Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02691/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02691-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CURTIS CLIFFORD INGRAM, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

K. STERLING, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14-cv-02691-GPC (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS PORTIONS OF 

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 22) 

 Plaintiff Curtis Clifford Ingram (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff 

commenced this action on November 12, 2014, in which he asserted a variety of claims 

against Defendants K. Sterling, K. Balakian, K.A. Seibel, and Warden Paramo 

(collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.)1

 On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Second 

                                                                

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and 

Recommendation refer to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”) 

system, unless prefaced by a p. or pp. 

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Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants. (ECF No. 18.)2

 Pending before the 

Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s SAC. (ECF No. 22.) 3

 After a thorough review of the pleadings, the parties’ papers and all supporting 

documents, this Court hereby RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Portions of Plaintiff’s SAC be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART with leave 

to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History

 Plaintiff commenced this action on November 12, 2014, by filing a Complaint and 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On December 31, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 3.) On February 9, 2015, 

the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and, following an initial screening of the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), directed U.S. Marshal service of the FAC on Plaintiff’s 

behalf. (ECF No. 4.) 

 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC on May 4, 2015, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 10.) Defendants contended the FAC 

should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim in any of his three counts; 

and (2) the face of the FAC demonstrated that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies as to Count 3. (Id. at 2:1-4.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss on June 5, 2014. (ECF No. 13.) Defendants filed a reply on June 9, 2015. (ECF 

No. 14.) On December 15, 2015, the Honorable David H. Bartick issued a Report and 

Recommendation recommending that Judge Curiel grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

                                                                

2

 A corrected version of the SAC, which was utilized by all parties and the 

Court in addressing this motion, is on the docket at ECF No. 18-1. All references to the 

SAC in this Order, however, refer to ECF No. 18, unless otherwise noted. 

3

 Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (SAC 

at 2.) 

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the FAC, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 16.) 

 Judge Curiel adopted the Report and Recommendation on March 29, 2016, and 

granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff 

was given leave to file an amended complaint on or before May 1, 2016. (Id. at 22.) On 

April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed his SAC. (ECF No. 18.) Defendants filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s SAC on April 28, 2016. (ECF No. 22.) Defendants did not 

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims in Counts 1 and 2 against Defendant Sterling. 

(ECF No. 22-1 (“Mot.”) at p. 22.) Plaintiff thereafter filed an opposition and Defendants 

filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 23, 26.) 

 On May 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Default, arguing he was 

entitled to entry of default on Counts 1 and 2 because Defendants only filed a partial motion 

to dismiss. (ECF No. 25.) The Court denied the motion on August 16, 2016. (ECF No. 

28.) 

B. Plaintiff’s SAC

 Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at CSP-Corcoran. (SAC at 1.) The allegations in 

Plaintiff’s SAC stem from incidents occurring in April and October 2014 while Plaintiff 

was incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges three separate counts: 

 1. Count 1

 Count 1 of the SAC asserts claims for retaliation, and violations of Plaintiff’s right 

to free speech and right to redress grievances. (Id. at 3.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2014, Defendant Sterling, a library technical 

assistant, denied his attempt to obtain Priority Legal User (“PLU”) status, even though 

Plaintiff had a court order from the Central District of California allegedly demonstrating 

extraordinary circumstances warranting such status.4

 (Id. at 2, 3, 4.) Defendant Sterling 

                                                                

4

 Plaintiff attaches to the SAC a November 21, 2013 order from the Central 

District of California, which advised “the Warden and other custodial officials” that 

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allegedly told Plaintiff that “PLU is generally for lockdowns and modified program,” 

which Plaintiff alleges is contrary to California Code of Regulations §§ 3122(a), (b)(1) 

(b)(6).5

 (Id. at 6.) 

 Defendant Sterling’s response prompted Plaintiff to file a California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Form 22, which is an informal request for 

response. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff attaches his CDCR Form 22, dated April 2, 2014, to the SAC. 

(Id. at 6.) In the request, Plaintiff states that he was “erroneously denied PLU status” by 

                                                                

Plaintiff had two pending civil rights actions and one habeas corpus petition. (SAC at 4.) 

The order further states: “Plaintiff needs access to, among other things, all legal documents, 

copying services, writing materials, the prison law library, as permitted by prison rules, to 

properly and adequately represent himself in the pending proceedings.” (Id.) 

5

 California Code of Regulations § 3122(b) of Title 15 provides, in part: 

Inmates who have established court deadlines may apply for Priority Legal 

User (PLU) status to the prison law libraries. Inmates who are granted PLU 

status based on their application shall receive higher priority to prison law 

library resources than other inmates. All inmates who are not on PLU status 

are on General Legal User (GLU) status. 

(1) An established court deadline may be either a court imposed 

deadline for an active case or a statutory deadline. Inmates who 

apply for PLU status based on a court imposed deadline must 

show documentation from the court to verify that deadline. 

Inmates who apply for PLU status based on a statutory deadline 

must identify the legal rule that compels the deadline. 

. . . 

(6) An inmate may receive PLU status within 30 calendar days 

of his or her established court deadline unless the inmate can 

demonstrate need for a longer period of PLU status based on 

extraordinary circumstances beyond the inmate’s control. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3122(b)(1), (b)(6). 

