Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02340/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02340-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEHAN ZEB MIR,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIMBERLY KIRCHMEYER et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:12-cv-02340-GPC-DHB

ORDER OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS AND 

AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE 

JUDGES’ ORDERS

[ECF Nos. 183, 185, 215.]

Before the Court are Plaintiff Jehan Zeb Mir’s (“Plaintiff’s”) three sets of 

Objections to Orders issued by Magistrate Judge David H. Bartick and Magistrate Judge 

Louisa S. Porter:

1. Objections (Dkt. No. 183) to Judge Bartick’s June 27, 2016 Order denying 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further deposition of Joshua Bardin (Dkt. No. 174);

2. Objections (Dkt. No. 185) to (1) Judge Bartick’s June 21, 2016 Order denying in 

part and reserving in part Plaintiff’s ex parte application to compel Defendant 

Kimberly Kirchmeyer to produce documents (Dkt. No. 169) and to (2) Judge 

Bartick’s July 1, 2016 Supplemental Order sustaining Kirchmeyer’s assertion of 

the deliberative process privilege and declining to compel Kirchmeyer to produce 

any further documents to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 177); and

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3. Objections (Dkt. No. 215) to Judge Porter’s November 14, 2016 Order denying 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of documents from Defendant Sharon 

Levine (Dkt. No. 207).

Defendants Kimberly Kirchmeyer and Sharon Levine, M.D. (collectively, “Defendants”),

filed three separate responses to each set of Plaintiff’s Objections. (Dkt. Nos. 228, 229, 

221, respectively.) Plaintiff filed three replies. (Dkt. Nos. 231, 233, 234.)

The Court deems Plaintiff’s Objections suitable for disposition without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Having reviewed the parties’ briefing

and the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES 

Plaintiff’s three sets of Objections and AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Bartick’s and 

Magistrate Judge Porter’s Orders.

BACKGROUND

Because the Court has previously recited the facts of this case at length, (see Dkt. 

No. 159), the Court will not repeat them here. 

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 25, 2012, alleging that Defendants 

wrongfully took disciplinary action against his physician’s and surgeon’s certificate. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Defendants in their official capacities, challenging the underlying California Medical 

Board’s decision to revoke his license. (Dkt. No. 159 at 39.

1

) 

For clarity, the Court will detail the relevant procedural background to each set of 

Plaintiff’s Objections infra in the Discussion section.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), aggrieved parties may file objections 

to the rulings of a magistrate judge in non-dispositive matters within fourteen days. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). In reviewing a magistrate judge’s order, the district judge “must 

 

1 All citations to the record refer to pagination generated by the CM/ECF system.

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consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly 

erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see 

also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980); Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 

1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the “clearly erroneous standard,” a court should 

overturn a magistrate judge’s ruling when it is “left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constrs. 

Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). A magistrate judge’s legal 

conclusions as to non-dispositive matters are reviewable for clear error. Grimes v. City & 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240–41 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Maisonville v. F2 

America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 747–48 (9th Cir. 1990)).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s First Set of Objections (Dkt. No. 183)

A. Plaintiff’s Deposition of Dr. Bardin

On October 21, 2015, Plaintiff served a deposition subpoena on third party Joshua 

Bardin, M.D. (“Dr. Bardin”) and included in the subpoena a request to produce 

documents. (Dkt. No. 157-2.) Dr. Bardin’s counsel invited Plaintiff to provide him with 

any documents Plaintiff wanted Dr. Bardin to review prior to the deposition, but Plaintiff 

did not provide counsel with any documents. (Dkt. No. 157-4 at 3, ¶ 4.) 

On December 16, 2015, Dr. Bardin appeared for his deposition. (Dkt. No. 157-3.) 

In response to Plaintiff’s document requests, Dr. Bardin produced his curriculum vitae, 

board certification, and license, but stated that he did not have any of the other documents 

that Plaintiff sought. (Id. at 4–6.) Dr. Bardin also testified that he did not have any 

copies of written communications with officials from the Board regarding Plaintiff’s 

underlying administrative matter, and that he lacked recollection of the medical journals, 

articles, and books upon which he based his testimony in October 2004. (Id. at 5.) Dr. 

