Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01148-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE CLATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01148-OWW-SMS-P

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND,

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

(Doc. 8)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Tyrone Clation (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

September 12, 2005. On October 13, 2005, the court issued an order striking plaintiff’s complaint

because plaintiff failed to sign it and ordering plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed

an amended complaint on November 3, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that while he was being transported from North Kern State

Prison to the California Medical Facility, the transportation bus, which was driven by defendant

Washington, was involved in an accident and plaintiff sustained injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that

he was retaliated against for filing this action.

1. Claim Stemming From Traffic Accident

Although plaintiff does not allege the legal basis for his claim, in light of the fact that he filed

suit pursuant to section 1983, the court shall treat the claim as one brought for violation of the Eighth

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Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray,

682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe

conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.

1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence

on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s

conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendant Washington. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that

defendant Washington “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] . . . safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The allegation that plaintiff was injured in a traffic accident is suggestive

of, at most, negligence, which is an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability under section

1983. 

With respect to the Transportation Division of the California Department of Corrections,

which plaintiff names as a defendant, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing

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suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct.

1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144

(1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh

Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a

defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421

(9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)

(concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

Because the Transportation Division is a part of the California Department of Corrections, which

is a state agency, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.

2. Retaliation Claim

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking a named defendant to acts that were retaliatory in

nature. Regardless of this deficiency, plaintiff may not pursue a retaliation claim in this action based

on retaliatory acts that were taken against him for filing this suit. 

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Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit.

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion

requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532

(2002), and “[a]ll ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 n.5 (2001)). In light of section 1997e(a), plaintiff may not add a

retaliation claim to this suit, as the retaliation claim arose after this suit was filed. In a “conflict

between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the PLRA, the rule would have to yield to the laterenacted statute to the extent of the conflict.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 982 (11th Cir. 2000).

Rule 15 “does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or restriction contained in a statute

(especially a subsequently enacted one).” Id. at 983; see also Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 428 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citing Harris for this proposition with favor). Allowing plaintiff to pursue the claim he

added in his amended complaint would allow plaintiff to thwart the mandate of section 1997e(a),

which requires that claim exhaustion occur prior to filing suit and not during the pendency of the

suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. 

All claims at issue in this action must have been exhausted by September 12, 2005.

Therefore, in his second amended complaint, plaintiff must omit claims that were not fully exhausted

on or before September 12, 2005.

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state any claims upon which

relief may be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to

file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

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involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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