Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02779/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Insurance Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa Divito Weber, )

Individually, as Personal )

Representative of the Estate )

of Norman Scott Weber, ) No. CIV 06-02779 PHX RCB

Deceased, and next-friend of )

Brittany M. Weber and Whittney) O R D E R

Nicole Weber, minor children )

of Decedent, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

Hartford Life and Accident )

Insurance Company, a )

Connecticut corporation, )

)

 Defendant. ) )

Currently pending before the court is a motion for summary

judgment (doc. 18) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by defendant,

Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”) on the

grounds that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10001-1461 (“ERISA”) preempts plaintiff’s

claims herein. Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s “Motion

to Strike Defendant’s Evidence Supporting Motion for Summary

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1 This is actually plaintiff’s “amended” motion to strike, correcting her

previously filed motion to strike (doc. 38). 

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Judgment”1 (doc. 39). Although Hartford did not request oral

argument as to its summary judgment motion, plaintiff did request 

oral argument as to her motion to strike. Given the parties’

submission of fairly comprehensive “memoranda . . . and evidence in

support of their respective positions[,]” the court finds that both

motions are suitable for resolution without oral argument. See

Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200

(9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff’s request

for oral argument. 

Background

Following Norman Weber’s death from carbon monoxide poisoning,

his wife, plaintiff Lisa DiVito Weber, submitted a claim to

Hartford for accidental death benefits. Plaintiff sought those

benefits pursuant to a group accidental death and dismemberment 

policy (“the policy” or “the AD&D policy”) which Hartford had

issued to Mr. Weber’s employer, W.W. Williams Company (“Williams”),

and under which plaintiff was the beneficiary. Mr. Weber was

insured under that policy at the time of his death. Following an

investigation, Hartford denied plaintiff’s claim relying upon the

policy’s exclusion for deaths caused by suicide. 

Plaintiff vigorously contends that her husband’s death was not

a suicide. Thus, believing that Hartford had improperly denied her

benefits under the policy, originally plaintiff commenced this

action in Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County. Plaintiff’s

claims sound primarily in breach of contract, although she also

alleges breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of unspecified

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statutory duties. Hartford timely removed this action, asserting

federal question jurisdiction. More specifically, Hartford

contends that ERISA completely preempts plaintiff’s state law

causes of action. Alternatively, Hartford contends that the court

has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is

diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00.

Discussion

I. Motion to Strike

Before addressing Hartford’s summary judgment motion, to

clarify the state of the record, the court must first address

plaintiff’s motion to strike.

Approximately two and a half weeks after filing her

response to Hartford’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff filed a

separate motion “to strike hearsay and other inadmissible evidence

contained in Defendant’s Statement of Facts [(“DSOF”)] and exhibits

thereto.” Mot. (doc. 39) at 1. Hartford responds that the court

should deny that motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. 

Procedurally, it is “improper and untimely” under the Local Rules. 

Resp. (doc. 44) at 1:16-17. Substantively, according to Hartford,

“plaintiff has completely failed to discredit or invalidate any of

[its] evidence.” Id. at 1:18-19. 

Plaintiff directs the bulk of her reply to Hartford’s

procedural objections, which she urges this court to “overlook[.]” 

Reply (doc. 50) at 3:4. In making this argument, plaintiff claims

that Hartford was not prejudiced by her delay in filing this motion

to strike. Substantively, in essence plaintiff counters that the

court should deny Hartford’s summary judgment motion because that

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2 On December 14, 2007, plaintiff filed her responsive memorandum (doc.

32) and statement of facts (doc. 33). On December 20, 2007, however, she expressly

withdrew both of those filings, explaining that the memorandum was a “misnamed and

misdirected ‘draft’ document,” and directing the court and Hartford to her amended

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motion is not supported by admissible evidence. 

A. Propriety/Timeliness?

Hartford invokes two Local Rules in responding to plaintiff’s

motion to strike. First, although not directly responsive to that

motion, Hartford relies upon LRCiv 56.1(b). That Rule requires a

party opposing summary judgment such as plaintiff Weber to provide,

among other things:

a [separate] statement, . . . . setting 

forth . . . for each paragraph of the moving

party’s separate statement of facts, a

correspondingly numbered paragraph indicating

whether the party disputes the statement of 

facts set forth in that paragraph[.]

LRCiv 56.1(b). That Rule further provides that “[e]ach numbered

paragraph of the statement of facts set forth in the moving party’s

separate statement of facts shall, unless otherwise ordered, be

deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment if

not specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered

paragraph in the opposing party’s separate statement of facts.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Hartford claims that “plaintiff utterly ignored” that Local

Rule by not filing a separate statement of facts in compliance

therewith. Resp. (doc. 44) at 2:13. Hence, Hartford maintains

that the court should deem admitted its separate statement of

facts.

It is true that plaintiff’s initial statement of facts

(“PSOF”)2

 did not conform to LRCiv 56.1(b) in that she did not

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response (doc. 35) and accompanying SOF (doc. 36) filed that same day. Doc. 34 at

1:22; and 25-26. 

3 Hereinafter all references to PSOF shall be read as referring to this

amended version (doc. 49).

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indicate whether or not she disputed any of the facts in the DSOF. 

Instead, she simply set forth her own 45 paragraph SOF. Thus, the

court could deem admitted Hartford’s 35 paragraph separate SOF. 

“However, given the phrase, ‘unless otherwise ordered,’ the court

finds that it has the discretion, but is not required, to deem the

uncontroverted facts admitted.” Huynh v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,

2008 WL 2789532, at *5 (D.Ariz. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Exercising that discretion, the court will not deem admitted

Hartford’s SOF because plaintiff did eventually file a SOF wherein

she noted her objections, in correspondingly numbered paragraphs,

to Hartford’s SOF. See PSOF (doc. 49).3

 Obviously, it would have

been preferable for plaintiff to have fully complied with LRCiv

56.1(b) from the outset. The court sees no prejudice to Hartford,

however; in the future, it will not overlook the rule’s

requirements. 

