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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2015 Decided December 15, 2015

No. 14-5203

WATERVALE MARINE CO., LTD., AS OWNER OF THE M/V

AGIOS EMILIANOS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

MERCATOR LINES (SINGAPORE) PTE, LTD., AS OWNER OF THE

M/V GAURAV PREM, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00105)

Barry M. Hartman argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Michael G. Chalos.

Anne Murphy, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Benjamin C.

Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen

Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Matthew

M. Collette, Attorney.

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Before: GRIFFITH and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: This case presents the

question whether the Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security – acting through the Coast Guard – may impose certain

conditions (nonfinancial in nature) upon the release of ships

suspected of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships.

Ship owners appeal from the district court’s holding that the

case is nonjusticiable. We disagree as to justiciability, but

affirm on other grounds. 

I.

The Act is a federal statute passed to implement various

environmental obligations that the United States assumed when

it entered into the International Convention for the Prevention of

Pollution from Ships. See 33 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(4). The goal of

the treaty and its implementing legislation is to eliminate the

intentional pollution of the oceans by “oil and other harmful

substances,” as well as minimize “accidental discharge of such

substances.” See Wilmina Shipping AS v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 934 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations

omitted). 

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is

authorized “to administer and enforce” the Convention and to

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“prescribe any necessary or desired regulations to carry out” its

requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1903(a), (c)(1).1 It is “unlawful to act

in violation of the” Convention “or the regulations issued

thereunder.” 33 U.S.C. § 1907(a). Knowingly violating the law

may give rise to both criminal and civil liability.

General authority to grant departure clearance to foreignflagged ships is in Customs. See 46 U.S.C. § 60105(b). But a

specific provision of the Act deals with the enforcement of the

Convention:

If any ship subject to the [Convention]...is liable for a

fine or civil penalty under this section, or if reasonable

cause exists to believe that the ship, its owner,

operator, or person in charge may be subject to a fine

or civil penalty under this section, the Secretary of the

Treasury [now DHS], upon request of the Secretary [of

DHS], shall refuse or revoke the clearance required by

section 60105 of Title 46. Clearance may be granted

upon the filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to

the Secretary [of DHS]. 

33 U.S.C. § 1908(e). Both references to the Secretary now refer

to the Secretary of Homeland Security who supervises both

Customs and the Coast Guard, but in accordance with

regulations, Customs maintains authority to clear a vessel unless

the Coast Guard requests otherwise, and it is the Coast Guard

that has authority to accept a bond. 

1

The authority to grant clearance, originally vested in the Secretary of

the Treasury, was subsequently transferred to the Secretary of

Homeland Security, and then further delegated to Customs. See 68

Fed. Reg. 28323 (May 23, 2003).

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Appellants own and operate two foreign-flagged vessels:

the M/V AGIOS EMILIANOS and the M/V STELLAR WIND. 

Each periodically docks at U.S. ports, in the course of its

oceangoing business, to load or offload cargo. In the spring of

2011, the Coast Guard began receiving whistleblower

complaints asserting violations of the Act. Specifically, it was

claimed that the appellants’ vessels had falsified the oil record

books required of all vessels when traveling over international

waters and docking at U.S. ports. Upon initial investigation

stemming from the complaints, the Coast Guard determined that

it had reasonable cause to believe that the vessels’ operators had

committed violations of the Act. Therefore the Coast Guard

ordered Customs to withhold departure clearance.2

 The vessels

were held for investigation for differing lengths of time, ranging

from a couple of days to over a month. 

As the district court noted, the vessels were eventually

released, but not until appellants had both posted a bond and

executed a “Security Agreement.” These agreements were

required by the Coast Guard as a condition of release of the

vessels. They were designed to allow the government to later

prosecute its case if merited. As such, these agreements include

several terms above and beyond the posting of a typical financial

bond. They called for the vessel owners and operators to pay

wages, housing, and transportation costs to crew members who

remain in the jurisdiction, as well as facilitate their travel to

court appearances, to encourage crew members to cooperate

with the government’s investigation, to help the government

serve subpoenas on foreign crew members located outside of the

United States, to waive objections to both in personam and in

rem jurisdiction, and to enter an appearance in federal district

court. After their release, the vessel owners initiated an

2

The AGIOS EMILIANOS and STELLAR WIND were held at

ports in Louisiana.

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administrative appeal with the Coast Guard to challenge the

validity of the Security Agreements. 

