Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01239/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01239-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTER BURNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. MIRANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-1239 MCE CKD P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of civil 

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding with claims arising under the Eighth

Amendment against defendants Sisson,1 Hitt,

2

Lewis, Miranda, Lee, Lankford, Simmerson, 

Swingle and French (defendants); all current or former employees of the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at High Desert State Prison (High Desert).3 

 

1

 The person identified as Lt. “Sessions” in plaintiff’s complaint answered plaintiff’s complaint 

as Lt. Sisson. 

2

 The person identified as Lt. “Hits” in plaintiff’s complaint answered plaintiff’s complaint as Lt. 

Hitt. 

3

 On August 13, 2013, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

In the screening order, the court found that the complaint asserts cognizable claims against these 

defendants arising under the Eighth Amendment. All other claims and defendants were 

dismissed.

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Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. In the motion, defendants argue: 1) 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims against 

defendants Sisson, Hitt, Lewis and Simmerson; 2) that all defendants are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on all of plaintiff’s claims because of a failure of proof as to certain essential 

elements of plaintiff’s claims; and 3) that all defendants are immune from plaintiff’s claims under 

the “qualified immunity” doctrine.4 

I. Plaintiff’s Claims

All of plaintiff’s claims are related in some way to the denial of a “single-cell, single bed” 

cell assignment (assignment to a cell with no cellmate and no bunk beds) while at High Desert

which plaintiff asserts he needed due to back pain. Plaintiff’s complaint is confusing, vague and, 

at times, misleading. Nevertheless, the court has, as directed by the Ninth Circuit, liberally 

construed plaintiff’s complaint, Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) while 

keeping in mind that defendants are entitled to “fair notice” of the claims against them. Jones v. 

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The court omits allegations in plaintiff’s complaint which are not relevant to a viable

Eighth Amendment claim for either inadequate medical care or inadequate cell conditions. 

Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a violation 

of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). An 

individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is deliberately indifferent to a 

prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. With respect to cell conditions, the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes on prison officials, among other things, a 

duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). An 

inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights can only be violated by a prison official if that official 

/////

 

4

 Defendants assert objections to certain evidence submitted by plaintiff. ECF Nos. 67-68. The 

objections are discussed below only to the extent the evidence to which an objection made is 

material to the outcome of defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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exposes an inmate to a “substantial risk of serious harm,” while displaying “deliberate 

indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. 

A. Sisson, Hitt, Lewis and Simmerson 

Plaintiff asserts that on June 9, 2010, when he arrived at High Desert, he was met by 

Correctional Lieutenants Hitt, Lewis, Sisson and Simmerson. Eventually, those defendants 

escorted plaintiff to a room with a computer. The computer indicated that plaintiff needed 

“single-cell, single bed housing.” Each defendant asked plaintiff “what the hell is that?” Plaintiff 

responded “that is the housing I need.” Defendants Hitt, Lewis, Sisson and Simmerson all said 

“‘you got to be fucking kidding’ while laughing hysterically.” They then taunted plaintiff by 

saying “do you think we are going to give you that housing here, you [are] out of your fucking 

mind.” “We are not going to give you that housing.” “We will have medical staff say you don’t 

need it.” After that, plaintiff was placed into a holding cell. As each defendant left, they told 

plaintiff “good luck with trying to get that housing here because it’s not going to happen.” 

B. French

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by defendant French on June 11, 2010. On that day, 

French told plaintiff “we are not cutting out the top bunk of a cell for you. . .” French told 

plaintiff she was aware of recommendations made by an outside doctor named doctor Rahimifar, 

but plaintiff “would not [receive] such housing at [High Desert].” Plaintiff also alleges French 

did not send plaintiff to be evaluated by a specialist to determine if plaintiff needed “single-cell, 

single bed” housing.

C. Miranda

Plaintiff alleges that he saw defendant Miranda, a physician’s assistant, on June 10 and 

June 14, 2010. On those occasions, plaintiff claims Miranda ignored the express orders of Dr. 

