Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01824/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01824-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ASU STUDENTS FOR LIFE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

MICHAEL M. CROW, et al.

Defendants.

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No. CV 06-1824-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs Arizona State University Students for Life

(“ASU Students for Life”), Katherine Brind’Amour, Sara Combellick, Jeffrey Malkoon, and

Christopher White’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #64); Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial

notice (Dkt. #97); and Defendants Michael Crow, Sally Ramage, and Judy Schroeder’s crossmotions for summary judgment (Dkt. #s 76, 77, 78). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality

of Arizona State University’s (“ASU”) insurance requirement for off-campus groups or

entities and ASU’s “one-zone” reservation requirement under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs are

prohibited from asserting their claims due to the doctrines of standing and mootness,

individual and qualified immunity, and the 11th Amendment. In addition, Defendants

contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements do not violate the First

Amendment. After consideration of the pleadings and holding oral argument on March 4,

2008, the Court issues the following Order.

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I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

ASU Students for Life is one of approximately 500 student organizations at ASU.

(Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, Dkt. #69, p.3; Defendants’ Joint Statement of Facts, Dkt. #75,

p.3). The mission of ASU Students for Life is “to educate the student body of ASU about

pro-life issues from conception to natural death, with emphasis on beginning of life issues.”

(Dkt. #69, p.1). Plaintiffs Brind’Amour, Combellick, and Malkoon are students at ASU,

each of whom held various official positions in ASU Students for Life during the 2006-07

academic school year. (Id., pp.1-2). Plaintiff White graduated from ASU in December 2006;

he was Director of Public Relations for ASU Students for Life from March 2005 to March

2006. (Id., p.2).

Defendant Crow is currently, and at all relevant times hereto, the President of ASU.

(Id.). Defendant Ramage was the Interim Vice President for Student Affairs from August

2005 to May 2006. (Id.). Defendant Ramage retired from ASU on July 1, 2007. (Dkt. #75,

p.10). Defendant Schroeder is currently, and at all relevant times hereto, Senior Program

Coordinator in ASU’s Event and Meeting Services office; her duties include assisting student

organizations in scheduling and coordinating activities at ASU’s Memorial Union and

making reservations for student organizations that want to conduct outdoor events on the

ASU campus. (Dkt. #75, p.2). There are 40 outdoor spaces, or zones, available for

reservation by student organizations. (Id.). ASU regulates the use of outdoor zones by

student organizations, university departments, and off-campus groups or entities. (Dkt. #69,

p.7). Student organizations may reserve outdoor zones by submitting an “Outdoor Event and

Sales Request Form” (“Event Form”), and they may also sometimes orally reserve outdoor

zones. (Dkt. #69, p.6; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, Dkt. #89,

p.10). From January 2005 to May 2006, ASU’s Event and Meeting Service’s office booked

approximately 6,000 reservations for use of outdoor zones on the ASU campus. (Dkt. #89,

p.13).

On December 1, 2005, Plaintiff White submitted an Event Form on behalf of ASU

Students for Life to reserve sixteen outdoor zones on the ASU campus in order to display an

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exhibit owned by Justice for All (“JFA”), a Kansas non-profit corporation, for four

consecutive days in February 2006. (Dkt. #69, p.7; Dkt. #75, p.3). JFA shares its exhibit

with student groups on college campuses around the country. (Dkt. #69, p.8). The JFA

exhibit involves several large panels, 8 feet wide by 16-18 feet high, that display images and

text that support a pro-life message. (Dkt. #69, p.7; Dkt. #75, p.3). Defendant Schroeder

reviewed Plaintiffs White’s reservation request and informed him that ASU Students for Life

would not be able to reserve the number of zones they requested; although most of the zones

that Plaintiff White requested were not previously reserved by other student organizations,

Defendant Schroeder told Plaintiff White that there was a “one-zone” reservation policy per

student organization and thus ASU Students for Life would be limited to one zone for the

JFA exhibit. (Dkt. #69, pp.8-9; Dkt. #75, p.4). However, Defendant Schroeder also

informed Plaintiff White that ASU Students for Life could reserve additional zones if they

were able to get other student organizations to co-sponsor the JFA exhibit. (Dkt. #69, p.9;

Dkt. #75, p.4). At that time, ASU’s one-zone requirement was not an explicit written policy.

(Dkt. #89, p.4). 

On December 19, 2005, Defendant Schroeder informed Plaintiff White that JFA

would have to submit a certificate of insurance and pay a $300 fee for the ability to come

onto the ASU campus due to a policy regarding vendors and insurance indemnification that

was scheduled to go into effect in January 2006. (Dkt. #69, pp.10-11; Dkt. #75, p.4).

According to ASU policy, if a student organization wants an off-campus group or entity to

participate in an on-campus event, the off-campus group must pay a fee and be sponsored by

the student organization. (Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Joint Statement of Facts, Dkt.

#85, p.9; Dkt. #75, p.5). In addition, ASU policy STA 503-01, “Scheduling Outdoor Campus

Activities Area,” effective November 1, 2005, through November 1, 2006, and ASU’s

Student Club Vendor Checklist stated that “vendors” are required to obtain a certificate of

insurance before conducting activities on the ASU campus. (Dkt. #75, p.5; Dkt. #69, p.21).

