Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00183/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Todd C Smith,

Petitioner,

v. 

JT Shartle,

Respondent.

No. CV-18-00183-TUC-JAS (EJM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Todd C. Smith (“Petitioner”), who is confined in the 

United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona. Petitioner alleges that pursuant to Mathis v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) 

§ 4B1.5 was erroneously applied to his case and that he is factually innocent of the career 

repeat and dangerous sex offender enhancement. Petitioner requests a hearing and his 

immediate release from custody.

Respondent argues that Mathis has no relevance to Petitioner’s claims and that the 

petition should be denied for several reasons: One, Petitioner is attempting to relitigate 

issues that have already been decided; two, the issues Petitioner raises do not fall under § 

2241; and three, Petitioner’s sentence was not based on U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. (Doc. 8).

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Markovich for a Report and Recommendation. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner did not lack an unobstructed 

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procedural shot to present his claim for relief prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Mathis. Mathis did not announce any new rule of law. Petitioner’s claim that his prior 

misdemeanor offenses are unable to be used as a predicate for a career-offender sentencing 

enhancement existed at the time of his original § 2255 petition. Accordingly, it is 

recommended that the District Court dismiss the petition. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was found guilty of one count of sexual exploitation of a child after a trial 

by jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The 

Presentence Investigation Report stated that Petitioner’s total offense level was 43 and his 

criminal history category was V, yielding an advisory sentencing guidelines range of life 

imprisonment. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 61, 71, 95). On December 20, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced 

to a term of life imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release. 

Petitioner has filed many civil actions since his sentencing, including a direct appeal 

and several post-conviction motions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

1

Smith [filed a direct appeal], claiming that the evidence 

presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that 

the conviction violated his First Amendment rights, the 

enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 exceeded Congress’s authority 

under the Commerce Clause, that his life sentence was 

imposed in error, that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and 

that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress the 

search of his cellular telephone. United States v. Smith, 529 

Fed.Appx. 798, 799 (8th Cir. 2013.) [The Eighth Circuit Court 

of Appeals] rejected each of Smith’s claims, affirming both his 

conviction and sentence. Id. at 800. Smith’s petition for writ of 

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on 

March 24, 2014. Smith v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1569 (2014).

On November 26, 2014, Smith filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 attempting to set aside his conviction and sentence. 

(Civ. I. DCD 1.) Smith argued that: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 2251 is 

unconstitutional and that the Government lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction; (2) his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated due to a Miranda violation and that the evidence 

should have been suppressed; (3) the search of his cell phone 

was unconstitutional; (4) U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 does not apply to 

his prior convictions to enhance his sentence; (5) his attorney 

was ineffective; and (6) his sentence was unconstitutionally 

 

1 The following summary is taken from Respondent’s Answer and has been confirmed by 

the undersigned’s review of the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Missouri and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dockets for Petitioner’s cases. 

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enhanced. (Civ. I DCD 1.)

The district court denied Smith’s § 2255 motion on July 23, 

2015, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Smith 

v. United States, No. 14-CV-5159-SW-DGK-P, 2015 WL 

4487957 (W.D. Mo. July 23, 2015).2(Civ. I DCD 13.) Smith 

subsequently filed an appeal, which was summarily dismissed 

by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 11, 2015. 

Smith v. United States, No. 15-2914 (8th Cir. Dec. 11, 2015). 

Smith then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United 

States Supreme Court, which was denied on March 28, 2016. 

Smith v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1507 (2016).

On July 13, 2016, Smith filed a petition seeking the right to file 

a successive § 2255 motion claiming that U.S.S.G. §§ 

2G2.1(b)(2)(b) and 4B1.5(a) are unconstitutional based upon 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 

U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the “residual 

clause” of § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, which was 

denied on November 21, 2016. Smith v. United States, No. 16-

2935 (8th Cir. Nov. 21, 2016.)

On December [5], 2016, Smith filed a petition for writ of error 

with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. 16-4386, 

alleging a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines 

affecting his constitutional rights in that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a) 

does not apply to his sentence. The Court denied the petition 

and issued its mandate on December 19, 2016. Smith v. United 

States, No. 16-4386 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 2016.)3 Smith’s petition 

for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme 

Court on April 24, 2017. Smith v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1835 

(2017).

