Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02911/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02911-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2911

___________

Voyageurs National Park Association; * 

Sierra Club; Help Our Wolves Live; * 

Humane Society of the United States; * 

Superior Wilderness Action Network; * 

Minnesota Wolf Alliance; Minnesotans * 

for Responsible Recreation; Defenders * 

of Wildlife, * 

* 

Appellants, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the * 

Interior; Fran P. Mainella, Director, * 

National Park Service; Steven A. * 

Williams, Director, U.S. Fish and * 

Wildlife Service; United States * 

Department of the Interior, * 

* 

Appellees, * 

* 

Minnesota United Snowmobilers * 

Association, * 

* 

Intervenor Below. *

___________

Submitted: May 14, 2004

Filed: August 25, 2004

___________

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1

 The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge, and DORR,1

 District Judge.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Voyageurs National Park Association ("the Association") appeals the grant of

summary judgment to the National Park Service ("Park Service") on the Association's

complaint seeking to enjoin the Park Service's decision to open eleven bays of the

Voyageurs National Park to recreational snowmobile use. The Association, utilizing

the Administrative Procedure Act, seeks review of the Park Service's decision

allowing expanded snowmobile use during the winter of 2000-2001. The Park

Service's decision was made pursuant to a Park Service regulation that opened certain

areas of the Park to snowmobiling (including the eleven frozen bays at issue in this

case), and which also gave the Park Service the authority to temporarily close trails

for various safety and environmental reasons. 36 C.F.R. §7.33(b). The Association

claims that the 2001 decision violated the Park Service's rule-making requirements,

the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act. The

Association also argues that the district court2

 committed reversible error in its refusal

to permit discovery in this case. We affirm.

I. Background

Voyageurs National Park, which lies in the southern part of the Canadian

Shield, was created by a 1971 act of Congress. The Park received its name from a

group of French-Canadian canoe-men, known as "voyageurs," who traveled its waters

in their birch-bark canoes from the Great Lakes to the interior of the western United

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3

 Of Minnesota's famed "10,000 Lakes," more than thirty of them form the

freshwater base and boundaries of the Park. The Park contains all or part of four large

lakes (Rainy, Sand Point, Namakan, and Kabetogama), each of which contains many

bays and inlets.

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States and Canada.3

 A vast wilderness area, Voyageurs is home to some of

Minnesota's most endangered wildlife, including the gray wolf and the bald eagle.

The Park also provides a recreational resource for boaters, campers, hikers, anglers,

cross-country skiers, snowshoers, ice-fishermen, and snowmobilers.

Congress delegated certain regulatory authority to the Park Service by which

it can control visitor access and use of Voyageurs. Two of these Park Service

regulations–36 C.F.R. §§ 1.5 and 7.33–are implicated in this appeal. The first, § 1.5

is a general regulation applicable to all units of the National Park System while the

second, § 7.33, is a more narrow regulation that specifically governs snowmobiling

at Voyageurs. 

Section 7.33, promulgated in 1991, designated certain areas of Voyageurs as

available for snowmobile use. Those areas include "[t]he frozen waters of Rainy,

Kabetogama, Namakan, Mukooda, Little Trout and Sand Point Lakes." 36 C.F.R. §

7.33(b)(1)(i). The regulation further provided that the park's superintendent "may

determine yearly opening and closing dates for snowmobile use, and temporarily

close trails or lake surfaces, taking into consideration public safety, wildlife

management, weather, and park management objectives . . . ." 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(3).

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4 See, e.g., Voyageurs Regional National Park Assoc. v. Lujan, No. 4-9-434,

1991 WL 343370, slip op. (D. Minn. 1991) (Voyageurs I); aff'd by 966 F.2d 424 (8th

Cir. 1992) (Voyageurs II); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F.Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996)

(Mausolf I); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996) (Mausolf II); Mausolf

v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997) (Mausolf III). 

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Much litigation followed the passage of § 7.33.4

 Indeed, the Association

immediately brought suit challenging the regulation and seeking to enjoin the Park

Service from opening the designated areas to snowmobiling. In resolving the dispute,

we held that neither the Park Service's regulations permitting snowmobiling nor the

ultimate decision to open areas of Voyageurs to snowmobiling were arbitrary or

capricious. Voyageurs Regional National Park Assoc. v. Lujan 966 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.

