Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02145/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02145-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

PAM HUBER PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 04-2145

WAL-MART STORES, INC. DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff brings this action against her current employer

contending that the Defendant discriminated against her in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of

1993. (Doc. 1). Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the

Defendant refused to provide her with a “reasonable accommodation”

which would have been a transfer to an equivalent vacant position

for which she was qualified, i.e., a router position. The

Plaintiff further alleges that the transfer to her current position

was not the equivalent of her previous position, as required under

the ADA, as the pay is below that of the previous position.

Additionally, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s alleged

defense, the existence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory policyto always hire the best qualified applicant-is not valid. The

Defendant asserts that its policy to always hire the best qualified

person renders unreasonable Plaintiff’s requested accommodation,

i.e., transfer, as the transfer violates its policy. Furthermore,

the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff’s reassignment to her

current maintenance position was an adequate “reasonable

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accommodation” under the ADA. Currently before the Court is the

Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) and the

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35). In support of

their motions, the parties have filed a Joint Statement of

Stipulated Facts. (Doc. 31).

I. BACKGROUND

Except as noted, the following facts are not disputed. The

Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a dry grocery Order Filler at

the Distribution Center in Clarksville, Arkansas. She earned

$13.00 per hour, including a $0.50 per hour shift differential.

While in this position, the Plaintiff sustained a permanent injury

to her right arm and hand. Both parties stipulate that the

Plaintiff has a “disability” as defined by the ADA. The Plaintiff

requested a reasonable accommodation. Because her injury prevented

her from being able to perform the essential functions of the Order

Filler position, the Plaintiff requested a reassignment to a

vacant, equivalent position. At the time of the request, there was

an open Router position at the facility where she worked. Both

parties stipulate that the Router position was, at the time, a

vacant, equivalent position under the ADA.

Pursuant to the Distribution Center’s policy under its

Associate Job Transfer Program of hiring the most qualified

applicant for the job, the Defendant did not immediately transfer

the Plaintiff into the Router position. Instead, the Defendant

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required the Plaintiff to compete with other applicants, to include

non-disabled applicants. Ultimately, the position was awarded to

a non-disabled employee. The Defendant denied the Plaintiff the

position solely on the basis that she was not considered the most

qualified candidate. Both parties agree that the Plaintiff was not

the most qualified applicant for the position, and that the person

placed in the Router position was the most qualified applicant. 

When the Defendant could not locate any other vacant,

equivalent positions in the Distribution Center, it looked to

another facility. The other facility had an opening for a

Maintenance Associate at a pay rate of $6.20 per hour. The

Plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of the job

with or without reasonable accommodation. The Plaintiff was

offered and accepted the position. The Plaintiff continues in this

position at a pay rate of $7.97 per hour. 

The parties stipulate that the Plaintiff’s back-pay and

compensatory damages total $28,000, and she is willing to accept

reinstatement or a pay increase in lieu of front pay. They also

stipulate her attorney fees and costs would be capped at a maximum

of $50,000.00.

The Defendant’s position is that the ADA does not require

employers, when it has an established policy of placing the most

qualified person in a position, to give preferential treatment to

disabled employees. The Plaintiff disagrees with this analysis and

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contends the ADA required the Defendant to transfer her to the

Router position, as the position was vacant, and able to be

performed by her with or without a reasonable accommodation. The

Parties stipulate that the Plaintiff was qualified for the position

and the position would not have been a promotion. 

The parties agree that the dispositive question in this case

is the resolution of a question of law: Must an employer give the

reasonable accommodation of reassignment , i.e., preferential

treatment to a disabled employee by placing that employee in a

vacant position, even though the disabled employee may not be the

best qualified for the position? (Doc. 31.)

II. DISCUSSION

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

facts and inferences from the facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and the burden is placed on the

moving party to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Nat'l. Bank of

Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th

Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to her case and on

which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, then the defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and all other facts are

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rendered immaterial. See Thelma D. By Delores A. v. Bd. of Educ.,

934 F.2d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1991).

The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating

against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. See 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, it prohibits an employer from

discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant failed or refused to

accommodate her disability and therefore a modified burden-shifting

analysis is applied. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern

Railroad Co., 327 F.3d 707 (8 Cir. 2003)(citations omitted). th

Under this standard, Plaintiff “at all times retains the burden of

persuading the trier of fact that [s]he has been the victim of

illegal discrimination due to h[er] disability.” Benson v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8 Cir. 1995). However, th

“once the plaintiff makes ‘a facial showing that reasonable

accommodation is possible, ‘the burden of production shifts to the

employer to show that it is unable to accommodate the employee.” 

