Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER- )

JEEP, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

CATHERINE E. WITHERSPOON, in )

her official capacity as Executive )

Director of the California Air Resources )

Board, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO

(NEW DJ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANT AND

DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF THE

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

COMPEL PRODUCTION OF

DOCUMENTS

(Documents #304)

This case concerns the legality of environmental regulations imposed by a state

administrative agency. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the

regulations violate and are preempted by federal law. This court has federal question jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

BACKGROUND

In September 2004, pursuant to its authority under California Health and Safety Code

§ 43098.5(a), the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) adopted regulatory amendments

addressing motor vehicle emissions of four greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous

oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961.1(e)(4). On December 7,

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Plaintiffs include various vehicle dealers, two manufacturers who supply them, an 1

automobile trade association, and the Tulare County Farm Bureau. The Association of

International Automobile Manufacturers has intervened as a Plaintiff.

Sierra Club, Bluewater Network, Global Exchange, Rainforest Action Network, 2

and Natural Resources Defense Council have intervened as Defendants.

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2004, Plaintiffs filed suit against CARB’s executive director to prevent enforcement of the 1

regulations. In their first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed February 16, 2005, Plaintiffs seek 2

declaratory and injunctive relief on the following claims:

1. Count I – Preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975

(“EPCA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 32902-32919, specifically Section 32919(a).

2. Count II – Preemption under § 209(a) of the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7543(a).

3. Count III – Preemption under the foreign policy of the United States and the foreign

affairs powers of the Federal Government.

4. Count IV – Violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution.

5. Count V – Violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

On April 13, 2006, Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors (collectively “Defendants”)

served their Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiffs. The requests

sought documents from General Motors (“GM”), DaimlerChrysler (“DCC”), and Alliance of

Automobile Manufacturers (“AAM”) (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “Manufacturers”). The

documents Defendants sought concerned the science of global warming, the Manufacturers’

knowledge of global warming and its effects, and the Manufacturers’ domestic and foreign

affairs with respect to global warming. Plaintiffs served their responses on May 16, 2006,

objecting to requests for various reasons. In letters dated June 1, 2006, Defendants requested that

the Manufacturers produce the withheld documents. After meeting and conferring to attempt to

resolve the disputes, Defendants filed a motion to compel on June 16, 2006. On July 3, 2006, the

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Defendants urge the court to employ an “abuse of discretion” standard for 3

reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s rulings on relevance in the discovery context. They

cite in support three district court opinions that apply that standard. See Geophysical Sys. Corp.

v. Raytheon Co., 117 F.R.D. 646, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ; Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chaetal

Pharm. Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13870, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1996); Forbes v.

Hawaiian Tug & Barge Corp., 125 F.R.D. 505, 507-08 (D. Haw. 1989). Local Rule 72-303

governs the district judge’s reconsideration of a magistrate judge’s rulings on general pretrial

matters. Local Rule 72-303(f) is clear and provides no exceptions: “The standard that the

assigned Judge shall use in all such requests is the ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).” Accordingly, the court declines to employ the “abuse of

discretion” standard Defendants propose.

3

parties filed a Joint Statement regarding the disputed requests. After conducting a hearing, the

Magistrate Judge issued an order denying the motion to compel in its entirety on July 7, 2006

(the “Order”). The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiffs had “rel[ied] on their objection that the

document[] requests are not relevant to any claim” and did not argue any other objection to the

requests for production. Order 7:19-26. He concluded that none of the requests sought evidence

relevant to claims or defense in this case. On July 24, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Order, which Plaintiffs opposed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Reconsideration

According to Local Rule 72-303, a district judge upholds a magistrate’s ruling on a

referred matter unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 3

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies only to a magistrate judge’s

findings of fact. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623

(1993). “[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly deferential, requiring a

‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. The “contrary to law”

standard, on the other hand, allows independent, plenary review of purely legal determinations by

the magistrate judge. FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal.

2000); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).

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B. Motion to Compel

On a showing of good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter “relevant to the

subject matter involved in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). At trial, relevant evidence

encompasses “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. For purposes of pretrial discovery, “[r]elevant

information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. The Federal Rules authorize broad pretrial

discovery “based on the general principle that litigants have a right to ‘every man’s evidence,’

and that wide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by

promoting the search for the truth.” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

A. Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy

The Magistrate Judge held that “defendants did not argue, and it is not obvious, how past

knowledge of global warming would be relevant to the preemption under the foreign policy

claim.” Order 8:19-20. The Magistrate Judge did not specifically address the merits of requests

for foreign policy–related documents other than those regarding past knowledge of global

warming. Because the Magistrate Judge has not made findings with respect to these requests, the

court will decide them de novo.

