Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00599/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00599-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALIFORNIA STATE OUTDOOR

ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION, INC.,

a California corporation, et

al., 

NO. CIV. S-05-0599 FCD/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

WILL KEMPTON, in his official

capacity as Director,

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1-50

inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motion for partial

summary judgment filed by defendants State of California

Department of Transportation and Will Kempton, Director of the

California Department of Transportation (collectively

“Caltrans”), and motion for partial summary judgment filed by

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230.

2 The court strikes from the record the Surreply and

objections to certain declarations submitted by defendants

(docket numbers 28 and 29) filed by plaintiffs on August 22, 2005

as improper and untimely under the Eastern District Local Rule

78-230. 

2

plaintiffs, California Outdoor Advertising Association, Inc., and

its members, Arcturus Outdoor Advertising, Bulletin Displays,

LLC, Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., Fairway Outdoor Advertising,

Inc., Edwards Outdoor Signs, General Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,

Heywood Company Outdoor, James N. Hoff doing business as Hoff

Outdoor Advertising, Hunter Media, Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc.,

J. R. Zukin Corporation doing business as Meadow Outdoor

Advertising, Sun Outdoor Advertising, Stott Outdoor Advertising,

Titan Advertising, United Outdoor Advertising, Van Wagner

Communications, Inc., and Viacom Outdoor, Inc. (collectively

“CSOAA”). The court held a hearing on the motions August 26,

2005.1,

2 

After considering the memoranda filed by the parties and

arguments made by counsel at the hearing, and for the reasons

stated herein, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment and DENIES defendants motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Caltrans, a department of the State of California, regulates

outdoor advertising pursuant to the Outdoor Advertising Act,

California Business & Professions Code § 5200 et seq. (“OAA”) and

regulations promulgated by Caltrans pursuant to the OAA. (Defs.’

Response to Pls.’ Sep. Statement of Und. Facts (“RUF”) ¶ 5.) 

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3

The OAA requires that any person operating an outdoor

advertising display in California referred to herein as “sign” or

“billboard”) obtain a permit (“Billboard permit”) issued by the

director of Caltrans or his authorized agent, which must be

renewed every five years. Cal Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 5350,

5360(a); RUF ¶ 7. Prior to January 1, 2003, the fee for

obtaining a Billboard permit was set by statute, California

Business and Professions Code section 5485(a), at $20.00 per year

for each billboard. (RUF ¶ 8.) Under regulations effective in

2002, billboard operators were required to pay the annual $20.00

permit fee for 2003 on or before December 31, 2002. (RUF ¶ 10.)

Effective January 1, 2003, the Legislature amended section

5485(a), which now provides that the Director of Caltrans shall

set the Billboard permit fee:

(a)(1) The annual permit fee for each advertising

display shall be set by the director.

(2) The fee shall not exceed the amount reasonably

necessary to recover the cost of providing the service

or enforcing the regulations for which the fee is

charged, but in no event shall the fee exceed one

hundred dollars ($100). This maximum fee shall be

increased in the 2007-08 fiscal year and in the 2012-13

fiscal year by an amount equal to the increase in the

California Consumer Price Index.

(3) The fee may reflect the department's average cost,

including the indirect costs, of providing the service

or enforcing the regulations.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5485(a).

On or about June 2, 2003, Caltrans announced a new annual

permit renewal fee of $92.00, which Caltrans indicated it

promulgated pursuant to newly-amended section 5485(a). At or

around the same time, Caltrans notified permit holders that they

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3 According to Caltrans, it extended the thirty-day

period to sixty days on July 17, 2003. 

4 California Business and Professions Code § 5463

provides in relevant part: “The director may revoke any license

or permit for the failure to comply with this chapter and may

remove and destroy any advertising display placed or maintained

in violation of this chapter after 30 days written notice is

forwarded by mail to the permitholder at his or her last known

address. If no permit has been issued, a copy of the notice shall

be forwarded by mail to the display owner, property owner, or

advertiser at his or her last known address.”

4

were required to pay within thirty days3 an additional $72.00 per

billboard for their 2003 permits or the permits would be revoked

pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 5463 .4

(RUF ¶ 11.) 

In setting the new Billboard permit fee, Caltrans did not

follow the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedures

Act, California Government Code section 11340, et seq. (“APA”). 

