Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04038/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04038-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 4/11/08*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MOHAMED ABOUELHASSAN, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 07-4038 RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1) and 12 (b)(6), defendants, the

United States of America, Donald C. Fischer, Jr. in his official capacity as Provost of the Defense

Language Institute (“DLI”), and Elena Levintova Allison in her official capacity as plaintiff's

former supervisor at the DLI, move to dismiss plaintiff's first, third, and fourth claims for relief

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and to dismiss individual defendant Fischer for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Based upon the briefs and arguments of the

parties, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

 II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mohamed Abouelhassan was hired by DLI as an assistant professor on April 3,

2006. On November 19, 2007, he was informed of a pending lay-off. Two days later,

Abouelhassan filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) subsequently filed suit in this court. The operative first amended complaint alleges:

(1) defendants violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”) when Abouelhassan was hired at a

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Sovereign immunity protects the government and its agencies from lawsuits except where

the government has waived it. Hercules Inc., v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996); United

States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). 

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lower salary than a female colleague, (2) defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act when

Allison allegedly retaliated against Abouelhassan by giving him a poor performance review, (3)

Allison intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Abouelhassan when she allegedly made

disparaging remarks about him, and (4) defendants' conduct violated Abouelhassan's equal

protection rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

III. STANDARDS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A court may hear claims against the United States only if it has subject matter jurisdiction,

otherwise the court must dismiss them. Claims against an agent of the United States, in his or her

official capacity, are also deemed claims against the United States. Balsar v. Dep't of Justice, 327

F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish that the court has jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show

that the government has waived sovereign immunity.1 McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,

298 U.S. 178, 182, 189 (1936); Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644

(9th Cir. 1998). Federal court jurisdiction cannot be presumed or inferred but must be

affirmatively and distinctively pled. Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 515 (1986). In determining

whether a case arises under federal law, a court is generally confined to the plaintiff's well-pled

complaint. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 

B. Failure To State A Claim For Which Relief Could Be Granted

A pleading must contain at least a short and plain statement of the claim that shows the

pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Defendants’ Rule 12 (b)(6) motion tests the

legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in Abouelhassan’s complaint. See Parks Sch. of Business

v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6) may be based

either on the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988). Hence, the issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not whether the

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 28 U.S.C. section 1491 (a)(1) provides that “[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims

shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either

upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon

any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in

cases not sounding in tort.” 

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claimant will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997),

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). Although the pleading does not

need detailed factual allegations, it, however, requires more than just labels, conclusions, or a

formulaic recitation of the elements of the claims. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65, 1968. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. There Is Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Hear The First Claim For Relief

Abouelhassan must first establish that this court has jurisdiction to hear his claims.

Defendants argue that Abouelhassan has not established subject matter jurisdiction for his EPA

claim (count one). Because the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. section 1491, vests subject matter

jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States" with the Court of Federal Claims,2

Abouelhassan cannot establish jurisdiction via the Tucker Act. The Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

section 1346 (a)(2), however, vests subject matter jurisdiction with the district court if the claim

does not exceed $10,000. In his opposition, Abouelhassan expressly waives any recovery in

excess of $10,000 on his EPA claim. On its reply and at the hearing, defendants acknowledge

that Abouelhassan may pursue the first claim for relief in light of his waiver. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss is denied as to the first claim for relief.

B. The Third And Fourth Claims For Relief Are Dismissed Without Leave To Amend

Defendants argue that both the third and fourth claims for relief should be dismissed

because, although the claims are pleaded as constitutional or state law torts claims, they are in

fact federal employment discrimination claims. Because Abouelhassan admittedly has not

pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies through the EEOC for such employment

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3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a); Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 768 (9th Cir. 1991)

(federal employees must exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit). Here, Abouelhassan

acknowledges that he has not exhausted his administrative requirements. See Complaint ¶ 33

(alleging that “greater, impending harm will be incurred before the exhaustion of administrative

remedies is complete”).

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 Abouelhassan cites to Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) for the proposition that he

may state a claim outside of Title VII. Davis, however, concerned a claim by a Congressional

employee and Congress has exempted itself from the purview of Title VII. 

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claims, the government contends they must be dismissed.3

 At oral argument, Abouelhassan

conceded his third claim should be dismissed but argues that his fourth claim for relief should

survive because it is a claim under the Fifth Amendment and therefore broader than, and distinct

from, an employment claim. 

Brown v. General Servs. Admin. states that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 section 717,

otherwise known as Title VII, “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of

discrimination in federal employment.” 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Abouelhassan may not pursue

claims related to work place discrimination outside of Title VII. See also Holloway v. Bentsen,

870 F. Supp. 898, 900 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (“Title VII is a federal employee's exclusive avenue for

relief from allegedly discriminatory employment practices”). Further, this exclusivity applies

equally to claims styled as “constitutional” challenges. See also Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp.

2d 421, 432 (D.N.J. 2007) (dismissing employment discrimination claims alleging Fifth

Amendment Due Process violations because exclusive remedy lies in Title VII). Abouelhassan

fails to show how his fourth claim for relief falls outside this rule.4

 

Additionally, as defendants point out, even if Title VII exclusivity did not apply,

sovereign immunity would still bar these claims, unless Abouelhassan could demonstrate

compliance with the procedures for bringing claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. section 1346. Abouelhassan's opposition to the motion to dismiss and his amended

complaint fail to address this point at all. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted as to the

third and fourth claims for relief. 

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 On reply, defendants argue that individual defendant Allison should also be dismissed. 

Because the motion did not seek her dismissal, the court declines to reach that argument. 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

C 07-4038 RS

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C. Abouelhassan Failed To State A Claim Against Donald C. Fischer

Defendants move to dismiss Fischer from the suit for failure to state a claim against him.5

Defendants assert that Abouelhassan fails to allege any conduct at all on Fischer’s part. Indeed, 

Fischer's name appears only as a defendant to the action and as a defendant under the "PARTIES"

section. The rest of the complaint is devoid of any mention of him. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to dismiss Fischer as a named defendant is granted. 

 V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, the motion to dismiss counts three and four and the motion

to remove Fischer as a party to this lawsuit is GRANTED. At the hearing, Abouelhassan

disclaimed any interest in obtaining leave to amend. Accordingly, no such leave will be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2008 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

C 07-4038 RS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Mohamed Abouelhassan alslanguage@gmail.com

Claire T. Cormier claire.cormier@usdoj.gov

Mark Tad Malachowski mark@marklawsf.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 4/11/08 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Chambers 

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