Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00575/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00575-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE LYLE GEHRKE,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv0575 IEG (LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: DENIAL OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

R. SULLIVAN, Warden,

Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jesse Lyle Gehrke, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has 

filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court 

conviction in case number SCS184975 for assault with a deadly weapon

and assault by a life prisoner. Respondent has filed an Answer to

the Second Amended Petition. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to 

Respondent’s Answer.

The Court has considered the Second Amended Petition, 

Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents

submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends

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that the Petition be DENIED.

II.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate 

court opinion denying Petitioner’s habeas petition. This Court 

gives deference to state court findings of fact. See Sumner v. 

Mata, 499 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).

A. PROSECUTION CASE

On the morning of February 12, 2004, Mr. Bennett (a

correctional officer at Donovan State Prison) observed

Williams (an inmate) enter a prison exercise yard. Gehrke

and a third inmate (Muncy) entered the yard after Williams. 

Gehrke was a life prisoner and Williams’s cellmate.

A fight subsequently ensued with Williams battling

Gehrke and Muncy. Gehrke reached Williams first, approaching

him from behind and striking him in the upper back, while

Muncy approached Williams from the front. As Gehrke

continued to strike Williams, Muncy also began hitting

Williams.

Bennett activated his alarm and verbally commanded the

inmates to get down. When Gehrke continued striking

Williams, Bennett fired a nonlethal round, striking Gehrke,

but Gehrke continued to strike Williams. It required several

more commands and rounds of nonlethal ammunition before

Gehrke ceased his attack. After the fourth round, Gehrke

broke off his attack and ran toward a urinal carrying an

inmate manufactured weapon. Gehrke flushed the item down the

toilet. Bennett ordered Muncy to get down, and fired a round

at Muncy, after which both Gehrke and Muncy ran to a wall and

assumed a prone position.

Williams suffered multiple puncture wounds across his

back, and also had wounds to his chest, abdomen, and leg. 

The puncture wounds to his back and chest were the most

serious injuries. Williams was life-flighted to a hospital

for treatment, including surgery.

B. THE DEFENSE CASE

Muncy testified he was acquainted with Gehrke and

Williams. That morning, Muncy entered the exercise yard

after Gehrke and Williams. Gehrke and Williams hugged, and

Muncy gave each of them a hug. Muncy started to put his

shirt away but, when he turned around, saw Williams 

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approaching in a violent manner with his fists clenched. 

Muncy was surprised, and reacted by pulling out his dagger. 

Muncy stabbed Williams in the leg while Williams was flat on

his back on the ground. The fight ended when Bennett shot

Muncy in the arm; Muncy ran to a nearby wall, wrapped up his

dagger, and secreted it away. Gehrke did not strike Williams

and had no weapon.

(Respondent’s Lodgment (hereinafter “Resp’t Lodgment”) No. 6 at 2-

3.)

III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 5, 2005, the San Diego District Attorney charged

Gehrke in an amended information with premeditated attempted

murder, assault with a deadly weapon/force likely to cause great

bodily injury, and assault by a life prisoner. (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 1 at 23-24, No. 3 at 1.) The information further alleged that

Gehrke had been convicted of assault with a firearm and great

bodily injury in 1996 and first degree murder in 2003, which

qualified as two strikes under California’s Three Strikes Law, and

as serious-felony prior convictions. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at

23-26, 29.) 

On June 8, 2005, a jury convicted Gehrke of assault with a

deadly weapon/force likely to cause great bodily injury and

assault by a life prisoner. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 125-126.) 

The jury further found that in the commission of these offenses,

Gehrke personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Williams

during a group beating. (Id.) The jury found Gehrke not guilty

of attempted voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder. (Id. at

123-124.) The trial court imposed a sentence of forty years to

life, comprising a term of 27 years to life under the Three

Strikes Law for assault by a life prisoner. (Id. at 150, Resp’t

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Lodgment No. 2 at 423-429.) The trial court arrived at 27 years

by tripling the base term of life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole in nine years. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at

150, Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 423-429.) The trial court

aggregated upon this sentence ten years for the two serious-felony

prior convictions and three years for the great bodily injury

during a group beating enhancement. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at

150, Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 423-429.) 

