Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00578/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00578-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATENT TECHNOLOGY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAWRENCE WOODMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00578-DMR 

ORDER ON ADMINISTRATIVE 

MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE 

METHOD OF SERVICE

Re: Dkt. No. 116

Plaintiff Patent Technology, LLC filed an administrative motion for leave to serve 

Defendant Marry Smith by alternative means under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). 

[Docket No. 116.] For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff filed the operative complaint on September 8, 2016, alleging claims against 

thirteen defendants based upon a scheme to defraud Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff’s 

attempts to ship a trunk believed to contain $1.2 million in cash from Malaysia to the United 

States. [Docket No. 110 (Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”).] Plaintiff alleges that one of the 

defendants, Marry Smith aka Marry Juliet Smith, “allegedly currently resid[es] in Malaysia.” Id. 

at ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s counsel is in regular email and telephone contact with Smith. Klicpera Decl. 

Sept. 25, 2016, ¶¶ 3, 6-9. He unsuccessfully has attempted to locate her through an online public 

records search engine, TruthFinder, using information she provided about her birthdate and 

birthplace. He asserts that Smith provided him with fraudulent information about her identity. Id. 

at ¶¶ 7, 13. Counsel also tried unsuccessfully to confirm information about Smith’s property 

holdings in the United States. Id. at ¶¶ 3-5. Plaintiff has not effected service of the summons and 

complaint on Smith, and now moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) for leave 

to serve Smith at the two email addresses counsel uses to communicate with her: 

Case 4:15-cv-00578-DMR Document 119 Filed 11/13/16 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

marrysmith210@yahoo.com and marrysmithjustforus007@gmail.com. Mot. at 8.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) sets forth three mechanisms for serving an individual 

in a foreign country: 1) by an internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated 

to give notice, such as those means provided by the Hague Convention; 2) if there is no 

international means or no means specified, then by means reasonably calculated to give notice; or 

3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(f). “[S]ervice under Rule 4(f)(3) must be (1) directed by the court; and (2) not prohibited by 

international agreement.” Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2002). While Rule 4(f)(3) gives courts discretion to “craft alternate means of service,” such 

means still must comport with constitutional notions of due process. Id. at 1016. “To meet this 

requirement, the method of service crafted by the district court must be ‘reasonably calculated 

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 

them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. at 1016-17 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. 

Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

A plaintiff “need not have attempted every permissible means of service of process” before 

seeking leave from the court to serve a defendant pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3); a plaintiff need only 

“demonstrate that the facts and circumstances of the present case necessitate[ ] the district court’s 

intervention.” Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016 (affirming propriety of service of process by e-mail).

“[C]ourt-directed service under Rule 4(f)(3) is as favored as service available under Rule 4(f)(1) or 

Rule 4(f)(2)” and is “neither a ‘last resort’ or ‘extraordinary relief.’” Id. at 1015 (quotations 

omitted). It is within the district court’s “sound discretion” to determine whether alternative 

means of service are warranted. Id. at 1016.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and supporting papers, the court finds that Plaintiff has 

failed to satisfy the requirements for alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3). It appears that service 

of the summons and complaint on Smith by email may be “reasonably calculated under all the 

circumstances” to apprise her of the action and afford her an opportunity to object. However, 

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information for the court to assess whether service by email 

on Smith is prohibited by any applicable international agreement. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 

Case 4:15-cv-00578-DMR Document 119 Filed 11/13/16 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1014. Specifically, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence about where Smith might be located. 

While a defendant’s location need not be known with certainty to authorize service under Rule 

4(f)(3), see, e.g., Wilens v. Automattic Inc., No. C 14-02419 LB, 2015 WL 498475, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (granting leave to serve defendant by email where defendant “appear[ed] to be 

located in Russia”), the court is unable to assess the propriety of service by email without some 

evidence supporting Smith’s location. The TAC states that Smith “allegedly currently resid[es] in 

Malaysia,” but did not provide any evidence to support this assertion, such as a statement by 

Smith to Plaintiff that she resides in Malaysia. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff possesses 

evidence that supports such a conclusion, it does not address whether service by email is 

prohibited by any international agreement to which Malaysia is a party. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

motion is denied without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file a second motion seeking permission 

to serve Defendant Smith by email, it must support its request with evidence of Smith’s location 

and specifically address whether any applicable international agreements prohibit service by 

email.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s administrative motion for leave to serve Defendant 

Marry Smith by email is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2016

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

Case 4:15-cv-00578-DMR Document 119 Filed 11/13/16 Page 3 of 3