Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01126/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAYLON M. MAJORS,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, Acting

Secretary, California

Department of Corrections,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 06cv1126-BTM(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1]

On May 23, 2006, Gaylon Majors filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1]. Petitioner alleges two grounds for

relief: (1) His conviction was based on insufficient evidence, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) he was denied due

process of law and his right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth

Amendment because "illegally seized evidence was admitted into

evidence to prove the petitioner's propensity to commit rape." 

(Pet. 6, 10.) He further claims "[t]he California courts erred in

finding this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt." (Id. at 10.) Majors also filed a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities [doc. no. 6] and Exhibits [doc. no. 7]. Respondent

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filed an Answer [doc. no. 10] on October 5, 2006. On November 13,

2006, Petitioner filed his Traverse [doc. no. 11].

After reviewing the Petition, Majors's Memorandum of Points

and Authorities and supporting exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, the

Lodgments, and Petitioner’s Traverse, this Court finds that Majors

is not entitled to the relief requested and recommends that his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED for the reasons

outlined below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2000, Alesandria Modesto rode her bike to a Zany

Brainy store in a shopping mall approximately thirty minutes from

her home to buy a gift for her brother. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s

Tr. vol. 3, 242-43, Mar. 12, 2001.) She left the store to run

another errand, then returned and bought another item. (Id. at

243-44.) She put her purchases and the receipts in her backpack

and began to ride home. (Id. at 244-45.) 

When she was halfway home, Petitioner, who was standing

outside of a white van, flashed a badge at Alesandria and asked her

to stop. (Id. at 245.) Majors told Alesandria he was a security

guard for the mall, and he had been told that someone riding a bike

had shoplifted from the Zany Brainy store. (Id. at 245-46.) 

Alesandria got off her bike and showed him the items she had

bought, the receipts, and her identification. (Id. at 246.) 

Petitioner told Alesandria she needed to go back to the mall

with him to talk to the security guard at the store. (Id. at 248.) 

Majors tried to put her bike in the van, but it would not fit. 

(Id.) So he told her to lock it up at a school across the street. 

(Id.) Petitioner told Alesandria to give her backpack to him while

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she locked up her bike, and she complied. (Id. at 249.) After

locking up her bike, Alesandria returned to Majors's van and asked

to see his badge again. (Id.) The badge had the words "Security

Guard" printed on it, and it was pinned to an orange laminated

card. (Id. at 250-51.) Alesandria testified at trial that she

believed Majors was a security guard and was afraid that if she did

not cooperate she could be taken to jail, even though she had done

nothing wrong. (Id. at 253.) 

Alesandria got in the van. (Id. at 254.) Petitioner took out

a cell phone and appeared to make a call to his partner, stating

that the suspect had been apprehended. (Id.) Alesandria asked if

she could call her parents, and Majors said she could when they got

back to the mall. (Id.) Petitioner drove to the rear parking lot

of the mall, claiming they were going to the security office. 

(Id.) 

Majors parked the van, and Alesandria started to get out; but

Petitioner grabbed her by the hair and slammed her head into the

passenger-side window. (Id. at 260.) He told Alesandria to get in

the back of the van, saying that if she complied he would not hurt

her. (Id.) Alesandria was scared and grabbed for his throat in an

attempt to get away. (Id. at 261.) Majors grabbed her head again

and tried to push her down. (Id.) Alesandria moved to the back of

the van to try to escape through the back doors, but Petitioner

pulled her by the back of her shirt and pants and threw her in the

back seat. (Id.) Alesandria was screaming and fighting to free

herself. (Id.) He told her to cooperate and he would not hurt

her. (Id. at 262.) Petitioner straddled her and pinned her arms

to her chest. (Id. at 264-65.) Majors hit Alesandria a couple

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times on the side of the head and said, "I don't want to be mean to

you, so just do what I say," while Alesandria continued to scream

and cry. (Id. at 265.) 

Alesandria tried to kick Petitioner to get him off of her. 

(Id.) Majors asked her if she wanted to die, and she said, "yes,"

so he responded, "Okay, you are going to die." (Id.) Alesandria

continued kicking him, and he eventually said, "Okay, I will let

you go." (Id.) She tried to open the door to leave, and

Petitioner went to the front of the van and pushed a button to

unlock the doors. (Id. at 266.) Majors then said, "Get out

bitch," and Alesandria ran out of the van. (Id.) She ran to the

front of the mall to find a security guard, and she reported the

incident. (Id. at 267.)

