Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01957/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STEVEN EDWARD CRITTENDEN,

NO. CIV. S-95-1957 FCD/GGH

Petitioner, NO. CIV. S-97-0602 FCD/GGH

v. DEATH PENALTY CASE

ARTHUR CALDERON, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on petitioner Steven Edward

Crittenden’s motion to amend the judgment entered February 23,

2005 pursuant to the court’s order of that same day, adopting the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and finally

denying petitioner’s habeas petition in its entirety. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e). While petitioner’s habeas petition asserted

numerous claims, he moves herein for relief only with respect to

one claim–-that he was shackled in violation of his due process 

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rights during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 

Specifically, with respect to the court’s order of February 23,

2005, petitioner argues that the court committed “clear error” in

finding that he was not prejudiced during either phase by his

shackling.

During the pendency of the instant motion, the United States

Supreme Court issued its decision in Deck v. Missouri,No. 04-

5293, 2005 WL 1200394 (May 23, 2005). It is petitioner’s

position that Deck supports his motion and requires this court to

reconsider its lack of prejudice finding and to find, instead,

that petitioner was prejudiced by his shackling, at a minimum,

during the penalty phase. Respondent, on the other hand, argues

that the court need not reach the prejudice issue because Deck

requires that the court reconsider its initial decision in May

2002 that petitioner’s shackling was constitutionally in error. 

(Memorandum and Order, filed May 13, 2002,(“May 13 M&O”) at

37:23-24 [finding that petitioner’s shackling with a waist chain

was constitutional error because the trial court failed “to at

least consider alternatives to physical restraints”]) (emphasis

in original).

For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees with

respondent. Deck mandates that this court reconsider its initial

decision finding that the state court’s failure to consider

alternatives to physical restraints resulted in constitutional

error. Because the court finds that Deck teaches that the law

with respect to shackling, in particular, the requirement of

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1 In light of this holding the court need not reach the

issue of prejudice.

3

consideration of alternatives to shackling, was not “clearly

established,” it reverses its finding of constitutional error.1 

BACKGROUND

In its May 13, 2002 M&O, the court found, contrary to the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, that the state

court erred in failing to consider alternatives to physical

restraints. In reaching this finding, the court applied

controlling Ninth Circuit authority because, at the time, it

construed the case as arising pre-AEDPA. (May 13 M&O at 9-13.) 

Thus, the court found that the Ninth Circuit required that the

trial court “‘be persuaded by compelling circumstances that some

measures were needed to maintain security’” and “‘[t]hen . . .

pursue less restrictive alternatives before [imposing] physical

restraints.’” (May 13 M&O at 36:1-4 [quoting Castillo v.

Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir. 1992)].) Under Castillo,

“constitutional error is committed by a state court that shackles

without [considering the criteria set out by the court].” 

Castillo, 983 F.2d at 148 (finding error because the trial court

did not consider “the various burdens imposed by shackling, and

did not weigh these burdens against other possible alternatives”

and “[t]he waist chain was not the court’s last resort”).

Having found constitutional error, the court directed the

magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether the error was prejudicial. Rhoden v. Rowland (Rhoden I),

10 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A claim of unconstitutional

shackling is subject to harmless error analysis.”) The

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magistrate judge conducted the hearing on this issue, among

others, December 12 and 13, 2002, and subsequently filed further

findings and recommendations on February 27, 2003 (“F&R”). In

that F&R, the magistrate judge recommended that the court deny

petitioner’s shackling claim on the ground that, despite credible

evidence that eight testifying jurors saw or otherwise knew

Petitioner was shackled, and that his shackling was discussed by

the jurors briefly during a recess in the guilt phase and during

deliberations in the penalty phase, petitioner was not

prejudiced, in light of the type and strength of case presented

against him and the fact that the shackles were unobtrusive and

not blatantly obvious. (F&R at 45-49.) 

However, prior to reaching this decision, the magistrate

judge asked that the court reconsider its prior finding that the

trial court committed error in failing to consider less

restrictive alternatives to shackles. Specifically, the

magistrate judge asked that the court consider “whether the fact

of minimal shackling itself is a ‘less restrictive alternative’

when compared to openly visible shackling, hands and feet.” (F&R

at 40:16-18.) The magistrate judge maintained that under Ninth

Circuit authority, less extensive shackling can be considered an

alternative to extensive shackling. (F&R at 40-42.)

