Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00884/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00884-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASA A. ALPHONSO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-00884-L-JMA

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Asa A. Alphonso (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 22 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction and sentence for nine 

felony offenses against Michelle C. These offenses include two counts of corporal injury 

on a cohabitant, two counts of false imprisonment by violence, and one count each of 

assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, assault with a deadly 

weapon, rape, attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime, and making a 

criminal threat. (Lod. 2 [Doc. 17-7], 179–81.) On August 12, 2015, Magistrate Judge 

Jan M. Adler issued a report and recommendation recommending the prejudicial

dismissal of Petitioner’s 22 U.S.C. § 2254 claims. (See R&R [Doc. 17].) Petitioner 

timely objected to the report and recommendation (See Objection [Doc. 18].) In 

reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” 

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and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons stated below, the 

Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and adopts the report and recommendation. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After reviewing the report and recommendation, the Court finds its factual 

background section to be a comprehensive and accurate reflection of the underlying 

record. Accordingly, the Court adopts it as its own. (See R&R 2:7–7:22.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002). In deciding a 

state prisoner's habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it 

agrees with the state court's determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily 

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court's decision was objectively 

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 

F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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III. OBJECTIONS

Petitioner advances four objections. He contends that the report and 

recommendation is erroneous inasmuch as it found that (1) the state court’s alleged abuse 

of discretion in denying his motion for a new trial is not cognizable on federal habeas 

review; (2) the exclusion of Michelle C’s estranged husband’s testimony did not violate 

Petitioner’s right to present a complete defense; (3) the harmless error standard 

articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) does not govern here; and (4) 

Petitioner’s Batson / Wheeler challenge based on the allegedly racially discriminatory use 

of peremptory challenges lacked merit. (See Objection.) The Court will address these 

objections in turn.1 

A. Claim 1

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for a new trial based on the allegedly wrongful exclusion of Michelle C’s estranged 

husband’s testimony. (Petition [Doc. 1] 12:2–15:2; Objection 2:12–3:23.) Habeas relief 

under § 2254 is available only for violations of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). 

Petitioner concedes the fact that, in his first claim, he cites only to California state case 

law to support his abuse of discretion claim. (Objection 2:21–22.) Nevertheless, 

Petitioner contends that his first claim presents an issue of federal law because its heading 

includes a reference to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution. 

The Court disagrees. While the heading suggests that his first claim will allege

federal constitutional violations, the fact remains that the substance of this section 

focuses exclusively on the alleged violation of his state statutory right to a new trial. The 

mere reference to an Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, unaccompanied by any 

analysis or citation to authority, does not suffice to convert an issue of state law into a 

 

1 The Court would like to note that, though the trial transcript was not complete when originally filed, 

the electronic record is now complete (see Doc. 19) and has been fully reviewed. 

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federal issue cognizable on federal habeas review. See Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 

993–94 (9th Cir. 1985). 

B. Claim 2

Petitioner contends that the state violated his right to present a defense by not 

allowing him to call Michelle C’s estranged husband as an impeachment witness. 

(Petition 15:3–19:26; Objection 4:1–5:8.) The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establish that 

criminal defendants have “the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the 

determination of guilt.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987). 

After the prosecution rested, and outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court 

heard the testimony of Michelle C’s estranged husband Kip Cowell (“Cowell”). Cowell 

testified that he married Michelle C in 1991, and the two were together for about 16 years 

before separating. (Lod. 1 Vol. 2 [Doc. 16-3], 387:23–388:4.) Cowell testified that 

Michelle C made various allegations of abuse against him during this time. Specifically, 

Cowell was in the Navy, and he claims that Michelle C approached the Navy with 

accusations that he mentally abused her, physically abused her, financially abused her,

and sexually abused her. Michelle C also contacted child protective services alleging 

sexual abuse of their daughter. These accusations were based on Cowell’s actions of 

engaging Michelle C in arguments that caused her stress (mental abuse); prying his work 

laptop computer from her hands when she refused to let go of it voluntarily (physical 

abuse); taking over the finances and, after separation, creating a bank account she could 

not access (financial abuse); not refusing her sexual advances toward him when she was 

under the influence of medications such as Ambien and Xanax (sexual abuse); and 

occasionally patting his daughter on the buttocks and kissing her on the head or neck at 

night when putting her to bed (child sex abuse). 

Cowell’s testimony, however, did not tend to suggest these allegations had no basis 

in reality. While Cowell’s testimony indicates he did not feel that these actions amounted 

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to the types of abuse Michelle C was alleging, he did not deny that he engaged in these

actions. Indeed, during cross-examination Cowell stated 

[a]ll these different allegations, I don’t resent any of them that she’s made. I 

believe she honestly believed them and that she made them because she felt 

that way and that was her option to do that. Knowing her history, I would 

have probably done the same thing if I was in her place.

