Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01940/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01940-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONELL OLIVER HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. HURTADO, M. CATE, L.

SCRIBNER,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 12cv1940 JAH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT [ECF NO.

8]

Plaintiff Lionell Oliver Hamilton, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on August 6, 2012,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First,

Fourth, and Eighth Amendment rights [ECF Nos. 1, 3]. Plaintiff

also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and California Civil Code

sections 52 and 52.1. (Compl. 1, 9, 12, ECF No. 1.)1

On October 9, 2012, Defendants Hurtado, Cate, and Scribner

filed a Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion") [ECF No. 8]. Hamilton

1

 Because Hamilton's Complaint and Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss are not consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to

each using the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing

system.

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filed his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (the

"Opposition") on December 3, 2012 [ECF No. 13]. Defendants did not

file a reply.

Plaintiff was given notice on December 19, 2012, of his

opportunity to submit additional evidence in opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849

F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) [ECF No. 14]. The Court noted that

Hamilton did not address his state law claims in the Opposition. 

(Klingele/Rand Notice 2, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff was given until

January 4, 2013, to file any additional declarations, affidavits,

or authenticated documents relevant to the exhaustion of those

claims. (Id.) Hamilton did not file a response to the Court's

notice.

The Court has reviewed the Complaint, Defendants' Motion, and

Plaintiff's Opposition. The Motion to Dismiss is suitable for

resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For

the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion [ECF No. 8] should be

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in the Complaint arise from a series of events

that occurred while Hamilton was incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison ("Calipatria"). (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a

grievance on February 16, 2009, against Correctional Officer

Hurtado for harassment. (Id. at 8.) Hamilton contends that on

April 7, 2009, in retaliation for filing that grievance, Defendant

Hurtado "unlawfully seized plaintiff and began to roughly and

forcefully pull[]" him while the Defendant was escorting Hamilton

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to his cell. (Id.) When the two arrived at the cell, Plaintiff

asserts that Hurtado "violently pulled plaintiff['s] right arm all

the way out of the food port slot, up to Plaintiff's shoulder[.]" 

(Id.) At that point, Hamilton claims that Hurtado falsely told the

control booth officer that Plaintiff tried to pull the Defendant's

arm through the food port. (Id.) According to Hamilton, Hurtado

then pepper sprayed Plaintiff in the face through the port. (Id.)

In count one of his Complaint, Hamilton alleges that Hurtado's

conduct was in retaliation for the February 16, 2009 grievance that

Plaintiff filed. (Id. at 3, 9.) Hamilton urges that these

retaliatory acts chilled and infringed upon his First Amendment

rights. (Id. at 9.) He maintains in count two that his right to

be free from unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourth

Amendment was violated by Hurtado's actions. (Id. at 4, 9.) His

third claim is that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

unnecessary and excessive force was violated as a result of the

incident. (Id. at 5, 9.) Plaintiff also brings causes of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and California Civil Code sections 52 and

52.1. (Id. at 1, 11-12.) Hamilton argues that as to all claims,

Defendants Cate and Scribner, respectively, the Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")

and the Warden of Calipatria, are liable because they were

deliberately indifferent to Hurtado's conduct. (Id. at 12.) He

also alleges that the two are responsible for the policies and

customs at Calipatria. (Id. at 10.)

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). "The old formula --

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit -- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)]." Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain "enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,

and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792

F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

"ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal under

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Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there "is no

cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged

to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must "examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged."). "Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v.

Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). "The

focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint." 

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of

"new" allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff's opposition to

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a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)).

"When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . ." Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc., 51 F.3d

at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents "'whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's]

pleading.'" Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App'x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer's Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights

cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not "supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

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are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). "The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim." Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint "unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where

amendment of a pro se litigant's complaint would be futile, denial

of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show that (1) a person acting "under color of state

law" committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived

the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by

the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2012); Shah v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

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III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF

No. 8.) They also insist that he has not adequately alleged the

personal involvement of Cate and Warden Scribner in the remaining §

1983 claims. (Id. at 5.) Finally, they maintain that Hamilton has

not shown compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, meriting

dismissal of his state-law claims. (Id. at 6.)

A. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Claim

In their Motion to Dismiss, all three Defendants assert that

Hamilton fails to allege a conspiracy to deny his right to equal

protection. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, they contend that he fails

to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Id.)