Bardin stated that he did not review any documents before the deposition. (Id. at 15.)

 The deposition concluded after less than ninety minutes. (Id. at 61–62.) Shortly 

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into the deposition, Plaintiff expressed frustration with Dr. Bardin’s inability to recall 

certain events and assumed that Dr. Bardin would thereafter be unable to answer 

Plaintiff’s remaining questions. (See, e.g., id. at 28–29.) Plaintiff asserted that the 

deposition had to be continued because Dr. Bardin had not reviewed his testimony from 

the underlying administrative proceedings or the medical records. (Id.) Despite opposing 

counsel’s repeated, good-faith efforts to encourage Plaintiff to proceed with the 

deposition, Plaintiff refused and responded that doing so would take too much time. 

(See, e.g., id. at 29–50, 59–60.) Plaintiff unilaterally terminated the deposition. (Id. at 

60–61.) Opposing counsel advised Plaintiff that Dr. Bardin would not agree to continue 

the deposition. (Id. at 45 – 46; Dkt. No. 157-1 at ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. No. 157-4 at ¶¶ 7–8.)

B. Magistrate Judge Bartick’s Order (Dkt. No. 174)

On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to compel a further deposition 

of Dr. Bardin. (Dkt. No. 150.) On June 27, 2016, Judge Bartick denied Plaintiff’s 

motion to compel a further deposition of Dr. Bardin. (Dkt. No. 174.) Judge Bartick 

began by noting Plaintiff’s continued failure to comply with Judge Bartick’s chambers 

rules and orders, the Southern District’s Civil Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, despite prior warning from the Court. (Id. at 3–4.) Although it would have 

been well within Judge Bartick’s discretion to reject Plaintiff’s motion solely for 

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with multiple rules, Judge Bartick nonetheless addressed the 

merits of the parties’ discovery dispute. (Id.) 

First, Judge Bartick cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1)’s requirement 

that “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take 

reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the 

subpoena.” (Id. at 4–5.) Judge Bartick also noted that Rule 45 does not impose a duty on 

a non-entity witness to review documents or otherwise prepare in advance of the 

deposition. (Id. at 5.) Judge Bartick then concluded that Dr. Bardin fulfilled his 

obligations under the subpoena by appearing for deposition on December 16, 2015, and 

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by bringing the requested documents that he had in his possession. (Id.) Judge Bartick 

then concluded that Plaintiff’s refusal to continue questioning Dr. Bardin was 

unreasonable, inappropriate, and based on speculation. (Id. at 5–6.) Judge Bartick found 

that Plaintiff’s actions did not constitute “reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue 

burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena” under Rule 45(d)(1) and denied 

Plaintiff’s motion. (Id.)

C. Plaintiff’s Grounds for Objections

Plaintiff objects on grounds that (1) Dr. Bardin is an expert; (2) Dr. Bardin did not 

produce documents as required under Rule 45(a)(1)(C)–(D), even though the documents 

were available to him and under his control; and (3) it was appropriate to terminate the 

deposition in order to provide Dr. Bardin with documents and time to refresh his 

recollection. (Dkt. No. 183 at 5–9.) In support of his motion to compel a further 

deposition of Dr. Bardin, Plaintiff cites Orrison v. Balcor Co., 132 F.R.D. 202, 203 (N.D. 

Ill. 1990) and Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98, 99–100 (S.D. 

Ohio 1995), cases wherein motions to compel further deposition of witnesses were 

granted. (Id. at 8–9.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that continuing the deposition would 

impose no prejudice on Dr. Bardin. (Id. at 9–10.)

Plaintiff’s grounds for objections amount to disagreement with Judge Bartick’s 

Order and fail to clear the high bar of demonstrating clear error. First, Plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate that Judge Bartick’s conclusion that Dr. Bardin is not an expert witness is 

contrary to law or clearly erroneous. Judge Bartick properly concluded that while Dr. 