ASU administrators interpret the word “vendor” to mean any third-party or off-campus entity

that comes onto the ASU campus. (Dkt. #69, p.13; Dkt. #89, p.7). 

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ASU Students for Life objected to Defendant Schroeder’s application of the one-zone

reservation policy and the fee and insurance requirements to the JFA exhibit, and Defendant

Schroeder subsequently met with ASU’s General Counsel, Nancy Tribbenesee, to discuss

these requirements. (Dkt. #75, p.5). ASU administrators ultimately waived the $300 fee and

allowed Students for Life to reserve multiple zones for the JFA exhibit. (Dkt. #75, p.6).

Defendant Schroeder referred Plaintiff White to ASU Student Risk Manager Kim

Novak for assistance in procuring insurance coverage for the JFA exhibit through the Tenant

and Users Liability Insurance Program (“TULIP”), administered by Bene-Marc, Inc., a

private insurance company. (Dkt. #69, p.9). Plaintiff White states that the insurance quotes

that were obtained from TULIP to cover the JFA exhibit ranged from approximately $400

to $1,200. (Dkt. #69, pp.9-10). However, Plaintiff White ultimately arranged for ASU

Students for Life to obtain a rider on the insurance policy of Arizona Right to Life, an

Arizona non-profit corporation, for $103.25. (Dkt. #69, p.10) Plaintiff White subsequently

submitted proof of the insurance rider to ASU and the JFA exhibit was allowed to proceed.

(Dkt. #69, p.11). ASU Students for Life later reimbursed Arizona Right to Life for the

amount of the rider. (Dkt. #69, p.10). 

In March 2006, ASU Students for Life planned an event called “Dignity of Life

Week” to take place on April 17-21, 2006, and requested to reserve multiple zones on which

to set up informational tables around the ASU campus. ASU Students for Life also requested

to have “Silent No More,” an off-campus organization, set up an information table next to

their tables. (Dkt. # 75, pp.8-9). Defendant Schroeder informed Plaintiff White that an offcampus third-party had to provide a certificate of insurance in order to come onto campus

and set up their own informational tables. (Dkt. #69, p.18; Defendants’ Response to

Plaintiff’s Statement of Fact, Dkt. #89, p.10). However, Defendant Schroeder later told

Plaintiff White that Silent No More was not required to present proof of insurance because

Silent No More was not a “formal organization,” and as long as off-campus individuals are

volunteers and not paid employees of an off-campus formal organization, proof of insurance

is not required. (Id.). Defendant Schroeder also stated that ASU only requires proof of

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insurance when a student organization sponsors an off-campus group to come onto the ASU

campus to set up their own informational table, separate from the student organization’s

table. (Dkt. #69, p.19; Dkt. #75, p.9).

On July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

Defendants violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process

and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment through their discriminatory

enforcement of ASU’s unwritten one-zone policy against ASU Students for Life and the

application of ASU’s policy that “vendors” pay a fee and obtain a certificate of insurance

before participating in on-campus events to ASU Student’s for Life’s February 2006 JFA

exhibit. (Compl., Dkt. #1). Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal and

compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

1343.

On November 1, 2006, ASU renumbered ASU policy STA 503-01 to USI 802-01 and

updated the policy to include the one-zone rule limiting student organizations to reserving

one zone per day for outdoor events on the ASU campus and to specify that the policy

applied to “vendors and other third parties.” (Dkt. #69, pp.20,21). ASU’s insurance policies

do not contain an exception for organizations that cannot afford to pay for insurance. (Dkt.

#69, p.21; Dkt. #89, p.11). Then, on July 23, 2007, the parties filed their instant motions for

summary judgment. (Dkt. #s 64, 76, 77, and 78).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements violate Plaintiffs’

First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and

equal protection. Specifically, Plaintiff’s argue that ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements: (1) amount to unconstitutional prior restraints on speech; (2) give Defendants

unfettered discretion to restrict speech based on its content; (3) constitute unconstitutional

content and viewpoint discrimination; and (4) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

In addition, Plaintiff’s argue that Defendant’s application of the insurance and one-zone

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requirements to Plaintiffs’ February 2006 JFA exhibit and April 2006 “Dignity of Life

Week” event amount to differential treatment of similarly situated organizations in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs assert both facial

and as-applied constitutional challenges to ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements.

Defendants contend that the instant action is limited if not precluded by the doctrines

of standing and sovereign and qualified immunity. In addition, Defendants contend that the

instant action is moot because ASU codified the challenged insurance and one-zone policies

when it amended ASU policy STA 503-01 on November 1, 2006. Moreover, Defendants

contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone policies do not violate the First and Fourteenth

Amendments because they are viewpoint and content neutral, and they are neither vague nor

overbroad under the First Amendment.

The parties dispute the extent to which ASU’s one-zone policy was applied to student

organizations other than ASU Students for Life prior to the occurrence of the JFA exhibit in

February 2006. (Dkt. #s 85, 89). The parties also dispute the extent to which ASU’s

insurance policy was applied to third-party off-campus groups or entities prior to ASU

Students for Life’s request to display the JFA exhibit. (Id.).

A. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows “that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws any reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996). A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome

of the litigation and requires trial to resolve differing versions of truth. S.E.C. v. Seaboard

Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). To defeat the motion, the non-moving party

must show there are genuine factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder

of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate against

a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

B. Motion for Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs move the Court to take judicial notice of eleven

exhibits, Exhibits A-K, that were submitted by affidavit of Heather Hacker, one of Plaintiffs’

counsel of record, in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. #97).

Defendants object to this motion. (Dkt. #100).

 FED.R.EVID. 201 provides that “[a] court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.” Judicial notice of an adjudicative fact

must “not [be] subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the

territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. FED.R.EVID. 201(b); see

also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (judicial notice may be

taken of public records); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d

1022, 1025 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.

1977) (“[C]ity ordinances fall within the category of ‘common knowledge’ and are therefore

proper subjects of judicial notice.”)).

Exhibits A, C, G, and J are printouts of information contained on various ASU

websites – Exhibit A is a printout of a general description of Defendant Crow’s duties as

President of ASU and Exhibits C, G, and J are printouts of the booking details for three

events – Body Pride Fair, Memorial to Fallen Soldiers, and Democracy for a Change – from

ASU’s Virtual Calendar. (Affidavit of Heather Hacker, Dkt. #71). Plaintiffs request that the

Court take judicial notice of Defendant Crow’s duties as President of ASU and the

occurrence of the three aforementioned events on the ASU campus. However, the Court

notes that internet printouts of this sort are quite unlike the publication of city ordinances on

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government websites, and as such they do not automatically fall within the category of

“common knowledge.” Indeed, Defendant Crow’s duties as President of ASU as they relate

to the instant matter are both subject to dispute and are not generally known within the

jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, the Court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibit A. 

In addition, the printouts of ASU’s Virtual Calendar do not by themselves establish

the fact that three events listed therein took place on the ASU campus; likewise, the fact

regarding whether any particular event occurs on the ASU campus is not necessarily a fact

that is generally known within the jurisdiction of this Court. However, Plaintiff also moves

for judicial notice of Exhibits B, E, and F, which are internet printouts of articles that discuss

the occurrence of the three events listed in Exhibits C, G, and J on ASU’s Virtual Calendar.

(Dkt. #71). Although the Court may not take judicial notice of the veracity of the statements

in these articles, the articles in Exhibits B, E, and F may be viewed in conjunction with

Exhibits C, G, and J to establish the fact that the three events listed on ASU’s Virtual

Calendar in Exhibits C, G, and F did in fact take place on the ASU campus. See, e.g.,

Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (taking judicial notice of

newspaper articles publicizing certain events in the area); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58

F.3d 454, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (taking judicial notice of a newspaper article to establish

the fact that widespread layoffs had occurred). Moreover, the Court notes that Defendants

acknowledge the occurrence of the Body Pride Fair, Memorial to Fallen Soldiers, and

Democracy for a Change events on the ASU campus in their Response to Plaintiffs’

Statement of Facts. (Dkt. # 89, p.13). Thus, the Court will take judicial notice of the

undisputed fact that the Body Pride Fair, Memorial to Fallen Soldiers, and Democracy for

a Change events took place on the ASU campus.

Plaintiffs also request that the Court take judicial notice of Exhibits D, H, I, and K,

which are internet printouts of information on various websites, to establish the fact that the

Body Image Project, the October 13th Alliance, and the Arizona Alliance for Peace & Justice

are not ASU campus organizations. (Dkt. #97, p.4). However, the status and affiliation of

these organizations is neither a subject that is generally known in this Court’s jurisdiction,

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nor is it a fact that is capable of ready and accurate determination by reference to the

information contained in the internet printouts in Exhibits D, H, I, and K. Thus, the Court

declines to take judicial notice of Exhibits D, H, I, and K.

C. Mootness and Standing

Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of

allegedly vague and unwritten policies, ASU’s codification of the one-zone requirement and

the insurance requirement requiring third parties to provide proof of insurance renders

Plaintiffs claims moot. Plaintiffs rebut this contention by stating that their claims are not

moot because the voluntary cessation of harmful conduct exception to the mootness doctrine

applies to render their claims not moot. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Ramage’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #82, pp. 7-8).

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief because

ASU codified the insurance and one-zone requirements and thus there is no on-going

challenged conduct and Plaintiffs no longer suffer a future threat of the enforcement of

allegedly vague and unwritten policies. In addition, Defendants contend that to the extent

Plaintiffs seek legal relief, they have not established any concrete injury because ASU’s

insurance policy applies to vendors and third-parties, not students or student organizations

such as ASU Students for Life. Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff White lacks

standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief because Plaintiff White is no longer a

student at ASU.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that they do possess standing to obtain injunctive

relief because they assert as-applied and facial challenges to ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements that, although at the time of the alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights

were allegedly vague and unwritten but are now codified in ASU policy USI 802-01, remain

unconstitutionally overbroad. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that they possess standing

because they suffered a concrete injury when Defendants deprived them of their First

Amendment freedoms. Thus, Plaintiffs contend that they suffered nominal damages, as well

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as actual damages in the amount of $103.25, the cost of the insurance rider that ASU

Students for Life obtained in order to satisfy ASU’s insurance requirement so that they could

display the JFA exhibit on the ASU campus. 

