Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01509/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF

RP

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathan W. Pardini, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-1509-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

On March 4, 2008, Plaintiff Jonathan W. Pardini, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Yuma (ASPC-Yuma), filed in the Tucson Division of this Court a pro se

civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. #3). The Clerk of Court assigned

this action the case number of CV 08-136-TUC-CKJ. Plaintiff did not pay the $350.00 civil

action filing fee but filed a deficient Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

By Order filed March 14, 2008 (Doc. #3), the Court denied Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis without prejudice. Plaintiff was given 30 days to either pay the

$350.00 filing fee or file a new, completed Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and

a certified six-month trust account statement from Central Office of the Arizona Department

of Corrections (ADOC). On April 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed a new Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (Doc. #4).

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 2 -

By Order filed August 15, 2008 (Doc. #5), the Court transferred this action to the

Phoenix Division of the Court because the cause of action arose in Yuma County, which is

within the Phoenix Division. The Clerk of Court in Phoenix assigned this case the new case

number of CV 08-1509-PHX-DGC (ECV). 

The Court will order Defendant Watson to answer Counts I and II of the Complaint,

will order Defendant Villalobos to answer Count I of the Complaint, will order Defendant

Schriro to answer Count III of the Complaint, and will dismiss the remaining counts and

Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #4) will be granted.

Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will

assess an initial partial filing fee of $23.62. The remainder of the fee will be collected

monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order

requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the

statutory formula.. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

III. Complaint

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: (1) Dora Schriro, ADOC Director;

(2) Herb Haley, ADOC Protective Segregation Administrator; (3) Kristine Harkin,

Classification Officer; (4) Stephan Morris, Classification Supervisor; (5) J. Franko, Deputy

Warden, Cheyenne Unit, ASPC-Yuma; (6) R. Watson, Assistant Deputy Warden, Cheyenne

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 3 -

Unit, ASPC-Yuma; (7) S. Miller, Captain, Chief of Security, Cheyenne Unit, ASPC-Yuma;

(8) Villalobos, Sergeant, Cheyenne Unit, ASPC-Yuma; (9) McNatt, Sergeant, S.S.U.

Supervisor, Cheyenne Unit, ASPC-Yuma; (10) Dempsy, Corrections Officer, S.S.U.

Department, Cheyenne Unit, ASPC-Yuma; (11) Clark, Sergeant, Disciplinary Coordinator,

Cheyenne Unit/CDU, ASPC-Yuma; (12) Barron, Sergeant, CDU Supervisor, Cheyenne

Unit/CDU, ASPC-Yuma; and (13) Sundwall, Captain, Disciplinary Hearing Officer,

Cheyenne Unit/CDU, ASPC-Yuma.

Plaintiff presents five counts in the Complaint. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, declaratory

and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive monetary damages, and costs and fees.

IV. Discussion

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that he has been subjected to a “Failure To Protect, Threat

To Safety” and that “he has been repeatedly physically assaulted everywhere ADOC staff

assign him placement, stating that each time he just needed [to be] moved to an alternate

general population location.” Plaintiff alleges that these assaults stemmed from word being

sent throughout the prison system by his co-defendant that he was a snitch. 

Plaintiff specifically alleges that on December 7, 2007, he was placed in the Cheyenne

Unit of ASPC-Yuma, even after he advised “a Captain for ADOC” that his placement “would

pose a threat to his safety due to it[]s proximity to the Dakota Unit, where inmates who were

aware of his situation would have been transferred.” Plaintiff states that “he was assured he

would be interviewed prior to placement on the unit, by security called S.S.U. and he would

be able to convey this information to them.” However, Plaintiff claims that when he advised

CO II Ortiz and Defendants Sgt. Villalobos of “this problem” upon his arrival at the

Cheyenne Unit, Defendant Villalobos “instructed Plaintiff he would not be interviewed by

S.S.U. staff or any other, he would be assigned placement on the unit, and he had no recourse

regarding concerns to his safety, even while he saw inmates from the adjacent unit posing

that danger waiting for him on that very unit.” Some time after following “the direct order

by staff to go to his assigned placement,” Plaintiff claims that he “was physically assaulted

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 4 -

again by multiple inmates and told he had to leave the unit.”

