Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04051/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOANN BRADFORD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHEVRON USA INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-04051-PJH 

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15 & 16

Plaintiffs Joann Bradford, Liza Mosqueriola, Jason Rohrbach, and Brian White’s 

motion to remand came on for hearing before this court on October 30, 2019. Defendant 

Chevron USA Inc.’s (“Chevron”) motion to dismiss came on for hearing before this court 

on the same date. Plaintiffs appeared through their counsel, Alexander Nazarov. 

Defendant appeared through its counsel, Douglas Hart and Marina Gruber. Having read 

the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant 

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to 

remand and DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss, for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2019, plaintiffs commenced a putative class action against Chevron in 

the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa. See Compl., Dkt. 1 

at ECF p. 31. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) failure to pay 

reporting-time pay pursuant to Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 1-2001, Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11010(5)(A) (“Wage Order 1-2001”); (2) failure to pay all wages 

earned at termination pursuant to Labor Code §§ 200–203; (3) failure to provide accurate 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 1 of 16
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

itemized wage statements pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226–226.3; and (4) violation of 

Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. All of plaintiffs’ claims are based on 

their contention that Chevron failed to compensate certain employees for reporting-time 

relating to “standby shifts” and standby time. Compl. ¶¶1–5, 7, 22. As such, the parties 

agree that the second, third, and fourth causes of action are derivative of the first cause 

of action, in that those claims seek penalties and other relief for Chevron’s alleged failure 

to pay wages disputed under the first cause of action. See Mot. at 2 (“The remaining 

claims are derivative from the reporting time pay claim.”); Opp. at 9 (because the second, 

third, and fourth claims are derivate of the first, “preemption of Plaintiffs’ claim for 

reporting time pay will result in preemption and ultimate dismissal of their remaining 

claims as well.”).

On July 15, 2019, Chevron removed the action to this court. Dkt. 1. On August 

14, 2019, plaintiffs filed the present motion to remand the action to state court. Dkt. 16. 

On August 21, 2019, defendant filed the present motion to dismiss the action. Dkt. 21.

Chevron owns and operates an oil refinery in Richmond, California. Plaintiffs are 

current and former operator employees (employees in that role are referred to as 

“Operators”) who have worked at the Richmond refinery. The dispute centers around 

Chevron’s policy of assigning Operators to “on-call” (also called “standby”) shifts.

(Operators are also assigned regular shifts, which are not challenged in this action.) 

Plaintiffs’ essential contention is that Wage Order 1-2001 requires Chevron to pay 

Operators for shifts when they are required to be available and “on-call” to work, even 

when Chevron does not ultimately require the Operators to physically appear at its facility 

to work.

Between plaintiffs’ allegations and defendant’s submission of undisputed collective 

bargaining agreements, the relevant features of the Operators’ standby shifts are not 

materially disputed, although there are minor discrepancies between the allegations and 

the collective bargaining agreements. See Leger Decl., Dkt. 1-1, Exs. A (2015–2019

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 2 of 16
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Articles of Agreement), B (the “12-Hour Shift Agreement”) (together, the “CBAs”).1

Plaintiffs allege that Chevron requires Operators to work regular 12-hour shifts, 

scheduled in advance. Operators can generally be confident that they will be required to 

physically appear at Chevron’s facility to work these shifts, and that they will be paid for 

their time. Chevron separately requires Operators to be available for 12-hour standby 

shifts, also scheduled in advance. Operators may or may not be required to physically 

appear at Chevron’s facility to work standby shifts.

Plaintiffs allege that Chevron requires Operators to be available to receive a call 

from Chevron either 30 minutes or 1 hour prior to the start of each assigned standby shift, 

and either 30 minutes or 1 hour after the start of the shift, during which time Operators 

may be told that they must travel to Chevron’s facility to work. Cf. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23.

2

 

Plaintiffs allege that they must arrive at work within 2 hours of being contacted. Id. ¶¶ 3, 

23.

3

 If an Operator fails to answer a supervisor’s telephone call during the designated 

time period, the Operator is considered absent without leave and subject to discipline. Id.

¶ 3. If the Operator is not contacted during the designated 1.5-hour time period, Chevron 

does not compensate the Operator. Id.

