Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01110/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01110-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTEBAN OCAMPO,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY OF FRESNO, et al.,

1

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO

FIRST SCREENING ORDER

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:

(1) FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT, OR

(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE

WISHES TO STAND ON HIS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANT SANGHA’S “MOTION TO 

DISMISS COMPLAINT; FOR MORE 

DEFINITIVE STATEMENT; MOTION 

FOR CONCISE STATEMENT AND TO 

STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT” AND 

PLAINTIFF’S “AMENDED MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT” 

(Docs. 14, 18, 22, 24, 25)

TWENTY ONE-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Esteban Ocampo is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action. Plaintiff 

filed his First Amended Complaint on October 16, 2024. (Doc. 14). Upon review, the Court 

concludes that that complaint fails to state any cognizable claims.

Plaintiff has the following options regarding how to proceed: Plaintiff may file a second 

amended complaint which the Court will screen in due course. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a 

statement with the Court stating he wants to stand on this amended complaint, and have it reviewed 

by the presiding district judge, in which case the Court will issue findings and recommendations to 

the district judge consistent with this order. If Plaintiff does not file anything, the Court will 

recommend that the case be dismissed.

1 The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend the Current Case Title,” which seeks to “amend the case 

title to include additional parties.” (Doc. 24). Because the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, 

see infra, such motion is denied as moot.

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Also pending before the Court is Defendant Aaranpreet Sangha’s “Motion to Dismiss

Complaint; For More Definitive Statement; Motion for Concise Statement and to Strike Portions 

of the First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 18) and Plaintiff’s “Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment” (Doc. 22),2both of which will be denied as moot, subject to renewal, if appropriate, on 

completion of screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty 

is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required 

of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. 

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma 

pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 

1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). If the Court determines that a 

complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies 

of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: 

(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See 

2 On November 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Request” to amend the heading associated with his November 5, 2024 

filing (Doc. 22). Because that document, regardless of heading, is ordered denied as moot, the Court likewise denies 

Plaintiff’s “Request” (Doc. 25) as moot.

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a 

minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice 

of what the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. 

Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept 

as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a 

court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] complaint 

[that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557).

II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s complaint, which uses the form “Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (NonPrisoner),” names as Defendants the City of Fresno, Ofc. Aaranpreet Sangha, Ofc. Gilberto Avila,

Ofc. Daniel Saldana, Ofc. Justin Phoolka, and Does 1–6.3 (Doc. 14 at 2–4.) Under a section titled 

“Basis for Jurisdiction,” Plaintiff indicated that that he was bringing a suit against state or local 

officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and lists violations based on violations of the

“4th.14th Amendment of the U. S Const.” (Id. at 2.)

In a section “explain[ing] how each defendant acted under color of state or local law,” 

Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Ofc Avila and Ofc Sangha performed a (Terry Stop) Stop-and-Frisk, For 

Bombs, Guns and Drugs. Ofc. Avila Days later California’s civil code ss 1708.7, 

then on another date as i was arriving home Ofc Avila California penal code ss 

646.9. Ofc. Sangha, Ofc Avila California civil code ss 46 amongst his associates, 

Ofc. Shin + 1 unknown Ofc(Doe1 )., whit the help of 1 Security guard (Doe2) Brake 

into Plaintiff Storage. PC ss 487. Ofc. Avila Ofc. Sangha failed to appear in court. 

Ofc Sanghas’ associate continue to Stalk Plaintiff and his family, (penal codes ss 

646 .9 PC)Plaintiff Request a Restraining order on Officers, Ofc Saldana initiated 

3 Plaintiff also lists an “Ofc. Shinn” in the caption of his complaint but does not include that officer as a named 

defendant on pages two through four of his complaint.

