Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-01784/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-01784-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Case No. C 07-1238 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

**E-filed 7/17/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

VANDA McCAULEY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER;

LUCILE PACKARD CHILDREN”S HOSPITAL;

STANDFORD HOSPITAL & CLINICS; and Does

1 through 10, inclusive,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 07-01784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

[re: docket no. 7]

Defendants seek to have several claims or parts of claims asserted by Plaintiff dismissed

or stricken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(f). First, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s

claims for gender discrimination and gender harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) fail as a matter

of law because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims. Second,

Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff failed to file a civil action within the permissible statute

Case 5:07-cv-01784-JF Document 24 Filed 07/17/07 Page 1 of 8
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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

of limitations period, her statutory claims must be limited to events that occurred on or after May

12, 2004, and any allegations which pre-date May 12, 2004 must be stricken from her complaint. 

Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination under FEHA and

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to

allege sufficiently that she is “disabled” within the meaning of those statutes. The Court heard

oral argument on July 6, 2007.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff alleges discrimination against her by

Defendants on the basis of race, gender, and disability. Plaintiff also alleges retaliation. Prior to

filing the instant action, Plaintiff filed three administrative charges of discrimination with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and the Equal Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”).

On February 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a DFEH charge alleging discrimination and

harassment on the basis of race and disability, and retaliation. Plaintiff alleged that this conduct

occurred on a continuing basis through the date of her charge. On February 14, 2005, Plaintiff,

through her attorney, received an immediate right to sue letter to file a civil action under FEHA. 

On March 8, 2005, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge which she cross-filed with the DFEH. 

Plaintiff alleged discrimination on the basis of race and disability, as well as retaliation. Plaintiff

asserted the earliest date that the discrimination took place was May 12, 2004. Plaintiff received

a right to sue letter from the DFEH dated March 10, 2005. The letter indicated that while

Plaintiff had one year from the date of the letter to file a civil action under FEHA, the statute of

limitations would be tolled during the EEOC’s investigation of the charge. Plaintiff received a

right to sue letter from the EEOC dated June 13, 2006.

On May 11, 2005, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination which she also

cross-filed with the DFEH. Plaintiff alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and

retaliation. Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the DFEH dated June 2, 2005. She

received a right to sue letter from the EEOC dated June 13, 2006. 

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on September 13, 2006.

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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts

under a cognizable legal theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to

dismiss, all allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754 (9th Cir. 1994). Although the Court generally may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Cooper v.

Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1997), it may consider documents that are attached to and

part of the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). A

complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754. However,

the Court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Id. at 754-55. Motions to

dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard and are granted rarely. See

Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claim for Gender Discrimination and Harassment

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants discriminated against her “on the basis of race,

gender, disability and for complaining about unlawful conduct . . . .” Complaint at ¶25. Further,

in her second claim for harassment/hostile work environment, she alleges that Defendants failed

to end their “severe and pervasive adverse employment action” because of her race, color,

gender, disability and complaints of discrimination. Complaint at ¶32.

Defendant seeks to have the claims for gender discrimination and harassment dismissed

on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to such claims. 

Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not first raise these allegations with the EEOC or

the DFEH as required by the law. 

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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

Plaintiff does not dispute that the administrative charges do not allege a claim regarding

gender or sex. However, she argues that the intake personnel at the DFEH and EEOC failed to

include information from a declaration she submitted in each of the three administrative

proceedings. Plaintiff alleges this declaration was attached to and submitted with her charges

filed both with the DFEH and the EEOC. However, Plaintiff has not provided a copy of the

alleged declaration to the Court. 

Ninth Circuit case law recognizes an equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement

when EEOC representatives mislead plaintiffs about their claims. However, these cases appear

to be limited to situations in which the plaintiff was acting pro se. See Josephs v. Pacific Bell,

443 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, according the her attorney’s declaration in

opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff was assisted by counsel with each of her administrative

filings. Boyd declaration at ¶3. 

In Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Cir. 1981), a

plaintiff was not allowed to expand his EEOC complaint alleging “sex” and “national origin”

discrimination to include charges of “race,” color” and “religious” discrimination because these

theories had not been investigated by the EEOC. In this case, Plaintiff’s administrative charges

make no reference whatsoever to gender or sex. Although she states that she was an AfricanAmerican woman, Plaintiff did not check the box for “sex,” nor did she allege any facts in the

body of the charges that reference “gender” or “sex.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s

claims for “gender” discrimination and “gender” harassment in violation of FEHA and Title VII

are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and will be dismissed without leave to

amend. 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegation that Pre-Date May 12, 2004

Defendants next move to strike Plaintiff’s allegations concerning events that pre-date

May 12, 2004 because Plaintiff failed to file the instant case within the statutory limitations

period. Plaintiff filed her first DFEH charge on February 10, 2005. In this charge, Plaintiff

alleged discrimination and harassment on the basis of race and disability, as well as retaliation,

and claimed that this conduct occurred on a “continuing” basis through the date of the charge. 

