Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01543/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01543-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1 Under the first (and only) ground for relief in his Petition, Petitioner wrote

“Insufficient Evidence” and then directed the Court to an attached copy of his opening

brief on direct appeal, which elucidates his sufficiency of the evidence claim before

09cv1543-JM (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY ANTHONY WOODFORK,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 09cv1543-JM (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc.

Nos. 13, 15, 18, 20]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Jeffrey Miller pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

On July 15, 2009, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed the current Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. Doc. No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner challenges his state court

conviction of receiving stolen property, arguing that there was

insufficient evidence to support the finding that he knowingly possessed

stolen property. Doc. No. 1-2 (“Pet’r Mem.”)1 at 1. On September 28,

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that court. This Court presumes Petitioner wishes to adopt the arguments from that

brief in his current Petition. 

2 09cv1543-JM (BLM)

2009, Respondent Matthew Cate filed an answer requesting that the

Petition be denied. Doc. No. 9 (“Answer”). Petitioner filed a traverse

on October 15, 2009. Doc. No. 10 (“Traverse”). 

This Court has considered the above documents as well as the record

as a whole. Based thereon, and for the reasons set forth below, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

be DENIED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion on direct review in People v. Jeffrey Anthony Woodfork, No.

D052472, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. September 12, 2008). See Lodgment 5.

This Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations to be

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1)(“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court

shall be presumed to be correct”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

340 (2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from

such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

In the early morning hours of October 1, 2007, the

security alarm sounded at the law firm of Grace Hollis Lowe

Hanson & Schaeffer (Grace Hollis). Michael Simpson, the

systems administrator at Grace Hollis, later arrived at work

to find the office had been burglarized. He initially

noticed four laptop bags, a digital camera and a set of keys

from his office were missing. Simpson also noticed the

absence of a bottle of tequila remaining from an office

party. 

That same morning, Woodfork and Grace Sandoval rode the

trolley to El Cajon. Woodfork originally met Sandoval at a

sober living facility, but because of an altercation she no

longer lived at the facility. Instead, Sandoval often slept

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in her car. While on the trolley Woodfork and Sandoval met

Zeat Martinez. Martinez saw that Woodfork and Sandoval

carried computer bags and a bottle of alcohol. During the

trolley ride, Woodfork showed Martinez one of the computers

and offered to sell the laptop for $1,000. After Martinez

refused, Woodfork reduced the asking price to $500. (Ibid.)

(sic) Martinez also rejected that price but told Woodfork he

would pay $100. Woodfork, Sandoval and Martinez then left

the trolley and walked to an abandoned apartment building to

determine whether the computer worked. 

Police Officer Joseph Crawford was on patrol in the area

when he noticed the three individuals by the apartment

building with an open bottle of tequila on the wall between

Woodfork and Martinez. Crawford approached them and searched

Woodfork and Sandoval. He found a pair of gloves, a

screwdriver, a pocket knife and a set of keys on Woodfork.

He found a digital camera in Sandoval’s purse. A security

tag attached to the camera identified it as “Property of

Grace Hollis” and included an identification number and a bar

code. Crawford also saw four canvas laptop bags against the

back side of the wall. He asked to whom the laptops belonged

and Woodfork and Sandoval both responded, “Those are ours.”

He asked Woodfork whether two of the bags were his and

Woodfork replied, “Yeah, those are mine.” Crawford searched

the bags and found a laptop in each bag with a security tag

labeled “Property of Grace Hollis” similar to the one found

on the digital camera. 

At trial, Woodfork testified in his own defense. He

said he did not know the laptops were stolen and he did not

find it suspicious that Sandoval had them in her possession.

Lodgment 5 at 2-3.

On December 28, 2007, a jury convicted Petitioner of receiving

stolen property. Lodgment 1 at 119. In a subsequent court trial on

January 2, 2008, the state court made a true finding as to Petitioner’s

two prison priors. Id. at 120. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner

to five years in prison: three years as the upper term limit for the

receiving stolen property conviction and one year for each of

Petitioner’s two prior prison sentences. Id. at 122. 

Petitioner appealed, arguing that insufficient evidence supported

his conviction of receiving stolen property. Lodgment 2 at 7-16. On

September 12, 2008, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

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conviction. Lodgment 5. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, challenging his conviction on the same ground.

