Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00323/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00323-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEWIS A. HENDERSON 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,

DMAFB, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-0323-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On August 28, 2007 this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case

should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 28, 2007,

Plaintiff filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause with Exhibits A through G

attached. On October 30, 2007, Defendants filed a reply. For reasons which follow,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Privacy

Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a civil service employee of the United States Air Force and

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. (Complaint, ¶ 3.)

On June 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States District Court

invoking the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §

552a. (Complaint, ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to keep confidential and properly

safeguard information as it relates to the IAW Air Force Civilian Drug Testing

Agreement. (Complaint, ¶ 7.)

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Plaintiff also alleged jurisdiction on other grounds, which the District Court has already

dismissed. Order Granting Mot. To Dismiss in Part (July 20, 2007). Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of 2 million dollars. (Complaint, ¶

18, p. 4.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Position

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, and that the Court should dismiss. Defendants assert that the Privacy Act

does not vest federal courts with the power to review personnel decisions where the

Civil Service Reform Act precludes such review.

B. Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff asserts that the court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the

Privacy Act and 5 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.

C. Analysis

1. Raising Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts that raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction must occur by

motion of the Defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Pl.’s Resp. to Order to Show

Cause p. 2 (September 28, 2007). 

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is

appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1). Defendants’ failure to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction in any

pre-Answer Motion or Answer does not waive the right to raise such a defense later.

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised whenever it “appears by suggestion

of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, [and

accordingly] the court shall dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A district court can raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its own accord.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal courts are always “under an independent obligation

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to examine their own jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231

(1990), and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction.

See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.

694, 701 (1982); see also Magana v. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands, 107 F.3d

1436, 1443 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Assuming that even if the court could not dismiss this action on its own,

Defendants nevertheless raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Reply to

Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss in Part. (¶ 2). This constitutes a “suggestion”

that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(h)(3). Under either circumstance, the court may dismiss this case of its

own accord if Plaintiff cannot show subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts that his Privacy Act claim falls under the courts subject matter

jurisdiction because 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g)(1) confers such jurisdiction to the district

courts, providing that an aggrieved “individual may bring a civil action against the

[aggrieving] agency, and the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a (g)(1). Plaintiff also asserts that the district court has subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that the “district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only that power

that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress

pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106

S.Ct. 1326, 1331 (1986) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180,

2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)

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(citations omitted). Where Congress intends to preclude judicial review by statute,

district courts may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Thunder Basin

Coal, Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994). 

3. Civil Service Reform Act

The Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), enacted in 1978, is an integrated

scheme of administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate

interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and

efficient administration.” See United States. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444. 108 S.Ct. 668

(1988). 

In deciding questions of jurisdiction and preclusion, the Supreme Court has

determined that this Court must first ascertain where Plaintiff’s claims fit within the

statutory scheme as the CSRA provides different treatment for grievances depending

on the nature of the claim. Whitman v. Dep’t of Trasnsp., 547 U.S. 512, 514, 126 S.Ct.

2014, 2015 (2006).

The CSRA states that “any collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) shall

provide procedures for the settlement of grievances . . . . [T]he procedures shall be the

exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances which fall within its

coverage.” 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (abbreviation added). The CSRA provides exceptions

to these procedures, most relevant to the present case where the conduct of the agency

falls within the scope of the CSRA’s “prohibited personnel practices.” 5 U.S.C. §

7121(d) is controlling where the “prohibited personnel practices” are traditionally

discriminatory in nature, which is not the case here as it pertains to the Privacy Act

claim. Where all other “prohibited personnel practices” are concerned, 5 U.S.C. §

7121(g) is controlling. Pursuant to § 7121(g), a claimant may elect only one of the

following remedies: an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, a negotiated

grievance procedure, or procedures under the Office of Special Counsel. 5 U.S.C. §

7121(g)(2)-(3). None of these remedies include judicial review. If the conduct of the

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agency is characterized by non-discriminatory prohibited personnel practices “then the

CSRA’s administrative procedures are [a claimant’s] only remedy, and the federal

courts cannot resolve [a claimant’s] claim under the Privacy Act . . . .” Orsay v. U.S.

Dept. of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In this case, the conduct of the Defendants alleged by Plaintiff’s Privacy Act

claim would constitute a prohibited personnel practice. The Defendants’ alleged failure

to maintain records of the Plaintiff, and alleged failure to comply with other provisions

of the Privacy Act constitute “personnel actions” that were not made with proper regard

to privacy rights. As such these alleged actions are “prohibited personnel practices,”

triggering the provision of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g)(2)-(3), which does not allow judicial

review as a remedy.

Even if the alleged conduct of the Defendants did not constitute a “prohibited

personnel practices,” subject matter jurisdiction is nevertheless thwarted by 5 U.S.C.

§ 7121(a)(1), which provides that the CBA provides the exclusive procedures for

remedying any grievances. 

The CBA in this case is the Labor Management Agreement between

Davis-Montham Air Force Base and the American Federation of Government

Employees, Local 2924. The CBA is applicable to Plaintiff, and it provides that the

grievance procedure contained therein is the “exclusive procedure available to the

Union and the employees in the bargaining unit for resolving such grievances except

as provided in Section 4 of this Article.” (Exhibit A, Def.’s Reply to Order to Show

Cause, Art. 30, Sec. 3.). The exception in Section 4 is for a “prohibited personnel

procedure.” Under such an exception, an employee may elect to raise the matter under

the negotiated grievance procedure, or under a statutory appellate procedure but not

both. Once an employee files a grievance in writing under the negotiated grievance

procedure, the employee is considered to have exercised his/her option, and the other

procedure is unavailable. Id. at Section 4. This exception does not apply here.

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Thus, whether this Court characterizes Defendant’s alleged conduct as a

“prohibited personnel practice” is immaterial. If the alleged conduct does constitute a

“prohibited personnel practice” then 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) is controlling and there can be

no judicial review, and thus the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this

dispute. If the alleged conduct does not constitute a “prohibited personnel practice”

then 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) is controlling and the CBA, which does not allow for

judicial review, provides the exclusive remedy of the negotiated grievance procedure.

Following either path, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim.

III. RECOMMENDATION

This court recommends that the District Judge, after its independent review,

DISMISS Plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 06-323-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc). 

DATED this 31st day of July, 2008.

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