Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00869/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00869-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 07cv0869 W (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYUN SOCKEE DODSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. ROCHA, Correctional Officer; 

C.J. SWEARINGEN, Correctional

Officer; V. CANADA, Correctional

Officer; M. TAMAYO, Correctional

Officer; E. SILVA, Correctional

Sergeant; H. MORA, JR.,

Correctional Officer; ARANI,

Correctional Officer; GALVAN,

Correctional Officer; D. BELL,

Medical Technician Assistant;

BARRIOS, Medical Technician

Assistant; RUAN, Correctional

Lieutenant; R. NELSON,

Correctional Lieutenant,

SANTIAGO, Medical Doctor; DOES

1-20,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07cv0869 W(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

[DOC. NO. 25] AND ORDER

DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT

OF COUNSEL [DOC. NO. 41]

Plaintiff Tyun Sockee Dodson, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint [doc. no.

1] on May 14, 2007, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dodson alleges:

(1) Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by inflicting cruel

and unusual punishment; (2) Defendants displayed deliberate

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1

 For convenience, all page numbers in the Complaint refer to

the electronic pagination supplied by the electronic case filing

system.

2 07cv0869 W (RBB)

indifference to both his safety and to a serious medical need in

violation of the Eighth; (3) Defendants Silva and Ruan prohibited

him from freely discussing the incident giving rise to this claim,

in violation of the First Amendment; (4) Defendant Santiago was

negligent in administering medical treatment; (5) Defendant Nelson

was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; (6)

various Doe Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by

placing Dodson in administrative segregation; and (7) he suffered

emotional, mental, and psychological injuries as a result of the

physical injuries. (Compl. 6-23.)1 

On October 24, 2007, Defendants Bell, Canada, Galvan, Nelson,

Rocha, Santiago, Silva, Swearingen and Tamayo filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint [doc. no. 25] with a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities and a Declaration of D. Jones. On January 7, 2008,

Defendant Barrios filed a Joinder to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

[doc. no. 32]. Defendants Arani and Mora also filed a Joinder to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 39] on February 15, 2008.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under the First and Eighth

Amendments, as well as for failure to state claims of medical

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Mot.

to Dismiss 1.) Plaintiff submitted an Opposition to Defendants’

Motion [doc. no. 34], which was filed nunc pro tunc to December 14,

2007. On January 11, 2008, Defendants submitted a Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition [doc. no. 37]. Dodson also submitted a

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Notice of Motion and Motion for Appointment of Counsel [doc. no.

41], filed nunc pro tunc to February 25, 2008. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel are suitable for decision without oral

argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set

forth below, the district court should GRANT in part and DENY in

part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and this Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Dodson is an inmate currently incarcerated at Corcoran State

Prison. (Notice of Change of Address [doc. no. 29].) On July 30,

2005, while incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, he was

allegedly beaten by several correctional officers. (Compl. 1, 6-

11.) 

The altercation began when Defendant Rocha entered Plaintiff’s

cell to collect his prior cellmate’s property. (Compl. 6.) After

removing the property, Rocha reentered the cell holding his baton. 

(Id.) Dodson alleges Rocha was angry that Plaintiff’s mother

lodged a complaint against him, and Rocha said, “You wanna cry to

your mommy, I’ll give you something to cry about.” (Id.) Dodson

replied by saying, “Whatever.” (Id.) Rocha then swung his baton

at Plaintiff, who lunged forward and struck Rocha in the face with

his fist. (Id.) 

The alarm was triggered, and responding officers arrived. 

(Id.) Defendant Swearingen entered the cell and sprayed Dodson

with pepper spray. (Id.) Dodson slipped and fell to the ground. 

(Id.) Defendant Mora placed him in handcuffs. (Id.) Defendants

Swearingen, Canada, and Tamayo then beat Plaintiff with their

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batons while Dodson was lying on his stomach handcuffed behind his

back. (Id.) Dodson crawled under his bunk after a blow to the

head by Tamayo. (Id. at 7.) Tamayo then sat on Plaintiff’s legs

and twisted his left foot. (Id.) Canada struck Dodson’s shin with

his baton. (Id.) Rocha grabbed Plaintiff’s left pinky and ring

fingers and beat his left hand with a baton. (Id.) Defendant

Silva placed his knee at the base of Dodson’s neck, covered his

nose and mouth with plastic, and tried to break his neck or

suffocate him. (Id.) 

The commotion caused other inmates in the building to yell for

the correctional officers to stop the abuse, although the view into

Dodson’s cell was blocked by a “green wall” of officers. (Id.) 

Dodson was escorted from his cell by Canada and Tamayo. (Id. at

8.) One of the other inmates asked, “You alright Sockee?” 

Defendant Canada told Plaintiff, “Tell him you’re alright!”, (id.)

but Dodson said nothing. (Id.) 

Dodson was escorted outside in the dark where numerous

officers were present. (Id.) Plaintiff had heard rumors that an

inmate was beaten in front of the building, and fearing the worst,

he began searching for the officers’ name tags. (Id.) Dodson saw

Defendant Arani with a “6 shooter block gun.” (Id.) Plaintiff

asked him, “Arani, you gone’ [sic] let them do this to me man?” 

(Id.) Arani replied, “It’s too late now man!” (Id.) Dodson also

saw Defendant Galvan, who would not make eye contact with Plaintiff

and quickly walked away. (Id.) 

Canada and Tamayo escorted Dodson to the Medical Technician

Assistant (MTA)’s office. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff noticed

Defendant Silva speaking with Defendant Ruan. (Id. at 9.) Once

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Plaintiff was inside the MTA office holding cage, Silva entered the

cage and told Defendants Bell and Barrios to “clear out,” which

they did. (Id.) Silva then asked, “You wanna hit my officers huh? 

