Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02639/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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NA 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lewis A. Martin, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-2639-PHX-DGC (MEA) 

ORDER 

On December 27, 2013, Plaintiff Lewis A. Martin, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Florence, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a February 18, 2014 

Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint 

because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an 

amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. On March 6, 

2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In a May 8, 2014 Order, the Court 

dismissed the First Amended Complaint, because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. 

The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that cured the 

deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed an unsigned Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 

10). In an August 4, 2014 Order, the Court required Plaintiff to complete and sign a 

Certificate provided by the Court certifying that Plaintiff’s signature on the Certificate 

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shall serve as an original signature on his Second Amended Complaint. On August 14, 

2014, Plaintiff filed the signed Certificate. On November 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a notice 

of change of address and asked the Court to provide him with the status of his case 

(“Motion for Status”) (Doc. 15). 

 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for status to the extent discussed herein. 

The Court will grant Plaintiff 90 days from the filing date of this Order in which to file a 

notice of substitution of the names of John Doe #7 and John Doe #8 in connection with 

Count I and will dismiss Count II and the remaining Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

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specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff sues the following Defendants in his two-count Second Amended 

Complaint: the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department; Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph 

M. Arpaio; Dr. Alvarez, Director of Correctional Health Services; Correctional Health 

Services; Correctional Health Services “Medical Staff 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. . .” at the Fourth 

Avenue Jail; and “John/Jane Doe 1, 2, 3 . . .,” identified as “Detention and/or Deputy 

Officers” at the Fourth Avenue Jail. Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive relief, and 

discovery. 

 In Count I, Plaintiff asserts claims of excessive force, unreasonable search and 

seizure, and violations of his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He 

alleges the following facts: Plaintiff was arrested on August 19, 2013 and taken to the 

Fourth Avenue Jail for processing. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and Correctional 

Health Services have a “well-documented history” of Plaintiff’s mental health issues, 

including “post[-]traumatic stress disorder, paranoid[] delusional behavior[,] and organic 

brain damage.” “Plaintiff is a documented ‘seriously mentally ill’ patient of a state run 

agency[,] ‘Mercy Maricopa,’ formally known as Magellan, and rec[ei]ves medical 

benefits, including p[sy]chotropic, depression, seizure[,] and anxiety medications.” 

Plaintiff was homeless, off his medication, and “exhibiting obvious mental health 

deterioration by exhibiting extreme paranoia and delusional behavior.” At some point, 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with nightmares and post-traumatic stress disorder while at the 

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Fourth Avenue Jail. 

 Plaintiff had a health assessment within one hour of arriving at the Fourth Avenue 

Jail. “Medical Staff Jane Doe #1” performed the health assessment, but did not recognize 

Plaintiff’s “deteriorating status.” Plaintiff had to wait to be processed in the “pre 

fingerprinting tank,” which is approximately twelve feet wide by twenty feet long and 

contained approximately 25-35 people. This cramped room “further served to exacerbate 

Plaintiff’s already deteriorating mental status.” 

 Several hours later, Plaintiff was approached by “Jane and/or J[oh]n Doe 

Deputy/Detention Officers as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.” A detention officer told Plaintiff that 

he was being moved to the “strip cell where he was to remove his cloth[e]s to be 

searched.” Plaintiff was not provoking, aggressive, or threatening to himself or others. 

Plaintiff was stripped of all clothing and left naked and alone in a padded cell without a 

blanket, water, or plumbing. “Sometime later, exact time unknown, Plaintiff was 

approached, while lying on his stomach naked, non[-]aggressive and told to roll over.” 

Plaintiff refused to roll over and “for his refusal was tased in the back by an unknown 

J[oh]n Doe D.O. (#7?).” Plaintiff requested medical attention for psychiatric and 

physical trauma to his back, neck, side and legs “before, during and after the above listed 

circumstance, on or within 24 hours,” which was denied “out of hand.” 

 “Plaintiff remained in the ‘padded’ room naked for approxim[a]t[e]ly 2-3 hours 

longer at which time he was given a pair of pink boxers by J[oh]n/Jane Does (D.O.) #8 

and #9 and placed into a transport van, naked except for the boxers and slippers, and 

transported to another detention unit, Lower Buckeye Jail.” There are dividers in the van 

to separate the detainees; Plaintiff was placed in one division and three females were 

placed in other divisions in the van. Plaintiff suffered further emotional trauma from this 

situation. 

 When Plaintiff had to attend court he was “routinely processed inappropriately and 

without just cause, to and from court.” A pre-court strip search was conducted in private. 

