Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN TENNISON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; SAN

FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRENTICE

EARL SANDERS; NAPOLEON HENDRIX; and

GEORGE BUTTERWORTH,

Defendants. _____________________________________

ANTOINE GOFF,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; SAN

FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRENTICE

EARL SANDERS; NAPOLEON HENDRIX; and

GEORGE BUTTERWORTH,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-0574 CW

Consolidated with

No. C 04-1643 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’

CROSS-MOTIONS ON

MONELL CLAIM

Defendant City and County of San Francisco (the City) moves

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiffs

John Tennison and Antoine Goff separately oppose the motion, and

cross-move for summary judgment in their favor. The City moves to

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The City’s October 7, 2005 motion to strike was also

untimely, as it was noticed for hearing on October 28, 2005,

without a motion to shorten time. The Court denies the

City’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ cross-motions on

timeliness grounds. 

2

strike the cross-motions as untimely.1 The matters were heard on

February 3, 2006. Having considered the papers filed by the

parties and oral argument on the motions, the Court denies the

City’s motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim and denies

Plaintiffs’ cross-motions.

BACKGROUND

For a detailed summary of the procedural and factual

background of this civil rights action, which arises out of

Plaintiffs’ conviction for the 1989 murder of Roderick Shannon, see

the Court’s March 22, 2006 Amended Order addressing the parties’

cross-motions for summary adjudication of claims against the

individual Defendants, San Francisco Homicide Inspectors Earl

Sanders and Napoleon Hendrix (together, the Inspectors) and

Assistant District Attorney George Butterworth. On August 26,

2003, this Court granted Tennison's petition for a writ of habeas

corpus based upon the suppression of material, exculpatory

evidence. The Court found that the prosecution's case against him

was weak, that items of potentially exculpatory evidence had been

suppressed in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

and that there was a reasonable probability that any one of the

items could have resulted in a different outcome for Tennison's

trial or motion for a new trial. After the Court granted

Tennison's petition, the San Francisco district attorney decided

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

not to retry the case, believing Tennison to be factually innocent

of the crime. See Tennison Complaint, Ex. B, People v. Tennison,

No. 13660, District Attorney's Concurrence with Tennison's Mot. for

Factual Innocence and Ex. C, Oct. 27, 2003 San Francisco County

Superior Court Order (declaring Tennison to be factually innocent). 

Tennison and Goff then filed these civil rights suits. 

Among the evidence supporting the Court's habeas ruling was a

memo authored by the Inspectors seeking reward money for a witness

or witnesses from the City's "Secret Witness Program" (SWP). The

SWP forms the basis for Plaintiffs' Monell claim. 

Since the Court granted Tennison's habeas petition, the

parties have had an opportunity for discovery of additional facts

regarding the SWP that were not before the Court during Tennison’s

habeas proceeding. For a summary of the evidence relating to the

SWP in the context of the Goff-Tennison prosecution, see the

Court’s March 22, 2006 Order at pages 5-8. The additional facts

set forth below relate only to the Monell claim against the City,

and are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

According to Assistant Chief of Police Morris Tabak, the

City's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, the SWP was a community-based reward

fund created and administered by the San Francisco Chamber of

Commerce to encourage individuals to come forward confidentially to

provide information to assist the police in solving crimes in San

Francisco. It was funded by private donations from the business

community. At the request of the SFPD, the Chamber of Commerce

(COC) would post rewards for information leading to the arrest,

prosecution and conviction of criminal suspects. The SWP was

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Although Plaintiffs offer no evidence contradicting this

general practice, the Inspectors’ withdrawal from Contingent

Fund B could contribute to a finding that, in the Shannon

investigation, SFPD police officers made a direct payment to

their primary eye-witness, a girl named Masina Fauolo, or

another witness. On the other hand, a fact-finder could

also reasonably conclude that the Contingent Fund B funds

were used for witness travel, not as a reward. See March

22, 2006 Order at 79 n.10. 

