Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02977/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02977-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DECIRE G. BOITNOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 14cv2977 BTM(DHB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, VACATING ALJ’S 

DECISION, AND REMANDING 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

In this action, Plaintiff Decire G. Boitnott seeks review of the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s denial of her application for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits. Plaintiff and Defendant have filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, VACATES the Commissioner’s decision, and REMANDS for further 

proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II application for a period 

of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning January 

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5, 2011. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on June 15, 2012, and upon 

reconsideration on November 27, 2012. 

On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff’s claim was heard by Administrative Law Judge 

James P. Nguyen (the “ALJ”). On September 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision 

denying benefits. Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, 

which was denied on October 20, 2014. The ALJ’s decision then became the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ conducted the five-step sequential analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520.1

At the outset, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements 

 

1 Under the Social Security Regulations, the determination of whether a claimant is 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is a five step process. The five steps are 

as follows: (1) Is the claimant presently working in any substantially gainful activity? If so, then 

the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is the claimant’s 

impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, then the evaluation proceeds 

to step three. (3) Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments set 

forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404? If so, then the claimant is disabled. If not, then 

the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Is the claimant able to do any work that she has done 

in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step 

five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is disabled. If, on 

the other hand, the Commissioner can establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy that the claimant can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999).

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of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016. (AR 12.) 

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since January 5, 2011, the alleged onset date.

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: gout, 

fibromyalgia, arthritis, obesity, a mood disorder, and depression.

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ considered 

whether Plaintiff’s mental impairments met or medically equaled the criteria of 

Listing 12.04 (Affective Disorder). 2 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not satisfy 

the “Paragraph B” criteria because Plaintiff only had a mild restriction in activities 

of daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate difficulties with 

respect to concentration, persistence and pace, and no episodes of 

 

2

In order to meet Listing 12.04, a claimant must provide medically documented findings 

of specified signs and symptoms and must also satisfy the criteria in either Paragraph B or 

Paragraph C of the Listing. See 20 C.F.R., subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.04. Paragraph B requires that 

Plaintiff's symptoms result in at least two of the following: (1) marked restriction of activities of 

daily living; (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; (3) marked difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) repeated episodes of decompensation, 

each of extended duration. Paragraph C requires medical evidence of a chronic affective 

disorder lasting at least two years and one of the following: (1) repeated episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration; (2) a prediction that a minimal change in the 

claimant’s environment would cause him to decompensate; or (3) a current history of at least 

one year’s inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication 

of continued need for such an arrangement.

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decompensation. The ALJ also found that the evidence failed to establish the 

presence of “Paragraph C” criteria.

At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), except: Plaintiff can no 

more than occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can have only 

occasional exposure to extreme heat and cold and vibration; and should avoid 

working around unprotected heavy machinery or at unprotected heights. The ALJ 

also found that (1) Plaintiff can understand, remember, and carry out simple job 

instructions and maintain attention and concentration necessary to perform simple, 

routine, and repetitive tasks; (2) Plaintiff can have frequent interaction with 

coworkers and supervisors, but only occasional interaction with the general public; 

and (3) Plaintiff can work in an environment with occasional changes to the work 

setting and requiring no more than occasional work related decision making.

In making his findings regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing failed to credibly establish 

functional limitations greater than set forth in the ALJ’s decision. 

Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 

work, based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform other work that exists in 

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significant numbers in the national economy, such as mail clerk (DOT 209.687-

026), routing clerk (DOT 222.587-038), and bagger (DOT 920.687-018). 

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act. 

III. STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 

1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance. Id. Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 

1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). A denial of benefits must be upheld if the evidence 

could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision. Robbins 

v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and 

that benefits should be awarded to her because (1) the ALJ failed to articulate clear 

and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony; and (2) the ALJ failed to 

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properly evaluate her mental impairments when determining whether the criteria 

of Listing 12.04 were satisfied. As discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ’s

stated grounds for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, which relates to her mental as 

well as physical impairments, are not supported by the record. The Court further 

finds that outstanding factual issues must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made. Therefore, the Court remands for further proceedings 

instead of awarding benefits.

