Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02134/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED DWAYNE GILBERT,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2134 LKK DAD P

vs.

RICHARD RIMMER, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the judgment of

conviction entered against him in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of receiving

stolen property and attempted burglary. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) he received

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (2) juror misconduct violated his right to a fair trial;

(3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (4) abuse of discretion by the trial

court violated his right to a fair trial; (5) prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to a fair trial;

(6) his right to due process and equal protection were violated when the trial court allowed him

to appear at trial in prison clothing; and (7) the cumulative effect of errors at his trial violated his

right to a fair trial. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the November 15, 2001, opinion by the 1

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-2,

filed on October 27, 2003, as exhibit C to respondents’ answer.

2

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A jury convicted defendant Fred Dwayne Gilbert of receiving

stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); undesignated section

references are to this code) and attempted vehicular burglary (§§

664/459). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted two prior

prison term allegations (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Another prior prison

term allegation was dismissed.

* **

About 1:00 a.m. on July 9, 1999, Megan Lee’s Mercedes parked

near 25th and P Streets in Sacramento was broken into and a car

stereo was stolen. Susan Reardon’s Volkswagen parked nearby

had its wing window broken out. Reardon’s friend saw defendant

standing next to the Volkswagen and confronted him. Defendant

walked away and got into a car driven by Della Fort. Fort’s car

was stopped by police two blocks from the scene. Defendant was

sitting in the passenger seat and underneath his seat officers found

Lee’s car stereo.

Defendant, in pro per, did not testify and presented no evidence. In

closing argument, he attacked the eyewitness’s identification and

suggested the car stereo had not been in his possession.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

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3

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

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 For purposes of overall clarity, the court will analyze petitioner’s claims out of the 2

order in which they were presented in the instant petition.

4

II. Petitioner’s Claims2

A. Juror Misconduct

Petitioner claims that juror misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. The facts

surrounding this claim are the following. During petitioner’s trial, the court clerk informed the

trial judge that he had observed juror No. 12 put her arm around victim Megan Lee, pat her on

the shoulder, and speak to her as they were walking out of the courtroom during a break. 

(Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 226.) The trial judge speculated that the juror, who

was elderly, “had a moral instinct for a rather young woman here in court.” (Id.) Petitioner

asked for a dismissal on the grounds that the jury had been instructed not to converse with any of

the witnesses during the pendency of the trial and that the contact between the juror and the

victim violated “the concept of due process.” (Id. at 226-28.) Subsequently, the trial court

questioned Juror No. 12 outside the presence of the other jurors. (Id. at 241.) The following

exchange ensued:

THE COURT: At some time in the trial yesterday, we were taking

a break, and the witness, the young woman Megan Lee was leaving

the courtroom at the same time the jurors, were and it was noted

that you entered into conversation with her and I don’t know how

long that conversation went on, but I, umm, I had advised the

jurors that they should not talk to the witnesses. Now, jurors are

not automatons, and so things happen in this world with no bad

intentions. Did you – do you recall having some kind of contact

with her as you were leaving the courtroom.

JUROR (REDACTED): Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: And what was the nature of the exchange of words?

JUROR (REDACTED): Umm, her name was Megan Lee, and a

lady who used to be a very close friend of mine had a daughter

named Megan Lee and I asked her if she was Judy Lee’s daughter.

THE COURT: Okay.

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JUROR (REDACTED): And she said no, her mother was peg

DeBlee (phonetic).

THE COURT: And that ended it?

JUROR (REDACTED): Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, it didn’t continue out in the hallway

and lead to anything further?

JUROR (REDACTED): No. No. It was just right here.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that’s the only thing that was noted,

was one of the attendants noted.

JUROR (REDACTED): I guess I was –

THE COURT: As you were leaving you were conversing.

JUROR (REDACTED): I guess I just didn’t think about the fact

that – 

THE COURT: Well, it’s a pretty innocent and understandable

question to ask somebody. So I just wanted to find out if there

was, umm, something deeper or more involved where you

recognized her as somebody you’d known or anything like that.

JUROR (REDACTED): No.

THE COURT: You don’t recognize her and you were curious

about the name.

JUROR (REDACTED): No, she was little when I saw her last, the

Megan Lee, and this wasn’t the same one.

THE COURT: All right. And I take it there’s nothing in that brief

contact with her that would affect you how you evaluate the

evidence in this case?

JUROR (REDACTED): No.

(Id. at 241-43.) Both the prosecutor and petitioner declined to question Juror No. 12 further. (Id.

at 243.) 

