Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-23-00282/USCOURTS-ca2-23-00282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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23-282

Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit ________ 

AUGUST TERM, 2023

(ARGUED: APRIL 9, 2024 DECIDED: DECEMBER 23, 2024) 

Docket No. 23-282

FORTESSA QORROLLI,

Plaintiff–Appellant, 

v.

METROPOLITAN DENTAL ASSOCIATES, 

D.D.S.- 255 BROADWAY, P.C.,

METROPOLITAN DENTAL ASSOCIATES

D.D.S., P.C., MARK ORANTES, individually, PAUL I. COHEN, 

individually, 

Defendants–Appellees.

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York. 

________

Before: WALKER, MENASHI, Circuit Judges, and MERCHANT, District

Judge.* 

* Judge Orelia E. Merchant, of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiff-Appellant Fortessa Qorrolli brought claims for sex 

discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former 

employer and supervisors. The United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York (Cote, J.) granted summary judgment 

in favor of Defendants-Appellees on Qorrolli’s retaliation claims and 

permitted the remainder of Qorrolli’s claims to proceed to trial. A 

jury awarded Qorrolli $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 

million in punitive damages. The district court, however, granted 

Defendants-Appellees’ motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s 

damages award to be excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice 

against Defendants-Appellees. For the second trial, the district court

precluded in limine the introduction of Qorrolli’s psychiatric records, 

portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax 

sent to her employer. The second jury found Defendants-Appellees 

liable but awarded Qorrolli only $1 in nominal damages. Qorrolli 

appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling, its order 

granting a new trial, and its evidentiary rulings with respect to the 

second trial. We conclude that the district court did not err and affirm 

the judgment of the district court.

________

STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & Ullrich, New 

Paltz, NY (Derek Smith, Zachery Holzberg, Derek 

Smith Law Group, PLLC, New York, NY, on the 

brief), for Plaintiff–Appellant Fortessa Qorrolli. 

DAVID C. WIMS, Law Office of David Wims, 

Brooklyn, NY, for Defendants–Appellees 

Metropolitan Dental Associates, D.D.S.- 225 

Broadway, P.C., Metropolitan Dental Associates, 

D.D.S., P.C., Mark Orantes, and Paul I. Cohen. 

________

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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, District Judge: 

In this action, Plaintiff-Appellant Fortessa Qorrolli (“Qorrolli”) 

brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence 

against Defendants-Appellees Metropolitan Dental Associates, D.D.S. 

- 225 Broadway, P.C., Metropolitan Dental Associates, D.D.S., P.C. 

(collectively, “MDA”), Mark Orantes (“Orantes”), and Dr. Paul I. 

Cohen (“Cohen” and, together with MDA and Orantes, “DefendantsAppellees”). The United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Cote, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants-Appellees on Qorrolli’s retaliation claims and permitted 

the remainder of Qorrolli’s claims to proceed to trial.

Following a trial in October 2022, a jury awarded Qorrolli

$575,000 in emotional distress damages for her claims brought under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the New York 

State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City 

Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The jury also found MDA liable 

for $2 million in punitive damages under the NYCHRL. On 

December 15, 2022, the district court granted Defendants-Appellees’ 

motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s damages award to be 

excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice against DefendantsAppellees. 

Prior to and during the second trial, the district court precluded

in limine the introduction of Qorrolli’s psychiatric records, portions of 

a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax sent to 

MDA. At the second trial, in February 2023, a jury found DefendantsAppellees liable under the NYCHRL but awarded Qorrolli only $1 in 

nominal damages. 

Qorrolli appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling, 

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its order granting a new trial, and its evidentiary rulings prior to and 

during the February 2023 trial. We conclude that the district court did 

not err in any of these challenged rulings and affirm the judgment of 

the district court.

BACKGROUND

Qorrolli, a dental hygienist, began working for MDA in 2009. 

During her employment at MDA, Qorrolli’s direct supervisor was 

Orantes, the office manager, and Orantes reported to Cohen, the 

owner of MDA. Qorrolli alleges that Orantes made repeated sexual 

advances and harassed her throughout her tenure at MDA by 

touching her, commenting on her appearance, and verbally abusing 

her in front of Cohen. Qorrolli testified at her deposition that, among 

other similar incidents, Orantes once “touched [her] leg, [her] upper 

thigh, and [] said wow, that’s firm. And then he made comments to 

[her] like well, if you worked out your brain as much as you worked 

out your ass with those squats, you’d be better off in life and you’d 

get things done right.” App’x 87. 