Alesandria tentatively identified Petitioner as her attacker

in a photographic lineup. (Id. at 298-99.) A witness who

testified at trial also identified Majors as the man she saw

talking to Alesandria outside Petitioner's van. (Id. at 321-22.) 

Majors's fingerprint was found on one of Alesandria's receipts from

the Zany Brainy store. (Id. at 329-30.) On the day of

Petitioner's arrest, he was seen driving a white Dodge Caravan

registered to the United States Government. (Id. at 299.)

After his arrest, the police obtained a warrant to search

Majors's house and his Jeep Cherokee. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 1, 37-38, Nov. 2, 2000; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. Augment,

42, Feb. 22, 2001.) A search of the vehicle uncovered a canvas bag

containing a digital camera, a set of binoculars, a plastic penis,

an orange laminated card, and a pair of sunglasses. (Id. at 45-46;

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3, 300-01.) In Petitioner's home,

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the police found a black plastic toolbox containing three

pornographic magazines, a magnifying glass, a pair of women's

panties with the crotch ripped out, computer disks, and a smaller

box. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. Augment, 48-49.) Inside the

smaller box were videocassette tapes, a picture of a young Asian

woman, and several computer disks. (Id. at 51-52.) The police

seized these items. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 47,

Nov. 2, 2000.) One of the videotapes showed Petitioner having sex

with his ex-wife, inserting foreign objects into her vagina, and

orally copulating her while she was unconscious. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2, 133-34, Mar. 6, 2001.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2000, the San Diego County District Attorney

filed a nine-count information against Majors. The first four

counts allege crimes against Alesandria: count one -- kidnaping

for rape, see Cal. Penal Code § 209(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006), count

two -- kidnaping, see Cal. Penal Code § 207(a) (West Supp. 2006),

count three -- assault with intent to commit rape, see Cal. Penal

Code § 220 (West 1999), and count four -- false imprisonment, see

Cal. Penal Code §§ 236, 237(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006), all

relating to the attack on Alesandria. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 1, 1-2, Dec. 29, 2000.) The information also charged

Petitioner with crimes against his ex-wife: count five -- rape of

an unconscious person, see Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(4) (West Supp.

2006), count six -- oral copulation of an unconscious person, see

Cal. Penal Code § 288a(f) (West Supp. 2006), and three counts of

rape by a foreign object of an unconscious person, see Cal. Penal

Code § 289(d) (West Supp. 2006) (seven, eight and nine), arising

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from the assault on his ex-wife depicted on the videotape. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 1-3.)

Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss count one of the

information pursuant to California Penal Code section 995 for lack

of probable cause to believe that Majors committed the crime.

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 5, 10-11, Jan. 29, 2001.) The

motion was denied. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 334, Feb.

22, 2001.) Counsel also filed a motion to quash search warrant and

to suppress evidence, claiming the items found in the canvas bag in

Petitioner's Jeep and in the toolbox in his home were seized in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 1, 19-21.) The motion was granted as to the computer disks

but denied for the other items. (Id. at 47, Nov. 2, 2000; Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 335, Feb. 27, 2001.) 

Majors pleaded guilty to counts five through nine of the

information, which related to the sexual abuse of his ex-wife

depicted on the videotape. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1,

199-201, Mar. 2, 2001; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2, 41-42,

Mar. 2, 2001.) Petitioner was tried by a jury on the other counts. 

(See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 342, Mar. 7, 2001.) 

Defense counsel made a motion in limine to exclude the videotape

from trial, which the prosecution proposed to use to prove Majors's

propensity to commit sexual offenses. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 2, 340-41, Mar. 6, 2001; see Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol.

2, 82-83, Mar. 6, 2001.) The trial judge granted the motion to

exclude the videotape but ruled that evidence of the conduct

depicted on the tape could be admitted by other means. (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 341; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 2,

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187-88.) The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation of

facts concerning the events depicted on the tape and the testimony

Petitioner's ex-wife would give about the events if called as a

witness; the stipulation was read to the jury. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3, 293-94, Mar. 12, 2001.) 

At the close of the prosecution's evidence, Petitioner's

attorney made a motion for judgment of acquittal based on

California Penal Code section 1118.1, specifically challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence of Majors's intent to commit rape. 

