Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05018/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 20, 2012 Decided April 13, 2012

No. 11-5017

JEFFREY KAPCHE,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Consolidated with 11-5018

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-2093)

John W. Griffin, Jr. argued the cause for the 

appellant/cross-appellee. Katherine L. Butler and David 

Cashdan were on brief.

Michael A. Greene was on brief for amicus curiae 

American Diabetes Association in support of the 

appellant/cross-appellee. 

Lindsey Powell, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee/cross-appellant. 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 1 of 25
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Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., United States Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney, 

were on brief. Anisha S. Dasgupta, Attorney, United States 

Department of Justice, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

United States Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Jeffrey 

Kapche (Kapche) sued United States Attorney General Eric 

H. Holder, Jr. (Holder), alleging that the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) refused to hire him as a special agent 

because of his Type 1 diabetes in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. A 

jury found in favor of Kapche and awarded him $100,000 in 

compensatory damages. Subsequently, the district court 

denied both Holder’s motion for judgment as a matter of law 

and Kapche’s request for equitable relief. Kapche appeals the 

denial of equitable relief and Holder cross-appeals the denial 

of judgment as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we 

affirm the district court. 

I. Facts

Kapche is a Type 1 insulin-dependent diabetic who 

manages his condition by injecting himself with insulin 

several times daily and managing his diet, exercise and blood 

sugar. Kapche applied for a special agent position with the 

FBI in February 2002, and, in November 2004, the FBI 

offered Kapche a conditional offer of employment pending 

Kapche’s successful completion of a medical examination and 

background investigation. On January 23, 2005, the FBI 

revoked Kapche’s conditional offer because it determined he 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 2 of 25
3

could not adequately manage his diabetes and that 

consequently he would be unable to perform certain functions

of a special agent. Kapche then filed an internal 

discrimination complaint alleging that the FBI declined to hire

him because of his diabetes. The FBI and Kapche agreed to a 

settlement pursuant to which the FBI reinstated Kapche’s 

conditional offer of employment and resumed processing his 

application. 

As part of its reconsideration, the FBI conducted a 

Personnel Security Interview (PSI) with Kapche on 

November 22, 2006 during which Kapche represented that he 

had never been disciplined by a current or former employer. 

In a follow-up inquiry with his then-employer, the Fort Bend 

County (TX) Sheriff’s Office (FBCSO), however, the FBI 

learned that the FBCSO had suspended Kapche for two weeks 

and placed him on 180 days’ probation for unauthorized use 

of gasoline from FBCSO’s gasoline tank in September 2005. 

After giving Kapche an opportunity to explain his omission 

during the PSI, the FBI concluded that Kapche’s explanation 

varied from the explanation he had provided his FBCSO 

supervisors. Based on its conclusion, the FBI decided that 

Kapche was unsuitable for employment as a special agent 

because of a proven lack of candor and, on March 1, 2007,

revoked his conditional offer of employment. 

On March 14, 2007, Kapche filed a complaint under

section 501 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791(g), against thenAttorney General Alberto Gonzales challenging the FBI’s 

January 2005 decision to revoke his conditional offer.1

 1 Kapche originally filed his complaint in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Texas but, on the 

defendant’s motion, the case was transferred to the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia. See Order at 10, 

Kapche v. Gonzales, No. 6:07-cv-0031 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2007). 

 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 3 of 25
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Kapche argued that he was protected under the Act because 

his Type 1 diabetes substantially limited several of his major 

life activities, including eating and caring for himself, and 

was therefore a disability within the meaning of the Act. On 

May 20, 2009, a jury returned a verdict in Kapche’s favor, 

finding that the FBI had unlawfully discriminated against him 

and awarding him $100,000 in compensatory damages.2

The district court then considered what equitable relief, if 

any, Kapche was entitled to under the “make whole” rubric.

 

Holder moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 50, asserting that there was 

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that 

Kapche suffered from a disability. According to Holder, the 

evidence did not establish that Kapche’s Type 1 diabetes 

substantially limited him in any major life activity. The 

district court denied the motion, concluding that Kapche 

produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

determination that “Kapche’s Type 1 insulin-dependent 

diabetes substantially limit[ed] the manner in which he 

perform[ed] the major life activities of eating and caring for 

himself when compared to an average person in the general

population.” Mem. Order at 4, Kapche v. Holder, No. 1:07-

cv-2093 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2009) (brackets in original; internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

3

 2 At a pre-trial hearing, the district court determined that the 

FBI’s January 2005 revocation was the relevant employment action 

and that the FBI’s “after-acquired reasons for not hiring [Kapche]” 

were relevant only with regard to the availability of equitable 

remedies. Tr. of Pretrial Conf. at 3-4, Kapche v. Holder, No. 1:07-

cv-2093 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2009). The district court accordingly 

excluded any evidence of Kapche’s alleged lack of candor or of the 

underlying incident involving the FBCSO. Id. 

