Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02039/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02039-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAELIENIU FAATILIGA,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES D. HARTLEY,

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-02039-LJO-DLB (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 RELEVANT HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) following his conviction of attempted murder and assault with a firearm. 

Petitioner is serving a sentence of seven years plus life with the possibility of parole.

 In the instant petition Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction; rather, he

claims the Board of Parole Hearings’ (Board) November 27, 2007 decision finding him

unsuitable for release violated his due process rights because it was not supported by some

evidence and he was improperly removed from the hearing.

Petitioner filed a state habeas court petition challenging the Board’s 2008 decision in the

This information is taken from the state court documents attached to Respondent’s answer and are not

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subject to dispute.

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San Diego County Superior Court on December 8, 2008. The petition was denied in a reasoned

decision on January 20, 2009. 

On February 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a state petition in the California Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District. The court denied the petition in a reasoned decision on March 23,

2009. 

Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Supreme Court on May 26, 2009, which

was summarily denied. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 20,

2009. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 7, 2010, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on June 30, 2010. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

On April 26, 1995, Petitioner went to the apartment of Terrence Hightower. When Mr.

Hightower opened the front door, Petitioner shot him three times with a 9.mm semiautomatic

firearm and then fled the scene. Hightower was severely injured but ultimately recovered. In

August 1995, Hightower saw Petitioner and notified the police. Petitioner was arrested and told

officers that he had done nothing wrong, and he had been in Samoa the last two months. 

Hightower was a friend of Petitioner’s girlfriend and believed Petitioner was jealous. Petitioner

made threats that he would “get” Hightower. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

This information is taken from the transcript of the 2007 Board hearing.

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The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions. 

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

pursuant to a state court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state

court conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because

he meets the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass

v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. th

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a th

habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the

petition is not challenging [her] underlying state court conviction.’”). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

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Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

II. Review of Petition

There is no independent right to parole under the United States Constitution; rather, the

 right exists and is created by the substantive state law which defines the parole scheme. 

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 559, 561 (9 Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Bd. of Pardons v. th

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987); Pearson v. Muntz, No. 08-55728, 2010 WL 2108964, * 2 (9th

Cir. May 24, 2010) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d

174 (2005)); Cooke v. Solis, No. 06-15444, 2010 WL 2330283, *6 (9th Cir. June 4, 2010). 

“[D]espite the necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, state

statutes may create liberty interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due

Process Clause.” Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 371. 

In California, the Board of Parole Hearings’ determination of whether an inmate is

suitable for parole is controlled by the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2402(a) and (b). Section 2402(c) sets forth circumstances tending to

demonstrate unsuitability for release. “Circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

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(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,

such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to

the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.’

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E),(2)-(9). 

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to show suitability which include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting others as a

juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the presence of

remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering

of the victim, or indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as a result of significant

stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime, the prisoner

suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears

the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic plans for release

or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release.

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(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function 

within the law upon release. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(1)-(9)

The California parole scheme entitles the prisoner to a parole hearing and various

procedural guarantees and rights before, at, and after the hearing. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5. If

denied parole, the prisoner is entitled to subsequent hearings at intervals set by statute. Id. In

addition, if the Board or Governor find the prisoner unsuitable for release, the prisoner is entitled

to a written explanation. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041.2, 3041.5. The denial of parole must also be

supported by “some evidence,” but review of the Board’s or Governor’s decision is extremely

deferential. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 59 P.3d 174, 210 (2002). 

Because California’s statutory parole scheme guarantees that prisoners will not be denied

parole absent some evidence of present dangerousness, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

recently held California law creates a liberty interest in parole that may be enforced under the

Due Process Clause. Hayward v. Marshall, 602 F.3d at 561-563; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d

606, 608-609 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this Court’s ultimate

determination is whether the state court’s application of the some evidence rule was unreasonable

or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Hayward v.

Marshall. 603 F.3d at 563; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d at 608. 

The applicable California standard “is whether some evidence supports the decision of

the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not

merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008) (emphasis in original and citations omitted). As to the

circumstances of the commitment offense, the Lawrence Court concluded that

although the Board and the Governor may rely upon the aggravated circumstances

of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated

nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current

dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in

the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor

and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense

remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public

safety. 

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Id. at 1214. 

In addition, “the circumstances of the commitment offense (or any of the other factors

related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to

the determination that a prison remains a danger to the public. It is not the existence or

nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the

significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current

dangerousness to the public.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212. 

“In sum, a reviewing court must consider ‘whether the identified facts are probative to the

central issue of current dangerousness when considered in light of the full record before the

Board or the Governor.’” Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in

original) (citing Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d at 560). 

A. Last Reasoned State Court Decision

In the last reasoned decision of the California Court of Appeal, the Court held, in

pertinent part, as follows:

[Petitioner] contends the Board denied him due process by refusing to

allow him to participate, speak on his own behalf and ask and answer questions

throughout his parole consideration hearing. The transcript of the hearing reflects

[Petitioner] appeared at the hearing and soon became argumentative and

disruptive. The Board members advised [Petitioner] how to comport himself and

that he would be removed if he did not comply. After nearly an hour of

[Petitioner’s] interruption, the Board had him removed from the hearing room and

conducted the hearing in his absence. [Petitioner] was afforded procedural due

process but his misconduct interfered with the hearing and he was properly

removed.

Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision is not supported by some

evidence. . . .

The record shows [Petitioner] had a history of assaultive behavior and

belonged to a gang during his teens. He had three serious disciplinary findings in

prison, including disrespect to staff in 1997, possession of contraband in 1998 and

possession of inmate-manufactured alcohol in 2003. He also had five minor

disciplinary findings, the last in 2002. The evaluating psychologist reported

[Petitioner] has an antisocial personality disorder and is in the moderate range for

future violence. The Board commended [Petitioner] for completing electrical and

dry cleaning vocations and for positive programming and self-help activities. The

Board made an individualized inquiry into [Petitioner’s] suitability for parole and

its decision is supported by some evidence.

(Exhibit 4, to Answer.) 

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B. 2007 Board Hearing

At Petitioner’s initial parole consideration hearing on November 27, 2007, the Board

found him unsuitable based on the circumstances of the commitment offense, prior criminal

history, institutional misconduct, and unfavorable psychological evaluation. 

The commitment offense involved Petitioner intentionally arming himself with a

semiautomatic weapon and approaching the victim at his residence awaking him from his sleep. 

Petitioner shot the victim several times at close range, resulting in five bullet wounds to the

victim. “Two of these bullets entered and exited through his right shoulder, causing four wounds

and the third bullet struck him in the face and traveled to his chest, entered his right lung,

continued to his stomach, his liver, and finally lodged in on the right side of his groin, and this

bullet was not retrieved during surgery.” The motive for the shooting was apparently jealously

because the victim was dating Petitioner’s former girlfriend, which the Board found to be very

trivial. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). 

The commitment offense occurred when Petitioner was twenty years old, and he had

previously suffered a juvenile conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(c)(2). He has a history of tumultuous relationships with others, as evidenced by his

active participation in the West Side Piru’s Gang for a few years. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c)(3). 

Petitioner suffered three serious rules violation including, disrespecting staff in 1997,

possession of contraband in 1998, and possession of pruno in 2003. Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c)(6). It was noted that Petitioner continued to display disrespect for officials which was

the cause of his removal from the 2007 Board hearing. He also suffered five minor disciplinary

violations, including delaying lockup, refusing to participate, failure to report, delaying lockup,

and failure to maintain his “quarters.” 

The most recent psychological report assessed Petitioner to be suffering from antisocial

personality disorder and concluded he posed a moderate likelihood to become involved in violent

activity if released, based at least in part on abstinence of substance abuse. Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(b). 

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After the considering the factors in favor of suitability, the Board concluded that the

positive aspects of Petitioner’s behavior did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability. Given the

circumstances of Petitioner’s commitment offense, prior criminal history, institutional

misconduct, and unfavorable psychological report, the state courts’ determination that there is

some evidence to support the Board’s 2007 decision is not an unreasonable application of federal

law, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record. Accordingly, federal

habeas corpus relief is foreclosed. 

Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated because he was removed from the

hearing. Petitioner’s due process right to be present at the parole hearing was not violated in this

instance because he was allowed to appear and it was his own wrongdoing that caused his

removal. The transcript of the hearing consists of ninety-five pages, and the first 54 pages are

full of objections and interruptions by Petitioner. Petitioner was extremely uncooperative and

attempted to discharge his appointed attorney. He repeatedly made objections even though he

was advised the objections were not cognizable. Petitioner was repeatedly informed that if he

continued to disrupt the proceeding the remainder of the hearing would be conducted in his

absence. Despite the strong warning, Petitioner continued to disrupt claiming that the law would

not be followed and he did not understand what the commissioners were telling him. He was

eventually removed from the hearing and it was conducted in his absence. 

Although section 2402 of the Title 15 California Code of Regulations does not

specifically allow for the removal of an inmate from the parole consideration hearing, by analogy

removal of a disruptive defendant is authorized under California law in a felony criminal trial. 

California Penal Code section 1043 subsection (b)(1) states:

The absence of the defendant in a felony case after the trial has commenced in his

presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to, and including, the return of the

verdict in any of the following cases: (1) Any case in which the defendant, after he

has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his

disruptive behavior, nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so

disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that the trial cannot be carried

on with him in the courtroom.

Even though Section 1043(b)(1) applies to criminal trials, not parole determination hearing, it is

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clear that a parole release determination is not subject to all of the due process protections of an

adversarial proceeding, and it logically follows that due process would not require greater

protection in a parole consideration hearing than required at a felony criminal trial. Therefore,

there is no basis to Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated by his removal

from the parole hearing because of his disruptive behavior. Even after Petitioner’s removal, his

appointed attorney continued to represent him and present evidence to the Board, and the record

is clear all the evidence was duly considered by the Board. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 14, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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