Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08088/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Deborah O’Grady-Spear, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-08088-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Deborah O’Grady-Spear’s appeal from the 

Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability benefits, disability 

insurance benefits, and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. 

Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding that 

(1) Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia is neither medically determinable nor severe, (2) Plaintiff’s 

migraines are not severe, and (3) Plaintiff is not credible. The Court now rules on 

Plaintiff’s appeal. 

I. Background 

 A. Procedural Background 

On November 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for disability and disability 

insurance benefits. (Tr. 16).1

 On December 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for 

supplemental security income. (Id.) In her applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset 

 

1

 Citations to “Tr.” are to the certified administrative transcript of record. 

(Doc. 17). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 1 of 16
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

date of May 31, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on July 18, 2012, and 

upon reconsideration on November 1, 2012. (Id.) Plaintiff timely requested a hearing, 

which was conducted before ALJ Paula Fow via videoconference on July 16, 2013. (Id.) 

On September 19, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 26). After 

Plaintiff’s request for review by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council was 

denied, she commenced this action in federal court on May 5, 2015. (Doc. 1). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Background 

Plaintiff was born in 1951 and lives with her husband in Flagstaff, Arizona. 

(Tr. 48, 97). Plaintiff completed high school and multiple years of college before working 

for several decades as a bookkeeper, auditor, office manager, accounting clerk, and retail 

manager. (Tr. 48, 61, 72). Currently, Plaintiff’s sole source of income is from retirement 

social security benefits. (Tr. 49). 

 In 2006, an ALJ determined that Plaintiff was disabled and entitled to social 

security benefits from September 4, 2000 through August 31, 2005. (Tr. 75). During that 

closed period of disability, Plaintiff suffered from the following impairments: 

fibromyalgia, asthma, obesity, sinus problems, affective disorder-moderate, and cervical 

arthritis. (Tr. 73). The ALJ found, however, that on September 1, 2005, Plaintiff 

“experienced ‘medical improvement’ related to her ability to work” and “retained the 

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary exertional work.” (Tr. 74). 

Consequently, as of September 1, 2005, Plaintiff has not been found disabled under social 

security standards. Plaintiff now seeks disability with an alleged onset date of May 31, 

2007. (Doc. 1). 

II. Legal Standard 

The ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence” means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 2 of 16
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 

would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. 

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining whether 

there is substantial evidence to support a decision, the Court considers the record as a 

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and the evidence 

that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “Where evidence is 

susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion which 

must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences 

logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted); see 

Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is 

because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); 

see Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports 

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On the other hand, the Court “may 

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

 Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own 

judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. Rather, the Court’s inquiry is 

constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of 

those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show that, among other things, she is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 3 of 16
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is: 

under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments 

are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but 

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 

Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

 B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 

721. A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential process will end the inquiry. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, 

but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The 

five steps are as follows: 

 1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be considered severe, the impairment must “significantly limit[] 

[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). 

Basic work activities are the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs,” such as lifting, 

carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions, 

responding appropriately to co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine. Id.

§ 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either have lasted for “a continuous period 

of at least twelve months,” be expected to last for such a period, or be expected “to result 

in death.” Id. § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The 

“step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 4 of 16
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not have a 

severe medically determinable impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. 

 3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without further inquiry. If not, 

before proceeding to the next step, the ALJ will make a finding regarding the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] 

case record.” Id. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is the most 

he can still do despite all his impairments, including those that are not severe, and any 

related symptoms. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). 

 4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the claimant 

can still perform “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this 

determination, the ALJ compares its “residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the 

physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(f). 

If the claimant can still perform the kind of work he previously did, the claimant is not 

disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step. 

 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In 

making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s “residual functional 

capacity” and his “age, education, and work experience.” Id. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the 

claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other 

work, he will be found disabled. 

 In evaluating the claimant’s disability under this five-step process, the ALJ must 

consider all evidence in the case record. See id. § 404.1520(a)(3); id. § 404.1520b. This 

includes medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and third-party reporting. 

See id. §§ 404.1527, 404.1529; Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06–3p, 71 Fed. Reg. 

45593-03. 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 5 of 16
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. The ALJ’s Evaluation under the Five-Step Process 

 At step one of the sequential evaluation process the ALJ found that Plaintiff did 

not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of May 31, 2007. 

(Tr. 18). At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following “severe 

impairments: diabetes mellitus; fibromyalgia; sinus migraines; asthma and obesity.” (Id.) 

The ALJ deemed these impairments “severe” because they “have caused and will 

continue to cause more than minimal work-related functional limitations.” (Tr. 18–19). 

