Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02350/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ZEPEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 11cv2350 JAH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING FIRST AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF

NO. 7]

Petitioner Robert Zepeda, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus on March 22, 2012, against F.E. Figueroa, warden of

North Fork Correctional Facility, and Steven Cooley [ECF Nos. 5,

7].1

 Zepeda contests his convictions for robbery and assault with

1

 Zepeda's original Petition was dismissed without prejudice

on October 17, 2011 [ECF No. 5]. Petitioner later filed an amended

petition [ECF No. 7], which he titled "Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus." For purposes of clarity, the Court will refer to that

document as the "First Amended Petition."

In his First Amended Petition, Zepeda names "F.E. Figueroa,

Warden" as a Respondent. (First. Am. Pet. 1, ECF No. 7.) It

appears that Figueroa is no longer the warden of North Fork

Correctional Facility; the Court therefore substitutes Jeffrey

Beard, secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

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a firearm on several bases. (First Am. Pet. 2, 6-10, ECF No. 7.)2

Petitioner contends, in ground one, that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel during the "pleading and bargaining phase." 

(Id. at 6.) In grounds two and three, respectively, he insists

that he was coerced into pleading guilty and that his plea was not

intelligent. (Id. at 7-8.) His fourth claim is that the trial

court erred by sentencing him to the highest statutory term of

imprisonment without a jury's finding to support the sentence. 

(Id. at 9.) Finally, Zepeda claims that his "conviction was the

result of the [court's] abuse of discretion in violation of due

process . . . ." (Id. at 10.)

The Attorney General for the State of California filed an

Answer on behalf of the Oklahoma warden along with a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities and Notice of Lodgment on April 17, 2013

[ECF Nos. 46, 47]. Petitioner's Traverse was filed nunc pro tunc

to June 27, 2013. (Mins., July 11, 2013, ECF No. 55; Traverse 1,

ECF No. 56.) The Court has reviewed the First Amended Petition,

Answer, the lodgments, and Traverse. For the reasons stated below,

the First Amended Petition [ECF No. 7] should be DENIED.

Rehabilitation ("CDCR"), for Figueroa. See Gray v. Beard, No.

2:11–cv–2974–JKS, 2013 WL 5934153, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013)

(substituting Beard as respondent in place of Figueroa); Pedroza v.

Tilton, Civil No. 05cv2169-BTM (PCL), 2007 WL 1711781, at *1 (S.D.

Cal. June 12, 2007) (substituting the CDCR secretary as respondent

in place of former warden at Ironwood State Prison); North Fork

Correctional Facility, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 

http://www.ok.gov/doc/Organization/Field_Operations/Private_Prison_

&_Jail_Administration/North_Fork_Correctional_Facility.html

(visited Dec. 16, 2013) (listing William Sherrod as warden). 

2

 The Court will cite to all filed documents using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system. Because all

of the lodgments are not consecutively paginated, the Court has

paginated each lodgment and will cite to each using the assigned

page numbers.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plea Negotiations and Change of Plea

On April 14, 2010, Petitioner's retained counsel, Frederick M.

Carroll, negotiated a plea bargain on Zepeda's behalf for the

above-mentioned offenses. (Lodgment No. 8, Zepeda v. Warden, [HC

20593] (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 4); Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (Cal.

Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011) (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

13).) The Petitioner waited outside of the courtroom while the

attorneys and Judge John S. Einhorn discussed the terms of the plea

bargain. (Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition

for writ of habeas corpus at 13).) Caroll emerged from the

courtroom and informed Zepeda that the prosecution offered him a

ten-year plea deal consisting of one year for robbery and nine

years for a gang enhancement. (Id. at 13-14.) 

Petitioner was unhappy with the offer and sent Carroll back

into the courtroom to renegotiate. (Id. at 14.) Following the

second round of negotiations, counsel returned and told Petitioner

that the judge "was mad as [Carroll] had never seen him before of

[sic] the whole situation." (Id.) Counsel said that Judge Einhorn

told him that if Zepeda did not accept the deal he would impose the

maximum sentence allowed. (Id.) Carroll urged Zepeda to accept

the plea bargain. (Id.) 

Petitioner asked for additional time to discuss the deal with

his sister because he did not have "an understanding of the

essential elements of the crime charged or of how each offense

related to the law." (Id.) Counsel continued to pressure Zepeda

into signing the plea agreement, but eventually agreed to meet with

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Petitioner and his sister later in the evening to discuss the terms

of the deal. (Id.) Carroll stated that the offer was only

available until the following day and only if Zepeda's codefendants

also accepted. (Id.)

Later that evening, Petitioner and his sister met with Carroll

in his law office. (Id.) There, Zepeda submits that counsel told

him that if he signed the agreement he could possibly get a

probation interview and receive a sentence of less than ten years. 

(Id. at 28.) Throughout the meeting, Carroll pressured Petitioner

to sign the plea agreement form even though it was not filled out. 

(Id. at 15, 27.) According to Zepeda, he was hesitant to sign a

blank plea form. (Id.) Carroll insisted that Petitioner sign the

form that evening so they could save time before the hearing the

following morning and appear "ready and professional." (Id.) He

also told Zepeda that he could sign a blank agreement and "wait for

the prosecution to make a mistake on the plea agreement that will

be favorable to Petitioner." (Id. at 15, 28.) 

Zepeda contends that his attorney explained the contents of

the form quickly, knowing that Petitioner did not have a clear

understanding of what he was signing. (Id. at 27.) He claims that

he signed and initialed the incomplete plea agreement out of fear

that the judge would otherwise impose a longer sentence. (Id. at

15, 28.) Zepeda maintains that at no time did counsel advise him

that he was agreeing to a stipulated sentence or pleading guilty to

an assault charge. (Id. at 16.)

Petitioner's change of plea hearing was held the following

day. (See Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (Cal. filed

Apr. 2, 2012) (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 56).) At the

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hearing, the court inquired into Zepeda's willingness to plead

guilty and waive his constitutional rights:

THE COURT: Mr. Zepeda, I have in front of me a

change of plea form with your name as the defendant. 

Within that change of plea form there are a number of

boxes that appear to have your initials. And on page 3

of the change of plea form next to the line that says

defendant's signature there appears your signature.

Are these your initials and signatures, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct. Yes.

THE COURT: Before you initialed and signed the

change of plea form, did you go over the change of plea

form with your lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And are the statements contained in

your change of plea form true and correct, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: YES.

THE COURT: You're offering to plead guilty to

Count 1, the robbery, and to Count 4, the assault with a

firearm. And as to that count, you're admitting that

the assault with a firearm was for the benefit of a

criminal street gang.

