Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00649/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00649-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY COLMENERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

1:16-cv-649-GSA

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 8)

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff, Ricky Colmenero (“Plaintiff”), filed a Social Security complaint (the 

“complaint”) on May, 10, 2016. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiff challenged a denial of his 

Social Security benefits. The Court reviewed the complaint and on May 25, 2016 and on 

September 1, 2016, dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. (Docs. 5 and 8). 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 14, 2016 in compliance with the 

Court’s September 1, 2016 order. (Doc. 8).

As discussed below, the FAC will be dismissed with leave to amend because it fails to 

state a claim, and because it appears that jurisdiction is not proper. Although Plaintiff filed an 

appeal with the Appeals Council, it appears that Plaintiff did not file his complaint in this Court 

within sixty days of the receiving Appeals Council decision as required. Failure to timely file an 

appeal results in divesting this Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case. Notwithstanding this lack of 
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jurisdiction, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to possibly 

establish that jurisdiction is proper, as well as to cure the deficiencies outlined in this order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Screening Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of the complaint

to determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or 

malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If 

the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. Leave to 

amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusion are not. Id. at 678.

To determine whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 

allegations in the complaint as true, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 

740 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to 

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 

Iqbal). 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff filed a sixty-six (66) page FAC consisting of a six-page pleading form, as well as 
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sixty pages of exhibits. In relevant part, the narrative of his pleading states as follows:

I am filing an amended complaint to remedy the deficiencies from [the] previous 

one filed. Since diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma in 8/12 I have 

experienced a great drop in my ability to perform work ... due to great fatigue, 

dizziness, chest pain, breathing difficulties, blurry vision just to name a few. I 

have been trying to receive disability benefits due to not being able to continue

working but have been denied. I have appealed. I am showing proof of this history with 

exhibit A. Exhibit B shows proof of my disabilities.

(Doc. 8, pg. 5).

Attached to the FAC is Administrative Law Judge Cynthia Floyd’s adverse Decision 

dated April 28, 20151(Doc. 8, pgs. 17-33), and two Appeals Council decisions denying Plaintiff’s 

appeal dated December 3 and 15, 2015, respectively. (Doc. 8, pgs. 7-16). Plaintiff also explains 

that one of his doctors made an error in diagnosing and treating his condition during the time he 

was applying for disability. (Doc. 8, pgs. 34-35). He attaches several different medical records

ranging in dates from April 2014 through April 2016 (all which were issued after the ALJ’s 

decision), in an attempt to demonstrate that the misdiagnosis was the reason his disability 

applications were denied. (Doc. 8, pgs. 24-33; 36-66). 

C. Analysis

1. Rule 8(a)

As Rule 8(a) states, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.”

The rule expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need only give the

opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule 8(a)

does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon at trial,

but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. As noted above, detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009).

In this case, although Plaintiff asserts that his applications were wrongfully decided 

 

1 A hearing on Plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Social Security Income

was held in Fresno, California on March 12, 2015. (Doc. 8, pg. 20). 
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because his doctor misdiagnosed his condition, he has not identified any errors in the ALJ’s 

decision given the information that the agency had at the time of his case. Plaintiff also contends 

that his condition has gotten worse since his application was denied. Plaintiff is advised that as a 

general rule, the Appeals Council and this Court may consider new evidence when reviewing the 

ALJ’s decision, so long as the evidence relates to the period on or before the ALJ’s decision. See, 

20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b); Burnell v. Colvin, 775 F. 3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) quoting Brewes 

v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin, 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (“when the Appeals 

Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that 

evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider when 

reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.”). Evidence obtained after 

the ALJ’s decision which is not reviewed by the Appeals Council is generally not reviewable by 

this Court, unless the claimant can establish that it is material, and that there was good cause for 

the failure to submit the evidence into the record in the prior proceeding. Brewes, 682 F. 3d at 

1164. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claim in this Court, any pleading must identify specific 

errors in the ALJ’s decision rather than making broad assertions or legal conclusions about the 

disability determination. Moreover, if new medical records are attached, Plaintiff must explain 

how the medical records relate in time to the ALJ’s decision. If the records were not considered 

by the Appeals Council, Plaintiff must establish that the records are material and that good cause

exists establishing why the records were not timely submitted.

