Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00840/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00840-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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28 1 Defendant McDonald’s Corporation joins in Tesstab’s motion to dismiss

07cv840

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARY FEEZOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

TESSTAB OPERATIONS GROUP, INC,

dba McDONALD’S #5416;

McDONALD’S CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 07cv840-L(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION [doc. #6]; and

DISMISSING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff filed the above-captioned case on May 9, 2007 alleging violations of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) as well as California

Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”) and Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”) against defendants

Tesstab Operations Group, Inc, dba Mcdonald’s #5416 (“Tesstab”); and Mcdonald’s

Corporation. Defendant Tesstab1

 moves the Court to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Having carefully

considered the matters presented, the Court enters the following decision.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-00840-BLM Document 19 Filed 12/17/07 Page 1 of 6
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2 07cv840

Discussion

1. Background

Plaintiff is a disabled person who alleges he was unable or had difficultly using or

accessing defendant’s public accommodations due to, inter alia, the lack of disabled parking

signage, safe and accessible exterior path of travel from parking to the entrance of the

establishment, no disability signage at the entrance, no designated accessible tables inside or

disabled seating at outside dining area, the card reader is at the wrong height and angle, the reach

range of the soda machine exceeds allowable distance, the pipes under the lavatory are

improperly wrapped, and the toilet paper dispenser is too high. (Compl. at 3-4). Plaintiff does

not allege, however, that he intends to return to defendant’s establishment, but is deterred due to

his knowledge of the access barriers. Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges these various deficiencies

violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) as well as

California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”) and Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”). 

2. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Defendant’s motion challenges the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state

law claims. A federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims to the

extent they are "so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy . . .." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). "A state law claim is

part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with

the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be tried together." 

Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant acknowledges that the

state law claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the ADA claim: the underlying

factual allegations are the same for all of plaintiff’s claims. Furthermore, the Unruh Act and the

DPA are alternative means under California law to enforce the architectural regulations or

design standards implemented by the ADA. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(f) (Unruh Act) & 54(c)

(DPA). Therefore, plaintiff’s state law claims are so related to the ADA claim that they form

part of the same case or controversy, and the court may properly exercise supplemental

jurisdiction under section 1367(a).

Case 3:07-cv-00840-BLM Document 19 Filed 12/17/07 Page 2 of 6
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2 Although Gibbs predates section 1367(c), it informs the exercise of the court’s

jurisdiction thereunder. See Acri v. Varian Assocs, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997).

3 07cv840

Once the court acquires supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, section 1367(c)

provides the only valid basis upon which it may decline to exercise it. Executive Software N.

Am., Inc. v. Jensen, 24 F.3d 1545, 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). Section 1367(c) provides:

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

under subsection (a) if--

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

Defendant seeks to have the court decline supplemental jurisdiction claiming that the state

law claims substantially predominate over the ADA claim and are novel and complex. Plaintiff

argues the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the state and ADA claims are

essentially identical and the claims are neither novel nor complex. 

"[I]f it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof,

of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state

claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.” United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

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 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Plaintiff correctly asserts that the state law

claims are almost identical to the ADA claims to the extent that liability under the Unruh Act

and the DPA may be predicated on an ADA violation. See supra. But the only remedy available

under the ADA is injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1); Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856,

858 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition to injunctive relief, the Unruh Act and the DPA also provide for

damages. California Civil Code Section 52(a), which provides for enforcement of the Unruh

Act, allows for damages no less than $4,000 "for each and every offense." Under the DPA,

California Civil Code Section 54.3(a) provides for damages no less than $1,000 "for each

offense." Plaintiffs seek damages for each and every offense under the Unruh Act. (Compl. at

11). If plaintiff proves all of the offenses alleged, he may be entitled to significant damages

under the Unruh Act, as opposed to relief limited to injunctive relief under the ADA. Given the

