Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02181/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MIRANDA WAITES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIMESTONE CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 5:14-CV-2181-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

Plaintiff Miranda Waites commenced this action on her own behalf, as well as

on behalf of the estate of Mark Tinsley, a former prisoner at Limestone Correctional

Facility. Her complaint asserts several claims under the Eighth Amendment — e.g.,

deliberate indifference to her decedent’s serious medical needs — as well asstate law

claims for wrongful death and negligent and wanton retention of employees. The

claims are asserted against the correctional facility in which plaintiff’s decedent was

incarcerated, and several officers and employees of the State of Alabama’s

Department of Corrections. The action presently is before the court on the motion to

dismiss filed by defendants Dewayne Estes, Ruth Naglich, Guy Noe, Jimmy Patrick,

1

FILED

 2015 Mar-02 AM 11:00

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 1 of 14
and Kim T. Thomas for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

1

Upon consideration of the pleadings and briefs, this court concludes that the motion

should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

1

See doc. no. 14 (Motion to Dismiss), at 1. Defendants not included in the motion include

“Dr. Stubbs,” “Nurse Jackson,” “Nurse Lopez,” “Nurse Shalah,” and Corizon. 

2

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 2 of 14
Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at

557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

3

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 3 of 14
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (emphasis added).

When ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that the

well-pleaded facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint are true. See Anza v. Ideal

Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (1994) (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the

court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”); Marsh

v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (setting forth the

facts in the case by “[a]ccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations(with reasonable

inferences drawn favorably to Plaintiffs) in the complaint as true”) (alteration

supplied). Accordingly, that which is set out in the following portions of this

memorandum opinion as “facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may, or may not, be the

actual facts. See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc ., 465 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.1

(11th Cir. 2006).

II. FACTS AS ALLEGED

Mark Tinsley entered Limestone Correctional Facility during September of

2012 to serve a twelve-year prison sentence.2 For several years prior to his

incarceration, and at the direction of his physician, Tinsley had been using on a daily

basis a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (“C-PAP”) machine to prevent the

2

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 28.

4

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 4 of 14
collapse of his airway.

3 He also had been suffering from hypertension, obstructive

sleep apnea, asthma, and atrial fibrillation.

4

Limestone Correctional Facility requires each new prisoner to undergo, within

fourteen days of arrival, a complete health evaluation by a medical professional,

including laboratory analyses and an assessment of medical history.

5 When Tinsley

entered the facility, he was placed in the Protective Custody Unit “due to his law

enforcement background.”6 Tinsley began requesting his C-PAP machine

immediately upon his placement in the Protective Custody Unit.

7 He submitted

numerous formal, written requests for the machine from November of 2012 until his

death in November of the following year.8 Even so, defendants repeatedly denied

Tinsley’s requests for a C-PAP machine, and refused to provide him with his

prescription medications.

9

3

Id. ¶ 34.

4

Id. ¶ 29.

5

Id. ¶ 31.

6

Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff did not provide any additional details regarding Tinsley’s law

enforcement background. See id. Even so, Tinsley’s obituary, from The Daily Home newspaper

published in Sylacauga, Alabama, indicates that his law enforcement career spanned thirty-three

years, during which he served in “such positions as a police officer, officer with [the] Bureau of

Prisons, and bailiff with the Birmingham court system.” Mark Luke Tinsley: Obituary, THEDAILY

HOME, Nov. 19, 2013, http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/dailyhome/obituary.aspx?n=

mark-luke-tinsley&pid=168088233& (alteration supplied) (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 

7

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint),¶ 36.

8

Id. ¶¶ 37–38.

9

Id. ¶ 38.

5

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 5 of 14
Mark Tinsley’srequestsfor medical care became so frequent that other inmates

in the Limestone Correctional Facility began submitting requests for medical care on

his behalf.10

In response, defendants transferred Tinsley to another cell, to prevent

other inmates from hearing his labored breathing.

11

Mark Tinsley became so ill during the two weeks preceding his death that he

was unable to move or breathe. During that time, he submitted several verbal and

written requestsfor emergencymedical care, all of which were denied.

