Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02338/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 05:0551 Administrative Procedures Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION, 

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-2338-MMA (LL) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT/TO AFFIRM AGENCY 

DECISION

[Doc. No. 3] 

On December 6, 2019, L1 Technologies, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 

“requesting an order to command” U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Defendant” or 

“CBP”) “to produce documents responsive to a subpoena and a demand for information” 

to be used in a pending state court civil action. See Doc. No. 1 at 2 (“Compl.”). On 

February 13, 2020, Defendant filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment/to Affirm Agency 

Decision.” See Doc. No. 3. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion, and 

Defendant replied. See Doc. Nos. 5, 7. The Court found the matter suitable for 

determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 8. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s request to compel Defendant to produce responsive documents to a 

subpoena and demand for information arises from a state court action between Plaintiff 

and Baruc Mayer (“Mayer”). Compl. ¶ 4. 

In California Superior Court, Mayer brought suit against Plaintiff, alleging 

discrimination, retaliation, and failure to compensate for completed work. Id. ¶ 5; see 

also Falkoff Decl., Ex. 1, Doc. No. 3-1 at 6–32 (state court complaint).

1

 As a defense in 

the state action, Plaintiff argues that Mayer resides in Mexico and was present in Mexico 

during the times Mayer alleges he worked for Plaintiff in the United States. Compl. ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s records contain evidence helpful to its defense in the 

state court action: 

[Plaintiff] therefore has strong reason to believe that [Defendant] has records 

that will show Mayer’s entry and exit between the United States and 

Mexico, and that such records will be strong evidence in the State Court 

Litigation both as evidence pertaining to whether Mayer was actually 

working in the United States for [Plaintiff] on dates he has claimed, and as 

impeachment evidence. [Plaintiff] is informed and believes that the 

requested information may and likely will have a significant impact on the 

outcome of the State Court Litigation, making the need for [Plaintiff] to 

obtain this information substantial and significant. 

Id. ¶ 9.

On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff served a “Deposition Subpoena for Production of 

Business Records” on Defendant. Falkoff Decl., Ex. 2, Doc. No. 3-1 at 34–39; see also

Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff describes the records sought as follows:

1. All Writings (defined by Evidence Code section 250) relating to the entry 

into the United States from Mexico by Baruc Mayer, whose date of birth is 

1 Citations to electronically filed documents refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

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2/20/1978 and California Driver’s License Number D7565002 from 

1/1/2016 through present date.

2. All writings (defined by Evidence Code section 250) relating to the exit 

from the United States from [sic] Mexico by Baruc Mayer, whose date of 

birth is 2/20/1978 and California Driver’s License Number D7565002 from 

1/1/2016 through present date.

3. Baruc Mayer also goes by the name “Baruc Nathan Mayer Morales” and 

have [sic] a Mexican Secretary of Defense Matricula Number: C-2390474.

Doc. No. 3-1 at 38; see also Compl. ¶ 13. On June 3, 2019, Plaintiff served a second 

subpoena on Defendant requesting the same type of materials but with greater 

specification relating to Mayer’s entry into the United States through the San Ysidro and 

Otay Mesa Border Crossings. See Falkoff Decl., Ex. 3, Doc. No. 3-1 at 43; Compl. ¶ 10. 

On June 6, 2019, Defendant responded to the first subpoena with a letter 

“declin[ing] to produce [the] requested records at this time.” Falkoff Decl., Ex. 4, Doc. 

No. 3-1 at 48. In declining Plaintiff’s request, Defendant based its decision on factors 

under its regulations “applicable to disclosure of information by CBP.”2

 See id. at 48–49. 

On June 19, 2019, Defendant responded to both the first and second subpoenas with a 

letter declining to comply with both subpoenas. See Falkoff Decl., Ex. 5, Doc. No. 3-1 at 

51–52. Defendant noted that state courts lack jurisdiction to enforce subpoenas against it

and Plaintiff did not adhere with the necessary Touhy regulations. See id. at 51–52. 

