Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01211/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ADAMS,

CDCR #F-92755,

Civil No. 10cv1211 MMA (POR)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) &

1915A(b); and

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

COURT TO ISSUE SUMMONS

UPON DEFENDANTS AS MOOT

vs.

LARRY SMALL, et al.,

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 4, 2010, Paul Adams (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at

Ironwood State Prison located in Blythe, California, and proceeding pro se, submitted a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

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On June 28, 2010, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

and dismissing his Complaint for failing to state a claim. See June 28, 2010 Order at 5-6.

Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. Plaintiff then sought, and received, several

extensions of time to file his Amended Complaint. On December 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed his First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In addition Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for Court to Issue

Summons Upon Defendants in the Case” [Doc. No. 13].

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints filed by prisoners against officers

or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or any portion of those found frivolous,

malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief

from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

/ / /

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“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may nevertheless not “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

A. Constitutional Claims

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

B. Rule 8

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. 

 Specifically, Rule 8 provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it must contain

“a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(1) & (2).

Plaintiff appears to have filed two separate First Amended Complaints and many of his

allegations are incomprehensible. If Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, he must

comply with Rule 8. He is further cautioned that he must also comply with Local Rule 8.2

which provides, in part, that prisoners must use the Court’s form complaints and any additional

pages are “not to exceed fifteen (15) in number.” S.D. CIVLR 8.2.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated

when he was classified as a prison gang member and lost privileges and good time credits as a

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result. As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are premature

under the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Constitutional

claims involving a prison’s disciplinary or administrative decisions to revoke good-time credits

are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever the claim for damages depends

on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the sentence currently being served

is unconstitutionally long. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486-87; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully classified as a gang member and lost good time

credits as a result. See FAC at 9. In order to state a claim for damages under section 1983 based

on these allegations under Heck and Edwards, however, Plaintiff must allege facts in his First

Amended Complaint sufficient to show that Defendants’ decision to remove his credits has

already been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas

corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff has failed to do so; therefore, he must sufficiently

amend his Complaint to provide such a showing before any cause of action for damages accrues

under the Civil Rights Act. Id.

Plaintiff also alleges that his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary

hearing which led to the loss of good time credits and time spent in Administrative Segregation

(“Ad-Seg”). Even if Plaintiff were able to overcome the Heck bar, he has failed to state a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process apply

only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and

prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process

protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has

significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes

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an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.

at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his placement in Ad-Seg which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that

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if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed”

in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not

re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend

and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Issue Summons Upon Defendants in the Case [Doc.

No. 13] is DENIED as moot in light of the Court’s dismissal of the action.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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