Thereafter, petitioner again objected on the grounds that the juror’s violation of

the court’s admonition not to talk to witnesses violated his due process rights and “prejudiced to

the case.” (Id. at 244.) The trial court declined to take any further action, ruling as follows:

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Okay. I think, umm, I think this is a rather innocent observation. I

mean, while she’s sitting here I’ll assume that the name didn’t ring

a bell until she’s sitting here and then it says my gosh, she’s of the

age that could be the daughter of this person I know. If the person

turned out to be the daughter of the person she knows, I trust she

would let us know: By the way, I have some contact with this

witness. It turns out there was no connection. And so I think the

mere inquiry did not reflect any, umm, connection of these people,

anything that’s been concealed from us, and I see no basis on

which it could affect this juror’s judgment. 

(Id. at 245.) 

Petitioner argues that the conduct of juror No. 12 violated his right to a fair trial. 

He alleges that the juror improperly spoke with the victim in violation of the trial court’s

instruction and deliberately concealed during voir dire that she recognized the victim’s name. 

Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct was raised for the first time in his

application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

The Superior Court rejected petitioner’s claim, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner claims that the court clerk had reported to the superior

court that Juror #11 had her arm around the victim Megan Lee and

had a conversation with the victim. Petitioner claims that Juror

#11 was then questioned by the court at a hearing, and that Juror

#11 explained that she had a friend with the same last name as the

victim, whose daughter Juror #11 used to babysit, and that Juror

#11 thought that the victim was that daughter. Juror #11 explained

to the court that that was why she initiated the conversation with

the victim, to determine if this was so, and that the victim told her

“no” in response. Petitioner claims that the court found it to be

merely a “motherly daughterly type situation,” and refused to

declare a mistrial or to dismiss Juror #11 from the panel. 

Petitioner claims that Juror #11 not only committed misconduct in

engaging in the contact, but that she had also committed

misconduct in concealing her seeming recognition of the victim’s

name during voir dire when asked if the name of any victim

sounded familiar. Petitioner claims that he made numerous but

unsuccessful attempts to have his appellate counsel add this issue

to his appeal.

Petitioner fails to attach a copy of the pertinent part of trial

transcript to support his claim (see In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th

813, 827 fn. 5). Without attaching the pertinent part of trial

transcript, this court cannot assess the merits of his claim. Indeed,

petitioner may even be confusing which juror was at issue, since

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 The Superior Court analyzed all of petitioner’s claims in the context of deciding his 3

claim that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id.) The Superior Court

concluded, in essence, that because none of petitioner’s individual claims had merit, appellate

counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise them on appeal. (Id.) All of the claims raised in

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court were

summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court on habeas

review. (Answer, Exs. H, J.)

7

the minute order from the October 6, 1999 day of trial indicates

that Juror #12, not Juror #11, “was summoned into the courtroom

and questioned regarding her exchange with” the victim, “which

turned out to be non-prejudicial.” Further, petitioner’s appellate

attorney thought there was no merit to the claim, as evidenced by

his letter to petitioner, attached as Exhibit W, stating “As far as

your concern over including the juror issue in the Opening Brief or

in a Supplemental Brief, I have already explained to you my

reasoning in previous correspondence. I simply do not believe the

issue is legal [sic] viable. It has no merit, and I will not raise it.” 

Since the matter was brought to the trial court’s attention at the

time it occurred, and the trial court appears to have assessed the

situation then and dispelled any potential prejudice that there may

have been, which probably was none since the victim turned out

not to be the person Juror #12 thought she might have been, and

petitioner, in failing to attach a transcript of the proceeding, fails to

show otherwise, the claim is denied.

(Answer, Ex. F at 1-2.)3

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim. “Any

unauthorized communication between a juror and a witness or interested party is presumptively

prejudicial, but the government may overcome the presumption by making a strong contrary

showing.” Caliendo v. Warden of California men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir.) (citing

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892)), cert. denied 543 U.S. 927 (2004). See also

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954). “[I]f an unauthorized communication with

a juror is de minimus, the defendant must show that the communication could have influenced

the verdict before the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution . . . [and] must offer sufficient

evidence to trigger the presumption of prejudice.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 696 (internal quotations

omitted). If a communication is not de minimus, prejudice is presumed and the defendant is 

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entitled to a new trial “unless the prosecution shows that there is no reasonable possibility that

the communication will influence the verdict.” Id. 

After a review of the state court record, this court concludes that the contact that

occurred here between juror No. 12 and the witness Ms. Lee was de minimus and could not have

influenced the verdict. Factors relevant to this inquiry include “the length and nature of the

contact, the identity and role at trial of the parties involved, evidence of actual impact on the

juror, and the possibility of eliminating prejudice through a limiting instruction.” Caliendo, 365

F.3d at 697-98. The contact that occurred at petitioner’s trial was short in duration and did not

involve matters crucial to the verdict. Although Megan Lee was the victim in this case, she did

not see who broke into her car and was not in a position to identify anyone as the perpetrator. 

