Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00001/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00001-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY BARKER and KATHY KENOLE, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:09-cv-00001-GEB-JFM

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

) MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING

PHILIP B. AVILA; CHERYL C. KOFF; ) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

BORTON & PETRINI, LLP; CHRISTIAN ) PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL CLAIM &

P. HURST; CHELSEA VANPETTEN; DAWN ) DISMISSING REMAINING STATE

HARLEMAN; SHELLY PREHM; G.O.N.E., ) CLAIMS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 

INC., ) 1367(c)(3)*

)

Defendants. )

)

This order addresses two pending motions: Defendants Philip

B. Avila and Borton & Petrini’s (the “Attorney Defendants”) motion to

strike certain portions of Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(f) and the Attorney

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants Cheryl C. Koff, Christian P. Hurst,

Chelsea Vanpetten, Dawn Harleman, Shelly Prehm, and G.O.N.E., Inc.

(the “Debt Collector Defendants”) joined both motions (collectively,

“Defendants”).

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Plaintiffs allege in their first amended complaint

Defendants “fraudulently induc[ed] judges into entering defaults and

default judgments through use of perjured declarations.” (First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the

following three claims in their first amended complaint: (1) violation

of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e

et seq. (“FDCPA”); (2) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, California Civil Code §§ 1788, et seq. (“Rosenthal

Act”); and (3) violation of California Business and Professions Code 

§ 17200 (“UCL”). The Court previously granted the Attorney

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ state law claims under the

California anti-SLAPP statute, following which Plaintiffs were granted

leave to amend “the dismissed state law claims” only. In Plaintiffs’

first amended complaint, however, Plaintiffs also amended their

federal FDCPA claim, to include for the first time, inter alia,

allegations of a “second collection lawsuit.” Defendants move to

strike these “new allegations,” arguing they are “pointedly

prejudicial to the [Defendants]” and are “in derogation of the scope

of the Court’s order granting [P]laintiffs leave to amend.” (Mot. to

Strike 5:22-24.) Defendants make a similar argument in their motion

to dismiss: “[Plaintiffs’] attempt . . . to amend . . . [their FDCPA

claim] is both unauthorized and unavailing.” (Mot. to Dismiss 3:16-

17.) Plaintiffs fail to address these arguments in their opposition

to Defendants’ motions.

A Rule 16 Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order was a entered

in this case on April 8, 2009, which prohibited any further amendment

to the pleadings absent a showing of “good cause.” (Docket No. 10

2:11-13.) Rule 16’s “good cause” “standard primarily considers the

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diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may

modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite

the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment)).

[T]o demonstrate diligence under Rule 16’s “good

cause” standard, the movant[s] may be required to

show the following: (1) that [they were] diligent

in assisting the Court in creating a workable Rule

16 order; (2) that [their] noncompliance with a

Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding [their] diligent efforts to comply,

because of the development of matters which could

not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at

the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and

(3) that [they were] diligent in seeking amendment

of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that

[they] could not comply with the order.

Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999)

(citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs satisfy none of these diligence inquiries. 

Plaintiffs did not state in the joint status report filed prior to the

issuance of the Rule 16 Scheduling Order that they anticipated

amending their FDCPA claim. Although Plaintiffs stated they “reserve

the right to motion the court for any appropriate amendments as may be

deemed necessary in light of discovery and any other further

developments in this case,” they have not filed such a motion; nor

does this statement satisfy Plaintiffs’ “‘unflagging obligation’ to

alert the Rule 16 scheduling judge of the nature and timing of such

anticipated amendments in their status reports so that the judge can

consider whether such amendments may properly be sought solely under

the Rule 15(a) standard, and whether structuring discovery pertinent

to the parties’ decision whether to amend is feasible.” Jackson, 186

F.R.D. at 608. Further, Plaintiffs have not responded to Defendants’

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argument that the amendments were unauthorized and should be stricken. 

Plaintiffs’ silence leaves the Court to speculate as to why Plaintiffs

have not complied with the Rule 16 Scheduling Order. This silence

also indicates Plaintiffs have not been diligent in seeking to amend

the Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs have, however, sought to modify the

Scheduling Order to extend the approaching discovery completion

deadline and the long-passed deadline to seek class certification. 

This motion shows Plaintiffs are aware of the good cause standard, yet

they have ignored its application to the following language in the

Scheduling Order: “No further . . . amendments to pleadings is

permitted, except with leave of Court, good cause having been shown.” 

(Docket No. 10 2:11-13.) Rule 16 is not designed to accommodate this

lack of diligence. Since Plaintiffs have failed to respond to 

Defendants’ lack of good cause to amend arguments in Defendants’

motions and have not sought to modify the applicable no further

amendment language in the Scheduling Order, they have failed to

demonstrate good cause justifies amending this provision of the

Scheduling Order. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to strike the

amendments to Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is granted. See Carbajal v.

Dorn, 2010 WL 487433, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2010) (striking new allegations

that exceeded the scope of amendments authorized by the court in a

previous order for failure to show good cause to modify the Scheduling

Order under Rule 16).

Defendants also seek dismissal of the remaining allegations

comprising Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim, arguing the claim is barred by the

one-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for

bringing an FDCPA action is one year from the date on which the

alleged offense occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Naas v. Stolman, 130

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F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs filed their original

complaint on December 31, 2008. Since all the alleged violations

occurred before December 31, 2007, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is barred

by the statute of limitations. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is granted. Further, since Plaintiffs

have made no request to modify the “no further amendments” language in

the Scheduling Order and have offered no showing of cause to justify

the amendment of their complaint, this claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

Since only Plaintiffs’ state Rosenthal and UCL claims

remain, the Court may consider whether to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d

999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (suggesting that a district court

may, but need not, sua sponte decide whether to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after all

federal law claims have been dismissed). Under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” when “all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction” have been dismissed. “While discretion to

decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered

by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c)(3), it is

informed by the . . . values of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001. “[I]n the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of [the]

factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). “Further, primary

responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the

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state courts.” Curiel v. Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc., 2010 WL

729499, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

Here, considerations of comity weigh heavily in favor of

declining supplemental jurisdiction since all remaining claims arise

under state law. “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided .

. . .” Gibbs v. United Mine Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Further, federal judicial economy is promoted by declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. See Otto v. Heckler, 802 F.2d 337, 338

(9th Cir. Cir. 1986) (stating that “[t]he district court, of course,

has the discretion to determine whether its investment of judicial

energy justifies retention of jurisdiction”). Here, “[t]here is no

prevailing reason for this court to maintain jurisdiction to preserve

judicial economy.” Meza v. Matrix Serv., 2010 WL 366623, at *4 (E.D.

Cal. 2010). Finally, considerations of convenience also weigh against

exercising supplemental jurisdiction since the state court is located

in close proximity to this federal court. See id. at *4 (finding that

convenience weighed against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction

where “the state and federal fora are located in Sacramento, only

blocks from one another, making both equally convenience for the

parties.”). Accordingly, the pertinent factors do not weigh in favor

of the continued exercise of jurisdiction, and the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state

Rosenthal Act and UCL claims. Therefore, those claims will be

dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion to strike

Plaintiffs’ amendments to their FDCPA claim is granted (Docket No.

123); Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ FDCPA

claim is granted (Docket No. 118); and Plaintiffs’ remaining state law

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claims are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

In light of this dismissal, the remaining pending motions (Docket Nos.

120, 126, 132, 138) need not be reached.

This case shall be closed.

Dated: August 11, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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