Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-03926/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-03926-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1The Amended Petition originally contained eleven claims. In his Notice of Confirmation of

Withdrawal of Claims, in addition to withdrawing multiple claims contained in his original Petition,

Petitioner withdrew what was listed as Claim VIII in the Amended Petition (in which he challenged the

trial court’s decision to transfer the penalty phase of his trial to Stanislaus County rather than Marin

County) and then renumbered the following claims as Claim VIII (asserting unjustifiable delay in state

appellate proceedings); Claim IX (alleging cumulative error); and Claim X (referred to by the parties as

the Ring/Apprendi claim).

Case No. C 01 3926 MHP

ORDER DISPOSING OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DPSAGOK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Royal Kenneth HAYES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

S.W. ORNOSKI, Acting Warden of San Quentin

State Prison,

 Respondent.

Case Number C 01 3926 MHP

DEATH-PENALTY CASE

ORDER DISPOSING OF CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Docket Nos. 31 & 33]

Petitioner Royal Kenneth Hayes is an inmate on death row in California’s San Quentin

State Prison. His Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus contains ten claims for relief for

alleged violations of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 In his final Status

Report Regarding Exhaustion of Petitioner’s Claim X, Petitioner withdrew Claim X from the

Court’s consideration. Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment on all remaining claims, Claims I through IX. The Court took the motions under

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ORDER DISPOSING OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DPSAGOK)

submission without oral argument as the parties indicated that oral argument on the motions

would not be necessary. As explained below, the Court concludes that Respondent is entitled to

summary judgment on Claims I through IX and the Court grants Respondent’s motion and denies

Petitioner’s. Accordingly, subject to reconsideration, the Court will deny Petitioner’s application

for a writ of habeas corpus and will grant judgment for Respondent.

I. BACKGROUND

The following recitation of the background of this case is based primarily on the Supreme

Court of California’s opinion disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, People v. Hayes, 989 P.2d

645 (Cal. 2000). The State court’s factual determinations are “presumed to be correct” pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2005). In addition, with immaterial exceptions, they are confirmed by

this Court’s independent review of the record. Cf. Earp v. Stokes, — F.3d —, No. 03-99005,

2005 WL 2159051, at *2 n.3 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2005).

On or about December 26, 1981, Deborah Garcia dug two shallow holes at a remote

location in the forest on the Santa Cruz campus of the University of California and she bought

two bags of oyster-shell gardening lime at a garden shop. According to Garcia, she believed that

the holes, which Petitioner had directed her to dig, were to be used to hide packages; Petitioner

had used such holes in the past to hide packages. Later that day or perhaps the next day or so,

according to Garcia, Petitioner telephoned her to meet him on December 29, 1981, so that they

could bury the packages.

According to Diane Weller, on December 27, 1981, in Millbrae, California, in the

presence of Weller and Lauren de Laet, Donald MacVicar gave Petitioner $160,000 towards

$250,000 for cocaine that MacVicar was led to believe would be delivered at a house in a remote

location in Santa Cruz. Later that day, Petitioner, who sometimes went by the code name

“Penguin,” told Weller that she was to accompany him to Santa Cruz two days later to kill

MacVicar and Laet with a gun and silencer from a friend in Minnesota that Petitioner was to

receive on the intervening day. Larry Dahl arrived in Millbrae from Minnesota on December 28,

1981, with a pistol and silencer from Jim Johnson.

On December 29, 1981, Laet, Petitioner, MacVicar, and Weller drove to Santa Cruz,

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ORDER DISPOSING OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DPSAGOK)

where they met Garcia. The five of them then drove to the location in the forest where Garcia

had dug the shallow holes. MacVicar and Laet were told that they had to be searched before

going to the house where delivery of the cocaine was to occur. Petitioner instructed Weller to

remain in the car. MacVicar was led to a tree. Petitioner instructed Garcia to search MacVicar

while he leaned against the tree. Petitioner shot and killed MacVicar with a single bullet to the

back of the head. Laet then was brought to the site and was shot twice in the head before she

died.

Garcia brought Weller from the car to the scene. Petitioner removed the victims’ heads

and hands from their bodies, and the bodies were placed into the shallow holes that Garcia

previously had dug, although the holes had to be enlarged. The oyster-shell gardening lime,

which Petitioner believed to be quicklime, was spread over the bodies to hasten decomposition

and the graves were covered with dirt, brush, and leaves. The severed body parts were placed in

plastic bags and left nearby. Petitioner, Garcia, and Weller later disposed of their clothes, the

guns, and other evidence at other locations.