Meanwhile, the Coast Guard proceeded with its criminal

prosecutions. Ultimately, the management associated with the

AGIOS EMILIANOS and STELLAR WIND pled guilty, and

admitted to intentionally bypassing mandatory anti-pollution

equipment on board and discharging oil waste directly into the

waterways. Some among the crew on both ships had rerouted

oily water around required water-oil separators and sludge

incinerators, discharging it directly into the ocean. Those

discharges were then hidden from the mandatory oil records

book, and false entries that the environmental protection

equipment was being used were made. 

Appellants, having failed in all administrative appeals,

challenge the nonfinancial Security Agreements that the Coast

Guard demanded before granting departure clearance as beyond

the Coast Guard’s statutory authority. The district court ruled for

the government, stating that the matter of conditional departure

clearance was committed to the Coast Guard’s discretion by law.

The court did observe that the final sentence of § 1908(e),

describing a “bond or other surety,” might well be limited to

purely financial terms. But the court was of the view that the

language stating that “clearance may be granted upon the filing

of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary” gave the

Department (the Coast Guard) unreviewable discretion, and

therefore the court had no standards by which to judge the claim. 

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II.

Appellants challenge the district court’s holding on several

grounds. Of course, they insist that the case is reviewable; that

there are judicially acceptable standards to apply. Then,

proceeding to the merits, appellants assert that only Customs –

not the Coast Guard – has authority to withhold a ship’s

clearance. And although the Coast Guard can require a bond (or

other surety), it may not demand any nonfinancial conditions as

part of the bond.3

The government reiterates its position before the district

court; that we lack jurisdiction because the Coast Guard has

unreviewable discretion to accept or reject a bond, and thereby

prevent a ship’s departure. Moreover before us, for the first

time, appellants’ standing is challenged and it is further claimed

that the cases are moot. Turning to the surety, the government

contends that the Coast Guard can insist on the nonfinancial

conditions it imposed because such conditions are within the

meaning of the terms “bond or other surety.” Indeed, it is

argued that such conditions are commonly included in bonds. 

(The government’s brief boldly so asserts, but no examples nor

dictionary definitions are cited, which is a novel approach to

brief writing.)

3

Appellants claim that the Coast Guard could have used several other

techniques to accomplish what it sought by way of the Security

Agreements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (authority to secure testimony of

material witnesses); Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 (authority to take depositions

of witnesses); 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (warrantless search, seizure, and

arrest authority); Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (grand jury powers); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1821; 28 C.F.R. Part 21 (authorizing and implementing procedures

to pay transportation, lodging and other expenses to secure witness

testimony). But, they claim, such measures are not permissible under

§ 1908(e).

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The government explains why the Coast Guard insisted on

the nonfinancial conditions in these cases. It asserts – and

appellants agree – that the financial terms of a bond referred to

in the Act cover the ultimate liability of a ship owner, which can

be determined only after a legal proceeding, either civil or

criminal. In other words, nothing prevents the ship, after

posting the bond, from sailing away. And if the government

lacks sufficient evidence to present in court without the ship and

its crew, the ship owner’s liability disappears.

* * *

We have little doubt as to our jurisdiction. Appellants

clearly have standing, and the case is not moot, even if the ships

have sailed. The government contends that the agreements have

no ongoing legal effect. Apparently this is because the plea

agreements were reached by some appellants in the interim

between the filing of the original complaint and this appeal. But

the government overlooks that two of the appellants never pled

to, nor were they, as yet, charged with a crime. It also ignores

the fact that Security Agreements with two of the parties have

no expiration date at all, and even for those Security Agreements

with a duration provision, language releasing the parties has not

been clearly triggered. Finally, the government disregards the

point that even the criminal pleas that were reached do not

foreclose the government’s ability to seek further civil penalties,

as allowed under the Act.

Nor do we agree with the government and the district court

that the Coast Guard’s discretion is unreviewable. Although the

Coast Guard may have wide discretion as to the amount of the

bond it requires (we doubt that even that is totally unreviewable)

there is no reason to believe that the legal question presented –

whether the Coast Guard can impose nonfinancial conditions –

is not suitable for judicial review.

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On the other hand, appellants’ lengthy discussion of the

respective roles of the Coast Guard and Customs seems rather

academic. After all, both entities are in the same Department

under the common supervision of the Secretary of Homeland

Security. In any event, it is clearly the Coast Guard under the

Secretary’s regulations that has the authority granted by the

Secretary to “request” that Customs “refuse” clearance.4

Which brings us to the main issue in the case; whether the

Coast Guard may require the nonfinancial conditions. 

