Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_25-cv-00200/USCOURTS-caed-2_25-cv-00200-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIE VUE,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEE LAY MOUA, et al.

Defendants.

No. 2:25-cv-0200-DC-CKD (PS)

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

On January 15, 2025, pro se plaintiff Maria Vue filed a civil complaint and a motion for a 

temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 1.) The presiding district judge referred the motion to the 

undersigned for issuance of findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 3.) 

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 

2.) Plaintiff’s application in support of the in forma pauperis request makes the required financial 

showing. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis request. 

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that plaintiff’s motion for temporary 

restraining order be denied. In addition, as the complaint fails to state a claim, it should be 

dismissed without leave to amend.

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I. Screening Requirement

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 

(9th Cir. 2000). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 

fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, 

the court accepts as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly 

baseless or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 

id. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 

2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory 

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council 

v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 

(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se 

litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend 

unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez, 203 

F.3d 1122.

II. The Complaint’s Allegations

Plaintiff filed a complaint and a “request for injunction” on January 15, 2025, against 

defendants Lee Lay Moua and Mai Moua Vang. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges violations of 

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several federal criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 875, 2261A, and 47 U.S.C. §223.1 (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff claims defendant Moua owns a public social conference line and defendant Vang is the 

moderator of the line. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that “harassment, threats, and intimidation” 

against her occurred beginning on November 17, 2024, and has been ongoing. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff 

alleges that one of the guests on the conference line encouraged another person to “blow 

[plaintiff’s] guts out.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff states that she has suffered irreparable emotional harm, 

threats to her physical safety, and loss of quality of life that monetary damages cannot 

compensate. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks a restraining order to protect her and her family from 

potential violence and to shut down the social conference line. (Id. at 7.)

III. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases authorized 

by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Jurisdiction 

is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 

appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); see Morongo Band 

of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief and 

must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be 

established in one of two ways: actions arising under federal law or those between citizens of 

different states in which the alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subjectmatter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua 

sponte” subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 

U.S. 134, 141 (2012).

Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, 

implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit 

1

 Plaintiff’s complaint lists 47 U.S.C. § 233 “Obscene or harassing calls,” but the proper statutory 

citation is 47 U.S.C. § 223.

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as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 

83, 89 (1998) (citation omitted). A court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

In this case, the complaint invokes federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (See ECF 

No. 1 at 3.) The basis for plaintiff’s claims is four criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 875, 

2261A, and 47 U.S.C. §223. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) However, there is no private right of action for 

violation of a criminal statute. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 

2006) (affirming dismissal of claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because they are “criminal 

statutes that do not give rise to civil liability”); Keyter v. McCain, 207 F. App’x 801, 802 (9th Cir. 

2006)2 (unpublished) (“The district court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] claims based on federal 

criminal statutes because statutes that provide for punishment by fine or imprisonment do not 

create privately enforceable rights or give rise to civil liability.”); see also Cain v. Christine 

Valmy Int’l Sch. of Esthetics, Skin Care, & Makeup, 216 F. Supp. 3d 328, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 

2016) (dismissing claims under 47 U.S.C. § 223 and 18 U.S.C. § 2261A because they are 

criminal statutes that do not confer a private right of action); Allen v. Citrus Heights Police Dep’t, 

2021 WL 4942842, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2021) (dismissing claims with prejudice under 

criminal statutes for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Plaintiff is unable to assert a claim 

against defendants under any of these four statutes. Additionally, while plaintiff alleges that she is 

diverse from both defendants (ECF No. 1 at 3-4), plaintiff has made no claim for monetary relief.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Allen, 2021 WL 4942842, at *3. Because amendment would not cure the 

deficiencies in the complaint, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. 

Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448; Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 

1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad 

faith, prejudice, and futility.”).

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2

 This unpublished decision is being cited for persuasive value only. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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B. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

The complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required by 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the grounds on 

which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by 

specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 

1996).

Here, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim because the criminal statutes under which 

she brings her claims do not provide for a private right of action. Additionally, even if plaintiff 

could bring her claim, she has not alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to allow the court to 

determine that defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 663. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was threatened and that this is ongoing, however other than one specific 

threat, plaintiff has not sufficiently described the alleged threats or behavior she seeks to prevent. 

She also states that the threat came from one of defendant’s guests on the conference line, whom 

plaintiff does not name, not one of the defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) 

IV. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order concurrently with her complaint. 

(ECF No. 1.) The purpose of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm “so long as is 

necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 

U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, a court relies 

on the factors that guide the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief: whether the 

moving party is (1) “likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and (4) “an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 

(2008); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (stating the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is 

“substantially identical”).