(RT at 141-160.) There is no evidence that the juror’s brief conversation with the victim had any

actual impact on any juror. Juror No. 12 stated the incident would have no impact on her

deliberations and there is no evidence the other jurors even noticed the event. Finally, the trial

court instructed the jurors, reminding them of their obligation to decide all questions of fact from

the evidence received at trial (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 380), and advised them not to

be influenced by sentiment, sympathy or prejudice. (Id. at 376.) The jury is presumed to have

followed these instructions. Penry, 532 U.S. at 799; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211,

(1987); McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1533 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Even assuming arguendo that the contact between juror No. 12 and the victim was

more than de minimus and triggered a presumption of prejudice, based upon the inquiry of the

juror conducted by the state trial judge, this court concludes that there is no reasonable possibility

this brief contact influenced the jury’s verdict. Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697. For all of the reasons

expressed above, the incident was simply too inconsequential to rise to the level of a federal

constitutional violation. 

Finally, petitioner’s argument that Juror No. 12 answered falsely during voir dire

when she failed to inform the court that she recognized the victim’s name is based on pure

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speculation and should be rejected. As explained by the state trial court, there is no evidence that

juror No. 12 recognized the victim’s name at the time of jury voir dire. 

For all of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of juror

misconduct. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner was charged with a violation of California Penal Code § 496(a)

(receiving stolen property), which provides as follows:

Every person who buys or receives any property that has been

stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or

extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who

conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or

withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to

be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a

state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year. 

(emphasis added.)

(CT at 349.) Petitioner was also charged with a violation of California Penal Code § 664/459

(attempted burglary). California Penal Code § 459 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who enters any . . . vehicle as defined by the Vehicle

Code, when the doors are locked . . . with intent to commit grand

or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. 

Id. Petitioner claims that the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to demonstrate “the

element of (knowingly) and (knowledge).” (Fourth Amended Petition (Am. Pet.) at 6.) 

Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in an application for a writ of habeas

corpus filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) The Superior Court

rejected petitioner’s arguments, reasoning as follows:

The third issue is whether the evidence was insufficient to support

the element of knowledge. This claim is rejected, as the evidence

clearly showed that petitioner was standing right next to a second

car, the window of which had just apparently been broken, then got

into another car that was stopped two blocks away, where he was

found to be in the passenger seat with the car stereo from the first,

nearby car broken into found right underneath where he was

sitting. The reasonable inferences from this evidence was that

either petitioner himself had broken into the first car and stolen the

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stereo from it, or had been with another person who had done that

and then gotten in the waiting car after attempting to break into the

second car, knowing that property had been stolen from the first

car. That the stereo stolen from the first car was found right under

the seat that petitioner was sitting in also gave rise to the

reasonable inference that petitioner had either put it there himself

after stealing it, put it there himself after being handed it by another

person who had taken it, or had seen it being placed under the seat. 

Petitioner claims that his accomplice had testified that petitioner

did not put anything in her car and that she had picked him up in

front of his residence before being stopped by police, showing he

was not even there at the crime scene. However, as noted by the

Third District Court of Appeal, another witness saw him standing

right next to the second car at the time its window was broken,

which could have been rationally believed by a juror over the

accomplice’s testimony. The evidence was more than sufficient to

show the element of knowledge. The claim, therefore, is denied.

(Answer, Ex. F at 2-3.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[T]he dispositive question

under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S.

___, 126 S. Ct. 1142 (2006). In order to grant the writ, the habeas court must find that the

decision of the state court reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and

Winship to the facts of the case. 408 F.3d at 1275 & n.13. 

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The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign the

inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 709 (9th Cir.

2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 984 (2001); United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir.

1991). “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It

is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg,

945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines the sufficiency of the

evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. 

The state court’s conclusion that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to

establish the element of knowledge is not erroneous under the federal standards set forth above,

nor is it contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Notwithstanding any exculpatory evidence, there was substantial

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner was guilty of receiving stolen property and attempted burglary of a vehicle and,

specifically, that he knew the car stereo found in his vehicle was stolen. As explained above, the

fact that there was evidence supporting petitioner’s version of the events is not dispositive. 

Because there was substantial evidence presented at trial to support petitioner’s convictions, the

state court’s analysis of this claim is not “objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

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U.S. 19, 25 (2002). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner claims at his trial that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he

“expressed his own personal opinion and belief to the credibility of government witness Della

Forts and exposed to the jury panel the past criminal history of [petitioner.]” (Am. Pet. at 6A.) 

