Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00388/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00388-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY WILLIAM CORTINAS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

BIVIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-CV-0388-WBS-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

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concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following parties as defendants: (1) Correctional Officer (CO) 

Bivin; (2) Correctional Sergeant (CS) Rios; (3) CO Reynolds; (4) Associate Warden Stewart; and 

(5) CO Dhillion. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff asserts three claims. 

Claim I

Plaintiff alleges that his rights to equal protection were violated by CO Bivin, CS 

Rios, and CO Reynolds. See id. at 3. Plaintiff contends that on September 21, 2021, at 9:00 AM 

CO Bivin commanded Plaintiff to get out of his wheelchair. See id. After CS repeated the 

command, Plaintiff complied and surrendered the chair. See id. Plaintiff states that he was 

forced to walk 100 yards with his cane to attend his court appearance, which took over twenty 

minutes and caused him to miss his appointment. See id. Plaintiff asserts he then asked CO 

Reynolds if he could use the wheelchair to get back, but CO Reynolds ordered him to “man-up 

and walk back.” 

Plaintiff states that he tried to walk back but fell. See id. Plaintiff alleges that he 

was placed in a neck collar and gurney, but during transport he “was dropped upon his head.” 

See id. Further, Plaintiff contends that unknown officers threatened the doctor and forced 

Plaintiff to be returned to the prison without receiving care. Plaintiff states that on November 15, 

2021, a “neurosurgeon stated cervical surgery to replace C-5-6, C-6-7 disc was required” and this 

diagnosis was affirmed on March 14, 2022. See id. Plaintiff alleges that he never has been 

provided surgery nor received pain medication for the injury. 

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Claim II

Plaintiff contends that CO Dhillion violated his constitutional rights by using 

excessive force against him. See ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 

8, 2021, CO Dhillion shut the power cell door which pressed Plaintiff’s shoulders between the 

door frame and wall. See id. Plaintiff indicates he had trouble filing a report but was eventually 

able to have Associate Warden Stewart contact a doctor and schedule surgery for January 7, 2022. 

See id. Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to California Medical Facility on January 7, 2022, 

to receive the surgery. Plaintiff then contends that the surgery was cancelled by Associate 

Warden Stewart “as reprisal over [Plaintiff’s] filing [of] the staff complaint against associate 

Warden Stewart side girl correctional officer Dhillion.” See id. 

Claim III

Plaintiff’s final claim is a retaliation claim based on the same facts discussed in his 

second claim. See id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the transfer to California Medical Facility caused 

him to contract Covid-19. See id. Plaintiff also claims that the surgery was cancelled to retaliate 

against Plaintiff, and as a result he lost his ability to walk. See id. 

II. DISCUSSION

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable excessive force claim 

in Claim II against Defendant Dhillion arising from the incident on November 8, 2021, and a 

cognizable retaliation claim in Claim III against Defendant Stewart based on cancellation of 

Plaintiff’s surgery. The Court also finds, however, that Plaintiff’s complaint suffers a number of 

defects, each of which is discussed in more detail below. First, Plaintiff’s Claim I fails to allege 

sufficient facts to sustain an equal protection claim against any defendant. Second, Plaintiff’s 

complaint fails to allege any facts to establish the liability of Defendants Rios, who is a

supervisory employee but not mentioned in the complaint. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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A. Equal Protection

 In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bivin, Reynolds, and Rios violated his 

equal protection rights by forcing him to walk with a cane instead of allowing Plaintiff to use a 

wheelchair. 

 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from 

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security 

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also 

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial 

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the 

disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 

(9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender). 

 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 

discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 

such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 

of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 

F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

/ / /

/ / /

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 Here, Plaintiff has not included any allegations as to Defendant Rios and Plaintiff 

fails to allege that Defendants Reynolds or Bivin acted with intentional discrimination. Nor has 

Plaintiff alleged the absence of any legitimate penological reason for Defendants’ conduct. 

Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to clarify his equal protection claim. 

B. Supervisor Liability

 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 

knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 

officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 

and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 

personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 

liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 

Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 

civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 

 As mentioned above, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any allegations related 

to Defendant Rios. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 

/ / / 

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 

Dated: July 25, 2023 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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