Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05698/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05698-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THEODORE WALTER JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

JOSEPH W. MOSS, Chief of Delano 

Community Correctional Facility,

Respondent.

Case No. 5:18-cv-05698-BLF 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; DENYING 

REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING AND DISCOVERY; 

DIRECTIONS TO CLERK

[Re: ECF 1, 28]

Petitioner Theodore Walter Jones (“Petitioner”) petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition” or “Pet.”), ECF 1. Chief of Delano Community Correctional Facility Joseph W. Moss 

(“Respondent”) filed an answer on the merits. Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Answer (“Response” or 

“Resp.”), ECF 21-1. Petitioner filed a traverse. Pet’r’s Traverse to Resp’t’s Ans. (“Traverse” or 

“Trav.”), ECF 26. Petitioner also requested an evidentiary hearing or new discovery on the 

matter. Req. for an Evid. Hr’g or, in the Alternative, Disc. (“Request” or “Req.”), ECF 28. 

Respondents opposed the Request, and Petitioner replied. Opp’n to Req. (“Opposition” or 

“Opp.”), ECF 29; Opp’n to Req. (“Reply”), ECF 32. For the reasons set forth below, both the 

Petition and the Request are DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On October 24, 2012, a jury in Alameda County Superior Court found Petitioner guilty of 

voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a felon. Pet. 2–3. On January 7, 2010, the 

Trial Court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years and 8 months, and he is currently confined at Delano 

Community Correctional Facility. Pet. 3. 

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Petitioner filed a direct appeal (People v. Jones, Court of Appeal Case No. A137714) and a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (People v. Jones, Court of Appeal Case No. A141861) with the 

Court of Appeal of the State of California. Pet. 3, 4. Petitioner appealed his convictions asserting

ten claims, including multiple sub-claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Resp. Exh. 4, ECF 

21–17. On November 18, 2016, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District (“State 

Appellate Court”) affirmed the judgment of convictions and denied petition for writ of habeas 

corpus.

2

 Pet. 4, 5 (citing People v. Jones, Cal. Court of Appeal No. A137714, available at Pet. 

Exh. 1, ECF 1-1). The California Supreme Court denied review on February 15, 2017. Pet. 6–7; 

id., Exh. 2, People v. Jones, Cal. Case No. S239112. On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court of 

the United States denied the petition. Pet., Exh. 3; Jones v. California, U.S. Case No. 19-9046. 

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on September 18, 2018, raising the claims from 

his direct review and the State Appellate Court habeas petition. See generally Pet.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following background facts describing the crime and evidence presented at trial are 

from the opinion of the State Appellate Court on direct appeal3:

A. Trial Testimony

The charges against defendant arose from an incident that occurred on the 

evening of September 8, 2010, near a taco food truck located in a parking lot in 

East Oakland. Defendant and the victim D’Mario Anderson engaged in an 

altercation during which defendant disarmed the victim of his firearm. Defendant 

then fired several shots at the victim, fatally wounding him. Forensic pathologist 

John Iocco, M.D., performed an autopsy on the victim. According to Iocco’s 

report, the victim sustained four wounds from three shots, which together caused 

the victim’s death. Specifically, the victim was wounded by a bullet striking and 

entering the front shoulder area and exiting the armpit; a bullet striking the front 

right parietal scalp; and a bullet striking the front mastoid area near the ear and 

entering the victim’s brain. Iocco believed the bullets striking the victim’s shoulder 

and scalp areas were non-fatal, and the bullet striking the mastoid area was fatal. 

1 The Petitioner, here, separates some claims that were combined in his filings with the State 

Appellate Court. See Resp. Exh. 4, at i–iv. 

2 Once the State Appellate Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, it summarily denied his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. Pet. Exh. 1, at 2, ECF 1-1.

3 The State Appellate Court’s finding of facts is presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 972 

(9th Cir. 2011). 

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However, Iocco was not able to determine the order in which the bullets struck the 

victim. 

At a jury trial held two years after the incident, the prosecution called as 

percipient witnesses to the shooting, the victim’s companions and friends Cornelius 

Hawkins (Hawkins) and Victor Wilkins (Wilkins); defendant’s companion and then 

girlfriend Brandy Davis (Davis); and three taco food truck workers, Luis Fernando 

Rivas-Castanellos (Rivas), and brothers Jorge Estrada and Eleazar Estrada. [FN4] 

Defendant testified in his own behalf. 

FN4. Because the Estrada brothers share the same last name, we will 

hereafter refer to them by their first names, for clarity and convenience, and 

intend no disrespect. 

The testimony given during the trial revealed that on the evening of the 

shooting, two groups were present at the taco food truck awaiting preparation of 

their food orders: (1) defendant, Davis, defendant’s then best friend Fred 

Thompkins (Thompkins), and Thompkins’ girlfriend Monique Broussard 

(Broussard); and (2) the victim, Hawkins, and Wilkins. There is no material 

dispute concerning the circumstances that gave rise to defendant’s possession of the 

victim’s firearm. While both groups waited to receive their orders at the taco food 

truck, Thompkins and Hawkins engaged in a fistfight. As the men fought, the 

victim drew a gun and defendant grabbed the victim in a bear hug to prevent him 

from using the gun. During the struggle, the gun was fired and defendant sustained 

a through-and-through gunshot wound in his leg. After this gunshot, defendant and 

the victim continued to struggle for the gun, and defendant ultimately disarmed the 

victim. What occurred after the victim was disarmed was hotly disputed by the 

parties at trial. 

The prosecution’s theory was that after the victim was disarmed by 

defendant, the victim tried to run away. Defendant, now armed with the victim’s 

gun, pursued the victim, firing several shots at him. One bullet struck the victim in 

the shoulder, and another bullet struck the victim in the scalp, causing him to fall to 

the ground on his stomach. While the victim was prone on the ground and bleeding 

from two gunshot wounds, defendant paused for about four seconds. At this point, 

defendant’s best friend Thompkins said something to him, and defendant readjusted 

the gun’s position, took a step or two, and shot the victim from a distance of about 

six or seven inches. This last gunshot, which entered the victim’s mastoid area 

behind his ear, killed the victim, “finishing him off.” Defendant took the victim’s 

gun with him when he left the scene. 

The defense, in turn, contended that while the defendant held the victim in a 

bear hug during the struggle for the victim’s gun, defendant felt an unidentified 

object in the victim’s waistband. After the victim was disarmed he ran, and as he 

ran, he turned back towards defendant. Defendant observed the victim reaching for 

his waistband and reasonably believed the victim had a second loaded gun based on 

what he had felt earlier as he held the victim in a bear hug. Believing there was no 

time to retreat, defendant pursued the fleeing victim, firing the victim’s gun and 

striking the victim in the scalp and mastoid area. Falling to the ground, the victim 

slid and twisted as a result of those gunshots. The victim came to rest on his back 

and facing up. Defendant saw the victim’s arms move and believed the victim was 

still reaching for a loaded gun. In response to the victim’s movement, defendant 

fired a final gunshot into the shoulder area of the victim. According to the defense, 

when defendant fired the final gunshot into the victim, the victim was already dead 

from the mastoid wound. At the time of the final gunshot, defendant was standing 

alone. 

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Several Oakland police officers, medical personnel, and a member of the 

coroner’s office responded to the scene of the shooting after the receipt of a 911 

call, which was played for the jury. The victim was found lying on his back, with 

visible gunshot wounds to his head and shoulder. The victim was declared dead at 

the scene. 

The investigating police officers found eight .22 caliber expended shell 

casings, fired from the same gun, in a pattern suggesting a firearm was fired 

multiple times in an arc from the taco food truck to the victim’s prone body. There 

were no visible firearms on or near the victim. However, when a member of the 

coroner’s office rolled the victim’s body over, a gun fell out of the back of the 

victim’s clothing from an area near the waistband of his pants. The victim was the 

owner of the gun, which was loaded but with no round in the chamber. After 

testing, it was determined the gun had not fired the shell casings found at the scene 

or the bullet recovered from the victim’s body.

Following the shooting, defendant fled in a car driven by Broussard, and 

accompanied by Thompkins and Davis. When he entered the car, defendant 

dropped the victim’s gun on the floor of the car where he was seated. Defendant 

said he had been shot and he acted in self-defense. Defendant told Thompkins to 

take him to a hospital. Thompkins told Broussard to drive to a hospital in Tracy. 

There was no discussion about whether to go to a nearby hospital in Oakland. 

During the one-hour drive to the Tracy hospital, defendant did not attempt to call 

the police because he was scared and wanted to distance himself from the situation. 

When they arrived at the hospital, defendant and Davis got out of the car 

and went into the emergency room. Thompkins and Broussard drove away. 

Defendant’s main focus “was getting to the hospital,” and once he got there, he left 

the gun in the car and there was no further discussion about the gun. Defendant 

testified he never asked anyone to turn over the gun to the authorities because “[w]e 

went straight to the hospital, went in, and left the gun in the car.” He last saw the 

gun “in [Thompkins’] car.” Defendant also testified that before he exited the car, 

there was “a preexisting plan” that he would not tell the truth about the shooting if 

questioned by the hospital staff in the hope of avoiding detection. Thompkins 

would pick up defendant and Davis after defendant was treated at the hospital. 

While defendant was being treated at the hospital, Tracy Police Department 

Officers Makeba Moore and Jared Trine were dispatched to the hospital to 

investigate a report of someone being treated for a gunshot wound in the 

emergency room. Officer Moore recorded her discussion with defendant regarding 

how he was shot and injured his hand. The recording was played for the jury.

[FN 5] Officer Trine interviewed Davis concerning how defendant was shot. 

Davis indicated she had been with defendant and that he had been shot in Tracy. 

Officer Moore determined the shooting incident had not occurred in Tracy and 

asked her dispatch to conduct a check of defendant’s name, which revealed that he 

lived in Oakland. Officer Moore also learned that the Oakland Police Department 

had reported a shooting in Oakland. Because defendant matched the description of 

the person sought in Oakland, Moore arrested defendant and he and Davis were 

transported to the Oakland police department. 

FN5. At trial, defendant did not recall what he said to the hospital staff or 

the Tracy police officer, when questioned, about how he was shot. He 

knew he had lied to the Tracy police officer because the officer “caught on 

to it,” and detained him. Defendant had lied to hospital staff and the Tracy 

police officer because he was “just trying to distance” himself from the 

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situation, he was thinking about his children, and he wanted to get home to 

them. Once defendant was detained, he cooperated with the authorities. 

B. Charges, Deliberations, and Verdicts

The jury was asked to consider the charges of murder in the first and second 

degree, and the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter (unreasonable selfdefense, heat of passion, or sudden quarrel), together with a related sentence 

enhancement of personal use of a firearm, and a charge of possession of a firearm 

by a felon. The jury was also instructed to consider defendant’s claims of lawful 

self-defense and defense of others and unreasonable self-defense and defense of 

others. During deliberations, the jury requested read backs of portions of Dr. 

Iocco’s direct and cross-examination testimony, and defendant’s direct and crossexamination testimony. The jury also requested a device to listen to the tape of the 

911 call. After less than two days of deliberations, the jury acquitted defendant of 

murder in the first and second degree, and found him guilty of voluntary 

manslaughter, with a true finding that he personally used a firearm during the 

commission of the offense, and guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 2–6, ECF 1-1 (internal citations omitted).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. 

Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). The only definitive 

source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed 

to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 

412; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). While circuit law may be “persuasive 

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authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the 

state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 

1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). A 

state court need not recognize the controlling cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result 

of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413. But “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ [under § 2254(d)(1)] simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas 

court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The 

federal habeas court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state 

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 926 F.3d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 2019). 

“The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011) (per 

curiam) (citation omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 96-100 (2011); Felkner v. 

Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam). In other words, the Supreme Court has 

vigorously and repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, a federal habeas court must give a 

heightened level of deference to state court decisions. With these principles in mind regarding the 

standard and limited scope of review in which this Court may engage in federal habeas 

proceedings, the Court addresses Petitioner’s claims.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts the following twelve grounds for relief, several of which include

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ineffective counsel claims: (1) insufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) prosecutorial 

misconduct for not disclosing material evidence; (3) trial court error in denying motion to dismiss 

the case; (4) ineffective counsel for failing to introduce certain evidence; (5) ineffective counsel 

for not calling Thompkins as a defense witness; (6) improper or inadequate curative jury 

instructions; (7) trial court error by excluding evidence of prior violent act; (8) trial court error by 

excluding excited statements; (9) improper witness testimony under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 

(1976); (10) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (11) general ineffective counsel, 

including representation for sentencing; (12) cumulative error. See Pet. 21–83. 

As noted, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request for review. 

Pet., Exh. 3, ECF 1-1. The State Appellate Court, in its reasoned opinion on direct review, 

addressed the claims in this Petition. See generally Pet. Exh. 1. It was also the highest court to 

have reviewed those claims raised in a reasoned decision; therefore, this Court reviews the State 

Appellate Court’s reasoned opinion and presumes that its factual findings are correct. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 

2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Court discusses each of Petitioner’s claims in turn, except the ineffective counsel 

claims, which are discussed together.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim 1)

Petitioner first claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he “harbored a conscious disregard for life.” Pet. 21. Petitioner argues that, 

consequently, the evidence establishes justifiable homicide because he “reasonably, objectively 

and actually believed that [the Victim] presented an imminent danger to him and his friend.” Pet. 

22. Additionally, Petitioner contends that because he possessed the weapon only when he needed 

it for defense, the evidence does not support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Pet. 23–24. The State Appellate Court rejected all aspects of this claim on direct appeal: 

Defendant challenges his convictions for voluntary manslaughter and 

possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove that he committed an unjustifiable homicide or illegally possessed a firearm 

as a felon. We disagree. 

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In evaluating a claim of insufficiency of evidence, “we review the entire 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212.) “The 

federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due 

process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether 

the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)

Defendant relies on isolated portions of the testimony of prosecution

witnesses and his own testimony in support of his claim that, as a matter of law, his 

actions in self-defense and defense of others were reasonable. Specifically, he asks 

us to consider that the evidence presented at trial established that the victim (1)

carried two firearms; (2) brandished the first firearm; (3) shot defendant; (4) 

reached for the second firearm; and (5) did not announce an intent to withdraw 

from the assault. The problem with defendant’s argument is that it is based on his 

version of the incident, which was submitted to the jury and “apparently 

disbelieved by them.” (People v. Thomas (1933) 135 Cal.App. 654, 659.) The 

dispositive issue before the jury was whether defendant reasonably believed, under 

all the facts and reasonable inferences, that he was threatened with such imminent 

danger as to justify shooting the victim in self-defense or defense of others. Given 

the totality of the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably find that (1) during 

the initial struggle between defendant and the victim, the victim’s gun accidentally 

discharged, causing defendant to sustain a through-and-through gunshot wound in 

his leg; (2) once defendant disarmed the victim, the victim withdrew from the 

altercation by running away from defendant; [FN6] (3) defendant did not know the 

victim was armed with a second gun; [FN7] and (4) at no time did the victim reach 

for a second gun either while fleeing or after falling to the ground. [FN8] “The 

jurors were entitled to base their verdict upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the testimony offered by the prosecution and were not bound to accept the 

evidence [relied on] by the defense in opposition to such inferences.” (Id. at p. 

659.)

FN6. Contrary to defendant’s contention, whether the victim’s act of 

fleeing after being disarmed demonstrated his intent to withdraw from the 

altercation was a question of fact for the jury. (See People v. Nem (2003) 

114 Cal.App.4th 160, 166-167 [withdrawal may be sufficient to 

communicate an intent to stop fighting in some situations and not others].)

FN7. Contrary to defendant’s contention, there was no evidence 

conclusively demonstrating that he “knew Anderson had a second firearm.” 

Defendant admittedly was not sure of the nature of the object that he felt in 

the victim’s waistband while holding the victim in a bear hug. After 

defendant disarmed the victim, no witness corroborated defendant’s 

testimony that the victim reached for his waistband as he ran away and after 

he fell to the ground. And, no witness, including defendant, ever saw the 

victim in possession of a second gun either as the victim ran away or after 

he fell to the ground.

FN8. Again relying on isolated portions of the record, defendant argues he 

acted reasonably, as a matter of law, because the victim’s second gun was 

found underneath the victim’s body and was “not concealed” at the time of 

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his death. However, the jury was free to find the victim’s second gun was 

concealed based on Officer Turner’s testimony that when the victim’s body 

was rolled up for removal, a handgun was “sort of loosely in the clothes, the 

shirt at the [victim’s] back,” and, as the loose clothing was “rolled out of the 

way,” the gun “sort of moved and fell onto the ground.” The officer 

recalled “pretty clearly” that the gun fell from the rear clothing area of the 

body as the body was moved by members of the coroner’s office. (See Evje 

v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 493 [judgment affirmed 

on testimony of a single witness rejecting argument that testimony was false 

in light of witness’s own documents and admissions].)

We also reject defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. We recognize, as 

defendant argues, that the “statutory prohibition against a convicted felon having 

possession of a firearm is not absolute. For example, in People v. King (1978) 22 

Cal.3d 12 [148 Cal. Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000], the California Supreme Court ... 

held, ‘when [a convicted felon] is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or 

reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without 

preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary 

possession of that firearm for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or 

apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate [former] 

section 12021.’ [Citation.] The court pointed out, however, that for self-defense or 

defense of others to excuse a violation of [former] section 12021, ‘the use of the 

firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if 

no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In the case of a 

felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other 

persons would not be required to do so.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 

Cal.App.4th 1029, 1034-1035 (Pepper).)

Consistent with Pepper, the trial court instructed the jury on the concept of 

temporary possession of a firearm by a felon when needed for self-defense or 

defense of the others. [FN9] By its verdict, the jury clearly found the prosecution 

had proven that defendant as a convicted felon had not met the requirements for 

temporarily possessing a firearm to defend himself or others. (People v. Martin

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191, fn. 9 (Martin).) Specifically, among other scenarios, 

the jury could reasonably find that after the victim had been shot twice and fell to 

the ground, defendant could have safely retreated to the getaway car without firing 

the last gunshot, which fatally wounded the prone victim. Alternatively, the jury 

could have determined that after the shooting defendant intended to retain 

possession of the gun, leaving it in Thompkins’ car, without intending to turn the 

gun over to the authorities or otherwise arrange for the gun’s safe disposal. [FN10] 

(See People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1414 [“[c]ommission of a 

crime under [section 29800] is complete once the intent to possess is perfected by 

possession;” “[w]hat the ex-felon does with the firearm later is another separate and 

distinct transaction undertaken with an additional intent which necessarily is 

something more than the mere intent to possess the proscribed firearm”]; see also 

Martin, supra, at p. 1191 [court recognized that allowing for only a “momentary 

possession” of a firearm by a felon serves the salutary purpose and sound public 

policy of encouraging disposal and discouraging retention of dangerous items such 

as firearms].)

FN9. Specifically, the jury was told defendant’s possession of the victim’s 

firearm would not violate the prohibition against felons possessing firearms 

if the jury found that defendant “as a reasonable person had grounds for 

believing and did believe that he was or others were in imminent peril of 

great bodily harm;” without a preconceived design on his part, a firearm 

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was made available to him; his possession of such firearm was “temporary 

and for a period of time no longer than that in which the necessity or 

apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continued;” and “[t]he use of the 

firearm was reasonable under the circumstances and was resorted to only if 

no alternative means of avoiding the danger were available.”

FN10. “Although the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon may 

involve the act of personally carrying or being in actual physical possession 

of the firearm, ..., such an act is not an essential element of a violation of the 

[former] section 12021(a) because a conviction of this offense also may be 

based on a defendant’s constructive possession of a firearm. (See People v. 

Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 903]; People 

v. Mejia (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 690] [defendant 

need not physically have the weapon on his person; constructive possession 

of a firearm ‘is established by showing a knowing exercise of dominion and 

control’ over it].) ... [¶] Thus, while the act of being armed with a 

firearm—that is, having ready access to a firearm [citation]—necessarily 

requires possession of the firearm, possession of a firearm does not 

necessarily require that the possessor be armed with it.” (People v. White

(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512, 524.)

