Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00877/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00877-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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Case No. 19-CV-00877-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS WITH PREJUDICE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WAYNE W. YETTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-CV-00877-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 38

Plaintiff Wayne Yetter (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendant Ford Motor Company 

(“Defendant”) for claims arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a vehicle manufactured by 

Defendant. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having 

considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff resides in Salinas, California. ECF No. 37 ¶ 2 (“First Amended Complaint” or 

“FAC”). Defendant Ford is a vehicle manufacturer incorporated in Delaware. Id. ¶ 3. On June 

30, 2008, Plaintiff purchased a new 2008 Ford Super Duty F-350 truck from Salinas Valley Ford, 

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an authorized dealer of Defendant’s vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 9, 56. Plaintiff paid $56,673.20 for the 

vehicle. ECF No. 37-1 at 2. 

Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle that Defendant manufactured and that Plaintiff purchased 

contains a defective engine. FAC ¶¶ 10, 13. Navistar supplied a 6.4 liter engine for Ford’s Super 

Duty trucks for model year 2008 to 2010. Id. ¶ 15. Ford claimed that the 6.4 liter engine “had 

‘been tested the equivalent of 10 million miles on road and in the lab, helping ensure excellent 

long-term durability.’” Id. Nonetheless, Plaintiff alleges that the 6.4 liter engine (“6.4L Engine”)

“is plagued by numerous problems and safety concerns.” Id. ¶ 17. For example, the engine loses 

power while in operation and is subject to overheating. Id. ¶ 19. Other defects “result[] in 

premature engine failure and require[] expensive repairs, including premature engine 

replacement.” Id. ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff alleges that Ford alerted automotive technicians about “several defects common to 

the 6.4L Engine.” Id. ¶ 29. Ford also issued two different recall notices in March 26, 2007 for 

Super Duty trucks for other defects not related to the engine, including an “excessive temperature 

defect” and a “wiring defect.” Id. ¶ 30. However, Ford has never developed a plan to identify and 

eliminate “the root cause of defects to the 6.4L Engines,” nor has Ford implemented a recall of the 

engines. Id. ¶ 46. Instead, Ford instructed its dealers to undertake repairs that “misled customers 

to believe that the underlying problem had been fixed, when in fact the symptom likely would 

reoccur on a later date.” Id. ¶ 47. 

Plaintiff read promotional materials and viewed Ford advertisements that represented that 

the Super Duty F-350 had “best-in-class rated towing power and engine reliability.” Id. ¶¶ 53-54. 

Specifically, at the authorized Ford dealership on the day of Plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle, a 

salesperson provided Plaintiff with a marketing brochure for the Ford 2008 F-350, which Plaintiff 

reviewed. Id. ¶ 53. The marketing brochure represented that the 6.4L Engine has “[h]igh-pressure 

common-rail fuel injection hels [sic] [that] deliver 100% of its 650 lb.-ft of torque (80 lb.-ft. more 

than 2007) at just 2000 rpm.” Id. ¶ 142(a). The brochure also noted that the 6.4L Engine had 

“cast-iron block, heads, and bedplate;” a “bigger crankshaft;” “powder-forged connecting rods;”

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and “oil-jet piston cooling.” Id. ¶ 142(b)-(e). Plaintiff alleges that “the Vehicle as delivered to 

Plaintiff had an unreliable, underperforming engine prone to overheating and failure of multiple 

systems, from the cooling system to the electrical system,” but Plaintiff never alleges how any of 

the representations in the brochure are false. Id. ¶ 143.

Additionally, according to Plaintiff, a salesperson at Salinas Valley Ford “verbally 

represented to Plaintiff that the Super Duty F-350 was better and improved over prior Ford 

models, and specifically, that the new 6.4L Engine was a newly designed higher performing and 

better engine than the previous 6.0 Liter PowerStroke Engine.” Id. ¶ 56. “[W]hen asked how the 

2008 F-350 would perform in comparison with Plaintiff’s prior 1996 Ford truck[,] the salesperson 

represented that the ‘2008 F-350 is a better truck with better performance; guaranteed’” and that 

“the 2008 F-350 had superior gas mileage and performance to previous Ford models.” Id.

Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to “an authorized Ford repair facility” for various repairs on 

multiple occasions, including on January 15, 2009; July 9, 2009; March 4, 2010; December 7, 

2010; January 5, 2011; October 3, 2011; April 30, 2012; October 27, 2012; and January 25, 2016. 

Id. ¶¶ 59-67. On each occasion, the technician at the repair facility informed Plaintiff “that the 

Vehicle had been repaired and was safe to drive.” Id. 

At least four of Plaintiff’s repairs concerned the engine. On December 7, 2010, Plaintiff’s 

vehicle received “its first engine repair.” Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff complained “that the check engine and 

wrench light were o[n] and that the vehicle lacked power.” Id. Again, on October 3, 2011, for the 

vehicle’s “second repair to the engine,” “Plaintiff complained that the check engine light was on” 

and “that the engine had an exhaust leak.” Id. ¶ 64. On April 30, 2012, for the vehicle’s “third 

engine repair,” “Plaintiff complained that the ‘drive to clean exhause [sic]’ message would come 

on after driving for 20 miles.” Id. ¶ 65. On October 27, 2012, for the vehicle’s “fourth engine 

repair,” “Plaintiff complained that the vehicle displayed the message ‘reduced engine power.’” Id.

¶ 66. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he earliest date that a person in 

Plaintiff’s position could have reasonably had notice of his claims would be April 30, 2012.” Id.

¶ 79.

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While Plaintiff still owned the vehicle, a class action was filed on May 14, 2013 against 

Defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Darne v. Ford 

Motor Co., Case No. 13-cv-03594 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2013); see ECF No. 39, Ex. C (“RJN”).

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The putative nationwide class was initially defined as “[a]ll persons in the United States who 

purchased or leased Ford trucks with the 6.4-liter Super Duty diesel engine.” ECF No. 39, Ex. C 

at 7. The putative class brought claims for (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied 

warranty; (3) breach of state consumer fraud statutes; (4) violations of the Illinois Uniform 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (5) negligence; (6) fraud; (7) unjust enrichment; and (8) exemplary 

damages. Id. at 11-21. Both parties acknowledge that Plaintiff was a putative member of the 

Darne class. On September 1, 2017, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois dismissed the case with prejudice. Darne v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3836586, at *13 

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017).

B. Procedural History

On January 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in California Superior 

Court for the County of Monterey. ECF No. 1-3 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged five 

causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 

(“Song-Beverly Act”), id. ¶¶ 83-97; (2) breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, 

id. ¶¶ 98-108; (3) fraudulent concealment, id. ¶¶ 109-119; (4) fraudulent inducement – intentional 

misrepresentation, id. ¶¶ 120-129; and (5) fraudulent inducement – negligent misrepresentation, 

id. ¶¶ 130-145. Plaintiff also alleged that “all statute of limitations periods are tolled by the 

discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.” Id. ¶ 69. 

