Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-md-02159/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-md-02159-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re: AutoZone, Inc., Wage and Hour

Employment Practices Litigation

 /

No.: 3:10-md-02159-CRB

Hon. Charles R. Breyer

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO STRIKE; 

DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE; 

GRANTING MOTION TO

DECERTIFY; 

GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

This is a wage and hour case involving California Autozone stores. In December

2012, this Court certified a Rest Break class, defined as: “All non-exempt or hourly paid

employees who have been employed at Defendant’s retail stores in the State of California at

any time on or after July 29, 2005 until the date of certification.” See Order re Class Cert.

(dkt. 174). The Court denied certification “as to all other subclasses.” Id. at 1. Three and a

half years and much discovery later, Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment, 

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see P MSJ (dkt. 289), Autozone has moved for partial summary judgment, see D MSJ (dkt.

282), the parties have each filed motions to strike in connection with the summary judgment

motions, see P Mot. to Strike (dkt. 306); D Mot. to Strike (dkt. 312), Autozone has moved to

decertify the rest break class, see Mot. to Decertify (dkt. 264), and Plaintiff Jesus Lozacruz

has moved to remand his case only, see Mot. to Remand (dkt. 309). The Court found this

matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and

ruled from the bench at the motion hearing, see Minutes (dkt. 324). The Court promised the

parties that it would set forth its reasoning in a written order. Id.

I. DISCUSSION

This order will address (A) the cross-motions for partial summary judgment, along

with the related motions to strike, followed by (B) the motion to decertify and (C) the motion

to remand.

A. Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

The parties each move for partial summary judgment: Plaintiffs move as to the

certified rest break claim, while Autozone moves as to the remainder of the claims, which are

uncertified. 

1. Legal Standard

Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323–24 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine

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dispute with respect to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Id. at 323. A genuine issue of fact is one that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve in favor

of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. 

Id. at 248–49.

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the nonmoving party may

not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but instead must produce admissible evidence

showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 1103. The nonmoving

party must “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). If the nonmoving party fails to

make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 323. 

It is not a court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” 

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, a

court is entitled to rely on the nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable particularity the

evidence that precludes summary judgment.” See id. However, when deciding a summary

judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;

see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

//

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1

 Plaintiff also move, in the alternative, for the Court to determine under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(g) that certain material facts are not disputed. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons the Court

denies summary judgment on this claim, it also declines to find that the facts Plaintiffs seek to have the

Court deem undisputed are in fact undisputed.

4

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their rest break claim. See P MSJ.1

Because there is at best a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Autozone indeed had

a uniform policy in place throughout the class period, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Wage Order No. 7 provides in part that an “authorized rest period time shall be based

on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours

or major fraction thereof.” 8 Cal. Code of Regs. § 11070, subd. 12(A). The Supreme Court

of California clarified in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1029

(2012), that “[e]mployees are entitled to 10 minutes’ rest for shifts from three and one-half to

six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts of more than six hours up to 10 hours, 30 minutes

for shifts of more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, and so on.” In seeking certification of the

rest break class here, Plaintiffs identified an Autozone policy, which they represented was in

place throughout the class period. Order on Order re Class Cert. at 6–7. That policy

provided:

An AutoZoner who works 4 hours per day is provided 1 break period of 10

consecutive minutes; an AutoZoner who works 8 hours per day is provided 2 break

periods of not less than 10 consecutive minutes.

Id. at 7. That policy is—on its face—inadequate under Brinker. See id. at 11. 

The Court noted at the class certification stage that there were “significant evidentiary

disputes in connection with [Autozone’s] interpretation and implementation of this policy.” 

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 As Autozone argues, Plaintiffs’ argument “presumes that once certification is established then

liability is automatically established. If this were the case, then every single class certified would

automatically be granted summary judgment.” Opp’n to P MSJ (dkt. 302) at 11.

5

Id. at 7. The Court discussed the conflicting evidence, but held that, because the “claims are

based entirely on the legality of [Autozone’s] uniform written rest break policy,” common

questions predominated. Id. at 13–14 (citing Kurihara v. Best Buy Co., No. 06-01884 MHP,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64224, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007); Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1020,

1033; Vedachalam v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., No. C 06-0963 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 46429, at *37–39 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012); In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions,

No. 1:07CV1314 LJO DLB, 2012 WL 5932833, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012)).

Plaintiffs’ motion now argues that the uniform policy “is sufficient to establish

liability,” and that if Autozone can demonstrate that some employees actually took

appropriate rest breaks, then such evidence is relevant to assessing damages, not liability. P

MSJ at 8 (citing Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Assocs., Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 220, 235 (2013);

Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 701 (2013)). Even Plaintiffs

concede, however, that simply pointing to a written policy does not entitle a plaintiff to

summary judgment.2

 See Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1033 (emphasis added) (referring even in

certification context to “uniform policy consistently applied”); Campbell v. Vitran Express,

Inc., No. CV 11-05029 RGK (SSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31360, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2,

2016) (“logically absurd and legally erroneous” to argue that liability attaches “solely based

on a facially defective policy.”); Reply re P MSJ (dkt. 305) (“Campbell . . . denied summary

judgment where plaintiff argued that the existence of facially defective policies warrants

liability. That is not Plaintiffs’ argument here. Rather, in addition to the facial illegality . . .

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3

 Autozone also asserts that the Wage Order continued to be posted in stores, and that “Plaintiffs

are unable to cite to any evidence that the allegedly deficient Exceptions policy constituted a change in

Defendant’s policy, or that it was intended to supplant the Wage Orders posted in each store.” Id. 

6

Defendant’s corporate designee and other corporate witnesses confirmed that Defendant

actually used the unlawful policies throughout the entire class period.”). 

Autozone, in opposing the motion, has successfully cast doubt on whether the written

policy Plaintiffs point to—the one that was the basis of the Court’s certification order in

2012—was actually used throughout the class period.

First, it turns out that at the beginning of the class period, in July 2005, Autozone’s

2004 California Store Handbook was in effect, and it provided that “[rest] breaks are

scheduled in accordance with California law.” See Opp’n to P MSJ at 2 (citing 2012 Jon

Decl. (dkt. 128) ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt. 264-1) ¶ 3, Ex. A). In addition, Wage Order

No. 7 was posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Stephens Decl. (dkt.

264–2) ¶¶ 3–4; Iskander Decl. (dkt. 264-3) ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Autozone revised that handbook in

2006, and it again provided that “[rest] breaks are scheduled in accordance with California

law.” Id. (citing 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A). The Wage Order

continued to be posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Stephens Decl.

¶¶ 3–4; Iskander Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2). The language Plaintiffs rely on, from the 2008 “Store

Handbook Exception, California,” was not implemented until 2008. See Opp’n to P MSJ at

3 (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B; 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A).3

 That is three years into the

class period. 

Second, in 2011, and thus before the end of the class period, an Autozone PowerPoint

presentation explained that any employee who worked between 3.5 and 6 hours was entitled

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 This declaration clarified that the PowerPoint was created in August 2011, not August 2012.

See Supplemental 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 2.

7

to a rest break, and that any employee who worked between 6 and 10 hours was entitled to

two. Supplemental 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt. 298) ¶¶ 2–34

; 2016 Jon Decl. Ex. C. This policy

complies with Brinker. See Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1029. As Plaintiffs point out, it is unclear

whether Autozone “actually gave the presentation to any of its employees during, or after,

the Rest Break Class Period.” See Reply re P MSJ at 4. Nonetheless, the Court is to view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, Autozone—which

would support an inference that Autozone did not create a PowerPoint and then do nothing

with it. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Third, Autozone points to some evidence that the various policies in place during the

class period were implemented in a compliant matter: Carlos Jon declares that there was a 2-

hour rule, see 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 9 (“it is the expectation that at California stores, AutoZoners

will take rest breaks every two hours.”); various employee deponents, including a named

Plaintiff, testified that they took rest breaks or told their subordinates to take rest breaks

every two hours, see Iskander Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6–7, Ex. 3, 5, 6; 117 class members declared that

they knew that they were entitled and permitted to take rest breaks if they worked over 3.5 or

6 hours, see Order re Class Cert. at 8–9; and Plaintiffs’ own survey evidence (discussed

below in the context of the motion to decertify) reflected that “a majority of the survey

respondents stated that they were in fact authorized and permitted to take all required rest

breaks during shifts of 3.5–4 and 6–8 hours,” Opp’n to P MSJ at 6 (citing Wazzan Report

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 The survey results were phrased in the negative: 25% of short shift employees stated that they

were not authorized and permitted to take a rest break; 29% of mid-shift employees stated that they were

not authorized and permitted to take two rest breaks; and 38% of long shift employees stated that they

were not authorized and permitted to take three rest breaks. See Saad Decl. ¶ 3.

8

(dkt. 287); Saad Decl. (dkt. 300-1) ¶ 3, Ex. A).5 

Plaintiffs move to strike the new evidence that Autozone did not implement the

unlawful policy language until 2008. See P Mot. to Strike. Autozone clarified in its

opposition brief that, “Due to the ambiguous nature of the copyright statement, Defendant’s

30(b)(6) deponent Tim Young mistakenly testified that the 2010 Exception was in effect

from 2004 to 2010, when in fact the policy was not even introduced until 2010.” See Opp’n

to P MSJ at 3 n.4 (citing Young Depo. (dkt. 289-1) Ex. E at 31). Plaintiffs argue that

Autozone cannot rebut Young’s 30(b)(6) deposition testimony, because Plaintiffs relied on it

and because Autozone has not provided an adequate explanation for Young’s change of

course. P Mot. to Strike at 3. But Autozone does offer an adequate explanation. The

policies that Young was given during his 30(b)(6) deposition had copyright statements in the

corner that state a range of dates. See 2016 Young Decl. (dkt. 300-2) ¶ 4. Young mistakenly

agreed with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions that the date range represented the entire time the

policy was in effect. Id. (“For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked if Exhibit 3 was ‘in effect

for Autozone’s California employees from the period that is stated at the bottom, which is

2004 to 2010?’ However, I also testified that I did not know when Exhibits 4 and 5 came

into effect, and I stated that my testimony with respect to Exhibit 3 was ‘based off [the]

document.’”). Young explains:

Looking back at the documents now, it is clear that the copyright information

in the lower left corner, to which Plaintiffs’ counsel referred, does not represent

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 Autozone also notes that under Plaintiffs’ theory, the 2013 handbook, which has a date range

of 2004–2013, would govern the entire class period, which would be problematic for Plaintiffs as the

policy in the 2013 handbook appears to be lawful. See Opp’n to P Mot. to Strike (dkt. 311) at 7.