4

discontinued in 1992. In 2001, the COC discarded all records

related to the 1989 through 1990 operation of the SWP. Chaw Decl.

¶ 2. 

Inspectors' requests for authorization of a SWP reward were

put into memoranda and then approved, first by their supervising

lieutenant, then by the deputy chief and ultimately by the chief of

police. The request would then be forwarded to the COC, which put

the reward in place and monitored a tip line. COC would forward

any information gained from the tip line to the police. Any reward

payment would be delivered by the COC, not by SFPD investigators,

to the individual who provided the information.2 However, SFPD

employees were involved in determining whether information had been

helpful and whether a reward was warranted. 

Neither the COC nor the SFPD kept records of the identity of

persons who received money or the amounts of payments made. 

According to Tabak, the "only" way to determine whether a witness

in a particular case was paid money by the SWP would be through the

testimony of the individuals involved. Tabak Dep. 47:9-16. It is

possible that the SFPD would not even be informed by the COC that a

reward had been paid; the SFPD "had no controls over the chamber of

commerce as to what information they provided to us." Id. 57:9-17. 

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 4 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Plaintiffs suggest that it would have been possible for a witness

to testify in a criminal case knowing that he or she would receive

reward money only if the defendant was convicted. Tabak is not

aware of any policies or procedures that would prevent such an

occurrence, although he states that such a thing would never happen

because it would be contrary to "integrity" and "common sense." 

Tabak Dep. 69:1-3. 

Linda Klee, the District Attorney’s Rule 30(b)(6) deponent,

was unaware that the SWP existed, and was also unaware of any

procedure by which prosecutors would have been informed of payments

made to witnesses through the SWP. Purcell Decl., Ex. 5, Klee Dep.

111-112. In fact, Klee testified that after learning of the

program’s existence in connection with this litigation, 

I was so surprised by the Secret Witness Program that I, out

of curiosity, went around and asked . . . probably five or six

deputies in the office -- have they ever heard of the Secret

Witness program. All of them . . . as I recall were not on

the homicide team. Because all of our homicide team of those

years aren’t in the office anymore. But nobody had heard of

the Secret Witness Program. 

Purcell Reply Decl., Ex. 42, Klee Dep. 66:10-19. Klee did not

speak with any prosecutor who dealt with homicide cases during the

time frame of the SWP. 

Hendrix claimed at his deposition that he "did not believe in"

reward money because it "[t]aints testimony of the [witness] a lot

of times." Purcell Decl. Ex. 2, Hendrix Dep. 124:9-12. He

explained that he would not use reward money except as a last

resort, after he had "exhausted every means possible." Id. 124:22-

23. Sanders, on the other hand, states that he requested authority

to offer reward money “[f]rom time to time.” Sanders Reply Decl.

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 5 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 According to Klee, some prosecutors kept only a “dummy”

file after sending the original case file to the Attorney

General’s office for purposes of appeal. Klee Reply Decl.

¶ 3. She states that the fact that the “dummy” files

contained no information about reward payments “does not

imply that the documents were not in the files at the time

of the prosecution.” Id. ¶ 4. 

6

¶ 4. Between 1984 and 1990, Hendrix and Sanders jointly or

separately sought reward money from the Secret Witness Program at

least eleven times. Purcell Decl. Ex. 3, Memos from the Inspectors

regarding Secret Witness Program. 

The City’s inspection of the SFPD files for an estimated 250

homicide investigations conducted by Hendrix and Sanders between

1984 and 1996 revealed sixteen case files containing documents

relating to a request for a reward or for witness protection funds. 

Kaiser Reply Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Based on these sixteen SFPD files,

Plaintiffs subpoenaed the production of documents relating to SWP

reward payments or witness protection expenditures from ten

corresponding DA files. Wallace Reply Decl. ¶ 3. The DA's office

concluded that of these ten, one case appeared never to have been

prosecuted, and another case file could not be found. Id. ¶ 3. 