On May 31, 2017, Smith filed yet another request to file a 

successive § 2255 motion in the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals 

essentially rehashing the same grounds previously raised, and 

notably challenged the manner in which the district court 

calculated his offense level under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines. Smith v. United States, No. 17-2193 (2017). The 

motion was summarily denied on November 27, 2017.

(Doc. 8 at 3–5) (footnote omitted). 

Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition on April 6, 2018 raising one ground for 

relief. (Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges that he is being illegally detained due to a manifest 

injustice which caused his sentence to be unreliable and unconstitutional because in light 

of the evidence as a whole, he is actually innocent. Petitioner specifically alleges that his 

 

2 Amended order issued February 8, 2016. Smith v. United States, 2016 WL 502064 (W.D. 

Mo. Feb. 8, 2016).

3 Corrected judgment issued December 20, 2016 denying Petitioner’s petition for 

extraordinary writ. Smith v. United States, No. 16-4386 (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 2016).

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phone was searched without a warrant, that he asked for an attorney but was not provided 

with one and made incriminating statements to police, that the fruit of the poisonous tree 

doctrine applies, and that he is factually innocent of being a career offender under U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.5 because his prior misdemeanor convictions were used to qualify as requisite 

offenses. 

This Court previously ordered that:

With regards to Petitioner’s arguments that his phone was 

illegally searched, he was illegally questioned, and that had the 

evidence obtained via these improper methods been excluded 

he would not have been found guilty, Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction over those claims. 

Petitioner has not explained why he has been unable to present 

these arguments previously. That other courts may have 

considered these arguments, and denied them, or refused to 

consider them on procedural grounds, does not mean that 

Petitioner has not had an unobstructed shot at presenting them. 

Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

(Doc. 5 at 4). Thus, Petitioner’s only remaining claim is that pursuant to Mathis, his prior 

convictions should not count as predicate convictions for purposes of enhancing his 

sentence. See id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

“[I]n order to determine whether jurisdiction is proper, a court must first determine 

whether a habeas petition is filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 or 2255 before proceeding 

to any other issue.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal 

prisoner challenging the legality of a sentence must generally do so via a motion raised in 

the sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 954 

(9th Cir. 2008). By contrast, a prisoner who wishes to challenge the manner, location, or 

conditions of the execution of a sentence must bring a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864. A prisoner may not bring a second 

or successive petition under § 2255 without first obtaining certification from “a panel of 

the appropriate court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Harrison, 519 F.3d at 955. The 

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restrictions on the availability of a § 2255 motion cannot be avoided through a petition 

under § 2241. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The one exception to the general rule against subsequent § 2255 petitions is what 

has been called the “escape hatch” or “savings clause” of § 2255. Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 

F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). The escape hatch permits a federal prisoner to “file a habeas 

corpus petition pursuant to § 2241 to contest the legality of a sentence where his remedy 

under § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’” Stephens, 

464 F.3d at 897 (quoting Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864–65). The Ninth Circuit has made 

clear that the ban on successive § 2255 petitions does not per se make § 2255 an inadequate 

or ineffective remedy for purposes of the escape hatch.4 Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 953; see 

also United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997) (the escape hatch is a narrow 

doctrine to be used in limited circumstances). 

A § 2241 petition meets the escape hatch criteria where a petitioner: (1) makes a 

claim of actual innocence; and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at 

presenting that claim. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). If a 

petition meets the escape hatch requirements, the petitioner may avoid the procedural 

prohibitions on the filing of second or successive petitions under § 2255. See Ivy v. 

Pontesso, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court must first make a 

threshold determination of whether Petitioner’s claim satisfies the requirements of the 

escape hatch before reaching the claim’s merits. For the following reasons, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate that the savings clause applies. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss the petition for 

lack of jurisdiction.

i. Actual Innocence for Purposes of the “Escape Hatch”

“To establish actual innocence for purposes of habeas relief, a petitioner must 

 

4 A petitioner can only file a successive § 2255 petition if the appropriate circuit court 

certifies that the successive petition is based on: (1) newly discovered evidence which 

would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have 

found the petitioner guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

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demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him.” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 (internal quotations and 

citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] petitioner is actually innocent when 

he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” Id. However, that court has “not yet 

resolved the question whether a petitioner may ever be actually innocent of a noncapital 

sentence for the purposes of qualifying for the escape hatch.” Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 

1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2012).