1. Mootness

Standing and mootness are jurisdictional elements that derive from the Article III

requirement that federal courts only decide live cases and controversies. See Cole v. Oroville

Union High School Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Burke v. Barnes, 479

U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (“Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or

controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case.”). A cause of action is moot

when a live case or controversy no longer exists. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277,

287 (2000). However, a cause of action will be considered moot only “if an event occurs that

makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.”

Church of Scientology of Cal. V. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quotations omitted).

“[T]he mere voluntary cessation of alleged unlawful activity does not render those

allegations moot.” Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.

1985). Because if mere voluntary cessation mooted a case, “courts would be compelled to

leave the defendant to return to his old ways.” United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp.

Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1968) (citation omitted). Thus, courts are “particularly

cautious when a case has become moot because the defendant has voluntarily ceased to

pursue the challenged course of action.” Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188,

1194 (9th Cir. 2000). A cause of action is not moot if there is a reasonable expectation that

the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. See Cole, 228 F.3d

at 1098 (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).

“It is well-settled that once a student graduates, he no longer has a live case or

controversy justifying declaratory an injunctive relief against a school’s action or policy.”

Id. (citing Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999). It is

undisputed that Plaintiff White graduated from ASU in December 2006. Thus, this court has

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no jurisdiction to entertain his claims for equitable relief. However, the court must also

consider whether Plaintiff ASU Students for Life and the remaining student Plaintiffs may

maintain their claims for equitable relief. To the extent that the remaining Plaintiffs assert

causes of action based on the alleged vagueness of ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements and the unfettered discretion with which Defendants applied them, their claims

are moot. Although it is true that ASU policy STA 503-01, effective when Plaintiffs

requested multiple zones for the JFA exhibit, did not explicitly limit student organizations

to one zone per day or explicitly state that ASU’s insurance requirements applied to all thirdparties, ASU later codified those requirements when ASU policy STA 503-01 was

renumbered to USI 802-01. As such, since ASU’s challenged insurance and one-zone

requirements are now explicitly codified in ASU policy USI 802-01, they are no longer

vague; and to the extent that Defendants and other ASU administrators previously had

unfettered discretion to apply the requirements, they no longer have such discretion. Thus,

this court has no jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief to the extent

that Plaintiffs challenge the vagueness and accompanying discretionary application of ASU’s

insurance and one-zone requirements unless an exception to mootness applies.

In addition, the voluntary cessation of harmful conduct exception does not apply in

this case. A case will not become moot if a defendant has voluntarily ceased to pursue the

challenged course of action unless it can be said with assurance there is no reasonable

expectation that the alleged violation will recur. See Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S.

625, 631 (1979). Although Plaintiffs are correct that ASU voluntarily codified its insurance

and one-zone requirements and thus remains free to change these policies, the Court can find

no indication or incentive for ASU to do so. The insurance and one-zone requirements now

codified in ASU policy USI 802-01 are the same as those that Plaintiffs contend were

previously unwritten and unconstitutionally vague. ASU merely codified the insurance and

one-zone requirements that both parties contend were previously in place, and there is no

indication or reasonable expectation that ASU will revert back to having and applying

allegedly unwritten and vague insurance and one-zone requirements. Thus, Plaintiffs

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equitable claims with respect to their vagueness challenge to ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements are moot.

2. Standing

In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show injury in fact, causation, and

redressability. Prescott v. County of El Dorado, 298 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Friends

of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000)). In other words, a plaintiff must establish a “(1) legally recognized injury, (2) caused

by the named defendant that is (3) capable of legal or equitable redress.” Schmier v. U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The party

seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts has the burden of alleging specific

facts sufficient to satisfy these three elements.”). An injury must be “actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Cole, 228 F.3d at 1100 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.

149, 155 (1990) (quotations ommitted)). In addition, to the extent that a plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, he or she must demonstrate a likelihood of future harm or

repeated injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1982); see also B.C.

v. Plumas Unified School Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the First Amendment context, “[l]itigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute

not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because a judicial prediction

or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to

refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Thus, a plaintiff may assert an overbreadth challenge to a statute if

“the plaintiff argues that the statute is written so broadly that it may inhibit the

constitutionally protected speech of third parties, even if his own speech may be prohibited.”

Id. However, “[a]n overbreadth claim is essentially a claim that a statute may be

constitutional as applied to the plaintiff but sweeps so broad as to unconstitutionally suppress

the speech of others not before the court. This theory presupposes that the ordinance is

constitutional as applied to the plaintiff.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont,

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506 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v.

Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)). Moreover, “‘[o]n an overbreadth

challenge [a plaintiff] would also be barred from collecting § 1983 damages which are

available only for violations of a party's own constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Advantage

Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 801 (8th Cir.2006)). Here, Plaintiffs

simply contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements are unconstitutional in

general, both as applied to them and as applied to others; Plaintiffs do not contend that the

insurance and one-zone requirements are constitutional as applied to them. In addition,

Plaintiffs seek to collect § 1983 damages for alleged violations of their own constitutional

rights. Thus, Plaintiffs may not sustain an overbreadth challenge to ASU’s insurance and

one-zone requirements.