Rahimifar” because “correctional staff ask[ed] him to and it would be a[n] inconvenience to order 

correctional staff to remove the top bunk in a cell.”

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In the body of his complaint, plaintiff also references two medical records authored by 

defendant Miranda on July 16, 2010. Both appear to have been generated after plaintiff visited 

Miranda that day. ECF No. 2 at 41-42. 5 According to Miranda, plaintiff complained about 

chronic neck and back pain. Among other things, plaintiff told Miranda that he cannot sit up 

straight while sitting on the lower bunk in his cell without hitting his head on the upper bunk. He 

also indicated that he had already hit is head on the upper bunk five times. Plaintiff requested to 

be placed in a cell by himself without bunk beds.

Miranda denied plaintiff’s request for a cell with only one bed and revoked authorization 

to be placed in a cell by himself based upon: 1) his own observations of plaintiff; and 2) the 

written opinion of neurosurgeon Dr. Calvin found in plaintiff’s medical filed in which Dr. Calvin 

indicates that plaintiff could share a cell with another inmate and be housed in a cell that has a 

“chair.” 

D. Lankford

Plaintiff alleges defendant Lankford denied plaintiff “single-bed, single cell” housing on 

July 16, 2010.

E. Lee 

Plaintiff alleges on March 17, 2011, defendant Dr. Lee removed plaintiff from the 

Disability Placement Program. Plaintiff alleges this denied plaintiff “single bed, single cell” 

housing. 

F. Swingle

Plaintiff alleges that on July 22, 2010, he mailed a letter to defendant Dr. Swingle, the 

Chief Medical Officer at High Desert. In the letter (ECF No. 57-2 at 127-28) plaintiff asserts that

around July 15, 2010 he was informed by a correctional officer that he would not be assigned to 

“single-cell, single-bed” housing as was ordered by a “doctor or neurosurgeon.” Plaintiff asserts 

he was told somebody in “custody” was of the opinion that plaintiff’s medical records indicated 

/////

 

5

 The page numbers referenced are generally those assigned by the court’s electronic docketing 

system. 

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plaintiff simply needed somewhere to sit in his cell, and the stool provided in every cell in the 

rear of the cell, and attached to a desk, would meet plaintiff’s needs. 

Plaintiff informed defendant Swingle that the stool did not meet his needs because he 

could not comfortably watch television while sitting on the stool, he had to share the stool with a 

cellmate, and he could only face the wall while sitting on the stool, not the cell door.

Finally, plaintiff informed Swingle that he had a bed sore at that moment because he had 

been lying down too much. He would not have been lying down so much if he had a reasonable 

place to sit where he would not be in “extreme pain.”

Defendant Swingle responded to plaintiff’s letter as follows (ECF No. 57-2 at 94):

Our institution was unaware of this inmates [sic] history or medical 

needs at the time of his arrival. We have extensively researched 

this issue and discussed it as possible with his specialty providers. 

The neurosurgeon has a noted in the UHR clarifying his position 

that a chair in the cell is adequate and that a lower bunk should be 

adequate to accommodate his needs.

Plaintiff asserts defendant Swingle ignored the recommendations made by Dr. Rahimifar 

that plaintiff be assigned to “single-cell, single bed” housing. Plaintiff also takes issue with the 

fact that Dr. Swingle never discussed plaintiff’s condition with Dr. Rahimifar or Dr. Calvin. 

Finally, plaintiff asserts Dr. Swingle should have sent plaintiff to a specialist before denying him 

“single-cell, single bed” housing. 

II. Failure To Exhaust

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect 

to his claims against defendants Lewis, Hitt, Sisson and Simmerson. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 

provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 

this title, or any other federal law . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once a prisoner has received a 

“Director’s Level Decision,” or third level review, with respect to his issues or claims. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Administrative remedies must be “properly” exhausted, which means use 

of all steps put forward by the agency. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Also, “proper 

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules 

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because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure 

on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. In deciding whether administrative remedies have 

been exhausted on a motion for summary judgment, the court may decide disputed issues of fact. 

See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).

