Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05065/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2008 Decided December 30, 2008

No. 07-5065

RUSSELL KAEMMERLING,

APPELLANT

v.

HARLEY G. LAPPIN, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

AND MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cv01389)

Jeff Kosseff, Student Counsel, argued the cause as amicus

curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were

Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, and Cecily E.

Baskir, Damon C. Elder, and Elizabeth A. Rose, Student

Counsel.

Russell Kaemmerling, pro se, was on the brief for appellant.

Oliver W. McDaniel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Michael J.

Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 1 of 27
2

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Russell Kaemmerling, a federal

prisoner, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his action

seeking to enjoin application of the DNA Analysis Backlog

Elimination Act of 2000 (“DNA Act” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 14135–14135e. Kaemmerling alleged that the Act violated

his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4, and the First,

Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The district court denied his request for a preliminary injunction

and then dismissed the action for his failure to exhaust

administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Although we

conclude that the PLRA does not require Kaemmerling to

exhaust administrative remedies on his challenge to the DNA

Act, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the case because his

complaint fails to state a claim.

 

I

Pursuant to congressional authorization, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (“FBI”) established the Combined DNA Index

System (“CODIS”), a national database containing electronic

DNA profiles of convicted offenders from the state and federal

systems, evidence from crime scenes, and unidentified human

remains that allows government officials to match an electronic

DNA profile to its donor’s identity for “law enforcement

identification purposes,” “judicial proceedings,” and “criminal

defense purposes.” 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a), (b)(3). Law

enforcement officers use the CODIS to match one forensic

crime scene sample to another, thereby connecting unsolved

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 2 of 27
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crimes through a common perpetrator, and to match evidence

from the scene of a crime to a particular offender’s profile,

thereby solving crimes committed by known offenders. See

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 819 (9th Cir. 2004).

Unauthorized uses or disclosures of DNA information stored in

the database are punishable by fines and imprisonment. 42

U.S.C. § 14133(c). 

To facilitate the efficacy of the CODIS, the DNA Act

directs the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to collect “a

tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample . . . on which a[n] . . .

analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) identification

information” can be carried out, id. § 14135a(c), from “each

individual in the custody of the [BOP] who is, or has been,

convicted of a qualifying Federal offense,” which includes all

felonies, sexual abuse, and crimes of violence, id.

§ 14135a(a)(1)(B), (d). Failure to cooperate in the collection of

a sample is a misdemeanor offense. Id. § 14135a(a)(5). The

BOP turns an offender’s sample over to the FBI, where an

analyst extracts the DNA from cells in the sample and then uses

short tandem repeat (“STR”) technology to identify non-genic

variants known as alleles at thirteen specific loci on the DNA.

See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir.

2007); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818. After creating the donor’s

unique DNA profile, the FBI then records a copy of the profile

in the CODIS. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

Kaemmerling was convicted of conspiring to commit wire

fraud, a felony offense, and is currently incarcerated at the

Federal Correctional Institution in Seagoville, Texas. Because

he has committed a qualifying offense, the DNA Act requires

the BOP to take a fluid or tissue sample from Kaemmerling for

DNA analysis and inclusion in the CODIS. In August 2006,

Kaemmerling brought suit against the Director of the BOP and

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 3 of 27
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the Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment and

injunctive relief against enforcement of the DNA Act. He

alleged that, as an “Evangelical Christian,” submitting to DNA

“sampling, collection and storage with no clear limitations of

use” is repugnant to his strongly held religious beliefs about the

proper use of “the building blocks of life.” According to his

religious beliefs, the collection and retention of his DNA

information is “tantamount to laying the foundation for the rise

of the anti-Christ.” Kaemmerling protested that enforcing the

DNA Act against him would violate his rights under the RFRA

and the First Amendment, as well as under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments. 

Four other plaintiffs joined Kaemmerling in his suit and

filed, along with their joint complaint, a motion for class

certification and a motion for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction to prevent the BOP from collecting their

DNA samples while the action was pending. The district court

denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order

and a preliminary injunction, discerning no imminent irreparable

injury. 

The district court subsequently dismissed the case without

prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under

the PLRA. The plaintiffs objected that the BOP “lacks any

authority to provide any relief or take any action whatsoever” in

response to their challenges to the DNA Act, leaving them with

no administrative remedy to exhaust. The district court

disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs must comply with

PLRA procedures even if pursuing administrative remedies

might be futile, because collection of their DNA samples is a

prison circumstance or occurrence. In its final order, the court

denied all other pending motions as moot, including the motion

for class certification.

