Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01560/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01560-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAMON L. JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE DAVEY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-01560-HSG (PR) 

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

STAY AND REQUIRING ELECTION 

BY PETITIONER

Re: Dkt. No. 8

On April 6, 2015, petitioner Damon L. Jones, an inmate at Corcoran State Prison, filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On August 12, 2015, the Court 

issued an Order on Initial Review in which it found that Petitioner had filed a mixed petition 

containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. In the Order, the Court explained to Petitioner that 

a federal court must dismiss a mixed petition and provided him with an opportunity to amend the 

petition by withdrawing the unexhausted claims and proceeding only on the exhausted claims, or 

to dismiss the mixed petition and return to federal court with a new petition once all claims were 

exhausted. The Court also explained that Petitioner could seek a stay of the petition while he was 

exhausting his claims in state court. Now before the Court is Petitioner’s motion to stay his 

petition. 

DISCUSSION

The United States Supreme Court has held that a district court may stay mixed habeas 

petitions to allow the petitioner to exhaust in state court. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 

(2005). The district court’s discretion to stay a mixed petition is circumscribed by AEDPA’s 

stated purposes of reducing delay in the execution of criminal sentences and encouraging 

petitioners to seek relief in the state courts before filing their claims in federal court. Rhines, 544 

Case 4:15-cv-01560-HSG Document 9 Filed 10/01/15 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

U.S. at 277. Because the use of a stay and abeyance procedure has the potential to undermine 

these dual purposes of AEDPA, its use is only appropriate where the district court has first 

determined that there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims in state 

court and that the claims are potentially meritorious. Id. Moreover, where granting a stay, the 

district court must effectuate the timeliness concerns in AEDPA by placing “reasonable limits on a 

petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Id. at 278. An assertion of good cause turns on whether 

the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse supported by sufficient evidence to justify the 

failure to exhaust. See Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing denial of 

stay when petitioner supported his good cause argument with evidence including a 

neuropsychological and psychological evaluation and many declarations). Good cause for failure 

to exhaust does not require “extraordinary circumstances.” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 

(9th Cir. 2005). But Rhines made it clear that district courts should only stay mixed petitions in 

“limited circumstances.” Id. at 661.

Here, petitioner has not attempted to show good cause to justify a Rhines stay. Nor is there 

anything in the record to suggest he could make the requisite showing. As Petitioner has not 

demonstrated good cause, the Court need not consider the other Rhines factor, i.e., whether the 

claims are potentially meritorious, and the motion for a stay will be denied.

Due to a critical one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions 

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d), the Court is reluctant to dismiss the mixed petition (and possibly cause a later-filed 

petition to be time-barred) without giving Petitioner the opportunity to elect whether to proceed 

with just his exhausted claims, or to try to exhaust the unexhausted claims before having this 

Court consider all his claims. Therefore, instead of an outright dismissal of the action, the Court 

will allow Petitioner to choose whether he wants to:

(1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the 

exhausted claims, or

(2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all claims before filing a 

new federal petition presenting all of his claims.

Case 4:15-cv-01560-HSG Document 9 Filed 10/01/15 Page 2 of 3
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United States District Court

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If he chooses option (1) and goes forward with only his exhausted claims, he may face 

dismissal of any later-filed petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If he chooses option (2), dismissing 

this action and returning to state court to exhaust all claims before filing a new federal petition, his 

new federal petition might be rejected as time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion for a stay is DENIED. Petitioner must serve 

and file within 28 days of the filing date of this Order, a notice in which he states whether he 

elects to (1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the remaining 

claims, or (2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all of his claims before 

returning to federal court to present all of his claims in a new petition. If he chooses either Option 

(1) or Option (2), his filing need not be a long document; it is sufficient if he files a one-page 

document entitled “Election By Petitioner” and states simply: “Petitioner elects to proceed under 

Option ___ provided in the Court’s Order Denying Request for Stay and Requiring Election by 

Petitioner.” Petitioner would have to insert a number in place of the blank space to indicate which 

of the two options he chooses. If Petitioner does not choose one of the two options by the 

deadline, the Court will dismiss the action.

This Order terminates Docket No. 8.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

10/1/2015

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