Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00995/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00995-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DEIDRA SALTER o/b/o P.S., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11cv995-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Deidra Salter, (“Salter”) brings this action on behalf of the Claimant, 

(“P.S.”), who is deceased. P.S. applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq, and supplemental security 

income payments under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Her application 

was denied at the initial administrative level. P.S. then requested and received a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a 

decision, on May 9, 2005, in which he found P.S. not disabled. Tr. 23. The Appeals 

Council denied P.S.’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. P.S. then filed an appeal 

to this district court. In November 2008, this district court remanded the matter to the 

Commissioner. The Appeals Council, thus, vacated the May 2005 hearing decision and 

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2 

remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. 323A. The ALJ held a second 

hearing on April 16, 2009, in which both P.S. and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 

Following the 2009 hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, dated May 21, 

2009, in which he found P.S. not disabled from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005. Tr. 280. 

The Appeals Council rejected P.S.’s request for review of the 2009 decision. Tr. 5. The 

ALJ’s 2009 decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 

1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and 

entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s 

Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). Based on the 

court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision 

of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with 

respect to Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 1:11-cv-00995-WC Document 21 Filed 08/02/13 Page 2 of 14
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques. 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case 

(SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II 

are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 

408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Pursuant to this court’s November 2008 Order, the Appeals Council remanded the 

case to the ALJ and directed the ALJ to obtain testimony from a VE. While the appeals 

process was pending, P.S. filed a subsequent application on July 12, 2005 alleging an 

onset date of May 10, 2005. That subsequent application was granted by another ALJ on 

July 23, 2008. Accordingly, the ALJ limited the scope of review of P.S.’s first 

application—at issue in this case—to whether P.S. was disabled from July 14, 2003 to 

May 9, 2005. Tr. 275. 

 P.S. was forty-two years old at the time of the second hearing before the ALJ, and 

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thirty-six years old at the time of the alleged onset date. Tr. 403. P.S. has a high school 

education. Tr. 403. P.S.’s past relevant work experience was as a “binder” in a bed linen 

factory, a “nursing assistant,” and a “small motor assembler.” Tr. 403. Following the 

2009 administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found P.S. 

“has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 14, 2003, the application date.” 

(Step 1) Tr. 277. At Step 2, the ALJ found that P.S. suffers from the following severe 

impairments: “congestive heart failure, headaches, obesity and hypertension.” Tr. 277.5 

The ALJ then found that P.S. “does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.925 and 416.926).” (Step 

3) Tr. 277. Id. Next, the ALJ found that “from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005, [P.S.] had 

the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work.” Tr. 278. At 

Step 4, and after consulting with a VE, the ALJ found that “[P.S.] was unable to perform 

any past relevant work from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005.” (Step 4) Tr. 279. At Step 5, 

the ALJ found that, “[b]ased on vocational expert testimony and considering [P.S.]’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that 

exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy that [P.S.] could perform from 

July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005.” Tr. 279. The VE testified that P.S. could perform the 

 

5

 The ALJ’s findings as to the Claimant’s severe impairments were the same as his 2005 

decision, which found that Claimant had “congestive heart failure,” “obesity,” “hypertension,” 

and “secondary headaches.” Tr. 22. 

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following jobs in the national economy: “surveillance system monitor” (sedentary, 

unskilled); “call out operator” (sedentary, unskilled); and “microfilm preparer” 

(sedentary, unskilled). Tr. 405-06.6

 Accordingly, the ALJ determined that “[P.S.] has 

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 14, 2003 

through the date of this decision.” Tr. 280.7

IV. SALTER’S CLAIMS

 Salter presents three issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: 1) “whether the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the medical opinions of 

record”; 2) “whether the ALJ’s finding of [P.S.]’s Residual Functional Capacity or 

(“RFC”) is not based on substantial evidence”; and 3) “whether the ALJ erred as a matter 

of law when he failed to find that [P.S.] was disabled through testimony of pain or other 

subjective symptoms.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 1. 

V. DISCUSSION 

 

 While Salter presents three issues for this court’s consideration, her challenges to 

the ALJ’s 2009 decision are interrelated as all three challenges hinge on her argument 

 

6

 The ALJ’s opinion states that the “Ms. Berthaume [the VE] testified that [P.S.] could perform 

jobs as a lens inserter and textile worker.” Tr. 280. However, a review of the hearing transcript 

shows that the VE identified “surveillance system monitor” (sedentary, unskilled); “call out 

operator” (sedentary, unskilled); and “microfilm preparer” (sedentary, unskilled) as examples of 

the jobs P.S. could perform. See Tr. 405-06. Accordingly, it appears the ALJ’s reference to 

“lens inserter and textile worker” in his opinion is a typographical error. 

7

 This appears to be a typographical error since the relevant time period of the ALJ’s 2009 

decision is July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005. The ALJ’s decision clearly states that his opinion is 

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that the ALJ did not intend to incorporate his earlier 2005 decision and that, therefore, the 

2009 decision should be read independently. 

