Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15112/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15112-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RIVER RUNNERS FOR WILDERNESS; 

ROCK THE EARTH; WILDERNESS

WATCH; LIVING RIVERS, nonprofit

corporations,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STEPHEN P. MARTIN, in his official

capacity as Superintendent of

Grand Canyon National Park;

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL PARK No. 08-15112 SERVICE; NATIONAL PARK SERVICE;

KENNETH D.C. No. L. SALAZAR, in his 

official capacity as Secretary of CV-06-00894-DGC

the U.S. Department of the OPINION

Interior; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

DIANE J. HUMETEWA; ERIC H.

HOLDER JR.,

Defendants-Appellees,

GRAND CANYON RIVER OUTFITTERS

ASSOCIATION; GRAND CANYON

PRIVATE BOATERS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-IntervenorsAppellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 10, 2009—San Francisco, California

1785

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Filed February 1, 2010

Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Betty B. Fletcher and

Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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COUNSEL

Julia A. Olson, Wild Earth Advocates, Eugene, Oregon, and

Matthew K. Bishop, Western Environmental Law Center,

Helena, Montana, for the plaintiffs-appellants. 

Charles R. Scott, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Federal appellees.

Sam Kalen, Van Ness Feldman, PC, Washington, D.C., for

defendant-intervenor-appellee Grand Canyon River Outfitters

Association. 

Lori Potter, Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP, Denver, Colorado, for defendant-intervenor-appellee Grand Canyon Private

Boaters Association.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case concerns the National Park Service’s decision to

permit the continued use of motorized rafts and support

equipment in Grand Canyon National Park. Plaintiffs contend

that such motorized activities impair the wilderness character

of the Canyon and that the Park Service’s decision violates its

management policies and various federal statutes. Plaintiffs

asked the District Court to set aside the decision under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). For reasons

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explained in this opinion, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the high

threshold required to set aside federal agency actions under

the APA.1

I. Background.

Grand Canyon National Park (“Park”) was established by

Congress in 1919 and expanded in 1975. The Park consists of

more than 1.2 million acres located on the southern end of the

Colorado Plateau in Arizona. 

The Park includes a 277-mile stretch of the Colorado River

referred to in this order as the “Colorado River Corridor” or

the “Corridor.” The Park Service regulates the Colorado River

Corridor through a periodically-revised Colorado River Management Plan (“Management Plan”). In November of 2005,

the Park Service issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) for the 2006 Management Plan. On February

17, 2006, the Park Service issued a Record of Decision

(“ROD”) that adopted and approved the 2006 Management

Plan. The 2006 Management Plan permits the continued use

of motorized rafts, generators, and helicopters in the Colorado

River Corridor. 

Plaintiffs River Runners for Wilderness, Rock the Earth,

Wilderness Watch, and Living Rivers constitute a coalition of

organizations committed to protecting and restoring the Grand

Canyon’s wilderness character and unique natural resources

and ensuring fair access to it. Plaintiffs filed this action

against the Park Service and various individual Defendants.2

1The wording of Judge Campbell’s carefully crafted district court opinion with its detailed factual discussion and thorough analysis, with which

we agree, has been utilized in this opinion. 

2The named individual Defendants included Joseph F. Alston, superintendent of the Park; Fran Mainella, director of the Park Service; Gale Norton, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; the

Department of the Interior; Paul K. Charlton, former United States Attorney for Arizona; and Alberto R. Gonzales, former Attorney General. 

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The district court subsequently permitted two private organizations to intervene in the action — Grand Canyon River Outfitters Association, which consists of commercial operators of

motorized and non-motorized rafts in the Colorado River Corridor, and Grand Canyon Private Boaters Association, which

consists of private rafters and kayakers of the Corridor (collectively, “Intervenors”).

Following exchanges of information and compilation of the

administrative record, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Intervenors

all filed motions for summary judgment. The district court

held oral argument on October 26, 2007. 

A. Park Service Management of the Colorado River

Corridor.

The waters of the Colorado River originate in the mountains of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah and run 1,450 miles

to the Gulf of California. The Colorado is the longest and

largest river in the Southwestern United States. Once in the

Grand Canyon, the river flows some 4,000 to 6,000 feet

below the rim of the Canyon through cliffs, spires, pyramids,

and successive escarpments of colored stone. Access to the

bottom of the Grand Canyon can be gained only by hiking,

riding mules, or floating the river. Those floating the river

typically do so in motor-powered rubber rafts, oar- or paddlepowered rubber rafts, oar-powered dories, or kayaks. Floating

the river through the Grand Canyon is considered one of

America’s great outdoor adventures and includes some of the

largest white-water rapids in the United States.

Use of the Colorado River Corridor increased substantially

after Glen Canyon Dam was completed in 1963 and produced

a relatively steady flow through the Canyon. Because of this

increased use, the Park Service initiated a series of river planning and management efforts, culminating in a December

1972 River Use Plan. The plan concluded that “motorized

craft should be phased-out of use in the Grand Canyon.” The

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plan also concluded that 89,000 commercial user days and

7,600 non-commercial user days would be allocated for the

1973 season, but that commercial use would be scaled down

to 55,000 user days by 1977.3 A 1973 Draft Environmental

Impact Statement concluded that “[t]he use of motors . . .

should be eliminated as soon as possible from the river environment” and that “[t]he propose[d] elimination of motorized

trips will . . . hav[e] a positive environmental impact.”

The Park Service initiated a Colorado River Research Program in 1974 to examine, among other things, the impact of

motorized activities on the river. In September of 1977, the

Park Service issued a document suggesting that “the use of

motors is contrary to established health and safety standards”

and again opining that the “use of motorized craft should be

eliminated.” The document noted that “[n]on-motorized travel

is more compatible with wilderness experience” and that

“[m]otor noise levels may have adverse effects on pilot performance, resulting in potential safety hazards.” The Park Service was unable, however, to document any difference in

numbers and degree of injuries between the two types of craft.

The Park Service released the first Management Plan in

December of 1979. Use of motorized watercraft between Lees

Ferry and Separation Canyon was to be phased out over a

five-year period. The 1979 Management Plan stated that such

a phase-out was consistent with the “objective of the [1976]

Master Plan[,] corresponded with the park wilderness proposal,” and was “based on the extensive Colorado River Research

project for the Grand Canyon[.]” The Management Plan

increased the allocated commercial user days from 89,000 per

3

“A ‘user day’ is calculated by multiplying the number of passengers by

the number of days. (A ‘day’ is defined as any portion of a 24-hour day.)

