Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02442/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02442-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL BRIAN DASILVA, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

PADILLA, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 14-cv-2442-WQH-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PARTIAL MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 37] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

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For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

Plaintiff Michael Brian Dasilva (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). Plaintiff filed 

the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on April 28, 2015, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 35). 

Plaintiff sets forth four interwoven federal claims alleging his 

constitutional rights were violated when prison personnel: (1) interfered 

with his access to the courts by withholding his legal mail for twentyeight days and transferring him in retaliation for filing grievances 

against them; (2) interfered with his right to petition the government 

for redress of grievances by refusing to process grievances and 

retaliating against him for filing grievances; (3) violated his Due 

Process rights by withholding legal mail, denying law library access, 

obstructing the grievance process, destroying his property and 

transferring him; and (4) engaged in retaliatory conduct against him for 

utilizing the prison grievance process. (Id. at 12-16). In his fifth claim, 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ conduct also violated California state law, 

and asks the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claims challenging the same conduct. (Id. at 19 ¶ 60). Plaintiff alleges 

this conduct led to $287.32 worth of missing personal property not being 

reimbursed and dismissal of his state tort case. (Id. at 16). 

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 On May 12, 2015, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss 

the FAC for Failure to State a Claim. (ECF No. 37). On June 1, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. (ECF No. 41). On June 11, 

2015, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 42). 

B. State Court Proceedings 

Relevant to this Partial Motion to Dismiss is Plaintiff’s closed civil 

state court case No. ECV07335, which proceeded in Imperial County 

Superior Court. (ECF No. 35 at 20). Plaintiff does not describe the 

dismissed state tort action as a criminal or civil rights case, but rather 

as a tort action for conversion. In that action, Plaintiff alleged 

defendants Lopez and Chavez lost his wedding ring and denied him 

reimbursement. (Id.). 

In this action, Plaintiff alleges his withheld legal mail contained a 

“Motion to Transport Prisoner” that the Superior Court was returning 

to him to correct and re-file. (Id.). Plaintiff’s tort case was dismissed 

for failure to appear on June 17, 2013, allegedly because Defendant 

Erece withheld his legal mail during the time his tort case was pending. 

(Id.). He alleges his mail was delivered to him on June 18, 2013, the 

day after his tort case was dismissed. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Plaintiff does not 

name Lopez or Chavez as defendants in this action. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Background Facts 

All facts are taken from the FAC and are not to be construed as 

findings by the Court. Plaintiff claims he exhausted all administrative 

remedies available to him. (ECF No. 35 at 20). 

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 On March 12, 2013, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Centinela 

State Prison, Defendant Lieutenant Gervin interviewed Plaintiff 

regarding a Form 602 Appeal (“grievance”). (ECF No. 35 at 1, 5 ¶ 1). 

Plaintiff alleges Gervin was “extremely abrasive, hostile, and 

derogatory.” (Id.). Plaintiff claims Gervin belittled him. (Id. ¶ 2). 

Plaintiff said “Whatever dude,” to which Gervin responded “Aren’t you a 

disrespectful little bitch.” (Id.). A verbal altercation followed and the 

interview was terminated. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff met with Defendant Assistant Warden Calderon after the 

incident and reported Gervin’s behavior. (Id. ¶ 3). Calderon expressed 

concern about Gervin’s behavior and told Plaintiff he would handle the 

matter. (Id. ¶ 4). On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff received notice Gervin 

cancelled his grievance. (Id. ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges the cancellation 

notice states Gervin cancelled his grievance because of Plaintiff’s 

behavior during the interview. (Id.). Plaintiff claims Gervin also filed a 

false report against him. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Gervin took these 

actions “to dissuade Plaintiff from further using the grievance process.” 

(Id. at 13 ¶ 40). 