 

3 The Act borrows from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 in setting out the remedies available for disability 

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After a hearing and briefing by the parties, the court denied 

Kapche’s motion to preclude Holder from applying his afteracquired evidence defense to Kapche’s request for equitable 

relief. It determined that Kapche was entitled to neither front 

pay nor instatement because Holder had presented afteracquired evidence that the FBI would have revoked Kapche’s 

conditional offer of employment on March 1, 2007 regardless 

of his diabetes because of his proven lack of candor during his 

background investigation. As to back pay, the court accepted 

Holder’s expert’s testimony that Kapche earned more at the 

FBCSO than he would have earned as an FBI special agent

between January 23, 2005 and March 1, 2007. The district 

court then ordered that final judgment be entered in Kapche’s 

favor in the amount of $100,000 with costs.4

Kapche timely appealed as did Holder on cross-appeal. 

We turn to Holder’s cross-appeal first and then address 

Kapche’s appeal. 

 

II. Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment 

as a matter of a law but “[w]e do not . . . lightly disturb a jury 

verdict.” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 

305, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (modifications in original; internal 

 

discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1); infra note 12. “[T]he 

purpose of Title VII [is] to make persons whole for injuries suffered 

on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Albemarle 

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 

4 The district court also denied Kapche’s motion to alter 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See

Order at 1-3, Kapche v. Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 

2010). Kapche appealed this denial as well but he has forfeited the 

issue because he failed to pursue it in his opening brief. See Am. 

Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(issue not argued in opening brief is “forfeited . . . on appeal”). 

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quotation marks omitted). Judgment as a matter of law “is 

proper if ‘the court finds that a reasonable jury would not 

have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for’ the 

nonmoving party.” Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 

F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(a)(1)). 

Section 501 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791(g), prohibits 

federal agencies from discriminating in employment on the 

basis of a disability. At the time of the challenged 

discrimination, a disability was defined in relevant part as “a 

physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one 

or more . . . major life activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i)

(2006); see Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 946 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). In assessing Kapche’s claim, the court 

employs the same standards used to determine liability under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(g);5 Desmond, 

530 F.3d at 952 (applying ADA employment discrimination 

standards to Rehabilitation Act claim). Holder does not 

dispute that Kapche’s Type 1 diabetes is a “physical 

impairment” or that eating and caring for oneself are “major 

life activities.”6

 5 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) provides that “[t]he standards used to 

determine whether [Section 501] has been violated in a complaint 

alleging nonaffirmative action employment discrimination under 

[Section 501] shall be the standards applied under title I of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) 

and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201-12204 

and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(g). 

 He argues, however, that no reasonable jury 

6

 Other circuit courts have decided that eating is a major life 

activity. See, e.g., Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 

25, 34 (1st Cir. 2010); Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 

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could have found that Kapche’s Type 1 diabetes 

“substantially limits” his eating or caring for himself. 

Determining whether an individual is substantially 

limited in a major life activity is an “individualized inquiry” 

and the effects—“both positive and negative”—of any 

measures “a person is taking . . . to correct for, or mitigate, a 

physical or mental impairment . . . must be taken into account 

when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in 

a major life activity.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 

U.S. 471, 482, 483 (1999).7

 

655 (5th Cir. 2003); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1039-40 

(9th Cir. 2003); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 

(7th Cir. 2001); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th 

Cir. 1999); Forest City Daly Hous., Inc. v. Town of N. Hempstead,

175 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).

 “A ‘disability’ exists only where 

an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not 

where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting 

if mitigating measures were not taken.” Id. at 482. The

plaintiff “must show that [his] limitation was substantial as 

compared to the average person in the general population,” 

Desmond, 530 F.3d at 955 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); however, an impairment need not cause an 

“utter inabilit[y]” to perform a major life activity in order for 

it to constitute a substantial limitation. Bragdon v. Abbott, 

524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). 

7 Because the conduct at issue preceded the ADA Amendments 

Act of 2008, the pre-amendment standards to determine liability 

govern here. Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 

939-42 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ADA Amendments Act of 2008 does not 

apply retroactively). The 2008 Act provides, inter alia, that “the 

determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major 

life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects 

of mitigating measures.” Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3556 

(2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). 

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“The analysis of when and under what conditions 

diabetes is considered a disability for ADA purposes is a 

matter of degree.” Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 

F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Although we have not addressed whether 

Type 1 insulin-dependent diabetes substantially limits the 

major life activity of eating, we note that several sister circuits

have done so. In Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896 

(7th Cir. 2004), the court concluded that a federal employee’s

Type 1 diabetes substantially limited his major life activity of 

eating because “[h]is dietary intake is dictated by his diabetes, 

and [he] must respond, with significant precision, to the blood 

sugar readings he takes four times a day.” Id. at 903. 

