Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01537/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01537-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 05cv1537 J (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARDO J. VIZCARRA,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, Warden,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 05cv1537 J (BLM)

ORDER:

1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE MAJOR’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; AND

2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court deny Petitioner Gerardo J. Vizcarra’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 8.] On August 1, 2005, Petitioner filed his Petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] On September 23, 2005, Respondent Roseanne Campbell, Warden

of the Mule Creek State Prison, where Petitioner is subject to confinement, filed an Answer to

the Petition [Doc. No. 5]; on October 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a Traverse [Doc. No. 7]. The

Magistrate Judge issued the R&R on April 10, 2006, and required that objections be submitted to

the Court no later than April 28, 2006. (See R&R at 8.) To date, no objections have been filed. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety and DENIES the

Petition. 

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 05cv1537 J (BLM)

Background

On September 19, 2001, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a two-count

information charging Petitioner with murder in violation of section 187(a) of the California

Penal Code, and arson in violation of section 451(b) of the California Penal Code. (See id. at 5.) 

On February 25, 2003, the trial court imposed a total sentence of sixty years to life, comprised of

consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for second-degree murder and arson, and an

additional five consecutive years for each of two prior felony convictions that constituted strikes

within the meaning of the ‘three strikes’ law. (See id. at 6.)

Petitioner subsequently appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed his

conviction, and petitioned the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied his petition on

January 19, 2005. (See id. at 6-7.) On August 1, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court, claiming that the trial court had impermissibly excluded

evidence, admitted hearsay statements, and imposed consecutive sentences upon him. [Doc. No.

1.] On April 10, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R finding that “Petitioner has failed to

present any evidence suggesting that the California Court of Appeal’s decision as to his claims

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,” and

recommending, therefore, that the Petition be denied. (R&R at 40-41.)

Legal Standard 

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

Before a federal court may grant a petitioner habeas relief, the petitioner is required to

exhaust all available state court remedies with respect to all claims contained in the petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 05cv1537 J (BLM)

exhaustion requires that the petitioner give the highest state court a “fair opportunity” to address

each claim before presenting the claims in a federal habeas petition. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1066-69;

see also Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that to properly exhaust a

habeas claim, “a petitioner must present his claim to the state supreme court”). Moreover, the

petitioner “must describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal

theory on which his claim is based ‘so that the [court has] a “fair opportunity” to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.’ ” Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066 (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). 

Once the state’s highest court considers the habeas petition, that court’s denial of the

petition without opinion or citation is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Harris

v. Superior Court, 500 F. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d

344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the “California Supreme Court’s summary order denying

[the] petition was a denial on the merits”). Upon satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement, a

federal court may consider the merits of a petitioner’s habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(1996). However, where a federal habeas petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, the court must dismiss the petition without prejudice. See id.; see Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

Discussion 

There being no objections to the findings contained in the R&R, the Court assumes the

correctness of the facts as set forth therein. Upon conducting a de novo review of the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusions of law, the Court FINDS that the R&R rightly concludes that Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief on any of the three grounds he presents in the Petition. 

I. Exclusion of Evidence

The R&R correctly concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s decision upholding

the exclusion of evidence was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Petitioner argues that the trial court impermissibly excluded evidence

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 05cv1537 J (BLM)

supporting his duress defense. Petitioner claims that he sought to introduce two categories of

evidence to establish that he acted under duress: 1) evidence relating to a man who, according to

Petitioner, was involved in the plan to dispose of the murder victim’s body; and 2) recordings of

telephone calls intercepted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration during an

investigation of the Mexican Mafia. He claims that this evidence was relevant to the

perpetration of the murder, was demonstrative of the Mexican Mafia’s history of and propensity

for violence, and corroborative of his fear of those involved in the murder. He argues that by

excluding this evidence, the trial court deprived him of an outcome-determinative defense and

his right to present that defense under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

Under Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985), five factors may be used to

evaluate whether a state court’s exclusion of evidence reaches constitutional proportions: 

1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; 2) its reliability;

3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; 4) whether it is the sole evidence

on the issue or merely cumulative; and 5) whether it constitutes a major part of the

attempted defense. 

The import of the evidence is then weighed against the state’s interest in excluding it, the

circumstances for which must be “unusually compelling.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530

(9th Cir. 1990); Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that of these factors only the fifth

weighs slightly in Petitioner’s favor and that, on balance, the factors weigh against admission of

evidence. (See R&R at 10-19.) This is due to the fact that the excluded evidence Petitioner cites

contains little probative value as to Petitioner’s participation in the murder and arson, and the

majority of the remaining factors actually undermine Petitioner’s argument. (See id. at 16-18.) 

Further, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that “Petitioner’s right to present this

evidence in defense of the charges against him was properly outweighed by the State’s interest

in the administration of a reliable and efficient trial.” (Id. at 18.) Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Petitioner habeas relief as to his first ground for relief.

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 05cv1537 J (BLM)

II. Right to Confrontation and Federal Due Process

The R&R also correctly concludes that neither Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Right to

Confrontation, nor Petitioner’s federal right to due process, was violated. (See id. at 19-30.) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court, having erroneously determined a twelve-year-old

declarant’s statements to be admissible as prior inconsistent statements, improperly allowed the

prosecution to recall a witness to relay the statements to the jury, in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation. (See id. at 19-20.) He alleges that he was not afforded the

opportunity to confront the declarant and that the hearsay statements introduced were those of

the recalled witness. (See id. at 20.)

While it is established under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution that the accused has a right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” the

Magistrate Judge rightly observes that “the Confrontation Clause confers no guarantee that every

witness called will provide testimony unmarred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.” (Id. at

23-24 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1985)). Noting that the Court of

Appeal declined to reach the Confrontation Clause issue, the Magistrate Judge conducts a

meticulous de novo review of the record, arriving upon a sound finding that Petitioner did in fact

have a fair opportunity to confront the declarant and that the hearsay evidence Petitioner contests

did not derive solely from an impermissible source. (See id. at 25-31.) The Magistrate Judge

thereby aptly concludes that Petitioner suffered no violation of either his Sixth Amendment right

to confrontation or his federal right to due process. (See id. at 30-31.) Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s second ground for habeas relief.

III. Right to Jury Trial

Lastly, the Court concurs with the R&R’s conclusion that the Court of Appeal’s

determination that Petitioner was not sentenced in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to jury

trial or in contravention of the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004), was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. (See R&R at 31-40.) In the final ground for relief he presents, Petitioner claims that

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 05cv1537 J (BLM)

his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, as outlined in Blakely, was violated by the trial court’s

imposition of consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life sentences for murder and arson. (See id. at

31.) He contends that the trial court’s determination that the murder and arson offenses occurred

on separate occasions was incorrect, should have been rendered instead by a jury, and thereby

led to an impermissible imposition of consecutive sentences. (See id.)

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge correctly observes that “[e]ven assuming that the

determination whether the murder and arson occurred on the same occasion or arose from the

same set of operative facts was a factual question that should have been submitted to a jury as a

matter of clearly established federal law ... Petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas relief.”

(Id. at 39.) This is due to the fact that, in the face of strong evidence to support Petitioner’s

sentences, Petitioner has provided no evidence to the contrary. Thus, in accordance with the

R&R, the Court FINDS that if there was any error in the trial court’s determination, it bears no

substantial or injurious effect or influence on Petitioner’s sentence. (See R&R at 40.) 

Petitioner’s third ground for habeas relief is therefore DENIED.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety and DENIES the

instant Petition. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 27, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Major

 

 All Counsel of Record

Case 3:05-cv-01537-J-BLM Document 9 Filed 09/27/06 Page 6 of 6