Is that your understanding of what you're going to

do?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry. Do what?

THE COURT: Pardon me?

THE DEFENDANT: Do what? I don't understand the

question.

THE COURT: Okay. You're offering to plead guilty

to robbery plus assault with a firearm. And on the

charge that's assault with a firearm you're admitting

[the] gang allegation. And you and the district

attorney have stipulated that you will receive a tenyear prison sentence, and the district attorney will

dismiss the balance of the charges against you.

Is that your understanding of the deal?

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

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THE COURT: Mr. Zepeda, do you have any questions

for me either about the contents of the change form or

what you're doing here today?

THE DEFENDANT: No questions.

(Id. at 58-59.)

Petitioner then proceeded to plead guilty to the robbery

charge. (Id. at 60.) When it came time to plead to the

assault charge, Zepeda hesitated until it was clear that he

was pleading guilty under an aider and abettor theory.

THE COURT: And how do you now plead to Count 4,

the assault with a firearm charge that charges on or

about July 8th, 2009, you unlawfully committed an

assault upon another with a firearm, in violation of

Penal Code Section 245(a)(2)?

Guilty or not guilty.

THE DEFENDANT: Aware of -- I'm aware of the charge

against me but --

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, if I can clarify, I think

the factual basis -- the district attorney and I agree

that he was pleading guilty under an aiding and abetting

theory, and I think that's the source of confusion right

here.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that correct?

MS. DIAZ: It is correct.

Mr. Zepeda was the driver of the car, not the

shooter.

THE COURT: All right. How do you now plead to

that count under an aider and abettor theory, that is

that you were the driver of the vehicle from which [a]

shot or shots were fired by somebody else?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: And do you admit that in connection

with that crime, it was for the benefit of and at the

direction of and in association with a criminal street

gang?

Yes or no.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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THE COURT: People satisfied there's a factual

basis for the plea?

MS. DIAZ: Yes, your Honor. 

THE BAILIFF: Have a seat.

THE COURT: On page 3, paragraph 15, the plea is

based upon the following: On July 8th, 2009, I robbed

Mullen's liquor store by means of force or fear. I

aided and abetted an assault with a firearm and

committed the assault for the benefit of and in

association with a criminal street gang within the

meaning of Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1).

Is that what you did that makes you think you're

guilty of these crimes, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I took chips.

THE COURT: What?

THE DEFENDANT: I took chips and guilty of -- of --

MR. CARROLL: Was taken on –- part of the robbery

was chips. So he's saying he did in fact take them. He

was just specifying what he took and that the balance is

also true. He's pleading guilty to it.

THE COURT: So this whole thing was precipitated by

stealing chips?

MS. DIAZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Carroll, do you join in your

client's waiver of constitutional rights and pleas of

guilty and admissions?

MR. CARROLL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'll accept the pleas of

guilty and admissions of the special allegation and make

the findings and order on the change of plea form above

my signature. The pleas of guilty, the change of plea

form will be made a part of the record of this

proceeding.

Ms. Diaz, in light of the pleas and admissions, do

the People have a motion as to the balance of the

Information as against Mr. Zepeda?

MS. DIAZ: Yes, your Honor. Motion to dismiss the

balance in furtherance of the plea.

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THE COURT: Thank you. That motion will be

granted.

(Id. at 60-62.) 

Two weeks later, Carroll and Zepeda met to discuss his

confusion about the terms of the plea agreement. (Lodgment No. 10,

Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

21).) Petitioner maintains that he also spoke with Carroll on June

10, 2010, but was informed that there was little they could do at

that point to change the terms of the plea agreement. (Id. at 22.)

B. Sentencing Hearings

At Zepeda's sentencing hearing on June 11, 2010, he addressed

the court and raised concerns about Carroll's representation. (Id.

at 16.) He requested an extension of time for sentencing so that

he could hire a new attorney. (Id.) The court interpreted his

comments as raising a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Id. at 17.) At Zepeda's request, the court appointed a new

attorney for the limited purpose of determining whether Carroll

provided ineffective assistance in connection with Zepeda's plea. 

(Id.) The judge continued sentencing and did not accept documents

that Petitioner had brought with him to show his good character. 

(Id.) 

At the continued sentencing hearing on July 23, 2010, Daniel

Cohen represented Zepeda for the purpose of exploring a motion to

withdraw the guilty plea; Cohen informed the court that the

Petitioner did not wish to withdraw his plea. (Lodgment No. 15,

Rep.'s Tr. 2, July 23, 2010.) Cohen stated that he had reviewed

the transcript and spoke with the attorneys and Zepeda. (Id.) The

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judge asked Petitioner if Cohen's statements were true; he replied,

"Correct." (Id. at 3.)

The court proceeded to impose the stipulated sentence:

THE COURT: Mr. Zepeda, consistent with the

stipulated sentence that you signed up for, sir, as to

Count 1, the -- let's make Count 4 the primary term. 

That's the 245(a)(2). And this Court will select the

midterm of four years. Probation is denied.

Mr. Zepeda, and on the 245 you're committed to the

Department of Corrections for the midterm of four years. 

With the admission of the gang enhancement under

186.22(b)(1), there must be an additional five years

consecutive or in addition to the midterm as to Count 4

for a total term in Count 4 of nine years.

You also pled to the robbery, Count 1. And in that

count probation is denied. You're committed to the

Department of Corrections for the additional term of one

year. That's one-third the midterm for 211, and that

would be consecutive or in addition to the sentence

imposed in -- in Count 4 mainly because they were

separate incidents. But that's how you got to ten also.

So for a total term, sir, of ten years.

(Id. at 4.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Zepeda filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego

Superior Court on approximately June 30, 2011. (Lodgment No. 8,

Zepeda v. Warden, [HC 20593] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

1, 30-31).) The superior court denied the petition on August 24,

2011. (Lodgment No. 9, In re Zepeda, HC 20593, order at 5 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011).) On December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed

a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal; the

court of appeal denied it on December 29, 2011. (Lodgment No. 10,

Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

1); Lodgment No. 11, In re Zepeda, D061017, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct.

App. Dec. 29, 2011).) Zepeda filed a petition on April 2, 2012,

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with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v.

Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1).) The

California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment on

June 27, 2012. (Lodgment No. 16,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select supreme court; then

search by case number and follow to docket (visited December 16,

2013)).)

On October 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] and a "Motion for Leave to Stay and Abey

Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on Unexhausted Claims [ECF No.

