Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03191/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-3191

__________

SANDRA HARMON,

Appellant

v.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Sussex Co. Delaware; JASON ADKINS, individually 

and in his capacity as defense counsel for Sussex County Administration; SUSSEX 

COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT & APPEALS MEMBERS; DALE 

CALLAWAY, Chairman individually and in his capacity as Chairman; ELLEN MAGEE, 

individually and in her capacity as a board member; J. BRUCE MEARS, individually and 

in his capacity as a board member; JOHN MILLS, individually and in his capacity as a 

board member; E. BRENT WORKMAN, individually and in his capacity as a board 

member; SUSSEX COUNTY ADMINISTRATION

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-01021)

District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

April 20, 2020

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 27, 2020)

___________

OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 19-3191 Document: 39 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/27/2020
2

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Sandra Harmon appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 

complaint. For the reasons detailed below, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment

and remand for further proceedings.

Harmon owned real property in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. In January 2018, 

Sussex County commenced a monition1 action against Harmon to collect delinquent 

sewer and water bills and costs incurred when it demolished her fire-damaged home. 

Harmon claims that she paid the sewer and water bills, but that Sussex County and the 

individual defendants never consulted with her about the demolition costs, failed to give 

her notice of the monition action, charged excessively high interest on the demolition 

costs, and sold the property at a sheriff’s sale without providing her with a reasonable 

time to pay the outstanding costs. She filed a complaint in District Court under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 alleging that the defendants had violated her constitutional rights.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, because the state monition 

action remained ongoing, the District Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 

U.S. 37 (1971). The District Court granted the motion. Harmon filed a timely notice of 

appeal.2

 

1 “Monition” is “a legal process in the nature of a summons or citation to appear and 

answer (as in default of performing some certain act).” Monition, Merriam-Webster’s 

Unabridged Dictionary (2016). 

2 Harmon also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. 

Because Harmon did not file a timely new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the 

order denying her motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to consider that order. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 

Case: 19-3191 Document: 39 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/27/2020
3

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review 

over whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 

F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2010).

We will vacate the District Court’s judgment. The Court concluded that 

abstention under Younger was appropriate because “(1) there are ongoing state 

proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state 

interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the 

federal claims.” ECF No. 23 at 6. These factors were set forth in Middlesex County

Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 

However, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the 

Supreme Court “narrowed Younger’s domain.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 

F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019). “The Court explained—and we have stressed several times 

since—that the ‘three Middlesex conditions’ are no longer the test for Younger

abstention.” Id. (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81). Rather, courts must first analyze 

whether the parallel state action falls within one of “three exceptional categories”: (1) 

criminal prosecutions, (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil 

proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 

perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quotation marks, alteration 

omitted). 

2008).

Case: 19-3191 Document: 39 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/27/2020
4

The District Court therefore failed to apply the proper standard. See Hamilton v. 

Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining, in similar circumstances, that 

“[b]y not applying the correct test for Younger abstention, the District Court erred”). 

Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand so that it can 

decide, in the first instance, whether the state monition action falls within one of the three 

classes of cases described by Sprint.

3 

3 We express no opinion about whether the monition action does fall within one of these 

classes of cases, whether Harmon’s claims have merit, or whether the defendants have 

other meritorious defenses. 

Case: 19-3191 Document: 39 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/27/2020