Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01633/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CYNTHIA CROSSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

HONDA MANUFACTURING OF

ALABAMA,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-1633-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction and Procedural History

PlaintiffCynthiaCrosson (“Ms. Crosson”) initiated thisjob discrimination case

(Doc. 1) on September 18, 2015. Because Ms. Crosson failed to ever perfect service

on Defendant, on January 26, 2016, the court entered an order directing “the Plaintiff

show good cause within 11 days why this action should not be dismissed pursuant to

FRCP 4(m).” (Doc. 7 at 1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not

served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own

after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that

FILED

 2016 Feb-16 AM 11:38

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-01633-VEH Document 8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 5
defendant or order thatservice be made within a specified time.”).1 Under Rule 4(m),

the deadline to serve Defendant expired on December 17, 2015.

2

Further, the court’sshow cause deadline ran on February 8, 2016. Ms. Crosson

has neither filed a response, perfected service on Defendant, nor otherwise

demonstrated good cause as unambiguously required by the court.Consequently, her

case is due to be dismissed without prejudice sua sponte.

II. Analysis

Asthe foregoing procedural history reveals, Ms. Crosson has neither complied

with Rule 4(m) nor provided any explanation for this non-compliance. Under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply

with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any

claim against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 

Further, case law reinforces that, as a result of Ms. Crosson’s failure to even

attempt to comply with the show cause order or otherwise indicate an intent that she

still wishesto pursue claims against Defendant (e.g., such as by seeking an extension

of time in which to perfect service on it), the court possesses the inherent power to

1 Effective December 1, 2015, the time to perfect service under Rule 4(m) was reduced from

120 days to 90.

2 Plaintiff’s lack of service also fails to comply with the prior version of Rule 4(m) as the

120-day deadline expired January 19, 2016.

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Case 1:15-cv-01633-VEH Document 8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 2 of 5
dismiss her case against Defendantsua sponte. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370

U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962) (“The authority of a

court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an

‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested

in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious

disposition of cases.”); see also Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.

1985) (“The court’s power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce

its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31,

82 S. Ct. at 1388-89)); cf. Gratton v. Great American Communications, 178 F.3d

1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that court has broad authority under Rule

37 to control discovery and enforce its orders); cf. also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These

rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”) (emphasis added). 

“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an

order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of

discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)

(citing State Exchange Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11thCir. 1982)). Here,

by virtue of its show cause order, Ms. Crosson was put on notice that the court was

considering whether to dismiss her claims against Defendant for lack of prosecution

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and, nonetheless, she ignored that warning and filed nothing. Even an unrepresented

party’s case is subject to dismissal when that litigant demonstrates an unwillingness

to comply with court orders. Cf., e.g. Moon, 863 F.2d at 838 (“Moon’s conduct and

words evidence a refusal to acknowledge the authority of the magistrate and indicate

no willingness to comply with court orders.”); id. at 838 n.5 (“[A] plaintiff who

ignore[s] notices and orders of the court [is not] excused merely because of her pro

se status.” (citing Anthony v. Marion County General Hospital, 617 F.2d 1164, 1169

(5th Cir. 1980))).3

 

Guided by the foregoing authorities, the court concludes that dismissing Ms.

Crosson’s action against Defendant “without prejudice” (ratherthan “with prejudice”)

isthe most appropriate measure to take, especially as a “without prejudice” dismissal

is consistent with the framework of Rule 4(m). Cf. Phipps v. Blakeny, 8 F.3d 788,

790-91 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the record clearly demonstrates that a plaintiff

deliberately and defiantly refused to comply with several court orders on discovery

and tells the court that he will not comply in the future, a district judge has the

authority to deny that plaintiff further accessto the court to pursue the case.”). Simply

3

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

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Case 1:15-cv-01633-VEH Document 8 Filed 02/16/16 Page 4 of 5
put, a “without prejudice” dismissal means that the merits of Ms. Crosson’s claims

against Defendant, if any, are not barred from further litigation by such an order.

III. Conclusion

Therefore, Ms. Crosson’s claims against Defendant are due to be dismissed

without prejudice due to her failure to prosecute as provided for under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and the express requirements of this court’s January 26,

2016, show cause order. The court will enter a separate order in conformance with

this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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