Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06147/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United Siat . ·r~nt. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB l 1i~ 

&OBERT L. HOECKt, 

Clerk 

DAVID LINDSEY; CYNTHIA LINDSEY, husband) 

and wife; TERESA M. LINDSEY; MICHAEL D. ) 

LINDSEY, minor children by and through ) 

their parents, David and Cynthia ) 

Lindsey, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

SARENE COX, in her official and 

individual capacity, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

PATRICIA LINCOLN, 

Defendant. 

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DAVID LINDSEY; CYNTHIA LINDSEY, husband) 

and wife; TERESA M. LINDSEY; MICHAEL D. ) 

LINDSEY, minor children by and through ) 

their parents, David and Cynthia ) 

Lindsey, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

SARENE COX, in her official and 

individual capacity, 

Defendant, 

and 

PATRICIA LINCOLN, individually, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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DAVID LINDSEY; CYNTHIA LINDSEY, husband) 

and wife; TERESA M. LINDSEY; MICHAEL D. ) 

LINDSEY, minor children by and through ) 

No. 89-6135 

(D.C. No. 88-555-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

No. 89-6147 

(D.C. No. 88-555-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 1 
their parents, David and Cynthia 

Lindsey, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v . 

) 

) 

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OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA, a corporation; ) 

SARENE COX, in her official and ) 

individual capacity; PATRICIA LINCOLN, ) 

individually, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-6396 

(D.C. No. 88-555-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. 

B. Sparr, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

These appeals arise from a series of events culminating in 

the seizure of David and Cynthia Lindsey's children from their 

home in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 1 Defendant Sarene Cox is a 

detective for the city of Oklahoma City who ordered that the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has detennined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the detennination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 2 
children be taken into protective custody. Defendant Patricia 

Lincoln is a social worker who was involved in the seizure. 

The decision to take the children into custody was made after 

a police investigation revealed accusations of child pornography 

and molestation involving the Lindseys. The children were taken 

during a search of the Lindsey home which was conducted pursuant 

to a warrant. The Lindseys were later charged with "indecent 

liberties with a minor" under Oklahoma law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 

21, § 1123 (1983). However, the district attorney declined to 

prosecute the case, and the children were returned after nine days 

of protective custody. 

The Lindsey family filed this suit pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983, alleging the defendants had deprived them of various 

constitutional rights. Defendant Oklahoma City filed a motion for 

summary judgment on the merits. The individual defendants filed 

summary judgment motions urging immunity defenses. The Lindseys 

filed cross motions on the merits. On April 19, 1989, the 

district court issued an order denying plaintiffs' motions and 

granting defendants' motions in part. All the parties have 

appealed from the rulings of the district court. We affirm. 

I. 

In August 1986, police began an investigation into alleged 

child pornography and molestation at the Lindsey residence. The 

investigation began after a child (D.D.) 2 told police the Lindseys 

had taken pornographic pictures of several children in the 

2 For the protection of the children involved, any minors 

identified in this order and judgment will be referred to by their 

initials. 

3 

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neighborhood. Police were interviewing D.D. as part of a separate 

investigation into allegations that he molested his younger 

cousin. He identified the Lindseys only after police began 

questioning him about the charges involving his cousin. The 

record reveals D.D. may have been accused of molesting other 

children in the past. Interviews with the neighborhood children 

allegedly involved failed to confirm D.D.'s allegations. However, 

the mother of one of the children told police two of the alleged 

victims confirmed the molestation to her. 

Based on the information received from D.D., Detective Cox 

prepared an affidavit to serve as the basis for search and arrest 

warrants against the Lindseys. The search warrant was designed to 

seize "photos of explicit sexual acts involving minors, both 

developed and undeveloped film, also including Polaroid 

photographs." See Rec. Vol. I at doc. 7 Exhibit II. The 

affidavit did not contain any information regarding D.D.'s past or 

his credibility. A district court judge issued both warrants. 

On August 20, 1986, Ms. Cox went to the Lindsey home to 

execute the search warrant. Social worker Lincoln accompanied 

her. When they arrived, the two Lindsey children were home, in 

the care of a baby-sitter. The children were sent to a police car 

with Ms. Lincoln during the search. The search discovered various 

sexual devices, lotions and magazines, all of which were seized. 

Police also found twenty-eight videotapes, three photographs, and 

an undeveloped roll of film. None of the materials were illegal 

or connected to child pornography. 

