Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05014/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05014-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2011 Decided July 10, 2012 

No. 10-5014 

WILFRED SAMUEL RATTIGAN, 

APPELLEE

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:04-cv-02009) 

On Petition for Rehearing 

______ 

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs 

were Tony West, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney. R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

Jonathan C. Moore argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief was James R. Klimaski. 

USCA Case #10-5014 Document #1382785 Filed: 07/10/2012 Page 1 of 24
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Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH. 

 TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellee, an employee of the FBI, 

alleges that FBI officials retaliated against him in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when, by reporting 

unfounded security concerns to the Bureau’s Security 

Division, they prompted an investigation into his continued 

eligibility for a security clearance. In our earlier opinion in 

this case, Rattigan v. Holder, 643 F.3d 975 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 

we held that although Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit 

precedent shields the Security Division’s security clearancerelated decisions from judicial review, the Title VII claim 

could nonetheless go forward so long as it challenged only the 

reporting of appellee to the Security Division and not the 

Division’s decision to investigate. On rehearing, however, the 

government has persuaded us that our earlier decision was too 

broad. For the reasons set forth below, we narrow the scope of 

Title VII liability in these circumstances and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I.

As recounted in our earlier opinion, Plaintiff-Appellee 

Wilfred Rattigan is a black male of Jamaican descent who has 

converted to Islam. See Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 977. In 1999, 

the FBI transferred Rattigan, a long-term FBI employee, to 

the Office of the Legal Attaché at the United States Embassy 

in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Serving first as the Office’s 

Assistant Legal Attaché and then as Legal Attaché (Legat), 

Rattigan functioned as the FBI’s primary liaison to the Saudi 

intelligence service and reported to the FBI’s Office of 

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International Operations (OIO) in Washington, D.C. During 

his tenure in the Riyadh office, Rattigan made several 

complaints of race- and national origin-based discrimination. 

Specifically, at an office-wide meeting in October 2001, 

Rattigan accused OIO supervisors Cary Gleicher, Michael 

Pyszczymuka, and Leslie Kaciban of discrimination and later 

pursued claims against them with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity (EEO) Office. 

Around the same time, in November 2001, OIO Special 

Agent Donovan Leighton, sent by Gleicher on a twenty-one 

day assignment to Riyadh, purportedly grew suspicious about 

Rattigan’s behavior and management of the office. In 

particular, Leighton worried that certain behavior, such as 

Rattigan’s appearance at the U.S. Embassy in “full Saudi 

Arabian costume,” suggested that Rattigan might be 

“inappropriately under the influence of his Saudi 

counterparts.” Trial Tr. at 58, 60 (July 23, 2009). Following a 

short vacation, Leighton returned to the OIO Washington 

Office, where he had further dealings with Rattigan that 

allegedly led him to become more concerned. After 

consulting his OIO supervisors, Leighton documented his 

concerns in an “electronic communication” (EC), i.e., a 

memorandum written for internal use, which he sent to OIO 

supervisor Pyszczymuka for review. Pyszczymuka then 

forwarded the EC to the Security Division, requesting a 

review of Leighton’s observations. Following its 

investigation, the Division concluded that the potential 

security risks alleged by Leighton “lack[ed] corroboration and 

[were] unfounded.” Memorandum from Maureen Chelak, 

Sec. Div. Analytical Integration Unit 4 (Sept. 18, 2002). 

Accordingly, the Division closed its investigation, and 

Rattigan retained his security clearance. 

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In 2004, Rattigan filed suit under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., alleging, 

among other things, that the decision to refer Leighton’s 

purported concerns to the Security Division, thus prompting a 

security clearance investigation, amounted to unlawful 

retaliation for Rattigan’s pursuit of discrimination claims. The 

jury found for Rattigan on the retaliation claim, ultimately 

awarding him $300,000 in damages. On appeal, the 

government argued primarily that Rattigan’s retaliation claim 

was non-justiciable under the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), which 

we have interpreted to bar judicial review of adverse 

employment actions based on the denial or revocation of a 

security clearance. See Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 

1001 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[E]mployment actions based on 

denial of security clearance are not subject to judicial review, 

including under Title VII.”); Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 524 

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that “under Egan an adverse 

employment action based on denial or revocation of a security 

clearance is not actionable under Title VII”). 