7

 Autozone’s motion to strike argues that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is procedurally improper

because Local Civil Rule 7-3 requires any objections to evidence to be included in a brief. See D Mot.

to Strike. Autozone is correct, but because the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to strike on the merits,

it DENIES Autozone’s motion to strike as moot.

8

 The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ last ditch request to have the Court grant summary judgment

on the rest break claim at least as to 2008 to 2012. See Reply re P MSJ at 3–4. First, the PowerPoint

presentation was from 2011. See Supplemental 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 2. Second, there remains a dispute

of fact as to whether the unlawful “rest breaks every 4 hours” policy was actually used from 2008 to

2011; it is not enough merely to point to a written policy. See Campbell, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31360,

at *9. Third, Plaintiffs’ expert report spans the entire class period and cannot obviously be truncated.

See Wazzan Report at 4.

9

the period during which the documents were in effect. If that were true, then as

of 2008 all four of the handbooks identified above would have simultaneously

been in effect.6

 Instead, as Exhibit 9 makes clear, the last date in the copyright

notice represents the year in which the particular handbook or exception first

became effective. 

Id. ¶ 5. 

The Court agrees that this is the appropriate interpretation of the copyright statements. 

Moreover, although Plaintiffs are frustrated by Young’s late clarification, see P Mot. to

Strike, it is nonetheless adequate, see AngioScore, Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., No. 12-cv03393-YGR, 2015 WL 4040388, at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2015) (collecting cases in support

of rule that defendant cannot rebut 30(b)(6) testimony without an “adequate explanation”). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and permits Young’s clarifying

testimony about the dates during which various policies were in effect.7

Because there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether the rest break policy upon

which this Court granted class certification was in effect throughout the class period, the

Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the rest break claim.8

//

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3. Autozone’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Autozone moves for partial summary judgment on the remaining, uncertified claims. 

See D MSJ. This order addresses: (a) Plaintiffs’ class-wide claims, and Ellison’s individual

claims, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2699 et seq.

(“PAGA”); (b) Plaintiffs’ class-wide claims, and Ellison’s individual claims, under Labor

Code section 558; (c) the portion of Plaintiffs’ individual waiting time penalties under Labor

Code section 203 that is based on an alleged failure to pay rest break premiums, and the

class-wide claim for waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203; and (d) the

portion of Plaintiffs’ individual claims, and the class-wide claim, for prejudgment interest

under Labor Code section 218.6 based on rest break premiums and waiting time penalties.

a. PAGA claims

Autozone argues that Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims fail because (1) there is no certified

PAGA class and (2) there is no representative PAGA claim in the operative complaint. D

MSJ at 1. This is correct. Plaintiffs cannot continue to seek recovery on a class-wide basis

for penalties under PAGA. 

The Court denied certification “as to all other subclasses” but the rest break class, and

so there is no PAGA class in the case. See Order re Class Cert. at 1. Nor is there a PAGA

claim in the complaint. In February 2007, Ellison filed a motion for leave to amend his

complaint to add a separate PAGA claim. Iskander Decl. Ex. B. Autozone did not oppose

the amendment and Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint in April 2007. Iskander

Decl. ¶ 3; Iskander Decl. Ex. C. In May 2007, Ellison filed another motion to amend,

seeking to remove the separate cause of action under PAGA. Iskander Decl. Ex. D. 

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 This language refutes Plaintiffs’ assertion that “contrary to Defendant’s argument, there is a

representative PAGA claim pled in the Second Amended Complaint.” See Opp’n to D MSJ (dkt. 301)

at 8.

11

Autozone did not oppose amendment and the Court granted the motion in July 2007. 

Iskander Decl. ¶ 5; Iskander Decl. Ex. E. Subsequently a dispute arose about whether any

PAGA claims remained at issue following the Court’s denial of a PAGA subclass. Iskander

Decl. Ex. H. In May 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend to add a representative PAGA

claim. Iskander Decl. Ex. J. This Court denied that request, explaining that the Second

Amended Complaint had “removed the separate cause of action under PAGA,” and that

permitting Plaintiffs to add a representative PAGA claim eight years after the original

complaint had been filed constituted “undue delay” and would prejudice Autozone. 

See Order Denying Mot. For Leave to Amend (dkt. 231) (adding, “Defendant and the Court

have operated on the understanding that the Second Amended Complaint is the operative

complaint in this case . . . and that, following the Court’s order on class certification, this

case is primarily about rest breaks.”).9

 As there is no PAGA claim left in the case, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment to Autozone as to representative PAGA penalties.

b. Labor Code section 558

Autozone next asserts that “only ‘the Labor and Workforce Development Agency

[LWDA] . . . and its constituent departments and divisions—are authorized to assess and

collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by the

employer,’” and that “PAGA is the only exception to this rule.” See D MSJ at 8 (citing

Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 134 Cal. App. 4th 365, 370 (2005); Arias v. Super.

Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (2009)). Plaintiffs seek to recover penalties under Labor Code

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section 558 as part of their PAGA claim. See Iskander Decl. Ex. E (SAC ¶¶ 51, 57, 78, 87). 

Autozone argues that because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a PAGA claim, they are also not

entitled to penalties under section 558. D MSJ at 8. Plaintiffs argue simply: “Because

PAGA claims remain available in this case, Section 558 penalties survive.” Opp’n to D MSJ

at 9. Because the Court concludes that the PAGA claims are no longer available, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment to Autozone as to the section 558 penalties.

c. Individual and Class-Wide Waiting Time Penalties under

Labor Code section 203

Autozone next argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to waiting time penalties under

Labor Code section 203 because section 203 provides for such penalties where an employer

willfully failed to pay “any wages of an employee . . .” and unpaid rest breaks are not

“wages.” See D MSJ at 9. Despite Autozone’s assertion that the law is “well established” in

its favor, this is in fact an area in which courts are sharply divided. See Brewer v. General

Nutrition Corp., No. 11-cv-3587 YGR, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015)

(collecting cases re split). This Court joins the majority of judges in this district and

concludes that unpaid rest breaks are “wages” entitling Plaintiffs to waiting time penalties

under section 203.

The California Supreme Court in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th

1094, 1114 (2007), considered the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim under the rest

break statute, Labor Code section 226.7. It held that “[t]he statute’s plain language, the

administrative and legislative history, and the compensatory purpose of the remedy compel

the conclusion that the ‘additional hour of pay’ . . . is a premium wage intended to

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compensate employees, not a penalty.” Id. That same court then muddied the waters when,

five years later, it again spoke about the rest break statute. In Kirby v. Immoos Fire

Protection, Inc., 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1248 (2012), the court was applying Labor Code section

218.5, which requires the awarding of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in “any action

brought for the nonpayment of wages. . . .” The court had to determine “whether a section

226.7 claim, which concerns an employer’s alleged failure to provide statutorily mandated

meal and rest periods, constitutes an ‘action brought for the nonpayment of wages’ within the

meaning of section 218.5.” Id. at 1255. It held that “a section 226.7 claim is not an action

brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought for nonprovision of meal or rest

breaks.” Id. at 1256–57. The court explained that this was “not at odds with” the Murphy

decision:

We said that the “additional hour of pay” remedy in section 226.7 is a

“‘liability created by statute’” and that the liability is properly characterized as

a wage, not a penalty. . . . To say that a section 226.7 remedy is a wage,

however, is not to say that the legal violation triggering the remedy is

nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the legal violation is nonprovision

of meal or rest breaks, and the object that follows the phrase “action brought

for” in section 218.5 is the alleged legal violation, not the desired remedy.

Id. at 1257. 

Courts post-Kirby have struggled to decide whether penalties for violating section

226.7 are still properly considered “wages,” under Murphy, or whether Kirby’s holding that a

claim for violation of section 226.7 is not an action for nonpayment of wages means that the

relief under section 226.7 is something other than wages. See, e.g., Brewer, 2015 WL

5072039, at *18. Although some courts have concluded that payments under section 226.7

should not be considered wages, see, e.g., Singletary v. Teavana Corp., No. 5:13-cv-01163-

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10 That opinion also cited a recent Internal Revenue Chief Counsel Advisory Letter stating that

payments under section 226.7 “would be wages for federal employment tax purposes.” Id. at *19 n.13.

11 Judge Tigar explained: “It is true that the violation described in section 203 . . . is concerned

with the improper payment of wages, while the violation described in section 226.7 is not. However,

it is unclear why this distinction resolves the issue. If the amounts due are classified by law as wages

and are not properly paid to the employee . . . , the employer has presumably committed a

violation—regardless of whether the wages are owed to the employee due to hours of labor, additional

overtime pay, an award under California law, or some other reason.” Id. at *5.

14

PSG, 2014 WL 1760884, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) (concluding that “Section 203, like

the attorney fee provision in Kirby, is concerned with a particular type of wrong, not a

particular type of remedy”); Jones v. Spherion Staffing LLC, No. LA CV 11-06462 JAK

(JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112396, at *21–22 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (reading Murphy

narrowly and applying Kirby), this Court is persuaded that the courts reaching the opposite

conclusion employ better reasoning. Judge Gonzales Rogers examined Murphy and Kirby at

length and concluded that the payments are wages, stating: “Kirby did not abrogate Murphy.” 

