Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01030/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01030-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SINRI KRISH,

PLAINTIFF,

v.

G.R. BALASUBRAMANIAM, an

individual, and DOES 1 through

10, inclusive

Defendant.

1:06-CV-01030 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO

DISMISS BASED ON FORUM NON

CONVENIENS

1. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision is Defendant G.R.

Balasubramaniam’s motion to dismiss this action based on the

common law theory of forum non conveniens. This action concerns

a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant over payments made

pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property located in

Coimbatore, India. 

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns a contract for the sale of real property

located in the Coimbatore, India. (Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶7.) 

Defendant, an Indian citizen who currently resides in

Bakersfield, California, has owned the property since 1988. (Id.

at ¶¶ 4, 10.) Plaintiff is currently a resident of Carrollton,

Texas. (Doc. 41-2, Krish Decl., Ex. A, Filed March 23, 2007.) 

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On or about November 1, 2005, the parties entered into an

oral agreement to sell the property. (Doc. 1, Compl. at ¶7.) 

This oral agreement was reduced to a written deed of sale

agreement (the “Sales Agreement”) in India and was signed by both

parties. 

Under the sales agreement, Plaintiff was to pay Defendant

approximately $356,000. (Id. at ¶12.) Approximately $4,600 was

paid as an advance, with the balance of the total amount due on

the closing date of June 13, 2006. (Id. at ¶13.) Plaintiff

alleges that he paid Defendant an additional $139,534 toward the

purchase price by wire transfer on January 11, 2006, pursuant to

an oral agreement. (Id. at ¶14.) The wire transfer was made

from Plaintiff’s account in Texas to Defendant’s account in

California. (Id. at ¶14 & Ex. D.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on May 9, 2006, Defendant breached

and repudiated the sales agreement by advising Plaintiff in

writing that he refused to convey the property to Plaintiff. 

(Id. at ¶15.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant has refused

to return the $139,534 paid to him for the purchase of the

property and that Defendant never intended to fulfill his

obligations to Plaintiff under the sales agreement to sell and

convey the real property. (Id. at ¶34.) 

On August 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed this action based on

diversity of citizenship, alleging: (1) breach of oral and

written contract; (2) assumpsit; (3) constructive trust; (4) and

intentional misrepresentation.

//

//

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3. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A district court has discretion to decline to exercise

jurisdiction in a case where litigation in a foreign forum would

be more convenient for the parties.” 28 U.S.C. 1404(a); Tuazon

v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir.

2006). Plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to deference. Id. 

A party moving to dismiss based on forum non conveniens bears the

burden of showing (1) that there is an adequate alternative

forum, and (2) that the balance of private and public interest

factors favors dismissal. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104,

1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff’s choice of forum will not

be disturbed unless the ‘private interest’ and ‘public interest’

factors strongly favor trial in the foreign country. Id. The

standard to be applied to a motion for dismissal on the ground of

forum non conveniens is whether defendants have made a clear

showing of facts which establish such oppression and vexation of

a defendant as to be out of proportion to plaintiff’s

convenience, which may be shown to be slight or non existent. 

Id. Forum non conveniens is an exceptional tool to be employed

sparingly, not a doctrine that compels plaintiffs to choose the

optimal forum for their claim. Id. 

4. DISCUSSION

A. Availability of Alternative Forum

A defendant seeking dismissal on forum non conveniens

grounds bears the burden of demonstrating that an alternative

forum exists and that it is adequate. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, an

alternative forum is available where the defendant is amenable to

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service of process and the forum provides some remedy for the

wrong at issue. Id. This test is easy to pass; typically, a

forum will be inadequate only where the remedy provided is so

clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory, that it is no remedy at

all. Id. 

Defendant has stated that he would be willing to submit to

the jurisdiction of Indian Courts. There is no dispute among the

parties that Defendant is amenable to process in India. The

parties dispute the ability of Indian courts to provide an

adequate remedy. 

Establishing that an alternative forum is adequate requires

the defendant to establish that the foreign forum’s laws provide

potential redress for the injury alleged. Tuazon 433 F.3d at

1178. Defendant argues that there is an adequate remedy

available under Indian law pursuant to both the express terms of

the sales agreement, as well as India’s Specific Relief Act. In

support of its motion, Defendant provides his own declaration

stating that the contract for the sale of real property was

drafted in India and is governed by Indian law. Defendant

further argues that a dispute over an agreement for the sale of

real property in India should be decided by a court in India. 

