Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06008/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06008-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request to have the Court consider recent filings in

the administrative proceedings. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendants’

over-length opposition brief. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike portions of

Plaintiffs’ reply brief or to file a sur-reply as MOOT.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LARRY EDER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

L. RYAN BRODDRICK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-06008 JSW

ORDER RE MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

AND REQUEST TO DISMISS

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and Defendants

request to dismiss this action pursuant to the Younger doctrine. Having carefully reviewed the

parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the Court hereby dismisses this action pursuant to the Younger doctrine.1

BACKGROUND

In this action, Plaintiffs are challenging the revocation of their California Dungeness

Crab Vessel Permit (“Permit”). The California Fish and Game Commission (“Commission”)

sent Plaintiffs a letter dated August 6, 2006, advising them that the Commission intended to

revoke the Permit for landing Dungeness crabs in violation of California Fish and Game Code

section 8279.1. (Declaration of James P. Walsh (“Walsh Decl.”), Ex. D.) The letter further

informed Plaintiffs that the Commission would hold a hearing on September 13, 2006, on

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revoking the Permit at which Plaintiffs were entitled to be represented by counsel, submit

supportive information, and call witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiffs submitted a brief, attended the

hearing, and presented argument in opposition to the revocation. (Mot. at 5.) Plaintiffs argued

before the hearing officer for the Commission that revoking the Permit would violate Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities

Clause. (Walsh Decl., Ex. G; Notice of Submission of Plaintiffs’ State Administrative Hearing

Brief).

The Commission’s hearing officer issued a proposed decision revoking the Permit. 

(Admin. Mot to Consider Recent Additions to Admin. Record, Ex. A (“Proposed Order”).) The

hearing officer considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Privileges and Immunities

Clause or the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes the Commission from revoking the Permit

pursuant to California Fish and Game Code § 8279.1 (“Section 8279.1”). (Id.) At oral

argument before this Court held on December 8, 2006, the parties informed the Court that the

Commission adopted the Proposed Order revoking the Permit, but that the revocation would not

become effective until December 26, 2006.

On September 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an action in this Court challenging the

anticipated action by the Commission revoking the Permit pursuant to Section 8279.1. The

Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, asserting that revoking their permit pursuant

to Section 8279.1 would violate their constitutional rights under the Dormant Commerce Clause 

and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In response, Defendants argued that this action

should be dismissed pursuant to the Younger doctrine. The Court requested and obtained

further briefing on the Younger doctrine by both parties.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss this action on the grounds that the Court should abstain

from adjudicating this matter pursuant to the Younger doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37 (1971), the Supreme Court espoused a strong federal policy against federal-court interference

with pending state judicial proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. H.C. v. Koppel,

203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden, 457 U.S.

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423, 431 (1982). “The policy rests of notions of comity and respect for state functions.” 

Champion Int’l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court must resolve

the threshold Younger abstention issue because, if the Court “is required to abstain under

Younger and dismiss the suit, then it has no authority to rule on a party’s motion for a

preliminary injunction.” See Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). Unless a

recognized exception to the Younger doctrine applies, “[a]bstention is required when: ‘(i) the

state proceedings are ongoing; (ii) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (iii)

the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions.’” Delta Dental

Plan of California, Inc. v. Mendoza, 139 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and

quotations omitted); see also Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Court finds that all three prongs of the Younger test are satisfied here. First, there

are ongoing state proceedings. The administrative decision was adopted by the Commissioner

and will become effective on December 26, 2006. Although Plaintiffs argue that the

administrative proceedings have been concluded, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at the hearing that

it is undisputed that Plaintiffs could file a writ in state court to appeal the administrative

decision. Because the Plaintiffs have an opportunity to appeal the administrative decision by the

Commission in state court, the proceedings are still considered pending under the Younger

doctrine. See United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 710 (2001) (“A necessary concomitant of

Younger is that a party must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in federal

court... .”); see also Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 1990)

(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the administrative proceedings were no longer pending for

purposes of the Younger doctrine because he could appeal the administrative order to state court

and was required to “exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District

Court”). Thus, Plaintiffs “cannot avoid Younger by choosing not to pursue available state

appellate remedies.” See Alleghany, 896 F.2d at 1144.