Qorrolli also asserted that Orantes gave preferential treatment 

to the women who acceded to Orantes’ advances and unfairly 

punished those women who rebuffed him, including Qorrolli. At her 

deposition, Qorrolli testified that she would “make it pretty obvious 

that . . . [she was] not interested” through nonverbal cues. Id. at 89. 

For instance, Qorrolli tried to rebuff Orantes by ignoring his 

advances, “st[anding] there frozen,” and walking away from him. 

Qorrolli also testified to making general objections to Orantes’ 

behavior, saying she “really need[s] [Orantes] to get off [her] back. 

[She] need[s] this to stop. [She is] starting to feel very uncomfortable.” 

Id. at 88. Qorrolli additionally testified that sometime in 2016 she told 

Orantes to “back off and leave [her] alone because [she couldn’t] take 

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this anymore.” Id. at 94. 

According to Qorrolli, a couple of days after she told him that 

she needed “this to stop,” Orantes’ abusive workplace behavior 

escalated. He started accusing Qorrolli of poor work performance

and began threatening to fire her in front of Cohen. 

Qorrolli asserts that she complained to Cohen “sometime in 

2015” about being sexually harassed prior to her termination in 2016, 

and that MDA received an anonymous fax from an unknown 

employee in 2015 containing similar allegations of sexual harassment. 

Specifically, Qorrolli testified that during her conversation with 

Cohen about Orantes’ perceived sexual advances, she said “[l]isten, 

this is what’s going on. . . . I’m not gonna be put in a position where I 

have to be sexually involved in order to keep my job here. . . . [A] lot 

of these women get away with everything, murder here, the things 

that go on. . . . [A]ll the blame that I’m getting is theirs. . . . I said I’m 

not going to allow myself to become sexually involved with [Orantes] 

to get away with the things that other women get away with here.” 

Id. at 90. 

Qorrolli asserts that her complaints were not taken seriously by 

Cohen and that no action was taken in response. Qorrolli also asserts 

that thereafter, sometime in early 2016, she gave Cohen a letter 

outlining workplace grievances against MDA. This letter made no 

mention of sex discrimination or sexual harassment. 

Qorrolli resigned from her employment at MDA on or about 

May 21, 2016, alleging that by failing to address the harassment she 

faced, Defendants-Appellees had “constructively discharged” her. 

On June 10, 2021, after the close of discovery, DefendantsAppellees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted 

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summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees in regard to 

Qorrolli’s retaliation claims, concluding that Qorrolli had not 

adequately established that she engaged in a protected activity as 

required for a retaliation claim: her letter complaining of workplace

grievances did not mention sexual harassment, her demand that 

Orantes “back off” was too vague to constitute protected activity

because it may have referred to Orantes’ abrasive but non-sexual 

workplace behavior, and her approach to rebuffing Orantes “by using 

silence, freezing him out, or turning her face away” was not 

sufficiently clear to qualify as a protected activity. Sp. App’x 11-12. 

Subsequently, the case was heard by two different juries. The 

first trial took place in October 2022. At that trial, Qorrolli testified 

that she was sexually harassed by Orantes almost daily, who, among 

other things, allegedly “told [Qorrolli] that [she] had a nice, firm 

body,” App’x 714, would “hug” Qorrolli, “kiss” her on the cheek, and 

tell her he “loved” her, id. at 711, and “lingered around [Qorrolli’s] 

lips for [her] to look up and have him kiss [her],” id. at 784. Qorrolli

testified that Orantes’ conduct made her “start[] feeling anxiety and 

[having] panic attacks.” Id. at 711. Qorrolli also testified that she 

observed Orantes sexually abusing her female coworkers and giving

preferential treatment to the women who accepted his advances. 

Qorrolli asserted that Orantes would blame her for these other 

women’s mistakes and would unfairly target Qorrolli for punishment 

and chastisement because of her refusal to submit to his advances. 

At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury awarded Qorrolli

$575,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering and $2 

million in punitive damages. 

