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Nature of Suit Code: 513
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

STEPHEN J. ROGERS, LINDA L. ROGERS, 

DONALD E. DURAN, JUDITH DURAN, DENISE

RIZZO, DEBORAH CHILDERS, NATHAN 

CHILDERS, CHESHIRE HUNT, MCCANN 

HOLDINGS, LTD., MISSION VALLEY GOLF AND 

COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PALMER RANCH 

HOLDINGS, INC., WYNNSTAY HUNT, INC.,

BEE RIDGE, LLC, CALUSA LAKES COMMUNITY 

ASSOCIATION, INC., FLORIDA BROADACRE 

TRAILER LODGE, INC., FLORIDA ROCK 

CONCRETE, INC., PINE RANCH EAST OWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC., POST OFFICE PROPERTIES, 

PUTLE HOME CORPORATION, SARASOTA 

INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC., STONEYBROOK 

GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB OF SARASOTA, INC.,

TOURNAMENT PLAYERS CLUB AT PRESTANCIA, 

INC., TRINITY CHAPEL OF SARASOTA, INC., 

LOUIS L. ALDERMAN, ALEXANDRINE BOSWELL,

ANN CONVERSE, SUSAN BELTRAN, CATHY C. 

SIANO, SANY CHESTNUT, MARK T. ENTWISTLE,

ROSEANN M. ENTWISTLE, CHRISTOPHER H. 

HERZONG, TRACY A. HERZOG, J. WATT, 

VIRGINIA GRAY SHROYER, ALSIE T. MARTIN, AND 

MARY K. MARTIN,

Plaintiffs

AND

COUNTRY CLUB ESTATES COOPERATIVE, INC., 

WILLIAM J. GILL, SARA S. GILL, HANSON PIPE & 

PRODUCTS SOUTHEAST, INC., HATCHETT 

CREEK CORPORATION, CAROLE A. MADDEN,

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2 ROGERS v. US

DAVID J. MARTINI, ROSE MARIE MARTINI, ALAN 

H. MORTIMER, LEE MORTIMER, VENICE LAND 

COMPANY, AUDREY ROSE ALLEN-WORDELL, 

JUDITH BADAMS, BATES SHOW SALES STAFF, 

INC., JEAN E. BECHTEL, RICHARD L. 

BUONPANE, DONALD CHAPMAN, DARBY SOUTH 

BUICK-PONTIAC-GMC, INC., ESTATE LANDS 

EXCAVATORS, INC., TRIMBLE B. GAILBREATH,

DIANA J. GAILBREATH, TERRY L. GARNER, 

KATHY GARNER, LANNING TIRE SALES, INC., 

CARL E. LONGWELL, MARY ELLEN LONGWELL,

DONALD GREY LOWRY, SAMUEL LUBUS, AS 

TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL LUBUS REVOCABLE 

TRUST AGREEMENT, GLENN LEE MCMURPHY, 

SANDRA KAY MCMURPHY, JACK MIDKIFF, 

AVONA MIDKIFF, MILFORD ENTERPRISES, INC.,

MARGARET L. MORAN, MARY JO PATTISON, AS 

TRUSTEE OF THE MARY JO PATTISON 

REVOCABLE TRUST, MARK RICHMOND,

TRUSTEE OF THE MARK RICHMOND 

REVOCABLE TRUST, WILLIAM R. SAUTTER, III,

THOMAS H. LEWIS, JR., RICHARD SERINO, 

JOYCE SERINO, SPERRY MARKETING GROUP, 

INC., JAMES R. STEWART, SHIRLEY A. STEWART, 

ROBIN E. STUART, TRUSTEE OF THE 

REVOCABLE TRUST, VICTOR D. VIRZI, LEONA 

VIRZI, WALGREEN CO., RICHARD M. 

