Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00975/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00975-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRENE MENDOZA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:15-cv-00975-SKO

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY APPEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Irene Mendoza (“Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental 

Security Income Benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1381-83. 

The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral 

argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on February 8, 1967, and was 39 years old when she was initially found 

disabled as of January 9, 2006. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 12; 95 (agency determination 

dated April 20, 2006).) On January 11, 2012, the agency found Plaintiff had medically improved 

as of January 1, 2012. (AR 76.) Plaintiff requested a hearing to dispute the determination, 

alleging she remained disabled due to depression, carpal tunnel syndrome, panic attacks, and 

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7; 8.)

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sleeping problems. (AR 80.) On September 24, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and 

testified in a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 38-69.) In a decision dated November 20, 2013, the 

ALJ affirmed the cessation of benefits and found Plaintiff’s “disability ended on January 1, 2012, 

and that [she] has not become disabled again since that date. (AR 12.) 

A. Relevant Medical Evidence2

On December 12, 2011, consultative examining psychiatrist Dr. Gil Schmidt, Psy. D., 

conducted a psychiatric examination at the request of the agency. (AR 328-35.) Dr. Schmidt 

noted Plaintiff was living with her boyfriend of more than two decades and her five children. 

(AR 328.) Plaintiff reporting attending school through the 10th grade, and dropping out because 

her family moved and she lacked parental support to finish school. (AR 329.) The longest she 

worked for an employer was three years, and she stopped working in 2001 “after having quit 

because she did not have transportation anymore and has not sought work since.” (AR 329.) 

Plaintiff was on time for her appointment, “observed to be socially interacting with other 

clients while waiting for their respective interviews,” and her “behavior, mood and gait all 

appeared to be within normal limits.” (AR 328.) Plaintiff reported suffering depression for the 

past two decades “because of marital discord,” and that significant other was currently dating a 

younger woman. (AR 328.) Plaintiff reported that she had not found counseling beneficial, 

though Dr. Schmidt observed Plaintiff “has been in and out of counseling for crisis intervention 

only and has not appeared to work on any root issues that have been promoting the marital 

discord.” (AR 329.) Dr. Schmidt opined that Plaintiff’s “concerns appear to be situational 

depression.” (AR 328.) 

Plaintiff reported showering 2-3 times per week, preparing and cooking her own meals, 

and taking care of her own hygiene without prompting or assistance. (AR 331.) She reported 

sleeping between 8 and 12 hours at a time as well as a disturbed sleep pattern of repeated 

awakening to use the restroom. (AR 331.) Dr. Schmidt noted Plaintiff “is capable of both light 

 

2

 As Plaintiff contends the ALJ adjudicated the wrong time period, failed to appropriately consider medical evidence 

from one of her treating providers, and improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility, only that medical evidence 

relevant to Plaintiff’s challenge will be summarized in the decision. 

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and heavy duty domestic chores without any noted limitations.” (AR 331.) Though Plaintiff 

reported suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder, Dr. Schmidt found “no evidence 

suggested during her presentation that would be supportive of this diagnosis” and opined that 

Plaintiff “appeared to be over endorsing mental health symptoms.” (AR 331-32 (observing 

Plaintiff to be “often times over endorsing symptoms both typical and atypical”).) 

Dr. Schmidt diagnosed Plaintiff as malingering, and assigned Plaintiff with a GAF3scale 

score of 71-80, reflecting “no significant impairment.” (AR 332.) Dr. Schmidt opined Plaintiff’s 

“functional level appears to be adequate with no significant mental health impairment” and found 

her prognosis “good,” and concluded that Plaintiff’s “mental health condition will probably abate 

within the next 12 months given the stable condition of her mental health condition, her high level 

of functioning, and the available mental health resources that she is presently accessing within her 

community.” (AR 332-33.) Dr. Schmidt found Plaintiff had no mental health functional 

impairments. (AR 333-34.) 

On January 10, 2012, reviewing agency psychiatrist Dr. Ida Hilliard, M.D., completed a 

psychiatric review technique form. (AR 350-63.) Dr. Hilliard concluded that Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable personality disorder was not severe, and found Plaintiff was mildly impaired in her 

activities of daily living, ability to maintain social functioning, and ability to maintain 

concentration, persistence, and pace. (AR 358.) Dr. Hilliard concluded there was evidence of 

significant medical improvement in Plaintiff’s depressive symptoms. (AR 360-62.) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Franco Song Seo, M.D., twice in 2013 at Kern County Mental Health. 

(AR 527-41.) On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff complained of pain in her knees and back, headaches, 

and carpal tunnel syndrome, and reported that she was unable to work due to her medical issues. 

(AR 533.) Plaintiff reported good response and compliance with her mental health medications, 

and requested to be continued on the same medications. (AR 533.) On examination, Plaintiff was 

appropriately dressed, made good eye contact, was cooperative, and her behavior was 

 

3

 Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale score is a numeric scale (1 through 100) used by mental health 

clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults. 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, American Psychiatric Association (4th ed. 2000) at 34. 

