Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02079/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐2079

JOSEPH S. ROBERTS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 828 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2016 — DECIDED MAY 6, 2016

Before BAUERandHAMILTON,CircuitJudges, and PETERSON,

*

District Judge.

BAUER,CircuitJudge.Defendant‐appellee,ColumbiaCollege

Chicago (“Columbia”), terminated plaintiff‐appellant, Profes‐

sorJosephRoberts (“Roberts”), afterit discovered that Roberts

plagiarized several chapters in a textbook that he composed in

*

  Of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,

sitting by designation.

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
2 No. 15‐2079

2004. Roberts filed suit against Columbia and several Colum‐

bia faculty members. In his complaint, Roberts pleaded

multiple theories of recovery. All defendants moved for

summary judgment, which the district court granted. Roberts

appealed the grant of summary judgment in regards to his

claims for breach of contract and age discrimination in viola‐

tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. Forthe following reasons, we affirm the

district court’s ruling.

I.  BACKGROUND

A. The Textbook

Columbia hired Roberts in 1999 as a tenure‐track professor

in the Arts, Entertainment and Media Management Depart‐

ment(“AEMMDepartment”).Roberts achievedtenuredstatus

in 2003. His tenure rights were secured by a contract entitled

“Columbia College Chicago Statement of Policy on Academic

Freedom, Faculty Status, Tenure, and Due Process” (the

“Statement of Policy”).

In late 2003, Roberts believed there were no good, reason‐

ably priced textbooks on the subject of economics as applied to

the arts. So, he began creating a new custom textbook with the

help of his AEMM Department colleague Clark Greene and

several graduate students in the AEMM Department. This

process involved working with a publishing company to

compile materials from other textbooks into one new custom

textbook. Roberts worked with publisher McGraw‐Hill and

usedmaterials from three currenttextbooks:IssuesinEconomics

Today by Robert Guell; Economics is Everywhere by Daniel

Hamermesh; andBasicEconomicConcepts byWerner Sichel and

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 3

Peter Eckstein. The final product, Economics for Arts Entrepre‐

neurs and Managers, consisted primarily of the copied material

from the three textbooks. Roberts and Clarke Greene also

prepared original material, such as the first chapter.

Roberts testifiedin hisdeposition that he sentMcGraw‐Hill

photocopies of the three covers of the textbooks, reference

sections, and copyright sections. When his textbook was

published, however, the cover was titled: Economics for Arts

Entrepreneurs and Managers: with selected material from Issues in

Economics Today and Economics is Everywhere. The cover also

lists the following authors in order: Dr. Joseph S. Roberts,

Robert C. Guell, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. The textbook does

not reference or cite Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and

Eckstein. Further, the inside cover page states, “Peer review,

class testing, and accuracy are primarily the responsibility of

the author(s).”

Roberts intendedtouseEconomicsfor ArtsEntrepreneurs and

Managers for his 2004 fall semester class. He requested a final

proof of the textbook from McGraw‐Hill prior to its publica‐

tion, but neverreceived one.Instead, the first time Roberts saw

the completed textbook was when he purchased it at Colum‐

bia’s bookstore, after his students forthe 2004 fall semester had

arrived in class with the textbook already purchased. Upon

reviewing it, Roberts noticed several errors, such as omitting

the reference to Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and Eckstein,

as well as the lack ofreference pages at the end of each chapter.

Roberts testified that after he identified the errors, he made

a phone call to McGraw‐Hill to inform the publisher of the

problem, but did not send a follow‐up letter or email detailing

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
4 No. 15‐2079

the issues. He also provided his students with a corrected

reference page. He understood at that time that not citing the

Sichel and Eckstein textbook was a “serious error” and created

a “big problem” for his book. Ultimately, Roberts and several

other colleagues decided to never use Economics for Arts

Entrepreneurs and Managers again due to the errors and its

price. Roberts made no further efforts to ensure McGraw‐Hill

corrected the omission.

Sometime around either December 2005 or January 2006,

Roberts approached graduate student Nissan Wasfie

(“Wasfie”), and asked for his assistance updating Economicsfor

Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers. Roberts intended to correct

the original textbook’s reference errors in the updated version.

Wasfie agreed to help, however, the updated version never

came to fruition because a dispute arose over money that

Roberts allegedly owed Wasfie. The original publication was

never corrected.

