Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905-89/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF

E-filed: 7/24/2008 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. C-00-20905 RMW

ORDER DENYING THE

MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW

TRIAL

[Re Docket No. 3640]

 RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket No. 1678]

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1 For the purposes of this order, the court uses "the Manufacturers" to collectively refer

to the Hynix, Micron, and Nanya entities.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 2

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket No. 1279]

Following a seven-and-a-half week consolidated trial on the jury issues set forth in the

parties' Joint Pretrial Statement filed January 14, 2008, the jury returned a verdict in favor of

Rambus and against the Manufacturers.1

 See, e.g., Special Verdict Form, Docket No. 1651, C-05-

00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008). Specifically, the jury found that Rambus did not commit

monopolization or attempted monopolization because it did not engage in anticompetitive conduct. 

Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. The jury also found that Rambus did not commit fraud because it made no false

misrepresentations and uttered no half-truths. Id. ¶¶ 12, 19, 26, 31. Finally, the jury found that

Rambus did not commit fraud because JEDEC members did not share a clearly defined expectation

that members would disclose relevant information they had about patent applications or the intent to

file patent applications on technology being considered for adoption as a JEDEC standard.

Id. ¶ 45.

The Manufacturers move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 for a number of reasons. 

Rambus opposes the motion. The court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of

counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion for a new trial.

I. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER RULE 59

After a jury has returned its verdict, the court may grant a new trial "for any reason for which

a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(a)(1)(A). The Manufacturers' motion for a new trial rests on an alleged error with respect to a

jury instruction, numerous evidentiary rulings, and on the basis that the verdict was against the

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 3

weight of the evidence. If the allegations were supported, they could justify a new trial. See 11

WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2805, at 55 (2d ed. 1995) (noting

that "any error of law, if prejudicial, is a good ground for a new trial" and listing other commons

reasons for holding a new trial). However, they are not.

II. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT INSTRUCTION

The Manufacturers first argue that jury instruction no. 26 ("Monopolization —

Anticompetitive Behavior in Standard-Setting") was erroneous. The entire instruction read:

The Manufacturers allege that Rambus willfully acquired or maintained

monopoly power based on anticompetitive behavior at JEDEC. JEDEC is a

standard-setting organization. A standard can enhance consumer welfare by

ensuring interoperability of products and devices and making multiple sources of

supply available to consumers. The ideal standard-setting process can allow

members of a standard-setting organization to make an objective comparison

between competing technologies before a standard is adopted. Based on the available

information, a rational standard-setting organization can select the best technology

(considering its cost and its performance) and can include that technology in the

standard. To the extent the marketplace recognizes only one standard, the process of

standardization may eliminate alternative technologies. When a patented technology

is incorporated into such a standard, adoption of the standard may eliminate

alternatives to the patented technology. Nonetheless, "winning" the competition

between technologies to be included in the standard may enhance consumer welfare

and not be anticompetitive, even if the technology is covered by a patent.

Disruption of a standards-setting process, however, may be anticompetitive.

If (1) JEDEC members shared a clearly defined expectation that members would

disclose relevant knowledge they had about patent applications or the intent to file

patent applications on technology being considered for adoption as a JEDEC

standard; (2) Rambus knowingly failed to disclose such information; (3) JEDEC

members relied on the requirement that Rambus would disclose such relevant patent

applications or its intent to file such applications when JEDEC adopted its standards;

and (4) Rambus later attempted to enforce such a patent against a standard-compliant

product, then you may find that Rambus willfully acquired or maintained monopoly

power through anticompetitive acts.

In determining whether JEDEC members shared a clearly defined expectation

that patent applications or the intent to file patent applications on standards being

considered by JEDEC must be disclosed, you may consider, among other factors: (1)

the expectations of individual JEDEC members; (2) any behavior by JEDEC

members with respect to disclosing or not disclosing such information; (3) oral

information communicated or discussed at JEDEC meetings or in JEDEC minutes;

(4) any written rules of JEDEC made available to members; (5) customs of the

industry; and (6) the purpose of JEDEC. The written rules of JEDEC during the

time that Rambus was a member were not in and of themselves definite enough to

require mandatory disclosure of patent applications or the intent to file such

applications. However, those rules may be considered as a factor in deciding

whether the JEDEC members shared a clearly defined expectation that such

applications or the intent to file such applications would be disclosed.

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2 The Federal Circuit suggests that whether a duty to disclose exists is a question for the

court. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1087 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However,

underlying factual questions such as what were the expectations of JEDEC members and what was the

custom within JEDEC are underlying factual questions for the jury.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 4

Jury Instructions, Docket No. 1650, Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., C-05-00334-RMW,

at 33 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008) (emphasis added). Specifically, the Manufacturers argue that the

emphasized portion instructing the jury that JEDEC's written policies alone were not enough to

require disclosure improperly removed a factual issue from the jury's decision making.

The court disagrees. Whether there is a duty to disclose information is a question of law,

though factual disputes must be resolved by the jury. See Rest. (2d) Torts § 551, cmt. m.2 In this

case, the court instructed the jury that a claim for fraud or monopolization could stem from the

violation of a "shared" and "clearly defined expectation" that JEDEC members would disclose

relevant information. The jury was further instructed on a number of factors to consider, but the

court also stated that JEDEC's written rules alone were not by themselves definite enough to require

mandatory disclosure of patent applications or the intent to file such applications. This caveat

represented the court's narrow holding limiting the legal duty to disclose.

That instruction flowed from the court's prior summary judgment rulings in these

consolidated cases. In the 00-20905 case, the court noted the vagueness of the JEDEC patent

disclosure policies, and therefore held that "breach of JEDEC's disclosure policy, by itself, is not

sufficient to constitute antitrust liability." See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 441 F.

Supp. 2d 1066, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The court repeated this ruling from Hynix in the 05-00334

and 06-00244 cases and highlighted the need for clear boundaries to section 2 liability. See Docket

No. 1004, Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., C-05-00334-RMW, at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5,

2008). It therefore "affirm[ed] its summary adjudication that any alleged breach of the written

JEDEC disclosure policies, without more, cannot give rise to antitrust liability." Id. at 5. In short,

the court determined that a legal duty to disclose patent applications or the intent to file such

applications could not be based solely on the written policies of JEDEC. This conclusion was in part

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 5

compelled by the policy value requiring clear rules before imposing liability for an omission.

This court is not the first to have concluded that JEDEC's disclosure policies were unclear. 

The Federal Circuit remarked that the disclosure policies featured "a staggering lack of defining

details." Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It further

explained that "[w]hen direct competitors participate in an open standards committee, their work

necessitates a written patent policy with clear guidance on the committee's intellectual property

position." Id. The court therefore held that the written policies of JEDEC could not "provide a firm

basis for the disclosure duty necessary for a fraud verdict." Id. 

The D.C. Circuit also considered the JEDEC disclosure rules at issue in its opinion reversing

the FTC's decision holding Rambus liable for monopolization. It remarked that "the need for clarity

seems especially acute where disclosure of those trade secrets itself implicates antitrust concerns;

JEDEC involved, after all, collaboration by competitors." Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522

F.3d 456, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). It further characterized any evidence

supporting a disclosure duty as "rather weak" and chastised the FTC for interpreting that evidence

"aggressive[ly]." Id. at 469.

The Manufacturers argue that they introduced sufficient evidence that the written rules of

JEDEC by themselves required disclosure, and that the court "improperly directed a finding" by

instructing the jury that it could not find that an expectation of disclosure existed based on JEDEC's

written rules alone. For the reasons stated above, JEDEC's written rules alone could not create a

duty to disclose patent applications. Nonetheless, had the jury believed that the Manufacturers

established that JEDEC's written rules required disclosure, the jury could have found a clearly

defined expectation by finding that any of five other factors existed and supported a finding of a

disclosure expectation. Hence, even if the court's instruction was erroneous, it was not "manifestly

prejudicial."

