Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00258/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK MAHONEY, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs Patrick Mahoney, Caroline Kennedy, Suracha Xiong and Brandon Allen, 

Sr. sought a temporary restraining order from the court on February 4, 2020. Mot. for TRO, ECF 

No. 2. Defendants City of Sacramento and Sacramento Police Department filed an opposition on 

February 5, 2020. Opp’n, ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs replied on February 6, 2020. ECF No. 9. 

Having considered the parties’ arguments and the applicable law, the court DENIES plaintiffs’ 

motion. As explained below, on the current record it is not clear plaintiffs have a federal case. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs Patrick Mahoney, Caroline Kennedy, Suracha Xiong and Brandon Allen, 

Sr. are persons who are homeless, who live in tents placed along North B Street west of 7th Street 

within the City of Sacramento. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4–7. They seek to represent a class of 

approximately thirty homeless persons who also reside in tents along North B Street. Id. ¶ 8. 

///// 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 1 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

Members of the putative class refer to themselves as the “Hopeful Community.” Id., Introduction 

at 2. 

 A private party contracted with a company to place a portable toilet near the 

encampment. Id. ¶ 16. The portable toilet was placed on January 16, 2020. Id. ¶ 17. It remained 

near the site for nine days. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs allege it was maintained during that time by 

members of the Hopeful Community. Id. Plaintiffs allege at the end of the nine days, the 

portable toilet “was removed on orders of the Sacramento City Police.” Id. ¶ 19. On February 3, 

2020, the portable toilet was once again placed at the site. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiffs state that without 

an order enjoining defendants from removing it, it will be removed, denying the plaintiffs and the 

putative class a private and sanitary place to use the bathroom. Id. Nothing in the record 

currently indicates removal of the portable toilet currently at the site is imminent. Plaintiffs say 

many members of the putative class are disabled and use walkers and wheelchairs, and would 

thus be without access to restroom facilities if the portable toilet was removed. Mot. at 7. 

 Defendants assert that the land on which the portable toilets sit is owned by the 

City of Sacramento. Opp’n at 2. They assert the private company that placed the portable toilets 

is United Site Services. Id. The first portable toilet was removed by United Site Services at the 

request of the Sacramento Police Department. Id. Defendants assert the toilets were removed 

because they were in violation of Sacramento City Code section 12.12.020, which makes it 

unlawful for any person to encroach within public rights-of-way or other city property without 

first obtaining an encroachment permit from the City. Id. at 4. Storage of personal property on 

public property is unlawful and a public nuisance. Id. (citing SCC § 12.52.040). Defendants 

assert plaintiffs have advanced no evidence that they applied for an encroachment permit, which 

would remedy the problem if granted; as a result, defendants say, plaintiffs’ claims are unripe. Id. 

at 7. 

 In response, plaintiffs proffer supplemental declarations explaining what they way 

are their efforts to obtain permits. Robin Kristufek, RN, avers she is the person, along with a 

fellow nurse assisting the homeless, who arranged to have the portable toilet delivered. 

Declaration of Robin Kristufek (“Kristufek Decl.”), ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 7. She does not state that she 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 2 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

applied for a permit, but notes that after the removal of the first toilet, she called the City’s nonemergency number 3-1-1 to explore obtaining a permit, and was eventually directed to the 

Sacramento City Encroachment Division. Id. ¶ 9. She alleges the woman with whom she spoke 

told her that “no such permit could be issued by the City, and that she had been specifically told 

that port-a-potty permits cannot be issued for ‘homeless’ use.” Id. 

 Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mark Merin, also avers he called the City’s Encroachment 

Division on February 6, 2020. Supp. Declaration of Mark Merin (“Merin Decl.”), ECF No. 9-1 

¶ 3. After speaking with the same woman and receiving the same answer about a policy of the 

department not to issue encroachment permits for toilets for use by homeless persons, Mr. Merin 

was referred to Matt Johns, evidently another City employee. Id. Mr. Johns stated the City 

would not issue a permit for a port-a-potty encroaching on a city right-of-way, unless it was in 

connection with a construction project. Id. ¶ 4. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of such an order is to preserve the 

status quo and to prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no 

longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In 

determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, a court applies the factors that guide 

the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief: whether the moving party “is likely to 

succeed on the merits, . . . likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, . . 

. the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and . . . an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter 

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. 

Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the analysis for temporary 

restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical”). 

 The Ninth Circuit sometimes employs an alternate formulation of the Winter test, 

referred to as the “serious questions” test. Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“‘A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates... that serious questions 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 3 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips strongly in the plaintiff’s favor.’” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lands 

Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted)). Under 

the “serious questions” approach to a preliminary injunction, the court may use a “sliding scale” 

where “[t]he elements of the preliminary injunction test must be balanced, so that a stronger 

showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 

1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). Winter was decided after the initial articulation of the “serious 

questions” test, but does not overrule it. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135. The “serious questions” test 

must be applied in conjunction with review of the other two Winter factors, likelihood of 

irreparable injury and whether the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Without at this point reaching defendants’ arguments about ripeness and standing, 

plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating their entitlement to a temporary restraining 

order, an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Cottrell, 632 F. 3d at 1131. This is 

the case even if there is a likelihood of removal of the second portable toilet so as to satisfy the 

requirement of likelihood of irreparable harm. 