For example, if the [permit] holder has two clients on a two day trip, this

would equal four user days.” National Park Service, How a Commercial

Use Authorization Works, https://cms.imr.nps.gov/bibe/parkmgmt/cuaoperations.htm (last updated June 9, 2007). 

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year to 115,500 and increased the allocated non-commercial

user days from 7,600 to 54,450. In September 1980, the Park

Service proposed that the Colorado River Corridor be designated as “potential wilderness” and, once motorboat use was

phased-out, as “wilderness.”

Congress countermanded the 1979 Management Plan in a

1981 appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior.

The bill prohibited the use of appropriated funds “for the

implementation of any management plan for the Colorado

River within the [Park] which reduces the number of user

days or passenger-launches for commercial motorized watercraft excursions[.]” Members of Congress sent a letter to the

Park Service expressing their “wish that the [1979 Management Plan] be amended to accommodate the 1978 level and

pattern of commercial, motorized watercraft access while at

the same time protecting the increased non-commercial allocation which the plan provides.” The Park Service subsequently revised the 1979 Management Plan to “retain[ ]

motorized use and the increase in user-days that had been

intended as compensation for the phase-out of motors, resulting in more motorized use of the river.”

The Park Service issued a second Management Plan in

1989. The 1989 Management Plan was similar to the revised

1979 Management Plan. It included the same allocation of

user days for commercial and non-commercial boaters, but

increased the number of non-commercial launches.

B. The 2006 Management Plan.

Planning for the 2006 Management Plan began in 1997

with the solicitation of public comments and a series of public

workshops in Oregon, Utah, and Arizona. After this process

was suspended and restarted following the filing of two lawsuits, the Park Service published in the Federal Register, on

June 13, 2002, a notice of intent to prepare an environmental

impact statement for a revised Management Plan. Seven addiRIVER RUNNERS v. MARTIN 1793

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tional public meetings and stakeholder workshops were held

in Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Maryland, and California. More than one thousand people attended the meetings and

the Park Service received more than 13,000 written submissions.

In the Fall of 2004, the Park Service released for public

review a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”) for

the revised Management Plan. The DEIS presented eight

alternatives (Alternatives A-H) for managing the river from

Lees Ferry to Diamond Creek, a stretch of 226 miles (referred

to in this order as the “Lees Ferry Segment”) and five alternatives (Alternatives 1-5) for managing the river from Diamond

Creek to Lake Mead, a stretch of 51 miles (referred to in this

order as the “Lower Gorge.”) The alternatives included

motorized and non-motorized options. Because of the complexity of the DEIS and the level of public interest, the Park

Service extended the standard 90-day comment period for one

additional month. The Park Service also hosted public meetings in Colorado, Utah, Washington, D.C., Nevada, Arizona,

and California. The Park Service received some 10,000 written submissions, including approximately 6,000 substantive

and 30,000 non-substantive comments on the DEIS. The Park

Service coded, organized, analyzed, and responded to the substantive comments, and modified the DEIS where it felt modifications were warranted. 

The Park Service received comments from a coalition of

groups representing both commercial and non-commercial

boaters of the Colorado River Corridor — groups often at

odds with each other on issues of river management. The

coalition included Intervenors, American Whitewater, and

Grand Canyon River Runners Association. The coalition supported equal allocation of river time between commercial and

non-commercial boaters and the continued authorization of

appropriate levels of motorized use.

In November 2005, the Park Service issued the threevolume Final Environmental Impact Statement. The FEIS

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addressed the same alternatives discussed in the DEIS, with

some modifications to Alternatives H and 4, and expressed a

preference for Modified Alternative H for the Lees Ferry Segment and Modified Alternative 4 for the Lower Gorge. The

selected alternatives permitted the use of motorized rafts, generators for emergencies and inflating rafts, and helicopters to

make passenger exchanges at the Whitmore helipad. As noted

above, in February 2006, the Park Service issued a ROD that

formally adopted Modified Alternatives H and 4 for the 2006

Management Plan.

II. The District Court’s Task.

Plaintiffs argue that the 2006 Management Plan is unlawful

and should be set aside. The court’s task is not to make its

own judgment about whether motorized rafts should be

allowed in the Colorado River Corridor. Congress has delegated that responsibility to the Park Service. The court’s

responsibility is narrower: to determine whether the Park Service’s 2006 Management Plan comports with the requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

The APA does not allow the court to overturn an agency

decision because it disagrees with the decision or with the

agency’s conclusions about environmental impacts. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427

U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). An agency’s decision may be set

aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). The standard is deferential. The court “may not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the

wisdom or prudence of [the agency’s] action.” Or. Envtl.

Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987).

In conducting an APA review, the court must determine

whether the agency’s decision is “founded on a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made . . . and

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whether [the agency] has committed a clear error of judgment.” Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife,

273 F.3d 1229, 1243 (9th Cir. 2001). “The [agency’s] action

. . . need only be a reasonable, not the best or most reasonable,

decision.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849, 855

(9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffs assert that the 2006 Management Plan is arbitrary

and capricious under the APA because it violates the Park

Service’s own policies, the National Park Service Concessions Management and Improvement Act (“Concessions

Act”), and the National Park Service Organic Act (“Organic

Act”). Each of these arguments will be addressed separately,

and this opinion is precedential only as to those issues

appealed.

III. Compliance with Park Service Policies.

A. Enforceability of the Policies.

Even though Congress has never acted on the Park Service’s recommendation to designate a substantial portion of

the Park as wilderness, Plaintiffs claim that the Park Service’s

own policies give rise to a legally binding obligation to maintain the wilderness character of the Park. Plaintiffs claim that

the Park Service has breached this legal duty by authorizing

the continued use of motorized activities in the 2006 Management Plan. Defendants and Intervenors argue that the Park

Service policies do not have the force and effect of law and

therefore may not be enforced against the Park Service in this

action. 

In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs identified

three policies that allegedly create binding obligations on the

Park Service: the 1976 Master Plan, the 1995 General Management Plan, and the 2001 Park Service Management Policies (the “2001 Policies”). Two of these arguments — the

1976 Master Plan and the 1995 General Management Plan —

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are not on appeal. Plaintiffs instead focus on the 2001 Policies, arguing that they are binding because they are written in

mandatory language, were mentioned in the Federal Register,

and have been found binding in S. Utah Wilderness Alliance

v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Utah 2005). 

