Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07032/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 2003 Decided July 25, 2003

No. 02-7032

3883 CONNECTICUT LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02453)

Roger J. Marzulla argued the cause for the appellant.

Nancie G. Marzulla was on the brief.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, argued the cause for the appellee. Charles

L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, was on the brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 1 of 12
2

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: 3883 Connecticut LLC, a limited liability corporation wholly owned by

Clark Tilden LLC and CEI, Inc. (Clark), brought suit against

the District of Columbia (District) claiming that the District’s

issuance of a stop work order (SWO) that halted Clark’s

construction of a 168–unit apartment building violated its

procedural due process and equal protection rights. The

district court dismissed the suit, holding that Clark lacked a

constitutionally protected property interest in the building

permits the District had issued and that its equal protection

claim was unripe. 3883 Conn. LLC v. District of Columbia,

191 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2002) (mem.). We affirm the

district court but on different grounds, concluding that, although Clark had a property interest in the permits, the

process afforded Clark was adequate; on Clark’s equal protection claim, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to

the District because the claim fails as a matter of law on two

of its elements.

I.

A.

The District of Columbia Construction Codes, D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 12A, §§ 101.0 et seq. (Construction Codes), authorize

the issuance of preliminary permits to a builder to begin

limited activities on a building site while approval of construction plans for the complete project pends before the District

Building and Land Regulation Administration (BLRA). Id.

§ 108.1–.2. Pursuant to these provisions, Clark sought and

obtained five separate permits to begin the sheeting, shoring,

excavation, foundation construction and underpinning of existing structures in preparation for its construction of the ninestory apartment building at 3883 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest. In order to obtain the five preliminary permits, Clark

submitted inter alia an Environmental Impact Screening

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 2 of 12
3

Form (EISF), describing the nature of the site and the

proposed project, to District authorities—in particular, to the

District Department of Health, Environmental Administration (DOH)—which determines whether a comprehensive,

detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required

by the Environmental Protection Act (DCEPA), D.C. CODE

§§ 8–109.01 et seq., before a building project can proceed.

D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 20, § 7204.1–.4. Based on Clark’s EISF,

DOH determined that an EIS was not required.1

 With its

five preliminary permits in hand (although full project approval was still pending), on July 31, 2000,2

 Clark began work

at the 3883 Connecticut Avenue site. The next day, opponents of the project calling themselves Friends of Tilden Park

filed suit in Superior Court seeking to enjoin construction.

They alleged that the EISF Clark had submitted contained

material errors and omissions. The court found that there

were discrepancies in Clark’s initial EISF and issued a

temporary restraining order (TRO). The TRO lasted only

two days and immediately upon its dissolution on August 3,

BLRA issued a SWO halting work on the project ‘‘until

compliance with all applicable District of Columbia law and

regulations TTT can be confirmed.’’ Notice of Stop Work

Order, Aug. 3, 2000, JA 44–46.

On August 9, Clark appealed the SWO to the BLRA

Administrator, arguing, among other things, that it was invalid under District law and should be rescinded because the

errors on the EISF were immaterial. Two days later, the

Administrator responded, denying Clark’s appeal and upholding the SWO because he questioned whether the preliminary

permits were based on inaccurate site information contained

in Clark’s EISF. Clark submitted a revised EISF on August

16, disclosing for the first time that mature trees were located

1 Clark in fact obtained the five permits before DOH made its

determination. Once it obtained them, Clark was allowed to begin

the preliminary work while the EIS determination was pending,

although Clark did no work at the site until DOH decided no EIS

was necessary.

2 All events occurred in 2000 unless otherwise noted.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 3 of 12
4

on the property, a stream ran near the property and an

adjacent building was listed on the National Register of

Historic Places. Clark then appealed the BLRA Administrator’s decision to the Director of the Department of Consumer

and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), BLRA’s supervising agency.

Although the Director did not act on Clark’s appeal, on

September 7, DCRA did order Clark to submit more detailed

environmental information regarding several potential impacts of its proposed project—including on traffic, vegetation

and trees, storm water, soil erosion and groundwater control

so that it could reconsider whether an EIS was required

Clark submitted the requested information and, on October 3,

renewed its request that the Director review the SWO.

Again the Director failed to respond. On October 13, Clark

filed the instant suit, initially seeking injunctive relief only.

Meanwhile DCRA requested DOH and other District agencies to review Clark’s revised EISF. DOH officials reviewed

Clark’s revised EISF and the supplemental materials Clark

had submitted and visited the 3883 Connecticut Avenue site.

