Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03687/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03687-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of

Nebraska. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3687

___________

Sarah A. Engelhart, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of *

the Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 7, 2006

Filed: December 5, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Sarah A. Engelhart appeals the district court’s1

 decision affirming the denial of

supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. In her 2001

applications, Engelhart alleged disability since August 2000 from dyslexia. After a

September 2003 hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Engelhart’s

severe impairments were a verbal borderline intellectual functioning level, lowaverage overall intelligence, and dyslexia. The ALJ noted that a recent post traumatic

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stress disorder diagnosis had been considered. The ALJ found, however, that

Englehart’s impairments were not of listing-level severity, that she and her witness

were not entirely credible, and that her residual functional capacity (RFC) did not

preclude her past relevant work as a production helper or housekeeper, or other jobs

a vocational expert had identified. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

See Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577-78 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review).

We find that the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See

Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005) (this court defers to ALJ’s

credibility determinations as to witnesses so long as they are supported by good

reasons and substantial evidence). As to the ALJ’s RFC findings, they are consistent

with Engelhart’s testimony that she thought she could learn tasks by demonstration,

with the type of work that Engelhart had performed in the past, and with the RFC

findings of evaluating psychologist William Stone and agency reviewing

psychologists. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (disability

claimant has burden to establish RFC); Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th

Cir. 2004) (in determining RFC, ALJ should consider medical records, observations

of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description of her limitations).

Psychologists Kelly Potts and Lori Wennstedt gave no explanation for their check-list

opinions that Englehart could not sustain an acceptable work pace, and Dr. Potts gave

no basis for a global assessment of functioning (GAF) rating of 30. Cf. Goff, 421

F.3d at 791 (physician’s rating of claimant’s GAF at 58 was inconsistent with his

opinion that she had extreme limitations); Stormo, 377 F.3d at 805-06 (treating

physician’s opinion is given less weight if it consists of vague, conclusory statements

unsupported by medically acceptable data). The ALJ’s failure to discuss a 2003

workshop evaluation does not mean it was not considered, and contrary to Engelhart’s

suggestion, such an evaluation is not per se determinative. See Social Security Ruling

96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (Social Security Administration July 2, 1996) (listing

evidence to consider in assessing RFC for initial claims); Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d

433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (ALJ is not required to discuss all evidence, and failure to

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cite specific evidence does not mean it was not considered); Lauritzen v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 561, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1975) (based on workshop evaluation, along with other

evidence, claimant was disabled). Because we find that the ALJ’s RFC and credibility

findings are supported by substantial evidence, we also reject Englehart’s challenge

to the ALJ’s hypothetical. See Stormo, 377 F.3d at 808-09 (hypothetical is sufficient

if it sets forth impairments supported by substantial evidence and accepted as true by

ALJ). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

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