In United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685

F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982), we established a two-part test for

determining when agency pronouncements have the force and

effect of law: 

To have the force and effect of law, enforceable

against an agency in federal court, the agency pronouncement must (1) prescribe substantive rules —

not interpretive rules, general statements of policy or

rules of agency organization, procedure or practice

— and (2) conform to certain procedural requirements. To satisfy the first requirement the rule must

be legislative in nature, affecting individual rights

and obligations; to satisfy the second, it must have

been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory

grant of authority and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by Congress.

Id. at 1136 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 

[1] The 2001 Policies fail the first part of the Eclectus Parrots test because they do not purport to prescribe substantive

rules. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit recently held with respect to these very

Policies: “While the text of the Policies on occasion uses

mandatory language, such as ‘will’ and ‘must,’ the document

as a whole does not read as a set of rules. It lacks precision

in its directives, and there is no indication of how the enumerated policies are to be prioritized.” The Wilderness Soc’y v.

Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

[2] The text of the 2001 Policies makes clear that they are

intended only to provide guidance within the Park Service,

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not to establish rights in the public generally. The Introduction describes the Policies as a “basic Service-wide policy

document,” as a “guidance document[ ],” and as a statement

of policy “designed to provide [Park Service] management

and staff with clear and continuously updated information . . .

that will help them manage parks and programs effectively.”

That the 2001 Policies are not intended to have the same force

as binding Park Service regulations is made clear by the Introduction’s explanation that existing, formally-promulgated

Park Service regulations will trump inconsistent provisions in

the 2001 Policies until such time as the regulations “are formally revised through the rulemaking procedure[.]”

Equally significant, the Introduction to the 2001 Policies

provides that Park Service management can choose to waive

or modify the Policies: “Adherence to policy is mandatory

unless specifically waived or modified in writing by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, or the Director.” “Waivers and

modifications will be considered on a case-by-case basis,” the

Policies explain. Needless to say, policy statements that may

be waived or modified by an agency can hardly be said to

have the binding force of law. As the D.C. Circuit noted, “this

language does not evidence an intent on the part of the agency

to limit its discretion and create enforceable rights. Rather, the

agency’s top administrators clearly reserved for themselves

unlimited discretion to order and reorder all management priorities.” Wilderness Soc’y, 434 F.3d at 596. 

Nor do the 2001 Policies purport to create substantive individual rights or obligations for persons or entities outside the

Park Service. The Policies set forth priorities, practices, and

procedures to be followed by Park Service personnel in

administering the national park system. In the words of Eclectus Parrots, they are “interpretive rules, general statements of

policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice[.]” 685 F.2d at 1136 (quotes and citations omitted). See

also United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161,

1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (agency rule did not have the force or

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effect of law in part because “[i]t was not intended to create

substantive rights in third parties”); Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d

864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2000) (agency provision did not satisfy

the Eclectus Parrots test, as it “creates no substantive rights”

and instead “provides [agency] staff with internal procedures”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979)

(whether an agency pronouncement affects individual rights

and obligations “is an important touchstone for distinguishing

those rules that may be binding or have the force of law”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The 2001 Policies also fail the second part of the Eclectus

Parrots test. The APA requires that “publication or service of

a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before

its effective date.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). The 2001 Policies were

not published in the Federal Register. The Park Service did

publish a notice of the availability of a draft of the 2001 Policies and a notice of new policy, but never published the 2001

Policies themselves. See 65 Fed. Reg. 2984 (Jan. 19, 2000);

65 Fed. Reg. 56003 (Sept. 15, 2000). What is more important,

the Policies were never published in the Code of Federal Regulations. This suggests that the Park Service did not intend to

announce substantive rules enforceable by third parties in federal court. See W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896,

901 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating, in its determination that two

agency documents did not satisfy the Eclectus Parrots test,

that “[n]either [document] is published in the Federal Register

or the Code of Federal Regulations”). The D.C. Circuit found

this lack of publication “particularly noteworthy” in concluding that the 2001 Policies are not substantive law. Wilderness

Soc’y, 434 F.3d at 595; see also Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs

Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The real

dividing point between regulations and general statements of

policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations[.]”).

This conclusion is bolstered by the Park Service’s own

characterization of the 2001 Policies. In its Federal Register

announcement that a draft of the 2001 Policies was available

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for public comment, the Park Service explained that “park

superintendents, planners, and other [Park Service] employees

use management policies as a reference source when making

decisions that will affect units of the national park system.”

65 Fed. Reg. 2984 (Jan. 19, 2000). A “reference source,” of

course, is not the same as binding substantive law. 

[3] In sum, the 2001 Policies are not enforceable against

the Park Service in this action. The Policies do not prescribe

substantive rules, nor were they promulgated in conformance

with the procedures of the APA. Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d

at 1136. The Court therefore may not set aside the 2006 Management Plan because it fails to comply with portions of the

2001 Policies requiring the Park Service to treat the Colorado

River Corridor as wilderness or potential wilderness.

B. Plaintiffs’ Chevron Cases.

Plaintiffs argue that the lack of formal rulemaking does not

prevent the 2001 Policies from having the force and effect of

law. For support, Plaintiffs rely primarily on United States v.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and S. Utah Wilderness

Alliance, 387 F.Supp.2d 1178. Plaintiffs in Mead challenged

a tariff ruling by the United States Customs Service. Plaintiffs

in S. Utah Wilderness Alliance challenged a decision by the

Park Service to ban motorized vehicles in a portion of Canyonlands National Park. In both cases the courts were

required to decide whether the agency decisions were entitled

to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

The Supreme Court explained Chevron deference in this

manner: when Congress has expressed an expectation that an

agency will speak with the force of law and resolve ambiguities or fill gaps in statutory law, “a reviewing court has no

business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority . . . simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems unwise, but is obligated to accept the agency’s

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position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at

issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable[.]” Mead,

533 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted). In short, Courts are not to

interfere with reasonable agency decisions rendered within

areas where Congress has authorized the agencies to act.