Roberts updated his curriculum vitae in 2009 and 2011.

Both times he listed Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and

Managers under his list of publications.

B. Roberts’ Age Discrimination Evidence

In 2010, Roberts served on a search committee to name the

AEMM Department Chairperson. The committee identified

who they believed was the best candidate, but that individual

refused the position due to issues regarding the terms of

employment. Eliza Nichols, the Dean of the School of Fine and

Performing Arts at Columbia (“Nichols”), then called the

individual members of the search committee and asked them

to approve Philippe Ravanas (“Ravanas”) as the new chairper‐

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No. 15‐2079 5

son, which each member did. Roberts testified that Ravanas

was the committee’s “reluctant second choice,” and that

Roberts wished the committee was able to convene as a whole

prior to making the decision.

Contention arose between Roberts and Ravanas sometime

after Ravanas was appointed the AEMM Department Chair‐

person. Ravanas commented that Roberts and other older

members of the faculty did not fit the “image” that Ravanas

desired to create, as he wanted to portray a “young and hip

look for the program.” At that time, Roberts was about fifty

years old.Ravanas also removed a photograph ofRoberts from

the online directory because he believed it did not project the

look he wanted for the AEMM Department. In addition, two

othertenured professors of the AEMM Department submitted

sworn testimony that Ravanas was “hostile” towards older

members of the faculty.

Ravanas had other disputes with Roberts as well. On

February 23, 2011, Ravanas sent Roberts an email asking him

to explain why Roberts received a $250 per month cellphone

allowance from Columbia when no other professor did, why

Roberts submitted a request for $950 to cover a membership

fee for an organization when that organization’s website listed

the fee as $125, and why Roberts identified himself as associ‐

ated with the Coleman Foundation after the AEMM Depart‐

ment had cut ties with the group. On April 12, 2011, Ravanas

sentRoberts another email questioning whyRoberts was listed

on the Coleman Foundation’s website, why the Self Employ‐

ment in the Arts Conference website listed Roberts as having

a PhD in Entrepreneurship when it was actually in Education,

and why Roberts’ biography on the AEMM Department

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6 No. 15‐2079

website indicated he designed entrepreneurship programs for

inner‐city neighborhoods when he had not provided this

information to the Department before. Roberts responded that

he would contact the websites and ask them to correct the

information.

C. Plagiarism Investigation

At some point in 2004, before Roberts published Economics

for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers, Wasfie noticed graduate

students inRoberts’ office hadopentextbooks onRoberts’desk

and were typing from them. Wasfie became suspicious that

Roberts had committed plagiarism, but did not mention this to

anyone at that time.

Wasfie developed a brain tumor in the fall of 2010, and

went on leave from December 2010 through March 2011 to

recover from brain surgery. Wasfie testified that while on

leave, he reflected on “life in general,” “justice,” and “doing

what’s right.” He decided during this time to investigate

whether Roberts had plagiarized Economics for Arts Entrepre‐

neurs and Managers. He went to the library to research his

suspicions, and eventually compared Roberts’ textbook with

Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and Eckstein.

In mid‐March 2011, Wasfie approached Ravanas with the

results of his investigation. He informed Ravanas that a

significantpart ofEconomicsfor ArtsEntrepreneurs andManagers

was unattributed. Wasfie also provided Ravanas with a copy

of Roberts’ textbook and information regarding the unattri‐

buted sections from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic

Concepts.

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No. 15‐2079 7

In his deposition,Roberts testified that he had indicated the

reference error to Wasfie years earlier when Roberts sought

Wasfie’s assistance with updating the textbook. Roberts also

testified that he did not think Wasfie harbored any antagonism

towards him, and he believed that someone “put [Wasfie] up

to” informing the faculty of Roberts’ plagiarism. Roberts

acknowledged that he had no evidence other than his own

speculations as to whether Ravanas, or anyone else, coerced or

induced Wasfie to make the plagiarism allegation against him.

After Wasfie informed Ravanas of the plagiarism, Ravanas

compared Roberts’ Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Mana‐

gers with Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic Concepts. He

concludedthat eight chapters from Roberts’textbook consisted

almost entirely of unattributed excerpts from the Sichel and

Eckstein textbook. This amounted to approximately 10,000

unattributed words total. Heprepareda writtenmemorandum

detailing his findings. Ravanas forwarded the memorandum

to Nichols in early April 2011, who then reviewed the memo‐

randum and compared the relevant textbooks. Nichols also

concluded that plagiarism had occurred and informed the vice

president for academic affairs, the provost, and the general

counsel’s office about her findings.

