Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06232/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06232-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

CLARENCE ADIE HARVEY,

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

ERIC ARNOLD, Acting Warden,1

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 11-06232 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Clarence Adie Harvey (“Petitioner”) brings the instant pro se habeas 

action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his 2009 state conviction and sentence for 

second degree robbery. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this 

matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES the Petition for the reasons set 

forth below. 

 1 Eric Arnold, the current acting warden of the prison where Petitioner is 

incarcerated, has been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 1 of 23
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I.

(“C

BACKG

A. S

The foll

Court of App

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She told Pra

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ridden in th

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day. She ne

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View since 

Avenue in M

Liquors—an

on April 21

man carryin

mask entere

the money.’ directed her

the cash reg

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a safe below

previous we

open it. Sou

money to th

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at the time t

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Sousa notic

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NT OF FACT

ts are taken 

tate appellat

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The Rent

recia Simms

prise Rent-A

ister, Venec

Venecia’s c

Sunday, Apr

ty car wash

ked up later 

s and the go

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ay. Before t

he car. Vene

dling some 

Venecia tr

ever saw th

The Mou

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nes & Liqu

1998. (In o

Mountain V

nd defendan

, Sousa was

ng a gun and

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’” Sousa sa

r to get it. S

gister. The 

Sousa gave h

w the registe

eekend’s tra

usa bent do

he man, who

He told her

that the man

was about $2

man’s face 

ced that the 

sa described

hout an acc

2

S

from the op

te court”):

idence 

ted Dodge A

s rented a si

A-Car on A

cia Simms. 

children. 

ril 20, Vene

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by Anthon

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ousa) and h

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2,000 in the

was entirel

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d herself as 

cent, and So

pinion of th

Avenger

ilver gray D

April 18, 200

 Defendant

ecia droppe

lo Alto and

ny Pratt, a fr

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neither Pratt

Pratt later o

nd he would

essfully to r

gain.

w Robbery 

her husband

ffett Boulev

004, Veneci

ch is near S

her there.) A

in the back 

a hooded bl

oached her a

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ehind her a

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“dark Portu

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Dodge Aven

08. She loa

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riend of her

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getting the 

t nor defend

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reach Pratt 

d have owne

vard in Mou

ia lived on T

Sousa’s Win

At about 12

of the store

lack jacket a

and said, “‘G

front, and h

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and had the 

register. Th

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nd passed th

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by a mask, 

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car back 

dant had 

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nes and 

2:15 p.m. 

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her to 

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nting a 

thought 

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n the 

but 

than 

He spoke 

was 

Appeal 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 2 of 23
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between 18 and 30 years old. While Sousa was opening the 

safe for the masked robber, she saw that he was wearing Nike 

tennis shoes that were “grayish with a swoosh of blue.” During 

trial, after standing next to defendant, Sousa testified that the 

man who robbed the liquor store was the same height and had 

the same skin tone as defendant. She also testified that the 

robber was approximately five feet 10 inches tall, the same 

height as her husband. 

The liquor store had a new, nine-camera video 

surveillance system that operated 24 hours a day. The system 

had the capability of capturing still photographs as well. The 

video surveillance system captured the robbery as it progressed, 

beginning with an image of the man outside the store. As he 

entered the store, the system showed him reaching into the right 

side of his waistband and pulling out a gun. 

 C. The Campbell Robbery

Stanley Ungson is the co-owner of the U-Save Liquor 

Store on Hamilton Avenue in Campbell. He was working there 

on April 21. At about 1:23 p.m., a man with a gun entered the 

liquor store. He was African American, approximately five feet 

11 inches to six feet tall, weighed about 210 to 215 pounds, and 

wore a ski mask and a black hooded sweatshirt. He approached 

the check-out stand and demanded of Ungson: “‘Give me all 

your money. Don’t mess around.’” Ungson gave the man all 

the money in the register. The man then asked if there was 

money in the drawer next to the cash register, and Ungson gave 

the man the small amount of cash in the drawer. 

As the man was leaving the store, he bumped into one of 

the doors; Ungson heard a gunshot, and then heard the man say, 

“‘Oh, shit.’” After the man left, Ungson locked the front door 

and called the police. Ungson testified that defendant’s skin 

tone and height were the same as the person who had 

committed the robbery. Ungson thought defendant’s build at 

the time of trial looked “[a] little slimmer” than the robber, but 

the robber’s sweatshirt “was a little baggy.” 

A neighbor, Michael Broback, heard a loud bang while 

he was in his backyard. He went to the front and saw an 

African American male, who was wearing dark clothing, 

“running peg-legged [with both legs straight] across the street.” 

He dropped something metallic that clattered on the street and 

picked it up. 