4 

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During the search, Ms. Cox ordered the children be taken into 

protective custody. She based this decision on her assessment 

that an emergency situation was present in the Lindsey home. Ms. 

Lincoln then took the children to the Department of Human Services 

(OHS). The next day, Detective Cox returned to the Lindsey 

residence to arrest David and Cynthia Lindsey. That same day, a 

special judge held a custody hearing regarding the children and 

determined they would remain with OHS. Both Ms. Cox and Ms. 

Lincoln were instrumental in initiating the hearing. The Lindseys 

were not present, although they were represented by counsel. 

After reviewing the case, the Oklahoma City district attorney 

decided not to prosecute the Lindseys. The children were returned 

to their custody on August 29, 1986. The seized materials were 

returned on September 18, 1986. 

Plaintiffs brought this action on April 4, 1988. At the time 

the district court considered the cross motions for summary 

judgment, the following claims remained: 1) against the city of 

Oklahoma City for improper training and supervision; 2) against 

Detective Cox for arrest without probable cause; 3) against 

Detective Cox for improper seizure of items not included in the 

search warrant; 4) against Ms. Cox and Social Worker Lincoln for 

the seizure of the children; and 5) against Ms. Cox and Ms. 

Lincoln for conspiracy to prevent the Lindseys from attending the 

child custody hearing. 

The individual defendants sought either absolute or qualified 

immunity on all claims. The city argued plaintiffs' claim failed 

as a matter of law. The district court ruled in favor of the 

5 

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city. It also held the individual defendants were absolutely 

immune from suit for any activities associated with the ex parte 

custody hearing. However, the court held factual issues precluded 

granting summary judgment on the issues related to seizure of the 

children and probable cause for the arrest. The court also held 

Ms. Cox retained no immunity for the seizure of items from the 

Lindsey home. Finally, the court granted defendants' motions 

. d h . 1 . summary JU gment on 

3 E h t t e conspiracy c aim. ac par y 

for 

has 

appealed the rulings decided contrary to its position. 

address each of these arguments in turn. 

II. 

A. Standard of Review 

We will 

The district court's order was based on cross motions for 

summary judgment. On appeal, we review the granting of a motion 

for summary judgment de novo, and apply the same standards as the 

district court. Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 

1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and one party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250 (1986). It is with these principles in mind that we 

examine the issues presented. 

B. Liability of the City of Oklahoma City 

The Lindseys have alleged the city is liable for the improper 

training and supervision of the two individual defendants. Under 

certain circumstances, a municipality can be held liable for the 

failure to train under section 1983. City of Canton v. Harris, 

3 Plaintiffs have not appealed this ruling. 

6 

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109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989). However, there must be a direct 

causal link between an unconstitutional policy and the alleged 

deprivation. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Respondeat superior cannot form 

the basis for holding a municipality liable for civil damages. 

To prevail, plaintiffs must show the failure to train 

amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 

whom the defendants came into contact. Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 

1204. 

follows: 

In Harris, the Supreme Court characterized the inquiry as 

Monell's rule that a city is not liable under § 1983 

unless a municipal policy causes a constitutional 

deprivation will not be satisfied by merely alleging 

that the existing training program for a class of 

employees, such as police officers, represents a policy 

for which the city is responsible. That much may be 

true. The issue in a case like this one, however, is 

whether that training is adequate; and if it is not, the 

question becomes whether such inadequate training can 

justifiably be said to represent "city policy." ... 

In resolving the issue of a city's liability, the 

focus must be on adequacy of the training program in 

relation to the tasks the particular officers must 

perform. That a particular officer may be 

unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to 

fasten liability on the city, for the officer's 

shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a 

faulty training program. 

109 S. Ct. at 1205-06 (footnote omitted). Thus, in order to 

defeat summary judgment, plaintiffs have the burden of submitting 

some genuine issue of material fact indicating city training was 

inadequate and, therefore, caused an unconstitutional deprivation. 

7 

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Mistakes made by these officers cannot form the basis for a 

section 1983 action. 4 

Moreover, only those officials who have final policymaking 

authority may subject the municipality to section 1983 liability. 

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). A 

subordinate does not become a policymaker merely because she 

exercises discretion in her position. Id. at 126. Rather, 

plaintiffs must show real authority to make final decisions for 

the municipality. 