During this same time period, Roberts and other faculty

members were organizing their complaints against Ravanas’

leadership ofthe AEMM Department. On May 2, 2011,Roberts

and several of his colleagues issued a formal complaint against

Ravanas. On May 31, 2011, Roberts and the other faculty

members met with Louise Love, who was then‐Vice President

ofAcademicAffairs (“Love”),regarding the situation.Immedi‐

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8 No. 15‐2079

ately afterwards, Roberts met with Nichols for a previously

scheduled meeting.

There are two conflicting accounts of how the May 31, 2011,

meeting between Nichols and Roberts transpired. According

toRoberts, Nichols accusedhimof committingplagiarism,told

him that he had five minutes to resign, and that if he refused

to resign the plagiarism would go on his record. Roberts also

testifiedthat Nicholsdidnot show him the memorandum from

Ravanas, did not give him an opportunity to present his side

of the story, and told him to go to his office and think about his

family and career. According to Nichols, she asked Roberts to

review Ravanas’ memorandum and address the charges

contained therein, but Roberts did not get through the first

line. She testified that Roberts claimed that the title of the book

was wrong, and thus he was not the author of the book. She

acknowledged giving him the option to resign and told him to

think about it, but denied saying that he only had five minutes

to decide. She also testified that Roberts was “very confusing”

throughout the meeting and “had absolutely no comprehensi‐

ble excuse for what he did.” Both agree that Roberts called

Nichols later that day and informed her that he would not

resign.

In June 2011, Love was appointed interim provost of

Columbia. As provost, she had the authority to terminate

tenured faculty members. Shortly after her appointment, she

was informed of the plagiarism charge against Roberts. She

investigated the matter by comparing Roberts’ Economics for

Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers with Sichel and Eckstein’s

Basic Economic Concepts. After reviewing the two sources, she

concluded that there was “substantial plagiarism” in Roberts’

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 9

textbook. She also spoke with Nichols about the matter and

reviewed the memorandum prepared by Ravanas. Love did

not speak with Roberts as part of herinvestigation because she

believed “[t]he evidence spoke foritself.” She also testifiedthat

it was irrelevant whether the mistake was Roberts’ fault or

McGraw‐Hill’s fault, because “[t]he author is responsible for

the material.”

After herinvestigation, Love decided to terminate Roberts’

employment. She testified that Columbia made no attempt to

address his conduct other than by termination because “[t]he

nature of his offense didn’t allow for that,” since “[h]is viola‐

tion of the standard of academic integrity was quite egre‐

gious.”

On June 9, 2011, Love sent Roberts a letter terminating his

employment with Columbia. The letter stated, “In accordance

with Section IX(A)(2) of the [Statement of Policy], your

termination is due to academic dishonesty related to plagia‐

rized passages within your book, Economics for Arts Entrepre‐

neurs and Managers.” It went on to state that “your continued

participation in the affairs of [Columbia] is likely to be detri‐

mental to [Columbia’s] reputation and will cause academic

harm to [Columbia].” The letter concluded that Roberts was

“hereby suspended without pay pending an internal review

you may wish to seek.”

Upon receiving the letter, Roberts sent an email to Love

with a list of clarifications. Love did not respond. Following

this, Roberts did not seek the internal review procedures

referenced in the termination letter. He stated in his deposition

that he “didn’t see any point in doing that” based on his

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
10 No. 15‐2079

previous experience serving as amember ofthe internalreview

panel, known as the Elected Representatives of the College

(“ERC”). He further testified that “the ERC powers were

reduced, so it was no longer an oversight as intended to be.”

On February 6, 2012, Roberts filed a civil lawsuit against

Columbia, Nichols, and Ravanas. He made several claims

against Columbia, such as breach of contract, retaliatory

discharge, defamation, and discrimination under Title VII, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the ADEA; and the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. He

also brought other claims against all of the defendants, and

against Ravanas individually. All defendants filed motions for

summary judgment in regards to all counts, which the district

court granted on April 21, 2015. Roberts appealed the district

court’s ruling as to whether summary judgment was appropri‐

ate in favor of Columbia for Roberts’ breach of contract claim

and his ADEA discrimination claim.1 So, Columbia is the only

appellee in this matter.

