Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00076/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00076-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sally Hart and Center for Medicare

Advocacy, Inc., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

United States Department of Health and

Human Services, 

Defendant. 

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CV-09-0076-TUC-CKJ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Sally

Hart and Center for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. on April 2, 2009. (Doc. No. 14.) Plaintiffs’

action, brought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”), seeks to

compel the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to provide government

documents requested by Plaintiffs on August 12, 2008. Plaintiffs contend that, based on the

undisputed facts before the Court, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services filed a Response

and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on June 4, 2009. (Doc. No. 24.) Defendant

contends that all requested documents have been provided to Plaintiffs and that Defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

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1

 References to the parties’ Statements of Fact are abbreviated herein as follows:

Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 18) is abbreviated as “PSOF”; Defendant’s Response to

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 25, pg. 1) is abbreviated as “DRSOF”; Defendant’s

Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 25, pg. 2.) is abbreviated as “DSOF”; and Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant’s Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 26) is abbreviated as “PRSOF”.

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Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s cross-motion and replied to Defendant’s response

on June 23, 2009. (Doc. No. 27.) Defendant replied to Plaintiffs’ response on July 13, 2009.

(Doc. No. 28.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Guerin for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 29.) The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order

denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2008, Plaintiffs wrote to the Freedom of Information Group within

Defendant’s division, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), requesting

copies of documents and information pursuant to FOIA. (PSOF 1, DRSOF 1.)1

 The request

sought information regarding numbers of attorneys against whom CMS or its agents took

action to recover conditional payments under the Medicare Secondary Payer Program.

(DSOF 1; PRSOF 1.) According to Plaintiff Sally Hart, the request was filed in an attempt

to gather information for an article that Ms. Hart is authoring regarding popular

misconceptions concerning the authority of the Medicare agency in collecting Medicare

Secondary Payer claims, particularly the ongoing description of Medicare’s unperfected

claims as “liens” which impose particular obligations on personal injury attorneys. (Doc. No.

27, Ex. 1.) Neither of the Plaintiffs will receive any remuneration for the article by Ms. Hart.

(Id.)

The CMS FOIA Group in the Baltimore Central Office (“CMS FOIA Group”) has a

staff of approximately 15 people, ten of whom are dedicated FOIA analysts. These analysts

are responsible for processing requests that seek categories of records that have not been

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designated for direct release by CMS program offices, including CMS regional offices and

Medicare contractors, in accordance with this agency’s FMS guidelines. (DSOF 2; PRSOF

2.) Plaintiffs’ FOIA request was assigned to a FOIA analyst because it sought documents

not within the direct release category. (DSOF 3; PRSOF 3.) 

Due to personal health issues and the care of a dependent family member, the FOIA

specialist assigned to Plaintiffs’ request was out of the office during the latter part of 2008

and the early part of 2009. (DSOF 5; PRSOF 5.) Because of the limited number of FOIA

personnel in the FOIA Group, it was not possible to reassign the specialist’s FOIA requests

to another staff member. (Id.) Consequently, Defendant’s response to the request was

delayed. (Id.) 

On October 30, 2008, Plaintiffs wrote again to CMS FOIA Group, appealing the

Defendant’s failure to supply the requested documents within the time frame specified by

law. (PSOF 2; DRSOF 2.) 

It is the responsibility of each FOIA analyst to send the requester an acknowledgment

letter and to refer the FOIA request to the CMS components likely to have responsive

records. (DSOF 4; PRSOF 4.) On February 17, 2009, CMS wrote to Plaintiffs to

acknowledge receipt of the FOIA request. (PSOF 3; DRSOF 3.) The letter explained that,

due to a very heavy volume of FOIA requests, CMS was processing requests on a “first in,

first out” basis. (PSOF, Ex. A.) The letter further stated: “Please be assured that a search

has been initiated for records falling within the scope of your request. If any such records

are located, they will be reviewed as soon as possible, and you will be notified of our

decision regarding release or non-release of those documents.” (Id.) The letter advised

Plaintiffs of the process for expediting their request if necessary. (Id.) The letter also

advised Plaintiffs of CMS’s policies regarding fees charged for processing requests. (Id.) 