1. Documents Relating to FAC Paragraph 9(c) and Count III

Defendants requested certain documents supporting Plaintiffs’ foreign policy preemption

claims:

GM REQUEST NO. 28/DCC REQUEST NO. 27/AAM

REQUEST NO. 26: All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR claim

in paragraph 9(c) of the First Amended Complaint that “A.B. 1493

regulation . . . conflicts with national policy and weakens the

diplomatic leverage of the federal government in negotiations on

greenhouse gas standards with other nations.” This request for

production of documents includes but is not limited to all

DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR communications with United

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Some identical requests are numbered differently with respect to each 4

Manufacturer. Where this occurs, the numbers are separately listed and divided by slashes.

5

States government officials with respect to any foreign affairs

aspect of the global warming issue.

. . .

GM REQUEST NO. 29/DCC REQUEST NO. 28/AAM

REQUEST NO. 27: All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR claim

in Count III of the First Amended Complaint that the regulation

adopted by CARB on September 24, 2004 is preempted by the

foreign policy of the United States and the foreign affairs powers

of the federal government.

Joint Statement 51:1-5, 53:4-8. Plaintiffs’ only objection to these requests is that all documents 4

responsive to these requests are “‘legal strategy’ documents.” Opp’n 11:4-7. 

Under Rule 26(b)(3), “documents and tangible things prepared by a party or his

representative in anticipation of litigation,” may not be ordered produced unless the party seeking

them demonstrates “‘substantial need [for] the materials’ and ‘undue hardship [in obtaining] the

substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.’” United States v. Torf (In re Grand Jury

Subpoena), 357 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). At its core, the

work-product doctrine protects “the mental processes of an attorney.” United States v. Nobles,

422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). Discovery of an attorney’s selection and compilation of documents is

prohibited to the extent it would reveal “an attorney’s legal strategy, his intended lines of proof,

his evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of his case, and the inferences he draws from

interviews of witnesses.” Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 903 (1985); see, e.g., United States v. TRW Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 564 (C.D. Cal. 2003)

(citing Sporck, 759 F.2d. at 316.).

In Sporck, plaintiff sought documents counsel gave to a particular defendant to review

prior to his deposition. Id. at 313. The district court had found that the grouping and selection of

the documents was not opinion work product and ordered them produced. Id. at 314. 

Defendants argued that such grouping and selection revealed counsel’s legal opinions as to how

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the evidence in the documents related to issues of the case. Id. at 315. The court found that the

compilation of documents fell within the category of highly protected information: “In selecting

and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel could not help but reveal important

aspects of his understanding of the case.” Id. at 316.

Here, Defendants’ requests are broadly worded to seek documents “related to” claims in

the FAC. They seek documents concerning how the regulation scheme “conflicts with national

policy and weakens the diplomatic leverage of the federal government in negotiations on

greenhouse gas standards with other nations” and concerning whether “the regulation adopted by

CARB on September 24, 2004 is preempted by the foreign policy of the United States and the

foreign affairs powers of the federal government.” Joint Statement 51:1-5, 53:4-8. Undoubtedly,

certain documents that fall under this request are privileged, such as attorney notes or

communications analyzing the legal merits of these contentions. Defendants clarify that their

request does not seek any such documents. Moreover, Defendants do not couch their request for

documents in a manner that forces Plaintiffs to disclose their counsel’s mental impressions. In

seeking any documents Plaintiffs have obtained concerning these claims, Defendants’ requests do

not appear calculated, nor likely, to reveal which documents Plaintiffs intend to use at trial,

which documents support or undermine their position, or what inferences counsel has drawn

from them. See Sporck, 759 F.2d. at 316. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how, by learning

which documents Plaintiffs’ counsel consider “related to” those claims, Defendants will become

privy to litigation strategy or other mental impressions protected under the work-product

doctrine. Of course, Plaintiffs are not required to produce responsive documents that were

themselves prepared by counsel “in anticipation of litigation or for trial,” such as legal

memoranda, notes, or communications. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED

with respect to requests GM 28/DCC 27/AAM 26 and GM 29/DCC 28/AAM 27. Plaintiffs shall

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Plaintiffs submit that their forthcoming interrogatory answers identifying all facts 5

in support of Count III makes production of such documents unnecessary. The court rejects this

claim on the basis that the documents themselves, apart from the facts they contain, may have

evidentiary value to Defendants and may lead to discovery of other admissible evidence.

Defendants indicate that the AAM request number was incorrectly stated in the 6

Joint Statement. Mot. 6 n.2. All such mistakes identified by the parties appear with corrections

in brackets.

7

produce any nonprivileged documents responsive to these requests. Plaintiffs shall not refuse to 5

provide any responsive documents on the basis that their inclusion in the scope of the request

reveals attorney mental impressions in violation of the work-product doctrine.

