Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-01782/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-01782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

DONNA LEAH LANDIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 3:15-cv-1782-LSC

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The Plaintiff, Donna Leah Landis, appeals from the decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying 

her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits. Plaintiff 

timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the 

Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Plaintiff was fifty years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a high school education. (Tr. at 110, 148). She 

has past work as a produce manager at a grocery store from February 1991 through 

July 26, 2012, when she stopped working. (Tr. at 133, 148-49). Plaintiff reported 

that from October 4, 2011, to July 26, 2012, she worked reduced hours: 34 hours 

FILED

 2017 Mar-17 AM 10:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 1 of 23
2

per week. (Tr. at 136.) Plaintiff claims that she became disabled on August 22, 

2011, which is the date that she had surgery on her neck (an anterior cervical 

discectomy and fusion), due to spinal stenosis, exostosis, bone spur, cervical disc 

degeneration, tendinopathy of rotator cuff, and tear of the supraspinatus tendon. 

(Tr. at 147).

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus 

eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 

F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until 

making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the

analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 

416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the 

plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See id. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the 

evaluator moves on to the next step.

The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of 

the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of 

impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 2 of 23
3

requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding 

of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The 

decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. 

Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical 

evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not 

disabled).

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the 

plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal 

to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed 

impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 

and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or 

medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id. 

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine 

whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant 

work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff’s impairment 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 3 of 23
4

or combination of impairments does not prevent her from performing her past 

relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s 

RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the 

plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find her

not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff 

cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find her disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found as an initial 

matter that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through December 31, 2016. (Tr. at 12.) The ALJ’s step one finding appears 

contradictory. He determined that Plaintiff “has not engaged in SGA since August 

22, 2011, the alleged onset of her disability.” (Id.) He then noted that she “worked 

after the alleged disability onset date but this work activity did not rise to the level 

of [SGA].” (Id.) Curiously, he then stated that she “returned to work at her prior 

job on October 3, 2011 following the neck surgery and continued to work making 

SGA until she injured her shoulder and last worked on July 26, 2012.” (Id.

(emphasis added)). His conclusion that her work from October 2011 to July 2012 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 4 of 23
5

constituted SGA was based on her earnings record which he noted indicated that in 

2012 she earned $18,160.45. (Id.) In any event, the ALJ apparently found in 

Plaintiff’s favor at step one of the sequential evaluation, thus allowing her to 

proceed to the next step, and neither party raises any issues with regard to his 

finding at step one.

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “cervical microdiskectomy and 

fusion at C4-5 followed by a separate injury to the shoulder which required surgery 

on July 23, 2013,” are “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the 

regulations. (Id.) However, he found at step three that these impairments neither 

meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, 

Regulations No. 4. (Id.) The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s allegations to be fully 

credible, and he determined that Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform light work 

“except no more than occasional overhead lifting.” (Tr. at 13.)

According to the ALJ at step four, Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her 

past relevant work, she is “closely approaching advanced age,” she has at least a 

high school education, and she is able to communicate in English, as those terms 

are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 16-17.) The ALJ determined that 

“[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 5 of 23
6

the claimant is ‘not-disabled’, whether or not the claimant has transferable job 

skills.” (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) to provide 

testimony as to whether jobs existed in the national economy for an individual with 

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Id.) At step five, the ALJ 

found that there are indeed a significant number of jobs in the national economy 

that Plaintiff is capable of performing, including “occasional lifting overhead” 

storage facility rental clerk, fitting room attendant, and parking lot attendant. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined by the 

Social Security Act from August 22, 2011, through the date of the decision. (Tr. at 

18.) 

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act 

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives 

deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 6 of 23
7

supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal 

conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute 

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 

(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision 

makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two 

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative 

agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 

793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. 

Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the 

proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin 

v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard 

[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its 

entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. 

Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 7 of 23
8

883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is 

grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and 

remanded for two reasons: (1) the ALJ erred in finding that she was not disabled for 

any one consecutive twelve-month period and (2) the ALJ erred in finding her 

subjective complaints of pain not credible. 