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or 

equal any of the listed impairments in the Social Security regulations. (Tr. 20). 

 Before moving to step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC determination in light of 

Plaintiff’s testimony and the objective medical evidence. (Id.) The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work” with several 

physical limitations and stated that her fibromyalgia “does not meet the requirements set 

forth by the Social Security Administration needed for the determination that 

fibromyalgia is a medically determinable impairment.” (Tr. 20, 22). The also ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s “medical records do not contain any objective findings suggesting that her 

migraines have imposed significant limitation on her ability to perform basic work 

activities for any continuous 12-month period.” (Tr. 23). 

 At step four, the ALJ found that based on the assessed RFC, Plaintiff could 

perform her past work of accounting clerk, office manager, and retail manager. (Tr. 25). 

At step five, the ALJ declined to make an alternative finding that Plaintiff could perform 

other jobs existing in the national economy. (Tr. 25–26). Because Plaintiff could perform 

her past work, the ALJ held that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 26). 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff makes three arguments for why the Court should set aside the ALJ’s 

decision and remand her case for further proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that 

the ALJ erred in her findings regarding Plaintiff’s (1) fibromyalgia, (2) migraines, and 

(3) credibility. (Doc. 19). The Court will address each argument in turn. 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 6 of 16
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Fibromyalgia 

 1. Background 

 The Court first turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by finding that 

Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was neither “medically determinable” nor “severe.” (Doc. 19 at 

4–10). Initially, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s fibromyalgia findings were contradictory. 

(Id.) Particularly, Plaintiff finds internally inconsistent the ALJ’s factual finding at step 

two that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was “severe” and the ALJ’s later finding that Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia was “not medically determinable.” (Id. at 5–6).2

 Regardless of the 

decision’s consistency, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that her 

fibromyalgia was not “medically determinable.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ 

inaccurately found that she failed to establish the requisite number of tender points 

needed for fibromyalgia and that all other potential causes of her symptoms had been 

excluded by a licensed physician. (Id. at 4–14). Plaintiff insists that the ALJ’s error was 

not harmless because it made “meaningful judicial review [impossible] since, by 

definition, the ALJ’s error is an error of omission.” (Id. at 9–10). 

 In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision is not contradictory. 

(Doc. 23 at 4–8). The Commissioner explains that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia 

to be a “severe” impairment at step two and “[a]lthough the ALJ’s wording may not have 

been clear, the ALJ did not conclude that fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable 

impairment.” (Id. at 6). According to the Commissioner, when the ALJ stated that 

Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia “does not meet the requirements set forth by the Social Security 

Administration needed for the determination that fibromyalgia is a medically 

determinable impairment,” (Tr. 22), the ALJ was “explaining that Plaintiff’s medical 

records during the relevant period detracted from Plaintiff’s claims of disability following 

her alleged onset date,” (Doc. 23 at 6). The Commissioner also asserts that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the record evidence did not establish the 

 

2

 Due to this inconsistency, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that her 

fibromyalgia was “neither ‘medically determinable’ or ‘severe.’” (Id. at 4). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 7 of 16
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

requisite number of tender points or that a licensed physician excluded all other 

impairments before diagnosing Plaintiff with fibromyalgia. (Id. at 6–8). 

 2. Analysis 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, the ALJ found, in relevant part: 

 3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: diabetes 

mellitus; fibromyalgia; sinus migraines; asthma and obesity. 

 The medical evidence of record documents the existence of the 

above-mentioned impairments. The claimant’s symptoms arising from her 

diabetes mellitus; fibromyalgia; sinus migraines and asthma have caused 

and will continue to cause more than minimal work-related functional 

limitations. As such, the undersigned finds these impairments ‘severe.’ 

(Tr. 18–19) (internal citations omitted). 

 The record contains several references to the diagnosis of 

fibromyalgia. However, these medical records do not confirm that the 

claimant has the requisite number of tender point findings (or any tender 

points) and there is no evidence that licensed physicians have excluded 

other impairments as required in SSR 12-2p. Moreover, physical 

examination shows gait and station as ‘normal’; head and neck as ‘normal’ 

alignment and mobility[;] and the spine, ribs and pelvis show ‘normal’ 

alignment and mobility with no deformity. Consequently, the undersigned 

finds that this impairment does not meet the requirements set forth by the 

Social Security Administration needed for the determination that 

fibromyalgia is a medically determinable impairment. 

(Tr. 22) (internal citations omitted). 

 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s findings are internally inconsistent. 