12 On one such

occasion, Tinsley pleaded for help with the defendant identified in the pleadings only

as “Nurse Jackson,” but Jackson instructed him to “fill out a sick call slip.”13 A few

days before his death, Tinsley began coughing up blood and became immobile. When

a correctional officer observed Tinsley’s physical condition, he instructed another

inmate in Tinsley’s cell to have Tinsley fill out a sick call slip.

14 Tinsley’s cellmate

responded that, if the officer did not take Tinsley to the infirmary, then the other

inmates were going to “yell all night until Tinsley got medical help.”15

Tinsleywas physically escorted to the infirmary on November 4, 2013, because

10

Id. ¶ 39.

11

Id. ¶ 40.

12

Id. ¶ 41.

13

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 45.

14

Id. ¶ 46.

15

Id.

6

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 6 of 14
he was unable to walk without assistance.16 Defendants held Tinsley in the infirmary

for two days before transporting him to Crestwood Medical Center in Huntsville,

Alabama, where he was admitted for pulmonary edema and hypoxia.17 Tinsley

remained at Crestwood Medical Center from November 6, 2013 until his death on

November 15, 2013.

18 The causes of death listed on his death certificate were

cardiopulmonary arrest, adult acute respiratory distress syndrome, and pneumonia.19

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that all claims asserted against the Limestone Correctional

Facility should be dismissed because the facility is not an entity capable of being

sued, and plaintiff agrees.

20 Accordingly, all claims asserted against Limestone

Correctional Facility are due to be dismissed.

16

Id. ¶ 47.

17

Id. ¶¶ 48–49.

18

Id. ¶ 50.

19

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 50.

20 Doc. no. 15 (Brief on Motion to Dismiss), at 1; doc. no. 22 (Response to Motion to

Dismiss), at ECF 7. “ECF” is the acronym for “Electronic Case Filing,” a system that allows parties

to file and serve documents electronically. See Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 2009 WL

4723547, *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 permits citations to the “page

numbers generated by the ECF header.” Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 257 n.5 (D.D.C.

2011) (citing The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. B. 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review

Ass’n et al., 19th ed. 2010)). Even so, the Bluebook recommends “against citation to ECF

pagination in lieu of original pagination.” Wilson, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless stated

otherwise, this court will cite the original pagination in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites

to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number with the letters

“ECF.” 

7

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 7 of 14
Defendants next argue that all fictitious defendants should be stricken.

21

“As

a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” 

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Even so,

the Eleventh Circuit has carved out an exception to that rule: i.e., when the plaintiff’s

description of the fictitious defendant isso specific asto render that defendant’s name

“at the very worst, surplusage.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 n.6 (11th Cir.

1992). Defendants contend that two individuals at Limestone Correctional Facility

fit plaintiff’s description of “Captain,” two fit her description of “Shift Commander,”

two fit her description of “supervisors,” four fit her description of “Officer Johnson,”

and twenty-six fit her description of “corrections officer.”22 This court concludes

that plaintiff has not described the fictitious party-defendants in her complaint with

sufficient specificity as to render their names mere surplusage. Accordingly, all

claims against fictitious party-defendants are due to be stricken.

Defendants next contend that plaintiff’s claims for money damages against

defendants “in their official capacities” are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and

state law sovereign immunity.

23 The court agrees. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

21

 Doc. no. 14 (Motion to Dismiss), at 1.

22 Compare doc. no. 15 (Brief on Motion to Dismiss), at 3, with doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at

¶¶ 14–15, 22–24. 

23

 Doc. no. 14 (Motion to Dismiss), at 2 (emphasis in original).

8

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 8 of 14
159, 171 n.14 (1985). Plaintiff also concedes that “a suit against Defendants in their

official capacities may only be for prospective equitable relief.”24 Accordingly, all

claims for money damages asserted against defendants in their official capacities are

due to be dismissed.

Defendants next contend that “the complaint, replete with allegations made

against ‘defendants’ generally, fails to state a claim against any specific defendant

and fails to put particular defendants on notice of their alleged liability-creating

activity.”25

Indeed, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “Defendants” altered Tinsley’s

medication, and that “Defendants” refused Tinsley’s requests for medical equipment

and treatment.

26 Even so, “[w]hen multiple defendants are named in a complaint, the

allegations can be and usually are to be read in such a way that each defendant is

having the allegation made about him individually.” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d

1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1997) (alteration supplied). Reading each allegation made

against “defendants” as an allegation made against each defendant individually, this

court concludes that the complaint puts each defendant on notice of the allegations

made against him or her. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of

notice is due to be denied.

