Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01189/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01189-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFTON JEROME MCDANIEL, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-1189 JAM JFM (PC)

vs.

S. HUBBARD, et al.,

Defendants.

 / FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on three claims: an excessive force claim against

defendant Cobbs; a deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement claim against defendant

Carson; and a cover-up claim against defendants Cueva, Hall and Swan. This matter is before

the court on defendants Cueva, Hall and Swans’ motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

STANDARDS FOR A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides:

After the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--

a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court accepts

“all factual allegations in the complaint as true” and construes the allegations “in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citing Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). Judgment on the pleadings is

appropriate “when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, id. (citing Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s complaint contains the following allegations. At all times relevant to

this action, plaintiff was a state prisoner housed at California Medical Facility in Vacaville. On

July 25, 2006, plaintiff, who was on psychotropic medication, became ill due to high

temperatures in his cell. He asserts his medication required extra precautions to be taken during

periods of extreme heat. Not feeling well, plaintiff notified medical staff, who sent a nurse to

examine plaintiff. Upon the nurse’s arrival, defendant Carson informed her that plaintiff was

“allright” [sic] and that she could leave. Defendant Carson, however, was aware that plaintiff

was not feeling well, having asked plaintiff earlier, “What’s wrong you can’t stand a little heat?” 

(Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff, who was unconscious at the time, became aware of defendant Carson’s

statements through various inmates and the visiting nurse. Plaintiff claims he suffered

irreparable brain damage as a result of defendant Carson’s actions. 

Also, on October 21, 2006, defendant Cobbs allegedly slammed a cell door onto

plaintiff’s arthritic shoulder. Plaintiff claims he has been prescribed more medication due to the

injury caused by defendant Cobbs. Upon investigation of the incident, defendants Swan and

Cueva threatened plaintiff by telling him that if he did not clear defendant Cobbs of the charges

during his video-recorded examination, then he “would be locked up and all of [his] property

would be destroyed and no one will ever see [him] or hear from [him] again.” (Compl. at 6.) 

Defendant Hall processed plaintiff’s inmate appeal regarding the Cobbs incident at the second

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level of review. When plaintiff informed him of the threats, defendant Hall attempted to cover

up the incident by claiming he did not know who defendants Swan and Cueva were and by

failing to question plaintiff’s witnesses. 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

Defendants Swan, Cueva and Hall bring the present motion on four grounds: (1)

plaintiff’s claim of a cover-up is premature and must be dismissed; (2) plaintiff’s factual

allegations are insufficient to support a failure to protect claim; (3) plaintiff’s factual allegations

are insufficient to support a due process violation; and (4) defendant Hall is entitled to dismissal

because plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against him or, alternatively, defendant Hall is

entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Cover-Up Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s cover-up claim against them on the

ground that the claim is not ripe.

Allegations that officials engaged in a cover-up state a constitutional claim only if

the cover-up deprived plaintiff of his right of access to courts by causing him to fail to obtain

redress for the constitutional violation that was the subject of the cover-up. See Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1988); Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 814

F.Supp. 878, 881 (C.D. Cal. 1993). A cover-up claim is premature when, as here, plaintiff’s

action seeking redress for the underlying constitutional violations remains pending. See

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 625 (claim alleging police cover-up of misconduct was premature

when action challenging misconduct was pending); Rose, 814 F.Supp. at 881 (same).

Here, plaintiff brings a claim against defendant Cobbs for excessive force and a

claim against defendants Swan, Cueva and Hall for covering up the incident. If plaintiff

succeeds on his claim against defendant Cobbs, then he will have suffered no injury caused by

defendants Swan, Cueva and Hall. If, however, plaintiff does not succeed on his claim against

defendant Cobbs, then defendants Swan, Cueva and Hall might have successfully impeded

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plaintiff’s right of access to the courts. Accordingly, the court finds plaintiff’s cover-up claim is

not ripe until he can show that his underlying suit – his pending claim of excessive force against

defendant Cobbs – fails. 

Because plaintiff has not yet suffered harm as a result of the defendants’ alleged

cover-up, this court recommends that plaintiff’s cover-up claim against defendants Swan, Cueva

and Hall be dismissed without prejudice. 

2. Failure to Protect Claim

Defendants next seek dismissal of plaintiff’s claim against them to the extent it is

construed as a failure to protect claim. 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes

on prison officials, among other things, a duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To properly allege an Eighth Amendment claim for

failure to protect an inmate from violence, the inmate must assert that he was incarcerated under

conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm,” and that a prison official displayed

“deliberate indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. A prison official displays deliberate

indifference to inmate-on-inmate violence when he is “both aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id. at 837.

Examination of the first amended complaint reveals no facts to support a claim for

failure to protect. Instead, plaintiff’s claim against these defendants is predicated on their

alleged attempts to “cover up [the defendant Cobbs] incident” and defendant Hall’s “covering up

the incident at the second level of review.” Unsurprisingly, then, plaintiff fails to assert that he

was incarcerated under conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm,” and that these

defendants displayed “deliberate indifference” to that risk. See Farmer, 468 U.S. at 834. 

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 Because plaintiff has not pleaded a failure to protect claim in his first amended

complaint, this action is not subject to dismissal for his failure to state facts supporting such a

claim. This aspect of defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied.

3. Due Process Violation

As a third ground for dismissal, defendants assert that to the extent plaintiff is

claiming his due process rights were violated by them, his claim fails because he has not alleged

any facts showing that his due process rights were implicated. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the state

shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” U.S.

Const., amend. XIV, § 1. “Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to

deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.” 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). The purpose of the clause is to protect

individuals from a government’s arbitrary exercise of its powers. Id. Thus, the clause

traditionally has protected against deliberately chosen, but arbitrary government actions.

Examination of the first amended complaint reveals that plaintiff’s cover-up claim

may allege a due process violation. Covering up the use of excessive force or using threats to

thwart plaintiff’s grievances may hinder plaintiff’s access to the courts to redress a constitutional

violation, a right protected by several constitutional provisions, including due process. See

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982); Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1332

(11th Cir. 2008) (right of access to the courts secured by Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities

Clause, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment). However, for the

reasons set forth above, that claim is not ripe. 

Accordingly, the court recommends that plaintiff’s cover-up allegation, to the

extent it is construed as a due process violation, be dismissed without prejudice.

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4. Failure to Investigate

Finally, defendants assert that defendant Hall is entitled to dismissal because the

allegations against him arise solely through the inmate grievance process. While not specifically

stated in his first amended complaint, plaintiff generally appears to grieve the review of his

inmate appeal by defendant Hall. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create

liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from

restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982),

accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement

to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)

(existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986).

Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under

a section 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

The substance of plaintiff’s claim against defendant Hall is that defendant Hall 

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failed to adequately investigate plaintiff’s claim against defendant Cobbs and lied about knowing

defendants Swan and Cuevo. Because this claim arises from defendant Hall’s review of

plaintiff’s administrative appeal, it cannot serve as the basis for liability in this action. See

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.

Accordingly, the court recommends that defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings be granted with prejudice on this ground as to defendant Hall. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

Defendants’ November 9, 2009 motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted

in part and denied in part:

1. Plaintiff’s cover-up claim against defendants Swan, Cueva and Hall be

dismissed without prejudice; and 

2. Plaintiff’s failure to investigate claim against defendant Hall be dismissed with

prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 12, 2010.

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014.mcda1189.mjop

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