 Plaintiff spoke with Calderon two more times regarding Gervin’s 

conduct. (Id. at 5-6 ¶ 6). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Form 22 Request 

for Interview (“Form 22”) and another grievance. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff claims that between May 21 and June 18, 2013, 

Defendants Erece and a Centinela State Prison mail room employee 

John Doe withheld Plaintiff’s legal mail concerning the tort case 

Plaintiff had pending in Imperial County Superior Court. (Id. at 6 ¶ 7). 

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Plaintiff claims the withholding of his legal mail caused him to miss his 

court appearance on June 17, 2013, which resulted in an adverse 

judgment against him. (Id. ¶ 8). 

During the same time period, Plaintiff claims he had “Priority 

Library Use Status,” because his state tort case was pending.1 (Id. ¶ 9). 

Plaintiff alleges that between May 17 and May 30, 2013, Defendant 

Padilla refused to allow him access to the prison law library. (Id. ¶ 10). 

On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff refused to return his morning food tray to 

Padilla until Plaintiff spoke with his supervisor. (Id. at 7 ¶ 11). Padilla 

refused and told Plaintiff to “Keep the f―ing tray.” (Id.). Plaintiff 

claims this incident occurred two more times with no supervisor being 

notified. (Id. ¶ 12). 

 On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff refused to return his “Hand Isolation 

Devices.”2 (Id. ¶ 13). Defendant Captain Greenwood was notified and 

he asked Plaintiff to identify the officer who let him keep his food tray 

because it posed a security risk. (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff identified Padilla. 

(Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff was transferred to a different cell and placed on 

 

1 Priority Library Use Status permits inmates with impending court 

deadlines an additional two hours of library use a week as opposed to 

the normally permitted single two hour session per week. (ECF Nos. 35 

at ¶ 9; 37 at 8 n.1). 

2 Defendants explain “[a] Hand Isolation Device is used to restrict an 

inmate’s ability to use his hands and must be approved by the Chief 

Deputy Warden or Warden. This device may be used when an inmate is 

on Contraband Surveillance Watch. DOM § 52050.23.4.” (ECF No. 37 

at 8 n.2). 

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“Management Cell Status.”3 (Id. at 8 ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges he received 

no mail, clothing, bedding or hygiene supplies except a single sheet and 

pair of boxers during the seven days he remained on Management Cell 

Status. (Id. ¶ 17). 

 On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff asked Defendant Ruiz for his mail. (Id. 

¶ 18). Ruiz told Plaintiff that his supervisors had prohibited Plaintiff 

from receiving mail. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he advised Ruiz of the 

illegality of the prohibition and Ruiz called Defendant Sergeant Rivas to 

talk to Plaintiff. (Id.). Rivas informed Plaintiff that although it was 

against prison policy to withhold mail, Defendants Lieutenant Sais and 

Captain Greenwood had specifically ordered it withheld from Plaintiff. 

(Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff claims the withheld legal mail included Superior 

Court documents necessary to the prosecution of his tort action. (Id. ¶ 

20). 

 On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff received back his confiscated personal 

property. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges Padilla searched his property and 

stored his possessions while they were confiscated. (Id.). Plaintiff 

claims personal documents and artwork were missing. (Id. at 8-9 ¶ 21). 

Plaintiff claims Padilla said he had destroyed the property “for ratting 

me off.” (Id.). 

 In response, Plaintiff filed a Form 22, which he claims Padilla 

signed and dated. (Id. at 9 ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges Padilla admitted to 

 

3 Defendants explain “[m]anagement Cell Status is for an inmate who 

persists in unduly disruptive, destructive, or dangerous behavior and 

who will not heed or respond to orders and warnings to desist from such 

activity. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3332(f).” (ECF No. 37 at 8 at n.3). 

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destroying his property. (Id.). Plaintiff claims such conduct not only 

violates prison policy but also state and federal law. (Id.). Plaintiff 

asserts he continued to file grievances against Centinela State Prison 

“supervisory staff, policies and harassments” between June and 

September 2013. (Id. ¶ 23). 

