Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02543/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02543-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) the Court dismissed Defendants

the State of Arizona, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Broderick, Harris, Adams,

Jane Doe #1, John Does #2-10, Jane Does #2-10, and Count IV (Doc. 13 at 12-13). The

Court dismissed Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County—along with Count III—on their

motions to dismiss (Doc. 25). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Wayne Farmer, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Director of Az. Adult Probation Dept., et

al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-2543-PHX-RCB (MEA)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Youhas’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution

(Doc. 30). The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 32, 37). The motion will be denied.

I. Background

In December 2009, Plaintiff John Wayne Farmer filed a pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Probation Officer Dana Youhas (Defendant) and John Doe

Officer #2381 (Doc. 10).1

 Plaintiff presented two claims for relief. In Count I, Plaintiff

alleged that Defendant violated his Fifth Amendment rights when she stated that Plaintiff’s

probation would be revoked if he refused to answer questions during a polygraph test (id. at

3-3A). Plaintiff asserted that the questions related to “sexually explicit materials which may

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 39 Filed 02/14/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court did not order service on John Doe Officer #2381. The Court informed

Plaintiff that he could amend his pleading if he discovered the identity of this Defendant

(Doc. 13 at 11).

- 2 -

include child pornography” and “[w]ith the risk of child p[or]nography[,] the questions

carried the risk of incrimination” because the “threat of probation being revoked if [he]

exercised his 5th Amendment [right] amounts to compulsion” (id.). 

In Count II, Plaintiff claimed that contrary to his surgeon’s instructions following knee

surgery, Defendant and John Doe Officer #2381 forced Plaintiff to walk, without his

necessary knee brace and crutches, approximately fifty feet to the unknown officer’s patrol

car (id. at 4-4C). Further, when Plaintiff arrived at the jail, the unknown officer informed

Plaintiff that no wheelchair was available and forced Plaintiff to walk another sixty feet into

the jail (id.). Plaintiff averred that his knee had swollen to the size of a large grapefruit by

the time he reached the intake area of the jail (id.).2

 

The Court ordered service on Defendant (Doc. 13), she filed her Answer in April 2010

(Doc. 18), and she served two discovery requests in October 2010 (Doc. 28). 

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to prosecute, arguing that Plaintiff failed to

appear for his deposition because he was in security lockdown or on suicide watch at the jail,

did not respond to her discovery requests, and has otherwise failed to prosecute this action

(Doc. 30). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to serve his own discovery requests,

disclose any information, or identify any witnesses warrants dismissal of this action (id.).

Plaintiff, in response, urges the Court to deny the motion (Doc. 32). Plaintiff disputes

that a security lockdown or his placement on suicide watch prevented him from appearing

for his deposition. Plaintiff asserts that he has never been on suicide watch and states that

he waited at the jail for his deposition at the appointed time but the deposition did not occur.

Further, Plaintiff acknowledges that he misread the dates for responding to Defendant’s

discovery requests but submitted the responses with his response to the motion. Finally,

Plaintiff argues that his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute simply because

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 39 Filed 02/14/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

he did not propound discovery requests on Defendant as he is not under an affirmative

obligation to pursue discovery.

In reply, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff “essentially conced[ed]” that he has failed

to prosecute his case (Doc. 37). She argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish “a prima

facie” case and that Plaintiff’s claims “are complex issues that must be evaluated on the

totality of the evidence, rather than a mere pleading made by Plaintiff” (id. at 3). 

III. Analysis

It is well established that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court

has authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s action because of his failure to prosecute or to comply

with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626,

629-30 (1962) (a district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure

to prosecute); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (1992) (holding that a district court

may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court); see also Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 99 th Cir. 1995) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with a local rule). 

Defendant argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff (1) failed to timely

respond to discovery requests, (2) did not propound his own discovery, (3) did not give his

deposition, and (4) his claims lack merit. The Court finds, however, that dismissal is not

appropriate in this case at this time. 

Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff’s failure to give his deposition was not

attributable to Plaintiff (Doc. 37 at 2 n. 1). As such, it is not a basis on which the Court could

grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss. As for Defendant’s second argument, Plaintiff

correctly points out that he is under no affirmative obligation to propound his own discovery.

It is plausible that Plaintiff intends to rely solely upon his own affidavit and personal

knowledge of the facts of this case in responding to a dispositive motion or during trial. Nor

does Defendant cite to any authority that would authorize the Court to dismiss this action

based on Plaintiff’s failure to take his own discovery. Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to

propound discovery does not necessarily mean that he did not prosecute his case. 

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 39 Filed 02/14/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

And, third, while it is true that Plaintiff failed to timely respond to discovery requests,

that alone does not establish a blanket “disregard for orders of the court” that would justify

a Rule 41(b) dismissal. Indeed, all of the cases Defendant cites relate to plaintiffs who have

repeatedly and willfully ignored Court instructions and have hindered the progression of their

cases. In contrast, here, Plaintiff’s only failure was to timely respond to two discovery

requests. But Defendant did not file a motion to compel Plaintiff to respond to her discovery

requests, she went straight to seeking dismissal. The Court is required to determine whether

“less drastic sanctions” than dismissal are available. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod.

Liability Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226-1228, 1234-1252 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant offers one

possible scenario in her reply: to extend the discovery, deposition, and dispositive motion

deadlines (Doc. 37 at 6). The Court agrees that this is the appropriate resolution at this time.

It appears that Defendant concedes that Plaintiff’s conduct does not support a Rule

41(b) dismissal because her reply shifts focus from Plaintiff’s perceived failure to prosecute

to the merits of his claims. But the substance of Plaintiff’s claims is irrelevant when

considering whether Plaintiff has failed to prosecute this case. In fact, public policy favors

disposition of cases on their merits, which is another reason to deny the motion to dismiss.

Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002).

In short, Plaintiff’s actions do not rise to the level warranting involuntary dismissal

of this action. The Court reminds Plaintiff, however, that he must fully comply with the

Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure along with all Court orders. Failure to so abide

may result in dismissal of this action. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th

Cir. 1992). Similarly, Defendant must also be diligent in defending this action. As stated,

Defendant never filed a motion to compel or sought Court assistance in taking Plaintiff’s

deposition, despite the knowledge that Plaintiff’s failure to give his deposition was not his

fault. And while the Court finds that a short extension of the discovery, deposition, and

dispositive motion deadlines is appropriate to facilitate resolution of this case, the Court is

unwilling to allow this case to languish. Any deadlines imposed will be firm and any request

for extension of time will not be viewed favorably. 

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 39 Filed 02/14/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 30).

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) is denied. 

(3) Defendant’s Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order (Doc. 38) will be addressed

by separate order.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 39 Filed 02/14/11 Page 5 of 5