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Defendant Sterling “under the unreasonable pretense that PLU status is generally for 

lockdown’s and modified program.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that he tried to give Defendant Sterling the CDCR Form 22, but was 

refused. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff forwarded the request to Defendant Sterling’s direct 

supervisor, Defendant Balakian, who Plaintiff believes instructed Defendant Sterling to 

respond. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sterling “failed to controvert Plaintiff’s 

verbatim account of what [Defendant] Sterling stated about the PLU process, and, instead, 

raised a moot issue concerning Plaintiff giving [Defendant] Sterling’s inmate clerk the 

informal request to give her, even though these same clerks handle and make copies of 

inmate litigants sensitive legal documents.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he re-submitted the 

informal response for supervisor review, but received no response from Defendant 

Balakian. (Id.)6

 

Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Sterling retaliated against him on April 2, 2014, for 

exercising his right to redress grievances and right to law library access, by instructing a 

trainee of less than a month, L. Acosta, to issue a CDCR 128A Chrono Report, alleging 

misconduct. (Id.) The CDCR 128A Chrono Report, which is attached the SAC, states: 

On Wednesday, April 02, 2014, at approximately 1315 hours, while 

performing my duties as Facility “D” LTA (A); I observed Inmate INGRAM, 

AE-6335 (D19-220L) entering the law library. During the time that INGRAM 

was inside the library, I entered the Staff restroom. Through the Staff 

restroom door, I could hear an escalating conversation between INGRAM and 

                                                                

6

 Defendant Sterling ultimately responded to Plaintiff’s April 2, 2014 CDCR Form 22 

on April 15, 2015, stating that clerks are not allowed to hand a CDCR Form 22 from an 

inmate to staff, in accordance with California Code of Regulations § 3086. (SAC at 6.) 

Rather, the forms must be given to personnel directly or mailed to staff from an inmate. 

(Id.) 

California Code of Regulations § 3086 of Title 15 provides, in pertinent part: “When 

seeking response to a written request for an interview, item, or service, the inmate . . . shall 

complete the Request for Interview, Item or Service form to describe his or her request. 

The inmate shall deliver or mail via institutional mail the completed form to any staff 

member who is able to respond to the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3086(e).

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my colleague Ms. K. Sterling who is the Facility “D” Librarian. The 

conversation was at such a loud tone, it was very discernable through the Staff 

bathroom door. I then came out of the restroom and advised INGRAM that 

he needed to step away from the out-of-bounds area that was clearly posted. 

INGRAM did not comply with my direct order the first time. I then ordered 

INGRAM a second time to leave the library to which he finally complied with 

my direct order and exited the library. 

(Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges the retaliation did not reasonably advance any penological goal 

and that it was reasonably inferrable the trainee issued the report at the instruction of 

Defendant Sterling. (Id. at 3.) 

 On April 5, 2014, Plaintiff attempted to renew his PLU status by submitting a PLU 

Request and Declaration. (Id. at p. 10, 12; ECF No. 18-1 at 4.) Defendant Sterling again 

refused to grant status. (Id. at 12; ECF No. 18-1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling 

“sought to make an incident alleging that Plaintiff was out-of-bounds,” and contacted 

custody. (ECF No. 18-1 at 4.) When custody arrived, Plaintiff explained the situation and 

handed a prepared CDCR Form 22 to one of the correctional officers, who hand-delivered 

it to Defendant Sterling. (Id.) 

In the CDCR Form 22, Plaintiff states that when he attempted to obtain PLU status, 

“[Defendant] Sterling became belligerent, refused to grant status, nor adhere to established 

rules or exception, and falsely accused [him] of threats, manipulation, etc., [and] when [he] 

tried to defend, explain, then [n]oticed that [he] would appeal to her supervisors.” (Id. at 

12.) Defendant Sterling responded to the CDCR Form 22 on the same day, stating that 

what Plaintiff presented for PLU status is not in accordance with Title 15, California Code 

of Regulations §§ 3122(b)(1) and (b)(6). (Id.) Plaintiff requested supervisor review on 

April 6, 2014, but Plaintiff alleges Defendant Balakian never responded. (Id. at 12; ECF 

No. 18-1 at 4.) 

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling retaliated against Plaintiff on April 

5, 2014, for seeking to redress/appeal another reasonable right to access by falsely charging 

him with a serious CDCR 115 Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) for “Disobeying a Direct 

Order.” (Id. at 3.) The RVR was signed by Defendant Sterling and dated April 11, 2014. 

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(Id. at 14.) In the RVR, Defendant Sterling states: 

On Saturday, April 05, 2014, at approximately 1030 hours, while performing 

my duties as Facility “D” rotation yard schedule; I observed Inmate 

INGRAM, AE-6335 (D19-220L) entering the Facility “D” Law Library out 

of his tier rotation yard schedule. I had already verbally counseled INGRAM 

on 04/02/14 and 04/03/14 regarding his unauthorized entry into the law library 

out of his tier rotation. I then gave INGRAM a direct order to exit the law 

library, at which time, he refused to comply with my order by becoming 

belligerent and argumentative with me for several minutes. I informed 

INGRAM that I would activate my Personal Alarm Device (PAD) if he did 

not leave. I then contacted the Facility “D” Program Office for further 

assistance, at which time, INGRAM voluntarily left without further incident. 

This concludes my report. Inmate INGRAM is aware of this report. 

(Id.) 

On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the RVR and the charges were 

dismissed. (Id. at 15.) The dismissal states: “[A] review of the yard schedule indicated 

that the top tier was out for a.m. yard, and [Plaintiff] is currently assigned to the top tier.” 

(Id.) Therefore, the hearing officer dismissed the charges “in good cause.” (Id.) The RVR 

was removed from Plaintiff’s Central File. (Id. at 17.) 

 2. Count 2 

Count 2 of the SAC asserts claims for retaliation, and violations of Plaintiff’s right 

to free speech and right to redress grievances. (Id. at 18.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that, following adjudication of the prior RVR in Plaintiff’s favor, he 

was instructed by custodial officials not to enter the law library on “off-tier” rotation, 

“without custody supervision and approval,” and to “ask [Defendant] Sterling for 

permission to enter.” (Id.) On April 26, 2014, Plaintiff contacted Officer Seagram and 

explained his intention to make copies at the law library and effectuate service of process. 

(Id.) Officer Seagram approved the request, but warned Plaintiff that if Defendant Sterling 

said “No,” that Plaintiff should leave the law library without further incident. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges he followed instructions and made the request to Defendant Sterling, which was 

denied. (Id.) He therefore left, “pending afternoon library session on Plaintiff’s tier 

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rotation.” (Id.) 

