Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04098/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LENNON H. MACDONALD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware 

corporation, and DELTA FAMILY CARE 

RETIREMENT PLAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 95-4098 

FILED 

&JniCfdifttfl Court ut Appeal& Ttnth Circuit 

AUG 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. D.C. 94-CV-287B) 

John Preston Creer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Chris Wangsgard, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for DefendantsAppellees. 

Before EBEL, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Lennon H. MacDonald appeals the district court's grant of the summary 

judgment motion of defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc, and Delta Family Care Retirement 

Appellate Case: 95-4098 Document: 01019278169 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 1 
Plan on his age discrimination and disability discrimination claims. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affmn. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The following are the undisputed facts in this case as set forth by the district court: 

Mr. MacDonald had been an airplane mechanic for Western Air Lines ("Western") for 

eighteen years when Western merged with Delta Air Lines ("Delta"). After the merger, 

he became a Delta mechanic on April1, 1987. His duties as an aircraft mechanic 

included meeting arriving flights, checking with the crew to identify any mechanical 

problems, and preparing flights for timely departure. 

As part of his duties in meeting arriving aircraft, Mr. MacDonald was assigned to 

an arrival gate in accordance with a schedule which was posted each morning on a 

mechanics' bulletin board. Under Delta's written policy, mechanics, including Mr. 

MacDonald, should be at the arrival gate five minutes before a flight arrived. If the 

aircraft crew had some mechanical problem to report, the assigned mechanic would 

correct the mechanical problem, if possible, before the plane took off. Additionally, the 

mechanic had the responsibility of visually inspecting the aircraft to detect possible 

mechanical problems and of determining if a flight should be delayed to repair 

mechanical malfunctions. After making a repair, the mechanic would document the 

repair in the computer log. Performance of these duties required fifteen to thirty minutes, 

even if the plane had no mechanical problems to report. 

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On June 29, 1993, Mr. Joseph F. Froehlich, Delta's general foreman of 

maintenance for Salt Lake City and the associated regional area, was observing 

operations at the D Concourse of the Salt Lake City Airport. At about 10:00 a.m., Mr. 

Froehlich noticed that Delta Flight 443 had arrived at Gate D3 and that no mechanic was 

present to meet the flight. Mr. Froehlich then walked down to the D Gate ready room, 

seeking an explanation for the absence of a mechanic at Gate D3. As he entered the 

room, he saw Mr. MacDonald sitting in the break area reading a newspaper or magazine. 

Mr. Froehlich went to the foreman's office and advised foreman Mark Werner that no 

mechanic was present at Gate D3. Mr. Werner investigated this report and discovered 

that Mr. MacDonald was the mechanic assigned to Flight 443. He located Mr. 

MacDonald in the break room reading a newspaper and told him to go work his assigned 

flight. 

The next day, June 30, 1993, Mr. Froehlich called Mr. MacDonald into his office 

and asked him to write an incident report explaining why he did not meet Flight 443. Mr. 

MacDonald complied and submitted a report in which he indicated that he did not meet 

the flight due to an oversight of time on his part. After reviewing the incident report, Mr. 

Froehlich informed Mr. MacDonald that his reason was unacceptable. Mr. Froehlich 

then suspended Mr. MacDonald from employment pending further investigation, based 

on his failure to meet the flight and on his prior poor work performance. 

Mr. Froehlich subsequently recommended that Delta terminate Mr. MacDonald's 

employment. On July 2, 1993, Mr. Ernie Menet, the Delta aircraft maintenance manager, 

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submitted a written memorandum recommending that Mr. MacDonald be terminated 

based on his failure to meet the flight and on prior disciplinary problems. Delta 

management accepted this recommendation. On July 20, 1993, Delta offered Mr. 

MacDonald the choice of resigning or of being terminated. He subsequently resigned at 

age fifty-two. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the 

same standard as did the district court. ~Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 627 

(lOth Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). "A fact is 'material' 

only if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a dispute 

about a material fact is 'genuine' only 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the non-moving party."' Thomas v. IBM. 48 F.3d 478, 486 (lOth Cir. 

1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). We view the 

evidence and draw any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment, here Mr. MacDonald. Id. at 484. 

Mr. MacDonald claims that Delta fired him in violation of both the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Americans 

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with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. However, because Mr. 

MacDonald has failed to establish a prima facie case under either act, meaning that no 

reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor, we uphold the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. 

