Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03974/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03974-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 3/6/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KAREN CARTER,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING CITY

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND 

[Doc. Nos. 13, 15]

Defendants City of Campbell (“City”) and Campbell police officer D.P. Livingston

(“Livingston”) move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(e). The Court has considered the briefing as well as the oral arguments presented at the

hearing on March 3, 2006. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted with

leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Karen Carter (“Carter”) alleges the following facts: on April 3, 2005, at

approximately 1:00 a.m. in the morning, Carter was a customer in Boswell’s Bar, located in the

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

Pruneyard Shopping Center in Campbell, California. Complt. ¶ 10. Two bouncers forcibly

ejected her from the bar, threw her to the ground and then stood over her while using abusive

language to describe her. Id. As a result of this incident, Carter suffered cuts, abrasions and

bruises. Id.

City police officers arrived at the scene, at which time Carter stated that she wanted to file

assault charges against the bouncers. Id. at ¶ 11. Livingston and the other officers tried to

convince Carter not to file assault charges but to take a taxicab home. Id. Because the officers

refused to fill out a report, Carter turned to the crowd that had gathered and asked for names and

telephone numbers from any witnesses. Id. At that point Livingston handcuffed Carter and told

her that she was under arrest for public intoxication. Id. Livingston placed Carter in a patrol car

and transported her to the Santa Clara County (“County”) booking facility. Id. Carter told

Livingston that she would like to go to the emergency room for her injuries, but he stated that she

would be seen by a nurse at the jail. Id. 

While Carter was waiting for completion of her paperwork, an elderly woman in the same

area asked to be taken to the restroom. Id. at ¶ 12. Carter told officers and a nurse who were

present that she did not mind waiting while somebody escorted the other woman to the restroom. 

Id. A female correctional officer, Rodriguez, responded by telling Carter to spit out her gum. Id.

When Carter refused, Rodriguez and another officer, Asban, dragged Carter across the room and

fingerprinted her. Id. Rodriguez was violent during the process, pulling and twisting Carter’s

fingers. Id. When Carter pulled her hand away, Rodriguez and other officers, including

Livingston, attacked her, slamming her face to the floor, twisting her arms, neck, head and back,

and sitting on her. Id. Carter then was “slammed backwards into a restraining chair” and

shackled so tightly as to cause loss of circulation to her arms and legs while a hood was placed

over her face. Id. When Carter later attempted to stand, her feet had gone to sleep such that she

lost her balance. Id. During the physical attack by the group of officers, a chunk of hair was

pulled from Carter’s head. Id. 

Carter filed suit against the County, the City, all of the officers allegedly involved in her

arrest, booking and fingerprinting, and Boswell’s and its principals. She alleges the following

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

claims: (1) a § 1983 claim against the defendant officers; (2) a Monell claim against the County

and the City; (3) assault and battery against all defendants; (4) intentional infliction of emotional

distress against all defendants; (5) negligence against all defendants; and (6) a claim under

California Civil Code § 52.1 against all defendants. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff’s allegations are

taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The Court’s review is limited to the

face of the complaint and matters judicially noticeable. North Star International v. Arizona

Corporation Commission, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983); MGIC Indemnity Corp. v.

Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D.

Cal. 1995). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies

cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. 

Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under Rule 12(e), the Court may order a plaintiff to provide a more definite statement

with respect to a complaint that is so vague or ambiguous that the defendant cannot reasonably be

required to frame a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that several of Defendants’ arguments are based upon

facts not alleged in the complaint and not subject to judicial notice. For example, Defendants

assert the following “facts” in their motion papers: Carter declined medical care at the

Pruneyard; Carter had been drinking heavily at the bar and harassing other patrons; two separate

taxicabs refused to transport Carter because she was intoxicated; Carter attacked the two

bouncers who ejected her from the bar, and the bouncers wanted to prosecute Carter for assault

and battery; Livingston did not discourage Carter from filing a report regarding the alleged

assault by the bouncers; Livingston arrested Carter for public intoxication because he was

concerned that she was endangering her own safety due to her drunken state; while Carter was

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

being transported to jail, she demanded to be taken to her personal physician, not to the

emergency room as alleged in the complaint; Livingston dropped Carter off with jail staff and

last saw her as she was being led away by County corrections officers; Livingston already had

left the jail when Carter was fingerprinted and allegedly was attacked by the group of officers;

and Carter attended Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings in order to avoid criminal

prosecution and the charges against her were dropped based upon proof of attendance at AA

meetings. 

Because these asserted facts are not alleged in the complaint, and are not the appropriate

subject of judicial notice, the Court cannot consider them in ruling on Defendants’ motion. 

Defendants submit some documentary evidence in support of their version of events, and argue

that it would be unfair for the Court to decline to consider the true facts because then Carter

would prevail based upon artful pleading. If Defendants believe that the true facts are not as

alleged in the complaint, and that the true facts would give rise to disposition of Carter’s claims

in Defendants’ favor, Defendants may bring a motion for summary judgment. A motion to

dismiss is not the appropriate vehicle for many of the arguments Defendants are attempting to

make.

