Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00013/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00013-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVA LEIGH SMITH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04CV0013-BEN (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

JUDGMENT 

ON THE PLEADINGS 

[DOCKET NOS. 101, 109, 110 ]

vs.

SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

 In her Fourth Amended Complaint, pro se Plaintiff Marva Leigh Smith (“Plaintiff) alleges

disability discrimination, unlawful retaliation, sexual discrimination, and harassment by her former

employer and educational provider, Defendant California State University, San Diego

(“Defendant” or “San Diego State”). Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former student and lecturer at San Diego State. Plaintiff completed her studies

in August 2002 and has not taken any further course work at San Diego State since that time. 

Plaintiff’s last lecturing assignment was on May 21, 2003, and her last day of employment was

July 31, 2003. Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on January 5, 2004, which was later dismissed

on December 2, 2004. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was dismissed by this Court on July

Case 3:04-cv-00013-BEN-CAB Document 150 Filed 06/14/07 Page 1 of 6
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26, 2005. After granting Plaintiff’s request to amend her Second Amended Complaint, the Court

dismissed Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint on October 4, 2006. Plaintiff filed the operative

Fourth Amended Complaint on October 30, 2006, alleging inter alia disability discrimination,

unlawful retaliation, sexual discrimination, and harassment by Defendant. Plaintiff seeks relief

under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act. 

III. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). If the moving

party meets this burden, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine

issue remains for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

As is the case here, when a party files a motion for summary judgment and challenges only

the sufficiency of the opposing party’s pleadings, the Court should treat the motion as one for

judgment on the pleadings rather than summary judgment. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court

for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1387 n6 (9th Cir. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(c) provides in relevant part that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to

delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). For

purposes of the motion, the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while

the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false. See Doleman

v. Meiji Mutual Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1984). Judgment on the pleadings is

proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material

issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. As

discussed below, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

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A. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 

In her Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges under Title II of the ADA that she

encountered disability discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and a hostile learning environment by

her former employer and educational provider. “Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in

public services and programs.” Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). Title II

provides that “. . . no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In the

Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that “[d]uring the relevant period of the [Fourth

Amended Complaint], [she] was employed as a graduate teaching assistant and lecturer. . . .[but]

due to the discriminatory treatment. . . . she was never taken off probationary status or given

additional teaching opportunities.” 4th Am. Compl. at 4. 

It is apparent after reviewing the Fourth Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s Title II claim

still derives solely from her employment status. This Court has already determined that no action

can lie for a Title II violation based upon Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant. Title II of the

ADA simply does not apply to employment situations. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of

Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title II does not apply to employment

discrimination claims). The Court notes that each of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Fourth Amended

Complaint remain directly or inextricably intertwined with her status as a San Diego State

employee. For example, Plaintiff states that 

... [t]hroughout her employment, in a course of ongoing conduct, [Plaintiff] was denied

equal benefits, and privileges, particularly in the areas of office and classroom

location, modified work schedules, and provision of equipment causing lost wages,

commissions, bonuses, and other economic and non-economic damages.

4th Am. Compl. at 7-8. Plaintiff also states that 

[w]ithin the time provided by law, [she] filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging disability discrimination, sex

discrimination, including harassment, and retaliation. This administrative complaint

also included allegations of failure to provide reasonable accommodation and

harassment constituting a hostile work environment.

4th Am. Compl. at 8. 

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Since no action can lie for a Title II violation based upon Plaintiff’s employment

relationship, Plaintiff’s Title II claim is not viable. Plaintiff’s related claims of retaliation under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and violation of the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794 also fail. This

Court previously dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because it is barred by the

statute of limitations. Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act claim is also time

barred. Given that Plaintiff still fails to state a recognizable claim under Title II, Defendant is

entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

 In her Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff once more alleges that Defendant violated

Title VII by harassing her because of her gender. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, or Title VII of the

ADA, protects against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

See Gafoor v. I.N.S., 231 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff can prevail in a Title

VII case if she can show that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor

for any employment practice even if other factors also motivated the practice). Discrimination

based on other characteristics, no matter how unfortunate or distasteful, simply does not fall within

the purview of Title VII. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1075 (9th Cir.

2002). 

In the context of gender discrimination, an employer can be liable under Title VII for such

conduct giving rise to a hostile environment where the employee proves: (1) that she was

subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature; (2) that this conduct was

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

employment and create an abusive working environment. See Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co., Inc., 192

F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir.1999). 

“Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of

employment. To be actionable under Title VII, a sexually objectionable environment

must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person

would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” 

Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and

quotation omitted). 

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This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII claim without prejudice because she

failed to allege facts sufficient to support a gender discrimination claim. Plaintiff’s earlier Title

VII claim was factually based on her efforts to publicize problems associated with breast implant

litigation. In support of her current claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

discriminated against her special status as a female in her efforts to publicize the breast

implant litigation problems affecting all women. [Plaintiff] had written editorials and

for a brief period of one semester was a health columnist for the campus newspaper,

The Daily Aztec. [Plaintiff] had also voluntarily lectured on campus in the political

science department and for a graduate program in the woman’s studies department.

In about 1997, during her first tenure of employment as a classified clerical assistant

for Telecommunications and Network Services, [Plaintiff] complained to Jerry Ledin,

the former Vice President of the Center for Human Resources after she was expected

to distribute flyers to her departmental staff that amounted to an advertisement for the

Plastic Surgery Division at the University of California, at San Diego. The literature

presented an offer of an employee and faculty discount for procedures to include breast

augmentation, a procedure where breast implants may be used. Eventually, when

[Plaintiff] was laid off on June 30, 1997, [Defendant] had already began a recruitment

for the nation’s first regulatory affairs program and a director of [t]he Center for

Pharmaceutical and Biodevices Development. 

4th Am. Compl. at 11-12. Plaintiff further alleges that

. . . [Defendant’s] conduct was so severe and pervasive throughout her employment

[with San Diego State.] Plaintiff alleges such conduct was unwelcome and abusive to

adversely affect the terms and conditions of her employment. The causal connection

between the adverse employment action or harassment, is expressed by an ongoing and

pervasive pattern best characterized as a “conspiracy of silence,” that largely

surrounded the associated risks and complications that [Plaintiff] made [sic] efforts to

inform other employees, students and the public about, [sic] including problems

evidenced in breast implant litigation. . . . 

4th Am. Compl. at 14. 

As in earlier versions of the Complaint, none of the facts that Plaintiff now alleges

demonstrate severe or pervasive harassment, nor do they demonstrate a general hostility toward

women. A review of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint indicates that Plaintiff still relies on

the same factual basis that resulted in her prior dismissals. Given that Plaintiff continues to fail to

state a recognizable claim under Title VII, Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment on the

pleadings.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings as to all claims. (Doc. No. 110). Plaintiff’s Motions to Appoint Counsel are denied as

moot. (Doc. Nos. 101 and 109). The Clerk of Court may close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 14, 2007

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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