Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02340/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02340-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW HORNUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

JON MADARANG, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C06-2340 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on Monday, October 30, 2006, on Defendants’

motion to dismiss. After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the

allegations in the complaint, and governing law, the Court now GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Matthew Hornung was one of the four Oakland police officers accused as

part of the “Oakland Riders” scandal. He filed this case for damages based on his contention

that Defendants wrongfully and maliciously accused him of misconduct. Defendants Keith

Batt, Steve Hewison, and Jon Madarang are current or former Oakland police officers. 

Hornung has also sued Richard Word, the former Oakland chief of police; the City of

Oakland (“City”); and the Oakland Police Department (“OPD”). The first amended

complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following:

Batt, an OPD trainee at the time, complained to Madarang, an internal affairs (“IA”)

investigator, on July 5 and 7, 2000, about the alleged actions of certain police officers,

including Clarence Mabanag, Batt’s field training officer, but not including Hornung. On

July 7, 2000, Deputy Chief Pete Dunbar placed three officers – Mabanag, Frank Vazquez,

and Jude Siapno – on administrative leave. No action was taken against Hornung.

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Batt then encouraged Hewison, another OPD trainee, to come forward with similar

allegations of misconduct. Hewison turned to Hornung for advice, and the two discussed

incidents that occurred during the arrest of Rodney Mack. Hewison told Hornung that the

police report Hewison authored regarding the Mack incident was accurate and that he did not

want to lie to cover for Batt’s allegations. However, Hewison later told Hornung that he felt

compelled to make false allegations against the officers accused by Batt. Hornung yelled at

Hewison and told him to tell IA the truth, but Hewison ultimately told IA that his report

regarding the Mack incident was false. Hewison received no discipline for allegedly

falsifying a report.

Following his conversations with Hewison, Hornung regularly expressed his belief

that Hewison and Batt were being untruthful. Hornung reported Hewison’s statements about

lying to IA investigators to high-ranking OPD command officials, who in turn informed

Madarang.

Defendants then decided to add Hornung to the list of subject officers (consisting of

Mabanag, Vazquez, and Siapno) in an attempt to silence Hornung, prevent other OPD

officers from speaking out against Batt and Hewison, and remove any credibility Hornung

might have had before the court or the public. Batt and Hewison intentionally and

specifically joined with Madarang, the City, and OPD to include Hornung in allegations of

misconduct because they had a personal stake in avoiding being accused of lying and making

false allegations.

On August 30, 2000, Madarang met with representatives from the Alameda County

District Attorney’s office. Hornung was subsequently placed on administrative leave on

September 1, 2000.

To help put allegations of a department-wide policy and practice of violating suspects’

civil rights behind them, Defendants decided to represent to the public that Mabanag, Siapno,

Vazquez, and Hornung were “bad apples” who needed to be removed to clean up the

department. Madarang wrote a report of more than sixty pages finding that the allegations

against these four officers were well-founded. His preliminary draft of the report did not

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include any allegations against Hornung, but a supervisor specifically directed Madarang to

revise the report to include such allegations. Madarang’s false report formed the basis for

criminal charges filed against all four officers on November 1, 2000. On that date, Hornung

was arrested, booked, fingerprinted, and required to post bail to be released from jail. His

telephone records were also seized and searched.

On December 20, 2000, Madarang conducted another interview with Batt by

telephone. During that interview, Batt falsely accused Hornung of beating Delphine Allen. 

These statements were made while Batt was unemployed and acting as a private citizen in his

individual capacity, not in any official capacity.

At the preliminary hearing, which occurred on several days in May, June, and July

2001, Batt, Hewison, and Madarang all testified in their capacity as police officers. 

Significant and relevant portions of their testimony were false, misleading, and intentionally

designed to cause the court to find probable cause to support charges against Hornung.

Batt, Hewison, and Madarang again gave false testimony during the first criminal

trial, which took place between the summer of 2002 and the fall of 2003. Hornung was

found not guilty of several charges, with the jury hung on all other charges.