A. First Claim Under § 1983

Carter asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendant officers, including

Livingston, alleging violation of her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As Carter appears to concede in her

opposition, she has failed to allege any cognizable claims under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or

Fourteenth Amendments. Carter argues that she has asserted a cognizable § 1983 claim for

unlawful arrest and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. With respect to the latter

claims, the Court concludes that the complaint is indefinite. It is not clear upon what basis Carter

alleges that she was unlawfully arrested. If Carter wishes to allege that she was not actually

intoxicated, she should do so explicitly. With respect to the excessive force claim, Carter does

allege that Livingston was one of the officers who attacked her at the jail. However, Carter does

not allege what, precisely, Livingston did during that attack. More specificity regarding the

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

attack is required in order to state a viable claim. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the first

claim with leave to amend so that Livingston may allege with more particularity claims of

unlawful arrest and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Livingston argues that the Heck doctrine bars Carter’s claim that she was arrested without

probable cause. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a civil

rights action for damages may not be asserted if a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence which remains outstanding against

the plaintiff. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); see also Trimble v. City of Santa

Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). Carter was not convicted of the crime for which she

claims she was falsely arrested, public intoxication. Livingston argues that the reason Carter was

not convicted was that she agreed to attend AA meetings and that the charges were dismissed

after she demonstrated proof of such attendance. Livingston argues that the Heck doctrine

extends to this situation even though Carter was not convicted. Even assuming, without

deciding, that Heck would be applicable to the situation Livingston describes, the facts upon

which the Heck argument is premised – i.e., that the charges were dismissed in exchange for

Carter’s attendance at AA meetings – do not appear on the face of the complaint and are not

judicially noticeable.

Livingston also argues that Carter’s arrest was objectively reasonable and therefore that

he is entitled to qualified immunity. A determination as to an officer’s entitlement to qualified

immunity involves a two-pronged inquiry. First, do the facts alleged, viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional

right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.

2002). This first prong mirrors the substantive summary judgment inquiry on the merits of the

constitutional claim. Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 969. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation

of a constitutional right, was that right clearly established? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Sorrels,

290 F.3d at 969. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. This inquiry is wholly objective; the

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

defendant’s subjective belief as to the lawfulness of his or her conduct is irrelevant. Sorrels, 290

F.3d at 970. 

In the instant case, Carter has failed to allege her claims of unlawful arrest and excessive

force with sufficient clarity. However, she may well be able to cure this defect and allege

conduct on the part of Livingston that would constitute violations of her Fourth Amendment

rights. Livingston appears to be requesting that the Court accept his version of events, based

upon facts outside the scope of the pleadings, to conclude as a matter of law that his conduct was

objectively reasonable. As noted above, the Court cannot consider facts outside the scope of the

pleadings on a motion to dismiss. Moreover, where there is a factual dispute as to what

happened, the Court cannot simply choose to believe the defendant’s version of events in order to

grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.

Livingston argues that the claims against him in his official capacity should be dismissed

because such claims are treated as claims against the City and Carter already is asserting claims

against the City. The Court declines to dismiss the official capacity claims against Livingston,

because Carter’s Monell claim against the City is different in nature from his official capacity

claims against Livingston.

B. Second Claim Under § 1983 – Monell

“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. In examining

municipal liability under Section 1983, a court must determine “whether there is a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). As noted above, Carter has failed to allege a viable § 1983

claim against Livingston. Even if she had, she has failed to identify any particular policy or

custom of the City that was in play during the events in question. Accordingly, the Monell claim

against the City will be dismissed with leave to amend.

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

C. Third Claim For Assault And Battery

Presumably, Carter’s assault and battery claim against Livingston is based upon his

alleged use of excessive force. As discussed above, the complaint fails to allege what, precisely,

Livingston did during the alleged attack by the group of officers at the jail. Accordingly, the

claim for assault and battery will be dismissed with leave to amend.

D. Fourth Claim For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress

The fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is derivative of her claim

for assault and battery. Because the latter claim is subject to dismissal with leave to amend, so

too is the former claim.

E. Fifth Claim For Negligence

Carter’s claim for negligence against Livingston appears to be based upon his exercise of

discretion in the course and scope of his official duties. California Government Code § 820.2

provides as follows: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable

for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the

exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” While the

Court is doubtful that Carter can allege a viable claim for negligence in light of § 820.2, the

Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend.

F. Sixth Claim Under California Civil Code § 52.1

California Civil Code § 52.1(a) provides that if a person interferes, or attempts to

interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment of the

constitutional or statutory rights of any individual, local prosecutors may bring a civil action for

equitable or injunctive relief. Section 52.1(b) allows the individual so interfered with to sue for

damages. To come within these provisions, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s

threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered with a constitutional or statutory right. Venegas, 32

Cal.4th at 843. The basis for Carter’s § 52.1 claim is unclear. Accordingly, the § 52.1 claim will

be dismissed with leave to amend.

G. Punitive Damages

The claim for punitive damages will be dismissed with leave to amend because Carter has

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

failed to allege a viable claim against either Livingston or the City. The Court notes that

California Government Code § 818 precludes an award of punitive damages against a

municipality pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 (the general punitive damages provision),

and that Carter has not identified any other basis for punitive damages against the City. 

IV. ORDER

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as set forth herein. Any

amended complaint shall be filed and served within twenty (20) days after service of this order. 

DATED: 3/6/06

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-3974-JF (RS)

ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ETC.

(JFLC2)

This Order was served on the following persons:

Michael G. Ackerman cjs@aandklaw.com,

Mark Scott Collins msc@cslawfirm.com, shunt@cslawfirm.com; steve@cslawfirm.com

Kevin B. Kevorkian kbk@aandklaw.com,

Christopher James Olson , Esq colson@smwb.com,

David Michael Rollo david.rollo@cco.sccgov.org, anna.espiritu@cco.sccgov.org 

Case 5:05-cv-03974-JF Document 36 Filed 03/06/06 Page 9 of 9