Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01777/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01777-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Sony Electronics, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

consolidated with 

05cv1796 - IEG - AJB

05cv1613 - IEG - AJB

RELATED CASE:

08cv1859 - IEG - AJB

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT OF U.S. PATENT

NO. 4,930,158

vs.

Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. and

Victor Company of Japan, Ltd.,

Plaintiffs.

vs.

Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.,

Defendant.

[Doc. No. 182 (Case No. 05cv1777);

Doc. No. 44 (Case No. 08cv1859)]

____________________________________

Thompson, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.,

Defendant.

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The “Non-Guardian Parties” are Plaintiffs Sony Electronics Inc., Thomson, Inc., Panasonic

Corporation, and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd., and Defendants Toshiba America Consumer

Products, L.L.C. and Toshiba America, Inc. (“Toshiba”). 

- 2 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

____________________________________

Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Toshiba American Consumer Products,

L.L.C. and Toshiba America, Inc.,

Defendants.

These consolidated actions concern a patent dispute between the “Non-Guardian Parties” – five

manufacturers/suppliers of consumer electronic products1 – and Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.

(“Guardian”). The suit involves two patents, only one of which is relevant to the present motion: U.S.

Patent No. 4,930,158 (“the ‘158 Patent”). Presently, the Non-Guardian Parties (“NG parties”) move

for summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘158 patent. Guardian filed an opposition and the

NG Parties replied. Having considered the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below,

the Court GRANTS summary judgment of non-infringement.

BACKGROUND

A. The ‘158 Patent

The ‘158 Patent, entitled “Selective Video Playing System,” teaches an invention for managing

objectionable content in video programs. The invention enables parents to prevent their children from

viewing violent or sexually explicit programming. Issued in 1988, the ‘158 Patent describes and

claims two “aspects” of the invention: (1) a device that prevents play of an entire video program of

a certain classification and (2) a device that plays a video program, but replaces objectionable

portions with substitute program material from another source. See (Pl. Motion, Ex. 1, ‘158 Patent,

Col. 5, ln. 7-14.) The claims at issue involve only the second aspect of the invention.

The specification of the ‘158 patent describes the second aspect in detail. The patent teaches

a system in which video programs contain codes that flag certain content, such as violent or sexually

explicit material. As the video program is playing, the video player continually searches for these

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

codes. When the video player detects a code, it suspends play of the video program and sends a signal

to an “auxiliary device,” a term with a disputed definition. The auxiliary device begins to play

substitute content that replaces the violent or explicit content on the viewing screen. As the substitute

content is being viewed, the video player advances the original program past the violent or explicit

portion. Once the replacement content concludes playing, the original content resumes play, having

skipped the offensive portions of the program.

Claims 8 and 19 of the ‘158 patent are directed to the second aspect of the invention, as are

their respective dependent claims, claims 9-11 and 20-22. Claims 8 and 19 read:

(‘158 Patent at 7:24-41(emphasis added) and 8:53-68 (emphasis added)). Both claims 8 and 19

require “sending a signal to an auxiliary device,” “causing playing of the video program to be

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

suspended,” and “comparing the detected code to a set of selected codes.” The meaning and

application of these terms underlies the present motion.

B. The Allegedly Infringing Products

Guardian claims the NG Parties produce DVD players that contain infringing parental-control

functions. To gain a better understanding of the parental-control functions at issue, counsel for the

NG Parties conducted a demonstrative test on a Sony DVD player. (Gresalfi Decl. ISO of Pl. Motion,

¶¶ 13-235.) Counsel performed three tests: (1) playing a DVD with the parental control disabled; (2)

playing the DVD with parental control enabled; and (3) playing the DVD with parental control

enabled, but bypassing the function with an unlock code.

During the first test, after disabling the parental control function, counsel placed in the DVD

player a disc of Star Wars II: Attack of the Clones. After closing the DVD player, the disc began

spinning and a “title sequence” appeared in the following order: (1) a FBI warning, Figure 1; (2) an

international copyright warning, Figure 2; (3) the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”)

rating, Figure 3; and (4) a title menu, Figure 4

 Figure 3: MPAA Rating Figure 4: Title Menu

Figure 1: FBI warning Figure 2: International Copyright Warning

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Level 8 appears to correspond with a certain level of parental control. 

