Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01778/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01778-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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 The docket numbers refer to the civil case, CV 08-1778, unless otherwise indicated.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

Moustapha Lofti Eljammal, 

Defendant-Movant. 

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CR 02-1170-PHX-DGC

CV 08-1778-PHX-DGC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Moustapha Lofti Eljammal (“Movant”), has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or

Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. #1.1

 On March 30, 2005, a jury found

Movant guilty of 15 felony counts including one count of Conspiracy, six counts of Altering

or Removing Motor Vehicle Identification, three counts of Transportation of Stolen Vehicles

and five counts of Sale or Receipt of Stolen Vehicles. Doc. #771 of CR 02-1170-PHX-DGC.

On December 19, 2005, Movant was sentenced to the Bureau of Prisons for 210 months to

be followed by supervised release for three years. Id. Movant filed a Notice of Appeal on

December 22, 2005. Doc. #765 of CR 02-1170-PHX-DGC. In July 2007, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision in which the court affirmed Movant’s

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convictions on 14 counts. Doc. #876 of CR 02-1170-PHX-DGC. The court reversed the

conviction on one count but affirmed the overall sentence. Id. 

On September 29, 2008, Movant, through counsel, filed the pending Motion to

Vacate. Doc. #1. The District Court screened the motion in an order filed on October 15,

2008, ordered Respondent to respond to the motion, and granted Movant’s request to file a

supplemental memorandum. Doc. #7. On January 27, 2009, Movant filed a Memorandum

in Support of Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody. Doc. #10. Movant identifies two grounds for relief in his memorandum. First, he

contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the

Sixth Amendment when he failed to properly advise Movant of the government’s plea offer

before it expired. Second, Movant alleges that his privately retained appellate lawyer

provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when he

failed to file a reply brief on direct appeal, the task he was retained to perform. Respondent

filed a Response to the Motion to Vacate on April 29, 2009. Doc. #17. Movant then filed

a Reply on June 26, 2009. 

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues in its response that Movant has failed to satisfy the standard for

ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. Respondent contends that Movant has

not shown deficient performance by his attorneys or that he was prejudiced by their conduct.

Respondent therefore argues that Movant’s request for relief should be denied. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. “A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

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There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. “The benchmark for judging

any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced

a just result.” Id. at 686.

The Strickland test also applies to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the plea

process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). To satisfy the “prejudice” requirement

in this context, a defendant must show that “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective

performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Id. at 59.

B. Ground One

Movant contends in ground one that his trial counsel failed to present the

government’s written plea offer to him or properly advise him about the details of the offer.

Movant asserts in his affidavit that prior to his trial, in January 2005, his attorney, William

Foreman, met with him in jail and told him there was a plea offer. Doc. #10, Exh. E.

Movant contends that Mr. Foreman told him the offer provided for a sentence of less than

five years. Id. Counsel also told Movant that he did not have a copy of the plea agreement

with him but, at Movant’s request, indicated he would bring it the next day. Id. Movant

further states that Mr. Foreman did not tell him there was an expiration date for the plea

offer. Id.

Movant next contends that Mr. Foreman returned the following day, told him the offer

had changed to 77 months, and that he again did not have a copy of the agreement with him.

Doc. #10, Exh. E. Movant claims he again asked him for the written agreement and Mr.

Foreman told him he would bring it the next day. Id. On the third day, Movant contends that

Mr. Foreman again came to see him, told him that the offer changed to 12-15 years and again

said he did not have a copy of the written agreement. Id. Movant claims he repeated his

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request for a copy. Id. Movant further asserts that after that day, he was told by Mr.

Foreman the offer was off the table. Id. Movant claims he never saw a written plea

agreement before his trial and was never advised about what was in the agreement other than

the length of the sentence. Id. He claims that if he had seen a written plea agreement

offering the low end of a 70-87 month sentencing range, which is what the government

offered, he would have accepted it. Id.

Movant also asserts in his affidavit that after the trial but before sentencing, he

received a letter from Mr. Foreman explaining that a co-defendant had been arrested and that

the government was offering a one or two year sentence reduction if Movant helped with the

co-defendant’s prosecution and waived his right to appeal. Doc. #10, Exh. E. He further

contends that Mr. Foreman failed to tell him there was a possibility of a more substantial

sentence reduction, nor did Mr. Foreman provide Movant with a written offer or advise him

of additional details. Id.

In its response, the government explains that a plea agreement was offered to Movant

on January 24, 2005, which contained a sentencing range of 70-87 months. Doc. #17 at 13.

The plea offer expired on January 26, 2005, at the close of business. Id.

