Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00906/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00906-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE MICHAEL DEMKO, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15cv906-LAB(BLM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

ECF Nos. 13 & 17 

Plaintiff Lawrence Michael Demko brought this action for judicial review of the Social 

Security Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits. 

ECF Nos. 1 and 13-1 at 4. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 

No. 13-1 (“Pl.’s Mot.”)], and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition 

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17-1 “Def.’s Mot.” & 18 “Def.’s Opp’n”)1. 

                                                                

1 Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment appear on the docket as two documents, numbers 17 & 18. However, the 

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Plaintiff did not file a reply to Defendant’s opposition or an opposition to Defendant’s cross 

motion for summary judgment. See Docket. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Alan 

Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth below, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On September 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability and disability 

insurance benefits alleging disability beginning on July 17, 2012. See Administrative Record 

(“AR”) at 20. The claims were denied initially on March 22, 2013, and upon reconsideration on 

June 20, 2013, resulting in Plaintiff’s request for an administrative hearing on July 11, 2013. Id. 

On August 22, 2014, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jesse 

J. Pease. Id. at 20, 32. Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert (Troy L. Scott) testified at 

the hearing. Id. at 20. In a written decision dated November 18, 2014, ALJ Pease determined 

that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. Id. 

at 32. Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. Id. at 1. In a letter dated February 

23, 2015, the Appeals Council found no basis for reviewing the ALJ’s ruling, and the ALJ’s 

decision therefore became the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. 

 On April 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review by the federal 

                                                                

content of the documents is the same. For clarity, the Court will refer to Defendant’s crossmotion and opposition as one document, namely, “Def.’s Mot.” 

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district court. See ECF No. 1. On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment alleging that the ALJ failed “to assign proper weight to Plaintiff’s treating source 

opinions contained in the record.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Defendant filed a timely cross-motion for 

summary judgment asserting that the “ALJ properly considered the medical evidence of record.” 

Def.’s Mot. at 3. 

ALJ’s DECISION 

On November 18, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he determined that 

Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. AR at 20-32. Initially, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time 

period (since July 17, 2012). Id. at 22. He then considered all of Plaintiff’s medical impairments 

and determined that the following impairments were “severe” as defined in the Regulations: 

“cognitive disorder, not otherwise specified; chronic lumbar strain and sprain; history of bilateral 

knee injuries with minimal degenerative changes; and status-post left forearm fracture with 

fracture of the radius, status-post surgical repairs (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” Id. At step three, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments or combination of impairments 

did not meet or medically equal the listed impairments. Id. at 23. In reaching this decision, the 

ALJ noted that 

No treating physician has identified findings equivalent in severity to the criteria 

of any listed impairment, nor does the evidence show medical findings that are 

the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment 

Id. at 23-24. At step four, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s severe impairments and determined 

that his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) permitted him “to perform light work as defined in 

20 CFR 404.1567(b)” which specifically means that Plaintiff “can lift 10 pounds frequently and 

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20 pounds occasionally and the claimant can stand and/or walk for six hours of an eight-hour 

period and can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour period. Postural activities are limited to an 

occasional basis, but no ladders, ropes, scaffolds, hazardous machinery, or unprotected heights. 

The work must be noncomplex.” Id. at 25. In reaching this decision, the ALJ found that the 

“objective findings, treatment records, consultative examinations and State Agency consultants’ 

opinions, support a finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled.” Id. at 31. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is 

limited in that a denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and contains no legal error. Id.; see also Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a 

preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). It is 

“relevant evidence that, considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v. 

Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “In determining whether the [ALJ’s] findings 

are supported by substantial evidence, [the court] must review the administrative record as a 

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] 

conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Where 

the evidence can reasonably be construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the 

court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. This includes deferring to 

the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d 

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at 509. 

 Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, 

the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in 

weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Section 

405(g) permits a court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s 

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social 

Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to include in the RFC determination physical 

and mental limitations identified by Plaintiff’s treating physicians. Pl.’s Mot. at 7. Plaintiff 

explains that the ALJ failed to “provide clear and convincing reasons for preferring the opinions 

of one time examiners and non-examiners over treating and specialist opinions.” Id. at 16. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ was required to give greater weight to the Veterans 

Administration’s (“VA”) determination of disability for Plaintiff. Id. at 21. Finally, Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ erred by not considering Plaintiff’s “stellar work history.” Id. at 23. 

 Defendant contends that the ALJ properly considered evidence of Plaintiff’s physical and 

mental impairments. Def.’s Mot. at 4-5. Defendant further contends that the ALJ properly 

considered evidence of Plaintiff’s VA disability rating “because the evidence before the agency 

contradicted the grounds upon which the VA based its disability rating.” Id. at 7. Finally, 

Defendant notes that the ALJ was under no obligation to discuss Plaintiff’s work history. Id. at 

8. 

/// 

/// 

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A. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Reject the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating Doctors. 

Plaintiff argues that his treating physicians identified physical and mental limitations, 

which the ALJ improperly failed to include in the RFC determination. Pl.’s Mot. at 7-15. 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Cara Eggers, a clinical psychologist at the Veteran’s 

Administration, identified several significant mental deficits, which Plaintiff argues are supported 

by medical records and neuropsychological testing, and that the ALJ improperly rejected these 

deficits when he adopted the unsupported findings of Dr. Ted Shore, a consultative examiner 

and licensed psychologist. Id. at 7-11, 17-18. Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Donald Pellioni, a 

physiatrist,2 and Dr. Rebecca Kim, identified a number of physical limitations that the ALJ 

improperly discounted or rejected and failed to include in the RFC. Id. at 11-15, 18-20. 