On August 31, 2005, Gehrke timely filed a Notice of Appeal in

the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 3 at 2.) His appeal raised two issues: (1)

that the trial court abused its discretion in placing Gehrke in

physical restraints during trial; and (2) that the trial court

improperly instructed the jury that Gehrke may be found guilty of

great bodily injury as the result of a group beating. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 3 at 5, 14.) 

On September 12, 2006, the California Court of Appeal denied

both of Gehrke’s claims in an unpublished opinion. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 6.) The court determined that (1) the trial court

had properly found a manifest necessity for restraining Gehrke

after conducting an evidentiary hearing into Gehrke’s history of

violence; and (2) the trial court had properly instructed the jury

of the circumstances under which a defendant can be liable for

personally inflicting great bodily injury. (Id. at 4-11.)

On October 12, 2006, Gehrke filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) In the

Petition, he raised only the issue regarding his shackling at

trial, stating the issue as follows: “Whether shackling a prisoner

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during trial violated his right to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 7 at 2.) Gehrke neglected to raise the jury

instruction issue to the California Supreme Court. On November

15, 2006, the California Supreme Court declined further

discretionary review without comment. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 8.)

On July 30, 2007, Gehrke timely filed in this Court his

currently pending Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. The Petition raises two grounds for relief: (1) that the

trial court denied Gehrke his right to due process by requiring

him to be shackled during trial; and (2) that the trial court

denied Gehrke his right to due process by instructing the jury

that he could be liable for inflicting injury if he participated

in a group beating of the victim. (Petition at 6, 9.)

On November 1, 2007, Respondent filed an Answer to Second

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support Thereof. On November 19, 2007,

Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

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The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Gehrke must satisfy either

§ 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as

follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

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decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for

its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme

Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be

“contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. ANALYSIS

1. The California Court of Appeal Reasonably Rejected

Gehrke’s Claim Regarding Shackling

Gehrke alleges that the trial court deprived him “of his

federal constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it

abused its discretion in placing Petitioner in physical restraints

during trial.” (Petition (hereinafter “Petition”) at 1-2.) He

argues that the fact that he was shackled in full view of the jury

gave the jury the presumption that Petitioner was guilty. (Id. at

6-8.) He claims that there was no justification for placing him

in restraints and that simply shackling him to a bolt in the

floor, out of the jury’s view, would have sufficed. (Pet. at 6-

7.) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s due process rights were

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not violated.

As noted above, the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s claim without comment. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 8.) 

Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state

court decision to address the claim, the appellate court opinion

denying his appeal of his conviction, as the basis of its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

In a reasoned analysis, the California Court of Appeal

rejected Gehrke’s claim:

The Evidentiary Basis for the Ruling

The court independently found on the record that there

was a manifest need to restrain Gehrke based on his criminal

history, the current charges, his outbursts in courtroom

settings, his recent escape attempt, and the security

concerns posed by the layout of the courtroom.

The court, noting Gehrke had a long history of violent

offenses, observed that Gehrke was serving a life sentence

for first degree murder committed by a stabbing, was facing

trial for another stabbing offense, and another stabbing

implement had been found in his prison cell a few months

earlier. Moreover, the court expressed concern that Gehrke’s

pattern of violent outbursts did not abate in a courtroom

setting despite the presence of law enforcement officers. 

When the jury returned a guilty verdict against him in May

2003, Gehrke (despite being in ankle chains) used his hands

to overturn the counsel table while yelling at the jury, and

three officers were required to subdue him. Moreover, a few

minutes before the court hearing on shackling in this case

began, Gehrke resisted an officer and created a disturbance

that required “[a]ll the law enforcement people that you see

here–and I think some others–...to calm him down.”

