Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05310/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2014 Decided July 11, 2014 

No. 12-5310 

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

v.

GINA MCCARTHY, SUED IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

 HAZARD COAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

 APPELLEES

Consolidated with 12-5311

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-01220) 

Matthew Littleton, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were 

Robert G. Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Aaron 

P. Avila, Michael T. Gray, Cynthia J. Morris, Kenneth C. 

USCA Case #12-5310 Document #1502014 Filed: 07/11/2014 Page 1 of 18
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Amaditz, Attorneys, and Ann D. Navaro, Attorney, Office of 

the Chief Counsel United States Army Corps of Engineers. 

Emma C. Cheuse argued the cause for appellants Sierra 

Club, et al. With her on the briefs were Jennifer C. Chavez

and Derek O. Teaney. 

Kirsten L. Nathanson argued the cause for appellees 

National Mining Association and Kentucky Coal Association. 

With her on the brief were John C. Martin, David Y. Chung, 

Mindy G. Barfield, and Sadhna G. True. 

Benjamin L. Bailey argued the cause for appellees State 

of West Virginia, et al. Mary Stephens argued the cause for 

appellee Commonwealth of Kentucky. With them on the 

brief were Michael B. Hissam, Patrick Morrissey, Attorney 

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of West 

Virginia, Elbert Lin, Solicitor General, Mindy G. Barfield, 

and Sadhna G. True. 

Luther J. Strange III, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General of the State of Alabama, John C. Neiman 

Jr., Solicitor General, Andrew L. Brasher, Deputy Solicitor 

General, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Mike Dewine, 

Atorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of Ohio, Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson, 

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of South Carolina, Ken Cuccinelli, Attorney General at the 

time the brief was filed, Office of the Attorney General for the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney 

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of 

Alaska, Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Florida, Derek Schmidt, 

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Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of Kansas, Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Michigan, and Timothy C. 

Fox, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the 

State of Montana, were on the brief for amici curiae States of 

Alabama, et al. in support of appellees. 

Karma B. Brown, Peter C. Tolsdorf, M. Reed Hopper, 

Ellen Steen, Thomas Ward, Quentin Riegel, Kristy A.N. 

Bulleit, and Andrew J. Turner were on the brief for amici 

curiae American Farm Bureau Federation, et al. in support of 

appellees. 

Before: GRIFFITH, KAVANAUGH, and SRINIVASAN, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: The process of surface coal 

mining is straightforward. When a coal deposit lies close to

the earth’s surface, mining companies remove the topsoil and 

the rock above the coal. Once the coal is exposed, the 

companies extract it and relocate the removed earth. 

Surface coal mining in the Appalachian region produces 

a good deal of America’s domestic coal, which is an 

important source (along with natural gas and nuclear energy) 

for the electricity that lights American houses and businesses,

and powers TVs and computers in American homes. But 

surface coal mining also leaves its mark on the environment. 

Among other effects, the process changes the nature of the 

land where the mining takes place, causing erosion and 

landslides. 

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In the 1972 Clean Water Act and the 1977 Surface 

Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Congress struck a 

balance between the need for coal on the one hand and the 

desire to mitigate surface coal mining’s environmental effects 

on the other. Congress created an extensive permitting 

system for surface coal mining projects. To conduct a coal 

mining project, a business must obtain permits from the 

Department of Interior or a federally approved state 

permitting program. If the mining project would result in the 

discharge of soil or other pollutants into navigable waters, the 

mining project also requires two Clean Water Act permits. 

The first Clean Water Act permit (known as the Section 404 

permit) must be obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. The Army Corps of Engineers permitting process 

also involves EPA, as EPA can deny the use of the sites 

selected as disposal sites for dredged or fill material. The 

second Clean Water Act permit (known as the Section 402 or 

NPDES permit) is issued by EPA or, as relevant here, EPAapproved state permitting authorities. The state permitting 

process likewise involves EPA, as States must submit a 

proposed permit to EPA for review, and EPA may object if 

the permit in EPA’s view does not meet extant state water 

quality standards or other provisions of the Clean Water Act. 

