Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05286/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2015 Decided November 13, 2015

No. 13-5286

SHARIF MOBLEY,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-02072)

(No. 1:11-cv-02073)

Kelly B. McClanahan argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant. 

Mark S. Zaid was on the brief for amicus curiae J. William

Leonard in support of appellant. 

H. Thomas Bryon III argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Vincent Cohen, Jr., Acting U.S.

Attorney, and Matthew Collette, Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 1 of 31
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Sharif Mobley seeks information

relating principally to his detention in Yemen from four federal

agencies. After submitting requests pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act,

id. § 552a, Mobley filed two lawsuits to compel disclosure. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies

and denied Mobley’s motion for reconsideration. Although his

appeal presents a thorny jurisdictional question, upon

determining that this court has jurisdiction to consider the

appeals in both of his cases, we conclude that Mobley’s

contentions fail on themerits under a straightforward application

of our precedent. We therefore affirm. 

I.

Mobley, a United States citizen, Cmpt. ¶ 3, has been

detained in Yemen since January 26, 2010. According to one of

his attorneys, he was abducted from the streets of Sana’a,

Yemen’s capital city, by eight armed men who forced him into

a van, shooting him twice in the process. Decl. Cori A. Crider,

¶¶ 1, 8–16 (July 21, 2010). Mobley had lived in Sana’a with his

family since 2008, but in January 2010, he contacted U.S.

Embassy officials to arrange for return to the United States. Id.

¶¶ 11–13. While in custody, Mobley claims that he was

interrogated by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”), the Defense Department, and other unspecified U.S.

federal agencies. Id. ¶¶ 32–51. Although it remains unclear to

Mobley why he was initially detained, id. ¶ 11, he is being held

on allegations that he shot two hospital guards — one fatally —

during an attempted escape while he was being treated for

injuries sustained during his abduction and detention, id. ¶¶

26–54. 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 2 of 31
3

On July 22, 2010, Mobley submitted an information

request, pursuant to FOIA and the Privacy Act, to various

federal agencies, including the FBI, the Central Intelligence

Agency (“CIA”), the Department of Defense, and the

Department of State. He sought information on: (1) his

abduction; (2) the involvement of various federal agencies in his

abduction and interrogation; and (3) the “wider pattern of U.S.-

sponsored sweeps and proxy detention in Yemen from January

2010, of which [his] seizure is a part.” FOIA/Privacy Act

Request at 2 (July 22, 2010). In addition, he sought “all records

in any way relating to, pertaining to, or mentioning [Mobley] by

any and all persons or entities, including all persons acting on

behalf of the United States.” Over a year later, Mobley’s

counsel sent two e-mails to the FBI, before it had responded to

his original request, asking that it search particular repositories

of analog and digital records, which we refer to as record

systems. 

On November 22, 2011, Mobley filed two lawsuits in the

federal district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); id.

§ 552a(g)(1)(B). In the first he sued the Justice Department and

the Defense Department. The following spring the FBI partially

released to Mobley 85 pages of responsive records, withholding

portions pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 6, and 7(C) and

Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2). See Decl. Dennis J. Argall,

Assistant Section Chief, Records/Info. Dissemination Section,

FBI, ¶¶ 24, 34 (June 29, 2012) (“First Argall Decl.”). We will

refer to this lawsuit as the FBI case. In the second lawsuit, he

sued the CIA and the State Department. Although Mobley sent

the CIA the same information request that he sent the FBI, the

Defense Department, and the State Department, he also sent the

CIA a separate request, on August 15, 2011, for “all [CIA]

records about Mr. Mobley and [his wife].” The appeal in his

second lawsuit involves only the CIA’s response to the August

15 request, and we will refer to the second lawsuit as the CIA

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 3 of 31
4

case. The CIA released some responsive records, which the

Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”) had referred to it in

response to Mobley’s information requests to the Defense

Department. Decl. Michele L. Meeks, Chief, Pub. Info.

Programs Div., CIA, ¶¶ 5–9 (Sept. 4, 2012). The CIA withheld

six of the DIA documents under FOIA Exemption 3, id. ¶ 7, and

as not subject to disclosure under the Privacy Act, Decl. Alesia

Y. Williams, Chief, FOIA Servs. Section, DIA, ¶ 4 (Oct. 12,

2012). 

The district court ruled on the government’s motions for

summary judgment in both cases in a single memorandum

opinion of February 7, 2013. See Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp.

2d 24, 74 (D.D.C. 2013). The court granted summary judgment

in full to the defendants, with the exception of the CIA, and in

the FBI case entered “a final and appealable Order.” Although

it rejected most of Mobley’s challenges to the CIA’s search for

responsive records and decisions to withhold certain

information, the district court ordered the CIA to conduct a

supplemental search in the Director of National Intelligence’s

Open Source Center (“OSC”) and to release any non-exempt

records it located, id. at 37–38. The CIA subsequently filed a

joint notice regarding OSC records. On June 7, 2013, the

district court granted summary judgment in full in the CIA case

and directed that case be closed. Four days later, the district

court consolidated Mobley’s two lawsuits. 

On June 17, 2013, Mobleymoved for reconsideration on the

grounds that the district court erred by failing to: (1) require the

FBI to search its e-mail systems; (2) require the CIA to disclose

six of the documents referred to it by the DIA; and (3) conduct

in camera review of two pages of responsive records withheld

by the FBI. The district court treated Mobley’s motion as filed

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 4 of 31
5

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and denied 1

reconsideration on August 7, 2013. 

Mobley appeals. Our review of the grant of summary

judgment is de novo. Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C.

