Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01429/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01429-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO HERRERA, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

GILL, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:13-cv-01429-AWI-GSA-PC

 

FIRST SCREENING ORDER

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1.)

ORDER FOR CLERK TO SEND PLAINTIFF 

A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFF 

TO SUBMIT FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Roberto Herrera (APlaintiff@) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. On September 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed 

the initial Complaint for this action, which is now before the court for screening. (Doc. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

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' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions, none of which apply to § 1983 actions. Swierkeiwicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 

506, 512 (2002). Under federal notice pleading, a complaint is required to contain Aa short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, 

courts Aare not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff 

must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison (CSP) in Corcoran, 

California, where the events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred. Plaintiff names as 

defendants Dr. Gill, LVN Ballesteros, CEO T. Macias, CMO E. Clark, CEO Connie Gipson, 

and Doe Defendants (LVNs and other CSP staff). Plaintiff’s factual allegations follow.

Plaintiff suffers from severe chronic pain and takes prescribed medication. On April 

17, 2013, LVN Ballesteros refused/failed to deliver Plaintiff’s medication and falsely recorded 

that she had delivered the medication, in violation of Operational Procedure 1050. On three 

other occasions -- April 3, 2013, April 24, 2013, and June 7, 2013 -- three other LVNs each

refused to issue Plaintiff’s 12:00 p.m. medication and falsely indicated on the Medication 

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Administration Record that they had issued the medication; Plaintiff does not know their names 

because they were not wearing name tags. Other unknown LVNs have also refused to deliver 

Plaintiff’s medication when he was out of his cell on a pass.

Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Gill regarding Plaintiff’s chronic pain and ineffective 

medication. Dr. Gill merely gave Plaintiff the same, ineffective treatment.

CSP Health Care CEO T. Macias and CMO E. Clark are legally responsible, because of 

their positions, for Plaintiff’s well-being, and for knowing about and allowing the illegal acts 

by CSP health care defendants, which have caused Plaintiff to suffer pain. Several other health 

care staff members are also responsible, but Plaintiff does not know their names or who they 

are.

CSP custodial staff members have not been providing Plaintiff with indigent envelopes,

which is denial of access to the courts. Defendant Connie Gipson is legally responsible for 

Plaintiff’s well-being and the denial of his access to the courts, because she is the CEO for CSP

and is/was aware of the problem, allowing it to happen. Several other CSP officials are also

responsible, but Plaintiff does not know who they are.

On or about August 18, 2013, Plaintiff was moved from one cell to another, and instead 

of being provided with a new mattress, he was issued an old, flat, lumpy, and torn mattress,

depriving him of sleep. CSP staff member Connie Gipson is legally responsible for Plaintiff’s 

well-being, including the mattress issue, because she is the CEO of CSP, knew about the 

matter, allowed it to happen, and failed/refused to resolve it. There are several other CDCR 

staff members who are responsible, but Plaintiff does not who they are.

From July 8, 2013 until about August 18, 2013, after being moved to another yard, 

Plaintiff was not provided with access to law library or allowed to bring with him any of his 

legal documents for active cases, depriving him of access to the courts. As of September 1, 

2013, several of Plaintiff’s legal documents had not been turned over by prison officials. 

Defendant Connie Gipson is responsible for it, because she is legally responsible for Plaintiff’s

well-being, including his denial to the courts, because she is the CEO for Corcoran Prison and

///

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knew about the issue but allowed it to happen and failed/refused to fix it. Several other CDCR 

staff members are also responsible, but Plaintiff does not know who they are.

CSP officials have been tampering with Plaintiff’s legal incoming and outgoing mail. 

On August 26, 2013, Plaintiff’s mail from the U.S. Court of Appeal was opened out of his 

presence. Some of Plaintiff’s outgoing legal mail does not make it to its destination, such as 

mail to the attorney appointed by the court for Plaintiff’s criminal case. Defendant Connie 

Gipson is responsible because she is the CEO for Corcoran Prison and is legally responsible for 

Plaintiff’s well-being, knows about the problem, allowed it to happen, and refused/failed to 

resolve it. Several other CSP officials are also responsible but Plaintiff does not know who 

they are.

Plaintiff requests compensatory damages and injunctive relief.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). AA person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s affirmative acts, 

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

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which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). AThe 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which 

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 

injury.@ (Id. at 743-44.)

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair 

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support Plaintiff's claim. Id.

A. Personal Participation and Supervisory Liability – Defendants Gipson, 

Macias, and Clark

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants Connie Gipson, T. Macias, and E. Clark liable in their 

supervisory capacities. Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 

(9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his 

or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 on the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Ewing 

v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). A supervisor may be held liable only 

if he or she Aparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.@ Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that defendants Gipson, Macias, or Clark 

personally acted to violate Plaintiff’s rights. It is not enough to allege that a defendant is 

responsible because of his or her position. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations that these 

///

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defendants “knew about” or “allowed” the violations, without supporting facts, are vague and 

conclusory and without more, fail to state a claim. 

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state any claims in the Complaint against defendants Gipson, 

Macias, and Clark. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint.

B. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

A[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show >deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.=@ Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976)). 

The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) A>a serious 

medical need= by demonstrating that >failure to treat a prisoner=s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,=@ and (2) Athe 

defendant=s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations 

omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown by Aa purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.@ Id. (citing 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference may be manifested Awhen prison 

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by 

the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. Where a prisoner is alleging a 

delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the 

prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 

1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm=rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985)). 

