Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01815/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01815-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CEDRIC BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

K. MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

1:06-CV-01815 AWI GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by

jury trial on May 16, 1985, of first degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187, and

robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211. See Respondent’s Answer to Petition (hereinafter

“Answer”), Exhibit 1. On June 14, 1985, Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term

of twenty-five years to life in state prison with the possibility of parole. Id. 

On April 6, 2005, Petitioner’s second subsequent parole suitability hearing was held

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affirming the conviction, as read into the parole hearing record by the Board. See Answer, Exhibit 2 at 11-13.

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before the California Board of Prison Terms (now the Board of Parole Hearings - “Board”). See

Answer, Exhibit 2. Petitioner participated in the hearing and was represented by counsel. Id. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied parole and deferred rehearing for two years. Id. at

63, 67.

Petitioner then sought relief in the state courts. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court on May 18, 2005, which was denied on

June 27, 2005, in a reasoned opinion. See Answer, Exhibit 3. He then filed a second habeas

petition in the Kern County Superior Court on July 4, 2005. Id. That petition was denied in a

reasoned opinion on September 1, 2005. Id. On September 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court. See Answer, Exhibit 4. On July 19, 2006, the petition

was summarily denied. Id.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 13, 2006, in

this Court. The petition challenges the 2005 decision of the Board denying parole. Petitioner

contends the Board erroneously denied parole without evidence to support the decision. He

claims the decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of his Constitutional rights. He

further argues the Board failed to consider all relevant factors, wrongly denied parole solely on

the basis of the commitment offense, used a disciplinary “chrono” to justify the denial when the

charges had been dismissed, and delayed the parole consideration hearing in violation of his

procedural due process rights.

On March 23, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes the

petition is exhausted and timely. Petitioner filed a traverse on October 9, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

While driving to Mass on August 19, 1984, Ynez Terrazas saw an elderly woman and a

black male struggling over her purse. When the black male, whom Terrazas identified as being

Petitioner, gained control of the purse, he ran off while the elderly woman fell. When Terrazas

stopped to aid the woman, she noticed the woman had blood on her arm and was not moving. On

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cross-examination, Terrazas admitted never seeing the black male push the elderly woman,

however on re-direct, Terrazas stated that the woman did not appear to relinquish control of the

purse voluntarily. 

David Barragan, another witness who was working on a nearby roof, saw a man take a

purse away from a woman. Although he was too far away to make a positive identification of

Petitioner, Barragan did notice that the woman would not give up her purse and that Helen Rupp,

the stipulated victim in this case, had to pull it away. When the man got the purse, Barragan saw

the woman fall in the same motion. Barragan noted that the man pulled at the purse more than

once. 

Ray Vaughn, who was staying at his brother’s apartment, saw Petitioner at the apartment

that same morning. Petitioner looked as if he was carrying a bag. Even after being refused

permission, Petitioner went into the bathroom. Through a crack in the door, Vaughn saw

Petitioner going through the purse. Petitioner was arrested soon after at this apartment complex.

The victim was a 77-year-old woman who was very active before breaking her hip in the

struggle for her purse. After the fall, Rupp was restricted to the use of a walker. Rupp, who not

only broke her hip but also fractured her shoulder, had surgery to replace the hip on August 22,

1984. After being discharged, Rupp returned to the hospital on September 9, suffering from

pneumonia. Rupp was released on September 24 and died in her home on October 18.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions.

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Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

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set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

II. Review of Petition

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural

protections that particular situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part

of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not

constitutionally mandated, even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at

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1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole

board proceeding, the only process to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive

advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the

inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision of the

Board must be supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability. Superintendent,

Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th

Cir.1987).

“In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of good time does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In

determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court need not examine the entire

record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. Rather,

the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion of the disciplinary board. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to parole, as both

situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the BPH is guided by

the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

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prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

In this case, with regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, Petitioner

was provided all that is required. Petitioner was given advance notice of the hearing, he was 

represented by counsel at the hearing, he was granted an opportunity to submit materials for the

Board’s consideration and an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and he was provided a

written decision explaining the reasons why parole was denied. See Answer, Exhibit 2.

Petitioner, however, contends the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious and had no

evidentiary support. After reviewing all relevant evidence, the Court finds that the state court

rejection of Petitioner’s claims was not unreasonable, because the Board’s decision is supported

by “some evidence.” 

Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c) sets forth certain

negative factors which the Board would consider in determining whether Petitioner is suitable for

parole. 

Section 2402(c) provides:

Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following circumstances each 

tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These circumstances are set forth as general

guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances

in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances tending to indicate

unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

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(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very

trivial in relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c). 

In denying parole in 2005, the Board first considered and found the circumstances of the

commitment offense indicated unsuitability. Pursuant to § 2402(c)(1), the Board found the

offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. In making this finding, the Board relied on

factors (D) and (E). 

The Board first found the offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering under § 2402(c)(1)(D). In support of this

finding, the Board noted that Petitioner struggled violently with a particularly vulnerable victim,

a 77 year old woman, over her purse. Petitioner’s actions caused the elderly woman to fall to the

ground, break her hip and fracture her shoulder. These injuries eventually caused her death. Thus,

there is some evidence to support the Board’s finding.