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had just moved in with her mother 

and previously lived by herself in an apartment. (AR 28-29.) She stated that her 

daughter helped her with most household chores. (AR 29.) Starting May 1, 2013, 

she had a job through IHSS taking care of her mother. (AR 29.) She used to work 

98 hours a month but her hours were decreased to 60 hours a month starting 

September 1, 2013. (AR 30.) Her duties include taking her mother to her doctor’s 

appointments, taking her to the grocery store, performing light housekeeping, and 

reminding her to take her medication. (AR 31.) Her mother is independent and 

does not need help physically. (AR 31.)

Plaintiff experiences pain as a result of her fibromyalgia. (AR 32.) Her 

medications do not help her symptoms. (AR. 32.) Her arthritis affects her knees 

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and wrists. (AR 33.) She gets flare ups of gout twice a month. (AR 34.) The flare 

ups last five to seven days. (AR 34.) When she experiences the flare ups, it is 

hard for her to get out of bed because her ankles get very swollen. (AR 34.) The 

last flare up she had was two weeks before the hearing. (AR 34.) She has been 

taking medication for gout for a couple of years. (AR 34.) The medication helps a 

little bit but not as much as she would like. (AR 35.) 

Plaintiff is being treated at Exodus Recovery Center for her depression. (AR 

33.) She gets depressed “[o]ff and on every other day.” (AR 34.) She doesn’t 

want to do anything and doesn’t have a social life.” (AR 34.) She does not leave 

her residence very much, only if she has to go to the doctor’s or grocery store. (AR 

36.) She will go up to four days not leaving her residence because she does not 

want to do anything. (AR 37.) Sometimes she does not want to get out of bed and 

sometimes does not change out of her night clothes. (AR 37.) There are many 

days when she does not leave her room. (AR 37.) She does not see any friends 

and has no social activities. (AR 37-38.) She started getting depressed and 

staying indoors in 2011 when her pain got worse and the medication was not 

helping. (AR 38.) 

She passes the time watching T.V. and sometimes checks e-mails. (AR 39.) 

She cannot focus for too long and if she lays in bed too long, her body aches more. 

(AR 39.) 

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B. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination

The ALJ gave the following reasons for finding not entirely credible Plaintiff’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of her 

symptoms: (1) her treatment has been routine, conservative, appropriate and 

sustained, and her continued use of medication suggests efficacy and toleration; 

(2) her activities of daily living include taking care of her mother as an in-home 

support service care worker, driving her mother to physician’s appointments, going 

grocery shopping, and performing light housekeeping; and (3) she has been 

encouraged to lengthen her recreational walks with her dog and to participate in 

vocational rehabilitation. 

The ALJ’s credibility determination was essential to the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity assessment as well as the ALJ’s evaluation of whether 

Plaintiff’s mental impairment met or equaled the criteria of Listing 12.04. As 

explained by the ALJ: 

The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 

and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed 

assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the broad 

categories found in paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listings 

in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments (SSR 96-8p). Therefore, the 

following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree 

of limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental 

function analysis.

(AR 14.)

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C. Review of the ALJ’s Credibility Determination

The Court has examined the record and concludes that the reasons given 

by the ALJ for finding Plaintiff not credible are not supported by the record.

First, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s treatment has been routine and 

conservative. However, Plaintiff was prescribed medication for her fibromyalgia 

and gout, including Allopurinol, Cymbalta, Flexeril, Prednisone, and Vicodin. (AR 

215, 263, 268, 276, 296, 356.) There was no medical testimony at the hearing or 

documentation in the medical record that the prescribed medication constituted 

“conservative” treatment of these conditions. Indeed, some courts have noted that 

because the recommended course of treatment for fibromyalgia does not include 

surgery, compliance with a prescribed course of treatment with medication such 

as Flexeril and Prednisone is not “conservative” treatment. See, e.g., Miller v. 