A. Disability for a Consecutive Twelve-Month Period

There are two separate injuries involved in this case. The first injury 

occurred on June 4, 2011, when Plaintiff picked up a case of cabbage at her job as a 

produce manager at a grocery store. (Tr. at 194, 214.) She felt pain in the back of 

her neck but continued the workday. (Id.) However, by that evening the pain was 

bad enough that she presented to MedPlus where she was diagnosed with muscle 

strain and treated with anti-inflammatory medication. (Id.) However, her

symptoms did not respond to conservative measures. (Id.) A Magnetic Resonance 

Imaging (“MRI”) scan showed spondylosis at C5-6 with some spondylophyte 

formation toward the left side and significant posterolateral disk protrusion with 

spondylophyte formation that results in significant stenosis. (Tr. at 214.) Plaintiff 

used medication to manage her pain and was told she could return to work as long 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 8 of 23
9

as she did not lift over twenty pounds and avoided repetitive overhead activity. (Tr. 

at 215.) At an August 3, 2011, follow up, Plaintiff reported that her symptoms had 

not improved. (Tr. at 210.) 

On August 22, 2011, Plaintiff was admitted to Huntsville Hospital 

complaining of neck pain radiating to her right shoulder and bicep with numbness 

in the right thumb and index finger. (Tr. at 192.) She was diagnosed with neck pain 

and upper extremity pain due to cervical spondylotic stenosis with disc protrusion 

at C4-5, C5-6. (Id.) It was noted that she had tenderness in her neck and positive 

impingement testing in the right shoulder but otherwise had a full range of motion 

in the shoulders, elbows, and wrists. (Id.) That day, Dr. Cyrus Ghavam, a surgeon, 

performed an anterior discectomy and fusion on the C4-5 and C5-6. (Tr. at 192, 

197-99, 252-54). This resulted in Plaintiff reporting that she had good relief of 

upper extremity pain, and she was discharged the next day, August 23, 2011. (Tr. at 

192.) Plaintiff was told to walk daily and avoid anti-inflammatories and 

tobacco/nicotine products. (Id.)

At a follow up on August 30, 2011, Dr. Ghavam noted Plaintiff was doing 

well with good relief of right upper extremity pain. (Tr. at 208). She had full upper 

extremity muscle strength. (Id.) She was to return to light activity for four weeks 

and regular work at her existing job in eight weeks. (Id.) Dr. Ghavam reminded her 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 9 of 23
10

of the adverse effect of smoking and fit Plaintiff with an external bone growth 

stimulator. (Id.)

Plaintiff returned to work on October 4, 2011, although she reported that she 

started working reduced hours: 34 hours per week. (Tr. at 206.) At a follow up with 

Dr. Ghavam on October 14, 2011, she reported having increasing pain but no 

specific injury. (Id.) She was continuing to smoke and not using the bone growth 

stimulator. (Id.) She had a satisfactory range of motion in her neck and an intact 

neurological examination with full upper extremity muscle strength. (Id.) Her 

surgical hardware was in good position and x-rays showed a stable fusion. (Id.) Dr. 

Ghavam opined that she had developed myofascial pain as a result of increased 

activity. (Id.) He prescribed physical therapy and opined that Plaintiff could 

gradually increase her activities at work and should be able to perform regular work.

(Id.)

At a follow up in December 2011, Dr. Ghavam noted Plaintiff was continuing 

to smoke and not using the bone growth stimulator. (Tr. at 204). She had some 

relief with physical therapy. (Id.) She was complaining of achiness in her neck with 

diffuse pain in the right arm with paresthesias, weakness, and numbness. (Id.) 

However, his examination showed no neurological deficits and no fasciculation or 

atrophy. He noted that she could perform regular work with no restrictions. (Id.)

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 10 of 23
11

Plaintiff continued to complain of neck pain. Therefore, workers’ 

compensation referred her to Dr. Robert L. Hash, II at the SportsMED Orthopedic

Surgery and Spine Center, where she was treated on four occasions from April 9, 

2012 through October 3, 2012. (Tr. at 226-36). At the first visit Plaintiff reported to 

Dr. Hash that she had continued to work without restrictions since the initial onset 

of symptoms on June 4, 2011. (Tr. at 226). Plaintiff had normal muscle tone in her 

upper extremities with no atrophy (Tr. at 227). Dr. Hash diagnosed cervical disc 

degeneration, displacement, cervical radiculopathy, neuritis not otherwise 

specified, and tingling/numbness (Id.) Dr. Hash ordered an MRI, EMG, and xrays, which showed no major nerve root compression, mild carpal tunnel syndrome 

on the right, and no soft tissue swelling. (Tr. at 229). On April 27, 2012, Plaintiff 

had nerve conduction studies which showed “the possibility of mild early right

median neuropathy at or distal to wrist (carpal tunnel syndrome).” (Tr. at 246).

The conclusion was that electrophysiologically, there was no carpal tunnel 

syndrome on the left side, and there was no right ulnar neuropathy or cervical 

radiculopathy. (Id.) Dr. Hash opined on April 30, 2012, that Plaintiff could perform 

her regular work as a produce manager which was light to medium exertional work.

