Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-02167/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-02167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 Respondent argues throughout her motion that references to certain

constitutional amendments in the pleading are inapposite. The court finds

this is not a ground to dismiss any claim or portion of a claim.

United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Jeffrey Gerard Jones,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 97-2167 MCE PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Jill L. Brown, Acting Warden, Death Penalty Case

San Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

-oOoThis capital habeas corpus action proceeds on the October

30, 2003, second amended petition.

Respondent moved August 24, 2004, to dismiss some claims in

the petition either because petitioner defaulted them in state

court or they fail to state a federal claim for relief, or both. 

Respondent also contends one claim is time-barred, one claim is

unexhausted, petitioner lacks standing to assert one claim, and

one claim is premature.1

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Petitioner was convicted by a jury and judgment was imposed

February 22, 1989. His opening brief in his automatic appeal was

filed September 7, 1994. Judgment was affirmed March 10, 1997,

in People v. Jones, 15 Cal. 4th 119 (1997). In affirming, the

court found petitioner had waived some of his claims by failing

to object in the trial court. 

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court December 6, 1995, and it was

denied November 3, 1997. See Respondent’s Item 61, lodged April

30, 2004. Some claims were denied because they could have been,

but were not, raised on appeal (id., citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal.

2d 756 (1953)), or because they were raised and rejected on

appeal. Id., citing In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965). 

Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court December 5, 2000, and it was denied

September 24, 2003. See Respondent’s Item 60, lodged April 30,

2004. Some claims were denied as untimely. Id., citing In re

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). 

Federal courts will not review a claim decided by a state

court if its decision rests on a state law that is independent of

the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). A state rule is

“independent” if not interwoven with federal law. Michigan v.

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). It is “adequate” if clear,

well-established and consistently applied. Bargas v. Burns, 179

F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999). The relevant date for

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determining the independence of the state procedural rule is the

date the state court makes its order finding the claim barred. 

See La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (assessing whether

California’s Dixon rule was “independent” when the California

Supreme Court denied petitioner’s habeas petition). The

adequacy of a state procedural rule is determined at the time of

the petitioner’s purported default. Id. Thus, the respective

dates for determining the adequacy and independence of a state

procedural rule may not be the same. 

Respondent asserts some claims are barred by California’s

requirement that habeas claims be timely presented. Pursuant to

policies adopted by the California Supreme Court in June 1989, a

habeas petition was presumed timely if filed within 90 days after

a petitioner’s reply brief on direct appeal was due. See In re

Robbins, 19 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998). If not entitled to this

presumption, a petitioner had to demonstrate timeliness by

establishing absence of substantial delay, good cause for delay

or an exception. Id. Because there was an exception for error

of federal constitutional magnitude, this rule was not

independent and was ineffective to bar federal review until the

Robbins decision August 3, 1998, when the California Supreme

Court disentangled its timeliness rule from any consideration of

federal constitutional law. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,

581 (9th Cir. 2003). Robbins was decided before the California

Supreme Court imposed the procedural bar on petitioner in 2000. 

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Petitioner’s attempt to distinguish Bennett upon the ground it

was not a capital case is unpersuasive insofar as it concerns the

independence of the rule. 

To assert the bar here, respondent also must sustain a

burden of establishing that California’s timeliness rule is

adequate. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86 (burden of proving

adequacy of a state bar lies with the state). Unlike the

“independence” determination, adequacy is assessed at the time

the actual default occurred. The California Supreme Court did

not state when petitioner defaulted the court’s timeliness rule

but, necessarily, it was some time between December 6, 1995, when

he filed his first petition (that was not found untimely) and

December 5, 2000, when he filed his second petition (that was

found untimely). As most of this period of delay occurred before

the Robbins decision, in light of the state court’s omission to

specify when the default occurred, it is not possible for

respondent to satisfy its burden.

Respondent next asserts some claims are procedurally

defaulted because they were not presented in petitioner’s opening

brief on appeal. See Dixon. At least until August 3, 1998, when

the California Supreme Court decided Robbins, the Dixon rule was

neither an independent nor an adequate state law ground. Park,

202 F.3d 1146 (Dixon rule not independent pre-Robbins); Fields v.

Calderon, 125 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1997) (Dixon rule unclear and

inconsistently applied as late as 1993). This default occurred

in 1994, when petitioner filed his opening brief on appeal. 