1. Relevant Law 

The opinion of a treating doctor generally should be given more weight than opinions of 

doctors who do not treat the claimant. See Turner v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 613 F. 3d 1217, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the treating 

doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for "clear and 

convincing" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. (citing Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830-31). Even when the treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by the opinion of another 

doctor, the ALJ may properly reject the treating doctor's opinion only by providing "specific and 

legitimate reasons" supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. Id. (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). This can be done by "setting out a detailed and thorough summary 

                                                                

2 A physiatrist is a medical doctor who has completed training in the specialty of physical 

medicine and rehabilitation. See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physiatrist/.

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of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating [his] interpretation thereof, and making 

findings." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). "The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. 

He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are 

correct." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 

418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by itself 

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining 

physician or a treating physician; such an opinion may serve as substantial evidence only when 

it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in the record.” Townsend v. 

Colvin, 2013 WL 4501476, *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31) 

(citing Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600). 

2. Mental Health Medical History 

Plaintiff was referred for a neuropsychological evaluation in April 2011 by Dr. Lasker due 

to Plaintiff’s reporting of cognitive problems and his history of head injury. Id. at 438. The 

doctor, clinical psychologist J. Vincent Filoteo, administered a wide variety of tests during the 

examination, the results of which were consistent with a diagnosis of “Cognitive Disorder NOS, 

mild characterized by mild executive dysfunction, naming problems, and slowed processing 

speed.” Id. at 440-444. Dr. Filoteo recommended a neurological evaluation with an MRI and 

referral to the Mental Health Clinic in light of Plaintiff’s scoring which indicated a moderate level 

of depressive symptoms. Id. at 443. Dr. Filoteo further recommended that Plaintiff “only 

attempt one task at a time and that he allow extra time to complete tasks.” Id. Dr. Filoteo 

opined that Plaintiff could benefit from cognitive rehabilitation and repetition of verbal material. 

Id. 

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Dr. Cara Z. Eggers, a clinical psychologist, examined Plaintiff on February 28, 2012 as 

part of a disability evaluation for the VA. Id. at 360-69. At the time, Plaintiff had been diagnosed 

with dementia due to head trauma and insomnia in the Axis I category and was “10% serviceconnected for Brain Syndrome.” Id. at 362-363. Dr. Eggers reviewed Plaintiff’s “C-file” and 

interviewed Plaintiff, but apparently did not perform any psychiatric or psychological tests. See 

Id. at 366, 360-69. Dr. Eggers opined that Plaintiff suffered from occupational and social 

impairment “with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, 

thinking and/or mood.” Id. at 365. She noted that Plaintiff’s dementia “impairs him severely in 

all areas. His insomnia exacerbates the dementia and makes it more difficult, sometimes 

impossible, for him to perform work and social tasks.” Id. Dr. Eggers further noted that despite 

being able to work full time, Plaintiff is unable to perform to the standards of his employer, has 

little hope of advancing or increasing his earnings, and has difficulty remembering what to do 

when he is fatigued. Id. She concluded that Plaintiff cannot work when his insomnia is active. 

Id. at 366. She also found that Plaintiff suffered from (1) chronic sleep impairment, (2) mild 

memory loss, (3) impairment of short and long term memory, (4) memory loss for names of 

close relatives, own occupation, or own name, (5) speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or 

irrelevant, (6) difficulty in understanding complex commands, (7) impaired abstract thinking, (8) 

gross impairment in thought processes or communication, (9) difficulty in establishing and 

maintaining effective work and social relationships, and (10) impaired impulse control. Id. at 

367-368. Dr. Eggers assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 50. Id. at 363. Dr. Eggers concluded her 

report by noting that Plaintiff is extremely close to being totally impaired and that the only 

reason she is not finding that to be the case now is because he is currently working a job, 

although she opined that he is not meeting his employer’s expectations and has received 

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numerous exceptions due to his Veteran status. Id. at 369. The record does not contain 

evidence that Dr. Eggers provided on-going treatment to Plaintiff or examined him on any other 

occasion. 

Dr. Ted Shore completed a Complete Psychological Evaluation of Plaintiff on January 16, 

2013 at the request of the Department of Social Services Disability & Adult Programs Division. 

Id. at 325. As part of the evaluation, Dr. Shore administered the following tests: Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale Fourth Edition, Wechsler Memory Scale Fourth Edition, and the Bender VisualMotor Gestalt Test – Second Edition. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale showed that 

Plaintiff‘s overall intellectual ability was within the average/high average range, the Wechsler 

Memory Scale showed that Plaintiff’s memory fell within the superior/high average range, and 

the Bender Visual- Motor Gestalt Test showed a high range or performance in the copy phase 

and that Plaintiff’s recall is in the average range which suggests an intact visual memory. Id. at 

327-329. Dr. Shore noted that Plaintiff reported that he is able to take care of his personal 

hygiene, perform chores, shop, complete errands, drive, manage funds, wash dishes, vacuum, 

clean laundry, shop, sweep, cook, perform yard work, and dress and care for his children. Id. 

at 326. He found that Plaintiff had average or higher intelligence, an organized thought process, 

and good remote memory. Id. at 327. Dr. Shore concluded that Plaintiff has no functional 

limitations and that he has the intellectual/emotional capacity to function effectively in a work 

setting and perform routine and complex work. Id. at 329-330. Dr. Shore noted that Plaintiff 

appears to get along well with others and has no difficulty relating to coworkers, supervisors 

and the public. Id. 

