Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01962/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01962-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Frederick King, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Ryan Thornell, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-23-01962-PHX-KML (MTM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Frederick King, Jr., who is confined in the Red Rock Correctional Center, 

has filed, through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 and Memorandum in Support thereof. (Docs. 1, 2.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

 Petitioner was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR 2002- 

098228-A, of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, 

and attempted robbery. He was sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, the longest 

of which is 25 years to life. In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief. 

However, the Petition is a second or successive habeas petition not authorized by the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider the Petition. The Court will recommend that the Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus be dismissed with prejudice. 

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II. BACKGROUND 

 On September 25, 2002, the State filed an indictment in Maricopa County Superior 

Court charging Petitioner with one count of first-degree murder, a class 1 dangerous felony 

(Count 1), two counts of attempted second-degree murder, class 2 dangerous felonies 

(Counts 2 and 3), and one count of attempted armed robbery, a class 3 dangerous felony 

(Count 4). (Doc. 13-1 at 8; Exh. A.) The case proceeded to trial where Petitioner was 

convicted on all four counts. (Doc. 13-1 at 15; Exh. B.) On August 29, 2003, Petitioner 

was sentenced, as follows: Count 1, a term of 25 years to life with 452 days presentence 

incarceration credit; Count 2, a term of 20 years consecutive to Count 1; Count 3, a term 

of 14 years consecutive to Counts 1 and 2; and Count 4, a term of 12 years concurrent to 

Count 1. (Doc. 13-1 at 20; Exh. C.) 

A. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals 

raising three claims in his opening and supplemental briefs. (Doc. 13-1 at 25, 29, 55; Exhs. 

D, E, F.) On February 1, 2005, the court issued a Memorandum Decision affirming 

Petitioner’s convictions, but remanding the case for resentencing on Counts 2, 3, and 4 

pursuant to Blakely v. Washington. (Doc. 13-2 at 2; Exh. J.) The State filed a petition for 

review on the Blakely issue and Petitioner filed a cross-petition for review. (Doc. 13-2 at 

21, 69; Exhs. K, M.) On September 27, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court granted the 

State’s petition for review and denied Petitioner’s cross-petition for review, and remanded 

the case back to the court of appeals for reconsideration “in light of State v. Martinez, 210 

Ariz. 578 (2005), and State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005).” (Doc. 13-2 at 83; Exh. 

N.) On remand, the court of appeals issued an Order affirming both the convictions and 

sentences imposed by the trial court. (Doc. 13-2 at 86; Exh. O.) 

B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

On December 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13-

2 at 101; Exh. R.) Counsel was appointed and Petitioner filed his PCR petition on March 

14, 2006. (Doc. 13-2 at 106, 109; Exhs. S, T.) On May 26, 2006, the trial court summarily 

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dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition, finding that Petitioner’s “claim regarding causation 

cannot be asserted at this time because the Court of Appeals has already heard this issue 

and has rejected it. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2), ARCrP [sic], this issue cannot be reurged.” 

(Doc. 13-3 at 2; Exh. V.) The court further found that there was no reasonable likelihood 

that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel raised the causation 

issue. (Id.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review that was dismissed by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals as untimely on August 17, 2006. (Doc. 13-3 at 5, 9, 32; Exhs. W, X, Y.) 

After his initial PCR proceedings were dismissed, Petitioner filed his second notice 

and PCR petition on November 26, 2012. (Doc. 13-3 at 36, 40; Exh. Z, AA.) On January 

2, 2013, the trial court summarily dismissed the proceeding as untimely, and found that 

Petitioner had failed to demonstrate actual innocence or a significant change in law. (Doc. 

13-3 at 94; Exh. CC.) Although Petitioner appears to have filed a motion for extension of 

time to file petition for review (Doc. 13-3 at 98; Exh. DD), the record indicates that 

Petitioner never filed any further pleading. 

On January 9, 2014, Petitioner filed a document entitled “petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus” in the trial court. (Doc. 13-3 at 104; Exh. EE.) On January 20, 2014, 

Petitioner filed a “request of status of state habeas filing” (Doc. 13-4 at 2; Exh. FF), and 

the Clerk of the Superior Court sent Petitioner a letter informing him that his filing was 

“deemed an Untimely PCR” (Doc. 13-4 at 6; Exh. GG). Petitioner then filed a “motion for 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be file[d] timely under Rule 1.3 computation of time 

and Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).” (Doc. 13-4 at 8; Exh. HH.) 

