Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02729/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02729-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mardian Equipment Company, an

Arizona limited partnership, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

St. Paul Insurance Company,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-2729-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff Mardian Equipment Company (“Mardian”) seeks to disqualify Defendant’s

counsel, Snell & Wilmer, from continuing to represent Defendant in this case. Doc. #24.

Mardian claims that Snell & Wilmer should be disqualified under ERs 1.9, 1.10, and 1.13 of

the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct because the firm previously represented a sister

corporation of Mardian, Marco Crane & Rigging Company (“Marco”), and had attorneyclient dealings with the principal of both companies, Dan Mardian, Jr. Defendant St. Paul

Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) opposes Mardian’s effort to disqualify St.

Paul’s counsel. Doc. #26.

The Preamble to the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct cautions that a violation

of an ethical rule “does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as

disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation,” and warns that “the purpose of the Rules

can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.” Pmbl.

¶ 20, Ariz. R. Prof’l Conduct. The burden is on the party seeking to disqualify opposing

counsel to demonstrate that disqualification is necessary. Amparano v. Asarco, Inc., 93 P.3d

Case 2:05-cv-02729-DGC Document 31 Filed 03/28/06 Page 1 of 3
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1086 ¶ 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Alexander v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz.

1984). 

Snell & Wilmer represented Marco and its then-controlling owner, Dan Mardian, Sr.,

in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In 1989, Snell & Wilmer represented Marco in a contractual

dispute arising out of the lease of a crane. During this representation, Snell & Wilmer

worked with Dan Mardian, Jr. and acquired information concerning Marco’s business

practices. In 2004, Snell & Wilmer represented Marco in defending against a citation from

the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health and again worked with Dan

Mardian, Jr. and discussed with him Marco’s business practices. Mardian alleges that Snell

& Wilmer acquired familiarity with Dan Mardian Jr.’s and Marco’s business practices,

system of contracting, and personality traits, behavior, and “hot buttons.” Because Mardian

is a closely-related sister corporation also controlled by Dan Mardian, Jr., and engages in a

similar business, Mardian argues that Snell & Wilmer effectively acquired the same

information about Mardian. 

St. Paul argues that Snell & Wilmer has never represented Mardian, that Mardian is

a separate corporation with a separate legal existence, and that Mardian therefore is not a

“former client” under ER 1.9. The Court need not resolve this issue. Even if it is assumed

that Mardian is a former client of Snell & Wilmer, the Court concludes that this case is not

“substantially related” to the former matters under Arizona law.

For two matters to be “substantially related” within the meaning of ER 1.9, there must

be more than general similarity. The Arizona Court of Appeals has explained that “‘[s]ome

factual nexus must exist between the two matters; i.e., the matters themselves must be

substantially interrelated.’” Amparano, 93 P.3d at ¶ 28 (quoting Ariz. State Bar. Comm. on

Rules of Prof’l Conduct Ethics Op. 94-06) (emphasis in original). Mardian does not contend

that this specific case is factually related to matters previously handled by Snell & Wilmer.

Rather, Mardian argues that the knowledge acquired by Snell & Wilmer of Mardian’s

business practices provides a sufficient factual nexus. As seen above, however, Arizona

courts require that the matters themselves be factually related. 

Case 2:05-cv-02729-DGC Document 31 Filed 03/28/06 Page 2 of 3
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This interpretation of ER 1.9 is made clear by Ethical Opinion 94-06, issued by the

Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct and cited favorably in

Amparano: 

Lawyer A properly may represent clients against Former Client – even if the

matter is precisely the type he previously defended for Former Client –

provided that the matter has no substantial factual relationship to any matters

he handled with Former Client. That Former Client still has substantially the

same business methods, products and personnel as when Lawyer A represented

Former Client is insufficient to create a conflict of interest.

Ethical Op. 94-06 at 4. 

Mardian provides only generalized assertions of the knowledge acquired by Snell &

Wilmer. Mardian identifies no substantial factual connection between this case and the

matters previously handled by the firm. Vague assertions and generalized affidavits are not

sufficient to disqualify opposing counsel. Amparano, 93 P.3d at ¶ 26. The Court concludes

that Mardian has not carried its burden of demonstrating that opposing counsel should be

disqualified under the applicable ethical rules.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Doc. #24) is denied.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-02729-DGC Document 31 Filed 03/28/06 Page 3 of 3