III. RAMBUS'S ATTORNEY'S ARGUMENT

The Manufacturers contend that the argument by Rambus's attorney that the Manufacturers

"took" Rambus's inventuions was highly prejudicial. This contention has no merit. Not only was

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 6

there substantial evidence to support the argument, it was appropriate for Rambus to counter the

Manufacturers' contention that the standards were independently developed from the "tool box" of

the reasonably skilled memory engineer without contribution from anything from Rambus. 

However, evidence showed that the JEDEC members had available to them during the development

of the standards Rambus's PCT application. Other evidence suggested the Manufacturers utilized

Rambus's inventions. See, e.g. Trial Ex. 5020, at 37-40 (internal Hynix document showing a

reference to Rambus's DRAM in its SDR/DDR design documents); Tr. 4057:7-15, 5132:25-5133:2,

513411-21 (testimony of Micron CEO Steve Appleton regardingMicron's use of Rambus's

technologies in its non-JEDEC RLDRAM and RLDRAM2 products).

Even if Rambus's argument was improper, which it was not, it would have had to "permeate"

the proceedings to justify a new trial. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69

F.3d 337, 346 (9th Cir. 1995). The court should order a new trial only where it firmly believes that

the jury "was influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict." Standard Oil Co. of

California v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 388 (9th Cir.1965).

The facts of these two cases illustrate the burden that must be met to set aside a jury verdict

based on an attorney's conduct. In Standard Oil, the defendant relied on "six instances where

counsel for Perkins, in the presence of the jury offered gratuitous observations that suggested

Standard was a malevolent Goliath and Perkins a righteous David." Id. While "[s]uch conduct is

not to be condoned and certainly should not be rewarded," the court could not "attach enough

significance to any of the matters or all of them collectively to conclude with any degree of

assurance that the verdict was tainted." Id. On the other hand, in Anheuser-Busch, the trial court

granted a new trial and the Ninth Circuit affirmed because the plaintiff "repeatedly violated its in

limine rulings" in its questioning of witnesses about certain offers. Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 346. 

The attorney then emphasized the inadmissible evidence in closing argument by arguing that "In

some other context, they would call this kind of stuff extortion. Or Attempted Extortion." Id. at 347. 

Moreover, some of the plaintiff's testimony appeared to have been false. Id.

Here, the Manufacturers argue that Rambus's counsel improperly argued that the

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3 By the court's rough count, the parties filed at least 90 briefs during the course of the trial.

Although the court limited such briefs to four pages with four pages for opposition, by conservative

estimate, the court considered over 500 pages of briefing over the course of the trial. This is in addition

to the dozens of pre-trial Daubert and in limine motions totaling 100's of pages.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 7

Manufacturers "took" Rambus's inventions, and that the "sole purpose of this line of argument was

to impugn the Manufacturers and inflame the jury." Referring to the Manufacturers' use of

Rambus's technology as "taking" obviously conveys emotional force. As Rambus's counsel stated,

"I told you that the Manufacturers and JEDEC knew about Rambus's inventions; I told you they took

them, strong language, took them, and they took them because they didn't want to pay." Tr.

5958:11-14.

But stray instances of "strong words" alone do not justify ordering a new trial on the basis of

attorney misconduct. Standard Oil, 347 F.2d at 388. Nor were Rambus's "strong words" any more

inflammatory than the closing argument by the Manufacturers. At one point, in explaining the

stakes involved in the case, the Manufacturers' counsel argued, "So the billion dollar fabs that we

have, you know, the employees could all go away. That's the risk we're taking by having the

audacity to challenge this conduct. So, yes, we do have to fight it rather than give in to really what

is extortion." Tr. 6075:12-17. Furthermore, placing any reference to "taking" inventions in the

context of the whole argument, the court does not believe that such argument tainted the jury's

deliberations or inflamed their passions. Indeed, the Manufacturers do not explain how Rambus's

counsel's "strong words" influenced the jury's findings of no anticompetitive conduct, no

misrepresentations, and no duty to disclose.

IV. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

The Manufacturers next argue that the court erred in making various evidentiary rulings and

that these "highly prejudicial" errors require a new trial. After reviewing the alleged errors, the

court disagrees. Throughout the trial, the court was inundated with extensive briefing on evidentiary

matters raised by the parties. The parties appeared intent on preserving every possible issue for

appeal regardless of its significance.3

 The court carefully reviewed this briefing and made what it

believed were fair and appropriate rulings. The court has again reviewed those rulings and finds no

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4 The "Samsung or Hynix guilty pleas" refer to the following documents: Plea Agreement,

Docket No. 11, United States v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., CR-05-00249 PJH (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2005)

(pleading guilty to price-fixing of SDRAM and DDR SDRAM and agreeing not to prosecute any

charges related to RDRAM), and Plea Agreement, Docket No. 8, United States v. Samsung Electronics

Co., Ltd., CR-05-00643 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2005) (pleading guilty to price-fixing of SDRAM, DDR

SDRAM, and RDRAM).

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 8

error in them.

A. Alleged Exclusion of Evidence Under Threat of Introduction of Price-Fixing or

Boycott Evidence

An issue raised several times during trial was whether Rambus could introduce evidence that

the Manufacturers allegedly engaged in price-fixing to destroy RDRAM and Rambus. Prior to the

trial, the Manufacturers moved in limine to exclude any evidence related to plea agreements or

alleged boycotts. Addressing the first motion, the court ruled that:

Rambus may not introduce into evidence the Samsung or Hynix guilty pleas for the

purpose of impeaching character for truthfulness. If Rambus wishes to raise the issue

of a price-fixing conspiracy to (1) inquire about specific instances of conduct on

cross-examination to impeach character for truthfulness, or (2) rebut evidence

regarding various lines of argument about pro-competitive behavior in the DRAM

industry, Rambus must first obtain permission from the court outside the presence

of the jury.

Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 350647, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2008).4

Addressing the second motion, the court ruled that: 

Ruling is deferred so that court can consider how evidence develops. Rambus must

seek permission from the court outside the presence of the jury before mentioning

anything about alleged boycott or price manipulation. If the Manufacturers present

evidence that RDRAM failed or experienced lack of market success because it was

too expensive or had technical flaws or performance problems, Rambus should be

able to explain other reasons that caused or contributed to its RDRAM's market

performance. However, if the Manufacturers do not get into the reasons for

RDRAM's lack of market success, evidence concerning an alleged boycott or price

manipulation seems irrelevant.

Id. at *2.

At various points in the trial, Rambus argued outside the presence of the jury that it should

be able to introduce evidence related to price-fixing or boycotts. Such requests were consistently

denied. For example, a lengthy argument ensured over whether Brian Shirley, a Micron employee,

could testify regarding Micron's profit margins to bolster Micron's case that its negative profits made

incurring the costs to switch away from Rambus's technology impossible. See Tr. 2297:5-2321:18. 

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 9

Mr. Price (Micron's counsel) proffered that he would like to ask Mr. Shirley about Micron's profit

margins. Rambus argued that any inquiry into Micron's profits raises the question of how they

obtained those profits, including any alleged participation in a DRAM cartel. The court ruled that:

Basically, it seems to me that with respect to lock in costs and the

Manufacturers' presentation, that it's legitimate for Rambus to go in and show what

a small percentage of – or create an inference that the costs of certain items are minor

or very small compared to a billion dollars of revenue. At the same time, it also

seems to me that it's legitimate to for the Manufacturers to come back and show that

that is a – that the costs are such that the revenues do no reflect obviously the profit

margin. And it seems to me that the profit margin is legitimate rebuttal to what

Rambus is presenting.