In his complaint, plaintiff points to a grievance he filed on June 10, 2010 in which 

plaintiff essentially makes the allegations he makes in his complaint. ECF No. 57-2 at 101. 

Plaintiff points to evidence indicating the grievance was screened out at the first level of review. 

ECF No. 57-2 at 100. The response to the grievance reads as follows:

[Inmate] Burnett, you submitted a green 602, a pink 602-hc and an 

ADA 1824 all with the same issues. This appeal 602 (Green) is 

being screened back as a duplicate. Your original 1824 was 

referred for a first level review. 

Plaintiff also points to the ADA 1824 form referenced above where he indeed makes 

essentially the same allegations made against defendants Lewis, Hitt, Sisson and Simmerson in 

this action and made in his grievance. ECF No. 57-2 at 83. On October 6, 2010, plaintiff 

received a “Director’s Level Decision” as to his ADA 1824. ECF No. 57-2 at 77.

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff exhausted all administrative 

remedies available to him. Plaintiff attempted to utilize the prisoner grievance process with 

respect to his allegations against Lewis, Hitt, Sisson and Simmerson, but was told the grievance 

would not be considered because it was duplicative of another administrative remedy sought by 

plaintiff. Either the actions taken by plaintiff through the ADA 1824 process served to exhaust 

plaintiff’s administrative remedies or he was barred from exhausting administrative remedies by 

prison staff. In any case, plaintiff did all he could do and his claims against Lewis, Hitt, Sisson 

and Simmerson should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

III. Failure of Proof

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by 

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

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electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 

Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

Id. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of their pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, 

and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists or show 

that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the 

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., 

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

/////

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be 

believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 

facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 

U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards 

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

A. Sisson, Hitt, Lewis and Simmerson

Defendants assert Sisson, Hitt, Lewis and Simmerson should be granted summary 

judgment because, under California law, it was not up to them to decide whether plaintiff should 

have been given a particular housing accommodation for medical reasons when he arrived at 

High Desert. Rather, it was up to medical staff to recommend housing accommodations which 

could then be provided by correctional staff. Defendants argue that because there is no evidence 

before the court that Sisson, Hitt or Lewis actually caused plaintiff to be denied a “single-cell, 

single bed” housing assignment, they should all be granted summary judgment.

First, the court notes that, in his declaration, defendant Simmerson indicates it was he who 

conducted the “intake, screening and processing” of plaintiff when he arrived at High Desert on 

June 9, 2010. ¶ 17. Simmerson indicates that when it comes to deciding at screening whether 

any housing accommodations should be made with respect to an inmate’s medical condition, the 

officer conducting the screening refers to the inmate’s most recent CDCR Form 1845 

“Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono.” ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff’s then-most-recent CDCR Form 

1845, dated December 7, 2009, indicates that plaintiff was restricted to being housed in a lower 

bunk and on a ground floor row of cells. Ds’ Ex. G at 12-13. There is nothing indicating plaintiff 

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had to be placed in a cell with only one bunk or by himself.

6

 Simmerson also indicates that if a 

housing accommodation is to be made other than one required on the most recent CDCR Form 

1845, it must be ordered by medical staff as part of medical screening conducted at intake. ¶ 14. 

Defendants present documents which appear to constitute a report drafted after plaintiff’s medical 

screening occurring on June 9, 2010. Ds’ Ex. F. The report indicates that plaintiff’s most recent 

CDCR 1845 is the one dated December 7, 2009 and nothing in the documents suggests that 

plaintiff should be housed in a cell with only one bunk, and nothing over the bunk.7 

Defendants provide a report drafted by defendant Simmerson pursuant to his intake 

screening of plaintiff conducted on June 9, 2010. Ds’ Ex. E. In the report, Simmerson indicates 

that based upon his screening, plaintiff was authorized to be in a cell by himself, on a lower tier 

and in a lower bunk. Ds’ Ex. E at 2. 

There are two problems with defendants’ argument concerning defendant Simmerson. 

First, plaintiff alleges that the computer indicated to Simmerson that plaintiff required “singlebed, single cell” housing, which creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was 

medical necessity to house plaintiff on a single bed, or on a lower bunk of a bunk bed in a cell, by 

himself.