Although the employee’s treatment regimen kept his diabetes 

under control, the court emphasized that he “is never free to 

eat whatever he pleases because he risks both mild and severe 

bodily reactions if he disregards his blood sugar readings. He 

must adjust his diet to compensate for any greater exertion, 

stress, or illness that he experiences.” Id. at 903-04. 

Likewise, in Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 

(7th Cir. 2001), the court concluded that a diabetic with “a 

perpetual, multi-faceted and demanding treatment regime” 

requiring “continued vigilance” was substantially limited in 

his ability to eat. Id. at 924 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The plaintiff in Lawson took multiple blood tests 

daily and could not “simply eat when and where he wants to, 

or exert himself without concern for the effect the exertion 

will have on his glucose levels.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

On the other hand, in Griffin v. United Parcel Service, 

Inc., 661 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011), the court concluded that 

“modest adjustments to . . . diet,” namely “proportion control 

and not tak[ing] quick sugar-containing foods,” and taking a 

“once-daily insulin shot” did not substantially limit a person’s 

eating. Id. at 222-24 (brackets in original; internal quotation 

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marks omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the court also 

noted that “even when [the diabetic] makes mild deviations 

from his dietary plan, the consequences are not imminently 

dangerous.” Id. at 223. Similarly, in Scheerer v. Potter, 443 

F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2006), the court held that the employee’s 

diabetes did not substantially limit his eating where the 

“predominant purpose of his dietary restrictions was to lose 

weight” and the dietary restrictions were not “of the type of 

severe dietary restrictions that if not followed would lead to 

dire and immediate consequences.” Id. at 920 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Shultz v. 

Potter, 142 F. App’x 598, 599 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

(diabetes not substantially limiting because “condition has no 

significant effect on [diabetic’s] diet: it merely requires her to

watch what she eats more carefully, have a snack if her blood 

sugar is low, and take insulin if it becomes too high” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)); Collado v. United 

Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005) (no 

substantial limitation on eating based on plaintiff’s testimony

that “with proper self monitoring, [he is] in no way limited by 

[his] diabetes in what [he] do[es] during the day or how [he] 

do[es] it”).

Kapche’s restrictions fall on the more limiting side of the 

spectrum. He takes insulin “every time [he] eat[s],” Tr. of 

Jury Trial at 539, Kapche v. Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 

(D.D.C. May 13, 2009) (Trial Transcript), and checks his 

blood sugar level three to five times daily using a finger prick. 

Moreover, he must be “cognizant of what [he’s] eating and 

how much [he’s] eating.” Id. at 541. Before eating anything, 

he must calculate the amount of carbohydrates he is about to 

ingest and adjust his insulin levels accordingly. And, while 

Kapche can eat or drink whatever he wants, he must 

constantly monitor and adjust his insulin levels and food 

intake to keep his blood sugar level within a safe range. 

Kapche must also adjust his insulin shots and food intake in 

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response to exercise and illness because of their effect on his 

blood sugar level. For example, when sick, Kapche may 

check his blood sugar level “eight or more times in a day . . . 

[to] make sure that it doesn’t spike or . . . raise[][sic] too 

high.” Id. at 543. As these measures suggest, Kapche’s 

treatment regimen is “a constant battle every day.” Id. at 540.

Kapche’s medical expert, Dr. James Gavin (Gavin), also 

attested to the limitations that Kapche’s diabetes and his

treatment regimen place on his eating, stating that Kapche 

must “exercise constant vigilance on [his] blood sugar 

[level].” Trial Transcript at 474. As Gavin testified,

“[Kapche] doesn’t have the prerogative to simply eat what he 

wants when he wants. Everything has to be calculated and 

planned because everything has consequences.” Id. at 465. 

Thus, if Kapche’s “blood sugar is already very high, [he] 

ha[s] to wait” to eat until his blood sugar level drops. He 

“can’t simply decide to [eat] because [he] feel[s] like doing 

it.”8

From this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude 

that Kapche’s diabetes and treatment regimen therefor 

“substantially limit[]” his major life activity of eating and that 

Kapche is therefore disabled within the meaning of the Act.

Id. at 470. Similarly, Kapche “doesn’t have the luxury 

of simply engaging in physical activity, doing exercise, or 

participating in what might be strenuous leisure time activity 

without considering what the consequences could be.” Id. at 

465. 

9

 8 “Consequences” of Type 1 diabetes include hypoglycemia (too 

low blood sugar) and hyperglycemia (too high blood sugar) as well 

as longer-term consequences such as heart disease, kidney disease, 

nerve disease and blindness. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 903.

9 Because of our conclusion regarding the major life activity of 

eating, we need not decide whether a jury could reasonably 

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Although Kapche’s treatment regimen allows him to control 

his diabetes, the treatment regimen itself substantially limits 

his major life activity of eating. It “involves . . . the 

coordination of multifaceted factors [and] . . . constant 

vigilance” and he must “adhere strictly to [his] demanding

regimen” “to avoid dire and immediate consequences.”

Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924-25; see also Branham, 392 F.3d at 

903 (“Even after the mitigating measures of his treatment 

regimen, he is never free to eat whatever he pleases because 

he risks both mild and severe bodily reactions if he disregards 

his blood sugar readings.”). Kapche “must always concern 

himself with the availability of food, the timing of when he 

eats, and the type and quantity of food he eats.” Lawson, 245 

F.3d at 924 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

And “[h]e must adjust his diet to compensate for any greater 

exertion . . . or illness that he experiences.” Branham, 392 

F.3d at 903-04. “It is the severity of these limitations on his 

ability to eat that distinguishes [Kapche’s] situation from that 

of other individuals who must follow the simple ‘dietary 

restrictions’ that medical conditions [like diabetes] sometimes 

entail.”10 Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924-25 (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Holder’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law.11

 

conclude that Kapche’s diabetes treatment regimen also 

substantially limited his ability to care for himself. 

10 Some diabetics may have more severe eating limitations than 

Kapche, see, e.g., Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1041-43 

(9th Cir. 2003), but our inquiry focuses on whether Kapche’s 

diabetes and control regimen substantially limit his eating “as 

compared to the average person in the general population.” 

Desmond, 530 F.3d at 955 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

11 Holder suggests that a finding of disability in this case is 

“tantamount to holding that Type 1 diabetics are disabled per se—a 

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Holder alleges other errors by the district court in 

denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law but they

are without merit. First, as discussed supra, the record 

evidence sufficiently established that Kapche’s diabetes and 

treatment regimen rendered him disabled within the meaning 

of the Act. Second, the district court properly considered

Gavin’s testimony that “Kapche is subject to a number of 

severe limitations in terms of his eating and the way he cares 

for himself.” Trial Transcript at 465. Gavin’s testimony did

not constitute an impermissible legal conclusion because 

Gavin did not use terms that “have a separate, distinct and 

specialized meaning in the law different from that present in 

the vernacular.” Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit 

Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expert 

testimony that means of communication employed were not

“ ‘as effective’ ” as means of communication with others

constituted impermissible legal conclusion because phrase 

was “lifted directly from the text of the Attorney General 

regulations implementing the ADA” and “the phrase as used 

in the regulations is a term of art with a meaning ‘separate’ 

and ‘distinct’ from the vernacular” (internal citation omitted)). 

Read in context, Gavin simply gave his “opinion as to facts 

that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal 

standard at issue was satisfied”; Gavin did not testify “as to 

whether the legal standard has been satisfied.” Id. at 1212-13. 

 

conclusion that is at odds with Sutton and the decisions of other 

circuits.” Appellee’s Br. 22. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 

supra, the United States Supreme Court observed that “[a] diabetic 

whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities” is not 

“disabled” under the ADA. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. Our holding 

today is consistent with this observation because, based on the 

individualized inquiry we must undertake to determine whether a 

person has a disability, Kapche’s diabetes and treatment regimen do

substantially “impair his . . . daily activit[y]” of eating. Id. 

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And third, in holding that Kapche produced sufficient 

evidence to establish that his treatment regimen substantially 

limited his eating, the district court did not err in noting the 

consequences of Kapche’s failure to adhere to his treatment 

regimen. Although the holding in Sutton, supra, makes clear 

that a disability does not exist where an impairment “ ‘might,’ 

‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating 

measures were not taken,” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482, the 

district court did not rely on the consequences to conclude 

that Kapche’s diabetes substantially limits his eating. Rather, 

the district court cited the consequences because they explain 

why Kapche must exercise vigilance in monitoring and 

controlling his diet, exercise and blood sugar and, 

consequently, why his treatment regimen substantially limits 

his eating. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 903 (noting 

consequences of failing to follow dietary restrictions to 

explain why diabetic “is never free to eat whatever he 

pleases”). 

III. Denial of Equitable Relief

We turn to Kapche’s appeal challenging the district 

court’s denial of equitable relief. Kapche asserts that the 

district court erred in denying him front pay or instatement 

based on Holder’s after-acquired evidence defense and in 

determining that Kapche was not entitled to back pay based 

on the testimony of Holder’s expert witness.

12

 12 Pursuant to section 505 of the Act, the district court is 

authorized to order the “hiring of employees, with or without back 

pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems 

appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) 

(remedies for employment discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791 include those “set forth in . . . 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) through 

(k)”). 

 We “review[] 

equitable relief, the standard for calculating back pay and 

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front pay, under an abuse of discretion standard.” Peyton v. 

DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “A ‘district 

court has wide discretion to award equitable relief,’ ” and it 

“ ‘should fashion this relief so as to provide a victim of 

employment discrimination the most complete make[-]whole 

relief possible.’ ” Id. at 1126 (quoting Barbour v. Merrill, 48 

F.3d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 

A. Front Pay / Reinstatement

As to the denial of front pay or instatement, Kapche 

alleges that the district court committed several errors most of 

which relate to Holder’s after-acquired evidence defense. 

