Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-00905/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-00905-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO G. LIRA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 00-905 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

On June 29, 2007 the Court heard arguments on defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion.

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff added defendants Smith and Pederson for the first time in his amended complaint on

June 28, 2006 based on events in 2001 and 2002. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as

untimely. Plaintiff argues that both the new claims and new parties “relate back” to the original

complaint, but the cases cited by plaintiff do not involve relation back of new parties. In fact, cases have

held that where there are new parties in a supplemental complaint there is no relation back. ITT

Gilfillan, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal. App. 3d 581, 587 (1982) (citing Spaulding v. Howard,

121 Cal. 194 (1898) and Elling Corp. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1978)). Plaintiff also

argues that his claims against Smith and Pederson are timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The

Court finds equitable tolling inapplicable because plaintiff failed to provide timely notice to Smith and

Pederson and never pursued a legal remedy against them. See Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare

Case 3:00-cv-00905-SI Document 138 Filed 07/03/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The parties agree that the appropriate statute of limitations is one year from the date the injury

accrued, see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(3), and that plaintiff is entitled to two years of statutory tolling

for disability of imprisonment. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). 

2

 Plaintiff filed a second administrative appeal on April 4, 1998, which was denied on September

21, 1998. Plaintiff filed a third administrative appeal on November 3, 1999, which was denied on

November 12, 1999. In total, the duration of these appeals took about six months.

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Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (equitable tolling requires timely notice, lack of

prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct); see also Collier v. City of Pasadena,

142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924 (1983) (timely notice requires the same defendants in the first action be the

same as in the second action). Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s claims against Smith and

Pederson are not timely. 

Plaintiff filed claims against defendants Herrera, Olmstead, Alameida, Busser, Schmidt, Mann,

Pizzella, Olsen, Bolles, and Heaps on March 14, 2000 based on events in 1996. Defendants move to

dismiss the claims as untimely.1

 The Court finds that plaintiff’s injury began to accrue on July 25, 1996,

when the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) informed plaintiff that it intended to transfer him

to Pelican Bay for segregated confinement. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)

(claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury). The Court finds that plaintiff

is entitled to six months of tolling while he exhausted mandatory administrative remedies, and that this

period runs consecutively with the two-year statutory tolling period. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,

943 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, this Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to another six months of equitable

tolling. Plaintiff provided timely notice by filing administrative appeals in 1998 and 1999, did not

prejudice the defendants by appealing the same due process claims, and acted reasonably and in good

faith while he was imprisoned and lacked legal counsel.2 In total, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled

to three years of tolling, and that his claims against Herrera, Olmstead, Alameida, Busser, Schmidt,

Mann, Pizzella, Olsen, Bolles, and Heaps are timely.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to as to defendants

Smith and Pederson, and DENIES the motion as to defendants Herrera, Olmstead, Alameida, Busser,

Case 3:00-cv-00905-SI Document 138 Filed 07/03/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Schmidt, Mann, Pizzella, Bolles, Olsen, and Heaps. (Docket No. 125).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:00-cv-00905-SI Document 138 Filed 07/03/07 Page 3 of 3