Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02006/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS CHAN,

Petitioner,

v.

A. KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-2006 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Dennis Chan, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this pro

se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the

court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Dennis Chan was convicted in San Francisco County Superior Court of kidnapping for

robbery and was found to have used a handgun in the offense. He was sentenced to life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole plus one year imprisonment in 1986. His habeas

petition does not concern that conviction directly, but instead focuses on a December 19, 2003

decision by a panel of the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT") finding him not suitable for parole.

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The BPT identified several factors in support of its determination that Chan was not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if he was released. The factors identified included the circumstances of the offense, his

unstable social history, an escalating pattern of criminal conduct, his need for additional selfhelp therapy, and his inadequate parole plans. The BPT also relied on opposition to parole from

the San Francisco County District Attorney's Office. The specifics regarding the crime and the

circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the Discussion section later

in this order.

Chan sought relief in the California courts. The San Francisco County Superior Court

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 4, 2004 in a reasoned order. Resp. Exh.

3. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and

the California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Chan then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged that

Chan's right to due process was violated because the BPT's denial of parole had insufficient

evidentiary support and because the BPT's denial of parole breached his plea agreement. After

an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, respondent filed an answer. Chan filed a traverse. The

matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, in Monterey County, California,

within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

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highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Chan's Claim That the Evidence Was Insufficient To support the Decision

1. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of life with the possibility of parole has

a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in the parole

suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

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disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence

standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Furthermore, and of key importance, the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole). The

familiar argument that the BPT cannot rely on these factors is based on the Ninth Circuit's

statements in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 99th Cir. 2003), that suggested that the value of

the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s

decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at

916-17. In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely

on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that

“[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and

prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916.

These statements were dicta and not clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme

Court, such that the state court's refusal to adopt the Biggs reasoning would be a decision

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contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth by the

Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit recently backed away from the Biggs statements, and

confirmed that these statements from Biggs were dicta and were inappropriate under § 2254.

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future

parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review

should be extremely deferential to the original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition

to the very low evidentiary standard that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court

comments suggest that the judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive

nature of a parole board's decision. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way

to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will

continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors

combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of actual parole

decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state

experimentation." Id.; see also id. at 8.

Past criminal conduct is not some arbitrary factor like eye color that has nothing to do

with present dangerousness. Recidivism concerns are genuine. See Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (O'Connor J.) (noting a report stating that over 60% of violent offenders were

arrested again within three years of their release). California's parole scheme does not offend

due process by allowing the BPT to predict that an inmate presents a present danger based on

a crime he committed many years ago.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to answer the

question, "'some evidence' of what?"

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The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and serious misconduct

while in prison. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c). The listed circumstances tending to show

suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse,

a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's

syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the

prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive

institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(d). The circumstances listed as tending to

show unsuitability and suitability "are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached

to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment

of the panel." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c) and (d). 

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2. State Law Standards For Parole For Kidnappers In California

California uses indeterminate life sentences for persons convicted of kidnapping for

robbery. See Cal. Penal Code § 209(b). California's parole scheme described below provides

that a release date normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier

is substantial. 

A BPT panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281, allows for consideration

of a wide range of information in determining suitability, see § 2281(b), and lists circumstances

tending to show suitability and circumstances tending to show unsuitability, § 2281(c) and (d).1

The regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether a prisoner is suitable

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One axis of the matrix concerns the kind of harm done to the victim and the other axis

of the matrix concerns the circumstances of the kidnapping. The choices on the axis for the

harm to the victim include no/minor harm, victim sexually or otherwise seriously assaulted,

victim suffered major injuries, or victim died. The choices on the axis for the circumstances of

the kidnapping are minor movement, extensive movement, victim taken hostage, and intricate

prior planning for the crime. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2282(c). 

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for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(a).

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes.

See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2282. For example, for kidnapping for robbery or ransom, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 8, 10, or 12 years to a high of 13, 15, or 17 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime.2

 Some prisoners estimate their time to serve based

only on the matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart

before the horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and regulations that

requires him first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005). Under state

law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is found suitable for parole. See id.

at 1070-71 (discussing use of matrix in murder cases); 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2282(a) ("[t]he

panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The

California Supreme Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this federal

habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime alone can

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

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the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process

"where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). 

3. Some Evidence Supports The BPT's Decision In Chan's Case

The BPT identified several factors supporting its decision to find Chan unsuitable for

parole, i.e., the circumstances of the offense, the prisoner's unstable social history and escalating

pattern of criminal conduct, the prisoner's in-prison behavior, and the prisoner's inadequate

parole plans. The San Francisco County Superior Court upheld the decision in a reasoned order.