Defendant declined to produce the requested documents and requested Plaintiff withdraw

the subpoenas. See id.; Compl. ¶ 11.

In an email thread confirming a phone conversation that Plaintiff would withdraw 

the subpoena, Defendant stated that it would further consider Plaintiff’s information 

request if it were submitted with a Privacy Act waiver, with the supporting information 

2 As explained infra, these regulations are colloquially referred to as “Touhy regulations” based on the 

Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). 

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required under the agency’s regulations, and “with a significantly narrowed geographical 

and temporal scope.” Falkoff Decl., Ex. 7, Doc. No. 3-1 at 56. On June 24, 2019, 

Plaintiff subsequently withdrew its June subpoena. See Falkoff Decl., Ex. 6, Doc. No. 3-

1 at 54.

On October 25, 2019, Plaintiff served a third subpoena on Defendant. See Falkoff 

Decl., Ex. 8, Doc. No. 3-1 at 64; Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff describes the records sought as 

follows:

1. All Writings (defined by Evidence Code section 250) relating to the entry 

into the United States from Mexico by Baruc Mayer, whose date of birth is 

2/20/1978 and California Driver’s License Number D7565002 from 

1/1/2016 through present date.

2. All writings (defined by Evidence Code section 250) relating to the exit 

from the United States to Mexico by Baruc Mayer, whose date of birth is 

2/20/1978 and California Driver’s License Number D7565002 from 

1/1/2016 through present date.

3. Bruce Mayer also goes by the name “Baruc Nathan Mayer Morales” and 

has a Mexican Secretary of Defense Matricula Number: C-2390474.

Doc. No. 3-1 at 64; Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff attached the state court complaint and an 

affidavit from its attorney to the third subpoena. See Doc. No. 3-1 at 60–101. The 

subpoena required Defendant to produce the records by November 14, 2019. See id. at 

62.

On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action. Plaintiff’s action seeks judicial 

review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) regarding Defendant’s refusal 

to produce documents responsive to the October 25 subpoena and demand for 

information. See Compl. ¶ 3, 22, 25. Plaintiff requests that “[Defendant] be ordered to 

comply with the subpoena and demand for information as attached in Exhibit 2 and that 

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the CBP produce its records relating to Mayer’s exit and entry between the United States 

of America and Mexico from January 1, 2016 through to the present.” Id. ¶ 25.3

In a declaration filed in support of its motion, agency counsel provides context for 

why Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s third subpoena:

L1 Technologies served its October 25, 2019 subpoena on the Office of 

General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security in Washington 

DC rather than CBP. On December 3, 2019, DHS OGC forwarded this 

subpoena to CBP’s Office of Chief Counsel in Washington DC, and it was 

then sent to CBP counsel’s office in San Diego on that same date. Thus, 

CBP did not receive this third subpoena from L1 Technologies until 3 days 

prior to LI Technologies’ filing the present lawsuit, which it did on 

December 6, 2019.

Falkoff Decl. ¶ 9, Doc. No. 3-1 at 2–3; see also Doc. No. 7 at 3 n.2. 

II. RELEVANT LAW

A. Legal Standard

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree on the applicable legal standard. 

Defendant moves to affirm its underlying agency decision pursuant to the standard 

governing Touhy regulations. See Doc. No. 3 at 7–11. In other words, Defendant 

requests the Court find that the underlying agency decision was neither arbitrary nor 

capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). However, 

Plaintiff applies the traditional standard for summary judgment and argues that Defendant 

has not met its burden to show no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Doc. No. 5 

at 3–4, 6. In reply, Defendant charges that Plaintiff applies the incorrect legal standard 

and places the burden of proof on the wrong party. Doc. No. 7 at 2.

3 Plaintiff describes “Exhibit 2” as the third subpoena issued on October 25. See Compl. ¶ 12. 

However, Plaintiff has failed to attach any of its two referenced exhibits to its Complaint. 