According to Caltrans, setting of the Billboard permit fee falls

within an exception to the APA for “regulations establishing

rates, prices or tariffs.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 11340.9(g); RUF ¶¶ 

8.) 

Instead, Caltrans calculated the new Billboard permit fee by

“taking the total costs of its Outdoor Advertising

Program (“ODA”) of $1,273,824.00 minus projected

revenues of $190,000.00 to give an annual net program

cost of $1,083.824.00. This net costs was divided by

the number of permits, 11850, to give an annual permit

cost of $92.00. The breakdown of costs and revenues in

arriving at the $92 permit fee are provided in the ODA

Expenditure Summary Data Sheet and related documents.” 

(RUF ¶ 19; Caltrans’ response to CSOAA’s Interrogatory No. 1.)

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint with the Los

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5 The court cannot locate in the file the date plaintiffs

filed the original complaint. 

5

Angeles County Superior Court.5 On November 29, 2004, plaintiffs

filed a First Amended Complaint asserting four claims: (1)

violation of the APA; (2) violation of California Business and

Professions code section 5485(a); (3) violation of Article I,

§2(a) of the California Constitution protecting liberty of

speech; and (4) against defendant Kempton only, a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights. 

On January 5, 2005, defendants removed the action to the

United States District Court for the Central District of

California. Defendants subsequently filed a motion for change of

venue which was granted by order dated March 14, 2005. The case

was transferred to this court on March 24, 2005. 

On June 7, 2005 defendants filed a motion for partial

summary judgment on plaintiffs’ first claim for violation of the

APA. On July 12, 2005 plaintiffs filed a cross motion for

partial summary judgment as to the validity of the permit fee. 

STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under this

standard, an issue is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party and a fact

is “material” when it may affect the outcome of the case under

the substantive law that provides the claim or defense. Anderson

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6

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The

determination is made based solely upon admissible evidence. Orr

v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Furthermore, the court must view inferences made from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). 

The moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party is

without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may either

produce evidence negating an essential element of the opposing

party’s claim, or demonstrate that the nonmoving party does not

have enough evidence to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Fritz Companies,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party

meets this initial requirement, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific

facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact remains for

trial. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). Summary judgment should not be granted

where “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

Following this same rubric, a court may grant summary

adjudication on part of a claim or defense, based on the

standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a),(b); State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d

772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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6 Parties do not dispute that the permit fee is a

“regulation” within the meaning of the APA. 

7

ANALYSIS

I. Violation of the APA

The sole question presented here is whether Caltrans was

required to adhere to the procedural requirements of APA in

setting the Billboard permit fee.

6 According to Caltrans, the

APA’s exemption for “regulations establishing rates, prices or

tariffs” applies to the setting the Billboard permit fee. See

Cal. Gov’t Code § 11340.9(g). Plaintiffs dispute that the

“rates, prices or tariffs” exception applies to the Billboard

permit fee. 

“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a

statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the

language of the statute itself.” United States v. Ron Pair

Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Chevron U.S.A. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The

Supreme Court describes this rule as the “one, cardinal canon

before all others.” Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.

249, 253 (1992). Thus, “courts must presume that a legislature

says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it

says there.” Id. (citing, Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241-242; United

States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897). When the

language of the statute is plain, the inquiry also ends with the

language of the statute, for in such instances “the sole function

of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its

terms.” Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)); Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc.,

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7 The other exceptions contained in section 11340.9 are:

(a) An agency in the judicial or legislative branch of the state

government.

(b) A legal ruling of counsel issued by the Franchise Tax Board

or State Board of Equalization.

(c) A form prescribed by a state agency or any instructions

relating to the use of the form, but this provision is not a

limitation on any requirement that a regulation be adopted

pursuant to this chapter when one is needed to implement the law

under which the form is issued.

(d) A regulation that relates only to the internal management of

the state agency.

(e) A regulation that establishes criteria or guidelines to be

used by the staff of an agency in performing an audit,

investigation, examination, [etc., which would disclose material

to the violator and facilitate violation of the law].

(f) A regulation that embodies the only legally tenable

interpretation of a provision of law.

(h) A regulation that relates to the use of public works,

including streets and highways, when the effect of the regulation

is indicated to the public by means of signs or signals or when

the regulation determines uniform standards and specifications

for official traffic control devices pursuant to Section 21400 of

the Vehicle Code.