2. Documents Relating to Plaintiffs’ Communications with Foreign Governments 

Defendants also seek reconsideration of the denial of the motion to compel production of

documents responsive to the following request: “GM REQUEST NO. 30/DCC REQUEST

NO. 29/AAM REQUEST NO. [28]: All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR communications (or

the communications of any other automobile manufacturer or association of automobile

manufacturers) with any foreign government with respect to any aspect of GLOBAL

WARMING.” Joint Statement 54:1-3. Defendants contend that this request is likely to uncover 6

evidence that the Manufacturers have sought to prevent international agreements that include

binding emissions limits. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the request is reasonably calculated to

obtain such evidence. Plaintiffs argue instead that any such evidence is irrelevant to its foreign

policy claims.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ success in preventing international agreements “directly

conflicts with” Plaintiffs’ theory that the United States’ official foreign policy is to negotiate to

secure binding international emissions agreements. Defs.’ Reply 8:21-9:4. Defendants do not

cite authority indicating that the practicality or likelihood of success of national policy is relevant

to preemption of a state law. Rather, the focus of such an inquiry into the nature of national

policy is on its tangible expressions, such as executive agreements and statutes. See Am. Ins.

Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (focusing preemption inquiry on “the national

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Defendants complain that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis was unduly focused on 7

the legal standard for relevance at trial, rather than the Rule 26(b)(1) discovery standard allowing

for discovery “reasonably calculated” to yield relevant evidence. Defendants point to the

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position, expressed unmistakably in the executive agreements signed by the President”); Crosby

v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375-76 (2000) (considering whether the

challenged state law “might . . . blunt the consequences” of actions available to the President

pursuant to a federal statute). 

Defendants have not presented this court with any basis to conclude that attempts by

Plaintiffs to influence national policy are relevant to determining the nature or character of that

policy. It is not necessary, or helpful, to draw inferences from the past or potential future

effectiveness of various foreign policy approaches to deduce what foreign policy actually is

today. Whether Plaintiffs have attempted to interfere with international emissions agreements

does not bear on whether the current United States’ policy is to pursue such agreements. This

request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants’

motion for reconsideration is DENIED with respect to request GM 30/DCC 29/AAM 28.

B. Global Warming

Defendants urge the court to compel Plaintiffs to produce certain documents related to the

science of global warming and to Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the effects of global warming. 

1. Relevance of Foreseeability to Dormant Commerce Clause Burden Analysis

Defendants contend that their requests for global warming related documents will lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence that awareness of the scope of the effects of global warming

should have caused Plaintiffs to foresee California’s regulations. Defendants further contend that

the foreseeability of the regulations is relevant to determining the burden on interstate commerce

in the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The Magistrate Judge reviewed the authorities

Defendants presented and concluded that, with the exception of certain contractual relationships

not applicable here, the foreseeability of a regulation is irrelevant to Dormant Commerce Clause

analysis.

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Magistrate Judge’s remark that the link between knowledge of global warming and anticipation

of greenhouse gas regulation “is entirely speculative.” Order 12:21-22. The Magistrate Judge

noted the speculativeness of the request only after categorically concluding that whether

Defendants foresaw or should have foreseen the regulations was irrelevant. As the court finds

that this conclusion was not contrary to law, it need not determine whether the Magistrate Judge

erred by, in the alternative, refusing the discovery request as speculative.

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By its terms, the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce . . .

among the several States.” U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted the

clause to prohibit states from unduly interfering with interstate commerce absent congressional

permission. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); Pike v.

Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Commerce Clause does not prohibit every

exercise of state power that affects interstate commerce. Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation

Int’l, 323 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, “[i]f the law ‘regulates even-handedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only

incidental,’ then the statute must be upheld ‘unless the burden imposed on such commerce is

clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’” Id. (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).

Plaintiffs’ Dormant Commerce Clause claim does not allege that California’s regulations

discriminate against out-of-state interests or directly regulate interstate commerce. See

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); NCAA v.

Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the regulations are

impermissible because they burden “the production and sale of new motor vehicles” while

providing “no local environmental benefit, or insubstantial benefits at best.” FAC ¶¶ 135, 136.

In support of its contention that foreseeability of a regulation bears on the burden

analysis, Defendants cite Transcontinental Pipe Line v. Oil & Gas Board, 457 So. 2d 1298 (Miss.

1984), rev’d on other grounds, 474 U.S. 409 (1986). In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court

evaluated whether a state rule governing natural gas was barred under the Commerce Clause

based on an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1318. A natural gas pipeline

operator sought to invalidate a state rule that would require it, by virtue of its contract to

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purchase gas from one supplier, to also purchase additional quantities of high-cost gas from other

suppliers. Id. at 1308-10. As part of its burden analysis, the court considered the burden the

operator faced in being forced to perform under the contract as affected by the state rule. Id. at

1322. The court found that the operator’s burden was traceable to its contract, not to the state

rule. Id. Drawing on state contract law, the court held that the operator’s burden stemming from

a freely entered contract was not grounds for invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Id. The

court held that the operator was chargeable with knowledge of the state rule’s affect, so the

contract impliedly incorporated the challenged state rule. Id. 