A mushroom hunter discovered fragments of what later turned out to be Laet’s skull on

February 20, 1982, and law-enforcement personnel began to investigate. On March 10, 1982,

Garcia, fearing for her life and for the safety of her family, filed a criminal complaint against

Petitioner, contending that Petitioner falsely imprisoned her, assaulted her with a deadly weapon,

and threatened to kill her the day before. She also informed the police of her, Petitioner’s, and

Weller’s involvement in the murders. Garcia led the police to the location of the bodies;

MacVicar’s body was found that day; Laet’s was found the next day. A second mushroom

hunter found MacVicar’s skull on March 18, 1982.

Petitioner was arrested, asserted his innocence, and, after lengthy pretrial proceedings,

went to trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court on December 3, 1984. The chief

prosecution witnesses were Weller, who admitted knowingly aiding and abetting the murders,

and Garcia, who claimed not to know that any homicide-related conduct was occurring before

MacVicar was shot. Weller and Garcia, each of whom claimed to have acted under Petitioner’s

domination and to have feared him, testified about their relationships with him (including

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ORDER DISPOSING OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DPSAGOK)

significant violence and threats against them) and about various drug-related criminal activities,

purportedly involving the Mafia and the CIA, in which they and others had participated with

Petitioner over the two to four years prior to the murders.

Diane Edwards, Garcia’s mother, was unable to testify at the trial because of her health,

so her preliminary-hearing testimony was read to the jury. Edwards’s testimony was consistent

with Garcia’s; in particular, Edwards testified about Petitioner’s unusual interest in the discovery

of the first skull in the Santa Cruz forest, his request that she collect newspaper stories about the

skulls and the investigation, and his subsequent threats against her.

Sondra Johnson, Jim Johnson’s spouse, also testified consistently with Weller and Garcia. 

She recounted the events surrounding her spouse, at Petitioner’s request, purchasing the gun and

building the silencer that were used in the murders. She stated that it was she who contacted

Dahl to have him drive the gun and the silencer from the Johnsons’ home in Minnesota to

Petitioner in California. Sondra Johnson also testified that she went to Miami to mail an

envelope to Petitioner in Hawai!i; this envelope, which she received from Dahl, was found to

have contained a letter from Laet, written at Petitioner’s direction, that said that Laet and

MacVicar were having a wonderful time in Florida and preparing to leave the country. Finally,

Sondra Johnson reported that Petitioner had admitted that he killed two people in California

whose bodies had been chopped up.

Petitioner’s defense was that the murders were committed by Weller, Garcia, and Dahl,

who had become the boyfriend of one of the prosecution witnesses between the time of the

murders and Petitioner’s arrest. Petitioner claimed that he was framed to deflect blame away

from Dahl.

On February 5, 1985, Petitioner’s jury convicted him of the first-degree murders of Laet

and MacVicar and found true a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation and an

allegation that Petitioner personally used a firearm during the commission of the murders. The

jury also convicted Petitioner of the March 9, 1982, false imprisonment of and assault with a

deadly weapon on Garcia and of possession of cocaine on the date of his arrest, March 10, 1982. 

The jury was unable to agree on the penalty for the murders.

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2The Court stayed the present action from April 1, 2003, to March 10, 2004, for Petitioner to

return to the California Supreme Court to exhaust Claim X in his Amended Petition. As noted, Petitioner

has withdrawn that claim from the Court’s consideration.

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(DPSAGOK)

On May 29, 1986, a jury in the Stanislaus County Superior Court, to which the case had

been transferred on Petitioner’s motion for a change of venue, returned a penalty verdict of death. 

The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for modification of the penalty and imposed a

judgment of death on August 8, 1986.

During the pendency of Petitioner’s automatic direct appeal to the California Supreme

Court, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court,

which the court denied “on the merits” in an unexplicated order filed on July 21, 1999. The court

subsequently affirmed the judgment against Petitioner in all respects in a reasoned opinion on

December 23, 1999; it modified its opinion and denied rehearing on February 16, 2000. 