The 12-Hour Shift Agreement largely aligns with plaintiffs’ relevant allegations 

about how standby shifts operate:

• For every 12-hour shift, there is also a “standby” crew “in the event short 

notice overtime (less than 12 hours notice) is required and no volunteers 

are available.” 12-Hour Shift Agreement at p. I-5. 

 

1 Although the complaint does not allege their existence, plaintiffs’ relationships with 

defendant are governed by the CBAs. Defendant attached the CBAs to its notice of 

removal, and plaintiffs do not contest their accuracy.

2 The CBAs provide that Operators must be available during a window beginning 2 hours 

prior to the start of shift and ending 30 minutes after the start of the shift. Compare

Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23 with 12-Hour Shift Agreement at p. III-7 ¶ 2.

3 The CBAs provide that Operators must “be able to get to work in a reasonable time 

period after being contacted.” Compare Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23 with 12-Hour Shift Agreement at 

p. III-7 ¶ 7.

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 3 of 16
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

• “Standby personnel must be available . . . during the period extending from 

2 hours prior to shift change and 1/2 hour after shift change” and “will 

receive no standby pay allowance.” Id.; see also id. at p. III-7 ¶ 2. As such,

on-call Operators need to make themselves available to work their 

scheduled 12-hour on-call shifts, and must also be accessible to speak by 

telephone from 4 AM to 6:30 AM. Id. at pp. I-5, III-7 ¶ 3.

• “Standby personnel must give a number where they can be reached during 

standby periods.” Id. at p. III-7 ¶ 4. Standby Operators must be available 

to be spoken with “directly.” Id. ¶ 5. Answering machines and beepers are 

not sufficient. Id.

• Employees scheduled to work standby for a given shift who “are not 

personally contactable during the standby period will be considered AWOL 

and subject to disciplinary action. (Discipline will follow the established 

practice for absenteeism).” Id. ¶ 6. 

• “Standby personnel must be able to get to work in a reasonable time period 

after being contacted.” Id. ¶ 7.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Removal

Removal jurisdiction is based entirely on federal statutory authority. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441–55. A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of 

which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

“To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a defendant must file in 

the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 

547, 551 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). The “short and plain” statement “need 

not contain evidentiary submissions.” Id.

Once confronted with a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burden of 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 4 of 16
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 553–54. On a motion 

to remand, both “parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits 

or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence[.]” Ibarra v. Manheim 

Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005).

Although the Ninth Circuit has “not addressed the types of evidence defendants 

may rely upon to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence test for jurisdiction, [it has] 

endorsed the Fifth Circuit's practice of considering facts presented in the removal petition 

as well as any ‘summary-judgement-type evidence[.]’” Matheson v. Progressive 

Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Singer v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 

F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendants cannot rely simply upon “conclusory 

allegations.” Singer, 116 F.3d at 377. “As with other important areas of our law, 

evidence may be direct or circumstantial.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

Plaintiff may submit rebuttal evidence. Id. “[T]he removing defendant, has the 

burden of proof on this. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, if the 

evidence submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federalcourt jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted).

2. LMRA Preemption

Under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 185 (the 

“LMRA”), “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or 

between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 

States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 

without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “As a result of this 

broad federal mandate, the Supreme Court has explained, the ‘preemptive force of 

section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of 

contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 5 of 16
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).

“Once preempted, any claim purportedly based on a state law is considered, from 

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. This is true even in 

some instances in which the plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in their 

complaint, if the plaintiffs' claim is either grounded in the provisions of the labor contract 

or requires interpretation of it. Otherwise, parties would be able to evade the 

requirements of section 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious 

breach of contract or some other state cause of action, and thus elevate form over 

substance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“However, not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a 

provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301 or other provisions 

of the federal labor law. Claims bearing no relationship to a collective-bargaining 

agreement beyond the fact that they are asserted by an individual covered by such an 

agreement are simply not pre-empted by § 301.” McCray v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 

902 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“The distinction between claims that are preempted and claims that are not doesn't lend 

itself to analytical precision.” Id. at 1009–10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has explained a 2-part test to determine whether section 301 

preempts a claim. First, the court inquires “into whether the asserted cause of action 

involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA. If the 

right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and our analysis 

ends there.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 

202, 212 (1985) (section 301 cannot “preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or 

establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract”); Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (section 301 only “governs claims founded directly on 

rights created by collective-bargaining agreements”)). “To determine whether a particular 

right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA,” the court considers “the legal 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 6 of 16
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement 

[and] not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be 

pursued.” Id. at 1060 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994)). 