8

 Second, according to the very regulations provided by defendants, Simmerson was 

obligated to review plaintiff’s most recent CDCR-128G form at screening to determine if plaintiff 

was entitled to single cell housing. ECF No. 31-1 at 11. While defendants do not provide 

plaintiff’s then-most-recent CDCR-128G, plaintiff does, and it is dated April 15, 2010. ECF No. 

57-2 at 183. In that document, it is indicated as follows:

The [Pleasant Valley State Prison] Chief Physician and Surgeon 

(CPS) was consulted regarding the temporary single cell status of 

BURNETT. [Institutional Classification Committee] was advised 

that BURNETT was seen by a Neuro Surgeon who recommended 

 

6

 On previous CDCR 1845 forms which were completed on February 5, 2009 and May 11, 2009, 

it is indicated that plaintiff requires a single bed in his cell with nothing over the bed. Id. at 9-11. 

7

 It appears this report was drafted by medical professionals not identified in plaintiff’s complaint 

as defendants or otherwise. 

8

 Again, as indicated above, the evidence presented by the party opposing summary judgment 

must generally be believed. 

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that BURNETT continue with single cell housing with no over head 

bunk due to a complication with his neck and lower back. . . The 

single cell with no overhead bunk is temporary as BURNETT heals 

from a prior surgery and shall be evaluated in the future by a neuro 

surgeon. 

Furthermore a follow-up CDCR 128G was drafted on July 15, 2010, after plaintiff arrived 

at High Desert. It was noted in that document that:

[P]er CDCR 128G dated 4/15/10, [the committee] recommended 

BURNETT continue with Single Cell housing with no over head 

bunk due to complications with his neck an[d] lower back (due to a 

prior surgery). 

ECF No.57-2 at 191.

In light of the foregoing, the court finds there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether the appropriate medical personnel had either authorized or recommended that plaintiff 

be assigned “single-cell, single-bed” housing when plaintiff arrived at High Desert on June 9, 

2010, and whether defendant Simmerson was aware that medical personnel had either authorized 

or recommended that plaintiff be assigned “single-cell, single-bed” housing. For these reasons, 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied with respect to plaintiff’s claim

against defendant Simmerson.

B. French

As indicated above, plaintiff claims defendant French failed to follow a housing 

recommendation made by an outside physician, Dr. Rahimifar. A progress report based upon 

dictation by Dr. Rahimifar indicates that he met with plaintiff on April 1, 2010 for neck and lower 

back pain:

The patient comes in complaining of continued neck pain radiating 

down both arms and low back pain radiating down both legs. He 

states that [it] has increased over the course of the last couple of 

weeks. He complains of inability to sleep due to both neck and 

back pain.

ECF No. 57-2 at 7-8.

After the examination, Dr. Rahimifar, with respect to housing, recommended that plaintiff 

be housed in a cell by himself and in a lower bunk. 

/////

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When Nurse Practitioner French met with plaintiff, however, plaintiff was already 

assigned to a lower bunk, and cell where he was housed alone, having been so assigned the prior 

day by defendant Simmerson. Therefore, plaintiff has no claim concerning defendant French’s 

failure to follow a recommendation by Dr. Rahimifar. To the extent plaintiff asserts other 

defendants failed to follow Dr. Rahimifar’s recommendation prior to the time plaintiff’s single 

cell status was revoked by defendant Miranda on July 16, 2010 (see below), those assertions will 

not be addressed further.

With respect to plaintiff’s assertion that French should have sent plaintiff to a specialist to 

determine if plaintiff should have been housed in “single-cell, single bed” housing, plaintiff fails 

to point to evidence suggesting this amounted to a violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

rights concerning medical care. Nothing suggests Nurse Practitioner French’s failure to refer 

plaintiff to a specialist amounts to deliberate indifference as plaintiff fails to show that French 

was not capable of evaluating plaintiff’s need for “single-cell, single bed” housing on her own, 

that referral to plaintiff’s primary care physician was insufficient, or that plaintiff’s use of normal 

prison procedure for requesting a medical accommodation would be insufficient. 