We held that “Egan shields from review only those 

security decisions made by the FBI’s Security Division,” 

whose employees are trained and authorized to make security 

clearance determinations, and “not the actions of thousands of 

other FBI employees who, like Rattigan’s OIO supervisors, 

may from time to time refer matters to the Division.” 

Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 983. We thus concluded that Rattigan’s 

claim based on the OIO reporting and referral could proceed 

“so long as the jury is not put in the position of secondguessing the Security Division.” Id. at 986. But finding that 

the district court’s instructions invited the jury to second 

guess the Security Division’s decision to initiate an 

investigation, we vacated the judgment and ordered the case 

remanded for further proceedings. 

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The government filed a petition for rehearing and 

rehearing en banc, arguing that our decision conflicts with 

both Egan and reporting obligations established by the 

President. As the government points out, Executive Order 

12,968, which sets forth security clearance standards and 

procedures, states that employees granted access to classified 

information “are encouraged and expected to report any 

information that raises doubts as to whether another 

employee’s continued eligibility for access to classified 

information is clearly consistent with the national security.” 

Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 

40,253 (Aug. 2, 1995) (emphasis added). According to the 

government, the prospect of Title VII liability for reportingbased claims could deter employees from reporting 

information they find doubtful or difficult to verify—

information that can be critical to the Security Division’s 

ability to conduct an effective investigation. Persuaded that 

this argument merited further consideration, we granted the 

petition for panel rehearing and requested briefing on the 

scope of Egan’s bar on judicial review of security clearance 

decisions, the potential for Title VII liability to chill reporting 

of security concerns to the Security Division, and the 

consequences of narrowing Title VII liability by limiting it to 

claims based on referrals of knowingly false information. 

 

II. 

In Egan, the Supreme Court made clear that the general 

presumption favoring judicial review “runs aground when it 

encounters concerns of national security,” as in cases “where 

the grant of security clearance to a particular employee, a 

sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call, is 

committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive 

Branch.” 484 U.S. at 527. As explained in our prior opinion, 

however, we do not believe that Egan insulates from Title VII 

all decisions that might bear upon an employee’s eligibility to 

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access classified information. Rather, the Court in Egan

emphasized that the decision to grant or deny security 

clearance requires a “[p]redictive judgment” that “must be 

made by those with the necessary expertise in protecting 

classified information.” Id. at 529. Likewise, under Executive 

Order 12,968, the decision to grant or deny access to 

classified information must be “based on judgments by 

appropriately trained adjudicative personnel.” Exec. Order 

No. 12,968, § 3.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,250. It is this expert, 

predictive judgment made by “appropriately trained” 

personnel that Egan insulates from judicial review. Rattigan, 

643 F.3d at 983. At the FBI, such “appropriately trained” 

personnel work in the Security Division. By contrast, OIO 

officials “have neither the authority nor the training to make 

security clearance decisions.” Id. Accordingly, finding that 

“[t]he decision by a non-expert employee to refer a colleague 

for a potential security investigation is categorically unlike the 

predictive judgment made by ‘appropriately trained 

adjudicative personnel’ who make security clearance 

decisions pursuant to delegated Executive authority and 

subject to established adjudicative guidelines,” we held that 

Egan’s bar on judicial review extends only to security 

clearance-related decisions made by the Security Division 

itself and not to decisions by other FBI employees to report 

their concerns to the Division. Id. at 984 (quoting Exec. Order 

No. 12,968, § 3.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,250). 

On rehearing, the government argues that decisions to 

report security concerns come within Egan’s scope because 

they “involve precisely the same type of predictions about 

risks to national security” as the decision to grant or deny 

clearance, Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 6; see also Dissenting Op. at 

5, and because the Executive Order’s reporting mandate 

reflects a “categorical determination that all employees with 

access to classified information have the necessary ‘training 

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and experience’ to report security concerns,” Appellant’s 

Reh’g Br. 21. But this argument is undercut by the 

government’s insistence—in the very same brief—that 

Executive Order 12,968 requires employees to report “any

information that raises doubts,” Exec. Order No. 12,968, 

§ 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,253 (emphasis added), without 

making a judgment as to the information’s veracity or 

relevance to national security. Indeed, the government 

explains that “[a]lthough plaintiff may argue that Leighton or 

other OIO officials ‘should have known’ that some of the 

facts included in his EC did not raise significant security 

issues, it was not their place to make that judgment or to 

undertake a mini-investigation to verify those facts.” 

Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 32–33 (emphasis added); see also

Reh’g Pet. 14 n.3 (suggesting that employees should report 

even “information the employee might believe is not directly 

relevant or accurate”). In other words, employees outside the 

Security Division are expected to refrain from making 

sensitive, predictive judgments and it is “not their place” to 

make the kinds of decisions that Egan shields from review. 

Given this, and for the reasons set forth in our earlier opinion, 

we adhere to our holding that Egan’s absolute bar on judicial 

review covers only security clearance-related decisions made 

by trained Security Division personnel and does not preclude 

all review of decisions by other FBI employees who merely 

report security concerns. 

III. 

In addition to its arguments about the scope of Egan, the 

government urges us to reconsider our decision on grounds 

that, in the judgment of “the Executive Branch agencies that 

handle security clearance issues,” preserving Title VII 

liability for security reporting claims will impair the ability of 

the Security Division to fulfill its Executive Order 12,968 

responsibility by “chill[ing] the timely and adequate reporting 

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of security issues.” Reh’g Pet. 13. As we understand it, the 

government’s point is this: by imposing a standard for Title 

VII liability that conflicts with the reporting standard set forth 

in Executive Order 12,968, our earlier opinion creates a risk 

that an employee’s compliance with the Order could provide a 

basis for Title VII liability—a risk that could chill reporting 

and thus undermine the ability of the Security Division to 

fulfill its responsibilities to make fully informed securityclearance decisions. 

The government’s argument rests on section 6.2(b) of the 

Executive Order, which, as explained above, states that 

employees with security clearances “are encouraged and 

expected to report any information that raises doubts as to 

whether another employee’s continued eligibility for access to 

classified information is clearly consistent with the national 

security.” Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 

40,253. According to the government, section 6.2(b) adopts a 

“broad margin of error in favor of national security,” 

Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 19, requiring employees to report “any

information that raises doubts,” Exec. Order No. 12,968, 

§ 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,253 (emphasis added), even if 

that information is mere rumor or has only uncertain 

relevance to national security. This broad reporting mandate 

reflects the Executive’s judgment that “[t]he reliability of 

final security clearance decisions . . . necessarily depends on 

the proper officials having full and complete access to all 

potentially relevant information, including information the 

employee might believe is not directly relevant or accurate.” 

Reh’g Pet. 14 n.3; see also Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 30. 

The government is concerned that our earlier decision 

conflicts with this broad reporting standard because it would 

allow a jury to infer pretext—and find Title VII liability—

from an employee’s decision to report dubious or potentially 

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irrelevant information. See Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 987 (“To 

determine whether OIO’s referral rested on legitimate security 

concerns as opposed to retaliatory animus, the jury must 

weigh the strength of the evidence Leighton submitted in 

support of his claim that Rattigan might pose a security 

risk.”); id. at 988 (plaintiff may show pretext by 

“convinc[ing] the jury that [the reporting] employees included 

in their referral accusations that they knew or should have 

known were false or misleading” (emphasis added)). The 

government points out, moreover, that a jury would evaluate 

the plaintiff’s pretext evidence under the preponderance of the 

evidence standard—a standard the Supreme Court in Egan

deemed “inconsistent” with the “clearly consistent with the 

interests of the national security” standard used in security 

clearance determinations. 484 U.S. at 531. Because we 

suggested that a jury could find pretext under a preponderance 

standard based on its own assessment of the weight and 

credibility of the information reported, the government warns 

that our decision will likely deter employees from reporting 

“any information that raises doubts,” Exec. Order No. 12,968, 

§ 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,253 (emphasis added), 

particularly when the information is either questionable or 

potentially insignificant. This chilling effect on reporting, in 

turn, could “seriously compromise the integrity of final 

security clearance decisions,” Appellant’s Reh’g Br. at 30, 

because the security clearance process as a whole is 

“predicated on timely and accurate reporting of even 

questionable information.” Id. at 13. The government is also 

concerned that an employee, fearing that reporting 

information she “should have known [was] false or 

misleading” could provide a basis for Title VII liability,

Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 988, might take it upon herself to 

investigate and verify the allegations before reporting—an 

action that could “tip[] off the subject, influence[] possible 

witnesses, or otherwise impede[] the Security Division’s 

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ability to conduct an effective investigation.” Appellant’s 

Reh’g Br. 29. 

