Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00163/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MACON and JENNIFER RICHARDS, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO.: 1:07-cv-163-MEF

 )

LESAFFRE YEAST CORPORATION, ) (WO - Recommended for Publication)

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint

(Doc. # 6) and Motion to Remand (Doc. # 7). Lesaffre Yeast Corporation (“Lesaffre”) has

filed briefs in opposition to both motions. The Court has carefully considered the

submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, as well as the applicable law, and

finds for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order that Plaintiffs’

motions are due to be DENIED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 18, 2007, Macon and Jennifer Richards (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against

Lesaffre and Dominique Ciboulet (“Ciboulet”) in the Circuit Court of Henry County,

Alabama. On behalf of a class, Plaintiffs sought an unspecified amount of punitive and

compensatory damages for injuries allegedly suffered by pollution from Lesaffre’s Henry

County plant (“the Lesaffre plant”). Plaintiffs’ claims are for nuisance, negligence, and

wantonness.

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On February 23, 2007, Lesaffre timely filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1) invoking

this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Lesaffre filed its Answer on the same date (Doc. # 3). 

On March 16, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc.

# 6). By this motion, Plaintiffs seek to add Dennis Barry (“Barry”), the current manager of

the Lesaffre plant and a citizen of Alabama, as a defendant to this action. Plaintiffs contend

that they mistakenly believed that Ciboulet was the current plant manager. Plaintiffs note

that the addition of Barry would strip this Court of its jurisdiction over this action.

Accordingly, on the same date Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. 7), in which their

entire argument in support of remand is predicated on the lack of diversity of citizenship

created by the addition as a defendant of Barry.

Lesaffre filed a response and a surreply to Plaintiffs’ motions. Therein, Lesaffre

contends that the motions should be denied because Plaintiffs’ purpose in seeking

amendment is to destroy this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that Plaintiffs

should have known of Barry, were dilatory in seeking amendment, and will not be prejudiced

by denial of their motion to amend.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Based on the record before it, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs and Lesaffre are

citizens of different states for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not

challenged Lesaffre’s contention that the amount in controversy requirement for subject

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matter jurisdiction is satisfied. Accordingly, this Court has original subject matter

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties have not disputed

personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds an adequate evidentiary basis for both

personal jurisdiction and venue. 

DISCUSSION

To the extent that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment of the Complaint seeks to add a

new party, who is not diverse in citizenship from Plaintiffs, it is a post-removal amendment

which would destroy this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1447(e) of Title 28 of

the United States Code provides that “[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional

defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny

joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. §1447(e).

Thus, the decision to grant or deny a post-removal motion to amend a complaint which would

destroy the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court is discretionary. However, “[t]he

district court, when faced with amended pleading naming a new nondiverse defendant in a

removed case, should scrutinize that amendment more closely than an ordinary amendment.”

Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 851

(1989). Accord, Sexton v. G & K Servs., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 1999)

(Albritton, J.). Before allowing a post-removal amendment which would destroy subject

matter jurisdiction, a court must consider the following factors:

(1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to

defeat federal jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff has been

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dilatory in asking for the amendment, (3) whether the plaintiff

will be significantly injured if the amendment is not allowed,

and (4) any other factors bearing on the equities.

Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. Accord, Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182; Smith v. White Consol.

Indus., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1279-80 (N.D. Ala. 2002); Jerido v. American Gen. Life

& Accident Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Albritton, J.); Bevels v.

American States Ins. Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (Albritton, J.).

1. Intent to Defeat Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs cannot seek to amend solely for the purpose of defeating federal subject

matter jurisdiction. Where the amendment seeks to add nondiverse defendants, of whom the

plaintiff was aware or should have been aware at the time the suit was filed, and occurs only

after removal of the case, this court has previously held that the nondiverse defendants were

sought to be added for the purpose of keeping the case out of federal court. See, e.g., Smith,

229 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Bevels, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1313; Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-14.

From the record before this Court, it appears that the intent of Plaintiffs’ proposed

amendment is solely to defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Dilatory Amendment 

It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs have been dilatory in amending the Complaint

to add Barry. “Another factor to consider in determining the propriety of the amendment is

whether the plaintiff was dilatory in seeking to add [the nondiverse defendant] to the case.”

Smith, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1282. A plaintiff who waits to seek to amend the complaint to add

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a known nondiverse party can be found to have been dilatory about seeking the amendment.

See, e.g., id. While a plaintiff may argue that discovery was necessary to confirm the proper

identity of the resident defendant, a plaintiff’s failure to name such a defendant when the suit

was filed and before it was removed is dilatory if plaintiff could have ascertained the identity

of the resident defendant without discovery. Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. In this case,

it is not clear why Plaintiffs were unable to identify Barry earlier. In fact, it appears that with

minimal effort they could have done so.

3. Lack of Injury or Prejudice to Plaintiffs 

Plaintiffs will not be injured or prejudiced by denial of the proposed amendment.

They can proceed with a separate state court action against Barry should they so desire.

Further, they can obtain full relief from Lesaffre in this case, even without Barry being

present as a defendant in this action. Courts look to several factors when addressing whether

a plaintiff will suffer any injury if the proposed diversity destroying amendment is denied.

For example, a court may address whether a plaintiff will be able to obtain full relief on his

claims without the presence of the nondiverse defendant. See, e.g., Jerido, 127 F. Supp. 2d

at 1325; Bevels, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. The court may also

consider whether the existing defendant can satisfy any potential judgment, whether the

existing defendant is legally responsible for the acts of the nondiverse party and can be held

liable for them without the nondiverse party being made a defendant to the same action, and

whether the plaintiff has adequate access to discovery without the presence of the nondiverse

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defendant. See, e.g., Bevels, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.

Moreover, a court may consider that a plaintiff will not be significantly injured if amendment

is denied where plaintiff has the option of filing suit in state court against the resident

defendants. See, e.g., Bevels, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.

Clearly, the defendant more likely to be able to satisfy a judgment is the corporate entity, not

the plant manager. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Plaintiffsfrom proceeding with two

separate actions: one in federal court against Lesaffre and Ciboulet and one in state court

against Barry. 

4. Other Equitable Concerns

Other equitable concerns support a denial of the proposed amendment. “In balancing

the equities, the parties do not start out on an equal footing.” Bevels, 100 F. Supp. 2d at

1313. Accord, Jerido, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The very purpose of the removal statutes is

to give diverse defendants the right to choose between a state or federal forum. Sexton, 51

F. Supp. 2d 1313. Accord, Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1181. “Just as plaintiffs have the right to

choose to sue in state court when complete diversity does not exist, non-resident defendants

have the right to remove to federal court when there is diversity.” Sexton, 51 F. Supp. 2d at

1313. Lesaffre has the right to remove this case to federal court because diversity

jurisdiction clearly existed when the suit was filed and at the time of removal. In this Court’s

view, the proposed amendment would be an act of futility which would accomplish little

other than establishing grounds for remand which should not otherwise exist. This Court will

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not allow Plaintiffs to deprive Lesaffre of its right to litigate this case in this Court. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. # 6) is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. # 7) is DENIED because this Court has

original subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

DONE this the 1 day of August, 2007. st

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 

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