Bardin was formerly a medical expert for the California Medical Board and was retained 

for purposes of testifying in the underlying disciplinary proceedings, Dr. Bardin was not 

retained or designated as an expert for purposes of this instant action. (Dkt. No. 174 at 

2.) Second, Dr. Bardin testified on the record that he did not have in his possession any 

of the other documents Plaintiff sought. (Dkt. No. 157-3 at 4–6.) Third, Plaintiff cites no 

law in support of his position that it was appropriate to unilaterally terminate the 

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deposition to (1) provide Dr. Bardin with documents that Plaintiff did not provide to Dr. 

Bardin beforehand despite opposing counsel’s invitation to do so, and (2) provide Dr. 

Bardin with more time to refresh his recollection, despite the fact that nearly six hours of 

deposition time remained and the fact that Plaintiff improperly assumed that Dr. Bardin 

would be unable to answer his remaining questions. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s legal 

authorities are inapposite. See Contardo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 119 

F.R.D. 622, 625 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that plaintiff could not circumvent an order 

prohibiting further discovery in the case “by serving a subpoena duces tecum upon an 

employee of the defendant commanding the employee to produce documents within the 

custody, control and/or possession of the defendant”); Orrison v. Balcor Co., 132 F.R.D. 

202, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that plaintiff could be required to submit to a second 

deposition even though the discovery cut-off date had passed because plaintiff “brought 

numerous documents which had not been produced previously” when appearing for the 

first deposition, and “[n]one of the defendants had a sufficient opportunity to review the 

documents prior to the deposition”); and Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 

160 F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (concluding that “[t]he record reflects numerous 

instances of improper instructions to witnesses not to answer questions by attorneys”).

Judge Bartick’s Order was neither contrary to law nor clearly erroneous. 

Accordingly, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. No. 183) and 

AFFIRMS Judge Bartick’s Order (Dkt. No. 174). 

II. Plaintiff’s Second Set of Objections (Dkt. No. 185)

A. Judge Bartick’s Orders (Dkt. Nos. 169, 177)

On October 19, 2015, Plaintiff served a Request for Production of Documents on 

Defendant Kimberly Kirchmeyer (“Kirchmeyer”). (Dkt. No. 148 at 44–48.) In Requests 

Nos. 2, 6, and 10, Plaintiff requested minutes from the closed session meetings that the 

Medical Board held in 2006, 2008, and 2010 concerning the disciplinary action against 

Plaintiff. (Id.) On December 22, 2015, Kirchmeyer responded and asserted that the 

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deliberative process privilege applied to the minutes from the closed sessions of the 

Board meetings. (Id. at 50–68.) 

On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to compel Kirchmeyer to 

produce documents. (Dkt. No. 148.) On June 21, 2016, Judge Bartick denied in part and 

reserved in part Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. No. 169.) Specifically, because Kirchmeyer did 

not provide a privilege log or a declaration substantiating her claim of deliberative 

process privilege, Judge Bartick reserved ruling on whether Kirchmeyer should be 

compelled to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production Nos. 

2, 6, and 10. (Id. at 4–6.) 

In addition, Judge Bartick noted Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s 

procedures for filing discovery motions, the Court’s rules governing ex parte 

applications, and the duty to meet and confer prior to bringing a discovery motion under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) and under the Southern District’s Civil Local Rule 

26.1(a). (Dkt. No. 169 at 2–3.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion was untimely by two 

months without justification. (Id. at 3.) As Judge Bartick correctly stated, (id.), it would 

have been well within Judge Bartick’s discretion to reject Plaintiff’s motion for these 

reasons alone. See, e.g., Civ. L.R. 26.1(a) (“The court will entertain no motion pursuant 

to Rules 26 through 37, Fed. R. Civ. P., unless counsel will have previously met and 

conferred concerning all disputed issues.”); Rogers v. Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. 469, 477 

(S.D. Cal. 2012) (“A court can deny a motion to compel solely because of a party’s 

failure to meet and confer prior to filing the motion.”); Scheinuck v. Sepulveda, No. C 09-

0727 WHA PR, 2010 WL 5174340, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010) (same).

On June 29, 2016, Kirchmeyer filed a declaration and privilege log pursuant to the 