Plaintiffs have identified three alleged unconstitutional 

policies. 

1. That [the Oklahoma City Police Department] has no 

policy or training requiring police officers to disclose 

matters bearing on the credibility of complaining 

witnesses; 

2. That OCPD officers are affirmatively trained that 

allegations made by ten year olds are automatically to 

be believed; 

3. That 

officers 

training 

exercising 

OCPD provides absolute discretion to policy 

in removing children from a home without 

as to the legally relevant standards in 

that discretion. 

Plaintiffs rely on the deposition testimony of defendant Cox, as 

well as Lt. Jewell Smith, to support these assertions. Lt. Smith, 

however, is not a policymaker for the city. Rather, she was 

produced for deposition in response to plaintiffs' discovery 

request for someone who knew the background of the case, as well 

4 During the pendency of this appeal, plaintiffs filed a motion 

to strike material from the record. Specifically, plaintiffs 

sought to delete material from defendant Cox's brief. All of the 

quoted material was designated in the record. However, some of it 

was not actually before the district court. We do not believe any 

of the cited passages are dispositive of the issues presented in 

this case. 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 8 
as the policies 

Plaintiffs did not 

Because Lt. Jewell 

and procedures of the 

request the deposition 

and Detective Cox are 

police department. 

of a policymaker. 

not policy-makers, 

municipal liability cannot attach by virtue of their testimony. 

See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123. 

Moreover, plaintiffs have not identified specific facts to 

support their assertion that these are unconstitutional policies 

of the city. Once the city properly supported its motion for 

summary judgment, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to come 

forward with specific facts to show the city's alleged policies 

were "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of third parties. 

See Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 1407, 1412 (10th Cir. 

1984). They failed to do so. In addition, there is no evidence 

to connect these alleged policies with the constitutional 

. deprivation plaintiffs have alleged. Consequently, we affirm the 

district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue. 

C. Seizure of the Lindsey Children 

This issue requires a two-part inquiry. First, we must 

address the immunity status of the two individual defendants for 

their participation in the ex parte hearing before the special 

judge. Second, we must determine that same status as regards the 

actual seizure of the children. We review these issues 

separately. 

1. Immunity status arising from the ex parte judicial hearing 

Absolute immunity defeats a lawsuit at the outset, so that 

the officials involved will be protected from the burdens of 

litigation. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236 (1979). This 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 9 
immunity "serves the important public policy goal of protecting 

officials performing important discretionary governmental 

functions from the threat of civil liability that may disrupt the 

decisionmaking process." Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 

1381 (10th Cir. 1989). However, absolute immunity is granted 

sparingly, as it frees government officials from the obligation of 

answering for their actions in a court of law. See Forrester v. 

White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988). See also Snell v. Tunnell, 

No. 88-2879, slip op. at 32 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1990)("Absolute 

immunity has its costs because those with valid claims against 

dishonest or malicious government officials are denied relief"). 

Social workers retain absolute immunity only for "advocacy 

functions" which are an intimate part of the judicial process. 

See Snell, slip. op. at 37; Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1382-83; see 

also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 

F.2d 1154, 1156-57 (9th Cir.)(social workers performing the 

function of initiating dependency proceedings are accorded 

absolute immunity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987). Likewise, 

police officers are absolutely immune from suit where they perform 

as an "integral part of the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 

460 U.S. 325, 335-36, (1983); see also Valdez v. City & County of 

Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989)(absolute immunity 

granted to officers carrying out the judicial functions of the 

court). 

Detective Cox and Social Worker Lincoln played important 

roles in the custody disposition in this case. They initiated the 

proceedings and testified at the hearing. In fact, we assume they 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 10 
were the central witnesses. In this context, their actions were 

similar to those of a prosecutor. Therefore, they are entitled to 

absolute immunity on this aspect of plaintiffs' claim. See Imbler 

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976)(prosecutors are entitled 

to absolute immunity for actions taken in the scope of their 

duties as prosecutors). 

court on this issue. 5 

Consequently, we affirm the district 

2. Immunity status arising from the seizure of the Lindsey 

children 

Ms. Cox and Ms. Lincoln both urged the district court to 

grant them absolute immunity or, in the alternative, qualified 

immunity as a matter of law, for their involvement in the seizure 

of the children. The trial court ruled they were entitled only to 

qualified immunity, and that factual issues precluded granting 

defendants' summary judgment motions. We agree. 

