Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05136/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 7, 2003 Decided June 3, 2003

No. 02-5136

CITIZENS COAL COUNCIL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS–APPELLANTS

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT/CROSS–APPELLEES

–————

Consolidated with

02–5137, 02–5190, 02–5232, 02–5244, 02–5245

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00274)

Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for federal appellant/cross-appellee Secre-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5136 Document #752397 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 1 of 14
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tary of the Interior. With her on the briefs were William B.

Lazarus and Robert H. Oakley, Attorneys.

Thomas C. Means argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee National Mining Association. With him on the briefs

were J. Michael Klise, Kirsten L. Nathanson, and Harold P.

Quinn, Jr.

Walton D. Morris, Jr., argued the cause for appellees/cross-appellants. With him on the briefs were Paul W.

Edmondson, Elizabeth S. Merritt, Howard I. Fox, and Glenn

P. Sugameli.

Gregory E. Conrad and Christopher B. Power were on the

brief for amicus curiae Interstate Mining Compact Commission in support of the Secretary of the Interior and the

National Mining Association. Henry M. Ingram entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal by the Secretary of the Interior and intervenor National Mining Association (‘‘NMA’’) from a judgment of the District Court. The

District Court held that the Secretary’s interpretation of the

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act’s (‘‘SMCRA’’)

section 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (2000), to exclude subsidence from the definition of ‘‘surface coal mining operations’’

regulated under section 522(e) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e),

was contrary to the law and therefore invalid. Because we

find that Congress did not speak unambiguously on this

precise issue in the SMCRA and because we find the Secretary’s interpretation to be reasonable, we defer to the Secretary and reverse the District Court.

I. Background

A. The Litigation

This case began with Citizens Coal Council’s (‘‘CCC’’) challenge to the Secretary of the Interior’s final rulemaking

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action by which she promulgated the regulation contained in

30 C.F.R. § 761.200 (2003). The challenged regulation is an

interpretive rule, based on sections 701(28) and 522(e) of the

SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. The regulation states:

761.200 Interpretive rule related to subsidence due to

underground coal mining in areas designated by Act of

Congress. OSM has adopted the following interpretation

of rules promulgated in part 761.

(a) Interpretation of § 761.11—Areas where mining is

prohibited or limited. Subsidence due to underground

coal mining is not included in the definition of surface

coal mining operations under section 701(28) of the Act

and § 700.5 of this chapter and therefore is not prohibited in areas protected under section 522(e) of the Act.

30 C.F.R. § 761.200. CCC sought review of this rulemaking

in District Court, after exhausting its administrative remedies. It claimed that the Secretary’s interpretation of the

cited provisions of the SMCRA was contrary to the clear law,

and therefore, unworthy of any deference by the courts. As a

remedy, CCC requested that the court vacate the regulation

and instruct the Secretary to impose instead, a regulation

stating that subsidence was included within 701(28)’s definition. The District Court granted CCC’s motion for summary

judgment holding that ‘‘Congress has expressed its intent

clearly on the precise point at issue here and that the

Secretary’s interpretation of § [701(28)] and § [522(e)] is

contrary to law.’’ Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 193

F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.D.C. 2002). The District Court then

remanded the regulation to the Secretary without instruction.

CCC filed a notice of appeal on April 11, 2002, and intervenor NMA filed its notice the following day. On June 5, 2002,

the District Court granted the appellant’s motion to stay the

remand order, but vacated the regulation and stayed its

judgment pending appeal. See Citizens Coal Council v.

Babbitt, No. 00–0274 (June 5, 2002). On June 6, 2002, the

Secretary filed a notice of appeal of both rulings. In the

present case, the Secretary and NMA appeal the District

Court’s ruling that the regulation was invalid and its subseUSCA Case #02-5136 Document #752397 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 3 of 14
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quent vacation of the regulation, and CCC appeals the District Court’s refusal to grant the full relief it requested.

B. The Statutory Scheme

We recognize from the outset that the SMCRA is a complex and often puzzling statute, in many cases raising a

variety of questions as to its correct interpretation. SMCRA

was enacted in an effort by Congress to both ‘‘protect society

and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal

mining operations’’ and to ‘‘assure that the coal supply essential to the Nation’s energy requirements, and to its economic

and social well-being is provided and strike a balance between

protection of the environment and agricultural activity and

the Nation’s need for coal as an essential source of energy.’’