4]" with this Court. The Motion to Stay and Abey was denied and

the Petition was dismissed without prejudice on October 17, 2011. 

(Order 3-4, ECF No. 5.) Petitioner filed his First Amended

Petition on March 20, 2012 [ECF No. 7]. The same day, he also

filed a another "Motion for Leave to Stay and Abey Petitioners Writ

of Habeas Corpus on Unexhausted Claims" [ECF No. 9]. On April 30,

2012, Respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus as Untimely Filed [ECF No. 14]" (the

"Motion to Dismiss"). 

The second request to stay the case was denied as moot because

Zepeda's claims had been exhausted. (Report & Recommendation Den.

Mot. Stay & Abey 4, ECF No. 21; Order Adopting Report &

Recommendation 3, ECF No. 30.) Petitioner's third request to stay

the case was filed nunc pro tunc to December 6, 2012 [ECF No. 32]. 

On December 17, 2012, the Court issued a report and recommendation

denying the Motion to Dismiss and an order denying Zepeda's third

request for a stay [ECF No. 33]. Judge Houston's Order Adopting

the Report and Recommendation was filed on March 11, 2013 [ECF No.

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40]. Respondent filed an Answer and Notice of Lodgment on April

17, 2013 [ECF Nos. 46, 47]. Petitioner's Traverse was filed nunc

pro tunc to June 27, 2013. (Mins., July 11, 2013, ECF No. 55;

Traverse 1, ECF No. 56.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or

a district court shall entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Zepeda's First Amended Petition was filed on

March 20, 2012, AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S.

at 204. 

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997), abrogated on other grounds, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000). As amended, section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

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to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not

required to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather,

a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore, 108 F.3d at

264. "[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id. (citing

Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin

v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Proper Respondents

In the First Amended Petition, Zepeda names "Steven Cooley,

The Attorney General of the State of California" as a Respondent. 

(First. Am. Pet. 1, ECF No. 7.) Yet Steven Cooley is not the

Attorney General of California. The Court infers that Petitioner

is attempting to name Kamala Harris as a Respondent. "A state's

attorney general is a proper party only if the petitioner is not

then confined, but expects to be taken into custody." Hogan v.

Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996); see Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, Rule 2(b), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2006). Because

Zepeda is already incarcerated, Harris is not a proper respondent. 

B. Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it

appears in its entirety in the First Amended Petition, provides:

Petitioner was convicted on the basis of a guilty

plea that was the product of ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of Petitioner's right to effective

counsel guaranteed by Amendment 6 to the U.S.

Constitution and a Fair Trial, as well as due process of

law safeguarded by the 5[th] and 14[th] Amendments. 

Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at

the pleading and bargaining phase.

(First Am. Pet. 6, ECF No. 7.) Zepeda also lists several cases

without comment. (See id.) 

In the petition he filed in the California Court of Appeal,

Petitioner elaborated on this claim. He alleges that unbeknownst

to him the plea agreement included an assault charge, stipulated

sentence, and would require him to register as a gang member. 

(Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 19, 25); see Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden,

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S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 11-13).)3 He

claims that he would have proceeded to trial if Carroll had

properly explained the terms of the plea agreement to him. 

(Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 25).)

Figueroa insists that the First Amended Petition contains

conclusory, vague, and speculative allegations that do not provide

a basis for habeas relief. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 8, ECF

No. 46.)4 Respondent argues that Zepeda decided not to proceed

with his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which demonstrates

that Petitioner "found no cause to complain of the plea." (Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 46.) According to Figueroa,

Zepeda has failed to provide evidence that he signed a blank plea

agreement form. (Id.) Further, Petitioner initialed and signed

the plea form, declaring under penalty of perjury that he read and

understood the offer. (Id.)

Respondent contends that the trial judge explained the plea

bargain to Zepeda, who acknowledged reading and understanding its

terms. (Id.) These terms, Figueroa submits, included the

3

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state habeas corpus petitions, the Court will only address those

that fall under the umbrella of the specific ineffective assistance

of counsel claim raised in his federal petition: that counsel

provided ineffective assistance at "the pleading and bargaining

phase." 

4

 Figueroa's Answer references a habeas petition that was

allegedly completed by Zepeda and sent to Respondent, but never

filed with this Court. (See id. at 10-11; Lodgment No. 14, Zepeda

v. Figueroa (unfiled petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The

ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in the unfiled

petition contains the same assertions as the petition Zepeda filed

with the California Court of Appeal. (Compare Lodgment No. 14,

Zepeda v. Figueroa (unfiled petition for writ of habeas corpus at

14-16), with Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition

for writ of habeas corpus at 19-26).)

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stipulated sentence and waiver of Zepeda's rights. (Id.) 

Respondent alleges that all of the evidence shows that Petitioner

understood the terms of the agreement, and there was no discussion

of the possibility of probation. (Id.) Finally, Figueroa

maintains that reasonable jurists could agree with the state

courts' opinions, precluding habeas relief here. (Id. at 17.)

In his Traverse, Zepeda asserts that Carroll did not "follow

the proper procedures regarding the issuance of pleas, and in

accordance to the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . ." (Traverse

10, ECF No. 56.) Petitioner argues that his affidavit, Elizabeth

Ochoa's affidavit,5 and the June 10, 2010 Reporter's Transcript

demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas relief. (Traverse 10-11,

ECF No. 56.)

The last state court to address the merits of Zepeda's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was the California Court of

Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 11, In re Zepeda, D061017, slip op. at

1-2.) This Court examines that decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 806 (1991). The appellate court found that Carroll's

performance was not deficient:

A review of the record reveals that the plea

agreement was explained to petitioner and that he asked

for time to think about the agreement and talk it over

with his sister, and the court granted petitioner an

extra day to consider the plea. The plea agreement

indicates that he entered his "plea freely and

voluntarily, without fear of threat to [him] or anyone

close to [him]" and petitioner initialed a box indicating

the stipulated 10-year term and explaining its

5

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statement from his sister claiming that she saw Carroll provide

Petitioner with a blank plea agreement form to sign and did not

tell him that he was agreeing to plead guilty to an assault charge. 

(See Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 87-88).) Petitioner did not include a

copy of his sister's statements with his federal petition. 

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calculation. The plea hearing also shows that the court

went over the plea agreement with petitioner and that he

understood he would receive the stipulated sentence. 

Petitioner waived his rights and pleaded guilty. The

record also shows that, after pleading guilty, the court

appointed another attorney for petitioner to explore a

motion to withdraw the plea. After consultation with the

attorney, petitioner indicated he did not want to move to

withdraw his plea, and he was sentenced.

