Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02364/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02364-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The instant petition names both Ron Kenan and Bill Lockyer as respondents.

Petition at 1. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that in cases in

which the Petitioner is not in custody, the petition must name as respondents the state

05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARNESA JOYNER,

Petitioner,

v.

RON KENAN, Warden, and BILL

LOCKYER, Attorney General of

the State of California,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

On December 28, 2005, Petitioner Arnesa Joyner, a state prisoner

appearing pro se, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. Petitioner challenges her sentence to

a two-year prison term on count 1 of her conviction. Id.

This Court has considered the Petition, Respondents’1 Answer, and

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

officer having custody of a habeas petitioner as well as the attorney general. Rule

2(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Because Petitioner currently is on parole, Petitioner

correctly named the warden of the last facility where she was housed, Ron Kenan

(spelled Kernan by Respondent), and the California Attorney General, Bill Lockyer.

However, the Deputy Attorney General only answered on behalf of the warden. See Answer

at 1. Because the arguments asserted by the parties and the analysis employed by this

Court are equally applicable to Respondent Lockyer, this Court RECOMMENDS that the

Petition be denied as to both respondents for the reasons set forth in this Report and

Recommendation.

2 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set

forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction

On April 17, 2003, the District Attorney of San Diego County filed

a two-count criminal complaint charging Petitioner with possession of

a controlled substance (cocaine base) in violation of California Health

and Safety Code § 11350(a) (“count one”) and possession of paraphernalia

used for narcotics in violation of California Health and Safety Code §

11364 (“count two”). Lodgment 1 at 1-2. The criminal complaint further

alleged that Petitioner had two prison priors. Id. at 2-3. 

On April 25, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to count one and admitted

the two prison priors. Lodgment 1 at 36; Lodgment 2 at 1. Pursuant to

the plea agreement, the State dismissed count two. Id. The court

sentenced Petitioner to three years of formal probation, admitted her

to the Proposition 36 treatment program, suspended imposition of the

sentence for three years, and imposed fines which were stayed pending

successful completion of the treatment program. Lodgment 1 at 35;

Lodgment 2 at 1; Lodgment 3 at 4. 

///

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

The trial court held four hearings between July of 2003 and

February of 2004 to address Petitioner’s multiple probation violations.

See Lodgment 1 at 37-43; Lodgment 3 at 51-52, 101-03, 202-03. On

January 23, 2004, Petitioner admitted violating her probation by failing

on at least two separate occasions to enter the residential drug

treatment program as directed, failing to enter the CRASH residential

program, using cocaine and alcohol, and failing to report to her

probation officer as directed. Lodgment 3 at 202. 

During the sentencing hearing on February 13, 2004, the court

stated that it had reviewed numerous documents pertaining to

Petitioner’s treatment status and recent parole violations, including

the probation officer’s February 10, 2004 probation report. Lodgment

3 at 251-52, 258. The probation report listed the following

circumstances in mitigation: (1) Petitioner was suffering from a mental

or physical condition that significantly reduced her culpability for the

crime, demonstrated by admitted alcohol and cocaine consumption, though

this condition was voluntarily imposed, (2) Petitioner acknowledged

wrongdoing at an early stage of the criminal process, though she did

receive sentencing consideration in return, and (3) Petitioner was found

in possession of only a small amount of cocaine base. Lodgment 1 at 26-

27. The probation report further detailed the following circumstances

in aggravation: (1) Petitioner had engaged in violent conduct, which

indicated a serious danger to society, (2) Petitioner had numerous prior

convictions, (3) Petitioner was on parole at the time of the crime, and

(4) Petitioner’s prior performance on probation and parole had been

“dismal” and she continued a pattern of criminal behavior. Id. at 27.

After considering these circumstances in mitigation and aggravation and

arguments by counsel and Petitioner, the court found the middle term

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

appropriate and sentenced Petitioner to four years in state prison,

consisting of the middle term of two years for count one with additional

consecutive one-year terms for each of the prison priors. Lodgment 1

at 30, 45; Lodgment 3 at 258-59. 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. Lodgment 4. In her only claim for

relief, Petitioner argued that her sentence to the middle term of two

years on count one violated the holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). Lodgments 4, 6. By order dated April 14, 2005, the

California Court of Appeal rejected this claim and affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction. Lodgment 7.

On May 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court asserting the same claim for relief she had

raised in the California Court of Appeal. Lodgment 8. On June 22,

2005, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without

comment or citation of authority. Lodgment 9.

C. Collateral Review

Petitioner has not sought collateral review of her conviction in

the state courts.

On December 28, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1.

Respondent filed an Answer on March 16, 2006. Doc. No. 7. Petitioner

did not file a traverse and the Court took the matter under submission.

D. Current Status

According to California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitations records, Petitioner was released on parole on January

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Because Petitioner remains subject to parole restrictions, she still is

considered “in custody” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and, therefore, is entitled

to seek habeas relief in this Court. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43

(1963) (holding that parolees are still “in custody” because they are subject to

conditions that significantly confine and restrain their freedom).