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Accordingly, none of petitioner’s claims is barred because not

presented on direct appeal. 

Respondent asserts some claims are procedurally defaulted

because petitioner violated California’s rules against piecemeal

litigation of claims, viz., “successive” petitions. The alleged

default occurred December 6, 1995, when petitioner filed his

first state habeas petition and did not include all of his

claims. California’s piecemeal litigation rule was not

“independent” of federal law until the state supreme court

decided In re Robbins in 1998. See Bennett. 

Respondent contends petitioner’s Claims II, VIII-B, VIII-C1,

VIII-C3, VIII-D and X are procedurally defaulted because counsel

failed to make contemporaneous objections at trial and the

California Supreme Court consequently found them waived. 

Petitioner opposes, arguing that the contemporaneous

objection rule was not well-established, clear, or consistently

applied at the time of petitioner’s trial; the rule does not

apply in capital cases because the California Supreme Court has

an affirmative duty to review the entire record of such cases for

error; and counsel was ineffective in failing to object and thus

review of the claims is not barred. 

California’s contemporaneous objection rule is an adequate

and independent state procedural rule enforceable by federal

courts when properly invoked by state courts. Rich v. Calderon,

187 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Hines v. Enmoto,

658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981), reversed on other grounds in

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Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); Van Sickel v. White, 166

F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Petitioner in essence concedes the rule but contends

California excepts capital cases. In People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d

321, 328 (1946), the California Supreme Court found that an

imperfect hearsay objection, conceded by the state, adequately

preserved the issue for appeal but also said that by providing

for automatic appeal to the supreme court in death penalty cases

and enjoining the court to examine the record and prepare a

written decision “from which it should appear that no miscarriage

of justice has resulted” and in view of the fact many capital

cases are defended by inexperienced appointed counsel, “it would

seem appropriate for this court to take a liberal view of the

technical rules applicable to criminal cases generally . . . and

examine the record with the view of determining whether or not in

the light of all that transpired at the trial of the case a

miscarriage of justice has resulted.” 

In People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711 (1985), the court

reversed a death penalty imposed in part on evidence obtained

pursuant to an overly broad warrant. The court acknowledged the

trial objection “could have been more specific,” then added:

[W]hile in a noncapital case a claim of erroneous

admission of evidence will not be reviewed in the

absence of a timely and proper objection . . . , we

have long followed a different rule in capital cases. 

On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of

death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an

objection will be disregarded and the entire record

will be examine[d] to determine if a miscarriage of

justice resulted. (People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321,

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328 [175 P.2d 12].) The Bob rule is even more relevant

today, in light of the recognition by the United States

Supreme Court of the fact that death is “profoundly

different from all other penalties” (Eddings v.

Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, [71 L.Ed. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct.

869]) and its repeated holdings that a capital

defendant is therefore entitled to enhanced procedural

protections against arbitrary infliction of the supreme

penalty. Indeed, this court recently cited Bob in

support of its promise that in capital cases it will

review trial errors even when defense counsel has

failed to complain of them on appeal. (People v.

Easley (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 858, 864 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309,

671 P.2d 813].)

Id. at 729 n. 3. 

In Easley the court withdrew an opinion after the state

public defender filed an amicus curiae brief on a number of

“significant legal issues” in the penalty phase of the trial that

neither the defense nor the state had raised, saying:

Recognizing that in death penalty cases the provisions

of section 1239, subdivision (b) impose “a duty upon

this court ‘to make an examination of the complete

record of the proceedings . . . to the end that it be

ascertained whether defendant was given a fair trial”

[citations omitted], we granted a rehearing to give

full consideration to the new issues.

34 Cal. 3d at 864-65. But the court then invoked the rule

barring attacks on search warrants not raised in the trial court

and examined the issue only insofar as it implicated competency

of trial counsel. 

Based on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Rich and Van

Sickel, I conclude these state court decisions do not establish

an exception to California’s general rule requiring objection in

the trial court. Accordingly, Claims II, VIII-B, VIII-C1, VIIIC3, VIII-D and X should be dismissed on this ground. That

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conclusion, however, does not foreclose examination of the same

issues pursuant to a claim that petitioner’s counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to make those objections at the

trial. 