(Id. at 331-33; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 346, Mar. 12,

2006.) The motion was denied. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

2, 346; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3, 335.) 

The jury convicted Petitioner on all four counts which related

to Alesandria. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 269-72, Mar.

14, 2001.) On May 3, 2001, Majors filed a motion for new trial on

counts one (kidnaping for rape) and three (assault with intent to

commit rape), claiming that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to support the verdicts. (Id. at 291-93, May 3, 2001;

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 4, 526-27, May 4, 2001.) The

motion was denied. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 4, 529.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole for count one. (Id. at 546.) The court

imposed the mid-term sentence for counts two, three, and four to

run concurrently with count one, and stayed those terms pursuant to

California Penal Code section 654. (Id.) The court also sentenced

Majors to eight years imprisonment for count five, to run

consecutively to the term for count one. (Id. at 547.) The midterm sentence of six years was imposed for each of the remaining

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counts, to run concurrently with count five. (Id.) Petitioner was

also ordered to pay a restitution fine of $5,000 and actual

restitution to the victims in an amount to be determined by the

court. (Id. at 547-48.) An additional $5,000 fine was suspended. 

(Id. at 548.)

Majors filed a notice of appeal on May 8, 2001. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 329, May 8, 2001.) On appeal, Petitioner

argued: (1) His Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the

police seized and viewed the videotapes; (2) the use of propensity

evidence at trial violated his right to due process and a fair

trial; (3) the court erred in admitting into evidence the conduct

displayed on the videotape; (4) the evidence was insufficient to

support a finding of intent to rape; (5) the court abused its

discretion in sentencing; (6) Majors's convictions for kidnaping

and false imprisonment must be vacated because they are lesserincluded offenses of kidnaping for rape; and (7) the evidence was

insufficient to support a kidnaping conviction. (Lodgment No. 3,

Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, 25, 27, 41, 44, 49, People v.

Majors, No. D037968 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002); Lodgment No. 4,

Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 1, People v. Majors, No. D037968

(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002).)

The California Court of Appeal reversed Petitioner's

convictions for kidnaping (count two) and kidnaping for rape (count

one) for insufficient evidence. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Majors,

No. D037968, slip op. at 23 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002).) The

court also held that the trial court erred in denying Majors's

motion to suppress the videotape, and directed the trial court to

allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty pleas to counts five

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through nine. (Id.) The judgment was affirmed in all other

respects, and the case was remanded for resentencing. (Id.) 

The Attorney General filed a petition for review with the

California Supreme Court, and the court granted review on the

question of "whether evidence that a victim entered a defendant's

vehicle under threat of arrest is sufficient to satisfy the force

or fear element of section 207(a) kidnaping." (Lodgment No. 8,

People v. Majors, No. S113086, slip op. at 5 (Cal. July 1, 2004);

see also Lodgment No. 7, People v. Majors, No. S11086, slip op. at

1 (Cal. Mar. 19, 2003).) The California Supreme Court reversed the

judgment of the court of appeal, finding there was sufficient

evidence to convict Majors of kidnaping and kidnaping for rape. 

(Lodgment No. 8, Majors, No. S113086, slip op. at 12, 17.) The

case was remanded to the court of appeal for further proceedings. 

(Id. at 17.) 

On remand from the supreme court, the appellate court reversed

Petitioner's convictions for kidnaping and false imprisonment

because they are lesser-included offenses of kidnaping for rape. 

(Lodgment No. 9, People v. Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 19, 23

(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2004).) The court again held that the trial

judge erred in denying Majors's motion to suppress the videotape,

and directed the trial court to let Majors withdraw his guilty plea

to counts five through nine. (Id. at 23.) The judgment was

otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for resentencing. 

(Id.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court, claiming there was insufficient evidence to prove

intent to rape and that the trial court committed error in

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admitting the stipulation about the conduct depicted on the

videotape. (Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review at 2, People v.

Majors, No. D037968 (Cal. Feb. 23, 2005).) The petition was

denied. (Lodgment No. 11, People v. Majors, No. S130373, slip op.

at 1 (Cal. Feb. 23, 2005).) 

The case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing. 