Defendant next argues that while Indian courts may take

longer to resolve this dispute, such delay is not so lengthy that

the remedy available would be clearly inadequate. Plaintiff does

not dispute that Indian courts have authority to grant remedies

sufficient to resolve this dispute. Plaintiff instead argues

that a resolution of this matter can be more quickly obtained in

the United States than in India. 

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In support of his position, Defendant offers the declaration

of R.M. Shanmukham, an attorney in Coimbatore, India for the past

fifty years. (Doc. 53, Decl. of R.M. Shanmukham, Filed April 2,

2007.) According to Mr. Shanmukham, India’s laws were amended in

2003 to vest civil jurisdiction in the district courts and “fast

track” courts were created. (Id., ¶ 2) These “fast track”

courts were formed to allow judges to try cases and reduce the

number of pending cases. As a result, Mr. Shanmukham states that

delay in litigation in India is no longer an issue and that

disputes arising out of the District Court’s jurisdiction come to

trial in about three years in Coimbatore. 

In Tuazon, the Ninth Circuit found that Defendant met its

burden of showing adequacy of the Philippine court system. 

Tuazon 433 F.3d at 1178. The Defendant offered an extensive

affidavit by a former Justice of the Philippine Court of Appeals,

detailing background about the Philippines and its court system,

the availability of contract and tort relief, the discovery

process, and procedural formalities. In this case, Defendant

does not provide a detailed background of Coimbatore, India and

its court system, the discovery process, or pretrial and trial

procedures. However, Defendant does provide an affidavit from an

attorney with fifty years of experience, who is a member and past

president of the Coimbatore Bar Association. If this attorney

witness has experience in Indian courts with trials, this is

sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s claims that Indian

courts provide an adequate forum. 

Plaintiff however, argues that venuing the dispute in India

would impose a seven to ten year delay before a final resolution

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 Plaintiff also argues that India is an inadequate forum 1

because Plaintiff will be subject to excessive costs in the

amount of $68,000 to commence the case. Plaintiff does not say

he is unable to provide for the cost or that he cannot recover

the cost under Indian Law. Plaintiffs showing of the cost of

suit is insufficient to undermine the adequacy of Indian courts

6

of the case. In contrast, a trial of the case in this court is

set for just over a year, on May 28, 2008. (Doc. 32, Scheduling

Conference Order, Filed December 19, 2006.) Plaintiff does not

argue that the delay in India will be so severe that it would

deprive Plaintiff of a remedy. Rather, Plaintiff argues that

India is not an adequate forum because resolution of the dispute

would take longer in Indian courts than in American courts. This

argument is insufficient to establish Indian courts are an

inadequate forum. 

A litigant asserting inadequacy or delay must make a

powerful showing. Tuazon 422 F.3d at 1179. Because litigation

delay is so pervasive, minor delay does not serve to undermine

the adequacy of an alternative forum. Bhatnagar by Bhatnagar v.

Surrendra Overseas, 52 F3d 1220, 1227 (3rd Cir. 1995). Delays of

a few years are of no legal significance in a forum non

conveniens calculus. Id. 

Plaintiff does not argue that the prospect of a judicial

remedy in India is so temporally remote that it is no remedy at

all. see, Bhatnagar by Bhatnagar, 52 F.3d at 1227-1228 (holding

that a delay of 15-20 years is extreme and finding no remedy as a

result of the delay.) Plaintiff has not made a powerful showing

that the delay in India is so severe that it undermines the

adequacy of Indian courts as an alternative forum.1

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as an alternative forum.

7

B. Balance of Factors

Even when an adequate alternative forum exists, plaintiff’s

original choice of forum will not be disturbed unless the

“private interest” and the “public interest” factors strongly

favor dismissal. Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1180. 

i. Private Factors

Courts apply a seven part test to evaluate private interest

factor considerations: (1) the residence of the parties and

witnesses, (2) the forum’s convenience to the litigants (3)

access to physical evidence and other sources of proof, (4)

whether unwilling witnesses can be compelled to testify, (5) the

cost of bringing witnesses to trial, (6) the enforceability of

the judgment, (7) any practical problems or other factors that

contribute to an efficient resolution. Id. In considering the

location and availability of evidence and witnesses the crucial

focus is not on the number of witnesses or quantity of evidence

in each locale, but rather the materiality and importance of the

anticipated evidence and witness’ testimony and their

accessibility and convenience to the forum. Id. 

a. Residence of the Parties and Forum’s Convenience 

to Litigants

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant both presently

reside in the United States and did so at the time the case

commenced. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not a resident of

the United States, but rather a resident of India, who

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temporarily resides in the United States and has the intention of

returning to India. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s choice of

forum should be given less deference because he is a foreign

citizen. Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143

(2001)(noting that a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less

deference). 

