Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01752/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01752-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 29, 2015*

Decided December 7, 2015 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1752 

CHRISTOPHER GOODVINE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GEORGE MONESE, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 13-CV-1057 

Lynn Adelman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Christopher Goodvine, a Wisconsin inmate, suffers from mental illness and has a 

history of self-harm and suicide attempts. In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

Goodvine claims that a prison psychiatrist violated the Eighth Amendment by not 

intervening to forestall a suicide attempt that left him seriously injured. The district 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. The appeal is thus submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-1752 Page 2 

court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Because we conclude that the 

district court should have recruited counsel for Goodvine, we vacate the judgment and 

remand for further proceedings. 

Goodvine suffers from personality and mood disorders and has harmed himself 

repeatedly. In August 2012 he was admitted to the Wisconsin Resource Center, a 

mental-health treatment facility within the state’s Department of Corrections, after 

overdosing on pain medication and lacerating his arms. Goodvine had been treated 

previously at WRC by the defendant, psychiatrist George Monese. Dr. Monese 

conducted an intake interview, classified Goodvine as a “high” suicide risk, and noted in 

his report that Goodvine had been taking the antipsychotic drug Seroquel. Dr. Monese 

also documented Goodvine’s account of chronic suicidal ideation but observed that 

Goodvine tends to harm himself when he does not get his way. 

 

A month later, Goodvine’s treatment at WRC had concluded. On October 1, 2012, 

Goodvine told Dr. Monese that he was depressed about his impending discharge from 

WRC and vowed to kill himself to avoid returning to a regular prison. Afterward, in his 

progress notes, Dr. Monese questioned whether Goodvine’s acts of self-harm were 

primarily volitional rather than impulsive. 

Nine days later, on October 10, Goodvine surrendered a stash of Seroquel and 

Tylenol pills that he had hoarded, he said, for a suicide attempt. After being briefed by 

the nursing staff, Dr. Monese discontinued the Seroquel prescription. Four days after 

that, on October 14, Goodvine prepared a will and also requested a standard “Do Not 

Resuscitate” directive specifically covering October 16 and 17. The next morning, at 

eight o’clock, Dr. Monese met in the dayroom with Goodvine, who wanted the Seroquel 

prescription reinstated. Goodvine avers that before leaving he told Dr. Monese he was 

“imminently suicidal” and likely would harm himself immediately if returned to his cell. 

But Dr. Monese insists—as he then wrote in his progress notes—that Goodvine had 

mentioned ongoing, though fleeting, thoughts of self-harm and said that he didn’t 

intend to hurt himself right then. Dr. Monese’s notes say that, when confronted about 

the will and Do Not Resuscitate directive, Goodvine had attributed them to an earlier 

bout of depression. 

After this meeting Goodvine was returned to his cell. Guards did not search him 

or the cell, and he was not placed on heightened monitoring for suicide risk. Within 

hours, Goodvine had covered his cell window and lacerated his right arm. A guard, 

noticing the covered window, instructed Goodvine to uncover it and alerted medical 

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No. 15-1752 Page 3 

staff. They found Goodvine still conscious, though blood was streaming down his arm 

and pooling on the floor. Dr. Monese and paramedics attended Goodvine before he was 

taken to the hospital. After an overnight stay he was released to WRC and then, two 

days later, returned to prison. 

 

Goodvine sued Dr. Monese, claiming that he violated the Eighth Amendment by 

doing nothing to lessen the risk of self-harm after learning during the October 15 

meeting that Goodvine was presently suicidal. The district court, after denying three 

requests from Goodvine to recruit counsel, granted summary judgment for Dr. Monese. 

The court reasoned that a jury could not find the psychiatrist liable for deciding against 

additional precautions after the October 15 meeting, since the evidence is undisputed 

that Dr. Monese did not believe Goodvine to be at immediate risk, and also that 

Goodvine was being closely monitored by WRC staff. 

 

On appeal, Goodvine challenges the adverse ruling at summary judgment and 

also contends that the district court abused its discretion in not recruiting counsel. 

Because we conclude that counsel should have been recruited for Goodvine, we do not 

discuss the grant of summary judgment. 

Though district courts may recruit counsel for indigent litigants, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(1), there is no right to an appointed lawyer in civil litigation, Olson v. Morgan, 

750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). But we have noted on several occasions that lawsuits 

involving complex medical evidence typically are more difficult for pro se litigants, as 

are cases involving a defendant’s state of mind. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 

(7th Cir. 2010); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Swofford v. 

Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 1992); but see Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 852 

(7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting categorical rule that claims of deliberate indifference are always 

too difficult for pro se litigants). This case presents both challenges. 

In declining to recruit counsel for Goodvine, the district court reasoned that the 

detail, clarity, and organization of his complaint suggested not only that Goodvine was 

capable of communicating with the court and the defendant, but also that he knew what 

was necessary to prove his Eighth Amendment claim, that he could request discovery 

from the defendant, and that he could present his own affidavits and evidence. These 

factors certainly bear on Goodvine’s capacity to represent himself, but they have little to 

do with the need for medical evidence. Goodvine may have understood the necessity of 

showing that Dr. Monese departed from accepted professional standards when he did 

not order greater restrictions after their meeting on October 15. See Henderson v. Ghosh, 

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755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding district court abused discretion in not 

recruiting counsel where inmate’s claim of deliberate indifference required expert 

medical evidence and proof of defendant’s state of mind); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 

658 (7th Cir. 2005) (pointing out that inmate’s claim of deliberate indifference was 

“legally more complicated than a typical failure-to-treat claim because” expert testimony 

likely would be required to assess adequacy of treatment inmate had received). But 

without a lawyer to assist him in locating expert testimony, Goodvine had no way to 

assemble the necessary evidence. See Henderson, 755 F.3d at 566 (pointing out that, as an 

inmate, plaintiff lacked ability to engage medical expert); Santiago, 599 F.3d at 762 

(noting that presenting evidence of prison doctor’s state-of-mind “is one of the more 

challenging aspects of section 1983 litigation”). Thus, the district court went beyond the 

bounds of its discretion when it refused to recruit counsel. 

 

Furthermore, Goodvine was prejudiced by the district court’s decision. 

See Santiago, 599 F.3d at 765 (explaining that this court reviews totality of circumstances 

to determine if there was reasonable likelihood that presence of counsel would have 

altered outcome); Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654 (noting that “[e]ven if a district court's denial of 

counsel amounts to an abuse of its discretion, we will reverse only upon a showing of 

prejudice”). Indeed, in granting summary judgment for the defendant, the district court 

repeatedly cited a lack of evidence demonstrating that a minimally competent 

psychiatrist would have taken additional steps to prevent Goodvine from harming 

himself on October 15. But Goodvine could not produce this type of medical evidence 

without assistance from a lawyer. See Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(“All these gaps cry out for evidence that a lawyer could obtain but the plaintiff could 

not.”); Pruitt, 503 F.3d 659–60 (explaining that litigant’s poor performance before trial or 

inability to engage in necessary investigation may establish that appointing counsel 

would have changed outcome). 

 

The judgment is VACATED, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

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