WILLIAMSON, PATRICIA WILLIAMSON, DELL 

WILLMAN, CAROL J. WILLMAN, SUBURBAN 

PROPANE, L.P., BAY PLAZA PROPERTIES, LLC, 

CRAMER MOTORS, INC., PUBLIC STORAGE, 

SOUTHERN SPRING & STAMPING, INC., TRIPLE 

DIAMOND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES LLC,

VENICE PLAZA LTD., WEST COAST INLAND 

NAVIGATION DISTRICT, DEE A. DEATERLY, 

KELLY A. GLAUSMAN, WILLIAM BREDA AND

ANGELYN P. BREDA, (ALSO KNOWN AS CFG 

PROPERTIES), THOMAS MAYHALL AND

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ROGERS v. US 3

KATHY MAYHALL, (ALSO KNOWN AS NEKARO, 

LLC), DOUGLASR. MURPHY, JR., SALLY M. 

BERRYMAN, SUSAN M. WEST, BIRD BAY 

EXECUTIVE GOLF CLUB, FAYE HOWARD, 

ROBERT WILLIAMS, KIMAL LUMBER, SEAN 

PATRICK HILL, ALFRED ART, BARBARA ART, 

JAMES BATTAGLIA, KATHRYN BATTAGLIA,

J. SCOTT BOYKIN, NADENE BOYLE, DALE 

BROWN, SCOTT BROWN, MARTIN CROCE, 

MELINDA CROCE, MARGARET DEWEY, 

DEBORAH FOCHT, TIMOTHY GEORGE, CHARLES 

GRIMM, MELINDA GRIMM, ROBERT HARRIS,

BILLIE HARRIS, RAYMOND LANE, BETH LANE, 

DONALD LANE, II, KEVIN LYMAN, LLOYD 

MEADOR, SANDRA SANZONE, DOROTHY 

THOMAS, JENNY TROYER-CURTIS, EDWIN VAN 

PELT, SR., JOYCE VAN PELT, ROSS WALKUP, 

SUSAN WALKUP, CINDY WATSON, ABSOLUTE 

MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., P&S 

PROPERTIES, INC., PRECISION FABRICATION 

CORP., AND SIGNTIST, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2013-5098, 2013-5102

______________________

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 07-CV-0273, 07-CV-0426, 08-CV-0198, 10-

CV-0187, 10-CV-0200, Judge Mary Ellen Coster Williams.

______________________

Decided: December 28, 2015

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4 ROGERS v. US

______________________

MARK F. HEARNE, II, Arent Fox, LLP, Clayton, MO, 

argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by 

LINDSAY S.C. BRINTON, STEPHEN SHARP DAVIS, MEGHAN 

SUE LARGENT.

LANE N. MCFADDEN, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by ROBERT G. DREHER.

______________________

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal arising from claims by 

Appellants—abutting landowners—that the United 

States effected a taking of their property without just 

compensation when it converted a former railroad corridor into a recreational trail pursuant to the National 

Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (“Trails Act”).1

Appellants allege that deeds transferred by their predecessors-in-title to a railroad company granted only easements on their land for railroad purposes and, upon 

termination of the use of the land as a railroad, left the 

landowners unencumbered title and possession of their 

land. The Court of Federal Claims consolidated the 

landowners’ claims into three cases, of which two are on 

appeal. Rogers v. United States (Bird Bay), 93 Fed. Cl. 

607 (Fed. Cl. 2010), and Rogers v. United States (Rogers 

III), 107 Fed. Cl. 387 (Fed. Cl. 2012). The court granted 

1 The Rails-to-Trails Act was enacted on March 28, 

1983, as part of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-11, Title II, 97 Stat. 42, 48 

(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2014)).

 

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ROGERS v. US 5

the government’s motion for partial summary judgment in 

both cases, holding that Appellants lacked a property 

right or interest in the land-at-issue because Seaboard Air 

Line Railway (“Seaboard”), the railroad company, had 

obtained fee simple title to the land from Appellants’

predecessors-in-title. Because we agree with the Court of 

Federal Claims and find the Florida Supreme Court’s 

answer to our certified question to be determinative of the 

remaining issues, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has exclusive and plenary authority over the construction, operation, and abandonment of most of the nation’s rail lines. 

Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). As we have previously explained in other rails-totrails cases, a taking, if any, occurs when, pursuant to the 

Trails Act, the STB issues a Notice of Interim Trail Use 

(“NITU”) to suspend the abandonment of the rail line by a 

railroad and preserve it for future active railroad use. 

Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d). The NITU preserves 

the STB’s jurisdiction over the corridor, thereby preempting the application of state law that might otherwise 

apply. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229-30. The government 

must provide just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if the issuance of a NITU results in 

the taking of private property. Whispell Foreign Cars, 

Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 324, 330 (Fed. Cl. 2011) 

(citing Preseault v. ICC (Preseault I), 494 U.S. 1, 12-16 

(1990)). Thus, a private party’s valid interest in the 

property-at-issue is a prerequisite to a taking. Wyatt v. 

United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

The facts relevant to this long overdue decision are set 

forth in full in the two trial court opinions on appeal, as 

well as in the certification order we sent to the Florida 

Supreme Court, as will be explained infra. We refer the 

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6 ROGERS v. US

reader to those opinions for the full details of the case 

leading to this opinion and only include here a brief 

summary of the facts. 

Seaboard acquired the right to operate a 12.43 mile 

long railroad line between the cities of Sarasota and 

Venice, Florida, through a series of conveyances with 

multiple landowners from 1910 through 1941. Rogers III, 

107 Fed. Cl. at 390. Specifically:

In a series of four deeds (the Blackburn, Phillips, 

Frazer, and Knight deeds), property owners conveyed their interests in the northern corridor of 

the rail way to Seaboard in September 1910. 

Those deeds appear, on their face, to unambiguously convey a fee simple interest to Seaboard. 

After receiving these deeds, Seaboard laid track 

and began to operate trains along the entire corridor as of November 1911. At this time, Seaboard 

had not received any deed corresponding to the 

southern portion of the rail corridor, but still operated trains along the entire corridor. 

In 1926–27, Seaboard relocated the southern portion of its rail corridor a quarter mile to the east. 

On April 1, 1927, trains began to run along the relocated rail corridor. Then, on April 4, 1927, Seaboard received a deed from the Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Engineers pension fund (“BLE”) that 

appears, on its face, to unambiguously convey a 

fee simple interest in the property corresponding 

to the relocated southern portion of the rail corridor.[n.2] Seaboard continued to operate trains 

along the entirety of the rail corridor.

[N.2] Seaboard also received a deed from 

the Venice-Nokomis Holding Corporation 

on November 10, 1941 that purported to 

transfer the same property that BLE 

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ROGERS v. US 7

transferred to Seaboard in the 1927 BLE 

deed.

Certification Order, Rogers v. United States, No. 2013-

5098, -5102, slip. op. at 5-7 (Fed. Cir. July 21, 2014). 

Thus, with respect to the northern corridor of the railroad, the four, largely identical, deeds-at-issue are the 

Blackburn Deed, the Phillips Deed, the Frazer Deed, and 

the Knight Deed. The southern corridor, which presently

abuts property owned by Appellant Bird Bay Executive 

Golf Club (“Bird Bay”), has a more convoluted history

involving numerous transactions. The parties agree, 

however, that the interpretation of only two deeds—the 

1927 BLE Deed and the 1941 Venice-Nokomis Deed—are 

dispositive of whether Bird Bay has a claim to the landat-issue. Bird Bay, 93 Fed. Cl. at 618, 619 n.13.

On December 15, 2003, due to decreased industrial 

activity in the area, the current operator of the railroad 

corridor, Seminole Gulf Railway, L.P. (“SGLR”), petitioned the STB to abandon the railroad corridor. On April 

2, 2004, the STB issued an NITU invoking § 1247(d) of 

the Trails Act. Pursuant to the order, SGLR and CSX 

Corporation, the successors and assigns of Seaboard, 

granted the Trust for Public Land—a national, nonprofit 

land conservation organization—the right to convert the 

railroad corridor into a recreational trail. 

Over 100 landowners filed suits alleging that the conversion of the railroad corridor to a public trail under the 

Trails Act resulted in a compensable taking of their 

property interests in the railroad corridor. As explained

in our Certification Order to the Florida Supreme Court:

The Court of Federal Claims consolidated all 

claims into three separate actions, resulting in 

three separate opinions. Two of those opinions, 

Rogers v. United States (“Bird Bay”), 93 Fed. Cl. 

607 (2010) and Rogers v. United States (“Rogers”), 

107 Fed. Cl. 387 (2012), are at issue in the present 

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8 ROGERS v. US

appeal. In both cases, the plaintiffs asserted that 

they retained a compensable interest in the property because Florida law limits a railroad’s ability 

to hold an interest in property used for a rail corridor. The government argued that the plain language of the deeds conveyed a fee simple interest 

to the railroad, and that neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Florida legislature has expressed a policy preventing a railroad from 

receiving title in fee simple, regardless of the uses 

for which the property is conveyed or the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed. 

In Bird Bay, the Court of Federal Claims found 

that the 1927 BLE deed for the southern portion 

of the railroad corridor conveyed a fee simple interest to Seaboard. In Rogers, the Court of Federal Claims similarly held that the 1910 Blackburn, 

Phillips, Frazer, and Knight deeds conveyed a fee 

simple interest to Seaboard for the northern portion of the railroad corridor. The Court of Federal

Claims concluded, accordingly, that those plaintiffs—the present Appellants—had no compensable property interest for which they could be 

entitled to compensation upon its taking. 

Certification Order, slip. op. at 7-8.2 Appellants filed 

timely notices of appeal. We have jurisdiction over this 

consolidated appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

2 A third decision, Rogers v. United States, 90 Fed. 

Cl. 418 (Fed. Cl. 2009), has not been appealed. Although 

we referred to Rogers v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 38

(Fed. Cl. 2012), as “Rogers” in our Certification Order, the 

parties refer to that case as Rogers III and, instead, refer 

to Rogers v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 418 (Fed. Cl. 2009) 

as “Rogers I.” To avoid confusion and maintain consisten-

 

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ROGERS v. US 9

DISCUSSION

The sole question on appeal is whether the Appellants—the plaintiffs from the Bird Bay and the Rogers III

actions—hold any interest in the land within the subject

rail corridor. The parties agree that the answer to that 

question turns on whether Seaboard acquired fee simple 

title to the land-at-issue through conveyances from Appellants’ predecessors-in-title. See Bird Bay, 93 Fed. Cl. at 

617 (“For Plaintiff Bird Bay, the first issue—whether the 

railroad obtained an easement or a fee simple estate—is 

dispositive.”). 

The Federal Circuit reviews a decision of the Court of 

Federal Claims granting summary judgment de novo. 

Ladd v. United States, 713 F.3d 648, 651 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

Rule 56(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims (“RCFC”) states that summary judgment 

is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ladd, 713 F.3d 

at 651 (quoting RCFC 56). 

We consider whether the United States has made a 

compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment as a 

question of law. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 

525 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We analyze the 

property rights of the parties in a rails-to-trails case 

under the relevant state law. Preseault v. United States

(Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en 

banc). Under Florida law, interpretation of instruments 

like contracts and deeds is generally a question of law. 

Peacock Constr. Co. v. Modern Air Conditioning, Inc., 353 

So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1977). See also Nourachi v. United 

cy with the parties, we refer to Rogers v. United States, 

107 Fed. Cl. 38 (Fed. Cl. 2012) in this opinion as Rogers 

III.

