Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00342/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

EDDIE BERNARD FIELDS, #203 347, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-342-MHT 

 ) [WO] 

COVINGTON COUNTY DISTRICT ) 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

 Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Alex City Work Release Center in Alex 

City, Alabama, files this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that his constitutional 

rights were violated in 2011 during his criminal court proceedings in the Circuit Court for 

Covington County, Alabama. The Covington County District Attorney’s Office is the 

named defendant. Plaintiff requests dismissal of the offenses under which he is 

incarcerated and damages for pain and suffering. Doc. No. 1.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court is required to screen complaints filed by 

prisoners against a governmental entity or officers or employees of governmental entities 

and to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint it finds frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant immune from such relief. While the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted the 

court to dismiss claims sua sponte if the court found them frivolous or malicious, § 

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1915A directs the court, in effect, to make and rule on its own motion to dismiss the 

complaint prior to service of process.1

 The court has carefully reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. From 

that review, the court concludes that dismissal of the complaint prior to service of process 

is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A). 

I. DISCUSSION 

On March 11, 2011, the Circuit Court for Covington County convicted Plaintiff, 

pursuant to his guilty pleas, of unlawful possession of a controlled sentence (as a lesser 

included offense of trafficking in cocaine) and unlawful possession of marijuana in the 

first degree. The trial court sentenced Plaintiff to twenty years’ imprisonment on each 

conviction under the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act to run concurrently with 

each other. Pursuant to his application for probation, the trial court granted Plaintiff a five 

year split sentence on each conviction to run concurrently. See Doc. No. 1, Exh. B. In 

filing this action, Plaintiff challenges the legality and validity of his criminal proceedings, 

including the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him and the provisions under 

which he was sentenced. Doc. No. 1, Attachments and Exhs. A-F. 

A. Statute of Limitations 

Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a challenge to the legality of matters associated with 

his criminal trial proceedings which occurred on or before March 11, 2011, is filed 

                                                            

1 The screening procedures which have been established for prisoner civil actions by § 1915A apply 

whether the plaintiff has paid the entire filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis. Martin v. Scott, 156 

F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). In this case, Plaintiff paid the full civil filing fee of $350.00. 

Notwithstanding the full payment of the filing fee, however, this court must dismiss the case if it finds 

that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

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outside the statute of limitations applicable to a federal civil action filed by an inmate 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to 

the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state 

where the § 1983 action has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 

275-76, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985). [Plaintiff’s] 

claim was brought in Alabama where the governing limitations period is 

two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 

1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to have his claim 

heard, [Plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date the 

limitations period began to run. 

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). 

 The matters about which Plaintiff complains occurred on or before March 11, 

2011. By its express terms, the tolling provision of Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) provides no 

basis for relief to Plaintiff from application of the time bar.2

 Thus, the statute of 

limitations began to run on the claims arising from the challenged convictions and 

sentences on March 11, 2011. The limitation period ran uninterrupted until it expired on 

March 11, 2013. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on May 17, 2015.3

 This filing 

occurred over two years after expiration of the limitation period. 

 Unquestionably, the statute of limitations is usually a matter which may be raised 

as an affirmative defense. The court notes, however, that in an action proceeding under 

                                                            

2 This section allows tolling of the limitations period for an individual who “is, at the time the right 

accrues[,] . . . insane.” Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a). The complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff was not legally 

insane at the time of the challenged events so as to warrant tolling under Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a).    

3 Although the Clerk stamped the present complaint “filed” on May 21, 2015, Plaintiff signed his 

complaint on May 17, 2015. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint is deemed filed the 

date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams 

v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th 

Cir. 1993). In light of the foregoing and for purposes of the proceedings herein, the court considers May 

17, 2015, as the date of filing. 

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section 1983, it may consider, sua sponte, affirmative defenses apparent from the face of 

the complaint. Clark v. Ga. Pardons and Parole Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 

1990); see also Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990). “[I]f the district court sees 

that an affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section 1915[A] dismissal is 

allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The expiration of the statute of limitations is an 

affirmative defense the existence of which warrants dismissal as frivolous. See Franklin 

[v. State of Oregon], 563 F. Supp. [1310,] 1330, 1332 [(D. Or. 1983)].” Id. at n.2. 