The second criminal trial occurred between the summer of 2004 and spring of 2005,

and Batt, Hewison, and Madarang again gave false testimony at that trial. Hornung was

acquitted by the jury of all criminal charges filed against him.

Throughout the time ranging from the initial investigation through the completion of

the second criminal trial, Batt, Hewison, and Madarang “engaged in intentionally and

deliberately making false and misleading statements, destroying or hiding exculpatory

evidence, intentionally creating false documentary evidence, and then providing further false

testimony to cover up the creation of the false documentary evidence, and encouraging other

witnesses to lie.” FAC ¶ 45. They did all of the above “with the plain intent and design to

obtain guilty verdicts as to HORNUNG and the other officers.” Id. All of the alleged acts

were conducted in Defendants’ prosecutorial and law enforcement capacity, except as to

Batt’s December 2000 defamatory statements, which were made in his individual capacity.

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Based on the above allegations, Hornung asserts multiple causes of action under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 for alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. He also asserts a Monell claim against the City and OPD, as well as a

RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) claim against all Defendants. 

In addition, Hornung originally asserted a defamation claim and a claim under California

Civil Code section 47.5 against Defendant Batt. However, after Batt filed a motion to strike

those causes of action under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16,

the parties stipulated to the dismissal of those two claims without prejudice, with each party

to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees associated with the motion to strike. Defendants

now move to dismiss all of Hornung’s remaining claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations, a court must assume

the facts as alleged in the complaint to be true unless the allegations are controverted by

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters subject to judicial notice, or documents

necessarily relied on by the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions. Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court should not grant dismissal

“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

Moreover, dismissal should be with leave to amend unless it is clear that amendment could

not possibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d

1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).

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DISCUSSION

I. Hornung’s Non-Opposition to Dismissal of Certain Claims

As an initial matter, Hornung does not contest dismissal of three sets of claims. First,

Hornung concedes that he does not state a claim under § 1985. The Court therefore

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Hornung’s § 1985 claims with prejudice.

Similarly, Hornung concedes that his first three causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, which do not identify a specific constitutional right alleged to have been violated, are

based on an alleged violation of Hornung’s Fourth Amendment rights – the same claim

raised in Hornung’s sixth cause of action. There is no need for such duplication, as Hornung

appears to have recognized at oral argument, when he asked for leave to amend to state one

“substantive” § 1983 cause of action based on the Fourth Amendment and a second § 1983

conspiracy cause of action. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Hornung’s first three causes of action. Dismissal is without prejudice so that Hornung may

combine the appropriate allegations to state a single cause of action against Defendants based

on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Finally, Hornung consents to the dismissal of his due process and equal protection

claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims with

prejudice.

II. Fourth Amendment Conspiracy Claim

Defendants also move to dismiss Hornung’s Fourth Amendment conspiracy claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A § 1983 conspiracy violation requires an agreement or meeting of

the minds to violate a constitutional right, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and a

constitutional violation. Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301

(9th Cir. 1999). The required agreement “need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis

of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id.

Defendants move to dismiss Hornung’s Fourth Amendment conspiracy claim on a

number of bases, the first being that Hornung has failed to allege an agreement or meeting of

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the minds. However, this argument is not persuasive under general notice pleading

standards, which Defendants agree apply to Hornung’s conspiracy claim. See, e.g., Empress

LLC v. City & County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a

heightened pleading standard should only be applied when the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure so require”). For example, Hornung alleges that “BATT and HEWISON both

intentionally and specifically participated in and joined with MADARANG, the CITY OF

OAKLAND, and the OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, to include HORNUNG in the

accusations and allegations of misconduct,” FAC ¶ 27, and that “[t]he defendants, and each

of them, agreed that the illegal object or course of action was to charge and prosecute

HORNUNG maliciously with crimes, and to intentionally and deliberately utilize knowingly

false testimony in order to achieve such end,” id. ¶ 75(d). Although extremely bare-bones,

such allegations are sufficient to satisfy Hornung’s burden at this stage of the proceedings,

particularly considering that, when viewed as a whole and in a light most favorable to

Hornung, the complaint’s allegations could lead to an inference that a meeting of the minds

occurred.