 Salter’s first two arguments challenge the ALJ’s findings as to P.S.’s severe 

impairments of “congestive heart failure, headaches, obesity, and hypertension” and RFC 

of “full range of sedentary work” arguing that the ALJ erred because “the ALJ did not 

discuss the medical records that led him to th[ese] finding[s].” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 7. 

Salter argues as follows: 

(1) the ALJ had the opportunity to incorporate his 2005 decision into his 

2009 decision by reference and chose not to; (2) any argument that 

incorporation was the ALJ’s intent is a post hoc justification, which is not 

allowed in this Circuit; (3) the ALJ’s severity findings in the 2009 decision 

are different from the findings in his 2005, which is indication that he found 

something more credible in 2009. (R. 272-280). 

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 9. Defendant contends that “[Salter]’s argument that reversal is 

required because only the ALJ’s 2009 Decision should be considered on appeal fails. 

Rather . . . when the ALJ’s Decisions are read in tandem, substantial evidence supports 

his conclusion that [P.S.] was not disabled.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 18) at 12. 

 Salter’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, it was not erroneous for the ALJ to 

limit his supplemental proceedings and decision to the scope of this court’s remand order. 

Second, it was not erroneous for the ALJ to rely on findings he made in his previous 

hearing and decision in 2005. 

 

limited to considering whether P.S. was disabled from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005 since P.S.’s 

subsequent application, with an alleged onset date of May 10, 2005, was granted by another ALJ. 

Case 1:11-cv-00995-WC Document 21 Filed 08/02/13 Page 8 of 14
 A review of the record in this case establishes that the ALJ did not commit 

reversible error. This court found that the ALJ’s 2005 decision erred in relying on the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines and remanded the case to the Commissioner solely for 

the purpose of obtaining VE testimony.8

 Memorandum Opinion, 07cv445-WC, Nov. 26, 

2008. The ALJ complied with the remand order and held a supplemental hearing where 

he obtained testimony from a VE. The ALJ made it clear that the supplemental hearing 

and decision were limited to complying with the court’s remand order, as his decision 

clearly states “Pursuant to the District Court remand order, the Appeals Council has 

directed the undersigned to obtain testimony from a vocational expert.” Tr. 275. The 

ALJ also noted that [P.S.]’s subsequent benefits application had been granted by another 

ALJ on July 23, 2008 and, thus, on remand, he would “only consider whether [P.S.] was 

disabled from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 2005.” Tr. 275. 

The ALJ did not err by limiting the 2009 hearing and his subsequent decision to 

obtaining VE testimony. The Social Security Regulations state that the ALJ “shall take 

any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council and may take any additional action that 

is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council’s remand order.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.977 

 

8

 In reviewing the ALJ’s 2005 decision, this court found that “the ALJ recognized explicit 

environmental limitations on the [P.S.]’s ability to work but did not consult a VE to determine 

whether those limitations would significantly limit her basic work skills at the sedentary level. 

Because the testimony of a VE was required to determine whether the ALJ’s environmental 

limitations would preclude [P.S.] from performing a wide range of sedentary work, the ALJ’s 

exclusive reliance on the guidelines was erroneous.” Memorandum Opinion, 07cv445-WC, Nov. 

26, 2008. 

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(emphasis added). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.9839 (providing that the procedures in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.977 should be followed if the Appeals Council returns a court-remanded 

case to an ALJ). Accordingly, while the ALJ may look into other issues on remand, he is 

under no duty to do so. See, e.g., Leonard v. Astrue, 2010 WL 338099, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 

Jan. 22, 2010) (finding that ALJ “was not required to take evidence on issues outside the 

scope of the remand”).10 Thus, it was not erroneous for the ALJ to limit his supplemental 

proceedings and decision to obtaining testimony of a VE in order “to determine whether 

the ALJ’s environmental limitations would preclude [P.S.] from performing a wide range 

of sedentary work” as this is what the court instructed him to do on remand. 

 

9

 “When a Federal court remands a case to the Commissioner for further consideration, the 

Appeals Council, acting on behalf of the Commissioner, may make a decision, or it may remand 

the case to an administrative law judge with instructions to take action and issue a decision or 

return the case to the Appeals Council with a recommended decision. If the case is remanded by 

the Appeals Council, the procedures explained in § 404.977 will be followed. Any issues 

relating to your claim may be considered by the administrative law judge whether or not they 

were raised in the administrative proceedings leading to the final decision in your case.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.983 (emphasis added). 

10 In fact, in Leonard v. Astrue, the court noted that “[o]n remand, the Commissioner is required 

to follow the district court’s remand order in the subsequent administrative proceeding; deviation 

from the district court’s order is itself legal error subject to reversal on further judicial review.” 