 D. Defendant’s Hospital Visit

At approximately 1:30 p.m. on April 21, George Skucius 

was at the emergency room of Kaiser Hospital in Santa Clara 

where he worked when a red Camaro with two African 

American males drove up quickly into the ambulance bay. The 

driver said that his friend had been shot. Skucius asked the 

passenger to describe where he had been shot, and he responded 

that he did not know. When he loaded the man onto a gurney, 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 3 of 23
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he saw that “there was blood all over the back side of his 

pants.” After bringing him inside, the hospital emergency room 

staff removed the patient’s clothing, which was then given to 

the police. The bag containing the clothes did not contain any 

shoes, although there were socks in the bag. Dr. Michelle 

Holmes, the emergency room treating physician, determined 

that the patient, defendant, had a wound on his right thigh (a 

hole with an entrance and exit), an abrasion on his right testicle, 

and a puncture wound in his left thigh. A bullet was found 

lodged in his left thigh. She concluded that it was likely he had 

been wounded by one shot. 

Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Skucius went outside 

to his truck parked in the employee lot. Parked next to him was 

the same red Camaro he had seen earlier drive into the 

emergency bay; there was a pair of tennis shoes that did not 

belong to him in the bed of his truck. Skucius went back inside 

and told police officers about the shoes, and they went outside 

and took custody of them. 

The police also obtained permission from Pratt to search 

his red Camaro. Located inside the car was a black hooded 

sweatshirt, and the key to the rented silver Dodge Avenger. 

 E. Post-Robbery Investigation 

Detective Cary Shueh of the Mountain View Police 

Department was assigned to investigate the Mountain View 

robbery. Sousa told him that she might be able to recognize the 

robber’s shoes. Detective Shueh obtained from the Campbell 

police department the tennis shoes that had been retrieved from 

Skucius’s truck and photographed them. He also took 

photographs of five pairs of Nike tennis shoes from a Mountain 

View shoe store. About a week after the robbery, he showed 

Sousa the photographs of the six pairs of tennis shoes. She 

indicated that the photograph depicting the shoes retrieved from 

Skucius’s truck looked similar to the ones worn by the robber. 

Those tennis shoes were tested by a criminalist, who 

determined that defendant was the major source of the DNA 

found on the tag on the interior tongue of the left shoe. In 

addition, the sleeves of the hooded sweatshirt retrieved from 

Pratt’s car were swabbed and tested. The sample from the left 

sleeve yielded “one consistent particle of gunshot residue,” and 

the sample from the right sleeve had “a few characteristic 

particles of gunshot residue.” 

The check-cashing business next door to the Campbell 

U-Save Liquor Store had a video surveillance system. An 

expert on Dodge vehicles testified that there was a Dodge 

Avenger depicted in the video taken at the time of the robbery. 

The same expert opined, after looking at video and several still 

photographs extracted from the video surveillance system at 

Sousa’s Wines and Liquors on April 21 at the time of the 

robbery, that a silver Dodge Avenger was also depicted in those 

photographs and was circling the parking lot before the robbery. 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 4 of 23
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Sometime after the robberies occurred on April 21, the 

police determined that the Dodge Avenger had been parked in a 

space at an apartment complex in San Jose; the space had been 

assigned to Alisha Farmer, Pratt’s girlfriend. Before its 

whereabouts were discovered by the police, the car was towed 

to the home of Patrick Cooper, the tow truck driver, who had 

been instructed to clean it. The front passenger seat had a 

brown stain that Cooper, after repeated cleaning efforts, was 

able to clean. About a week later, Cooper’s boss had the Dodge 

towed to a lot in San Jose. When the car was ultimately located 

by the police, the lead investigator for the Campbell robbery 

determined that the keys recovered from Pratt’s Camaro 

belonged to the Dodge. A criminalist ripped the front passenger 

seat and determined that the seat appeared to be stained with 

blood. He determined from DNA testing that the traces of 

blood found in the seat cushion were a match to defendant’s 

DNA. 

Pursuant to a search warrant, the police obtained the call 

records for defendant’s cellular phone from the provider, Metro 

PCS. On the day of the robberies, April 21, there was a record 

of 30 calls involving defendant’s cell phone between 11:48 a.m. 

and 1:37 p.m. There were no connected calls that occurred with 

defendant’s cell phone during the times that the Mountain View 

or Campbell robberies transpired. 

II. Pertinent Defense Evidence

 Around noon or 1:00 p.m. on April 21, Marvella Millan, 

a clerk at the hotel next door to Sousa’s Wines and Liquors, 

encountered an African American male who “kind of looked 

suspicious.” He came to the front desk inquiring about a room. 