Non-examining doctor J. Flocks reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and completed a 

Disability Determination Explanation for Plaintiff. Id. at 87-99. On March 22, 2013, Dr. Flocks 

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concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and that despite some limitations, Plaintiff was not 

prevented from performing his past relevant work (“PRW”). Id. at 98-99. Dr. Flocks found that 

the “report of Dr. Eggers is at odds with every other AMS opinion in the records and the clinical 

data. I must reject the diagnosis of dementia as incorrect.” Id. at 93-95, 107-108. He further 

stated that the VA used a very unreliable test (the Beck Inventory) for finding Plaintiff to have 

mild depression and noted that the test results can fluctuate by twenty points in a single day in 

the same patient. Id. at 95, 108. Dr. Flocks concluded that there may be a mild depression 

present, but that the claim was non-severe. Id. 

On June 18, 2013, K.P. Morris, PsyD reviewed Plaintiff’s case and found that the evidence 

was consistent with non-severe impairment and adopted Dr. Flocks’s findings. Id. at 108. 

Doctor Morris agreed that Plaintiff’s organic mental disorders and affective disorders lead to a 

mild restriction of activities in daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social function, 

concentration, persistence, or pace, and no repeated episodes of decompensation. Id. at 109. 

 3. Analysis 

 Initially, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s broad statement that the ALJ improperly 

“reject[ed] every treating opinion in the records (including specialist opinions) in determining 

his RFC” [see Pl.’s Mot at 16] is unsupported. The ALJ considered Dr. Filoteo’s findings that 

Plaintiff experienced “mild executive dysfunction, naming problems, and slowed process speed” 

and gave “some weight to Dr. Filoteo’s opinion that [Plaintiff] may benefit from repetition of 

verbal material.” Id. at 29. This weight was reflected in the ALJ’s RFC analysis limiting Plaintiff 

to noncomplex tasks. Id. at 25, 29. Accordingly, the ALJ incorporated some of Dr. Filoteo’s 

opinions and Plaintiff does not specifically argue that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Filoteo’s 

opinions or that the limitation to noncomplex tasks is insufficient to account for Dr. Filoteo’s 

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recommendations. See Pl.’s Mot. 

 Secondly, the Court finds that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Eggers’ opinion. Dr. Eggers’ 

opinion was contradicted by Drs. Shore, Flocks, Morris, and Filoteo. Id. at 360-369, 325-329. 

Dr. Eggers concluded that Plaintiff was close to totally impaired and was only able to work in his 

then current position because he was receiving numerous exceptions due to his Veteran status 

and that even with those exceptions, he was still failing to meet expectations. Id. at 369. Dr. 

Shore, however, opined that Plaintiff had no functional limitations and had the capacity to 

function effectively in a work setting performing routine and complex work. Id. at 329-330. 

Drs. Flocks and Morris concluded that any mental limitations of Plaintiff were non-severe. Id. at 

109. Similarly, although made at an earlier time, Dr. Filoteo found that Plaintiff had mild mental 

impairments. Id. at 440-44. Because Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Eggers, was contradicted 

by other doctors, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record for rejecting her opinion. Turner, 613 F. 3d at 1222 (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). The ALJ has done just that. 

 The ALJ states that he gave “little weight” to Dr. Eggers’ opinions that Plaintiff’s dementia 

was “extremely impairing,” limited the type of work he could perform, and that because Plaintiff 

was still working, she did not find he had “total occupational and social impairment.” AR at 29. 

In support, the ALJ states that Dr. Eggers’ opinions were vague, failed to provide a function-byfunction assessment of Plaintiff’s abilities, and were inconsistent with the neuropsychological 

and objective test results performed during the psychological consultative examination. Id. at 

29-30. The ALJ specifically cites to the April 21, 2011 neuropsychology consult with Dr. Filoteo 

and the January 16, 2013 complete psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Shore. Id. at 30, 

325-330, and 438-444. 

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 Vagueness and the failure to provide a function-by-function assessment of Plaintiff are 

not specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Eggers’ opinions. Dr. Eggers’ medical 

records are not vague as they (1) address Plaintiff’s previous diagnosis of dementia and insomnia 

and provide commentary on those conditions with respect to Plaintiff, (2) indicate that Dr. Eggers 

reviewed Plaintiff’s C-file for medical evidence of his conditions, (3) provide a patient history, 

(4) identify Plaintiff’s symptoms, (5) discuss Plaintiff’s financial competency, and (6) include Dr. 

Eggers’ conclusions. Id. 360-369. In addition, “[t]here is no requirement in the regulations or 

Social Security Rulings that a medical source opinion must provide a “function by function” 

analysis, nor does the lack of such an analysis provide a proper basis for an opinion's outright 

rejection.” Farris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2012 WL 1552634, at *13 (S.D. Ohio April 30, 

2012) (citing Rivers v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1160259, at *15–16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2009) (holding 

that medical sources are not required to provide detailed function by function RFCs but otherwise 

upholding the ALJs decision because “the ALJ thoroughly considered both medical and nonmedical evidence.”); Phillips v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1246342, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014) (stating 

that “the ALJ rejected Dr. Meshi's opinion for the sole reasons that the opinion failed to ‘offer 

specific function-by-function limitations as to the type of stress that [Plaintiff] must avoid.’ (AR 

at 31.) This, however, is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the consultative examiner's 

opinion”) (citing Farris, 2012 WL 1552634, at *13 and Garrison v. Astrue, 2011 WL 813832, at 

*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan.25, 2011)). Accordingly, the Court does not find that the alleged vagueness 

of Dr. Eggers’ opinion or the lack of a function-by-function analysis are appropriate reasons for 

the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Eggers’ opinions. 

 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Eggers’ opinions because they were inconsistent with the 

neuropsychological and objective test results performed during the psychological consultative 

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examination. Id. at 30. This is a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Eggers’ opinions. 