On November 18, 2022, Defendants-Appellees moved for a 

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new trial. The district court granted the motion,1 finding that Qorrolli 

had introduced inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay at trial, that the 

jury’s damages award “illustrate[d] that [the jury’s] verdict was not 

based on the admissible evidence introduced at trial of Orantes’[]

treatment of the plaintiff,” Sp. App’x 41, and that “[t]he jury’s 

punitive damages award strongly indicate[d] that [the jury]

disregarded the Court’s multiple limiting instructions,” id. at 43. The 

district court ordered a new trial on Qorrolli’s sex discrimination and 

negligence claims. 

Prior to the second trial in February 2023, the district court 

precluded the introduction of Qorrolli’s psychiatric records, the

anonymous fax purportedly sent to MDA complaining about sexual 

harassment, and the deposition transcript of Mercedes Vila (“Vila”), 

a former coworker of Qorrolli’s who refused to appear at trial. 

At the second trial, Qorrolli again recounted the story of her 

harassment. The jury found in favor of Qorrolli on her NYCHRL 

claim but awarded her only nominal damages of $1. Qorrolli then 

filed the instant appeal.

DISCUSSION

We consider first, the district court’s summary judgment order

dismissing Quorrolli’s retaliation claims, second, the district court’s 

order requiring a new trial, and third, the district court’s evidentiary 

rulings prior to and during the second trial.

1 See Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., D.D.S. - 225 Broadway, P.C., No. 18-CV-6836 

(DLC), 2022 WL 17689836, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2022). 

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I. Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing a summary 

judgment decision, we apply the same standards applied by the 

district court. Under this standard, summary judgment may be 

granted only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned 

up). “In determining whether there is a genuine dispute as to a 

material fact, we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences 

against the moving party.” Id. at 127. “Summary judgment is 

inappropriate when the admissible materials in the record make it 

arguable that the claim has merit, for the court in considering such a 

motion must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party 

that the jury is not required to believe.” Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 

F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks, internal 

citations, and emphasis omitted). 

To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must 

show that “(1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer 

was aware of that activity; (3) the employee suffered a materially 

adverse action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the 

protected activity and that adverse action.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 

670 F.3d 127, 157 (2d Cir. 2012). “As to the second element, implicit 

in the requirement that the employer have been aware of the 

protected activity is the requirement that it understood, or could 

reasonably have understood, that the plaintiff’s opposition was 

directed at conduct prohibited by Title VII.” Galdieri-Ambrosini v. 

Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998). 

Case 23-282, Document 121-1, 12/23/2024, 3638761, Page8 of 21
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The NYCHRL employs a similar but slightly broader standard: 

a plaintiff claiming retaliation must demonstrate “that she took an 

action opposing her employer’s discrimination and that, as a result, 

the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter 

a person from engaging in such action.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole 

Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal 

citation omitted). The NYSHRL historically utilized the same 

standard as Title VII,2 but it was amended in 2019 to align with the 

NYCHRL’s more liberal pleading standard. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 

(requiring that the NYSHRL be construed “liberally for the 

accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof”). We decline to 

decide whether the amendment retroactively applied to Qorrolli’s 

retaliation claim, which arose prior to the amendment, because we 

conclude that, under either standard, Qorrolli has failed to show the 

requisite prima facie retaliation elements.

B. Qorrolli Did Not Engage in Protected Activity

The district court granted summary judgment after 

determining that Qorrolli had not engaged in any form of protected 

activity. On appeal, Qorrolli argues that the district court erred and 

that she engaged in at least three different instances of protected 

activity. We examine each in turn.

First, Qorrolli asserts that the written letter that she gave to 

Cohen constitutes protected activity. But, as the district court 

correctly noted, “[t]he [l]etter contains only Qorrolli’s generalized 

complaints about oppressive working conditions such as excessive 

hours and the use of abusive language. The [l]etter is not reasonably 

2 See Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Engineers, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 14 

(2d Cir. 2013) (“The standards for evaluating . . . retaliation claims are identical 

under Title VII and the NYSHRL.”). 

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understood as describing conduct prohibited by Title VII.” Sp. App’x 

11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Qorrolli’s appeal as to 

the retaliation claims cannot stand on this ground.

