Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00555/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 NORTHERN DIVISION 

 

KAREN RALEY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv555-WC 

 ) 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) 

Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff, Karen Raley, applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and supplemental security 

income payments under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.. Her application 

was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ 

issued a decision in which he found Plaintiff not disabled at any time through the date of 

his decision. Tr. 18. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. Tr. 1-5. Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with 

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2 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff sought judicial review, and this court remanded the 

case for further administrative proceedings. Tr. 357-66. On September 10, 2012, 

Plaintiff received a second administrative hearing before the ALJ. Tr. 313-47. On 

October 25, 2010, the ALJ again issued an unfavorable decision after the second hearing. 

Tr. 296-308. On June 30, 2011, the Appeals Council considered Plaintiff’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s October 25, 2010 decision and stated that it “found no reason under 

[the Appeals Council’s] rules to assume jurisdiction.” Tr. 265-68. The ALJ’s October 

25, 2010 decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner. The case 

is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final 

judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to 

Jurisdiction (Doc. #10); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #9). Based on the court’s 

review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the 

Commissioner.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

 

respect to Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques. 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case 

(SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II 

are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 

408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was awarded disability benefits as of February 11, 2008 based on a 

subsequent application. Thus, the limited issue before the ALJ during this second 

hearing on September 15, 2010 was whether Plaintiff established disability from the 

alleged onset date of February 17, 2005 through February 10, 2008. Tr. 298; 316. 

 Plaintiff was forty-seven years old at the time of the second hearing before the 

ALJ. Tr. 325. Plaintiff graduated high school and has a two-year associate’s degree in 

drafting and design. Tr. 325. Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience was as a 

“technical support specialist,” “receptionist,” and “drafter.” Tr. 338. Following the 

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administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “did 

not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of 

February 17, 2005 through February 10, 2008.” (Step 1) Tr. 18. At Step 2, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairment: “bilateral carpal tunnel 

syndrome status post surgical release.” Tr. 298. The ALJ then found that “[t]hrough 

February 10, 2008, [Plaintiff] did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Tr. 300. Next, the 

ALJ found that: 

through February 10, 2008, [Plaintiff] had the residual functional capacity 

to perform less than the full range of light work . . . . Specifically, she 

could not perform handling or fingering in a repetitive fashion. She could 

no more than occasionally perform reaching. 

Tr. 300. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(Step 4) Tr. 306. At Step 5, the ALJ found that, “through February 10, 2008, considering 

[Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” and after 

consulting with a VE, “[Plaintiff] was capable of making a successful adjustment to other 

work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.” Tr. 308. After 

consulting with the VE, the ALJ identified the following occupations as examples: 

“office helper,” information clerk,” and “parking lot attendant.” Tr. 307. Accordingly, 

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “was not under a disability . . . at any time from 

February 17, 2005, the alleged onset date, through February 10, 2008.” Tr. 308. 

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IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents several issues for this court’s consideration in review of the 

ALJ’s decision: 1) whether “[t]he RFC was incorrect and incomplete and should not be 

used to determine this case”; 2) whether the ALJ “fail[ed] to realistically discuss 

[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform sustained work activities on a regular and continuing basis 

. . . in violation of [SSR] 96-8p”; 3) whether the ALJ “fail[ed] to evaluate [Plaintiff’s] 

subjective complaints”; and 4) whether the Plaintiff’s rights were violated under the 

Privacy Act. Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 1. The court will address each argument in the 

section that follows. 

 

V. DISCUSSION 

 A. Whether the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s RFC.

 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination, arguing that “the ALJ failed to 

include the non-exertional limitations imposed by [her] medically determinable 

impairments in his RFC findings.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 1.5

 The ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “less than the full range of light work” with the 

following limitations: “she could not perform handling or fingering in a repetitive 

 

5

 Exertional limitations are defined as those restrictions affecting a person’s ability to meet what 

the Social Security Administration considers the seven strength demands of a job: sitting, 

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. Social Security Ruling 96-9P, 1996 

WL 374185 at *5 (July 2, 1996). Nonexertional limitations, on the other hand, relate to 

limitations that affect capacities such as mental abilities, vision, hearing, speech, climbing, 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. 

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fashion” and “[s]he could no more than occasionally perform reaching.” Tr. 300. 

Defendant contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination was “reasonably determined, 

based on a thorough review of all the evidence of record and giving Plaintiff more than 

every benefit of doubt.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #20) at 7. 

 Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not consider her nonexertional limitations 

lacks merit. First, the ALJ placed specific limitations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to 

“handle,” “finger,” and “reach,” all of which are nonexertional limitations. See Moore v. 