Cir. 2007). Our review of the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is 

for abuse of discretion,see Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755,

759 (D.C. Cir. 2006), as is the decision not to inspect in camera

documents withheld under a FOIA exemption, Larson v. Dep’t

of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869–70 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In light of our

recent decision in DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178 (D.C.

Cir. 2015), Mobley has withdrawn his appeal regarding the DIA

and several challenges to the district court’s rulings regarding

the CIA. 

II.

The court must first address the threshold question of

whether it has jurisdiction to consider Mobley’s challenges to

the district court’s grants of summary judgment in the FBI and 

the CIA cases. Our review of jurisdictional issues is de novo,

Foretich v. ABC, 198 F.3d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and this

includes whether Mobley’s Rule 59(e) motion was timely filed,

Winslow v. FERC, 587 F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The

jurisdictional issue is complicated bythe district court’s decision

not to consolidate the FBI and CIA cases until after it had

granted summary judgment in both cases. It is also complicated

by the fact that upon granting summary judgment in the FBI

case on February 7, 2013, the district court also entered “a final

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that “[a] 1

motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28

days after the entry of the judgment.”

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 5 of 31
6

and appealable Order.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a). The district 2

court did not enter such an order in the CIA case until it granted

summary judgment in full on June 7, 2013. Mobley filed his

notice of appeal on September 16, 2013. The timeliness of

Mobley’s appeal therefore depends on whether his motion for

reconsideration under Rule 59(e) was timely filed. If so, then

his time to file a notice of appeal was tolled. FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(iv). If not, then Mobley’s appeal of summary

judgment in the FBI case was also untimely, and this court lacks

jurisdiction. 

A.

Because timing is central to the jurisdiction question, a brief

chronology of the relevant events follows. As noted, on

February 7, 2013, the district court granted summary judgment

in the FBI case and entered a final, appealable order,see FED.R.

CIV. P. 58(a). At the same time, in the CIA case, it granted

summary judgment to the State Department, but granted

summary judgment only in part to the CIA, remanding for the

CIA to conduct a supplemental records search. Shortly

thereafter, on February 19, the district court denied a consent

motion to consolidate the cases without prejudice, on the ground

that the cases were not in the same procedural posture; the FBI

case was closed while the CIA case remained open. 

A week later, Mobley filed, in light of the “high degree of

overlap between these cases,” a motion to stay the FBI case until

the district court had finally resolved the CIA case, so that the

“motions for reconsideration or appeals to the D.C. Circuit” in

both cases could be filed and adjudicated at the same time. The

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) providesthat “[e]very 2

judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a separate

document,” subject to exceptions inapplicable here. 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 6 of 31
7

district court granted the motion and stayed the FBI case until “a

final appealable order has been issued” in the CIA case. 

On June 7, 2013, the district court granted summary

judgment in full in the CIA case and entered a final, appealable 

order. It also lifted the stay in the FBI case. Four days later, it

consolidated the two cases.

 

On June 17, 2013, Mobley moved for partial

reconsideration, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

59(e) and 60(b). Although the government neither opposed

Mobley’s motion for a stay nor objected to the district court’s

stay order, it opposed his motion for reconsideration as untimely

in the FBI case. The district court, which treated Mobley’s

motion as filed pursuant to Rule 59(e), acknowledged that it

lacked authority to extend the filing deadline for a Rule 59(e)

motion. Mem. & Order at 7–8 (Aug. 7, 2013) (citing FED. R.

CIV. P. 6(b)(2), Derrington-Bey v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 39 F.3d 3

1224, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Ctr. for Nuclear

Responsibility, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 781

F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). But the court concluded that its

stay power, which is “incidental to the power inherent in every

court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with

economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

litigants,” id. at 8 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,

254 (1936)), had “halted” the proceedings in the FBI case until

the court issued a final appealable order in the CIA case, id. In

other words, the district court concluded that its stay order did

not “extend” the time to file a Rule 59(e) motion within the

meaning of Rule 6 because its stay order was an exercise of its

 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) provides that “[a] 3

court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b),

59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).”

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 7 of 31
8

inherent power to manage its docket. Having found Mobley’s

Rule 59(e) motion timely filed, the district court denied it on the

merits on August 7, 2013. Mobley filed his notice of appeal on

September 16, 2013. 

B.

The government, while acknowledging Mobley’s appeal of

the denial of his motion for reconsideration is timely, suggests

that this court’s jurisdiction over the grants of summary

judgment of February 7 and June 7 is “less clear,” Appellees’

Br. 2. For the following reasons, we conclude the court has

jurisdiction over the entirety of Mobley’s appeal.

1. With regard to the FBI case, the government declined,

curiously, to take a position on whether the court lacks

jurisdiction. Presumably, the government’s summarily stated

intimation is based on the fact that where one of the parties is a

United States agency, a notice of appeal must be filed within 60

days after entry of the judgment or order appealed. FED.R. APP.

P. 4(a)(1)(B)(ii). That time began to run in the FBI case when

the district court entered the Rule 58(a) order on February 7,

2013. Id. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Only if Mobley timely filed a Rule 4

59(e) motion — that is, within 28 days of the grant of summary

judgment — would the time to appeal not begin to run until the 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A) provides 4

that “[a] judgment or order is entered for purposes of this Rule 4(a) . . .

(ii) if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) requires a separate

document, when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket

. . . and when . . . the judgment or order is set forth on a separate

document . . . .” 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 8 of 31
9

entry of the order disposing of his motion. Id. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).