On January 31, 2019, in state court, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. 

ECF No. 1-3, Ex. B. On February 19, 2019, Defendant removed the case to federal court. ECF 

 

1 Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of seven publicly filed court documents. ECF 

No. 39. Courts regularly take judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record, including 

documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff does not oppose this request. Accordingly, the 

Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice.

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No. 1. 

After removal, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 14, 2019. 

ECF No. 12. On July 19, 2019, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings with leave to amend. ECF No. 34. The Court determined that the Song-Beverly Act 

express and implied warranty claims were both subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 

6. The remaining common law claims for fraud were all subject to a three-year statute of 

limitations. Id. at 6. Therefore, “because Plaintiff purchased his vehicle on June 30, 2008, the 

statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims appear to have expired on June 30, 2011 (for Plaintiff’s 

fraud claims) and on June 30, 2012 (for Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims)—several years 

before Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on January 17, 2019.” Id.

In response, Plaintiff argued that the claims did not accrue until January 2016, when 

Plaintiff became aware of an engine defect after visiting a Ford repair facility. The Court 

concluded otherwise. First, the Court determined that even if the future performance exception 

applied to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act express warranty claim, that claim would only be tolled 

for five years, the duration of Plaintiff’s express warranty. Id. at 7-8. As a result, the four-year 

statute of limitations under the Song-Beverly Act began to run on June 30, 2013 and expired on 

June 30, 2017, more than a year and a half before Plaintiff filed his complaint. Id. at 8.

Next, the Court held that neither the delayed discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment 

tolling applied to any of Plaintiff’s claims because “to merit application of the discovery rule or 

fraudulent concealment tolling, a plaintiff must allege that he exercised due diligence to uncover 

his injury.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff failed to adequately allege that Plaintiff 

exercised due diligence to uncover his injury and that Plaintiff was unable to discover the engine 

defect until January 25, 2016 because Plaintiff had repeatedly complained of engine problems and 

tendered his vehicle to authorized Ford repair facilities on eight different occasions between 

January 9, 2009 and October 27, 2012. Id. at 9. “Plaintiff’s allegation that Plaintiff only became 

aware of the engine defect in January 2016, even though the Ford dealer that Plaintiff visited in 

January 2016 made the same representation as after all prior repairs ‘that the Vehicle had been 

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repaired and was safe to drive,’ [was] implausible.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims 

were all time-barred, and the Court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

with leave to amend. Id. at 12. 

The Court noted, however, that “[e]ven though the statute of limitations alone suffice[d] to 

grant Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court 

[would address] Defendant’s other arguments that Plaintiff’s fraud claims [were] inadequate.” Id.

at 12. The Court first rejected Defendant’s argument that the economic loss rule barred Plaintiff’s 

fraud claims, but agreed that Plaintiff failed to plead the fraud claims with the specificity that Rule 

9(b) requires. Id. at 13. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he received and read written 

promotional materials from Ford, but Plaintiff failed to allege what those promotional materials 

were, how Plaintiff received them, and specifically when Plaintiff read the materials. Id. at 14. 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleged that he viewed television and radio commercials about the Super 

Duty F-350’s features, but did not specify when he viewed those commercials, which specific 

commercials he saw or heard, and any specific statements Defendant made in those commercials. 

Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that a salesperson at Salinas Valley Ford verbally represented to 

Plaintiff that “‘the new 6.4L engine was a newly-designed higher performing and better engine 

than the previous 6.0 Liter PowerStroke Engine,’” id. (quoting Compl. ¶ 56), but Plaintiff did not 

allege what the salesperson specifically said or the salesperson’s identity. Id. Accordingly, the 

Court held that “Plaintiff has failed to plead his fraud allegations with the requisite specificity 

under Rule 9(b), which provides another reason, beyond the statute of limitations bar, to grant 

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Id.

Finally, for good measure, the Court addressed Defendant’s puffery arguments. Plaintiff 

alleged that a salesperson told Plaintiff that the Ford F-350 engine was “better and improved” and 

“higher performing,” and that unspecified promotional material “advertised the Super Duty F-350 

and its engine as high-quality products.” Id. at 14-15. The Court concluded that “[t]hose 

statements are precisely the sort of ‘vague or highly subjective claims about product superiority’ 

that are not actionable.” Id. at 15. This conclusion provided yet another reason to grant judgment 

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on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s fraud claims. Nonetheless, the Court granted leave to amend on 

all of Plaintiff’s fraud claims.

Following the Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

with leave to amend, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 37 (“FAC”). The FAC 

alleges the same five causes of action as the Complaint: (1) breach of express warranty under the 

Song-Beverly Act, id. ¶¶ 102-16; (2) breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, id.

¶¶ 117-27; (3) fraudulent concealment, id. ¶¶ 128-38; (4) fraudulent inducement – intentional 

misrepresentation, id. ¶¶ 139-48; and (5) fraudulent inducement – negligent misrepresentation, id.

¶¶ 149-64. Similar to the Complaint, the FAC alleges that “all statute of limitations periods are 

tolled by the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.” Id. ¶ 69. The FAC, 

however, also claims that Darne v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 13-cv-03594 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 

2013)—a class action filed on May 14, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois that alleged similar claims against Defendant—tolled the relevant statute of 

limitations periods because of “the tolling doctrine established in American Pipe & Construction 

Co. v. Utah” and “under California law by the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Id. ¶¶ 84, 93. 

Finally, the FAC included additional allegations regarding the statements in the Ford marketing 

brochure and the statements made by a salesperson at Salinas Valley Ford. Id. ¶¶ 53, 56, 142.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for 

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly 

granted when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, there is no issue of 

material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Chavez 

v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Like a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion under Rule 12(c) challenges the 

legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. See id. Indeed, a Rule 12(c) motion is 

“functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and courts apply the “same standard.” Dworkin 

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v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the “principal 

difference” between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) “is the timing of filing”); see also U.S. ex rel. 

Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Judgment on the pleadings should thus be entered when a complaint does not plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 

12(c) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Rule 9(b)

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud “must state 

with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Kearns v. Ford 

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). To satisfy the heightened standard under Rule 

9(b), the allegations must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular 

misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the 

charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 

727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, claims sounding in fraud must allege “an account of the time, 

place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 

misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and 

how of the misconduct charged.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiff must also set 

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forth “what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Ebeid ex rel. U.S. v. 

Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that judgment on the pleadings is warranted, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. See Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131, 1134-35 

(9th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(c) but reversing for failure to 

grant leave to amend). Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When granting judgment on the pleadings, “a district court should grant leave to amend 

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing amendment 

would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party 

has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 

At the same time, a court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff “repeated[ly] 

fail[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. 

Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, a “district court’s discretion to deny leave 

to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Cafasso, 

U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the Court should grant judgment on the pleadings on all five of 

Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and that 

Plaintiff’s fraud claims fail to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard and that many of the 

alleged statements constitute non-actionable puffery. 