See Brewer, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18–19.10 Judge Tigar discussed the relevant case law in

Parson v. Golden State FC, LLC, No. 16-cv-00405-JST, 2016 WL 1734010, at *3–5 (N.D.

Cal. May 2, 2016), distinguished Singletary and Jones as making distinctions that have no

legal bearing,11 and concluded that payments under section 226.7 are wages, as “[n]othing in

Murphy or Kirby suggests that wages awarded under section 226.7 be treated any differently

than other wages earned by the employee.” Judge Corley, too, was “not persuaded” by the

defendant’s argument that Kirby precludes a finding that section 226.7 payments are wages,

stating “while Kirby is helpful in determining the contours of a Section 226.7 claim, it says

nothing particular to the question of whether a Section 226.7 premium wage is a wage under

Section[] 203. . . .” See Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., No. C-13-02377 JSC, 2014

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12 Judge Corley, like Judge Tigar, was “not persuaded by Jones.” Id. However, she ruled

simply that “[g]iven the uncertainty in the caselaw,” she could not conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims

failed as a matter of law. Id. at *9.

13 The Court also rejects Autozone’s argument that the waiting time penalties are no longer part

of the case because the Court did not certify a Late Payment Class. See D MSJ at 10–11. The claim

for penalties under Section 203 is derivative of the rest break claim, see Opp’n to D MSJ at 15 (citing

P Mot. for Class Cert. (dkt. 95-1) at 3 (alleging “rest break . . . violations, as well as derivative claims

alleging the late payment of wages”)); see also Chavez v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV-09-4812

SC, 2012 WL 6115611, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (section 203 claims co-extensive with the wage

claim on which they were based, and “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff can succeed on this claim, certain

class members may be entitled to additional compensation under section 203.”). Autozone does not

really disagree. See Reply re D MSJ at 8 (“There is therefore no basis for class-wide recovery of

waiting time penalties, except to the extent that the Section 203 claim is premised on the claims of the

sole certified class (i.e. missed rest breaks).” 

15

WL 465907, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014).12

Autozone relies on the opinion in Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 245 Cal. 

App. 4th 1242 (2016). See D MSJ at 9; Reply re D MSJ (dkt. 304) at 7 n.5. Although that

case included broad language about section 203, see Ling, 245 Cal. App. 4th at 1261

(“Following Kirby, section 226.7 cannot support a section 203 penalty because section 203,

subdivision (b) tethers the waiting time penalty to a separate action for wages.”), that

language is dicta. The Ling case concerned only whether “a section 203 waiting time claim

based on section 226.7 premium pay is an ‘action [] brought for the non-payment of wages’

under section 218.5”—the attorneys’ fees provision at issue in Kirby. See id. Its assertion

that “the fact that the remedy [under section 226.7] is measured by an employee’s hourly

wage does not transmute the remedy into a wage as that term is used in section 203,” is

neither central to its holding nor, if read as Autozone urges, consistent with Murphy. See id.

Because the Court is persuaded by the numerous Northern District courts recognizing

that section 203 penalties are available for wage payments under section 226.7, the Court

DENIES summary judgment to Autozone on Section 203.13 

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14 Plaintiffs also argue in their opposition brief that they are entitled to prejudgment interest

under California Civil Code section 3287(a) and 3287(b). Opp’n to D MSJ at 17–20. The Court does

not reach this question, as Autozone did not move for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ entitlement

to prejudgment interest based on section 3287, see D MSJ at 11 (arguing only about prejudgment

interest under Labor Code section 218.6). 

16

d. Individual and Class-Wide Prejudgment Interest under

Labor Code section 218.6

Finally, Autozone argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims

for prejudgment interest under Labor Code section 218.6 based on either (1) unpaid rest

break premiums or (2) waiting time penalties. D MSJ at 11. Section 218.6 provides that “In

any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court shall award interest on all due and

unpaid wages at the rate of interest specified in subdivision (b) of Section 3289 of the Civil

Code. . . .” Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6. Autozone is correct.14

A prerequisite for prejudgment interest under Section 218.6 is that the action be one

“for the nonpayment of wages”—and Kirby explicitly held that a rest break claim is not an

“action brought for the nonpayment of wages,” see Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6; Kirby, 53 Cal. 

4th at 1255. Waiting time penalties also cannot form the basis for prejudgment interest

because such penalties are not wages. In Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., Judge Henderson

explained that “[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest ‘is . . . to make the plaintiff whole as of

the date of the injury.’” 695 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Lakin v. 

Watkins Assoc. Indus., 6 Cal. 4th 644, 663 (1993)). He explained that “The waiting time

penalty, like a punitive damage award, is designed not to make employees whole, but to act

‘as a disincentive to employers who are reluctant to pay wages in a timely manner.’” Id. at

1019 (quoting Mamika v. Barca, 68 Cal. App. 4th 487, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). 

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Accordingly the Court GRANTS Autozone’s motion as to prejudgment interest under

Labor Code section 218.6.

4. Conclusion as to Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summery Judgment,

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, DENIES AS MOOT Autozone’s Motion to Strike,

GRANTS Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to the PAGA claims, the

section 558 penalties, and the prejudgment interest under section 218.6; and DENIES

Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to section 203. 

B. Motion to Decertify Rest Break Claim

Autozone next moves to decertify the rest break claim, arguing based on Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that there is a lack of predominance and that the case is

unmanageable. See Mot. to Decertify. The Court agrees on both points.

1. Background

In December of 2012, the Court certified a rest break class, defined as: “All nonexempt or hourly paid employees who have been employed at Defendant’s retail stores in the

State of California at any time on or after July 29, 2005 until the date of certification.” Order

re Class Cert. at 6. 

The Court premised its ruling on its understanding that “[t]hroughout the relevant time

period, Defendant had a written rest break policy, applicable to all California AutoZone

stores, which provided” that “an AutoZoner who works 4 hours per day is provided 1 break

period of 10 consecutive minutes; an AutoZoner who works 8 hours per day is provided 2

break periods of not less than 10 consecutive minutes.” Id. at 6–7. The Court determined

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15 Again, Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1029, clarified that under the Wage Order, “[e]mployees are

entitled to 10 minutes’ rest for shifts from three and one-half to six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts

of more than six hours up to 10 hours, 30 minutes for shifts of more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, and

so on.” 

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that Autozone’s written policy was akin to the policy in Brinker, upon which “‘[c]lasswide

liability could be established . . . if [plaintiff] were able to demonstrate that, for example,

Brinker under this uniform policy refused to authorize and permit a second rest break for

employees working shifts longer than six, but shorter than eight, hours.’”15 Although the

Court acknowledged that there was some evidence that (paraphrasing Autozone), they “do

not really follow” their own rest break policy, the Court noted that “‘courts’ discomfort with

individualized liability issues is assuaged in large part where the plaintiff points to a specific

company-wide policy or practice that allegedly gives rise to consistent liability.’” Id. at 10,

13 (quoting Kurihara, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64224, at *6). 

The Court addressed Autozone’s argument that the case would not be manageable,

stating, “If . . . the Court believed that it would need to make endless individualized inquiries

about whether and how often putative class members got rest breaks, and all of the different

reasons why rest breaks did not occur, it would agree with Defendant that the case was

unmanageable.” Id. at 15. Indeed, at the motion hearing, the Court had commented: “Seems

to me it’s going to be a nightmare,” and asked Plaintiffs: “How are you going to do it? I just

don’t know. How are you going to do it? I mean, I’ve got to tell you: no records. 

Recollections, . . They are going to get some money, if in fact they seem to recall eight years

ago not getting a break on a particular day.” Tr. of 12/14/2012 (dkt. 173) at 24. The Court

reasoned in its order, though, that “Autozone’s liability will be based on whether its rest

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16 At the motion hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel initially stated,“there are records in this case” to

“demonstrate the universe of people to which the violation could have occurred,” and the Court

responded: “We’re not talking about those records. . . . we’re talking about the record of somebody not

getting a break. And that’s the record—that’s the record that doesn’t exist.” Tr. of 12/14/2012 at 23.

Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “I don’t think that’s true. I think there could be evidence of rest breaks

that we haven’t obtained yet.” Id. at 25.

17 At the motion hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated: “in fact, the Defendant conducted audits of

rest breaks. . . . Now, we haven’t gotten them all, but they had a plan, an audit system in place where

they looked at this very issue. They apparently believed that we could determine whether or not there

was rest break response or there was rest break compliance. They undertook a policy . . . to do that very

thing.” Id. at 26.

19

break policy violates the law or not—the policy is a fact common to all class members,” and

that “Plaintiffs’ counsel argued at the motion hearing that there might well be records that

would render the case more manageable.” Order re Class Cert. at 16.16 The Court

specifically referenced Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation that Autozone “conducted audits

of its rest breaks,”17 and concluded, “[w]hether this would work or would ultimately prove

impractical remains to be seen, but the Court is willing to let Plaintiffs proceed.” Id. at 16. 

Autozone now moves to decertify the class. Although there are numerous bases for

Autozone’s motion, two facts stand out as substantially different than the Court understood

them to be at class certification. 

First, as discussed above with reference to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, the

policy with the unlawful language about rest breaks was not in place throughout the class

period. At the beginning of the class period, in July 2005, Autozone’s 2004 California Store

Handbook was in effect, and it provided that “[rest] breaks are scheduled in accordance with

California law.” See Opp’n to P MSJ at 2 (citing 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl.

¶ 3, Ex. A). In addition, the Wage Order with the “major fraction thereof” language was

posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Iskander

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Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Autozone revised its handbook in 2006, and the revised handbook again

provided that “[rest] breaks are scheduled in accordance with California law.” Id. (citing

2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A). Wage orders continued to be posted

in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Iskander Decl. ¶ 3,

Ex. 2). The unlawful language from the 2008 “Store Handbook Exception, California” was

not implemented until 2008. See Opp’n to P MSJ at 3 (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B;

2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A). 