The court’s concern with Gehrke’s violent tendencies and

courtroom outbursts, together with Gehrke’s willingness to

employ “small stabbing instruments” like “stuff around the

courtroom” within his reach, was magnified by the particular

security issues presented by the configuration of the

courtroom. The court expressed concern for the safety of

staff, counsel and witnesses because the courtroom was small,

and a witness against Gehrke “literally has to walk...less

than a couple of feet in front of” where Gehrke sat at the

counsel table, and the witness stand is “right next to...the

defendant....” The trial court stated that Gehrke’s “ability

even with one hand free to throw a table or interfere with

this trial based on [his] past performance is significant in

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my mind to say that he is a danger.”

Finally, the court noted that Gehrke, a life prisoner

who earned “level 2" status under California’s Department of

Corrections policies (requiring CDC officers to restrain him

in order to control him), was a flight risk and had recently

offered a $100,000 bribe to a transporting officer to let him

escape.

Based on the court’s concerns for safety and the

potential flight risk, the court ruled there was a manifest

need to restrain Gehrke, and he would be restrained at both

his feet and wrists.

Analysis

Gehrke’s violent behavior (both in and out of court),

his willingness to possess and use small stabbing implements

like those available in the courtroom, particularly

considering the cramped courtroom layout, and his willingness

to try to escape custody, provide a sufficient basis for the

court’s order restraining Gehrke at trial.

Gehrke argues this evidence did not justify the order. 

He asserts his violent outburst at the end of his prior trial

should be disregarded because he did not disturb the

proceedings during the prior trial. However, Gehrke’s long

history of violent behavior resurfaced just moments before

the court hearing on shackling, and his outburst required the

services of numerous law enforcement personnel to “calm” him,

and the court could infer his anger management skills had

deteriorated since his previous trial. Gehrke’s willingness

to keep forbidden weapons and to employ them against those

who affronted him, even in full view of law enforcement

personnel, raised particularized safety concerns in the

cramped space of the courtroom. Finally, Gehrke’s effort to

escape by offering a $100,000 bribe could permit a court to

conclude he was showing signs of increasing desperation and

might take even more extreme actions if not shackled.

Gehrke asserts the order was an abuse of discretion

because many of the factors cited by the court have been

deemed an improper basis for shackling. The courts have

found that the layout of the courtroom, even if the defendant

is charged with a violent offense, will not alone suffice to

justify shackling. (See, e.g., People v. Seaton (2001) 26

Cal.4th 598, 651-652.) However, the Seaton court found

shackling to be improper because there was no record of any

individualized concerns that the defendant would engage in

nonconforming behavior (ibid), and the present case had ample

evidence to support such a concern. Similarly, the cases

holding that it is an insufficient basis to order shackling

merely because the defendant is serving a life sentence (see

People v. Hawkins (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110), or because law

enforcement personnel favor shackling (see People v. 

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Ceniceros (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 266), are inapposite because

(unlike Hawkins or Ceniceros) the court here had specific

individualized concerns that Gehrke’s pattern of violence,

both in and out the courtroom, created a danger to the

public. We conclude the shackling order was not an abuse of

discretion.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 6 at 6-9.)

A “defendant has the right to be free from shackles and

handcuffs in the presence of the jury, unless shackling is

justified by an essential state interest.” Ghent v. Woodford, 279

F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Rhoden v. Rowland, 172

F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,

568-69 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In order

for a defendant who was shackled during trial to prevail on a

claim that his due process rights were violated, “a court must

find that the defendant was indeed physically restrained in the

presence of the jury, that the shackling was seen by the jury, and

that the physical restraint was not justified by state interests.” 

Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132. The shackling rises to the level of a

constitutional error only if the defendant then shows that he

suffered prejudice as a result of the shackling. Id; see also

Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993)(finding

that if there is a constitutional error, “court next must ask

whether the error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the

jury’s verdict). However, because shackling before the jury is so

likely to cause a defendant prejudice, “due process requires the

trial court to engage in an analysis of the security risks posed

by the defendant and to consider less restrictive alternatives

before permitting a defendant to be restrained.” Rhoden, 172 F.3d

at 636.

