Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03733/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 7, 2016*

Decided September 15, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3733

SHUNTAY ANTONIO BROWN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 1313

Amy J. St. Eve,

Judge.

O R D E R

Shuntay Brown sought judicial review of the denial of his applications for

Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. The district court

dismissed the suit without prejudice after concluding that Brown had failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies. Brown moved for reconsideration of that determination

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and the court denied the motion. We affirm.

                                                 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral

argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3733    Page 2

Brown applied for SSI and DIB based on various mental‐health conditions. Those

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.   

Rather than request a hearing in front of an administrative law judge (the next

step in the agency’s administrative review process), Brown filed this suit. In March 2015,

the district court dismissed the suit; he did not exhaust administrative remedies, the

court said, because he did not seek review from an ALJ and the Appeals Council.

Brown then requested and received a hearing before an ALJ, who concluded in a

decision dated May 13, 2015, that he was not disabled. The ALJ found that Brown was

capable of a full range of work at all exertional levels, with certain limitations regarding

his ability to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and his interactions with

others. The ALJ informed Brown that he had 60 days within which to appeal her

decision to the Appeals Council, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.968, 416.1468. Over the following

month, Brown sent multiple letters to the ALJ asking her to reopen the case. The ALJ

denied these requests, and in a letter of June 10, 2015, informed Brown that he should file

an appeal with the Appeals Council “immediately” if he disagreed with her unfavorable

decision in May.   

Brown filed an appeal with the Appeals Council on July 29. The Appeals Council

dismissed the request for review as untimely, finding no good cause to extend the time

for appealing because Brown repeatedly had been advised that he needed to file an

appeal within 60 days of the ALJ’s decision.

Brown then returned to the district court and sought reconsideration of its earlier

dismissal on grounds that the agency had rendered a final decision that the court could

review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court denied his motion. The agency’s final decision

was the Appeals Council’s dismissal, which the court said was not subject to further

review, and Brown had not established exceptional circumstances meriting relief under

Rule 60(b).

On appeal Brown maintains that he is entitled to Rule 60(b) relief because he has

exhausted the agency’s administrative‐review process but says nothing to suggest why

the district court was wrong to conclude that he did not demonstrate exceptional

circumstances to merit the “extraordinary remedy” of relief under that rule, Banks v. Chi.

Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v.

Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009)). Even pro se litigants must

comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8), which requires that an

appellate brief contain a cogent argument and reasons supporting it. In his reply brief,

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No. 15‐3733    Page 3

Brown asserts that his mental impairments and lack of counsel kept him from complying

with the administrative‐review procedures, but he waived those arguments by not

developing them and by raising them for the first time only in his reply brief.

See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund, 704 F.3d 522, 527 (7th Cir. 2013).

To the extent that Brown seeks to challenge the underlying dismissal for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, he may not do so because in a prior order we limited

this appeal to a review of the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion (the order of

December 3, 2015).

AFFIRMED.

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