Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00626/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00626-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ARTEMUS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JIM YAN LOUIE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.16-cv-00626-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

ADMISSIONS AND FOR PERMISSION 

TO SERVE TARDY RESPONSES TO 

DEFENDANTS’ REQUESTS FOR 

ADMISSION

Re: Dkt. No. 30

Relator William Artemus brings this action against his landlords, Defendants Jim Yan 

Louie and Christine Nan Louie, for retaliatory eviction and violation of the Federal False Claims 

Act for demanding and accepting side payment from Relator in violation of the Section 8 housing 

assistance program. Now pending before Court is Relator’s motion to withdraw deemed 

admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) and for permission to serve tardy 

responses to the requests for admission. (Dkt. No. 30.) After carefully considering the parties’ 

submissions, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and 

GRANTS Relator’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Discovery in this case commenced in early September, and the fact discovery cut-off is in 

August 2017. (See Dkt. No. 27 at 1.) The parties have agreed that Relator’s deposition will occur 

in the second week of January 2017 before the parties’ January 30, 2017 mediation. (Dkt. No. 30-

1 ¶¶ 2-3.) Trial is set for December 2017. (Dkt. No. 27 at 1.)

In the meantime, Relator’s counsel has been “on a working vacation abroad” since late 

September with plans to return at the end of December. (Dkt. No. 30-1 ¶ 4.) While abroad, 

Relator submitted Rule 26 disclosures supported by a number of exhibits. (Id. ¶ 6; see also Dkt. 

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

No. 33-2—33-13.) Defendants properly and timely served Relator with discovery requests—

including requests for production of documents, interrogatories, and requests for admission—by 

mail on September 30, 2016. (Dkt. No. 30-1 ¶ 5.) Relator did not serve proposed responses to the 

requests for admission until November 27, 2016—two months later. (Id. ¶ 12.) Relator’s counsel 

has submitted a declaration explaining the cause of the delay.

Because Relator was abroad, his office staff scanned and emailed him any mail received. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) On October 4, 2016, Relator received via email a PDF that began with Defendants’ 

requests for production of documents and also contained the other discovery requests, including 

the requests for admission. (Id. ¶ 8.) Relator’s counsel “was too busy to read all 74 pages [of the 

PDF] and foolishly assumed it was only one discovery request” and never downloaded the 

document. (Id.) Thus, Relator’s counsel did not realize that Defendants had served requests for 

admission. (Id.)

About two weeks later, Relator’s counsel began to address Defendants’ discovery requests 

but could not find the PDF his staff had sent him. (Id. ¶ 9.) At Relator’s counsel’s request, 

Defendants sent him another copy of their request for production of documents—the only 

discovery request Relator’s counsel requested—then granted Relator a 20-day extension to 

respond to the discovery requests. (Id.) The parties did not discuss the requests for admission at 

that time. (Id. ¶ 10.) Despite the extension, Relator served responses to the requests for 

production of documents early, on November 2, 2016. (Id.) 

On November 25, 2016, after the extended deadline had passed, Defendants sent Relator a 

meet-and-confer letter contending that Relator failed to respond to the requests for admissions, 

maintaining that the admissions were therefore deemed admitted as a matter of law, and noting 

Defendants’ intent to file a motion to deem them admitted pursuant to Rule 36. (Dkt. No. 33.) In 

a written response, Relator apologized for the late requests for admission, explained the 

circumstances that led to the delay, and attached Relator’s motion to withdraw the admissions 

along with the proposed admissions, which Relator filed on the docket the same day. (Dkt. No. 

33-1; Dkt. No. 30.) 

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admissions

When one party serves requests for admission on another under Rule 36(a), the matter is 

deemed admitted “unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is 

directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and 

signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). “A matter admitted under this rule is 

conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or 

amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Rule 36(b) provides that “the court may permit withdrawal or 

amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not 

persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on 

the merits.” The first prong “essentially asks if allowing the withdrawal will aid in the resolution 

of the case.” Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2002). This prong “is 

satisfied when upholding the admission would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits 

of the case,” Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), such as 

when a party is deemed to have admitted an ultimate legal issue, see, e.g., id.; Hadley v. United 

States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995); Medina v. Donahoe, 854 F. Supp. 2d 733, 748-49 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Where . . . the admissions go directly to the ultimate questions at issue in this 

case, the presentation of the merits in this action would be subserved if defendant were allowed to 

prevail on the matters deemed to be admitted under Rule 36.”) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Here, the admissions do not bear directly on legal conclusions or “simply concede essential 

elements” of Relator’s claims. Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622. But they do so indirectly, asking Relator 

to admit that he has no evidence to support the essential elements. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 31 at 7 

(requesting that Relator admit he has no information to support his contention that Defendants 

submitted a false claim); id. at 8-10 (requesting that Relator admit that he has no evidence to

support his contention that he suffered emotional distress or undue financial burden; general and 

special damages; or considerable mental anguish, fear and anxiety as a result of Defendants’ 

conduct); id. at 7, 9 (requesting that Relator admit that he has no evidence to support his 

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

contention that Defendants acted with the requisite scienter for any of the violations).) The 

ultimate effect of the admissions is the same, as Relator would be forced to admit at trial or 

summary judgment that he has no evidence in support of the essential elements of his claims. 

Withdrawing the deemed admission—and permitting Relator to proffer evidence that supports his 

contentions—would promote resolution of this case on the merits.

The court next considers whether withdrawal will prejudice Defendants. “The party 

relying on the deemed admission has the burden of proving prejudice.” Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622. 

