Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00892/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00892-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAMS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-892-WKW

 ) [WO]

JANARIUS JACKSON, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Janarius Jackson’s motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff James Williams’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

claim. (Doc. # 38.) The motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 41, 42.) Upon 

consideration of the parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the relevant law, the 

court finds that Mr. Jackson’s motion is due to be granted in part and denied in 

part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343. 

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a 

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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. JeanBaptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Or, the movant can assert,

without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant 

meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish – with 

evidence beyond the pleadings – that a genuine dispute material to each of its 

claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine dispute of material 

fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact 

finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Mr. Williams is a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) inmate at Ventress 

Correctional Facility. Mr. Jackson works as a correctional officer at Ventress. On 

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July 16, 2012, Mr. Williams sustained a non-life threatening injury during an 

altercation with another inmate, DeAndre Bell. Mr. Williams claims the injury 

could have been much more serious because Mr. Bell had a weapon. Mr. Williams

asserts that Mr. Jackson watched the fight with adequate time to intervene and 

defuse the situation. The following facts are taken from the complaint and the 

record evidence which includes the parties’ sworn testimony and the DOC’s

incident reports and investigation.

Mr. Williams alleges that Mr. Jackson is the officer who permitted him to 

leave his dorm, C-1, to enter Mr. Bell’s dorm, C-4. (Compl. at ¶ 4.)1 Mr. Jackson 

denies any responsibility for allowing Mr. Williams out of his dorm. (See Jackson 

Aff. at 2 (Doc. # 38-1).)2 DOC’s investigation into the incident revealed that Mr. 

Williams wanted to confront Mr. Bell about a missing package that allegedly 

contained a cell phone and “dope.” (See Duty Officer Report (Doc. # 38-2 at 4); 

ODC Investigative Report (Doc. # 38-3, at 2) (“Inmate Williams stated that he 

went to talk to [Mr. Bell] about some stolen property of a fellow inmate.”).) While 

the complaint alleges that Mr. Bell accosted Mr. Williams without provocation, 

 

1

(But see Williams Aff. at ¶2 (Doc. # 44) (claiming that Mr. Bell “was permitted to come 

over to [Mr. Williams’s] area”).) Regardless of whether Mr. Williams came to Mr. Bell or Mr. 

Bell came to Mr. Williams, the primary disputed fact in the case is whether Mr. Jackson watched 

an altercation involving a weapon without intervening.

2

It is apparently not very difficult to move from C1 to C4. See Bell Statement (Doc. 

# 38-3, at 5) (describing the various sections of C dorm as being separated by a cube in the center 

of the dorm).)

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(Compl. at ¶ 5), Mr. Bell reported that Mr. Williams, who is considerably larger 

than Mr. Bell, approached him demanding the return of property, (Bell Statement 

(Doc. # 38-3, at 4–5)). Mr. Williams acknowledged approaching Mr. Bell and 

asking about a missing phone when he spoke to a DOC investigator. (Williams 

Statement (Doc. # 38-3, at 10).)

When approached by Mr. Williams, Mr. Bell drew a weapon similar to what 

has been variously described as a hand-made knife, ice pick, or screwdriver, and 

swung it at Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams tried to force the weapon out of Mr. Bell’s 

hand. During the fracas, Mr. Bell cut Mr. Williams’s nose. He also “stabbed” Mr. 

Williams’s upper body with the weapon “approximately 11 or 12 times”, (Compl. 

at ¶ 5), but those wounds did not require stitches. Mr. Williams overturned 

benches and a table in an effort to trip Mr. Bell, and the two men eventually wound 

up in front of the dorm’s bathroom, squared off in a fighting stance. When 

speaking with DOC officials investigating the incident, both Mr. Bell and Mr. 

Williams reported that the altercation ended at the moment that they observed a 

corrections officer. (See Bell Statement (Doc. # 38-3, at 6) (“[T]hen the police 

came, ended up coming to the door and you know I stopped cause he stopped 

coming at me.”); Williams Statement (Doc. # 38-3, at 11–12) (“[I was] just trying 

to make him just come on with it, then at that point that’s when the police was 

watching.”).) Mr. Bell walked away from the scene, and his weapon was never

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recovered. Mr. Williams approached Mr. Jackson and reported that he had been 

stabbed and needed medical attention.