Thus, the Plaintiff must first make a showing that she has an ADA

disability and that she has suffered adverse employment action.

See Fenney, 327 F.3d at 712. 

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Under the ADA and its regulations, “discrimination occurs if

‘a covered entity [does] not . . . make reasonable accommodation to

the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

applicant or employee with a disability, unless such covered entity

can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of its business.’” Peebles v. Potter,

543 F.3d 761, 766 (8 Cir. 2004) (citing 29 C.F.R. 1630.9(a) th

(2003)) (additional cite omitted) (alterations in original). The

issue before the Court is whether the Defendant took adverse action

against the Plaintiff because of her disability, i.e., failed to

reassign her to a vacant, equivalent position, and instead,

reassigned her to a vacant position with less pay. 

Currently, there is a circuit split as to whether an

employer’s policy to hire/transfer the best qualified applicant

“trumps” a qualified employee’s request to be reassigned as a

reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The Tenth Circuit Court

and D.C. Circuit Court espouse the view that forcing a qualified,

disabled employee to compete with others in order to be provided a

reassignment as a reasonable accommodation for his disability

violates the ADA. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154

(10 Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 th

F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The other view, i.e., finding an

employer can decline to reassign a qualified employee and instead

award the vacant position to a more qualified applicant without

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running afoul of the ADA, is articulated in EEOC v. HumistonKeeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7 Cir. 2000). th

The Defendant urges the Court to follow the latter view, that

it was not required to reassign Plaintiff to the Router position,

an equivalent position, when Plaintiff was qualified for the

position but not the best qualified. Defendant states that to do

so would have violated its legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of

hiring the most qualified candidate. 

The plaintiff in Humiston-Keeling, Inc. requested a reasonable

accommodation of her disability in the form of reassignment to one

of several vacant positions for which she was qualified. The

defendant failed to reassign the plaintiff to any of the positions,

and instead awarded the positions to persons more qualified. The

parties agreed that the defendant had a consistently implemented

policy of awarding vacant jobs to the best qualified applicant

instead of the first qualified applicant. The Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, holding that “[the

reassignment provision makes clear that the employer must . . .

consider the feasibility of assigning the worker to a different job

in which his disability will not be an impediment to full

performance, and if the reassignment is feasible and does not

require the employer to turn away a superior applicant, the

reassignment is mandatory.” Id. at 1028. The Court clearly stated

that an employer’s “policy of giving the job to the best applicant

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is legitimate and nondiscriminatory.” Id.

The Humiston-Keeling Court explained that requiring employers

to hire inferior persons, even ones that are minimally qualified,

because they are members of a protected group would amount to

“affirmative action with a vengeance” and “goes well beyond

enabling the disabled applicant to compete in the workplace, or

requiring the employer to rectify a situation (such as lack of

wheelchair access) that is of his own doing.” Id. at 1028-29

(citation omitted). 

The Defendant correctly observes that the Eighth Circuit Court

of Appeals cited to a Seventh Circuit case for guidance regarding

a related issue. In Cravens v. Blue Cross, the Eighth Circuit was

faced with the issue of what was required of an employer to

adequately engage into an interactive process with an employee

seeking a reasonable accommodation. 214 F.3d 1011 (8 Cir. 2000). th

The Cravens Court cited a Seventh Circuit case in holding that “the

employer is generally not required to transfer a disabled employee

if such a reassignment would violate ‘a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory policy of the employer.’” Id. at 1020 (quoting

Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7 Cir. th

1988). However, the Cravens Court also cited to several different

circuit courts within the Cravens opinion. See, e.g., id. at 1018-

19 (citing Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th

Cir. 1999 (en banc) (“The ADA plainly states that re-assignment may

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be required to reasonably accommodate a worker with a

disability.”); Willis v. Conopco, 108 F.3d 282, 284 (11 Cir. 1997) th

(“Reassignment to another position is a required accommodation only

if there is a vacant position available for which the employee is

otherwise qualified.”)). This Court cannot place more importance

on one cite versus another cite contained in dicta, specifically

when the citations were not essential to the holding in Cravens. 

