Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08222/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DeWayne Curbow,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-14-8222-PCT-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff DeWayne Curbow’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of 

the Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his claim for disability 

benefits. Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges disability beginning on January 22, 2010. 

This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the 

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for 

a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 15). After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”), Plaintiff’s 

Opening Brief (Doc. 20), Defendant’s Response Brief (Doc. 24), and Plaintiff’s Reply 

(Doc. 25), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision contains 

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harmful legal error. For the reasons explained in Section II below, the decision is 

reversed and the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further 

administrative proceedings. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for disability insurance benefits to 

those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a 

physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible for benefits based 

on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in 

any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant must also show 

that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period of at least 

twelve months. Id.

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an 

analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:1

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits 

are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step 

three.

1 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or equals one 

of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively 

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is 

presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step 

of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the last step. 

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:2

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). Social Security is responsible for 

providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 

can do, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

2 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

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In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the 

ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 

Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving conflicts 

and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Id.; see also Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ’s 

decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1963, has worked as a truck driver and grocery store 

stocker. (A.R. 61, 70). In early 2011, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability 

insurance benefits. (A.R. 135-36). Plaintiff’s application alleged that on April 27, 2009,3

Plaintiff became unable to work due to the following impairments: (i) depression; (ii) five 

bad discs in his lower back; and (iii) three bad discs in his neck. (A.R. 70). Social 

3 Plaintiff later amended his alleged disability onset date to January 22, 2010. (A.R. 37, 236).

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Security denied Plaintiff’s application in August 2011. (A.R. 98-101). In January 2012, 

upon Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of 

Plaintiff’s application. (A.R. 105-07). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. 

(A.R. 108-09). The ALJ held a video hearing in March 2013. (A.R. 34-68). In her May 

2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled. (A.R. 14-21). The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final 

decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On November 19, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting judicial 

review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

The ALJ completed all five steps of the disability analysis before finding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 22, 2010. (A.R. 16). Neither party disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe 

Impairment/Combination of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has one severe impairment—cervical multi-level 

spondylosis with neural impingement. (A.R. 16). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by 

not including Plaintiff’s alleged lumbar orthopedic issues and depression in the list of 

severe impairments. (Doc. 20 at 5-7).

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 18). Plaintiff disputes

the ALJ’s determination at this step. (Doc. 20 at 7-8).

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4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light exertional work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), except that:

[Plaintiff] is limited to performing occupations that require no 

more than occasional postural maneuvers such as balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling and climbing on 

ramps and stairs. [Plaintiff] must avoid all occupations that 

require climbing on ladders/ropes/scaffolds.

(A.R. 18). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) and Plaintiff’s 

RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work as a 

truck driver and stocker. (A.R. 19-20). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step four by improperly weighing the 

Plaintiff’s Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) medical records and Plaintiff’s 70% VA 

disability rating. (Doc. 20 at 8-9). The Court finds that the ALJ committed harmful legal 

error by failing to sufficiently explain the consideration and weight given to Plaintiff”s 

VA disability rating. 

5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

At the final step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing 

in significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 21-22). Because the ALJ 

committed harmful legal error at step four, the ALJ’s determination at step five is also 

erroneous.

C. The ALJ Committed Reversible Legal Error by Failing to Properly 

Weigh Plaintiff’s VA Disability Rating

“No circuit has held that an ALJ is free to disregard a VA disability rating.” 

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). In McCartey, the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals held that an ALJ must ordinarily give great weight to a VA 

determination of disability. Id. at 1076. An ALJ may discount a VA disability rating

only if he or she provides persuasive, specific, and valid reasons that are supported by the 

record. Id.

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Here, the VA assigned Plaintiff a 50% disability rating for major depressive 

disorder and a 40% disability rating for intervertebral disc syndrome. (A.R. 17, 878). 

Under the VA regulations, this equates to a combined disability rating of 70%. 38 C.F.R. 

§ 4.25 The ALJ’s decision addresses Plaintiff’s VA disability rating in a single

paragraph:

The undersigned notes that the claimant also has been treated 

for a major depressive disorder (MDD) during the 

adjudicatory period. In fact, as of November 2012, 50% of 

his 70% service-connected disability was for MDD and 40% 

was for intervertebral disc syndrome (exhibit 17F/27). Yet, 

during much of the adjudicatory period, the claimant was 

must less depressed when his physical condition improved. 

For example, in September 2010, he was walking daily and 

taking care of his friend’s two children after school (exhibit 

5F/122). Moreover, in July 2010, the claimant underwent a 

consultative psychiatric evaluation at the request of the State 

agency. The examiner, Doris Javine, Ph.D., a clinical 

psychologist, diagnosed the claimant with depression related 

to his medical condition. Dr. Javine noted that the claimant 

had received good results with treatment, including 

counseling and medications. In her medical source statement, 

the doctor determined that the claimant has had no significant 

mental limitation, which has lasted or is expected to last for 

12 continuous months or longer (exhibit 8F).

(A.R. 17).

