Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00050/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Neil Davis, a single man, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gretchen Spier and John Doe Spier, a

married couple, individually and in Ms.

Spier’s capacity as an employee of the

State of Arizona; The State of Arizona;

Detective Chris Western and Jane Doe

Western, a married couple, individually

and in Mr. Western’s capacity as an

employee of the Casa Grande Police

Department; The City of Casa Grande, an

incorporated municipality; John Does 1-

10, and XYZ political subdivisions or

government agencies, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-00050-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Gretchen Spier (“Spier”) and Defendant State of

Arizona’s Motion to Dismiss based on Rules 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Doc. # 4.) On December 5, 2007 Plaintiff Neil Davis (“Davis”) filed his

Complaint in the Superior Court of Arizona seeking compensatory, consequential, and

special damages for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona tort law. Defendants

Chris Western (“Western”) and the City of Casa Grande removed the case to this court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Case 2:08-cv-00050-NVW Document 10 Filed 04/14/08 Page 1 of 15
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1

 Though defendants have attached additional evidentiary documents along with their

motion, the court declines to convert the motion into one for summary judgment and

excludes the documents from consideration. 

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I. Background

On this motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint must be accepted

as true and all reasonable inferences from those facts must be construed in the light most

favorable to Davis. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Davis was charged with credit card theft on or about December 6, 2006. The charges

stemmed from an investigation headed by Western, a police officer with the Casa Grande

Police Department. Pinal County probation officer Spier learned about the charges and

submitted a petition to revoke Davis’s probation, which included a request that he be

arrested and incarcerated until the revocation hearing. The judge granted her petition, and

Davis spent 35 days in jail before the probation violation and the criminal charges were

dismissed. According to the Complaint, both Western and Spier knew, or should have

known, that Davis could not have committed the charged offense because he was

incarcerated at the Pinal County Jail at the time the offense occurred. Davis claims that

Western and Spier, in both their official and individual capacities, acted intentionally or

with gross negligence, deliberate indifference, recklessness, or negligence, to violate his

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

He also claims that they committed the torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and

malicious prosecution.1

II. Scope of the Motion

As a preliminary matter, § 1983 provides that any person who deprives another of

constitutional rights under color of state law will be liable to the injured party in an action

at law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither a state nor state officials acting in their official

capacities can be sued for monetary damages under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that state governments and state officers in their

official capacities are not “persons” who can be sued for monetary damages under §

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1983). Davis’s § 1983 claims against the State of Arizona and against Spier in her

official capacity are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

The remaining issue presented by this motion is whether Spier is absolutely

immune from Davis’s federal and state claims against her in her individual capacity. 

Among the powers and duties that Arizona law provides to probation officers are:

. . . 

2. Exercise general supervision and observation over persons under

suspended sentence, subject to control and direction by the court.

3. Serve warrants, make arrests and bring persons before the court who

are under suspended sentences. The officer has the authority of a

peace officer in the performance of the officer’s duties.

. . . 

6. Obtain and assemble information concerning the conduct of persons

placed under suspended sentence and report the information to the

court.

7. Bring defaulting probationers into court when in the probation

officer’s judgment the conduct of the probationer justifies the court

to revoke suspension of the sentence.

. . . .

A.R.S. § 12-253.

III. Immunity from § 1983 Claims Under Federal Law

Spier moves to dismiss the § 1983 claims because she is entitled to absolute

immunity for her actions. Two forms of immunity shield state government officials sued

in their individual capacities under § 1983. Most officials receive qualified immunity,

which shields them from liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity, on the

other hand, is a complete defense to an action for civil damages and is reserved to those

persons “performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were

rendered immune at common law.” Swift v. State of California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 

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2

 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 and n.20 (1976) (discussing the

immunity granted to judges and grand jurors at common law).

3 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–27 (1997).

4 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1991) (discussing the immunity granted

to witnesses at common law). 