 On September 5, 2013, a Classification Committee comprised of 

Defendants Greenwood, Sais and Warden Amy Miller placed Plaintiff 

for transfer. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff claims he came before the Committee 

every six months since 2010, and had always been retained at Centinela 

due to pending state court proceedings and disciplinary adjudications. 

(Id. at 9-10 ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleges the Committee’s decision to transfer 

him came two weeks prior to his arraignment date in Imperial County 

Superior Court. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff claims the only difference between the prior Committee 

decisions and the one resulting in his transfer was his repeated filings 

of Form 22’s and grievances against supervisory staff, including 

Greenwood and Sais. (Id. at 10 ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges the decision to 

transfer him was upheld despite his protest that the transfer would 

jeopardize the effectiveness of his self-representation in a criminal 

proceeding in state court due to a twelve-hour round trip commute 

between the courthouse and new prison, and the increased possibility of 

missing or delayed legal materials. (Id. ¶ 27). 

 On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to Tehachapi State 

Prison’s Special Housing Unit. (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff claims prison staff 

failed to properly transfer his personal property resulting in a loss he 

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values at $287.32. (Id.). Plaintiff does not indicate whether this 

estimate includes the value of the lost wedding ring which was the 

object of his dismissed state court case. 

 Plaintiff alleges he filed grievances over his missing property. (Id. 

at 10-11 ¶ 29). He claims Defendants Sergeant Dominguez and 

Associate Warden Calderon “lied on reports, made false allegations, 

ignored all the facts, and denied Plaintiff’s grievances.” (Id.). Plaintiff 

claims Dominguez and Calderon’s conduct was retaliation for his filing 

grievances against them. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff further alleges 

Dominguez filed a false report against him on September 4, 2013. (Id. ¶ 

30). Plaintiff was later acquitted of the allegations in the report filed by 

Dominguez. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff asserts he was transported between prison and Imperial 

County Superior Court twice for criminal proceedings. (Id. ¶ 31). 

Plaintiff claims he was transported wearing Hand Isolation Devices 

“coupled with a black box,” and waist chains. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges 

using these devices in conjunction with each other during transport is 

not permitted. (Id.). Plaintiff claims these devices caused him such 

discomfort that it forced him to stop defending himself in court to avoid 

“this tortuous procedure.” (Id.). 

 After his transfer to Tehachapi State Prison, Plaintiff alleges a 

Centinela State Prison mail room employee John Doe once again 

withheld his mail for three months between December 2, 2013, and 

February 22, 2014. (Id. ¶ 32). Plaintiff does not specify whether this 

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was the same Centinela State Prison mail room employee John Doe who 

had previously withheld Plaintiff’s mail. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal 

quotations omitted). The pleader must provide the Court with “more 

than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] 

must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court 

is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). 

 On a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a 

pro se pleading is construed liberally. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 

895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 

(9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his 

complaint that bring his claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court “may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. 

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claims at Issue 

 1. Claim One: Access to the Courts 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendants 

Erece, Greenwood, Miller, Rivas, Ruiz and Sais for denial of access to 

the courts arising out of the withholding of Plaintiff’s legal mail which 

resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state court civil case. Defendants 

do not challenge Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against Defendants 

Greenwood, Miller and Sais arising out of his prison transfer. 

2. Claim Two: Right to Petition the Government for 

Redress of Grievances 

 Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s second claim only as it relates to 

the retaliatory conduct alleged against Defendant Gervin arising out of 

the interview. Defendants do not challenge the remaining allegations 

against Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Greenwood, Miller, Padilla, 

Rivas and Sais arising out of their retaliatory interference with the 

prison grievance process against Plaintiff for his filing grievances 

against them. 

 3. Claim Three: Due Process 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s third claim for denial of Due 

Process against Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Gervin, Miller, 

Padilla, and Sais arising out of the denial of law library access, 

interference with the grievance process, prison transfer and property 

deprivation. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s claims against 

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Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Rivas, Ruiz and Sais for denial of Due 

Process arising from the withholding of his legal mail. 