In support of its response, the government provides an affidavit from William

Foreman. Doc. #17, Exh. A. Mr. Foreman explains in the affidavit that during the first

meeting with his client, Movant told him he had no interest in any plea offer and wanted to

take his case to trial. Id. Mr. Foreman states that despite Movant’s directive, he continued

to explore possible resolutions of the case with the prosecutor. Id. Anytime he tried to

discuss a possible settlement with Movant, Movant strongly resisted and made it clear he

wanted a trial. Id. Mr. Foreman even met with two of Movant’s friends, one of whom was

an attorney, to explore ways to convince Movant of the need to at least consider plea options.

Id. 

Regarding the specific plea agreement offered by the government in January 2005,

Mr. Foreman specifically recalls trying to discuss the plea offer with Movant. Id. He states

that Movant told him to “stop wasting my time and do your job.” Id. Mr. Foreman

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understood this to mean Movant wanted no further discussions about the offer and that he

should continue to prepare the case for trial. Id. Mr. Foreman has no independent

recollection of whether Movant was shown the draft plea agreement provided by the

government. Id. 

Additionally, Mr. Foreman asserts that contrary to Movant’s affidavit, Movant did not

ask to review the written plea agreement or the government’s letter regarding plea

negotiations, nor did he ask Mr. Foreman to provide him a written copy of the agreement.

Id. Mr. Foreman further states that Movant is wrong when he says Mr. Foreman did not

discuss a deadline for acceptance of the plea offer. Id. Mr. Foreman explains that throughout

his representation, Movant’s position was that he had engaged in no criminal conduct, that

the government could not prove its case, and that he had no desire to discuss a negotiated

settlement. Id. Lastly, Mr. Foreman explains that as an experienced criminal defense

attorney he is well aware of his obligation to convey to his client any plea offers. Id. He

says that Movant’s contentions that he wanted to discuss plea options and that Mr. Foreman

refused to show him a draft or ignored his requests and left him no option but to go to trial,

are “patently false.” Id. 

Regarding the post-trial offer, Mr. Foreman prepared a memo to his file on July 14,

2005, explaining that he advised Movant about the government’s offer for him to engage in

a “free talk” to determine if he would be willing to cooperate with the government’s

prosecution of a co-defendant. Doc. #11, Exh. H. The memo reflects that Movant was

advised he would have to waive his appeal rights and, according to the prosecutor, Movant

could receive a 2-3 level reduction in criminal history and a 2-3 point reduction for

acceptance of responsibility. Id. Further, in his affidavit, Mr. Foreman states that he

discussed the government’s post-trial cooperation offer in full detail with Movant. Doc. #17,

Exh. A.

Movant claimss that his lawyer’s failure to provide him with sufficient information

about the plea offer establishes the deficient performance prong of Strickland. Regarding the

second element of Strickland, Movant argues that statements in his affidavit along with other

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objective evidence show that he suffered prejudice. He contends that the large discrepancy

between the sentence offered in the plea agreement and the sentence received after trial

supports his contention that he would have accepted the plea offer. In addition, he claims

that the strength of the government’s case provides further objective evidence to support his

claim. Further, Movant contends that the more than two years he spent in pretrial

incarceration constitutes more objective evidence that he would have accepted a plea

agreement that called for only 3.5 additional years in prison. He claims that the “ample

objective evidence,” when taken into consideration with his affidavit, establishes that he

suffered prejudice as a result of his lawyer’s performance. 

Movant argues that the court must accept the allegations in his affidavit as true in

determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court, however, is not

required to consider those allegations in a vacuum. Movant’s reply fails to refute any of the

assertions in his counsel’s affidavit. Even if all of Movant’s factual allegations are true, they

do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of the circumstances asserted

by Mr. Foreman. Mr. Foreman asserts, and Movant does not refute, that when he attempted

to present and discuss the relevant plea agreement, Movant wanted nothing to do with it and

told Mr. Foreman to stop wasting his time and do his job. Especially in light of Movant’s

aversion to a plea agreement since the beginning of the relationship, Mr. Foreman was under

no obligation to continue pushing the issue. Movant presents no authority to show that a

lawyer is required to force his client to discuss a plea when the client has made it clear from

the beginning of the representation that he has no interest in such a resolution. Whether Mr.

Foreman had a copy of the agreement when he attempted to discuss the offer is irrelevant

given Movant’s hostility toward the plea. In light of the unrefuted facts asserted by Mr.

Foreman, the court finds that Movant has failed to satisfy either element of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.

Regarding the post-trial plea offer, Movant fails to allege in his affidavit that he would

have accepted the post-trial offer even if he had the information that he alleges his counsel

failed to present. Absent a demonstration that the result would have been different, Movant’s

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the post-trial offer must fail. The court

will therefore recommend that ground one be denied. 

