Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01516/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01516-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Zane Gray, 

Petitioner,

vs.

E.W. Morris, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 08-1516-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner William Zane Gray, who is confined under Arizona Department of

Corrections authority in the Great Plains Correctional Facility in Hinton, Oklahoma, has filed

a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. #1.)

Respondents filed an Answer on November 5, 2008. (Doc. #11.) Despite having been given

the opportunity to file a reply, Petitioner failed to do so.

BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2004, Phoenix police officers conducted a “knock and talk” at a

Phoenix motel as part of a community-based crime prevention program. (Doc. #11, Exh. M,

¶2.) When the officers knocked on one door, a white male subject – later identified as

Petitioner – looked through the window and quickly shut it. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.) A short

time later, a Hispanic male opened the door and let the officers in. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.)

Petitioner was no longer in the room. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.) The management at the motel

informed police that the room was rented in Petitioner’s name. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.)

Petitioner had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.) When

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Petitioner returned to the motel, an employee alerted the police and Petitioner was arrested

on the warrant. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶2.) In a search incident to the arrest, the officers found

heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶3.)

The State charged Petitioner with two counts of possession of narcotic drugs (heroin

and crack cocaine), and one count of possession of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine).

(Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶4.) Petitioner failed to appear at a status conference, waived his

appearance at two trial management conferences, did not appear at a pre-trial conference, and

failed to appear at trial. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶5.)

Petitioner was ultimately convicted on all charges and the trial court issued a bench

warrant for Petitioner. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶6.) After Petitioner was arrested, the trial court

conducted a hearing on Petitioner’s prior felony convictions and found that Petitioner had

at least two historical prior felony convictions under Arizona’s repetitive-offender statute.

(Doc. #11, Exh. F at 23-51.) Thereafter, the court sentenced Petitioner to three, concurrent,

presumptive 10-year terms of imprisonment. (Doc. #11, Exh. F at 23-51.)

Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Doc. #11, Exh. I.) Petitioner also filed a supplemental pro

se brief raising three issues: (1) his absence from trial was not voluntary; (2) his attorney was

ineffective; and (3) his prior convictions were too old to be used to enhance his sentence

under Arizona’s repetitive-offender statute. (Doc. #11, Exh. L.) On May 6, 2008, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. #11, Exh.

M.) The appellate court denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because

under Arizona law such claims may only be presented in post-conviction relief proceedings.

(Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶18.) The court rejected Petitioner’s voluntary-absence claim and his

sentencing claim on the merits. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶¶ 12-17; ¶¶ 19-22.) On June 30, 2008,

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. #11,

Exhs. N, Q.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Doc. #3.)

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1

 A.R.S. § 13-604(W)(2)(b)-(c), now codified at § 13-105(22)(b)-(c), defines the term

“historical prior felony conviction” as follows, in pertinent part:

“(b) [a]ny class 2 or 3 felony ... that was committed within the ten years immediately

preceding the date of the present offense.” Under this section, any time the defendant spent

incarcerated “is excluded in calculating if the offense was committed within the preceding

ten years.”

“(c) [a]ny class 4, 5 or 6 felony ... that was committed within the five years immediately

preceding the date of the present offense.” Under this section, any time the defendant spent

incarcerated “is excluded in calculating if the offense was committed within the preceding

five years.”

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On August 15, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition raising two grounds

for relief. (Doc. #1.) In Ground One, Petitioner’s claims that pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604

his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court improperly used prior convictions

to enhance his sentence. (Doc. #1 at 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that he was not

present for all of his trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. #1

at 7.)

DISCUSSION

With respect to Ground One, Respondents contend that although Petitioner asserts that

his rights to “due process” and “equal protection” were violated, Ground One solely raises

a state-law issue, which is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. #11 at 3-4.)

As to Ground Two, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. (Doc. #11

at 5-12.)