“[R]eliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to inject a federal 

question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Second, if “the right exists independently of the CBA, we must still consider 

whether it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 

agreement.’ If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if 

not, then the claim can proceed under state law.” Id. at 1059–60 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 

U.S. at 394) (citations omitted). To determine whether a state law right is “substantially 

dependent” on the terms of a CBA, the court

decide[s] whether the claim can be resolved by “looking to” 

versus interpreting the CBA. If the latter, the claim is 

preempted; if the former, it is not. Although the “look 

to”/“interpret” distinction is not always clear or amenable to a 

bright-line test, some assessments are easier to make than 

others. For example, we know that neither looking to the CBA 

merely to discern that none of its terms is reasonably in dispute, 

nor the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in 

computing a penalty, is enough to warrant preemption. 

Similarly, alleging a hypothetical connection between the claim 

and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim. 

Finally, in cases presenting the question whether the plaintiff's 

union bargained away the state law right at issue a court may 

look to the CBA to determine whether it contains a clear and 

unmistakable waiver of state law rights without triggering 

section 301 preemption.

Id. at 1060 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 

124 (“when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that 

a [CBA] will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the 

claim to be extinguished”).

“The line between reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be 

somewhat hazy. But the totality of the policies underlying § 301—promoting the 

arbitration of labor contract disputes, securing the uniform interpretation of labor 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 7 of 16
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

contracts, and protecting the states' authority to enact minimum labor standards—guides 

our understanding of what constitutes ‘interpretation.’ In the context of § 301 complete 

preemption, the term ‘interpret’ is defined narrowly—it means something more than 

‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” McCray, 902 F.3d at 1011 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant’s sole basis for removal, and its sole argument in opposition to 

plaintiffs’ motion to remand, is that plaintiffs’ first claim under the California Labor Code is 

preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. This is also the basis for defendant’s motion to 

dismiss.

As described above, the court applies a 2-part test to determine whether 

section 301 preempts plaintiffs’ first cause of action. First, the court inquires “into 

whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by 

virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. Second, if “the right 

exists independently of the CBA, we must still consider whether it is nevertheless 

‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’” Id.

Regarding the first step, plaintiffs’ primary cause of action is asserted under 

California state law for failure to pay reporting-time pay. Plainly, plaintiffs do not raise 

any claim under a CBA, or even reference one in their complaint. Defendant does not 

challenge this point, but instead argues the CBAs must be analyzed under the second 

Burnside step.

Regarding the second step, the parties dispute whether the CBAs must be 

analyzed to determine when an employee reports to work under Wage Order 1-2001.

The wage order underlying plaintiffs’ first cause of action provides, in part:

Each workday an employee is required to report for work and 

does report, but is not put to work or is furnished less than half 

said employee's usual or scheduled day's work, the employee 

shall be paid for half the usual or scheduled day's work, but in 

no event for less than two (2) hours nor more than four (4)

hours, at the employee's regular rate of pay, which shall not be 

less than the minimum wage.

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 8 of 16
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Wage Order 1-2001 (emphasis added).

4

The California Court of Appeal recently addressed similar language in an 

analogous wage order, in the context of the mercantile industry. See Ward v. Tilly's, Inc., 

31 Cal. App. 5th 1167, 1170 (2019), review denied (May 15, 2019) (addressing wage 

order No. 7-2001). That opinion is instructive. Like here, that court considered when an 

employee “report[s] for work” within the meaning of a wage order. Much like here, the 

plaintiff in that case contended “that when on-call employees contact Tilly’s [the 

employer] two hours before on-call shifts, they are ‘report[ing] for work’ within the 

meaning of the wage order, and thus are owed reporting time pay. Tilly’s disagrees, 

urging that employees ‘report for work’ only by physically appearing at the work site at the 

start of a scheduled shift, and thus that employees who call in and are told not to come to 

work are not owed reporting time pay.” Id. at 1171. 

