Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05207/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICKKE LEON GREEN, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

vs. 

THOMAS SEYMOUR, STEPHANIE K. 

SEYMOUR, JOHN P. MOORE, 

DEANELL TACHA, WADE BRORBY, 

WILLIAM HOLLOWAY, DAVID EBEL, 

BOBBY R. BALDOCK, MONROE G. 

MCKAY I JAMES LOGAN AND 

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, 

'Defendants - Appellees. 

APPEALS F 1 ~!Y,.,,-, \lmted s;:th Circuit 

JUL ~ 1 1995 

PATIUC'K nsUER 

Clerk 

No. 92-5207 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-773-B) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

RICKKE LEON GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se. 

No Appearance For Defendants-Appellees. 

Before FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit, 

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge of the Federal Circuit, and ALARCON, 

Senior Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation 

(all the active and senior circuit judges of this court are 

recused) . 

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a) ; lOth Cir. R. 34 .1. 9. This case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissing under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) as frivolous the appellant Green's civil 

suit against all of the active judges of this court and the husband 

of the chief judge. He alleges that they conspired to deny him his 

constitutional right of access to the courts. We affirm. 

I. 

The appellant Green has been incarcerated in the Oklahoma 

prison system since 1972, following his state conviction for armed 

robbery. Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1383, 1385 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

He remained incarcerated since then "because of additional 

convictions that have been imposed as a result of his assaultive 

behavior." Id. at 1385-6. "In 1975 [he] was placed in 

administrative segregation because of his aggressive and assaultive 

conduct, both for his protection and for the protection of others. 

He remained there continuously until 1984 and has been in 

administrative segregation for most of the time since." 

1386. 

Id. at 

The present suit by Green stems from two prior federal court 

suits he filed. The first was a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against prison guards and officials, alleging they had violated his 

constitutional rights. Green v. Johnson, No. 85-647-C (E.D. Ok.). 

The appellee Mr. Seymour, the husband of the chief judge of this 

court, was his attorney in the case. Shortly before trial Green 

fired Mr. Seymour. In his present complaint Green alleges that Mr. 

Seymour became angry and threatened him, stating that Mr. Seymour 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 2 
would use his influence with his wife and three friends who were 

judges of the lOth Circuit, to bar him from court. Green asserts 

that Mr. Seymour concluded the conversation by stating that "You 

black boys don't understand who controls the judicial system." 

In Johnson, we stated: 

In 1975 [he] was placed in administrative 

segregation because of his aggressive and 

assaultive conduct, both for his protection 

and for the protection of others. He remained 

there continuously until 1984 and has been in 

administrative segregation for most of the 

time since. 

Id. at 1386. 

The record in that case showed that after Green repeatedly 

engaged in disruptive conduct and had several verbal altercations 

with prison officers, an officer knocked him to the floor of his 

cell, and three other officers 

entered the cell and, using "unnecessary 

excess force, " restrained plaintiff. Id. at 

10. "Plaintiff was pinned down by four large 

correction officers. Plaintiff was struck 

more than once on his face and head. His body 

was repeatedly kicked and his feet were 

twisted at the ankle". . Plaintiff received 

a cut on his nose and under his eye. Id. 

Plaintiff was taken back to the infirmary 

where he was again attacked. "Johnson 

lectured plaintiff. Green and Morgan would 

strike plaintiff about the face and neck if he 

was unresponsive to Johnson's commentary, and 

use other means of intimidation." 

Id. at 1386-7. 

After a bench trial, the court awarded Green damages of 

$15,000 but denied him other relief. On appeal Green challenged 

the damages as inadequate. This court affirmed the award and the 

denial of punitive damages, but remanded the case to the district 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 3 
court for further proceedings on several of Green's other claims. 

Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1383 (1992). 

The second case was another section 1983 suit, in which Green 

also was represented by counsel. Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915 

(lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1336 (1993). Two months 

after filing suit, Green personally, not through his attorney, as 

FRCP 11 required, moved to substitute counsel. [Dorrell, 969 F.2d 

at 916; Add. A, Pet. for Cert. p. 2] He later personally moved to 

dismiss counsel and to proceed pro se. [Dorrell, 969 F.2d at 916; 

Add. A, Pet. for Cert. p. 2-4] The defendants moved to dismiss the 

action. [Dorrell, 969 F.2d at 916, Add. A, Pet. for Cert. p. 3] 

Green failed to respond within 10 days as Local Rule 14(a) of the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma required. [Dorrell, 969 F. 2d at 916] 

Instead, almost a month later, Green's counsel sought to withdraw 

and requested an extension of time to answer the motion to dismiss. 

