Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01229/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY HARRIS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv1229 WQH (POR)

ORDER

vs.

LARRY SMALL, Warden,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed by Magistrate

Judge Louisa S. Porter. (Doc. # 20).

BACKGROUND

On July 2, 2008, Petitioner Michael Anthony Harris, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

initiated this action by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States

District Court for the Central District of California. (Doc. # 1). Petitioner challenges his

conviction for robbery on the grounds that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion for substitute counsel, resulting

in ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 5. On July 9, 2008, the action was transferred to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. (Doc. # 3). On September

4, 2008, Respondent Larry Smalls filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. # 9). Respondent contended the petition was untimely. (Doc. # 9-1 at 3). On

Case 3:08-cv-01229-WQH-POR Document 25 Filed 06/11/10 Page 1 of 6
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April 14, 2009, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that Petitioner was entitled

to equitable tolling. (Doc. # 16). 

On June 9, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. (Doc. # 18). The

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Respondent’s Answer contends the state

courts reasonably denied Petitioner’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction and Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to provide substitute

counsel. (Doc. # 18-1 at 5, 7-8). 

On June 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. # 19).

On February 19, 2010, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) which recommends that the Petition be denied. (Doc. # 20). The R&R concludes

that “the state appellate court reasonably concluded that there was ample evidence to support

a rational trier of fact’s conclusion that Petitioner committed the robbery.” Id. at 7. The R&R

concludes that the state appellate court’s decision properly relied on the evidence offered at

trial that a man with the same weight, height, build, and skin tone touched an item at the crime

scene subsequently recovered with Petitioner’s print on it. Id. at 6-7. The R&R addresses the

two issues raised by Petitioner’s second claim separately. Id. at 7 n. 2. First, the R&R

concludes that the state appellate court correctly held that the trial court did not commit

constitutional error in denying Petitioner’s Marsden motion for substitute counsel. Id. at 8-9;

see also People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Applying Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017,

1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the R&R concludes the trial court properly addressed the

Marsden motion for substitute counsel by assigning a different judge to preside over a closed,

ex parte hearing where the court gave Petitioner an opportunity to explain his concerns with

his current counsel and heard testimony from Petitioner’s counsel about his view on their

disagreements. Id. at 9. The R&R concludes this record shows Petitioner’s differences with

his counsel were “over a matter of trial tactics, which does not mandate granting a motion for

substitution of counsel.” Id. at 10. Second, the R&R concludes that Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that his trial attorney’s performance was deficient. Id. at 11-12. Although

Petitioner contends “his attorney presented no meaningful defense by rejecting pursuit of an

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alibi defense” after investigating Petitioner’s alibi and concluding it was weak, the R&R

concludes that Petitioner’s trial counsel presented a defense based on the weakness of the

prosecution’s case. Id. 

The R&R informed the parties that any party may file an objection no later than March

22, 2010 and that any reply shall be filed no later than fourteen days after being served with

the objections. Id. at 12-13. On March 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Enlargement

of Time to Respond to the Report and Recommendations. (Doc. # 22). The Court granted the

motion on March 29, 2010. On April 13, 2010, Petitioner filed his objection to the R&R.

(Doc. # 24). Respondent did not file any objections or response to Petitioner’s objection. 

In his objection, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the state

court’s decision on the sufficiency of the evidence was neither an unreasonable application of

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-318 (1979), nor based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. (Doc. # 24 at 2). Petitioner contends the Magistrate Judge erred

because the evidence does not permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that he is guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt. Id. Petitioner contends the circumstantial evidence against him “at least

equally supports guilt and innocence.” Id. Petitioner contends there was no evidence that a

tile recovered from a stolen vehicle with Petitioner’s fingerprint on it was the same tile which

witnesses saw one of the robbers touch. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner contends his print is only

evidence that he was a “curious passerby or an accessory after the fact” who encountered the

stolen vehicle, not evidence that he was involved in the robbery. Id. at 4. 

In the event that the Court adopts the conclusion of the R&R and denies the Petition,

Petitioner requests a Certificate of Appealability allowing him to appeal his case pursuant to

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). (Doc. # 24 at 5). Petitioner contends he has made

a sufficient showing that he was denied a constitutional right to merit a Certificate of

Appealability and contends that reasonable jurists could debate whether he is entitled to relief.

Id. at 6-8.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The duties of the district court in connection with the Report and Recommendation of

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a Magistrate Judge are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28

U.S.C § 636(b). The district judge “must make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The

district court need not review de novo those portions of a Report and Recommendation to

which neither party objects. Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 100 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

ANALYSIS

Petitioner objected to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the state appellate court’s

determination that sufficient evidence supports his conviction is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Court therefore reviews this

portion of the R&R de novo. 

In reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, a court must “determine

whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The reviewing court must “view[]

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 319. In federal habeas review

of a state court conviction, the federal court must defer to a state appellate decision denying

relief pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), and may only reverse the state appellate decision if it is “an objectively

unreasonable” application of the standard established in Jackson. See Saruasad v. Porter, 479

F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the Court must “look through” the California Supreme Court’s summary denial

of the petition and examine the state appellate court’s decision because it was the last reasoned

decision in Petitioner’s state court appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806

(1991). 

The state appellate court determined that a rational trier of fact could have found

Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because

[T]he physical evidence of Harris’s fingerprint on the jewelry store tile insert .

. . supports the verdict. Fingerprints are evidence of identity and ordinarily will

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suffice to identify the perpetrator of a crime, and the jury is entitled to draw its

own inferences as to how the defendant’s prints came to be on the object and

when. Harris does not contend the fingerprint evidence in this case was not an

accurate match of his fingerprints to the finger on the tile. A man with the same

height, weight, build, and skin tone as Harris was seen reaching his gloveless

hand into the drawer from which the tile was taken, and the tile (along with other

detritus of the robbery) was then abandoned less than an hour later in a stole car

in a parking lot many miles from the site of the robbery. . . . [T]here is ample

evidence to support a rational trier of fact’s conclusion that the most logical

explanation was Harris touched the tile during the robbery and then abandoned

it shortly thereafter in a car earlier stolen to provide a getaway vehicle. 

(Lodgment # 6 at 5-6). The Court concludes that this determination was neither contrary to

or an unreasonable application of the standard established by the Supreme Court in Jackson

v. Virginia. The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the forensic evidence combined

with the circumstantial evidence linking it to the robbery is sufficient to sustain Petitioner’s

conviction.

Petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his Marsden claim

and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied. The Court concludes the

Magistrate Judge correctly determined that these claims should be denied.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability must be obtained by a petitioner in order to pursue an

appeal from a final order in a Section 2254 habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when

it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”

A certificate of appealability should be issued only where the petition presents a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A

certificate should issue where the prisoner shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000).

For the reasons in the order dismissing the petition, the Court concludes that jurists of

reason would not find it debatable whether this Court was correct in denying the petition.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT (1) the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 20)

is ADOPTED in its entirety; and (2) the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

DATED: June 11, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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