Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00039/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KATHY SUMMERLIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICES, 

et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 2:15-cv-00039-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The court has before it Defendant Shellpoint Mortgage Services’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. # 14), filed April 24, 2015. Shellpoint filed a Brief in 

Support of its Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 15). Plaintiff1had the opportunity to file a responsive 

brief but did not do so. Therefore, Shellpoint’s Motion is ripe for review. For the reasons 

outlined below, the court finds that the Motion is due to be granted and this case is due to be 

dismissed with prejudice.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff brought this case pro se to stop foreclosure of her home in Jefferson County, 

Alabama, and alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (“RESPA”) and the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) relating to a notice of service transfer, violations 

 

1

Plaintiffs Tommy and Kathy Summerlin initially brought this case. (Doc. # 1-2). The court dismissed 

Plaintiff Tommy Summerlin from this case with its June 15, 2015 Order upon notice of his death. (Doc. # 18). 

Kathy Summerlin is now the sole Plaintiff.

FILED

 2016 Feb-29 PM 12:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 1 of 24
2

of the FDCPA concerning a pre-foreclosure notice, and fraud upon origination of her mortgage 

loan, among other things. The court discerns the following allegations supporting those claims 

from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and the many, non-enumerated exhibits attached to the 

Amended Complaint.2

On May 6, 2008, Plaintiff received a loan from Empire Equity Group Inc. d/b/a 1st 

Metropolitan Mortgage, which was secured by a mortgage and promissory note (the “Note”). 

(Doc. # 13). The agent and payee on the Note was Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. 

(“TB&W”). (Id.). The Note was supported by a Direct Endorsement Approval for a HUD/FHAInsured Mortgage. (Id.). With an Assignment of Mortgage dated May 6, 2008 (the 

“Assignment”), from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), acting as the 

nominee for TB&W to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”), MERS transferred and 

assigned to BAC, “its successors, transferees, and assigns forever, all right, title and interest of 

[MERS] in and to” Plaintiff’s mortgage. (Id.). Sirote & Permutt, P.C., was the vendor for the 

Assignment. (Id.). 

Bank of America, N.A., thereafter became the successor by merger to BAC, and, utilizing 

the law firm of McFadden, Lyon & Rouse, L.L.C. (“McFadden”), instituted foreclosure actions 

in September 2012. (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff sent McFadden letters disputing Bank of America’s 

ownership of the debt and declaring the debt “null and void.” (Id.). McFadden sent Plaintiff a 

 

2 The Eleventh Circuit directs a court generally to “not consider anything beyond the face of the complaint 

and documents attached thereto when analyzing a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). There 

is “an exception, however, in cases in which a plaintiff refers to a document in its complaint, the document is central 

to its claim, its contents are not in dispute, and the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss.” Id. 

(citation omitted). A document is “undisputed” when its authenticity is not challenged. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 

1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). In this case, Plaintiff refers to many of the documents, both expressly and impliedly, in 

in her Amended Complaint. (See Doc. # 13). Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant produced no transfer 

service notices, but Defendant attaches such a notice to its Motion. (See id.; Doc. # 15-1). No party has disputed the 

authenticity of any of these documents. Accordingly, this court will consider those exhibits which are central to the 

dispute and relevant to the resolution of the Motion. 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 2 of 24
3

letter on February 4, 2013, stating that alternatives to foreclosure exist, but otherwise the 

foreclosure sale is scheduled for March 18, 2013. (Id.). Plaintiff does not state what occurred 

next. However, effective August 1, 2013, Bank of America placed Plaintiff’s account with

Resurgent Mortgage Servicing (“Resurgent”) for mortgage servicing. (Id.). 

On October 30, 2013, Resurgent sent Plaintiff a letter stating that it had not received any 

payments since it began servicing the loan, and that the loan had been past due since January 1, 

2009. (Doc. # 13). Resurgent stated in that letter it had placed a restriction on Plaintiff’s 

account preventing further contact with Plaintiff due to correspondence from her requesting a 

“cease and desist.” (Id.). However, Resurgent stated that if it received no further information 

from Plaintiff within thirty days of the date of the letter’s receipt, it “will assume this dispute is 

resolved.” (Id.). It does not appear Plaintiff sent any more information to Resurgent during that 

time period.

Subsequently, effective March 1, 2014, Resurgent became part of Shellpoint Mortgage 

Servicing (“Defendant” or “Shellpoint”). (Docs. # 13, 15-1). On November 11, 2014, 

Defendant Elizabeth Loefgren of Sirote & Permutt, on behalf of Shellpoint, sent Plaintiff a 

foreclosure notice setting forth the total amount owed on the debt but also providing contact 

information for Plaintiff to discuss alternatives to foreclosure. (Doc. # 13). It appears from Ms. 

Loefgren’s December 12, 2014 letter that she received from Plaintiff a letter on December 8, 

2014.

3

 (Id.). Ms. Loefgren responded to Plaintiff in a letter dated December 12, 2014, stating 

that she forwarded Plaintiff’s letter to Shellpoint for review and a response. (Id.). 

On December 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson 

County, Alabama. (Doc. # 1-2). Defendant removed the case to this court in January 2015. 

 

3 The contents of this December 8, 2014 letter are not stated and that letter is not attached to the Amended 

Complaint. 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 3 of 24
4

(Doc. # 1). Pursuant to the court’s March 19, 2015 Order (Doc # 12), which directed Plaintiff to 

amend her Complaint to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (among other 

things),4Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Loefgren and Shellpoint on 

April 10, 2015.5 (Doc. # 13).

