Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00781/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00781-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERNARD A. WHITE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0781 MCE GGH P

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently

without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall be collected

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and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

It is difficult to discern what the allegations of this complaint are, much less to

determine whether they are colorable. Plaintiff’s filing on the face of if violates Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8. Fed. R. Civ. P 8 sets forth general rules of pleading in the federal courts. Complaints are

required to set a forth (1) the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction rests, (2) a short and

plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief

plaintiff seeks. All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of

the claims against them. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d

80 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202 (2d ed. 1990). Rule

8 requires “sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” 

McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accord Richmond v. Nationwide

Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty

allegations fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 8.)

In a garbled complaint, plaintiff states that he is seeking punitive damages “on

mental anguish that was cause [sic] by the Director of Corrections Agency Employees period

[sic].” Complaint, p. 4. As to suing the State of California, the Eleventh Amendment serves as a

jurisdictional bar to suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state

or the agency consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v.

Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)( per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir.

1982). In the instant case, the State of California has not consented to suit. Accordingly,

plaintiff's claims against the state are frivolous and must be dismissed.

Plaintiff names as a defendant, “Director of Corrections–Head Director of

Correction Agency,” and also states, under “additional defendants,” the following:

1991 Old Folsom made movement, men, femal [sic], womens [sic]

went though [sic] made construction movement using a red tool

box operation to plaintiff residence since 1967 Antelope Valley

Palmdale, Lancaster area also the Sheriff of Los Angeles County

Jails, public people family and friends.

Complaint, p. 2.

Within his allegations, plaintiff sets forth:

\\\\\

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The Director of Corrections head agency as well correctional

facilities inmates, employees, policy and procedures due process,

violation, in 1991 through 2007 that cause curel [sic] and unusaul

[sic] punishment to plaintiff, family, relatives, friends, the public

people not sucure [sic] from the cause to violent individuals staff

violated employees. Relative dead causes 2002 by the Antelope

Valley Sheriff Palmdale California. Lies that plantiff [sic] have as

well plantiff in the cell with Crips. Enemies, when plantiff had fit

the criteria required to a specialized segregated unit which apply to

CDC title # 15 3341.5 segregated (a) and (5).

Complaint, p. 4. 

Plaintiff also appends a series of rambling and indecipherable claims regarding,

inter alia, the Attorney General and ex post facto laws. Complaint Exhibit, pp. 1-12. Although

it is far from clear, it appears that plaintiff is alleging, among some wholly unintelligible claims,

that insufficiently identified defendants have at some point violated his constitutional rights, both

under the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments, by placing him in a cell at some unidentified

location with inmates belonging to the Crips gang even though plaintiff fits the criteria set forth

in a specific state prison regulation. 

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3341.5(a) sets forth that “An inmate whose safety would

be endangered by general population placement may be placed in PHU [protective housing unit]

providing the following criteria are met[,]” which criteria includes under subsection (5) that

“[t]he inmate has specific, verified enemies identified on CDC Form 812 likely to and capable of

causing the inmate great bodily harm if placed in general population.” Plaintiff apparently claims

to fit that specific criterion without reference to any other criteria set forth.

In general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to

federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.

Ct. 2701 (1972). Nor does the Constitution guarantee a prisoner placement in a particular prison

or protect an inmate against being transferred from one institution to another. Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-225, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2358 (1976).

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On the other hand, “‘[P]rison officials have a duty...to protect prisoners from

violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

1976 (1994). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are

met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’ ...For a claim (like

the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. 

Second, “[t]o violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison officials must have a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ ... [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to

inmate health or safety.” Id. The prison official will be liable only if “the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the officials must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed primarily as violative of Rule 8, as set

forth above, because it does not contain sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice. 

See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Richmond v.

Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and

scanty allegations fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 8); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202 (2d ed. 1990). Plaintiff’s allegations do not identify a

specific time or place when he was allegedly wrongly denied protective housing unit. He does

not name individual defendants who were responsible for actually placing him in any such

housing. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief; therefore, in his suit for money damages

only, he must show how the CDCR Secretary, herein dismissed as a defendant, was actually

linked to any constitutional deprivation plaintiff claims to have suffered. Plaintiff will be granted

thirty days to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff has filed a document at least partly entitled “motion for temporary

restraining order.” He claims that he has been held illegally in detention for nine months for a

penal code violation referred for criminal prosecution. He claims to be under some sort of threat

by two correctional officers, Peterson and Peeler, apparently linked to a lack of law library

access. Once again, plaintiff does not frame a request that is sufficiently discernible for the

court to recommend any form of preliminary injunctive relief, stating:

The plaintiff want [sic] a temporary restraining order for C/O

Peeler to stay conditions away from the plaintiff while the plaintiff

has order already upon the magistrate [judge] Dennis Beck due to

other concern upon the correctional state officials located at

Tehachapi Facility.

Motion, docketed as filed on September 28, 2007, pp. 3-4. 

The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo

pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a

temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the

hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent, however, that requests for temporary

restraining orders which are not ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general

standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch.

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Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting);

Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the

emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the balance of hardships because the

merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and adjudicate on short notice. In this

case, plaintiff’s complaint having been herein dismissed, plaintiff has made no showing of

having meritorious underlying claims before the court nor does he by his motion make any

coherent showing of irreparable harm. Plaintiff’s putative motion for a TRO will be vacated

without prejudice to bringing another motion for preliminary injunctive relief, one that is

adequately supported, should plaintiff file an amended complaint with colorable claims for which

the court may direct service upon any defendant.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. The complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file

an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file an

amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

4. Plaintiff’s defective motion for a restraining order, docketed as filed on

September 28, 2007, is vacated without prejudice.

DATED: 10/15/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

whit0781.bnf

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