Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02879/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02879-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY A LUCERO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-2879 CRB

ORDER CONDITIONALLY

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

On April 29, 2010, the Court dismissed this case for failure to prosecute and entered

Judgment in favor of Defendants. Eight days later, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion for

Relief from the Judgment. That Motion is now pending before this Court. 

As explained below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion on the following

condition: Plaintiff must post a bond with the Court in the amount of $11,746.00 within 30

days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiff posts the required bond by the deadline, the Court

will GRANT the requested relief. Otherwise, Plaintiff’s motion will be DENIED.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake,

inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Case 3:09-cv-02879-CRB Document 44 Filed 07/14/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Whether a party’s neglect is excusable is an equitable determination that “tak[es] account of

all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v.

Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). These circumstances

include “the danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of delay and its potential

impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the

reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id.

Moreover, “‘excusable neglect’ covers negligence on the part of counsel.” Bateman v.

United States Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000).

The conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel in this case was undeniably negligent. First,

counsel failed to attend a scheduled hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint. Then, she failed to file an amended complaint within the time allotted by the

Court in an Order that was issued following the hearing. Worst of all, after she learned of the

missed court appearance and the elapsed deadline, she waited an additional three months to

contact the Court. This failure to communicate with the Court was particularly striking in

light of the fact that counsel had been previously admonished for a similar failure. See Order

Re Plaintiff’s August 21, 2009 Filing (Dkt. No. 12).

Balancing the factors set forth in Pioneer, the Court finds, however, that counsel’s

negligence constitutes “excusable neglect.” Though counsel did not communicate with the

Court for several months, counsel filed the instant motion only eight days after the Court

dismissed Plaintiff’s case and entered Judgment in Defendants’ favor. Thus, the delay

between the Court’s entry of Judgment and the filing of the instant motion was not

significant and had no impact on judicial proceedings. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225

(concluding that a sixteen day delay was “not long enough to justify denying [Rule 60(b)]

relief”). 

Moreover, while, as in Bateman, Plaintiff’s counsel’s reasons for her neglect of her

client’s case are weak, “there is no evidence that [she] acted with anything less than good

faith.” Id. Her errors “resulted from negligence and carelessness, not from deviousness or

willfulness.” Id. The equities therefore largely favor granting the requested relief.

Case 3:09-cv-02879-CRB Document 44 Filed 07/14/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court is, however, somewhat concerned about the “danger of prejudice” to the

Defendants. Defendants maintain that, in reliance on the Court’s entry of Judgment, they

have “engaged in active marketing efforts to sell the subject real property.” Oppn. at 2. 

Specifically, Defendants assert that they have incurred the following out-of-pocket expenses

in reliance on the Court’s Judgment:

(1) $3,550.00 “in connection with a re-sod of the lawn and the installation of

irrigation”; Mays Suppl Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 6(B).

(2) $3,996.00 “for the painting of the interior of the house”; Id. and

(3) $4,200.00 “as a result of the home’s carpet being replaced.” Id.

Defendants have submitted copies of invoices confirming these expenditures. Mays Suppl.

Decl Ex. 6(B). 

In light of the evidence submitted by Defendants, the Court finds that these expenses

were actually incurred in reliance on the Court’s entry of Judgment and that Defendants may

therefore suffer some prejudice, in the form of lost investments, if the Court grants Plaintiff’s

motion.

At the same time, the Court is not certain that the prejudice Defendants will suffer is

equal to the full amount of the expenses they have so far incurred. After all, if this case is

resolved quickly and in Defendants’ favor, Defendants may not have to re-sod the lawn a

second time, install another irrigation system, repaint the interior of the home, or install new

carpeting. In such a circumstance, Defendants’ previous expenditures would not be wasted

ones.

To minimize the possible prejudice to Defendants without also providing Defendants

with a potential windfall, the Court imposes the following “just term,” see Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

60(b), on Plaintiff’s request for relief from the judgment: To receive relief from the

Judgment, Plaintiff must post a bond with the Clerk’s Office (to be deposited within the

registry of the Court) in the amount of $11,746.00 within 30 days of the date of this Order. If

Plaintiff fails to post the bond within the requisite time period, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion

will be DENIED. 

Case 3:09-cv-02879-CRB Document 44 Filed 07/14/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\CRBALL\2009\2879\Order Re Rule 60 motion.wpd 4

If Plaintiff posts the bond, the motion will be GRANTED. The bond will then remain

in the registry of the Court until Judgment is entered at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case. 

Within 30 days of the entry of that Judgment, Defendants may submit a request for

reimbursement of any of the above expenses that turn out to be duplicative. For instance, if,

at the conclusion of the case, Defendants must again re-paint the interior of the house, they

can request reimbursement of the $3,996.00 they unnecessarily paid to paint the house two

months ago. On the other hand, if Defendants have no need to, for instance, install another

irrigation system or re-sod the yard, they will not be entitled to reimbursement for such

expenses. Any portion of the bond that is not paid to Defendants at the conclusion of the

case will be returned to Plaintiffs.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-02879-CRB Document 44 Filed 07/14/10 Page 4 of 4