Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00823/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00823-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD VILLAPANDO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CDCR, 

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:14cv00823 LJO DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Richard Villapando (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prison inmate proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff 

filed this action on May 30, 2014. He names the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as the sole Defendant.

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the 

actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

(“SATF”) in Corcoran, California. 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff is a Native American inmate who participates in the Native American Spiritual 

Circle (“NASC”). For decades, these inmates have been permitted to possess items that are 

essential to their daily cultural, ceremonial and spiritual beliefs and practices. 

On October 19, 2012, Kathleen Dickinson, the director of Division of Adult Services, 

issued a memorandum that proposed a matrix for allowable religious property. The proposed 

matrix omitted previously approved items essential to the practice of Native American religious 

beliefs. The memo proposed a one-year “wear-out” period for items not on the list. There was 

no grandfather clause, even though grandfather-clause protection was offered for inmates who 

had non-religious items that were no longer approved (i.e., electric typewriters with memory and 

televisions with speakers). 

Plaintiff and other members of the NASC became aware of the memo in April 2013 when

the chaplain denied their spiritual package orders. Plaintiff appealed the denial, but it was denied 

at the third level in October 2013.

As Plaintiff and other inmates were trying to obtain further information about the new 

proposed rules, they were told that as of October 19, 2013, SATF staff would actively seek out, 

confiscate and destroy any religious property not included in the matrix. The inmates were also 

told that staff would target Native American inmates.

Also in April 2013, Plaintiff acquired a copy of the official Notice of Change to 

Regulations 13-01 (“NCR 13-01”), which had been implemented on February 15, 2013. 

On May 27, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an appeal contending that NCR 13-01 was 

unconstitutional because it did not include a grandfather clause to protect items essential to 

Native American inmates. The appeal was screened out at the second level as duplicative. 

On July 1, 2013, Plaintiff was told that CDCR changed the matrix to include beads and 

beading materials, but not the leather/hide/skin essential to construct beaded items. It also did 

not include components such as “earwire” needed to construct traditional earrings, or flutes, 

rattles and handdrums. 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On October 18, 2013, the day before the original “wear-out” period was set to expire, 

CDCR issued a memo extending the wear-out period for 180 days after approval of the matrix. 

On December 23, 2013, CDCR issued another memo indicating that the matrix had been 

approved and the wear-out date was now June 9, 2014. 

Based on the above, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:

1. Violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); 

2. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment based on NCR 13-01’s benefit to 

conventional and/or predominantly Caucasian religions;

3. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the lack of a grandfather clause 

in NCR 13-01; and

4. Violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the ability of staff to “threaten and 

instigate the confiscation and/or destruction of religious property.” 

C. DISCUSSION

1. Case or Controversy Requirement

“[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the 

threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or 

controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665 (1983) 

(citations omitted); Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 

2010); Chandler v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010). 

This requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that he has standing to sue by showing (1) an injury-infact, (2) causation, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a decision in his 

favor. Human Life of Washington Inc., 624 F.3d at 1000 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992)) (quotation marks omitted). Related to standing is the 

doctrine of ripeness, which precludes from consideration injuries that are speculative and may 

never occur. Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). Ripeness is a question of timing and 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

can be characterized as standing on a timeline. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 

220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotations and citations omitted). 

At the time Plaintiff filed this action, the “wear-out” period had not yet elapsed. Plaintiff 

filed this action on May 30, 2014, but he alleges that he would be permitted to keep his items 

until June 9, 2014. Therefore, at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, his non-approved 

religious items had not been confiscated pursuant to NCR 13-01, and it is unclear when or even 

if the regulation will be enforced against Plaintiff. The mere existence of the regulation does not 

satisfy the case or controversy requirement, Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139 (citation omitted), and 

therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are unripe and are subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

However, given the passage of time between the initiation of this suit and the issuance of 

the screening order, the Court will permit Plaintiff leave to amend in the event that this 

deficiency is curable. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The Court provides the following analysis to assist Plaintiff in amending his complaint.

2. Defendant CDCR

Plaintiff names CDCR as the sole Defendant based on his contention that CDCR is 

responsible for the generation and implementation of NCR 13-01.1 However, the Eleventh 

Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against the state. Wolfson v. 

Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). While 

“[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state official for prospective relief,” 

Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1065-66, suits against the state or its agencies are barred absolutely, 

regardless of the form of relief sought, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 

U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners, 678 F.3d 

737, 740 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 

1

Plaintiff alleges that Kathleen Dickinson issued a memorandum discussing the upcoming changes. He makes it 

clear, however, that he is only suing CDCR and the Court will not assume that Ms. Dickinson is a Defendant.

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Therefore, Plaintiff may not maintain a claim against CDCR. As explained above, 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 

1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or 

omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. First Amendment and RLUIPA

The protections of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment are triggered when 

prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him from 

engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith, Shakur v. Schriro, 

514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008), and RLUIPA prohibits prison officials from substantially 

burdening a prisoner’s “‘religious exercise unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental 

interest and does so by the least restrictive means,’” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that NCR 13-01’s restrictions unduly and overly inhibit 

the practice of his Native American religion. Construed liberally, and if Plaintiff can establish 

standing and name a proper Defendant, this may state a claim under the First Amendment and 

RLUIPA. 

4. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 

situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 

439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). A prisoner is entitled “to ‘a 

reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (per curiam)).

To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support the claim that prison 

officials intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by failing to provide 

him a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith compared to other similarly situated religious 

groups. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321-22; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 

1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001); Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884-85.

a. Benefit to Other Religions

Plaintiff contends that NCR 13-01 is “skewed to benefit conventional religions 

(Christianity and Islam) and one ‘alternative’ religion (Wicca) that is predominantly Caucasian 

in membership.” Comp. 12. Construed liberally, and if Plaintiff can establish standing and 

name a proper Defendant, this may state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

b. Grandfather Clause 

Plaintiff also contends that the lack of a grandfather clause in NCR 13-01 violates the 

Fourteenth Amendment because other inmates are permitted to keep non-religious items that 

become disapproved. As an example, he explains that inmates who possess non-religious items 

such as keyboards and certain televisions, were permitted to keep the items after they were no 

longer approved for possession. 

Unlike Plaintiff’s claim based on inequality amongst religions, this claim does not 

compare similarly situated individuals. In other words, there is no relationship between 

Plaintiff’s inability to keep non-allowed religious items and other inmates’ ability to keep nonreligious, non-allowable items. The two groups are not similarly situated and he fails to state a 

claim based on these allegations.

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 

101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and 

often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of 

pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 

554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that NCR 13-01 permits staff to “threaten and instigate, the 

confiscation and/or destruction of religious property.” Compl. 13. However, even though 

Plaintiff may believe that his religious items are important, the confiscation and/or destruction of 

the items does not involve a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Moreover, even if 

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff could state a claim based on the denial of religious items, his allegations are purely 

speculative.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which 

relief may be granted. While he may ultimately be able to state a claim under the First 

Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and RLUIPA, he must address the standing issue and name 

a proper Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability 

may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB Document 11 Filed 07/07/14 Page 10 of 10