24

 Doc. no. 22 (Response to Motion to Dismiss), at ECF 13.

25

 Doc. no. 15 (Brief on Motion to Dismiss), at 3.

26

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 37–38. 

9

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 9 of 14
The complaint asserts an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference

to the serious medical needs of plaintiff’s decedent.

27 The Eleventh Circuit addressed

the adequacy of such claimsin Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam), saying that:

To state an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983, a prisoner

must allege facts to satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry

regarding a prison official’s conduct. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d

1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the objective component, a prisoner

must allege a prison condition that is so extreme that it poses an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner’s health or safety. 

To satisfy the subjective component, the prisoner must allege that the

prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state of mind that constituted

deliberate indifference. “[D]eliberate indifference has three

components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)

disregard of thatrisk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” 

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks

and citations omitted).

Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738. Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to state a

claim of deliberate indifference because she has not alleged factsthat plausibly could

show that defendants had “prior notice or knowledge.”28 However, the Supreme

Court held in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), that the issue of “[w]hether

a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact

subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

27

Id. ¶¶ 51–56.

28

 Doc. no. 15 (Motion to Dismiss Brief), at 5.

10

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 10 of 14
evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial

risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (internal citation

omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges circumstantial evidence of defendants’

subjective knowledge: i.e., defendants were required to conduct a health examination

of Tinsley within fourteen days of his arrival; they were required to review his

medical history; and, Tinsley submitted numerous written and verbal requests for

emergency medical treatment.

29 A finder of fact could infer from that circumstantial

evidence that defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to

Tinsley. Further, and as previously stated, allegations made against multiple

defendants usually are treated as allegations against each defendant individually. 

Accordingly, this court concludes that plaintiff has alleged facts that plausibly could

establish the first element of a claim of deliberate indifference: i.e., subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm. Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendants” altered

Tinsley’s medications and refused to provide him with medical treatment or a C-PAP

breathing machine.30 Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged facts that plausibly could

establish the second element of a claim of deliberate indifference: i.e., disregard of

a risk of serious harm. Finally, plaintiff has alleged that defendants’ conduct

29

Id. ¶ 38.

30

Id.

11

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 11 of 14
“constitutes [an] unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”31 That allegation

plausibly could establish the third element of deliberate indifference: i.e., conduct that

is more than negligence. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for

deliberate indifference against defendants, and their motion to dismiss that claim is

due to be denied.

Defendants also move to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief

on the ground that plaintiff lacks standing to seek such relief.32 The court agrees. 

The Supreme Court held in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), that a

plaintiff may pursue injunctive relief only when she “has sustained or is immediately

in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official

conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 101–02 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

plaintiff proceeds individually and as administrator of Tinsley’s estate. Plaintiff has

not alleged that she has either sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining,

some direct injury as a result of defendants’ conduct, nor has she alleged that

Tinsley’s estate is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury. 

Accordingly, plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims for injunctive relief, and

31

Id. ¶ 55.

32

 Doc. no. 15 (Motion to Dismiss Brief), at 5.

12

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 12 of 14
defendants’ motion as to those claims is due to be granted. See Golthy v. Alabama,

287 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Albritton, J.) (finding no standing for

injunctive relief when administratrix had shown no immediate danger to decedent’s

estate).

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss

filed by defendants Dewayne Estes, Ruth Naglich, Guy Noe, Jimmy Patrick, and Kim

T. Thomas is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion as to Limestone

Correctional Facility is GRANTED, and all claims asserted against that entity are

DISMISSED with prejudice. The motion based upon defendants’ sovereign

immunity is GRANTED, and all claims for money damages asserted against the

above-named defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

The motion as to plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief also is GRANTED, and all

claims for injunctive relief asserted against the above-named defendants are

DISMISSED with prejudice. The motion to dismiss claims asserted against fictitious

defendants is GRANTED, and those claims are STRICKEN. The motion is denied

in all other respects. Defendants are allowed fourteen daysfrom the date of this order

to file answers to plaintiff’s complaint.

13

Case 5:14-cv-02181-CLS Document 26 Filed 03/02/15 Page 13 of 14
DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of March, 2015.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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