Lodgment 6. On December 10, 2008, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition for review without citation to authority.

Lodgment 7. Petitioner then filed the instant Petition on July 15,

2009.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials constitute adjudications on the

merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). Where

there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

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“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or

(2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to

[the Supreme Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies the

correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue a writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly . . . .

Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 75-

76 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Wood

v. Allen, __ U.S. __, 2010 WL 173369, *2 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010). A state

court’s decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this

Court finds that the state court’s factual determinations were

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2 Petitioner was found guilty of receiving stolen property in violation of

California Penal Code § 496(a). Lodgment 1 at 119. The trial judge instructed the

jury that in order to establish this crime, the prosecution had to prove that

Petitioner (1) “received, aided in selling, concealed or withheld from its owner, aided

in concealing or withholding from its owner, property that had been stolen,” (2) “knew

that the property was stolen,” and (3) “actually knew of the presence of the property.”

Lodgment 8 at 353. Petitioner does not dispute the jury’s finding as to the first and

third elements, so the only issue in dispute is the government’s evidence that

Petitioner knew the property was stolen. See Pet’r Mem. at 7-16.

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objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state

court. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Rice v. Collins, 546

U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds reviewing the

record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively

unreasonable). This Court will presume that the state court’s factual

findings are correct, and Petitioner may overcome that presumption only

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Petitioner challenges his conviction of receiving stolen property

on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence he knew the property

was stolen.2 Pet. at 6, Pet’r Mem. at 7. Respondent counters that the

jury reasonably could infer Petitioner’s knowledge from the

circumstantial evidence presented. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer (“Resp’t

Mem.”) at 7-8. Petitioner refutes this argument in his Traverse,

pointing to evidence that Sandoval gave him the property and that

Petitioner did not behave in a furtive manner when confronted by the

police officer. Traverse at 7-9. 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s

sufficiency of the evidence claim, so this Court will “look through” the

silent denial to the Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 804. The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient evidence

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to support the challenged conviction, explaining:

Suspicious circumstances surrounding the possession of

stolen property corroborate the inference that the property

was received with knowledge of its stolen nature. (People v.

Lopez (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 274, 278.) Here the facts

constitute suspicious circumstances based on Sandoval’s

behavior, which was inconsistent with her lifestyle, and

Woodfork’s offer to sell the property at an unreasonably low

price. Sandoval’s lifestyle was inconsistent with someone

who would lawfully possess four laptop computers, a camera

and an extra set of keys. This was not her first encounter

with the law. She was previously convicted of selling drugs

in 2005. She claimed she obtained the stolen property from

an apartment once occupied by her son, rather than a retail

location. The laptops were encased in matching black canvas

bags but were received by Woodfork from a woman who routinely

slept in her car. Sandoval told Woodfork that she needed to

sell the items to raise money to fix her car, yet admitted

that she spent money on alcohol the same day. Additionally,

Woodfork received the stolen keys from Sandoval, a woman

without a steady home or an operable car.

Woodfork further contributed to the suspicious

circumstances surrounding his possession of the stolen items.

His contention that he possessed the laptops to help Sandoval

program them for sale is inconsistent with the behavior of

someone who lawfully obtained possession of electronic

equipment. Additionally, he offered to sell one of the

laptops to a complete stranger for half his initial price.

Woodfork initially offered one of the laptops to Martinez for

$1,000 but Martinez told Woodfork the price was too high.

Woodfork then reduced his price to $500. The sale of

property at a disproportionately low price is a suspicious

circumstance. (People v. Malouf (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 697,

706.) Substantial evidence supports a finding Woodfork

received stolen property with knowledge it was stolen. 

Lodgment 5 at 4-6. 

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of the

evidence claims in the criminal context is set forth in Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Court held that the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant

is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the

record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 324. “In making this determination, habeas courts must respect the

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province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve

evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts

by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that

supports the verdict.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.

1995). “Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Cordova Barajas,

360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). Once a state court fact finder has

found a defendant guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324. 

Federal habeas courts also must analyze Jackson claims “with

explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense

as defined by state law.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). When assessing

the evidence presented at trial, a reviewing court must conduct a

thorough review of the state court record. Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d

1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[a]n additional layer of

deference is added to this standard by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which

obliges [Petitioner] to demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication

entailed an unreasonable application of the quoted Jackson standard.”

Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Juan

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, it

falls to this Court to determine whether the state appellate court

opinion here “reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson . . . to

the facts of this case.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275.

As an initial matter, it is apparent from the Court of Appeal’s

citation to People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 (1980) that the state

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3 The standard set forth in Johnson mirrors and, in fact, cites to the standard

set forth in Jackson. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d at 562, 575-78; see also People v. Cuevas,

12 Cal. 4th 252, 260-261 (1995) (citing both Jackson and Johnson as setting forth the

applicable standard for sufficiency of the evidence claims).

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court applied the Jackson standard in reviewing Petitioner’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim.3 The question, then, is whether it did so

reasonably. See Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1078; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274.

Under California law, “[p]ossession of recently stolen property is so

incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition

to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct

of the defendant tending to show his guilt.” People v. McFarland, 58

Cal. 2d 748, 754 (1962); People v. Anderson, 152 Cal. App. 4th 919, 950

(3d Dist. 2007) (confirming that the McFarland “slight corroboration”

rule remains the governing law). While California courts have been

loath to expressly define the term “recent,” appellate courts have

upheld convictions where the interval was as long as four and a half

months. See People v. Anderson, 210 Cal. App. 3d 414, 422 (4th Dist.

1989) (four and a half months); see also People v. Reynolds, 149 Cal.

App. 2d 290, 295 (2nd Dist. 1957) (six days); People v. Rodriguez, 177

Cal. App. 3d 174, 179 (5th Dist. 1986) (later that day). In this case,

Petitioner does not dispute that he, along with Sandoval, possessed four

laptops, a digital camera, the tequila bottle, and Simpson’s keys. The

government demonstrated at trial that police apprehended Petitioner, in

possession of these items, roughly nine hours after they were stolen

from the law firm. See Lodgment 8 at 104 (Grace Hollis alarm sounded

at about 2:00 a.m.) and 232-33 (Officer Wilson stopped Petitioner around

10:50 a.m.). At that time, Petitioner had the stolen keys in his pocket

and told Officer Crawford that two of the laptops were his own.

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Lodgment 8 at 234-35, 237. This admitted possession of the property

just nine hours after it was stolen raises a strong inference of

Petitioner’s knowledge. Reyes, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 985.

In light of this inference, only “slight” additional corroborating

evidence was needed to permit a guilty verdict. Id. Here, the record

is replete with circumstantial evidence that Petitioner knew the laptops

were stolen. As the Court of Appeal noted, Petitioner offered to sell

a laptop to Martinez at half his initial asking price. See Lodgment 5

at 6; see also Lodgment 8 at 240 (Officer Crawford’s testimony

recounting what Martinez said at the scene). California courts have

held that selling property at a disproportionately low price (as

compared to its actual worth) may be considered a suspicious

circumstance supporting an inference of knowledge of the property’s

stolen nature. Malouf, 135 Cal. App. 2d at 706. While Martinez later

disclaimed having negotiated with Petitioner over price, the jury was

entitled to credit Officer Crawford’s testimony over Martinez’s

frequently conflicting and evasive testimony and it is not the province

of this Court to discredit the jury’s weighing of the evidence. See

Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358.

Petitioner’s explanation for why he was with Sandoval and in

possession of the laptops also is suspicious and contradictory. “[T]he

law is [] clear that possession of stolen property, accompanied by no

explanation, or an unsatisfactory explanation, or by suspicious

circumstances, will justify an inference that the goods were received

with knowledge that they had been stolen. People v. Perez, 40 Cal. App.

3d 795, 799 (3d Dist. 1974) disapproved of on other grounds by People

v. Allen, 21 Cal. 4th 846 (1999). In this case, Petitioner claimed that

all of the items were Sandoval’s and he was just helping her. Lodgment

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8 at 294, 297-98. But a reasonable jury could find it implausible for

Petitioner to believe a woman who had just been evicted from a

rehabilitation facility due to addiction problems, lived in her car, and

had no money could legally have come into possession of four laptops in

matching bags. Sandoval’s explanation that she obtained the laptops

from her son, who was incarcerated for theft (id. at 257, 322), does not

lend any credibility to her story. Moreover, Petitioner understood that

Sandoval wanted him to help program the computers, or at least show her

how to use them, so she could sell at least one of them in El Cajon.