1

  Roberts also alleged that the district court improperly resolved disputed

issues of material fact in favor of Columbia, improperly rejected testimony

in favor of Roberts as “self‐serving,” and improperly construed facts, made

credibility determinations, and drew inferences in favor of Columbia. Since

we review grants of motions for summary judgment de novo, whether the

district court erred in this regard is not determinative of whether this court

should reverse and remand. Under de novo review, Roberts can rely upon

his brief to argue anew how the relevant facts and reasonable inferences

drawn from them, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, show

that Columbia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or that a

genuine dispute of material fact exists.

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 11

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, while construing all facts and drawing all reasonable

inferences within the record in favor of Roberts. Harris v.

Warrick Cty. Sheriffʹs Depʹt, 666 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the

moving party shows that no genuine dispute of material fact

exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In its brief, Columbia argues that this court cannot hear

Roberts’ claims because the Statement of Policy precludes

judicial review by limiting Roberts’ relief to the college’s

internal ERC review process. So, before we can address the

merits of Roberts’ appeal, we must determine whether the

claims were properly brought before the court.

A. Statement of Policy’s Preclusion of Judicial Review

Columbia argues that the Statement of Policy provides that

the ERC process was Roberts’ sole recourse for reviewing the

merits of Columbia’s decision to terminate his employment. In

support, it cites the following provision from the Statement of

Policy:

A faculty member who wishes to challenge or

seek review of the Provost/Senior Vice Presi‐

dent’s decision to sanction or dismiss him or her

may do so solely in accordance with the follow‐

ing provisions of this Section IX.D.2.b., allowing

for a review by the [ERC].

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12 No. 15‐2079

Columbia relies on the word “solely,” as well as the

extensive ERC review procedures set forth within Section

IX.D.2.b. of the Statement of Policy, to argue that the contract

prevented judicial review of the merits of Love’s decision to

terminate Roberts’ employment.

Initially, we note that Columbia never presented this

argument to the district court. Rather, Columbia argued that

Roberts had to seek ERC review as a prerequisite for obtaining

judicial review. Thus, it made an exhaustion of remedies

argument, not the argument that the Statement of Policy

summarily prevented Roberts from bringing his claim to the

court. As a result, Columbia has waived any argument that the

Statement of Policy precludes judicial review. See Domka v.

Portage Cty., Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2008).2

Further, even if the argument were preserved, we find that

the Statement of Policy does not prevent judicial review of

Roberts’ claims. Neither party provided any binding authority

regarding whether a private university could preclude judicial

review of the merits of a decision to dismiss a tenured profes‐

sor. While we generally avoid reviewing the merits of deci‐

2

  At oral argument, Columbia claimed that seeking ERC review was a

prerequisite for seeking judicial review of whether the termination

procedures were properly followed, but that a court could never review the

substantive merits of the decision to terminate a tenured professor. Since

Columbia never argued this in its brief, it is waived and we need not

address it. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL‐CIO v. Rabine,

161 F.3d427, 432 (7th Cir. 1998)(citation omitted)(although partypresented

argument before district court and at oral argument, the argument was not

in the appellate brief, and “arguments not raised in a brief are waived”).

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 13

sions to grant tenure, see, e.g., Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687

F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2012), it is unclear whether private

universities cancontractuallypreventthe courtfrom reviewing

the substantive merits of a university’s decision to dismiss a

tenured faculty member.

In examining this issue, we find that McConnell v. Howard

University, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987), provides persuasive

authority. In McConnell, a tenured professor sued Howard

University for breach of contract after his employment was

terminated. Id. at 59. The district court applied a deferential

standard ofreview because the faculty handbook stated thatin

reviewing faculty grievances, “[t]he decision of the Board of

Trustees shall be final.” Id. at 67. The District of Columbia

Circuit reversed, finding the contract did not limit judicial

review of university decisions to terminate tenured faculty

members. Id. at 67–68. “Such a reading of the contract renders

tenure a virtual nullity. Faculty members like Dr. McConnell

would have no realsubstantiverightto continued employment,

but only certain procedural rights that must be followed before

their appointment may be terminated.” Id. at 67 (emphasis in

original).Although the contractlanguage stated thatthe Board

of Trustees’ decision was final, the court found that this only

clarified that there were no “further avenues of review within

the University.” Id. at 68 (emphasis in original). The court

reasoned, “If we were to adopt a view limiting judicial review

over the substance of the Board of Trustees’ decision, we

would be allowing one of the parties to the contract to deter‐

mine whether the contract had been breached. This would

make a sham of the parties’ contractual tenure arrangement.”