5

The government opposed Mobley’s Rule 59(e) motion as

untimely. Were the government correct, then Mobley would

have had to file his appeal in the FBI case within 60 days of

February 7, 2013, and because he did not, this court would lack

jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding the government’s demurrer, this court

must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132

S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012). We agree with the district court that

Mobley’s Rule 59(e) motion was timely filed in the FBI case but

for a different reason, which avoids addressing the complex

interaction between the district court’s inherent stay power, Rule

6(b)(2), and Rule 58(a). Instead, we conclude we have

jurisdiction under the unique circumstances doctrine, which

affords the opportunity, in view of the non-jurisdictional nature

of the federal rules at issue, to excuse the tardiness of a late-filed

Rule 59(e) motion. 

Prior to Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the unique

circumstances doctrine permitted appellate courts to excuse

untimeliness where a party acted belatedly in reliance on an

erroneous district court ruling. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S.

384 (1964); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers,

Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962). The doctrine, however, applied “only

where a party who could have filed a timely notice of appeal is

 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) provides:

5

If a party timely files in the district court any of the following

motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time

to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order

disposing of the last such remaining motion: . . . 

(iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59; . . . .

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 9 of 31
10

lulled into missing the deadline by a formal court order or

ruling, containing specific assurances that action which extends

or postpones the deadline has properly been taken . . . .” Moore

v. S.C. Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also

Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). In

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214, the Supreme Court expressly overruled

Thompson and Harris Truck Lines and rejected the unique

circumstances doctrine, but only “to the extent [it] purport[s] to

authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.” Id. That

qualifying dependent clause left open the doctrine’s continued

vitality as an exception to a non-jurisdictional rule. Cf.

Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 198–99 & n.10

(3d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d

1287, 1291–92 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2007); 4B CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1168 (4th ed. 2008); 16A id. § 3950.1.

“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,

452 (2004). Timing rules are therefore jurisdictional if they

implement a statutory time limit, whereas timing rules lacking

a statutory basis are “simple ‘claim-processing rule[s]’” subject

to waiver and forfeiture. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213. The timing

rules at issue here — Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2)

and 59(e) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”)

4(a)(4)(A)(iv) — are claim-processing rules. Obaydullah v.

Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 788–91 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also

Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005);Kontrick, 540

U.S. at 454; Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1146 n.11

(D.C. Cir. 2007); Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione

Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.15 (11th Cir. 2010); Lizardo

v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 274 (3d Cir. 2010); Dill v. Gen.

Am. Life Ins. Co., 525 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 2008); Nat’l

Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 10 of 31
11

2007); In re Onecast Media, Inc., 439 F.3d 558, 562 (9th Cir.

2006). 

Unique circumstances excuse Mobley’s untimely filing of

his Rule 59(e) motion. On the same day, Mobley filed two

complaints in the district court seeking virtually the same relief

under FOIA and the Privacy Act. Except for the federal

agencies he sued as defendants, his two complaints were

grounded in functionally identical FOIA and Privacy Act

requests. The district court’s treatment of the two cases reflects

their near-equivalence. Most notably, the district court issued a

single memorandum opinion ruling on the defendants’ motions 

for summary judgment in both cases. Mobley and the

government, which consented to Mobley’s motion to

consolidate, agreed that, in view of anticipated post-judgment

motions and appeals, the most efficient way to proceed was for

the district court to handle both cases as one. Indeed, Mobley

tried in two different ways to have the district court formally

treat his two cases the way it was treating them in practice — as

a single case. The second effort — his stay motion —

succeeded. The district court entered an order staying the FBI

case until it entered a final, appealable order in the CIA case.

A litigant in Mobley’s position would reasonably have

concluded that he could delay filing a Rule 59(e) motion until

after the district court had finally ruled on the motion for

summary judgment in the CIA case, closing that case, without

jeopardizing his opportunity to appeal the grant of summary

judgment in the FBI case. The court had entered a stay order in

response to his request to align post-judgment motion practice

in his two cases, and the opposing parties did not object. Thus,

Mobley missed the deadline for filing a Rule 59(e) motion in the

FBI case in reliance on a stay order that, in view of his stated

reason for seeking a stay, provided specific assurances that he

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 11 of 31
12

would not need to file post-judgment motions until after the

district court lifted the stay.

Under the unique circumstances doctrine, because no

jurisdictional rule is implicated, Mobley’s Rule 59(e) motion

was timely filed and therefore tolled the time for filing a notice

of appeal of the February 7 order in the FBI case until the

district court ruled on his Rule 59(e) motion. FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(iv), see supra note 5. Mobley needed only to “file[]

his notice of appeal within 60 days after the district court denied

his Rule 59(e) motion,” Obaydullah, 688 F.3d at 788, which he

did. 

Our conclusion that the court has jurisdiction is reinforced

by an alternative basis for that conclusion, which would involve

treating the district court’s grant of Mobley’s unopposed motion

for a stay as a motion for extension of time under FRAP

4(a)(5)(C). Although the 60-day period for taking an appeal in 6

FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) is based on 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b), and is

therefore jurisdictional, see Obaydullah, 688 F.3d at 788, this

court has distinguished that provision from other provisions in

FRAP 4(a). Under FRAP 4(a)(5)(A)(i), the district court may

extend the time to file a notice of appeal, but FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)

limits such extensions to 30 days. In granting a stay that

contemplated prolonging the time to file an appeal, the district

court effectively extended the time to appeal beyond the 30-day

limit. FRAP 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30-day cap, however, unlike FRAP

4(a)(1)(B), is a claim-processing rule. Youkelsone v. FDIC, 660

F.3d 473, 475–76 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Objections based on FRAP

 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) provides: 6

No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days

after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the

order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 12 of 31
13

4(a)(5)(C) therefore can be forfeited or waived. The

government did not object to either Mobley’s motion for a stay

or to the stay order as an over-long extension of the time to

appeal, and Mobley delayed noting his appeal in the FBI case in

reliance on the stay order. The government therefore forfeited

any timeliness objection to Mobley’s filing a notice of appeal. 

