Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01859/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01859-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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15-cv-1859 LB

ORDER

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

RUDY WILKINS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE;

et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. 15-cv-1859 LB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND 

[Re: ECF No. 1]

INTRODUCTION

Rudy Wilkins, an inmate at the Alameda County Santa Rita Jail, filed this pro se civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 6.) 

His complaint is now before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This order dismisses the

complaint, and allows Mr. Wilkins to file an amended complaint. 

STATEMENT

The complaint has no statement of Mr. Wilkins's claim and consists of only a description of his

efforts to exhaust administrative remedies. Attached to the complaint are twenty-one pages of

inmate grievances and responses thereto. 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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1

The inmate's claim arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

rather than under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment if he was a

pretrial detainee at the relevant time; however, the deliberate indifference standard still applies to the

claim. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (standard of deliberate indifference

applicable to pretrial detainees' medical claims). 

15-cv-1859 LB

ORDER 2

ANALYSIS

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se

complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

Mr. Wilkins's complaint has no claims and essentially invites the reader to look through the

grievances and responses to try to figure out what claims Mr. Wilkins might want to assert. The

court will not read through exhibits to attempt to piece together a claim for a plaintiff. It is the duty

of a plaintiff, such as Mr. Wilkins, to provide a statement that is a complete statement of the claim(s)

against each of the defendants. Mr. Wilkins must file an amended complaint that sets forth "a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

The exhibits to the complaint appear to concern mostly his medical care. The Eighth

Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison and jail officials take

reasonable measures for the safety and health of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994). A prison or jail official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements

are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is,

subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety or health. See id. at 834.1

 Deliberate

indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v.

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If Mr. Wilkins has named the Alameda County Sheriff in an effort to sue the municipality,

he needs to make additional allegations in his amended complaint to establish municipal liability. 

Local governments, such as Alameda County, are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of

constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of

which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving

force behind the constitutional violation." See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130

F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For municipal

liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy,

custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these facts must plausibly

suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th

Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a policy, custom or practice existed or that

individual officers' wrongdoing conformed to a policy, custom or practice. See id. at 636-68.

15-cv-1859 LB

ORDER 3

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

For each instance of a constitutional violation, Mr. Wilkins should name each person who

violated his constitutional right(s), describe what each person did to violate his right(s), state where

the violation occurred, and state when the violation occurred. 

Mr. Wilkins must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability for each individual

defendant. He should not refer to them as a group (e.g. "the defendants"); rather, he should identify

each involved defendant by name and link each of them to his claim by explaining what each

defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy,

844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (liability may be imposed on individual defendant under § 1983

only if plaintiff can show that defendant proximately caused deprivation of federally protected

right). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that

one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee. See Board of Cty.

Comm'rs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d

1128, 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, a claim would not be stated against Corizon Health

Services merely because it employed the medical care providers, and a claim would not be stated

against the Alameda County Sheriff merely because he was in charge of the jail at which the alleged

constitutional violations occurred. If Mr. Wilkins wants to pursue the Sheriff based on a supervisor's

liability, he must make allegations in his amended complaint to support such a theory.2

 A supervisor

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 4

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional

deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The

amended complaint must be filed no later than July 31, 2015, and must include the caption and civil

case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Mr.

Wilkins is cautioned that his amended complaint will supersede existing pleadings and must be a

complete statement of his claims, except that he does not need to plead again any claim the court has

dismissed without leave to amend. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc). Failure to file the amended complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of

the action for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 1, 2015 _______________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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