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Plaintiff offers a number of responses. First, Plaintiff argues that the Song-Beverly express 

and implied warranty claims are tolled by the future performance exception. Second, Plaintiff 

again contends that the delayed discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine tolled the 

statute of limitations on all his claims. Third, Plaintiff asserts that all of Plaintiff’s claims are 

subject to American Pipe tolling. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that California equitable tolling applies 

to save all of Plaintiff’s claims. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Amended Complaint fulfills Rule 

9(b)’s requirements and that the alleged statements are actionable.

The Court agrees with Defendant that none of Plaintiff’s tolling arguments apply to save 

his claims. Specifically, the future performance exception, the delayed discovery rule, the

fraudulent concealment doctrine, American Pipe tolling, and California equitable tolling do not

save Plaintiff’s claims. The Court addresses each of these tolling arguments in turn before 

addressing Defendant’s remaining arguments that Plaintiff’s fraud claims fail to state a claim. The 

Court agrees with Defendant that the FAC fails to state a claim for fraud. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice.

A. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff brings two claims under the Song-Beverly Act and three common law claims for 

fraud. First, Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act for violation of express and implied 

warranty are both subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, 

Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 213-15 (1991); see Philips v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 1745948, at 

*6 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016) (explaining that California courts apply to Song-Beverly Act claims 

the four-year statute of limitations that is also applicable to warranty actions under the California 

Commercial Code). Second, Plaintiff’s fraud claims—specifically, for intentional fraudulent 

inducement, negligent fraudulent inducement, and fraudulent concealment—are all subject to a 

three-year statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d); see Kline v. Turner, 87 Cal. App. 

4th 1369, 1373 (2001) (“An action for relief on the grounds of fraud or mistake must be 

commenced within three years.”). 

Plaintiff purchased his vehicle on June 30, 2008 and filed this lawsuit about 11 years later

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on January 17, 2019. Accordingly, absent the application of any tolling doctrines, the statutes of 

limitations on Plaintiff’s claims appear to have expired on June 30, 2011 (for Plaintiff’s fraud 

claims) and on June 30, 2012 (for Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims)—approximately 6.5 to 7.5

years before Plaintiff filed suit on January 17, 2019.

1. Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act Express and Implied Warranty Claims Are Not 

Saved by the Future Performance Exception

First, Plaintiff contends that under the future performance exception, the four-year statute 

of limitations on Plaintiff’s express and implied warranty claims began to run not when Plaintiff 

purchased his vehicle on June 30, 2008, but rather on April 12, 2012, the date that Plaintiff could 

have discovered the defective 6.4L Engine. The Court holds that the future performance exception 

does not apply to an implied warranty claim and therefore does not save Plaintiff’s implied 

warranty claim. However, even accepting Plaintiff’s argument that the future performance 

exception applies to both Plaintiff’s express warranty claim and implied warranty claim, the fouryear statute of limitations began to run on April 12, 2012, and thus expired on April 12, 2016, well 

before Plaintiff filed suit on January 17, 2019. 

Under the Song-Beverly Act, an express warranty claim normally accrues at tender of 

delivery, with a limited exception for future performance: 

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s 

lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of 

delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future

performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such 

performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been 

discovered. 

Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1306 (2009) (quoting Cal. Comm. Code § 

2725(2)). The future performance exception “must be narrowly construed.” Cardinal Health 301, 

Inc. v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 169 Cal. App. 4th 116, 130 (2008). As such, the future performance 

exception “applies only when the seller has expressly agreed to warrant its product for a specific 

and defined period of time.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Consequently, the California Court of Appeal has interpreted and applied the future 

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performance exception almost exclusively in the express warranty context. See id. at 16-18 (citing 

cases). To emphasize this point, the Cardinal Health court stated that “[b]ecause an implied 

warranty is one that arises by operation of law rather than by an express agreement of the parties, 

courts have consistently held [that] it is not a warranty that explicitly extends to future 

performance of the goods.” Id. at 19-20; see also id. at 20 (citing cases). “In other words, the 

future performance exception only applies to the breach of an express warranty. It does not allow 

the breach of an express warranty to toll the statute of limitations ‘to an altogether separate claim,’

such as an implied warranty claim.” Philips, 2016 WL 1745948, at *13 (quoting MacDonald v. 

Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2014)); Mangiapane v. Ford Motor Co., 

2019 WL 5199534, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Because Plaintiff’s cause of action . . . is for 

breach of an implied warranty, the future performance exception is inapplicable to her claim.”). 

Therefore, the future performance exception does not apply to toll Plaintiff’s claim for breach of 

an implied warranty.

Nevertheless, even accepting Plaintiff’s argument that the future performance exception 

applies to both Plaintiff’s implied and express warranty claims, those claims are still not timely. 

At most, even if the future performance exception applied, Plaintiff’s implied and express 

warranty claims would accrue “when the breach is or should have been discovered.” Mexia, 174 

Cal. App. 4th at 1306 (quoting Cal. Comm. Code § 2725(2)). Plaintiff concedes that he could 

have discovered the 6.4L Engine defect on April 12, 2012. FAC ¶ 79. Even accepting Plaintiff’s 

date of accrual as April 12, 2012, Plaintiff’s implied and express warranty claims would have 

expired on April 12, 2016, well before Plaintiff filed suit on January 17, 2019. Accordingly, the 

future performance exception does not save Plaintiff’s implied and express warranty claims.

2. Neither the Delayed Discovery Rule nor the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine 

Applies to Any of Plaintiff’s Claims

Second, Plaintiff again contends that under the delayed discovery rule and the fraudulent 

concealment doctrine, the statute of limitations on all of Plaintiff’s claims did not begin to run 

until January 25, 2016, the date of Plaintiff’s last visit to an authorized Ford repair facility to 

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repair the vehicle’s engine. Opp. at 6 (“Plaintiff did not have actual notice of the facts giving rise 

to his claims until on or around January 25, 2016 . . . .”). The Court previously rejected these 

exact arguments in its earlier order on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because 

Plaintiff could have discovered his injury far earlier than January 25, 2016. ECF No. 34 at 8-12. 

Nothing in the FAC alters this conclusion.

The discovery rule “postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or 

has reason to discover, the cause of action.” WA Southwest2, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 240 

Cal. App. 4th 148, 156 (2015). “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or 

she has reason to at least suspect a factual basis for its elements.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 

Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To allege that 

the discovery rule applies, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) 

the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” Id. at 808 (citation 

omitted) (emphasis in original). “The courts interpret discovery in this context to mean not when 

the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but when the plaintiff suspected or 

should have suspected that an injury was caused by wrongdoing.” Kline, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 

1374. 

Relatedly, Plaintiff contends that the fraudulent concealment doctrine tolled the statute of 

limitations on his claims until January 25, 2016. Opp. at 8-9. “The doctrine of fraudulent 

concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a defendant, through deceptive conduct, has 

caused a claim to grow stale.” Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (2013). 