That raises a question as to, well, does the price fixing issue then allow

Rambus to suggest that the profit margin would have been different because of price

fixing, or the ability to price fix? And it seems to me that that is, to some extent,

speculative even though there have been guilty pleas to some extent.

I just – but it is so incredibly prejudicial, it seems to me, that it's probative

value, which I think is really marginal given the issues we're dealing with, that the

prejudicial effect far outweighs the probative value.

That being said, I think the redirect should just be limited to testimony with

respect to whether or not costs have exceeded revenue during the past eight years,

and that there was a loss rather than a profit and not go into detail.

Tr. 2320:8-2321:16. Over the course of the entire trial, the court never admitted any price-fixing or

boycott evidence.

Nevertheless, the Manufacturers argue that the court erred by not conclusively excluding all

evidence related to price-fixing or boycotts prior to trial. The Manufacturers argue that the

possibility that such evidence could be admitted operated as a "sword of Damocles" and prevented

them from offering certain types of evidence that would have helped their case. For example, the

Manufacturers suggest that they would have offered evidence about the pro-competitive nature of

JEDEC and standard-setting and that RDRAM was an inferior technology.

To begin, the Manufacturers never proffered such evidence or testimony. When the

Manufacturers sought to admit testimony that might touch on matters related to price-fixing and

sought guidance from the court, the court admitted the evidence and explained the limits necessary

to avoid making price-fixing evidence relevant. See, e.g., Tr. 2320:8-2321:6 (explaining limits on

testimony regarding Micron's profit margins); 5404:3-14 (explaining limits on questioning regarding

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

C-00-20905-RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-06-00244-RMW

TSF 10

industry-wide sales figures to avoid evidence of price-fixing). Had the Manufacturers proffered

testimony about the pro-competitive nature of JEDEC, it is likely that it could have been tailored to

avoid making evidence regarding price-fixing probative.

Furthermore, the court's order stated that Rambus must seek permission to introduce

evidence regarding price-fixing to "rebut evidence regarding various lines of argument about

pro-competitive behavior in the DRAM industry." The order did not unequivocally immunize

discussion of JEDEC from rebuttal regarding price-fixing, but the order did make plain that pricefixing evidence was inadmissible unless Rambus first obtained permission from the court outside the

presence of the jury. The only evidence "effectively excluded" by this order was Rambus's evidence

of price-fixing, not the Manufacturer's evidence about JEDEC.

In any event, the "effective" exclusion of evidence regarding JEDEC's procompetitive nature

was not manifestly prejudicial because the jury heard evidence regarding the benefits of standardsetting. Desi Rhoden testified that standards are important because "they provide

interchangeability" and described the benefits of having many suppliers making a standardized,

interoperable product. See Tr. 451:10-452:19. He further testified that he considered JEDEC

important to the semiconductor industry, as well as other electronics industries. See Tr. 455:5-22. 

Contrary to the muzzled presentation of evidence depicted in the Manufacturers' motion, the

Manufacturers' very first witness laid out the mission of JEDEC, the benefits of standard-setting, and

the importance of standards. Mr. Bechtolsheim also testified regarding Sun and Cisco's preferences

for open standards and the benefits of open standards. See Tr. 1499:7-1500:10.

With respect to RDRAM's merits and failure, the court does not see how it could have

permitted the Manufacturers to introduce evidence that RDRAM was a technical failure without

permitting Rambus to introduce evidence that RDRAM was superior and failed because it was

allegedly illegally boycotted by DRAM manufacturers. Such boycott evidence would be highly

probative in rebutting the Manufacturers' arguments about technical superiority, and while they

would be prejudicial, they would not be unfairly prejudicial in that context. Accordingly, the relief

the Manufacturers retrospectively request - the entry of a blanket order forbidding Rambus from

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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TSF 11

introducing evidence of the Manufacturers' conduct with respect to RDRAM no matter how

probative – would have been unfair to Rambus.

In short, the Manufacturers after-the-fact argue that they would have tried their case

differently had the court entered a blanket order excluding evidence of their misdeeds. The court

declined to enter such an order. Instead, the court presumptively excluded evidence regarding pricefixing and boycotts, contingent on how the evidence developed at trial. This was not an erroneous

ruling. The Manufacturers were free to introduce whatever evidence they pleased, cognizant of the

risk that if evidence of price-fixing or an agreement to boycott was probative in rebutting their

evidence, it might come into evidence. To be sure, the Manufacturers had to be careful in their

presentation of evidence to exclude the portion of the story in which the Manufacturers allegedly

violated the antitrust laws. This was a "sword of Damocles" hanging over the Manufacturers' case,

but it was placed there by the Manufacturers' own alleged conduct – not the court's rulings.

B. Graham Allan

Repeating a theme, the Manufacturers argue that the court "effectively" barred them from

presenting their case. Here, the Manufacturers complain that court prevented them from eliciting

testimony from Graham Allan (one of Hynix's expert witnesses) about his understanding of JEDEC's

disclosure policies. Mr. Allan was previously a JEDEC representative for Mosaid. In unrelated

litigation, Micron has alleged that Mosaid committed fraud during its tenure at JEDEC based on

various misleading disclosures and on its failure to make additional disclosures. Portions of the

complaint suggest that Mr. Allan, as Mosaid's JEDEC representative, was responsible for Mosaid's

alleged failures to disclose. Prior to Mr. Allan's testimony, the manufacturers moved to prevent

Rambus from questioning Mr. Allan about the allegations contained in Micron's lawsuit with

Mosaid.

The court circulated a draft order to the parties suggesting that the court would deny the

motion. See Craig Decl., Ex. Y. The court then heard argument regarding its tentative order. See

Tr. 2365:10-2381:22. After extensive argument, the following discussion occurred:

Mr. Price: I think there will still be, likely to be argument, because my

understanding is that Mr. Allan's testimony is going to have

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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nothing to do with his understanding of JEDEC policy. He's being

called as an expert witness and is not going near this topic.

The court: So he's not even going to talk about JEDEC.

Mr. Price: He'll talk about JEDEC policy.

Mr. Nissly: Well, since we'll put on Mr. Allan, maybe I can amplify. It is

certainly not our intention to ask Mr. Allan questions about his

understanding of the JEDEC patent policy. That wasn't what we had

in mind with him. His testimony is, as we've laid out in the motions

that have been filed before the court, I certainly wouldn't say that he

wouldn't be asked a question about JEDEC because, of course, he

went there for a long time. But I don't anticipate getting into any

areas that would give the court concern. But I just want to make sure

I understand what the areas of the court's concern are so we can be

clear here.

The court: Well, basically my concern is that if Mr. Allan were to testify as to

the disclosure policy at JEDEC, that that would certainly allow

questions on cross about his understanding about disclosure, what he

did or did not do.

Mr. Nissly: Um-hum.

The court: And probably would open the door to a question about any

allegations that he did not disclose something he should have

disclosed.

Mr. Nissly: Okay.

The court: But if the testimony of Graham Allan is basically only that he heard

certain presentations at JEDEC, or how the standards were developed

when he was there, percipient knowledge of what went on when he

was there having nothing to do with disclosure, that's a totally

different situation.

Mr. Nissly: That's helpful. Thank you, your Honor.

Tr. 2376:25-2378:20 (emphasis added). Finally, the court ruled that "based on what I've heard,

we're going to have to wait and hear his direct and then if there's an issue, we'll discuss it, with the

understanding that if there's a desire to get into an allegation made in Mosaid/Micron, that that be

brought up outside the presence of the jury." Tr. 2381:16-22.

The Manufacturers now argue that they wished to ask Mr. Allan about his understanding of

the JEDEC disclosure duty, but that the court's refusal to prevent Rambus from cross-examining Mr.

