Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-02334/USCOURTS-ca2-15-02334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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15‐2334‐cv(L), 15‐2465‐cv(XAP)   

Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton        

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit ________________

August Term, 2015

(Argued:  June 20, 2016      Decided: November 4, 2016)

Docket Nos. 15‐2334‐cv(L), 15‐2465‐cv(XAP)

________________                                   

FRIENDS OF THE EAST HAMPTON AIRPORT, INC., ANALAR CORPORATION,

ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT GROUP, INC., ELEVENTH STREET AVIATION LLC,

HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, INC., HELIFLITE SHARES, LLC, LIBERTY

HELICOPTERS, INC., SOUND AIRCRAFT SERVICES, INC., NATIONAL BUSINESS

AVIATION ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellees‐Cross‐Appellants,

—v.—  

TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON,

   

    Defendant‐Appellant‐Cross‐Appellee.

________________                                  

Before:

JACOBS, CALABRESI, RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

________________                        

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On cross appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.) granting in part and denying in part a  

motion for a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of three local laws

limiting access to the town’s airport operations, the defendant municipality

challenges the court’s determination that the enactment of one law, placing a

numerical limit on weekly flights, was an unreasonable exercise of the town’s

reserved proprietary authority under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, see 49

U.S.C. § 41713(b)(3).    Plaintiffs defend that decision, and challenge the partial

denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing that federal preemption precludes

enforcement of all three laws because they were enacted in violation of the

procedural requirements of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990, see 49

U.S.C. §§ 47521–47534.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

________________                                  

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN (W. Eric Pilsk, Kaplan, Kirsch & Rockwell,

LLP, Washington, D.C.; David M. Cooper, Quinn Emanuel

Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New York, on the brief),

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New

York, for Defendant‐Appellant‐Cross‐Appellee.

   

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LISA R. ZORNBERG (Helen A. Gredd, Jonathan D. Lamberti, on the

brief), Lankler Siffert & Wohl LLP, New York, New York, for

Plaintiffs‐Appellees‐Cross‐Appellants.

Lauren L. Haertlein, General Aviation Manufacturers Association,

Washington, D.C., Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiffs‐

Appellees‐Cross‐Appellants.

________________                                 

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

We here consider cross appeals from an order of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York (Joanna Seybert, Judge), granting in

part and denying in part a motion for a preliminary injunction to bar

enforcement of three local laws restricting operations at a public airport located

in and owned and operated by the Town of East Hampton, New York (the

“Town” and the “Airport”).  See Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of

E. Hampton, 152 F. Supp. 3d 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).    Plaintiffs, who sought the

injunction, represent various aviation businesses that use the Airport and

representative entities.  The district court enjoined the enforcement of only one of

the challenged laws—imposing a weekly flight limit—concluding that it reflected

a likely unreasonable exercise of the Town’s reserved proprietary authority,

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which is excepted from federal preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of

1978 (“ADA”), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(3).  

The Town challenges the district court’s rejection of this proprietor

exception with respect to the weekly flight‐limit law.    Plaintiffs defend the

district court’s decision as to that law, and, on cross appeal, argue that

enforcement of all three challenged laws should have been enjoined.  Specifically,

plaintiffs contend that none of the challenged laws falls within the ADA’s

proprietor exception to federal preemption because the Town failed to comply

with the procedural requirements of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990

(“ANCA”), see 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521–47534, in enacting them.  The Town counters

that plaintiffs cannot invoke equity jurisdiction to enforce ANCA’s procedural

requirements, and that compliance with these procedures is not required because

the Town is willing to forgo future federal funding for its airport.

We identify merit in plaintiffs’ ANCA argument and resolve these cross

appeals on that basis without needing to address the Town’s proprietor

exception challenge.    Specifically, we conclude that plaintiffs (1) can invoke

equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the challenged laws; and (2) are

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likely to succeed on their preemption claim because it appears undisputed that

the Town enacted all three laws without complying with ANCA’s procedural

requirements, which apply to public airport operators regardless of their federal

funding status.

We affirm the district court’s order insofar as it enjoins enforcement of the

weekly flight‐limit law, but we vacate the order insofar as it declines to enjoin

enforcement of the other two challenged laws.  In so ruling, we express no view

as to the wisdom of the local laws at issue.  We conclude only that federal law

mandates that such laws be enacted according to specified procedures, without

which they cannot claim the proprietor exception to federal preemption.  

Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for the entry of a

preliminary injunction as to all three laws and for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

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I. Background1

A.   The East Hampton Airport   

The Town of East Hampton, located approximately 100 miles east of New

York City, is a popular summer vacation destination on the south shore of Long

Island.  Its year‐round population of approximately 21,500 more than quadruples

to approximately 94,000 in the months of May through September (the

“Season”).   This results in increased traffic, including air traffic, and attendant

noise.

The Town owns and operates East Hampton Airport (the “Airport”),

which is a public use, general aviation facility servicing domestic and

international flights.    The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has

designated the Airport as a “regional” facility “significant” to the national

aviation system.    J.A. 117.    Although the Airport provides no scheduled

commercial service, it serves a range of private and chartered helicopters and

fixed‐wing aircraft.  In 2014, the Airport supported 25,714 operations, i.e., take‐

                                              

1 Because discovery has not yet taken place, the stated background derives from

plaintiffs’ amended complaint and from the declarations submitted by the parties

in litigating plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion.

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offs or landings, by such aircraft.    On the busiest day of that calendar year,

Friday, July 25, 2014, the Airport supported 353 operations between 3:04 a.m. and

11:08 p.m.

B. The Town’s Efforts To Control Airport Noise

For more than a decade before the enactment of the laws at issue in this

action, Town residents had expressed concern about Airport noise.  Counsel for

the Town, however, repeatedly advised the Town that federal law placed

significant limitations on its ability to restrict Airport access to reduce noise.

1. Federal Limitations on Local Noise Regulation

a. The Town’s Receipt of AIP Grants

The Town was advised that its obligation to comply with federal law

derived, in part, from its receipt of federal funding under the Airport and

Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (the “AAIA”), Pub. L. No. 97‐248, 96 Stat. 671

(recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 47101 et seq.).    The AAIA established the Airport

Improvement Program (the “AIP”), which extends grants to airports that, in

return, provide statutorily mandated assurances to remain publicly accessible

and to abide by federal aviation law and policy.    See 49 U.S.C. §§ 47107(a)(1),

47108(a).

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The Town’s most recent AIP grant, received on September 25, 2001, was

for $1.4 million to rehabilitate the Airport’s terminal apron.    In the grant

agreement, the Town certified that for a period of twenty years—i.e., through

September 25, 2021—it would comply with certain specified assurances.    See

Pacific Coast Flyers, Inc. v. County of San Diego, FAA Dkt. No. 16‐04‐08, 2005 WL

1900515, at *11 (July 25, 2005) (“Upon acceptance of an AIP grant, the grant

assurances become a binding contractual obligation between the airport sponsor

and the Federal government.”).  These included assurances to make the Airport

available “for public use on reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination

to all types, kinds and classes of aeronautical activities,” J.A. 61 (Grant Assurance

22(a)), and to “comply with all applicable Federal laws, regulations, executive

orders, policies, guidelines, and requirements as they relate to the application,

acceptance and use of Federal funds . . . including but not limited to . . . Title 49

U.S.C., subtitle VII,” id. at 53 (Grant Assurance 1(a)).  

