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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3169

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Radu Rasidescu, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

Globe College, Inc.; Carin Wolchock, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: July 7, 2004

Filed: July 26, 2004

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Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Radu Rasidescu appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of

Rasidescu's breach-of-contract and civil rights action for failure to prosecute.

Rasidescu brought the action against Globe College, where he was an instructor, and

his supervisor, Carin Wolchock. When defendants failed timely to answer, the

district court entered default against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

55(a). On defendants’ motion, however, the court set aside the default entry under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). The court also denied Rasidescu’s motion to

recuse the district judge. 

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Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Rasidescu’s filings did

not comport with multiple federal rules. The district court entered an order granting

Rasidescu leave to amend his complaint “to conform with Rules 8 and 9 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Although Rasidescu filed an amended complaint,

the court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute, stating

Rasidescu had an opportunity to conform his pleading with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and he had not done so. 

On appeal, Rasidescu argues the district judge should have recused himself,

based on Rasidescu’s belief the court had contacted defendants about the pending

action. We hold the court properly denied Rasidescu’s motion to recuse, because

there was no support for his belief. See Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d

661, 664 (8th Cir. 2003). Turning to Rasidescu’s challenge of the district court’s

order setting aside the default entry, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion

because defendants made an ample showing of excusable neglect due to their goodfaith mistake in misconstruing both of Rasidescu’s filings to relate to a pending statecourt action involving the same parties. See Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140

F.3d 781, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1998). Contrary to Rasidescu’s assertion, in ruling on the

motion to set aside the default, the court did not abuse its discretion in considering

the affidavit and motion arguments of defense counsel. See McMillian/McMillian,

Inc. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 319, 320 (8th Cir. 1997).

Nevertheless, we conclude the district court committed clear error in finding

Rasidescu did not comply with Rule 8, and abused its discretion in dismissing with

prejudice on that ground. See Avionic Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 957 F.2d 555,

558 (8th Cir. 1992) (standard); Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I-Blackbird Bend Area,

933 F.2d 1462, 1468 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1991).

Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction, and it is appropriate when a plaintiff

willfully or deliberately disobeys a court order. See Hunt v. City of Minneapolis,

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Minn., 203 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 2000); First Gen. Res. Co. v. Elton Leather Corp.,

958 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 

Although the district court’s dismissal order was not specific, we construe the

dismissal to be a sanction for Rasidescu’s failure to comply with the court’s earlier

order directing him to amend his complaint to conform with Rule 8. Rasidescu’s

complaint and amended complaint should be liberally construed, see Atkinson v.

Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), and his accompanying

affidavit should be considered as part of the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). In

the affidavit attached to the original complaint, Rasidescu presented a narrative of

events concerning his employment and his treatment, and claimed the defendants

discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, religion, and national origin; he also

claimed breach of state contract law. As amended, the complaint made clear that

Rasidescu's claims were based on federal employment law and various state laws. 

In our view, Rasidescu’s complaint gave defendants fair notice of his claims

and the basis for those claims, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002);

set forth a short and plain statement of jurisdiction, his claims, and his entitlement to

relief, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); and each allegation was simple, concise, and direct,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Considering Rasidescu's pro se status and language

difficulties, we conclude he satisfied the requirements of Rule 8, and the district court

abused its discretion in dismissing his action for non-compliance. See Miles v. Ert.,

722 F.2d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal where pleadings

alleging employer discriminated against plaintiff narrated sequence of events that

arguably gave rise to a cause of action and could be addressed by responsive

pleading). 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal and remand for further

proceedings in conformity with this opinion. 

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