For largely the same reasons that the unique circumstances

present here render Mobley’s Rule 59(e) motion timely, they

also compel the conclusion that the time for filing a notice of

appeal had not expired before Mobley filed his Rule 59(e)

motion.

In re Sealed Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 2009),

does not require a contrary conclusion regarding this court’s

jurisdiction over Mobley’s appeal. There, the court held that

even though Rule 60(b) is a claim-processing rule, a party

cannot use it to circumvent FRAP 4(a)(6), which limits the time

to reopen the window for filing an appeal after it has closed. 

Sealed Case, 624 F.3d at 486–87. But our conclusion that

jurisdiction exists here rests on claim-processing rules, either

Rule 59(e) or FRAP 4(a)(5)(C). By contrast, the rule at issue in

Sealed Case, FRAP 4(a)(6), is jurisdictional. Bowles, 551 U.S.

at 213; Sealed Case, 624 F.3d at 483. There is no evidence that

Mobley is deploying “sham maneuvers . . . to avoid hard

jurisdictional deadlines . . . .” Sealed Case, 624 F.3d at 483. 

Rather, much as the district court’s analysis of its stay power

reflects, Mobley sought and relied on the stay order out of a

good-faith interest in litigation efficiency and judicial economy. 

See Mem. & Order at 8 (Aug. 7, 2013). 

The government’s remaining objection, to the manner in

which the district court counted the 28-day period for filing a

Rule 59(e) motion, also fails. The government maintains that

even if the stay tolled the time to file a Rule 59(e) motion, the

district court ought not to have excluded from the Rule 59(e)

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 13 of 31
14

period February 26, the day the court entered the stay order. 

Oddly, at the same time as it puts forward this argument, the

government calls into question the argument’s relevance: In a

footnote in its brief, it states that “[i]t is not clear whether [the

time computation rules at issue] apply by their terms because the

term of the stay was not a ‘period . . . stated in days or a longer

unit of time.’” Appellees’ Br. 4 n.2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.

6(a)(1)(A) and FED. R. APP. P. 26(a)(1)(A)). No matter. Even

applying the counting rules in Rule 6 and FRAP 26, the Rule

59(e) motion was timely. The inclusion or exclusion of

February 26 is irrelevant. Counting February 26 against

Mobley’s 28 days, the last day Mobley could have filed his

motion was June 15 or 16, depending on whether the tally

includes June 7, the day the district court lifted the stay. June

15, 2013, was a Saturday, and June 16 was a Sunday. Mobley

therefore had until the end of the day the following Monday to

file his motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). That Monday was 7

June 17, the day Mobley filed his motion.

As a final point, we note that some of the complexity of the

jurisdictional question presented here could have been avoided

had the district court stayed entry of the Rule 58(a) order in the

FBI case until entry of a final, appealable order in the CIA case,

instead of staying the FBI case after entering the Rule 58(a)

order. This would not interfere with the district court’s control

of its docket, and it would avoid the need to consider the

interrelationship between Rules 6(b)(2) and 58(a) and the district

court’s inherent stay power.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1) provides that 7

“[w]hen the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time: . . . (C)

include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday,

Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of

the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 14 of 31
15

2. There is no merit to the government’s suggestion this

court lacks jurisdiction to address Mobley’s appeal of the June

7, 2013, order granting summary judgment in full in the CIA

case. Although the government’s briefing on this point is not a

model of clarity, its argument appears to be that Mobley has

forfeited his challenge to the district court’s February 7 partial

grant of summary judgment to the CIA by failing to mention, in

his notice of appeal, the June 7 Rule 58(a) order that made the

February 7 summary judgment ruling in the CIA case final and

appealable. The notice of appeal requirements in FRAP 3 are

jurisdictional. See Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 652.

“This circuit adheres to the ‘rule that a mistake in

designating the specific judgment or order appealed from should

not result in loss of the appeal as long as [1] the intent to appeal

from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the

appellant’s notice (and subsequent filings) and [2] the opposing

party is not misled by the mistake.’” Messina, 439 F.3d at 759

(quoting Foretich, 198 F.3d at 273 n.4). The second prong is

quickly disposed of. There is no indication that the government

was misled about Mobley’s intent, for it has fully briefed the

issues he raised with respect to the CIA. 

Underthe first prong, Mobleyplainly intended to appeal the

grant of summary judgment to the CIA. He appended to his

notice of appeal the February 7 summary judgment order, which

addressed not only the FBI case but granted summary judgment

to the State Department and partial summary judgment to the

CIA. Further, this court has looked to filings other than the

notice of appeal to establish intent, including an appellant’s

statement of issues, Sinclair Broad. Grp. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148,

158 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Mobley’s statement of issues

challenged several rulings in favor of the CIA made by the

district court in its February 7 summary judgment order. 

Specifically, he identified in paragraphs 6 and 9 of his statement

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 15 of 31
16

of issues the district court’s ruling that the CIA had not waived

its so-called Glomar response and that the CIA’s invocation of

the response was procedurally sound. Mobley, 924 F. Supp. 2d

at 45–50. 

We turn to the merits of Mobley’s contentions.

III.

FOIA mandates disclosure of agency records upon request,

unless they are subject to one of the nine statutory exemptions. 

See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011); see also

5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), (b)(1)–(9). “In order to obtain

summary judgment the agency must show that it made a good

faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using

methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the

information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920

F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This court applies a

reasonableness standard to determine whether an agency

performed an adequate search, Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and our review is

heavily fact-dependent, Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 705

F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The agency bears the burden

of justifying the applicability of FOIA exemptions, which are

exclusive and must be narrowly construed. Elec. Privacy Info.

Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C.