Where governmental officials are performing investigative, 

rather than prosecutorial functions, they are only entitled to 

qualified immunity. See Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1382-83; see also 

Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843-44 (10th Cir.)(prosecutor 

performing "police-related" work entitled to qualified immunity), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985). Here, the individual 

defendants were performing investigative functions when they 

5 Defendant Lincoln asserts the collateral estoppel doctrine 

bars review of this claim because the state court judge approved 

defendants' actions at the custody hearing. We need not address 

this issue in light of our disposition. Moreover, we have 

reviewed the entire record and cannot locate any documents to 

indicate this issue was raised and argued in the district court. 

We will not review issues on appeal which were not properly 

preserved. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 570 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

11 

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seized the children. They were in the process of searching the 

premises for evidence of a crime. We must now proceed to 

determine whether the individual defendants are actually entitled 

to the qualified immunity they seek under the particular 

circumstances of this case. 6 

The seminal standard for considering a grant of qualified 

immunity is found in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 

The Harlow test is stated as follows: 

"In an attempt to balance the need to preserve an 

avenue for vindication of constitutional rights with the 

desire to shield public officials from undue 

interference in the performance of their duties as a 

result of baseless claims, the [Harlow] [c]ourt has 

adopted an objective test to determine whether the 

doctrine of qualified immunity applies". The test for 

qualified immunity is whether defendants violated 

"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 

of which a reasonable person would have known. If the 

law at that time was not clearly established, an 

official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 

subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be 

said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not 

previously identified as unlawful." ... 

. . . Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified 

immunity as a defense to an action, "[t]he plaintiff 

carries the burden of convincing the court that the law 

was clearly established." ... Only after plaintiff 

has shown a violation of a clearly established right 

does the defendant assume the normal burden of a movant 

for summary judgment of establishing that no material 

facts remain in dispute that would defeat her or his 

claim of qualified immunity. 

Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1456-57 (10th 

1989)(citations omitted); see also Snell, slip op. at 56. 

Cir. 

6 Ms. Lincoln asserts she should not be held liable for the 

seizure because detective Cox actually ordered it. However, Ms. 

Lincoln was personally involved and therefore subject to potential 

section 1983 liability. See Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341, 

1346 n.7 (10th Cir. 1983); see also McClelland v. Facteau, 610 

F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the language in 

section 1983 "is broader than direct personal involvement"). 

12 

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Here, the clearly established law involves 

substantial liberty interest in the custody of their 

parents' 

children. 7 

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). The due process 

clause unquestionably protects this parent/child relationship. 

See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & 

Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1383. The 

focus is necessarily on what process is due, Spielman, 873 F.2d at 

1385, and whether the actions taken in this case were objectively 

reasonable. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 648 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Oklahoma statute provides that police or a court officer may 

take a child into protective custody "whose surroundings are such 

as to endanger his welfare." Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 1107(c) 

(1982). When a child is taken into custody pursuant to this 

section, a hearing must occur within twenty-four hours to 

determine if probable cause exists to detain the child. Id. 

Plaintiffs were provided this due process protection. The 

parties do not dispute that a hearing was held within twenty-four 

hours pursuant to Oklahoma statute. The real dispute in this case 

is whether an emergency situation existed at the Lindsey home. In 

particular, we must address whether it was objectively reasonable 

for Detective Cox to conclude that seizure of the children was 

appropriate. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc., 847 

7 The district court identified Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 1107(c) 

as the clearly established law in this case. However, that 

statute is not a right of the plaintiffs. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 

818-19. Rather, it is the perceived justification for the 

governmental conduct. The right which plaintiffs allege is to the 

custody of their children. 

13 

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F.2d at 648 ("Under the Harlow standard, the focus is on the 

'objective reasonableness' of the defendant's conduct.") 

with the district court that factual issues preclude 

defendant's summary judgment motion. 

We agree 

granting 

The record provides little guidance as to why the children 

were taken into custody or on what basis Detective Cox determined 

their welfare was in danger. Further, it is unclear when the 

decision was made to take the children. Moreover, although Ms. 

Cox stated she took the children into custody because of the 

allegations against their parents, Rec. Vol. VI at 111, there is 

no testimony regarding what evidence prompted her to do so. On 

this record, we cannot say as a matter of law that Ms. Cox's 

decision to seize the children was objectively reasonable. We 

agree with the district court that further discovery is necessary. 