Defendant timely responded by filing a Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. # 14). In its brief, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are 

confusing and do not meet pleading standards ordered by this court and required under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 15). Defendant contends the Amended Complaint 

simply repeats the four causes of action in the original Complaint (the court reads the pleadings 

as including more claims than that), and advances certain arguments as to why all of Plaintiff’s 

claims “lack merit” and should be dismissed with prejudice. (See id.). Further, Defendant 

asserts Plaintiff’s claims misconstrue the law or misstate the facts, and thus fail to state a claim 

for relief, and that some claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.). Defendant includes 

as exhibits a Notice of Transfer of Servicing dated February 14, 2015, and the initial Complaint.6 

(Docs. # 15-1, 15-2).

 

4

Specifically, the court ordered Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. (Doc. # 12). The original Complaint consisted solely of an unmarked, handwritten document that did not 

provide any factual or legal basis for the requested relief, and with several pages of unreferenced correspondence 

attached. (See Doc. # 1-2). The court further ordered that the amended complaint comply with Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 8(a), 8(d)(1), 10(b), and 11(b), and that each count contain no more than one discrete claim for 

relief. (Doc. # 12). Also, the court instructed Plaintiff to set forth factual allegations supporting each discrete claim. 

(Id.). The court stated, “Plaintiff must set forth each claim she is making against Defendants separately, in a short, 

plain statement, containing allegations of fact and referencing the statute or law under which each separate claim is 

brought and the relief sought under each separate claim.” (Id.). The Amended Complaint does not comply with the 

court’s Order.

5 According to the Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting, filed May 26, 2015, Ms. Loefgren “has not been 

served with the Complaint.” (Doc. # 16); (see also Doc. # 1) (“Ms. Loefgren has not been served.”). More than 120 

days have passed since Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint (on April 10, 2015). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

Therefore, the claims against Ms. Loefgren are due to be dismissed without prejudice.

6

See note 2, supra.

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 4 of 24
5

III. The Amended Complaint

The Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading. It is jumbled and difficult to follow. Its 

style is further in violation of the court’s directives in its March 19, 2015 Order instructing 

Plaintiff to amended her pleadings. (Doc. # 12). The court would be entitled to dismiss the 

Complaint on these grounds alone. Nevertheless, the court will also address the other reasons 

why Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed. Construing Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint liberally, the court reads it as setting forth four “sections” presenting seven causes of 

action.

7

 (See Doc. # 13). 

Plaintiff alleges in section one that Shellpoint lacks legal capacity to foreclose on a 

property in Alabama for the following reasons. (Doc. # 13). On November 11, 2014, Ms. 

Loefgren commenced foreclosure actions (i.e., preparing, signing, and sending a Notice of 

Acceleration of a Promissory Note and Mortgage to Plaintiff (the “Notice”)) on Plaintiff’s home 

on behalf of Shellpoint. (Id.). Plaintiff avers that Shellpoint (1) is neither a resident of, nor 

licensed to conduct business in Alabama, and (2) has not obtained a non-residential bond prior to 

or following the sending of the Notice. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff contends Shellpoint has no standing 

to foreclose on Plaintiff’s home. 

Section two sets forth a claim under the FDCPA related to the Notice.8 (Doc. # 13). 

Plaintiff asserts Defendant has no legal entitlement to Plaintiff’s house, and thus violated the 

FDCPA by purportedly threating nonjudicial foreclosure and collection of the mortgage debt. 

(Id.). Plaintiff also appears to aver that the Notice does not follow FDCPA debt collector notice 

 

7 Defendant construes the Amended Complaint to allege four causes of action, but in this court’s liberal 

construction of the Amended Complaint—which is appropriate when a plaintiff brings a case pro se—there are 

seven claims. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

8

It appears Plaintiff’s averments supporting this claim are also based upon allegations made in the first 

section of the Amended Complaint. 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 5 of 24
6

requirements, and that Defendant did not give Plaintiff an opportunity to dispute the debt. (See 

id.). (Note: The allegations appearing in a later section of the Amended Complaint, contending 

that “in September 2013” Plaintiff disputed the debt and declared it “null and void,” seemingly 

contradict the FDCPA claim regarding the Notice. (Id.)). 

Section three is a single paragraph requesting relief for separate violations of the FDCPA 

and RESPA. (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff alleges that Shellpoint failed to provide a service transfer 

notice in violation of RESPA, and, paradoxically, any notices that were given did not comply 

with the FDCPA. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff avers that, prior to receiving a December 22, 2014

notice of sale, the only communications “or knowledge” she had regarding Shellpoint “was 

received in a Notice of Force-placed insurance from the Insurance Dept. on June 7/11/2014 

[sic],” and a similar one received August 20, 2014. (Id.). “The notice stated, Shellpoint 

Mortgage Services was the mortgagee and lienholder on the mortgage in question.” (Id.). 

Further, Plaintiff contends that she had received no communications from Shellpoint or 

Resurgent as required by RESPA or the FDCPA prior to or following August 2014 regarding a 

merger or name change. (Id.). In contradiction of certain of her other allegations, Plaintiff notes 

that “[n]o attempts or efforts were made by Shellpoint related to collection of a debt, either by 

mail or phone.” (Id.). 