Plaintiff, however, has provided evidence of his Certificate

of Naturalization, evidencing that he has been a United States

citizen since 2002. (Doc. 41-2, Krish Decl., Ex. A, Filed March

23, 2007.) Plaintiff has also lived and worked continuously in

the United States since 1992 (15 years) and permanently resides

in Texas. (Doc. 41-1, Pl.’s Opposition, Filed March 23, 2007.) 

Plaintiff neither owns nor leases any real property in India. 

Id. Plaintiff has only been out of the United States for

business or vacation for no more than five weeks at a time and

has been an employee of a United States company in Dallas, Texas

since 1998. Id. Defendant is also a United States Citizen who

lives in Kern County, California. Id. 

The first and second factors favor retaining the case in

California. Plaintiff is not a foreign party. Neither party is

a resident of India and both reside in the United States. It is

not unreasonable that Defendant should defend a lawsuit in a

court of his state of residence rather than in India. see,

Tuazon at 433 F.3d at 1181 (upholding the district court’s

reasoning that Washington was a more adequate forum than the

Philippines because neither party was a resident of the

Philippines, both parties were residents of the United States,

and it was not unreasonable to expect Defendant to litigate an

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 However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3) states that “depositions 2

may be taken in a foreign country... on notice before a person

authorized to administer oaths in the place where the examination

is held, either by law thereof or by the law of the United

States.” Depositions in India can be and are taken under oath. 

9

action in Washington given its extensive operations in the state

for half a century.) Also, a California forum is more convenient

to the litigants since Defendant lives in this state and

Plaintiff’s travel to California is more convenient and less

expensive than requiring both litigants to travel to India for

the litigation. 

b. Location and Availability of Evidence and 

Witnesses

The third and fourth private interest factors present a

closer issue between Plaintiff and Defendant. The dispute

involves material witnesses who live abroad. The importance of

their anticipated evidence is disputed. Defendant argues that at

least nine material witnesses in this action reside in India. 

Defendant claims that a severe limit on access to evidence will

result if the witnesses are not voluntarily produced for

deposition. Defendant contends that India is not a signatory to

the Hague convention and that the parties could not engage in

“cumbersome, restrictive, and time consuming letters rogatory

process set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b).”2

According to Defendant, Plaintiff and Defendant did not

personally negotiate the sale of property in India. Instead,

Defendant argues that they negotiated the transaction through

individuals who reside in India, to whom they each gave power of

attorney. Plaintiff gave his father N. Krishnasami Naidu

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(“Naidu”), a resident of India, power of attorney. Defendant

gave S.G. Ramakumar (“Ramakumar”), also a resident of India,

power of attorney. Defendant also claims that these are the two

most critical witnesses but that there “are additional percipient

witnesses and attorneys in India who worked on the case” and who

will be required to testify to the transaction, the alleged

presuit litigation, and as experts on Indian law.” However,

Defendant has not provided names of these witnesses and does not

explain how, aside from Naidu and Ramakumar, the witnesses are

material to the case. 

Plaintiff rejoins that the seminal and material witnesses

are the parties who formed the contract and whose intentions and

performance are in dispute. Plaintiff argues that he and

Defendant engaged exclusively in all negotiations regarding

Plaintiff’s purchase of the property while both were in the

United States. Plaintiff further argues that all key documents

are located in the United States. Plaintiff indicates the facts

are as follows: 

1. In June 2005, while traveling in India, Plaintiff 

saw the Property at issue and learned from 

Ramakumar, Defendant’s agent, that it was for 

sale. Plaintiff then obtained Defendant’s contact

information. (Doc. 41-2, Krish Declaration, ¶¶ 7-

8.)

2. Plaintiff claims that he did not negotiate any 

issues related to the purchase of the property 

with Ramakumar. (Id. at ¶ 9.) 