Court’s June 21, 2016 Order. (Dkt. No. 176.) In a Supplemental Order on July 1, 2016, 

Judge Bartick concluded that the closed session minutes were predecisional and 

deliberative, and that Plaintiff’s need for the minutes did not outweigh the Board’s 

interest in nondisclosure. (Dkt. No. 177 at 3.) Judge Bartick further found that 

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disclosure of the closed session minutes could chill frank and open discussion by Board 

members during closed session deliberations. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, Judge Bartick 

sustained Kirchmeyer’s assertion of the deliberative process privilege. (Id.)

B. Plaintiff’s Grounds for Objections

Plaintiff asserts five objections: (1) the deliberative process privilege does not 

apply to civil rights claims (Dkt. No. 185 at 4–6); (2) Kirchmeyer’s assertion of the

qualified deliberative process privilege is overcome by a number of factors, which the 

Court did not consider (id. at 6–8); (3) Kirchmeyer’s declaration is not consistent with the 

privilege log, which is independently defective (id. at 8–10); (4) administrative decisions 

are not protected by the deliberative process privilege (id. at 10); and (5) the privilege 

was waived by the publication of the Board’s decisions (id. at 10–11).

Again, Plaintiff’s grounds for objections amount to disagreement with Judge 

Bartick’s Orders and fail to clear the high bar of demonstrating clear error. First, Plaintiff 

provides no legal authority to support his assertion that the deliberative process privilege 

does not apply to civil rights claims. Plaintiff’s cites to factually inapposite cases

wherein courts held that the “deliberative process privilege does not apply when the 

government’s intent is at issue.” Jones v. City of Coll. Park, Ga., 237 F.R.D. 517, 520 

(N.D. Ga. 2006) (Title VII and Section 1983 claim alleging “racial discrimination in 

connection with nonrenewal of Plaintiff’s employment”); see also Waters v. U.S. Capitol 

Police Bd., 218 F.R.D. 323, 324 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the deliberative process 

privilege could not be used “to thwart discovery of information in a case in which a 

plaintiff challenges governmental action as discriminatory”); Qamhiyah v. Iowa State 

Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 245 F.R.D. 393, 399 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (holding that the 

deliberative process privilege did not apply where plaintiff alleged that the deliberative 

process itself was “tainted with unlawful discrimination”); Burka v. N.Y. City Transit 

Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that “the recorded observations 

of an eyewitness” were not protected by the deliberative process privilege, as the 

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“privilege applies only to expressions of opinion or recommendations, not to the facts 

upon which such evaluations might have been based”); Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. 

Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the deliberative process 

privilege did not apply where plaintiff “alleged that the defendants . . . used the Hospital 

committee apparatus discriminatorily to deny him staff privileges at the Hospital in 

furtherance of an unlawful restraint of trade”); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 

F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D.D.C. 1981) (“An exception to the general thought-process rule is 

made where there are allegations of misconduct or misbehavior, and evidence to that 

effect is not privileged.” (emphasis added)); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 

659 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (dicta voicing the court’s opinion that “the ‘deliberative process’

privilege should be limited to communications designed to contribute, directly, to the 

formulation of important public policy”). Government intent is not similarly at issue in 

this case, as this Court previously held that Plaintiff did not sufficiently state a claim for 

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations (inter alia, racial discrimination) 

under Section 1983. (Dkt. No. 59 at 14–16; Dkt. No. 159 at 32–34.)

Second, Judge Bartick did in fact consider factors to determine whether the 

deliberative privilege applied. (Dkt. No. 177 at 3–4.) Applying settled law, Judge 

Bartick evaluated the following factors: “1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the 

availability of other evidence; 3) the government’s role in the litigation; and 4) the extent 

to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding 

contemplated policies and decisions.” F.T.C. v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 

1161 (9th Cir. 1984). In particular, Judge Bartick found that Plaintiff already has the 

complete State administrative record available to him, and that disclosure of the closed 

session minutes would chill frank and independent discussion by Board members. (Dkt. 