We find the government’s arguments quite powerful, 

especially given the deference owed “the executive in cases 

implicating national security,” Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926–27 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

Specifically, we agree that our earlier decision could indeed 

discourage critical reporting by permitting jurors to infer 

pretext based on their own judgment that the information 

reported was either unlikely to prove true or raised 

insufficiently weighty security concerns. Such a standard 

plainly conflicts with Executive Order 12,968’s expectation 

that employees will report even overheard rumors and small 

details that may ultimately prove irrelevant. Moreover, to the 

extent that jurors would be called upon to “weigh the strength 

of the evidence” submitted in support of reported security 

concerns, Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 987, Egan suggests that the 

preponderance standard could lead them to “depart[]” from 

the “clearly consistent” standard mandated by the President in 

evaluating the decision to report seemingly insignificant 

information. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. And although, as 

Rattigan points out, only the government can be held liable 

under Title VII, we agree that the “substantial burdens, loss of 

privacy, and public humiliation” that accompany litigation, 

Appellant’s Reh’g Reply Br. 13, could nonetheless have a 

serious chilling effect on individual employees. 

Critically for our purposes, this likely chilling effect 

presents serious Egan problems given that Security Division 

employees, trained to make security clearance decisions and 

thus covered by Egan, need all the evidence they can get to 

“control access to information bearing on national security 

and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently 

trustworthy to . . . [have] access to such information,” Egan, 

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484 U.S. at 527. The Executive Order encourages broad 

reporting precisely because the entities charged with making 

security clearance decisions—here the Security Division—

need full access to even unsubstantiated and doubtful 

information in order to make the sensitive, predictive 

judgments that Egan protects. Although, as explained above, 

we continue to believe that the reporting decisions at issue in 

this case fall outside the scope of Egan’s protection, we 

conclude that because broad liability for such reporting could 

compromise the integrity of decisions that are shielded from 

judicial intrusion, i.e., decisions of the Security Division, 

allowing such liability would conflict with Egan. 

The question, then, is whether we must bar reporting and 

referral claims altogether, as the government urges, or 

whether we can sufficiently minimize the chilling effect of 

Title VII liability by narrowing the scope of such claims. We 

ask this question because it is our duty not only to follow 

Egan, but also to “preserv[e] to the maximum extent possible 

Title VII’s important protections against workplace 

discrimination and retaliation.” Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 984; cf. 

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 

124, 143–44 (2001) (“when two statutes are capable of 

coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 

expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard 

each as effective” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given 

this, and given that, as explained below, Title VII claims 

based on knowingly false reporting present no serious risk of 

chill, we believe that claims of knowingly false security 

reports or referrals can coexist with Egan and the Executive 

Order. 

A knowingly false standard, unlike the standard 

suggested by our earlier opinion, would create no conflict 

with Executive Order 12,968’s broad reporting mandate. 

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However critical it is for employees to report doubtful or 

unreliable information, the Security Division cannot possibly 

be assisted by employees who knowingly report false 

information—that is, outright lies—about fellow employees. 

Conceding as much, the government emphasizes that 

employees can face internal discipline for false or inaccurate 

reporting. See Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 8, 30–31. A knowingly 

false standard, moreover, would obviate any need for jurors to 

“weigh the strength” of the information reported, Rattigan, 

643 F.3d at 987, or to second-guess the employee’s 

determination that seemingly doubtful or insignificant 

information warranted reporting. Under a knowingly false 

standard, whether the information reported was sufficient to 

“raise[] doubts,” Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 6.2(b), 60 Fed. 

Reg. at 40,253, about the plaintiff’s eligibility for a security 

clearance is irrelevant; the only question is whether the 

reporting employee actually knew at the time of the reporting 

that the information he provided was actually false. The 

limited scope of this inquiry would also alleviate the 

government’s (and Egan’s) concerns about conflicting 

evidentiary standards, for juries would apply the 

preponderance standard only to determine whether the 

employee knowingly reported or referred false information 

and would make no judgments, under any standard, as to 

whether the plaintiff’s continued access to classified 

information was clearly consistent with national security. 