Allan about his understanding of that duty and allegations that he did not comply with the duty

"effectively prohibited" them from doing so. This argument seems disingenuous since the

Manufacturers twice disclaimed any intention of asking Mr. Allan about the JEDEC disclosure duty,

as illustrated in the excerpt above.

While the Manufacturers' assertion of error is not only bold, it is baseless. The court made

no erroneous ruling; it deferred ruling on the scope of Rambus's cross-examination based on Mr.

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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Allan's direct examination. Even had it entered its tentative ruling, the court did not err. Were Mr.

Allan asked about a JEDEC disclosure duty, and, as the Manufacturers suggest, that he testified that

a JEDEC disclosure duty broadly extended to patent applications and intentions to file, then Rambus

would have been well within the scope of permissible cross-examination to ask about alleged

instances where Mr. Allan failed to make such broad disclosures.

Finally, the Manufacturers claim that Rambus's counsel argued unethically in pointing out to

the jury that the Manufacturers did not ask Mr. Allan about his understanding of the JEDEC

disclosure duty and suggested the inference that he would have testified in Rambus's favor had he

been asked. In Rambus's closing argument, Mr. Stone argued:

Let me remind you of Graham Allan. Remember when he was called – he

was paid to testify. He was asked some engineering questions. But he was also

asked, in his introduction, he was asked, well, did you attend JEDEC?

Yes.

You know Richard Crisp?

Yes.

What years did you go?

Oh, '92 through much later.

And then he was asked the question: "Now Mr. Allan, it's my intention not

to ask you about JEDEC policies or JEDEC rules or anything like that." That was

Mr. Ruby's question, not mine.

"I wish to ask you some engineering questions. If you think that I've asked

you a question about JEDEC policies or JEDEC rules, point that out to me because

that wasn't my intention. Fair enough?"

"Yes."

Why, if we're trying to see if there's a clearly defined expectation shared by

JEDEC members is a JEDEC member, who's called to testify and paid to be here, not

asked what his expectation was?

Well, it's because his expectation, I submit to you and it's your judgment on

the credibility of each of these witnesses, his testimony might have been [that there

was no duty to disclose patent applications]."

Tr. 5991:10-5992:17.

The Manufacturers argue that this was unethical because Rambus knew Mr. Allan would

have testified that the JEDEC disclosure duty extended to patent applications. The Manufacturers

base this purported knowledge on the following statements from Mr. Allan's expert reports:

Additionally, Rambus' membership in JEDEC clearly required them to disclose any

relevant proprietary technology that relates to the work of the JC42.3 committee

during the time Rambus was a member.

Craig Decl., Ex. X at 8.

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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Based on my personal experience and the discussions in which I participated as a

JEDEC member, the working members of the JEDEC committees interpreted and

understood the policy to impose a requirement of good faith disclosure of

information that would compromise the openness of a proposed standard. JEDEC

participants are required to disclose the possible inclusion of patented technology

and to allow the committee to make informed decisions regarding the possible

inclusion of patented technology (e.g., who owns it?, what are the licensing terms?,

are there other options?, etc.). Given the open concern regarding submarine patents

and the typical length of time consumed to successfully publish a JEDEC standard,

committee participants also had a good faith duty to disclose possible incorporation

of intellectual property as early in the standardization process as possible so as to not

waste the time of the committee or benefit from the associated delays.

Craig Decl., Ex. W at 9-10. The Manufacturers read too much into Mr. Allan's vague discussion of

a disclosure duty. The first excerpt refers to "relevant proprietary technology," which seems most

likely to refer only to patents based on the "proprietary" qualification. The second excerpt refers to

a duty to disclose patents, and then a "good faith duty to disclose possible incorporation of

intellectual property as early . . . as possible." While the latter may refer to patent applications, it is

unclear whether such disclosure was required and when "as early . . . as possible" vested. In short,

based on Mr. Allan's reports, it is not clear what he would have answered had he been asked whether

JEDEC members shared an expectation requiring the disclosure of patent applications. If Mr. Allan

believed that patent applications had to be disclosed, it seems he could have said so in much more

direct and succinct language than he used in his reports. Accordingly, it is not clear that Rambus's

counsel knowingly urged an unreasonable inference to the jury.

Finally, it is worth noting that this is the first time the Manufacturers have raised any

objection to Rambus's counsel's conduct in closing argument. To be sure, one need not object

during the closing argument. Walden v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 975 F.2d 361, 366 (7th Cir.

1992). But "objections to closing argument must be made prior to the submission of the case to the

jury in order to enable the judge to make a curative instruction if necessary." Id. Even if the

Manufacturers had a valid objection to how Rambus's counsel argued about the Manufacturers'

failure to ask Mr. Allan a question, it was waived.

C. License Agreement Renegotiations

The Manufacturers next argue that the court erred by excluding evidence that Rambus

accepted lower royalty rates in renegotiations following its initial losses in the Infineon litigation. 

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5 The court later vacated the portion of this order related to the admissibility of certain

purported JEDEC board minutes. On reconsideration, the court agreed with the Manufacturers and

determined that the proffered board minutes appeared untrustworthy and could not qualify as business

records.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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TSF 15

The court excluded such evidence and explained its reasoning in a detailed order. See Docket No.

1361, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008); see also Craig Decl. Ex. BB.5

 In short, the

court concluded that evidence of renegotiated royalty rates was irrelevant and, to the extent they

were relevant, unfairly prejudicial because explaining their context would be confusing and would

take too much time. Id. at 4-6. In hindsight, the court believes the ruling was sound and that the

renegotiated royalty rates had no probative value but an enormous potential for confusion and

mischief.

Putting aside the merits of the decision, the Manufacturers do not satisfactorily explain how

the exclusion of this evidence prejudiced them. The Manufacturers argue that the renegotiated rates

are "highly probative" of "Rambus's licensing practices, whether Rambus possessed market power,

and whether Rambus would have offered a RAND assurance." If anything, Rambus being forced to

accept lower rates in renegotiation suggests Rambus lacked market power. Nor do the

Manufacturers explain these other relevance theories or how they connect to an element of their

antitrust or fraud claims. The Manufacturers do suggest that Rambus's evidence of royalty rates

(which Rambus offered as evidence that it licensed on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis)

prejudiced them by suggesting to the jury that the Manufacturers were unreasonable in not taking the

same licensing terms, when in fact, had the Manufacturers licensed Rambus's technologies at the

original rates, they would have been at a disadvantage against the DRAM manufacturers with

renegotiated royalty rates. While the Manufacturers may have wanted to dispel this inference from

the jury's mind, the evidence the Manufacturers sought to offer was still minimally, if at all,

probative and substantially more prejudicial due to its confusing context. In sum, the Manufacturers

fail to explain how the exclusion of these minor pieces of evidence made the proceedings "grossly

unfair." Because the precluded evidence would have had no impact on the Manufacturers' claims or

the jury verdict, its exclusion is no basis for granting a new trial.

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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D. Rambus's Privileged Documents

The Manufacturers argue that the court erred by allowing Rambus to "claw back" portions of

four documents that the Manufacturers had on their trial exhibit list. The court denied Rambus's first

motion in limine to exclude certain exhibits, but explained that Rambus could reassert privilege as to

documents that were ordered produced pursuant to the crime-fraud exception given that the court

found that Rambus had not engaged in spoliation (thus vitiating the basis for ordering the documents

produced). Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 350641 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2008). 

On the basis of that opinion's reasoning and further briefing, the court granted Rambus's motion to

exclude portions of four documents from evidence as privileged. See Tr. 819:15-820:12. The court

maintains that this decision was correct.