. . . .

Counsel was not deficient by warning petitioner that

he could receive a harsher sentence considering the

prosecution dismissed additional counts in exchange for

the plea. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 446 U.S. 668,

687.)

(Lodgment No. 11, In re Zepeda, D061017, slip op. at 1-2.) The

court did not address whether Zepeda suffered any prejudice as a

result of Carroll's conduct. (See id.) 

"It is well-settled that '[c]onclusory allegations which are

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant

habeas relief.'" Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also

Foote v. Del Papa, 244 F. App'x 74, 80 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding

that conclusory allegations in a habeas petition do not warrant

relief, even where the petitioner includes factual assertions in a

traverse). To plead a sufficient claim for relief, Zepeda "'must

point to errors or omissions in the record on appeal that establish

that he did not receive adequate representation.'" United States

v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United

States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985)). Vague and

speculative assertions of counsel's deficient performance do not

fulfill the burdens that the Supreme Court established in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Id.)

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As to claim one, the First Amended Petition is completely void

of any factual allegations. The two-sentence claim does not

reference the record or give any indication of how Carroll's

performance was inadequate or resulted in prejudice. (First Am.

Pet. 6, ECF No. 7.) The Court therefore recommends that Zepeda's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim be DENIED on this basis.

Alternatively, the Court will consider the merits of

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim by looking to

the factual allegations in his state habeas corpus petitions. For

ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for federal

habeas relief, Zepeda must satisfy the two-part test outlined in

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, Petitioner must show that his

counsel's performance was deficient. Id. Second, he must

establish that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, Zepeda need only

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different absent the error. Williams,

529 U.S. at 406; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable

probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The United States

Supreme Court noted that "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is

never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371

(2010). 

In the context of federal habeas review, "[t]he standards

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,'

and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so[.]" 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011)

(citations omitted). "When § 2254 applies, the question is not

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whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland's deferential standard." Id.

Trial counsel is presumed to be competent. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. "To rebut this presumption, [Petitioner] must

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was unreasonable under

prevailing professional norms and was not the product of sound

strategy." Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 815 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). Counsel's representation

is deficient if "it falls outside the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id.

"[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea

bargain context are governed by the two-part test set forth in

Strickland." Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405

(2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)); see

Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). To

demonstrate that the attorney's performance was deficient, Zepeda

must show that Carroll "made errors so serious that [he] was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Under the prejudice

prong, Petitioner must demonstrate "that if he . . . had received

accurate information and advice, he . . . would not have accepted

the plea." Cerda v. HedgPetch, Kern State Prison, 744 F. Supp. 2d

1058, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 56–57). The

Court must determine if Carroll's advice was inadequate when

compared to "objectively reasonable advice under prevailing

professional norms." Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 870

(9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

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Here, Zepeda admitted the factual allegations and pleaded

guilty to robbery and assault with a firearm. (Lodgment No. 12,

Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

60-61).) The prosecutor dismissed the remaining charges against

him after the court accepted the plea. (Id. at 62.) Additionally,

after becoming aware of Petitioner's initial ineffective assistance

of counsel allegations, the court continued sentencing and

appointed a new attorney to represent Zepeda and consider whether

to withdraw the plea. (Lodgment No. 5, Rep.'s Tr. 5-6, June 11,

2010.) At the continued sentencing hearing, Zepeda stated that he

did not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. (Lodgment No. 15, Rep.'s

Tr. 2-3.) 

A petitioner "bears the burden of rebutting the state court's

factual findings 'by clear and convincing evidence.'" Burt v.

Titlow, __ U.S. __; 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). Here, statements by

Zepeda's sister are the only evidence indicating that Petitioner

did not know about the assault charge or stipulated sentence. See

Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 87-88).) "'[A] state-court factual determination

is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'" Id.

(quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010)). The court of

appeal weighed the evidence and rejected Zepeda's claim. In light

of the evidence supporting the state courts' decisions, their

factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2); see also id. § 2254(e)(1) ("[A]

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct."); Burt, __ U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 13 

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("[AEDPA and Strickland] do not permit federal judges to so

casually second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues

or defense attorneys . . . ."). 

Nor was the California Court of Appeal's decision contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner has not

established that counsel's performance was so deficient that he was

no longer acting as "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Attorney Carroll provided reasonable

advice by recommending that Zepeda plead guilty to the robbery and

assault charges in order to avoid going to trial on all charges. 

The state courts did not apply Strickland in an unreasonable

manner. See Cuellar v. Uribe, No. ED CV 10–1024–DOC (PLA), 2011 WL

891073, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011) (rejecting ineffective

assistance of counsel claim under Strickland where petitioner

followed counsel's advice to plead guilty to gross vehicular

manslaughter to avoid a potential murder conviction at trial);

Olsen v. Prosper, No. 2:04-cv-00640-ALA, 2008 WL 564823, at *7

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008) (finding no ineffective assistance of

counsel where petitioner pleaded guilty on advice of counsel and

was sentenced to six years, avoiding a possible twelve-year

sentence). For all these reasons, Zepeda's ineffective assistance

of counsel claim should be DENIED.

C. Claim Two: Coerced Guilty Plea

Next, Petitioner contends that he was coerced into pleading

guilty. (First Am. Pet. 7, ECF No. 7.) He explains his claim as

follows:

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Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a "packagedeal" arrang[e]ment that was coerced by the state in

violation of due process of law as guaranteed by

Amendments 5, 6 and 14 to the U.S. Constitution, as well

as the 8[th] Amendment defending against

disproportionate punishment. Specifically, counsel

misrepresented and failed to disclose the full terms and

consequences of the offer, both orally and written,

where the allegations and conditions of the offer would

be instituted at a later time without Petitioner[']s

awareness before the change of plea hearing. 

Petitioner[']s plea was the result of unconstitutional

coercion.

(Id.) 

Petitioner outlined the basis for this claim in his state

habeas corpus petitions. (See Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden,

[D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 13-18); Lodgment

No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 14-16).) There, he alleged that he was coerced into

signing the plea agreement because (1) he thought he would receive

a longer sentence if he did not sign the agreement, and (2) his

attorney pressured him to sign the agreement without disclosing all

of its terms. (Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017]

(petition for writ of habeas corpus at 13, 17); see Lodgment No.

12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 14-16).)

Respondent insists that the allegations in the First Amended

Petition are conclusory, vague, and speculative. (Answer Attach.

