Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01269/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Copyright Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

AMA Multimedia LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sagan Limited, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-16-01269-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff AMA Multimedia, LLC (“AMA”), a producer of pornographic material, 

asserts copyright infringement claims against several entities and one individual 

associated with the website Porn.com: Sagan, Limited (“Sagan”), Cyberweb, LTD 

(“Cyberweb”), Netmedia Services, Inc. (“Netmedia”), GLP, 5, Inc. (“GLP”), and David 

Koonar. Defendants GLP and Netmedia – a Michigan corporation and Canadian 

company, respectively – move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), or, in the alternative, to stay these proceedings 

pending resolution of an action currently before the Supreme Court of Barbados. 

Doc. 27. The parties’ request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been 

fully briefed and oral argument will not aid in the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court will deny the 

stay request and hold the motion to dismiss in abeyance until limited jurisdictional 

discovery and supplemental briefing are completed. 

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I. Background. 

Porn.com is a video streaming website that generates revenue through its content 

partnership program and advertising banners. Doc. 16, ¶¶ 56–57. AMA asserts that 

Defendants Sagan, Cyberweb, Netmedia, and David Koonar are each owners and/or 

operators of Porn.com and GLP. Id., ¶¶ 46-47. AMA also alleges that GLP is doing 

business as Traffic Force, an advertising and publishing network that provides end-user 

traffic to websites for profit. Doc. 16, ¶ 47. Defendants respond that Cyberweb is the 

owner/operator of Porn.com. Doc. 27-3 at 3, ¶15. 

In September 2012, AMA joined Porn.com’s Content Partnership Program by 

entering into a content partner revenue sharing agreement (“CPRA”) with GIM Corp. 

(“GIM”). Doc. 33 at 6; Doc. 27-3 at 17. AMA agreed to the CPRA by completing an 

automated process at Paidperview.com. Doc. 33 at 6. There was no direct contact 

between AMA and any of the Defendants. Id. The CPRA granted GIM a license to use 

content provided by AMA on websites whose advertisements are controlled by Traffic 

Force. Id. The CPRA dictated the manner and form in which AMA would provide 

content, and AMA granted GIM a license only for content provided under the CPRA. Id. 

 In November 2015, AMA became aware that Porn.com had displayed 64 of 

AMA’s copyright registered works over 110 separate Porn.com affiliated URLs. Doc. 16 

at ¶ 78. In December 2015, AMA provided Defendants’ counsel with a draft complaint 

and settlement offer regarding the alleged infringement. Doc. 33 at 2. According to 

AMA, over the next four months “Defendants provided a string of delays and 

misrepresentations about the matters and settlement negotiations.” Id. In April 2016, 

AMA presented Defendants with an amended complaint and a “deadline to choose 

between accepting a settlement offer or hav[ing] the case filed in U.S. District Court, for 

the District of Arizona.” Id. at 3. Defendants requested an extension until April 28, 2016 

to consider the settlement offer, and AMA agreed. Id. 

 On April 27, 2016, Cyberweb, Netmedia, Sagan, GLP, GIM, and David Koonar 

(collectively, “Porn.com Entities”) filed a complaint against AMA and Adam Silverman 

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in the Supreme Court of Barbados. Doc. 27-3 at 17-23. The Porn.com Entities sought 

(1) injunctive relief to restrain anticipatory breach of the CPRA, (2) a declaration that any 

disputes related to the CPRA are governed by Barbados law and must be adjudicated in 

Barbados, (3) a declaration that the Porn.com Entities are entitled to rely on their rights 

under the CPRA, (4) a declaration that the Porn.com Entities are entitled to publicize and 

distribute materials provided to them by AMA and Silverman, and (5) relief for prior 

breaches of the CPRA, including damages. Id. at 17-18. 

 AMA filed this action the next day, April 28, 2016. Defendants Netmedia and 

GLP now move to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction, or, in 

the alternative, to stay these proceedings pending completion of the Barbados action. 