Defendants also argue that they cannot be held liable for bringing criminal charges

because that decision was made by the District Attorney’s office, which is presumed to have

made an independent determination to prosecute. However, the Ninth Circuit squarely

rejected that argument in Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004),

explaining that “the presumption of prosecutorial independence does not bar a subsequent

§ 1983 claim against state or local officials who improperly exerted pressure on the

prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or

otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing

the initiation of legal proceedings.” Like the Ninth Circuit in Awabdy, this Court cannot say

that it would be impossible, based on the allegations in the complaint, for Hornung to

demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct, including that of Defendant Batt, was instrumental in

bringing about legal proceedings against Hornung.

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Next, Defendants argue that police officers are absolutely immune from liability for

testimony given at trial, even if such testimony is perjurious, and that such testimony

therefore cannot form the basis for a conspiracy claim. While these are generally true

statements, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36, 345-46 (1983) and Franklin v. Terr,

201 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court has also held that a complaining

witness who wrongfully brings about prosecution, such as an officer who requests an arrest

warrant based on false grounds, is not entitled to absolute immunity, Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The Ninth Circuit subsequently ruled that Malley provides an

exception to Briscoe so that officers who “functionally served as complaining witnesses who

may be said to have initiated [a plaintiff’s] prosecution . . . are not entitled to absolute

immunity for their false statements.” Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir.

1997). In Harris, the court held that absolute immunity did not shield defendants who

allegedly:

conspired to cover-up their own misdeeds and to shift the blame

to [the plaintiff] by fabricating and disseminating a false version

of the events that occurred at Ruby Ridge. The subsequent

official testimony was simply a part of the implementation of that

conspiracy, a step in the overall plan. We do not believe that the

general policy that immunizes false official testimony requires

that we preclude Harris from showing the full range of occasions

on which [defendants’] falsehoods were uttered, simply because

some of them occurred before a grand or petit jury.

Id. Similar factual allegations exist in this case, and Harris therefore bars Defendants’

assertions that they are absolutely immune for damages allegedly caused by their false

testimony.

Defendants attempted to distinguish Harris at oral argument by asserting that Harris

is consistent with Defendants’ position that absolute immunity applies whenever a witness

gives testimony in a setting with the full protections of the adversarial process. Again, this

statement may be generally true, see Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 127 (9th Cir. 1987)

(extending a witness’s absolute immunity beyond trial to all adversarial pretrial proceedings),

but Defendants have cited no authority that the proposition applies to complaining witnesses. 

To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected Defendants’ position in Harris, a case in

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which the defendants testified both before a grand jury and petit jury (i.e., trial). See Harris,

126 F.3d at 1196, 1199.

Finally, Defendants argue that the City and OPD are improper parties to the

conspiracy claim because Hornung has failed to identify an official policy, custom, or

practice in his conspiracy claims and explicitly bases the liability of these defendants on

respondeat superior. This argument fails for two reasons. First, although Defendants are

correct that municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior, Gibson

v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002), the cited paragraph of the FAC

also alleges that the municipal defendants “are liable individually.” FAC ¶ 75(e). Second, as

discussed in the next section, Hornung has – contrary to Defendants’ assertions – adequately

alleged the existence of a policy or practice.

In short, Defendants have failed to persuade the Court that Hornung has failed to state

a § 1983 claim based on an alleged conspiracy to violate Hornung’s Fourth Amendment

rights. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss such a claim is DENIED.

III. Monell Claim

Defendants next move to dismiss Hornung’s claim under Monell v. New York City

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which provides that a municipality may

be held liable under § 1983 for an officer’s unconstitutional actions if those actions were

taken pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom. Defendants contend that Hornung’s

Monell claim must be dismissed because Hornung has not adequately alleged the existence of

an official policy or practice.

