Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05429/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05429-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENENTECH, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INSMED INCORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-04-5429 CW (EMC)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL REOPENING

THE DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM

WOOD

(Docket No. 330)

The Defendants’ motion to compel the further or reopening of the deposition of Dr. William

Wood came on for hearing on April 12, 2006. Having considered the papers filed in support of and

in opposition to the motion and the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the

Court hereby GRANTS the motion in part.

Plaintiff does not seriously contend that the deposition question posed to Dr. Wood – “Do

you know why you’re an inventor on the patent?” – directly implicates the attorney-client privilege. 

As established in the foundational voir dire conducted by counsel for Defendants, Dr. Wood had not

discussed this issue in this case with any attorney. At most, Dr. Wood intimated that he has a

“general” understanding as to why people are named as inventors on patents as a result of previous

conversations involving attorneys, but those conversations were not in connection with this case. 

The relationship between his understanding as it pertain to his inventorship on the ‘287 patent and

any prior conversations with attorneys about inventorship generally is extremely attenuated. His

testimony regarding the ‘287 patent will not necessarily reveal the content of any specific attorneyclient communication. In fact, Plaintiff has stated it is willing to allow Dr. Wood to answer the

Case 4:04-cv-05429-CW Document 425 Filed 04/13/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

question and provide factual information in regard thereto if Defendants agree not to use any such

testimony to claim a waiver of a privilege.

Rather than asserting a direct privilege, Plaintiff argues that by answering the question (and

reasonable follow up) Dr. Wood would be testifying as to his state of mind and that this would open

the door for a future waiver claim, citing the previous dispute over Dr. Clark’s deposition testimony

on the ‘151 patent and this Court’s order of February 23, 2006 requiring in camera review and

subsequent order of March 9, 2006 ordering production of one redacted document. Plaintiff seeks to

prevent any such prospective waiver by stopping Dr. Wood from even opening the door via his

testimony, at least until Judge Wilken has ruled on Plaintiff’s objections to this Court’s order.

The Court declines to do so. First, there is no dispute that the question seeks relevant

information relating to the identity of the ‘287 patent’s correct inventors. Nor is there any dispute

that the information sought in the first instance is not privileged since it would not reveal any

privileged attorney-client communication. Thus, the information sought is relevant, non-privileged,

and discoverable under Rule 26(b). Plaintiff’s counsel forthrightly conceded at the hearing that he

has not been able to find any case supporting the position that a party may block otherwise

discoverable matters simply because it might eventually lead to a claim of waiver. There is no legal

basis for Plaintiff’s position.

Second, the risk of waiver is attenuated here. Neither side can point to any communication

between Dr. Wood and counsel that is being sought and which might be subject to a waiver

agreement. This stands in contrast to Dr. Clark’s situation where there were communications with

counsel clearly falling within the attorney-client privilege and subject to a waiver argument.

Third, Plaintiff overstates the risk of waiver. Even if there were a specific communication

put at risk of a waiver argument as a result of Dr. Wood’s testimony, waiver would not follow

automatically from such testimony. The legal issue implicated here is not fraud or inequitable

conduct, but proper identification of inventorship. The former directly implicates concerns of

fairness in permitting an opposing party an opportunity to refute exculpatory assertions as to state of

mind otherwise irrefutable. General Electric Company v. Hoechst Celanses Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 14106 (D. Del. 1990) at *25 (“fairness requires that defendants be allowed to uncover

Case 4:04-cv-05429-CW Document 425 Filed 04/13/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

foundations for GE’s assertions”); Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Development Corp., 158

F.R.D. 653, 655 (N. D. Cal. 1994) (“applying the rule of fairness”). Cf. Laser Industries, Ltd. v.

Reliant Technologies, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (although rejecting waiver

argument, holds it would be “unfair” for attorneys to testify at trial without giving opponent

opportunity to examine confidential communications to confirm or refute). Such fairness concerns

are less obvious in the context of inventorship determination. It may be that a different, more

rigorous standard for waiver applies in this context.

Plaintiff’s concerns are further exaggerated because even in the context of waiver where

fraud or inequitable conduct is asserted, affirmative testimony about state of mind (beyond mere

denial of inequitable conduct) that leads to in camera review (as this Court held it its February 23,

2006 order), does not necessarily result in disclosure. The waiver exception still must be narrowly

construed and applied in determining whether documents should actually be disclosed. Starsight

Telecast, Inc., 158 F.R.D. at 655. The court still must determine “if facts relevant to a particular,

narrow subject matter have been disclosed in circumstances in which it would be unfair to deny the

other party an opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter.” Id.,

quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 424 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977). The court must consider

“the subject matter of the documents disclosed, balanced by the need to protect the frankness of

client disclosure and to preclude unfair partial disclosures.” Id., quoting American Standard, Inc. v.

Pfizer Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 897 (D. Del. 1986). Indiscriminate disclosure, even in the face of a waiver

sufficient to permit in camera review, is not permitted. The courts, upon completing in camera

review, have been selective in deciding which documents, if any, warrant disclosure. See e.g.

Starsight, 158 F.R.D. at 655-56; United States v. Oettinger, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21087 (N.D.

Cal. 1992) at *2. In the case at bar, this Court ordered disclosure of only three paragraphs of one

document.

In sum, the information sought does not infringe directly upon any attorney-client privileged

communication. There is no legal basis for preventing deposition questions that seek relevant and

non-privileged information on the ground that the answer could open the door to a future claim of

Case 4:04-cv-05429-CW Document 425 Filed 04/13/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Such an argument, moreover, is based on speculative

concerns for the reasons stated above.

Accordingly, the motion to compel the reopening of Dr. Woods deposition is granted. 

Defendants may ask Dr. Woods about his understanding as to why he is listed as an inventor on the

patent and reasonable follow up questions (such as the factual basis for his understanding) so long as

no questions are asked which would elicit answers that would clearly reveal the protected content of

any attorney-client communication. Dr. Woods may also be asked about his understanding as to

why Dr. Baxter is listed as an inventor and the factual basis of such understanding.

As to the deposition questions regarding who devised certain experimental conditions, those

questions, despite the assertion of an objection, were asked and answered. Therefore, the motion to

compel as to those question is denied as moot.

This order disposes of Docket No. 330.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2006

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:04-cv-05429-CW Document 425 Filed 04/13/06 Page 4 of 4