Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00315/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RICK EATON,

NO. CIV. S-07-315 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARK J. SIEMENS, an individual

and in his capacity as Chief

of Police, CARLOS A. URRUTIA,

an individual and in his

capacity as City Manager, CITY

OF ROCKLIN, a public

municipality and public

entity,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion brought by

defendants City of Rocklin (the “City”), Mark J. Siemens

(“Siemens”), Chief of Police, and Carlos A. Urrutia (“Urrutia”),

City Manager (collectively, “defendants”) to dismiss plaintiff

Rick Eaton’s (“plaintiff”) complaint on the ground said complaint

is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or alternatively, to

stay the action pending resolution of a prior state court action

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the

ground the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted because plaintiff is barred from relitigating claims

which were or could have been heard in the administrative

proceeding in which plaintiff challenged his termination. Scott

v. Kuhlman, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that

the affirmative defense of res judicata may be raised by a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). As to their alternative request

for a stay of the instant action, defendants move for relief

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), generally. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized the propriety of raising

abstention doctrines as non-enumerated Rule 12(b) motions. Ritza

Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369

(9th Cir. 1988). Unlike motions under Rule 12(b)(6), in ruling

on an un-enumerated Rule 12(b) motion, the court may look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id.

3 The Younger abstention doctrine derives from the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 43-44 (1970). There, the Court held that a federal court

should abstain from hearing a constitutional challenge to an

ongoing criminal prosecution. Younger has been subsequently

extended to support abstention in federal civil cases where 

ongoing state (civil or administrative) matters are pending. See

e.g. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965,

979 (9th Cir. 2004).

2

filed by plaintiff.1

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b).2 The court does not consider herein defendants’

alternative motion to stay the action, pursuant to the “Younger”

abstention doctrine,3 because plaintiff has dismissed the subject

state court action. (Pl.’s Decl., filed April 26, 2007, ¶s 10-

11.) Defendants concede that upon that dismissal the issue of

Younger-abstention became moot. (Defs.’ Reply, filed May 4,

2007, at 10 n. 5.) The court also does not consider herein

defendants’ argument for a stay pursuant to “Burford”-abstention,

as the court finds that abstention doctrine wholly inapplicable

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4 Burford-abstention derives from the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315

(1943). While the scope of Burford-abstention remained unclear

for many years, in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of

City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), the Court clarified

that there are only two circumstances under which Burford- abstention is appropriate: (1) when state administrative orders

or proceedings involved “difficult issues of state law bearing on

policy problems of substantial public import whose importance

transcends the case at bar,” or when federal review of such

orders or proceedings “would be disruptive of state efforts to

establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of

substantial public concern.” Id. at 361 (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Such circumstances simply are not present in

this case. Indeed, defendants cite no factually similar case

where Burford-abstention has been applied.

3

to the instant case.4

 Therefore, the only issue for the court’s

determination is whether plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata.

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that this

action is not precluded. The underlying administrative

proceeding was not of a judicial nature, in that the arbitrator

was not empowered to adjudicate the rights of the parties before

him, but rather, he offered only an advisory decision designed to

assist the City Manager make his decision as to the propriety of

plaintiff’s termination. As such, the requirements for claim

preclusion are not met, and defendants’ motion to dismiss is

therefore DENIED.

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5 The following statement of facts is drawn from

plaintiff’s complaint in this action, filed February 16, 2007,

and other materials of which the court takes judicial notice,

including plaintiff’s Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate,

filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Placer, the

arbitrator’s written decision, Urrutia’s termination letter, and

the Memorandum of Understanding between the City and the Rocklin

Police Officers Association (of which plaintiff was a member),

pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement (“MOU”). (See

infra n. 8.)

4

BACKGROUND5

On November 1, 2004, Urrutia, the City Manager for the City

of Rocklin, issued plaintiff a Notice of Termination dismissing

him from employment as a police sergeant for the City. Plaintiff

thereafter made a timely written application for an evidentiary

hearing to challenge the termination of his employment, pursuant

to the MOU. Under the terms of the MOU, plaintiff and the City

agreed on the selection of arbitrator William Riker to hold a

fact-finding administrative hearing as to whether there was good

cause to support the City’s termination of plaintiff’s

employment.

The MOU provided under the section entitled “Advisory

Arbitration,” the following:

The arbitrator shall conduct an evidentiary hearing in

accordance with the American Arbitration Association 

Voluntary Arbitration Rules. The decision of the arbitrator

shall be advisory only.

The arbitrator shall prepare a written advisory decision

which shall include a statement of decision, the facts

upon which it was based, and a full description of the 

remedies or corrections suggested. The arbitrator’s

decision shall be sealed and filed with the City Manager.