Defendants also cite Justice Rehnquist’s dissent to the Supreme Court’s opinion reversing

the Mississippi Supreme Court on other grounds. Transcontinental, 474 U.S. at 434-35

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices’ discussion of foreseeability also appears to

hinge on contract principles. Id. The dissent cites Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power

& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 434-35 (1983), for the language which Defendants cite in support of

their contention: “A party runs the risk of reasonably foreseeable applications of new principles

of state law to its activities.” Energy Reserves is a Contract Clause case wherein the Court held

that a regulation does not impermissibly impair a contract where the complaining party should

have foreseen that state actions would alter the contract. Id. at 416.

Neither the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Transcontinental opinion nor Justice

Rehnquist’s dissent stands for a general rule that the foreseeability of government regulation is

relevant to Commerce Clause burden analysis. At best, they provide that the foreseeable effect of

a state law on a freely entered contract does not constitute an actionable burden. Neither opinion

implicitly or explicitly lends support to a more ambitious legal rule.

Defendants also ask the court to draw analogies directly from Contract Clause

jurisprudence. The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law

impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 16, cl. 1. Where a state law

operates “as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” the Contract Clause requires

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that it “have a significant and legitimate public purpose.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411. 

Where the regulation was foreseeable, for instance where the subject matter of the contract is

highly regulated, courts are reluctant to find such an impairment. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at

415; Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, 148 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1998). In Chrysler

Corp., Chief Judge Posner clarified that the rationale for this rule is that, to the extent the

regulations were foreseeable, they were taken into account in the negotiations over the terms of

the contract. Chrysler Corp., 148 F.3d at 894-95. It follows that in a freely negotiated agreement

the party bearing the burden of regulatory uncertainty has already been compensated in the form

of more favorable contract terms. Id. at 895. Thus, considerations of foreseeability are uniquely

relevant where a party had the opportunity to contract for protection against regulatory

uncertainty. Consequently, the court declines to extend the Contract Clause consideration of

foreseeability of regulations at the time of contracting to a Dormant Commerce Clause burden

analysis.

Defendants also point to a Takings Clause case where the court considered whether

plaintiff utilities “should have anticipated that such liability could be imposed by the federal

government.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1353 (Fed. Cir.

2001). In Commonwealth Edison, this language appears in the context of discussion of

plaintiffs’ “investment-backed expectations,” which comprise part of the three-factor analysis of

regulatory takings. Id. at 1348 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,

124 (1978)). “The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private property for public

use is ‘to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” Connolly v. Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986). To this end, the Supreme Court has reasoned that “those

who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by

subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358

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U.S. 84, 91 (1958)). 

A rule barring compensation for a taking where the affected party should have expected

to bear the cost of the regulation is consistent with the purposes of Takings Clause jurisprudence. 

A party who undertakes a venture, knowing that his interests might be harmed by future

government action, “cannot object” that he is due compensation when the predicted harm is

realized. Rather, the party who voluntarily took on the risk of regulation evaluated that the

opportunity was nonetheless sufficiently favorable. Cf. Chrysler Corp., 148 F.3d at 895. In a

sense, it is absurd to see the manifestation of a known risk as the equivalent of the state taking an

individual’s property. The value of the property had already diminished by virtue of the known

risk. On the other hand, one who has no reason to anticipate being harmed by regulation, is more

properly characterized as having been forced “to bear public burdens.” Connolly, 475 U.S. at

227. 

No analogy to the Contract Clause or Takings Clause cases emerges in this case. The

Dormant Commerce Clause analysis does not call for the court to consider the culpable lack of

foresight of those who shoulder the burden of state regulation. It instead requires the court to

undertake a “delicate adjustment” of the national interests expressed by the Commerce Clause

and “sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern.” Raymond,

434 U.S. at 440-41. The difficult balancing of interests that Dormant Commerce Clause analysis

requires does not permit the court to assign blame to particular actors for failure to respond to a

foreseeable risk. Defendants urge that common sense dictates that “the magnitude of an alleged

‘burden’ is inversely related to the head start one has in tackling the burden.” Mot. 14:14-16. 

This is only true from the perspective of someone who has time remaining to “tackl[e] the

burden.” Whether or not the Manufacturers knew in the past that these regulations would be

implemented, the time for them to have acted on this foresight has passed. In any event, what is

relevant to a Commerce Clause analysis is the burden Plaintiffs now face because of the

regulations, which can be evaluated straightforwardly by determining what they must do to

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Defendants also argue that documents related to global warming science are 8

relevant to issue under the Clean Air Act claim of whether the regulations are entitled to an EPA

waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). As the request for documents related to global warming

science is relevant to deciding the benefits of the regulation under the Dormant Commerce

Clause, the court need not decide whether such a request is, in the alternative, likely to lead to the

discovery of evidence relevant to the Clean Air Act claim.

13

comply. Accordingly, no requested document is discoverable solely because it may yield

admissible evidence that the Manufacturers should have foreseen the challenged regulations.

2. Relevance of Global Warming Science to Dormant Commerce Clause Benefits Analysis

Defendants contend that documents related to global warming science are relevant to

deciding the benefits of the regulations on a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. The 8

Magistrate Judge did not address the merits of this position in the context of his Dormant

Commerce Clause analysis. The court will therefore address this issue de novo.