No. 177 at 3–4.) This Court finds that there was no clear error in Judge Bartick’s 

conclusion that Plaintiff’s need for the information did not outweigh and override the 

deliberative process privilege. 

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Third, Kirchmeyer’s declaration is not “incorrect and misleading” or inconsistent 

with the privilege log. (Dkt. No. 185 at 8.) Plaintiff’s citation to Grossman v. Schwarz, 

125 F.R.D. 376, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) does not avail his objection to Kirchmeyer’s 

declaration. (Id.) In her declaration, Kirchmeyer stated that she is the Executive Director 

for the Medical Board of California, affirmed she had personal knowledge of the facts 

attested to in the declaration and privilege log, and provided the factual bases for her

claim of injury to legitimate government interests flowing from a potential disclosure. 

(Dkt. No. 176.) Furthermore, Kirchmeyer’s list of the dates of the closed session 

meetings (November 2, 2006; April 24, 2008; and July 29, 2010) and the dates on which 

the decisions rendered at the meetings were adopted (December 6, 2006; June 13, 2008;

and September 27, 2010, respectively) are completely consistent with the dates provided 

in the privilege log. Plaintiff does not establish how Kirchmeyer’s declaration is 

incorrect or misleading; rather, the record indicates that Kirchmeyer complied with 

applicable legal requirements. See Grossman, 125 F.R.D. at 381 (“Governmental 

privilege must ordinarily be invoked by a department head or other responsible agency 

official, after a personal review of the documents, in an affidavit stating a factual basis 

for the claim of injury to legitimate government interests flowing from disclosure.”).

Nor is the privilege log independently defective. (Dkt. No. 176-1.) Contrary to 

Plaintiff’s assertions, (Dkt. No. 185 at 10), the privilege log contains sufficient 

information, including document descriptions and the subject matter contained within; 

the author, recipient, and/or custodian of the documents; and the category of privilege 

and application of privilege asserted for each document, (Dkt. No. 176-1). Plaintiff does 

not identify any defects in the privilege log that would inhibit Plaintiff or the Court from 

adequately assessing the claim of privilege. See Friends of Hope Valley v. Frederick Co., 

268 F.R.D. 643, 650–51 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 

Fourth, Plaintiff mistakenly conflates the ultimate administrative decision itself 

with the deliberative process that resulted in the decision. (Dkt. No. 185 at 10.) It is 

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settled law that “the deliberative process privilege permits the government to withhold 

documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising 

part of a process by which governmental decisions and polices are formulated.”

Hongsermeier v. C.I.R., 621 F.3d 890, 904 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation, quotation 

marks, and alteration omitted). Plaintiff’s legal authorities are factually inapposite. See 

Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981)

(confidential medical disciplinary proceedings based on peer review required to be 

disclosed in antitrust action alleging conspiracy); Scott v. Bd. of Educ. of City of E. 

Orange, 219 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.N.J. 2004) (concluding that “inquiry into the Board’s 

pre-decisional mental impressions and discussions [was] necessary to challenge the 

purported reason for Plaintiff’s termination,” as plaintiff “attack[ed] the integrity of the 

Board’s decision to terminate him” and “alleged that he was terminated . . . because he 

failed to participate in an illegal bidding scheme and because he attempted to unearth 

such scheme”).

Fifth, Plaintiff provides no support for the proposition that the publication of the 

Board’s decisions results in an automatic waiver of the deliberative process privilege. 

(Dkt. No. 185 at 10–11.) Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 

1989) (concluding that the EPA had not “waived its right to invoke statutory exemptions 

to Mobil’s request for documents under FOIA by its release of related documents to 

Mobil and third parties”) does not avail Plaintiff’s argument.

Finally, this Court expresses concern with Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply 

with the rules and orders governing discovery despite multiple warnings from the Court. 

It would have been well within Judge Bartick’s discretion to reject Plaintiff’s motion

solely for his failure to comply with Judge Bartick’s scheduling order and chambers 

rules, the Southern District’s Civil Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See, e.g., Civ. L.R. 26.1(a); Rogers, 288 F.R.D. at 477.

