Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REDWOOD CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C-01-4282 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW:

UNREASONABLE

LIMITATION AND FIRST

AMENDMENT CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2007, upon the close of Plaintiff Redwood

Christian Schools' ("Plaintiff" or "Redwood") case, Defendants the

County of Alameda et al. ("Defendants" or "the County") moved for

Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure as to all claims except Plaintiff's Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") Substantial

Burden claim. Upon considering the submissions and arguments of

counsel for both parties, the Court GRANTED Defendants' Motion as

to Plaintiff's three First Amendment claims and DISMISSED those

claims, but DENIED the Motion as to Plaintiff's other claims. 

On February 26, 2007, upon the close of all the evidence in

the case, Defendants renewed their Rule 50 Motion as to all

remaining claims and the Court GRANTED Defendants' Motion as to

Plaintiff's RLUIPA Unreasonable Limitation claim and DISMISSED

that claim, but DENIED the Motion as it related to Plaintiff's two

remaining claims, which were presented to the jury. In both

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instances, the Court ruled from the bench and notified the parties

that a written order explaining the Court's reasoning would be

forthcoming.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court has issued numerous orders in this case explaining

the relevant facts; familiarity with those orders is assumed. In

short, Redwood applied to the County for a Conditional Use Permit

("CUP") to build a 650-student combined junior-senior high school

on property located in an unincorporated area of Alameda County. 

The property, in the Palomares Canyon area of Castro Valley, was

comprised of several individual parcels of land that Redwood had

purchased in a series of transactions. Redwood required a CUP to

develop the site. After the Alameda County Municipal Advisory

Committee, Planning Commission, and Board of Supervisors all

denied the application, Redwood sued in federal court. Six claims

proceeded to trial, including Redwood's claims that the CUP denial

violated its civil rights under the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution and RLUIPA.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) states: 

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury

trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not

have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the

party on that issue, the court may:

(A) resolve the issue against the party; and

(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against

the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling

law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable

finding on that issue.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Judgment as a matter of law "is

proper if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable

conclusion. . . .” Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455,

1460 (9th Cir. 1993). “If reasonable minds could differ as

to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not

be directed.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250-51 (1986). Indeed, “[i]f conflicting inferences may be

drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury.” Pierce

v. Multnomah County, Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1448

(9th Cir. 1986)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Redwood's First Amendment Claims

During its case, Redwood failed to present sufficient

evidence such that a reasonable jury could have found in Redwood's

favor on any of its three First Amendment claims. Regarding all

three of Redwood's First Amendment claims, as the Court ruled from

the bench, Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of Defendants'

intent to violate Redwood's First Amendment rights. One of the

few jointly submitted proposed jury instructions included the

elements and burdens of proof for Plaintiff's first amendment

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first element stated that

Redwood had the burden of proving that "the acts or omissions of

the County were intentional." See Docket No. 364, Part 7,

Plaintiff's Proposed Liability Instructions, 7. Despite this,

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during oral argument, Plaintiff urged the Court not to grant

Defendants' Rule 50 Motion as to Plaintiff's First Amendment

claims on the ground that § 1983 does not require a showing of

specific intent. In support, Plaintiff cited Caballero v. City of

Concord for the Ninth Circuit's statement that "specific intent is

not a prerequisite to liability under § 1983." 956 F.2d 204, 206

(9th Cir. 1992). While correct, Plaintiff failed to add that the

state-of-mind requirements for § 1983 claims are the same as those

for the underlying constitutional or statutory violations. See

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 140 & n. 3 (1979). For First Amendment violations,

Redwood must prove that the County intended to interfere with

Redwood's First Amendment rights.

In order to demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a

plaintiff must provide evidence showing that by his actions

[the defendant] deterred or chilled [the plaintiff's]

political speech and such deterrence was a substantial or

motivating factor in [the defendant's] conduct.

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300

(9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore,

Plaintiff's last-minute attempt to reverse its previous statement

regarding the intent required for the § 1983 claims was misguided. 

See San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d

1024, 1031-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing whether intent had been

shown by the plaintiff for each First Amendment claim). 