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Despite Defendant’s motion being brought as a “Motion for Summary Judgment/to 

Affirm Agency Decision,” the Court does not apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56 standard to review an administrative agency’s final decision under the APA. See

Occidental Eng’g Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Tolowa 

Nation v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 3d 959, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Benhoff v. United 

States Deptt of Justice, No. 16-cv-1095-GPC (JLB), 2017 WL 840879, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 

Mar. 3, 2017) (“[T]he standard on summary judgment in a standard civil case is different 

than reviewing an agency decision in an APA case.”); SLPR, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, No. 6-cv-1327-MMA (POR), 2011 WL 940509, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 

2011). The Ninth Circuit has clearly differentiated summary judgment in a standard civil 

case from summary judgment as a means for a district court to review a final agency 

decision:

[The District Court] is not required to resolve any facts in a review of an 

administrative proceeding. Certainly, there may be issues of fact before the 

administrative agency. However, the function of the district court is to 

determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the 

administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did. De 

novo factfinding by the district court is allowed only in limited 

circumstances that have not arisen in the present case. The appellant 

confuses the use of summary judgment in an original district court 

proceeding with the use of summary judgment where, as here, the district 

court is reviewing a decision of an administrative agency which is itself the 

finder of fact. In the former case, summary judgment is appropriate only 

when the court finds there are no factual issues requiring resolution by trial. 

In the latter case, summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for 

deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have 

found the facts as it did. 

Occidental Eng’g Co., 753 F.2d at 769–70 (citations omitted). When reviewing an 

agency’s decision, the district court sits as an appellate body “to determine whether or not 

as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make 

the decision it did.” Id. at 769. Accordingly, the district court is “limited to review of the 

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administrative record.” Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 

1988) (citing Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 1986)). The 

district court does not focus on “some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” 

Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 

U.S. 138, 142 (1973)). “The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA 

standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency 

presents to the reviewing court.” Animal Def. Council, 840 F.2d at 1436 (quoting Fla. 

Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 743–44). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks judicial review under the APA of Defendant’s refusal to 

produce documents responsive to a subpoena and demand for information. See generally

Compl. Despite its clunky title, Defendant’s motion requires the Court to review the

agency’s decision not to produce documents. Therefore, the Court applies the required 

legal standard under the APA and not the traditional Rule 56 standard.

B. Standard of Review

Pursuant to the APA, a court may set aside a final agency action that is “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A). “The arbitrary and capricious standard is ‘highly deferential, presuming the 

agency action to be valid and [requires] affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis 

exists for its decision.’” Kern Cty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 

2000)); see also Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 384 F.3d 

721, 728 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, this court must 

determine whether the agency articulated a rational connection between the facts and the 

choice made.”). Courts give additional deference to a final agency decision “when that 

agency is not a party to the dispute.” Akal Sec., Inc. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 

Enf’t, No. 9-cv-2277-W (NLS), 2010 WL 2731649, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2010)

(quoting COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 278 (4th Cir. 1999)). The 

reviewing court’s application of the standard is “narrow,” and a court cannot supplant the 

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agency’s judgment. Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 384 F.3d at 728

(citing Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)). To fulfill its 

obligations, the Court must conduct a “thorough, probing, in-depth review” of the 

administrative record. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 

415, (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). A 

reviewing court can overturn a final agency decision only if the agency demonstrated a

“clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting California Trout v. Schaefer, 58 F.3d 469, 473 

(9th Cir. 1995)).

Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 

relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 

failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 

for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 

product of agency expertise. 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). 

A court’s review under the APA is “limited to review of the administrative 

record.” Animal Def. Council, 840 F.2d 1436 (citing Friends of the Earth, 800 F.2d at 

828). However, the record can be expanded “(1) if necessary to determine ‘whether the 

agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,’ (2) ‘when the 

agency has relied on documents not in the record,’ or (3) ‘when supplementing the record 

is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter.’” Sw. Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 703–04 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

C. Touhy Regulations

An agency head may “may prescribe regulations for the government of his 

department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its 

business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property

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5 U.S.C. § 301. These regulations are referred to as Touhy regulations and have “the full 

force of law.” Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Ex parte 

Sackett, 74 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1935)); see generally U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 

U.S. 462 (1951) (citing Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900)).