- 5 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

During the second test, counsel enabled the parental control function, and again placed the Star

Wars disc in the DVD player. After the tray closed, the screen went blank (Figure 5) before

proceeding to the parental-control-menu, which read, “The Parental Level of the Player Has Been Set.

Press ‘Yes’ to Continue.” See Figure 6. The screen includes the options “Yes” and “Stop.” Counsel

selected STOP and the DVD ceased playing.

 Figure 5: Blank Screen Figure 6: Parental-Control-Menu

During the third test, Counsel enabled the parental control function. Once the Star Wars DVD

was in the DVD player, the screen went blank. After a moment, the parental-control-menu appeared,

which read, “The Parental Level of the Player Has Been Set. Press ‘Yes’ to Continue.” See Figure 6.

Counsel selected “Yes.” A message then appeared, which read “Do you want temporarily change

parental control to 8?”2

 See Figure 7. Counsel selected “Yes.” Then a message stating, “parental

control temporarily canceled” appeared on the screen. See Figure 8. Counsel entered a password and

the message disappeared. The screen then displayed the four screens comprising the title sequence.

Figure 7 Figure 8 

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

Counsel also tested the products of the other NG Parties, all of which functioned in substantially

the same manner in all three tests. 

C. Procedural Background

After obtaining the patent in 1988, the inventor, Peter Vogel, unsuccessfully pursued licensing

agreements with the NG Parties. In November 2003, Vogel assigned the patents to Guardian, which

also pursued licensing agreements with the NG Parties. 

In September 2005, following the break down of licensing negotiations, the NG Parties brought

suit requesting a declaration that Guardian’s patents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed.

On its own motion, the Court consolidated the actions brought by the NG Parties.

At about the same time, the NG Parties filed ex parte petitions for re-examination of the two

patents with the PTO. The PTO found substantial questions of patentability and granted both requests.

On November 4, 2008, following full reexamination proceedings of the ‘158 patent, the PTO confirmed

the patentability of claims 8-11 and 19-22 and cancelled claims 1-7 and 12-18.

On June 12, 2009, the NG Parties filed the motion for summary judgment of non-infringement

of the ‘158 patent. The Court conducted a status conference regarding the motion on August 7, 2009

and heard oral argument on August 19, 2009.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and materials demonstrate “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material issue of

fact is a question a trier of fact must answer to determine the rights of the parties under the applicable

substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

Summary judgment may be granted where the moving party shows “an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Fritz

Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

The moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

its motion.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. To satisfy this burden, the movant must demonstrate that no

genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. at 322. However, the moving party is not required

to negate those portions of the non-moving party’s claim on which the non-moving party bears the

burden of proof. Id. at 323. To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must then

show that there are genuine factual issues which can only be resolved by the trier of fact. Reese v.

Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323). The nonmoving party may not rely on the pleadings but must present specific facts

creating a genuine issue of material fact. Nissan, 210 F.3d at 1103. The inferences to be drawn from

the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, but conclusory

allegations as to ultimate facts are not adequate to defeat summary judgment. Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). The court is not required “to scour the record in

search of a genuine issue of triable fact,” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996), but

rather “may limit its review to the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those

parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237

F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Patent Infringement and Claims Construction

A determination of patent infringement requires a two-step analysis. PC Connector Solutions

LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005). First, the Court must ascertain the

scope of the claims as a matter of law. Id. Second, the Court must compare the properly construed

claim to the accused device or process. Id. This second step is a question of fact; however, if there is

no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, summary judgment is proper. Id.

During the first step, the Court determines the meaning of the patent’s claims, which define

the scope of the patented invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en

banc). In construing patent claims, the Court must first evaluate the intrinsic evidence, which includes

the language of the claims themselves, the specification of the patent, and the prosecution history. Id.

at 1312-1317. However, not all intrinsic evidence is equal: the language of the claim is given primary

importance. The Federal Circuit has warned, “although the specification often describes very specific

embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

embodiments.” Id. at 1323. After completing the intrinsic evaluation, a court may consider extrinsic

evidence only if “a disputed claim term remains ambiguous after analysis of the intrinsic evidence.”

Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc., 284 F.3d 1365, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Extrinsic evidence

is “all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,

dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. 

During the second step, the Court must determine whether the accused products either literally

infringe the patent or, alternatively, if they infringe the patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal

infringement occurs when “all of the elements of the claim, as correctly construed, [are] present in the

accused device.” TechSearch, LLC v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Where literal

infringement is not present, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be found where the

“accused product or process contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the

patented invention.” Warner-Jenkison Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).