In June 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA 

adopted an Enhanced Coordination Process to facilitate their 

consideration of certain Clean Water Act permits. The 

Enhanced Coordination Process allows EPA to screen Section 

404 mining permit applications submitted to the Corps. EPA 

then initiates discussions with the Corps on proposed mining 

projects that EPA considers likely to damage water bodies. 

In 2011, EPA also promulgated a Final Guidance 

document relating to those Clean Water Act permits. Among 

other things, the Final Guidance recommends that States 

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impose more stringent conditions for issuing permits under 

Section 402. 

The States of West Virginia and later Kentucky, along 

with coal mining companies and trade associations – whom 

we will collectively refer to as plaintiffs – challenged the 

Enhanced Coordination Process and EPA’s Final Guidance 

before the district court as exceeding EPA’s authority under 

the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act and the 

Clean Water Act. The District Court agreed and granted 

summary judgment for plaintiffs. We conclude otherwise. In 

our view, EPA and the Corps acted within their statutory 

authority when they adopted the Enhanced Coordination 

Process. And under our precedents, the Final Guidance is not 

a final agency action reviewable by the courts at this time. If 

and when an applicant is denied a permit, the applicant at that 

time may challenge the denial of the permit as unlawful. 

We therefore reverse the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment to plaintiffs. We remand to the District 

Court with directions to grant judgment for the Government 

on the Enhanced Coordination Process claim and to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ challenge to the Final Guidance. 

I 

The two statutes at issue in this case together regulate 

surface coal mining. Under the Surface Mining Control and 

Reclamation Act of 1977, mining projects require permits to 

ensure that the planned projects will sufficiently protect the 

environment. See 30 U.S.C. § 1256. The Department of the 

Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 

Enforcement oversees Department of Interior-approved state 

programs for issuing those permits. See id. §§ 1211, 1251-56. 

Those permits are not at issue in this case.

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Under the Clean Water Act, mining projects that result in 

the discharge of soil or other pollutants into navigable waters 

must meet additional requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 

As relevant here, those mining projects must comply with 

state “water quality standards.” See id. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 

State water quality standards identify the proper uses of water 

bodies (recreation, irrigation, etc.) and provide “water quality 

criteria” to measure the health of those water bodies. An 

example of water quality criteria is a requirement that “no 

significant adverse impact to the chemical, physical, 

hydrologic, or biological components of aquatic ecosystems 

shall be allowed.” W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2-3.2.i. Under the 

Clean Water Act, a mining project may not violate the 

relevant state water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1342(b)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1). 

To ensure that no violation occurs, those mining projects 

that result in the discharge of soil and other pollutants into 

navigable waters require two Clean Water Act permits. 

The first is a permit under Section 404 of the Act. See 33 

U.S.C. § 1344. Section 404 permits ensure that the discharge 

of dredged or fill material as a result of the mining project 

will not harm navigable waters. As relevant here, the Army 

Corps of Engineers issues those permits, but EPA plays a role 

because EPA may deny the use of an area as a disposal site if 

a discharge at that site would “have an unacceptable adverse 

effect” on certain water bodies, wildlife, or recreational areas. 

Id. § 1344(c); see Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 

608, 612-13 (D.C. Cir. 2013). So the Corps and EPA have 

complementary roles in the Section 404 process. 

The second is a permit under Section 402 of the Act. See 

33 U.S.C. § 1342. Section 402 permits – known also as 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System or NPDES 

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permits – ensure that mining projects do not result in any 

other pollutants damaging States’ water bodies. As relevant 

here, States decide whether to issue those permits, but EPA 

may object to issuance of the permit if EPA concludes that the 

permit would not meet state water quality standards or other 

requirements of the Clean Water Act. See id. § 1342(d). So 

States and EPA both have a role in Section 402 permits. 

In 2009, the two federal agencies involved in Section 404 

permits, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, signed an

“Enhanced Coordination Process” memorandum. The 

Enhanced Coordination Process applies to 108 permit 

applications that were stalled in the Section 404 permitting 

process because of litigation. The Enhanced Coordination 

Process calls for EPA to run the applications through a 

database that compares the information in the permit 

application to the guidelines the Corps must consider when 

issuing permits. (The guidelines identify, among other things, 

mining practices that may damage the environment.) Using 

the Enhanced Coordination Process, EPA identifies permits 

that could run afoul of the guidelines and notifies the Corps. 