Docs. 27, 44, 45. 

II. Personal Jurisdiction. 

 A. Legal Standard. 

“When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” 

Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). “Where, as here, the 

defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the 

motion to dismiss.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th 

Cir. 2011). “The plaintiff cannot ‘simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,’ 

but uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.” Id. (quoting 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

Court may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading that are contradicted by an 

affidavit, but factual disputes are resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. 

 B. Personal Jurisdiction over Netmedia. 

 AMA argues that Netmedia is subject to personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Doc. 38 at 7–8. Rule 4(k)(2) provides that “serving a 

summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant” 

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if (1) the claim arises under federal law, (2) “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in 

any state’s courts of general jurisdiction,” and (3) exercising jurisdiction is consistent 

with the United States Constitution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 

 The first factor is satisfied because AMA asserts claims of copyright infringement 

under federal law. The second factor is satisfied if the defendant “does not concede to 

jurisdiction in another state.” Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 

450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Netmedia does not concede that jurisdiction 

would be proper in any state. 

 Analysis under the third factor – the due process analysis – “is nearly identical to 

traditional personal jurisdiction analysis with one significant difference: rather than 

considering contacts between the [defendant] and the forum state, we consider contacts 

with the nation as a whole.” Id. at 462. The question, then, is whether Netmedia has 

sufficient minimum contacts with the United States so that maintenance of the suit here 

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). AMA does not allege that Netmedia’s own 

contacts with the United States satisfy this requirement. AMA instead argues that 

Porn.com’s contacts with the United States can be imputed to Netmedia because of 

Netmedia is an alter ego or agent of Porn.com, and Porn.com’s contacts with the United 

States are sufficient to satisfy due process. Doc. 38 at 12. 

 The Court can dispose of the agency argument easily. The Ninth Circuit once 

recognized an agency theory for personal jurisdiction, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 

915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001), but the Supreme Court rejected this theory, noting that it would 

“subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an instate 

subsidiary or affiliate.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). The Court 

therefore will focus only on AMA’s alter ego argument. 

 1. Alter Ego Choice of Law. 

 The parties do not address what law should govern the alter ego analysis. The 

parties primarily cite two cases from the Ninth Circuit, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 

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915 (9th Cir. 2001), and Ranza v. Nike, 793 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). Unocal looked 

mostly to California law, but also cited federal court decisions from New York, Illinois, 

Delaware, and Florida. See Unocal, 248 F.3d at 926-27. Ranza applies the alter ego 

standard set forth in Unocal. See Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1071, 73-74. In the absence of any 

assertion that the law of some other state should apply, the Court will also look to Unocal 

and Ranza. 

 2. Alter Ego Analysis 

 In Ranza, the Ninth Circuit provided this explanation of the alter ego test, relying 

primarily on Unocal: 

To satisfy the alter ego test, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie 

case (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 

personalities of the two entities no longer exist and (2) that failure to 

disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or injustice. The 

“unity of interest and ownership” prong of this test requires a showing that 

the parent controls the subsidiary to such a degree as to render the latter the 

mere instrumentality of the former. This test envisions pervasive control 

over the subsidiary, such as when a parent corporation dictates every facet 

of the subsidiary’s business—from broad policy decisions to routine 

matters of day-to-day operation. Total ownership and shared management 

personnel are alone insufficient to establish the requisite level of control. 

793 F.3d at 1073 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

 AMA asserts that “Defendants have created multiple ‘companies’ which operate 

crucial and necessary aspects of Porn.com[,]” and that “[t]his has become nothing more 

than a ‘shell game.’” Doc. 38 at 2. “NetMedia IS Porn.com and Traffic Force.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). In support of its argument, AMA presents the following facts. 