Regarding Redwood's free exercise claim, no reasonable jury

could conclude that the evidence at trial demonstrated an aim by

the County to restrict Redwood's religious practices because of

their religious motivation or impose burdens only on conduct

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motivated by religion. See id. at 1031-32. Moreover, regarding

Redwood's free speech claim, as in San Jose Christian: 

The record reflects no indication that the City's action was

motivated by the City's disdain of College's religious

orientation, or by the message to be communicated to the

students/parishioners at the Property. Thus, no viable

impingement of speech claim has been asserted.

360 F.3d at 1032 (emphasis in original). At trial, the evidence

and witnesses all point to the conclusion that the County harbored

no disdain for Redwood's religious orientation or message. The

same holds true for Redwood's free association claim.

Redwood has thus failed to present any evidence to

demonstrate the requisite level of intent for each of its First

Amendment claims and for that reason each claim fails. 

Additionally, each of Redwood's First Amendment claims fails for

reasons specific to each claim, as discussed below. 

1. Redwood's Free Exercise Claim

Prior to trial, the Court ruled that the Alameda County

zoning ordinances were neutral and of general applicability. See

Docket No. 239; No. 351 at 9. Thus, under Supreme Court and Ninth

Circuit precedent, rational basis review applies. See Employment

Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-

77 (1990); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). 

As the Ninth Circuit summarized, "[i]f the zoning law is of

general application and is not targeted at religion, it is subject

only to rational basis scrutiny, even though it may have an

incidental effect of burdening religion." San Jose Christian, 360

F.3d at 1031. 

Despite arguing that the County abridged its First Amendment

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right to the free exercise of religion, Redwood failed to present

any evidence that the challenged law was neither neutral nor

generally applicable. A law is neutral and generally applicable

"if it does not aim to 'infringe upon or restrict practices

because of their religious motivation,' and if it does not 'in a

selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by

religious belief.'" Id. at 1031 (quoting Church of the Lukumi

Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 543 (1993). 

Similar to a prior Ninth Circuit RLUIPA case, in the record of

this case "there is not even a hint that [Redwood] was targeted on

the basis of religion for varying treatment in the City's

application of the ordinance." San Jose Christian, 360 F.3d at

1032. The County employees testified that they were solely

concerned with the impact of the proposed school on the land and

neighborhood; they were not concerned with the fact that Redwood

was religiously oriented. Furthermore, both Gus Enderlin and

Bruce Johnson from Redwood admitted on cross-examination that they

had seen no indication that the County denied the project due to

Redwood's religious goals. As such, any impact on Redwood's free

exercise of religion was an unintentional and incidental burden

and thus is subject to rational basis review. 

Applying rational basis review, Redwood's facial attack on

the County's neutral ordinances fails because Redwood did not

present any evidence that the ordinances were not rationally

related to the County's stated legitimate interests in maintaining

a fair and coherent system of zoning laws, protecting the rural

character of the Palomares Canyon area, or controlling the impact

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of noise and traffic.

2. Redwood's Free Association Claim

Redwood also asserted that the County's denial of the CUP

application violated its First Amendment right to free

association. Again, the Ninth Circuit speaks clearly in San Jose

Christian: 

Admittedly, the [CUP] ordinance and the City's enforcement

thereof render College unable to provide education and/or

worship at the Property. But the fact that the church's

congregants cannot assemble at that precise location does not

equate to a denial of assembly altogether. 

360 F.3d at 1033 (emphasis in original). Redwood's situation is

remarkably similar to that in San Jose Christian. Though the

County's denial of the CUP application prevented Redwood from

building a school on the Palomares Canyon property, Redwood was,

and still is, operating a school at the Martin Site, also located

in Alameda County. To this day, Redwood is able to assemble their

student body for various forms of religious exercise. Redwood's

main complaint is that they would rather assemble in a school

building at the Palomares Canyon property, but this does not rise

to the level of a free association violation. Thus, Redwood has

failed to present any evidence that the County's denial of the CUP

application caused a "significant interference with the freedom of

association of their members." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361

U.S. 516, 523 (1960). Consistent with Supreme Court and Ninth

Circuit precedent, the County's actions do not equate to a

violation of Redwood's First Amendment right to freedom of

association. 