Hartford, more properly, also is relying upon LRCiv 7.2 in

responding to plaintiff’s motion to strike. Effective December 1,

2007, a subsection pertaining expressly to motions to strike was

added to that Rule. Among other things, LRCiv 7.2(m)(2) requires

that a party objecting to the admission of evidence offered in

support of a summary judgment motion present those objections “in

the party’s response to [the] []other party’s separate statement of

material facts[.]” LRCiv 7.2(m)(2). That Rule is explicit: such

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4 Mot. (doc. 39) at 3:9.5.

5 In her motion plaintiff refers only to the “Glendale Police Offense

Reports” in exhibit B to DSOF; she does not specify page numbers. In addition to

documents explicitly labeled as such, that exhibit includes five pages entitled

“Glendale Police Department Supplementary[.]” Presumably plaintiff’s motion to

strike includes those five pages as well. 

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evidentiary objections shall “not [be] in a separate motion to

strike or other separate filing.” Id. 

Despite the foregoing, obviously plaintiff did file a separate

motion to strike. Once again, the court will be lenient in

overlooking this procedural irregularity. The court will do so for

two reasons. First, as plaintiff is quick to point out, this

particular subsection of LRCiv 7.2 only became effective less than

a month prior to the filing of her motion to strike. Second, under

all the circumstances the court finds that there is no prejudice to

Hartford if it considers this motion on the merits. In short, the

court will overlook Hartford’s procedural objections to plaintiffs’

motion to strike. 

B. Business Record Exception

Turning to the merits, plaintiff is seeking to strike in its

entirety exhibit C to DSOF (doc. 19), which contains part of

Hartford’s policy file. Plaintiff also is seeking to strike

certain documents contained in Hartford’s claims file -- the

“Glendale Police Department Offense Report[]”4 (DSOF (doc. 19),

exh. B thereto at HLAWCF00015 - HLAWCF000225); the Medical Examiner

Report (id. at HLAWCF0032 - HLAWCF00040; and Hartford’s denial of

claim letter (id. at HLAWCF00005-HLAWCF00007). Primarily,

plaintiff objects to these documents based upon lack of foundation

and because supposedly they are replete with inadmissible hearsay.

Hartford invokes Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), the business record

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exception to the hearsay rule, to argue that both its claim and

policy files are properly admissible on this motion. Then,

Hartford relies upon the affidavit of a Hartford employee to

authenticate those files, and thus overcome plaintiff’s objection

to lack of foundation. See Resp. (doc. 44) at 3. 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the police and medical examiners’

reports, as well as the denial of claim letter, need not detain the

court for long. In arguing that the court should strike those

particular documents, plaintiff vehemently disputes the cause of

Mr. Weber’s death. In contrast to what those documents indicate,

plaintiff claims that Weber’s death was accidental and not a

suicide. At this juncture, however, the cause of death is simply

irrelevant. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to

strike the documents enumerated above. Moreover, as more fully

discussed below, because those records were part of Hartford’s

claim file they would be admissible, in any event, as business

records.

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 

even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, 

in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, 

or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, 

if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 

business activity to make the memorandum, report, 

record or data compilation, all as shown by the 

testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 

. . . , unless the source of information or the method 

or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of

trustworthiness. 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). “This [C]ircuit has held that records a

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business receives from others are admissible under [that] Rule 

. . . when those records are kept in the regular course of that

business, relied upon by that business, and where that business has

a substantial interest in the accuracy of the records.” MRT

Construction Inc. v. Hardrives, Inc., 158 F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir.

1998) (citation omitted). That standard is met here. 

The averments by Hartford employee and “Team Leader,” Kenneth

Malley, who is “familiar with the different files maintained by 

. . . Hartford,” establishes that he is a “qualified witness” under

Rule 803(6). Further, the fact that “Hartford maintains policy

files for each of its group policies[,]” and “claims files for each

claim that is submitted to it[,]” along with the fact that those

files “consist entirely of documents prepared or received by

[Hartford] personnel . . . in the ordinary course of business[,]”

Resp. (doc. 42), exh. A (doc. 42-2) at 2, ¶¶ 4; 5; and 9, supports

a finding that those files were “kept in the course of [Hartford’s]

regularly conducted business activity[]” under Rule 803(6). 

Additionally, although Mr. Malley does not expressly aver that

Hartford relies upon these files, viewing his affidavit as a whole,

that is the obvious and only inference which can be drawn. 

Therefore, the court finds that Hartford’s policy and claims files

are properly admissible as business records. See Deland v. Old

Republic Life Insurance Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985)

(correspondence between two insurers and administrator of a

disability plan regarding coverage for worker’s disability claim

admissible under Rule 803(6) as a business record where insurer

received such correspondence in the ordinary course of its business

and it became part of the worker’s file). As an aside, the court

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observes that a careful reading of plaintiff’s motion shows, as

Hartford points out, that she is actually arguing about how the

court should interpret the proffered evidence and the inferences

which should be drawn from it. The court agrees with Hartford that

those arguments are more properly brought in responding to

Hartford’s summary judgment motion, as opposed to being made as

part of a motion to strike. For the reasons set forth above, the

court denies plaintiff’s motion to strike (doc. 39).

There is one final issue before turning to Hartford’s summary

judgment motion, and that is Hartford’s request for its 

“attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in responding to this motion[]”

to strike. See Resp. (doc. 44) at 5:10-12. Hartford is seeking

this relief based solely upon its view that that motion to strike

was “patently improper under the rules[.]” Id. at 5:10. 

Particularly because when plaintiff filed this motion, LR 7.2 as it

pertains to motions to strike, had only recently been amended, the

court does not find that that motion was “patently improper.” 

Thus, it denies Hartford’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs

incurred in responding to that motion. Nonetheless, the court

stresses that as a lawyer admitted to practice in this district

court, plaintiff’s counsel is under a continuing obligation to keep

apprised of current changes in the law, including changes in the

Local Rules. 