 Netmedia identifies itself as an operator of Porn.com, providing services related to 

the uploading of content pursuant to a “technical services agreement with Cyberweb 

Ltd.” Doc. 38 at 4; Doc. 32-4, 11, 13. Netmedia shares a physical address and telephone 

number with Cyberweb, GIM, and the management of Traffic Force/GLP, but the placard 

on the building lists only Netmedia. Doc. 38 at 3. Under the CPRA between AMA and 

GIM regarding the posting of content on Porn.com, AMA is instructed to mail checks to 

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Cyberweb at Netmedia’s address. Doc. 32-2 at ¶ 24. Defendant Cyberweb is the stated 

owner of Porn.com, and GIM is a part owner of Cyberweb. Doc. 16, ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 38 at 

2. GIM operates the content partnership program for Porn.com, which requires joining 

partners to sign the CPRA, and from which Porn.com generates its revenue. Id. The 

CPRA limits its scope to websites “who[se] advertisements are controlled by Traffic 

Force.” Doc. 27-3 at 25. The Traffic Force terms of service identify GLP as Traffic 

Force. Doc. 38 at 5; Doc. 32-2 at 16. Traffic Force places banner ads for clients on 

Porn.com. Doc. 34-1, ¶ 21. Netmedia’s employees are Traffic Force’s personnel for 

operations. Doc. 32-5 at 5, ¶ 22; Doc. 32-2 at 5, ¶¶ 26-27. Phil Bradbury holds all 

official positions at GLP/Traffic Force and is also a Vice President of Netmedia. 

Silverman decl. 28. Defendant David Koonar is the President of GIM (Doc. 49-2, ¶ 8), a 

former Director of both Cyberweb (Doc. 32-4 at 2) and GLP (Doc. 27-3 at 7), and a 

Director of Netmedia (Doc. 27-3 at 14). 

 This evidence suggests a complicated inter-linking of these entities, but it does not 

show “such unity of interest and ownership [between Netmedia and Porn.com] that the 

separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1073. 

Discussing the holding in Unocal, the Ninth Circuit noted that even a company’s 

“(1) involvement in its subsidiaries’ acquisitions, divestments and capital expenditures; 

(2) formulation of general business policies and strategies applicable to its subsidiaries, 

including specialization in particular areas of commerce; (3) provision of loans and other 

types of financing to subsidiaries; and (4) maintenance of overlapping directors and 

officers with its subsidiaries,” is “insufficient” to deem the two entities alter egos. Id. at 

1073-74. Here, AMA provides no evidence that Netmedia and Porn.com comingle funds, 

enter into contracts on behalf of one another, assume liability for one another’s debts, fail 

to keep separate corporate records, or are inadequately capitalized – factors often 

addressed in alter ego analysis. Id. at 1074. AMA does identify some common officers 

and directors, but such overlap is not sufficient to establish an alter ego relationship. 

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998) (“It is entirely appropriate for directors 

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of a parent corporation to serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that fact alone may not 

serve to expose the parent to liability for its subsidiary’s acts.”). 

 What is more, AMA entirely disregards the second element of the alter ego test 

recognized in Ranza and Unocal: “that failure to disregard their separate identities would 

result in fraud or injustice.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1073. AMA does not address this 

requirement in its briefing. 

 So far, AMA has failed to show that Netmedia is an alter ego of Porn.com. The 

Court will permit to AMA to conduct limited discovery on this issue as described at the 

end of this order, but in the absence of more compelling evidence, Porn.com’s contacts 

with the United States will not be imputed to Netmedia for purposes of personal 

jurisdiction. 

 C. Jurisdiction over GLP. 

 AMA argues that the Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over GLP. 

