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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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FIL~ D 

United States Court of Appa..als UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

DEBRA ROXBERRY, 

Plaintiff-Appe llant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERTSON AND PENN, INC., also known 

as National Service Company, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 15 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 91-333 0 

(D.C. No. 90-1323-K) 

(Dist. of Kansas) 

Be fore LOGAN, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate rec ord, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App . P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34 . 1 . 9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument . 

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the dist rict 

court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendantappellee, Robertson And Penn, Inc . , on the ground that plaintiffappellant Roxberry had failed to state a cause of action for 

wrongful discharge by retaliation for whistle-blowing because 

Roxberry reported the c laimed contract violation t o the victim 

* This Order and Judgment has no pre c edential value and sha ll not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Cir cuit, except 

f or purposes of establishing the doctrine s of the l a w of the case , r e s judica ta, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 .3. 

Appellate Case: 91-3330 Document: 010110249172 Date Filed: 05/15/1992 Page: 1
rather than to either company management or law enforcement 

officials. 

The district court relied on Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 

752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988) which holds that the whistle-blowing must 

be reported"· .. to either company management or law enforcement 

officials" in order to support a cause of action in t ort for 

employment termination in retaliation for good faith reporting of 

infraction of rules, regulations or laws. Id. at 900. 

We AFFIRM substantially for the reasons set forth in the 

district court Memorandum and Order dated and filed September 30, 

1991, a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference made a 

part hereof. We deny appellant's motion for certification of 

question to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E . Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-3330 Document: 010110249172 Date Filed: 05/15/1992 Page: 2
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( 'FILED 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

11.~. DISTRICT COURT 

Dl~TP.IST e;: KA~SAS 

SEr 30 10 33 AH '91 

DEBBIE ROXBERRY, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ROBERTSON AND PENN, INC., a/k/a 

National Service Company, 

Defendant. 

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

IH.LrH L. C::LOt.Cll 

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No. 90-1323-K 

ffITf RtD OH THE DCC" 

DAT!=• 1 ~ ;i..EJ ~. -oc; . c;; 

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This matter is before the court on defendant Robertson and 

Penn, Inc. 's motion for summary judgment. 

Debbie Roxberry, plaintiff and a former employee of the 

defendant, filed suit against the defendant seeking compensatory 

damages for alleged retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff contends she 

was discharged in retaliation for reporting improper acts of the 

defendant in its performance under a contract with the United 

States of America. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant 

asserts a lack of jurisdiction based upon diversity or a federal 

question, and contends plaintiff was discharged for good cause. 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for 

summary judgment, the court must resolve all disputed facts in 

favor of the party resisting summary judgment. White v. General 

Appellate Case: 91-3330 Document: 010110249172 Date Filed: 05/15/1992 Page: 3
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Motors Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 669, 670 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3441 (1991). Summary judgment shall be denied 

if the moving party fails to demonstrate its entitlement beyond a 

reasonable doupt. Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 

1980). 

The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an 

essential element of the case for which the nonmoving party has the 

burden. of proof. Celote x Co rp. v . Ca trett, 477 U.S . 317, 322, 91 

L.Ed.2d 265, 106 s.ct. 2548 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 

(1988). In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving 

party may not rely upon mere allegations, or denials, contained in 

its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the party must come forward with 

specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue for trial. 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 

1990). One of the principal purposes of summary judgment is to 

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, 

and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to 

accomplish this purpose. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. 

A hearing on the motion was held on September 25, 1991. At 

that time both parties presented arguments and the court announced 

its decision. Consistent with its decision at the hearing, and for 

the reasons cited herein, the court grants defendant's motion for 

summary judgment. 

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Upon review of the record and the parties' arguments 

concerning summary judgment, the court makes the following findings 

of undisputed material facts. 

Defendant, a Missouri corporation, is a private contractor to 

the United States of America for laundry and dry cleaning services 

at Fort Riley. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as supervisor 

of the dry cleaning department until her termination on May 3, 

1990. 

In March, 1990, plaintiff told Willie Dawson that certain 

·shirts had been washe d rather than dry cleaned, the process for 

which they had been delivered. Willie Dawson was an employee of 

JC&N, a private contractor to the United States government which 

operated the Central Issue Facility at Fort Riley. Upon inquiry, 

plaintiff told her project manager that she had informed Dawson 

some shirts were washed rather than dry cleaned. It is a 

controverted fact as to who initiate d the conversation between 

Dawson and plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Dawson approached her 

and asked about the shirts. De f e ndant conte nd s plaintiff initiated 

the conversation with Dawson and then lied about that fact when 

questioned by the project manager. 