ADeliberate indifference is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). AUnder this standard, the prison official must not only >be aware of the 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,= but 

that person >must also draw the inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994)). A>If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but 

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was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the 

risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 

2002)). AA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a 

constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1060. A[E]ven gross negligence 

is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.@ Id. (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

AA difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities 

regarding treatment does not give rise to a ' 1983 claim.@ Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff Amust show that the course 

of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . 

that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff=s health.@ 

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff has demonstrated that he has a serious medical need because he suffers chronic 

pain. However, Plaintiff’s allegations against the defendants do not demonstrate deliberate 

indifference. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gill knew Plaintiff’s medication was not effective, yet

prescribed him the same treatment, but Plaintiff has not shown that Dr. Gill acted, or failed to 

act, while knowing about and deliberately disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm to 

Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff’s allegations that the LVNs failed/refused to issue his medication 

and lied about it are insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff must allege facts, telling what the 

LVNs did or said to indicate that they knew about Plaintiff’s serious medical need, how they 

acted or failed to act, and how they deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of harm to 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations that the LVNs “failed/refused” to act is ambiguous and does 

not describe how each LVN personally acted. 

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendants Dr. Gill, LVN Ballesteros,

or the unnamed LVNs, and he fails to state an Eighth Amendment medical claim against any of 

the defendants.

///

///

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C. Inmate Appeals Process

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to state a claim against any of the defendants for 

failing to respond properly to his inmate appeals, Plaintiff is advised that Defendants= actions in 

responding to his appeals, alone, cannot give rise to any claims for relief under section 1983 for 

violation of due process. A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not 

confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 

1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because 

no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty 

interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ 

Azeez, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions 

in reviewing a prisoner=s administrative appeal, without more, are not actionable under section 

1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive 

right in inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for the processing and/or 

reviewing of his 602 inmate appeals. 

D. Eighth Amendment Claim -- Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, 

and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim 

for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a 

claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the 

plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether 

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the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment 

claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). A[R]outine discomfort inherent in 

the prison setting@ does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 731. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was issued an old, flat, lumpy, and torn mattress, which 

deprived him of sleep. This allegation, without more, does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for 

adverse conditions of confinement based on the mattress he was issued.

E. Denial of Access to Courts

While Plaintiff has a constitutional right to access the courts, the interferences 

complained of by Plaintiff must have caused him to sustain an actual injury. Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002) Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 

S.Ct. 2174 (1996); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Hust , 588 

F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004). The absence 

of an injury precludes an access claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415-16; Jones, 393 F.3d at 936. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Law 

libraries and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id.

Because inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, 

an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or 

legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the law library and his legal documents,

that his attorney did not receive the mail sent by Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was not given 

indigent envelopes. However, Plaintiff=s Complaint is devoid of any facts suggesting any 

injury occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.

F. Mail Interference

Prisoners have Aa First Amendment right to send and receive mail.@ Witherow v. Paff, 

52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). The right to receive mail is subject to substantial limitation, 

however, and the regulation or policy infringing on the right will be upheld if it is reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397F.3d 692, 699 

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(9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not 

support a claim under section 1983 for violation of plaintiff=s constitutional rights. See Davis 

v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 

1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are analyzed under the 

Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). 

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the 

reasonableness of the regulation, the court must consider the following factors: (1) whether 

there is a Avalid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government 

interest put forward to justify it,@ (2) Awhether there are alternative means of exercising the 

right,@ (3) the impact that the Aaccommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on 

guards and other inmates,@ and (4) Athe absence of ready alternatives.@ Id. at 89-90. Further, 

the mere fact that prison officials open and conduct a visual inspection of a prisoner=s legal 

correspondence, which appears to be the case here, does not support a claim for violation of a 

prisoner=s constitutional rights. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); 

Mitchell v. Dupnick, 75 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1996).

Censorship of outgoing prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) the 

regulation furthers Aan important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression 

of expression@ and (2) Athe limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is 

necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.@ 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (overturned by Thornburgh, 490 U.S. 401 

only as test relates to incoming mail - Turner test applies to incoming mail). Plaintiff’s 

allegation that some of his mail does not arrive at its destination, without more, is insufficient 

to state a claim.

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for interference with his mail.

///

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G. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff makes allegations in the Complaint against unidentified or “Doe” defendants. 

Defendants must be named or otherwise identified before service can go forward. AAs a 

general rule, the use of >John Doe= to identify a defendant is not favored.@ Gillespie v. Civiletti, 

629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that his unnamed and unidentified 

defendants cannot be served by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as

actual individuals and amended his complaint to substitute names. For service to be successful, 

the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff=s Complaint fails to state any cognizable claims upon 

which relief may be granted under ' 1983. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, leave to amend >shall be freely given when justice so requires.=@ The Court will 

provide Plaintiff with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to 

file an amended complaint within thirty days.

The amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did 

that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. There is no respondeat superior liability, 

and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter ... to >state a claim that is plausible on its 

face.=@ Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that 

each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 

(emphasis added). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (citations 

omitted). To succeed with the amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, 

explaining how each named defendant acted, or failed to act, resulting in the violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights. For example, it is not enough to say that a named defendant “refused” to 

issue medication; Plaintiff must name the defendant and allege facts, not conclusions, 

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explaining what Plaintiff saw or heard and what the defendant did or said, showing with facts

that the defendant “refused” to issue the medication. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of adding new defendants relating to issues arising after September 9, 2013. In 

addition, Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that have been exhausted prior 

to the initiation of this suit on September 9, 2013. Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not change 

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 

titled AFirst Amended Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff=s Complaint, filed on September 9, 2013, is dismissed for failure to 

state a claim, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk=s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint AFirst Amended Complaint@ and 

refer to the case number 1:13-cv-01429-AWI-GSA-PC; 

5. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended 

complaint and any attempt to do so may result in an order striking the amended 

complaint; and

///

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6. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

6i0kij8d

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