Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_97-cv-03825/USCOURTS-cand-5_97-cv-03825-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN LOUIS MITCHAM,

Petitioner,

 v

JILL BROWN, Warden,

Respondent.

________________________________/

No C 97-3825 VRW

CAPITAL CASE

ORDER REGARDING PETITIONER’S

RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

CONDUCT DISCOVERY

Petitioner has filed a renewed motion for leave to

conduct discovery, requesting leave to serve his proposed Requests

for Production of Documents and First Set of Interrogatories. Doc

#313. Respondent opposes the motion. 

On April 11, 2005, the court denied petitioner’s motion

for leave to conduct discovery and directed him to seek relief in

state court pursuant to section 1054.9 of the California Penal

Code. Subsequently, petitioner sought relief from the Alameda

Superior Court. On March 13, 2006, the state court granted postconviction discovery on eighteen of petitioner’s proposed document

requests, and denied relief as to requests 7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 (since

withdrawn) and 20-30, and the First Set of Interrogatories, on the

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ground that the proposed discovery was outside the scope of section

1054.9, which limits discovery materials to those in the possession

of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the

defendant would have been entitled at time of trial. Mot, Ex A.

Petitioner now renews his motion for leave from this

court to serve the requests for discovery on which the state court

denied relief. The court finds the matter suitable for decision

without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below,

petitioner’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I

A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in

federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary

course. See Bracy v Gramley, 520 US 899, 904 (1997). However,

Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 USC

§ 2254, provides that the district court "may, for good cause,

authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery." Good cause

for discovery under Rule 6(a) is shown "'where specific allegations

before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if

the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is 

. . . entitled to relief.'" Bracy, 520 US at 908-09 (quoting

Harris v Nelson, 394 US 286, 299 (1969)). 

Before deciding whether a petitioner is entitled to

discovery under Rule 6(a), the court must first identify the

essential elements of the underlying claim. Bracy, 520 US at 904

(difficulties of proof aside, petitioner's allegation of judicial

bias, if proved, would violate due process). The court must then

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determine whether the petitioner has shown good cause for

appropriate discovery to prove his claim. Id. The scope and

extent of the discovery permitted under Rule 6(a) is a matter

confided to the discretion of the district court. Id at 909.

II

In his renewed motion for discovery, petitioner proposes

requests to produce files from the Alameda County Superior Court,

the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, the Oakland Police

Department, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, the Alameda County

Probation Office, the California Attorney General’s Office, the

California District Attorney’s Association, and the California

Department of Corrections. Petitioner further proposes to propound

interrogatories on respondent seeking information about the

practices of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office in cases

eligible for the death sentence, and the county’s procedures for

appointing counsel in capital or homicide cases.

A

In document request 7, petitioner seeks training

materials used by the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office

from 1977 to 1984 relating to methods, procedures and/or criteria

for selecting jurors in criminal cases. In document request 7.1,

he seeks such training materials used by that office “before and

after the decision in People v Wheeler, 22 Cal 3d 258 (1978),” from

1974 to 1984, showing changes in the methods for selecting jurors. 

Petitioner contends that these requested documents are relevant to

Claim D alleging race-based exclusion of African Americans from the

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jury in violation of his constitutional rights under Batson v

Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), and Claim P alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing to object on Batson grounds. See

also Am Pet, Claim D at 46-47; Claim R at 209. Respondent’s

contention that the state supreme court denied relief on the Batson

claim as procedurally defaulted does not preclude this court from

granting discovery upon a showing of good cause.

Batson established a three-part test for evaluating

claims that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges in violation of

the Equal Protection clause. First, petitioner must make a prima

facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the

basis of race. 476 US at 96-97. Second, if that showing has been

made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking

the juror in question. Id at 97-98. Third, the court must

determine whether petitioner has shown purposeful discrimination. 

Id at 98. 

To establish the first step under Batson, petitioner, who

is African American, alleges that the prosecutor exercised

peremptory challenges against fifteen jurors, eight of whom were

African American, effectively removing “every African American who

was called to the jury box.” Am Pet, Claim D at 43. Petitioner

also alleges that the prosecutor expressed to defense counsel his

intention to strike three additional African American jurors if any

of them were called to the jury box. Id at 44. Petitioner further

alleges that no members of his race were among the twelve jurors or

four alternate jurors. Id. For the purposes of this discovery

motion, the court determines that such allegations may give rise to

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an inference of discrimination, particularly if supported by

additional evidence. 

