Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00959/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00959-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DUNCAN LINDSEY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

ELSEVIER INC., et al. 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 16-cv-00959-GPC (DHB) 

ORDER REGARDING JOINT 

MOTION RE DISPUTED 

PROTECTIVE ORDER 

(ECF No. 12) 

 On July 8, 2016, Plaintiff Duncan Lindsey (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants Elsevier, 

Inc., Elsevier B.V., and Elsevier, Ltd. (collectively “Elsevier”) filed a Joint Motion 

regarding a disputed protective order. (ECF No. 12.) The parties represent they have 

agreed upon a form of protective order in all respects except one: they disagree about 

whether the protective order should have an “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” (“AEO”) level of 

confidentiality designation that would preclude Plaintiff from reviewing documents with 

that designation. (Id. at p. 1, lines 5-9.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds 

Elsevier has failed to establish good cause for the inclusion of an AEO provision in the 

protective order. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff commenced this action against Elsevier on March 17, 2016, alleging breach 

of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and breach of implied 

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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 1-2, Exh. A.) Plaintiff, a former tenured 

full Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, alleges Elsevier failed to pay 

him royalties owed under a written contract for a scholarly research journal about children 

and youth services that Plaintiff developed and has edited for thirty-eight years and Elsevier 

published. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 7.) 

In 1978, Plaintiff and Elsevier’s predecessor, Pergamon Press, entered into a written 

contract to develop and publish a journal called “Children and Youth Services Review” 

(“CYSR”) which became the premier research journal in the field of child welfare social 

work. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Under the contract, Plaintiff was to receive each year 15% of the net 

subscription income received “in respect of institutional subscriptions to the journal over 

and above the first 750 institutional subscriptions” in the form of royalty payments. (Id. at 

¶¶ 1, 17.) Plaintiff alleges Elsevier has never paid him any compensation, maintaining 

none was ever due. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6.) Elsevier and its predecessor repeatedly informed 

Plaintiff that the threshold of 750 subscriptions was never met. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Elsevier has obfuscated, misled, and failed to disclose the truth about the way it is 

calculating its subscriptions and his royalties. (Id. at ¶ 6.) In this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks 

damages, disgorgement of profits, rescission, accounting, and declaratory relief. (Id. at p. 

19.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

1. Legal Standard 

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 

Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 

relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 

case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the 

amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 

parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 

benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in 

evidence to be discoverable. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

 Rule 26 authorizes the court, upon a showing of good cause, to issue a protective 

order to “[a] party . . . from whom discovery is sought . . . to protect [that] party . . . from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(c)(1). The court’s order may, among other things, forbid the discovery; “forbid[] 

inquiry into certain matters, or limit[] the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain 

matters”; or “require[] that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 

commercial information not be revealed, or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (D), (G). 

 The party seeking a protective order bears the burden of establishing good cause. 

Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2004). “‘Good cause’ is established 

where it is specifically demonstrated that disclosure will cause a ‘specific prejudice or 

harm.’” Id. (citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 

1211 (9th Cir. 2002)). The showing of good cause under Rule 26 is a “heavy burden.” Id. 

(citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975)). “Broad allegations of 

harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 

26(c) test.” Id. (citing Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211-12). “If a court finds particularized harm 

will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the public and 

private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Id. (quoting Rivera v. 

NIBCO, Inc. 364 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

District courts have “broad discretion . . . to decide when a protective order is 

appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211 (quoting 

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)). In addition, district courts have 

“broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types 

of information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets or other confidential research, 

development, or commercial information.” Id. 

/// 

/// 

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 2. Discussion 

The parties agree that a protective order is appropriate in this case. The only dispute 

is whether the protective order should contain an AEO provision to cover documents 

Elsevier deems highly confidential and sensitive and/or trade secrets. (See ECF No. 12 at 

p. 1.) As the party seeking the AEO provision, Elsevier bears the burden of establishing 

good cause for its inclusion in the protective order. See Rivera, 384 F.3d at 827. To 

establish good cause, Elsevier must demonstrate that disclosure will cause specific 

prejudice or harm. See id. In evaluating prejudice or harm in cases “[w]here trade secrets 

or other confidential commercial information is involved, the court will balance the risk of 

disclosure to competitors against the risk that a protective order will impair prosecution or 

defense of the claims.” Nutratech, Inc. v. Syntech (SSPF) Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 552, 555 

(C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th 

Cir. 1992)). 