Second, Qorrolli contends that she engaged in protected 

activity by verbally complaining to Cohen. While this issue was not 

directly addressed by the district court’s summary judgment opinion,

we conclude that Qorrolli’s alleged verbal complaint to Cohen also 

did not constitute protected activity. Although Qorrolli responded 

“correct” when asked in her deposition if “at some point” she went to 

“Cohen about these perceived sexual advances from [Orantes],” 

App’x 90, her own description of that conversation reveals that her

verbal complaint to Cohen focused on her objection to being treated 

poorly in comparison to other female employees who were 

romantically or sexually involved with Orantes. See id. (“[A] lot of 

these women get away with everything . . . . [A]ll the blame that I’m 

getting is theirs. . . . I’m not going to allow myself to become sexually 

involved with him to get away with the things that other women get 

away with here.”). But “[o]ur Circuit has long since rejected 

‘paramour preference’ claims,” wherein employees are treated 

disparately based not on their gender, “but rather on a romantic 

relationship between an employer [or supervisor] and a person 

preferentially treated.” Kelly, 716 F.3d at 14 (alteration omitted). 

Thus, Qorrolli’s complaint could not have been reasonably 

understood as opposing conduct that violated the laws forbidding 

employment discrimination. 

This conclusion is supported by Qorrolli’s testimony indicating 

that her verbal complaint to Cohen mirrored her letter, in that she did 

not mention that she felt sexually harassed by Orantes. Qorrolli 

testified that she prepared the letter after Cohen was dismissive of her 

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verbal complaint, thinking “[i]f I give [Cohen] a letter . . . to read and 

start from the beginning to now,” that letter would “really [give 

Cohen] a feel for what I’ve been going through.” App’x 98. This 

description of the letter suggests that it was a more detailed 

articulation of Qorrolli’s complaints to Cohen than her verbal 

complaints. 

Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s analysis in its 

denial of Qorrolli’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s 

summary judgment order, wherein the district court stated that 

“[t]here is nothing in Qorrolli’s opposition brief or in the cited 

excerpts of her deposition to suggest that the written letter omitted 

anything that was stated in her verbal complaints to Dr. Cohen.” Sp. 

App’x 17.

Finally, Qorrolli asserts that her verbal and non-verbal 

rejections of Orantes constitute protected activity. We agree with the 

district court’s conclusion that they do not. At her deposition, 

Qorrolli testified that she told Orantes “I really need you to get off my 

back. I need this to stop. I’m starting to feel very uncomfortable,” 

App’x 88, and to “back off and leave me alone because I can’t take this 

anymore,” id. at 94. She did not assert that her statements to Orantes 

were made directly following an attempt to sexually harass her. 

Qorrolli further testified that she rebuffed Orantes’ advances by using 

avoidance and silence, in one instance responding to a purported 

advance by “st[anding] there frozen” and not looking up when 

Orantes allegedly kissed Qorrolli on her cheek. Id. at 87. On another 

occasion, when Orantes purportedly inappropriately touched 

Qorrolli, she “looked at him and . . . just walked away.” Id. at 89. 

Although this court has not yet ruled on whether rejecting a 

workplace harasser’s sexual advances can qualify as a protected 

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activity under Title VII and the NYSHRL, an issue over which district 

courts have disagreed,3 we have ruled that such a rejection can 

constitute “an action opposing [plaintiff’s] employer’s 

discrimination” under the NYCHRL. See Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 112, 115, 

116 n.12. However, since we find that Qorrolli’s purported rejections 

of Orantes’ advances were not sufficiently clear to communicate an 

opposition to sexual harassment, and therefore do not constitute 

protected activity, we need not address the broader questions of 

whether the verbal rejection of a sexual advance could constitute 

protected activity under Title VII or the NYSHRL, or whether a purely 

non-verbal rejection of a sexual advance could constitute protected 

activity under any of the three laws at issue here. 

Qorrolli’s verbal complaints to Orantes were too generalized to 

constitute protected activity under the laws prohibiting employment 

discrimination. As Qorrolli herself admitted, she “never directly told 

[Orantes to] stop sexually harassing [her],” App’x 94, and her broad 

requests that Orantes “back off” could not reasonably have been 

understood as remonstrations regarding Orantes’ sexual advances as 

opposed to his abrasive but non-sexual workplace behavior, 

3 Compare Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 

(“Requiring an employee to do more than simply reject[] a sexual advance to 

satisfy the ‘protected activity’ requirement also serves the salutary purpose of 

informing the employer of alleged discriminatory conduct in the workplace thus 

enabling the employer to take such corrective measures as may be necessary.”), 

with Davis v. Navada’s Bar & Lounge, LLC, No. 22 CV 4176 (LDH) (CLP), 2024 WL 

1531092, at *27-28 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2024) (“The better view, and the view adopted 

by a majority of the courts to have addressed the issue, is that rejecting a 

supervisor’s advances does in fact constitute[] protected activity under both the 

NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Applying that same rule here, the Court concludes that 

by deliberately avoiding contact with [his supervisor] and altering his previously 

friendly demeanor in an attempt to mitigate future incidents of misconduct, 

plaintiff was engaged in protected activity in opposition to [supervisor’s] unlawful 

discrimination towards him.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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particularly given that Qorrolli does not allege that any such 

statements were made immediately after Orantes attempted to 

sexually harass her. And the silence, inaction, and avoidance 

described by Qorrolli when Orantes made sexual advances did not 

rise to a level of outwardly expressing opposition to her supervisor’s 

alleged discrimination or sexual harassment. In short, Qorrolli’s 

alleged verbal and non-verbal rejections of Orantes were 

insufficiently clear, as a matter of law, to constitute a protected 

activity. 

In each asserted instance of protected activity, Qorrolli’s 

complaints were overly generic and insufficiently specific and 

particularized such that Defendants-Appellees “could not reasonably 

have understood that [Qorrolli] was complaining of conduct 

prohibited by Title VII,” the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL. Rojas v. 

Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Qorrolli did not engage in the protected activity 

required to sustain a claim for retaliation under any of the statutes at 

issue, we affirm the district court’s judgment insofar as it granted 

summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on the issue of 

retaliation. 

II. Trial Court’s Grant of New Trial

A. Standard of Review

This court “review[s] a district court’s [grant] of a Rule 59 

motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. It is a deferential 

standard, which reflects district courts’ significant—although not 

limitless—latitude to exercise their inherent discretionary authority.” 

Ali v. Kipp, 891 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2018); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. We 

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view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and we will reverse a judgment only if the district court (1) 

based its decision on an error of law, (2) made a clearly erroneous 

factual finding, or (3) otherwise rendered a decision that cannot be 

located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

“A motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted 

unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously 

erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Amato 

v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1998)); see 

also Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417-18 (2d Cir. 

2012) (“A court may grant a new trial for any reason for which a new 

trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court, 

including if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. A 

decision is against the weight of the evidence if and only if the verdict 

is (1) seriously erroneous or (2) a miscarriage of justice.” (cleaned up)). 

In particular, a district court weighing a Rule 59 motion on the 

basis of an allegedly excessive damages award should consider 

“whether the award is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and 

constitute a denial of justice.” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 113 (2d 

Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jennings v. Yurkiw, 18 

F.4th 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2021) (applying the same standard when 

assessing punitive damages). An unusually high damages award 

should be corrected through remittitur when “the trial has been free 

of prejudicial error,” but “the size of a jury’s verdict may be so 

excessive as to be inherently indicative of passion or prejudice and to 

require a new trial.” Ramirez v. N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 112 F.3d 

38, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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B. Motion for New Trial

Following the first trial, the district court was convinced that 

the jury’s verdict met this standard and justified the granting of 

Defendants-Appellees’ Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Specifically, 

the district court found that Qorrolli had introduced inadmissible and 

prejudicial hearsay during trial, that the jury’s damages award 

“illustrate[d] that [the jury’s] verdict was not based on the admissible 

evidence introduced at trial of Orantes’[] treatment of the plaintiff,” 

Sp. App’x 41, and that “[t]he jury’s punitive damages award strongly 

indicate[d] that [the jury] disregarded the Court’s multiple limiting 

instructions,” id. at 43.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 

jury’s awarded damages were sufficiently excessive to merit a new 

trial. 

As the district court correctly noted, courts in the Second 

Circuit generally categorize emotional distress damages as either 

“garden-variety, significant, [or] egregious,” with “garden-variety” 

claims generally meriting “$30,000.00 to $125,000.00 awards.” Id. at 40

(quoting United States v. Asare, 476 F. Supp. 3d 20, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)); 

see also Sooroojballie v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 816 F. App’x 

536, 545-46 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). Claims categorized as 

significant, “based on more substantial harm or more offensive 

conduct,” Asare, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 37 n.2, generally “‘support 

damages awards ranging from $50,000 to $200,000,’ although awards 

of up to $500,000 may also be upheld under some circumstances,” Sp. 