Colvin, 2014 WL 1873276, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2014); Baker v. Astrue, 2009 

WL 2231680, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009). The ALJ was not qualified to draw 

his own inference regarding whether more aggressive courses of treatment were 

available for Plaintiff’s conditions. See Matamoros v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1682062, 

at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 28, 2014) (ordering that on remand the ALJ develop the record 

as to the issue of whether Plaintiff’s prescribed treatment for fibromyalgia was 

conservative).

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were not 

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consistent with her allegations of functional limitations. It is not clear from the 

record that this is so. The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact 

that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, 

driving a car, or limited walking for exercise does not in any way detract from her 

credibility as to her overall disability.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th 

Cir. 2001). In order for a claimant’s daily activities to be used to discredit her 

subjective pain and symptom testimony, the cited activities must occupy a 

substantial part of the claimant’s day and utilize skills transferable to the workplace. 

Id. at 1049. 

According to Plaintiff’s testimony, she worked 98 hours per month (before 

her hours were reduced to 60 hours per month) as a caregiver for her mother. She 

performed “really light housekeeping” and took her mother to doctor’s 

appointments and the grocery store. (AR 31.) This testimony is not necessarily 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims that she will go multiple days without leaving her 

home because of her pain and depression (AR 37), and that she experiences flare 

ups of gout about twice a month that can last five to seven days and make it hard 

for her to get out of bed. (AR 34). 

It appears that Plaintiff’s job as a caregiver for her mother may allow Plaintiff 

the flexibility to work when she is feeling well and not work when she is in pain or 

depressed. If Plaintiff does not have to work a designated number of hours per 

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day, she may work intermittently throughout the entire week as her health permits. 

The record does not support the conclusion that her work taking care of her mother 

occupies a substantial part of her day and utilizes skills transferable to the 

workplace. There is a lack of evidence that her part-time job taking care of her 

mother translates into being able to maintain the persistence and pace of regular 

work.

Finally, the ALJ states that Plaintiff has been encouraged to lengthen her 

recreational walks with her dog and to participate in vocational rehabilitation. It is 

unclear to the Court how this recommendation, contained in a Progress Note by 

Exodus Wellness & Recovery (AR 441), bears upon Plaintiff’s credibility. The 

Progress Note summarizes an assessment interview with Plaintiff on May 2, 2013, 

in which Plaintiff described her struggles with depression and hypomania, her lack 

of exercise, her poor eating habits, and her fear of seeking employment because 

“I may become manic and go off on someone.” Plaintiff expressed that her goals 

included improving communication skills, improving impulse control, reducing 

depression, and vocational rehabilitation. Consequently, Plaintiff was given 

contact information for the Department of Rehabilitation and was given the 

homework assignment to eat at least 2 meals per day and increase the length of 

her walks with her dog. That Plaintiff has the goals to become healthier and get 

back to work and was encouraged to take steps to accomplish those goals, does 

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not mean that Plaintiff currently has the ability to achieve those goals. 

D. Propriety of Remand

Under the “ordinary remand rule,” when “the record before the agency does 

not support the agency action, . . . the agency has not considered all relevant 

factors, or . . . the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency 

action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare 

circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 

Departure from the ordinary remand rule may be permissible under the “credit-astrue” rule set forth in Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396 

(9th Cir. 1988). 

The Ninth Circuit has developed a three-part credit-as-true standard, each 

part of which must be satisfied before a court can remand to an ALJ with 

instructions to calculate and award benefits: (1) the record has been fully 

developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; 

(2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 

whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled on remand. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014). Even 

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when all three elements are satisfied, raising the “rare circumstances” that would 

allow departure from the ordinary remand rule, the decision whether to remand for 

further proceedings or just award benefits rests within the discretion of the court. 

Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, as discussed above, the record has not been fully developed with 

respect to any alternative courses of treatment for Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and gout 

and the extent to which Plaintiff’s job taking care of her mother requires regularity 

and consistency. Therefore, further administrative proceedings would be useful, 

and remand is appropriate. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

[Doc. 14] is GRANTED IN PART and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

[Doc. 19] is DENIED. The Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and this matter 

is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2016

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