“This doctrine requires the plaintiff to (1) plead with particularity the facts giving rise to the 

fraudulent concealment claim and (2) demonstrate that he or she used due diligence in an attempt 

to uncover the facts.” Allen v. Similasan Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1071 (S.D. Cal. 2015) 

(citing Hunter v. Gates, 68 F. App’x 69, 71 (9th Cir. 2003)). In other words, a plaintiff must 

allege both the elements of fraud and “an excuse for late discovery of the facts.” Investors Equity 

Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 (2011) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Even if there is fraudulent concealment, “the tolling ceases when those facts are, 

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or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff.” Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 

566 U.S. 221, 227 (2012). 

Accordingly, to merit application of the discovery rule or fraudulent concealment tolling, a 

plaintiff must allege that he exercised due diligence to uncover his injury. See Allen, 96 F. Supp. 

3d at 1071 (applying the “same reasoning” to whether the plaintiff exercised the due diligence 

required to apply either the discovery rule or fraudulent concealment tolling). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Plaintiff was unable 

to discover the engine defect until January 25, 2016. The Court agrees. After Plaintiff purchased 

his vehicle in June 2008, Plaintiff tendered the vehicle to authorized Ford repair facilities on eight 

different occasions between January 15, 2009 and October 27, 2012. See FAC ¶¶ 59-66. At least 

four of Plaintiff’s repairs concerned the engine, the very defect that Plaintiff claims not to have 

discovered until January 25, 2016. Indeed, Plaintiff conceded that the April 30, 2012 repair “was 

the first time Plaintiff could have realized that the second repair to the engine had been 

unsuccessful.” Id. ¶ 65. Indeed, Plaintiff himself acknowledges that “[t]he earliest date that a 

person in Plaintiff’s position could have reasonably had notice of his claims would be April 30, 

2012.” Id. ¶ 79. Accordingly, it is not plausible that Plaintiff first discovered a defect with his 

vehicle’s engine in January 2016. With any reasonable diligence, Plaintiff should have been 

aware of a problem by April 30, 2012 at the latest, after his engine had already had multiple 

unsuccessful repairs. 

As the Court previously recognized in its earlier order on Defendant’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings, “[m]ultiple courts have reached the same conclusions on almost identical 

allegations, including in another case involving allegations about Ford defects.” ECF No. 34 at 

10. In Finney, the plaintiff, Finney, alleged that although she purchased her Ford Super Duty 

truck in 2005 and delivered the truck for repairs on several occasions between 2005 and 2010, she 

first became aware of defects with the truck’s engine in March 2015 when her check engine light 

came on. Finney v. Ford Motor Co., 2018 WL 2552266, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2018) (“Finney 

I”). Finney attempted to invoke the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment tolling. Id. at *3. 

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As Plaintiff does in this case, Finney argued that she was unable to discover the defect until March 

2015 because after each repair visit, technicians told Finney that the car was repaired. Id. at *4. 

The district court rejected Finney’s allegations as insufficient: “Finney’s allegations are 

particularly implausible given the absence of an explanation as to why a 2015 engine light 

revealed the defect, but no prior engine issue—whether during the 2005 to 2010 warranty repair 

period, or after—revealed the defect.” Id. The district court gave Finney leave to amend her 

complaint to rectify the problems with her discovery rule and fraudulent concealment allegations. 

Id. at *9. 

After Finney amended her complaint, the district court again concluded that Finney had 

not plausibly alleged delayed discovery or fraudulent concealment tolling. Finney v. Ford Motor 

Co., 2019 WL 79033 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2019) (“Finney II”). The district court found insufficient 

Finney’s allegation that the Ford dealership repeatedly told her, after each successive repair, that 

her truck was fixed: 

If anything, these allegations more starkly illustrate the flaws in Finney’s delayed 

discovery claim: she fails to explain how the illumination of a check-engine light 

alerted her to the existence of her claims in 2015, while repeated problems with the 

same engine between four and eight years earlier did not. After four visits to the 

dealership for repairs in as many years, Finney should have suspected that something 

was amiss, regardless of representations that the problem was fixed.

Id. at *3. As a result, the district court granted Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on all 

claims without leave to amend. Id. at *4–5.

Likewise in Herremans v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2014 WL 5017843 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 

2014), the plaintiff Herremans purchased a vehicle in 2008 and brought the vehicle in for multiple 

repairs to her water pump, the last in January 2013. Id. at *1. Herremans argued that the 

discovery rule and fraudulent concealment tolling applied because she was unaware of the defect

until “the car needed repairs a second time.” Id. at *5. However, the district court held that 

Herremans’ allegations were insufficient because Herremans failed to plead “why, in the exercise 

of reasonable diligence, she could not have discovered the defect earlier.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege why only the January 25, 2016 repair, and not any of 

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the eight prior repairs to the vehicle in the four years after Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, put 

Plaintiff on notice of an engine defect. As in Finney II, Plaintiff should have been aware by at 

least April 2012 that “something was amiss, regardless of representations that the problem was 

fixed.” Finney II, 2019 WL 79033, at *3. Plaintiff’s argument that Plaintiff only became aware of 

the engine defect on January 25, 2016—even though the Ford dealer that Plaintiff visited on

January 25, 2016 made the same representation as after all eight prior repairs “that the Vehicle had 

been repaired and was safe to drive”—is implausible. FAC ¶ 67. Indeed, as previously 

mentioned, Plaintiff himself acknowledges that “[t]he earliest date that a person in Plaintiff’s 

position could have reasonably had notice of his claims would be April 30, 2012.” Id. ¶ 79. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts related to what, if anything, changed in January 2016, eight 

years after Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, to finally bring the defect to light. 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant kept information about the defect secret from 

Defendant: “No amount of diligence by Plaintiff could have led to discovery of these facts because 

they were kept secret by Ford.” FAC ¶ 82. But Plaintiff himself contradicts this allegation earlier 

in the FAC, where Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he earliest date that a person in Plaintiff’s position 

could have reasonably had notice of his claims would be April 30, 2012.” Id. ¶ 79. Discovery 

occurs “not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but when the plaintiff 

suspected or should have suspected that an injury was caused by wrongdoing.” Kline, 87 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1374. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim began to accrue when he suspected or should have 

suspected that his vehicle suffered from a defect, which occurred at the latest on April 30, 2012. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged reasonable diligence, Plaintiff is 

not entitled to invoke the discovery rule or the fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll his claims 

to January 25, 2016. See Finney I, 2018 WL 2552266, at *4 (concluding that the plaintiff’s failure 

to exercise reasonable diligence precluded both the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment 

tolling). At the latest, Plaintiff became aware of the defect on April 30, 2012. See FAC ¶¶ 65, 79. 

The statute of limitations thus expired on April 30, 2015 (for Plaintiff’s fraud claims) or April 30, 

2016 (for Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims), well before Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on January 

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17, 2019. Therefore, neither the delayed discovery rule nor the fraudulent concealment doctrine 

saves Plaintiff’s claims.