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b. ANCA’s Procedural Requirements for Local Laws

Limiting Access to Public Airports

Subtitle VII (referenced in Grant Assurance 1(a), at Part B, Chapter 475,

Subchapter II) encompasses the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990

(“ANCA”), Pub. L. No. 101‐508, 104 Stat. 1388 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521–

47534).    This statute, which is at the core of plaintiffs’ preemption claim,

(1) directs the Department of Transportation (which has delegated its authority

to the FAA) to establish “a national aviation noise policy,” 49 U.S.C. § 47523(a),

including “a national program for reviewing airport noise and access restrictions

on operations of Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft,” id. § 47524(a); and (2) outlines the

requirements of that program.    Acting under the authority delegated by the

Department of Transportation, the FAA promulgated a national aviation noise

policy through 14 C.F.R. Part 161, the “notice, review, and approval

requirements,” which “apply to all airports imposing noise or access restrictions.”  

14 C.F.R. § 161.3(a), (c) (emphasis added).

ANCA’s requirements vary based on the type of aircraft at issue.  “Aircraft

are classified roughly according to the amount of noise they produce, from Stage

1 for the noisiest to Stage 3 for those that are relatively quieter.”  City of Naples

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Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2005).2   In ANCA, Congress

states that airport operators may impose noise or access restrictions on Stage 2

aircraft “only” upon 180 days’ notice and an opportunity for comment.  49 U.S.C.

§ 47524(b).3  Local restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft “may become effective only if”

                                              

2 In 2005, the FAA promulgated an additional Stage 4 classification for aircraft

that operate beneath the noise thresholds specified for Stage 3 and that are,

therefore, protected by the same requirements.    See Stage 4 Aircraft Noise

Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 38742, 38743 (July 5, 2005).   In 2012, Congress enacted

section 506 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112‐

95, 126 Stat. 11, 105 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 47534(a)), which provided for Stage 2

aircraft operations to be phased out by December 31, 2015.

3  The relevant provision states that an airport restriction on Stage 2 aircraft may

take effect

only if the airport operator publishes the proposed restriction and

prepares and makes available for public comment at least 180 days

before the effective date of the proposed restriction—

(1) an analysis of the anticipated or actual costs and

benefits of the existing or proposed restriction;

(2) a description of alternative restrictions;

(3) a description of the alternative measures considered

that do not involve aircraft restrictions; and

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they have either been “agreed to by the airport proprietor and all aircraft

operators” or “submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Transportation

after an airport or aircraft operator’s request for approval.”  Id. § 47524(c)(1).   

c. Federal Preemption of Local Police Power To Regulate

Airport Noise

The Town was further advised that, even after expiration of the twenty‐

year AAIA compliance period—indeed, even if it had never accepted any AIP

grants—the Airport would not be “free to operate as it wishes” because the

federal statutory limitations applied regardless of whether an airport is subject to

grant assurances.   J.A. 239–240; see also id. at 273 (stating that “Town does not

now have ‘local control’ and seeking FAA grants does not fundamentally change

that legal reality,” and that “[o]nly way to achieve local control is to close

airport”).

                                                                                                                                                  

(4) a comparison of the costs and benefits of the

alternative measures to the costs and benefits of the

proposed restriction.

49 U.S.C. § 47524(b).  

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Such limitations were first acknowledged by the Supreme Court more than

40 years ago in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).  

Referencing the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, the Court there

concluded that “the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of

aircraft noise”—manifested by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85‐

726, 72 Stat. 731, as amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92‐

574, 86 Stat. 1234, and FAA regulations promulgated thereunder—had

completely preempted the states’ traditional police power to regulate noise in

that area.   Id. at 633; see id. at 638 (reasoning that “pervasive control vested in

[federal agencies] under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local

curfews or other local controls”).

d. The ADA Codifies a Proprietor Exception to

Preemption

In City of Burbank, the Supreme Court specifically did not consider whether

the same preemption that applied to local police power also applied to local

proprietary authority.    See id. at 635 n.14 (observing that “authority that a

municipality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police

power”).    Since City of Burbank, federal courts, including our own, have

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concluded that municipalities retain some proprietary authority to control noise

at local airports, although that role is “extremely limited.”  British Airways Bd. v.

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (“Concorde II”), 564 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir. 1977).  We

reasoned that, because an airport proprietor “controls the location of the facility,

acquires the property and air easements and [can] assure compatible land use,” it

might be liable to other property owners for noise damage and, thus, has a right

“to limit [its] liability by restricting the use of [its] airport.”  British Airways Bd. v.

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (“Concorde I”), 558 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Griggs

v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962)).  That right, however, is narrow, vesting the

proprietor “only with the power to promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary and

non‐discriminatory regulations that establish acceptable noise levels for the

airport and its immediate environs.”  Id. at 84.  Moreover, such regulations must

be “consistent with federal policy; other, noncomplementary exercises of local

prerogative are forbidden.”  Id. at 84–85.

Congress codified the so‐called “proprietor exception” in the Airline

Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), Pub. L. No. 95‐504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)).    At the same time that the ADA expressly preempts all

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state and local laws or regulations “related to a price, route, or service of an air

carrier,” id. § 41713(b)(1), it clarifies that such preemption does not limit “a State,

political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States that owns

or operates an airport served by [federally certified air carriers] from carrying out

its proprietary powers and rights,” id. § 41713(b)(3).

2. Litigation Challenging the Town’s AIP Grants

In 2003, an unincorporated association of Town residents living near the

Airport sued the FAA and Department of Transportation—but not the Town—in

the Eastern District of New York, challenging the legality of post‐1994 AIP grants

to the Town on the ground that, in the absence of a “current layout plan,” such

grants violated the AAIA, specifically 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(16).    The litigation

concluded in an April 29, 2005 Settlement Agreement, wherein the FAA

stipulated that it would not enforce Grant Assurance 22(a)—which provides for

nondiscriminatory access to the Airport on reasonable terms—past December 31,

2014, unless the Town received additional AIP funding thereafter.    The

Settlement Agreement also provided, however, that with three exceptions not

relevant here, all other grant assurances, including Grant Assurance 1(a),

requiring compliance with federal law, “shall be enforced in full.”  J.A. 43.

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3. The FAA’s Response to the 2011 Bishop Inquiry

On December 14, 2011, then–United States Representative Timothy Bishop,

whose district included the Town, submitted questions to the FAA concerning

the effect of the Settlement Agreement on the Town’s ability to adopt noise and

access restrictions at the Airport.

In an unsigned response, the FAA represented that after December 31,

2014, it would not “initiate or commence an administrative grant enforcement

proceeding in response to a complaint from aircraft operators . . . or seek specific

performance of Grant Assurance[] 22a” unless and until the award of a new AIP

grant to the Town.  Id. at 391.  The FAA further stated that its agreement not to

enforce meant that, unless the Town wished to remain eligible for future federal

grants, it was “not required to comply with the requirements under . . . (ANCA),

as implemented by title 14 CFR, part 161, in proposing new airport noise and

access restrictions.”    Id.    Counsel for the Town received a copy of this

communication from the FAA on February 29, 2012, remarking to an FAA

attorney that news reports construing the FAA’s response as relieving the Town

from ANCA compliance “certainly c[ame] as a surprise.”  Id. at 389.  

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4. The Town’s Enactment of the Challenged Legislation

By 2014, the Town had concluded that its decade‐long attempt to develop

voluntary noise‐abatement procedures for aircraft operators had failed, and that

Airport noise was becoming increasingly disruptive.4    Relying on the FAA’s

response to the Bishop inquiry, the Town decided to take official action.

