Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00630/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is Defendants City of Chandler, et al.’s (“Defendants”) Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. 29), Plaintiff’s Response

(Doc. 33), and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 34). The Court now rules as follows. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Nancy Ring (“Plaintiff”) brings various claims against Defendants on 

behalf of herself and as the representative of her son’s estate. Her son, decedent Richard 

Allyn Ring, Jr. (“Decedent”), died in an incident with City of Chandler police officers on 

March 29, 2023. (Doc. 27 at 4). Decedent suffered from mental illness and had recently 

used methamphetamine. (Id.). On the evening of March 29, 2023, he allegedly robbed an 

Ace Hardware Store, fled to a nearby residential area, and entered two residences. (Id. at 

5). Several residents in the neighborhood called 911, and City of Chandler Police Officers 

Buchanan, Wagner, Figley, Deanda, and Prendergast arrived on the scene. (Id.). The 

officers surrounded the second residence, and Decedent entered the backyard with 

significant, self-inflicted injuries to his throat area and holding a long-bladed, bloodied 

Nancy Ring,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

City of Chandler, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-24-00630-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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kitchen knife. (Id.). Decedent moved forward, either from falling due to his injuries or 

intentionally. (Id.). Officer Buchanan shot Decedent multiple times, and Officer Wagner 

tased Decedent. (Doc. 27 at 5). Plaintiff was unresponsive and died on scene. (Id.). The 

parties dispute what happened next: Plaintiff alleges that the officers failed to contact 

emergency medical responders and left Decedent’s body outside for several hours (Id.), 

whereas Defendants allege that Officer Deanda called for paramedics within seconds of 

the shooting and Officer Wagner immediately ran to get medical gear to provide aid to 

Decedent before realizing Decedent did not have a pulse. (Doc. 29 at 4).

Plaintiff filed suit on March 22, 2024. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed her SAC on July 10, 

2024, bringing various federal and state law claims against the City of Chandler, Officers 

Buchanan, Wagner, Figley, Deanda, and Prendergast (the “Officers”) in their individual 

and official capacities, and Does 1–50. (Doc. 27). Plaintiff’s claims include Count One –

Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment against the Officers; Count Two –

Fourteenth Amendment Violation of Plaintiff’s Civil Rights to a Familial Relationship 

against the Officers; Count Three – Negligent Wrongful Death in Violation of ARS § 12-

611 against all Defendants; Count Four – Intentional Wrongful Death in Violation of ARS 

§ 12-611 against all Defendants; Count Five – Negligence pursuant to ARS § 12-821.01(A) 

against all Defendants; and Count Six – Assault and Battery in Violation of ARS § 13-20 

and ARS § 13-1203(A)(1) against all Defendants. (Doc. 27). On July 24, 2024, Defendants 

filed this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. 29). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. 33, 34).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must 

meet the requirements of Rule 8.” Jones v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV 11-8093-PCT-JAT, 

2012 WL 79882, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2012); see also Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt. v. 

United Energy Grp., 818 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2016) (Rule 12(b)(6) provides “the one 

and only method for testing” whether pleading standards set by Rule 8 and 9 have been 

met); Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2006) (Rule 12(b)(6) “does not 

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stand alone,” but implicates Rules 8 and 9). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. In re Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 

F.4th 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it 

contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the 

moving party is liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Factual allegations in 

the complaint should be assumed true, and a court should then “determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Facts should be viewed “in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 

1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). “Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Jones, 2012 WL 79882, at *1 (citing Papasan 

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise various arguments for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s multiple causes 

of action. Additionally, Defendants move for the dismissal of all “John and Jane Doe” 

Defendants. (Doc. 29 at 16). Defendants seek to submit evidence outside the pleadings to 

support their claims. This Court will first determine whether it may consider the exhibits 

attached to Defendants’ Motion before addressing Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s 

SAC fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted and that the dismissal of all 

Doe Defendants is warranted. 

A. Evidence Outside the Pleadings

A threshold issue central to Defendants’ arguments is whether Defendants can 

introduce extrinsic evidence at the Motion to Dismiss stage. Specifically, the evidence at 

issue includes: Exhibits 1–3, the Officers’ body camera footage; Exhibit 4, the Medical 

Examiner Report; Exhibit 5, Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim; Exhibit 6, the Application for 

Informal Appointment of Personal Representative; and Exhibit 7, the Registrar’s Denial. 

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(Doc. 29-1).

Generally, a district court may not consider extrinsic evidence in determining the 

legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]f a district court considers evidence 

outside the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion 

for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Because Defendant failed to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court’s 

local rules for filing a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court declines to convert the 

Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If on a motion under Rule 

12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, 

the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”).

A court may consider outside evidence without converting the motion to a summary 

judgment motion under two circumstances. One, a court may take judicial notice of matters 

of public record in considering a 12(b)(6) motion. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 

899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). Two, a court may consider evidence on which the 

complaint necessarily relies if its authenticity is uncontested under the incorporation by 

reference doctrine. Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013).

A court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts only if they are “not subject 

to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]ourts may 

take judicial notice of some public records, including the ‘records and reports of 

administrative bodies.’” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 909 (citing Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. S. Cal. 

Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953)). However, courts may not take judicial notice 

of facts that are in dispute or subject to varying interpretations. See generally Sanz v. City 

of Vallejo, 2:19-CV-02134-TLN-DB, 2021 WL 2682162, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2021).