Finally, section four references Alabama state law claims of fraud, malice, and 

wantonness, and requests punitive damages. (Doc. # 13). As grounds for these claims, Plaintiff 

asserts she sent to Resurgent in September 2013 a dispute of the mortgage debt, declaring the 

debt “null and void.” (Id.). Plaintiff indicates she alleged in the dispute the mortgage and Note

were counterfeit because, in summary: (1) the mortgage originator was not licensed to originate 

mortgages in Alabama, and the origination “lacked lawful consideration;” (2) the mortgage was 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 6 of 24
7

directly endorsed to the lender and payee TB&W; the Note is “non-negotiable;” (3) TB&W did 

not assign or transfer the Note; (4) the “payee” did not sign the Note; and (5) the mortgage and 

the “titile” were not perfected and were void from the time of origin. (Id.). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff asserts that Shellpoint and its predecessors cannot collect an invalid debt, become 

holders-in-due-course, or foreclose the mortgage; all assignments, transfers, and sales of the 

mortgage were invalid and unsecured; and all threats of foreclosure were unlawful and caused

Plaintiff emotional harm and suffering. (Id.). Plaintiff concludes by claiming, “As this fraud 

occurred in May 2008, plaintiff has suffered far to [sic] much emotional pain, mental suffering 

and worry and can no longer tolerate anymore [sic] abuse.” (Id.).

IV. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the complaint provide Aa short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Accordingly, the complaint must include enough facts Ato raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.@ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that 

contain nothing more than Aa formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action@ do not 

meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon Alabels and 

conclusions@ or Anaked assertion[s]@ without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555, 557. 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Intl. Univ., 495 F.3d 

1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). The court draws all “reasonable inferences” in favor of the 

plaintiff. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 7 of 24
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must Astate a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. AA claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although A[t]he 

plausibility standard is not akin to a >probability requirement,=@ the complaint must demonstrate 

Amore than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.@ Id. A plausible claim for 

relief requires Aenough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 

evidence@ to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

The Supreme Court has identified Atwo working principles@ for a district court to use in 

applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must 

assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to 

accept as true legal conclusions when they are Acouched as [] factual allegation[s].@ Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Second, Aonly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion 

to dismiss.@ Id. Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under prong 

one, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are wellpleaded and assume their veracity; and under prong two, the court must proceed to determine the 

claim=s plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, to survive the 

motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its Ajudicial experience and common sense 

. . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.@ Id. If the court determines that wellpleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be 

dismissed. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 8 of 24
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V. Pro Se Pleadings

When, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the complaint is to be “liberally construed,” 

and the “complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Harney v. McCatur, Inc., No. 11-cv-4103, 2012 WL 

2479630, at *2 (N.D. Ala. June 26, 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 

However, a pro se litigant is not given carte blanche in crafting a pleading; a “pro se plaintiff’s 

complaint must meet the minimum requirements of presenting a viable claim.” Id. (quoting 

Hales v. City of Montgomery, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2004)); see also GJR Invs. 

v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his leniency does not give a 

court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading 

in order to sustain an action.”). In other words, “[o]nce a pro se litigant is in court, [s]he is 

subject to the relevant laws and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Smith v. Fla. Dept. of Corr., 369 Fed. Appx. 36, 38 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Moon v. Newsome, 

863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)). Thus, while the court liberally construes Plaintiff’s 

pleadings and “affords them significant leniency in light of her pro se status, the court may not 

wholly disregard the federal pleading standards and standard of review.” Roberts v. Chase Home 

Fin., No. 12-cv-1883, 2012 WL 2862033, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 22, 2012) (citing Brown v. 

Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Further, a pro se plaintiff “must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint 

before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Carter v. HSBC Mortg. Services, 

Inc., No. 14-11898, 2015 WL 4125602, at *3 (11th Cir. July 9, 2015) (unpublished opinion) 

(quoting Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. 

Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). Consistent 

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 9 of 24
10

with that legal principle, the court offered Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint. 

(Doc. # 12). Although Plaintiff purported to take advantage of this opportunity, she nevertheless 

failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this court’s orders in doing so. 

(See id.; Doc. # 13). Thus, while the court could dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on that basis, it 

concludes below that the Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed for other reasons.

VI. Argument

Plaintiff has alleged seven claims. After careful consideration, the court concludes they 

are all due to be dismissed. Plaintiff’s claims are addressed below.

A. Defendant has standing to foreclose in Alabama

Plaintiff contends that Defendant “is not a resident or licensed to conduct business in 

Alabama,” is not entitled to collect the “invalid” mortgage debt, become a holder-in-due-course, 

or enforce the mortgage in a foreclosure, and avers that the Note is non-negotiable. (Doc. # 13). 

Those allegations are conclusory and fail as a matter of law. 

“In Alabama, a note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument,” and is subject to 

Alabama’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, 

LP, 159 So.3d 47, 55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (citing Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 116 

So.3d 226, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)). The Note in this case is secured by a mortgage on 

Plaintiff’s property. (See Doc. # 13). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s averment that the Note is nonnegotiable is simply off the mark.

9

 

9 Even if the Note were non-negotiable, the Alabama Code provides that “[t]he transfer of a . . . note given 

for the purchase money of lands, whether the transfer be by delivery merely or in writing, expressed to be with or 

without recourse on the transferor, passes to the transferee the lien of the vendor of the lands.” Ala. Code § 8-5-24. 

Thus, a non-negotiable note “given for the purchase money of lands” may be transferred, which would allow the 

transferee the right to enforce the terms of that note. Id. Accordingly, Defendant would still have the right to 

foreclose on the Note even if it were non-negotiable.