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 4 of 27
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Kaemmerling timely appealed the dismissal, and we

dismissed the plaintiffs’ earlier interlocutory appeal from denial

of the motion for a temporary restraining order. Although all

five plaintiffs pursued the interlocutory appeal, only

Kaemmerling seeks review in the present proceeding. See

December 28, 2007 Order, Case No. 07-5065 (denying plaintiff

Daniel Siler’s motion for injunction because he “failed to note

an appeal in this action”). On appeal, Kaemmerling argues that

the district court erred in dismissing his case because the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply and that it erred

in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. The BOP

defends the district court’s PLRA decision and further argues

that, even if Kaemmerling is not required to exhaust

administrative remedies, we should dismiss his complaint for

failure to state a claim. 

II

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The

exhaustion requirement affords prison officials time and

opportunity to resolve complaints concerning the exercise of

their responsibilities before allowing the initiation of a federal

case. Exhaustion thus “has the potential to reduce the number

of inmate suits” by resolving problems at the administrative

level and “to improve the quality of suits that are filed by

producing a useful administrative record.” Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199 (2007); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25

(2002). 

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 5 of 27
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1

Footnote 4 of Porter makes it plain that the exhaustion

requirement of § 1997e(a) is quite encompassing enough to include

the litigation at bar.

Exhaustion is the “general rule” for litigation within Section

1997e(a)’s compass. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 n.4.1 Even if an

inmate believes that seeking administrative relief from the

prison would be futile and even if the grievance system cannot

offer the particular form of relief sought, the prisoner

nevertheless must exhaust the available administrative process.

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 741 & n.6 (2001). But a

prisoner must exhaust only “such administrative remedies as are

available,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), that is, those prison grievance

procedures that provide “the possibility of some relief for the

action complained of,” Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. The statutory

requirement of an available remedy presupposes authority to

take some action in response to a complaint. Booth, 532 U.S. at

736. Thus, if “the relevant administrative procedure lacks

authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever

in response to a complaint,” then a prisoner is left with nothing

to exhaust and the PLRA does not prevent the prisoner from

bringing his or her claim directly to the district court. Id.; see

Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (prisoner

must exhaust any prison administrative process that “was

empowered to consider his complaint and . . . could take some

action in response to it”); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113

n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If . . . the inmate’s suit complains that he

was beaten by prison guards, and the institution provides a

grievance proceeding for inmate complaints about food . . . but

none for complaints about beatings,” the inmate would not be

required to pursue the grievance procedure having “no

application whatsoever to the subject matter of his complaint.”).

This case is the rare one in which there is no administrative

process to exhaust because the BOP lacks authority to provide

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 6 of 27
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Kaemmerling any relief or to take any action whatsoever in

response to his complaint challenging enforcement of the DNA

Act. The BOP has no discretion not to collect Kaemmerling’s

DNA, as the statute’s mandatory language indicates and as the

BOP conceded at oral argument. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 14135a(a)(1)(B) (“[t]he Director of the [BOP] shall collect a

DNA sample from each individual” in BOP custody who has

been convicted of a qualifying offense), (b) (“the Director of the

Bureau of Prisons . . . shall furnish each DNA sample collected

. . . to the [FBI], who shall carry out a DNA analysis”); see also

United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 2003)

(the BOP “flouts the multiple layers of legal obligations placed

upon it” if it does not collect a DNA sample from felons while

in custody). Even under questioning from this court, counsel for

the BOP could not articulate a single possible way the prison’s

administrative system could provide relief or take any action at

all in response to Kaemmerling’s claim that collecting his DNA

would violate his statutory and constitutional rights. The BOP

has failed to carry its burden of showing an administrative

remedy available for Kaemmerling to exhaust. See Jones, 549

U.S. at 215-16 (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under

the PLRA).

 

This is not a situation like that in Booth, where the prison

grievance process cannot grant the exact type of relief the

inmate seeks or where the inmate believes pursuing the process

would be futile because it is unlikely to resolve his complaint.

Although the administrative process in Booth could not offer

money damages—the exclusive form of redress the inmate

sought—it did authorize at least some responsive action on the

inmate’s complaint of abuse, such as reassigning the abusive

guard. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 735-36. Here, the prison

grievance process cannot authorize any action on the subject of

Kaemmerling’s complaint because he challenges the statute’s

command that BOP collect his DNA sample. Kaemmerling

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2

We reject the suggestion of the BOP that our holding

conflicts with United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756 (5th Cir.

2003). There, the Fifth Circuit decided that the collection of a federal

offender’s DNA sample during incarceration was not part of the

offender’s sentence, subject to challenge on direct appeal, but instead

was a prison condition that must be challenged through a separate civil

does not complain about the method or timing of collecting the

sample, which counsel for the BOP suggested the prison might

have authority to change; he complains only about the fact that

the BOP will collect his DNA at all, a complaint for which the

BOP can offer no possible relief. 

