Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04130/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04130-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT B. MERRIMAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

OFFICER JAKOB NEUMAN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 14-CV-4130 YGR

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF DEFENDANT 

SGT. GARY SORIA TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND;

DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT OFFICER 

JAKOB NEUMANN TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS MOOT

DKT. NO. 19, 26 

Plaintiff Scott B. Merriman brings this civil rights action against Defendants Officer Jakob 

Neuman, individually and in his official capacity for the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”); Sgt. 

Gary Soria, individually and in his official capacity for the CHP; and the CHP. Defendant Soria 

has filed a Motion to Dismiss, directed to Merriman’s amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 15, “FAC”) 

on the grounds that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim against him in his official 

capacity; (2) the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim against him individually and any duty 

to Merriman ended when he was delivered to the custody of the Mendocino County Jail; (3) any 

challenge to Merriman’s arrest and detention cannot be made unless his conviction is overturned or 

rendered invalid (citing Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477(1994)); and (4) any state law claims are 

barred for failure to file a government claim timely. 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Soria’s Motion to Dismiss First 

Amended Complaint with leave to amend. In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES the later-filed 

Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Officer Jakob Neumann as MOOT. 

I. APPLICABLE STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). “Dismissal can be 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). To survive a motion 

to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the 

plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of 

specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in 

the plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

II. DISCUSSION 

Although the exact basis for Merriman’s claims for relief is not clear from his complaint, he 

appears to be attempting to state claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of his First, 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, alleging a 

claim for false imprisonment and/or false arrest without probable cause (First Claim); for cruel and 

unusual punishment for withholding medication (Second Claim); for defamation and “ruination of 

his reputation” due to a “bad blog” (Third Claim); and for defendants’ illegal possession and 

seizure of his pain pills (Fourth Claim). The basis of the claims begins with Merriman alleging he 

was wrongfully accosted while shopping in a Rite Aid drug store by defendant Neuman, who said 

he suspected Merriman of driving under the influence. (FAC ¶ 6.) Merriman was handcuffed and 

put into the back of a CHP patrol car. (Id.) Merriman alleges that at some point thereafter, 

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Neuman grabbed Merriman in a forceful way, took him out of the car, and pushed his head down 

on the trunk of the car. (Id. ¶ 8.) Merriman alleges that Neuman told him he was under arrest, but 

did not explain the reason for the arrest or read him his rights. Merriman alleges that Neuman 

roughly handled him and was “fairly violent.” (Id. ¶ 9.) En route to the jail, Merriman requested to 

be taken and was taken to the hospital. The physician there told Merriman and Defendant Soria 

that Merriman had been treated previously at that hospital for back injury. (Id. ¶ 10.) Neuman 

alleges he was given pain pills. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Merriman alleges that, thereafter, he was booked into Mendocino County jail on charges of 

charges of driving on a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance and held for six 

days. (FAC ¶ 15.) He alleges that he obtained a plea deal that set his punishment at one day for the 

suspended license charge and dropped the controlled substance charge, such that the balance of five 

days spent in jail was false imprisonment. (Id.) He alleges that he was made to stay in jail without 

his usual pain medication and that “defendants” took his medication. (Id.¶ 18.) 

First, Defendant Soria seeks to dismiss the claims against him in his official capacity on the 

grounds that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials for damages when sued in 

their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Merriman seems to 

concede that an action for damages must be stated against the defendants in their individual 

capacities, and states that a suit for injunctive relief, suing them in their official capacities, will be 

filed separately. In conjunction with his opposition to the instant motion, on September 17, 2015, 

Merriman filed another amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 23.)1

 The Court notes that the two amended 

complaints appear to be identical except for the addition of the word “amended” in the caption of 

the later-filed document, the addition in the caption of the words “individually” after the names of 

Defendant Neuman and Defendant Soria, and minor formatting changes. 

 1

 This new amended complaint (captioned “Amended Complaint”) was Merriman’s second

amended complaint, since he filed a first amended complaint on June 26, 2015. (Dkt. No. 15.) 

Merriman did not have leave to file the second amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a)(1) 

(party may amend its pleading once without leave of court, but thereafter may only amend with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave). The Court, on its own motion, STRIKES the 

September 17, 2015 amended complaint (Dkt. No. 23). As further explained herein, this Order 

gives Merriman leave to incorporate the changes he made in this document into a Second Amended 

Complaint. 

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Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claim against Soria in his official capacity is 

GRANTED with leave to amend to allow Merriman to plead the claims against the individual 

defendants in their individual capacities. 