[Dorrell, 969 F.2d at 916; Add A, Pet. for Cert. p. 3] 

The district court denied Green's motion to dismiss counsel, 

denied his counsel's request for an extension of time and 

application to withdraw, and granted the defendants' motion to 

dismiss. [Dorrell, 969 F.2d at 916; Add A, Pet. for Cert. p. 4] 

On the same day, Green moved to recuse the district judge, a motion 

which the judge did not address. [Dorrell, 969 F. 2d at 916; Add 

A, Pet. for Cert. p. 4] 

On Green's appeal, this court affirmed. Green v. Dorrell, 969 

F. 2d at 915. The court held that the dismissal was a proper 

sanction for filing several motions that did not comply with Rule 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 4 
11 and that the district court was not required to address Green's 

untimely and insufficient recusal motion. Id. at 918-19. Green 

petitioned for rehearing en bane, which was denied, and filed a 

petition for a writ of certiorari, which was denied. 

Green then filed the present suit alleging that Mr. Seymour 

and the judges of this court, in retaliation for his dismissal of 

Mr. Seymour and because of racial animus, 

access to the courts by affirming the 

conspired to deny him 

dismissal of Green v. 

Dorrell, and by denying rehearing en bane in that case. He seeks 

a declaratory judgment that his rights have been violated and a 

permanent injunction that prohibits the defendant judges, their 

successors in office, and their agents and employees from (1) 

"rendering nothing less than well-founded, logical, and impartial 

judicial decisions" in any of Green's present or future appeals, 

and (2) retaliating against him for the present suit. He also 

seeks compensatory damages of $1 million and punitive damages of 

$1 million from Mr. Seymour, apparently based on the latter's 

alleged participation in the conspiracy. 

The only factual basis Green sets forth for this conspiracy 

claim are Mr. Seymour's alleged threats and this court's panel 

decision and denial of rehearing in Green v. Dorrell, which he 

asserts demonstrate that the judges of this court conspired with 

Mr. Seymour. He apparently accepts this court's factual 

description in the panel opinion of the proceedings in that case, 

since he refers to his petition for writ of certiorari there, which 

tracked that factual description. 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 5 
The district court granted Green permission to proceed in 

forma pauperis but dismissed his complaint without prejudice before 

service of process. The court ruled that the "complaint lacks an 

arguable basis in law and in fact, and should be dismissed as 

frivolous." The court stated: 

Plaintiff alleges no competent facts to 

support his claim of a conspiracy, nor does he 

allege any competent facts to support his 

claims of racial discrimination or a 

retaliatory animus on the part of Defendants. 

The court finds that Plaintiff's claims are 

fanciful, delusional, and malicious. 

II. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 requires that "[e] very 

judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is 

effective only when so set forth II There was no separate 

judgment document in this case. 

The "parties to an appeal," however, "may waive the separate 

judgment requirement of Rule 58" by failing to object to the 

absence of a separate judgment, provided that "the District Court 

clearly evidenced its intent that the opinion and order from which 

an appeal was taken would represent the final decision in the 

case." Banker's Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 387 (1978). 

Green has not objected to the absence of a separate judgment, and 

the district court's order "evidences its intent that [it] would 

represent the final decision in the case." Aviles v. Lutz, 887 

F.2d 1046, 1047-48 n.l (lOth Cir. 1989). 

After ruling that the complaint "should be dismissed as 

frivolous," the penultimate sentence of the order stated: 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 6 
"Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed without 

prejudice." This was followed by "SO ORDERED THIS 2nd day of Oct., 

1992." Here, as in Aviles, where the district court similarly 

"failed to enter a 'final judgment' on a separate document as 

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 . . and where no question exists 

as to the finality of the district court's decision, the absence 

of a Rule 58 judgment will not prohibit appellate review. 

[B]ecause the district court in this case disposed of the entire 

complaint, we may exercise jurisdiction over Aviles' appeal." Id. 

The present case is unlike United States v. Kansas City, 761 

F. 2d 605 (lOth Cir. 1992) (and similar cases), in which the 

separate-document rule was "mechanically applied." Id. at 607. 

In that case there were two orders, and the question was which 

order was the final judgment for purposes of appeal. That 

determination was necessary to ascertain whether the appeal was 

timely. The court pointed out that "[t] he separate-document 

requirement was established expressly to eliminate confusion about 

whether a purported 'judgment' effectively started the running of 

the time for appeal. " Id. at 606. 

In the present case, however, no such confusion is possible 

because there is only a single order and no challenge to the 

timeliness of the appeal. 

requiring the court of 

Here, "nothing but delay would flow from 

appeals to dismiss the appeal. Upon 

dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the 

separate judgment from which a timely appeal would then be taken." 

Banker's Trust, 435 U.S. at 385. Green waived any objection to 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 7 
the lack of a separate judgment document by appealing from the 

district court's order. 

III. 

Section 1915(d) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to 

dismiss a forma pauperis case if the court is "satisfied that the 

action is frivolous or malicious." A complaint "is frivolous where 

it lacks an arguable basis either in fact or law. " Nietzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

This provision "accords judges not only the authority to 

dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, 

but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's 

factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual 

contentions are clearly baseless. Examples of the latter 

class are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, 

claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar." 

