Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00350/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00350-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRINT CLARK,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRAZELTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00350-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Docs. 15, 17) 

30-DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

In the First Amended Complaint,1Plaintiff again alleges causes of action against several 

correctional officers of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at Pleasant 

Valley State Prison for improperly identifying him as a member of the Black Gorilla Family gang 

when, in fact, he is a member of the Crips gang. (Doc. 17.) The Court finds the First Amended 

Complaint fails to state a claim and DISMISSES it with leave to amend. 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

 

1 The filing of the First Amended Complaint resolved the order to show cause that issued when Plaintiff failed to file 

it within the granted extension of time. (Doc. 15.)

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frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Though he is now housed at California Correctional Institute , Plaintiff complains of acts 

that occurred while he was housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff names the following 

four Defendants in this action: PVSP Warden, PD Brazelton; Lieutenants A. Shimmin and Duty; 

Sergeant A. Avila; and Correctional Officer M. Seese. Plaintiff seeks monetary and declaratory 

relief. 

Plaintiff identifies two Causes of Action/Claims: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment's 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment (excessive force); and (2) violation of his rights to 

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. These claims appear premised on Plaintiff’s claim

that prison officials erroneously identified him as a member of the Black Gorilla Family when he 

is actually a member of the Crips gang. 

As discussed in further detail below, the First Amended Complaint fails to state a 

cognizable claim against any of the named defendants. Plaintiff may be able to state cognizable 

claims and is being given one last opportunity to correct his pleading deficiencies by filing a 

second amended complaint which must be 20 pages or less. To assist Plaintiff's efforts, the Court 

is providing him here the applicable pleading requirements and legal standards that apply to the 

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claims he has identified. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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As discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is a bit too brief 

as he fails to link the Defendants to his allegations and to give sufficient description of the events 

underlying his claim to discern which Defendant he feels engaged in what activities that 

amounted to a violation of his rights. His second amended complaint must state which of his 

constitutional rights he feels were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis, and he must 

do so in no more than 20 pages. 

2. Linkage Requirement

Plaintiff seeks to proceed under the Civil Rights Act. The Act provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

The only defendant named in Plaintiff's allegations is Officer Seese. Other than that, 

Plaintiff generally refers to "Defendants," which is insufficient to place any of the Defendants on 

notice as to what he claims they did--or failed to do—that Plaintiff feels amounted to a violation 

of his federal rights. Plaintiff must clearly state which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for

each violation of his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each

Defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment 

"The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 

114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Prison officials have 

a duty "to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been interpreted 

to include a duty to protect prisoners." Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 

1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2005)). 

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must "show that the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate." Labatad, at 1160 (citing 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective 

and subjective components.

Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious" and where a failure to 

prevent harm is alleged, "the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 

S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Subjectively, the prison official must "know of and disregard an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th 

Cir. 1995). A prison official must "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison official "knows that inmates 

face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it." Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Further, the Supreme Court has stated that a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await 

a tragic event; rather, where a risk/injury has yet to occur, the plaintiff's burden would be to prove 

that his future health/safety is unreasonably endangered, "that it is contrary to current standards of 

decency for anyone to be so exposed against his will, and that prison officials are deliberately 

indifferent to his plight." Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-35. 

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The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with 

deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to 

his future health . . . .” Farmer, at 843 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35). The Supreme Court has 

explained that “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] 

something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge 

that harm will result.” Id., at 835. The Court defined this “deliberate indifference” standard as 

equal to “recklessness,” in which “a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id., 

at 836-37.

Being incorrectly identified as a prison gang member carries a sufficiently serious risk of 

serious harm from violence at the hands of other prison gang members. However, Plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to support which Defendant knew he was not a member of the Black Gorilla 

Family when they housed him with that gang, which Defendant knew that he was, instead, a 

member of the Crips gang, and to which Defendant he complained about being placed with the 

wrong gang. His allegations must, but do not, state what each Defendant knew about his 

placement with the Black Gorilla Family and the allegations must support that each Defendant 

acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.