Defendant contends that under Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685 

(9th Cir. 2009), the ALJ was justified in giving little weight4 to Plaintiff’s VA disability 

rating by referencing evidence not considered by the VA—Dr. Javine’s psychological 

evaluation. (Doc. 24 at 11-12). In Valentine, the claimant’s VA disability rating was 

increased from 70% to 100% while the claimant’s case was pending before the ALJ. Id. 

at 688-89. The ALJ’s decision discussed the 100% disability rating, but noted that it 

“was not based on a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence available to the 

4 As discussed below, the ALJ did not explicitly state that she assigned little weight to Plaintiff’s disability rating. 

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undersigned [ALJ].” Id. at 695. The Ninth Circuit found that the “ALJ was justified in 

rejecting the VA’s disability rating on the basis that she had evidence the VA did not, 

which undermined the evidence the VA did have.” Id. The Ninth Circuit further 

concluded that “on this record, the acquisition of new evidence or a properly justified 

reevaluation of old evidence constitutes a ‘persuasive, specific, and valid reason[ ] . . . 

supported by the record’ under McCartey for according little weight to a VA disability 

rating.” Id. (emphasis added). Three points distinguish this case from Valentine. 

First, while a reviewing court may draw specific and legitimate inferences from an 

ALJ’s decision, a court cannot speculate on the ALJ’s reasoning or make “post hoc 

rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 

755. In Valentine, it was clear from the ALJ’s decision that the ALJ rejected the 

claimant’s 100% VA disability rating by finding that the claimant was able to work. In 

this case, it is not clear that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s disability rating. Not only 

does the ALJ’s decision not discuss the weight assigned to Plaintiff’s disability rating, but 

it does not acknowledge that a VA disability rating is ordinarily entitled to great weight. 

In addition, the ALJ’s decision does not provide sufficient analysis in which the Court 

may infer the weight assigned to the rating.

5

 The Court cannot speculate what the ALJ 

may have been thinking with respect to Plaintiff’s disability rating.

Second, the ALJ in Valentine explicitly stated that Plaintiff’s VA disability rating 

was not based on evidence available to the ALJ. The ALJ in this case made no such 

explicit statement. Defendant’s argument that the ALJ rejected the disability rating based 

on new evidence invites the Court to engage in impermissible speculation as to the ALJ’s 

5 It is possible that the ALJ simply found that Plaintiff’s 70% VA disability rating 

was consistent with Plaintiff”s assessed RFC. See Lewis v. Astrue, No. CV 08-5669 

MHP, 2009 WL 4981142, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (claimant argued on appeal that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the claimant’s 70% VA disability rating; 

Social Security contended that the rating was accepted and reflected in the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment).

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reasoning. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225; see also see also Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 

F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a 

ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision.”) (citations omitted). 

“Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some 

reasoning in order for [the court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s 

conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 

487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2014). Without additional analysis, the Court cannot meaningfully review the 

ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s disability rating. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s VA disability rating is based on both depression and 

intervertebral disc syndrome. Dr. Javine only evaluated Plaintiff’s mental state. The ALJ 

does not discuss any evidence regarding Plaintiff’s intervertebral disc syndrome that the 

VA did not review. Nor does the ALJ set forth a “properly justified reevaluation of old 

evidence.”6

 Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695. The Court cannot speculate as to the extent of 

the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s 40% VA disability rating for intervertebral disc 

syndrome.

For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate 

Plaintiff’s VA disability rating. The Court does not find that this error is 

“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 

6 The ALJ’s statement that “in September 2010, [Plaintiff] was walking daily and taking care of his friend’s two children after school” does not constitute a properly 

justified reevaluation of old evidence. Plaintiff testified that he was walking daily 

pursuant to his doctor’s recommendation and that his legs are almost totally numb by the end of the walks. (A.R. 54-55). Plaintiff also testified that he only took care of his friend’s children for six or seven months. (A.R. 44). It is unclear from the record exactly how much activity was involved in taking care of the children, who were ages 9 and 11. 

(Id.). The ALJ has not adequately explained how Plaintiff’s daily walks and babysitting translate to the ability to sustain competitive employment on a full-time basis. Garrison 

v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily 

activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that would 

unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will 

often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day”). 

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1038. Because the error alone warrants remand, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s 

remaining arguments.

D. Remand for Further Proceedings is Appropriate

The Court has discretion to remand a case for further proceedings or for an award 

of benefits. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). A court may remand 

for an award of benefits if the record has been fully developed and further proceedings 

would serve no useful purpose. Id.; McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076. The Ninth Circuit has 

explained that:

Such a circumstance arises when: (1) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the claimant's 

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be 

resolved before a determination of disability can be made; 

and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled if he considered the 

claimant’s evidence.

McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076.

In McCartey, the Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ erroneously disregarded the 

claimant’s 80% VA disability rating. Id. Finding that the claimant’s disability rating was 

supported by several hundred pages of medical records, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 

case should be remanded to Social Security for payment of benefits. Id. at 1077. Here, 

while Plaintiff’s 70% disability rating is supported by numerous medical records, it is 

unclear whether the rating necessarily means that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning 

of the Social Security Act. See Herron v. Astrue, 407 F. App’x 139, 141 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(finding that ALJ failed to give valid reasons for discounting a claimant’s 70% VA 

disability rating and remanding to the district court with instructions to further remand to 

Social Security for further proceedings rather than an award of benefits). While 

Plaintiff’s VA records show that Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain, “disability requires 

more than mere inability to work without pain.” Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362–63 

(10th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Court 

notes that the VA denied Plaintiff’s request for a 100% unemployable rating. (A.R. 483). 

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This suggests that Plaintiff may be able to perform substantial gainful activity as defined 

by Social Security. It is the ALJ’s role to resolve conflicts in the medical testimony and 

any ambiguities in the record. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001). Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to remand this action for further 

proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is 

not based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

and remanding the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ shall issue a new decision that 

is consistent with the applicable law as set forth in this Order. The ALJ, however, is not 

precluded from reopening the hearing to receive additional evidence if deemed 

appropriate. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 1st day of February, 2016. 

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