 

Requiring an inmate to exhaust an administrative grievance

process that cannot address the subject of his or her complaint

would serve none of the purposes of exhaustion of

administrative remedies. When the BOP cannot take any action

at all in response to a complaint, it has nothing to offer that

could possibly satisfy the prisoner and obviate the need for

litigation. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. Requiring exhaustion

when no relief is available “is more likely to inflame than to

mollify passions, and thus is unlikely to ‘filter out some

frivolous claims.’” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525) (first quotation

omitted). And prison administrators are unlikely to spend

resources developing an administrative record when that process

cannot possibly lead to relief, nor would there be much record

to develop when the prisoner is challenging, as here, the

enforceability of a statute rather than the prison’s method of

enforcement. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525; Brown, 422 F.3d at

936. Finally, requiring exhaustion in these circumstances is not

necessary for protection of administrative agency authority from

judicial interference, because no administrative program or

mistake is at issue, nor can an administrative solution resolve the

complaint.2

 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). 

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 8 of 27
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action in accordance with the strictures of the PLRA. See id. at 761.

The court had no occasion to consider, and did not consider, the

availability of administrative remedies on Carmichael’s challenge to

the collection of his DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Act. See id.

at 759-61. 

III

We now turn to the BOP’s alternative ground for dismissal,

that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. The BOP raised this alternative basis for dismissal in

the district court, and both parties have fully briefed the merits

of the issue before us. We consider the sufficiency of a

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de

novo; therefore, we may independently assess the complaint and

need not remand at this stage for the district court to evaluate its

sufficiency in the first instance. Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29

F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.

106, 121 (1976). Dismissal of Kaemmerling’s pro se complaint

at this stage is proper only “if, after construing the complaint

liberally in [Kaemmerling’s] favor and granting [him] the

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts

alleged, he could prove no set of facts in support of his claim

that would entitle him to relief.” Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 684.

Even given the special liberality with which we consider pro se

complaints, we need not accept inferences unsupported by the

facts alleged in the complaint or “legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Kaemmerling’s complaint alleges violations of his rights under

the RFRA and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. After

thoroughly considering each of these challenges, we conclude

that none of them state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 9 of 27
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A

We begin with Kaemmerling’s religious claim, which fails

to allege a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Kaemmerling

contends that mandatory collection and analysis of his DNA

under the DNA Act burdens the free exercise of his religious

belief that “DNA sampling, collection and storage” “defile[s]

God’s temple.” Even assuming this is true, it does not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. The right of free exercise

protected by the First Amendment “does not relieve an

individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral

law of general applicability on the ground that the law

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or

proscribes).” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879

(1990) (quotation omitted). Kaemmerling does not suggest that

the DNA Act is not, in theory or practice, a religion-neutral,

generally applicable law, therefore he alleges no Free Exercise

violation, even if the Act incidentally affects religiously

motivated action. See id. at 878-81; Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d

1180, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding plaintiff failed to state

a claim for denial of First Amendment rights when he did not

contend that the DNA Act was not neutral or generally

applicable or that it was applied to him differently because of his

religious beliefs). 

 

B

But the First Amendment is not the only potential refuge for

Kaemmerling’s religious claim—the RFRA offers religious

exercise greater protection from intrusion by religion-neutral

federal laws. The RFRA prohibits the federal government from

“substantially burden[ing]” a person’s exercise of religion even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless

the government can demonstrate that “application of the burden

to the person– (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

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governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb-1(b); see id. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person whose religious

exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may

assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.”). Congress instructs

us that, in analyzing a claim under the RFRA, we must return to

“the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205

(1972).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 

1

To apply this test, we first must determine if Kaemmerling

alleges a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The

RFRA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of

religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7). A

litigant’s claimed beliefs “must be sincere and the practice[] at

issue must be of a religious nature.” Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281

F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Because the burdened

practice need not be compelled by the adherent’s religion to

merit statutory protection, we focus not on the centrality of the

particular activity to the adherent’s religion but rather on

whether the adherent’s sincere religious exercise is substantially

burdened. See id. at 1321. A substantial burden exists when

government action puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to

modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” Thomas v.

Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981), as in Sherbert, where the

denial of unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian who could not

find suitable non-Saturday employment forced her “to choose

between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting

benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of

her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand,”

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. An inconsequential or de minimis

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burden on religious practice does not rise to this level, nor does

a burden on activity unimportant to the adherent’s religious

scheme. See Levitan, 281 F.3d at 1320-21. 

