Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-02120/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-02120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Enforcement of Judgment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUDITH A. CHANCE, et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 2:19-cv-02120-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on Defendants’ Cross Motions to Vacate or Deem the 

Arbitration Awards Invalid or Unenforceable. (Docs. # 30, 35, 50). The Motions have been fully 

briefed (see Docs. 30, 35, 50, 53) and are ripe for review. After careful review, and for the reasons 

stated below, Defendants’ Motions (Docs. # 30, 35, 50) are due to be denied, and the arbitration 

award (Doc. # 1-7) is due to be confirmed.

I. Background

This action arises out of a commercial loan agreement between Plaintiff Wells Fargo and 

non-party Vestavia Hills, Ltd., wherein Defendants agreed to serve as guarantors of a loan in the 

amount of $26,010,00.00 (the principal amount). (Doc. # 1 at 5, ¶ 21).

On February 27, 2019, Wells Fargo filed an action in this court against Defendants to 

enforce the terms and conditions of the loan agreement. (Id.; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Chance 

et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00339-JEO). However, Defendants demanded that Wells Fargo dismiss 

that case and submit its claims to binding arbitration, as was required by the loan agreement. (Id.

¶ 22). According to the arbitration provision in the loan agreement:

FILED

 2020 Apr-16 PM 03:03

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:19-cv-02120-RDP Document 56 Filed 04/16/20 Page 1 of 13
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[A]ny arbitration would be conducted by the American Arbitration Association 

(“AAA”) pursuant to its commercial dispute resolution procedures at a location in 

Alabama selected by AAA. To the extent the amount in controversy exceeded $5.0 

million, the arbitration provisions provided that the arbitration would be decided by 

a panel of three arbitrators. The arbitration provisions also provided that the 

arbitrators were to award all costs and expenses of any arbitration proceeding and 

that, to the extent possible, the arbitrators and parties were to take all action to 

conclude any arbitration proceeding within 180 days of the filing of a demand for 

arbitration with AAA.

(Id. ¶ 24). Consequently, on March 27, 2019, Wells Fargo filed a demand for arbitration with 

AAA, and on April 1, 2019, it dismissed the initial lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 25). On May 16, 2019, without 

objection, William Hasty, Jr., John Sherrill, and Henry Chalmers were appointed to the arbitration 

panel (the “Panel”). (Id. ¶ 26; Doc. # 1-4 at 2).

On July 19, 2019, the Panel “sent each side correspondence requesting that they each make 

an initial deposit of $32,225.00 to cover the costs of the final hearing.” (See Docs. # 53 at 6; 30-1 

at 2). On August 30, 2019, Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary disposition, requesting the 

Panel to find that Defendants violated their guaranty agreements. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 27). On October 

7, 2019, the Panel “communicated to the parties that [it] had decided to defer ruling on the motion

for summary disposition until the parties completed discovery; the Panel also allowed the parties 

until November 6 to file briefs addressing any additional matters they wished to bring to the Panel’s 

attention, and until November 11 to file any responses thereto.” (Docs. # 53 at 6; 54 at 22). On 

October 29, 2019, the Panel emailed the parties stating that they had not yet received either party’s 

deposit of $32,225.00, and that, “if the outstanding balance [was] not brought current by November 

5, 2019, the [AAA] [would] inform the [P]anel which party ha[d] not paid and the amounts owed. 

At that point, the arbitrators [would] have a number of options on whether to proceed with the 

arbitration.” (Doc. # 54 at 24). On November 8, 2019, the Panel again informed the parties that the 

amount due ($32,225.00) had not been paid in full and that the payment was due on or before 

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November 11, 2019. (Docs. # 30-1 at 2; 54 at 30).

“On November 26, 2019, the Panel issued an ‘Interim Order Regarding Liability and 

Damages’ granting Wells Fargo’s motion for summary disposition and finding that [Wells Fargo] 

had established Defendants’ liability under their guaranties and that the outstanding principal of 

the loan was $17,653,004.62.” (Id. ¶ 28; Doc. # 1-5). Subsequently, on December 3, the Panel 

canceled the previously-scheduled telephone conference for that day and notified the parties that 

if there was to be a final hearing, it would be on December 12. (Doc. # 30-2 at 2). 

