Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01931/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01931-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joochul Kim, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Board of Regents, et al.,, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-04-1931-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is the question of whether Mr. Kim’s claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should proceed to trial. 

I. Procedural History

On April 6, 2009, the Court held a Final Pretrial Conference (FPTC), at which time

the Court addressed the issue of Mr. Kim’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims, and whether these two

claims remained viable following the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate, which reversed in part and

affirmed in part this Court’s September 29, 2006 Order granting summary judgment in favor

of Defendants on all five Counts contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

At the FPTC, Defendants argued that neither the § 1981 claim, nor the § 1983 claim

should be permitted to proceed to trial. With respect to these claims, Defendants argued that

Plaintiff’s appeal should be construed as dealing only with his Title VII claims because the

§ 1981 and § 1983 claims were not specifically addressed in either Plaintiff’s appellate

briefing or by the Ninth Circuit’s in its Memorandum Opinion. Plaintiff responded by

Case 2:04-cv-01931-MHM Document 127 Filed 04/16/09 Page 1 of 5
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Kim had abandoned his Title VII

retaliation claim.

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arguing that the only aspect of the September 29, 2006 Summary Judgment Order that was

affirmed on appeal was the dismissal of Mr. Kim’s § 1983 claim based on Procedural Due

Process under the 14th Amendment.1

 Plaintiff contended that all remaining issues, namely,

the Title VII, § 1981 and § 1983 claims, remain viable and must be permitted to proceed to

trial. 

After hearing the Parties’ respective positions, but without making an ultimate

determination as to whether Mr. Kim’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims were in fact triable, the

Court informed Mr. Kim’s counsel that they should prepare for trial as if only the Title VII

claims would be moving forward. At the same time, the Court directed the Parties to submit

supplemental briefing on the § 1981 and § 1983 issues; this briefing was due by close of

business Friday, April 11, 2009. 

On Monday, April 13, 2009, without waiting for this Court to issue a final decision,

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Ninth Circuit, and moved the Circuit

to stay the district court proceedings during the pendency of the Petition. 

II. Legal Analysis

Despite Plaintiff’s premature attempt to seek appellate intervention, the Court finds

that the positions set forth by Plaintiff in his supplemental filing are legally correct, and both

the § 1981 and § 1983 claims are viable. 

With respect to the procedural posture of a case on remand, the Ninth Circuit has

previously stated that without question “the trial court must proceed in accordance with the

mandate on appeal.” Stevens v. F/V Bonnie Doon, 731 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).

Yet, while the mandate is obviously controlling “as to all matters within its compass,” it

leaves the district court with the discretion to resolve “any issue not expressly or impliedly

disposed of on appeal.” Id. Admittedly, the record currently before the Court is not a model

of clarity. To begin with, Count V in Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to contain two separate

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claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: one claim under the Equal Protection Clause and

another under the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, although Defendants moved for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s “§ 1983 Count,” it does not appear as though Defendants

actually made an argument before this Court on the equal protection aspect of that Count.

In any event, Plaintiff never brought this issue to the Court’s attention and all five Counts of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, including both aspects of the § 1983 Count, were subsequently

dismissed. Plaintiff then appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff’s opening brief focused solely on the

legal merits of his Title VII discrimination claim. Plaintiff did not make a separate and

distinct legal argument that dismissal of his § 1983 equal protection claim or his § 1981 claim

was in error. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting

that the Ninth Circuit does not generally consider matters that “are not specifically and

distinctly argued in an appellant’s opening brief”). In fact, this Court noted that the words

“equal protection” do not appear anywhere in Plaintiff’s opening appellate brief. 

In September 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued a Memorandum Opinion, where it noted

that Plaintiff had “appeal[ed] the district court’s grant of summary judgment . . . on Kim’s

claims for national origin/racial discrimination and violation of due process pursuant to Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Dkt.#

88, Attachment 2, p.2) (Emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to Defendants’ position, the

Ninth Circuit apparently recognized that Plaintiff had preserved all five of his Counts for

appellate review. Citing only one case, Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir.

1994), the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that there were “genuine issue of material fact

whether the University discriminated against Kim on the basis of his Asian ethnicity . . ..”

Id. The court went on to conclude that this Court erred in “granting summary judgment on

Kim’s discrimination claim.” Id. (Emphasis added). Presumably, the discrimination claim

that the Circuit was referring to was Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, since his appellate briefing

focused solely on that issue. Because the Ninth Circuit opinion refers to only a single claim

of discrimination, the status of Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim and § 1983 equal protection claim,

which were based on the same allegedly discriminatory facts, remains uncertain and there

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are the Parties have presented colorable arguments that could sufficiently support a finding

in either direction. 

On the one hand, as Plaintiff argues, if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the

Title VII discrimination claim, then the same should be true for the two additional claims.

After all, Plaintiff’s claims under the equal protection clause and § 1981 are, like his Title

VII claim, related to allegations of national origin/racial discrimination. In addition, Plaintiff

argues that the Lam case, which was the only case relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in its

Memorandum Opinion, had a procedural history similar to the instant case. In Lam, the

plaintiff had brought claims of discrimination under Title VII, § 1981 and § 1983. The Ninth

Circuit then analyzed whether there was sufficient evidence of discrimination under Title VII

alone. Upon finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to discrimination under

Title VII, the court summarily applied the legal conclusion that it had reached under Title VII

to the discrimination claims brought under § 1981 and § 1983. Lam, therefore, arguably held

that the viability of a claim for discrimination under § 1981 or § 1983 could either rise or fall

with the court’s legal determination of Title VII. Plaintiff contends that the holding of Lam

should compel the same result in the instant case. 

On the other hand, in its Memorandum Opinion, the Ninth Circuit, when reversing this

Court’s grant of summary judgment, referred only to Mr. Kim’s discrimination claim in a

singular sense. Presumably, the Circuit addressed a single discrimination claim because

Plaintiff solely briefed the Title VII discrimination issue on appeal. Therefore, one

permissible reading of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is that this Court’s September 2006

Summary Judgment Order was reversed only as to Kim’s Title VII claim, rather than

multiple discrimination claims brought under § 1981 and § 1983. 

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim

and § 1983 equal protection claim should be allowed to proceed to trial, as each claim

concerns the University’s allegedly discriminatory practices, which is the very factual issue

for which the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for determination by a jury. Given the Ninth

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Circuit’s mandate and the confusing state of the record, the most prudent course of action is

to let all of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims proceed to trial.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s request to allow his claims for relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 move forward to trial.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2009.

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