 

In his complaint, Kaemmerling alleges that it is his sincere

religious belief that DNA is “a foundational aspect . . . of God’s

creative work” and that “DNA sampling, collection and storage

with no clear limitations of use, merely to satisfy the broadly

overreaching efforts of secular authorities, politicians and their

representatives” “defile[s] God’s temple, as represented by one’s

mortal body, filled with the Holy Spirit.” His complaint further

alleges harms arising from government possession and storage

of his DNA profile, including the potential that he could become

an unwilling participant in future activities that violate his

religious beliefs—including cloning experiments and stem-cell

research—and use of his DNA profile by the anti-Christ, who

according to Kaemmerling’s religious beliefs will in the future

rule the world and “make war against the saints,” “forc[ing]

everyone . . . to receive a mark . . . which is the . . . number of

his name.” 

As a preliminary matter, we pause to discern

Kaemmerling’s alleged religious beliefs. Kaemmerling makes

abundantly clear that he does not challenge the collection of any

particular DNA carrier—such as blood, saliva, skin, or hair—but

rather that, regardless of the medium by which the government

acquires access to his DNA, he objects to the government

collecting his DNA information from any fluid or tissue sample

they may recover. At oral argument, counsel emphasized that

Kaemmerling objects to any collection of his DNA profile at all,

even collecting DNA information from hair and skin that he

naturally shed onto his clothes then turned over to prison

officials for washing. (Indeed, the fact that he does not object

to the means of the DNA collection is the very reason that the

BOP can offer no remedy for purposes of exhaustion.) These

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representations make clear that Kaemmerling does not object to

DNA collection on the basis of bodily violation. He also

certainly does not object to the BOP sweeping up his hair after

a haircut or wiping up dust that contains particles of his skin,

even though those are acts of collecting bodily specimens

containing DNA, if the BOP does not extract the DNA

information contained in those specimens. His objection to

“DNA sampling and collection,” then, must be a more specific

objection to collection of the DNA information contained within

any sample. It is not penetrating the body or collecting bodily

material that Kaemmerling alleges violates his beliefs but rather

collecting the “building block of life” specifically. Given these

representations, we understand Kaemmerling’s objection to

“DNA sampling and collection” not to be an objection to the

BOP collecting any bodily specimen that contains DNA material

such as blood, saliva, skin, or hair, but rather an objection to the

government extracting DNA information from the specimen. 

Accepting as true the factual allegations that

Kaemmerling’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature—but

not the legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegation, that his

religious exercise is substantially burdened—we conclude that

Kaemmerling does not allege facts sufficient to state a

substantial burden on his religious exercise because he cannot

identify any “exercise” which is the subject of the burden to

which he objects. The extraction and storage of DNA

information are entirely activities of the FBI, in which

Kaemmerling plays no role and which occur after the BOP has

taken his fluid or tissue sample (to which he does not object).

The government’s extraction, analysis, and storage of

Kaemmerling’s DNA information does not call for

Kaemmerling to modify his religious behavior in any way—it

involves no action or forbearance on his part, nor does it

otherwise interfere with any religious act in which he engages.

Although the government’s activities with his fluid or tissue

USCA Case #07-5065 Document #1156078 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 13 of 27
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sample after the BOP takes it may offend Kaemmerling’s

religious beliefs, they cannot be said to hamper his religious

exercise because they do not “pressure [him] to modify his

behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.

Kaemmerling alleges no religious observance that the DNA

Act impedes, or acts in violation of his religious beliefs that it

pressures him to perform. Religious exercise necessarily

involves an action or practice, as in Sherbert, where the denial

of unemployment benefits “impede[d] the observance” of the

plaintiff’s religion by pressuring her to work on Saturday in

violation of the tenets of her religion, 374 U.S. at 404, or in

Yoder, where the compulsory education law compelled the

Amish to “perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental

tenets of their religious beliefs,” 406 U.S. at 218. Kaemmerling,

in contrast, alleges that the DNA Act’s requirement that the

federal government collect and store his DNA information

requires the government to act in ways that violate his religious

beliefs, but he suggests no way in which these governmental

acts pressure him to modify his own behavior in any way that

would violate his beliefs. See Appellant’s Br. at 21 (describing

alleged substantial burden as “knowing [his] strongly held

beliefs had been violated by a[n] unholy act of an oppressive

regime”). 