Id.

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14 No. 15‐2079

This case parallels McConnell. The Statement of Policy’s

language states that terminated tenured professors wishing to

seek review of the decision “may do so solely in accordance

withthe followingprovisions ofthis Section IX.D.2.b., allowing

for a review by the [ERC].” This does not mandate ERC review

as the sole recourse available, and that terminated tenured

professors cannot seek judicial review. Rather, it states that

terminated professors who “wish” to challenge the provost’s

decision “may do so solely in accordance with” the procedures

specified within the contract. As in McConnell, the provision

here merely clarifies the internal review procedures for

professors seeking to challenge the termination decision within

Columbia itself. It does not prevent terminated tenured profes‐

sors from bringing their claims to court. Further, tenure would

be an illusory benefit if we interpreted the Statement of Policy

as preventing Roberts from filing suit to challenge the merits

of Columbia’s decision to terminate his employment.

Therefore, since Columbia waived its argument that the

Statement of Policy precluded judicial review, and the State‐

ment of Policy does not prevent judicial review, we find that

Roberts properly brought his breach of contract complaint

before the court. So, we turn to the merits of his claim.

B. Breach of Contract

Both parties agree that Illinois law governs Roberts’ breach

of contract claim. Under Illinois law, to sustain a breach of

contract claim a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the existence of a

valid and enforceable contract; (2) substantial performance by

the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant

damages.” W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 351

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 15

Ill. App. 3d 752, 286 Ill. Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d 960, 967 (2004). In

this case, Roberts’ tenure rights were secured by the Statement

of Policy, which both parties agree constitutes a contract

between Roberts and Columbia.

Roberts argues that Columbia breached two separate

provisions of the Statement of Policy. He first claims that Love

did not conduct an “appropriate” investigation into the

plagiarism charge. He also argues that Columbia breached the

contract by not imposing less severe sanctions to remedy his

conduct. We address each issue separately.

1. Whether Love Conducted an Appropriate Inves‐

tigation  

The pertinent language from the Statement of Policy

regardingRoberts’first claim is as follows: “the Provost/Senior

Vice President will undertake such investigation and comply

with such procedures as he or she believes appropriate.”

Roberts acknowledges that the Statement of Policy granted

Love discretion in determining how to investigate the plagia‐

rism charge. But he argues that she still had to exercise her

discretion in good faith. Roberts alleges that Love did not

exercise her discretion in good faith because plagiarism

contains an intent element, yet Love never attempted to

discern whetherRoberts intentionallyplagiarized.Instead, her

investigation consisted of comparing the relevant chapters

from Roberts’ Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers

with the corresponding text from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic

Economic Concepts, consulting with Nichols (who had previ‐

ously met with Roberts regarding the matter), and reviewing

the memorandum prepared by Ravanas.

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16 No. 15‐2079

We disagree that as a matter of law plagiarism necessarily

contains anintent element.InSeitz‐Partridge v. LoyolaUniversity

Chicago, the Illinois appellate court examined an almost

identical issue in a case involving a graduate student who was

accused of plagiarism. 2013 Ill. App. (1st) 113409, 369 Ill. Dec.

692, 987 N.E.2d 34, 42 (2013). The graduate student argued that

she did not commit plagiarism because any plagiarism that

occurred was unintentional. Id. In its analysis, the court

examined the student handbook and found that it did not

contain an intent element for its definition of plagiarism. Id.

The court also examined the two university committees’

investigations against her, and found that neither made a

finding that the plaintiff intentionally plagiarized. Id. As a

result, the student could not create a genuine dispute of

material fact by arguing that she did not intend to plagiarize.

Id. at 42–43. In this case, Roberts similarly cannot point to

anything in the Statement of Policy defining plagiarism, nor

did Provost Love make a finding that he acted intentionally.

