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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 2002 Decided April 22, 2003

No. 01-7191

SANDRA JEAN SIMPSON,

APPELLEE

v.

SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01722)

Arman Dabiri argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Eric C. Sorenson argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Sandra Jean Simpson (‘‘appellee’’

or ‘‘Simpson’’) sued the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (‘‘appellant’’ or ‘‘Libya’’) alleging claims for hostage

taking and torture. After entering default judgment in favor

of appellee, the District Court, on motion of appellant, reopened the case and permitted Libya to file motions to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim for relief. The

court denied the motions to dismiss. Libya brought the

instant interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. For the reasons more fully set out below, we reverse

as to the torture claim and remand for dismissal; as to the

hostage-taking claim, we vacate and remand to permit

Simpson to attempt to cure the deficiency of her complaint by

amendment.

I

Simpson’s complaint alleges the following facts: On February 7, 1987, Simpson, a United States citizen, and her husband, then a permanent resident of the United States, were

passengers on the Carin II, a cruise ship, cruising through

the Mediterranean, when a severe storm interrupted the

cruise. The Carin II was seriously damaged in the storm.

On February 10, 1987, Libyan harbor authorities in Benghazi,

Libya notified the Carin II that it could use the Port of

Benghazi as a safe harbor. Subsequently, a Libyan harbor

boat escorted the Carin II into port.

On February 14, 1987, Libyan authorities boarded the

Carin II and ‘‘forcibly removed’’ the passengers and crew.

Libya held Simpson and her husband captive and threatened

to kill them if they tried to leave. Libyan authorities separated Simpson from her husband approximately three months

into their captivity. Shortly thereafter, Libya released

Simpson but held her husband incommunicado for four more

months.

On July 21, 2000, Simpson filed a pro se complaint against

Libya, alleging battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and seeking

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compensatory and punitive damages. Following some difficulty in serving the summons and complaint, service was

effected on or about January 25, 2001. On March 27, 2001,

Simpson moved for entry of default, which the District Court

granted two days later. On April 19, 2001, Simpson mailed to

Libya an offer to arbitrate. Simpson’s offer to arbitrate was

made subject to certain conditions. Among the conditions

were that the arbitration would be conducted ‘‘by a thirdparty organization with extensive experience in arbitrating

international disputes’’ and that the arbitration would ‘‘not

require [Simpson’s] absence from the United States.’’ Offer

to Arbitrate ¶ ¶ 1, 2. After receiving Simpson’s offer to

arbitrate, Libya filed an entry of appearance and a motion to

reopen the case and extend time to file an answer. The

District Court granted this motion on June 15, 2001. On July

23, 2001, Libya filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to

state a claim. The District Court denied the motion.

Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180

F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2001). Libya now appeals from the

denial of its motion.

II

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (‘‘FSIA’’) entitles

foreign states to immunity from civil suits in United States

courts, with specific exceptions. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act amended the FSIA by adding what

is now 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), creating a new exception.

Under section 1605(a)(7), foreign states that, like Libya, have

been designated as state sponsors of terrorism are denied

immunity for damages actions for personal injury or death

resulting from certain acts, including acts of ‘‘torture’’ and

‘‘hostage taking.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). The Flatow

Amendment to the FSIA creates a right of action for torture

or hostage taking against an ‘‘official, employee, or agent of a

foreign state.’’ Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c),

110 Stat. 3009–172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note).1

1 As we acknowledged recently in Price v. Socialist People’s

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the

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Section 1605(a)(7) contains as a jurisdictional requirement

that ‘‘the claimant TTT afford[ ] the foreign state a reasonable

opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted

international rules of arbitration’’ if ‘‘the act occurred in the

foreign state against which the claim has been brought.’’ 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i). Libya contends that the case

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Simpson’s

offer to arbitrate was neither timely nor reasonable under 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).

With regard to the timeliness of the offer to arbitrate,

Libya argues that because this is a jurisdictional matter, we

should require that the offer to arbitrate be made prior to (or

at least concurrent with) the filing of the complaint. However, section 1605(a)(7) sets no rule requiring that the offer to

arbitrate be made before the filing of the complaint. It

merely requires that the offer be made by such time as to

allow Libya a ‘‘reasonable opportunity’’ to arbitrate. 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i). In this instance, Simpson transmitted her offer to arbitrate to Libya in April of 2001. Libya

received the offer almost two months before responding to

Simpson’s complaint with the motion to dismiss presently

under review. Simpson, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 83. We cannot

say that the timing of the offer is such that Simpson has not

afforded Libya a ‘‘reasonable opportunity’’ to arbitrate. This

is especially true given that a plaintiff may amend a complaint

to remedy a jurisdictional defect even as late as the appellate

stage of proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (‘‘Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended TTT in the trial or

appellate courts.’’). Thus, it is difficult to see how an offer of

arbitration two months before a foreign sovereign responds to

a complaint against it in any fashion can be factually prejudicial, or legally insufficient, given that the plaintiff may amend

Flatow Amendment does not list ‘‘foreign states’’ among the parties

against whom an action may be brought. Libya, recognizing this,

argues that Simpson’s complaint should be dismissed because the

Flatow Amendment does not create a federal cause of action against

foreign states. However, Libya concedes that it failed to raise this

issue in the District Court, so we do not pass on this issue here.