 That afternoon, Plaintiff went to the law library and processed two separate sets of 

items to copy, including exhibits from the dismissed RVR (for attachment to a CDCR 602 

Appeal) and a settlement conference request motion. (Id. at 18, 21-22.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Sterling, for the first time, handled his copy job herself, and in addition to 

making Plaintiff’s copies, made copies for herself. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff contends that 

although he watched her make copies for herself, she lied about making the copies and 

attempted to conceal the “illegally copied documents.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Sterling’s inmate clerks usually make copies. (Id.) 

 After making copies for both herself and Plaintiff, Defendant Sterling notified 

Plaintiff that he would be receiving another RVR for “Disobeying a Direct Order,” alleging 

that he was “out-of-bounds” again. (Id. at 18-19, 28.) The RVR, issued by Defendant 

Sterling on May 6, 2014, alleges Plaintiff “refused to sign the sign-in/sign-out sheet, 

entered a restricted area, and refused a direct order.” (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff contends that 

Defendant Sterling issued the RVR in retaliation for Plaintiff attempting to redress/appeal 

a reasonable right to library access. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was engaged 

in the protected conduct of filing a grievance at the time Defendant Sterling gave notice, 

and that Defendant Sterling’s copying of his documents for herself, was an attempt to 

“chill” his grievance process. (Id. at 19.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sterling further retaliated against him on April 26, 

2014, by issuing a CDCR 128A Chrono Report for documenting in the copy log book that 

she made copies of his documents for herself. (Id.) In the CDCR 128A Chrono Report, 

Defendant Sterling contends that Plaintiff “intentionally introduced false information on 

[a] document/record maintained by the CDCR’s Education/Library program” when he 

wrote “Ms. Sterling took copies (4) herself  of 602 exhibits” on the “Copy List” log. (Id. 

at 26.) Defendant Sterling further states that Plaintiff was in “direct violation of CCR 

Section § 3021” by intentionally entering and introducing false information upon a 

record/document maintained by CDCR’s Education/Library Program. (Id.) In the SAC, 

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Plaintiff alleges his conduct was protected because he was documenting Defendant 

Sterling’s conduct for appeal purposes. (Id. at 19.) 

On April 26, 2014, after Plaintiff finished at the law library, he submitted another 

CDCR Form 22, which was signed off by and delivered to Defendant Sterling by Sergeant 

Bettingger. (Id. at 19, 24.) He received no response. (Id. at 19.) 

 On May 10, 2014, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the May 6, 2014 RVR and the 

charges were dismissed. (Id. at 31.) The dismissal order states that “the Reporting 

Employee failed to identify the direct order given, and the direct order that [Plaintiff] failed 

to follow.” (Id.) The RVR was removed from Plaintiff’s Central File. (Id. at 31, 33.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that he submitted CDCR 602 Appeals on these issues on both April 

28, 2014,7

 and May 13, 2014.8 (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff contends his factual allegations of 

“Employee Misconduct – Course of Conduct” were misconstrued as a “Disciplinary” 

matter, and as a result, the merits of his claims were not reached. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the 

administrative appeals process was ineffective in addressing his retaliation claims. (Id.) 

 3. Count 3 

 Count 3 of the SAC asserts claims for retaliation, and violations of Plaintiff’s right 

to free speech and right to redress grievances. (Id. at 44-46.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that on October 17, 2014, Defendant Sterling retaliated against 

Plaintiff by falsely charging him with an RVR for “Behavior Which Might Lead to 

Violence.” (Id. at 44, 53.) As a result of the RVR, Plaintiff was placed in Administrative 

Segregation (“Ad-Seg”), his privileges were reduced, his job and pay were terminated, and 

he was transferred from RJD to CSP-Corcoran. (Id. at 44-45.) Plaintiff alleges this incident 

                                                                

7

 The April 28, 2014 CDCR 602 Appeal concerns the incidents on April 2, 2014 

and April 5, 2014. (SAC at 34-38.) 

8

 The May 13, 2014 CDCR 602 Appeal concerns Defendant Sterling’s ongoing 

conduct and references incidents on April 2, 2014, April 5, 2014, April 16, 2014, and April 

26, 2014. (Id. at 39-43.) Plaintiff sought to have it classified as a Staff Complaint. (Id. at 

40.)

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was part of an ongoing course of conduct of retaliation by Defendant Sterling and that if 

CDCR had properly characterized his earlier CDCR 602 Appeal, this incident could have 

been prevented. (Id.) 

On October 17, 2014, Plaintiff sought to make copies of a motion for one of his three 

pending Central District of California proceedings and to obtain a certified trust account 

statement to file an in forma pauperis application for a new case in the Southern District 

of California. (Id. at 44, 48-51.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling refused to process 

the application because she observed that he was attempting to initiate a case in the 

Southern District of California. (Id. at 44.) He further alleges that the following 

conversation occurred: 

Defendant Sterling: “Your application is incomplete.” 

Plaintiff: “How is that? I’ve filled out relevant sections.” 

Defendant Sterling: “You have to state your defendants.” 

Plaintiff: “No, I don’t! I’ve stated a Biven’s Claim. You can’t tell me how to 

litigate my case.” 

Defendant Sterling: “I’m not processing your application. I’m tired of going 

through this stuff with you.” 

Plaintiff: “Well, you haven’t seen anything yet.” 

(Id. at 44-45.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that no threats were implied or stated, and that Defendant Sterling 

did not activate her PAD at that time, per institution policy and procedure. (Id. at 45.) 

Rather, Defendant Sterling waited approximately five hours to file her allegedly false 

charges in an RVR stating that she was “verbally threatened” and did not feel safe around 

Plaintiff. (Id. at 45, 53.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sterling’s actions chilled his 

access to the courts. (Id. at 45.) As a result of the RVR, Plaintiff was placed in Ad-Seg on 

October 17, 2014. (Id. at 64.) 