C. Ground Two

Movant alleges in ground two that his direct appeal lawyer provided ineffective

assistance of counsel when he failed to file a reply brief, the task he was retained to perform.

Following Movant’s conviction, an attorney was appointed by the court to represent him on

direct appeal. Doc. #10 at 26. That lawyer filed an opening brief on Movant’s behalf on

September 28, 2005. Id. Movant provides evidence showing that he then retained Patrick

McGillicuddy in October 2006 for the purpose of preparing a reply brief and, if necessary,

representing Movant at oral argument. Doc. #11, Exh. J, K. Mr. McGillicuddy was paid

$15,000.00 for his services. Doc. #11, Exh. K. He did not file a notice of appearance until

January 19, 2007, in which he acknowledged that the time for a reply brief “may have

already expired.” Doc. #11, Exh. M. He claims in the notice that he would make a separate

request to file an untimely reply. Id. Movant contends that Mr. McGillicuddy never sought

an extension of time and never filed a reply brief. Doc. #10 at 26.

In a disciplinary proceeding before the State Bar of Arizona, a Probable Cause

Panelist of the State Bar found that Mr. McGillicuddy violated two rules of professional

conduct when he failed to contact his client (Movant) for 14 months and charged an

excessive fee for work that was not performed. Doc. #11, Exh. N. Consequently, Mr.

McGillicuddy was informally reprimanded and placed on probation for one year. Id.

Additionally, Mr. McGillicuddy was ordered to return the $15,000.00 fee to Movant. Id.

Movant argues that the result of the direct appeal would have been different if his

lawyer had filed a reply brief. He contends that his lawyer should have argued in the reply

that the four point increase in the offense level for Movant’s role in the offense was not

warranted. He then summarizes his involvement in this multi-layered criminal activity to

show that the enhancement should not have been applied. 

Movant’s arguments are unpersuasive. First, as he concedes, his opening brief did not

challenge the role in the offense enhancement. It was mentioned only peripherally as part

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2

 Because Movant did not include among his attachments a copy of the opening brief

on appeal, the court must rely on the parties’ descriptions of what was in the brief.

3

 A court can decide the prejudice issue without first determining whether counsel’s

performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id.

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of the argument challenging the loss calculation.2

 Movant’s role in the offense was not

addressed in the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum decision. Doc. #11, Exhibit O. Had Mr.

McGillicuddy directly challenged the role in the offense enhancement as a new claim, it

would likely have been rejected because it wasn’t raised in the opening brief. See CedanoViera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1066 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to raise an argument in an

opening brief constitutes waiver). Movant contends that the government’s responding brief

addressed the role in the offense issue further, thus authorizing Movant to argue in the reply

that the enhancement was unwarranted. Having failed, however, to attach a copy of the

government’s responding brief, Movant has provided nothing that would allow the court to

consider his argument.

Second, and regardless of the previous argument, Movant offers no role in the offense

authority to support his claim that the enhancement was improperly applied here. He offers

nothing more than a summary of the same facts that were before the District Court at the time

of sentencing. Citing to no authority, he contends in the reply that “generally speaking, a

leader organizer is most often involved in very little hands on activity in the organization,

and yet collects the majority of the proceeds.” Based on this and other generalities, he argues

that he was merely a middle man. He concedes, however, that the government had a “very

strong case...tying him to just about every vehicle involved in the case to some degree....”

Absent any legal authority to conclude the role in the offense enhancement was improperly

applied, the court finds Movant’s claim to be without merit.

For these reasons, the court finds that Movant has not demonstrated he suffered

prejudice as a result of his appellate lawyer’s conduct.3

 Accordingly, Movant has not

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satisfied the elements of an ineffective assistance claim and the court will recommend that

ground two be denied. 

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Lastly, Movant requests that an evidentiary hearing be held in this matter. Movant

contends that where his allegations are based on occurrences outside the record, they must

be taken as true. He claims that because he has presented prima facie allegations of

ineffective assistance, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a court shall grant a hearing to determine the issues

“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner

is entitled to no relief....” As explained above, even taking as true Movant’s allegations

regarding his trial attorney’s actions surrounding the plea offer, the court finds that Movant

has not presented a prima facie case of ineffective assistance. The lawyer’s affidavit

explains at length how Movant repeatedly refused to even consider a negotiated settlement.

In that context, which Movant does not contest, the lawyer’s actions as alleged by Movant,

do not establish deficient performance or resulting prejudice. 

Similarly, although the facts alleged against Movant’s appellate counsel may show

deficient performance, Movant has not presented a sufficient showing of prejudice to warrant

an evidentiary hearing. For these reasons, the court will recommend that Movant’s request

for an evidentiary hearing be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #1) be DENIED; and 

That Movant’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 23rd day of November, 2009.

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