Plaintiff urges in his Opposition that Hurtado, Scribner, and

Cate conspired to violate his rights through the prison policies

that they implemented. (Opp'n 4, ECF No. 13.) He claims that Cate

and the Warden knew that Hurtado would violate Hamilton's rights

because several complaints had been filed against Hurtado and other

staff members for unlawful uses of force. (Id.) Plaintiff states

that all three Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the

civil rights violations that staff members carried out as part of a

"sanctioned" and "underground" use-of-force policy at Calipatria. 

(Id.)

In his Complaint, Hamilton claims that Hurtado was acting

under the direction and control of Scribner and Cate. (Compl. 9-

10, ECF No. 1.) He also maintains that Scribner and Cate enacted

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the policies and procedures for the department in which Hurtado

worked. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff contends as follows:

[Defendants Scribner and Cate] intentionally, knowingly,

recklessly, or with deliberate indifference . . . failed

to instruct, supervise, control, and/or discipline . . .

all named Defendants above, in the performance of their

duties to refrain from[] falsifying reports, conspiring

to violate inmate rights, unlawfully using force against

inmates, unlawfully seizing inmate persons[,] retaliating

against inmates, neglecting to follow proper CDCR policy,

failing to conduct lawful investigations of inmates

complaints, otherwise depriving persons of their

constitutional, statutory and department privileges,

rights and immunities.

(Id. at 10-11.) Had Cate and the Warden performed their duties in

a diligent fashion, Hamilton maintains that they would have known

that Hurtado would commit the alleged acts against Plaintiff and

that staff members would commit "other unlawful or unconstitutional

acts." (Id. at 11.) Hamilton urges that Scribner and Cate

"intentionally, knowingly, or with deliberate indifference" failed

to prevent Hurtado from injuring him. (Id.)

"Section 1986 authorizes a remedy against state actors who

have negligently failed to prevent a conspiracy that would be

actionable under § 1985." Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll.

Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). A conspiracy under §

1985 is therefore a prerequisite to a valid claim under § 1986. 

See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626; Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana,

936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 1990).

Sections 1985(2) and (3) prohibit conspiracies to interfere

with the civil rights of others. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626.2

2 Section 1985(1) is inapplicable here because it only

applies to federal officers, which Hamilton is not. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(1); Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641

F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The clear import of [§ 1985(1)] is

that the statute's protections extend exclusively to the 

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An allegation of racial or class-based discrimination is required

to state a claim for relief under either subsection. See RK

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate

that defendants were motivated by class-based animus); Portman v.

Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding

that a claim under § 1985(2) must contain an allegation of

class-based animus). A § 1985 claim "must allege facts to support

the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere

allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is

insufficient." Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626 (citations omitted);

see also Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th

Cir. 1989)) ("To state a claim for conspiracy to violate

constitutional rights, 'the plaintiff must state specific facts to

support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.'")

Here, Hamilton does not bring a claim under § 1985. (See

generally Compl. 1, 9, 11, ECF No. 1.) Moreover, the allegations

in Plaintiff's Complaint are premised on the assertion that Hurtado

retaliated individually against Hamilton for filing a grievance. 

(See Compl. 9, ECF No. 1 ("Defendant Hurtado . . . unlawfully

seiz[ed] plaintiff's person in retaliation for plaintiff filing an

grievance against him on approximately 02-16-09 which was done in

an attempt to discourage plaintiff from exercising his 1st

Amendment rights.").) He makes no showing that Hurtado's conduct

was racially motivated or class based. Further, Hamilton fails to

provide any specific facts in support of the alleged conspiracy. 

benefit of federal officers."). 

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See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. Thus, the allegations in the

Complaint fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and

therefore under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. See Guerra v. Janda, Civil No.

12cv2313 BEN (WVG), 2013 WL 76251, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013)

(dismissing § 1985 claim where plaintiff failed to allege that he

was a member of a protected class and that any defendant acted with

class-based animus); Rideau v. Velasco, Civil No. 11cv2343 JAH

(JMA), 2012 WL 460469, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) (same);

Anderson v. Dist. Attorney Office, No. 11–CV–0572–IEG (MDD), 2011

WL 6013274, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing § 1986

claim where plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a § 1985 claim). 

