Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04158/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04158-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED 

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For the Northern District of California

NITED 

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND

STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROCHE MOLECULAR SYSTEMS, INC.; ROCHE

DIAGNOSTICS CORPORATION; ROCHE

DIAGNOSTICS OPERATIONS INC.,

Defendants. 

ROCHE MOLECULAR SYSTEMS, INC.; ROCHE

DIAGNOSTICS CORPORATION; ROCHE

DIAGNOSTICS OPERATIONS INC.,

Counterclaimants,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND

STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY,

Counterclaim Defendants. 

No. C 05-04158 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendants’ Motion to Compel

On October 14, 2005, plaintiff The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior

University (“Stanford”) filed a complaint alleging patent infringement (the “Complaint”) by

defendants Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., Roche Diagnostics Corporation, Roche Diagnostic

Operations, Inc., and Roche Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (collectively the “Roche defendants”). On

November 17, 2005, defendants filed an answer and counterclaim against plaintiff and counterclaim

defendant Thomas Merigan (the “Counterclaim”), denying infringement and further alleging that the

patents in question are not duly and lawfully issued to the plaintiff. Now before the court is the issue

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of whether Stanford waived its attorney-client privilege and work product protection as to the

subject of inventorship of United States Patent Application No. 07/883,327 (the “’327 Application”)

and patents and applications claiming priority from the ’327 Application.

Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth

below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND1

The instant motion concerns an incident that occurred more than a decade prior to the

commencement of the current litigation. On May 14, 1992, Stanford’s lawyers at Pennie &

Edmonds filed the ’327 Application with the PTO on behalf of Drs. Michael J. Kozal, who at the

time of the patent application in April 1992 was a post-doctoral research fellow in the Division of

Infectious Diseases at Stanford University, and Thomas C. Merigan, Professor of Medicine and

Director of the Center for AIDS Research at Stanford University. The ’327 Application is the parent

of the two disputed patents at the heart of the current action, namely United States Patent Nos.

5,968,730 and 6,503,705 (the “’730 Patent” and “’705 Patent,” respectively). In submitting its initial

patent application to the PTO, Stanford omitted the names of two of the original co-inventors, Drs.

Mark Holodniy and David A. Katzenstein. On December 7, 1992, Stanford sought to correct the

inventors named on the application. PTO rules require that Stanford submit facts sufficient to

establish that the initial omission of the two inventors was through error rather than deceptive intent.

 Stanford submitted three declarations to the PTO that included a detailed factual explanation of how

the initial error occurred, was discovered, and was subsequently investigated as required under 37

C.F.R. section 1.324(b)(2). The three declarations were authored by Thomas C. Merrigan, Michael

J. Kozal, and Barry W. Elledge, who at the time of the initial patent application in April 1992 was an

associate at Pennie & Edmonds.

In his declaration to the PTO, Dr. Merigan explained that he had “never attempted to mislead

or deceive the law firm of Pennie & Edmonds, the PTO, Stanford University or the scientific

community . . . .” Declaration of T.J. Chiang in support of Roche’s Brief on Stanford’s Waiver of

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the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Concerning Inventorship (“Chiang

Dec.”), Exh. A ¶ 10. During the course of preparing the application, Dr. Merigan initiated numerous

communications with his attorneys, and he included details of the legal advice he received in his

declaration to the PTO.

Drs. Kazenstein and Holoniy communicated to me their opinions that their

contributions should entitle them to be named as coinventors. I informed attorney

Laura Coruzzi of these opinions, and requested Pennie & Edmonds to pursue

whatever action needed to be done to name the proper coinventors.

Id., Exh. A ¶ 9. Barry Elledge also described attorney-client communications in his declaration:

Dr. Kole [of Pennie & Edmonds] stated that, to the best of her recollection, Dr.

Merigan and Kozal were listed as inventors of the above-referenced application

because they were the persons named on the Information Disclosure statement, and

with whom she had discussed the invention.”

Id., Exh. B ¶ 3.

In the declarations, Stanford explained that the extremely short time frame for preparing the

original patent application resulted in the omission of the two individuals who should have been

named as co-inventors in the original filing to the PTO. See id., Exh. B. On May 10, 1994, the PTO

accepted the affidavits after concluding that “the error in inventorship occurred without deceptive

intent.” Id., Exh. C.