Over a 60-day period, subject to extensions, EPA and the 

Corps, along with any interested parties, then discuss those 

permit applications. The Corps then decides whether to issue 

the permits.

In 2011, EPA also issued a Final Guidance document 

related to, among other things, Section 402 permits. The 

Final Guidance explained that recent peer-reviewed studies 

had found that surface coal mining raises the salinity of 

States’ waters. That elevated salinity increases the ability of 

the water bodies to conduct electricity – that is, it increases 

their conductivity. According to the studies, certain levels of 

conductivity endanger aquatic life. The Final Guidance

therefore advises EPA staff to ask state permitting authorities 

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to assess the potential for elevated conductivity in proposed 

Section 402 permits. For the Appalachian region, the Final 

Guidance recommends that water conductivity levels not 

exceed 300-500 μS/cm (microSiemens per centimeter). 

The States of West Virginia and later Kentucky, along 

with coal mining companies and trade associations, brought a 

variety of challenges in federal district court. Collectively, 

the lawsuits challenged both the Enhanced Coordination 

Process and the Final Guidance document. Arrayed against 

those plaintiffs were EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and 

several intervenor environmental organizations. 

First, plaintiffs argued that the Enhanced Coordination 

Process violates the Clean Water Act. They also contended

that the Enhanced Coordination Process is a legislative rule 

and therefore should not have been promulgated without 

notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act. 

Second, they argued that the Final Guidance violates the 

Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control and 

Reclamation Act. In a series of rulings, the District Court 

granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. The rulings 

invalidated the Enhanced Coordination Process and the Final 

Guidance. We review the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. 

II

We first address plaintiffs’ challenges to the Enhanced 

Coordination Process adopted by EPA and the Army Corps of 

Engineers for coordination on Section 404 permits.

A 

Plaintiffs argue that the Enhanced Coordination Process 

violates the Clean Water Act. In particular, relying on a form 

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of the expressio unius canon, plaintiffs point out that 

Congress has explicitly mandated EPA participation at certain 

stages of the Section 404 permitting process: for example, to 

co-write guidelines under Section 404(b), to veto one aspect 

of a permit under Section 404(c), to minimize delays under 

Section 404(q), and to exempt certain discharges from the 

permitting process under Section 404(l). See 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1344(b), (c), (q), (l). Those explicit grants of statutory 

authority to EPA in the Section 404 process, according to 

plaintiffs, mean that Congress silently intended to restrict 

EPA’s involvement in the Corps’ permitting process outside 

of those four circumstances. 

We reject that argument. To begin with, nothing in the 

Enhanced Coordination Process has changed the statutory 

criteria on which the Section 404 permitting decisions are 

based. And nothing in the Enhanced Coordination Process 

has changed the substantive statutory responsibilities of the 

two agencies involved in the Section 404 permitting process. 

The Corps still makes the ultimate decision whether to 

approve the permit. EPA still makes the decisions on the 

disposal sites. So plaintiffs’ objection here is simply to

enhanced consultation and coordination between two federal 

agencies. But no statutory provision forbids EPA from 

consulting with or coordinating with the Corps, or vice versa. 

And we will not read into that statutory silence an 

implicit ban on inter-agency consultation and coordination. 

After all, this kind of inter-agency consultation and 

coordination is commonplace and often desirable. Indeed, 

restricting such consultation and coordination would raise 

significant constitutional concerns. Under Article II of the 

Constitution, departments and agencies in the Executive 

Branch are subordinate to one President and may consult and 

coordinate to implement the laws passed by Congress. See 

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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Executive Power Clause); U.S.

CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause). The two agencies here 

are both executive agencies that operate under the direction 

and supervision of the single President. Putting aside 

independent agencies, none of which is involved here, the one 

President is responsible and accountable for the entirety of the 

Executive Branch. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 

Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 

3152-56 (2010). Indeed, one of the main goals of any 

President, and his or her White House staff, is to ensure that

such consultation and coordination occurs in the many 

disparate and far-flung parts of the Executive behemoth. The 

right hand should know what the left hand is doing. Given 

the backdrop of Executive Branch tradition, sound 

government practice, and constitutional principle, we will not, 

as plaintiffs request, read into this statute an implicit

congressional intent to restrict consultation and coordination 

between two executive agencies. As this Court, in an opinion 

by Judge Wald, once stated when considering consultations 

among Executive Branch officers, our “form of government 

simply could not function effectively or rationally if key 

executive policymakers were isolated from each other and 

from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not 

always have the answers to complex regulatory problems” 

and need “to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers 

in other agencies as well as in the White House.” Sierra Club 

v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Put another 

way: In a “single Executive Branch headed by one 

President,” we do not lightly impose a rule “that would deter 

one executive agency from consulting another about matters 

of shared concern.” Empresa Cubana Exportadora de 

Alimentos y Productos Varios v. Department of the Treasury, 

638 F.3d 794, 803 (D.C. Cir. 2011). So it is here. 

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In short, the Clean Water Act does not explicitly or 

implicitly bar the Enhanced Coordination Process adopted by 

the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA.1

B 

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the memorandum 

initiating the Enhanced Coordination Process is a legislative 

rule that was promulgated without the required notice and 

comment. Legislative rules have the “force and effect of law” 

and may be promulgated only after public notice and 

comment. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 n. 19 (1983) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). But the APA does not 

require notice and comment for interpretive rules, general 

 

1

 Plaintiffs also argue that the Enhanced Coordination Process 

is incompatible with the Corps’ regulations for processing Section 

404 permit applications. Those regulations state that Corps 

engineers “will be guided by” certain time limits in evaluating 

permit applications, including a target that “engineers will decide 

on all applications not later than 60 days after receipt of a complete 

application” unless one of six exceptions applies. 33 C.F.R. 

§ 325.2(d)(3). It is true that the memorandum initiating the 

Enhanced Coordination Process indicates that the process may take 

more than 60 days to complete. However, one of the six exceptions 

to the 60-day target applies when “[i]nformation needed by the 

district engineer for a decision on the application cannot reasonably 

be obtained within the 60-day period.” Id. § 325.2(d)(3)(vi). The 

Corps tells us that its engineers may need more than 60 days to 

determine, in conjunction with EPA, that surface mining will not 

degrade waterways covered by the Clean Water Act. In any event, 

the Corps’ regulations are aspirational time targets rather than 

mandatory requirements. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,796 (July 22, 

1982) (time targets in Section 325.2(d)(3) are “goals”); Auer v. 

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (agency’s interpretation of own 

regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent 

with the regulation.’”). 

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statements of policy, and rules of organization, procedure, or 

practice. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 

We need not dally on this issue. The “critical feature” of 

a procedural rule “is that it covers agency actions that do not 

themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it 

may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves 

or their viewpoints to the agency.” James V. Hurson 

Associates, Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 

2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). That description 

neatly covers the Enhanced Coordination Process. The 

Enhanced Coordination Process is a rule of procedure and 

thus did not require notice and comment. 

III

Plaintiffs also challenge the Final Guidance. They 

contend that the Final Guidance exceeds EPA’s authority 

under the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control 

and Reclamation Act. According to plaintiffs, the Final 

Guidance’s instruction to EPA staff to recommend limitations 

on mining projects – including that mining projects meet the 

conductivity levels identified in scientific studies – 

impermissibly interjects extra-statutory roadblocks into 

States’ Section 402 permitting process.

We may review agency action under the APA only if it is 

“final.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. One might think that an agency 

memo entitled “Final Guidance” would be final. But that 

would be wrong, at least under the sometimes-byzantine case 

law. An agency action is final only if it is both “the 

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and a 

decision by which “rights or obligations have been 

determined” or from which “legal consequences will flow.” 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). EPA concedes that the Final 

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Guidance is the consummation of EPA’s decisionmaking 

process. But EPA characterizes the Final Guidance as a 

general policy statement that has no “legal consequences.” 

Therefore, according to EPA, we cannot review its legality at 

this time; EPA says that judicial review must wait until a 

permit applicant has had a permit denied and seeks review of 

that permit denial.