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Hamilton's claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1986 should be GRANTED.

Because it is unclear whether the Plaintiff could amend his

pleading to include facts sufficient to state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1986, he should be given leave to amend this cause of

action. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

B. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claim

Next, Defendants assert that Hamilton's Fourth Amendment claim

must fail because there is no right to be free from searches and

seizures while in prison. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4-

5, ECF No. 8 (citing Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

2010)).)

In his Complaint, Plaintiff bases his Fourth Amendment claim

on the allegation that Hurtado "unlawfully seiz[ed] plaintiff's

person." (Compl. 9, ECF No. 1.) In the Opposition, he explains

that his seizure claim is based on when Hurtado "snatched

plaintiff's arm and O.C. pepper sprayed" him. (Opp'n 4-5, ECF No.

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13.) Hamilton insists that, contrary to Defendants' point of view,

he has a right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures while

in prison. (Id. at 4.)

"Where an amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against a particular sort of government

behavior,' it is that Amendment . . . that 'must be the guide for

analyzing' the complaint." Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770

(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273

(1994) (plurality opinion)). While Hamilton initially claimed that

Hurtado "seized" him, Plaintiff clarifies in his Opposition that

his Fourth Amendment claim is premised on an inappropriate use of

force by Hurtado. (See Opp'n 4-5, ECF No. 13.)

"The Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force claims by

pretrial detainees, see Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415

(9th Cir. 2003), while the Eighth Amendment applies to excessive

force claims of convicted inmates, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)." 

Bustamante v. Roman, No. CV 08-0116-PHX-DGC (JRI), 2008 WL 622021,

at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2008); see also Ellis v. Albonico, No. CIV.

S–04–1483 LKK/CMK P, 2009 WL 961437, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009)

(citations omitted) ("When prison officials use force against

post-conviction inmates, the applicable right is the Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,

rather than the Fourth Amendment right underlying excessive force

claims by non-prisoners."); Davis v. Schiro, No. CV 07-2167-PHX-SMM

(ECV), 2008 WL 490622, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 20, 2008) ("Claims of

excessive force by prison officials arise under the Eighth

Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment."). To the extent Hamilton

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attempts to allege a Fourth Amendment claim based on improper use

of force, he has already brought this claim under "an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection," the Eighth Amendment. 

See Jones v. Ryan, Civil No. 07–1019 J JMA, 2009 WL 1883700, at *9

(S.D. Cal. June 26, 2009) (quoting Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767,

770 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Hurtado, Scribner, and Cate's

Motion to Dismiss Hamilton's Fourth Amendment claim should be

GRANTED.

Courts must give a plaintiff leave to amend an allegation

unless he could not possibly cure the claim by asserting other

facts. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. A plaintiff should not be granted

the opportunity to amend when doing so would be futile. See James,

221 F.3d at 1077. There is nothing in his Complaint or Opposition

that suggests that Hamilton can allege other facts that will state

a plausible Fourth Amendment claim. Because there are no

additional facts that could cure these deficiencies, Plaintiff

should not be given leave to amend his Fourth Amendment claim.

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

C. The Personal Involvement of Defendants Scribner and Cate

In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim (count two),

Plaintiff's remaining § 1983 claims include causes of action for

violations of his First (count one) and Eighth (count three)

Amendment rights. (Compl. 3, 5, ECF No. 1.) Both the Plaintiff

and Defendants combine their arguments for these two claims.

To be liable under § 1983, a person acting under color of

state law must cause the plaintiff to suffer the violation of a

constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. "A person 'subjects'

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right . . . if he

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does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Sims v. Adams,

537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976)). Thus, the plaintiff must allege

that each of the defendants committed some act, or failed to act in

a particular way, that was the cause of the purported

constitutional injury. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1385

(11th Cir. 1982). "The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act does not authorize a

plaintiff to bring a cause of action based on respondeat superior

liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978) ("[T]he fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's

tort became B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a

tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to

attach where such causation was absent."). State officials are

subject to suit in their personal capacity if "they play an

affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987),

overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d

896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). "A plaintiff must allege facts, not

simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally

involved in the deprivation of his civil rights." Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (1998).