3. Upon Plaintiff’s return to the United States, 

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Plaintiff claims that he had about 30 telephone

conversations with Defendant in which they

negotiated the terms for purchase of the property

including price, advanced deposits for the

property, logistics of having the power of

attorney agents in India sign the Sales Agreement,

and the date of close of escrow. Plaintiff

submitted his phone records in an attachment to

his declaration as evidence that such

conversations took place in the United States. 

(Id. at ¶ 10.)

4. Each telephone conversation took place in the 

United States. (Id.) 

5. Plaintiff also states in his declaration that he 

exchanged three emails and two faxes where various

terms of the property purchase were discussed. 

(Id.) 

6. On November 1, 2005, Plaintiff entered into an 

oral agreement to purchase the property free of 

all encumbrances, via telephone with Plaintiff in 

Texas and Defendant in California. Plaintiff 

claims that as part of the agreement, Plaintiff 

advanced to Defendant the sum of $139,534 on 

January 11, 2006 by wire transfer from his Texas 

bank to Defendant’s bank in California. Plaintiff

has submitted bank statements as evidence of the 

transfer. (Doc. 41-4, Krish Decl., Ex. C and Ex. 

D., Filed March 23, 2007.) 

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7. Thereafter the parties agreed via telephone, 

email, and fax negotiations in the United States, 

to enter into a written agreement for registration

in India. It was then that Plaintiff appointed 

his father, Mr. Nammalwar, to be his power agent 

and instructed him to sign the Sales Agreement in 

India. Once the purchase was finalized, Plaintiff

asked an Indian attorney, Mr. Chandrasekaran to 

conform the agreement to Indian law, and print it 

on required paper with the appropriate stamps. 

(Id. at ¶ 13.)

8. On December 14, 2005 the Sales Agreement was 

executed. Plaintiff argues that the Power Agents 

did not negotiate any terms or conditions with 

each other or anyone else. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

There is a significant factual dispute between the parties

as to who are the most critical witnesses. Defendant argues that

the most critical witnesses are the Power Agents who signed the

sales agreement in India as well as the attorneys in India who

assured that the agreement conformed to Indian law. Plaintiff

argues that the most critical witnesses are the Plaintiff and

Defendant because they negotiated the Sales Agreement. Plaintiff

notes that Defendant has never disputed the terms of the

agreement and that there is no compelling reason to require

testimony from the Power Agents since they could only testify as

to the fact that they executed the document under Indian law. 

Plaintiff provides the court with the following list of witnesses

arguing that they are peripheral and that their testimony can be

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obtained by deposition: 

1. Mr. Ramakumar & Mr. Krishnasami Nammalwar

(identified as N. Krishnasami) were the Power

Agents and did not negotiate any terms of the

Sales Agreement with anyone. (Doc. 41-4,

Nammalwar Decl. ¶7, Filed March 23, 2007.) 

2. Mr. Narayannan is employed by the State Bank of

India, which granted Plaintiff a loan in March

2006 to pay the balance due under the Sales

Agreement; his testimony will likely be limited to

the loan terms and can be obtained by deposition.

(Doc. 41-8, Narayanan Decl. ¶¶2-6, Filed March 23,

2007.) 

3. Mr. Ar. D. Prabu is an engineer for Prabu

Associates in Coimbatore, who performed a

valuation of the Property in March 2007; his

testimony will likely be limited to his valuation

report and can be obtained by deposition. (Doc.

41-6, Declaration of Ar. D. Prabu (“Prabu Decl.”)

at ¶¶2-5, Filed March 23, 2007.)

4. Mr. Krishnasami Sivaraveendran (identified as Siva

Ravi) is the person who arranged for the March

2006 publication of the notice in an Indian

newspaper; the notice speaks for itself. Even if

required to testify, his testimony can be obtained

by deposition. (Doc. 41-7, Declaration of

Krishnasami Sivaraveendran (“Sivaraveendran

Decl.”) ¶¶3-5, Filed March 23, 2007.) 

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5. Mr. S. Chandrasekaran, an Indian attorney retained

by Plaintiff, who prepared the Sales Agreement in

compliance with Indian law (required language,

type of paper, endorsements etc.), undertook a

title search to ensure the Property was free of

encumbrances, and prepared the March 2006 notice;

his testimony can be obtained by deposition. (Doc.

