Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00775/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00775-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roger Wayne Murray, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 03-775-PHX-DGC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Petitioner Roger Wayne M urray (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner sentenced to

death. This Court denied Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary development in support of

various habeas claims. (Dkt. 90.)1

 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration. (Dkt. 91.) Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate only if the

Court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). Petitioner seeks reconsideration in connection with Claims 5, 7, 44, 45 and 48.

He does not present newly discovered evidence or assert an intervening change in

controlling law, but assert s t hat he is entitled to reconsideration based on factual and legal

errors. (Dkt. 91 at 2.)

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2

 To prevail on a fair cross-section claim, a litigant must prove: “ (1) t hat t he group

alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in t he community; (2) that the representation

of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation

to the number of such persons in t he community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is

due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri,

439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation

in the jury selection process, a defendant also must show discriminatory intent. See

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.

1998).

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Claim 5

The Court denied Claim 5 on the merits. (Dkt. 90 at 28-29.) In t hat claim, Petitioner

alleged that the state supreme court “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent” by

failing to find that his Sixth and Fourt eenth Amendment rights to a master jury pool

representing a fair cross-section of the community and equal protection were violated.

(Dkts. 56 at 17; 40 at 57-65.) Specifically, he alleged that the Mohave County Jury

Commissioner, Linda Seapy, improperly excused or disqualified persons from the master

jury p ool who, in response to a questionnaire regarding their availability to serve, indicated

they were unwilling to sit in judgment of others for religious reasons. (Dkt. 56 at 60.) This

Court concluded that Petitioner failed to allege any of t he criteria necessary to state a fair

cross-section or equal protection claim, including in relevant part, the improper exclusion

of a “ dist inct ive” group in the community.2 (Dkt. 90 at 29.) In a footnote, the Court stated

that: 

T he only “group” to which Petitioner specifically refers as possibly having

been excluded includes those whose religious beliefs preclude them from

sitting in judgment of others. Similarit y among such jurors’ beliefs fails to

satisfy the “distinctive group” requirement. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476

U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (“groups defined solely in terms of shared at t it udes that

would prevent or substantially impair members of the group from performing

their duties as jurors . . . are not ‘distinctive groups’ for fair-cross-sect ion

purposes.”).

(Id., n. 15.)

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3

 Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, McCree does not hold that parties are entitled

to question prospective venire members before they may be excused as not qualified to

serve.

4

 Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 652 (1987), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412

(1985), cited by Petitioner, are not to the contrary. Both concerned challenges for cause

during voir dire, not fair cross-section challenges to the composition of the venire,

although the dissent in Witt treated death qualification as a violation of t he fair crosssection requirement. Witt, 469 U.S. at 439-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

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Petitioner argues that the Court misconst rued and misapplied McCree, which he

maintains stands for the proposition that “ both sides ‘must be given the opportunity to

identify . . . prospective jurors [who oppose capital punishment] by questioning them at

voir dire about their views of the death penalty.’” (Dkt. 91 at 2.) McCree concerned

whether excusing prosp ect ive jurors for cause during voir dire based on their opposition

to the death penalty violated the fair cross-section clause.3 The Supreme Court held that

it did not, stating that the Constitution does not prohibit “ t he removal for cause, prior to

t he guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposit ion t o t he

death penalty was so strong t hat it would prevent or substantially impair the performance

of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase.” 476 U.S. at 165. In so holding, it

determined that shared attitudes among prospective jurors against the death penalty was

not sufficient to establish that they were members of a distinctive group for purposes of

t he fair cross-section clause.4

 Id. In this case, the Court concluded that prospective venire

members who expressed an unwillingness to sit in judgment of ot hers, i.e., who shared an

attitude against judging others, did not constitute a “distinctive group” for p urp oses of

a fair cross-sect ion and equal protection challenge. Petitioner has not demonstrated that

the Court clearly erred. Accordingly, reconsideration will be denied. 

Claim 7

Claim 7 alleges that the trial court ’s denial of a defense request for access to the

crime scene, in light of the alleged denial of adequate funds to retain experts, violated his

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Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt . 40 at 65-67.) The Court denied evidentiary

development in support of this claim because it is subject to review on the state court

record. (Dkt. 90 at 30-31.) Petitioner argues t his claim is subject to de novo review because

the state court’s resolution is not entitled to deference, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and

Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475 (7t h Cir. 2004). However, even if subject to de novo

review, Petitioner fails to explain how t hat entitles him to evidentiary development of a

record-based claim. Reconsideration will be denied. 

