Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06545/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06545-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA L. LONG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COLUMBIA-ARORA JOINT VENTURE,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-06545 CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this is employment discrimination lawsuit against

her former employer, defendant Columbia-Arora Joint Venture. Now pending before the

Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After carefully considering the papers

and evidence filed by the parties, including excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition and

plaintiff’s late filing, the Court concludes that no reasonable trier of fact could find in

plaintiff’s favor and GRANTS defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a Medical Records Technician at the Petaluma

United States Coast Guard clinic from August 2003 until defendant terminated her

employment in November 2005. Plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, filed this action in

October 2006. The Court granted plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

had defendant served with the complaint. Defendant responded to the complaint and 

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appeared at the initial case management conference on January 26, 2007. Plaintiff, however,

did not appear for the conference and did not otherwise communicate with the Court or

defendant. Accordingly, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why her action should not

be dismissed because of her failure to prosecute. Around the same time defendant filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to provide any specific

allegations as to the alleged employment discrimination. Plaintiff subsequently filed with the

Court a binder full of documents and her notes; the binder appeared to express her view of

the case. Although plaintiff submitted the binder, she did not appear at the show cause

hearing, and she did not make arrangements to appear by telephone.

Because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, and resides in Colorado, the Court declined

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failing to prosecute; instead, it provided the binder to

defendant for its review and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The

Court’s order declining to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint specifically warned plaintiff that if

defendant files a new motion to dismiss she must file a written opposition and she must make

arrangements to appear at the noticed hearing, either in person or by telephone. The Court

also warned plaintiff that her failure to appear at any future court hearings, in person or by

telephone, may result in dismissal of her lawsuit for a failure to prosecute. 

After reviewing the binder, defendant renewed its motion to dismiss. Although

plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion, and although the motion was well taken, the

Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Court believed that the only practical way to

accurately discern the basis for this pro se plaintiff’s claims was for defendant to take

plaintiff’s deposition and move for summary judgment. The Court provided plaintiff with a

summary judgment warning for pro se plaintiffs and scheduled a further case management

conference for October 19, 2007.

Defendant took plaintiff’s deposition in September 2007 and at the October 19, 2007

case management conference the Court set a summary judgment briefing schedule. Now

pending before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

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Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition to defendant’s motion; instead, on the eve of

the summary judgment hearing, she submitted a receipt from an office supply store with a

handwritten notation. The notation appeared to request a continuance. In any event, plaintiff

appeared by telephone at the November 30, 2007 summary judgment hearing. She requested

a continuance to December 7, 2007 to file her opposition. The Court granted her request. On

December 13, 2007, plaintiff filed her submission. It appears she has not served defendant

with a copy of what she has provided the Court.

Despite her receipt of the summary judgment warning for pro se litigants, plaintiff has

not submitted a memorandum in opposition; nor has she submitted any declarations, even

from herself. Instead, her submission consists of a number of documents with highlights,

handwritten notes, and “post its.” For example, she submitted handwritten narratives

describing telephone calls she has had with various persons along with a long list of persons

with telephone numbers. She has also provided the Court with letters of recommendations

and an undated newspaper article entitled “Workplace is Fertile Ground for Backstabbers.” 

Her submission includes a highlighted and notated copy of defendant’s motion for summary

judgment along with a notated and highlighted copy of her deposition transcript, among other

documents. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial (here, the defendant) has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party does not

have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

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may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one that

could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Title VII. 

//

A. ADEA

At plaintiff’s deposition she testified that she does not believe she was terminated

because of her age and that she does not have any evidence that suggests defendant

terminated her employment because of her age. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to

judgment on plaintiff’s ADEA claim.

B. The ADA Claim

Plaintiff appears to allege that defendant terminated her employment in violation of

the ADA because she is disabled from Lupus, an autoimmune disorder. On summary

judgment, ADA discrimination claims are analyzed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

framework, which requires the plaintiff to carry the initial burden of establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973). The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. The burden then shifts back to the

plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is in fact pretext. See id. 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must

prove: (1) that she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is

otherwise qualified, which means that with or without reasonable accommodation she is able

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to perform the essential functions of her job; and (3) that she was terminated because of her

disability. See Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996).