3. American Pipe Tolling Does Not Apply to Toll Any of Plaintiff’s Claims

Third, Plaintiff argues that the tolling doctrine established in American Pipe & 

Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), applies such that none of Plaintiff’s claims are 

time-barred. American Pipe holds that the pendency of a class action tolls the statute of 

limitations for putative class members who later bring individual suits when class certification is 

denied. Plaintiff contends that Darne v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 13-cv-03594 (N.D. Ill. May 

14, 2013)—a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois on May 14, 2013 and dismissed on September 1, 2017 that alleged similar claims against 

Defendant based on the allegedly defective 6.4L Engine—tolled the applicable statute of 

limitations periods. If American Pipe tolling applies, Plaintiff’s claims are all timely. As 

explained more fully below, however, the Court holds that under controlling Ninth Circuit 

precedent, California has not recognized “cross-jurisdictional” American Pipe tolling. See 

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, American Pipe 

tolling does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims.

In American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court held that the “commencement of a 

class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class 

who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” 414 U.S. 

at 554. “Where class-action status has been denied, . . . members of the failed class could timely 

intervene as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class character.” China 

Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct 1800, 1804 (2018) (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 544, 552-

53). In subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court clarified that “[t]he [American 

Pipe] rule is not dependent on intervening in or joining an existing suit; it applies as well to 

putative class members who, after denial of class certification, ‘prefer to bring an individual suit 

rather than intervene once the economies of a class action are no longer available.’” Id. (quoting 

Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350, 353-54 (1983)) (internal alterations 

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omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court justified the new rule on two grounds. First, the high 

court noted the need to protect “the efficiency and economy of [class action] litigation.” American 

Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553. Had the class action not tolled the statute of limitations, putative class 

members would have been incentivized to file individual actions to preserve their claims. Id. at 

553-54 (“[A] rule requiring successful anticipation of the determination of the viability of the class 

would breed needless duplication of motions.”). Second, though the United States Supreme Court 

recognized that defendants should not have to litigate stale claims, the tolling rule would apply 

only where defendants were on notice “of the substantive claims being brought against them,” as 

well as “the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the 

judgment.” Id. at 554-55. As such, “[w]ithin the period set by the statute of limitations, the 

defendants [would] have the essential information necessary” to be put on notice of the later 

substantive claims. Id. at 555.

Nonetheless, federal law does not control the issue before the Court. “As a federal court 

sitting in diversity jurisdiction, . . . this Court is bound by state law with respect to the tolling of 

statute of limitations and the treatment of class action lawsuits.” Hendrix v. Novartis Pharm. 

Corp., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 647 Fed. App’x 749 (9th Cir. 2016)

(citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)). The parties agree that California 

law governs this issue and that the determinative question is whether California law recognizes 

American Pipe tolling.

In Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103 (1988), the California Supreme Court first 

addressed whether California law recognized a state-law analogue to American Pipe tolling. The 

Jolly plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer and claimed that she had been injured in utero by her 

mother’s use of an allegedly defective drug. Id. at 1107. Plaintiff asserted that American Pipe 

tolling applied to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a class action in which she 

was a putative class member. Id. at 1118. The California Supreme Court disagreed that American 

Pipe tolling applied to the facts of the case.

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The California Supreme Court first noted that the relevant class action in Jolly “sought 

only declaratory relief and an order directing defendants to publicize the dangers of [the allegedly 

defective drug]” for the class. Id. at 1120. In other words, the class action suit had not put 

defendants on notice of the scope of the claims within the class. Additionally, Jolly involved 

personal injury claims, which tended to “vary widely from claim to claim, creating a wide 

disparity in claimant’s damages and issues of defendant liability, proximate cause, liability of 

skilled intermediaries, comparative fault, informed consent, assumption of the risk and periods of 

limitation.” Id.at 1123. The defendants therefore could not have been put “on notice of 

allegations related to personal injury within the statutory period of limitations so that they might 

[have] prepare[d] their defense.” Id. at 1124. These facts stood in contrast to the facts in 

American Pipe, where the defendants had been put on notice of the general nature of claims and 

injuries of the putative class through the filing of the class action. Id. at 1123-25.

Furthermore, the class action complaint in Jolly “did not seek personal injury damages on 

behalf of the class,” such that “even those absent class members who were aware of that action 

could not reasonably have relied on the complaint as a basis for postponing their own personal 

injury actions.” Id. at 1125. Therefore, the California Supreme Court noted that its ruling would 

“not result in the duplicative litigation of the sort feared by the court in American Pipe.” Id.

Based on this reasoning, the California Supreme Court ultimately declined to apply 

American Pipe tolling to a personal-injury mass-tort class action case based on allegedly defective 

pharmaceuticals. The California Supreme Court, however, left unanswered “the broader question 

whether in any personal injury mass-tort case the filing of a class action complaint can serve to toll 

the statute of limitations for putative class members when the class ultimately is denied 

certification for lack of commonality.” Id. Indeed, the California Supreme Court “left open the 

possibility of applying the [American Pipe] tolling doctrine . . . in which a lack of commonality 

had been found, if the circumstances so required.” Becker v. McMillin Constr. Co., 226 Cal. App. 

3d 1493, 1501 (1991).

Since Jolly, however, no California Supreme Court decision has directly addressed 

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whether California courts would apply American Pipe tolling to facts analogous to the instant 

case, where Plaintiff relies on the filing of a prior class action in another jurisdiction to toll the 

statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims. “The California Supreme Court has not adopted such 

cross-jurisdictional tolling,” and the Ninth Circuit has conclusively held that “the weight of 

authority and California’s interest in managing its own judicial system counsel us not to import the 

doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling into California law. The rule of American Pipe—which 

allows tolling within the federal court system in federal question class actions—does not mandate 

cross-jurisdictional tolling as a matter of state procedure.” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 

534 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Hendrix, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (applying Clemens

to deny American Pipe tolling based on a Tennessee class action). Plaintiff asserts that Clemens is 

“out of date,” and California Courts of Appeal have applied American Pipe cross-jurisdictional 

tolling. Opp. at 10. This Court, however, “is bound by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit until a 

state court of last resort renders a decision clearly irreconcilable with Ninth Circuit precedent.” 

Vasquez Cruz v. Barr, 2019 WL 6327576, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019) (citing Miller v. 

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Accordingly, Clemens is directly applicable and controls this case such that under 

California law, the filing of Darne did not toll the statute of limitations periods under American 

Pipe. Therefore, American Pipe does not apply and save Plaintiff’s claims.

4. California Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply to Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s final tolling argument rests upon the California equitable tolling doctrine. Like 

all of Plaintiff’s other tolling arguments, the Court holds that California equitable tolling does not 

salvage Plaintiff’s claims.

According to the Ninth Circuit, California equitable tolling is a distinct doctrine from 

American Pipe tolling. Hatfield v. Halifax, PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although 

the two types of tolling—equitable and American Pipe—overlap to some extent, and even though 

California courts have treated them at times as interchangeable, they are not congruent.”). 

“Clemens, which only rejected the application of American Pipe tolling in a cross-jurisdictional 

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action, does not affect the application of California’s equitable tolling doctrine, which covers 

situations beyond those covered by American Pipe.” Id.