He and Millan never made eye contact when they spoke, and 

after asking some questions, he left the hotel. She described the 

man as about five feet six inches tall, and wearing a black 

hooded sweater.

 Another hotel employee, Patricia Demeza, saw an 

African American man on April 21 shortly before the time she 

heard there had been a robbery. He was on the other side of the 

wall between the hotel and the liquor store walking toward the 

store entrance. She did not see him go into the liquor store. 

The man wore a hooded sweatshirt and was about five feet six 

inches tall. Demeza also testified that at that time, there was a 

trailer behind the liquor store where several Hispanic and 

African American people would loiter, occasionally drink, and 

periodically go into the liquor store.

 Detective Shueh arranged a photo lineup that included 

the photographs of six men, including defendant. Neither 

Millan nor Demeza was able to identify the man seen at or 

outside the hotel.

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 5 of 23
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Peo

omi

On 

on t

Tra

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ano

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line

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B. C

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November 

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Petition

adequacy o

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CASE HIST

1. Conv

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CT”) 448. T

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2. App

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of the trial c

equacy of th

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e appellate c

etitioner’s c

Harvey, 201

e 27, 2011, 

all his claim

n. Dkt. 7, E

gust 10, 201

3. Fede

cember 13, 2

etition for r

WL 203970

ORY

viction and

was tried bef

jury convic

bberies that

The jury also

oth offense

that he had

me of the inc

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d the judgm

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court affirm

claim that th

11 WL 2039

Petitioner f

ms on direc

Ex. J. The 

11. Id. 

eral Court 

2011, Petiti

review. Dkt

6

1, *1-4 (Ca

d Sentencin

fore a jury i

cted him of 

t occurred o

o found tru

s. Harvey, 

d been relea

cidents, and

d prison term

s and four m

ment to the C

ponse to a ju

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Ex. F. In a

med the judg

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9701, *1. 

filed a petit

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California S

Proceedin

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t. 1. On Fe

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ng 

in the Santa

two counts

on April 21

ue the allega

2011 WL 2

ased from cu

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ms. Id. On

months. 

Court of Ap

ury question

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re erroneou

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Supreme C

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the instant P

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May 25, 20

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, 2008. Dk

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usly calculat

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ourt denied

Petition, wh

2012, the C

011) (footn

unty Superio

degree robb

kt. 7, Ex. A,

Petitioner u

4. Petition

bail in conn

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9, 2010, the

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ssibility of 

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court found

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Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 6 of 23
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to Show Cause why the writ should not be granted.2 Dkt. 6. Respondent has answered the 

Petition, and Petitioner has filed a Traverse. Dkts. 7, 8. The matter is fully briefed and ripe 

for adjudication. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The instant Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant 

habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court proceeding 

unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Habeas 

petitioners bear the burden of showing that a state court’s decision applied some Supreme 

Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). 

 2 In an Order dated January 19, 2012, the Court had dismissed this action without 

prejudice based on Petitioner’s failure to provide the proper forms in support of his in 

forma pauperis application. Dkt. 4. However, in its February 15, 2012 Order to Show 

Cause, the Court vacated the January 19, 2012 dismissal and reopened the case, explaining 

that the missing forms had actually been submitted on January 13, 2012, but they were not 

entered into the Court’s electronic database until January 31, 2012—six days after the 

dismissal order was issued. Dkt. 6. 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 7 of 23
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In determining whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or involves an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, courts in this Circuit look to 

the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the petitioner’s claim in a 

reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991); LaJoie v. 

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “a determination of a factual 

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have 

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 

of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the above standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned 

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The last reasoned decision in this case is the Court of Appeal’s unpublished disposition 

issued on May 25, 2011. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) the trial court provided an inadequate 

response to a jury question regarding CALCRIM No. 224 (instruction concerning 

circumstantial evidence), causing the jury to misapply the law; (2) the trial court gave 

improper instruction on consciousness of guilt, CALCRIM No. 371, which directed the jury 

towards an inaccurate conclusion; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting the “suggestive” 

shoe lineup. Dkt. 1 at 6-10.3

// 

// 

// 

// 

 3 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case 

management filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner. 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 8 of 23
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that

Har

orig

reli

v. S

not 

thre

bef

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ver

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During 

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regard that p

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w the trial c

T

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c

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L

RESPONSE 

1. Back

, the court r

follows: 

Before you 

that a fact n

proved, you

each fact es

doubt. [¶] 

evidence to 

that the only

circumstant

can draw tw

circumstant

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accept the o

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WL 203970

413. This i

mstantial ev

172 Cal.Ap

e burden of

uiry regardin

on circums

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deliberatio

M [No.] 22

piece of ev

437 (empha

ourt respon

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jury’s quest

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counsel, to 

are referring

Lines 3-5 on

TO JURY Q

kground 

read CALC

may rely o

necessary to

u must be co

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Also, befor

find the de

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wo or more 

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one that poi

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conclusions

01, *6 (quo

instruction 

vidence to e

pp.4th 1148

f proof” or “

ng the use o

stantial evid

itted). 