“On December 9, 2019, the [P]anel issued its ‘Second Interim Order Regarding Damages,

finding that [Wells Fargo] had proved it was owed $18,077,246.12 in outstanding principal, 

interest, costs, and fees, and $87,114.68 in attorneys’ fees.” (Id. ¶ 29). In addition, the Panel 

postponed the final hearing indefinitely until Defendants explained why they contested Wells 

Fargo’s entitlement to “$869 per day in accumulating default interest.” (Doc. # 1-6 at 2). 

On December 20, 2019, because Defendants refused to respond to the Second Interim 

Order, the Panel issued its Final Award. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 30; Doc. # 1-7 at 3). The total amount to be 

awarded to Wells Fargo was $18,086,910.61, with interest to accrue “at the rate of $3,477.47 per 

day from the date of this Final Award.” (Doc. # 1-7 at 3).

On December 27, 2019, Wells Fargo filed this suit seeking to enforce the arbitration award. 

(Doc. # 1). On January 10, 2020, a Notice of Bankruptcy was filed on behalf of Vestavia Hills, 

Ltd. (the company who actually received the commercial loan from Wells Fargo). (Doc. # 4). On 

February 18, 2020, Defendants answered and moved to vacate the arbitration award. 

II. Standard of Review

Under 9 U.S.C. § 9:

If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be 

entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, 

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then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration 

may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and 

thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, 

or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified 

in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United 

States court in and for the district within which such award was made. 

9 U.S.C. § 9; see Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“Section 9 of the FAA provides that, upon application of any party to the arbitration, the court 

must confirm the arbitrator’s award unless it is vacated, modified, or corrected in accordance with 

sections 10 and 11 of the statute.”). “A motion to vacate is not a mechanism to appeal or otherwise 

challenge the merits of a dispute conclusively determined in arbitration. Indeed . . . on a motion to 

vacate an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), a district court ‘may revisit neither the legal 

merits of the award nor the factual determinations upon which it relies.’” Floridians for Solar 

Choice, Inc. v. PCI Consultants, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (internal 

citations omitted). “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract 

and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error 

does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL–

CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).

“There is nothing malleable about [the] ‘must grant’ [language in the FAA] which 

unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ 

exceptions applies.” Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008). “A proceeding 

to confirm an arbitration award under Section 9 of the FAA is intended to be summary, and 

confirmation should be withheld only if a party meets its substantial burden under Section 10 or 

11 of the FAA.” Careminders Home Care, Inc. v. Concura, Inc., 660 F. App’x 795, 796 (11th Cir. 

2016) (per curiam). “A court’s confirmation of an arbitration award is usually routine or 

summary.” Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002); see also AIG Baker 

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Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(“Because arbitration is an alternative to litigation, judicial review of arbitration decisions is 

‘among the narrowest known to the law.’” (citations omitted)). To be sure, “Section 10 permits 

vacatur of arbitration awards only in four narrow circumstances”:

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 

them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 

hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 

material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 

party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 

that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 

made.

Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)). Importantly, “[t]here is a presumption under 

the FAA that arbitration awards will be confirmed, and ‘federal courts should defer to an 

arbitrator’s decision whenever possible.’” Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1321 (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l,

LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by 

CM S. E. Texas Houston, LLC v. CareMinders Home Care, Inc., 662 F. App’x 701 (11th Cir. 

2016)).

III. Analysis

Defendants contend that the arbitration award should be rendered invalid or unenforceable 

because “(1) two of the awards [were] not signed by all three members of the Panel . . . , and (2) 

... the Panel members’ summary disposition of the arbitration matter without a hearing was 

influenced by Defendants’ non-payment of the arbitration fees.” (Doc. # 30 at 8). For the reasons 

discussed below, the court rejects both arguments and concludes that the arbitration award is due 

to be confirmed. 

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1. The Fact that Two Awards Were Not Signed by All Arbitrators Does Not Render 

the Final Award Invalid 

Defendants assert that the arbitrators exceeded their powers in violation of § 10(4), and 

therefore the Second Interim Award and the Final Award are due to be vacated. The court 

disagrees.

Importantly, “[o]nly if ‘the arbitrator act[s] outside the scope of his contractually delegated 

authority—issuing an award that simply reflects his own notions of economic justice rather than 

drawing its essence from the contract—may a court overturn his determination.’” PCI Consultants, 

Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (quoting Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 

(2013)); see Johnson v. Directory Assistants Inc., 797 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To 

vacate an award under § 10(a)(4), it is not enough to show that the arbitrator committed an error—

or even a serious error.”) (quoting Oxford, 569 U.S. at 568).