#1 Mem. P & A. 8, ECF No. 46.) Figueroa argues that the judge's

findings and Zepeda's representations while accepting the plea

bargain "'constitute a formidable barrier.'" (Id. at 17 (quoting

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).) According to the

Respondent, the record shows no evidence of coercion. (Id. at 18.) 

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Figueroa maintains that Petitioner initialed portions of the

agreement stating that he was not threatened and was voluntarily

pleading guilty. (Id.) Respondent urges that Zepeda's coercion

claim is also undermined by the fact that he was appointed a new

attorney to address his concerns, yet declined to withdraw his plea

at the continued sentencing hearing. (Id.) The record

demonstrates that Zepeda understood the entire written agreement

and chose not to withdraw his plea. (Id.) 

Petitioner responds in the Traverse by claiming that his

guilty plea was coerced because it was a "'blind-plea initiated by

counsel.'" (Traverse 12, ECF No. 56.) The California Court of

Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion on

Zepeda's coercion argument. (See Lodgment No. 11, In re Zepeda,

D061017, slip op. at 1-2.) Relying on the same facts described

above in the ineffective assistance of counsel discussion, the

state appellate court rejected Zepeda's coercion claim:

There is nothing to indicate petitioner did not

understand the agreement or that it was not knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily made. Indeed, petitioner's

supporting documentation, showing his skills as a tutor

and his scholastic aptitude in high school and college,

including receiving top grades in English, belies his

contention that he did not understand the agreement. 

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474-475.)

(Id. at 2.)

In his federal petition, Zepeda does not explain what

misrepresentations or coercive statements were made, or what terms

counsel failed to disclose. (See First Am. Pet. 7, ECF No. 7.) 

His coercion claim lacks the necessary specificity required to

present a federally cognizable claim. See Foote v. Del Papa, 244

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F. App'x at 80; Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05. On this basis,

his claim should be DENIED. 

Even if the Court considers the more complete allegations from

Zepeda's state habeas petitions, he is not entitled to relief on

this ground. "An involuntary guilty plea is 'a constitutionally

inadequate basis for imprisonment.'" Brown v. Salazar, 431 F.

App'x 579, 579 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blackledge, 431 U.S. at

75). In Blackledge, the Court stated:

In administering the writ of habeas corpus . . . federal

courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all

possibility that a defendant's representations at the

time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the

product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress or

misrepresentation by others as to make a guilty plea a

constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 75 (footnote omitted). In Brown, the court

remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Brown had provided

(1) detailed allegations in his state and federal habeas petitions,

(2) supporting declarations from three attorneys who witnessed the

underlying plea negotiations, and (3) a corroborating letter from

his trial attorney; Brown included requests for an evidentiary

hearing with each habeas petition he filed. Brown, 431 F. App'x at

579. The Ninth Circuit found that the California Supreme Court's

summary denial was an unreasonable violation of clearly established

Supreme Court precedent and that the petitioner had presented a

colorable claim for relief. Id. at 579-580 (citing Cullen v.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Blackledge 431

U.S. at 75-76; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493

(1962)).

 "The voluntariness of [a petitioner's] plea can be determined

only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding

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it." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 749, 749 (1970). "[T]here

is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas." Corbitt v.

New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1978). But a guilty plea must

"'represent[] a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Hill v.

Valdez, 1:09-CV-00601-LMB, 2012 WL 5949205, at *3 (D. Idaho Nov.

28, 2012) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31

(1970)). An agreement to plead guilty is not voluntary if it is

the result of "physical or psychological coercion." Henderson v.

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 653 (1976). "[A] plea is not knowing and

voluntary if it was the result of defense counsel's advice

amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill, 2012 WL

5949205, at *3 (citing Hill, 474 U.S at 59).

"A state court's factual finding that a plea was voluntary and

knowing is entitled to a presumption of correctness by a federal

habeas court." Crayton v. Ryan, No. CIV 10–01409 PHX FJM (MEA),

2010 WL 5488470, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2010) (citing Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Cunningham v.

Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996)). "Factual findings

of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented

with clear and convincing evidence." Id. (citing Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41 (2005); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d

1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th

Cir. 2000)).

Here, Petitioner initialed the section of his guilty plea form

that states, "I am entering my plea freely and voluntarily, without

fear or threat to me or anyone closely related to me." (Lodgment

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No. 1, People v. Zepeda, No. [S]CD 221785 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 15,

2010) (plea of guilty/no contest -- felony at 1.)) Further, at the

change of plea hearing the trial judge reviewed the constitutional

waivers in the agreement and asked Zepeda if he understood and

wished to waive each right. (Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden,

S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 58-60).) Petitioner

answered yes to each of the judge's questions. (Id.) Zepeda

stated that he reviewed the agreement with his attorney, signed and

initialed the form, and understood that he was accepting a

stipulated ten-year sentence for robbery and assault with a firearm

for the benefit of a gang. (Id. at 58-59.) After waiving his

rights and stating that he understood the agreement, charges, and

sentence, Petitioner pleaded guilty. (Id. at 58-63.) The

prosecution dismissed Zepeda's remaining charges. (Id. at 62.) 

On the date set for sentencing, after Petitioner informed the

judge of his concerns about his guilty plea, the judge appointed a

new attorney to review the allegations and continued the sentencing

for thirty days. (Lodgment No. 5, Rep.'s Tr. 2-5.) At the

continued sentencing hearing, Zepeda stated that he did not wish to

withdraw his guilty plea, and the judge imposed the stipulated

sentence. (Lodgment No. 15, Rep.'s Tr. 2-4.) 

Petitioner relies on his sister's statements that she saw him

sign a blank plea agreement form under the impression that he was

pleading guilty to robbery with a gang enhancement. (Lodgment No.

12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 83-84).) Yet, his sister's statements conflict with the rest of

the evidence in the record. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74

("Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of

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verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are

contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.")

(citations omitted). 

Although Zepeda argues that his plea was the result of

coercion by his attorney, unlike the petitioner in Brown v.

Salazar, he has not provided sufficient allegations, declarations,

or corroborating evidence to support his contention. The

assertions that Petitioner was pressured into accepting a plea

bargain are generalized and lack factual and evidentiary support to

overcome the clear and convincing standard. The plea agreement

form and colloquies on April 15, 2010, when Zepeda pleaded guilty,

and on July 23, 2010, the continued sentencing hearing, demonstrate

that Zepeda understood the nature of the charges and the

significance of his plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401

n.12 (1993) ("The purpose of the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry

. . . is to determine whether the defendant actually does

understand the significance and consequences of a particular

decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.") 