In making their argument, Defendants rely on cases applying a different standard of

review than that applicable on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d

1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or

new trial); Kanae v. Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Haw. 2003) (considering motion for

summary judgment). At this stage of the proceedings, “[i]t is improper to dismiss . . . a

section 1983 complaint alleging municipal liability even if the claim is based on nothing

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more than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.” Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Hornung easily satisfies this minimal standard by alleging the existence of a policy, custom,

or practice to violate employees’ constitutional rights, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 79, 81-84, and the Court

therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hornung’s Monell claim. Defendants

argue that Hornung’s complaint only discusses his own situation, and that one person’s

factual circumstances cannot constitute a pattern or practice; however, whether the alleged

policy or practice actually does exist is a factual matter that cannot properly be resolved on a

motion to dismiss.

Defendants also asserted in their moving papers that Hornung’s Monell claim is

barred by the statute of limitations. In opposition, Hornung pointed to California

Government Code section 945.3, which provides that a person may not bring suit against a

peace officer or public entity “based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense

for which the accused is charged, including an act or omission in investigating or reporting

the offense or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges against the accused are

pending before a superior court.” The statute further provides that “[a]ny applicable statute

of limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions shall be tolled during the period that the

charges are pending before a superior court.” Id. Defendants apparently concede the

applicability of this statute to Hornung’s claims by failing to rebut Hornung’s argument in

their reply brief or at oral argument. While Defendants do not concede that all of Hornung’s

claims are timely even considering section 945.3, that is not a matter that can be resolved on

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

IV. Claims Related to Mack and Miller Incidents

In their moving papers, Defendants also sought dismissal of all claims based on

incidents involving the arrests of Phillip Miller and Rodney Mack on grounds that such

claims are barred by the statute of limitations. In opposition, Hornung responded that these

arrests were part of a general criminal conspiracy charge to obstruct justice brought against

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Although Hornung did not present a copy of the charging instrument to the Court, he

did represent in his opposition papers that the Miller incident is included in the Sixth Overt

Act regarding the general conspiracy charge, and the Mack incident is alleged in the

Thirteenth Overt Act of that charge.

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Hornung under California Penal Code section 182(a)(5). See FAC ¶ 52 (including “an

overall, general conspiracy to obstruct justice” among the list of criminal charges brought

against Hornung).1

 Defendants’ reply then modified their initial position and, rather than

seeking dismissal of claims based on the Mack and Miller incidents, Defendants now assert

that “[a]ny incidents not linked to [the overall] conspiracy charge cannot survive a statute of

limitations challenge. Plaintiff, therefore, must identify in his pleadings the incidents

identified by the District Attorney in the Overt Acts that formed the basis of the conspiracy

charge.” Reply at 8.

Defendants, however, cite no support for their contention that the complaint must

contain this level of detail, and the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion regarding

the Mack and Miller incidents. While the Court agrees that Defendants must know which

incidents formed the basis for the general criminal conspiracy charge brought against

Hornung, Defendants may obtain such information during discovery.

V. RICO Claim

Defendants’ final argument is that Hornung’s RICO claim must be dismissed because

Hornung fails to allege a nexus to interstate commerce. Hornung bases his RICO claim on

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which provides that it is “unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or

foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 

In his RICO allegations, however, Hornung omits reference to “interstate or foreign

commerce.” See FAC ¶ 124.

To support his RICO claim, Hornung relies on two cases in which RICO claims were

allowed to stand against Los Angeles Police Department officers based on false arrest claims:

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In fact, Hornung fails even to argue that the law requires only a “de minimis” impact

on interstate commerce.

