Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01698/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01698-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Branon, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Larry Debus, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. 04-CV-1698-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion to Determine Service

on Estate of Thomas Thinnes (doc.42) and Thinnes Parties' Response and Motion to Strike Same

(doc. 43); defendants Larry Debus and Debus, Kazan & Westerhausen Ltd.'s (Debus defendants)

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (doc. 49) and plaintiff's Response to

Debus defendants' motion (doc. 58); defendant Robert Owens' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second

Amended Complaint (doc. 56) and plaintiff's Response to defendant Owens' motion (doc. 60);

defendant Thomas A. Thinnes' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (doc. 54),

plaintiff's Response (doc. 62), plaintiff's Supplemental Authority (doc. 64), defendant Thinnes'

Reply (doc. 65) and errata to the Reply (doc. 66); defendant Bruce Lowe's Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be

Granted (doc. 73), to which no response was timely filed, see L. R. CIV. 7.2 (c); plaintiff's Motion

to Allow Late Compliance with Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosure (doc. 50) and defendant Owens'

Case 2:04-cv-01698-FJM Document 74 Filed 10/11/05 Page 1 of 9
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Response (doc. 51); and defendant Owens' Motion to Extend Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure

Deadline (doc. 67), to which Debus defendants' join (filed as both doc. 68 and doc. 71), defendant

Thinness joins (doc. 70), defendant Lowe joins (doc. 72), and to which no response was timely

filed, see L. R. CIV. 7.2 (c).

I.

In 2000, Larry Debus and Thomas A. Thinnes, now deceased, were retained by plaintiff to

defend him in a criminal case. At a 2002 hearing in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Judge

O'Toole removed Debus and Thinnes as plaintiff's counsel, and entered an order prohibiting those

in attendance from divulging what transpired at the hearing and sealing the transcript. Plaintiff now

claims that, in relation to plaintiff's representation, Debus defendants and Thinnes committed legal

malpractice, fraud, conversion, and civil rights violations. Plaintiff additionally claims that Robert

Owens, an investigator working for Debus and Thinnes, committed fraud, conversion, and civil

rights violations; and that Bruce Lowe, a police officer for the City of Glendale, Arizona, committed

civil rights violations.

II.

Plaintiff requests a hearing to determine whether defendant Estate of Thomas Thinnes

(Thinnes) and its Executor, Benjamin Thinnes, have been properly served with a federal summons

and the original complaint in this case. Defendant Thinnes argues that the issue of service of process

has already been fully briefed in the context of the Thinnes Parties' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 13), that

this court has not indicated that an evidentiary hearing on this issue is necessary, and that such a

hearing is not necessary. The Thinnes Parties' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 13) was denied without

prejudice to refile in order to clarify the docket (doc. 47), but at the time plaintiff requested a

hearing, the issue of service of process had been fully briefed in that motion to dismiss, the response,

and the reply. The court is not required to grant a hearing when the relevant issues have been fully

briefed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. Accordingly, we deny plaintiff's request for a hearing and grant

defendant's motion to strike the same.

III.

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Debus defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted in regard to plaintiff's claims for legal malpractice, civil

rights violations, and conversion; and for the failure to allege fraud with particularity as required by

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Owens and Thinnes join Debus defendants'

motion to dismiss. Lowe separately filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for civil rights

violations.

Although the complaint is unclear, it appears that plaintiff asserts a claim for legal

malpractice against Debus defendants and Thinnes. In order to assert a claim for legal malpractice

in a criminal context, a plaintiff must establish a favorable termination of the underlying criminal

proceeding. Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 32, 83 P.3d 26, 32 (2004). Defendants argue that

plaintiff waived his rights to trial and appeal, pled guilty, was convicted, and did not seek postconviction relief. Plaintiff does not dispute this, although plaintiff does state that he intends to

pursue state writs of habeas corpus. Since plaintiff failed to establish a favorable termination of the

underlying criminal proceeding, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's malpractice claims is

granted without prejudice. Plaintiff may refile only upon a favorable termination of the underlying

criminal proceeding.

Plaintiff claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Debus defendants, Thinnes, Owens and Lowe

deprived him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. This claim is based on the

assertions that 1) defendant Owens, an investigator for defense attorneys Debus and Thinnes,

conspired with defendant Lowe, a police officer for the City of Glendale, Arizona, for Lowe to

obtain a tape of a conversation between Owens and plaintiff's wife, Shawna Branon; 2) that

defendant Lowe knew that the statements made by Shawna Branon on the tape were false; 3) that

a secret hearing took place before Judge O'Toole in which the defendants used this tape to obtain

an order relieving Debus defendants and Thinnes from representation as plaintiff's counsel; and 4)

that this involuntary deprivation of counsel violated plaintiffs Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights.