Nor does the criminal penalty for “fail[ure] to cooperate,”

42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5), in the collection of “a tissue, fluid, or

other bodily sample . . . on which a DNA analysis can be carried

out,” id. § 14135a(c)(1), substantially burden Kaemmerling’s

exercise of religion. He objects only to the collection of the

DNA information from his tissue or fluid sample, a process the

criminal statute does not address, and he does not allege that his

religion requires him not to cooperate with collection of a fluid

or tissue sample. Moreover, he alleges that even “involuntary

and/or forced collection” of his DNA would “violate[] [his]

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convictions.” The criminal statute is therefore no inducement

for Kaemmerling to cooperate and potentially violate his beliefs,

because he alleges that collection of his DNA sample would

violate his convictions whether or not he acquiesces in the

process. Thus, Kaemmerling does not allege that he is put to a

choice like the plaintiffs in Yoder, between criminal sanction

and personally violating his own religious beliefs. See Yoder,

406 U.S. at 218.

This case is instead more analogous to Bowen v. Roy, 476

U.S. 693 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that the state’s

use of a Native American child’s Social Security number in

determining eligibility for federal welfare benefit programs did

not impair her parents’ freedom to exercise their religious

beliefs, a tenet of which was that use of the number beyond her

control would “rob [her] spirit.” Id. at 696; see id. at 697, 699.

The parents objected to a statutory requirement that state

agencies “shall utilize” Social Security numbers “not because it

place[d] any restriction on what [they could] believe or what

[they could] do,” but because they believed use of the number,

an entirely governmental act, would harm the child’s spirit. Id.

at 699. The Court concluded that the government’s use of the

child’s Social Security number did not “in any degree” impair

her parents’ freedom to believe, express, or exercise their

religion, emphasizing that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply

cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its

own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious

beliefs of particular citizens. . . . [A]ppellees may not demand

that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by

refraining from using a number to identify their daughter.” Id.

at 699-700. 

Similarly, Kaemmerling’s objection to the DNA Act centers

on the government’s act of extracting and analyzing his DNA to

collect its information and store an electronic DNA profile,

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without suggesting that the Act imposes any restriction on what

Kaemmerling can believe or do. Like the parents in Bowen,

Kaemmerling’s opposition to government collection and storage

of his DNA profile does not contend that any act of the

government pressures him to change his behavior and violate his

religion, but only seeks to require the government itself to

conduct its affairs in conformance with his religion.

Kaemmerling thus fails to allege a substantial burden on his

religious exercise that would be cognizable under the RFRA.

To the extent that Kaemmerling challenges storage of his

DNA profile or retention of the DNA sample itself based on fear

of specific future misuses that would conflict with his religious

beliefs, we emphasize that we must consider the statute as it

exists and is applied today, complete with its protections against

misuse, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(b)(3) (limiting the permissible

uses of DNA profiles and stored samples), 14133(c) & 14135e

(providing criminal penalties for those who improperly disclose

or receive DNA information or samples), and we cannot pass on

hypothetical future harms. See Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499;

Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837-38. 

2

Even if Kaemmerling did allege a substantial burden on his

exercise of religion, his complaint would still fail to state a

claim for relief because the burden “is in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive

means of furthering that . . . interest,” satisfying the RFRA

exception. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 

The DNA Act serves the compelling governmental interest

in accurately and expeditiously solving past and future crimes in

order to protect the public and ensure conviction of the guilty

and exoneration of the innocent. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.

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17

253, 264 (1984) (“The legitimate and compelling state interest

in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” )

(quotation omitted); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 880-

81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The [Supreme] Court has repeatedly

adverted to the government’s ‘compelling interest in finding,

convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.’ Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986); accord Texas v. Cobb, 532

U.S. 162, [172-73] (2001); . . . McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.

171, 181 (1991); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210

(1987).”); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir.

2007) (“There can be little doubt that the government has a

compelling interest in rapidly and accurately solving crimes and

that having DNA-based records of the identity of . . . past

offenders . . . effectuates this interest.”). Courts have

consistently held that the Act furthers these compelling interests.

See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1188-89 (10th Cir.

2007) (DNA Act provides “dramatically effective tool” for

solving crime and exonerating the innocent); United States v.

Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006) (Act serves

governmental interests in solving past and future crimes and

protecting communities where felons are released); Johnson,

440 F.3d at 497 (Act helps “solve past and future crimes,” in

furtherance of government’s “duty . . . to protect the public”);

United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“The interest in accurate criminal investigations and

prosecutions is a compelling interest that the DNA Act can

reasonably be said to advance,” along with “protecting society

from future criminal violations.”); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838-39

& n.38 (Act furthers the “undeniably compelling” interests of

ensuring parolee complies with requirements of release, solving

past crimes, sheltering society from future victimization,

prosecuting crimes accurately, and absolving the innocent

expeditiously); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14135 Note(a)(1)-(3) (DNA

testing is “the most reliable forensic technique for identifying

criminals when biological material is left at a crime scene” and

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18

“can, in some cases, conclusively establish . . . guilt or

innocence” and in others can “have significant probative

value”); id. (a)(6)-(7) (“DNA testing can and has resulted in the

post-conviction exoneration” of innocent people and in some of

those cases “also enhanced public safety by providing evidence

that led to the apprehension of the actual perpetrator”). 