In its order of February 23, 2005 (“Feb. 23 M&O”), the court

declined to reconsider its prior finding, but ultimately adopted

the magistrate judge’s recommendation on the prejudice issue,

thereby denying petitioner’s habeas petition on this claim. 

(Feb. 23 M&O at 33-47.) In reaching these conclusions, the court

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considered the issues under a different standard of review than

the magistrate judge. 

After the filing of the F&R, the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003),

which both parties agreed required application of the AEDPA to

this case. (Feb. 23 M&O at 4:26-5:2 [quoting Woodford which

overruled contrary Ninth Circuit authority and found that the

AEDPA’s provisions apply to habeas petitions, like petitioner’s,

that were filed after the AEDPA’s effective date, even if a

request for counsel was filed prior to the statute’s enactment].)

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may grant an application for

writ of habeas corpus only if the claim “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). While Ninth Circuit authority

may be used as persuasive authority, Supreme Court precedent is

the only “clearly established Federal law” that is controlling. 

Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Significant to the pending motion, after applying this

standard, the court declined to reconsider its prior decision

finding constitutional error in the shackling of petitioner. In

doing so, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court was

“silent on the specific issues addressed by this case,” but it

nonetheless found that the Supreme Court had addressed the use of

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2 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970)

(considering the trial of an unusually obstreperous criminal

defendant, the Court held that the Constitution sometimes

permitted special measures, including physical restraints, even

“shackl[ing] and gagg[ing]... as a last resort”); Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05 (1976) (finding that making a

defendant appear in prison clothing poses such a threat to the

“fairness of the fact-finding process” that it must be justified

by an “essential state policy”); and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

560, 568-69 (1986) (finding that deployment of additional

security personnel during trial is not “the sort of inherently

prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted

only where justified by an essential state interest specific to

each trial”). 

6

courtroom restraints generally, and those cases2 supplied 

principles establishing a governing standard as further

elucidated by the Ninth Circuit in such cases as Castillo and

Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). (Feb. 23

M&O at 35-44.) Thus, the court reaffirmed its decision finding

constitutional error despite the AEDPA’s more restrictive

standard of review.

Now, the court considers the propriety of that decision in

light of Deck.

STANDARD

Where the court’s ruling has resulted in a final judgment or

order, a motion for reconsideration may be based either on Rule

59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion

for relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS,

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). Because petitioner’s

motion was filed within ten days of entry of judgment, the court

will consider the instant motion under Rule 59(e). Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e) (requiring, unlike Rule 60(b), that all motions 

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submitted pursuant to this rule be filed within ten days of entry

of judgment). 

Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly

in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d

877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Absent “highly unusual circumstances,”

reconsideration of a final judgment is appropriate only where (1)

the court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2) the

court committed “clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust,” or (3) there is an intervening change in the

controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263.

ANALYSIS

In Deck, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of

the use of visible shackles on a defendant in the penalty phase

of a capital case. The Court concluded that the “use of visible

shackles during the penalty phase” was unconstitutional “unless

that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’-such as

the interest in courtroom security specific to the defendant on

trial.” Deck, No. 04-5293, 2005 WL 1200394 (May 23, 2005), at

*2.

The petitioner, Deck, was convicted and sentenced to death

for robbing and murdering an elderly couple. At the trial, Deck

was required to wear leg braces that were not visible to the

jury. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Deck’s

conviction, but reversed his death sentence. During the retrial

of the penalty phase, Deck was shackled with visible leg irons,

handcuffs and a belly chain. Id. at *3. His counsel objected

before the jury voir dire began and after the jury was empaneled,

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but the court overruled the objection, stating that Deck “‘has

been convicted and will remain in leg irons and a belly chain’”

and “his ‘being shackled takes any fear out of their minds.’” 

The penalty phase proceeded with Deck in shackles. Deck was

again sentenced to death. Id.

On appeal, Deck claimed his shackling violated both Missouri

law and the Federal Constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court

affirmed the death sentence, holding that the trial court had

properly exercised its discretion in shackling the defendant, and

in any event, Deck had not demonstrated he was prejudiced by his

shackling. Id.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Deck began with the

preliminary question of whether the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution permitted a

state to use visible shackles in the guilt phase of a criminal

trial. Id. The Court stated that, while “[t]he law [referencing

the common law and Nineteenth century cases] has long forbidden

routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase,”

requiring instead that a state shackle a criminal defendant only

in the presence of a “special need,” its own decisions have only

“suggested that a version of this rule forms part of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process guarantee.” Id. at *3-5

(citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44; Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568-69;

Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503) (emphasis added). 