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Such persons include judges performing judicial acts, grand jurors acting within the scope

of their duties,2

 prosecutors in their roles as advocates,3 and witnesses testifying in court.4 

“An official derives the appropriate degree of immunity not from his or her

administrative designation but by the function he or she performs.” Swift, 483 F.3d at

1188 (quoting Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1983)). Thus, judges

receive only qualified immunity when performing administrative functions. Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). Prosecutors receive only qualified immunity when acting as

investigators, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993), and when swearing to

the truth of facts underlying applications for arrest warrants, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.

118, 129–31 (1997). The Supreme Court has emphasized: 

[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that

such immunity is justified for the function in question. The presumption is

that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government

officials in the exercise of their duties. We have been quite sparing in our

recognition of absolute immunity, and have refused to extend it any further

than its justification would warrant.

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486–87 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Spier bases her absolute immunity claim on the immunity provided to judges and

prosecutors. She argues that absolute judicial immunity bars Davis’s claim because it

“was the Honorable Stephen F. McCarville of the Pinal County Superior Court (not Spier)

who ordered that Davis be arrested and held without bond pending the outcome of his

probation violation hearing.” (Reply, doc. # 9 at 2.) Davis is not, however, seeking

liability for the judge’s decision to issue the arrest warrant. Rather, he claims liability for

Spier’s actions in seeking the arrest warrant and the petition to revoke probation.

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Spier also argues that her actions should receive judicial immunity because her

duties to investigate the charges and petition to revoke Davis’s probation are related to the

judge’s decision to issue the bench warrant. She relies on the reasoning of an Arizona

Court of Appeals panel, which stated: “The relationship between the probation officers’

investigating/reporting function and the judge’s sentencing function supports absolute

immunity.” Desilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597, 603, 96 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Ct. App. 2004). 

Our circuit rejected that reasoning in Swift v. State of California, 384 F.3d at 1190. 

Swift concerned the immunity of parole officers. Parole board members receive

quasi-judicial absolute immunity for their decisions “‘to grant, deny, or revoke parole’

because those functions are ‘functionally comparable’ to tasks performed by judges.” Id.

at 1189 (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981)). The parole

officers in Swift argued that they should also receive absolute immunity because their acts

were related to the parole board’s quasi-judicial function. Specifically, they had

investigated a suspected parole violation, authorized the arrest of the parolee, and

recommend initiation of parole revocation proceedings. The court rejected their argument

and concluded that after Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), “the

relation of the action to a judicial proceeding . . . is no longer a relevant standard.” Swift,

483 F.3d at 1190 (citing Miller, 335 F.3d at 897). “[W]e must determine not whether an

action ‘relates to’ the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole . . . but whether an action

is taken by an official ‘performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which

officials were rendered immune at common law.’” Id. 

 Similarly in Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 491 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d

en banc, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008), social workers argued that they should be afforded

absolute immunity for investigating and filing dependency petitions with a court. The

original three judge panel had followed precedent and held that the social workers were

absolutely immune because their duties had the “requisite connection to the judicial

process.” 491 F.3d at 1100 (following Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

The court vacated the panel’s decision and overruled Lebbos at rehearing en banc, stating,

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5

 The court knows of only two district courts that found absolute immunity

appropriate, and both found it significant that the probation officers had not sought prehearing arrest warrants. Gant v. U.S. Prob. Office, 994 F. Supp 729, 734 (S.D. W. Va. 1998);

Schiff v. Dorsey, 877 F. Supp. 73, 79 n. 2 (D. Conn. 1994).

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“Parties to section 1983 suits are generally entitled only to immunities that existed at

common law.” 514 F.3d at 906.

To merit absolute immunity, probation officers’ duties to investigate probation

violations and petition to revoke probation must be functionally comparable to duties that

received absolute immunity at common law. The majority of federal courts have decided

that, at least where an arrest warrant is sought, probation officers should not receive

absolute immunity for such duties. Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir.

1987); Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1984); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d

214, 215 (5th Cir. 1983); Callaway v Bell, No. 6:05-cv-1569-Orl-18DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 29933 at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2006); Gelatt v. County of Broome, 811 F. Supp.