II. Summary Judgment.

A. Governing Legal Standards

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a party is entitled to summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving party

bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine

issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d

1029, 1035 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). “Once the moving

party meets its initial burden, . . . , the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided

in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). This “[e]vidence must be concrete and cannot

rely on mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Bates v. Clark

County, 2006 WL 3308214, at * 2 (D.Nev. Nov.13, 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, a mere scintilla

of evidence is not sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion

for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving party must introduce

some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.’” Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 252).

Thus, in opposing a summary judgment motion it is not enough to

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)

(citations omitted).

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial,” the court

must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in h[er] favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). “Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn.” Yang v. Peoples Benefit Ins. Co., 2007 WL

1555749, at *7 (E.D.Cal. May 25, 2007) (citations omitted). On a

summary judgment motion, the court may not make credibility

determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting evidence. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the Supreme Court,

the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion is whether the

evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission

to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail

as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. With these general principles

firmly in mind, the court will now consider whether, as Hartford

contends, summary judgment is proper on the issue of ERISA

preemption.

B. ERISA Preemption

The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly emphasized that ERISA

contains one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by

Congress.” Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1175

(9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The

scope of ERISA preemption “is deliberately broad as a means to

bring exclusively within federal control the regulation of pension

and welfare plans.” Gelow v. Central Pacific Mortg. Corp., 2008 WL

436935, at *6 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987)).

 Starting from the position that the policy is an “employee

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welfare benefit plan,” Hartford argues that as such ERISA “wholly

preempts [plaintiff’s] state law causes of action[.]” Mot. (doc.

18) at 1:21. Therefore, Hartford contends that it is entitled to

summary judgment as to those causes of action. 

Plaintiff’s response is two-fold. First, she contends that

the policy is an “[e]ntrepreneurial [p]lan,” and thus “not

[s]ubject to ERISA [p]reemption[.]” Resp. (doc. 35) at 6:2-3. 

Second, plaintiff contends that the policy is a “voluntary[,]

employee-paid excess benefit plan” for which Williams, as the

employer, “merely acted as a ‘pass through’ deducting premiums,”

and “provid[ing] ministerial functions[.]” Id. at 6:23; and at

3:14 and 16-17. On that basis, plaintiff contends that the policy

is outside the scope of ERISA because it falls within the

Department of Labor’s “safe harbor” regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-

1(j). Hartford counters that plaintiff cannot rely upon the safe

harbor because Williams “[e]ndorsed [t]he [p]lan[]” by engaging in

a number of activities which will be more fully discussed below. 

Mot. (doc. 18) at 8:9. 

The court will address these arguments in reverse order. It

will first consider whether, as plaintiff contends, the policy

falls within the safe harbor regulation. If Hartford prevails,

i.e. the court finds that the policy falls outside of the safe

harbor exception, that does not end the court’s inquiry. The court

still must determine whether the policy is an “employee welfare

benefit plan” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). See

Anderson v. UNUM Provident Corp., 369 F.3d 1257, 1263 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“[A] plan that falls outside of the

safe harbor exception does not necessarily fall within the

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jurisdiction of ERISA.”); Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d

1129, 1133 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing, inter alia, Qualls v. Blue

Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis

added) (“Failure to fulfill any one of the . . . criteria listed in

the [safe harbor] regulation, . . . , closes the safe harbor and

exposes a group insurance program, it if otherwise qualifies as an

ERISA program, to the strictures of the Act.”); and Grimo v. Blue

Cross/Blue Shield of Vermont, 34 F.3d 148, 152 (2nd Cir. 1994)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (“Of course, a plan that does

not meet the . . . requirements of this [safe harbor] regulation

must still be an ‘employee welfare benefit program’ under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1002(1) to be covered by ERISA.”) If the Hartford policy

qualifies as an “employee welfare benefit plan,” then summary

judgment in Hartford’s favor will be proper. Conversely, if the

policy does not meet that statutory definition, ERISA preemption

will not come into play here. 

1. “Safe Harbor” 

For plaintiff to prevail on her argument that the policy comes

within ambit of the safe harbor regulation, she must “prove that

the p[olicy] meets [the] four separate requirements of th[at]

regulation[.]” See Sgro v. Danone Waters of North America, Inc.,

2008 WL 2598936, at *1 (9th Cir. 2008). Those four requirements

are: 

(1) No contributions are made by an employer 

or employee organization;

(2) Participation in the program is completely 

voluntary for employees or members; 

(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee 

or with respect to the program are, without 

endorsing the program, to permit the insurer 

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6 See Mot. (doc. 18) at 9:4-5 (“The Safe Harbor exemption does not apply

here because the third element of the test is not met.”)

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to publicize the program to employees or members, 

to collect premiums through payroll deductions 

or dues checkoffs and to remit them 

to the insurer; and

(4) The employer or employee organization receives 

no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise 

in connection with the program, other than 

reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for

administrative services actually rendered in 

connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.

Stuart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 217 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th

Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)) (other citation

omitted) (emphasis added). In the Ninth Circuit, “each of these

criteria must be met before an insurance plan can be excluded from

ERISA coverage.” Rubin v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 174

F.Supp.2d 1111, 1117 (D.Or. 2001) (citing cases) (emphasis added). 

By focusing exclusively upon plaintiff’s supposed inability to

establish the third element6, the court finds that Hartford is

conceding that the other three safe harbor criteria are met here. 

In particular, Mr. Weber’s employer, Williams, did not make any

contributions towards the policy premiums; participation in the

policy was “completely voluntary” for Williams’ employees; and

Williams did not receive any consideration forbidden by 29 C.F.R. §

2510.3-1(j)(4). In light of the foregoing, the court, like the

parties, will confine its analysis to the third safe harbor element

– endorsement. 