Cir. 2015). 

A.

Adequacy of search. Mobley contends the district court

erred in ruling that the FBI had performed an adequate search in

response to his FOIA request. Our review of the adequacy of an

agency’s search is de novo. See Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast

Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The court may rely

on a “reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 16 of 31
17

and the type of search performed, and averring that all files

likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist)

were searched.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Agency affidavits —

so long as they are “relatively detailed and non-conclusory” —

are “accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be

rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and

discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v.

SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground

Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

Over a year after Mobley’s initial request for all records

pertaining to him, his attorney sent two e-mails to the FBI

requesting that it search specific record systems. Among them

were all “shared drives,” in particular those for FBI headquarters

and the New Jersey and New York Field Offices, and record

systems located in the Washington and Baltimore Field Offices. 

One of the e-mails linked to a news story attributing to the FBI

the statement that the Baltimore Field Office was working on

Mobley’s case. In response to Mobley’s request, the FBI

searched its Central Records System (“CRS”) and Electronic

Surveillance (“ELSUR”) Indices. Generally, Mobley maintains

that the FBI was required to search — or explain in greater

detail than it did why it did not search — the record systems he

asked it to search. In addition, although Mobley did not

specifically ask the FBI to search e-mail systems, he insists the

FBI was required to search them as record systems reasonably

likely to contain responsive materials. 

The detailed declarations of Dennis J. Argall, the assistant

section chief of the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination

Section, demonstrate that the FBI’s search was adequate. 

Among other things, Argall explains the automation of the CRS

in the 1990s and describes the wide array of databases

incorporated into it, such that the CRS houses “all information

which [the FBI] acquire[s] in the course of fulfilling its

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 17 of 31
18

mandated law enforcement responsibilities.” First Argall Decl.

¶¶ 25–30; Decl. Dennis J. Argall, Assistant Section Chief,

Records/Info. Dissemination Section, FBI, ¶¶ 3–9 (Oct. 12,

2012) (“Second Argall Decl.”). He sets out in detail what search

terms the FBI employed, and concludes that the FBI’s search of

the CRS — alongside its search of the ELSUR Indices — was

reasonably likely to produce the information Mobley requested. 

Second Argall Decl. ¶ 9b. 

Argall explains further that the specific record systems

Mobley asked the FBI to search either are captured by the CRS

or are unlikely to contain responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 3–9. 

Likewise, he states that e-mail systems also are not reasonably

likely to result in additional responsive records because the

records in them are redundant of records stored in the CRS. Id.

¶ 9b. Moreover, according to Argall, some record systems that

Mobley asked the FBI to search — the so-called “I-Drive” and

“tickler” files — are no longer in use. In 2001, all FBI field

offices were instructed to perform comprehensive searches of

the I-Drives in order to determine if I-Drive files were already

in the FBI’s automated search system. Id. ¶ 9a. If they were

not, those files were added to that system, and thereafter the IDrive was eliminated. Id. As for “tickler” files, they are

“historical in nature,” and the FBI no longer requires that they

be created or maintained. Id. ¶ 7. The files were duplicates that

contained copies of documents already indexed in the CRS. 

Regarding the newspaper storyabout the Baltimore Field Office,

Argall states that access to CRS files in FBI field offices is also

obtained through the general CRS search. First Argall Decl.

¶ 27. Additionally, if an exclusion has been employed in this

case, it has been amply justified by the in camera, ex parte

declaration submitted by the FBI. 

Mobley’s specific challenges to the adequacy of the FBI’s

search and the good faith of Argall’s declarations are thus

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 18 of 31
19

unpersuasive. Had the FBI only searched the record systems

“most likely” to contain responsive records, its search would be

inadequate. See DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 190; Oglesby, 920 F.2d

at 68. But, as Mobley concedes, that is not what the FBI’s

declarations state it did here. Still, Mobley insists his selective

close reading of Argall’s declarations, taken alongside FBI

declarations in other FOIA cases, demonstrates that Argall’s

declarations actually say that the FBI limited its search to the

record systems “most likely” to contain responsive records. 

Neither Argall’s words nor the FBI declarations that Mobley

identified from other FOIA cases call into question the good

faith of Argall’s representations. Although Mobleymay believe

that Argall’s sworn statements are disingenuous, he has offered

no basis on which this court could conclude the presumption of

good faith has been overcome. 

Further, a request for an agency to search a particular

record system — without more — does not invariably constitute

a “lead” that an agency must pursue. A “lead” must be “both

clear and certain” and “so apparent that the [FBI] cannot in

good faith fail to pursue it.” Kowalczyk v. Dep’t of Justice, 73

F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For example, in Campbell, 164

F.3d at 27–28, the court held that the FBI could not decline to

search beyond the CRS where records in the CRS themselves

indicated that there were undiscovered responsive records

located in other record systems. Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279

(2d Cir. 1999), on which Mobley relies by analogy, is in

alignment with this court’s precedent. Id. at 288–89. By

contrast, Mobley’s demand that the FBI search certain record

systems is generally mere fiat. To the extent it is not, as noted,

the Argall declarations demonstrate the FBI conducted an

adequate search. In any event, under Mobley’s approach, which

would allow a requester to dictate, through search instructions,

the scope of an agency’s search, the reasonableness test for

search adequacy long adhered to in this circuit would be

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 19 of 31
20

undermined. Cf. DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 191 (citing SafeCard

Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201). Although an agency may not ignore

a request to search specific record systems when a request

reaches the agency before it has completed its search, cf.

Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28, a search is generally adequate where

the agency has sufficiently explained its search process and why

the specified record systems are not reasonably likely to contain

responsive records, see id. at 27–28; Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. 

As noted, the FBI did just that. 

