Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01403/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 01cv1403

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEL M. MARIN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 01CV1403WQH

ORDER 

vs.

STEPHEN SHAW,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the motion for summary judgment (#170) or, in the

alternative, for summary adjudication of claims by the remaining Defendant Stephen Shaw.

BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2001, Plaintiff Mel M. Marin filed a Complaint for Malpractice and Breach

of Fiduciary Duty naming a single Defendant Stephen Shaw. Plaintiff alleged that he met with

Shaw for the purpose of retaining Defendant Shaw to represent him in an ongoing action in

state court, and that Plaintiff confided information during the meeting to Defendant Shaw not

generally known in the legal field or in the community at large. The Complaint alleged that

Defendant Shaw declined to represent Plaintiff in any action because of an inability to pay and

took the information held in confidence and used that information against Plaintiff in an

unrelated state court action to engineer the dismissal of that action against Plaintiff. Complaint

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 01cv1403

at pages 2 and 3. 

On February 14, 2003, Defendant Stephen Shaw represented by Samy Henein of

Suppa, Trucchi & Henein, LLP filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint denying each and

every allegation of the Complaint and setting forth a number of affirmative defenses.

On October 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint naming three

Defendants as follows: 1) Stephen Shaw; 2) Suppa, Trucchi & Henein, LLP, a California

Partnership; and 3) the United States Army.

On October 4, 2004, the Court granted a motion by the Defendant United States Army

to dismiss for improper service and dismissed the United States Army from the action without

prejudice. 

On February 8, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint naming four

Defendants as follows: 1) Stephen Shaw; 2) Suppa, Trucchi & Henein, LLP, a California

Partnership; 3) the Department of Defense; and 4) the Secretary of the Department of Defense.

On March 9, 2006, this Court granted a motion by the Department of Defense and the

Secretary of the Department of Defense and dismissed all claims in the Second Amended

Complaint against the Department of Defense and the Secretary of the Department of Defense.

On March 30, 2006, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this action should

not be dismissed for failure to file provide proof of service of the amended complaints upon

Defendant Shaw and failure to serve any complaint upon Defendant Suppa, Trucchi & Henein.

On May 15, 2006, this Court held a hearing on the Order to Show Cause. Plaintiff

appeared and informed the Court that he had mailed the amended complaints to counsel for

Defendant Shaw. Plaintiff asserted that the United States Marshal had failed to complete

service upon Suppa, Trucchi & Heinen or, in the alternative, that Defendant Suppa, Trucchi

& Henein had waived service of the Complaint. 

On June 7, 2006, this Court entered an order dismissing Defendant Suppa, Trucchi &

Henein, LLP, a California Partnership, without prejudice and referred the case to the

Magistrate Judge for a case management conference in an effort to move forward with the

claims against the only remaining Defendant Shaw.

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 01cv1403

On July 5, 2006, the Magistrate Judge held a case management conference.

On July 11, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an order which required that “All

discovery, including expert discovery, shall be completed on or before September 25,

2006”and that “[a]ll motions, other than motions to amend or join parties, or motions in limine,

shall be FILED on or before October 10, 2006.” 

On October 10, 2006, Defendant filed the motion now before this Court for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of claims. 

On November 2, 2006, the Magistrate Judge held a telephonic status conference upon

Plaintiff’s request at which Plaintiff stated that he had a number of discovery issues and was

considering bringing a motion to compel. The Magistrate Judge ordered that “Plaintiff may

submit his motion directly to chambers. If the motion is brought, Defendant shall submit his

opposition, also directly to the chambers, within five days of his receipt of the motion.”

Document #174. Plaintiff did not file a motion to compel.

On December 1, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion

to vacate scheduling order. The order stated in part that “Plaintiff has had ample opportunity

conduct discovery and build his case. Plaintiff has not brought any motions addressing

specific discovery disputes, although the Court allowed him to do so even after the September

25, 2006 discovery cut-off.” Docket No. 187, Order at page 2. 

On December 1, 2006, the Magistrate Judge received a letter from Plaintiff which

attached “the full motion, or something close to what I would like to file if granted leave to do

so.” Docket no. 187, Order at page 1. In an effort to avoid further unnecessary delay, the

Magistrate Judge construed Plaintiff’s letter as a motion to compel.

On December 6, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion

to compel. The Magistrate Judge stated in part “prior to the present motion, Marin has never

attempted to bring a motion to compel before this Court. . . . when allowed to make the

motion, Plaintiff took a month to do so . . . Plaintiff previously made essentially the same

request in his motion to vacate the current scheduling order. The Court denied that motion for

lack of good cause to modify the current deadlines. This case has been pending since 2001.

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 01cv1403

Most recently the discovery cut-off was set for September 25, 2006. Plaintiff has had more

than sufficient time to conduct discovery.” Docket No. 187, Order at page 4. 

