Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06900/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06900-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAMALJIT SINGH HUNDAL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

KATHY PROSPER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:03-CV-6900 LJO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. #1]

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Due to the death of Magistrate Judge Hollis G. Best and the

appointment of Magistrate Judge William M. Wunderlich, by order dated May 2, 2004, this case was

reassigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings. The parties having voluntarily consented to

exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated

October 18, 2004, this case was assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final

judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced, following his conviction by jury

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

trial on January 24, 2001, of spousal rape, spousal abuse, forcible sodomy, attempted spousal rape,

malicious destruction of a telephone line, and false imprisonment. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 262(a)(1),

286(c)(2), 273.5, 664, 262(a), 236, and 591). See Exhibit D, Respondent’s Answer to the Petition

(hereinafter “Answer”). Petitioner was sentenced to serve a total term of fifteen years in state prison. 

Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). On September 6, 2002, the 5th DCA issued an

unpublished opinion affirming the judgment. Id.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on October 17, 2002.

See Exhibit E, Answer. On November 26, 2002, the petition was summarily denied. See Exhibit F,

Answer.

On December 15, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. By order of the

Court dated December 22, 2003, the case was transferred to the Fresno Division. Petitioner raises

four grounds for relief: 1) Petitioner claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to

religious and cultural bias during trial; 2) Petitioner claims he was denied due process and a full and

fair trial by jury when the trial court used a jury instruction defining consent as “positive

cooperation”; 3) Petitioner alleges he was denied the full opportunity to present his defense of a good

faith belief in consent based on prior consensual activities within the marriage; and 4) Petitioner

contends the terms for Counts Three and Four (false imprisonment and telephone line disabling)

should have been stayed pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 654.

On May 25, 2004, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes that

Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA in its opinion dated

September 6, 2002:

[Petitioner] married the victim pursuant to an arrangement by their parents. After their

marriage [Petitioner] did not permit his wife to be involved in the family finances. Sexual

relations were consensual “[m]ost of the time” at the beginning of their marriage. Their

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

marital relations changed, however, when the victim was four months pregnant with their

first child. [Petitioner] became verbally abusive and frequently forced the victim to have sex

despite her objections. She separated from [Petitioner] on a few occasions, moving back into

her parents’ home. When she moved back in with him, however, [Petitioner] continued his

violent behavior. He pushed, wrestled, threw, and strangled her in order to have sex, ignoring

her pleas to stop. [Petitioner] was most often violent when he had been drinking.

On the evening of July 3, 2000, [Petitioner] drank before he and the victim went to

bed. Once in bed, [Petitioner] removed his underwear and cuddled up to the victim. She told

[Petitioner] she did not want to have sex. [Petitioner] pinned the victim to the bed and

removed her sweat pants and underpants. The victim continued to object to [Petitioner’s]

actions. At times, [Petitioner] held a pillow over her face or covered her mouth with his hand.

[Petitioner] turned the victim onto her stomach, twisted her arm so that she could not move,

and inserted his penis into her anus. She told [Petitioner] that this was painful and told him to

stop, but he ignored her. The couple’s two-year-old daughter entered the room during this

intercourse. [Petitioner] continued and eventually ejaculated on the victim’s buttocks.

[Petitioner] left the room and returned shortly thereafter with a can of beer. The

victim held her child while [Petitioner] was gone. When [Petitioner] returned, he quickly

grabbed the victim’s ankles and began to have vaginal sexual intercourse with her. The

victim released the child, told [Petitioner] to stop because it hurt and because their daughter

was still in the room, sitting on the bed. [Petitioner] continued, heedless. The victim was left

with bruises on her arms and legs, scratches, and chafes. Photographs of these wounds were

admitted into evidence. The victim did not report the incident to the police because she was

scared.

On the evening of July 10, the victim put the children to bed and went to bed herself

at 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., wearing the same pair of sweat pants and T-shirt as on July 3.

[Petitioner] was already in bed. The victim told [Petitioner] before she got into bed that she

did not want to have sex because she was still bruised and sore from the July 3 incident.