Although evidence of the plaintiff’s wrongdoing acquired 

subsequent to an employer’s discriminatory hiring decision 

does not negate liability, it is relevant in determining whether

equitable relief is available to the plaintiff. McKennon v. 

Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63 (1995). 

“[A]s a general rule . . . , neither reinstatement nor front pay is 

an appropriate remedy” if the employer has after-acquired 

evidence of wrongdoing “of such severity that the employee 

in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if 

the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” 

Id. at 362, 363. Kapche contends Holder did not timely raise 

the defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) and 

did not sufficiently make out the defense even if timely

raised. Finally, Kapche contends the district court abused its 

discretion with respect to several discovery rulings.

1.

Kapche first contends that Holder forfeited his afteracquired evidence defense by failing to plead it sufficiently 

under Rule 8(c), which provides that “[i]n responding to a 

pleading, a party must affirmatively state any . . . affirmative 

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). “[I]t is well-settled that [a] 

party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense . . . generally 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 14 of 25
15

results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the 

case.” Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 

F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 

omitted; emphasis removed). Rule 8(c) “gives the opposing 

party notice of the defense . . . and permits the party to 

develop in discovery and to argue before the District Court 

various responses to the affirmative defense.” Id. We have 

not decided if the after-acquired evidence defense is an 

affirmative defense subject to Rule 8(c) and we need not do 

so here because, assuming arguendo that it is an affirmative 

defense, Holder’s amended answer sufficiently alleged it.13

In his amended answer filed April 2, 2008, Holder

averred that “[Kapche] was not appointed as a Special Agent 

for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, and would not have 

been appointed as a Special Agent even in the absence of his 

diagnosis and treatment for Type 1 diabetes.” Def.’s Am. 

Answer to Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at 2, Kapche v. Holder, No. 

1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2008). Kapche argues that this 

averment is insufficient because his complaint related to the 

FBI’s January 2005 decision to revoke Kapche’s conditional 

offer of employment. The record makes clear, however, that 

Holder adequately asserted the after-acquired evidence 

defense with respect to the FBI’s March 2007 decision to 

revoke Kapche’s conditional offer because Kapche had 

“notice of the [defense], conducted discovery on the issue, 

and had ample opportunity to respond.” FEC v. Nat’l Rifle 

Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also 

Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d 442, 

444 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of [Rule 8(c)] is to put 

 

 13 Nor have we expressly decided whether a district court ruling 

on the timely assertion vel non of an affirmative defense is subject 

to de novo or abuse of discretion review. Again, we need not 

decide the standard here, however, because under either standard 

the district court did not err. 

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16

opposing parties on notice of affirmative defenses and to 

afford them the opportunity to respond to the defenses.”). 

One week before Kapche filed his complaint in this case, 

the FBI informed Kapche that it was withdrawing his 

conditional offer of employment because of his “failure to 

provide pertinent and accurate information during applicant 

processing.” Letter from Bonnie Adams, Chief of Applicant 

Adjudication Unit, to Jeffrey Kapche at 1 (Mar. 1, 2007). 

Thus, when Holder alleged in his answer that the FBI had

“legitimate non-discriminatory reasons” for not hiring 

Kapche, Kapche was already on notice of what those reasons 

were. Moreover, in his response to Kapche’s first set of 

discovery requests, Holder argued that due to Kapche’s 

“exhibited lack of candor during an FBI investigation in 2006, 

[Kapche] is no longer eligible to become an FBI agent or 

entitled to compensation as an FBI agent as of that date.” 

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s First Set of Disc. Reqs. at 22, Kapche v. 

Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Mar. 6 2008). In noticing 

Holder’s deposition, Kapche declared his intent to depose 

Holder regarding the allegation and he later served a 

discovery request referencing the “FBI’s guidelines for 

reviewing background investigations for special agent 

applicants.” Pl.’s Second Set of Disc. Reqs. at 4, Kapche v. 

Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. July 30, 2008) (Second 

Discovery Request). Kapche successfully excluded all 

testimony on the defense from the jury trial; the district court 

also afforded Kapche an opportunity in the form of briefing 

and a hearing to rebut the defense post-trial. Accordingly, 

Holder sufficiently asserted the after-acquired evidence

defense. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d at 189.

2.

Kapche next contends that the district court erred by 

allowing the after-acquired defense because Holder failed to 

demonstrate that the FBI’s practice is to deny employment to 

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17

applicants who demonstrate a lack of candor. To establish the 

defense, Holder must demonstrate that the FBI “would have

[revoked Kapche’s conditional offer] because of the 

misconduct, not simply that it could have done so.” Frazier 

Indus. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 750, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(emphases in original); see also Hartman Bros. Heating & Air 

Conditioning, Inc. v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 

2002) (employer establishes after-acquired evidence defense 

“if . . . the employer unearths evidence that . . . would have 

caused him, without fault, to refuse to hire the employee”). 