61, 67, 68–69 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).5

 A probation officer who investigates and petitions to

revoke probation functions like a police officer, not a judge or a prosecutor acting as an

advocate. Unlike a prosecutor initiating a criminal prosecution, a probation officer does

not decide whether to commence a judicial proceeding. Rather, the officer merely

submits a report containing evidence to the judge, who then decides how to proceed. 

Gelatt, 811 F. Supp. at 68–69. The probation officer’s “function in this context is more

akin to that of a police officer in deciding whether there is probable cause for an arrest

than it is to that of a prosecutor in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution.” Ray, 734

F.2d at 374. See also Harper v. Jefferies, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining

that a probation officer’s general responsibilities are “more executive than judicial in

nature”). 

Multiple courts, including our circuit in Swift, have held the same for parole

officers when investigating and petitioning for parole revocation. Swift, 384 F.3d at

1191–93 (“[R]equesting that the [parole board] initiate revocation proceedings, [is] more

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akin to a police officer seeking an arrest warrant, than to a prosecutor exercising quasijudicial discretion to initiate criminal proceedings.”); Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105,

112–13 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445–46 (7th Cir. 1996)

(same); Mee v. Ortega, 967 F.2d 423, 427 (10th Cir. 1992) (same). To hold that

probation officers receive absolute immunity because of their proximity to a judge, but

parole officers receive only qualified immunity for highly similar functions, would defy

the well settled principle that “immunity flows not from the rank or title or ‘location

within the Government,’ but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual

official.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (citation omitted). 

According to our circuit’s precedent, probation officers do receive absolute

immunity for preparing and submitting pre-sentence reports. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d

155, 157–58 (9th Cir. 1985). The primary reason is that the probation officer “engage[s]

in impartial fact gathering for the sentencing judge” and to allow liability would “impair

the sentencing judge’s ability to carry out his judicial duties.” Id. at 157. In contrast,

probation officers investigate and petition to revoke probation at their “own initiative and

at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary

[than sentencing].” Galvan, 710 F.2d at 215. Accord Scotto, 143 F.3d at 111–12; Ray,

734 F.2d at 373 (“The probation officer is not acting as closely with the court as in the

presentence report process.”). Unlike sentencing, “[t]he judge authorizing the issuance of

a Violation of Probation and an arrest warrant relies on the one-sided account of the

probation officer.” Gelatt, 811 F. Supp. at 67. At least where the probation officer

requests an arrest warrant, few safeguards protect the probationer from a pre-hearing

unjustified deprivation of liberty, and no viable alternative to damages exists to redress

that injury once it has occurred. Id. 

Spier has not met her burden to show that her duties to investigate and petition to

revoke probation are functionally comparable to the duties of judges acting in their

judicial capacities or prosecutors acting as advocates. She is entitled to only qualified

immunity from Davis’s claims against her in her individual capacity under § 1983. 

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II. Immunity for State Officials Under State Law

Whether Spier is immune from Davis’s Arizona tort law claims is a question of

Arizona law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n.5 (1980) (“[W]hen state

law creates a cause of action, the State is free to define the defenses to that claim,

including the defense of immunity, unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with

federal law.”). Federal courts must follow the decisions of a state’s highest court when

deciding issues of that state’s law. Harvey’s Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. Van Blitter, 959 F.2d

153, 154 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Like the United States Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme Court has

“emphasized that liability of public servants is the rule in Arizona and immunity is the

exception.” Fidelity Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 225, 954 P.2d

580, 583 (1998). It has provided judicial immunity to judges acting in their judicial

capacities. Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38,

40 (1984) (citing Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982)). Relying on federal

authorities, it has also provided absolute immunity to court officials “who perform

functions ‘intimately related to’, or which amount to ‘an integral part of the judicial

process.’” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir.1980), and

Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965)) (citation omitted). In such cases,

the “non-judicial officer performed a function, pursuant to a court directive, which was

related to the judicial process.” Id. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40. Thus, court appointed

psychologists, Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 99, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ct. App.