DISCUSSION

The NG Parties offer three reasons the accused DVD players do not infringe the ‘158 patent.

First, they contend their products do not contain an “auxiliary device.” Second, the NG Parties believe

the accused devices do not “compare the detected code to a set of selected codes.” The parties dispute

the meaning of all these terms, therefore, the Court must construe the terms before making an

infringement determination. Third, the Non-Guardian Parties contend a “video program” is not

“suspended” or “resumed” when played on the DVD players of the NG Parties. 

I. AUXILIARY DEVICE

A. Claim Construction

TERM NON-GUARDIAN

PARTIES’ PROPOSED

CONSTRUCTION

GUARDIAN’S PROPOSED

CONSTRUCTION

Auxiliary Device A playback device, such as

another VCR, that is

physically separate from the

video player that plays back

the video program, and is the

source of substitute material

A substitute source of video

material, where such material

may include messages,

information, advertisements or

other video programs.

Claim 8 uses the term “auxiliary device” in the following context: “sending a signal to an

auxiliary device.” Claim 19 uses the exact same terminology. 

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

i. Parties’ Arguments

The NG Parties argue “auxiliary device” means “a playback device, such as another VCR, that

is physically separate from the video player that plays back the video program, and is the source of

substitute material.” First, the NG Parties rely on the plain meaning of the phrase “sending a signal to

an auxiliary device.” They believe the verb “sending to” means the auxiliary device is external to the

video player because a device cannot send a signal to itself. Second, the Non-Guardian Parties argue

the specification exemplifies the “auxiliary device” only by reference to external devices such as “a

second video player,” “another VCR,” or “a VCR.” 

Guardian believes “auxiliary device” means “a substitute source of video material, where such

material may include messages, information, advertisements or other video programs.” Guardian

believes their construction is consistent with the findings of the PTO’s reexamination of the patent.

Further, Guardian contends the PTO rejected the definition proposed by the NG Parties.

In its reply, the NG Parties contest Guardian’s use of “substitute.” They assert the auxiliary

device is “the source of substitute material” not “a substitute source of video material.” The NG Parties

believe Guardian’s construction avoids the essence of the claimed invention: replacing material from

the main program. Further, the NG Parties argue the auxiliary devices at issue do not replace anything.

ii. Analysis

The first issue is whether the auxiliary device need be external to the video player system. The

Court first turns to the language of the claim. Both claim 8 and claim 19 include the phrase “sending

a signal to an auxiliary device.” Generally, a device cannot send a signal to itself; therefore, the video

player and auxiliary device must be separate and distinct components of the system. However, neither

claim 8 or claim 19 discusses whether the system must be located either inside or outside of one

enclosure. When reasonably read, the claims’ limitations would allow both components – the video

player and auxiliary device – to be housed in same enclosure. The silence of the claims on the issue

of physical separation weighs against reading a “physically separate” limitation into the claim. 

Moreover, the specification is also silent on the issue of the proposed “physically separate”

limitation. According to the specification, the “auxiliary device” provides substitute material to replace

material from a main program:

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

If a REPLACE code is detected, a signal is sent to auxiliary output . . .

. On receipt of this signal, an auxiliary device, such as another VCR,

responds by playing another recording, and an auxiliary switching

device selects the substitute material to be displayed . . . . . . When the auxiliary device has finished replaying the substitute program,

it sends a signal to auxiliary input . . . which causes replay of the first

program to resume.

(‘158 Patent, at Col. 5:25-41.) Although the specification contains an example of an auxiliary device,

“another VCR,” it does not explicitly require the auxiliary device be external to the enclosure that

contains the video player. Furthermore, after scouring the remainder of the specification, the Court

finds no support for the physically separate requirement. Accordingly, the specification weighs against

reading a “physically separate” limitation into the claim.

The NG Parties fail to appreciate the difference between an exemplar and a requirement. The

specification includes two exemplars of the “auxiliary device” that are external devices. First, the

specification states, “[o]n receipt of this signal, an auxiliary device, such as another VCR, responds by

playing another recording . . . .” (The ‘158 Patent, 5:27-30.) Later, the specification again describes

the auxiliary device as an external device, “In this case, the auxiliary device can be a VCR which plays

a recording comprising a number of advertisements or messages . . . .” (The ‘158 Patent, 5:48-50.)