(I) A regulation that is directed to a specifically named person

or to a group of persons and does not apply generally throughout

the state.

8

965 F.2d 1497, 1502 (8th Cir. 1992) (plain meaning of a statute

governs over ambiguous legislative history). 

California Government Code section 11340.9(g) provides:7 

This chapter does not apply to any of the

following:

. . . 

(g) A regulation that establishes or fixes rates,

prices, or tariffs. . . .

Initially, the court notes that the word “fee” is not used

in the statute. Under the canon of construction, expressio unius

est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing in a statute

impliedly excludes another. By including a list of exceptions

for “rates”, “prices” and “tariffs,” the legislature implicitly

excluded fees. 

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8 In fact, the term “fee” appears in the same 1945

statute (different section) that added the “rate or tariffs”

exception to the APA. See Stats. 1945 c. 111 p. 445; Guarantee

Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152,

159-160 (1912)(where different language is used in different

parts of a statute, it is presumed that the language is used with

a different intent); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 131 (May,

2005).

9

The term “fee” is used extensively throughout the California

code. In light of this ubiquitous term, it seems likely that

the legislature would have expressly referenced “fees” within

this statute had it intended the exemption to apply to fees.8

Interestingly, in other statutes, the legislature did include

both the terms “fees” and “rates”, indicating that, when it

intended to include fees, it the legislature expressly so

provided. See e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 6557 (“Said indenture may

include covenants or other provisions relating to the bonds

issued thereunder requiring the entity to fix, prescribe and

collect rates, tolls, fees, rentals or other charges . .

..”)(emphasis added); Cal. Educ. Code § 94147 (“The authority

may fix, revise, charge, and collect rates, rents, fees, and

charges for the use of and for the services furnished or to be

furnished by each project . . ..”)(emphasis added).

Nor does the court agree with defendants’ argument that the

terms “fee” and “rate,” or alternatively “fee” and “price” are

synonymous. The common meanings of these terms are quite

distinct. 

Black’s law dictionary defines “rate” as “proportional or

relative value, measure or degree. The proportion or standard by

which quantity or value is adjusted.. . . Amount of charge or

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9 Defendants do not contend that the permit fee falls

under the exception for “tariffs”.

10

payment with reference to some basis of calculation. A certain

quantity or amount of on thing considered in relation to another

thing and used as standard or measure.” Black’s Law Dictionary

at 1261 (Sixth Ed. 1990). 

By contrast, a “fee” is defined as “a charge fixed by law

for services of public officers or for use of a privilege under

control of government.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 614. Unlike a

rate, which is measured by reference to something else, a “fee”

has a fixed value. A fee is $20.00. A rate is $20.00 per hour

or $30.00 per pound. A fee can be set by reference to a rate, 

but is not synonymous with the term rate. 

Similarly, “fee” and “price” are not synonymous.9 Price is

defined as “the cost at which something is obtained. Something

which one ordinarily accepts voluntarily in exchange for

something else. The consideration given for the purchase of a

thing. Amount which a prospective seller indicates as the sum

for which he is willing to sell . . . The term may be synonymous

with cost and with value as well as with consideration, though

prices is not always identical either with consideration.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary at 1188-89. 

Unlike “fee”, which refers to the charge for a government

privilege, i.e., a permit or license, “price” connotes a sale,

purchase or commercial transaction. This connotation is apparent

in the references to price setting in the code. See e.g., Cal.

Food & Agric. Code § 62062 (authorizing Director of Department of

Agriculture to set minimum milk prices); Cal. Educ. Code §

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10 The earlier versions of this provision, originally

codified as Government Code section 11380, provide no definition

of the terms “rates,” “prices” or “tariffs”, nor did a search of

archival documents reveal any explication of the terms or

discussion of the purpose of the 1949 amendment. See Stats. 1949

c. 313 § 2 p. 601. 

11

1249(a) (“The county superintendent of schools may sell

publications that he or she produces.. . . The county

superintendent of schools, . . . may fix the price . . . for the

sale of any publication produced by him or her.”); Cal. Fish & G.

Code § 15301 (“The department may sell wild aquatic plants or

animals, except rare, endangered, or fully protected species, for

aquaculture use at a price approximating the administrative cost

to the department for the collection or sale of the plants or

animals. The commission shall set this price.”); Cal. Gov. Code §

9792 (authorizing Department of General Services to sell copies

of laws, resolutions and journals “at such price as it may fix”).