Plaintiff's claims are belied by a transcript of an April 1, 2005 hearing before Judge O'Toole,

which plaintiff attached to his complaint. That transcript can properly be considered in the motion

Case 2:04-cv-01698-FJM Document 74 Filed 10/11/05 Page 3 of 9
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to dismiss, and does not convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment, because the

transcript was attached to the complaint. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994).

Judge O'Toole stated that during the sealed hearing at issue, "there was no testimony," "[n]obody

was placed under oath," and "nothing of any evidentiary nature was presented." Transcript at 21-24.

Furthermore, Judge O'Toole specifically stated that the recorded telephone conversation did not

come up and was not involved in the decision to relieve Debus and Thinnes. Id. at 12. Plaintiff fails

to produce any evidence to suggest otherwise. Plaintiff therefore fails to adequately support his §

1983 claim and it is accordingly dismissed as to Debus defendants, Thinnes, Owens and Lowe.

Moreover, plaintiff's claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Debus defendants, Thinnes,

Owens and Lowe deprived him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, are dismissed

based upon the alternative justification that plaintiff has failed to have his underlying criminal

conviction reversed or declared invalid. To recover damages for an "allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render

a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).

The plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction has not been so disposed, therefore providing an

alternate justification for the dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Debus defendants,

Thinnes, Owens and Lowe.

Moreover, plaintiff's claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Debus defendants and Thinnes

deprived him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, is dismissed based upon the

alternative justification that plaintiff fails to plead any basis of state action. Plaintiff alleges that

Debus defendants and Thinnes violated plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel,

as made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963). The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the states,

and therefore can only be violated by a state actor. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922,

102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982). Plaintiff fails to posit any theory as to how Debus and Thinnes would be

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considered state actors, and neither plaintiff nor defendant considered the issue of state action in the

motion, response and reply. Plaintiff merely alleges that Debus defendants and Thinnes employed

an investigator, who conspired with Lowe, a police officer and state actor, to have Debus and

Thinnes removed as counsel. For all of the aforementioned reasons, plaintiff's § 1983 claims against

Debus defendants and Thinnes are dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court finds it

unnecessary to consider the issue of state action as to defendant Owens since the court has already

provided two alternative determinations as to why plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted as to his § 1983 claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that Debus defendants, Thinnes, Owens and Lowe formed a conspiracy

to violate plaintiff's rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiff fails to assert which subsection

of the statute was violated. While this in itself subjects plaintiff's complaint to dismissal, the court

will consider § 1985(3), conspiracy to deprive persons of equal protection, which is the most likely

basis for plaintiff's claim. Subsection 3, however, requires race or class-based invidiously

discriminatory animus, which plaintiff fails to allege. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91

S.Ct. 1790, 1798 (1971). Plaintiff therefore fails to support his § 1985 claim and it is dismissed as

to Debus defendants, Thinnes, Owens and Lowe.

Plaintiff also alleges that Debus defendants, Thinnes and Owens committed conversion by

failing to return unused legal fees. Defendants argue that money can only be the subject of

conversion if it "can be described, identified, or segregated, and an obligation to treat it in a specific

manner is established," Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 208 Ariz. 140, 143, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2004) (quoting Autoville, Inc. v. Friedman, 20 Ariz. App. 89, 92, 510 P.2d 400, 403 (1973)); and

that a claim for conversion may not be maintained to collect a debt that could be satisfied by money

generally. Autoville, 20 Ariz. App. at 92, 510 P.2d at 403. However, a claim for conversion can

be grounded on the use of money that should be held in a client trust account, which by its nature

must be segregated from the attorney's personal funds. See, e.g., In Re Davis, 129 Ariz. 1, 628 P.2d

38 (1981). Plaintiff alleges that he paid a $200,000 retainer for legal services to Debus and Thinnes

in association with the underlying criminal matter, that Debus and Thinnes were removed as counsel

by Judge O'Toole, and that Debus and Thinnes have not provided an accounting or a return on any

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funds. Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for conversion grounded on money that should be held

in a client trust account, and accordingly, we deny defendants' motion to dismiss the conversion

claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that Debus defendants, Thinnes and Owens committed fraud.

Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in regard to this allegation. The elements of fraud essentially include a false material

representation, that the speaker knows is false, that is intended to induce reliance by the hearer, and

that the hearer relies upon the representation to his detriment. Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335,

338, 419 P.2d 514, 517 (1966). Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all

averments of fraud and the circumstances constituting fraud "shall be stated with particularity." The

circumstances of the alleged fraud must be "specific enough to give defendants notice of the

particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have

done anything wrong." Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Semegen

v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985)). "The who, what, where, when, and how" of the

alleged fraud must be set forth. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting DiLeo

v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).

Plaintiff fails to meet this standard. Plaintiff alleges 1) that Debus and Thinnes represented

themselves as "top notch" Phoenix practitioners, 2) that Debus and Thinnes represented that Owens,

their investigator, was a competent, professional criminal investigator, and 3) that Owens' license

had been revoked and Owens had previously conveyed defense secrets to prosecutors. Plaintiff does

not allege any statements by a specific defendant, nor the time and place of any such statement.