(Tr. at 229).

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 11 of 23
12

On August 22, 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Hash again, and she reported that on 

July 26, 2012, when she was raising her hands overhead at work her neck “got 

stuck,” that she has limited range of motion in her neck, and that her right arm felt 

“dead and painful.” (Tr. at 231, 234.) Plaintiff told Dr. Hash that her pain never 

improved after her prior surgery and that it had worsened after this new incident 

(Tr. at 233). Dr. Hash said he would consider this an exacerbation of the previous 

injury and ordered testing. (Id.) He also noted that the Workman’s Compensation 

nurse reported that a different doctor had discharged Plaintiff from his care 

because she violated the narcotic contract. (Id.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine

conducted at that time showed post-surgical fusion changes extending from C4 to 

C6 without recurrent disc herniation with no detrimental change from the previous 

April 2012 MRI which had occurred before the second injury. (Tr. at 242-43). A 

September 17, 2012, computerized tomography (“CT”) of the cervical spine 

showed evidence of prior cervical fusion with some spurring identified at the C4-5 

interspace. (Tr. at 240). A cervical myelogram showed no high-grade cervical 

stenosis. (Tr. at 239).

At a follow up on October 3, 2012, Dr. Hash recommended an epidural 

steroid injection at C5-6, and if it did not provide relief, he recommended surgery. 

(Tr. at 235). On October 23, 2012, Dr. Michael Cosgrove performed a C7-T1 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 12 of 23
13

interlaminar Epidural Steroid Injection and Fluoroscopy. (Tr. at 250-51).

Thereafter, Plaintiff reported no improvement. (Id.)

Thus, at Dr. Hash’s referral, Dr. John J. Greco, an orthopedist, treated 

Plaintiff from November 2012 through April 2013. (Tr. at 269-77). At their first 

visit on November 8, 2012, Plaintiff denied any problems with her right shoulder 

prior to the July 26, 2012, work injury. (Tr. at 274). Dr. Greco assessed right 

shoulder impingement with tendinosis and partial thickness rotator cuff tear and 

right shoulder pain. (Id.) He put Plaintiff on modified work duty, opining that she 

could lift and carry one to three pounds and push or pull ten to twenty pounds with 

no repetitive overhead activity. (Id.) Dr. Greco felt that she had two separate issues 

with the shoulder being separate from the neck, stating, “Her shoulder has been 

painful in and around the shoulder and that is different from what she was having 

issues with before.” (Id.)

At a visit on December 6, 2012, Dr. Greco recommended going forward with 

surgery. (Tr. at 272.) He again noted, “I do think that more of her problems [sic] is 

her shoulder than her neck . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff underwent a decompression and AC 

joint resection surgery in January 2013 and followed with several weeks of physical 

therapy at Shoals Orthopedics Physical Therapy from January 25, 2013 through 

March 12, 2013. (Tr. at 271, 302-320). Therapy notes indicated that Plaintiff 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 13 of 23
14

performed very slowly with several rest breaks and actively resisted exercise which 

limited progress with range of motion. (Tr. at 319-20.) 

Dr. Greco examined Plaintiff’s shoulder post-surgery on February 7, 2013, 

noting some pain on the extremes but stated that she was neurovascularly intact 

and the wounds were healing nicely. (Tr. at 271.) He stated, “I think a lot of the 

shoulder issue is better. She does still have some of a neck issue and she very well 

have [sic] two separate issues but I felt all along we needed to get the shoulder 

settled down . . .” (Id.) She was to perform only light duty, lifting and carrying one 

to three pounds and pushing and pulling ten to twenty pounds with no repetitive 

overhead activity. (Id.) She was to continue physical therapy and take Percocet.

(Id.) On March 14, 2013, Dr. Greco noted that Plaintiffs “guards” her shoulder 

and instructed that she was to continue current work restrictions. (Tr. at 270). 

On April 24, 2013, Dr. Greco’s office examined Plaintiff and completed a 

functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”). (Tr. at 324.) The FCE recommended that 

she could perform a job at the medium level of exertion with the following 

additional limitations: “exerting 20 to 50 pounds of force occasionally, or 10 to 25 

pounds of force frequently, or greater than negligible up to 10 pounds of force

constantly to move an object.” (Id.) Plaintiff was also limited to lifting 45 pounds 

from the floor to waist, 45 pounds from waist to waist, and 35 pounds from waist to 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 14 of 23
15

eye level, carrying 50 pounds for 50 feet, and pushing or pulling 90 pounds. (Id.) 

She was able to frequently stand, walk, sit, bend, squat, reach overhead, grasp, and 

could constantly reach horizontally. (Tr. at 331).

