Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01522/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01522-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HUFTILE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1522 FCD DAD P

vs.

L.C. MICCIO-FONSECA, ORDER AND

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to California’s Sexually

Violent Predators Act (SVPA), California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600, et seq. and is

proceeding pro se with a civil rights action seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Following remand by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, this court directed the U.S.

Marshal to serve process on defendant Miccio-Fonseca and ordered the defendant to file her

response to the complaint. (Order filed 5/10/06 at 2.) 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is now before the court. In that

motion defendant Miccio-Fonseca argues that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable

claim, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the Younger abstention doctrine, and that

plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion,

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but instead has filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for preliminary

injunction and motion to reinstate his claim for declaratory relief and damages.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may amend his or her

pleading “once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). A motion to dismiss, such as that filed by defendant here, is not a "responsive

pleading" within the meaning of Rule 15. See Crum v. Circus Circus Enterprises, 231 F.3d 1129,

1130 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, plaintiff did not need to obtain leave of

court to file his amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended pleading is

filed, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Id.; see also E.D. Local

Rule 15-220. In light of plaintiff’s amended complaint, defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

denied without prejudice. The court will set a deadline for defendant to file either her answer or

a new motion to dismiss the amended complaint. If defendant Miccio-Fonseca elects to proceed

by filing another motion to dismiss, she may incorporate by reference any applicable arguments

presented in the motion she has already filed. 

Defendant has also requested that this court take judicial notice of the cases

brought in state court by plaintiff, this court’s May 10, 2006 order directing service by the U.S.

Marshal, the waiver of service of summons, and plaintiff’s habeas petition filed with the District

Court. The request will be granted. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.

1980) (“a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records

of an inferior court in other cases.”); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1

(N.D. Cal. 1978) (“the power of a court to take judicial notice of its own records is amply

established”).

In his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff contends that defendant

Miccio-Fonseca used an “illegal Clinical Evaluator’s Handbook and Standardized Assessment

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 At the time plaintiff filed his complaint, he had been civilly detained at Atascadero 1

State Prison since November 19, 2002. On December 10, 2003, plaintiff was discharged to

California Department of Corrections custody following revocation of his parole for being in

possession of child pornography. A civil recommitment trial was set for August 23, 2005. See

Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the court does not

have further information about the trial, it appears that plaintiff was found to meet the criteria for

civil commitment. On September 6, 2005, plaintiff was transferred to Coalinga State Hospital

where he remains detained. (Second Am. Compl., Attach. at 6.) 

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Protocol (SAP) manual” in her March 26, 2001 psychological evaluation and June 27, 2002

updated evaluation which were used for plaintiff’s SVPA proceeding. Although defendant 1

Miccio-Fonseca has not conducted further evaluations of plaintiff, plaintiff argues that her

evaluation continues to harm him because it is relied upon by other evaluators and taints their

evaluations. Plaintiff attaches portions of commitment evaluations conducted by three clinical

psychologists in 2004 and 2005, listing defendant’s evaluations along with several other

documents which were reviewed in the preparation of those evaluations.

The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well

established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122

F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374,

1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal

point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under

any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

The court finds that plaintiff’s motion is defective and premature. Plaintiff has

failed to comply with Local Rule 65-231(d) which requires a brief on the legal issues and a

declaration that demonstrates irreparable injury. Furthermore, since this action is proceeding

solely as an action for injunctive relief, a motion requesting the same relief is premature. Finally,

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plaintiff is advised that the documents attached to his motion are not sufficient by themselves to

demonstrate irreparable harm. 

On September 14, 2006, plaintiff filed a document styled, “Motion And Notice Of

Motion To Reinstate Declaratory Relief And Damages Based Upon Newly Discovered

Evidence.” Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the fact that he was

discharged from Department of Mental Health jurisdiction and turned over to the California

Department of Corrections in 2003, and that his claim for damages and declaratory relief are

therefore not Heck-barred as was determined in Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th

Cir. 2005). In this regard, the Ninth Circuit made the following determination:

The district court record does not include a transcript of Huftile’s

civil commitment proceeding. However, the structure of the SVPA

statutory scheme indicates that the success of Huftile’s § 1983

claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil

commitment. Before the California Director of Mental Health can

forward a request for an SVPA commitment petition to the

appropriate county, two evaluators must agree that “the person has

a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in

acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d). An attorney for that county

may then file a petition for commitment. Id. § 6601(I). A judge

must then review this petition to determine whether there is

probable cause to believe that the person “is likely to engage in

sexually violent predatory criminal behavior” upon release. Id. §

6602(a). Because Dr. Miccio-Fonseca was one of Huftile’s

evaluators, a judgment in favor of Huftile in his § 1983 action

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil commitment. 

That is, if only one evaluator, rather than two, had concluded that

Huftile had a “mental disorder” within the meaning of § 6601(d),

there would have been no basis for the state Director of Mental

Health to send the request to the county, no basis for the county

attorney to file a petition for commitment, and no basis for the

judge to go forward with a probable cause determination. 

Id. at 1140-41. 

Plaintiff presented this same argument recently in Huftile v. Vognsen, No. CIV S03-0604 DFL JFM P (Court doc. no. 29, filed 9/14/06). In that case, the assigned magistrate

judge recommended that plaintiff’s argument be rejected, stating as follows:.

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 The revocation of plaintiff’s parole had no legal impact on his

civil commitment other than to terminate his custody in the

Department of Mental Health and return him to the custody of the

Department of Corrections. His discharge from the civil

commitment did not invalidate or call into question the underlying

validity of the civil commitment. . . .

 Moreover, because the circuit court was aware of plaintiff’s

2003 transfer from the Department of Mental Health to the custody

of the California Department of Corrections at the time plaintiff

appealed the Heck dismissal in Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410

F.3d at 1136, this court is bound to follow the court’s finding that

plaintiff is barred form seeking declaratory relief or damages

“unless and until his civil commitment is invalidated.” Id. t 1142. 

Just because the circuit court did not expressly reference the fact

that plaintiff had been transferred to the custody of the California

Department of Corrections does not mean that the court did not

consider that fact in reaching its decision.

(Id., court doc. no. 35, filed 11/30/06 at 3-4.) For these same reasons plaintiff’s motion to

reinstate his claims for declaratory relief and damages in this case should also be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s July 24, 2006 motion to dismiss the complaint is denied without

prejudice;

2. Within thirty days from the service of this order, defendant shall file and serve

an answer or a new motion to dismiss the amended complaint. If defendant’s response is a

motion to dismiss, plaintiff shall file his opposition or statement of non-opposition within thirty

days from the service of the motion. Defendant’s reply, if any, shall be filed within fourteen days

thereafter;

3. Defendant’s July 24, 2006 request for judicial notice is granted; and

4. Plaintiff’s August 14, 2006 motion for preliminary injunction is denied as

defective and premature.

Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s September 14, 2006

motion to reinstate declaratory relief and damages be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 7, 2006.

DAD:4

huft1522.mtd1

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