 On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before the Institution Classification 

Committee (“ICC”) for an Ad-Seg review. (Id. at 45, 63-66.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

Seibel was in attendance and failed to respond, which resulted in Plaintiff being released 

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to a different facility pending transfer, with reduced privileges. (Id. at 45, 65.) He further 

alleges a subsequent “emergency appeal on this matter went unanswered.” (Id. at 45, 67.) 

 On November 6, 2014, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the October 2014 RVR and 

the charges were dismissed. (Id. at 45, 53-59.) The RVR was removed from his Central 

File. (Id. at 58.) Plaintiff contends that “[c]ustody is well aware of an on-going issue 

between [Defendant] Sterling and inmate litigants.” (Id. at 45.) Plaintiff lists cases and 

attaches letters and grievances involving Defendant Sterling, alleging that her supervisors, 

including Defendant Paramo, were aware of her conduct towards inmates and should have 

prevented her constitutional violations. (Id. at 44-45.) 

 On July 9, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Corcoran, allegedly as a direct 

result of the retaliatory conduct of Defendant Sterling. (Id. at 45.)9

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standards 

 1. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive 

merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion 

to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, courts may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the 

pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of 

the complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (citing 

Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978))). However, 

                                                                

9

 The ICC review states that Plaintiff’s transfer “is considered adverse because 

his behavior with Library Sterling is the cause of the transfer.” (SAC at 65.) 

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exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally undermine the 

complaint’s allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including . . . details contrary 

to his claims.” (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 

contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”))). 

 A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ 

[Citation omitted.] A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556, 570). 

 “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 

(citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (on motion to dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). 

 Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

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must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 

of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when plaintiffs have 

not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must 

be dismissed.”)). 

 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

 2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions

 “In a civil rights case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–Panahi 

v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 

of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim 

under § 1983). 

 Nevertheless, a court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless 

it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing 

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Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

complaint may be dismissed, the Court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24. But where amendment of 

a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James 

v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Analysis 

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). It 

imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under 

color of state law committed the conduct at issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived the 

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), 

overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. 

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

Here, there appears to be no dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law 

in their official capacities as employees of RJD. “[G]enerally, a public employee acts under 

color of state law while acting in his [or her] official capacity or while exercising his [or 

her] responsibilities pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s claims turn on the second inquiry, namely, whether Defendants deprived 

Plaintiff “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of 

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim under Section 1983 for 

violation of Plaintiff’s right to free speech and right to redress grievances, and for deliberate 

indifference or supervisory liability. Defendants further contend that Count 3 must be 

dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 

1. Exhaustion of Remedies as to Count 3 

Defendants contend that Count 3 should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to 

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exhaust administrative remedies as to the claims asserted therein before filing suit. 

 a. Applicable Law

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion 

is “mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 739 (2001)); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). 

“In a typical PLRA case, a defendant will have to present probative evidence [in a 

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] . . . that the prisoner has failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies under § 1997e(a).” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). However, “in . . . rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the 

face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim.” Id. (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16; Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 

F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“[A]ffirmative defenses may not be raised 

by motion to dismiss, but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues 

of fact.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nly in 

rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a 

prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid 

excuse.”)). 

 b. Analysis

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff admits on the face of the SAC that he failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies as to Count 3 before commencing this action. The 

allegations in Count 3 stem from the incident between Plaintiff and Defendant Sterling on 

October 17, 2014, the subsequent RVR, dated October 17, 2014, and the ICC review, which 

occurred on October 23, 2014. (SAC at 44-45.) After the ICC review, Plaintiff alleges that 

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he sought an “emergency appeal” on the ICC action and RVR false charges, but the appeal 

went unanswered. (Id. at 45, 67.) 

Defendants argue that pursuant to CDCR’s inmate appeal system, which is codified 

in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, Plaintiff could not possibly have 

exhausted his appeal prior to the filing of his initial complaint in this action on November 

12, 2014. (Mot. at pp. 10-12.) Therefore, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count 3 

without prejudice, but without leave to amend. (Id. at p. 1.) Plaintiff argues in response 

that his allegation that there was an “emergency appeal” that went unanswered is sufficient 

to demonstrate Count 3 was exhausted. (ECF No. 23 at p. 8.) Plaintiff further argues there 

was an unavailability of remedy because of the failure to respond. (Id.) 

The Supreme Court has “held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies 

prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 

applicable procedural rules,’ [citation] -- rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the 

prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). The administrative appeal system for inmates in the California prison 

system is described in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations: “Any inmate . . . 

under the [CDCR’s] jurisdiction may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or 

omission by the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.1(a). For appeals submitted after January 28, 2011, inmates must commence the 

appeals process by submitting a CDCR Form 602 to the facility’s appeals coordinator 

describing “the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. at § 3084.2(a), 

(c). Among other requirements, the appeal must be “limited to one issue or related set of 

issues” and “list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the 

issue.” Id. at § 3084.2(a)(1), (3). 

If a prisoner is not satisfied with the first level response, he may submit a formal 

appeal for a second level review, which is “conducted by the hiring authority or designee 

at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden . . . or the equivalent.” Id. at § 3084.7(d)(2). 

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If the prisoner is not satisfied with the second level review, he may appeal to the third level 

of review by the Chief of the Office of Appeals in Sacramento. Id. at § 3084.7(c), (d)(3). 

“The third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on an appeal, and . . . exhausts administrative 

remedies.” Id. at § 3084.7(d)(3). 

CDCR has exceptions to the regular appeals process for certain types of appeals, 

including staff complaints, disciplinary appeals, and emergency appeals. See id. at § 

3084.9. An inmate alleging staff misconduct by a departmental employee, as defined by § 

3291(b), shall attach a § 3391(d) “Rights and Responsibility Statement” to the appeal and 

forward the appeal to the appeals coordinator. Id. at §§ 3084.9(i)(1). “All appeals alleging 

staff misconduct will be presented by the appeals coordinator to the hiring authority or 

designee within five working days.” Id. at § 3084.9(d)(i)(3). “If the hiring authority makes 

a determination that the complaint shall not be accepted as a staff complaint, it shall be 

processed as a routine appeal.” Id. at § 3084.9(i)(1). With respect to disciplinary appeals, 

“[a] disciplinary action cannot be appealed until the hearing process is completed, 

including any re-hearing.” Id. at § 3084.9(g)(1). In cases of emergency, such as the threat 

of death or injury or serious and imminent threat to health or safety, appeals shall be 

processed as emergency appeals with expedited processing. Id. at § 3084.9(a). 