App’x 40-41 (citing Villalta v. JS Barkats, P.L.L.C., No. 16-CV-02772,

2021 WL 2458699, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2021)). 

After accurately reciting the law, the district court then found 

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that Qorrolli’s “emotional distress straddles the line between ‘gardenvariety’ and ‘significant,’” noting that, although Qorrolli alleged 

serious psychological harm, she did not provide corroborating 

medical testimony and “presented limited evidence regarding the 

severity of the conduct that produced such distress.” Id. at 41. As the 

district court correctly noted, the jury’s emotional distress award 

following the first trial was significantly larger than other awards that 

have been deemed worthy of remittitur in cases presenting more 

extreme facts. See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 41 (remittitur to $500,000 in 

pain and suffering damages in a case where plaintiff was rendered 

“non-functional”); Villalta, 2021 WL 2458699, at **15, 17 (remittitur to 

$350,000 in emotional distress damages recommended in a case where 

plaintiff was sexually assaulted twice and her distress was deemed 

“egregious,” the most severe damages category). 

The district court’s concerns about the $575,000 emotional 

distress award were justifiably compounded by the jury’s $2 million 

punitive damages award against MDA. The district court found that 

the punitive damages award was “dozens of times larger than a 

reasonable compensatory damages award,” and that the “conduct 

attributable to” MDA did not “rise[] to the level of reprehensibility 

needed to justify a large punitive damages award.” Sp. App’x 44-45. 

The district court also found it concerning that the jury did not award 

punitive damages against Cohen or Orantes but awarded such high 

punitive damages against MDA, even though “[t]he only negligent or 

reckless conduct attributable to [MDA]—as opposed to Dr. Cohen or 

Orantes—consists of [MDA’s] failure to maintain a sexual harassment 

policy.” Id. at 45. 

Having found that the combined compensatory and punitive 

damages awarded were “so excessive as to be inherently indicative of 

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passion or prejudice,” id. at *48 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 41), the district court concluded that the 

jury’s damages awards “can only be explained by the unfair prejudice 

to the defendants from the hearsay offered by the plaintiff,” id. It 

thus determined that a new trial was necessary. This reasoning was 

based neither on an error of law nor on a clearly erroneous factual 

finding, and the district court’s application of the law to this case was

“within the range of permissible decisions.” Ali, 891 F.3d at 64

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of a new trial.

III. Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings

A. Standard of Review

This court “review[s] evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion,” United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2006), 

because “the trial judge is in the best position to weigh competing 

interests in deciding whether or not to admit certain evidence,” United 

States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 

Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, we “only will 

reverse where the improper . . . exclusion of evidence affects a 

substantial right of one of the parties. Making this determination 

involves an assessment of the likelihood that the error affected the 

outcome of the case.” Malek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 

1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Qorrolli argues that the district court erred in excluding three 

pieces of evidence: (1) her psychiatric records, (2) portions of the 

deposition testimony of Mercedes Villa, and (3) an anonymous fax 

complaining of sexual harassment at MDA.

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B. Qorrolli’s Psychiatric Records 

On February 2, 2023, the district court ruled that Qorrolli’s 

psychiatric records were inadmissible in an order on DefendantsAppellees’ motion in limine. The district court did not state a rationale 

in its February Order, although it later specified, in its opinion 

denying Qorrolli’s request for a new trial on damages, that the records 

were excluded at Qorrolli’s second trial pursuant to Rule 403. See Sp. 

App’x 139 (“Applying the balancing test under Rule 403, the court 

excluded the records.”). The district court described the records as 

“general descriptions of the plaintiff’s mental wellbeing—including 

that she was having problems in the workplace, having trouble 

sleeping, and experiencing symptoms of depression. . . . There are 

limited references to Orantes, and none of those references describe 

the specific instances of sexual misconduct described by plaintiff at 

the second trial. He is described as ‘very manipulative’ and ‘verbally 

abusive.’ There is no description of a specific event and no use of the 

term sexual harassment.” Id. at 138. The district court saw limited 

probative value in the psychiatric records because they contained 

“few” statements “made for the purpose of a medical diagnosis or 

treatment” and because their general description of Qorrolli’s 

psychological maladies did not include any attribution to causes or 

precipitating incidents. Id. at 139.

Qorrolli argues that the district court’s ruling was reversible 

error because the district court should have admitted the psychiatric 

records in their entirety under the business records exception to the 

rule against hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Qorrolli is correct that 

psychiatric records sometimes fall within that exception. See Lewis v. 