The government objects that even limited Title VII 

liability for knowingly false reporting would likely have a 

chilling effect. According to the government, plaintiffs will 

simply allege knowing falsity in every case, an allegation the 

government claims is “famously easy to make and difficult to 

rebut.” Appellant’s Reh’g Reply Br. 14. Given the ease with 

which plaintiffs could allege such claims, the government 

argues, employees might hesitate to report information they 

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find doubtful, fearing that a plaintiff could argue, and a jury 

could find, that they knew the information was false when 

they reported it. As the government sees it, there is no need to 

make a “policy-based exception” for cases involving 

fabricated security reports because “such reports are, by 

definition, already subject to independent review and 

investigation” through internal agency procedures. 

Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 8. Such procedures, the government 

tells us, allow agencies to inquire into allegations of 

knowingly false reporting quickly, confidentially, and with 

appropriate sensitivity to the wide margin of error mandated 

by the Executive Order. In contrast, the government claims, 

Title VII litigation presents a greater risk of chill because of 

its public nature, the lengthy timeframe of civil cases, and 

other burdens imposed by litigation. See Oral Arg. Rec. 

23:25–25:09; Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 30–31; Appellant’s 

Reh’g Reply Br. 13–15. 

In our view, the government’s concerns are insufficient to 

justify the sweeping immunity from Title VII liability that it 

seeks. Although civil litigation can impose substantial 

burdens, internal agency proceedings carry a more immediate 

threat of discipline, “ ‘up to and including removal,’ ” see 

Rattigan, 643 F.3d at 991 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 

(quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 64,562, 64,563 (Nov. 2, 2006))—a 

threat that surely creates its own chilling effect. Moreover, 

contrary to the government’s arguments, we see no reason to 

think that an agency has any greater competence than juries 

when it comes to determining what a particular person knew 

at a particular time and whether that person intentionally 

reported false information about a co-worker. Indeed, making 

such determinations is the quintessential function of a jury. 

See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) (“Our 

legal system . . . is built on the premise that it is the province 

of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing 

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witnesses[.]”). By contrast, the agency’s expertise in security 

matters and its sensitivity to the Executive’s broad reporting 

standard have little relevance to whether an employee has 

reported knowingly false information. And though allegations 

of knowing falsity may be easy to make, they are, in our 

experience, far from easy to prove. If this evidentiary 

difficulty fails to deter unfounded claims, district courts can 

be counted upon to weed them out at summary judgment. 

In reaching this conclusion, we are not, as the 

government suggests, creating a “policy-based exception” for 

knowingly false reporting claims. Rather, given that Egan

imposes an absolute bar only on review of Security Division 

decisions, the limits we place on Title VII liability for other

decisions must be no broader than necessary to protect the 

integrity of the Division’s security clearance-related 

responsibilities. In this way, we preserve to the maximum 

extent possible congressionally mandated protections against 

and remedies for unlawful retaliation in the workplace. Were 

we to declare all reporting-based claims nonjusticiable, 

federal employees could no longer seek redress for the harm 

caused when a coworker fabricates security concerns in 

retaliation for statutorily protected activity, and Congress’s 

purpose in enacting Title VII would be frustrated. But we 

need not grant the government such broad immunity. As 

explained above, a narrow, knowingly false standard for 

security reporting claims creates no conflict with Executive 

Order 12,968. And given the government’s representation that 

agencies have internal procedures for investigating and 

punishing knowingly false reports, we think that the marginal 

chilling effect, if any, of allowing such Title VII cases to go 

forward would be negligible. For all of these reasons, we hold 

that Rattigan’s Title VII claim may proceed only if he can 

show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or 

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discriminatory motive in reporting or referring information 

that they knew to be false. 

IV. 

Both Rattigan and the government argue that were we to 

adopt a knowingly false standard for security reporting claims 

under Title VII, there would be no need to remand for further 

proceedings. For its part, the government argues that the 

record contains no evidence supporting a claim that OIO 

officials knowingly referred false information to the Security 

Division and that remand would therefore be futile. Rattigan 

sees the record very differently, claiming that the jury 

effectively found knowingly false reporting and urging us to 

affirm the district court’s judgment on that ground. Neither is 

correct. 