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to cure jurisdictional defects even at later times, and there is

no claim that the allegation of the offer is untrue.

Libya further argues that the offer to arbitrate was not

reasonable because it requires that the arbitration take place

in the United States. Libya’s argument fails because it

misstates the conditions Simpson attached to her offer to

arbitrate. The offer simply stated that the arbitration ‘‘not

require [Simpson’s] absence from the United States.’’ Offer

to Arbitrate ¶ 2. This is not synonymous with requiring that

the arbitration be conducted in the United States. With

modern means of electronic communication, there is no impediment to conducting arbitrations with one party in the

United States and the other in Libya. Furthermore, arbitrations may be conducted through attorneys or agents, so that

even if all proceedings were conducted in Libya or some

neutral site, there is no reason why Simpson would be

required to be absent from the United States. The FSIA, as

amended, does not require any particular form of offer to

arbitrate, simply the extension of a ‘‘reasonable opportunity.’’

The form of Simpson’s offer to arbitrate did not prevent it

from affording Libya a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate.

As Simpson’s complaint survives the jurisdictional challenge, we next consider the sufficiency of the complaint to

state claims for relief for torture and hostage taking against

Libya. The term ‘‘torture,’’ as used in the amended FSIA,

derives its meaning from section 3 of the Torture Victim

Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (‘‘TVPA’’),

which borrows from the 1984 United Nations Convention

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th

Sess. Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (‘‘Torture

Convention’’). As we held in Price, 294 F.3d at 91–93, that

definition of torture includes a ‘‘severity requirement’’ that is

‘‘crucial to ensuring that the conduct proscribed by the Convention and the TVPA is sufficiently extreme and outrageous

to warrant the universal condemnation that the term ‘torture’

both connotes and invokes.’’ Id. at 92. ‘‘[T]orture does not

automatically result whenever individuals in official custody

are subjected even to direct physical assault.’’ Id. at 93.

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Rather, torture is a label that is ‘‘usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example,

sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents

to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in

positions that cause extreme pain.’’ Id. at 92–93 (quoting S.

Exec. Rep. No. 101–30, at 14 (1990)).

Simpson alleges here that she was ‘‘interrogated and then

held incommunicado,’’ ‘‘threatened with death TTT if [she]

moved from the quarters [where she was] held,’’ and ‘‘forcibly

separated from her husband TTT [and unable] to learn of his

welfare or his whereabouts.’’ Although these alleged acts

certainly reflect a bent toward cruelty on the part of their

perpetrators, they are not in themselves so unusually cruel or

sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to constitute torture

within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the

District Court’s order as to Simpson’s claim for torture.

Section 1605(e)(2) defines ‘‘hostage taking’’ as that term is

used in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the

Taking of Hostages (‘‘ICATH’’). ‘‘Hostage taking’’ occurs

under the ICATH (and so under the FSIA) when a person

‘‘seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to

continue to detain another person in order to compel a third

party TTT to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or

implicit condition for the release of a hostage.’’ Article I,

ICATH, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 39, U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979).

The essential element of the hostage-taking claim is that the

intended purpose of the detention be to accomplish the sort of

third-party compulsion described in the convention. Price,

294 F.3d at 94.

In her complaint, Simpson alleges that she was held captive

and incommunicado for several months, but she does not

allege that Libya’s intended purpose behind her detention

was to compel anyone to do or abstain from doing any act.

Although the District Court thought it ‘‘reasonable to infer

that Libya sought to compel some third-party action or

inaction’’ by detaining Simpson, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 89, we

think it clear that Simpson’s complaint fails to state a

hostage-taking claim because it does not articulate any inUSCA Case #01-7191 Document #745055 Filed: 04/22/2003 Page 6 of 7
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tended purpose behind her detention, and certainly not one of

the sort described in the convention and discussed by this

court in Price. Nevertheless, we, as in Price, find it possible

that Simpson might be able to allege facts supporting the

proposition that Libya intended to compel action or inaction

by a third party ‘‘as an explicit or implicit condition’’ of

Simpson’s release. So, with respect to Simpson’s hostagetaking claim, we vacate and remand to the District Court to

allow Simpson to attempt to amend her complaint in an effort

to satisfy the definition of hostage taking as used in the FSIA

and the ICATH.

CONCLUSION

As Simpson’s offer to arbitrate afforded Libya a reasonable

opportunity to arbitrate Simpson’s claim, there is no jurisdictional flaw barring Simpson’s complaint, and we affirm the

District Court with respect to this issue. Nevertheless,

Simpson fails to state a claim for torture as that term is used

in the FSIA and the TVPA, and we reverse as to that claim.

Simpson likewise fails to state a claim for hostage taking as

that term is used in the FSIA and the ICATH. Because it

appears possible that Simpson might be able to allege facts

supporting a claim that Libya intended to compel action or

inaction by a third party as a condition of Simpson’s release,

we vacate the District Court’s decision with respect to the

hostage-taking claim and remand to allow Simpson an opportunity to amend her complaint.

So ordered.

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