Except for allegations of sexual violence or staff sexual misconduct, an inmate must 

submit his first level appeal within 30 calendar days of: “(1) [t]he occurrence of the event 

or decision being appealed, or; (2) [u]pon first having knowledge of the action or decision 

being appealed, or; (3) [u]pon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an 

appeal filed.” Id. at §§ 3084.8(b)(1)-(3). Generally, all appeals must be responded to and 

returned to the inmate by staff at the first level within thirty working days from the date of 

receipt by the appeals coordinator. Id. at § 3084.8(c)(1). An appeal accepted as an 

emergency appeal, however, is processed within a different time frame. Id. at §§ 3084.8(c), 

(f). “If emergency processing is warranted, the first level shall be waived and the second 

level review shall be completed within five working days.” Id. at § 3084.9. 

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Under the burden-shifting analysis recognized in Albino, Defendants bear the initial 

burden of establishing “there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner 

did not exhaust that available remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 

2015) (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 767 (9th Cir. 1996)). The failure to 

respond to a grievance makes remedies “unavailable” and therefore excuses the failure to 

exhaust. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Dole v. Chandler, 

438 F.3d 804, 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

Plaintiff alleges that he filed an emergency appeal after his ICC review, which took 

place on October 23, 2014. (SAC at 45, 67.) Plaintiff does not allege the date of his appeal. 

However, if he filed the emergency appeal, by which emergency processing was deemed 

warranted, on October 23, 2014, he should have received a response within five working 

days. Plaintiff alleges he did not receive a response. As he filed his initial complaint in 

this matter on November 12, 2014, more than five working days after October 23, 2014, 

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a failure to respond, which excuses his failure to exhaust. 

Defendants argue the face of the SAC shows that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged 

he was entitled to an emergency appeal, as he “would not have been subject to serious and 

irreparable harm by going through the regular grievance procedure timelines for his 

complaint . . . since Plaintiff admits that he would only suffer ‘reduced privileges.’” (Mot. 

at p. 12.) Defendants further argue that inmates can only grieve a transfer after a 

classification staff representative has actually issued a transfer endorsement, and Plaintiff 

was not transferred until July 9, 2015. (Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.9(h)).) 

Therefore, Defendants contend Plaintiff could not have grieved his transfer before the filing 

of his complaint in this matter. (Id.) 

As stated in Albino, “a plaintiff is not required to say anything about exhaustion in 

his complaint.” 747 F.3d at 1169. Thus, Plaintiff was not required to attach his emergency 

appeal to the SAC, which he has not, or allege the foundation for his emergency appeal, 

which he has not. Although Defendants argue the face of the SAC is clear, the Court 

disagrees. The Court simply does not have enough information about the emergency 

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appeal, the response or lack thereof, or the basis for the alleged emergency, to find that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims in Count 3 before filing suit. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that it cannot be determined at this stage based on a 

review of the SAC that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the claims 

asserted in Count 3. 

2. Retaliation (Count 3) 

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges claims for retaliation against Defendants in all counts. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Count 3. (Mot. at pp. 12-13.) 

 a. Applicable Law

 The Constitution provides protection against “[d]eliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of grievances. 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Franco v. 

Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988) (intentional obstruction of the right to seek redress 

“is precisely the sort of oppression that . . . section 1983 [is] intended to remedy”); Harrison 

v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm’n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986)). Indeed, “[o]f 

fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file prison 

grievances,’ Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to ‘pursue civil rights 

litigation in the courts.’ Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995).” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Soranno’s Gasco, 874 

F.2d at 1314 (“The right of access to the courts is subsumed under the first amendment 

right to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 

v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); Harrison, 780 F.2d at 1427-28). 

“Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable 

mechanism to remedy prison injustices. And because purely retaliatory actions taken 

against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those 

protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying 

misconduct they are designed to shield.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 

65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment 

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is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes. That 

retaliatory actions by prison officials are cognizable under § 1983 has also been widely 

accepted in other circuits.”)). 

 Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. 

Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000);

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“A prisoner suing 

prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against 

for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance 

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.”)). 

 Because retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate’s exercise of his 

legitimate First Amendment rights, such conduct is actionable even if it would not 

otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “[r]etaliation is not established simply by showing 

adverse activity by a defendant after protected speech; rather, Plaintiff must allege 

sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus between the two.” Rojo v. Paramo, No. 

13cv2237, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80156, at *12-13 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (citing 

Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest 

on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of 

this”)). “Thus, while ‘the timing and nature’ of an allegedly adverse action can ‘properly 

be considered’ as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, the official alleged to have 

retaliated must also be alleged to have been aware of the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Id.

at *13 (quoting Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1315-16; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“[T]iming 

can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.”); see also 

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “mere speculation that 

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defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient” and affirming summary judgment 

where the record contained “nothing . . . to indicate [defendant] even knew about [an] 

earlier [law]suit.”)). Moreover, a plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a 

“substantial” or “motivating” factor in the defendant’s decision to act. Soranno’s Gasco, 

874 F.2d at 1314. 

 b. Analysis

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim in Count 3 in 

connection with the issuance of the RVR related to the October 17, 2014 incident. (Mot. 

at pp. 12-13.) Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendant 

Sterling took adverse action against him by issuing a false RVR, which resulted in him 

being placed in Ad-Seg, the loss of his job and pay, and an adverse transfer to another 

prison, because he was trying to redress his grievances in federal court, and that this action 

chilled the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

has not sufficiently alleged “the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the allegedly 

retaliatory action of reporting [Plaintiff’s] comment for investigation.” (Id. at p. 13.) In 

particular, Defendants contend that “[r]eporting interactions with inmates that might be of 

a threatening nature for investigation serves the correctional goals of ensuring staff safety, 

and of reminding inmates that they need to be respectful when they interact with staff and 

need to think about how their comments might be interpreted.” (Id.) 