 Although plaintiffs rightly point out that “an alleged constitutional infringement 

will often alone constitute irreparable harm,” (Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 

Coalition of Econ. Equity, 950 F. 2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991)), the court is not persuaded 

plaintiffs have shown the likelihood of a violation of any constitutional right. 

 Plaintiffs assert that the substantive due process rights of privacy and bodily 

integrity include the right to eliminate bodily waste in private. Although they cite district court 

cases from outside the Ninth Circuit for this proposition, (West v. Dallas Police Dep’t, No. 3:95-

cv-01347-P, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23900, at *19 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997); Glaspy v. Malicoat, 

134 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896 (W.D. Mich. 2001); and Thompson v. Spurgeon, No. 3:13-cv-00526, 

2013 WL 2467755, at *6–7 (M.D. Tenn. June 7, 2013)), they cite no controlling authority decided 

by the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court. While the court at times agrees with solely persuasive 

authority, in this instance the cases plaintiffs cite are not closely enough analogous to the 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 4 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

circumstances here for the court to be convinced the cases should be given weight. Generally 

speaking, the cases address extreme situations in which plaintiffs were forced to soil themselves 

or eliminate in view of strangers. See, e.g., West, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23900, at *3–4 (pretrial 

detainee denied access to restroom during booking process and urinated on booking room floor, 

then handcuffed with penis still exposed); see also Glaspy, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 892–93 (prison 

visitor denied access to restroom without justification, forced to soil self in presence of guards); 

see also Thomson, 2013 WL 2467755, at *1 (detainee denied access to restroom during 

rehabilitative program soiled self and forced to return to supervising corrections officer soaked in 

urine). These cases do not expressly recognize a free-floating constitutional right to private 

elimination in all circumstances. They stand for the proposition that being forced into specific, 

immediately foreseeable situations of elimination and self-soiling in full view of authority figures 

and strangers violates a constitutional guarantee. These cases are insufficiently analogous to the 

facts in the record to persuade the court plaintiffs’ circumstances have a constitutional dimension. 

 One former member of the Supreme Court has observed, “there are few activities 

that appear to be more at the heart of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment than the right to eliminate harmful wastes from one’s body away from 

the observation of others,” but he did so in dissent and the Court has not adopted any principle of 

law applicable here. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 645–46 (1989) 

(Marshall, J. Thurgood, dissenting) (majority upholding validity of warrantless urine testing of 

railway employees). Regardless of the intuitive appeal of Justice Marshall’s views, there is an 

absence of any authority recognizing the specific contours or even the existence of a right to 

private elimination. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing they possess a constitutional 

right to be violated. 

 Plaintiffs also have not shown that removal of the portable toilet is constitutionally 

cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. They do have an Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from punishment for involuntary conduct under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and 

its progeny. Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 616 (9th Cir. 2019). Martin, in particular, 

holds that individuals may not be subjected to criminal penalties for engaging in involuntary, lifeCase 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 5 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

sustaining actions on public property in the absence of adequate shelter. Id. (holding enforcement 

of Boise’s anti-public camping ordinance against homeless people was unconstitutional 

punishment for involuntary act of sheltering against elements in absence of available homeless 

shelter space). However, it is not a necessary corollary that the same right is violated by the 

removal of the portable toilet at issue here. Extending Martin to these facts, the City may not 

prosecute or otherwise penalize the plaintiffs and the Hopeful Community for eliminating in 

public if there is no alternative to doing so. Given plaintiffs’ allegations here, no irreparable 

injury to plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights is likely. 

 Plaintiffs’ further argue the City’s removal of the portable toilet constitutes a statecreated danger. The test for a state-created danger is whether the agents of the state have engaged 

in affirmative conduct that leaves the person in danger in a situation more dangerous than the one 

in which the agents of the state found them. Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dept., 227 F. 3d 

1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). Fatal to plaintiffs’ argument here is that the danger alleged is danger 

to purported constitutional rights, which as the court notes are not colorable on the record 

currently before the court. Plaintiffs also point vaguely to the likelihood of plaintiffs’ 

“endangering the lives and health of the community at large while suffering humiliation and 

degradation.” Mot. at 7. Between a constitutional right that appears not to exist, and generalized 

public health threats to an undefined community, plaintiffs have not met their burden of 

establishing a likelihood of irreparable harm. 

 Lastly, plaintiffs have not established the alleged harm is likely to occur, as 

opposed to merely possible. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based 

only on the possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive 

relief as an extraordinary remedy that may be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.”). Assuming it is possible the portable toilet will be removed even after the 

filing of this suit, it is plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury, a burden 

they have not met. 

 Given the conclusions it reaches above, the court need not address the remaining 

Winter factors or defendants’ ripeness and standing arguments. 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 6 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order is 

DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED 

DATED: February 10, 2020. 

 

Case 2:20-cv-00258-KJM-CKD Document 10 Filed 02/10/20 Page 7 of 7