In sum, we conclude defendant’s “insufficiency of the evidence argument[s] 

simply ask us to reweigh the facts,” which “we cannot do.” (People v. Gutierrez

(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 519, citing People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 

331-333.) The cases cited by defendant do not compel a different conclusion on 

this record. [FN11]

FN11. Defendant also contends the “trial court wrongly denied” his section 

1181.1 motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence made at the 

conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, and his later motion for a new 

trial based on a claim there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions. Having presented no separate substantive arguments 

explaining why those rulings were in error, we need not and do not address 

those rulings.

Pet. Exh. 1, at 6–10.

To start, the State Appellate Court applied the correct federal standard from Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979), to analyze Petitioner’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 7 (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 20 Cal.4th 

1, 11 (1999) (applying Jackson)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Jackson standard derives

from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

The State Appellate Court reasonably applied the correct legal standard to Petitioner’s 

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court has emphasized 

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that claims contesting the sufficiency of the evidence “face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam); see also id. at 655

(finding that the appellate court “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” when it 

engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to deem the evidence insufficient to support the

conviction); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (explaining that the standard “impinges upon ‘jury’ 

discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of 

law”). 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether 

it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 

F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). “The federal court determines only whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656 

(explaining that, under Supreme Court standards, “the only question under Jackson is whether [the 

jury’s finding of guilt] was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality”). 

Hence, the “standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19. Only if no rational trier of fact could have 

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 324. Furthermore, where a state court has issued a reasoned opinion for denying a 

petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, AEDPA requires the federal court to apply the 

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference by asking whether the state court’s 

application of Jackson and Winship was unreasonable. Juan v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th 

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006). 

To assess a habeas petition, the Court looks to California state law to establish the 

elements of the crimes at issue and then turns to the federal question of whether the State 

Appellate Court was objectively unreasonable in its conclusion that sufficient evidence supported 

its decision. See Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018); Jackson, 

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443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

1. Voluntary Manslaughter

Petitioner asserts that the Prosecution failed to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt the intent 

element of voluntary manslaughter. See Pet. 21. In California, voluntary manslaughter is “the 

unlawful killing of a human being without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” Cal. 

Pen. Code § 192. “A defendant commits voluntary manslaughter when a homicide that is 

committed with either intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life—and therefore would 

normally constitute murder—is nevertheless reduced or mitigated to manslaughter.” People v. 

Bryant, 56 Cal. 4th 959, 968 (2013). In application, voluntary manslaughter may be found where 

a defendant acts either in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or with the actual but unreasonable 

belief that defense was necessary to protect against imminent danger to life or great bodily injury

(i.e., imperfect self-defense). See People v. Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 85 (2000) (killing with 

conscious disregard for life and the knowledge that the conduct is life-endangering); see also 

People v. Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 104 (2000) (killing in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion); 

People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1082 (1996) (“[F]or either perfect or imperfect selfdefense, the fear must be of . . . imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.”) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

It appears that Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he 

possessed the required intent for voluntary manslaughter because his actions were justified as a 

matter of law under a theory of perfect defense of self or others. See Pet. 21–24. After viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Prosecution, the Court finds the State Appellate 

Court’s rejection of this argument was not unreasonable. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Any 

rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner acted unreasonably. See Payne, 982 F.2d at 

338. The State Appellate Court reviewed what the record showed: (1) Petitioner’s friend fought 

with the Victim’s friend; (2) the Victim drew a gun; (3) Petitioner bear-hugged the Victim; (4) the 

Victim shot Petitioner; (5) Petitioner wrested the gun away from the Victim; (6) the Victim ran; 

(7) Petitioner fired several shots; (8) the Victim collapsed; (9) Petitioner shot the Victim again; 

(10) Petitioner fled with the gun; and (11) officers found a second gun near the Victim’s 

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waistband at the scene. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 7–8. 

The State Appellate Court explored the parties’ competing versions of the shooting and 

reasonably concluded, “[t]he problem with [Petitioner’s] argument is that it is based on his version 

of the incident, which was submitted to the jury and apparently disbelieved by them.” See Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 7 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As the State Appellate Court

explained, “the jury could reasonably find that (1) during the initial struggle between defendant 

and the victim, the victim’s gun accidentally discharged, causing defendant to sustain a throughand-through gunshot wound in his leg; (2) once defendant disarmed the victim, the victim 

withdrew from the altercation by running away from defendant; (3) defendant did not know the 

victim was armed with a second gun; and (4) at no time did the victim reach for a second gun 

either while fleeing or after falling to the ground.” Pet. Exh. 1, at 7–8 (internal footnotes omitted). 

In such a scenario, a jury could reasonably conclude that neither Petitioner’s actions were 

reasonable nor was he in imminent danger. Indeed, Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence 

argument simply seeks to reweigh facts, which is the province of the jury. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 10. 

Thus, because the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable, 

Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief as to the first claim for his voluntary manslaughter 

conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

2. Possession of a Firearm by a Felon

Petitioner further asserts that, because he acted in defense of self or others, the Prosecution 

failed to establish voluntary possession of a firearm by a felon beyond a reasonable doubt. Pet. 

23–24. In California, a convicted felon may not have in his or her possession, custody, or control 

a concealable firearm. People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 15 n.1 (1978) (citing Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 12021(a)); see also Cal. Pen. Code § 29800.

4

 This law does not, however, prohibit convicted 

felons from using a concealable firearm in defense of self or others in emergency situations. 

People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 15 (1978). Instead, when a convicted felon “is in imminent peril of 

great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without 

4 Effective January 1, 2012, Cal. Pen. Code § 29800(a) continues former Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 12021(a) without substantive change. 

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preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of 

that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it 

in self-defense continues, does not violate [the law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a 

felon].” Id. at 24. That said, “the use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances 

and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In 

the case of a felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other 

persons would not be required to do so.” Id. 

Petitioner argues that he took possession of the gun only for defensive purposes after he 

was shot and “left the gun on the floor of the car immediately after obtaining safety.” Pet. 24. 

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Prosecution, the Court again finds 

that the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this argument was not unreasonable. See Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 324. As explained above, any rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner 

acted unreasonably in possessing the gun to shoot the Victim—both when the Victim began to run 

and when he lay on the ground. See Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (“The federal court determines only 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”) 

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The Trial Court instructed the jury on the concept of temporary possession of a firearm by 

a felon when needed for self-defense or defense of the others, allowing the jury to consider the 

facts in light of Petitioner’s potential reasons for shooting. Pet. Exh. 1, at 9. The State Appellate 

Court reviewed all the facts and concluded that a jury could reasonably convict Petitioner. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 9. For example, the jury could have reasonably found that Petitioner was safe to retreat 

once the Victim fell to the ground. Pet. Exh. 1, at 9. Or the jury could have found that Petitioner 

intended not to hand the gun over to authorities when he took it to the car. Pet. Exh. 1, at 9–10

(citing People v. Martin, 25 Cal. 4th 1180, 1191 (2001) (“[R]ecognition of a ‘momentary 

possession’ defense serves the salutary purpose and sound public policy of encouraging disposal 

and discouraging retention of dangerous items such as . . . firearms.”). Hence, here too Petitioner 

essentially asks this Court to reweigh facts, which the Court will not do. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 7. 

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Thus, because the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable, 

Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief as to the second claim regarding Petitioner’s excuse for 

temporary possession of a firearm by a felon. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Based on the foregoing analysis, habeas relief is not available as to Claim 1 regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence.

B. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct for Failing to Disclose Evidence (Claims 2, 3, & 

6)

There is no dispute that the Prosecution did not timely disclose that the three workers at the 

taco truck sought U-Visa5applications for assisting the Prosecution with Petitioner’s case. See

Pet. Exh. 1, at 11–19; Resp. 12. In connection with this delayed disclosure, Petitioner asserts three 

claims: (1) the Prosecution’s delay in disclosure resulted in an unfair trial; (2) the Trial Court erred 

in refusing to strike the witnesses’ testimony or dismiss the charges; and (3) the Trial Court’s 

admonishment and instruction were insufficient to cure the resulting harm.

6 Pet. 24, 47–48, 52, 

61, 63. The State Appellate Court evaluated these claims together on direct appeal, rejecting all of 

them: 

II. Prosecution’s Late Disclosure of Evidence in Alleged Violation of Brady 

v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) [FN12] and Section 1054

FN12. “ ‘Under Brady, the prosecution violates a defendant’s federal due 

process rights when it suppresses evidence material to the defendant’s guilt 

or punishment, regardless of the good faith belief of the prosecution. 

(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.)’ ” (People v. Lewis (2015) 240 

Cal.App.4th 257, 263 (Lewis); italics added.)

A. Relevant Facts

Prior to the preliminary hearing in September 2011, the assigned Deputy 

District Attorney (DDA) Brian Owens interviewed the three taco food truck 

workers, Eleazar, Jorge and Rivas (hereinafter also referred to as the three 

witnesses). DDA Owens knew the three witnesses “were here illegally,” but he did 

not discuss their immigration status with them. Each witness was subpoenaed to 

appear at the preliminary hearing. However, only Jorge testified at the preliminary 

5

“An I-918 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification, signed by an appropriate District 

Attorney, ‘is necessary for undocumented individuals, unlawfully in the United States, to obtain 

Temporary Resident status for themselves, their spouses, their children, and their siblings, by 

providing helpful testimony to the District Attorney.’” Pet. Exh. 1 at 11 n. 13.

6 Petitioner also brings several ineffective counsel claims associated with the Prosecution’s alleged 

Brady violation. These claims are discussed below with the other ineffective counsel claims.

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hearing. After the preliminary hearing, the case was assigned for trial to DDA Mas 

Morimoto. 

After the preliminary hearing, in April 2012, DDA Owens received an 

email from the three witnesses’ immigration attorney requesting that DDA Owens 

sign the witnesses’ I-918 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certifications 

(hereinafter referred to as the U-Visa applications). [FN13] The U-Visa 

applications were attached to the email. [FN14] Because DDA Owens was no 

longer assigned to the case, he sent the email and attachments to DDA Morimoto. 

Four months later, in August 2012, the witnesses’ immigration attorney contacted 

DDA Morimoto and inquired if the District Attorney’s office was “still open” to 

signing the U-Visa applications. DDA Morimoto responded that “nothing could be 

done” or “nothing would even be considered” until defendant’s trial was over. In 

September 2012, defendant moved in limine for disclosure of all Brady evidence 

not previously disclosed by the prosecution. The prosecution did not disclose the 

existence of the U-Visa applications at that time.

FN13. An I-918 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification, 

signed by an appropriate District Attorney, “is necessary for undocumented 

individuals, unlawfully in the United States, to obtain Temporary Resident 

status for themselves, their spouses, their children, and their siblings, by 

providing helpful testimony to the District Attorney. [¶] There are four 

statutory eligibility requirements for obtaining U Nonimmigrant Status: [¶] 

The individual must have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a 

result of having been a victim of a qualifying criminal activity. [¶] The 

individual must have information concerning that criminal activity. [¶] The 

individual must have been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful 

in the investigation or prosecution of the crime. [¶] The criminal activity 

violated U.S. laws.” 

FN14. The U-Visa applications detailed the terms under which the three 

witnesses “intended to be helpful” to the District Attorney. According to 

specific terms set forth in the U-Visa applications, the three witnesses were 

required to willingly provide “eyewitness” testimony about the alleged 

offenses charged against defendant. The U-Visa applications also had 

attached separate evaluations of each witness prepared by a psychologist to 

establish the required element that the witnesses suffered substantial mental 

abuse as a consequence of witnessing the incident. The psychologist’s 

evaluations contained a narrative of each witness’s description of the 

incident. 

On October 1, 2012, the trial commenced with opening statements and the 

taking of testimony of Hawkins and Wilkins, with Wilkins completing his 

testimony on the morning of October 2, 2012. DDA Morimoto then called Eleazar 

as a witness. Just before he took the stand, Eleazar “mentioned something about 

the visa” to the prosecutor. The witness’s comment prompted DDA Morimoto to 

ask defense counsel whether she was aware of the three witnesses’ immigration 

statuses and that they had retained counsel. According to defense counsel, DDA 

Morimoto “made a vague, offhand oral comment ... that the [three] witnesses had 

retained an attorney, and wanted the District Attorney to sign an affidavit saying 

they were cooperative witnesses for immigration purposes.” DDA Morimoto did 

not then disclose the nature of the affidavit he referred to, the content of discussions 

between the three witnesses and members of the District Attorney’s office, the 

existence of the completed U-Visa applications and attached declarations, or that

the district attorney’s office was then in actual possession of the U-Visa 

applications. However, defense counsel’s response to DDA Morimoto’s comment 

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suggested that defense counsel was not aware of the existence of the U-Visa 

applications. The trial then proceeded with the direct and cross-examination of 

Eleazar, Jorge, and Rivas, respectively. [FN15]

FN15. During their testimony, Eleazar, Jorge, and Rivas, described the 

conduct of the men and women they saw in the parking lot by their skin 

color, height, and age range. Neither Eleazar nor Jorge made in-court 

identifications of any of the men or women they saw in the parking lot on 

the day of the shooting. Rivas described defendant as looking like the 

“shorter man,” who he had previously described as approximately 32 years 

old, with a fuller build. For the sake of clarity, and as necessary, when 

recounting the testimony of Eleazar, Jorge, and Rivas, we shall refer to the 

actions of defendant, the victim, Thompkins, and Hawkins, by appellation 

or name, based on the undisputed testimony of other percipient witnesses.

Eleazar testified he had been working inside the taco food truck, when 

Rivas indicated there were people arguing outside and someone had taken out a 

firearm. Eleazar did not look outside, but crouched down on the floor of the truck. 

As he was calling 911 [FN16] to report the incident, Eleazar heard the first 

gunshot. Eleazar remained on the floor of the truck and heard five or six more 

gunshots. He estimated that approximately one minute after the final gunshot, he 

got up, looked outside, and saw defendant and Thompkins get into a car and leave 

the parking lot. 

FN16. The tape-recorded 911 call was played for the jury.

Jorge testified he had also been working inside the taco food truck, when he 

heard Rivas say there were people “fighting” in the parking lot. Jorge looked 

outside and saw Thompkins hit the victim in the face. The victim reacted by 

pulling out a gun from his waistband. [FN17] Jorge then saw defendant put the 

victim in a bear hug. The victim’s arms were extended downward and trapped 

within defendant’s arms. While defendant held the victim in a bear hug, 

Thompkins hit the victim in the face several times. Jorge heard a gunshot, and he 

ducked down and did not see what happened next. When Jorge got up he looked 

outside and saw the victim running towards the driveway of the parking lot. The 

victim no longer had a gun. As the victim ran through the parking lot, Jorge saw 

defendant, with a gun, and heard three or four gunshots. Jorge could not tell in 

which direction defendant was shooting. Jorge again ducked down to the floor of 

the truck. When he again got up and looked outside, the victim was already on the 

ground. Jorge could not tell if the victim was moving or not. He did not remember 

if anyone else was near the victim other than defendant. Jorge testified he heard 

and saw another gunshot fired by defendant. When defendant fired the gun he was 

standing approximately several feet from the victim. Jorge could see that defendant 

was aiming the gun when he fired the last gunshot, but Jorge could not see at what 

part of the prone victim the defendant was aiming the gun. After listening to the 

tape-recorded 911 call in court, Jorge testified that he remembered hearing the first 

gunshot (when defendant and the victim were struggling for the firearm), a second 

gunshot, then five more gunshots as the victim ran through the parking lot, 

followed by a final gunshot as the victim lay prone on the ground. After the final 

gunshot defendant and Thompkins ran to the car and left the parking lot. 

FN17. After reviewing his statement to the police, Jorge confirmed that he 

had told the police that Thompkins had punched one of the men, but not the 

victim, and that the victim then removed a gun from his waistband.

Rivas testified that he observed the altercation between Thompkins and 

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Hawkins. During that altercation, the victim pulled out a gun from his waistband. 

Defendant ran over and put his arms around the victim so he could not fire the gun. 

While defendant and the victim were struggling, Thompkins came over and hit the 

victim in the face. Rivas heard a gunshot, but he did not see the gun at that time. 

Once he heard the gunshot, Rivas threw himself down on the floor of the truck. 

While on the floor, Rivas heard two more gunshots “in a row,” and then a few 

seconds later, he “heard” three or four gunshots. After reviewing his transcribed 

statement given to the police, Rivas testified in court that he had told the police 

what Jorge said to Rivas concerning Jorge’s observations of the incident. 

According to Rivas, Jorge said the “guys had taken the gun away from [the victim], 

and with the same gun, they had killed” the victim; “they followed [the victim] to 

finish him off.” 

Neither the prosecution nor the defense questioned Eleazar or Jorge about 

their immigration status. Defense counsel briefly questioned Rivas about his 

immigration status. Rivas confirmed that he needed a signed affidavit indicating he 

was a cooperative witness for the prosecution, but as of that date no one from the 

District Attorney’s office had signed the affidavit. Eleazar and Rivas were released 

without being subject to recall, and Jorge was released subject to recall. 

The following day (October 4, 2012), outside the presence of the jury, DDA 

Morimoto informed the court of the existence of the U-Visa applications, and that 

the prosecution had not disclosed this evidence to the defense. The U-Visa 

applications were provided to the court, for examination, at an ex parte in camera 

hearing. After review, the court found some portions of the U-Visa applications 

were discoverable and ordered the prosecution to immediately disclose the material 

to defense counsel. [FN18] 

FN18. The clerk’s transcript in the record on appeal includes those portions 

of the U-Visa applications released to defense counsel, including portions of 

the psychologist’s evaluations that include the three witnesses’ narrative 

descriptions of the incident and the effect of the incident on each witness’s 

mental health including that each witness was suffering symptoms 

characteristic of post-traumatic stress disorder as well as other 

psychological symptoms of depression (Rivas), and insomnia, anxiety 

episodes, and dysthymic disorder (form of depression) (Eleazar and Jorge). 

The court refused to disclose those portions of the U-Visa applications 

concerning privileged medical and psychological information. At 

defendant’s request, we granted his motion to augment the record “to 

include a supplemental [sealed] clerk’s transcript consisting of the 

documents placed under seal by the trial court on October 4, 2012, 

identified as “U-Visa applications prepared for witnesses [Rivas, Jorge, and 

Eleazar].” However, we denied defendant’s motion to unseal the 

supplemental clerk’s transcript finding that “the right to appellate review is 

limited to a determination as to whether the [trial] court’s ruling was 

correct. This court may make its determination by reviewing the materials 

sealed by the trial court.” In his briefs on direct appeal, defendant asks this 

court to review in camera the sealed portions of the U-Visa applications and 

to order full disclosure of the U-Visa applications. He argues the 

information contained in the U-Visa applications should not be treated as 

privileged information, and, the information is material to his defense and 

relevant to the witnesses’ memories of the incident. We have reviewed the 

sealed records submitted to this court and conclude there is no discoverable 

information that is material to defendant’s defense or relevant to the 

witnesses’ memories of the incident. Accordingly, we deny his request to 

order full disclosure of the U-Visa applications.

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Trial resumed on October 9, 2012. After the jury was excused for the day, 

defendant moved to dismiss or strike the testimony of the three witnesses based on 

the prosecution’s failure to disclose the U-Visa applications. The prosecutor 

opposed the motion. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing in which three 

witnesses from the District Attorney’s office, DDA Brian Owens, District Attorney 

(DA) Investigator Gustavo Galindo, and DA Inspector Patrick Johnson, testified 

regarding two issues: (1) the prosecution’s failure to disclose the U-Visa 

applications with regard to any potential immigration benefits that might accrue to 

the witnesses for giving helpful eyewitness testimony; and (2) the prosecution’s 

failure to disclose the attachment to each U-Visa application, namely, a 

psychologist’s report, dated April 2012, for each witness, which contained each 

witness’ narrative description of the incident. Defense counsel also apprised the 

court of her discussion with the witnesses’ immigration attorney.