In analyzing § 1983 cases, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for 

frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the 

answer.” Ali, 892 F.2d at 440. “It necessarily follows that in the absence of the 

defendant or defendants, the district court must evaluate the merit of the claim sua 

sponte.” Id. 

An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a 

significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce 

resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free 

them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to 

prisoners (because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give 

meritorious claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take 

advantage of every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 

766 F.2d [179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985)]. 

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). 

 Based on the facts apparent from the face of the present complaint, Plaintiff has no 

legal basis on which to proceed regarding the validity of his 2011 convictions and 

sentences as he filed this cause of action over two years after the challenged actions 

occurred. As previously noted, the statutory tolling provision is unavailing. 

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Consequently, the two-year period of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s claims expired 

over two years prior to him filing the instant complaint, and these claims are, therefore, 

subject to dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1). See Clark, 915 F.2d 

636. 

B. The Named Defendant

 Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that his claims against the Covington County 

District Attorney’s Office are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, his 

complaint against this defendant would be subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(A). The Covington County District Attorney’s Office is not a legal entity subject 

to suit or liability under § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 

1992). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit directly against a state or its 

agencies, regardless of relief sought. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Pennhurst 

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). District Attorney’s offices are 

deemed to be agencies of the State of Alabama. See Hooks v. Hitt, 539 So. 2d 157, 159 

(Ala. 1988) (holding that the district attorneys and their employees are “state employees 

whose salaries are funded by the state”) (citing Ala. Code § 12–7–182 (1975)); McMillan 

v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 790 (1997) (citing Hooks and noting that an 

Alabama district attorney is a state official). Accordingly, Defendant Covington County 

District Attorney’s Office is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1) & (2). 

C. The Challenge to Plaintiff’s Convictions

 Regarding Plaintiff’s attempt to challenge his state court convictions and the 

sentences imposed because of those judgments through filing a civil rights lawsuit under 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983, he may not do so because such is not an appropriate remedy. Where a 

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and the 

relief sought is a determination he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release 

from that imprisonment, the inmate’s federal remedy is by way of a writ of habeas 

corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (habeas corpus is the 

exclusive remedy for prisoners attacking the validity of their conviction or confinement). 

Further, § 1983 may not be used to challenge the fact of a plaintiff’s state court criminal 

conviction and/or sentence. Rather, the proper vehicle for mounting such a challenge 

would be filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 In filing this action, Plaintiff seeks as relief dismissal of his convictions and his 

release from custody. The core of his claims concern matters related to the validity and 

the legality of his current confinement. When the effect of granting equitable relief under 

the civil rights statute would be to substitute a § 1983 action for a federal writ of habeas 

corpus challenging the basis for ongoing detention or for a petition under § 2254 to attack 

a state court conviction and/or sentence, a prisoner fails to state a claim under § 1983. 

See Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. A 

plaintiff, therefore, cannot seek declaratory or injunctive relief relating to his confinement 

and/or conviction in a § 1983 action.4

 See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); 

                                                            

4 Compensatory and punitive damages are available in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action but not by way of a writ 

of habeas corpus. To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional confinement in a civil rights 

action, a plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. 

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Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-89 (1994); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; St. Germaine 

v. Isenhower, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 

The instant collateral attack on the convictions and sentences in question is 

prohibited as habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges 

the validity of the fact or duration of his confinement. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645; Heck, 

512 U.S. at 481; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-490. Such attack is, therefore, subject to 

summary dismissal by this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1). 

II. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

1. Plaintiff’s claims against the named defendant challenging events which 

occurred on or before March 11, 2011 be DISMISSED with prejudice under the 

directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1) as Plaintiff failed to file the complaint regarding 

these allegations within the time prescribed by the applicable period of limitation; 

 2. The § 1983 claims presented against Defendant Covington County District 

Attorney’s Office, to the extent they are not barred by the statute of limitations, be 

DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1) & (2); 

 3. Plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of his March 11, 2011, convictions and 

sentences entered against him by the Circuit Court for Covington County, Alabama, be 

DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1) as such claims are not 

properly before the court at this time; and 

 4. This case be DISMISSED prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(A)(b)(1) & (2). 

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It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before September 18, 2015. Any objections filed must 

specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the 

party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by 

the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order 

of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 4th day of September, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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