Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04579/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Case No. 5:14-cv-04579-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

VINCENT MAY,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

ROBERT MCDONALD, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-04579-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

(Re: Docket No. 19)

Defendants Robert McDonald, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, (“VA”) 

and Robert Burnes move to dismiss claims four, five, six and seven of Plaintiff Vincent May’s 

second amended complaint.1 Because the court finds that—as to these causes of action—May’s 

SAC fails to state a claim as a matter of law, the motion is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

I.

May is an African-American male over the age of 40. Between 2010 and 2013, he applied 

for police officer positions with the VA office in Palo Alto, California, at least six times.2 The VA 

denied May’s application each time despite his prior experience with the U.S. Marine Corps, the 

Richmond Police Department and the East Palo Alto Police Department.3 During this time period, 

May also applied for and was hired for a Public Safety Dispatcher position.4 While working as a 

dispatcher, May asked several police lieutenants, including Burnes, why his police officer 

 

1

 For the purposes of this motion, counsel for the VA specially appears on behalf of Burnes. See

Docket No. 19 at 1 n.1. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

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applications had been denied. Each lieutenant responded that “there was a need to hire women in 

the department” and that “[May] was too old to work as a police officer.”5

 During one of May’s shifts on dispatch duty, Burnes told May that he (Burnes) was about 

to stop an African-American man engaged in “suspicious activity.”6 Due to Burnes’s reputation 

for racial profiling and a “propensity towards violence,” May informed Lieutenant Cartius Stevens 

that additional officers should be sent to Burnes’s location “to ensure the safety of” the suspect, 

Vincent Warren.

7

 Stevens ignored May’s suggestion, and Burnes subsequently beat Warren

severely.

8

 

After this incident, May explained to Burnes that he did not have probable cause to stop 

Warren.9 In response, Burnes became “angry and aggressive” and “threatened to discipline [May] 

if he ever questioned him again.”10 Upon learning that May had a video of the Warren beating,

Burnes harassed May to give him a copy and threated reprisal if May refused.

11 After May 

declined to hand over the video, Burnes began denying May’s requests for overtime, training and 

more favorable shifts.12 Burnes also used his influence to ensure that the police selection 

committee denied May’s pending police officer application.13 May reported Burnes’s behavior to 

 2 See Docket No. 17 at ¶¶ 13, 16 and 18. 

3 See id. at ¶¶ 13, 14. 

4 See id. at ¶ 15. 

5 Id. at ¶ 17. 

6 Id. at ¶ 20. 

7 Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22. 

8 See id. at ¶¶ 22, 23. 

9 See id. at ¶ 26. 

10 Id.

11 See id. at ¶ 28. 

12 See id. at ¶ 29. 

13 See id. at ¶ 30. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

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Stevens, but Stevens did not pursue an investigation.14 “Burnes [also] tried to use his authority to 

inquire about [May’s] request for vacation.”15 Burnes entered May’s office, “ordered [him] to get 

up and move away from his computer” and “berated” May—telling him that he was too 

incompetent to fill out a vacation request form.16 During the exchange, Burnes “cornered” May by 

positioning himself between May and the only door out of the office.17 Throughout the exchange, 

Burnes kept one hand on his gun or baton while pointing his free hand at May.18 Worried that 

Burnes would strike him, May “remain[ed] seated while Burnes disrespected him and acted in an 

intimidating manner.”19 Eventually, Burnes left May’s office without further incident. Burnes was 

“not disciplined or counseled” for his actions.20 Three months later, the VA terminated May’s 

employment “under the pretext of [his] exhibiting disruptive behavior.”21 

May then filed suit against the VA and Burnes, asserting seven causes of action:

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(1) racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act23 against the VA, (2) age 

discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act24 against the VA, (3) retaliation 

under Title VII against the VA, (4) hostile work environment under Title VII against both the VA 

and Burnes, (5) hostile work environment under the California Fair Employment and Housing 

Act25 against Burnes, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Burnes and 

 

14 See id. at ¶ 31. 

15 Id. at ¶ 33. 

16 Id. at ¶ 34. 

17 Id. at ¶ 35. 

18 See id. at ¶¶ 36, 37. 

19 Id. at ¶ 38. 

20 Id. at ¶ 40. 

21 Id. at ¶ 41. 

22 See Id. at ¶¶ 42-90. 

23 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 

24 See 29 U.S.C. § 621. 

25 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). 

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(7) violation of the Bane Act26 against Burnes. Defendants now move to partially dismiss May’s

fourth cause of action as to Burnes and entirely dismiss May’s fifth, sixth and seventh causes of 

action.

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II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The 

parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”28 If a plaintiff 

fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the complaint 

may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.29 A claim is 

facially plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”30

At this stage of the case, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.31 The court’s review is 

limited to the face of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice.32 However, the court need not accept as true 

 

26 Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. 

27 To be clear, Defendants move to dismiss all claims as to Burnes, and Burnes alone. Claims one 

through four against the VA are not challenged at this time. See Docket No. 19 at 1 nn.1-2. 

28 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

29 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

30 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

31 See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 

32 See id.

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allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.33 

Applying these standards to May’s fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action, the court holds 

that May fails to state claims that are plausible on their face.

III.

May’s fourth cause of action alleging creation of a hostile work environment under Title 

VII against Burnes fails as a matter of law. In the Ninth Circuit, the proper defendant in such a suit 

is “the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate,” not the individual federal 

employee.34 Because Burnes is merely an individual employee, he cannot be held liable for an 

alleged violation of Title VII.