Putting aside whether the four documents are privileged, the Manufacturers have failed to

demonstrate that their case was unfairly prejudiced by the documents' exclusion. The

Manufacturers' argue that the four documents "are directly relevant to [their] fraud and antitrust

claims" because the documents purportedly show that Rambus believed that JEDEC SDRAM

infringed its patents and that it planned to sue the Manufacturers. The Manufacturers do not,

however, explain how this evidence would have been relevant to dissuading the jury from finding

that JEDEC members shared no disclosure expectation, that Rambus made no false statements or

uttered any half-truths, and that Rambus did not engage in anticompetitive conduct. Nor does the

court believe the Manufacturers can make a persuasive argument that these documents were relevant

to those elements of their claims. Even if the Manufacturers should have been permitted to

introduce the documents, they were not harmed by their inability to do so.

E. Mr. McAlexander's Proffered Rebuttal Testimony

At the end of Rambus's case, the Manufacturers sought to put on rebuttal evidence. The

court permitted some limited rebuttal, but did not permit the Manufacturers to recall their technical

expert, Mr. McAlexander, to testify that he did not believe Rambus's technologies were "superior" to

the alternative technologies.

To begin, even if the exclusion of this evidence were improper, the court doubts it would

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have influenced the jury's verdict on the antitrust claim. Mr. McAlexander's proffered rebuttal

testimony would only affect the outcome of this case if the jury based its finding that Rambus's

conduct was not anticompetitive on Rambus's technological superiority. While the interrogatory on

anticompetitive conduct does not explain why the jury did not find Rambus's conduct

anticompetitive, a compelling inference is reasonably drawn from the jury's separate finding on the

fraud claim that JEDEC members lacked a clear expectation of disclosure. See Docket No. 1651, C05-00334 at 12. Given the similarity in the instructions regarding disclosure expectations, it is

apparent that the jury returned its verdict on the antitrust claim because it found no duty to disclose

information. Hence, any exclusion of Mr. McAlexander's rebuttal testimony was irrelevant.

Second, the Manufacturers overinflate the probative value of Mr. McAlexander's proffered

testimony. Mr. McAlexander had already testified that he considered the various alternative

technologies "viable" alternatives to the Rambus technologies, Tr. 2100:8-2126:22, and "not

slower," Tr. 2127:5-2128:3. As the court explained in rejecting the Manufacturers' proffer,

additional testimony that Rambus's technologies were "not superior" is largely a semantic

distinction. See Tr. 5325:17-5327:12 (limiting Mr. McAlexander's rebuttal testimony); 5641:1-4

(confirming tentative ruling). The purported rebuttal was in essence a request to repeat Mr.

McAlexander's direct testimony in rebuttal. Based on the testimony Mr. McAlexander had already

given, the jury could easily infer from "viable" and "not slower" that Rambus's technologies were

"not superior."

Finally, the court has broad discretion over the scope of rebuttal. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). 

Here, the court found that the Manufacturers' additional evidence sought from Mr. McAlexander

was of minimal probative value and would have given the Manufacturers the opportunity to present

Mr. McAlexander's testimony twice, once in its case in chief and again in rebuttal. That finding was

well within the court’s discretion.

F. Evidence Regarding the Manufacturers' Coordinated Litigation Strategy

The parties frequently disputed the admissibility of evidence related to the Manufacturers'

coordinated litigation strategy. For context, the Manufacturers' theory of the case was that Rambus's

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6 The court has some reservations about the correctness of this ruling but since it benefitted

the Manufacturers, the court's reservations are of no consequence.

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conduct at JEDEC created a "patent trap" and that the Manufacturers' expenses in defending patent

litigation constituted the harm caused by Rambus's anticompetitive conduct. Rambus urged that

evidence that the Manufacturers coordinated their efforts and jointly filed declaratory judgment

actions against Rambus negated the element of causation because Rambus's conduct at JEDEC did

not "cause" the Manufacturers to incur litigation expenses.

The court deferred ruling on the Manufacturers' first motion addressed to the topic because it

appeared to address only documents such as the Manufacturers' joint defense agreement which was

not something Rambus sought to offer. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL

350647, *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2008). During trial, the Manufacturers raised the issue again. At that

point, the court denied the motion because the evidence Rambus had offered did not appear

prejudicial to the court. See Tr. 2685:12-20. The issue came to a head later during the questioning

of Farhad Tabrizi, a former Hynix employee. See Tr. 3955:19-4008:12. Contrary to the

Manufacturers' assertion in their brief, their objections were not "to no avail." After giving Rambus

the legitimate opportunity to demonstrate Mr. Tabrizi's bias against Rambus, the court curtailed

Rambus's questioning regarding litigation. E.g., 4002:20-4003:8.

Having had the chance to comprehend the scope of Rambus's evidence on causation, the

court held that Rambus could not put on additional evidence related to the Manufacturers'

coordinated litigation strategy. Tr. 4525:10-4527:1. The court reached this conclusion by finding

that if the Manufacturers prevailed on the other elements of their antitrust claim, they had introduced

sufficient evidence to prevail as a matter of law on causation. See Tr. 4525:15-4526:2.6

 To

ameliorate any prejudice from argument regarding coordinated litigation strategy, the court

instructed the jury that "[w]hether or not the Manufacturers developed a joint litigation strategy in

opposing Rambus's claims of patent infringement is not relevant to the issues before you at this

time." Jury Instructions, Docket No. 1650, Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., C-05-00334-

RMW, at 13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008).

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7 The Manufacturers also object to the deposition testimony used to authenticate and

introduce the exhibits. The court issued an opinion during trial explaining the reasons for admitting the

deposition testimony, and stands by the decision. Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., — F.R.D.

—, 2008 WL 687252 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2008).

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The Manufacturers argue that the coordinated litigation strategy was irrelevant, that

Rambus's argument regarding their litigation strategy was unfairly prejudicial, and that the court

should have given the jury instruction that they proposed. Taken as a whole, the court is

unpersuaded. The jury was instructed that the Manufacturers' coordinated litigation efforts were

irrelevant to the first phase of trial. The evidence in the record, while suggesting that Hynix and

Micron may have discussed coordinating an attack on Rambus, was also relevant to various

witnesses' bias against Rambus and therefore relevant to their credibility. The court did not perceive

that Rambus's argument unfairly tainted the jury's reasoning. Accordingly, the evidence and

argument related to the Manufacturers' desire to mutually attack Rambus does not support granting a

new trial.

G. The Siemens Presentations

The Manufacturers take issue with the court's decision to admit into evidence four internal

presentations from Siemens and IBM. The court repeatedly explained that the testimony introducing

the exhibits and exhibits could only be considered to prove notice to, and the state of mind of,

Siemens and IBM about the scope of Rambus's technology.7

 Tr. 5000:17-5001:3; 5009:6-12;

5012:7-11. The limiting instructions focused the jury on the relevance of the evidence and made

clear that the evidence was not to be considered for the truth of its contents. The so-limited exhibits

were probative to show how DRAM manufacturers, in particular IBM and Siemens, both members

of JEDEC, had notice that Rambus was seeking broad patent claims.

With respect to exhibits 6078 and 9005, the Manufacturers argue that the characterization of

Rambus as a "deadly menace" was unfairly prejudicial because the basis for the concern animating

the statement was not related to Rambus's patents. The Manufacturers point out that Mr. Meyer (the

exhibit's author) did not agree that Rambus was a "deadly menace" and that he "exaggerated." One

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8 Mr. Meyer worked for Siemens and later Infineon. He was deposed and questioned about

the exhibits in litigation between Infineon and Rambus.