In the late summer of 2014, the Town began to hold public meetings and

to collect and analyze data with a view toward adopting regulations to address

Airport noise.  At an October 30 Town meeting, a joint citizen‐consultant team

presented the results of a “Phase I” study on Airport operations, which indicated

that (1) helicopter noise generated the majority of complaints; (2) compliance

with voluntary procedures—at 15.3%—was low; and (3) complaints peaked

during the summer, on weekends, and in response to nighttime operations.  A

Phase II study by a private firm confirmed these conclusions and prompted a

Phase III analysis of possible regulatory solutions.   The results of the Phase III

analysis, reported on February 4, 2015, indicated that three restrictions would

                                              

4 In 2014, the Town received a record number of complaints about Airport

operations.    Town analysis indicated that between 2013 and 2014, helicopter

operations at the Airport—considered particularly disruptive—rose by 47% from

5,728 to 8,396.

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address the cause of more than 60% of noise complaints while affecting less than

23% of Airport operations:  (1) a mandatory curfew on all aircraft traffic, (2) an

“extended” curfew for certain “noisy” aircraft, and (3) a weekly one‐round‐trip

limit on noisy aircraft.    Following a period of public comment, as well as

communications with various industry constituencies, FAA officials, and

members of New York’s congressional delegation, the Town, on April 16, 2015,

codified the three recommended restrictions on the Stage 2, 3, and 4 aircraft

operations that are at issue in this case (the “Local Laws”).    See Town of East

Hampton, N.Y., Code (“Town Code”) §§ 75‐38, 75‐39 (2015).

The Local Laws establish: (1) a curfew prohibiting all such aircraft from

using the Airport between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. (the “Mandatory Curfew”);

(2) an extended curfew on “Noisy Aircraft” starting at 8:00 p.m. and continuing

through 9:00 a.m. (the “Extended Curfew”);5 and (3) a two‐operations‐per‐week

                                              

5 The Town Code defines “Noisy Aircraft” as “any airplane or rotorcraft for

which there is a published Effective Perceived Noise in Decibels (EPNdB)

approach (AP) level of 91.0 or greater.”    Town Code § 75‐38(A)(4)(a).    The

General Aviation Manufacturers Association, as amicus curiae, explains that this

definition is inconsistent with federal noise standards insofar as both Stage 3 and

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(i.e., one round trip) limit on Noisy Aircrafts’ use of the Airport during the

Season (the “One‐Trip Limit”).  See id. § 75‐38(B)–(C).  The Local Laws address

violations through escalating fines, enforcement costs, injunctive relief, and bans

on Airport use.  See id. § 75‐39(B)–(E).   

The Town does not dispute that, in enacting the Local Laws, it did not

comply with ANCA’s procedural requirements.  Specifically, although the laws

restrict Stage 2 aircrafts’ Airport access, the Town did not conduct the requisite

analysis set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 47524(b)(1)–(4),6 much less make such analysis

available for public comment at least 180 days before the laws took effect.  Nor

did the Town seek aircraft operator or FAA approval for laws restricting Stage 3

and Stage 4 aircrafts’ Airport access, as required by 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1).

C. District Court Proceedings

On April 21, 2015, five days after the Local Laws were enacted, plaintiffs

filed this declaratory and injunctive‐relief action to prohibit enforcement of §§ 75‐

                                                                                                                                                  

Stage 4 aircraft, which satisfy the most demanding federal noise requirements,

nevertheless constitute “Noisy Aircraft” under the Local Laws.

6 See supra Part I.B.1.b note 3.   

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38 and 75‐39 of the Town Code.7  In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege

that the Local Laws (1) violate the ADA, AAIA, ANCA, and these statutes’

implementing regulations, and, thus, are preempted under the Supremacy

Clause; and (2) constitute an unlawful restraint on interstate commerce in

violation of the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

On April 29, 2015, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order,

relying exclusively on the preemption prong of their claim.  They argued that the

Local Laws violate (1) ANCA, see 49 U.S.C. § 47524, insofar as the Town failed to

comply with that statute’s procedural requirements for the adoption of local

noise and access restrictions affecting Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft; (2) the AAIA,

see id. § 47107, insofar as the Local Laws fail to comply with three of the Town’s

                                              

7 On April 27, 2015, plaintiffs moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 to consolidate

this action with another one that some of them had filed against the FAA in

January 2015, seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the FAA is statutorily

obligated to ensure Town compliance with grant assurances until September 25,

2021; and (2) the FAA’s 2012 response to Rep. Bishop erroneously interpreted a

settlement agreement to imply that the Town had no legal obligation to comply

with certain grant assurances, or ANCA itself, after 2014.    See Compl. at 25,

Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. FAA, No. 2:15‐CV‐441 (JS) (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

29, 2015), ECF No. 1.  The district court reserved judgment on the motion, which

plaintiffs subsequently withdrew, and the action has been stayed pending this

appeal.

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2001 grant assurances; and (3) the ADA, see id. § 41713(b), because they are

unreasonable.   

The district court conducted a hearing on May 18, 2015, after which, with

the parties’ consent, it decided to treat the motion as a request for a preliminary

injunction.  The Town agreed to delay enforcement of the challenged laws until

the court ruled on the motion.8

On June 26, 2015, the district court preliminarily enjoined the Town’s

enforcement of its One‐Trip Limit law, but declined to enjoin enforcement of the

                                              

8 The FAA also appeared at the hearing, seeking further time to consider whether

to take a position on the merits of the case.    At that time, FAA counsel

maintained that the Town’s characterization of the agency’s response to Rep.

Bishop as a “legal interpretation” was “disingenuous.”    J.A. 470.    Counsel

maintained that the FAA was only responding to a hypothetical and not waiving

its right to enforce its own regulations. See id. at 470–71 (referencing

contemporaneous email from FAA staff stating that news reports of its response

to Rep. Bishop indicated that the response “is likely being misunderstood”).  

Insofar as the Town also cited a February 27, 2015 meeting with FAA

representatives to support its arguments, FAA counsel stated that the agency had

specifically advised the Town that it would be a “listening‐only” meeting, at

which the FAA would not give advice or render a legal opinion.  Id. at 480.

We give these statements no weight because the FAA did not thereafter file any

papers with or appear again in the district court, nor has it participated in any

way in these cross appeals.

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Mandatory and Extended Curfew laws.   In so ruling, the court observed, first,

that neither the AAIA nor ANCA created a private right of action, and plaintiffs

could not rely on the Supremacy Clause as an independent source of such an

action.9  Nevertheless, the district court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to

invoke equity jurisdiction to enjoin the challenged laws to the extent the exercise

of that jurisdiction was not explicitly or implicitly prohibited by Congress.  The

court located congressional intent to foreclose equitable enforcement of the

AAIA in that statute’s comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme.  But

“nothing in the text or structure” of ANCA supported a similar conclusion as to

that statute.  Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 152 F.

Supp. 3d at 105.  Accordingly, the district court ruled that plaintiffs could invoke

its inherent equity jurisdiction to bring a preemption claim based on ANCA, but

not on the AAIA.   

                                              

9  Plaintiffs do not challenge these conclusions on appeal and, thus, we have no

reason to address them.   

