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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10499

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00502-WS-CAS

ADA ALBORS GONZALEZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, 

CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND EXHISTING UNDER 

THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(January 29, 2020)

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Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff Ada Albors Gonzalez, proceeding pro se,

1 appeals the district 

court’s denial of her Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief. No reversible error 

has been shown; we affirm.

Plaintiff filed in state court this civil action against Federal National 

Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), challenging the already ongoing state-court 

foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiff’s home in Winter Park, Florida. Fannie Mae 

removed this case to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and 

moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Because the separate state-court foreclosure proceedings were still underway 

when this civil action was filed, the district court determined that it should abstain 

from consideration of Plaintiff’s claims here, pursuant to the Colorado River2

abstention doctrine. On 5 June 2018, the district court granted Fannie Mae’s 

1 We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 

(11th Cir. 1998).

2 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 

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motion to dismiss: in reality, not dismissing -- but staying this case -- pending 

resolution of the earlier-filed and related state-court foreclosure proceedings.3

 

Plaintiff filed no appeal to the district court’s 5 June order.

4

 

In December 2018, Plaintiff filed pro se a motion for relief -- pursuant to

Rule 60(b) -- from “all voidable and or void orders.” In pertinent part, Plaintiff 

asserted that the district court’s orders removing Plaintiff’s case to federal court 

and staying Plaintiff’s case were “void” or “voidable” based on Fannie Mae’s 

purported fraud on the court and the district court’s lack of jurisdiction. The 

district court denied Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Briefly stated, Plaintiff asserts on appeal that she is entitled to relief under 

Rule 60(b) because Fannie Mae purportedly lied to the district court to invoke 

improperly federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff also contends that the 

district court violated her due process rights by not conducting an evidentiary

hearing on Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion. 

3 We have said that “a stay, not a dismissal, is the proper procedural mechanism for a district 

court to employ when deferring to a parallel state-court proceeding under the Colorado River

doctrine.’” Moorer v. Demopolis Waterworks & Sewer Bd., 374 F.3d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 2004). 

4 The district court’s 5 June order constituted a final and appealable order. See Ambrosia Coal 

& Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1327 n.15 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Abstention orders staying 

litigation under the Colorado River doctrine are final and, therefore, appealable under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.”). 

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The scope of our review on appeal is limited to addressing “the propriety of 

the denial or grant of relief” under Rule 60(b): we will not consider the underlying 

judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 

1338 (11th Cir. 1999).

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for 

relief under Rule 60(b)(3). Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom., 

771 F.3d 713, 734 (11th Cir. 2014). To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(3), the 

moving party must prove, “by clear and convincing evidence that an adverse party 

has obtained the verdict through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” 

Cox Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc. v. CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007). 

The moving party must also show that the opposing party’s misconduct prevented 

her from fully and fairly presenting her case. Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc.,

205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) 

to set aside a judgment for voidness. Stansell, 771 F.3d at 736. Rule 60(b)4) is no 

substitute for a timely appeal: the Rule “applies only in the rare instance where a 

judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a 

violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be 

heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010). 

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Under Rule 60(b)(6) -- the “catchall provision” -- a court may relieve a party 

from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(6). We have said that Rule 60(b)(6) relief “is an extraordinary remedy 

which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” 

Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984). A party seeking 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “has the burden of showing that absent such relief, an 

‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result.” Id. 

The district court committed no error in denying Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) 

motion. For purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction, Fannie Mae is 

designated by statute as a citizen of the District of Columbia. See 12 U.S.C. § 

1717(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show by clear and convincing 

evidence that Fannie Mae mispresented fraudulently law or facts about its 

citizenship. Plaintiff has thus shown no grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). 

Plaintiff has also failed to show either an underlying jurisdictional error or a 

due process violation that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(4). This Court 

has already concluded -- based in part on a notarized statement from Plaintiff 

establishing Plaintiff’s Florida citizenship -- that complete diversity of citizenship 

existed between the parties at the time of removal. Because Plaintiff’s allegations 

also satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, federal diversity jurisdiction 

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existed when Plaintiff’s case was removed to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1332; MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Nor were the district court’s orders void for lack of personal jurisdiction. A 

district court has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if, among 

other things, the defendant waives its objection to service of process. In re 

Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003). Because Fannie 

Mae raised no objection to personal jurisdiction in the district court, that objection 

was waived; and the district court exercised properly personal jurisdiction over 

Fannie Mae. 

Plaintiff’s due process argument is also without merit. The district court 

need not conduct an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion unless a hearing is

necessary to aid the district court’s analysis. See Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 

1342-43 (11th Cir. 2006). Given the record in this case, we cannot say that a 

hearing was necessary for the proper consideration and adjudication of Plaintiff’s 

motion. Moreover, Plaintiff was permitted to present arguments in support of her 

motion, received actual notice of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and filed 

timely objections to that recommendation, which were considered by the district 

court before the district court ruled on Plaintiff’s motion. See United Student Aid 

Funds, Inc., 559 U.S. at 272 (“Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, 

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under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 

action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (quotations 

omitted)). 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to relief under either 

Rule 60(b)(3) or (b)(4). Nor has Plaintiff shown “exceptional circumstances” that 

would compel relief under Rule 60(b)(6). We affirm the district court’s denial of 

Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief.

AFFIRMED.

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