(See Pet'r's Mem. Ex. J at 1.) Majors moved to dismiss counts five

through nine, and the motion was granted. (Id. Ex. I at 1.) The

court sentenced Petitioner to the indeterminate term of life with

the possibility of parole for count one, and the mid-term of four

years for count three, which was stayed pursuant to California

Penal Code section 654. (Id. Ex. J at 1.)

On May 23, 2006, Majors filed his federal habeas corpus

Petition in this Court [doc. no. 1]. Petitioner was granted leave

to file additional points and authorities and exhibits to his

Petition, and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [doc. no. 6]

and Exhibits [doc. no. 7] were filed on July 20, 2006. Respondent

filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities [doc. no.

10] on October 5, 2006. On November 13, 2006, Majors filed a

Traverse [doc. no. 11].

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006), applies to all federal

habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326

(1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Majors's Petition was filed on May 23, 2006,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 2006). 

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882,

885 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that federal courts have no

authority to review a state's application of its law). Federal

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courts may grant habeas relief only to correct errors of federal

constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395,

1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned

with errors of state law unless they rise to the level of a

constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71 (citation omitted). A federal court is

not required to review the state court decision de novo. Id.

Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness

analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty" in § 2254(d)(1) is "the reference to 'Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law." 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. "[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,' an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996). Ninth

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Circuit case law "may be persuasive authority for purposes of

determining whether a particular state court decision is an

'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help

us determine what law is 'clearly established.'" Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing MacFarlane v.

Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999); O'Brien v. Dubois, 145

F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998)). 

With respect to the factual findings of the trial court, AEDPA

provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West Supp. 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

Majors claims that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

process was violated when he was convicted on insufficient

evidence. (Pet. 6.) He asserts that the evidence was insufficient

to prove he intended to commit rape, which is a necessary element

of his convictions for kidnaping to commit rape and assault with

intent to commit rape. (Id.) Petitioner also claims his right to

due process was violated when the trial court admitted illegally

seized evidence. (Id. at 10.) The California Court of Appeal

found that videotapes admitted into evidence had been illegally

seized but found the error to be harmless. (Id.) Majors argues

the error was not harmless, and the court's finding of harmless

error was an unreasonable application of Chapman v. California. 

(Id.; Pet'r's Mem. 15.) 

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In deciding a § 2254 habeas petition, this Court reviews the

"last reasoned" state court decision. Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d

872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The California Supreme Court summarily

denied Majors's petition for review. (Lodgment No. 11, Majors, No.

S130373, slip op. at 1.) Therefore, this Court "looks through"

that dismissal to the California Court of Appeal's decision of

December 1, 2004, after remand from the supreme court on

Petitioner's direct appeal. Medina, 386 F.3d at 877.

A. Majors Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief Because His

Convictions Were Supported by Sufficient Evidence of Specific

Intent to Rape.

Majors claims the evidence produced at trial was insufficient

to prove that he acted with the intent to commit rape. (Pet. 6;

Pet'r's Mem. 15.) According to Petitioner, the evidence more

clearly shows that he intended to commit some other sex offense,

such as rape by foreign object. (Pet. 6; Pet'r's Mem. 15; Traverse

4.) Thus, Majors asserts that the court of appeal's decision to

uphold his convictions for kidnaping for rape and assault with the

intent to commit rape involved an unreasonable application of

federal law. (Pet. 6.)

Under AEDPA, a writ for federal habeas relief shall not be

granted unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of" Supreme Court precedent or

"resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

[A] state court decision is 'contrary to [the Supreme

Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

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forth in [the Court's] cases' or 'if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . . 

precedent.'

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A

state court unreasonably applies federal law if its application is

"objectively unreasonable," which is "more than [being] incorrect

or erroneous." Id. at 75.

The Due Process Clause protects a criminal defendant from

conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When challenging a

conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, the constitutional

standard established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia is

"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Smith

v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

Petitioner argues the California Court of Appeal's decision is

not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because the

court did not cite Jackson or make any specific reference to the

federal standard for determining sufficiency of the evidence. 

(Pet'r's Mem. 16; Traverse 3-4.) Petitioner's reliance on Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999), is misplaced. 

(Traverse 4.) Hiivala discusses exhaustion, whether the Petitioner

fairly presented a federal constitutional claim to the state

courts, not whether the state courts applied a rule consistent with

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clearly established Supreme Court law. A state court's opinion is

entitled to deference under AEDPA so long as the court applies a

rule that does not contradict the governing law set forth by the

Supreme Court. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citing

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). This "does not

require citation of [the Supreme Court's] cases -- indeed, it does

not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts them." Id. 