The Ward case concerned “on-call” shifts that required employees “to contact their 

stores two hours before the start of their on-call shifts to determine whether they were 

needed to work those shifts.” Id. “Employees were disciplined if they failed to contact 

their stores before on-call shifts, or if they contacted the stores late, or if they refused to 

work on-call shifts. . . . However, Tilly’s did not include on-call shifts as part of the 

employee’s ‘scheduled day’s work’ when calculating pay unless the employee was 

required to work the on-call shift; and it did not consider an employee to have ‘reported 

for work’ if he or she called the store prior to an on-call shift, but was told he or she was 

not needed.” Id. at 1172. The Ward court held that such on-call scheduling “triggers 

Wage Order 7’s reporting time pay requirements.” Id. at 1171.

The Ward court concluded that “telephonic call-in requirements” can “trigger 

reporting time pay.” Id. at 1182. Accordingly, “an employee need not necessarily 

physically appear at the workplace to ‘report for work.’ Instead, ‘report[ing] for work’

 

4

“[W]age orders are issued pursuant to an express delegation of legislative power, and 

they have the force of law.” Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California, 4 Cal. 5th 

542, 552 (2018).

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 9 of 16
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

within the meaning of the wage order is best understood as presenting oneself as 

ordered. ‘Report for work,’ in other words, does not have a single meaning, but instead is 

defined by the party who directs the manner in which the employee is to present himself 

or herself for work—that is, by the employer. As thus interpreted, the reporting time pay 

requirement operates as follows. If an employer directs employees to present 

themselves for work by physically appearing at the workplace at the shift’s start, then the 

reporting time requirement is triggered by the employee’s appearance at the job site. But 

if the employer directs employees to present themselves for work by logging on to a 

computer remotely, or by appearing at a client’s job site, or by setting out on a trucking 

route, then the employee ‘reports for work’ by doing those things. And if, as plaintiff

alleges in this case, the employer directs employees to present themselves for work by 

telephoning the store two hours prior to the start of a shift, then the reporting time 

requirement is triggered by the telephonic contact.” Id. at 1185.

The Ward court thoroughly assessed of the proper construction of “report to work”

as used in the relevant wage order, and arrived at the holding described above. This 

court finds that analysis relevant and persuasive with respect to Wage Order 1-2001. 

See Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We generally 

will ‘follow a published intermediate state court decision regarding California law unless 

we are convinced that the California Supreme Court would reject it.’”).

The definition elucidated by the Ward court turns on the employer’s factual 

practices of how it directs employees to report for work. Contrary to defendant’s view, 

Wage Order 1-2001 does not simply defer to whatever formal definition of “report to work” 

the employer might choose to document. Instead, the inquiry turns on how employees 

actually report for work. That is to say, the legal definition of “report to work” is 

established by the wage order, but the physical acts an employee must undertake to 

satisfy that definition can differ by employer. For example, in Ward, the employer’s actual 

practices required employees to phone into work two hours before their on-call shift 

began to learn whether they would need to physically appear at the store and work the 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 10 of 16
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

on-call shift. As the court explained, the act of an employee calling in to learn whether he 

would be required to work an on-call shift constituted reporting for work under the wage 

order’s definition of “report to work” (regardless of whatever formalistic definition of 

“report for work” the employer might prefer). Here, defendant’s primary argument—that 

an employer may define the phrase “report for work” as used in Wage Order 1-2001 

however it chooses—is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Ward.

5

 

However, defendant is right to the extent that Wage Order 1-2001’s definition of 

“report for work” hinges on how an employer actually requires employees to present 

themselves for work. So, the court looks to plaintiffs’ allegations and the CBAs to assess 

whether the CBAs must be analyzed or interpreted to determine how Chevron requires 

employees to present themselves for work.

The CBAs explain that Operators may volunteer for overtime on their days off “as 

long as the overtime does not interfere with their standby requirement.” 12-Hour Shift 

Agreement at p. I-4. Plainly, Operators are expected to reserve the hours of their 

scheduled, on-call shifts for the potential to work on-call, and they cannot make other 

plans (like volunteering for other shifts) during times they are scheduled to be on-call. 