Petitioner next sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, which denied

such writ on November 6, 2000. On October 16, 2001, Petitioner initiated the present action

seeking a writ of habeas corpus in United States District Court.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates

“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court “shall not” grant a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a State court judgment with

respect to any claim that a State court adjudicated on the merits unless that court’s adjudication

of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2005).

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

A. CLAIM I

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

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enjoy the right to . . . a trial, by an impartial jury. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right is

incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures fair trials for criminal defendants

with its provision that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,

362 (1966) (“Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from

outside influences.”). In Claim I in his Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges that he was deprived

of his Federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury by the trial court’s denial of

his motion for a change of venue for the guilt phase of his trial. The California Supreme Court

denied this claim on the merits in its opinion disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal. 989 P.2d at

668-70.

At his arraignment, Petitioner moved for a change of venue from Santa Cruz County. 

The motion was based on the extensive countywide publicity in the print media and on the radio

and television regarding the discovery of the victims’ remains, the arrest of Petitioner, and

subsequent events. Petitioner noted that the media had disclosed highly prejudicial information

that would be inadmissible at trial, including the facts that Petitioner twice had been acquitted of

prior homicides, once on the grounds of insanity, and that the chief prosecution witnesses had

passed lie-detector tests. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice, recognizing that a

change of venue would have been appropriate if the trial were to have commenced at the time of

the motion, but stating that as time went by there would be less likelihood that Petitioner could

not receive a fair trial in Santa Cruz County.

Petitioner renewed his motion eighteen months later after almost three weeks of voir dire

of prospective jurors. Two months after that, Petitioner supplemented his motion with additional

supporting materials that reflected current publicity about juror selection, the commencement of

the trial, and Petitioner’s recent marriage; these materials included local newspaper editorials

decrying the amount of money spent on trials for “Trailside Killer” David Carpenter and

Petitioner. See Carpenter v. Ornoski, No. C 98 2444 MJJ JL (N.D. Cal. filed June 19, 1998).

The trial court denied the motion the day before trial began. The judge commented that

the exposure to pretrial publicity was less than had been anticipated and that many prospective

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jurors knew nothing about the case; moreover, the court had passed the selected jurors for cause

because the judge was satisfied that the selected jurors would be fair and that those who had been

exposed to pretrial publicity recalled very little about the case, would disregard the publicity, and

had not formed opinions as to Petitioner’s guilt or innocence.

In the storied Sheppard case, the United States Supreme Court held that “where there is a

reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should

continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with

publicity.” 384 U.S. at 363. A “barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial

amounting to a huge wave of public passion” may establish such a likelihood. Patton v. Yount,

467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

This Court’s independent review of the record reveals that the California Supreme Court

correctly concluded that “substantial evidence supports the ruling of the trial court” in denying

Petitioner’s motion for a change of venue. 989 P.2d at 669; see id. at 669-70 (summarizing

evidence). First, while the trial judge expressed concerns about the costs associated with a

change of venue—and even apparently considered the costs despite the inappropriateness of

doing so—he indicated that such costs would not prevent him from granting a change of venue if

there were a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial could not be held in Santa Cruz County;

relatedly, there is nothing to suggest that any seated juror had knowledge of or considered the

costs of the trial or had any bias because of the costs. Second, contrary to Petitioner’s

contentions, most of the relevant news coverage was neither lurid nor sensationalistic: indeed, as

the State court found, “the print and television media articles were factual, not inflammatory. 

There was no sensationalism beyond reporting the fact that the heads and hands had been

removed from the bodies.” Id. at 670. Third, “[m]uch of the publicity occurred almost three

years before jury selection began” and the publicity was relatively “sporadic.” Id. As in Yount,

“this lapse in time had a profound effect on the community and, more important, on the jury, in

softening or effacing opinion,” 467 U.S. at 1033, for “time soothes and erases,” id. at 1034: 

several prospective jurors had moved to the county after the murders; many others had no

recollection of reading about or seeing television news coverage about them; few who did recall

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3Although the text of Claim II in the Amended Petition states that “Petitioner was deprived of his

Federal rights of due process and his right of confrontation by the prosecution’s invocation of Larry

Dahl’s Federal conviction to bolster his credibility and to insinuate Petitioner’s guilt” (emphasis added),

it is clear from the discussion of this claim that it is Weller’s credibility that is meant.

