Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03580/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allen G. Hutchens,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Teresa Jean Hutchens; City of Kingman,

Arizona; and Police Officer Bryan

Bredenkamp in his official capacity and

individual capacity, 

Defendants. 

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CV 05-3580-PHX-DGC

ORDER

The parties have filed a large number of motions. For the reasons stated below,

Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp’s motion to dismiss will be denied in

part and granted in part; Defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens’s joinder in the motion to dismiss

will be denied; Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp’s motion to strike notice

of correction will be granted; Defendant Hutchens’s motion to dismiss based on lack of

subject matter jurisdiction will be denied; Defendant Hutchens’s motion for protective order

will be denied with clarifications for Plaintiff; Defendant Hutchens’s motion for extension

of time will be denied as moot; Defendant Hutchens’s motion to withdraw motion for

extension of time will be denied as moot; Plaintiff’s motion to expedite clarification will be

denied; and Plaintiff’s motion for clarification of case status will be denied as moot.

I. Background.

 Allen G. Hutchens, pro se, a citizen of Florida, sued Defendants Teresa Jean

Hutchens, City of Kingman, and Bryan Bredenkamp (a police officer for Kingman), all

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Arizona citizens, based on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff seeks

$3,000,000 in consequential and punitive damages. Doc. #1. 

Plaintiff alleges multiple tort claims against Defendant Teresa Hutchens, including

abuse of process, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

Plaintiff’s complaint also includes claims for negligence and IIED against City of Kingman

and Bredenkamp in his official and individual capacities.

II. Defendants City of Kingman and Mr. Bredenkamp’s Motion to Dismiss.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants City of Kingman

and Bredenkamp move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. #10.

Defendants assert that (1) the abuse of process and defamation claims are not alleged against

them, (2) Plaintiff cannot assert simple negligence against them, (3) Plaintiff cannot prove

a prima facie IIED claim, and (4) punitive damages are not available against a public entity

or its employees. Plaintiff Teresa Hutchens has joined this motion. Doc. #23

In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to deny the motion to dismiss. He seeks leave to

amend his complaint to omit the punitive damages claim and to change his negligence claim

to a gross negligence claim. Doc. #19. Defendants oppose this motion and reaffirm their

arguments for dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims for negligence or IIED.

Doc. #31. Plaintiff filed a reply to this motion reaffirming his requests that the motion to

dismiss be denied and leave to amend be granted. Doc. #35. Defendants filed a motion to

strike Plaintiff’s reply to the motion to dismiss. Doc. #37. 

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley v.

Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); W. Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “The federal rules require only a ‘short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Gilligan v.

Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “The

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Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to

state a claim.” Id. at 249 (quotation marks omitted). “All that is required are sufficient

allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v.

Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). Indeed, though “‘it

may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] . . . that

is not the test.’” Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974)). “‘The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’” Id. Finally, it is well

established that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded[,] are held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)

(quotation marks omitted); see Ortez v. Wash. County, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Because Ortez is a pro se litigant, we must construe liberally his inartful pleading[.]”)

(citation omitted). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996); see Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.

25, 27 n.2 (1977). In addition, the district court must assume that all general allegations

“embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano

Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The district court

may not assume, however, that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in

the complaint. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc.,

407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although we assume the truth of the facts alleged in

the complaint, we cannot assume any facts necessary to the [plaintiffs’] claim that they have

not alleged.”). 

The Court will address Plaintiff’s negligence, IIED, and punitive damages claim. The

abuse of process and defamation claims are not alleged against Defendants City of Kingman

and Bredenkamp. Those claims were specifically asserted against Defendant Hutchens.

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Defendant Hutchens has not opposed these claims, and they will remain in the case against

her.

A. Negligence.

Defendants argue that a city cannot be held liable for simple negligence, citing

Landeros v. City of Tucson, 831 P.2d 850, 851 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1992). The controlling law

in Arizona, however, is A.R.S. § 12-820.02. This statute provides qualified immunity to

police officers for specific acts or omissions taken within the scope of their duties. In

Calnimptewa v. Flagstaff Police Dept., 30 P.3d 634 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2001), Flagstaff

police officers were accused of negligence in failing to obtain medical care for an arrestee.

The court interpreted A.R.S. § 12-820.02 according to its “plain language” and held that the

statute did not cover the officers’ specific acts or omissions. Because the statute did not grant

the police defendants qualified immunity, they were subject to an ordinary negligence

standard. Id. at 639.

Here, the Defendants’ specific acts – an alleged conspiracy and failure adequately to

investigate Defendant’s credibility before contacting Plaintiff – are not included in A.R.S.

§ 12-820.02. Because the statute does not grant Defendants qualified immunity, an ordinary

negligence standard applies. Id.

Defendant Bredenkamp does enjoy personal immunity from civil suit. A.R.S.

§ 41-621(J) states that “[a] state officer, agent or employee, except as otherwise provided by

statute, is not personally liable for an injury or damage resulting from his act or omission in

a public official capacity where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the

discretion vested in him if the exercise of the discretion was done in good faith without

wanton disregard of his statutory duties.” Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant

Bredenkamp failed to act in good faith or with wanton disregard of his statutory duties.

The motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the Defendants City of Kingman,

Mr. Bredenkamp in his official capacity, and Teresa Hutchens will be denied. The motion

to dismiss the negligence claim against Defendant Bredenkamp in his individual capacity

will be granted. 

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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

To recover on an IIED claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant’s conduct

was extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress

or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that distress would result from the conduct,

(3) the conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress

was severe. See Lucchesi v. Stimmell, 716 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Ariz. 1986) (citing Watts v.

Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ariz. 1980)); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734

P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on the first and second

prongs of the IIED claim. Construed liberally, however, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that

Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct and internationally caused emotional

distress. Doc. #1. Nothing more is required at the pleading stage. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the IIED claim against City of Kingman, Mr. Bredenkamp in his official capacity,

and Teresa Hutchens accordingly will be denied. The motion to dismiss the IIED claim

against Defendant Bredenkamp in his individual capacity will be granted under A.R.S. § 41-

621(J) as discussed above. 

C. Punitive Damages.

Defendants correctly cite A.R.S. § 12-820.04, which states that “neither a public entity

nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for punitive or

exemplary damages.” Defendants City of Kingman and Mr. Bredenkamp are, therefore,

immune from punitive damages and their motion to dismiss on this issue will be granted.

Ms. Hutchens does not enjoy the same immunity and her joinder in this portion of the motion

will be denied. 

III. Defendants’ Motion To Strike.

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s reply will be granted as it is redundant under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Doc. #37. That rule provides: “the court may order

stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Plaintiff’s request to amend will also be denied because

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it appears unnecessary in light of this order and it was not asserted in a proper Rule 15

motion.

IV. Defendant Teresa Hutchens’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Defendant Hutchens moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because the complaint fails to meet the requisite amount in controversy under 28

U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. #13. Defendant Hutchens argues that Plaintiff’s $3,000,000

consequential damages claim has not been made in good faith and that the facts supporting

damages in this case are insufficient to support federal diversity jurisdiction. Doc. #15. 

The court has diversity jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states

involving claims greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The test for evaluating the

jurisdictional amount was set forth in St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co. 303 U.S.

283 (1938), as follows:

It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the

jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff to recover

an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith

or oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the

existence of a valid defense to the claim. 

Id. at 289. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a pleading is sufficient to confer federal diversity

jurisdiction if it alleges that the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs,

the requisite amount in controversy. Yoder v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck, 339

F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936)). In

making this determination, courts look to the face of the complaint. Commercial Cas. Ins.

Co. v. Fowles, 154 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1946). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages in excess of $75,000. Doc. #1. While the alleged

$3,000,000 in consequential damages appears excessive, the court cannot conclude to a legal

certainty that Plaintiff’s damages are less than $75,000. Plaintiff is alleging multiple claims

against multiple defendants and is seeking punitive damages from at least one. Defendant

Hutchens’s motion to dismiss accordingly will be denied. 

/ / /

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V. Defendant Teresa Hutchens’s Motion for a Protective Order. 

Defendant Hutchens moves for a protective order. She requests that the court instruct

Plaintiff to cease all contact with her. Doc. #11. Plaintiff opposes the motion for lack of

good cause. Doc. #17. 

Because Defendant cites no authority for this protective order, the requested relief

will be denied. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff is bound by the same ethical

limitations on lawyers in litigation. United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.

1989) (stating that pro se litigants are subject to the same good faith limitations imposed on

lawyers, as officers of the court); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pro se

litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”); Jacobsen v.

Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that pro se litigants in ordinary civil

cases should not be treated more favorably than parties represented by attorneys). Attorneys

must refrain from directly contacting parties represented by counsel regarding the subject of

the representation. Ethical Rule 4.2, Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, Ariz.R.Sup.Ct.

42. The Court will require Plaintiff to comply with this same ethical rule and communicate

with Defendant Hutchens about this litigation only through her counsel.

VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Processing and Clarification. 

Plaintiff moves for expedited processing and for clarification of case status regarding

the court’s jurisdiction. Doc. #18. This order addresses Plaintiff’s request.

VII. Defendant Teresa Hutchens’s Motion for Additional Time.

 Defendant Hutchens filed a motion for additional time, it was opposed by Plaintiff,

and ultimately withdrawn by Defendant. Docs. # 12, 26, 24. The motion will be denied as

moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp’s Motion to Dismiss for

failure to state a claim (Doc. #10) is denied in part and granted in part.

2. To the extent Defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens joins the above motion (Doc.

#23), it is denied with respect to her.

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3. Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp’s Motion to Strike Notice

of Correction (Doc. #37) is granted.

4. Defendant Hutchens’s Motion to Dismiss based on lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (Doc. #13) is denied.

5. Defendant Hutchens’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. #11) is denied with

the clarification set forth above.

6. Defendant Hutchens’s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Extension of Time

(Doc. # 24) is denied as moot.

7. Defendant Hutchens’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. #12) is denied as

moot.

8. Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite Clarification (Doc. #18) is denied.

9. Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification of Case Status (Doc. #18) is denied as

moot.

10. The Court will set a Case Management Conference by separate order.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2006.

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