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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JACK HIDAHL and CINDY HIDAHL, individually 

and as next friends on behalf of TORE HIDAHL 

and TAD HIDAHL, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

GILPIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ) 

SUSIE LALA, individually and as an employee ) 

of the GILPIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ) 

SERVICES, JANE FELIX, individually and as an ) 

employee of the GILPIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ) 

SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MASON, individually and) 

as an employee of the GILPIN COUNTY DEPART- ) 

MENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, GILPIN COUNTY ) 

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, JOHN BAYNE, individually ) 

and as DEPUTY SHERIFF FOR THE GILPIN COUNTY ) 

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, THE BOARD OF COUNTY COM- ) 

MISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF GILPIN AND THE ) 

BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE COUNTY OF ) 

GILPIN, ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

v. 

THE CITY OF CENTRAL, 

Third Party Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

Uaimi Statet Court of Appeals 

TE'nth Circuit 

J1Jl lG 1991 

:&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1074 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-C-1537) 

Joe Pickard of White & Pickard, Denver, Colorado (Claudia D. 

Miller of Frazer & Miller, Lakewood, Colorado, with him on the 

briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

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James J. Petrock of Petrock, Fendel & Dingess, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Paul E. Collins (James E. Goldfarb of Greengard Senter Goldfarb & 

Rice, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for The City of 

Central, Third Party Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, ALDISERT,* and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, United States Senior Circuit 

Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 

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This appeal concerns an action brought under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

seeking redress for alleged violation of constitutional and 

statutory rights. 

Jack and Cindy Hidahl, husband and wife, individually and as 

next friends on behalf of their minor children, Tore and Tad 

Hidahl, brought a civil rights action for money damages and 

declaratory relief under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 671 and 672. Named as defendants were the following: (1) the 

Gilpin County Department of Social Services; (2) the Colorado 

State Department of Social Services; (3) Susie Lala, Jane Felix, 

and Mary Mason, individually and as employees of the Gilpin County 

Department of Social Services; (4) the Gilpin County Sheriff's 

Office; (5) John Bayne, individually and as deputy sheriff for the 

Gilpin County Sheriff's Office; (6) the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Gilpin; and (7) the Board of Social 

Services for the County of Gilpin. 

The gist of the Hidahls' complaint was that the defendants, 

acting under the color of state law, violated the Hidahls' 

constitutional and statutory rights by: (1) improperly conducting 

a child abuse investigation; (2) improperly filing a dependency 

and neglect action against Jack and Cindy Hidahl; and (3) 

improperly removing the two Hidahl children from the Hidahls' 

home. 

One defendant, the Colorado State Department of Social 

Services ("CSDSS"), filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It also requested an award 

of costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 11. CSDSS contended, inter alia, that the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Hidahls' action was 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court agreed and dismissed the Hidahls' claims 

against CSDSS on the ground that such claims were barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. 

The district court also held that although 42 U.S.C. § 1988 

did not authorize an award of costs and attorneys' fees to CSDSS, 

costs and attorneys' fees were authorized under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

and 28 u.s.c. § 1927. Accordingly, the district court ordered 

counsel for the Hidahls--not the Hidahls--to pay CSDSS its costs 

and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in defending the action. 

In this latter connection, the district court ordered counsel to 

confer and in good faith attempt to agree on an appropriate award 

of costs and attorneys' fees. The district court's order now appears as Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep't of Social Services, 699 F. 

Supp. 846 (D. Colo. 1988). The chronology of events out of which 

this litigation arose is set forth there and will not be repeated 

in any detail here. There apparently was no appeal from the 

district court's order dismissing the Hidahls' action against 

CSDSS and awarding the latter costs and attorneys' fees. 

The remaining defendants also filed a motion to dismiss under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), alleging, inter alia, that 

qualified immunity. In an order dated 

the district court granted that motion as to 

and denied it as to other defendants. 

they were entitled to 

December 28, 1989, 

certain defendants, 

Specifically, the motion to dismiss was denied as to the Gilpin 

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County Department of Social Services and the Gilpin County Board 

of Social Services. The motion to dismiss was also denied as to 

the Gilpin County Board of County Commissioners and the Gilpin 

County Sheriff's Office. However, the motion to dismiss was 

granted as to Susie Lala, Jane Felix and Mary Mason, all employees 

of the Gilpin County Department of Social Services, and John 

Bayne, a deputy sheriff in the Gilpin County Sheriff's Office. 

