Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07158/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 1997 Decided January 6, 1998 

No. 96-7158

M.A. EVERETT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv00990)

Brian W. Shaughnessy argued the cause for appellants, 

with whom Philip A. Gagner and Lester A. Katz were on the 

briefs.

Neal D. Mollen argued the cause for appellees, with whom 

Zachary D. Fasman and Erin M. Sweeney were on the brief.

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Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: A group of retired and active US 

Airways pilots (collectively, "Pilots") appeal from a decision of 

the district court dismissing two claims as subject to mandatory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 

U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., and staying proceedings on a third 

claim pending the outcome of that arbitration. Because the 

district court's order is not final, and no exception to the final 

order rule applies, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction.

I

Around 500 retired and active US Airways pilots sued US 

Airways Group, Inc. and its pension fund (collectively, "US 

Airways") for: (1) failure to pay approximately $70 million in 

benefits due under Sections 1054(g) and 1132(a)(1)(B) of the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.; (2) violation of ERISA's disclosure 

provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1022; and (3) breach of ERISA fiduciary duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104. The Pilots are each eligible for 

pension benefits under a plan collectively bargained in 1972 

between US Airways and the Air Line Pilots Association 

("ALPA"). This 1972 collective bargaining agreement replaced the pension benefits of participants under a prior plan 

with a "minimum benefit" based in part on "the investment 

performance of the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index 

(unadjusted for dividends)." The Pilots allege that US Airways has improperly interpreted the relevant language of the 

1972 agreement by excluding dividends from its benefit computations.

On motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Counts (1) and (3), holding that the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these claims because 

they depended on the proper interpretation of a collective 

bargaining agreement and thus were subject to mandatory 

arbitration under the RLA. See Everett v. USAir Group, 

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Inc., 927 F. Supp. 478, 482-83 (D.D.C. 1996). The district 

court retained jurisdiction over Count (2), holding that even if 

US Airways properly interpreted the agreement, it had an 

independent duty under ERISA to provide a summary plan 

description that was "calculated to be understood by the 

average plan participant." Id. at 484. The district court 

stayed proceedings on Count (2) until the end of the arbitral 

process. Id.

Claiming among other things futility of resort to an arbitration process controlled by US Airways and ALPA, both of 

whom the Pilots believe have interests adverse to their own, 

the Pilots ask this court to reverse the district court's dismissal of Counts (1) and (3). Because the order of the 

district court is not final, we have no jurisdiction to reach the 

merits of the Pilots' claims.

II

Our jurisdiction to review judgments of the district court is 

limited to "appeals from all final decisions," 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

(emphasis added), and to interlocutory appeals that fall within 

the narrow exceptions defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Thus, we 

cannot review this case unless the judgment of the district 

court is final or one of the conditions enumerated in § 1292 is 

satisfied.

A final decision "ends the litigation on the merits and 

leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." 

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The 

question presented by this case is whether the order may be 

considered final because the district court dismissed two of 

the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the stay 

of the third claim is, arguably, effectively unreviewable. The 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure speak directly to these 

issues, providing in relevant part:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, ... the court may direct the entry of a final 

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

claims ... only upon an express determination that 

there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 

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direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 

such determination and direction, any order ... which 

adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... shall not 

terminate the action as to any of the claims....

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added); see also Summers v. 

United States Dep't of Justice, 999 F.2d 570, 571 n.1 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993) (citing Kappelmann v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 539 

F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); 15A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.7, at 544 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the bright-line rule that "[a]bsent an express direction for entry of judgment, an order that disposes of less 

than all the claimsno matter with what firmness and apparent finalityis not appealable....").

In the instant litigation, the trial court dismissed two of 

three claims, but stayed Count (2) pending the outcome of 

arbitration. The stay of judgment on a claim pending arbitration does not constitute a final ruling by the trial court 

with respect to that claim. See McCowan v. Dean Witter 

Reynolds Inc., 889 F.2d 451, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding 

that an order dismissing two claims and referring two others 

to arbitration is not final). Thus, the district court adjudicated "fewer than all the claims" and, without the express 

determination and direction required by Rule 54(b), the judgment cannot be considered final "as to any of the claims." Of 

course, entry of judgment according to Rule 54(b) is not alone 

sufficient to confer appellate jurisdictionan appellate court 

must also satisfy itself that the district court applying Rule 

54(b) properly determined the particular claims to be final 

and distinct from other claims in the litigation. See Gold Seal 

Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (noting that 

Rule 54(b) only permits entry of final judgment with respect 

to "a claim distinct from the other claim or claims"); Inverworld, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) ("Rule 54(b) does not 'create' finality under § 1291 

where it does not already exist...."). But this does not 

imply, as the Pilots contend, that compliance with Rule 54(b) 

is unnecessary. Where, as here, the district court adjudicates 

fewer than all of the claims, finality with respect to certain 

claims, while not a sufficient condition for appellate review of 

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those claims, is a necessary one. Barring some other exception to the final decision rule, appellate review of an order 

which does not decide all the claims presented requires both

finality with respect to the adjudicated claims and entry of 

judgment on those claims in accordance with Rule 54(b). 