2. Fourteenth Amendment -- Due Process

Plaintiff's allegations under his Due Process claim are exceedingly sparse and vague. The 

Court is unable to distinguish whether Plaintiff is complaining that his due process rights were 

violated in a hearing that resulted in his placement with the wrong prison gang, or if he is 

complaining of the actions of supervisors in ruling on and/or processing his inmate appeals when 

the incident occurred. 

a. Gang Validation 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 

process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself 

does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population 

instead of segregation. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983) (overruled on other 

grounds by Sadin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). Liberty interests created by state law are 

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limited to freedom from restraint which Aimposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.@ Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

Prisoners may be housed in Administrative Segregation to protect them from other 

inmates, to protect other inmates from the segregated prisoner, or pending investigation of 

disciplinary charges, transfer, or classification. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. Thus, the initial 

placement of Plaintiff in Ad-Seg (see Doc. 34, 1stAC, 11:18-21) for investigation of gang 

validation does not rise to the level of a cognizable claim for violation of Plaintiff=s rights to due 

process. 

The assignment of gang members to the Security Housing Unit is an administrative 

measure rather than disciplinary and is “essentially a matter of administrative discretion.” Bruce 

v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th 

Cir.1997)).2 Under California State Regulations, prison officials house an inmate routinely in 

administrative segregation pending review of his gang status and if validated as a gang member, 

the inmate may be assessed an indeterminate term in the Secured Housing Unit. 15 Cal.Code 

Regs. ' 3378. When determining whether a prisoner is to be segregated for administrative 

reasons, due process only requires: (1) an informal non-adversary hearing within a reasonable 

time after the prisoner is segregated; (2) that the prisoner be informed of the charges or reasons 

for considering segregation; and (3) the prisoner must be allowed to present his views. Bruce, 

351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1099 (9th Cir.1986), abrogated in 

part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). Thereafter, prison officials 

must periodically review the initial placement. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, n.9; Toussaint, 801 

F.2d at 1101. Annual review of the placement is insufficient, but a court may not impose a 90-

day review period where prison officials have suggested a 120-day review period. Toussaint, 926 

F.2d at 803. 

 

2

In his response (ECF No. 39) to the Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 38) why this action should not be dismissed as 

barred by Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) Plaintiff asserted that this cause of action is controlled by 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). However, Devereaux identifies a clearly established 

constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was 

deliberately fabricated by the government. Since gang validation is an administrative measure, Devereaux is 

inapplicable to this case.

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Further, where the basis for the administrative segregation is challenged and an inmate has 

been given “ ‘some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to 

the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation,’ 

the relevant issue is whether there was ‘some evidence’ to support [the] validation.” Bruce, 351 

F.3d at 1287, quoting Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1099. 

b. Inmate Appeals

"[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in 

processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure), citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right 

only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see 

also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 

confers no liberty interest on prisoner). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability 

under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.@ Greeno 

v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.2005) accord George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th 

Cir. 2007); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in 

inmate appeals, Plaintiff is unable to state a cognizable claim merely for the processing and/or 

reviewing of his 602 inmate appeals.

3. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

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employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, allegations that supervisors—including Sergeant Avila or 

Lieutenants Shimmin and Duty—are somehow liable because their subordinates violated 

Plaintiff's rights are not cognizable. 

a. Supervisory Liability via Inmate Appeals

In addition to that discussed in the immediately preceding section, “a plaintiff must show 

the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. The law 

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clearly allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal 

connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally secured 

right.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991)(internal quotation 

marks omitted)(abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 

“The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of 

acts by others,” id. (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted), or by “knowingly 

refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury,” Dubner v. City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2001). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 

1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff may intend his allegations to allege that by reviewing Plaintiff's IAs on this issue, 

various of the Defendants knew that he was placed with the wrong gang in deliberate indifference 

of a substantial risk of serious harm. If so, a plaintiff may "state a claim against a supervisor for 

deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in 

unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates," Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (2011), 

which may be shown via the inmate appeals process where the supervisor reviewed Plaintiff's 

applicable inmate appeal and failed to take corrective action which allowed the violation to 

continue. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave 

to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to 

comply with this order, he must file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than thirty 

days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

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227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short 

and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change 

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended complaint. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints). His second amended 

complaint must not exceed 20 pages in length. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. The First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a second 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order; and

///

///

///

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action based 

upon Plaintiff’s failure to obey a court order and for his failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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