The City produced to Plaintiffs the remaining eight DA homicide

files. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. One of the eight related to witness protection

measures, but not to any witness reward money. Id. ¶ 5. Five were

only “dummy” files,3 and two contained the DA’s entire record. Id.

¶ 5. For the two prosecutions on which complete DA files were

produced, the files included information obtained through the SWP,

as well as communications demonstrating awareness of rewards

promised or given to witnesses. Purcell Decl., Ex. 7 at DA 2127

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

(including defense request for statements made by “secret

witness”); Ackiron Decl., Ex. 1 at DA 1162 (documenting SFPD’s

successful request for, and publication of, a reward funded by

mayor). Neither of these DA files contained any record of whether

SWP funds requested or offered were in fact paid to witnesses. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party support its

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.;

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990);

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the moving party shows an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 8 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

forth specific facts controverting the moving party's prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's

"burden of contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not

negligible." Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." Id.

DISCUSSION

The City moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the

evidence fails to raise a triable issue of material fact that would

allow a reasonable jury to find that Plaintiffs have proved the

required elements of a Monell claim. 

I. Monell Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A. Liability

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of action for the

'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). 

Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under section

1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. 

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 9 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

To impose liability on a government entity, a plaintiff must

show that “the municipality itself causes the constitutional

violation through ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy.’” Ulrich v. City &

County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). 

While the liability of municipalities does not depend upon the

liability of individual officers, it is contingent on a violation

of constitutional rights. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). 

B. Intent

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs must show that the City

was “deliberately indifferent” to their constitutional rights. 

Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault,

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or

obvious consequence of his action.” Board of County Comm’rs of

Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The Ninth Circuit

applies a “deliberate indifference” requirement in order to find

liability in “single incident cases,” such as where a municipal

employee applies a facially permissible policy in an

unconstitutional manner. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1240

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,

1535 (9th Cir. 1995) and Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797,

803 (9th Cir. 1988)). In contrast, where a plaintiff claims that a

particular municipal action in itself violates or directs employees

to violate federal law, there is no “‘state-of-mind requirement

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 10 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

independent of that necessary to state a violation’ of the

underlying federal right.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-405 (quoting in

part Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)). The stringent

deliberate indifference standard is a response to the “danger of

permitting liability for . . . a facially valid policy.” Christie,

176 F.3d at 1241. As the Supreme Court explained,

Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single

decision, not itself representing a violation of federal law

and not directing such a violation, the danger that a

municipality will be held liable without fault is high.

Because the decision necessarily governs a single case, there

can be no notice to the municipal decisionmaker, based on

previous violations of federally protected rights, that his

approach is inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that

the municipality's action caused the injury in question,

because the plaintiff can point to no other incident tending

to make it more likely that the plaintiff's own injury flows

from the municipality's action, rather than from some other

intervening cause.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 408. 

Here, Plaintiffs’ entire theory of municipal liability, and in

particular their theory of causation, rest on their assertion that

the Inspectors followed a practice that itself was

unconstitutional. For the reasons described in Section III below,

the existence of such a practice is a disputed issue of fact. If

Plaintiffs succeed in proving the existence of such a practice,

then they will not need to prove that the City acted with

deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights. 

II. Deprivation of Constitutional Right

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show evidence

sufficient to establish that they were deprived of a constitutional

right. In its March 22, 2006 order, the Court set forth the legal

standard for § 1983 claims based on the government’s failure to

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 11 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

disclose, pursuant to Brady, exculpatory or impeachment

information. The Court concluded that disputes of material fact

existed as to whether Masina was offered or paid reward money,

whether the SWP memo was exculpatory and whether it was

intentionally withheld. See March 22, 2006 Order at 77-80. 

Therefore, a dispute of fact exists, for purposes of Plaintiffs’

Monell claim, as to whether a civil rights violation occurred. 