Under the Forbearance Agreement between Wells Fargo, Vestavia Hills, Ltd., and 

Defendants, the arbitration provision provided that “any arbitration proceeding in which the 

amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00 shall be decided by a majority vote of a panel of 

three arbitrators; provided however, that all three arbitrators must actively participate in all 

hearings and deliberations.” (Doc. # 1-1 at 20). Here, there were three arbitrators. There is no 

substantive argument or suggestion that they did not all “actively participate” in the arbitration of 

this matter. Rather, Defendants complain that: (1) the Second Interim Order Regarding Damages

-- executed on December 9, 2019 -- was signed only by one arbitrator, Henry R. Chalmers, and 

that Chalmers signed the other two signatures “with permission” from the other arbitrators (see

Docs. # 1-6 at 3, 1-7); and (2) the Final Award -- executed on December 20, 2019 -- was signed 

only by one arbitrator, John A. Sherrill, and that Sherrill signed the other two signatures “with 

permission” from the other arbitrators (see Doc. # 1-7 at 3). Defendants contend that they did not 

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consent to an award being signed “with permission,” and that such practice violates Rule 46(a) of 

the Commercial Rules of Arbitration and Section 6-6-4 of the Alabama Code. That assertion is 

meritless.

Under Rule 46(a) of the Commercial Rules of Arbitration, “[a]ny award shall be in writing 

and signed by a majority of the arbitrators. It shall be executed in the form and manner required 

by law.” Comm. Arb. Rule 46(a). Relatedly, under Section 6-6-4 of the Alabama Code, “[i]t is the 

duty of the arbitrators to . . . make their award in writing, which must be signed by them.” Ala. 

Code § 6-6-4. There is nothing in this Alabama Rule, the AAA Rules, or elsewhere in the Alabama 

Code that explicitly prohibits a member of an arbitration panel from signing the name of another 

member “with permission.” See Publicis Comm. v. True North Comms., Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 730 

(7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Publicis’ similar “argument goes nowhere” and finding it

immaterial that “the tribunal chairman Philip signed the decision ‘for and on behalf’ of the other 

arbitrators”). 

The Seventh Circuit has reached a similar result interpreting the arbitration rule of the 

National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). In Olson v. Wexford Clearing Servs. Corp., 

397 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff (Olson) filed a demand for arbitration against several 

defendants over the handling of certain brokerage accounts. Id. at 488-89. NASD appointed a 

three-member panel of arbitrators to conduct the arbitration. Id. at 489. The chair of the panel 

granted a motion to dismiss Defendant Wexford Clearing, denied a motion to reconsider that 

decision, and denied a motion by Olson to amend his claim. Id. The order dismissing Wexford 

Clearing was signed “by the chair on behalf of the panel.” Id.

Olson then filed suit to vacate the award, asserting, among other things, that the chair’s 

signing of the order “on behalf of the panel” rendered it invalid. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, 

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labeling this argument as a complaint about a “superficial technicality”:

But, Olson argues, even if the April 15 award was sufficiently final to end the case, 

it had another flaw serious enough to affect the limitations period. NASD Rule 

10330(a) requires all awards to be “signed by a majority of the arbitrators.” Thus, 

according to Olson, the April 15 award could not have been a proper award under 

NASD rules because it was signed by the chair on behalf of the panel. While 

conceding that “‘superficial technicalities’ should not control whether a decision in 

arbitration is final or not,” Olson nonetheless urges us to find in his favor on this 

basis because he believes that the signature requirement is substantively important. 

In Publicis Communication, [supra], the parties to an arbitration disagreed over the 

interpretation of a rule requiring the chairman’s signature on procedural matters. 

Noting that either party’s interpretation was plausible, we focused on the more 

relevant issue: that the finality of an arbitration agreement “should be judged by 

substance and effect, not by superficial technicalities.” Id. at 730. Following that 

general approach, we are unpersuaded that the arguable violation of the NASD rule 

here should have the drastic consequence of rendering the April 15 decision a 

nullity. As Wexford points out, the NASD rules do not prohibit the chair from 

signing an order on behalf of the panel. At the end of the day, this technicality offers 

no reason to disregard the unambiguous dismissal of Wexford on April 15.

Olson, 397 F.3d at 491-92 (emphasis added).

The court notes that the parties’ Forbearance Agreement does not limit or preclude a 

member of the Panel from signing for another “with permission.” Under the AAA Rules:

[B]ecause arbitration is a creature of contract, the parties, when incorporating any 

set of arbitration rules by reference in an arbitration agreement, are free to include 

provisions in conflict with certain provisions of rules incorporated by reference; the 

specific provisions in the arbitration agreement take precedence and the arbitration 

rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict with the express 

provisions of the arbitration agreement.

Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831-32 (11th Cir. 1991). Further, “the ‘authority 

of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions of the arbitration

agreement under which the arbitrators were appointed,’” and under these circumstances, there is 

nothing to suggest that the arbitrators could not operate using this practice. Cat Charter, LLC v. 

Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

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Wells Fargo also argues that under Rule 41 of the Commercial Rules of Arbitration, “[a]ny 

party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these 

rules has not been complied with and who fails to state an objection in writing shall be deemed to 

have waived the right to object.” Comm. Arb. Rule 41. Wells Fargo contends -- and there is nothing 

in the record suggesting otherwise -- that during arbitration, Defendants “never argued, claimed, 

or even suggested that Wells Fargo or the Panel violated the AAA Rules in any respect, including 

in the making of the Final Award.” (Doc. # 53 at 9). It claims this is another indication that 

Defendants are playing cat and mouse trying to avoid or delay a judgment. 

Therefore, the court concludes that the arbitrators acted within the bounds of the AAA 

Rules and the applicable Alabama Rules. The arbitrators did not exceed their power or violate the 

AAA Rules or the Alabama Code. 

2. The Fact that Defendants Did Not Pay Their Fees Is Immaterial to the Panel’s 

Decision to Forego Holding a Hearing

Defendants assert that the arbitration award should be vacated because, under § 10(a)(3), 

the Panel “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,” thus depriving 

Defendants of a hearing. Specifically, Defendants contend that they “were never heard at a 

scheduled hearing because the Panel made a summary decision after learning Defendants owed 

outstanding fees to the AAA.” (Doc. # 30 at 10). But, this argument holds no water.

Under Rule 57 of the Commercial Rules of Arbitration, “[i]f arbitrator compensation or 

administrative charges have not been paid in full, the AAA may so inform the parties in order that 

one of them may advance the required payment.” Relatedly, “[u]pon receipt of information from 

the AAA that full payments have not been received, the arbitrator, on the arbitrator’s own initiative 

or at the request of the AAA or a party, may order the suspension of the arbitration.” Comm. Arb. 

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Rule 57 (emphasis added).1

On October 29, 2019, the Panel emailed the parties to inform them that neither of them had 

paid the $32,225.00 fee for the Panel’s “anticipated compensation and expenses.” (Doc. # 54 at 

24). Payment was to be paid on or before November 5, 2019. (Id.). On November 8, 2019, the 

Panel again informed the parties that the amount due ($32,225.00) had not been paid in full and 

that the payment was due on or before November 11, 2019.

2

(Docs. # 30-1 at 2; 54 at 30). 

Notwithstanding the payment (or nonpayment) of fees, the Panel proceeded. They clearly 

had the authority to do so. (See Doc. # 54 at 34-35). On November 26, 2019, after giving both 

parties multiple opportunities to submit additional evidence, the Panel granted Wells Fargo’s 

motion for summary disposition by issuing an Interim Order Regarding Liability and Damages in 

favor of Wells Fargo in the amount of $17,653,004.62. (Doc. # 1-5). However, the Panel allowed 

Defendants until December 2, 2019 to file a brief stating their position with respect to the amounts 

of interest, attorney’s fees, and expenses owed to Wells Fargo. (Id. at 1). 

Subsequently, on December 9, 2019, the Panel issued a Second Interim Order, finding that 

Wells Fargo had established it was owed $18,077,246.12 in outstanding principal, interest, costs, 

and fees, and $87,114.68 in attorneys’ fees.3(Id. ¶ 29). In addition, the Panel postponed the final 

hearing indefinitely until Defendants explained, by December 12, 2019, why they contested Wells 

Fargo’s entitlement to “$869 per day in accumulating default interest.” (Doc. # 1-6 at 2). On 

December 13, 2019, Defendants informed the Panel that they would not be submitting any 

1

Indeed, the Panel may suspend the hearing, but it does not have to. If so desired, the Panel could continue 

the proceedings without prepayment of the fees. 

2 Wells Fargo claims that it made its payment, as well as the payment for Defendants. (Doc. # 53 at 12). 

However, there is no evidence in the record supporting that claim. Indeed, in an email from the Panel to Defendants 

on November 12, 2019, the Panel stated: “Please advise me as soon as possible regarding your client’s payment.” (See 

id. at 34). In any event, whether payment was made or not, the Panel issued its ruling.