In sum, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. No. 185) and 

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AFFIRMS Judge Bartick’s Orders (Dkt. Nos. 169, 177).

III. Plaintiff’s Third Set of Objections (Dkt. No. 215)

A. Judge Porter’s Order (Dkt. No. 207)

Plaintiff moved to compel documents from Defendant Sharon Levine (“Dr. 

Levine”) responsive to his amended Requests for Production of Documents A, B, C, D, 

E, and G. (Dkt. No. 201.) Judge Porter denied the motion on November 14, 2016. (Dkt. 

No. 207.) With respect to Requests A, B, and C, Judge Porter determined that the 

documents requested were equally available to Plaintiff, and that the Requests were 

improperly served after the discovery cut-off date without permission. (Id. at 3–4.) With 

respect to Requests D and E, Judge Porter determined to be sufficient Dr. Levine’s 

responses indicating that despite a diligent search and inquiry, the documents requested 

were not in her possession, custody or control. (Id. at 4–5.) Finally, with respect to 

Request G, Judge Porter concluded that the Request sought irrelevant information that 

violated privacy rights, and that Plaintiff did not establish sufficient need for the 

information, given his prior deposition of Dr. Garg.

2

 (Id. at 5.)

B. Plaintiff’s Grounds for Objections

Plaintiff contends that Judge Porter abused her discretion in denying his motion to 

compel responses to Requests A, B, and C. (Dkt. No. 215 at 7.) However, Plaintiff 

merely avers that Judge Porter’s determination was incorrect, without establishing any 

grounds for how Judge Porter’s decision was contrary to law. Plaintiff also objects to 

Judge Porter’s determination that his Requests A, B, and C, which requested new 

documents not requested in Plaintiff’s original Document Requests, exceeded the scope 

of the Court’s June 29, 2016 order. (Id.) Plaintiff’s objection is futile. Judge Porter’s 

June 29, 2016 order reopened discovery solely for the purpose of allowing the 

depositions of Kirchmeyer and Dr. Levine to go forward and directed Kirchmeyer and 

 

2 Plaintiff does not object to Judge Porter’s ruling regarding Request G. (Dkt. No. 215 at 8.)

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Dr. Levine to respond only to the Requests for Production of Documents that were 

attached to their deposition notices. (Dkt. No. 175 at 8.) Plaintiff improperly sought 

documents beyond the scope of discovery allowed by the Court’s order.

With respect to Requests D and E, Plaintiff again asserts that the Court’s sustention 

of the deliberative process privilege is erroneous. (Dkt. No. 215 at 8.) Plaintiff’s 

objection to Judge Porter’s Order is misplaced, as Judge Porter based her decision not on 

Judge Bartick’s earlier ruling sustaining Defendants’ assertion of the deliberative process 

privilege, but on Dr. Levine’s statement that “after a diligent search and inquiry,” she was 

unable to locate any responsive documents, as the documents were not in her possession, 

custody, or control. (Dkt. No. 207 at 4–5.) Moreover, this Court has already addressed 

Plaintiff’s objections regarding the deliberative process privilege, supra Part II, with 

respect to the closed session minutes from 2006, 2008, and 2010.

Finally, Plaintiff attached to his Objections excerpts from the deposition transcripts 

of Linda Whitney and Kimberly Kirchmeyer. (Dkt. No. 215 at 10–21.) This Court 

declines to consider the deposition transcripts, as Plaintiff provides no justification for 

not first raising the excerpts to the Magistrate Judge. See Harbridge v. Yates, No. 1:10-

CV-00473 AWI, 2012 WL 639476, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (“[O]bjections to a 

Magistrate Judge’s order are not the place for a party to make a new argument and raise 

facts not addressed in his original brief.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. No. 185) and 

AFFIRMS Judge Porter’s Order (Dkt. No. 207). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s three sets of 

Objections (Dkt. Nos. 183, 185, 215) and AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Porter’s and 

Magistrate Judge Bartick’s Orders. (Dkt. Nos. 174; 169, 177, 207.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/ / / /

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Dated: January 17, 2017

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