Additionally, the FBI has no responsibility to pursue leads

that might be contained in documents released by other agencies

where it does not become aware of those documents until after 

it has completed its search. See Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28;

Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389. Mobley maintains that the redacted

e-mails released by the State Department, on the same day and

through the same counsel as the FBI release, demonstrate that

the FBI failed to pursue relevant leads in its search. But

Mobley provides no evidence that the FBI was aware of those

leads in the State Department e-mails before completing its

search. Because agencies are not required to perform additional

searches once their search is concluded, the court cannot

conclude that the FBI failed to conduct an adequate search. 

Finally, the FBI’s search, under FOIA, “is not unreasonable

simply because it fails to produce all relevant material . . . .” 

Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 952–53 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see

also Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004);

Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C.

Cir. 2003); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d

885, 892 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995); SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at

1201. Over objections similar to Mobley’s, the court upheld 

the adequacy of a search although it failed to discover an entire

category of records about a secret meeting that, according to the

requester, was “of such importance that records must have been

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 20 of 31
21

created.” DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 190; see also Oglesby, 920 F.2d

at 67 n.13. In the absence of any supporting evidence,

Mobley’s argument that files predating his arrest must have

existed also fails to raise a material question of fact regarding

the adequacy of the search.

B.

Waiver by official acknowledgment. Mobley contends

that the FBI and CIA waived their application of FOIA

Exemption 1 to certain information through official

acknowledgment of that exempt information. Exemption 1

shields from disclosure records that may be and are properly

classified, thus removing from FOIA’s scope “matters that are

. . . specifically authorized under criteria established by an

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national

defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly classified

pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). But

“when information has been ‘officially acknowledged,’ its

disclosure may be compelled even over an agency’s otherwise

valid exemption claim.” Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765

(D.C. Cir. 1990). A three-part test determines whether an item

is “officially acknowledged”: (1) “the information requested

must be as specific as the information previously released”; (2)

“the information requested must match the information

previously disclosed”; and (3) “the information requested must

already have been made public through an official and

documented disclosure.” Id.

The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying specific

information that is already in the public domain due to official

disclosure. Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007);

Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

Mobley has not carried that burden. First, Mobley points to a

document filed by a private party in a Yemeni court proceeding. 

According to Mobley, the FBI had given the interview record to

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 21 of 31
22

the Yemeni government without any restrictions on its use, and

the Yemeni government, in turn, had provided it to the party

that filed it in court. Even assuming the truth of his claims, the

district court did not err in ruling there had been no official

acknowledgment of the document. Disclosure by one federal

agency does not waive another agency’s right to assert a FOIA

exemption. Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774–75 (D.C. Cir.

1999). By parity of reasoning it follows that a foreign

government also cannot waive a federal agency’s right to assert

a FOIA exemption. It is more difficult still to understand how

disclosure by private litigants in a foreign court proceeding

could constitute official acknowledgment. That kind of

disclosure is no more “official” than the disclosure of

information by former CIA agents and officers acting with the

blessing of that agency’s pre-publication review process, and

this court has held the latter insufficiently official to trigger

waiver. Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133–34.

 

Second, Mobley contends that an error in the CIA’s FOIA

office waived reliance on its Exemption 1 Glomarresponse. An

agency asserts a Glomar response when it refuses to confirm or

deny the very existence of responsive records. The name finds

its source in Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976),

which involved the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the

existence of documents pertaining to the Glomar Explorer, a

ship the U.S. government allegedly had deployed in an effort to

recover a sunken Soviet submarine. See Am. Civil Liberties

Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 426 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Here,

Mobley locates waiver in the first of two final response letters

he received from the CIA. A September 20, 2011, letter from

the CIA states that (1) the agency had located responsive

records but was withholding them in full based on two FOIA

and two Privacy Act exemptions, and (2) as to any records that

“reveal[ed] a classified connection to the CIA,” it was asserting

a Glomar response. On January 11, 2012, the CIA issued an

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 22 of 31
23

“amended final response” stating that (1) the September 20

letter “contained inaccuracies” as to the CIA’s search; (2) in

fact, its search turned up no “responsive records that might

reflect an open or otherwise acknowledged [CIA] affiliation”;

and (3) its Glomar response applied to “a classified connection

to the CIA.” Mobley maintains that the first CIA letter

constitutes official acknowledgment that the CIA possesses

records responsive to his FOIA request that reveal a classified

connection between him and the CIA. That, in Mobley’s view,

waived the Glomar response the CIA relied on in its second

letter.

A Glomar response is proper only if “the fact of the

existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA

exemption,” Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374, and like other information

withheld pursuant to an exemption, an agency can waive a

Glomar response through official acknowledgment, id. at 378. 

The Chief of the Public Information Programs Division at the

CIA stated in a sworn declaration that the September 20 letter

was “mistakenly issued” and “contained inaccuracies regarding

the results of the CIA’s search,” an “error” that the CIA did not

notice until after Mobley appealed the agency’s response. Decl.

Michele L. Meeks, Chief, Pub. Info. Programs Div., CIA,

¶¶ 21–22 (May 25, 2012); see also Supplemental Decl. Michele

L. Meeks, Chief, Pub. Info. Programs Div., CIA, ¶ 4 (Aug. 1,

2012). Mobley concedes that the CIA’s first letter was a

“mistake.” Appellant’s Br. 31. Mobley’s waiver argument

therefore fails on the third prong of the test in Fitzgibbon. 

Although a FOIA response could satisfy that prong, a simple

clerical mistake in FOIA processing cannot. A contrary

conclusion would be inconsistent with the deference granted to

agency determinations in the national security context. See,

e.g., Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374; Krikorian v. Dep’t of State, 984

F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 23 of 31
24

C.