Plaintiff allege that on December 8, 2007, he “sought protective placement by

Security Staff due to the physical assaults and threats” and was placed in the Complex

Detention Unit (CDU). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Watson entered CDU and

advised him that he would be returned to the unit where he “was just assaulted and removed

from” and that he would “have to accept the physical assaults” and that “refusal” to do so

“would result in refusal of shelter, adequate clothing, all property, medication, food, legal

materials, etc. until [he] complied.” Plaintiff states that on December 15, 2007, he “received

most of the allowable property.”

Plaintiff’s claims in Count I will be liberally construed as being brought under the

Eighth Amendment. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment in failing to protect

an inmate only when two conditions are met. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation

must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious;” the official’s act or omission must result in the

denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Id. In

defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme Court has imposed a

subjective test: “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. A merely negligent failure to protect an inmate is

not actionable under § 1983. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id.

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 5 -

1. Defendant Schriro

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schriro “enacted policies, procedures and practices

which instructed, allowed and/or enable the threat to safety of the Plaintiff to take place;

allowed it to perpetuate, and disallows a means of safety for staff or Plaintiff to stop it. Also,

she has enacted policies, procedures and/or practices which are illegal as written and/or

applied. Also, she has failed to act in a manner which conforms to State and/or Federal

Constitutional standards, or properly supervise those who don’t meet said standards, which

she had or should have knowledge of.”

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Schriro are too conclusory and vague to state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not state any facts whatsoever to

support these allegations. He does not describe any of the policies, procedures, or practices

allegedly at issue, and does not show how Defendant Schriro failed to “properly” supervise

anyone. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

against Defendant Schriro in Count I.

2. Defendant Haley

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haley “failed to recognize the continued threat to

safety of the Plaintiff in denying assignment to protective placement, by denying such

assignment, and continue to.” Plaintiff has not stated any facts to support this allegation,

such as when this happened, where this happened, or what facts Defendant Haley knew when

he made this decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against Defendant Haley in Count I. 

3. Defendants Harkin and Morris

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Harkin and Morris “failed to provide safe placement

to Plaintiff by repeatedly assigning him to locations which endanger(ed) his life, and

continue to do so.” Again, Plaintiff has not stated any facts to support this allegation, such

as when this happened, where, or what facts Defendant Harkin or Morris knew when they

assigned him to these unspecified locations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted against either Defendant Harkin or Morris in Count I. 

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 6 -

 

4. Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt, and Dempsey 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt, and

Dempsey “all allowed placement at the Cheyenne Unit when they knew or should have

known the threat to Plaintiff’s life.” However, Plaintiff has not stated any facts at all to

support this allegation against Defendants Franko and Miller. Moreover, with regard to

Defendants McNatt and Dempsey, Plaintiff only states that he was interviewed by Defendant

Dempsy of S.S.U. on December 10, 2007, that Defendant Dempsey informed him that he

would not be returned to the same unit, and that when he was interviewed by Defendants

McNatt and Dempsey on December 13, 2007, “it was stated to [him] they didn’t know why

[he] received the treatment [he] did, but once they learned of it they were carefull[] to keep

their distance to it due to the potential rep[er]cussion which could stem from it” and that “it

seemed odd how it happened as they had not completed their initial stages of the

investigation which was the practice, and felt that serious mistakes were made.” None of

these facts support a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendants Franko, Miller, McNatt,

and Dempsey in Count I. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants Watson and Villalobos. Accordingly, the Court will call for an answer to Count I

from Defendants Watson and Villalobos. 

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that, as described in Count I, he was denied “food and

medication, adequate cold weather clothing, all legal and writing material, and hygiene.”

Plaintiff’s claims in Count II will be liberally construed as being brought under the Eighth

Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (A convicted inmate’s claims for

unconstitutional conditions arises from the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment).

To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions, a plaintiff must allege an objectively

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 7 -

“sufficiently serious” deprivation that results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

1994); see Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). That

is, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In addition to alleging facts to support

that he is confined in conditions posing a substantial risk of harm, a plaintiff must also allege

facts to support that a defendant had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that the

official acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

837. In defining “deliberate indifference” in the jail context, the Supreme Court has imposed

a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Id.

