Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02420/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02420-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANTHONY ALSTON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

2:18-cv-02420-TLN-CKD (PS)

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, Eric Anthony Alston, Jr., proceeds pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is 

before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 94.) Pursuant to Local Rule 

230(g), the undersigned takes the motion under submission on the record and briefs on file. The 

hearing noticed for June 14, 2023, is vacated. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 

recommends the motion be granted in part, and plaintiff be granted 30 days to file a first amended 

complaint adding a claim under the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure/excessive force

against defendant Ball, claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect against Ball 

and Madriago, and claims under the Bane Act1 against defendants Ball, Madriago, and the 

County of Sacramento. 

1 See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. 

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I. Background 

Plaintiff was arrested on November 21, 2017, after defendants Ball and Madriago were 

called to plaintiff’s house about a domestic incident.2 (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 21-22.) When plaintiff went 

to step into the patrol car, his walking boot got stuck and he fell to the ground. (Id., ¶ 24.) Due to 

plaintiff’s walking boot, he “could not sit in the vehicle in a legal manner” and was not buckled in 

by a seatbelt while wearing handcuffs in the front. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 26.) While defendants were 

transporting plaintiff, Ball allegedly braked hard on purpose, causing plaintiff, who was not 

buckled in, to “continuously” hit his head. (Id., ¶ 26.) Based on these allegations, plaintiff

proceeds with negligence claims pleaded in the original complaint against Ball, Madriago, and the 

County of Sacramento. (See ECF No. 88.) 

After plaintiff was booked at the jail, defendant Riviera allegedly attempted to throw 

plaintiff out of his wheelchair, and then ordered other officers to do so, stating “just make sure he 

doesn’t fall on his head.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was thrown from his wheelchair. (Id.) 

Based on these allegations, plaintiff proceeds with excessive force, Bane Act, battery, and 

negligence claims pleaded in the original complaint against Riviera. (See ECF No. 88.) 

Plaintiff filed the original complaint on September 4, 2018, naming as defendants the 

County of Sacramento and ten individuals, asserting twelve causes of action arising from 

plaintiff’s arrest on November 21, 2017, and subsequent events. (See ECF No. 1.) On May 31, 

2019, the court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, 

except for plaintiff’s claims against defendant Lloyd. (ECF No. 23.) On December 12, 2019, the 

court ordered “[n]o further joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings is permitted except with 

leave of court, good cause having been shown.” (ECF No. 46 at 2.) On December 15, 2020, the 

court granted defendant Lloyd’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 78.) 

In a memorandum opinion dated March 7, 2023, the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the 

dismissal of plaintiff’s claims and remanded for further proceedings. (ECF No. 88.) Following 

remand, this case proceeds on plaintiff’s claims against defendants County of Sacramento, Ball, 

2 All criminal charges were ultimately dismissed. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 32.) 

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and Madriago, for negligence, related to the transport of plaintiff, and against defendant Riviera

for excessive force, Bane Act, battery, and negligence, related to Riviera’s alleged order to throw 

plaintiff from the wheelchair. (ECF No. 88.) The Ninth Circuit held in the memorandum opinion 

dated March 7, 2023, that this court had not abused its discretion in denying two prior motions by 

plaintiff seeking to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 88 at 8.) 

In the motion to amend presently before the court, plaintiff seeks to add the following new 

claims: 

• Violation of Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment against 

defendants Pahl, Mattison, Bates, Clark and Panasyuk based on the taking of 

plaintiff’s property without providing a receipt (ECF No. 93 at ¶¶ 29-32.) 

• Unreasonable Seizure/Excessive Force under the Fourth Amendment against Ball and 

Madriago (Id., ¶¶ 33-36.) 

• Violation of Bane Act against County of Sacramento, Ball, Madriago, Riviera, Pahl,

Mattison, Bates, Clark, Panasyuk, and Espejo (Id., ¶¶ 37-40.) 

• Deliberate indifference to Serious Medical Needs against Ball, Madriago, Pahl, 

Mattison, Bates, Clark, Panasyuk, and Espejo (Id., ¶¶ 41-44.) 

• Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the County of Sacramento (Id., ¶¶ 

45-48.) 

 Defendants oppose the motion to amend the complaint, arguing plaintiff has not shown 

good cause to amend because the new facts or theories should have been known to plaintiff prior 

to the cutoff date in the court’s scheduling order for amendments. (ECF No. 95 at 3.) Defendants 

argue the motion lacks merit, as new claims at this point are likely barred by the applicable 

statutes of limitations and by a failure to timely present the necessary government claims. (Id. at 

3-4.) Defendants note the court previously denied a motion to amend the complaint to add R.N. 

Espejo and five additional deputies. (Id. at 4.) Defendants argue the renewed request is frivolous, 

is filed in bad faith, and will cause undue delay. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff argues in reply that he is allowed an amendment as a matter of right under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a), because no responsive pleading has been served. 