Astrue, 256 F. App’x 330, 332 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Grasping, handling, and fingering are 

nonexertional limitations. ‘Handling’ means having the ability to seize, hold, grasp, or 

turn an object. ‘Fingering’ means having the ability to pick or pinch.” (citing Social 

Security Ruling 85-15 (1984)). See also Social Security Ruling 96-9P, 1996 WL 374185 

at *5 (July 2, 1996) (“a nonexertional limitation is an impairment-caused limitation 

affecting such capacities as . . . reaching, handling, fingering . . . ”). 

 Moreover, in reaching his determination regarding Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ 

accorded great weight to the opinions of Dr. Roland Rivard (“Dr. Rivard”) and Dr. 

Donald Brobst (“Dr. Brobst”), finding that both physicians are “certified independent 

medical examiners” and “[t]heir conclusions are consistent with and supported by the 

substantial evidence contained in the record, particularly their own objective clinical 

examination findings and the results of ergometric testing. Their conclusions are 

 

Environmental restrictions are also considered to be nonexertional. Id.

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consistent with one another and are supported by the opinion of [Plaintiff’s] own treating 

surgeon who released [Plaintiff] ‘to all activities within her FCE limits.’” Tr. 306.6

 The 

ALJ noted that in 2005, 

Dr. Rivard opined [Plaintiff] could lift no more than 55 pounds at a time 

and no more than 30 pounds frequently . . . could carry loads of 30-35 

pounds frequently for a short distance. . . . [Plaintiff] had no limitations of 

her abilities to reach in any direction or to climb stairs or ladders . . . could 

not perform ‘Handling (includes seizing, holding, grasping, and turning[)]’ 

or ‘Fingering (picking, pinching, or otherwise working with the fingers 

primarily)’ continuously and repetitively. He recommended that these 

activities be limited to frequent for the upper right extremity. 

Tr. 305. The ALJ also noted that in 2006, “Dr. Brobst recommended that [Plaintiff’s] 

work restrictions for lifting, carrying, climbing, and reaching remain the same as those 

recommended by Dr. Rivard” and further opined that Plaintiff “could not perform 

‘handling (includes seizing, holding, grasping, and turning)’ continuously or repetitively 

with either extremity” and that Plaintiff “could not perform ‘fingering (picking, pinching, 

or otherwise working with the fingers primarily)’ repetitively and continuously.” Tr. 

305-06. Given this medical evidence, the court finds the ALJ properly found Plaintiff 

“was unable to perform handling or fingering in a repetitive fashion during the relevant 

time period,” as the RFC adopts the limitations recommended by both Dr. Rivard and Dr. 

Brobst during the relevant time period. Tr. 306.7

 Moreover, the ALJ further restricted 

 

6 See Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516, 1518 (11th Cir. 1985) (the ALJ may rely on opinions of 

an examining physician). 

7

 The court finds that Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the limitations imposed 

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Plaintiff’s RFC stating “in consideration of her pain complaints, the [ALJ] has further 

limited [Plaintiff’s] [RFC] to lifting and carrying no more than 20 pounds at a time or 10 

pounds frequently and no more than occasional reaching.” Id. 

 Plaintiff challenges the RFC arguing that the ALJ failed to account for all her 

limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she has further limitations than those 

indicated in her RFC because “the ALJ could see that [she] wore corrective lenses at the 

hearing” and asserts she has “a hard time telling the difference between some colors.” 

Tr. 299.8

 A review of the ALJ’s decision shows he addressed Plaintiff’s complaints 

about her vision including her assertion that while her vision has not been checked since 

2004, “[she] know[s] they’re worse.” Id. However, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “did not 

describe any functional limitations related to her vision, and she did not allege that her 

vision is not treatable through corrective eyeglasses. The medical record contains no 

evidence of a visual impairment.” Id. Thus, the ALJ properly addressed and discounted 

Plaintiff’s alleged visual limitations due to the lack of objective evidence. 

 

by her carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis lacks merit as: 1) the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s 

carpal tunnel was a severe impairment during the relevant time period; and 2) he included 

handling, fingering, and reaching limitations consistent with the medical evidence of record. As 

to Plaintiff’s alleged chronic tendonitis, the record is devoid of any objective medical evidence 

establishing any limitations due to this alleged impairment. 

8

 Plaintiff does not indicate whether she suffered her alleged visual impairments during the 

relevant time period. 

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 Plaintiff further challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination contending that she had 

environmental limitations for which the ALJ did not account. Plaintiff asserts that on 

January 13, 2005, “Dr. Samuelson told [her] to ‘avoid vibratory tools and any items as 

such.’” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 2.9

 She further contends that “No one has ever asked 

[her] about cold, heat, vibrations, etc. So how can any or no limitations be decided upon? 