The balancing of state and national interest in a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge

entails “consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern.” Raymond, 434

U.S. at 441. The more substantial the benefit of the state regulation, the greater the burden it may

impose on interstate commerce. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 (“But the State’s tenuous interest in

having the company’s cantaloupes identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally

justify the requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $ 200,000 packing plant

in the State.”); Raymond, 434 U.S. at 444-45 (considering state regulation’s limited advantage

for public safety in finding a Dormant Commerce Clause violation). Accordingly, a disputed

factual issue in this case is “the regulation’s environmental benefits and specifically its impacts

on global warming.” Joint Statement 4:10.

Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants need to know about global warming has been filed in

their expert reports. In support, Plaintiffs point to uncontested facts establishing CARB staff has

stated that the regulations’ “contribution to a reduction in global warming . . . will be small” and

stated that “greenhouse gas emissions from California light duty vehicles are a small fraction of

the global total.” Scheduling Conference Order 11:5-10. Plaintiffs also point out CARB’s

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On September 5, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for permission to 9

file a proffer of new testimony in opposition to Defendants’ request for reconsideration. The

court hereby GRANTS the ex parte application. The testimony proffered comes from the

deposition of Charles Shulock, CARB’s Program Manager for Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas

Reduction. Shulock concedes (1) that CARB was unable, through any means available to it, to

determine whether the California regulations would lead to any real world impact; (2) that it was

possible that no human being would notice the impact; (3) that CARB had not quantified the

impact on sea level, spring runoff, snowpack, or timetable for spring blooms; (4) that he did not

believe the regulations would cause the temperature to drop a quarter of a degree or more; and

(5) that CARB has not attempted to quantify the regulations’ total impact on average

temperatures in California. Pls.’ Proffer of New Test. 2:9-4:10. These concessions do not permit

the court to decide, at this early stage, that discovery regarding global warming science will not

lead to admissible evidence. The court has no basis to conclude that a regulation resulting in a

climate change in California has no benefit merely because CARB cannot predict how much the

change will be or what impacts it will have and because human beings cannot measure or feel the

change. 

14

admissions that the regulations’ effects on climate can only be quantified using computer models. 

Opp’n 13:16-19. Plaintiffs contend that the regulation has merely a “symbolic” connection with

global warning based on “an imaginary scientific hypothesis that does not exist in the real

world.” Id. at 13:6-19. It follows, Plaintiffs argue, that such a theoretical inquiry is properly a

matter of expert opinion only.

It appears that Plaintiffs are asking the court, in the context of a discovery dispute, to

conclude that any decrease in temperature that is “small” or that cannot be measured through

traditional meteorological methods is the same as any other temperature change that shares those

characteristics. Undoubtedly, Defendants will argue that the regulations’ effects on temperature,

even if small or immeasurable by conventional methods, will “effectuate a legitimate local public

interest” of California. See Gravquick, 323 F.3d at 1224. In fact, such a finding is presumably

what led CARB to enact the regulations in the first place. It is not self-evident that the

magnitude of a climate change is irrelevant simply by virtue of its being small and not

measurable by conventional methods. It could very well be the case that a small, immeasurable

climate change could reap benefits where an even smaller change would not.9

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are broadly contesting published global warming

science. Defendants point to Plaintiffs’ Expert Report of Thomas C. Austin as an example. See

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Joint Statement Ex. H (“Austin Report”). Before extrapolating the temperature change the

regulations will make, Austin expresses his uncertainty about whether a correlation between

greenhouse gas emissions and future temperature increases even exists. Austin Report 59. He

notes that there are many other factors affecting greenhouse gas concentrations and temperature:

• greenhouse gas emissions contribute to increased growth of plants, which remove

carbon dioxide from the atmosphere,

• changes that humans make to the surface of the Earth increase or decrease the

amount of light reflected back into space, which may increase or decrease

warming, and

• changes in solar activity and the Earth’s orbit around the Sun can affect the

Earth’s climate and cause significant cooling.

Id. He concludes from these predictions that “rising greenhouse gas concentrations may not be

sufficient to offset the cooling effect.” Id. He also notes that there is “considerable uncertainty”

as to the degree to which certain feedback effects of warming, such as increased low-level cloud

cover, will cool the climate. Id. at 59-60.

Defendants intend to oppose Plaintiffs’ Dormant Commerce Clause claim by arguing that

the local benefits of the regulation justify its burden on interstate commerce. Demonstrating

local benefits appears to turn on Defendants establishing (1) that temperatures will rise in the

future in the absence of the regulations, (2) that rising temperatures will harm California, and (3)

that the regulations will decrease such harm by slowing the temperature increase. Testimony by

Austin to the effect that rising greenhouse gas concentration may not offset other cooling effects

would directly undermine the first and third premises of that argument. 

