Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02008/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2008

STEVEN D. JOHNSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BRIAN FOSTER,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 11-CV-1137 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED MAY 6, 2015

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Steven Johnson of 

several state gun crimes arising out of a shootout in 

Milwaukee. He challenged his convictions in a state postconviction motion, but the trial court denied the motion and 

the state court of appeals affirmed. Johnson had 30 days to 

petition for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He 

applied for a loan from the prison Business Office to help 

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2 No. 13-2008

cover the cost of the paper, photocopying, and postage 

necessary to file the petition; Wisconsin law permits inmates 

to borrow up to $100 annually for that purpose. The Business Office denied his request, but Johnson contends that he 

met the eligibility requirements and the loan was unlawfully 

denied.

Johnson never filed a petition for review in the state supreme court. Instead, he sought federal habeas relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal courts are normally precluded from 

reviewing the habeas claims of state prisoners who procedurally default their claims by failing to present them 

through one full round of state-court review. A default can 

be excused, however, if the prisoner shows that prison 

officials interfered with his ability to comply with the state 

court’s procedural rules. Johnson argues that the wrongful 

denial of his loan request should excuse his failure to petition the state supreme court for review. 

The district court rejected this argument, and we affirm.

Johnson has not established that the denial of his loan application was an objective, external impediment to his ability to 

comply with the state court’s procedural rules or that it 

actually prevented him from petitioning for review in the 

Wisconsin Supreme Court. Moreover, Johnson’s argument 

rests on his contention that the Business Office misinterpreted or misapplied prison policies governing the loan program. No state court has ruled on that question. For a federal 

habeas court to excuse a procedural default based on its own 

interpretation of a state prison policy—without guidance

from the state courts—would be starkly contrary to the 

principles of federalism and comity that constrain all federal 

habeas review.

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No. 13-2008 3

I. Background

On November 8, 2007, Steven Johnson exchanged gunfire

with his ex-girlfriend’s brother-in-law in the parking lot of a

Milwaukee-area Family Dollar store. He was charged with 

four gun crimes under Wisconsin law. A jury found him

guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 22 years in 

prison.

Johnson alleges in his federal habeas petition that two 

constitutional violations occurred during his state-court 

proceedings: First, the court refused to continue the preliminary hearing in order to give him time to hire the lawyer of 

his choice, and later it denied his multiple requests to represent himself. 

Johnson attempted to raise these and other claims in a 

direct appeal. Because his filing was untimely, however, the 

trial court construed it as a motion for postconviction relief 

under section 974.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes and denied it. 

Johnson timely appealed that ruling to the Wisconsin Court 

of Appeals. 

The appeal remained pending for well over two years. At 

some point Johnson sought reinstatement of his direct 

appeal rights but that motion was denied. In December 2011, 

while his appeal was still pending, he filed a premature 

§ 2254 petition in federal district court seeking habeas review. On April 19, 2012, before the federal court took up his 

habeas petition, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the 

denial of his postconviction motion. Johnson had 30 days

from that date to petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court for

review of the appellate court’s decision. See WIS. STAT.

§§ 808.10(1), 809.62(1m).

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In early May 2012, Johnson applied for a loan from the 

prison Business Office under a state program that permits 

loans of up to $100 per year to assist prisoners in paying for 

the paper, photocopying, and postage needed to file legal 

documents. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 309.51(1); WIS.

STAT. § 301.328(1m). Johnson had used the loan program 

earlier that year, but this time his application was rejected. 

When Johnson asked for an explanation, the Business Office 

promptly responded as follows: 

A review of your income and expenditures 

shows that you had deposits of $55.00 and canteen expenditures of $17.90 over the last 

60 days. The canteen purchases were primarily 

junk food. These funds could and should have 

been used to meet your legal needs.

We will reconsider your request to reinstate 

your legal loan at a future date. In the meantime, you may take advantage of the free weekly envelope/mailing for those who qualify.

