Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01066/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:688 Jones Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVE V. GONZALES, Personal

Representative of the Estate of MIGUEL

VIVERO GONZALES, Deceased, and his

heirs,

Plaintiff,

v.

F/V DANIELA, U.S. Coast Guard official

number 531005, her engines, tackle, apparel,

furniture, and appurtenances in rem; AACH

HOLDING CO. NO. 2, LLC, a Florida

limited liability company; AACH HOLDING

CO., LLC, a Florida limited liability

company; SARDINHA AND CILEU

MANAGEMENT, INC., a California

corporation, in personam, and DOES 1

through 20, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11cv01066 AJB (JMA)

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. No. 16]

On May 14, 2011, the Plaintiff, Eve V. Gonzales, wife of the Decedent, Miguel Vivero

Gonzales, filed a complaint alleging wrongful death and survival actions under the Jones Act, General

Maritime Law, Death on the High Seas Act, and Merchant Seamen Protection and Relief Act. Pl.’s

Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 1. The Plaintiff filed the complaint against the Defendants, AACH Holding Co.,

AACH Holding Co. No. 2. LLC, F/V Daniela, and Sardinha and Cileu Management (“SCM”), Inc. Id.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Decedent died “as a result of injuries and complications legally resulting

from an accident” while aboard the Defendant’s ship, the Daniela. Id. at 3. On March 2, 2012, the

1 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants specially appeared and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot.

to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 1. On April 23, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 24. On May 7, 2012, the Defendants filed a reply in support of

their motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 25. The hearing set for August 17, 2012 is hereby VACATED as the

Court finds this motion appropriate for submission on the papers without oral argument pursuant to

Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, [Doc. No.

16], is hereby DENIED.

Legal Standard

“It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Doe v.

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). On a motion to dismiss, the court may decide the issue

of personal jurisdiction on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, or

hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the matter. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Ass’n Inc., 557 F.2d

1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). Under either procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that

jurisdiction is appropriate. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). If the motion is

based on affidavits and documentary evidence, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of

facts establishing personal jurisdiction, namely, “facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the

defendant.” Id. Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and conflicts between

parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Discussion

I. Personal Jurisdiction

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 17. The Plaintiff maintains that jurisdiction is proper because 

Defendant SCM is the agent of Defendants AACH2 and AACH “and stands in the shoes of AACH2 or

AACH when operating and managing the vessel.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 24, at

10. 

A. Legal Standard

“Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is tested by a two-part analysis.” Chan v.

Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). “First, the exercise of jurisdiction must

2 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

satisfy the requirements of the applicable state long-arm statute.” Id. “Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with federal due process.” Id. at 1404-05. Because California’s long arm statute is

coextensive with the limits of due process, the court need only consider the requirements of due process. 

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001).

Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum

state so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Where the claim does not arise out of a

defendant’s contacts with the forum, there is no specific jurisdiction. However, “[i]f the defendant’s

activities in the forum are substantial, continuous and systematic, general jurisdiction is available.” Doe

v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition to establishing the requisite contacts, the

assertion of jurisdiction must be found reasonable. Id. A court may excercise either general or specific

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir.

1997) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).

“For purposes of personal jurisdiction, the actions of an agent are attributable to the principal.”

Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). “In determining the sufficiency of a defendant’s

contacts, it is not only defendant’s activities in the forum, but also actions relevant to the transaction by

an agent on defendant’s behalf, which support personal jurisdiction.” Theo H. Davies & Co. v. Republic

of the Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). “The agency test is satisfied by a showing

that the subsidiary functions as the parent corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform

them, the corporations own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.” Doe v.

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Analysis

The Defendants argue that neither AACH2 nor AACH has engaged in any forum-related acts

which would give rise to a finding of specific jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 12.

The Defendants also argue that neither AACH2 nor AACH has the requisite minimum contacts with

California to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. Id. at 11. The Plaintiff argues that Defendant

SCM is the managing agent or operator of the vessel. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No.

24, at 10. The Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction over Defendants AACH2 and AACH is still proper

3 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because SCM, a San Diego company, is the agent of AACH2 and AACH “and stands in the shoes of

AACH2 or AACH when operating and managing the vessel.” Id. The Plaintiff relies on SMC invoices

sent to AACH charging for a “management fee” regarding the Daniela. Id. at 12. The Plaintiff also

offers AACH and AACH2's insurance policies regarding the Daniela, which were placed with a San

Diego insurance broker and delivered to SCM’s offices. Id. at 13. Additionally, the Plaintiff offers

various invoices that were sent to SCM’s offices for the Daniela’s parts and supplies. Id. at 13. The

Plaintiff also offers evidence in the form of a deposition of one of SCM’s owners regarding SCM’s

dealings with AACH2 and AACH. Thus, the Plaintiff argues that because SCM performed essential

functions on behalf of AACH2 and AACH in managing the vessel, SCM’s acts in California can be

imputed to Defendants. Id. at 14. In the Defendants’ reply the Defendants argue that SCM “was never

decedent’s employer and had nothing to do with the incident”. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss, Doc. No. 25, at 4. As discussed above conflicts between parties over statements contained in

affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.

