Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02565/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02565-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner’s supplemental brief raised a number of contentions outside the scope of the Court’s

order directing further briefing. The Court does not consider those arguments, which largely repeat

petitioner’s earlier briefing on the merits of petitioner’s claim.

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDALL BYRD FERGUSON,

Petitioner

 v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER Governor of

California,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2565 SI

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

REMAINING CLAIM IN PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

By order filed August 9, 2006, the Court denied in part petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The Court also directed further briefing on petitioner’s remaining claim that the trial court

violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it denied his request for a

continuance to substitute counsel on the day of his sentencing. The Court has reviewed the parties’

supplemental papers, and for the reasons set forth below, DENIES the remainder of the petition.1

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the events at petitioner’s sentencing as follows:

Initially defendant asked for a continuance in order to receive “a second opinion over the

whole entire situation prior to being sentenced so that certain issues that I have can be

resolved.” When the trial court asked, “an opinion as to what,” defendant responded,

“[a]s to the whole overall process of the trial that took place.” The court then explained

that it did not “think that it’s feasible to approach it from that point of view,” that

defendant could appeal and that the appellate process was the proper vehicle in which

to address his concerns regarding what took place during the trial.

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Defendant next said he wanted a different attorney, Mr. Hatcher to represent him at

sentencing. Defendant said he was trying to hire Mr. Hatcher, but that “he’s been in the

hospital.” Defendant added that he assumed that if Mr. Hatcher “would recover from

his hospital visit that he was more than willing to represent me through the sentencing.”

The trial court denied the motion to continue, reasoning that “that may be the case but

Mr. Hatcher has some serious medical problems that [sic] we don’t know when he would

be available. So without his presence here . . . I’m not willing to continue the matter on

the theory that at some point he might be available to represent you.”

Trial counsel then indicated to the court that defendant did not want his representation

at sentencing and preferred to represent himself. Asked if he intended to represent

himself, defendant told the court, “I don’t feel that my attorney is competent and

aggressive enough in dealing with this situation. . . . If you refuse to let me postpone

sentencing then he’s got to go because I’m not going to have a counsel which I feel is not

competent enough to deal with this situation.”

After announcing its intention “to proceed with sentencing today,” the court gave

defendant the right to either represent himself or have his current attorney represent him

“as you choose.” [In a] discussion off the record, the court noted that defendant

“indicated he will continue to proceed” with his current attorney and that, “given that,

[the court is] unwilling to delay the matter for appearance of Mr. Hatcher as other

counsel.”

Answer, Ex. D at 14-15; see also Ex. B-2, RT at 1252-54 (transcript of sentencing hearing).

The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when

it denied petitioner’s requests for a continuance in order to obtain substitute counsel. The court held:

Here, defendant did not make a showing of good cause for the continuance when he

sought “a second opinion” regarding the “whole overall process of the trial that took

place.” The trial court properly explained to defendant that th[at] type of review is

properly address[ed] by the appellate process after judgment is imposed.

Defendant’s second request for an indefinite continuance in order to hire Mr. Hatcher to

represent him at sentencing in the indefinite future once Mr. Hatcher would be released

from the hospital was untimely because it was made at the sentencing hearing.

Moreover, defendant had not retained Mr. Hatcher, and the requested continuance was

likely to disrupt the orderly process of justice since the intended substitute counsel was

seriously ill and had not indicated when he would be prepared to proceed with

sentencing. Given the uncertainty of Mr. Hatcher’s availability or intent to represent

defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to

continue the sentencing proceedings.

Answer, Ex. D at 15.

DISCUSSION

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th

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Cir. 2000) (en banc). As an initial matter, the Court notes that petitioner relies on the three-part test for

reviewing such claims articulated in Bland v. California Department of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Schell overruled Bland to the extent that

the Bland inquiry did not require a constitutional violation:

In Bland, we said that the test is whether a state court’s denial of such a motion was for

“an abuse of discretion.” Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475. In Bland, we described our

considerations in reviewing the discretion exercised in the denial of the motion as “(1)

timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s

complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so

great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.”