Second, contrary to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representations at the class certification

hearing, there are no audit records or any other time records of when class members took rest

breaks. See Mot. to Decertify at 5 (citing Stephens Depo. at 41); Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify

(dkt. 310) at 1 (citing Theriault Decl. ¶ 2 (“these documents were not useful to the analysis of

when rest breaks were taken”)).

Both developments impact this Court’s view of certification. 

2. Legal Standard

A federal court’s order granting class certification is subject to later modification. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). The

standard of review is the same as a motion for class certification: whether the Rule 23

requirements are met. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410 (C.D. Cal.

2000). Courts are expected to engage in a “rigorous analysis” to determine if Rule 23 has

been satisfied. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011). Because

parties should be able to rely on a certification order, “in the normal course of events it will

not be altered except for good cause,” such as “discovery of new facts or changes in the

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18 Autozone also argues that Plaintiffs cannot meet the preponderance requirement because

damages cannot be attributed to Plaintiffs’ theory of liability, as required by Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431, 1435 (2013) (denying certification in antitrust case where plaintiffs relied on

regression model that “did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact.”).

Mot. to Decertify at 15; Reply re Mot. to Decertify at 9. But the Ninth Circuit explained in Vaquero v.

Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 13-56606, 2016 WL 3190862, at *3 (June 8, 2016), that, “[i]n a wage

21

parties or in the substantive or procedural law.” O’Connor, 197 F.R.D. at 409–10. The party

seeking decertification bears the burden of demonstrating that the elements of Rule 23 have

not been established. Weigele v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 267 F.R.D. 614, 617 (S.D.

Cal. 2010).

3. Discussion of Motion to Decertify

This order addresses Autozone’s two challenges to certification: (a) predominance and

(b) manageability. 

a. Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Court previously

found this element met, noting that “[o]ther cases have likewise held that claims based on a

uniform policy are entitled to class certification.” Order re Class Cert. at 13 (citing Brinker,

53 Cal. 4th at 1020; Vegachalam, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46429, at *37–39; In re Taco Bell

Wage & Hour Actions, 2012 WL 5932833, at *6).

Autozone argues that Plaintiffs cannot meet the predominance requirement of Rule

23(b)(3) because it is now clear that there was not one uniform policy in place throughout the

class period, that many class members received rest breaks, that there were varied reasons

why class members did not receive rest breaks, and that some class members chose not to

take rest breaks. See Mot. to Decertify at 10–14.18 

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and hour case, unlike in an antitrust class action, the employer-defendant’s actions necessarily caused

the class members’ injury. Defendants either paid or did not pay their sales associates for work

performed. No other factor could have contributed to the alleged injury. Therefore, even if the measure

of damages proposed here is imperfect, it cannot be disputed that the damages (if they are proved)

stemmed from Defendant’s actions.” The court reiterated that “the need for individualized findings as

to the amount of damages does not defeat class certification.” Id. (citing Yokoyama v. Midland Nat.

Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087,1094 (9th Cir. 2010)). The predominance problem in this case is not that

damages cannot be linked to Autozone.

19 In fact, named Plaintiff Jimmy Ellison signed a variation of the lawful rest break policy in

March 2004. See Mot. to Decertify at 1 (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B).

22

Of these arguments, the argument as to the uniform policy is the most significant. It is

doubtful that the Court would have certified the class in 2012 had it understood that

Autozone did not have a single uniform policy in place throughout the class period. Brinker,

53 Cal. 4th at 1033, held: “Claims alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a

group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and

properly, found suitable for class treatment.” It now appears that Autozone had a lawful

written policy in place from 2005 to 2008 and that Autozone required the posting of the

Wage Order with the “major fraction thereof” language in each store during this time. See

2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7, Ex. A; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Iskander

Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2.19 That does not mean that Autozone gave its employees appropriate rest

breaks from 2005–2008, but it does mean that Plaintiffs cannot attribute missed rest breaks

during that period to the written policy. It is no longer accurate to say that this case involves

“a uniform policy consistently applied” throughout the class period. See Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th

at 1033. 

That Autozone’s policy was lawful, as written, for three years of the class period

requires the Court to seriously consider Autozone’s assertion that, “[e]ven though the written

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20 The Court rejected Autozone’s argument at the class certification stage that it “does not really

follow” its unlawful policy because the Court believed that “there is no dispute that there is a uniform

policy here.” See Order re Class Cert. at 12. 

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four-hours-worked language, “the implementation of the policy did not.” See Mot. to

Decertify at 1.20 Taking a fresh look, it is unclear what Autozone’s rest break policy was

from 2008 forward. 

On the one hand, Autozone Divisional Human Resources Manager Carlos Jon

declared that “it is the expectation that at California stores, AutoZoners will take rest breaks

every two hours,” that rest break practices were “highly variable between stores,” and that

“[i]t is the store manager’s responsibility to establish rest break practices at the store level.” 

2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 9. Jon clarified in 2016 that “[a]t all times it was my understanding that by

providing rest breaks every 2-hours, as was AutoZone’s policy, that it was consistent with

California law.” Supp. 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Jon also declared that

Autozone’s policy was to continue to post the Wage Order in all stores, even after

implementing the 2008 language. 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 6; see also Stephens Decl. ¶ 3 (policy to

post Wage Order in store from 2005 to present). 

On the other hand, Autozone in July 2011 sent all California district and store

managers an email entitled “Break Period Update (CA Stores Only),” which included a

“Manager’s Action Plan” that asked managers to (1) ensure that all employees who worked

for four or more hours are provided one break period of no less than ten minutes and (2)

ensure that all employees who work for eight or more hours are provided two break periods

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21 Plaintiffs also point to the deposition testimony of Azeem Sikander on rest periods, see Opp’n

to Mot. to Decertify at 4, but the Court has already held that Sikander was not Autozone’s person most

knowledgeable on rest breaks and that his answers did not bind Autozone on that subject, see Order re

Class Cert. at 7.

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of no less than ten minutes. See Theriault Decl. Ex. F.21 And yet, in August 2011, Carlos

Jon prepared a PowerPoint presentation that included “Autozone’s understanding of the

requirements under California law for rest breaks”—which appropriately stated that

employees who worked 3.5 to 6 hours were to receive one rest break, while employees who

worked 6 to 10 hours were to receive two. See 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C; Supp. 2016 Jon

Decl. ¶ 2 (clarifying that PowerPoint was from August 2011). 

Plaintiffs point to the 2016 deposition testimony of Nancy Stephens, a Divisional

Human Resource Manager from 2000 to 2008 and from 2010 to the present, that she was not

aware of any changes made in the Autozone rest break policy from 2005 to the present, or in

how it was implemented. Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 4 (citing Theriault Decl. Ex. B at

18–19. Stephens went on to state, “well, in 2012, we updated the policy. But we made it

clearer for our AutoZoners, with giving them examples of when rest periods should be

taken.” Id. at 19. Although Plaintiffs argue that this testimony belies Autozone’s assertion

that there were multiple policies during the class period, Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 4, it

provides equal support for Autozone’s position that whatever the language of the written

policy, Autozone’s unwritten policy was always to give breaks every two hours (after all,

Plaintiffs do not contend that the 2012 policy, which Stephens suggested was not a real

change in policy, was unlawful).

The Court also looks to evidence of Autozone’s rest break practices. 

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There is evidence that some employees were allowed to take rest breaks in compliance

with California law. For example, named Plaintiff Doland declared that he only “sometimes”

did not receive a second rest break, Doland Decl. (dkt. 95-7) ¶ 9, although he also testified

that he received a 10-minute smoke break “a couple times a shift,” Iskander Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3

at 77. Although some class members testified that they never received a break, see, e.g., id.

¶ 5, Ex. 4, others testified that they took breaks or told their subordinates to take breaks every

two hours, id. ¶¶ 6–7, Ex. 5 at 24–25 (took rest breaks every couple hours), Ex. 6 at 17, 23

(tell employees entitled to breaks every two hours). Others testified that it depended on the

manager, position held, hours scheduled, and/or store staffing levels. See id. ¶¶ 8–9, 11, Ex.

7 at 39 (store manager would tell you; if busy, you had to stay at counter); Ex. 8 at 40 (did

not take break when too busy, no one told her that she could not take a break; when on

remodeling crew, got breaks); Ex. 10 at 39 (only took breaks when manager authorized). 

Autozone points to declarations from 117 class members stating that they knew they were

authorized and permitted to take first and second rest breaks if they worked three-and-a-half

or six hour shifts. See Mot. to Decertify at 8 (citing Opp’n to Mot. to Certify (dkt. 121)

(citing Waggoner Decl. (dkt. 122) Ex. B)). 

Some employees testified to more generous policies. One declarant testified that he

was authorized and permitted to take a 10-minute break every two hours. See Arreola Decl.

(dkt. 133-2) ¶ 9; see also Beltran Decl. (dkt. 134-1) ¶ 8 (“In terms of taking rest breaks, our

team sometimes refers to it as the ‘2-4-6,’ meaning that we generally take the first rest break

about two hours into the shift, then lunch around the 4 hour mark, and then the second break

around six hours into the shift.”); Cisneros Decl. (dkt. 136) (“[w]henever I am scheduled to

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work a shift of 6 hours or more, I know that I can take a second paid rest break of 10

minutes.”); Baylon Decl. (dkt. 134-1) ¶ 6 (one 10 minute rest break no matter how few hours

worked and a second 10 minute rest break if more than five hours); Velasquez Decl. (dkt.

145-2) ¶ 7 (rest break on any shift longer than 2 hours, second rest break on shift longer than

6 hours, but often chose to forego breaks); Smith Decl. (dkt. 144-2) ¶ 3 (employees often

take more than two breaks).