The post-court strip search was conducted in the “Pink Cage” in front of cameras and 

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“with any # of staff, female and otherwise, as well as visitors who walk the hallways, 

being witnesses to Plaintiff’s demoralization.” The strip searches consisted of 

“surrendering all clothing and legal papers taken to and returned from court.” “Plaintiff 

was required to turn his back to John Doe D.O. #8 and others unnamed and as yet 

identified . . . bend forward and with both hands spread his cheeks, exposing his anus, 

stand up, turn around and lift his genitals, squat and cough, expose armpits and soles of 

feet and finally run his fingers through his hair.” Plaintiff was “then required to dress 

himself without the benefit of soap, water or sanitary lotion to sanitize his hands.” 

 Plaintiff alleges that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department is liable for his 

“injur[i]ous harm” by its policy of “stripping of Plaintiff in which excessive and abusive 

force was utilized,” placing Plaintiff, a mentally ill detainee, in a “stripped,” padded cell 

“with no provocation,” and by denying Plaintiff medical treatment. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Defendant Arpaio is liable, as “executor” of the policies at the Fourth Avenue 

Jail, by allowing his officers to “treat Plaintiff thus,” by not training staff for handling a 

mentally unstable detainee, and “for his continuing indifference to the arbitrary treatment 

levied against Plaintiff.” He alleges that “Defendants John Doe/Jane Doe” are liable for 

his “mental anguish, physical pain to body, exacerbation to pre-existing mental illness 

through acts of physical abuse with the strip search, [and] tasing with an electrical 

device[.]” Finally, he alleges that Defendant Alvarez and “CHS John/Jane Doe #1” are 

liable for their “indifference to medical needs during the initial evaluation” and that John 

Does 1-9 are liable “throughout Plaintiff’s intake” as well as for their “indifference to 

Plaintiff’s physical needs, blankets, water, etc., while in a padded cell were also 

denied[.]” 

 Plaintiff designates Count II as a denial of basic necessities, the right to be free 

from “unreasonable search/seizure,” and the right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment. Plaintiff alleges the same facts as in Count I. He further alleges that the 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department is liable for its policies related to the 

“manhandled strip search, the transport inc[i]dent” and the “denial/indifference to a 

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mental health patient[’]s medical needs.” Plaintiff alleges that John Does 1 through 6 

used excessive force and denied his needs by “stripp[ing] [Plaintiff] with no provocation 

other than he may have been acting a little ‘weird.’” In addition, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants Arpaio and Alvarez are liable as “leaders of their respected offices” and that 

“the policies and standard operating procedures that incorporate create an environment 

where rights are constantly violated.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that 

he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he 

must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

Moreover, although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause 

of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 A. Defendant Arpaio 

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a specific defendant and show an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo, 423 

U.S. at 371-72, 377. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 

(9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious 

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liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts against Defendant Arpaio in his 

Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Arpaio is liable as “executor” of the 

policies at the Fourth Avenue Jail, as leader of his “respected office,” for allowing his 

officers to “treat Plaintiff thus,” and by not “training staff for handling a mentally 

unstable detainee.” These vague and conclusory references to Arpaio’s liability are 

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that Arpaio directly 

violated his constitutional rights. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that 

his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a specific policy or custom 

promulgated or endorsed by Arpaio. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that the postcourt strip searches in the “Pink Cage” were conducted pursuant to a policy or custom 

promulgated or endorsed by Arpaio or that the tasing of a mentally ill detainee for 

refusing an order was pursuant to a custom or policy. Accordingly, Defendant Arpaio 

will be dismissed. 

 B. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 

Plaintiff names the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) as a Defendant; 

however, MCSO is not a proper defendant. Claims under § 1983 are directed at “bodies 

politic and corporate.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 

Congress intended municipalities and other local government units to be included among 

those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Id. at 689-690. In Arizona, the responsibility for 

operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff and the County. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-251(8), 11-291(A), 11-441(A)(5), 31-101. MCSO is simply an 

administrative creation of the sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties; it is 

not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g., Petaway v. City of New 

Haven Police Dep’t, 541 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D. Conn. 2008); Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 

227 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Accordingly, MCSO will be dismissed 

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C. Correctional Health Services 

Although not clear, it appears that Plaintiff may be attempting to sue Correctional 

Health Services (CHS). While Arizona places responsibility for operating county jails by 

law upon the sheriff, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-141(A)(5), 31-101, Maricopa County is 

responsible for the provision of medical care to inmates. CHS is an administrative 

creation of the County and is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, 

CHS will be dismissed. 

 D. “Correctional Health Services Medical Staff 1, 2, 3 . . . etc.” 

Plaintiff sues “Correctional Health Services Medical Staff 1, 2, 3 . . . etc.” 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts against “Correctional Health Services Medical Staff 1, 

2, 3 . . . etc.” Accordingly, “Correctional Health Services Medical Staff 1, 2, 3 . . . etc.” 

will be dismissed. 