The United States Supreme Court has yet to resolve the circuit

split of whether an employer is obligated under the ADA to reassign

a disabled employee to a vacant position which she is qualified,

even if the employer has a policy of hiring/transferring the most

qualified applicant. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme

Court held that an employer is not required to reassign a disabled

person if such a reassignment would conflict with seniority rules.

535 U.S. 391 (2002). However, the Court rejected the creation of

a per se rule, instead, it held that ordinarily a seniority system

will trump a reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. The Court

said, however, a plaintiff will be permitted to present evidence of

special circumstances that would make reasonable an exception to

the seniority rule. Id. at 1524-25.

An employer’s policy to hire/transfer the best qualified

person is distinguishable from an employer’s seniority rules. The

US Airways Court listed benefits of a typical seniority system to

show that to make exceptions to such a system would be generally

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unreasonable. Id. at 1524. Those benefits are:

* It creates and fulfills “employee expectations of fair,

uniform treatment;

* It “include[s] an element of due process, limiting

unfairness in personnel decisions; and

* It “encourage[s] employees to invest in the employing

company, accepting less than their value to the firm early in

their careers in return for greater benefits in later years.

Id. (internal quotes omitted) (citations omitted). The Court gave

examples of when an exception to a seniority system may be

reasonable, i.e., when the employer retains the right to change the

system and frequently does so, or when the system already contains

exceptions. Id. at 1525.

The Supreme Court ruled that while it is generally

unreasonable to require an employer to depart from a seniority

policy, it did not rule that it is generally unreasonable to

require an employer to depart from a legitimate, non-discriminatory

policy. “[T]he fact that the difference in treatment violates an

employer’s disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the

accommodation beyond the Act’s potential reach.” Id. at 1521.

Comparing a unilateral seniority system with a collective

bargaining seniority system is a completely different endeavor than

comparing a “best qualified” transfer policy with a collective

bargaining seniority system.

The Defendant asserts that the ADA is not a mandatory

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See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary 1

 Judgment, p. 5 (Doc. 34).

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preference act. However, the US Airways Court dismissed an 1

identical argument, stating “[t]he Act requires preferences in the

form of “reasonable accommodations” that are needed for those with

disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those

without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any

special “accommodation” requires the employer to treat an employee

with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. Id. at 1521.

“The simple fact that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’

– in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to

violate a rule that others must obey – cannot, in and of itself,

automatically show that the accommodation is not “reasonable. As

a result, we reject the position taken by [defendant] and J[ustice]

S[calia] to the contrary.” Id. 

We adopt the reasoning that to require a qualified disabled

employee, who is requesting a transfer to an equivalent, vacant

position as a reasonable accommodation when no reasonable

accommodation is available for her to remain in her current

position, to be forced to compete with other applicants to satisfy

the employer’s “best qualified” policy clearly violates the ADA.

See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10 Cir. 1999); th

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

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The Tenth Circuit has stated that 

[i]f no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in

his or her existing job, then the reasonable

accommodation may require reassignment to a vacant

position so long as the employee is qualified for the job

and it does not impose an undue burden on the employer.

Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned employee

to be the best qualified employee for the vacant job, is

judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory language or

its legislative history.

Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1169. “There is nothing about a

reassignment that transforms it into a lesser accommodation than

the others listed [by the ADA as reasonable accommodations], which

an employer must not only consider but must also implement if

appropriate.” Id. at 1167. To allow an employer to merely

consider a disabled employee’s request for reassignment along with

other applications for the vacant position would render that

portion of the ADA meaningless. 

The employer could merely go through the meaningless

process of consideration of a disabled employee’s

application for reassignment and refuse it in every

instance. It would be cold comfort for a disabled

employee to know that his or her application was

“considered” but that he or she was nevertheless still

out of a job - a job to which he or she was otherwise

qualified and as to which he or she had a reasonable

claim to reassignment. We do not think Congress intended

such a hollow promise with it listed reassignment as one

of the specific reasonable accommodations in 42 U.S.C. §

12111(9).

Id. 

The Aka Court adopted a similar approach. 156 F.3d 1284. The

Court focused on the word “reassign.” 

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An employee who on his own initiative applies for and

obtains a job elsewhere in the enterprise would not be

described as having been “reassigned”; their core word

“assign” implies some active effort on the part of the

employer. Indeed the ADA’s reference to reassignment

would be redundant if permission to apply were all it

meant; the ADA already prohibits discrimination “against

a qualified individual with a disability because of the

disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures.” 

Id. at 1304. 