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"The required causal connection between supervisor conduct and

the deprivation of a constitutional right is established either by

direct personal participation or by setting in motion a 'series of

acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know

would cause others to inflict constitutional injury.'" Little v.

Pena, No. C 94-0671 MHP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9068, at *9 (N.D.

Cal. June 29, 1994) (quoting Bergquist v. Cnty. of Cochise, 806

F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986)); see K'Napp v. Adams, No.

1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *9

(E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009).

Defendants contend that Hamilton's allegations under § 1983

"do not support the requisite personal involvement and/or causation

by Defendants Cate and Scribner." (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 5, ECF No. 8.) Cate and the Warden assert that Plaintiff's

claims are general, conclusory, and based on their role as

Hurtado's supervisor. (Id. at 5-6.) "However, there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983." (Id. at 6.) 

Hamilton states in his Opposition that these Defendants knew

that civil rights violations were occurring at Calipatria because

numerous complaints had been filed against Hurtado and other staff

members. (Opp'n 5, ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff insists that Scribner

and Cate failed to prevent those violations and implemented a

deficient use of force policy. (Id.)

In his Complaint, Hamilton maintains that Scribner and Cate

directed and controlled Hurtado, and established the policies and

practices at Calipatria. (See Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff

also claims that these Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference by failing to instruct, supervise, control, and

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discipline Calipatria staff members for a variety of misdeeds. 

(Id. at 10-11.) He additionally complains that had Cate and the

Warden diligently performed their duties, they would have known of

Hurtado's alleged misconduct and "other unlawful or

unconstitutional acts." (Id. at 11.) Finally, Plaintiff urges

that based on the many notifications from Calipatria prisoners,

Scribner and Cate could have prevented Hurtado's actions against

Hamilton, but "intentionally, knowingly, or with deliberate

indifference to the rights of plaintiff failed to do so." (Id.)

1. Count one: First Amendment retaliation claim

"[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that

are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The Constitution provides

protections from deliberate retaliation by government officials for

an individual's exercise of First Amendment rights. See Vignolo v.

Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); Soranno's Gasco,

Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Because

retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate's exercise of

legitimate First Amendment rights, retaliatory conduct is

actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242

(11th Cir. 1989). Yet, retaliation claims are reviewed with

particular care because they are prone to abuse by prisoners. 

Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996); Colon v.

Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).

A plaintiff suing prison officials pursuant to § 1983 for

retaliation must allege sufficient facts that show that (1) "the

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retaliated-against conduct is protected," (2) the "defendant took

adverse action against plaintiff," (3) there is a "causal

connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct,"

(4) the act "would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness,"

and (5) the conduct does not further a legitimate penological

interest. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.

2012) (citations omitted). A plaintiff can allege retaliatory

intent with a time line of events from which retaliation can be

inferred. See id. (citations omitted). If the plaintiff's

exercise of his constitutional rights was not chilled (factor

four), he must allege that the defendant's actions caused him to

suffer more than minimal harm. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 567-68 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.

Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The test is

objective -- whether an official's acts would "'chill or silence a

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment

activities.'" Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1300 (citation

omitted).

Plaintiff's retaliation claims against Scribner and Cate are

largely premised on their supervisory role of Hurtado. Nowhere in

Hamilton's Complaint does he allege that Cate and the Warden

personally participated in Hurtado's retaliatory conduct or

otherwise took any adverse action against Plaintiff. See Rhodes,

408 F.3d at 567-68. To the extent Hamilton claims that Scribner

and Cate caused the constitutional deprivation because they

directed Hurtado to injure Plaintiff, his conclusions are

unsupported by the facts alleged. See Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754-55

(stating that courts need not accept conclusory allegations as true

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if they cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged); Ivey,

673 F.2d at 268; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (stating that legal

conclusions must be supported by factual allegations).

Further, while Hamilton argues that Scribner and Cate

established the policies, practices, or customs at Calipatria, he

does not provide any facts showing that these two Defendants

instituted any policies that adversely affected Plaintiff and or

were implemented in retaliation after he filed the grievance. See

Wayne v. Leal, No. 07 CV 1605 JM (BLM), 2009 WL 2406299, at *6

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). ("Here, although Plaintiff makes a

general claim of retaliation, he fails to articulate exactly what

action was taken in retaliation against him . . . .") (citation

omitted). Finally, Hamilton fails to plausibly allege that any of

Scribner and Cate's actions or inactions did not further a

legitimate penological interest. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114.