The 12-Hour Shift Agreement further explains that for every 12-hour shift, there will be a 

“standby” crew “in the event short notice overtime (less than 12 hours notice) is 

required[.]” Id. at p. I-5. “Standby personnel must be available . . . during the period 

extending from 2 hours prior to shift change and 1/2 hour after shift change” and “will 

receive no standby pay allowance.” Id.; see also id. at p. III-7 ¶¶ 2–3; cf. Compl. ¶¶ 3 

(“Chevron requires operators at its Richmond factory to be at the ready to receive calls 

. . . when assigned to cover standby shifts . . . commenc[ing] 1 hour prior to the start of 

the scheduled standby shift and end[ing] 30 minutes after the standby shift has started”), 

23 (“Plaintiffs and other operators had to be at the ready to receive a call for the period 

30 minutes prior to the start of a standby shift until one hour after the standby shift 

 

5 The CBAs’ definition of that phrase may be relevant to a cause of action alleging breach 

of contract based on the CBAs, but not to a cause of action under Wage Order 1-2001.

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 11 of 16
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

commenced.”). The shift changes are at 6 AM and 6 PM, meaning that Chevron requires 

on-call Operators to be available to speak by telephone from approximately 4 AM to 6:30 

AM. See 12-Hour Shift Agreement at pp. I-3 (shift change at 6 AM and 6 PM), I-5 (2.5-

hour standby period, from 4 AM to 6:30 AM), III-7 (same).

6

 “Standby personnel must give 

a number where they can be reached during standby periods.” Id. at p. III-7 ¶ 4. They 

must be available to be spoken to “directly”—answering machines and beepers are not 

sufficient. Id. ¶ 5. Employees scheduled for a given standby shift who “are not 

personally contactable during the standby period will be considered AWOL and subject to 

disciplinary action. (Discipline will follow the established practice for absenteeism).” Id.

¶ 6; Compl. ¶ 3.

The CBAs and allegations make clear that Operators must be ready to personally 

answer a phone call for a 1.5- or 2-hour period surrounding the start of every scheduled, 

on-call shift or face punishment. The mere inability of a supervisor to talk to an Operator 

“directly” during that 2.5-hour window renders the employee “AWOL and subject to 

disciplinary action.” 12-Hour Shift Agreement at p. III-7 ¶¶ 5–6.

There is no language in the CBAs that must be “analyzed” to reach these 

understandings. Although the court is not tasked with determining whether plaintiffs’

allegations state a meritorious claim under Wage Order 1-2001 upon consideration of 

plaintiffs’ motion to remand, the facts above make up plaintiffs’ essential allegations 

under the precedent set out in Ward, and they are all plain from a mere “look” to the 

CBAs. The primary distinction between plaintiffs’ complaint and the policy discussed in 

Ward is that here, the employees must be ready to receive a call from their employer

during a set window of time, whereas in Ward the employees were required to initiate the 

call.

Defendant argues that the CBAs must be interpreted—rather than merely looked 

to—for four primary reasons.

 

6 Under the facts alleged in the complaint, the standby reporting period would be slightly 

different.

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 12 of 16
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

First, defendant argues that this court would have to resolve ambiguities of what it 

means to be “contacted” versus “personally contactable” during the window of time that 

Operators must be available to answer a call from Chevron. The court disagrees. The

CBA provisions containing these terms are entirely clear and do not require analysis for 

purposes of preemption. The CBAs provide that standby personnel must be “available”

during a 2.5-hour window, they must give a number “where they can be reached,” and 

they are “contacted” only when a supervisor has “been able to talk with them directly. 

Answering machines or beepers are not an acceptable alternative to direct contact 

between supervisors and employees.” 12-Hour Shift Agreement at p. III-7 ¶¶ 2–5. The

next paragraph explains that standby employees who “are not personally contactable 

during the standby period will be considered AWOL and subject to disciplinary action.” 

Id. ¶ 6. The CBAs could hardly be more clear on this point. If a supervisor calls an 

employee at the phone number the employee designated and does not “talk with [him] 

directly,” the employee is subject to discipline. The employee must be available to speak 

on the phone and cannot rely on answering machines or beepers. A mere look is 

sufficient to understand and apply this requirement.