Under the incorporation by reference doctrine, courts may consider extrinsic 

evidence, including police body camera recordings, that the complaint necessarily relies 

upon, if the evidence’s authenticity is not contested. Lihosit v. Flam, No. CV-15-01224-

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PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 2865870, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2016). The complaint must “refer 

extensively” to the extrinsic evidence or the evidence must form the basis of or be integral 

to plaintiff’s claim in order to be admissible under the incorporation by reference doctrine. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907. Mere mention of the existence of a document is insufficient. Id. 

at 908. Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found it appropriate to consider

evidence, such as body camera footage, when the “complaint necessarily relie[d] on the 

circumstances surrounding” the arrest and the plaintiff did not dispute the video’s 

authenticity. Lihosit, 2016 WL 2865870, at *3; see also Covert v. City of San Diego, No. 

15-CV-2097 AJB (WVG), 2017 WL 1094020, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017) (considering 

footage that “reveals the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s claims” and was undisputed 

by Plaintiff). However, if the extrinsic evidence “merely creates a defense to the well-pled 

allegations in the complaint, then that document did not necessarily form the basis of the 

complaint.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. “Submitting documents not mentioned in the 

complaint to create a defense is nothing more than another way of disputing the factual 

allegations in the complaint,” and deprives the plaintiff of the “opportunity to respond to 

the defendant’s new version of the facts.” Id. at 1003. 

i. Exhibits 1-3: Police Body Camera Footage

Exhibits 1–3 consist of Officers Buchanan, Deana, and Prendergast’s body camera 

footage of the incident. While courts may consider police body camera footage as matters 

of public record, such consideration is only appropriate if the evidence is not in dispute. 

Muhaymin v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-17-04565-PHX-SMB, 2019 WL 699170, at *3 (D. 

Ariz. Feb. 20, 2019). Here, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to review the footage and 

thus the authenticity of the footage is still up to dispute. (Doc. 33 at 4). As such, it is 

inappropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1–3.

Additionally, in the present case, Plaintiff’s SAC does not refer to or rely upon the 

body camera footage. The Complaint arguably necessarily relies on the circumstances 

surrounding the incident captured in the footage. However, as noted, Plaintiff asserts that 

she has not had the opportunity to review the evidence and disputes its introduction at this 

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stage. (Doc. 33 at 4). Moreover, Defendants submission of the body camera footage 

exhibits aims to create a defense to and refute Plaintiff’s allegations without giving Plaintiff 

a sufficient opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ proposed version of facts. Therefore, 

the Court declines to incorporate by reference Exhibits 1–3.

ii. Exhibit 4: Medical Examiner’s Autopsy Report

Exhibit 4 is the Medical Examiner’s Autopsy Report. Plaintiff’s SAC does not 

reference or necessarily rely upon the report, so incorporation by reference is inappropriate. 

Although a public record, Plaintiff appears to contest the validity or interpretation of the 

facts included in the Autopsy Report in her Response. (Doc. 33 at 10). Thus, the Court 

finds it inappropriate to consider the report at the Motion to Dismiss stage. 

iii. Exhibit 5: Notice of Claim

Defendants’ proposed Exhibit 5 is the Notice of Claim Plaintiff submitted to the 

City of Chandler Board of Supervisors in accordance with administrative requirements 

under Arizona law. Plaintiff references the document in the SAC, and the document is a 

public record. (Doc. 33 at 4). As a plaintiff must file a Notice of Claim before bringing suit 

against public employees under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), Plaintiff’s Notice is integral to her 

state law claims. Moreover, Plaintiff created the document, and thus, there is no dispute of 

its authenticity. The facts of the Notice that Defendants seek to submit—namely, which 

parties Plaintiff identified and addressed in the Notice—are indisputable. Courts in this 

District have found it appropriate to consider Notices of Claim at the motion to dismiss 

stage. See Stuart v. City of Scottsdale, No. CV-17-01848-PHX-DJH, 2018 WL 11590045, 

at *11 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2018) (considering Notice of Claim at motion to dismiss stage).

The Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of Exhibit 5.

iv. Exhibits 6 and 7: Public Filings of Decedent’s Estate

Exhibit 6 is Plaintiff’s Application for Informal Appointment of Personal 

Representative of Decedent. (Doc. 29-2 at 16). Exhibit 7 is the Probate Registrar’s Denial 

of Plaintiff’s Application due to application deficiencies. (Id. at 21). Defendants seek to 

submit these exhibits as proof that Plaintiff is not the personal representative of Decedent’s 

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estate. (Doc. 29 at 7). Plaintiff’s SAC does not mention or rely upon either document, so 

incorporation by reference is inappropriate. However, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege that 

she is the personal representative of Decedent’s estate as necessary to have standing to 

bring claims on his behalf. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff has since obtained 

standing as the personal representative of Decedent’s estate but argue that Plaintiff still 

must take leave to amend to properly assert standing in her claim. (Doc. 34 at 3). As 

Exhibits 6 and 7 pertain to the issue of Plaintiff’s status as Decedent’s estate 

representative—an issue that has been resolved since the filing of the present Motion—the 

Court declines to consider whether these exhibits are appropriate for consideration at the 

Motion to Dismiss stage.