Two days later, on April 26, 2013, Dr. Greco saw Plaintiff again. He noted 

Plaintiff was three months out from her decompression and joint resection surgery 

and had much better motion and had definitely improved. (Tr. at 269). He 

prescribed her “one last” prescription for Percocet and released her from his care 

with the modified duty described in the FCE that was completed two days prior. 

(Id.) He noted that she was still battling issues with her neck and he would see her 

again if need be. (Id.)

Based on the aforementioned medical records, Plaintiff contends that she 

had one continuous disabling event that began in June 2011 and continues up 

through the date of the ALJ’s decision denying benefits in 2014. Thus, according to 

Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in finding that the record did not contain any one period of 

disability for a consecutive twelve months. 

The definition of disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” See 42 U.S.C.

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 15 of 23
16

§ 423(d)(1)(A). “To meet this definition, [a plaintiff] must have a severe 

impairment(s) that makes [her] unable to do [her] past relevant work . . . or any 

other substantial gainful work [i.e., SGA] that exists in the national economy.” See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). SGA means work that “involves doing significant and 

productive physical or mental duties; and is done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1510.

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s first injury—to her neck—occurred on June 

4, 2011, but Plaintiff returned to her past light-to-medium-exertional work as a 

produce manager on October 4, 2011, and continued to work nearly full time (34 

hours per week) with no restrictions through July 26, 2012, the date of her second 

work-related injury, this time to her shoulder. (Tr. at 133, 136, 142-42, 148-49).

While Plaintiff would have had significant limitations on her ability to work from 

June 4, 2011, through October 4, 2011, that was only a four-month period of time 

before she returned to her past work. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s 

finding that her work from October 2011 through July 2012 constituted SGA as 

evidenced by her earnings record showing earnings of $25,217.17 in 2011 and 

$18,160.45 in 2012. “As a matter of law,” a person who is otherwise disabled 

ceases to be disabled when she engages in SGA. Powell v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1572, 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 16 of 23
17

1576 (11th Cir. 1985).Thus, Plaintiff was not disabled from October 2011 through at 

least July 2012.

As also noted, Plaintiff stopped working again after she was injured a second 

time—this time to her shoulder—on July 26, 2012. Even if she could show that her 

second injury rendered her disabled beginning on her last day of work in July 2012, 

she cannot show that she was disabled at any time after April 26, 2013, when Dr. 

Greco released her from his care, opining that she could return to medium work 

with the permanent modified duties enumerated in the FCE. (Tr. at 269). Dr. 

Greco’s treatment notes constitute substantial evidence in the record for the ALJ 

to find that Plaintiff was not disabled after April 26, 2013.

July 2012 to April 2013 is also less than one year. The regulations provide 

that where unrelated severe impairments develop sequentially, one following the 

other or with some overlap, at least one impairment alone must meet the twelvemonth duration requirement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a) and SSR 

82-52. Two unrelated impairments cannot be combined to meet the duration 

requirement. See id. Plaintiff’s treating orthopedist, Dr. Greco, opined on multiple 

occasions that Plaintiff had two separate issues with the shoulder being separate 

from the neck. (Tr. at 274, 272, 271). Although Dr. Hash described the July 2012 

injury as an exacerbation of her first neck injury, this impression was an initial one

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 17 of 23
18

done before testing. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the 

ALJ’s finding that because Plaintiff had two separate impairments and neither one 

met the twelve-month durational requirement, the record did not show a period of 

disability for twelve consecutive months.

B. Subjective Complaints of Pain 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the severity of her 

impairments because he relied on the FCE without considering (1) Dr. Greco’s 

statement at their last visit on April 26, 2013, that she continued to have neck 

issues or (2) her own subjective complaints of pain.

A claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms will support a 

finding of disability if it is supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain 

standard and is not discredited by the ALJ. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 

(11th Cir. 1995). To satisfy the pain standard, a claimant must show “evidence of 

an underlying medical condition, and either (1) objective medical evidence to 

confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (2) that the 

objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that it can reasonably be 

expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Id. at 1560; see also Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 

F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Once the pain standard is satisfied, the ALJ must 

consider a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms. Foote, 67 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 18 of 23
19

F.3d at 1560; see also Minter v. Astrue, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2010) 

(finding that “if a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part 

pain standard, he must be found disabled unless that testimony is properly 

discredited”). If the ALJ discredits the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and 

other symptoms, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. 

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-

7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must carefully consider the 

individual’s statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in 

the case record in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s 

statements.”). “Although [the Eleventh Circuit] does not require an explicit 

finding as to credibility, . . . the implication must be obvious to the reviewing 

court.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). The ALJ is not 

required to cite “particular phrases or formulations” in his credibility 

determination, but it cannot be a broad rejection that is insufficient to enable this 

Court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a 

whole. Id. 

