Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02218/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv2218

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ESPINOZA, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv2218-LAB (RBB)

ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY

vs. OR ABSTAIN FROM ACTION

CITY OF IMPERIAL, a public entity; and

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

I. Background

John Espinoza, a former police officer, alleges he was wrongfully terminated by the

City of Imperial following a psychological examination. He seeks both damages and

injunctive relief based on claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and

retaliation under the Americans With Disabilities Act. 

Espinoza first challenged his termination through an administrative hearing before the

City Council that began on November 15, 2007. Five days later, Espinoza filed this action.

Although the administrative hearing totaled just 3 days, the City Council did not reach a

decision until April 29, 2009. It upheld the termination. On July 24, 2009, Espinoza filed a

Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus, seeking review of the decision of the City

Council to uphold his termination. By then, Espinoza had already amended his federal

//

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07cv2218

complaint to include a civil rights violation claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a state

claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). 

Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay or abstain from action.

Defendants urge this Court to abstain from hearing this case under the abstention doctrines

of either Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), or

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Specifically, Defendants claim that state proceedings

were initiated prior to the filing of the original federal complaint in this case, that the state

proceedings arise out of the same factual situation and involve the same legal issues as this

case, and that the state proceedings were therefore pending when the federal complaint was

filed. 

Abstention is not warranted, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion

is DENIED. 

II. Discussion

A. Colorado River Abstention 

The Supreme Court has recognized that under extraordinary circumstances, federal

courts may stay cases involving questions of federal law where a concurrent state action is

pending in which the identical issues are raised. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 815 (1976).

Abstention is “an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to

adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,

728 (1996); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,

359 (1989) (explaining that abstention remains the exception, not the rule). Typically, federal

courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon

them. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. 

The Court made clear in Colorado River that “[g]enerally . . . the pendency of an

action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal

court having jurisdiction.” Id. at 817. It also identified a number of factors that federal courts

may take into account in deciding whether or not to invoke the abstention doctrine in

extraordinary circumstances, mindful that there is no rule requiring federal court abstention

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv2218

in a given case. Those factors include: (1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction

over any property at issue; (2) possible inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the

desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (3) and the order in which jurisdiction was

obtained by the concurrent forums. See id. at 818. Since Colorado River was decided, the

Court has added two more factors that bear on the abstention question: whether state or

federal law controls and whether the state proceeding is adequate to protect the parties’

rights. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-27

(1980). No one factor is determinative, and judgments should take into account both the

obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors weighing against the

exercise of jurisdiction. Colorado River, 424 at 818-19. 

Of these six factors, Defendants make the most of the fact that Espinoza sought

administrative review of his termination just five days before filing this action. The order in

which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora is just one factor to consider, however,

and the Court doubts that an administrative review by a city council is the type of concurrent

state court action contemplated by Colorado River, let alone whether this is the kind of

exceptional circumstance that warrants abstention. Espinoza’s claims were never pending

before a state court until July 24, 2009, when he sought a writ of mandamus from the state

superior court to review the City Council’s decision, and when his federal action had been

pending for over a year. Defendants’ assertion that the state proceedings in this case are

already “far advanced” is undermined by the fact that the City Council’s hearing totaled just

three days over 2007, 2008, and 2009. (Dkt. 59, p. 1-2). Furthermore, Defendants do not

argue that any of the other factors enumerated in Colorado River support a finding that this

is an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting a stay. 

Defendants also fail to recognize the general reluctance of district courts to abstain

from hearing cases in which monetary damages are sought under federal civil rights laws

such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9 Cir.

th

1997). The § 1983 cause of action was meant to provide litigants with a federal forum in

which to vindicate federal rights when relief may not be adequate in state courts. See id. at.

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07cv2218

782. In this case, Espinoza amended his original complaint on March 12, 2008 — again,

well before this case landed in state court — to include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Dkt. 3, p. 19.) 

Civil rights actions such as the one that Espinoza brings here are precisely the kinds

of claims that federal courts have found to be ideally suited for federal jurisdiction. The mere

fact that a three day administrative hearing was conducted over a three-year time span, and

a writ of mandamus was filed in state court earlier this year is insufficient to justify abstention

under the Colorado River doctrine. Espinoza received a right to sue letter from the E.E.O.C.

and his complaint is rightly before this Court.

B. Younger Abstention

Defendants also contend that if this Court denies abstention under Colorado River,

it should abstain from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger

v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not enjoin pending state court

criminal proceedings, even if there is an allegation of a constitutional violation and even

though all jurisdictional requirements for federal court are met. Id. Since Younger was

decided, the Court has expanded the doctrine beyond the criminal context, applying it to

prevent federal courts from interfering with state civil and administrative proceedings as well.

See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 363 (1976) (federalism considerations limit federal court

review of police department practices). 

Defendant relies on a four-factor test used by the Ninth Circuit in Gilbertson v.

Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977–78 (9 Cir. 2004) (en banc), to show that Younger abstention th

is warranted here. Under the test, a federal civil proceeding would interfere with a state

proceeding contrary to the dictates of Younger if: (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing;

(2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred

from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court

action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so. Id. Defendants

argue that each one of these factors is met in this case. The Court disagrees. 

//

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07cv2218

With regard to the first factor enumerated in Gilbertson — whether a state-initiated

proceeding is ongoing — the fact-finding portion of Espinoza’s administrative review has

concluded. He is now appealing the decision of the City Council in state court, and it is

unlikely that the state court will add to the factual findings of the administrative hearing at the

appellate phase. Therefore, the disruption of state proceedings is likely to be minimal, and

the only way in which the matter is ongoing is that the request for mandamus remains on the

docket of the state court. 

Secondly, Defendants’ argument that this proceeding implicates important state

interests is not persuasive. Defendants argue that the important state issue in this case is

the elimination of disability discrimination, and the public entity’s ability to terminate a police

officer found to be unfit for duty. (Dkt. 59, p. 7.) However, under Defendants’ own authority,

the Ninth Circuit has stated that the state interests involved in civil proceedings meriting

Younger abstention are “akin to those involved in criminal prosecutions.” Gilbertson, 381

F.3d at 975. Defendants do little to liken the interests at issue here to the important state

interests typically involved in criminal proceedings. 

With regard to the opportunity of the plaintiff to litigate constitutional issues in the state

proceedings, the Court believes that because Espinoza has asserted a federal civil rights

claim under § 1983, he should be entitled to argue his claim in federal court. Plaintiffs are

not precluded from bringing § 1983 claims in federal court just because state proceedings

might be adequate for resolving those claims. This Court is likely to be better suited to

determine whether the Defendants violated Espinoza’s constitutional rights. The City

Council’s administrative review was likely more concerned with determining whether or not

Defendants’ termination of Espinoza was pretext for discrimination on the basis of perceived

disability, which is separate from the constitutional claims raised by Espinoza’s § 1983

action.

Finally, the Court does not believe that continued federal jurisdiction over Espinoza’s

case would have the same practical effect as an injunction against the state proceedings.

Defendants argue that the simultaneous existence of this action and the state proceeding

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07cv2218

raises the “specter of inconsistent rulings.” (Dkt. 59, p. 9.) The Court is perplexed as to how

inconsistent rulings would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceeding. Rather,

the “specter of inconsistent rulings” appears to be more threatening to Espinoza’s interests

than to the interests of the state in maintaining jurisdiction over the case. If in fact

Espinoza’s proceedings in state court come to a resolution before his federal action does—a

likely result—he risks being bound by the judgment of the state court under the doctrines of

res judicata or collateral estoppel. See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d

1143, 1152 (9 Cir. 2007) (recognizing that abstention not warranted where federal action th

does not enjoin state proceeding, although collateral estoppel may bind litigant to state court

judgment). 

Here, Espinoza seeks primarily compensatory and punitive damages—remedies that

are not the virtual equivalent of an injunction. If Espinoza sought primarily declaratory relief,

the Court might be more willing to abstain or stay under Younger because such relief might

be tantamount to an injunction against the state proceedings. However, Espinoza seeks

primarily monetary relief under § 1983 to compensate him for his termination, and the Court

has an unflagging obligation to hear claims that are properly before it. See id. at 1153.

Even if the Court were to decide Espinoza’s claim in a way that would have preclusive

effect on the state court’s review of the decision of the city council, abstention under Younger

would not be necessary. The Ninth Circuit in AmerisourceBergen noted that “the possibility

of a race to judgment is inherent in a system of dual sovereigns, and in the absence of

exceptional’ circumstances . . . that possibility alone is insufficient to overcome the weighty

interest in the federal courts exercising their jurisdiction in cases properly before them.” Id.

at 1151, quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. The decision further explained “the

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that federal courts should abstain whenever a suit

involves claims or issues simultaneously being litigated in state court merely because

whichever court rules first will, via the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,

preclude the other from deciding that claim or issue.” Id. at 1151. This Court is free to

//

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 07cv2218

resolve Espinoza’s claims on its own timing without reference to the proceedings in the state

court.

Thus, the Court does not see the need to stay this case under the Younger abstention

doctrine, given the fact that no federal injunction has issued and Defendants have not

offered anything more than a conclusory assertion that federal jurisdiction here would

effectively enjoin the state proceeding in a way that runs afoul of the Younger doctrine. 

III. Conclusion

The Colorado River and Younger abstention doctrines are no help to Defendants.

Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allow plaintiffs to pursue their federal civil rights claims

in federal courts. Defendants’ Motion to Stay or to Abstain from Action is DENIED, and their

motion for summary judgment remains calendared for February 1, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 19, 2009

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-02218-LAB-RBB Document 68 Filed 11/23/09 Page 7 of 7