B. Count One – Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officers and Does 1–50’s excessive force violated 

Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 27 at 7). Defendants 

propose two arguments for the dismissal of the excessive force claim: (1) Plaintiff is not 

the personal representative of Decedent and therefore cannot bring a Fourth Amendment 

claim on behalf of Decedent; and (2) alternatively, that Defendants Figley, Deanda, 

Prendergast, and Wagner (the “non-shooting officers”) cannot be liable for Excessive 

Force in violation of the Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 29 at 7–8). 

With respect to the first argument, Plaintiff failed to plea in the SAC that she was 

the personal representative of Decedent’s estate, as required to bring a Fourth Amendment 

claim on behalf of a decedent. See Longoria v. Pinal Cnty., 873 F.3d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 

2017) (“Only [decedent’s] estate may bring a § 1983 for the violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights; his family members have no standing to sue on their own behalves.”).

Defendants acknowledge that since the filing of the Motion, Plaintiff has obtained standing 

through appointment as the personal representative of Decedent’s estate. (Doc. 34 at 3). As 

such, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim 

against all Defendants and grant Plaintiff leave to amend to properly assert standing against 

the Defendants.

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Because Plaintiff’s standing deficiency appears to be easily remedied with leave to 

amend, the Court finds it appropriate to address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s 

claims against the non-shooting officers fail to meet the requirements of Rule 8. Regarding 

the non-shooting officers, to allege a claim that a police officer’s excessive force violated 

an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, a plaintiff must show that the officer used force 

that was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible excessive 

force claim against Defendants Figley, Deanda, and Prendergast because they did not use 

any force at all or against Defendant Wagner, because Defendant Wagner’s use of the taser 

against Decedent did not cause his death. (Doc. 29 at 7–8). Plaintiff argues that the nonshooting officers should be held liable as integral participants and for failing to intervene, 

and in the case of Defendant Wagner, as an integral participant. (Doc. 33 at 5–6). 

i. Integral Participant

Under the integral participant theory, officers may be liable under § 1983 even if 

they did not directly engage in unconstitutional conduct if they are fundamentally involved 

in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation. Monteilh v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 820 F. 

Supp. 2d 1081, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 936 (9th 

Cir. 2002)). “Officers are fundamentally involved in the alleged violation when they 

provide some affirmative physical support . . . and when they are aware of the plan to 

commit the alleged violation or have reason to know of such a plan, but do not object.” 

Monteilh, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. Alternatively, an officer may be an integral participant 

if he sets in motion a sequence of events that gives rise to a constitutional violation when 

the violation is a foreseeable consequence of his decision. Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 

935 F.3d 685, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2019). All told, “simply being present at the scene does not 

demonstrate that an officer has acted as part of a common plan.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 

877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022). Rather, an officer must participate in the planning or the execution 

of the unconstitutional conduct to constitute an integral participant. Id.

In the present case, Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege facts that plausibly support a 

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claim that the non-shooting officers were integral participants in the alleged Fourth 

Amendment violation. The SAC does not propose that the non-shooting officers were 

aware of a plan to allegedly commit excessive force or set in motion the series of events 

that led to Decedent’s death. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 891–92 (finding no integral participation 

when the shooting was unplanned, and officers had no reason to know that providing armed 

backup would result in an unconstitutional shooting). Even in the case of Defendant 

Wagner, whose use of the taser could potentially constitute affirmative physical support, 

the SAC fails to allege that Defendant Wagner knew or should have known of some 

common plan to engage in unconstitutional conduct. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

does not allege a plausible claim that the non-shooting officers are liable as integral 

participants in the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 

ii. Failure to Intervene

Under the failure to intervene theory, “police officers have a duty to intercede when 

their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). “If an 

officer fails to intervene when fellow officers use excessive force, despite not acting to 

apply the force, he would be responsible for violating the Fourth Amendment.” Garlick v. 

Cnty. of Kern, 167 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1161 (E.D. Cal. 2016). However, “officers can be 

held liable for failing to intercede only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” 

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289. To that end, “such a duty is not triggered by an officer’s 

mere presence at the scene of the constitutional violation.” Viehmeyer v. City of Santa Ana, 

67 F. App’x 470, 473 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the non-shooting officers surrounded the second 

residence Decedent entered. (Doc. 27 at 5). Plaintiff’s alleged facts show that Decedent

specifically encountered Defendants Buchanan and Wagner, who shot and tased Decedent, 

respectively, before he died. (Id.). Plaintiff’s facts do not allege that Defendants Deanda, 

Figley, or Prendergast were even in the backyard or that the non-shooting officers, 

including Defendant Wagner, were near Defendant Buchanan such that they could have 

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physically intervened. See Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“[T]he agents were positioned around the room away from [the shooting officer and 

victim] and were thus physically incapable of preventing the incidents surrounding the 

shooting, all of which transpired in a matter of seconds. Therefore, it cannot be said that 

the agents’ failure to intervene was the cause in fact of [the victim’s] injuries.”). Moreover, 

the SAC does not provide facts that any of the non-shooting officers had the opportunity 

to know of and intervene with Defendant Buchanan’s decision to shoot Decedent. See id. 

(finding no failure to intervene when there was no evidence the non-shooting agents knew 

the shooting officer would hurt or shoot the plaintiff). Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly 

alleged that the non-shooting officers failed to intervene.