 If an employer’s level of involvement with a given policy

rises to the level of endorsement, the third safe harbor criteria

is not satisfied. In accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)(3),

an employer may “perform certain duties and still remain within the

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safe harbor of the regulation.” Ames v. Jefferson Pilot Financial

Co., 515 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1056 (D.Ariz. 2007). Thus, “[a]s the

regulation itself indicates, remaining neutral does not require an

employer to build a moat around a program or to separate itself

from all aspects of program administration.” Rubin, 174 F.Supp.2d

at 1118 (internal quotations and citations omitted). So, for

example, as the regulation itself states, “[a]n employer may permit

the insurer to publicize the program and may collect premium

payments through payroll deductions and remit them to the

insurer[,]” and still not be deemed to have endorsed the program

within the meaning of the safe harbor regulation. Ames, 515

F.Supp.2d at 1056 (citation omitted). Likewise, “[a]n employer

does not endorse an insurance program as long as it performs no

more than ministerial administrative tasks that do not constitute

abandonment of its neutrality with regard to its operation of the

insurance program.” Id. at 1056-1057 (citing Zavora v. Paul Revere

Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

On the other hand, “when an employer purposes to do more, and

takes substantial steps in that direction, . . . it offends the

ideal of employer neutrality and brings ERISA into the picture.” 

Rubin, 174 F.Supp.2d at 1118 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “An employer . . . will be said to have

endorsed a program within the purview of the . . . safe harbor

regulation if, in light of all the surrounding facts and

circumstances, an objectively reasonable employee would conclude on

the basis of [its] actions that the [employer] . . . had not merely

facilitated the program’s availability but had exercised control

over it or made it appear to be part and parcel of [its] own

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7 The court recognizes that Department of Labor opinion letters are not

controlling; however, they “do constitute a body of experience and informed

judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort to for guidance.”

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124

(1944).

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benefit package.” Pierson v. Continental Casualty Co., 2000 WL

1879895, at *6 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Dep’t. of Labor Opinion No. 94-26A

(1994) (employer’s communications with its employees regarding

group insurance program will constitute an endorsement for purposes

of § 2510.3-1(j)(3) if, together with other employer activities, it

leads reasonable employees to believe that the program has been

established or maintained by the employer).7 

Based upon a culmination of factors, Hartford vehemently

contends that Williams crossed the line of employer neutrality to 

endorsing the policy. Broadly stated, those activities by Williams

fall into four categories: (1) negotiating and procuring the

policy; (2) maintaining and administrating the policy; (3)

negotiating lower rates in exchange for increasing solicitation

efforts; and (4) filing annual reports which the Internal Revenue

Code and ERISA require. Given these activities, detailed below,

Hartford maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to rely upon the

safe harbor regulation because she cannot satisfy the third element

of that regulation, i.e. that Williams did not endorse the Hartford

policy.

Plaintiff responds by stressing the voluntary nature of the

policy, and the fact that the employees paid the premiums –- not

the employer. Plaintiff’s reliance upon those two factors, as

Hartford is quick to point out, is not germane to the endorsement

issue. As set forth at the outset, to invoke ERISA’s safe harbor

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8 This exhibit was actually attached to plaintiff’s original SOF.

However, because plaintiff did not attach any exhibits to her amended SOF,

presumably she is continuing to rely upon the originally provided exhibits. 

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regulation, it is not enough to show voluntary participation and a

lack of employer contributions. Those are only two of the criteria

necessary to invoke the safe harbor exemption. Rather, a plaintiff

who wants to escape ERISA coverage based upon the safe harbor

regulation must also show, inter alia, that the employer did not

endorse the policy. 

 In an effort to show lack of endorsement, plaintiff Weber

relies, inter alia, upon the affidavit of Williams’ Vice President

of Human Resources who avers that Williams “merely acted as a ‘pass

through[,]’ . . . deducting premiums from the employee’s [sic] pay

on a monthly basis and remitting payment to . . . Hartford.” PSOF

(doc. 49), exh. 1 (doc. 36-28) thereto (Turley Aff.) at ¶ 3. This

particular averment, as Hartford notes however, is “conclusory,

self-serving . . . , [and] lacking detailed facts and any

supporting evidence[.]” See Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947,

952 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). By including the pass through language, this affidavit

likewise contains an impermissible legal conclusion. See In re

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 335 B.R. 868, 887

n. 16 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (reasoning that “[a] legal conclusion is

not a fact admissible in evidence[,]” on a summary judgment motion,

the court struck legal conclusion from a supporting declaration). 

Accordingly, this affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact on the endorsement issue. Moreover, as will

be seen, there is substantial record proof showing that Williams

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was far more than a mere conduit or “pass through” for premium

payments, and that it greatly exceeded the bounds of employer

neutrality. 

Plaintiff makes the related contention that Williams provided

only “ministerial functions to facilitate employees’

participation[;]” thus it cannot be deemed to have endorsed the

policy. Resp. (doc. 35) at 3:16-17 (citations omitted). None of

the cites following this statement support that assertion, however,

and it is not the court’s obligation “to scour the record in search

of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d

1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). In fact, none of the cites pertain to “ministerial

functions” at all. In any event, it is plaintiff’s duty as the

“nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the

evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not done that. What

is more, as just noted and as will soon become evident, the record

proof shows that Williams performed more than strictly ministerial

functions. 

 In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff claims that the

“advertising brochures” and “enrollment forms” “originated” with

Hartford, not with Williams. Resp. (doc. 35) at 8:7. Plaintiff

adds that those brochures and Hartford’s proposals were directed

towards Williams’ employees and their family members, as opposed to

being directed towards Williams as the employer. Even assuming the

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9 There is some ambiguity in the record in terms of enrollment cards

versus enrollment forms. As to the former, the record is clear though that

Williams provided its own, which Hartford ultimately approved. DSOF (doc. 19),

exh. C thereto at HLWSP00190. 

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record supports plaintiff’s version of these events,9 neither of

these factors, standing alone or combined, is sufficient to support

a finding that Williams did not endorse the policy given its

extensive involvement with many other aspects of the policy as

discussed below. 

Without citing to the record, plaintiff also claims that the

Proposed Plan “dictated responsibility” to Hartford, not Williams,

“for soliciting and publicizing coverage among Williams [sic]

employees[,]” another factor which from plaintiff’s standpoint

indicates that Williams did not endorse the policy. See Resp.