Even Plaintiffs’ survey, which this order discusses below in the context of

manageability, does not confirm that there was a common practice of denying rest breaks. It

shows that of respondents who worked Short Shifts (shifts of 3.5 to 4 hours), 25% stated that

they were not authorized and permitted to take a rest break during short shifts, 58% said that

they were authorized and permitted, and 16% said that they did not know or could not

remember. Saad Decl. in Opp’n to P MSJ (dkt. 300-1) ¶ 3. Of respondents who worked Mid

Shifts (shifts of 6 to 8 hours), 29% stated that they were not authorized and permitted to take

two rest breaks during mid-shifts, 53% said that they were authorized and permitted, and

17% stated that they did not know or remember. Id. Of respondents who worked Long

Shifts (shifts of between 10 and 12 hours), 38% stated that they were not authorized and

permitted to take three rest breaks during long shifts, 25% said that they were authorized and

permitted, and 38% stated that they did not know or remember. Id. Additionally, 48% of the

respondents stated that they took their rest breaks 75% of the time during Short Shifts, 57%

said that they took their rest breaks 75% or more of the time during Mid Shifts, and 51% said

that they took their rest breaks 75% or more of the time during Long Shifts. Id. ¶ 4. If

Autozone had a uniform policy or practice of disallowing rest breaks for these shifts

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throughout the class period, the Court might expect that the rate of respondents who stated

that they were “not authorized and permitted” to take rest breaks, or who did not take rest

breaks, would be higher.

Because Autozone did not have a uniform written policy in place throughout the class

period and because the evidence of employee rest break practices does not reflect a

consistent rest break practice, the cases Plaintiffs cite about uniform policies do not apply. 

See Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 5 (citing Faulkinbury, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 235

(“employer’s liability arises by adopting a uniform policy that violates the wage and hour

laws”); Benton, 220 Cal. App. 4th at 726 (same); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs. Inc., 731

F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (adopting Faulkinbury language re potential liability); Brewer,

2015 WL 9460198, at *2 (explaining that it would be error to focus on whether some

individuals were able to take breaks because “liability arises by adopting a uniform policy

that violates the wage and hour laws”); McCowen v. Trimac Transp. Servs. (W.), 311 F.R.D.

579 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“policies and practices [plaintiff] targets appear to have applied

company-wide”); Scott-George v. PVH Corp., No. 2:13-CV-00441-TLN-DAD, 2015 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 157410, at *26 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (“all eight Subclasses are based on

Defendant’s uniform policies and practices”); Tapia v. Zale Del., No. 13-cv-1565-BAS

(PCL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48046, at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. April 6, 2016) (“uniform payroll

policy and practice”); Saechao v. Landry’s Inc., No. 15-815 WHA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

33409, at *17–19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (describing “uniform practice regarding rest

breaks” that put onus on employees to take breaks, holding that “her rest-break class relies on

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wide resolution”)). 

This case is more akin to cases in which courts have denied certification (or

decertified) because they found that there is not a uniform policy consistently applied. See,

e.g., Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 3:14-CV-02098-JD, 2016 WL 3648550, at *6 (N.D.

Cal. July 7, 2016) (“for a class to be certified for claims under these laws, the evidence

would typically need to show that crew members were denied meals and rest breaks by the

application of a uniform policy, or by a consistent and widespread practice in the workplace,

even if not memorialized in any formal fashion”); Cole. v. CRST, Inc., No. EDCV 08-1570-

VAP (SPx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48940, at *7 (C.D. Cal. April 1, 2016) (“Plaintiff must

show that Defendant had a general policy of preventing its drivers from taking meal and rest

breaks. Plaintiff has not made this showing because a number of drivers, including Plaintiff,

acknowledge that they took meal and rest breaks when needed. . . .”); and Ordonez v. Radio

Shack, Inc., No. CV 10-7060-CAS (JCGx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7868, at *21–22 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (“plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating that a uniform

corporate policy denying employees the opportunity to take meal breaks could be proven on

a classwide basis. Plaintiff’s evidence of such a policy (or policies), taken as a whole, is

simply insufficient to warrant class certification here”).

Because there was no single uniform written policy in place from 2005 to 2012, nor a

consistent practice of denying rest breaks during that time, Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any

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22 Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their opposition brief that Autozone’s “lack of any policy,

procedure or mechanism to pay rest break premiums . . . is also sufficient to support certification.”

Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 5–6. The Court does not know what “sufficient to support” means—it

certainly cannot mean that it is sufficient in and of itself. Plaintiffs point to the testimony of Autozone

corporate designee Mark Dessem, who “did not know “ if employees received premiums if they missed

rest breaks, and Autozone designee Stephens, who testified that she is not aware of any rest break

premiums having been paid (although she also stated that the way to determine if any were paid was “to

talk to each store manager and ask them how they implemented that”). Id. (citing Theriault Decl. Ex.

I at 56; Theriault Decl. Ex. C at 17–18). Plaintiffs overreach. The cases they cite, id. at 6, relate to

claims of employers not paying premium wages for missed breaks. See Safeway, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of

L.A. Cnty., 238 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1155 (2015) (case pertained to failure to pay premium wages);

Amaro v. Gerawan Farming, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00147-DAD-SAB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66842, at

*26–27 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2016) (“The issue in this case is not the availability of rest breaks; plaintiffs

and defendants agree that class members were offered, and free to take, rest breaks. Rather, the issue

is whether class members were properly compensated for these breaks.”); Cervantez v. Celestica Corp., 253 F.R.D. 562, 573 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (claims relating to meal and rest period class directly relate to

common policy re paying premium pay). In our case, the Court did not certify a rest break premium

class. See Order re Class Cert. at 1 (certification denied “as to all other subclasses.”). Rest break

premiums are relevant to damages—because employees who prevail on their rest break claims will be

entitled to premiums—but do not assist Plaintiffs in establishing predominance on the rest break claim.

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questions affecting only individual members.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).22 

b. Manageability (Superiority)

In addition to predominance, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find that “a class action

is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 

Pertinent to that determination are “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). The Court previously found this element met, commenting that

“Defendant does raise legitimate concerns about manageability” but ultimately concluding

that “Plaintiffs have convinced the Court, for now” that the case would be manageable. 

Order re Class Cert. at 15–16. Specifically, the Court understood that “AutoZone’s liability

will be based on whether its rest break policy violates the law or does not” and that “there

might well be records that would render the case more manageable.” Id. at 16. 

Autozone argues that Plaintiffs cannot meet the manageability requirement of Rule

23(b)(3) because there are no rest break records or audits, and because Plaintiffs’ proffered

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23 Autozone also argues that the survey cannot be used to establish damages, but the Court does

not reach this issue. The Ninth Circuit instructs that the need for individual damages calculations cannot

defeat class certification. See Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing

that “damages determinations are individual in nearly all wage-and-hour class actions”).

24 The Court observes that Plaintiffs included nearly 500 names of trial witnesses on their

Modified Third Supplemental Disclosures. See Reply re Mot. to Decertify at 4. 

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survey cannot be used to establish liability.23 Plaintiffs downplay the importance of rest

break records and tout the merits of their survey. The Court agrees with Autozone that the

case has become unmanageable.

i. No rest break records

Employers are not obligated to keep records of rest breaks. See Washington v. Joe’s

Crab Shack, 271 F.R.D. 629, 641 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8,

§ 11070). Because in this case there are no records of rest breaks, or audits, and there is no

uniform policy or practice forbidding appropriate rest breaks, assessing class members’

claims of lost rest breaks requires an individual analysis. Id. (“[f]or this reason,

individualized analyses must be conducted to determine whether and when rest breaks were

not taken.”). Mini-trials of 20,000 class members would be unmanageable.24 

Relevant to this issue is the Taco Bell litigation, which each side contends favors its

position. See Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 7–8; Reply re Mot. to Decertify (dkt. 313) at 4. 

In the November 27, 2012 Taco Bell order, the Eastern District found that the plaintiffs had

established commonality on a meal break subclass; the court noted that “Brinker did not . . .

require a store by store inquiry as to how the policy at issue was implemented in finding a

uniform, consistently applied policy. Rather, the court cited a corporate policy that was

equally applicable to all employees.” In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, 2012 WL

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5932833, at *6. The court in that same order noted that “[a]s with the meal break claim,

Plaintiffs contend that the rest period policy is facially invalid.” Id. at *10. The court

explained, “[a]t first glance, it appears that this theory is similar to Plaintiffs’ meal break

claim insofar as it is based on an allegedly facially invalid policy. However, the differences

in time keeping requirements affect commonality and, to some extent, ascertainability and

numerosity.” Id. at *11 (emphasis added). Because the state of California does not require

employers to record rest breaks, the court held that “[w]ithout reliable evidence in the time

cards, an individual inquiry is the only way to determine whether a second break was or was

not taken.” Id. The court concluded that the rest break claim was “not suitable for classwide treatment.” Id.

Plaintiffs note in the present briefing that the rest break claims in Taco Bell were

“subsequently certified by the trial court on a motion for reconsideration.” Opp’n to Mot. to

Decertify at 7 (citing In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:07-cv01314-SAB, ECF No. 510 at 12–13). Plaintiffs’ counsel, who represented the plaintiffs in

that case, assert that “the three certified claims in In re Taco Bell were tried to a jury in

February and March 2016, in 11 days.” Id. at 8; see also id. at viii (arguing that “theory of

liability and evidence” in Taco Bell was “remarkably similar to this case”). But Plaintiffs

omit the reason that the court reconsidered certification on the rest break claim. The court

explained that it had “denied certification based upon Defendants’ argument that the time

records were inaccurate with respect to rest breaks.” In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions,

E.D. Case No. 1:07-cv-01314-SAB, ECF No. 510 at 10. “Accepting Defendants’ argument,

the Court determined that the Rest Break Subclass was unascertainable because it would be

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impossible to determine membership of the class if there was no way to ascertain from the

records which employees actually missed a rest break and which employees simply did not

record their rest breaks.” Id. at 11. The Court reconsidered because, contrary to Defendants’

earlier representation, “the record indicates that Defendants[] kept records of rest breaks

irrespective of whether they were legally required to do so.” Id. The combination of (1) a

uniform written policy and (2) time records of rest breaks meant that the rest break claims

were amenable to class treatment. Id. at 13.