Some courts have interpreted similar claims as an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. See Hill v. Valdez, 2012 WL 5949205,

at *14 n.8 ("[B]ecause under Petitioner's facts, counsel is the

primary factor allegedly causing the coercion, the underlying issue

is always ineffective assistance of counsel (no other cause of the

coercion was identified by Petitioner).") (citing Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)); Douglas v. Blacketter, No. CV

05-104-MA, 2007 WL 781457, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2007) ("As

petitioner has not rebutted with clear and convincing evidence the

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presumption of correctness afforded the PCR trial court's factual

findings, to be entitled to habeas corpus relief petitioner must

show the PCR trial court decision was an unreasonable application

of Strickland."); Frelimo v. Ayers, No. C97-0215 MMC, 1998 WL

730854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1998) ("A defendant who enters a

guilty plea on the advice of counsel may generally only attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.") (citations

omitted). As discussed above, the appellate court properly found

that Zepeda did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Lodgment No. 11, In re Zepeda, D061017, slip op. at 2.)

Accordingly, the holding of the California Court of Appeal is

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74; 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(d)(1). Nor is it an unreasonable determination of the

facts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, Petitioner's second claim

should be DENIED.

D. Claim Three: Guilty Plea Not Intelligent

Zepeda's third ground for relief is contained in two

conclusory sentences:

Petitioner[']s plea was not voluntary, knowing or

intelligently made, received by the court without

Petitioner[']s appreciation of its consequences and

absent constitutional waivers of a right to a jury trial,

to confrontation, and the right[]against compulsory selfincrimination in violation of Petitioner[']s due process

of law guaranteed by Amendments 6, 5 and 14 to the U.S.

Constitution. Petitioner[']s guilty plea was uninformed

and involuntary.

(First Am. Pet. 8, ECF No. 7.) In place of additional facts,

Zepeda simply lists five cases. (See id.) 

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Petitioner's state petitions provide some clarity as to this

claim. In the petition he filed with the California Court of

Appeal, Zepeda alleged that "counsel obtained Petitioner's

signature to a 'package-deal' plea bargain before any written

charges were written on the printed plea form, allowing the

District Attorney to institute an assault charge per Penal Code

245(a)(2) and restrictions, which Petitioner was not advised of

prior to the hearing." (Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden,

[D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 26).) He also

maintains that the trial court failed to properly explain his

rights to him. (Id. at 29.) Further, Zepeda claims that he "was

not made aware that as a direct consequence he would be limited to

work-time credits and programs, that he would have to register as a

gang member and would be denied probation and an opportunity for a

probation interview." (Id.) 

Figueroa insists that the federal claim, like the others,

should be denied because it is conclusory, vague, and speculative. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 8, ECF No. 46.) Even if the

pleading deficiency is overlooked, according to the Respondent, the

record shows that Petitioner understood that he was agreeing to a

ten-year prison sentence. (Id. at 20.) Zepeda initialed each

waiver provision in the form corresponding to particular

constitutional rights, and the judge explained each waiver to him. 

(Id.) Further, Petitioner was given court-appointed counsel and a

later opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea, yet Zepeda chose not

to do so. (Id.) He also confirmed under oath his waiver of his

rights. (Id.) 

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In his Traverse, Zepeda asserts that Carroll violated

California Rules of Professional Conduct 3-110(A) and (B) and did

not communicate formal offers from the prosecution. (Traverse 14-

15, ECF No. 56.) The last state court to rule on this claim was

the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 11, In re

Zepeda, D061017, slip. op at 1-2.) The court denied this claim,

stating, "There is nothing to indicate petitioner did not

understand the agreement or that it was not knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily made." (See id. at 2.)

"'[A] defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed

decision whether to accept a plea offer.'" Turner v. Calderon,

281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Day,

969 F.2d 39, 43 (3rd Cir. 1992)). "The longstanding test for

determining the validity of a guilty plea is 'whether the plea

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Hill, 474

U.S. at 56 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31). "A guilty plea

operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, 'with sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'" 

Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady, 397

U.S. at 748). The court must consider "whether the petitioner's

guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the

circumstances." Root v. Martel, No. CF 08-4219-SJO (OP), 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 142778, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2010).

 Some courts have stated that as long as a petitioner

"'understood the length of time he might possibly receive, he was

fully aware of his plea's consequences.'" Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d

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634, 635 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d

1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1981)). Others have explained, "The defendant

must not only want to plead guilty; he must have adequate knowledge

of what the plea entails as well as the intelligence to bring that

knowledge, along with all other pertinent knowledge, to bear on his

decision." Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992). 

But there is "'no fixed colloquy, no set of sequence or number of

questions and answers, no minimum length of hearing, no Talismanic

language that the judge is required to use.'" Dietrich v.

Czerniak, Civil No. 01-498-TC, 2007 WL 3046481, at *7 (D. Or. Oct.

7, 2007) (quoting Stewart, 958 F.2d at 1384).

Despite Zepeda's protestations, the record shows that he

"understood the length of time he might possibly receive, [and] he

was fully aware of his plea's consequences." See Barbee, 678 F.2d

at 635. Furthermore, the agreement expressly states that

Petitioner was pleading guilty to one count of robbery and one

count of assault with a firearm for the benefit of a gang. 

(Lodgment No. 1, People v. Zepeda, No. [S]CD 221785 (plea of

guilty/no contest -- felony at 1, 3).) The plea form also provides

that Zepeda would accept a ten-year stipulated sentence. (Id. at

1.) The form describes Zepeda's constitutional rights and includes

a disclosure of the multiple potential consequences of pleading

guilty, including having to register as a gang offender. (Id. at

2.) A waiver of rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), is also included in paragraph ten; it states that

Petitioner waived his right to have any aggravating facts used to

support an upper-term sentence determined by a jury. (Id.) In

paragraph thirteen of the plea form, Petitioner waives his right to

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a full probation report prior to sentencing. (Id.) Zepeda

initialed each of these sections and signed the form. (Id. at 1-

3.) 

At the change of plea hearing on April 15, 2010, the judge

explained Petitioner's constitutional rights to him and asked if he

understood them and agreed to waive them. (Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda

v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 59-60).) 

Zepeda confirmed that he had initialed the change of plea form and

agreed to waive his rights. (Id. at 58-60.) He then pleaded

guilty. (Id. at 59.) On the date set for sentencing, the judge

appointed a new attorney for the Petitioner and gave him thirty

days to reconsider his guilty plea. (Lodgment No. 5, Rep.'s Tr. 2-

6.) At the continued sentencing hearing, Zepeda informed the court

that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea. (Lodgment No.

