Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVERETT H., a minor, by and through 

his Guardians Ad Litem REBECCA 

HAVEY and HEATH HAVEY; 

REBECCA HAVEY, an individual; and 

HEATH HAVEY, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DRY CREEK JOINT ELEMENTARY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF DRY CREEK JOINT 

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 

MARK GEYER, individually and in his 

official capacity of Superintendent of 

Dry Creek Joint Elementary School 

District; EVONNE ROGERS, 

individually and in her official capacity 

as Assistant Superintendent of 

Educational Services; LYNN 

BARBARIA, individually and in her 

official capacity as Director of Special 

Education; ANDREW GIANNINI, 

individually and in his official capacity 

as Principal at Olive Grove Elementary 

School; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF EDUCATION; and TOM 

TORLAKSON, individually and in his 

official capacity as State 

Superintendent of Public Instruction for 

the State of California,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DAD

ORDER

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 89 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 5
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Through this action, Plaintiffs Heath and Rebecca Havey, both individually and on 

behalf of their son Everett H. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), allege educational harms based 

on purported violations of Everett’s right as a disabled student to a free and appropriate 

public education (“FAPE”) pursuant to the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400m et seq. (“IDEA”) and various state 

statutes. Plaintiffs also assert associated violations of Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“§ 504”). Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims under the auspices of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), including claims for failure to accommodate, discrimination,

and retaliation. By way of damages, Plaintiffs seek compensatory education and 

reimbursement, punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. 

The Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District, Everett’s local school district, is 

named as a Defendant, along with Dry Creek’s Board of Trustees and four individual Dry 

Creek administrators, Lynn Barbaria, Mark Geyer, Andrew Giannini and Evonne Rogers,

in their official capacities (the “Local Defendants”). In addition to the Local Defendants,

Plaintiffs also name as Defendants the California Department of Education (the “CDE”) 

and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Torlakson (the “State Defendants”).

On September 25, 2014, the parties filed their Joint Status Report (“JSR”, ECF 

No. 59). The JSR carefully outlined the parties’ disagreement on how discovery should

proceed. Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc), Defendants argued that discovery should be bifurcated so as to initially 

limit discovery to whether Plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies applicable to 

their IDEA claims. According to Defendants, only following that initial discovery, and the 

adjudication of summary judgment motions as to such exhaustion, should discovery as 

to the remainder of the case be permitted. Thereafter, Defendants advocated a second 

round of summary judgment encompassing the merits of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that Albino was distinguishable because it involved 

an instance in which the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust would have precluded plaintiffs’ 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 89 Filed 09/01/15 Page 2 of 5
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claims in their entirety. Here, on the other hand, Defendants’ exhaustion defense 

applies to only two of Plaintiffs’ twelve causes of action.

In issuing the Pretrial Scheduling Order of January 16, 2015 (“PTSO”) (ECF 

No. 60) and adopting a single deadline for both discovery and hearing any dispositive 

motions, the Court necessarily denied Defendants’ arguments as set forth in the JSR. 

Nonetheless, Defendants filed objections to the PTSO on January 23, 2015, and 

January 28, 2015, respectively. Both objections posited the same arguments already 

made in the JSR and rejected by the Court’s issuance of the PTSO.

Paragraph XIV of the PTSO provided that the PTSO “will become final without 

further order of the Court unless objections are filed within (7) seven court days of 

service of this Order.” Based on the paragraph, Defendants apparently took the position 

that the discovery schedule in this matter was not finalized until the Court issued a 

specific order denying their objections, despite the fact, as indicated above, that the 

Court’s issuance of the PTSO rejecting the same argument should already have made 

that clear. It appears Defendants may have refrained from initiating certain discovery in 

reliance on their erroneous position.

Following a request for clarification, an email dated July 28, 2015, from the 

Courtroom Deputy made clear that the deadlines for completing discovery as set forth in 

the PTSO remained in place absent an order to the contrary. This prompted Defendants 

to file two motions on August 5, 2015. First, Defendant CDE filed a Request for 

Clarification of Scheduling Order and/or Stay and Extension. ECF No. 72. That Motion 

requested that the Court extend discovery for a period of nine months after issuance of 

the Court’s order on Defendant CDE’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 67).

1

Defendant CDE also seeks extensions of all remaining pretrial dates consistent with that 

nine month period. CDE argues that its uncertainty over whether the Court’s discovery 

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 1 That Motion, filed on April 2, 2015, as to the Court’s previous Memorandum and Order filed 

March 26, 2015 (ECF No. 36) is being denied by an additional Order filed concurrently herewith.

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 89 Filed 09/01/15 Page 3 of 5
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deadlines were final, along with the ruling it awaited on its reconsideration request, 

justified those extensions.

Second, the Local Defendants also filed a Motion for Clarification of Scheduling 

Order and/or Stay and Extension. ECF No. 72. That Motion advanced similar arguments 

with respect to the need for more time in view of the parties’ pending objections to the 

PTSO.

Defendants’ objections are without merit, and the Court has already rejected the 

same arguments made at length in the JSR. The Court further finds it unwise and 

irresponsible on Defendants’ part to have refrained from discovery based on those 

misplaced objections. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that paragraph XIV of the 

PTSO is at least susceptible to an interpretation that further direction from the Court 

would be forthcoming as to the content of its PTSO, including discovery deadlines, in the 

event timely objections were made. At the same time, the Court also recognizes 

Plaintiffs’ clear interest in moving this case towards trial without further delay.

In balancing those competing considerations, the Court hereby extends the 

deadline for completing fact discovery from September 25, 2015, until November 27, 

2015. The deadline for disclosing experts is also extended from November 25, 2015, to 

January 22, 2016. All other dates set forth in the January 16, 2015, PTSO, including but 

not limited to the dispositive motion hearing date of March 17, 2016, the final pretrial 

conference date of June 9, 2016, and the trial date of July 25, 2016, remain in full force 

and effect. Additionally, all terms and conditions set forth in the PTSO will remain 

unchanged, except that the page limitations applicable to dispositive motions shall be 

increased from 20 pages to 30 pages for moving and opposition papers, and 15 pages 

for any reply.

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Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 89 Filed 09/01/15 Page 4 of 5
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Except for the limited modifications to the PTSO set forth in the preceding 

paragraph, Defendant CDE’s Motion for Clarification of Scheduling Order and/or Stay 

and Extension (ECF No. 78) and Local Defendant’s Motion for Stay of Pretrial 

Scheduling Order to Modify Scheduling Order Extending Discovery Deadlines, and for 

Leave of Court to File Two Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72) are hereby 

DENIED.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2015

 2 Having determined that oral argument was not of material assistance, the Court orders both 

Motions submitted on the briefing in accordance with Local Rule 230(g).

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 89 Filed 09/01/15 Page 5 of 5