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May’s fifth cause of action—creation of a hostile work environment under FEHA—also 

fails as a matter of law. Title VII is the “exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme 

for the redress of federal employment discrimination” based on race, and the ADEA is the “the 

exclusive enforcement mechanism” for the redress of federal employment discrimination based on 

age.36 These statutes are “exclusive of any other remedy against not only the federal government, 

but also against the individual federal employee alleged to have participated in the 

discrimination.”37 As such, the race- and age-based discrimination claims May asserts as part of 

his hostile work environment claim against Burnes are preempted by Title VII or the ADEA. 

Because May alleges that he “experienced constant harassment based upon his race and age while 

carrying out his job duties as a dispatcher for the VA,”38 his claim is precluded.

 

33 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 561 (2007) (“a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim” will not survive a motion to 

dismiss).

34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see also Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 707 n.1. 

35 May recognized this limitation in his opposition brief and agreed to amend his complaint by 

removing Burnes as a defendant to the fourth cause of action. See Docket No. 22 at 5:2-6. 

36 Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976); Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 

555 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009). 

37 Chan v. Salas, Case No. 10-cv-04348, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67355, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 

2011) (citing White v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 652 F.2d 913, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

38 Docket No. 17 at ¶ 76. 

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May’s sixth cause of action also is preempted by Title VII. A plaintiff may only bring a 

claim against an individual federal employee that would normally be precluded by Title VII under 

very narrow circumstances. For example, claims based on the Federal Tort Claims Act39 or state 

tort law may supplement Title VII claims when the allegations go “beyond the meaning of 

workplace discrimination . . . and involve physical or emotional injuries that are highly personal.”40 

The Ninth Circuit has explored the boundaries of what kinds of injuries constitute a highly personal 

violation; while allegations of rape, sexual assault and stalking seem to meet the threshold,41 other 

acts of physical violence have been summarily rejected. In Sommatino v. United States, the 

plaintiff alleged that her co-worker “brushed his body against [her] arms, legs, and hips . . . [and 

that he] often used loud, offensive, and vulgar language in the office.”42 The plaintiff further 

alleged that she “felt intimidated and fearful of physical violence” by said co-worker.43 The court 

ultimately concluded that Title VII barred the plaintiff’s FTCA claims against the government 

because she did not support her complaint with “allegations of specific harm directed” at her.44 

Instead, the allegations were “typical of the offensive workplace behavior giving rise to an action 

to remedy a hostile work environment.”45 

Here, May’s state law tort claim against Burnes as an individual does not fall within the 

“highly personal” exception to Title VII preemption. May’s allegations do not rise to “the order of 

 

39 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 

40 Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 711. 

41 See, e.g., Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1422-24 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a highly 

personal violation based on plaintiff’s allegation that her supervisor raped her); Arnold v. United 

States, 816 F.2d 1306, 1308-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding a highly personal violation based on 

plaintiff’s allegation that her supervisor “blocked the door preventing her from leaving” her office 

and then held her “close to his body, kissing and fondling her”); Otto v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 754, 758 

(9th Cir 1986) (finding a highly personal violation based on plaintiff’s allegation that her 

supervisor stalked and defamed her and that “the resulting mental distress caused her to suffer a 

miscarriage”).

42 Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 705. 

43 Id. at 706. 

44 Id. at 712. 

45 Id. 

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magnitude of . . . personal violation” that the Ninth Circuit has previously considered “highly 

personal.”46 Rather, the timbre of May’s allegations more closely mirror those in Sommatino—a 

pattern of verbal abuse, harassment, intimidation and wrongful denial of career advancement 

opportunities,47 specifying an instance in which Burnes “cornered” and “berated” May, causing 

May to “[sit] paralyzed, in fear, looking at Burnes, terrified that Burnes was going to shoot him.”48 

While May certainly may have felt uncomfortable, he does not allege any conduct that would bring 

Burnes’s conduct within the scope of a “highly personal” violation under Ninth Circuit precedent. 

May’s seventh cause of action does not allege facts sufficient to state a claim. May alleges 

that Burnes violated the Bane Act by “interfer[ing] with . . . by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion,’ 

Plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment [of] state and federal constitutional rights.”49 Specifically, May 

refers to “Burnes’s threatening deadly conduct, including use of intimidation and blocking 

Plaintiff’s movements while holding his weapon.”50 This claim is not facially plausible.51 The 

SAC does not state with particularity which constitutional rights Burnes allegedly violated.52 

Instead, May only provides “a formulaic recitation of [the] cause of action’s elements”—he 

specifically points to “Burnes’s threatening deadly conduct” and “use of intimidation” to prove that 

Burnes violated a statute prohibiting “interfere[nce] by threat[] [or] intimidation . . . with the 

 

46 Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 712. See also Brock, 64 F.3d at 1422-24; Arnold, 816 F.2d at 1308-12; 

Otto, 781 F.2d at 758. 

47 See generally Docket No. 17. 

48 Id. at ¶¶ 32-39. 

49 Docket No. 17 at ¶ 87; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a) (prohibiting “interfere[nce] by threat, 

intimidation, or coercion...with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights 

secured by the Constitution”).

50 Docket No. 17 at ¶ 88. 

51 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007). 

52 May’s opposition requests leave to amend the SAC to include claims against Burnes for 

violation of May’s First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Docket No. 22 at 3:8-11. 

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