After review of the SAC, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the 

claimed adverse action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff 

alleges an ongoing course of conduct of retaliation by Defendant Sterling. (SAC at 44-45.) 

He further alleges that his interactions with Defendant Sterling on October 17, 2014 

occurred as he was attempting to initiate a Section 1983 civil rights suit, after filing multiple 

CDCR 602 Appeals naming Defendant Sterling, of which she was aware. (Id. at 44.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Sterling stated during their interaction that she was 

“tired of” Plaintiff, and did not activate her PAD after the alleged threat, as required “per 

institution policy and procedure.” (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling waited 

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nearly five hours before filing the relevant RVR. (Id. at 45.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges “[n]o 

threats were implied or stated,” and it was ultimately determined after a hearing that 

Plaintiff was not guilty, with the hearing officer believing that Plaintiff “was telling the 

truth and when he made the statement, he was referring to his civil case.” (Id. at 45, 53-

59.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant 

Sterling’s issuance of the RVR on October 17, 2014 was purely retaliatory and did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 

532 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that where a plaintiff makes allegations, supported by 

facts, that a defendant’s actions were retaliatory and arbitrary and capricious, he has 

sufficiently alleged the retaliatory acts were not a reasonable exercise of prison authority 

and did not serve any legitimate correctional goal). 

As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a retaliation claim in Count 

3. 

c. Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants further argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for the retaliation 

claim in Count 3. (Mot. at pp. 13-16.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 

government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-51 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be raised by a 

defendant.” Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6), “is not appropriate unless [the court] can determine, based on the 

complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies.” Id. 

“Determining whether officials are owed qualified immunity involves two inquiries: 

(1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts 

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the 

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right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case.” Krainski v. Nevada 

ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “For a constitutional right to be clearly 

established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 739 (2002)). Courts have discretion to address these two prongs in any sequence it 

sees fit. Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 573 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). 

As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a First 

Amendment retaliation claim in Count 3. Thus, the question of whether qualified immunity 

applies turns on whether Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. 

Defendants argue that the proper inquiry is “whether a reasonable prison librarian 

could have believed that she could report comments made to her by an inmate that could 

be broadly interpreted as threatening even though the comments could also be interpreted 

in a non-threatening manner.” (Mot. at p. 16.) The answer to this question, Defendants’ 

claim, “is by no means open and shut”; thus, Defendant Sterling did not have fair warning 

that her actions were unconstitutional. (Id.) 

However, a prisoner’s general right against retaliatory punishment was clearly 

established before the events at issue in 2014. Shepard v. Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 693 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 

F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 

that Defendant Sterling was purely motivated by a retaliatory animus, the Court denies 

Defendants’ motion on the grounds of qualified immunity at this stage. See id. (finding 

that if it was determined the defendant was motivated by a “retaliatory animus,” rather than 

relying on what he reasonably thought was a prison policy, the defendant would have been 

knowingly violating the law); see also Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289 (prison officials may not 

abuse valid procedures “as a cover or a ruse to silence and punish” an inmate). 

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have failed to establish they are entitled to 

qualified immunity on Count 3 at this stage. 

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3. Right to Redress Grievances and Right to Free Speech 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s right to redress grievances and right to free 

speech claims for failure to state a claim. (Mot. at pp. 16-18.) In the SAC, Plaintiff 

generally alleges Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his rights to redress 

grievances and free speech. However, Plaintiff does not separate his right to redress 

grievances and right to free speech claims from his retaliation claims. 

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2014, Defendant Sterling retaliated 

against him “for exercising his right to redress/appeal a reasonable right to law library 

access.” (SAC at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Sterling retaliated against him on 

April 5, 2014, “for seeking to redress/appeal another reasonable right to access issue.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling also retaliated against him on April 26, 2014 “for 

attempting to redress/appeal a reasonable right [to] law library access.” (Id. at 18-19.) 

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sterling retaliated against him on October 17, 2014 

when he attempted to make copies and obtain a certified trust account statement in order 

to pursue civil rights litigation in court. (Id. at 44.) 

As stated above, “[o]f fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment 

‘right[s] to file prison grievances,’ and to ‘pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.’” 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (internal citations omitted). “Without those bedrock constitutional 

guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices.” 

Id. “The right of access to the courts is subsumed under the [F]irst [A]mendment right to 

petition the government for redress of grievances.” Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc., 874 F.2d at 

1314. 

Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s right to redress grievances and right 

to free speech claims on the basis they fail as retaliation claims. Rather, Defendants 

generously construe Plaintiff’s SAC as alleging separate claims. As to the free speech 

claim, Defendants argue “Plaintiff does not allege that he was prevented from speaking out 

on any issue except perhaps for Defendant Sterling reporting that Plaintiff said, ‘Well, you 

haven’t seen anything yet.’” (Mot. at p. 16.) Defendants argue that an inmate’s verbal 

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challenge to prison staff is not within the scope of First Amendment protection. (Id.) 

However, the Court does not construe the SAC as alleging a separate free speech claim as 

to this statement. Rather, both the SAC and Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss make clear that Plaintiff’s free speech claim is subsumed within his First 

Amendment retaliation claim. (See SAC at 44-45; ECF No. 23 at 22-23.) 

As to Plaintiff’s right to redress grievances claim, Defendants argue that any 

allegation that they improperly responded to Plaintiff’s prison grievances fails to state a 

claim for violation of right to redress grievances. (Mot. at pp. 16-17.) Again, Defendants 

generously construe Plaintiff as alleging right to redress grievances claims, separate and 

apart from his retaliation claims. However, to the extent Plaintiff’s right to redress 

grievances claims are based, at least in part, on the allegations that Defendants improperly 

responded, or failed to respond, to his CDCR Form 22s and CDCR 602 Appeals, the Court 

agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (See SAC at 3, 19, 45.) 