Austin’s opinion rebuts Defendants’ first premise because it tends to establish that there

is a real chance that temperatures will not rise in the future. The probability that temperatures

will stay the same or decrease in the absence of the regulations is inversely related to the local

benefits of the regulation. This is because a regulation that aims to prevent a harmful eventuality

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that is likely to materialize can succeed in outweighing its burden on interstate commerce where

a regulation ameliorating a less probable undesirable occurrence would fail. Compare Raymond,

434 U.S. at 444 (striking down a state highway regulation under the Dormant Commerce Clause

based on failure to show an “appreciable threat” in its absence), with S.C. State Highway Dep’t

v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938) (upholding state vehicle regulation that

ameliorated a condition responsible for “increased hazard”). 

Austin’s opinion also provides a basis to question Defendants’ third premise. He states

that increased plant growth may reduce carbon dioxide levels and that other human activities may

stimulate warming. These propositions tend to show that the regulations may not succeed in

preventing rising temperatures, should they occur. To the extent that carbon dioxide emissions

stimulate plant growth, they may not result in a net increase in greenhouse gas accumulations. 

Likewise, if changes to the surface of the Earth are the controlling cause of warming, decreases

in automobile emissions may be ineffectual in decreasing warming.

Austin’s report contains contentions that, if accepted by the trier of fact, diminish the

purported benefits of the challenged regulations. Accordingly, the court concludes that it is

likely that the merits of global warming science will be in dispute in this case.

To rebut Defendants’ objection that not being able to discover documents regarding

global warming science will limit their ability to prepare a defense, Plaintiffs point out the

availability of a large volume of publicly available literature on the science of global warming. 

They claim that this availability counsels against permitting the discovery Defendants seek. The

court is unaware of, and Plaintiffs do not cite, authority for refusing requests for documents

reasonably calculated to discover relevant evidence on the basis that the documents are publicly

available. To the contrary, “[t]here is, strictly speaking, no relevance question that arises merely

because the discovering party already knows or has access to the information it seeks to discover. 

Relevance is inherent in the content of the information, not in who possesses or has access to it.” 

6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §26.41[13] (3d ed. 2006); Weiner v. Bache

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The request, in its entirety, reads as follows: 10

GM REQUEST NO. 22/DCC [REQUEST NO. 21/AAM

REQUEST NO. 20]: All DOCUMENTS relating to the effect of

the GHG EMISSIONS reductions required by the GHG

REGULATIONS (including the reductions required by the GHG

REGULATIONS in each ADOPTING STATE, separately or

cumulatively) on (a) atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse

gases; (b) temperature and/or (c) GLOBAL WARMING impacts or

risks of GLOBAL WARMING impacts.

Joint Statement 40:11-15. 

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Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (whether requesting party was already in

possession of the document it sought was immaterial to relevance under the Federal Rules). 

Plaintiffs do not complain that Defendants have requested these documents for an improper

purpose, such as to harass them. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir.

1991) (reversing dismissal for plaintiff’s failure to respond to interrogatories seeking information

defendants already possessed and which was obviously difficult for plaintiff to obtain). Nor do

Plaintiffs contend that obtaining these documents from the public domain is “more convenient,

less burdensome, or less expensive” or explain why “the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). In any event, it is not a

prerequisite to a granting a discovery request that the requesting party will otherwise suffer

hardship.

Plaintiffs take odds with some of Defendants’ particular requests regarding global

warming science. Defendants seek certain documents concerning effects of the challenged

regulations. See Joint Statement 40:11-15. Plaintiffs admit that this request “does in fact 10

pertain to a relevant issue.” Id. at 41:16-17. They argue, nonetheless, that the request should not

extend to Plaintiffs’ “rank-and-file” employees “regardless of their status as experts.” Id. at

41:17-25. Plaintiffs’ do not specify what they mean by “rank-and-file” employees. In its

response to this request, GM agreed to make available “final management reports and

presentations and other materials responsive to the request.” Id. at 40:19-20. To the extent

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The request, in its entirety, reads as follows: 11

GM REQUEST NO. [23]/[DCC] REQUEST NO. [22/AAM

REQUEST NO. 21]: All DOCUMENTS relating to the effect of

any GHG EMISSIONS reductions or limits proposed or

implemented by any state, country (including the United States), or

group of countries, separately or cumulatively, on (a) atmospheric

concentrations of greenhouse gases; (b) temperature; and/or (c)

GLOBAL WARMING impacts or risks of GLOBAL WARMING

impacts.

Joint Statement 42:1-4.

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Plaintiffs are asking the court to restrict responses to this request to certain reports and

presentations that have been internally compiled, their request is unreasonable. Nor does it

make sense to restrict the scope of this discovery to the documents their experts have reviewed. 

Either of these approaches would allow Plaintiffs to avoid producing certain stray documents

that, though relevant, would not be the subject of a report or presentation or be delivered to an

expert preparing for litigation. Plaintiffs have not proposed any other reasonable restriction on

the breadth of the request. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED

with respect to this request. Plaintiffs shall produce all documents responsive to request GM

22/DCC 21/AAM 20.