A. The Age Discrimination Claim 

Under the ADEA, an employer cannot "discharge any individual ... because of 

such individual's age." See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). Thus, for Mr. MacDonald to 

establish a claim under the ADEA, he must show that Delta's decision to frre him was 

motivated, at least in part, see James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 992 (lOth 

Cir. 1994) (explaining that the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer was 

motivated only by the plaintiff's age), by his age. See. e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 

507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); Jones, 54 F.3d at 630; Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484. There are two 

methods for showing that an ADEA defendant held the requisite discriminatory intent. 

First, the plaintiff may present direct proof of the defendant's discriminatory intent. Mr. 

MacDonald has offered no direct evidence showing that Delta fired him because of his 

age; therefore, he must proceed in the second manner, by presenting circumstantial 

evidence that indirectly proves Delta's discriminatory motive in firing him, see Jones, 54 

F.3d at 630; Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484. 

Where an ADEA plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, 

we apply the analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-

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02 (1973) (a Title VII case). See, e.g., Jones, 54 F.3d at 630; Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484. 

For a plaintiff-employee to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the 

McDonnell Douglas analysis requires a showing that "( 1) the employee belongs to the 

protected age group; (2) the employee's job performance was satisfactory; (3) the 

employee was discharged; and (4) the employee was replaced by a younger person." 

Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484. 

1. The Establishment of the First Three Elements of the ADEA Claim 

The parties do not dispute that Mr. MacDonald has established the first and third 

elements of a prima facie case under the ADEA. When Delta forced him to resign, 

effectively firing him, he was fifty-two, bringing him within the ADEA's protected class 

of individuals, those "who are at least 40 years of age," 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). 

As to the second element, the defendants argue that Mr. MacDonald has not shown 

that his "job performance was satisfactory" in light of his past adverse employee 

evaluations and his failure to meet his assigned flight on June 29, 1993. See Thomas, 48 

F.3d at 484. However, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. MacDonald was a satisfactory 

airplane mechanic. This evidence includes the following: On March 5, 1993, four 

months before Mr. MacDonald's termination, Mr. Larry Rogers, who was Mr. 

MacDonald's supervisor at the time, completed a personnel evaluation of Mr. 

MacDonald. See Aplt's App., Ex. D at 83. In all categories evaluated, he gave Mr. 

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MacDonald a rating of"standard." Id. He stated that Mr. MacDonald "continue[ d) to 

improve in his use of the computer system and the tech manuals ... [and] continue[ d] to 

make the effort to improve from the below standard rating he was given." Id. at 84. Mr. 

Rogers recommended that Mr. MacDonald "be taken off the monthly evaluation list," 

describing Mr. MacDonald as "dependable, cooperative and always willing to help out 

when asked." I d. 

In addition to Mr. Rogers's "standard" evaluation, the evidence regarding the 

frequency of a mechanic missing an assigned flight and the punishment imposed for 

doing so shows that a reasonable jury could conclude that, despite missing his assigned 

flight, Mr. MacDonald was a satisfactory airplane mechapic. Mr. Mark Werner, a Delta 

foreman at the Salt Lake City airport, testified in his deposition that occasionally "there is 

an airplane that arrives and a mechanic isn't there to start his work on it." See Aple's 

Supp. App., Ex. Fat 233. Both he and Mr. Tom Orges, a Delta supervisor, testified in 

their depositions that they were unaware of any employee, other than Mr. MacDonald, 

having been frred for missing an assigned flight. See id. at 238-39; Aple's Supp. App., 

Ex. Eat 228-29. Further, Mr. MacDonald stated in his affidavit that he had "never been 

written up for missing an airplane in 24 years and 5 months of service with Western and 

Delta Air Lines, except for the one incident on June 29, 1993." See Aplt's App., Ex. Hat 

199. Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. MacDonald, this 

evidence shows that he was fired for an incident of unsatisfactory performance that had 

previously been committed by others who did not suffer similar punishment. This 

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evidence in sum might lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. MacDonald was a 

satisfactory airplane mechanic, establishing the second element of his ADEA claim for 

purposes of summary judgment. 

2. The Failure to Establish the Fourth Element, Replacement by a Younger Person 

Mr. MacDonald has not, however, established the fourth element of a prima facie 

case under the ADEA, that he "was replaced by a younger person," Thomas, 48 F.3d at 

484. In an attempt to establish this element, Mr. MacDonald argues that he was replaced 

by Mr. John R. Brzenk. The parties do not dispute that Mr. Brzenk is younger than Mr. 