1992) (Voyageurs II). 

However, in December of 1992, the Park Service–in an exercise of its authority

under § 7.33–temporarily closed seventeen of Voyageurs's bays to snowmobiling.

The Park Service renewed these closures for the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995

snowmobiling seasons. In 1994, the Park Service was again sued. This time the suit

was brought by a group of snowmobilers, including the Minnesota United

Snowmobiling Association. The suit alleged that the bay closures were improper and

legally defective. Once again, an appeal came to this court. We determined that the

Park Service's actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125

F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997) (Mausolf III). We also noted that the closures were only

temporary and, thus, annual renewal was required in order for the closure to remain

effective. Id.

In 1996, the Park Service reopened six of Voyageurs seventeen lake-bays to

snowmobile use, but eleven of the bays remained closed. However, in 2001, these

eleven bays were reopened to snowmobilers. Upon reopening, the Park Service

reserved the right to limit the use of motorized-winter sports in the bays for safety

reasons or to promote other interests of park management.

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Over a decade after the Park Service initially passed snowmobiling regulations,

the litigation over these regulations' meaning and implementation continues. In this

latest case, the Association argues that because snowmobiling may harm the baldeagle and the gray-wolf populations, the eleven bays that were closed between 1996

and 2001 should remain closed to snowmobiling. As to the relief the Association

seeks, it requests that we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in the

Park Service's favor and asks us to remand with direction to order these eleven bays

closed to winter recreational use. In the alternative, the Association asks that it be

granted limited discovery and the district court decision be vacated for further

proceedings. 

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal

standards used by the district court. Darst-Webbe Tenant Assoc. Bd. v. St. Louis

Housing Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2003). Judicial review of administrative

decisions is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Under the APA, our review of an agency decision is limited. We are only permitted

to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Our review standard

requires that we give "agency decisions a high degree of deference." Sierra Club v.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 252 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2001).

We review whether the agency's decision was "based on consideration of the

relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). If an agency’s

determination is supportable on any rational basis, we must uphold it. Friends of

Richard-Gebaur Airport v. FAA, 251 F.3d 1178, 1184 (8th Cir. 2001). This is

especially true when an agency is acting within its own sphere of expertise. Friends

of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1128 (8th Cir. 1999)

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("[w]hen the resolution of the dispute involves primarily issues of fact and analysis

of the relevant information requires a high level of technical expertise, we must defer

to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.") (citations omitted).

B. National Environmental Policy Act

The Association argues that the Park Service failed to conduct a proper

National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") review prior to its decision to reopen

the eleven bays that had been closed from 1996 until 2001. The NEPA requires all

federal agencies, including the Park Service, to prepare an environmental impact

study for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). There is, however, no dispute that the Park

Service conducted a full NEPA review in conjunction with the enactment of § 7.33,

which governs snowmobile usage at Voyageurs. The question we consider is whether

the Park Service must conduct a full NEPA review before deciding that it will not

renew its annually-made decision to close some of Voyageurs' bays to motorizedrecreational activity.

Our court has twice reviewed the Park Service's decisions regarding the use of

snowmobiles at Voyageurs–first considering the Park Service's decision to allow

snowmobile use, then considering its decision to suspend their use. In each of these

decisions, we were satisfied that the Park Service could limit or expand the scope of

permissible snowmobile activity without a full-blown NEPA review. Now, after

reviewing the instant appeal we are satisfied that the Park Service has complied with

its obligations under the law. The opening and closing of the bays are temporary

measures, which must be renewed annually. It is impractical to require full NEPA

review each year. Rather, we conclude that the opening and closing of the bays is a

discretionary Park Service decision that is subject only to the Park Service's

obligation (as well-stated by the district court) to be a "faithful steward of national

resources" and its own procedural rules and regulations as set forth at 36 C.F.R. § 1.5.

