Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01980/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01980-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Henry Tomlin, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Nathaniel E. Gafvert, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1980-PHX-SMM (ESW) 

 O R D E R 

 Plaintiff John Henry Tomlin brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against two Mesa Police Department Officers: Nathaniel E. Gafvert and Kevin 

Gillis (Doc. 16). Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on statute-oflimitations grounds (Doc. 22). 

 The Court will deny the motion. 

I. Background 

Tomlin initiated this lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court on December 4, 

2012, while he was confined in the Maricopa County Jail in Phoenix, Arizona (Doc. 1-1 

at 2, CV 2012-017916). In his Complaint, Tomlin named as Defendants Gafvert and 

John Does #1, #2, and #3 (id.). Tomlin attempted service on Gafvert multiple times to no 

avail (Doc. 1-3 at 40). On May 7, 2013, Gafvert moved to dismiss the Complaint for 

failure to serve (Doc. 1-3 at 97-98 (July 9, 2013 Minute Entry)). The state court denied 

Gafvert’s motion and extended the deadline to serve Defendants to October 31, 2013 

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(id.). On September 30, 2013, before Tomlin completed service, Gafvert removed the 

case to this Court (Doc. 1). 

 On January 15, 2014, the Court dismissed Tomlin’s Complaint because it was not 

filed on the court-approved form (Doc. 7). 

 On February 4, 2014, Tomlin filed his First Amended Complaint, which named 

Gafvert and Gillis as Defendants (Doc. 8). Before the Court screened the amended 

pleading, Tomlin moved to amend his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The Court 

granted his motion to amend, docketed the Second Amended Complaint, and screened it 

(Doc. 14). The Court determined that Tomlin’s claim for excessive force did not include 

sufficient facts to evaluate whether the use of force during his arrest was reasonable; that 

is, whether he posed a threat or was resisting arrest (id. at 5). Tomlin was granted leave 

to amend, and, on July 25, 2014, he filed his Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). 

 The Court screened the Third Amended Complaint and determined that Tomlin 

remedied the deficiencies, and Gafvert and Gillis were directed to respond to Tomlin’s 

allegations (Doc. 19). 

 Specifically, Tomlin alleged that at 9:20 p.m. on January 3, 2012, he was walking 

his bicycle in Mesa when he stopped to throw away some trash, at which point Gafvert, 

who was driving an un-marked police truck, suddenly stopped, exited the truck, and 

approached Tomlin (Doc. 16). According to Tomlin, Gafvert inquired about what 

Tomlin was doing, and Tomlin told him he was just throwing away trash (id.). Tomlin 

claimed that Gillis then arrived in another un-marked police vehicle, and then Gafvert 

suddenly and forcefully knocked Tomlin to the ground and hit him on the head with 

something sharp (id.). Both Defendants then handcuffed Tomlin while he was semiconscious (id.). Tomlin claimed that he committed no crime to prompt the use of force, 

he posed no threat to Defendants, and he had no weapon (id.). He further claimed that he 

did not resist arrest and was surprised by the attack (id.). Tomlin stated that he suffered 

various injuries, including a large wound to his right shoulder; a lower-back injury that 

makes it difficult to walk and that required him to seek emergency medical care; head 

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injuries that became infected and that caused him headaches; and mental and emotional 

damage (id.). 

 On March 5, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that 

Tomlin’s claim is time-barred because he was injured on January 3, 2012, yet he did not 

raise his excessive-force claim until he filed his First Amended Complaint on February 

12, 2014—outside of the two-year statute of limitations (Doc. 22 at 2). Defendants 

contend that Tomlin’s amended pleading does not relate back to the original Complaint 

because he did not assert the excessive force claim in his original Complaint and, 

therefore, he fails to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) 

(id. at 2-3). They also contend that Tomlin never asserted any claim against Gillis within 

the statute of limitations because Gillis was not named as a Defendant until after the 

statute of limitations period expired (id. at 4). 

II. Governing Standards 

 A. Statute of Limitations 

 Section 1983 does not include its own statute of limitations. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, federal courts apply the statute of 

limitations governing personal injury claims in the forum state. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 

U.S. 261, 280 (1985); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. In Arizona, the limitations period for 

personal injury claims is two years. Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 

1986); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must 

be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues). 

 Although the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims is borrowed from 

state law, federal law continues to govern when a § 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 

549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. Under federal law, a claim 

accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis 

of the action.” Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

 The statute-of-limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss “only 

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when the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the complaint.” U.S. ex rel. 

Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations 

period may be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required 

liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail 

Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). In order to dismiss a claim as untimely on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, it must “appear[ ] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that 

would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. at 1207. Thus, “[i]f, from the 

allegations of the complaint as well as any judicially noticeable materials, an asserted 

defense raises disputed issues of fact, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper.” 

ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

Generally, the court may not consider any material outside the pleadings in ruling 

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2011). But the incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows material that is attached to 

the complaint to be considered, as well as unattached evidence on which the complaint 

relies if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to 

plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document.” Id. at 999. 

III. Discussion 

 A. Gafvert 

As set forth above, the alleged excessive-force incident occurred on January 3, 

2012; thus, the statute-of-limitations expired on January 3, 2014. As noted by 

Defendants, Tomlin’s original Complaint is the only pleading that was filed prior to this 

deadline. But to the extent that Defendants contend Tomlin failed to assert an excessive 

force claim in his original Complaint, the Court disagrees. 

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 A comparison of the original Complaint with the First Amended Complaint 

reflects that Tomlin set forth virtually identical factual assertions in both pleadings 

(Compare Doc. 1-1 at 3-4, Compl. ¶¶ 6-9, 12 with Doc. 8 at 3). In his First Amended 

Complaint, the only significant differences are that Tomlin replaced “John Doe #1” with 

“Gillis” and added that he was struck in the head with something sharp (Doc. 8 at 3). 

That Tomlin did not specifically cite to the Fourth Amendment or use the words 

“excessive force” in his original Complaint does not result in the failure to allege an 

excessive force claim. He was not required to identify the constitutional source of his 

claim or a specific legal theory. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“[n]otice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not 

causes of action, statutes or legal theories”) (emphasis in original); see Hearns v. 

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (pro se plaintiff need not plead specific 

legal theories “so long as sufficient factual averments show that [he] may be entitled to 

some relief”) (quotation omitted). The Court looks at the facts alleged, and because 

Tomlin is proceeding pro se, it must “‘afford him the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining 

what claims he raised in his complaint[.]” Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Morrison 

v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Here, the factual assertions in Tomlin’s original pleading give rise to an excessiveforce claim even without the added sentence that he was struck in the head with 

something sharp. In light of Defendants’ acknowledgement that the First Amended 

Complaint asserts an excessive-force claim, they cannot credibly argue that the original 

Complaint, with the same basic factual assertions, did not do so as well. Thus, the Court 

finds that the original pleading asserted an excessive force claim. Because Tomlin 

specifically named Gafvert in the original pleading, which was filed within the statute of 

limitations, the excessive force claim against Gafvert is not time-barred. 

 Assuming, arguendo, that the original pleading did not assert an excessive force 

claim, the Court finds that the First Amended Complaint relates back to the original 

Complaint. See Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 

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(“[r]elation back is intimately connected with the policy of the statute of limitations”). 

The decision of whether an amended complaint relates back is committed to the Court’s 

discretion. Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 5 F.3d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Further, the relation-back doctrine of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) is to be 

“liberally applied.” ASARCO, 765 F.3d at 1004 (citing Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky 

Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1259 n.29 (9th Cir. 1982)). The 

Rule’s purpose “is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its 

merits rather than on procedural technicalities.” ASARCO, 765 F.3d at 1005 (quoting 6 

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1471 (3d ed. 1998)). 

 Under Rule 15(c)(1), an amendment relates back to the date of the original 

pleading when: 

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows 

relation back; 

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the 

original pleading; or 

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against 

whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the 

period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the 

party to be brought in by amendment: 

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 

defending on the merits; and 

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been 

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s 

identity. 

 Rule 15(c)(1) incorporates the relation back rules of state law “when that state’s 

law provides the applicable statute of limitation and is more lenient.” Butler v. Nat’l 

Comm. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198-1201 (9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the 

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Court must consider both federal and state law “and employ whichever affords the more 

permissive relation back standard.” Id. at 1201. 

 Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, there is nothing in Arizona Revised Statute 

§ 12-542 that prohibits relation back (see Doc. 22 at 3 n. 1). Rather, state law provides 

for relation back under the same circumstances as set out in Federal Rule 15(c). See Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 15(c). 

 With respect to the second provision in Rule 15(c)(1), both the original Complaint 

and the First Amended Complaint seek recovery based on the same set of facts 

surrounding the January 3, 2012 occurrence and the police officers’ alleged conduct 

during that occurrence (see Doc. 1-1 at 3-4; Doc. 8 at 3). Defendants maintain that in his 

original pleading, Tomlin asserts a claim for false arrest; however, the facts alleged in the 

original pleading are the very same facts that form the basis of Tomlin’s excessive force 

claim (see id.). “So long as the original and amended [complaints] state claims that are 

tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v. Felix, 

545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005); see O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2006) (finding that amended pleading relates back to prior pleading because, although the 

plaintiff did not raise her ELA claim until the later amendment, the facts alleged in her 

prior complaint in support of her Title VII claim also form the basis for the EPA claim 

asserted in her amended pleading). Liberally applying Rule 15(c), Tomlin’s First 

Amended Complaint relates back to the original pleading, and the excessive-force claim 

against Gafvert is not time-barred. 

