Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00556/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00556-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

P.I.C. INTERNATIONAL INC., a 

California corporation d/b/a H2Odyssey 

and LI CHUNG PLASTICS INDUSTRY 

CO., a Taiwan corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MIFLEX 2 SPA, an Italy corporation and 

MAURO MAZZO, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0556-CAB-WVG

ORDER ON DEFENDANT MAURO 

MAZZO’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

[Doc. No. 16.]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Mauro Mazzo’s (“Mazzo”) motion 

to dismiss [Doc. No. 16]. On August 8, 2017, Defendant Mazzo sought dismissal of the 

lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Additionally, Defendant Mazzo 

moved the Court for an award of $6,135.00 in attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1927.

In the interim between Defendant Mazzo’s filing of the motion to dismiss and 

Plaintiffs’ response in opposition’s due date, this Court issued an order on Defendant 

MiFlex 2 S.P.A’s motion to dismiss. Based on the affidavits and documentary evidence 

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before it the Court determined that Defendant MiFlex was not subject to the personal 

jurisdiction in this court. [Doc. No. 17.] In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on 

Defendant Mazzo’s declaration that provided details of MiFlex’s contacts with California 

and lack thereof, to find that MiFlex did not have sufficient minimum contacts with 

California to support a claim of specific personal jurisdiction over it. [See Doc. No. 12-2. 

at ¶¶ 12, 18, 19-23, 25, 26, 28-32.] Defendant Mazzo relies on essentially the same 

evidence as MiFlex did in its earlier motion.

The deadline for Plaintiffs to file their opposition has come and gone, and as of the 

date of this order, Plaintiffs have not filed a response. On September 5, 2017, Defendant 

Mazzo filed his reply, noting Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose the motion1and requesting the 

Court grant his motion to dismiss and for monetary sanctions in full. [Doc. No. 18.] 

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a district court to dismiss an action 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. In order to survive the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must 

show that Defendant Mazzo has minimum contacts with the forum state as will “potentially 

allow exercise of personal jurisdiction” over him. Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Because the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is based on 

affidavits and documentary evidence, Plaintiffs are required to make a prima facie showing 

that Mazzo is subject to personal jurisdiction in California. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton 

Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene 

Tech., 566 F.3d 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 

1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant Mazzo submitted declarations from 

himself, Matthew C. Lapple, and incorporates by reference, the earlier declaration he made 

 

1 Local Rule 7.1 (f)(3) provides that “if an opposing party fails to file the papers required by Civ. Local 

Rule 7.1.e.2. that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of the motion.”

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in support of Defendant MiFlex’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 12-2, 16-2, 16-5] In the 

declaration filed in support of this motion Mazzo attests that he is an Italian citizen, 

domiciliary and businessman who has lived most of his life in Italy. [Doc. No. 16-2 at ¶ 

9.] Mazzo declares that in May 2015 he executed a contract with MiFlex 2 to sell all of his 

rights and interests in the ‘722 patent at issue in this case. [Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14.] Mazzo also 

declares that, in his personal capacity, he has no contacts with California other than 

vacations taken here in the past, does not own or rent any property in California, has no 

assets or employees in California, and has never paid any California taxes. [Doc. No. 16-

2 at ¶¶ 19, 22, 23.] He also states that with the exception of the present lawsuit, neither 

MiFlex nor himself, has ever been sued or filed a lawsuit in California, and since the 

patent’s issuance in 2013, has sent only eight cease and desist letters to five companies, 

two of which, Oceanic and Trident Diving Equipment, are based in California. [Doc. No. 

12-2 at ¶¶ 15, 16, 34-36; Doc. No. 16-2 at ¶ 18, 20] 

By not filing an opposition, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating 

that Mazzo “has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the 

litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’” 

Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted)). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that 

Defendant Mazzo is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court2. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Mazzo’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 

16], and hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ claims against Mazzo are DISMISSED.

 

2 Having determined that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Mazzo, the Court need not address 

his argument that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter to grant 

declaratory relief.

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B. Request for Attorneys’ Fees

Defendant Mazzo moved the Court for an award of $6,135.00 in attorneys’ fees, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 provides that: 

[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 

United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 

any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 

because of such conduct.

28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 sanctions must be supported by a finding of bad faith or 

recklessness. Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th 

Cir. 2010); In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996). “Bad 

faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or 

argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” In re Keegan, 78 

F.3d at 436 (citation omitted). 

Defendant Mazzo asserts that on multiple occasions requests were made to dismiss 

him from the case because he was not a proper defendant in the declaratory judgment 

action. Mazzo declares that he provided Plaintiffs’ counsel with a “Confirmatory 

Assignment” attesting to the comprehensiveness of the original assignment he executed 

that transferred all of his rights to the ‘722 patent, including the right to seek damages for 

past infringement, to MiFlex. [Doc. Nos. 16-3, 16-4.] The Confirmatory Assignment was 

signed on the July 21, 2017 and emailed to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Trevor Coddington. [Doc. 

No. 16-4; 16-5 at ¶ 7; Doc. No. 16-10.] Defendant Mazzo contends that upon receipt of 

this indisputable proof that he personally could not and did not pose any patent enforcement 

threat to Plaintiffs they should have dismissed him from this case. In Mazzo’s view 

Plaintiffs’ have “vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the proceedings in this case by 

refusing to voluntarily dismiss Mr. Mazzo.” [Doc. No 16-1 at 21.]

3

 Further, Defendant 

 

3 Page cites refer to the CM/ECF assigned page designations at the top of the docketed document.

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Mazzo asserts that Plaintiffs’ continued refusal to dismiss him “gives rise to the inference 

that either Plaintiff’s or their counsel sought to impose upon Defendant Mazzo the 

additional expense and effort of filing the present motion for dismissal.” [Id. at 22.] 

Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition to this request, therefore there is no evidence

before the court that their refusal to dismiss Defendant Mazzo from the case was not done 

in bad faith for the purpose of harassing him. Furthermore, upon receipt of the 

Confirmatory Assignment, Plaintiffs’ were on notice that Mazzo was not a proper 

defendant in this action yet refused to dismiss him. Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Defendant Mazzo’s motion to sanction Plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Accordingly, 

the Court hereby ORDERS Plaintiffs pay Defendant Mazzo $6,135.00 in attorneys’ fees

to cover the costs reasonably incurred because of their conduct.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2017

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