Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00653/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00653-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 10CV0653

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD REED DUMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 10-0653-LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS 

(DOC. # 7)

On March 25, 2010, Petitioner Ronald Reed Dumas (hereafter

“Petitioner”) a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent

has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. Respondent asserts that

the Petition is untimely, and that neither statutory nor equitable

tolling applies to make the Petition timely. Petitioner did not file

an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and the Lodgments

submitted by Respondent, finds that the Petition is barred by the

statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 1 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1/The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988)

2 10CV0653

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 11, 2001, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of 20

counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery.

(Respondent’s Lodgments Nos. 1, 2)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. On June 3, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction on all counts, except one. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 1).

Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review of the

California Court of Appeal’s decision.

On December 23, 20081/, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2). On February 23, 2009, the Superior Court denied the

Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). 

On April 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 4) On June 8, 2009, the Petition was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5). 

On June 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 6). On December 17, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the

Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7). 

On March 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court.

 

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 2 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 10CV0653

 II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (hereafter “AEDPA”)

statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to

petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court after the

AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Since the Petition was filed on

March 25, 2010, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Prior to the enactment of AEDPA on April 24, 1996, “state

prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when to file

a federal habeas petition.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 U.S.

897 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). “[D]elays of

more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking

relief.” Id. 

With enactment of AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame for

seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically limited. AEDPA amended

28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part, adding subdivision (d), which provides

for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d) states, in

pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply

to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court. The limitation period shall run

from the latest of -

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 3 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2/The fortieth day was Sunday July 13, 2003. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(a)(3), the Court considers the next day, July 14, 2003, as the date Petitioner’s

conviction became final.

4 10CV0653

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d).

The Ninth Circuit has noted that under 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(1)(A), a conviction becomes final by the expiration of the

time to seek review from the highest court, whether or not such a

petition is actually filed. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894,

897(9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir.

1999). Direct review of Petitioner’s convictions was completed on

June 3, 2003. Petitioner’s conviction became final on July 14, 2003,

40 days after his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

Appeal. Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008).2/

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 4 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 10CV0653

Therefore, on July 14, 2003, Petitioner’s conviction became final and

the statute of limitations began to run.

Absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the statute of

limitations for Petitioner expired on July 14, 2004. 

1. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed”

state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. Under

the holding of Nino v. Galaza 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999),

the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects

petitioner’s final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were

properly filed and pending during that entire time.

The statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a

final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the

first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case

“pending” during that interval. Nino 183 F.3d at 1006 

In this case, Petitioner’s first petition for post conviction

relief was filed in the San Diego Superior Court on December 23,

2008. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2). From July 14, 2003 (the date

Petitioner’s conviction became final) to December 23, 2008, five

years, five months and nine days elapsed. Therefore, Petitioner filed

his first petition for post-conviction relief well over four years

after the statute of limitations expired. Thus, Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling.

2. Petitioner Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling of

the Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling because equitable tolling is only available to 

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 5 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 10CV0653

petitioners who pursue their rights diligently and that Petitioner

did not pursue his rights diligently in this case. 

The one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable

tolling. Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288. Equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations is appropriate where a habeas petitioner shows: (1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo 544

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9th Cir. 2005). When courts assess a habeas petitioner’s

argument in favor of equitable tolling, they must conduct a “highly

fact-dependent” inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early 233 F.3d 1146, 1148

(9th Cir. 2000), Lott v. Mueller 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) The

extraordinary circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause”

of the untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir.

2001).

Petitioner concedes that his Petition is untimely. (Petition,

Motion to Entertain Habeas Corpus, hereafter “Motion to Entertain,”

at iii-iv.) However, he appears to argue that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Specifically, he

argues: (1) On July 22, 2005, his mother contacted an attorney

seeking legal representation for him; but the attorney his mother

sought was negligent in not timely filing his Petition; (2) California’s court decisions with regard to state habeas corpus procedures

made his Petition untimely; and (3) he is ignorant of the law.

a. Alleged Attorney Negligence

Petitioner argues that on July 22, 2005, his mother sought

legal representation for him to file the Petition that is the subject

of this Report and Recommendation. (Motion to Entertain at ix,

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 6 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3/The time period between July 14, 2004 (the date the statute of limitations

expired) and July 22, 2005 (the date his mother sought assistance from an attorney

to file his Petition) is one year and eight days.

7 10CV0653

Declaration of Mrs. Mary Bruce). However, Mrs. Bruce’s Declaration

establishes that Petitioner failed to even seek assistance in filing

his Petition until one year and eight days after the statute of

limitations expired.3/

Further, Petitioner argues that even though his mother paid

the attorney a significant sum of money, the attorney did not file

the Petition. However, an attorney’s negligence does not constitute

“extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to warrant equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800

(9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.

2002). Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument in

these regards are without merit.

b. California Decisions

Petitioner appears to argue that certain California court

decisions made his Petition untimely. Specifically, he refers to

California court-created law regarding the time to seek habeas corpus

relief in the California courts and its alleged interplay with AEDPA.

(Motion to Entertain at iv).

However, Petitioner confuses California law regarding time

limits for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California courts with AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Here,

Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief was filed in

the California courts on December 23, 2008, after AEDPA’s statute of

limitations had expired. That Petition was not denied as untimely.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). Therefore, the Court does not find

merit in this argument.

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 7 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 10CV0653

c. Ignorance of the Law

Petitioner argues that his Petition is untimely because he is

a “layman at law” and is ignorant of the law. (Motion to Entertain

at iii). However, this argument is unavailing. Ignorance of the law

is not an excuse for untimely filing of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009); WaldronRamsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009); Washington

v. Gonzalez, 2010 WL 3258575 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2010). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s argument in this regard has no merit.

As a result, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the

Court declines to equitably toll the statute of limitations in this

case. As a result, Petitioner failed to file his Petition For Writ

of Habeas Corpus with this Court within the one-year statute of

limitations mandated in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A).

 III

CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

Court has determined that Petitioner has failed to comply with the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 14, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 8 of 9
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 10CV0653

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 28, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 14, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:10-cv-00653-LAB-WVG Document 14 Filed 12/14/10 Page 9 of 9