Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01491/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marvin W. Phillips, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-1491-PHX-DGC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 filed by Petitioner Marvin W. Phillips. Doc. #1. Following a jury trial in Maricopa

County Superior Court in 2006, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving

under the influence, class four felonies under Arizona law. Doc. #5, Exh. A, Memorandum

Decision at 3. On January 3, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 years

in prison for each count, the presumptive term under Arizona law for a class four felony with

two prior convictions. Id. at 4. 

On the same day he was sentenced, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Doc. #5, Exh.

B. Petitioner’s appointed counsel subsequently filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), indicating that after searching the entire record on appeal,

he could find no arguable grounds for reversal. Doc. #5, Exh. A, Memorandum Decision at

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2. Petitioner then filed a pro se supplemental brief. Doc. #11, Exh. H. On February 12,

2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals in a Memorandum Decision rejected Petitioner’s claims

and affirmed his convictions. Doc. #5, Exh. A. A subsequent Petition for Review to the

Arizona Supreme Court was denied on June 13, 2008. Doc. #5, Exh. G. 

On February 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. #5, Exh. C. He then filed a pro se

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on February 27, 2007. Doc. #5, Exh. D. On May 8,

2007, through counsel, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief without prejudice to a later filing because Petitioner already had a direct appeal

pending. Doc. #5, Exh. E. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw in a Minute Entry

dated May 10, 2007. Doc. #5, Exh. F. It appears from the habeas petition that Petitioner did

not re-file a petition for post-conviction relief after his direct appeal was denied. Doc. #1 at

4. Respondents assert in their answer that Petitioner elected to bypass state collateral

proceedings and instead filed his federal habeas petition. Doc. #5 at 4.

Petitioner filed his pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on July 20,

2009. Doc. #1. He alleged three grounds for relief in the petition but in the screening order,

the District Court Judge denied ground three and a portion of ground one. Doc. #3. The

Court directed Respondents to respond to the following claims: (1) that Petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were denied when he was charged

with a possession of marijuana count that had already been adjudicated, thus violating the

double jeopardy clause and demonstrating that the prosecution was vindictive; and (2) that

Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments when his court appointed lawyer at the pretrial conference failed to represent

him to the best of his ability and file appropriate motions. 

Less than a month after the original petition and the screening order were filed,

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on August 17, 2009. Doc. #4. The amended petition

contains only one ground for relief (“ground four”) and thus appears to be a supplement to

his original petition. Generally, an amended complaint supersedes its original complaint.

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Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990); King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Causes of action alleged in an original complaint

which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d at 567.

Because it clearly appears that Petitioner did not intend the amended complaint to supersede

the original and instead intended it as a supplemental petition, the court will consider the

claim raised in the amended petition. Petitioner alleges in “ground four” of the amended

petition that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the

prosecutor presented perjured testimony regarding Petitioner’s alcohol level as determined

by the Intoxilyzer breath machine. 

On September 8, 2009, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. Doc. #5. Petitioner filed a Reply on November 2, 2009. Doc. #8. Petitioner then

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 2010. Doc. #9. 

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Respondents

did not address the one claim in the amended petition, presumably because they were not

directed to do so. See Rule 5(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The

respondent is not required to answer the petition unless a judge so orders.”). Upon review

of the claims, the court finds that the double jeopardy claim in ground one and the ineffective

assistance claim in ground two were properly raised in the state court. The court will,

therefore, address those claims on the merits. However, the selective prosecution claim in

ground one and the claim in ground four were not fairly presented in the state court and are

procedurally defaulted. 

A. Procedural Default 

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

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in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

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1

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

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U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

2. Application

In his pro se direct appeal brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner raised

three claims. He first alleged that he was indicted on an offense to which he already pled

guilty, thus violating his double jeopardy rights. Doc. #11, Exh. H. He also alleged that his

court-appointed attorney was incompetent when he failed to file a timely motion to remand

regarding the offense to which Petitioner had already pled guilty. Id. Lastly, he alleged that

he was sentenced in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Id. 

Petitioner’s allegation of selective or vindictive prosecution in ground one of the

habeas petition was not raised in the state court. Nor was the claim in ground four of the

habeas petition, which alleges the prosecutor presented perjured testimony regarding the

breath machine. Having failed to present these claims in the state court , Petitioner has failed

to exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if

he returned to the state court.1

 As a result, these claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has not alleged cause for the default and actual prejudice, nor has he shown a

miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural default. The court will therefore

recommend that the claims be denied. 

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Double Jeopardy Claim in Ground One

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed a double jeopardy claim in its Memorandum

Decision on direct appeal. Doc. #5, Exh. A at 6. Although Petitioner arguably raised a

federal double jeopardy claim in his brief (Doc. #11, Exh. H at ii and 1), the Court of

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Appeals addressed his state double jeopardy claim only. Doc. #5, Exh. A at 5-6. Regardless,

the facts of the claim provide no basis to find double jeopardy. As the Court of Appeals

explained, although it was error to charge Petitioner for a marijuana offense he already pled

guilty to, once the error was discovered, the trial court dismissed the charge before trial.

Doc. #5, Exh. A at 6. The Court of Appeals decision denying Petitioner’s appeal, and thus

necessarily any federal double jeopardy claim, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Nor was the decision

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceeding. The court that this claim be denied.

3. Ineffective Assistance Claim

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Petitioner argues in ground two that his lawyer at the initial pretrial conference after

Petitioner’s indictment failed to file any motions to address the marijuana charge he had

already pled guilty to. Petitioner raised essentially the same claim in his direct appeal. Doc.

#11, Exh. H at 1-2. The Arizona Court of Appeals resolved this claim in its Memorandum

Decision, stating that Petitioner filed two waivers of counsel and therefore the attorney

against whom he alleged ineffective assistance was advisory only. Doc. #5, Exh. A at 8-9.

The Court further explained that it would not consider ineffective assistance claims on direct

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appeal and that they must be presented in a state petition for post-conviction relief. Id.

Petitioner has presented nothing to show that the Court of Appeals decision regarding his

ineffective assistance claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief, the court will

recommend that the claim in ground two be denied.

C. Conclusion

Having determined that two of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and that

the remaining claims fail on the merits, the court will recommend that the petition be

dismissed.

D. Motion for Summary Judgment

The court will further recommend that Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

denied as moot. The court has addressed the claims raised by Petitioner in his habeas petition

and a motion for summary judgment on those claims is unnecessary and procedurally

improper. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

and the Amended Petition (Doc. #4) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED:

That Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 27th day of May, 2010.

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