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and CBP both have enacted 

Touhy regulations for when a party in a state civil suit seeks information from the

agencies. See 6 C.F.R. § 5.41–5.49 (DHS’s Touhy regulations); 19 C.F.R. § 103.21–

103.27 (CBP’s Touhy regulations). Both DHS and CBP bar employees from complying 

with a demand for agency information without approval from the respective agency’s 

chief counsel. See 6 C.F.R. § 5.44; 19 C.F.R. § 103.22. Each agency provides the 

necessary procedures and requirements for subpoenas and demands for information. See

6 C.F.R. § 5.43–5.45; 19 C.F.R. § 103.22.

Determining whether to disclose information, each agency examines several

general factors. See 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(a); 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(a). For example, the CPB 

considers the following factors: 

(1) Whether the disclosure would be appropriate under the relevant 

substantive law concerning privilege;

(2) Whether the disclosure would be appropriate under the rules of 

procedure governing the case or matter in which the demand arose; and,

(3) Whether the requesting party has demonstrated that the information 

requested is:

(i) Relevant and material to the action pending, based on copies of the 

summons and complaint that are required to be attached to the 

subpoena duces tecum or other demand;

(ii) Genuinely necessary to the proceeding, i.e., a showing of 

substantial need has been made;

(iii) Unavailable from other sources; and,

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(iv) Reasonable in its scope, i.e., the documents, information, or 

testimony sought are described with particularity.

(4) Whether consultation with the originating component requires that the 

Chief Counsel make a separate determination as to the disclosure of the 

information requested.

19 C.F.R. § 103.23(a). Each agency also examines circumstances where disclosure will 

not be authorized. See 6 C.F.R. § 5.48(b); 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(b). The circumstances 

where disclosure will not be made include the following under the CBP regulations: 

(1) Disclosure would violate a treaty, statute (such as the Privacy Act, 5 

U.S.C. 552a, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905, or the income tax laws, 

26 U.S.C. 6103 and 7213), or a rule of procedure, such as the grand jury 

secrecy rule, Fed.R.Crim.Proc. rule 6(e) (18 U.S.C.App.);

(2) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation;

(3) Disclosure would reveal classified or confidential information;

(4) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant;

(5) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law 

enforcement purposes, interfere with enforcement proceedings, or disclose 

investigative techniques and procedures;

(6) Disclosure would improperly reveal confidential commercial information 

without the owner's consent (e.g., entry information);

(7) Disclosure relates to documents which were produced by another agency 

or entity;

(8) Disclosure would unduly interfere with the orderly conduct of CBP 

business;

(9) CBP has no interest, records, or other official information regarding the 

matter in which disclosure is sought;

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(10) There is a failure to make proper service upon the United States; or

(11) There is a failure to comply with federal, state, or local rules of 

discovery.

19 C.F.R. § 103.23(b).

A party can challenge a final agency decision based on Touhy regulations through 

bringing a civil action in district court pursuant to the APA. See Kwan Fai Mak v. F.B.I., 

252 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that actions taken pursuant to the 

Department of Justice’s Touhy regulations were not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion,” or “in excess of statutory . . . authority” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).); see also 5 

U.S.C. § 702 (“A person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 

meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); Akal Sec., Inc., 

2010 WL 2731649, at *4 (“DHS’s decision to prohibit its current and former employees 

from testifying pursuant to a state-court subpoena is exactly the kind of final agency 

action subject to review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.”). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Objections

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s “procedural and 

evidentiary objections” to Defendant’s motion. Doc. No. 5-1 at 2–3.