1. Defendant Schriro

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schriro “implemented internal policies, procedures

and/or practices authorizing the condition, actions and omissions described in Count I.

Additionally, this designation of behavior and treatment of Plaintiff prevented other ADOC

staff from potentially or effectively intervening in an effort to prevent it, thereby failing to

properly supervise subordinates when she knew or should have known.” 

As with Count I, Plaintiff ’s allegations against Defendant Schriro in Count II are too

conclusory and vague to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Again, Plaintiff does

not state any facts to support these allegations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant Schriro in Count II.

2. Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt, Dempsey, and

Barron 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt,

Dempsey, and Barron “all knew or should have known their acts and/or omissions in

conjunction to said conditions was/is illegal and violative, as well as their failure to

adequately supervise their subordinates who also participated or omitted to prevent said

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 8 -

treatment and conditions. All had actual and or constructive knowledge of the behavior

undertaken, and failed to prevent it or participated in asserting it.” 

Plaintiff has not stated any facts at all to support these allegation against Defendants

Franko, Miller, McNatt, Dempsy, and Barron. With regard to Defendant Villalobos, Plaintiff

only states in Count I that during the time that he was refused “shelter, adequate clothing, all

property, medication, food, legal materials, etc.,” Plaintiff had occasion to question

Defendant Villalobos and another officer, Lt. Smith, “who advised [him] such denial (s) were

based upon” Defendant Watson’s “instructions.” Thus, it appears that Defendant Watson

was the person responsible for the denial of these basic necessities, not Defendant Villalobos.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against

Defendants Franko, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt, Dempsey, and Barron in Count II. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant Watson. Accordingly, the Court will call for an answer to Count II from

Defendant Watson.

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that he was denied due process prior to punishment and

before deprivation of rights and privileges. Plaintiff’s claims in Count III will be liberally

construed as being brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

1. Defendant Schriro

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schriro:

has implemented a classification policy that determines inmate custody rights,

privileges and placement which allows for no input by the effected inmate it

concerns or any appeal process to address errors, eliminating all due process

for the inmate to address their accusers[,] to information used against him as

well as no manner for the inmate to effectively provide important information

in determining facts relied upon, thus adversely effecting all aspects of due

process and operating at times as punishment as well as arbitrary and

capricious determinations. This is the only process used. It is illegal as

written and applied. Inmates are, by use of this policy, practice, procedure and

guidelines, placed in danger, and as in the D.I. 67 process when asked where

they may recommend (only during D.I. 67 process, not reclass) it’s used as a

means to do just the opposite. Additionally, Defendant Schriro denies due

process in utilizing the method of denying food, property, medications, legal

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 9 -

materials, adequate clothing, mail, hygiene, etc. It’s just summarily denied. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint has stated a due process claim against

Defendant Schriro. Accordingly, the Court will call for an answer to Count III from

Defendant Schriro. 

2. Defendant Haley

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haley “repeatedly denied Plaintiff’s right to protection

by refusing protective placement, violating his due process.” However, Plaintiff has not

stated any facts to support this allegation, such as when this happened, where, what facts

Defendant Haley knew when he made this decision, or how he denied Plaintiff due process

in making his decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against Defendant Haley in Count III. 

3. Defendants Harkin and Morris 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Harkin and Morris “denied Plaintiff his due process

in using said reclass policy(s) which disallows the necessary facts and information to be

provided and/or used, and relied upon. It disallows any input by the inmate while

detrimentally effecting his safety, visitation, parole, jobs, education, rights, privileges,

property, court access, etc., in their use of a procedure that’s illegal as written and as they

apply it.”

Plaintiff has not stated any facts to support this conclusory and vague allegation. He

does not give any details of when and how Defendants Harkin and Morris used the

reclassification policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against either Defendant Harkin or Morris in Count III. 

4. Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt, Dempsy and

Barron

Plaintiff alleges in part that Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt,

Dempsy and Barron “allowed, participated in, knew of, failed to prevent, ordered, or caused

by act or omission the removal of all property, medication, hygiene, shelter and all the things

listed previous, for the Plaintiff resisting/failing to agree or cooperate and waive his right to

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 10 -

protection from physical assault.” Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]hese Defendants created,

followed, authorized, contributed, allowed and/or failed to prevent said conditions for which

no immediate[] recourse was available, due to no means allowed to access the long time

process of the grievance procedure.” Plaintiff argues that “[w]hen Plaintiff is stripped of all

property and access to any means, that due process avenue is intentionally and effectively

barred from him, by the Defendants.” 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt,

Dempsy and Barron in Count III are conclusory and vague. Plaintiff does not describe

specific, individual actions of any of these Defendants. General allegations against a group

of Defendants are not sufficient. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted against Defendants Franko, Watson, Miller, Villalobos, McNatt,

Dempsy and Barron in Count III. 

5. Defendant Clark

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Clark “processed a false disciplinary report against

Plaintiff, without proper investigatory review, which resulted in a wrongful guilty finding,

and the Plaintiff being placed on disciplinary loss of privileges beyond the thirty days

allowed by policy, and continues to run.” Again, Plaintiff’s allegation is conclusory and

vague. Plaintiff does not explain what the disciplinary report was about, what was improper

about Defendant Clark’s investigatory review, and how the improper review resulted in a

wrongful guilty finding. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against Defendant Clark in Count III.

D. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that he “was returned to the same complex (Yuma) and

housed with the same inmates he was previously removed from due to safety/life if

continuation of housing proximity, without any factual determination made that placement

was/is safe, as retaliation for previously seeking protections by AD[O]C staff.” Plaintiff also

claims that he was “placed outside in weather that prevailed in the low 30 degree

temperature, without adequate clothing, and denied all food, medication, property, legal

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 11 -

materials, court access, clothing, property, hygiene, etc. for days on end for seeking

protective placement from continued physical assaults known to have occurred.” 

“A prisoner suing prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that

he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action

does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and

discipline.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, to succeed on

the merits of a retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that he was retaliated against

for exercising his constitutional rights, and he must also demonstrate that the retaliatory

action does not advance a legitimate penological goal, or is not narrowly tailored to achieve

that goal. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff has not specifically alleged in Count IV that he was retaliated against for

exercising his constitutional rights. Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the alleged

retaliatory action does not advance a legitimate penological goal, or is not narrowly tailored

to achieve that goal. Accordingly, Count IV will be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

E. Count V

In Count V, Plaintiff claims that all of the Defendants abused their authority and that

this abuse of authority “raised to a level of unconstitutional behavior, violative of Plaintiff’s

rights/privileges.” In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that

the conduct of a defendant deprived him of a constitutional right. Haygood v. Younger, 769

F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, Plaintiff has failed to allege the

violation of a specific constitutional provision in Count III. Plaintiff simply does not have

a constitutional right for prison officials not to abuse their authority. Accordingly, Count IV

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

V. Dismissal of Defendants

Because no claims now remain against them, Defendants Herb Haley, Kristine Harkin,

Stephan Morris, J. Franko, S. Miller, McNatt, Dempsy, Clark, Barron, and Sundwall will be

dismissed from this action will be dismissed from this action for failure to state a claim upon

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 12 -

which relief may be granted.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #4) is granted. 

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $23.62.

(3) Counts IV and V of the Complaint are dismissed for failure to state a claim

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 13 -

upon which relief may be granted.

(4) Defendants Herb Haley, Kristine Harkin, Stephan Morris, J. Franko, S. Miller,

McNatt, Dempsy, Clark, Barron, and Sundwall are dismissed from this action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

(5) Defendant Watson must answer Counts I and II of the Complaint, Defendant

Villalobos must answer Count I of the Complaint, and Defendant Schriro must answer

Count III of the Complaint. 

(6) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. #1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Dora Schriro, Villalobos, and R. Watson.

(7) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(8) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(9) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(10) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants Dora Schriro, Villalobos,

and R. Watson of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the

summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to

Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file requests

for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and waivers of service of the summons. If

a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date

the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 14 -

upon the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(11) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(12) Defendants must answer Counts I, II, and III of the Complaint or otherwise

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule

12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(13) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings. 

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-01509-DGC Document 6 Filed 09/03/08 Page 14 of 14