The government opposes remand on the ground that 

“[t]he basic facts reported in the Leighton EC were largely 

uncontested at trial, and the only question was what inference 

of security risk should properly be drawn from those facts.” 

Appellant’s Reh’g Br. 32 (citation omitted). As to many of the 

allegations in Leighton’s EC, the government is certainly 

correct. Rattigan has acknowledged, for instance, that he 

occasionally wore traditional Saudi clothing to the Embassy 

and that he restricted interactions between American 

temporary duty staff and Saudi intelligence personnel—both 

facts that formed part of the basis for the OIO security 

referral. Although Rattigan claims that these allegations were 

in dispute, his evidence suggests only that he had previously 

explained this behavior to his supervisors and provided an 

innocent explanation for his conduct. For example, Rattigan 

points out that he had explained to OIO management that 

Saudi personnel would view frequent meetings with 

temporary staff as an affront and that he therefore chose to 

limit such meetings in order to preserve good relations with 

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the Saudi intelligence service. While this may indicate that 

OIO officials had little reason to believe that Rattigan’s 

actions raised legitimate security concerns—an issue that has 

no relevance under the knowingly false standard—it does not 

suggest that Leighton reported or that OIO officials referred 

factual information they knew to be false. The same can be 

said of the allegations that Rattigan dressed in traditional 

Saudi clothing, that the Saudi intelligence service attempted 

to find him a wife, and that he could be contacted only 

through the Saudi intelligence service while on the Haaj. 

Nonetheless, our review of the record suggests that there 

may be evidence to support a claim that Leighton or other 

OIO officials chose to report other information that they knew 

to be false. For example, Leighton’s EC states that Rattigan 

hosted wild parties attended by “so-called ‘nurses,’ ” who 

Leighton claims were described in a manner suggesting “that 

the term ‘nurses’ was being used by Legat Rattigan as a 

euphemism for ‘prostitutes.’ ” Leighton EC, at 2. In support 

of his claim that this allegation was knowingly false, Rattigan 

contends that it was widely known by his co-workers, 

including OIO staff, that he was dating—and later married—a 

woman who was in fact a nurse. Given this, Rattigan claims, 

Leighton and his OIO supervisors knew that his suggestion 

that the nurses might be prostitutes was false. The government 

responds that Leighton’s report only recounted various 

conversations that suggested to Leighton that the “nurses” 

might be prostitutes. According to the government, because 

Rattigan offers no evidence suggesting that Leighton 

fabricated the details of these conversations, Rattigan cannot 

establish any false reporting. But this argument ignores 

Rattigan’s contention that Leighton and other OIO officials 

knew that Rattigan was dating a woman who actually was a 

nurse. See Appellee’s Reh’g Br. 19–20; see also Manneson 

Dep. 29–30 (deposition of Rattigan’s wife describing 

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meetings with Rattigan’s co-workers). Moreover, although 

Leighton’s EC states that he “was told” that Rattigan had 

hosted a party “in which he and two other [FBI employees] 

had had sexual relations with one or more of the so-called 

‘nurses,’ ” Leighton EC, at 2, the Security Division 

investigation concluded that “[n]one of the personnel 

interviewed could offer any information which would support 

SSA Leighton’s allegation that Legat Rattigan, along with 

several other [temporary duty] personnel, engaged in sexual 

relations with these women.” Memorandum from Maureen 

Chelak, Sec. Div. Analytical Integration Unit 3 (Sept. 18, 

2002). All this suggests that Rattigan may be able to prove 

that (1) no one “told” Leighton that Rattigan hosted parties in 

which he and others engaged in sexual relations with 

“nurses,” and that (2) because Leighton and other OIO 

officials knew that Rattigan’s girlfriend and her co-workers 

were in fact nurses, the claim that circumstances suggested 

they might instead be prostitutes was knowingly false. 

At this stage, we have no need to determine whether the 

record evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Leighton or his OIO supervisors knowingly 

reported or referred false factual allegations to the Security 

Division. Because we set forth this knowingly false standard 

for the first time on appeal, Rattigan had little reason to 

thoroughly develop evidence of knowing falsity in the district 

court. Given this, and given that the record contains some 

evidence that could form the basis for a claim of knowingly 

false security reports, we shall remand for the district court, 

after permitting any necessary discovery, to determine in the 

first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowing 

falsity to allow Rattigan to bring his claim before a jury. 