In sum, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that, taken as true, support a claim that the 

non-shooting officers violated Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights as integral 

participants or by failing to intervene. The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Count One with respect to Defendants Deana, Figley, Prendergast, and Wagner without 

prejudice and grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

C. Count Two – Fourteenth Amendment Violation of Familial Relationship

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim that the Officers violated her Fourteenth 

Amendment interest in the companionship of her child must be dismissed, as the nonshooting officers did not deprive Plaintiff of her familial relationship and Defendant 

Buchanan acted with a legitimate law enforcement purpose. (Doc. 29 at 9). Plaintiff 

counters that the non-shooting officers acted with deliberate indifference in failing to 

intervene and that Defendant Buchanan lacked a legitimate law enforcement purpose in 

shooting Decedent. (Doc. 33 at 6–7). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment interest in 

the companionship of their children. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th 

Cir. 1991). In order for official conduct to violate a parent’s due process rights, the conduct 

must “shock the conscience.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Courts consider the facts of the case in order to determine if an officer’s conduct meets the 

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“shocks the conscience” standard. Id. In urgent, emergency situations that necessitate fast 

action and involve competing public safety obligations, a plaintiff must show that an 

official acted with a “purpose to harm” for reasons other than legitimate law enforcement 

objectives to meet the “shocks the conscience” standard. Id. at 1137–39; see also Moreland 

v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended (Nov. 

24, 1998) (finding purpose to harm standard appropriate when police responded to a 

gunfight in a large crowd because it was an extreme emergency); Peck, 51 F.4th at 893

(“We apply the purpose-to-harm standard when officials were required to make ‘repeated 

split-second decisions’ about how best to respond to a risk, such as during a high-speed car 

chase or when confronting a threatening, armed suspect.”). Alternatively, an official’s 

“deliberate indifference” may violate a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under 

certain circumstances. Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137. For instance, deliberate indifference may 

rise to the level of shocking the conscience in situations where officers had extended 

opportunities for actual deliberation and still engaged in unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 

1137–39. This standard is appropriate “when officials had ‘ample time to correct their 

obviously [wrongful conduct],’ such as in Eighth Amendment prisoner-treatment cases or 

in wrongful-detention cases.” Peck, 51 F.4th at 893 (citing Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139). 

In the present case, the Court finds that the purpose to harm, rather than deliberate 

indifference, standard is appropriate. Plaintiff’s SAC alleges facts that indicate the incident 

was an urgent, dangerous emergency: several calls were made to 911 regarding Decedent 

allegedly stealing from a nearby Ace Hardware store, fleeing and jumping various fences 

in a nearby residential area, and entering two homes, and Defendant confronted the Officers 

with a long blade knife in hand. (Doc. 27 at 5). The alleged facts show that Decedent was 

armed and non-responsive to the Officers’ commands for Decedent to drop the knife before 

engaging in a forward motion. (Id.). While the SAC does not specify the length of the 

incident, the facts demonstrate a situation in which the Officers were required to make 

multiple fast decisions on how to best respond to risk posed by an armed, potentially 

dangerous suspect. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 894 (“Once the deputies identified the gun, they 

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were required to develop a concrete tactical response quickly, making repeated snap 

judgments and assessing [defendant’s] every move. In such a fast-paced environment, 

deliberate action within the meaning of our cases was not possible.”). The SAC does not 

allege that the Officers had ample time to contemplate their conduct, and this case is not 

akin to the kind of prison custodial situations that have utilized the deliberate indifference 

standard. See generally Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1998) (“But 

just as the description of the custodial prison situation shows how deliberate indifference 

can rise to a constitutionally shocking level, so too does it suggest why indifference may 

well not be enough for liability in the different circumstances of [a high-speed auto 

chase].”). Because a deliberate indifference review is not appropriate under the 

circumstances of this case, Plaintiff’s argument that the non-shooting officers violated 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference in failing 

to intervene fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Count Two with respect to Defendants Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, 

and Wagner is granted. Because no new facts could remedy this claim against the nonshooting officers, the Court finds that leave to amend Count Two against Defendants 

Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, and Wagner is inappropriate.

Under the purpose to harm standard, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acted 

with a purpose to harm that was unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Porter, 

546 F.3d at 1137. Conduct such as purely reactive decision-making or responding to an 

emergency weighs against a purpose to harm finding. See id. at 1140. Instead, a plaintiff 

must show that an officer’s intention was “to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object 

of arrest,” “induce . . . lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill,” or to “teach [the 

suspect] a lesson” or “get even.” Id. (citations omitted). Absent evidence of such intentions 

or evidence that an “officer’s reaction was driven by anything other than his ‘instinct ... to 

do his job as a law enforcement officer,’” an officer will escape liability under the purpose 

to harm standard, even if the officer misperceived danger or acted irresponsibly. Bingue v. 

Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855).

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Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that Defendant Buchanan shot Decedent “for no legitimate 

law enforcement reason.” (Doc. 27 at 9). The SAC continues to allege that Defendant 

Buchanan “acted maliciously with a purpose to harm Decedent Ring unrelated to legitimate 

law enforcement purposes because Ring was collapsing from his own self-inflicted knife 

wounds.” (Id.). The Court finds these allegations are conclusory and do not include facts 

sufficient to support a finding that Defendant Buchanan acted with a purpose to harm that 

was unrelated to his attempt and instinct to do his job. See Coleman v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, No. 21-16269, 2022 WL 3594272, at *1 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Plaintiffs’ failure 

to assert non-conclusory allegations regarding Officer Peacock’s intent to harm is fatal to 

their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim.”). In sum, Plaintiff’s SAC does not 

plausibly allege that Plaintiff is entitled to relief on her Fourteenth Amendment claim 

against Officer Buchanan, and thus, dismissal of Count Two against Officer Buchanan is 

warranted. However, because new facts could remedy Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, 

the Court finds that leave to amend is appropriate.