ns, the jury

24 (pg.7), if

idence and 

asis added)

nded to this

met with cou

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sion, and it w

the jury. T

g to the firs

n page 7 of

9

QUESTION

RIM No. 22

n circumsta

o find the de

onvinced th

hat conclusi

re you may 

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le conclusio

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reasonable 

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nnocence a

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s and reject

oting CALC

must be giv

establish an

8, 1171 (20

“define reas

of circumsta

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. The Cour

jury questi

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ourt prepar

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The response

st paragraph

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24, a circum

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hat the Peop

ion beyond

rely on circ

ilty, you mu

on supporte

e defendant

conclusion

of those rea

and another 

cence. How

nce, you mu

t any that ar

CRIM No. 2

ven where “

ny element 

09)). In ad

sonable dou

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nd the defen

ollowing qu

ircumstanti

remaining p

rt of Appeal

ion as follow

discussed a r

red the respo

red, without

e read: “Ye

h of CALCR

ctions. [¶] 

mstantial ev

ence to conc

uilty has bee

ple have pro

d a reasonab

cumstantial

ust be conv

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t is guilty. I

ns from the 

asonable 

to guilt, yo

wever, when

ust accept on

re unreason

224) (footno

“the prosecu

of the case.

ddition, CAL

ubt,” but in

ence” and “t

ndant guilty

uestion to th

ial evidence

pieces of ev

l summariz

ws: 

response to

onse based 

t objection 

es, if by unc

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assuming your question refers to the first paragraph only and 

not the second paragraph of CALCRIM [No.] 224.] [¶] That 

paragraph states: [¶] [‘]Before you may rely on circumstantial 

evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant 

guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People 

have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ [¶] If I have not answered your question or 

misunderstood your question, please let me know and re-ask 

your question.” (Original italics.) 

Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *5 (brackets added). The jury did not ask any follow-up 

questions. 

In his Petition, Petitioner contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

instructing the jury that under CALCRIM No. 224, it could disregard circumstantial 

evidence that it deemed “unclear.” Dkt. 8 at 12. Petitioner argues that the trial court’s 

response conflicts with California Penal Code § 1096, which requires that a jury “apply the 

beyond a reasonable doubt standard to all the evidence.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner asserts: “If the evidence is unclear[,] i.e., the People have not proved each fact 

essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover disregarding some 

evidence and considering other evidence abrogates the jury’s sworn duties.” Id. at 13. The 

Court of Appeal construed Petitioner’s argument as one that the jury instruction 

“improperly allowed [the jury] to view the People’s case as being stronger than it actually 

was since the persuasive portion of the segregated evidence was segregated from the 

unpersuasive portion of the People’s case.” Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *6. 

 Petitioner acknowledges that defense counsel, Andrea Ambrosio, Esq., “waived any 

objection to the [trial] court’s answer to the jury.” Dkt. 8 at 11. The state appellate court 

addressed this claim in connection with Petitioner’s direct appeal, and initially found that 

because defense counsel did not object to the court’s response, she forfeited the issue on 

appeal. Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *5 (citing People v. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 4th 863, 949-50 

(2009) (challenge to court’s response to jury question concerning meaning of “lingering 

doubt” forfeited where defense counsel agreed to language)). Nonetheless, the state 

appellate court also considered and rejected this claim on the merits. Id., *5-7. 

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 The state appellate court found that Petitioner’s argument—that the court’s response 

advised the jury that it should not consider all of the evidence presented in assessing 

whether the prosecution proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—ignored the fact that 

the jury received CALCRIM No. 220. CALCRIM No. 220 reads, in part: 

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider 

all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must 

find him not guilty. 

Id., *7 (quoting CALCRIM No. 220) (emphasis added). The state appellate court noted 

that the jury was advised, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 200, that it should “[p]ay careful 

attention to all of these instructions and consider them together.” Id. (quoting CALCRIM 

No. 200). In rejecting Petitioner’s claim and finding the court’s response to be adequate, 

the court explained as follows: 

 Here, the jury was properly instructed that it was 

required to “impartially compare and consider all the evidence 

that was received throughout the entire trial.” Were we to 

assume the jury interpreted the court’s answer to the question 

regarding CALCRIM No. 224 in the manner urged by 

defendant—namely, that it could discard certain evidence 

entirely and thereby ignore its obligation under section 1096 to 

compare and consider all the evidence to decide whether the 

prosecution had proved defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt—we would infer that it had ignored the instruction given 

under CALCRIM No. 220. We shall presume the jury obeyed 

the court’s instructions. (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 

346, 371 [jury presumed to have followed court’s instructions 

concerning proper purpose for which it could consider 

evidence]; see also People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 334, 390 

[jurors presumed intelligent and “‘capable of understanding’ 

[‘]and correlating jury instructions’”].) 