This balancing test “requires the district court to examine factually all the risks and 

safeguards surrounding inadvertent disclosure.” Id. The district court should factor in “the 

nature of the claims and of a party’s opportunity to develop its case through alternative 

discovery procedures.” Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1470. The court should also 

factor in whether the receiving party is “involved in ‘competitive decisionmaking’; that is, 

advising on decisions about pricing or design ‘made in light of similar or corresponding 

information about a competitor.’” Id. (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 

1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The resulting protective order should strike a “reasonable 

balance” between the parties’ interests. Id. at 1471. 

 a. Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure

Elsevier argues that although Plaintiff is not currently a competitor involved in 

competitive decision-making, he may be a competitor in the future. (ECF No. 12 at pp. 5-

6.) Elsevier contends that although Plaintiff claims he plans to retire, “regardless of [his] 

pronounced plans, it would be impossible to prevent him from starting a competing journal 

at the end of this litigation.” (Id.) In addition, Elsevier claims that Plaintiff seeks rescission 

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of his contract in the Complaint, and if he is successful, Plaintiff has threatened this will 

give him ownership of the CYSR journal. (Id.) 

In response, Plaintiff argues that he has never been a competitor of Elsevier; rather, 

he has been the editor of Elsevier’s CYSR journal for the past thirty-eight years and to this 

day continues to work for Elsevier as the journal’s editor. (Id. at pp. 11-17.) Plaintiff 

asserts that he is a retired university professor, who has dedicated his academic career to 

child welfare and social work, and that he has never been, and is not currently, a publisher, 

and has no intention of becoming a publisher. (Id. at pp. 15-16; see also ECF No. 12-3, 

Declaration of Dr. Duncan Lindsey (“Lindsey Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff acknowledges 

that his contract with Elsevier will expire in 2018 absent renewal, but at that time he will 

be in his early 70s and states that he plans to retire from editing. (Id. at p. 16; Lindsey 

Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff further asserts that he has no intention of working on another journal 

or starting a new journal, and has no intention of competing with Elsevier in the future. 

(Id.; Lindsey Decl. at ¶ 4.) 

Elsevier argues the Nutratech case is directly on point. (Id. at p. 8.) The Court 

disagrees, finding the cases factually distinguishable. In Nutratech, the court analyzed 

whether the president of the plaintiff company should be allowed to review materials in 

order to properly prepare the plaintiff’s case, and found that the defendant’s fear of 

competitive harm was legitimate. Nutratech, Inc., 242 F.R.D. at 554-55. However, in 

Nutratech, while the plaintiff argued it was not in direct competition with the defendant 

company as it sold to different buyers, the plaintiff also described the parties as competitors 

throughout its proposed protective order and admitted it sold the same product. Id. at 555. 

Thus, the court found the defendant’s fear of competitive harm from the disclosure of its 

supplier and customer lists to the plaintiff’s president to be legitimate. Id. Here, Plaintiff 

is not currently in competition with Elsevier, and the Court does not find Elsevier’s fear of 

a current employee potentially starting a competing business in a brand new field in his 

early 70s to be remotely as legitimate as, or even comparable to, the fear of disclosing 

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supplier and customer lists to the president of a competing business currently in the same 

field. 

In Mad Catz Interactive, Inc. v. Razor USA, Ltd., No. 13cv2371-GPC (JLB), 2014 

WL 4161713 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014) (Burkhardt, J.), the court undertook an extensive 

analysis of the role played by the plaintiff’s general counsel to determine whether he was 

a competitive decision-maker, before finding the general counsel’s role would not give rise 

to an unacceptable risk of disclosure such that he should be denied access to the defendant’s 

highly confidential information. Id. at *2-5. Such an extensive analysis is not necessary 

here. Undisputedly, Plaintiff is not presently a competitive decision-maker, nor is he a 

competitor or an individual who interacts with competitors. Elsevier’s argument therefore 

rests on the concern that Plaintiff may be a competitor in the future. However, the argument 

that Plaintiff may be a competitor in the future is not only highly speculative, but in light 

of Plaintiff’s representations, his career history, his retirement status, and his age, also 

highly unlikely. Therefore, the Court finds the risk of inadvertent disclosure and 

competitive harm to be low. 

b. Potential Harm from Inadvertent Disclosure

Although formal discovery may have only recently commenced, Elsevier argues that 

Plaintiff has indicated he will seek highly confidential and sensitive information. (ECF 

No. 12 at p. 2; ECF No. 12-1 at ¶¶ 2-5, Exh. A.) In particular, Elsevier is concerned about 

disclosure of financial information and publishing agreements for unrelated journals that 

are published and distributed by Elsevier. (Id. at p. 3.) Elsevier argues that its publishing 

agreements with unrelated journals are highly confidential and contain protected business 

and trade secret information, as well as confidentiality provisions. (Id.) Elsevier is also 

concerned about the production of the following categories of documents: journal 

subscriber lists; pricing and financial information; royalties payable; IRS 1099 tax forms 

for its editors, owners, staff, and other personnel affiliated with thousands of journals; 

expense reimbursements, subsidies and honorariums paid for other journals from 1978 to 

present; Elsevier’s costs in printing journals versus converting them to electronic media; 

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formulas for allocation revenues; identity of subscribers, marketing data; and possibly 

source code, technical information and internal formulas for setting up bundled plans and 

electronic search mechanisms. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) Elsevier contends these categories include 

protected trade secret information, and highly confidential documents that implicate 

privacy rights and are covered by the taxpayer privilege. (Id. at p. 3; see also ECF No. 12-

2 at ¶¶ 2-3.) 