Mr. Jackson emphasizes that he has testified consistently with Mr. Bell’s and 

Mr. Williams’s statements to the DOC Investigator that he first observed

something amiss when he saw overturned benches in the C4 dorm while 

conducting a roving patrol. He did not observe the altercation. Rather, he saw the 

two men as they stood in front of the bathroom in the fighting stance. (Jackson 

Aff. (Doc. # 38-1, at 1).) Mr. Williams insists, however, that “while [he] was 

being stabbed repeatedly, [he] could see Officer Jackson just standing outside the 

room looking through the glass window and watching [Mr.] Bell hurt him.” 

(Williams Aff. at ¶ 3 (Doc. # 44).) According to Mr. Williams, Mr. Jackson could 

have intervened before he was injured.

Once the fight stopped and Mr. Williams reported his injury to Mr. Jackson, 

Mr. Jackson took him to the health care unit where other personnel determined that 

Mr. Jackson required treatment at a hospital. Mr. Williams was transported to 

Troy Medical Center where he received stitches for a one-and-a-half inch cut to his 

nose. Mr. Williams alleges in his complaint that Mr. Bell “almost kill[ed]” him, 

and he “struggled to stay alive.” (Compl. at ¶ 5.) Viewing the record evidence in 

the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, he could have been more seriously 

injured or killed, but his actual injuries were not life-threatening.

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Mr. Williams declined to press charges against Mr. Bell and the two 

reportedly signed a “living agreement.”

3

 There is no evidence that Mr. Williams 

still considers Mr. Bell to be a threat to his safety.

B. Procedural History

In October 2012, Mr. Williams filed his complaint naming Mr. Jackson and 

Warden J. C. Giles as defendants. Mr. Jackson was not properly served with 

process. Warden Giles moved for dismissal of the claims against him. The court 

granted the motion, finding that Warden Giles was immune from suit in his official 

capacity and that Mr. Williams failed to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim against Warden Giles in his individual capacity. (See 

Doc. # 31.) Mr. Williams declined to amend his complaint with respect to Warden 

Giles. He then obtained leave from the court to serve Mr. Jackson with his 

complaint, even though service was untimely under Rule 4(m). (See Doc. # 34 

(describing circumstances justifying the grant of an extension of time to serve Mr. 

Jackson).) After receiving service, Mr. Jackson responded to the complaint by 

filing the instant motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 38.) Mr. Williams 

responded and alluded to evidence supporting his position. (Doc. # 41.) However, 

 

3

The term “living agreement” has not been defined, but it is presumably a statement 

signed by two or more inmates who have a history of conflict with one another in which they 

relieve the DOC of liabilities or damages and represent that they can live together in the prison 

population without violence. See Martin v. Forniss, 2:07-CV-335-MEF, 2009 WL 1664074, at 

*3 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2009) (recommendation of the magistrate judge). The alternative to not 

signing a living agreement could mean segregation from the prison population. See id.

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no evidence was submitted. The court granted Mr. Williams additional time to 

supplement the record. (See Doc. # 43.) Mr. Williams responded by submitting 

his affidavit. (Doc. # 44.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Official Capacity Claims

Mr. Jackson asserts that any claim against him in his official capacity is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. # 38, at 5.) Mr. Williams concedes this 

point, (Doc. # 41, at ¶ 1), and therefore, Mr. Williams’s deliberate indifference 

claim against Mr. Jackson in his official capacity is due to be dismissed.

B. Individual Capacity Claims

As for the individual capacity deliberate indifference claim, Mr. Jackson 

argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because of (1) qualified immunity 

doctrine, and (2) Mr. Williams’s failure to meet his evidentiary burden at summary 

judgment.

1. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of “[q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for 

government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct 

violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 

1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity 

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exists to allow officials to carry out their duties without worrying about personal 

liability or subjection to lawsuits. Id. To be entitled to qualified immunity, an 

official must first establish that “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary 

authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, there is no dispute that Mr. Jackson was exercising his 

discretionary authority while roving the C dorm. Thus, to defeat the qualified 

immunity defense, the onus is on Mr. Williams to show that Mr. Jackson violated 

his clearly established constitutional right. See id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223 (2009).

Mr. Williams’s right to be free from prison officials’ deliberate indifference 

to his safety was clearly established. “Prison officials have an obligation to protect 

prisoners from violence inflicted upon them by other prisoners,” but “every injury 

suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another [does not] translate[] into 

constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” 

Harrison v. Culliver, ___ F.3d ____, ____, 2014 WL 1304010, at *5 (11th Cir. 

2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “Prison officials 

must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. 

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). The Eighth 

Amendment is violated only when an officer is deliberately indifferent to “a 

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known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Id. (quoting Marsh v. Butler 

Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc)).