Doc. 38 at 7. Specific jurisdiction exists where (1) the defendant purposefully directed 

his activities at the forum or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated conduct, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 AMA asserts the following facts. GLP does business as Traffic Force. Docs. 38-1 

at 16; see also id. 38-2 at 2. Traffic Force places banner ads for clients on video 

streaming websites, including Porn.com. Id. at 4, ¶ 2. Traffic Force sends employees to 

the Phoenix Forum – an annual industry tradeshow held in Arizona – to solicit business, 

including from Arizona-based companies. Doc. 38-4 at 65, ¶¶ 30-34. In 2015, Traffic 

Force entered a contract with an Arizona company – Oppenheit, LLC – to display 

advertisements on sooshtime.com, a pornographic website. Doc. 38-5 at 2-3. 

 Even if these contacts showed that GLP purposefully availed itself of the privilege 

of conducting activities in Arizona (an issue the Court need not decide), AMA has not 

shown that its claims against GLP arise out of these contacts. AMA makes no effort to 

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explain how Traffic Force’s participation in the Phoenix Forum relates to the copyright 

claims in this case. See Doc. 38 at 18-19. AMA does assert that the shooshtime.com ads 

“are the subject of [its] copyright claims,” (id.), but this allegation does not appear in the 

complaint, and AMA does not explain the connection between Porn.com’s allegedly 

illegal display of AMA’s content and ads that appear on a different pornographic website. 

AMA has not shown that this case arises out of GLP’s contacts with Arizona. 

D. AMA’s request to conduct Jurisdictional Discovery 

 The court may order jurisdictional discovery where “pertinent facts bearing on the 

question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the 

facts is necessary.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1977). The Court will grant limited jurisdictional discovery as set forth below. 

Because the Court will allow this discovery, it will not enter a final ruling on the motions 

to dismiss until the discovery and supplemental briefing are completed. 

III. Forum Selection Clause. 

 In the ordinary case, a federal court will enforce a valid forum selection clause by 

dismissing an action filed in a forum other than the one specified in the clause. Atl. 

Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013). Defendants argue 

that the Court should dismiss this action because the CPRA contains a forum selection 

clause which provides that “[a]ny legal action arising out of or relating to this Agreement 

must be instituted in a court located in Barbados.” Doc. 27-3 at 30, § 10.5. 

 A claim is subject to a forum selection clause if the claim “relates in some way to 

rights and duties enumerated in” a related contract. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., 

Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1988). For example, a forum selection clause will be 

enforced if the defendant asserts a contract-based defense to a claim. Id. In the 

analogous area of patent infringement, however, federal courts have recognized that 

infringement actions should not be dismissed or transferred merely on the basis of an 

allegation that a contract with a forum selection clause contains a license for the patent’s 

use. “[I]f all that is required is a license and a bare allegation that it provides a defense, 

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then virtually every subsequent dispute between contracting parties would trigger such a 

forum selection clause.” Gen. Protecht Grp., Inc. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 651 F.3d 1355, 

1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011). To avoid this risk, courts require that the party seeking to enforce 

the forum selection clause raise “a non-frivolous dispute regarding the scope of a patent 

license.” Id. 

 Defendants have failed to present a non-frivolous argument that the CPRA 

licenses the conduct complained of in this case. The agreement refers to AMA as 

“Licensor” and the Porn.com Entities as “Licensee.” Section 1.1 then provides: 

Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, with respect 

to any and all Content that Licensor submits or provides to Licensee, 

Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive, nontransferable worldwide 

license during the Term to use, publish, display, and distribute the Content 

on the Websites(s). 

Doc. 27-3 at 25, § 1.1 (emphasis added).1

 

 The license granted by this section is expressly limited to content that AMA 

“submits or provides” to the Porn.com Entities. Section 1.1 then makes clear that “[n]o 

license to any other intellectual property of Licensor . . . is provided hereby.” Id. A later 

provision states that “[a]ll rights in and to the Content not expressly licensed to Licensee 

under Section 1.1 are reserved to Licensor.” Id., § 1.3. 