The test results that the ALJ refers to in support of his finding appear in the medical records of 

Dr. Shore who had the opportunity to evaluate Plaintiff and conduct objective testing in January 

2013, almost a year after Dr. Eggers’ evaluation of Plaintiff. Id. at 30. As explained above, Dr. 

Shore administered a series of objective tests to Plaintiff, the results of which lead Dr. Shore to 

conclude that Plaintiff has no functional limitations and that he has the intellectual/emotional 

capacity to function effectively in a work setting and perform routine and complex work. Id. at 

325-331. The tests included a standardized intelligence test for adults (Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale), a memory test (Wechsler Memory Scale), and a screen for organic 

impairment (Bender Visual-Motor Gestalkt Test). Id. While it does not appear that Dr. Eggers 

performed any objective tests, the tests performed by Dr. Shore were clearly independent of 

any such tests that may have been performed by Dr. Eggers. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[w]here the opinion of the claimant's treating physician 

is contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings 

that differ from those of the treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself 

be substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict”) (citing 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). 

 Dr. Shore also conducted a psychological examination of Plaintiff which showed that 

Plaintiff’s current level of functioning included the ability to care for himself, drive, manage 

funds, care for his home, and care for his children. Id. at 326. Plaintiff was also able to 

immediately recall 3/3 objects and 2/3 objects after a few minutes, recall eight digits forward 

and six digits backwards, had normal speech, intact abstract thinking, and an appropriate mood. 

Id. at 327. The ALJ relies in part on the finding of Dr. Shore in reaching his conclusions because 

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Dr. Shore had the opportunity to evaluate Plaintiff and conduct objective testing. Id. at 30. The 

ALJ also gave some weight to the medical assessments conducted by State Agency medical 

consultants Flocks and Morris who, like Dr. Shore, found that based on the psychiatric testing, 

Plaintiff has no mental limitations. Id. at 30. The ALJ noted that the consultants “had the 

benefit of reviewing the record” and were “familiar with the requirements for determining 

disability pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Social Security Act, and their findings are 

consistent with the lack of specialized treatment.” Id. 

 The ALJ did not give any weight to the Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score 

of 50 that Dr. Eggers assigned to Plaintiff [see id. at 363, 487 (same)]. Id. at 3. In support of 

his position, the ALJ stated that the assessment “appears to be based primarily on the [Plaintiff’s] 

subjective complaints, which has been determined to be not fully credible3 and is not supported 

by the totality of the medical evidence, lack of mental health treatment, or the objective 

psychiatric testing.” Id. at 30. The ALJ has provided a specific and legitimate reasons for 

rejecting Dr. Eggers’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s GAF score. 

The GAF Scale provides a measure for an individual's overall level of psychological, social, 

and occupational functioning. Vanbibber v. Carolyn, 2014 WL 29665, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 

3, 2014) (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32–

34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score of “41–50 indicates ‘serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, 

severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, 

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).’” Michaels v. Colvin, 

2014 WL 37744, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (quoting American Psychiatric Association, 

                                                                

3 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility determination. See Plf.’s Mot. 

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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed.)); see also AR at 30. The 

totality of the medical evidence and objective psychiatric testing supports the ALJ’s position and 

does not support a GAF score of fifty. First, at the time of Dr. Eggers’ opinion, Plaintiff was 

working a job full-time. Id. at 365, 369. While, Dr. Eggers reported (based on Plaintiff’s 

representations) that Plaintiff was “just hanging on” to his job and was failing to meet his 

employer’s standards, the fact that he was holding a full-time job at the time detracts from the 

idea that Plaintiff was seriously impaired occupationally and unable to keep a job. Id. at 369. 

Second, the record does not indicate that Plaintiff has ever been suicidal, suffered from severe 

obsessional rituals or frequently shoplifted. See Id. at 367 (report of Dr. Eggers leaving boxes 

for depressed mood, anxiety, and near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to 

function unchecked when identifying Plaintiff’s symptoms); see also 326 (report of Dr. Shore 

noting that Plaintiff denied a history of mental illness and a history of receiving mental health 

services); 108 (report of Dr. Flocks noting that there may be a mild depression present, but that 

it was non-severe). Third, Dr. Eggers did not provide any support or justification for her 

designation of fifty. Id. at 363 (comment section left blank). Finally, as noted above, Dr. Eggers 

apparently did not perform any tests or evaluations, other than interviewing Plaintiff, to reach 

her diagnosis. Id. at 360-69. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ has provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Eggers, Plaintiff’s treating 

physician. The ALJ found that Dr. Eggers’ opinions were inconsistent with the neuropsychological 

and objective test results performed during the psychological consultative examination and that 

GAF score assessment was based primarily on subjective complaints and was not supported by 

the totality of the medical evidence or the objective psychiatric testing. Accordingly, the Court 

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RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue be DENIED. 

 4. Physical Health Medical History 

 Dr. Donald J. Pellioni examined Plaintiff on March 23, 2012 as part of a disability 

evaluation for the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”). Id. at 338-359. Dr. Pellioni noted 

that Plaintiff was diagnosed with a left wrist condition in 1984 due to a fracture that Plaintiff 

sustained when he survived a plane crash. Id. at 340. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Pellioni that he 

has continued to experience weakness and limitations such as less strength and less stability 

with the left wrist since the crash. Id. Dr. Pellioni measured Plaintiff’s range of motion in both 

wrists and found that Plaintiff did have a functional loss and/or impairment of the left wrist 

resulting in (1) less movement than normal, (2) weakened movement, (3) pain on movement, 

and (4) localized tenderness or pain or palpation of joints/soft tissue. Id. at 340-344. Muscle 

strength testing revealed that Plaintiff did have normal strength (5/5) with his wrist flexion and 

wrist extension. Id. at 344. Other test performed showed that there is no degenerative or 

traumatic arthritis. Id. at 347. Dr. Pellioni concluded that Plaintiff’s wrist condition impacts his 

ability to work as he will need to “use the right arm as an assist whenever he is using his left 

arm” which will reduce his work speed. Id. 