Claim 44

In Claim 44, Petitioner alleged the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by failing to replace counsel desp ite irreconcilable conflicts. (Dkt. 40

at 147-52.) The Court found this claim procedurally barred based on the PCR court’s

finding that it was precluded under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) because it could have been

raised on direct ap peal. (Dkt. 90 at 17.) Petitioner seeks reconsideration because the Court

did not address his arguments that the trial court’s ruling was not adequate to bar federal

habeas review of the claim. (Dkt. 91 at 7-9.) 

The crux of Petitioner’s argument is t hat Claim 44 is, in essence, a claim concerning

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). As such, the claim could not have been raised

on ap p eal because the Arizona Supreme Court has stated IAC claims should be presented

in post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 2, 39 P.3d 525, 526

(2002); State v. At wood, 171 Ariz. 576, 599, 832 P.2d 593, 616 (1992); accord Lambright v.

Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203-1204 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the state supreme court has

clarified that IAC claims should be raised in post-convict ion proceedings). However, Claim

44 is not an IAC claim. Rather, in both his habeas petition and his state PCR petition,

Petitioner alleged t hat the trial court erred by failing to appoint different counsel with

whom Petitioner did not have irreconcilable differences; Petitioner did not assert that

counsel with whom he allegedly had irreconcilable differences rendered ineffective

assistance.

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Under Arizona law, challenges to a trial court’s failure to appoint new counsel on

the basis of irreconcilable differences are properly raised on direct appeal, as the PCR court

found. See e.g., State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 119 P.3d 448, 453-55 (2005) (citing cases);

State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 342-43, 93 P.3d 1056, 1058-59 (2004) (trial court has obligation

to inquire into fact ual basis for a defendant’s request to appoint new counsel); State v.

Moody, 192 Ariz. 507, 968 P.2d 578 (1998) (challenge to trial court’s failure to substitute

counsel based on irreconcilable differences reviewed on direct appeal); cf. M urray, 184

Ariz. at 27, 906 P.2d at 560 (supreme court noted that the trial court held a hearing

concerning alleged irreconcilable differences and determined that trial court had not

abused its discretion in denying Petitioner hybrid representation). Petitioner has not cited

any Arizona case indicating that a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a motion to

substitute counsel based on irreconcilable differences should be raised in PCR

proceedings. Therefore, the Court denies reconsideration of its ruling that Claim 44 is

procedurally barred.

 Claim 45

The Court denied evidentiary development in support of Claim 45. In t his claim,

Petitioner alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective

assistance of counsel were violated by counsel sleep ing during portions of his trial. (Dkt.

40 at 152-53.) Although the state PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on the claim (PCR

doc. 8, tab 12 at 28), Petitioner requested a federal evidentiary hearing to “submit t he same

testimony [from the state evidentiary hearing] and perhaps some additional testimony from

jurors” and “to admit the testimony of Judge Chavez depending upon his deposition

testimony.” (Dkt. 72 at 30.) The Court determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prohibited an

evidentiary hearing because Petitioner had not demonstrated diligence for his failure to

present evidence not presented to t he state court during the PCR hearing. (Dkt. 90 at 32.)

In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner seeks to “wit hdraw” his request for

evidentiary development of Claim 45, thereby by p assing the prohibition on evidentiary

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develop ment set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Instead, he seeks a federal court hearing

to re-present the same evidence present ed in state court in order to show that the state

court’s findings were unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

This Court’s general procedures order permit t ed the filing of evidentiary

development motions to enable the Court to determine early on in the case whether

extensive investigation and discovery would be necessary to develop any of Petitioner’s

claims. Petitioner concedes that no such development is necessary for this claim. Rather,

he asks the Court to hold a hearing to assess whether the state court’s findings of fact are

unreasonable. In his view, the state court’s hearing was not full and fair.

The Court is not presently in a position to determine the propriety of holding such

a hearing because it has not yet fully reviewed the state court record in this matter. Upon

doing so, the Court will, pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, determine

for itself whether a hearing is warranted to assess the reasonableness of the state court’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 8, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“If the petition is not

dismissed, the judge must review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court

proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an

evidentiary hearing is warranted.”) (emphasis added). In the event the Court concludes

that a hearing is necessary, it will notify t he parties. Because Petitioner no longer seeks

evidentiary develop ment with respect to Claim 45, reconsideration of the Court’s order

denying evidentiary development will be denied. 