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(DPSAGOK)

the initial publicity remembered anything other than nonprejudicial facts such as that the bodies

had been found on the University of California’s campus in Santa Cruz, that Petitioner’s first

name is Royal, that mushroom hunters discovered the victims’ bodies, or that real estate, drugs,

and Hawai!i (where Petitioner, Weller, and Garcia had lived) somehow were involved in the

case; and few were aware of Petitioner’s prior homicide acquittals, 989 P.2d at 669.

The California Supreme Court correctly determined that the trial court’s denial of

Petitioner’s motion for a change of venue of the guilt phase of his trial did not deprive him of his

right to an impartial jury at the guilt phase of his trial. The State court’s determination having

been correct, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim I. 

B. CLAIM II

In addition to guaranteeing an accused’s right to trial by jury, the Sixth Amendment

provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right, like the right to trial by

an impartial jury, is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pointer

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In Claim II in his Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges that he

was deprived of his Federal rights to due process and of confrontation by the prosecution’s

invocation of Dahl’s Federal conviction to bolster Weller’s3 credibility and to insinuate

Petitioner’s guilt. The California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its opinion

disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal. 989 P.2d at 681-82.

During her opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that it would hear evidence

about Dahl’s involvement in the events leading up to the murders and that Dahl had been

convicted in Federal court of transporting firearms. Petitioner did not object to any statement in

this part of the opening statement. The prosecutor subsequently asked Weller several questions

regarding her past testimony against Dahl at his trial for transporting firearms. When Weller said

“yes” in response to the prosecutor’s question as to whether Dahl subsequently had been

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convicted, Petitioner objected to Weller’s response as hearsay. The trial court sustained the

objection.

In discussing this claim, the California Supreme Court reasonably “infer[red] that the

confrontation claim is based on the hearsay nature of the evidence that Dahl had been convicted.” 

As that court correctly noted, “The [trial] court immediately sustained the hearsay objection” and

Petitioner “was afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-examine Weller.” Id. at 682. 

Petitioner contends that Weller’s testimony that Dahl was convicted following her

testimony against him bolstered her credibility because it suggested that another jury believed her

prior testimony. However, by sustaining the objection, the trial judge removed this statement

from consideration by Petitioner’s jury. Moreover, even assuming misconduct on the part of the

prosecutor and assuming that the jury considered Weller’s statement despite the sustaining of the

hearsay objection, the jury already would have had to find Weller credible in order to give this

statement any credence; if the jury did so, the statement could not have served to bolster Weller’s

credibility further; if the jury did not do so, then the statement would have been disregarded;

either way, the statement necessarily had no effect on the jury’s determination of Weller’s

credibility. Thus, this Court’s independent review of the record confirms that the California

Supreme Court correctly concluded that “[t]he possibility that the jury may have concluded that

Weller was truthful in her testimony regarding [Petitioner] because another jury convicted Dahl

after her testimony about delivery of the gun is too remote to warrant the inference of prejudice”

that Petitioner would draw. Id.

This Court agrees with the State court that “[t]here was no Sixth Amendment violation”

here. Id. A fortiori, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim II.

C. CLAIM III

In Claim III, Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by the

trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial after Weller improperly volunteered a statement about 

being the object of a murder-for-hire plot. The California Supreme Court denied this claim on

the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id. at 678.

On the second day of Petitioner’s trial, defense counsel raised a question with the trial

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court about a reference the prosecutor had made to an alleged jailhouse informant. The

prosecutor said that the alleged informant’s attorney had stated that Petitioner had “offered

money in the sum of $50,000 to do away with two witnesses in the case,” but the prosecutor did

not feel that this information was sufficiently reliable to use it at trial. The trial judge then

instructed the prosecutor, “Don’t use it for any purpose.”

The prosecutor subsequently asked Weller why she had not gone to the police about the

killings when she was in Minnesota and Petitioner was elsewhere. Weller responded that she

was scared that Petitioner would have her killed. When the prosecutor asked whether she had

received any actual threats, Weller stated that Petitioner had threatened to kill her if she ever said

anything about what happened in California. Weller then volunteered, “a day or two after Jim

Johnson was arrested, Sondra Johnson said there was a contract out on me for $25,000 from

Kenny Hayes.” Defense counsel immediately objected to the volunteered statement as hearsay. 