Although these examples prove the auxiliary device may be external, it does not necessarily follow that

the device must be external. See, e.g., Varco, L.P. v. Pason Systems USA, Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1373

(Fed. Cir. 2006) ("'In examining the specification for proper context . . . this court will not at any time

import limitations from the specification into the claims.'"). Accordingly, this language does not

support the position of the NG Parties. 

The second issue is whether the auxiliary device is “the source of substitute video material” or

“a substitute source of video material.” Despite Guardian’s protestations, this is a distinction with a

difference. A review of the specification reveals that the sole purpose of the auxiliary device is to

provide “substitute video material.” The specification states the patent’s purpose is “directed to

providing means for replacing unwanted program with programme [sic] from another source.”

(Gresalfi Decl., Ex. 1, at A.9: 5:12-15) (emphasis added). Further, at oral argument, Guardian agreed

the auxiliary device provides substitute video material. Guardian’s construction improperly implies

the auxiliary device is a substitute source, not a source of substitute material. This would mean an

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

After oral argument, the NG Parties filed a supplemental letter brief arguing the Court should

apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to determine the proper construction of the term “video

program.” The NG Parties argue this Court is bound by the Central District’s construction of that term

in the case Guardian v. Coby, Case No. 2:08cv08439, which also concerned the ‘158 patent. The

Court will not consider this argument, raised by the NG Parties for the first time after extensive

briefing and oral argument on the summary judgment motion.

- 11 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

auxiliary device could provide the same video material, as long as it was generated from a different

source. This would clearly fail to reflect the purpose of “providing means for replacing unwanted

program with program from another source.” Accordingly, the Court finds the auxiliary device is “the

source of substitute video material.”

The third issue is whether to include the final sentence of Guardian’s proposed construction,

in which it defines “video material” as “may include messages, information, advertisements, or other

video programs.” Turning to the intrinsic record, the specification teaches that substitute material may

include “information,” “advertisements,” “messages,” or “substitute programs.” (Gresalfi Decl., Ex.

1., at A.9: 5:39, 48, 50-51.) However, because the specification cannot act as a limitation unto itself,

the construction should not constrain the term “video material” to these categories. Accordingly, the

Court includes the phrase “video material, where such material may include messages, information,

advertisements, or other video programs.”3

iii. Construction

The Court construes the term “auxiliary device” as “the source of substitute video material,

where such material may include messages, information, advertisements or other video programs.” 

B. Literal Infringement

i. Parties’ Arguments

Guardian asserts the accused devices contain an “auxiliary device.” According to both parties,

when a DVD recording is suspended because it exceeds the parental control settings, a parental control

warning and override message is displayed. Guardian believes this message is generated from “flash”

or “one time programmable (OTP)” memory installed in the accused devices. From this, Guardian

concludes the flash or OTP memory is an auxiliary device because it is the source of the parentalcontrol-menu, which replaces the normal DVD function. Guardian presents the testimony of its expert,

Richard Ferraro, in support of this conclusion.

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

The NG Parties argue their DVD players do not have an external, auxiliary device. Moreover,

the NG Parties argue a flash or OTP do not provide replacement material. Further, the NG Parties

argue these internal components are independently mentioned in the patent; therefore, cannot be

auxiliary devices. 

ii. Analysis

The issue is whether the flash or OTP memories are “the source of substitute video material,

where such material may include messages, information, advertisements or other video programs.” It

is undisputed the parental-control-menu originates from the flash or OTP memory. Further, a jury

could only find the parental-control-menu is video material, where such material includes messages,

information, advertisements or other video programs. Accordingly, the sole dispute is whether the

parental-control-menu is “substitute video material.” 

To determine whether the parental-control-menu is substitute video material, the Court turns

to the demonstrative tests conducted by the counsel for the NG parties using the Star Wars II DVD.

First, counsel tested the device with the parental-control settings turned off. He turned on the player

and the screen displayed the title sequence: (1) the FBI warning screen, (2) the international copyright

screen, (3) the MPAA rating screen, and (4) the title menu. 

Later, counsel conducted a different test with the DVD player’s parental-control settings

enabled. He turned on the player and the screen displayed a parental-control menu overlaying a 20th

Century Fox logo. When counsel entered the parental control pin, the parental-control menu

disappeared and the title sequence began running. All four screens of the title sequence appeared.