Following the hearing and argument by counsel, the court ruled on 

defendant’s motion to dismiss or strike the testimony of the three witnesses in the 

following manner. The court first determined that although the prosecution had 

made no promises to the three witnesses, the information in the U-Visa applications 

was “material and could be relevant for purposes of impeachment.” Regarding the 

prosecution’s failure to disclose the psychologist’s reports attached to the U-Visa 

applications, the court found that because Eleazar and Rivas had not testified at the 

preliminary hearing, an informed decision could not have been made as to the 

disclosure of those reports until those witnesses testified at trial. However, the 

court found that because Jorge had testified at the preliminary hearing, the 

prosecution should have placed under seal his psychologist’s report and requested 

an in-camera hearing prior to the witness’s trial testimony. Nonetheless, the court 

did not find sufficient grounds at that time to dismiss the charges against defendant. 

The court indicated the trial would proceed, with the proviso that the court would 

entertain a mistrial motion in the event that the witnesses testified in such a way as 

to give cause for the court to believe there had been “a direct violation of the 

Constitution.” Regarding the issue of sanctions for the prosecution’s late 

disclosure of the U-Visa applications, the court asked the parties to craft a 

stipulation to be read to the jury concerning the prosecution’s late disclosure and 

special jury instruction to be given at the conclusion of the trial. The court also 

directed the prosecution to make each witness available for further examination 

subject to having the testimony of Eleazar and Rivas stricken if they became 

unavailable; the court did not make a similar ruling as to Jorge. Following this 

ruling, the court asked defense counsel if there was a need for a continuance based 

on the new disclosures or the information counsel received in court that day. 

Defense counsel replied she was not seeking a continuance. Instead, she asked the

court to order the prosecutor to make the three witnesses available the next morning 

for further questioning. The court granted the request, but gave the prosecutor an 

additional day until Thursday, October 11, to produce the three witnesses. 

On Thursday, October 11, before the recall of Rivas as a witness, the court 

read a stipulation to the jury, advising them, in pertinent part, regarding the 

prosecution’s late disclosure of the U-Visa applications, which had been in the 

prosecution’s possession since April 17, 2012. The court described the U-Visa 

applications, noting that each application included a psychologist’s evaluation of 

the witness. The court further explained that “[a]lthough the People’s failure to 

timely disclose evidence was without legal justification, the court has, under the 

law, permitted the production of this evidence after the court was informed of the 

existence of the applications and attached [psychologist’s] reports by the People on 

October 4th 2012.” The jury was informed the prosecution had disclosed portions 

of the U-Visa applications to the defense, and “[t]he defense is now entitled to 

additional cross-examination of all three witnesses.” 

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Defense counsel then recalled Rivas as a witness. Rivas, when questioned 

about his immigration status, confirmed that he, Jorge, and Eleazar, together, had 

hired an immigration attorney after the incident. Rivas filled out a “form” to obtain 

legal status, which was important to him because he had children here and his 

brother had asked him to look into the matter. Rivas was not aware of any 

promises made by the prosecution regarding the U-Visa application. At the 

conclusion of Rivas’ testimony, defense counsel declined the court’s invitation to 

call any other witnesses for further cross-examination. At the end of the trial 

session on October 11, outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor put on the record 

his compliance with the court’s order to produce Jorge and Eleazar. Specifically, 

the prosecutor informed the court that “Jorge Estrada and Eleazar Estrada were 

both here this morning as well as this afternoon and available to be recalled as 

witnesses by the defense.” Defense counsel confirmed that the witnesses had been

made available for further cross-examination, but she had informed the prosecution 

that the defense would not be calling Jorge and Eleazar as witnesses. 

During the ensuing jury instruction conference, the court discussed with 

counsel a special instruction regarding the prosecution’s late disclosure using some 

language in CALJIC No. 2.28. In pertinent part, the prosecutor argued that because 

the disclosed portions of the U-Visa applications were not offered into evidence, 

any characterization of the witnesses’ statements in those applications as being 

“material ... relevant [or] exculpatory,” was inappropriate. Conversely, defense 

counsel argued the jury should be advised as to (a) the “materiality,” “relevancy,” 

and “exculpatory nature” of the evidence that was concealed by the prosecution, 

and (b) the prosecution’s failure to disclose, even if the defense chose not to use the 

disclosed information or re-examine the witnesses on the subject in light of their 

previous lengthy testimony. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court eliminated 

any reference in the special jury instruction to the prosecution’s conduct as being a 

“concealment” of the U-Visa applications, opting to refer to the prosecution’s 

conduct as a late disclosure of evidence. Defense counsel lodged no other 

objection to any other modifications made by the court to the special jury 

instruction. Thereafter, as part of its closing instructions, the court again advised 

the jurors of the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose the U-Visa applications, in 

which the witnesses purported to be willing to provide eyewitness testimony for the 

prosecution; that the U-Visa applications contained “evidence regarding the 

credibility of the witnesses and expectations of profound benefit in exchange for 

‘helpful’ testimony from all three individuals;” that “[t]he weight and significance 

of the delayed disclosure are matters for your consideration;” and that the jury 

“should consider whether the untimely disclosed evidence pertains to a fact of 

importance, something trivial or subject matters already established by other 

credible evidence.” 

During his initial closing remarks, the trial prosecutor made no mention of 

the testimony of Jorge and Eleazar, and asked the jury to consider that aspect of 

Rivas’ testimony concerning his observations before the victim first pulled out a 

gun from his waistband. In response, defense counsel made an extensive argument 

regarding the testimony of Jorge and Rivas, pointing to inconsistencies and noting 

each witness may have been influenced by their need to provide helpful eyewitness

testimony to secure legal status. In rebuttal, without objection, the prosecutor 

argued, in pertinent part, that there was no evidence that the three witnesses had 

“shaped their testimony” to be helpful to the prosecution, the three witnesses were 

not able to identify defendant in court, there was no evidence the prosecution had 

made any promises to the three witnesses, and the defense had not recalled two of 

the witnesses to discuss their immigration status. The prosecutor also described in 

detail how most, if not all, of the testimony given by Jorge and Rivas was 

consistent with the testimony of other prosecution witnesses and/or the physical 

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evidence.

B. Analysis

Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecution 

committed a Brady violation by intentionally suppressing the U-Visa applications. 

We disagree.

“There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds 

evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to 

the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence 

is material. [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 263, citing to Strickler 

v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282.) In evaluating the effect of a Brady

violation, “the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 

have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 

confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown 

when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.’ [Citation.]” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 434 

(Kyles).)

After independently reviewing both the unsealed and sealed portions of the 

U-Visa applications of Rivas, Jorge, and Eleazar, we conclude there is no reason to

order a new trial based on a Brady violation because the late disclosure of the UVisa applications does not undermine “our confidence in the verdict.” (Lewis, 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) As noted previously, there was no material 

dispute as to the events that occurred before defendant disarmed the victim: the 

victim drew a loaded gun in response to a fistfight between Thompkins and 

Hawkins, defendant held the victim in a bear hug to prevent the victim’s use of the 

gun, and during the struggle for the gun, defendant was shot in the leg, but he was 

ultimately able to disarm the victim. The dispositive issue at trial was whether 

defendant acted in self-defense or defense of others when he fired the gun at the 

victim. This theory, in turn, was based on the reasonableness of defendant’s belief 

that the victim was reaching for a second gun as he ran away from defendant and 

after he fell to the ground. “The most persuasive evidence that [defendant] felt 

compelled to shoot [the victim] in self-defense [and defense of others] necessarily 

came from [defendant].” (Reis-Campos v. Biter (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 968 [2016 

U.S. App. Lexis 14519, *18, 2016 WL 4174770].) Except for defendant, no other 

witness testified that after being disarmed the victim reached for his waistband. 

Additionally, no witness, including defendant, testified that after being disarmed 

the victim actually possessed a second gun. Moreover, the U-Visa applications do 

not provide support or otherwise corroborate defendant’s claim that he fired the 

gun at the victim because he reasonably believed the victim was reaching for a 

second gun in his waistband. [FN19] Thus, we are confident the verdicts would 

not have changed had the jury learned of the disclosed information in the U-Visa 

applications, i.e., the witnesses’ narratives of the incident or that the witnesses 

suffered from certain psychological symptoms as a consequence of the incident. 

[FN20] (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 434.)

FN19. In Rivas ‘s U-Visa application, it was reported that Rivas believed 

he saw the victim fire his handgun once and hit defendant before the victim 

was disarmed, that defendant took the gun from the victim, and defendant, 

using the victim’s gun, shot the victim and then fired a second shot at close 

range, hitting the victim while he was lying on the ground. And, in 

Eleazar’s U-Visa application, it was reported that Eleazar had seen two men 

attempt to disarm the victim, causing Eleazar to duck down, and while he 

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took cover, he heard gunshots, and later, he got up and saw the victim lying 

dead.

In Jorge’s U-Visa application, it was reported that Jorge saw a fight 

between a group of teenagers and “two couples....” “One of the teenagers 

pulled out a handgun and one of the men in the second group began 

struggling with him to disarm him. The rest of the teenagers ran away, but 

the other man in the second group soon joined the struggle for the handgun. 

[¶] [Jorge] then heard a shot, he and his two co-workers ducked. When he 

raised his head again, he noticed that one of the men was now in possession 

of the handgun. A second shot was fired and [Jorge] saw the teenager trying 

to get up, but he was shot again.” Contrary to defendant’s contention, 

Jorge’s reported narrative does not corroborate defendant’s testimony that 

the victim looked like he was reaching for a second gun, nor is the narrative 

otherwise “material” as it does not “ ‘tend in reason to prove that 

[defendant’s] fear was reasonable’ ” at the time he fired the gun while the 

victim was prone on the ground. 

FN20. The cases cited by defendant are factually inapposite and do not 

otherwise support reversal on this ground. (See, e.g., Giglio v. United 

States (1972) 405 U.S 150, 154 [new trial ordered where government failed 

to disclose evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future 

prosecution of the defendant’s coconspirator, where the Government’s case 

depended almost entirely on the witness’s testimony, and without it there 

could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the 

jury]; Comstock v. Humphries (9th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3d 701, 706 [Brady

violation found where evidence impeaching victim’s trial testimony was not 

disclosed until after trial]; Amado v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2014) 758 F.3d 

1119, 1127 [Brady violation found where evidence impeaching testimony 

of key prosecution witness was not disclosed during the trial]; Silva v. 

Woodford (9th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 825, 828 [court granted evidentiary 

hearing into defendant’s Brady claim that the prosecution failed to disclose 

an agreement that the state’s key witness not be psychiatrically examined 

until after the trial].) 

We also see no merit to defendant’s argument that, under section 1054, the 

trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charges or strike in its 

entirety the testimony of Rivas, Jorge, and Eleazar. [FN21] “Where there has been 

a failure of discovery the normal remedy is not dismissal or suppression of 

evidence, but a continuance to enable the defense to meet the new evidence. 

[Citations.]” (In re Jessie L. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 202, 210, citing to People v. 

Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 501-502, and People v. McGowan (1980) 105 

Cal.App.3d 997, 1002; see § 1054.5, subds. (b), (c); People v. Superior Court 

(Mitchell) (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 451, 459 [trial court may exclude witnesses’ 

testimony as late discovery sanction “ ‘only if all other sanctions have been 

exhausted’ ”].) Here, as indicated above, defendant received the pertinent portions 

of the U-Visa applications, the trial court offered a continuance to the defense, and, 

contrary to defendant’s contention, the three witnesses were made available and 

defense counsel had the opportunity to recall them for further questioning. We 

therefore see no basis for reversal on this ground. [FN22] 

FN21. Section 1054.5 provides, in pertinent part: “(b) ... Upon a showing 

that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon a 

showing that the moving party complied with the informal discovery 

procedure provided in this subdivision, a court may make any order 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but not 

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limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or 

prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, 

continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the court may 

advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely 

disclosure. [¶] (c) The court may prohibit the testimony of a witness 

pursuant to subdivision (b) only if all other sanctions have been exhausted. 

The court shall not dismiss a charge pursuant to subdivision (b) unless 

required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”

FN22. Defendant complains, on his direct appeal and in his petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request 

a continuance, failing to question Rivas about the narrative of the incident 

reported in his U-Visa application, failing to renew the motion to strike the 

testimony of Eleazar and Jorge when those witnesses were unavailable to 

testify, and, assuming Eleazar and Jorge were available to testify, failing to 

recall them as witnesses because their testimony “would have been material, 

necessary and admissible,” and failing to introduce all material evidence 

contained in the U-Visa applications concerning “ the witnesses’ 

immigration status, PTSD, and recollection of the shooting.” However, 

defendant has failed to demonstrate that either a continuance, or the 

exculpatory or impeachment evidence that counsel could have revealed by 

the admission of the redacted U-Visa applications and further questioning 

of the witnesses, “would have produced a more favorable result at trial.” 

(People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 662, disapproved in part on another 

ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 (Doolin).) 

(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 (Strickland) [claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining 

the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies”].) 

Defendant also challenges the jury admonition (stipulation read to the jury 

before the recall of Rivas as a witness) and the special jury instruction regarding the 

prosecution’s late disclosure of the U-Visa applications. He contends the jury was 

not provided with sufficient guidance to evaluate the significance of the late 

disclosure or otherwise make adverse findings regarding the late disclosure if the 

jury found the disclosed evidence was material. However, the record shows both 

defense counsel and the prosecutor proposed jury admonitions and special jury 

instructions addressing the issue, and the trial court worked with both counsel when 

modifying the special jury instruction. Consequently, defendant has forfeited any 

claim the jury admonition and the special jury instruction were incomplete on the 

grounds he now asserts on appeal. (See People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 

750 (Cleveland) [“ ‘[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in 

law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first 

requesting such clarification at trial’ ”].) Even if the jury admonition and the 

special jury instruction suffer from the deficiencies as outlined by defendant, he has 

failed to demonstrate prejudice. As we have noted, the testimony of Rivas, Jorge, 

and Eleazar, was not outcome-determinative. Consequently, on this record, we 

conclude any error in the jury admonition and the special jury instruction regarding 

the prosecution’s late disclosure of the U-Visa applications was harmless applying 

any standard of review. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(Chapman); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) [FN23] 

FN23. Because we find no prejudicial error in the jury admonition and 

special jury instruction, we reject defendant’s contention, made on direct 

appeal and in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to adequately object to the jury admonition and 

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special jury instruction, inviting the court to submit a deficient special jury 

instruction, and failing to object on the ground that the special jury 

instruction violated defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, a fair 

trial and equal protection under Article I of the California Constitution and 

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”]).

Pet. Exh. 1, at 11–23. This Court discusses the State Appellate Court’s reasoned opinion below 

and finds that the State Appellate Court applied the correct precedent and did not unreasonably 

evaluate the facts. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on Claims 2, 3, or 6.

1. Brady Violation (Claim 2)

Petitioner asserts that the Prosecution failed to timely disclose evidence of the U-Visa 

applications in bad faith (Pet. 32) and that it is reasonably probable those actions affected the 

outcome at trial (Pet. 35). As described above, the State Appellate Court rejected this claim on

direct appeal because it found, after independently reviewing the U-Visa applications, that their

late disclosure did not undermine confidence in the verdict. Pet. Exh. 1, at 19. This Court finds 

that the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in arriving at its conclusion.

To start, the State Appellate Court applied the correct Supreme Court precedent set forth in

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 19. Under Brady, 

“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The prosecution must disclose such 

evidence even where the accused fails to request it. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110

(1976). 

In the context of an alleged Brady violation, “material” evidence is tantamount to

“prejudicial,” meaning “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that

the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281 (1999); see also United States v Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). A 

“reasonable probability” does not mean “more likely than not,” but rather “that the likelihood of a 

different result is great enough to ‘undermine confidence in the outcome of trial.’” Smith v. Cain, 

565 U.S. 73, 75–76 (2012) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). For this reason, 

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“evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong 

enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). 

In sum, there are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) “the evidence at issue must be 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) “that 

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently”; and (3) 

“prejudice must have ensued.”7 Strickler 527 U.S. at 281–82; see also United States v. Bagley, 

473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

Here, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the late disclosure of 

the U-Visa applications did not prejudice the outcome.

8

 See Pet. Exh. 1, at 19; see also Kyles, 514 

U.S. at 434; Strickler 527 U.S. at 281–82. The State Appellate Court concluded that “there was no 

material dispute as to the events that occurred before defendant disarmed the victim” and thus, the 

dispositive issue at trial was whether Petitioner acted in defense of self or others when he shot the 

Victim. Pet. Exh. 1, at 20. This defense primarily turned on whether Petitioner’s actions were 

reasonable, which largely depended on whether the evidence showed he reasonably believed the 

Victim was reaching for a second gun in his waistband. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 20. 

Petitioner asserts that statements on the U-Visa applications could have established that 

Thompkins was not the first aggressor. Pet. 35. But whether Petitioner’s then-friend was the first 

aggressor did not pertain to whether the Victim was reaching for a second gun because other than 

Petitioner, no witness provided testimony to support this defense. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 20. The 

State Appellate Court independently reviewed both the unsealed and sealed portions of the U-Visa 

applications of Rivas, Jorge, and Eleazar, and concluded that they contained no discoverable 

information that was material to Petitioner’s defense or relevant to the witnesses’ memories of the 

7 Habeas relief is typically granted under the Brecht analysis, where alleged constitutional errors 

“had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, certain 

claims, such as an alleged Brady violation, are subject to their own harmless error standards, 

rendering the Brecht analysis unnecessary. Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2008); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.

8 Because this Court finds that the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in concluding that 

the Prosecution’s delayed disclosure did not prejudice the outcome, it does not evaluate the first 

and second prong of the Brady violation test. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.

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incident. Pet. Exh. 1, at 15, n. 18. Moreover, as the State Appellate Court noted, there was no 

material dispute at trial as to the events that occurred before Petitioner disarmed the victim –

instead, the dispositive issue at trial was whether petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of 

others when he fired the gun at the victim (based on the reasonableness of Petitioner’s belief that 

the victim was reaching for a second gun as he ran away and after he fell to the ground). Pet. Exh. 

1, at 19-20.

Petitioner further asserts that Jorge states in his U-Visa application that the victim “was 

moving when he was shot” by Petitioner – and argues that this statement “established that 

petitioner shot [the Victim] in self-defense.” Pet. At 35. The State Appellate Court explained:

In Jorge’s U-Visa application, it was reported that Jorge saw a fight 

between a group of teenagers and “two couples . . . .” “One of the 

teenagers pulled out a handgun and one of the men in the second 

group began struggling with him to disarm him. The rest of the 

teenagers ran away, but the other man in the second group soon joined 

the struggle for the handgun. [¶] [Jorge] then heard a shot, he and his 

two co-workers ducked. When he raised his head again, he noticed 

that one of the men was now in possession of the handgun. A second 

shot was fired and [Jorge] saw the teenager trying to get up, but he 

was shot again.”

Pet. Exh. 1, at 20, n. 19. 

The State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that Jorge’s U-Visa application 

(and his statement that the Victim was trying to get up) does not provide support or otherwise 

corroborate Petitioner’s claim that he fired the gun at the Victim because he reasonably believed 

the Victim was reaching for a second gun in his waistband. Pet. Exh. 1, at 20; see also id. n.19

(“Contrary to defendant’s contention, Jorge’s reported narrative does not corroborate defendant’s 

testimony that the victim looked like he was reaching for a second gun, nor is the narrative 

otherwise ‘material’ as it does not ‘tend in reason to prove that [defendant’s] fear was reasonable’ 

at the time he fired the gun while the victim was prone on the ground.”) (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, in Petitioner’s case, the Prosecution’s late disclosure was made before trial 

ended, enabling the Trial Court to cure the error. Pet. Exh. 1, at 21–22. “Brady does not 

necessarily require that the prosecution turn over exculpatory material before trial. To escape the 

Brady sanction, disclosure ‘must be made at a time when disclosure would be of value to the 

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accused.’” United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. 

Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985). In Gordon, for example, the court found no 

Brady violation where visitor’s logs were not disclosed until close of the government’s case-inchief on the grounds that the prosecution did turn over the documents, allowing the defense to recall witnesses. Id. at 1402–03. The court found no due process violation because the defendants 

were able to use the documents and cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure. Id. In 

contrast, in Giglio and Cain, the prosecution’s misconduct was discovered after the jury verdict. 

See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150–51 (1972); Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 74–75 

(2012).

Here, the Prosecution disclosed the U-Visa applications during trial when they were still of 

value to Petitioner’s defense. Pet. Exh. 1, at 15–16. As the State Appellate Court highlighted, the

Trial Court admonished the jury as to the Prosecution’s delay in disclosure, made the three 

witnesses available for re-call by the defense, and provided a curative instruction at the end of 

trial. Pet. Exh. 1, at 21–22. The three witnesses returned to Court and the Trial Counsel recalled 

one witness (Rivas) to testify. Pet. Exh. 1, at 17. Petitioner acknowledges that there is no 

discussion on the record as to why Jorge and Eleazar were not recalled to testify. Pet. 30. Hence, 

any prejudice was cured during the proceedings. See Gordon, 844 F.2d at 1403. 

Accordingly, the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

the claim for a Brady violation.

2. Trial Court’s Refusal to Strike Evidence or Dismiss Charges (Claim 3)

Petitioner next asserts that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss charges 

or to strike the testimony of Rivas, Jorge, and Eleazar in its entirety based on prosecutorial 

misconduct under California Penal Code § 1054.5. Pet. 47–52. Section 1054.5 permits a 

California trial court to order various sanctions for discovery violations. See Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 1054.5. The State Appellate Court rejected Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, reasoning that 

the Trial Court ordered appropriate remedy. Pet. Exh. 1, at 21–22. This Court does not find that 

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the State Appellate Court’s decision regarding this claim was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

To start, federal habeas relief is generally unavailable for violations of or alleged error in 

the interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 

So, to the extent that Petitioner disagrees with the decision not to strike the witnesses’ testimony 

or dismiss the charges under § 1054, there is no basis for federal habeas relief.

Regardless, Cal. Pen. Code § 1054.5(c) states: “The court may prohibit the testimony of a 

witness pursuant to subdivision (b) 9only if all other sanctions have been exhausted.” Here, the 

State Appellate Court evaluated the record and found that other appropriate sanctions were utilized

– specifically, Petitioner received the pertinent portions of the U-Visa applications, the Trial Court 

offered a continuance, and the three witnesses were made available and Trial Counsel had the 

opportunity to recall them for further questioning. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 22.

Accordingly, the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

this claim.

3. Trial Court’s Admonishment and Curative Instruction (Claim 6)

Petitioner asserts that the Trial Court’s “admonishment and instruction failed to accurately 

convey the importance of the prosecutor’s misconduct.” Pet. 61. Specifically, Petitioner attacks 

the Trial Court’s failure to inform the jury that the Prosecution willfully failed to disclose evidence 

of the U-Visa applications and to explain why Jorge and Eleazar were not re-called to testify.

10

 

9 Cal. Pen. Code § 1054(b) states: “Before a party may seek court enforcement of any of the

disclosures required by this chapter, the party shall make an informal request of opposing counsel

for the desired materials and information. If within 15 days the opposing counsel fails to provide

the materials and information requested, the party may seek a court order. Upon a showing that a

party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon a showing that the moving party

complied with the informal discovery procedure provided in this subdivision, a court may make

any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited to,

immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or

the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the

court may advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure.”

10 Petitioner’s focus on the Prosecution’s alleged “intentional” conduct is misplaced. See Pet. 61. 

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Pet. 62. Petitioner also claims that CALJIC No. 2.28 is “problematic” because it “invites jurors to 

speculate” by instructing the jury “to evaluate the weight and significance of a discovery violation 

without any guidance on how to do so.” Pet. 62 (quoting People v. Bell, 118 Cal. App. 4th 249, 

257 (2004)). Petitioner argues that the instruction failed to “inform the jury that they could make 

adverse findings against the prosecution due to their suppression of material evidence.” Pet. 63. 

The State Appellate Court rejected this claim because the record indicates that both the 

Prosecution and Trial Counsel worked with the Trial Court to issue the admonition – and thus 

petitioner forfeited any claim the jury admonishment and the special jury instruction were 

incomplete. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 22–23; see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644–45 

(1974) (finding that a prosecutor’s remarks were not sufficiently prejudicial to violate due process, 

in part because the court took special pains to issue a curative instruction). Moreover, the State 

Appellate Court also found that, regardless of any alleged deficiencies in the jury instructions, 

there was no demonstration of prejudice. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 23. 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that 

the instruction by itself “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 78; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly, 

416 U.S. at 643 (“[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous 

or even universally condemned, but that it violated some [constitutional right].”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be 

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” See Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 72 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, the Court must evaluate jury 

instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury and as a component of the entire trial 

process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citation omitted); Prantil v. 

California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The relevant inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied 

the challenged instruction in a manner that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant 

The key issue on collateral review is whether the trial error violated the Constitution, not whether 

the Prosecution’s misconduct was willful or inadvertent. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.

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evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). That said, a determination that there is 

a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates 

the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 

141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the Court also must then determine that the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict before granting

habeas relief. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146–

47.

Petitioner asserts that the jury instruction was problematic because it failed to convey the 

extent to which the Prosecution’s disclosure was delayed and because it invited the jury to 

speculate about the significance of the violation. See Pet. 62–63. But, as previously discussed, the 

State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the testimony of the three workers was 

not outcome-determinative. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 23. Ultimately, the Prosecution’s delay in 

disclosure was revealed to the jury, and the Trial Court allowed Trial Counsel to re-call and 

impeach the three workers. Pet. Exh. 1, at 17. The jury knew that the workers approached the 

Prosecution about the U-Visa applications and that the applications provided an incentive to testify 

against Petitioner. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 17. 

Hence, based on the record, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in concluding 

that any error in the jury admonishment and the special jury instruction regarding the late 

disclosure of the U-Visa applications was harmless. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 23. This Court agrees 

with the State Appellate Court that Petitioner fails to demonstrate prejudice, given the context of 

the entire trial. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 78 (1991); Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; see also

Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146. 

Based on the foregoing, the State Appellate Court’s rejection of Claim 6 was not contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent or based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented at trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the instructional error claim.

C. Excluded Evidence (Claims 7 & 8)

Petitioner asserts two Trial Court errors with respect to the exclusion of evidence. First, 

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Petitioner argues that the Trial Court should have admitted evidence of the Victim’s prior juvenile 

arrest for battery against a police officer. Pet. 65. Second, Petitioner argues that the Trial Court 

erroneously excluded his own excited statements, which support his theory of self-defense. Pet. 

67. In both instances, Petitioner contends that the exclusion of such evidence prejudiced the 

verdict by depriving him of the opportunity to present a defense. See Pet. 66, 69.

Under the applicable federal law, “state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under 

the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). As such, habeas relief is available to a prisoner in state 

custody only where the custody violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In other words, “[a] federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a 

perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 67–78. Instead, a state court’s evidentiary ruling must violate federal law, either by infringing 

upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the 

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Brown v. Paramo, No. 17-cv-03948-JD, 2018 

WL 3632042, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2018); see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 

919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“On federal habeas we may only consider whether the petitioner’s conviction 

violated constitutional norms.”). Hence, the issue for federal courts collaterally reviewing state 

evidentiary rulings is not whether the ruling violated state evidentiary principles, “but whether the 

trial court committed an error which rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it 

violated federal due process.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (quoting Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 

1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

A defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense, which includes the 

right to present evidence such as witness testimony. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 

(1967). This right, however, is implicated only where the exclusion of the evidence (1) infringes 

upon “a weighty interest of the accused” and (2) is “arbitrary” or “disproportionate” to the purpose 

of the rule of evidence at issue. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324; see also Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308; Rock 

v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 (1987). The Supreme Court has occasionally held that the right to 

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present a complete defense was violated by excluding evidence under a state evidentiary rule, but 

such holdings are rare. Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013); see, e.g., Holmes, 547 U.S. 

at 331 (finding a violation where the rule itself did not rationally serve a legitimate end); Rock, 

483 U.S. at 62 (finding that a per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony was infringing); 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973) (concluding that “critical” hearsay 

evidence should not have been excluded where it “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” 

and the State refused to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness); Washington v. Texas, 

388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that the petitioner was denied due process where “the State 

arbitrarily denied him the right to put the witness on the stand, . . . whose testimony would have 

been relevant and material to the defense”). Furthermore, the alleged erroneous exclusion of 

evidence must result in actual prejudice, meaning a federal court has grave concerns that its 

exclusion “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–98 (2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 

436 (1995)). 

1. Prior Violent Acts (Claim 7)

Petitioner argues that the Trial Court’s exclusion of the Victim’s prior juvenile arrest for

battery against a police officer was erroneous and prejudicial. Pet. 65-66. The State Appellate 

Court rejected this claim on direct appeal: 

A. Relevant Facts

Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude the 

victim’s prior acts of violence, including evidence of the commission of a battery 

on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b)), for which he was arrested but there was no 

juvenile adjudication. Relying on People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 165-166 

(Tafoya), the prosecutor sought to exclude the evidence on the ground that although 

the victim committed an alleged act of violence and defendant might assert selfdefense, there was no indication defendant knew the victim prior to the altercation. 

The trial court granted the prosecution’s request to exclude the evidence after 

defense counsel submitted on the motion in limine without comment.

B. Analysis

Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court failed, as a 

matter of law, to discharge its statutory duty under Evidence Code section 352, to 

weigh the probative value of the excluded evidence against its potential prejudice. 

“[T]he trial court ‘ “need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value ... 

or even expressly state that [it] has done so....” ’ ” when it makes its rulings. 

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(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1187 (Riel).) In this case, the “record as a 

whole shows that the court was well aware of” the evidence that was sought to be 

excluded by the prosecution’s motion in limine and ruled on the matter. (People v. 

Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1053.) 

We also reject defendant’s argument that a reversal is required because the 

trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim’s commission 

of a battery on a peace officer. Defendant claims, for the first time on appeal, that 

the trial court erred in excluding the evidence based on Tafoya. He properly 

concedes, however, that his appellate claim is forfeited because he failed to object 

on the ground now asserted on appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 354 [exclusion of 

evidence]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162, fn. 6 (Williams); People 

v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 320, fn. 10 (Daniels).)

In all events, reaching defendant’s claim of error on the merits, we find no 

grounds for reversal. As a preliminary matter, the record contains no evidence of 

the circumstances giving rise to the victim’s arrest for battery on a peace officer. 

Consequently, we cannot determine the probative value of such evidence. 

Moreover, given the absence of any evidence that defendant was aware of the 

victim’s purported character or reputation for committing violent acts, we question 

the probative value of the excluded evidence to assist the jury in resolving the 

dispositive issue, namely, defendant’s claim that he reasonably believed the victim 

had a second gun. We recognize that “Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the 

due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and to his right to present all relevant 

evidence of significant probative value to his defense.” (People v. Reeder (1978) 

82 Cal.App.3d 543, 553.) However, “this does not mean the trial court 

constitutionally was compelled to permit defendant to introduce all possibly 

relevant evidence on [an issue] despite its marginal relevance, the possible effect 

upon the jury’s ability to remain focused on the issues before it (rather than 

becoming sidetracked on collateral questions) and the potentially significant 

amount of time entailed in admitting the evidence in a manner fair to both sides. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 665, see People v. Lawley

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 155 (Lawley) [“[t]he general rule remains that ‘ “the 

ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s 

[constitutional] right to present a defense” ’ ”].) On this record, we have no 

problem concluding that it is neither significantly likely nor reasonably probable 

defendant would have received more favorable verdicts if the jury had heard 

evidence that the victim had committed a battery on a peace officer. Even if we 

assume the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, the error would be harmless 

applying any standard of review. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Watson, 

supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836).

Pet. Exh. 1, at 28–30.

Here, to the extent Petitioner argues that the Trial Court erroneously applied state 

evidentiary laws, collateral review is unavailable. See Pet. 65–66; see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41; 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–78. With respect to the merits, the State Appellate Court applied the 

correct Supreme Court precedent in reaching its decision by evaluating whether the evidence was 

significant and resulted in an unfair result. Pet. Exh. 1, at 29; see also Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

While the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether a state evidentiary rule precluding 

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evidence can violate a defendant’s due process rights to present a defense, courts in this District 

and in the Ninth Circuit have found that petitioners bringing such a claim are not entitled to 

federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 756, 58–59 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 

no relief where expert testimony was excluded); Paramo, 2018 WL 3632042, at *7–9 (following 

Moses and finding that no clearly established law governing the petitioner’s challenge to the 

decision to exclude the evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts meant the defendant was not 

entitled to habeas relief); Mendez v. Biter, No. C 10-5555 PJH (PR), 2013 WL 843554, at *15 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (same).

In any event, the State Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply controlling precedent to 

the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The State Appellate Court concluded that the Trial Court’s 

decision was not arbitrary, but rather that the Trial Court weighed the probative value of the 

evidence and rejected it based on its potential prejudicial effect. Pet. Exh. 1, at 28. California’s 

evidentiary rules grant state courts discretion “to exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of 

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. The 

State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the Trial Court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding the evidence where it was based on an undeveloped record of the Victim’s 

juvenile battery arrest and had little weight on Petitioner’s ultimate interest of proving selfdefense. Pet. Exh. 1, at 29; see also Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. 

Furthermore, this Court agrees that the exclusion of such evidence did not result in actual 

prejudice. See Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Petitioner presents no 

evidence that he knew the Victim before the shooting or that he was aware of the Victim’s prior 

battery. Pet. 65–67; Pet. Exh. 1, at 29–30. For this reason, such evidence would not assist his 

claim that he acted in reasonable defense of self or others (i.e., that the Victim was reaching for a 

second gun). See Pet. Exh. 1, at 29. Hence, the State Appellate Court reasonably concluded that it 

was neither likely no reasonably probable that Portioner would have received more favorable 

verdicts if the jury heard evidence that the Victim committed a battery on a peace officer. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 29–30. 

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Accordingly, the State Appellate Court’s analysis was not an unreasonable application of 

federal precedent or determination of facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas relief on the claim for excluded evidence of the Victim’s prior acts.

2. Excited Statements (Claim 8)

Next, Petitioner argues that the Trial Court’s exclusion of his own excited statements in the 

car was erroneous and prejudicial. Pet. 67, 69. The State Appellate Court rejected this claim on 

direct appeal: 

A. Relevant Facts

During direct examination, Davis testified that immediately after she heard 

several gunshots, defendant returned to the car. Defendant was bleeding and said he 

had been shot. However, Davis did not remember any other conversation in the 

car. On cross-examination, defense counsel explored Davis’s recollection of her 

conversation with defendant in the car. Davis repeated her previous testimony that 

a couple of seconds after defendant got into the car he immediately said he had 

been shot and he appeared in pain and upset. Defense counsel then asked, “And 

when he got in the car, he immediately said things like, ‘They tried to kill us,’ 

correct?” Davis replied, “Reading the transcript, I remember seeing that.” [FN28]

Defense counsel next asked, “He said things like, ‘He almost shot you’; correct?” 

Before the witness could respond, the prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds, and 

the following colloquy between the court and counsel ensued:

“The Court: Sustained.

“[Defense Counsel]: Spontaneous statement, Your Honor. It’s narrating or 

describing events that have just occurred.

“The Court: Response?

“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I don’t think we know exactly how much time 

elapsed between the incident and these statements.

“The Court: Sustained.

“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, it also goes to state of mind. It’s 

probative.

“The Court: Sustained.”

Defense counsel then continued her questioning, asking Davis if defendant 

had made multiple statements when he got into the car. Davis replied, “Reading 

the statement, yeah.” In response to further questions, Davis testified that at no 

point did defendant say anything about having a gun, and while she did not 

remember, she was “getting maybe” that defendant’s main concern was he was 

shot.

FN28. During the prosecution’s direct examination of Davis, the witness 

testified she did not remember certain events. To refresh her memory, 

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Davis was asked to read to herself portions of the transcript of her testimony 

given at the preliminary hearing held a year after the shooting and a year 

before the trial. At the preliminary hearing, Davis testified that when 

defendant got into the car, “the only thing” she remembered was that 

defendant “kept saying ..., ‘I got shot. Take me to the hospital. I can’t 

believe this has happened. I got shot.’ ” When asked if she remembered 

telling the detectives that defendant said, ‘He tried to kill us,’ ” Davis 

replied, “Kind of. Kind of just a little.” As to these statements, Davis did 

not remember if defendant made the statements while he was in the car on 

the way to the hospital, but she did remember defendant saying “something 

of that nature.” 

B. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Davis’ 

testimony that when defendant entered his companions’ car after the incident he 

said, “[t]hey tried to kill us,” and “[h]e almost shot you (referring to Thompkins).” 

[FN29] He contends the testimony should have been admitted under the 

“spontaneous statement” exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1240.) 

[FN30] We conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error in 

the court’s ruling.

FN29. As noted, the prosecutor made no objection to defense counsel’s 

initial questions to Davis about defendant’s statements made in the car after 

the incident, including whether defendant said, “ ‘They tried to kill us.’ ” It 

was only in response to defense counsel’s question (“He said things like, 

‘He almost shot you,’ correct?”), that the prosecutor raised a hearsay 

objection and the court sustained it on the grounds that the statement was 

not admissible either as a spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay 

rule or as probative of defendant’s state of mind. However, for the purposes 

of our discussion, we assume that, based on the colloquy in the record in 

which reference is made to the fact that defense counsel was seeking to 

elicit “statements” or a narration or description of “events that had just 

occurred,” the jury could reasonably find that it was not to consider Davis’ 

testimony concerning defendant’s statements.

FN30. Defendant also argues Davis’ testimony concerning his statements 

“should have been admitted to explain his state of mind during the shooting 

(i.e. good-faith belief in need for self-defense and defense of others),” citing 

to People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1383 (Hughey). That case, 

however, concerns the admissibility of statements as spontaneous 

declarations under Evidence Code section 1240. (Hughey, supra, at p. 

1388.) Although there is a “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule 

(Evid. Code, §§ 1250, 1251, 1252), defendant makes no argument 

concerning that exception in his appellate briefs. In all events, it appears 

that Davis’ testimony concerning defendant’s statements would not have 

been admissible under the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule 

because the declarant has to be unavailable (before the statements can be 

admitted) and for purposes of that exception defendant is deemed an 

available witness. (Evid. Code, § 1251, subd. (a); see People v. Ervine

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 779, fn. 13.)

“In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial court has broad 

discretion.... A trial court’s ruling on admissibility implies whatever finding of fact 

is prerequisite thereto....” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196.) “We 

review the trial court’s conclusions regarding foundational facts for substantial 

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evidence. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s ultimate ruling for an abuse of 

discretion [citations], reversing only if ‘ “the trial court exercised its discretion in 

an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest 

miscarriage of justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 

132.)

“Evidence Code section 1240 provides that ‘[e]vidence of a statement is not 

made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement’ ‘[p]urports to narrate, 

describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant’ and 

‘[w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 

caused by such perception.’ ... [¶] ‘To be admissible, “(1) there must be some 

occurrence startling enough to produce ... nervous excitement and render the 

utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before 

there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement 

may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; 

and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding 

it.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 751-752 (Lynch), 

overruled in part on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 

636-643.) “Because the second admissibility requirement, i.e., that the statement 

was made before there was ‘ “time to contrive and misrepresent,” ’ ‘relates to the 

peculiar facts of the individual case more than the first or third does [citations], the 

discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this 

requirement is met.’ [Citations.]” (Lynch, supra, at p. 752.)