The latter will hereinafter be referred to collectively as "the 

defendants." The Hidahls filed a motion to reconsider the 

district court's order of dismissal of their claim against the 

defendants, which motion was denied. The Hidahls appeal from the 

December 28, 1989 order of the district court, made final pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) by an order dated February 16, 1990. We 

affirm. 

In dismissing the Hidahls' complaint against the defendants, 

the district court held, in effect, that the allegations set forth 

in the complaint were not sufficient to show that the defendants' 

conduct violated clearly established constitutional or statutory 

rights of the plaintiffs which a reasonable person would have 

known were being violated by such conduct, and that accordingly 

the defendants, three of whom were employees of the Gilpin County 

Department of Social Services and one of whom was an employee in 

the Gilpin County Sheriff's Office, were, under the circumstances 

described in the complaint, entitled to qualified immunity. In 

thus holding, the district court relied on its prior ruling in 

Whitcomb v. Jefferson County Dep't of Social Services, 685 F. 

Supp. 745 (D. Colo. 1987). Having found qualified immunity, the 

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district court noted that it need not address the issue of 

absolute ~unity. 

At the outset, we reject any suggestion that the district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In its 

order, the district court never mentioned summary judgment and 

specifically referred to the defendants' motion as one to dismiss 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Further, there was 

very little of an evidentiary nature before the district court 

when it granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and there is nothing to indicate that in granting defendants' motion to dismiss the 

district court took into consideration matters outside the four 

corners of the complaint. Accordingly, we are not here concerned 

with summary judgment, but with a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). 

As indicated above, the Hidahls in their complaint alleged 

that their cause of action was brought pursuant to 42 u.s.c. §§ 

1983 and 1988, and 42 u.s.c. §§ 671 and 672. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

provides that a person acting under the color of state law who 

causes another to be deprived of his, or her, rights, privileges, 

or ~unities secured by the United States Constitution or laws of 

the United States shall be liable to the party thus injured. 42 

u.s.c. § 1988 "does not create independent causes of action, it 

simply 'defines procedures under which remedies may be sought in 

civil rights actions.'" Schroder v. Volcker, 864 F.2d 97, 99 

(lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 907 

(lOth Cir. 1985)). 42 u.s.c. §§ 671 and 672 are part of the 

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and concern federal 

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funding for approved state plans for foster care and adoption 

assistance. 

This action having been resolved on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we are of course 

concerned with the contents of the complaint as such relate to 

these defendants. We are not concerned with the remaining 

defendants in the proceeding still pending in the district court. 

In their complaint the Hidahls alleged that the defendants, 

acting under the color of state law, violated their constitutional 

rights to privacy, to family relations, to substantive and 

procedural due process, and to be free from illegal searches. 

They also alleged that the defendants violated rights secured them 

by 42 u.s.c. §§ 671 and 672. As indicated, the gravamen of the 

complaint was that the defendants improperly conducted an 

investigation of child abuse, improperly filed a dependency and 

neglect action, and improperly removed the two minor children 

from the Hidahls' home on December 9, 1986. 

More specifically, in their complaint the Hidahls alleged 

that on March 27, 1986, employees of the Gilpin County Department 

of Social Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect 

against the Hidahls alleging emotional abuse of their son, Tore, 

and that at a hearing held on June 20, 1986, the petition was 

dismissed without prejudice. The Hidahls further alleged that on 

September 18, 1986, shortly after the birth of the Hidahls' second 

child, Tad, a second petition in dependency and neglect was filed 

against the Hidahls alleging emotional abuse of both children. 

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According to the complaint, at a hearing held on October 3, 1986, 

the Hidahls and the Gilpin County Department of Social Services 

entered into an informal agreement which required the Hidahls to 

provide counseling for Tore and to participate in counseling 

themselves, to furnish a copy of an alcohol evaluation for Jack 

Hidahl, and to allow the Gilpin County Department of Social 

Services to supervise the family. 

The Hidahls went on to allege in their complaint that on 

December 9, 1986, at approximately 11:00 p.m., two employees from 

the Gilpin County Department of Social Services (Lala and Felix), 

one representative from the Gilpin County Sheriff's Office 

(Bayne), and a representative from the Central City Police Department1 went to the Hidahl home to conduct a child abuse investigation. This investigation, according to the complaint, was in 

response to an erroneous child abuse report and resulted in the 

two Hidahl children being removed from the Hidahl home. Following 

the children's removal, the second petition in dependency and 

neglect filed September 18, 1986, was amended to include allegations of physical abuse. That petition was tried and dismissed on 

March 13, 1987. The Hidahls filed this action on September 26, 

1988. 

1 Although such does not appear in the record before us, we are 

advised that shortly after the district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss here in question, the Gilpin County Department of 

Social Services, the Gilpin County Sheriff's Office, the Gilpin 

County Board of Social Services, and the Gilpin County Board of 

County Commissioners filed a third party complaint against the 

City of Central, seeking declaratory relief, indemnification and 

contribution. The City of Central appears before this court as a 

third party defendant-appellee. 

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The defendants moved to dismiss the Hidahls' complaint, arguing, inter alia, that, under the circumstances described in the 

complaint, they were entitled to qualified immunity. As 

indicated, the district court agreed and dismissed the action 

against the -defendants on the ground that they were entitled to 

qualified immunity. We agree. 

With this factual background in mind, we reiterate that we 

are here concerned with whether the Hidahls' complaint sets forth 

a cause of action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 based on a claimed 

deprivation by the defendants of the Hidahls' constitutional and 

statutory rights. We are not concerned with whether the Hidahls 

might conceivably have a cause of action under some other federal 

statute, or under a state statute. 

The Hidahls' basic argument on appeal is that the question of 

whether the defendants acted in good faith presented a genuine 

issue of material fact which could not be resolved on a motion to 

d . . 2 J.Sml.SS. In this regard, our reading of the complaint fails to 

disclose any allegation that the defendants acted in bad faith or 

with malice. Be that as it may, the question of whether bad faith 

vis-a-vis good faith in a § 1983 action can be resolved short of 

actual trial has been resolved by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 

800 ( 1982) . In fact, the rationale of Harlow is virtually 

dispositive of this appeal. 

2 In their brief, the Hidahls contend that the district court 

erred in presuming the existence of good faith on the part of the 

defendants and that there were genuine issues of material fact as 

to whether the defendants acted in good faith. 

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In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management 

analyst with the Department of the Air Force during a departmental 

reorganization and a reduction in forces. He then brought suit 

against the then President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, 

and certain .. of his aides, charging an unlawful retaliatory 

discharge. The Supreme Court eventually held that former 

President Nixon was entitled to absolute immunity, see Nixon v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 731 (1982), and that President Nixon's aides, 

Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, were entitled to qualified 

immunity. Harlow, 457 u.s. 800. 

In Harlow, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of 

immunity questions necessarily involves a balance between "the 

evils inevitable in any available alternative." Id. at 813-14. 

In so stating, the Supreme Court recognized that, on the one hand, 

a public official may, on occasion, abuse his office, and that, on 

the other hand, and perhaps more frequently, an indignant private 

citizen may also initiate a groundless claim against an honest 

official who is simply carrying out his duties. Be that as it 

may, the Supreme Court in Harlow specifically rejected the suggestion that a claim by a plaintiff of bad faith or malice on the 

part of a government official requires a trial. 3 The Supreme 

3 Harlow, of course, was not a § 1983 action. However, in 

Harlow the Supreme Court in footnote 39, page 818, citing Butz v. 

Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 504 (1978), noted that, "for purposes of 

immunity law," it would be "untenable" to distinguish between 

suits brought under § 1983 against state officials and suits 

brought against federal officials under the Constitution. See 

also Davis v. Scherer, 468 u.s. 183, 194 n.l2 (1984), reh'g 

denied, 468 U.S. 1226 (1984), (stating that although "Harlow was a 

suit against federal, not state, officials the same 

qualified immunity rules apply in suits against state officers 

under§ 1983). 

