Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00057/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY LYNN NORWOOD,

CDC# J-53407,

Civil No. 07-0057 WQH (JMA)

Plaintiff,

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL FILING

FEE, GARNISHING PAYMENT OF

$350 FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT, AND 

(2) DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) 

& 1915A(b)(1)

[Doc. No. 2]

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Gregory Norwood, an inmate currently incarcerated at the California

Correctional Institution located in Tehachapi, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint Plaintiff alleges, while he was

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, he was placed in administrative segregation (“ad-seg”)

in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff also alleges that

Calipatria officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they deprived him of outdoor

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exercise for a lengthy period of time. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Plaintiff has also submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure

to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners

granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), further

requires that each prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP submit a “certified copy of [his] trust

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Using these certified trust

account statements, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposit, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever

is greater, and collect that amount as the prisoner’s initial partial filing fee, unless he has no

current assets with which to pay. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner must collect

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which

his account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is

paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit that complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1) [Doc. No. 3] as well as a certified copy of his prison trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement

indicates that he has insufficient funds to pay a partial initial filing fee. Accordingly, the Court

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hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3], and assesses no initial partial

filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (court shall assess initial partial filing fee only

“when funds exist”); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from

bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely

on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”).

However, Plaintiff is required to pay the full $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a)

and 1915(b)(1), by subjecting any future funds credited to his prison trust account to the

installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Motion Requesting Certification of Class Action

In addition to his Complaint, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for Class Action Certification.”

However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the violation of the rights of other detainees,

he has no standing, for pro se litigants have no authority to represent the interests of anyone

other than themselves. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“Art. III judicial power exists

only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party.... A federal

court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some

threatened or actual injury.”) (quotations and citation omitted); Johns v. County of San Diego,

114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); see also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d

696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that while a nonattorney may represent himself, he has no

authority to appear as an attorney for others). Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for

Class Action Certification.

III. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

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practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited

to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court

reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting

service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun,

254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur

“before service of process is made on the opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1121. In addition, while screening a Complaint under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court has

the same duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings as it does under Rule 12, but it may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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B. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 authorizes a ‘suit in equity, or other proper proceeding

for redress’ against any person who, under color of state law, ‘subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution.’” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc). 

1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was denied his right to due process during his

disciplinary hearing resulting in his placement in administrative segregation. (Compl. at 4-11.)

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant

prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances

in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995),

a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant

hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his placement in Ad-Seg which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

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confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

I. Outdoor Exercise claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied outdoor exercise from November 7, 2005 until

December 16, 2005 in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Compl. at 13.) “Whatever

rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth amendment most

certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of

crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). The

Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that

prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1981). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain,” which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that

it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183

(1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This

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1

 Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, § 3383(a), which governs "States of

Emergency" provides that "[a]n institution head may temporarily suspend any nonessential facility

operation, procedure, service or function, and the normal time limits or schedules for such activity in

order to prevent, contain or control a widespread facility disturbance. This may include but is not

limited to confinement of inmates to quarters, a lock down, and the control of all individual inmate

movement in affected areas."

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includes not only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.

86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

Although prison administrators generally have broad discretion in determining whether

to declare emergencies and impose “lockdowns” to control institutional disturbances,1

 the

conditions imposed during the lockdown may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980). To assert an

Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must

satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. This objective component is

satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Wright v. Rushen, 642 f.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.

1981).

The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Finally, the Court must

analyze each claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations

may not be based on the “totality of conditions” at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 246-47;

Wright, 642 F.2d at 1132.

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////

In Spain, the court stated that “regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the

psychological and physical well being of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. While a

temporary denial of outdoor exercise would not necessarily rise to the level of a constitutional

violation, Plaintiff’s allegations of a several month denial of outdoor exercise may meet the

objective requirement for stating an Eighth Amendment claim. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (complete denial of outdoor recreation for six and one half weeks was

sufficient to satisfy the objective requirement). However, Plaintiff must also allege that

Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the named Defendants acted with

“deliberate indifference.” 

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b)(1). Because

it is not altogether certain that Plaintiff would be unable to allege additional facts which might

state a claim against Defendant, however, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity

to amend his pleading in light of the standards set forth above. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty

five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in which to file a First Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D.

Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: March 15, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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