Plaintiff fails to meet the standard of Rule 9(b) and his fraud claims are dismissed without prejudice.

IV.

Defendant Thinnes moves to dismiss all claims by plaintiff against defendant Thinnes for

untimely service. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 16, 2004. Plaintiff first attempted service

within the 120 day window, by serving Mr. William Bennett, the attorney representing the personal

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representative of the Estate in the state court probate action for the administration of the Estate's

affairs. Mr. Bennett told the process server that he was not authorized to accept service and that

Benjamin A. Thinnes (Personal Representative), the Personal Representative of the Estate was

probably the appropriate representative for receipt of service. Affidavit of William F. Bennett, ¶¶

6,7. Defendant filed a prior motion to dismiss (denied without prejudice for clarity of the docket)

contesting the adequacy of the service of process and pointed out that the Personal Representative

should have been served. Plaintiff did eventually serve the Personal Representative on July 5, 2005,

203 days after the deadline for effectuating service. Affidavit of Benjamin A. Thinnes, ¶ 16.

Plaintiff argues that the Thinnes Estate was "effectively served" because service was

attempted on the law firm representing the executor. Additionally, plaintiff argues that he has

demonstrated "good cause" under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an extension

of time to complete service on the Personal Representative because plaintiff originally appeared pro

se, because he was not aware that his first attempted service was improper, and because the Thinnes

Estate "brought these problems" on itself.

Plaintiff, however, fails to demonstrate good cause. Plaintiff was warned by Judge Wake

(October 27, 2004 Order) that service must be completed within 120 days of filing the complaint.

Plaintiff did not even attempt service on defendant Thinnes until December 1, 2004, 107 days after

filing the complaint. During that attempt, plaintiff's process server was expressly told by Mr.

Bennett that he was not authorized to accept service. Plaintiff was therefore on notice that he had

not yet effectively served defendant Thinnes. Defendant Thinnes' prior motion to dismiss contested

service and again alerted plaintiff that service was incomplete. Counsel has represented plaintiff

since March of 2005, yet plaintiff took no action to remedy service on defendant Thinnes until he

filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue in June 2005. Moreover, plaintiff never requested

an extension of time to serve defendant Thinnes. Plaintiff failed to diligently pursue proper service

on defendant Thinnes and has not demonstrated good cause for his failure. Accordingly, defendant

Thinnes' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is granted. Even if we were to

extend the deadline for service of process, plaintiff's claims against defendant Thinnes for violations

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of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, legal malpractice, and fraud would be dismissed for the reasons

discussed above.

V.

Plaintiff seeks an order allowing late compliance with this court's Rule 16 scheduling order.

Plaintiff claims he did not receive a copy of the order until a courtesy copy was faxed to him on June

30, 2005, and was therefore unable to comply with the July 1, 2005 deadline for initial disclosures.

Defendant Owens responds and seeks an order allowing plaintiff and Owens until July 15, 2005, to

exchange initial disclosure information. Without conceding that plaintiff did not receive a copy of

the order until June of 2005, we grant plaintiff's motion for late compliance and require that all

initial disclosures shall have been made by July 15, 2005. All other deadlines in the Rule 16

scheduling order remain in effect.

VI.

Defendants Owens, Thinnes, Lowe and Debus defendants request that the court extend

the deadline to disclose expert witnesses. Defendants, however, fail to show good cause for an

extension, and the motions are accordingly denied.

VII.

Plaintiff asserts that this court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1332, and 1343. This order dismisses all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, and

accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is the sole remaining basis for jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims. We are concerned, however, that the plaintiff's current incarceration in the

State of Arizona may affect his citizenship, and accordingly, may defeat diversity jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, we request that the parties brief the issue as to whether this court has jurisdiction

over the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Service on Estate of

Thomas Thinnes (doc.42); and GRANTING Thinnes Parties' Motion to Strike Same (doc. 43).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING IN PART the Debus defendants' Motion to

Dismiss with respect to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, legal malpractice claims,

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and fraud claims; and DENYING IN PART with respect to plaintiff's conversion claims (doc.

49).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING IN PART defendant Owens' Motion to

Dismiss with respect to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims and fraud claims; and

DENYING IN PART with respect to plaintiff's conversion claims (doc. 56).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING defendant Estate of Thomas A. Thinnes'

Motion to Dismiss (doc. 54).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING defendant Lowe's Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be

Granted (doc. 73).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff's Motion to Allow Late

Compliance (doc. 50).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING defendant Owens Motion to Extend

Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure Deadline (doc. 67).

The parties shall have to and including October 21, 2005 within which to file Memoranda

on the issue of remaining diversity jurisdiction.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2005.

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