclassified to limited duty with

no prolonged standing and no lifting of over five pounds. 

Moore’s § 1983 claim was filed on June 18, 2001, and concerns his work

assignment on the “captain’s crew,” a work detail that cleans and maintains the prison

yard by mowing the grass, picking up trash, and, in the winter, shoveling snow and

clearing ice from the walkways. Moore contends the work assignment constituted

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cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because of his physical

disabilities and because he was forced to work in extreme weather conditions without

appropriate protective clothing and forced to handle bio-hazardous waste without

appropriate protective gear. 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Moore’s

Eighth Amendment claim. See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 982 (8th

Cir. 2004). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane

conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A

prison official may be liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Id. at 837. 

Moore first claims he was forced to work on the captain’s crew despite his

physical disabilities. There is no dispute that forcing an inmate to work beyond his

physical abilities could pose a serious risk to an inmate’s health or safety. See

Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990). There is also no dispute

that Moore suffers from back problems. However, at all times relevant to the

Complaint, Moore was not under any medical restrictions that prevented him from

working on the captain’s crew. Although work restrictions were imposed on

March 28, 2001, Moore was not given a medical lay-in, and the record shows he

worked within the restrictions while on the captain’s crew. Cf. Williams v. Norris,

148 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence that prison officials

violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing an inmate to work in excess of his medical

restrictions). Furthermore, in the absence of a medical lay-in or any other medical

confirmation to support Moore’s assertions that he was too injured to work, there is

no evidence to show that NECC officials were aware that working on the captain’s

crew posed a risk to Moore’s health or safety.

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Moore next claims he was forced to work outside without appropriate clothing

regardless of the weather conditions. We do not dispute that forcing inmates to

endure extreme weather conditions without proper protection violates the Eighth

Amendment. See Chandler v. Moore, 2 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless,

the Defendants’ undisputed summary judgment evidence shows (1) that NECC

inmates are provided standard issue clothing, including pants, shirts, socks, shoes, a

duck coat, and a stocking cap; (2) that inmates working on the captain’s crew may

request gloves and insulated coveralls for use during their shifts; and (3) that heavy

work gloves are also available for inmates to purchase in the prison canteen. Moore

has not come forward with any evidence to refute that the clothing provided to him

was appropriate to protect him from the weather. The fact that Moore chose not to

obtain and use the extra clothing available to inmates working on the captain’s crew

does not mean he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Moore also alleges

he was forced to work outside “with lightning crashing all around him.” However,

he provides no evidence to refute the Defendants’ evidence that inmates are not

required to work in inclement weather and merely relies on the allegations in his

Complaint. This is not sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Finally, Moore claims he was forced to handle bio-hazardous waste by virtue

of having to pick up cigarette butts and other refuse from the prison yard. However,

the record shows, and Moore does not dispute, that he had access to protective gloves

while working on the captain’s crew and was not required to handle any items

containing bodily fluids because specially trained individuals could have been called

to clean up such items. Thus, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that

picking up trash did not expose Moore to a serious risk of harm.

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The officials were identified in the Complaint as K. Bergner, Unknown

Ledbetter, Unknown Green, and Unknown Kitner.

-5-

Moore raises three other issues on appeal. First, Moore challenges the district

court’s dismissal of four DOC officials3

 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After de

novo review of the record, we conclude Moore’s allegations against these officials did

not state a claim. See Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Dep’t, 198 F.3d 711, 712

(8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (standard of review). Viewing the factual allegations in

the Complaint in the light most favorable to Moore, see Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden

Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2002), we conclude Moore can prove no

set of facts to support his claim that the officials committed a constitutional violation

by telling him he must either return to work or face segregation. 

Second, Moore argues the district court erred in denying his motion to strike

the Defendants’ summary judgment evidence because the Defendants failed to

disclose the evidence in response to his discovery requests. Upon review of the

record, we find no abuse of discretion in district court’s denial of Moore’s motion to

strike or in the district court’s management of the protracted, adversarial discovery

process in this case. See Life Plus Int’l v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799, 803, 806 (8th Cir.

2003) (standard of review).

Finally, Moore argues the district court erred in awarding costs to the

Defendants for obtaining transcripts from Moore’s deposition and the hearing on

Moore’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Having reviewed the award of costs for

an abuse of discretion, see Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 363 (8th Cir.

1997), we find none. Although the district court ultimately found that Moore’s

deposition was inadmissible, we agree with the district court’s finding that the

deposition appeared reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. See id. at 363-64

(costs for taking a deposition may be awarded if the deposition was reasonably

necessary when it was taken). Also, the fact that the Defendants did not make use of

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the preliminary hearing transcript in their summary judgment papers does not

preclude an award of costs for the transcript. See id.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We also

deny Moore’s pending motion for sanctions.

______________________________

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