 Based upon all of the circumstances, including 

consideration of the instructions in their entirety, we find that it 

is not reasonably likely that the jury interpreted and applied the 

court’s answer to the CALCRIM No. 224 question in the 

improper manner claimed by defendant. 

Id., *7. 

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2. Analysis 

Whenever a jury “makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away 

with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946). The 

trial judge has a duty to respond to the jury’s request for clarification with sufficient 

specificity to eliminate the jury’s confusion. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 

574-75 (9th Cir. 2004). The formulation of the response to a jury’s question is a stage at 

which defense counsel can make a valuable contribution. See Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 830, 839-41 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing importance of defense counsel’s participation 

in the formulation of a response to a jury question). 

When a trial judge responds to a jury question by directing its attention to the precise 

paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, and the jury 

asks no follow up question, a reviewing court may “presume[] that the jury fully 

understood the judge’s answer and appropriately applied the jury instruction.” Waddington 

v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 196 (2009). The trial judge has wide discretion in charging the 

jury, a discretion which carries over to the judge’s response to a question from the jury. 

Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). And just as a jury is presumed to 

follow its instructions, it is presumed to understand a judge’s answer to a question. Weeks 

v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). 

To obtain habeas relief following an allegedly erroneous response to a jury question, 

a petitioner must show constitutional error resulted and that the error was not harmless. 

Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the instructions, the 

“reviewing court must determine ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has 

applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of 

constitutionally relevant evidence.’” Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1993) 

(quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990)). “That inquiry also can be described as 

having two parts: (1) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood an 

assertedly ambiguous instruction to mean what the defendant suggests it means; and (2) if 

so, ‘whether the instruction, so understood, was unconstitutional as applied to the 

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defendant.’” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting in part 

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)). 

Here, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s response to the jury 

question infringed upon his constitutional rights. As an initial matter, the Court is bound by 

the Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court gave an “adequate” response to the 

jury’s question, which must be accepted on federal habeas review. See Hicks v. Feiock, 

485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988) (federal court must accept state court’s interpretation of state 

law). In any event, no constitutional error resulted, since the jury was not reasonably likely 

to interpret the court’s response in the manner that Petitioner claims when viewed in the 

context of the overall charge. See United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 

1994) (A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be 

viewed in the context of the overall charge.). As noted, CALCRIM 220 instructed jurors to 

“consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial,” while CALCRIM 

200 instructed that all instructions must be considered together. 

Even if constitutional error had occurred, such error was harmless because the 

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming. The prosecution presented evidence that 

Petitioner matched the victim’s unimpeached description of the robber of the second liquor 

store. Dkt. 7, Ex. B, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 570-571, 809. The prosecution also 

presented testimony from the victim and an onlooker which established that the robber 

accidentally shot himself as he left the store. RT 562-563, 587, 596. Shortly after the 

second robbery, Petitioner arrived at the hospital suffering from a gunshot wound that was 

fully consistent with the kind of wound the robber would have suffered by accidentally 

shooting himself. RT 719-724. Gunshot residue was on the sleeves of the sweatshirt that 

the police found in the car where Petitioner had been sitting when he was driven to the 

hospital. RT 662, 912-913, 924-927. 

Also compelling is the fact that a Dodge Avenger was near both liquor stores just 

before the robberies. The same type of car was closely linked to Petitioner’s friends during 

the relevant time-period and Petitioner’s blood was found to be where the robber’s blood 

Case 4:11-cv-06232-SBA Document 15 Filed 03/27/15 Page 13 of 23
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rental car that the prosecution claimed was hidden after the robberies. RT 993. The court 

overruled the objection and gave the following instruction: 

If someone other than the defendant tried to conceal or destroy 

evidence, that conduct may show the defendant was aware of 

his guilt, but only if the defendant was present and knew about 

the conduct, or, if not present, authorized the other person’s 

actions. It is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of 

this evidence. However, evidence of such conduct cannot prove 

guilt by itself. 

RT 994, 1012; CT 427. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by giving the 

consciousness of guilt instruction. Dkt. 8 at 20. As he did on direct appeal, Petitioner now 

argues that the instruction misstated the law insofar as it permitted the jury to find his 

consciousness of guilt “merely because he was present when a third party disposed of 

evidence.” Id. at 17; Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *10. Moreover, Petitioner argues that the 

instruction should not have been given because there was no evidentiary support that he 

authorized Pratt to conceal the Dodge Avenger or discard his shoes. Id. at 17. 