In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), the U.S. Supreme

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Court held the limitation on restraints is encompassed by federal

constitutional protections, stating “the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the

jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its

discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific

to a particular trial.” Id. at 629. The Court explained that

“courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other

physical restraints visible to the jury...The constitutional

requirement, however, is not absolute. It permits a judge, in the

exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special

circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for

shackling.” Id. at 633. The Court recognized the need to

restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom attacks or the

need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized

security determinations, but cautioned that such determinations

must be case specific: “that is to say, it should reflect

particular concerns, say special security needs or escape risks,

related to the defendant on trial.” Id. The Court concluded

that, “given their prejudicial effect, due process does not permit

the use of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken

account of the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 632.

The Court granted relief to the defendant in Deck because the

evidence in the record demonstrated that (1) the jurors were aware

of the defendant’s restraints; (2) the trial court did not make

any formal or informal findings justifying the restraints such as

a risk of escape or a threat to courtroom security, or explaining

why the chosen restraints were necessary; and, (3) the shackling

of the defendant was “inherently prejudicial,” so that it could

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not be upheld without adequate justification. Id. at 633-635.

In the present case, Gehrke was shackled to the floor, placed

in a waist chain, and required to wear handcuffs. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 2 at 2, No. 4 at 6.) The table at which Gehrke was

seated throughout the trial was covered so that his legs were not

visible to the jury. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 3, No. 4 at 6.) 

He was brought to the courtroom before the jury entered the

courtroom and removed from the courtroom after the jury departed,

so the jury never observed his movements. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2

at 3, No. 4 at 6.) Thus, Gehrke’s shackles were substantially

concealed from the jury. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 3, No. 4 at

6.) However, after defense counsel requested, and the court

granted, permission to have Gehrke’s right handcuff lengthened to

enable him to write and take notes during trial, his restraint may

have become apparent to the jury. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 105,

No. 4 at 6.)

On May 26, 2005, an evidentiary hearing on the shackling

issue was held. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 2-12.) After the

evidentiary hearing was held, the trial court ordered Gehrke to

remain shackled. (Id. at 11-12.) The court based its decision to

shackle Gehrke on security concerns derived from his criminal

background and current charges, history of disorderly incidents in

the courtroom, security concerns posed by the layout of the

courtroom, and evidence of conduct suggesting he posed a flight

risk. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 2-12, No. 4 at 7.) The court

began by observing that Gehrke had been found to possess prisonmade weapons while incarcerated at the California Department of

Corrections (hereinafter “CDC”), had sustained a conviction for

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doing so, and presently faced charges involving similar conduct. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 5-6, No. 4 at 7.) The court noted that

contraband weapons are typically small, and considered the fact

that small instruments available for use as a weapon, including

pens, are commonly found in the courtroom. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2

at 103, No. 4 at 7.)

The court observed that CDC representatives considered Gehrke

to be a level 2 inmate requiring restraint in order to gain

compliance and that CDC policy requires that life prisoners be

shackled. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 6, 104; No. 4 at 7.) The

court consulted with numerous deputy sheriffs who opined that

Gehrke should be shackled and that he posed a danger in the

courtroom. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 7, 104; No. 4 at 7.) The

court observed that the courtroom was small and that witnesses

would have to pass within two feet of Gehrke. (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 2 at 104, No. 4 at 7.) Additionally, the witness stand was

adjacent to Gehrke’s seat, and with one hand free, his ability to

throw objects, overturn counsel table, or otherwise interfere with

the trial, was, in the court’s mind, a significant factor to

consider. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 104, No. 4 at 7.)

The court reviewed notes regarding an incident which occurred

in court on May 23, 2003, when a verdict against Gehrke was

announced and he pushed over a counsel table and began yelling

loudly. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 6-7, No. 4 at 7.) Three deputy

sheriffs were required to subdue him. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

7, No. 4 at 7.) At the time, Gehrke was restrained only by ankle

chains. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 6-7, 103; No. 4 at 7.)