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner’s claims that pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(W)(2)(b)-(c)1

 his

constitutional rights were violated when the trial court improperly used prior convictions to

enhance his sentence “because [the convictions] occurred beyond the time limitations period

for using old prior convictions ... .” (Doc. #1 at 6.)

Despite Petitioner’s reference to alleged constitutional violations, the Court’s review

of Petitioner’s claim in Ground One reveals that Petitioner is only asserting a violation of

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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state-law. As such, Ground One fails to constitute a basis for federal habeas relief. The

Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[I]t is not

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). This

includes a trial court’s evidentiary rulings based upon state law matters unless admission of

the evidence was so prejudicial that it offends due process. See id.; Walters v. Maass, 45

F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

Additionally, a petitioner cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by

asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1982) (“While

they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we believe that this claim does

no more than suggest that the instructions at respondents’ trials may have violated state

law.”). Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground

One be denied.

B. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he was not present for all of his trial in

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. #1 at 7.) Petitioner argues that

his absence at trial was not voluntary because he did not have notice of the date and location

of his trial. (Doc. #1 at 7.)

Pursuant to the AEDPA2

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

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proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

Regarding the merits of Ground Two, one of the most basic rights guaranteed by the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is the right of the accused to be present at

every stage of his trial. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); Brewer v.

Raines, 670 F.2d 117, 118-19 (9th Cir. 1982). It is clear, however, that such right can be

waived. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973); see also Gagnon, 470 U.S. at

528-29 (right is waived when defendant fails to “assert his right” and does not appear for

trial); Brewer, 670 F.2d at 119 (absence from trial may be deemed voluntary when defendant

had notice of the trial date and was informed that the trial could proceed in his absence if he

failed to appear).

Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1, a court may infer that an absence

is voluntary if the defendant had personal notice of (1) the time of the proceeding, (2) his

right to be present at the proceeding, and (3) a warning that the proceeding would go forward

in his absence should he fail to appear. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 9.1; see also Brewer, 670 F.2d

at 119-20 (holding that Rule 9.1 is constitutional).

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Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the appellate court’s

determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner was

voluntarily absent from his trial is supported by the record. Petitioner signed multiple release

orders informing him of his right to be present at all pre-trial and trial proceedings and was

informed that “the proceeding[s] may go forward in [his] absence.” (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶13;

Exh. G, Items 8, 14, 29.) Further, after appearing late for an initial pre-trial conference on

February 3, 2006, Petitioner was warned that his trial could proceed in his absence if he

failed to appear and was reminded that he had to stay in touch with his attorney. (Doc. #11,

Exh. A at 1-8.) Petitioner was also present on September 11, 2006, when the court continued

his trial to September 19, 2006. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶13; Exh. H, Item 47.)

Petitioner, however, failed to appear for trial on September 19, 2006, telling his

attorney that he had been in an auto accident and was in the hospital. (Doc. #11, Exh. C at

2-3.) Although counsel had requested that Petitioner fax him documentation from the

hospital, counsel did not receive any confirmation that Petitioner was in the hospital by the

time court began. (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 2-3.) Counsel stated, “We are ready to proceed to

trial, and [Petitioner] will be here as soon as he’s available.” (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 3.) The

prosecution requested that the trial proceed in Petitioner’s absence because the case was more

than two years old and all of the State’s witnesses were ready for trial. (Doc. #11, Exh. C

at 3.) The trial court stated, “I really don’t have the ability to say that [Petitioner] is

involuntarily unavailable. It sounds as if he is voluntarily unavailable, until I know

otherwise.” (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 4.)

Petitioner’s counsel responded that he did not “have a problem with proceeding” to

trial, but requested that the court not issue a bench warrant until later in the day so he could

try to produce documentation from the hospital. (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 4.) The court

responded that it would issue the warrant, but that it would “entertain a motion to quash [the

warrant] if, in fact, it turns out that [Petitioner] is hospitalized.” (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 4.) The

court added:

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The problem that I have is if he is actually hospitalized, it’s not just a quashing

of the bench warrant, he’s not available for trial through no fault of his own.