As noted, the trial court here found there was an insufficient foundation for 

the admission of defendant’s alleged statements as spontaneous declarations 

because there was no evidence regarding how soon after the shooting defendant 

made the statements sought to be admitted into evidence. Contrary to defendant’s 

contention, whether defendant had sufficient time to “contrive and misrepresent” 

was a relevant factor in evaluating the spontaneity of his statements. (Lynch, 

supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 752 [in evaluating mental state of declarant, the court should 

consider a number of factors including “length of time between the startling 

occurrence and the statement”].) Defendant’s argument that the court failed to 

consider other factors in rendering its decision is forfeited as he did not asked the 

court to consider those factors or object to the court’s ruling on the grounds he now 

asserts on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 354 [exclusion of evidence]; Williams, supra, 17 

Cal.4th at p. 162, fn. 6; Daniels, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 320, fn. 10.) In all 

events, we conclude there is no merit to his argument. While defendant was in 

pain, having been shot in the leg, the record does not show, as a matter of law, that 

his physical condition “was such as would inhibit deliberation.” (People v. Raley

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 894.) Despite being shot in the leg and bleeding, defendant, 

without any apparent difficulty, continued to struggle with the victim, disarmed the 

victim, and pursued the victim through the parking lot, firing several gunshots at 

the victim. After firing the last gunshot into the prone victim, defendant ran to his 

companions’ car, having the presence of mind to take the gun. Additionally, the 

evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, that defendant’s “ ‘reflective 

powers were still in abeyance’ ” at the time he made the self-serving statements in 

the car. (Id. at p. 893.) Rather, the evidence shows he had the presence of mind to 

make self-serving statements regarding the victim’s conduct, designed to avoid 

apprehension for the shooting and to prevent his friends from reporting the matter 

to the authorities. Thus, on this record, we could not find, as a matter of law, that 

the court’s exclusion of Davis’ testimony concerning defendant’s statements was 

an abuse of discretion.

Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced by the 

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defense and defense of others. By its verdict of voluntary manslaughter, the jury 

clearly discredited defendant’s testimony that he reasonably believed it was 

necessary to shoot the victim after defendant had disarmed him. We see nothing in 

the excluded evidence that would have lead the jury to believe that defendant acted 

reasonably when he shot at the victim after disarming him. Thus, even if the trial 

court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s statements, the error was harmless 

applying any standard of review. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Watson, 

supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836). [FN31]

FN31. Because we find no prejudicial error in the exclusion of evidence of 

defendant’s statements, we reject his contention, made on direct appeal and 

in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because she inadequately objected to the exclusion of the 

evidence and she failed to argue that the exclusion of the evidence would 

violate defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, to 

present a defense and to equal protection under Article I of the California 

Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 30–34.

Here, to the extent Petitioner argues that the Trial Court erroneously applied state 

evidentiary laws, collateral review is unavailable. See Pet. 68; see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41; 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–78. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that petitioners bringing claims

on collateral review for the exclusion of evidence are not entitled to federal habeas relief. See, 

e.g., Moses, 555 F.3d at 58–59; Paramo, 2018 WL 3632042, at *7–9; Mendez, 2013 WL 843554, 

at *15. 

Regardless, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the Trial Court 

did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 33–34. Petitioner is 

correct that the mental state of the declarant is essential (Pet. 68) but the Trial Court was not 

required to admit evidence where Petitioner lacked foundation to establish his mental state. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 33. The State Appellate Court affirmed Trial Court’s finding that there was insufficient 

foundations for the admission of Petitioner’s alleged statements as spontaneous declarations 

because there was no evidence in the record regarding how soon after the shooting Petitioner made 

those statements. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 33. The State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in 

finding that Petitioner failed to show that he had insufficient time to contrive the statements. See 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 33; see also Cal. Evid. Code § 1240. The decision was neither arbitrary or 

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disproportionate to § 1240. See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. And unlike Chambers, the record does 

not indicate that Petitioner’s hearsay statements “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness.” 

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302–03. 

Moreover, the State Appellate Court weighed the calculating decisions Petitioner made 

from the time of the fight to his arrest against the fact that event was sufficiently startling. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 33–34. California’s evidentiary rules grant trial courts broad discretion in determining 

the fact-intensive inquiry of whether sufficient time elapsed for a defendant to contrive and 

misrepresent his recollection of an event. See People v. Lynch, 50 Cal. 4th 693, 751–52 (2010), 

overruled on other grounds in People v. McKinnon, 52 Cal. 4th 610, 636-643 (2011); see also Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 32–33. The State Appellate Court did not unreasonably determine the facts and 

therefore was not unreasonable for finding that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. 

More importantly, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the 

exclusion of such evidence was not prejudicial. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 34. Petitioner is correct that 

his statements in the car could support Petitioner’s claim that he believed defense was required –

but, as the State Appellate Court explained, his statements do not support that his belief was 

reasonable. See Pet. 69. By its verdict of “voluntary manslaughter,” the jury clearly discredited 

Petitioner’s version of events (i.e., that he reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot the 

Victim after Petitioner had disarmed him). See Pet. Exh. 1, at 34. Thus, the State Appellate Court 

was not unreasonable in concluding that even if the Trial Court erred in excluding evidence of 

Petitioner’s statements, the error was harmless because nothing in the excluded evidence would 

have led the jury to believe that Petitioner acted reasonably when he shot the Victim after 

disarming him. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 34.

In sum, the State Appellate Court’s decision did not violate the standards of AEDPA. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the claim that the Trial Court 

erred in excluding evidence of Petitioner’s alleged excited statements in the car.

D. Doyle Error (Claim 9)

Because Petitioner invoked Miranda before officers could question him, Petitioner filed a 

motion in limine before trial, seeking an Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the 

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admissibility of any post-arrest statement made by Petitioner to Oakland Police Department 

homicide investigators. Pet. 70; RT Vol. 1 at 29, ECF 21-7. At a hearing on the motion, 

Prosecution argued that because Petitioner had invoked his Miranda rights, Prosecution did not 

intend to use Petitioner’s statement unless Petitioner takes the stand and contradicts the statements 

he made to the officers. Pet. Exh. 1, at 23-24; RT Vol. 1 at 29-30, ECF 21-7. Based on the 

Prosecution’s representation, the Trial Court tentatively deferred ruling on Petitioner’s request for 

an Evidence Code section 402 hearing until the proffer of Petitioner’s post-arrest statement. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 24; RT Vol. 1 at 30, ECF 21-7. The Trial Court advised both counsel to “admonish” 

their witnesses regarding the court’s in limine rulings. Pet. Exh. 1, at 24, RT Vol. 1 at 37, ECF 27-

1. 

While testifying, however, Sergeant Gantt mentioned Petitioner’s interview and 

Mirandization of Petitioner in response to questions from Trial Counsel. Pet. 70–71. Petitioner

asserts that Sergeant Gantt’s reference to the interview impermissibly suggested that he “did not 

cooperate with police and reserved his story for trial.” Pet. 72. He further contends that Sergeant 

Gantt’s testimony was not harmless. Pet. 72. The State Appellate Court rejected this claim on 

direct appeal: 

III. Admission of Sergeant Gantt’s Testimony in Purported Violation of 

Trial Court’s In Limine Ruling and Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 (Doyle)

[FN24]

FN24. In Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. 610, 619, the United States Supreme 

Court held that “the use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] 

silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, 

violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (See 

Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986) 474 U.S. 284, 292 [“[t]he point of the 

Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested 

person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach 

that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony”].)

A. Relevant Facts

Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking an Evidence Code 

section 402 hearing regarding the admissibility of any postarrest statement made by 

defendant to Oakland Police Department homicide investigators. At a hearing on 

the motion, the prosecutor argued that “because defendant [had] invoked” his 

Miranda rights, the prosecutor “[did] not plan on using any portion of that 

statement at this time unless the defendant takes the stand and somehow contradicts 

the small passages that he did tell to the officers.” In light of the prosecution’s 

offer, the court tentatively deferred ruling on defendant’s request for an Evidence 

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Code section 402 hearing until the proffer of defendant’s postarrest statement. The 

court advised both counsel to “admonish” their witnesses regarding the court’s in 

limine ruling.

During its case-in-chief, the prosecution questioned Oakland Police 

Sergeant James Gantt concerning his interviews with various percipient witnesses. 

Sergeant Gantt testified that he first questioned Davis about the incident. Davis 

admitted to the officer that she and defendant, Thompkins, and Broussard, had been 

at the taco food truck that night. A group of men arrived in the parking lot, and 

began to “mean mug” them by staring at them with menacing looks. Defendant 

engaged in a physical altercation with one of the men. When defendant grabbed the 

man in a bear hug, the man tried to pull out a gun, the men continued to struggle, 

and Davis heard a gunshot. She ran to the car and got into the front passenger seat, 

and then she heard more gunshots. Between five and ten seconds later, defendant 

and Thompkins got into the car. Davis and her friends ultimately went to a hospital 

in Tracy. They did not go to a nearby hospital because they were scared and did not 

“want it to come out about the little fight and altercation” they had at the taco food 

truck. Davis initially said the victim and one of his friends started shooting first. 

She later retracted her statement and said she did not see a gun or the shooting. 

When asked in a series of questions, who he next interviewed, Sergeant Gantt 

testified, “[d]efendant,” and, then, Thompkins, Broussard, and the victim’s friends.

Sergeant Gantt was not questioned about the substance of the statements made by 

defendant or the other percipient witnesses.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Sergeant Gantt about his 

interview with defendant in the following manner.

“[Defense Counsel]: Q. Sergeant Gantt, when you entered the interview 

room with Mr. Jones, did you get basic contact information from him: Name, 

address, phone number?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And other than that, you didn’t conduct anything further than that; 

correct?

“A. I read him his rights.

“[Prosecutor]: Object at this point, Your Honor. Relevance.”

“The Court: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time we are going to 

take our afternoon recess....”

Outside the presence of the jury, the court told defense counsel that her 

questioning of Sergeant Gantt might lead the witness to proffer responses, which 

would infringe on defendant’s right to remain silent in violation of the court’s in 

limine ruling and Doyle. Defense counsel replied that her questions were meant to 

eliminate any concern the jurors might have that evidence of the substance of 

defendant’s interview with Sergeant Gantt was being withheld from them. The 

court noted that defense counsel’s last question to Sergeant Gantt “called for a yes 

or no response,” and the witness volunteered more information than necessary. The 

court invited defense counsel to ask the court to give “some curative admonition” 

to the jury. When the trial resumed, defense counsel did not ask the court for the 

anticipated curative admonition. Nor did counsel further question Sergeant Gantt 

about his interview with defendant. At the conclusion of Sergeant Gantt’s 

testimony, he was released subject to recall, but neither the prosecution nor defense 

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counsel recalled him as a witness. During closing arguments, the prosecutor did not 

ask the jury to consider or draw any inferences from Sergeant Gantt’s testimony 

that he had interviewed defendant and read him his rights.

B. Analysis

Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because Sergeant Gantt’s 

testimony (he interviewed defendant and read him his rights) violated the trial 

court’s in limine ruling and Doyle. We disagree.

We initially conclude defendant’s challenge to Sergeant Gantt’s testimony 

that he interviewed defendant is forfeited as he failed to make either a timely 

objection or timely motion to strike the testimony in the trial court. “Evidence Code 

section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed because of erroneous 

admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it 

was ‘timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the 

objection.’ Pursuant to this statute, [it has been] ... ‘ “consistently held that the

‘defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on the ground asserted 

on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.” ‘ [Citation.]” (People v. Demetrulias

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 20.) In all events, we reject defendant’s argument that the 

prosecutor’s question to Sergeant Gantt as to who he interviewed, “ran afoul of the 

trial court’s [in limine] ruling by leading [the witness] to testify, ‘I interviewed the 

defendant.’ ” “Although a prosecutor engages in misconduct by intentionally 

eliciting inadmissible testimony,” the record here does not reflect the prosecutor 

intentionally solicited or anticipated that in response to his question as to who had 

been interviewed, Sergeant Gantt would respond that he interviewed defendant. 

(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 125; see People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 

Cal.4th 865, 964-965 (Pinholster) [FN25] [“there is no indication the prosecutor 

purposely elicited the [complained of] responses; rather she was pursuing 

legitimate lines of inquiry”].)

FN25. Pinholster was overruled in part on another ground in People v. 

Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.

We also reject defendant’s argument that a reversal is required based on 

Sergeant Gantt’s revelation that he read defendant his rights. Defendant’s objection 

at trial was premised on an argument that Sergeant Gantt’s answer was “somewhat 

nonresponsive” to the question posed by defense counsel. Defendant never asked 

the court to rule on his appellate claim that the testimony violated the court’s in 

limine ruling and Doyle. (People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [“questions 

relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the 

absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to 

be urged on appeal”].) More significantly, the trial court agreed that Sergeant 

Gantt’s answer to the question was “nonresponsive,” and invited defense counsel to 

request a curative admonition. Defense counsel never asked the court to strike the 

testimony and admonish the jury not to consider it. Consequently, defendant’s 

claim of error is not cognizable on appeal. (See People v. Jackson (2014) 58 

Cal.4th 724, 765 [court refused to review defendant’s contention that prosecutor 

committed misconduct in eliciting certain testimony as defendant refused to accept 

trial court’s offer to give proposed admonition that would have been more than 

sufficient to cure any possible harm].)

In all events, we see no merit to defendant’s argument that he was 

prejudiced by those portions of Sergeant Gantt’s testimony challenged on appeal. 

Sergeant Gantt did not testify that defendant had invoked his Miranda rights after 

the officer read him his rights. More importantly, during closing remarks the 

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prosecutor made no mention of Sergeant Gantt’s testimony or defendant’s 

postarrest silence, despite defendant’s argument to the contrary. The prosecutor 

asked the jury to consider that defendant “had two years to think about this, ladies 

and gentlemen. Two years to come up with this story. If he cooked up a tale way 

back when this happened, what is to stop him from cooking up a tale now?” When 

read in context, it is apparent the prosecutor’s quoted remarks were permissible 

references to defendant’s prearrest explanations of how he got shot, which he told 

to hospital staff and a Tracy police officer who first responded to the hospital 

where defendant was being treated for his through-and-through gunshot wound to 

his leg. (See People v. Champion (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448 [“[a]n 

assessment of whether the prosecutor made inappropriate use of defendant’s 

postarrest silence requires consideration of the context of the prosecutor’s ... 

argument”].) Thus, even if we assume the challenged portions of Sergeant Gantt’s 

testimony should not have been admitted, the error would be harmless applying any 

standard of review. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 

at p. 836.)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 23–27.

As a threshold matter, the State Appellate Court correctly identified and reasonably applied 

the Supreme Court precedent established under Doyle to assess this claim.11 See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Doyle holds that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a criminal defendant’s 

post-Miranda silence during an arrest to be used against him for impeachment purposes. Doyle, 

426 U.S. at 619. This holding “rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a 

suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an 

explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 628 (quoting Wainwright v. 

Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The standard for overturning a conviction based on the prejudicial impact of a trial error

under habeas review (i.e., collateral review, as opposed to direct review) is not the harmless-error 

analysis set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).12 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622–23; 

see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2007) (holding that “in § 2254 proceedings a court 

11 Respondent argues that Petitioner has forfeited the Doyle-error claim because Trial Counsel 

failed to object or request a curative admonition. See Resp. 41–43. The State Appellate Court 

found in favor of this argument on direct review. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 25–27. The State Appellate 

Court also concluded that Sergeant Gantt’s reference to the interview did not amount to 

prosecutorial misconduct because it did not appear that the Prosecution intentionally solicited or 

anticipated the remark. Pet. Exh. 1, at 26; see also Pet. 72. This Court need not address these 

arguments, however, as it decides the alleged Doyle-error claim on the merits.

12 The State Appellate Court properly applied the standard set forth in Chapman because it 

reviewed Petitioner’s Doyle claim on direct review. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 2, 27, 51; Brecht, 507 U.S. 

at 622–23, 30–31 (1993).

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must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court trial under the ‘substantial 

and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht”); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2008) (applying Brecht to a Doyle claim in a habeas petition). “Instead, the standard for 

determining whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the Doyle error ‘had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos 

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Under this less onerous standard, “habeas petitioners

may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief 

based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). The Supreme Court has 

explained that the Kotteakos standard is “better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral 

review,” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, because “[t]he role of federal habeas proceedings, while 

important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal 

courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.” Id. at 633 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 

463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, this Court agrees with the State Appellate Court that Sergeant Gantt’s testimony did 

not prejudice the outcome of trial. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. Sergeant Gantt mentioned interviewing 

and Mirandizing Petitioner, but he did not elaborate that Petitioner invoked his rights. Pet. Exh. 1, 

at 27. During closing remarks, the Prosecution highlighted that Petitioner had several years to 

craft a story for trial. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. As the State Appellate Court noted, however, such 

statements referred to Petitioner’s pre-arrest explanations to doctors and police about how he was 

shot. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. The Prosecution never further discussed Sergeant Gantt’s testimony or

Petitioner’s post-arrest silence. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. In other words, the Prosecution did not actually

use Petitioner’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 

763–65 (1987) (distinguishing use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence to impeach the defendant

from a question that only touched upon it and finding no Doyle error where a defendant’s postarrest silence “was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any 

permissible inference”). 

The State Appellate Court found that any impact Sergeant Gantt’s statements had on the 

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trial outcome was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. Under the less 

onerous Kotteakos standard, this is especially true. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776; see also 

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (explaining that “the Brecht standard “subsumes” the requirements that 

§ 2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas petitioner contests a state court’s determination that a 

constitutional error was harmless under Chapman”) (citing Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)). 

None of the statements the Petitioner complains of, considered in light of the entire trial 

proceedings, “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

See id. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that the alleged Doyle error actually prejudiced 

the jury verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Based on the foregoing, the State Appellate Court’s 

analysis was not an unreasonable application of federal precedent or determination of facts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the Doyle error claim.

E. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Statements (Claim 10)

Petitioner asserts that the Prosecution committed misconduct by highlighting in closing 

rebuttal arguments that Petitioner failed to call Thompkins as a defense witness. Pet. 73. 

Petitioner argues that these statements effectively reduced the Prosecution’s burden of proof by 

inappropriately implying that Petitioner was required to call Thompkins to prove his innocence. 

Pet. 74, 75. The State Appellate Court rejected this claim on direct appeal: 

A. Relevant Facts

The prosecution’s pretrial witness list included Davis, Thompkins, and 

Broussard, as witnesses for the People. Additionally, the prosecution filed several 

motions in limine in anticipation that those witnesses would testify if called as 

witnesses by the People. While the prosecution ultimately called Davis as a 

witness, Thompkins and Broussard were not called as witnesses. As part of his 

case, defendant did not call Thompkins or Broussard as witnesses.

During the trial held two years after the shooting, the jury heard testimony 

from Davis and defendant, who each described defendant’s personal relationships 

with Davis, Thompkins, and Broussard, at the time of the shooting and at the time 

of the trial. Defendant testified that at the time of the shooting, Davis was his 

girlfriend, they were in love and had been living together for 10 months; 

Thompkins was defendant’s best friend, having grown up together; and Broussard 

was Thompkins’ girlfriend, whom defendant had known for five to six years. Davis 

testified that by the time of the trial, she was no longer living with defendant and 

she no longer had feelings for him. She did not consider defendant a friend because 

she did not keep in touch with him. Since their break up defendant had made efforts 

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to keep in touch with Davis through phone calls and letters. Defendant testified he 

ended his relationship with Davis because Davis was attending school and the 

relationship “was putting a strain on her.” Defendant no longer considered Davis a 

friend, but he held no ill will towards her. Defendant also testified his friendships 

with Thompkins and Broussard had changed. Defendant no longer saw or spoke 

with Thompkins by telephone, and defendant no longer saw Broussard. When 

asked if he had an issue with Thompkins, defendant replied, “Yeah. I do. I just felt 

like, you know, he could have [come] and told the truth.”