Fundamental to the Act is the government’s compelling

interest in accurately identifying convicted offenders. Banks,

490 F.3d at 1188 (“It is well settled that once an individual has

been convicted, his or her identity becomes a matter of

compelling interest to the government.”) (quotation and

alteration omitted); see Conley, 453 F.3d at 678 (government

interest in collecting DNA includes “the creation of a permanent

record of the identities of convicted felons”); Johnson, 440 F.3d

at 497 (“[T]he government is ‘quite justified’ in taking steps to

keep tabs on ex-convicts.”); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185 (“[T]he

government . . . has a compelling interest in the collection of

identifying information of criminal offenders.”). DNA profiling

furthers this interest in a way no other identifying feature can,

because DNA is unique to each individual (excepting identical

twins) and cannot, within current scientific knowledge, be

altered or disguised. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307

(4th Cir. 1992). 

Finally, courts also agree that the deterrent effect of

compulsory DNA profiling under the Act serves “society’s

enormous interest in reducing recidivism.” Kincade, 379 F.3d

at 838; see Johnson, 440 F.3d at 497 (“[T]he government is

‘quite justified’ in taking steps[, namely enforcing the DNA

Act,] . . . to deter recidivism.”); Banks, 490 F.3d at 1189

(“[C]ollecting DNA combats recidivism by solving crimes and

removing criminals from the streets and by deterring future

criminal acts by felons on release, presumably because the

felons know that they are more easily identifiable when the

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19

authorities have their DNA.”); Conley, 453 F.3d at 678

(government interest in collecting DNA for “deterrence of future

criminal acts by felons on release”); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186

(“[C]ollection of [DNA] will indirectly promote the

rehabilitation of criminal offenders by deterring them from

committing crimes in the future.”). 

Kaemmerling argues that the government has not

shown—and cannot show, at this pre-evidentiary stage of the

case—that the DNA Act serves a compelling interest as applied

to him, “a first-time offender convicted of a non-violent crime

that did not turn on DNA evidence.” The RFRA demands that

“the compelling interest test [be] satisfied through application of

the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant

whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially

burdened.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao

Do Vegetal (“UDV”), 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)). We must look beyond the “broadly

formulated interests justifying the general applicability” of the

statute to examine the interests the government seeks to promote

as applied to Kaemmerling “and the impediment to those

objectives” that would flow from granting him a specific

exemption. Id. at 431; see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.

We first note that Congress specifically amended the DNA

Act in 2004 to expand the qualifying federal offenses that

subject an offender to DNA sampling to include “[a]ny felony.”

42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1) (as amended by the Justice for All Act

of 2004, Pub. L. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, at 2270). The Act

previously only affected felons who had committed violent

crimes such as murder, sexual abuse, and kidnaping. See DNA

Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-546,

114 Stat. 2726, at 2729-30. This amendment is definitive

evidence that nonviolent offenders were in fact the intended

object of the compelling interests Congress sought to advance

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20

through the Act. 

Indeed, the interests served by the DNA Act are compelling

as to nonviolent first-time felons and violent recidivists alike.

Kaemmerling’s status as a nonviolent felon or first-time

offender in no way undermines DNA profiling as an effective

way to identify and “keep tabs on” him. See Banks, 490 F.3d at

1190. As unchangeable personal identifiers, DNA profiles can

do more than verify a suspect’s presence at the scene of a crime.

They can, for example, be used to identify a felon “who has

attempted to alter or conceal his or her identity.” See Jones, 962

F.2d at 308. The identification purpose therefore serves

interests aside from catching repeat offenders.

 The government’s compelling interest in accurately and

expeditiously solving crime, by matching DNA evidence to an

offender profile and by quickly excluding innocent offenders,

also applies to felons previously convicted of nonviolent crimes

and those who are first-time offenders. DNA exists in numerous

parts of the body that even nonviolent criminals leave behind,

including hair, saliva, and skin cells, and modern technology can

generate a DNA profile from just thirty to fifty cells. See Banks,

490 F.3d at 1190 (citing studies documenting “identifiable

quantities of human DNA on doorknobs, coffee cups, and other

common items”); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838 n.37 (“[A] new

crime lab planned for New York City expects to generate

profiles culled from as little as 6 cells’ worth of genetic material

collected at the scene of nearly every crime committed in the

city—including . . . property offenses like home burglaries and

auto thefts.” (citing Shalia K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of

DNA, a Smudge Could Trap a Thief, N.Y. Times, May 26,

2004)). Although it may be true that law enforcement officers

currently use DNA evidence more often in solving violent

crimes than nonviolent ones, the even stronger interest in

collecting the DNA of violent offenders does not diminish the

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21

connection between taking and storing the DNA of nonviolent

offenders and the government’s crime-solving interest. See

Amerson, 483 F.3d at 88 n.15 (“DNA can be, and is

increasingly, being used to solve non-violent crimes.”).

