Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. HUNTER, D.V.M.; and

HOWARD ELEY,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; SHERIFF

SCOTT JONES, in his official

capacity, 

 Defendants.

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2:06-cv-00457-GEB-EFB

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

AND NEW TRIAL

Defendants move post-verdict for judgment as a matter of law

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 50(b) and for a new trial

under Rule 59, arguing that “there was insufficient evidence to support

the [jury’s] verdict.” (Defs.’ Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law, (“Defs.’

Mot.”), ECF No. 191, 1:25.) Defendants’ motions are based almost

entirely on the trial proceedings, but Defendants fail to provide a

transcript of the trial proceedings or citations to the specific

portions of the proceedings on which their motions are premised.

Plaintiffs oppose the motions and also fail to supply the trial record

or specific citations to the record.

I. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

Decision on a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of

law requires “review [of] the record as a whole.” Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000); accord Cent. Office

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Tel., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 108 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 1997)

(stating “that a trial judge must consider all the evidence submitted in

ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law”), rev’d on other

grounds, 524 U.S. 214 (1998); Bank of the W. v. Valley Nat’l Bank of

Ariz., 41 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1994) (mandating review of “the

evidence as a whole”). Likewise, adjudication of a motion for a new

trial requires consideration of “the entire evidence.” Tortu v. Las

Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith,

J., concurring) (quoting Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can.,

833 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Skydive Ariz., Inc. v.

Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (employing the “clear

weight of the evidence” standard, which presupposes examination of all

the evidence).

The Local Rules governing Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions

similarly require that these motions be grounded in the trial record.

These rules prescribe that parties “shall” supply “specific references”

to the “particulars” of any evidentiary insufficiency. E.D. Cal. R.

291.1 (setting out this standard for Rule 50(b) motions); E.D. Cal. R.

291.2 (listing these requirements for Rule 59 motions). The Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure likewise demand that insufficiency of the

evidence appeals “must include in the record a transcript of all

evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” Fed. R. App. Proc.

10(b)(2). Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for summary

dismissal, irrespective of other considerations such as a party’s

penury. E.g., Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924 F.2d 167, 168 (9th Cir.

1991) (per curiam) (dismissing petitioner’s insufficiency of the

evidence appeal “because he failed to provide us with a transcript” and

faulting petitioner for the same); Thomas v. Computax Corp., 631 F.2d

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139, 142—43 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that she

was excused from supplying a transcript because of inability to pay). 

Defendants’ Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions demand that the

court consider the sufficiency and weight of evidence that Defendants

inexplicably fail to supply. See McClure ex rel. Cotton v. City of

Eureka, Cal., 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1008 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (railing

against defendants for “inexplicably fail[ing]” to do the same). Without

a record of the trial, which took place months ago, the Court is left

“to fumble through its own notes of the trial for possible support for

the various factual issues in dispute.” City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear

Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 720, 723 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d

in part on other grounds, 365 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2004). Further, since

“[n]o trial transcript has been provided,” the Court can neither perform

the type of comprehensive review mandated by the motions nor confidently

“determine[] which position is correct.” Ruff v. Cnty. of Kings, 75 Fed.

R. Serv. 3d 211, 2009 WL 4572779, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the pending motions are

considered, as they must be, and the following order issues in light of

the applicable standards, and the arguments, testimony, and evidentiary

exhibits at trial. Oritz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A jury’s verdict must be upheld under Rule 50(b) unless “the

evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is

contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050,

1062 (9th Cir. 2006); see Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1023

(9th Cir. 2008) (limiting Rule 50(b) judgments to cases in which “the

only conclusion that a reasonable jury could draw” is contrary to the

jury’s verdict); see also Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Schs., 371 F.3d

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503, 512 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing Rule 50 as a “demanding”

standard that poses “a very high hurdle”). Thus in evaluating a Rule

50(b) motion, the trial judge’s role is strictly “limited.” Johnson v.

Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court must “‘accept the jury’s credibility findings consistent with

the verdict,’” and view the evidence and “all inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs.

Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bilbrey

ex rel. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1468 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984)). “The

court ‘may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the

jury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227).

Under Rule 59, a trial court may grant a new trial “if the

jury verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” DSPT

Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “‘a

stringent standard applies when the motion is based on insufficiency of

the evidence.’” Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Venegas v. Wagner,

831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987)). “‘A motion for a new trial may be

granted on this ground only if the verdict is against the great weight

of the evidence or it is quite clear that the jury has reached a

seriously erroneous result.’” Id. (quoting Venegas, 831 F.2d at 1519);

see also Landes Constr. Co., Inc., 833 F.2d at 1372 (“Doubts about the

correctness of the verdict are not sufficient grounds for a new trial:

the trial court must have a firm conviction that the jury has made a

mistake.”). “[A] district court may not grant a new trial simply because

it would have arrived at a different verdict.” Silver Sage Partners,

Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).

Further, decision on a Rule 59 motion rests with the sound discretion of

the district court. Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010).

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When “the basis of a Rule 59 ruling is that the verdict is not against

the weight of the evidence, the district court’s denial of a Rule 59

motion is ‘virtually unassailable.’” Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Flight

Int’l of Fla., Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The gravamen of Defendants’ motions is that “there was

insufficient evidence to support the verdict” for Plaintiffs since much

of Plaintiffs’ evidence “suffers from . . . problems” and their

remaining evidence is too infrequent to “show practices that are

‘permanent’ or ‘widespread.’” (Defs.’ Mot. 1:25, 3:21, 3:28.) 

