Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00653/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00653-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 11CV0653

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAVIN W. MCCOY,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY HEDGPETH,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11-0653-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: 

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. # 18)

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

STAY AND ABEY (DOC. # 17)

Kavin W. McCoy (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §2254 (“Petition”). Respondent Anthony Hedgpeth (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. Petitioner has

filed a document entitled “Response (sic) to Argument From Atty

General Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice,” which the Court construes

as an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner also filed a

Motion to Stay and Abey his Petition. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion to Stay and Abey. 

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto, Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Abey and Respondent’s Opposition thereto,

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 1 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1/

All further references to statutes are to the California Penal Code, unless

otherwise indicated.

2/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

2 11CV0653

and the lodgments presented therewith, finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to the relief requested, that Petitioner’s Petition is

barred by the statute of limitations and is not entitled to stay and

abeyance. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED and Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey be

DENIED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 15, 2007, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of

two counts of robbery in violation of California Penal Code §§ 211

and 2131/, residential burglary in violation of §§ 459, 460 and

667.5(c)(21), and assault with a semi-automatic firearm in violation

of § 12022.5(a). (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 2-3).

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence. On June 10,

2009, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Review of the Court of Appeal’s denial of his appeal. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 6).

On December 30, 2009, Petitioner constructively2/ filed a

Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7). On March 24, 2010, the Superior Court

denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8).

On April 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ Of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 2 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3/

On page 4 of the Petition, Petitioner indicated that he filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. However, the case

information that he provided reflects that he actually referred to the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the San Diego Superior Court. Nevertheless,

Petitioner stated that he presented his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel to the California Supreme Court and resolution of those claims are

pending. (Response (sic) To Possible Dismissal For Failure To Exhaust State Court

Remedies, filed May 13, 2011). However, Petitioner did not provide to the Court

any document he claims to have filed in the California Supreme Court. Even if

Petitioner did in fact file a document in the California Supreme Court regarding

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, he does not state that he

presented his claim of prosecutorial misconduct to the California Supreme Court.

3 11CV0653

Lodgment No. 9). On April 27, 2010, the Court of Appeal denied the

Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10).

On September 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11). On October 7, 2010, the Petition was

denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12).

Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review of the Court of

Appeal’s denials of his Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

On March 27, 2011, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus that is now before this Court. The Petition contains

three claims: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting

knowingly false testimony, (2) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failing to properly prepare for trial and adequately

investigate the facts of the case, and (3) ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel for his refusal to present evidence that Petitioner was innocent of the charges. The Court’s review of the record

presented indicates that none of these claims have been presented to

the California Supreme Court.3/

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 3 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 11CV0653

II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the AEDPA”)

statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to

petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court after

the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Therefore, because the

Petition was filed on March 27, 2011, the AEDPA applies to this

case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, “state

prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when to file

a federal habeas petition.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118

U.S. 897 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

“[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner

from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame

for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically limited. The

AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part, adding subdivision (d),

which provides for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners

to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of -

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 4 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 11CV0653

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection.

Petitioner’s conviction became final at the end of the time

he could have sought review by the United States Supreme Court of

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his Petition for Review.

The California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on June

10, 2009. Petitioner had 90 days to seek review in the United States

Supreme Court. Wixom v. Washington, 264 f.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

2000); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore,

Petitioner’s conviction was final on September 8, 2009, 90 days

after June 10, 2009.

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year or until

September 8, 2010, to file his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in

this Court. However, as explained in detail below, Petitioner waited

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 5 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 11CV0653

over one year to file the Petition that is now before the Court,

thus making it untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed several petitions for post-conviction relief

in the California Superior and Appellate Courts. The statute of

limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute of

limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition

is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects petitioner’s

final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were properly

filed and pending during that entire time. The statute of

limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued

on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed because there is no case “pending” during that

interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and “pending” in

Nino have been clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time

between denial in a lower California court and the filing of a

subsequent petition in the next higher court does not toll the

statute of limitations, if the petition is ultimately found to be

untimely. Id. at 223-226. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005), the Court held that statutory tolling is not available for

the period a petition is under consideration, if it is dismissed as

untimely. Id. at 413.

