Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01324/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01324-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBIN BREWER, )

)

)

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Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

)

SCOTT SALYER, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:06cv1324 AWI DLB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

CLASS CERTIFICATION

(Document 72)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO STRIKE EXPERT DECLARATION

(Document 87)

On January 8, 2008, Plaintiff Robin Brewer (“Plaintiff”) filed the present motion for class

certification. Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike on March 13, 2008. Both motions were heard

on March 29, 2008, before the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate Judge. 

Howard Foster, Matthew Galin and Michael Goldberg appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Brian

Maschler and Jan Kahn appeared on behalf of Defendant Scott Salyer (“Defendant”). 

BACKGROUND

This is a RICO class action brought against Defendant based on allegations that he

knowingly hired illegal immigrants at SK Foods for the purpose of depressing wages. Plaintiff

brings the case on behalf of all legal U.S. citizens who worked as hourly paid employees at SK

Foods during the last four years. 

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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2007, which alleges that Defendant’s

Illegal Immigrant Hiring Scheme (“Scheme”) violates RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Plaintiff

further alleges that Defendant personally approved the Scheme which his co-conspirators

implement. He alleges that the conspiracy to perpetrate the Scheme is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1962(d) and that it will not stop without judicial intervention. Plaintiff seeks judgment in an

amount equal to three times the damage caused to the Class by Defendant’s racketeering

activity/Scheme, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Defendant answered the first amended complaint on June 19, 2007. 

Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, this case is bifurcated between issues relating to class

certification (Phase I) and issues relating to the merits. 

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for class certification on January 8, 2008, and seeks to

certify the following class:

“Plaintiff and all other persons legally authorized to be employed in the United States

who have been employed by SK Foods, LP, as either hourly-paid or piece rate workers1

from September 22, 2002, through the present.”

Pursuant to stipulations to extend time, Defendant filed his opposition on March 4, 2008. 

On March 13, 2008, Plaintiff filed his reply. 

Also on March 13, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the expert deposition of Mark

Killingsworth submitted in support of Defendant’s opposition to the class certification motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In support of his motion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knows that most of the people

seeking unskilled, hourly-paid or piece rate employment at SK Foods are illegal immigrants and

are using fake or fraudulent documents. Plaintiff contends that Defendant requires hiring

personnel to be “wilfully blind” to the fraudulent documentation. For example, Plaintiff alleges

that applicants often inform hiring personnel that they were educated in Mexico and have worked

only in agricultural/contractor jobs while living in the United States, facts which should indicate

to any reasonable employer in the Central Valley that there is a high probability that such

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workers are not legally authorized to work in the United States. He also alleges that hiring

personnel often do not properly complete the I-9 forms, or complete the form before the

employee fills it out. 

In opposition, Defendant explains that SK Foods’ hourly employee base is only a small

fraction of those of its competitors for labor in the immediate area, i.e., 300 hourly workers in

2006, and that in order to remain competitive, it pays well in excess of the applicable minimum

wage, has given raises at least every other year, and keeps close track of competitors’ hourly

wages. Declaration of Lisa Crist (“Crist Dec.”), ¶¶ 8-11. It also employs a wide range of hourly

workers: 22 year-round supervisors and 31 non-supervisory positions, and at least 117 different

positions during peak processing season (late June-early October). Crist Dec., ¶¶ 5, 22, 23. 

Compensation for the year-round employees varies according to seniority, performance, job

responsibilities, required expertise and competitors’ wages. Crist Dec., ¶¶ 22, 23. Wages for the

seasonal employees are set forth in the Rate Schedules, and are based also on these factors as

well as an assessment of the competitors’ compensation. Crist Dec., ¶ 5 and Exh. A.

SK Foods maintains a policy against hiring undocumented workers. Crist Dec., ¶ 18 and

Exh. G. Defendant states that as the president of SK Foods, he delegates the hiring of nonexempt employees to the Human Resources Staff and senior plant executives. Declaration of

Scott Salyer (“Salyer Dec.”), ¶ 4, 6. His office is in Monterey, California, and he visits the

Lemoore facility a few times a year. Salyer Dec., ¶ 7. He has never known or heard of the hiring

or retention of undocumented or illegal workers. Salyer Dec., ¶ 6. 

