Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02003/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EEOC, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

T.R. Orr, Inc. an Arizona Corporation, 

Defendant. 

Thomas J. Louviere, a married man, 

Intervenor.

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No. CV 04-2003-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant T.R. Orr, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 86). Also pending is Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike "Defendant T.R. Orr's

Objections to Plaintiff EEOC's Statement of Facts" or, in the alternative, Motion for Leave

to File a Surresponse to the "Objections" and to T.R. Orr's Reply (Doc. # 101) and Plaintiff

EEOC's Motion for Expedited Decision on "Motion to Strike . . . or Motion for Leave to File

a Surresponse" (Doc. # 105).

I. Background

On September 24, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the

"EEOC") filed a complaint against T.R. Orr, Inc. ("T.R. Orr") alleging that Orr has "engaged

in unlawful employment practices at its Cottonwood, Arizona job site, in violation of section

703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1), by allowing a co-worker to subject Mr. Louviere

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to sexual harassment that altered the terms and conditions of Mr. Louviere's employment and

created a hostile work environment." According to the complaint, the "unlawful sexual

harassment was partially physical in nature" and "partially verbal in nature." The EEOC also

alleges that Orr "has failed, in violation of section 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e8(c), to make and preserve records relevant to the determination of whether unlawful

employment practices have been or are being committed." The EEOC seeks injunctive relief,

compensation for Louviere's past and future pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, and

punitive damages. Thomas Louviere ("Louviere"), the alleged victim of the sexual

harassment, subsequently intervened and filed his own complaint. In his complaint, Louviere

asserts the same allegations and seeks similar relief. Additionally, Louviere specifically

seeks back pay, rightful place reinstatement or front pay, and damages for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

On May 17, 2006, T.R. Orr filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it is

not liable for the alleged harassment because it neither knew nor should have known of the

alleged harassment and that, upon receiving a complaint from Louviere, took prompt and

effective action to remedy the alleged harassment. T.R. Orr also claims that Louviere's

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails because its alleged conduct was not

outrageous and beyond all bounds of decency. Further, T.R. Orr claims that Louviere has

failed to state a claim for constructive discharge because he voluntarily quit after T.R. Orr

remedied the alleged hostile work environment by terminating the alleged harasser. Finally,

T.R. Orr claims it has complied with the record keeping requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e8(c).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is mandated,

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"...against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant "must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" by "com[ing]

forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)). A dispute about a fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The non-movant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create

a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. However,

in the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.

2004). 

III. Discussion

A. Sexual Harassment Claim

Under Title VII, an employer may not "discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Samesex sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination and is actionable under Title VII.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1997). "By tolerating sexual

harassment against its employees, the employer is deemed to have adversely changed the

terms of their employment in violation of Title VII." Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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To prove a hostile work environment claim, plaintiff must demonstrate conduct

"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create

an abusive working environment." Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.

57, 67 (1986). When a non-managerial co-worker is the alleged harasser, an employer is

"liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which

management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have

known." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting EEOC v. Hacienda

Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989). An employer may avoid such liability by

undertaking measures "reasonably calculated to end the harassment." Id. (quoting Katz v.

Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). The measures undertaken must be reasonably

prompt. Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Ninth Circuit

further explained, "[a]n employer's remedy should persuade the individual harassers to

discontinue unlawful conduct." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881. This does not necessarily require

termination of the harasser's employment; instead, "the reasonableness of an employer's

remedy will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in

harassment." Id. 

Liability may also be imputed to an employer "who anticipated or reasonably should

have anticipated that the plaintiff would become a victim of sexual harassment in the

workplace and yet failed to take action reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment."

Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 107 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd in relevant part, vacated

in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990). An employer's knowledge of prior

sexual harassment by the co-worker against other co-workers "will often prove highly

relevant in deciding whether the employer should have anticipated that the plaintiff too

would become a victim of" the co-worker's harassment. Id. 

T.R. Orr argues that it is not liable for Stoke's alleged sexual harassment of Louviere

because it did not know and should not have known of the alleged conduct. Further, T.R. Orr

argues that once Louviere reported the alleged conduct, it took prompt and effective action

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Because T.R. Orr's motion is not premised, in whole or in part, on the

characterization of Stokes' conduct as constituting sexual harassment, the Court's Order shall

not be construed as a finding that Stokes' conduct constitutes same-sex sexual harassment

under the case law. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75

(1998); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Cole v. Kone

Elevators, Inc., 2006 WL 3313707 (D.Ariz. 2006) (Martone, J.). 

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against Stokes by terminating him. In contrast, the EEOC argues that T.R. Orr is liable for

Stoke's alleged conduct because two prior T.R. Orr employees reported similar conduct by

Stokes. Accordingly, the EEOC concludes that T.R. Orr anticipated or reasonably should

have anticipated that Louviere would become a victim of sexual harassment in the

workplace, but failed to take action reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment. The

EEOC also argues that Stokes' pervasive use of curse words and inappropriate physical

touching of other employees clearly shows that T.R. Orr knew or should have known of

Stoke's alleged conduct. Finally, the EEOC argues that T.R. Orr failed to take prompt,

effective remedial action to prevent further harassment by Stokes. The EEOC's argument in

this regard concerns not only T.R. Orr's remedial actions prior to Louviere's complaints, but

also T.R. Orr's actions after Louviere reported the alleged harassment.

The Court has reviewed the memoranda and supporting exhibits submitted by the

parties and, construing all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the EEOC, finds that

there are material disputes concerning the pervasiveness of Stokes' verbal and physical

conduct. The Court further finds that there are material disputes concerning T.R. Orr's actual

or constructive knowledge of Stokes' conduct, including whether or not certain employees

who were aware of Stokes' conduct were acting in a managerial capacity, and the promptness

and effectiveness of T.R. Orr's remedial actions before and after Louviere's complaints.