III. Policy, Custom or Practice

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show evidence

sufficient to establish a policy, custom or practice of suppressing

Brady information regarding rewards offered or given under the SWP. 

Plaintiffs argue that the testimony of Defendants’ own witnesses

conclusively establishes such a practice. 

A plaintiff may bring an action under § 1983 based on a

“widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law

or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as

to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.’” City of

St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (quoting Adickes

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). Proof of

“random acts or isolated events [is] insufficient to establish

custom.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th

Cir. 1989) (citing Prapotnik at 127). However, a plaintiff may

prove “the existence of a custom or informal policy with evidence

of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant

municipal officials were not discharged or reprimanded.” Gillette

v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing McRorie v.

Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

As evidence from which the existence of an unconstitutional

practice could be inferred, Plaintiffs point to Tabak’s testimony

that the SFPD kept no record of SWP payments to witnesses and that

no mechanism existed to ensure that SWP reward information was

passed along to the DA; Klee’s testimony that she and others at the

DA’s office were not aware of the SWP; and the absence of SWP

reward information in the DA’s file on the Shannon case. 

Defendants, on the other hand, note that the survey of Hendrix’ and

Sanders’ SFPD files and the corresponding DA files shows that SWP

reward-related information, if not records of payments, was

disclosed to defendants in two other cases. They also note that

the probative value of Klee’s testimony is slight because she did

not speak with prosecutors who worked on homicide cases during the

time when the SWP was in effect. 

The custom-related evidence before the Court is susceptible to

multiple competing inferences which preclude summary adjudication

in favor of either party. Plaintiffs have shown that an

unconstitutional custom may have been followed. SFPD inspectors

could have been faced with two competing policies or practices, one

that applied to secret informants, and one that applied to

witnesses. An inspector trying to follow both the SFPD’s usual

policy of disclosing Brady material about witnesses, as well as a

practice of offering rewards to secret informants payable only upon

conviction, could have been aware that a secret informant who was a

witness would be eligible for reward money through the SWP, and, in

accordance with the SWP practice, failed to disclose the witness'

participation in the SWP to the DA. 

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

The fact that only two DA files have been found to contain any

witness reward information and Klee's ignorance of the SWP program

could allow a fact-finder to draw the inference that inspectors

routinely kept potential impeaching evidence from prosecutors and

thus from criminal defendants. If a jury were to find that a

constitutional violation relating to an SWP reward had in fact

occurred during the Shannon investigation and prosecution, this

would provide further evidence of an unconstitutional practice. 

However, Plaintiffs have not shown that a custom of failing to

disclose SWP reward information undisputedly existed. The two DA

files in which SWP reward information was found would allow a factfinder to infer that there was no custom of keeping SWP rewards

secret. A fact-finder could also infer from Klee’s ignorance and

the relatively small number of SWP requests submitted by Hendrix

and Sanders that the program simply was rarely used. 

IV. Causation

Finally, Defendants argue that even if the operation of the

SWP was an unconstitutional practice, Plaintiffs could not prove

that it was the cause of their injury. 

To prove causation in a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that, through a policy, custom or practice, “the

municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” 

Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. “Where a plaintiff claims that a

particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs

an employee to do so, resolving . . . issues of fault and causation

is straightforward.” Id. at 404 (emphasis in original). 

On this issue, Defendants merely repeat their argument that no

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

constitutional injury occurred. If at trial Plaintiffs prove both

that they suffered a constitutional deprivation related to the

withholding of SWP reward information, and that the withholding of

SWP reward information was customary, then a finding that municipal

practice was the moving force behind the injury may follow. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the City’s motion

for summary judgment of the Monell claim (Docket No. 374). The

Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Docket

Nos. 381 and 426). Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ crossmotions is DENIED as moot (Docket No. 428).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/29/06

Dated 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 498 Filed 03/29/06 Page 15 of 15