1. Objection 1: Defendant Has Not Provided a Separate Statement of 

Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff objects generally because Defendant did not file a separate statement of 

undisputed material facts pursuant to the Court’s Civil Chambers rules. See Doc. No. 5-1 

at 2 (referring to J. Anello Civ. Chambers R. IV). Defendant argues that it is not 

necessary because the “motion is not a garden variety summary judgment motion but is 

instead a motion to affirm an agency decision under the APA.” See Doc. No. 7 at 5 

(footnote omitted).

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As already discussed, the Court does not apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 

when reviewing an administrative agency’s final decision. See supra Section II.A. 

Although summary judgment may serve as a possible vehicle for a party seeking to 

affirm or dispute an agency’s decision, see, e.g., Occidental Eng’g Co., 753 F.2d at 770; 

Tolowa Nation, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 962, the APA’s legal standard controls. In reviewing 

an APA action, a district court functions as an appellate court “to determine whether or 

not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to 

make the decision it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co., 753 F.2d at 769. A separate statement 

of undisputed material facts is unnecessary when the Court functions as an appellate 

entity reviewing an administrative record. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES 

Plaintiff’s objection.

2. Objection 2: Defendant Has Not Filed an Answer or Supplied the Entire 

Administrative Record

Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s motion as procedurally inappropriate because 

Defendant did not file an answer or the entire administrative record. See Doc. No. 5-1 at 

2. Defendant argues that it was not required to file an answer, and that it filed its motion

before the deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. Doc. No. 7 at 7. Defendant notes 

that the motion to affirm the agency decision could have been brought either as a motion 

for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. Id. Regarding the administrative record, 

Defendant states that it “submitted the administrative record for this Court’s review” and 

“the administrative record upon which the agency acted in this case, and which the 

agency is asking this Court to review, is what CBP submitted—the underlying state court 

complaint, L1 Technologies’ subpoenas, the responses by CBP attorneys, and the Falkoff 

declaration.” Doc. No. 7 at 8.

As to the first dispute, Defendant filed its motion within the time required under 

Rule 12 to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Doc. Nos. 3, 4. Defendant’s response to 

Plaintiff’s Complaint challenging an agency decision could have been brought as a 

motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Occidental Eng’g Co., 

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753 F.2d at 770 (reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment); Tolowa 

Nation, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 962 (ruling on parties’ cross motions for summary judgment); 

Debry v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling on 

an agency’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment). 

Either motion would have required the Court to conduct the same analysis under the 

APA. The Court finds that the form of motion is inconsequential. 

As to the dispute over the administrative record, Defendant clearly states in its 

reply brief that it has produced the entire administrative record. See Doc. No. 7 at 8

(“Here, the administrative record upon which the agency acted in this case, and which the 

agency is asking this Court to review, is what CBP submitted . . . .”). The Court takes 

Defendant’s representation as true. Moreover, discovery beyond the administrative 

record is inappropriate when a reviewing court decides whether an agency action was 

arbitrary or capricious. Again, the reviewing court functions as an appellate entity and is 

limited to the administrative record. See Occidental Eng’g Co., 753 F.2d at 769. 

Traditional discovery is unnecessary and inappropriate because “there are no disputed 

facts that the district court must resolve.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection.

3. Objections 3 and 4: Defendant’s Declaration in Support of its Motion

Should Be Stricken or Not Considered

 Plaintiff’s final objections pertain to the Declaration of Stacy Falkoff in Support of 

Defendant’s Motion—both as to the entire declaration and, specifically, paragraph nine. 

See Doc. No. 5-1 at 3 (referring to Doc. No. 3-1). Plaintiff argues that “in reviewing 

agency action the Court is limited to reviewing the entire administrative record and posthoc rationalization in [a] declaration do[es] not constitute proper evidence in support of 

an agency decision.” Doc. No. 5-1 at 3 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 

401 U.S. at 419). Defendant responds that “the Court can and should consider the 

paragraph . . . explaining why CBP would continue to decline to produce the requested 

records.” Doc. No. 7 at 8. It explains that “the reasons provided in the paragraph in the 

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Falkoff Declaration declining to produce the requested records were reasons provided in 

CBP’s prior letters.” Id. at 9. It further notes that the declaration—to the extent the 

declarant relied upon the Complaint—provides context as to why further information was 

needed with the earlier subpoenas: “It was only with its third subpoena that [Plaintiff] 

actually supplied the state court complaint, and attempted to provide some reasoning for 

why the requested records were genuinely necessary in the context of the underlying 

proceeding.” Id.