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

a stop, locate 2 legally owned pistols without clips inside a sealed backpack in the 

locked trunk, Ofc. Saldana Ofc Sangha, Ofc Felicia, Ofc. Phoolka Doe 3, with no 

Warrant Enter and searched Plaintiffs home and vehicles, Mothers home, Brothers

Home, Brothers Tenets home. Base on Previous event

*Depravation of Rights Under Color Of LAW : 42 U.S.C 1983

(Id. at 8 (“Bases of Jurisdiction (D)”).) As to relief,

[Plaintiff] respectfully request that the court administer justice to the fullest extent. 

I belief the defendants should receive the maximum sentence for the crimes they 

have committed. Additionally, I request that the court revoke all Peace Officer 

licenses and certificates granted to the defendants to ensure that no one in Fresno, 

CA, does through what I have endured. 

Furthermore, I urge the court, in collaboration with the Judicial and 

Legislative branches, to establish Police Brutality Codes (PB). I also advocate for 

all complaints against Fresno Police Officers to be investigated by an independent 

third party.

We are at the dawn of a new millennium, and our young nation is facing the 

early stages of a societal collapse. Cities like San Francisco, once prominent, now 

resemble scenes from a Zombie apocalypse. Seattle, Washington, is no different. 

Recognizing the direction we are all headed, I feel a profound responsibility to take 

action. I request that the court award the Plaintiff $7. million in damages, including 

punitive damages. The discovery phase will reveal the full extent of the truth, and 

while settlements may be discussed by law, my primary goal is to hold these 

individuals accountable. I want them to understand the impact of their actions and 

for their families to experience the consequences my family has endured. Although 

the defendants did not take my life, they have caused significant trauma to my life 

and character, which cannot be undone.

I pray to God every day that no one else has to endure what I have 

experienced.

I ask the court to make a lawful definition of “Fee” as “Taxes.”

I also request that the court consider California SB 50 2804.5 for the 2023-

2024 regular session regarding law-level vehicle infractions and adopt this bill. This 

is a great leap forward and will prevent unnecessary contact with Fresno Police 

Officers.

(Id. at 18). The remainder of his complaint is comprised of 188 pages of miscellaneous attachments 

and exhibits that purportedly support Plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violations.

III. EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the complaint does not state any 

cognizable claims. Plaintiff shall be provided with the legal standards that appear to apply to his 

claims and will be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the identified 

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

deficiencies, where appropriate.

A. Rule 8

Rule 8 states that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint violates Rule 8 

because it does not contain a short and plain statement of the claim demonstrating that he is entitled 

to relief.

Although the Federal Rules use a flexible pleading policy, Plaintiff is required to give fair 

notice to the defendants of the basis of the claim and must allege facts that support the elements of 

the claim plainly and succinctly. A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to give 

the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555; see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Rule 8(a) 

dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely 

irrelevant”); Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 

1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” 

“confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of 

“incomprehensible rambling,” while noting that “[o]ur district courts are busy enough without 

having to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern a plaintiff's 

claims and allegations.”).

Here, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that identify the basis of Plaintiff’s 

Section 1983 claim.4 Although Plaintiff names several defendants, the factual basis for those claims 

4 While the First Amended Complaint is too incoherent to make a definite finding, the Court takes notice of a similar 

case filed by the Plaintiff and resolved by this Court, Ocampo v. Fresno Police Department, No. 1:23-cv-01653-

KES-EPG, and advises the Plaintiff that his claims may be subject to res judicata. Two related doctrines of 

preclusion are grouped under the term “res judicata.” See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). 

The first of these doctrines—claim preclusion—forecloses “successive litigation of the very same claim, 

whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” Id. Stated another way, “[c]laim 

preclusion . . . bars any subsequent suit on claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action.” Cell 

Therapeutics, Inc. v. Lash Group, Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009). “Newly articulated claims based on the 

same nucleus of facts are also subject to a res judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the earlier 

action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff 

from later presenting any legal theories arising from the “same transactional nucleus of facts.” Hells Canyon Pres.