Under California law, “[t]he equitable tolling of statutes of limitations . . . . is designed to 

prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the purpose of the 

statute of limitations—timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claims—has been satisfied.” 

McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 99 (2008) (quotation marks 

omitted). Equitable tolling requires a showing of three elements: “(1) timely notice to the 

defendant in the filing of the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant in gathering 

evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by the 

plaintiff in filing the second claim.” Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185 (citing Collier v. City of 

Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917 (1983)); see McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102 (“Concerning our 

judicially created equitable tolling rule, we clarified that it required a showing of three elements: 

timely notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on 

the part of the plaintiff.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, under an established line of California precedents, a plaintiff invoking 

equitable tolling “must have actually relied on the use of some other legal mechanism to vindicate 

his rights.” Hendrix, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1115. “[T]he doctrine applies when an injured person has 

several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 

100 (quotation marks and internal alterations omitted); Addison v. State, 21 Cal.3d 313, 317 

(1978) (“[C]ourts have adhered to a general policy which favors relieving plaintiff[s] from the bar 

of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies[,] he . . . pursues one designed to 

lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.” (citing cases)). “Thus, it may apply where one action 

stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where administrative 

remedies must be exhausted before a second action can proceed; or where a first action, embarked 

upon in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 100.

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, however, it is unclear whether a plaintiff invoking 

equitable tolling must show that he or she previously pursued an alternative legal mechanism. In 

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Hatfield v. Halifax, a plaintiff filed a class action suit in federal court in California the same day 

that her substantively identical class action suit in New Jersey court was dismissed. 564 F.3d at 

1179-80. The Ninth Circuit held that California equitable tolling applied because the defendants 

have been given timely notice, the claims in the two suits were substantially similar, and the 

second action was filed on the same day that the New Jersey court dismissed her case. Id. at 1185. 

Some courts have interpreted Hatfield to be consistent with California precedents requiring 

a plaintiff to take some prior legal action in order to claim equitable tolling. For example, in a 

recent case out of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, a district 

court noted that “in Hatfield, the plaintiff had herself filed the class action that tolled her 

California claims.” Cousyn for Cousyn Grading & Demo Inc v. Ford Motor Co., 2019 WL 

3491930, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019). Defendant makes the same argument here—namely, 

that “California’s equitable tolling doctrine requires prior action by the plaintiff seeking tolling to 

preserve his or her claims” and that “Plaintiff does not allege that he took any steps prior to his 

filing the Complaint in January [2019] to preserve his claims against Ford.” Mot. at 6. 

The Ninth Circuit, however, did not limit its analysis of equitable tolling to the named 

plaintiff in Hatfield. Rather, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the claims of the putative class 

members who resided in California were tolled by the filing of the New Jersey action, even though 

the putative class members who resided in California had not taken any actions themselves to 

preserve their claims. The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]n light of California’s endorsement of class 

actions generally, we see no reason why, in an equitable tolling situation, California would require 

each individual California resident who is a member of the Hatfield class to file individually and 

burden the courts with numerous suits.” Id. at 1189 (citation omitted).

This holding is in tension with California precedents concluding that equitable tolling 

“applies when an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, 

pursues one.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 100 (quotation marks and internal alterations omitted)). 

This conflict is all the more confounding given that the Hatfield court itself recognized that “the 

usual scenario in which California has applied equitable tolling involves a situation where the 

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plaintiff possesses several legal remedies and reasonably and in good faith pursues one of them to 

try and prevent further damages.” Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1186.

As the Court previously held in the context of American Pipe tolling, this Court “is bound 

by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit until a state court of last resort renders a decision clearly 

irreconcilable with Ninth Circuit precedent.” Vasquez Cruz, 2019 WL 6327576, at *6 (citing 

Gammie, 335 F.3d at 893). No California Supreme Court decision has called Hatfield into 

question, and indeed, even one California Court of Appeal has cited Hatfield approvingly, though 

in an unpublished opinion. See Love v. First Mortg. Corp., 2012 WL 314875, at *15 (Cal. Ct. 

App. Feb. 2, 2012) (“The Ninth Circuit noted California law permits equitable tolling and 

‘California courts have permitted a plaintiff to take advantage of tolling based on the filing of a 

prior class action,’ even where the plaintiff was only a putative class member in the earlier action.” 

(quoting Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185) (unpublished opinion, may not be cited in California courts)). 

Nonetheless, the Court need not decide this issue today because the Court holds that the FAC fails 

to allege facts that satisfy the three-element test necessary to demonstrate equitable tolling. 

Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating the third element, “good faith 

and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim.” Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185 

(citation omitted); see McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102 (“Concerning our judicially created equitable 

tolling rule, we clarified that it required a showing of three elements: timely notice, and lack of 

prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). “The third prerequisite of good faith and reasonable conduct on the 

part of the plaintiff is less clearly defined in the cases,” “[b]ut in Addison v. State of California, the 

[California] Supreme Court did stress that the plaintiff filed his second claim a short time after 

tolling ended.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102 n.2 (quotation marks omitted). A California Court 

of Appeal decision, interpreting Addison, noted that “if a plaintiff delayed filing the second claim 

until the statute on that claim had nearly run, even after crediting the tolled period, his conduct 

might be considered unreasonable.” Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 926.

Here, Plaintiff concedes that he should have known about the 6.4L Engine defect by April 

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30, 2012. FAC ¶ 79. The Darne class action was filed on May 14, 2013 and dismissed on 

September 1, 2017. RJN, Exs. C and F. Plaintiff did not file this action until January 17, 2019—

more than 16 months after the Darne class action was dismissed. Plaintiff provides no 

justification for his 16-month delay even though this Court previously found that Plaintiff’s claims 

were time-barred, gave Plaintiff leave to amend, and admonished Plaintiff that failure to cure the 

timeliness deficiency would result in a dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.

Courts have generally applied equitable tolling when the delays in filing the second claim 

were substantially less than 16 months. See Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2016 WL 6540452, at 

*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (collecting cases). Indeed, in Hatfield, the second action was filed on 

the same day that the New Jersey court dismissed the original case. Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185; 

see also Oltman v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 538 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying 

equitable tolling where plaintiffs “promptly” filed in federal court on the same day the state court 

claims were dismissed). 

Additionally, courts have found that delays similar in length to 16 months demonstrated

unreasonable conduct, thereby justifying the denial of equitable tolling. Audio Mktg. Servs., S.A.S. 

v. Monster Cable Prod., Inc., 2013 WL 633202, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding no 

“good faith and reasonable conduct” justifying equitable tolling for 16 month delay); Easley v. 

County of El Dorado Prob. Dep’t., 478 Fed. App’x 447, 447 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no equitable 

tolling for a delay of over one year (citing Ervin v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-20 

(9th Cir. 1988))); PetersonHouston v. Finet/RPM Mortg. Corp., 1997 WL 335129 (N.D. Cal. July 

23, 1997) (finding equitable tolling inappropriate after a delay of one year). 