The court thus concludes that the plain meaning of the

language in California Government Code section 11340.9(g)

excludes fees from the exception. However, even if the language

were ambiguous, the legislative history further supports the

conclusion that the exception does not cover fees. When added to

former Government code section 11380 in 1945, the exception

listed only “rates or tariffs.”10 See Stats. 1945 c. 111 p. 445

§ 3 (“As used in this chapter: . . . (b) ‘Regulation’ includes

any rule or regulation made by any state agency except one which:

(2) establishes or fixes rates or tariffs.”). In 1949, the

legislature added the term “prices” to the section 11380,

presumably because the terms “rates” and “tariffs” have unique

definitions which do not encompass “prices”. See Stats. 1949 c.

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11 Caltrans and other agencies’ conduct in setting other

fees is of little relevance to the court’s interpretation of the

statute. From the materials provided by the parties, the court

cannot conclude that agencies consistently establish fees in

compliance with the APA. However, the court includes reference

to the above cited examples to demonstrate an apparent

inconsistency between Caltrans’ position that fees fall within

section 11340.9(g) exception and its own conduct in setting other

fees in compliance with the APA, and also to defeat any

suggestion that requiring agencies to comply with the APA in

setting fees would place an undue burden on agencies, since it

appears that at least in some instances agencies do comply with

the APA in setting fees. 

12

313 § 2 p. 601. If the legislature felt compelled to add the

word “prices” because “prices” were not encompassed within the

terms “rates” and “tariffs,” logic suggests that the terms

“rates” and “tariffs” also do not encompass other different

terms, such as “fees”. 

The court also notes that Caltrans has followed the

Administrative Procedures Act when promulgating regulations

establishing permit fees in other contexts.11 plaintiff cites

two examples where Caltrans itself followed the APA in setting

fees. See 4 C.C.R. § 2424 (describing late renewal process and

setting penalty fees); 21 C.C.R. § 2114 (establishing permit fees

and other fees for placement of business names on roadside signs

placed in rural areas to alert motorists to nearby services). 

In addition, plaintiffs identify numerous examples where other

agencies established fees in conformity with the APA. See e.g.,

2 C.C.R. § 2202(c)(2)($1.00 per acre permit fee for prospecting);

10 C.C.R. § 2604.02(B) ($35.00 application fee for preorganization permit to organize insurance company; 10 C.C.R. §

225 (fees relating to real estate appraisers); 14 C.C.R. § 13055

(fees for processing permit applications for approval by coastal

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12 The court grants plaintiffs’ request for judicial

notice of the regulations cited. 

13

commission); 12 C.C.R. § 676(b)(9)(B)($200.00 permit fee fore

fallow deer farming).12 

Defendant distinguishes these regulations on the ground

that, unlike here, where the regulation involved solely the

setting of a fee with statutory guidance provided by the

legislature, these permit fees were part of a broader regulation

adopting a process. However, defendants’ argument ignores the

statutory requirement that Caltrans adopt regulations

establishing the process for permit renewal. California Business

and Professions Code section 5630 provides: 

(a) The director shall establish a permit renewal term

of five years, which shall be reflected on the face of

the permit. (b) The director shall adopt regulations

for permit renewal that include procedures for late

renewal within a period not to exceed one year from the

date of permit expiration. Any permit that was not

renewed after January 1, 1993, is deemed revoked. 

Pursuant to that authority, Caltrans promulgated 4 C.C.R. §

2424, which sets forth the process for permit renewal and payment

of the fee. While the statutory authority for setting the

Billboard permit fee appears in a different code section, it is

nonetheless part of a broader permit renewal process. Thus, it

is indistinguishable from the other permit fees cited by

plaintiff.