“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

A plaintiff may bring an as-applied challenge under the First Amendment if the plaintiff

“contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to [his] particular speech activity” and

the “discriminatory enforcement of [the] speech restriction amounts to viewpoint

discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d

629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Although Plaintiff White’s graduation from ASU moots his equitable claims and he

also no longer has a personal interest in the outcome of this litigation in order to satisfy the

case or controversy requirement, the remaining student Plaintiffs and Plaintiff ASU Students

for Life do have personal interests in the outcome of this case. Plaintiffs assert both asapplied and facial constitutional challenges, arguing that ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements, as now codified in ASU policy 802-01, are unconstitutionally overbroad and

constitute speech restrictions that were discriminatorily enforced and amount to content and

viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs allege the

deprivation of their First Amendment freedoms. Thus, Plaintiffs ASU Students for Life,

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Brind’Amour, Combellick, and Malkoon satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement and possess

standing to bring their equitable claims in the instant action.

Moreover, “[a]lthough a student’s graduation moots his claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief against school officials, it does not moot his damage claims.” Cole, 228

F.3d at 1099. Thus, although Plaintiff White may no longer seek equitable relief since he has

graduated from ASU, the court must address his damage claims, as well as the damage and

equitable relief claims of the remaining Plaintiffs, and determine whether Defendants are

entitled to individual or qualified immunity for their decisions to enforce ASU’s insurance

and one-zone requirements against Plaintiffs’ JFA exhibit and Dignity of Life Week event.

D. The 11th Amendment and Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants in their individual capacities for actual and

nominal damages, and in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants Crow and Ramage contend that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excludes Plaintiffs’ claims

against them in their individual capacities. In addition, all three Defendants argue that they

are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, and that the Eleventh Amendment bars

Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities.

As an initial matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars an award of damages or

retrospective relief, against a state, state agency or state official sued in an official capacity.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676 (1974). However, it is well settled that suits seeking

prospective relief, i.e. declaratory and injunctive relief, against a state official in her official

capacity for an ongoing or threatened constitutional violation is not barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Defendants contend that the

Eleventh Amendment acts to bar Plaintiffs’ claims against them in their official capacity.

However, Plaintiffs do not merely object to the past vagueness and application of ASU’s

insurance and one-zone requirements against them. Although as discussed above, Plaintiffs

may not assert an overbreadth challenge, Plaintiffs also assert a facial challenge to ASU’s

insurance and one-zone requirements under the First Amendment. Defendants themselves

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contend that the insurance and one-zone policies currently codified in ASU policy USI 802-

01 are the same policies that were previously in place, albeit explicitly unwritten, under ASU

policy STA 503-01. Thus, although ASU’s subsequent codification of the requirements may

prohibit Plaintiffs from challenging the vagueness of those requirements, Plaintiffs’ contend

that the insurance and one-zone requirements constitute content and viewpoint discrimination

under the First Amendment, as they existed at the time they were applied to Plaintiffs’ events

and as they similarly exist now. And since Defendants state that the challenged requirements

are currently and consistently being applied to student organizations, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs do sufficiently allege an ongoing or threatened violation, and as such, the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. “Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by

the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Rounds v.

Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs

suing state officials in both their official and individual capacities must allege a connection

between the state official and the allegedly unconstitutional action.”). A supervisor is only

liable for constitutional violations of his or her subordinates if he or she participated in or

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; “[t]here

is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Id.; see Menotti v. City of Seattle,

409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to establish that

Defendant Crow knew of the challenged actions, let alone personally participated in them.

The Court agrees. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Crow was “constructively aware of the

imposition of the insurance requirement on Plaintiffs’ event” because the event was

discussed over e-mail that included his chief of staff. (Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant

Crow’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #81, p.9). Plaintiffs’ also argue that Defendant

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was aware of the allegedly unconstitutional insurance and one-zone requirements because

he is familiar with the policies of the university that affect academic freedom and the First

Amendment. (Id., p.10). However, these contentions do little more than exhibit the paucity

of evidence that exists to establish that Defendant Crow is somehow individually liable for

the challenged actions. Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendant Crow, as President of ASU, is

familiar with and ultimately responsible for ASU policy is the definition of respondeat

superior liability, which is not permitted under section 1983. Thus, Plaintiffs may not assert

a claim for damages against Defendant Crow in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

On the other hand, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence

to suggest that Defendant Ramage knew of the challenged conduct. Defendant Ramage was

the Interim Vice President for Student Affairs during the relevant time period in this case,

and although Plaintiffs submit no evidence to establish that Defendant Ramage was

personally involved in the challenged actions, the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs

sufficiently indicates that Defendant Ramage knew of the insurance and one-zone

requirements and the controversy surrounding the JFA exhibit. The emails submitted as

evidence by Plaintiffs and Defendant Ramage’s own testimony that she recalled seeing an

email concerning the JFA exhibit indicates that Defendant Ramage was aware of the JFA

exhibit, and perhaps the challenged conduct. (Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Crow’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. # 81, Ex. 1 and 2). Viewing the evidence on this issue

in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing any reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’

favor on summary judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiffs may assert a claim for damages

against Defendant Ramage in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition,

Defendants do not dispute that Defendant Schroeder was personally involved in applying

ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements to Plaintiffs, and thus Plaintiffs may also assert

a claim for damages against Defendant Schroeder in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

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Nonetheless, “[w]hen government officials assert the defense of qualified immunity

to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court evaluating the defense must first determine

whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right and, if so, then

determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”

Cole, 228 F.3d at 1101 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)) (quotations

omitted); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“[G]overnment officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.”). In the present action, Defendants

contend that Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of establishing a genuine existence of a

material fact regarding both the denial of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and that Defendants’

actions were the moving force behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. Accordingly,

the Court must address the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and decide whether ASU’s insurance

and one-zone requirements violate Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

i. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that suggests that

Plaintiffs were denied one of their constitutional rights. Specifically, Defendants contend

that Plaintiffs cannot show that their First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth

Amendment due process and equal protection rights have been violated by Defendants’

actions and ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements.

A three-part framework is used to evaluate the constitutionality of a restriction on free

speech. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).

First, the court must determine whether the speech at issue is protected; second, the court

must identify the nature of the forum; and third, the court must assess whether the

justifications for exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard. Id. The

parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ speech is protected under the First Amendment.

However, the parties do dispute the nature of the forum at issue in the instant action.

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“The extent to which the government may limit speech that is protected by the First

Amendment depends in large part upon the nature of the forum.” Seidman v. Paradise Valley

Unified School District No. 69, 327 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1104 (D.Ariz. 2004). There are three

types of forums: (1) public forums; (2) limited public forums; and (3) nonpublic forums. Id.

A “public forum” is a place that has been traditionally open for public expression, such as

sidewalks or parks; and a “designated public forum” is created when the government

intentionally opens a nontraditional forum to public discourse. Id. On the other hand, a

“limited public forum” is a subcategory of designated public forums that refers to a type of

non-public forum that the government has intentionally opened to certain groups or to certain

topics. Id.; see Arizona Life Coalition v. Stanton, 2008 WL 217012 at *8 (9th Cir. 2008).

If the forum is “public,” either a traditional or designated, speakers cannot be excluded unless

it is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and the exclusion is “narrowly drawn to

achieve that interest.” Arizona Life Coalition, 2008 WL 217012 at *8 (citing Sammartano

v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, if a forum is

“limited,” the government may restrict access “as long as the restrictions are reasonable and

are not an effort to suppress expression merely because the government disagrees with the

speaker’s viewpoint.” Seidman, 327 F.Supp.2d at 1104. 

“The relevant forum is defined by the access sought by the speaker.” DiLoreto v.

Downey Unified School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[I]n defining the forum we have focused on the access sought

by the speaker.”). In this case, Plaintiffs seek indiscriminate access to the outdoor zones on

the ASU campus, and thus the relevant forum is those outdoor zones.

“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited

discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public

discourse.” Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “[a]

policy purporting to keep a forum closed (or open to expression only on certain subjects) is

no policy at all for purposes of public forum analysis if, in practice, it is not enforced or if

exceptions are haphazardly permitted.” Id. “When a forum involves school facilities, it may

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be deemed a public forum only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened

the forum ‘for indiscriminate use’ by the general public or some segment of the public.’” Id.

(citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988). If the school facilities

“have been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, no public

forum has been created.” Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267). The court must

examine the selectivity with which the forum is open to particular forms of expression; “[t]he

more restrictive the criteria for admission and the more control that is placed on access to the

forum, the less likely it is that the forum will be deemed a designated public forum for First

Amendment purposes.” Id. (citing Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074).

The outdoor zones on the ASU campus are open for use by student organizations to

engage in expressive activity, subject to certain restrictions. (ASU policy STA 503-01, Dkt

#67, Ex. 20; ASU policy USI 802-01, Dkt. #67, Ex. 21). In addition, ASU imposes greater

restrictions on the ability of “vendors” to use the outdoor zones. (Id.) Both ASU policy STA

503-01, and its current successor, ASU policy USI 802-01, clearly reflect that there are a

number of restrictions that ASU places on both student organizations and vendors with

regards to their use of ASU’s outdoor zones. Although the parties appear to acknowledge

these restrictions, the parties specifically dispute the extent to which the insurance and onezone restrictions are applied to student organizations and all off-campus groups or entities.

Thus, Plaintiffs only contend that Defendants haphazardly applied two restrictions, the

insurance and one-zone restrictions, out of a number of other restrictions that ASU applies

with respect to the use of ASU’s outdoor zones by student organizations and other groups

or entities.

The Court recognizes that a policy purporting to limit a particular forum is no policy

at all for the purposes of forum analysis, but the Court is not willing to find that the fact that

the alleged haphazard application of one or two requirements in a policy that contains a

number other limitations on the use of a forum somehow evidence that the government

intended to open the forum to indiscriminate use. However, even if the Court found that

Defendants did in fact haphazardly apply the insurance and one-zone requirements in these

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two instances, that does not suggest a clear intent by ASU to open their outdoor zones, i.e.,

the forum at issue, for “indiscriminate” use. Both ASU policy STA 503-01 and ASU policy

USI 802-01 establish that ASU does not intend to open its outdoor zones for indiscriminate

use by even its student organizations, let alone the general public. Instead, the multiple

restrictions in ASU policy, that exist apart from the insurance and one-zone requirements,

establish an intention to restrict the use of the outdoor zones for off-campus groups as well

as student organizations, albeit to a different extent. Even if Defendants did in fact apply

some restrictions on the use of the relevant forum in a haphazard manner, that finding would

not indicate that Defendants intended to create a forum for indiscriminate use by either

student organizations or the general public because other restrictions on the use of the

outdoor zones remained in place under STA 503-01. In addition, Plaintiffs offer no evidence

to suggest that these other restrictions were not consistently applied. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs cite the Court to a footnote in Widmar v. Vincent for the notion

that the Supreme Court “has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for

its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.