Our case is the reverse of Taco Bell. Here, the Court certified a class when it believed

that there were rest break records. See Order re Class Cert. at 16; Tr. of 12/14/2012 at 23–

25 (representations by Plaintiffs’ counsel that “there could be evidence of rest breaks”). It

now turns out that such records do not exist. Plaintiffs’ argument that the records are

irrelevant to liability and only speak to damages are unpersuasive: somehow Plaintiffs must

demonstrate that Autozone is liable as to each class member. 

ii. Plaintiff’s survey

Plaintiffs suggest that their expert’s survey—new since 2012—could bridge the

evidentiary gap created by the absence of rest break records and help them establish liability. 

Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 11–15. It does not. The survey fails Plaintiffs because it is not

a proper use of representational evidence, and because its fundamental lack of scientific rigor

makes it inadmissible. 

As to the use of representational evidence in class actions, a pair of recent Supreme

Court cases are instructive. The Supreme Court in Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367, objected to the

notion of “Trial by Formula” where the Court of Appeals had envisioned that 

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[a] sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for

sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in

depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to be

valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of

(presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the average

backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery—without

further individualized proceedings. 

The Court’s objection was that such a process prevented the defendant from litigating its

statutory defenses to individual claims. Id. 

The Court recently observed in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036,

1046 (2016), that “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only practicable means to

collect and present relevant data’ establishing a defendant’s liability.” It explained that the

permissibility of such evidence does not turn on whether the case is an individual or class

action: “[i]n a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff’s

individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is

brought on behalf of a class.” Id. In Tyson Foods, the representative evidence consisted of a

study performed by an industrial relations expert who “conducted 744 videotaped

observations and analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities took” in the three

different departments of a meat processing facility. Id. at 1043. The expert then averaged

the time taken in his observations to produce an estimate of 18 minutes per day for two

departments and 21.25 minutes a day for a third department. Id. The Court explained that

because “each class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she

had brought an individual action,” the expert’s calculation of average donning and doffing

times was also “a permissible means of making that very showing” in the class action. Id. at

1046–47; see also Vaquero, 2016 WL 3190862, at *3–4 (discussing Dukes, Tyson Foods).

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There is no question, then, that representational evidence can help plaintiffs establish

liability in class actions. The problem with the survey Plaintiffs seek to use here is that it is

more like the representational evidence in Dukes than the representational evidence in Tyson

Foods. The representational evidence in Tyson Foods would have been appropriate for an

individual class member to use in an individual action because an employee cannot travel

back in time and record how long it took to put on her equipment each day; instead, the

employee can hire an expert to generate an average time. The representational evidence did

not depend on individual employees’ memories, it simply filled in a gap: there was a uniform

policy “not to pay for those activities,” and plaintiffs needed to establish “the amount of

uncompensated work each employee did.” See Tyson Foods, 136 S.Ct. at 1042–44. In

contrast, the plaintiffs in Dukes sought to establish that a small number of employees had

experienced sex discrimination, and then to extrapolate those results to the class as a whole. 

See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367. But an employee bringing an individual action would not have

been able to rely on another employee’s sex discrimination to establish her own claim. 

Similarly here, an Autozone employee in an individual action would not be able to point to

other employees’ varied experiences of when they were allowed rest breaks and how often

they took rest breaks in order to establish her own claim for missed rest breaks, particularly

in the absence of a uniform policy. This would unfairly deny Autozone the right to litigate

individual issues of liability. As Judge Spero recently explained in Senne v. Kansas City

Royals Baseball Corp., Case No. 14-cv-608-JCS, Order re Class Cert. (dkt. 687) at 91:

Rather than merely filling in “evidentiary gaps” in a situation where all of the

employees were similarly affected by a uniform policy, Plaintiffs here are

attempting to paper over significant material variations that make application of

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the survey results to the class as a whole improper. Allowing Plaintiffs to rely

on the survey evidence . . . would be inappropriate under the circumstances

here because doing so would enlarge the rights or Plaintiffs and deprive

Defendants of the right to litigate the individual issues. . . . 

The survey is not an appropriate use of representational evidence.

As to the survey’s admissibility, the Court looks first to Federal Rule of Evidence 702

and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Fed. R. Evid.

702 (allowing expert testimony only if: “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue; the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of

reliable principles and methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and

methods to the facts of the case”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“Daubert does not require a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its

persuasiveness; rather it requires a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its scientific

reliability and relevance.”). “Evidence should be excluded as unreliable if it ‘suffer[s] from

serious methodological flaws.’” Senne Order re Class Cert. at 96 (quoting Obrey v. Johnson,

400 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2005)). And evidence should be excluded as irrelevant if it does

not “fit” the issue to be decided: “scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily

scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 

Alongside this guidance about expert evidence generally is the Ninth Circuit’s

guidance about surveys in particular. “Survey evidence should be admitted ‘as long as [it is]

conducted according to accepted principles and [is] relevant.’” See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v.

Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth

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25 “I was asked by Counsel to determine damages based on the assumption that no rest break was

authorized and permitted for any Short Shift, Mid shift, or Long Shift. I was also asked to determine

damages based on the assumption that rest breaks actually taken were in fact authorized and permitted.”

Id.; see also id.¶ 12 (“I have also been asked by counsel for the plaintiffs to calculate damages

associated with the following categories . . .”).

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Circuit has explained that there are two steps in a district court’s treatment of a survey. See

Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1263 (9th Cir. 2001). First, the

court is to determine admissibility: “is there a proper foundation for admissibility, and is it

relevant and conducted according to accepted principles?” Id. Second, once the survey is

admitted, “follow-on issues of methodology, survey design, reliability, the experience and

reputation of the expert, critique of conclusions, and the like go to the weight of the survey

rather than its admissibility.” Id.; see also Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1036 (“‘technical

inadequacies’ in a survey, ‘including the format of the questions or the manner in which it

was taken, bear on the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.’”). On the other hand,

“substantial deficiencies in the design or execution of a survey of individuals is grounds for

its complete exclusion.” See Gibson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067 (C.D.

Cal. 2002); see also Sirko v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. CV 13-03192 DMG (SSx), 2014

WL 4452699, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014); Stonebrae, L.P. v. Toll Bros., Inc., No. C-08-

0221 EMC, 2011 WL 1334444, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011), aff’d, 521 F. App’x 592 (9th

Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (“so long as the data are reliable, methodological deficiencies”

impact weight, not admissibility). 

Although the Court is concerned about the relevance of Plaintiffs’ survey—which

Plaintiffs commissioned in order to help them establish damages, see Tr. of 12/14/2012 at 30,

Wazzan Report ¶ 1125; Wazzan Depo. at 24, 140–43. 190–91, 242–45, and now try to use to

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28 26 Plaintiffs complain in the opposition brief that the response rate is 6%, not 3.5%; either is

lower than 8%. See Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 15 n.7

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establish liability, see Opp’n to Mot. to Decertify at 14 (“The Survey Addresses Relevant

Liability and Damages Questions to a Random Sample of the Relevant Population”)— the

Court is more concerned that there are substantial deficiencies, and not mere quibbles about

methodology, that render it inadmissible.

First, Plaintiffs’ survey had a woefully low response rate. Out of a random sample of

10,000 individuals, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Wazzan obtained 343 usable responses, Wazzan

Report ¶ 24, which is a response rate of 3.43%, Saad Decl. (dkt. 264-4) ¶ 4. Even removing

the 4,320 “nonreachable” individuals from the total, the response rate would be 6.0%. Id.

“In survey research, such low response rates are generally not considered adequate for being

able to generalize, or extrapolate the results of the survey to the wider population from which

the sampled group was drawn.” Id. The California Supreme Court explained in Duran v.

U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 59 Cal.4th 1, 42 (2014), that “[a] sample must be sufficiently large to

provide reliable information about the larger group.” The court found a sample size of 8%

inadequate. Id. at 12, 42. It explained that a small sample size might be “convenient and

manageable,” but “the same could be said of a sample of one.” Id. The sample size here is

smaller than the one judged inadequate in Duran.

26 See also Senne, Order re Class Cert. at

98 (discussing “possibility” of non-response bias where response rate was 32.4%). But see

Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (Spx), 2013 WL 15630, at *4 (C.D. Cal.

Jan. 15, 2013) (problems with response rate go to weight not admissibility). The Central

District recently explained, in a case involving a survey with a 95% non-response rate, that,

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27 Dr. Saad relies in part on The Reference Guide on Survey Research in Reference Manual on

Scientific Evidence, which states that response rates below 75% should receive “greater scrutiny,” those

below 50% should be regarded with “significant caution,” and that surveys with response rates of 5%

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“Although . . . a survey’s non-responsive rate generally goes to the weight of the results

rather than their admissibility,” where the offering party is unable “to validate that the survey

was reliably designed and administered, such concerns reasonably suggest that the survey’s

methodology may be flawed.” See In re ConAgra Food, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 951 (C.D.

Cal. 2015).

While it is possible that a survey with such a low response rate could nonetheless be

reliable, see, e.g., Rodman v. Safeway Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 922, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2015),

Plaintiffs’ expert provides the Court with no assurance that his is. Instead, he sweepingly

concludes: “My calculation of the violation rates are derived entirely from survey responses

made by class members who worked at least one shift that met any of the Short Shift, Mid

Shift, or Long Shift criteria. Therefore, I find it appropriate to extrapolate these results to the

class as a whole.” Wazzan Report ¶ 28. He offers no explanation of why the 343 responding

class members adequately stand in for the class as a whole, simply because each worked at

least one of the relevant shifts. Autozone’s expert explains that “it would be especially

inappropriate to extrapolate” from the small response rate “without careful and extensive

survey reliability analysis, neither of which is done to the requisite extent.” Saad Decl. ¶ 4. 