Plaintiffs also dispute that the administrative proceedings were judicial in nature, as

opposed to executive or legislative. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (“NOPSI”) (clarifying that the Younger doctrine only applies

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to judicial proceedings, not legislative or executive action). Plaintiffs contend that the

administrative proceedings are not judicial because the facts are not disputed, and that based on

the undisputed facts, the Commission is required to revoke the Permit pursuant to Section

8279.1. (Plaintiff’s Opp. to Motion to Dismiss Based on Younger). In NOPSI, the Supreme

Court defined a “judicial proceeding” by analyzing the distinction between a judicial and a

legislative act: “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on

present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. ... Legislation on the other hand

looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter

to all or some part of those subject to its power.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 370-71. Here, the

Commission adjudicated Plaintiffs’ alleged violation of Section 8279.1 based on admittedly

undisputed facts. The Court therefore finds that the administrative proceedings were judicial. 

See Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding administrative

proceeding revoking licence to race horses was “quasi-judicial”). Accordingly, the Court finds

that the state proceedings are ongoing and are judicial, thus satisfying the first prong under

Younger.

Next, the Court must determine whether the state court actions implicate important state

interests. See Delta Dental Plan, 139 F.3d at 1294. For purposes of the Younger doctrine “[t]he

importance of the interest is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by

focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual case.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 618;

see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365. The Court finds that Section 8279.1 furthers important state

interests. Section 8279.1 regulates Dungeness crab fishing in California. The California

Legislature has specifically found that “the Dungeness crab fishery is important to the state

because it provides a valuable food product, employment for those persons engaged in the

fishery, and economic benefits to the coastal communities of the state.” See Cal. Fish & Game

Code § 8279.1. California has an interest in conserving, allocating, and preventing waste of its

Dungeness crab fisheries. The Court thus finds that Section 8279.1 implicates important state

interests. 

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2 Section 3.5 provides:

An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the Constitution or

an initiative statute, has no power:

(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being

unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute is

unconstitutional;

(b) To declare a statute unconstitutional;

(c) To declare a statute unenforceable or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that federal

law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court

has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is prohibited by federal law or

federal regulations.

Cal. Const., Art. III, § 3.5.

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Lastly, the Court finds that the state action provides an adequate opportunity for

Plaintiffs to raise the federal issues they seek to address in this action. “[A] federal court should

assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous

authority to the contrary.” Meredith, 321 F.3d at 818 (quoting Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481

U.S. 1, 14 (1987)). Plaintiffs asserted their constitutional claims and supporting evidence to the

Commission. (Walsh Decl., Ex. G; Notice of Submission of Plaintiffs’ State Administrative

Hearing Brief.) The Commission adjudicated Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims and found them

to be meritless. (Proposed Order.) 

The Court notes that while Article III, § 3.5 of the California Constitution prohibits

administrative agencies from declaring a statute unconstitutional or refusing to enforce a statute

based on constitutional grounds, section 3.5 does not specifically prohibit the opposite. See Cal.

