Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_09-cv-00622/USCOURTS-alsd-1_09-cv-00622-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JENNIFER FAY JONES, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : CA 09-0622-C 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, : 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 : 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c) and Rule 54(d)(2)(D) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on plaintiff=s application for an award of attorney=s fees under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. ' 2412. (Doc. 22) Upon consideration of all pertinent 

materials contained in this file, it is determined that plaintiff should receive a reasonable attorney’s fee 

in the amount of $2,218.75 under the EAJA for legal services rendered by her attorney in this Court. 

See Astrue v. Ratliff, 505 U.S. , 2010 WL 2346547, *4 & *5 (2010) (“Ratliff [] asserts that subsection 

(d)(1)(A)’s use of the verb ‘award’ renders § 2412(d) fees payable directly to a prevailing party’s 

attorney[.] . . . We disagree. . . . The plain meaning of the word ‘award’ in subsection (d)(1)(A) is [] that 

the court shall ‘give or assign by . . . judicial determination’ to the ‘prevailing party’ (here, Ratliff’s 

client Ree) attorney’s fees in the amount sought and substantiated under, inter alia, subsection 

(d)(1)(B). . . . The fact that the statute awards to the prevailing party fees in which her attorney may 

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have a beneficial interest or a contractual right does not establish that the statute ‘awards’ the fees 

directly to the attorney. For the reasons we have explained, the statute’s pain text does the opposite-it 

‘awards’ the fees to the litigant[.]”). 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On April 22, 2010, this Court entered a Rule 58 judgment reversing and remanding this 

cause to the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) for 

further proceedings. (Doc. 21; see also Doc. 20) 

2. The application for an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA was filed on July 8, 

20010 (Doc. 22), some seventy-seven (77) days after entry of final judgment (compare id. with Doc. 

21). In the application for EAJA fees, plaintiff requests attorney=s fees in the amount of $2,218.75 to 

compensate her attorney for the time (17.75 hours) spent representing her before this Court as of the 

date of the filing of the fee application. (See Doc. 22) 

 3. The Commissioner of Social Security filed a notice of intent not to object to plaintiff=s 

EAJA application on July 26, 2010. (Doc. 24 (“Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiff $2,218.75 in attorney 

fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act[.]”))

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act requires a district court to “award to a prevailing party . . 

. fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . ., including proceedings for 

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States . . ., unless the court finds that 

the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award 

unjust.” 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)(1)(A). It is imminently clear in this case that plaintiff is a prevailing 

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party under the EAJA1 and that the position of the United States in this case was not substantially 

justified, the defendant having made no argument to the contrary (see Doc. 24). 

 2. The EAJA requires a prevailing party to file an application for attorney’s fees within 

thirty (30) days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)(1)(B). The thirty-day clock did not 

begin to run in this case until this Court’s reversal and remand order of April 22, 2010 became final, 

which occurred at the end of the sixty (60) days for appeal provided under Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632, 125 

L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), that is, June 21, 2010. The application filed in this case, bearing a date of July 8, 

2010, is timely since it was filed within thirty days of June 21, 2010. 

 3. The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. ' 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. The Supreme Court has 

indicated that “‘the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” 

Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (EAJA), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)(' 1988); see Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 

772-773 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the reasonableness of the hours expended in the context of 

contentions by the government that the fee requests were not supported by sufficient documentation and 

often involved a duplication of effort), aff’d sub nom. Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 

S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990). 

This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial 

 

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 “[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 

509 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993). 

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estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an award of 

fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates 

claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court 

may reduce the award accordingly. The district court also should exclude 

from this initial fee calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended.” 

 . . . Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary 

widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to 

exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to 

exclude such hours from his fee submission. “In the private sector, ‘billing 

judgment’ is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important 

here. Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly 

billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” 

Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433-434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-1940 (citations omitted); see also 

id., at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 (“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing 

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly 

rates.”); ACLU of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir.1999) (“If fee 

applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut 

the amount of hours for which payment is sought, pruning out those that are ‘excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ Courts are not authorized to be generous with the 

money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and 

expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.”); Norman v. 

Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Excluding excessive or 

otherwise unnecessary hours under the rubric of ‘billing judgment’ means that a lawyer 

may not be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he would not bill a client 

of means who was seriously intent on vindicating similar rights, recognizing that in the 

private sector the economically rational person engages in some cost benefit analysis.”). 

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 4. In Norman, supra, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that “the measure of reasonable 

hours is determined by the profession’s judgment of the time that may be conscionably billed 

and not the least time in which it might theoretically have been done.” 836 F.2d at 1306. 

 5. Because the defendant has filed no objection to the fee petition, the Court finds 

that plaintiff’s counsel reasonably spent 17.75 hours on legal tasks in this case. 

 6. With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA case, 

for services performed by attorneys, the express language of the Act, as amended by the 

Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, provides in pertinent part as follows: 

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing 

market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that . . . 

attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour unless the court 

determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the 

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a 

higher fee. 

28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)(2)(A) (Cum.Supp. 1997). 

 7. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (1992), the Eleventh Circuit determined that 

the EAJA establishes a two-step analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be 

applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act. 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine the market rate for “similar 

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and 

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is needed only if the market rate is greater 

than $[125] per hour, is to determine whether the court should adjust the hourly fee 

upward from $[125] to take into account an increase in the cost of living, or a 

special factor. 

Id. at 1033-1034 (citations and footnote omitted). 

 8. For years, the prevailing market rate in the Southern District of Alabama has been 

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$125.00 per hour. See, e.g., Willits v. Massanari, CA 00-0530-RV-C; Boggs v. Massanari, 00-

0408-P-C; Boone v. Apfel, CA 99-0965-CB-L. This Court has adjusted that rate to account for 

the increase in the cost of living. Lucy v. Barnhart, CA 06-0147-C, Doc. 32. More specifically, 

the Court has adopted the following formula to be used in calculating awards of attorney=s fees 

under the EAJA: A>($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average AAll Items Index@, South Urban, for 

month and year of temporal midpoint2

)/ 152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the 

month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.=@ (Id. at 11, quoting Doc. 31, at 2) 

 9. The temporal midpoint in this case was January 8, 2010, the complaint having 

been filed September 25, 2009 (Doc. 1) and the Court having entered its order and judgment on 

April 22, 2010 (Docs. 20-21). The CPI-U for January of 2010 was 210.056. Plugging the 

relevant numbers into the foregoing formula renders the following equation: 

$125x210.056/152.4. Completion of this equation renders an hourly rate of $172.29. However, 

because plaintiff has specifically asked to be compensated at the statutory rate of $125.00 per 

hour (Doc. 22, at 1 (“Plaintiff . . . makes application to the Court for an award of Attorney Fees . 

. . under the Equal Access to Justice Act . . . in the amount of $2,218.75. Fees are computed 

based upon an hourly rate of $125.00 per hour for attorney time.”)), and the defendant has 

agreed to payment of attorney fees at this rate for 17.75 hours of work (see Doc. 24, at 1 

(agreeing to pay plaintiff $2,218.75, which is 17.75 hours times $125 per hour)), the Court finds 

 

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 “The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living adjustment is the temporal midpoint 

of the period during which the compensable services were rendered[;] . . . [t]he temporal midpoint is calculated 

by computing the number of days from the date the claim was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or 

District Judge=s Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart, CA 06-0147-C, Doc. 31, at 3. 

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that plaintiff is due to be awarded an attorney’s fee in the amount of $2,218.75 under the EAJA 

for the 17.75 hours her attorney spent performing work traditionally performed by attorneys in 

social security cases. 

 CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that plaintiff be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,218.75 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act, representing compensation for 17.75 hours of service by 

Quinn E. Brock, Esquire, at the statutory hourly rate of $125.00 per hour. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of July, 2010. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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