//

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3. Redwood's Free Speech Claim

Redwood also argued that the County violated Redwood's First

Amendment right to freedom of speech. As explained in the Court's

prior order denying Redwood's Motion for Reconsideration and its

order granting the County's Motion in Limine No. 7, the zoning

ordinances in question do not grant County officials unbridled or

standardless discretion to prohibit Redwood's expressive activity

and thus do not implicate the First Amendment on those grounds. 

See Docket Nos. 239, 351. 

In addition, Alameda County's zoning ordinances neither

regulate speech nor operate as a pretext for suppressing

expression. The ordinances are materially dissimilar from those

at issue in the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, such as

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, where the laws prohibited a

particular type of speech in certain locations. See 475 U.S. 41,

43 (1986). The language of Alameda County's zoning ordinances and

CUP application criteria contain no content-based orientation and

Redwood presented no evidence that they are used as a pretext for

suppressing expression. Rather, the ordinances and criteria are

content-neutral "time, place and manner" restrictions, which have

"long been held to be permissible." San Jose Christian, 360 F.3d

at 1033 (quoting Howard v. City of Burlingame, 937 F.2d 1376, 1381

(9th Cir. 1991). If an ordinance "is content-neutral, it will be

upheld against a First Amendment challenge so long as it furthers

a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably

limit alternative avenues of communication." Johnson v. City of

Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1992), citing City of

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Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The zoning ordinances further the

County's stated substantial governmental interests in controlling

excessive noise and vehicular traffic, preserving the rural

character of the Palomares Canyon area, and maintaining a coherent

land use plan. The ordinances do not unreasonably limit

alternative avenues of communication because Redwood currently

operates a school at the Martin Site where it has the ability to

express its views, and could do so elsewhere in the County if it

desired.

 Therefore, Redwood failed to present sufficient evidence

such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the County

violated Redwood's right to freedom of expression.

B. Redwood's RLUIPA Unreasonable Limitation Claim

After the conclusion of their case, but prior to closing

arguments and jury deliberations, Defendants renewed their Rule 50

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The Court granted

Defendants' Motion on the RLUIPA Unreasonable Limitation claim and

dismissed that claim.

During trial and in their jury instructions, Redwood

presented their RLUIPA Unreasonable Limitation claim as an

argument that the County's land use regulations gave unbridled

discretion to the Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors. 

See Docket No. 364, Part 7, Plaintiff's Proposed Liability

Instructions at 11-12. Redwood asserted that the land use

regulations were vague and imprecise, arbitrary, and conferred

standardless discretion on the decision-makers. All three of

these arguments facially attack the regulations. Thus, Redwood

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restated claims that this Court had already dismissed prior to

trial. See Docket No. 351, Order Regarding Motions in Limine, 9. 

In addition, in this Court's Order dismissing Plaintiff's state

law § 1094.5 claim, the Court found that the County had given

Redwood due process of law by following the proper procedures and

making appropriate findings. See Docket No. 123.

Regardless of how Redwood presented its claim, however, there

is no evidence to support a RLUIPA Unreasonable Limitation claim

in this case. After extensive review of the Alameda County

ordinances, the Court determined that the County's land use laws

are facially neutral and contain narrowly drawn standards for the

decision-makers to use in evaluating Conditional Use Permits. See

Docket No. 351 at 9. The County's discretion is narrowly

circumscribed by the applicable zoning regulations and the four

criteria for granting a CUP, which set forth the various factors

the Alameda County regulatory bodies use in making their

decisions. 

Furthermore, Redwood presented no evidence that the County's

regulations or actions unreasonably limited "religious assemblies,

institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction" as required to

prevail under this provision of RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C.

2000cc(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). As discussed previously, though

Redwood was not permitted to build at the Palomares Canyon site,

it operates a school at the Martin Site, also in Alameda County. 

Redwood has been granted several CUPs to make improvements to the

Martin Site and would be eligible for a CUP at various other sites

in the County where it might choose to move in the future.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, at trial the Court GRANTED

Defendants' Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law with

respect to Plaintiff's First Amendment claims and RLUIPA

Unreasonable Limitation claim and DISMISSED those four claims

prior to submission of the case to the jury. For each of those

claims, Plaintiff failed to present evidence such that a

reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis

to find in Plaintiff's favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2007 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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