DOH was concerned with surface water problems and recommended to DCRA that it require Clark to prepare a mitigation plan. Clark met with DOH and developed a plan that

resolved the issue; on November 22, BLRA rescinded the

SWO and, four days later, issued a building permit for Clark’s

entire project. Clark then amended its complaint to seek

compensatory and punitive damages for the four-month interruption of its project.

B.

The District moved for summary judgment and the district

court dismissed both of Clark’s claims. It dismissed Clark’s

due process claim because, it concluded, Clark lacked a

property interest in the five preliminary permits suspended

by the District’s SWO. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 93–95.

The court read our statement in Tri-County Industries, Inc.

v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1997),

rejecting the notion ‘‘ ‘that an agency deprives an applicant of

property whenever it backtracks on a prior favorable finding

on one of [the approvals preliminary to issuance of a building

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 4 of 12
5

permit] independently of withdrawal of the permit itself,’ ’’ to

mean that the District’s approval of the five preliminary

permits issued to Clark did not confer any property rights on

Clark. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (quoting TriCounty, 104 F.3d at 458) (internal quotations omitted). According to the district court, Clark’s only property interest

lay in ‘‘the real building permit,’’ i.e., the one ultimately

granted on November 27. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 93.

Permits for preliminary work, the court said, were merely

‘‘ ‘steps toward the issuance of a building permit’ ’’and therefore, under Tri-County, not property. Id. at 93.

As other courts have done, the district court applied the

property interest test set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972), to land-use regulation, concluding

that Clark lacked ‘‘ ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement,’ ’’ 3883

Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at

577), and therefore had no property interest in the preliminary permits because ‘‘ ‘significant discretion [is] conferred

upon the local agency’ ’’ under District law. 3883 Conn., 191

F. Supp. 2d at 94 (quoting Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969

F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992)). The court characterized the

permits at issue as ‘‘partial permits’’ under the Construction

Codes, in particular, D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12A, § 108.2, which

provides:

the code official is authorized to issue a partial

permit for the construction of foundations or any

other part of a building or structure before the

entire plans and specifications for the whole building

or structure have been submitted, provided adequate

information and detailed statements have been filed

complying with all pertinent requirements of the

Construction Codes.

3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (quoting D.C. MUN. REGS.

tit. 12A, § 108.2) (emphasis added). Because ‘‘[t]he language

of this section is discretionary,’’ the court said, it created no

property interest in the permits. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp.

2d at 94.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 5 of 12
6

The district court also dismissed Clark’s equal protection

claim, explaining that Clark’s assertion that its rights were

violated because ‘‘the District applied the requirements of the

DCEPA to this project alone’’ boiled down to a complaint that

the District had required Clark to prepare an EIS. 3883

Conn., F. Supp. 2d at 95. But because the District had not in

fact required Clark to submit an EIS, it concluded, Clark’s

claim was premature. Id. Clark then filed this appeal.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107

F.3d 32, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘‘ ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

TTT the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.’ ’’ Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328

F.3d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). A dispute is ‘‘genuine’’

only ‘‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party,’’ Morgan, 328 F.3d

at 650 (internal quotations omitted), and a moving party is

‘‘ ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ ’’ if the nonmoving party ‘‘ ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ’’ Id.

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

A.

We determine whether the interest at issue here constitutes property protected by the Fifth Amendment under

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, which declared that ‘‘[p]roperty interests TTT are not created by the Constitution[,] [but] are

created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as

state law.’’ See also Gardner, 969 F.2d at 68; George Wash.

Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 205–08 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (considering, but finding it unnecessary to decide

whether to adopt Roth approach); Bituminous Materials v.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 6 of 12
7

Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997); RRI Realty

Corp. v. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989); cf. George Wash. Univ., 318

F.3d at 212–13 (Henderson, J., concurring). In adopting the

analytical approach of Gardner and similar cases, however,

the district court overlooked a critical distinction between

those cases and this one—namely, in those cases the question

was whether an applicant for a permit had a property

interest therein whereas, here, we must decide whether the

holder of a permit has a property interest therein. Gardner

and George Washington University focus on an official’s

discretion to approve an application in determining whether

the applicant has ‘‘more than a unilateral expectation’’ in the

permit it seeks while we must determine whether the permit

holder has ‘‘more than a unilateral expectation’’ in the permit’s continued effect. Therefore our inquiry focuses on the

official’s discretion to revoke or suspend the permit. Lopez v.

FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In Lopez, the court

considered whether the plaintiff had a property interest in his

continued designation by the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) as a ‘‘Designated Engineering Representative’’ (DER).

