Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02468/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02468-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Because Boyd’s Petition is not consecutively paginated, the

Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system. 

1 09cv2468 JLS (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN L. BOYD, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 09cv2468 JLS (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS [DOC. NO. 9]

Petitioner Glenn Boyd, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [doc. no. 1].1 Petitioner

asserts that “prison officials under the guise of an underground

classification scheme violate[d] [Petitioner’s] right to due

process, equal protection of the law, his right against double

jeopardy, ex post facto as proscribed by the United States

Constitution . . . [.]” (Pet. 9-10.) Boyd argues that the Unit

Classification Committee improperly recharacterized his commitment

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offense as an execution-type murder which raised his security

placement from CVSP-II to CVSP-III. (Id. at 9-13.) Petitioner

also maintains that “the [state] court abuse[d] its discretion or

commit[ted] reversible error in violation of Petitioner’s rights as

proscribed under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment(s) to

the United States Constitution . . . [.]” (Id. at 14-15.) Boyd

argues that the state court abused its discretion and unreasonably

denied his direct and collateral challenges to the Unit

Classification Committee’s decision. (Id. at 14-16.) 

On January 21, 2010, Respondent requested additional time to

respond to the Petition [doc. no. 7]. The Court granted

Respondent’s request [doc. no. 8]. On February 26, 2010,

Respondent timely filed his Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a

Notice of Lodgment [doc. no. 9]. Respondent claims the Petition

should be dismissed because Boyd does not challenge the legality or

duration of his confinement; he does not have a liberty interest in

his classification; Petitioner does not state sufficient particular

facts to allege violations of the Constitution; and Boyd cannot

properly raise challenges to the state court’s decision on habeas

review. (Mot. to Dismiss Mem. P. & A. 1.) 

Petitioner requested additional time to oppose the Motion

[doc. no. 10]. The Court granted Boyd an extension [doc. no. 11]. 

On April 30, 2010, Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss Petition with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and

a declaration was timely filed [doc. no. 12].

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss and Memorandum, Boyd’s Opposition and Memorandum, and the

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lodgments. For the reasons discussed below, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 6, 1988, in the County of San Bernardino Superior

Court, Petitioner was convicted of murder and robbery. (Pet. 1-2.) 

He was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. (Id. at

1.) From 2001 through 2006, Petitioner was housed at a prison

facility with security at level II. (Id. at 10.) 

On April 18, 2005, the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation issued a memorandum regarding “inmates sentenced

to a life term appropriately housed in level III and IV

institutions.” (Id. at 9-10; id. Attach. #1 Ex. A8 at 102.) On

November 16, 2006, while Boyd was at Chuckawalla Valley State

Prison, a level II institution, he was informed that he had been

“deemed a threat to the safety and security of the institution due

to the fact that his [commitment offense] case factors were under

review for possibly being an execution-type murder.” (Id. at 9.) 

The next day, Petitioner was moved to the administrative

segregation unit pending his Institutional Classification Committee

hearing. (Id.) On November 22, 2006, his hearing was held and

Boyd’s commitment offense was recharacterized as an execution type

murder. (Id. at 9-10.) As a result, Petitioner was no longer

eligible to be housed at a level II institution and was transferred

to a level III facility instead. (See id. at 9; id. Attach. #1 Ex.

A6 at 10; id. Ex. A7 at 11.) 

Boyd contends that his reclassification was improper, and

prison officials failed to fully consider the evidence presented at

his trial. (Pet. at 10-13.) Petitioner argues that the memorandum

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that prison officials relied on to reclassify him “has made the

definition [of execution-type murder] vague and ambiguous and

subject to the whimsical and capricious interpretation [by prison

officials] . . . . [because it] gives the prison officials too much

latitude to interpret case factors beyond the scope of their

authority.” (Id. at 12.) 

Boyd appealed the committee’s decision and contends that “the

state court failed to exercise its discretion [to] take judicial

notice [of the] indisputable fact [that] petitioner [was] not found

guilty or convicted of an ‘execution type murder’ . . . .” (Id. at

14.) Petitioner argues that the state court’s decision was

unreasonable because he did not have an opportunity to take

discovery, present evidence, or make oral argument. (Id. at 14,

16.) 