30 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (f). As the District Court recognized

and the parties do not dispute, the focus of the regulation in

SMCRA was primarily on the surface mining techniques,

such as strip-mining, and one of its goals was to encourage

the development and application of underground mining technologies as an alternative less likely to disturb lands used for

other activities. See Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 161

(citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202(k)).

To this purpose, SMCRA section 522(e) prohibits ‘‘surface

coal mining operations’’ with certain exceptions, in a number

of protected areas, particularly within the boundaries of the

national parks system, national forests, and public parks and

historic sites. In addition, these operations are also prohibited ‘‘within [100] feet of the outside right-of-way line of any

public road’’; ‘‘within [300] feet from any occupied dwelling,

unless waived by the owner thereof’’; and ‘‘within [300] feet

of any public building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or within [100] feet of a cemetery.’’ 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4), (5).

SMCRA section 701(28) defines ‘‘surface coal mining operations’’ as follows:

(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal mine or subject to the reUSCA Case #02-5136 Document #752397 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 4 of 14
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quirements of section 1266 of this title surface operations

and surface impacts incident to an underground coal

mine, the products of which enter commerce or the

operations of which directly or indirectly affect interstate

commerce. Such activities include excavation for the

purpose of obtaining coal including such common methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box

cut, open pit, and area mining, the uses of explosives and

blasting, and in situ distillation or retorting, leaching or

other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning,

concentrating, or other processing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine

site TTT and

(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where

such activities disturb the natural land surface. Such

areas shall also include any adjacent land the use of

which is incidental to any such activities, all lands affected by the construction of new roads or the improvement

or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of such

activities and for haulage, and excavations, workings,

impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entryways, refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil

banks, culm banks, tailings, holes or depressions, repair

areas, storage areas, processing areas, shipping areas

and other areas which are sited structures, facilities, or

other property or materials on the surface, resulting

from or incident to such activities[.]

30 U.S.C. § 1291(28). SMCRA section 516(a) requires the

Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations directed toward ‘‘the surface effects of underground coal mining operations’’ embodying the requirements of section 516(b), but

instructs the Secretary, in adopting such rules, to ‘‘consider

the distinct difference between surface coal mining and underground coal mining.’’ 30 U.S.C. § 1266(a). The permit

requirement of section 516(b) mentions subsidence specifically, in contrast to sections 522 and 701(28).

516(b): Permit requirements

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Each permit issued under any approved State or Federal

program pursuant to this chapter and relating to underground coal mining shall require the operator to—

(1) adopt measures consistent with known technology in

order to prevent subsidence causing material damage to

the extent technologically and economically feasible, maximize mine stability, and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use of such surface lands, except in

those instances where the mining technology used requires planned subsidence in a predictable and controlled

manner: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall

be construed to prohibit the standard method of room

and pillar mining;

30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1). Section 516(c) extends the Secretary’s authority to regulate underground coal mining if it

creates a danger to inhabitants.

c) Suspension of underground coal mining operations in

urbanized areas

In order to protect the stability of the land, the regulatory authority shall suspend underground coal mining under urbanized areas, cities, towns, and communities and

adjacent to industrial or commercial buildings, major

impoundments, or permanent streams if he finds imminent danger to inhabitants of the urbanized areas, cities,

towns, and communities.

30 U.S.C. § 1266(c). Section 516(d) extends the subchapter

to cover ‘‘surface operations and surface impacts incident to

underground coal mining operations.’’

The provisions of this subchapter relating to State and

Federal programs, permits, bonds, inspections and enforcement, public review, and administrative and judicial

review shall be applicable to surface operations and

surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine

with such modifications to the permit application requirements, permit approval or denial procedures, and bond

requirements as are necessary to accommodate the disUSCA Case #02-5136 Document #752397 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 6 of 14
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tinct difference between surface and underground coal

mining.

30 U.S.C. § 1266(d).

II. Analysis

We review the Secretary’s interpretation of the provisions

of the SMCRA, a statute she administers, under the analysis

articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The two-step test of

Chevron requires, first, that both the agency and the courts

give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent if

the underlying statute speaks directly to the precise question

at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. In this first analytical

step, the courts use ‘‘traditional tools of statutory interpretation–text, structure, purpose, and legislative history.’’

Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219,

224 (D.C. Cir. 2001). If, however, the statute is ‘‘silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue’’ the court must

defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Because we find that the term ‘‘surface

impacts incident to an underground coal mine’’ as it appears

in section 701(28) does not unambiguously include subsidence,

the second step of Chevron requires that we defer to the

Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of the statute and reverse the District Court. See NMA v. Dep’t of the Interior,

105 F.3d 691, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

We begin, as always, with the plain language of the statute

in question. The Secretary interprets the definition of ‘‘surface coal mining operations’’ contained in 701(28), and thereby

prohibited in 522(e), to exclude subsidence. The Secretary

first argues that the plain meaning of the word ‘‘operations’’

suggests a reference to some human activity, and not to a

possible effect of underground mining, like subsidence. See

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1581 (1971)

(defining ‘‘operation’’ as ‘‘doing or performing’’). If 701(28)’s

definition ended after its first phrase, ‘‘activities conducted on

the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal mine or

subject to the requirements of section 516 surface operaUSCA Case #02-5136 Document #752397 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 7 of 14
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tions,’’ this interpretation might be more clearly compelled.

However, as CCC points out, the phrase which follows:

‘‘surface operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine’’ could add significantly to the scope of the

term ‘‘operations’’ as used in this context.

As the District Court noted, the Secretary essentially parses the definition to read ‘‘activities conducted on the surface

of lands in connection with [1] a surface coal mine or [2]

subject to the requirements of section 1266 of this title[,]

surface operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mineTTT’’. Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 163

(citing 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A)). The Secretary supports this

interpretation with the definition’s next sentence which begins with the phrase ‘‘[s]uch activities.’’ This phrase is

repeated throughout the remainder of the definition, and is

defined within the provision by the examples of activities

listed, e.g., excavation; physical or chemical processing; and

loading for interstate transport. See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A).

The Secretary therefore concludes that the opening sentence

refers to these ‘‘activities’’ only. The District Court held that

this reading was not ‘‘the most natural’’ one, in light of the

legislative history and the overall purpose of the Act. See

Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 163–64. The reading

advanced as the ‘‘most natural’’ by CCC and accepted by the

District Court ‘‘becomes apparent with the addition of three

commas’’ as follows: ‘‘ ‘surface coal mining operations’

means—(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in

connection with a surface coal mine[,] or [,] subject to the

requirements of section 1266 of this title [,] surface operations

and surface impacts incident to an underground coal

mineTTTT’’ Id. at 163. The District Court and CCC therefore read 701(28) to mean the surface coal mining operations—prohibited in areas specified by 522(e)—to include as a

separate matter ‘‘surface impacts’’ incident to an underground

mine, which must then include subsidence.

We need not disavow the District Court’s determination

that CCC’s tendered interpretation is the more natural one in

order to reverse the District Court and uphold the Secretary.

As noted by the District Court we have, on a previous

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occasion, observed that ‘‘[t]he most natural reading of the

[SMCRA] as a whole, and the definition in [§ 1291(28)] in

particular TTT then suggests that ‘surface coal mining operations’ encompasses both surface coal mines and the surface

effects of underground mines.’’ Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp.

2d at 163 (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d

694, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Even assuming the correctness of

our reasoning and that of the District Court, the ambiguity of

the statute in combination with the Chevron doctrine eclipses

the ability of the courts to substitute their preferred interpretation for an agency’s reasonable interpretation when that

agency is the entity authorized to administer the statute in

question. See, e.g., NMA v. Babbitt, 172 F.3d 906, 916 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (‘‘If we were interpreting the statute de novo, we

might well agree that appellant has the better argument.

But we are not. And although the government’s reading is a

bit of a stretch, we think it passes the Chevron test’’). While

we do not find that the language of the definition of ‘‘surface

coal mining operations’’ compels the exclusion of subsidence

from its scope, neither do we find that the definition compels

its inclusion. Therefore, we endeavor to resolve this issue

under the second analytical step of Chevron because Congress has not spoken unambiguously on this precise question.

We find the Secretary’s interpretation, while not necessarily

the most natural one, is reasonable, and therefore we defer to

it. Cf. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980–81.

(1986). (Upholding the FDA’s interpretation of an ambiguous

statutory provision, finding that although the lower court’s

‘‘reading of the statute may seem to be the more natural

interpretation TTT the phrasing TTT admits of either respondents’ or petitioners’ reading of the statuteTTTT We find the

FDA’s interpretation TTT to be sufficiently rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the

FDA.’’).