In the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal remarks, covering 50 pages of the 

reporter’s transcript, he extensively addressed defendant’s claim of self-defense and 

defense of others. On appeal defendant challenges certain portions of the 

prosecutor’s closing remarks as follows (challenged portions are italicized):

[Prosecutor]: “The second reason to doubt the defendant’s credibility, he 

concealed evidence in this case, ladies and gentlemen. [¶] The defense is making a 

big deal on how a trial is the process of having the truth come out, the truth come to 

light. Well, the defendant himself did not want the truth to come to light. He was 

the one who had the pistol that was used in shooting Anderson. He was the one 

who had the opportunity to turn the pistol into the authorities, but he didn’t. He 

didn’t, ladies and gentlemen. And he didn’t ask anyone to do it on his behalf. And 

the reason why he didn’t, ladies and gentlemen, is because he knew that that pistol 

would link him to the scene. He knew that if he was linked to the scene ..., he 

would have to face what he had done there—the same reason why he didn’t call 9-

1-1; the same reason why he cooked up a tale with Davis. [¶] And, ladies and 

gentlemen, he admitted to you that he had lied in the past about this very subject. 

About this very subject. And not only did he lie once, but he tried to cover it up 

with his girlfriend. And that’s significant, because he is not trying to get—he is not 

trying to fool himself, he is trying to make sure that others who had information 

who were at the scene, who probably saw what went down or at least heard what 

the defendant said about what went down, he wanted to make sure everyone was 

quiet. That’s why Fred Tompkins, his best friend, is not here.

“[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

“The Court: Comments of counsel are not evidence.

“[Prosecutor]: If the defendant claims that he acted in self-defense and he 

told everyone he acted in self-defense in that car, and there were witnesses to 

testify to those observations, they would be here to testify.

“[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Burden shifting.

“The Court: The comments of counsel are not evidence. You are to rely 

upon the evidence that you have received during the course of the trial.

“[The Prosecutor]: Bottom line, ladies and gentlemen. Fred Thompkins is 

not here. Fred Thompkins is not here to testify. Fred Thompkins is no friend of the 

prosecution. Fred Thompkins is no friend of D’Mario Anderson. Fred Thompkins is 

the best friend of the defendant in this case.” [FN32]

FN32. After the jury returned its verdict, defendant filed a motion for a 

new trial. He complained that the prosecutor had “continually entreated the 

jury to shift the burden of production of evidence to the defendant. On three 

consecutive instances, [the prosecutor], asked the jury to attribute his failure 

to call Fred Thompkins as a witness to the defendant.” The prosecutor 

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opposed the motion, arguing that his closing remarks were permissible 

based on well-established case law. In denying defendant’s motion for a 

new trial, the trial court commented on the unavailability of Thompkins in 

the following manner: “[T]he Court recognizes the flow of a trial, the ability 

to secure witnesses, and then the arguments that can be reasonably made 

based upon the absence of evidence.” The court noted it had provided some 

additional remedies for the failure to call Thompkins as a witness to ensure 

that no hearsay statements attributed to Thompkins were inserted during the 

trial. The court’s latter comment was apparently referring to defendant’s 

pretrial supplemental motion in limine to exclude Hawkins’ testimony that 

he heard Thompkins say, “ ‘Pull the trigger,’ ” “not 30 seconds” before 

defendant shot the victim while he was prone on the ground. After an 

Evidence Code section 402 hearing, and over the prosecution’s objection, 

the court granted defendant’s supplemental motion in limine, in part, by 

ruling that Hawkins would be permitted to testify he heard Thompkins 

“make a statement towards the defendant and the defendant then shot,” but 

the content of Thompkins’ statement was excluded as hearsay.

B. Analysis

“ ‘ “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 

conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a 

criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only 

if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 

either the trial court or the jury.” [Citation.] When a claim of misconduct is based 

on the prosecutor’s comments before the jury, as all of defendant’s claims are, “ 

‘the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or 

applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” [Citation.] 

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make 

a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to 

disregard the improper argument. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Linton (2013) 

56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205 (Linton).)

Defendant argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial error by making 

remarks that defendant had the duty of producing Thompkins as a witness, and 

other remarks that were based on “facts not in evidence,” “contrary to the facts in 

evidence;” and “contrary to his knowledge of what was true.” However, in the trial 

court defendant did not object on the grounds he now asserts on appeal. He 

objected to the prosecutor’s remarks solely on the ground that the prosecutor 

entreated the jury to engage in “burden shifting.” Additionally, the trial court

addressed defendant’s objections, issuing admonitions to the jury that the 

prosecutor’s remarks were not evidence and the jury was to rely on the evidence 

received during trial. Given the court’s implicit sustaining of the objections, 

defense counsel was required to lodge a specific objection to preserve the claims of 

error defendant now asserts here. Because specific objections on the grounds now 

asserted on appeal “could easily have cured any harm, [defendant’s] current claims 

are not cognizable on appeal. [Citation.]” (Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 747; 

see People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 178 (Mayfield) [court is not required 

to address merits of prosecutorial error where defense “counsel did not object to the 

prosecutor’s remarks and it appears that an admonition would have cured any 

potential harm”].) [FN33]

FN33. Defendant argues, in his direct appeal and in his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately 

objecting to the challenged remarks, failing to request an admonition to 

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some of the challenged remarks, and for failing to lodge an objection to 

other challenged remarks. However, “competent counsel may often choose 

to forgo even a valid objection. ‘[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is 

best able to determine proper tactics in the light of the jury’s apparent 

reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to object is inherently a 

matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’ [Citation.]” 

(Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1197; see United States v. Eaglin (9th Cir. 

1977) 571 F.2d 1069, 1087[defense counsel’s failure to object could be 

explained on the ground that counsel “could have legitimately thought that 

an objection would have served only to draw further attention to the 

damaging statement while clearly not erasing its effect from the jurors’ 

minds”].) In all events, as we later explain in the text of this opinion, 

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as we find no 

prejudicial error in the prosecutor’s closing remarks. (See Strickland, supra, 

466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be 

resolved solely by “examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 

result of the alleged deficiencies”].)

In all events, we see no merit to defendant’s contention that the prosecutor’s 

challenged remarks require reversal. It is well settled that a prosecutor is entitled to 

comment on the state of the evidence and a defendant’s failure to call witnesses. 

(See People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 491 [prosecutor did not commit 

error when he argued that “defendant’s mitigating evidence was ‘not very reliable’ 

because the jury had not heard from the best witnesses on this point,” “[y]ou would 

think that one of his brothers would come in to talk about him if there was 

something good to say about [defendant];” and “[i]f there were witnesses out there 

who had good things to say about [defendant], who could provide evidence that 

you could consider on his behalf, they would have been here”]; People v. Bradford

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340 [“distinction clearly exists between the permissible 

comment that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an 

improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a 

duty or burden to prove his or her innocence”]; People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 

431, 435-436 [prosecutor’s remark on defendant’s failure to call codefendants to 

support his testimony was proper “[b]ecause defendant did not call the witnesses 

and the trial court did not determine that they could exercise their privilege against 

self-incrimination”]; People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 112 

[“[c]omments on the state of the evidence or defense’s failure to call logical 

witnesses, introduce material evidence, or rebut the People’s case are generally 

permissible”]; People v. Miller (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 171, 177 [prosecutor did not 

commit error when he argued defense could have subpoenaed witnesses, and 

defendant’s testimony, if true, would have been substantiated, as “district attorney 

may comment upon the failure of the defendant to produce witnesses who would 

substantiate his evidence”]; see also Rhoades v. Henry (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 

495, 511 [a “natural reading” of prosecutor’s statement, “ ‘If there was evidence 

out there that would disassociate this gun from [the defendant], we’d have heard it,’ 

” “is not that defendant didn’t testify, but that there was no meaningful challenge to 

the government’s evidence”].)

In this case, although the prosecutor’s challenged remarks came in his 

rebuttal, the jury was well aware that neither the prosecution nor the defense had 

called Thompkins as a witness, that at the time of the shooting defendant and 

Thompkins had been best friends but by the time of the trial defendant was no 

longer friends with Thompkins, and defendant had explained that his issue with 

Thompkins was that Thompkins had apparently refused to come to court and tell 

the truth. The prosecutor’s remarks that the jury had not heard evidence supporting 

defendant’s testimony that “he had told his friends he had acted in self-defense” 

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was fair comment on the evidence, following an evidentiary ruling, which we have 

upheld. (See Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 156.) Consequently, we conclude 

“there was no misconduct and, contrary to defendant’s claim, no miscarriage of 

justice” on this record. (Ibid.) People v. Varona (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 566, cited 

by defendant, is “inapposite” as that case “involved erroneous evidentiary rulings 

on which the prosecutor improperly capitalized during his closing argument.” 

(Lawley, supra, at p. 156; italics added.) Moreover, as we have noted, any potential 

for harm caused by the prosecutor’s challenged remarks was cured by the court’s 

admonition to the jury during the closing remarks. Later, in its closing instructions, 

the court again admonished the jury that counsel’s remarks were not evidence and 

“[n]either side is required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been 

present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have 

some knowledge of these events.” (CALJIC Nos. 1.02 (Statements of Counsel); 

2.11 (Production of All Available Evidence Not Required).) “We presume absent 

contrary indications that the jury was able to follow the court’s instructions.” 

(Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 919.) Despite defendant’s argument to the 

contrary, “[t]he court’s instructions, not the prosecution’s argument, are 

determinative, for ‘[w]e presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a 

statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by 

an advocate in an attempt to persuade.’ [Citation.] Given the instructions provided 

here, we discern no reasonable likelihood [citation] that the prosecutor’s 

[challenged remarks] would have misled the jury....” (Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 

p. 179.) [FN34] 

FN34. We decline defendant’s suggestion that we consider whether the 

prosecutor’s challenged remarks resulted in prejudicial error based on 

statements allegedly made by some of the jurors after rendering their 

verdict. In a footnote in his motion for a new trial, defendant informed the 

trial court that “[a]fter the verdict, discussions with jurors revealed that at 

least some jurors adopted the prosecution’s position that the burden to 

produce Fred Thompkins was defendant’s. Juror #5 specifically, stated that 

defendant’s failure to produce Fred Thompkins as a witness went to 

defendant’s ‘credibility.’ ” However, the jurors’ reported statements were 

not evidence the jury ever discussed defendant’s failure to call Thompkins 

as a witness. (Demirdjian v. Gipson (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 1060 [2016 

U.S. App. Lexis 14688, *35, 2016 WL 4205938] [statements by jurors to 

reporters (one juror thought jury should have heard from defendant, and 

another juror was persuaded to change her vote from not guilty to guilty 

because of defendant’s failure to testify), were not evidence the jurors ever 

discussed defendant’s silence].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 34–40.

To start, the State Appellate Court applied the correct Supreme Court precedent. See Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 37 (quoting People v. Linton, 56 Cal. 4th 1146, 1205 (2013)). “[T]he touchstone of due 

process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 

culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Hence, the relevant 

question in assessing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct is “whether the prosecutors’ 

comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986) (quoting Donnelly, 416 v. U.S. at

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643); see also Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 45 (2012) (per curiam) (explaining that Darden

represents the clearly established federal law governing a prosecutor’s alleged improper remarks 

during closing argument); cf. Linton, 56 Cal. 4th at 1205 (“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as 

to make the conviction a denial of due process.”). Where a defendant contends that a prosecutor’s 

remarks rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, the remark must be examined within the context 

of the entire trial. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766–67. 

For habeas petitions the standard of review for such claims is “the narrow one of due 

process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting 

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, it is insufficient to show 

“that the prosecutor’s remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden, 477 

U.S. at 181. Instead, “[o]n habeas review, constitutional errors of the ‘trial type,’ including 

prosecutorial misconduct, warrant relief only if they ‘had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38). 

Here, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that the Prosecution’s 

comments were permissible comments on the state of the evidence.

13

 Pet. Exh. 1, at 38. “A 

prosecutor may properly comment upon a defendant’s failure to present witnesses so long as it is 

not phrased as to call attention to the defendant’s own failure to testify.” United States v. 

Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982), implied 

overruling on other grounds recognized by U.S. v. Ibarra-Alcarez, 830 F.2d 968, 973 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1987); see also Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 511 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the prosecutor’s 

comment, “[i]f there was evidence out there . . . we’d have heard it,” naturally suggested the 

defense failed to challenge the state’s evidence meaningfully); United States v. Cabrera, 201 F.3d 

1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that “[a] prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s failure to 

13 The State Appellate Court also concluded that this argument was forfeited for Trial Counsel’s 

failure to raise proper objections. Pet. Exh. 1, at 37–38. Because the Court decides this issue on 

the merits, it does not address this issue. 

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call a witness does not shift the burden of proof, and is therefore permissible, so long as the 

prosecutor does not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on the 

defendant’s failure to testify”). Here, Petitioner did testify, undermining Petitioner’s claim that the 

Prosecution’s comments somehow reduced Petitioner’s burden of proof. See Pet. 74; Pet. Exh. 1, 

at 35; see also Cabrera, 201 F.3d at 1250. 

Regardless, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in determining that any error 

in the Prosecution’s comments did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. By the time the

Prosecution made the challenged remarks during rebuttal closing arguments, the jury knew about 

the nature of Thompkins’ and Petitioner’s relationship (that Thompkins and Petitioner were best 

friends, but by the time of trial Thompkins and Petitioner were no longer friends) and Petitioner 

explained that Thompkins had “apparently refused to come to court and tell the truth.” Pet. Exh. 

1, at 39. The jury was also well aware that Thompkins did not testify for Petitioner or the 

Prosecution. Pet. Exh. 1, at 39. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Prosecution’s comments “had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637–38. 

Also, given that Petitioner put Thompkins’ failure to appear at issue during his testimony, 

it was not unreasonable for the State Appellate Court to conclude that the Prosecution’s statements

constituted “a fair comment on the evidence.” Pet. Exh. 1, at 39–40; see also United States v. 

Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that comments highlighting a failure to present 

evidence did not shift the burden of proof but rather challenged the other side “to explain to the 

jury uncomfortable facts and inferences”).

Furthermore, the Trial Court issued several curative jury instructions. Pet. Exh. 1, at 40. 

The Supreme Court has found no due process violation where the trial court “cured any possible 

error by sustaining the defendants’ objections . . . and immediately admonishing the jury that the 

defense was not required to produce any witnesses or evidence.” United States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 

1009, 1016 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993). And courts “normally presume that a jury will follow an 

instruction . . . unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow 

the court’s instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect . . . would be devastating to the 

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defendant.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 

Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1344 (finding that the trial court’s instructions were sufficient to cure any 

impermissible shifting of the burden of proof that may have occurred). Hence, it cannot be said 

that the State Appellate Court was unreasonable in finding that “any potential for harm caused by 

the prosecutor’s challenged remarks was cured by the court’s admonition to the jury during the 

closing remarks . . . [and] in its closing instructions.” Pet. Exh. 1, at 40. Likewise, in light of the 

lack of prejudice, the curative instructions, and other evidence presented at trial, the State 

Appellate Court was not unreasonable in determining that the trial as a whole was not unfair. See 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 182–82 (finding that, while the “trial was not perfect—few are—but neither 

was it fundamentally unfair”). 

Based on the foregoing, the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim did not result in 

a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

precedent and nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas relief on his charge of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the closing rebuttal 

statements.

F. Ineffective Counsel (Claims 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, & 11)

Petitioner cites various instances of ineffective counsel that he argues warrant habeas 

relief, including (1) inadequately handling the Trial Court’s admonishment and jury instructions

provided to cure the Prosecution’s alleged Brady violation; (2) failing to produce material 

evidence of the three workers’ testimony; (3) inadequately objecting to the Trial Court’s exclusion 

of evidence; (4) inadequately objecting to the officer’s testimony about Mirandizing Petitioner; (5) 

failing to call Thompkins as a witness; (6) inadequately objecting to the Prosecution’s rebuttal 

statements during closing arguments; and (7) inadequately objecting to the alleged Trial Court 

errors during sentencing. Pet. 79–82.

The Sixth Amendment recognizes that a criminal defendant has the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). The 

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 

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undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 

having produced a just result. Id. at 686.

To prevail on an ineffective counsel claim, a petitioner must make two showings: (1) 

deficiency and (2) prejudice. Id. at 687. First, petitioner must show that counsel’s performance 

was deficient such that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing

professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, counsel’s deficient performance 

must have prejudiced the petitioner’s case, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 

694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

A “doubly” deferential judicial review is appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims under § 2254. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202 (2011); Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 105; Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122–23 (2011). The general rule of Strickland

affords counsel’s effectiveness great deference. 466 U.S. at 689. Hence, state courts have greater 

leeway in reasonably applying it, which “translates to a narrower range of decisions that are 

objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). When § 2254(d) applies, the 

question for the Court is not simply whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but rather 

“whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added).

In reviewing Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, the State 

Appellate Court correctly identified and reasonably applied the following federal legal principles

set forth in Strickland:

Defendant also seeks habeas relief on the ground that he was prejudiced by 

certain acts or omissions of his trial counsel. However, “[i]n order to establish a 

violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that 

counsel’s performance was inadequate when measured against the standard of a 

reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel’s performance prejudiced 

defendant’s case in such a manner that his representation ‘so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 

produced a just result.’ [Citation.] Moreover, [as we have noted], ‘a court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

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prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.’ 

[Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.’ [Citations.] If defendant fails to show that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s performance, we may reject his ineffective assistance claim 

without determining whether counsel’s performance was inadequate. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 40-41, disapproved in part on another 

ground in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)14

Pet. Exh. 1, at 49; see also Pet. Exh. 1, 22 n.22, 23 n.23, 27 n.26, 30 n.27, 34 n.31, 38 n.33, 48 

n.39; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Each of Petitioner’s claims for ineffective counsel is 

discussed in turn below.

1. Brady Violation

In Claim 6, Petitioner asserts that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

certain deficiencies in the Trial Court’s admonishment to the jury regarding the U-Visa 

applications and its use of CALJIC No. 2.28 as a jury instruction. Pet. 64. Specifically, Petitioner 

complains that the admonishment and instruction “did not direct the jury to ‘consider that 

concealment and delayed disclosure in determining the believability or weight to be given to the 

particular evidence.’” Pet. 64 (quoting CALJIC No. 2.28). According to Petitioner, Trial Counsel 

should have objected when the Trial Court did not instruct the jury as to the dates surrounding the 

parties’ knowledge of the witnesses’ request for U-Visas and should have further objected on 

constitutional grounds. Pet. 64–65. The State Appellate Court reviewed the evidence as follows: 

Because we find no prejudicial error in the jury admonition and special jury 

instruction, we reject defendant’s contention, made on direct appeal and in his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

adequately object to the jury admonition and special jury instruction, inviting the 

court to submit a deficient special jury instruction, and failing to object on the 

ground that the special jury instruction violated defendant’s constitutional rights to 

due process, a fair trial and equal protection under Article I of the California 

Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the prejudice suffered 

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”] ).

Pet. Exh. 1, at 23 n.23. 

The State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in its assessment of the Trial Court’s 

14 The State Appellate Court’s standard cites Sanchez, 12 Cal. 4th at 40–41, which relies almost 

entirely on Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 686, 94, 97 (1984). Pet. Exh. 1, at 49.

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curative admonishment and use of CALJIC No. 2.28. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Upon an 

extensive review of the facts surrounding the late disclosure of the U-Visa applications and its

impact on the jury’s decision, the State Appellate Court concluded that “[e]ven if the jury 

admonition and special jury instruction suffer from the deficiencies as outlined by [Petitioner], he 

has failed to demonstrate prejudice.” Pet. Exh. 1, at 23. 

This Court agrees. To start, the Trial Court’s curative instructions apprised the jury of the 

late disclosure and explained how the U-Visa applications affected the weight of the three 

workers’ testimony. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 18. Moreover, the three workers’ testimony offered little 

as to the ultimate issue at trial—whether Petitioner acted reasonably in shooting the Victim. See 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 21, 23. Accordingly, a “doubly” deferential judicial review establishes that the 

State Appellate Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim for ineffective counsel was likewise not 

unreasonable. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202. 