Id. at 299, 321, 324-25. However, Petitioner then claimed that, though

he and Sandoval took the computers first to her car then on the trolley

to El Cajon, he never opened the computers, let alone tried to use or

program them. Id. at 298, 323-25. And, though he originally said they

were going to sell the laptops, he later contradicted his own testimony

and said he did not know if Sandoval was selling them and Officer

Crawford was mistaken when he said Petitioner told him at the scene that

Sandoval was going to sell them. Id. at 322-25. A reasonable jury

could have concluded that these unsatisfactory explanations supported

an inference that Petitioner knew the laptops were stolen. See Perez,

40 Cal. App. 3d at 799. 

The same is true of the conflicting evidence of whether Petitioner

opened and looked at the laptops. Petitioner contradicted his own

testimony by first stating that he never opened the laptops and then,

a few minutes later, saying “I opened the laptop only to see if it

opened, if it will turn on.” Lodgment 8 at 323, 327. This discrepancy

is significant because all of the laptops bore inventory control

stickers - stickers Petitioner presumably would have seen had he opened

the laptop - indicating that they were the property of Grace-Hollis (id.

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at 111-12), not Sandoval or her son. Martinez’s corroborating testimony

that Petitioner showed him the computer (id. at 209-10) suggests that

of the two, Petitioner’s first statement that he never opened the

laptops is the untrue one. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, this evidence supports the inference that

Petitioner knew the laptops were stolen. 

Finally, while Sandoval claims she never told Petitioner the

computers were stolen (id. at 269, 276), the jury was presented with

evidence tending to impugn her credibility. As previously noted, habeas

courts must respect the jury’s role of assessing witness credibility.

See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. Here, Sandoval admitted that she pled

guilty to receiving stolen property in relation to this incident and

that she had a previous felony conviction. Lodgment 8 at 276, 279. She

then acknowledged that Petitioner is her boyfriend and it is “common

sense” that she would want to protect him. Id. at 278. Having already

pled guilty, the jury could conclude that Sandoval had nothing to lose

in protecting Petitioner. Moreover, she testified that she drank at

least a bottle and a half of vodka and some tequila the day of the

incident. Id. at 283-86. A reasonable jury could have concluded that

Sandoval’s recollection of events was impaired by her intoxication and

skewed by her relationship with Petitioner.

In light of this evidence, “a rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” that Petitioner received

stolen property with knowledge that the property was stolen. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324. This Court, therefore, concludes that Petitioner’s

conviction of receiving stolen property was supported by sufficient

evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the state court’s

analysis and decision denying the insufficiency claim was not “contrary

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to or an unreasonable application of Federal law.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court, thus, RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

habeas petition be DENIED.

B. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner has filed two motions requesting an evidentiary hearing.

See Doc. Nos. 15 & 20. In both, Petitioner argues that because the

state court deprived him of a hearing on his insufficiency of the

evidence claim during his direct appeal, the state court’s factual

findings are unreasonable and not binding on this Court. Id. He,

therefore, contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.

At the hearing, he proposes to offer exculpatory evidence including his

prescription glasses, “house keys,” and testimony and/or evidence from

Officer Crawford, Sandoval, and himself regarding this exculpatory

evidence. Id. It is unclear what Petitioner believes the glasses will

show or why it appears Petitioner wishes to demonstrate that there were

two sets of keys. Id.

In order to receive an evidentiary hearing in federal court,

Petitioner first must show that he “has not failed to develop the

factual basis of the claim in the state courts.” Insyxiengmay v.

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 n.1 (2007) (confirming that “AEDPA

generally prohibits federal habeas courts from granting evidentiary

hearings when applicants have failed to develop the factual bases for

their claims in state courts”). If Petitioner fails to satisfy this

threshold test, he must demonstrate that he meets one of the two narrow

exceptions stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). Id. On direct

appeal in this case, Petitioner offered no new facts outside of those

present in the trial record to support his sufficiency of the evidence

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4 There also is no evidence that Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing in

state court. C.f. Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1235 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008)

(finding the petitioner did develop the factual basis for his claims where the record

shows the petitioner properly sought, and was denied, an evidentiary hearing in both

state and federal court).