 

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10 ROGERS v. US

States, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1110 (M.D. Fla. 2009) 

(under Florida law, “[t]he interpretation of a deed, including the legal description of the boundaries set forth in the 

deed, is a question of law for the Court to resolve”). The 

Federal Circuit gives no deference to legal conclusions 

made by the Court of Federal Claims regarding either 

federal or state law. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1372-73; Hash 

v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

Upon a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

find no error in the Court of Federal Claim’s thorough 

parsing of the language of the four deeds-at-issue governing the northern segments of the railroad corridor (Blackburn, Phillips, Frazer, and Knight) or the two deeds-atissue governing the southern segment of the corridor 

(1927 BLE and 1941 Venice-Nokomis). With respect to 

the northern segments, the court reviewed the text of the 

Blackburn, Frazer, Phillips, and Knight deeds, and held 

that “[t]he language could not be clearer—the property 

owners were conveying all of their interest” in the rail 

corridor they transferred to Seaboard. Rogers III, 107 

Fed. Cl. at 395-96. The court noted that the deeds make 

no reference to an easement or right-of-way (referring 

instead to a “strip of land”), contain no reversionary 

clauses, and “unambiguously indicate” that these conveyances “intended to grant fee simple title to Seaboard”

through their granting clauses. Id. at 395-97. Although 

it recognized that the Knight Deed, unlike the other 

three, has a provision stating that the deed would become 

“null [and] void” if the railroad were not built within five 

years from the execution of the deed, it properly held that 

this proviso meant only the conveyance was a fee simple 

determinable and did not thereby transform an otherwise 

unambiguous transfer of fee simple title into an easement. Id. at 398.

As for the southern segment of the railroad corridor, 

the court also properly determined that BLE held title to 

both the railroad corridor (through August 31, 1926 deeds

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ROGERS v. US 11

from Potter and Honore Palmer) and the lands abutting 

the corridor (through an October 6, 1925 deed from Dr. 

Fred Albee) when it executed the BLE Deed to Seaboard 

in 1927. See Bird Bay, 93 Fed. Cl. at 618. Because BLE 

held the land-at-issue in fee simple in 1927, a point not in 

dispute, and the 1927 BLE Deed transferred “all of its 

right, title and interest” in “a strip of land” to Seaboard, 

the court properly determined that the deed appears 

unambiguously to convey fee simple title. Id. Although 

Appellants argue that a subsequent foreclosure proceeding against BLE in 1934 extinguished any interest Seaboard obtained through the 1927 BLE Deed, we find no 

error in the court’s rejection of this argument on the 

grounds that the railroad corridor was not part of the 

lands foreclosed. Id. at 620. And we further agree that, 

even if it were, the 1941 Venice-Nokomis Deed, which was

conveyed by the company that foreclosed on BLE’s remaining property in 1934, appears on its face to grant the 

exact same railroad corridor “real estate” back to Seaboard “in fee simple forever.” Id. at 621. We agree that, 

even if the 1941 Venice-Nokomis Deed was redundant, it 

was not a legal nullity because quitclaim deeds may be 

used to put a doubtful claim to rest. Id. at 622.

Despite our conclusions as to what the deeds appear 

to convey on their face, the question remained as to 

whether there is any reason under Florida law why a 

railroad cannot hold fee simple title to land deeded to it

by a private party generally or on the facts of this case. 

The parties hotly contest this point on appeal. 

Appellants rely heavily on Preseault II for the proposition that a railroad that acquires a right-of-way for its 

railway track only acquires the estate necessary for the 

purposes of operating a railway—that is, typically an 

easement—and that the act of survey and location before 

the conveyance is the operative determinant of the type of 

transfer effected by the deed. Appellants argue that,

although Vermont law guided Preseault II, Florida law is 

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12 ROGERS v. US

consistent with Vermont law in that it, too, restricts a

railroad’s eminent domain power by statute. Appellants 

also contend that Seaboard only acquired an easement 

and not fee simple because railroads can only use railway 

land received by voluntary grant “for purposes of such 

grant only.” Rev. Gen. Fla. Stat. § 4354 (1920).3 According to Appellants, Seaboard received the right-of-way land 

by voluntary grant because the consideration it exchanged for the deeds was nominal. 