The court of appeal explained the standard it applied as

follows: 

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

support the verdict, we review the entire record, viewing

the evidence most favorably to the judgment and presuming

in support of the verdict the existence of every fact the

jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. The

issue is whether the record so viewed discloses evidence

that is reasonable, credible, and of sufficient solid

value to permit a rational trier of fact to find the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Lodgment No. 9, Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 18.) This is in

line with the federal standard established in Jackson. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 (holding that evidence is insufficient to

support a conviction when, based on the record viewed in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could

have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, the state

appellate court correctly identified the governing law as set forth

by the Supreme Court.

"Our task under AEDPA, then, is to determine whether the

decision of the California Court of Appeal, holding that the

evidence was sufficient to convict [Majors], was an unreasonable

application of Jackson." Smith, 437 F.3d at 889 (citing 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(d); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir.

2005)). "The Jackson inquiry does not focus on whether the trier

of fact made the correct guilt or innocence determination, but

rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or acquit." 

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). 

To determine whether the state court's application of Jackson

was unreasonable, the Court must look to state law to determine the

substantive elements of the crime necessary to support a

conviction. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Panther v. Hames, 991

F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1993). Kidnaping for rape and assault with

intent to commit rape are specific intent crimes under California

law. People v. Dominguez, 39 Cal. 4th 1141, 1151, 140 P.3d 866,

873, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 583 (2006); People v. Deporceri, 106

Cal. App. 4th 60, 68, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 2003)

(citations omitted). A defendant can only be convicted of these

offenses if he acted with the specific intent to rape the victim. 

"This specific intent element is sufficiently met when the

defendant sets out to 'use whatever force is required to complete

the sexual act against the will of the victim.'" People v.

Bradley, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1154, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 283

(Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Greene, 34 Cal. App. 3d 622,

648, 110 Cal. Rptr. 160, 177 (Ct. App. 1973)). "The question

whether the intent existed is one for the jury to determine from

the conduct of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances." 

Greene, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (citations

omitted). 

The court of appeal found the jury had sufficient evidence to

conclude that Majors intended to rape Alesandria. (See Lodgment

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No. 9, Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 19.) The court stated: "A

jury could reasonably conclude that at least one of Majors's

intents in gaining control of Alesandria was to rape her after the

van parked in the shopping mall." (Id.) The question before this

Court is whether the appellate court's determination was an

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Juan H., 408

F.3d at 1274-75. 

The facts presented at trial, viewed favorably to the

prosecution, show that Majors pretended to be a security guard in

order to get Alesandria inside his van. (See Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3, 245-48.) He then drove to an isolated location

in the mall parking lot, far away from any cars or pedestrians. 

(Id. at 254.) Petitioner would not let Alesandria get out of the

car; when she tried, he pulled her hair and slammed her head

against the window. (Id. at 260.) He ordered her to get in the

back of the van, then grabbed her and threw her down on the back

seat. (Id. at 261.) Majors held her shoulders and hands and

pushed her, forcing her to lay down on the seat. (Id. at 264.) He

then straddled Alesandria while pinning her arms to her chest so

she could not move. (Id. at 264-65.) Majors told Alesandria to

cooperate so he would not have to hurt her. (Id. at 265.) 

The jury was instructed that to convict Petitioner of

kidnaping for rape or assault with intent to rape it must find he

specifically intended to commit the crime of rape. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 233, 241, Mar. 14, 2001; Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 3, 229, 232, 235.) Rape was defined as "an act of

sexual intercourse with another person who is not the spouse of the

perpetrator accomplished against that person's will . . . ." 

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(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 244.) Thus, the jury was

instructed that to convict Petitioner of kidnaping for rape or

assault with intent to rape, the jurors must find Majors intended

to have sexual intercourse with Alesandria against her will. 