To do so, Holder must establish “that [the FBI’s] practice has 

been to dismiss employees for similar [conduct].” Frazier 

Indus., 213 F.3d at 760. We conclude that Holder adequately

established that (1) Kapche demonstrated a lack of candor 

during his background investigation regarding his suspension 

by the FBCSO and (2) the FBI’s policy and practice is to 

refuse to hire an applicant for proven lack of candor. 

According to his FBCSO personnel file, Kapche initially 

denied taking gasoline from the FBCSO gas tank without 

permission when confronted by his FBCSO supervisor but 

later admitted it and explained that he did so in case he and 

his family lost electricity during Hurricane Rita. In his 

second FBI interview, Kapche said he had not recalled the 

FBCSO incident at the November 2006 PSI and further that 

he understood any record of the incident had been removed 

from his FBCSO personnel file. He then explained that he 

took the gasoline for use in his vehicle in preparation for 

working long shifts due to Hurricane Rita. Tracy Johnson 

(Johnson), the FBI adjudicator responsible for recommending 

whether Kapche was suitable for employment, noted the

inconsistent explanations Kapche gave the FBCSO and the

FBI for why he took the gasoline without authorization. In a 

memorandum to Sharon Magargle (Magargle), a program 

manager in the FBI’s Applicant Adjudication Unit, Johnson 

communicated her findings and recommended that the FBI 

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18

discontinue Kapche’s application. See Kapche Adjudication 

Recommendation at 4 (Mar. 1, 2007) (Recommendation). 

Magargle reviewed and accepted Johnson’s recommendation 

and subsequently revoked Kapche’s conditional offer of

employment. Magargle testified that the decision to revoke 

Kapche’s conditional offer for a proven lack of candor “was a 

slam dunk” and “not a close call . . . at all.” Tr. of 

Evidentiary Hearing at 234, 235, Kapche v. Holder, No. 

1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2009) (Evidentiary Hearing). 

Bonnie Adams (Adams), who, as chief of the FBI’s Applicant 

Adjudication Unit, is ultimately responsible for all 

unsuitability decisions, testified similarly that Kapche’s 

proven lack of candor was “clear cut.” Id. at 180.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the 

FBI treated inconsistent representations like Kapche’s as 

demonstrating lack of candor. See Frazier Indus., 213 F.3d at 

760. 

The FBI’s suitability guidelines used to determine

whether an applicant is eligible for employment provide that 

“[d]eliberate omissions from or misrepresentations of facts” 

and “[m]isrepresentation of facts pertaining to derogatory 

information developed during current/previous background 

investigation” are “[i]ssues, absent mitigating circumstances, 

[that] may be disqualifying.” FBI Application Adjudication 

Unit, Suitability Guidelines at 5 (2007) (emphasis in original). 

Although the guidelines indicate that the FBI’s decision 

finding Kapche unsuitable for employment is a discretionary 

one, Holder also introduced evidence that the FBI’s usual 

practice is not to hire an applicant for proven lack of candor. 

See Frazier Indus., 213 F.3d at 760 (if policy gives employer 

“potential option” to dismiss employee for certain 

misconduct, employer must “provide[] . . . evidence that its 

practice has been to dismiss employees for similar 

[misconduct]”). Adams testified that “when a proven lack of 

candor is discovered, the applicants are deemed unsuitable for 

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19

FBI employment.” Evidentiary Hearing at 132. Adams also 

stated that out of 800 unsuitability decisions made in 2007, 

about 100 were for “failure to provide pertinent and/or 

accurate information, or lack of candor.” Id. at 153-54. 

Magargle also testified that, of the decisions she has made

finding an applicant unsuitable for employment, “[t]he 

majority are [for] lack of candor.” Id. at 234. The FBI’s 

policy and practice makes sense in light of a special agent’s 

position of public trust and because a “proven lack of candor” 

can affect a special agent’s credibility in testifying on behalf 

of the government at trial. See O’Day v. McDonell Douglas 

Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ften the 

only proof an employer will have is . . . a company policy 

forbidding the conduct and the testimony of a company 

official that the conduct would have resulted in immediate 

discharge.”); id. (in determining employer established it 

would have discharged employee, it is “significant” that 

company policy and testimony “is corroborated by . . . 

common sense”). 

Kapche introduced evidence that the FBI hired previously 

two applicants despite their lack of candor. In neither case, 

however, did the FBI determine that the applicant 

“deliberate[ly] omi[tted] and misrepresent[ed] . . . facts 

pertaining to derogatory information developed during his 

Background Investigation” as it did in Kapche’s case. 