4. Claim Four: Retaliation 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s fourth claim for retaliation 

against Defendant Gervin only. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Erece, Greenwood, 

Miller, Padilla, Rivas and Sais for retaliatory conduct arising from the 

destruction of his property, prison transfer, withholding mail or 

interfering with the prison grievance process. 

 5. Claim Five: State Law Claims 

Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s fifth claim requesting the 

Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. 

B. Claim One: Access to Courts 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Rivas, Ruiz, and 

Sais withheld his legal mail and thereby denied Plaintiff access to the 

courts. (ECF No. 35 at 12 ¶¶ 34-37). Plaintiff claims his mail being 

withheld resulted in the dismissal of his pending state court tort case. 

(Id.). Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Greenwood, Miller and Sais 

transferred him in retaliation prior to his criminal proceedings in 

Superior Court. (Id.). Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim arising from his transfer. (ECF No. 37 at 12 n.4). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim he was denied 

access to the courts by the withholding of his legal mail. (Id. at 14). 

Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to plead the withholding of legal mail 

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interfered with a pending criminal appeal, habeas corpus petition or 

civil rights action, and therefore Plaintiff’s claim fails. (Id.). 

A plaintiff must allege two elements to plead a civil rights 

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and United States law; and (2) a person acting under color 

of state law committed the violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

(1988). The First Amendment guarantees a prison inmate a limited 

right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). 

Likewise, the First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a limited right of 

access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); 

Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Both rights are 

restricted in the prison context. 

A prisoner’s right to send and receive mail is attenuated by the 

prison’s competing right to adopt regulations and policies “reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests,” including “security, order, 

and rehabilitation.” Whitherow, 52 F.3d at 265 (citing Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 

(1974)). 

A prisoner’s right of access to the courts is similarly limited. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). Lewis imposed an actual 

injury requirement on prisoners claiming denial of access to the courts. 

Id. Actual injury must be alleged for any access to the courts claim 

because it is a jurisdictional requirement giving the plaintiff standing to 

bring suit. Nevada Dep’t. of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th 

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Cir. 2011). A prisoner cannot satisfy the injury requirement with “any 

type of frustrated legal claim.” Id. A plaintiff pleading denial of access 

to the courts must allege interference with a direct criminal appeal, 

habeas corpus petition or civil rights action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-56. 

The Ninth Circuit addressed claims similar to Plaintiff’s, where a 

prisoner’s pending state civil litigation was dismissed for failure to 

appear due to lack of transport to the courthouse from the facility in 

which he was incarcerated. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. 

Ct., 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Following Lewis, Simmons held that 

the prisoner had not stated a cognizable injury. Id. at 1160. 

Plaintiff fails to plead an actual injury under Lewis. Plaintiff 

alleges Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Rivas, Ruiz and Sais withheld 

his legal mail resulting in dismissal of his pending state tort case. (ECF 

No. 35 at 6 ¶¶ 7-8; 8 ¶¶ 18-19). Plaintiff does not claim his dismissed 

tort case was a criminal appeal, habeas corpus petition or a civil rights 

action. The Court cannot supply the missing essential allegation. Ivey, 

673 F.2d at 268. 

Plaintiff’s opposition cites multiple cases which hold that once a 

prisoner has filed a civil action in state court prison officials may not 

interfere with the prisoner’s prosecution of that action. (ECF No. 41 at 

2-3). The cases Plaintiff relies on are all out-of-circuit decisions and all 

except one pre-date Lewis, and therefore his argument fails. 

Because Plaintiff fails to allege a legally cognizable injury 

resulting from interference with a pending criminal appeal, habeas 

corpus petition or civil rights case, his claim of denial of access to the 

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courts fails to the extent it is based on the grounds that interference 

with his legal mail caused the dismissal of his tort case. Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 354. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s claim of denial 

of access to the courts against Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Rivas, 

Ruiz and Sais arising out the withholding of Plaintiff’s legal mail be 

DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Greenwood, Miller 

and Sais arising out of the retaliatory transfer survive this Partial 

Motion to Dismiss because Defendants do not challenge this basis for 

this claim. 