When she got into bed, [Petitioner] began to cuddle up to the victim and she reiterated that

she did not want to have sex. He ignored the victim’s statements and tried to remove her

clothes. She tried to keep [Petitioner] from removing her clothes, and the two struggled on

the bed. [Petitioner] held the victim down by her biceps, then put his leg on her stomach and

removed her pants. He then tried to insert his penis in her vagina.

The victim was eventually able to push [Petitioner] off of her, then jumped out of bed

and turned on the light. [Petitioner] got out of bed and tried to push her back onto the bed.

The victim told [Petitioner] she wanted to call her parents or the police and leave the house.

[Petitioner] replied that she could leave the next morning and blocked the bedroom doorway

with his arms so that she could not leave the room. The victim shouted, hoping that the

neighbors would come and help her escape. Nobody came, so she eventually stopped yelling.

[Petitioner] moved from the doorway after approximately five minutes. The victim

ran into the kitchen and grabbed the telephone to call the police. [Petitioner] followed her and

pulled the telephone cord from the wall. He then took the car keys and returned to the

bedroom, lying in front of the other telephone, preventing the victim from reaching it. After

[Petitioner] again pursued the victim to the kitchen, she broke free, grabbed her clothes and

went to the neighbor’s house to call the police from their telephone. The neighbors, however,

did not answer the door. The victim returned to her house, got the children out of bed, and

called her parents. She suffered additional scratches and a ripped shirt from this incident. The

victim reported this incident to police soon after leaving the house.

[Petitioner] testified on his own behalf. He denied ever forcing his wife to have sex.

[Petitioner] claimed that he and the victim engaged in consensual anal sex on a regular basis.

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

The victim left [Petitioner] for a period in 1994, but she returned to the relationship. She

again left [Petitioner] in 1998, then returned in October 1999.

[Petitioner] did not recall anything unusual happening on July 3, 2000. On July 10,

the victim told him when they went to bed that she did not feel like having sex. He replied

that this was fine with him. [Petitioner] denied trying to have sex with the victim that

evening. The couple fought that evening, however, because the victim was unhappy that

[Petitioner] was unemployed. She said she was going to leave him, but he tried to calm her

down. The victim’s shirt ripped and her arm was scratched when she pulled away from

[Petitioner] while he was holding her shirt.

[Petitioner] admitted he took the car keys so the victim could not leave. He testified

that he offered to call her mother for her. The victim said, however, that she would make the

call herself. She then called the police. [Petitioner] denied ever having threatened or hit the

victim. 

In rebuttal, the victim’s mother testified that she saw [Petitioner] hit her daughter in

the mouth, causing her lip to bleed. This occurred after he had been drinking. The victim

testified that [Petitioner] once pointed a shotgun at her and threatened to shoot her. He also

kicked her once while she was pregnant. [Petitioner] admitted he owned a rifle but claimed

he never pointed it at her. He also testified that he never kicked the victim.

See pp. 3-5, Exhibit D, Answer.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Merced County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 5

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

These facts are quoted from the factual summary in the opinion of the 5th DCA. See pp. 5-7, Exhibit D, Answer.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 6

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by

inflaming the jury’s bias against Petitioner by arguing his actions were the result of his cultural and

religious background.

1. Factual Background2

During the case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the victim regarding

the history and nature of her relationship with [Petitioner]. She testified that the couple’s

families had arranged their marriage before they had met, and that she had not loved

[Petitioner] when they married. She also testified that [Petitioner] told her the family finances

were not her business.

The victim married [Petitioner] because of pressure from her family. After the

marriage, she did not have any friends other than [Petitioner’s] friends. During the

relationship, [Petitioner] physically forced the victim to have sex more often than occurred

with her consent. She told [Petitioner] when she did not want to have sex. The couple had

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 7

sexual intercourse usually at least once a day. He would comply with her desire not to have

sex approximately twice per week.