Dr. Pellioni also examined Plaintiff’s left knee which was also injured in the plane crash. 

Id. at 348. Plaintiff reported that his knee is painful, unreliable and occasionally gives out when 

he climbs ladders, stairs, or inclines. Id. Dr. Pellioni conducted a range of motion test and 

found that Plaintiff’s left knee flexion was normal at 140 degrees, but that objective evidence of 

painful motion began at 130 degrees. Id. at 350. There was no objective evidence of pain for 

the left knee extension tests. Id. at 350-351. Dr. Pellioni found that Plaintiff did have a 

functional loss and/or impairment of the left knee resulting in (1) pain on movement, (2) 

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occasional giving away of the knee, and (3) tenderness or pain or palpation of joints/soft tissue. 

Id. at 352-353. Muscle strength testing revealed that Plaintiff did have normal strength (5/5) 

with his knee flexion and knee extension. Id. at 354. Plaintiff also had normal anterior instability, 

posterior instability, and medial-lateral instability. Id. Dr. Pellioni noted that Plaintiff regularly 

wears a knee brace and concluded that he has “left knee degenerative joint disease associated 

with residuals, injury, left knee instability” and arthritis in the left knee. Id. at 358-359. Dr. 

Pellioni concluded that Plaintiff’s knee condition impacts his ability to work as his knee will give 

out occasionally going up and down ladders, stairs, or inclines and Plaintiff will move more slowly 

than his co-workers. Id. at 359. 

 Dr. Thomas J. Sabourin performed an Orthopedic Consultation on Plaintiff on January 3, 

2013, at the request of the Department of Social Services Disability & Adult Programs Division. 

Id. at 315. Dr. Sabourin noted that during the exam, Plaintiff did not use any assistive devices, 

was able to sit comfortably, rose from his chair without difficulty, and got on and off the 

examination table without difficulty. Id. at 316. Dr. Sabourin conducted a physical examination, 

orthopedic examination, and neurological examination and found the results were mostly 

normal, with some mild limitations. Id. at 316-18. Dr. Sabourin’s final impressions were “chronic 

lumbar strain and sprain,” “history of bilateral knee injuries with minimal degenerative changes 

commensurate with his age,” and “status post left forearm fracture with fracture of radius status 

post open reduction and internal fixation and removal of metallic devices.” Id. at 318. Dr. 

Sabourin found no ACL instability, questioned whether Plaintiff actually ever had an ACL 

problem, found Plaintiff’s forearm and back were satisfactory, and concluded that Plaintiff can 

lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally, twenty five pounds frequently, stand, walk, and sit for 

six hours in an eight hour work day, and climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch frequently with no 

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manipulative limitations and no need for canes or other devices. Id. at 319. Plaintiff’s push and 

pull limitations match his lift and carry limitations. Id. 

Non-examining Doctors J. Flocks and J. Hartman reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and 

completed Disability Determination Explanations for Plaintiff. Id. at 87-99 and 101-114. On 

March 22, 2013, Dr. Flocks concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and that despite some 

limitations, Plaintiff was not prevented from performing his PRW. Id. at 98-99. Dr. Flocks found 

that Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations and that 

Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry fifty pounds, frequently lift and/or carry twenty five 

pounds, stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight hour work day, and was unlimited in his 

push/pull ability. Id. at 96-97. Plaintiff’s postural limitations left him able to frequently climb 

ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. On June 20, 

2013, Dr. Hartman also concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and could perform PRW as a 

maintenance engineer. Id. at 112-113. Dr. Hartman found that Plaintiff had the same RFC as 

Dr. Flocks.4

 On September 15, 2014, treating physician Rebecca G. Kim completed a medical opinion 

form regarding Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities (physical). Id. at 651-652. Dr. Kim 

found that Plaintiff (1) could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds 

frequently, (2) could stand, walk, and sit for less than two hours during an eight-hour workday, 

(3) could sit for ten minutes before changing position, (4) could stand for five minutes before 

                                                                

4 That is that Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations 

and that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry fifty pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 

twenty five pounds, stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight hour work day, was unlimited in 

his push/pull ability, and could frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. at 110-112.

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changing positions, (5) needed to walk around every thirty minutes for five minutes, (6) needed 

the opportunity to shift at will, and (7) would not need to lie down during an eight hour shift. 

Id. at 651. Dr. Kim reported that these limitations are based upon Plaintiff’s decreased range 

of motion in his lower back (limited by pain), his left wrist weakness, and the decreased dexterity 

in his left hand. Id. Dr. Kim checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff could occasionally twist, 

stoop (bend), and crouch but could never climb stairs (unless it was only a few stairs and with 

a railing) or ladders. Id. at 652. Dr. Kim stated that this was due to Plaintiff’s frequent lower 

back muscle spasms and decreased range of motion in his back and the decreased range of 

motion and strength of left upper extremity overhead. Id. Dr. Kim also concluded that Plaintiff’s 

ability to reach (including overhead) and finger (fine manipulation) were affected by his 

impairments. Id. She elaborated by noting that Plaintiff is unable to reach over his head with 

the left upper extremity and has poor dexterity as evidence by the weakness and decreased 

range of motion shown on Plaintiff’s physical exam. Id. Plaintiff’s left knee injury and chronic 

knee pain also resulted in limits on kneeling and crawling. Id. Dr. Kim stated that Plaintiff’s 

impairments would often interfere with the attention and concentration required to perform 

simple work-related tasks and cause Plaintiff to be absent from work more than four days a 

month. Id. 