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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

Because Plaintiff received a right to sue letter dated February 14, 2005, she was required to file a

civil action based on the allegations in the charge on or before February 14, 2006. Plaintiff does

not dispute that she failed to file the instant action before that date; rather her attorney argues that

“because Ms. McCauley is a layperson, when she filed her first complaint with the DFEH she

mistakenly requested a ‘right to sue letter’ not understanding the procedures that permitted the

DFEH to investigate her claims.” Boyd Declaration at ¶3. However, as discussed above,

Plaintiff in fact was represented by counsel at all relevant times.

Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, which was cross filed with DFEH, on March 8, 2005. 

Plaintiff again alleged discrimination on the basis of race and disability, as well as retaliation. In

this charge, Plaintiff did not check the box to indicate that the alleged conduct constituted a

“continuing action,” nor did Plaintiff allege in her narrative that the alleged discrimination was

occurring on a continuing basis. Rather, Plaintiff specifically indicated in the designated box that

the earliest date of discrimination was May 12, 2004. She further alleged in the body of the

charge that the discrimination had been occurring “[s]ince at least May 12, 2004.” Plaintiff

received her right to sue for these allegations on June 13, 2006. The letter informed her of her

right to file a lawsuit within 90 days with respect to her Title VII and ADA claims and within one

year with respect to a civil action under FEHA. Accordingly (adding five days for service by

mail), Plaintiff was required to file a Title VII or ADA action not later than September 16, 2006,

and she was required to file a FEHA civil action on or before June 13, 2007. Plaintiff filed the

instant action by September 13, 2006. 

Based on the these facts, a civil action based upon the claim filed February 10, 2005 is

well outside the applicable computation period, and thus the instant action is timely only as to the

charge filed on March 8, 2005. This charge specifically limits Defendants’ alleged unlawful

conduct to events occurring on or after May 12, 2004. Plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral

argument that the claims should be limited to the events occurring on or after that date. 

Accordingly, any allegations contained in the complaint with respect to events alleged to have

occurred before May 12, 2004 will be stricken.

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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Disability Discrimination

Finally, Defendants seek to have Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination and

failure to accommodate dismissed because the complaint fails to allege sufficiently that Plaintiff

is disabled withing the meaning of the ADA or FEHA. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she

is a “qualified individual,” which is sufficient to allege a disability. Plaintiff also alleges she was

not able to work for a period of time because of suffering stress from discrimination, hostility,

and retaliation. In her opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed

to accommodate her because of a physical medical condition but does not state what the physical

medical condition is. 

An individual is considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA is she has: 1) a

physical or mental impairment; 2) that substantially limits; 3) a major life activity. 42 U.S.C.

§12102(2)(A). Similarly, an individual is disabled within the meaning of the FEHA if she has: 1)

a physical or mental impairment; 2) that limits; 3) a major life activity. Cal. Gov. Code

§12926.1(c), (d)(2). 

Under the ADA, stress may qualify as disability if it substantially limits an employee’s

ability to perform a major life activity. Mustafa v. Clark County School District, 157 F.3d 1169,

1174-75 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint does not allege what major life activity Plaintiff has

been unable to perform. It alleges only that Plaintiff became disabled as a result of the stress

caused by working under her supervisor and other unnamed managers. Such an allegation is not

legally sufficient to establish a claim for disability discrimination. See Schneiker v. Fortes Ins.

Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000) (Stress caused by a personality conflict with a

supervisor was not enough to demonstrate that the employee is disabled within the meaning of

the ADA.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege anywhere in her complaint (as distinguished from

her opposition papers) that she suffers from a physical disability. Because stress may qualify as a

disabling condition under certain factual circumstances, and Plaintiff does claim in her

opposition papers that she suffered from a physical disability, the Court will grant leave to amend 

in order that Plaintiff may plead her disability claim with particularity. 

Case 5:07-cv-01784-JF Document 24 Filed 07/17/07 Page 6 of 8
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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

IV. CONCLUSION

Good cause appearing: 

1.) Plaintiff’s claims for gender discrimination and gender harassment in violation of 

the FEHA and TITLE VII are DISMISSED, without leave to amend;

2.) Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination/failure to accommodate in violation 

of FEHA, Title VII, and the ADA is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Any 

amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order;

and

3.) Any allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint that are based on events alleged to have

occurred prior to May 12, 2004 are hereby stricken. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 17, 2007.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:07-cv-01784-JF Document 24 Filed 07/17/07 Page 7 of 8
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Case No. C 07-1784 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(JFLC3)

Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Marylon M. Boyd marylonboyd@msn.com, tmeyers@tanyameyerslaw.com

Alyson Cabera acabrera@gordonrees.com

Notice has been delivered by other means to:

Michael Terrence Lucey

Gordon & Rees

275 Battery Street, 20th Fl.

San Francisco, CA 94111

Case 5:07-cv-01784-JF Document 24 Filed 07/17/07 Page 8 of 8