Petitioner also claims that the prosecutor: (1) improperly induced Ms. Fort to concede during her

direct examination that she had exercised her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent prior to

receiving immunity from the government; and (2) made an improper closing argument to the jury

during which he expressed his personal belief that petitioner was guilty, engaged in improper

“vouching,” and questioned the credibility of Ms. Fort. (Traverse, Attach. entitled “D. The

Prosecution Committed Misconduct” at 23-24.) Petitioner does not cite to any portion of the

state court record in support of these claims. 

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was raised for the first time in his

application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

The Superior Court rejected the claim, reasoning as follows:

The fourth issue is whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial

misconduct, in commenting on the accomplice’s credibility and

“exposing” to the jury the fact that she was testifying under a grant

of immunity. Again, however, petitioner fails to attach a copy of

pertinent trial transcript to support this claim, to show that this

actually occurred and that petitioner in fact objected to the

comments at the time. Without such reasonably available

documentary evidence attached to support the claim (Harris,

supra), the claim is denied. Moreover, petitioner fails to show that

if either occurred, that either was error of any kind at all, requiring

denial of the claim. 

(Answer, Ex. F at 2-3.)

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). 

However, such misconduct does not, per se, violate a petitioner's constitutional rights. Jeffries v.

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Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 and Campbell v.

Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987)). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are

reviewed "'on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's

[actions] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.’" Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). See also

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974);

Turner v Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). Relief on such claims is limited to cases

in which the petitioner can establish that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. 

Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)); see also

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83; Turner, 281 F.3d at 868. Put another way, prosecutorial misconduct

violates due process when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

1. Witness Fort’s Assertion of Her Fifth Amendment Privilege

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited from

Ms. Fort a concession on direct examination that she had exercised her Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent prior to receiving immunity from the government. The background to this claim

was described by the California Court of Appeal as follows:

Prior to Fort’s testimony, the court inquired outside the presence of

the jury whether Fort planned to assert her privilege against selfincrimination. Fort stated she would assert her Fifth Amendment

privilege. The prosecutor granted her use immunity and the court

approved. The court then informed Fort she would be required to

testify but that nothing she said could be used against her regarding

the events of July 8 and 9, 1999. The prosecutor requested the

court instruct defendant not to mention that Fort had asserted her

Fifth Amendment privilege and only allow her to be questioned

about her testifying under a grant of use immunity. The following

discourse ensued:

“THE COURT: Okay, the Defendant is not to question her about

whether she has taken the Fifth Amendment. You can question her

and determine and bring out the fact that she has been granted a

form of immunity for her testimony, that she can – that this

witness, that her testimony may not be used against her.

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“[DEFENDANT]: That this witness came in here, stated she took

the Fifth Amendment, that is a fact and I can bring it out in front of

the jury or anyone else.

“THE COURT: That is so obviously and totally incorrect. It is

incredible your sister courts have uniformly and consistently in lots

of cases said if the witness is going to take the Fifth Amendment

and not testify at all, then the jury never sees or hears any of that

process.

“[DEFENDANT]: This witness chose to take the Fifth Amendment

an[d] not testify in this courtroom.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I will withdraw it. That’s

okay. I’ll withdraw that whole issue. That’s fine.

“THE COURT: Okay.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Just to move this.”

When Fort was called to testify by the prosecution, she was asked

on direct whether she knew someone had put a stolen car radio in

her car. She denied knowing anything about it, volunteering that

she had had “enough encounters” with the police to know better. 

The prosecutor then asked about her prior convictions.

“Q. [THE PROSECUTOR:] And you did it again and you got a

petty theft with a prior conviction?

“A. [THE WITNESS:] Uh-huh. But that didn’t send me to the

prison. Drugs did.

“[DEFENDANT]: I’m going to object to the district attorney

impeaching the witness after offering this witness immunity.

“THE COURT: Objection’s overruled. Any witness is subject to

impeachment relating to criminal convictions.

“[DEFENDANT]: Just as any witness can take the Fifth

Amendment.

“THE WITNESS: I tried.”

The prosecutor also asked Fort whether she had responded to a

subpoena. She admitted that she did not appear but explained she

“just got out of jail.”

“Q. Okay. But when you were subpoenaed, the process server told

you what it was about?

“A. No, the process server told me nothing what he did, he came

back and lied to the rest of the courts and told them she said she

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wasn’t going to come anyway. That’s what your processor told. 

That is – that’s what he did.

“Is he in this courtroom now?

“Q. No?

“A. Exactly. 

“Q. Okay. Miss Fort, but you didn’t show up for court, right?

“A. No, I didn’t. And I had [a] very good reason. It’s not to

showing up. I had a doctor’s appointment. My daughter was six,

and I am pregnant.