2. Analysis 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a 

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 

62, 71-72 (1991). To obtain federal habeas relief for error in the jury charge, Petitioner 

also must show actual prejudice from the error, i.e., that the error had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Coleman, 525 U.S. at 

146 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). The error may not be judged in artificial isolation, but 

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

In determining whether an allegedly erroneous instruction violated Petitioner’s right 

to due process, the Court first considers whether the instruction creates a mandatory 

presumption or a permissive inference. See United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 897 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (analyzing whether jury instruction shifted burden of proof by determining 

whether inference permissive or mandatory). “A mandatory presumption instruction tells 

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the jury that it must presume that an element of a crime has been proven if the government 

proves certain predicate facts.” Id. In contrast, “a permissive inference instruction allows, 

but does not require, a jury to infer a specified conclusion if the government proves certain 

predicate facts.” Id. An instruction that creates a permissive inference does not shift the 

burden of proof or relieve the state of its burden of persuasion, as “it still requires the State 

to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate 

facts proved.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985). 

A permissive inference does not violate due process if can be said “‘with substantial 

assurance’” that the inferred fact is “‘more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on 

which it is made to depend.’” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 

& n.28 (1979) (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)). Courts “determine 

the constitutionality of a permissive inference instruction on a case-by-case basis” by 

reviewing the record evidence to see if the court can say with substantial assurance that the 

inferred fact flows more probably than not from the facts proven in the particular case. See 

Warren, 25 F.3d at 898; see, e.g., Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 162-67 (finding instruction 

constitutional only after concluding that inference more probably than not flowed from 

specific facts proven to jury at trial). 

Here, the record does not support Petitioner’s claim that the challenged instruction 

denied him due process of law. First, the state appellate court recognized that California 

courts have held that CALCRIM No. 371 creates a constitutionally valid permissive

inference, stating: 

[T]he high court recently recognized that CALCRIM No. 371 

correctly states the law: “Consciousness of guilt may be shown 

by (1) a defendant’s own efforts to create false evidence or 

obtain false testimony, or (2) the efforts of someone else to do 

so, ‘but only if the defendant was present and knew about that 

conduct, or, if not present, authorized the other person’s 

actions.’ (CALCRIM No. 371.)” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 

Cal. 4th 198, 214, fn. 9.) 

[S]uch an inference of consciousness of guilt in the case of a 

third party attempting to conceal or destroy evidence in the 

defendant’s presence is not irrational. A person’s omissions 

may be just as revealing as his or her actions. Where a 

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defendant stands by while another conceals or destroys 

evidence unfavorable to the former, this inaction may show a 

consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. We note 

further that such an inference under CALCRIM No. 371 is not 

mandatory; it is only permissive. And the giving of the 

instruction was therefore “beneficial to defendant, to the extent 

that it made clear the [effort to suppress evidence] did not, in 

itself, suffice to establish his guilt.” (People v. Johnson (1992) 

3 Cal. 4th 1183, 1235 [addressing CALJIC No. 2.06, 

predecessor to CALCRIM No. 371].) 

Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *11. The state appellate court further explained that 

CALCRIM No. 371 requires that evidence must be found to support the permissive 

inference, stating as follows: 

It is, of course, “an elementary principle of law that before a 

jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, 

evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the 

jury, will support the suggested inference. [Citation.]” 

([People v.] Hannon . . . [(1977)] 19 Cal. 3d [588] at p. 597.) A 

consciousness of guilt instruction such as CALCRIM No. 371 is 

proper where there is “some evidence in the record that, if 

believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested 

inference.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 

1, 102.) The determination of whether such evidence exists to 

support the jury’s inference, thus rendering the instruction 

proper, is one of law for the trial court to decide. (Hannon, at 

pp. 597-598.) 

Id., *12. 

Second, the state appellate court pointed out that “[h]ere, contrary to defendant’s 

claim, some evidence was available from which the jury could have inferred that 

[Petitioner] participated in the suppression of evidence.” Id. at *13 (emphasis added). 