You piece of shit! . . . Huh? You little bitch!” (Id.) Dodson

responded, “He hit me first.” (Id.) Silva then struck Plaintiff

in the face, causing him to lose consciousness. (Id.) When he

regained consciousness, Canada and Tamayo were kicking him as he

lay on the floor. (Id.) Canada and Tamayo then pulled Dodson up

and held him while Silva punched him in the stomach. (Id.) Silva

said, “You’re not so tough now are you? You little bitch!” (Id.) 

Silva then spit on Dodson. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was stripped and searched for contraband; then he

was handcuffed by Defendant Tamayo. (Id. at 10.) Defendants Bell

and Barrios returned and started attending to Plaintiff’s more

serious wounds. (Id.) Bell and Barrios documented some, but not

all, of Dodson’s injuries. (Id.) Silva then entered the building

and said to Dodson, “It was all your fault and I better not hear

anything different!” (Id.) Silva motioned to Defendant Ruan, who

stopped short of the entrance and said, “Let me hear it.” (Id.) 

Dodson responded, “It was all my fault.” (Id. at 10-11.) 

Plaintiff was taken to the Outpatient Housing Unit (OHU). 

(Id. at 14.) Defendant Santiago, a doctor, and an unnamed nurse

treated him. (Id.) Santiago examined Dodson’s wounds and

determined that the wounds to his hand needed to be sutured. (Id.) 

When Santiago asked Dodson how he got the wounds, Officer Rowe

yelled, “This is the bastard that knocked out the officer’s teeth

you just saw in the other room!” (Id.) Plaintiff had cut his hand

on Defendant Rocha’s teeth. (Id.) Santiago sutured the wound,

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ignoring the advice of the unnamed nurse not to suture it because

it was a teeth wound. (Id.) The nurse gave Dodson a tetanus shot

and said that he would need antibiotics. (Id.) 

Dodson was then escorted to a shower for pepper spray

decontamination. (Id. at 15.) While he was in the shower,

Defendant Nelson arrived to place Plaintiff in Administrative

Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). (Id.) At the same time, the nurse arrived

to give Dodson his antibiotics and began instructing him on how to

take them. (Id.) Nelson yelled, “Get the fuck out of here! He

doesn’t want your fucking meds!” (Id.) Nelson then took the pills

and threw them to the ground at the nurse’s feet. (Id.) When

Plaintiff asked, “What’s up with my antibiotics?” Nelson kicked

the pills, causing them to go “all over the place.” (Id.) 

Dodson was escorted to Ad-Seg, where he was held without a

mattress, blanket, eating utensils, or toiletries for two days. 

(Id. at 15-16.) Three days after the incident, Plaintiff was

examined by Defendant Bell for complaints of a throbbing hand. 

(Id. at 16.) That evening, Plaintiff had cold chills and was

sweating all night. (Id.) Dodson was examined the next day by Dr.

Levine, who diagnosed him with an infection and told Plaintiff that

the wound should never have been sutured. (Id.) Dr. Levine milked

the wound and admitted Dodson to the OHU, where he received

intravenous medication for approximately four days. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Motions to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

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sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . .

a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his

“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . . 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007) (citations omitted) (quoting and abrogating Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, (1957)). Courts must accept as true all

material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable

inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint

in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix,

Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v.

City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch.

of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995);

N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The issue is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

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v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc. (In re Verifone Sec. Litig.), 11

F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d

at 973 (citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55

(9th Cir. 1994)) (stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is

not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of

factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn

from the facts alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept

as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1997) (“The court may not . . . take

into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the

motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute

pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines

apply to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

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B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, courts must construe the pleadings liberally and give the

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the plaintiff

must be provided with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment of a pro se

litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

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appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting under color of state law

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

III. THE MERITS OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM

Dodson makes seven claims against Defendants. Count one

alleges that against Defendants Rocha, Swearingen, Mora, Canada,

Tamayo, Silva, Arani, Galvan, Ruan, Bell, and Barrios used 

excessive force amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. (Compl.

6-11.) Count two claims that Defendants Mora, Arani, Galvan, Ruan,

Bell, Barrios, and “numerous John Doe [correctional officers] were

deliberately indifferent to Dodson’s safety.” (Id. at 12.) In

count three, Dodson states that his First Amendment right to free

speech was violated by Defendants Silva and Ruan. (Id. at 13.) 

Count four alleges a medical negligence claim against Defendant

Santiago. (Id. at 14-17.) Dodson alleges a claim for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Nelson in

count five. (Id. at 18.) Count six asserts that Plaintiff endured

cruel and unusual punishment from the deprivation of minimal

measures of life’s necessities by three unnamed defendants. (Id.

at 19.) In count seven, Dodson alleges that he suffered emotional,

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2

 Defendants Canada, Rocha, Silva, Swearingen, and Tamayo do

not move to dismiss on this ground because they concede that the

Complaint states a claim against them, although they contest the

factual allegations. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 5 n.2.)

11 07cv0869 W (RBB)

mental, and psychological injuries from the actions of all

Defendants. (Id. at 20-23.)

Defendants Arani, Barrios, Bell, and Galvan move to dismiss

count one and, along with Defendant Mora, count two for failure to

state a claim against them. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 5-6.) 

Defendant Silva moves to dismiss count three against him for

failure to state a claim for violating Dodson’s First Amendment

right to free speech. (Id. at 9.) Defendant Santiago asks the

Court to dismiss count four for failure to state a medical

negligence claim. (Id. at 10.) Defendant Nelson moves to dismiss

count five for failure to state a claim of deliberate indifference

to Dodson’s serious medical needs. (Id. at 11.) Although none of

the moving Defendants are named in count six, they purport to move

to dismiss the count against the Doe Defendants for deprivation of

Dodson’s minimal measures of life’s necessities. (Id. at 12.) 