The Roche defendants claim that Stanford has waived its attorney-client privilege and work

product immunity with regards to inventorship of the ’327 Application because the declarations

submitted to the PTO contain segments of privileged communication between Stanford and its

attorneys at Pennie & Edmonds. Therefore, the Roche defendants argue that Stanford should be

compelled, without temporal limitation, to produce all documents related to the inventorship of each

and every patent or application claiming priority from the ’327 Application. The Roche defendants

maintain that they are entitled access to these documents because further investigation and discovery

will provide additional evidentiary support that Stanford failed to disclose to the PTO the

collaboration between Roche and its predecessor-in-interest, Cetus, and employees of Stanford, and

the inventive contributions of the relevant Cetus employees to the subject matter claimed in the ’730

and ’705 Patents. Stanford counters that the doctrine of subject matter waiver does not apply in this

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instance because the disclosures made to the PTO were done outside the context of litigation and

without prejudice to the Roche defendants. Furthermore, Stanford argues that even if the court finds

a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection, the scope of the waiver should

be limited to the subject matter upon which the information was disclosed—namely, the error which

led to the omission of two inventors.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Scope of Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is

relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence,

description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents,

or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having

knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order

discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. 

Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The scope of discovery permissible under Rule 26 should be liberally

construed; the rule contemplates discovery into any matter that bears on or that reasonably could

lead to other matter that could bear on any issue that is or may be raised in a case. Oakes v.

Halvorsen Mar. Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998). However, the broad scope of

permissible discovery is limited by the attorney work product doctrine2 and any relevant privileges,

including the attorney-client privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (3).

II. Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of communications between

attorney and client made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See American Standard Inc. v.

Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed Cir. 1987). The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to

encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote

broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’” Swidler &

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Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.

383, 389 (1981)). In determining whether disclosure of privileged communications is required, the

burden of persuasion rests on the party claiming the privilege. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.

391, 402–403(1976). Generally disclosure of confidential communications or attorney work

product to a third party, such as an adversary in litigation, constitutes a waiver of privilege as to

those items. See Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 811 (1990).

III. Work Product Doctrine

“The work product doctrine, codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), protects

‘from discovery documents and tangible things prepared by a party or his representative in

anticipation of litigation.’” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Zenith

Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The work product privilege

protects the attorney’s thought processes and legal recommendations.”). Rule 26(b)(3) further

divides work product into two categories. The first general category is subject to disclosure in

discovery upon an adverse party’s showing of “substantial need for the materials and undue hardship

in obtaining the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Grand Jury Subpoena, 357

F.3d at 906 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

The second category, “opinion work product,” includes the “mental impressions, conclusions,

opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

The work-product privilege is intended to promote a fair and efficient adversarial system by

protecting “the attorney’s thought processes and legal recommendations” from the prying eyes of his

or her opponent. Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); accord Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–14 (1947) (“Proper

preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the

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relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and

needless interference . . . . Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of

what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten . . .”).

However, like the attorney-client privilege, protection for attorney work product may be

waived by disclosure or by other conduct, such as the testimonial use of the materials. United States

v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239–40 (1975).

DISCUSSION

I. Choice of Law

The two sides disagree as to which circuit’s law governs the present motion. The Roche

defendants argue that Federal Circuit Law governs because the dispute surrounding the waiver of

attorney-client privilege and work product protection concerning inventorship relates to an issue of

substantive patent law. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803–04 (Fed. Cir.

2000). Stanford maintains that this court should follow Ninth Circuit law, which construes subject

matter waiver more narrowly. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Penzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th

Cir. 1992) (holding that disclosure of information resulting in the waiver of attorney-client privilege

constitutes a waiver “only as to communications about the matter actually disclosed.”) (citing Weil

v. Investments/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981)).

“Federal circuit law applies when deciding whether particular written or other materials are

discoverable in a patent case, if those materials relate to an issue of substantive patent law.” In re

Echostar Communs. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Spalding, 203 F.3d at

803); see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185–86 (E.D. Cal. 2001)

(“the district court in a patent litigation shall apply Federal Circuit law when resolving discovery

issues that occur in the unique context of patent litigation.”). If a discovery issue does not implicate

substantive patent law, then the court applies the “law of the circuit in which the district court sits.” 

Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803 (citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1358

(Fed. Cir. 1999)). However, “a procedural issue that is not itself a substantive patent law issue is

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nonetheless governed by Federal Circuit law if the issue pertains to patent law . . . .” Id. at 803

(citing Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan, 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

Stanford does not directly address the choice of law issue in its brief. One of Stanford’s cited

authorities however, suggests that regional circuit law should apply because an order compelling

discovery does not fall exclusively in the realm of patent law. See GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265

F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Dorf & Stanton Communs., Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100

F.3d 919, 922 (Fed Cir. 1996)). In GFI, the district court found that the patentee waived its attorneyclient privilege when its patent attorney testified in an earlier litigation concerning “his state of

mind, knowledge of prior act, and communications with his client.” Id. at 1273. The Federal Circuit

concluded that “waiver by the disclosure of privileged material” was not a substantive patent issue

and therefore the law of the regional circuit applied to govern the standard of review of the district

court’s order. Id. at 1272; see also Dorf, 100 F.3d at 922 (“Because an order compelling discovery

is not unique to patent law, we agree that Second Circuit law must be considered for the proper

standard of review.”).

Here, unlike in both GFI and Dorf, the disclosures in question took place during

communication with the PTO regarding inventorship. The Federal Circuit has consistently held that

disclosures in patent-law-specific contexts are evaluated under Federal Circuit law. See Spalding,

203 F.3d at 803–04 (“[A] determination of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to

Spalding’s invention record clearly implicates, at the very least, the substantive patent issue of

inequitable conduct.”); see also Echostar, 448 F.3d at 1298 (Federal Circuit law applies in a case

involving the extent to which “a party waives its attorney-client privilege and work-product

immunity when it asserts the advice-of-counsel defense in response to a charge of willful patent

infringement.”). Issues that relate to discovery disputes and other procedural issues, which are

unique to patent cases, should be decided pursuant to Federal Circuit law. See Martin Marietta

Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382, 391 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (holding

that the issue of “whether [the patentee’s] invention record was protected by the attorney-client

privilege was ‘unique to patent law because the invention record relates to an invention submitted

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for consideration for possible patent protection . . . clearly implicat[ing] substantive patent law.’”)

(quoting Spalding, 203 F.3d at 804). Plaintiff’s citations to opinions from other circuits will

accordingly be given less weight.

 II. Waiver3

The Roche defendants argue that as part of the declarations submitted to the PTO, Stanford

and its attorneys disclosed the contents of confidential attorney-client communications, including

discussions and communications regarding inventorship for the ’327 Application, and therefore have

waived this privilege entirely.

Although Stanford concedes that the declarations contained privileged material, Stanford

argues that no waiver occurred for two reasons. First, Stanford maintains that since the disclosures

were made in a non-judicial context and have not subsequently been placed at issue in this litigation,

there has been no waiver of attorney-client privilege. Second, Stanford argues that the declarations

were submitted to the PTO more than ten years prior to the current litigation, and therefore that the

Roche defendants have suffered no prejudice. 

A. Judicial Context

Stanford asserts that the declarations in question have not been “placed at issue” during

litigation against Roche or any other adversary, citing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987). 

In In re von Bulow, a criminal defendant and his defense attorney published a book about the events

surrounding von Bulow’s criminal trial and subsequent acquittal. See id. at 96. The book included

details of at least four confidential communications between von Bulow and his attorney. Id. at 101. 

The Second Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion by allowing discovery of

unpublished portions of attorney-client communications. Id. at 102. The appellate court noted that

the where “the privilege-holder or his attorney has made extrajudicial disclosures, and those

disclosures have not subsequently been placed at issue during litigation,” the doctrine of subject

matter waiver is inapplicable. Id.

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In contrast to In re von Bulow, where publishing a book did not secure a legal right for the

criminal defendant, by submitting the declarations to the PTO to correct inventorship of the ‘327

Application, Stanford actively sought to gain a legal advantage by obtaining an enforceable patent. 

Since ownership and enforceability of the two asserted patents are at the heart of the dispute between

Stanford and the Roche defendants, Stanford’s initial application to the PTO and subsequent filing

of a corrected petition must be viewed as adversarial from Roche’s perspective despite having taken

place in a prior proceeding. See Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 262 F.3d 1363,

1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the patentee waived its attorney-client privilege and work

product protection for documents and communications submitted to the PTO to correct inventorship

of a contested patent, even though the disclosures were made in a separate administrative

proceeding); see also In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(holding that pre-litigation disclosure to Securities and Exchange Commission of counsel’s tax

advice waived privilege “with respect to all documents which formed the basis for the advice, all

documents considered by counsel in rendering that advice, and all reasonably contemporaneous

documents reflecting discussions by counsel or others concerning that advice”).

