Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01281/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01281-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 29, 2015*

Decided November 2, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1281

ULYSSES SCOTT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 6657

Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

Order

Ulysses Scott contends in this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that Chicago’s police officers violated his rights by stopping his car, arresting him without probable cause, searching his car, and ransacking his business, destroying some items and stealing others (and 

stealing his personal effects as well). Scott was held for 16 days (beginning February 1, 

2012) before being released on bond. He was charged with drug and firearm crimes but 

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

Case: 15-1281 Document: 18 Filed: 11/02/2015 Pages: 2
No. 15-1281 Page 2

asserts, without contradiction from the defendants, that he was acquitted at a trial in 

June 2014.

The problem in Scott’s case, the district judge held when dismissing it, lies in its timing. It was filed in August 2014, though all of the material events occurred in February 

2012, more than two years earlier. The statute of limitations for §1983 litigation in Illinois is two years. Moore v. Burge, 771 F.3d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 2014). Claims for wrongful 

search or wrongful deprivation of property accrue at the time of the search or seizure, 

and for wrongful detention when the person is “detained pursuant to legal process”—

meaning the date a judge determines that the custody is justified. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 397 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013); Fox v. Hayes, 600 

F.3d 819, 846 (7th Cir. 2010); Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1480 (7th Cir. 1994). The 

last of these dates is February 18, 2012, when Scott was released on bond and learned 

that the police would not return the items that he now characterizes as stolen. The suit 

is untimely, which makes it unnecessary to discuss other potential issues.

For clarity, however, we add that Scott’s attempt to evade the time limit by characterizing the defendants’ conduct as a conspiracy is unavailing. A conspiracy between 

private parties and state actors authorizes suit against the private parties in federal 

court. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (42 U.S.C. §1985(3)); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 

Co., 398 U.S. 114, 149–52 (1970) (§1983); Dixon v. Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1447–48 (10th 

Cir. 1990) (discussing the differences between §1983 and §1985 conspiracy liability). All 

of the defendants in this suit, however, are public employees (plus their employer), 

which means that a conspiracy claim has no role to play. See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578 

F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009).

The district court relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over Scott’s claims under 

Illinois law, see 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), and did not abuse his discretion in doing so. All of 

Scott’s state-law claims remain open to litigation in state court.

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-1281 Document: 18 Filed: 11/02/2015 Pages: 2