2001). The Court concludes that based on the affidavits and evidence submitted, the Plaintiff has made a

prima facie showing of facts establishing personal jurisdiction over Defendants AACH and AACH2.1

II. Dismissal of SCM

Defendants argue that the action should be dismissed against SCM, because SCM cannot be held

liable to Plaintiff under any theory alleged in the complaint. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 17.

Specifically, the Defendants argue that SCM does not own, operate, or manage the Daniela as alleged by

the Plaintiff in the complaint. Id. The Defendants argue that under the Jones Act, an action may only be

brought against an employer, and since SCM is not an employer, SCM cannot be held liable by the

Plaintiff. Id. 

1

 The Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of two past rulings in cases that involved the

same Defendants and the issue of personal jurisdiction in the District Court of San Diego. Pl.’s Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 24, at 5. “Taking judicial notice of findings of fact from another case

exceeds the limits of Rule 201.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly

this Court declines to take judicial notice of another court’s ruling.

4 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2009). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all

factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed

factual allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007). A claim has "facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

B. Analysis

Defendants contend that SCM does not own, operate, or manage the Daniela and since a Jones

Act action may only be brought against an employer and SCM was not the Decedent’s employer, the

Plaintiff’s claims against SCM should be dismissed. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 17. In the

Plaintiff’s complaint the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant SCM is one of the operators and managers of

the vessel as well as Defendants’ co-employer. Pl’s Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 4. The Plaintiff further

alleges that the Decedent was employed by Defendants and died while working as a seaman aboard the

vessel while in the service of the vessel. Id. at 5. Additionally Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants were

agents, alter egos, partners, joint venturers, co-conspirators, principals, shareholders, servants,

employers, employees and the like of their co-defendant. Id. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff

need only set forth factual allegations to support the claims. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). The Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendant SCM is an employer and acts as

manager, operator and owner of the vessel to support the claims for relief. The Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Defendant SCM is DENIED.

5 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Vessel as Defendant

 In the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Defendants allege that the Daniela was improperly

named as a Defendant. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 18. The Defendants argue that pursuant

to “Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule C(2)(a), for an in rem action to proceed, that the

Complaint be verified.” Id. at 19. The Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is not verified and this

defect alone provides the court with procedural authority to dismiss this action against the Daniela. Id. at

19. In the Plaintiff’s opposition the Plaintiff argues that “given the transitory nature of vessels, under

Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims, Rule E(3)(b), issuance and delivery of process

in rem shall be held in abeyance if the plaintiff so requests.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc.

No. 24, at 15.

The Defendant fails to provide any case law or citation of authority which demonstrates that

dismissal of the Defendant, the Daniela, is warranted based on this alleged defect. Absent any legal

analysis or citation to authority supporting their argument, the Court finds the Defendants’ unsupported

arguments unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improperly naming the

vessel is DENIED. 

IV. Request to Transfer Case to the Southern District of Florida

In the event the Court does not dismiss the action, the Defendants request the Court transfer this

case to the Southern District Court of Florida. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 19. “For the

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The

court may consider the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the promotion of judicial

efficiency and economy in determining whether to transfer an action. Id. The moving party has the

burden of demonstrating transfer would be more convenient and better serve the interests of justice. See

Commodity Futures Commission v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). The Defendants argue

that the Southern District of Florida is the more appropriate venue because it is where Defendants

AACH and AACH2 reside. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 19. In the reply, the Defendants also

argue that the documents and witnesses relating to this case are located in Florida. Def.’s Reply in Supp.

of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 25, at 1. According to the Ninth Circuit, “the defendant must make a

6 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co.

v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). The Defendants’ argument that

witnesses and documents are located in Florida is too vague to make a strong showing of inconvenience

to warrant upsetting the Plaintiff’s choice of forum. The Court finds the Defendants’ arguments are

insufficient to support that a transfer would be more convenient and better serve the interests of justice.

The Defendants have failed to meet their burden and the Defendants’ request to transfer venue is

DENIED.

V. Plaintiff’s Standing to Sue

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff does not having standing to sue on behalf of her deceased

husband because the Plaintiff has not produced evidence showing that she is legally the personal

representative of the estate of the Decedent. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16, at 21. In the Plaintiff’s

opposition the Plaintiff argues that “under state law the wrongful death heirs have the right to sue in

their own name” and that the personal representative has a right to bring survival claims on behalf of the

decedent’s estate. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 24, at 15. The Plaintiff also includes

her and the Decedent’s marriage license as well as letters of administration issued by the High Court of

American Samoa, appointing the Plaintiff as the administrator of the Decedent’s estate. Id. In the

Defendants’ reply, the Defendants fail to address the evidence provided by the Plaintiff in the opposition. The Defendants fail to provide case law in their motions explaining why dismissal of the Plaintiff

is warranted. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 21, 2012

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

K:\COMMON\BATTAGLI\DJ CASES\Even Numbers - Erin's Cases\Gonzalez\11cv1066.Order.Deny. MTD.wpd 7 11cv1066

Case 3:11-cv-01066-AJB-JMA Document 28 Filed 06/22/12 Page 7 of 7