To analyze EPA’s reviewability argument, we need to 

take a step back. The APA divides agency action, as relevant 

here, into three boxes: legislative rules, interpretive rules, and 

general statements of policy. A lot can turn on which box an 

agency action falls into. In terms of reviewability, legislative 

rules and sometimes even interpretive rules may be subject to 

pre-enforcement judicial review, but general statements of 

policy are not. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking 

Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 477-49 (2001) (reviewable 

interpretive rule); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 

136, 149-51 (1967) (reviewable legislative rule); National 

Park Hospitality Association v. Department of the Interior, 

538 U.S. 803, 809-11 (2003) (non-reviewable policy 

statement). Legislative rules generally require notice and 

comment, but interpretive rules and general statements of 

policy do not. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Legislative rules generally 

receive Chevron deference, but interpretive rules and general 

statements of policy often do not. See United States v. Mead 

Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 

467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

So given all of that, we need to know how to classify an 

agency action as a legislative rule, interpretive rule, or general 

statement of policy. That inquiry turns out to be quite 

difficult and confused. It should not be that way. Rather, 

given all of the consequences that flow, all relevant parties 

should instantly be able to tell whether an agency action is a 

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legislative rule, an interpretive rule, or a general statement of 

policy – and thus immediately know the procedural and 

substantive requirements and consequences. An important 

continuing project for the Executive Branch, the courts, the 

administrative law bar, and the legal academy – and perhaps 

for Congress – will be to get the law into such a place of 

clarity and predictability. See generally John F. Manning,

Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 893 (2004) 

(“Among the many complexities that trouble administrative 

law, few rank with that of sorting valid from invalid uses of 

so-called ‘nonlegislative rules.’”). 

For today, however, our far more modest task is to apply 

existing precedents on reviewability to EPA’s Final Guidance. 

Under the case law, legislative rules (and sometimes 

interpretive rules) may be subject to pre-enforcement review. 

Plaintiffs contend that the Final Guidance is a legislative rule 

and thus subject to pre-enforcement review now. But in 

EPA’s view, the Final Guidance is a general statement of 

policy, which means it is not subject to pre-enforcement 

review. As the parties frame it, the reviewability issue turns 

on one question: Is the Final Guidance a legislative rule or a 

general statement of policy? 

To answer that question, we must know what makes 

something a legislative rule or general statement of policy. 

To simplify a bit, we offer the following overview: An 

agency action that purports to impose legally binding 

obligations or prohibitions on regulated parties – and that 

would be the basis for an enforcement action for violations of 

those obligations or requirements – is a legislative rule. An 

agency action that sets forth legally binding requirements for 

a private party to obtain a permit or license is a legislative 

rule. (As to interpretive rules, an agency action that merely 

interprets a prior statute or regulation, and does not itself 

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purport to impose new obligations or prohibitions or 

requirements on regulated parties, is an interpretive rule.) An 

agency action that merely explains how the agency will 

enforce a statute or regulation – in other words, how it will 

exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permitting 

discretion under some extant statute or rule – is a general 

statement of policy. 

But those general descriptions do not describe tidy 

categories and are often of little help in particular cases. So in 

distinguishing legislative rules from general statements of 

policy, our cases have focused on several factors. 

The most important factor concerns the actual legal effect 

(or lack thereof) of the agency action in question on regulated 

entities. See Catawba County v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 33-34

(D.C. Cir. 2009); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 

382 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also National Association of Home 

Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Here, 

that factor favors EPA. As a legal matter, the Final Guidance 

is meaningless. As EPA acknowledged at oral argument, 

“The Guidance has no legal impact.” Oral Arg. at 12:12. The 

Final Guidance does not tell regulated parties what they must 

do or may not do in order to avoid liability. The Final 

Guidance imposes no obligations or prohibitions on regulated 

entities. State permitting authorities “are free to ignore it.” 