Stanford argues that Winbond is distinguishable because in Winbond the International Trade

Commission denied the patentee’s request to enforce a patent in the context of ongoing litigation

before the patentee sought to obtain a corrected inventorship from the PTO. By contrast, Stanford

argues that it submitted its declarations to the PTO ten years prior to the current litigation with the

Roche defendants. As a result, Stanford maintains that it has not placed the disclosures contained in

the declarations to the PTO “at issue” and therefore the Roche defendants are not entitled to a broad

waiver of the attorney-client privilege. However, the court is not persuaded by this distinction. 

Winbond did not depend on the timing of the disclosures to the PTO or hold that any such

disclosures have to be made in a concurrent proceeding during the course of ongoing litigation in

order to constitute a waiver of privilege. 262 F.2d at 1375. Similar to the patentee in Winbond,

Stanford relied on its declarations to the PTO to obtain a certificate of correction and is now

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attempting to use that certificate to enforce the ’730 and ’705 Patents in the context of its

infringement dispute with the Roche defendants.

B. Prejudice

In its brief, Stanford argues that the contents of the declarations do not unfairly prejudice

Roche. However, the declarations were submitted to the PTO in order to correct authorship and

ensure Stanford’s ownership of enforceable patents, which are now asserted against Roche. Since

Roche stands to suffer significant legal harm if it is found to infringe those patents, it is disingenuous

for Stanford to conclude that Roche has suffered no prejudice.

In sum, Stanford disclosed the contents of privileged attorney-client communications and

work product protection to the PTO to successfully obtain ownership of the contested patents, and

cannot now attempt to shield all other communications on the same subject matter, as this would

unfairly prejudice Roche. See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (holding that a party cannot selectively choose to disclose information that supports its

position, while withholding information that might damage its case). Thus, Stanford’s submission of

the declarations to correct inventorship on the original patent application to the PTO was a waiver of

privilege.

III. Subject Matter Scope of the Waiver

Stanford asserts that even if the court finds a waiver, the waiver should be construed as

narrowly as possible and be limited to the inadvertent omission of Drs. Holodniy and Katzenstein

from the initial ’327 Application. The Roche defendants argue that the subject matter of the waiver

should be construed broadly, i.e., all documents and communications related to the correct

inventorship on the ’327 Application.

The scope of a waiver of attorney-client privilege extends the privilege to all

communications on the same subject matter. See Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1416; In re Grand Jury

Proceedings, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 n.18

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(7th. Cir. 1984). The rationale for such a broad mandate has been justified “so that a party is

prevented from disclosing communications that support its position while simultaneously concealing

communications that do not.” Fort James Corp., 412 F.3d at 1349 (citing Weil, 647 F.2d at 24.). 

However, “[t]here is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a

waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought

and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.” Id. at 1349–50.

The Federal Circuit considered a similar privilege waiver in Winbond, 262 F.3d at 1363. In

Winbond, the patentee Atmel, which acquired ownership of United States Patent No. 4,451,903 (the

“’903 Patent”) in 1994 from the original assignee, SEEQ, discovered during the course of

subsequent patent litigation that the patent application was defective as it failed to properly list all

the inventors. Id. at 1367. Atmel petitioned the PTO to correct inventorship by adding Mr. Anil

Gupta, who had been omitted as an inventor in the original patent application. Id. at 1368. Atmel

then moved for the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”) to enforce its

patent. Id. at 1368–69. The Commission found that Atmel had not submitted an incomplete

authorship in the patent application with an “intent to deceive.” Id. at 1374. However, “Atmel

placed at issue the advice of counsel by its affirmative act of petitioning the Commission for

reconsideration of the inventorship issue based on the certificate of correction of the ’903 Patent

issued by the PTO.” Id. at 1369 (internal quotations omitted). As a result the court concluded that

Atmel had waived any attorney-client privilege and work product protections “for all documents

concerning the ’903 patent’s inventors.” Id. The Commission specifically found that:

[B]y expressly relying on [Mr.] Gupta’s statement as a central part of its effort to

obtain a certificate of correction and then using that certificate to convince the

Commission to reconsider the enforceability of the 903 patent, Atmel explicitly

placed the legal advice to [Mr.] Gupta – and the fact that [Mr.] Gupta had obtained

that advice – “at issue” in these proceedings.