The prosecutor argued that the statement was not hearsay because it was being offered not for its

truth but to show that Weller believed that she had reason to fear for her life. The trial court

sustained the objection and told the jury that the volunteered comment “should be stricken from

your minds.”

After the jury was excused, Petitioner moved for a mistrial on the ground that the jury

heard the volunteered statement, which was highly prejudicial and virtually impossible to rebut. 

Defense counsel referred to the trial court’s prior ruling that information about contracts not be

used; the judge indicated that that ruling had to do with the alleged jailhouse informant or

Petitioner’s past history as a contract killer. The judge noted that the volunteered statement was

“very prejudicial” and “the worst kind” of hearsay, but concluded that “I sustained the objection

on that basis. I don’t think it would justify a mistrial or as grounds for a mistrial.”

Petitioner relies on Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988), and Mason v.

Hanks, 97 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1996), in arguing that the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial

denied him a fair trial. However, Dudley and Mason are inapposite, as the trial courts in those

cases admitted challenged testimony as evidence over objections by defense counsel; in

Petitioner’s case, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection. While Weller’s

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volunteered statement was highly prejudicial, the trial court’s admonition to the jury to strike the

statement from their minds likely cured any prejudice resulting from the statement.

There is no support for the claim that the trial court was required to declare a mistrial

even after excluding Weller’s hearsay testimony; thus, the California Supreme Court correctly

denied Petitioner relief on this claim. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim III.

D. CLAIMS IV AND V

In Claim IV, Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of his Federal constitutional rights of

confrontation by the trial court’s refusal to permit him to call Garcia’s attorney to impeach her

regarding motive and bias. In Claim V, Petitioner argues that he was deprived of due process

and a fair trial by the prosecution’s knowing use of Garcia’s false testimony. The California

Supreme Court denied these claims on the merits in its opinion disposing of Petitioner’s direct

appeal. 989 P.2d at 678-80.

At Petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel asked Garcia questions about

when she received immunity from prosecution. She responded, “Before the preliminary hearing,

I believe in 1982,” and “I thought . . . it was just before the preliminary, but I could be mistaken.” 

Garcia also testified, in response to a question put to her by the prosecutor, that she did not recall

whether or not she or someone acting on her behalf sought anything from the police or the

district attorney’s office other than protection.

During the presentation of the defense case, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed points and

authorities describing Garcia’s testimony about the timing of the prosecution’s offer of immunity

to her, her denial that she or any agent of hers sought immunity for her, and her inquiry to an

attorney as to why she needed it. He sought leave to call Garcia’s attorney to impeach Garcia,

arguing that Garcia had testified regarding what was or was not said during her relationship with

the attorney, without objection, thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner’s

counsel made an offer of proof that the attorney had spoken to an attorney in Petitioner’s

counsel’s firm stating that he had told Garcia that she needed immunity because she faced

prosecution and execution for first-degree murder, and that he had negotiated for immunity with

the prosecutor for several months before it was granted by the trial court. The trial court ruled

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that there had been no waiver of privilege, that the attorney would not be permitted to testify, and

that the subpoena would be quashed.

Petitioner contends that Garcia’s allegedly false testimony regarding immunity permitted

her to appear to be testifying simply to tell the truth, thereby bolstering her credibility, when the

reality was that she was testifying to avoid being charged herself with the crimes for which

Petitioner was standing trial. However, Petitioner’s argument assumes that Garcia denied that

she had been granted immunity; in fact, Garcia testified that she had received immunity; she

merely stated that she did not recall whether or not she or anyone associated with her sought

immunity before it was offered to her and that she believed—but acknowledged that she “could

be mistaken”—that she received immunity shortly before Petitioner’s preliminary hearing in

November 1982 rather than shortly after Garcia’s first statement to the police in March of that

year. As the California Supreme Court recognized, “nothing in the record . . . would establish

either that Garcia testified falsely or that the prosecution knowingly permitted her to do so,” id. at

680; this is confirmed by this Court’s independent review of the record. Moreover, even

assuming falsity, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how Garcia’s attorney’s testimony would have

had any impact on the jury’s verdict of guilty. Finally, as the record reveals, Petitioner “was not

denied the right to, and in fact did, thoroughly cross-examine Garcia. The ruling he challenges

here did not restrict his right to confrontation and cross-examination. It precluded only the

presentation of other evidence to impeach Garcia on a collateral matter.” Id. at 679 n.15.