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 10 of 24
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Alabama’s Uniform Commercial Code defines a “[p]erson entitled to enforce” a 

negotiable instrument as “(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the 

instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument 

who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 7-3-309 or 7-3-418(d).” Thomas, 

116 So.3d at 233 (citing Ala. Code. § 7-3-301). A “holder” is “a person in possession if the 

instrument is payable to bearer.” Id. (citing Ala. Code § 7-1-201(21)). If a note has been 

indorsed in blank, it “becomes payable to ‘bearer’ and may be negotiated by transfer of 

possession alone . . . .” Id. (citing Ala. Code § 7-3-205(b)). “Possession of a note payable to 

order and indorsed in blank is prima facie evidence of ownership. Id. (citing Berney v. Steiner, 

19 So. 806, 807 (Ala. 1896)); see also Perry v. Fed. Natl. Mortg. Assn., 100 So.3d 1090, 1095 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (“A blank indorsement allows a party to transfer a note merely by 

possession.”) (citing Ala. Code §§ 7-3-201(b), 7-3-205(b)). 

Plaintiff alleges that the “mortgage was directly endorsed to [TB&W].” (Doc. # 13). The

court reads this statement as averring the Note was either not endorsed in blank, not transferable, 

or to make both assertions. However, in her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff avers that TB&W 

was the lender and payee, the Note was endorsed to TB&W, and the “payee” did not sign the 

Note.10 (Id.). In any event, Plaintiff’s averments suggest the Note was endorsed in blank.11 (See 

id.); see also Graveling v. BankUnited N.A., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1253-54 (N.D. Ala. 2013); 

Ala. Code § 7-3-205(b). 

 

10 Plaintiff did not attach to her Amended Complaint the third of three pages of the Note, which is 

presumably the absent signature page. (See Doc. # 13). The Note is a “Multistate FHA Fixed Rate Note.” A 

standard example of such a note is available from FannieMae at https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/notes. 

The third page on the standard note is the signature page. Nevertheless, Plaintiff did attach a Direct Endorsement 

Approval for a HUD/FHA-Insured Mortgage that TB&W did not sign. (Doc. # 13).

11 Plaintiff also expressly stated in the initial Complaint that the note was indorsed in blank. (Doc. # 1-2). 

While Defendant points out this admission in its Motion to Dismiss, the court need not consider whether Plaintiff is 

judicially estopped from denying it because Plaintiff makes a similar, albeit slightly less direct admission in her 

Amended Complaint. (Docs. # 13, 15); cf. Ward v. AMS Serv., LLC, 606 Fed. Appx. 506, 508-510 (11th Cir. 2015).

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 11 of 24
12

Plaintiff attached to the Amended Complaint a copy of the Note and a copy of the 

Assignment. (Doc. # 13). In the Assignment, MERS, acting as the nominee for TB&W (the 

agent for the lender), assigned or transferred to BAC and “its successors, transferees, and assigns 

forever, all right, title and interest of [MERS] in and to” Plaintiff’s mortgage, “together with the 

note and indebtedness secured by the Mortgage.” (Id.). The court recognizes that the MERS 

system “operates as follows:”

When a home is purchased, the lender obtains from the borrower a promissory 

note and a mortgage instrument naming MERS as the mortgagee (as nominee for 

the lender and its successors and assigns). In the mortgage, the borrower assigns 

his right, title, and interest in the property to MERS, and the mortgage instrument 

is then recorded in the local land records with MERS as the named mortgagee.

When the promissory note is sold (and possibly re-sold) in the secondary 

mortgage market, the MERS database tracks that transfer. As long as the parties 

involved in the sale are MERS members, MERS remains the mortgagee of record 

(thereby avoiding recording and other transfer fees that are otherwise associated 

with the sale) and continues to act as an agent for the new owner of the 

promissory note.

In re: Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (MERS) Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370 n. 6 (J.P.M.L.

2009). “Through this system, MERS attempts to separate the promissory note evidencing the 

debt from the mortgage that is collateral or security for the note. According to MERS, the lender 

takes possession of and holds the note, which may be subsequently assigned multiple times 

through multiple note owners.” Fuller v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 

1257, 1265-66 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, the court 

reasonably infers that the Assignment indicates that the Note was endorsed in blank, and 

consequently is (currently) owned by Defendant.12 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has 

pleaded no facts to indicate otherwise. (See Doc. # 13).

 

12 Additionally, the Assignment directly contradicts Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that “[n]o 

assignment, sale or transfer was issued to another party by [TW&B],” and “[a]ll assignments, transfers and sales of 

said mortgage are invalid and not secured by real property.” (Doc. # 13).

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 12 of 24
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Under Alabama Code § 35-10-12,13 “any person or entity who, before initiating 

foreclosure proceedings, becomes a holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage and 

thereby is entitled to the payment of the mortgage debt may validly foreclose upon a borrower’s 

default.”14 Sturdivant, 159 So.3d at 55 (citing Perry, 100 So.3d at 1094, Ala. Code § 35-10-12) 

(emphasis in original). In other words, “[a] holder of a note secured by a mortgage is entitled to 

enforce the terms of the note.” Id. (citing Perry, 100 So.3d at 1094). The holder of a mortgage 

in Alabama is not required to be qualified to do business in Alabama in order to enforce the 

mortgage. See Midwest Homes Acceptance Corp. v. Langdon, 253 So.2d 29, 30-31 (Ala. 1971) 

(holding that Alabama law “permit[s] foreign corporations to lend money to residents of 

Alabama and to take security for such loans in the form of mortgages on real property located 

within the state, and to enforce such obligations in the courts of Alabama”). Therefore, 

Defendant may foreclose on Plaintiff’s property regardless of whether it is licensed to do 

business in Alabama.