5 (1981). However, in that same footnote, the Supreme Court went on to state that it “has

not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to

students or nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds

or buildings.” Id. Moreover, Widmar is inapposite to this case, because there the university

policy excluded all religious student groups from all use of university facilities that were

generally available for the activities of registered student groups. Id. at 264-65. Here,

Plaintiffs do not contend that they were excluded from the use of the outdoor zones, and nor

do Plaintiffs contend that ASU does not place a number of restrictions on the use of the

outdoor zones other than the challenged insurance and one-zone restrictions. Instead,

Plaintiffs contend that the outdoor zones constitute a designated public forum merely because

ASU purports not to place restrictions on the content of the speech that student organizations

may engage in on the outdoor zones. However, ASU does place restrictions on the extent

to which student organizations and off-campus groups or entities may engage in expressive

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ASU’s restrictions on the use of its outdoor zones are evident in both ASU policy

USI 802-01 and its predecessor, STA 503-01. (Dkt. #67, Ex. 20, 21). Among other things,

both policies limit the use of the outdoor zones to campus departments, student organizations,

and sponsored community members; require advance reservation requests; limit the decibel

level of events; place restrictions on the use of musical instruments and the sale of food;

require consultation with ASU departments for certain types of events; confine activities to

assigned areas; and place additional restrictions on vendors.

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activity in the outdoor zones1

, and thus the Court cannot find that ASU intentionally opened

its outdoor zones for indiscriminate use. Accordingly, the Court finds that the outdoor zones

on the ASU campus are a limited public forum, and as such, the Court must now turn to

whether ASU’s challenged restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress

Plaintiffs’ expression merely because Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs’ viewpoint.

However, the Court must first address Plaintiffs’ contention that ASU’s insurance and

one-zone requirements constitute prior restraints on speech. “The term prior restraint is used

to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued

in advance of the time that such communication are to occur.” Alexander v. United States,

509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (citation/quotation omitted). “[G]overnment officials violate [the

First Amendment] when their acts ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from

future First Amendment activities.’” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Mendocino Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.

1999)). However, in this case, the challenged insurance and one-zone requirements do not

prevent Plaintiffs from actually engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Instead, the

requirements merely place limitations on the extent to which Plaintiffs may engage in speech

by limiting the number of outdoor zones that Plaintiffs can use and limiting the ease with

which off-campus groups can come onto campus and participate in Plaintiffs’ speech. In

addition, although Plaintiffs contend that the insurance and one-zone requirements “chill”

First Amendment activities, they offer no evidence that any individual or organization has

ever been prevented from engaging in First Amendment activities on ASU’s outdoor zones.

Further, since the outdoor zones are a limited public forum, such requirements, as long as

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Plaintiffs’ also contend that Defendants’ application of ASU’s insurance requirement

to the JFA exhibit amounts to a “heckler’s veto,” which “is an impermissible content-based

speech restriction where the speaker is silenced due to an anticipated disorderly or violent

reaction of the audience.” Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158. However, the risk of a “heckler’s

veto” arises “where a permittee might be subject to higher fees because of higher security

costs associated with a hostile crowd.” Id. (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,

505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992). But although ASU requires a certificate of insurance from third

parties, it does not provide insurance and thus has no influence on the cost of insurance

required for any particular event. Moreover, Plaintiffs submit no evidence to indicate that

the insurance required for the JFA exhibit was higher than it would have been for any other

event, let alone higher based on a perceived security risk based on the content of speech.

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they are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because of a

disagreement with a particular viewpoint, are permissible.

Plaintiffs contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements amount to content

and viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. “‘Content discrimination’

occurs when the government ‘choos[es] the subjects' that may be discussed, while ‘viewpoint

discrimination’ occurs when the government prohibits ‘speech by particular speakers,’

thereby suppressing a particular view about a subject.” Rosenbaum v. City and County of

San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘[W]hether a statute is content neutral

or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes

speech by content then it is content based.’” Menotti, 4098 F.3d at 1129 (quoting City of Los

Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)); see also Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d

at 1158 (“It should be underscored . . . that ‘[a] regulation that serves some purpose unrelated

to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some

speakers but not others.’”) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Indeed, “government regulation

of expressive activity is ‘content neutral’ if it is justified without reference to the content of

regulated speech.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000). Plaintiffs offer no evidence

that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements were adopted “because of disagreement

with the message it conveys.”2

 ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements are neither

directed toward speech nor describe speech by content. Thus, the insurance and one-zone

requirements are content-neutral. 