Classification of documents. Mobleyalso takes issue with

the district court’s ruling that the FBI properly classified certain

responsive records after it received his FOIA request. The

problem, as he sees it, is that the official who classified those

records acted pursuant to an improper sub-delegation of post

hoc classification authority. The text of the sub-delegation

order indicates that the sub-delegation was permissible. 

Executive Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010)

(“the Order”), sets forth the executive branch’s classification

system and procedures. Section 1.7(d) of the Order governs the

classification or re-classification of previously undisclosed

information after it has become the subject of a FOIA request. 

Classification in those circumstances is permissible “onlyif” (1)

the information meets the Order’s substantive requirements and

(2) classification “is accomplished on a document-by-document

basis with the personal participation or under the direction of

the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency

official designated under section 5.4 of this order.” Exec. Order

No. 13,526, § 1.7(d) (emphasis added), 75 Fed. Reg. at 711. At

all relevant times, the designated senior agency official within

the Justice Department was the Assistant Attorney General for

Administration. 28 C.F.R. § 17.11(a). 

In 1999, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration

delegated his § 1.7(d) authority to the chief of the FBI’s

Document Classification Unit. Pursuant to that delegation, the

document-by-document review mandated by § 1.7(d) was

conducted twice in Mobley’s case, first by David M. Hardy, the

chief of the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination Section —

the Document Classification Unit’s successor — and later, in

Hardy’s absence, by Argall, the acting section chief. 

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 24 of 31
25

Sub-delegation to a subordinate federal official is

presumptively permissible, absent affirmative evidence in the

original delegation of a contrary intent. Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n

v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under § 1.7(d) of

the Order, post hoc classification is permissible so long as a

designated official takes part in the decision at one of two levels

of involvement: The designated official must personally

participate in the classification decision, or the official deciding

to classify a document must act under the direction of the

designated official. The 1999 sub-delegation order opts for the

latter. It requires that the sub-delegee keep the Assistant

Attorney General for Administration “apprised in a timely

manner of any action taken under this authority.” Order,

Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Admin. (Dec. 29,

1999). The ongoing notification requirement qualifies the subdelegee’s classification decisions as made “under the direction”

of the Assistant Attorney General for Administration. Mobley

points to nothing in the record that suggests a failure to comply

with this requirement of the sub-delegation order.

IV.

The Privacy Act. Mobley also challenges two of the

district court’s Privacy Act rulings, one pertaining to the FBI

and the other to the CIA. Each challenge fails. The FBI’s

declarations satisfied the requirements of Doe v. FBI, 936 F.2d

1346 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The documents withheld by the CIA

were not housed in a “system of records” and therefore are

beyond the reach of the Privacy Act.

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “safeguards the public

from unwarranted collection, maintenance, use and

dissemination of personal information contained in agency

records . . . by allowing an individual to participate in ensuring

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 25 of 31
26

that his records are accurate and properly used, and by imposing

responsibilities on federal agencies to maintain their records

accurately.” Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1407 (D.C. Cir.

1984). One of the ways the Privacy Act accomplishes this goal

is to require any agency that maintains a “system of records” to

provide information pertaining to a particular person to that

person when he or she asks to access it. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). 

A “system of records” is defined as “a group of any records

under the control of any agency from which information is

retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying

number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the

individual.” Id. § 552a(a)(5). A “record” is “any item,

collection, or grouping of information about an individual that

is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his

education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal

or employment history and that contains his name, or the

identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular

assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a

photograph.” Id. § 552a(a)(4). 

“The Privacy Act — unlike [FOIA] — does not have

disclosure as its primary goal” and instead uses disclosure as a

tool to “allow individuals on whom information is being

compiled and retrieved the opportunity to review the

information and request that the agency correct any

inaccuracies.” Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453,

1456–57 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, like FOIA, the Privacy

Act provides a cause of action to compel compliance with subsection (d)(1). 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B). Also like FOIA, the

Privacy Act carves out exemptions from disclosure when a

system of records meets certain criteria. Id. §§ 552a(j)–(k).

A.

Mobley contends that Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) did not

justify the FBI’s decision to withhold certain responsive

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 26 of 31
27

documents. Exemption (j)(2) permits an agency head to

promulgate rules — subject to public notice and comment — to

exempt any of the agency’s systems of records from several of

the Privacy Act’s requirements, including disclosure under subsection (d)(1), so long as the system of records satisfies certain

criteria. Id. § 552a(j). The agency’s principal function must be

criminal law enforcement and the system of records must

consist of one of three types of information, as relevant here,

“information compiled forthe purpose of criminal investigation,

including reports ofinformants and investigators, and associated

with an identifiable individual.” Id. § 552a(j)(2). 

A Justice Department regulation, promulgated pursuant to

§§ 552a(j)–(k), exempts the FBI’s CRS from disclosure under

sub-section (d) of the Privacy Act. 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(a). A

particular record in the CRS is exempt, however, only if the FBI

demonstrates that the record is a law enforcement record within

the meaning of the Privacy Act. Doe, 936 F.2d at 1352–53. 

According to Argall, the records at issue were “generated as a

result of interviews conducted during early 2010 with Sharif

Mobley while in Yemeni custody,” First Argall Decl. ¶ 31, and

“[t]hese records were compiled as a result of the FBI’s

legitimate law enforcement mission to ascertain the facts and

circumstances of the detention of a U.S. Citizen abroad,” id.

¶ 33; Second Argall Decl. ¶ 11. 