For these reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

First Amendment claims against Scribner and Cate should be GRANTED.

Because it is unclear whether Hamilton could amend to allege facts

sufficient to state a First Amendment claim against these two

Defendants, Plaintiff should be given leave to amend. Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1127.

2. Count three: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from using

excessive physical force against inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The inquiry is not whether the prisoner

suffered a certain level of injury, but "'whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Wilkins v. Gaddy,

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559 U.S. 34, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (citation omitted);

Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2011); see Farmer,

511 U.S. at 835-36 (noting that a plaintiff must allege that the

defendant used force knowing that harm would occur). To determine

whether a plaintiff has satisfied the malicious and sadistic

standard, courts examine the following five factors: (1) the

inmate's injury; (2) the need for the use of force; (3) "'the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4)

the threat reasonably perceived by the [defendant]; and (5) any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'" 

Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 7); see Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 321 (1986); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1247

(N.D. Cal. 1995).

A plaintiff may state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference against a supervisor based on the supervisor's

knowledge of, and acquiescence in, unconstitutional conduct by his

or her subordinates. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.

2011). "A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under §

1983 'if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in

the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation.'" Id. (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d

642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). "'A supervisor can be liable in his

individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

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others.'" Id. at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145

F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against Cate and the Warden. 

Hamilton generally asserts that these Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to Officer Hurtado's Eighth Amendment

violation. (Compl. 12, ECF No. 1.) Yet, Hamilton does not allege

facts showing that Hurtado's conduct was pervasive and that pattern

of conduct was known to Scribner and Cate.

As pleaded, Plaintiff has not provided any specific facts

suggesting a causal connection between Scribner and Cate's general

failure to take disciplinary action and Hurtado's use of excessive

force against Hamilton on April 7, 2009. See Redman v. Cnty. of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a

plaintiff may state a § 1983 cause of action against a supervisor

when there is an adequate causal connection between the defendant's

breach of duty and the constitutional injury). The requisite

causal connection cannot be reasonably inferred from Hamilton's

generalized contentions. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Further,

there are no concrete facts suggesting that Cate and the Warden

improperly supervised Hurtado, acquiesced in the excessive use of

force, or acted with a reckless or callous indifference to

Plaintiff's rights. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 ("We have held

that 'acquiescence or culpable indifference' may suffice to show

that a supervisor 'personally played a role in the alleged

constitutional violations.'") Moreover, as discussed above,

Hamilton's allegation that Scribner and Cate directed Hurtado to

hurt Plaintiff is unsupported by any plausible factual basis.

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Hamilton also fails to state a claim against Scribner and Cate

on the basis that they enacted constitutionally-flawed policies,

practices, or customs at Calipatria. (See Compl. 10, ECF No. 1.) 

Supervisory liability may exist if officials implement a policy so

deficient that the policy "'itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights'" and is "'the moving force of the

constitutional violation.'" Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (quoting

Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987); see also

Hydick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that

plaintiff failed to state a claim where he failed to allege the

specific policy defendants implemented that led to constitutional

violations). Here, Hamilton does not identify which policy

Scribner and Cate allegedly implemented, how it was deficient, or

how it served as the moving force to cause Hurtado to violate

Plaintiff's rights. See Gregory v. Clark, No. 1:11-cv-00151 JLT

(PC), 2012 WL 6697955, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012) (holding

that plaintiff failed to state a claim based on supervisory

liability where the he failed identify the policy, describe the

problematic content, and explain how the policy was the moving

force for the purported Eighth Amendment violations). Moreover,

Hamilton claims that Hurtado "did not follow CDCR use of force

policy" and thus was acting contrary to, rather than in compliance

with, any policies promulgated by CDCR. (See Compl. 9, ECF No. 1.)

 Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss count two from the

Complaint against Scribner and Cate should be GRANTED. Because it

is unclear whether Hamilton could amend to allege facts sufficient

to state a deliberate indifference claim against Scribner and Cate,

Plaintiff should be given leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

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D. Plaintiff's State-Law Claims

Next, as to Hamilton's claims brought pursuant to California

Civil Code sections 52 and 52.1, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

has not affirmatively alleged compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act (the "Act"), as required by California law. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 8.) Further, they

insist that Hamilton can no longer comply with the Act because more

than six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to this

lawsuit occurred. (Id. at 7.) Thus, they maintain that

Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed without leave to

amend. (Id.)