Id. at 12:19. The Final Guidance may not be the basis for an 

enforcement action against a regulated entity. Moreover, the 

Final Guidance may not be relied on by EPA as a defense in a 

proceeding challenging the denial of a permit. And the Final 

Guidance does not impose any requirements in order to obtain 

a permit or license. As a matter of law, state permitting 

authorities and permit applicants may ignore EPA’s Final 

Guidance without facing any legal consequences. Cf. Holistic 

Candlers & Consumers Association v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 

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944 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (FDA warning letter not final agency 

action because it “communicates the agency’s position on a 

matter” but “compels action by neither the recipient nor the 

agency”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Another factor in our case law concerns the agency’s 

characterization of the guidance. See Center for Auto Safety 

v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 452 F.3d 

798, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2006); General Electric, 290 F.3d at 382. 

The Final Guidance repeatedly states that it “does not impose 

legally binding requirements.” J.A. 1052; see also id. at 

1054, 1080. The Final Guidance also notes that it is “not 

intended to direct the activities of any other Federal, State or 

local agency or to limit the exercise of their legal authority.” 

Id. at 1053. On its face, the Final Guidance disclaims any 

intent to require anyone to do anything or to prohibit anyone 

from doing anything. To be sure, the Final Guidance may 

signal likely future permit denials by EPA; if so, those permit 

denials can be challenged at that time, and EPA will not be 

able to rely on the Final Guidance in defending a permit 

denial.

Plaintiffs counter that this Court has referred to similar 

agency caveats in guidance documents as “boilerplate.” See 

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). In Appalachian Power, this Court found that an 

EPA guidance document was a legislative rule despite the 

guidance document’s caveat denying its compulsory nature. 

See id. But in doing so, we examined the document as a 

whole and noted that “the entire Guidance, from beginning to 

end – except the last paragraph – reads like a ukase. It 

commands, it requires, it orders, it dictates.” Id. Here, the 

caveats run throughout the document, and more to the point, 

the document is devoid of relevant commands. See, e.g., J.A. 

1080 (Final Guidance is “not legally or practically binding on 

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the Corps’ determinations of whether a particular project 

complies” with Section 404(b)(1) guidelines). 

Our cases also have looked to post-guidance events to 

determine whether the agency has applied the guidance as if it 

were binding on regulated parties. In many cases, of course, 

we will not yet know the answer to that question because the 

recently issued guidance will have been implemented in only 

a few instances. So we will get only an early snapshot. In 

any event, in this case, the sparse record before us does not 

suggest that the agency has applied the Final Guidance as if it 

were binding on regulated parties. 

Plaintiffs nonetheless point to EPA’s statutory role within 

the permitting programs and argue that permit applicants (and 

state permitting authorities) really have no choice when faced 

with EPA “recommendations” except to fold. As plaintiffs 

see it, EPA will not issue the permit unless its 

recommendations are followed. But while regulated parties 

may feel pressure to voluntarily conform their behavior 

because the writing is on the wall about what will be needed 

to obtain a permit, there has been no “order compelling the 

regulated entity to do anything.” Independent Equipment 

Dealers Association v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

States and permit applicants may ignore the Final Guidance 

without suffering any legal penalties or disabilities, see Oral 

Arg. at 40:16, and permit applicants ultimately may be able to 

obtain permits even if they do not meet the recommendations 

in the Final Guidance. And EPA agrees that the Final 

Guidance “has no legal impact” and that state permitting 

authorities are “free to ignore it.” Id. at 12:12. 

To be clear, we reiterate what we have said before: 

“When the agency applies [a general statement of] policy in a 

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particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy 

just as if the policy statement had never been issued.” Pacific 

Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 506 F.2d 

33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

We have considered all of plaintiffs’ arguments for 

obtaining review now of the Final Guidance and find them 

unpersuasive under the current case law. The question is not 

whether judicial review will be available but rather whether 

judicial review is available now. The Final Guidance is not a 

final agency action subject to pre-enforcement review. We 

therefore do not decide plaintiffs’ challenges to the legality of 

the Final Guidance at this time.

* * *

We conclude that the Enhanced Coordination Process 

memorandum is a procedural rule that EPA and the Corps had 

authority to enact under the Clean Water Act. Under our case 

law, we conclude that the Final Guidance is not a final agency 

action subject to review at this time. We therefore reverse the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand to 

the District Court with instructions to grant judgment for 

defendants on the Enhanced Coordination Process and to 

dismiss the challenge to the Final Guidance. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #12-5310 Document #1502014 Filed: 07/11/2014 Page 18 of 18