Consequently, Ms. Cox must stand trial on this claim. See 

Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

D. Probable Cause to Issue the Arrest Warrant 

We now turn to plaintiffs' claim regarding the arrest 

warrant. Plaintiffs assert that the failure to include all 

available information regarding D.D.'s credibility and history 

rendered the search warrant invalid for lack of probable cause. 

Detective Cox asserts the district court erred in failing to grant 

her summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On appeal, we 

must determine whether Ms. Cox was entitled to immunity on this 

claim. 

14 

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The affidavit which Ms. Cox submitted to obtain the search 

warrant contained extensive information based on testimony gained 

from D.D. Standing alone, the affidavit contained sufficient 

indicia of probable cause. However, it did not contain the 

denials from other children regarding the Lindseys' alleged 

activities nor did it include any information regarding D.D.'s 

past history or allegations that he abused other children. 

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court 

held a search warrant can be voided if a defendant makes a 

substantial showing that the warrant application contains 

perjurious statements. Id. at 155-56. The warrant is void if, 

without the statements, the aff~davit lacks probable cause. Id. 

This court recently held the same theory applicable to material 

omissions. See Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582-83 (10th Cir. 

1990). In this section 1983 action, the question is whether it 

was clearly established in August 1986 that recklessly omitting 

material facts from an affidavit violated clearly established 

fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. We hold it was. 

At the time these events occurred, various circuits had 

already recognized the Franks decision's applicability to material 

omissions. See United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1985); Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 n.5 (7th 

Cir. 1985); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 841 (1985); United States v. 

Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 

U.S. 1003 (1985); see also Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582-83 

(recognizing clearly established right in this context and 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-6147 Document: 010110098406 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 15 
outlining decisions from other circuits holding same). All of 

these cases were decided prior to the incidents in these appeals. 

As a result, we hold the law was clearly established. 8 

We agree with the district court that in this case, the 

omission was material. D.D.'s testimony forms the entire basis 

for the affidavit. Information indicating other children denied 

the very same allegations is clearly relevant. Likewise, 

information questioning his credibility would also be important. 

This information could well have vitiated probable cause. 

Detective Cox testified in her deposition that she verbally 

informed the judge of D.D.'s credibility problems. Rec. Vol. VI 

at 55. If she did, there can be no reckless omission. However, 

there is nothing in the record to corroborate this statement. 

Because the parties dispute whether the judge was informed, there 

is a genuine issue of material fact which requires that Ms. Cox 

stand trial. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583. 

E. The seizure of items from the Lindsey home 

The district court determined, as a matter of law, that Ms. 

Cox is not entitled to immunity for her actions in seizing items 

from the Lindsey home which were not identified in the search 

warrant. We address this issue under the same qualified immunity 

standards set forth in previous sections, and agree with the 

district court. 

8 Although this circuit did not have controlling precedent on 

this issue at the time these events occurred, we may look to the 

law of other circuits to determine whether a right was clearly 

established. Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 906 F.2d 1434, 

1439 (10th Cir. 1990) 

16 

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The constitutional right at issue is the ability to remain 

free from the unreasonable seizure of personal property. See Katz 

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Snell, slip 

op . at 65 (in child abuse context, reasonable officer would know 

that using false information to justify search of home violates 

fourth amendment). In this case we must focus on whether it was 

objectively reasonable for Ms. Cox to seize items not identified 

in the search warrant. 9 We agree with the district court that it 

was not. 

The search warrant described very specific items. With the 

exception of the undeveloped film and the videotapes, none of the 

items seized were identified in the warrant. Further, none of the 

material was illegal or related in any logical or visual way to 

child pornography or abuse. As the district court noted, there is 

no evidence linking the seized materials to the sexual abuse 

charges. Under these circumstances, we agree that the seizure of 

items not identified in the search warrant was objectively 

unreasonable. 

III. 

For the reasons stated, we remand to the district court for 

further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. The 

order of the United States District Court for the Western District 

9 In Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990), the Supreme 

Court held police officers may validly seize evidence in plain 

view even though it is not within the purview of a search warrant 

and the seizure was not inadvertent. Id. at 2308-11. However, 

there must be probable cause to conduct the initial search, see 

id. at 2310, and to believe the seized evidence is related to the 

crime. See id. at 2305 n.1. 

17 

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of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs' motion to strike material 

from the record is DENIED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

18 

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