USCA Case #10-5014 Document #1382785 Filed: 07/10/2012 Page 17 of 24
18 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court 

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. Our earlier opinion, Rattigan, 643 F.3d 975, 

remains in effect to the extent consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Although 

slightly tweaking its analysis in response to the Government’s 

petition for rehearing, the majority opinion still suffers from a 

basic flaw. The majority opinion continues to insist that some 

agency security clearance decisions are judicially reviewable. 

In my respectful view, the majority opinion’s conclusion

cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).

In Egan, the Supreme Court held that the Navy’s decision 

to deny Egan a security clearance could not be reviewed in

the course of his personnel action against the Navy. Justice 

Blackmun’s opinion for the Court reasoned that “the 

protection of classified information must be committed to the 

broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must 

include broad discretion to determine who may have access to 

it.” Id. at 529. The Egan Court thus precluded agency 

employees such as Egan from pursuing personnel actions

against their agency employers when doing so would entail 

second-guessing the agency’s security clearance decision. 

The Court recognized that Congress could override the 

presumption of unreviewability that attached to security 

clearance decisions, but it said that Congress had not done so 

with respect to personnel suits like Egan’s. See id. at 530.

The majority opinion here, however, reads Egan far more 

narrowly. Under the majority opinion, security clearance 

decisions are committed not “to the broad discretion of the 

agency responsible,” id. at 529, but only to some 

“appropriately trained” employees within the agency. Maj. 

Op. at 6 (quoting Rattigan v. Holder, 643 F.3d 975, 983 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011)). Under the majority opinion’s new-fangled

scheme, courts may not review the decisions of agency 

employees who initiate investigations or grant, deny, or 

revoke clearances, but courts may review the decisions of 

agency employees who report security risks. The majority 

opinion’s slicing and dicing of the security clearance process 

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2

into reviewable and unreviewable portions is nowhere to be 

found in Egan, and it does not reflect the essential role that 

the reporting of security risks plays in the maintenance of 

national security.

* * *

To begin with, contrary to the majority opinion’s 

approach, the Supreme Court in Egan consistently referred to 

“the agency” – not to certain employees within an agency – as 

the decisionmaker that may not be second-guessed in security 

clearance cases. Consider the following from Egan:

• “[T]he grant of security clearance to a particular 

employee . . . is committed by law to the appropriate 

agency of the Executive Branch.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 

527.

• “[C]ertain civilian agencies . . . were entrusted with 

. . . protecting . . . information bearing on national 

security.” Id. at 527-28.

• “Presidents . . . have sought to protect sensitive 

information . . . by delegating this responsibility to the 

heads of agencies.” Id. at 528.

• “Certainly, it is not reasonably possible for an outside 

nonexpert body to review the substance of such a 

judgment and to decide whether the agency should 

have been able to make the necessary affirmative 

prediction with confidence.” Id. at 529.

• “[A]n agency head . . . should have the final say in 

deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee 

who has access to [classified] information.” Id.

(citation omitted).

• “[T]he Senate and House Committees . . . gave no 

indication that an agency’s security-clearance 

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3

determination was now to be subject to review.” Id. at 

531 n.6.

• “Placing the burden on the Government” would 

involve “second-guessing the agency’s national 

security determinations.” Id. at 531.

In the face of the recurring “agency” theme in Egan, the 

majority opinion here concludes that Egan protects only the 

actions of certain agency employees. The majority opinion

relies on a single sentence in Egan that mentions “those with 

the necessary expertise in protecting classified information.” 

Id. at 529. But in that sentence, the Egan Court was simply 

contrasting the expertise of agencies with that of outside 

reviewing bodies, not implying that courts should draw a 

reviewability line based on which employees of an agency 

possessed certain amounts of expertise. The full quote from 

Egan makes that clear:

Predictive judgment of this kind must be made by those 

with the necessary expertise in protecting classified 

information. For reasons too obvious to call for enlarged 

discussion, the protection of classified information must 

be committed to the broad discretion of the agency

responsible, and this must include broad discretion to 

determine who may have access to it. Certainly, it is not 

reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to 

review the substance of such a judgment and to decide 

whether the agency should have been able to make the 

necessary affirmative prediction with confidence.