In addition, Kaemmerling’s status as a first-time offender

does not diminish the government’s crime-solving interest as

related to him. Even if Kaemmerling never re-offends, his DNA

profile would still further this purpose because law enforcement

uses the CODIS not only to identify a perpetrator but also to

swiftly and efficiently eliminate countless potential suspects. Of

course, all recidivists were once first-time offenders, so the

government also has an interest in determining if Kaemmerling

will be such a case, given that he has already demonstrated a

willingness to commit a crime meriting imprisonment. Other

courts addressing this issue have observed that nonviolent

offenders not only have a higher recidivism rate than the general

population, but certain groups—such as property offenders—

have an even higher recidivism rate than violent offenders, and

a large percentage of the crimes nonviolent recidivists later

commit are violent. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003)

(citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, P.

Langan & D. Levin, Special Report: Recidivism of Prisoners

Released in 1994, p.1 (June 2002)); Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191; see

Amerson, 483 F.3d at 89 n.15 (“[E]xperience indicates that

samples collected on the basis of convictions for nonviolent

offenses are actually among the most useful in solving crimes,

including violent crimes.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I),

at *29 (letter from Dept. of Justice))). Even white-collar

criminals like Kaemmerling appear to show a high level of

recidivism, with fraud and larceny offenders demonstrating only

slightly lower rates of recidivism than other offenders.

Amerson, 483 F.3d at 88 n.15 (citing U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,

Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computations of

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, at 30, Exh. 11 (May 2004),

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22

and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Profile of Nonviolent Offenders

Exiting State Prisons, at 2 (Oct. 2004)); see Conley, 453 F.3d at

679 (“[R]ecidivism in certain groups of white-collar criminals

is very close to the rate of recidivism in firearm offenders, and

is only slightly lower than felons convicted of robbery.” (citation

omitted)).

Finally, because law enforcement officials can find usable

DNA evidence related to both violent and nonviolent crimes, the

Act’s compelling interest in deterring recidivism applies

undiminished to Kaemmerling, who has already displayed his

need for a deterrent in his willingness, as mentioned before, to

commit a felony meriting imprisonment. Regardless of whether

a felon has been convicted of one or many offenses and

regardless of whether he is tempted to commit a violent or

nonviolent crime in the future, his knowledge that the

government has stored an unchangeable aspect of his identity

that can be used to ferret out his best attempts at concealing

future crime certainly furthers the government’s deterrence

interest. 

3

Having concluded that the government has a compelling

interest in extracting and storing Kaemmerling’s DNA

information for identification, we have no trouble concluding

that application of the DNA Act to Kaemmerling “is the least

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). A statute or regulation is

the least restrictive means if “no alternative forms of regulation

would [accomplish the compelling interest] without infringing

[religious exercise] rights.” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. While

we acknowledge the government’s argument that an intrusion

like drawing blood might be considered an acceptably minimal

invasion of privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, it

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23

does not necessarily follow that it is the means least restrictive

of religious exercise under the RFRA. 

 

It is not the method of collecting the tissue or fluid sample

for DNA analysis which Kaemmerling alleges burdens his

religious exercise, so this is not a case like United States v.

Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 2007), in which the

religious adherent’s beliefs prohibited him from giving blood,

but the court considered whether other methods of obtaining a

DNA sample would intrude less on his beliefs. Because

Kaemmerling alleges that collecting his DNA information at all

is what impedes his religious exercise, a less restrictive

alternative would exist only if some means of identification

other than DNA would accomplish the government’s compelling

purposes. 

No less restrictive alternative exists. As Congress stated,

DNA profiling is currently “the most reliable forensic technique

for identifying criminals when biological material is left at a

crime scene.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135 Note(a)(1). Perhaps more

importantly, it is the one identifying characteristic that criminals

cannot change, disguise, or hide to avoid detection. As the

Fourth Circuit explained,

It is a well recognized aspect of criminal conduct that the

perpetrator will take unusual steps to conceal not only

his conduct, but also his identity. Disguises used while

committing a crime may be supplemented or replaced by

changed names, and even changed physical features.

Traditional methods of identification by photographs,

historical records, and fingerprints often prove

inadequate. The DNA, however, is claimed to be unique

to each individual and cannot, within current scientific

knowledge, be altered. The individuality of the DNA

provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforcement

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24

effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even a

suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the

match that his DNA might make with a sample

contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime

within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair follicles.

The governmental justification for this form of

identification, therefore, relies on no argument different

in kind from that traditionally advanced for taking

fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force

because of the potentially greater precision of DNA

sampling and matching methods.

Jones, 962 F.2d at 307. Any alternative method of identification

would be less effective in identifying offenders and much more

easily capable of evasion, thus “adversely affect[ing]” the

government’s compelling interests. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236

(asking how the state’s “admittedly strong interest in

compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting

an exemption to the Amish”); see UDV, 546 U.S. at 431

(discussing Yoder); cf. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 (explaining

that providing Sabbatarian business owners an exception to

Sunday closing laws was not an adequate less restrictive

alternative in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), because

the exception appeared to present an administrative problem or

to afford the exempted class a competitive advantage rendering

the Sunday closing scheme unworkable).

C

Kaemmerling’s complaint also alleges violations of his

Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection and against selfincrimination and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. 

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Kaemmerling argues that the DNA Act violates the equal

protection component of the Due Process Clause because it

requires collection of DNA from felons who are incarcerated or

on supervised release but does not mandate collection of DNA

from “free” felons, who are no longer under the supervision of

the BOP. Because prisoners are not a suspect class, we must

sustain the statute’s classification “if there is a rational

relationship between the disparity of treatment and some

legitimate governmental purpose.” Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d

1294, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509

U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). Even if Congress has not articulated the

purpose supporting the distinction, we must uphold it “if there

is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide

a rational basis for the classification.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.

The DNA Act certainly passes the rational basis test. The BOP

exerts a measure of control over incarcerated felons and felons

on supervised release that it does not exert over felons who are

now out of the prison system, making it significantly easier for

the BOP to collect DNA samples from incarcerated and

supervised felons than from free felons. See Tucker, 142 F.3d

at 1300 (control over prisoner funds as compared to indigents at

large is rational basis for treating prisoners and non-prisoners

differently with respect to filing fees). Moreover, the statute’s

alleged underinclusiveness is not a basis for invalidating it,

because under rational basis review Congress may choose to

proceed “one step at a time,” applying remedies to “one phase

of one field [while] . . . neglecting the others.” Williamson v.

Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); see United

States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see

also Roe v. Carcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding

state DNA statute does not violate equal protection by targeting

incarcerated sex offenders but not prior sex offenders currently

residing in the community). 

 

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Regarding the privilege against compelled selfincrimination, Kaemmerling argues that the DNA Act is

unconstitutional because it requires him to give the government

potentially incriminating evidence for later use against him in

court. The Fifth Amendment privilege bars only compelling

testimonial communications from an accused, not making the

accused a source of physical evidence. Schmerber v. California,

384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). So the forced extraction of a

blood sample, to be chemically analyzed for alcohol content and

used against the accused, was not compelled self-incrimination

because “the blood test evidence, although an incriminating

product of compulsion, was neither [the accused’s] testimony

nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by

the [accused].” Id. at 765. For the same reason, a DNA sample

is not a testimonial communication subject to the protections of

the Fifth Amendment. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431

(6th Cir. 2008) (extraction of DNA does not implicate the

privilege because DNA samples are physical, not testimonial,

evidence); United States v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th

Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773-74

(7th Cir. 2006) (same); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340

(10th Cir. 1996) (same). 

Kaemmerling’s complaint also asserts that collecting a

sample of his DNA pursuant to the Act violates his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures because the Act unconstitutionally authorizes a blanket,

suspicionless search for general law enforcement purposes. But

we have already held, in a previous challenge to the DNA Act,

that “the Fourth Amendment . . . certainly permits the collection

of a blood sample [for DNA analysis] from a convicted felon . . .

while he is still on probation,” much less from a currently

incarcerated felon. Johnson, 440 F.3d at 497; see id. (“[T]he

Fourth Amendment does not require an additional finding of

individualized suspicion before blood can be taken from

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27

incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.”

(quotation omitted)); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530

(1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cell); Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (body cavity

inspections after contact visits in prison are not unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment). That decision, which accords

with the opinion of every court of appeals to consider the issue,

forecloses Kaemmerling’s claim. See Johnson, 440 F.3d at 496

(listing cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Weikert,

504 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d

674, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d

922, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2006). 

 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Kaemmerling’s

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and therefore should be dismissed. Dismissal of the case moots

Kaemmerling’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his

motion for a preliminary injunction, as he no longer has a

potential claim or continuing litigation and we have adjudged

him unsuccessful on the merits of his case. We affirm the

district court’s judgment dismissing Kaemmerling’s complaint,

but order that the dismissal be with prejudice.

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