Appellants point to the legislative history indicating that

Congress intended a bond or other surety to cover only financial

liability for penalties imposed in civil or criminal proceedings.

See H.R. No. 96-1224, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849.

The government does not contest the House Report on which

appellant relies, instead focusing on the phrase “satisfactory to

the Secretary” as giving the Coast Guard broader authority. We

find it unnecessary to decide the scope of the term “bond or

other surety” because the first sentence of section 1908(e) gives

the Coast Guard the requisite authority. It states that “[i]f any

ship subject to the [Convention]...is liable for a fine or civil

penalty...or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the

ship...may be subject to a fine or civil penalty [Customs]...upon

request of the Secretary [the Coast Guard]...shall

refuse...clearance,” and as such it clearly provides authority in

the Coast Guard to simply hold the ship in port until legal

proceedings are completed.5

 

4

See 19 C.F.R. §§ 4.60a, 4.66a, 4.66c(a). 

5

Our concurring colleague suggests that we are bypassing the text and

resorting to our own reasoning. We concede we are reasoning, but we

are focusing on the meaning and necessary implication of the first

sentence of section 1908(e), which of course is textual analysis. The

concurrence does not directly dispute that in the absence of the second

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The nonfinancial conditions can, therefore, be thought of as

simply the quid pro quo for allowing ships to depart. It is not

necessary to consider whether those conditions are legitimately

a part of “a bond or other surety” because they could be required

independently of a bond. Although the Act authorizes the

Secretary (Coast Guard) to request clearance of a ship if a bond

is satisfactory, the Coast Guard is not required to accept a bond. 

(Here we agree with the district court that the words “may” and

“satisfactory” are significant.) Indeed, as we understand the

government, a financial bond, given its limited use, is ordinarily

not satisfactory, so the Coast Guard need not accept bonds

without accompanying nonfinancial conditions.

We note that another statutory section provides a ship

owner with a cause of action for the government’s unreasonable

delay in granting departure clearance.6 We need not consider

whether the reasonableness of nonfinancial conditions is also

subject to challenge because in the cases before us appellants

have not asserted that the nonfinancial conditions are

unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we must assume that holding the ships and

crew until a civil or criminal proceeding was completed was

reasonable. And since the Coast Guard can hold the ship for

sentence of 1908(e), the first sentence would give the Coast Guard the

requisite authority for the Security Agreements.

Nor do we understand why our own interpretation gives the Coast

Guard any more authority than does our colleague’s interpretation. 

After all, the concurrence contends that a “bond or other surety” can

include any nonfinancial condition – lasting presumably indefinitely

– so long as it is secured by a pot of money and labeled a bond.

6

See 33 U.S.C. § 1904(h). 

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such a purpose, it seems to follow that the Coast Guard can

agree to notify Customs to release the ship only upon condition

that a civil or criminal proceeding would not be jeopardized. 

* * *

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

So ordered. 

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment:

The majority is correct that section 1908(e) authorizes the 

Coast Guard to accept a quid in return for the quo of releasing 

the ship. That quid is a “bond or other surety.” 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1908(e). Rather than find that the Security Agreements in 

this case qualify as a “bond or other surety,” however, the 

majority bypasses the text of the statute and resorts to its own 

reasoning: the greater power granted by the statute to hold the 

ship must surely include the lesser power to condition its 

release. And as a matter of logic, that seems right. However, 

nothing in the text expressly authorizes such a broad, freefloating quid pro quo authority. Unlike the majority, I would 

not decide whether such authority exists by implication. 

Instead, I would affirm the judgment of the district court on 

the narrower ground provided by the text of the statute: a

“bond or other surety”—the quid provided by Congress—

includes the Security Agreements in this case.

As the majority recognizes, Congress has given the Coast 

Guard wide discretion in setting the conditions of a bond or 

other surety. My point is only that such discretion comes from 

an explicit statutory grant allowing the Coast Guard to accept 

a “bond or other surety.” Apart from that authority, nothing in 

the express language of the statute permits a quid pro quo 

exchange and ignoring the phrase “bond or other surety” 

renders that provision superfluous.

Once a ship’s clearance has been refused or revoked, the 

statute authorizes the granting of clearance “upon the filing of 

a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary.” 33 

U.S.C. § 1908(e). Because the phrase “bond or other surety” 

is not qualified or defined, the phrase must be given its

“ordinary meaning,” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 

S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012), which includes both financial and 

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non-financial conditions. A bond, for example, is simply a 

“written promise to pay money or do some act if certain 

circumstances occur or a certain time elapses.” BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added); see also

MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (online ed.

