Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01295/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01295-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Interpleader Action

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE & No. CIV.S-05-1295 GEB DAD

ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VINCENT BROTHERS, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

This matter came before the court on December 16, 2005, for

hearing on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Having

considered all written materials submitted with respect to the

motion, and after hearing oral argument, the undersigned recommends

that the motion be granted.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff American General Life & Accident Insurance

Company initiated this interpleader action (28 U.S.C. § 1335) by

filing its complaint on June 27, 2005. Plaintiff’s complaint seeks

interpleader and declaratory relief. Despite being served with

Case 2:05-cv-01295-GEB-DAD Document 27 Filed 12/21/05 Page 1 of 8
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process, defendant Vincent Brothers has failed to appear in this

action. Pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the Clerk of the Court

entered default against defendant Brothers. Plaintiff filed the

instant motion, noticing it to be heard before the undersigned

pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(19). Michael K. Brisbane appeared

at the hearing on the motion on behalf of plaintiff. Despite being

served with all papers filed in connection with the motion, there was

no appearance on behalf of defendant Brothers. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) governs

applications to the court for default judgment. Upon entry of

default, the complaint’s factual allegations regarding liability are

taken as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must

be proven. Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, 722

F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983)(citing Geddes v. United Fin. Group,

559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v.

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Where damages are

liquidated (i.e., capable of ascertainment from definite figures

contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits),

judgment by default may be entered without a damages hearing. See

Dundee, 722 F.2d at 1323. Unliquidated and punitive damages,

however, require “proving up” at an evidentiary hearing or through

other means. Dundee, 722 F.2d at 1323-24; see also James v. Frame, 6

F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993).

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Granting or denying default judgment is within the court’s

sound discretion, see Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), and the court is free to consider a

variety of factors in exercising that discretion, see Eitel v. 

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The court may

consider such factors as:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the

plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the

complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the

action, (5) the possibility of a dispute

concerning material facts, (6) whether the

default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 55-

05[2], at 55-24 to 55-26). 

ANALYSIS

According to the complaint, plaintiff issued a term life

insurance policy to Marques Harper in 1999 in the face amount of

$25,000. The primary beneficiary on the policy was Joanie Harper

(Marques Harper’s mother) and the secondary beneficiary was

Earnestine Harper (Marques Harper’s grandmother). According to the

complaint, Marques Harper, Joanie Harper and Earnestine Harper were

murdered on July 8, 2003. It is unknown, based on information which

plaintiff has obtained from law enforcement officials, whether

Marques Harper (the insured) preceded Joanie Harper (the primary

beneficiary) in death. This fact is relevant to the determination of

the proper beneficiary under the policy and therefore relevant to who

is entitled to the proceeds.

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 Despite their counsel having been served with this motion,

these defendants have not filed a response to it. Counsel for

plaintiff represented at the hearing that defendants Linda Piggee,

Eddie Harper, Helen Elain Byrd and Robert Harper have no opposition

to the motion for default judgment as to defendant Brothers.

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The complaint further alleges that Marques Harper is

survived by his father, defendant Vincent Brothers. Defendant

Brothers presently is incarcerated at Kern County Jail awaiting trial

on charges of murdering Marques Harper, Joanie Harper and Earnestine

Harper. According to the complaint, defendant Brothers may have a

claim to the life insurance proceeds but would not be entitled to

them if he were convicted of murder. See California Probate Code §

250.