The City Manager may accept the advisory decision and order

its implementation, may modify and implement the decision

and any remedies or corrections suggested, or may reject

the decision. The City Manager will provide a copy of the

arbitrator’s decision to the appealing party with the City

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5

Manager’s decision within ten (10) days of receipt of the

arbitrator’s decision.

(Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 3 at 30-31.) 

An evidentiary hearing was held before Mr. Riker on July

20-22, August 10-12 and 31, 2005, during which plaintiff, who was

represented by counsel, presented witnesses and documentary

evidence. 

On January 9, 2006, Mr. Riker issued his arbitration

decision, recommending to Urrutia that the City’s termination of

plaintiff “for cause be sustained and the grievance/appeal

denied.” Mr. Riker found the evidence established the six

grounds for termination, including incidents of disobedience,

insubordination, wrongful exercise of authority for malicious

purpose, and/or subverting the good order of the police

department, set forth in the City’s Notice of Termination. He

concluded:

As noted, the preponderance of the evidence indicates 

that Eaton did commit the acts outlined in the six charges.

These actions also impacted a wide number of officers within

the Department who were aware of his behavior. It is also

credible that he did negatively impact the good order and

efficiency of the organization. If he were allowed to

remain as a police officer with the City of Rocklin, then

his behavior would serve as a benchmark against future

violations of such insubordinate and disruptive nature. It

is a recommendation that frankly would be inconsistent

with the findings.

(Defs.’ RJN, filed April 10, 2007, Ex. 2 at 48-49.) In so

ruling, Mr. Riker also rejected plaintiff’s First Amendment free

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6 Plaintiff argued he could not be disciplined or

terminated in retaliation for speaking out against the police

department because his comments raised issues of a public concern

which were protected by the First Amendment.

7 Plaintiff argued Siemens committed perjury and offered

a forged “General Order 3" into evidence at the arbitration

hearing to establish plaintiff violated a general order that did

not exist at the time of the alleged violation. Mr. Riker

overruled plaintiff’s objection to the General Order and admitted

the order into evidence.

6

speech defense6

 and found that there were no procedural defects7

under California’s Public Safety Officers’ Procedural Bill of

Rights Act (“POPBRA”). 

On January 11, 2006, Urrutia, as City Manager, informed

plaintiff in a letter, captioned “RE: Advisory Arbitration –

Decision and Recommendation,” that “[he] accept[ed] the advisory

decision [of the arbitrator] and sustain[ed] the termination of

[plaintiff’s] employment with the City of Rocklin.” Urrutia

enclosed with the letter a copy of Mr. Riker’s “advisory award,”

which provided that “the Arbitrator’s recommendation to the City

Manager is that the Department’s decision to terminate

[plaintiff] for cause be sustained and the grievance/appeal be

denied.” (Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 3.)

On January 26, 2006, Urrutia sent plaintiff a letter

informing him that his termination was governed by California

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and that plaintiff had 90

days within which to seek judicial review of the decision. (Ex.

A to Urrutia Reply Decl., filed May 4, 2007.)

Pursuant to Section 1094.5, plaintiff filed a Petition for

Writ of Mandate (“Petition”) on April 10, 2006, in the Superior

Court of California, County of Placer. Plaintiff’s Petition asks

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7

the superior court to set aside his termination and to order his

reinstatement. The Petition also seeks back pay with interest,

attorney fees and costs, and punitive damages against the City,

Urrutia and Siemens, who are named as respondents. The Petition

alleges plaintiff’s termination is not supported by the

arbitrator’s findings, and the findings are not supported by the

evidence in light of the entire record. The Petition also

alleges that in terminating plaintiff’s employment, the City

violated plaintiff’s constitutional free speech and procedural

due process rights as well as his rights under state law under

POPBRA.

On February 16, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant action in

this court against the same defendants, seeking as in the

Petition, reinstatement to his position as police sergeant, back

pay with interest, attorneys fees and costs and punitive damages. 

Plaintiff alleges claims against defendants for violation of

plaintiff’s constitutional rights (free speech, procedural and

substantive due process and equal protection) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. section 1983 and for violation of plaintiff’s rights

pursuant to California’s “whistleblower” statute, California

Labor Code section 1102.5, and POPBRA, California Government Code

section 3309.5(e).