He has the right to be present if he wants to be present and that’s a problem.

So without knowing this, at this point, all I can do is act on the facts that I have

in front of me. There is no support for his claim that he’s in the hospital, so at

this point I will affirm the trial. I will issue a bench warrant but all that could

change.

(Doc. #11, Exh. C at 4-5.) The court then put Petitioner’s case into “case transfer,” giving

Petitioner’s counsel more time to provide the court with documentation supporting his effort

to quash the warrant. (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 5.)

After a recess, defense counsel handed the court documents from the hospital, which

showed that Petitioner had been discharged the previous day. (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 6; Exh.

R [medical documents indicating that Petitioner had been discharged at 8:11 p.m. on

September 18, 2006].) The court reviewed the documents and stated, “It looks like he had

muscle and cervical strain and muscle pain. I’m going to affirm my prior orders regarding

the bench warrant. He should be here this morning.” (Doc. #11, Exh. C at 6.) The court

then transferred the case to the transfer coordinator for reassignment of the trial and the case

was then transferred to a different judge. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶14; Exh. H, Item 50.) Due

to scheduling difficulties, however, the trial was continued to September 26, 2006, and

transferred to a third judge. (Doc. #11, Exh. M, ¶15; Exh. H, Item 51; Exh. D.)

On September 26, 2006, the first day of trial, the new judge assigned to Petitioner’s

case asked whether Petitioner had notice of the new trial date. (Doc. #11, Exh. D at 3.)

Counsel responded:

Your Honor, as to today’s date, [Petitioner] was provided by telephone – I

have the days [marked down]. I called him last week when this Court picked

[up this case], which I believe was on Thursday. I called and left a message

on his cell phone. I also called his mother.

I did receive a phone call from [Petitioner] yesterday. He did not acknowledge

the trial dates. I did speak to his mother also, and she did acknowledge the

trial date. In fact, she complained that [the trial] was 40 miles from her house.

I think [Petitioner] does have knowledge of this hearing. I’ve had contact with

him since the 19th when the bench warrant was issued. However, he has not

appeared.

I think as for today, the Court can make a determination that he is voluntarily

absent from the proceeding, and we can proceed in absentia.

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(Doc. #11, Exh. D at 3-4.) The trial court continued the discussion stating:

Now, back to the voluntariness issue and whether or not [Petitioner] had notice

of the proceedings today. It appears to me that the inquiry under Rule 9.1 is

whether he was provided notice. It seems to me that he was aware that a trial

date had been previously set. I’m going to presume that he would also have

knowledge that if the trial date doesn’t go [forward] in [a particular] division

[of the court], it can be heard by another judge.

I also would find, [counsel], based upon your personal conversation with him

to give him the actual location of where his trial would take place, and the date

and time, that he received adequate notice.

(Doc. #11, Exh. D at 5.)

When the court asked for the prosecutor’s position on the issue, she indicated that the

State was ready to proceed, and noted that Petitioner was notified at a trial management

conference that “the trial could go forward [in] his absence.” (Doc. #11, Exh. D at 6.) The

court then concluded that Petitioner’s absence was voluntary finding:

Pursuant to Rule 9.1, then, I do find that the defendant’s absence is voluntary,

that he did receive notice of the date and time and, also, peculiar to us here in

Maricopa County, the location of his trial, as well.

I will grant the request to proceed with a trial in absentia.

(Doc. #11, Exh. D at 6; Exh. H, Item 58 [minute entry concerning trial court’s voluntariness

finding].)

The record is clear and demonstrates that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that

Petitioner was voluntarily absent from his trial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Nor was the Arizona Court of Appeals’ ruling “an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding[s].” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

The Court will, therefore, recommend that Petitioner’s claim that he was not present for all

of his trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as asserted in Ground Two

be denied.

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CONCLUSION

Having determined that Ground One fails to constitute a basis for federal habeas relief

and that Ground Two fails on the merits, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1) be DENIED and DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 29th day of April, 2009.

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