Accordingly, T.R. Orr has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law and the Court will deny T.R. Orr's motion for summary judgment to the extent it seeks

dismissal of the sexual harassment claim.1

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B. Record-Keeping Claim

Title VII requires employers to "make and keep such records relevant to the

determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being

committed" and "preserve such records for such periods . . . as the [EEOC] shall prescribe

by regulation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). The regulations provide that employers shall

preserve all personnel records for one year and shall preserve all records relevant to litigation

stemming from a charge of discrimination until the litigation is terminated. 29 C.F.R. §

1602.14. The EEOC alleges that T.R. Orr violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) because T.R. Orr

failed to keep a letter, drafted in October 2002, detailing Stokes' alleged harassment of

another employee that occurred prior to the conduct at issue. T.R. Orr received the letter less

than seven months before Louviere filed his charge with the EEOC. Thus, the EEOC argues

that T.R. Orr was required to keep the letter through the resolution of this litigation.

T.R. Orr represents that it misplaced the letter regarding the prior incident, but made

a written notation in Stokes' personnel file concerning the incident. T.R. Orr argues that

because it has continually maintained Stokes' personnel file, the notation therein is sufficient

to comply with the record-keeping requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). Further, T.R.

Orr argues that there is no evidence that it purposefully destroyed or failed to retain a copy

of the letter or that it has ever attempted to hide the prior sexual harassment allegation.

However, as the EEOC notes, a record-keeping violation may occur whether the records are

purposely destroyed or merely lost. See Lombard v. MCI Tel. Corp., 13 F.Supp.2d 621, 629

n. 10 (N.D.Ohio 1998). Accordingly, the Court will deny T.R. Orr's motion for summary

judgment to the extent it seeks dismissal of the record-keeping claim. 

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

To prevail on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Louviere must

show that T.R. Orr's conduct was extreme and outrageous, that T.R. Orr either intended to

cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that emotional distress

would result, and that T.R. Orr's conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. Ford v.

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Revlon, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987). Extreme and outrageous conduct is "conduct that

an average member of the community would regard as atrocious and beyond all possible

bounds of decency." Id. The Court must make a preliminary determination whether T.R.

Orr's conduct may be considered so outrageous and extreme as to permit recovery. Mintz v.

Bell Atlantic System Leasing Int'l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). That issue

may only be sent to the jury where "reasonable minds may differ." Nelson v. Phoenix Resort

Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 46). Even if T.R. Orr's conduct was unjustified, "it does not necessarily rise to the level

of 'atrocious' and 'beyond all bounds of decency'" to allow recovery under a claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. (quoting Ford, 734 P.2d at 585). Further, a

claim for sexual harassment under Title VII is, standing alone, insufficient to support a claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F.Supp. 424, 431

(D.Ariz. 1992). This is because the threshold of inappropriate conduct is much higher for

a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress than it is for sexual harassment. Id.

"Major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other

will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough."

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. f.

Louviere's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based only on T.R.

Orr's actions in failing or refusing to investigate Louviere's complaints and properly

supervise Stokes. Louviere alleges this conduct was extreme and outrageous and was done

in reckless disregard that Louviere would suffer severe emotional distress. In opposition,

T.R. Orr argues that, even accepting as true the allegations it knew Stokes used sexually

inappropriate language and engaged in inappropriate physical conduct, its conduct was not

outrageous, atrocious or beyond all possible bounds of decency. Considering the "extremely

high burden of proof for demonstrating intentional infliction of emotional distress," the Court

agrees with T.R. Orr. See Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2004). While

T.R. Orr's conduct may eventually be found improper or unjustified, the Court cannot

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conclude that reasonable minds could find that T.R. Orr's alleged conduct was outrageous,

atrocious, or beyond all possible bounds of decency. Simply stated, T.R. Orr's alleged

conduct simply does not rise to such a level. Accordingly, the Court will grant T.R. Orr's

motion for summary judgment to the extent it seeks dismissal of the intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. 

D. Constructive Discharge Claim

"In order to survive summary judgment on [his] constructive discharge claim,

[Louviere] must show a triable issue of fact as to whether 'a reasonable person in [his]

position would have felt that [he] was forced to quit because of intolerable and

discriminatory working conditions.'" Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &

Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1143-45 (9th Cir. 2001). T.R. Orr argues, in part, that there was

no constructive discharge because Louviere voluntarily resigned his employment after T.R.

Orr terminated Stokes for the alleged conduct. Accordingly, T.R. Orr argues that Louviere

was not subjected to intolerable working conditions at the time he quit. In contrast, Louviere

states that when he spoke to Mr. Orr, the owner of T.R. Orr, about Stokes' conduct, Mr. Orr

told him that Stokes had been fired before for such conduct, but was re-hired after Stokes

showed remorse. Accordingly, Louviere argues he quit because he was afraid Stokes would

be re-hired like before and that the harassment would not end. The Court finds that a genuine

issue of material fact exists concerning the circumstances surrounding Louviere's resignation

and the working conditions at T.R. Orr at the time. Accordingly, the Court will deny T.R.

Orr's motion for summary judgment to the extent it seeks dismissal of the constructive

discharge claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant T.R. Orr, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 86) is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Intervenor's intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim and DENIED in all other respects;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike "Defendant T.R.

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Orr's Objections to Plaintiff EEOC's Statement of Facts" or, in the alternative, Motion for

Leave to File a Surresponse to the "Objections" and to T.R. Orr's Reply (Doc. # 101) is

DENIED as moot; and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff EEOC's Motion for Expedited Decision

on "Motion to Strike . . . or Motion for Leave to File a Surresponse" (Doc. # 105) is DENIED

as moot.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2007.

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