“Q. One of the other reasons was you didn’t want to testify about

what happened that night, isn’t that right?

“A. I thought if you didn’t want to testify you could come in on

your subpoena and say you plead the Fifth, because this isn’t a

capital crime and they would leave you alone; am I correct.

“Q. No, you are not correct, but you did plead the Fifth to this [sic]

afternoon, didn’t you?

“A. Yeah, but I’m saying am I correct or not, if you don’t want to

testify there’s a way to go around not having anything to do with it;

am I correct? I do not live in your neighborhood, I live in a very

bad neighborhood. People don’t take kindly to people coming

against anybody. Especially not your relatives.

“Q. Okay. All right?

“A. Are you going to move me and my kids?

“THE COURT: That’s enough, Miss Fort, we don’t get to ask too

many questions.

“THE WITNESS. Okay. Neither does he.

“Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Miss Fort, when you did come in this

afternoon you didn’t want to testify?

“A. No, I didn’t.

“Q. In fact, I had to give you what we call use immunity so that

you could testify today, right?

“A. Whatever that is.

“Q. Well, the Judge explained it to you?

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“A. Yes, he did.

“Q. And do you understand it?

“A. Yes, I do, that nothing that I say will incriminate me here.

“Q. Right. Can’t be used against you, whatever you say today?

“A. Right. No matter how many petty thefts I have.”

Fort explained that she had been waiting for defendant in her car

parked in the area where the car break-ins occurred. She gave

away all the clothes defendant had left in a duffle bag in her car. 

She admitted telling the police she picked defendant up to drive

him to her mother’s house and was pulled over by the police. 

When asked whether she assumed defendant was innocent of the

crime the officer arrested him for, Fort started complaining that the

prosecutor only brought up “all the bad points about [her]” and did

not ask her about “any good things about [her]” claiming that she

had had many jobs after her release from prison.

Defendant interjected:

“THE DEFENDANT: I object to the fact this witness came in to

take a Fifth Amendment. You guys have made this witness a

hostile witness in this courtroom without the righteous

understanding of what immunity truly is. This witness is not

understanding that basically she can admit to this crime and that

nothing could be done against her.

“THE COURT: Well, sir, you are confusing a number of principles

here. And the most important point --

“THE DEFENDANT: You are confusing --

“THE COURT: Just a moment. The most important point is if

there’s some legal – as to the legal issue you’re raising, you’ve

already raised it. I’ve ruled on it, and we’re going to continue with

the testimony of this witness and you will cease your discussion.

“THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me. I don’t understand what the

ruling was.

“THE COURT: You will – what?

“THE DEFENDANT: What was the ruling? This witness asked to

take the Fifth Amendment.

“THE COURT: Just a second, sir. I have ruled there are legal

issues that are settled in the absence of the jury, and we’re not 

/////

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going to rehash them in the presence of the jury and cause some

confusion or misunderstanding.

“Now I have ruled. And if you want some further ruling --

“THE DEFENDANT: I’d just like to object to the fact that the

witness has become a hostile witness.

“THE COURT: Your objection has been noted --

“THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

“THE COURT: – numerous times. Okay.”

(Opinion at 9-14.) (See also RT at 404-07, 442-43.)

Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s reference to Ms. Fort’s

assertion of the Fifth Amendment did not result in actual prejudice to petitioner, nor did it have a

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. It appears clear from the state

court record that petitioner was determined to inform the jury that Ms. Fort had asserted her Fifth

Amendment privilege. He succeeded in doing so on several occasions. The prosecutor’s

cumulative reference to the same subject was not improper or prejudicial. As explained by the

California Court of Appeal:

The court never specifically instructed defendant not to mention

the privilege. Although the prosecutor at first requested that the

court so instruct defendant, the prosecutor withdrew his request

when defendant insisted on bringing Fort’s assertion of the

privilege before the jury. While it is obvious defendant did not

want Fort to testify at all, defendant’s statements to the jury as well

as Fort’s answer highlighted the fact she had asserted her Fifth

Amendment privilege before the prosecutor mentioned her

assertion of the privilege in clarification of her answer. When the

prosecutor asked his clarification question, the rule prohibiting

comment on the assertion of the privilege to preclude the jury from

speculating why Fort had asserted the privilege had already been

ignored by defendant. Thus, defendant suffered no adverse

consequences when the prosecutor asked his clarification question. 

Further, the trial court cannot be faulted for allowing the

prosecutor’s clarification question in view of defendant’s previous

statement to the jury that Fort had earlier asserted the Fifth

Amendment. Moreover, even assuming the trial court had stricken

the clarification question and admonished the jury, defendant later

/////

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further highlighted Fort’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment

privilege when he again objected. We find no error.