These Defendants seek to dismiss count seven for failure to timely

file a government claim of negligent and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. (Id. at 13.) 

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim of Excessive Force Amounting

to Cruel and Unusual Punishment Against Defendants Arani,

Barrios, Bell, Galvan and Ruan.

Defendants Arani, Barrios, Bell and Galvan seek a dismissal

count one of Dodson’s Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff fails

to state an Eighth Amendment claim against them for excessive force

amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.2

 (Defs.’ Mem. of P. &

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A. 5.) Dodson asserts that the officers acted “maliciously,

sadistically, and with culpable intent for the very purpose of

causing Petitioner harm . . . .” (Compl. 11.) 

A plaintiff claiming excessive force under the Eighth

Amendment must “allege . . . the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain . . . .” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 

“To survive the motion to dismiss, he is required to allege overt

acts with some degree of particularity such that his claim is set

forth clearly enough to give defendants fair notice of the type of

claim being pursued.” Ortez v. Wash. County, 88 F.3d 804, 810 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d at 649). 

Count one alleges that Defendants Swearingen, Canada, Tamayo,

Rocha, and Silva each used excessive force against Plaintiff. 

(Compl. 6-11.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Arani and

Galvan were present when Dodson was escorted through the yard. 

(Id. at 8.) Arani responded, “It’s too late now man!” when Dodson

asked, “Arani, you gone’ [sic] let them do this to me man?” (Id.) 

Arani then headed toward a building. (Id.) The only allegation

made against Defendant Galvan is that, upon making eye contact with

Dodson, she looked down and walked away. (Id.) Defendant Ruan

spoke with Defendant Silva as Dodson was escorted to the MTA

office. (Id. at 9.) Defendants Barrios and Bell subsequently left

their post in the MTA office when ordered to “clear out” by

Defendant Silva. (Id.) Later, they returned to tend to Dodson’s

more serious wounds, noting some but omitting others from their

report. (Id. at 10.) After Dodson was beaten in the MTA office,

Ruan approached and said, “Let me hear it?” (Id. at 10.) None of

the allegations against these five Defendants –- Arani, Barrios,

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3 It appears that Defendant Ruan has not been served with

Plaintiff’s Complaint and has not filed a responsive pleading in

this action because he is deceased [doc. no. 14]. Although he is

not a party to the Motion to Dismiss, the Court may sua sponte

dismiss claims against him that are similar to those brought

against the moving Defendants. Columbia Steel Fabrications, Inc.

v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1995); see Ricotta

v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978-79 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

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Bell, Galvan, or Ruan -- demonstrate the commission of any overt

acts resulting in unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on

Plaintiff.3 

Dodson concedes that the behavior of these five defendants

does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) 

He indicates that he did not intend to assert claims of excessive

force against these Defendants, instead alleging in count two that

they were deliberately indifferent when they failed to protect him

from the other Defendants. (Id.) For these reasons, the Motion to

Dismiss the claim against Defendants Arani, Barrios, Bell and

Galvan for excessive force amounting to cruel and unusual

punishment should be GRANTED without leave to amend. Additionally,

the Court should sua sponte dismiss the claim against Defendant

Ruan without leave to amend. 

B. The Motion to Dismiss the Claim for Deliberate Indifference to

Plaintiff’s Safety Should be Denied as to Defendants Arani,

Galvan, and Mora and Granted With Leave to Amend as to

Defendants Barrios and Bell.

Defendants Arani, Barrios, Bell, Galvan and Mora move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action against them it fails to

state a claim for deliberate indifference to Dodson’s safety. 

(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 6.)

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To be found liable for an Eighth Amendment violation for

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety, a prison “official

must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

A defendant’s acts or omissions will not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation unless there is a reckless disregard of

the risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Id. at 836. The

official must have “know[n] that [the] inmate face[d] a substantial

risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. “It is not enough

merely to find that a reasonable person would have known, or that

the defendant should have known . . . .” Id. at 843 n.8. But, a

“claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to

act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is

enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. 

“[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a

substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” 

Id.

1. Defendants Arani and Galvan

After Dodson was beaten in his cell, he was escorted through

the yard, where he spotted Arani. (Compl. 8.) Dodson asked Arani

if he was going to let them “do this” to him, and Arani replied,

“It’s too late now man!” (Id.) Arani then headed toward a

building, leaving Plaintiff with Defendants Canada and Tamayo. 

(Id.) Defendant Galvan looked down and walked away as Dodson was

escorted through the yard. (Id.) 

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The Court must construe Dodson’s Complaint in the light most

favorable to him and draw all reasonable inferences from it. 

Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Karam, 352 F.3d at 1192). 

Using this standard, it is reasonable to infer that Arani’s

statement indicated actual knowledge of a substantial risk to

Dodson. Likewise, it can be inferred that Galvan, who was to

Arani’s “immediate left,” (Compl. 8), heard Arani’s statement and

also knew of a substantial risk to Dodson. Plaintiff is alleging

overt facts, not mere conclusory allegations against these

Defendants. Whether Defendants actually perceived the significant

risk posed to Dodson is an issue appropriate for summary judgment

or trial, but this claim cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage. 

See Varella v. Adams, No. 1:03-CV-06324-OWW-LJ-P, 2006 WL 2013478,

at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2006). Dodson has alleged sufficient

facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” see

Bell Atl. Corp., U.S. at , 127 S. Ct. at 1965, so the Court

should deny Defendants Arani and Galvan’s Motion to Dismiss.