The court also considered evidence that Gehrke posed a flight

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risk in that he had recently offered $100,000.00 to a CDC

transporting officer for assistance in escaping from prison. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 6, 11; No. 4 at 8.)

Immediately before the court examined the shackling issue,

the prosecutor related that Gehrke had created a disturbance in

the courtroom requiring law enforcement officers to intervene. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 4, No. 4 at 8.) Gehrke and his counsel

explained that he reacted when he was placed in handcuffs without

warning despite the fact that he had a broken hand. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 2 at 4, No. 4 at 8.) The court called upon the CDC

representative, Mr. Clark, to explain. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

9-10, No. 4 at 8.) Clark explained that Gehrke needed to be kept

in restraints, because when he uncuffed Gehrke’s right hand,

Gehrke stood up and caused a commotion. (Resp’t Lodgment at 9-10,

No. 4 at 8.) 

The judge determined that Gehrke would remain shackled. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 105, No. 4 at 8.) However, he did relax

Gehrke’s restraints at the defense counsel’s request by

lengthening his wrist chains, thereby allowing him to take notes

and communicate in writing with his attorney during trial. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 105, No. 4 at 8.) Additionally, the

court advised the jury that the fact that Gehrke had been placed

in restraints was not evidence of guilt and could not be

considered by them for any purpose. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

352, No. 4 at 8.) 

As these facts demonstrate, the trial court examined the

circumstances regarding the necessity of Gehrke’s restraints.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 5.) In conducting a case specific

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inquiry, the trial court determined and entered findings that

Gehrke presented an obvious danger to court staff, counsel,

witnesses, the jury, and the public. (Id. at 7-8.) Central to

the court’s decision to restrain Gehrke was the fact that Gehrke

had a history of violence and courtroom disturbances and had

attempted to bribe an officer to help him escape. (Id. at 4, 6-7,

9-11, 103-104.) Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing, the

trial court considered alternatives to shackling, which it

rejected, although it did allow lengthening of Gehrke’s handcuffs

so he could take notes and communicate with counsel during trial. 

(Id. at 105.) Although lengthening the handcuff restraint made

the restraints visible to the jury, the court admonished the jury

that it was not to consider Gehrke’s shackles for any purpose. 

(Id. at 352.) Since the trial court exercised its discretion

reasonably and considered less restrictive alternatives to

shackling, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this

regard be DENIED.

2. Gehrke’s Claim in Ground Two is Unexhausted, But It is

Not Cognizable on Federal Habeas Review and, Thus, May

be Denied on Its Merits

Gehrke alleges that he was “deprived of his federal

constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the

trial court improperly instructed the jury that petitioner may be

found guilty of great bodily injury as the result of a group

beating.” (Pet. at 9.) Gehrke argues that he was denied due

process and the right to a fair trial when the trial court

instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.20 because the

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faulty instruction allowed the jury to infer that he was guilty

based on the fact that he was in the general area of the attack. 

(Pet. at 9.) Gehrke further claims that the jury instruction

allowed the jury to find “proof of an element of a crime on a

standard less demanding than beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Pet. at

9.)

The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No.

17.20, as follows:

It is alleged in Counts 1, 2, and 3 that in the

commission of a felony or attempted felony the defendant

personally inflicted great bodily injury on a person, inmate

Williams, not an accomplice to the crime. If you find a

defendant guilty of the felony, you must determine whether

that person inflicted great bodily injury to some person not

an accomplice to the crime in a commission or attempted

commission of the felony.

Great bodily injury as used in this instruction means a

significant or substantial physical injury. Minor, trivial,

or moderate injuries do not constitute great bodily injury. 

When a person participates in a group beating and it is not

possible to determine which assailant inflicted a particular

injury, he may be found to have personally inflicted great

bodily injury upon the victim if, one, the application of

unlawful physical force upon the victim was of such a nature

that by itself it could have caused the great bodily injury

suffered by the victim; or, two, that at the time the

defendant personally applied unlawful physical force to the

victim the defendant knew that other persons as part of the

same incident had applied, were applied, or would apply

unlawful physical force upon the victim and the defendant

knew or reasonably should have known that the cumulative

effect of all the unlawful physical force would result in

great bodily injury to the victim.