Therefore, to succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate-plaintiff 

must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners.” Id.

(quoting Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028–29). Then he must show that the prison officialdefendant was subjectively aware of the risk and deliberately indifferent to it. Id.; 

Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). And finally, he 

must show causation. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582.

Addressing the theory that Mr. Jackson was deliberately indifferent when he 

allowed Mr. Williams to visit Mr. Bell’s area of the C dorm, Mr. Jackson argues 

that Mr. Williams was under no threat until he entered the C4 dorm and 

approached Mr. Bell. Indeed, there is no allegation or evidence that Mr. Bell 

previously had threatened or hurt Mr. Williams.

4

 With respect to the theory that 

Mr. Jackson was deliberately indifferent when he failed to intervene in the ruckus, 

Mr. Jackson contends that even if the allegation that he watched Mr. Bell attack 

Mr. Williams is adequate to support a deliberate indifference claim, the claim “is 

directly at odds with the evidence,” including Mr. Jackson’s affidavit and the 

inmates’ statements to DOC investigators. (Doc. # 38, at 9 (citing Exs. A & C).) 

 

4 Assuming that Mr. Williams’s affidavit version of events is accurate, i.e., assuming that 

Mr. Bell “was permitted to come over to [Mr. Williams’s] area,” (Doc. # 44, at 1), the result is 

the same. These inmates had no history that could put Mr. Jackson on notice of a substantial risk 

to Mr. Williams’s safety.

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Therefore, Mr. Jackson asserts, that qualified immunity is appropriate because Mr. 

Williams cannot prove that he suffered a deprivation of his clearly established

Eighth Amendment rights.

In response, Mr. Williams argues that his sworn testimony conflicts with Mr. 

Jackson’s and creates a genuine dispute of material fact which precludes summary 

judgment on qualified immunity grounds. In his affidavit, Mr. Williams addresses 

the evidentiary import of his seemingly contradictory, prior statements to DOC 

investigators. There, he says, “I admit that I did meet with a state investigator [to] 

talk about this incident. When Officer Jackson came to the door of the room we 

were in, [Mr.] Bell did stop stabbing me. However, before that, and while I was 

being stabbed repeatedly, I could see Officer Jackson just standing outside the 

room looking through a glass window and watching [Mr.] Bell hurt me.” (Doc. # 

44.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, Mr. 

Williams’s reported statement to an investigator regarding Mr. Jackson’s conduct

is not necessarily a contradiction of Mr. Williams’s later affidavit testimony.5 Mr. 

Williams’s and Mr. Bell’s indications that the “police” were watching at a point 

after the Mr. Williams had been stabbed, which prompted Mr. Bell to walk away, 

 

5

The location of the fracas in Mr. Williams’s area of C dorm, per Mr. Williams’s 

affidavit, is clearly inconsistent with the balance of the evidence. Nevertheless, this and other 

inconsistencies, sure to be explored at trial, are not material disputes here.

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does not foreclose the possibility that Mr. Williams observed Mr. Jackson 

watching Mr. Bell attack him earlier. Further, the apparent purpose of the DOC 

investigation was not to learn about whether Mr. Jackson was deliberately 

indifferent or derelict in his duties, but to obtain information about Mr. Bell’s 

criminal conduct against Mr. Williams. (See Doc. # 38-3, at 12 (where investigator 

discusses her intent to present the case to a grand jury in spite of Mr. Williams’s 

decision not to press charges against Mr. Bell).) For these reasons, the motion for 

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is due to be denied.6

2. Failure to Meet Evidentiary Burden at Summary Judgment

Alternatively, Mr. Jackson argues that “[Mr.] Williams will not be able to 

present admissible evidence to prove his claim that [Mr.] Jackson witnessed the 

altercation [and] failed to intervene.” (Doc. # 38, at 10.) But, as discussed, Mr. 

Williams has presented his own sworn testimony as admissible evidence, thereby 

meeting his evidentiary obligation under Rule 56.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. # 38) is granted with respect to Mr. Williams’s

 

6 Mr. Williams also argues that his statements to DOC investigators are inadmissible 

because they are unsworn and the transcript of his conversation was not produced by a certified 

court reporter or otherwise authenticated. (See Doc. # 41, at 3–4.) Consideration of the merits of 

that argument is unnecessary in view of the finding that Mr. Williams’s affidavit testimony 

regarding the conduct of Mr. Jackson does not necessarily contradict his prior statements.

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official capacity claim against Mr. Jackson, but denied with respect to the 

individual capacity claim.

DONE this 12th day of May, 2014.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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