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could reasonably refuse to credit Mr. Meyer's self-interested8 testimony disowning his statement in

the slides. The Manufacturers also argue that the context of the exhibit suggests that the statement

had nothing to do with Rambus's patents, but instead with Rambus's RDRAM architecture or

Rambus's corporate structure. Even were the court to accept the Manufacturers' construction as the

only way to interpret an ambiguous document, a JEDEC member's recognition of Rambus's

"fabless" corporate structure was itself probative. Rambus's business model depended on obtaining

patent royalties. Recognizing that, IBM or Siemens could infer that Rambus would be obtaining

patents and therefore obtaining licenses or bringing law suits. To the extent that this is the proper

construction of the "deadly menace" statement, it would have been probative of the reasonableness

of the reliance of IBM, Siemens, and by analogy, JEDEC and the Manufacturers, on any alleged

misrepresentations. The relevance of the "deadly menace" statement demonstrates another flaw in

the Manufacturers' motion for a new trial on this point. The Manufacturers do not explain how a

reference to Rambus as a "deadly menace" materially prejudiced their case given the jury's special

verdict findings. Hence, even if the exhibits were admitted in error, the Manufacturers have not

demonstrated that the error harmed them enough to warrant a new trial.

The Manufacturers concern over the other two exhibits (8245 and 8294) stems from the pros

and cons chart which suggested that SDRAM had "patent problems" regarding Rambus. The

Manufacturers argue that these concerns were irrelevant, and hence unduly prejudicial, because the

"patent problems" referred to a dual bank design (a technology not at issue in this case) in the

original draft of the presentation. The Manufacturers' interpretation is blind to other reasonable

inferences. The second, more general version of the presentation was made after the JEDEC

meeting at which Rambus's JEDEC representative was asked about Rambus's patents. The parties

presented conflicting evidence about what Rambus did in response to the question, but the response

taken by IBM and Siemens' representatives was to make their presentation about patent problems

more general. One can infer that the more general language was inserted because IBM and Siemens

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9 The Manufacturers' reply brief suggests for the first time that such testimony was

irrelevant. The testimony was relevant to the issue of whether Rambus's technologies were superior.

From Dr. Farmwald and Dr. Horowitz's testimony that they rejected alternative technologies as inferior

in the late eighties, one can infer that those technologies remained inferior into the mid-nineties (the

time for considering whether there was a relevant technology market and whether Rambus's

technologies were superior).

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became more concerned about patent problems after the meeting. The Manufacturers' assertion that

this evidence was irrelevant and hence prejudicial ignores the fact that it was probative regarding

whether JEDEC and DRAM manufacturers had inquiry notice about Rambus's intention to seek

various patents.

As all of the testimony and exhibits about Siemens and IBM had substantial probative value

and were introduced with repeated limiting instructions, the court does not agree that the evidence

was substantially more prejudicial than probative, and hence, the court did not err in admitting the

exhibits for their limited purpose.

H. Drs. Farmwald and Horowitz's Testimony About Alternative Technologies

The Manufacturers allege that the court erred by permitting Dr. Farmwald and Dr. Horowitz

to provide expert testimony regarding alternative technologies without their having provided expert

reports pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A).9

 The Manufacturers' argument

relies entirely on the conclusory premise that Dr. Farmwald and Dr. Horowitz provided expert

opinion testimony requiring a report, but they did not.

The proper scope of lay opinion and percipient witness testimony was a recurring issue

throughout the trial as both parties aggressively offered evidence that stressed the boundaries created

by Rule 702. E.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 504098 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19,

2008) (order addressing the testimony of Joe Macri and Ilan Krashinsky). Nonetheless, issues

regarding Joe Macri's testimony were easily resolved, and provide a useful comparison to Dr.

Farmwald and Dr. Horowitz's testimony. The court held that Mr. Macri was free to testify to his

"percipient observations regarding votes at JEDEC, requests from JEDEC members, and

descriptions of what ATI did and why they did it." Id. at *5. While this testimony touches on

"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," it falls outside of Rule 701 and 702's

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strictures because it is not opinion testimony.

When Rambus began to present its case, the Manufacturers moved to prevent Dr. Horowitz

from providing expert testimony about various alternatives to the Rambus technologies. The court

ruled on the motion from the bench as follows:

As far as testimony which the Manufacturers objected to as calling for expert

testimony, I think Dr. Horowitz can describe the development history of his

invention; in other words, what he did to develop the invention. To the extent that

he considered alternatives in that development process, I think he can testify as to

that. As to alternatives that he didn't consider that have been referred to during of

the course of the trial, if there are any, I think that would be placing him into the

position of an expert.

Tr. 4070:3-15 (Mar. 5, 2008). By that ruling, the court distinguished between Dr. Horowitz's

permissible percipient testimony of what he did and what he considered in developing the Rambus

technologies and impermissible expert testimony regarding his opinion of the merits of alternative

technologies he did not, in fact, consider when making his inventions.

Dr. Horowitz's testimony conformed to these limits. See Tr. 4118:6-4133:14. Where doubt

existed about Dr. Horowitz's testimony, it was clarified at the direction of the court by specifying

that Dr. Horowitz's testimony was limited to his personal considerations during the timeframe of his

development of the Rambus technologies. E.g., Tr. 4121:18-4122:1 (instructing the witness to limit

his testimony to "what you actually considered in your development process or design process"). 

Where Dr. Horowitz testified that he did not consider any other technologies, he was not permitted

to testify about them. E.g., Tr. 4133:2-14 (preventing Dr. Horowitz from testifying about off-chip

DLL because he testified that he did not consider it in his development).

The Manufacturers identify two specific instances where they argue that Dr. Horowitz

provided improper expert testimony, each reproduced below:

Mr. Stone: So focus you along those lines, Professor Horowitz, I want to know

about did you consider the possibility of doing fixed burst lengths or

block sizes as opposed to variable?

Dr. Horowitz: We briefly considered it and thought it was not a feasible solution. . . . Mr. Stone: You thought about the fixing the value?

Dr. Horowitz: One could fix the value, but that seemed to have problems, right, you

could use pins, but we don't want to use pins, so we didn't find – there

wasn't a solution that we thought was anywhere near as effective as

variable, having a register that specifies the access times.

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Tr. 4122:10-15; 4127:6-12. Put simply, the two excerpts of testimony are not examples of improper

expert testimony. Mr. Stone's first question begins by asking Dr. Horowitz to "focus along those

lines." that is, the limits the court had just imposed on the time frame of his testimony. See Tr.

4121:18-4122:10. Dr. Horowitz's answers also clearly reveal that he and Dr. Farmwald considered

using a fixed burst length (but rejected it) and that they considered fixing access times using pins,

but that they did not want to use pins, and hence opted for using a programmable mode register. As

demonstrated, nothing contained in the excerpts the Manufacturers complain about is opinion

testimony. The testimony consists purely of Dr. Horowitz's percipient observations and decisions in

developing his technology.

The Manufacturers filed a similar motion objecting to Dr. Farmwald's testimony, which

Rambus opposed by suggesting it would conform Dr. Farmwald's testimony to the limits placed on

Dr. Horowitz's. See Tr. 4928:20-24. Accordingly, the court permitted Dr. Farmwald to testify

within the same limits imposed on Dr. Horowitz. In their motion, the Manufacturers identify one

segment of Dr. Farmwald's testimony as improper expert testimony, reproduced below with

additional context:

Mr. Stone: Okay. Then let me ask you about DLL or PLL on a chip.

Did you consider alternatives to doing that?

Dr. Farmwald: Yes.

Mr. Stone: And at the time, what alternatives did you consider?

Dr. Farmwald: Again, we, we considered the alternative of using no DLL, no

DLL at all. That we very quickly decided was going to have

a serious performance limitation. It just wouldn't work nearly

as fast. I mean, there is a real advantage to using DLL to

adjust the skew of the clocks.

Mr. Stone: Okay, so no DLL at all, you concluded was not as good as –

Dr. Farmwald: Significantly inferior in terms of performance.