Prior to receipt of CMS’ February 17, 2009 letter, on February 6, 2009, Plaintiffs had

filed the pending action. (Doc. No. 1.) Patricia Mantoan, an attorney in the General Law

Division of the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”), learned of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit on

February 18, 2009, when she received a copy of the Complaint by electronic mail from the

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U.S. Attorney’s Office in Tucson, Arizona. (DSOF 9; PRSOF 9.) The CMS FOIA Group

did not become aware of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit until February 18, 2009, when two staff persons

in the CMS FOIA Group received email notification from Ms. Mantoan. (DSOF 8, 9;

PRSOF 8, 9.)

On that same date, Plaintiffs’ request was referred to the Center for Medicare

Management (“CMM”) and the Office of Financial Management (“OFM”) for searches for

responsive records. (DSOF 4; PRSOF 4.) CMM serves as the focal point for all CMS

interactions with health care providers, intermediaries, carriers, and Medicare Administrative

Contractors (“MACs”) for issues relating to Medicare fee-for-service (“FFS”) policies and

operations. (Id.) OFM has responsibilities for the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery

Claims program. (Id.) 

On February 24, 2009, Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s letter of February 17,

2009. Plaintiff noted the filing of their Complaint in this action and provided further

information regarding their entitlement to a waiver of fees for the requested documents.

(PSOF 4; DRSOF 4.)

On February 25, 2009, CMM notified the FOIA Group that they did not have any

responsive records. (DSOF 10; PRSOF 10.) 

In March 2009, OFM referred Plaintiffs’ request to OGC, which may handle litigation

involving recovery under the Medicare Secondary Payer program. (DSOF 11; PRSOF 11.)

The request was then circulated to the ten OGC regional offices and the OGC Central Office.

In early April, 2009, OFM informed the CMS FOIA Group that it did not have any

responsive records. (DSOF 12; PRSOF 12.) 

In early April 2009, OGC informed the CMS FOIA Group that it did not have any

directly responsive records, but that it was able to find a court decision on a recovery case

in West Virginia. (DSOF 13; PRSOF 13.) The CMS FOIA Group conducted additional

research and retrieved two additional court decisions cited in the case provided by OGC.

(Id.) 

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On April 8, 2009, Defendant sent to Plaintiffs via overnight mail the 12 pages of

responsive records and two cases printed from Westlaw. (DSOF 14; PRSOF 14.) Defendant

also informed Plaintiffs that it was waiving any fees incurred in providing the documents.

(Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co.

of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents “show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

 A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party merely needs to

point out to the Court the absence of evidence supporting its opponent’s claim; it does not

need to disprove its opponent’s claim. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If a moving party

has made this showing, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256;

Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The ultimate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 

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2

 Plaintiffs also devote a portion of their Motion for Summary Judgment to outlining the

law regarding waiver of fees associated with document production. (Doc. No. 17, pgs. 2 & 5.) 

However, because it is undisputed that Defendant did not charge Plaintiffs any fees for the

production of their requested information, this discussion is irrelevant.

3

 “Unusual circumstances are defined as “(I) the need to search for and collect the

requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office

processing the request; (II) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a

voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or

(III) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with another

agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among two or more

components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein.” 5 U.S.C. §

551(a)(6)(B)(iii). 

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated the timeliness requirement of the FOIA.

Plaintiffs further allege that they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in

bringing this action. In response to Plaintiffs’ Motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’

action is moot and should be dismissed and that Plaintiffs’ request for fees should be denied.

Defendant further moves for summary judgment on the ground that it has discharged its

obligation under FOIA and is therefore entitled to dismissal of the case against it.