[4] Among other considerations, a court applying the Chevron doctrine asks whether an agency decision is intended by

Congress to have the force of law. The Supreme Court noted

in Mead that the existence of formal notice-and-comment

rulemaking is a strong indicator of such authority. The

Supreme Court went on to explain, however, that “as significant as notice-and-comment rulemaking is in pointing to

Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not

decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for

Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded[.]” Id. at 230-31. The

District Court in S. Utah Wilderness Alliance relied on this

language and found that Chevron deference was due the Park

Service’s decision to ban motorized vehicles in Canyonlands

even though the decision was based on the 2001 Policies that

were not adopted through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1187-88. Plaintiffs rely on this

holding and the above-quoted language from Mead to argue

that the same 2001 Policies should have the force and effect

of law in this case.

There is a difference, however, between application of the

Chevron doctrine in SUWA and the question to be decided in

this case. The plaintiffs in SUWA argued that the 2001 Policies were not entitled to deference and that a decision based

on them should be set aside. The District Court relied on the

Chevron doctrine to conclude that the 2001 Policies provided

a sound basis for deference to the Park Service — a shield for

the agency’s decision concerning the proper administration of

Canyonlands National Park. Plaintiffs in this case seek an

opposite result — to use the same 2001 Policies as a sword

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to set aside Park Service decisions concerning the proper

administration of Grand Canyon National Park. 

[5] Chevron analysis does not control this case. Whether

an agency’s decision falls within the scope of activity

intended by Congress to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps in the

governing statutes and therefore is entitled to deference in the

courts is a different question than whether an agency’s decision becomes binding law that gives outside parties the right

to enforce the decision against the agency in court. The first

question asks whether the agency has acted within the realm

and with the expertise Congress intended. The second focuses

on the substance and form of the agency’s action and asks

whether the agency intended to promulgate binding law for

itself and the outside world. This case presents the second

question — a question to be decided under Eclectus Parrots.

As explained above, the 2001 Policies are not enforceable

against the Park Service under Eclectus Parrots.

C. The Policies Do Not Render the 2006 Management

Plan Arbitrary and Capricious.

[6] Citing Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057

(9th Cir. 2005), and related cases, Plaintiffs alternatively

argue that the 2006 Management Plan is arbitrary and capricious even if the 2001 Policies do not have the force and

effect of law. We held in Ecology Center that the Forest Service could not disregard a non-binding soil standard when the

Forest Service’s own environmental impact statement purported to comply with the standard. To disregard the standard,

we held, would render the environmental impact statement

misleading and unlawful. Id. at 1069. Plaintiffs argue that

because the FEIS and ROD purport to follow the 2001 Policies and the 1995 General Management Plan, but in fact fail

to do so, they are arbitrary and capricious. We do not agree.

Plaintiffs base their argument on the fact that the Colorado

River Corridor has been classified by the Park Service as

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potential wilderness. The 2001 Policies provide the following

guidance with respect to the management of potential wilderness areas: 

The National Park Service will take no action that

would diminish the wilderness suitability of an area

possessing wilderness characteristics until the legislative process of wilderness designation has been

completed. . . . This policy also applies to potential

wilderness, requiring it to be managed as wilderness

to the extent that existing non-conforming conditions

allow. The National Park Service will seek to

remove from potential wilderness the temporary,

non-conforming conditions that preclude wilderness

designation.

2001 Policies § 6.3.1 (SAR 016136-37). The FEIS makes this

same commitment with respect to the Colorado River Corridor. See FEIS Vol. I at 234.

[7] The language of § 6.3.1 makes clear that the Park Service is required to manage potential wilderness areas as actual

wilderness only “to the extent that existing non-conforming

conditions allow.” This language does not require the Park

Service immediately to remove existing non-conforming uses

— in this case, motorized rafts. It requires the Park Service

to manage the Colorado River Corridor as wilderness to the

extent possible given the existing use of motors. In light of

this clear provision, the court cannot conclude that the 2006

Management Plan is arbitrary and capricious for failing to

remove motorized uses in the Colorado River Corridor immediately.4

4Nor did Plaintiffs appear to believe that immediate removal was

required when they submitted written comments on the DEIS. Plaintiffs

did not assert that the 2001 Policies required the immediate removal of

motorized uses, but instead endorsed a plan to “phas[e] out motorized use

over a reasonable time period not to exceed 10 years.” AR 050222. 

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Section 6.3.1 further states that the Park Service “will seek

to remove from potential wilderness the temporary, nonconforming conditions that preclude wilderness designation.”

2001 Policies § 6.3.1 (SAR 016137). Seasonal uses of motors

on the river do not preclude wilderness designation. Plaintiffs

do not contend that such uses work any permanent change on

the Corridor that would preclude later wilderness treatment.

Seasonal float trips are not like the construction of a road or

other physical improvements that might disqualify an area for

wilderness designation in the future. Motorized float trips can

readily be eliminated if Congress decides that the Corridor

should be designated as wilderness. The FEIS concludes that

the use of motors in the Corridor “is only a temporary or transient disturbance of wilderness values” and “does not permanently impact wilderness resources or permanently denigrate

wilderness values.” FEIS, Vol. I at 17; see also AR 093108-

19 (discussion of limited effect of motorized uses on soils),

AR 093051 (same for water quality), AR 093083-84 (same

for air quality), AR 093132-33 (same for natural soundscape).5

We note, additionally, that federal agencies are entitled to

some leeway when interpreting their own policies and regulations. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)

(“provided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations

does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must

be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.”). When that leeway is added

to the Management Plan’s general consistency with the 2001

Policies, the court cannot conclude that the policies, even if

not enforceable in court, render the Management Plan arbitrary and capricious. 

5During oral argument, Plaintiffs asserted that § 6.4.3.3 of the 2001 Policies, which precludes motors in “wilderness” areas, trumps § 6.3.1. It

appears to the Court, however, that § 6.3.1 is the more relevant provision

because it applies specifically to areas “possessing wilderness characteristics” that have not yet been designated as wilderness by Congress — precisely the circumstance of the Colorado River Corridor. 

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[8] Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the 2006 Management Plan

is arbitrary and capricious because it contradicts earlier Park

Service decisions to phase out motorized boating in the Colorado River Corridor. As noted above, the 1979 Management

Plan called for motorized watercraft between Lees Ferry and

Separation Canyon to be phased out over a five-year period.

SAR 005244. The Court cannot conclude, however, that the

2006 Management Plan is arbitrary and capricious solely

because it differs from earlier Park Service decisions. Part of

the discretion granted to federal agencies is the freedom to

change positions. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n

agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change,

either with or without a change in circumstances. But an

agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis.”