Id. at 1375.

Here, as in Winbond, Stanford submitted a petition to correct inventorship and relied on

attorney opinions in supporting its assertion that it lacked deceptive intent. Stanford relied on the

corrected inventorship to enforce the patent in subsequent proceedings. Thus, under Winbond,

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Stanford waived its “attorney-client privilege and work product protection for documents and

communications relating to inventorship.” See id. at 1375.

Weil, cited by Stanford, is distinguishable. In Weil, a defendant in a securities litigation

disclosed to opposing counsel during a deposition that he had received incorrect advice from counsel

regarding local registration requirements. 647 F.2d at 23. Plaintiffs argued that this disclosure

served as a broad waiver of privilege as to all communications regarding compliance with those

requirements. Id. The court acknowledged that “voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged

attorney communication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications on

the same subject.” Id. at 24. Noting that the disclosure had occurred early on in the litigation and

was made to opposing counsel as opposed to the court, the court ruled that the scope of the

defendant’s waiver was limited to the substance of counsel’s advice regarding local registration

requirements. Id at 25. Indeed, the court made a point of stressing that the disclosure did not

unfairly prejudice opposing counsel. Id.

Here in contrast, the disclosures were made deliberately in order to secure a legal

advantage—an enforceable patent—which provides the basis for Stanford’s suit against Roche. In

any event, Federal Circuit law is controlling in the present case as the dispute between the parties

concerns an issue of substantive patent law, and therefore the reasoning and conclusion of Winbond

are controlling.

In its brief, Stanford further asserts that policy considerations warrant a narrow scope of

waiver. Stanford argues that it should not be penalized for abiding by PTO’s regulations that require

submission of both confidential attorney-client communications and attorney work product to

correct inventorship on a patent application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.324(a) (“[whenever] through error an

inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his

or her part,” the party requesting a correction of inventorship is permitted to submit a proper

petition.); see also Coleman v. Dines, F.2d 353, 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a party is required

to submit specific facts to explain the error as opposed to conclusory statements of innocent error.).

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However, Stanford was only required to include segments of privileged information in its

declarations to the PTO to correct its own failure to include two of the original co-inventors on the

’327 Application to the PTO in May 1992. Even though the PTO ruled that the initial omission was

an inadvertent error, it was an error nonetheless, and Stanford was compelled, as a matter of law, to

abide by PTO rules in correcting its own mistake.

 As was the case in Winbond, the subject matter scope of Stanford’s waiver of its attorneyclient privilege extends to documents and communications surrounding inventorship on the ’327

Application and patents subsequently issuing thereon. 

IV. Temporal Scope of the Waiver

Stanford argues that any waiver should be limited to the communications that directly

address Stanford’s omission of two of the original co-inventors on its May 14, 1992 patent

application to the PTO. The problem with this position is, as Roche correctly notes, Stanford has

continued to rely on the declarations in divisional and continuation applications derived from the

’327 Application. See Chiang Dec., Exhs. A, B (indicating that the Merigan and Elledge

Declarations were submitted as part of the file history for the ’705 Patent, filed on February 13,

2001, and includes date stamps showing that the declarations were resubmitted to the PTO in 1995). 

Stanford has renewed its waiver each time it submitted the privileged declarations to the PTO. 

Winbond is again instructive. In Winbond, the patentee Atmel waived attorney-client

privilege and work product protection with respect to a declaration by Mr. Anil Gupta, who had been

omitted as an inventor in the original application. 262 F.3d at 1375. Mr. Gupta’s declaration was

subsequently used to obtain a certificate of correction from the PTO to lawfully enforce a patent in

ongoing litigation. Id. Despite the finding of a waiver, Atmel was not required to produce any

documents filed before January 1997, when it filed its initial complaint alleging patent infringement

with the Commission. Id. Furthermore, the patentee was not required to furnish attorney-client

communications or attorney work product prepared in anticipation of a reconsideration hearing

scheduled for September 1998 before the Commission. Id. at 1369, 1375. However, Atmel wanted