2. Defendants Barrios and Bell 

Defendants Barrios and Bell complied when Defendant Silva told

them to “clear out!” of the MTA office. (Id. at 9.) Dodson fails

to allege facts that these medical technicians were aware of the

incident in Plaintiff’s cell or that they had any other knowledge

from which they could infer that a substantial risk of harm to

Dodson existed. Dodson entered the MTA office after the first

beating, and the facts alleged do not show that Defendants Barrios

or Bell knew that Dodson was at risk for additional harm. In his

Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Barrios and Bell knew about the

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previous incident by radio communication, and they witnessed Dodson

“being man-handled by Canada and Tomayo.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 7.) 

The Court may not consider any new allegations or additional

facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. See

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. Nevertheless, the Court must give

a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint unless it clearly

appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome

by amendment. Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448. Here, Defendants Barrios

and Bell’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted with leave to amend. 

3. Defendant Mora 

Mora placed Dodson in handcuffs after Plaintiff struck

Defendant Rocha in the face. (Compl. 6.) Defendant argues that

Dodson fails to allege Mora “witnessed, participated in, or was

even present during the alleged incident either before or after he

placed Plaintiff in handcuffs.” (Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 7.) Again,

however, the Court must draw reasonable inferences in favor of

Dodson’s Complaint. See Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing

Karam, 352 F.3d at 1192). After being handcuffed by Mora,

Defendant Swearingen stepped in and started beating Dodson. 

(Compl. 6.) While the Complaint does not specify what Mora did

after placing Dodson in handcuffs, there is no suggestion that Mora

left, and it is reasonable to infer that he was present as

Defendant Swearingen stepped in. The Court must give Plaintiff any

benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dep’t, 839 F.2d at 623. Defendant Mora’s Motion to Dismiss should

be denied.

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4. Defendant Ruan

Defendant Ruan spoke with Defendant Silva as Dodson was

escorted to the MTA office. (Compl. 9.) After Silva cleared the

office and Dodson was allegedly beaten a second time, Ruan

approached the entrance to the MTA office and said, “Let me hear

it?” (Id. at 10.)

These allegations do not demonstrate Ruan’s knowledge that a

substantial risk of serious harm to Dodson existed. In fact, this

exchange happened after the serious harm to Dodson had occurred. 

Plaintiff later claims that Defendant Ruan had knowledge of the

situation because he was constantly briefed by Defendant Silva. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 6.) Once again, the Court cannot consider any new

allegations presented outside of the pleadings. See Schneider, 151

F.3d at 1197 n.1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to provide any

facts that would show Defendant Ruan had any knowledge from which

he could have drawn an inference that a substantial risk of harm to

Dodson existed. 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants Arani, Galvan and

Mora’s Motion to Dismiss Dodson’s deliberate indifference to safety

claim against them should be DENIED. Defendants Barrios and Bell’s

Motion to Dismiss the second cause of action should be GRANTED with

leave to amend. The Court should sua sponte dismiss the second

cause of action against Defendant Ruan without leave to amend.

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim that Defendants Silva and

Ruan Retaliated Against Plaintiff in Violation of His First

Amendment Rights.

Dodson alleges in count three that Defendants Silva and Ruan

used fear and intimidation to keep him from saying what was done to

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him, effectively avoiding an internal investigation or subsequent

disciplinary action. (Compl. 13.) Silva moves to dismiss on the

ground that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him for

abridging Dodson’s First Amendment right to free speech. (Defs.’

Mem. of P. & A. 9.)

“A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are

not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Prisoners have a First

Amendment right to free speech, Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1249

(11th Cir. 2003), and to petition the government. Bradley v. Hall,

64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Constitution provides protections from "deliberate

retaliation" by government officials for an individual’s exercise

of First Amendment rights. See Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075,

1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d

1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Because retaliation by prison

officials may chill an inmate’s exercise of legitimate First

Amendment rights, retaliatory conduct is actionable even if it

would not otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir.

1989). Even so, there must be a causal connection between the

allegedly retaliatory conduct and the action that provoked the

retaliation; a plaintiff must “show that the protected conduct was

a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant’s decision”

to act. Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1314 (citing Mt. Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). 

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Courts have noted that “[r]etaliation claims by prisoners are

‘prone to abuse’ since prisoners can claim retaliation for every

decision they dislike.” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d

Cir. 1996). As a result, these claims are reviewed with particular

care. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff suing prison

officials pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation must allege facts that

show the following: (1) “[A] state actor took some adverse action

against [the] inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

conduct, and . . . such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of

his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” See Rhodes v. Robinson,

408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

815-16 (9th Cir. 1994)) (footnote omitted). If the plaintiff’s

exercise of First Amendment rights was not chilled (factor four),

he must allege that the defendant’s actions caused him to suffer

more than minimal harm. Id. at 567-68 n.11. But see Mendocino

Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.

1999) (stating that the test is objective -- whether official’s

acts would “chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from

future First Amendment activities[]”).

Dodson contends that after he was beaten in the MTA office,

Defendant Silva said, “It was all your fault and I better not hear

anything different!” (Compl. 10.) Defendant Ruan then said, “Let

me hear it?” to which Dodson responded, “It was all my fault.” 

(Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff states that he answered “these two

officers” out of fear that saying anything else would lead to

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retaliation. (Id. at 13.) These allegations fail to satisfy the

factors set forth in Rhodes.

Dodson alleges that he did not exercise his First Amendment

right to tell Ruan what actually happened because he feared

retaliation if he did so. (Id.) He asserts that he “wanted to

speak to a lawyer or someone not connected to the prison.” (Id.) 

But there is no allegation that he actually made this request for

an attorney or that he faced any retaliation for making such a

request. There are no facts alleging retaliation for engaging in

protected conduct. 

Dodson’s First Amendment claim also fails when the facts are

applied to the test set forth in Mendocino -- whether an official’s

acts would “chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from

future First Amendment activities.” Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1300. 