Id. This protocol, of course, is the correct methodology for reviewing federal cases on

direct appeal, see United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990), but our

focus is different on direct review than in the context of a § 2254 proceeding. As the

controlling statutes and the Supreme Court have pointed out on recent occasions, our

only concern when reviewing the constitutionality of a state-court conviction is whether

the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“The [habeas] court does not review a

judgment, but the lawfulness of the petitioner’s custody simpliciter.”) (emphasis in

original). A particular abuse of discretion by a state court may amount also to a violation

of the Constitution, but not every state court abuse of discretion has the same effect.

Accordingly, to the extent that they conflict with this opinion, we overrule Bland and

Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1024-25. Thus, while the Court will consider the Bland factors in evaluating

petitioner’s claim, the ultimate inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in such a way as

to result in a violation of the Constitution. Id. at 1025. 

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying petitioner’s requests for

a continuance. Petitioner asserts that when he stated he wanted a continuance in order to “receive a

second opinion over the whole entire situation prior to being sentenced so that certain issues that I have

can be resolved and the second opinion of another attorney,” he was alluding to a new trial motion.

Answer, Ex. B-2, RT at 1253. Petitioner contends that the trial court “deliberately misled” him by

telling him that the appellate process was the “only vehicle” in which to address his concerns regarding

what took place during trial. Petitioner also contends that the trial court abused its discretion because

the court failed to make an inquiry into the reasons why petitioner wanted to retain new counsel. 

The Court concludes that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its

discretion. In applying the Bland factors, the Court first notes that petitioner’s requests were made on

the day of sentencing. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of the trial court’s decision not

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 The Court further finds that the transcript does not support petitioner’s assertion that the trial

court “deliberately misled” him; to the contrary, the transcript shows that the trial judge adequately

inquired into the reason petitioner wanted a continuance, and properly explained to him that the appellate

process was the avenue by which he could have another lawyer examine “the entire process of this case

from the beginning to end.” 

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to grant petitioner’s request for new counsel. See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 638 (9th Cir.

2005) (on direct appeal, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that untimeliness of request for new

counsel made on day of sentencing “weigh[s] heavily” in favor of lower court’s decision); see also

United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2002) (defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel is qualified by the need for “fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice.”).

As to the second Bland factor, the Court finds that the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry

as to the reason why petitioner wanted to retain new counsel. When petitioner’s lawyer informed the

trial court that petitioner wanted a continuance, the trial court asked, “Mr. Ferguson, anything you want

to add?” Answer, Ex. B-2, RT at 1252-53. After petitioner expressed his generalized desire to obtain

a “second opinion over the whole entire situation,” the trial court asked, “Well, an opinion as to what?”

Id. at 1253. Petitioner again responded generally, stating “As to the whole overall process of the trial

that took place.” Id. The trial court then explained that it was not procedurally feasible to obtain a

second opinion on the entire trial prior to sentencing, and that petitioner could file an appeal.2 

The third Bland factor – whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney “was so

great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense” – also supports

the trial court’s decision. Petitioner’s request to substitute counsel was first made on the day of

sentencing; the record does not reflect any prior requests, nor is there any other indication of conflict

between petitioner and his counsel prior to that day. After petitioner generally stated that he wanted a

“second opinion” on the trial, he also stated that he felt his lawyer was not “competent and aggressive

enough in dealing with this situation.” Id. at 1254. Petitioner did not elaborate on this statement. The

Court finds that while the better course may have been to inquire further regarding what petitioner

meant, the record does not show that the conflict between petitioner and his counsel was so significant

that it impaired the sentencing proceeding. Cf. United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 777-78

(9th Cir. 2001) (defendant repeatedly requested substitute counsel prior to trial; informed trial court that

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counsel had used profanity, ignored him, and threatened to “sink him”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the balance of petitioner’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Docket No. 1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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