 The Court remarked that the lower courts have interpreted

these “statements” from Allen, Holbrook, and Estelle, as “setting

forth a constitutional standard” governing shackles. Id. at *5. 

Namely, the courts have emphasized the importance of preserving

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trial court discretion, but they have applied the “limits on that

discretion described in [these cases].” Id. However, the Court 

found that, while courts were “close to a consensus that, during

the guilt phase of a trial, a criminal defendant has a right to

remain free of physical restraints that are visible to the jury,”

absent “essential state interests such as physical security,

escape prevention, or courtroom decorum.” Id. However, “[l]ower

courts have disagreed about the specific procedural steps a trial

court must take prior to shackling, about the amount and type of 

evidence needed to justify restraints, and about what forms of

prejudice might warrant a new trial.” Id. The Court thus held

that, in light of its own precedent and of a lower court

consensus disapproving routine shackling, dating back to the

Nineteenth century, “it is clear that this Court’s prior

statements gave voice to a principle deeply embedded in the law.” 

Id.

We now conclude that those statements identify a 

basic element of the ‘due process of law’ protected by

the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical

restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court

determination, in the exercise of its discretion,

that they are justified by a state interest specific 

to a particular trial.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court then proceeded to apply this

same holding to the penalty phase of a criminal trial. Id. at *8

(finding that “[t]he considerations that militate against the

routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a

criminal trial apply with like force to penalty proceedings in

capital cases”). 

Respondent interprets this holding as requiring a finding

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that no clearly established Federal law existed prior to Deck

regarding the use of shackles, in general, at either the guilt or

penalty phase. According to respondent, the Court’s opinion

makes clear that the Supreme Court had not previously determined

the constitutionality of the use of visible shackles at trial. 

As support, respondent points to the fact that the Court

addressed preliminarily the question of the constitutionality of

the use of shackles during the guilt phase and referred to its

prior decisions as “suggesting,” (rather than as “holding”) that

visible shackles implicated constitutional concerns.

Respondent’s interpretation is unpersuasive. There can be

clearly established Federal law under a “generalized standard”. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (explaining that

under the AEDPA, “rules of law may be sufficiently clear for

habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a

generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule”); Taylor

v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 2002) (“the lack of an

explicit statement” of a particular rule by the Supreme Court “is

not determinative” of clearly established law, since “[t]he Court

has made clear that its relevant precedents include not only

bright-line rules but also the legal principles and standards

flowing from precedent”). Even though the Court in Deck appears,

for the first time, to announce a bright-line rule that

unjustified, visible shackling violates the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it does not follow that no

constitutional standard previously existed. Indeed, this court

finds Deck holds otherwise. 

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3 “Thus, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the

use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial

court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they

are justified by a state interest specific to a particular

trial.” Id.

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 In recounting the common law as annunciated over the past

several centuries, the Court found that the law has “long

forbidden” the unjustified use of visible shackles during

criminal trials. The Court further explained that its prior

precedents, Allen, Holbrook, and Estelle, while not considering

the issue directly, nonetheless supported this “basic principle.” 

Deck, 2005 WL 1200394, at *5. The Court stated “it is clear that

this Court’s prior statements gave voice to a principle deeply

embedded in the law ... [and] that those statements identif[ied]

a basic element of the‘due process of law’ protected by the

Federal Constitution.” Id. 

Moreover, the Court specifically found that a near consensus

existed among the lower courts that, absent an essential state

interest, a criminal defendant has the “constitutional” right to

remain free of physical restraints visible to the jury. Id.

(noting that while “[l]ower courts have disagreed about the

specific procedural steps a trial court must take prior to

shackling,” among other things, they have not “questioned the

basic principle” that unjustified, visible shackling of a

criminal defendant is unconstitutional). 

Thus, this court finds that Deck did not establish in the

first instance the constitutional standard for imposition of

shackles. Rather, it set forth a bright-line rule3 that simply

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construed prior case law, including Supreme Court authority and

elucidations of that authority by lower courts. 

This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. This

court’s prior finding of constitutional error was predicated on

the trial court’s failure to consider “less restrictive

alternatives to shackling.” (Feb. 23 M&O at 41.) The pivotal

question remains whether this specific, procedural and

evidentiary requirement was clearly established Federal law at

the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. In

Deck, the Court appears to answer this question. When it stated

that “[l]ower courts have disagreed about the specific procedural

steps a trial court must take prior to shackling, [and] about the

amount and type of evidence needed to justify restraints . . . .” 