Case 3:07-cv-00840-BLM Document 19 Filed 12/17/07 Page 3 of 6
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disparity in terms of comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, state law claims substantially

predominate over the ADA for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). See Singletary v. The Brick

Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130-31 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 

The court further finds that due to recent developments in California law, plaintiff’s state

law claims raise novel or complex issues of state law. In Harris v. Capital Growth Investors, the

California Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act

must plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations . . ..” 52 Cal.3d

1142, 1172-73 (1991). Shortly thereafter, in 1992, the California Legislature amended

California Civil Code Section 51 and added a provision that a defendant violates the Unruh Act

whenever it violates the ADA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f). A meritorious ADA claim does not

require proof of intent. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); Lentini v. Cal. Center for the Arts,

370 F.3d 837, 846-47 (9th Cir.2004). The Unruh Act amendment raised the question whether

the section 52 damages provision, as read in conjunction with section 51(f), required proof of

intent. In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the 1992 Unruh Act

amendments superseded Harris, and held that where a defendant violates the ADA, damages can

be awarded under the Unruh Act regardless of intent to discriminate. Lentini, 370 F.3d at

846-47. In 2006, the California Court of Appeal issued Gunther v. Lin, wherein it reasoned that

Harris was still viable, rejected Lentini as an improper interpretation of California law, and held

that section 52 damages required proof of intentional discrimination. 144 Cal. App. 4th 223,

252-57 (2006). 

Gunther appears to contradict the express language of section 51(f) which provides that

“violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” On the other hand, its

reasoning, based in part on distinguishing between two damages provisions for disabled access

violations, is not unsound. See 144 Cal. App. 4th at 231-32. Under the Unruh Act, section 52(a)

allows for damages no less than $4,000, while under the DPA, section 54.3(a) provides for

damages no less than $1,000. To avoid double recovery, “[a] person may not be held liable for

damages pursuant to both [section 54.3] and section 52 for the same act or failure to act.” CAL.

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3 The court does not believe certifying this issue to the California Supreme Court

would be helpful in light of that court’s denial of review and request for depublication of

Gunther. Gunther v. Lin, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 350 (Cal. Jan. 17, 2007).

5 07cv840

CIV. CODE § 54.3(c). Gunther reasoned that the intent element was required to distinguish

section 52 from section 54.3, avoid making either section redundant of the other, and justify a

higher award under section 52. See 144 Cal. App. 4th at 231-32, 239-40, 242, 250. This court is

therefore faced with a conflict in state law, which raises novel or complex state law issues for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).3

 

The discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction is “triggered by the court's

identification of a factual predicate that corresponds to one of the section 1367(c) categories.” 

Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1557. The predominance of the state law claims and the conflict

in pertinent state law are such factual predicates. “Once that factual predicate is identified, the

exercise of discretion . . . still is informed by whether [dismissing] the pendent state claims

comports with the underlying objective of most sensibly accommodating the values of economy,

convenience, fairness and comity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Although it would undoubtedly be more convenient to have this suit adjudicated in one action,

the novelty and complexity of state law issues weighs in favor of dismissing them to allow

California state courts to resolve the issue. “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided

as a matter of comity.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Furthermore, given the greater

comprehensiveness of state law remedies, fairness dictates that the claims are more appropriately

adjudicated in state court. The court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s state law claims. See Wilson v. PFS, LLC, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125-26 (S.D.

Cal. 2007); Cross v. Pac. Coast Plaza Invs, L.P., No. 06cv2543-JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772 *6

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007); see also Brick Oven, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. 

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for the court to decline supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims is GRANTED and plaintiff’s claims under

California Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act are hereby DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE to asserting them in state court. Defendant Tesstab shall file an

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Answer or other appropriate response to plaintiff’s Complaint asserting a cause of action under

the ADA within ten days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 17, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. BARBARA L. MAJORS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:07-cv-00840-BLM Document 19 Filed 12/17/07 Page 6 of 6