Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00072/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00072-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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- 1 - 05CV0072

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF SAN

DIEGO; JOANN REED; and MILTON

RODGERS, JAMEL RODGERS and

ANTWAN RAMSEY, minors, by their

guardian ad litem, JOANN REED,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05CV0072-LAB (CAB)

ORDER RE POST-TRIAL

MOTIONS

vs. [Dkt Nos. 100, 102, 104]

PEÑASQUITOS CASABLANCA

OWNER’S ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

On February 20, 2007, the court convened the hearing of the post-trial motions in this matter.

Christopher Brancart, Esq. appeared for plaintiff Joann Reed. Jim Treglio, Esq. appeared for plaintiff

Fair Housing Council. GregoryC.Kane, Esq. appeared for defendant Penasquitos Casablanca Owner's

Association ("PCOA"). Each side opposed the other's motions. For the reasons discussed on the

record, memorialized herein, plaintiffs' Motion For Injunctive Relief is DENIED, defendant's Motion

For Judgment As A Matter Of Law is GRANTED, but only to the extent of the finding a $25,000 civil

penalty award is unavailable to individual plaintiffs under the Bane Act, and plaintiffs' Motion To

Amend The Pleadings To Conform To Evidence At Trial (converting the Bane Act foundation for the

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 110 Filed 02/21/07 Page 1 of 6
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awarded civil penalty to a Ralph Act foundation) is GRANTED, preserving the $25,000 civil penalty

the jury awarded as a component of the verdict on that modified basis. 

This case was tried on plaintiffs' civil rights and housing discrimination theories against

defendant the Penasquitos Casablanca Owner's Association ("PCOA") for their conduct or omissions

contributing to the sexual harassment of plaintiff Reed, then a Casablanca condominium complex

resident, by a premises security guard PCOA employed. Multiple claims initiallypledwere abandoned

before trial. The jury deliberated on the federal Fair Housing and the state civil rights and fair housing

claims (Unruh Act and Bane Act). The jury's January 11, 2007 verdict found liability under the Fair

Housing claims, both state and federal, the Unruh Act (CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9. Sexual Harassment),

and the Bane Act (CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, interference by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the

exercise or enjoyment of individual rights secured by federal or state Constitutions or laws). The jury's

verdict awarded to Reed $10,000 in total compensatory damages, $12,000 in statutory damages under

the Unruh Civil Rights Act, statutory damages in the amount of $25,000 under the Bane Act, and $500

in compensatory damages to the Fair Housing Council. The parties filed post-trial motions.

 Plaintiffs move for additional relief in the form of injunctions to require the PCOA, for a

period of four years, to take specific actions to refrain from engaging in unlawful discrimination or

harassment in housing rental, to impose fair housing training obligations on the volunteer members

of the PCOA board, to post at the condominium complex premises a HUD equal housing opportunity

poster, to require the PCOA to promulgate and require its employees to review a sexual harassment

policy, and to report yearly to the Fair Housing Counsel its compliance with the terms of the

injunctions. While injunctive relief can be a proper remedy in the fair housing context, the court is

not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law, and under general

principles for equitable relief, any such relief should be targeted to the particular conduct or omission

giving rise to the particular violation of fair housing laws. 

As is more fully recited on the record, the court finds as Ms. Reed no longer resides at the

Casablanca condominium complex, she would not benefit from any injunctive relief imposed against

the PCOA. In contrast to the defendant in Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1999), the court

also finds PCOA has no involvement in the business of renting housing or determining who may be

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 110 Filed 02/21/07 Page 2 of 6
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- 3 - 05CV0072

a tenant through prohibited discriminatory criteria or in any manner, rendering the requested injunctive

relief too remote from any conduct or remedial need established at trial. Moreover, plaintiffs'

unpublished authority in support of its Motion is distinguishable in that the courts there were

approving injunctive relief the parties themselves had fashioned into a consent decree. In addition,

the court has expressed reservations throughout this litigation that the unique circumstances of the

conduct giving rise to this lawsuit make it a close call whether the case even falls within fair housing

policies and statues, including the federal fair housing law upon which federal jurisdiction was

predicated. The circumstances certainly fall outside the arena of the usual fair housing cases. The

facts of this case reveal no endemic or even isolated discriminatory practice rectifiable by a mandatory

injunction of the kind plaintiffs seek. The PCOA does not engage in offering housing, conditioning

tenancies on any criteria, or perpetuating particular tenancies. The court is unable to articulate any

purpose related to the substance of this case to be served by granting any of the aspects of the

injunctions requested. Finally, "[i]n each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury

and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief."

Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). The PCOA board

is a voluntary group whose service should not be unnecessarily burdened with requirements remote

from their responsibilities predicated on an isolated instance of sexual harassment by a now-former

employee unrelated to any condition of housing targeted by traditional fair housing concerns.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Injunctive Relief is accordingly DENIED.

The PCOA moves for judgment as a matter of law that the Bane Act does not support the jury's

award of a $25,000 civil penalty when the prevailing plaintiff is an individual as opposed to a

government entity or official. There is no dispute this case was nominally tried under the Bane Act,

and only after the trial and the jury's award of the statutory penalty has the PCOA demonstrated such

an award is unavailable to these private plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now acknowledge they are not entitled

to any civil penalty award under the Bane Act. The PCOA is manifestly correct the $25,000 civil

penalty award cannot stand as a matter of law if predicated on the Bane Act, and to that extent the

motion is GRANTED.