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (quotation omitted). The question

posed by this lawsuit, therefore, is not whether the 2006 Management Plan differs from past Park Service decisions, but

whether it is arbitrary and capricious in light of facts in the

administrative record and the reasoning of the FEIS. For reasons explained herein, the court finds the 2006 Management

Plan sufficiently reasonable to pass APA muster.

IV. The Concessions Act.

[9] Plaintiffs contend that the 2006 Management Plan is

arbitrary and capricious because it fails to comply with the

requirements of the Concessions Act. The Act governs the

granting of commercial concessions within the National Park

System. “To make visits to national parks more enjoyable for

the public, Congress authorized [the Park Service] to grant

privileges, leases, and permits for the use of land for the

accommodation of visitors. Such privileges, leases, and permits have become embodied in national parks concession contracts.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior,

538 U.S. 803, 805-806 (2003). The specific provision of the

Act relied on by Plaintiffs articulates a Congressional “policy” for the granting of concessions:

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It is the policy of the Congress that the development of public accommodations, facilities, and services in units of the National Park System shall be

limited to those accommodations, facilities, and services that — 

(1) are necessary and appropriate for public use

and enjoyment of the unit of the National Park System in which they are located; and 

(2) are consistent to the highest practicable degree

with the preservation and conservation of the

resources and values of the unit.

16 U.S.C. § 5951(b).

Plaintiffs claim that the 2006 Management Plan is arbitrary

and capricious because the Park Service never determined that

the types and levels of motorized uses authorized by the Management Plan are necessary and appropriate for public use and

consistent with the Park’s resources and values. Before

addressing this argument, we must address the legal standard

that governs review of a Concessions Act claim.

A. Legal Standard Under the Concessions Act.

In support of their Concessions Act argument, Plaintiffs

rely heavily on High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390

F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004), a case in which we struck down the

Forest Service’s grant of permits to commercial packstock

operators in the Ansel Adams and John Muir Wilderness

Areas of California. The court held that the Forest Service

must make a finding that “the number of permits granted was

no more than was necessary to achieve the goals of the Act.”

Id. at 647. Plaintiffs argue that Blackwell requires a similar

Park Service finding for the number of motorized raft trips

permitted in the 2006 Management Plan. 

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It is significant, however, that the court in Blackwell was

applying the Wilderness Act, not the Concessions Act. The

Wilderness Act places strict limitations on the use of lands

formally designated by Congress as wilderness. With narrow

exceptions, the Wilderness Act prohibits commercial enterprises, permanent roads, and motorized vehicles in wilderness

areas. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). Federal agencies are obligated to

manage such areas to preserve their wilderness character. Id.

at § 1133(b). We explained in Blackwell that the Forest Service’s obligation to limit commercial packstock permits

“flows directly out of the agency’s obligation under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve wilderness areas.” 390

F.3d at 647. It was this “ultimate interest” and “overarching

purpose” of the Wilderness Act — to protect the Ansel

Adams and John Muir Wilderness Areas from degradation —

that led the Ninth Circuit to hold that the packstock permit

decision violated “the Forest Service’s statutory responsibility.” Id. at 647-48. 

This case, by contrast, does not concern a wilderness area.

Congress has never acted on the Park Service’s recommendation that portions of the Park be formally designated as wilderness. The Park Service, therefore, is not under the same

“statutory responsibility” that applied to the Forest Service in

Blackwell. The court must look to the Concessions Act, not

the Wilderness Act, for the governing legal standard.

In Wilderness Preservation Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250

(9th Cir. 1972), we decided a case under 16 U.S.C. § 20, the

statutory predecessor to the Concessions Act. See City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004)

(Kleppe decided under predecessor to Concessions Act); Pub.

L. 105-391, 1123 Stat. 3515 (16 U.S.C. § 20 superceded by

16 U.S.C. § 5951). The predecessor statute, like the Concessions Act, stated a Congressional “policy” that commercial

concessions in national parks should be “limited to those that

are necessary and appropriate for public use and enjoyment of

the national park area in which they are located.” Kleppe, 608

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F.2d at 1253. In rejecting a challenge under this policy to the

Park Service’s allocation of rafting permits in the Colorado

River Corridor, Kleppe recognized the “administrative discretion” granted the Park Service and invoked “a judicial presumption favoring the validity of administrative actions.” Id.

at 1254. 

[10] This more deferential standard appears to be warranted. The Park Service is charged with administering almost

400 national parks. See National Park Service, About Us,

http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visited October

22, 2009). The Concessions Act does not impose strict wilderness requirements on those parks, but instead articulates a policy that calls for the Park Service to balance the interests of

public use and resource preservation. 16 U.S.C. § 5951(b).

The Park Service’s balancing of those interests over the broad

range and diverse circumstances of hundreds of national parks

is appropriately accorded the kind of deference recognized in

Kleppe. The Court concludes that the deferential approach of

Kleppe, rather than the statutory application of the Wilderness

Act in Blackwell, should govern this case.

B. The 2006 Management Plan and the Concessions

Act.

Plaintiffs first contend that the Park Service failed entirely

to determine that the types and levels of commercial services

authorized by the 2006 Management Plan are necessary and

appropriate. We disagree. The Park Service made the following determinations:

Since many visitors who wish to raft on the Colorado River through Grand Canyon possess neither

the equipment nor the skill to successfully navigate

the rapids and other hazards of the river, the [Park

Service] has determined that it is necessary and

appropriate for the public use and enjoyment of the

park to provide for experienced and professional

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river guides who can provide such skills and equipment.

***

[S]ervices provided by commercial outfitters, which

enable thousands of people to experience the river in

a relatively primitive and unconfined manner and

setting (when many of them otherwise would be

unable to do so), are necessary to realize the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the park.

FEIS Vol. I at 19. 

Plaintiffs argue that although the Park Service may have

found commercial outfitters to be necessary and appropriate

generally, it never made such a finding for motorized commercial services. Again we disagree. The ROD specifically

states that “[d]etermination of the types and levels of commercial services that are necessary and appropriate for the Colorado River through Grand Canyon National Park were

determined through [the FEIS].” ROD at 6 (emphasis added).