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Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005), and Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287

(C.D. Cal. 2000). Neither of these cases addressed the interstate commerce issue, but

Hornung urges the Court to conclude that both courts must have implicitly concluded that the

interstate commerce test was satisfied because the courts otherwise would “likely have

dismissed the claim[s] on that ground.” Opp’n at 21. However, silence on an issue does not

amount to a holding. See, e.g., Kinney v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 939 F.2d 690, 692 n.3

(9th Cir. 1991) (“The substantial benefit basis for awarding attorney’s fees was not at issue

and the court did not discuss it. Silence on the issue could not be interpreted as holding the

substantial benefit theory inapplicable to section 185 cases.”). The issue before both the

Diaz and Guerrero courts was whether the plaintiff had adequately alleged the type of injury

that is redressable under RICO, and it appears that the interstate commerce issue was never

raised. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902-03 (noting that the district court’s dispositive ruling on

standing made it unnecessary for the court to decide whether the complaint suffered from

other deficiencies); Guerrero, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1292 (noting that the defendant only argued

that the plaintiff “lacks standing to pursue his RICO claims” and did “not dispute that the

necessary RICO elements are met”). Thus, Diaz does not require, and Guerrero does not

support, finding that the allegations in this case satisfy the interstate commerce requirement.

On the other hand, RICO requires only “that the individual predicate racketeering acts

have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d

1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1997). A de minimis impact is one that has “a probable or potential

impact on interstate commerce.” Id. at 1349. Hornung asserts that since drug trafficking has

been found to affect interstate commerce for RICO purposes – a proposition undisputed by

Defendants – then “a Police Department engaged in the arrest and prevention of drug

trafficking is [also] engaged in activities that affect interstate commerce.” Opp’n at 22. The

Court finds this argument to be somewhat tenuous, and Hornung cites no authority to support

finding a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce based on such an attenuated argument.2

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However, the Court need not resolve the parties’ dispute over the interstate commerce

requirement because it finds another of Defendants’ arguments persuasive. As Defendant

Batt argued in his reply brief, and as all Defendants argued at the motion hearing, it appears

that Hornung has failed to allege a predicate act under RICO. The RICO statute enumerates

predicate acts that qualify as “racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). None of

Defendants’ alleged conduct appears to fall under this definition, and courts have specifically

found that perjury and malicious prosecution do not qualify as RICO predicate acts. E.g.,

Streck v. Peters, 855 F. Supp. 1156, 1162 (D. Haw. 1994) (explaining that perjury in federal

court may qualify as RICO predicate act, but perjury in state court does not); Von Bulow v.

Von Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that “malicious prosecution

may not constitute a RICO predicate act”). The Court therefore TENTATIVELY GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hornung’s RICO claim with prejudice because it appears that

Hornung has not and cannot allege that Defendants committed any of the predicate acts

enumerated in § 1961(1).

The Court’s ruling on this issue is tentative because Defendants did not raise the

argument regarding predicate acts in their moving papers, and Hornung therefore has not had

an opportunity to submit a written opposition. Although Hornung failed to take advantage of

his opportunity to respond to this argument at the motion hearing, the Court will nonetheless

allow Hornung an opportunity to submit a written opposition out of an abundance of caution.

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the above, the Court finds good cause to GRANT IN PART and

DENY IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows:

1. All claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as Hornung’s due process and

equal protection claims, are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Hornung’s first three causes of action, which allege violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

without identifying particular constitutional rights, are dismissed without prejudice. 

Hornung may consolidate these claims into a single claim based on an alleged violation of

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his Fourth Amendment rights. Hornung may also state a separate claim based on an alleged

conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

3. Hornung’s tenth cause of action under RICO is tentatively dismissed with

prejudice, subject to the following:

(a) If Hornung believes he has or can allege “racketeering activity” as defined in

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), then he shall file a supplemental opposition of no more than three pages

on or before November 9, 2006. Defendants may then file a supplemental reply of no more

than three pages on or before November 16, 2006. The matter will then be submitted on the

papers unless the Court otherwise orders oral argument.

(b) If Hornung fails to file a timely supplemental opposition, then the tentative

ruling dismissing Hornung’s RICO claim with prejudice will become final, and Hornung

shall file his second amended complaint on or before November 30, 2006.

4. In all other respects, Defendants’ motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/02/06 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:06-cv-02340-TEH Document 24 Filed 11/02/06 Page 13 of 13