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge,

stating, "We need clarification of rape, specifically of sexual

intercourse. Does 'sexual penetration' mean by any object?" (Id.

at 349, Mar. 13, 2001.) The judge responded: "No. Sexual

intercourse as it is referenced in the jury instruction carries its

commonly understood meaning of penetration of the female sex organ

by the male sex organ." (Id.) The jury later sent another note to

the judge asking, "'Sexual Offense' as defined in the jury

instructions under 'Evidence of other sexual offenses' states:

'Rape of an unconscience [sic] person with a foreign object.' Can

rape be performed in some instances with a foreign object[?]" (Id.

at 353.) The judge responded: "No. The crime of Rape, which

involves 'sexual intercourse' as we have defined that term, is

defined in Section 261 of the Penal Code." (Id.) The trial court

distinguished the crime of rape by a foreign object from the crime

of rape, pointing out that they are separate offenses and are

defined in different sections of the Penal Code. (Id.) 

These questions focus on the distinction between intent to

rape and intent to commit some other sexual offense. By asking

questions about the precise definition of rape, the jurors

demonstrated they were trying to determine whether Petitioner's

actions showed intent to commit that particular offense. The jury

considered and deliberated on whether Majors's intent was to rape

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Alesandria or to rape her by a foreign object, and it ultimately

concluded Petitioner intended to commit rape.

While admitting that the evidence shows he intended to assault

the victim, Petitioner claims it was insufficient to show he

intended to commit rape "as opposed to committing some other sexual

offense, such as digital penetration or rape with a foreign

object." (Pet'r's Mem. 15.) He asserts that his actions in the

van do not show intent to rape because he did not unbutton his

pants, which would be necessary to commit rape. (Id.; Traverse 4.) 

Majors also argues that the dildo found in his Jeep Cherokee "made

it more likely the petitioner intended to commit rape by a foreign

object or digital penetration." (Traverse 4; see also Pet'r's Mem.

15-16.) The crimes with which he is charged, however, took place

in the van, not the Jeep.

Intent to rape is commonly found where a defendant removes the

victim's clothing, exposes himself, or grabs the victim's breasts

or genitals. See, e.g., Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 290 (8th

Cir. 2004) (stating the act of removing a victim's clothing

corroborates an intent to rape); People v. Craig, 25 Cal. App. 4th

1593, 1601, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 101 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding

intent to rape where defendant forcibly grabbed victim and "placed

one of his hands under her clothing[]"). But these actions are not

necessary to find intent to rape. See, e.g., Smith v. Hart, No.

90-3361-RDR, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7254, at *6-7 (D. Kan. May 14,

1993) (upholding jury's finding of intent to rape when defendant

assaulted victim and tried to drag her into a bedroom but did not

remove her clothes or touch her sexually). When presented with

evidence that Majors forced Alesandria to lie on her back, pinned

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her arms down and straddled her after impersonating a security

guard to get her in his van, a reasonable jury could find that he

intended to commit rape, even though he did not unbutton his pants.

 The presence of a plastic penis in a different vehicle,

months later, did not prevent the jury from reasonably finding

intent to rape. One California court held that a vibrator in the

shape of a penis found in the possession of a defendant at the time

of the assault was evidence of "sexual motivation" rather than

intent to rape. People v. Puckett, 44 Cal. App. 3d 607, 614 & n.5,

118 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 & n.5 (Ct. App. 1975). Here, however, the

plastic penis was found in Majors's possession when he was arrested

two months after the assault. Alesandria did not testify to seeing

a plastic penis in Majors's possession during the assault. The

existence of the plastic penis does not undermine the jury's

finding that Petitioner intended to commit rape.

The jury was presented with evidence that Majors has a

propensity to commit sexual offenses, including rape. Majors

admits that his prior offenses against his ex-wife, which were

presented at trial via stipulation, showed an intent to commit rape

in addition to other offenses. (Pet'r's Mem. 15.) It is clear

that the jury considered evidence of the prior rape because it

directly referenced the evidence in a note sent to the judge. The

jury's note asked, "Did the crime of which the defendant was

previously found guilty include 'sexual intercourse' as defined in

the answer to the first question[?]" (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 2, 354, Mar. 13, 2001.) The judge answered, "Yes, one of the

crimes did, in violation of Penal Code section 261. She (his

former wife) was unconscious at the time of sexual intercourse." 

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(Id.) Thus, the jury knew that Majors had previously committed

rape and considered this evidence in reaching its conclusion that

Petitioner had the requisite intent. 

The Court "must respect the province of the jury to determine

the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and

draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the

jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict." 