MacDonald. Their dispute focuses on whether Mr. Brzenk replaced Mr. MacDonald 

after Delta frred him. 

The uncontradicted evidence establishes that Mr. Brzenk was originally assigned 

as a mechanic in department 250, Mr. MacDonald's department. Aplt's App., Ex. J at 

207. He was then temporarily assigned to work as a training instructor oti a project 

involving Delta 737 aircraft. Id. During this temporary assignment, he was no longer 

paid by department 250, but was instead on the payroll of the department that paid the 

training instructors working on the 737 project. Id. When Mr. Brzenk's temporary 

assignment ended, he returned, once again as a mechanic, to department 250. Id. 

Mr. MacDonald asserts that in transferring Mr. Brzenk back to his position as a 

mechanic in department 250, Delta replaced him with Mr. Brzenk. If in fact Mr. Brzenk 

were transferred in order to replace Mr. MacDonald, this would be true. However, Mr. 

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Orges's uncontradicted deposition testimony establishes that Mr. Brzenk "always was in 

department 250," see id., and was not transferred to department 250 in order to replace 

Mr. MacDonald. 

Mr. Orges testified in his deposition that Mr. Brzenk's assignment as a training 

instructor was "a temporary situation." Id. That assignment was originally for 

"approximately 18 months," id. at 208, and was only shortened by Delta's decision to sell 

the fleet of737's for which Mr. Brzenk was training people, id. at 207-08, causing Mr. 

Brzenk's return to Mr. MacDonald's department to coincide with the timing of Mr. 

MacDonald's termination. Mr. Orges testified that when Mr. Brzenk accepted the 

temporary assignment as a training instructor, he was "told ... that once his stint of 18 

months is up, that he goes back to his same position." Id. at 208. Finally, Mr. Orges 

testified that even while Mr. Brzenk was on temporary assignment and on another 

department's payroll, he was still included in the total number of mechanics allotted to 

department 250. Id. 

In addition to Mr. Orges's deposition testimony, exhibits attached to the affidavit 

of Mr. Joseph F. Froehlich, Delta's general foreman of maintenance for the regional area 

including Salt Lake City, indicated that Mr. Brzenk was always considered one of the 

mechanics assigned to department 250. See Aplt's App., Ex. M. The frrst exhibit, a 

report made on June 18, 1993, two days before Mr. MacDonald was frred, lists Mr. 

Brzenk as a mechanic assigned to department 250. See id. at 219. In a subsequent report, 

made on November 2, 1993, Mr. Brzenk was still listed as a mechanic assigned to 

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department 250. See id. at 224. These reports demonstrate that Mr. Brzenk was 

considered a mechanic with department 250, both before and after Delta frred Mr. 

MacDonald, meaning that Mr. Brzenk did not replace him. 

Not only do these reports indicate that Mr. Brzenk did not replace Mr. 

MacDonald, they show that no one replaced him. They state that as of June 18, 1993, 

two days before Mr. MacDonald was frred, department 250 was approved to have 116 

mechanics, but was assigned only 110. See id. at 218. As ofNovember 2, 1993, the 

department was still approved to have 116 mechanics, but the number assigned to it had 

reduced to 103. I d. at 223. As the district court noted, this decrease in the number of 

mechanics in the department indicates that Mr. MacDonald was not replaced by anyone, 

younger or older. 1 Based on this uncontradicted evidence, a reasonable jury could not 

conclude that Mr. Brzenk replaced Mr. MacDonald. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; 

Thomas, 48 F.3d at 486. Therefore, he has not established the fourth element of his 

prima facie case under the ADEA. For this reason, we affrrm the district court's grant of 

the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim. 

B. The Disability Discrimination Claim 

1Mr. MacDonald does not argue that this reduction in assigned mechanics in department 

250 reflects that Delta was reducing its workforce. See Aplt's Br. at 9. Had he instead argued 

and established that the decrease in mechanics was part of a reduction in Delta's workforce, he 

would have needed to demonstrate the fourth element under McDonnell Douglas "by producing 

'evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a fact-finder might reasonably conclude that the 

employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue."' Jones, 54 F.3d at 630 

(quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771 (lOth Cir. 1988)). 