DISCUSSION

To qualify for class certification, Plaintiff must satisfy all of the requirements of Rule

23(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and any one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a)

requires (1) impracticability of joinder due to numerosity; (2) commonality of questions of law or

fact; (3) typicality of claims; and (4) adequacy of representation. 

The burden is on the party seeking to maintain the class action. In this case, Plaintiff

must establish a prima facie showing of each of the elements of Rule 23(a) prerequisites and the

appropriate 23(b) ground for a class action. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270

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 Plaintiff recognizes that the Court denied this request during Phase I, but states that he has a “good faith 2

argument” to raise the issue again during merits discovery because determination of such facts goes to the central

issue- whether SK employees are using fake documents to get work. 

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(10th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680

(1983). The burden, however, is slight. Plaintiff need only present sufficient proof to allow the

court to come to a “reasonable judgment” on each requirement. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d

891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 

A. 23(a) Requirements

1. Numerosity

The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is

“impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). No specific numerical threshold is required; each case

must be examined. General Tel.C. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698 (1980). 

Generally, 40 or more members will satisfy the numerosity requirement. Consolidated Rail

Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2nd Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff contends that the proposed Class includes hundreds, possibly thousands, of

workers at SK Foods. While Plaintiff concedes that he doesn’t know the exact number, he

believes that he will be able to identify which workers are not class members during merits

discovery by examining I-9 forms, submitting documents to the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) and/or Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) , examining “no-match” letters, and 2

using databases such as Lexis-Nexis SmartLinx. 

Although Defendant opposes the methods by which Plaintiff proposes to determine the

class, he does not specifically oppose numerosity. 

2. Commonality

A class has sufficient commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) if “there are questions of law or

fact which are common to the class.” Rule 23(a)(2) does not require each member in a class to

have identical factual and legal issues surrounding their claim. “The existence of shared legal

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient” to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). 

See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019-1022 (9th Cir. 1998). The commonality test

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is qualitative rather than quantitative. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir.

2007). 

Plaintiff argues that the common questions of law and fact are “obvious and

overwhelming.” His argument is based on his characterization of wages as being set on a

company-wide basis, without the use of any particularized criteria to individual workers. He

identifies the common questions as (1) whether Defendant perpetrates the Scheme in violation of

the INA and RICO; (2) whether SK Foods, through Defendant, depressed wages because of the

large number of illegal workers; and (3) what is the proper measure of damages. In support of

his argument, Plaintiff relies mainly on Dukes v. Wal-Mart, supra, where the Ninth Circuit

upheld the district court’s class certification in a Title VII sexual discrimination action, finding

that the plaintiffs established commonality by providing, in part, significant evidence of

company-wide corporate practices and policies.

Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the characteristics of the workforce at SK Foods, when

combined with the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, precludes a finding of commonality. SK Foods

hires employees for approximately 117 different job categories during peak processing season. 

Crist Dec., ¶ 5. It employs 22 permanent supervisors, who are paid hourly. The supervisor job

categories range from Paste Supervisor to Lab Supervisor (I and II) and an Accounts Payable

Supervisor. Crist Dec., ¶ 22. Compensation for supervisors varies, depending upon factors such

seniority, performance, job responsibilities and required expertise. Crist Dec., ¶ 22. SK Foods

also employs 31 non-supervisory hourly employees on a year-round basis, for positions such as

Flash Cool Operator, Sanitation Lead, Office Clerk and Computer Clerk. Crist Dec., ¶ 23. These

non-supervisory permanent employees are paid a variety of hourly rates according to job

classification and work requirements. Crist Dec., ¶ 23. Most of the seasonal positions are

compensated pursuant to a Rate Schedule. Crist Dec., ¶ 5.

SK Foods is therefore a diverse operation within a specialized, agricultural market,

characteristics which do not allow for broad, all-inclusive generalizations. Indeed, Plaintiff

appears to partly understand this and conceded at the hearing that supervisory positions should be

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excluded from the class. The differences, though, go beyond supervisory positions, and preclude

a finding of commonality.