1992), and court appointed guardians ad litem, Widoff v. Wiens, 202 Ariz. 383, 386, 45

P.3d 1232, 1235 (Ct. App. 2002), have been accorded absolute immunity for duties they

performed pursuant to a court’s order in the course of judicial proceedings. 

The supreme court addressed the immunity of probation officers for clearly

administrative tasks in Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Deptarment, 142 Ariz.

319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984), vacating 142 Ariz. 360, 690 P.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1983). State

probation officers were sued for negligently supervising a probationer who injured the

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plaintiffs. The court of appeals had reasoned that “the probation officer ‘stands in the

shoes’ of the superior court judge in carrying out the order of the court and is answerable

only to the judge.” 142 Ariz. at 362, 690 P.2d at 81. It accordingly held that “since the

officer’s duty to supervise a probationer arises out of a ‘judicial proceeding’ and is a

continuation of that proceeding, his/her activities are protected by . . . absolute judicial

immunity.” Id. at 363, 690 P.2d at 82. 

The supreme court relied on federal precedent to reject the court of appeals’

reasoning and its holding, stating that the precedents did “not support such a broad grant

of immunity” to administrative tasks. 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40. Although it

“believe[d] that a probation officer is entitled to absolute protection from suit for actions

which are necessary to carry out and enforce the conditions of probation imposed by the

court,” it immediately cautioned: 

We do not agree, however, that all the activities of a probation officer in

supervising a probationer are entitled to immunity. Much of the work of a

probation officer is administrative and supervisory. Such activities are not

part of the judicial function; they are administrative in character . . . . [T]he

activities of a probation officer will often not be connected with the

performance of a judicial function, and as a consequence not be entitled to

immunity. 

Id. at 322, 690 P.2d at 41 (emphasis supplied). Specifically, the court decided that a

“probation officer cannot assert for immunity unless the officer is acting pursuant to or in

aid of the directions of the court.” Id. The probation officers had negligently allowed the

probationer to violate his conditions of probation, so they acted contrary to the court’s

order and were not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. 

Acevedo is not squarely on point with the facts of this case. That was a claim of

negligent supervision; this is a claim of negligent investigation leading to arrest of the

probationer. However, the decision in Acevedo is strong evidence of how the supreme

court would decide this issue. “Where the state’s highest court has not decided an issue,

the task of the federal courts is to predict how the state court would resolve it.” 

Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986). In so doing, “[w]e

do not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly. Rather, we treat such dicta

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with ‘due deference,’ as it serves as a ‘prophecy of what that Court might hold.’” 

McCalla v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted). 

According to Acevedo, probation officers are not absolutely immune for their

administrative duties. They are absolutely immune only for those acts that are

“necessary” to enforce the conditions of probation and “pursuant to or in aid of the

directions of the court.” 142 Ariz. at 322, 690 P.2d at 41. Although Arizona probation

officers are technically subject to the “control and direction” of the court, A.R.S. § 12-

253(2), Arizona law evidences that they usually operate under their own discretion. It

provides that probation officers “[b]ring defaulting probationers into court when in the

probation officer’s judgment the conduct of the probationer justifies the court to revoke

suspension of the sentence.” § 12-253(7) (emphasis supplied). The supreme court’s

holding in Acevedo simply indicates that in some situations a probation officer could be

investigating or petitioning to revoke probation pursuant to the direction of the court, and

in those specific situations would enjoy absolute immunity. 

The decision of a panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Adams v. State of

Arizona, 185 Ariz. 440, 916 P.2d 1156 (Ct. App. 1995), supports this conclusion. There,

the court had to decide whether social workers are absolutely immune for negligently

supervising and investigating prospective adoptive parents. The court noted that the

judge did “not specify how the caseworkers should conduct their investigations” and that

the social workers had not shown that they “acted pursuant to any specific court order in

conducting their investigations or in supervising the children post placement.” Id. at 444,

916 P.2d at 1160. Therefore, it held that the social workers’ “investigative and

supervisory functions cannot clearly be characterized as court-ordered so as to justify

absolute immunity on that ground.” Id. at 445, 916 P.2d at 1161. See also Gelatt, 811 F.