E. Medical Care 

To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert inadequate medical care at 

the Fourth Avenue Jail, Plaintiff should be aware that not every claim by a prisoner 

relating to inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth 

Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants 

acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A 

plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the 

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825, 837 

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(1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a 

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the 

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges that he had a health assessment within one hour 

of arriving at the Fourth Avenue Jail. Jane Doe #1 performed the health assessment, but 

allegedly failed to recognize Plaintiff’s “deteriorating status.” According to Plaintiff, 

Jane Doe #1 “has an obligation[,] as a licen[s]ed healthcare worker, based on training and 

experi[e]nce to recognize medical problems . . .” Plaintiff further alleges that “Dr. 

Alv[a]rez, director of C.H.S. has a responsibility to [e]nsure proper conduct by staff and 

thus should be held accountable when his staff shows indifference to an inmate[’]s 

medical need as was exhibited here.” Later in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges that he was diagnosed with nightmares and post-traumatic stress disorder while at 

the jail. 

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Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that any Defendant knew, or should have 

known, that he was suffering from serious mental illness at his initial health assessment 

or knew of his previous mental health problems at that time. Nor does he allege that he 

informed Jane Doe #1 or Dr. Alvarez that he had a serious medical need or facts to 

support that they were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need and knew, or 

should have known, that failure to take further steps posed an excessive risk to his health. 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that after he was tased he requested medical attention for 

psychiatric and physical trauma to his back, neck, side and legs, which was denied “out 

of hand.” Plaintiff provides no other information about these alleged injuries, to whom 

he directed his request(s) for medical attention, or other facts to support that any 

Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

has failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in Counts I 

and II. Further, although Plaintiff did not properly name Jane Doe #1 as a Defendant, to 

the extent he is attempting to sue Jane Doe #1D, as well as Dr. Alvarez, the Court will 

dismiss Defendants Jane Doe #1 and Dr. Alvarez as Defendants. 

F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment was violated. A pretrial detainee=s claim for unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement arises from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 

rather than from the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards 

are applied, requiring proof that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must 

allege that a defendant’s acts or omissions have deprived the inmate of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that the defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 

1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see Estate of Ford v. RamirezCase 2:13-cv-02639-DGC--MEA Document 16 Filed 11/25/14 Page 10 of 14
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Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether conditions of confinement rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation may depend, in part, on the duration of an 

inmate’s exposure to those conditions. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)). “The circumstances, 

nature, and duration of a deprivation of [] necessities must be considered in determining 

whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Thus, for example, to state a claim regarding personal security, the detainee must show 

that the defendant was deliberately indifferent. Redman v. County of Los Angeles, 942 

F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). To adequately allege deliberate indifference, 

a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an 

excessive risk to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33. That is, “the official must 

both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] draw[n] the inference.” 

Id. 

It is not clear which conditions at the Fourth Avenue Jail Plaintiff is alleging 

violate the Eighth Amendment. To the extent he is alleging that the conditions in the 

padded cell where he was held naked for several hours violate his Eighth Amendment 

rights, he fails to state a claim. Plaintiff fails to allege how he was injured by conditions 

in the cell, which Defendant(s) refused his requests for medical or psychiatric attention, 

or other facts supporting that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to an excessive 

risk to his health or safety. For that reason, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state 

an Eighth Amendment claim regarding his conditions of confinement in Counts I and II. 

IV. Service Cannot Be Effected at this Time 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim in Count I for excessive 

force by an officer against Defendant John Doe #7 and a Fourth Amendment claim 

regarding the post-court strip searches against John Doe #8. However, the Court cannot 

direct that service be made on John Does #7 and #8 at this time. Generally, the use of 

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fictitious names to identify defendants is not favored, and as a practical matter, it is in 

most instances impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and 

complaint upon a fictitiously identified defendant. 

The Court will allow Plaintiff 90 days in which to identify the Defendants by 

name, through subpoena or otherwise, and to substitute that names for Defendant John 

Doe #7 and John Doe #8 by filing a “notice of substitution.” See Wakefield v. Thompson, 

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th 

Cir. 1980)) (where identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to filing of 

complaint, plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 

unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or 

that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds). Failure to timely file a notice 

of substitution will result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice for failure to 

prosecute. 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

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Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Count II of the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) Defendants Alvarez, Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 

Correctional Health Services, Correctional Health Services “Medical Staff 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. 

. .” and all but John Does 7 and 8 of “John/Jane Doe 1, 2, 3 . . .” are dismissed without 

prejudice. 

 (3) Plaintiff is granted 90 days from the filing date of this Order in which to 

discover by subpoena, or otherwise, the identities of Defendants John Doe 7 and John 

Doe 8 and to file a “notice of substitution” providing the Defendants’ names in place of 

John Doe 7 and John Doe 8. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must issue two subpoenas in blank and send them to 

Plaintiff. 

 (5) The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal for failure to 

prosecute without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff, if Plaintiff fails to file 

a “notice of substitution” of parties within 90 days from the filing date of this Order. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 (6) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 15) is granted to the extent set forth 

herein. 

 Dated this 25th day of November, 2014. 

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