Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02616/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02616-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ELAINE PARKER-REED,

NO. CIV. S 03-2616 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SPRINT CORPORATION, George

White, and DOES 1-49,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On October 18, 2005, Defendant Sprint/United Management

Company (“Sprint”) filed a motion for immediate stay and

reconsideration of this Court’s order remanding the above

entitled action to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. 

As a basis for its motion, Sprint avers that the Court mistakenly

assumed that federal jurisdiction had been premised on a federal

question rather than on diversity. In its motion, Sprint

requests reconsideration of the Court’s remand order because,

Sprint claims, diversity jurisdiction does now and has at all

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

times existed in this case. For the reasons set forth below,

Sprint’s motion for reconsideration is denied.1

BACKGROUND

The Court has already set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order dated October 14, 2005,

which is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced

herein. Mem. & Order 2-3, October 14, 2005. In that Order, the

Court granted Sprint’s summary adjudication motion on all of

Plaintiff’s federal claims and one of Plaintiff’s state claims. 

This left three of Plaintiff’s state law claims unresolved. The

Court elected not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

those state claims and, consequently, remanded the case to the

state court. Sprint immediately sought a stay of this Court’s

remand order and reconsideration thereof. The Court denied

Sprint’s request for an immediate stay and now turns to their

motion for reconsideration.

STANDARD

A court should be loathe to revisit its own decisions unless

extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was

clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice. 

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816,

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108 S. Ct. 2166, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988). This principle is

generally embodied in the law of the case doctrine. That

doctrine counsels against reopening questions once resolved in

ongoing litigation. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.

Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, under

certain limited circumstances, a court has discretion to revisit

a previous decision to assure that justice is served. 

A timely filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule

is construed as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule

59(e). Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A motion for reconsideration is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if

filed within ten days of entry of judgment, but as a Rule 60(b)

motion if filed more than ten days after judgment. See Am.

Ironworks & Erectors Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). While the Sprint brought this as a Rule

60(b) motion, it is more properly considered a Rule 59(e) motion

because it was filed within ten days after judgement was entered. 

Accordingly, the Court will treat this as a Rule 59(e) motion.

Absent highly unusual circumstances, reconsideration

pursuant to Rule 59(e) is appropriate only where 1) the court is

presented with newly discovered evidence; 2) the court committed

clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or 3)

there is an intervening change in controlling law. School Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993)(citations and quotations omitted). Mere discontent

with the Court’s order, or belief that the Court is wrong in its

decision, are not grounds for relief under Rule 59(e). 

///

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ANALYSIS

Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) are

addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Turner

v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th

Cir. 2003). As noted above, Sprint cannot prevail on a 59(e)

motion for reconsideration unless they can present newly

discovered evidence, establish clear error or manifest injustice

or show an intervening change in controlling law.

Sprint does not allege the existence of newly discovered

evidence or an intervening change in controlling law. Rather,

they allege that this Court committed clear error in remanding

the surviving state law claims to the state court. As a basis

for this allegation, Sprint contends that the Court mistakenly

assumed jurisdiction was based on a federal question as opposed

to diversity. Operating under the assumption that diversity

jurisdiction does, in fact, exist in this case, Sprint claims

that this Court’s remand order was in error.

As explained in its Memorandum and Order dated October 20,

2005, the Court must determine the existence of federal

jurisdiction solely by an examination of the plaintiff’s case

without regard to the defendants’ pleadings. See Ritchey v.

Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Mem. & Order at 2, October 20, 2005. In addition, jurisdiction

is to be determined as it exists at the time it was invoked. 

Subsequent events do not confer jurisdiction. Faysound, Ltd. v.

United Coconut Chemicals, Inc., 878 F.2d 290, 296 (9th Cir.

1989). At the time Plaintiff filed her complaint, Sprint was

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named as a California resident. Sprint did nothing to clarify

Plaintiff’s mistaken assertion. This alone destroyed the Court’s

ability to exercise diversity jurisdiction as both Plaintiff and

Sprint were alleged to be citizens of California. In addition,

however, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint named George White,

who was similarly alleged to be a citizen of California further

destroying diversity. Accordingly, the Court exercised its

federal question jurisdiction in adjudicating Plaintiff’s federal

claims. Upon dismissal of those federal claims, the Court chose

not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims and remanded the case to the state court. 

While the foregoing should end the inquiry, Sprint persists

in asserting that diversity rather than the existence of a

federal question as the proper basis for jurisdiction. Their

assertion is based on the contention that George Smith is a sham

defendant. Sprint goes on to explain that because none of the

three remaining claims against Defendant White can prevail, his

citizenship should have been disregarded in the first instance. 

As an initial matter, the Court is not inclined to permit

Sprint to assert that George Smith is a sham defendant long after

he was clearly named without objection in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Even were the Court to yield to this argument, however, the rule

against fraudulent joinder does not save the day. While it is

true that a court may ignore the citizenship of a joined party

when there are no viable claims against him, it is equally true

that the court must consider all claims alleged at the time

jurisdiction was conferred rather than only those existing at a

later point in the litigation.

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As discussed above, the Court is to determine jurisdiction

at the time it is invoked. Subsequent dismissal of certain

claims does not render George White a sham Defendant nor does it

confer jurisdiction. At the time federal jurisdiction was

invoked, there were eleven claims set forth in Plaintiff’s

complaint. The Court cannot say that, as a matter of law, none

of those claims could have been successful against Defendant

White. The fact that a majority of those claims have since been

dismissed in no way cures the jurisdictional defect that existed

at the time jurisdiction was conferred. Consequently, federal

question was the proper basis for jurisdiction and, in light of

the dismissal of those federal claims, the Court has properly

exercised its discretion to remand the surviving state claims to

the state court. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth fully above, Sprint’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2005

___________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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