Supp. at 67 (interpreting Acevedo to hold “that if the official performed a function at the

direction of a judge, then there should be absolute immunity . . . [but only qualified

immunity] [i]f the function performed is not at the behest or direction of the court”). 

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The specific issue on this motion is whether Spier’s activities “are not part of the

judicial function,” but instead “are administrative in character.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at

322, 690 P.2d at 41. The pleadings in this case do not indicate that the sentencing order

or any act of the court thereafter had any specific bearing on Spier’s investigation, on her

decision to file a petition to revoke Davis’s probation, or on her initial decision to seek an

arrest warrant. She performed those duties routinely, not pursuant to a specific direction

from the court. Although Spier was in a general sense performing duties related to the

court’s sentencing order, the same can be said for the probation officers in Acevedo, to

whom the court denied absolute immunity. Here, as in Acevedo, Spier allegedly failed to

adequately perform routine duties and therefore the supreme court would hold that her

acts were administrative in character and are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Spier relies on Desilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597, 96 P.3d 1084 (Ct. App. 2004),

which holds that her “duty to prepare and file the necessary papers with the court to

revoke probation entitles [her] to absolute immunity for that specific conduct.” Id. at 602,

96 P.3d at 1089. “Applying the functional test,” the court decided that “[s]uch functions

are similar to the duties of a judge acting in his or her official capacity.” Id. It discussed

federal court decisions that held probation officers absolutely immune for submitting

presentence reports, and concluded that petitions to revoke probation should also receive

absolute immunity because they are equally as integral to the judicial process. 

Specifically, it reasoned: 

The relationship between the probation officers’ investigating/reporting

function and the judge’s sentencing function supports absolute immunity. The

officers’ on-going supervision of probationers to ensure execution of court

orders, as well as their duty to investigate and report violations to the court

itself, are on behalf of and in aid of the court’s judicial function. 

Id. at 603, 96 P.3d at 1090. The court noted that its decision “is consistent with Acevedo,

which suggests that if filing a petition to revoke were ‘necessary to carry out and enforce

the conditions of probation imposed by the court’ a probation officer would be entitled to

absolute immunity.” Id. (quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322, 690 P.2d at 41). 

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The court of appeals’ holding that probation officers are always absolutely

immune when they file petitions to revoke probation cuts against concluding that the

Arizona Supreme Court would hold otherwise. See Dimidowich, 803 F.2d at 1482

(explaining that federal courts look “for ‘guidance’ to decisions by intermediate appellate

courts of the state.”). However, “[b]ecause a federal court must take into account ‘all

available data,’ the decision of a [state] intermediate appellate court is not controlling.” 

Wilson v. Haria & Gogri Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting

Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1982)). See also 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT,

ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4507, at

141 (1996) (“[T]o give state [intermediate] court decisions more binding effect . . . would

undermine the ability . . . to ensure that the outcome . . . be substantially the same as it

would be if tried in a state court and subjected to that system’s appellate process.”). State

intermediate appellate court decisions “are data which are ‘not to be disregarded by a

federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the

state would decide otherwise.’” Dimidowich, 803 F.2d at 1482 (quoting Estrella, 682

F.2d at 817) (declining to follow a state intermediate court opinion). See also Hunter v.

Ayers, 336 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Martinez v. Asarco Inc., 918 F.2d

1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.

1983) (same); Wilson, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–41 (same).