Appellants further argue that the Court of Federal 

Claims’ findings violate the common law “strips and gore” 

doctrine, which it asserts was adopted in Florida by 

implication and incorporation. See Seaboard Air Line 

Rwy. v. Southern Inv. Co., 44 So. 351 (Fla. 1907) (“the 

proprietor of lots abutting on a public street is presumed, 

in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to own soil to 

the center of the street”) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also Florida Southern Ry. Co. v. 

Brown, 1 So. 512, 513 (Fla. 1887). According to Appellants, this doctrine creates a presumption that owners of 

parcels of land that are bounded by adjacent public roadways or railways own all the land to the center of the 

strip, rather than to just the edge of the strip. 

In light of a dearth of Florida case law interpreting 

the property rights of railroad companies, we decided to

avail ourselves of Florida’s certification procedure to refer

these issues to the Florida Supreme Court. Fla. Const. 

Art. V § 3(b)(6); Fla. Stat. § 25.031; Fla. R. App. P. 

9.150(a) (permitting a U.S. court of appeals to certify 

questions to the Supreme Court of Florida “if the answer 

3 Fla. Stat. § 2241 (1892) (recodified at Fla. Stat. 

§ 4354 (1920); Fla. Stat. § 6316 (1927); Fla. Stat. § 360.01 

(1941)). Section 360.01, the last recodification of the 

statute, was repealed in 1982. See ch. 81-318, § 2, eff. 

Oct. 1, 1982, Laws of Fla.

 

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ROGERS v. US 13

is determinative of the cause and there is no controlling 

precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida”). This decision was not solely on our own initiative:

Although, [in Bird Bay,] the Court of Federal 

Claims rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Seaboard’s status as a railroad prevented it from 

holding title in fee simple under Florida law, it 

lamented its inability to certify the question to the 

Florida Supreme Court. Bird Bay, 93 Fed. Cl. at 

618 n.11, 622-24. In an earlier takings case under 

the Trails Act applying Florida law, the Court of 

Federal Claims also found that the Florida Supreme Court had not yet addressed when and how 

a private party could convey property to a railroad 

in fee simple, and similarly expressed a desire to 

seek resolution of that question directly from the 

Florida Supreme Court. Whispell Foreign Cars, 

Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 324, 331-34 & n.6 

(2011).

Certification Order, slip. op. at 8. We also note that 

Appellants also raised this option in their Reply Brief. 

Appellants Reply Br. 26-28 (“should there be uncertainty 

about the meaning of § 4354 or the common law as applied by the Florida Supreme Court . . . , this Court 

should certify this issue to the Florida Supreme Court”). 

Our Certification Order posed the following question of 

law to be answered by the Florida Supreme Court:

Assuming that a deed, on its face, conveys a strip 

of land in fee simple from a private party to a railroad corporation in exchange for stated consideration, does Fla. Stat. § 2241 (1892) (recodified at 

Fla. Stat. § 4354 (1920); Fla. Stat. § 6316 (1927); 

Fla. Stat. § 360.01 (1941)), state policy, or factual 

considerations—such as whether the railroad surveys property, or lays track and begins to operate 

trains prior to the conveyance of a deed—limit the 

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14 ROGERS v. US

railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of 

the language of the deed?[n.1]

[N.1] While the Appellants dispute whether the deeds appear on their face to transfer a fee simple interest in the properties 

at issue, like the Court of Federal Claims 

before us, we conclude that they do.

Certification Order, slip. op. at 8. The Supreme Court of 

Florida acknowledged receipt of our certification on July 

29, 2014, and on November 5, 2015, issued its answer in a 

thorough opinion addressing the relevant state law, 

policy, and factual considerations. The Supreme Court 

parsed our question into three questions:

(1) Does section 2241, Revised Statutes of Florida 

(1892), limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds?