Council v. United States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 686 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The second—issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel—“bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of 

fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the 

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

is unclear. While Plaintiff’s allegations are generally incoherent, he appears to make numerous 

allegations of alleged officer misconduct. (Doc. 14 at 10–17.) He does not, however, explain with 

any clarity what act(s) of misconduct were allegedly perpetrated against him and by whom. Such 

pleading is not permissible because it does not give the defendants “fair notice” of the claims 

against which they must defend and the facts and legal theories that give rise to the claims. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he must separate each claim, state the legal basis 

for the claim, and identify how the facts alleged support and show how each particular defendant

committed the violation asserted as the legal basis for the claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Plaintiff is advised that any further amended complaint must contain more than confusing

allegations and attached exhibits. Plaintiff’s complaint must contain “a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

“A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as 

practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (emphasis added). “[E]ach 

claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” Id.

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff is also cautioned that, in determining whether a complaint states cognizable claims, 

the Court’s duty is to evaluate the complaint’s factual allegations, not to wade through exhibits. 

The Court is not a repository for the parties’ evidence. Originals, or copies of evidence need not 

be submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a 

motion for summary judgment, at trial, or when requested by the Court). The Court is not in a 

position at the pleading stage to determine questions that go to the merits of a claim. Barrett v. 

Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). At screening, because the Court must assume Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations are true, it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to submit exhibits in support of the 

issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 

742, 748–49 (2001)). 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to relitigate claims that were dismissed or issues related to those claims, any 

such claims are subject to dismissal and any such issues subject to collateral estoppel.

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

allegations in a complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should simply state 

the facts upon which he alleges a defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from 

submitting exhibits.

In sum, the Plaintiff’s is advised that any amended complaint must clearly state individually 

for each defendant (1) who that defendant is; (2) what that defendant did; (3) what right that 

defendant violated; and (4) how that defendant's actions violated that right. Plaintiff may not simply 

provide a narrative story or a collection of exhibits. Failure to comply with these pleading rules

may result in dismissal of this action.

B. Legal Standards

In the event Plaintiff amends his complaint, the Court provides the following legal standards 

that may be relevant to his action:

1. Section 1983

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim for the deprivation of a constitutional right, 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, known as the Civil Rights Act, provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides 

‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”

5 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. 

Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 

5 To the extent Plaintiff makes references to defendants having violated various California Code of Regulation 

provisions and / or the California Penal Code, Plaintiff is advised such deprivations do not support a claim under section 

1983. Section 1983 only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. See e.g., Nible v. 

Fink, 828 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations do not create 

private right of action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised 

on violation of federal constitutional right); Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW (PC), 2009 WL 

1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of action under Title 15 of the California 

Code of Regulations); see also Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) (district court properly 

dismissed claims brought under several sections of the California Penal Code because those code sections did not create 

enforceable individual rights).

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. 

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) acted 

under color of state law,6and (2) deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. 

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of 

San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state law”). A person 

deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. 

Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 

‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 

inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). 

This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of 

proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also 

Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

A plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77. In other words, there must be an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 

suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 

(1978).

6 Plaintiff appears to identify Doe 2 as a security guard. (Doc. 14 at 8.) Plaintiff is advised that private individuals and 

entities not affiliated with a state or municipal government generally do not meet the element of Section 1983 that a 

defendant was acting “under color of state law.” See Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 

922 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We start with the presumption that conduct by private actors is not state action.”); Price v. State 

of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law.”). 

However, the actions of a private individual or entity may properly be attributed to the government for purposes of 

Section 1983 if at the time of an alleged constitutional violation (1) the private actor was performing a public function; 

(2) the private actor was engaged in joint activity with the government; (3) the private party acted under governmental 

compulsion or coercion; or (4) there was a sufficient nexus between the government and the private actor. Kirtley v. 

Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing “at least four . . . tests” for determining whether private 

conduct amounts to state action) (citations and quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff seeks to allege a claim under 

Section 1983 against a private individual or entity, he bears the burden the burden to establish state action under one 

of the aforementioned tests. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922; see also Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092 (“Satisfaction of any one test 

is sufficient to find state action, so long as no countervailing factor exists.”).