The Mendocino court explained: “[I]t would be unjust to allow a

defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation

merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his

protected activity . . . .” Id.

Neither Silva’s alleged threat nor Ruan’s remark should deter

a person of “ordinary firmness” from filing a prison grievance or

civil rights suit. Dodson exhausted administrative remedies and

filed this lawsuit; both show that the actions of Silva and Ruan

did not chill or silence Plaintiff’s First Amendment activities. 

See, e.g., Lim v. Proulx, No. 1:07-cv-01053-AWI-GSA-PC, 2008 WL

686118, at *3, *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008) (holding plaintiff’s

protected speech was not chilled when he filed a grievance ten days

after defendant told plaintiff he would be “eating concrete” if he

ever told anyone about the incident). But see Hightower v.

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Schwarzenegger, No. 1:04-cv-06028-OWW-SMS PC, 2008 WL 752555, at *5

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2008) (finding valid retaliation claim stated

when defendant directed another inmate to make threats against

plaintiff after plaintiff filed a grievance against defendant). 

For these reasons, Defendant Silva’s Motion to Dismiss Dodson’s

First Amendment right to free speech claims against him should be

GRANTED without leave to amend. On the Court’s motion, count three

against Defendant Ruan should be dismissed without leave to amend. 

See Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc., 44 F.3d at 802.

In his Opposition, Dodson makes a new allegation of

conspiracy. (Pl.’s Opp’n 8.) Conclusory allegations are

insufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of

his First Amendment rights. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. 

Plaintiff’s belated assertion does not change the result. 

Furthermore, a conspiracy to “cover up” an Eighth Amendment

violation raises different legal and factual issues from the

allegations in count three of Dodson’s Complaint. The Court may

not consider new allegations raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to

a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. 

D. Plaintiff States a Claim Against Defendant Santiago 

for Negligence in Providing Medical Care.

In count four, Dodson alleges that Defendant Santiago was

negligent when he sutured Dodson’s “teeth wound” contrary to “well

established medical doctrine that teeth wounds are to never be

sutured closed.” (Compl. 14.) Defendant Santiago moves to dismiss

for failure to state a claim of negligence in providing medical

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4

 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities also asks

that “Defendant Levine” be dismissed from this claim. (Defs.’ Mem.

Of P. & A. 10.) Levine, however, is not named as a defendant in

this lawsuit. (See Compl. 2-5.) Plaintiff also confirms that

Levine is not a defendant. (Pl.’s Opp’n 10 n.2.)

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care. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 10.)4 “The elements of a cause of

action in tort for professional negligence are: (1) the duty of

the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as

other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2)

a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between

the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss

or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.” Budd v.

Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849,

852 (1971).

Dodson alleges facts that address all four elements. First,

he establishes Dr. Santiago’s duty by stating that Santiago was

employed at Calipatria State Prison where he was “assigned to carry

out . . . the care of inmates.” (Compl. 5.) Second, Plaintiff

alleges that Santiago breached that duty when he sutured Dodson’s

hand, knowing the wound had been caused by a human bite. (Id. at

14.) According to Chief Medical Officer Dr. Levine, teeth wounds

are “never, never . . . sutured.” (Id. at 16.) Third, Dodson

alleges that Santiago’s act of suturing the wound was the proximate

cause of his infection and that infections are “absolute” when a

teeth wound is sutured. (Id. at 14, 17.) Nurse Doe “pleaded with”

Dr. Santiago not to suture the wound; she subsequently administered

a tetanus shot and antibiotics to Plaintiff. (Id. at 14-15.) Dr.

Levine confirmed that Dodson’s hand was infected and said that it

never should have been sutured. (Id. at 16.) Fourth, Dodson

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alleges that Santiago’s negligence continued to cause “constant

pain and aches” after the infection was treated. (Compl. 16.) He

also alleges physical and mental suffering including loss of

appetite, weight loss, loss of sleep, and “other pains.” (Id. at

22.) 

Defendant argues that Dodson’s allegations amount to a

difference of medical opinion between Dr. Levine and Dr. Santiago,

and that expert testimony is required to show that a professional

duty of care has been breached. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 11.) 

Although this may be true in order to survive a motion for summary

judgment, see Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal. 4th

992, 1001, 884 P.2d 142, 147, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 690 (1994), it

is not required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Instead, the Court does not decide whether Dodson will “ultimately

prevail but whether [he] is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims.” Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. 

In his Opposition, Dodson makes a new allegation that

Defendant Santiago was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. (Pl.’s Opp’n 9.) Because Plaintiff’s Complaint

only purported to state a negligence claim against Dr. Santiago,

the Court may not consider this new deliberate indifference

allegation. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. 

Dodson alleges facts that address all elements of a medical

negligence claim. Consequently, Defendant Santiago’s Motion to

Dismiss Dodson’s claim against him for negligence in providing

medical care should be DENIED.

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E. Defendant Nelson’s Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a

Claim of Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious

Medical Needs Should be Denied.

Plaintiff contends in count five of his Complaint that

Defendant Nelson was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs when he threw Dodson’s antibiotics on the

ground and kicked them “all over the place.” (Compl. 15, 18.) 

Nelson moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim against him

for deliberate indifference. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 11.)

Two elements comprise an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976)). “First, the plaintiff must show a ‘serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s

condition could result in further significant injury or the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”’ [Citation omitted.]

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the

need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (citing McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc)). 

“Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he existence of

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60). 

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The second element, deliberate indifference, is pled if the

prisoner alleges facts that show “(a) a purposeful act or failure

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b)

harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To be

found liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, a prison “official

must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “This is true

whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their

response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in

intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or

intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). The indifference

to medical needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a

constitutional violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297

(1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); Jett, 439 F.3d at

1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). 

A defendant’s acts or omissions will not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation unless there is a reckless disregard of

the risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. 