Id. at 327-28. Under this provision "frivolousness is a decision 

entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in forma 

pauperis petition" and "a§ 1915(d) dismissal is properly reviewed 

for an abuse of that discretion." Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 

1728, 1734 (1992). 

The district court did not abuse its discretioL in dismissing 

Green's complaint based on its determination that the complaint 

was frivolous because Green had alleged "no competent facts to 

support his claim of a conspiracy, nor [did] he allege any 

competent facts to support his claims of racial discrimination or 

a retaliatory animus on the part of Defendants." 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 8 
Green has not set forth in his complaint any facts supporting 

his conspiracy claim. His argument, as we understand it, is that 

the court 1 s decision in Dorrell affirming the dismissal of his 

complaint was so egregiously wrong that it must have resulted from 

a conspiracy among the members of the panel to deny him his rights, 

and that by refusing to rehear the case en bane and reverse the 

panel decision, the other members of the court thereby joined the 

conspiracy. 

Green 1 s complaint does not allege fraud on the court and 

nothing in it would support such a claim. Except for cases 

involving fraud on the court, we know of no basis upon which a 

decision of a court of appeals, valid on its face, and the denial 

of rehearing en bane of that decision, may be challenged as the 

product of a conspiracy among the judges to deny the losing 

litigant his rights. 

A charge of judicial misconduct cannot be based solely upon 

the way the court decided a particular case. Cf. 28 U.S. C. § 

372 (c) (c) (A) (II) (authorizing the chief judge of a circuit or 

district to dismiss a complaint alleging that a circuit or district 

judge has engaged in conduct "prejudicial to the effective and 

expeditious administration of the business of the courts" if the 

chief judge finds that the complaint is "directly related to the 

merits of a decision or procedural ruling") . The "compelling 

policy" underlying the "statutory directive for dismissal of 

complaints of judicial misconduct which in substance are simply 

objections to substantive or procedural error, " In re Charge of 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 9 
Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227, (9th Cir. Jud. Coun. 

1982), is equally applicable here: 

To determine whether a judge's rulings were so 

legally indefensible as to mandate 

intervention would require the same type of 

legal analysis as is afforded on appeal. More 

important, the gravamen of the complaint is 

not the fitness of the judge, but the merit of 

his decision. Disciplinary procedures must 

not be used to correct judicial mistakes. 

The rationale of the doctrine of judicial immunity--- 11 the risk 

that judges will be harassed and their independence compromised by 

the threat of having to defend themselves against suits by 

disgruntled litigants, 11 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 552, 537-8 

(1984) (footnote omitted)---also is equally applicable to Green's 

charge that in performing their judicial duties the judges of this 

court were engaging in a conspiracy against him. 

In essence, Green's suit is an attempt collaterally to 

challenge the decision of this court in Dorrell, which the Supreme 

Court declined to review by denying Green's petition for a writ of 

certiorari. A district court cannot review and reverse a decision 

of a court of appeals that is challenged in a civil rights suit. 

See, ~' Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 

1994) (district court had no jurisdiction to hear § 1983 case 

seeking collaterally to attack decision of 4th Circuit) ; People 

ex. rel. Snead v. Kirkland, 462 F. Supp. 914, 923 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 

(district court had no authority in civil rights suit to vacate 

conviction affirmed by court of appeals); Carino v. Grasso, 413 

F. Supp. 75, 77 (D. Conn. 1976) (district court had no authority 

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Appellate Case: 92-5207 Document: 01019277458 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 10 
to reconsider, in civil rights suit, the decision of three-judge 

district court and circuit justice to allow extradition of 

plaintiff to another state) . Under similar reasoning, the district 

court in this case had no authority to overturn the prior decision 

of this court on the basis of an allegation that that decision was 

the product of a conspiracy among the judges. 

Green's claims that the judges' decision against him was in 

retaliation for his dismissal of Mr. Seymour and reflected racial 

discrimination similarly were without adequate factual basis and 

were frivolous. 

IV. 

Green's charge against his former lawyer, Mr. Seymour, stands 

on no firmer footing. If, as the district court correctly held, 

Green's allegation that the judges of this court engaged in a 

conspiracy against him is frivolous, his allegation that Mr. 

Seymour was a party to, and indeed the instigator or leader of, 

that conspiracy fails to state a claim against him cognizable in 

federal court. In the absence of any valid claim of a conspiracy 

among federal or state officials, there is no basis for a claim 

under § 1983 against Mr. Seymour, a private citizen. See Polk 

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319-2 (1981). 

v. 

Green's complaint was "based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory" and involved claims "whose factual contentions are 

clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The district court 

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• did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing Green's 

complaint. 

AFFIRMED. 

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