Furthermore, Alabama’s “[S]upreme [C]ourt held that ‘[i]t is not at all necessary that a 

mortgage deed be assigned in order to enable the owner of the debt to foreclose under a power of 

 

13 Section 35-10-12 provides:

Where a power to sell lands is given in any mortgage, the power is part of the security and may be 

executed by any person, or the personal representative of any person who, by assignment or 

otherwise, becomes entitled to the money thus secured. A conveyance of the lands sold under such 

power of sale to the purchaser at the sale may be executed by the mortgagee, their agents, attorneys 

or any person making the sale. Such conveyance vests the legal title of the lands sold under the 

power of sale to the purchaser at the sale. Probate judges shall index foreclosure deeds by the name 

of the original grantor and grantee in the mortgage, deed of trust, or other conveyance intended to 

secure the payment of money, and also by the names of the grantor and grantee in the foreclosure 

deed.

Ala. Code § 35-10-12.

14 Pursuant to Alabama law, a mortgagee has various remedies upon a mortgagor’s default, including 

obtaining a judgment on the note secured by the mortgage, or taking separate action to foreclose the mortgage. See 

Triple J. Cattle, Inc. v. Chambers, 551 So.2d 280, 282 (Ala. 1989). These remedies include foreclosure by power of 

sale of the mortgage. See Ala. Code §§ 35-10-11 – 35-10-16.

Case 2:15-cv-00039-RDP Document 22 Filed 02/29/16 Page 13 of 24
14

sale.’” Perry, 100 So.3d at 1095 (quoting Harton v. Little, 57 So. 851, 851 (Ala. 1911)). “The 

power of sale is a part of the security, and may be exercised by an assignee, or any person who is 

entitled to the mortgage debt. And a transfer of the debt, by writing or by parol, is in equity an 

assignment of the mortgage.” Id. (quoting Harton, 57 So. at 851-52) (other citations omitted). 

Plaintiff avers that the Note was not assigned, sold, or transferred but does not allege any facts to 

support this statement, and the court disregards it. (Doc. # 13); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Of course, Defendant need not produce the Note in order to foreclose. “A foreclosure is 

an action on a mortgage and, as such, is not governed by the U.C.C.” Farkas v. SunTrust Mortg., 

Inc., 447 Fed. Appx. 972, 973 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Ala. Code §§ 7-3-104(a), 35-10-11 to 35-

10-14; Triple J Cattle, 551 So.2d at 282). “Alabama’s foreclosure statute sets forth the 

requirements for conducting a non-judicial foreclosure under the ‘power of sale’ contained in the 

mortgage, but the statute does not provide a cause of action for a mortgagor to require the 

mortgagee to establish proof of claim prior to initiating the foreclosure.” Id.; see also Douglas v. 

Troy Bank & Trust Co., 122 So.3d 181, 184 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (adopting Farkas’s 

reasoning). A nonjudicial foreclosure is not invalid because a foreclosing entity, such as 

Defendant, has failed “to produce or present original documentation evidencing the underlying 

debt and security for repayment thereof.” Douglas, 122 So.3d at 184; see also Graveling, 970 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1252-53 (referencing “the considerable case law suggesting that Alabama does not 

require production of the original instrument in order to institute foreclosure” (emphasis in 

original)). In other words, a foreclosing entity like Defendant is not required to surrender the 

original promissory note and mortgage to the mortgagor (or to a court) prior to instituting 

foreclosure under Alabama law. See Douglas, 122 So.3d at 182-83 (rejecting so-called “show 

me the note” argument). As such, Defendant does not have to present the Note to Plaintiff in 

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order to foreclose. Finally, and in any event, the court properly disregards Plaintiff’s conclusory 

statements (which lack factual support) that the Note and mortgage were “null and void” and 

“fake and counterfeit.” (Doc. # 13); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

For these reasons, Defendant has standing to foreclose on Plaintiff’s property. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant cannot foreclose on her property is due to be 

dismissed.

B. Plaintiff Does Not Plausibly Allege a Claim for Relief under the FDCPA for 

Defendant’s Sending the Pre-Foreclosure Notice

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the FDCPA (particularly, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d1692f) by sending the Notice, which “threaten[ed] a nonjudicial foreclosure and collection of the 

debt by offering alternative to foreclosure by providing” certain contact information. (Doc. # 

13). However, Plaintiff fails to state a FDCPA claim against Shellpoint relating to the Notice.15

Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 

collectors. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The FDCPA both requires and forbids specific conduct by 

debt collectors. See, e.g., id. at §§ 1692g(a) (collector must provide thirty-day notice to dispute 

 

15 While in a different section of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff claims that a previous dispute of the 

mortgage debt was sent to Resurgent Capital Services in September 2013, declaring the debt “null and void,” those 

letters do not relate to the Notice at issue and the Defendants in this case (as discussed in the below paragraph). 

Regardless, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any facts suggesting that a valid dispute existed as to the mortgage 

debt, or that Shellpoint violated the FDCPA.

The court notes that Plaintiff likely refers to the September 2012 and February 2013 letters attached to the 

Amended Complaint, including a September 17, 2012 letter to McFadden, in response to a Notice of Foreclosure 

Action. (Doc. # 13). That letter makes various rote legal claims and cites the FDCPA, while stating that the 

mortgage debt is disputed. (Id.) Plaintiff says she never permitted any instrument to be recorded by Bank of 

America or BAC, received no notices from any entities or individuals, and that the foreclosing entity at that time

(Bank of America) was the mortgage servicer but not the note holder. (Id.). Plaintiff demanded proof of the debt 

owed to Bank of America. (Id.). Likewise, Plaintiff includes a September 18, 2012, letter to an individual attorney 

at McFadden, disputing and denying the debt on the same grounds. (Id.). Also, Plaintiff included a September 10, 

2012 letter from McFadden, informing Plaintiff that Bank of America instructed the law firm to initiate foreclosure. 