2005 WL 1200394, at *5 (emphasis added). The court juxtaposed

this finding with the “close [to] consensus” it found in the

lower courts regarding the general principle that the unjustified

imposition of visible shackles at trial violates the

Constitution. 

The disagreement referenced by the Court, above, is evident

in reviewing the Court’s lengthy string cite to cases, both

federal and state, which discuss procedural and evidentiary

requirements necessary to justify the use of shackles. Id. An

examination of those cases demonstrates that, while they do not

all share the same procedural and evidentiary requirements, they

do fall into three general categories which include both similar

and dissimilar requirements. 

For example, one category of courts require, in addition to

a showing of a “compelling need” that the court consider less

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4 The Court also cited Dyas v. Poole, 309 F.3d 586, 588-

89 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); however, the Ninth Circuit did

not consider whether shackling of the defendant in that case was

constitutional error. Rather, the case addressed only the

prejudice issue, as the state conceded the defendant’s shackling

was constitutionally in error. As such, in Dyas there is no

discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s test for determining whether

the shackling of a criminal defendant is constitutional. This

court assumes that the Court in Deck, meant in citing to Dyas, to

reference the Ninth Circuit’s controlling test which is clearly

set forth in such cases as Castillo and Gonzalez referenced

above. Therefore, the court places the Ninth Circuit among the

courts falling within this category.

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restrictive alternatives to shackling. See, e.g., State v.

Herrick, 101 P.3d 755, 757-59 (Mont. 2004) (adopting the Ninth

Circuit’s test which requires demonstration of “compelling

circumstances” and consideration of less restrictive

alternatives); People v. Jackson, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1818, 1822-30

(1993) (requiring a “showing of a manifest need,” and

consideration of less restrictive alternatives).4 

A second category of courts does not require consideration

of lesser alternatives to shackling; instead, they require only

demonstration of a specific need to justify the use of shackles

in the particular case. See, e.g., Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d

632, 635 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (requiring a showing of

“extreme need” to justify use of physical restraints on a

defendant at trial); Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233-34

(Ky. 2004) (finding shackling permissible only in exceptional

cases where “evident danger” of escape exists or to protect

others from attack by the prisoner); State v. Turner, 23 P.3d

499, 504-05 (Wash. 2001)(en banc)(requiring shackling decisions

to be based on evidence that defendant poses an imminent risk of

escape, intends to injure someone in the courtroom, or cannot

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5 Many of the cases cited above under the “second”

category also expressly discuss the requirement of a hearing,

See, e.g., Jackson, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1825, and/or the

requirement of stating the reasons for shackling “on the record”

See, e.g., Cooks, 844 S.W.2d at 722. Other courts have expressly

found a hearing unnecessary so long as the reasons for shackling

are stated on the record. See, e.g., Tweedy, 594 A.2d at 915.

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behave in an orderly manner); People v. Brown, 358 N.E.2d 1362,

1363-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (finding that the “burden rests on

the State to show the necessity of extreme physical security

measures,” such as to prevent escape, protect persons in the

courtroom, and maintain order during trial); Cooks v. State, 844

S.W.2d 697, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (requiring “good and

sufficient reasons” to shackle a criminal defendant); State v.

Tweedy, 594 A.2d 906, 914-15 (Conn. 1991) (allowing “reasonable

means of restraint” if the court finds restraints are “reasonably

necessary”).

Yet still a third category imposes the additional specific

requirement of notice and a hearing to determine the propriety of

imposition of shackles, at which time the defendant must be given

an opportunity to respond to the claimed “need” to shackle him. 

State v. Crawford, 577 P.2d 1135, 1141-46 (Idaho 1978) (finding

trial court’s ex parte decision to shackle the defendant

constitutional error); State v. Tolley, 226 S.E.2d 353, 365-69

(N.C. 1976) (requiring a hearing where the defendant is given an

opportunity to respond and at which the trial judge states

reasons for shackling on the record).5

This body of law, cited by the Court, demonstrates that,

contrary to this court’s prior interpretation, the law was not

clearly established as to the procedural requirements which

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consider less restrictive alternatives or the quantum or type of 

evidence that justify use of shackles. Indeed, some courts

imposed the less restrictive alternative requirement, while most

did not.

