Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07657/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07657-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIYOUNG MOON and CRAIG STANFORD,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX KINKO’S OFFICE AND PRINT

SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-7657 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Defendant’s motion to transfer venue is scheduled for a hearing on June 1, 2007. Pursuant to

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral

argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES defendant’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2006, plaintiff Jiyoung Moon filed this action under the Fair and Accurate

Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. Plaintiff Moon is a resident of the

County of Los Angeles, which is located in the Central District of California. Complaint ¶ 4. On

December 20, 2006, the complaint was amended to add an additional named plaintiff, Craig Stanford.

Plaintiff Stanford is a resident of the County of San Francisco.

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative nationwide class of consumers.

First Amended Complaint ¶ 4. Plaintiffs allege that FedEx Kinko’s has violated Section 1681c(g) of

Case 3:06-cv-07657-SI Document 37 Filed 05/25/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Court GRANTS defendant’s request for judicial notice. (Docket No. 29).

2

 According to plaintiffs’ counsel, Payan’s counsel have stated that they do not oppose a transfer

of that action to this District. Defendant states that defense counsel and Payan’s counsel have had

several discussions regarding the possibility of joining this action and Payan in the same venue, but that

“to date the parties have not been able to get on the same page.” Reply at 4. 

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the FACTA by “print[ing] the expiration date and/or print[ing] more than the last five digits of

Plaintiffs’ credit card or debit card numbers on the receipts provided to Plaintiffs at the point of a sale

or transaction between Plaintiffs and FEDEX KINKO’S.” Id. ¶ 10. 

FedEx Kinko’s is headquartered in Dallas, Texas, and has locations in this District, the Central

District of California, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. Defendant seeks judicial notice

of two other putative nationwide class actions under FACTA that have been brought against FedEx

Kinko’s in the Central District of California, William Harrison v. FedEx Kinko’s Office and Print

Services, Inc., Case No. CV 06-8206 (FMC) (Ssx) (“Harrison”), and Farah Payan v. FedEx Kinko’s

Office and Print Services, Inc., Case No. CV 07-00971 ABC (AJWx) (“Payan”).1

 The plaintiffs in

Harrison voluntarily dismissed that case on April 16, 2007. Payan, which was filed on February 9,

2007, is still pending in the Central District.2 As with this case, the Payan plaintiffs seek to represent

a nationwide class of consumers who allegedly received electronically printed receipts from FedEx

Kinko’s at the point of sale or transaction that did not comply with FACTA. 

LEGAL STANDARD

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

transfer any civil matter to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). The purpose of § 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect

litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v.

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal citations and quotation omitted). A motion for transfer lies

within the broad discretion of the district court, and must be determined on an individualized basis. See

Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000).

To support a motion for transfer, the moving party must establish: (1) that venue is proper in the

transferor district; (2) that the transferee district is one where the action might have been brought; and

Case 3:06-cv-07657-SI Document 37 Filed 05/25/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(3) that the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the

interests of justice. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503,

506 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 907 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1990). Transfer is discretionary, but is governed by

certain factors specified in § 1404(a) and in relevant case law.

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that this action could have been brought in either this District or the

Central District of California. Once venue is determined to be proper in both districts, courts evaluate

the following factors to determine which venue is more convenient to the parties and the witnesses: (1)

plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of

access to the evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, (6) feasibility of

consolidation with other claims, (7) any local interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court

congestion and time of trial in each forum. See Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D.

Cal. 2001). 

While defendant’s motion presents a close question, the Court concludes that this action should

remain in this District. Although the Court is troubled by the appearance of forum-shopping, one of the

current plaintiffs resides in this District, and this action was filed before Harrison or Payan.

Defendant’s most persuasive argument in favor of transferring this action to the Central District was the

pendency of the Harrison and Payan actions; with the dismissal of Harrison, both districts are now

equally feasible for consolidation purposes. In addition, where federal law governs all claims raised,

as here, “either forum is equally capable of hearing and deciding those questions.” DealTime.com Ltd.

v. McNulty, 123 F. Supp. 2d 750, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Defendant does not address the other venue

factors (such as convenience of witnesses, ease of access to the evidence, or relative court congestion).

Because the venue factors are largely neutral in the transfer analysis, the Court finds that defendant has

not met its burden to show that transfer is warranted.

CONCLUSION

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to transfer venue. (Docket

No. 28). The Court SUSTAINS defendant’s objection to paragraph six of the Linde Declaration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-07657-SI Document 37 Filed 05/25/07 Page 4 of 4