Second, defendant argues that the requirement that Operators “be able to get to 

work in a reasonable time period after being contacted” is ambiguous and requires 

interpretation. Id. ¶ 7. Although it is true that the use of the word “reasonable” makes 

that phrase inherently subject to interpretation, it does not need to be interpreted to 

resolve plaintiffs’ claim. Wage Order 1-2001 concerns employees who are required to 

report to work, do report, and are not put to work. Plaintiffs’ claim, relying on Ward, is 

that they were required to report to work and actually reported to work by being available

and personally contactable during specified on-call periods, and after so reporting they 

were not put to work. The merits of that claim do not depend on how much time might 

have passed between the employee reporting for work and his physical arrival at the 

workplace. Plaintiffs’ claim is that the Operators report to work by being reachable at 

fixed times, which California law can evaluate without any dependence on the 

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 13 of 16
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

requirement that standby Operators “be able to get to work in a reasonable time period 

after being contacted.” A CBA does not preempt claims under California’s labor laws 

simply because it contains ambiguous terms. Something more is required—resolution of 

the state-law claim must depend upon an analysis of such a term.

Third, defendant argues that when an Operator is called for a standby shift, he can 

answer the phone and lie to his employer in various ways, for example by falsely claiming 

to be sick, to avoid the shift. Defendant argues that historical practice shows that 

Chevron considers intentional lying by its employees permissible, and their doing so does 

not result in discipline. Therefore, defendant argues that Operators are not actually 

punished for failing to work on-call shifts. This argument fails for at least two reasons. 

For one, this argument does not identify any language in the CBAs that must be 

analyzed or interpreted. The plain language of the CBAs on this point is clear from a 

simple look. It explains that employees who do not answer their telephone while on-call 

“will be considered AWOL and are subject to disciplinary action. (Discipline will follow the 

established practice for absenteeism).” 12-Hour Shift Agreement at p. III-7 ¶ 6. 

Defendant’s argument appears to amount to a factual dispute—that Chevron’s policy 

conflicts with its practice—about whether standby employees are ever really required to 

work standby shifts, because they are not punished for failing to do so. But that is a 

factual question about how Chevron enforces its policies, not an argument that the CBAs 

must be analyzed or interpreted. Again, the CBAs could hardly be more clear on this 

point, regardless of whether Chevron declines to enforce their provisions in particular 

circumstances. 

Moreover, the CBAs make clear that not answering a supervisor’s phone call 

makes one subject to disciplinary action—even if Chevron is indifferent as to whether

employees lie after answering the call. Plaintiffs’ argument is that they report to work by 

being available to answer the call, not by physically appearing at Chevron’s facility.

Defendant’s argument that plaintiffs can evade work by lying after answering the call

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 14 of 16
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

misses the point, and is irrelevant to plaintiffs’ claim.

7

Fourth, defendant points to numerous other uses of the phrase “report for work” in 

the CBAs. This is apparently an effort to argue that “report to work” under California law 

must take on the definition used in Chevron’s contracts, which defendant argues means

physical arrival at Chevron’s workplace. But the meaning of the term in the parties’

contractual agreements is not relevant to plaintiffs’ claim. As addressed above, contrary 

to defendant’s view, Wage Order 1-2001’s definition of “report to work” does not depend 

upon whatever formal definition of the term Chevron chooses to include in its private 

contractual agreements. It is possible for the CBAs and California law to define the same 

phrase differently, and defendant does not argue that the CBAs have displaced California 

law or reduced its protections. See Opp. at 15. Of course, the CBAs can provide their 

own protections independent of California law using their own definitions of terms. But 

for the reasons stated above, the court need not harmonize the phrase’s meaning 

between California law and the CBAs. Nor need the court harmonize the phrase within 

the CBAs themselves, if a state court can resolve how employees report to work under 

Wage Order 1-2001 without analyzing the CBAs at all.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs’ first cause of action is not 

preempted by the LMRA. As defendant’s removal was based solely on the argument that 

plaintiffs’ first cause of action was preempted by the LMRA, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is 

GRANTED. As such, the court does not reach defendant’s motion to dismiss, which is 

TERMINATED by this order. This action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

7 Defendant separately argues that Operators can be removed from the list of standby 

employees for a given shift prior to being called. That is true enough, and plaintiffs are 

unlikely to prevail under Wage Order 1-2001 for on-call shifts they are not scheduled to 

work, and for which they are not required to report to work. But that does not address the 

scheduled, on-call shifts upon which plaintiffs’ complaint is actually based.

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 15 of 16
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

California, County of Contra Costa.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-04051-PJH Document 32 Filed 12/05/19 Page 16 of 16