2015) (defining “bond” as “a usually formal written 

agreement by which a person undertakes to perform a certain 

act (such as to appear in court or fulfill the obligations of a 

contract) or abstain from performing an act (such as 

committing a crime) with the condition that failure to perform 

or abstain will obligate the person . . . to pay a sum of money”

(emphasis added)). A surety is similarly broad: a “formal 

assurance,” especially “a pledge, bond, guarantee, or security 

given for the fulfillment of an undertaking.” BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER 

UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (online ed. 2015) (defining 

“surety” as “a pledge or other formal engagement given for 

the fulfillment of an undertaking”). 

These definitions demonstrate that both bonds and 

sureties are general contractual devices used to assure

performance of some act. The text of the statute nowhere 

limits these ordinary meanings to financial conditions alone. 

The cardinal rule of statutory construction—that the

legislature says in a statute what it means and means what it 

says—cautions against overlooking the text and relying 

instead on what a court might think is an unstated principle 

that informs the provision. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 

503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Reading the statute for what it 

says, the Security Agreements comfortably fit within the 

authorization to demand a “bond or other surety” in exchange 

for the release of the ship. Each Agreement requires the ship 

owner to post a “Surety Bond” to “ensure performance of 

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th[e] Agreement” and the payment of any fines or penalties.

To perform the Agreement, the ship owner must waive 

objections to jurisdiction and assist in the investigation, for 

example by paying for lodging and meals for the crew to 

remain in the United States. The United States may keep the 

bond amount not only if it secures a judgment against the 

owner, but also if the owner “fail[s] to waive objections to 

jurisdiction as required by this Agreement.” And it may keep 

a certain portion of the bond amount if the ship owner 

materially breaches the Agreement’s other conditions. Thus, 

as with any bond or surety, the Agreements bind the ship 

owners “to perform [ ] certain act[s]”—waive objections to 

jurisdiction and assist in the investigation—“with the 

condition that failure to perform . . . will obligate the [ship 

owners] . . . to pay a sum of money.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER 

UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (online ed. 2015) (defining 

“bond”). 

The appellants challenge this reading of the statute, 

arguing that a phrase in the legislative history shows the Coast 

Guard lacks the power to impose non-financial conditions for 

the release of a ship: 

To assure payment of any fine or civil penalties that 

might be incurred upon completion of criminal 

proceedings or civil penalty actions, the Secretary of the 

Treasury is required to refuse or revoke clearance to any 

ship upon request of the Secretary of Transportation. 

However, clearance may be granted upon the filing of a 

bond or other satisfactory surety.

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1224, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849, 4864 (emphasis added). According to the 

appellants, “[t]o assure payment of any fine or civil penalties” 

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means that the bond or surety must be limited to covering the 

payment of a fine. Leaving to one side the debate about the 

value of legislative history in statutory interpretation, see 

Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326-27 (2010) (Scalia, J., 

concurring in the judgment), we have consistently held that 

where the statutory text is clear, “[t]he plain meaning of 

legislation should be conclusive” unless it “compels an odd 

result.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nat’l Pub.

Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 226, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, 

nothing odd results from imposing conditions that assist the 

United States in its prosecution of violations of the Act to 

Prevent Pollution from Ships. We would be stepping beyond 

the bounds of the judicial role were we to disregard the text of 

the statute based on a phrase in a House Report. 

In any event, the appellants make too much of this 

phrase. The language from the House Report upon which the 

appellants rely does not limit a bond or other surety to 

financial conditions. Instead, it offers that one purpose of 

section 1908(e) is to make sure that fines are paid. But any

likelihood of obtaining a fine vanishes if the United States

cannot secure the conditions included in the Security 

Agreements here. For instance, if ship owners do not waive 

objections to jurisdiction, the United States may lack 

jurisdiction to prosecute them after granting clearance. No 

prosecution means no fine, in which case the United States 

must return the bond amount to the ship owners. Recognizing 

this problem, the appellants conceded at oral argument that a 

“bond or other surety” could, at a minimum, contain an 

obligation to waive objections to jurisdiction. Appellants then 

suggested a new line between non-financial conditions that 

are jurisdictional and those that are not. But that line, like the 

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distinction the appellants urge between financial and other 

conditions, has no basis in the text of the statute.

For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 

district court on the ground that the Security Agreements are

the type of “bond or other surety” that the statute’s plain text

authorizes the Coast Guard to accept in exchange for the 

release of the ship. 

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