On February 26, 2014, the trial court issued a minute entry construing Petitioner’s 

petition for writ of habeas corpus as a PCR notice and analyzing Petitioner’s claims under 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 13-4 at 22; Exh. II.) The court 

noted that this was Petitioner’s “third Rule 32 proceeding” and that it was “both untimely 

and successive.” (Id.) Accordingly, the trial court dismissed this PCR proceeding, ruling 

that Petitioner was “procedurally precluded from raising [his claims] now” under Rule 

32.2(a)(2). (Id.) Petitioner filed a “motion for rehearing pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

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32.9(a)” in March 2014. (Doc. 13-4 at 25; Exh. JJ.) The trial court issued another minute 

entry dismissing Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, which contained identical language to its 

February 26, 2014 minute entry. (Doc. 13-4 at 61; Exh. KK.) 

On May 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a “motion for clarification; motion for extension 

of time to file petition for review.” (Doc. 13-4 at 64; Exh. LL.) The trial court issued a 

minute entry on June 23, 2014, denying the motion for clarification, declining to 

“reconsider or clarify prior rulings,” and noting that Petitioner “continues to re-litigate the 

issues.” (Doc. 13-4 at 73; Exh. MM.) The trial court granted Petitioner 90 days from the 

date of its ruling to file a petition for review. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on May 19, 

2014 (Doc. 13-4 at 76; Exh. NN), and a “supplement to petition for review” on June 30, 

2014 (Doc. 13-4 at 113; Exh. OO). On February 17, 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 13-11 at 5; Exh. EEE.) 

On February 7, 2017, Petitioner filed another document entitled “petition for writ of 

habeas corpus” in the trial court. (Doc. 13-11 at 15; Exh. GGG.) On February 22, 2017, the 

trial court deemed his petition as Petitioner’s fifth Rule 32 proceeding and dismissed it as 

untimely and successive. (Doc. 13-11 at 85; Exh. HHH.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted Petitioner’s request for review of the trial court’s order, but denied relief on 

December 26, 2017, finding that this was Petitioner’s third successive petition and he failed 

to show any abuse of discretion by the trial court. (Doc. 13-11 at 90; Exh. III.) 

On October 20, 2020, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a PCR petition, asserting a 

significant change in the law relating to the burden of proof in self-defense cases. (Doc. 

13-12 at 2; Exh. JJJ.) Specifically, Petitioner argued that because he “presented evidence 

at trial that supported a self-defense justification, and because the statute change applies 

retroactively, he is entitled to a new trial that properly instructs the jury on the burden of 

proof related to a justification defense.” (Id.) On May 13, 2021, the trial court dismissed 

the PCR petition, finding that Petitioner’s convictions became final on January 10, 2006, 

when the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences and issued an Order and 

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Mandate. (Doc. 13-13 at 8; Exh. NNN.) The court stated, “[b]ased on the [statutory] 

language itself, the Court finds that the Legislature intended the 2006 law to be retroactive 

to cases pending as of April 24, 2006.” (Id.) Since Petitioner’s convictions became final on 

January 10, 2006, and were no longer pending, the court concluded that “the change in the 

law regarding self-defense does not apply retroactively to this matter.” (Id.) On January 

25, 2022, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s request for review of the trial 

court’s order, but denied relief, finding that this was Petitioner’s fifth successive petition 

and he failed to show any abuse of discretion by the trial court. (Doc. 13-13 at 27; Exh. 

UUU.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on September 

16, 2022. (Id.) 

C. First Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

In June 2014, Petitioner filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court raising four grounds for relief. King v. Ryan, No. CV-14-1229-

PHX-SMM (MHB). In Ground One, Petitioner asserted a claim of actual innocence 

because the evidence at trial showed that he was acting in self-defense. In Ground Two, 

Petitioner claimed that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the trial. In Ground 

Three, Petitioner alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In Ground Four, 

Petitioner claimed the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion 

for judgment of acquittal. Id. at Docs. 5, 10. 

On April 23, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a 

Report and Recommendation recommending that the habeas petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice because Petitioner’s habeas petition was untimely. Id. at Doc. 17; 

King v. Ryan, 2015 WL 8905722 (D. Ariz. April 23, 2015). On December 15, 2015, Senior 

United States District Judge Stephen M. McNamee issued an Order adopting the Report 

and Recommendation, and Judgment was entered that same day. King v. Ryan, No. CV14-1229-PHX-SMM (MHB) at Docs. 19, 20. 