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court held that

in the absence of a clear indication by the California Supreme Court

that a petition is untimely, “the federal court must itself examine

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 6 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 11CV0653

the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would

have held in respect to timeliness.” Id. at 197. The Evans Court

gave some guidance in making that determination: federal courts must

assume (until the California courts state otherwise) that California

law regarding timeliness does not differ significantly from other

states which use thirty or sixty day rules for untimeliness and, a

six month unexplained delay is presumptively unreasonable. 

Statutory tolling is unavailable for the interval between

successive filings in the same court. Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984,

986 (9th Cir. 2001); Camacho v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 192483 at *4 (S.D.

Cal. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit applies a two part test to determine

whether the period between the denial of one petition and the filing

of a second petition in the same court should be tolled. Banjo v.

Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Hamerle v. Schriro,

495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court must ask

whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first

petition. King v. Roe, 340 F. 3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). If the

petitions are not related, the subsequent petition constitutes a new

round of collateral attack, and the time between them is not tolled.

Banjo, supra, at 969, citing Hemerle, supra, at 1075. If the

successive petition was attempting to correct deficiencies of a

prior petition, then the petitioner is still making “proper use of

state court procedures” and habeas review is still pending. Banjo,

supra, at 969, citing King, supra, at 823.

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his convictions

and sentence became final was filed on December 30, 2009 in the San

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 7 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 11CV0653

Diego Superior Court. On March 24, 2010, the Superior Court denied

the Petition. From September 8, 2009 (the date Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence became final) to December 30, 2009, (the

date Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

San Diego Superior Court) (113 days, or 3 months, 22 days), the

statute of limitations was not tolled because there was no case

pending during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

On April 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On April 27, 2010,

the Court of Appeal denied the Petition.

On September 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On October

27, 2010, the Court of Appeal denied the second Petition. 

The Court determines that from April 27, 2010 (the date of

the denial of Petitioner’s first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Court of Appeal) to March 27, 2011, (the date

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court), the statute of limitations was not tolled because Petitioner’s second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Court of Appeal was not limited to an elaboration of the facts

relating to the claims in his first Petition in the California Court

of Appeal. Instead, in the second Petition to the Court of Appeal,

Petitioner repeated one of the claims presented in his first

Petition and added two new claims. Therefore, the second Petition is

unrelated to the first Petition and is successive and not entitled

to the tolling of the statute of limitations. From April 27, 2010 to

March 27, 2011, 334 days, (or 11 months) elapsed. Banjo, 614 F.3d at

969; King, 340 F.3d at 823.

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 8 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4/

The record reflects that Petitioner actually filed two Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Court of Appeal. 

9 11CV0653

Adding together the two periods of time when the statute of

limitations was not tolled: 113 days (3 months, 22 days) + 334 days

(11 months), results in a total of one year, two months and 22 days,

which is beyond the one year statute of limitations mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in a timely fashion and it is

therefore barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling of the

Statute of Limitations

Petitioner states “I, Petitioner, know that ignorance to the

law is no excuse but I filed my habeas corpus in Superior Court

twice: believing that every court building had a Superior and

Supreme branch. I ask the Court to excuse my ignorance...” (Petitioner’s Opposition Motion to Dismiss at 2).4/

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable tolling is

available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see Holland v. Florida, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010). In Holland, the Court recognized

equitable tolling of the AEDPA one-year limitations period when the

prisoner can show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The Ninth

Circuit also has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

is subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 9 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 11CV0653

noted that “equitable tolling will not be available in most cases,

as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to

file a petition on time.” Id. [quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)]. The Beeler court wrote

that district judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to

accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289.