On December 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed an objection to the December 1, 2006 order of

the Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge acted outside of her

jurisdiction by issuing a dispositive order in the discovery matter. Plaintiff further contends

that the Magistrate Judge prevented him from filing a motion to compel in July 2006.

On December 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the ruling of the

Magistrate Judge filed on December 1, 2006 and all previous and/or related rulings. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

Defendant contends that he is entitled to judgment in his favor dismissing Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds

that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any statements made by Plaintiff to the

Defendant which were confidential. Defendant contends that the information that Plaintiff is

a reserve soldier who the United States orders to temporary duty allegedly confided to

Defendant by Plaintiff was a commonly known fact which Plaintiff has attempted to use to his

benefit in a number of unrelated cases. In support of his position, Defendant submits in the

record of this case six exhibits from the proceedings in other courts in which Plaintiff’s

military classification was detailed in the public record prior to March 2000. Defendant

contends that there was public knowledge of Plaintiff’s claim to military security clearance

well before the March 2000 meeting alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. Defendant

further contends that the alleged confidential information could not be the legal cause of any

injury to Plaintiff because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Defendant Shaw

knew that Plaintiff was out of town when Plaintiff filed his motion in the state court action or

come forward with any evidence to establish that he was injured by the conduct asserted. 

CONTENTIONS OF PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff contends that the motion for summary judgment by Defendant Shaw is a repeat

of an earlier Rule 12 motion brought by the Defendant Shaw and denied by the Court. Plaintiff

further contends that Defendant has failed to meet the standard for summary judgment and that

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 01cv1403

Plaintiff is entitled to further discovery.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when it could affect the outcome of the

case under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party

may meet this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. The court views all inferences drawn from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56, an adverse party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this

rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse

party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the

adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

APPLICABLE LAW

In order prevail on a claim for breach of the attorney client privilege, a plaintiff has the

burden to demonstrate that privilege applies to the information in question. United States v.

Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 723 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984). To have the privilege

apply, the plaintiffs must prove that: “(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from

a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that

purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at [the client’s] instance permanently

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 01cv1403

protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by legal advisor (8) except that the protection may

be waived . . . .” United States v. Ladof, 591 F.2d 36, 38, (9th Cir. 1979) quoting 8 Wigmore,

Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). The privilege does not extend beyond the

substance of the client’s confidential communication to the attorney and facts which an

attorney receives from a third party about a client are not privileged. Matter of Fischel, 557

F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977). 

In order to prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty Plaintiff must demonstrate

the existence of a fiduciary duty, breach of that duty, and damages. Benasra v. Mitchell

Silberberg & Knupp, 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183 (2004).

ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdiction

On December 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the ruling of the

Magistrate Judge filed on December 1, 2006 and all previous and/or related rulings. 

In California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects,

Inc., 309 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir 2004), the Court of Appeals explained that it is the “general rule

that once a notice of appeal has been filed, the lower court loses jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the appeal. This general rule, however, refers discretely to a loss of jurisdiction over

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal, and is a judge-made doctrine designed to

avoid confusion and waste of time that might flow from putting the same issues before two

courts at the same time. The divestment rule, therefore, is a rule of judicial economy and not

one that strips the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1120, 1121. (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for an appeal as a matter

of right after judgment has been entered. While there are provisions for an appeal prior to a

final judgment, such as Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b), there are no exceptions which would apply in this

case. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a order denying relief in a pretrial matter by the

Magistrate Judge is premature. Delay in considering the Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will unnecessarily extend this case which has been pending for over five years and

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 01cv1403

will not advance any rule of judicial economy. Since the district court is not stripped of subject

matter jurisdiction, this Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to resolve

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Shaw used confidential

information obtained in a meeting between Plaintiff and Defendant to an advantage in

unrelated action. The confidential information alleged is described in the complaint as

follows:

During [the March 2000] meeting, plaintiff confided information to defendant

that is not generally known among the legal field in San Diego, nor the

community at large, to wit: (a) the plaintiff is a reserve soldier with a record

involving classified military duty which the United States has a history of

refusing to confirm; (b) because the United States orders plaintiff to temporary

duty in other states; if opposing counsel do not allow for extensions of time to

respond to motions as is the courtesy, California judges have and will punish

plaintiff for missing hearings; c) because plaintiff’s mail to different duty

locations takes so long, plaintiff does not even receive mail for weeks or months

after a court issues any order, so if any defendant wanted to destroy any case

against plaintiff, all the defendant has to do is make any motion to shorten time

to rule and the case will be over before plaintiff gets off duty and even receives

mail.

