Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01212/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1212

CANDICE MCCURDY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVID FITTS and JEFF GILL,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 13-cv-455-SMY-SCW— Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 13, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, 

and BRUCE, District Judge.*

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Candice McCurdy, a patrol 

deputy with the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department, 

applied for a job as an inspector with the Southern Illinois 

Enforcement Group, which investigates drug crimes. She 

 * Of the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 15-1212

was selected, subject to a background check. While that 

check was conducted, she remained in her deputy’s post. 

Agent Barbee Braddy, who conducted the check, recommended that she not be hired. Braddy discovered that 

McCurdy had recently filed for bankruptcy and was in a 

long-term relationship with Jon Mohring, who belonged to a 

biker gang associated with criminal activity. Braddy thought 

that these facts made McCurdy unsuitable for a more responsible job, particularly given what had happened when 

the Group hired Caleb Craft. He, too, had been in financial 

difficulty and had some criminal associates, and he was fired 

when the Group discovered that he was stealing drugs and 

money from the unit. McCurdy wanted to fill the Craft vacancy; following the adage “once burned twice shy” the 

Group decided to look elsewhere.

In this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, McCurdy contends 

that the officers who made these decisions engaged in sex 

discrimination. She offers two theories: first, that she would 

have been promoted immediately had she been a man; second, that the Group gave her background and associates 

more scrutiny than it does for male applicants. She does not 

deny that the Group had legitimate reasons for thinking that 

someone else would be more suitable; instead she contends 

that the Group would not have discovered these matters had 

the applicant been male. The district court, however, granted 

summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that McCurdy 

was treated the same as a male applicant would have been.

The district court’s conclusion is well founded with respect to the hiring decision, because Agent Braddy testified 

in discovery that she investigated McCurdy exactly the same 

way as she investigates other applicants, and that she always

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No. 15-1212 3

checks financial details and romantic entanglements. Indeed, 

Braddy had investigated Craft and recommended that he not 

be hired because she discovered that he had financial problems and associated with people engaged in shady activities. 

The Group overrode her recommendation about Craft, suffered the consequences, and was determined not to make 

that mistake again. This has nothing to do with sex.

McCurdy points to Craft as a comparator treated more favorably, but employers are entitled to learn from their errors.

Given Agent Braddy’s uncontested testimony that she investigated McCurdy exactly as she investigates men who apply 

to be inspectors, and McCurdy’s concession that Braddy’s 

findings constitute sex-neutral reasons for not hiring her, 

summary judgment was proper.

This brings us to McCurdy’s contention that a man would 

have taken the inspector’s job pending Braddy’s investigation. McCurdy contends that she lost the difference between 

her deputy’s salary and an inspector’s salary during that interval. Defendants reply that there was no difference—that a 

person receives the salary of her existing position until a 

promotion or new appointment becomes final. McCurdy replies that this is wrong and that her income would have been 

higher in the interim.

The district court did not resolve this dispute, and the 

record on appeal does not enable us to say which side is correct. Nor did the district court address McCurdy’s contention 

that keeping her in the deputy’s job pending the background 

check was an instance of sex discrimination. McCurdy contends that every man who has been selected for an inspector’s position with the Group has been transferred to that job 

(and given its salary) immediately—though subject to final 

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4 No. 15-1212

approval after the background check. Defendants concede 

that this is so. They contend that McCurdy’s transfer was delayed not because she is female but because she was needed 

in the Sheriff’s Department until her replacement could be 

hired.

The district court needs to determine whether there is a 

material dispute of fact about either the defendants’ explanation for delaying McCurdy’s transfer or the salary she would 

have received had she been promoted conditionally. If the 

salaries would have been identical, or if any reasonable trier 

of fact would be bound to conclude that the delay was unrelated to sex, then defendants are entitled to prevail, but otherwise this subject requires a trial.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed to the extent it rejects McCurdy’s hiring theory but vacated to the extent it rejects her delay theory, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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