Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02403/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEITH WILKINS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

K. FARRIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-2403 WBS AC P 

ORDER 

Plaintiff is a state inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

without a lawyer. He has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this 

action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 

afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis is granted.1

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 

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 This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 filing fee in monthly installments that are 

taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As 

part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust 

account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order directed to CDCR requires monthly 

payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be taken from plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

Case 2:23-cv-02403-WBS-AC Document 8 Filed 01/02/25 Page 1 of 7
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claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 

an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 

at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 

arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 

court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 

considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

II. Factual Allegations of the Complaint 

The complaint alleges that defendants Farris, McCoard, and Fujiwara violated plaintiff’s 

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 1. Specifically, plaintiff claims 

that Farris violated his rights by falsely writing him up for refusing to house even though plaintiff 

was already housed in a cell and Farris did not have a cellmate for him or a different cell to move 

him to. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further asserts that Farris put his safety in danger by trying to put 

violent inmates in cells with each other and targeted plaintiff because of his race. Id. at 4. 

McCoard violated plaintiff’s due process rights by not properly reviewing the disciplinary report 

Farris wrote and Fujiwara failed to stop the disciplinary proceedings and falsified documents to 

say that plaintiff walked out of the disciplinary hearing. Id. at 3. As a result of the disciplinary, 

plaintiff lost good-time credits along with other privileges. Id. at 3-4. 

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Case 2:23-cv-02403-WBS-AC Document 8 Filed 01/02/25 Page 2 of 7
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III. Failure to State a Claim 

 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 

complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth or Fourteenth 

Amendments. Although plaintiff has alleged that he lost good-time credits, and was therefore 

entitled to some due process, he does not allege that he was denied any of the limited due process 

protections afforded to disciplinary proceedings (i.e., twenty-four hour written notice of the 

charges, a written statement of the evidence relied on to find him guilty, an opportunity to call 

witnesses or present evidence, assistance if he is illiterate or the matter complex, a sufficiently 

impartial fact finder, and some evidence to support the finding of guilt). The disciplinary reports 

themselves fail to support a claim for relief because there is no constitutional right to be free from 

false accusations. To the extent plaintiff alleges Farris’ conduct was racially motivated, there are 

no facts to support this conclusory assertion. Similarly, there are no facts supporting plaintiff’s 

claim that Farris’ conduct put him in danger because plaintiff explicitly alleges that Farris did not 

actually attempt to house plaintiff with another inmate. Because of these defects, the court will 

not order the complaint to be served on defendants. 

Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding 

whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with the relevant legal standards 

governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this order. See Attachment A. 

IV. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 

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 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 

Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 

claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If 

you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this 

order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights. 

Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 

CONCLUSION 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 

3. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 

number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” 

5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 

recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

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Procedure. 

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 

form used in this district. 

DATED: December 30, 2024 

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Attachment A 

This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may 

apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an 

amended complaint. 

I. Disciplinary Due Process 

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Rather, with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings that include the loss 

of good-time credits, an inmate must receive (1) twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the 

charges against him, id. at 563-64; (2) “a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence 

relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action,” id. at 564 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence where doing so 

“will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,” id. at 566; (4) 

assistance at the hearing if he is illiterate or if the matter is complex, id. at 570; and (5) a 

sufficiently impartial fact finder, id. at 570-71. A finding of guilt must also be “supported by 

some evidence in the record.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

II. False Statements 

A prisoner has no constitutionally-guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 

accused of conduct that may lead to disciplinary sanctions. See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 

450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the 

disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge generally fail to state a claim under section 

1983. See Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140– 41 (7th Cir. 1984). An exception exists 

when the fabrication of charges infringed on the inmate's substantive constitutional rights, such as 

when false charges are made in retaliation for an inmate's exercise of a constitutionally protected 

right. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452 (holding that filing of a false disciplinary charge in retaliation 

for a grievance filed by an inmate is actionable under section 1983. 

III. Equal Protection 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 

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similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him 

based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, a 

plaintiff may state an equal protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate government 

purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). 

IV. Failure to Protect 

“[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. 

First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or 

omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, 

the prison official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, “one of deliberate 

indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 

official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. He must then fail to take reasonable 

measures to lessen the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. Negligent failure to protect an 

inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 835. 

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