(2) Does state policy limit the railroad’s interest in 

the property, regardless of the language of the 

deeds?

(3) Do factual considerations, such as whether the 

railroad surveys land or lays track and begins 

running trains before the conveyance of a deed, 

limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds? 

Rogers v. United States, No. SC14-1465, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 

2477, *7 (Fla. Nov. 5, 2015). It answered all three in the 

negative. Id. 

On the first question, the Florida Supreme Court 

examined the relevant statutes, particularly Section 4354 

of the Revised General Statutes of Florida (1920), and

Florida case law on interpreting deeds. The Supreme 

Court held that, contrary to Appellants’ argument, subsection (2) of the statute regarding “voluntary grants of 

real estate” does not apply to this case because a “volunCase: 13-5102 Document: 4-2 Page: 14 Filed: 12/28/2015
ROGERS v. US 15

tary conveyance” is one made without valuable consideration, and the deeds-at-issue were conveyed for valuable 

consideration. Rogers, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2477, at *18. It 

further quoted Saltzman v. Ahern for the well-established 

rule that, “[i]f there is no ambiguity in the language 

employed then the intention of the grantor must be ascertained from that language.” 306 So. 3d 537, 539 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1975). It concluded from its analysis that Florida 

statutes do not limit Seaboard’s interest in the propertyat-issue. 

On the second question, the Florida Supreme Court 

found that Appellants’ argument that rights-of-way 

obtained by eminent domain can only be easements does

not apply because the lands in question were conveyed by 

bargain and sale, not eminent domain. The court also

rejected Appellants’ argument that the nominal consideration exchanged for the land-at-issue indicates the grantors’ intent to convey less than fee simple title because 

Florida law does not consider the amount of consideration

to be a basis for questioning the validity of a deed. Finally, the court explicitly stated that it did not need to determine whether and to what extent the “strips and gores” 

doctrine applies in Florida today because the presumption 

created by that doctrine “does not apply if[, as here,] a 

contrary intention is made clear by the language of the 

deed.” Rogers, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2477, at *29. Thus, the 

court held that “no policy of the State of Florida limits the 

railroad’s interest in the property regardless of the language of the deed.” Id. at *30.4

4 Of note, we also find it is unnecessary to consider 

the Appellants’ argument that the trial court’s decision 

was contrary to the common law “strips and gores” doctrine because Appellants waived the argument by raising 

it for the first time on appeal before this court. Fresenius 

 

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16 ROGERS v. US

Finally, on the third question, the Florida Supreme 

Court found unpersuasive Appellants’ argument, relying 

on Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 153, that a railroad that 

surveys the land and locates the corridor prior to purchasing the land-at-issue thereby obtains only an easement. 

The court held that, because Appellants have not shown 

that, in Florida, a deed for passing fee simple title is 

limited by the fact that the grantee already occupies the 

property, “factual considerations [in this case] do not limit 

the railroad’s interest in the property regardless of the 

language of the deeds.” Rogers, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2477, at 

*34. The Florida Supreme Court then remanded the case 

back to this court. 

Appellants were the ones to suggest that we certify 

the question to the Florida Supreme Court if there is any 

doubt as to Florida law. Appellants Reply Br. 26-28. The 

Florida Supreme Court has now answered, and we find its

opinion to have removed all doubt as to the correct result

in this case. Its opinion confirms that, under Florida 

state law, a railroad can acquire either an easement or fee 

simple title to a railroad right-of-way and that no statute, 

state policy, or factual considerations prevails over the 

language of the deeds when the language is clear. As 

explained supra, the language of the six deeds-at-issue 

clearly convey fee simple title to Seaboard on their face. 

CONCLUSION

Without further ado, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009).

 

Case: 13-5102 Document: 4-2 Page: 16 Filed: 12/28/2015