Thus, whether he intentionally plagiarized is irrelevant.

Roberts also argues that Love’s investigation was not

undertaken in good faith because she did not examine whether

he took efforts to remedy his plagiarism. Specifically, he claims

that he called McGuire‐Hill to report the problem, did not use

the textbook for future classes, and distributed corrected

reference pages to his students. We note, however, that he

failed to remove the plagiarized textbook from his curriculum

vitae for several years. Regardless, the fact that Roberts took

some efforts to remedy his plagiarism is not relevant in this

matter. The question before us is not whether Love’s

investigation was maximally thorough; it is only whether she

Case: 15-2079 Document: 27 Filed: 05/06/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15‐2079 17

actedin goodfaith when she exercisedherdiscretion underthe

Statement of Policy to determine an “appropriate” investiga‐

tion into whetherRoberts plagiarized. Love had a documented

case of serious plagiarism. She made a reasonable decision that

she had the evidence she needed, andRoberts has not adduced

evidence to show her bad faith. We conclude that Columbia

did not breach the Statement of Policy.

2. Whether Lesser Sanctions Were Required

Roberts also claims that Columbia breached the Statement

of Policy by not imposing less severe sanctions against him to

remedy his conduct. The pertinent language reads:

The College is authorized ... to dismiss a

faculty member with a Tenured Appointment

for Cause. Prior to dismissing such a faculty

member, the College will, in ordinary circum‐

stances, attempt to correct the conduct giving

rise to Cause by other less severe action. Dis‐

missal is appropriate if such action has failed to

end such conduct within a specified period of

time or otherless severe action is inappropriate

and contrary to the best interests of the College

because of the nature or seriousness of the con‐

duct. (Emphasis added.)

Plagiarism is not an “ordinary circumstance” in the

academic community. As Columbia cited in its brief,

“[p]lagiarism is considered by most writers, teachers, journal‐

ists, scholars, and even members of the general public to be the

capital intellectual crime.” Richard A. Posner, The Little Book

of Plagiarism 107 (2007). Roberts himself admitted that “[i]n

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18 No. 15‐2079

academia, plagiarism is considered an egregious and serious

offense.”

Roberts argues that, based on the broad Statement of Policy

language, it is necessarily a jury question whether his conduct

constituted “ordinary circumstances” in which less severe

action was required.3 We acknowledge that it may be difficult

in some instances to distinguish between an “ordinary circum‐

stance” and a case in which the “nature or seriousness of the

conduct” justifies termination. It is clear, though, that in the

academic realm few charges are more serious than plagiarism.

Therefore, it was perfectly reasonable for Love to find that the

“nature or seriousness” of Roberts’ plagiarism within Econom‐

ics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers was such that it was

improperto attempt to correct his conduct through less severe

action. See Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.

1984) (finding that the university reasonably interpreted the

faculty ethics provision prohibiting “exploitation of students

for ... private advantage” to include the professor’s sexual

exploitation of his students). As a result, her decision to

terminateRoberts’ employment,ratherthan impose less severe

sanctions, did not breach the Statement of Policy.

3

   Roberts relies on a district court case, Lerman v. Turner, 2013 WL 4495245

(N.D. Ill. 2013), to support this argument. Lerman is an unpublished district

court opinion that has no binding precedential authority over this court.

Wirtz v. City of South Bend, 669 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations

omitted)(“A district court decision does not have precedential effect...that

is, it is not an authority, having force independent of its reasoning, and to

which therefore a court with a similar case must defer even if it disagrees,

unless the circumstances that justify overruling a precedent are present.”).

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No. 15‐2079 19

C. ADEA Claim

Roberts also claims that Columbia’s termination of his

employment constituted unlawful discrimination on account

of his age. “The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to

refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against an individual

‘because of such individual’s age.’” Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc.,

773 F.3d 871, 880 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).

ADEA protection extends to individuals who are 40 years of

age or older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). A plaintiff asserting an ADEA

claim may proceed under the direct or indirect method of

proof. Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir.

2012). In this case, Roberts has proceeded under the direct

method of proof, which requires him to either present a direct

admission from Columbia that he was fired for age discrimina‐

tory reasons, or show a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial

evidence that “points directly to a discriminatory reason for

[Columbia’s] action.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, Roberts

must “show evidence that could support a jury verdictthat age

was a but‐for cause of the employment action.” Id. at 604

(citations omitted).

