Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01287/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR ARMANDO ROJAS,

CDCR #AB-4157,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RASHAD JOHNSON, Probation Officer, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01287-JAH-JMA

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

CESAR ARMANDO ROJAS (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Mule Creek 

State Prison (“MCSP”) in Ione, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). 

Plaintiff claims a San Diego County probation officer, his unnamed “transferring 

partner,” a San Diego County Deputy Sheriff, the University of California San Diego 

(“UCSD”) Emergency Room, and an unidentified emergency medical technician (“EMT”) 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights on December 22, 2014. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 

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3-5. He seeks to enjoin Defendants from “bothering” him, and more than $19 million in 

general and punitive damages. Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff has not paid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he 

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF 

No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report. See ECF No. 2 at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that while Plaintiff carried an average 

monthly balance of $77.63 and had average monthly deposits of $52.86 to his account over 

the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available 

balance of zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 2. Thus, the Court assesses Plaintiff’s 

initial partial filing fee to be $15.52 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), but acknowledges 

he may be unable to pay that initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 

F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of 

funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he may have 

“no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect 

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them 

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

///

///

///

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II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are 

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

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§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the 

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

While Plaintiff’s factual allegations are sparse and conclusory, he claims Rashad 

Johnson, his probation officer, “refused drug testing [him],” “forc[ed] [him] to urin[ate] in 

a trash can at UCSD,” and then took him to jail “for no reason” on December 22, 2014. 

See ECF No. 1 at 2, 3. Plaintiff further claims another probation officer, identified only as 

Johnson’s “transferring partner,” used “excessive force” against him by “splittin[g] [his] 

chin,” and an unidentified “EMT” in an ambulance handcuffed him while injured. Id. at 2. 

Finally, Plaintiff claims San Diego Sheriff’s Department Deputy Ayehart “denied [him] 

medical care in front of [a] nurse at George Bailey Detention Facility,” on an unspecified 

occasion, and “kept [him] in for violation 120 days in County Jail.” Id. at 2, 5.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 

F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

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D. Proper Parties

First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the USCD Emergency Room and an 

unidentified EMT, his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be 

granted because neither of these purported parties are alleged to be persons acting “under 

color of state law.” Id.

As a general matter, private hospitals and medical officials are not state actors and 

therefore cannot be sued under § 1983. See Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855-856 

(9th Cir. 1977) (noting that “private hospitals and physicians have consistently been 

dismissed from § 1983 actions for failing to come within the color of state law requirement 

of this section.”); see also Babchuk v. Indiana Univ. Health, Inc., 809 F.3d 966, 970-71 

(7th Cir. 2016). While Plaintiff might be able to hold these defendants liable if his 

Complaint alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that either UCSD or the EMT who 

treated him contracted directly with the State or municipality to provide medical services 

to persons within their custody, his pleading contains no such allegations. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53-54 (1988); cf., Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 

(9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding state action where hospital “contract[ed] with the state 

... to provide medical services to indigent citizens”); George v. Sonoma Cnty. Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 732 F. Supp. 2d 922, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“A private ... hospital that contracts 

with a public prison system to provide treatment for inmates performs a public function 

and acts under color of law for purposes of § 1983.”); Coyle v. San Diego Sheriff’s Dep’t, 

No. 3:16-CV-0667-GPC-JLB, 2016 WL 3523250, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2016).

E. Official Capacity / Monell Claims

Against the remaining Defendants, probation officer Rashad Johnson, Johnson’s

unidentified “transferring partner,” and San Diego Sheriff’s Department Deputy Ayehart, 

Plaintiff seeks damages for actions allegedly committed by them in their official capacities. 

See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. 

His Complaint fails to state a claim against these persons, however, because while 

municipal officers may be sued in their official capacities, Plaintiff must allege facts to 

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plausibly show that the constitutional violations for which he seeks redress occurred as the 

result of the municipality’s official policy or custom, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City 

of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), or through the municipality’s failure to train its 

employees adequately. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989).

While individual-capacity actions seek to impose personal liability upon a 

government official for actions performed under color of state law, official-capacity actions 

generally represent another way of suing “an entity of which an officer is an agent.” 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1984) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55).

Local governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 

475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-683). They may not be held

vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 392; Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403

(1997) (collecting cases). 

In addition, a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must 

amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained 

employees] come into contact.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). “Only then “can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a 

city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 61 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. 

at 389). 

As it stands, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains none of these critical pleading 

requirements. Therefore, it is subject to dismissal in its entirety for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded facts to establish municipal 

liability, his Complaint alleges only violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 

“cruel and unusual punishments.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3-4. The Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” applies only “after conviction and 

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sentence.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 & n.6 (1989) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 

430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 

2001). Therefore, any allegations of excessive force or inadequate medical treatment 

arising during the course of an arrest or pretrial custody also fail to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim as a matter of law. See, e.g., Langley v. Tulare Police Dep’t, et al., No. 

1:16-CV-0336-DAD-SKO, 2017 WL 4151246, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).

G. Unlawful Detention

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages for an unlawful or prolonged “120 days 

in County Jail,” see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5, based on what the Court presumes was due 

to an alleged probation violation, Plaintiff cannot proceed under § 1983. Challenges to the 

fact or duration of confinement must be brought in a habeas action, not in a civil rights 

case. Habeas corpus “is the exclusive remedy ... for the prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or 

speedier release’ from confinement.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (quoting

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). A challenge to the fact or duration of 

confinement that would, if successful, result in immediate or speedier release falls within 

the “core” of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-89 (1973); see also

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the validity 

of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas 

corpus.”); Cristiano v. Brown, No. 3:16-CV-3077-BEN-BLM, 2017 WL 3446812, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2017).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

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amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2017

HON.JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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