Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00787/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00787-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff originally filed this action on August 20, 2009. On October 8, 2009 the court directed 1

Plaintiff to file an amended complaint as further set forth therein. The order also informed Plaintiff that

the amended complaint filed in compliance with the October 8 order would supersede the original

complaint. (See Doc. No. 19.) 

A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint 2

screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure

requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the

complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 _____________________________

NEDOLANDEZ LEONEL SANTOS, * 

#140 896

Plaintiff, *

v. * 2:09-CV-787-TMH

 (WO)

OFFICER DANNY FLEMMING, *

et al.,

Defendants. *

 _____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on an amended complaint filed by Plaintiff on October

19, 2009. Plaintiff seeks $10,000.00 in damages for a violation of his right to equal 1

protection. Names as defendants are Lieutenant A. Moses, Sergeant Calhoun, and

Correctional Officer Danny Flemming. Upon review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint the

court finds that this matter is due to be dismissed prior to service under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).2

Case 2:09-cv-00787-TMH-TFM Document 26 Filed 12/01/09 Page 1 of 6
I. DISCUSSION

A. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to equal protection on July 4, 2009

by denying him the opportunity to eat one of the two meals served that day. According to

Plaintiff, he took the shortest route to the chow hall but “[m]issed chow because [he] was

sent back to go the route far around away from the chow hall . . .” (Doc. No. 22 at pg. 3.) 

Equal protection principles require generally that government officials behave in a

way such “that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Thus, in order to establish a claim cognizable

under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must, at the very least, allege that he is

similarly situated with other persons who were treated differently and that the reason for the

differential treatment was based on a constitutionally protected interest. Jones v. Ray, 279

F.3d 944, 947 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Com’n, 785 F.2d th

929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986). Inconsistency in the operation of a prison may not, in itself, th

constitute a denial of equal protection. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1573 (11 Cir.

th

1993); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11 Cir. 1987). th

[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in

a . . . disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected .

. . a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite

of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Case 2:09-cv-00787-TMH-TFM Document 26 Filed 12/01/09 Page 2 of 6
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation

omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Evidence which merely

indicates disparity of treatment or erroneous or even arbitrary administration of state powers,

rather than against instances of purposeful or invidious discrimination, is insufficient to show

discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Conclusory allegations

or assertions of personal belief of disparate treatment or discriminatory intent are insufficient.

GJR Inv., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998); Coon v. Ga.

Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987).

Inmates themselves do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitling such

persons to “strict scrutiny” of disparate government treatment. Here, what Plaintiff

complains of is his disappointment in missing one of two meals served at the prison during

a holiday meal schedule. Plaintiff regards this conduct as actionable unequal treatment.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff does not allege that he has been subjected to any tangible unequal

treatment by Defendants’ conduct such as their decision being based upon a constitutionally

protected interest. As a matter of law, therefore, the allegations supporting this claim, without

more, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

B. Eighth Amendment

To the extent Plaintiff’s claim that he missed a meal on July 4, 2009 may be

considered to assert an Eighth Amendment violation, he is likewise entitled to no relief.

Plaintiff claims that missing one of the meals served on July 4, 2009 was unthoughtful and

unreasonable conduct and deprived him of one of the required nutritional number of meals

Case 2:09-cv-00787-TMH-TFM Document 26 Filed 12/01/09 Page 3 of 6
served that day (Doc. No. 22 at pgs. 3-4.) 

A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). In order to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to

conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The objective component requires an inmate to prove that he was

denied the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. The challenged prison

condition must be “extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his

future health.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11 Cir. 2004). The subjective th

component requires a prisoner to prove that the prison official acted with “deliberate

indifference” in disregarding that risk by showing that an official knew the inmate faced a

“substantial risk of serious harm” and with such knowledge, disregarded that risk by failing

to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 834, 837. 

With respect to claims involving a denial of food, courts look to the amount and

duration of the deprivation in determining whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious. See

Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5 Cir. 1998). In this case, Plaintiff alleges the th

deprivation of a single meal on one occasion. The court concludes that this deprivation is not

sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and it is, therefore, subject

to dismissal as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See e.g. Dartling v. Farwell, 139

Fed. Appx 847 (9 Cir. 2005) (inmate’s allegation that he was deprived of a single meal did th

not constitute an injury serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim.); Wilkins v.

Case 2:09-cv-00787-TMH-TFM Document 26 Filed 12/01/09 Page 4 of 6
Roper, 843 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mo.1994) (plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment based on the denial of a single meal); Brown v. Madison Police Department,

2003 WL 23095753, *3 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (dismissing claim by plaintiff alleging that he was

denied two meals on a single occasion).

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the

Recommendation on or before December 15, 2009. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Case 2:09-cv-00787-TMH-TFM Document 26 Filed 12/01/09 Page 5 of 6
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done, this 1st day of December 2009.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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