In 2004, defendants Linda Piggee, Eddie Harper, Helen Elain

Byrd and Robert Harper submitted claims for benefits under the

policy. Linda Piggee, Eddie Harper, Helen Elain Byrd and Robert

Harper are the siblings of Joanie Harper and the children of

Earnestine Harper. Plaintiff filed this action for interpleader and

declaratory relief as a disinterested stakeholder to determine who

should receive the proceeds of the policy. Plaintiff has deposited

with the Clerk of the Court the sum of $28,963.80, which represents

the policy proceeds plus interest. Defendants Linda Piggee, Eddie

Harper, Helen Elain Byrd and Robert Harper have answered and appeared

in this action through the same counsel, Dawn O. Bittleston of Klein,

DeNatale, Goldner, Cooper, Rosenlieb & Kimball, LLP.1

As indicated above, the complaint alleges claims for

interpleader and declaratory relief. The complaint prays for a

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decree that this is a proper cause for interpleader and that the sum

of $28,963.80 be deposited in the court’s registry held in an

interest bearing account. The complaint further prays that

defendants be compelled to interplead or settle among themselves

their respective claims to the proceeds and be restrained from

instituting any proceeding against plaintiff regarding the policy. 

Plaintiff also seeks to be discharged from all liability under the

policy. Finally, the complaint prays for reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs and declaratory relief that plaintiff is properly

withholding policy proceeds in light of the statutory requirements

set forth in California Probate Code § 250 and the simultaneous

deaths of the insured and beneficiaries. 

Weighing the factors outlined in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d

at 1471-72, the undersigned has determined that default judgment

against defendant Brothers is appropriate. Defendant Brothers has

made no showing that his failure to respond to the complaint is due

to excusable neglect. There is no reason to doubt the merits of

plaintiff’s substantive claim, nor is there any apparent possibility

of a dispute concerning the material facts underlying the action. 

Since plaintiff only seeks declaratory relief and a relatively small

amount of costs, the amount of money at stake is not an issue. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is also sufficient. Because each of these

factors weigh in plaintiff’s favor, the undersigned, while

recognizing the public policy favoring decisions on the merits, will

recommend that default judgment be granted.

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After determining that entry of default judgment is

warranted, this court must next determine the terms of the judgment. 

As indicated above, plaintiff does not seek money damages. Rather,

consistent with the prayer in the complaint plaintiff now seeks

declaratory relief that this is a proper cause for interpleader and

costs of suit. Plaintiff also seeks relief permanently enjoining

defendant Brothers from instituting any proceeding against plaintiff

with respect to the policy and releasing plaintiff from any liability

to defendant Brothers under that policy. Plaintiff is entitled to

the requested relief. “It has been held that ‘[t]he failure of a

named interpleader defendant to answer the interpleader complaint and

assert a claim to the res can be viewed as forfeiting any claim of

entitlement that might have been asserted.’” Amoco Production Co. v.

Aspen Group, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Colo. 1999)(quoting Gulf

Coast Galvanizing, Inc. v. Steel Sales Co., 826 F. Supp. 197, 203

(S.D. Miss. 1993)). See also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eason,

736 F.2d 130, 133 n.4 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Clearly, if all but one named

interpleader defendant defaulted, the remaining defendant would be

entitled to the fund.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Dev.

Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)(defaults of interpleader

defendants "did not make the interpleader action inappropriate but

merely expedited its conclusion by obviating the normal second

stage," in which adverse claimants' rights to the fund are settled).

Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that the district court

grant default judgment as requested.

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Finally, plaintiff’s moving papers establish costs incurred

in the amount of $1,200.30. Plaintiff’s claimed costs are reasonable

and plaintiff has demonstrated that it is entitled to such costs in

the first instance. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(“costs other than

attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party

unless the court otherwise directs”); Gelfgren v. Republic Nat. Life

Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 79, 81 (9th Cir. 1982)(“In an interpleader action,

it is within the court's discretion to award costs to the

stakeholder.”). Therefore, the undersigned will further recommend

that plaintiff’s request for costs be granted. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be granted;

2. The district court enter the default judgment of

defendant Vincent Brothers in favor of plaintiff; and

3. The district judge assigned to this matter sign the

proposed order filed in this regard on November 9, 2005 (Doc. no.

23).

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Findings and

Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

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the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 20, 2005.

DAD:th

Ddad1\orders.civil\americangeneral1295.default.judg

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