B. Gillis

 As stated, in the original pleading filed in state court, Gillis was not named but 

instead was identified as “John Doe #1” (Doc. 1-1 at 3-4). Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 10(f) permits the use of a fictitious name when a plaintiff actually intends to 

sue a defendant but does not know his name. Gonzalez v. Tidelands Motor Hotel Co., 

Inc., 598 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). When the defendant’s true name is 

discovered, the plaintiff may amend the pleading accordingly. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 10(f). 

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“Under this practice, substitution of the correct name at a later date does not add a party 

to the case—it merely corrects the name of the defendant whom the plaintiff already has 

sued.” McGill v. Nat’l Speciality Ins. Co., CV12-1671-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 331256, at 

*3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2013) (emphasis added). Arizona courts have therefore concluded 

that in this situation, “[t]here is no need to implicate [R]ule 15(c) to provide for relation 

back since a party is not being changed or added.” Id. (quoting Lane v. Elco Industries, 

Inc., 656 P.2d 650, 655 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)). But if a plaintiff uses Rule 10(f) to add a 

claim against a defendant that the plaintiff did not originally intend to sue, Rule 10(f) is 

not applicable, “and the plaintiff would need to comply with Rule 15(c) if the amendment 

of the new party is to relate back to the original complaint.” Lane, 656 P.2d at 655. 

 In this case, Tomlin used Rule 10(f) properly. He intended to sue Gillis but, at the 

time he filed his original pleading, he did not know Gillis’s name and therefore identified 

him as a Doe defendant. When Tomlin substituted Gillis for “John Doe #1” in the First 

Amended Complaint, he was correcting the name, not adding or changing a party, and 

Rule 15(c) is not implicated. For this reason, Defendants’ argument that the claim 

against Gillis is time-barred fails, and their motion will be denied. 

 Even if Rule 15(c) did apply, Tomlin satisfies the relation-back requirements with 

respect to Gillis. The Court has already determined that the First Amended Complaint 

asserts a claim “that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 

attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Under 

Rule 15(c)(1)(C), two requirements must be met: notice and mistake. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(c)(1)(C). 

 1. Notice

 For an amendment to relate back, the new party must have received notice of the 

action within 120 days of the original Complaint and “not be prejudiced in defending on 

the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i), 4(m). Notice within this time period need not 

be formal. Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 

Notice may be actual or constructive or it may be imputed to a defendant with an 

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“identity of interest” with the named defendant. G.F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 

Ltd., 23 F.3d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994); see Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 

(1986) (if there is a sufficient agency or community of interest between the person served 

and the intended defendant, notice may be imputed to the intended defendant). Also, 

“[i]nformal notice is sufficient if it allows the defendant the opportunity to prepare a 

defense.” Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 229 F.R.D. 152, 158 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

 Because the original Complaint was filed on December 4, 2012, Gillis needed to 

have notice no later than April 3, 2013. Tomlin asserts that prior to filing his original 

Complaint, he submitted a Notice of Claim pursuant to state-law (Doc. 24 at 7, 10).1

 

Tomlin’s filing of an administrative claim, however, “does not impute notice of ‘the 

institution of the action.’” G.F. Co., 23 F.3d at 1503 n.3 (internal quotation omitted). 

Tomlin also provides a September 24, 2012 letter from Mesa Police Department 

Lieutenant Thompson, who confirmed that the Department received Tomlin’s letter 

alleging excessive force and informed Tomlin that Gillis investigated the allegations and 

determined they have no merit (Doc. 24, Ex. A).2

 This establishes that Gillis was aware 

of the of excessive force allegations in September 2012; however, that was before 

Tomlin’s lawsuit was filed and is therefore insufficient. The Rule is specific that it is 

notice of the action that is required for relation back. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 

 As mentioned, notice may be imputed where there is sufficient agency or 

community of interest between the served defendant and intended defendant. Schiavone, 

477 U.S. at 29. A community or identity of interest “generally means that the parties are 

so closely related in their business operations or other activities that the institution of an 

action against one serves to provide notice of the litigation to the other.” 6A Wright, 

 

1

 Tomlin referred to the Notice of Claim in his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8 at 3 ¶ 5), the Notice relates to the excessive force claim, and Defendants do not challenge that Tomlin filed the Notice. See Corinthian Coll., 655 F.3d at 999. 