(doc. 35) at 4. A careful review of that Plan reveals, however,

that Hartford had a narrowly circumscribed “solicitation” role

which consisted of “work[ing] with . . . Williams to solicit

coverage by developing a customized brochure and enrollment

material.” DSOF (doc. 19), exh. C thereto at HLWSP00045. 

Moreover, in designating whether Williams, Hartford or another

entity would be responsible for certain “[a]dministrative

[f]unctions[,]” the record unequivocally states that Williams is to

perform “[a]ll solicitation & sales activity[.]” Id., exh. C

thereto at HLWSP00193 (emphasis added). In light of the foregoing,

the record does not support a finding, as plaintiff suggests, that

Hartford alone was responsible for soliciting employees and

publicizing the policy. In short, especially when juxtaposed with

Hartford’s uncontroverted proof, plaintiff has not created a

genuine issue of material fact on the issue of endorsement. 

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Indeed, for a host of reasons which it will now outline, the court

is convinced that as a matter of law Williams did “endorse” the

policy as that term is used in ERISA’s safe harbor regulation.

Relying upon a variety of activities by Williams, Hartford

maintains that “in light of all the surrounding facts and

circumstances, an objectively reasonable employee would conclude on

the basis of [its] actions that [Williams] . . . had not merely

facilitated the program’s availability but had exercised control

over it or made it appear to be part and parcel of [its] own

benefit package.” See Pierson, 2000 WL 1879895, at *6 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The court agrees.

Initially, Hartford points to the fact that after negotiation

through an agent, Williams selected Hartford as the group insurer

to provide AD&D coverage to Williams’ employees and their eligible

dependents. DSOF (doc. 19) at ¶¶ 7-12; and exh. C thereto at

HLWSP00205; HLWSP00208; and HLWSP00215. In addition, Hartford

deviated from its standard policy in a number of ways to

“customize[]” its policy “to meet the needs of . . . Williams and

their employees.” Id., exh. C thereto at HLWSP00037; see also id.

at ¶ 18; and exh. C thereto at HLWSP00141-89, HLWSP00194-99. 

Illustrative changes include adding a provision to ensure

continuity of coverage from Williams’ previous AD&D insurance

provider, as well as creating and defining two different eligible

classes of employees. See id. at ¶ 18, and exh. C thereto at

HLWSP00197; and DSOF at ¶¶ 14-16, and exh. C thereto at HLWSP00200

and HLWSP00084. Not only did Williams select Hartford in the first

instance, but Williams, as the policyholder, was also responsible

for “indicating the coverage desired and effective date[]” before

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Hartford would issue the policy. Id., exh. C thereto at

HLWSP00045. 

Plaintiff attempts to undermine this proof by suggesting that

it is not clear from the cited documents that Williams actually

influenced the policy changes. However, the only reasonable

inference which can be drawn from the record as a whole, including

the “customized” language in the Proposed Plan, is that Hartford

undertook those changes at Williams’ behest. It is not reasonable

to conclude otherwise, i.e. that Hartford would voluntarily go to

the effort and expense of modifying its standard policy and

enrollment cards without at least some prompting by Williams. 

Indeed, as noted earlier, the record shows that Hartford had to

modify its standard enrollment cards to conform to Williams’ desire

to have the employee and his/her spouse choose their own benefit

limits. See id. at HLWSP00190 and HLWSP00200. 

Even assuming arguendo that the policy modifications were not

done at Williams’ behest, there are several other factors which

weigh heavily in favor of a finding of endorsement here. Among

those facts is that it is settled that an employer, such as

Williams, “‘who creates by contract with an insurance company a

group insurance plan and designates which employees are eligible to

enroll in it is outside the safe harbor created by the Department

of Labor regulation.’” The Meadows v. Employers Health Insurance,

826 F.Supp. 1225, 1230 (D.Ariz. 1993) (quoting Brundage-Peterson v.

Compcare Health Services Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir.

1989)), aff’d on other grounds, 47 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Williams did just that. It contracted with Hartford to provide a

group AD&D policy, and it designated two groups of eligible

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10 Nominal payment by the employee is exactly what occurred here as

evidenced by the affidavit of plaintiff Weber wherein she avers that because the

monthly premium was “only $9 per month for a $160,000 policy for each of us[,]” she

and her husband “discussed it and decided the premium was so cheap it would be

unwise to turn down the offer.” PSOF (doc. 36), exh. 2 (doc. 36-2) thereto (Weber

Aff.) at 6, ¶ 4.

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employees. 

The court is fully cognizant that the employers in both

Meadows and Brundage paid the premiums, while Williams did not. Of

primary importance to the Brundage Court, however, was the

contractual relationship between the employer and the insurance

companies to provide group coverage. In Brundage, Judge Posner 

noted that “in addition” the employer “help[ed] defray the

employee’s insurance cost[]” by paying for the employee’s but not

the dependent’s premiums. Brundage, 877 F.2d at 511. Judge Posner

continued though: “[F]rom an economic standpoint there is little

difference between payment nominally by the employer--which the

employer will treat as a cost of employment, causing him to pay a

lower wage than otherwise--and payment nominally by the

employee.”10 Id. (emphasis added) Thus, in this court’s opinion,

the fact that Williams did not pay the premiums is not dispositive

of the endorsement issue. This is all the more so given Williams’

other significant involvement with the policy described herein. 

Another significant factor which supports a finding of

endorsement in the present case is Williams’ role as plan

administrator. This is not a situation where Williams was an

administrator in name only. Rather, “the undisputed facts show

that [Williams] participated in the administration of the [Hartford

AD&D policy] to a material extent bringing” that policy “outside

the scope of . . . [ERISA’s] safe harbor.” See Alloco v.

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Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1028 (D.Ariz.

2003). Several factors lead inescapably to this conclusion.

First of all, the “ADD POLICY WORKSHEET” pertaining to

“Issuance & Administration[,]” naming Williams as the

“[p]olicyholder,” plainly states that the “policyholder” is the

“Administrator[.]” DSOF (doc. 19), exh. C thereto at HLWSP00193. 