In this case, Love made the decision to terminate Roberts.

Roberts has not produced any evidence indicating that she had

any animus against him on account of his age. Instead, Roberts

argues that under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, Ravanas’

hostility against Roberts on account of his age could be

imputed to Love due to Ravanas’ involvement in the termina‐

tion process.

“In employment discrimination law the ‘cat’s paw’ meta‐

phor refers to a situation in which an employee is fired or

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20 No. 15‐2079

subjected to some other adverse employment action by a

supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive, but

who has been manipulated by a subordinate who does have

such a motive and intended to bring about the adverse

employment action.” Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628

(7th Cir. 2012). To prevail on his cat’s paw theory, Roberts has

to show that Love’s decision was “decisively influenced by

someone who was prejudiced.” Blasdel, 687 F.3d at 817 (empha‐

sis in original) (citations omitted). Even if we assume that

Ravanas’ comments toRoberts andthe affidavits from Roberts’

colleagues were sufficient to show that Ravanas was preju‐

diced against Roberts on account of his age, there is no

evidence that Ravanas “manipulated” or “decisively influ‐

enced” Love’s decision to terminate Roberts’ employment.

In Woods v. City of Berwyn, we found that the Supreme

Court’s holding in Staub v. Proctor Hospital changed cat’s paw

liability in this circuit such that we no longer require the

subordinate with thediscriminatory animus to be the “singular

influence” on the decision‐maker. 803 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir.

2015). But we noted that the Supreme Court still left open the

possibility for cases in which a subordinate’s discriminatory

animus is too remote to the decision‐maker to sustain a cat’s

paw theory of liability. Id. at 870. Specifically, in instances

where the final decision‐maker conducted his or her own

investigation into the matter, we stated:

If the ultimate decision‐maker does determine

whether the adverse action is entirely justified

apartfrom the [subordinate’s]recommendation,

then the subordinate’s purported bias might not

subject the employer to liability. This is consis‐

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No. 15‐2079 21

tent with our previous holdings that “the chain

of causation can be broken if the unbiased

decision‐maker conducts a meaningful and

independent investigation of the information

being supplied by the biased employee.”

Schandelmeier–Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d

372, 383 (7th Cir. 2011). To hold otherwise would

be to rule that whenever a discriminatory subor‐

dinate makes an allegation or institutes a charge

and the plaintiff‐employee is fired, there are no

steps the ultimate decision‐maker could ever

take to break that chain of proximate causation.

That cannot be so.

Id.

In this case, Love conducted her own investigation into

whether to terminate Roberts’ employment. She read Roberts’

Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers and compared

the controversial chapters with the specific un‐credited

sections from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic Concepts. By

examining the primary sources, shedeterminedfor herselfthat

Robertshadcommittedplagiarism.Inaddition,Love consulted

with Nichols after Nichols had previously met with Roberts

regarding the situation.AlthoughLove also reviewedRavanas’

memorandum, itis clearthat she conducteda “meaningful and

independent investigation” into the matter apart from relying

on Ravanas’ recommendations. Further, Roberts does not

contest the accuracy of Ravanas’ memorandum, and in fact

admitted the accuracy of substantially all of the allegations

contained therein. Also, there is no evidence that any other

tenured professor, of any age, had engaged in similar plagia‐

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22 No. 15‐2079

rism and had not been fired. Thus, there is no reasonable

inference that Ravanas’ age hostility against Roberts manipu‐

lated Love’s decision to terminate Roberts’ employment.

Roberts attempts to save his cat’s paw theory by arguing

that Ravanas’ memorandum “set in motion the eventual

termination.” That is incorrect; Wasfie originated the plagia‐

rism charge againstRoberts, notRavanas. Further, onceWasfie

accused Roberts of plagiarism, Ravanas undertook his own

independent investigation into the matter, rather than blindly

rely onWasfie’s accusations. As discussed above,Roberts does

not contest the accuracy of Ravanas’ memorandum’s findings

and has not presented any evidence that Ravanas only investi‐

gatedtheplagiarism charge because ofRoberts’ age.Therefore,

his ADEA claims cannot withstand summary judgment.

III.  CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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