 4. Analysis 

 The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Pellioni’s assessment because it was vague and did not 

provide a function-by-function assessment of Plaintiff’s capabilities. Id. at 28. The ALJ also 

gave “little weight” to Dr. Kim’s opinions because they were not supported by objective medical 

evidence and Dr. Kim’s treating relationship with Plaintiff was “quite brief.” Id. The ALJ gave 

“some weight” to the opinions of Dr. Sabourin and the medical consultants who found that 

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Plaintiff could “perform work at the medium exertional range” because Dr. Sabourin examined 

Plaintiff, the consultants are familiar with the SSA rules and regulations, and the “findings are 

consistent with the lack of specialized treatment.” Id. at 29. The ALJ concluded, however, that 

“after reviewing evidence not available to the aforementioned physicians5 as well as generously 

accommodating the [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints of pain, the undersigned adopted a light 

residual functional capacity with additional limitations that were best supported by the objective 

evidence.” Id. 

 As discussed above with regards to Dr. Eggers’ opinions, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 

decision to reject Dr. Pellioni’s opinions due to vagueness and the failure to provide a functionby-function assessment of Plaintiff’s functional abilities are not specific and legitimate reasons. 

See Farris, 2012 WL 1552634 at *13; Phillips, 2014 WL 1246342 at *4. While Dr. Pellioni failed 

to provide a function-by-function assessment of Plaintiff’s limitations, his medical records and 

opinions which (1) address Plaintiff’s previous diagnosis of a left wrist condition due to fracture 

and left knee condition, (2) include Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms and use of medication to 

control pain, (3) provide range of motion measurements for Plaintiff’s wrists and knees, (4) 

identify the functional loss, functional impairment, and additional limitations that exist due to 

the range of motion in Plaintiff’s wrists and knees, (5) provide results from Plaintiff’s muscle 

strength testing for his wrists and knees, (6) identify Plaintiff’s previous wrist surgery and the 

residual signs or symptoms due to the surgery, (7) show that no trauma or degenerative arthritis 

has been documented, (8) describe how Plaintiff’s wrist and knee conditions will impact his 

                                                                

5 The ALJ does not elaborate or explain what medical records were available to him that were 

not available to the doctors who examined or reviewed Plaintiff’s case and neither side mentions 

the ALJ’s comment in their briefing. 

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ability to work, and (9) note Plaintiff’s regular use of a knee brace are not vague. Id. at 339-

359. Accordingly, the Court does not find that the alleged vagueness of Dr. Pellioni’s opinion or 

the lack of a function-by-function analysis are appropriate reasons for the ALJ assigning little 

weight to Dr. Pellioni’s opinions. 

 In rejecting Dr. Pellioni’s opinion, the ALJ also notes that the Disability Benefits 

Questionnaire that was provided by Dr. Pellioni was completed in March 2012 while Plaintiff was 

still working. AR at 28. Plaintiff argues that this fails to take into consideration that fact that 

Dr. Eggers reported that Plaintiff was failing to meet the standards of his employer and was 

“just hanging on” to his job. Pl.’s Mot. at 19; see also AR at 369. Given that the Court has 

found that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Eggers’ opinions, and that Dr. Eggers’ comment was 

only based on Plaintiff’s self-reporting, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff was “just hanging 

on” to his job or that the ALJ erred by not relying on the veracity of that statement. The fact 

that Plaintiff was working when Dr. Pellioni completed the medical examination and issued his 

opinions is a specific and legitimate reason in support of the ALJ’s decision to assign “little 

weight” to Dr. Pellioni’s medical assessment.6 

                                                                

6 Despite assigning only “little weight” to Dr. Pellioni’s medical findings, the ALJ considered Dr. 

Pellioni’s findings in creating his RFC and many of the limitations indicated by Dr. Pellioni are 

addressed by the ALJ’s RFC assessment. Dr. Pellioni found that Plaintiff’s knee condition 

impacted his ability to work as his knee will give out occasionally going up and down ladders, 

stairs, or inclines and Plaintiff will move more slowly than his co-workers. Id. at 359. By limiting 

Plaintiff’s postural activities to an occasional basis (occurring from very little up to one-third of 

the time) and stating that Plaintiff should not be on ladders, ropes, scaffolds, hazardous 

machinery, or unprotected heights, the ALJ incorporated this limitation into Plaintiff’s RFC. Dr. 

Pellioni did not provide a function-by-function analysis of Plaintiff’s capabilities and did not 

discuss any limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to stand, walk or sit in a workday. While Dr. Pellioni 

noted that Plaintiff regularly wears a knee brace, he also noted that Plaintiff had normal strength 

with his knee flexion and knee extension and normal anterior instability, posterior instability, 

and medial-lateral instability (right and left knee). Id. at 354.

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 The ALJ’s decision to give “little weight” to Dr. Kim’s opinions because they were not 

supported by objective medical evidence and because Dr. Kim’s treating relationship with 

Plaintiff was “quite brief” are substantial and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Kim’s opinions. 