Among the eight management alternatives considered by the

Park Service in the DEIS and FEIS were two that did not

authorize any motorized uses in the Colorado River Corridor

(Alternatives B and C). After evaluating these alternatives, the

Park Service found that they “violated the basic premise of

this planning effort; that of reducing congestion, crowding

and impacts without reducing access of visitors to the Colorado River[.]” FEIS Vol. III at 373. “As demonstrated by the

Park Service’s analysis of the no-motor alternatives, a decision by the Park Service to eliminate the motorized trip option

would cause a dramatic reduction in the public availability of

professionally outfitted river trips[.]” Id. at 87. The Park Service explained that “continued authorization of motorized use

for recreational river trips in the [Park] is essential . . . to

meeting the . . . management objectives” for the 2006 Management Plan. Id. Thus, the Park Service quite clearly conRIVER RUNNERS v. MARTIN 1809

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cluded that motorized commercial services were “necessary

and appropriate for public use and enjoyment” of the Corridor. 16 U.S.C. § 5951(b).

Plaintiffs contend that even if the Park Service found that

motorized services were necessary and appropriate, it made

no determination as to the amount of such services that are

necessary, and therefore failed to “limit” motorized uses to

those that are necessary and appropriate as required by the

Congressional policy statement of the Concessions Act. It is

true that the FEIS and ROD do not contain a specific discussion of the amount of motorized traffic found necessary and

appropriate for public use and enjoyment of the Corridor. But

the absence of such a specific discussion does not necessarily

require the agency’s action to be overturned. “While [a court]

may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that

the agency itself has not given, [the court] will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (citations omitted). The Park Service’s consideration of the amount of

motorized traffic required in the Colorado River Corridor can

reasonably be discerned from the FEIS.

The 1989 Management Plan established use levels that

were still in effect when the 2006 Management Plan planning

process began. Among the alternatives considered in the

DEIS and FEIS was a “no-action alternative” — an alternative that would have left the 1989 levels in place. This alternative, designated in the FEIS as Alternative A, would continue

to allocate 113,083 user days to commercial operators (74,260

motorized and 38,823 non-motorized) and 58,048 user days to

non-commercial users. FEIS Vol. I at 45. Alternative B would

have eliminated all motorized traffic on the river and allocated 97,694 user days to commercial operators and 74,523 to

non-commercial. Id. at 47. Alternative C also would have

eliminated all motorized trips, but would have increased commercial user days to 166,814 and non-commercial to 115,783,

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presumably to accommodate sufficient numbers of visitors

with the slower non-motorized trips. Id. at 49. Alternatives D,

E, F, and G would have permitted motorized uses, but varied

the amounts for commercial and non-commercial traffic. Id.

at 51-57. The levels of motorized user days for Alternatives

D, E, F, and G would have been 70,104, 76,913, 83,076, and

76,913, respectively. Id. 

User days were not the only variables evaluated by the Park

Service. The FEIS also considered months without motors on

the river, trip lengths, trip lengths during various parts of the

year, group sizes, numbers of launches, numbers of passengers, and helicopter exchanges at the Whitmore helipad. Id. at

61. The Park Service evaluated these alternatives against

environmental, social, and park-management factors including impacts on soils, water, air, soundscape, caves, vegetation,

terrestrial life, aquatic resources, special status species, cultural resources, visitor experience, socio-economic resources,

park management and operations, adjacent lands, and wilderness character. Id. at 61-65. 

The Park Service ultimately concluded that Alternatives B

and C — the non-motor alternatives — would not meet the

agency’s objective of providing “a diverse range of quality

recreational opportunities for visitors to experience and

understand the environmental interrelationships, resources,

and values of Grand Canyon National Park” because of the

significantly reduced number of visitors who could experience the Colorado River Corridor. Id. at 71; see FEIS Vol. II

at 626-27, 630-31. The Park Service evaluated a range of

motorized use times in the other alternatives and, after considering all factors and variables, selected Modified Alternative

H. That Alternative included specific allocations for motorized and non-motorized uses: a total of 115,500 commercial

user days consisting of 76,913 motorized and 38,587 nonmotorized, and an estimated 113,486 non-commercial user

days. FEIS Vol. I at 60.

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Modified Alternative H reduced the amount of motorized

traffic in the Colorado River Corridor and the months within

which it can occur, while significantly increasing the traffic

for non-commercial uses. The time period during which it

prohibited motorized uses in the Corridor each year is September 16 through March 31 — 3.5 months longer than under

the 1989 Management Plan. FEIS Vol. I at 61. Modified

Alternative H also reduced motorized commercial launches

from 473 per year to 429 per year, and total motorized passengers from 14,487 to 13,177. Id. at 45, 60. Maximum group

sizes for commercial motor excursions were also reduced

from 43 to 32. Id. at 61. Commercial user days were held

essentially level at 115,500, while non-commercial user days

were more than doubled to an estimated 113,486. Id. at 60.6

[11] In sum, the Park Service’s decision concerning the

amount of motorized trips on the river was made after considering competing alternatives and a significant number of variables. The Park Service chose an alternative that reduced

motorized uses from current levels. The court is satisfied that

the Park Service, as stated in the ROD, determined the “type

and level” of traffic on the river that was “necessary and

appropriate,” including the type and level of motorized uses.

ROD at 6. 

Plaintiffs argue that even if the Park Service made such a

determination, the determination was arbitrary and capricious.

As noted above, however, the decision occurred only after an

extensive analysis of various alternatives. Defendants have

identified a number of factors in the Administrative Record

6The Park Service considered five alternatives for the Lower Gorge,

including a no-action alternative (Alternative 1), but the Lower Gorge

issues differed from those in the Lees Ferry Segment. Plaintiffs have spent

little time addressing Lower Gorge issues in this case. The Lower Gorge

management is complicated by the existence of Hualapai tribal lands and

Hualapai River Runner day trips. After undertaking an analysis of five

alternatives, the Park Service selected Alternative 4, which eliminated upriver jet boat tours. FEIS Vol. I at xiii. 

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that support the Park Service’s decision to allow motorized

traffic to continue. First, because motorized trips take less

time to complete (10 days as opposed to 16 days for nonmotorized trips), substantially more people can see the Park

each year from the river if motorized trips continue. FEIS

Vol. I at 33-34; Vol. III at 87-88, 328-29. Second, motorized

trips are frequently chartered for special-needs groups, educational classes, family reunions, or to support kayak or other

paddle trips. Third, because of their increased mobility,

motorized trips help alleviate overcrowding at popular campsites and attractions in the Corridor. FEIS Vol. I at 33-34;

Vol. III at 302. Fourth, some individuals feel safer when traveling in motorized rafts. FEIS Vol. III at 312-313. In addition,

studies performed as part of the DEIS found that visitors are

able to experience the river as wilderness in the presence of

motorized uses and that those who took motorized trips were

significantly more likely to stress safety and trip length as the

most important factors in the choosing the type of trip they

took.