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(ECF No. 98 at 1.) Plaintiff appears to assert he complied with the California Tort Claims Act for 

the state-law claims he seeks to add. (See id. at 2.) Plaintiff also appears to assert the new claims 

against the Doe defendants would relate back and not be untimely with tolling of the statute of 

limitations. (Id. at 2.) 

II. Legal Standard 

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, a party may 

amend its pleading once as a matter of course within “(A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the 

pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive 

pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

When a party may not amend as a matter of course, it “may amend ... only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although courts 

should freely give leave when justice requires, a variety of reasons may be sufficient to deny 

leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Foman factors commonly 

considered are: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant; (3) 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (4) undue prejudice to 

the opposing party; and (5) futility of amendment. Id. Undue delay alone, without a 

contemporaneous specific finding of prejudice, bad faith, or futility, is insufficient to justify 

denial of a motion to amend. Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent 

prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, a presumption in favor of 

granting leave to amend exists under Rule 15(a). Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 

F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Separately, under Rule 16(b), “good cause” is required for modification of a court’s 

pretrial scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy 

which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice 

to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’ s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the 

party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th 

Cir. 1992). 

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Following remand, amendment of pleadings cannot be inconsistent with the appellate 

court’s mandate. See Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18 (1979)). The general rule that leave to amend 

should be freely granted does not extend without limit when a motion to amend is brought after a 

claim has been fully litigated on the merits through appeal. See Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp, 

752 F.2d at 1338. 

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff requires Court Leave to Amend

Defendants filed and served a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on October 17, 2018. (ECF No. 15.) Under Rule 15(a)(1), plaintiff’s right to amend 

once as a matter of course terminated 21 days after service of defendants’ motion under Rule 

12(b)(6). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2009 Amendments 

(“The right to amend once as a matter of course terminates 21 days after service of a motion 

under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).”). Because defendants oppose amendment of the complaint, plaintiff 

requires leave of court to file an amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

 B. Proposed Claims against New Defendants 

Plaintiff seeks to add the proposed new claims against defendants Pahl, Mattison, Bates, 

Clark, and Panasyuk for taking plaintiff’s property at the jail, including his walking boot, without 

giving him a receipt, and then forcing him to stand without it “even after they had already 

searched [the boot].” (ECF No. 93, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff seeks to add claims against Defendant Espejo 

for “voluntarily [not doing] a tuberculosis test on the plaintiff” in deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s safety. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s proposed new claims against defendants Pahl, Mattison, Bates, Clark, 

Panasyuk, and Espejo are based on the same or similar facts as those for which plaintiff 

previously sought, by motion filed on January 21, 2020, to add to this case through his second 

motion to amend the complaint.3 (See ECF No. 52 at 3.) Plaintiff appealed the denial of that 

3 Plaintiff’s first motion to amend the complaint was filed on August 12, 2019. (ECF Nos. 33, 

34.) It was denied on October 26, 2019. (See ECF Nos. 41, 45.) 

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motion to amend, and the Ninth Circuit held there was no abuse of discretion because “Alston did 

not demonstrate that he had been diligent in seeking his second motion to amend.” (See ECF No. 

88 at 8.) 

Granting leave to amend to add these claims would be futile. Plaintiff’s property 

allegations do not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause where, as here, “a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the 

loss [was] available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff’s proposed 

complaint also fails to adequately allege facts showing that his need for a walking boot and need 

for a tuberculosis test rose to the level of serious medical needs, such that a failure to treat the 

condition could result in a further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain. See Russell v. Lumitap, 31 F.4th 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Having failed 

to allege an underlying constitutional violation on these facts, plaintiff also does not state a claim 

under the Bane Act based on these alleged deprivations. See Williamson v. City of National City, 

23 F.4th 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2022). 

Moreover, plaintiff does not show he has been diligent in seeking to add the proposed new 

claims against defendants Pahl, Mattison, Bates, Clark, Panasyuk, and Espejo. The scheduling 

order dated December 10, 2019, ordered “[n]o further joinder of parties or amendments to 

pleadings is permitted except with leave of court, good cause having been shown.” (ECF No. 46 

at 2.) Except to state in conclusory fashion that these claims are based on information learned 

after the filing of the complaint, plaintiff does not address his diligence, which is the primary 

consideration for the good cause standard required to amend a pleading after the pretrial 

scheduling order’s deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Because 

granting leave to amend to add these claims would be futile, and because plaintiff has not shown 

diligence in seeking to add them, the undersigned will recommend that leave to amend be denied

as to proposed new claims against defendants Pahl, Mattison, Bates, Clark, Panasyuk, and Espejo. 

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 C. Proposed Claims against the Current Defendants

 1. Ball and Madriago

Pertaining to the alleged acts and omissions of Ball and Madriago in transporting plaintiff, 

plaintiff seeks to add claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Bane 

Act. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff’s claims for negligence against these defendants, which 

are based on the same or similar facts, were dismissed in error. Plaintiff was not granted a prior 

opportunity to amend. Given this procedural posture, plaintiff has acted with reasonable diligence 

in seeking to amend to add claims based on the same or similar facts. 