The Commissioner’s artful attempt to reconcile the findings by rewording them is 

unpersuasive. As readily seen, the ALJ expressly found at step two that Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia was a “severe impairment,” but when crafting the RFC, stated that her 

fibromyalgia was not a “medically determinable impairment.” There can be no debate 

that these findings contradict each another as an “impairment” must be “medically 

determinable” to be “severe.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The Court therefore 

concludes that the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia were in error. 

 Nonetheless, not all errors mandate reversal of an ALJ’s non-disability decision. If 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 8 of 16
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

an error is “harmless,” i.e., “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination[,]” reversal is prohibited. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quotations omitted). The burden of establishing that an “error is harmful normally 

falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. at 1111 (citing Shinseki v. 

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). In this case, the ALJ performed a full five-step 

evaluation and crafted Plaintiff’s RFC after finding that her fibromyalgia was not a 

medically determinable impairment. (Tr. 22). Thus, the ALJ’s inconsistent findings did 

not prevent a complete review of Plaintiff’s application. Accordingly, if substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was not a medically 

determinable impairment under the Social Security Rulings (“SSR”), the Court will not 

reverse the ALJ’s decision because the internal inconsistency would be harmless. 

 For fibromyalgia to be considered a medically determinable impairment, Plaintiff 

must establish the following three elements: (1) a history of widespread pain, (2) at least 

eleven positive tender points on physical examination, and (3) evidence that other 

disorders that could cause the symptoms or signs were excluded by a licensed physician. 

SSR 12-2p.3

 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was not a medically 

determinable impairment for several reasons. First, the ALJ explained that the record was 

devoid of any medical evidence establishing the requisite number of tender points. 

(Tr. 22). Second, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that a 

licensed physician excluded all other impairments before diagnosing fibromyalgia. (Id.) 

Third, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff was purportedly diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 

1985 but was able to work for nearly two dozen years thereafter. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff did not see specialists for treatment and her physical examination 

showed normal findings as to her gait, station, head, neck, spine, ribs, and pelvis. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her findings regarding tender points and 

 

3

 The Court notes that even if all three of these elements are proven, SSR 12-2p 

does not obligate the Social Security Administration to find that a claimant has a 

medically determinable impairment of fibromyalgia. Rather, SSR 12-2p states that the 

Social Security Administration “may find” same. 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 9 of 16
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

exclusion of other impairments. (Doc. 19 at 6–8). Plaintiff cites several documents in the 

record in attempt to show that she established the requisite number of tender points. (Id.) 

However, some of the medical evidence Plaintiff identifies is from several years before 

Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of May 31, 2007. See (Tr. 341). Moreover, the 2010 

consultative examiner report to which Plaintiff cites does not establish the requisite 

number of tender points and in fact observes that Plaintiff was capable of working with 

only minor limitations. (Tr. 375–81) (noting that Plaintiff “was tender at points delineated 

for fibromyalgia as well as control points in between” but could “stand and/or walk” for 

six to eight hours per workday and had no limitations sitting).4

 On the other hand, Glenn 

R. Kunsman, a 2012 consultative examiner whose opinion was assigned “great weight” 

by the ALJ, diagnosed Plaintiff with “fibromyalgia with 18 positive tender points.” 

(Tr. 426). However, Dr. Kunsman concluded that Plaintiff’s conditions would not 

“impose any limitations for 12 continuous months.” (Id.) Because a medically 

determinable impairment must be expected to last for twelve months or result in death, 

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff 

failed to establish the requisite number of tender points. 

 Plaintiff also contends she provided evidence that a licensed physician rejected all 

other potential causes of her symptoms before diagnosing fibromyalgia. (Doc. 19 at 7–8). 

The Court disagrees. As before, Plaintiff points to medical records that were applicable to 

her prior disability between 2000 and 2005. (Id.) However, the ALJ who awarded 

Plaintiff benefits for that closed period specifically found that Plaintiff improved from her 

disability and was not disabled as of August 31, 2005. (Tr. 75). Accordingly, any 

evidence establishing Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia before that date is irrelevant to the present 

inquiry of whether her fibromyalgia was a medically determinable impairment at the time 

of the alleged onset date in this case, May 31, 2007. Beyond this material, Plaintiff 

identifies no other evidence showing that a licensed physician excluded all other causes 

 

4

 Similarly, Plaintiff cites to a 2006 report which does not expressly state that all 

other potential causes of her symptoms had been excluded. See (Tr. 337). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 10 of 16
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of her symptoms before diagnosing fibromyalgia.5 Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff failed to show that a licensed physician excluded 

other causes of Plaintiff’s symptoms and signs before diagnosing fibromyalgia. 