Next, the Board found the motive to be very trivial pursuant to § 2402(c)(1)(E). Petitioner

admitted he assaulted the elderly woman so he could obtain money to buy drugs. Therefore, there

is some evidence to support the Board’s finding that the motive was very trivial. 

In addition to the commitment offense, the Board noted Petitioner’s previous record of

violence indicated unsuitability pursuant to § 2402(c)(2). Petitioner’s record demonstrated an

escalating pattern of violence. As a juvenile, Petitioner was placed on formal probation for

receiving stolen property. On October 30, 1980, he was convicted and sentenced for carrying a

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concealed firearm on his person. In 1981, he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and

convicted of battery. In 1982, he was found guilty of vandalism and received 24 months

probation. In 1983, he was convicted of carrying a loaded weapon in a public place and

possessing PCP. Again in 1983, Petitioner was convicted of possessing a controlled substance:

PCP. And in 1984, he was arrested for the underlying offenses. Based on these facts, there is

some evidence to support the Board’s finding that Petitioner’s previous record of violence

indicated unsuitability.

The Board next found Petitioner had an unstable social history pursuant to § 2402(c)(3).

Although Petitioner had a family and children, and a full-time job at the time he committed the

offense, he also had a history of alcohol, marijuana and cocaine use. And, he had sold PCP on

prior occasions. Given Petitioner’s problems with substance abuse, the Board found he had an

unstable social history. This finding is supported by at least “some evidence.”

The Board also found Petitioner had engaged in negative behavior and misconduct while

incarcerated. Petitioner had been disciplined eight times for serious misconduct, most recently in

1997 for battery on an inmate. He had also been recently counseled in 2004 for violating

grooming standards. Pursuant to § 2402(c)(6), the Board properly relied on these circumstances

as negative indicators of suitability.

Finally, the Board found the psychologist’s report disturbing. Although the report was

generally supportive of release, the Board was concerned over the psychologist’s reservations

with respect to Petitioner’s history of substance abuse. The psychologist had written that

Petitioner poses a “moderately low likelihood of becoming involved in a violent offense if

released to the free community.” See Answer, Exhibit 2 at p. 50. But, the psychologist noted that

“[t]here is a caveat that such an assessment is at least partially based on the likelihood of

continued abstinence from substance abuse.” Id. Petitioner also told the Board he had been sober

since 1994, but the psychologist had recorded Petitioner had been sober for fourteen years. To

add further confusion to Petitioner’s substance abuse question, a chrono in the file indicated he

had tested positive for alcohol in 1998. Petitioner argues the chrono should not have been

considered because it had been dismissed. Nevertheless, the Board could find no record of the

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chrono having been dismissed, and Petitioner did not submit proof of the dismissal. The chrono

was present in Petitioner’s legal file and was therefore properly considered. Additionally, the

psychologist noted that Petitioner’s risk of violence to the community was moderate to low

provided he abstained from substance abuse. In light of these facts, the Board found Petitioner

needed further self-help programming and therapy. The Board’s finding was supported by some

evidence.

The Board also considered the various circumstances demonstrating suitability pursuant

to § 2402(d). The Board noted Petitioner had a stable social history other than his substance

abuse issues. He had maintained relationships with his children and family. In addition,

Petitioner was commended for his numerous positive work reports. The Board noted the many

letters in support Petitioner had received from his community as well as the numerous offers of

employment and residence. Nevertheless, the Board found these positive factors, while promising

for a possible future grant of parole, did not outweigh the Board’s determination that Petitioner

remained an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. The gravity of Petitioner’s

offense, his prior record of violence, his substance abuse issues and his negative institutional

behavior, despite his positive gains, were more indicative of a danger to the public. 

It is apparent the Board considered all relevant evidence in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors. Those findings were supported by at least “some

evidence.”

Petitioner raises various other claims which are also without merit. He claims the Board

failed to consider “all relevant factors.” However, he does not state what other factors were not

properly considered. As discussed above, all relevant factors were addressed by the Board. He

also argues the Board improperly based its decision on the commitment offense itself. As

Respondent correctly argues, the California Supreme Court in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th

1061, 1095 (2005), found the commitment offense and prior offenses could alone be sufficient to

deny parole under California law. Moreover, the Board did not rely solely on the commitment

and prior offenses. The Board also relied on Petitioner’s institutional behavior and substance

abuse issues in denying parole. Petitioner also complains that a chrono was relied upon that had

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been previously dismissed. As previously discussed, there was no record of this dismissal and

Petitioner did not offer proof of it. Finally, Petitioner claims the Board improperly postponed his

hearing in violation of his procedural rights, and he argues he should be compensated. The Kern

County Superior Court found the Board was justified in postponing the hearing in order to clarify

Petitioner’s sentence. Also, the remedy for an improper postponement would have been a

rehearing, which Petitioner has already received.

In light of the above, it cannot be said that the state court resolution of Petitioner’s claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Dated: December 4, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij UNI 8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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