C. Claim Two: Right to Petition the Government for 

Redress of Grievances and Claim Four: Retaliation 

 In his second and fourth causes of action, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Gervin engaged in retaliatory conduct against him and 

interfered with his right to petition the courts for redress of grievances. 

(ECF No. 35 at 18 ¶¶ 40, 50). Plaintiff alleges Gervin filed a false 

report against him and verbally abused him during his interview. (Id. 

at 18 ¶ 59). Plaintiff claims Gervin’s retaliatory conduct was to 

dissuade him from using the grievance process. (Id. at 13 ¶ 40). 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s second and fourth claims only as to the 

allegations of retaliatory conduct against Defendant Gervin.4 (ECF No. 

37 at 14). 

 

4 Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Calderon, Dominguez, Erece, Greenwood, Miller, Padilla, Rivas and 

Sais for retaliatory conduct arising from the destruction of his property, 

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 Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Gervin for 

retaliation and fails to sufficiently allege he was engaged in protected 

conduct giving rise to a retaliation claim against Gervin. (ECF No. 37 

at 15). 

 “In the First Amendment context . . . a prisoner retains those First 

Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a 

prisoner or with the legitimate penological interests of the corrections 

system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Prisoners retain 

the right to file prison grievances and pursue civil rights litigation. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) amended on other 

grounds by Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005) (reh’g 

denied). “Deliberate retaliation by state actors against an individual’s 

exercise of this right is actionable under section 1983.” Soranno’s Gasco 

v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 A plaintiff must plead five basic elements to state a claim for 

retaliation under § 1983: 

(1) a state actor took an adverse action against him (2) 

because of (3) the prisoner’s protected conduct, and that the 

action taken against him (4) chilled the prisoner’s exercise of 

his First Amendment Rights and (5) did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567). 

 

prison transfer, withholding mail or interfering with the prison 

grievance process. 

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 Plaintiff adequately alleges Gervin is both a state actor and took 

adverse action against him, and that he did so to dissuade Plaintiff from 

exercising his First Amendment rights. (ECF No. 35 at 5 ¶¶ 1, 5; 13 ¶ 

40; 18 ¶ 60). Plaintiff fails to allege, however, that Gervin’s conduct did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Because Plaintiff 

fails to allege this essential element, his retaliation claim fails. 

Plaintiff offers a declaration with additional allegations in his 

opposition. (ECF No. 41). The Court cannot consider the declaration as 

complaint allegations, but can consider the declaration in deciding 

whether leave to amend should be granted. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 

1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). The declaration fails to cure the 

aforementioned deficiency. (ECF No. 41). While Plaintiff reiterates 

that Gervin’s conduct was retaliatory and undertaken to discourage him 

from using the grievance process, he again fails to allege that Gervin’s 

conduct did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. (Id. at 5-7). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s second and 

fourth causes of action be DISMISSED as to Defendant Gervin. 

Plaintiff’s retaliation and right to petition the government for redress of 

grievances claims against Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Erece, 

Greenwood, Miller, Padilla, Rivas and Sais survive this Partial Motion 

to Dismiss because Defendants do not challenge these claims against 

these Defendants. 

D. Claim Three: Due Process 

In his third claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Padilla denied him 

access to the prison law library, failed to notify supervisors of his 

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grievances and destroyed Plaintiff’s property in retaliation for 

exercising his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 35 at 

¶ 46). Plaintiff also asserts Defendants Calderon, Dominguez and 

Gervin violated his Due Process rights by cancelling and denying his 

grievances. (Id. ¶¶ 47-49). Plaintiff further alleges Defendants 

Greenwood, Miller and Sais transferred him prior to his criminal 

proceedings, thereby violating his Due Process rights. (Id. at 16 ¶ 51). 