Plaintiff’s RICO cause of action will require proof that SK foods engaged in a pattern of

racketeering activity by committing the predicate offense, as well as proof that each member of

the class has been injured. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

 Section 1964(c) contains a causation requirement: A plaintiff must show that the

defendant’s RICO violation was not only a “but for” cause of his injury, but that it was a

proximate cause as well. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112

S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d

1303, 1311(9th Cir.1992). A proximate cause is not the same thing as the sole cause. 

Cox v. Admin. United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1399 (11th Cir.1994). 

Instead, the proximate cause of an injury is “a substantial factor in the sequence of

responsible causation.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Some “direct relationship”

between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct is necessary. Holmes, 503 U.S. at

269, 112 S.Ct. 1311.

Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 298 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Courts in similar actions have recognized the difficulty of proving individual causation. 

In Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 413635 (E.D.Tenn. 2008), plaintiffs consisted of a

class of legally authorized employees who sued Tyson for RICO violations, alleging, as Plaintiff

here, that Tyson knowingly hired undocumented workers to depress wages. The court found that

the class could avoid summary judgment on the underlying predicate claim, but not as to injury

and causation. It explained:

Plaintiffs must also provide evidence of a direct causal link between Tyson's lower wages

and Tyson's retention of some illegal employees at the Corydon, Indiana facility. Even if

a jury accepts Plaintiffs' arguments that their wages were depressed and Tyson retained

unauthorized employees, that is not a sufficient basis for the jury to determine one caused

the other-only that both occurred. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Borjas, could testify generally

that the employment of illegal immigrants can cause a decrease in the wages paid to

employees (Court File No. 500, p. 16). However, this is meaningless if Plaintiffs cannot

provide evidence that retention of unauthorized employees caused the depression of

wages in this case. Without such evidence, Plaintiffs' causation argument is purely

speculative. See Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 614, 620.

Trollinger, 2008 WL 413635, *13. 

Trollinger involved a motion for summary judgment, and the Court recognizes that the

standards governing summary judgment and class certification are very different. However,

Tyson is instructive insofar as the court certified a class yet granted summary judgment based, in

part, on a failure to demonstrate causation. The case is illustrative of the factual and legal issues

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that would face Plaintiff’s class, and when analyzed in light of the characteristics of the SK

Foods work force, demonstrates why common issues of fact and law do not exist.

As in Trollinger, Plaintiff has provided nothing more than a speculative declaration in an

attempt to satisfy his burden of demonstrating common issues of law and fact. Interestingly,

Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Borjas, also participated in Trollinger as the plaintiffs’ expert. According

to his declaration submitted in this action, Dr. Borjas has not performed any analysis of this

action and has instead set forth speculative conclusions that damages can be calculated using

regression analysis. Declaration of George Borjas, Ph.D. (“Borjas Dec.”), ¶¶ 5, 7. He has not

provided any information or analysis as to the specific labor market at issue or the geographic

location, nor has he set forth how he would calculate causation and damages given the diversity

of the SK Foods employment structure. We know from Tyson and the nature of a RICO action

that causation and damages are specific, individualized issues. When combined with the

characteristics of employment at SK Foods, these issues become even more individualized. 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry his burden of demonstrating common issues of law and fact. 

An analysis of the Dukes case relied upon by Plaintiff does not change this result. 

Plaintiff cites Dukes in support of his belief that a class can be certified despite differences in the

class membership. In the Northern District’s original Dukes decision, the court found class

certification proper, despite class members in 3400 stores across the country, because “each store

operates in a basically similar fashion using similar job categories, job descriptions, and

management hierarchies...” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal.

2004). In fact, Plaintiff believes that the instant class will be easier to certify than the class in

Dukes because, for instance, all of the proposed members are in one location.

