Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00294/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dianna Lynn Demaree,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Sanders, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-17-00294-TUC-EJM

ORDER 

Petitioner Dianna Lynn Demaree filed an amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (“PWHC”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 5, 2017.1, 2(Doc. 5). Petitioner 

raises one grounds for relief alleging that her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were 

violated by the state courts because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 

the federal preemption doctrine and the supremacy clause. (Doc. 5 at 6). 

Respondents filed an Answer contending that the PWHC is untimely and that 

equitable tolling is not warranted to excuse the untimely petition. (Doc. 16). Respondents 

further assert that Petitioner’s claim has no merit. 

 

1 Petitioner’s original PWHC was filed on May 4, 2017 and also listed her brother and codefendant, Brian Demaree, as a petitioner. (Doc. 2). The PWHC was refiled as an amended 

petition on May 5, 2017 to include the civil cover sheet. (Doc. 5). On June 26, 2017, the 

Court ordered this action severed to avoid logistical problems because Dianna Demaree 

and Brian Demaree had not followed the same course of action with regard to postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 1). The Clerk of Court opened this case number for Dianna 

Demaree. Brian Demaree’s case number is CV-17-00294-TUC-EJM. The Court shall issue 

a separate order addressing Brian Demaree’s petition. 

2 Petitioner previously filed a habeas petition in this Court on March 12, 2014 in case 

number CV-14-1961-CKJ-LAB. That action was dismissed without prejudice so that 

Petitioner could exhaust her claims in state court. 

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Petitioner did not file a Reply. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s PWHC is untimely and that Petitioner has not 

shown that she is entitled to equitable tolling to excuse her untimely filing. Accordingly, 

the petition will be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plea and Sentencing

On February 6, 2014, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of criminal impersonation 

in Pima County Superior Court. (Doc. 16 Exs. H & I).

On March 24, 2014 the court sentenced Petitioner to 3 years probation, and as a 

condition of probation, ordered that Petitioner spend 30 days in jail. (Doc. 16 Exs. K & 

SS).

The presentence report summarized the facts of the case (Doc. 16 Ex. J) as noted in 

Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 16 at 3). All parties are familiar with the facts and for brevity’s 

sake the Court will not repeat them here.

B. Motion to Dismiss and Petition for Special Action

Prior to pleading guilty, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction on January 8, 2013. (Doc. 16 Ex. D). The trial court denied 

the motion and found that the Arizona statutes involved in Petitioner’s case were not 

preempted or otherwise in conflict with the federal statutes. (Doc. 16 Ex. F).

Petitioner then filed a special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals on January 7, 

2014, again arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction. (Doc. 16 Ex. N). The COA 

declined to accept jurisdiction of the special action and subsequently denied Petitioner’s 

motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 16 Exs. R & T). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court on March 4, 

2014 (Doc. 16 Ex. V), which denied review on July 7, 2014. (Doc. 16 Ex. Y). 

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C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief3, 4

On June 16, 2014, Petitioner initiated proceedings in Pima County Superior Court 

for Rule 32 post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 16 Ex. AA). On February 2, 2015, 

Petitioner filed her of-right PCR petition, arguing that the court should vacate her 

conviction and sentence because it had no subject matter jurisdiction over her indictment. 

(Doc. 16 Ex. DD). 

The trial court denied PCR on April 9, 2015 and stated that although Petitioner 

raised the same arguments that she had presented in her motion to dismiss, the trial court 

would reconsider them in the PCR petition. (Doc. 16 Ex. GG). The court concluded that 

there was no express preemption provision in the federal statute and that Petitioner had 

failed to establish that preemption was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Id. at 

136. The court found that a prosecution under state law would not frustrate or otherwise 

impede any federal statutory scheme and therefore denied the petition. Id. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on May 7, 2015 

realleging the same argument regarding subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 16 Ex. HH). On 

July 29, 2015 the COA issued its decision granting review but denying relief. (Doc. 16 Ex. 

KK). The COA first stated that it was not clear whether Petitioner’s conduct would be 

subject to prosecution under the federal statute that she cited. Id. at 188. The court 

concluded that even if Petitioner’s conduct could be prosecuted pursuant to a federal 

 

3 Because Petitioner pled guilty to her charge, she could not file a direct appeal and could 

only challenge her conviction and sentence through a Rule 32 petition. See A.R.S. § 13-

4033(B) (“In noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence 

that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to a probation violation.”); 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“Any person who pled guilty or no contest, admitted a probation 

violation, or whose probation was automatically violated based upon a plea of guilty or no 

contest shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding 

shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding.”); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an “‘of right proceeding,’ available under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of ‘direct review’ 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).”). 