 Section 4 of the CPRA is titled “Provision of Content.” Doc. 27-3 at 27. It makes 

clear that AMA is to provide material to the Porn.com Entities for their subsequent 

distribution. See, e.g., § 4.1 (“Licensor shall provide the content,” “Licensor shall 

provide all the materials”); 4.3 (“Licensor reserves the right not to provide Licensee with 

any item of Content”); 4.6 (“Licensor shall have sole responsibility for providing, at its 

own expense, the Content to Licensee”). Exhibit B to the CPRA is titled “Acceptable 

Methods of Delivery,” and states that “Licensor shall have the sole responsibility for 

providing, at its own expense, the Content.” Doc. 27-3 at 31. It then provides four 

 

1

 “Content” is defined as follows: “Licensor [AMA] is and attests that he is the 

author, license holder, and/or aggregator of certain sexually explicit content (the “Content”).” Doc. 27-3 at 25, § A. 

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methods by which AMA may deliver the content to the Porn.com Entities – file transfer, 

delivery of physical copies, delivery on a hard drive, or by uploading material to the 

Porn.com Entities’ PaidPerView account. Id. Each method involves an affirmative 

action by AMA to provide the content. 

 AMA does not assert claims in this case related to content it provided to the 

Porn.com Entities under the CPRA. Doc 16, ¶ 63. AMA instead alleges that the 

Porn.com Entities published AMA content that they took from other locations on the 

Internet without AMA’s knowledge or consent. Id., ¶¶ 78, 82. The Porn.com Entities do 

not argue that AMA knew of or consented to the publication of this content. Nor do they 

present any evidence that they acted in accordance with the CPRA in handling this 

content by, for example, paying royalties to AMA. Thus, AMA’s copyright infringement 

claims are wholly unrelated to content provided under the CPRA, and the contract’s 

forum selection clause is inapplicable. 

 The Porn.com Entities argue that they had the “express right” under the CPRA to 

download AMA’s content from other locations on the Internet, but the CPRA says 

nothing of the kind. True, it grants the Porn.com Entities a broad license to distribute the 

content provided by AMA under the CPRA, but nowhere does it suggest that the 

Porn.com Entities can acquire that content for themselves from other sources on the 

Internet. The only provision Defendants cite to support this assertion is found in a 

section of the contract titled “Compensation,” and reads as follows: 

In the event that the Content originates and/or is associated with an existing 

website associated with Licensor, Licensee may amongst its various 

methodologies, direct traffic to any such website and Licensee shall be 

compensated for any revenues generated as a result of Licensee directing 

such traffic. 

Doc. 27-1 at 27, § 3.9. This provision states that the Porn.com Entities will receive 

compensation if they direct Internet users to AMA’s websites. It says nothing about how 

the content for which AMA is to be paid may be procured by the Porn.com Entities. 

 In sum, Defendants have failed to present a non-frivolous argument that the CPRA 

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bars AMA’s copyright infringements claims. Gen. Protecht Grp., 651 F.3d at 1359. 

Those claims relate to materials acquired and published by Defendants outside the terms 

of the CPRA and are not subject to its license provisions. Because the claims do not arise 

out of or relate to the CPRA, they are not subject to its forum selection clause. 

IV. Abstention. 

 Defendants ask the Court to stay this case pending resolution of the Barbados 

action, pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 

U.S. 800 (1976). The Court declines to do so. 

 Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 

jurisdiction given them.” Id. at 817. In “exceptional circumstances,” however, federal 

courts may abstain from deciding a case over which they have jurisdiction. Id. Where a 

state or foreign proceeding runs parallel to the federal case, for example, “considerations 

of wise judicial administration” may favor abstention. Id.; see AAR Int’l, Inc. v. Nimelias 

Enterprises S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001) (Colorado River framework applies 

where court is asked to abstain based on parallel foreign proceedings). The threshold 

question is whether “the two proceedings are substantially similar.” Nakash v. Marciano, 

882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989). If not – because “a substantial doubt” exists “as to 

whether the [foreign] proceedings will resolve the federal action” – abstention is 

improper. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 AMA argues that the Barbados action is not substantially similar to this action. 