The people have the burden of proving the truth of this

allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true,

you must find it to be not true. Include a special finding

on that question in your verdicts using a form that will be

supplied for that purpose. 

If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 

a defendant is innocent of the crimes for which he is accused

in Counts 1, 2, and 3, and you unanimously so find, you may

convict him of any lesser crime provided you are satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of that crime.

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1

 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)-(2) states:

(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts

of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective

to protect the rights of the applicant.

 (2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies

available in the courts of the State.

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(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 370-371.)

Gehrke raised this jury instruction claim on direct appeal in

the Court of Appeal (Resp’t Lodgment No. 3 at 14), but he did not

raise it in his Petition for Review in the California Supreme

Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 7). Therefore, Gehrke’s claim is

unexhausted. Generally, before a federal court may grant relief on

a habeas corpus petition, all claims must be exhausted. Jackson

v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654m 658 (9th Cir. 2005)(citing Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied by providing the

state courts with a “fair opportunity” to rule on Petitioner’s

constitutional claims. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). 

In most instances, a claim is exhausted once it is fairly

presented to a state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or

through state collateral proceedings.1 See Sandgathe v. Maass,

314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). To present a claim fairly,

Petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that he is

asserting a federal claim. See Duncan v, Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365-366 (1995); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (a

petitioner exhausts state remedies only if he characterized the

claims raised in state court specifically as federal). Petitioner

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must make the federal basis of the claim explicit, either by

specifying particular provisions of the federal constitution or

statutes or by citing federal case law. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 688 (9th Cir. 2005). To present a claim fairly to

the state courts requires Petitioner to describe both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory. Anderson, 459 U.S.

at 6. The constitutional claim raised in the federal proceedings

must be the same as that raised in the state proceedings. See

Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

This Court may not grant relief on an unexhausted claim, but

it may deny such a claim if it clearly lacks merit. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Gehrke’s claim falls within this category.

As noted above, Gehrke never raised his claim in the

California Supreme Court. Thus, this Court must “look through” to

the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the

California Court of Appeal opinion denying Gehrke’s appeal of his

conviction, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

801-06.

In denying Gehrke’s claim, the California Court of Appeal

stated:

The jury found true the enhancement alleging Gehrke

personally inflicted great bodily injury in connection

with the assault on Williams within the meaning if

section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Gehrke asserts the

court erred by instructing the jury with the so-called

“group beating” portion of CALJIC No. 17.20, arguing the

group beating provisions of CALJIC No. 17.20 erroneously

state the circumstances under which a defendant may be

liable under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Gehrke

notes that section 12022.7, subdivision (a), as

construed in People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568,

requires a defendant personally inflict the injury and

cannot be imposed on someone who merely aids and abets

another attacker. (Id. at p. 572.) Gehrke asserts that

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CALJIC No. 17.20 erroneously permits a jury to find the

defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in

connection with an assault under an aider and abettor

theory, because the “second” group beating theory of

CALJIC No. 17.20 would permit a jury to find a defendant

liable for the enhancement if the defendant

“participate[d]” in a group beating, and “it is not

possible to determine which assailant inflicted a

particular injury,” and “at the time that the defendant

personally applied unlawful physical force to the

victim, the defendant knew that other persons, as part

of the same incident, had applied, were applying, or

would apply unlawful physical force upon the victim and

the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that

the cumulative effect of all the unlawful physical force

would result in great bodily injury to the victim.” 

Gehrke asserts this second alternative permits a jury to

find the enhancement true as long as the defendant had

knowledge of the purpose of the other attackers even

though the defendant’s actions did not contribute to the

injury.

This precise claim was considered in, and rejected by,

the court in People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481. In

Modiri, the defendant argued CALJIC No. 17.20 was

inconsistent with Cole. The Modiri court, rejecting the

defendant’s critique of the second alternative of CALJIC No.

17.20, stated:

“Defendant also parses the second group beating theory. 