When reviewing this evidence, it is important to note the parental-control-menu did not replace

any content. Instead, the parental-control-menu merely delayed the play of the title sequence. Once

counsel entered the parental-control pin, the screen showed all four screens of the title sequence. As

such, the parental-control-menu is not substitute video material. Because the flash or OTP memories

only provide the parental-control-menu, which is not substitute video material, the flash or OTP

memories are not auxiliary devices. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could only conclude the

accused DVD players do not literally infringe the ‘158 patent. 

Accordingly, the Court finds there is no literal infringement.

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

C. Doctrine of Equivalents

i. Parties Arguments

The NG Parties argue that there is no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because

the internal flash or OTP memory cannot be equivalent to an external device. Further, the NG Parties

argue that the ‘158 patent discloses this type of internal flash or OTP memory, but does not identify

it as an auxiliary device. Accordingly, the NG parties argue Guardian is subject to prosecutorial

estoppel. Guardian believes the accused devices meet the “auxiliary device” limitation under the

doctrine of equivalents. Guardian implements the “function, way, result” test, focusing on the

physically separate requirement proposed by the NG Parties. Guardian argues the function is merely

to receive a signal because the independent claim does not require playback. The “way” is the same

because the “auxiliary device” is still the alternate source of video signals and connected to the

microprocessor to enable a signal be sent by the processor and received by the auxiliary device. 

ii. Analysis

The DVD players do not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents because there is no

equivalent of the auxiliary device. Although the independent claim does not require playback, it

requires the existence of an auxiliary device. The parties agree that the auxiliary device must be a

source of video material. Further, as discussed above, the video material must be substitute video

material. As used in the patent, “substitute” is a synonym for “replace.” The parental-control-menu,

which is the only video material generated by the flash or OTP memory, does not replace anything.

Because the flash or OTP memory do not provide substitute video material, or the equivalent substitute

material, the DVD players do not infringe the ‘158 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment of non-infringement. 

II. SET OF SELECTED CODES

Even if the allegedly infringing products contained auxiliary devices, the Court also finds the

products do not “compar[e] the detected code to a set of selected codes.”

///

///

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

A. Claim Construction

TERM NON-GUARDIAN

PARTIES’ PROPOSED

CONSTRUCTION

GUARDIAN’S PROPOSED

CONSTRUCTION

“Comparing the detected code

to a set of selected codes”

Comparing a detected

program classification code to

more than one code, each of

which has been assigned a

value by the user

Comparing a detected

program classification code to

one or more user selected

codes.

Both Guardian and the NG Parties agree that “comparing the detected code” means “comparing

a detected program classification code.” The sole dispute centers on the term “to a set of selected

codes,” which appears in claims 8, 9, 19, and 20.

i. Parties’ Arguments

The NG Parties urge the Court to define “set of selected codes” as “more than one code.” They

argue the phrase “set of codes” is clearly plural, therefore, requires the inclusion of multiple codes. In

their reply, the NG Parties make a cursory reference to the specification.

Guardian argues “set of selected codes” means “one or more user selected codes.” First,

Guardian relies on mathematical definitions. Guardian cites the definition of the word “singleton” in

Webster’s dictionary, which means “a set consisting of one given element.” (Harsell Decl. ISO Def.

Motion, Ex. 7 at 5.) Additionally, Webster’s defines a “set” as “a collection of objects or elements

classed together.” Id. Further, Guardian cites two cases finding “set” to have a plain meaning of “one

or more.” Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise, Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49750, at *12 (D.D.C. July 11,

2007); Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20458, at *26-27 (E.D. Tex.

Mar. 22, 2007).

Moreover, Guardian believes the NG Parties represented to the PTO that a “set” means “one

or more” during reexamination. Guardian asserts the NG Parties argued a prior art reference involving

“one or more”codes satisfied the “set of selected codes” limitation in the ‘158 patent. (Hartsell Decl,

Ex. 16, “Request for Ex Parte Reexamination” at 15.) The PTO agreed and found when a user selects

“one or more rating levels,” a set has been selected. Id. at 5, 12. Guardian believes the Court should

not allow this inconsistent argument because the NG parties violated their duty to act with “candor and

good faith” during reexamination, citing Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1992).