The California Supreme Court correctly denied Petitioner relief on these claims. 

Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claims IV and V in the Amended

Petition.

E. CLAIM VI

In Claim VI, Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by the

trial court’s approval of allegedly unnecessary security procedures that conveyed to the

prospective jurors that Petitioner was dangerous and frightening. The California Supreme Court

denied this claim on the merits in its opinion disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id. at 680-

81.

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After hearing from law-enforcement officers responsible for court security and for

maintaining custody of Petitioner while he was confined in the Santa Cruz County jail, the trial

court permitted, over defense objection, the posting of additional deputies and the screening of

all persons who entered the courtroom in a manner similar to that used at airports. Prospective

jurors were screened until the actual jury was selected; jurors subsequently were not screened.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that “the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court

determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to

a particular trial.” Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2005). However, “the deployment

of security personnel during trial is not the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like

shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each

trial.” Id. at 2011 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The security measures

employed at Petitioner’s trial were not of a kind that required the trial court to determine

specifically whether or not they were appropriate at Petitioner’s trial. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475

U.S. 560, 569 (1986) (“While shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the

need to separate a defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant’s

trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable.”). 

Nevertheless, the trial judge permitted the security measures only after hearing specific “concerns

that [Petitioner] might escape and for the security of witnesses who allegedly had been

threatened. . . .” 989 P.2d at 680 n.16.

The California Supreme Court correctly observed that the record “suggests that those

prospective jurors who were questioned about the subject during voir dire viewed [the screening]

as a routine procedure like that at an airport,” id. at 680, and that “[n]o juror who actually sat on

the case is identified as being a person who believed that the security precautions were instituted

because the defendant was dangerous,” id. at 681. Thus, that court correctly concluded that

Petitioner “has not demonstrated actual prejudice, and we find nothing in the description of the

security measures utilized at his trial . . . that is so inherently prejudicial as to warrant a

conclusion that in reaching a verdict the jurors might have been affected by their observation of

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those measures.” Id.

The security measures used at Petitioner’s trial were appropriate; thus, the State court

correctly denied Petitioner relief on this claim. Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to summary

judgment on Claim VI.

F. CLAIM VII

In Claim VII, Petitioner contends that he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by

the trial court’s refusal to instruct that Garcia was an accomplice as a matter of law. The

California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its opinion disposing of Petitioner’s

direct appeal. Id. at 682-84.

The California Penal Code requires that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated. 

Cal. Pen. Code § 1111 (West 1985). As Petitioner observes, a State trial court in California may

and must instruct that a prosecution witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only where the

evidence requires that as the only reasonable inference: as the State court explained in denying

Petitioner relief on this claim, “whether a witness is an accomplice is a question of fact for the

jury in all cases unless there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn

therefrom.” 989 P.2d at 682 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury that Garcia was an

accomplice as a matter of law; as a result, the jury did not find corroboration of Garcia’s

testimony beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby depriving Petitioner of a fair trial. Cf. Carmell v.

Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). However, this Court’s independent review of the record confirms

that Garcia credibly denied that she knew of Petitioner’s intent to kill: this fact compels the

conclusion that it actually would have been erroneous for the trial court to instruct that Garcia

was an accomplice as a matter of law because the evidence as to whether she was an accomplice

was ambiguous. Moreover, Garcia’s testimony was corroborated by Sondra Johnson’s testimony

regarding the delivery of the murder weapon, Petitioner’s instructions to mail the letter written by

Laet from Florida to Hawai!i (to try to cover up the murders), and Petitioner’s admission that he

killed two people in California whose bodies had been chopped up, along with Edwards’s

testimony demonstrating Petitioner’s interest in and response to the discovery of the first skull

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an order of this Court on November 5, 2001, appointing him nunc pro tunc to October 15, 2001.

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and the ensuing investigation.

The California Supreme Court correctly determined that the trial court was not erroneous

in refusing to instruct that Garcia was an accomplice as a matter of law. Accordingly,

Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim VII in the Amended Petition.