“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” West, 487 U.S. at 48. Inmates, 

however, “lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific grievance procedure.” 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 40 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1982)) (“‘[A prison] grievance 

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon [an] 

inmate[].’”); Arceo v. Salinas, No. 11-cv-2396 KJN P, 2016 WL 1073257, at * (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 18, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 6897226 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2016) (“Even if the 

facility elects to provide a grievance mechanism, alleged violations of the procedures do 

not give rise to § 1983 claims because inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in 

jail or prison grievance procedures.”); Herrera v. Hall, 08-cv-01882-LJO-SKO PC, 2010 

WL 2791586, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 3430412 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 30, 2010) (“[A p]laintiff has no substantive right to a prison grievance system and . . 

. due process claims based on the denial of or interference with a prisoner’s access to a 

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prison grievance system are not cognizable” under Section 1983.). Therefore, Defendants’ 

involvement in handling Plaintiff’s administrative grievances, as alleged, cannot serve as 

the basis for liability in a Section 1983 action. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has not stated a free speech claim 

separate and apart from his retaliation claims. In addition, the Court finds Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim for violation of his right to redress grievances based on Defendants’ 

involvement in handling his administrative grievances. 

4. Supervisory Liability and Deliberate Indifference 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Balakian, Seibel, and Paramo are based on 

a theory of supervisory liability, which Plaintiff calls “deliberate indifference.” (See SAC 

at 2.) 

a. Applicable Law 

“Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates 

on any theory of vicarious liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645–46 (9th Cir. 1989)). “A supervisor 

may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, 

or (2) there is ‘a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct 

and the constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646); see also Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). In order to demonstrate a sufficient causal 

connection, “a plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was 

the proximate cause of the injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Redman v. Cnty. Of 

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). “‘The requisite causal connection can be 

established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others,’ . . . , or by ‘knowingly 

refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.’” Id. at 1207-08 

(internal citations omitted and alteration in original). 

 “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or 

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in 

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the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference 

to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (“[A] 

plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the 

supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her 

subordinates.”). 

 b. Analysis

 In the SAC, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants Balakian, Seibel, and Paramo 

are liable because they were deliberately indifferent to, and acquiesced in, Defendant 

Sterling’s alleged constitutional violations. (SAC at 2.) He further alleges that Defendants 

Balakian, Seibel, and Paramo were aware, or should have been aware, of Defendant 

Sterling’s actions, which included previous incidents with other inmates over a period of 

time, but failed to provide a remedy, training, or supervision. (Id. at 45-46.) 

 As against Defendant Balakian, Plaintiff alleges in Count 1 that after Defendant 

Sterling refused to accept his CDCR Form 22 on April 2, 2014, he forwarded the request 

to Defendant Balakian, who, Plaintiff believes, instructed Defendant Sterling to respond. 

(Id. at 3.) Defendant Sterling responded on April 15, 2014. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff further 

alleges that, after being dissatisfied with Defendant Sterling’s response, he resubmitted the 

request for supervisor review, but received no response from Defendant Balakian. (Id. at 

3, 6.) However, based on the attached CDCR Form 22, he forwarded the request for 

supervisor review prior to receiving a response from Defendant Sterling. (Id. at 6.) In 

addition, Plaintiff alleges he submitted his April 5, 2014 CDCR Form 22 to Defendant 

Balakian for supervisor review on April 6, 2014, but received no response. (Id. at 12; ECF 

No. 18-1 at 4.) 

Based on the foregoing, even liberally construed, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege 

that Defendant Balakian participated in or directed Defendant Sterling’s allegedly 

wrongful actions. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that upon being informed of the issue 

regarding Plaintiff’s PLU status, Defendant Balakian instructed Defendant Sterling to 

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respond to Plaintiff’s allegation that he was erroneously denied PLU status, which 

Defendant Sterling did on April 15, 2014. 

Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege Defendant Balakian 

knew or should have known of Defendant Sterling’s alleged unconstitutional conduct and 

acquiesced thereto. The two CDCR Form 22s Plaintiff alleges he sent to Defendant 

Balakian do not address his retaliation claims, or put Defendant Balakian on notice of his 

concerns about Defendant Sterling’s alleged ongoing retaliation. Both CDCR Form 22s 

only address the denial of his PLU status. (See id. at 6, 12.) The Court finds these 

allegations against Defendant Balakian insufficient to withstand Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. 

 As against Defendant Seibel, Plaintiff alleges in Count 2 that Defendant Seibel 

denied Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 Appeal (Log No. RJD 14-1835), dated May 13, 2014, at the 

second level of review on June 14, 2014, thereby siding with Defendant Sterling. (SAC at 

19, 41-42.) The appeal alleged “an ongoing and serious problem with [Defendant] Sterling 

[that] is reprisal and retaliatory in nature, for exercising the protected right of ‘Access to 

Court.’” (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff discussed in the appeal the incidents with Defendant Sterling 

on April 2, 5, 16, and 26, 2014. (Id. at 40.) The appeal was reviewed and determined not 

to meet the requirement for assignment as a staff complaint and was referred for routine 

appeal processing. (Id. at 41.) 

Plaintiff further alleges in Count 3 that Defendant Seibel was “[i]n attendance” at 

the October 23, 2014 ICC review, whereupon Plaintiff was released from Ad-Seg, assigned 

to a different facility pending adverse transfer, and had his privileges reduced. (Id. at 45, 

63-66.) Plaintiff alleges that during the ICC review, he addressed Defendant Seibel “when 

given permission,” and explained the situation. (Id. at 45.) He informed her that “but for 

the unreasonable misclassification of CDCR 602 Appeal/Grievance, resulting in 

unfavorable outcome and no remedy, that this current incident could have been prevented, 

and Plaintiff’s right to access to court . . . would not have been infringed upon.” (Id.) He 

alleges that Defendant Seibel’s failure to respond allowed Captain Stout to assign Plaintiff 

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to a different facility pending adverse transfer and reduce his privileges. (Id.) 