5 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

29, 2006.2 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas

corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials do constitute adjudications on the

merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). Where

there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2)

“confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant

Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme

Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies the

correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue a writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly . . . .

Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Andrade,

538 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme]

Court’s decisions.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

proceeding. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). This

Court will presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct,

and Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts only one claim of error in her Petition.

Specifically, Petitioner contends that her sentence to the middle term

of two years on count one must be vacated because Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004), requires imposition of the low term where the

defendant has presented evidence in mitigation. Petition at 6.

Petitioner acknowledges that the middle term is the presumptively

correct term under Blakely if the defendant has presented no mitigating

evidence and the prosecution has presented no facts in aggravation. Id.

However, she interprets Blakely as requiring a jury determination of the

facts once any evidence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is

presented. Id. On this basis, Petitioner contends that the California

Court of Appeal erred by finding that the middle term did not trigger

Blakely’s jury determination requirement in her case. Id. Petitioner

argues that the low term was the only sentence the trial court could

lawfully impose under Blakely in her case, given the absence of jury

findings. Id. 

Respondent counters that, because Petitioner’s sentence to the

presumptive middle term of two years did not exceed the statutory

maximum of three years permitted by her guilty plea, the Court of

Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Blakely. Answer at 3.

The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition

for review on direct appeal, so this Court must look through to the last

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Here, the

last reasoned state court decision came from the California Court of

Appeal. Lodgment 7. That court rejected Petitioner’s Blakely argument,

stating:

This court is split on the issue of whether Blakely applies

to a sentencing court’s selection of the upper term, and the

issue is currently pending before the California Supreme

Court. As we shall explain, even assuming arguendo that

Blakely applies to an aggravated upper term sentence, there

is no doubt that it is inapplicable to a case where the court

selects the middle term. (citations omitted).

Blakely applies the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530

U.S. 466, 490, which provides: “‘Other than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

The Blakely court defined the “‘statutory maximum’” as “the

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of

facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant.” However, Blakely recognizes that not all fact

finding by a sentencing court is prohibited—i.e., a judge may

impose a sentence derived from facts not found by the jury or

admitted by the defendant as long as the sentence does not

exceed the sentence to which the defendant has a legal right

under the state’s statutory scheme for the particular

offense.

Lodgment 7 at 2-3. Applying this analysis to Petitioner’s case, the

court rejected Petitioner’s argument that a jury determination is

required any time mitigating or aggravating evidence is presented, and

that absent a jury determination, the court must impose the lower

sentencing term. Id. at 4. The court explained “[w]hen a court selects

the middle term, it is imposing the sentence selected by the legislature

as applicable to the particular offense based on the jury verdict alone.

Thus, the middle term does not trigger Blakely’s jury determination

requirement because the middle term is not a “penalty for a crime beyond

the prescribed statutory maximum. . . .”” Id. (citation omitted).

In California, most offenses are governed by a determinate

sentencing scheme, which specifies by statute three terms of

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The United States Supreme Court will decide this term in Cunningham v.

California, __ U.S. __, 2006 WL 386377 (2006) whether California’s sentencing scheme

violates Blakely and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005) (holding that

mandatory federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because, just as

in Blakely, the judge increased the sentence beyond the guideline range dictated by the

jury findings as a result of the judge’s own fact-finding).

9 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

imprisonment for each offense.3 See People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238,

1247 (2005). Pursuant to California Penal Code § 1170(b), a sentencing

judge “shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are

circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.” Cal. Penal

Code § 1170(b). Judges retain discretion to identify aggravating and

mitigating factors, but “may not impose an upper term by using the fact

of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision

of law.” Black, 35 Cal. 4th at 1247; Cal. Penal Code § 1170. Under the

applicable rules, “[s]election of the upper term is justified only if,

after a consideration of all the relevant facts, the circumstances in

aggravation outweigh the circumstances in mitigation” and “[s]election

of the lower term is justified only if, considering the same facts, the

circumstances in mitigation outweigh the circumstances in aggravation.”

Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.420(b). Either way, the court is required

to “state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time

of sentencing.” Cal. Penal Code § 1170(c). 

On June 20, 2005, after the California Court of Appeal ruled on

Petitioner’s appeal, the Supreme Court of California resolved the split

of authority as to whether Blakely applies to a sentencing court’s

selection of the upper term. See People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238

(2005). In Black, the court analyzed California’s determinate

sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. The

California Supreme Court explained that California’s sentencing scheme

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

does not implicate the concerns raised in Blakely and Booker. Id. at

1255-56. Unlike in Blakely, where the court was concerned that

Washington’s sentencing scheme allowed judges discretion to impose a

sentence greater than the standard range with no warning to the

defendant (i.e. “a defendant, with no warning in either his indictment

or plea, would routinely see his maximum potential sentence balloon from

as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment...”) (Blakely,

542 U.S. at 311), defendants sentenced in California have knowledge of

the range of possible sentences and “cannot reasonably expect a

guarantee that the upper term will not be imposed.” Black, 35 Cal. 4th

at 1258. By providing for an upper term as part of California’s

determinate sentencing scheme, the legislature also intentionally

preserved the traditional power of the jury — unlike in the federal

sentencing scheme, found unconstitutional in Booker, where Congress

essentially “shift[ed] the proof of particular facts from elements of

a crime (to be proved to a jury) to sentencing factors (to be decided

by a judge).” Id. at 1256. In other words, California preserved

judicial discretion within, as opposed to above, the range authorized

by the jury. See id. Thus, the California Supreme Court found that

“[t]he level of discretion available to a California judge in selecting

which of the three available terms to impose appears comparable to the

level of discretion that the high court has chosen to permit federal

judges in post-Booker sentencing.” Id. at 1261. The court concluded

that under California’s determinate sentencing scheme, “the upper term

is the ‘statutory maximum’ for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis”