D. Counts Three–Six – State Law Claims

Plaintiff brings various state law claims against the Defendants. Plaintiff brings two 

claims—Negligent Wrongful Death and Intentional Wrongful Death—against all 

Defendants under A.R.S. § 12-611. (Doc. 27 at 9–10). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges all 

Defendants are liable for “Negligence.” (Id. at 11–12). Lastly, Plaintiff alleges all 

Defendants are liable for Assault and Battery in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-20 and 13-

203(a)(1). With respect to Defendant City of Chandler (“Defendant Chandler”), Plaintiff 

alleges it is vicariously liable for the Officers’ actions under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims against the Officers fail because 

she did not timely serve her Notice of Claim on the individual officers as required by A.R.S. 

§ 12-821.01(A). (Doc. 29 at 11). If the alleged deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim 

do not doom Plaintiff’s state law claims, Defendants argue that the claims fail on the merits 

or are otherwise not viable causes of action. (Id. at 12). Lastly, Defendants argue that 

Defendant Chandler cannot be held vicariously liable for the Officers’ actions because 

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A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) immunizes public entities from vicarious liability unless the entity 

knew of its employee’s propensity for the criminal action. (Id. at 15).

i. Notice of Claim

In Arizona, a state law claim against a public employee is barred unless a notice of 

claim is filed within 180 days of the claim’s accrual. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). “A claimant 

who asserts that a public employee’s conduct giving rise to a claim for damages was 

committed within the course and scope of employment must give notice of the claim to 

both the employee individually and to his employer.” Crick v. City of Globe, 606 F. Supp. 

3d 912, 916 (D. Ariz. 2022) (citations omitted). “[A] party seeking to sue a government 

employee must personally serve the employee with the [Notice of Claim]—service upon 

the City Clerk, or the receptionist at the office where the government employee happens to 

work, is insufficient.” Andrich v. Kostas, No. CV-19-02212-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 

377093, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2020). “Actual notice and substantial compliance do not 

excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).” 

Falcon v. Maricopa Cnty., 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).

Plaintiff’s SAC provides that “Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Board of 

Supervisors for the City of Chandler.” (Doc. 27 at 4). Defendants argue in their Motion to 

Dismiss that Plaintiff’s failure to serve any of the individual Defendants within 180 days

of the incident dooms Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Doc. 29 at 11). Plaintiff counters that at 

the time Plaintiff timely served her claim notice on the City of Chandler, Plaintiff did not 

have all the names of the officers involved and can substitute Defendant “Does” with 

individual officer names to sustain the state law claims. (Doc. 33 at 8). As Plaintiff’s Notice 

of Claim only addressed the “City of Chandler,” rather than any unknown officers or 

Defendant “Does,” it is unclear how Plaintiff intended to substitute identified officers in 

the Notice of Claim. (Doc. 29-2 at 13). In any event, courts have found that a failure to 

individually serve public employees does not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), even if 

the plaintiff discussed the employees’ conduct in a Notice identifying the city as an 

employee or failed to serve individuals because their identities were undisclosed. See 

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Adame v. City of Surprise, No. CV-17-03200-PHX-GMS, 2018 WL 3209388, at *5 (D. 

Ariz. June 29, 2018) (dismissing claim against officer when the notice was not addressed 

to or served upon officer nor identified him as a party, despite reciting the officer’s alleged 

misconduct); Bustamante v. Gonzalez, No. CV07-0940PHX-DGC JRI, 2010 WL 396361, 

at *10 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2010) (dismissing claims because plaintiff failed to individually 

serve officers whose identities were undisclosed at time of filing); Baker v. City of Tempe, 

No. CV 07-1553-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 2277882, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008)

(dismissing claims against officers when notice failed to name them because “the Notice 

would not have enabled them to know that they were potential litigants, nor the nature of 

the claims against them as individuals”).

Here, Plaintiff failed to properly serve or give timely notice—indeed, Plaintiff gave 

no notice at all—to the individual officers prior to filing this suit. As such, “Plaintiff’s 

claims against all individual officers are barred based on a straightforward failure to 

comply with the notice of claim statute.” Boss v. Unknown Parties, No. CV-14-02344-

PHX-ROS, 2015 WL 12592106, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2015). All told, Plaintiff failed to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted for Counts Three through Six with respect 

to Defendant Officers and Defendant Does, and the Court finds that leave to amend would 

be futile.

i. Defendant Chandler’s Vicarious Liability

Under Arizona law, municipal responsibility arises from vicarious liability. Crick v. 