Mobley disagrees with the FBI’s characterization of those

efforts and believes they are better described as consular or

diplomatic functions. But even had Mobley offered a basis for

the court to accept his characterization, and he does not, 

Mobley erroneously assumes that a federal agency is capable of

acting in pursuit of only a single objective at a time. Agencies

may well — and surely often do — seek to advance a variety of

objectives through a single act. Here, for example, the FBI may

have wanted to “ascertain the facts and circumstances” of

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 27 of 31
28

Mobley’s detention in order to protect the interests of U.S.

citizens abroad and, at the same time, may have wanted to

“ascertain the facts and circumstances” of Mobley’s detention

in order to determine whether Mobley or another person had

violated federal criminal laws having extraterritorial effect, see

Second Argall Decl. ¶ 11. Mobley’s view might carry more

force if the interview records were compiled by an agency with

an express consular mission, but the declarations in the record

state that the interview records were compiled “as a result of the

FBI’s legitimate law enforcement mission,” and nothing in the

record casts doubt on these being FBI records. The FBI’s

declarations satisfy the requirements of Doe.

B.

Mobley also challenges the district court’s ruling that the

DIA’s Web Intelligence Search Engine or WISE (hereinafter, 

“DIA database”) falls outside the reach of the Privacy Act

because it is not a “system of records.” In response to Mobley’s

FOIA and Privacy Act request, DIA referred to the CIA for

processing 41 records that came to the DIA from the Open

Source Center, which is managed by the CIA. The CIA

withheld six of these records as exempt under FOIA. The

government maintains that the 41 open source documents sent

to the CIA were not subject to the Privacy Act at all because

they were housed in the DIA database.

“A system of records exists only if the information

contained within the body of material is both retrievable by

personal identifier and actuallyretrieved bypersonal identifier.”

Maydak v. United States, 630 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In

determining whether an agency maintains a system of records,

“the court should view the entirety of the situation, including

the agency’s function, the purpose for which the information

was gathered, and the agency’s actual retrieval practice and

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 28 of 31
29

policies.” Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461. A court may rely on a nonconclusory agency declaration, absent evidence to the contrary. 

McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

The declaration describing the DIA database establishes

that it is not a “system of records,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). The

Chief of the FOIA Services Section of the DIA attests in a

sworn statement that the DIA database was “not part of a

Privacy Act system of records” because “DIA does not organize

records in [the DIA database] by individuals who may be

mentioned in those records, nor does DIA retrieve records about

individuals from that database by use of an individual’s name

or personal identifier as a matter of practice.” Decl. Alesia Y.

Williams, Chief, FOIA Servs. Section, DIA, ¶ 4 (Oct. 12, 2012). 

The DIA database is “DIA’s repository for electronic message

traffic” to and from DIA, including open source media articles

sent it by other intelligence agencies. Id. 

Mobley’s efforts to call this declaration into question rest

on insinuation and supposition. Chiefly, Mobley relies on his

attorney’s declaration that a DIA representative told him the

DIA database is a “search engine [that] returns data from a

multitude of sources based on a specific inquiry.” Decl. Kelly

McClanahan ¶ 6 (June 17, 2013). All databases are searched by

some kind of specific inquiry. That says nothing about whether

the DIA searches the database by personal identifier. Nor,

contrary to Mobley’s assertion, do the statements made to his

attorney undercut the good faith presumptively accorded

Williams’ declaration. Williams stated that the DIA database

consisted of e-mail traffic to and from other intelligence

agencies, which is consistent with what DIA told Mobley’s

lawyer — that the database is a search engine that draws “data

from a multitude of sources.” McClanahan Decl. ¶ 6. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in its application of

the Privacy Act.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 29 of 31
30

V.

Finally, Mobley’s contention that the district court abused

its discretion when it twice declined to review in camera an FBI

document, which he claims was improperly classified, is

unpersuasive. 

At its discretion, a district court “may examine the contents

of . . . agency records in camera . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 

“If the agency’s affidavits provide specific information

sufficient to place the documents within the exemption

category, if this information is not contradicted in the record,

and if there is no evidence in the record of agency bad faith,

then summary judgment is appropriate without in camera

review of the documents.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S.

Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). When an agency meets its burden

through affidavits, “in camera review is neither necessary nor

appropriate,” and “[i]n camera inspection is particularly a last

resort in national security situations like this case.” Larson v.

Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The court has stated that, in some

circumstances, district courts should conduct in camera review

of allegedly FOIA-exempt documents, as, for example, where

the affidavits are too conclusory to permit de novo review of the

agency exemption decision or where there is tangible evidence

of agency bad faith. Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 830

F.2d 388, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Another factor that plays

into the calculus is the nature of the parties’ dispute, because “in

camera review is of little help when the dispute centers not on

the information contained in the documents but on the parties’

differing interpretations as to whether the exemption applies to

such information.” Id. at 393.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 30 of 31
31

Here, as our own review confirms, the district court, after

reviewing in camera the FBI’s classified declaration, acted

within its sound discretion when it decided that it did not need

to review the classified document in camera to conclude that the

FBI withheld it as properly classified. Mobley points to no

record evidence of bad faith. See id. at 392–93. Moreover, the

document implicates national security, Larson, 565 F.3d at 870,

and the parties’ dispute is over how to interpret the document —

whether it was properly classified, Carter, 830 F.2d at 393. To

the extent Mobley states in his reply brief that in camera review

would also reveal that the FBI had improperly withheld records

on the basis of FOIA Exemption 7(C), the court “need not

consider this argument because [Mobley] ha[s] forfeited it on

appeal, having raised it for the first time in [his] reply brief,”

Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir.

2008), and shown no extraordinary circumstances to excuse his

delay, Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23,

29 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, we affirm the orders granting summary

judgment in Mobley’s two cases and denying reconsideration.

USCA Case #13-5286 Document #1583392 Filed: 11/13/2015 Page 31 of 31