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary

circumstances” he has identified were the proximate cause of his

untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part.

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain solely to

the filing of the federal habeas petition, rather it is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state

court remedies as well.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir.

2006) citing Lacava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When

courts assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable

tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry.

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). The extraordinary

circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the

untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 10 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 11CV0134

Petitioner’s ignorance of the rules attendant upon seeking

review in the California courts and exhausting his state court

remedies, is not an extraordinary circumstance that warrants

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2009); Rasberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner also states that he lacked the “Preliminary

Transcript, Trial (sic) Transcripts and discovery” and that he

“filed twice in the lower courts for Transcripts” but he “he was

denied both times.” (Petitioner’s Response (sic) To Possible

Dismissal for Failure To Exhaust State Court Remedies, filed May 13,

2011).

Petitioner’s ignorance in not knowing that he was not

entitled to free transcripts is not an extraordinary circumstance

that warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d 1008, at fn. 4; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d at 1154.

As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner

has failed to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court declines to

equitably toll the statute of limitations and finds that his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this Court is untimely.

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED.

 

 

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 11 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 11CV0134

 III

 PETITIONER’S MOTION TO STAY AND ABEY

Petitioner seeks to stay and abey his Petition so that he can

exhaust his claims in the California courts. Respondent opposes

Petitioner’s request because all of the claims in the Petition are

unexhausted.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), provides that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State." "For reasons of federalism,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires federal courts to give the states an

initial opportunity to correct alleged violations of its prisoners'

federal rights." Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983); see Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995). 

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of

a petitioner's federal claim has been fairly presented to the

state's highest court. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996); Bland v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947 (1994), overruled on other grounds in

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000). A claim has been

fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based.

Bland, 20 F.3d at 1473; see Johnson, 88 F.3d at 830.

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 12 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 11CV0134

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1533

(2005), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that AEDPA changed many aspects

of federal habeas corpus proceedings, including the application of

the one-year statute of limitations for bringing a habeas corpus

petition in federal court, which is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).

In Rhines, the Supreme Court recognized petitioners can effectively

be denied the opportunity for collateral review in federal court

“(a)s a result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of

limitations and [Rose v.] Lundy’s dismissal requirement.” Rhines,

125 S.Ct. at 1533-1534. Therefore, the Rhines court held that

federal courts have discretion to stay mixed petitions and to hold

habeas proceedings in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state

court to exhaust all claims. Id. at 1534-1535.

The Rhines court identified “mixed petitions” as those

petitions that contain “some claims that have been exhausted in the

state courts and some that have not (been exhausted in the state

courts.)” Id. at 1531, 1533.

The Rhines court also held that stay and abeyance “should be

available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 1535. If employed

too often, the procedure could undermine the purposes of AEDPA,

namely, to reduce delay and streamline federal habeas corpus

proceedings. Id. at 1535. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated

“it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had

good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are

potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 13 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 11CV0134

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.”

Id. (emphasis added).

A petition that has only unexhausted claims must be dismissed

without prejudice. A petitioner’s motion to stay and abey a petition

that contains only unexhausted claims must be denied. Cervantes v.

Jacquez, 2011 WL 38978 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2011), citing 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1), and Rhines.

Here, as previously noted, all of the claims in the Petition

are unexhausted. Since the stay and abeyance procedure is only

authorized for petitions that contain exhausted and unexhausted

claims, stay and abeyance of the Petition is not available.

Moreover, even if the stay and abeyance procedure was available,

Petitioner has failed to show good cause for his failure to exhaust,

his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and that he did

not engage in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Therefore,

even if the Petition was not barred by the statute of limitations,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey be

DENIED.

 IV

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

Court has determined that Petitioner has failed to comply with the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d).

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 14 of 15
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 11CV0134

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED. Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion To Stay and Abey be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 31, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

September 14, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 3, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00653-MMA-WVG Document 29 Filed 08/03/11 Page 15 of 15