Johnson doesn’t dispute the Business Office’s numbers, but 

he says that all the money not spent at the canteen was 

automatically withheld to pay for mandatory fees and 

outstanding debts, including the principal on his prior legal 

loans.1

 1 Johnson also says that he only bought food at the canteen on Fridays, 

when the kitchen served fish (to which he’s allergic). His trust-account 

statement shows all of his canteen charges were on Mondays, though 

there may be a delay between the date charges are incurred and when 

they’re posted. In any case, while we sympathize with Johnson’s predicament, canteen purchases are, by definition, a discretionary use of funds. 

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No. 13-2008 5

Johnson never filed a petition for review in the Wisconsin 

Supreme Court. Accordingly, the district court denied his

§ 2254 petition based on procedural default—his failure to 

complete one full round of state-court review. The court

concluded that the procedural default was not excused by 

the Business Office’s rejection of Johnson’s loan request

because he had no legal entitlement to a loan and the Business Office provided a rational reason for the denial. The 

court entered final judgment dismissing the habeas petition

and denied a certificate of appealability.

Johnson filed a notice of appeal. A motions judge of this 

court construed the notice as a request for a certificate of 

appealability and authorized an appeal on the two constitutional claims mentioned above. The order also instructed the 

parties to address the issue of procedural default.2

II. Discussion

The first and ultimately dispositive question is whether 

Johnson’s procedural default may be excused. We review the 

district court’s ruling on that issue de novo. Miller v. Smith, 

765 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 2014).

Federalism and comity principles pervade federal habeas 

jurisprudence. One of these principles is that “in a federal 

system, the States should have the first opportunity to 

address and correct alleged violations of [a] state prisoner’s 

 2 The order also appointed pro bono counsel to assist Johnson on appeal. 

Attorneys Thomas M. Dunham and Phoebe N. Coddington of Winston & 

Strawn LLP accepted the representation and have ably discharged their 

duties. We thank them for their assistance to their client and the court. 

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federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

To protect the primary role of state courts in remedying

alleged constitutional errors in state criminal proceedings,

federal courts will not review a habeas petition unless the 

prisoner has fairly presented his claims “throughout at least 

one complete round of state-court review, whether on direct 

appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings.”

Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014); 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This requirement has two components: the petitioner’s claims must be exhausted, meaning 

that there is no remaining state court with jurisdiction, and 

the exhaustion must not be attributable to the petitioner’s 

failure to comply with the state court system’s procedural 

rules. “In habeas, the sanction for failing to exhaust properly 

(preclusion of review in federal court) is given the separate 

name of procedural default ... .” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 

92 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Procedural default is one application of the “adequate 

and independent state ground” doctrine: “When a state 

court resolves a federal claim by relying on a state law 

ground that is both independent of the federal question and 

adequate to support the judgment, federal habeas review of 

the claim is foreclosed.”3 Richardson, 745 F.3d at 268 

 3 An adequate and independent state-law ground for a state-court 

decision denies the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction. See Michigan v. 

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). Thus, the procedural-default rule 

prevents the anomaly of federal habeas courts reviewing state-court 

decisions that the Supreme Court itself would be unable to review. See 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991) (“Without the rule, a 

federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court could 

not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose 

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an 

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No. 13-2008 7

(quotation marks omitted). The violation of a state court’s

procedural rules is an adequate and independent state-law 

basis for denying a petitioner’s requested relief. Therefore, a

habeas petitioner who has procedurally defaulted in state 

court—and thus has not fairly presented those claims 

through one complete round of state-court review—cannot 

have his defaulted claims heard in federal court. In this way, 

federalism and comity principles protect the integrity of a 

state court system’s procedural rules and ensure that the 

state judiciary has the first opportunity to correct constitutional errors. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997) (“A State’s procedural rules are of vital importance to 

the orderly administration of its criminal courts; when a 

federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice system.”).

As we’ve noted, Johnson’s direct appeal was deemed untimely, so the state trial court construed the filing as a postconviction motion and denied it. Johnson appealed, and on 

April 19, 2012, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Under the state court’s procedural rules, Johnson had 

30 days from that date to petition the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court for review. See WIS. STAT. §§ 808.10(1), 809.62. Johnson 

never filed a petition for review and cannot do so now. Thus,

although he has exhausted review in the state courts (in the 

sense that the doors of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are no 

longer open to him), his claims are procedurally defaulted

because the exhaustion resulted from his own failure to 

comply with state procedural rules. Johnson concedes as 

much but argues that his default should be excused.

 

end run around the limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to 

undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its laws.”).

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A federal court may excuse a procedural default if the 

habeas petitioner establishes that (1) there was good cause 

for the default and consequent prejudice, see Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986), or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the defaulted claim is not 

heard, see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995). The second

ground is satisfied only when the claimed constitutional 

violation probably caused an innocent person to be convicted. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991). Johnson 

does not make that argument here. Instead he contends that 

his procedural default should be excused for cause and 

prejudice.

“Cause is defined as an objective factor, external to the 

defense, that impeded the defendant’s efforts to raise the 

claim in an earlier proceeding.” Weddington v. Zatecky, 

721 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Prejudice means an error which so infected the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Id.

The Supreme Court has not provided “an exhaustive catalog of ... objective impediments” that satisfy the cause 

requirement. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. But interference by 

state officials that makes compliance with a procedural rule

“impracticable” is one recognized impediment. Id. (quotation marks omitted). To be “external to the defense,” the 

cause must be “something that cannot fairly be attributed 

to” the petitioner.4 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 

 

4 Perhaps the most common reason to excuse a procedural default based 

on interference by state officials is the concealment or suppression of 

evidence that should have been disclosed by prosecutors under Brady v. 

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For example, we recently said that confiscation of a prisoner’s legal materials can establish cause for a procedural 

default. Weddington, 721 F.3d at 466; see also Buffalo v. Sunn, 

854 F.2d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing cause if a 

prisoner was denied access to his legal materials, in contravention of prison policy, during a lockdown). Other courts 

have recognized interference by prison officials as a cause to 

excuse a procedural default if the prisoner tendered his legal 

documents to the prison mailroom before the filing deadline, 

but they are not received by the court clerk until after the 

deadline has passed.5 See, e.g., Henderson v. Palmer, 730 F.3d 

554, 560 (6th Cir. 2013); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 

(8th Cir. 1999); cf. Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1006 (7th Cir. 

2012) (holding that the prison mailbox rule applies when 

 

Maryland. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Crivens v. 

Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1999). 

5 The record indicates that after his loan request was denied, Johnson 

cobbled together a Wisconsin Supreme Court petition and submitted it 

to the prison Business Office for mailing. But Johnson did not raise a 

prison-mailbox argument in the district court or on appeal, and nothing 

in the record addresses why this document was never received by the 

state supreme court, so the issue is waived. After oral argument Johnson

(acting pro se) attempted to supplement the record with documents 

purporting to show that his petition was not mailed because he did not 

have sufficient available funds to pay for postage. We denied this belated 

attempt to supplement the record. And waiver aside, although Wisconsin has adopted a tolling rule similar to the prison-mailbox rule, see State 

ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 635 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. 2001), there’s no reason to 

believe that Wisconsin’s rule permits prisoners to send correspondence 

submitted to the mailroom without proper postage. Cf. Ingram v. Jones, 

507 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although prisoners have right of 

access to courts, they do not have right to unlimited free postage.”). So 

the rule would not have excused Johnson’s default anyway.

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determining whether a petitioner’s state postconviction 

motion was properly filed for the purposes of triggering 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)’s one-year statute of limitations). A 

third possible cause arises when a prisoner is housed out of

state and the resources available in the prison library are 

inadequate for him to learn the procedures of the state 

where he needs to file. See, e.g., Watson v. New Mexico,

45 F.3d 385, 388 (10th Cir. 1995). But see Malone v. Vasquez, 

138 F.3d 711, 719 (8th Cir. 1998) (“While being incarcerated 

in California may have made filing his petition in Missouri 

slightly more cumbersome, Malone has not shown it interfered with his ability to file. His California incarceration did 

not amount to state interference with his access to the courts 

and is therefore not cause.”).

The claimed impediment here—the Business Office’s denial of Johnson’s request for a legal loan—is not quite like 

any of these examples. To properly evaluate it, we need to

clarify exactly what Johnson’s “cause” theory is. After all, he

“has no constitutional entitlement to subsidy to prosecute a 

civil suit.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 

2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see WIS. STAT.

§ 974.06(6) (“Proceedings under this section [i.e., collateral 

postconviction motions] shall be considered civil in nature ... .”). Acknowledging this, Johnson rests his argument 

on the loan-eligibility criteria found in state regulations and 

prison policies.

Recall that the Business Office denied Johnson’s loan request because he had funds available in his prison account 

and had recently spent money on junk food from the canteen 

rather than saving it for his anticipated legal expenses. 

Johnson argues that this decision improperly interpreted 

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and applied the eligibility requirements for the loan program. He also contends that he relied on the published loaneligibility criteria when he decided to spend his money at 

the canteen. In other words, by promulgating (and then 

disregarding) the loan-eligibility standards, the prison

altered the cost-benefit analysis he applied when deciding 

whether to spend his money at the canteen or save it to pay 

the expenses associated with a petition for review.

Loans to prisoners for legal expenses are governed by 

section 301.328 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which (among 

other requirements not relevant here) caps the annual loan 

amount at $100. See WIS. STAT. § 301.328(1m). A state regulation provides that a prisoner’s “[c]orrespondence to 

courts ... may not be denied due to lack of funds, except as 

limited in this subsection.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC

§ 309.51(1). The regulation goes on to say that “[i]nmates 

without sufficient funds ... may receive a loan from the 

institution where they reside,” id. (emphasis added), which 

implies some discretion on the part of prison administrators

in making the loans.6 Johnson was not over the annual limit 

when he applied for a loan in May 2012, so he takes the 

position that his loan request was unlawfully denied. That is, 

he insists that the Business Office’s reliance on any factor

other than the cap was improper. 

 6 The regulation specifies a $200 annual loan limit, but section 301.328 of 

the Wisconsin Statutes was amended in 2011 to impose a $100 annual 

cap. See 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 3014M (creating subsection (1m) of section 

301.328, the $100 cap, effective July 1, 2011). The regulation has not been 

updated to reflect the $100 cap.

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This is not the interpretation adopted by the Division of 

Adult Institutions (“DAI”), which has published loaneligibility policies to guide prison administrators in implementing the program. DAI Policy #309.51.01(II) provides 

that “[c]riteria used by facility staff to determine eligibility 

or ineligibility for a legal loan include, but are not limited to”

ten listed factors. For example, the policy permits consideration of “[i]nmate account balances,” the “[n]ature of pending 

litigation and current legal needs,” and “[t]he inmate’s 

history of repayment of legal loans.” DAI Policy 

#309.51.01(II)(A), (E), (I). The Business Office’s reason for 

denying Johnson’s application comports closely with subsection (D) of the policy: “[r]ecent spending patterns, including 

canteen purchases, outside purchases, and funds to family.” Id. 

at (D) (emphasis added).