(Doc. # 13). The letter stated (pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g) the approximate amount owed on the debt, the name 

of the creditor to whom the debt is owed (Bank of America), and a thirty-day notice to dispute the validity of the 

debt. (Id.). And, Plaintiff provided a February 4, 2013 letter from McFadden informing Plaintiff of alternatives to 

foreclosure, and stating that the sale is scheduled for March 18, 2013. (Id.). Neither McFadden (nor any McFadden 

attorneys , or Bank of America, or BAC) are named as defendants in this case. Furthermore, it appears Resurgent 

properly addressed this dispute in its initial communication with Plaintiff, as discussed infra. Regardless, 

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debt), 1692e (prohibition of use of “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with” debt collection). The FDCPA “does not ordinarily require proof of intentional 

violation and, as a result, is described by some as a strict liability statute.” LeBlanc v. Unifund 

CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also 

Graveling, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (“a single violation of the statute is sufficient to establish 

civil liability”) (citations omitted). To prevail on a FDCPA claim, Plaintiff must show, among 

other things, that (1) Defendant is a “debt collector” and (2) the challenged conduct is related to 

debt collection. Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 

2012).

Shellpoint is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. “A debt collector is anyone whose 

principal business is the collection of debts or the enforcement of security instruments or any 

anyone who regularly collects debts owed to another.” Saint Vil v. Perimeter Mortg. Funding 

Corp., -- Fed. Appx. --, 2015 WL 6575814, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6)). If a mortgage servicer acquires the debt after the debtor has gone into default—which 

is what happened here—then the servicer may be a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Cf. id.; 

cf. also Fenello v. Bank of America, N.A., 577 Fed. Appx. 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 

(a mortgage service is not a “debt collector” when “its debt collection activities involved a debt 

that was not in default at the time” it became the servicer). However, “an enforcer of a security 

interest, such as [a mortgage servicing company like Defendant] foreclosing on mortgages of real 

property . . . falls outside the ambit of the FDCPA except for the provisions of section 

1692f(6).”16 Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 Fed. Appx. 458, 460-61 (11th Cir. 

 

16 Section 1692f(6) prohibits “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession 

or disablement of property if – (A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral 

through an enforceable security interest; (B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or (C) 

the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

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2009) (per curiam) (collecting cases); accord Ausar-El ex el. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of 

America) Home Loans Servicing LP, 448 Fed. Appx. 1, 1 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“an 

enforcer of a security interest only qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ for the purpose of § 1692f(6)”); 

see also Dunavant v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C., 603 Fed. Appx. 737, 739-40 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(favorably discussing Warren’s holding). And, Section 1692f(6) does not apply here because, as 

discussed above, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant has no present right to 

possession of the property. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). (The other provisions of Section 1692f(6) 

are inapplicable). Further, because the FDCPA “specifically says that a person in the business of 

enforcing security interests is a ‘debt collector’ for the purposes of § 1692f(6), [this express 

inclusion] reasonably suggests that such a person is not a debt collector for purposes of other 

sections of the Act.” Warren, 342 Fed. Appx. at 460 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, and in any event, Defendant assumed the mortgage debt one year before 

instituting foreclosure, which reasonably suggests that Defendant’s business is not primarily to 

collect a debt but rather to service a mortgage. (See Doc. # 13). Thus, Shellpoint is not a “debt 

collector.”

Further, the potential foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home is not a “debt collection” for 

purposes of the FDCPA. See Roberts v. Chase Home Fin., No. 12-1883, 2012 WL 2862033, at 

*2 (N.D. Ala. July 11, 2012) (citing Warren, 342 Fed. Appx. at 460-61). “[I]f a person enforcing 

a security interest is not a debt collector, it likewise is reasonable to conclude that enforcement of 

a security instrument through the foreclosure process is not debt collection for purposes of the 

[FDCPA].”17 Warren, 342 Fed. Appx. at 460.

 

17 To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit has “held that a law firm’s communications made in the course of 

foreclosing on a mortgage can qualify as debt collection.” Saint Vil, 2015 WL 6575814, at *2 (citing Reese, 678 

F.3d at 1217; Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012)). But, that inquiry is based on a 

number of factors, namely the actions taken by the firm. See id. “[S]ending just the statutorily required notice of 

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But even if Shellpoint were a debt collector and the foreclosure were a debt collection, 

the Notice itself does not violate the FDCPA. (See Doc. # 13); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 

1692e-1692g. Additionally, whether the Defendant’s actions amount to “debt collection” 

depends on a number of factors, but Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded any facts suggesting that 

any such factors exist here. See Saint Vil, 2015 WL 6575814, at * 2 (discussing factors); (see 

also Doc. # 13). “[S]ending just the statutorily required notice of foreclosure is not enough” to 

be considered debt collection. Saint Vil, 2015 WL 6575814, at * 2. Accordingly, the Notice 

does not violate the FDCPA, and Plaintiff’s claims under it are due to be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff Does Not Have Viable Claims under RESPA and FDCPA Due to 

Defendant’s Alleged Failure to Send Notice of a Service Transfer

Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated RESPA and the FDCPA by failing to provide 

“communications . . . prior to or following that time [the Notice of Force-placed insurance from 

the Alabama ‘Insurance Dept. on June 7/11/2014’] regarding a merger or name change.” (Doc. # 

13). But Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead supporting facts and legally does not state viable claims 

for relief. (See id.). 