The official must have “know[n] that [the] inmate[] face[d] a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847.

Dodson’s injuries were first attended to by Defendants Barrios

and Bell, who started dressing his more serious wounds and making

note of some wounds and not others. (Compl. 10.) Dodson required

further treatment from Dr. Santiago. (Id. at 14.) Two of the

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wounds were half-inch cuts to his left hand, “apparently from the

teeth of Officer Rocha.” (Id.) In addition to suturing the

wounds, Dodson received a tetanus shot and antibiotics. (Id. at

14-15.) These allegations are sufficient to establish that Dodson

had a serious medical need, as his injuries were found to be

“important and worthy of comment or treatment.” See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1131 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60). 

To satisfy the second element, Defendant Nelson must have

known that Dodson faced a substantial risk of serious harm when he

kicked Dodson’s antibiotics “all over the place.” (See Compl. 15.) 

Defendant claims that Dodson’s Complaint is deficient because it

fails to assert that Nelson confiscated the antibiotics, that the

antibiotics were ruined, or that it was impossible to obtain

replacements. (Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 12.) The Court, however, must

construe the pleadings liberally, give Dodson the benefit of any

doubt, and make any reasonable inferences. See Karim-Panahi, 839

F.2d at 623; Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Karam, 352

F.3d at 1192). 

Defendant is correct that Dodson does not specifically allege

Nelson ruined the antibiotics. He does, however, say that

Defendant Nelson “has no authority to . . . render medication

useless.” (Compl. 18.) It is reasonable to infer from the

Complaint that kicking the antibiotics all over the floor of the

shower area rendered them useless. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges

that he was placed in Ad-Seg where he was not given “anything at

all in line with civilized measures of life’s necessities for two

days.” (Id. at 16.) This allegation is sufficient to include

replacement medications. Dodson’s failure to more explicitly

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assert that he did not obtain replacement medicine before being

hospitalized does not make his claim deficient. Dodson’s hand

became infected, (Compl. 16), supporting a reasonable inference

that at least while in Ad-Seg, he did not have access to

antibiotics. 

For these reasons, Defendant Nelson’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim against him for deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need should be DENIED. 

F. The Claim That Unnamed Defendants Are Responsible for

Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement That Violated the

Eighth Amendment Should Be Dismissed.

In count six of his Complaint, Dodson alleges that three

unidentified officers deprived him of “minimum measures of life’s

necessities” in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he was left

Ad-Seg for two days dressed only in boxer shorts, without personal

hygiene items, a mattress, sheets, or blankets. (Compl. 19.) 

To satisfy the requirements for an Eighth Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claim, the prisoner must allege facts

sufficient to show that a prison official’s acts or omissions

deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities” and that the defendant acted or failed to act “in the

face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or

so obvious that it should be known.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 836.

“The discrete basic human needs that prison officials must satisfy

include food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.

1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981));

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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citations omitted) (containing a

list of basic necessities). Prison conditions do not violate the

Eighth Amendment unless they amount to “unquestioned and serious

deprivations of basic human needs” or of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981); see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (reiterating the

“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” standard). 

There is a constitutional obligation to provide prisoners with

adequate shelter. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citations omitted). 

This includes protection from extreme cold. See, e.g., Johnson v.

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiffs

provided sufficient evidence of substantial deprivations of basic

human needs when they were left, inadequately dressed, in

subfreezing temperatures for five to nine hours); Gordon v. Faber,

973 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding prisoners’ Eighth

Amendment rights had been violated when they were required to stay

outdoors in subfreezing temperatures for less than two hours, even

though some were provided with lined denim coats and allowed to

move about freely); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir.

1975) (holding Eighth Amendment rights were violated when an inmate

was confined to a cell for two days without clothing, a blanket or

mattress). Although the deprivation of a blanket or clothes other

than boxer shorts may not violate the Eighth Amendment by itself,

in some cases, the combination of the two may result in the

deprivation of an identifiable human need, for example, the need

for warmth. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. 

Dodson alleges that he “froze all night long, shivering on

cold metal steel with only boxer shorts on.” (Compl. 19.) He was

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not provided with any mattress, sheets, blankets or clothing other

than his boxer shorts. (Id.) Defendants argue that lack of

clothing or blankets during a summer night and deprivation of these

items for two nights does not amount to an Eighth Amendment

violation. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 12.) The Court does not

resolve factual disputes, it only determines whether sufficient

facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”

have been presented. See Bell Atl. Corp., U.S. at , 127 S.

Ct. at 1965.

“In deciding whether to dismiss, the court may consider only

the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits

or incorporated by reference in the pleadings, and matters of which

the judge may take judicial notice.” 2 James Wm. Moore, et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[2], at 12-87 (3d ed. 2008)

(footnote omitted). The Court takes judicial notice that

Calapatria State Prison, where Dodson was housed in August 2005, is

located in Imperial County, California, a desert community.

To successfully allege an Eighth Amendment conditions-ofconfinement claim, Dodson must show that the unidentified officers

were deliberately indifferent to his needs by failing to act “in

the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known

or so obvious that it should be known.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

836. Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants had actual

knowledge of his basic human needs and deliberately refused to meet

those needs. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 734. 

The officer who met Dodson in Ad-Seg told him he had to earn

whatever he needed, and if he did not cause any problems, he would

“get the things [he would] need.” (Compl. 19.) Dodson was then

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escorted to a cell with no mattress, sheets, blankets or clothes. 