The lack of clarity in Federal law as to the need to

consider alternatives to shackling is underscored in Deck,

itself. Deck gives little guidance to a trial judge on the

issue of what specific procedures or evidence should be

considered before shackling is imposed. In fact, Deck only

requires a “trial court determination [on the record], in the

exercise of its discretion, that [shackles] are justified by a

state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 2005 WL

1200394, at *5. The question of what procedures or evidence is

left to the discretion of the trial judge subject to the above

announced standard. Id. The Court further noted that “[s]uch a

determination may of course take into account the factors that

courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security

problems and the risk of escape at trial.” Id. (emphasis add). 

And certainly those factors “in a particular trial” may leave a

judge to consider less restrictive alternatives to shackling. 

However, the issue before this court is whether the trial judge

is mandated by clearly established Federal law to consider less

restrictive alternatives on the record. 

According to Deck, and contrary to petitioner’s argument,

“justification” does not require that less restrictive

alternatives must be considered on the record. Deck teaches that

“justification” is satisfied when the trial judge based on the

evidence of “essential state interest, specific to a particular

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trial”, determines shackles are necessary. Deck does not

mention, much less expressly impose, a further requirement of

considering less restrictive alternatives. Indeed, Deck cites

many more lower court cases in which the exercise of discretion

does not include consideration of less restrictive alternatives. 

Thus, following the Deck analysis of constitutional compliance,

there appears to be no clearly established Federal Law regarding

such a requirement and certainly no clearly established Federal

law at the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. 

The trial judge in this case did not consider less

restrictive alternatives to shackles on the record. However, in

light of Deck, this court finds the failure to follow that

procedure was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Conner, J., concurring)(stating that if

the Federal law is not clearly established at the time of the

state court determination, § 2254(d)(1) bars relief). 

Accordingly, the Court must accordingly reverse its finding of

constitutional error.

The final inquiry then is whether the state court otherwise 

complied with the clearly established Federal law as confirmed by

Deck. Here, as described more fully in the court’s May 13 M&O at

34-35, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court

ordered petitioner restrained with a waist chain tied to a

security chair on the basis that “there is a likelihood of escape

from the courtroom” or “nonconforming conduct” based on (1)

petitioner’s escape from jail, which was pre-planned and involved

the taking of a hostage with a gun (later identified as a toy),

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(2) his attempted escape from jail which involved the assault

upon a correctional officer, (3) the nature of the crimes which

he was charged, and (4) his physical stature. These findings

were supported by testimony from the Assistant Marshal in charge

of courtroom security and a criminal investigator for the

district attorney’s office. Id. The court also expressly noted

that the proposed restraints were “unobtrusive” and that every

attempt would be made not to let the jury see the restraints and

not to otherwise call attention to them.

Thus, unlike the case at bar, in Deck, the record contained

“no formal or informal findings” by the judge, nor did he refer

to any risk of escape or a threat to courtroom security. Rather,

the judge simply stated that Deck was shackled because he “has

been convicted.” Deck, 2005 WL 1200394, at *9. While the judge

also noted that the shackles would “take any fear out of” the

jurors minds, he did not explain any reason for that fear. Id.

As the Court concluded, the trial judge did not explain why

“shackles were necessary.” Id.

Here, the trial judge heard testimony from two qualified

witnesses, who were cross-examined by defense counsel. As set

forth above, the judge found that these witnesses supported the

state’s “need” to shackle petitioner. Thereafter the judge made

a clear record of his findings, explaining the reasons why he

found shackles were necessary, describing the type of shackles to

be imposed, and the efforts which would be made to prevent the

jury from seeing the shackles.

Under these facts and based on clearly established Federal

law at the time, this court cannot conclude that the trial judge

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did not properly exercise his discretion to impose shackles on 

petitioner based upon essential state interests, specific to

petitioner and his trial. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES

petitioner’s motion to amend the judgment, filed February 23,

2005. However, the court modifies its order of that same day to

the extent it reconsiders herein its prior finding of

constitutional error in the shackling of petitioner during the

guilt and penalty phases of his trial. Under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Deck, the court finds that there was no clearly

established Federal law requiring consideration of less

restrictive alternatives to shackling on the record at the time

petitioner’s state court conviction became final. The trial

judge’s decision to shackle defendant at both the guilt and

penalty phases was compliant with clearly established Federal

law, and as such, was not in violation of the Due Process Clause.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 24, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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