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Second, the district court found that, absent a preliminary injunction, the

Local Laws would cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm.10

Third, the district court concluded that plaintiffs’ preemption claim was

likely to succeed on the merits with respect to the One‐Trip Limit law, but not

the Mandatory and Extended Curfew laws.    In reaching that conclusion, the

district court reasoned that ANCA did not necessarily preempt local laws

enacted in violation of its procedures because the statute’s enforcement provision

mandated only the loss of eligibility for further federal funding and for

imposition of certain charges.11    Thus, an ANCA violation did not defeat the

                                              

10 The Town does not challenge this finding on appeal and, thus, we have no

reason to review it.

11 On this point, the district court stated as follows:

[U]nder Section 47526 of ANCA, entitled, “Limitations for

noncomplying airport noise and access restrictions,” the only

consequences for failing to comply with ANCA’s review program

are that the “airport may not—(1) receive money under [the AAIA];

or (2) impose a passenger facility charge under [49 U.S.C. § 40117].”  

49 U.S.C. § 47524.    This provision raises an obvious question.    If

Congress intended to preempt all airport proprietors from enacting

noise regulations without first complying with ANCA, why would it

also include an enforcement provision mandating the loss of

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ADA’s “proprietor exception” to preemption, and a municipal proprietor’s

restrictions on airport access remained permissible to the extent they were

“reasonable, non‐arbitrary and non‐discriminatory.”  Id. at 109.12  On the record

presented, the district court determined that the Mandatory and Extended

Curfew laws satisfied that standard, but that the One‐Trip Limit law did not

because it had a “drastic” effect on plaintiffs’ businesses, and there was “no

indication that a less restrictive measure would not also satisfactorily alleviate

the Airport’s noise problem.”  Id. at 111–12.   

The parties timely filed these interlocutory cross appeals, which we have

jurisdiction to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

                                                                                                                                                  

eligibility for federal funding and the ability to impose passenger

facility charges?  The logical answer is that Congress intended to use

grant and passenger facility charge restrictions to encourage, but not

require, compliance with ANCA.

Id. at 108–09 (brackets in original).  

12 The district court offered “no opinion on whether the FAA has authority to

enjoin the Local Laws on the basis that the Airport is still federally obligated and

therefore would need to comply with ANCA’s procedural requirements.”  Id. at

109 n.10 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 47533 (stating that ANCA does not affect Secretary of

Transportation’s authority to seek and obtain appropriate legal remedies,

“including injunctive relief”)).

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II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

When, as here, a preliminary injunction “will affect government action

taken in the public interest pursuant to a statute or regulatory scheme,” the

moving party must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm absent injunctive relief,

(2) a likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) public interest weighing in favor

of granting the injunction.  Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d 138, 143 (2d

Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Although we review

a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of

discretion, see Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011), we

must assess de novo whether the court “proceeded on the basis of an erroneous

view of the applicable law,” Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir.

2012); see Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2006)

(reviewing Federal Aviation Act preemption de novo); U.S. D.I.D. Corp. v.

Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 775 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing

jurisdiction de novo).

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B. The Town’s Challenge to Equity Jurisdiction

The Town contends that the district court erred in concluding that

plaintiffs could invoke equity jurisdiction to enjoin the challenged laws as

preempted by ANCA.  On de novo review, we identify no error.

1. The Doctrine of Ex parte Young Supports Equity Jurisdiction in

this Case

The Supreme Court has “long recognized” that where “individual[s]

claim[] federal law immunizes [them] from state regulation, the court may issue

an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.”  Armstrong v.

Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).  The principle is most often

associated with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–63 (1908), which held that the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from enjoining state officials

from taking official action claimed to violate federal law.    Since then, the

Supreme Court has consistently recognized federal jurisdiction over declaratory‐ 

and injunctive‐relief actions to prohibit the enforcement of state or municipal

orders alleged to violate federal law.    See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645–46 (2002) (authorizing suit by

telecommunications carriers asserting federal preemption of state regulatory

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26

order); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (enjoining

state statute barring certain foreign transactions in face of federal statute

imposing conflicting sanctions); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411

U.S. at 638–40 (upholding injunction barring municipal aircraft curfews as

subject to federal preemption).  Our own court has followed suit.  See, e.g., Air

Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2008) (granting

airline trade organization declaratory and injunctive relief against preempted

state regulatory statute); United States v. State of New York, 708 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir.

1983) (relying on “equitable power” recognized in Ex parte Young to uphold

preliminary injunction against nighttime ban on airport use).

In such circumstances, a plaintiff does not ask equity to create a remedy

not authorized by the underlying law.    Rather, it generally invokes equity

preemptively to assert a defense that would be available to it in a state or local

enforcement action.   See, e.g., Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563

U.S. 247, 262 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (invoking Ex parte Young involves

“nothing more than the pre‐emptive assertion in equity of a defense that would

otherwise have been available in the State’s enforcement proceedings at law”);

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27

Fleet Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 888 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that it is

“beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits” that “seek[]

injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre‐

empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution, must prevail” (emphasis in original) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983))).    A party is not required to pursue

“arguably illegal activity . . . or expose itself to criminal liability before bringing

suit to challenge” a statute alleged to violate federal law.    Knife Rights, Inc. v.

Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs, who are here threatened with escalating fines and other

sanctions under the Local Laws, thus seek to enjoin enforcement on the ground

that the laws were enacted in violation of ANCA’s procedural prerequisites for

local limits on airport noise and access.  Such a claim falls squarely within federal

equity jurisdiction as recognized in Ex parte Young and its progeny.   

2. ANCA Does Not Limit Equity Jurisdiction

A federal court’s equity power to enjoin unlawful state or local action may,

nevertheless, be limited by statute.  See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,

Case 15-2334, Document 116-1, 11/04/2016, 1900227, Page27 of 57
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135 S. Ct. at 1385; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–74 (1996).  The

Town does not—indeed, cannot—argue that ANCA expressly precludes actions

in equity relying on its statutory requirements.    Instead, the Town relies on

Armstrong to urge us to recognize ANCA’s implicit foreclosure of equitable relief.  

The argument is not persuasive.   

In Armstrong, the Supreme Court construed a different statute—part of the

the Medicaid Act—implicitly to preclude healthcare providers from invoking

equity to enjoin state officials from reimbursing medical service providers at

rates lower than the federal statute required.    The Court located Congress’s

intent to foreclose such equitable relief in two aspects of the statute.  First, federal

statutory authority to withhold Medicaid funding was the “sole remedy”

Congress provided for a state’s failure to comply with Medicaid requirements.  

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1385 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396c); see id. (recognizing that “‘express provision of one method of enforcing

a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others’” (quoting

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001))).  Second, even if the existence of a

provision authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enforce the

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29

statute by withholding funds “might not, by itself, preclude the availability of

equitable relief,” it did so “when combined with the judicially unadministrable

nature of [the statutory] text.”  Id. (emphasis in original); see id. (“It is difficult to

imagine a requirement broader and less specific than § 30(A)’s mandate that state

plans provide for payments that are ‘consistent with efficiency, economy, and

quality of care,’ all the while ‘safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of

. . . care and services.’” (citation omitted)).    In sum, “[t]he sheer complexity

associated with enforcing § 30(A), coupled with the express provision of an

administrative remedy, § 1396c, shows that the Medicaid Act precludes private

enforcement of § 30(A) in the courts.”  Id.   

