Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James L. Gagan, )

)

Plaintiff/Judgment )

Creditor, ) No. CIV 99-1427 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Victor E. Sharer and James )

A. Monroe, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

On July 26, 2005, the Court denied Defendant James A. Monroe's

motions to quash writs of garnishment and the filing of the foreign

judgment in this matter. Order (doc. 241) ; see also Motions (docs.

217 & 236). Thereafter, Plaintiff James L. Gagan filed a Request

for Entry of Judgement Against Garnishee. (doc. 242). In response

to this request, Monroe filed a motion entitled "Motion for Stay of

Order Pending Appeal and Waive the Discretionary Bond". (doc. 247).

Gagan filed his objection to Monroe's motion on September 12, 2005.

Resp. (doc. 254). Having carefully reviewed the arguments submitted

by the parties, the Court now rules.

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 260 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 5
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I. Background Facts

On November 23, 1994, Plaintiff James L. Gagan obtained a

judgment for damages against Monroe, and others, in the amount of

$1,687,500 in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Indiana. Gagan registered the judgment in the United

States District Court in the District of Arizona on March 28, 1995.

He recorded it in Maricopa County on March 31, 1995. Plaintiff then

re-filed the Indiana judgment - obtained in 1994 - in the District

Court for the District of Arizona on June 9, 2000. 

On September 13, 2004, and April 6, 2005, Monroe filed motions

to quash writs of garnishment and the filing of the foreign

judgment in this matter, challenging the enforceability of the

judgment. Motions (docs. 217 & 236). The Court, however, concluded

that since Gagan filed numerous applications for writs of

garnishment and motions in this matter within five years of the

date the judgment was entered, the judgment had been appropriately

renewed and is enforceable. Order (doc. 241) at 6-7. Consequently,

the Court denied Monroe's motions to quash, and Gagan filed a

request for entry of the contested judgement against garnishee

Central Arizona Communications. Id. at 7; Request for Judgmt. (doc.

242). Following Gagan's request for judgment, Monroe moved the

Court to stay its order on Gagan's request, pending an appeal, and

waive the discretionary bond. Mot. (doc. 247).

II. Monroe's Motion

Federal courts have the statutory or inherent power to stay

judgments or orders pending appeal. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1651. Procedurally, discretionary stays of judgments and orders

pending appeal are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 260 Filed 11/10/05 Page 2 of 5
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62(c) and (g) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) and (b).

A party seeking a stay pending appeal must show that: (1) it is

likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal; (2) it will suffer

irreparable injury in the absence of a stay; (3) no substantial

harm will come to the other parties to the appeal; and (4) the stay

will do no harm to the public interest. See In re Wymer, 5 B.R.

803, 806 (9th Cir. BAP 1980) citing Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d

537 (9th Cir. 1965). In addition, "the court in its discretion may

suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the

pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as

it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse

party." Fed.R.Civ.P 62(c).

Here, Monroe asserts that each of the elements required for a

discretionary stay are satisfied in this case. First, Monroe argues

that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his appeal due to

prior rulings in his favor made by certain Arizona courts. Mot.

(doc. 247) at 2. "The issue, therefore, has been decided by the

Arizona Courts, that [Gagan] never properly renewed the judgment

under A.R.S. § 12-1611." Id. This is the same argument Monroe

asserted in his motions to quash the writs of garnishment and

filing of the foreign judgment, which the Court found unconvincing.

See Mot. to Quash (doc. 217) at 3; Second Mot. to Quash (doc. 236)

at 2. In its previous review of the Arizona Court of Appeals

opinion offered by Monroe, the Court found that the Arizona court

determined Gagan's judgment lien to be unenforceable, not the

judgment itself. Order (doc. 241) at 3. Thus, this argument alone

does not indicate a likelihood of success on the merits of the

appeal. 

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Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that the denial of a

motion to quash a writ of execution is not an appealable order. See

United States v. Moore, 878 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1989). The Moore

court found that a refusal to quash a writ is not a final judgment,

and, consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal of

such an order. Id. Thus, according to the decision in Moore, the

Court's order denying Monroe's motion to quash the writs of

garnishment is not an appealable order. 

The Court concludes that Monroe has not demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal on either his

motions to quash the writs of garnishment or his motions to quash

the filing of the foreign judgment. In reaching such a conclusion,

a further analysis of the remaining elements required for a

discretionary stay and Monroe's request for waiver of the

discretionary bond is unnecessary. The law affords Monroe the

option to receive the stay he desires through the posting of a

supersedeas bond. Fed.R.Civ.P 62(d); In re Wymer, 5 B.R. at 806

("An appellant from a money judgment may, as a matter of right,

obtain a stay of execution by posting a supersedeas bond in an

approved amount at any time, whether before or after the time of

filing the notice of appeal."). The Court finds no additional

relief appropriate at this time.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Monroe's Motion for Stay of Order Pending

Appeal and Waive the Discretionary Bond (doc. 247) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gagan's Request for Entry of

. . . 

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 260 Filed 11/10/05 Page 4 of 5
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Judgement Against Garnishee (doc. 242) is GRANTED. 

DATED this 1st day of November, 2005.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 260 Filed 11/10/05 Page 5 of 5