2

 Tomlin referred to the Mesa Police Department’s internal investigation in his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8 at 4 ¶ 5), the investigation relates to the excessive force allegations, and Defendants do not challenge Thompson’s letter or that there was an investigation. See Corinthian Coll., 655 F.3d at 999. 

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Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1499 at 197-98 (2010). Here, Gafvert 

and Gillis are both Mesa police officers, they were both present and involved in the event 

underlying Tomlin’s excessive force claim; they are alleged to have committed the same 

violation; and they both continued to work as Mesa police officers. See Ayala Serrano v. 

Lebron Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that new defendant prison 

guard shared identity of interest with prison officials named in the original complaint 

where prison guard was present at the attack underlying the plaintiff’s failure-to-protect 

claim, the original defendants were the prison guard’s superiors, and the prison guard 

continued to work in the unit where the plaintiff was housed). Further, courts have 

considered imputed notice where, like here, the same counsel represents the served 

defendant and the new defendant. See, e.g., Krupski, 560 U.S. at 544 (noting that the new 

defendant was represented by the same counsel who had represented the served 

defendant); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998) (notice imputed to 

newly named officer defendants through shared counsel with original city and officer 

defendants); Palmtree Acquisition Corp. v. Neely, C 08-3168 MHP, 2010 WL 3910370, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (imputing notice under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) where the original 

complaint was served on the individual’s stepmother and the parties were represented by 

the same law firm). When considering these facts, there is sufficient identity of interest 

between Gafvert and Gillis, and Gillis would have had notice of the Tomlin’s lawsuit 

within the prescribed period. 

 Moreover, Gillis will not be prejudiced in defending the claim against him. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Discovery has not begun, a Scheduling Order has not been 

issued, Gillis has the same counsel as Gafvert, and Defendants do not argue or show that 

any unfair prejudice would result from relation back (see Doc. 22). See Krupski, 560 

U.S. at 545. 

 2. Mistake 

 The final consideration is whether Gillis knew or should have known that he 

would have been named as a defendant but for a mistake concerning his identity. Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Defendants argue that because Tomlin cannot demonstrate that he 

mistakenly named someone other than Gillis as a defendant in the original complaint, 

there is no relation back (Doc. 22 at 5). But this argument is disconnected from the facts 

of this case. Tomlin does not claim to have mistakenly named John Doe #1 in the 

original complaint. The only conceivable “mistake” is failing to amend the original 

Complaint and name Gillis as a Defendant prior to the statute-of-limitations deadline. 

 Defendants argue that relation back is precluded because Tomlin admits that he 

knew of Gillis’s identity in February 2013, but did not name him until February 2014 

when he filed his First Amended Complaint, and the failure to timely name a defendant is 

not a “mistake” permitting relation back under Rule 15(c) (Doc. 25 at 7). In support, 

Defendants cite to the Ninth Circuit’s 1986 decision in Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 

which held that Rule 15(c) was not intended “to assist a plaintiff who ignores or fails to 

respond in a reasonable fashion to notice a potential party” (id. at 7, citing 800 F.2d 853, 

857-58 (1986); Doc. 22 at 5). 

 The United States Supreme Court has squarely rejected Defendants’ argument that 

undue delay in seeking to amend precludes relation back. Krupski v. Costa Crociere 

S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). In Krupski, the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff’s 

dilatory conduct cannot justify denial of relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) where the 

Rule “plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation back, and the 

amending party’s diligence is not among them.” Id. at 552-53. Thus, relation back under 

15(c)(1)(C) does not depend on the plaintiff’s knowledge or his timeliness in seeking to 

amend; rather, it turns on what the prospective defendant knew or should have known. 

Id. at 541. 

 The record supports that Gillis should have known that, absent some mistake, the 

action would have been brought against him. He was aware of Tomlin’s excessive-force 

allegations, he would have had notice of the lawsuit during the Rule 4(m) period, and the 

original Complaint described his involvement in the underlying incident under the name 

John Doe #1. 

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 In sum, under the Arizona Rules of Procedure, the relation back requirements do 

not apply to a fictitious-named defendant who is substituted in an amended pleading. See 

Lane, 656 P.2d at 655. But even if Federal Rule 15(c) applies, relation back is 

appropriate. Accordingly, Tomlin’s claim against Gillis is not barred by the statute of 

limitations, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be denied. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22), and the Motion is denied. 

 (2) Within 20 days from the date of this Order, Defendants must answer the 

Third Amended Complaint.

 DATED this 3rd day of August, 2015. 

Honorable Stephen M. McNamee

Senior United States District Judge

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