That Worksheet also specifies that Williams, not Hartford or an

“Agent/Administrator,” is to perform the following

“[a]dministrative [f]unctions[:]” 

 • “[a]ll solicitation & sales activity[;]” 

• “[i]ndividual billing, collection and accounting for 

premiums[;]” 

• “[i]ssue certificates[,]” defined as “brochure/cert 

[sic](considered a solicitation material[)][;]” 

• “[i]nitial contact with insureds at time of claim[;]” and

• “[v]erification of coverage to the Company Claim 

Office[.]”

Id. Insofar as the claims procedure is concerned, Williams’

Employee Handbook directs its employees to obtain claim forms from

a Williams’ “branch location” or Williams’ “Corporate Office.” 

PSOF (doc. 36), exh. 5 (doc. 36-2) thereto at 21. These

“administrative functions” go far beyond merely “facilitat[ing] the

[policy’s] availability[,]” and contribute to a finding that

Williams abandoned its neutral employer role. See Pierson, 2000 WL

1879895, at *6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

They show that Williams “exercised control over” the Hartford

policy. 

Further evidence of Williams’ exercise of control over the

Hartford policy is found in the “Special Risk Life & Health

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11 Hereinafter all references to this Guide will be only to the modified

Guide, and not also to Hartford’s standard issue Guide.

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Administrator’s Guide” (“the Guide”), which Hartford “[i]ssued

to[]” Williams “to assist . . . [Williams] in the administration”

of Hartford’s AD&D policy. DSOF (doc. 19), exh. C thereto at

HLWSP00120-HLWSP00130; and at HLWSP00164-HLWSP00165 (emphasis

added).11 Hartford modified that Guide in accordance with

Williams’ needs. Compare id. at HLWSP00129-HLWSP00139 with id. at

HLWSP00164-HLWSP00179. Like the policy worksheet, that Guide

unequivocally states that the AD&D policy is “[a]dministered by[]”

Williams. Id. at HLWSP00164. That Guide instructs Williams on a

host of administrative tasks such as enrolling employees in the

policy. This is accomplished by Williams’ employees “return[ing]”

their completed enrollment cards to Williams, not to Hartford. Id.

at HLWSP00165. It is then Williams’ responsibility “to insure that

all the [referenced] information . . . has been filled in, and 

. . . is correct[.]” Id. Williams’ Employee Handbook echoes this

procedure, advising employees to “return[]” their “completed

enrollment card” to the “employee’s respective [Williams’]

Personnel Department[]” -- again, not to Hartford. PSOF (doc. 36),

exh. 5 thereto at 19. 

That Handbook not only informs Williams’ employees of the

availability of AD&D insurance and how to enroll, but it devotes 

four and a half pages to that policy. Id. at 18-22. Hartford is

not mentioned anywhere in that section. That, in combination with

the fact that, inter alia, employees returned their enrollment

cards to Williams and Williams initiated the claims process,

contribute to a finding that “an objectively reasonable employee

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would conclude” that Williams “made it appear” that the AD&D policy

was “part and parcel of [Williams] own benefit package.” See

Pierson, 2000 WL 1879895, at *6. 

In addition to its enrollment responsibilities, it fell to

Williams to handle employees’ requests for changes in coverage or

beneficiaries. See DSOF (doc. 19), exh. C thereto at HLWSP00169-

HLWSP00171. Consistent with this responsibility is the fact that,

as the Guide explains, the policy is “[s]elf-[a]dministered” such

that “information on individual insureds is not maintained by . . .

Hartford.” Id. at HLWSP00175 (emphasis added). The Guide also

advises Williams how to proceed when it receives a “notification of

a loss from an insured or an insured’s beneficiary[.]” See id. at

HLWSP00174-HLWSP00176. That Guide further informs Williams how to

obtain “SUPPLIES OR SPECIAL REQUESTS” from Hartford. Id. at

HLWSP00176. Interestingly, the Guide explicitly states that the

policy “may be subject to ERISA[,]” a fact which neither party

mentions. Id. at HLWSP00178. 

To be sure, as plaintiff alludes to, the Proposed Plan states

that Hartford’s “administration and claims service teams provide

ongoing support[.]” Id. at HLWSP00044. This statement is not

sufficient, however, to overcome the evidence of Williams’

extensive involvement in administering the policy as outlined in

the preceding paragraphs. Not only that, “[a]cting as

administrator of the benefit plan tends to show that the employer

endorsed the plan.” Alloco, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1029 (citing Sarraf

v. Standard Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Besides its administrative responsibilities, Williams, through

a broker, negotiated the premium rates. In fact, in 2002 Hartford

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12 See Brundage, 877 F.2d at 510 (contrasting an employer who “take[s] a

few steps beyond” the safe harbor regulation, but “still remain[s] outside [its]

scope with “the other extreme” of an “employer who provides welfare benefits

directly to its employees[]”).

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agreed to lower rates for Williams “on the condition that

[Williams] be willing to resolicit this coverage to [its] employees

in an effort to bring enrollment up.” Id. at HLWSP00056 (emphasis

added). In 2000, 2001 and again in 2002, Williams also filed Form

5500, the “Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan” which the

Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service require. See

id., exh. D thereto. In those forms, Williams identifies itself,

as opposed to Hartford, as the “plan sponsor” and as the “plan

administrator.” See, e.g., id. at HLWFE00001; and HLWFE00002. 

The broad scope of Williams’ administrative responsibilities,

especially when coupled with Williams’ other involvement with the

policy, belies plaintiff’s assertion that Williams “did [no]thing

beyond offering Hartford . . . an opportunity to propose a

voluntary life plan offering excess coverage for employees wishing

to purchase additional life insurance, and facilitate payment

through voluntary payroll deductions.” Resp. (Doc. 35) at 8:14-17

(citations omitted). Indeed, the policy underlying the no

endorsement element of the safe harbor regulation, which “is to

prevent situations where the employer is taking positions on behalf

of, or in connection with, the insurer[]” would be thwarted by a

finding here that Williams did not endorse the Hartford policy. 

See Ames, 515 F.Supp.2d at 1056 (citation omitted). 