ANCA cannot be analogized to the Medicaid statute in either of the two

ways prompting jurisdictional concern in Armstrong.    First, as to the

identification of an exclusive remedy, there is no textual basis to conclude that

the loss of federal funding is the only consequence for violating ANCA.    The

Town highlights—as the district court did—49 U.S.C. § 47526, which states that

an airport may not receive AIP grants or collect passenger facility charges

“[u]nless the Secretary of Transportation is satisfied” that, insofar as the airport

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30

imposes any noise or access restrictions, those regulations comply with the

statute.  The Town’s assertion that this is the sole available remedy for violating

ANCA, however, is defeated by § 47533, which states that, “[e]xcept as provided

by section 47524 of this title, this subchapter does not affect . . . the authority of

the Secretary of Transportation to seek and obtain legal remedies the Secretary

considers appropriate, including injunctive relief.”    49 U.S.C. § 47533(3).    As

already noted, § 47524 provides only limited exceptions to the Secretary’s

authority to bring suit: as against local Stage 2 aircraft restrictions if the airport

proprietor complies with § 47524(b)’s notice‐and‐comment process;13 and as

against local Stage 3 and 4 aircraft restrictions “agreed to by the airport

proprietor and all aircraft operators” or approved by the FAA, id. § 47524(c).  

Thus, § 47533 confirms that Congress did not intend § 47526 to be the only means

of enforcing ANCA’s procedural requirements.  The FAA can employ any legal

or equitable remedy necessary to prevent airports from enacting or enforcing

restrictions on (1) Stage 2 aircraft without utilizing the § 47524(b) process, and on

                                              

13 But see City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d at 434–35 (holding that FAA

retains power under AAIA to withhold AIP funding for airport that imposes

unreasonable Stage 2 aircraft restrictions).

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31

(2) Stage 3 and 4 aircraft without securing either the § 47524(c) consent of all

airport operators or the FAA’s own approval.  The fact that Congress conferred

such broad enforcement authority on the FAA, and not on private parties, does

not imply its intent to bar such parties from invoking federal jurisdiction where,

as here, they do so not to enforce the federal law themselves, but to preclude a

municipal entity from subjecting them to local laws enacted in violation of

federal requirements.  See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 222

(pre‐enforcement challenge to pre‐empted state law presented no “barriers to

justiciability”) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 145–47).

Further support for the conclusion that Congress did not intend for

funding ineligibility to be the sole means of enforcing the § 47524(b) and (c)

requirements can be located in the twenty‐year compliance assurance that airport

proprietors must give in return for AIP grants.    Such grants, unlike Medicaid

funding, involve one‐time transfers.    Thus, if, as the Town argues, the sole

remedy for a proprietor’s failure to comply with the § 47524 requirements for

local laws is the loss of eligibility for future funding, the proprietor could (1) give

a twenty‐year assurance of compliance to obtain an AIP grant on one day and,

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32

(2) on the next day, promulgate non‐ANCA‐compliant laws, relinquishing

eligibility for future grants.   We cannot conclude that, in those circumstances,

Congress intended to foreclose legal or equitable actions to enforce either the

statutorily mandated assurances or ANCA’s procedural prerequisites for local

legislation.  See generally Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (stating

that courts must construe statute “so that no part will be inoperative or

superfluous, void or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed,

§ 47533 makes plain that Congress did not so intend.

Second, unlike the Medicaid claim at issue in Armstrong, plaintiffs’ ANCA‐

based challenge to the Town’s Local Laws would not require application of a

judicially unadministrable standard.  In urging otherwise, the Town relies on 49

U.S.C. § 47524(c), the statutory section detailing various factors that can inform

an FAA decision to approve local noise restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft.  The Town

argues that ANCA compliance is, thus, so much a matter of agency discretion as

to signal Congress’s intent that the FAA alone—not private individuals—should

enforce the statute’s terms.   The argument fails because § 47524(c) sets forth a

simple rule: that airports seeking to impose noise restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft

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33

must obtain either the consent of all aircraft operators or FAA approval.   It is

“difficult to imagine” more straightforward requirements.    Armstrong v.

Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1385.   A federal court can evaluate the

Town’s compliance with these obligations without engaging in the sort of

“judgment‐laden” review that the Supreme Court in Armstrong concluded

evinced Congress’s intent not to permit private enforcement of § 30A of the

Medicaid Act.14    Id.    Indeed, at oral argument before this court, the Town

acknowledged that this case does not implicate “the same kind of judicial

administrability problem” as Armstrong.    See Oral Argument, June 20, 2016, at

1:26:39–45.

In sum, because (1) the denial of eligibility for federal funding is not the

exclusive remedy for an airport proprietor’s failure to comply with ANCA’s

                                              

14 While Stage 2 aircraft operations—addressed in § 47524(b)—were phased out

by December 31, 2015, the same conclusion obtains with respect to that

subsection.    Under § 47524(b), airports must, more than 180 days before a

restriction becomes effective, publish the proposed restriction and make

available for public comment an analysis of the restriction’s costs and benefits,

including alternative measures that were considered.  As with § 47524(c), judicial

administration of subsection (b) is simple: if no such notice has been published

for the requisite period, the proposed Stage 2 restriction violates ANCA.  

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34

procedural requirements, and (2) those requirements plainly are judicially

administrable, we conclude that Congress did not intend implicitly to foreclose

plaintiffs from invoking equitable jurisdiction to challenge the Town’s

enforcement of Local Laws enacted in alleged violation of ANCA.  Accordingly,

the Town’s jurisdictional challenge is without merit.

C. Plaintiffs’ ANCA‐Based Preemption Claim

Plaintiffs fault the district court’s conclusion that they are unlikely to

succeed on the merits of their preemption challenge to the Local Laws.    They

argue that ANCA’s procedural requirements for local restrictions on airport

access apply to all public airport proprietors regardless of their federal funding

status.  Thus, plaintiffs maintain, the Town’s disavowal of future federal funding

cannot insulate the Local Laws from ANCA’s procedural requirements.    And

enactment of the Local Laws without such procedures cannot be deemed

reasonable so as to support a proprietor exception to federal preemption under

the ADA.    We agree and, therefore, conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to a

preliminary injunction barring enforcement of all three Local Laws.    

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1. ANCA’s Text and Context Establish Procedural Requirements

for Local Noise and Access Restrictions Applicable to All

Public Airport Proprietors

In considering de novo whether ANCA’s § 47524 procedural requirements

for local noise and access restriction laws apply to all public airport proprietors,  

or only to those receiving federal funding as the Town contends, we begin with

the statute’s text because “we assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory

language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”    Marx v. Gen. Revenue

Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted).    In deciding “whether the language at issue has a plain and

unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case,”  Roberts

v. Sea‐Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted), we consider “the language itself, the specific context in which that

language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole,” Greathouse v.

JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

“If the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent

and consistent . . . the inquiry ceases.”  Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).  That is the case

with respect to the relevant provisions of § 47524, which employ comprehensive

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36

and unmistakably limiting language in affording airport proprietors some

authority to regulate noise.

Subsection (b) states that a local “airport noise or access restriction may

include a restriction on the operation of stage 2 aircraft . . . only if the airport

operator publishes the proposed restriction and prepares and makes available for

public comment at least 180 days before the effective date of the proposed

restriction” the analysis outlined therein.  49 U.S.C. § 47524(b) (emphasis added).  

Similarly, subsection (c) states that “an airport noise or access restriction on the

operation of stage 3 aircraft . . . may become effective only if the restriction has

been agreed to by the airport proprietor and all aircraft operators or has been

submitted to and approved by the [FAA] after an airport or aircraft operator’s

request for approval.”  Id. § 47524(c)(1) (emphasis added).  The phrase “only if”

is unambiguously limiting, identifying procedures that airport proprietors must

follow in order to impose any noise or access restrictions on air operations.15  At

                                              

15 This language reflects the statute as it was re‐codified in 1994, when Congress

published a reorganized version of Title 49 “without substantive change.”  