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According to the Park Service's own rule 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(b), "a closure . . . or

the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration

that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area,

adversely affect the park's natural, aesthetic, scenic or cultural values, require a longterm or significant modification in the resource management objectives of the unit,

or is of a highly controversial nature, shall be published as rulemaking in the Federal

Register." However, closures or terminations of closures that do not rise to this level

are subject only to the procedural requirements of § 1.5(c) and 36 C.F.R. § 1.7. The

§ 1.5(c) procedures require the park superintendent to prepare a written determination

justifying the decision, and § 1.7 requires the park superintendent to publicize the

decision in a specified manner. Further, § 1.7 requires that the public be notified of

the change, after the fact, through signage, maps, publication in local newspapers,

and/or "[o]ther appropriate methods."

The Association suggests that § 1.5(b) of the Park Service's procedural

regulations more aptly describe the Park Service's obligations with regard to the bay

openings because the decision could cause significant alteration of the area. The Park

Service, on the other hand, believes that its legal obligations surrounding the bay

reopenings are set forth in § 1.5(c) and § 1.7. We agree. This position is consistent

with our prior holding in Mausolf III in which we concluded that no formal rule

making–as established in § 1.5(b)–was required of the Park Service prior to closing

bays that were otherwise designated for snowmobile use. We found that closing a few

bays in the enormous Voyageurs system would not amount to a "significant

alteration" of its use. Likewise, it also follows that opening these eleven areas does

not implicate the formal rulemaking required by § 1.5(b). In fact, the initial

regulations permitting snowmobiling in Voyageurs (which received full-blown NEPA

review) allowed snowmobiling in all of the bays where the activity is now permitted.

Therefore, we need only consider whether the Park Service's decision to open

the bays complied with the limited-notice requirements of § 1.7 (as set out above) and

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 Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536.

6

 Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) and 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).

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the Park Service's general stewardship obligations. Finding no notice violation–and

considering the substantial amount of scientific evidence, albeit at times

contradictory, contained in the record that thoroughly outlined the impact of

snowmobiling on the gray-wolf and bald-eagle habitats–we find the Park Service's

decision opening the bays to be neither arbitrary nor capricious. 

C. Endangered Species Act

The Association also argues that the Park Service violated the Endangered

Species Act ("ESA")5

 in its failure to formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife

Service ("FWS") before opening the eleven bays to snowmobiles. The ESA requires

federal agencies to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife agency when

their actions "may affect" an endangered or threatened species.6

 The Park Service

concedes that it was required to seek formal FWS consultation but that it failed to do

so until after the bays were reopened. However, the Park Service directs our attention

to the informal communication that occurred prior to the reopening of the bays–the

Park Service and FWS jointly evaluated data in 1996, had a joint meeting with

scientists and agency representatives in 1997, and exchanged scientific evidence on

the issues in 2001. Informal communication also occurred in December of 2001.

Although the formal consultation was delayed, it was eventually completed in January

of 2002. 

Acknowledging the technical violation, we must consider whether it is

rendered moot by subsequent compliance of the Park Service. In its consideration of

a similar scenario–the effect of a post-hoc "formal" consultation–the Tenth Circuit

adopted the "prudential mootness" view. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith,

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7

 The court in Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 82

F. Supp.2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2000), similarly found that a Forest Service consultation

with FWS (after suit was filed) rendered the action moot because the plaintiffs' only

requested remedy was consultation.

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110 F.3d 724 (10th Cir. 1997).7

 Our sister circuit found that a claim that seeks both

declaratory and injunctive relief was mooted when the required consultation was

completed, even if such consultation did not occur before the implementation of the

policy change. Id. We consider this view to be sound and adopt its reasoning.

Therefore, after the Park Service and the FWS completed their formal consultation

in January, the procedural defect identified by the Association was cured and the

Association's claim for relief–seeking the remedy of formal consultation–was

rendered moot.

The Association also alleges that the Park Service and FWS relied primarily

on a "Draft Study" to support the conclusion that the openings would not adversely

impact the bald eagle and gray wolf. This alleged reliance, according to the

Association, establishes that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously (in

violation of the ESA). Specifically, the Association argues that the Park Service failed

to make an adequate assessment of whether the reopening of these eleven bays would

have a negative affect on these endangered species. We disagree. The Park Service

used studies produced over about a nine year period (some supporting the opening of

the bay, while others favored its closure) in its consideration of the effects the

reopening would have on the bald eagle and the gray wolf and their habitats. While

reasonable people may disagree with the Park Service's ultimate decision, the record

does not show it was arbitrary or capricious.