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In addition to his claim that he was frred because of his age, Mr. MacDonald 

asserts that Delta frred him because of a disability he had under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Specifically, he claims that 

Delta's knowledge of his vision problems caused Delta to regard him as having "a 

physical . . . impairment that substantially limit[ ed]" his ability to perform the duties of 

an airplane mechanic. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (C). 

The ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from discriminating "against a qualified 

individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . 

discharge of employees." See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Act defmes a "qualified 

individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 

position that such individual holds or desires." See 42 U.S.C § 12111(8). Thus, to 

establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Mr. MacDonald must establish "(1) that he is 

a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, that is, with or 

without reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is able to perform the 

essential functions of the job; and (3) that the employer terminated him because of his 

disability." See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (lOth Cir. 1995), quoted 

in Milton v. Scrivner. Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1123 (lOth Cir. 1995). Mr. MacDonald has 

failed to establish the frrst and third elements of an ADA claim. 

1. Failure to Establish a Disability Under the ADA 

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The ADA defmes a "disability ... with respect to an individual" as: "(A) a 

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 

activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 

having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Mr. MacDonald relies upon 

subsection (C) of§ 12102(2) in an effort to establish that he was disabled under the 

ADA. Subsection (C)'s description of"such an impairment" refers to subsection (A)'s 

defmition of the type of impairment required under the ADA. Thus, under subsection 

(C), a person is disabled under the ADA if he is "regarded as having," 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(2)(C), "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 

the major life activities of such individual," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), regardless of 

whether he actually has such an impairment, see Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 

723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff"might have qualified as disabled 

under the ADA if she could have provided sufficient summary judgment evidence that 

she was regarded by [the defendant] as having an impairment that substantially limited a 

major life activity, whether she actually had such an impairment or not'' (emphasis 

added)). 

To determine whether Mr. MacDonald has satisfied§ 12102(2)(C)'s defmition of 

a disability, thereby establishing the first element of his ADA claim, we must define three 

terms that, by reference to§ 12102(2)(A), are included in the definition: "regarded as," 

"major life activities," and "substantially limits." The ADA does not define these terms. 

For this reason, we have previously referred to the Act's implementing regulations, see 29 

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C.F.R. Pt. 1630, for clarification. See Bolton v. Scrivner. Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995). 

(i) "Regarded As" 

The regulations implementing the ADEA explain that a person is regarded as 

having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity if he 

( 1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit 

major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such 

limitation; 

(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life 

activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; 

or (3) Has none of the impairments defined in [29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(hf] 

but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting 

impairment. 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). Thus, "[a] person is 'regarded as having' 

an impairment that substantially limits the person's major life activities when other 

people treat that person as having a substantially limiting impairment. The focus is on the 

impairment's effect upon the attitudes of others." Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 

382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

(ii) "Major Life Activities" 

In order to evaluate Mr. MacDonald's assertion that he is disabled under the ADA, 

the second term from§ 12102(2) that must be defmed is that which Delta must have 

2Section 1630.2(h) defines "physical or mental impairment" as used in 42 U.S. C. § 

12102(2). 

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perceived as being substantially limited by his impaired vision: "major life activities." 

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), incorporated in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The ADA's 

implementing regulations defme "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for 

oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 

and working." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (emphasis added). Mr. MacDonald claims that 

Delta perceived his vision problems as substantially limiting the "major life activit[y ]" of 

"working." See id. 

(iii) "Substantially Limits" 

The final aspect of the ADA's definition of a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(2)(C) that requires explanation is the requirement that the impairment at issue be 

perceived as "substantially limit[ing]" a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), 

incorporated in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The regulations implementing the ADA list 

three factors that "should be considered in determining whe~er an individual is 

substantially limited in a major life activity." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2). They are: 

"(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of 

the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent 

or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(2)(i)-

(iii), quoted in Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(ii) (listing three 

additional factors that "may be considered in determining whether an individual is 

substantially limited in the major life activity of 'working"'), quoted in Bolton, 36 F.3d at 

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943. 

The regulations further explain that 

[t]o demonstrate that an impairment "substantially limits" the major life 

activity of working, an individual must show "significant[] restrict[ion] in 

the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 

various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 

· training, skills and abilities." 