In his Petition, Boyd requests “(1) [t]hat an evidentiary

[h]earing be granted; and/or (2) [a]lternatively, discovery hearing

be granted; (3) [t]hat the Court allow verbal argument; (4) [t]hat

the Court grant injunctive and/or prospective [r]elief; (5) [t]hat

the Court grant the writ of habeas corpus; [and] (6) [a]ll other

relief deemed appropriate.” (Id. at 18.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenged his endorsement to security level III

through the administrative grievance process, but his grievance and

appeals were denied. (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. A54-55, at 148-49.) On

February 20, 2008, Boyd filed his first habeas corpus petition

regarding his reclassification in the Superior Court of California,

County of Imperial. (Lodgment No. 2, Boyd v. Almager, Case No.

EHC00979 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 2008) (petition for writ

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of habeas corpus).) The court denied his petition without

considering the merits of his claim because Boyd failed to use the

proper form. (Lodgment No. 3, In re Boyd, Case No. EHC00979, slip

op. at 1-2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 2008).) Next, Petitioner filed

another habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court of Imperial

County. (Lodgment No. 4, Boyd v. Almager, Case No. EHC01019 (Cal.

Super. Ct. filed May 21, 2008) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) His petition was denied on July 25, 2008. (Lodgment No.

5, In re Boyd, Case No. EHC01019, slip op. at 1-3 (Cal. Super. Ct.

July 25, 2008).) 

On September 25, 2008, Boyd’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus was filed in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgement No. 6, Boyd v.

Smelosky, D053782 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Sept. 25, 2008) (petition

for writ of habeas corpus).) The appellate court denied the

petition without prejudice stating that “[b]ecause the judgment of

conviction was reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Fourth

District, Division Two, the petition is properly reviewed in that

division.” (Lodgment No. 7, In re Boyd, Case No. D053782, slip op.

at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2008).) Next, Boyd filed his petition

in the correct appellate court on October 24, 2008. (Lodgment No.

8, Boyd v. Smelosky, Case No. E046918 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Oct. 24,

2008) (petition for writ of habeas corpus). On November 10, 2008,

Boyd’s petition was summarily denied. (Lodgment No. 9, In re Boyd,

Case No. E046918, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2008).) 

On January 12, 2009, Boyd filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the Supreme Court of California. (Lodgment No. 1, Boyd

v. Smelosky, Case No. [S169673] (Cal. filed Jan. [12], 2009)

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(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The state supreme court

summarily denied his petition on July 8, 2009. (Lodgment No. 10,

In re Boyd, Case No. S169673, docket, http://appellatecases.

courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1901351&doc_

no=S169673.) 

On November 3, 2009, Boyd filed this federal Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1]. This Court issued an Order setting

the briefing schedule [doc. no. 6]. The Order provided that if the

Respondent contended that “the Petition can be decided without the

Court reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims . . . , Respondent

shall file a motion to dismiss . . . .” (Order Reopening Case &

Setting Briefing Schedule 2.) “The motion to dismiss shall not

address the merits of Petitioner’s claims . . . .” (Id.) “If

Respondent does not contend that the Petition can be decided

without the Court reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims,

Respondent shall file and serve an answer to the Petition.” (Id.)

On February 26, 2010, Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss

[doc. no. 9]. On April 30, 2010, Petitioner’s Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition was filed [doc. no. 12]. 

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

The “court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006). It is well established that

“[f]ederal habeas corpus relief [under § 2254] is limited to claims

that allege a constitutional violation in the state criminal

proceedings." Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993); Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)); see also McGuire v. Blubaum, 376

F. Supp. 284, 285 (D. Ariz. 1974) (“Section 2254 applies only to

collateral attacks on state court judgments.”). But a habeas

proceeding can be pursued even if the petitioner is not seeking

immediate release, if he can show that but for the alleged due

process violation, he would be released at an earlier date than now

scheduled. Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1983)

In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court

considered the potential overlap between federal habeas actions

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges to the conditions of

confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The Court held that

habeas is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact

or duration of confinement, and the relief sought is a

determination that he or she is entitled to immediate release or a

speedier release from that confinement, even though the claim may

also come within the literal terms of § 1983. Id. at 488-90, 498-

500. On the other hand, a § 1983 action is the proper avenue for a

state prisoner making a constitutional challenge to the conditions

of prison life, but not to the fact or length of custody. Id. at

499. 