(Lod. 1 Vol. 2, 411:17–22.) Furthermore, the Navy actually substantiated the mental 

abuse claim and sent Cowell to a sixteen-week anger management program. (Id. 394:21–

395:16.) 

After hearing and considering Cowell’s testimony, the Superior Court judge stated

the witness’ testimony, at least in the court’s view, doesn’t frankly establish 

false allegations of any substance at all. I will note the court felt that was a 

highly credible witness. I appreciate his testimony. I don’t believe this 

testimony would provide this jury with any relevant facts at this point. So 

I’ll preclude the testimony based on, frankly, no probative value.

(Lod. 1 Vol. 2, 412:11–18.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating

[d]ue to the strength of the victim’s testimony, as corroborated by the 

testimony of Gorchow and Officer Sdringola and the photographic evidence 

of her injuries, we conclude [Petitioner] has failed to meet his burden of 

showing it is probable that at least one juror would have voted to find him 

not guilty had the new evidence been presented. Accordingly, we reject 

Alphonso’s claims that the court abused its discretion and violated his 

constitutional right to present a defense by denying his motion for a new 

trial. 

(Lod. 6 [Doc. 16-11], 31.) 

This Court finds that neither the California Superior Court nor the Court of 

Appeal’s decision was objectively unreasonable. After reviewing the transcript of 

Cowell’s testimony, the Court finds it carried no probative force suggesting that 

Michelle C has a disposition such that she would likely (1) inflict injury upon 

herself, including by burning herself eight times with cigarettes, and then (2) cover 

her injuries up with make-up and (3) persuasively pretend to be scared for her life 

and therefore reluctant to speak with her therapist or Officer Sdringola, all to frame 

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Petitioner for crimes he never committed. Because Cowell’s testimony thus lacked 

probative force, the Court of Appeal accurately concluded that, given the strength 

of Michelle C’s testimony and its corroboration by both her therapist Sandra 

Gorchow and Officer Steve Sdringola, the introduction of Cowell’s testimony 

would not have changed the result at trial. Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner 

has failed to sustain his objection on the basis that he suffered prejudice from a 

denial of his right to present a defense. 

C. Claim 3

Petitioner asserts that the prejudicial effect of the alleged denial of his 

Constitutional right to present a defense should be assessed under the “harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 

rather than the “substantial and injurious effect” standard articulated in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). (Petition 20:2–21:8; Objection 5:10–6:11.) 

Petitioner is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that a 

federal habeas court reviewing a state court conviction is to apply the Brecht standard in 

assessing the prejudicial effect of any Constitutional error. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 

121 (2007) (stating “in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of 

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious 

effect’ standard set forth in Brecht. . . .”) 

D. Claim 4 

Petitioner contends that the rejection of his Batson/Wheeler challenge based on the 

allegedly racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was erroneous. (Petition 

21:10–26:4; Objection 6:12–9:7.) The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges in a racially or ethnically 

discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986). A necessary 

element of a successful Batson/Wheeler challenge is “a prima facie showing that the 

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prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.” Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991) (Citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97). To satisfy this 

element, a petitioner must show (1) that the prosecutor used a peremptory strike (2) to 

remove a juror of a “cognizable racial group” and (3) the totality of the circumstances 

raises an inference that the strike was based on the juror’s race. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 

F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2010).

At the time Petitioner made his Batson/Wheeler objection, the prosecutor had 

exercised seven peremptory challenges. (See Lod. 1 Vol 1 [Doc. 19], 157:2–160:5.) 

Petitioner objected that the prosecution had “limited every minority juror that’s been on 

the panel so far.” (Id. 160:22–23.) During a sidebar, the court determined that three of 

these seven jurors appeared to be Caucasian, one was African American, one of the jurors 

was Hispanic and another might be Hispanic, and one of the jurors might have been of 

Middle Eastern descent. (Id 161:3–163:18.) It was also established during sidebar that 

Petitioner is Caucasian and the prosecutor was a Hispanic female. (Id. 160:26–27, 

161:17–18.) Accordingly, the court concluded Petitioner had failed to establish a prima 

facie showing “for the systematic exclusion of individuals of any particular origin or 

group.” (Id. 163:22–164:6.) The Court of Appeal agreed. (Lod. 6, 16–21.) After 

reviewing the record and considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds 

that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler objection was not objectively 

unreasonable. 

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections, adopts 

Magistrate Judge Adler’s Report and Recommendation, and DENIES the Petition with 

prejudice. Certificate of appealability is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: July 5, 2016

CC: The Honorable Jan M. Adler

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