Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00408/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00408-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IZEAR KEGLER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

JAMED D. HARTLEY, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:08-CV-00408 LJO JMD HC

ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Izear Kegler (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On March 23, 2009, the Court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that there

was some evidence in the form of the commitment offense to support the denial of parole. The

Court further found that a certificate of appealability was not required to proceed on appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

On April 16, 2009, Petitioner appealed the Court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit. On May 18,

2010, pursuant to new Ninth Circuit authority, the case was remanded to the district court for the 1

limited purpose of granting or denying a certificate of appealability.

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides that a circuit judge or judge may

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). As noted in the Ninth Circuit’s order

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remanding this case to the district court, the Hayward decision overruled previous Ninth Circuit authority that relieved a

prisoner from obtaining a certificate of appealability where the prisoner was challenging the denial of parole.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

Case 1:08-cv-00408-LJO-JMD Document 25 Filed 06/10/10 Page 1 of 3
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issue a certificate of appealability where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” Where the court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a

certificate of appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate

“something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.”

Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1040. 

Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would disagree on whether there was some

evidence of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. As enunciated by the Ninth Circuit, the current

standard for courts in this circuit is “whether the California judicial decision approving the

governor’s decision rejecting parole was an “unreasonable application” of the California “some

evidence” requirement, or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.” Hayward, 603 F.3d 546, 563 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2))

(emphasis added). Under California law, the inquiry is whether there was some evidence to support

the finding that Petitioner is currently dangerous. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205 (2008);

see Pearson, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2108964, * 4 (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 in stating

“California has created a parole system that independently requires the enforcement of certain

procedural and substantive rights, including the right to parole absence ‘some evidence’ of current

dangerousness”); see also Cooke v. Solis, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2267018, * 6-7 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement is a component of the liberty interest created

by the parole system of that state”). Pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of its

some evidence standard, immutable factors cannot constitute some evidence of current

dangerousness “absent articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current

dangerousness.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1227. A reasonable jurists may likewise argue that

the parole board’s reliance on disciplinary infractions that occurred almost two decades prior to the

parole hearing is analogous to reliance on immutable factors and would not constitute some evidence

of current dangerousness. See Cooke, 2010 WL 2267018, *8 (finding that two minor non violent

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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disciplinary infractions that occurred one decade prior to parole hearing does not provide evidence of

current dangerousness). Thus, the Court finds that reasonable jurists can disagree on whether

disciplinary infractions that occurred almost two decades prior to the hearing and the commitment

offense constitutes sufficient evidence of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS a certificate of appealability in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

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