Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01699/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01699-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1364 Auto Negligence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALEB E. BELCHER; and CLB, by 

and through his guardian ad 

litem CALEB E. BELCHER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-01699-GEB-KJN

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE*

Plaintiffs move in limine for a pretrial order 

precluding the admission of certain evidence at trial. Each 

motion is addressed below.

Motion in Limine No. 1

Plaintiffs move to exclude Defendant’s accident 

reconstruction expert Dr. Rajeev Kelkar’s “[Expert] Report with 

appendices (totaling over 200 pages of unauthenticated 

evidence),” arguing it is “inadmissible hearsay,” and “there has 

been insufficient foundation laid for [its] introduction.” 

(Pls.’ Mot. in Limine (“MIL”) No. 1 1:23-27, 2:7-8, 2:16-26, ECF 

 

* These motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. 

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No. 33.) Plaintiffs also request “that the testimony of Dr. 

Kelkar be limited, and specifically that he not be allowed to 

comment upon or interpret the facts as contained within the 

subject surveillance video.” (Id. at 4:7-9.) Plaintiffs argue:

[I]n his prior declaration[,] Dr. Kelkar 

purports to offer “opinions” as to what the 

surveillance video (an overhead view of the 

accident location at the time of the subject 

incident) shows. . . . [T]o the extent his 

“opinions” are a description of what is 

occurring in the video, the matter is 

improper for expert comment, and further 

lacks sufficient foundation for his 

conclusions and opinions as it forces his 

reliance on a distant bird’s eye view of 

the subject incident, without other personal 

knowledge. . . . 

The matter should further be precluded 

as that of improper opinion evidence. . . . 

Here, Dr. Kelkar’s anticipated 

testimony stands to serve as a narrative of

his perception of the . . . surveillance 

video, and what is occurring therein. Any 

“opinion” or “conclusion” derived theref[rom] 

is simply inappropriate for expert comment as 

the trier of fact is certainly capable . . . 

of interpreting such evidence as it is not 

beyond the common experience or ordinary 

skill of the trier of fact. 

Furthermore, . . . Dr. Kelkar . . . has no 

personal knowledge on the subject . . . , and 

simply seeks to interpret “facts” veiled as 

an expert opinion. 

(Id. at 3:3-4:6.)

Defendant counters: “Plaintiffs’ request to exclude Dr. 

Kelkar’s expert report and appendices is baseless. Dr. Kelkar is 

entitled to offer the opinions in his report and to 

testify . . . as to the bases for those opinions.” (Def.’s Opp’n 

MIL No. 2 5:21-23, ECF No. 40.) Defendant argues:

Dr. Kelkar [is] entitled to rely on all the 

data referenced and attached to his 

report. . . . 

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. . . [A]nalysis of video footage is a 

routine part of accident reconstruction 

analysis when available. Dr. Kelkar is also 

entitled to talk about the other bases for 

his opinions, including the vehicle 

specifications, Anthropometric Reference 

Data, and camera information. . . . This is 

the type of data that an expert routinely 

relies upon and is thus admissible under Rule 

703 to show the bases for the expert’s 

opinions.

(Id. at 6:17-7:3.)

Defendant also rejoins that “[t]here is no basis to 

limit or exclude the testimony of . . . Dr. Kelkar.” (Id. at 

1:18-19.) Defendant argues: 

Plaintiff[] . . . [contends] that Dr. 

Kelkar offers improper opinions by doing 

nothing more than reciting what the video 

shows. This is false. To the contrary, Dr. 

Kelkar uses the information in the video as 

one data point for his expert assessment and 

opinions regarding the speed Officer Linn was 

driving, the amount of time between when 

minor CLB was standing still until the time 

he unexpectedly darted into the street and 

collided with Officer Linn’s vehicle, the 

distance that minor CLB traveled, and whether 

Officer Linn could have stopped in time to 

avoid the accident. As noted in the report, 

Dr. Kelkar used measurements at the scene, 

analyzed the geometry of the accident 

location, and compared them with the video, 

which included a clock showing what occurred 

to the thousandth of a second. Dr. Kelkar 

thus takes the qualitative video footage and 

converts it to quantitative information that 

is used as a basis for his accident 

reconstruction conclusions. Accordingly, when 

Dr. Kelkar discusses the video at trial, he 

will not merely recite what is shown, he will 

describe how he used what is shown to conduct 

his expert assessment and form his ultimate 

expert opinions. Dr. Kelkar’s analysis and 

opinions go well beyond merely narrating what 

the video shows.

. . . . 

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. . . Dr. Kelkar’s opinions require 

specialized skill and provide the trier of 

fact significantly more information than is 

otherwise available.

(Id. at 8:1-14, 9:25-27 (citations omitted).)

Plaintiffs state in their reply that they “seek to 

clarify the intent of their motion.” (Pls.’ Reply MIL No. 1 1:22, 

ECF No. 44.) Plaintiffs state: 

Specifically, the motion seeks to preclude 

the admission of Dr. Kelkar’s written 

report / analysis . . . and to limit his 

testimony to the extent it purports to 

narrate the subject surveillance video. 

Plaintiffs have no objection to the [expert 

report’s] appendices, at this time, assuming 

an appropriate foundation will be laid at 

trial.

(Id. at 1:22-27.) These statements will not be considered in 

ruling on this motion since they were made for the first time in 

reply and change the scope of the original motion. Cf. Zamani v. 

Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court 

need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief.”).

This motion lacks the preciseness and sufficient 

factual context required for a pretrial in limine ruling. 

Motion in Limine No. 2

Plaintiffs “move to preclude any testimony of” a trial 

witness Defendant identified in the Joint Pretrial Statement as 

“an agency witness,” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c).

(Pls.’ MIL No. 2 1:22-24, 2:6, ECF No. 34.) Plaintiffs argue: 

“Defendants have identified a ‘witness’ without providing the 

actual identity or contact information in either its initial, 

supplemental or pre-trial disclosures. Plaintiffs have had no 

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opportunity to discover, depose or otherwise obtain any 

understanding as to who this witness is or what the substance of 

his/her testimony may be.” (Id. at 2:2-6.)

Defendant states “it is true that Capt. Aguilar was not 

named in the United States’ Rule 26(a) disclosures, and that the 

United States listed an ‘agency representative’ in the Joint 

Pretrial Statement.” (Def.’s Opp’n Pls.’ MIL No. 2 1:28-2:2, ECF 

No. 41.) However, Defendant rejoins that it “should be permitted 

to have its agency representative . . . offer brief background 

testimony regarding agency operations, the unique or unusual 

duties of Forest Service law enforcement officers, and other 

related matters.” (Id. at 1:16-18.) Defendant argues: 

Capt. Aguilar is not offered for his 

knowledge of the accident involved in this 

case; instead, he is offered . . . to explain 

how the agency operates. In other words, he 

will not be offering percipient testimony 

about the accident. . . .

. . . .

Moreover, Rule 37(c)(1) rule does not 

permit exclusion of testimony if the alleged 

non-disclosure is “substantially justified or 

is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Here, 

it is both. First, it is harmless in that 

there is no prejudice to Plaintiffs. Capt. 

Aguilar will merely testify regarding Officer 

Linn’s patrol duties on the day of the 

accident, including why she needed to patrol 

the area in question and why she could not 

simply avoid an area with people recreating 

in it. As the chief law enforcement officer 

on this portion of the National Forest, Capt. 

Aguilar will further provide the Court a 

broader picture and an understanding of how 

the Forest functions and the important role 

law enforcement officers play in the Forest. 

His testimony is expected to be very brief, 

and Plaintiffs also have the opportunity to 

depose him before trial if they wish.

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In addition, any failure to disclose 

Capt. Aguilar in discovery is justified 

because . . . he is not offered as a 

percipient witness and was not chosen as a 

trial representative until after discovery 

closed. Shortly after the United States chose 

him as its trial representative, he 

unexpectedly was away from work for an openended period of time for personal reasons and 

could not confirm that he could testify until 

early-May 2015. Plaintiffs were immediately 

notified of his identity once he confirmed 

that he would be back to work in time for 

trial, and he was made available for 

deposition at Plaintiffs’ convenience. There 

is simply no harm or prejudice to Plaintiffs 

in permitting this witness to testify 

briefly.

(Id. at 2:2-5, 3:24-4:12.)

Plaintiffs reply:

Despite the late information 

provided in [Defendant’s] Opposition, 

prior to the filing of motions in limine, 

Defendant never identified the subject 

“witness” in any of its pre-trial 

disclosures. Plaintiffs have had no 

opportunity to discover, depose or otherwise 

obtain any understanding as to who this 

witness is or what the substance of his/her 

testimony may be. Thus, the element of 

surprise is clearly established herein. 

Defendant seeks to counter this argument by 

providing a late opportunity for deposition. 

Even if a deposition could reasonably be set 

before trial, as trial is just weeks away and 

discovery has been closed for some time, this 

does little to cure the element of surprise, 

or allow Plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity 

to respond to or address anything that might 

be learned from this deposition. Defendant’s 

accusation that Plaintiffs have known of this 

since the pre-trial statement and therefore 

shows no surprise again fails, as Plaintiffs 

stated their objection at that time and made 

an inquiry as to the [agency witness’s] 

identity. At that time, [Defendant’s] counsel 

still could not identify the witness, and 

agreed to consider withdrawal or otherwise 

allow the issue to be raised by way of a 

motion in limine. No offer of deposition or 

production of evidence[] . . . was made at 

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that time.

(Pls.’ Reply MIL No. 2 2:7-21, ECF No. 45.)

“Parties are required to [disclose] the name and 

contact information of any individual likely to have discoverable 

information ‘that the disclosing party may use to support its 

claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for 

impeachment.’” Matson v. UPS, Inc., No. C10-1528 RAJ, 2013 WL 

5966131, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

Proc. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)). “Parties are also required to 

[disclose] . . . the name and contact information of any 

witnesses, . . . ‘the party expects to present [at trial] and 

those it may call if the need arises.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

Proc. 26(a)(3)(A)(i)). Further, “[a] party . . . who has made a 

disclosure . . . must supplement or correct its . . . 

response . . . if the party learns that in some material respect 

the disclosure or response is incomplete.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(e)(1). 

“If a party fails to . . . identify a witness as 

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use 

that . . . witness to supply evidence . . . at trial, unless the 

failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(c)(1). “The burden is on the party facing sanctions to 

prove harmlessness [or substantial justification].” Yeti by 

Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 2001).

Defendant has not shown that its failure to identify 

Captain Aguilar as a witness was “substantially justified 

or . . . harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Therefore, this 

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motion is granted.

Dated: May 27, 2015

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