Tr. 5528:20-5529:11 (challenged portions emphasized). Stripped of its context, the emphasized

portion might appear to be expert opinion testimony. But placed in its context in the trial, it is clear

that Dr. Farmwald was testifying to his percipient observations and choices in developing the

Rambus technologies. Because the testimony about alternative technologies by Dr. Horowitz and

Dr. Farmwald was proper, it cannot serve as a basis for a motion for new trial. Further, it is highly

unlikely that the Manufacturers did not learn through discovery or review of prior testimony exactly

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what Drs. Horowitz and Dr. Farmwald would say at trial. The Manufacturers make no claim that

they were surprised by the inventor testimony.

I. Dr. Rapp's Testimony

Rambus's economic expert, Dr. Richard Rapp, provided opinions on a number of economic

issues and rebutted the opinions of the Manufacturers' two economists, Dr. Weinstein and Dr.

Gilbert. The Manufacturers take umbrage at two aspects of his testimony.

The first is easily dealt with. The Manufacturers argue that the court improperly permitted

Dr. Rapp to testify that Rambus lacked monopoly power. But the jury found that Rambus possessed

monopoly power. Far from being unfairly prejudicial, Dr. Rapp's allegedly improper testimony did

not sway the jury – the jury found for the Manufacturers on this element. Accordingly, it is not

grounds for a new trial and the court does not address the merits of the evidentiary ruling.

The second is that Dr. Rapp improperly opined that Rambus's technology was superior based

on the Manufacturers' revealed preference for incorporating Rambus's technologies in their products,

even when not required by a JEDEC standard. As addressed above, this does not appear material

given the jury's responses to the special verdict form. But turning to the merits, the court denied the

Manufacturers' after-the-fact motion to strike Dr. Rapp's brief mention of "revealed preference

theory" but also ruled that Rambus could not reopen his direct testimony on that topic. See Tr.

5273:21-5275:9. In passing, the court noted that "the argument really is more of a common sense

argument that doesn't really require expert testimony to understand." Tr. 5275:3-6. While Rambus's

counsel mentioned Dr. Rapp in passing during closing argument, he grounded his argument in the

court's observation that Rambus's argument did not require expert testimony. See Tr. 5969:17-

5970:4 (explaining that revealed preference theory is nothing more than a cowboy's admonition that

"actions speak louder than words"). Rambus's counsel then summarized the evidence without

relying on Dr. Rapp's opinion. See Tr. 5969:25-5979:2. Accordingly, the Manufacturers were not

materially prejudiced by Dr. Rapp's one line of opinion testimony.

J. Testimony Quantifying the Amount of Switching Costs

The Manufacturers next claim that the court erred in preventing the Manufacturers from

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presenting evidence regarding the financial cost of switching away from using Rambus's

technologies. Specifically, the Manufacturers allege the court erred in restricting the scope of

Andreas Bechtolsheim and Brian Shirley's testimony and by excluding Dr. Christopher McArdle's

opinion on the magnitude of switching costs. Contrary to the implication in the Manufacturers'

argument, the court did not preclude evidence regarding switching but rather found the proffered

testimony lacked foundation.

Ignoring for the moment the merits of the court's rulings, the Manufacturers do not

adequately explain how exclusion of the dollar amount of switching costs prejudiced their case. The

court instructed the jury that switching costs could be relevant to the existence of monopoly power. 

See, e.g., Docket No. 1650, C-05-00334, at 30 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008). In fact, the jury found that

Rambus possessed monopoly power in all six technology markets. See Docket No. 1651, C-05-

00334, at 3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008). The elements of causation and injury could also be

influenced by evidence of high switching costs, though the jury did not reach that issue because the

jury found that Rambus did not engage in anticompetitive conduct in obtaining its monopoly power.

The Manufacturers point out that Rambus argued that the Manufacturers' continued use of

Rambus's inventions suggest that Rambus's technologies were superior. They argue that this

inference is incorrect because their continued use is due to high switching costs, not technological

superiority. Completing the argument, the Manufacturers suggest that their inability to present the

exact amount of their switching costs prevented them from rebutting Rambus's argument, which

could have motivated the jury's verdict on anticompetitive conduct. This argument sets forth an

attenuated theory of relevance and fails to explain how the Manufacturers were prejudiced by not

being able to submit a specific estimate of switching cost from Bechtolsheim, Shirley or McArdle.

Dr. McArdle did testify about the economic phenomenon of lock-in generally and how it applied to

this case. Bechtolsheim testified that Sun's switching cost would be enormous. Shirley was

permitted to give detailed testimony as to the nature of some of Micron's switching costs and the

magnitudes of some of those costs. See Tr. 2266:8-2284:4 (detailing Micron's cash costs,

opportunity costs, and inventories). 

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But turning to the evidentiary rulings themselves, the court did not err in excluding Dr.

McArdle's opinion on the amount of switching costs. See generally Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v.

Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 73681 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2008). To summarize, Dr. McArdle presented two

hypothetical scenarios to attempt to explain how the Manufacturers were locked in to using

Rambus's technologies and to quantify the amount of switching costs. As discussed, his first

scenario - the "abrupt change" - was so unmoored from reality that it was not admissible. See id. at

*4-*5. Dr. McArdle's second scenario - the "gradual change" - built off of his unreliable work

regarding the abrupt change. See id. at *5. Dr. McArdle's basis for his cost estimate was flawed and

the court held that "Rambus's arguments regarding the quality of McArdle's data and the accuracy of

his methods are meritorious." Id. at *6. The court then held that because the Manufacturers were

not claiming monetary damages based on their switching costs, Dr. McArdle's switching cost

estimate was of limited probative value and the court excluded it. Id. at *6. 

At the time, the court's opinion did not consider how the amount of switching costs could be

relevant to anticompetitive conduct. Nonetheless, given the limited probative value of the switching

cost testimony to the element of anticompetitive conduct (as described above), and the utterly flawed

data and methodology used by Dr. McArdle in arriving at his opinion, the court's Daubert ruling was

sound.

The court's reasoning regarding Brian Shirley was also described in a detailed order. See

Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 504101 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2008). In short,

Mr. Shirley lacked any foundation for proffering a lay opinion on the amount of switching costs

Micron would have endured had it switched because the opinion was not based on Mr. Shirley's

personal experience. Id. at *1. Putting aside this independent ground for excluding the testimony,

Mr. Shirley's testimony was of minimal relative probative value. In light of the minimal relative

probative value of his "recollection" that Micron calculated its switching costs to be "multiple

hundreds of millions of dollars at minimum," the court properly excluded this one line of testimony

as substantially more prejudicial than probative.

Finally, the Manufacturers argue that the court erred in preventing Mr. Bechtolsheim from

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10 To the extent the Manufacturers' motion meant to argue that Mr. Bechtolsheim was

prevented from providing a number regarding Sun's switching costs, Mr. Bechtolsheim's testimony was

that "I cannot give you a specific number."

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providing an estimate of Cisco's switching costs, pointing to the following colloquy:

Mr. Ruby: Given the number of products that Sun makes that incorporate

JEDEC standards, are you able to estimate the cost to Sun of, of

changing from the JEDEC standard to something else, if that decision

were made?

Mr. Stone: Objection, your Honor. Lacks foundations and outside the scope.

The court: I think he can answer the question yes or no, and then see if we need

to worry about going further.

Mr. Stone: Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Bechtolsheim: I cannot give you a specific number, but the cost would be

enormous.

Mr. Stone: Move to strike the comment beyond I can't give you a specific

number.

The court: I'm going to allow the enormous, but I think that's all that can be

taken from what he said.

Mr. Ruby: That's all the questions I have. Thank you, Mr. Bechtolsheim.