G. CLAIM VIII

One component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that a person may not be

deprived of life or liberty “without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1, is the Sixth

Amendment’s provision of a criminal defendant’s right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for

his defence,” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). “It has long

been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). In addition, “[w]hile the Sixth Amendment

guarantees the accused a speedy trial, excessive delay in the appellate process may also rise to

the level of a due process violation.” Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1991)

(emphasis on original). In Claim VIII, Petitioner asserts that he has been deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and appellate due process by an unjustifiable delay in the state

appellate proceedings.

The California Supreme Court received Petitioner’s judgment of death and docketed his

automatic appeal on August 26, 1986. The court appointed H. Peter Young, Esq., to represent

Petitioner on December 10, 1986. The record-completion proceedings were concluded on

January 13, 1993, when the certified record was filed. Young requested and received numerous

extensions of time to file Petitioner’s opening brief on appeal before the court relieved him of his

appointment on April 4, 1995. The court subsequently appointed Eric S. Multhaup, Esq., on July

16, 1995.4 Multhaup filed Petitioner’s opening brief on July 31, 1997.

The period from the initiation of the automatic appeal to the filing of Petitioner’s opening

brief lasted nearly eleven years. Petitioner concedes that four of the years used for the recordcompletion process plus the two years that Multhaup used to prepare the opening brief (for a total

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Petitioner initially argued that Young’s ineffective assistance and the delay in the appeal also

impaired Petitioner’s “grounds for appeal or . . . the viability of his defense in case of retrial,” Coe, 922

F.2d at 532. However, in his brief replying to Respondent’s opposition to his motion and opposing

Respondent’s motion, Petitioner concedes that there was no such impairment.

6

Petitioner is not entirely without the prospect of a remedy for the claimed violations of his

appellate due-process rights: while he may not obtain habeas relief, he may bring a suit for damages

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005). See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991).

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of six years) were reasonable uses of time. However, he contends, the three additional years used

for the record-completion process plus the two subsequent years during which Young conducted

substantial work on Petitioner’s appeal but did not produce a draft brief—a total of five years—

constitute an unjustified delay, due in part to the ineffective assistance of counsel, that denied

him appellate due process; as a result, Petitioner experienced “oppressive incarceration pending

appeal” as well as “anxiety and concern . . . awaiting the outcome of the appeal,” id. at 532.5

Assuming without deciding that Petitioner’s appellate due-process rights were violated as

Petitioner contends, the remedy in a habeas proceeding would be an order “that the petitioner be

released unless the appeal is heard within a set time,” not, as Petitioner urges, that he be granted a

new trial. Id. However, Petitioner already has had his appeal heard and denied; the Court

therefore is unable to provide a remedy for the alleged violation. Accordingly, Respondent is

entitled to summary judgment on Claim VIII.6

H. CLAIM IX

In Claim IX, Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by the

cumulative effect of the multiple errors he has identified at the guilt phase of his trial. The

California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its opinion disposing of Petitioner’s

direct appeal. 989 P.2d at 693. This Court, like the State court, has “concluded that no

prejudicial error occurred.” Id. There having been no prejudicial error, there is no cumulative

effect of errors, and Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim IX.

IV. DISPOSITION

The Court has determined that Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on the

remaining claims in Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Claims I through

IX. Accordingly, the Court grants Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims

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and denies Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims.

Petitioner shall file any motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of this order

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9 not later than thirty days after receipt of this order. If Petitioner

files such a motion, Respondent shall file any response not later than thirty days after Petitioner’s

motion is served. The Court will take the motion under consideration upon receipt of

Respondent’s response or upon the expiration of the time for Respondent to respond.

If Petitioner does not file a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration within the

time specified, the Court will deny Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus and render

judgment for Respondent forthwith.

It is so ordered.

DATE: October 26, 2005 __________________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Judge

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Copies of Order e-mailed on ____________________ to:

Eric S. Multhaup, Esq.

Twenty Sunnyside Avenue, Suite A

Mill Valley, CA 94941

Bill Lockyer, Esq.

Lloyd G. Carter, Esq.

Office of the Attorney General

2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090

Fresno, CA 93721

Habeas Corpus Resource Center

50 Fremont Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94105

Federal Court Docketing

California Appellate Project

101 Second Street, Suite 600

San Francisco, CA 94105

Case 3:01-cv-03926-MHP Document 36 Filed 10/26/05 Page 18 of 18