Doc. 33 at 8-13. The Court agrees. The only issue in the Barbados action is whether 

AMA breached the CPRA. See Doc. 27-3 at 17-18. As explained above, the CPRA is 

not implicated by this case. The issue here is whether the Porn.com Entities infringed 

AMA’s copyrights by publishing AMA content obtained without AMA’s knowledge or 

consent. Complaint, ¶¶ 78, 82. The CPRA does not apply to such content. 

 The Porn.com Entities argue that they were authorized to distribute pirated AMA 

content pursuant to the CPRA. Doc. 27-1 at 18-19. As explained, that argument is 

frivolous. Because it is exceedingly unlikely that the Barbados Supreme Court would 

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adopt the Porn.com Entities’ argument, there is a “substantial doubt as to whether the 

[foreign] proceedings will resolve the federal action” and abstention is inappropriate. 

Intel Corp., 12 F.3d at 913.2

 In addition, GLP is no longer involved in the Barbados 

action. Doc. 27-1 at 18 n. 3; Doc. 34-4 at 14. The action therefore will not resolve 

AMA’s claims with respect to GLP. 

 The Porn.com Entities argue, in the alternative, that the Court should stay the 

matter under Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Under Leyva, “[a] trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket 

and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending 

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Id. at 863. Because 

the Barbados action is unlikely to have any bearing on this case, it would neither be fair 

nor efficient to stay this action pending resolution of that case. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. A final ruling on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 27) regarding Netmedia and 

GLP will be issued after the Court receives the supplemental briefing 

discussed below. 

2. The motion to stay proceedings pending the outcome of the Barbados 

action (Doc. 27) is denied. 

3. AMA will have until December 2, 2016 to complete limited jurisdictional 

discovery. The discovery may include up to 5 document production 

requests and 10 interrogatories served on each Defendant. AMA may also 

conduct one Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of no more than 7 hours, and three 

other fact depositions of no more than 5 hours each. This discovery should 

 

2

 The Porn.com Entities cite two cases where district courts stayed copyright infringement cases pending resolution of a foreign case construing a related licensing agreement. These cases are distinguishable because each involved a plausible contract 

defense to the charge of copyright infringement. See Seven Arts Pictures PLC v. 

Fireworks Entm’t, Inc., 244 F. App’x 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Seven Arts 

acknowledges that it possesses the copyrights in question only if [its contracts with the 

defendant] are unenforceable.”); CRC Info. Sys., Inc. v. Quebecor World (USA), Inc., No. 03-cv-0591, Doc. 33 at 10-12 (D. Ariz., July 21, 2003) (contract provided defendant with license to use the very software at issue in plaintiff’s copyright claim). 

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cover issues raised in all of the pending motions to dismiss (and any 

potential motion by Cyberweb Ltd.), not just those raised in the motion 

addressed in this order. By December 9, 2016, AMA shall file a 

supplemental memorandum that applies to all Defendants and does not 

exceed 17 pages. Defendants may collectively file a joint response, not to 

exceed 17 pages, by December 21, 2016. No reply memorandum will be 

permitted unless ordered by the Court. 

4. The parties should complete briefing of the pending motions to dismiss on 

the schedule provided by the relevant rules. If Defendant Cyberweb is 

going to file a motion to dismiss, that motion shall be filed by 

October 12, 2016. In light of the jurisdictional discovery that is being 

allowed, the Court recognizes that the schedule set forth in the Case 

Management Order (Doc. 58) may need to be adjusted once it rules on the 

motions to dismiss. If the parties find that the schedule requires adjustment 

after the Court rules, they should place a joint conference call to the Court 

promptly. 

Dated this 5th day of October, 2016. 

Case 2:16-cv-01269-DGC Document 62 Filed 10/05/16 Page 13 of 13