Any loud or strong fumes gives me a headache.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 2. However, 

as Defendant correctly points out “there is no suggestion in the record that these alleged 

impairments resulted in any significant functional limitations.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #20) at 

9. The court also notes that a Physical RFC assessment completed by a medical 

consultant in August 2006, indicated Plaintiff had no visual or environmental limitations. 

Tr. 177-78. The assessment further stated “[Plaintiff] has some residuals as addressed in 

the RFC. However they are not of a severity as described. Her ADLs show she had few 

limitations.” Tr. 179. Because there is no evidence on the record to support Plaintiff’s 

alleged environmental limitations, this argument lacks merit. 

 Finally, Plaintiff seems to argue that the ALJ’s RFC determination is erroneous 

because the VE indicated that she was able to perform her past relevant work and she 

 

9

 A review of this medical evidence reveals that on the date Plaintiff alleges Dr. Samelson made 

this statement, his reflect that he had released her back to work on “light duty.” Tr. 460. 

Moreover, Dr. Samelson placed the vibration restrictions only until a functional capacities 

evaluation was performed. Tr. 460; 240. On February 10, 2005, Dr. Samelson released Plaintiff 

“to all activities within her FCE limits” and indicated he would send those limits “to her 

employer.” Tr. 244. Thus, the medical evidence fails to establish Dr. Samelson placed further 

restrictions than those accounted for by the ALJ, who determined Plaintiff “had the [RFC] to 

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asserts that “all these jobs required frequent use of hands and fingers which [she is] now 

unable to do.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 2. However, the ALJ’s decision clearly indicates 

that he “has given [Plaintiff] the benefit of the doubt and finds that the demands of her 

past relevant work exceed the residual functional capacity.” Tr. 306. Thus, this 

argument lacks merit as the ALJ’s decision accepts Plaintiff’s assertion that she cannot 

perform her past relevant work. 

 For the reasons indicated above, the court finds the ALJ did not err in failing to 

include restrictions in Plaintiff’s RFC for which the record provides no basis. Because 

the ALJ properly included limitations based on the medical evidence of record, the ALJ 

properly determined and placed limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. 

 

B. Whether the ALJ failed to discuss Plaintiff’s ability to perform sustained 

work activities on a regular and continuing basis. 

 Plaintiff cites to Social Security Ruling 96-8p and argues that the ALJ’s decision 

warrants reversal because he failed “to realistically discuss [her] ability to perform 

sustained work activities on a regular and continuing basis . . . in violation of Social 

Security Ruling 96-8p.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 2. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. 

Pursuant to SSR 96-8p, an “RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do 

sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and 

continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a 

 

perform less than the full range of light work.” Tr. 300. 

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week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, 

at *1 (July 2, 1996). Thus, in creating a RFC assessment for Plaintiff, the ALJ has 

implicitly reached a determination on whether or not Plaintiff can perform those work 

activities during an eight-hour work day. 

 C. Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective complaints 

as set forth in SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529. Defendant argues that “[Plaintiff’s] 

subjective complaints were reasonably discounted because they were inconsistent with 

the objective medical evidence of record.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #20) at 10. 

 Pursuant to SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), the ALJ must consider 

the consistency of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, evaluating the subjective complaints 

in light of the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s own statements, and other evidence 

in the record, and offer specific reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996). In evaluating 

subjective complaints, the ALJ considers the extent to which symptoms, such as pain, 

affect Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. 

 In this case, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that “Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints are inconsistent with her self-reported daily activities.” Tr. 301. 

For example, the ALJ noted that at her “first hearing on December 4, 2007, [Plaintiff] 

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testified she felt pain in her hands and arms and that they felt ‘heavy’ . . . that everything 

she did aggravated her upper extremities from the elbows down. . . . that her fingers 

pulled and stung when she used them. . . . [and] her hands hurt even when she was not 

using them.” Tr. 301. However, the ALJ also noted Plaintiff stated “[o]n a ‘good’ day, 

she reported she was able to drive approximately 12 miles to town, perform errands, and 

drive back.” Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff “described her daily activities as feeding her cat, 

making coffee, sitting around the house, doing the housework she could do, washing a 

load of clothes, sweeping the floors and straightening up a little bit.” Id. The ALJ also 

noted that: 

[i]n 2006, [Plaintiff] described daily activities that were not limited to the 

extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and 

limitations. On June 29, 2006, [Plaintiff] reported her daily activities 

included performing housework and running errands as needed. The 

following month, she described performing yard work, such as pulling 

weeds from her flowers or garden, with frequent breaks. She stated her 

hobbies included crafts, canning, and yard work. She reported she drove 

her mother to town. Although [Plaintiff] reported performing tasks for only 

thirty-minute intervals, she described cleaning her stove, cleaning her 

bathrooms, and sweeping the carpet. She was able to use a light mop, 

although she had trouble squeezing it. While she could not operate a push 

mower, she was able to cut grass using a riding mower. . . . was able to 

shop but relied on a shopping cart to carry her items. She reported 

difficulty carrying heavy dishes and ‘bigger items,’ such as dog food or 

fertilizer. . . . [and] she drove short distances. 