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United

States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 515 (9th Cir. 1986)). After

hearing the testimony of the victim, learning of Majors's prior

sexual offenses, and hearing all other evidence presented at trial,

the jury found Petitioner possessed the intent to rape. There is

sufficient evidence in the record to support that conclusion. 

Although intent to commit rape, rather than some other sexual

offense, was not the only possible interpretation of the evidence

presented, it was one rational interpretation. That is all that is

required under Jackson. See Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 889

(stating the standard as "'whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements'"). Therefore, the California

Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply Jackson in affirming

Petitioner’s convictions for kidnaping to commit rape and assault

with intent to commit rape. Majors's claim of insufficient

evidence should be DENIED.

B. Majors’s Fourth Amendment Claim Is Not Cognizable on Federal

Habeas Review.

Petitioner's second claim for relief is that he was denied due 

process of law and a fair trial when evidence of the sexual assault

on his ex-wife was admitted into evidence to prove his propensity

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to commit rape. (Pet. 10; Pet'r's Mem. 13.) The California Court

of Appeal held that the videotape depicting the assault on his exwife was illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and

accordingly, it ordered that Petitioner be allowed to withdraw his

guilty pleas to counts five through nine of the information. 

(Lodgment No. 9, Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 11, 23.) The

court found, however, that the admission of the stipulation about

those offenses at trial as propensity evidence was harmless error

under People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956), and

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). (Id. at 18.) 

Majors claims the state court erred in holding that admission of

the evidence was harmless error, asserting that "the evidence had a

substantial and injurious impact upon the jury, and was therefore

prejudicial under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)." 

(Pet. 10.) 

Brecht, however, does not require a different result. "[The

Watson] standard under California state law is the equivalent of

the Brecht standard under federal law, to wit, whether the errors

had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict." Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).

Even so, "[a] Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in

federal habeas proceedings if a petitioner has had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the claim in state court." Ortiz-Sandoval

v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)). The Supreme Court, in Stone v.

Powell, weighed the utility of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary

rule against the benefits of barring these claims from federal

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habeas review. The Court reasoned that the "long-recognized costs

of the rule persist when a criminal conviction is sought to be

overturned on collateral review . . . ." Stone, 428 U.S. at 491. 

Therefore, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at his trial." Id. at 494. "The relevant inquiry is

whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was

correctly decided." Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 899 (citations

omitted). 

Majors admits that Stone v. Powell bars federal habeas review

of Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims when the petitioner

has had a full and fair hearing on the issue in state court. 

(Traverse 5.) But Petitioner argues that his claim is not barred

because he is not challenging the merits of the state court's

determination, but rather he is raising a "separate constitutional

issue arising from the prejudice of the admission of the illegally

seized evidence." (Id.) Majors claims the court of appeal

committed constitutional error, separate and distinct from its

decision about the illegal search and seizure, when it found that

admission of the stipulation was harmless error. (Id.; Pet'r's

Mem. 14.) 

Several district courts have found that claims like the one

presented by Majors are not cognizable on habeas review. See,

e.g., Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1284 (N.D. Okla.

2006); Mena v. Greiner, No. 01 Civ. 1358(DAB), 2002 WL 31867723, at

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*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2002); McCambridge v. Hall, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1,

3-4 (D. Mass. 1999); Bastardo v. Marshall, No. Civ. A. 93-40099-

NMG, 1997 WL 667785, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 1997). The courts in

McCambridge and Bastardo specifically rejected the argument

presented by Majors that error in the state court's harmlessness

analysis is separate from the underlying Fourth Amendment error:

A state court's determination of harmlessness, even if

incorrect, does not constitute a violation of a

constitutional right. Such a determination is not

independent of the underlying error. The analysis of

harmless error by the state appellate court is part of

that court's view of a defendant's claim that his

conviction was improper because of the state trial

court's failure to suppress evidence.

. . .

Review of a state court's determination of harmless

error where the underlying error involves the Fourth

Amendment is, for all practical purposes, the equivalent

of reviewing a claimed Fourth Amendment violation. . . .

This is exactly what the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell

sought to prevent.

McCambridge, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (quoting Bastardo, 1997 WL 667785,

at *2).