3 Wells Fargo initially demanded $102,111.68 in attorney’s fees but then reduced the amount by $15,000, 

thus totaling $87,114.68. (Doc. # 1-6 at 2). 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-RDP Document 56 Filed 04/16/20 Page 10 of 13
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response to the Second Interim Order. (Doc. # 1-7 at 3). So, on December 20, 2019, the Panel 

issued its Final Award, totaling $18,086,910.61, with $3,477.47 in interest accruing daily. (Doc. # 

1-7).

Based on the record before the court, it is readily apparent that the Panel gave Defendants 

multiple opportunities to supplement their evidentiary material, including opportunities to do so

after the Panel informed both parties that the total fee had not yet been paid. Indeed, it was not 

until December 9, 2019 (when the Panel issued the Second Interim Order) that the final hearing 

was indefinitely suspended pending resolution of the accumulating default interest question.

Defendants never responded to that inquiry. 

“Arbitrators enjoy wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing. When a party 

challenges an evidentiary decision of the arbitration panel, a federal court may vacate the award 

only if the arbitrator’s refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudiced the rights of the 

parties to the arbitration proceedings.” Aviles v. Charles Schwab & Co., 435 F. App’x 824m 828 

(11th Cir. 2011) (citing Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 494 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 

2007)). Here, there is no indication that the Panel refused to hear evidence. But, even if it did, there 

are no facts establishing that such a refusal prejudiced Defendants in any way. Defendants simply 

did not (and, in at least one instance, deliberately chose not to) put forth evidence supporting their 

case.

Therefore, the court cannot conclude that the Panel “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent 

and material to the controversy” within the meaning of § 10(a)(3). Defendants were given ample 

opportunities to present all their evidence but chose not to take advantage of those opportunities.

Consequently, because “[t]here is a presumption under the [FAA] that arbitration awards will be 

confirmed, and federal courts should defer to an arbitrator’s decision whenever possible,” the court 

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concludes that Defendants have failed to show that the Final Award should be vacated and/or 

rendered invalid or unenforceable. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Urquidi, 786 F. App’x 970, 973 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 

3. The Arbitration Award is Due to be Confirmed 

Plaintiff requests that the court confirm the December 20, 2019 Final Award and enter 

judgment in its favor and against Defendants in the amount of $18,086,910.61, with “post-award 

interest at the rate of $3,477.47 from December 20, 2019 through the date of judgment and postjudgment interest from the date of judgment,” as well as attorney’s fees. (Doc. # 1). 

“The Federal Arbitration Act presumes that arbitration awards will be confirmed, and 

judicial review of an arbitration award is narrowly limited.” Rosensweig, 494 F.3d at 1333 

(citations omitted). Because the court concludes that the Panel committed no error in the 

underlying arbitration proceedings, the Final Award is due to be confirmed. See Continental 

Casualty Co. v. Staffing Concepts, Inc., 2014 WL 12622469, *1 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2014) 

(“[U]pon petition to confirm an arbitration award, a ‘court must grant such an order.’”) (citation 

omitted). And, “[u]pon confirmation of an arbitration award, a party may be awarded both 

prejudgment and postjudgment interest.” Id. (citing Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. 

Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1998)).

Defendants have objected to the arbitrators’ award, but those objections are without merit. 

Therefore, there being no other arguments as to why the arbitration award is invalid, the court 

concludes the arbitration award (Doc. # 1-7) is due to be confirmed in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. and against Defendants. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 

IV. Conclusion 

This case brings to mind the following words of the Eleventh Circuit: 

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When a party who loses an arbitration award assumes a never-say-die attitude and 

drags the dispute through the court system without an objectively reasonable belief 

it will prevail, the promise of arbitration is broken. Arbitration's allure is dependent 

upon the arbitrator being the last decision maker in all but the most unusual cases. 

The more cases there are, like this one, in which the arbitrator is only the first stop 

along the way, the less arbitration there will be. If arbitration is to be a meaningful 

alternative to litigation, the parties must be able to trust that the arbitrator's decision 

will be honored sooner instead of later.

B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC, 441 F.3d at 913. Defendants cannot continue to drag out this dispute any 

longer. 

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions (Docs. # 30, 35, 30) are due to be 

denied, and the arbitration award is due to be confirmed. A Final Judgment consistent with this 

Memorandum Opinion will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this April 16, 2020.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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