Tr. 1506:2-21. First, Mr. Bechtolsheim was asked about Sun, not Cisco, so it is unclear how the

court prevented Mr. Bechtolsheim from testifying about Cisco's switching costs. Second, the

Manufacturers did not attempt to ask about Cisco or raise the issue that Mr. Bechtolsheim should be

asked to provide a specific number.10 Third, the court did not preclude any line of questioning with

its ruling denying Rambus's motion to strike Mr. Bechtolsheim's testimony. The Manufacturers

argue that court "instructed that Mr. Bechtolsheim could only testify that switching costs would have

been 'enormous.'" Nothing in the court's comments denying Rambus's motion to strike can be

construed as limiting the Manufacturers' ability to question Mr. Bechtolsheim. In sum, the

Manufacturers' argument regarding Mr. Bechtolsheim is premised on a distortion of the court's

ruling. As the court did not make any ruling prejudicing the Manufacturers, let alone an erroneous

one, there is no basis for granting a new trial based on Mr. Bechtolsheim's testimony.

K. The FTC's Liability Opinion

The Manufacturers argue that this court erred by refusing to accord prima facie or collateral

estoppel effect to the FTC's liability opinion or to allow it into evidence under Rule 803(8). See

Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Docket No. 1019, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9,

2008) (denying prima facie and collateral estoppel effect); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus

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Inc., 2008 WL 282376 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (denying motion in limine to admit the FTC's

opinion). The D.C. Circuit recently set aside the FTC's orders. See Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d

456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, regardless of whether the court properly excluded the evidence,

the ruling kept the jury from considering findings that were vacated.

The Manufacturers also characterize the court's order denying prima facie weight to the

FTC's findings as "eve-of-trial" and that the Manufacturers had relied on the order in preparing for

trial. The Manufacturers overstate their surprise. The court apprised the Manufacturers of its

concerns regarding its prior order granting prima facie weight on November 21, 2007, over two

months before trial began. See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 3068, Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus

Inc., C-00-20905, at 6:6-9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2008). The court provided the parties with a copy of

a tentative order explaining the court's reasoning and the court's intent to vacate its prior order and

deny prima facie weight to the FTC's liability opinion. Id. At the hearing, the court granted the

Manufacturers' request to submit additional briefing on the issue. Id. at 7:8-13, 40:21-42:20. After

considering the Manufacturers' additional briefing, the court ruled on December 13, 2007 that it

would adopt the tentative order it shared with counsel three weeks earlier. See Hearing Tr., Docket

No. 3069, Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., C-00-20905, at 107:14-19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22,

2008). The court then posted the order denying prima facie and collateral estoppel effect on January

9, 2008.

Significantly, at no point did the Manufacturers request a continuance of the trial date to

adjust their trial planning. The absence of such a request undermines the Manufacturers' after-thefact claim of detrimental reliance on the court's order. The failure to request a continuance is also

fatal to a request for a new trial based on any "surprise" caused by the court's order. "Litigants are

required to be reasonably alert at trial in the protection of their own interests." Moylan v. Siciliano,

292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1961). A party's failure to request a continuance after being "stunned"

by a witness' testimony waived their argument in urging a new trial that they had been unfairly

surprised. Id. Similarly, the Manufacturers' failure to request a continuance at any point in the two

months between being informed of the court's intent to vacate its prior order and the start of trial

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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waives any argument that they were prejudiced by unfair surprise in presenting their case.

V. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

On page 39 of their brief, the Manufacturers baldly assert that the jury's verdict was not

supported by the substantial weight of the evidence. In support, the Manufacturers "incorporate by

reference" their opposition to Rambus's motion for judgment as a matter of law, a document with 53

pages of briefing.

In light of the civil local rules' page limit on briefing, the Manufacturers sought forty pages

for their motion for a new trial. Docket No. 1664, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008). The

court granted that request over Rambus's opposition. Docket No. 1670, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D.

Cal. Apr. 9, 2008). The Manufacturers cannot now twist that page limitation by "incorporating"

dozens of additional pages that would more than double their requested (and granted) page limit.

Nonetheless, the court may only grant a new trial if the jury's verdict is against the "clear

weight" of the evidence. Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2007). It

may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict. Id. at 630. 

Reflecting on the evidence in the record, the court does not believe the jury's verdict was against the

clear weight of the evidence. Cf. Rambus Inc., 522 F.3d at 469 (commenting on the FTC's

"aggressive interpretation of rather weak evidence").

VI. CONCLUSION

To be sure, errors must be considered cumulatively in deciding whether a trial was more

likely than not tainted by error. Jerden v. Amstutz, 430 F.3d 1231, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2005). The

Manufacturers have ascribed error to a variety of rulings, but the court finds none, let alone any

prejudicial errors. The trial was lengthy and complex with a multitude of issues raised by the

parties. The court finds that the trial was fair and the result was not against the clear weight of the

evidence. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is denied.

//

//

//

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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VII. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Manufacturers' motion for a new trial is denied.

DATED: 7/24/2008

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Rambus Inc., all actions Counsel for Hynix entities, C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Burton Alexander

Gross

Burton.Gross@mto.com Allen Ruby ruby@allenrubylaw.com

Carolyn Hoecker

Luedtke

carolyn.luedtke@mto.com Belinda Martinez Vega bvega@omm.com

Catherine Rajwani crajwani@sidley.com Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com Geoffrey Hurndall Yost gyost@thelenreid.com

David C. Yang david.yang@mto.com Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Douglas A. Cawley dcawley@mckoolsmith.com Joseph A. Greco jagreco@townsend.com

Erin C. Dougherty erin.dougherty@mto.com Kenneth Lee Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com Kenneth Ryan

O'Rourke 

korourke@omm.com

Jennifer Lynn Polse jen.polse@mto.com Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com

Keith Rhoderic Dhu

Hamilton, II

keith.hamilton@mto.com Susan Gregory

VanKeulen 

svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Kelly Max Klaus kelly.klaus@mto.com Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Miriam Kim Miriam.Kim@mto.com Tomomi Katherine

Harkey 

tharkey@thelen.com

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com Counsel for Micron entities, C-06-00244

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com Aaron Bennett Craig aaroncraig@quinnemanuel.com

Rosemarie Theresa

Ring

rose.ring@mto.com David J. Ruderman davidruderman@quinnemanuel.com

Scott L Cole scole@mckoolsmith.com Harold Avrum Barza halbarza@quinnemanuel.com

Scott W. Hejny shejny@sidley.com Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Sean Eskovitz sean.eskovitz@mto.com John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Steven McCall

Perry 

steven.perry@mto.com Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Thomas N Tarnay ttarnay@sidley.com Linda Jane Brewer lindabrewer@quinnemanuel.com

William Hans

Baumgartner, Jr

wbaumgartner@sidley.com Rachael Lynn Ballard

McCracken

rachaelmccracken@quinnemanuel.c

om

Robert Jason Becher robertbecher@quinnemanuel.com

Yonaton M

Rosenzweig 

yonirosenzweig@quinnemanuel.co

m

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Counsel for Nanya entities, C-05-00334 Counsel for Samsung entities, C-05-00334 and C-05-

02298

Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com Ana Elena Kadala anita.kadala@weil.com

Craig R. Kaufman ckaufman@orrick.co

m

Claire Elise Goldstein claire.goldstein@weil.com

Jan Ellen Ellard jellard@orrick.com David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com Edward Robert Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

Kaiwen Tseng ktseng@orrick.com Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com

Robert E. Freitas rfreitas@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Counsel for intervenor, Texas Instruments, Inc., C-05-00334

Kelli A. Crouch kcrouch@jonesday.com

Counsel for intervenor, United States Department of Justice, C-00-20905

Eugene S. Litvinoff eugene.litvinoff@usdoj.gov

May Lee Heye may.heye@usdoj.gov

Nathanael M. Cousins nat.cousins@usdoj.gov

Niall Edmund Lynch Niall.Lynch@USDOJ.GOV

Counsel for intervenor, Elpida Memory, Inc., C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Eric R. Lamison elamison@kirkland.com

John J. Feldhaus jfeldhaus@foley.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program in each action.

Dated: 7/24/08 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3856 Filed 07/24/08 Page 32 of 32