Id. (citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphases added).

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4

Nothing in Egan’s language suggests that the Supreme 

Court was only barring review of the security clearance 

actions of “appropriately trained” employees, as the majority 

opinion here contends. Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting Rattigan, 643

F.3d at 983). Nor have this Court’s decisions applying Egan

drawn the line that the majority opinion creates. Following 

the Supreme Court’s lead, we have referred to the 

decisionmaking process of the agency as a whole, not to 

certain parts or employees of an agency, in employment 

discrimination cases involving security clearance decisions. 

See, e.g., Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 

2005) (“trier of fact” may not “evaluate the validity of the 

agency’s security determination”); Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 

520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Egan applies in a Title VII action 

to preclude . . . a discrimination claim . . . resulting from an 

agency security clearance decision”). The separation of 

powers issue identified by the Supreme Court in Egan and 

reflected in our subsequent decisions stems from the kind of 

decision being made by the agency official – a predictive 

judgment about security risks – not from the job title or 

expertise of the agency official making the decision.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Egan protected the 

security clearance process as a whole. The Court did not 

suggest that courts could review distinct parts of that process. 

The majority opinion here, however, says that only the 

initiation of security clearance investigations and the grant, 

denial, or revocation of clearances are within the Egan rule. 

In the majority opinion’s view, the reporting of security risks 

is not within the Egan rule. I do not find that distinction in 

Egan. Nor do I think it makes much sense. Investigations 

and revocations of security clearances will often be prompted 

by reports of misconduct. Reports of misconduct are an 

essential part of the overall process of maintaining national 

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5

security and preventing those who may be security risks from 

accessing sensitive government information. Egan protects 

the front end of the security clearance process – including 

reports of possible security risks – as much as it protects the 

back end.

One powerful indication that the reporting of security 

risks is important to national security and falls within the 

Egan rule is that the President himself has required such 

reporting. In an executive order issued by President Clinton 

and still in effect, all federal employees with security 

clearances must make a predictive judgment about what 

constitutes suspicious behavior and report any such behavior 

for investigation: “Employees are encouraged and expected 

to report any information that raises doubts as to whether 

another employee’s continued eligibility for access to 

classified information is clearly consistent with the national

security.” Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 6.2(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 

40,245, 40,253 (Aug. 2, 1995). Egan recognized that the 

“authority to protect such [national security] information falls 

on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as 

Commander in Chief.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 527. The Egan rule 

thus covers reports made under President Clinton’s executive 

order. See id. at 527-30. The majority opinion, however, 

would allow courts to second-guess the decisions of agency 

employees who report security risks pursuant to President 

Clinton’s executive order. I cannot square that with Egan.

I appreciate and share the majority opinion’s concern

about deterring false reports that in fact stem from a 

discriminatory motive. But there are a host of sanctions that 

deter an agency employee from engaging in such behavior. 

See, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 64,562, 64,563 (Nov. 2, 2006) 

(Department of Justice “retains the right, where appropriate, 

USCA Case #10-5014 Document #1382785 Filed: 07/10/2012 Page 23 of 24
6

to discipline an employee for conduct that is inconsistent with 

Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower Protection 

Laws up to and including removal”). And in any event, it is 

not for us to revise the rule set forth in Egan; that’s a decision 

for the Supreme Court or Congress.

* * *

The rule that the Supreme Court announced in Egan

applies “unless Congress specifically has provided 

otherwise.” 484 U.S. at 530. If Congress wishes to re-strike 

the balance between personnel and employment 

discrimination laws on the one hand and national security on 

the other, it is free to do so – either broadening or narrowing 

the scope of the protection for agencies’ security clearance

decisions. Until Congress does so, however, we must apply 

Egan according to its terms. Here, Rattigan claims that FBI

officials improperly decided to report him to security 

clearance investigators. Under Egan, we cannot second-guess 

the FBI’s decision. For that reason, Rattigan’s suit faces an 

insurmountable bar, and I would dismiss it.

I respectfully dissent. When we vacated the prior panel 

decision, we indicated that the parties would have an 

opportunity to file new petitions for rehearing en banc after 

our new opinion was issued. If the Government files a

petition for rehearing en banc in response to today’s 

revamped but still-flawed majority opinion, I will urge the full 

Court to grant it.

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