 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Due Process claim fails as a matter of 

law because he fails to plead a liberty interest in either the prison 

grievance process or in his prison transfer. (ECF No. 37 at 15). 

Defendants further argue Plaintiff cannot state a Due Process claim for 

lost property under § 1983. (Id.). 

 “[The] range of interests protected by procedural due process is 

not infinite . . . . Due Process is required only when a decision of the 

State implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (citing Bd. 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972)). A prisoner “has no 

legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.” Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (reh’g denied). 

 1. Prison Law Library Access 

 Plaintiff claims denial of prison law library access as part of his 

third claim for violation of his Due Process rights. (ECF No. 35 at 15 ¶ 

46). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Padilla denied him Due Process by 

refusing to grant him prison law library access while his state tort case 

was pending. (ECF No. 35 at 15 ¶ 46). Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

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fails to plead actual injury arising from the denial of access to the 

prison law library and therefore Plaintiff’s claim fails. (ECF No. 37 at 

12). 

The affirmative protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not 

extend beyond the ability of a prisoner to file a petition or complaint. 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974). The right to access the 

courts “guarantees no particular methodology but rather a conferral of a 

capability―the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to 

sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 356. 

Prisoners do not have a constitutional guarantee to unlimited law 

library access. Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858 

(9th Cir. 1985). Prison officials have discretion in choosing how to 

regulate the time, manner and place in which a law library can be used. 

Id. Prisons are only required to provide law library access that meets 

minimum constitutional standards. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 

1169 (9th Cir. 1989) overruled on other grounds by Silva v. Di Vittorio, 

658 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A plaintiff must satisfy two essential elements to establish a 

constitutional violation arising from denial of law library access: 

First, he must show that the access was so limited as to be 

unreasonable. Second, he must show that the inadequate 

access caused him actual injury, i.e., show a “specific 

instance in which [he] was actually denied access to the 

courts.” 

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Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations 

omitted). As explained earlier, Lewis further defined “actual injury” to 

mean interference with a prisoner’s ability to bring a direct criminal 

appeal, habeas corpus petition or civil rights action. Id. at 354-356. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Padilla denied him law library access 

although Plaintiff had “Priority Library User” status due to his pending 

state tort case. (ECF No. 35 at 6 ¶¶ 9, 10). Plaintiff alleges this status 

gave him an extra two hours of library time per week above the 

minimum two hours afforded to inmates. (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff claims 

he made daily attempts to gain library access from May 17, 2013, to 

May 24, 2013. (Id. at 7-8 ¶¶ 10, 11). On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff was 

placed on “Management Cell Status” because he had kept his thermal 

trays and Hand Isolation Devices in attempts to attract supervisor 

attention. (Id. ¶¶ 11-16). Plaintiff claims Defendant Greenwood 

“promptly” rectified his library access issues when he was notified. (Id. 

¶ 14). 

 Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts 

arising out of the denial of law library access. Plaintiff makes no 

showing of how the denial of access was unreasonable beyond alleging 

he was denied access during his Priority Library Use status. Plaintiff 

does not allege how the denial of access to the prison law library 

affected his state tort case. Plaintiff also does not allege the denial of 

access prevented him from filing a challenge to his conviction or 

conditions of his confinement. Rather, Plaintiff alleges he was not 

allowed to make use of extra allotted time under prison rules. Such an 

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allegation is insufficient to state a claim for denial of access to the 

courts. A prisoner’s ability to file challenges to his conviction or 

conditions of confinement is the touchstone of his constitutional right to 

access the courts not his ability to turn pages in a prison law library. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-357. Plaintiff’s claim fails because he neither 

shows that the denial of library access was unreasonable nor pleads an 

actual injury to a challenge to his conviction or conditions of 

confinement. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim for denial of Due Process 

against Defendant Padilla arising from the denial of prison library 

access be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against Padilla 

for destroying his property survive this Partial Motion to Dismiss 

because Defendants do not challenge this claim on this basis. 