As noted above, a court’s review under the APA is “limited to review of the 

administrative record.” Animal Def. Council, 840 F.2d 1436 (citing Friends of the Earth, 

800 F.2d at 828). However, the Ninth Circuit has explained that a court may expand the 

record under certain circumstances: “(1) if necessary to determine ‘whether the agency 

has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,’ (2) ‘when the agency 

has relied on documents not in the record,’ or (3) ‘when supplementing the record is 

necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter.’” Sw. Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450 (quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council, 88 F.3d at 703–

04). “Post-hoc rationalizations” are generally an inadequate basis for review and fall 

outside the “‘whole record’ complied by the agency” under 5 U.S.C. § 706’s scope. 

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 419. 

Although Plaintiff brought suit before Defendant responded to the third subpoena, 

the Court remains constrained to its review of the administrative record. Defendant’s 

declaration is primarily a means to attach exhibits constituting the administrative record. 

See Doc. No. 3-1 at 2. In the ninth paragraph, the declarant provides information 

regarding issues between DHS and CBP in delivering the third subpoena to the correct 

CBP official. See id. at 2–3. The ninth paragraph also provides the following 

information:

Had CBP formally responded to this subpoena, CBP would have declined to 

produce the requested records, for essentially the same reasons as CBP had 

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previously given in its prior two letters. In particular, CBP would have cited 

the Touhy regulations that counsel the agency to conserve its and the U.S.’s 

resources for its federal mission, and to avoid partiality between private 

parties and the diversion of federal resources to purposes that are both 

private and not part of CBP’s mission. This is particularly the case where 

complying with such requests would have much larger impacts if considered 

not just singly, but in the aggregate. In addition, CBP had requested that L1 

Technologies obtain a Privacy Act waiver from the person whose personal 

records were at issue, Baruc Mayer; and that Ll Technologies reduce the 

temporal and geographic scope of its request. Ll Technologies did neither of 

those things. Finally, having looked more closely at the state court 

complaint underlying this subpoena, it is apparent that witnesses other than 

the state court plaintiff are identified as being present during the events 

specifically alleged in that complaint, and even witnesses apart from L1 

Technologies’/the state court defendant’s CEO. Thus, there would seem to 

be other avenues—such as witness testimony—to get at the information put 

at issue by the state court complaint itself. This too would have counselled 

against CBP providing the information requested by L1 Technologies in its 

third subpoena. 

Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 

The Court finds that this part of the declaration pertaining to how Defendant 

“would have” responded to Plaintiff’s third subpoena is a post-hoc rationalization that 

falls outside of the administrative record. Therefore, it “may not be advanced as a new 

rationalization either for sustaining or attacking an agency’s decision.” Sw. Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450–51 (holding that a district court did not abuse its 

discretion in striking a letter that “constitute[d] post-decision information). The three 

exceptions articulated by the Ninth Circuit do not save Defendant. First, the proffered 

information as to how Defendant “would have” replied to the third subpoena is not 

necessary to determine whether Defendant considered the relevant factors because 

Defendant, in fact, was unable to determine the relevant factors in the first place as to the 

third subpoena. Second, it does not appear that Defendant has relied on documents not in 

the record. Third, there are no technical terms or complex subject matter that would 

allow for supplemental information.

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Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS in part and OVERRULES in part Plaintiff’s 

objection to the Falkoff Declaration. In ruling on the instant motion, the Court will only 

examine the administrative record. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s 

objection regarding paragraph nine of the declaration only as to the sentences after 

Defendant’s explanation of the receipt of the subpoena from DHS. Plaintiff’s objection is 

otherwise overruled.

