Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02220/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLEX PRODUCTS, INC., a Nevada

corporation; and PETROCHEM

MANUFACTURING, INC., a Nevada

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09cv2220-WQH-JMA

ORDER

vs.

VALLEY SLURRY SEAL COMPANY,

a California corporation,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue (“Application for

TRO”), filed by Plaintiffs Flex Products, Inc. (“Flex”) and Petrochem Manufacturing, Inc.

(“Petrochem”). (Doc. # 6).

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2009, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a Complaint for Patent

Infringement against Defendant. (Doc. # 1). On Friday, October 9, 2009, at 6:32 p.m.,

Plaintiffs filed the Application for TRO against Defendant. (Doc. # 6). The docket does not

reflect that Defendant has been served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, and

Defendant has not filed an appearance. However, the Application for TRO contains a

certificate of service, which states that Plaintiffs’ “counsel certifies that it has delivered to

Defendant Valley via facsimile and overnight delivery this Ex Parte Application and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the accompanying Declarations of Bryan Burris

and Frederick Berretta and exhibits attached thereto.” (Doc. # 6 at 15).

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Plaintiffs move for the entry of an order:

temporarily restraining and preliminarily enjoining Defendant Valley Slurry Seal

Company (‘Valley’) and its agents, representatives, and all other persons acting

in concert or participation with Valley, during the pendency of this action, from

engaging in, committing or performing, directly or indirectly, any and all of the

following acts:

From manufacturing, using, selling or offering to sell any rubberized

emulsion aggregate slurry (‘REAS’) paving composition falling within

the scope of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,811,477 (‘the ‘477 patent’).

(Doc. # 6 at 1). The Application for TRO is made on the grounds that: 

(1) Flex is the owner of the ‘477 patent; (2) Petrochem is the exclusive licensee

of the ‘477 patent in California; (3) Valley has formulated and tested samples

of REAS and obtained approval from the County of Riverside (‘the County’) to

use its REAS for the County’s Slurry Seal and Cape Seal Projects at various

locations in the County, Project No. X0901 (the ‘Project’) for application on

streets in the County; (4) Valley’s manufacture, sale and use of its REAS paving

composition infringes one or more claims of the ‘477 patent; (5) Valley may

have already begun using its infringing REAS on the Project and applying it to

streets in the County, or such use is imminent; and (6) the TRO would not delay

the Project because Plaintiffs are willing and able to supply their patented REAS

paving composition (‘Flex Seal’) to Valley for the balance of the Project.

(Doc. # 6 at 1).

The Application for TRO is accompanied by a declaration from the President of

Plaintiff Petrochem, Bryan B. Burris, a declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel, and attached

exhibits. Among the exhibits is a letter dated September 10, 2009 from a materials engineer

with the County of Riverside to Defendant Valley stating: “After reviewing the documentation

and laboratory report of tests provided, the Materials lab has determined that the subject mix

design covering all the proposed materials to be acceptable for use in the Rubberized Slurry

Seal.” In his declaration, Burris states:

I understand that Valley has developed its own REAS product for use on the

Project, and may have already started using their product on the Project....

Valley’s continued infringement will cause immediate and irreparable harm to

Flex and Petrochem if Valley is not restrained. Immediately, Petrochem will

lose substantial anticipated revenues if it is not able to provide its Flex Seal

product for the County of Riverside for the Project. I anticipate that this loss

will reduce Petrochem’s anticipated annual revenues by between 5% and 10%.

Additionally, if Valley is allowed to continue substituting their product for ours,

it will disrupt existing and future relationships with paving contractors and

potentially reduce our market share for years to come. Even if a monetary

judgment against Valley is eventually granted, the potential loss of contracts and

revenues in the interim will immediately and permanently harm Petrochem’s

business and a valuable portion of the ‘477 patent’s remaining term will be

wasted. Finally, if Valley is allowed to sell its product to other paving

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contractors, it may force Petrochem to file additional lawsuits which will be

expensive and surely harm current and future business relationships.

(Burris Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7, Doc. # 6-3). 

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides:

(b) Temporary Restraining Order.

(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining

order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney

only if: 

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly

show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in

opposition; and 

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to

give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 

(2) Contents; Expiration. Every temporary restraining order issued

without notice ... expires at the time after entry--not to exceed 10

days--that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause,

extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer

extension....

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

Plaintiffs’ Application for TRO fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 65(b).

The Application for TRO does not contain “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint

clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Id. The Complaint is not verified, and

the only reference to immediate and irreparable injury in the submitted declarations is abovequoted paragraph from the Burris Declaration. The evidence in support of the Application for

TRO fails to specifically indicate: when Defendant began or will begin work involving REAS

on the County project; when Plaintiffs received the September 10, 2009 letter from the County;

and what efforts Plaintiffs made to apprise Defendant of Plaintiffs’ claims between the time

when Plaintiffs received the September 10, 2009 letter and when Plaintiffs filed the October

9, 2009 Application for TRO. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ proposed temporary restraining order

contains no time limitation, as required by Rule 65(b). See Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285

F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a “temporary restraining order” with a 30-day

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duration and which was entered after an adversary hearing is “appropriately characterize[d]”

as a preliminary injunction) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1974) (“where

an adversary hearing has been held, and the court’s basis for issuing the order strongly

challenged, classification of [a] potentially unlimited order as a temporary restraining order

seems particularly unjustified”).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for TRO (Doc. # 6) is

DENIED.

DATED: October 13, 2009

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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