Thus, the appellate court reasonably found that the permissive inference did not violate due 

process because the inferred fact, i.e. Petitioner’s consciousness of guilt, was “more likely 

than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Ulster County, 442 

U.S. at 167 & n.28. Specifically, the state appellate court pointed to the following facts 

proven to jury at trial showing that Petitioner either suppressed evidence himself or 

authorized another person’s destruction of evidence: 

The prosecution argued, based on the video surveillance 

evidence showing a Dodge Avenger at both liquor stores at the 

times of the respective robberies, that the rented Dodge was 

used in the commission of both crimes. The evidence was 

uncontroverted that Petitioner’s blood was present in the 

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Dodge’s passenger seat, supporting the conclusion that it was 

used in the Campbell robbery. And it was also undisputed that 

defendant arrived at the hospital in Pratt’s Camaro. Since a 

person who is shot would ordinarily seek the fastest means of 

obtaining medical attention, the record supported an inference 

that defendant decided to switch cars in order to hide the Dodge 

used to commit the robberies. And as to the Nike shoes, the 

evidence was undisputed that defendant arrived at the 

emergency room in socks but without shoes. Shortly after 

dropping defendant off at the emergency room, Pratt apparently 

discarded the tennis shoes in a neighboring truck in the hospital 

parking lot. Defendant’s DNA was present on the shoes, and 

there is no ready explanation why Pratt would, without 

permission, discard his friend’s shoes. The jury could have 

reasonably concluded—contrary to defendant’s claim that such 

a conclusion would constitute mere speculation—that defendant 

authorized Pratt to dispose of the shoes to avoid detection. 

Id. 

Finally, the state appellate court found that even if no evidence showed the scenario 

contemplated by the instruction to have existed, the instruction would have been mere 

surplusage. Therefore, the court determined that any theoretical error would have been 

harmless. Specifically, the court concluded that “it was not ‘reasonably likely that the trial 

court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law.’” Id., *12. 

In the instant habeas action, the Court is not persuaded that the challenged 

instruction by itself “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. As noted, jury instructions must be considered by a 

federal habeas court in their entirety, not in isolation. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 

(1973). Here, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 200, which stated that not all instructions 

may apply, that the jurors were not to assume that the giving of an instruction suggested 

anything about the facts, and that the jurors were to “follow the instructions that do apply to 

the facts as you find them.” RT 1017; CT 407. The jury is presumed to have followed the 

instructions and this is not a case where that presumption should be ignored. See Francis v. 

Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324-25 n.9 (1985). In addition, the state court of appeal’s 

determination that CALCRIM No. 371 correctly states the law is binding on this court. See 

Hicks, 485 U.S. at 629-30. Construing the instructions as a whole, there was no reasonable 

likelihood that the jury misapplied CALCRIM No. 371 in a manner that lessened the 

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identification of the defendant’s car, holding that the court had 

correctly “rul[ed] that, although at trial defendant could fully 

probe any suggestiveness in the identification process, it would 

go ‘to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.’” 

[FN 5] And the argument was similarly rejected by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals, where the court gave it “credit for 

creativity” (Johnson v. Sublett (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 926, 

932), but concluded: “There is no authority holding that a 

defendant’s due process right to reliable identification 

procedures extends beyond normal authenticity and 

identification procedures for physical evidence offered by the 

prosecution. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

We conclude, following Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at 

page 369, and Edwards, supra, 126 Cal. App. 3d at pages 456 

to 457, that the due process considerations involving suggestive 

lineups of potential suspects are not applicable to 

circumstances in which the police show witnesses inanimate 

objects such as vehicles or clothing. 

[FN 5]: Other jurisdictions have similarly rejected claims that 

the identification of physical objects is subject to the same 

scrutiny as procedures under which suspects are identified 

through in-person or photographic lineups. (See, e.g., Inge v. 

Procunier (4th Cir. 1985) 758 F.2d 1010, 1015 [truck], cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 833 (1985); State v. Roscoe (Ariz. 1985) 145 

Ariz. 212, 224 [700 P.2d 1312, 1324] [car]; Klase v. State (Del. 

1975) 346 A.2d 160, 162 [knife]; Dee v. State (Ga. 2001) 545 

S.E.2d 902 [gun]; Brooks v. State (Ind. 1990) 560 N.E.2d 49, 

58 [handgun]; State v. Bruns (Iowa 1981) 304 N.W.2d 217 

[car]; People v. Miller (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 535 N.W.2d 518, 

523 [car]; Hughes v. State (Miss. 1999) 735 So.2d 238, 261 

[truck]; State v. Cyr (N.H. 1982) 453 A.2d 1315, 1317 [car]; 

State v. King (Wash. App. 1982) 639 P.2d 809, 811 [jacket].) 

Harvey, 2011 WL 2039701, *7-8 (footnote and brackets in original, emphasis added). In 

addition, the state appellate court noted that the manner in which Sousa identified the shoes 

was that she indicated they looked similar to those worn by the robber. Harvey, 2011 WL 

2039701, *10. Nonetheless, the state appellate court acknowledged that the identification 

was still subject to challenge by Petitioner, but that any such challenge “bore on ‘the weight 

rather than the admissibility of the evidence.’” Id. 