2010 WL 338099, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2010) (citing Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885-

86 (1989) (“Where a court finds that the Secretary has committed a legal or factual error in 

evaluating a particular claim, the district court’s remand order will often include detailed 

instructions concerning the scope of the remand, the evidence to be adduced, and the legal or 

factual issues to be addressed. . . . Deviation from the court’s remand order in the subsequent 

administrative proceedings is itself legal error, subject to reversal on further judicial review.” 

(internal citations omitted)). 

 

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Salter’s argument that the ALJ did not discuss the medical records that led to his 

findings regarding P.S.’s severe impairments and RFC and that, thus, these findings are 

not supported by substantial evidence is due to fail. First, contrary to Salter’s argument, a 

review of the 2005 and 2009 decisions reveals that the ALJ’s findings as to P.S’s severe 

impairments and RFC are almost identical.11 Second, a review of that 2005 decision 

reveals that the ALJ did discuss how the record supported his findings. Salter does not 

attack the 2005 findings, she merely attacks the 2009 findings based on her argument that 

the ALJ did not explicitly incorporate his 2005 findings. Moreover, the ALJ’s reliance 

on his findings in the 2005 decision does not constitute error. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that it is not error for an ALJ to rely on factual 

findings made in the claimant’s previous hearings and decisions. Leonard v. Comm’r of 

 

11 As to P.S.’s severe impairments, in 2009, the ALJ found that P.S. suffers from the following 

severe impairments: “congestive heart failure, headaches, obesity and hypertension.” Tr. 277. 

In 2005, the ALJ found that: 

The medical evidence established that the claimant has severe congestive heart 

failure, but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations 

No. 4. The claimant’s obesity has not been shown to cause any work-related 

limitations, and her hypertension and secondary headaches are controllable with 

appropriate medications. There is absolutely no medical reference to anxiety or to 

any severe mental or emotional impairment of record. 

Tr. 22. In both decisions the ALJ found that P.S. does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of the 

Regulations. See Tr. 19 and 277. 

 As to P.S.’s RFC, in both decisions the ALJ found that P.S. can perform a “full range of 

sedentary work” but should not work in “hazardous situations as unprotected heights or 

dangerous machinery.” See Tr. 278-79 and 22-23. 

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Soc. Sec., 409 F. App’x 298, 300 (11th Cir. 2011). In fact, as Defendant points out, “the 

ALJ relied on his 2005 Decision in articulating to the VE the parameters of various 

hypotheses presented to her.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 18) at 10. Indeed, the ALJ asked the VE 

to consider a hypothetical “including the facts as found by me and my May 9th, 2005, 

decision and in particular the environment[al] limitations.” Tr. 405. The ALJ did exactly 

what he was supposed to do on remand—he presented a hypothetical to the VE framed 

with an identical RFC as he found in 2005. The VE testified that the hypothetical 

individual could perform some jobs available in the national economy and the ALJ relied 

on the VE’s testimony in finding that P.S. was not disabled from July 14, 2003 to May 9, 

2005. Thus, the ALJ committed no reversible error. 

 Salter’s third challenge to the ALJ’s decision is that “the ALJ erred as a matter of 

law when he failed to find that [P.S.] was disabled through testimony of pain or other 

subjective symptoms.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 1. According to Salter, the ALJ’s finding 

that “[P.S.]’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual 

functional capacity assessment,” Tr. 27, constitutes reversible error because “[t]his 

finding fails to explicitly articulate the reasons that the ALJ discredited [P.S.]’s testimony 

and is not supported by substantial evidence.” Pl.’s Br. (doc. 13) at 11. Again, as with 

Salter’s other arguments, her argument fails because the ALJ’s 2009 credibility finding 

did not change from his 2005 decision where he fully explained why he did not find 

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P.S.’s testimony to be credible, explaining in part that “[P.S.]’s allegations of disability 

are disproportionate to the evidence of record, are not supported by her infrequent follow 

up visits with her heart doctor subsequent to her hospitalization, are consistent with her 

described activities, and are not credible.” Tr. 21. 

 Moreover, as Defendant points out, “even if [P.S.]’s testimony of her symptoms as 

of April 2009 were accepted as true, they are irrelevant to a determination of whether 

[P.S.] was disabled between June 14, 2003 and May 9, 2005, and have no impact on the 

ALJ’s decision.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 18) at 15. Indeed, P.S.’s testimony at the 2009 hearing 

focused on her limitations from her various impairments at the time of the hearing. See

Tr. 397-400. Thus, the court finds this testimony is irrelevant given that, on remand, the 

sole question before the ALJ was whether P.S. was disabled between July 14, 2003 to 

May 9, 2005. See Carroll v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 453 F. App’x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 

2011) (“Evidence is irrelevant and immaterial when it relates to a time period after the 

eligibility determination at issue.” (citing Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th 

Cir.1999) (per curiam) (explaining that a medical opinion given one year after the denial 

of benefits “may be relevant to whether a deterioration in [the claimant’s] condition 

subsequently entitled her to benefits” but is not probative to the issue of eligibility during 

the time period for which benefits were denied))). 

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VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 2nd day of August, 2013. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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