City of Globe, 606 F. Supp. 3d 912, 918 (D. Ariz. 2022). While an employee’s exoneration 

would typically preclude an employer’s vicarious liability, “dismissing a claim against an 

employee for reasons that did not exonerate the employee from wrongdoing [does not 

require] the court to also dismiss a claim against the employer under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior.” Laurence v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 

528 P.3d 139, 145 (2023). Dismissal of a claim with prejudice based on a failure to comply 

with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) does not exonerate an employee defendant from the claim and 

does not necessarily bar a vicarious liability claim against the employee’s employer. See

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generally id. at 141. Moreover, a plaintiff is not required to serve a notice of claim on an

employee to pursue a claim against its employer. Id. at 148; Moore v. Arizona, No. CV 22-

01938-PHX-JAT (JFM), 2024 WL 2699939, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2024). Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s failure to serve the individual Officers the Notice of Claim does not prevent 

Plaintiff from pursuing or require dismissal of the claims against Defendant Chandler. The 

Court will analyze whether Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant Chandler are 

subject to dismissal on the merits or other procedural grounds below. 

a. Negligent Wrongful Death

A.R.S. § 12-611 provides a cause of action “[w]hen death of a person is caused by 

wrongful act, neglect or default.” Plaintiff brings two claims—Negligent Wrongful Death 

and Intentional Wrongful Death—against all Defendants under A.R.S. § 12-611. (Doc. 27 

at 9–10). Plaintiff alleges that the Officers breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff and 

Decedent through their negligent and intentional acts and omissions, and that Defendant 

Chandler is vicariously liable for these wrongful acts and omissions. (Id. at 10–11). 

Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because under Arizona state law, 

claims for negligence arising out of the intentional use of force are barred. (Doc. 29 at 12). 

Defendants correctly assert that the Arizona Supreme Court has held that negligence 

claims cannot be based solely on an officer’s intentional use of force. See Ryan v. Napier, 

425 P.3d 230, 233 (2018). Here, Plaintiff alleges no negligent conduct by the officers that 

harmed Decedent independent of the use of force. See Harris v. City of Phoenix, No. 22-

16307, 2023 WL 6635077, at *1 (9th Cir. 2023). It is undisputed that Officer Buchanan 

intentionally shot Decedent, leading to his death. (Doc. 27 at 6). 

In her Response, Plaintiff argues that the negligence claim “is not just based on 

Buchanan’s intentional conduct. The negligence claim is based on the officers’ tactical 

errors . . . [that] necessitated shooting Ring.” (Doc. 33 at 9). It is unclear whether this 

argument refers to Count Three (Negligent Wrongful Death), Count Five (Negligence), or 

both. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Defendant Officers’ tactical errors support the 

Negligent Wrongful Death claim, this Court is unconvinced. The Arizona Supreme Court 

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has refused to recognize negligence liability resulting “from a law enforcement officer’s 

‘evaluation’ of whether to intentionally use force against another person.” Ryan, 425 P.3d 

at 236. “A negligence claim requires ‘an act’ or a ‘failure to act.’” Id. “An actor’s internal 

evaluation about whether to use force and the decision to do so are not ‘acts’ and therefore 

cannot, by themselves, constitute negligence.” Id. at 237; see also Weber v. City of 

Kingman, No. 1 CA-CV 21-0063, 2022 WL 1468246, at *2–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022) 

(finding that negligence wrongful death claims based on pre-shooting tactical decisions 

and failure to engage in de-escalation techniques are barred). Thus, Defendant Officers’ 

evaluations and tactical decisions on how to handle the incident leading up to the shooting 

cannot alone constitute negligence. 

Because no cognizable legal theory supports Plaintiff’s Negligent Wrongful Death 

claim, Defendant Chandler cannot be held vicariously liable. See Laurence, 528 P.3d at 

150 (“Dismissing a tort claim against an employee because the claim lacks merit requires 

the court to also dismiss a claim against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior.”). As no additional facts could support a plausible claim, the Court finds leave to 

amend would be futile. Count Three is dismissed with prejudice against Defendant 

Chandler. 

b. Intentional Wrongful Death

Plaintiff’s second claim under A.R.S. § 12-611, Intentional Wrongful Death, closely 

mirrors her Negligent Wrongful Death Claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached 

various duties of care owed to Plaintiff through their intentional use of excessive force, and 

that Defendant Chandler is vicariously liable for the Defendant Officers’ actions. (Doc. 27 

at 11). Defendants request the Court interpret Count Four (Intentional Wrongful Death) as 

barred under the same legal theory that dooms Plaintiff’s Negligent Wrongful Death claim, 

because despite its “intentional” label, it is based on negligence elements such as duty and 

breach of care. (Doc. 29 at 13). Defendants are correct that intentional tort claims do not 

require proof of duty, breach, or a causal connection between breach and the alleged injury, 

and instead require a showing of tortious intent. Ryan, 425 P.3d at 235.

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“A wrongful death claim is not itself a theory of liability.” Harris v. Phoenix, No. 

CV-20-00078-PHX-DLR, 2021 WL 4942662, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2021) (cleaned up). 