Because the latter condition is not met in this case, the 

district court's order cannot be considered final with respect 

to any of the claims.

The Pilots also try to bring the district court's ruling within 

the narrow "collateral order" exception to the doctrine of 

finality as set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). We have recognized that 

"[t]o fall within the small class of decisions excepted from the 

final judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively 

determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action, and be 

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 

Summers v. United States Dep't of Justice, 925 F.2d 450, 453 

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 

U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Pilots initially contended that because they expect the retirement board to rule against them, and because under the RLA 

an arbitration decision is "effectively unreviewable," the practical effect of the referral to arbitration will be to end the 

entire case. Not only have the Pilots failed to explain why 

this should imply finality with respect to the disclosure violations alleged in Count (2), but both parties agreed at oral 

argument that at the end of arbitration, after a final judgment from the district court on the entire case, this Court 

could review any error in the initial decision dismissing 

Counts (1) and (3) as subject to mandatory arbitration. Thus, 

neither the decision to refer Counts (1) and (3) to arbitration 

nor the stay of Count (2) are "effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from a final judgment," and the collateral order exception does not apply.

The Pilots also urge upon us a "practical finality" doctrine 

drawn from Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 

148 (1964). Discussing Cohen, Gillespie recognized that the 

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finality requirement should be given "a practical rather than 

a technical construction." Id. at 152 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. 

at 546). Gillespie noted that in "marginal cases," i.e., where 

finality is a close question, courts should consider the "inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review" as well as the "danger of denying justice by delay." Id. at 152-53. The Pilots 

argue that Gillespie expands the set of exceptions to the 

finality rule, and some authority supports that proposition. 

See, e.g., Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County 

of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 774 (1996) (finding appellate jurisdiction to 

rule on a central legal question arising from a "marginally 

final" order when the only remaining proceeding in the 

district court was a calculation of damages); Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 922-23 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 

district court order remanding proceedings to an agency 

under particular statutory provisions was immediately appealable even though not fitting precisely within the contours of 

the collateral order rule). But it is just as plausible that the 

Gillespie dictum does nothing more than discuss application 

of existing doctrine. As we have noted, "No federal appellate 

court, to our knowledge, has ever followed the Gillespie

dictum in a case in which the appeal could not be justified on 

the basis of some other, narrower, policy demanding deviation 

from the finality rule." Green v. Department of Commerce,

618 F.2d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

We recognize the warning of the Supreme Court that "[i]f 

Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, 

§ 1291 would be stripped of all significance." Coopers &

Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 477 n.30. As we have already discussed, the Pilots have an adequate remedy on appeal from a 

final judgment, and the Cohen exception therefore does not 

apply. We declineat least on these factsto hold that 

Gillespie provides an additional exception to the finality rule 

or otherwise expands the set of cases deemed final under the 

collateral order doctrine. In summary, the judgment of the 

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district court cannot be deemed final and subject to appeal 

under § 1291.

The Pilots further argue that the judgment qualifies for 

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which confers jurisdiction over appeals from district court orders 

"granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions." They rely on Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,

450 U.S. 79 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that this 

provision also allows in some cases appeals from orders 

having "the practical effect of refusing an injunction." Id. at 

84. The district court in Carson had refused to enter a 

proposed consent decree which would have required one 

party to give hiring and seniority preferences on the basis of 

race. Id. at 81. The heart of the rejected settlement involved "prospective relief" that would have "permanently 

enjoined respondents from discriminating against black employees." Id. at 84. The Court held that because rejection of 

the settlement could not be "effectually challeng[ed]" and 

plainly had a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," the 

order should be deemed immediately appealable within the 

ambit of § 1292(a)(1). Id. at 86.

The instant case is readily distinguishable from Carson.

The Pilots have sought no relief which we could properly 

deem injunctive. Asking the court to enjoin US Airways to 

interpret pension provisions in a certain fashion merely restates the Pilots' claim for benefits under ERISA. Indeed, 

not only do we find dubious the Pilots' claim that the order 

has the effect of denying injunctive relief, but Carson also 

requires that "[u]nless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a serious, perhaps 

irreparable, consequence, and that the order can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal." Id. at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As already discussed at length, the district court's order can 

be adequately challenged by appeal from a final judgment 

issued after the completion of arbitration. The Pilots will 

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suffer no harm sufficient to invoke the interlocutory review 

provisions of § 1292(a)(1).

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the partial dismissal by the district court 

neither constitutes a final order nor satisfies any of the 

exceptions to the finality rule. We therefore dismiss the 

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

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