He continues: “No survey research professional would proceed as Dr. Wazzan has done and

essentially assume, with little to no additional analyses, that such a sample was appropriate to

support the conclusion that over 20,000 persons shared the experience of 3% or even 6% of

the sampled group of 10,000.” Id.27 

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to 20% are “very unlikely” to “provide any credible statistics of the population as a whole.” Id. ¶ 5.

28 One way to make a survey more reliable is to do an adequate pre-test, but Plaintiffs’ pre-test

was inadequate. The first pre-test involved 50 individuals, only two of whom completed the survey.

Id. ¶ 27. The second pre-test also involved 50 individuals, only three of whom responded. Id. This is

a response rate of 5%, which is arguably higher than the survey itself. But it is “far too small a group

to conduct relevant pre-test diagnostics,” which should consist of testing “the survey instrument itself,

and make sure that questions are clear, that terms are stated in language target respondents will

understand, to make sure there is no confusion, and so on.” Id.; see also York v. Starbucks Corp., No.

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Second, a problem with the low response rate is that it “suggests that there is a

nonresponse bias, which is a form of bias that can occur when particular systematic segments

of the target population or sample do not provide responses to a survey.” Id. Autozone’s

expert explains that “If those who do not respond are systematically different from those who

do respond, the results will be biased and unreliable for making conclusions about the

population as a whole.” Id. He states that there is a type of non-response called selected

non-response: “some of the persons called actively choose not to respond for particular

reasons—that is, they self-select out of the survey.” Id. ¶ 8. Dr. Wazzan encountered 572

individuals who refused to participate; refusals outnumbered surveys responded to by almost

two-thirds. Id. ¶ 9. “This is a red flag in any survey, and especially one conducted in a

litigation context.” Id. If one does not know why the self-selection took place, then one

cannot adjust for it. Id. ¶ 8. 

Plaintiffs’ expert did not adequately account for the possibility of nonresponse bias. 

See Medlock v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 1:07-cv-01314-SAB, 2015 WL 8479320, at *3 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 9, 2015) (discussing expert’s efforts to test own survey’s “reliability and validity

by comparing survey respondents to the population and the initial sample to evaluate

nonresponse error on a key characteristic measure” as well as “post survey testing comparing

the consistency of answers”).28 Although he compared the number of days worked by

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survey with numerous flaws, including failure to pre-test “to see how respondents may misunderstand

the questions that were to be asked during the telephone interviews.”). 

29 Put another way: “[h]earing that the nature of the survey relates to a class action lawsuit may

bias the answers of the respondents if they feel that they may experience financial gain by participating

and then responding in a certain way.” Id. ¶ 29.

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respondents against non-respondents, “this adjustment is meaningless without understanding

why respondents tended to have worked more days than non-respondents.” Saad Decl. ¶ 11. 

Plaintiffs did not make the respondent data available to Autozone’s expert, but Autozone’s

expert asserts that “the limited analysis I am able to perform already shows that the profiles

between the two groups are different, and thus the respondents are not representative of the

population as a whole.” Id. ¶ 14. He states that “Dr. Wazzan has essentially assumed there

is no non-response bias, which in the case of a 3% or 6% response rate, is simply not

appropriate.” Id. ¶ 16. “A survey that ‘begins with a random sample,’ but does not ‘take

measures to assure that the nonresponses are random and provide analysis of the reasons of

nonresponse’ is not ‘the product of reliable principles and methods.’” Wallace v.

Countrywide Home Loans Inc., No. SACV 08-1463-JST (MLGx), 2012 WL 11896333, at *4

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (excluding survey under Daubert). 

Third, there is also a problem of self-interest bias: “If the subject matter of a survey

interests a potential respondent, they will be more inclined to respond. . . . it would be

surprising if they did not make the connection between monetary gain and what their

responses would be to a survey.” Saad Decl. ¶ 15.29 “‘A sample that includes even a small

number of interested parties can produce biased results.’” Trahan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

No. C 09-03111 JSW, 2014 WL 3750053, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (quoting Duran, 59

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30 “The Court’s concerns regarding possible self-interest bias are compounded by the problems

identified by Defendants’ expert arising from the heavy reliance in the Pilot Survey—and in any future

survey—on the ability of the minor league players to remember the type of mundane events necessary

to come up with reliable answers to questions about the amount of time they spent on various types of

activities.” Id.

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Cal. 4th at 43). Autozone’s expert explained, “[I]f a class member recalled always taking

their rest breaks, they would infer that they were not entitled to any monetary award” and

might be “less inclined to participate.” Saad Decl. ¶ 15. On the other hand, a class member

might have been more inclined to participate, and to provide answers suggesting labor

violations, as the purpose of the survey was no mystery. The survey included a phone script

in which the surveyor stated: “Your contact information was obtained as part of a class action

lawsuit involving individuals who worked at Autozone in the state of California between July

2005 and December 2012. . . . The information you provide will be used in connection with

this lawsuit to help resolve it.” See Survey Layout (dkt. 264-4) at 18 of 71; see also Sirko,

2014 WL 4452699, at *4 (“The survey recipients had to have been aware they would be

potential beneficiaries of such a lawsuit. This undermines any possible inference that the

survey responses were objective. Because they survey lacks basic indicators of reliability,

the Court finds it inadmissible.”); Gibson, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (“More importantly, the

recipients of the survey were informed of the purpose of the survey and reminded that they

were the beneficiaries of the survey. This is exactly the situation that the Pittsburgh Press

court found so egregious.”); Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 43 (“[s]elf-interest may motivate class

members to act in ways that will maximize the class award.”).

Fourth, the survey asks respondents to recall very specific events that occurred

between three and a half and eleven years ago. See Senne Order re Class Cert. at 10230;

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28 31 Autozone also complains that the survey contains double hearsay. Mot. to Decertify at 5;

Reply re Mot. to Decertify at 4–5. Plaintiffs have no response. 

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Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 47 (“Witnesses’ recollections of their past overtime were bound to be

imprecise”). While class members might reliably remember whether they were “authorized

and permitted” to take one/two/three rest breaks when they worked Short/Mid/Long shifts

(although they might not if the policy was indeed in flux during the class period), some

questions asked individuals to recall specific information they would have no way of

recalling. “[H]ow would a respondent be expected to accurately distinguish shift[s] that were

3 hours 35 minutes in length versus shifts that were 3 hours 25 minutes in length?” Saad

Decl. ¶ 20. This is a real problem: when asked what percentage of his shifts between 3.5 and

4 hours contained an authorized rest break, respondent number 37 responded “About 75% of

the time,” though Autozone’s expert demonstrates that this individual worked only one shift

between 3.5 and 4 hours. Id. ¶ 21. In fact, of the 58 respondents who had only one shift

between 10 and 12 hours, over 79% gave a response between 25% and 75%. Id. ¶ 22. 

Further evidence that respondents had trouble remembering is that some gave different

answers in the survey than they did in depositions. See, e.g., Mann Reply Decl. (dkt. 313-2)

¶ 5, Ex. 1; Iskander Reply Decl. ¶¶ 2–3, Ex. A–B (McCarl responded that he was authorized

and permitted to take two rest breaks on Mid Shifts in the survey but at deposition did not

recall; Zavala responded on the survey that he did not know if he received a handbook, but at

deposition he responded that he had.).31 

Fifth, the survey was imprecise. It never clarified to respondents “that the questions

only relate to the respondents’ time as hourly, non-exempt employees,” and swept at least

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32 Autozone also notes a lack of clarity in a number of the questions. See Reply re Mot. to

Decertify at 6 (asserting that “Plaintiffs’ counsel objected to many of the survey questions in

deposition[s] as vague, ambiguous, and speculation.”); see, e.g., Iskander Reply Decl. (dkt. 313-1) Ex.

A (Zavala Depo.) at 37 (“Q. On shifts you worked longer than three and a half hours, but shorter than

four hours, were you authorized and permitted to take at least one rest break? Mr. Meneses: I’m going

to object. Vague. Calls for speculation.”).

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one manager into the responses. Id. ¶ 26. The survey also finds that 64% of survey

respondents recalled receiving an employee handbook, but it is unclear which

handbook—the 2004 handbook with the lawful policy, the 2008 handbook with the unlawful

policy, or some other handbook. See Wazzan Report ¶ 26 (“an employee handbook”). Nor

does the survey adequately address those employees who stated that they voluntarily chose

not to take rest breaks. Saad Decl. ¶¶ 41–45 (“Had Dr. Wazzan asked respondents if they did

not take some rest breaks because they voluntarily chose not to, he would be able to more

accurately estimate which respondents chose not to take a rest break, versus those who claim

they were not authorized and permitted to take one.”).32 

These problems with the survey are fundamental and demonstrate that it is an

unreliable means of measuring Autozone’s potential liability to individual employees. The

Court therefore excludes it under Rule 702 and Daubert. Without any rest break records and

without appropriate representational evidence, Plaintiffs will need to call each class member

into court to testify, a situation the Court previously described as “a nightmare.” See Tr. of

12/14/2012 at 24. Because Plaintiffs have not identified a viable method to proceed, the case

is unmanageable and class treatment is not superior under Rule 23(b)(3). See Ordonez, 2014

WL 4180958, at *6 (“substantial manageability problems remain” where “Plaintiff has not

proffered a viable method of determining when (or if) a particular employee took a rest break

on a particular day, short of obtaining testimony regarding each Radioshack store and each

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Radioshack employee. The parties agree that rest breaks were not recorded. . . .”)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate predominance or

manageability/superiority, the Court GRANTS the motion to decertify the class.