The State Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply the proper law to Trial Counsel’s

representation with respect to the U-Visa applications. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Material Witness Testimony

Petitioner next asserts that Trial Counsel failed to introduce material and exculpatory 

evidence regarding the three workers’ U-Visa applications. Pet. 52, 79–80. Specifically, 

Petitioner argues that “[r]easonably effective counsel would have recalled all three witnesses and 

examined them about the material evidence in the U-Visa applications, or sought a continuance 

and renewed the motion to dismiss if the witnesses were not available.” Pet. 56. The State 

Appellate Court reviewed the evidence as follows:

Defendant complains, on his direct appeal and in his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 

continuance, failing to question Rivas about the narrative of the incident reported in 

his U-Visa application, failing to renew the motion to strike the testimony of 

Eleazar and Jorge when those witnesses were unavailable to testify, and, assuming 

Eleazar and Jorge were available to testify, failing to recall them as witnesses 

because their testimony “would have been material, necessary and admissible,” and 

failing to introduce all material evidence contained in the U-Visa applications 

concerning “ the witnesses’ immigration status, PTSD, and recollection of the 

shooting.” However, defendant has failed to demonstrate that either a continuance, 

or the exculpatory or impeachment evidence that counsel could have revealed by 

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the admission of the redacted U-Visa applications and further questioning of the 

witnesses, “would have produced a more favorable result at trial.” (People v. Cox

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 662, disapproved in part on another ground in People v. 

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 (Doolin).) (See Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 (Strickland) [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

may be resolved solely by “examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 

result of the alleged deficiencies”].) 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 22 n.22. In other words, the State Appellate Court found, and this Court agrees (as 

discussed in detail above), that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice based on the delayed 

disclosure of the U-Visa applications. See Pet. Exh. 1 at 50. Here, under the “doubly” deferential 

judicial review, this Court finds that the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not

based on an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; Harrington, 562

U.S. 86, 105 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122–23 (2011). 

Petitioner alternatively argues that Trial Counsel could have questioned the three workers

about their legal status to impeach them. Pet. 54–55. But even if such information were relevant 

to the weight of their testimony, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in determining 

that it did not prejudice the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Trial Counsel briefly 

questioned Rivas about his immigration status at the outset, during which time Rivas confirmed 

that he sought a signed affidavit from the District Attorney’s office in exchange for cooperating as 

a witness for the prosecution. Pet. Exh. 1, at 14. Furthermore, after discussing the matter outside 

the presence of the jury, the Trial Court admonished the jury as to the U-Visa applications and the 

implications of their existence. Pet. Exh. 1, at 16–17. Then, Trial Counsel recalled Rivas and 

questioned him further about his immigration status and the importance of obtaining legal status to 

him and his family. Pet. Exh. 1, at 17. 

The same conclusion applies to Petitioner’s contention that evidence regarding the 

workers’ PTSD could have been used to question their memories of the event. Pet. 55. The State 

Appellate Court independently reviewed the sealed records concluded they contained no 

discoverable information that is material to Petitioner’s defense or relevant to the witnesses’ 

memories of the incident. Pet. Exh. 1, at 15, n. 18. And the Trial Court included as part of its 

admonishment to the jury that the witnesses’ psychological evaluations included in their U-Visa 

applications. Pet. Exh. 1, at 17.

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Finally, Petitioner claims that Jorge could have testified that he saw the Victim “trying to 

get up” after the first few shots were fired. Pet. 54; Pet. Exh. 16, at 250, ¶ 11. But, as the State 

Appellate Court explained, there was no prejudice because nothing in the record indicates that

Jorge could corroborate Petitioner’s testimony on the key issues at trial – namely, that the Victim 

appeared to be reaching for a gun or that Petitioner’s fear was reasonable when he fired the gun at 

the prone Victim. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 20 n.19. 

Accordingly, after conducting a “doubly” deferential judicial review, this Court finds that 

the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was neither an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence. See 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

his claim for ineffective counsel in handling the U-Visa applications.

3. Exclusion of Evidence

Petitioner first asserts that Trial Counsel should have objected to the Trial Court’s 

exclusion of evidence that the Victim previously committed battery against a police officer based 

on constitutional grounds. Pet. 67, 80. According to Petitioner, such specific acts of aggression 

should have been admissible to show that the Victim was the aggressor and that the homicide was 

therefore justified. Pet. 80. The State Appellate Court reviewed the evidence as follows: 

Because we find no prejudicial error in the exclusion of evidence of the 

victim’s prior act of violence, we reject defendant’s contention, made on direct 

appeal and in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because she failed to make an appropriate objection (by distinguishing 

Tafoya and citing to other cases in support of the admission of the evidence), or 

otherwise argue that the exclusion of the evidence would violate defendant’s 

constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, to present a defense and to equal 

protection under Article I of the California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 

466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved 

solely by “examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 

alleged deficiencies”].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 30 n.27. 

Here, as explained above, the State Appellate Court concluded on the merits that exclusion 

of the Victim’s battery on a police officer likely had no prejudicial effect on the jury verdict. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 29–30. This Court agrees. There was no evidence that Petitioner knew about the 

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Victim’s past aggressive act, meaning it did not bear on Petitioner’s decision to shoot the Victim. 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 29. Petitioner claims that he acted on both actual and reasonable belief of imminent 

danger because of the events surrounding the homicide, not because the Victim’s past conduct. 

See Pet. 21–24. The jury, therefore, likely would have decided no differently as to whether 

Petitioner’s actions were justified. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38.

Second, Petitioner claims that Trial Counsel should have objected on constitutional 

grounds to the exclusion of Petitioner’s excited statements in the car. Pet. 69, 80–81. The State 

Appellate Court reviewed the evidence in similar fashion to the first evidentiary claim: 

Because we find no prejudicial error in the exclusion of evidence of 

defendant’s statements, we reject his contention, made on direct appeal and in his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective because she 

inadequately objected to the exclusion of the evidence and she failed to argue that 

the exclusion of the evidence would violate defendant’s constitutional rights to due 

process, a fair trial, to present a defense and to equal protection under Article I of 

the California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].) 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 34 n.31.

First, as discussed above, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in affirming the 

Trial Court’s decision that there was insufficient foundation for the admission of Petitioner’s 

alleged statements as spontaneous declarations because (1) there was no evidence regarding how 

soon after the shooting defendant made the statements and (2) Petitioner’s actions after the fight 

demonstrated his presence of mind. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 33-34. Second, this Court agrees with the 

State Appellate Court that by its verdict of “voluntary manslaughter,” the jury clearly discredited 

Petitioner’s testimony that he reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot the victim after 

Petitioner had disarmed him. Pet. Exh. 1, at 34. Consequently, the State Appellate Court was not 

unreasonable in concluding that the jury likely still would have found voluntary manslaughter, 

meaning that neither excluding the evidence nor failing to object on constitutional grounds 

prejudiced the outcome. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 34; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637–38. 

This Court reviews these claims for ineffective counsel as to the excluded evidence with 

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double deference. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202. The State Appellate Court found no harm

resulting from both exclusions. Pet. Exh. 1, at 29–30, 34. Accordingly, Trial Counsel’s failure to 

object to both evidentiary exclusions based on constitutional grounds was not also not prejudicial. 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 30 n.27, 34 n.31. Thus, because State Appellate Court’s rejection of both claims

was not an unreasonable, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to them. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). 

4. Doyle Error

Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion in limine seeking an Evidence Code section 402 

hearing regarding the admissibility of any post-arrest statement made by Petitioner to Oakland 

Police Department homicide investigators. Pet. 70; RT Vol. 1 at 29, ECF 21-7. At a hearing on 

the motion, Prosecution argued that because Petitioner had invoked his Miranda rights, 

Prosecution did not intend to use Petitioner’s statement unless Petitioner takes the stand and 

contradicts the statements he made to the officers. Pet. Exh. 1, at 23-24; RT Vol. 1 at 29-30, ECF

21-7. Based on Prosecution’s representation, the Trial Court offer tentatively deferred ruling on

Petitioner’s request for an Evidence Code section 402 hearing until the proffer of Petitioner’s postarrest statement. Pet. Exh. 1, at 24; RT Vo. 1 at 30, ECF 21-7. The court advised both counsel to 

“admonish” their witnesses regarding the court’s in limine ruling. Pet. Exh. 1, at 24, RT Vol. 1 at 

37, ECF 21-7. 

At trial, Sergeant Gantt testified that he had interviewed Petitioner and read him his rights 

in response to Trial Counsel’s questions. See Pet. 70–71. Petitioner asserts that Trial Counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to Sergeant Gantt’s testimony on constitutional grounds and for 

failing to request that the jury be admonished to disregard Sergeant Gantt’s testimony. Pet. 72–73, 

81. The State Appellate Court properly found that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Sergeant 

Gantt’s testimony. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. The State Appellate Court reviewed the evidence with 

respect to the ineffective counsel claim as follows: 

Because we find no prejudicial error in the admission of those portions of 

Sergeant Gantt’s testimony challenged on appeal, we reject defendant’s contention, 

made on direct appeal and in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial 

counsel was ineffective because she failed to appropriately object to the 

introduction of any evidence or arguments concerning defendant’s interrogation, 

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the reading of his Miranda rights and his postarrest silence, or otherwise argue that 

Sergeant Gantt’s testimony violated defendant’s constitutional rights to due 

process, a fair trial, to remain silent and to equal protection under Article I of the 

California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 27 n.26. 

This Court agrees with the State Appellate Court that Petitioner was not prejudiced by 

Sergeant Gantt’s testimony. While Sergeant Gantt alluded to interviewing Petitioner and 

Mirandizing him, Sergeant Gantt never testified that Petitioner invoked his Miranda rights. Pet. 

Exh. 1, at 27. Furthermore, during closing remarks the Prosecution mentioned neither Sergeant 

Gantt’s testimony nor Petitioner’s post-arrest silence. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. Instead, the Prosecution 

mentioned only Petitioner’s pre-arrest statements explaining how he was shot. Pet. Exh. 1, at 27. 

Therefore, it is unlikely that Trial Counsel’s failure to object on constitutional grounds prejudiced 

the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1494

(9th Cir. 1995) (finding an ineffective counsel claim was unavailing because the alleged Doyle 

error upon which the claim was based was neither erroneous nor prejudicial); Melendez, 2013 WL 

1662355, at *13 (finding no prejudice on an alleged Doyle error where the prosecutor highlighted 

other legitimate evidence pointing to the petitioner’s guilt during closing remarks); Nguyen v. 

Felker, No. C 07-2479 MHP (pr), 2009 WL 1246693, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (finding no 

prejudice on an alleged Doyle error where there was no reasonable probability that a proper 

objection would have changed the outcome because the prosecutor focused on other evidence 

during closing remarks). 

A “doubly” deferential judicial review of this claim shows that the State Appellate Court’s 

rejection was not an unreasonable given the role of Sergeant Gantt’s testimony at trial. See 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on this 

ground.

5. Failure to Call a Defense Witness

In Claim 5, Petitioner asserts that “[t]rial counsel should have called Mr. Thompkins as a 

defense witness because he could have testified to facts establishing that petitioner acted in 

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defense of another and self-defense.” Pet. 59. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Thompkins 

could establish facts supporting that (1) the Victim, as the initial aggressor, brandished a firearm 

and shot Petitioner first, (2) the situation was exigent, and (3) Thompkins did not encourage the 

last shot. Pet. 59–60. The State Appellate Court reviewed the evidence as follows:

In support of his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective, defendant 

asks us to consider parts of the record on appeal and certain documents annexed to 

his petition that were not part of the record on appeal. He specifically argues . . . his 

trial counsel should have . . . called Thompkins as a defense witness.

Based on our review of the record as well as the additional documents 

submitted by defendant annexed to his petition for writ of habeas corpus, we find 

defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief on the ground of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he has not demonstrated there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s alleged unprofessional 

errors and/or omissions, the trial would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. 

(Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 352.) Except for the claim that counsel should 

have called Thompkins as a defense witness, we have addressed defendant’s claims 

on the direct appeal and concluded trial counsel’s acts or omissions did not 

prejudice defendant. Regarding trial counsel’s failure to call Thompkins as a 

defense witness, we accept, for the purpose of argument, that counsel had no 

“tactical reason” for not calling Thompkins as a defense witness. Nevertheless, in 

determining whether counsel’s failure was prejudicial, we evaluate the entire 

record, not the single error in isolation. The testimony of Thompkins would have 

been materially helpful if he corroborated defendant’s testimony that he fired a gun 

at the victim because he reasonably believed the victim was reaching for a second 

gun as he ran away or after he fell on the ground. However, we see nothing in the 

transcripts of Thompson’s [sic] interviews with the police and the public defender, 

and, defendant points to nothing, that would have assisted the jury in resolving this 

dispositive issue—whether defendant knew, or reasonably could have known, the 

victim had a second gun. Thus, defendant has not shown it is reasonably probable 

that, had his trial counsel called Thompkins as a defense witness, the verdicts 

would have been different. (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1175.) “[T]he benchmark 

for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 

relied on as having produced a just result.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686.) 

Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the verdicts and sentences in this case were not 

“rendered unreliable by a breakdown of the adversary process caused by 

deficiencies in counsel’s assistance.” (Id. at p. 700.)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 50–51.

This Court agrees with the State Appellate Court that Petitioner has not demonstrated there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for his Trial Counsel’s alleged errors, the trial would have 

resulted in a more favorable outcome. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 50. Even assuming Trial Counsel had 

no “tactical reason” for not calling Thompkins as a defense witness (as the State Appellate Court 

did), the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding that Trial Counsel’s failure to call 

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Thompkins was not prejudicial. This is because the State Appellate Court, correctly, considered 

the entire record and found nothing in the transcripts of Thompkins’ interviews with the police and 

the public defender that would have led to jury to conclude that Petitioner knew or reasonably 

could have known that the Victim had a second gun. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 50-51. In other words, 

while Thompkins’ testimony would have been materially helpful if he corroborated Petitioner’s 

account (that he shot the Victim because he reasonably believed the Victim was reaching for a 

second gun as he ran away or after he fell on the ground), there is no basis on the record to 

demonstrate that Thompkins would have provided such testimony. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 50-51. 

Accordingly, the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable 

application of precedent or an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at

202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on Trial Counsel’s 

failure to call Thompkins as a defense witness.

6. Closing Statements

Petitioner also argues that Trial Counsel ineffectively handled the Prosecution’s statements 

during closing rebuttal on constitutional grounds. Pet. 78, 81–82. The State Appellate Court 

reviewed the evidence as follows: 

Defendant argues, in his direct appeal and in his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately objecting to the 

challenged remarks, failing to request an admonition to some of the challenged 

remarks, and for failing to lodge an objection to other challenged remarks. 

However, “competent counsel may often choose to forgo even a valid objection. 

‘[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to determine proper tactics in 

the light of the jury’s apparent reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to 

object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’

[Citation.]” (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1197; see United States v. Eaglin (9th 

Cir. 1977) 571 F.2d 1069, 1087 [defense counsel’s failure to object could be 

explained on the ground that counsel “could have legitimately thought that an 

objection would have served only to draw further attention to the damaging 

statement while clearly not erasing its effect from the jurors’ minds”].) In all 

events, as we later explain in the text of this opinion, defendant’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel fails as we find no prejudicial error in the 

prosecutor’s closing remarks. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 38 n.33.

This Court cannot find that the State Appellate Court was unreasonable in assessing 

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Petitioner’s claims. Trial Counsel raised several objections during the Prosecution’s closing 

rebuttal marks, prompting the Trial Court to remind the jury that the Prosecution’s comments were 

not evidence. Pet. Exh. 1, at 36. Trial Counsel addressed the issue through objections and a 

motion for a new trial. Pet. Exh. 1, at 36 n.32. As the State Appellate Court noted, competent 

counsel may choose to forgo even a valid objection for tactical reasons. Pet. Exh. 1, at 38, n. 33 

(citing People v. Riel, 22 Cal. 4th 1153, 1197 (2000)); see also Mengarelli v. United States 

Marshal, 476 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Where counsel otherwise perform in a fully 

competent manner, a choice of trial tactics, even though deemed unwise in retrospect, can rarely 

be said to rise to the level of a deprivation of a constitutional right.”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 

(“Any [particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct] would interfere with the 

constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have 

in making tactical decisions.”). 

More importantly, as already explained, the State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in 

finding that the Prosecution’s challenged remarks did not warrant reversal. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 38; 

see also Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38; Mares, 940 F.2d at 461. The jury was already aware that 

Thompkins had not been called as a witness and the reasons why. Pet. Exh. 1, at 39–40. And the 

Trial Court’s admonitions to the jury—both during the Prosecution’s closing remarks and again in 

its closing instructions—cured any potential for harm. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 40. While one juror 

may have noticed Petitioner’s failure to produce Thompkins as witness, Petitioner presented no 

evidence that the jury discussed this failure during deliberations. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 40 n.34;

Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that statements to jurors by 

reporters about a defendant’s silence were not evidence that jurors discussed the issue and that 

jury instructions mitigated any prejudice). In any event, the Federal Rules of Evidence preclude 

inquiry into the jurors’ deliberations and mental processes. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see also 

Estrada, 512 F.3d at 1237–38. Consequently, Trial Counsel’s failure to object to such remarks on 

constitutional grounds was not prejudicial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Accordingly, after conducting a “doubly” deferential judicial review, this Court finds that 

the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was neither an unreasonable application of 

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Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence. See 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

based on this claim.

7. Sentencing

Petitioner asserts that Trial Counsel did not adequately object to the Trial Court’s 

sentencing decisions. Pet. 82. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Trial Counsel should have 

argued that consecutive sentences for the two charges were prohibited by Cal. Pen. Code § 654. 

Pet. 82. Additionally, Petitioner contends that Trial Counsel should have argued that the Trial 

Court did not consider Petitioner’s good behavior since his previous conviction, successful 

completion of probation, and the unusual circumstances under which his crimes were committed. 

Pet. 82. The State Appellate Court reviewed the evidence as follows: 

A. Relevant Facts

Before sentencing, the probation department filed a report with attached 

sentencing memoranda written by the prosecution and defense counsel. The 

probation department report indicated defendant, who was 34 years at the time of 

the current offenses, was not eligible for probation because he sustained a 1993 

juvenile adjudication based on the commission of an armed robbery at the age of 

16, for which he was sent to juvenile camp. The report also noted defendant had 

sustained the following additional juvenile adjudication and convictions: (1) 1994 

juvenile adjudication for possession of drugs (committed to CYA for one year); (2) 

1996 convictions, as an adult, for the felony offense of possession of cocaine for 

sale (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11351.5) and the misdemeanor offense of 

gaming (§ 330), for which he was granted probation, which was revoked and 

reinstated several times, and ultimately terminated in 1999; (3) 2000 conviction, as 

an adult, for the misdemeanor offense of attempt to evade a peace officer while 

driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); and (4) 2002 conviction, as an adult, for 

the felony offense of possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, former 

§ 11351.5), for which he was again granted probation, which was revoked in 2006, 

and ultimately terminated in 2008.

As to the current offenses, the probation department report listed several 

circumstances in aggravation: (1) “The crime involved great violence and acts 

disclosing a high degree of viciousness;” (2) “The defendant was armed with a 

firearm at the time of the commission of the crime;” and (3) “The defendant’s prior 

convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings 

are numerous or of increasing seriousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, [FN35] rule 

4.421(a)(1), (2), (b)(2)). The report also listed several circumstances in mitigation: 

(1) “The victim was an initiator of the incident;” (2) “The crime was committed 

because of an unusual circumstance, which is unlikely to recur;” and (3) “The 

defendant participated in the crime under circumstances of duress.” (Rule 

4.423(a)(2), (3), (4).) The probation department report also noted the following 

criteria affected concurrent or consecutive sentences: (1) “The crimes and their 

objectives were not predominantly independent of each other;” and (2) “The crimes 

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were not committed at different times or separate places, and were committed so 

closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.” (Rule 

4.425(a)(1), (3).) In the analysis portion of the report, the probation department 

officer stated that because there were mitigating and aggravating factors, the middle 

term for the voluntary manslaughter conviction appeared to be appropriate. The 

probation department officer also pointed out that concurrent sentences on the two 

substantive offenses would be appropriate because the offenses were committed 

close in time and place. The probation department report further noted defendant 

had provided a statement, expressing his remorse. [FN36]

FN35. All further unspecified references to rules are to the California Rules 

of Court.