(Opinion at 17-18.) 

The undersigned agrees with the state appellate court’s analysis. Petitioner has

demonstrated neither prosecutorial misconduct not actual prejudice stemming from the

prosecutor’s examination of Ms. Fort. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

2. Closing Argument

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing

argument to the jury when he stated that petitioner “committed said crimes,” made negative

comments regarding the credibility of prosecution witness Della Fort, and engaged in improper

“vouching.” (Traverse, Attach. entitled “D. The prosecution committed misconduct” at 22-24.) 

In order to determine whether a prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing

argument, it is necessary to examine the entire proceedings and place the prosecutor’s remarks in

context. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988) (“[P]rosecutorial comment must

be examined in context. . . .”); Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647 (“[A] court

should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging

meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the

plethora of less damaging interpretations.”); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir.

1998). In fashioning closing arguments, prosecutors are allowed “reasonably wide latitude,”

United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1984), and are free to argue “reasonable

inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989). See

also Ducket v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 1995). 

After a careful review of the prosecutor’s closing argument, this court finds no

evidence of misconduct. Although the prosecutor suggested that Ms. Fort was “lying” in her

testimony in order to mask her own culpability (RT at 539), he was entitled to argue this

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reasonable inference from the evidence. See Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir.

2000) (prosecutor’s reference to defense argument as “a piece of garbage” and defendant as “a

liar” found not to be improper), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1148 (2001); United States v. Molina, 934

F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) (where versions were in direct conflict, prosecutor’s statement

in argument that one side was lying was unavoidable and not improper); United States v. Laurins,

857 F.2d 529, 539 (9th Cir. 1988) (statement that defendant was a liar could be construed as a

comment on the evidence and therefore permissible). Here, the prosecutor merely argued that it

was petitioner who had committed the charged crimes based on the evidence introduced at trial. 

(See e.g., RT at 556, 562-63, 569.) This argument was entirely proper and did not constitute

prosecutorial misconduct. 

 “As a general rule, a prosecutor may not express his opinion of the defendant's

guilt or his belief in the credibility of government witnesses.” Molina, 934 F.2d at 1444. It is

improper vouching for the prosecutor to offer personal assurances of the veracity of government

witnesses or to suggest that their testimony is supported by evidence not introduced at trial. See

id. at 1445. Petitioner provides no citations to the record to support his contention that the

prosecutor disclosed petitioner’s prior convictions, expressed his personal belief in the credibility

of the evidence or of any witness, or improperly vouched for the credibility of any witness. 

Nonetheless, the undersigned has reviewed the prosecutor’s closing argument in its entirety. 

(See RT 531-572, 576-578.) Nowhere in his closing arguments to the jury did the prosecutor

improperly disclose petitioner’s prior criminal convictions or improperly vouch for the credibility

of any witness. The prosecutor’s closing argument was proper and did not render petitioner’s

trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct.

D. Abuse of Discretion by the Trial Court

Petitioner raises numerous claims alleging abuse of discretion by the state trial

court. This court will evaluate these claims in turn below.

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1. Evidentiary Rulings

Petitioner claims that the trial judge committed misconduct when he “ruled a

constitutional violation harmless and allowed petitioner’s past criminal history to be exposed to

the jury.” (Am. Pet. at 6.) In his traverse, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for new trial based on insufficient evidence and improperly denied petitioner’s motion

for discovery to support the motion for new trial. (Traverse, Attach. entitled “Trial Courts (sic)

Abused it Discretion” at page four (B-1) - B-2.) Petitioner provides no citation to the record in

support of these claims and they should be rejected on that basis. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d

199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“‘[c]onclusory

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief’”). 

In any event, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any evidentiary ruling by the

trial court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710

(9th Cir. 2000) (a state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas

relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process);

Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926

F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). Petitioner’s arguments in this regard reflect nothing more

than mere disagreement with the trial court’s rulings. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

2. Jury Issues

 Petitioner also claims that the trial judge “allowed jurors to give false answers

during voir dire and undermined the jury selection process.” (Am. Pet. at 6.) As discussed

above, there is no evidence the trial judge allowed any juror to provide false answers during voir

dire or, indeed, that any juror gave false answers. It appears that this claim is based upon

petitioner’s allegations with respect to Juror No. 12 which have been addressed in detail above.

/////

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After a review of the record, this court concludes that the trial judge did not err in his handling of

the issues concerning juror No. 12. 

3. Comment on Della Fort’s Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial judge committed prejudicial error when he

commented in front of the jury that prosecution witness Della Fort was being deliberately

forgetful on the witness stand. (Traverse, Attach. entitled “The Prosecution Committed

Misconduct” at 23.) The state court record reflects that the trial judge made the following

remarks during Ms. Fort’s testimony:

Q. (By the prosecutor): What were your hours at that place you

were working?