On May 3, 1990, plaintiff's employment with defendant was 

terminated. She alleges the discharge was in retaliation for 

informing Dawson of the alleged contract violation. Defendant 

claims it had permission to wash the shirts and plaintiff, 

therefore, had no wrongdoing to report. 

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Defendant also contends plaintiff was discharged for good 

cause based upon her untruthfulness in reporting the conversation 

with Dawson, refusing to learn all the duties required of a 

supervisor, and bearing a bad attitude at work. Finally, defendant 

argues plaintiff was not a whistle-blower because she did not 

report the incident to the proper authorities. 

Conclusions of Law 

The first issue the court considers is whether plaintiff has 

sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 

The record indicates plaintiff was an at-will employee. The 

employment of an at-will employee is terminable at the will of 

either party at any time and for any cause. Kistler v. Life care 

Centers of America, Inc., 620 F.Supp. 1268, 1269 (D.C. Kan. 1985). 

Kansas courts, however, have recognized a public policy exception 

to this general rule. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 

630 P.2d 186 (1981) (employee discharged for filing worker's 

compensation claim has actionable tort claim). 

In Palmer v . Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685 (1988), the 

Kansas Supreme Court recognized that an at-will employee has a 

cause of action against an employer for discharge in retaliation 

for "whistle-blowing". Therein the court stated: 

Public policy requires that citizens in a democracy 

be protected from reprisals for performing their civil 

duty of reporting infractions of rules, regulations, or 

the law pertaining to public heal th, safety, and the 

general welfare. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding 

termination of an employee in retaliation for the good 

faith reporting of a serious infraction of such rules, 

regulations or the law by a co-worker or an employer to 

either company management or law enforcement officials 

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(whistle-blowing) is an actionable tort. To maintain 

such an action, an employee has the burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence, under the facts of the 

case, a reasonably prudent person would have concluded 

the employee's co-worker or employer was engaged in 

activities in violation of rules, regulations, or the law 

pertaining to public heal th, safety, and the general 

welfare; the employer had knowledge of the employee's 

reporting of such violation prior to discharge of the 

employee; and the employee was discharged in retaliation 

for making the report. However, the whistle-blowing must 

have been done out of a good faith concern over the 

wrongful activity reported rather than from a corrupt 

motive such as malice, spite, jealousy or personal gain. 

Palmer, 242 Kan. at 900 (emphasis added). 

In the present matter, plaintiff has failed to establish a 

case of whistle-blowing. Plaintiff asserts she reported the 

alleged contract violation to Willie Dawson. Willie Dawson, 

however, was simply an employee of a private company who also 

contracted with the United states government. In order to 

maintain an action for retaliatory discharge based upon whistleblowing, the plaintiff must report an alleged infraction to either 

company management or law enforcement. Palmer, 242 Kan. at 900. 

In those jurisdictions which have recognized retaliatory 

discharge for whistle-blowing as an actionable tort, the plaintiff 

has revealed to the proper authorities evidence of unlawful acts by 

the employer. See McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Horne, Inc., 69 

Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984) (plaintiff reported alleged 

patient mistreatment to state health division); Watassek v. 

Michigan, Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W . 2d 

617 (1985) (state employee reported alleged patient abuse to 

immediate supervisor); Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 

246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (plaintiff reported to proper banking 

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authorities illegal overcharges on credit accounts by employer 

bank). Even in those cases where the court declined to impose 

employer liability for retaliatory discharge of whistle-blowers, 

the plaintiff had reported the alleged violations to proper 

authorities. See Martin v . Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App. d 549, 36 Cal. 

Rptr. 880 (1964) (plaintiff reported alleged securities violations 

to Dept . of Investment, Div. of Corporations of the state of 

California); Pavolini v . Ba rd Air Corp., 88 App.Div.2d 714,451 

N.Y.S.2d 288 (1982) (plaintiff reported employer safety violation 

to Federal Aviation Adminis tration); Welch v. Brown's Nursing Home, 

20 Ohio App.3d 15, 484 N.E.2d 178 (1984 ) (plaintiff reported 

alleged patient abuse to State Commission on Aging). 

Plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action for 

retaliatory discharge. The court finds insufficient evidence to 

establish that plaintiff reported the alleged misconduct to her 

supervisor or any member of company management, or to any member of 

the controlling governmental agency. Therefore, summary judgment 

is proper. 

Based upon the above conclusion, the court finds it 

unnecessary to rule on additional issues raised by the parties. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 0-

3<'2-day of September, 1991, 

that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (0kt. No. 61) is 

granted. 

PATRICK F. KELLY, JUDGE 

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