Section 1(a), Pub. L. No. 103‐272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994).  As originally enacted, the

statute provided that “[n]o airport noise or access restriction shall include a

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37

the same time, no statutory language cabins these procedural requirements to

proprietors receiving or maintaining eligibility for federal funds.  Thus, the plain

statutory text is fairly read to mandate the identified procedural requirements for

local noise and access restrictions on Stage 2 and 3 aircraft at any public airport.  

                                                                                                                                                  

restriction on operations of Stage 2 aircraft, unless the airport operator” complied

with the statute’s notice‐and‐comment requirements.  ANCA § 9304(c), Pub. L.

No. 101‐508, 104 Stat. 1388‐381 (1990) (emphasis added).   It further established

that “[n]o airport noise or access restriction on the operation of a Stage 3

aircraft . . . shall be effective unless it has been agreed to by the airport proprietor

and all aircraft operators or has been submitted to and approved by the [FAA]

pursuant to an airport or aircraft operator’s request for approval.”  Id. § 9304(b),

104 Stat. 1388‐380–81 (emphasis added).    The Supreme Court has “often

observed” that similar language is unambiguously mandatory.  Ross v. Blake, 136

S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (construing as mandatory language in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

stating that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted” (emphasis added)).

Because Congress made clear that the 1994 recodification of § 47524 did not effect

any “substantive change”—a representation consistent with the absence of any

material difference between the two versions of the statute—the same mandatory

conclusion obtains notwithstanding the stylistic revisions.    Northwest, Inc. v.

Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1429 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In any

event, we “will not . . . infer[] that Congress, in revising and consolidating the

laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.”  

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989).  There is no such clear expression

here.

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See City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d at 433–34 (stating that airports

“must comply” with § 47524(b) to impose Stage 2 aircraft restrictions, and that

“subsection (c)’s requirement of FAA approval is not tied to grants; grants or not,

no airport operator can impose a Stage 3 restriction unless the FAA gives its

approval”).

Statutory context further compels this construction.  First, the only textual

limitation on the aforementioned procedural requirements is that referenced in

§ 47524(d), a “grandfather” provision that generally exempts local noise

restrictions existing prior to ANCA’s effective date.

Second, § 47527 shifts liability for “noise damages” from local airport

proprietors to the federal government when “a taking has occurred as a direct

result of the [FAA’s] disapproval” of a proposed restriction.  49 U.S.C. § 47527.    

Insofar as the proprietor exception to federal preemption rests on an airport

operator’s potential liability for—and, thus, right to mitigate—noise damage “by

restricting the use of his airport,” Concorde I, 558 F.2d at 83 (citing Griggs v.

Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. at 84), the federal government’s assumption of that

liability not only undermines the rationale for the exception, but also offsets the

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39

extent to which ANCA constrains local authority.  Moreover, no language limits

this federal acceptance of liability to airports whose proprietors have received or

are eligible for AIP grants.    Thus, the general assumption of liability under

§ 47527 reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended for the requirements of

§ 47524(b) and (c) to apply generally to all proprietors wishing to impose noise or

access restrictions on Stage 2, 3, or 4 aircraft at public airports.   

Third, § 47533(3) places no limits—and certainly no funding eligibility

condition—on the FAA’s statutory authority to enforce the § 47524(b) and (c)

procedural requirements.

The Town nevertheless urges us to construe § 47524 in light of § 47526 and

to conclude from that funding ineligibility provision that Congress’s intent was

to “encourage, but not require, compliance” with the former’s procedures.  

Town’s Br. 34 (citing Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton,

152 F. Supp. 3d at 109).  We are not persuaded.  As explained supra at Part III.B.2,

§ 47526 provides for loss of funding eligibility as a consequence of

noncompliance with § 47524 procedures.  Nothing in § 47526 signals that funding

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40

ineligibility is the only consequence of such a procedural violation.16  The same

conclusion obtains with respect to the funding ineligibility effected by § 47524(e)

with particular reference to § 47524(c) violations.

In sum, ANCA’s text and context unambiguously indicate Congress’s

intent for the § 47524 procedural mandates to apply to all public airport

proprietors regardless of their funding eligibility.    

                                              

16 We do not think that the title of § 47526 (“Limitations for noncomplying airport

noise and access restrictions”) can fairly be read in the definitive (i.e., “[The]

Limitations for . . .”) to support the Town’s urged conclusion.    Precedent

instructs that a statute’s title “cannot limit the plain meaning of the text,”

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998), and that rule

applies with particular force here where the quoted title was not part of the

statute as originally enacted in 1990.   Rather, it was added as part of the non‐

substantive 1994 recodification.  Compare ANCA § 9307, 104 Stat. 1388‐382, with

49 U.S.C. § 47526.    “Congress made it clear” that this recodification “did not

effect any ‘substantive change.’”   Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429.  

Indeed, the statute’s original title, “Limitation on Airport Improvement Program

Revenue,” is as susceptible to the indefinite as the definite article, i.e., “[A]

Limitation on . . . “ and, thus, cannot be construed to manifest Congress’s intent

that federal funding ineligibility be the sole consequence of a § 47524(b) or (c)

violation.  

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2. Congress’s Intent for ANCA Procedures To Apply

Comprehensively and Mandatorily Is Confirmed by Statutory

Findings, Legislative History, and Implementing Regulations

Even if text and context did not speak unambiguously to the question,

statutory findings, legislative history, and implementing regulations would

confirm the conclusion that § 47524(b) and (c) apply comprehensively and

mandatorily to all public airport proprietors.   

Congress promulgated ANCA based on findings that “community noise

concerns have led to uncoordinated and inconsistent restrictions on aviation that

could impede the national air transportation system” and, therefore, “noise

policy must be carried out at the national level.”    49 U.S.C. § 47521(2)–(3)

(emphasis added).  Such findings, which are “particularly useful” in determining

congressional intent, Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990);

accord WLNY‐TV, Inc. v. FCC, 163 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)—and which

themselves speak in mandatory terms—undermine the Town’s argument that

Congress intended for the § 47524(b) and (c) procedures to apply only to noise

and access restrictions at some public airports, i.e., those whose proprietors

wished to maintain federal funding eligibility.    It was by mandating local

restriction procedures for all public airport proprietors that Congress could

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42

prevent “uncoordinated and inconsistent restrictions” “at the national level,”

while still allowing “local interest in aviation noise management [to] be

considered in determining the national interest.”    49 U.S.C. § 47521(1)–(4).  

Congress’s recognition that “revenues controlled by the [federal] government

can help resolve noise problems and carry with them a responsibility to the

national airport system,” id. § 47521(6), does not undermine this conclusion.  

Congress can certainly regulate commerce both by providing monetary

incentives for voluntary compliance by some actors, while at the same time

allowing for enforcement actions more generally.  Nor are we persuaded by the

Town’s contention that the reference to “noise problems” in the quoted excerpt

from § 47521(6) refers to noise restrictions, as opposed to problems created by

airport noise.  In any event, the finding states only that such revenue control “can

help resolve” those problems, which comports with a view of funding eligibility

as a means—but not the only means—of executing ANCA’s policy objectives.  Id.

(emphasis added).

That conclusion is consistent, moreover, with ANCA’s legislative history.  

