Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS DEAN, SR.,

individually; AMY DEAN, 

individually; SUSANNAH 

HARDESTY, individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, a

municipal corporation; and 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00730-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART SACRAMENTO 

COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sacramento 

County’s (“the County”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #40) Plaintiffs 

Dennis Dean, Sr., Amy Dean, and Susannah Hardesty’s (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #39) (“TAC”).1

 

Plaintiffs oppose the motion (“Opposition”) (Doc. #41). The 

County filed a reply (Doc. #42).

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for August 6, 2014.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dennis Dean, Sr. is the father of Decedent Dennis 

Dean, Jr. (“Decedent”). TAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff Susannah Hardesty is 

the mother of Decedent. TAC ¶ 3. Plaintiff Amy Dean is the 

widow of Decedent. TAC ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff’s TAC includes the following allegations:

On April 12, 2012, Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies (“the 

officers”) took Decedent into custody. TAC ¶ 8. After a search 

of Decedent’s home, the officers found a small safe located in a 

bedroom closet. TAC ¶ 9. The officers ordered Decedent to open 

the safe, placing him handcuffed and kneeling in the small closet

opening. TAC ¶¶ 9-10. Decedent was surrounded by at least three

of the armed officers when opening the safe with his hands cuffed 

in front of him. Id. The officers were forewarned that the safe 

contained a firearm. Id. 

After one of the officers allegedly yelled that there was a 

gun, the group of officers opened fire on Decedent, “executing 

him by firing squad.” TAC ¶ 11. Decedent was shot dozens of 

times resulting in at least thirty-two gunshot wounds. Id. 

Decedent did not fire a weapon. TAC ¶ 12. After the shooting, 

the officers exited the bedroom and withheld medical treatment 

from Decedent for at least two hours. TAC ¶¶ 13-14. He was 

pronounced dead at the scene. Id.

On October 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #17) in this Court. The FAC included the 

following causes of action: (1) “Wrongful Death” under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“§1983); (2) “Violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights to 

familial relationship” under §1983; (3) a “Monell” claim for 

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violations of §1983; and (4) a survival action claim for

violation of Decedent’s civil rights” under §1983. Defendants 

moved to dismiss the FAC (Doc. #18), and the Court granted the 

motion (Doc. #22), dismissing the §1983 claim for violation of 

Plaintiffs’ rights to familial relationship and the Monell claim 

with leave to amend. The wrongful death and survival action 

claims were dismissed without leave to amend. 

The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. #24) was filed on 

February 12, 2014, naming the County and the unknown officers 

responsible for Decedent’s injuries (“Doe Officers”) as 

defendants. The SAC included causes of action on behalf of 

Decedent against the County and Doe Officers pursuant to §1983; 

claims of Monell liability against the County by the individual 

Plaintiffs; and claims against the Doe Officers for violations of 

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights pursuant to §1983. The 

Court granted (Doc. #38) the County’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 

#25) the Monell claim with leave to amend and the motion to 

strike the claims brought on behalf of Decedent. The Court denied 

the motion to dismiss the remaining claim against the Doe 

Officers brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs individually.

The TAC was filed on June 4, 2014. It alleges two causes of 

action pursuant to §1983 for the deprivation of the rights of 

Plaintiffs to a familial relationship with Decedent against the 

Doe Officers (First cause of action) and the County and remaining 

Doe Defendants (Second cause of action). TAC ¶¶ 15-25. 

II.OPINION

A. First Cause of Action – Doe Officers

The County first contends the claims against the Doe 

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Officers in the First Cause of Action should be dismissed for 

failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. MTD at p. 

4. The County repeats the arguments it made against the same 

claim in the SAC. 

As stated in the Court’s previous Order, Plaintiffs may 

individually assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the 

deprivation of their liberty interest arising out of the familial 

relations with Decedent. See Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 

(9th Cir. 1998); Provencio v. Vazquez, 258 F.R.D. 626, 640 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009). To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment claim arising 

out of the loss of a familial relationship, a plaintiff must show 

that the officers acted with a purpose to harm the decedent that 

is unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Johnson 

v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

The TAC alleges that Decedent was handcuffed and kneeling 

when the Doe Officers opened fire on him. The Doe Officers then 

left Decedent’s injuries unattended for at least two hours; 

Decedent later died as a result of those injuries. These 

allegations, nearly identical to those in the SAC, accepted as 

true, show the Doe Officers acted with a purpose to harm that is 

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Johnson, 724 

F.3d at 1168-69. Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss the 

First Cause of Action as against the Doe Officers is DENIED.

B. Second Cause of Action – Monell Claim

The County next moves to dismiss the Monell claim found in 

the Second Cause of Action for failure to state a claim. It 

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argues the TAC contains bare and conclusory allegations of 

policies and customs that fail to meet the pleading standard. 

MTD at pp. 5-6. 

As the Court has stated, bare allegations of the existence 

of an official policy or custom are insufficient to withstand a 

motion to dismiss, and the complaint “must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable 

the [municipality] to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca,

652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs argue the TAC adequately alleges specific customs 

and policies of the County that led to Plaintiffs’ injuries. 

Opp. at pp. 5-6. Plaintiffs point specifically to paragraphs 

twenty-one through twenty-three of the TAC. Those paragraphs 

allege that the County maintains and permits “official policies 

and customs which allow the occurrence of the types of wrongs set 

forth” in the TAC, all in deliberate indifference to the rights 

of citizens. TAC ¶ 21. The TAC further alleges that these 

policies and customs include “the deliberately indifferent 

training of its law enforcement officers related to the use of 

force and the appropriate handling of suspects in their custody” 

leading to the use of excessive force. TAC ¶ 22. The County’s 

alleged “ratification of police misconduct, along with the 

failure to conduct adequate investigations of misconduct leads to 

the violations of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” Id. 

Finally, the TAC alleges that despite the controversial 

circumstances surrounding Decedent’s death, the County failed to 

“conduct an unbiased investigation, or take any action in 

preserving Plaintiffs’ and Decedent’s rights, or verify 

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misconduct and discipline” the officers for it. TAC ¶ 23. 

These allegations are again conclusory, not entitled to a 

presumption of truth, and therefore are insufficient to state a 

claim for Monell liability. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

680-81 (2009). Plaintiffs have merely stated the general basis 

for a Monell claim, without any factual allegations to support 

it. The TAC does not identify what the practices or policies 

were, how they were deficient, or how they caused Plaintiffs’ 

harm, allegations necessary to state a claim against the County. 

See Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149-50 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009); Warren v. City of Grass Valley, 10-CV-1650-JAM-EFB, 

2010 WL 5170317, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 

Accordingly, the County’s Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim 

in the Second Cause of Action is GRANTED. Since the Plaintiffs

have been afforded several opportunities to state a viable Monell

claim against the County, the Court finds that further amendment 

would be futile. The motion to dismiss is granted, therefore, 

without leave to amend. 

II. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE the County’s Motion to Dismiss the second cause of 

action and DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ 

claims in the first cause of action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2014

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