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to further restrict the scope of the waiver to between July 9, 1998 to August 13, 1998, since this

represented “the period when Atmel’s counsel explained inventorship law to Mr. Gupta.” Id. at

1376. Since Mr. Gupta’s declaration was central to the patentee’s efforts to gain a certificate of

correction, the patentee maintained that “only this time period is relevant to the attorney-client

communication put ‘in issue’ by Mr. Gupta’s statement to the PTO.” Id.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with this argument, countering that “the Commission correctly

found that Atmel put at issue Mr. Gupta’s, and thus its attorneys’, understanding of inventorship law

both before and after the Commission’s initial decision.” Id. (emphasis added). Rather than grant

an unrestricted waiver, however, the Commission expressly delineated the period of the privilege to

extend from the patentee’s preparations for the Commission’s initial investigation, “up to

communications and documents pertaining to Atmel’s preparations for the Commission’s

reconsideration hearing.” Id. In reviewing the Commission’s findings, the Federal Circuit found

that the Commission “did not abuse its discretion in limiting Atmel’s waiver . . . .” Id. Yet, there

was also no specific requirement that the Commission expressly limit the scope of Atmel’s waiver

up until the period of its preparations for the Commission’s reconsideration hearing. Id.

In the present case, Stanford continues to place the issue of inventorship of the ’327

Application before the PTO as it files continuation and divisional applications that claim priority

from the ’327 Application. In these applications, Stanford asserts that Drs. Holodniy and

Katzenstein are among the proper inventors, and it uses the Merigan and Elledge declarations to

prove that fact. Once a waiver has occurred, “it is inappropriate to limit waiver on a temporal

basis.” McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 611, 613–14 (N.D. Cal.

1991) (Conti, J.); see also Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Development Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650,

655 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Infante, Mag. J.) (holding that a waiver of attorney-client privilege can

extend to documents and communications that post-date the issuance of a patent because they fall

within the scope of subject matter waiver).

Stanford’s waiver of attorney-client privilege with respect to documents and communications

on the subject matter of inventorship on the ’327 Application clearly extends from the initiation of

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contact between the inventors and Pennie & Edmonds in March 1992 up until the PTO granted the

petition for correction of inventorship on May 10, 1994. Also, to the extent that the declarations

submitted in support of corrected inventorship concerning the inadvertent omission of the two coinventors are placed “at issue” by Stanford in subsequent applications derived from the ’327

Application, the Roche defendants are entitled to discovery to later documents and communications

that directly cover the issue of inventorship, even though they might post-date the issuance of the

’730 and ’705 Patents.

V. Conclusion

In summary, Stanford knowingly and voluntarily submitted the contents of confidential

attorney-client communications to correct inventorship on its original patent application to the PTO

submitted on May 14, 1992. In accordance with Federal Circuit law, this court finds a waiver of the

attorney-client privilege by Stanford with regards to communications on the subject of inventorship

on the ’327 Application, the parent application to the disputed ’730 and ’705 Patents. The temporal

scope of the privilege extends from initial contact between the named inventors and Pennie &

Edmonds regarding the filing of the’327 Application in March 1992 to at least May 10, 1994, when

the PTO accepted the petition for corrected inventorship. Stanford is further compelled to produce

any subsequent documents and communications that relate to the correctness of the declarations as

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used in pursuing subsequent patents and applications claiming priority from the ‘327 Application,

from May 10, 1994 until the present.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2006 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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1. Unless other specified, background facts are taken from plaintiff’s Complaint and defendant’s

Answer and Counterclaim, and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion only.

2. The court recognizes that the work-product doctrine is not an evidentiary “privilege,” Admiral

Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989), but may at times refer to

it as such for convenience.

3. The parties’ briefs do not clearly distinguish between attorney-client privilege and work product

protection as they relate to the issue of subject matter waiver. The work product doctrine is “a

‘privilege’ related to but distinct from the attorney-client privilege.” Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450,

1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990). However, in cases where the voluntary disclosure of attorney work product

to an adversary or third party substantially increases the possibility of an opposing party obtaining

the information, this would “defeat the policy underlying the privilege.” Id. (citing United States v.

American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1298–99 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In these instances, “the

criteria for waiver of the work product and attorney client privileges are equivalent.” Id. The Court

will restrict its analysis to the attorney-client privilege in the body of the motion, with the

understanding that this applies, where relevant, to work product protection as well. 

ENDNOTES

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