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Plaintiffs cite the Court to Santa Monica Food Not Bombs for the proposition that

because this case involves an insurance requirement, it must be narrowly tailored to further

a significant government interest. (Dkt. #83, p.14). However, Santa Monica Food Not

Bombs does not support that proposition. In Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, the Ninth

Circuit applied the requirement of narrowly tailoring because the forum at issue was a

traditional public forum, and as such, requires that the regulation at issue be narrowly tailored

to further a significant government interest. 450 F.3d at 1035, 1036. 

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“Restrictions on speech in the context of a limited public forum must be both

viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” Hills v.

Scottsdale Unified School Dist. No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003). In Arizona,

state entities are generally subject to tort liability, and the state’s self-insurance does not

extend to claims arising from the acts and omissions of non-state actors. See Stone v.

Arizona Highway Comm’n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392 (1963); see also A.R.S. § 41-621. As such,

Defendants state that the purpose of ASU’s insurance requirement is the protection of the

university from liability for claims arising out of the acts and omissions of non-state actors.

In addition, Defendants state that the purpose of ASU’s one-zone requirement is the

coordination of use among student organizations. There is no indication that the purpose of

either regulations is the preclusion of a particular expression. See Santa Monica Food Not

Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006)3. Thus, although the

insurance and one-zone requirements may limit the extent with which Plaintiffs may engage

in their speech, specifically by limiting the number of outdoor zones that Plaintiffs may use

and limiting the ease with which off-campus groups may come onto campus to participate

in Plaintiffs’ speech, the regulations place no more than an incidental burden on speech and

are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.

“Despite the neutral content of a statute on its face, however, a statute as-applied may

be constitutionally infirm if its enforcement is based on viewpoint discrimination.”

Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158. “[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it

denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise

includible subject.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches

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Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the

government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense

of others.”) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs contend that because “Defendants did not

produce a single example of an expressive event involving a non-campus entity prior to the

JFA exhibit where insurance was required,” ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements are

not viewpoint neutral. (Dkt. #83, p.13). However, in order to engage in viewpoint

discrimination, the government must discourage a particular viewpoint on a given subject,

and advance the opposite viewpoint on that subject. See Hills, 329 F.3d at 1050, 1051; see

also U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (“Clearly, the regulation does not discriminate on

the basis of content or viewpoint. Indeed, ‘[n]othing suggests the Postal Service intended to

discourage one viewpoint and advance another. . . . [T]he Postal Service is not granting to

one side of a debatable public question . . . a monopoly in expressing its views.’”) (quoting

Monterey County Democratic Central committee v. United States Postal Service, 812 F.2d

1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to indicate that Defendants’ application of

ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements regulated the extent of Plaintiffs’ speech based

on the ideology of Plaintniffs’ message. Although Plaintiffs contend that the lack of

evidence in the record that Defendants applied the insurance and one-zone requirements to

other student organizations and off-campus third-parties prior to Plaintiffs’ JFA exhibit

establishes viewpoint discrimination, that lack of evidence does not somehow establish that

Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs based on their viewpoint or ideological message.

Plaintiffs have simply submitted no evidence to indicate that the insurance and one-zone

requirements were applied to Plaintiffs’ speech based on its message, whereas it wasn’t

applied to other organizations based on their message, let alone that it was not applied to the

opposite, pro-choice viewpoint. Indeed, the record indicates that Plaintiffs’ requested an

unprecedented number of zones for the JFA exhibit, which supports a finding that the

insurance and one-zone requirements were applied in this case based on that fact. As such,

the Court cannot find that Defendants’ enforcement of ASU’s insurance and one-zone

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requirements in this case was based on viewpoint discrimination. Thus, ASU’s insurance and

one-zone requirements do not violate the First Amendment because they are both content and

viewpoint neutral, and they are reasonable in light of the purpose served by ASU’s

designated outdoor zones.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs also contend that ASU’s insurance and one-zone

requirements violate Plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment. A statute that “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms

so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ

as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. Gen.

Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 291 (1926). As such, Plaintiffs’ due process claim relies on

Plaintiffs’ argument that ASU’s insurance and one-zone requirements are unconstitutionally

vague. However, as discussed above, that claim is moot given the codification of the

challenged requirements in ASU policy 802-01. Thus, Plaintiffs may not sustain a due

process claim. In addition, “the viability of equal protection claims relating to

expressive conduct is contingent upon the existence of a public forum. Only when rights of

access associated with a public forum are improperly limited may we conclude that a

fundamental right is impinged.” Center for Bio-Ethical Reform v. City and County of

Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 924 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As such, Plaintiffs’ equal

protection claim relies on a finding that Defendants’ unconstitutionally burdened the exercise

of Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to free speech. See United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557,

565 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that strict scrutiny applies under the equal protection clause if the

governmental action “targets a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right”);

see also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“Necessarily, then,

under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government

may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to

those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”). But as discussed

above, the outdoor zones on the ASU campus are a limited public forum and ASU’s

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insurance and one-zone requirements do not violate Plaintiffs’ right to free speech. Thus,

Plaintiffs may not sustain an equal protection claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice (Dkt. #97) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt.

#64) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ cross-motions for summary

judgment (Dkt. #s 76, 77, 78) are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment accordingly.

 DATED this 7th day of March, 2008.

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