The Court finds these allegations insufficient to allege supervisory liability against 

Defendant Seibel. Although Plaintiff’s May 13, 2014 CDCR 602 Appeal apprised 

Defendant Seibel of ongoing retaliatory conduct by Defendant Sterling in April 2014, 

Plaintiff’s only subsequent allegation of retaliation occurred in October 2014. Thus, over 

five months passed between Defendant Seibel being on notice of retaliatory conduct and 

the next alleged incident occurring. Although a sufficient causal connection may be 

established where a supervisor knowingly refuses to terminate a series of unconstitutional 

acts by others, the Court finds the SAC does not sufficiently allege that Defendant Seibel 

knew the alleged unconstitutional acts were ongoing in October 2014. See Starr, 652 F.3d 

at 1207-08. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action 

against Defendant Seibel on a theory of supervisory liability. 

As to Defendant Paramo, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 

supervisory liability as to his First Amendment claim in Count 3. Plaintiff attaches three 

letters to the SAC addressed to Defendant Paramo and others from an inmate at RJD who 

assists other inmates proceeding pro se in legal proceedings. (SAC at 72-87.) The first 

letter, dated August 28, 2013, raises the issue of Defendant Sterling’s failure to maintain 

regular library hours, which hampers inmate access to the law library. (Id. at 72-74.) The 

second letter, dated August 29, 2013, raises the issue of Defendant Sterling’s conduct, 

including her lack of professionalism, “disparaging and rude interaction with inmates,” and 

inaccurate interpretation and lack of understanding of the law and appropriate filing 

procedures. (Id. at 75-81.) The second letter further states that Defendant Sterling’s 

conduct “has reached the constitutional dimension of state actor interference with the 

prisoners’ access to the Courts.” (Id. at 80.) The third letter, dated October 4, 2013, 

contends that “practically any interaction” between Defendant Sterling and inmates is full 

of “inconsiderate disregard, abundant sarcasm, and just rife with an obvious objective to 

find fault and suspect in everyone.” (Id. at 82-87.) The letter further states that Defendant 

Sterling “just won’t let it go,” and will “lay and wait for any opportunity to write up any 

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inmate for her construed of view any conduct at all . . . with her presentation of claims 

consistent yet whimsically changing as the evidence unfolds.” (Id. at 84.) The letter 

indicates a lawsuit will be filed naming Defendant Sterling and alleging that she has 

“violated the plaintiff’s right to access the Court.” (Id. at 85.) 

In addition to the letters, Plaintiff attaches to his SAC a CDCR 22 Form from another 

inmate, dated January 3, 2015, complaining of Defendant Sterling improperly reading his 

court documents, refusing to show him his copies, and making a copy of a complaint in its 

entirety. (Id. at 70.) In the body of the SAC, Plaintiff also lists orders in two cases which 

involved Defendant Sterling filed in the Southern District of California: Wiseman v. 

Hernandez, No. 08-cv-01272-LAB (NLS) (S.D. Cal.), and Gray v. Hernandez, No. 08-cv00147-JM (WVG) (S.D. Cal.).10 (Id. at 45.) 

Based on the August and October 2013 letters attached to the SAC, the Court finds 

the SAC contains specific factual allegations demonstrating that Defendant Paramo was 

put on notice of Defendant Sterling’s conduct prior to the alleged violations at issue in 

Count 3, and failed to act, thereby plausibly suggesting he acquiesced in the alleged 

unconstitutional conduct. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1209-11 (finding allegations of specific 

                                                                

10 In Wiseman v. Hernandez, No. 08-cv-01272-LAB (NLS) (S.D. Cal.), the 

plaintiff brought claims against Robert Hernandez, Warden of RJD, and Defendant 

Sterling, among others, alleging Defendant Sterling denied him access to the prison law 

library and access to the courts. Summary judgment was denied in that case as to 

Defendant Sterling, and the parties ultimately settled. (See ECF Nos. 145, 159.) In Gray 

v. Hernandez, No. 08-cv-00147-JM (WVG) (S.D. Cal.), the plaintiff brought claims against 

Robert Hernandez, Warden of RJD, and Defendant Sterling, among others, alleging 

Defendant Sterling denied him access to the courts. The plaintiff withdrew all allegations 

as to Defendant Sterling. (See ECF Nos. 61, 65.) 

The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in these cases. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; 

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (a court 

“may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record”); United States 

ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 

1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 

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incidents in letters and reports sufficient to put a supervisor on notice of a problem; and his 

failure to act plausibly suggests that he acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his 

subordinates). 

 In conclusion, the Court finds Plaintiff’s SAC does not contain sufficient factual 

allegations against Defendants Balakian and Seidel that would permit a claim to proceed 

against them based on a theory of supervisory liability. However, Plaintiff’s SAC does 

contain sufficiently detailed factual allegations to permit Count 3 to proceed against 

Defendant Paramo on a theory of supervisory liability. 

5. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s SAC be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

As discussed above, to the extent Plaintiff intended to assert free speech and right to redress 

grievances claims in his SAC, separate and apart from his retaliation claims, the Court 

recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted, with leave to amend these claims. 

The Court further recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims 

based on a theory of supervisory liability against Defendants Balakian and Seibel, as well 

as Counts 1 and 2 against Defendant Paramo, be granted, with leave to amend. However, 

the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 3 as to Defendants 

Sterling and Paramo be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s SAC. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that 

Plaintiff be afforded leave to file a Third Amended Complaint to cure the pleading defects 

mentioned herein. 

/// 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than February 17, 2017, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply 

to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than March 

3, 2017. 

 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 31, 2017 

 _________________________ 

 LOUISA S PORTER 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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