A. I don’t remember. 

Q. Because you would have been working the next day on Friday,

right?

A. No.

Q. You had Fridays off?

A. I don’t remember.

THE COURT: Miss Fort, you’re making no – it appears you’re

making no effort to remember.

THE WITNESS: He’s not making any effort to just – I mean to ask

sensible questions. He’s going to sit here and ask me am I

burglarizing cars. I come in here – why ain’t I sitting over there?

THE COURT: He can ask you – a question is not evidence. A

question only poses a question to a witness. The answer –

THE WITNESS: Your Honor –

THE COURT: The answer is the evidence. He can ask a question,

and you can say that’s not true, as you have.

THE DEFENDANT: That’s badgering the witness.

THE COURT: The question is not testimony.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

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THE COURT: It does not prove anything.

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, you know I prefer not to be in this

seat right now. I really do. So please can we just get this over

with.

THE COURT: Well, if you will make some effort to remember –

THE WITNESS: I am.

THE COURT: – and answer questions –

THE WITNESS: I am.

THE COURT: we’ll get it over with.

(RT at 425-26.)

Petitioner’s arguments in this regard were raised for the first time in an

application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

The Superior Court rejected those arguments with the following reasoning:

The second issue is whether the superior court made statements to

the jury that biased and tainted the verdict, in stating to the jury

that petitioner’s accomplice appeared to have forgotten everything

when she testified. Petitioner, however, fails to attach a copy of

pertinent trial transcript to support this claim, to show that this

actually occurred and that petitioner in fact objected to the

comment at the time. Without such reasonably available

documentary evidence attached to support the claim (Harris,

supra), the claim is denied.

(Answer, Ex. F at 2.)

On direct appeal in federal court, the standard for reversal based on general

judicial misconduct is stringent – there must be an “extremely high level of interference by the

trial judge which creates a pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.” Duckett v. Godinez,

67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). On habeas, the standard is even

more stringent: relief is warranted only if “the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process. . .” Id. The trial judge’s remarks to Ms.

Fort were not gratuitous, but came after the witness gave several evasive answers in response to

questioning. Under the circumstances, the trial judge’s reminder to the witness that she could not

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be deliberately forgetful, and his implication that she had a duty to answer questions on direct

examination to the best of her ability, did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. The

state court’s decision rejecting this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law and should not be set aside. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

this claim.

E. Prison Attire

Petitioner claims that his right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court

allowed the jury to view him in prison clothing during his trial. (Am. Pet. at 6A-6B.) Petitioner

states that the trial court “at no time during the course of the trial offered to give petitioner

clothing.” (Id. at 6B.) Respondents argue that petitioner “had no constitutional right to appear in

civilian clothes, he fails to establish that he objected to appearing in jail issued clothing, and he

fails to show that his jail attire was ‘identifiable’ as such.’” (Answer at 20.)

Petitioner raised this claim on appeal in state court. (Answer, Ex. C.) The

California Court of Appeal fairly described the relevant background as follows:

Beginning at 9:40 a.m. on the first day of trial, the court considered

in limine matters and several of defendant’s recently filed motions.

Prior to taking the morning recess at 11:40 a.m., the court asked:

“THE COURT: . . . .

“And now let me ask you this, sir: Do you have some clothes to

wear when the jury is here?

“THE DEFENDANT: I assume so, but if I don’t I’m quite sure

they’ll find something and I’ll put it on.

“THE COURT: Well –

“THE DEFENDANT: God will make a way. I won’t worry.

“THE COURT: Sir, have you made any efforts to arrange to have

some clothing here so you can appear in civilian clothing?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

“THE COURT: Where [is] your clothing, then?

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“THE DEFENDANT: Well, if they’re here, I don’t know. I

haven’t been called to put them on yet.

“THE COURT: Is there some way – can our escort officer check

and see if there is clothing down there for this defendant?

“THE BAILIFF: I’m also the clothing officer, and I don’t recall any

clothing being down in the clothing room for [defendant].

“THE DEFENDANT: Is it necessary that I have to wear clothing?

“THE COURT: You mean civilian clothing?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

“THE COURT: Do you want to appear in front of the jury?

“THE DEFENDANT: It doesn’t make a difference. I doesn’t make

a difference, Your Honor. It doesn’t make a difference.

“THE COURT: Does the clothing system have random clothes

hanging around?

“THE BAILIFF: No, sir, we do not.

“THE COURT: That would be a pretty big order to have clothing

to fit all possible needs.