D. Record on Review

The Association next argues that "[j]udicial review of the legality of [the Park

Service's] action to open the bays under NEPA and 26 C.F.R. § 1.5 was thwarted by

the district court's decision to prohibit limited discovery to fill in these gaps . . . ." The

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district court concluded that "[t]he administrative record contains sufficient

information about the basis for the agency decision . . . " and, as such, denied the

Association's motion for discovery to supplement that record. This decision is entitled

to deference "absent a gross abuse of discretion." Tenkku v. Normandy, 348 F.3d 737,

743 (8th Cir. 2003).

It is well-established that judicial review under the APA is limited to the

administrative record that was before the agency when it made its decision. Overton

Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44

(1985); Newton County Wildlife Assoc. v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1998)

("APA review of agency action is normally confined to the agency's administrative

record."). That record, "not some new record made initially in the reviewing court,"

becomes the "focal point" for judicial review. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142

(1973); Corning Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 736 F.2d 479,

480–81 (8th Cir. 1984). By confining judicial review to the administrative record, the

APA precludes the reviewing court from conducting a de novo trial and substituting

its opinion for that of the agency. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).

However, certain exceptions have been carved from the general rule limiting

APA review to the administrative record. These exceptions apply only under

extraordinary circumstances, and are not to be casually invoked unless the party

seeking to depart from the record can make a strong showing that the specific extrarecord material falls within one of the limited exceptions. Animal Defense Council

v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436–38 (9th Cir. 1988). When there is "a contemporaneous

administrative record and no need for additional explanation of the agency decision,

'there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior' before the

reviewing court may permit discovery and evidentiary supplementation of the

administrative record." Newton, 141 F.3d at 807–808 (quoting Overton Park, 401

U.S. at 420).

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The Association's argument hinges on its assertion that the administrative

record is incomplete and thus will frustrate effective judicial review. However, the

exception allowing extra-record evidence to explain the administrative record and

agency decision is very narrow. Inquiry into the mental processes of administrative

decisionmakers is to be avoided unless it is "the only way there can be effective

judicial review." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Camp, 411 U.S. at 142–43. 

The Association's claims notwithstanding, the administrative record in this

case–which consists of over ten-thousand pages of reports, correspondence, studies

and analyses–is fully sufficient to facilitate judicial review without discovery. We are

satisfied that the district court's denial of extra-record discovery was not an abuse of

discretion, and the decision is therefore affirmed.

III. Conclusion

In sum, we find that the Park Service, in electing not to close eleven bays to

snowmobiling, appropriately exercised its discretionary authority under federal law.

In 1991, when the snowmobiling regulation was promulgated, it was subject to full

rule-making requirements, including publication in the Federal Register, notice, and

comment. It was also subject to environmental review under NEPA. Further, the Park

Service and the FWS consulted regarding the impact of snowmobiling on endangered

species–the gray wolf and the bald eagle in particular–prior to the Park Service's 2001

decision. 

The Park Service did not decide to "open" the eleven bays to snowmobiling in

2001. The bays were in fact opened to snowmobiling in 1991. 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b).

Although, by regulation, the Park Service "may" temporarily close specific areas of

Voyageurs, the position that the Park Service "opened" bays to snowmobiling in 2001

is inaccurate. Nothing in the administrative record establishes that the Park Service

was arbitrary or capricious in carrying out its NEPA and ESA obligations in

conjunction with the 1991 opening of these bay areas to motorized-recreational use.

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Based upon our review of the present record, we hold the Park Service was not

arbitrary or capricious in its subsequent "reopening" of these eleven bays after

deciding not to renew the annually-decided closing.

We have carefully considered all other arguments made by the Association and

conclude they are without merit and require no discussion. For the foregoing reasons,

the judgment of the district court is affirmed in all respects.

______________________________

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