Recognizing that employer endorsement is a matter of degree,12

on the record as presently constituted, the court finds that

employer neutrality, the hallmark of the third safe harbor

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criteria, is missing here. Viewing the record as a whole, it is

clear that Williams did far more than “arrange for desirable

coverage at attractive rates, serve as an honest broker, and remain

neutral regarding the operation of [Hartford’s] . . . insurance

polic[y].” See Rubin, 174 F.Supp.2d at 1118 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Consequently, the court finds that plaintiff Weber

cannot avail herself of ERISA’s safe harbor exemption so as to

defeat Hartford’s summary judgment motion. The court’s analysis

cannot end here, however. As explained earlier, the next issue is

whether the Hartford policy is an “employee welfare benefit plan”

within the meaning of ERISA. If it is not, plaintiff could,

nonetheless, survive this summary judgment motion. 

2. “Employee Welfare Benefit Plan”

“State common law claims are preempted by ERISA ‘insofar as

they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan’

regulated by ERISA.” Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 504 F.3d 1102, 1105

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). Thus, among other

things, “ERISA preempts state law claims if such claims are brought

as an attempt to recover benefits owed under a plan governed by

ERISA.” Gelow, 2008 WL 436935, at *6 (citing, inter alia, Crull v.

Gem Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995)). Therefore,

because the safe harbor regulation does not apply here, if the

Hartford policy is an “employee benefit plan” which ERISA governs,

then section 1144(a) preempts plaintiff’s state law claims. See

Gelow, 2008 WL 436935, at *5; see also Castiglione v. U.S. Life

Ins. Co., 226 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1029 (D.Ariz. 2007) (citation

omitted) (“If ERISA applies [to the parties’ insurance dispute), it

would preempt Plaintiffs’ common law claims.”)

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“[T]he question of ERISA preemption is one of law[.]” Gelow,

2008 WL 436935, at *6 (citing Waks v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue

Shield, 263 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)). The burden is on

Hartford though, as the party asserting ERISA preemption as a

federal defense, to “prove the facts necessary to establish it.” 

Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 n. 4

(9th Cir. 1988). Similarly, “[t]he burden of establishing the

existence of an ERISA plan is on [Hartford].” See Zavora, 145 F.3d

at 1120 n. 2 (citation omitted).

“The ‘starting point in every case involving construction of a

statute is the language itself.’” Ordlock v. C.I.R., 2008 WL

2841156, at *3 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood

Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 239

(1978)). Essentially, ERISA defines an “employee welfare benefit

plan” as “(1) a plan, fund, or program (2) established or

maintained (3) by an employer, . . . (4) for the purpose of

providing . . . benefits in the event of death (5) to participants

or their beneficiaries.” Pierson, 2000 WL 1879895, at *5 (citing

Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 917 (9th

Cir. 1997)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (West 1999). In

Demars v. CIGNA Corporation, 173 F.3d 443 (1st Cir. 1999), cited

with approval by the Ninth Circuit in Waks, the First Circuit aptly

stated that “[t]his nearly tautological definition offers little

guidance.” Id. at 445. Despite the lack of guidance from the

statute itself, with elucidation from case law, the court finds

that the Hartford group AD&D policy constitutes an “employee

welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 

. . .

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13 “The Policy is, . . . , excluded from the definition of hearsay and is

admissible evidence because it is a legally operative document that defines the

rights and liabilities of the parties in this case.” Stuart v. UNUM Ins. Co. of

America, 217 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

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a. “Plan, Fund, or Program”

As the Ninth Circuit has astutely observed, “[t]he precise

definition of a ‘plan, fund, or program’ is less than well

defined[.]” Curtis v. Nevada Bonding Corp., 53 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th

Cir. 1995). At a minimum, “[t]o qualify as an employee benefits

plan, the accounts at issue must demonstrate an ongoing

administrative structure and allow reasonable persons to identify

and distinguish the plan’s beneficiaries, intended benefits,

funding source, and the procedures beneficiaries utilize to receive

benefits.” Gelow, 2008 WL 436935, at *6 (citing Winterrowd v. Am.

Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 321 F.3d 933, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2003)). The

Hartford policy easily satisfies these criteria. Even a cursory

review of that policy13 shows that the “intended benefits” are for

“Accidental Death and Dismemberment[.]” DOSF (doc. 19), exh. A

thereto at HLAWSP00001 (emphasis in original). Such a review

likewise readily allows a reasonable person to “identify and

distinguish the plan’s beneficiaries” as “[a]ll full-time

employees” of Williams and their “eligible dependents[.]” Id., exh.

A thereto at HLAWSP00006 and HLAWSP00012. The “funding source,” as

the policy reflects, is the premiums paid. The policy also

contains fairly comprehensive procedures for the receipt of

benefits. See id. at HLAWSP00034. Based on the foregoing, the

court finds that the Hartford policy is a “plan” as that term is

used in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).

. . .

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b. “Established or Maintained”

“A program[,]” such as the Hartford policy, “that fails to

satisfy the [safe harbor] regulation’s standards is not

automatically deemed to have been ‘established or maintained’ by

the employer, but, rather, is subject to further evaluation under

the conventional tests.” See Rubin, 174 F.Supp.2d at 1116

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

“established or maintained” aspect of an employee welfare benefit

plan serves a discrete purpose; it is “designed to ensure that a

plan is part of the employment relationship.” Pierson, 2000 WL

1879895, at * 9 n. 62 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “Whether a plan is part of the employment relationship

in turn depends on whether the employer has engaged in a meaningful

degree of participation in the plan and whether the purchase of an

insurance policy constituted an expressed intention to provide

benefits on a regular and long-term basis.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

As already explained, Williams did participate to a

“meaningful degree” in various aspects of the Hartford policy

ranging from negotiating premiums to performing a host of

administrative functions to being in charge of all solicitation and

sales activities. The nature and scope of Williams’ participation

easily persuades the court that that policy was part of Williams’

“employment relationship” with its employees, such that Williams

can be deemed to have “established or maintained” the Hartford

policy as section 1002(1) contemplates. 