III. SECOND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner initiated his second habeas corpus proceeding on September 19, 2023, 

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raising one ground for relief. (Docs. 1, 2, 7.) Petitioner alleges the following: 

Arizona’s self-defense statute, which was law at the time Petitioner was tried, 

was unconstitutional because the affirmative defense placed the burden on 

the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The 

law should be applied to Petitioner’s case retroactively because under federal 

law, a case is not final until petitioner’s right to review is exhausted. Mr. 

King’s case was still pending review at the time the new law went into effect. 

The State of Arizona violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process 

by denying him the relief of a new trial. 

(Doc. 2 at 10-11; Doc. 7.) 

 On January 22, 2024, Respondents filed an Answer arguing that the habeas petition 

is successive and Petitioner has not been granted authorization from the Ninth Circuit to 

file it. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner filed a Reply on February 20, 2024. (Doc. 14.) 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes 

significant burdens on petitioners who try to raise new claims in “second or successive” 

habeas petitions. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152–53 (2007) (per curiam) (observing 

that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), as amended by AEDPA, established a stringent set of procedures 

a prisoner must follow before filing a second or successive federal habeas corpus petition 

challenging the same conviction). First, a district court must dismiss any claim presented 

in a second or successive habeas petition that was presented in a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(1). Second, a new claim not raised in a prior petition also must be dismissed 

unless (1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, or (2) the factual 

basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence and these new 

facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Even before 

either of these circumstances is considered, leave of the court of appeals is required before 

the successive petition may be pursued in a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). These 

requirements are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Burton, 549 U.S. at 157. 

A “second or successive” petition is not defined by the AEDPA, but rather is a “term 

of art given substance” by the case law. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000). A 

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petition is generally considered “second or successive” where it raises claims related to the 

judgment challenged that were or could have been adjudicated on their merits in an earlier 

petition. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332-33 (2010). 

On September 18, 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a “Second or 

Successive” Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) in 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, requesting an order authorizing the filing and 

consideration of a “second and successive” habeas corpus petition in the United States 

District Court or, alternatively, for an order holding that the proffered petition is not 

deemed “second or successive” under the Act. (Doc. 13-13 at 107; Exh. DDDD.) On 

December 14, 2023, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s Motion stating, as follows: 

We are not persuaded by the applicant’s contention that his proposed 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition is not second or successive under 

AEDPA. The record shows that the applicant challenged his 2003 Maricopa 

County conviction in a § 2254 habeas petition filed in District of Arizona 

case number 2:14-cv-01229-SMM, which was dismissed as untimely on 

December 15, 2015. The applicant, therefore, must first obtain this court’s 

authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) before filing another § 2254 

petition. See McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 

that “dismissal of a section 2254 habeas petition for failure to comply with 

the statute of limitations renders subsequent petitions second or successive 

for purposes of the AEDPA”). 

The application for authorization to file a second or successive § 2254 habeas 

petition is denied. The applicant has not made a prima facie showing under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) that: 

(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 

that was previously unavailable; or 

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; 

and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 

light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found 

the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

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The applicant has not shown that the change in Arizona law on which he 

relies announced a new rule of constitutional law within the meaning of § 

2244(b)(2)(A). See Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(discussing prerequisites for § 2244(b)(2)(A)). 

Any pending motions are denied as moot. No further filings will be 

entertained in this case. 

(Doc. 13-13 at 112; Exh. EEEE.) 

Despite the findings set forth in the Ninth Circuit’s Order, Petitioner argues that the 

instant habeas petition is not a second or successive under AEDPA and is, therefore, ripe 

for consideration by this Court without authorization from the Ninth Circuit. The Court is 

not persuaded. 

The instant Petition is Petitioner’s second habeas petition, challenging the same 

convictions and sentences on which he previously sought federal habeas relief. Petitioner’s 

prior habeas petition was dismissed as untimely which “renders subsequent petitions 

second or successive for purposes of the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).” McNabb, 576 

F.3d at 1030. Further, it is undisputed that Petitioner has not obtained permission from the 

Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive habeas petition. 

Accordingly, because Petitioner has not obtained authorization from the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot entertain the present Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A). See Burton, 549 U.S. at 157 (where the petitioner did not receive 

authorization from the court of appeals before filing second or successive petition, “the 

District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain [the petition]”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the above analysis, Petitioner’s Petition is a second or successive habeas 

petition not authorized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 16th day of August, 2024. 

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