The victim left [Petitioner] for the first time in 1994 when he physically attacked her

in front of her brother. The victim’s brother grabbed her and her son and took them to their

parents’ home to protect her from [Petitioner]. The victim returned to [Petitioner] under

pressure from her mother. When she returned, [Petitioner] was more sexually aggressive and

forceful.

[Petitioner] testified in his native Punjabi language with the use of an interpreter. He

lived in India from his birth in 1967 until 1984. He did not move permanently to the United

States until 1989. The victim was in love with someone else at the time of her marriage to

[Petitioner]. 

During [Petitioner’s] cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:

[PROSECUTION]: Isn’t it true that the Indian culture is a very controlling culture?

[DEFENSE]: Objection. This is argumentative. It’s also lacking foundation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I don’t understand what you mean.

[PROSECUTION]: With respect to generally how men treat women in the Indian

culture, isn’t it true men control women?

[The Court upheld defense counsel’s objection on the grounds of insufficient foundation.]

[PROSECUTION]: You were an adult living in India, weren’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn’t there a cast[e] system where people of the Indian – in the Indian culture have

different rank?

A. Yes.

Q. – or different status?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn’t it true that men have a higher status than women?

A. I don’t know that. [¶]. . . 

Q. This was an arranged marriage?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn’t you think of her as an object?

[DEFENSE]: Objections. Argumentative.

THE COURT: As phrased. Sustained.

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 8

Later, the prosecutor argued to the jury,

. . . That is felony false imprisonment. Ladies and Gentlemen, you’re dealing with the

Indian culture here. There is a cast[e] system. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Defense objection to discussion

of facts not in evidence is overruled.] [¶] . . . Men have a higher status than women. This

Defendant views his wife as property. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .[Upon defense counsel’s objection to

facts not in evidence, the court asked the prosecutor to rephrase her last comment.] [¶] . . .

This Defendant’s actions in this case and on July 3rd and on July 10th showed you that he

viewed [his wife] as his property, his property that he can have sex with whenever he wants

and however he wants. [¶] Ladies and Gentlemen, that is not accepted in our society. You

send a message to him that it’s not accepted, you cannot accept it, and you will not accept it.

Hold him responsible. . . .

2. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial

misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair

trial.” Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667

(1985). Any claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be reviewed within the context of the entire

trial. Id. at 765-66; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994). The court

must keep in mind that “[t]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor” and “the aim of due

process is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair

trial to the accused.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). "Improper argument does not, per

se, violate a defendant's constitutional rights." Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir.

1996), quoting Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir.1993). If prosecutorial misconduct is

established, and it was constitutional error, the error must be evaluated pursuant to the harmless error

test set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1577 ("Only

if the argument were constitutional error would we have to decide whether the constitutional error

was harmless.").

3. Review of Claim by State Courts

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5th DCA. The 5th DCA denied the claim

on September 6, 2002, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit D, Answer. The claim was then presented

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 9

to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; however, the petition was summarily

denied on November 26, 2002. See Exhibit F, Answer. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent

order” denying review of the 5th DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented

for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the 5th DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991). 

In reviewing Petitioner’s claim, the 5th DCA first found the evidence of Petitioner’s religious

and cultural practice to be relevant as “to why the victim would have stayed in and returned to a

controlling and abusive relationship.” See p. 8, Exhibit D, Answer. The evidence was also relevant

to “explain why [the victim] was willing to marry a man chosen by her parents and to stay with him

despite the history of physical and sexual abuse. Without this context, the jury would likely have

doubted the credibility of her account.” Id. Although the 5th DCA found the admitted cultural

evidence to be constitutional, it determined the prosecutor’s remarks were arguably improper in

violation of Petitioner’s federal rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Specifically,

the 5th DCA found the prosecutor’s argument that “‘you’re dealing with the Indian culture here.

There is a cast[e] system’ and ‘Men have a higher status than women,’ threatened to inflame the jury

to improperly overgeneralize that Petitioner must have behaved according to the prosecutor’s view of

Indian or Sikh behavior, i.e., that the men control their wives.” Id. at 10. 