41-5, Declaration of S. Chandrasekaran

(“Chandrasekaran Decl.”) ¶¶3-10, Filed March 23,

2007.) 

6. Mr. S. Dorairaj is Defendant’s Indian lawyer.

According to Defendant, this witness became

involved only after Plaintiff allegedly breached

the Sales Agreement and the basis for his

testimony is therefore unclear. 

7. Dr. V. Ramachandran, his real estate company (G.

Ramakrishnan), and his attorney (Mr. M.K. Sampath)

relate to Defendant’s allegation of a “cloud on

the title” to the Property, and that Ramachandran

had an interest in the Property through an alleged

agreement made in December 2003; even if true,

this is a legal question under Indian law, which

can be dealt with by expert declarations or

deposition. (Doc. 41-10, Karthikeyan Decl. at

¶¶12-16, Filed March 23, 2007.) 

Plaintiff also argues that the key witnesses are willing to

submit themselves to deposition and voluntarily travel to the

United States for trial. 

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Lastly, Plaintiff claims that access to the relevant

documents is in the United States. All negotiations were

conducted in the United States and all relevant documents,

including the sales agreement, assignment of powers of attorney,

bank records, loan documents, and land valuation on the property,

are in the United States. 

The factual disputes as to the role of the witnesses and how

much of the agreement was negotiated in the United States instead

of in India makes this a close call. Whether this case is tried

in the United States or in India, evidence will inevitably be

drawn from both places. Defendant concedes that this is not the

type of case where it is necessary to view the property in

question. However, because both parties invoked the assistance

of Power Agents in India, proof of the signing of the contract

and the circumstances surrounding that event will likely be in

India. It is factually unclear how much or how little a role the

Power Agents played in the negotiations. 

Plaintiff represents that all of the witnesses he may rely

upon in this case have stated under penalty of perjury that they

are willing to submit to a deposition in India under oath and

willing to travel to the United States for trial. According to

Plaintiff, Defendant’s concern with compulsory process to compel

witness attendance should not be an issue if the parties

cooperate. Defendant’s power of attorney, Mr. Ramakumar is his

uncle and Mr. Dorairaj is his counsel in India. Plaintiff points

out that they have every motivation to have their depositions

taken and to come to trial in order to assist defendant. 

On balancing the parties’ factual contentions, the third and

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fourth private interest factors weigh in favor of retaining this

matter in the original forum in California. No matter where the

case is tried, witnesses will travel from or to India. 

c. Costs of Bringing Witnesses to Trial

A factual dispute also exists as to the costs of litigating

this case in the United States rather than in India. Defendant

argues that his costs of bringing witnesses from India to the

United States would be exorbitant. Defendant claims that he will

incur substantial expert witness fees, some of which is entirely

unnecessary were the case to go forward in India. Defendant

estimates that the costs would be well in excess of $25,000.00. 

Also, Defendant states that he is considering instituting a cross

claim against Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s decision to publish

a higher purchase price for the property than appears in the

Sales Agreement. Defendant argues that this would result in

additional costs and fees for him if he were forced to file it in

Fresno because it would require him to incur more travel expenses

for additional witnesses to his cross claim. The latter is

speculative as such a claim is not before the court. This is a

simple dispute over a land sale agreement. Although experts on

Indian law may be required by each side it is difficult to see

what issues create the need for other experts, other than

valuation if that is in issue. 

Plaintiff argues that it would cost an estimated $68,800 to

commence a case in India leading to a civil trial regarding a

dispute over real property. Plaintiff points out that to

litigate this case in India would require the parties to travel

to India several times for their depositions and possibly for

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trial. Plaintiff would have to pay attorneys fees in India to

litigate this case from its inception, duplicating efforts and

costs, since the case has already been instituted in California. 

In response to Defendant’s contention that there would be

high costs in bringing witnesses from India to California,

Plaintiff argues that such costs should not be necessary since

witnesses can be deposed by sworn transcript and may not have to

attend trial. Plaintiff is also willing to pay the costs of

bringing his own witnesses to trial. According to Plaintiff, the

increased speed and ease of travel and communication makes the

possibility of obtaining witness testimony without their presence

less costly and burdensome. 

Lastly, the possibility that Defendant might file a counter

claim in India does not have much weight in the analysis since

Defendant may file the counterclaim in this pending action. On

balance, the economics of bringing a few witnesses from abroad to

California will be less costly than moving the case and trial,

including both parties, to India. see, Tuazon 433 F.3d at 1181. 