Resp. Exh. 3. That court stated that some evidence had to support the decision and found that

some evidence did support the decision. The state court applied the correct legal standard of

some evidence, as evidenced by its citation to In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 652, a case

which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard as the proper

standard for judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency for parole denial cases. See Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. Because the San Francisco County Superior Court's decision is the last

reasoned decision, that is the decision to which 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

a. Commitment Offense

The BPT considered the circumstances of the kidnapping for robbery and concluded that

it was an carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. The BPT determined that the

offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner and was carried out in a manner

which demonstrated a disregard for human suffering. December 19, 2003 BPT hearing

transcript ("RT"), at 39. The record included the following information about the kidnapping:

Chan, Eddie Zheng and David Weng knew each other for 2-3 years before the crime. The

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threesome encountered Mr. Tam in his store on January 3, 1986, and followed him home after

he closed his shop to learn his home address. They believed that Mr. Tam had a lot of money

because he owned two shops. The threesome returned to Oakland and discussed robbing Tam's

home and store. They followed Mr. Tam home on January 5 again to get his exact address. On

January 6, 1986, they went to the Tams' home, each armed with a gun. Zheng and Weng

approached Mr. and Mrs. Tam and their children and pointed their loaded guns at them, forcing

Mr. Tam to open his door. Chan followed. Mr. Tam was pushed into a chair in the living room.

Chan tied up Mrs. Tam in the living room and took her into the second bedroom and taped her

mouth. Zheng tied up Mr. Tam and put him in a separate bedroom. Chan took bracelets from

the two young children and some jewelry which he put in a bag and left by the front door to take

with him when they left. Weng put the children in the bathroom. The threesome took Mr. Tam's

wallet, and some jewelry. One or two of the intruders ripped off Mrs. Tam's clothing and she

was threatened with rape. Zheng found a camera to take pictures of Mrs. Tam tied up and nude.

After they searched the house and had been therefor about four hours, Mrs. Tam was unbound,

dressed and taken by Zheng and Chan to the Tams' store while Weng stayed with Mr. Tam and

the two children. Zheng and Chan took money and goods from the store. As they drove back

toward the residence, they were stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. During the

course of the stop, the officer noticed that Mrs. Tam had tears in her eyes; when asked, she told

him that there was danger in her house. Zheng and Chan were handcuffed and Mrs. Tam told

the police that her husband and children were being held hostage. By the time the police arrived

at the residence, Mr. Tam and children had unbound themselves and Weng had fled. Resp. Exh.

11, pp. 3-7. 

At the BPT hearing, Chan disputed some of this information. He said that he had taken

the children to the bathroom and had not tied up Mrs. Tam. RT 11-12. Chan admitted that he

had threatened her family as he went with Mrs. Tam to the store. RT 31-32. In discussing the

crime, Chan stated that the threesome believed the Tams had a lot of money because they had

a store and the three kidnappers wanted to buy drugs. RT 9, 14. The BPT was not required to

accept any or all of Chan's version of the crime. 

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 The BPT considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. A

circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that the prisoner "committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(1).

The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are that there were

multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(1).

There was some evidence in the record to support the BPT's determination that the

circumstances of the commitment offense indicated unsuitability. The record supported a

determination that offense was committed in a dispassionate and calculated way and in a way

that demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. Chan had participated

in a home invasion robbery at gunpoint, a couple and their two children were taken hostage; the

wife was tied up, stripped, threatened with rape, and then taken to the family's store and told by

Chan that her husband and children would be killed if she did not help them get money and

property. There was much more than some evidence to support the finding that the

circumstances of the offense supported the denial of parole. The BPT identified more than the

minimum elements of a kidnapping for robbery when it determined that Chan and his two

partners had committed a home invasion robbery and held three family members hostage while

forcing Mrs. Tam to go with them to the store to obtain money and property. And Chan had

used a gun during the offense. There also was extensive planning which included advance

surveillance the Tam home. Although only Mrs. Tam was taken to the store, there really were

four victims of the crime. Further, there was a special depravity in the gratuitous stripping of

Mrs. Tam and the (real or feigned) picture-taking of her nude and bound. All this showed far

more than the minimum elements of a kidnapping for robbery. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1071. 

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b. Pre-Offense Behavior

The BPT also relied on Chan's escalating criminality and unstable social history. The

BPT found that Chan's escalating pattern of criminal behavior supported the decision that he was

unsuitable for parole. His escalating criminality was shown by the fact that he had an arrest for

petty theft in 1984 and for auto burglary in 1985; neither resulted in a criminal charge, although

he admitted he was present while other persons committed each of these offenses. See RT 16.