“[I]n cases advancing claims based ‘solely on an officer’s intentional use of physical force,’

a plaintiff may only advance a theory of intentional use of force.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Courts have found that in Arizona, an allegation that a police officer unjustifiably shot a 

decedent is a theory of intentional force akin to aggravated assault, a criminal felony. Id.; 

see also Betancourt v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0361, 2017 WL 5586533, at *4 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). In order for a public entity to be liable for an employee’s intentional 

use of force, it must actually know of the employee’s propensity to commit that particular 

act. Harris, 2021 WL 4942662, at *1; see also A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) (“A public entity is 

not liable for losses that arise out of and are directly attributable to an act or omission 

determined by a court to be a criminal felony by a public employee unless the public entity 

knew of the public employee’s propensity for that action.”). 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts in the SAC that Defendant Chandler had 

any actual knowledge that Officer Buchanan had a propensity for aggravated assault or to 

otherwise wrongfully shoot or engage in excessive force. In her Response to the present 

Motion, Plaintiff argues that “[i]t stands to reason that City might have prior knowledge of 

Buchanan’s or other officer’s propensities to shoot.” (Doc. 33 at 10). This statement is too 

conclusory to warrant a favorable inference that Defendant Chandler had actual knowledge 

and was on notice that Officer Buchanan specifically had such a propensity. The Court will 

dismiss Count Four against Defendant Chandler and grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

c. Negligence

Count Five (Negligence) argues that the Officers breached a duty to use reasonable 

judgment while interacting with Decedent and refusing to treat Decedent’s gunshot 

wounds, and further, that Defendant Chandler is vicariously liable for the Officers’ actions. 

(Doc. 27 at 12–13). Defendants interpret this common law claim to be an attempted 

survival action under A.R.S. § 14-3110, and in doing so, argue that Count Five should fail 

because Plaintiff did not allege these claims as the personal representative of the estate and 

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because Plaintiff does not seek recoverable damages. (Doc. 29 at 12). 

Arizona’s survival statute, A.R.S. § 14-3110, allows a decedent’s estate to bring 

claims on behalf of the decedent. Manion v. Ameri-Can Freight Sys. Inc., 391 F. Supp. 3d 

888, 892 (D. Ariz. 2019). Only the personal representative of a decedent’s estate can use 

the survival statute as a vehicle to bring claims the decedent could have themselves brought 

if not for their death. Bd. of Tr. of Sw. Carpenters Health & Welfare Tr. v. Jackson, No. 

CV-22-01781-PHX-SMM, 2023 WL 4488978, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 12, 2023). 

It is unclear whether Plaintiff intended Count Five to be a survival action; Plaintiff’s 

SAC shows that she brings Count Five “as successor in interest to decedent,” but there is 

no mention of A.R.S. § 14-3110—the requisite foundation for bringing a claim on behalf 

of Decedent—in her claim. (Doc. 27 at 12). Plaintiff’s only mention of the statute can be 

found in the damages section of the SAC, where she states that she is “entitled to recover 

wrongful death damages” under the statute. (Id. at 6). In her Response, Plaintiff argues that 

she can bring a survival action under A.R.S. § 14-3110 because she intends to substitute as 

the proper estate representative. (Doc. 33 at 8). However, Plaintiff fails to explain within 

the four corners of the SAC or the responsive briefing to this Motion whether she intends 

to bring her claim for “Negligence” pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3110 or how she otherwise 

has standing to bring a claim for “Negligence.” In the event Plaintiff intended to bring the 

Negligence claim as a survival action on behalf of Decedent, the Court does not find 

Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. As noted above, Plaintiff has yet to plead that she is the

proper estate representative. Thus, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a survival action for any 

claims on behalf of Decedent, and her claims must be dismissed. 

Even if Plaintiff amends her Complaint to properly assert standing to bring a 

survival action, Defendants argue that there can be no survival action because there are no 

recoverable damages. (Doc. 29 at 12). It is well-settled that in Arizona, a survival action 

only provides for recovery of damages sustained by the deceased party from the time of 

accident until his death. Barragan v. Superior Ct. of Pima Cnty., 470 P.2d 722, 724 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1970). Plaintiff argues that survival actions allow for the recovery of damages 

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such as lost wages, funeral expenses, burial expenses, and punitive damages. (Doc. 33 at 

8). 

The Court disagrees. The Ninth Circuit declined to find that the Arizona survival 

statute provides for recovery of a decedent’s future loss of earnings, noting:

Although the Arizona Supreme Court has not addressed 

whether Arizona’s survival statute allows recovery of future 

economic damages, several Arizona Court of Appeals cases 

have held that the survival statute only allows for damages that 

accrued before death, and the Arizona Supreme Court has 

recently declined to review two of those decisions.

See Matus v. Kustom US, Inc., No. 23-16134, 2024 WL 3688728, at *1 (9th Cir. 2024). 

Thus, Plaintiff cannot recover any of Decedent’s future lost wages. Furthermore, funeral 

and burial expenses are not accrued until after an individual’s death. Such expenses are 

therefore categorically excluded from recovery under the survival statute. Lastly, A.R.S. § 

12-280.04 provides that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee acting within the 

scope of his employment is liable for punitive or exemplary damages.” Therefore, Plaintiff 

cannot recover punitive damages under the survival statute. 

The Court finds that even if Plaintiff amends her Complaint to properly assert 

standing under Arizona’s survival statute and provide additional facts, she will still be 

unable to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Count Five will be dismissed 

with prejudice. 

d. Assault/Battery in Violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-20 and 13-

1203(A)(1)

Plaintiff’s Count Six alleges that Defendant Officers violated A.R.S. §§ 13-20 and 

13-1203(A)(1) by placing Decedent “in immediate fear of death and severe bodily harm 

by battering and shooting him without any just provocation or cause” and that Defendant 

Chandler is vicariously liable. (Doc. 27 at 13). Defendants argue that Defendant Chandler 

is immune from liability on the assault and battery claim under A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B). 