Id. at 245. To answer the question, the court did not examine

the FAA’s discretion to make the designation in the first

place, but rather its discretion to revoke it. Because the

FAA had the authority to ‘‘rescind [this] delegation TTT at

any time for any reason’’ under the applicable regulation, we

held that the plaintiff had no constitutionally protected property interest in his status as a DER. Id. at 249; see Barry v.

Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 n.11 (1979) (plaintiff had property

interest in horse trainer’s license because under state law

license could ‘‘not be revoked or suspended at the discretion

of the racing authorities’’); see also Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d

688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (no property interest in continued

designation as pilot examiner where status could be freely

rescinded); Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1184–86 (9th Cir.

1983) (no property interest in permit issued to veterinarian to

conduct brucellosis tests on cattle ‘‘held at the sufferance and

will of the officials charged with administering the permit

program’’), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 7 of 12
8

Sections 108.9 and 117.1 of the Construction Codes, respectively, define District authorities’ discretion to revoke and

suspend permits through a stop work order.3

 D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 12A, §§ 108.9, 117.1. An examination of these two

sections reveals that discretion to terminate or suspend work

already allowed by the permits is substantially limited. Under section 108.9, a ‘‘code official is authorized to revoke a

permit or approval issued under the Construction Codes, for

any of the following [5] conditions:’’ (1) ‘‘a false statement or

misrepresentation of fact in the application TTT that substantively affected the approval’’; (2) the proposed construction

does not comply with the Construction Codes, the permit, or

the approved plans; (3) issuance of a citation for violation(s)

of the Construction Codes threatening health and safety; (4)

at least two SWOs have been ‘‘posted’’ and not complied with;

and (5) the contractor’s license has terminated. D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 12A, § 108.9. Section 117.1 authorizes the issuance

of a SWO suspending a permit if ‘‘work on any building or

structure is being performed contrary to the provisions of the

Construction Codes or in an unsafe and dangerous manner.’’

Id. § 117.1.

We believe both of these provisions indicate that Clark has

a property interest in the continued effect of the five permits.

Revocation is limited to the five circumstances listed and

3 In their briefs the parties follow the district court’s analysis

and thus focus only on the provisions that authorize the issuance of

building permits under the Construction Codes. Clark argues that

the permits were issued under section 108.1, which governs ‘‘permits,’’ and, according to Clark, limits the issuing official’s discretion

sufficiently to create a property interest. The District contends the

permits were issued under section 108.2, which governs ‘‘partial

permits,’’ and, the District says, vests sufficient discretion in the

official to create no property interest. The district court determined that Clark’s permits were ‘‘partial permits’’ issued pursuant

to section 108.2. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 94. We need not

decide which provision applies, however, because the revocation and

suspension provisions of the Construction Codes do not distinguish

between ‘‘permits’’ under section 108.1 and ‘‘partial permits’’ under

section 108.2. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12A, §§ 108.9, 117.1.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 8 of 12
9

issuance of a SWO depends on whether work is performed

contrary to the provisions of the Construction Codes or

unsafely. Id. §§ 108.9, 117.1. Discretion is not unfettered as

in Lopez, where the FAA could ‘‘rescind [this] delegation [as a

DER] TTT at any time for any reason,’’ Lopez, 318 F.3d at

249, but instead is constrained sufficiently to give Clark an

expectation in the continued effect of the permits—and therefore a property interest in them. Cf. George Wash. Univ.,

318 F.3d at 208–09 (property interest where official’s discretion to issue ‘‘special exception’’ was based on finding that use

was ‘‘not likely to become objectionable to neighboring property.’’).

Tri-County, on which the district court relied, does not

compel a different conclusion. Our holding there that a

permit applicant had no property interest in the District’s

waiver of the EIS requirement because the waiver was ‘‘a

mere step toward issuance of a building permit’’ does not fit

the permits issued here. 3883 Conn., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 93

(quoting Tri-County, 104 F.3d at 458). The Tri-County

waiver, unlike the permits, did not affirmatively authorize the

holder to do anything. Tri-County, 104 F.3d at 458 (‘‘The

waiver was simply an administrative finding that no more was

required by way of satisfying [the environmental review]

requirement for issuance of the building permit.’’). The five

preliminary permits are, on their own, authorizations to act—

authorizations with which the District could not interfere

without affording Clark adequate process.

B.