2. Plaintiff’s Appeal May Be Time-Barred

Additionally, it appears that the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this Court is timebarred and consequently divests this Court of jurisdiction. As Plaintiff was already advised in the 

last order (Doc. 6, pgs. 2-5), judicial review of the Commissioner’s administrative decisions is 

governed by Section 405(g) and (h) of the Social Security Act, which reads in relevant part:

(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in

controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced

within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such

further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.
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(h) The findings and decision of the Commissioner after a hearing shall be binding

upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of facts or

decision of the Commissioner shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or

governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United

States, the Commissioner, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought

under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this

subchapter.

Section 405(g) and (h) therefore operates as a statute of limitations setting a sixty day time 

period in which a claimant may appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. As part of this 

process, Plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing a case in this 

Court. Specifically, upon receiving his denial from an administrative law judge, Plaintiff had 

sixty days to file an Appeal with the Appeals Council. 20 CFR §§ 404.967 and 404.968. When 

the Appeals Council reviews the case, it will either affirm, modify, or reject the ALJ’s 

recommendation. 20 CFR § 404.979. It may also remand the case. 20 CFR § 404.977. The 

Appeals Council’s decision is binding unless a party files an action in federal district court within 

sixty days of the Appeals Council’s decision. 20 CFR §§ 422.210 and 404.981. 

It appears that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He submitted two Appeals 

Council’s decisions dated December 3 and 15, 2015, denying his appeal.2(Doc. 8, pgs. 7 and 13). 

Both of the decisions advised Plaintiff that he had sixty days after receiving the decision to file an 

appeal. (Doc. 8, pgs. 9 and 15). The agency assumes the letter was received five days after the 

date on the order unless it is demonstrated that it was not received within the five day period. 

(Doc. 8, pgs. 9 and 15). Plaintiff did not file his complaint in this Court until May 10, 2016 (Doc. 

1), which is well beyond sixty days from the latest Appeals Council order which is dated 

December 15, 2015. Based on the face of the documents, it appears that Plaintiff’s appeal is 

untimely.

 Plaintiff is advised that in certain rare circumstances, the doctrine of equitable tolling 

allows a plaintiff to avoid the statute of limitations. Supermail Cargo Inc. v. United States, 68 

F.3d at 1206. “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two 

 

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In the December 15, 2015 decision, the Appeals Council set aside the December 3, 2015 decision after considering 

additional evidence. (Doc. 8, pg. 13). In both decisions, the Appeals Council found that the additional information 

Plaintiff submitted did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 8, pgs. 8 and 14).
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elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his way.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 

S.Ct. 1414, 1419 (2012) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (emphasis 

omitted). Equitable tolling is only warranted where “litigants are unable to file timely documents 

as a result of external circumstances beyond their direct control.” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 

F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)) 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, equitable circumstances that might 

toll a limitation period involve conduct (by someone other than the claimant) that is misleading or 

fraudulent.” Turner v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir. 1988). For example, in Bowen v. City 

of New York, 476 U.S.467 (1986), the court applied equitable tolling because plaintiffs were 

prevented from filing because of “the Government's secretive conduct.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 467. 

Likewise, in Vernon, the court reasoned that equitable tolling was appropriate because the 

plaintiff had allegedly been told by an employee of the Social Security Administration that the 

deadline would be extended. Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1275. In contrast, in Turner v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 

708 (8th Cir. 1988), the court did not find equitable tolling applicable because the plaintiff was 

not “unusually disadvantaged in protecting his own interests” despite his being illiterate and 

unrepresented when he received the letter from the Appeals Council denying his benefits and 

informing him of his right to file a civil action. Turner, 862 F.2d at 709. Thus, equitable tolling 

only applies in very rare circumstances. If Plaintiff did not file his complaint within sixty days of 

receiving the last Appeals Council decision, he needs to articulate facts similar to those outlined 

above in order to establish equitable tolling applies and his that claim in not time barred.

Given the above, Plaintiff will be given a final opportunity to amend the FAC to establish 

that jurisdiction is proper. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must establish that he filed this 

case within sixty days of receiving the Appeals Council denial of his benefits, or that equitable 

tolling applies to his case.

III. Conclusion and Order 

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may 

be granted, and it appears the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s case. However, if 
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Plaintiff believes that there are other facts that the Court should consider, he may file an Second 

Amended Complaint no later than December 30, 2016. If Plaintiff chooses to file a Second 

Amended Complaint, he must establish that this Court has jurisdiction. An amended complaint 

must bear the docket number assigned in this case and be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 

As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes any earlier complaints. Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that there may be limited exceptions to this rule on 

appeal). In other words, the Second Amended Complaint must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. If Plaintiff no longer wishes to 

pursue his case after reviewing this order, he shall file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file a Second Amended Complaint by December 30, 

2016 will result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2016 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE