Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.J. MCELROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY ADAM,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-03348-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

SECOND REQUEST FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 

TRO; AND TERMINATING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN 

EXTENSION FOR TIME

Plaintiff, a state prisoner who is currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”), filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against prison officials at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), where he was previously 

incarcerated. It seems that Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with adequate medical and 

dental care by Defendant Dr. Nancy Adam at PBSP. 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary 

Restraining Order (“TRO”).

1

 Dkt. 37. In its January 9, 2019 Order, the Court noted that

Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO was difficult to decipher, but it 

chose not to rule on that motion and, instead, it directed Defendant to respond to it. See Dkt. 49 at 

3-5.

On February 4, 2019, Defendant filed a response, and on February 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed 

his reply to the response. Dkts. 50, 51.

In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate a 

need for a preliminary injunction or TRO, and states as follows:

As noted above, Plaintiff’s request for restraining order contains only 

a few references to Dr. Adam which all correlate to Plaintiff’s 

treatment at Pelican Bay State Prison. (Docket No. 37, pages 4, 5 and 

6 of 11.) As the Court has noted, Plaintiff is no longer at Pelican Bay 

State Prison where Dr. Adam is employed. (Docket No. 15.) His 

 

1 The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s First Request for Preliminary Injunction 

and TRO (dkt. 29) because it had been made moot by his Second Request for Preliminary 

Injunction and TRO (dkt. 37). See Dkt. 49 at 3-4.

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United States District Court

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request for preliminary injunction and/or TRO does not indicate that 

he [sic] Dr. Adam is in any way responsible for his medical care at 

R.J. Donovan State Prison. Nowhere does Plaintiff describe 

irreparable harm that might occur to him if Dr. Adam is not enjoined 

or restrained by the Court. Plaintiff lists nine forms of relief in his 

request for preliminary injunction/TRO. (Docket No. 37 at 9-11.) All 

relate to current conditions or seek monetary damages. Only one, 

number 5, specifically relates to medical care. (Docket No. 37, 10:12-

15). There, Plaintiff makes a vague demand that “Medical 

Defendants and their department are required to meet plaintiff 

effective medical care necessities ‘promptly’ in accord with Exhibit 

B also see Exhibit A.” Plaintiff’s request for current medical care 

cannot properly be the subject of a TRO or preliminary injunction 

directed to Dr. Adam at Pelican Bay State Prison. Regardless of the 

nature of Plaintiff’s claims, a TRO or injunction directed at Dr. Adam

. . . 900 miles away from Plaintiff’s place of incarceration could not 

be narrowly drawn, or the least intrusive means necessary to correct 

any alleged violation of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate a 

need for a preliminary injunction or restraining order against Dr. 

Adam. 

Dkt. 50 at 6-7.

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO 

is procedurally deficient in that he has not provided specific facts in an affidavit or verified 

complaint that clearly show an immediate and irreparable harm will result before the adverse party 

can be heard in opposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). However, even if the notice problem 

could be solved, Plaintiff would not be entitled to interim relief because the motion is 

substantively deficient. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff does not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits 

and the possibility of irreparable injury without the TRO. See Winter v. Natural Res. Defense 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). As explained above, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at PBSP,

where Defendant is employed. As Defendant has pointed out, “Plaintiff’s request for preliminary 

injunction and/or TRO does not indicate that [Defendant] is in any way responsible for his medical 

care at [RJDCF].” Dkt. 50 at 7. And, “[n]owhere does Plaintiff describe irreparable harm that 

might occur to him if [Defendant] is not enjoined or restrained by the Court.” Id. The Court 

agrees with Defendant. After reviewing Plaintiff’s nine forms of relief requested in his pending 

motion, the Court also comes to the same conclusion as Defendant that they all relate to current 

conditions of confinement at RJDCF or seek monetary damages. See Dkt. 37 at 9-11. As to

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number 5 (listed as relief requested), which specifically relates to medical care, the Court finds 

that any request for current medical care at RJDCF cannot properly be the subject of a preliminary 

injunction or a TRO directed to Defendant at PBSP. Specifically, there is no showing that 

Defendant can or should dictate the medical care for a patient Defendant has not seen since 

Plaintiff was transferred out of PBSP, and there is no showing that Defendant has any control over 

Plaintiff’s medical care at another prison, i.e., RJDCF. The Court will not issue a TRO that 

Defendant is in no position to comply with, nor will it issue a TRO against non-parties, i.e., 

medical staff at RJDCF. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (restraining order binds only the parties, 

their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and persons in “active concert or participation 

with [them]”); see generally Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1138 (“When an inmate challenges 

prison conditions at a particular correctional facility, but has been transferred from the facility and 

has no reasonable expectation of returning, his [injunctive relief] claim is moot.”) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO is DENIED. Dkt. 37.

Also pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma 

pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the case without prejudice (dkt. 43), 

(2) Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment (dkt. 54); 

(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Penal/Pecuniary Sanctions [and] Further Relief from Defendant[’]s 

Delay and Failure to Produce Logical Reason[] of Delay/Costs” (dkt. 48); and (4) Plaintiff’s 

motion entitled, “Motion for Judgment Upon Clear Establishment Agains[t] Defendant[] and/or 

Counter Summary Judgment in Full Support” (dkt. 53). The Court notes that it has already 

granted Defendant’s previously-filed request for an extension of time to file a motion for summary 

judgment. See Dkt. 49 at 4-5. The Court has already set a briefing schedule directing Defendant 

to file a motion for summary judgment sixty days after the Court rules on Defendant’s pending 

motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the 

case without prejudice. See id. Thus, Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file a motion 

for summary judgment is TERMINATED as moot. Dkt. 54. 

The Court will rule on the other pending motions in a separate written Order. To date, 

Plaintiff’s “Motion for Judgment Upon Clear Establishment Agains[t] Defendant[] and/or Counter 

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Summary Judgment in Full Support” (dkt. 53) is not fully briefed as Defendant’s response is due 

on April 1, 2019, and Plaintiff’s reply is due April 15, 2019. The Court directs Defendant to also 

respond to Plaintiff’s other pending “Motion for Penal/Pecuniary Sanctions [and] Further Relief 

from Defendant[’]s Delay and Failure to Produce Logical Reason[] of Delay/Costs” using the 

aforementioned briefing schedule.

This Order terminates Docket Nos. 37 and 54.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 15, 2019

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