Bolstering this finding is the Ninth Circuit’s recognition

that “[a]n employer . . . can establish an ERISA plan rather

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easily.” Credit Managers Ass’n v. Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins., 809

F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, “[e]ven if an employer

does no more than arrange for a ‘group-type insurance plan,’” the

Ninth Circuit has indicated that the employer “can establish an

ERISA plan, unless [that employer] is a mere advertiser who makes

no contributions on behalf of its employees.” Id. (citation

omitted). By now it should be fairly self-evident that Williams’

role vis-a-vis the Hartford policy went far beyond that of a “mere

advertiser” who made no plan contributions. Thus, the court is

convinced that there is more than sufficient proof on this record

to show that Williams “established or maintained” a plan. 

c. “By an Employer”

ERISA defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly as

an employer or indirectly in the interests of an employer, in

relation to an employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). In

the present case, it is undisputed both that Hartford issued the

subject policy to Williams, and that Williams was Mr. Weber’s

employer. See DSOF (doc. 19) at 1, ¶1 (citation omitted); See PSOF

(doc. 49) at 2, ¶1. Accordingly, the “employer” aspect of section

1002(1) is met on this record. 

d. “For the Purpose of Providing Employee Welfare

Benefits”

Clearly, the purpose of the policy was to provide employee

welfare benefits in that it offered coverage for accidental death

and dismemberment. See Castiglione, 262 F.Supp.2d at 1029. 

e. “To Participants or their Beneficiaries”

It is also readily apparent, as already explained, that the

policy offers benefits to “participants,” i.e. full-time Williams’

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employees who elect coverage under the policy, and their eligible

dependents, hence satisfying the fifth aspect of an employee

welfare benefit plan. 

As the foregoing demonstrates, all five elements of an

“employee welfare benefit plan” are met on this record. Thus,

“[w]hile ordinarily ‘[t]he existence of an ERISA plan is a question

of fact to be answered in light of all the surrounding facts and

circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person[,]’

where, no genuine issues of material fact exist, as here, summary

judgment should be granted.” See Bellisario v. Lone Stare Life

Ins., 871 F.supp. 374, 376 (C.D.Cal. 1994) (quoting Harper v.

American Chambers Life Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir.

1990)). In sum, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the

Hartford policy fits the statutory definition of an employee

welfare benefit plan.

Plaintiff attempts to avoid this result, not by coming forth

with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial as to the existence of an ERISA plan, but, rather, by

contending that the policy “is an [e]ntrepreneurial [p]lan[.]”

Resp. (doc. 35) at 6:2. As such, plaintiff asserts that ERISA does

not preempt the Hartford policy. With no analysis whatsoever,

plaintiff relies exclusively upon Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Trust,

434 F.Supp. 1196 (D.Ariz. 1977), to support this argument. The

court agrees with Hartford though that Hamberlin is completely

inapposite here, primarily because it is readily distinguishable on

its facts.

In Hamberlin, after an insurance company notified a multiemployer trust that it was cancelling the group coverage, defendant

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insurance brokers established a new self-funded trust and acted as

an administrator for a commission. In holding that the defendant

trust did not qualify as an ERISA employee benefit plan, the court

explained that the trust “was purely an entrepreneurial plan put

together by [the insurance brokers] to protect business commissions

they would have lost if the trust had not been restructured and

continued after [the insurer] cancelled.” Hamberlin, 434 F.Supp.

at 1198. The court further explained that creation of the new

trust allowed the brokers to “maintain[] business relations with

customers they could have lost.” Id. What was “[m]ost

important[]” to the court’s holding, however, was that the new

trust, which was “designat[ed] [as] an ERISA plan,” was created

“in the hope[] [of] escap[ing] from direct supervision and auditing

by the State Insurance Department and from its coverage and reserve

requirements under the theory of federal preemption.” Id. The

court went on to note the “substantial national concern over the

increase in the numbers of uninsured multiple employer trusts such

as this which have avoided state supervision and have failed,

leaving sick or injured employees holding an empty bag.” Id. at

1198-99 (citation and footnote omitted). 

Clearly the present case does not raise similar policy

concerns in that the Hartford policy is a fully insured, single

employer plan, with significant involvement by the employer, in

sharp contrast to Hamberlin. Furthermore, the Hartford policy was

not designed to avoid state regulation, such as the trust at issue

in Hamberlin. The court simply fails to see how Hamberlin has any

bearing upon the present case. Thus, it abides by its finding that

the Hartford policy is a plan subject to ERISA preemption. Having

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14 Plaintiff is improperly characterizing defendant’s motion. Plainly it

is not a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, but rather a summary

judgment motion in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

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found that plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the protections of

ERISA’s safe harbor regulation, and having further found that the

Hartford policy is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by

ERISA, the court necessarily finds that ERISA preempts plaintiff’s

state law causes of action. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to

summary judgment as to those causes of action. 

III. Cross-Motion to Amend

Evidently attempting to cover all of her bases, plaintiff

purports to be “cross-moving for summary judgment on defendant’s

motion to dismiss[.]14” Resp. (doc. 35) at 9:18-19 (footnote

added). Close examination of this aspect of plaintiff’s response

shows that what she actually is seeking is denial of defendant’s

motion. Obviously, the court will not be granting that relief

having found that summary judgment in favor of the defendant is

proper here.

Finally, in accordance with this court’s prior scheduling

order, the parties have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of

this order in which “to amend the[ir] pleadings to add an ERISA

claim, [and] any other claims or defenses, [and] [to] bring in such

additional parties as a party deems may be reasonably necessary[.]”

Order (doc. 14) at 3:19-21. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the court hereby ORDERS:

(1) that plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Defendant’s Evidence

Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment” (doc. 39) is DENIED; and

(2) that defendant’s “Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds

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of ERISA Preemption” (doc. 18) is GRANTED; and

(3) the parties have thirty (30) days from the date of entry

of this order in which to amend the pleadings to add an ERISA

claim, and any other claims or defenses, and [to] bring in such

additional parties as a party deems may be reasonably necessary.

IT IS ORDERED.

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2008.

Copies to all counsel of record

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