The Third Circuit discussed in great depth whether Stone "bars

federal habeas corpus review of a state court's determination that

a violation of the habeas petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights

constituted harmless error." See Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 52

(3d Cir. 1986). The petitioner in Gilmore argued that he was

denied due process when the state court found admission of a

confession obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be

harmless error. Id. at 54. The federal court rejected Gilmore's

claim, finding, "[a] habeas claim based on a state court's

determination that the introduction of evidence from a Fourth

Amendment violation was harmless error is inseparable from the

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underlying Fourth Amendment claim." Id. at 55. "Thus, for

purposes of the Stone v. Powell rule, a habeas petitioner's claim

that a state appellate court improperly found a Fourth Amendment

violation to be harmless does not have a separate identity and may

not be raised in a habeas petition in federal court." Id. A

"petitioner may not cloak his or her Fourth Amendment claim in due

process clothing to circumvent Stone v. Powell." Id. at 57.

Majors's Fourth Amendment claim was fully and fairly litigated

in state court. Petitioner filed a motion in the trial court,

seeking to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence

obtained as fruit of the illegal search. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 19-21.) Majors received a hearing on the

motion which included extensive oral argument as well as

examination of a witness, Detective Jana Beard. (See Lodgment No.

2, Rep.'s Tr. Augment, 10-75.) The court granted the motion in

part and excluded seized computer disks from use at trial. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 2, 335.) 

Petitioner's claim was also fully litigated on appeal. Majors

argued to the California Court of Appeal that his Fourth Amendment

right to be free from illegal search and seizure was violated when

the police seized and viewed the videotapes. (Lodgment No. 3,

Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, Majors, No. D037968 (Cal. Ct. App.

Dec. 13, 2002).) The court thoroughly considered the issue,

devoting eight pages of its reasoned opinion to this claim, and

agreed with Petitioner that the evidence was obtained illegally. 

(Lodgment No. 6, Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 4-11.) As a

result, the court ordered that Majors be allowed to withdraw his

guilty pleas to the offenses that were only discovered by viewing

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the videotapes. (Id. at 23.) On remand after review by the

supreme court, the appellate court again examined Petitioner's

Fourth Amendment claim and held that the evidence was illegally

obtained. (Lodgment No. 9, Majors, No. D037968, slip op. at 4-11.) 

Although the court ultimately held that the trial court's

admission of the stipulation was harmless error, Majors was given a

full and fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim. This Court is

therefore barred by Stone v. Powell from re-examining issues

relating to the seizure of the videotape. See Agee v. White, 809

F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a state court's

harmlessness analysis "constituted a full and fair appellate

litigation, foreclosing the claim from federal habeas review")

(citations omitted); accord McDaniel v. Oklahoma, 582 F.2d 1242,

1244 (10th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th

Cir. 1977).

Under Stone, a state appellate court's application of the

harmless error doctrine, even if applied incorrectly, does not

entitle a petitioner to federal habeas relief. Mack v. Cupp, 564

F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1977); Cole v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 1164, 1165

(5th Cir. 1977); see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321

(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "correctness of the state court

resolution" of the Fourth Amendment claim is "an issue which Stone

v. Powell makes irrelevant"). Even if this Court were to

distinguish Stone and consider Petitioner's complaint about the

state court's harmless error analysis, Majors is not entitled to

relief. The California Court of Appeal did not "appl[y] harmlesserror review in an 'objectively unreasonable' manner." Mitchell v.

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1 Majors twice raises the spectre of the cumulative effect of

the constitutional error. "The combined effect of the evidence,

jury instructions, and argument by the prosecution concerning

evidence that was based upon the illegally seized videotapes had a

substantial and injurious effect upon the jury . . . ." (Pet'r's

Mem. 15; Traverse 7.) Petitioner did not raise a cumulative error

claim in the state courts. If he had, he would fare no better. 

Because Major's Fourth Amendment claim is not independent of his

harmless error claim, Stone v. Powell precludes habeas relief. See

Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.3d at 55-56. Likewise, his complaint about

the related jury instructions and argument by the prosecution meets

the same fate. As a result, there are no cognizable errors to

combine.

K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\MAJORS1126\R&R.wpd 28 06cv1126-BTM (RBB)

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003). Petitioner's second claim is thus

precluded from federal habeas review under Stone v. Powell.1 

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the district court should DENY Majors's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 12, 2007. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 26, 2007. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: December 21, 2006 ______________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Moskowitz

All parties of record

Case 3:06-cv-01126-BTM-RBB Document 12 Filed 12/20/06 Page 28 of 28