2. Grievance Process 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Gervin and 

Padilla violated his Due Process rights by failing to notify supervisors of 

grievances, and by denying and cancelling his grievances. (ECF No. 35 

at 15 ¶¶ 46, 48, 49). Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter 

of law because Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally recognized 

liberty interest in the prison grievance process. (ECF No. 37 at 12). 

It is well established that state prisoners do not have a recognized 

liberty interest in prison grievance procedures. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding failure of prison officials to 

properly implement administrative appeals process in the prison does 

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not give rise to constitutional concerns); Mann, 855 F.2d at 640 (stating 

a prisoner has “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 

procedure” thus no protected liberty interest exits). 

Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because he does not have 

a protected liberty interest in the prison grievance process. Id. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim for violation of Due Process against 

Defendants Padilla, Gervin, Calderon and Dominguez be GRANTED to 

the extent it rests on the denial and cancellation of his grievances. 

3. Transfer 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Greenwood, Miller and Sais violated 

his Due Process rights by transferring him to Tehachapi State Prison. 

(ECF No. 35 at 16 ¶ 51). Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have a 

liberty interest in avoiding transfer to another prison and therefore 

cannot state a claim for denial of Due Process. (ECF No. 37 at 16). 

Prisoners do not have a liberty interest in remaining at a 

particular prison because Due Process does not protect prisoners from 

transfer between prisons. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). 

A prisoner has no reasonable expectation he will serve his entire 

sentence at the same prison. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 

(1983). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim that his prison transfer 

violated his Due Process rights. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss Defendants Greenwood, Miller and Sais be 

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Due Process claims against them arising 

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from his prison transfer. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against 

Defendants Greenwood, Miller and Sais arising out of his transfer 

survive this Partial Motion to Dismiss because Defendants do not 

challenge this claim on this basis. 

 4. Property Deprivation 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Padilla deprived him of his personal 

property without Due Process. (ECF No. 35 at 15 ¶ 46). Plaintiff does 

not allege Padilla was authorized to do so, but does allege Padilla’s 

conduct was intentional. (Id. at 8-9 ¶ 21). Plaintiff does not allege 

California state remedies are inadequate or unavailable. 

 “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state 

employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements 

of the Due Process Clause [] if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for 

the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see

Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp. 2d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007). A state 

can cure an otherwise unconstitutional property deprivation by 

providing an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Zimmerman v. City of 

Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001). California provides a 

remedial scheme for property deprivations committed by state 

employees. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-817 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The California Tort Claims Act is “an adequate post-deprivation 

remedy.” Id.; see CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 810-895. The possibility “[a 

prisoner] might not be able to recover under these remedies the full 

amount which he might receive in a § 1983 action is not . . . 

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determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies.” Hudson, 468 U.S. 

at 535. 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deprivation of Due Process under 

§ 1983 arising from Padilla’s destruction of his personal property. 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Plaintiff’s appropriate remedy for the loss of 

the property lies in a state proceeding pursuant to the California Tort 

Claims Act. CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 810-895; Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-817; 

Manson, Iver & York v. Black, 176 Cal. App. 4th 36, 42 (2009); Talley v. 

Valuation Counselors Grp., Inc., 191 Cal. App. 4th 132, 146 (2010). 

Plaintiff may pursue redress for his previously dismissed state 

court case No. ECV70335 through filing a motion in California court to 

set aside the judgment. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 473(b); Manson, 176 

Cal. App. 4th at 42; Talley, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 146. Because Plaintiff’s 

remedies lie in California law, he should pursue those remedies “in 

state court rather than seeking a remedy under section 1983 in federal 

court.” Smith v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, No. 13-cv-00595, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 101054, at *n.10, 2014 WL 3615492 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2014). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process claim arising from the 

deprivation of his property by Defendant Padilla be DISMISSED. 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Padilla arising out of his 

property deprivation survives this Partial Motion to Dismiss because 

Defendants do not challenge this claim on this basis. 