Second Amended Complaint at paragraph 6. The complaint alleges “at the time of the March

2000 meeting, plaintiff was threatened with or had actually been found in contempt by Judge

Wickersham for plaintiff’s request to extend time on a court deadline followed by plaintiff’s

refusal to submit his entire classified military record to Judge Wickersham. Plaintiff also had

another active case, Marin v. HFC, in which the state judge was refusing additional extensions

of time and needed an attorney for that one, confiding that the HFC judge may not believe

plaintiff with no support from federal offices.” Second Amended Complaint at paragraph 7.

The complaint alleges that Shaw became counsel of record for HFC and “used the confidential

information against plaintiff, to wit: instead of agreeing to extend time as a courtesy as is

normal in the first instance with any attorney in the community, Mr. Shaw waited until

Plaintiff was away on his military duty, and then made a motion for attorney fees.” Second

Amended Complaint at paragraph 11. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff did not respond to

the motion for attorney fees and that the Court awarded fees “in excess of $27,000 as claimed

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 01cv1403

attorney fees in about March 2001; and assessed an appellate charge as well, and the state court

judge published an order suggesting plaintiff was a professional liar.” Second Amended

Complaint at paragraph 12. 

Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint that “California judges have and will punish

plaintiff for missing hearings” and that “any defendant wanted to destroy any case against

plaintiff, all the defendant has to do is make any motion to shorten time to rule and the case

will be over before plaintiff gets off duty and even receives mail” are not any manner of

confidential information. Parties who miss hearings and do not respond in a timely manner

suffer the consequences of as a result of the application of court rules. Any consequence of

the application of time limits by the court to the detriment of a litigant is not caused by the

opposing attorney and cannot form the basis of a legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty

action. 

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Shaw provides court records

from five proceedings prior to March 2000 which refer specifically to Plaintiff’s claims of

military service, and Plaintiff’s claims that the military would not provide correct information

or access to his records. See Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits A through E. Defendant

has come forward with evidence to show that Plaintiff’s assertion in the complaint that it is not

generally known that he “is a reserve soldier with a record involving classified military duty

which the United States has a history of refusing to confirm” was referenced in the public

record on a significant number of occasions and cannot support a claim of confidential

information. The Court concludes that Defendant has come forward with evidence and

argument which support his position that Plaintiff could prove no set of facts which could

entitle him to prevail on his claims of breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. Pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P 56, the burden shifts to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, to come forward with

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Plaintiff has not come forward

with any evidence to support his claim that he conveyed confidential information to Defendant

which resulted in damage. In response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

submits no evidence to support his claims; and asserts that the issue before the Court was

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 01cv1403

decided in a prior order and that he has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.

In the prior order denying Defendant Shaw’s motion to dismiss filed on October 15,

2003, this Court found that the allegations of damages in the original Complaint were adequate

to satisfy the jurisdictional amount and that “a legally cognizable relationship” could exist

between the Plaintiff and Defendant Shaw even though Defendant Shaw never represented the

Plaintiff. Docket No. 30, Order at page 4. This prior ruling does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden

to come forward with some evidence to support his claims. Plaintiff further contends that

summary judgment should not be granted because he has not had adequate time for discovery.

On June 7, 2006, this Court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge to allow Plaintiff

an additional opportunity to address his discovery issues. On December 1, 2006, the

Magistrate Judge stated that “Plaintiff has had ample opportunity conduct discovery and build

his case. Plaintiff has not brought any motions addressing specific discovery disputes, although

the Court allowed him to do so even after the September 25, 2006 discovery cut-off.” Docket

No. 185, Order at page 2. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district

judge “may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending

before the court” with certain exceptions none of which apply to the discovery matters in this

case. The Magistrate Judge was specifically designated by this Court to resolve pretrial

matters against the remaining Defendant Shaw. Docket No. 161, Order at page 6. This Court

may reconsider any pretrial matter “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order

is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the December 1, 2006 order of the Magistrate Judge is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law or that he is entitled to any further delay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendant Shaw on July 31, 2001. In the

intervening five and a half years, Plaintiff filed two amended complaints adding four

Defendants who were subsequently dismissed by order of this Court. Plaintiff has had a

pending action against Defendant Shaw for more than five years. Plaintiff has had more than

adequate opportunity to conduct discovery and full access to this Court to move to compel

discovery. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence to support his claim that he

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 01cv1403

gave confidential information to Defendant Shaw about his military service or the refusal of

judges to extend time which Defendant Shaw utilized to damage Plaintiff. Pursuant to Fed.

R.Civ. P. 56(e), the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate against Plaintiff

and in favor of Defendant Shaw. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling

of December 1, 2006 (#191) is denied and the motion for summary judgment (#170) or, in the

alternative, for summary adjudication of claims by Defendant Stephen Shaw is granted. The

Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Plaintiff dismissing this action.

DATED: January 17, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:01-cv-01403-WQH-CAB Document 194 Filed 01/17/07 Page 10 of 10