The Court, in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), found

that habeas was the sole federal vehicle available for a prisoner’s

constitutional challenge to the procedures used in a disciplinary

hearing which resulted in the loss of custody credits where the

claim would, if proven, “necessarily imply the invalidity of the

deprivation” of custody credits. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48. A

prisoner’s claim for an injunction barring future unconstitutional

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procedures does not fall within federal habeas review if the

prospective relief does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the

previous loss of custody credits. See id. at 648; see also

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (finding an implied

habeas exception bars a prisoner from bringing a § 1983 action

where it would necessarily result in a determination of the

invalidity of confinement or alter the duration of confinement). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Challenges the 

Legality or Duration of Conviction.

Boyd challenges his reclassification from security level II to

security level III. (Pet. 9-13.) A prisoner’s security

classification affects the conditions of confinement. See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3375(d) (2009) (“A lower placement score

indicates lesser security control needs and a higher placement

score indicates greater security control needs.”); id. at § 3375(i) 

(“An inmate shall not remain at a institution/facility with a

security level which is not consistent with the inmate’s placement

score . . . .”); id. at § 3375.1(a)(2)-(3) (2009) (“An inmate with

a placement score of 19 through 27 shall be placed in a Level II

facility. An inmate with a placement score of 28 through 51 shall

be placed in a Level III facility.”)

Because Petitioner does not challenge the legality or duration

of a state court conviction, he does not state a valid claim under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Badea v. Cox, 931

F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). As discussed above, habeas corpus

proceedings are the proper mechanism for challenging the legality

or duration of confinement. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484. A civil

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rights action is the proper method of challenging the conditions of

confinement. Id. at 498-99.

Boyd also challenges the state court’s handling of his direct

and collateral challenges to his security level reclassification. 

(Pet. 14-17.) He asserts that “the state court unreasonably denied

[his] petition for writ of habeas corpus by denying informal

briefing, additional discover[y] or oral argument.” (Id. at 16.) 

Boyd alleges this resulted in an unreasonable determination of the

facts and faults the court for not exercising its discretion to

take judicial notice of the fact that he was not convicted of an

execution-type murder or granting him extraordinary relief. (Id.

at 14.) These allegations do not challenge the legality or

duration of a state court conviction; thus, they do not state a

valid claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see

also Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484. 

Additionally, to present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim,

a state prisoner must that the state court violated his federal

constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v.

Ylst, 921 F.2d at 885; Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition should be GRANTED. 

B. The Court Will Not Consider the Merits of Petitioner’s

Claims.

Respondent also argues that Boyd’s Petition should be

dismissed because he has no federally protected liberty interest in

his custodial classification score, and his remaining allegations

against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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are not specific enough to state a claim for relief. (Mot. Dismiss

Mem. P. & A. 4-6.) 

Boyd counters that even if he does not have a liberty interest

in his custodial classification score, he retains a constitutional

right to due process. (Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 6.) He contends that

the reclassification is akin to an unconstitutional bill of

attainder. (Id. at 6-9.) Even so, this claim, and Boyd’s

remaining claims, all affect the conditions of his confinement and

are not cognizable under federal habeas review. See Preiser, 411

U.S. at 499.

In the Order Reopening Case and Setting Briefing Schedule, the

Court directed Respondent to “address all grounds upon which

Respondent contends dismissal without reaching the merits of

Petitioner’s claim is warranted.” (Order Reopening Case & Setting

Briefing Schedule 2.) Boyd’s conditions of confinement cannot be

addressed in this habeas proceeding. Accordingly, the Petition for

habeas relief should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge, assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 9, 2010. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before July 23, 2010. 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\BOYD2468\OrderOnMotiontoDismiss.wpd 11 09cv2468 JLS (RBB)

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district

court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.

1991).

Dated: June 8, 2010 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino

All parties of record 

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