In Marrero, the court concluded it did not have jurisdiction of the § 2241 petition 

under the escape hatch because the petitioner was making a purely legal claim—that he 

was incorrectly treated as a career offender—“that had nothing to do with factual 

innocence.” 682 F.3d at 1193. The court noted that “some of our sister circuits have 

recognized exceptions to the general rule that a petitioner cannot be actually innocent of a 

noncapital sentence under the escape hatch.” Id. at 1194. Those exceptions include: (1) a 

petitioner may be actually innocent of a sentencing enhancement, and qualify for the escape 

hatch, if he was factually innocent of the crime that served as the predicate conviction for 

the enhancement; (2) a petitioner may qualify for the escape hatch if he received a sentence 

for which he was statutorily ineligible; and (3) a petitioner may be actually innocent of a 

sentencing enhancement if the sentence resulted from a constitutional violation. Id. at 

1194–95. The Marrero court did not endorse any of these exceptions because the petitioner 

did not qualify for any of them. Id. at 1195. Rather, the court held that “the purely legal 

argument that a petitioner was wrongly classified as a career offender under the Sentencing 

Guidelines is not cognizable as a claim of actual innocence under the escape hatch.” Id.

The undersigned has previously found the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ conclusions 

on this issue persuasive. See Terry v. Shartle, 2017 WL 2240970, at *10–*11 (D. Ariz. 

May 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 5151130 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 

2017) (agreeing with the decisions in Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013) and 

Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016) that petitioners could successfully claim 

actual innocence for a possible error in applying a sentencing enhancement). In both Brown 

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and Hill, the courts decided that a petitioner may utilize the escape hatch to challenge the 

misapplication of the career offender sentencing guideline where the petitioner was 

sentenced in the pre-Booker era when those guidelines were mandatory. See Brown, 719 

F.3d at 588; Hill, 836 F.3d at 599. Those courts reasoned that a misapplication of 

mandatory sentencing guidelines raises a fundamental fairness issue. Brown, 719 F.3d at 

588; Hill, 836 F.3d at 599. Here, the Court finds no reason to reevaluate the conclusion it 

reached in Terry that a claim of actual innocence may be predicated on a petitioner having 

been statutorily ineligible for a sentencing enhancement. The Ninth Circuit still has not 

ruled definitively on the issue and this Court stands by its previous analysis. However, 

while in Terry the undersigned concluded that the petitioner very well may have been

actually innocent of the career offender sentencing enhancement, the present case is 

distinguishable.

Here, Petitioner contends that his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 based on his prior misdemeanor convictions, resulting in his

classification as a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.5(a), and that he is factually innocent 

of being a career offender. (Doc. 1 at 36). Petitioner further contends that since he was 

improperly classified as a career offender, he has been unconstitutionally sentenced to a 

life term. However, despite Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, Petitioner’s offense 

level was not determined under the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a). Pursuant to that 

statute, 

In any case in which the defendant’s instant offense of 

conviction is a covered sex crime, § 4B1.1 (Career Offender) 

does not apply, and the defendant committed the instant 

offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at least one sex 

offense conviction:

(1) The offense level shall be the greater of:

(A) the offense level determined under Chapters Two and 

Three; or

(B) the offense level from the table below . . .5

 

5 Table lists the offense statutory maximum and a corresponding offense level

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A review of Petitioner’s Presentence Investigation Report indicates that his offense level 

was determined under Chapters Two and Three of the Sentencing Guidelines, not under § 

4B1.5, resulting in a combined adjusted offense level of 44. (Doc. 12 at 9 ¶ 59).6

Furthermore, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2251, the offense Petitioner was convicted of, if a 

“person has 2 or more prior convictions under this chapter . . . or under the laws of any 

State relating to the sexual exploitation of children, such a person shall be fined under this 

title and imprisoned not less than 35 years nor more than life.”18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). Thus, 

Petitioner’s sentence is within the range contemplated by the statute of conviction and he 

has not shown that his sentence would have been different even if U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a) was 

improperly applied to enhance his sentence. 

ii. Unobstructed Procedural Shot to Present Claims

However, even assuming arguendo that Petitioner has made a substantial claim of 

actual innocence, it is clear that he cannot establish that he has not previously had an 

unobstructed procedural shot to present his claims because Mathis in no way announced a 

new rule applicable to Petitioner’s claims. His petition must therefore be dismissed. 

“In determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to pursue 

his claim, we ask whether [the] petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a 

federal court decision.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898). 

“[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the 

time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 

In deciding whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, 

the court considers: (1) whether the legal basis for the petitioner’s claim arose after he had 

exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law has changed 

in any way relevant to the petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion. Harrison, 519 

F.3d at 960. 