Both parties argue that the legislative history of the

SMCRA supports its interpretation. CCC relies on several

statements in the Senate and House reports relating to

SMCRA’s promulgation. According to CCC, the Senate report indicates that SMCRA was addressed to ‘‘surface coal

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mining operations-including exploration activities and the surface effects of underground mining.’’ S. REP. NO. 95–128, at

49 (1977). CCC contends that the report clarifies that those

effects include subsidence, quoting a discussion in the report

on the environmental hazards posed by coal mining: ‘‘Similar

hazards also occur from the surface effects of underground

coal mining, including the dumping of coal waste piles, subsidence and mine fires.’’ Id. at 50. Additionally, the report

states that the Act’s initial regulatory requirements extended

to ‘‘[a]ll surface coal mining operations, which include, by

definition surface impacts incident to underground coal

mines.’’ Id. at 71. The District Court relied on this passage

from the report to support its position that section 522(e)

applied to subsidence.

‘Surface coal mining operations’ is so defined to include

not only traditionally regarded coal surface mining activities but also surface operations incident to underground

coal mining, and exploration activities. The effect of this

definition is that coal surface mining and surface impacts

of underground coal mining are subject to regulation

under this Act.

Id. at 98. The court found that the references in the reports

to ‘‘surface effects’’ of underground coal mining, and ‘‘surface

impacts’’ of underground coal mining must include subsidence. See Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 163–64. Finally, CCC contends that the House report also supports its

position in a discussion entitled ‘‘Surface Impacts of Underground Mines,’’ stating:

The environmental problems associated with underground mining for coal which are directly manifested on

the land surface are addressed in section [516] and other

such sections which may have application. These problems include surface subsidence.

H.R. REP. NO. 95–218, at 125–26 (1977). Essentially, the CCC

interprets the legislative history’s use of the phrase ‘‘surface

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impacts’’ which appears in 701(28) to necessarily include

subsidence.

The Secretary counters with the argument that the legislative history does show that Congress had an intention to

regulate subsidence within the SMCRA, but intended to limit

that regulation to section 516. More importantly, this interpretation is consistent with the language of the statute.

Section 516 is the only section in the statute in which subsidence is specifically mentioned. This demonstrates that Congress specifically stated that subsidence was being dealt with

in a provision when its intention was to include subsidence

under that section of the SMCRA. The Secretary argues

that the House report on section 516 illustrates Congress’s

intention to authorize the Secretary to regulate subsidence in

that section, rather than prohibit it entirely by way of section

522(e).

Surface subsidence has a different effect on different

land uses. Generally, no appreciable impact is realized

on agricultural land and similar types of land and productivity is not affected. On the other hand when subsidence occurs under developed land such as an urbanized

area, substantial damage results to surface improvements be they private homes, commercial buildings or

public roads and schoolsTTTT It is the intent of this

section to provide the Secretary with the authority to

require the design and conduct of underground mining

methods to control subsidence to the extent technologically and economically feasible in order to protect the

value and use of surface lands.

H.R. REP. NO. 95–218, at 126 (1977). The Secretary reiterates

that Congress did not discuss subsidence as being among the

‘‘impacts’’ of underground mining that are prohibited in section 522(e) areas. The Secretary also noted that she had

concluded during the promulgation of the regulation at issue

that the passage from the Senate report on which the District

Court specifically relied was ‘‘imprecise’’ and of questionable

precedential value because it states that exploration activities

are included in the definition of ‘‘surface coal mining operations’’ even though the statute expressly provides to the

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contrary. See 64 Fed. Reg. 70,844–45 (citing 30 U.S.C.

§ 1291(28)(A)). Furthermore, the Secretary points out that

the Senate report on section 522(e) notes that ‘‘surface coal

mining’’ is prohibited within the specified distances of public

roads, occupied buildings, and active underground mines ‘‘for

reasons of public health and safety.’’ S. REP. NO. 95–128, at

55. The Secretary posits that to accomplish that purpose,

522(e) need not prohibit subsidence, because underground

mines must already meet the requirements of section 516,

which prevents almost all risks to public health and safety.