As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s delay of 16 months between the dismissal 

of the Darne action and the filing of this action is not reasonable. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges

absolutely no facts justifying this 16-month delay despite previously being given leave to amend 

to allege facts to show that Plaintiff’s claims were not time-barred. Accordingly, California 

equitable tolling does not apply in the instant case. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are all time-barred, and the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

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motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice. Denying leave to amend is permissible if 

allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, 

or if the moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532.

A court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff “repeated[ly] fail[s] to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 892. Indeed, a “district 

court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (quotation marks omitted). This is especially 

true here, as the Court’s prior order put Plaintiff on notice that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred 

and explained that “[f]ailure to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in dismissal 

with prejudice of the challenged claims.” ECF No. 34 at 15.

Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he earliest date that a person in Plaintiff’s position 

could have reasonably had notice of his claims would be April 30, 2012.” FAC ¶ 79. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not file suit until almost seven years later. Indeed, even after the Darne 

class action was dismissed on September 1, 2017, Plaintiff still waited 16 months before filing this 

action on January 17, 2019. Plaintiff provides no justification for the 16-month delay despite 

having been given leave to amend to allege that Plaintiff’s claims were not time-barred. Plaintiff 

had all the facts necessary to allege all of its tolling arguments in its original complaint as well as 

the First Amended Complaint, yet Plaintiff failed to do so. Allowing another serial amendment 

after a prior opportunity to do so would cause undue delay and “unduly prejudice Defendant by 

forcing it to defend against stale claims.” Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Health Sys., 2012 WL 

381240, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Health Sys., 

Inc., 585 Fed. App’x 572 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In light of all these factors, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings with prejudice.

B. Deficiencies in Fraud Claims

Even though the statute of limitations alone suffices to grant Defendant’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings on all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court addresses Defendant’s other 

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arguments that Plaintiff’s fraud claims are inadequate. 

Plaintiff brings claims for fraudulent inducement – concealment, fraudulent inducement –

intentional misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement – negligent misrepresentation. FAC ¶¶ 

128-64. Plaintiff asserts that three sources of information contained misrepresentations such that 

Defendant is liable for fraud. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for false 

television and radio commercials, a marketing brochure that supplied misrepresentations, and false 

statements from a salesperson at Salinas Valley Ford.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to meet the specificity that Rule 9(b) requires and the alleged statements constitute 

non-actionable puffery. The Court agrees with Defendant.

1. Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims Based on Statements from Television and Radio 

Commercials Fail to Satisfy Rule 9(b)

To allege a fraud claim based on misrepresentations, as Plaintiff does in this case, a 

plaintiff must allege “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” Vess, 

317 F.3d at 1106; see also Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764 (claims sounding in fraud must allege “an 

account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities 

of the parties to the misrepresentations”). Additionally, a plaintiff must also set forth “what is 

false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff alleged that he was exposed to 

misrepresentations about Ford vehicles through “(1) Ford’s televised national marketing 

campaign; (2) sales materials found at the dealership where he bought his vehicle; and (3) sales 

personnel working at the dealership where he bought his vehicle.” 567 F.3d at 1126–27. The 

Ninth Circuit held that these “general pleadings” were insufficient because the plaintiff failed to 

allege “the particular circumstances surrounding such representations.” Id. at 1126. In particular, 

the plaintiff failed to “specify what the television advertisements or other sales material 

specifically stated” or when he was exposed to them, “which sales material he relied upon,” and 

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which salesperson made any representations about the vehicles to the plaintiff. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit thus upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b). Id. at 

1127. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding television and radio commercials remain unchanged from 

Plaintiff’s prior complaint. In the Court’s prior order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s fraud claims 

predicated on television and radio commercials because Plaintiff “[did] not specify when he 

viewed those commercials, which specific commercials he saw or heard, and any specific 

statements Defendant made in those commercials.” ECF No. 34 at 14. That same conclusion 

follows here.

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

Plaintiff’s fraud claims to the extent they are premised on alleged misrepresentations from 

television and radio commercials. In its prior order, the Court explained that “[f]ailure to cure the 

deficiencies identified in this Order will result in dismissal with prejudice of the challenged 

claims.” ECF No. 34 at 15. Additionally, Plaintiff already had the opportunity to amend the 

complaint, and the Court’s “discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff 

has previously amended the complaint.” Carasso, 637 F.3d at 1058. Because Plaintiff has failed 

to cure the exact deficiencies previously identified in the Court’s prior order, the Court finds that 

amendment would be futile and dismisses these claims with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims Based on Statements from the Marketing Brochure Fail 

to Satisfy Rule 9(b)

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s fraud claims based on statements from a Ford 

marketing brochure. Previously, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s fraud claims based on statements 

in “written promotional materials prepared by Ford” because Plaintiff “fail[ed] to allege what 

those promotional materials were, how Plaintiff received them, and specifically when Plaintiff 

read the materials.” ECF No. 34 at 13-14. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that on the day of Plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle at the 

authorized Ford dealership, a salesperson provided Plaintiff with a marketing brochure for the 

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Ford 2008 F-350 that represented that the 6.4L Engine has “[h]igh-pressure common-rail fuel 

injection hels [sic] [that] deliver 100% of its 650 lb.-ft of torque (80 lb.-ft. more than 2007) at just 

2000 rpm.” Id. ¶ 142(a). The brochure also noted that the 6.4L Engine had “cast-iron block, 

heads, and bedplate;” a “bigger crankshaft;” “powder-forged connecting rods;” and “oil-jet piston 

cooling.” Id. ¶ 142(b)-(e). Plaintiff alleges that “the Vehicle as delivered to Plaintiff had an 

unreliable, underperforming engine prone to overheating and failure of multiple systems, from the 

cooling system to the electrical system,” but Plaintiff never alleges how any of the representations 

in the brochure are false. Id. ¶ 143.

Plaintiff does not adequately plead that these statements are false or misleading. To meet 

Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff must allege “what is false or misleading 

about a statement, and why it is false.” Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff merely alleges that “the Vehicle as delivered to Plaintiff had an unreliable, 

underperforming engine prone to overheating and failure of multiple systems, from the cooling 

system to the electrical system,” but Plaintiff never alleges how any of the representations in the 

brochure are false. FAC ¶ 143. For example, Plaintiff never pleads that the 6.4L Engine does not 

actually have “[h]igh-pressure common-rail fuel injection hels [sic] [that] deliver 100% of its 650 

lb.-ft of torque (80 lb.-ft. more than 2007) at just 2000 rpm” or that the 6.4L Engine does not 

actually have cast-iron block, heads, and bedplate; a bigger crankshaft; powder-forged connecting 

rods; ot oil-jet piston cooling. Id. ¶ 142(a)-(e).