 Defendant first argues that plaintiff cannot carry her prima facie burden because she

has not shown that at the time of her termination she was “otherwise qualified.” In her

deposition she testified that at the time of her termination she was not healthy enough to

work; indeed, she testified that she could not have “h[e]ld down a job,” and that since the

termination of her employment she has not been well enough to go back to work. In her

submission in opposition to summary judgment she includes documents for the Social

Security Agency which suggest she began receiving social security disability payments in

October 2005. Based on this testimony and evidence, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the ADA claim must be granted.

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim for a second reason: plaintiff

cannot show that defendant terminated her employment because of her alleged disability. In

support of its summary judgment motion defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s firing, namely, her continued and repeated violation

of the company’s dress code and inappropriate behavior and related complaints from coworkers and clients. Based on this evidence, no rational trier of fact could find that

defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment because of her alleged disability. The Court has

reviewed the documents submitted by plaintiff and none include admissible evidence that

create a genuine dispute as to the reason for the termination of plaintiff’s employment.

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

C. The Title VII Sex Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff also appears to contend that she was the victim of a hostile work

environment. Her claim is based on incidents involving her direct day-to-day supervisor

Chief Warrant Officer Edward Chacon (a Coast Guard employee, not an employee of

defendant) and Coast Guard Secretary Lorraine Shipley, who did not supervise plaintiff.

In her deposition plaintiff explained that the basis for her claim involving Shipley is

that Shipley once took a photograph of plaintiff and was always “checking her out.” Shipley

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also told plaintiff that plaintiff dressed inappropriately for work. The basis for plaintiff’s

claim involving Chacon, according to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, is that Chacon once

sent an inappropriate joke to plaintiff by email and once left her a note that stated: “By the

way, nice outfit today. Love the pinstripes. Looks sharp.” Plaintiff’s submission includes a

copy of Chacon’s email as well as plaintiff’s written complaint to Chacon about Shipley

having taken plaintiff’s photograph.

“A hostile work environment claim involves a workplace atmosphere so

discriminatory and abusive that it unreasonably interferes with the job performance of those

harassed.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923. “The working environment must both subjectively and

objectively be perceived as abusive.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined from the perspective of a

reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics and hostility must be measured

based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. “These [circumstances] may include the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 

Plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, do not amount to a hostile work environment as a

matter of law. First, there is nothing discriminatory about her allegations as to Shipley. 

Plaintiff’s attorney wrote a letter to Shipley complaining about Shipley’s behavior that never

refers to Shipley’s conduct as sexual harassment; to the contrary, the letter accuses Shipley of

attempting to destroy plaintiff’s reputation. And plaintiff admitted that she approved the

letter before it was mailed. Second, the incidents themselves are, at most, a mere offensive

utterance and do not rise to the level of sexual harassment. The Court is aware of no case

that would support plaintiff’s claim here. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on the hostile work environment claim.

To the extent plaintiff also intended to make a gender discrimination Title VII claim,

she admitted at her deposition that she has no basis for doing so. Summary judgment on the

Title VII claim must be granted.

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D. The Retaliation Claims

Finally, plaintiff also appears to make retaliation claims under the ADA, ADEA and

Title VII. To prevail on her retaliation claims plaintiff must prove, among other things, that

she engaged in protected activity for which defendant retaliated against her. See, e.g., Elvig

v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004). At her deposition plaintiff

was unable to identify any protected activity which could have led to the termination of her

employment. The only arguably protected activity she identified was her complaint filed

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; that complaint, however, was filed

after defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment.

Even if plaintiff had identified some protected activity, however, as explained above

defendant has produced undisputed evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s

firing; accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claims must

be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of

plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 28, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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