Here, the legal basis for Petitioner’s claim existed prior to his direct appeal and first 

§ 2255 petition. In fact, Petitioner has repeatedly argued that his sentence was improperly 

 

6 Had Petitioner’s offense level been calculated using the table in § 4B1.5, Petitioner would 

have been assigned an offense level of 37. 

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calculated under the guidelines, a claim that his been rejected by both the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

On direct appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected Petitioner’s argument that the district court 

erred in sentencing him to life in prison, finding no error in the sentence and that it was 

within the properly calculated guidelines range. United States v. Smith, 529 Fed.Appx. 798, 

799 (8th Cir. 2013). In his first § 2255 petition, Petitioner argued that the sentencing court 

improperly used non-qualifying offenses to increase his criminal history category under 

the U.S.S.G. In denying the petition, the Western District of Missouri found that because 

the Eighth Circuit had already confronted and rejected this claim on direct appeal, 

Petitioner could not raise it again. Smith v. United States, 2016 WL 502064, *5 (W.D. Mo. 

Feb. 8, 2016). The Court further rejected Petitioner’s argument that Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) constituted an intervening change in law allowing him to 

raise the sentencing claim again, and noted that Petitioner’s mandatory minimum sentence 

for the statute of conviction “was determined solely by the number of previous convictions 

for sexual exploitation of minors.” Id. at n.3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e)). Petitioner filed 

an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion on June 29, 2016, 

again arguing that he was serving an illegal sentence because he was improperly classified 

as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a), and citing Johnson v. United States, 135 

S. Ct. 2551 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2563 (2016). The Eighth Circuit 

denied the petition for authorization to file a successive habeas application. (No. 16-2935). 

On December 5, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error in the Eighth Circuit, 

again arguing that § 4B1.5 was improperly applied to enhance his sentence. The court 

denied the petition for extraordinary writ. (No. 16-4386). On May 30, 2017 Petitioner filed 

another request to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, which the Eighth Circuit 

denied. (No. 17-2193). 

Further, Petitioner has not shown that the law has changed since his first § 2255 

petition. “An intervening court decision must ‘effect a material change in the applicable 

law’ to establish unavailability.” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Harrison, 519 F.3d 

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at 960). By contrast, a decision that merely further clarifies the statute of conviction without 

materially varying the statutory construction set forth in prior case law does not affect such 

a change. Id. at 1048. It is clear to this Court that Mathis effected no material change in the 

law as it stood prior to Petitioner’s sentencing in 2012 and his first § 2255 petition in 2014.

In Mathis, the Supreme Court analyzed the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed on federal 

defendants who have three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug 

offenses, or both. Under the ACCA, any crime punishable by more than a year in prison is 

a violent felony if it falls under one of three categories, including the “enumerated crimes” 

of “burglary, arson, or extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court in 

Mathis considered whether the sentencing court had properly concluded that the 

defendant’s prior convictions under Iowa’s burglary statute qualified as an “enumerated

crime” and could therefore be used to enhance his sentence. 136 S. Ct. at 2248. In doing 

so, the Court decided whether the elements of the state crime (Iowa burglary) corresponded 

to those of the generic offense (generic burglary). Id. at 2250. The Court held that it did 

not by employing the categorical approach and finding that the Iowa burglary statute covers 

a “greater swath of conduct than the elements of the relevant ACCA offense (generic 

burglary).” Id. at 2251. 

The Supreme Court declared no new conception of the categorical or modified 

categorical approach in Mathis. Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that it was not 

effectuating a new legal rule, but rather using its own precedents to decide whether an 

exception to the already established law existed:

For more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior 

crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its 

elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic 

offense. The question in this case is whether ACCA makes an 

exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a 

statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one 

(or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an exception.

136 S. Ct. at 2247–48. The Court further explained, 

Our precedents make this a straightforward case. For more than 

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25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of 

ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements . . . 

whether for good or for ill, the elements-based approach 

remains the law. And we will not introduce inconsistency and 

arbitrariness into our ACCA decisions by here declining to 

follow its requirements.