 3. Conclusion for Plaintiff’s Fibromyalgia 

For the reasons set forth above, after “look[ing] at the record as a whole to 

determine whether the ALJ’s error alters the outcome of the case,” the Court concludes 

that although the ALJ issued contradictory findings as to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, the 

error was harmless as it was “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 

B. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Migraines 

 1. Background 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff’s sinus migraines 

were “severe” but not “vocationally severe.” (Doc. 19 at 10–14) (citing Tr. 18, 23). 

Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ provides no explanation for why she found migraines to 

be ‘severe’ but then concluded that there was no evidence that they ‘imposed limitations.’ 

. . . [I]t is impossible as a matter of law for impairment to be severe and cause no 

limitations at all.” (Doc. 24 at 4) (citations omitted). Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ 

erred by considering “objective medical findings” when reviewing the severity of 

Plaintiff’s migraines because migraines are a “diagnosis of exclusion.” (Doc. 19 at 12). 

Plaintiff also insists that the ALJ erred by not expressly considering Listing of 

Impairment – Adult Listing (“Listing”) 11.03. (Id. at 11). 

 In response, the Commissioner explains that “[r]ather than questioning the 

existence of [Plaintiff’s] headaches, the ALJ noted a lack of evidence that these 

headaches imposed significant limitation on work activity.” (Doc. 23 at 9). The 

Commissioner argues the ALJ properly considered objective medical evidence when 

 

5

 Plaintiff states that Dr. Kunsman noted that Plaintiff has a “long history of 

fibromyalgia.” (Doc. 19 at 7). Dr. Kunsman, however, never expressly excluded all other 

impairments. (Tr. 421–26). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 11 of 16
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

determining the severity of Plaintiff’s migraines. (Id.) Finally, the Commissioner 

contends that while the ALJ did not “expressly” consider Listing 11.03, the ALJ 

“implicitly” analyzed the Listing. (Id. at 10). 

 2. Analysis 

 The ALJ made the following findings: (1) Plaintiff’s migraines were a “severe” 

impairment at step two, (Tr. 18–19), and (2) Plaintiff “failed to prove she has a 

vocationally ‘severe’ migraine condition” because her “medical records do not contain 

any objective findings suggesting that her migraines have imposed significant limitations 

on her ability to perform basic work activities for any continuous 12-month period,” 

(Tr. 23). As with fibromyalgia, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that these findings are 

internally inconsistent. A “severe” impairment means the impairment “significantly limits 

[a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(c). At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s migraines were a “severe 

medically determinable impairment” but found expressly to the contrary when crafting 

Plaintiff’s RFC. This was error. 

 Nonetheless, as outlined above, reversal of a non-disability determination is 

improper if the ALJ’s error was harmless. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ 

erred by reviewing “objective medical findings” as a means to reject Plaintiff’s subjective 

pain testimony. (Doc. 19 at 12). However, although the existence of subjective pain 

testimony cannot be rejected solely due to lack of corroborating objective medical 

evidence, an ALJ may properly look to objective medical evidence to determine the 

vocational severity of an applicant’s complaints. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 

857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole 

ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical 

evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its 

disabling effects.” (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2))). Here, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff’s “medical records do not contain any objective findings suggesting that her 

migraines have imposed significant limitations on her ability to perform basic work 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 12 of 16
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

activities for any continuous 12-month period.” (Tr. 23). Beyond her own statements of 

severity, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record establishing that her 

migraines imposed more than minimal related work limitations. Thus, assuming the 

existence of Plaintiff’s migraines, the ALJ properly reviewed the “objective findings” of 

the medical record and found the severity of the migraines to be nominal. Accordingly, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s migraines were not 

“vocationally severe” due to the lack of “objective findings” in the medical record. (Id.)

6

 Moreover, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by not expressly identifying 

Listing 11.03 in the decision. Listing 11.03 identifies non-convulsive seizures as those 

which cause significant interference with daytime activities. Here, the ALJ considered the 

relevant aspects of Listing 11.03 in her analysis by discussing the lack of evidence that 

Plaintiff’s migraines caused significant interference in basic daily activities. (Tr. 23). 

 3. Conclusion for Plaintiff’s Migraines 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by issuing contradictory 

findings as to Plaintiff’s migraines; however, because this error was inconsequential to 

the ALJ’s ultimate non-disability determination, it was harmless. Therefore, the Court 

will not remand for further proceedings based on this error. 

C. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 1. Background 

As her final contention of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found her 

to be non-credible without considering her documented lack of health insurance and 

“incredibly strong work record.” (Doc. 19 at 14). The Commissioner responds that 

Plaintiff failed to establish her inability to afford medical coverage. (Doc. 23 at 12). The 

Commissioner also contends that the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s work history was a 

reasonable interpretation of the evidence. (Id. at 13–15). 

6

 The Court notes that following her alleged onset date, Plaintiff consistently and 

repeatedly denied having any problems with headaches. See (Tr. 361, 394, 439, 444, 452, 

468, 472). Although the ALJ did not cite these documents in the decision, the ALJ 

properly relied upon the lack of evidence as to the severity of Plaintiff’s migraines. 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 13 of 16
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 2. Analysis 

 a. Health Insurance 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her credibility determination by failing to 

consider Plaintiff’s “documented” lack of health insurance. (Doc. 19 at 14). According to 

Plaintiff, the ALJ erred by “cit[ing] lack of objective evidence in addition to alleged 

‘conservative treatment’ as a basis to discredit her symptoms without acknowledging her 

lack of medical insurance[.]” (Id. at 15). The record, however, does not establish that 

Plaintiff lacked the means to obtain necessary medical treatment. Simply because a 

claimant does not have medical insurance does not mean that she cannot obtain necessary 

medical treatment. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s testimony clearly indicates that she has 

been able to obtain the necessary medications for her ailments. See (Tr. 54–56) (listing 

current medications as estrodiol, metformin, guaifenesin, furosemide, atenolol, Lisinopril, 

levothyroxine, Effexor XR, albuterol spray, azmacort, and nortriptyline). Plaintiff does 

not point to evidence that establishes she was unable to afford necessary treatment due to 

a lack of health insurance, and her treatment records indicate that she has been able to 

obtain ongoing medical care throughout her alleged disability period. See (Tr. 337–39, 

347–68, 386–420, 438–53, 462–79). Consequently, as Plaintiff failed to establish that she 

was unable to afford necessary medical treatment, the ALJ did not err by considering 

Plaintiff’s “conservative treatment” as a factor diminishing Plaintiff’s credibility. 

 b. Work History 

Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to consider her “incredibly 

strong work record” in the credibility analysis. (Doc. 19 at 15). The Court disagrees. The 

ALJ expressly examined Plaintiff’s testimony that she quit her previous job immediately 

after she was awarded disability benefits by the prior ALJ. (Tr. 23). This evidence alone 

is a “clear and convincing” reason for discrediting Plaintiff and, in fact, is “affirmative 

evidence of malingering.” See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(holding that ALJ properly found “affirmative evidence of malingering” because the 

claimant “reported that he wanted to do volunteer work but refrained for fear of 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 14 of 16
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

impacting his disability benefits, and claimed disability dating from his last day of 

employment even though he admitted at the hearing that he left his job because his 

employer went out of business and probably would have worked longer had his employer 

continued to operate”); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001), as 

amended (Nov. 9, 2001) (finding that ALJ properly discredited a claimant’s testimony 

because he “stated at the administrative hearing and to at least one of his doctors that he 

left his job because he was laid off, rather than because he was injured”). 

 To the extent Plaintiff argues that her “incredibly strong work record” establishes 

that she is credible, the Court disagrees. The ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s 

testimony that she had been able to work for over twenty years with her impairments and 

determined that this factor detracted from Plaintiff’s credibility. (Tr. 23). An ALJ may 

properly discredit a social security claimant’s testimony if the claimant was able to work 

with the allegedly disabling impairments. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 

595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (discrediting a claimant’s testimony in part because he held his 

previous job while under the same allegedly disabling conditions). Although Plaintiff 

argues that similar evidence has been interpreted as indicating credibility, the ALJ’s 

finding was a rationale and permissible interpretation of the evidence that must be 

upheld. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453. 

 3. Conclusion for Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in finding 

Plaintiff to be non-credible. The reasons appealed by Plaintiff constitute “clear and 

convincing” reasons for discrediting her testimony.7

 

 

7

 Even without considering these two reasons, the ALJ provided multiple other 

“clear and convincing” reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony to be non-credible thus 

requiring the ALJ’s decision to be upheld. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). Namely, the ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s daily activity 

level, ability to effectively control her symptoms with medication, and self-reporting that 

her impairments do not impact her daily activities. (Tr. 23). As Plaintiff does not contend 

the ALJ erred in these areas, she waived doing so. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. 

Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 15 of 16
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 7th day of September, 2016. 

Case 3:15-cv-08088-JAT Document 27 Filed 09/07/16 Page 16 of 16