“Well, sir, do you have family here in Sacramento?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, I have a mother here, but she’s of

age, and I don’t want to bother her with my burden.

“THE COURT: To bring down a pair of pants and a shirt?

“THE DEFENDANT: My mother is of age, and I wouldn’t do that.

“THE COURT: Do you have any brothers or sisters?

“THE DEFENDANT: No.

“THE COURT: Uncles or aunts?

“THE DEFENDANT: Not that I would like to bring my burden on

them. I’m comfortable. I’m okay. I think it won’t be of concern.

“THE COURT: Well, I’m going to tell the jury that you’re in these

clothes by your choice. Because I don’t want the jury to think that

the system is making you stand trial in jail clothes.

The afternoon session reconvened at 1:30 p.m. and the parties

continued to discuss defendant’s motions and in limine matters.

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During discussions, the court again inquired:

“THE COURT: All right. And you want to proceed with the trial

today with [sic] even though you don’t have civilian clothes on? 

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

“THE COURT: And you realize that we could make some efforts

or your family could be contacted and try to get you some clothes?

“THE DEFENDANT: Not necessary.

“THE COURT: Not necessary. Okay.”

At 3:30 p.m., a jury panel entered the courtroom and selection

commenced. 

Prior to the afternoon session of the third day of jury trial,

defendant changed into civilian clothing.

(Opinion at 3-4.)

A defendant in a criminal case may not be compelled to appear in front of the jury

wearing identifiable prison garb because it could impair the presumption of innocence. Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 512 (1976); United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.

1985). A criminal defendant may choose, however, to dress in jail clothes. See Felts v. Estelle,

875 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Williams, 425 U.S. at 508). “[The] failure to make an

objection to the court as to being tried in such [identifiable prison] clothes, for whatever reason,

is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional

violation.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13. Further, the decision whether to appear before the jurors

in identifiable prison clothes as a matter of strategy or tactics “rests with the accused and his

attorney.” Id. at 512. Indeed, “it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in

jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury.” Id. at 508.

The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner was not forced to appear

before the jury in jail garb, but chose to do so. (Opinion at 7-8.) The state appellate court noted

that the trial judge offered to try and find clothing for petitioner and suggested that petitioner’s

family bring civilian clothes to the courthouse, but petitioner declined both suggestions. (Id.) 

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identifiable as such. It is true that “a person seeking reversal of his conviction because he was

compelled to stand trial in prison garments must demonstrate from the trial record that a juror

would recognize the clothing as having been issued by prison authorities.” United States v.

Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, the trial court initiated a conversation

regarding petitioner’s attire because he recognized that it was prison issue. The state appellate

court simply assumed the petitioner was dressed in identifiable prison clothing. Under these

circumstances, this court will likewise assume that petitioner’s attire was recognizable as having

been issued by prison authorities.

 Although not entirely clear, petitioner may also be challenging the failure of his 5

appellate counsel to raise on appeal petitioner’s claims concerning prosecutorial misconduct.

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These findings are consistent with the state court record. There is no evidence that petitioner was

compelled to proceed before the jury in prison attire. On the contrary, he rebuffed all efforts to

help him obtain a change of clothing. Under these circumstances, there was no violation of

petitioner’s right to a fair trial. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

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F. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner next claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to raise on appeal claims regarding juror misconduct, sufficiency of the evidence, and

abuse of discretion by the trial court (specifically, disclosure of petitioner’s “past (sic) C.D.C.

incarceration”). (Am. Pet. at 2C-8.)5

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

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466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751

(1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the

ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1998) (Counsel is not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and

is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise

meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a

showing of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing

to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to establish prejudice in this

context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9. 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel apparently reviewed the trial transcripts and

concluded that petitioner’s claims of juror misconduct, insufficiency of the evidence,

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prosecutorial misconduct, and abuse of discretion by the trial court, none of which were raised on

direct appeal, lacked merit. As described above, this court has reached the same conclusion. 

Appellate counsel’s decision to press only claims with arguably more merit was "within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,

771 (1970). The California Superior Court denied this claim on the ground that petitioner had

failed to demonstrate prejudice stemming from any of appellate counsel’s alleged errors. 

(Answer, Ex. F.) This determination is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of

Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

G. Cumulative Error

Petitioner contends that errors at his trial, when considered cumulatively, deprived

him of a fair trial. Where the cumulative effect of errors is so prejudicial that a defendant is

denied a fair trial, habeas relief may be warranted. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d

1273, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner has not established a denial of due process with respect

to any of his individual claims raised in the instant petition. Likewise, considered in their

aggregate, those claims do not compel the finding of a due process violation. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief with respect to this cumulative error claim. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 15, 2006.

DAD:8

gilbert2134.hc

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