Our finding of a property interest, however, does not alter

the disposition of Clark’s due process claim because the

procedures available to Clark to challenge the SWO afforded

it due process. Under the Construction Codes, Clark was

entitled to challenge the SWO pursuant to an expeditious

appeal process with three levels of review. D.C. MUN. REGS.

tit. 12A, § 122.1.2. Specifically, Clark was entitled to first

seek review of the SWO by a District ‘‘reviewing official,’’

here, the BLRA Administrator, who was required to, and did,

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 9 of 12
10

render a decision within three working days. Id. If dissatisfied, Clark could, and did, seek a second review from the

Director of the DCRA, who also must render a decision

within three working days. Id. Finally, if the Director

denied the request or failed to act timely, Clark could appeal

to the District Board of Appeals and Review (BAR). Id.4

We decide whether these provisions adequately protected

Clark’s interest in the permits under Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976), which requires the court to consider:

first, the private interests that will be affected by

the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Clark maintains that under

Mathews the procedure to challenge a SWO is constitutionally

infirm because it does not guarantee a hearing before the

SWO can issue. Clark urges that it has a substantial interest

in the continued effect of its permits—it incurred construction

delay costs caused by the SWO—and therefore the risk of

deprivation must be minimized. Therefore, according to

Clark, due process mandates an adversarial hearing to test

the validity of a SWO before it issues.

We agree with Clark that the permit holder has a substantial interest in the continued effect of the permit and in

proceeding with a project without delay. See Tri-County, 104

F.3d at 462.5

 At the same time, we recognize the District’s

4 Clark sought review at the first two levels. Although the

Director twice failed to render a decision, Clark did not seek BAR

review.

5 Tri-County, in addition to discussing whether the plaintiff had

a property interest in the waiver of an EIS requirement, considered

whether a district official’s ‘‘oral order of suspension’’ of a building

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 10 of 12
11

significant interest in maintaining its capability to act swiftly

to bring an immediate halt to construction work that poses a

threat to public health and safety or to the environment. See

D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12A, § 117.1. Moreover, the regulations

provide for expedited post-deprivation review before two District officials and then immediate appeal to the District Board

of Appeals and Review—a procedure that reduces the risk of

protracted harm from a wrongly-issued order. D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 12A, § 122.1.2. We therefore conclude that these

protections meet the requirements of due process. Cokinos

v. District of Columbia, 728 F.2d 502, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(car towing without pre-deprivation hearing valid in light of

prompt post-deprivation hearing); cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.

105 (1977) (driver’s license may be summarily suspended

before hearing where record showed driver had extraordinarily poor driving record).

C.

Finally, we consider Clark’s assertion that the district court

erred in dismissing its equal protection claim. Clark maintains the district court mistakenly characterized its claim to

be that it was required to submit an EIS when, in fact,

Clark’s claim is that the District based the SWO on the

expectation that an EIS would be necessary.

Even if the district court mistook the thrust of Clark’s

claim and therefore concluded Clark’s claim was unripe because no EIS had been required, we agree with the district

permit violated procedural due process. Tri-County, 104 F.3d at

460. In that case, the acting DCRA Director announced during a

public meeting the summary suspension of a building permit based

on another official’s inaccurate representation. Id. at 457. We

analogized that action to the issuance of a SWO because the two

have similar effects, and held that the ‘‘oral order of suspension’’

violated due process because it was not based on ‘‘formal evidence,’’

id., and the only review was by the Board of Appeals and Review—

a single-step appeal process that did not guarantee prompt resolution. Id. at 460–62.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 11 of 12
12

court’s decision. Summary judgment against Clark was appropriate because Clark failed to make a sufficient showing

regarding two essential elements of its ‘‘class of one’’ equal

protection claim: (1) disparate treatment of similarly situated

parties (2) on no rational basis. Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (‘‘Our cases have recognized

successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’

where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally

treated differently from others similarly situated and that

there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’’);

see Morgan, 328 F.3d at 650. Clark showed only that the

District had never before required an EIS for an apartment

building project. Second Declaration of Francis J. Coen, Oct.

30, 2000 at ¶ 5, JA 120. That showing said nothing about

what requirements the District had imposed upon other projects before ultimately determining no EIS was required,

which was Clark’s situation. Nor does that showing suggest

that the District targeted Clark without a legitimate reason.

Clark’s claim all along has been that the District subjected

the project to a more probing analysis than others because of

local opposition; but there is nothing unusual or untoward in

local government officials’ responsiveness to public opinion.

Cf. Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir.

2000) (‘‘[I]n a democratic republic, responding to the voice of

the public is expected and is not, standing alone, a malevolent

motive for selective enforcement purposes.’’) (mayor’s leadership in opposition to plaintiff’s construction of apartment

complex in response to community opposition not improper).

Therefore, Clark’s equal protection claim was properly dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #02-7032 Document #762825 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 12 of 12