Johnson insists that he could not have been expected to 

manage his own finances “in anticipation of a legal need that 

did not exist at the time of his purportedly irresponsible 

canteen purposes.” If Johnson is suggesting that he had no 

general responsibility to manage his funds in anticipation of 

a forthcoming important legal need, he’s incorrect: “[L]ike 

any other civil litigant, [an inmate] must decide which of his 

legal actions is important enough to fund.” Lindell, 352 F.3d 

at 1111. It’s true that Johnson’s appeal was pending for a long 

time and he could not know precisely when it would be 

decided, but he could have maintained a reserve sufficient to 

finance his petition for review whenever the court of appeals 

announced its decision. Instead he chose to deplete his 

personal funds and rely on his ability to access a legal loan.

Furthermore, to qualify as good cause to excuse 

Johnson’s procedural default, the denial of his loan 

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No. 13-2008 13

application must have made the timely filing of a petition for 

review “impracticable” and it must be a factor “external”

(that is, not attributable) to him. Even if we were to accept 

Johnson’s argument that the Business Office misinterpreted

or misapplied the loan-eligibility regulation and policy, it’s 

not clear that the loan denial made it “impracticable” for him 

to file a petition for review or that it qualifies as a cause 

“external” to him.

Johnson argues that the denial of his loan application 

prevented him from filing a petition for review because he 

had depleted his own funds in reliance on the loan-eligibility 

criteria. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 497–98 (“For cause to exist, 

the external impediment ... must have prevented petitioner 

from raising the claim.”). In other words, the Business 

Office’s misapplication of the eligibility criteria pulled the 

rug out from under him.

We’ve rejected a similar reliance-based argument before, 

albeit under somewhat different circumstances. In Moore v. 

Casperson, we held that a prisoner’s reliance on circuit precedent later overturned by the Supreme Court was insufficient 

to establish cause to excuse a procedural default. 345 F.3d 

474, 487 (7th Cir. 2003). We explained in Moore that the 

“subsequently overruled circuit decision ... did not actually 

impede the effort to comply with any state court rule” but

rather “removed an incentive for compliance by indicating 

(erroneously) that a particular action was not necessary for 

federal habeas review purposes.” Id. In other words, reliance 

on legal precedent is not enough by itself; there must be a 

discrete, identifiable impediment to the prisoner’s ability

(rather than his motivation) to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. Applying the same understanding here, 

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Johnson’s purported reliance on the loan-eligibility criteria 

may help explain why he didn’t keep a larger reserve in his 

account, but it did not impede his ability to file a petition for 

review in a concrete sense or otherwise make compliance 

with the state’s procedural rules “impracticable.”

In addition to impracticability, Johnson must also show 

that the Business Office’s loan denial was truly external to 

him and not attributable to his own actions. Johnson insists

that under the DOC regulation and DAI policy, he was 

entitled to a loan; his canteen spending was not a proper 

reason to deny his request. The Business Office obviously 

disagreed. Who’s right? The answer requires an interpretation and application of DOC § 309.51(1) and DAI Policy 

#309.51.01(II). But a federal habeas court is not the proper 

body to adjudicate whether a state court correctly interpreted its own procedural rules, even if they are the basis for a 

procedural default.7 See Barksdale v. Lane, 957 F.2d 379, 383–

84 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] federal court sitting in habeas corpus 

is required to respect a state court’s finding of waiver or 

procedural default under state law. Federal courts do not sit 

to correct errors made by state courts in the interpretation of 

 7 A few very narrow exceptions to this doctrine exist. See Mullaney v. 

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n.11 (1975) (“On rare occasions the Court has reexamined a state-court interpretation of state law when it appears to be 

an obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 366 

n.11 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the district court could review a claim 

that the state supreme court said was not raised in the petitioner’s direct 

appeal, and thus was waived, because the record was clear that the claim 

had been properly raised). 

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No. 13-2008 15

state law.”) (quotation marks omitted). The same rule applies to administrative regulations and prison policies. See 

Lenz v. Washington, 444 F.3d 295, 304 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Federal 

habeas review is not the best context in which to determine 

the propriety of [a state prison policy] ... . [C]oncerns of 

federalism and comparative expertise militate against federal court supervision of administrative decisions made by 

state departments of corrections.”).