For all of these reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

remaining claim against defendant French should be granted.

C. Miranda

With respect to the allegations regarding Miranda’s actions on July 16, 2010, the court 

finds there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Miranda was deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm by denying plaintiff housing in a cell with no bunk 

beds. As indicated above, evidence before the court (ECF No. 53-2 at 12) indicates that plaintiff 

told Miranda of his difficulties with sitting on a bunk with another bunk on top of it including the 

fact that he had already hit his head on the upper bunk five times. While there is evidence from 

plaintiff’s medical file and other evidence submitted by defendants that plaintiff did not really 

need to be housed in a cell with only one bunk, plaintiff’s clear explanation of his problem to 

defendant Miranda and her failing to order that plaintiff be housed in a cell without bunk beds 

despite her apparent authority to make such an order at least creates an issue of fact to be decided 

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by a finder of fact.

As indicated above, Miranda appears to rely on the opinion of Dr. Calvin that plaintiff did 

not need to be housed in a cell without bunk beds, he simply needed a chair. From all the 

evidence before the court, however, an appropriate inference could be made that defendant 

Miranda was aware that plaintiff’s trouble with being assigned to a lower bunk bed was not only 

the fact that he could not sit in the bed comfortably, but it was difficult for him to get in and out 

of the lower bunk. Furthermore, there is no evidence that plaintiff had a chair in his cell on July 

17, 2010, or that Miranda ever caused plaintiff to have a chair.9 

For the reasons stated above, the court will recommend that defendant Miranda be granted 

summary judgment with respect to any claim against him except the claim that he violated 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights on July 16, 2010 when he denied plaintiff housing in a cell 

without bunk beds.

D. Lankford

As for plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Dr. Lankford denied plaintiff “single-bed, 

single cell” housing on July 16, 2010, plaintiff fails to point to any evidence supporting this.

10

 In 

his declaration, ECF No. 38, Lankford indicates he provided treatment to plaintiff after he had 

been involved in an altercation with another inmate; nothing in the declaration concerns a 

determination regarding housing made on July 16, 2010. Accordingly, the court will recommend

that defendant Lankford be granted summary judgment. 

/////

/////

 

9

 In her affidavit, defendant Dr. Swingle indicated plaintiff was given a chair. ECF No. 45 at 4,

¶ 8. However, Dr. Swingle fails to point to any evidence in support of this or indicate how she 

knows that plaintiff was given a chair. It does appear that there was a small, built-in metal desk 

and connected metal stool in the back of plaintiff’s cell as there is in all or most cells at High 

Desert. See e.g. ECF No. 57-2 at 152. Absent further clarification from Dr. Calvin, a small metal 

stool permanently located in the rear of a cell and attached to a desk is not the same as a chair 

especially for someone with back problems. 

10

 Defendant Lankford is not identified anywhere in the report authored by defendant Miranda on 

July 16, 2010 where Miranda terminated plaintiff’s “single cell” status. 

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E. Lee

Plaintiff alleges defendant Lee removed plaintiff from the Disability Placement Program

on March 17, 2011 which removed plaintiff from “single-cell, single bed” housing. However, as 

already discussed, plaintiff had been removed from single cell housing on July 16, 2010 by 

defendant Miranda and plaintiff had never been authorized for “single bed” housing while at High 

Desert. Thus, it is not clear what effect, if any, any action taken by defendant Lee on March 17, 

2011 had on plaintiff’s housing assignment. To the extent plaintiff alleges Lee should have given 

plaintiff a “single-cell, single bed” assignment on March 17, 2011, plaintiff fails to point to 

anything reviewed by Lee demonstrating as much. Most importantly, plaintiff fails to indicate 

that he spoke with defendant Lee about his condition on or around March 17, 2011 or that Lee 

conducted an examination of plaintiff. Furthermore, the document signed by Lee on March 17, 

2011 appears to have been signed by Lee in her capacity as a “Health Care Manager” and not a 

treating physician. See ECF No. 57-2 at 23; ECF No. 39.11 

For these reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted with 

respect to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant Lee.