Taken together, as is so often the case, legislative history

on which both parties rely is at best inconclusive as to either

interpretation. As Judge Leventhal once observed, reviewing

legislative history is like ‘‘looking over a crowd and picking

out your friends.’’ Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on

the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court

Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). This inconclusiveness

underscores our conclusion that the statute is ambiguous on

the question of whether subsidence is included within the

prohibitions in 522(e). In addition, one amendment to the

statute since its promulgation bolsters the reasonableness of

the Secretary’s interpretation. In 1992, Congress added

section 720 to the SMCRA, an amendment entitled ‘‘Subsidence,’’ which provides compensation for property owners

who suffer material damage caused by subsidence to ‘‘occupied residential dwelling and structures related thereto, or

non-commercial building due to underground coal mining

operations.’’ 30 U.S.C. § 1309a(a)(1). Intervenor NMA argues that the passage of this section demonstrates that

Congress was aware that SMCRA does not prohibit subsidence in section 522(e) areas and therefore added the section

to provide a remedy for property owners damaged by this

result of an underground mining operation. CCC argues that

the addition of this provision does not foreclose their interpretation because section 522(e)’s alleged prohibition of subsidence does not apply to mines operating pursuant to valid

existing rights as of August 3, 1977, and section 720 offers

compensation to property owners damaged by these mines, as

well as to those who have waived 522(e)’s protections, or

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where subsidence damage occurs from a mine more than 300

feet away from protected structures, and thereby outside

522(e)’s buffer zone. Nothing in the statute or in section 720

supports CCC’s arguments, and a far more plausible explanation for the provision is that it provides a remedy for subsidence damage, because subsidence was not already prohibited

by section 522(e), as the Secretary argues. While this section

does not, in combination with the others, resolve all ambiguity

on the precise issue in question, it supports the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation.

Finally, we do not find compelling the argument drawn by

CCC from a footnote in the District Court’s opinion. At the

end of its opinion, the court added the note, which reads in

pertinent part: ‘‘[s]ection [522] also falls within § [516(d)]’s

mandate that SMCRA provisions ‘relating to State and Federal programs [and] permits TTT shall be applicable to surface

operations and surface impacts incident to an underground

coal mine,’ since it imposes requirements on federal and state

regulatorsTTTT’’ Citizens Coal, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 165 n.3.

The District Court offered no further reasoning or explanation in support of this conclusion. CCC argues that this

footnote is an alternative holding meaning that section 516(d),

by referencing provisions ‘‘relating to TTT permits’’ unambiguously requires the Secretary to apply section 522(e) to protect

against subsidence, simply because of the use of the word

‘‘permitted’’ in that later section. We disagree.

There is certainly a colorable difference between the noun

‘‘permit’’ and the verb ‘‘permitted.’’ The SMCRA contains a

number of provisions which do deal directly and specifically

with ‘‘Permits.’’ For example, section 506, 30 U.S.C. § 1256,

is entitled ‘‘Permits’’ and provides for the terms, termination,

and renewal of permits. The following section 30 U.S.C.

§ 1257 is entitled ‘‘Application requirements’’ and provides

for the fee and content requirements of the permits. These

sections stand in contrast to section 522(e) which provides for

a number of prohibitions, and uses the verb ‘‘permitted’’

simply to describe the geographical limitations to which the

Secretary is bound when ‘‘[d]esignating areas unsuitable for

surface coal mining,’’ as the title of the section instructs. See

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30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (no surface coal mining operations TTT

shall be permitted—(1) on any lands within the boundaries of

units of the National Park System TTT (2) on any Federal

lands within the boundaries of any national forest TTT (3)

which will adversely affect any publicly owned park TTT (4)

within 100 feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public

road TTT (5) within 300 feet from any occupied dwellingTTTT).

Thus, the ‘‘permit’’ argument based on section 516(d) has no

compelling force on the interpretation of section 522(e).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we find that the definition

of ‘‘surface coal mining operations’’ in SMCRA section 701(28)

is ambiguous as to whether Congress intended it to include

subsidence, and therefore, whether subsidence is among the

prohibitions contained in section 522(e) is likewise ambiguous.

We conclude that the Secretary’s interpretation, albeit perhaps not the ‘‘most natural’’ reading, is a reasonable one, and

therefore we defer to that interpretation in accordance with

the requirements of Chevron. We reverse the decision of the

District Court and uphold the validity of the regulation.

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