Here, of course, no state court or administrative adjudicator has addressed Johnson’s claim that the Business Office 

misinterpreted the loan-eligibility criteria. That’s part of the 

problem. Johnson never sought review from, much less 

exhausted, the inmate complaint review system on this 

issue. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC §§ 310.04–.11, 310.08 (“An 

inmate may use the ICRS to raise significant issues regarding 

rules, living conditions, staff actions affecting institutional 

environment, and civil rights complaints ... .”); see also

Lovell v. Norris, 198 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that

the petitioner “caused his own default by not pursuing the 

remedies that Arkansas law afforded him” after a court 

officer negligently failed to send documents that he had 

requested). The inmate grievance system should have been 

Johnson’s first step to challenge the decision by the Business 

Office. If the unfavorable determination was upheld on 

administrative appeal, Johnson would have had the option 

to take the matter to state circuit court on certiorari review. 

See State ex rel. L’Minggio v. Gamble, 667 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. 

2003) (“[A] court that is petitioned for a writ of certiorari 

regarding a decision by a prison ... committee determines: ... whether the committee acted according to law; 

[and] whether the committee’s action was arbitrary, 

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oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not 

its judgment ... .”).

Without a ruling from a state court or agency that the denial of his loan request was unlawful, we cannot conclude 

that Johnson’s reliance on his ability to access a loan was well

placed. If it wasn’t, then his inability to file a petition was 

attributable to the risk he assumed by relying on his own 

unverified interpretation of the loan-eligibility criteria—not 

to any external interference by prison officials. Only a 

Wisconsin court or agency’s interpretation of the state regulation and policy—or a concession by the State—could 

provide us with the authority to excuse Johnson’s default on 

this ground. But since Johnson never presented the issue to

any state authority for review, a federal habeas court cannot 

be the first to interpret the loan-eligibility requirements.

Finally, the record does not support a conclusion that the 

loan denial actually impeded Johnson’s ability to file a

petition for review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The

prison trust-account statement in the record shows that 

Johnson had $25.80 in available funds as of May 14, 2012, the 

day his loan request was denied. It’s not clear that this 

amount wouldn’t cover the photocopying and postage 

expenses for a petition for review. As the district court noted, 

“[e]ven given Johnson’s expenditures and withholdings, his 

prison trust account statement shows a balance of $25.80 ... , 

thus not leaving him completely without funds.” Indeed, 

Johnson doesn’t argue that $25.80 would have been insufficient to fund his petition. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC

§ 309.51(2) (capping the price to prisoners for photocopies at 

15¢ per page and paper at 2¢ per page).

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When asked about this issue at oral argument, Johnson’s 

counsel replied that the record was “confusing” on this point

but “there is some information” that Johnson “wasn’t able to 

buy postage or anything with that money based on his 

current status.” This seems to suggest that Johnson was 

prohibited from accessing part or all of his account balance, 

but nothing in the record or the briefs supports that claim. 

We decline to consider it.8

In sum, Johnson failed to ask the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court to review his constitutional claims before bringing 

them to federal court in a § 2254 habeas petition. He argues

that this procedural default should be excused because 

prison administrators refused to give him a legal loan. But 

he’s not constitutionally entitled to a subsidy, and the denial

of his loan request was not an objective, external impediment to compliance with the state court’s procedural requirements. Nor did the denial of his loan request actually 

prevent him from filing a petition for review; as far as we 

can tell on this record, he had funds available to do so.

Because Johnson has not established cause to excuse his 

procedural default, federal habeas review is precluded. The 

district court properly denied the § 2254 petition.

AFFIRMED.

 

8 As we noted in footnote 5, after oral argument Johnson attempted to 

supplement the record with additional financial statements. We denied 

leave to supplement the record.

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