ANCA was adopted after Congress determined that voluntary financial and

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43

legal incentives established by the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of

1979, Pub. L. No. 96‐193, 94 Stat. 50 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 47501–47510), had

proved insufficient to secure airport conformity to federal aviation policy

respecting noise.    Notwithstanding these incentives, and the federal funding

scheme established by the AAIA in 1982, Congress perceived that a “patchwork

quilt” of local noise restrictions continued to stymie the airport development

required for the nation’s aviation.    See 136 Cong. Rec. S13619 (Sept. 24, 1990)

(statement of Sen. Ford).17    Thus, it was to resolve a problem that persisted

despite federal financial incentives that Congress enacted regulatory legislation

                                              

17 Senator Wendell H. Ford, the original sponsor of the legislation ultimately

enacted as ANCA, explained as follows:  

No issue facing air transportation is more important than settling the

noise debate.    The greatest obstacle to expanding airports and

increasing air carrier service is the opposition to aircraft noise and

not the cost of building more runways and establishing more

technologically advanced air traffic control. . . . Airports are now

telling the airlines what kind of aircraft they can fly as a method of

regulating noise.    Some airports have enforced restrictions on the

type of aircraft, the number of operations and the time of day for

operations.

136 Cong. Rec. S13619 (Sept. 24, 1990).

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permitting local noise and access restrictions at public airports “only if” the

restrictions conformed to the procedural mandates of § 47524(b) and (c).   

Indeed, many of the legislators who opposed ANCA’s enactment objected

to the statute’s mandatory nature precisely because it meant that local noise

restrictions not enacted under the specified procedures would be preempted by

federal law.    See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S15819 (Oct. 18, 1990) (statement of Sen.

Durenberger) (“This [legislation] would have far reaching consequences for the

millions of Americans living beneath the landing and takeoff flight paths of our

Nation’s airports.  In many communities, the pending aviation noise legislation

would effectively preempt existing local aviation noise controls.”); id. at S15820

(statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“[T]his legislation has far‐reaching ramifications for

cities and towns throughout the country.    Many of these communities have

already been through the long, and often painful process of developing

comprehensive noise standards for their airports . . . balancing the economic

development interests of those communities and the desire to provide a healthy

environment free of noise pollution . . . .”).   This belies the suggestion that in

ANCA, Congress was, yet again, seeking only to give incentives for compliance

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by those seeking federal funding.    Rather, it confirms mandated procedures

applicable to all proprietors seeking to impose noise or access restrictions at

public airports.  

Finally, even if text, context, findings, and history did not speak so plainly,

any ambiguity would be resolved by the FAA’s interpretation of § 47524 to

mandate procedural compliance regardless of funding status.    See Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have long

recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive

department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”).  

The FAA’s Part 161 regulations state that “notice, review, and approval

requirements set forth in this part apply to all airports imposing noise or access

restrictions” affecting Stage 2 or Stage 3 airport operations.  14 C.F.R. §§ 161.3(c),

161.5 (emphasis added).  They admit no exception for airports not maintaining

federal funding eligibility.  Rather, they employ comprehensive and mandatory

language.  See id. § 161.205(a) (“Each airport operator proposing a noise or access

restriction on Stage 2 aircraft operations shall prepare the [specified analysis] and

make it available for public comment . . . .” (emphases added)), § 161.303(a)

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(“Each airport operator or aircraft operator . . . proposing a Stage 3 restriction

shall provide public notice and an opportunity for public comment, as prescribed

in this subpart, before submitting the restriction to the FAA for review and

approval.” (emphases added)).    Further, the FAA regulations state, in no

uncertain terms, that “the procedures to terminate eligibility for airport grant

funds and authority to impose or collect passenger facility charges for an airport

operator’s failure to comply with [ANCA] . . . may be used with or in addition to

any judicial proceedings initiated by the FAA to protect the national aviation

system and related Federal interests.”  Id. § 161.501(a) (emphasis added).

In sum, the statutory findings, legislative history, and implementing

regulations accord with what we have identified as the plain meaning of

ANCA’s text.  We therefore construe § 47524(b) and (c) to mandate procedures

for the enactment of local noise and access restrictions by any public airport

operator, regardless of federal funding status.    Because these procedures are

mandatory and comprehensive, we further conclude that local laws not enacted

in compliance with them (which the Town concedes the Local Laws challenged

in this case were not) are federally preempted.  See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct.

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1943, 1949–50 (2013) (“State law is pre‐empted to the extent of any conflict with a

federal statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent

Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that such conflict

occurs when, inter alia, “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their preemption claim and

are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the Town’s enforcement of each of the

three challenged Local Laws.   

3. National Helicopter Warrants No Different Preemption

Conclusion

National Helicopter Corp. of America v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.

1998), relied on by the Town as well as the district court, does not warrant a

different conclusion on preemption.

In that case, the parties cross appealed the partial grant and partial denial

of an injunction barring New York City from restricting operations at

Manhattan’s East 34th Street Heliport.   Plaintiff helicopter operator “National”

argued that the “regulation of airports is a field preempted by federal law,” id. at

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84, while the City maintained that its restrictions represented a lawful exercise of

its  power as the Heliport’s proprietor, id. at 88.18   

                                              

18 Preliminary to ruling, the court provided a general outline of how the

proprietor exception fits within the ADA’s general preemption of local laws

pertaining to airline operations:  

Congress preempted state and local regulations “related

to a price, route or service of an air carrier” when it

passed § 1305(a) of the Airline Deregulation Act, now

recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).    Cf. id.

§ 40101, et seq. (1994) (Federal Aviation Act); id. § 44715

(1994) (Noise Control Act); id. § 47521, et seq. (1994)

(Airport Noise and Capacity Act) (acts implying

preemption of noise regulation at airports).

In enacting the aviation legislation, Congress stated that

the preemptive effect of § 1305(a) did not extend to acts

passed by state and local agencies in the course of

“carrying out [their] proprietary powers and rights.”  Id.

§ 41713(b)(3).    Under this “cooperative scheme,”

Congress has consciously delegated to state and

municipal proprietors the authority to adopt rational

regulations with respect to the permissible level of noise

created by aircraft using their airports in order to

protect the local population.  See Concorde I, 558 F.2d at

83–84 (discussing the 1968 amendment to Federal

Aviation Act and Noise Control Act legislative history

in which Congress specifically reserved the rights of

proprietors to establish regulations limiting the

permissible level of noise at their airports); S. Rep. No.

96–52, at 13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 89, 101

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The Town urges us to conclude from the fact that National Helicopter found

certain of the challenged restrictions to fall within the proprietor exception—

despite the City’s apparent failure to comply with ANCA procedures—that this

court has necessarily, if not explicitly, decided that ANCA procedures do not

                                                                                                                                                  

(proclaiming that the Aviation Safety and Noise

Abatement Act was not “intended to alter the respective

legal responsibilities of the Federal Government and

local airport proprietors for the control of aviation

noise”) . . . .

Hence, federal courts have recognized federal

preemption over the regulation of aircraft and airspace,

subject to a complementary though more “limited role

for local airport proprietors in regulating noise levels at

their airports.”  City and County of San Francisco v. FAA,

942 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).  Under this plan of

divided authority, we have held that the proprietor

exception allows municipalities to promulgate

“reasonable, nonarbitrary and non‐discriminatory”

regulations of noise and other environmental concerns

at the local level.  Concorde I, 558 F.2d at 84 (regulations

of noise levels); see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port

Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 658 F. Supp. 952, 957 (S.D.N.Y.

1986) (permissible regulations of noise and other

environmental concerns), aff’d, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.