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

ii. Analysis

The claim language supports the proposed construction by the NG Parties. Regardless of how

the Court defines the word “set,” the Court’s interpretation of the word “codes” is dispositive. Turning

to the language of the claim, the patentee decided to use the plural word “codes” when defining the

contents of the set. This indicates he intended the contents of the set to be multiple selected codes. If

he had intended the set to contain only one code, he could have used the singular word “code.”

Accordingly, the use of the plural “codes” weighs in favor of the NG Parties’ construction.

This inference is supported by the claim language adjacent to the disputed term. The patentee

used the word “code” earlier in the claim element. Specifically, the claim requires the “comparing of

the detected code to a set of selected codes.” The use of the singular “detected code,” closely followed

by the plural “codes,” indicates an intent to distinguish between the plural and singular forms.

Accordingly, the claim language supports the definition proposed by the NG Parties. 

The specification does not compel a different conclusion. Throughout the specification, the

patent only exemplifies “set of codes” as multiple codes. (See ‘158 Patent, Col. 3:37 - 4:31.) For

example, in column four of the patent, the specification describes an embodiment where the set of

codes is comprised of “three bits, corresponding to the classifications: (1) Violent, (2) Sexually explicit,

and (3) Adult only.” (‘158 Patent, 4:11-15.) Although the specification cannot impose additional

limitations into the claim, in this case, it reinforces the plain meaning of the claim.

The “duty of candor and good faith” does not estop the NG Parties from presenting their

definition. The “duty of candor and good faith” requires parties to a patent reexamination to “bring

materials to the attention of the PTO as they ‘are aware, or become aware’ of them.” Ball Corp., 967

F.2d at 1447. This duty is codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.555, which only addresses the duty to disclose

information. The section simply does not apply to arguments made during the reexamination. During

reexamination, the NG Parties argued a specific piece of prior art, the Chard reference, allowed “a user

to select one or more rating levels that will be blocked, for both video and audio, thereby ‘enabling

selection of a of a set of classification codes.’” (Hartsell Decl., Ex. 16 at 12.) Guardian does not

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Moreover, even if a reviewing court believed estoppel could apply, the statement regarding

the Charad reference is not in direct contradiction to the current position of the NG parties. The NG

Parties noted the Charad reference allowed a user to select ratings levels for both the video or audio.

This would require the selection of two codes, a.k.a., more than one code.

5

 A “bit-field” is a field containing only binary characters, such as 1s and 0s.

- 16 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

indicate what materials were withheld from the PTO, therefore, the Court rejects this argument.4

The extrinsic sources submitted by Guardian are unpersuasive. Guardian submits the

declaration of Richard Ferraro, an expert in the field. Ferraro believes one ordinarily skilled in the art

would understand “set of selected codes” to mean “one or more selected codes.” (Ferraro Decl., Ex.

11 to Hartsell Decl., ¶99.) However, the opinion is conclusory and only addresses the definition of

“set” without explaining why “codes” would mean one code.

In sum, the language of the claim, the specification, and extrinsic sources all support the

proposed construction of the NG Parties.

iii. Construction

The Court construes the term “comparing the detected code to a set of selected codes” as

“comparing a detected program classification code to more than one code, each of which has been

assigned a value by the user.” 

B. Literal Infringement

i. Parties’ Arguments

The NG Parties argue their products do not compare a code to a set of selected codes because

the MPAA age rating system only provides for comparison to a single code. The NG Parties contrast

the MPAA system with the U.S. TV Parental Guidelines, which provide for separate and independent

content labels D, L, S, V, FV to indicate whether a program contains suggestive dialogue, course or

crude language, sexual situations, violence, or fantasy violence.

Guardian argues there is no dispute the DVD players compare a detected MPAA rating code

from a DVD to preselected codes with the DVD player. Guardian argues, even if the NG Parties’

definition applies, the user can set a rating code and a country code. Guardian argues the country code

is used exclusively in the parental control system. Further, Guardian argues, the code selected by the

user is translated into a 16 bit bit-field as a series of 16 contiguous 1s and 0s.5

 

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

ii. Analysis

The accused DVD players are pre-programmed at the factory to recognize and process the

various rating codes, roughly corresponding to the well-known MPAA rating system. (Hartsell Decl.,