Courts within this circuit may also consider a request for a temporary restraining order 

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using a “sliding scale” test in which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 

showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2011). “[W]hen plaintiffs establish that the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor, there 

is a likelihood of irreparable injury, and the injunction is in the public interest, they need only 

show ‘serious questions’ on the merits.” Where Do We Go Berkeley v. California Dep’t of 

Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 

1135).

However, likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor, and it is 

relevant to the court’s evaluation of the other factors. See Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1044 

(9th Cir. 2023). Without showing a likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff also does not 

establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor, or that an injunction is in the public interest. 

See id.; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-21.

The Eastern District of California’s local rules impose specific requirements on those who 

request a temporary restraining order. See Local Rule 231. Among other things, these rules 

require “actual notice to the affected party and/or counsel” except in “the most extraordinary of 

circumstances.” Local Rule 231(a). “Appropriate notice would inform the affected party and/or 

counsel of the intention to seek a temporary restraining order, the date and time for hearing to be 

requested . . . , and the nature of the relief to be requested.” Id.

A court may issue a temporary restraining order “without written or oral notice to the 

adverse party” only if

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show 

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to 

the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give 

notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 

When deciding whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the court may rely on 

declarations, affidavits, and exhibits, among other things. See Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 

1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). This evidence need not conform to the standards that apply at 

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summary judgment or trial. Id.; Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 

1984).

A. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Procedurally Deficient

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 65 or Local Rule 231 governing applications for temporary restraining orders.

First, plaintiff has not filed a brief on all relevant legal issues presented by the motion. Second, 

plaintiff has not filed a proposed order. Third, plaintiff has not filed an “affidavit detailing notice, 

or efforts to effect notice to the affected parties or counsel or showing good cause why notice 

should not be given[.]”3 Local Rule 231(c)(5). While plaintiff responded in the TRO checklist 

that there was notice to the affected party (ECF No. 1-2 at 1), plaintiff has not provided an 

affidavit detailing this notice or describing the efforts plaintiff took to effect notice. The motion 

for a temporary restraining order is therefore procedurally defective. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); 

Local Rule 231.

Courts regularly deny TROs for failing to comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 

65(b)(1), including those sought by pro se plaintiffs. See Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 

452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (“courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying 

the issuance of an ex parte [temporary restraining order]”); Abdel-Malak v. Doe, 2020 WL 

5775818, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying TRO sought by pro se plaintiff for failure to 

satisfy Rule 65(b)’s “strict requirements”). In addition, plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Local 

Rules’ requirements for TROs is sufficient justification to deny the motion. See Nible v. 

Macomber, 2024 WL 2133319, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2024) (denying TRO sought by pro se 

plaintiff as procedurally deficient); see, e.g., Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 

1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local 

rules is well within a district court’s discretion.”).

Therefore, the Court will recommend denial of the temporary restraining order motion 

3 The court does not assume all affected parties or counsel received actual notice of plaintiff’s 

motion for temporary restraining order through CM/ECF Notice of Electronic Filing because no 

named defendants have appeared in this matter.

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based on these procedural deficiencies.

B. Plaintiff Has Not Clearly Shown a Likelihood of Success of the Merits

The Court also examines the first and most important Winter factor: likelihood of success 

on the merits. Because the first Winter factor of likelihood of success is a threshold inquiry and 

the most important factor, a “court need not consider the other factors” if a movant fails to show a 

likelihood of success on the merits. Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040 (citation omitted); see Garcia v. 

Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Although pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), they are still required to conform 

to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits. As stated above, the 

basis for plaintiff’s claims is four criminal statutes, however there is no private right of action for 

violation of a criminal statute. See Allen, 464 F.3d at 1048; supra p. 4. Accordingly, plaintiff 

cannot bring a claim under any of these four statutes, and plaintiff has failed to establish the 

likelihood of success on the merits. See Feathers v. U.S. SEC, 2022 WL 17330840, at *2-3 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 29, 2022) (dismissing complaint under Rule 8 with leave to amend, and denying TRO 

based on no available plausible claims); Hanson v. Hanson, 2014 WL 587867, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 

Feb. 14, 2014) (denying TRO because even when construing pro se complaint liberally, 

allegations were insufficient to show likely success on the merits). The Court need not address the 

other Winter factors based on plaintiff’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits. See 

Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040. The Court therefore also recommends denying plaintiff’s motion for 

failing to establish the likelihood of success on the merits.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis and recommends denial of plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order. The Court 

further recommends dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

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IT IS FUTHER HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 1) be DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within seven (7) days after service of the 

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 16, 2025

5, vue.0200.25.scrn.tro

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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