Courts have dismissed misrepresentation claims when a plaintiff fails to plead how an 

alleged misrepresentation is false or misleading. For instance, in Palmer v. Apple Inc., the 

plaintiff pleaded that he relied on “quantitative statements regarding the iPhone 5’s performance 

or its compatibility with Wi-Fi and cellular networks.” 2016 WL 1535087, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

15, 2016). However, the Palmer plaintiff did not allege how such quantitative statements 

regarding the iPhone’s performance were false, so the court dismissed the claims. Id.

In another case, Davidson v. Apple, Inc., 2017 WL 3149305, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 

2017), the plaintiffs alleged that Apple’s statement that iPhones are made with “stainless steel and 

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titanium inserts” were false misrepresentations because their iPhones suffered alleged defects. 

The court determined, however, that the “[p]laintiffs d[id] not allege that the iPhones are not made 

with any of these specific materials” but that these materials “d[id] not sufficiently reinforce the 

iPhone.” Id. “[T]hat some iPhones suffered from the touchscreen defect does not demonstrate 

that Apple made any misrepresentation of fact in stating that the iPhones were made with certain 

materials and components.” Id.

Most recently, in Ahern v. Apple, the plaintiffs argued that Apple’s statement that its 

products underwent “rigorous testing methods that simulated customers’ experiences” were false 

and misleading. 2019 WL 5102621, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019). The court dismissed those 

claims because the plaintiffs did not allege that Apple’s statement was false or misleading. Id. 

Rather, the plaintiffs simply alleged that the products did not perform up to plaintiffs’ 

expectations. Id.

The logic of these cases applies here with equal force, as Plaintiff does not allege that the 

6.4L Engine does not have the qualities stated in the marketing brochure. Plaintiff merely alleges 

that “the Vehicle as delivered to Plaintiff had an unreliable, underperforming engine prone to 

overheating and failure of multiple systems, from the cooling system to the electrical system.” 

FAC ¶ 143. “[T]hat some [vehicles] suffered from the [alleged] defect does not demonstrate that 

[Ford] made any misrepresentation of fact in stating that the [engines] were made with certain 

materials and components.” Davidson, 2017 WL 3149305, at *11.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 

Plaintiff’s fraud claims to the extent they are premised on statements from the Ford marketing 

brochure. In its prior order, the Court explained that “[f]ailure to cure the deficiencies identified in 

this Order will result in dismissal with prejudice of the challenged claims.” ECF No. 34 at 15. 

Additionally, Plaintiff already had the opportunity to amend the complaint, and the Court’s 

“discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended 

the complaint.” Carasso, 637 F.3d at 1058. Because Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies

previously identified in the Court’s prior order, the Court finds that amendment would be futile 

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and dismisses these claims with prejudice.

3. The Alleged Statements from the Salinas Valley Ford Salesperson are NonActionable Puffery

Finally, according to Plaintiff, a salesperson at Salinas Valley Ford “verbally represented 

to Plaintiff that the Super Duty F-350 was better and improved over prior Ford models, and 

specifically, that the new 6.4L Engine was a newly designed higher performing and better engine 

than the previous 6.0 Liter PowerStroke Engine.” Id. ¶ 56. “[W]hen asked how the 2008 F-350 

would perform in comparison with Plaintiff’s prior 1996 Ford truck[,] the salesperson represented 

that the ‘2008 F-350 is a better truck with better performance; guaranteed’” and that “the 2008 F350 had superior gas mileage and performance to previous Ford models.” Id.

These statements are quintessential, non-actionable puffery. “A challenged claim is nonactionable ‘puffery’ if it is a generalized, vague, and unspecified assertion upon which a 

reasonable consumer could not rely.” Rasmussen v. Apple Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1039 (N.D. 

Cal. 2014) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). An actionable statement must make a 

“specific and measurable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably interpreted 

as a statement of objective fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he common theme that seems to run 

through cases considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance will be 

induced by specific rather than general assertions.” Elias v. Hewlett-Packard co., 950 F. Supp. 2d 

1123, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 

Inc., 911 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1990)). Whether a statement is puffery or a representation of fact is a 

question of law that can be properly decided on a motion to dismiss. Cook, 911 F.2d at 245.

“Vague or highly subjective claims about product superiority amount to non-actionable 

puffery.” Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2012). As a result, 

generalized claims about a vehicle’s “high performance” or “durability” are non-actionable 

puffery. Cook, 911 F.2d at 246 (holding that “advertising which merely states in general terms 

that one product is superior is not actionable”); see Elsayed v. Maserati N. Am., Inc., 215 F. Supp. 

3d 949, 960 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that manufacturer’s statement about car’s “state of the art 

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engineering” was puffery); Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 964, 973 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (“[G]eneralized and vague statements of product superiority such as ‘superb, 

uncompromising quality’” and “‘longer battery life’ are . . . all non-actionable puffery.”); Hodges 

v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4393545, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) (concluding that Apple’s 

statement that its product had “the world’s most advanced notebook display . . . . is non-actionable 

puffery because it is a generalized, vague, and unspecified assertion upon which a reasonable 

consumer could not rely” (internal alterations and quotation omitted)); Apodaca v. Whirlpool 

Corp., 2013 WL 6477821, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) (holding that “statements about 

dependability and superiority,” including comments such as “unequaled tradition of quality 

production” or “unrivaled performance” are “too vague to be actionable”); Cook, 911 F.2d 242 

(statement that lamps were “far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home movies” was 

puffery (citing Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 308-09 (N.D. 

Ill. 1965)).

The Court previously held that these statements constituted puffery because they were 

“precisely the sort of vague or highly subjective claims about product superiority that are not 

actionable.” ECF No. 34 at 15. Nothing alleged in the FAC changes this conclusion. Statements 

about a “higher performing and better engine,” “better truck with better performance,” or 

“superior gas mileage and performance” (FAC ¶ 56) “are all boasts, all-but-meaningless 

superlatives.”2 Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1361 

(2003). 

In addition, the FAC fails to allege the salesperson’s identity, as required by the Court’s 

prior order. ECF No. 34 at 14 (“Plaintiff does not allege what the salesperson specifically said or 

the salesperson’s identity.” (citing Finney I, 2018 WL 22552266, at *7-8 (holding that the plaintiff 

failed to adequately plead misrepresentation where the plaintiff relied on general allegations about 

 

2 The Court’s conclusion that these statements constitute non-actionable puffery also applies to 

similar alleged statements in the marketing brochure and television and radio commercials. See 

FAC ¶¶ 53-54 (alleging that Ford promoted the vehicle as “best-in-class”).

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promotional materials and an unidentified salesperson’s statement))).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 

Plaintiff’s fraud claims to the extent they are premised on statements from a Salinas Valley Ford 

salesperson. In its prior order, the Court explained that “[f]ailure to cure the deficiencies 

identified in this Order will result in dismissal with prejudice of the challenged claims.” ECF No. 

34 at 15. Additionally, Plaintiff already had the opportunity to amend the complaint, and the 

Court’s “discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Carasso, 637 F.3d at 1058. Because Plaintiff has failed to cure 

deficiencies previously identified in the Court’s prior order, the Court finds that amendment would 

be futile and dismisses these claims with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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