Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04322/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04322-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEARNING TECHNOLOGY 

PARTNERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNIVERSITY OF THE INCARNATE 

WORD, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-4322-PJH 

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

 Before the court is defendant’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of the court’s order denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant 

contends that the court committed a “clear error of law” in “ruling that LTP’s claim for 

repayment of the discount may proceed as liquidated damages.” In the alternative, 

defendant notes that it plans to challenge the testimony of plaintiff’s damages expert, and 

that “[t]he court may prefer to consider the issue in the context of a Daubert challenge, in 

which case this request would become moot.” 

 The court finds that defendant’s motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration must be denied. While defendant is correct that “[n]either party had 

argued, or briefed,” the issue of whether the damages provision was a liquidated 

damages provision, that argument underscores the fact that the statements challenged 

by the current motion were merely dicta. 

 The only issue raised by defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, and 

thus, the only issue before the court, was whether the challenged provision of the parties’ 

Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 85 Filed 11/13/15 Page 1 of 3
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

contract was unenforceable. Specifically, defendant argued that enforcement of the 

provision would place plaintiff in a better position than it would have been had it received 

the “benefit of the bargain.” The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that 

defendant’s argument overlooked the value of exclusivity, which plaintiff bargained for but 

did not receive. Because the value of the discount could serve as a measure of the value 

of exclusivity – in fact, the language of the contract specifically tied together the discount 

and the exclusivity grant – the court denied defendant’s motion to the extent that it sought 

to render the discount-related provision unenforceable. Any statement equating the 

provision to a liquidated damages provision was dicta, not essential to the disposition of 

defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Along the same lines, the court’s use 

of the term “penalty” was not as a term of art, as used in the case law regarding 

liquidated damages clauses. 

To the extent that the court’s order needs clarification, the court now clarifies that 

the order did not expressly hold that the damages provision is a liquidated damages 

provision, nor did it expressly hold that the provision imposed a “penalty” – as that term is 

used in evaluating the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses – as neither of those 

issues were raised by defendant’s motion. The court’s relevant findings were limited to 

the issue of whether plaintiff’s measure of damages was expressly precluded by the 

language of the contract, which was answered in the negative. 

 That said, while the court found that the amount of the discount could be used as a 

measure of the value of exclusivity, it also found “questionable” plaintiff’s attempt to 

“recover non-discounted rates for the entire life of the contract, dating back to 2004.” 

However, because that issue was “not presently before the court,” the court did not 

further address it. Dkt. 74 at 17. However, if the issue is raised at a later time, including 

as part of defendant’s above-mentioned Daubert motion, the court will consider it at that 

time. As noted by defendant, the court’s preference to consider the issue in the context 

of a Daubert motion renders the present request moot. 

Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 85 Filed 11/13/15 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Da

IT IS S

ted: Nove

O ORDER

mber 13, 20

ED. 

15 

3

__

PH

Un

__________

HYLLIS J. H

nited States

__________

HAMILTON

s District Ju

__________

dge 

______ 

Case 4:14-cv-04322-PJH Document 85 Filed 11/13/15 Page 3 of 3