Second, Soria seeks to dismiss the claims against him on their substance, arguing that the 

allegations against him do not state a basis for any claim against him. He contends that allegations 

do not say Soria had any involvement in Merriman’s arrest, in the decision to hold Merriman at the 

Mendocino County Jail for six days, in the decision not to provide him pain medication during his 

stay, or in the publication of the “bad blog.” Soria contends that the FAC is impermissibly vague 

and lacking in allegations of material facts against him. Relatedly, Soria contends that he cannot be 

liable for any alleged excessive imprisonment or cruel and unusual punishment because his duty 

ended upon Merriman being taken into the custody of the Mendocino County Jail. Merriman does 

not allege that Soria, or any other defendant, played any role in the length or conditions of 

Merriman’s detention. Likewise, the viability of any claim alleging false imprisonment may 

depend unless he first successfully challenges the validity of his conviction. See Heck, supra, 512 

U.S. at 486-87; Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (a section 

1983 claim challenging arrest and imprisonment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 

related conviction, but claims of excessive force would not). 

The Court agrees that Merriman’s allegations are vague and do not state the facts upon 

Soria would be liable for each of the claims. Because the allegations are indefinite, the Court 

cannot determine whether they may be barred by Heck. Likewise, Merriman has not alleged facts 

to connect the actions of the CHP officer defendants with alleged misconduct after he was taken 

into the custody of the Mendocino County Jail. While Merriman, states that both defendants are 

responsible for imprisoning him, and offers some additional facts in his opposition to the motion, 

the facts needed to state the claim must be pleaded in the complaint. 

Merriman’s First, Second, and Fourth Claims appear to be asserted under 28 U.S.C. section 

1983. In order to state a claim under section 1983, Merriman must allege facts sufficient to show 

what each defendant did that violated his constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 

634 (9th Cir. 1988) (sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead set 

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United States District Court 

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forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's actions which violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights). Conclusory allegations of involvement will not do. Merriman must allege 

facts to explain some affirmative link or connection between each defendant’s conduct and the 

alleged deprivation of rights or other basis for legal liability. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). The FAC fails to set forth such allegations. 

In addition, to the extent that Merriman is basing any section 1983 claim on a violation of 

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, he must allege: (1) a 

serious medical need; and (2) deliberate indifference to that need by the defendants. See McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, 

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official is deliberately 

indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that 

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 

844 (1994). A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004). Again, at 

most, the FAC appears to allege incarceration for a period of six days without medication. It fails 

to allege with clarity which defendant knew of a serious medical need and then showed deliberate 

indifference. The FAC does not allege that any CHP officer played any role once Merriman was 

placed in the custody of the jail. 

With respect to Merriman’s Third Claim, and construing Merriman’s complaint liberally, it 

appears Merriman may be attempting to allege common law defamation. Such a claim would be 

governed by California state law. Merriman fails to state a claim for defamation against Soria 

because, at a minimum, he must allege facts that indicate Soria made an allegedly defamatory 

statement. See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007); see also Judicial Council of California 

Civil Jury Instructions 1700-1705. There are no allegations indicating the “bad blog” statements, at 

which the claim seems to be directed, were statements made by any defendant. 

Finally, Soria argues that Merriman’s claims under state law are barred for failure to present 

them to the government agency as required by the California Government Claims Act. Cal. Gov. 

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Code § § 950.2, 950.4.2 To the extent that Merriman is attempting to allege claims under California 

law against defendants, he must allege facts to show that he complied with the claims presentation 

requirements, or that he is entitled to some exception to those requirements, consistent with these 

Government Code sections. The FAC does not do so. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the Motion of Defendant Soria to Dismiss First Amended Complaint is 

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Merriman has leave to file a Second Amended Complaint 

consistent with federal pleading standards and which addresses the defects set forth above. 

Merriman is advised that for each claim, he must specifically identify, to the best of his ability, 

each defendant, what constitutional right he believes each defendant has violated, and the facts on 

which he bases each alleged violation. The Court will analyze each claim as to each defendant, 

independently. 

Merriman shall file and serve his Second Amended Complaint no later than November 13, 

2015. Any response is due 21 days thereafter. 

Merriman may seek assistance at the Court’s Legal Help Center. The Legal Help Center 

may assist persons who do not have lawyers if they make an appointment. The Legal Help 

Center’s phone number is (415) 782-8982 and its website is http://cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersf. 

Finally, Defendant Jakob Neumann filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 26) on October 8, 

2015. In light of the Court’s ruling herein, that motion is Denied Without Prejudice as moot. 

Defendant Neumann may make any arguments therein, as appropriate, in response to any Second 

Amended Complaint 

This terminates Docket Nos. 19 and 26. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 14, 2015 _______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

 2

 Soria seeks judicial notice of a declaration from a custodian of records of the Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board, indicating that Merriman has not filed such a claim. 

(Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 20.) The Court does not find this declaration to be a proper 

subject of judicial notice in support of the motion to dismiss. The request is DENIED. 

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