In opposition to the motion for leave to conduct

discovery, respondent argues that petitioner was arrested in 1983

and tried in 1984, rendering overbroad his requests for

prosecutorial training materials during the ten-year period before

his trial. Respondent further argues that prosecutorial adherence

to or divergence from training materials is irrelevant to whether

the prosecutor’s actual use of peremptory challenges at

petitioner’s trial violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme

Court has held, however, that historical evidence of racial

discrimination “is relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the

legitimacy of the motives underlying the State’s actions.” MillerEl v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 336 (2003). There, the defendant

presented evidence of the district attorney’s policy to exclude

minorities from jury service in the form of a circular instructing

prosecutors to exercise peremptory strikes against “‘Jews, Negroes,

Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race.’” Id at 334-35. 

The Supreme Court noted that although the manual had been written

in 1968, it remained in circulation until 1976, or later, and was

available to at least one of the prosecutors in the defendant’s

trial. Id at 335.

Here, petitioner has presented evidence that the Alameda

County District Attorney’s Office conducted professional training

of its prosecutors, particularly on the impact of Wheeler, in which

the California Supreme Court held that discriminatory use of

peremptory challenges violated the right to an impartial jury under

the state constitution. Mot, Ex B (Meehan Decl). The court deems

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reasonable petitioner’s request for prosecutorial training

documents used as early as 1974, to show whether discriminatory

practices existed before, or even after, Wheeler was decided in

1978. See Miller-El, 537 US at 347 (evidence suggested that

prosecutors were aware of culture of discrimination). 

In light of his allegations of discriminatory jury

selection, petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that his

proposed requests for prosecutorial training materials are

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence relevant to his allegations of racial discrimination in

jury selection. Because an expanded record may show a prima facie

Batson violation, shifting the burden of proof to respondent,

petitioner has demonstrated good cause for discovery of evidence

supporting his Batson claim. Petitioner’s motion is therefore

granted as to document requests 7 and 7.1. 

B

Document request 7.2 calls for documents from the Alameda

County District Attorney’s Office relating to Superior Court Judge

Golde. Petitioner asserts that the documents are relevant to Claim

I of his federal habeas petition, alleging that Judge Golde made a

comment ex parte to a juror about petitioner’s failure to testify

at trial.

To establish a judicial misconduct claim, petitioner must

show that the trial judge’s behavior "rendered the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the

United States Constitution." Duckett v Godinez, 67 F3d 734, 740

(9th Cir 1995). Petitioner’s request for the District Attorney’s

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7

Office’s documents relating to Judge Golde is overbroad and is not

reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of documents relevant to

his claim that Judge Golde acted improperly at petitioner’s trial. 

This matter is distinguishable from Bracy, where the petitioner

alleged that the trial judge facilitated a conviction in the

petitioner’s trial in order to camouflage his own pattern of

corruption in other cases where he accepted bribes. 520 US at 905-

06. The Supreme Court noted that a general theory of judicial bias

and corruption may have been too speculative to warrant discovery

without more specific allegations to support Bracy’s claim of

actual bias in his own case: namely, that the trial judge had been

convicted of taking bribes in other cases and that Bracy’s trial

counsel was a former associate of that judge whose law practice was

familiar with corruption. Id at 909.

Here, by contrast, document request 7.2 is designed to

uncover evidence of Judge Golde’s misconduct in matters wholly

unrelated to petitioner’s due process claims that the judge made

improper comments during petitioner’s own trial. The possibility

of uncovering evidence of Judge Golde’s misconduct in other cases

is too remote to prove that he committed misconduct in petitioner’s

case. As Petitioner has not shown good cause, his motion for leave

to conduct discovery is denied as to document request 7.2.

C

Requests 20, 21, and 22 seek written standards for

charging special circumstance and prosecuting capital cases used by

the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, the state Attorney

General, and the California District Attorneys Association since

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November 8, 1978. Document requests 27 and 28 seek a list of

defendants convicted of murder and voluntary manslaughter in

Alameda County from 1978 to 2001 and each of their probation

officers’ reports. Interrogatories 1 through 4 request information

relating to every homicide case prosecuted by the Alameda County

District Attorney’s Office from 1978 to 1984 in which there was

probable cause to believe that one or more special circumstances

existed. Petitioner contends that these discovery requests relate

to Claim R alleging arbitrary prosecutorial decisions, Claim HHH

alleging that the state’s death penalty scheme does not assure

rational and consistent application of the death penalty, and Claim

III alleging that California’s death penalty statute fails to

meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible crimes and permits

imposition of the death sentence in an arbitrary and capricious

manner. Petitioner relies in part on a 1997 study and subsequent

declaration by Steven F. Schatz which purport to show that the

special circumstances set forth in section 190.2 of the California

Penal Code do not genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible

crimes, and create a substantial risk of arbitrariness. See Mot,

Ex D (Schatz Decl) ¶ 31.