and, therefore, “the upper term is the ‘maximum sentence a judge may

impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict.’”

Id. at 1258 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). Accordingly, under the

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

California Supreme Court’s interpretation, a California judge does not

violate Blakely by imposing any of the three sentence terms based on the

judge’s, as opposed to a jury’s, proper findings regarding facts in

mitigation or aggravation. See id. at 1257-58. 

In Petitioner’s case, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the

applicability of Blakely to a sentence imposed under California’s

determinate sentencing scheme was consistent with the California Supreme

Court’s subsequent reasoning in Black. The appellate court began by

implying that it did not interpret Blakely as applying to sentences

falling within the three-tiered range of possible sentences because the

upper term would be the “statutory maximum” under Apprendi. See

Lodgment 7 at 2 (“even assuming arguendo that Blakely applies to an

aggravated upper term sentence...”) (emphasis added). The appellate

court then reasoned that, even if Blakely did apply to the upper term,

the middle term would still be the statutory maximum and, thus,

Petitioner’s sentence to the middle term would not violate Blakely:

The panels of this court that have found Blakely

applicable to the selection of the upper term have done so

premised on a conclusion that the middle term is the term to

which the defendant has a legal right and the upper term

cannot be based on matters derived solely from the jury

verdict or guilty plea (i.e. from the elements of the

offense). 

Under this view, if Blakely applies to a court’s

selection of the upper term, it is because the middle term is

defined as the statutory maximum. When a court selects the

middle term, it is imposing the sentence selected by the

legislature as applicable to the particular offense based on

the jury verdict alone. Thus, the middle term does not

trigger Blakely’s jury determination requirement because the

middle term is not a “penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum....” (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S.

at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2536].)

Id. at 3-4. As the Supreme Court confirmed in Blakely, its precedent

makes clear that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is “the

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely,

542 U.S. at 303. Here, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of cocaine

base, for which the middle term sentence of two years shall be imposed,

unless there are circumstances in mitigation or aggravation. See Cal.

Penal Code § 1170(b); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.420(a). In light of

the applicable Supreme Court precedent, the appellate court reasonably

concluded that, at the very least, the middle term was the “statutory

maximum” because it is the sentence the court is required to impose if

no other facts or circumstances beyond those admitted in the guilty plea

are present. In other words, the appellate court’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s sentence not only did not violate Blakely, but that Blakely

is in fact inapplicable to Petitioner’s sentence, is not objectively

unreasonable. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (district court may not

issue writ of habeas corpus unless state court applied clearly

established federal law in an objectively unreasonable manner).

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal points out:

[Petitioner] has presented no argument warranting a

conclusion that the lower term is the statutorily-defined

maximum for the offense. Instead, she broadly argues that

whenever the trial court weighs aggravating or mitigating

circumstances, it is engaged in fact finding proscribed by

Blakely. This argument ignores the analysis in Blakely that

allows fact finding by a sentencing court if the sentence

does not exceed the maximum sentence authorized by the

legislature for the offense based on the jury verdict alone.

Lodgment 7 at 4. In her habeas petition before this Court, Petitioner

argues that:

What the court of appeal opinion ignores is that the middle

term is only presumptively correct after Blakely if the

parties have not sought to prove factors in aggravation or

mitigation ... once either party presents such evidence, the

determination is a factual question that must be resolved by

a jury ... [which] means that the only lawful sentence that

can be imposed by a trial court is the low term.

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

Petition at 6. This is simply an incorrect reading of Blakely.

Petitioner’s argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would eliminate

all judicial fact-finding and mandate the lower sentencing term whenever

any mitigating evidence is presented unless the evidence is presented

to a jury. This conclusion contradicts Blakely’s approval of judicial

fact-finding within the statutory range. Thus, Petitioner’s argument

lacks merit as well as precedential support.

Therefore, the Court finds that the California Court of Appeal’s

decision upholding Petitioner’s middle term sentence was not an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(1); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present any

evidence suggesting that the California Court of Appeal’s decision as

to her claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has Petitioner

made any argument that further factual development is necessary, such

that an evidentiary hearing would be warranted. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2) (exceptions where an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate).

As such, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED and the case dismissed with prejudice.

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition.

///

///

///

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 05cv2364-WQH (BLM)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 15, 2006. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 12,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

 

DATED: November 15, 2006

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

Case 3:05-cv-02364-WQH-BLM Document 10 Filed 11/15/06 Page 14 of 14