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in allowing 

the testimony of Sousa because it was based upon a “prejudicially suggestive” shoe lineup 

in that (1) Petitioner’s used, dirty shoes were compared with five pairs of new shoes; (2) the 

colors of the other five pairs of shoes were all different from that of Petitioner’s shoes; 

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(3) Petitioner’s shoes were shown against a beige background, while the other shoes were 

shown against black backgrounds; and (4) Detective Shueh could not remember whether he 

gave an admonition to Sousa before the lineup. Dkt. 8 at 24-26. Petitioner argues that the 

shoe lineup procedure should be governed by the same standards that apply to photographic 

lineups of potential suspects, and alleges that the error that resulted from the lineup was not 

harmless. Id. 

2. Analysis 

“A conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of 

justice.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), overruled on another ground in 

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). When a witness identifies the defendant in a 

police-organized photo lineup, due process requires suppression of eyewitness 

identification only where “the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-85 (1968). 

The claim presented in this action relates to a lineup involving a physical object, i.e., 

shoes. Yet, Petitioner has not cited to—and the Court is unaware of any—clearly 

established Supreme Court law that supports his position that lineups featuring physical 

objects should be subject to the same standards as lineups featuring potential suspects; 

therefore, his challenge to the state appellate court’s rejection of his claim fails under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (noting that if there 

is no Supreme Court precedent that controls on the legal issue raised by a petitioner in state 

court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly-established federal law.). As the state appellate court pointed out, the Ninth Circuit 

has acknowledged that there is no authority holding that Petitioner’s due process right to 

reliable identification procedures for such physical objects extends beyond “normal 

authenticity and identification procedures.” See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 931-32 (no right to car 

lineup pretrial identification procedures for identifying car). Therefore, Petitioner’s due 

process claim fails for this reason alone, and he is not entitled to habeas relief. 

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Even if Petitioner had cited authority that clearly establishes the principle on which 

he relies, his claim still fails because use of the allegedly suggestive shoe lineup was 

harmless. Petitioner argues that without the “wrongfully admitted shoe lineup and 

testimony” by Sousa, the identity of the first liquor store robber would be “inconclusive at 

best.” Dkt. 8 at 30. This contention is unpersuasive. Despite Petitioner’s claim to the 

contrary, the record shows that the jury was presented with other evidence that linked him 

to the first liquor store robbery, including: (1) the pre-lineup description of the robber’s 

shoes that Sousa gave to police—i.e., the “blue and grayish” Nikes, RT 703; (2) People’s 

Exhibit 26—i.e., photos of Petitioner’s shoes found in the parking lot of the hospital; and 

(3) People’s Exhibit 27—i.e., photos of enlarged view of robber’s shoes from the store’s 

video surveillance system that captured the robbery. 

In addition to her testimony about the shoe lineup, Sousa testified that she 

recognized both People’s Exhibits 26 and 27 as photos of the shoes the robber wore. RT 

515-516. Because both exhibits were presented to the jury, there was no reason for the jury 

to rely exclusively on Sousa’s testimony because the jury could make its own assessment as 

to whether the photo of Petitioner’s shoes matched the photo of the shoes worn by the 

robber. Furthermore, the jury heard testimony that a Dodge Avenger was near both liquor 

stores just before they were robbed, and there was evidence that the same kind of car could 

have been used by Petitioner as the getaway car after the robberies. RT 461-465, 475-476, 

639, 662, 768, 770, 775, 840-844. The jury also heard testimony that Petitioner’s cell 

phone use placed him near both liquor stores when they were robbed during the 

approximately one-hour time span on April 21, 2008, and that he did not use his phone 

during the exact times each robbery took place. RT 558, 695-696, 880-885. 

Finally, a review of the trial record indicates that the testimony based on the shoe 

lineup was not heavily relied upon by the prosecution. During closing argument, the 

prosecution emphasized the scope of the evidence against Petitioner, and spent very little 

time discussing the shoe lineup evidence. RT 1034-35. Instead, the prosecutor relied 

mostly on a close comparison of the photo of Petitioner’s shoes to the photo of the robber’s 

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shoes captured by video surveillance system (People’s Exhibits 26 and 27). RT 1035. And 

on rebuttal, the prosecutor said nothing about the shoe lineup or Sousa’s description of the 

shoes at trial but argued instead that Petitioner’s shoes matched the description Sousa gave 

the police after the robbery. RT 1085-1086. 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s due process

challenge to the shoe lineup is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on this claim. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set out 

above, jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims debatable 

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the 

denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. All claims from the Petition are DENIED, and a certificate of appealability 

will not issue. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment, close the file, and terminate any pending 

matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/27/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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