/ / /

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1

 Rule 15(b) provides (emphasis added): "(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated

in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be

necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of

any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these

issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,

the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits

of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission

of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. . . ."

2

 Rule 54(c) provides, in pertinent part (emphasis added): ". . . "Except as to a party against whom

a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor

it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings." In this

case, plaintiffs expressly demanded the statutory penalty relief in their prayer for relief, but under a statutory

provision that does not allow for that recovery (i.e., the Bane Act): "2. Awards statutory damages to each

plaintiff against each defendant pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Bane Civil Rights Act. . . "

Compl. 9:22-23. 

- 4 - 05CV0072

However, as part of their opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiffs identify a different

statutory basis for their claim, the Ralph Act, which does provide for a $25,000 civil penalty to a

prevailing private litigant. They move to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, in the form

of denominating the Ralph Act rather than the Bane Act as the foundation for the jury's award of a

$25,000 civil penalty. The court elects to reach the merits of that motion, although the briefing

schedule set for post-trial motions makes the motion technically late. The first explication of the Bane

Act civil penalty problem was presented in the PCOA's motion, and plaintiffs admit they had not

caught the eligibility impediment to the civil penalty award they sought under the Bane Act. 

Plaintiffs rely on FED.R.CIV.P. ("Rules") 15(b) and 54(c) in support of their Motion to avoid

striking the statutory penalty award that would occur if the court grants the PCOA's Motion For

Judgment As A Matter Of Law without recharacterizing the Bane Act claim as a Ralph Act claim.

They ask the court to "construe the pleadings as amended pursuant to Rule 15(b)[

1

] to state a claim

under the Ralph Act, Civil Code § 51.7, providing for imposition of the $25,000 penalty" or "in the

alternative, the Court should sustain the jury's $25,000 award as relief to which plaintiff is entitled

pursuant to Rule 54(c)."2 Opp./Mot. 15:15-19. Plaintiffs support their arguments with authority

demonstrating Bane Act cases and Ralph Act cases have been sometimes loosely treated by litigants

and courts as associated with the Unruh Civil Rights Act, with the technical distinctions not always

clearly delineated. See, e.g., Stamps v. Superior Court, 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449-50 (2006) (an

/ / /

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employment discrimination case discussing and distinguishing Bane Act and Ralph Act civil rights

actions from Unruh Civil Rights actions). 

Plaintiffs contend: "The primary difference between the Ralph Act and the Bane Act is that

the Ralph Act requires that the intimidation by threat of violence be committed against persons or

property because of their membership in a protected class" (Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a)), whereas "the

Bane Act does not limit its protection to specific protected classes -- it extends protection to all persons

whose state or federal rights are violated, regardless of their membership in a protected class" (Cal.

Civ. Code § 52.1(a)). Opp./Mot. 7:21-27. Plaintiffs argue in this case "the same evidence establishing

the threat of violence in violation of the Bane Act established the threat of violence and acts of

intimidation under the Ralph Act" because the conduct involved sexual harassment in violation of the

Fair Housing Act and FEHA, necessarily implicating the protected class status of sex or gender.

Opp./Mot. 8:5-11. They conclude "the nature of the federal and state laws interfered with here

necessarily imported a 'because of sex' requirement into the Bane Act Violation," supported by jury

instructions, warranting construction as de facto a Ralph Act claim. Opp./Mot. 8:24-2 . As Reed

prevailed on her allegations of the underlying misconduct, plaintiffs argue she is entitled to the civil

penalty award available to her under the Ralph Act, and the pleading should be amended to save that

award by replacing the Bane Act citation with the Ralph Act citation, with the trial construed as having

actually proceeded under the Ralph Act. 

The court finds, as plaintiffs argue, there was no seriously erroneous result in the award of the

$25,000 civil penalty because the evidence and prosecution of this case were adequate to support a

finding for plaintiffs under either the Bane Act or the Ralph Act, and it was contemplated throughout

the proceedings that if liability were found from the underlying conduct, the jury was to award a

$25,000 statutory civil penalty, which it did. The court finds the case was tried in substance as sexual

harassment, with the violation proved to the satisfaction of the jury and with no reversibly erroneous

result as to liability. Accordingly, the court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion to conform the pleading to

the evidence and to substitute the designation of the Ralph Act for the pleading-denominated Bane Act

theory of recovery. A $25,000 civil penalty is available to a prevailing individual plaintiff under the

Ralph Act. Accordingly, the jury's civil penalty award will not be disturbed.

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For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion For Injunctive Relief is DENIED.

2. Defendant's Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law to acknowledge no $25,000

civil penalty is available to private persons suing under the Bane Act is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend The Pleading is GRANTED, to substitute for the

denominated Bane Act claim a denominated Ralph Act claim.

4. Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a [Proposed] Judgment reflecting the jury's verdict and

the results of the parties' Post-Trial Motions. The parties shall meet and confer regarding the content

of the [Proposed] Judgment, including the amount of the attorneys' fee award to which the prevailing

plaintiffs are entitled, the agreed amount of which shall be incorporated in to the [Proposed] Judgment.

5. Should the parties fail to agree upon the amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees award, the

court anticipates it will refer any such dispute to Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo for a

facilitated agreement or, failing that result, for a Report and Recommendation on the issue of the

amount of an appropriate attorneys' fees award.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 21, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 110 Filed 02/21/07 Page 6 of 6