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Court described the applicable rule in the following.language: 

Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in 

Butz, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice 

should not suffice to subject government officials 

either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broadreaching discovery. We therefore hold that government 

officials performing discretionary functions, generally 

are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as 

their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known. 

Id. at 817-18 (citations and footnote omitted). 

As indicated, the reason urged in this court by the Hidahls 

for reversal is that in granting the defendants' motion to 

dismiss, the district court foreclosed them from litigating to a 

jury the question of whether the defendants acted in bad faith or 

with malice. Under Harlow, even an allegation of malice, which 

was not made in the instant case, is insufficient to subject a 

defendant in a proceeding of this sort "to the costs of trial or 

to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery." 

Further, we are not inclined to disturb the district court's 

holding that the Hidahls' complaint does not measure up to the 

Harlow requirement that the complaint show that the conduct of the 

defendants violated clearly established constitutional or 

statutory rights of which a reasonable person would, or should, 

have known. 4 We are not persuaded by Good v. Dauphin County 

Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989), on which the 

Hidahls rely. The facts there differ from the facts alleged in 

4 A constitutional or statutory right is 

if "[t]he contours of the right [are] . that a reasonable official would understand 

violates that right." (emphasis added). 

483 u.s. 635, 640 (1987). 

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"clearly established" 

. . sufficiently clear 

that what he is doing 

Anderson v. Creighton, 

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the Hidahls' complaint. In Good, the constitutional right 

involved was the right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches found in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Further, in Good, the plaintiffs alleged a strip search in the 

context of a forced . entry into their residence. In any event, 

Good is a Third Circuit case which was decided after the operative 

facts in the instant case occurred and certainly these defendants 

cannot be charged with a failure to anticipate Good. A defendant 

in a § 1983 action is not required to anticipate changes in the 

law, and the reasonableness of his conduct is to be judged by the 

state of the law at the time of his conduct. Harlow, 457 u.s. at 

818; Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1567 (lOth Cir. 1989). In 

this general connection, the district court observed that, after 

accepting all of the Hidahls' allegations in their complaint as 

being true, there was no case law cited by the Hidahls to support 

their contention that the conduct of these defendants violated 

clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. The 

district court also stated that no case had been cited by the 

Hidahls where a defendant had been held liable under § 1983 on 

facts which had "some factual correspondence" to the alleged actions of these defendants. 

In Eastwood v. Department of Corrections of State of Okla., 

846 F.2d 627 (lOth Cir. 1988), we said that "recovery under§ 1983 

[would] only be allowed if the official's unlawfulness is apparent 

in light of the pre-existing law," although the particular action 

in question need not have been previously held unlawful. Id. at 

630. Hence, while there need not be "strict [or precise] factual 

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.-

correspondence between the cases establishing the law and the case 

at hand," there must nonetheless be "some factual correspondence." Id. 

In Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491 (lOth Cir. 1990), we 

quoted with approval language to the effect that Harlow places a 

presumption in favor of immunity for public officials acting in 

their individual capacities. Id. at 499 (quoting Melton v. City 

of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 701, 728-29 (lOth Cir.), reh'g granted 

on other grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (1989)). Similarly, in Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 u.s. 335, 341 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that 

"[a]s the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides 

ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law." 

Finally, in Lutz v. Weld County School Dist. No. 6, 784 F.2d 

340, 342-43 (lOth Cir. 1986), we stated that in a§ 1983 action, 

where the defense of qualified immunity is raised, it becomes the 

plaintiff's burden to convince the court that the law was "clearly 

established" at the time of the defendant's conduct. And the 

"plaintiff's failure to do so ... calls for entry of judgment in 

favor of the defendants who have plead the defense." Id. at 343. 

We agree with the district court's holding that taking all of the 

complaint's allegations as true, no case law cited by the Hidahls 

supports their assertions that the defendants' actions violated 

"clearly established" constitutional or statutory rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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