Plaintiffs rejoin that their evidence established Defendants’ widespread

and routine practice or custom “of using excessive force” and “fail[ing]

to follow [their] own written ‘Use of Force’” procedures. (Pls.’ Opp’n

to Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 201,

8:13—16.)

Defendants attempt to distinguish and discount Plaintiffs’

evidence of incidents of excessive force, arguing that multiple 

incidents on which Plaintiffs rely are “distinct” or not actually

evidence of excessive force. (Defs.’ Mot. 4:20.) Specifically,

Defendants argue that (1) the testimony of a witness named Chase, “who

was incarcerated in the Main Jail for approximately 20 days in 2005,”

involves deputies’ “reactions to exigent circumstances, not random

use[s] of improper force,” (Defs.’ Mot. 3:6—7, 3:18—19); (2) the “video

evidence . . . show[s] deputies reacting to non-cooperative inmates as

opposed to merely meting out punishment,” (id. 3:21—22); (3) Deputy

Swoles’s actions were “distinct,” because they were “motivated by

comments made by Eley” and subject to subsequent reprimand, (id. 4:20,

4:3); and (4) Orsay’s expert witness testimony is “insufficient” since

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Orsay “never worked as a correctional officer” or “supervis[ed

correctional officers] in the setting of a facility similar to the

Sacramento Main [J]ail.” (Id. 4:26; Defs.’ Reply 4:1—3.) However, under

Rule 50(b), a trial court may not “disregard,” “discount,” or

“discredit” the nonmovant’s evidence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152. Rather,

the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the nonmovant’s]

favor.” Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062 (emphasis added); Winarto, 274 F.3d at

1283. Therefore, Defendants improperly request the court to draw

inferences against Plaintiffs that “the jury [wa]s not required to

believe.” Id. Accordingly, this portion of Defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion

is denied. 

In their motions under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59, Defendants also

contend that Plaintiffs’ evidence is too limited to show practices or

customs that are sufficiently “‘permanent’ or ‘widespread’” to sustain

Monell liability. (Defs.’ Mot. 3:28.) Liability under Monell requires a

showing that Defendants “‘had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice

that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [each

Plaintiff] suffered.’” Hernandez ex rel. AE v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d

631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572,

581 (9th Cir. 2007)). A “practice” or “custom” involves “‘persistent and

widespread’” conduct that amounts to more than just “isolated or

sporadic incidents.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978)). “Relatively few decisions” analyze the “legal, factual, and

evidentiary” requisites for custom or practice liability. Martin A.

Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section 1983

Litigation 111 (2d ed. 2008). Further, the line between “isolated or

sporadic incidents” and “persistent and widespread” conduct is not

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clearly delineated. Compare Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230,

1233–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling a single incident of excessive force

inadequate to prove liability), and Meehan v. Cnty. of L.A., 856 F.2d

102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding two incidents insufficient), with

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1143 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding

“genuine issue . . . as to the existence of a municipal custom or

practice” based on a detective’s single act and her testimony that she

performed that act as part of her job description), Duvall v. Cnty. of

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (identifying “clear” county

custom and practice based on county’s failure to provide one requested

accommodation and county judge’s statement that the accommodation was

not available from the county), and Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d

1113, 1147—48 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding triable issue of fact existed as

to municipal liability based on the testimony of five individuals and

the testimony of the officer in charge). See generally Sanchez v. City

of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (acknowledging

that the requirements for custom or practice liability are “not clearly

delineated”).

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has “long recognized” that a

custom or practice need not be proven with direct evidence of

“persistent and widespread” acts. Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652

F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing this as “far from a

complete” definition of Monell customs or practices). Instead, indirect

evidence—such as statements by county employees about county

practices—may support custom or practice determinations. See, e.g.,

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1142; Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1143. Likewise, a county

custom or practice may be inferred from evidence of repeated, but

unreprimanded, constitutional violations. See McRorie v. Shimoda, 795

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F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Policy or custom may be inferred if,

after [a prison incident], the prison officials took no steps to

reprimand or discharge the guards [involved], or if they otherwise

failed to admit the guards’ conduct was in error.”); see also Hunter,

652 F.3d at 1233 (holding Defendants’ practice or custom may be

“‘inferred from . . . evidence of repeated constitutional violations for

which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or

reprimanded’”) (quoting Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 268

F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

in Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Defendants argue that “[t]he totality of the

evidence . . . [involves] the three incidents shown on video” concerning

three arrestees, testimony by “Mr. Chase . . . [regarding] two specific

events,” “reference by [P]laintiff[s’] expert to an incident involving

a [d]eputy . . . who struck an inmate on the back of the head,” and the

“incidents involving [P]laintiffs.” (Defs.’ Mot. 3:4—10).

However, drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, and

accepting the jury’s credibility findings consistent with the verdict,

it cannot be said that the “only” reasonable verdict is contrary to the

jury’s verdict. Harper, 533 F.3d at 1023. Nor, weighing the evidence

under the applicable “‘great weight of the evidence . . . or seriously

erroneous’” standard, is it “‘quite clear that the jury has reached a

seriously erroneous result.’” Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1229 (quoting

Venegas, 831 F.2d at 1519). Neither Rule 59’s “stringent standard,” id.,

nor Rule 50’s “demanding . . . standard” has been met. Settlegoode, 371

F.3d at 512 n.6.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Therefore, Defendants’ post-verdict motion for judgment as a

matter of law is DENIED, and Defendants’ alternative motion for a new

trial is also DENIED.

Dated: July 30, 2013

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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