(Id.) When he asked about a mattress, the officer escorting him to

the cell reiterated what the first officer told him, “You gotta

earn it.” (Id.) Dodson asked for some clothing; the officer

responded, “You gotta earn that too!” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges

that he spent the night “shivering on cold metal steel with only

boxer shorts on.” (Id.) In his Opposition, he seems to attribute

the cold to the air-conditioning system, which he describes as “a

blasting air vent blowing cold air.” (Opp’n 15.) The next

morning, he asked a third officer if he could have some laundry, a

mattress and some eating utensils. (Id.) The third officer told

him to take it up with “3rd watch.” (Id.) 

The facts alleged are that Defendants had actual knowledge of

Dodson’s need for a mattress, sheets, blankets and clothing, as he

asked two officers for these items. The officers are alleged to

have deliberately refused these needs, telling Dodson that he had

to earn them. These assertions are insufficient to state an Eighth

Amendment claim.

In Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988),

the court held that a claim that the inmate slept without a

mattress for one night did not allege an Eighth Amendment

violation. Other courts agree. See O’Leary v. Iowa State Men’s

Reformatory, 79 F.3d 82 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a program

depriving inmate of underwear, blankets, a mattress, exercise or

visits which he gradually regained with satisfactory behavior did

not violate the Eighth Amendment).

None of the moving Defendants are named in Dobson’s sixth

claim for relief. (Compl. 19.) Instead, he is pursuing Doe

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Defendants one through three. (Id.) Nevertheless, the Court may

dismiss the Complaint against Doe Defendants who have not appeared. 

Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstom Recovery, 44 F.3d at

802; see also Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978-79. 

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss count six of

Dodson’s Complaint for deliberate indifference to his conditions of

confinement should be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

In his Opposition, Dodson makes a new allegation that the

unnamed defendants also violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 13.) As previously noted, the Court may not consider

new allegations raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to

dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Schneider, 151 F.3d

at 1197 n.1. 

G. Plaintiff’s State Tort Causes of Action Should be Dismissed

for Failure to Timely File a Government Claim.

Dodson alleges in count seven that the physical injuries he

incurred resulted in “psychological and emotional negative

impacts.” (Compl. 20.) Defendants Canada, Nelson, Silva, Tamayo,

Bell, Galvan, Rocha, and Swearingen construe this count as a claim

for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and

move to dismiss it for failure to timely file a government claim. 

(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 13, 15.) But Plaintiff states that he is

not alleging a claim for negligent or intentional infliction of

emotional distress against the moving Defendants. (Opp’n 17.) It

appears that the allegations in count seven are a description of

damages for the preceding six counts. (Compl. 20-23.) 

When adjudicating a supplemental state law claim, this Court

must apply state substantive law. United Mine Workers of Am. v.

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Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Under the California Tort Claims

Act, the filing of a tort claim in the time and manner prescribed

by statute is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit against any state

employee or agency. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 911.2, 945.4,

950.2 (West 2003). Defendants assert that Dodson filed state tort

claims only against Dr. Levine, who is not a defendant named in

this action, and Defendant Dr. Santiago. (Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 13;

Jones Decl. ¶¶ 4,6, Ex. A.) Dodson does not provide any evidence

that he filed state tort claims against the other defendants. 

Plaintiff’s Opposition states that he is not alleging negligent or

intentional infliction of emotional distress against these

defendants “at the state level.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 17.) The only state

law cause of action he intends to assert is the medical malpractice

claim against Dr. Santiago. (Id.) 

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss supplemental state

claims in count seven against Defendants Canada, Nelson, Silva,

Tamayo, Bell, Galvan, Rocha, Swearingen, Barrios, Arani, and Ruan

(sua sponte by the Court) should be GRANTED without leave to amend. 

The medical negligence or malpractice claim against Defendant

Santiago remains pending; however, it appears to be duplicative of

the claim alleged against Dr. Santiago in count four.

V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Dodson requests that the Court appoint counsel for him in this

case for several reasons. First, he cannot afford to hire a

lawyer, and his family cannot afford to hire one on his behalf. 

(Dodson Decl. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 3-4.) Second, the case

will likely involve substantial discovery, and Plaintiff has

limited access to witnesses. (Id.) Third, Dodson has limited

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access to the prison law library, which impairs his ability to

litigate the case. (Id. at 4.) Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that the

issues in the case are complex, and a lawyer would help him to

properly apply the law. (Id.) Finally, he has been unsuccessful

in finding a lawyer to take his case. (Id.; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot.

to Appoint Counsel Exs. 1-11.)

There is no constitutional right in a civil action to

effective representation of counsel. Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d

1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). There is also no constitutional right

to appointed counsel to pursue a § 1983 claim. Rand v. Rowland,

113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman,

654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Campbell v. Burt, 141

F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, in “exceptional circumstances,” a district court

may appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,

1093 (9th Cir. 1980). To decide whether exceptional

circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both

“‘the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the

ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved.’” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331

(9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952,

954 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Dodson argues that a lawyer can do a better job than a

prisoner in conducting discovery, negotiating a settlement, and

“performing other difficult tasks of litigation.” (Pl.’s Mem.

Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 2.) Although a pro se litigant might

fare better with the assistance of counsel, this is not the test

for appointment of counsel. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Instead, Dodson “must show that because of the complexity of the

claims he was unable to articulate his positions.” Id. Dodson

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does not make this showing. He has competently submitted papers to

the Court throughout this action. Although they are not as well

written as what might have been prepared by an attorney, they

adequately make Plaintiff’s arguments and are organized. See id. 

Dodson next argues that appointment of counsel is appropriate

when a substantial constitutional issue has been raised. (Pl.’s

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 3.) Plaintiff cites cases from

the Second and Third Circuits as authority for his argument. (Id.

at 3). The Ninth Circuit, however, follows a different standard,

the “exceptional circumstances” standard, when determining whether

to appoint counsel in a civil matter. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d

147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). This Court, therefore, is not required to

appoint counsel whenever a constitutional issue of substance has

been presented, but it must apply the “exceptional circumstances”

test set forth in Aldabe. See Rand, 113 F.3d 1520; Aldabe, 616

F.2d at 1093.

