Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01999/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01999-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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1 When Defendant contacted the court to obtain a hearing date, as required by Civil

Local Rule 7.1(b), it requested a hearing on a motion for reconsideration, not a motion for

certification of interlocutory appeal. Defendant’s counsel now declares he “is not aware of any

change in facts or law that would have merited a motion for reconsideration.” (Decl. of Andrew

Steinheimer, ¶ 2; Def.’s P.&A. at 3 n.1.) Consistency between the request to schedule a motion

hearing and the motion filed advances efficient case management and enables that motions are 

appropriately prioritized. In the future, filing a motion other than that scheduled with the court

may result in striking the motion filed at variance with the court’s schedule.

05CV1999

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMANDA KIGHT, on behalf of herself

and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ESKANOS & ADLER, P.C.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 05cv1999-L(AJB)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION

OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

Following denial of its motion to dismiss a portion of Plaintiff’s fair debt collection

practices complaint, Defendant Eskanos & Adler, P.C. moves for certification of interlocutory

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).1

 Plaintiff Amanda Kight filed an opposition, and

Defendant replied. For the reasons which follow, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff Amanda Kight allegedly incurred consumer debt with American Express, which

assigned it to Defendant for collection. Defendant sent Plaintiff a dunning letter, which she

Case 3:05-cv-01999-AJB Document 32 Filed 01/08/07 Page 1 of 4
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2 05CV1999

claims violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. and the

California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq.. 

Defendant moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s dunning letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g because it contained

language which “overshadowed, weakened, and failed to comply with” the statutory notice

requirement “because it attempted to limit the right available to Plaintiff in a manner that creates

a contradiction that would confuse the least sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her

rights.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) By order filed May 5, 2006, Defendant’s motion was denied. 

Defendant’s letter announced a lawsuit would be filed against Plaintiff in ten days, and at the

same time informed her she could dispute the debt within thirty days. It left open the question of

consequences if Plaintiff waited more than ten but less than thirty days to dispute the debt. (See

Compl. Ex. 1.) In denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the court found the letter “convey[ed]

the . . . message . . . that the debtor should ignore his or her right to take thirty days to verify the

debt and act before the expiration of ten days,” and was therefore threatening and confusing to

the least sophisticated debtor. (Order Denying Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed 5/5/06, at 5-6.) 

Defendant seeks to certify the May 5 order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b). “Section 1292(b) provides a mechanism by which litigants can bring an immediate

appeal of a non-final order upon the consent of both the district court and the court of appeals.” 

In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1981). This

certification is intended to be “used only in exceptional situations in which allowing an

interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” Id. at 1026. Section

1292(b) provides in pertinent part:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable

under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

Accordingly, the statute contains three certification requirements:

(1) that there be a controlling question of law, (2) that there be substantial grounds

for difference of opinion, and (3) that an immediate appeal may materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation. 

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2 Defendant suggests that the issue decided in the May 5 order was “whether the

debt collector may inform the debtor of its intent to file . . . a lawsuit, or whether it overshadows

or contradicts the statutory notice required to be provided the debtor which informs the debtor

that he/she has 30 days to dispute the validity or any portion of the debt.” (Def.’s P.&A. at 3.) 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss did not present, and the court’s May 5 order did not decide, this

broader issue. 

3 Defendant concedes as much. (See Def.’s P.&A. at 3 (“Plaintiff also contends that

the defendant violated § 1692e(5) by threatening an action which it did not intend to take.”)).

Defendant contends, however, that this claim, which is asserted as a class allegation (Compl. at

6), does not provide a basis for class certification. (Reply at 3.) As Plaintiff has not yet moved

for class certification, and the issue of class certification has not been briefed, the court declines

to consider it at this time. On the record before the court, Plaintiff alleges three claims on behalf

of the putative class. (Compl. at 6.)

3 05CV1999

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. All three requirements must be met for certification to

issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Defendant maintains its motion meets all three requirements. 

The court disagrees.

“[A]ll that must be shown in order for a question to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of

the issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” Id. 

Defendant argues that the issue decided by the May 5 order is a controlling question of law

because it is the only claim that provides the potential for class certification in this case. (See

Def.’s P.&A. at 4-5.) The issue decided was whether Plaintiff adequately alleged a cause of

action for a 15 U.S.C. § 1692g violation based on the claim that Defendant’s dunning letter

contained language which overshadowed the statutory notice requirement, and was likely to

deceive or mislead a hypothetical least sophisticated debtor.2

 Defendant’s argument that this is

the only potential class claim is negated by the allegations in the complaint, which contains

additional statutory claims, all of which are asserted as class allegations.3

 (See Compl. at 5-6;

Opp’n at 7.) Although a different resolution of Defendant’s motion to dismiss may affect one

claim, it would not affect the remaining claims, and therefore would not materially affect the

outcome of the litigation.

Defendant also argues that immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate

termination of this litigation because, if the appellate court were to reverse the May 5 order, “this

will dispose of the class claims in plaintiff’s complaint . . ..” (Def.’s P.&A. at 12-13.) As

discussed above, the complaint alleges additional claims on behalf of the putative class. 

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Accordingly, and immediate appeal would delay the ultimate termination of this litigation rather

than advance it.

Last, Defendant maintains that there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion

regarding the issue decided on motion to dismiss. Defendant concedes there “is a plethora of

case law surrounding this issue, although none right on point.” (Def.’s P.&A. at 1.) As reflected

in the May 5 order, several Ninth Circuit cases address the legal issue which was presented in

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (See Order Denying Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed 5/5/06, at 4-5.) 

What Defendant is apparently arguing is that no cases address precisely the same language as

that contained in Defendant’s letter. This is insufficient to create an “exceptional situation” as

required to grant a section 1292(b) certification.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for certification of interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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