/ / 

/ / 

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D. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 

 Plaintiff alleges violations of his First and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights in claims one and three. (ECF No. 35). Defendants 

raise qualified immunity as an alternative basis for dismissal of claims 

one and three. (ECF No. 37 at 17). 

Qualified immunity shields government employees from personal 

liability when sued in their individual capacities for acts committed in 

the course of their official duties. Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 

F.3d 945, 964 (9th Cir. 2010). “A government official sued under § 1983 

is entitled to qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory 

or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the 

challenged conduct.” Carroll v. Carman, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350 (2014). 

Qualified immunity is a two pronged inquiry: (1) did the defendant’s 

actions violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) if so, were the 

constitutional rights violated by the defendant’s conduct clearly 

established at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201 (2001). The sequence prescribed in Saucier is not mandatory; a 

court has discretion which question to resolve first. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). A “clearly established right” is one 

that is sufficiently clear so that a reasonable officer would know that his 

conduct would violate that right. Carroll, 135 S.Ct. at 350 (citing 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “[E]xisting precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). If a plaintiff 

fails to satisfy both prongs then qualified immunity attaches to the 

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defendant official. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The inquiry goes no 

further if a court determines no constitutional right was violated. 

Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on claims one and 

three to the extent those claims are based on denial of access the courts, 

interference with the grievance process and the prison transfer. 

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to litigate civil claims 

unrelated to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus petitions or civil 

rights litigation. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-356. Plaintiff likewise does not 

have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in the prison 

grievance process or in avoiding transfer between prisons. Ramirez, 

334 F.3d at 860; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224. Because Plaintiff has not 

established Defendants’ conduct violated a clearly established 

constitutional right in claims one and three, the inquiry ends and 

qualified immunity attaches. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 236; Aguilera, 510 

F.3d at 1167. 

 The Court RECOMMENDS finding that Defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity on claims one and three to the extent those 

claims are predicated upon Plaintiff’s claims for denial of access to the 

courts, the denial and cancellation of his grievances and prison transfer. 

 Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS Defendants Calderon, 

Dominguez, Erece, Greenwood, Miller, Rivas, Ruiz and Sais are entitled 

to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s first and third causes of action and 

be DISMISSED from those claims. Claims one and three survive this 

Partial Motion to Dismiss as to the Due Process claims for withholding 

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Plaintiff’s legal mail against Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Rivas, Ruiz 

and Sais, and Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against all Defendants 

except Gervin. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss; and (3) DISMISSING: 

 Plaintiff’s first claim for denial of access to the courts against 

Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Miller, Rivas, Ruiz and Sais 

arising out of the withholding of Plaintiff’s legal mail which 

resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state court tort case; 

 Plaintiff’s second and fourth claims against Defendant Gervin for 

retaliation arising out of the interview; and 

 Plaintiff’s third claim for denial of Due Process against 

Defendants Calderon, Dominguez, Gervin, Miller, Padilla and Sais 

and arising out of the denial of law library access, denial and 

cancellation of grievances, property deprivation and prison 

transfer. 

If the Court’s recommendations are adopted, the following claims 

remain PENDING: 

 Plaintiff’s second claim for denial of the right to petition the 

government for redress of grievances against Defendants 

Calderon, Dominguez, Greenwood, Miller, Padilla, Rivas and Sais 

arising from interference with the prison grievance process; 

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 Plaintiff’s third claim for violation of Due Process against 

Defendants Erece, Greenwood, Ruiz and Sais arising from the 

withholding of Plaintiff’s legal mail; 

 Plaintiff’s fourth claim for retaliation against all Defendants, 

except Gervin, arising from the deprivation of Plaintiff’s property, 

transfer to Tehachapi State Prison, withholding Plaintiff’s legal 

mail and filing false allegations and reports against Plaintiff; and 

 Plaintiff’s fifth claim requesting the Court exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over related state law claims. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than October 30, 2015. The document should be captioned “Objections 

to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

November 6, 2015. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 7, 2015 

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