On April 26, 2007, plaintiff dismissed his Petition in the

superior court.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

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8 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Docket #11) is

GRANTED. The court may properly take judicial notice of matters

of public record, such as pleadings in another action and records

and reports of administrative bodies pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198

(9th Cir. 1988). In his opposition papers, plaintiff attaches as

exhibits to his declaration the MOU controlling the terms and

conditions of his employment with the City at the time of his

termination as well as a prior MOU in effect during his

employment with the City. Plaintiff did not move the court to

take judicial notice of these documents. However, said documents

are properly considered by the court under Rule of Evidence 201

as they are materials “whose accuracy can be readily determined

by resort to sources which cannot reasonably be questioned,” and

the court may take judicial notice of facts even when not

requested to do so by a party. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), ©. 

Plaintiff’s declaration, on the other hand, is not properly

considered by the court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), and its contents will be disregarded for those

purposes.

8

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be

judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.8

Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1988). In addition, when a plaintiff fails to introduce a

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9 Here, throughout his complaint, plaintiff makes

reference to the arbitration proceeding; accordingly, documents

pertaining to that proceeding, such as the arbitrator’s written

decision, the transcripts of the proceeding, and Urrutia’s

termination letter accepting the arbitrator’s recommendation are

properly considered on this motion to dismiss. See Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not

object to the court’s consideration of these documents. 

9

pertinent document as part of his pleading, the defendants may

introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the

pleading. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“[W]e hold that documents whose contents are alleged in a

complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).9

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the

ground the City’s administrative decision resulting in

plaintiff’s termination bars this action, which either raises the

same factual and legal issues presented in the arbitration

proceeding or issues which could have been raised in that

proceeding. 

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1738 requires federal courts to give

the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as they would

be given in the state in which they are rendered. Marrese v. Am.

Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). 

Section 1738 does not govern cases involving unreviewed decisions

of a state administrative hearing board or commission. 

University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). 

However, as a matter of federal common law, federal courts give

preclusive effect to the findings of state administrative

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10

tribunals in later actions under Section 1983. Id. at 797-99. 

In Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032-33

(9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit recognized that its subsequent

cases had extended Elliott, holding that “‘the federal common law

rules of preclusion described in Elliott extend to state

administrative adjudications of legal as well as factual issues,

even if unreviewed [by a state court], so long as the state

[administrative] proceeding satisfies the requirements of

fairness outlined in [United States v. Utah Construction & Mining

Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966)].’” Id. at 1033 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). Those requirements are: first, the

administrative agency must act in a judicial capacity; second,

the agency must resolve disputed issues of fact properly before

it; and third, the parties must have had an adequate opportunity

to litigate. Id. These three distinct “fairness requirements”

must be satisfied before a prior administrative ruling can bar a

Section 1983 action because such an administrative ruling, the

Miller court emphasized, is only entitled to preclusive effect

when the proceedings “[were] conducted with sufficient safeguards

to be equated with a state court judgment.” Id.

Factually, in Miller, the court affirmed a summary judgment

ruling for the defendant in a Section 1983 action on the ground

the administrative ruling sustaining the plaintiff’s termination

had preclusive effect on the action pending in federal court. 

There, the plaintiff was dismissed from his employment at the

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. He contested his

dismissal before the Santa Cruz County Civil Service Commission;

the Commission affirmed his dismissal after a “public evidentiary

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11

hearing at which Miller was represented by counsel and was

permitted to present oral and documentary evidence and to call

witnesses.” Id. at 1032. California Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5 provided Miller with an opportunity to seek

judicial review of the Commission’s decision in superior court. 

Miller declined to seek that review; instead, he brought a

Section 1983 action in federal court. The Ninth Circuit held

that the unreviewed administrative determination, having met the

Utah Construction-fairness requirements, precluded the

plaintiff’s Section 1983 action. Id. at 1038.

Defendants ask this court to apply Miller to this case and

similarly preclude plaintiff’s action. In so arguing, defendants

emphasize the nature of the arbitration proceeding in this case;

a proceeding which lasted seven days, and wherein, like Miller,

plaintiff was represented by counsel and allowed to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence. Further, the

arbitration proceeding here was presided over by a qualified

arbitrator, selected by the parties, who applied the American

Arbitration Association Voluntary Arbitration Rules to the

hearing. Also similar to Miller, plaintiff did not seek state

court review via Section 1094.5; while he initially filed a

petition pursuant to Section 1094.5, he later withdrew the

petition, instead relying on this action to challenge his

termination. 

While said facts are indeed relevant to the second and third

“fairness requirements,” defendants’ argument fails to address

the threshold inquiry under Elliott and Miller--that the

administrative body act in a judicial capacity. Such a capacity

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10 Lambert is an unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit

but the court cites it here nonetheless because of the paucity of

relevant case law on the specific issue critical to this case. 