C. Motion to Remand Lozacruz Case

Finally, Plaintiff Jesus Lozacruz moves to remand his case to state court following

Autozone’s removal, on diversity grounds, in January of this year. See Mot. to Remand at 3. 

Lozacruz’s argument is simple: his is a PAGA case, and not a class action, and therefore

there is no diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2–3. Autozone counters by arguing that Lozacruz is

incorrect: his complaint does not plead a PAGA case, but “ten causes of action for alleged

wage losses and unreimbursed expenses” and PAGA penalties are just one of the remedies he

seeks. See Opp’n to Mot. to Remand (dkt. 316) at 1. Autozone is incorrect.

Lozacruz’s complaint repeatedly and unmistakably identifies itself as a PAGA

complaint. See generally Pantel Decl. (dkt. 309-1) Ex. A (hereinafter “Lozacruz Compl.”). 

This begins on its face. See id. at 2 (caption reads: “Enforcement Action Under the Private

Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq.”; Plaintiff is listed in the

caption as “Jesus Lozacruz, as an aggrieved employee pursuant to the Private Attorneys

General Act (‘PAGA’)”). The complaint begins, “Plaintiff, acting in the public interest as a

private attorney general pursuant to California Labor Code sections 2699(a), 2699.3, 2699.5

and 558. . . .” Id. at 1. It also states: “This is an enforcement action under the Labor Code

Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (‘PAGA’)

to recover civil penalties, and all other available relief on behalf of Plaintiff, the State of

California, and all persons that are or were employed by Defendants,” whom the complaint

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identifies as “aggrieved employees.” Id.33 The complaint includes the diversity-defeating

arguments that Lozacruz makes now (that there is no complete diversity because the State of

California is the real party in interest, and that under Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., 726 F.3d

1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013), civil penalties cannot be aggregated to satisfy the amount in

controversy requirement). Id. at 1. It includes numerous paragraphs about the applicability

of PAGA, Lozacruz’s status as an aggrieved employee, and his satisfying of administrative

remedies to bring a PAGA claim. See Pantel Decl. Ex. A ¶¶ 29–38.

Autozone’s contention that the complaint does not only seek PAGA remedies (and is

therefore not purely a PAGA complaint) is based on paragraph 38, which reads:

AUTOZONE, and others acting on its behalf, . . . have violated numerous

provisions of the Labor Code, including the sections regulating hours and days

of work, and the applicable Wage Order of the IWC. Accordingly, Plaintiff

seeks the remedies set forth in Labor Code section 558 for himself, the State of

California and all aggrieved employees. Specifically, pursuant to PAGA, and

in particular California Labor Code sections 2699(a), 2699.3, 2699.5 and 558,

Plaintiff, acting in the public interest as a private attorney general, seeks

assessment and collection of civil penalties for himself, all aggrieved

employees, and the State of California against AUTOZONE, in addition to

other remedies, for violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203,

204, 226(a), 226.7, 450, 510, 512(a), 1174(d), 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1,

1198, and 2802.

Id. ¶ 38. Autozone latches on to the “in addition to other remedies” language and argues that

“wages are ‘remedies’” for violation of many of the statutes the complaint lists—and so

Lozacruz must be seeking wages. Opp’n to Mot. to Remand at 1–2. Although the “in

addition to other remedies” language is somewhat ambiguous, and echoed elsewhere, see,

e.g., Lozacruz Compl. ¶ 1 (“and all other available relief”); ¶ 35 (“in addition to other

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34 The complete sentence in paragraph 35 is: “Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the administrative

prerequisites under California Labor Code section 2699.3(a) to recover civil penalties and unpaid wages

against Defendants pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. and 558, in addition to other

remedies, for violations of California Labor Code § 201, 202, 203, 204, 226(a), 226.7, 450, 510, 512(a),

1174(d), 1182.12. 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802.” Id. Although that sentence actually includes the

words “and unpaid wages,” the context is Lozacruz’s assertion that he has satisfied the administrative

prerequisites under section 2699.3(a) (“Requirements for aggrieved employee to commence a civil

action” under PAGA). See Lozacruz Compl. ¶ 35; Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a). 

35 Cal. Code Civ. P. § 580(a) reads: “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer,

cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint. . . but in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff

any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.” 

36 That case actually held that the defendant “had a right to rely on the pleading limiting the

amount of damages,” and “had a right to rely upon the provisions of [section 580(b)(1)], which provides

that in a limited civil case, relief may not be granted which exceeds the maximum amount in controversy

for a limited civil case.” Id. This does not support Autozone’s argument that—notwithstanding the

complaint here—Lozacruz might end up recovering unpaid wages he does not seek. See Opp’n to Mot.

to Remand at 14.

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remedies”),34 and at 23 (Prayer for Relief, seeking “civil penalties, costs, and attorneys’ fees .

. . and such other and further relief as the Court may deem equitable and appropriate,”), there

is simply no way to read the complaint as seeking such wages. 

Although the sections that Autozone identifies indeed provide for wage remedies, the

complaint does not seek wages in its discussion of each section. See, e.g., Lozacruz Compl.

¶¶ 60, 69 (no wages sought in reference to § 226.7); id. ¶ 74 (no wages sought in reference to

§ 203); ¶ 48 (no wages sought in reference to § 510); ¶ 51 (no wages sought in reference to

§ 1194). Autozone argues that this is not controlling—that under California law, the court

“may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and

embraced within the issue,” see Opp’n to Mot. to Remand at 14 (citing Cal. Code. Civ. P. 

§ 580;35 Wozniak v. Lucutz, 102 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1044 (2002),36 disapproved on other

grounds by Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC, 61 Cal. 4th

830, 844 (2015); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 875, 883

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37 That case held: “it is fundamental that after trial on the merits, the court may afford any form

of relief supported by the evidence and as to which the parties were on notice, whether requested in the

pleadings or not. . . . [Defendant] had ample notice prior to trial that [Plaintiff] sought the imposition

of a resulting or constructive trust upon the proceeds of the settlement. The stipulation signed by

counsel for all parties approximately two months before trial expressly stated that American Motorists

desired relief by way of a constructive trust on the settlement proceeds.” Id. (emphasis added).

American Motorists is therefore distinguishable from the present case, where—given the explicit

statements in the complaint and in the briefing on this motion—Autozone would not be on notice that

Lozacruz intended to recover unpaid wages as a result of the alleged Labor Code violations. 

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(1982)).37 But that authority does not support the notion that a court could award a plaintiff

unpaid wages if it understood his complaint to only seek remedies under PAGA. See Achal

v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that a

prevailing plaintiff in a PAGA case is statutorily entitled only to 25% of civil penalties

recovered). Lozacruz explains that the reason he included the underlying Labor Code

violations in his complaint was to show that he is aggrieved and has standing to sue. Mot. to

Remand at 4. Indeed, how else could one advance a PAGA action? Moreover, Lozacruz

explicitly states in his briefing that he “does not seek individual damages or restitution for

himself. The operative complaint seeks only civil penalties on behalf of the State of

California pursuant to [PAGA].” Mot. to Remand at 2. Although Autozone complains that

“Plaintiff did not file a declaration or any evidence with this Motion disclaiming an interest

in recovering wages,” Opp’n to Mot. to Remand at 2, neither does Autozone point to any

requirement that Lozacruz do so. 

Given that this is a PAGA case, and that Lozacruz does not seek statutory damages

based on the alleged underlying Labor Code violations, his case does not nearly meet the

$75,000 diversity threshold. In his Reply, Lozacruz spells out that he is seeking: 

1. $3,750 total civil penalties relating to the underlying labor code

violations re overtime wages; 

2. $3,750 total civil penalties relating to the underlying labor code

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28 38 Because the Court holds that the amount in controversy requirement is not met, it does not

reach the question of complete diversity. 

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violations re off-the-clock wages;

3. $3,750 total civil penalties related to the underlying labor code

violations re meal periods;

4. $3,750 total civil penalties related to the underlying labor code

violations re rest breaks;

5. $150 total civil penalties related to the underlying labor code violations

re Late Wages at Separation;

6. $16,014 total civil penalties related to the underlying labor code

violations re Late Wages During Employment;

7. $5,000 penalties relating to wage statements;

8. $2,500 civil penalties relating to reporting time pay;

9. $2,500 civil penalties relating to business expenses;

10. $2,500 civil penalties relating to forced patronage;

11. Attorneys’ Fees of $30,000.

See Reply re Mot. to Remand (dkt. 318) at 6–7. That number adds up to $73,664. Lozacruz

hastens to point out, however, that he is not entitled to the total civil penalties, but only to

25% of them. Id. (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(I) (aggrieved employee entitled to 25%)). 

Moreover, under Urbino, 726 F.3d at 1122, PAGA penalties cannot be aggregated to meet

the amount in controversy requirement. Lozacruz’s 25% share of the $43,664 in civil

penalties amounts to $10,916. See Millar v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:15-cv-03320-LB,

2015 WL 5698744, at *3, 5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (recognizing that weight of authority

in this district “considers only the named plaintiff’s PAGA penalties when determining the

amount in controversy”). The total amount in controversy in Lozacruz’s case is therefore

$10,916 (amounting to Lozacruz’s 25% of civil penalties under PAGA) plus $30,000 in

attorneys’ fees, or $40,916—well below the $75,000 diversity threshold.38 

The Court holds that Autozone has not met its burden of establishing that removal was

proper, see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566–67 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting also “‘strong

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presumption’ against removal jurisdiction”), and GRANTS the motion to remand the

Lozacruz case.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment; GRANTS Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to the PAGA

claims, the section 558 penalties, and the prejudgment interest under section 218.6; DENIES

Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to section 203; DENIES Plaintiffs’

motion to strike; DENIES AS MOOT Autozone’s motion to strike; GRANTS Autozone’s

motion to decertify; and GRANTS Plaintiff Lozacruz’s motion to remand his case only.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 10, 2016 

HON. CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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