Bolton, 36 F.2d at 942 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(i)). The regulations guide us 

further in our analysis of whether Mr. MacDonald has shown that Delta regarded his 

impaired vision as substantially limiting the major life activity of working by defming 

what is meant by "a class of jobs" or "a broad range of jobs." They defme a "class of 

jobs" from which an individual's impairment restricts him as "[t]he job from which the 

individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of 

jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, 

from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2G)(3)(ii)(B). They defme a "broad range of jobs in various classes" from which an 

individual's impairment has disqualified him as "[t]he job from which the individual has 

been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not 

utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, 

from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2G)(3)(ii)(C). If neither of these defmitions is met, and an individual instead shows 

only that he is unable "to perform a single, particular job," see 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2G)(3)(i), the regulations and case law make clear that he has not shown that he is 

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"substantial[ly] limit[ ed] in the major life activity of working." See id.; see also Bolton, 

36 F.2d at 942 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727 (explaining 

that "the inability to perform one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to perform the 

work in general does not amount to substantial limitation of the activity of working."); 

Wooten, 58 F.3d at 386 (holding that under the ADA, "'working' does not mean working 

at a particular job of that person's choice."). 

Thus, to establish that he has a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), Mr. 

MacDonald must have shown that Delta regarded him as being substantially limited in 

performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. He claims 

that he has done this because "[a]n airplane mechanic is a class of jobs," see Aplt's Br. at 

15, and Delta regarded his impaired vision as significantly restricting his ability to be an 

airplane mechanic. He relies upon the following evidence in support of this argument: 

He testified in his deposition that six months before June of 1993, the month in which he 

was frred, he told Mr. Orges that he "believed that [he] had a cataract which was 

preventing [him] from performing [his] job as an aircraft mechanic." See Aple's Supp. 

App., Ex. D at 110. In addition, on May 10, 1993, less than two months before he was 

terminated, his impaired vision caused him to fail a physical that one must pass in order 

to be certified to taxi aircraft. See Aplt's App., Ex. D at 85-86. 

This evidence fails to establish that Mr. MacDonald was disabled under the 

ADA's defmition found in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) because it does not show that Delta 

regarded his vision problems as substantially limiting his ability to be an airplane 

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mechanic. It in no way indicates that Delta treated him as having a substantially limiting 

impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1)-(3); Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385. If in fact Mr. 

MacDonald told Mr. Orges of his vision problems, which Mr. Orges disputes, there is no 

evidence that Mr. Orges or any other Delta employee treated or regarded Mr. MacDonald 

differently as a result of this knowledge. In fact, the evidence upon which Mr. 

MacDonald relies in support of this claim establishes that the only treatment by Delta of 

him that resulted from his failed eye exam was that Delta did not allow him to taxi 

aircraft. However, taxiing aircraft is neither "a class of jobs," nor "a broad range of jobs 

in various classes," but is instead "a single, particular job." See 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2(j)(3)(i). Mr. MacDonald himself admitted in his deposition testimony that 

"passing the taxi physical wasn't a necessary part of being an aircraft mechanic." See 

Aple's Supp. App., Ex. D at 111. In fact, Mr. MacDonald had not been certified to taxi 

aircraft since 1985, see Aplt's App., Ex. Hat 199, meaning he had performed the job of 

airplane mechanic for approximately eight years without taxiing aircraft before he was 

terminated. Therefore, when Delta disallowed him from taxiing aircraft due to his 

impaired vision, it did not demonstrate that Delta regarded him as being substantially 

limited in his ability to perform the major life activity of working. 

2. Failure to Establish that the Disability Resulted in Termination 

Even if Mr. MacDonald's evidence showed that he was disabled under the ADA, 

which it does not, he has not established the third element of an ADA claim, that he was 

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.. 

terminated because of this disability. See White, 45 F.3d at 360-61. He has presented no 

evidence suggesting that Delta terminated him because it regarded his vision problems as 

substantially limiting his ability to be an airplane mechanic. There is no evidence that 

Mr. Orges, who Mr. MacDonald claims knew of his impaired vision, was in any way 

connected to his termination. There is also no evidence that Mr. MacDonald's failure to 

pass the eye exam needed to taxi aircraft was related to his eventual termination. We 

therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Mr. 

MacDonald's ADA claim. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Because we conclude that Mr. MacDonald has failed to establish a prima facie 

case under either the ADEA or the ADA, we hold that a reasonable jury could not return 

I 

a verdict in his favor on either claim. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. 

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