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claim. In Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2005), the

prisoner was afforded a federal evidentiary hearing after showing that

he supported his state habeas petition, which alleged prosecutorial

misconduct, with signed declarations from a witness, a defense

investigator, and his trial attorney as well as a transcript of part of

the prosecutor’s interview with the above witness. Here, Petitioner

proffered no evidence that had not been considered by the jury at trial

nor did he suggest that he was prevented from presenting evidence that

would entitle him to relief. See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 671

(granting federal evidentiary hearing where defendant was precluded by

the state court from developing the state court record). Thus, the

Court finds that Petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for his

claim.4

The statutory exceptions do not help Petitioner. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2) provides:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not

hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant

shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered through

the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

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5 As described in Insyxiengmay, even if Petitioner had satisfied the threshold

requirement, he still would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he also

met one of the factors set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293(1963), and made a

colorable allegation that, if proved at the evidentiary hearing, would entitle him to

habeas relief. The Court does not find that Petitioner’s allegations are sufficient

to surmount these hurdles either.

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sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner has not cited to a new

constitutional rule and he does not suggest that the alleged

“exculpatory evidence” (the prescription glasses and extra keys and

testimony related thereto) could not have been discovered previously.

Id. Moreover, Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing in no way

explains how presentation of this “exculpatory evidence” would have

prevented a reasonable factfinder from finding him guilty of receiving

stolen property. Id.; see also Schriro, 550 U.S. at 475 (“If district

courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop even

the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings,

district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were

conclusively resolved in the state courts”). As such, these exceptions

do not apply.5

Accordingly, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not

warranted in this case. Petitioner’s requests are DENIED.

C. Request for Appointment of Counsel

On November 6, 2009, and again on December 18, 2009, Petitioner

filed requests for appointment of counsel. This Court previously denied

a request for counsel for Petitioner in this case. Doc. No. 8.

As the Court explained in its previous order, the Sixth Amendment

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6 The Terrell court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but the legislature

subsequently renumbered this section as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

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right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions by

state prisoners. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Nevius

v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that there

currently exists no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in

habeas proceedings); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.

1986). However, courts may appoint counsel for financially eligible

habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 where

“the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B);

Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. Whether or not to appoint counsel is a matter

left to the court’s discretion, unless an evidentiary hearing is

necessary. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728-30 (9th Cir.

1986) (explaining that the interests of justice require appointment of

counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition).

The court’s discretion to appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.”

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).6

 “A finding of

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood

of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate

his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved.’ Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

In its prior order, this Court concluded that Plaintiff had a

sufficient grasp of his case and the legal issues involved and has been

able to adequately articulate the basis of his claims without legal

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assistance. Doc. No. 8. The Court further found that, while Petitioner

has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim for federal habeas

relief, he has not established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Id. Nothing in Petitioner’s two newest requests alters this Court’s

determination.

In his November request, Petitioner argues that an August 8, 2009

prison riot resulted in restricted access to the law library, which in

turn, impaired Petitioner’s ability to meet Court deadlines. Doc. No.

13. He further contends that deprivation of library access resulted in

Petitioner missing an opportunity to adjudicate a meritorious defense

and losing the option of filing motions. Id. However, Petitioner does

not specify which deadlines he missed or what defense he wished, but was

unable, to raise. Given that Petitioner timely filed a traverse and has

been able to file seven motions in this case, the Court finds that these

reasons do not constitute the requisite “exceptional circumstances”

necessary to justify the appointment of counsel. Terrell, 935 F.2d at

1017.

The Court also is not persuaded by the reasons set forth in

Petitioner’s December request for counsel. There, Petitioner argues

that the August 2009 riot and resulting lockdown negatively affected

Petitioner’s ability to obtain the addresses of counsel who might agree

to represent him on a pro bono basis. Doc. No. 18. He also claims that

he would require counsel if the Court granted his request for an

evidentiary hearing. As to the first argument, the Court finds no

authority justifying the appointment of counsel based on a prisoner’s

inability to retain his own counsel. The second contention is moot as

this Court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary

in this case.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that this habeas

proceeding does not present “exceptional circumstances” justifying the

appointment of legal counsel. Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s motions for appointment of counsel are DENIED without

prejudice. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Judge issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 23, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report

and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later that March 16,

2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 2, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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