As petitioner recognizes, Claims HHH and III are similar

to the claims on which discovery has been granted in Ashmus v

Ayers, C 93-0594 TEH (ND Cal) and Frye v Ayers, CIV S 99-0628 LKK

KJM (ED Cal). While recognizing that petitioner’s requests are

limited to documents concerning capital cases prosecuted in Alameda

County, rather than statewide, the court denies leave to conduct

discovery without prejudice in the interest of judicial economy,

and defers ruling on good cause for document requests 20, 21, 22,

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27 and 28 and interrogatories 1, 2, 3 and 4 pending the outcome of

litigation on the similar claims presented in Ashmus and Frye.

D

In request 23, as modified, petitioner seeks all

documents used by the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office or

any other agency relating to prosecutorial misconduct or

indiscretion within that office during the time period that

prosecutor Albert Meloling was employed there. Petitioner contends

that this request is relevant to his claims alleging prosecutorial

misconduct at trial: Claims B, C, D, L, M, R, EE, GG, II, PP.

In order to prove his prosecutorial misconduct claims,

petitioner must show that the prosecutor's misconduct rendered his

trial so fundamentally unfair as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process. Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168, 178-81

(1986). Petitioner has not adequately demonstrated that his

expansive request for all documents relating to misconduct by the

District Attorney’s Office would assist him in proving that it

committed prosecutorial misconduct at his own trial. As petitioner

has not demonstrated good cause, his motion for leave to conduct

discovery is denied as to document request 23.

E

In document request 24, Petitioner seeks complaints and

other documents concerning the competence of trial counsel Lincoln

Mintz and Harry Traback in representing criminal defendants,

contending that such documents are relevant to the following claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel: A, P, W, Y, BB, GG, MM, RR. 

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Petitioner further contends that the state had a duty to disclose

information about Mintz’s or Traback’s inability to competently

represent petitioner, and seeks documentation to determine whether

the state had such knowledge.

To prove his ineffective assistance claims, petitioner

must meet the two-prong test under Strickland v Washington, 466 US

668 (1984). First, he must establish that counsel's performance

was deficient, i e, that it fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id at 687-88. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance, i e, that "there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id at 694. 

Request 24 is overbroad and not calculated to lead to the

discovery of relevant evidence that would prove petitioner’s claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither the state’s

awareness of trial counsel’s professional history, nor trial

counsel’s conduct in other cases, is relevant to counsel’s

performance at petitioner’s trial. On the question of whether

counsel’s performance was deficient, the court only considers the

reasonableness of counsel’s conduct on the facts of petitioner’s

particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. 

Strickland, 466 US at 690. As petitioner fails to show good cause

for discovery, his motion is denied as to document request 24.

F

In document requests 25 and 26, petitioner seeks written

guidelines and procedures for the appointment of counsel in

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homicide or capital cases from 1980 to 1985, as well as lists of

qualified counsel during the same period. Interrogatories 5, 6 and

7 request information relating to appointment and payment of

capital counsel by the Alameda County Superior Court. Petitioner

maintains these requests are relevant to Claims Q and P alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to adequately

investigate and prepare for both guilt and penalty phases of his

trial.

To establish the relevance of his discovery requests,

petitioner contends that court-appointed attorneys were not

compensated for time spent on out-of-court preparation, and that

Mintz failed to adequately prepare for petitioner’s capital trial

because of this compensation policy. Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the procedures of the Alameda County courts in

selecting capital defense counsel are relevant to his claims that

trial counsel were ineffective in his particular case, nor has he

demonstrated that the information regarding selection and payment

of counsel would tend to prove that his attorneys’ actual

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in

his case. As petitioner has not demonstrated that the requested

discovery would assist him in demonstrating an entitlement to

relief, his motion for leave to propound document requests 25 and

26 and interrogatories 5-7 is denied.

G

Petitioner has withdrawn document requests 29 and 30

relating to Claim NNN, pending litigation in Morales v Tilton, 

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C 06-0219 JF RS. Petitioner shall adhere to the Federal Rules upon

any further motion for leave to propound these requests.

III

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s motion is granted

as to document requests 7 and 7.1; denied without prejudice as to

requests 20-22, 27 and 28 and interrogatories 1-4; and denied with

prejudice as to requests 7.2 and 23-26 and interrogatories 5-7.

The court directs respondent to file a series of motions

for summary judgment on any remaining claims. Respondent shall

meet and confer with petitioner’s counsel in order to group the

claims according to trial phase, e g, pre-trial, guilt and penalty

phase. Respondent shall file the first of these motions within 90

days of the date of this order. The court will set the filing

dates of the remaining motions in future orders.

Petitioner shall file an opposition within 60 days of the

date of service of respondent’s motion. Respondent shall file a

reply within 30 days of the date of service of petitioner’s

opposition. The parties shall adhere to the page limitations set

forth in the court’s local rules governing motion practice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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