In this case, the ALJ cited the relevant regulations, considered Plaintiff’s 

allegations in relation to the other evidence, and articulated reasons for finding her

allegations not totally credible, which shows that he properly applied the Eleventh 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 19 of 23
20

Circuit pain standard. (Tr. at 13-14). The ALJ found that while Plaintiff had 

“medically determinable impairments [which] could reasonably be expected to 

cause the alleged symptoms . . . [her] statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence [sic] and limiting effects of these symptoms” were not credible. (Tr. at 

14).

Plaintiff emphasizes that at her hearing she testified that she experiences 

chronic constant pain, an eight out of ten in severity, and completely disabling pain 

three to five days per week. (Tr. at 36-37.) She says that on the days she 

experiences disabling pain, it limits her to 15-20 minutes of activity at a time, after 

which she can sit comfortably for 15-20 minutes at a time. (Tr. at 37, 40-42). 

Further, she claims that after several surgeries, epidural steroid shots, physical 

therapy, and current use of Norco and Percocet, her pain is not relieved. (Tr. at 

46). Plaintiff contends that her increased pain levels resulting from a return to work 

after surgery support her subjective complaints of pain. 

While Plaintiff relies on her testimony and complaints, the work history and 

medical evidence do not support her allegations. As noted by the ALJ, despite 

complaints of disabling limitations, Plaintiff was able to work for nine months from 

October 2011 through July 2012. (Tr. at 133, 136, 142-43, 148-49). Although she 

argues that her pain worsened when she began working again, her physicians 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 20 of 23
21

repeatedly cleared her for work with various levels of modified duties. Further, 

nine months after Plaintiff’s July 2012 injury and three months after surgery, her 

orthopedist, Dr. Greco, noted that she had much better motion and had definitely 

improved, and he released her from his care with permanent modified duties for 

medium work. (Tr. at 269).

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred because he relied on the FCE without 

considering Dr. Greco’s assessment on their last visit in the record that she 

continued to have neck issues. However, Dr. Greco himself relied upon the results 

of the FCE, noting she had modified work duty “as per her FCE restrictions 

permanent.” (Id.) In any event, the ALJ actually limited Plaintiff to more 

restrictions than the FCE provided. The ALJ limited her to the performance of no 

more than light work, which requires lifting no more than 20 pounds with only 

occasional overhead lifting, while the FCE allowed for medium work, lifting 

between 35 and 45 pounds and frequent overhead reaching. Additionally, Dr. 

Greco’s observation about her continuing neck issues does not undermine his 

overall opinion that she had improved greatly, that he could release her from his 

care, and that she could perform medium work with additional restrictions. (Id.) 

The ALJ also noted that additional evidence raises questions about 

Plaintiff’s credibility. Plaintiff provided conflicting information to her doctors. On 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 21 of 23
22

August 31, 2011, several weeks after her neck surgery, Plaintiff reported to Dr. 

Ghavam that she was doing well with good relief of right upper extremity pain. (Tr. 

at 208). Yet, a year later, on August 22, 2012, Plaintiff told Dr. Hash that her pain 

had never improved after her prior 2011 surgery. (Tr. at 233). She also reported to 

Dr. Hash that she had continued to work with no restrictions since the June 4, 

2011, neck incident, which was not true. (Tr. at 226.) Additionally, when Dr. 

Ghavam was treating her for her neck injury, she complained of “diffuse pain right 

arm with parathesia, weakness, and numbness” post-surgery. (Tr. at 204). 

However, at her visit with Dr. Hash in November 2012, Plaintiff denied having had 

any problems with her shoulder prior to her July 26, 2012 work injury. (Tr. at 276). 

Plaintiff also did not cease smoking as advised by her doctors, did not use the bone 

growth stimulator prescribed by Dr. Hash, was discharged from another doctor’s 

care for violating a narcotics contract, and actively resisted exercising during 

physical therapy which slowed her progress considerably. (Tr. at 206, 233, 302-

320.) These instances of noncompliance indicate that Plaintiff’s pain was not as 

debilitating as she alleges. The ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by 

substantial evidence.

Upon review of the record and consideration of the ALJ’s decision with 

respect to Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ articulated “explicit and adequate 

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 22 of 23
23

reasons” for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225. Those 

reasons are supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Plaintiff’s 

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be 

entered.

DONE and ORDERED on March 17, 2017.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

160704

Case 3:15-cv-01782-LSC Document 15 Filed 03/17/17 Page 23 of 23