1. Plaintiff’s RESPA Claim Is Implausible and Fails as a Matter of Law

RESPA, among other things, requires mortgage servicers of federally related mortgages 

to notify the borrower in writing of any assignment, sale, or transfer of service to them not more 

than fifteen days after the effective date of transfer. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c)(1), (c)(2)(A). 

Similarly, transferors of servicing must notify the borrower not more than fifteen days before the 

effective date of the servicing transfer. Id. at §§ 2605(b)(1), (b)(2)(A). RESPA regulations 

provide that the transferor and transferee may provide a single notice not less than 15 days before 

 

foreclosure was not enough.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that Defendant Loefgren (or Sirote 

& Permutt) did anything more than send the Notice and exercise their lawful right to foreclose on Plaintiff’s 

mortgage. (See Doc. # 13). Even so, as already noted, Plaintiff did not timely serve Ms. Loefgren, and the claims 

against her are due to be dismissed for that reason, also.

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the effective date of the servicing transfer. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33(b)(3). The regulations also 

allow an exception to the notice of transfer of service if there is no change in the payee, address 

to which payment must be delivered, account number, or amount of payment due and the transfer 

is between affiliates or as a result of a merger or acquisition. Id. at § 1024.33(b)(2). 

The service transfer from Resurgent to Shellpoint may fall into the RESPA regulation’s 

exceptions, but Defendant does not proffer any argument on to that point.18 (See Doc. # 15). 

Defendant sent Plaintiff a combined notice of service transfer on February 14, 2014, more than 

fifteen days prior to the transfer’s effective date (and which otherwise complies with RESPA’s 

notice requirements). (Docs. # 15, 15-1); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b)(3). The provision, not 

the receipt, of notice is all that RESPA mandates. See U.S.C. §§ 2605.

Regardless, Plaintiff has advanced no allegations that demonstrate actual damages caused 

by any RESPA violations. See Madura v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 593 Fed. Appx. 834, 

843 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)); see also Frazile v. EMC Mortg. 

Corp., 382 Fed. Appx. 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that showing damages 

caused by the failure to provide notice of transfer is a “necessary element” of a RESPA claim). 

“To the extent [Plaintiff] raises the purported RESPA violations as an affirmative defense to 

foreclosure, [she] ha[s] not demonstrated how a RESPA violation would preclude a 

foreclosure.”19 Madura, 593 Fed. Appx. at 843. 

 

18 Indeed, the address to which payment must be delivered, amount of payment due, and account number 

remained the same, the payee name did not change, as Shellpoint acquired or merged with Resurgent. (See Doc. # 

15-1); see also Madura v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 593 Fed. Appx. 834, 842 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 

(BAC acquired Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and was not required to send a notice of service transfer).

19 Insofar as Plaintiff’s RESPA claim may be construed as alleging Defendant failed to provide notice of 

transfer because it is “the mortgagee and lienholder on the mortgage in question,” that claim still fails as a matter of 

law. (Doc. # 13). “RESPA governs the notice requirements where loan servicing is assigned, sold, or transferred, 

but does not govern notice requirements where a note or mortgage is transferred.” Newcomb v. Cambridge Home 

Loans, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (D. Haw. 2012); accord Jones v. ABN Ambro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 

119, 124-25 (3d Cir. 2010). 

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For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under RESPA, and that cause of 

action is due to be dismissed.

2. Plaintiff’s FDCPA Claim Relating to the Notice of Service Transfer 

Fails as a Matter of Law and Is Not Plausibly Alleged

Plaintiff has also asserted a FDCPA claim in relation to the service transfer notice, but the 

court is perplexed by that assertion. Plaintiff expressly alleges that “[n]o attempts or efforts were 

made by Shellpoint related to collection of a debt, either by mail or phone.” (Doc. # 13). 

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant’s notice of service transfer was an attempt to 

collect a debt (and to be sure, the undisputed facts indicate that it was not such an attempt). 

Moreover, as stated above, Shellpoint (and Resurgent) is not a debt collector under the FDCPA. 

See Warren, 342 Fed. Appx. at 461. Additionally, like her RESPA claim, Plaintiff has failed to 

allege any damages she sustained as a result of Defendant’s alleged failure to comply with the 

FDCPA. She has not alleged a claim for statutory damages under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a) (setting forth damages allowed under FDCPA); see also Crawford v. LVNV Funding, 

LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (same) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim pursuant to the FDCPA.

D. Plaintiff’s Fraud Claim is Implausible, Does Not Comply with Rule 9(b), and 

is Time Barred 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for fraud because the Note and mortgage were 

“fake and counterfeit” at the time of origination. (Doc. # 13). Specifically, the Amended 

Complaint states that Empire Equity Group, “who was not licensed to originate mortgages in 

Alabama,” originated the mortgage that was endorsed to TB&W. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff asserts 

that the origination of the Note was a fraud committed against Plaintiff in May 2008, and the 

mortgage debt is invalid and uncollectable. (Id.). However, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is not 

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plausibly pled, fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in any event fails

as a matter of law.