Id. at 2257. The Supreme Court first established the categorical and modified categorical 

approaches described in detail and heavily relied upon in Mathis almost thirty years ago in 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Therefore, because of this reliance and the 

repeated explanation that the Mathis Court was merely following its own precedent in 

deciding the case, subsequent circuit court decisions, including the Ninth Circuit, have 

affirmed that Mathis announced no new rule of law, but merely clarified its existing 

precedent. See Arazola-Galea v. United States, 876 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Our 

subsequent decisions have confirmed the notion that Mathis is a clarification of existing 

rules rather than a new rule itself. . . . We now join our sister circuits in definitively holding 

that Mathis did not establish a new rule of constitutional law.”); see also Yates v. United 

States, 842 F.3d 1051, 1052 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Taylor, 672 F. App’x 860, 

864 (10th Cir. 2016). 

Here, it is clear that Petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to raise his claim 

challenging the application of the career-offender sentencing enhancement at least at the 

time of his first § 2255 petition, if not sooner. Indeed, Petitioner first challenged his 

sentence calculation on direct appeal. While Petitioner cites to Mathis, the existence of 

Petitioner’s argument predates the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis and definitively 

existed at the time of Petitioner’s first § 2255 petition in 2014. As explained by the Court 

in Mathis, that case was resolved entirely by the Court’s precedent and held that the 

elements-based approach is still alive and well. 136 S. Ct. at 2257. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner did have an unobstructed 

procedural shot at presenting his actual innocence claim at the time of his first § 2255 

motion and, for that reason, he may not now raise that claim in a § 2241 petition. Therefore, 

Petitioner has not successfully established that he has satisfied the requirements of the 

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escape hatch. 

B. Dismissal

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner may only bring his claim in a § 2255 motion 

because the escape hatch is unavailable to him. Because § 2255 motions must be filed in 

the district where the Petitioner was sentenced, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear a 

recharacterized § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 

818 (9th Cir. 2012). Petitioner is serving a sentence imposed by the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Missouri and therefore must file a § 2255 petition with 

that court. Thus, this Court must decide whether to dismiss the petition or transfer it to the 

Western District of Missouri. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Transfer is appropriate if three 

conditions are met: “(1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee could 

have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the 

interest of justice.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Kolek v. Engen, 869 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, as discussed above, the first 

factor is met, but the other two are not. 

Because this is a subsequent § 2255 petition, the District Court for the Western 

District of Missouri could not have exercised jurisdiction over this petition at the time the 

action was filed. Instead, Petitioner would first need to seek Eighth Circuit authorization 

to file the subsequent § 2255 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Harrison, 519 F.3d at 955. 

Since the Western District of Missouri could not have exercised jurisdiction over the claim, 

the second condition for transfer is not met. The third condition is also not met. Because 

the transferee court would not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the instant Petition, 

transfer of the case would not further the interests of justice. Therefore, dismissal of the 

instant § 2241 petition is warranted.7

 

7Some circuit courts have ruled that if a petitioner erroneously files a motion for leave to 

file a second or successive § 2255 petition in the district court or if a petitioner actually 

files a second or successive § 2255 petition in the district court without first having 

obtained circuit court authorization, then the district court has the option of transferring the 

motion or petition to the proper court of appeals. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252 

(10th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 691 (4th Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Johnson, 

313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002); Boyd v. United States, 304 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir. 2002) 

(per curiam); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 41 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999). Two circuit 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Judge enter an order DISMISSING the Petition (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack 

of jurisdiction.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. 

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-183-TUCJAS.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall 

send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.

Dated this 17th day of December, 2019.

 

courts mandate such a transfer. See In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997); Liriano v. 

United States, 95 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1996). While not explicitly expressing an opinion 

on the issue, the Ninth Circuit has seemingly determined that transfer of a petition is not 

mandatory. See Hernandez v. Campbell 204 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 

(directing the custodial court to dismiss the § 2255 petition as a secondary or successive 

filing if that court decided that the savings clause did not apply). The Tenth Circuit has 

articulated certain factors that district courts should consider in deciding whether to transfer 

a motion or petition to the circuit court including “whether the claims alleged are likely to 

have merit.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. Here, this Court is not required to transfer this 

successive § 2255 petition to the Eighth Circuit. Furthermore, for the reasons stated above, 

it is unlikely that Petitioner’s claims have merit given the lack of any new law in Mathis, 

and the Eighth Circuit has already rejected Petitioner’s requests to file a second or 

successive petition. Therefore, this Court will also not transfer this petition to the Eighth

Circuit for consideration. 

Case 4:18-cv-00183-JAS Document 17 Filed 12/17/19 Page 13 of 13