Claim 48

In Claim 48, Pet it ioner alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to present exculpatory evidence. Specifically, he alleged that John Anthony, in a

stat ement given to police shortly after the murders, reported seeing three men, who differed

in appearance from Petitioner and his brother and had a different car than theirs, outside

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5

 Anthony also reported driving by that location several hours later and noting that,

contrary to usual, the lights remained on inside.

6

 He also argued in his Traverse that counsel would have learned, if he had

interviewed Mr. Anthony, that Anthony’s wife heard a man threaten victim Dean Morrison

the day before the murders. Petitioner did not develop facts during his state PCR

proceedings regarding the extent of trial counsel’s efforts to locate or interview the

Anthonys. 

7

 Pet it ioner does not cite the record to support this contention and he concedes

that t his defense “may not have been articulated at trial.” (Dkt. 91 at 14.) Petitioner’s PCR

counsel stat ed t hat “ t here was very little ‘theory of defense’” at trial, but that his attorneys

at least argued that he was innocent and that the murders must have been committed by

someone else. (PCR pet at 18.) Robert’s trial counsel testified that “ basically the theory

of the defense that we p resented at trial was that the reason that [Robert] had the money

from Grasshopper Junction is they [Robert and Roger] had somehow gotten to

Grasshopper Junction, the bodies were there which would explain the physical evidence

found in the car, but that they didn’t commit the murders.” (Dkt . 64, ex. A at 8-9.) She

stated that testimony from Anthony that he had seen other persons at Grasshop p er

Junction shortly before the murders would have supported that theory. (Id. at 9-10.) 

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the victims’ Grasshop p er Junction store and home the night of the murders.5

 Petitioner

argued that there was a reasonable probabilit y of a different outcome if counsel had

presented this evidence.6 The Court denied the claim on the merits after concluding that

Petitioner could not establish prejudice. (Dkt. 90 at 36.) Petitioner seeks reconsideration

based on the Court’s statement that t he defense theory at trial was that the Murrays

burglarized the victims’ store and home after finding the victims already dead. (Id. at 34.)

Petitioner argues that the defense theory at trial actually was that the Murrays stole items

belonging to the victims which they found inside a tow truck, abandoned miles from

Grasshopper Junction, that belonged to victim Dean Morrison.7

 However, a different

outcome based on the allegedly exculpatory evidence is no more reasonably probable

under that theory. 

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8

 As described in the opinion on direct appeal, “[t]he blood on Roger’s pants could

have come from either victim or Robert, but not from Roger. T he blood on Robert’s shirt

could have come from either victim, but not from Robert or Roger. The blood on the

cushion could have come from [victim Jackie] Appelhans, but not Morrison, Robert, or

Roger.” Murray, 184 Ariz. at 22, 906 P.2d at 555.

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As the Court described previously, in addition to possessing the murder weapons,

expended and unexpended shotgun shells, and a bloody couch cushion cover taken from

the victims’ home, Petitioner and his brother had blood on their clothing that was

consist ent with the victims’ blood types8

 and footprints consistent with the Murrays’

shoes were intermingled with footprints of one of the victims at their home. (Id. at 34-35.)

For there to be a reasonable probability of a different outcome under the theory that the

Murrays were never at Grasshopper Junction, jurors would have to believe that the victims

were murdered at their home by unknown persons, who left footprints consistent with the

footwear worn by Petitioner and his brot her. They would also have to believe that the

killers took the murder weapons, expended and unexpended shotgun shells, money , the

couch cushion cover, keys to another of Morrison’s vehicles and placed them in

Morrison’s tow truck before abandoning the tow truck miles away and leaving the stolen

items inside. Further, jurors would have t o believe that the Murrays then happened upon

the abandoned tow truck, took the weapons, shotgun shells, money, keys, couch cushion

cover, and the tow truck scanner and knob and, in the process, got the victims’ and/or their

own blood on their clot hing, before being pulled over for unrelated reasons by police on

the opposite side of the state. A different outcome was not reasonably probable under this

theory if the allegedly exculpatory evidence had been presented. To the extent that

Petitioner otherwise seeks reconsideration, he fails to present new facts or law t o support

his request. Reconsideration will be denied. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Pet itioner’s motion for reconsideration regarding Claims 5, 7,

44, 45 and 48 is DENIED. (Dkt. 91.) 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of this

Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-

3329. 

DATED this 26th day of January, 2006.

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