The Alabama Code defines fraud as “[a]n intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or 

concealment of a material fact the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, 

oppressive, or malicious and committed with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby 

depriving a person . . . of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Ala. Code § 6-

11-20(b)(1). When proven, fraud allows for an award of punitive damages. Id. To establish 

fraud, Plaintiff must prove the following: (1) a false representation (2) of a material existing fact 

(3) reasonably relied upon by Plaintiff (4) who suffered damage as a proximate causation of the 

misrepresentation. Graveling, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (citing Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d 

638, 653 (Ala. 2006) (other citations omitted)). Plaintiff does not demonstrate any false 

representations by Defendant, particularly with regards to the origination of the mortgage loan in 

May 2008. (See Doc. # 13). And, the basis for Plaintiff’s claim of fraudulent origination due to 

the originator not being licensed to originate mortgages in Alabama is without merit: Alabama 

law “permit[s] foreign corporations to lend money to residents of Alabama and to take security 

for such loans in the form of mortgages on real property located within the state, and to enforce 

such obligations in the courts of Alabama.” Midwest Homes Acceptance Corp. v. Langdon, 253 

So.2d at 30-31. Without pleading any plausible facts, Plaintiff cannot pursue this claim for 

relief. 

Additionally, the Amended Complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 9(b), which requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 

other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In other 

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words, “fraud must be averred with particularity.” Waldrup v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 598 F. 

Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (citations omitted). 

Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint sets forth “(1) precisely what statements 

were made in what documents or oral representations or what omissions were 

made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement and the person 

responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) 

the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, 

and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.” 

Ziemba v. Cascade Intl., Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brooks v. Blue 

Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1371 (11th Cir.1997)). Even accounting for 

Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Amended Complaint does not come close to pleading with 

particularity those details, and fails to set forth any alleged fraudulent statements or 

misrepresentations. (See Doc. # 13).

Finally, and in any event, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is time barred. “An action alleging fraud 

is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.” Ex parte Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 795 So.2d 685, 689 

(Ala. 2000) (citing Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l)). “‘The two-year period does not start to run until the 

plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts that would . . . put a reasonable person on notice of the 

fraud.’” Id. (quoting Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 703 So.2d 307, 308 (Ala. 1997) (citing 

Ala. Code § 6-2-3)) (additional citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff admits that the alleged “fraud 

occurred in May 2008,” and she did not file her Complaint until December 2014.20 (Doc. # 13). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is clearly time-barred.

 

20 Even if Plaintiff had not so readily admitted when the alleged fraud occurred, her fraud claim would be 

due to be dismissed as untimely. “[T]he Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that, under certain circumstances, 

this question [of when a plaintiff should have discovered fraud] may be decided as a matter of law.” Waldrup, 598 

F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citations omitted). “[A] party will be deemed to have ‘discovered’ a fraud as a matter of law 

upon the first of either the actual discovery of the fraud or when the party becomes privy to facts that would provoke 

inquiry in a reasonable person that, if followed up, would lead to the discovery of the fraud.” Jones v. Kassouf & 

Co., P.C., 949 So.2d 136, 140 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dickinson v. Land Developers Constr. Co., 882 So.2d 291, 298 

(Ala. 2003)). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that as a “corollary to this rule, . . . fraud is discoverable . . . 

when one receives documents that would put one on notice that the fraud reasonably should be discovered.” 

Waldrup, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Ex parte Gen. Fin., 795 So.2d at 689-90). That is, the objective standard 

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E. Plaintiff’s Claims for Wantonness and Malice are Impermissibly Vague and 

Also Time Barred

The Amended Complaint sets forth rote recitations of the definitions of wantonness and 

malice. (Doc. # 13). Wantonness is tortious “[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or 

conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(3). Malice is the 

“intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, either: (a) with an intent to 

injure the person or property of another person or entity, or (b) under such circumstances that the 

law will imply an evil intent.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(2). Punitive damages may be awarded 

for a claim of wantonness or malice. Id. Plaintiff has pleaded no facts supporting claims for 

wantonness or malice, and the court disregards her conclusory statements of the legal elements. 

(See Doc. # 13); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And, the foreclosing of a mortgage does not 

imply an evil intent. Thus, on these grounds, Plaintiff’s wantonness and malice claims fall far 

short and are due to be dismissed.

Furthermore, and in any event, under Alabama law, any action for an injury arising from 

claims of wantonness and malice must be brought within two years of the harmful act. See Ala. 

Code at § 6-2-38(l); see also Travis v. Ziter, 681 So.2d 1348, 1350 n. 1 (Ala. 1996) (“Actions 

alleging . . . wantonness . . . must be brought within two years after the accrual of the cause of 

action.”). Plaintiff alleges that the act giving rise to her “emotional harm and mental suffering” 

was the “fraud” that occurred “in May 2008” (that is, the origination of the mortgage and Note 

by Empire Equity Group, which “was not licensed to originate mortgages in Alabama”). (Doc. # 

 

“imposes a duty to read documents received in connection with a particular transaction,” and “a fraud claim accrues 

upon a plaintiff’s ‘receipt of a document or contract alerting the plaintiff to the possibility of fraud if the [objective] 

plaintiff could have read and understood such document and choose to ignore its written terms.” Id. (citing Owens 

v. Life Ins. Co of Ga., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 2003)) (other citation omitted). And, to be sure, the 

exceptions of a plaintiff’s illiteracy or the document (i.e., the Note) being ambiguous are not present here, where 

Plaintiff filed a pro se Amended Complaint that she drafted. See id. (citations omitted) (setting forth exceptions). 

(Also, the Note is plainly unambiguous). Plaintiff received the mortgage loan documents in May 2008, and, thus, 

her fraud claim accrued then. (See Doc. # 13). She did not file her initial Complaint until over six years later. (Doc. 

# 1-2).

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13). However, Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on December 17, 2014—more than six years 

later. (See Doc. # 1-2). Thus, Plaintiff’s wantonness and malice claims (and their associated 

request for punitive damages) are time barred by the statute of limitations. 

VII. Conclusion

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Shellpoint are due to be dismissed with 

prejudice. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this February 29, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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