B. Whether There Is a “Final Agency Action”

Although neither party addresses this point, the Court must assess as a threshold 

matter: whether there is a final agency action subject to review under the APA.

“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 

review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 

not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency 

action.”

5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 384 F.3d at 727 

(“It is well established that once an agency has taken final agency action under the APA, 

a reviewing court analyzes that decision under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of 

review.”). The APA defines “agency action” as both action and refusal to act: “the whole 

or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 

thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Determining an agency action as final 

requires satisfaction of two conditions: (1) “the action must mark the consummation of 

the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or 

interlocutory nature” and (2) “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have 

been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 

U.S. 154, 177–78). In examining finality, courts “focus on the practical and legal effects 

of the agency action: ‘The “finality element must be interpreted in a pragmatic and 

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flexible manner.”’” Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Harrell, 52 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th 

Cir. 1995)); see also Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 

2018). 

In its motion, Defendant states “[its] decision in this case to decline production of 

the requested information pursuant to a state-court subpoena is exactly the kind of final 

agency action subject to review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.” 

Doc. No. 3 at 8. Although Plaintiff withdrew its second subpoena, see Doc. No. 3-1 at 

54, it has not withdrawn the first or third subpoenas. Defendant’s June 6 and June 19 

letters, which declined to produce the records, do not pertain to the third subpoena. See

id. at 48–49, 51–52.

The Court finds that there was a final agency action as to the first subpoena

through Defendant’s June 6 and 19 letters. The letters both clearly note Defendant 

declined to produce the sought records, see Doc. No. 3-1 at 48–49, 51–52, thus indicating

the end of the agency’s decision-making process and determination of Defendant’s legal 

obligations. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (quoting Bennett, 520 

U.S. at 177–78); see also Akal Sec., Inc., 2010 WL 2731649, at *4 (“DHS’s decision to 

prohibit its current and former employees from testifying pursuant to a state-court 

subpoena is exactly the kind of final agency action subject to review under the APA’s 

arbitrary and capricious standard”). 

It is less clear that there is a final action as to the third subpoena. Administrative 

issues between DHS and Defendant did not allow Defendant to respond to the subpoena 

in a timely manner and Plaintiff filed suit before Defendant could respond. See Doc. No. 

3-1 at 2–3; see also Doc. No. 7 at 3 n.2. However, the first and third subpoenas ask for 

essentially the same information, compare Doc. No. 3-1 at 38, with id. at 64, and 

Defendant repeated in its June 6 and June 19 letters that it declines to produce the sought 

information from the first subpoena, see id. at 48–49, 51–52. Defendant’s motion is clear 

that it still does not intend to produce information responsive to any of Plaintiff’s issued 

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subpoenas. See Doc. No. 3 at 2, 13, 14, 15–16. This indicates that Defendant considers 

its decision as to the third subpoena as final. Moreover, Plaintiff appears to consider 

Defendant’s failure to respond to the third subpoenas as final given it filed the present 

action. See, e.g., Compl. ¶16 (“Despite L1’s demand for documents fully complying with 

the applicable regulations, CBP has again refused and failed to produce any responsive 

information.”).

Despite any uncertainty over the timing of the third subpoena’s receipt and 

whether Plaintiff brought this action prematurely, the Court ultimately examines “the 

practical and legal effects of the agency action.” Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n, 465 F.3d at 

982. Because Defendant treats its refusal to comply with the third subpoena as final—as 

demonstrated by its responses to the to the prior subpoenas and its present motion—and 

its decision determined its legal obligations, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes 

Co., 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78), the Court finds that 

Defendant has rendered a final agency action under the APA.

