Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00387/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00387-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAYNE BRIDGEMAN,

CDCR #AD-9461, Civil No. 11-0387 JLS (CAB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350.00 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER TRUST ACCOUNT

[ECF No. 2]; 

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT; LAW

LIBRARY, GEORGE NEOTTI,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his

inmate trust account statement which the Court has construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

/ / /

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account

statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial partial filing fee. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF

No. 2], and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire

$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the

Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also obligate the Court to review

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated

or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil

action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

/ / /

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A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

B. Eleventh Amendment

First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the “Education Department” and the

“Law Library” of the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, the Court finds the claims

against these Defendants must be dismissed for failing to state a claim and for seeking damages

against defendants who are immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii). The State

of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, an agency of the

State of California, and Departments within the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, are

not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 and are instead, entitled to absolute immunity from

monetary damages actions under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 106 (1984); see also Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that a state department of corrections is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the “Education Department” and the “Law Library” are

hereby dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) without leave to amend.

C. Access to Courts 

Plaintiff alleges that correctional officers have denied him adequate access to the prison’s

law library. Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of

their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van

Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.

1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional

right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and

filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

Case 3:11-cv-00387-JLS-CAB Document 3 Filed 04/05/11 Page 3 of 8
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 To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must

allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence,

or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual

injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined

as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to

meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794,

796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); see also Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just

as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”). Moreover,

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been actually injured by any specific

defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a

complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ...

the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show

that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983

relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

/ / /

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D. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff names Warden Neotti as a Defendant in this matter but fails to set forth any

factual allegations with regard to Defendant Neotti in the body of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Thus,

it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Neotti liable in his supervisory capacity. 

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson,

9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order

to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual

Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See

Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendant Neotti.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted , and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

/ / /

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To the extent that Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, the Court cautions

Plaintiff that his entire action may be subject to dismissal on the grounds that it appears that he

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this action.

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases

covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). “The

‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be

entertained,” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001), and “regardless of the relief offered

through administrative procedures.” Id. at 741. Moreover, the Supreme Court held in

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006) that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can

function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the court of its proceedings.”

Id. at 90. The Court further held that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must complete

the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules . . . as a

precondition to bring suit in federal court.” Id.

The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall be

brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002) holds that prisoners who are incarcerated at the time they file a civil action

which challenges the conditions of their confinement are required to exhaust “all administrative

remedies as are available” as a mandatory precondition to suit. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1198;

see also Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Congress

could have written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The

actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.”) (emphasis original). Section 1997e(a)

“clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to the commencement of the action as an indispensable

requirement. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of the suit will not suffice.” McKinney, 311

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F.3d at 1198 (quoting Medina-Claudio v. Rodriquez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 / / /

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5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 5, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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