Velez, 149 F.R.D. 474, 484 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). However, Qorrolli’s 

psychiatric records were not excluded as inadmissible hearsay. 

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Instead, the district court applied relevant factors under the Rule 403 

balancing test and found that the probative value of the evidence was 

substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 

defendants. It is well-settled that “[t]he probative value/unfair 

prejudice balancing required by Fed. R. Evid. 403, performed by the 

district court with regard to . . . medical records . . . , is a matter 

confided to the discretion of the district court.” Conway v. Icahn & Co., 

16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the district court allowed 

Qorrolli to testify about the dates of her psychiatry appointments and 

the medications she had been prescribed. Nothing in the record 

indicates that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 

Qorrolli’s psychiatric records. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment insofar as it excluded those records. 

C. Mercedes Vila’s Deposition Testimony

At both the first and the second trial, Qorrolli had hoped to 

introduce testimony by Vila, a former coworker of Qorrolli’s. At the 

first trial, Vila initially refused to testify, complaining that she had the 

flu. Then, on the second day of the first trial, Vila’s doctor submitted 

a letter indicating that Vila had anxiety that a trial might exacerbate. 

Ultimately, at the first trial, the district court did not rule on the issue 

of Vila’s availability and excluded Vila’s testimony on other grounds.

On the eve of the second trial, Qorrolli provided a second letter 

concerning Vila’s medical conditions to the district court. The second 

letter stated that Vila had “metastatic breast cancer, moderate, 

persistent asthma, anxiety disorder, and spondylolisthesis.” App’x 

1532. Qorrolli moved to have portions of Vila’s deposition testimony 

admitted at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

32(a)(4)(C), which permits a party to “use for any purpose the 

deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds . . . 

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that the witness cannot attend or testify because of age, illness, 

infirmity, or imprisonment.”

The district court determined that Qorrolli had not established 

Vila’s unavailability because, although “it would ordinarily find a 

doctor’s note to be determinative regarding unavailability, . . . Ms. 

Vila was still travelling to and attending work in Manhattan; 

[Qorrolli’s] counsel had been uncertain whether Ms. Vila would 

testify in person; the physician’s letters were vague and produced 

only at the eleventh hour; and, it appeared the doctor had simply 

accommodated a witness’s desire not to appear because of the 

emotional stress an appearance would entail.” Sp. App’x 143-44 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in so holding. In 

light of Vila’s repeated hesitance to appear for trial and the everchanging explanations for her unavailability, the district court acted 

well within its discretion in finding that Qorrolli had not adequately 

established Vila’s unavailability at trial. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment insofar as it excluded Vila’s deposition 

testimony. 

D. The Anonymous Fax

At the second trial, Qorrolli sought to admit the anonymous fax 

that MDA received in 2015, which contained allegations that Orantes 

was sexually harassing MDA employees. Qorrolli argued that the fax 

was evidence that Cohen and MDA had notice of Orantes’ sexual 

harassment in 2015 but failed to take corrective action. 

At the pre-trial conference, the district court noted that the 

content of the fax was “pure hearsay” that had little probative value 

given that the “allegations that are described in the anonymous [fax]

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do not include allegations of misconduct towards the plaintiff and do 

not describe the kind of conduct that the plaintiff herself says she 

suffered at the hands of Mr. Orantes.” Id. at 62. The district court also 

determined that, even putting aside the problem of hearsay, the 

anonymous fax should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403. It did, 

however, allow Qorrolli’s counsel to attempt to elicit testimony at trial 

that there was an anonymous fax received at MDA that contained a 

complaint of sexual harassment against Orantes and that Qorrolli 

discussed the fax with Orantes and Cohen.

During the second trial, Qorrolli’s counsel again requested to 

use the fax, this time for the specific purpose of impeaching Orantes 

after he erroneously testified that the fax had not directly accused him 

of sexual harassment. The district court denied the request.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the 

fax. The district court acted well within its discretion in determining 

that the potential probative value of showing the jury the salacious 

allegations in the fax would be significantly outweighed by the 

prejudice it would introduce. Likewise, the district court acted within 

the range of its discretion in concluding that the probative value of 

using the fax for impeachment was substantially outweighed by its 

potential prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment insofar as it excluded the anonymous fax.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court 

did not err in its summary judgment ruling, its order granting a new 

trial, or its evidentiary rulings prior to and during the February 2023 

trial. The judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed.

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