The major reason given to accord probation officers absolute immunity for

petitions to revoke probation is “[t]he relationship between the probation officers’

investigating/reporting function and the judge’s sentencing function.” Desilva, 208 Ariz.

at 603, 96 P.3d at 1090. At least as a broad proposition, and on significantly different

facts, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in Acevedo. It stated, “The

Court of Appeals would extend . . . absolute judicial immunity to probation officers

supervising probations because the task arises out of a judicial proceeding and is a

continuation of that proceeding. The authorities do not support such a broad grant of

immunity.” 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40. Rather, “the activities of a probation officer

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will often not be connected with the performance of a judicial function, and as a

consequence not be entitled to immunity.” Id. The seeming similarity of presentence

reports to petitions to revoke probation also fades upon scrutiny. Presentence reports

have no effect until judicial action after a full adversarial proceeding. Petitions to revoke

probation are ex parte and their relationship to “the judge’s sentencing function,” Desilva,

208 Ariz. at 603, 96 P.3d at 1090, is more attenuated. They look more like probation

officers’ general administrative functions, as most federal courts have held.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s prior precedents also strongly suggest that it would

take a more discriminating position. It has long supported the principle “that where

negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the

exception.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392, 381 P.2d 107, 112

(1963). It has “endorsed the use of governmental ‘immunity as a defense only when its

application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or

thwarting of established public policy.’” Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 558, 729

P.2d 905, 912 (1986) (citing Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 311, 656 P.2d 597, 600

(1982)). It has held that “absolute immunity for public officials in their discretionary

functions acting in other than true judicial proceedings is not required and, indeed, is

improper.” Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265, 564 P.2d 1227,

1232 (1977). With respect to court officials performing functions in judicial proceedings,

it has “narrowly construed the requirement that the act raising the privilege have a close,

direct relationship to such proceedings.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 558, 729 P.2d at 912

(citing Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 614, 688 P.2d 617, 622 (1984)). 

In light of this evidence, it is unlikely that the supreme court would accord

absolute immunity to a probation officer who was grossly negligent when routinely

investigating a probation violation and who requested an arrest warrant in a petition to

revoke probation. In that role, probation officers have the authority of police officers and

the power to precipitate pre-hearing deprivations of liberty without the safeguard of

adversarial judicial proceedings. Arizona probation officers are employed by the

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judiciary, but Arizona law specifically provides that a probation officer “has the authority

of a peace officer in the performance of the officer’s duties.” A.R.S. § 12-253(3). The

Arizona Supreme Court has “refused to extend absolute immunity to police officers.” 

Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 557, 729 P.2d at 911 (citing Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz.

501, 503, 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981)). As discussed above, the great weight of federal

authority is that probation and parole officers seeking arrest warrants in petitions to

revoke probation function like police officers, not prosecutors, and receive only qualified

immunity. In Acevedo, the Arizona Supreme Court cited two such cases that “ruled that

probation officers do not have absolute immunity for the damages caused by reports filed

to revoke probation or parole.” 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40 (citing Galvan v.

Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983); Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1984)). The

judge’s initial review of a petition is not sufficient to hold probation officers accountable

for their actions. See Adams, 185 Ariz. at 446, 916 P.2d at 1162 (finding it significant

that the judge decides based on a one-sided version of the facts); accord Gelatt, 811 F.

Supp. at 67; Babcock v. Washington, 116 Wash. 2d 596, 610, 809 P.2d 143, 151 (1991). 

 Probation officers’ investigative and petitioning duties are often more executive or

administrative in nature than judicial. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Acevedo,

its previous decisions denying absolute immunity, the federal case law upon which it has

relied, the reasoning of another Arizona Court of Appeals panel, and the Arizona statute

defining probation officers’ powers all evidence that the supreme court would not adopt

the absolute immunity that Desilva supports. It is also of some significance that the

supreme court had no opportunity pass on Desilva because no petition for review was

filed. Spier is not absolutely immune from Davis’s claim that she was grossly negligent

when investigating the charges against him and requesting his arrest in the petition to

revoke probation. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against Defendant State of Arizona and against Defendant Gretchen Spier in her

official capacity are dismissed with prejudice. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Gretchen Spier’s motion to dismiss

based on absolute immunity is denied with respect to the claims against her in her

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Arizona law. 

DATED this 14th day of April, 2008.

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