 Consideration of and reliance on Chan's pre-offense criminal history was not improper.

Although the prisoner's "previous record of violence" on a victim is a specifically listed

circumstance and non-violent criminal history is not specifically listed as a circumstance that

tends to indicate unsuitability, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(2), the list of circumstances in §

2281(c) is non-exclusive, and § 2281(b) specifically allows the BPT to consider a great range

of relevant and reliable information, such as the prisoner's "past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented." Chan's prior criminal

activity could be considered by the BPT as tending to show unsuitability even if it alone might

not support a decision that he was unsuitable. 

Second, the BPT considered Chan's unstable social history as a factor supporting its

decision that he was unsuitable for parole. The record indicated that Chan had problems in

school due to language problems after he moved to the United States from China with his family

in 1980 when he was 11-12 years old. He had poor grades, truancy problems, fights with other

students and was asked to leave school. See RT 17-18. He also had started using cocaine when

he was 17. The prisoner's unstable social history was a specifically listed factor that the BPT

could rely upon as tending show unsuitability for parole. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(3).

c. In-Prison Behavior

The BPT found that Chan had not sufficiently participated in the beneficial self-help

previously requested by the BPT and he had a CDC-128 counseling memo for delaying the yard

recall since his last parole suitability hearing. See RT 40, 42. The San Francisco County

Superior Court determined that there was some evidence to support the BPT's finding that Chan

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needed further self-help work. 

Consideration of and reliance on Chan's prison behavior and progress was not improper.

Section 2281(b) specifically allows the BPT to consider a great range of relevant and reliable

information, such as the prisoner's "past and present attitude toward the crime," social history

and mental state. 

d. Parole Plans

The BPT determined that Chan's parole plans were not realistic in that he did not have

viable residential or employment plans in the event of his removal to China. See RT 40-41. The

BPT decision stated that Chan had good parole plans if he was released to his family in

California. 

The uncertainty of Chan's parole plans if he was removed from the United States to China

appears not to be an adequate reason to find him unsuitable. The BPT properly may consider

the uncertain nature of an inmate's parole plans as tending to show unsuitability under § 2402(b),

which allows the BPT to consider "any other information which bears on the prisoner's

suitability for release." The regulations do not, however, require that a prisoner have alternative

plans lined up, i.e., one set for here and another in the event of removal to China. In light of the

BPT's determination that Chan had "outstanding support from his family and . . . good parole

plans if he were released to California," RT 41, there does not appear to be some evidence to

support the finding that the uncertainty of his parole plans tended to indicate unsuitability.

e. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision

The BPT noted that Chan had various in-prison achievements, but concluded that the

positive factors did not outweigh the factors showing unsuitability. The nature of the

commitment offense, the increasing criminality, the unstable social history, and the need for

further programming factors listed by the BPT in support of its determination that Chan was not

suitable for parole had some evidentiary support. And the factors were factors that could be

considered in determining parole suitability. 

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The San Francisco County Superior Court identified the commitment offense and Chan's

in-prison behavior (i.e., failure to participate in sufficient self-help rehabilitation and the recent

receipt of a CDC-128 counseling memo) as circumstances of which there was some evidence

and which supported the decision that Chan was unsuitable for parole. The San Francisco

County Superior Court's rejection of Chan's due process claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Superintendent v. Hill's some evidence standard. Chan is not

entitled to the writ.

B. Breach Of Plea Agreement Claim

Chan also contends that the BPT's decision to find him unsuitable for parole breached his

plea agreement, in violation of his right to due process. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257, 261-62 (1971) (defendant has a right to enforce terms of plea agreement). 

The San Francisco County Superior Court rejected Chan's claim that the BPT's decision

violated the plea agreement. That court found that the conclusory allegations made without any

explanation of their factual benefit did not warrant relief. That claim had to be rejected because

Chan had not provided a copy of his plea agreement or any other documentation in support of

his contention. Resp. Exh. 3, p. 4.

The state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, as required for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Chan has not pointed to language in any plea agreement that shows that any

particular term in his plea agreement has been breached. His inability to identify any particular

term that has been breached undermines his claim. His claim that his plea agreement was

breached in violation of his right to due process fails.

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. Petitioner's motion for

an extension of time to file a traverse is GRANTED. (Docket # 5.) The traverse filed on July

12, 2006 is deemed timely filed. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2006 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-02006-SI Document 13 Filed 10/23/06 Page 15 of 15