As formal discovery may have only recently commenced, which, if any, of these 

documents will be produced is yet to be determined.1

 The parties generally do not dispute 

that several of these categories of documents may contain highly confidential information 

and/or trade secrets, and that a protective order is warranted and must be followed. In his 

declaration submitted in support of the Joint Motion, Plaintiff states that he will comply 

with the confidentiality provisions of a protective order, and he will be bound by this order. 

(Lindsey Decl. at ¶ 5.) Although Elsevier has not met its “burden of showing that specific 

prejudice or harm will result from the disclosure of each document (or item of information) 

that it seeks to protect,” because Plaintiff does not dispute the nature of the documents, the 

Court will assume for purposes of this motion only that the categories of documents at 

issue contain highly sensitive and confidential information and/or trade secrets. See 

Nutratech, Inc., 242 F.R.D. at 554 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 c. Prejudice to Plaintiff

“A showing that the protective order increases the difficulty of managing litigation, 

without more, does not constitute actual prejudice.” Mad Catz Interactive, Inc., 2014 WL 

4161713, at *6 (citing Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 525, 529 (N.D. Cal. 

2000)). “The protective order must actually prejudice presentation of the moving party’s 

case.” Intel Corp., 198 F.R.D. at 528. Courts have found good cause to outweigh the risk 

                                               

1

 The parties spend time arguing relevance in their Joint Motion. However, a 

request for determination of relevance is not presently before the Court. 

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of inadvertent disclosure and permit access to confidential information where, because of 

the technical nature of a case, specialized knowledge is necessary to supervise the 

litigation. Id. In addition, courts may also consider financial hardship as a factor when 

evaluating the balancing test, but it is not dispositive. Mad Catz Interactive, Inc., 2014 WL 

4161713, at *6 (citing RPA Int’l Pty Ltd. v. Compact Int’l, Inc., No. 06cv1147, 2007 WL 

4105725, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov.16, 2007)). 

Plaintiff argues he will be severely prejudiced if he were barred from reviewing 

Elsevier’s financial information and agreements relevant to his claims. (ECF No. 12 at pp. 

19-20.) He argues that his inability to review Elsevier’s financial information would 

preclude him from “meaningfully participating in this litigation, analyzing his damages, 

engaging in settlement discussions, or preparing his case for trial.” (Id. at p. 19, lines 4-6.) 

Plaintiff asserts that his counsel has “no expertise with regard to subscriptions, institutional 

subscribers, journal publishing, editorial compensation and other issues at the heart of this 

litigation,” and that he cannot afford an expensive team of expert consultants. (Id. at p. 19, 

lines 15-17.) He states that he “will be relying on his own expertise and decades of 

experience as an editor of an Elsevier journal to analyze Elsevier financial and contractual 

data and make important determinations regarding the validity of Elsevier’s factual 

defenses, his damages, the adequacy of Elsevier’s settlement proposals and all other key 

decisions affecting his rights in this litigation.” (Id. at p. 19, lines 18-23.) He further asserts 

that he will “rely on counsel to present his case in court, but all factual conclusions, the 

factual preparation of his case for trial, and any settlement decisions can only be made by 

[him].” (Id. at p. 19, lines 23-26.) 

Although Plaintiff’s counsel is more than qualified to assist with analyzing and 

preparing Plaintiff’s case, the Court finds Plaintiff is uniquely qualified to evaluate 

Elsevier’s financial and contractual data, and based on that data, Elsevier’s claims and 

defenses. Given Plaintiff’s extensive experience working in the field and with Defendant, 

and Plaintiff’s claimed lack of extensive funds, the Court further finds Plaintiff would be 

prejudiced if he were not permitted to review Elsevier’s information. 

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Weighing all the factors and examining all the risks and safeguards surrounding 

inadvertent disclosure, the Court finds Elsevier has failed to establish good cause to include 

an AEO provision in the protective order. In making this finding, the Court places 

particular emphasis on Elsevier’s failure to demonstrate that Plaintiff is presently a 

competitor, there is a likelihood that he will be a competitor in the future, or that there is a 

high risk of inadvertent disclosure to a competitor. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Elsevier has failed to establish good cause 

for the entry of an AEO provision in the protective order. Accordingly, the Court will issue 

a protective order in the form attached as Exhibit D to the Declaration of Jennifer Jonak. 

(ECF No. 12-1, Exh. D.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 19, 2016 

 _________________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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