[12] Given the “judicial presumption favoring the validity

of administrative actions” and the “administrative discretion”

granted the Park Service under the Concessions Act, Kleppe,

608 F.2d at 1254, the court cannot conclude that the agency

acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it found that the Modified Alternative H levels of motorized uses were “necessary

and appropriate for public use and enjoyment” of the Colorado River Corridor. 16 U.S.C. § 5951(b). The question is not

whether this court agrees with the Park Service’s decision, but

whether it is reasonably supported by the Administrative

Record. In light of the DEIS and FEIS analysis outlined

above, we conclude that it is.

Plaintiffs spend little time addressing the other policy statement of the Concessions Act — that the necessary and appropriate public uses should be “consistent to the highest

practicable degree with the preservation and conservation of

the resources and values of the unit.” 16 U.S.C. § 5951(b).

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Read in isolation, this policy could eliminate all public uses

of the Colorado River Corridor, motorized and nonmotorized, because preservation of the natural resources of

the Corridor would be accomplished to the “highest practicable degree” by eliminating all human interference. This is not

what Congress intended. The Concessions Act, after all,

authorizes the Park Service to permit commercial concessions

in national parks. Rather, this policy must be achieved in light

of the policy’s preceding requirement — that uses be limited

to those necessary and appropriate for public use of the parks.

Once those necessary uses are identified, they must be managed to the highest practicable degree to preserve the

resources and values of the Park.

We are satisfied that the Park Service did not act arbitrarily

and capriciously when it concluded that Modified Alternative

H was consistent to the highest practicable degree with preserving the resources and values of the Corridor. As noted

above, the DEIS and FEIS evaluated Modified Alternative H

and other alternatives against a large number of environmental factors. With the exception of the effects of motors on the

soundscape of the Park, Plaintiffs do not challenge this evaluation. With respect to the effects on soundscape, we conclude

that the Park Service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously.

V. The Organic Act.

[13] The Organic Act provides that the Park Service “shall

promote and regulate the use of . . . national parks . . . in such

manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for

the enjoyment of future generations.” 16 U.S.C. § 1. The Act

also provides that “[n]o natural curiosities, wonders, or

objects of interest shall be leased, rented, or granted to anyone

on such terms as to interfere with free access to them by the

public[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 3. Plaintiffs contend that the 2006

Management Plan is arbitrary and capricious because it permits commercial boaters to use the river at levels that interfere

with free access by the public, and because it concludes that

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motorized uses do not impair the natural soundscape of the

Park.

A. Free Access.

[14] Plaintiffs argue that the allocation of river access

between commercial and non-commercial users is inequitable

and thus limits the free access of members of the public. As

noted above, however, the Park Service has significantly

increased the access of non-commercial users. The 2006 Management Plan allocates 115,500 user days to commercial users

and an estimated 113,486 user days to non-commercial users.

See FEIS Vol. I at ix.7 This is essentially the same allocation

commercial users received under the 1989 Management Plan,

but a substantial increase from the 58,048 user days that noncommercial boaters received under the 1989 plan. Stated in

different terms, the allocation of river time between commercial and non-commercial user days changed from 66.5% commercial and 33.5% non-commercial under the 1989

Management Plan, to 50.4% commercial and 49.6% noncommercial under the 2006 Management Plan. The 2006

Management Plan also reduced the number of launches and

passengers for commercial users while nearly doubling both

categories for non-commercial users. FEIS Vol. I at 45, 60. It

is noteworthy that neither GCROA, which consists of commercial river users, nor GCPBA, which consists of noncommercial users, agree with Plaintiffs. Both organizations

7Plaintiffs argue that user days are not a fair measure of use. While the

Park Service has stated that “[d]aily launches are probably the most

important use measure for measuring impacts to visitor use and experience,” it also has noted that “[t]he daily number of people launching

would probably provide similar information[.]” FEIS Vol. III at 55. The

court finds that user days — a factor of the number of people that launch

and the number of days the trip lasts — is a reasonable basis for analysis.

The Ninth Circuit used the same measure in Kleppe. See 608 F.2d 1250.

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contend that the Park Service’s allocation of user days is reasonable.8

[15] Plaintiffs argue that non-commercial users are required

to wait for permits to run the river — sometimes for 10 or

more years — while clients of commercial rafting companies

usually can book a trip within one year. They also assert that

the current allocation favors the wealthy who can afford commercial trips, and they criticize the Park Service for not conducting a demand study that would have revealed the most

equitable allocation. The court cannot conclude on this basis,

however, that the Management Plan is arbitrary and capricious. The 2006 Management Plan significantly revised the

system for private boaters to obtain permits by establishing a

lottery system that is weighted to favor those who have not

received a permit in previous years. ROD at 20. Moreover,

surveys show that 61% of private boaters have floated the

Colorado River Corridor before, while only 20% of commercial boaters were on repeat trips. The existence of a waiting

list therefore does not necessarily show that more private

boaters than commercial customers are awaiting their first

river trip. Finally, experts advised the Park Service that a

demand study would cost more than $2 million and likely

would be of limited value. FEIS Vol. III at 177. 

8Plaintiffs complain that a substantial portion of the additional noncommercial days are in the winter, and that the Park Service acted without

evidence that boaters would use the river in the winter. Defendants note

that the 2006 Management Plan increases non-commercial user days in all

seasons of the year. The FEIS also notes that “there is interest in trips during the winter . . . . [W]inter trips offer greater opportunities for quiet and

solitude compared to other times of the year. The less crowded nature of

winter months enhances wildlife viewing and cooler daytime temperatures

are conducive to off-river hiking.” FEIS Vol. I at 34 (emphasis omitted).

Ninety percent of available winter dates were used between 1998 and

2002 — 100% when they were made available six months in advance. AR

107920, 109498. The court concludes that the Park Service had a reasonable basis for concluding that winter trips would be used by noncommercial boaters. 

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More generally, Plaintiffs tend to characterize the dispute

as one between commercial companies and private citizens.