1987).

Id. at 88–89.

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limit the scope of the ADA’s proprietor exception to federal preemption, thereby

foreclosing a contrary decision in this case.   The argument is unpersuasive for

several reasons.   

First, “a sub silentio holding is not binding precedent.”    Getty Petroleum

Corp. v. Bartco Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 101 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008)

(explaining that government concession in prior appeal that certain evidence

should not be considered in evaluating sufficiency did not bind later panel

because first panel “did not independently analyze whether this was the proper

course”); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(reasoning that court is not bound by earlier “statement of law . . . uttered in

passing without due consideration of the alternatives, or where it is merely a

prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel’s full attention”).

Second, National Helicopter is distinguishable from this case in that the

court there understood National “not [to] dispute the viability of the proprietor

exception.”   National Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d at 89.  

Rather, it understood National to argue that the exception did not apply because

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the City’s challenged actions were taken under its police power rather than its

proprietary authority.  See id.  In resolving that dispute favorably to the City, this

court did not address whether and to what extent ANCA’s procedural

requirements cabined the reasonable exercise of a municipality’s proprietary

authority over airport noise, much less did it decide whether local restrictions

imposed in the absence of ANCA procedures were federally preempted.  Indeed,

the court mentioned ANCA only in passing, at the end of a string cite comparing

the ADA with other “acts implying preemption of noise regulation at airports.”  

Id. at 88.19

                                              

19 We need not ourselves decide whether National’s briefing might have been

understood differently.    See generally Plaintiff‐Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant Br. 40,

National Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998)

(arguing for affirmance of injunction on alternative ground that ANCA

“preempts restrictions on Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft that were imposed without

following ANCA’s required procedures and cost‐benefit calculations”).    We

consider only whether the panel in National Helicopter in fact decided whether

ANCA’s procedural requirements inform the proprietor exception to ADA

preemption.  We conclude that National Helicopter did not decide that question.   

In any event, consistent with our practice in such circumstances, we have

circulated this opinion to all active members of this court prior to filing.    See

Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67 & n.9 (2d Cir.

2009).

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What the court did acknowledge, however, was that the role preserved for

local airport proprietors in regulating noise levels is a “limited” one.  Id.  To the

extent local restrictions must be “reasonable, nonarbitrary, and non‐

discriminatory,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), nothing in National

Helicopter suggests that an airport proprietor can satisfy these criteria if he fails to

comply with mandated procedures of federal law—such as ANCA—for the

enactment of such restrictions.  To the contrary, actions taken in violation of legal

mandates are, by their nature, unreasonable and arbitrary.  See generally Austin v.

U.S. Parole Comm’n, 448 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that committing

“procedural error” effects result that is “unreasonable . . . and therefore . . . in

violation of law”); Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)

(observing that factual findings made without following regulations constitute

error of law); Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[A]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations and procedures is arbitrary

and capricious.”).   

Accordingly, we conclude that National Helicopter does not support the

conclusion that plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their preemption claim.

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4. A Preemption Conclusion Does Not Transform Federal

Aviation Law Contrary to Congress’s Intent

The Town further argues that construing ANCA to preempt the

challenged Local Laws would effectively “invalidat[e] the proprietor exception”

to preemption expressly reserved by Congress in the ADA.  Town’s Reply Br. 28.  

Our ruling does no such thing.

In § 47524, Congress itself cabins airport operators’ proprietary authority

by mandating certain procedures for the enactment of local noise and access

restrictions.  By 1990, Congress had concluded that, at the same time that “local

interest in aviation noise management shall be considered in determining the

national interest,” 49 U.S.C. § 47521(4), the exercise of proprietary authority

could not be allowed to produce a patchwork of “uncoordinated and

inconsistent” airport restrictions that impede the national transportation system,  

136 Cong. Rec. S13619 (Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Ford).  Thus, ANCA’s

procedural requirements are properly understood to refine what can constitute a

“reasonable” exercise of the proprietary authority reserved by the ADA.    See

National Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d at 88–89 (recognizing

ADA to reserve “a complementary though more limited role for airport

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proprietors in regulating noise levels at their airports” by promulgating

“reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory” regulations for “noise and

other environmental concerns” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  

Local laws not enacted in compliance with ANCA procedures cannot claim to be

a reasonable exercise of such authority and, therefore, the federal preemption of

such laws does not invalidate reserved proprietary authority contrary to

Congress’s intent.

Nor does such a preemption conclusion “dramatically enlarge the FAA’s

role in a manner that Congress never intended.”  Town’s Reply Br. 31.  Indeed,

the Town has failed to demonstrate that events since ANCA’s enactment have

belied the FAA’s prediction that the statute would not impose substantial

burdens on small public airports.  See Notice and Approval of Airport Noise and

Access Restrictions, 56 Fed. Reg. 8644, 8661–62 (Feb. 28, 1992) (codified at 14

C.F.R. pt. 161).  Insofar as the Town asserts that the reason only one proprietor

has applied for FAA approval to impose noise restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft is

because of the “agency’s . . . vigorous opposition to any airport use restrictions,”

J.A. 240 (emphasis in original), the assertion is conclusory and hardly

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demonstrates that, if more applications were filed, the agency would arbitrarily

withhold consent, or that courts would fail to correct any abuse.    No more

convincing is the Town’s assertion that concerns of time and cost have resulted

in only one airport successfully imposing restrictions on certain aircraft

operations.    See id.    To the extent the process is inherently burdensome, that

decision was, in the first instance, Congress’s, and not a reason for courts to

excuse a non‐complying party from preemption.  To the extent a party considers

itself unduly burdened by FAA implementation of ANCA’s procedures, its

remedy is an action to curb agency excess, not relief from preemption.

Thus, we reject the Town’s contention that deeming local laws enacted in

violation of ANCA’s procedural mandates in § 47524(b) and (c) to be preempted

would radically transform federal aviation law by invalidating the proprietor

exception reserved in the ADA.    Rather, we conclude that ANCA establishes

what Congress thought were necessary procedures for a reasonable exercise of

proprietary authority within the national aviation system.         

The Local Laws at issue not having been enacted according to the

procedures mandated in 49 U.S.C. § 47524(b) and (c), the Town cannot claim the

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protection of the proprietor exception from federal preemption.    Because

plaintiffs are thus likely to succeed on their preemption claim, they are entitled to

a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of all three challenged Local

Laws.20   Accordingly, we affirm the challenged order to the extent it granted an

injunction as to the One‐Trip Limit Law, we vacate the order to the extent it

denied an injunction as to the Mandatory and Extended Curfew Laws, and we

remand the case for entry of a preliminary injunction as to all three laws and for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                              

20 In this appeal, the Town does not contest the other factors required for a

preliminary injunction.

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III. Conclusion

To summarize, we conclude as follows:

1. The district court properly exercised federal equity jurisdiction to

hear plaintiffs’ claim that enforcement of the challenged Local

Laws is barred by preemptive federal aviation law.

2. Federal law mandating procedures for the enactment of local laws

restricting noise and access to public airports, see 49 U.S.C.

§ 47524(b) and (c), applies to public airports without regard to

their eligibility for federal funding.

3. Because it is undisputed that the defendant Town enacted the

Local Laws at issue without complying with § 47524 procedures,

those Local Laws are federally preempted, and plaintiffs are

entitled to a preliminary injunction barring their enforcement.

Therefore, the challenged district court order is AFFIRMED IN PART and

VACATED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for it to

enter a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of all three laws and for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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