(Doc. 29 at 14–15). Defendants argue that the claims are premised on losses resulting from 

Defendant Buchanan’s shooting of Decedent, which constitutes at minimum felony 

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aggravated assaulted when viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Id. at 15). As Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendant Chandler had actual 

knowledge of Defendant Buchanan’s propensity for felony aggravated assault, Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff’s claim is doomed. (Id. at 16). Plaintiff counters, as noted above, that 

Defendant Chandler “might have prior knowledge of Buchanan’s or other officer’s 

propensities to shoot” and thus Defendant Chandler should still be held vicariously liable 

under A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B). (Doc. 33 at 10).

This claim fails for several reasons. Similarly to Plaintiff’s Negligence claim, it is 

unclear whether Plaintiff intends to bring this claim as a survival action pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 14-3110 or—as the parties seem to argue in this Motion’s briefing—as a theory of 

intentional use of force to advance an Intentional Wrongful Death claim in her own 

capacity. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring this claim as a survival action, Plaintiff 

fails to allege recoverable damages—as discussed above in the Court’s dismissal of Count 

Five—which warrants dismissal with prejudice. 

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring this claim as a theory of intentional force 

to advance a wrongful death claim, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. First, A.R.S. § 13-20 does not exist. Second, while A.R.S. § 13-1203 

codifies assault as a criminal misdemeanor, Plaintiff does not contest Defendants’ assertion 

that the Court should interpret Count Six as a claim for felony aggravated assault

underlying an intentional wrongful death claim subject to analysis under A.R.S. § 12-

820.05(B). (Doc. 29 at 14–15; Doc. 33 at 10). However, the Court declines to do so, 

because Plaintiff’s SAC does not seek to bring this “Assault/Battery” claim as a wrongful 

death claim, Plaintiff already brings an Intentional Wrongful Death claim based on the 

Defendants’ same conduct in Count Four, and the Court already applied an A.R.S. § 12-

820.05(B) analysis to Plaintiff’s Count Four. 

If Plaintiff intended to bring Count Six under a vehicle other than a survival or 

wrongful death action, the Court cannot determine that from the SAC. “Judges are not like 

pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th 

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Cir. 1991). “Nor are they archaeologists searching for treasure.” Jeralds v. Astrue, 754 

F.Supp.2d 984, 985 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six against 

Defendant Chandler is granted. Because the Court cannot determine what theory of 

standing Plaintiff brings this claim under, the Court cannot determine whether amendment 

will be futile. The Court will therefore give Plaintiff the opportunity to amend the SAC.

E. Defendants Does 1–50

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s naming of “John and Jane Doe” Defendants 

is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus all “Doe” Defendants 

should be dismissed. (Doc. 29 at 16). Fictitious defendants are not favored in federal court 

as a general rule. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). “[T]he plaintiff 

should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, 

unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint 

would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that she is ignorant of the true names and capacities 

of Defendant Does. (Doc. 27 at 4). Plaintiff’s Response to the present Motion indicates that 

while Plaintiff “did not know the true or exact names or roles of all the defendants. 

Plaintiffs now have more information about the true defendants.” (Doc. 33 at 11). It is 

unclear whether Plaintiff intends to concede that all Defendant Does have been identified 

since the filing of her Complaint or to argue that discovery is needed to uncover the 

identities of additional unidentified parties. As such, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to 

amend Counts One and Two to either substitute parties or withdraw the claims against 

Defendant Does. As noted above, Plaintiff’s state law claims fail against Defendant Does 

because Plaintiff failed to identify or serve her Notice of Claim on those Defendants. Thus, 

the Court has already deemed it appropriate to dismiss Counts Three through Six against 

Defendant Does with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

All told, “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

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common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A district court should normally grant leave to 

amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegations of 

other facts. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.

1990).

While Plaintiff only needs to allege enough facts to “plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief,” that has not occurred here. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore, the 

Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading standards set forth by Rule 8 and 12(b)(6), 

and its dismissal is both warranted and necessary. Some of Plaintiff’s claims cannot be 

cured with further amendment and are thus futile. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for 

leave to amend.”). Specifically, Plaintiff’s Count Two against Defendants Deanda, Figley, 

Prendergast, and Wagner; Counts Three, Four, Five, and Six against Defendants Buchanan, 

Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, Wagner, and Defendant Does 1–50; and Counts Three and 

Five against Defendant Chandler are dismissed in their entirety. These theories are barred 

as a matter of law and leave to amend these counts would be inappropriate. However, 

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend Counts One through Six to cure the other 

deficiencies identified by the Court throughout this Order. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Count One against Defendants 

Buchanan, Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, Wagner, and Does 1–50; Count Two against 

Defendants Buchanan and Does 1–50; and Counts Four and Six against Defendant City of 

Chandler are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend to correct the 

deficiencies identified in this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Count Two against Defendants 

Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, and Wagner; Counts Three, Four, Five, and Six against 

Defendants Buchanan, Deanda, Figley, Prendergast, Wagner, and Defendant Does 1–50;

and Counts Three and Five against Defendant City of Chandler are dismissed with 

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prejudice and without leave to amend.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no 

later than February 18, 2024.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted in part 

and denied in part. The Court will take judicial notice of Exhibit 5 only. 

Dated this 21st day of January, 2025.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:24-cv-00630-SPL Document 35 Filed 01/21/25 Page 24 of 24