4 The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended effective January 20, 2020. New 

Rule 32 applies to defendants convicted after a trial, and new Rule 33 applies to pleading 

defendants. Because Petitioner’s state court actions were filed prior to January 20, 2020 

and she had no state court action pending at the time the new rules went into effect, former 

Rule 32 applies to Petitioner’s case. See Arizona Supreme Court Order R-19-0012, 

available at https://www.azcourts.gov/rules/Recent-Amendments/Rules-of-CriminalProcedure 

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statute, federal law did not preempt her prosecution under state law. Id. at 189–190. The

court found that Petitioner had not met her burden to show that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law or otherwise abused its discretion and therefore denied relief. Id. at 190–191.

Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

D. Habeas Petition

Petitioner filed her PWHC in this Court on May 5, 2017. (Doc. 5). Respondents 

contend that the PWHC is untimely and that Petitioner has not shown that she is entitled to 

equitable tolling or that she is actually innocent such that her petition should be considered 

timely. (Doc. 16). Respondents further contend that Petitioner’s claim is without merit. For 

the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds that the PWHC is untimely and thus not 

properly before this Court for review.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Timeliness 

As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s PWHC is barred 

by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The

writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The AEDPA 

mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides 

that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

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retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). The one-year 

limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The other subsections being inapplicable here, Petitioner must have filed her habeas 

petition within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1929 (2013). By 

pleading guilty, Petitioner waived her right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. However, 

she retained her right to seek review in an “of-right” PCR proceeding pursuant to Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 32, 32.1, and 32.4. Thus, her conviction became final upon 

“the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding.”

Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. 

Petitioner was sentenced on March 24, 2014 and had 90 days from that date to file 

a notice of PCR. See Summers, 481 F.3d at 715 (“To bring an of-right proceeding under 

Rule 32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition 

for Post-Conviction Review.”) (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)). The notice for PCR was

timely filed on June 16, 2014. 

The trial court denied Petitioner’s of-right petition for PCR on April 9, 2015. 

Petitioner had 30 days to file a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and 

timely did so on May 2, 2015. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (requiring a petition for review 

that challenges the final decision in a PCR proceeding be filed with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals within 30 days). The COA denied relief on July 29, 2015. Petitioner then had 30

days to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(g) (petitions for review of decisions by the COA in Rule 32 actions are governed by 

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Rule 31.21, which provides that the petition for review must be filed no later than 30 days 

after the COA issues its decision). Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Therefore, Petitioner’s judgment became final within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) on August 28, 2015, 30 days after the COA issued its decision, 

when the time for seeking review in the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012) (holding that where a state prisoner does not seek review in 

a state’s highest court, the judgment becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on 

the date that the time for seeking such review expires). AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

began to run the next day, August 29, 2015, and continued to run, uninterrupted, until it 

expired one year later on August 29, 2016. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245–

47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Accordingly, Petitioner’s May 4, 2017 PWHC is 

untimely, unless the statute of limitations was tolled. As discussed below, it was not. 

B. Equitable Tolling

In certain limited circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline may be 

equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A petitioner is entitled 

to equitable tolling if he can demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent him 

from timely filing a petition. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). 

An extraordinary circumstance is one that is “beyond a prisoner’s control [that] make[s] it 

impossible to file a petition on time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citations omitted). And, to justify equitable tolling, the extra ordinary circumstance must 

be attributable to “external forces [] rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence[.]” Id. 

Further, a petitioner must establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary 

circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney 

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 

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1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Petitioner has wholly failed to meet her burden. Petitioner did not address 

timeliness under AEDPA in her petition, and did not file a reply. This Court’s review of 

the record does not reveal the existence of any extraordinary circumstances such that 

equitable tolling would be warranted. And, in any event, Petitioner’s pro se status, 

indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during 

the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Ford 

v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A petitioner’s misunderstanding of accurate 

information cannot merit relief, as equitable tolling requires a petitioner to show that some 

extraordinary circumstance[ ] beyond [his] control caused his late petition, and this 

standard has never been satisfied by a petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law alone.” 

(internal quotations and citation omitted)); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 

1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To apply the doctrine in extraordinary circumstances necessarily 

suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary circumstances stood 

in his way suggests that an external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than . . .

merely oversight, miscalculation or negligence on the petitioner’s part . . . .” (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling 

and the PWHC is untimely.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s PWHC is barred by 

the statute of limitations. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 5) is denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a Certificate of Appealability and leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a 

plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

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Dated this 30th day of April, 2020.

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