Respondent asserts Claims III, IV, V, VIII and X should be

dismissed for failure to state a federal question. 

Claim III alleges that petitioner was denied assistance of

competent experts, the competent assistance of counsel and,

consequently, a reliable determination of competency, guilt,

sanity and penalty. Specifically, petitioner challenges trial

counsel’s choice of Dr. Edwards as an expert neuro-psychologist

at the competency phase, and decision to abandon all issues

pertaining to neuro-psychology at subsequent stages. Petitioner

claims a violation of two rights, that of competent expert

assistance (Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) and that of

effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). 

Respondent argues there is no federal constitutional right

to the assistance of an effective expert. 

Ake gives a criminal defendant a right of access to a

competent psychiatric expert but the state fulfills its duty by

giving defendant’s counsel funds to engage the expert. Harris v.

Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the state

satisfied that obligation regardless of whether, in hindsight,

the services provided by Dr. Edwards’ proved “competent”. The

court will address Claim III through the lens of Strickland by

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asking whether counsel reasonably relied upon Dr. Edwards’

evidence. Separate “Ake” claims should be dismissed.

Respondent contends as to Claim IV-A of the petition that

“the portion” of the claim citing People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d

258 (1978) should be dismissed as stating a claim of a state law

violation only. Each reference to Wheeler in the pleading

includes a reference in the same sentence to Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986). While citation to Wheeler is unnecessary,

this superfluity does not vitiate the pleading.

Respondent also seeks dismissal of Claim IV-C. Petitioner

alleges denial of his request for a separate penalty jury

violated his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments and his right to a reliable determination

of capital sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Respondent

argues this claim merely asserts evidence of petitioner’s antisocial behavior admitted during sanity phase was inadmissible as

an aggravating factor in the penalty phase, and federal habeas

corpus does not lie to review questions about the admissibility

of evidence. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). 

However, respondent herself admits such evidentiary ruling may

state a federal claim if it violates petitioner’s fundamental

right to a fair trial. Respondent’s argument fails and dismissal

is not warranted. 

Claim VII alleges petitioner was denied procedural due

process by being deprived of a full and fair hearing of his

competency to stand trial because he was mentally absent (Claim

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I), forcibly medicated (Claim II), and denied effective

assistance of counsel at the competency hearing (Claim III). In

essence, this is a “cumulative error” claim which this court must

consider whether or not it was presented in state court as an

independent claim. See e.g., Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th

Cir. 1992). “Relation back” is not truly at issue; this claim is

not time-barred where component claims were filed timely in state

court. 

Respondent contends portions of Claim XIII alleging

constitutional violations based on incompetency during appellate

and state post-conviction proceedings are unexhausted. 

Respondent admits this court found the claim exhausted in its

March 13, 2000, findings and recommendations adopted by the

district court June 22, 2000. Respondent has not shown that

resolution of the claim will turn on facts that fundamentally

alter the claim presented in the California Supreme Court. 

Respondent argues, citing only decisions from other

circuits, that Claim XVII should be dismissed because petitioner

lacks standing to challenge violations of international treaties. 

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Breard v. Greene,

523 U.S. 371 (1998), recognizing the standing of a criminal

defendant but not of a foreign government to assert rights under

the Vienna Convention, disproved respondent’s argument. 

Dismissal of Claim XIII is unwarranted. 

Finally, respondent asserts petitioner’s Claim XIX, that he

is incompetent to be executed, is premature because no execution

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date yet has been set. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399

(1986). This claim was raised in petitioner’s second state

habeas petition and dismissed as premature, and petitioner

explains he now raises it in this proceeding to preserve his

rights under Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998).

Petitioner concedes the claim is not ripe. It should be

dismissed as premature. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that:

1. Respondent’s August 24, 2004, motion to dismiss be

granted in part;

2. Claims II, VIII-B, VIII-C1, VIII-C3, VIII-D and X be

dismissed based on California’s contemporaneous objection rule;

3. Allegations in Claim III the state violated plaintiff’s

right to a competent expert under Ake v. Oklahoma be dismissed

and the claim be addressed only as alleging ineffective

assistance under Strickland v. Washington; and

4. Claim XIX be dismissed as premature. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: June 2, 2005. 

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 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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