Tr. 302. The ALJ further noted that “clinical findings by [Plaintiff’s] surgeon provide 

some support for [Plaintiff’s] allegations of pain but do not support the severity of 

limitations she had alleged.” Tr. 302. For example, on January 29, 2007, Plaintiff 

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reported increased pain on the right hand and more numbness on the left in the ulnar side. 

Tr. 302; 192. However, Dr. Samelson’s physical examination on that date revealed “both 

hands ha[d] normal grip,” “carpal tunnel, Tinel’s, compression, ulnar, Phalen’s and 

cubital tunnel compression or percussion signs were all negative,” her light touch 

sensation was intact, there was no obvious hand abnormality, and she exhibited only 

“mild lateral epicondylar tenderness bilaterally.” Tr. 302; 192. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

allegations contradict evidence of the effectiveness of the medical treatment she has 

received. In short, the court finds the ALJ reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints and he articulated his reasons for doing so as Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 

contradicted her own testimony of her daily activities and the complaints were 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence on the record. 

 D. Whether the Plaintiff’s rights were violated under the Privacy Act.

 Plaintiff argues that the “Social Security Administration, Appeals Council violated 

the Privacy Act by sending [her] information on two other SSA clients, when they sent 

[Plaintiff] [her] electronic file.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 1. 

 Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. In order to bring a claim under the Privacy Act, 5 

U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D): 

The plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the government failed to fulfill its 

record-keeping obligation; (2) the agency acted intentionally or willfully in 

failing to perform its obligation; (3) the failure proximately caused an 

adverse effect on an individual; and (4) that individual suffered actual 

damages. 

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Fanin v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action under the Privacy Act. First, Plaintiff presents 

no evidence, nor does she even allege, that the SSA intentionally or willfully sent her 

another individual’s information. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence that 

could establish that receiving someone else’s information proximately caused an adverse 

effect on her and that she has suffered actual damages as a result. While Plaintiff argues 

that “[t]his action [sending her someone else’s information] alone deliberately delayed 

these proceedings for months, and could have delayed them for years,” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. 

#12) at 1, Plaintiff presents no evidence to establish that receiving someone else’s 

information did in fact adversely affect her. See Speaker v. United States Dep’t of Health 

& Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1383 (11th Cir. 

2010) (“As to the actual damages requirement in element four, this Court has held that 

‘actual damages’ as used in the Privacy Act permits recovery only for proven pecuniary 

losses and not for generalized mental injuries, loss of reputation, embarrassment or other 

non-quantifiable injuries.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary 

elements to bring a claim under the Privacy Act. 

 Moreover, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim. As Defendant points out, 

“Plaintiff has not shown that her own records were disclosed to another individual 

without her consent.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #20) at 12. Essentially, Plaintiff brings a claim 

on behalf of the individuals whose information she received and Plaintiff lacks standing 

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to do so. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (finding that, in 

general, a plaintiff “must assert his own legal interests, rather than those of third 

parties”); Zanoni v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 605 F. Supp. 2d 230, 235 (D.D.C. 

2009) (“To view subsection (g)(1)(D) in isolation of the other sections and to interpret 

‘individual’ so broadly to apply it to any citizen of the United States—regardless of 

whether they are the subject of the information—is inconsistent with the way the term is 

used in other areas of the Privacy Act.”). 

 Because Plaintiff lacks standing and fails to present any evidence to establish this 

claim, Plaintiff is entitled to no relief.10 

VI. CONCLUSION

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 

10 Plaintiff raises other issues without providing any argument in support. Plaintiff asserts 

that “a reversal of the ALJ’s decision is necessary” because the ALJ “fail[ed] to issue a 

credibility finding in compliance with the law of the Eleventh Circuit.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 

2. The basis of Plaintiff’s argument is unclear. However, Plaintiff’s argument is due to fail as 

the ALJ clearly issued credibility findings in this case by reaching a determination on Plaintiff’s 

RFC and disability status during the relevant time period. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ “discriminated against [her], and has a personal 

vendetta against [her].” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 5. Although the regulations require that the 

ALJ must not be prejudiced or partial in any way during the hearing, 20 C.F.R. § 404.940; see 

also Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400-01 (11th Cir.1996), a review of the record does not 

reveal that the ALJ was biased. Thus, as Defendant argues “A claim of bias or dishonesty 

against an administrative adjudicator must overcome the ‘presumption of honesty and integrity in 

adjudicators.’ See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)” and “Plaintiff has not met her 

burden to overcome th[is] presumption.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #20) at 11. 

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 Done this 21st day of June, 2012. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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