The fifth factor also weighs in favor of retaining the case

in California. 

d. Compelling Witnesses to Testify and Enforceability

of Judgment

Defendants argue that there is currently no mechanism to

compel witnesses in India to testify. However, Fed. R. Civ. P.

28(b)(3) states that “depositions may be taken in a foreign

country... on notice before a person authorized to administer

oaths in the place where the examination is held, either by law

thereof or by the law of the United States.” Depositions in

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India can be and are taken under oath. Further, Plaintiff points

out that witnesses material to this case, such as Defendant’s

Power Agent who is also his uncle and Defendant’s attorney, have

an interest in participating as witnesses in this case. Also,

Plaintiff argues that enforcing a judgment in California would be

easier than enforcing a judgment in India. Defendant is a

resident of California and has a bank account in California. 

Defendant does not address the enforceability of judgment issue.

The sixth and seventh factors also weigh in favor of retaining

the case. The court recognizes that the contry of India has

treaties with the United States and that the Indian legal system

recognizes affidavits and the taking of testimony under oath. 

ii. Public Factors

In addition to the private interest factors, courts must

consider five public interest factors: (1) the local interest in

the lawsuit, (2) the court’s familiarity with the governing law,

(3) the burden on local courts and juries, (4) congestion in the

court, and (5) the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to a

particular forum. Id. 

a. The Local Interest in the Lawsuit

Defendant argues that it cannot seriously be disputed that

there exists no connection between the instant dispute and the

forum selected by Plaintiff. According to Defendant, there is no

local interest in having this foreign breach of contract action

decided locally. However, California ties to this litigation are

prevalent. Defendant is a United States citizen who resides in

Tulare County, California. He has lived and worked in California

for 23 years. It is alleged that all negotiations for the

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purchase of the real property were conducted with Defendant in

California. It is alleged that Defendant reviewed the sales

agreement in California, that Defendant signed the assignment of

power of attorney in California, and that Defendant executed the

Sales agreement in California. These facts are sufficient to

establish a substantial local interest in the resolution of this

matter in California. 

b. The Court’s Familiarity With Indian Law

Defendant also argues throughout his moving papers that this

court has previously indicated that Indian law likely controls

this case. see, (Doc. 32, Scheduling Conference Order, Filed

December 19, 2006.)(noting as an uncontested legal issue that

Indian law applies to the construction and interpretation of the

Sales Agreement.) However, in its Order Denying Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss issued on October 10, 2006, the court also

noted that federal courts routinely apply the law of other

countries; the determination that another country’s law controls

does not automatically render improper venue in a United States

court. Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2

F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1993)(choice of law issue is not

dispositive of venue analysis). The need to apply unfamiliar

foreign law is just one factor that may be considered in

determining whether to dismiss a case for forum non conveniens. 

See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260 (1981). 

Though Indian law may apply to the construction of the agreement,

this court may properly apply Indian law to the pending

litigation. The court has previously tried a complicated

extradition proceeding, where India was the petitioner seeking

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extradition under a treaty between United States and Indian law. 

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005). 

c. The Burden on Local Courts and Juries

Defendant also argues that a local jury should not be

burdened with an action having absolutely no connection with the

Eastern District. However, this case does have a connection with

the Eastern District since the Defendant is a resident of Kern

County, California and both parties are U.S. citizens. Local

courts and local juries routinely address subjects totally

foreign to them, ranging from the foreign language of patent

disputes to cases involving foreign companies, foreign cultures,

and foreign languages. see, Piper Aircraft 454 U.S. at 257; see

also, Tuazon 433 F.3d at 1181-1182. Given that Defendant is a

resident of the Eastern District of California, it will not be an

unfair burden on local courts and juries to adjudicate a

controversy involving a resident of Tulare county. 

d. Congestion in the Courts

Defendant provides no evidence of the calendar in any Indian

court where this case may be tried. In the Fresno Division of

the Eastern District of California, although the overall caseload

is around 1,000 cases per judge, every civil case set for trial

of this court in the past fifteen years has been tried, on or

near the scheduled trial date. 

e. The Costs of Resolving a Dispute Unrelated to A 

Particular Forum

The costs of resolving the dispute appear to be higher if

the case is litigated in India. 

//

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5. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons state above, Defendant’s motion for

forum non conveniens is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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