FN36. In her sentencing letter to the probation department, defense counsel 

did not recommend specific sentences, but she asked that certain criteria and 

factors in mitigation be considered in forming any sentencing 

recommendations, including, in pertinent part, that defendant’s “prior 

record is insignificant given the factual background of the present offense, 

the lack of any adult convictions involving violence or guns, and the age of 

his two adult prior drug convictions (1996 and 2002),” he had performed 

satisfactorily in the past on probation, and he had no prior prison 

commitments. (Rule 4.423 (b)(1), (6).)

At sentencing, the court struck the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication 

for second-degree robbery for the purposes of sentence. The court then noted that it 

had read the probation department report, counsels’ sentencing memoranda, letters 

from various family members and friends, restitution reports, defendant’s letter 

expressing a great deal of remorse, a letter from defendant’s girlfriend, a victim 

impact statement from the victim’s mother, and viewed photographs of the victim 

during his life. The court tentatively ruled it would impose an aggregate term of 21 

years and 8 months, consisting of consecutive terms of 11 years (aggravated term) 

on the voluntary manslaughter conviction, 10 years (aggravated term) on the 

firearm-use sentence enhancement, and 8 months (one-third of the middle term) on 

the possession of a firearm by a felon conviction.

The court then considered in-court statements made by the victim’s mother, 

the victim’s uncle, and defendant, and counsel’s arguments addressing the tentative 

sentence. In pertinent part, defense counsel urged the court to reconsider its 

decision, arguing it failed to consider several mitigating factors concerning the 

unusual circumstances of the shooting. In response to the court’s query as to 

whether counsel was recommending a consecutive term be imposed on the 

conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, defense counsel argued, that 

“given the proximity of events,” the court should impose a concurrent term of onethird of the middle term on that conviction. Based on the court’s decision to strike 

defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication for the purposes of sentence, the prosecutor 

argued for an aggregate term of 16 years, but submitted the matter to the court’s 

discretion.

After taking “into strong consideration all arguments of counsel and all new 

evidence” received at sentencing, the court revised its tentative ruling and imposed 

an aggregate term of 15 years and 8 months, consisting of consecutive terms of 11 

years (aggravated term) on the voluntary manslaughter conviction, 4 years (middle 

term) on the firearm-use sentence enhancement, and 8 months (one-third of the 

middle term) on the possession of a firearm by a felon conviction. In so ruling, the 

court commented as follows: “This case was troubling for so many reasons. And it 

all appeared that if someone had just arrived at that driveway a little later or a little 

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sooner, maybe nothing would have happened—all of this over disrespect, over 

mean-mugging, over feeling that you have to protect other individuals, over 

intoxication, and then the bravado of having another friend who then all of a 

sudden is missing in action when it really counts, who persuades you to take one 

more step, if we are to believe the comment that was contained during the pretrial 

hearing in this matter. [¶] It is still my position, as it relates to count one [voluntary 

manslaughter], that the ... aggravated term, is appropriate for eleven years due to 

the gratuitous shot at the end; the level of intoxication; the consciousness of guilt 

by leaving the scene; contriving a story that didn’t support the facts or the 

circumstances; and [defendant]’s history that in some ways was mitigating for the 

purposes of striking a ... prior, which could have increased this penalty two-fold. 

[¶] Conversely, [defendant’s] version on the witness stand rang true when, 

subsequent to his leaving the incident, the gun was found beneath the victim. And 

[defendant] could not have contrived that story had he had not felt something when 

he placed the victim in a bear hug. That may have clearly contributed to some of 

his actions absent that last fatal shot, or that last gratuitous shot, depending upon 

the point of view of either advocate. [¶] The midterm clearly is warranted as it 

relates to the enhancement.”

B. Analysis

Defendant argues section 654 prohibited the trial court from imposing 

separate terms on the convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a 

firearm by a felon. [FN37] We disagree.

FN37. Although defense counsel did not address at the sentencing hearing 

section 654’s applicability, in her sentencing memorandum she 

appropriately asked the court to evaluate, first, whether section 654 was 

applicable, and then, to consider imposing a concurrent term, instead of a 

consecutive term, on the possession of a firearm by a felon conviction 

(count two). (Rule 4.424.) In all events, “[e]rrors in the applicability of 

section 654 are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the point was 

raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as error on appeal.” (People 

v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, fn. 3; People v. Scott (1994) 9 

Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17 (Scott) [accord].)

“Before determining whether to impose either concurrent or consecutive 

sentences on all counts on which the defendant was convicted, the court must 

determine whether the proscription of section 654 against multiple punishments for 

the same act or omission requires a stay of execution of the sentence imposed on 

some of the counts.” (Rule 4.424; see People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 

1227.) [FN38] “In the absence of any reference to Penal Code section 654 during 

sentencing, the fact that the court did not stay the sentence on any count is 

generally deemed to reflect an implicit determination that each crime had a separate 

objective.” (People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.) The trial court’s 

finding will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support 

it. (People v. Blake (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512.)

FN38. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that if section 654 

applied in this case the court should have imposed a concurrent sentence on 

the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. As noted in the text of 

the opinion, if section 654 applied, the sentence imposed on that conviction 

would be imposed and then its execution would be stayed.

“[S]ection 654 ‘literally applies only where [multiple] punishment arises out 

of multiple statutory violations produced by the “same act or omission.” ’ 

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[Citation.] But decisions interpreting section 654 have extended its protection ‘to 

cases in which there are several offenses committed during “a course of conduct 

deemed to be indivisible in time.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Hicks (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 784, 791.) “It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal 

proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) Pertinent to our 

discussion, “ ‘[w]hether a violation of [section 29800, subd. (a)(1) ], forbidding [a] 

person[ ] convicted of felonies from possessing firearms ..., constitutes a divisible 

transaction from the offense in which he employs the firearm depends upon the 

facts and evidence of each individual case.’ ” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 

8, 22; see, e.g., Ibid. [prosecution conceded applying section 654 where defendant 

assaulted police officer with officer’s weapon and retained weapon only until 

arrested after police chase immediately following assault]; People v. Venegas

(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [applying section 654 where “the evidence shows a 

possession [of the firearm] only at the time defendant shot [the victim]; People v. 

Killman (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 951, 959 [rejecting application of section 654 where 

defendant convicted of first degree robbery as accomplice to armed robber, and 

possession of firearm by felon for his own personal possession of gun before the 

robbery].)

As we have stated previously, not unlike the jury, the trial court here could 

reasonably find defendant’s possession of the firearm after the shooting “was 

indisputably an act separate in time from the [shooting] and thus justified separate 

convictions and separate punishments.” (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 

Cal.App.3d 1003, 1029; see People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1565, 

1566 [trial court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences for firearm 

possession by a felon and second-degree robbery committed with the same firearm; 

“implicit in the trial court’s concurrent sentencing order is the implied finding that 

defendant’s intent in possessing the firearm during the Arcadia robberies was 

different from that when he was stopped in El Monte and he contemplated the 

shootout with the arresting officers”]; cf. People v. Atencio (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 

1239, 1244 [“defendant’s theft of the pistol was merely the means by which he 

gained possession of the pistol;” “[u]nder these facts, without more, there was no 

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s double punishment of defendant for 

taking the pistol and subsequently possessing it” as a felon].) Accordingly, on this 

record, because substantial evidence supports the court’s implicit finding that 

section 654 did not apply, we must uphold its imposition of a term of imprisonment 

on the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.

Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

aggravating his sentence and imposing consecutive terms. He claims the factors 

cited in support of such choices were inapplicable, duplicative, and improperly 

weighed. However, as defendant correctly concedes, he has forfeited his claims of 

error because he failed to object on these grounds in the trial court. (Scott, supra, 9 

Cal.4th at p. 356 [“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises 

its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal”].) Nonetheless, as we now discuss, the claims of error are 

without merit, and, in all events, do not require remand for resentencing.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court’s failure to mention 

specific mitigating factors when issuing its sentences does not mean the court did 

not consider those factors. “While the trial court was obliged to consider the factors 

in aggravation as well as mitigation prior to sentencing [citation], it was not 

required to set out its reasons for rejecting mitigating factors. [Citations.]” (People 

v. Jones (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1181.) “Absent an explicit statement by the 

trial court to the contrary, it is presumed the court properly exercised its legal duty 

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to consider all possible mitigating and aggravating factors in determining the 

appropriate sentence. [Citation.]” (People v. Oberreuter (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 

884, 888.) The trial court here was also permitted to consider the fact that it had 

stricken defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication for the purposes of sentence. (See 

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500 [trial court may properly exercise its 

discretion to avoid imposing an unjust sentence by striking prior conviction 

allegations with respect to some, but not all counts, even if current offenses do not 

differ from one another]; see Rule 4.420(b) [“[i]n exercising his or her discretion in 

selecting one of the three authorized prison terms referred to in section 1170(b), the 

sentencing judge may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and any 

other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision”].)

We also see no merit to defendant’s contention that the trial court was 

prohibited by rule 4.425 from imposing a consecutive term on the conviction for 

possession of a firearm by a felon, having imposed a term of imprisonment on the 

firearm-use sentence enhancement. Rule 4.425(b) reads: “Any circumstances in 

aggravation or mitigation may be considered in deciding whether to impose 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, except: (1) A fact used to impose the 

upper term; (2) A fact used to otherwise enhance the defendant’s prison sentence; 

and (3) A fact that is an element of the crime may not be used to impose 

consecutive sentences.” Here, the trial court could reasonably impose a term of 

imprisonment on the firearm-use sentence enhancement based on defendant’s 

personal use of the firearm during the shooting and a consecutive sentence for 

defendant’s possession of a firearm by a felon based on his subsequent and 

continued possession of the firearm after the shooting, without the intent to 

relinquish or arrange for the firearm’s proper disposal or destruction. Even 

assuming the trial court committed error as argued by defendant, given the other 

aggravating factors mention by the court, we are confident that if we remanded the 

matter for resentencing, the court would impose the same consecutive term without 

relying on the purported use of the same aggravating factor. (See People v. Osband

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 732; Id. at pp. 728-729 [“[o]nly a single aggravating factor 

is required to impose the upper term ..., and the same is true of the choice to impose 

a consecutive sentence”].) [FN39]

FN39. Because we find no prejudicial error in the court’s sentencing 

decisions, we reject defendant’s arguments, made on his direct appeal and 

in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to (1) specifically mention at the sentencing hearing 

his “good behavior since his last conviction [and] successful completion of 

probation,” (2) object to the court’s purported dual use of sentencing 

factors, (3) argue that the court’s errors violated defendant’s rights to due 

process, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection 

under Article I of the California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (4) 

submit letters from defendant’s family members regarding his sentence. 

(See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel may be resolved solely by “examining the prejudice suffered by the 

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].)

Pet. Exh. 1, at 41–48.

Here, this Court finds no merit in Petitioner’s contentions that Trial Counsel provided 

ineffective assistance through her failure to object to the Trial Court’s sentencing. To start, the 

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Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal habeas relief is unavailable for alleged errors of 

state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011); accord Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68. 

Hence, to the extent that Petitioner disagrees with the State Appellate Court’s characterization of 

the evidence as it applies to § 654, there is no basis for federal habeas relief. 

Furthermore, Trial Counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient for failing to argue 

that § 654 does not permit consecutive charges in this context because § 654 makes no such 

prohibition. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that counsel’s 

performance was not deficient for failing to raise an objection that would have been properly 

overruled). Under § 654, “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different 

provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term 

of imprisonment.” Cal. Pen. Code § 654(a). As the State Appellate Court explained, the Trial 

Court could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s possession of the firearm after the shooting 

was a distinct act from the shooting itself, especially given that Petitioner kept the gun after the 

shooting and showed no intent to relinquish the gun or arrange for its proper disposal or 

destruction. Pet. Exh. 1, at 46–48. And even if an objection to consecutive sentences had been 

warranted, Trial Counsel did raise the issue. See Pet. Exh. 1, at 43. Not only did the Trial 

Counsel highlight the proximity of the events for each charge at the hearing, but her sentencing 

memorandum also asked the Trial Court to consider whether § 654 was applicable and to impose a 

concurrent term regardless. Pet. Exh. 1, at 43, 44 n.37. 

Finally, this Court disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that “[g]iven the trial court’s 

broad discretion, trial counsel’s failure to raise the 654 issue at sentencing is very likely to have 

prejudiced petitioner.” Trav. 26. Trial Counsel offered the mitigating evidence at issue; the Trial 

Court simply did not explicitly cite this evidence to support its reasons for the sentence. Pet. Exh. 

1, at 47. That said, the Trial Court was aware of mitigating circumstances such as the unusual 

circumstances under which the crime was committed. Pet. Exh. 1, at 42. Trial Counsel

highlighted this evidence and urged the Trial Court to reconsider its tentative sentence of 21 years 

and 8 months based on unusual circumstances. Pet. Exh. 1, at 42 n.36, 43. And in support of its 

sentencing decision, the Trial Court explained that finding the second gun on the Victim “may 

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have clearly contributed to some of [Petitioner’s] actions absent that last fatal shot . . . . The midterm is clearly is warranted as it relates to the enhancement.” Pet. Exh. 1, at 44. 

The State Appellate Court was not unreasonable in finding no prejudicial error during the 

sentencing or in finding no prejudice with respect to Trial Counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. 

See Pet. Exh. 1, at 48 n.39. Accordingly, after conducting a “doubly” deferential judicial review, 

this Court finds that the State Appellate Court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. See 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

his claims for ineffective counsel during sentencing.

8. Summary of Ineffective Counsel Claims

This Court disagrees with Petitioner that “[a] result more favorable to petitioner would 

have occurred at trial if counsel had fully objected to the errors and misconduct and sought 

appropriate jury instructions.” Pet. 83. For each ineffective counsel claim, the State Appellate 

Court found that Trial Counsel’s actions did not prejudice the outcome at trial. Pet. Exh. 1, at 50. 

In no instance did the State Appellate Court unreasonably apply Strickland or the facts on record 

when evaluating these claims. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, 

Petitioner’s request for habeas relief as to all claims for ineffective counsel is DENIED.

G. Cumulative Error (Claim 12)

Petitioner separately claims that even if the foregoing individual errors are not sufficiently 

prejudicial to warrant a new trial, the cumulative effect of those errors does. Pet. 83. The State 

Appellate Court rejected this claim: 

Lastly, we conclude defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing 

demonstrating that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s late disclosure of the 

U-Visa applications, and the individual claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel alleged in the petition, would warrant granting the petition. As we have 

recognized, “[u]nder the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually 

harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (Avena, 

supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 772, fn. 32.) Any purported errors, considered individually 

or collectively, were not so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial or reliable 

verdicts and sentences. 

Pet. Exh. 1, at 51.

“‘[P]rejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies.’” Harris v. 

Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 

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(9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979)). To succeed on a claim for 

cumulative error, the trial must have been “fundamentally unfair” because “the errors rendered the 

criminal defense ‘far less persuasive.’” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Furthermore, where no single constitutional error exists, the errors cannot accumulate to the level 

of a constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011); Mancuso v. 

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 

Chandler, 658 F. App’x. 841 (9th Cir. 2016); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999)

overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Filson, 908 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2018); Rupe v. Wood, 93 

F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

The State Appellate Court’s rejection of cumulative error here was not unreasonable. 

While Petitioner’s trial was not perfect, the State Appellate Court reasonably found that those

errors lacked prejudicial effect. Pet. Exh. 1, at 51. The resulting trial was not fundamentally 

unfair. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928. Petitioner has failed to show cumulative prejudice to warrant 

federal habeas relief. See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 524. Accordingly, the State Appellate Court’s

rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Thus, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief as to Claim 12 for cumulative error is DENIED.

V. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING & DISCOVERY

Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing and leave to engage in further discovery, primarily 

to develop his ineffective counsel claims. See generally Req. for an Evid. Hr’g or, in the 

Alternative, Disc. (“Request” or “Req.”), ECF 28. Specifically, Petitioner aims to determine 

whether Trial Counsel made a tactical decision (1) to limit use of U-Visa evidence (Claim 4), (2) 

not to call Fred Thompkins as a witness (Claim 5), and (3) not to object to the Prosecution’s 

rebuttal comments on constitutional grounds (Claim 10). Req. 4–6. For these claims, Petitioner 

seeks to depose Trial Counsel, a Strickland expert, the three workers, and Thompkins. Req. 4–5. 

For Claim 10, Petitioner also seeks to depose jurors to determine whether Petitioner was 

prejudiced by the Prosecution’s rebuttal comments. Req. 5–6. Finally, for Claim 11 Petitioner 

seeks to depose a Strickland expert to determine whether Defense Counsel should have requested 

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that the Trial Court apply § 654 at sentencing. Req. 6. Because Petitioner’s arguments as to 

Claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 are unavailing under AEDPA, his request for an evidentiary hearing is 

DENIED.

A. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner asserts that an evidentiary hearing is mandatory as to Claims 4, 5, 10, and 11, or 

alternatively that this Court should exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on those 

claims. Req. 3. AEDPA standards aim to prevent federal courts from re-trying state proceedings 

through habeas petitions. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 186. Under AEDPA, § 2254(d) governs the 

standards for granting relief, while § 2254(e) governs the standards for granting an evidentiary 

hearing. To obtain an evidentiary hearing and present evidence for the first time in federal court, a 

petitioner must first satisfy § 2254(d). See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 183; Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014). This is because the Supreme Court has held that federal habeas review 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits” and “that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing 

on” such review. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 182–83; see also Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that 

§ 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.).

Here, this case was already adjudicated on the merits in state court. As already explained, 

the State Appellate Court applied the correct governing Supreme Court precedent to all ineffective 

counsel claims and did not unreasonably apply precedent to the facts of this action. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d); Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182, 85. Specifically, for the reasons described above, the facts 

alleged to support these claims, even if established at an evidentiary hearing, would not entitle 

Petitioner to federal habeas relief because Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. And Petitioner 

has not identified any concrete and material factual conflict that would require the Court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing to resolve. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 

1166–67 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Additionally, as to whether the Prosecution’s rebuttal comments prejudiced the jury, the 

Federal Rules of Evidence preclude jurors’ testimony “about any statement made or incident that 

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occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s 

vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); 

see also Estrada, 512 F.3d at 1237–38. Petitioner does not present any valid reasons for deposing 

jurors. See Pet. 74–75, 77; Req. 5–6. Because Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing under 

§ 2254(d), Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing as to those claims is not warranted. See 

Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Cullen, 563 U.S. at 203 n.20).

Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is neither required nor warranted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e). Thus, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

B. Discovery

Alternatively, Petitioner requests leave to conduct discovery that he claims could produce 

new evidence sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Req. 6–7. He seeks to depose Trial 

Counsel, a Strickland expert, Fred Thompkins, jurors, and the three workers. Req. 7. Rule 6 of 

the Federal Rules Governing § 2254 does allow a habeas petitioner to open up discovery pursuant 

to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the Court grants leave to do so. But “[a] habeas 

petitioner . . . is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 

U.S. 899, 904 (1997). The Court may grant leave for discovery “in the exercise of [its] discretion 

and for good cause shown.” Id. (emphasis added). Good cause exists “where specific allegations 

before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be 

able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Id. at 908–09. As discussed above, Petitioner 

has failed to show good cause for new discovery because he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

See, e.g., Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing a district court’s refusal 

to grant discovery where the court based its decision on an incomplete state record and where 

petitioner sought to obtain new DNA evidence); see also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, 908–09 (finding

good cause where the petitioner offered new evidence that his trial attorney took bribes). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for discovery is also DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED.

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Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that “reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a Certificate 

of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of Respondent, 

and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2020

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:18-cv-05698-BLF Document 33 Filed 03/03/20 Page 74 of 74