F. Swingle

Finally, with respect to plaintiff’s claim against defendant Swingle arising out of the letter 

he wrote to her, as Chief Medical Officer, Swingle is not obligated to research, address or even 

review every issue raised by an inmate in correspondence given that inmates have primary care 

providers and more than one grievance procedure. In any case, the response Swingle gave to 

plaintiff did not amount to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical condition or his 

conditions of confinement. First, the court reiterates there is no evidence Dr. Rahimifar ever 

recommended that plaintiff be housed in a cell without bunk beds. Rather, he recommended that 

plaintiff be given a bottom bunk which, at all times relevant in this case, he was. Furthermore, 

plaintiff complained that the stool provided in his cell was inadequate for him to watch television 

 

11

 In her declaration, defendant Lee indicates that the recommendations made in the March 17, 

2011 Disability Placement Program Verification form were made by defendant Miranda whom 

Lee indicates was plaintiff’s “primary care provider.” However, Miranda’s signature does not 

appear to be on the form. 

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or to just leisurely sit and watch the comings and goings outside his cell. But, plaintiff has no 

right to watch television while in prison and conditions of confinement which amount to 

“[r]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” are not an adequate basis for an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000).12

For these reasons, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment be granted with respect to plaintiff’s remaining claims against defendant Swingle.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert they are immune from plaintiff’s remaining claims under the “qualified 

immunity” doctrine. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

As indicated above, there is a failure of proof with respect to most of plaintiff’s claims. In 

those instances, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there are not facts which 

can show a violation of Constitutional rights. 

With respect to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant Simmerson, defendants 

assert Simmerson acted appropriately: “[u]pon Burnett’s arrival, he was referred for medical 

clearance, which was conducted, and he was housed according to the requirements for his safety 

and security.” However, defendants’ ignore plaintiff’s assertion that Simmerson was made 

aware via computer that plaintiff required “single-bed, single-cell” housing and that plaintiff’s 

 

12

 To be clear, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Miranda is distinguished from plaintiff’s claim 

against defendant Swingle in the following respects. First, Miranda was directly responsible for 

plaintiff’s medical care as one of plaintiff’s primary care providers during the relevant period of 

time, ECF No. 42 at ¶ 3, while Swingle was essentially an administrator. Furthermore, the report 

drafted by Miranda on July 16, 2010, (ECF No. 53-2 at 12) makes clear that he was aware of 

plaintiff’s specific complaints about the pain from which he was suffering, the ways in which his 

cell was causing him discomfort, including that he did not have anywhere he could sit in his cell 

where he would not be in pain, and that he injured himself getting in and out of his bunk. In his 

letter to defendant Swingle, plaintiff essentially complains that his stool is not ideal for watching 

television or for sitting and monitoring the outside of his cell. Finally, in his letter to Swingle

plaintiff does not claim that sitting on the stool causes him pain or that getting in and out of his 

bunk does. 

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then-most-recent 128G form, which, under California law, Simmerson was required to review at 

screening, also recommended that housing assignment. Therefore, defendants have not met their 

burden of demonstrating that defendant Simmerson is entitled to immunity under the “qualified 

immunity” doctrine.

With respect to plaintiff’s claim against defendant Miranda arising out of the report 

drafted by him on July 16, 2010, plaintiff has a clearly established right to have correctional staff 

not be deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s exposure to substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 

511 U.S. 834. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Miranda violated the aspect 

of the Eighth Amendment specifically addressed in Farmer.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ 

motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 48) be:

1. Denied with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant Miranda violated plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights on July 16, 2010 when he denied plaintiff housing in cell 

without bunk beds. 

2. Denied with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant Simmerson violated plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights on June 9, 2010 when Simmerson failed to house plaintiff in a 

cell without bunk beds.

3. Granted in all other respects.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections, no longer than 15 pages, with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 

days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

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the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 5, 2015

1

burn1239.57(3)

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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