1. Timeliness Requirements of FOIA2

A federal agency must “promptly” make available records properly requested by

members of the public. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Upon receipt of a request for records,

the agency must “determine within 20 days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public

holidays) . . . whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person

making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such

person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination.” 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(6)(A)(I). The agency must make a determination with respect to any appeal within

twenty days after receipt of the appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). In “unusual

circumstances,”3

 the 20-day time limit for an agency’s response to a FOIA records request

may be extended by “written notice to the person making such request setting forth the

unusual circumstances for such extension and the date on which a determination is expected

to be dispatched.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(a)(6)(B)(I). 

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If the agency does not make a timely determination regarding a records request, the

requesting party may proceed as if the request had been denied. 45 CFR 5.35(a). If the

agency fails to respond timely to a request for records, or to an appeal, the requesting party

is deemed to have exhausted remedies and can seek relief at the next stage of the process.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(I). “On complaint, the district court of the United States in the

district in which the complainant resides . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from

withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly

withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

2. Plaintiff’s action is moot because Defendant has discharged its obligations under

FOIA

It is undisputed that Defendant has conducted a reasonable search for records and

provided to Plaintiffs all responsive records found. (Doc. No. 27, pg. 4; Doc. No. 28, pg. 1.)

Under the law of this Circuit, Plaintiffs’ action is moot. An action to compel the production

of documents under the FOIA is mooted, and appropriately dismissed, when the agency in

control of the requested documents delivers them to the plaintiff. See Beech v. C.I.R., 190

F.Supp.2d 1183 (D. Ariz. 2001), aff’d in Beech v. C.I.R., 37 Fed.Appx. 324 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Carter v. Veterans Administration, 780 F.2d 1479, 1481 (9th Cir.1986)); see also

Rouse v. U.S. Dept. of State, 567 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming Carter). 

Plaintiffs argue that a party who voluntarily ceases unlawful conduct after the other

party has filed suit falls within the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine,

and that the voluntary cessation doctrine has been applied in FOIA cases. (Doc. No. 27, pg.

5.) Plaintiffs do not offer any case law from this jurisdiction to support that assertion, citing

instead to the federal districts of the D.C. Circuit and Oregon. These cases apply the

voluntary cessation doctrine where “an agency's refusal to supply information evidences a

policy or practice of delayed disclosure or some other failure to abide by the terms of the

FOIA, and not merely isolated mistakes by agency officials,” noting that “a party's challenge

to the policy or practice cannot be mooted by the release of the specific documents that

prompted the suit.” Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States., 837 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir.

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4

 To the contrary, a “first-in, first-out” approach to handling FOIA requests was approved

by the Ninth Circuit in Exner v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 542 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.

1976).

5

 Defendant cited to information from the Department of Health and Human Services

demonstrating that CMS has increased the number of FOIA requests it processes each year and

is taking affirmative steps to reduce backlog and streamline the FOIA process, which further

undercuts Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant is engaged in a pattern and practice of deliberately

delayed responses to FOIA requests. (Doc. No. 28, pgs. 3-5.)

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1988). While there is some case law in this Circuit suggesting that an agency’s pattern and

practice of delayed responses to FOIA requests may be held to violate the FOIA, see Mayock

v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006, 1007 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting district court’s determination that,

because the complaint alleged a recurring “pattern and practice” of FOIA violations, the

plaintiff had standing and his claims were not moot), Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient

evidence of a “pattern” of delayed responses by Defendant. Plaintiffs do not offer any

evidence in support of their claim that they have “made FOIA requests to Defendant in the

past and [expect] to do so in the future, when [they] would again face delays resulting from

Defendant’s non-compliant procedures.” (Doc. No. 27, pg. 5.) The fact that Defendant

stated in its February 17, 2009 letter to Plaintiffs that it processes FOIA requests on a “first

in, first out” basis does not amount to a factual showing that Defendant continually violates

the FOIA timeliness requirements.4

 In sum, while the evidence demonstrates that Defendant

did not comply with the timeliness requirements in this case, there is only a suggestion, not

evidence, of other failures by Defendant.5

 See generally Biodiversity Legal Foundation v.

Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an agency which exhibited a

recurring pattern of correcting regulatory violations immediately after the commencement

of litigation could be challenged, as an exception to the mootness doctrine, where challenging

party presented other, similar cases as evidence). Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their burden

of proof for summary judgment. 

3. Plaintiffs are not eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees

Although Plaintiffs’ FOIA claim is moot, they may nonetheless pursue a claim for

attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing this action. Attorney fee issues are ancillary to the

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6

 Both parties briefed the attorneys’ fees issue in this case pursuant to the old legal

standard (presumably because the issue was largely briefed before the Ninth Circuit issued its

decision in Oregon Natural) although Plaintiffs contended it was no longer the current legal

standard. (Doc. No. 24, pgs. 6-11; Doc. No. 27, pgs. 6-15; Doc. No. 28, pgs. 5-7.)

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underlying action and survive independently under the court's equitable jurisdiction. See

Carter v. Veterans Administration, 780 F.2d 1479, 1481 (9th Cir.1986). The FOIA attorney

fee provision requires courts to engage in a two-step inquiry: first, whether the plaintiff is

eligible under the statute for an award of fees; and second, whether the court in its discretion

finds the plaintiff entitled to an award of fees. See Church of Scientology of California v.

U.S. Postal Service, 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1983). Because the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs are not eligible for attorneys’ fees, it does not reach the issue of Plaintiffs’

entitlement.

Prior to its most recent amendments, the FOIA had a basic fee provision: “The court

may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs

reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially

prevailed.” Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Locke, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 1941471, *3 (9th

Cir. July 8, 2009) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (prior to amendment)). Whether a party

had substantially prevailed such that the party was eligible for a fee award was examined

under a court-determined legal framework that analyzed: (1) whether the suit was reasonably

necessary to obtain the information; and (2) whether the suit had a substantial causative

effect on the release of the documents in question.6

 See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at

489. However, the current version of FOIA, signed into law on December 31, 2007,

amended the attorneys’ fee provision and provided a statutory definition of “substantially

prevailed,” thereby changing the legal standard regarding a party’s eligibility for an award

of attorneys’ fees. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Locke, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL

1941471, *3 (9th Cir. July 8, 2009). FOIA currently provides: 

The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and

other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in

which the complainant has substantially prevailed.

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(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, a complainant has substantially

prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief through either–

(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or

consent decree; or 

(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency,

if the complainant's claim is not insubstantial. 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). This amendment was designed to ensure that FOIA

complainants could rely on the “catalyst theory” in order to become eligible for an award of

attorney fees. See Oregon Natural, 2009 WL 1941471 at *3-4. The “catalyst” theory “posits

that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit

brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. and Care

Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601

(2001). In the amendments to the FOIA, the “catalyst theory” is incorporated into the statute

at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II).

Accordingly, under the current version of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii), Plaintiffs are

eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees if (a) they have obtained a judicial order granting

them relief, or (b) Defendant voluntarily changed its position as a result of Plaintiffs’

complaint. Neither applies in the instant case. First, the Court has not issued an order

granting Plaintiffs relief. Second, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not bring about a voluntary change

in Defendant’s conduct. It is undisputed that Defendant initiated its search for records

requested by Plaintiffs on or before February 17, 2009. This search led to Defendant’s final

response to Plaintiffs’ request for records. It is also undisputed that Defendant did not learn

of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit until February 18, 2009, after the record search had been initiated.

Although Plaintiffs speculate that Defendant was motivated by the litigation to respond to

Plaintiffs’ request as soon as possible, Plaintiffs have not presented any factual evidence to

support that assertion. To the contrary, Defendant’s February 17, 2009 letter stated that any

records located would be “reviewed as soon as possible” and that Plaintiffs would be notified

accordingly. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have substantially

prevailed.

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RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, enter an order DENYING the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs

on April 3, 2009 (Doc. No. 17), GRANTING the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed

by Defendant on June 4, 2009 (Doc. No. 24) and DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE the

claims alleged against Defendant. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-09-76-TUC-CKJ.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2009.

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