In support of its position that the permit fee falls within

the “rates, prices and tariffs” exception, defendants rely on a

1961 California Court of Appeals case, Estate of Setzer, 192 Cal.

App. 2d 634 (1961). Neither Setzer, nor any other reported case

addresses whether “fees” fall within the “rates, prices or

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13 See California Ass’n of Nursing Homes, Sanitariums,

Rest Homes for Aged, Inc. v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800 (1970)

(concluding that regulation establishing reimbursement rates for

MediCal patients in nursing homes did not fall within “rates,

prices or tariffs” exception even though it set “rates” because

in the authorizing statutes, the scope of the agency’s

regulations was broader than the exemption); State Compensation

Ins. Fund v. McConnell, 46 Cal. 2d 330 (1956)(rating plan for

workers’ compensation insurance premium fixed by insurance

commissioner fell within “rates, prices and tariffs” exception to

the APA); Winzler & Kelly v. Department of Industrial Relations,

121 Cal. App. 3d 120, 128 (1981) (determination that field

surveyors were covered by wage and hour laws was integral to 

wage rate-setting and thus exempt from the APA as a regulation

fixing rates, prices or tariffs).

14 Defendants also rely on two opinions by the California

Attorney General, 66 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 505 (1983). That

opinion held that the Department of Developmental Services could

establish a “parental fee schedule” for services provided to

developmentally disabled children without complying with the APA.

However, the court disagrees with the Attorney General’s

conclusion that “there appears little doubt but that a parental

fee schedule sets ‘rates’ in common parlance.” 66 Ops. Cal. Atty. 

(continued...)

14

tariffs” exception.13 Setzer involved a challenge to rates fixed

by the Director of Mental Hygiene for the maintenance of

incompetent individuals in state hospitals. The conservator for

an individual committed to a state hospital challenged the

Director’s increase in the rates for failure to comply with the

APA. The district court upheld the rate increase and the

appellate court affirmed, holding that: 

“the rate determinations made by the director were not

required to be filed with the secretary of State nor

published in the California Administrative Code or

Register since they come within the provisions of

[former version of section 11340.9(g)], which excepts

from such filing any regulation establishing or fixing

rates, prices or tariffs.” 

Id. at 686. Setzer is distinguishable. First, Setzer involved

fixing rates, which expressly falls within the ambit of section

11340.9(g).14 Moreover, the type of charge involved was a rate

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14(...continued)

Gen. 505. Moreover, the Attorney General’s opinion is

distinguishable in that, like Setzer, it involved a government

service, specifically, services for developmentally disabled

children, and not a regulatory permit. 66 67 Ops. Cal. Atty.

Gen. 50. 

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charged for a service, i.e., maintenance of the committed person

at the mental hospital. Here, the fee does is not charged for a

service but for a government privilege, i.e., the right to erect

a billboard along a highway. It did not involve a regulatory

permit. 

Finally, defendants argue that the language of California

Business and Professions Code section 5485 reveals legislative

intent to exempt the fee setting from the APA. Specifically

defendants note that the statute itself establishes a “process”

by setting a maximum fee of $100.00, limiting the fee to the

reasonably necessary to recover the cost of providing the service

or enforcing the regulations for which the fee is charged, and

providing that the fee can include indirect costs of

administering the program. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5485. 

The court disagrees that the statutory language can be

interpreted to indicate legislative intent to exempt the fee

setting from the APA. The APA applies broadly to agency

regulations. Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14

Cal.4th 557, 570 (1996). Specifically the APA provides that 

[n ]o state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or

attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin,

manual, instruction, order, standard of general

application, or other rule, which is a regulation ...,

unless the guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual,

instruction, order, standard of general application, or

other rule has been adopted as a regulation and filed

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15 In Alta Bates Hospital v. Lackner, 118 Cal. App. 3d

614, the appellate court confronted a challenge to a 10% cutback

in MediCal reimbursement rates instituted by the director of the

Department of Health Services. The cutback was instituted

pursuant to a state statute authorizing the director to make

emergency cutbacks when it appeared that there would be a budget

shortfall. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 14120. The court

determined that the legislature did not intend for the director

to comply with the APA because the cutback would be implemented

only in specific, emergency situations, and the delay attendant

to complying with the APA would undermine the efficacy of the

statute. No parallel exigency is present here. 

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with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter. 

Cal Gov’t Code, § 11340.5(a). Moreover, the APA provides that

its provisions “shall not be superseded or modified by any

subsequent legislation except to the extent that the legislation

shall do so expressly.” Cal. Gov’t Code, § 11346. The

limitations on the permit fee contained in section 5485 do not 

constitute an express exemption from the APA.15 Thus, the APA

applies. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for partial

summary judgment is granted and defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 29, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00599-FCD-DAD Document 31 Filed 08/29/05 Page 16 of 16