Nevertheless, the appellate court correctly applied the harmless error test and found the error 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the evidence itself was properly admitted,

and the only impropriety arose during the prosecutor’s closing remarks. The questionable remarks

were very brief, and after the remarks were made, the prosecutor returned to a proper line of analysis:

Petitioner’s “personal beliefs and actions.” Id. at 12. In addition, defense counsel objected to the

remarks and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to rephrase her argument, “implicitly instructing

the jury that [the prosecutor’s] previous approach was improper.” Id. Given these circumstances, and

in light of the great weight of evidence against Petitioner, the appellate court found the improper

argument to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, even without a remedial instruction by the trial

court. Id.

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 10

4. Analysis

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. As

fully discussed by the appellate court, the evidence itself was properly admitted. Petitioner’s cultural

and religious background were relevant to explain the couple’s relationship. The specific remarks by

the prosecutor during closing, however, were improper. Nevertheless, the 5th DCA’s determination

that the remarks were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was neither contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The prosecutor’s remarks

were very brief, and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to rephrase her argument. Thus, the jury

was implicitly informed that the prosecutor’s approach was improper. Thereafter, the prosecutor

corrected her line of argument by arguing to the jury that Petitioner viewed his wife as an object of

property. Petitioner’s cultural and religious background were relevant to Petitioner’s motivation in

committing the crimes. Furthermore, in light of the sheer weight of the evidence against Petitioner,

the improper argument by the prosecutor could not have had an impact on the outcome of the trial. 

Thus, the claim must be denied. 

B. Ground Two

The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 1.23.1, as follows:

In prosecutions for rape, attempted rape and sodomy, the word ‘consent’ means

positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free will. The person must act

freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.

Petitioner alleges the instruction which defined consent as “positive cooperation” violated his due

process rights by decreasing the prosecutor’s burden of proof of an element of the crime. Petitioner

argues that the instruction allowed him to be convicted based upon mere neutrality or ambiguity in 

participation in a sex act.

1. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that an allegation that a jury instruction is incorrect

under state law does not form a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) ("We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not

lie for errors of state law."). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a

petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 11

conviction violates due process. Id. at 72. Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

record. Id. The court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury

as a component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982),

citing Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Furthermore, even if it is determined that the

instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the

unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in

actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993) (whether

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.). See

Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1996). The burden of demonstrating that an

erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional

validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error

on direct appeal." Id. 

2. Review by State Courts

This claim was also first presented on direct appeal to the 5th DCA, which denied it on

September 6, 2002, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit D, Answer. The claim was then presented to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review, which was summarily denied on November

26, 2002. See Exhibit F, Answer. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying

review of the 5th DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same

reasons stated in the opinion of the 5th DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the 5th DCA found the instruction was correct under California

law. Citing to People v. Gonzalez, 33 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1443 (1995), the appellate court stated that

“jury instructions relating to forcible sex crimes clearly indicate that the prosecution has the burden

of proving the lack of consent.” See p. 13, Exhibit D, Answer. Furthermore, the jury was instructed

that “rape and forcible sodomy must be executed ‘by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or

fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.’” Id. Petitioner produced no evidence that the jury did

not follow these instructions, and juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. In addition,

Petitioner failed to demonstrate a factual basis from which a reasonable jury could have found the

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 12

victim consented to sexual activity.

3. Analysis

The Court finds this claim to be without merit. First, the instant claim is based on

interpretation of state law, and generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus

relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990);

Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law,

one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal

habeas”). 

Moreover, the appellate court properly rejected the claim, because Petitioner failed to

demonstrate that the jury did not follow its instructions in finding Petitioner guilty of rape and

forcible sodomy. Petitioner makes no showing that the jury, in finding Petitioner guilty of rape and

forcible sodomy, did not conclude that he accomplished the crimes by force, violence, duress,

menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.

Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court rejection of his claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States, or a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim must be rejected.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner next alleges he was denied an opportunity to fully present his defense of a good

faith belief in consent based on prior sexual intercourse. The jury was instructed as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant and his

wife engaged consensually in sexual intercourse on one or more occasions prior to the charge

against the defendant in his case. ¶ If you believe this evidence, you should consider it only

for the limited purpose of tending to show that the defendant’s wife consented to the act of

intercourse charged in this case, or the defendant had a good faith reasonable belief that the

defendant’s wife consented to the act of sexual intercourse. 

Petitioner argues that the jury understood the definition of “sexual intercourse” to include only

penile-vaginal intercourse, not penile-anal intercourse. He contends the instruction given was

constitutionally infirm because it created a negative implication that consensual anal intecourse

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 13

could not be considered as evidence that the charged sodomy was consensual.

1. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

As discussed supra, an allegation that a jury instruction is incorrect under state law does not

form a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 ("We have stated many times

that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law."). To obtain federal collateral

relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at 72. Additionally, the

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The court must evaluate jury instructions in the

context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. See United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982), citing Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

Furthermore, even if it is determined that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due

process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial

influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637

(whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.). The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will

support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater

than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Id. 

2. Review by State Courts

This claim was also first presented on direct appeal to the 5th DCA, which denied it on

September 6, 2002, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit D, Answer. The claim was then presented to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; it was summarily denied on November 26,

2002. See Exhibit F, Answer. The California Supreme Court is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the 5th DCA. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the appellate court first noted that it was defense counsel who

requested the challenged instruction, and Petitioner could not now claim error after counsel had

made this tactical decision at trial. People v. Macias, 16 Cal.4th 739, 746 n.3 (1997). See p. 14,

Exhibit D, Answer. In addition, the appellate court stated that Petitioner had waived his right to

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 14

challenge the instruction because he failed to request an instruction during trial to pinpoint or clarify

the issue to be considered by the jury. Id. 

The appellate court also found Petitioner’s claim to be without any merit. The court noted

that the ordinary definition of the term “sexual intercourse” as defined in Webster’s Dictionary is not

limited to penetration of a vagina by a penis. Id. “It also includes ‘genital contact between

individuals other than penetration of the vagina by a penis.’” Id., quoting Webster’s 3d New Internat.

Dict. at 2082 (1986). Therefore, the terminology used in the instruction did not exclude Petitioner’s

defense.

Lastly, the appellate court concluded that the omission of a pinpoint instruction was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt, because the jurors could not have considered consent to be an issue in

this case. The court noted that the jury was presented with “two diametrically opposing renditions of

events: one in which violent rape took place, and another in which no unusual sexual relations

occurred.” See p. 15, Exhibit D, Answer. Because Petitioner was found guilty of rape and attempted

rape, the jury could not have concluded that the victim consented to sexual relations on the relevant

dates. Therefore, Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the omission of a clarification

instruction on whether “sexual intercourse” included anal intercourse. 

3. Analysis

The state court rejection of this claim is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. As fully

discussed by the appellate court, Petitioner’s claim is without any factual or legal support. The

ordinary definition of “sexual intercourse” includes anal intercourse, and in any event, the omission

of a clarifying instruction could not have prejudiced Petitioner because the jury clearly rejected

Petitioner’s position that the victim had consented to any sexual intercourse on the relevant dates. 

The claim must be denied.

D. Ground Four

In his last claim for relief, Petitioner alleges he was improperly sentenced pursuant to Cal.

Penal Code § 654 to six-month terms for each of the convictions for false imprisonment and

disabling a telephone line.

As correctly argued by Respondent, the claim fails to state a cognizable federal claim. 

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 15

“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (1991), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Gilmore

v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”).

Here, Petitioner challenges the state court’s interpretation and application of state law. Therefore, the

instant claim is not cognizable in federal habeas. See Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir.

1989) (holding a petitioner’s argument that California court could not impose two sentences for a

single act under Cal. Penal Code § 654 is not cognizable in a federal habeas action). 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED with prejudice; and 

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06900-NEW Document 14 Filed 06/12/06 Page 15 of 15