AR at 28. The ALJ found that the objective medical evidence did not support the “severe 

limitations assessed by Dr. Kim.” Id. In support, the ALJ identified the progress note from 

Plaintiff’s September 2014 visit with Dr. Kim where despite Plaintiff describing his pain level as 

an eight out of ten and suffering from episodes of loss of breath, Dr. Kim noted that Plaintiff (1) 

was “well-appearing, in no acute distress, alert, cooperative and pleasant,” (2) had a supple 

neck with full range of motion, and (3) had a muscle strength rating of five out of five in all 

extremities with sensation grossly intact. Id. at 688. The ALJ also cites to Dr. Pellioni’s March 

2012 examination where muscle strength testing showed that Plaintiff had normal strength (five 

out of five) in both his right and left knees for knee flexion and for knee extension. Id. at 28, 

352-354. Finally, the ALJ cites to Dr. Sabourin’s January 2013 orthopedic consultation with 

Plaintiff where Dr. Sabourin found that Plaintiff had chronic lumbar strain and sprain, but noted 

that Plaintiff (1) did not use assistive devices, (2) had a normal range of motion of the cervical 

spine, shoulders, elbows, hips, ankles, right wrist, and feet, (3) had no gross instability in his 

knees, (4) showed normal sensation to light touch and pinprick and normal motor strength 

throughout his upper and lower extremities, and (5) had no ACL instability. Id. at 28, 315-319.7 

                                                                

7 Despite assigning only “little weight” to Dr. Kim’s medical findings, both Dr. Kim and the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff could occasionally lift twenty pounds and were very close with respect to 

how much Plaintiff could lift frequently, ten pounds (ALJ) and nine pounds (Dr. Kim). AR at 25 

and 651. Dr. Kim and the ALJ also agree that Plaintiff cannot climb ladders and that Plaintiff 

would not need to lie down during an eight hour shift. Id. at 25 and 652. Finally, Dr. Kim and 

the ALJ agree that Plaintiff is limited in his ability to stoop, crouch, kneel and crawl. Id. Dr. Kim 

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 The ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Kim’s opinion because of the brief nature of 

her treating relationship with Plaintiff is another substantial and legitimate reason for rejecting 

her opinions. See Carrigan v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1757208 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014) (stating 

that “[t]he length of a treating relationship is a specific and legitimate reason to reject a treating 

physician and give the physician's opinion less weight” and finding that the ALJ did not err where 

the ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Benjamin's opinions because Plaintiff had only one 

examination with Dr. Benjamin prior to the doctor authoring the letter declaring Plaintiff disabled 

for a year and the overall length of the treatment relationship prior to writing the letter was 

approximately one month); see also Alsyouf v. Astrue, 2013 WL 327794, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 

29, 2013) (finding that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a treating 

doctor’s opinion where the doctor only saw Plaintiff on one occasion and the doctor’s opinion 

was outweighed by the totality of the evidence). Here, the records provided to the Court relating 

to Dr. Kim’s treatment are minimal, indicate a single examination date (9.11.14), and do not 

identify the tests, if any, she performed to reach her opinions. AR at 686-691. 

 The ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinions of Dr. Sabourin and the medical consultants 

who found that Plaintiff could “perform work at the medium exertional range” because Dr. 

Sabourin examined Plaintiff, the consultants are familiar with the SSA rules and regulations, and 

the “findings are consistent with the lack of specialized treatment.” Id. at 29.8

                                                                

noted that Plaintiff can only occasionally twist, stoop, and crouch and the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s 

postural activities to occasional. Id. 

8 Despite assigning only “some weight” to the medical findings of Drs. Sabourin, Flocks, and 

Hartman, the ALJ’s RFC assessment considered their findings and is actually more restrictive 

than what they suggested. While Drs. Sabourin, Flocks, and Hartman concluded that Plaintiff 

could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently [see AR at 25, 

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 The Court finds that the ALJ has provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, 

Drs. Pellioni and Kim. The ALJ found that Dr. Pellioni’s opinions were less impactful as they 

were written while Plaintiff was employed. The ALJ also found that Dr. Kim’s opinions were 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence9 and that her treating relationship with Plaintiff 

was quite brief. The ALJ provided an example of the contradictory evidence and cites to other 

examples. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

on this issue be DENIED. 

C. The ALJ Gave Proper Weight to Plaintiff’s Disability Rating as Determined by 

the VA

 Effective January 21, 2011, the VA found that Plaintiff was 100% disabled and increased 

his military service benefits. AR at 220-224. In making this determination, the VA specifically 

found that his “dementia due to head trauma with primary insomnia” had worsened and 

                                                                

96, 111, and 319], the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could only carry ten pounds frequently and 

twenty pounds occasionally. Id. at 25. In addition, while Drs. Sabourin and Flocks found that 

Plaintiff could climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch frequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s postural 

activities were limited to an occasional basis. Id. at 25, 96-97, 110-112, and 319. The stand, 

walk and sit limitations found by the ALJ, six hours out of an eight hour workday, are equivalent 

to the limitations found by Drs. Sabourin, Flocks, and Hartman. Id. Accordingly, The ALJ’s RFC 

does consider and account for the limitations found by Drs. Sabourin, Flocks, and Hartman even 

though the ALJ did not assign great weight to their opinions. 

9 The Court recognizes that Dr. Kim’s findings are more recent than those of Drs. Pellioni and 

Sabourin by a couple of years. AR at 315, 339, and 651. However, Dr. Kim’s report is very brief 

and it is unclear if her written comments came from Plaintiff’s self-reporting or from independent 

testing that she performed. Id. at 651-652. In addition, where the evidence can reasonably be 

construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s 

decision which includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of 

evidentiary conflicts. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; see also Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509. 

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increased his disability rating to 100%. Id. at 222. The VA found that the damage to Plaintiff’s 

left hand and left knee had not increased in severity and remained at 10% each, the 

“degenerative arthritis impairment” in his right knee had increased to 10%, and that his shoulder 

and back complaints were not service-related.10 Id. at 221-23. The VA denied Plaintiff’s claim 

for “individual unemployability . . . because the evidence does not show you are unable to 

secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities.” 