15, Rep.'s Tr. 2-3.)

Zepeda's sister stated that Carroll told her brother that he

was pleading guilty to robbery with a gang enhancement, and Carroll

did not mention the assault charge. Her version is belied by the

statements Zepeda made under oath and the other evidence in the

record. The evidence supports the state courts' determinations

that the Petitioner was aware of the consequences he faced at the

time he waived his rights and accepted the plea offer. See Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) ("'It is well settled

that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused

person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be

collaterally attacked.'") (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

508, (1984)). "'[T]he concern with finality served by the

limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to

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convictions based on guilty pleas.'" Id. (quoting United States v.

Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)). The state court decisions

were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established United States Supreme Court law. See 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). Further, the courts did not unreasonably 

determine the facts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2). For these reasons,

habeas relief premised on ground three of Zepeda's First Amended

Petition should be DENIED.

E. Claim Four: Sentence in Excess of Statutory Maximum

In summary fashion, Zepeda alleges his fourth ground for

relief as follows:

Petitioner was sentenced to the upper term of the

three terms provided by the California legislature

without supporting jury findings to justify the upper

term. Specifically, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to

an unauthorized sentence in violation of due process of

law guaranteed by Amendments 5 [and] 14 to the U.S.

Constitution and the 6[th] Amendment right to a fair

trial.

(First Am. Pet. 9, ECF No. 7.) To support his claim, he cites to

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 499 (2000); Blakely, 54[2] U.S.

296 (2004); and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). 

(Id.) In his state habeas corpus petition, he elaborated that the

prosecutor "offered a stipulated sentence to the upper term of four

years per Penal Code 245(a)(2) and the judge convicted Petitioner

without stating the reasons for imposing such a sentence." 

(Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 31); see Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden,

S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 19-21).)

Figueroa insists that Petitioner's claim should be denied

because it is conclusory, vague, and speculative. (Answer Attach.

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#1 Mem. P & A. 8, ECF No. 46.) Respondent also contends that a

sentence in excess of the statutory maximum does not violate the

Constitution when a defendant agrees to a particular sentence. 

(Id. at 21.) Here, Zepeda stipulated to a ten-year sentence and

that was the sentence he received. (Id. at 20-21.) In his

Traverse, Petitioner states that he was misinformed of the

consequences of the plea, which resulted in a "sentence that was

not presented in the initial stages of counsel's consultation." 

(Traverse 16-17, ECF No. 56.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in the habeas petition he filed

with the California Court of Appeal, but the court did not address

the issue in its opinion. (See Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v. Warden,

[D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 31-33); Lodgment

No. 11, In re Zepeda, D061017, slip op. at 1-2.) He also raised

the claim in the petition he filed in the California Supreme Court,

but that court denied the petition without a reasoned opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 19-21); Lodgment No. 16,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select supreme court; then

search by case number and follow to docket).) Accordingly, there

is no reasoned opinion for this Court to defer to. 

"Under such circumstances, [courts] independently review the

record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law." Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d

1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,

982 (9th Cir. 2000)); see Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089

(9th Cir. 2002) ("(W)hile we are not required to defer to a state

court's decision when that court gives us nothing to defer to, we

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must still focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding

whether the state court's resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.")

(quoting Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely, the Court applied

Apprendi, and invalidated a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge

to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum

based on judicial factfinding. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Over two

years later, in Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270, the Supreme Court held

that California's determinate sentencing law violated Apprendi's

"bright-line rule" that facts in aggravation must be submitted to a

jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 291 (citing

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 307-08). The Court concluded that the

California determinate sentencing laws resembled those that the

Supreme Court invalidated in Blakely. Id. at 294.

"Following the decision in Cunningham, the California

legislature amended its statutes such that imposition of the lower,

middle, or upper term is now discretionary and does not depend on

the finding of any aggravating factors." Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d

624, 652 n.20 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see Redd v.

Trimble, No. 11-CV-1275 LAB (WMc), 2011 WL 7856208, at *4 (S.D.

Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). The amended sentencing scheme took effect on

March 30, 2007. See Kiser v. Gonzales, Civil No. 11–CV–1944 DMS

(NLS), 2012 WL 6641899, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012) (citations

omitted). 

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On April 15, 2010, Zepeda pleaded guilty and agreed to a

stipulated sentence of ten years. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Zepeda, No. [S]CD 221785 (plea of guilty/no contest -- felony at 1-

3; see Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 58-62).) Therefore, the new law applies,

and it was within the discretion of Petitioner's sentencing judge

to select an upper term. See Fernan v. Garcia, No. SA CV

11–983–DOC (PJW), 2012 WL 1440924, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012)

(citing Juarez v. Allison, No. CV 10–10001–GW E, 2011 WL 3654449,

at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011); Cal. Penal Code § 1170(b)). 

"[I]mposing the upper term based on the agreed-on terms of a plea

bargain does not run afoul of Apprendi." Fernan, 2012 WL 1440924,

at *5 (citing Graves v. Salazar, No. EDCV 10-2013-DMG (OP), 2011 WL

6942080, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011)). On this basis alone,

Zepeda's claim should be denied.

 Further, the Supreme Court has not held that Cunningham

applies to sentences resulting from plea bargains. See Morales v.

Hartley, No. C 12–5311 PJH (PR), 2013 WL 5799997, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 28, 2013); Redd v. Trimble, 2011 WL 7856208, at *4; Russell v.

Martel, No. EDCV 08–963 AG (FFM), 2011 WL 6817690, at *5 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 9, 2011); Woods v. Wong, No. 10–cv–00693 JLS (WMc), 2011 WL

6214393, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2011). Thus, the state court

did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. 

Even assuming the law was clearly established, many courts

have held that the Apprendi-Blakely-Cunningham tripartite is not

violated when a sentence is the result of the agreed-upon terms of

a plea bargain. See McGowan v. Bitter, No. 11CV1620-LAB (PCL),

2013 WL 2898185, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) ("[T]he right to a

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jury trial on aggravating facts [can] be waived by the

defendant."); Soto v. Cullen, No. C 10–0468 CRB (PR), 2010 WL

4942274, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (same); Amezcue v.

Almager, No. CV 08-3798-PA (JTL), 2009 WL 1513427, at *5 (C.D. Cal.

May 25, 2009) (same). Zepeda agreed to the factual basis of his

plea, waived his Blakely rights, stipulated to a ten-year sentence,

and received a ten-year sentence. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Zepeda, No. [S]CD 221785 (plea of guilty/no contest – felony at 1-

3.) For these reasons, the state court decisions were not contrary

to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, the Court recommends

that Petitioner's fourth ground for relief be DENIED.