Recommendation at 4. Kapche’s two examples involved 

instances of “reported lack of candor,” not “proven lack of 

candor,” and Adams’s testimony makes clear that a report of 

misconduct not confirmed by the FBI’s independent 

investigation is not a barrier to employment. In contrast, 

Kapche’s case involved a “proven lack of candor” because the 

FBI’s review of Kapche’s FBCSO personnel file and 

Kapche’s re-interview “prove[d] [Kapche was] being less 

than honest” about his previous misconduct. Evidentiary

Hearing at 132. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

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20

allowing Holder’s after-acquired evidence defense because he 

adequately established that the FBI “would have terminated 

[Kapche’s] employment for his misconduct.” Frazier Indus., 

213 F.3d at 760.

14

3.

Kapche also alleges that the district court erred in 

allowing Holder to use Magargle as a witness at the remedy 

hearing in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

37(c)(1) and in denying him additional discovery related to 

Johnson, Kapche’s polygraph examination results and other 

matters relating to the after-acquired evidence defense. “ ‘We 

review district court rulings on discovery matters solely for 

abuse of discretion,’ reversing only if the party challenging 

the decision can show it was ‘clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, 

or fanciful.’ ” Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1136 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Charter Oil Co. v. Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co.,

69 F.3d 1160, 1171 (D.C. Cir.1995)).

Rule 37(c)(1) provides that “[i]f a party fails to provide 

information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or 

(e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness 

to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, 

unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” 

 14 Kapche’s claim that the after-acquired evidence defense is 

inapplicable because his misconduct arose as a result of the FBI’s 

revocation of his initial offer is without merit. Kapche’s 

misconduct—both taking the gasoline and, more importantly, his 

subsequent lack of candor to the FBI—was not “occasioned by” the 

revocation of his initial offer. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 

F.3d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1999). That is, the FBI’s revocation of 

Kapche’s conditional offer was not the proximate cause of 

Kapche’s subsequent misconduct. See id. (no after-acquired 

evidence defense if “alleged misconduct arises as a direct result of 

[illegal] termination” (emphasis added)). 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 20 of 25
21

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Rule 26(a) requires a party to 

disclose, inter alia, “the name . . . of each individual likely to 

have discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party 

may use to support its claims or defenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(1)(A)(i). Rule 26(e)(1)(A) imposes a duty to 

supplement a Rule 26(a) disclosure but only “if the additional 

or corrective information has not otherwise been made known 

to the other parties during the discovery process or in 

writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Although Holder did 

not include Magargle in his initial disclosure, her identity

nevertheless became known to Kapche during discovery. 

Holder produced Johnson’s memorandum to Magargle 

recommending that the FBI “discontinue[]” Kapche’s 

application, Recommendation at 1; during Adams’s 

deposition, Kapche’s lawyer asked her questions about

Magargle; and Kapche sought discovery of “[e]mails and 

documents from or to Sharon Magargle about Jeff Kapche.” 

Second Discovery Request at 4. Also, at a pretrial hearing, 

the district court identified Magargle as a potential witness on

“equitable issues.” Tr. of Pretrial Conf. at 3, Kapche v. 

Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2009). Because 

Magargle’s identity was “made known” to Kapche, Holder

had no obligation to supplement his disclosures pursuant to 

Rule 26(e)(1)(A) and therefore the district court did not err in 

allowing Magargle to testify at the equitable relief hearing.15

 15 Holder had no obligation to supplement his discovery 

disclosure regarding Johnson for the same reason, namely, 

Johnson’s identity and related information were “made known” to 

Kapche during discovery. Holder produced Johnson’s memo to 

Magargle and Kapche asked Adams questions about Johnson 

during Adams’s deposition. Moreover, the district court did not err 

in denying Kapche’s request to depose Johnson: Kapche’s lawyer 

expressly disclaimed any interest in deposing Johnson for strategic 

reasons, fearing that her deposition would “supply a missing 

element of [Holder’s] defense.” Evidentiary Hearing at 295; 

 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A); see also

English v. Dist. of Columbia, 651 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(no abuse of discretion in declining to strike testimony under

Rule 37(c)(1) if “government’s failure to supplement its 

disclosure was harmless”). 

Kapche’s other discovery-related claims are also 

meritless. Although the district court did not allow Kapche 

access to the unredacted results of his polygraph examination

conducted in December 2006, the district court reviewed the 

unredacted polygraph results in camera and determined they 

were immaterial to Holder’s after-acquired evidence 

defense.16

 

cf. Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]n 

attorney’s failure to evaluate carefully the legal consequences of a 

chosen course of action provides no basis for relief from a 

judgment.”). 