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

2. Heck Bar

To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under Section 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or term of imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would 

render a conviction or sentence invalid (see, e.g., Doc. 14 at 183, 187 (exhibits providing evidence 

of a pending state criminal case in which Plaintiff is the defendant)),7he must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed or declared invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 

486–87 (1994). A claim for damages bearing such relationship to a conviction or sentence that has 

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under Section 1983. Id. at 487. 

Although a plaintiff's damages claims will not be barred under Heck if the plaintiff has not 

yet been convicted, the claims cannot go forward if plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are still 

pending. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (holding Heck does not encompass 

principle that “an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought 

until that conviction occurs and is set aside”). Rather, “it is within the power of the district court, 

and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood 

of a criminal case is ended.” Id. at 393–94. Thus, if a judgment for Plaintiff on any of his civil 

claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction” on any of the pending criminal 

charges against him, the Court has discretion to stay Plaintiff's civil action until the resolution of 

that criminal charge. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Therefore, to the extent the Plaintiff pleads a 

cognizable Section 1983 claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation related to this pending state

court case, the Court notes that such an action would be subject to a stay until those state charges 

are resolved.

3. Younger Abstention

To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages stemming from his state criminal prosecution—or any 

other form of relief other than damages—directly challenging his ongoing state criminal proceeding

7 A court ‘may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.” United States ex rel. v. Robinson Rancheria 

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice of 

Plaintiff's pending criminal action in Fresno Superior Court, The People of the State of California v. Ocampo, Case 

No. F24903019. (See Doc 14 at 183, 187). Insofar as Plaintiff seeks damages based on a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, that would implicate the Heck bar. See Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There is 

no question that Heck bars [plaintiff's] claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought 

unfounded criminal charges against him.”). 

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

in Fresno Superior Court (see supra), the Court notes that any such claim is barred under the 

doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger doctrine “prevents a federal court 

in most circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court.” 

Jones v. Buckman, No. 2:18–cv–0054–MCE–EFB, 2019 WL 1227921, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 

2019). “Further, the Younger abstention doctrine bars requests for declaratory and monetary relief 

for constitutional injuries arising out of a plaintiff’s ongoing state criminal prosecution.” Id. (citing

Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986)).

C. Leave to Amend

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state any cognizable 

claims due to non-compliance with Rule 8.

Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff with time 

to file a second amended complaint, so Plaintiff can provide additional factual allegations. Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff 

chooses to further amend his complaint, in his second amended complaint he must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to further amend, it is not for 

the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 

F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff is advised that a second amended complaint supersedes the first amended

complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must 

be complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. 

Therefore, in any amended complaint, as with an original complaint, each claim and the 

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The second amended complaint should 

be clearly and boldly titled “Second Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, 

and be an original signed under penalty of perjury.

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff has a choice on how to proceed. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint if 

he believes that additional true factual allegations would state cognizable claims. If Plaintiff files 

a second amended complaint, the Court will screen that complaint in due course. Alternatively, 

Plaintiff may choose to stand on his first amended complaint subject to the Court issuing findings 

and recommendations to a district judge consistent with this order.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (21) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either:

a. File a Second Amended Complaint; or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on this complaint; 

2. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the amended 

complaint “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to case number 1:24-cv-01110-

KES-SKO; 

3. Defendant Sangha’s “Motion to Dismiss Complaint; For More Definitive Statement; 

Motion for Concise Statement and to Strike Portions of the First Amended 

Complaint” (Doc. 18) is DENIED AS MOOT, subject to renewal, if appropriate, 

upon completion of screening. The hearing on the motion set on December 11, 2024 

is hereby VACATED, 

4. Plaintiff’s “Amended Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 22) is DENIED AS 

MOOT, subject to renewal, if appropriate, on completion of screening, and

5. Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend the Current Case Title” (Doc. 24) and “Request to 

Amend Heading” (Doc. 25), are DENIED AS MOOT.

Plaintiff is advised that failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this

action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:24-cv-01110-KES-SKO Document 27 Filed 11/15/24 Page 11 of 11