Plaintiffs also specifically object to the request that they produce documents regarding the

efficacy of greenhouse gas regulations other than the regulations challenged in this case. See 11

Joint Statement 42:1-4. Plaintiffs contend that because the benefits of the challenged regulations

are admittedly not “identifiable,” the effects of other regulations are irrelevant. Opp’n at 16:6. 

Again, Plaintiffs appear to be conflating the concept of the effects of a regulation being

meteorologically measurable with the concept of the regulation mitigating the impacts of global

warming. Defendants have not conceded that the challenged regulations will be ineffectual. This

request seeks information about regulations imposed on a greater scale, such as the United States

and other countries, and about the cumulative effect of those regulations. To the extent this

information reveals that past restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions have ameliorated the

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The request provides, in full, as follows: 12

GM REQUEST NO. 25/DCC REQUEST NO. 24: All

DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR submission of annual reports to

the United States Department of Energy reporting the amount of

carbon dioxide emissions avoided or sequestered from YOUR

MOTOR VEHICLE manufacturing facilities.

Joint Statement 43:18-20.

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effects of global warming, it tends to show that the regulations at issue here will also have such

an effect. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall produce all documents responsive to request GM 23/DCC

22/AAM 21, whether or not they are publicly available. 

Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ request for documents related to the filing of annual

reports with the United States Department of Energy (“DOE”) regarding carbon dioxide

emissions from manufacturing facilities. Joint Statement 43:18-20. Plaintiffs agree to produce 12

the reports themselves, but refuse to produce any other related documents. Opp’n 16:13-21. 

Defendants contend that the documents related to the reports but not submitted to the DOE are

likely to contain Defendants’ reasons for reducing emissions and the effects of emissions

reductions. Plaintiffs do not deny that the request is likely to yield such documents. Plaintiffs

argue only that “one struggles to understand” how documents concerning manufacturing

facilities, which are “stationary sources” of carbon dioxide, are relevant to this case, concerning

vehicle emissions. Opp’n 16:13-17. The documents that Defendants claim this request will

yield, those regarding the benefits of reducing greenhouse gases, are relevant to determining

whether the challenged regulations, by reducing emissions, will result in a legitimate local

benefit under the Dormant Commerce Clause. There is no reason to conclude at this stage that

the warming effects of greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources, and the associated

benefits of reducing such emissions, so differ from the effects of emissions from motor vehicles

as to justify denying this discovery on a relevance ground. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration is GRANTED with respect to request GM 25/DCC 24. Defendants shall produce

all responsive documents, including those that were not submitted to the DOE.

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The request provides, in full, as follows: 13

GM REQUEST NO. 26/DCC REQUEST NO. 25/AAM

REQUEST NO. 24: All DOCUMENTS relating to abrupt climate

change, including but not limited to DOCUMENTS relating to

thresholds of GHG concentrations or of temperature beyond which

a GLOBAL WARMING impact occurs rapidly.

Joint Statement 45:1-3.

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In response to Defendants’ request for documents relating to “abrupt climate change”13

(see Joint Statement 45:1-3), Plaintiffs agree to produce only “any original research of their own

on this issue.” Opp’n 16:26-27. Such a limitation appears to exclude relevant documents from

the scope of the request. For instance, Plaintiffs’ internal communications about the merits of

research performed by third parties could be relevant to the Dormant Commerce Clause Claim. 

A statement of a Plaintiff recognizing the environmental harm presented by Plaintiffs’ products

would be especially trustworthy, given that there would be diminished motive to fabricate such a

statement. Cf. People v. Chapman, 50 Cal. App. 3d 872, 879 (1975) (recognizing the

trustworthiness of a statement against the declarant’s interest where a “reasonable man in

[declarant's] position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true”). Nor,

as discussed above, does the availability to Defendants of any of the global warming science bear

on the permissibility of discovery. See Weiner, 76 F.R.D. at 625. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for reconsideration is GRANTED with respect to request GM 26/DCC 25/AAM 24. 

Plaintiffs shall produce all documents responsive to request.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not specifically address the merits of several of

Defendants’ document requests regarding the causes of global warming (GM-DCC-AAM 8 and

9), the impacts of global warming (GM-DCC-AAM 10 and 11), and Plaintiffs’ SEC disclosures

on global warming (GM 20/DCC-AAM 19). Plaintiffs appear to rely on their arguments that

documents concerning global warming science, other than the contents of their experts’ reports,

are categorically irrelevant and that Defendants should not be allowed to discover publicly

available documents. For the reasons mentioned above, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration

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is GRANTED with respect to these requests. Plaintiffs shall produce all documents responsive

to requests GM-DCC-AAM 8, 9, 10 and 11, and request GM 20/DCC-AAM 19.