Indeed, the parties do not cite any case addressing a similar

fact pattern to this case where the challenge to the

administrative proceeding rests on the first inquiry under Utah

Construction–-whether the administrative body acted in a judicial

capacity. The cases cited by the court above, while not

controlling, are nonetheless persuasive authority since they

address the particular issue here.

12

entails adjudication of the parties’ rights. In other words, a

judicial-like hearing is an adversary proceeding in which the

decision-maker renders a final decision binding on the parties. 

Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 n. 4 (D. Conn. 1975)

(recognizing that Utah Construction applies only to state

administrative decisions that are “judicial in nature” and that

the hearing in Darnell was not “an adversary proceeding in which

the Commissioner was empowered to adjudicate rights of the

parties before him” but rather, the hearing was an “advisory

proceeding designed to help the Commissioner make his decision”); 

United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211, 1212 (4th Cir. 1978)

(recognizing in the double jeopardy context that a military,

investigatory hearing which did not adjudicate the defendant’s

guilt or innocence but rather offered only a recommendation to

the Commanding Officer as to the charges against the defendant

did not permit jeopardy to attach); Lambert v. Andrews, 2003 WL

22508205, *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005) (finding the Nevada State

Personnel Commission “clearly act[ed] in a judicial capacity” as

the Commission’s decision was “binding on both parties”).10 

In this case, like Darnell, the arbitrator did not

adjudicate the parties’ rights and issue a binding decision on

them. Instead, the arbitrator provided only an “advisory

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11 Defendants contend that by “accepting the advisory

decision” of the arbitrator to sustain plaintiff’s termination,

the City Manager “incorporat[ed] the arbitrator’s decision and

findings as his own.” (Reply at 4:1-2.) Ziegler v. City of

South Pasadena, 73 Cal. App. 4th 391, 393-94 (1999), cited by

defendants to support their argument, is inapposite. There, the

court, in reviewing the plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate

under Section 1094.5, upheld a city manager’s decision to

terminate a police officer after an advisory arbitration

proceeding, but the case did not involve the application of res

judicata or more specifically the Utah Construction-fairness

requirements.

13

decision,” a recommendation, to the City Manager for his use in

deciding plaintiff’s appeal. The arbitrator wrote at the outset

of his decision: “The parties agre[e] . . . the arbitrator’s

decision is an advisory recommendation to the Rocklin City

Manager.” (Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 2 at 2.) (emphasis added). Pursuant

to the express terms of the MOU, the City Manager could accept,

modify or reject the recommendation. As such, the final decision

as to plaintiff’s termination lay solely in the City Manager, who

had the unilateral authority to render any decision he saw fit. 

That ultimate decision was clearly not made pursuant to any sort

of judicial process. The City Manager did not preside over or

take any part in the arbitration proceeding, and more

importantly, he was not required to accept any aspect of the

arbitrator’s findings in rendering his decision. 

While he could, as he did here, choose to accept the

arbitrator’s decision and findings, significantly, he could

choose to ignore them in full and render his decision for wholly

other reasons. As a result, defendants’ argument, in their

reply, that the process was “judicial” because the City Manager

based his decision on the arbitrator’s findings of fact is

unavailing.11 While the City Manager chose to follow the

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12 The court also notes that unlike most judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings, the arbitrator’s decision in this

case was only made public after the City Manager rendered his

final decision. The MOU required that the arbitrator’s decision

be filed under seal with the City Manager, and that plaintiff be

provided a copy of the arbitrator’s decision only in conjunction

with the City Manager’s decision. Such procedures are hardly

akin to judicial proceedings conducted and decided publicly.

14

arbitrator’s recommendation in this case, what is critical to the

inquiry is that he was not obligated to do so. As a result, the

court cannot find that the administrative decision here, namely,

the City Manger’s decision, to be of a “judicial nature.”

As the initial “fairness requirement” is not met, the court

need not consider whether the other elements of Utah Construction

are satisfied, nor need the court consider whether plaintiff’s

claims asserted herein were decided or could have been decided by

the arbitrator. As the procedure used by the City to terminate

plaintiff’s employment cannot “be equated with a state court

judgment,”12 the court must deny defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033. The decision to terminate plaintiff’s

employment did not result from a procedure which comported with

the requirements of a judicial hearing, which adjudicated the

parties’ rights and resulted in a final, binding decision. 

Rather, the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment resulted

from the unabridged discretion of the City Manager. As such,

plaintiff’s instant complaint is not barred by the doctrine of

res judicata.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as barred by res judicata is 

DENIED; defendants’ alternative motion for a stay is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: May 23, 2007

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