The prejudice that Rule 36(b) contemplates “is not simply that the party who obtained the 

admission will now have to convince the factfinder of its truth.” Id. (citation omitted). And 

“reliance on the admission in connection with a dispositive motion is not enough to constitute 

prejudice.” Mosley v. Groupon, Inc., No. 15-cv-01205-BLF-PSG, 2016 WL 324384, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (citing Conlon, 474 F.3d at 624). Instead, the relevant concern is the 

“difficulty a party may face in proving its case at trial.” Conlon, 474 F.3d at 624. For example, 

prejudice may flow from the “unavailability of key witnesses” or “the sudden need to obtain 

evidence with respect to the questions previously deemed admitted.” Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348. 

Courts often find prejudice where a plaintiff moves to withdraw automatic admissions after 

discovery has closed. See, e.g., Doty v. City of Santa Clara, No. 14-CV-03739-LHK, 2015 WL 

9027727, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015). But in Conlon, where the plaintiff sought to withdraw 

admissions after discovery had already closed, the Ninth Circuit noted its “reluctan[ce] to 

conclude that a lack of discovery, without more, constitutes prejudice” because “[t]he district court 

could have reopened the discovery period[.]” Id. at 624; see also, e.g., Chartsis Specialty Ins. Co. 

v. Telegraph Hill Props., Inc., No. C 11-05696-RS, 2013 WL 1629173, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 

2013) (finding no prejudice even though the plaintiff had relied on defendants’ automatic 

admissions for many months and discovery had already closed because it could be reopened). 

Generally, the closer a date is to trial, the greater the prejudice. See id. at 622-24.

Here, Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that they will be prejudiced 

if the Court permits Relator to withdraw his automatic admissions. To start, Defendants have been 

aware of the factual basis for Relator’s claims since Relator submitted his initial disclosures in 

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

early October. (See Dkt. No. 33-2—33-13.) More importantly, the parties are only three months 

into discovery with nearly eight more months remaining. (See Dkt. No. 27 at 1.) Trial is a full 

year away. (Id.) Under such circumstances, permitting Relator to withdraw the automatic 

admissions will not prejudice Defendants. Defendants argue that, as in Conlon, they will suffer 

prejudice because they “will suddenly need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions 

previously deemed admitted.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 7.) Their reliance on Conlon is misplaced. There,

the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines had already passed. The “sudden” need for 

discovery arose because trial was drawing near. Here, in contrast, Defendants have many months 

to pursue any follow up discovery they need before trial. The only approaching deadline is the 

parties’ mediation in late January 2017, and Defendants have more than a month to obtain 

discovery necessary for mediation. If Defendants believe they need more time to obtain particular 

discovery in advance of mediation, they may seek to amend the Pretrial Order if they can 

demonstrate good cause to extend the deadline. At bottom, because significant time remains in 

discovery, there is no prejudice here.

Thus, Relator has satisfied both Rule 36(b) factors. Even if both prerequisites are met, 

Rule 36 “is permissive, not mandatory” in that the court may allow withdrawal or amendment of 

admission but is not required to do so. See Conlon, 474 F.3d at 621, 625. “[I]n deciding whether 

to exercise its discretion when the moving party has met the two-pronged test of Rule 36(b), the 

district court may consider other factors, including whether the moving party can show good cause 

for the delay and whether the moving party appears to have a strong case on the merits.” Id. at 

625.

An attorney’s mistake due to administrative difficulties does not constitute good cause for 

delay. See, e.g., Chartsis Specialty Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1629173, at *8 (finding that moving 

offices, a paralegal quitting, and being on vacation did not constitute good cause for delay). “[A] 

client is ordinarily chargeable with his counsel’s negligent acts,” Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 

F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002), and in most contexts “clients must be held accountable for the 

acts and omissions of their attorneys.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 

U.S. 380, 396 (1993). Nor is the Court persuaded by Relator’s attempt to shift the blame for his 

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

attorney’s mistake onto Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 30-2 at 6.) As for the strength of Relator’s 

case on the merits, based on his initial disclosures Relator has some evidence to support his case, 

which supports withdrawal of the admissions. (See Dkt. No. 33-2—33-13.)

Ultimately, although Relator’s attorney missed a deadline, Defendants now have Relator’s 

admissions and plenty of time to seek follow-up discovery. “While lawyers should strive to avoid 

such oversight, forcing [Relator] to adhere to [his automatic] admissions does not serve 

truthseeking or judicial efficiency.” North Venture Partners, LLC v. Vocus, Inc., No. 14-cv00337-RS, 2016 WL 1177923, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). Accordingly, despite Relator’s 

inability to provide a good cause for the delay, given the absence of prejudice to Defendants and in 

the interests of permitting Relator to present his case on the merits, the Court will exercise its 

discretion to grant Relator relief from his automatic admissions. 

II. Relator’s Bank Account Information

In support of his motion, Relator’s counsel filed on the public docket Relator’s bank 

statements complete with account numbers. (Dkt. Nos. 32-1, 32-2.) Financial account numbers 

are typically redacted given individuals’ privacy interest and to prevent exposure to harm or 

identity theft. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Kamakana v. City & Cnty. Of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., A.B. ex 

rel. W.F.B. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 07-4738 PJH, 2007 WL 2900527, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007). Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk’s Office to remove Docket 

Nos. 32-1 and 32-2 from the public docket forthwith and orders Relator to refile the documents 

with Relator’s account information redacted by December 27, 2016. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Relator’s motion for withdrawal of 

admissions deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 36(a)(3) and for permission to serve tardy responses 

to Defendants’ requests for admission.

This Order terminates Docket No. 30.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2016

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-00626-JSC Document 38 Filed 12/21/16 Page 7 of 7