Aka also considered congressional intent in order to determine

whether reassignment merely places the disabled employee on the

same footing as other applicants for the vacant position. Id. at

1304 (citing H.R. REP. NO 485(II), 101 Cong., 2d Sess. At 63 st

(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345 (“If an employee,

because of disability, can no longer perform the essential

functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to another

vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the

employee from being out of work and [the] employer from losing a

valuable worker.)) The D.C. Circuit went on to explain that if

Congress had intended a disabled employee seeking reassignment to

be treated like all other applicants, there would have been no

reason for Congress to specify that the job had to be vacant (no

bumping required) or that a collective bargaining agreement based

on seniority could be considered as a factor in determining whether

a requested transfer was reasonable, as there would have been no

possibility of bumping or a less senior disabled employee obtaining

the vacant position if they were treated as all other applicants.

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Id. 

The Tenth Circuit also discussed Congressional intent,

pointing out that Congress had supplied sufficient safeguards for

the employer, such as requiring the employee be qualified, not

requiring a promotion, not requiring the employer create a

position, nor requiring the transfer if it would create an undue

hardship on the employer. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1170.

Any further limitations would have to come from Congress. Id. 

There are legitimate, nondiscriminatory policies that would

make an employer’s reassignment of a disabled employee

unreasonable, i.e. seniority policies. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc.

535 U.S. 391; Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154. However, there

are also legitimate, nondiscriminatory policies that require the

employer to create an exception to reasonably accommodate a

qualified, disabled employee. These less important policies,

“might have to be subordinated to an employer’s reassignment

obligation under the ADA because to do otherwise would essentially

vitiate the employer’s express statutory obligation to employ

reassignment as a form of reasonable accommodation.” Midland

Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1176 (Giving the examples of no

reassignment or no transfer policies). 

The Defendant’s best qualified transfer policy is not a policy

that rises to the level of seniority policies, as it cannot be said

to encourage employees to accept less in early years with the

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company in return for greater benefits in later years. If the

Defendant is correct in its position, the ADA will become

meaningless as employers can completely avoid the law by adopting

the same policy adopted by Wal-Mart. 

In addition to showing the request for accommodation was

reasonable, the Plaintiff must also show that she suffered an

adverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is one

that causes a material change in the terms or conditions of

employment.” Brown v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 286 F.3d

1040, 1045 (8 Cir. 2002). “[A] transfer from one job to another th

is not an adverse employment action if it involves only minor

changes in the employee’s working conditions with no reduction in

pay or benefits.” Id. (citing Ledergerber v. Strangler, 122 F.3d

1142, 1144 (8 Cir. 1997)). th

The Court now addresses whether the requested reasonable

accommodation would create an undue hardship on the Defendant. It

is unnecessary to evaluate whether the requested transfer would

create an undue hardship on the Defendant, as the Defendant has

stated that it is not asserting that such a transfer would have

posed an undue hardship on the Defendant. See Brief in Support of

Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgement, p. 8 n.2 (Doc.

32).

The Plaintiff’s request to the Router position was reasonable.

The Router position was vacant at the time of the request and the

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Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, para. 6 (Doc. 9). 2

See Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (stating that a lower paying position 3

 may be a reasonable accommodation if a comparable position is not 

 available.

See Joint Stipulation of Facts, para. 7 (Doc. 31) (The Plaintiff is 4

 currently being paid at a rate of $7.97 per hour due to pay increases). 

16

position was equivalent to the Plaintiff’s position, which paid

$13.00 an hour, including a $0.50 shift differential, at the time

she became disabled. The pay for the Router position was $12.50

per hour. Plaintiff’s transfer to the Maintenance Associate 2

position amounted to a demotion, as the pay was only $6.20. 3 4

Therefore, the transfer of the Plaintiff to the janitorial position

was an adverse employment action in violation of the ADA. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff

has an established "disability" as defined under the ADA. The

Plaintiff has shown that the requested accommodation was reasonable

and that the accommodation given was an adverse employment action.

The Defendant has failed to show that the requested reasonable

accommodation would pose an undue hardship or that the given

accommodation was to an equivalent position. Therefore, the Court

finds the Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be

and hereby is DENIED, and the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. 

WHEREFORE, before entry of a final judgment in this case,

Plaintiff is directed to file a written memorandum and supporting

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documentation regarding the amount of damages before December 20,

2005. The Defendant will have ten days to file its response.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 7 day of December 2005. th

 /s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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