Dodson also argues that he needs appointed counsel because his

ability to investigate the facts and conduct discovery is limited

by his incarceration and the fact that he was transferred to

another prison. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 3.) The

need for discovery is not an exceptional circumstance. Wilborn,

789 F.2d at 1331 (“[A] pro se litigant will seldom be in a position

to investigate easily the facts necessary to support the case.”) 

Dodson’s need to learn additional facts is no different than the

needs of other pro se litigant, and is not an exceptional

circumstance compelling the Court to appoint counsel.

Plaintiff contends that he should have appointed counsel

because his law library access severely limits his ability to

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“learn the law and [keep] up with the litigation aspect of this

case.” (Dodson Decl. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 4.) "[T]he

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing

of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law

libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). "The existence of an

adequate law library does not provide for meaningful access to the

courts if the inmates are not allowed a reasonable amount of time

to use the library." Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections,

776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). Prisoners, however, are not

guaranteed unlimited access to the law library; access may be

limited by time, manner, and place regulations. Id. Dodson does

not make any showing that his limited law library access rises to

the level of denying him meaningful access to the courts, nor does

he give the Court any reason to conclude that his law library

access amounts to an exceptional circumstance different from what

other pro se litigants experience.

Plaintiff next argues that the need to cross-examine witnesses

requires that the Court appoint counsel. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to

Appoint Counsel 3-4.) He cites cases from other circuits to

support his contention. (Id. at 4.) Factual disputes and

anticipated cross-examination of witnesses do not indicate the

presence of complex legal issues warranting a finding of

exceptional circumstances. See Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (holding

that while the appellant might have fared better with counsel

during discovery and in securing expert testimony, “this is not the

test[]”). 

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Dodson explains that he has a general education and lacks

experience in the law, finding it intimidating and confusing;

consequently, it is difficult to present his case in a “clear and

precise” manner. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 4.) 

This is a common difficulty for litigants proceeding pro se and is

not an exceptional circumstance. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Dodson also argues that the Court must consider factors such

as the need for expert witnesses, difficulties finding and locating

witnesses, whether trial will be by jury, and the existence of

“state of mind” issues such as deliberate indifference when

determining whether appointment of counsel is appropriate. (Pl.’s

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 5.) He again cites to cases

from several other circuits that consider these factors. (Id.);

see Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1991)

(directing the district court to appoint counsel for a prisoner

using the Seventh Circuit’s five-factor test.) 

In the Ninth Circuit, however, the Court decides whether

exceptional circumstances exist by evaluating two factors: “‘the

likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the

petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at

1331 (quoting Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954). 

Even if this Court were to apply the Seventh Circuit test,

Dodson could not be appointed counsel at this time. Unlike the

petitioner in Tucker, whose “inartful pleadings” and inability to

follow the briefing schedule convinced the court he was unable to

present his case, Dodson’s papers have been generally articulate

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and organized. See Tucker, 948 F.2d at 392; see also Rand, 113

F.3d at 1525 (“Though [motions] did not achieve the quality of

papers that might have been prepared by a lawyer, Appellant’s

papers were generally articulate and organized.”).

Finally, Dodson notes that he has attempted to find an

attorney to represent him before petitioning the Court for

appointed counsel. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 5.) 

Courts have required that “indigent plaintiffs make a reasonably

diligent effort to secure counsel as a prerequisite to the court’s

appointing counsel for them.” Bailey v. Lawford, 835 F. Supp. 550,

552 (S.D. Cal. 1993). Dodson provides ten responses from various

attorneys and agencies rejecting his request for legal

representation. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Appoint Counsel Exs. 1-

10.) Plaintiff has made a reasonably diligent effort to secure

counsel prior to petitioning for appointment of counsel.

Dodson has shown that he is capable of articulating his claims

pro se in light of the complexity of the issues involved. At this

stage, it is too early for the Court to determine Dodson’s

likelihood of success on the merits. While he has adequately

stated his claims, without some evidence to support his assertions,

the Court cannot find that he is likely to succeed on the merits. 

See Bailey, 835 F. Supp. at 552. Dodson has failed to present any

exceptional circumstances that warrant appointment of counsel. 

Therefore, his Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion to

Dismiss count one against Defendants Arani, Barrios, Bell and

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Galvan for excessive force amounting to cruel and unusual

punishment should be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court

should sua sponte dismiss Defendant Ruan from this count without

leave to amend. Defendants Arani, Galvan, and Mora’s Motion to

Dismiss the count two claim for deliberate indifference should be

DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss the count two claim against

Defendants Barrios and Bell for deliberate indifference should be

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. On the Court’s motion, the second

count should also be dismissed against Defendant Ruan without leave

to amend. Defendant Silva’s Motion to Dismiss the count three

claim for violation of Dodson’s First Amendment right to free

speech should be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Sua sponte, the

Court should also dismiss the third count against Defendant Ruan

without leave to amend. Defendant Santiago’s Motion to Dismiss

count four alleging negligence in providing medical care should be

DENIED. Defendant Nelson’s Motion to Dismiss the count five claim

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need should be

DENIED. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the count six claim

against the Doe Defendants for deliberate indifference to Dodson’s

conditions of confinement should be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;

the claim is also dismissed sua sponte by the Court. Count seven

fails to state a claim against Defendants Canada, Nelson, Silva,

Tamayo, Bell, Galvan, Rocha, Swearingen, Barrios, Arani, Mora, and

Ruan; the motion to dismiss the count against them should be

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Dodson’s Motion for Appointment of

Counsel is DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

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provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 7, 2008. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before July 28, 2008. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: June 6, 2008 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Whelan

All Parties of Record

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