Const., Art. III, § 3.5.2 In other words, the California Constitution does not prohibit an agency

from considering constitutional defenses if the agency finds such defenses meritless and thus

upholds the statute. Moreover, this provision of the California constitution “does not affect ...

administrative agencies’ competence to examine evidence before them in light of constitutional

standards.” Kenneally, 967 F.2d at 332 (internal quotes and citation omitted). Administrative

agencies may “receive evidence in light of [plaintiffs’] constitutional challenges and the

California courts remain competent to review such challenges upon a petition for writ of

mandate.” Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted); cf. Canatella v. California, 404 F. 3d 1106,

1111 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding state bar court’s inability to declare a statute unenforceable or

unconstitutional was inconsequential to determination that the party had an adequate

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opportunity to litigate his federal constitutional claims). At oral argument on Plaintiffs’ motion

for preliminary injunction and Defendants’ request to dismiss, the Court noted that the

Commission considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims and questioned whether

this provided Plaintiffs a sufficient opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in the

ongoing state proceedings. Significantly, Plaintiffs did not argue that the Commission did not

have authority to consider and reject their constitutional claims.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs may file a writ of mandate to appeal the Commission’s decision

and have their constitutional claims heard again in state court. See Baffert, 332 F.3d at 620

(finding the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to have his constitutional issues adjudicated

where he raised them in the administrative proceeding and would have another opportunity to

raise his constitutional claims in state court by way of writ of mandate). The Court therefore

finds that Plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise their constitutional claims and have them

adjudicated before their licences are revoked. 

In addition, the Court notes that the Commission’s decision will not become effective

until December 26, 2006. Therefore, Plaintiffs may immediately file a writ in state court and

request a stay before the Permit is actually revoked. See Kenneally, 967 F.2d at 332-33

(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to present his

constitutional claims to state court because he could file a writ and request a stay of the

administrative order before the revocation of his licence became effective). Accordingly, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs have had, and continue to have, adequate opportunities to raise the

federal issues they seek to address in this action.

Finally, the Court finds that there are no applicable exceptions barring the application of

the Younger doctrine here. Plaintiffs argue that two exceptions are satisfied here, but the Court

disagrees. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not abstain because, according to

Plaintiffs, the statute at issue is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional. Younger, 401 U.S. at

53-54. To demonstrate this exception to the Younger doctrine, Plaintiffs must show that Section

8271.9 is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every

clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might

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be made to apply it.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that Section 8279.1 is flagrantly unconstitutional

because it discriminates against interstate commerce. Section 8279.1 may be applied to

California residents for fishing wholly with the state of California. See Cal. Fish & Game Code

§ 8279.1 (a), (b). Even under Plaintiffs’ arguments, such an application would not violate the

Dormant Commerce Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, this exception

does not apply.

Plaintiffs next argue that the proceedings were brought in bad faith. “[W]here a state

tribunal has been found incompetent by reason of bias, the Supreme Court has held that there

was effectively no opportunity to litigate constitutional claims.” Kenneally, 967 F.2d at 333

(quoting Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Bias exists where a court

has prejudged, or reasonably appears to have prejudged, an issue.” Id. The Supreme Court has

cautioned that a party alleging bias has a “difficult burden of persuasion to carry.” Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). To demonstrate bias, the party “must overcome a presumption

of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a

realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative

and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment

that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately

implemented.” Id. The Court concludes that the evidence and arguments proffered by Plaintiffs

in support of the alleged bias are insufficient to meet this difficult burden. 

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3

 After the hearing on the pending motions, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file

an amended complaint. Plaintiffs seek to add a claim for damages which, if such a claim

were in the complaint, would require the Court to stay, rather than dismiss this action. See

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that actions in which

damages are at issue should not be dismissed pursuant to Younger doctrine; “rather, damages

actions should be stayed until the state proceedings are completed”). However, the

complaint, in its current state, does not include a claim for damages. Although Plaintiffs

filed a motion for leave to amend, the motion was just filed and is not yet ripe. Because the

Court has resolved the threshold Younger doctrine and found that the Younger doctrine

applies, the Court must dismiss this action and may not rule upon the motion for leave to

amend. Cf. Meredith, 321 F.3d at 816 (“if the district court is required to abstain under

Younger and dismiss the suit, then it has no authority to rule on a party’s motion for a

preliminary injunction”).

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Accordingly, in the absence of any applicable exception to the Younger doctrine, the

Court must dismiss this action without prejudice.3 The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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