This is not the true nature of the issue:

Throughout these proceedings [plaintiff] has persisted in viewing the dispute as one between the recreational users of the river and the commercial

operators, whose use is for profit. It asserts that by

giving a firm allocation to the commercial operators

to the disadvantage of those who wish to run the

river on their own the Service is commercializing the

park. [Plaintiff] ignores the fact that the commercial

operators, as concessioners of the [Park] Service,

undertake a public function to provide services that

the [Park Service] deems desirable for those visiting

the area. The basic face-off is not between the commercial operators and the non-commercial users, but

between those who can make the run without professional assistance and those who cannot.

Kleppe, 608 F.2d at 1253-54 (internal citations omitted). 

As noted above, a coalition of commercial and private

boater organizations submitted joint comments to the Park

Service that supported an equal allocation of river time

between commercial and non-commercial users on an annual

basis. These users of the river apparently did not believe that

such a system would interfere with free access.9

9

In support of their argument, Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Donald W. Walls. Dkt. #71-2. Dr. Walls opines that an equal allocation

between commercial and non-commercial boaters cannot be determined to

be fair in the absence of a demand study, and that a lottery system that

applies to all users would be more fair. As noted above, however, a panel

of experts advised the Park Service in January of 2003 that a demand

study was likely to cost $2 million and be of limited use. FEIS Vol. III at

177. Dr. Walls does not address this advice and therefore does not provide

a basis for concluding that the Park Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it decided not to conduct such a study. Moreover, although

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B. Impairment of the Natural Soundscape.

Plaintiffs make several arguments in support of their claim

that the Park Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when

it concluded that motorized uses of the Corridor do not impair

the natural soundscape of the Park within the meaning of the

Organic Act. These arguments are unpersuasive.

First, Plaintiffs contend that the Park Service used the

wrong baseline — that it compared motor-generated sounds

to the noise of the Corridor with aircraft flying overhead,

rather than comparing motorized noises to the natural quiet of

the Park. This argument is incorrect. The Park Service compared periods of noise from river traffic (motorized and nonmotorized) to periods when there was no noise. FEIS Vol. II

at 348-87. The Park Service also evaluated the length of

“noise-free intervals” when motorized traffic was in the Park.

See, e.g., id. at 386.

Plaintiffs next contend that the Park Service failed to consider the cumulative effects of noise from river traffic. This

also is incorrect. After comparing river traffic noise to natural

background sounds, and evaluating noise-free intervals, the

Park Service considered the cumulative effect of such noise

when added to other sounds in the Park such as aircraft overDr. Walls opines that a lottery system would be more fair than the Park

Service’s equal allocation of days between commercial and noncommercial users, he does not address whether such a system — which

would render the yearly demand for commercial services less predictable

— would permit the continued operation of commercial river runners that

the Park Service has found to be necessary and appropriate. Nor does Dr.

Walls address the fact that a coalition of river users, including commercial

and private users, supported the equal allocation adopted by the Park Service, or explain why the Park Service’s consideration of such representative support was unreasonable. Dr. Walls’ opinion, although a legitimate

point of view, does not persuade the court that the Management Plan is

arbitrary and capricious. 

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flights. The Park Service then reached the following conclusion: 

Although Modified Alternative H would contribute

to the overall cumulative effects of noise on the

park’s natural soundscape, even if all noise from all

river recreation was eliminated from the park

(including river-related helicopter flights at Whitmore), the cumulative effects of aircraft noise would

still be adverse, short- to long-term, and major.

There would still be ‘significant adverse effects’ on

the natural soundscape due to frequent, periodic and

noticeable noise from overflights, and ‘substantial

restoration of natural quiet’ would not be achieved as

required by Public Law 100-91 and other mandates.

Id. at 387 (emphasis omitted).

Plaintiffs contend that this cumulative analysis should have

caused the Park Service to eliminate sounds from motorized

river traffic. But if a cumulative analysis were to result in the

elimination of all sounds that can be eliminated by the Park

Service — in this case, all sounds other than aircraft overflights, which are not within the jurisdiction of the Park Service — then all human activity in the Park would be

eliminated. And still the aircraft overflights would create substantial and adverse sound effects in the Park. Plaintiffs have

articulated no principled basis upon which the court can conclude that the Park Service should have eliminated motorized

noises on the basis of such cumulative analysis, but not other

human-caused noises such as hiking or non-motorized raft

trips. The court cannot conclude that the Park Service acted

arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded from a

cumulative-effects analysis that motorized river traffic noise

was not the source of serious sound problems in the Park and

that elimination of such noise would not significantly improve

the overall soundscape.

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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Park Service failed to consider earlier environmental impact statements and a number of

studies conducted in the 1970s, some of which found that

river use impacted the soundscape within the Park. The Park

Service relied primarily on studies conducted by noise experts

in 1993 and 2003. FEIS Vol. II at 352-53. These studies

included field acoustic measurements, including sounds from

motorized and non-motorized raft trips. The studies determined the distance at which motorized rafts could be heard

and the length of time they were audible while traveling

down-river, when measured from fixed points in the Park. Id.

The studies also evaluated the effects of other sounds such as

water flow, wind, wildlife, human voices, helicopters, and aircraft overflights. Id. The studies provide a reasonable basis

for evaluating sound effects within the Park.

Plaintiffs argue that the Park Service failed to consider 28

previous studies, but they identify no specific studies for the

court to consider. Nor do Plaintiffs cite any recent studies that

call into question the findings of the 1993 and 2003 studies.

Defendants also note that any studies conducted in the 1970s

would have concerned louder two-stroke engines rather than

the quieter and cleaner four-stroke engines now used in the

Corridor. Finally, the 2003 study specifically considered and

summarized the earlier studies relied on by Plaintiffs.

[16] Given all of these considerations, the court cannot conclude that the Park Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously

when it concluded that motorized uses do not impair the

soundscape of the Park within the meaning of the Organic

Act.

VI. Conclusion.

[17] Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Park Service

acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it adopted the 2006

Management Plan. The court accordingly AFFIRMS the

granting of the summary judgment motions of Defendants and

1820 RIVER RUNNERS v. MARTIN

Case: 08-15112 02/01/2010 ID: 7214595 DktEntry: 48 Page: 34 of 35
Intervenors and the denial of the summary judgment motion

of Plaintiffs. 

AFFIRMED.

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