Ex. 17, ¶ 3.) To set parental control, a user selects codes using the “Custom Parental Control” menu

on the accused DVD players. Id., ¶2. Once the Custom Parental Control menu is accessed, “the user

can set a parental control level of 1 to 8, with 1 being the most restrictive (“G rated”) and 8 being the

least restrictive. Id., ¶ 3. Once the user sets the code and places the DVD in the DVD player, the

player detects the rating code on the DVD and compares it to the user selected code. For example,

when attempting to play the Star Wars II DVD, the DVD player reads the code on the DVD – in this

case a PG rating – and compares it to the code selected by the user. During the demonstrative test,

when the user selected a code 1, the player compared the detected PG code to the user selected code,

and blocked play of the program. The player did not compare the PG rating to multiple codes, instead

it only compared it to the G rating selected by the user. Accordingly, the player only compares the

code to one code, not a set of selected codes. 

The country code is a red herring. When the user accesses the “Custom Parental Control” menu

to set the parental-control level, the user can also set a country code. (Hartsell Decl., Ex. 17.) On the

“Custom Parental Control” menu, three options appear: (1) “level,” (2) “standard,” and (3) “change

password.” See Figure 9, below. The “level” option allows the user to set the parental-control level

of 1 through 8. The “standard” option allows the user to set the country code by selecting a variety of

countries.

 

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

This country code determines what a selection of 1 or 8 means, depending on the country. For

example, if the user enters a 1 in the United States, it might not be the same as a 1 in the United

Kingdom. Once the user selects the country code, the player translates the parental-control level based

on the country selected. Critically, this translation occurs before any code is read off of the DVD.

Once the DVD begins playing in the machine, the DVD player detects the rating code and compares

it to the translated parental-level rating code selected by the user. The timing of this is important

because the country code translates the meaning of the parental-level rating code prior to the DVD

playing. The comparison required by the claim occurs while the DVD is playing, when the player

compares the DVD rating to the translated, singular code. Therefore, the accused DVD player is not

comparing the detected code to a set of codes. 

Guardian’s 16 bit bit-field argument is misplaced. The patent requires “[c]omparing the

detected code to a set of selected codes.” The patent focuses on the actions taken by the user in

selecting the codes, not the form those codes ultimately take once inputted and processed by the

machine. Undoubtedly, as binary numbers drive the technology at issue, the machine translates any

user-action into a string of binary numbers. Regardless, the patent is unconcerned with what the

machine does; user-selection drives the claim. Therefore, Guardian’s argument is unpersuasive.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds there is no literal infringement.

C. Doctrine of Equivalents

i. Parties’ Arguments

Alternatively, Guardian argues the accused DVD players infringe under the doctrine of

equivalents. Guardian argues if a user selects “PG” as a rating code, the player will perform the

compare function against both “G’” and “PG” movies. The NG parties do not address this argument.

ii. Analysis

Guardian’s argument fails because the selection of a single code, that happens to encompass

another code, is not sufficient under the doctrine of equivalents. See Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard

Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091,1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he term ‘majority’ is not entitled to a scope of

equivalents covering a minority . . . [I]t would defy logic to conclude that a minority – the very

antithesis of a majority – could be insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a majority

. . . .”) Likewise, the term “codes” is not entitled to a scope of equivalents covering “code.” Like in

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 - 05cv1777 - IEG - AJB

Moore, it would defy logic to make a distinction between “code” and “codes” during claim

construction, then find “codes” meant “code” under the doctrine of equivalents. Accordingly, the Court

finds the product does not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment of noninfringement.

III. CAUSING PLAYING OF THE VIDEO PROGRAM TO BE SUSPENDED

The parties extensively brief, and strenuously dispute, the meaning of the term “causing playing

of the video program to be suspended.” However, regardless which definition of the term the Court

adopts, the evidence presented in support of the infringement argument creates a genuine issue of

material fact that precludes summary judgment. Specifically, there is a dispute about the differences

in the parental coding of two DVDs lodged with the court: Star Wars II and Species II. The fact is

material because it impacts what screen images the user sees once the DVD is placed in the DVD

player. Because this dispute of material fact exists, this issue is not amenable to summary disposition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) GRANTS summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘158 patent because the accused

players do not contain an “auxiliary device”;

(2) alternatively GRANTS summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘158 patent because the

accused devices do not “compare a detected code to a set of codes”; and

(3) declines to reach the issue whether the accused devices “cause playing of the video program

to be suspended.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2009

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:05-cv-01777-IEG-MDD Document 233 Filed 08/31/09 Page 19 of 19