 Mem. at 4 n.2, Kapche v. Holder, No. 1:07-cv2093 (D.D.C. May 29, 2010) (May Memorandum); see 

United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 

(per curiam) (no abuse of discretion where district court

reviewed document in camera and “concluded that it 

contained nothing exculpatory, that there were no 

discrepancies between the affidavits and the contents of the 

file and that it was not material to the preparation of the 

defense”). As to the FBI’s database of hiring records, we 

cannot say the district court abused its discretion in declining 

to draw an inference adverse to Holder for failing to produce 

the database given Kapche’s failure to raise any claim 

16 Kapche makes much of the fact that he “passed” a polygraph 

examination following his PSI in November 2006, indicating he 

never intended to deceive the FBI about the earlier disciplinary 

action. It does not appear, however, that Kapche was asked about 

his lack of candor during the polygraph examination and, as noted 

above, the court decided that the results were irrelevant to Holder’s 

defense. 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 22 of 25
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regarding the database. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 

140 F.3d 259, 266 n.1 (1998) (“[T]he decision of whether to 

draw an adverse inference has generally been held to be 

within the discretion of the fact finder.”).17

B. Back Pay

Finally, Kapche alleges that the district court erred in not 

awarding him back pay. In reviewing the district court’s 

decision on the amount of back pay owed, we consider

“whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant 

factor, whether [the decision maker] relied on an improper 

factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the 

conclusion.” Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1278 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

appropriate measure of any back pay owed Kapche is 

“back[]pay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date 

the new information was discovered.” McKennon, 513 U.S. 

at 362. The district court determined that Kapche was entitled 

to back pay for the period from January 23, 2005—when the 

FBI revoked his first conditional offer—to March 1, 2007—

when the FBI revoked his second conditional offer. The court 

awarded him no back pay, however, because it determined 

that Kapche earned more working for the FBCSO during that 

26-month period than he would have earned as a special 

agent.

The district court credited the declaration of Holder’s

expert, William Carrington (Carrington), over Kapche’s 

expert, Amy McCarthy (McCarthy), that Kapche earned more 

in salary and benefits during the relevant period working at 

the FBCSO than he would have earned in salary and benefits 

 17 At the equitable relief hearing, Kapche’s lawyer told the court 

he sought additional discovery only on issues relating to back pay 

and Kapche failed to identify the database in his post-hearing 

motion for further discovery. 

USCA Case #11-5018 Document #1368684 Filed: 04/13/2012 Page 23 of 25
24

as a special agent. Carrington calculated the net present value 

of the salary and benefits Kapche earned at the FBCSO and of 

the hypothetical salary and benefits he would have earned as a 

special agent.18 Kapche’s FBCSO retirement benefits had 

already vested but his FBI retirement benefits would not have 

vested during the relevant time period.19 Consequently, 

Carrington included the vested retirement benefits in his 

calculation of Kapche’s FBCSO salary and benefits and 

excluded the unvested retirement benefits in his calculation of 

Kapche’s hypothetical FBI salary and benefits. In contrast,

McCarthy deferred the value of Kapche’s vested FBCSO 

retirement benefits but included the value of his unvested FBI 

retirement benefits in calculating back pay. In his second 

declaration, Carrington discussed the errors in McCarthy’s

calculation and the court noted that “[a]fter adjustment for 

[McCarthy’s] errors, [McCarthy’s] calculation would also 

result in a negative back pay figure.” May Memorandum at 8.

Kapche never contested Carrington’s critique.

20

Given the uncontested errors in McCarthy’s calculations 

and Carrington’s consistent use of a net present value 

 18 Carrington calculated that Kapche made $11,934 more in his 

position with the FBCSO than he would have earned as a special 

agent. McCarthy calculated that Kapche would have made $38,871 

more as a special agent than he earned with the FBCSO. 

19 Kapche’s FBCSO retirement benefits were generous: he 

received a 2 for 1 match up to 7 per cent of his income and he was 

guaranteed a 7 per cent annual return. By contrast, Kapche

acquired no retirement benefits as a special agent until he had 

worked for the federal government for five years. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8410 (employee “must complete at least 5 years of civilian 

service” to be eligible for federal retirement benefits). 

20 Despite seeking leave to file a response (which Holder did not 

oppose), Kapche did not do so. See Pl.’s Mot. To Strike, Kapche v. 

Holder, No. 1:07-cv-2093 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2009). 

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25

methodology in calculating Kapche’s salary and benefits, we 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying back pay because it reasonably credited Carrington’s 

back pay calculation. See Downes v. Volkswagon of Am., 

Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (no abuse of 

discretion if front pay award “was based on appropriate 

evidence and reasonably informed estimates [by plaintiff’s 

expert]” and defendant “never objected to [plaintiff’s 

expert’s] evidentiary submissions on the front pay issue”); see 

also EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1276 

(11th Cir. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in “crediting the back 

pay calculation of the EEOC’s expert economist”); Thomas v. 

Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 96-7242, 1998 WL 

1988451 at *9 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 1998) (no abuse of 

discretion where district court “weigh[ed] expert testimony” 

to determine time period for which back pay was owed). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment denying Holder’s motion for judgment as a matter 

of law and denying Kapche equitable relief.

So ordered.

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