F. Claim Five: Choice of Counsel

Zepeda's final ground for relief, labeled "Withdrawal/Vacate

Plea," is that Petitioner[']s conviction was the result of the

[court's] abuse of discretion in violation of due process of law

safeguarded by Amendments 6, 5 and 14 to the U.S. Constitution and

a Fair Trial. (First Am. Pet. 10, ECF No. 7.) He also lists four

California and two federal cases without discussion. (See id.) 

According to Figueroa, all of Zepeda's claims are conclusory,

vague, and speculative. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 8, ECF No.

46.) Zepeda explains the factual basis for the fifth claim in his

Traverse. There, he asserts that the trial court denied him

"counsel of choice" prior to imposing his sentence. (Traverse 17,

ECF No. 56.) Petitioner submits that he had a private attorney

throughout his case and requested a continuance so that he could

hire new counsel. (Id. at 18.) Zepeda argues that he was

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prejudiced because the right to hire the attorney of his choice is

"regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee." 

(Id. (citations omitted).)

Respondent insists that Petitioner's allegations are also

factually wrong. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 21, ECF No. 46.) 

Figueroa states that Zepeda was represented by private counsel at

the first sentencing hearing and requested time to hire a new

attorney. (Id.) But once Petitioner learned that he would be

remanded to custody, he requested that the court appoint an

attorney instead. (Id. at 21-22 (citing Lodgment No. 5, Rep.'s Tr.

5).) Respondent maintains that the court did not prevent Zepeda

from hiring a private attorney, as he had until the continued

sentencing hearing to do so. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner chose not to

hire new counsel. (Id.)

Petitioner admits in his third motion to stay that this claim

is unexhausted. (Mot. Leave Stay & Abey 4, ECF No. 32.) Indeed,

the record supports this contention. (See generally Lodgment No.

12, Zepeda v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 10-24).) Because Zepeda's First Amended Petition contains both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, the Petition is "mixed." See

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).

Typically, mixed petitions should be dismissed. Id. at 522. 

Yet, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on

the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(b)(2). Courts may only deny an unexhausted claim on the

merits if it is "perfectly clear" that the claim is not a

"colorable federal claim." Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624

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(9th Cir. 2005). Unexhausted claims are reviewed de novo where

there is no reasoned state court decision addressing that claim. 

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. The Court therefore reviews this claim

de novo.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 

U.S. Const. amend. VI. Included in the right to counsel "is the

right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to

choose who will represent him." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.

153, 159 (1988)). "'[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant

the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom

that defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to represent

the defendant even though he is without funds.'" Id. (quoting

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25

(1989)). Additionally, a criminal defendant "should be afforded a

fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).

Although the right to one's counsel of choice "is comprehended

by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to

guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather

than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by

the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 (citing Morris

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745

(1983)). Rather, "the purpose of providing assistance of counsel

'is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair

trial[.]'" Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at

689). And when evaluating a Sixth Amendment claim "'the

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appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the

accused's relationship with his lawyer as such.'" Id. (quoting

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984)).

Although Petitioner insists that the trial court abused its

discretion and violated his due process rights, he fails to provide

any facts supporting this assertion. See Foote v. Del Papa, 244 F.

App'x at 80; Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204-05. Zepeda's

conclusory allegations are insufficient, and on this basis alone,

the claim should be DENIED. 

Alternatively, to the extent he argues that he was denied

choice of counsel, that claim is directly contradicted by the

record. On July 14, 2009, Petitioner hired Carroll, a private

defense attorney, to represent him. (Lodgment No. 10, Zepeda v.

Warden, [D061017] (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 13).) 

Zepeda pleaded guilty and accepted the plea bargain on April 15,

2010, while still represented by Carroll. (Lodgment No. 12, Zepeda

v. Warden, S201310 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 57, 60-

61).)

Approximately one month later, on June 11, 2010, with Carroll

appearing as his attorney, Petitioner addressed the court to

complain about counsel's performance. (Lodgment No. 5, Rep.'s Tr.

2-3.) The judge noted that he was "bother[ed]" by the

"untimeliness" of Zepeda's request for a continuance because he

"had since April 15th when [he] changed [his] plea to get another

lawyer," but had chosen instead to proceed with Carroll's

representation. (Id. at 4.) Nonetheless, the court continued the

sentencing hearing until July 23, 2010, so that Zepeda could hire

another attorney. (Id. at 4-5, 7.) After Petitioner learned that

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he was being remanded into custody, however, he requested that the

court appoint counsel. (Id. at 5.) The court appointed counsel to

review the record and "report to [the court] whether or not there

is a legal basis to withdraw [Petitioner's] plea of guilty." (Id.

at 6.) At the continued sentencing hearing, Zepeda decided not to

pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the court proceeded

with sentencing. (Lodgment No. 15, Rep.'s Tr. 2-4.)

Petitioner has failed to show that he was "erroneously

prevented from being represented" by his attorney of choice. See

Figueroa v. Cate, 12-CV-00416-H (BLM), 2013 WL 1411988, at *5 (S.D.

Cal. Apr. 8, 2013) (quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). 

Quite the contrary; the trial court continued Zepeda's sentencing

hearing so he could obtain a new attorney and appointed an attorney

at Petitioner's request. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; see also

Figueroa, 2013 WL 1411988, at *5 ("[T]he right is not absolute, and

must be balanced against the needs of fairness and the needs of

[the court's] calendar. Trial courts are granted extreme latitude

in balancing these interests.") (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Considering the "extreme latitude" granted to

trial courts and the steps taken to allow Petitioner to hire a new

attorney, Zepeda's claim that he was denied the right to the

counsel of his choice should be DENIED.

G. Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, in his Traverse Petitioner requests an evidentiary

hearing. (Traverse 3, ECF No. 56.) He does not present any facts

that would warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay v.

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the

petitioner must demonstrate he failed to develop the factual basis

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of his claims in state court and that his request comes within one

of two exceptions in § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B)). If the factual

basis for the claim was developed in state court, the federal 

court considers whether a hearing is required under Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078

(9th Cir. 1999). Zepeda has not carried his burden. His request

for an evidentiary hearing is therefore DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Zepeda's First Amended Petition

[ECF No. 7] should be DENIED. This Report and Recommendation will

be submitted to the United States District judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties on or before February 3, 2014. The document should

be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any Reply

to the objections shall be served and filed on or before February

17, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 2, 2014 ____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Houston

All Parties of Record

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