C. Whether Defendant’s Decision Was “Arbitrary and Capricious” Under the APA

Defendant argues that it considered the relevant Touhy factors and subsequently 

made a rational connection between the factors and its decision to decline to supply 

information to Plaintiff. See Doc. No. 3 at 12. In response, Plaintiff asserts that the 

documents provided in support of Defendant’s motion do not “indicate who considered 

the requests, what information they considered, or whether they meaningfully considered 

the requests. Instead, the letters from the CBP denying the requests are loaded with 

boilerplate.” Doc. No. 5 at 5.

As noted above, both DHS and CBP have established Touhy regulations that 

govern how the agencies respond to subpoenas arising from state court litigation. See 6 

C.F.R. § 5.41–5.49; 19 C.F.R. § 103.21–103.27. The Court proceeds by determining 

whether Defendant articulated a rational connection between the facts, its established 

Touhy regulations, and its ultimate decision. See Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery Ltd. 

P’ship, 384 F.3d at 728. 

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In its response, Defendant stated that it would not be able to seek a protective order 

or shield sensitive information, see Doc. No. 3-1 at 49, which it connected to factors not 

authorizing disclosure when there is sensitive information, see 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(b)(3)–

(6). Defendant noted that disclosure would be burdensome when examining similar 

requests in aggregate in the context “of all third-party demands served upon CBP,” Doc. 

No. 3-1 at 49, which it connected to factors not authorizing disclosure where the request 

would interfere with CBP’s work, see, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(b)(3)(8)–(9). Defendant 

questioned whether the sought information is “genuinely necessary” to the state action, 

see Doc. No. 3-1 at 49, which connects to a factor asking whether the requesting party 

demonstrated necessity and unavailability from other sources, see 19 C.F.R. § 

103.23(a)(3)(ii)–(iii) (“i.e., a showing of substantial need”). Addressing the burdensome 

scope of the request “seek[ing] all inbound and outbound border crossing records for an 

individual for a 3.5 year period,” Doc. No. 3-1 at 52, Defendant’s reasoning connects to 

another factor where a request’s scope is not reasonable, see 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(a)(3)(iv). 

Defendant also stated that the records are protected by the Privacy Act, Doc. No. 3-1 at 

52 (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 552a), which connects to a factor not authorizing disclosure 

where disclosure would violate a statute, see C.F.R. § 103.23(b)(1) (explicitly listing 5 

U.S.C. § 552a as an example). Finally, Defendant noted that it generally declines 

involvement in third party civil litigation because of its limited resources, see Doc. No. 3-

1 at 52, and points to several DHS and CBP regulations not authorizing disclosure, see, 

e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 103.23(b)(3)(8)–(9); see also Benhoff, 2017 WL 840879, at *5 (“Courts 

should defer to the agency on how to best use its resources as they are in the best position 

to determine how much time and effort would be involved considering its ability to 

comply.”). 

The Court finds that Defendant made reasonable connections in applying the 

Touhy regulations to the facts available when declining to furnish the information. 

Because the Court finds that there is a reasonable connection between the facts and final

agency decision, the Court defers to the agency and presumes that the agency action is 

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valid. See Kern Cty. Farm Bureau, 450 F.3d at 1076; Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery 

Ltd. P’ship, 384 F.3d at 728. Moreover, the Court also keeps in mind the additional 

deference provided to Defendant’s final actions where it is not a party in the underlying 

state court litigation. See Akal Sec., Inc., 2010 WL 2731649, at *4 (quoting COMSAT 

Corp., 190 F.3d at 278). Plaintiff does not overcome the presumption of validity. The 

Court cannot, and thus does not, supplant Defendant’s judgment. See Mt. St. Helens 

Mining & Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 384 F.3d at 728 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378). In 

reviewing the agency’s judgment, the Court does not find that Defendant committed a 

clear error of judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s refusal to comply with Plaintiff’s 

subpoenas and demands for information was neither arbitrary nor capricious. See 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion and 

AFFIRMS Defendant’s final agency action declining to comply with the subpoenas and 

demands for information issued by Plaintiff. The Court INSTRUCTS the Clerk of Court 

to enter judgment accordingly and to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 8, 2020

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