It allows the jury to [find personal infliction of great

bodily injury] if the defendant ‘personally applied

unlawful physical force’ to the victim while he ‘knew’ others were applying similar force at the same time, and

while he ‘knew, or reasonably should have known, that

the cumulative effect of all [such] force would result

in great bodily injury.’ (CALJIC No. 17.20, italics

added.) According to defendant, the italicized language

should not have appeared in the instruction, because it

substituted his knowledge of the force applied by others

for the injury that he was personally required to

inflict. He claims this approach allowed ‘vicarious’

liability [for personal infliction of great bodily

injury] in violation of controlling law. [¶] The

asserted error did not occur. We have seen that [the

statute] requires the defendant to personally inflict,

or contribute to the infliction of, great bodily harm

while participating in a group attack. [Citation.] The

second group beating theory in CALJIC No. 17.20 follows

this principle by requiring the defendant to apply

physical force directly to the victim to such a

significant degree that he adds to the ‘cumulative’

injurious effect. Contrary to what the defendant

claims, this language does not define the defendant’s

personal infliction of great bodily harm primarily or

solely in terms of the harmful acts that others in the

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group commit.” (Id. at pp. 500-501.)

Thus, Modiri has concluded that CALJIC No. 17.20

correctly instructs a jury of the circumstances under which a

defendant can be liable for personally inflicting great

bodily injury. We are bound by the majority opinion in

Modiri (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57

Cal.2d 450, 455), and therefore reject Gehrke’s claim that

the court’s instruction was erroneous.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 6 at 9-10.)

To the extent Petitioner claims the jury instructions were

incorrect under state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To

merit relief, clearly established law provides that a petitioner

must show the instructional error so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violated due process. Id. at 72;. The

allegedly erroneous instruction must be considered in the context of

the entire trial record and the instructions as a whole. Id. at

72; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156 (1977); Cupp v. Naughten,

414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). The instructions must be more than

just erroneous; Gehrke must show that there was a reasonable

likelihood that in light of the instructions as a whole, the jury

applied the challenged instruction in such a way that his

constitutional rights were violated. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971

F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

In the present case, Officer Bennett testified that he saw

Gehrke approach Williams from behind and strike the first blow.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 129, No. 4 at 12.) Muncy approached

Williams face to face and immediately proceeded to strike Williams

as Gehrke continued striking him as well. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

129, No. 4 at 12.) Williams sustained various injuries; however,

the puncture wounds to his chest and back were the most serious

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injuries inflicted. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 195-197, 246-246,

248; No. 4 at 12.)

Muncy testified that when he first confronted Williams the two

were face to face. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 300, No. 4 at 13.)

Muncy first stabbed Williams in the stomach and possibly in the

neck. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 299-303, No. 4 at 13.) Muncy also

testified that he stabbed Williams in the legs after Williams had

fallen to the ground. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 302-303, No. 4 at

13.) Muncy never described stabbing Williams in the back, although

he stated that he could not recall exactly what happened. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 2 at 299-303, No. 4 at 13.)

The evidence at trial demonstrated that Gehrke personally and

independently inflicted great bodily injury upon Williams. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 4 at 13.) Although Muncy testified that he attacked

Williams and that Gehrke was not involved, the prosecution provided

evidence that Gehrke was actively involved in the attack and had

even struck the first blow. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 129, No. 4

at 12.) Furthermore, the appellate court determined that the “group

beating” jury instruction “correctly instructed the jury of the

circumstances under which a defendant can be liable for personally

inflicting great bodily injury.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 6 at 10.)

Therefore, not only is Gehrke’s jury instruction claim not

cognizable under federal law, but it also fails because the jury

instruction was not erroneous. (Id. at 11.) Accordingly, the jury

instruction did not infect the entire trial, thereby resulting in

Gehrke’s conviction, because the jury instruction was not in error,

but was in accordance with state law. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s claim in this regard be DENIED.

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V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that Judgment be

entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 20, 2007, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than January 4, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections with the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner

v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 20, 2007

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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