Hamilton does not address these claims in the Opposition. 

(See generally Opp'n 4-5, ECF No. 13.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff

does not assert that he complied with the requirements of the

California Tort Claims Act, nor does he state how Defendants'

conduct was in violation of state law. (See generally Compl. 8-14,

ECF No. 1.)

When adjudicating a supplemental state law claim, this Court

must apply state substantive law. United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The California Tort Claims Act

provides that a person who sues a public employee for conduct that

occurred within the scope of his or her employment must file a

claim with the defendant's public-entity employer. Rutledge v.

Cnty. of Sonoma, No. C 07-4274 CW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51313, at

*29-30 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2008) (citations omitted). Under the

Act, filing a tort claim within the time and in the manner

prescribed by statute is a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit

against any state employee or agency. See Cal. Gov't Code §§

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905.2, 911.2 (West 2010); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 945.4, 950.2 (West.

Supp. 2013). A tort claim must be filed within six months of when

the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2. This

applies to "injur[ies] resulting from an act or omission [of a

public employee] in the scope of his employment as a public

employee . . . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 950.2.

Hamilton fails to allege or provide evidence demonstrating

that he filed a tort claim related to his section 52.1 claim. (See

generally Compl. 8-14, ECF No. 1; Opp'n 4-5, ECF No. 13.) On

December 19, 2013, the Court gave Plaintiff an extension to file

"declarations, affidavits, or authenticated documents that [he]

believe[d] [were] important to submit before the Court rules on the

exhaustion" of this claim. (Klingele/Rand Notice 2, ECF No. 14.) 

To date, he has still not provided the Court with a copy of a tort

claim presented to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims

Board. Hamilton has failed to show compliance with the California

Tort Claims Act; thus, he fails to state a cognizable claim under

section 52.1. See Archer v. City of Taft, No.

1:12–cv–00261–AWI–JLT, 2012 WL 3638064, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22,

2012) (dismissing section 52.1 claim for failure to allege

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act); Soliz v. City of

Bakersfield, No. 1:12–CV–00841–LJO–JLT, 2012 WL 3645358, at *2

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) (same).

For this reason, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim under

California Civil Code section 52.1 should be GRANTED. In order to

proceed with this cause of action, Hamilton is required to show

that he complied or can comply with the provisions of the

California Tort Claims Act. Because Hamilton's ability to file a

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claim appears to be time barred, and he has made no argument to the

contrary, Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend his statelaw claims. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Hamilton attempts to state a "claim" under California Civil

Code section 52; this section provides remedies for claims brought

pursuant to California Civil Code sections 51, 51.5, 51.6, 51.7,

and 51.9. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52 (West 2007); Munson v. Del Taco,

Inc., 522 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that section 52 is

a remedy). Plaintiff does not allege any of the state claims that

would support injunctive relief. Because section 52 provides for a

remedy and is not a cause of action, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's "claim" under California Civil Code section 52 should

be GRANTED without leave to amend. See Chang Tang v. Bank of

America, N.A., No. SACV 11–2048 DOC (DTBx), 2012 WL 960373, at *15

(C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice pro se

plaintiff's "claim" for injunctive relief on the basis that it is a

remedy and not a cause of action).

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1986

claim against Hurtado, Scribner, and Cate should be GRANTED with

leave to amend. The Motion to Dismiss Hamilton's Fourth Amendment

claim should be GRANTED, as to all Defendants, without leave to

amend. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First and Eighth

Amendment claims against Scribner and Cate should GRANTED with

leave to amend. The First and Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendant Hurtado remain unaffected. The Motion to Dismiss

Hamilton's claims under California Civil Code section 52.1 should

be GRANTED without leave to amend. The Motion to Dismiss

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Hamilton's "claim" under California Civil Code section 52 should be

GRANTED without leave to amend.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United

States District Court Judge John A. Houston, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties or before

May 20, 2013. The document should be captioned "Objections to

Report and recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed on or before June 3, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 11, 2013 ___________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Houston

 All Parties of Record

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