Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02006/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DON CLARK WILSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-2006 DFL KJM P

vs.

D.K. SISTO, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner has paid the filing fee.

In the body of the printed habeas form, petitioner raises two challenges to his

continued confinement without a parole date following his 1972 conviction for first degree

murder. First, he alleges that he is being subjected to parole procedures that violate the federal

constitution. Second, he contends that the Board of Prison Terms has failed to reset his term

under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law.

In the lengthy points and authorities that follow, petitioner makes an ex post facto

claim based on the application of Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) parole criteria being

applied to his ISL sentence. He also alleges, however, that he has “met all of the criteria for

qualifying as a candidate for parole. . . .” Pet., Attachment (Attach.) at 2. He also relies on

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the Ninth Circuit noted the due

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process problems that might arise if continued denials of parole are based on unvarying and

unvariable factors such as an inmate’s prior record and the circumstances of the offense. Finally,

he argues that the Board “was without sufficient evidence to deny parole to Petitioner . . .” and

asks that the court direct the Board “to set the release date of Petitioner. . . .” Attach. at 29.

Petitioner concedes he has not exhausted his state remedies by presenting his

claims to the California Supreme Court, which is, in most cases, a condition precedent to seeking

federal habeas relief. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1). He

argues, however, that because he is challenging only parole procedures, he is not required to

exhaust state remedies. He relies on Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). 

In Wilkinson, two prisoners filed civil rights actions challenging Ohio parole

procedures. Dotson alleged that the parole board improperly used procedures enacted after he

began to serve his term; Johnson made the same claim and also argued that his due process rights

were violated because he was not allowed to speak at the hearing, which was not attended by the

required number of board members. The Supreme Court considered whether the claims were

cognizable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than in a habeas action. It concluded:

[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation)–no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no mater the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in

that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dotson and Johnson seek relief that will render invalid the state

procedures used to deny parole eligibility (Dotson) and parole

suitability (Johnson). Neither respondent seeks an injunction

ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community . . .

. Success for Dotson does not mean immediate release from

confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new

eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new

parole application. Success for Johnson means at most a new

parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities may, in their

discretion, decline to shorten his prison term.

Id. at 81-82 (emphases in original; citations omitted).

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Wilkinson thus considered a prisoner’s use of a civil rights action to challenge

procedures; it did not hold that a prisoner was excused from the normal requirement that he

exhaust state remedies when he files a habeas action ultimately seeking release on parole. 

While petitioner has challenged the procedures used in his parole hearings, he has

also challenged the substantive result of those hearings: the denial of a parole date. Moreover,

petitioner has not filed a civil rights action seeking damages or an injunction: he has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release. There is no allegation that state court

remedies are no longer available to petitioner; before he may pursue federal habeas relief, he

must exhaust those remedies.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for

a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 28, 2007. 

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2/wils2006.156

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