Specifically, plaintiff seeks to add claims against defendants Ball and Madriago under the 

Fourteenth Amendment for transporting him in the patrol car in an alleged unsafe and illegal 

manner, without a seatbelt, and against Ball for excessive force for allegedly braking hard on 

purpose and causing plaintiff to continuously hit his head. (ECF No. 93, ¶¶ 34, 42.) Considering 

the Foman factors, defendants have been on notice of the basic facts underlying these proposed 

new claims since the filing of the original complaint. Defendants do not show they will suffer any 

prejudice if plaintiff is granted leave to amend to add these claims. Defendants have taken no 

discovery and plaintiff’s negligence claims based on the same facts have yet to proceed beyond 

the pleading stage. Granting leave to amend to add these claims will not cause substantial delay or 

a separate re-opening of discovery as the court will be issuing a further scheduling order for 

plaintiff’s negligence claims against these defendants. Finding good cause, the undersigned will 

recommend plaintiff be granted leave to amend the complaint to add claims for excessive force 

and failure to protect, respectively, under the Fourth4 and Fourteenth5 Amendments against Ball, 

and for failure to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment against Madriago.

4

 The undersigned liberally construes the complaint’s allegations to find plaintiff has adequately 

alleged that Ball indirectly applied an objectively unreasonable amount of force when allegedly 

braking hard on purpose while plaintiff was handcuffed and unrestrained by a seatbelt, causing 

plaintiff to continuously hit his head. 

5 See, e.g., Rich v. Ahern, No. 18-CV-06267-EMC, 2019 WL 2744831, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 

2019) (allegations of a pretrial detainee being transported in a motor vehicle without seatbelts in 

combination with other allegations that show a high degree of risk, such as reckless driving by the 

operator, may state a cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).

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 2. County of Sacramento 

Plaintiff’s proposed ADA claim against the County of Sacramento is based on the alleged 

deprivation of his walking boot. (See ECF No. 93, ¶¶ 38- 39, 47.) Granting leave to amend for 

this claim would be futile. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 

12101 et seq. (ADA), provides “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12132. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the 

plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in 

or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was 

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, 

programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such 

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Here, plaintiff alleges he was excluded from participation in “going to jail in a legal 

manner for the walking boot” and “being able to have the service of getting dressed with his 

equipment[.]” (ECF No. 93 at ¶ 47.) Assuming for purposes of this motion that plaintiff suffers 

from a disability for purposes of the ADA, these allegations do not identify a particular “service[], 

program[], or activit[y]” from which plaintiff was excluded during his overnight stay in the 

County jail. Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

12132.) Plaintiff also does not allege “how the accommodation[ ] offered by [the County jail],” in 

this case a wheelchair, was “not reasonable.” Memmer v. Marin Cnty. Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 634 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Moreover, plaintiff already asserted an unsuccessful claim under the ADA against the 

County of Sacramento in this suit on a slightly different theory involving a wrist brace and knee 

brace. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 62, 65.) Plaintiff’s original ADA claim against the County of Sacramento 

was dismissed with prejudice on May 31, 2019. (ECF No. 23.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 

dismissal of this claim. (See ECF No. 88 at 5-6.) 

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“[L]ate amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and 

the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of 

action.” Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 

1986). Here, plaintiff does not explain his failure to develop his contentions previously for the 

proposed new ADA claim based on the alleged deprivation of his walking boot. Plaintiff knew or 

should have known about the facts underlying this claim when he filed his original complaint. 

Therefore, the current requested amendment goes against principles of finality. See Matter of 

Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d at 1338. Under these circumstances, leave to amend to add 

plaintiff’s proposed new ADA claim should be denied. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist 

West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (in evaluating undue delay, a court looks at the 

timeliness of the motion under the Rule 16 scheduling order and whether the moving party knew 

or should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading).

The undersigned will recommend that plaintiff be granted leave to amend to add a Bane 

Act claim against the County of Sacramento. As noted earlier, having failed to allege an 

underlying constitutional violation based on the deprivation of the walking boot, plaintiff does not 

state a related claim under the Bane Act based on that alleged deprivation. See Williamson, 23 

F.4th at 1155. However, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff be granted leave to amend 

to add his proposed Bane Act claim against the County of Sacramento based on the alleged 

manner of transport by Ball and Madriago. 

IV. Conclusion 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 

1. The hearing noticed by plaintiff to take place on June 14, 2023, is vacated. 

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that defendants 

Ball, Madriago, Riviera, and the County of Sacramento are no longer terminated from this case 

following the Ninth Circuit’s mandate on March 30, 2023. 

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 94) be granted in part, to the extent that 

plaintiff be granted leave to amend the complaint to add only following claims: (a) under the 

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Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure/excessive force against defendant Ball, (b) under the 

Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect against Ball and Madriago, and (c) under the Bane 

Act against defendants Ball, Madriago, and the County of Sacramento. 

2. Plaintiff be granted 30 days from any order adopting these findings and 

recommendations to file a first amended complaint adding only the claims set forth above.

3. In all other respects, the motion to amend be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: June 7, 2023 

8 

Alston18cv2420.r15.fr

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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