Id. at 223. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the VA’s determination that 

Plaintiff was 100% cognitively disabled, as well as physically disabled. Pl.’s Mot. at 21-23. While 

Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ is not required to follow the VA’s determination, Plaintiff 

complains that the ALJ failed to give it “great weight” or to provide “persuasive, specific, valid 

reasons” for rejecting it. Id. at 22. 

 1. Relevant Law 

 “[A]lthough a VA rating of disability does not necessarily compel the SSA to reach an 

identical result, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, the ALJ must consider the VA's finding in reaching his 

decision.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering a VA 

determination of disability, the ALJ must give great weight to the decision because “of the 

marked similarity between these two federal disability programs.” Id. Specifically, 

[b]oth programs evaluate a claimant's ability to perform full-time work in the 

national economy on a sustained and continuing basis; both focus on analyzing a 

claimant's functional limitations; and both require claimants to present extensive 

medical documentation in support of their claims. Both programs have a detailed 

                                                                

10 The notice states that the VA does not add individual percentages of each condition to 

determine the combined rating. However, given the severity of Plaintiff’s cognitive limitation, 

the VA determined that Plaintiff’s combined disability rating was 100%. AR at 223. 

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regulatory scheme that promotes consistency in adjudication of claims. Both are 

administered by the federal government, and they share a common incentive to 

weed out meritless claims. 

Id. An ALJ may give less weight to a VA disability determination only if he or she provides 

“persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.” Id. 

 2. Analysis 

 Here, the VA increased Plaintiff’s cognitive disability due to dementia to 100%. AR at 

222. In choosing to “not giv[e] great weight” to the VA’s decision, the ALJ considered that the 

rating was based mostly on Plaintiff’s self-reported cognitive loss and found that Plaintiff’s tested 

cognitive ability does not justify a finding of disability. Id. at 29. In support, the ALJ cites to 

Dr. Shore’s Complete Psychological Evaluation of Plaintiff performed on January 16, 2013. Id. 

at 29, 325-330. 

 As discussed in more detail above, and in the ALJ’s opinion, the ALJ rejected Dr. Eggers’ 

finding of total cognitive disability because it was inconsistent with the medical records and all 

of the opinions of other physicians. The VA complete cognitive disability determination was 

made by Dr. Eggers and based on her limited examination of Plaintiff. Because the VA 

determination was based on Dr. Eggers’ examination and the ALJ provided legitimate reasons 

for rejecting Dr. Eggers’ opinion, the ALJ’s analysis also provides the requisite “persuasive, 

specific, valid reasons” for rejecting the VA total disability determination. Moreover, the Court 

notes that Dr. Eggers, like Dr. Shore, only examined Plaintiff on one occasion. 

 The VA also found that Plaintiff had a 10% disability rating for each of his left wrist, left 

knee instability, left knee degenerative joint disease, and right knee degenerative arthritis. Id. 

at 221-222. The ALJ gave “little weight” to this opinion because “examinations revealed that 

the [Plaintiff] had no tenderness to palpation and normal range of motion of the left wrist as 

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well as mild tenderness of the lumbar spine and no strength or coordination deficits of the 

knees.” Id. at 29. In support, the ALJ cites to the same September 2014 visit with Dr. Kim, 

March 2012 visit with Dr. Pellioni, and January 2013 visit with Dr. Sabourin that he cited to when 

he assigned “little weight” to Dr. Kim’s medical opinions. Id. at 28-29; see also supra at 22-23. 

As stated previously, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had knee problems and accounted for 

this in his RFC analysis by limiting Plaintiff to light work with no ladders, ropes, or scaffoldings, 

and only occasional postural activities. Id. at 27. The ALJ also recognized Plaintiff’s history of 

a fractured left forearm and radius and post-surgical repair status and accounted for this with a 

light RFC capacity. Id. In light of the objective medical evidence considered and discussed by 

the ALJ, the Court finds that the ALJ has provided “persuasive, specific, valid reasons for” 

assigning little weight to the VA opinions. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue be DENIED. 

D. The ALJ Did Not Err by Failing to Consider Plaintiff’s Work History

 Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erroneously failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s 

“stellar” work history when making credibility findings. Pl.’s Mot. at 23-24. While Plaintiff 

explains that he worked for the vast majority of time prior to the onset of his disability and 

asserts that this factor should weigh in favor of his credibility, Plaintiff does not identify what 

finding was improper or address any other credibility issues. Id. Respondent asserts that the 

ALJ is not required to consider Plaintiff’s work history and because Plaintiff does not challenge 

the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding, the decision not to address this issue is moot. Def.’s Mot. 

at 8. 

 While an ALJ may consider a plaintiff’s work history when making a credibility 

determinations, an ALJ is not required to do so. Dixon v. Colvin, 2015 WL 347569, at *10 (W.D. 

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Wash. Jan. 26, 2015) (stating “thus, a claimant's work history is also one of the factors that may 

be considered by the ALJ in evaluating credibility”) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 

(9th Cir.1996) and Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947 at 959 (9th Cir.) (upholding the ALJ's 

adverse credibility findings because the claimant had “an extremely poor work history” and “has 

shown little propensity to work in her lifetime.”)). Here, Plaintiff is not questioning the ALJ’s 

credibility determination and the ALJ does not have a duty or obligation to analyze Plaintiff’s 

work history. Accordingly, the Court RECCOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment on this issue be DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be 

GRANTED. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report and 

Recommendation must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 

26, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than March 11, 2016. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/11/2016 

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