Indeed, classes have been certified in numerous instances where there are multiple

locations or multiple job descriptions. However, the decision to do so must take into account the

type of claim asserted and the requested relief. See General Tel. Co. Of Southwest v. Falcon,

457 U.S. 155 (9182) (there must be issues of common to the class as a whole and relief must turn

on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class). Dukes involved

allegations of sexual discrimination, allegations that don’t require the type of individual and

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specific causation and damages analyses as the RICO action asserted by Plaintiff. More

importantly, though, the Dukes plaintiffs submitted an abundance of evidence to met their

burden, including factual evidence, expert opinion evidence, expert statistical evidence and

anecdotal evidence. Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1178-1183. Plaintiff has not done so here.

Plaintiff is therefore unable to demonstrate commonality. While the Court recognizes

that this is a minimal burden, and that the commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less

rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), it is Plaintiff’s burden nonetheless. 

3. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]

 typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” In General Tele. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,

457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982), the Court noted “[t]he commonality and typicality

requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364. A named

plaintiffs’ claim is “typical” under Rule 23 if it arises “from the same event or practice or course

of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members and his or her claims are based

on the same legal theory.” Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, 186 F.R.D. 589, 595 (E.D.Cal.

1999). 

Plaintiff argues that typicality exists because all class members are “united in their effort

to prove that their wages have been depressed” by the Scheme. He further contends that they do

not individually bargain for their wages and there are no “unique defenses.” Motion, at 11. 

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show that he occupies the same

labor market as the other class members. He worked as a seasonal worker for only six weeks in

2004, earning $14.35 an hour. 

The Court agrees with Defendant. Plaintiff has made no showing that his claims are

typical of employees who worked at the company in other years, in other positions, and who

enjoyed different levels of compensation. As the Court touched upon in discussing commonality,

the agricultural labor market is quite different than standard, year round businesses. It is a very

specific market with distinct needs and huge variations among positions and workers. For this

reason, and given Plaintiff’s specific employment at SK Foods, he cannot show that his claims

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are typical of the class. See eg Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 222 F.R.D. 439, 443 (E.D. Wash.

2004) (finding that “minimal contact” precluded a finding of typicality as to plaintiff’s proposed

class relating to one Defendant).

4. Adequacy of Representation

The person representing the class must be able “fairly and adequately to protect the

interests” of all members in the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The representation is “adequate” if

the attorney representing the class is qualified and competent and the class representatives are not

disqualified by interests antagonistic to the remainder of the class. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion

Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 597, 512 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court does not question Mr. Foster’s competency as an attorney and Defendant has

not provided any reason to find that his representation would be less than adequate. In any event,

such a determination is not necessary given the Court’s finding that Plaintiff cannot satisfy

commonality and typicality under 23(a). 

B. 23(b) Requirements

Plaintiff requests that the Court certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides for

certification when:

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action

is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of

the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the

extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or

against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be

encountered in the management of a class action.

The 23(b)(3) requirements, of course, are only worthy of discussion when all

requirements under 23(a) have been met. Since the Court found that Plaintiff has not carried his

burden of meeting the 23(a) requirements, a discussion as to whether the questions of law or fact

predominate over individual issues and/or whether a class action format is superior is not

necessary. To be sure, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is more stringent than the

commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), and the analysis under Rule 23(b)(3) “presumes that

the existence of common issues of fact or law have been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2).” 

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-1022. As Plaintiff cannot demonstrate commonality under the more

permissive standard of 23(a), he can not do so under the heightened standard of 23(b). 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, based on the above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for class

certification be DENIED. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B)

and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

ORDER

In the course of briefing this motion, Plaintiff moved to strike the Declaration of Mark

Killingsworth, Ph.D., submitted in support of Defendant’s opposition. Plaintiff believes that the

declaration, which critiques Dr. Borjas’ deposition testimony, goes beyond the subject matter

contemplated in expert designation and should therefore be stricken. However, Professor

Killingsworth’s opinions are fairly within the subject matter for which he was designated. 

Moreover, because Dr. Borjas had not been deposed at the time of the designation, Professor

Killingsworth’s declaration could not have included a critique at that time. Anticipating this, his

initial expert disclosure stated that his conclusions were “subject to a supplementation of the

discovery record and a further particularization of Dr. Borjas’ analysis and conclusions. . .” 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 3, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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