With respect to the document requests that Defendants characterize as relating to “the

vehicle manufacturers’ past and present activities challenging and questioning the science of

global warming” (Mot. 8:24-25), Plaintiffs have successfully argued that they are not relevant to

the Dormant Commerce Clause burden analysis, as discussed above. Plaintiffs neglect, however,

to rebut in their opposition Defendants’ contention that these documents, to the extent they

discuss the science of global warming, are relevant to the Dormant Commerce Clause benefit

analysis. With respect to two of these requests, GM-DCC-AAM 13 and GM 16/DCC-AAM 15,

the Manufacturers state that they have conducted a “reasonably diligent search” and “located no

responsive non-privileged documents.” Joint Statement 31:10-20, 37:16-38:2. The

Manufacturers have effectively certified that, “to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information,

and belief,” the response is given for a proper purpose, not simply to prevent Defendants from

receiving discovery material. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2). The attorney’s signature on a discovery

response “signals that the attorney has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has

provided a truthful response—e.g., that all available documents are . . . furnished in response to

discovery requests.” 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §26.154[2][a] (3d ed.

2006). Failure to comply with this directive results in mandatory sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(g)(3). The record currently before the court does not demonstrate that the Manufacturers’

representations are untrue. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED with respect to

GM-DCC-AAM 13 and GM 16/DCC-AAM 15.

Defendants’ request 14 to GM seeks documents “relating to both Global Warming and to

Tech Central Station including” their communications and documents relating to their

relationship. Joint Statement 34:1-4. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants seek irrelevant

documents concerning what the Manufacturers knew about global warming to use to embarrass

Plaintiffs into dropping this litigation. This request potentially seeks relevant documents

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The request provides, in full, as follows: 14

GM REQUEST NO. 15/DCC-AAM REQUEST NO.14: All

DOCUMENTS relating to both GLOBAL WARMING and to any

of the following individuals: S. Fred Singer, James Glassman,

David Legates, Richard Lindzen, Patrick J. Michaels, Thomas Gale

Moore, Robert C. Balling, Jr., Sherwood B. Idso, Craig D. Idso,

Keith E. Idso, Sallie Baliunas, Paul Reiter, Chris Homer, Ross

McKitrick, Julian Morris, Frederick Seitz, Willie Soon, and Steven

Milloy, including but not limited to:

a. All DOCUMENTS relating to any communications between 

YOU and these individuals, and

b. All DOCUMENTS relating to YOUR relationship (or the

relationship of any automobile manufacturer or association of

automobile manufacturers) with any of them, including but not

limited to payments directly or indirectly from YOU or any other

automobile manufacturer or association of automobile

manufacturer to any of them.

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concerning communications regarding the science of global warming. However,

communications concerning, for example, the politics of or public opinion regarding global

warming and that do not discuss the science of global warming are not likely to be relevant to the

benefit analysis. Nor does it appear documents that concern GM’s relationship with Tech

Central Station and that do not discuss the science of global warming are relevant. Defendants

have not explained how documents not discussing global warming science are likely to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part with respect to request GM 14. GM shall only produce documents

responsive to request 14 that relate to any aspect of the science of global warming, such as the

causes of global warming, the effects of global warming, the effects of greenhouse gas emissions

or greenhouse gas concentrations on global warming, and the effect on global warming of

reductions in greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to government regulations or otherwise. 

Defendants also request documents relating to a list of 18 individuals and to global

warming, including the Manufacturers’ relationship with or communications with the individuals

and any automobile manufacturers’ payments to the individuals. Joint Statement 35:1-9. As

14

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Joint Statement 35:1-9.

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with the Tech Station request, this request is likely to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence regarding the science of global warming that is relevant to the Dormant Commerce

Clause claim. It also encompasses a variety of documents concerning communications or aspects

of the individuals’ relationship to the Manufacturers that are irrelevant. The Federal Rules

require Plaintiffs to disclose “the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony” of any

witness who will provide expert testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Defendants do not

explain how documents concerning any other payments are relevant. Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part with respect to request GM 15/DCCAAM 14. The Manufacturers shall only produce documents responsive to this request that relate

to any aspect of the science of global warming. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the above Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for RECONSIDERATION of the Magistrate Judge’s order

denying the motion to compel is DENIED with respect to requests GM-DCCAAM 13, GM 16/DCC-AAM 15, and GM 30/DCC 29/AAM 28;

2. Defendants’ motion for RECONSIDERATION is GRANTED with respect to

requests GM-DCC-AAM 8, 9, 10 and 11, GM 20/DCC-AAM 19, GM 22/DCC

21/AAM 20, GM 23/DCC 22/AAM 21, GM 25/DCC 24, GM 26/DCC 25/AAM

24, GM 28/DCC 27/AAM 26, and GM 29/DCC 28/AAM 27; and

//

//

//

//

//

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3. Defendants’ motion for RECONSIDERATION is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part with respect to requests GM 14 and GM 15/DCC-AAM 14. The

Manufacturers shall produce all documents responsive to requests GM 14 and GM

15/DCC-AAM 14 that discuss any aspect of the science of global warming.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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