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unremarkable. (AR 535.) Plaintiff’s mood was sad, with affect congruent to mood and 

appropriate to situation and content. (AR 535-36.) Plaintiff’s intensity, range and stability were 

normal, and though her speech was slow with low tone, the amount, clarity, and fluency of her 

speech was normal. (AR 536.) Though Plaintiff’s concentration was “impaired,” her intelligence 

was “below average,” and her immediate and recent memory and insight were “poor” (AR 537), 

Dr. Seo observed that Plaintiff’s thought process was logical, with unremarkable thought content, 

and she was oriented to person, place, date and time (AR 536-37). Dr. Seo diagnosed Plaintiff 

with mood disorder, opioid dependence, and personality disorder and assessed Plaintiff with a 

GAF scale score of 50, reflecting serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupation, 

or school functioning. (AR 538-39.)

On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff was observed to be “much improved” and “hopeful about her 

future and recovery.” (AR 531.) On examination, Plaintiff was observed to be anxious and 

euthymic and oriented to person, time and place, with unremarkable thought process, appropriate 

affect and cooperative behavior, good eye contact, normal speech, fair insight, judgment, and 

memory, intact concentration, and below average intelligence. (AR 528-29.) Despite these 

observations, Dr. Seo checked boxes indicating Plaintiff’s “current disability” was “moderate,” 

she was unable to work, her prognosis was “fair,” and the expected length of treatment would be

six months. (AR 532.) Dr. Seo recommended Plaintiff continue with her current medications and 

transferred her treatment back to her primary care physician. (AR 532.) 

B. Testimony

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony at Hearing

Plaintiff testified that she cannot mop and sweep because of her hands and back, but that 

she can fold clothes and can microwave food. (AR 46-47.) Plaintiff can use her fingers to pick up 

small things from the table, perform her own personal care, and tie her shoes. (AR 47.) She 

spends most of her day sleeping, lying down, or watching television. (AR 49.) Plaintiff takes 

Vicodin for the pain in her hands, but not for the pain in her back. (AR 50.) Plaintiff testified that 

she can sit of approximately 30 minutes at a time and that while her medications help with her 

depression, she experiences anxiety when “something comes up.” (AR 52; 56.)

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2. Vocational Expert Testimony at Hearing4

The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert (“VE”) whether a hypothetical individual of 

Plaintiff’s age and educational background who can lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 

pounds occasionally; sit, stand, and walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; frequently climb 

ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequently 

reach, handle, finger, and feel with her bilateral upper extremities; should avoid extreme cold and 

wetness; and is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive unskilled work would be able to perform 

the requirements of any work in the national economy. (AR 64-65.) The VE testified such an 

individual could work as an assembler of small products, DOT 706.684-022, and inspector, DOT 

559.687-074, both light, unskilled work with an SVP5of 2. (AR 65-66.)

The ALJ then asked the VE whether an individual who additionally would need to 

alternate sitting and standing at will and could not sit or stand more than 30 minutes at a time 

could work. (AR 66.) The VE testified, based on his experience, that such an individual could 

perform the requirements of small products assembler and inspector “as sit, stand stools are 

furnished” without erosion in the number of available jobs. (AR 66.) 

The ALJ then asked whether an individual with the same total limitations, except that they 

could only lift a maximum of 10 pounds, could work. (AR 66-67.) The VE testified that such an 

individual could work as a bench hand assembler, DOT 715.684-026, table worker, DOT 739.687-

182, and lens inserter, DOT 713.687-026, all unskilled, sedentary work with an SVP of 2. 

(AR 67.) 

The ALJ finally asked whether an individual who would also be off task more than 15 

percent of the work day would be able to work. (AR 67.) The VE testified such an individual 

could not work. (AR 67.) 

//

 

4

 The VE testified that his testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). (AR 66; 

67.) 

5

 Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”), as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a 

typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average 

performance in a specific job-worker situation. 

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C. Administrative Proceedings 

On November 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision and found that the April 20, 

2006 decision finding Plaintiff disabled was the “comparison point decision” for the purpose of 

determining whether medical improvement had occurred. (AR 14.) At the time of the comparison 

point decision, Plaintiff had been unable to engage in sustained work activities due to depression 

and carpel tunnel syndrome. (AR 14.) 

The ALJ found that as of January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had medically determinable 

impairments of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, 

spondylosis of the lumbar spine, depression, and personality disorder. (AR 14.) The ALJ 

determined that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 14.) The ALJ 

found that as of January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had medically improved so that she had the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of sedentary work. (AR 14-15.)

The ALJ found that, beginning on January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a 

range of sedentary work, except that she is limited to 

. . . lifting and carrying 10-pounds at any time, and sitting and stand and/or 

walking for 6-hours total in an 8-hour day with appropriate breaks. [Plaintiff]

must be able to alternate between sitting and standing at will, with no 

sitting/standing more than 30 minutes. She can frequently use ladders, ropes, 

scaffolds, ramps and stairs. She can also frequently stoop, kneel, crouch and 

crawl. Further, [Plaintiff] can frequently reach, handle, finger and feel with the 

bilateral upper extremities but must avoid extreme cold and wetness. Cognitively, 

she can perform at least simple, routine, repetitive, unskilled work tasks.

(AR 15.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, and had a marginal 

education but was able to communicate in English. (AR 20.) Given this RFC, the ALJ 

determined there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could 

perform, including representative occupations bench hand assembler, DOT 715.684-026, table 

worker, DOT 739.687-182, and lens inserter, DOT 713.687-026, all sedentary work with an SVP 

of 2. (AR 21.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social 

Security Act. (AR 21-22.)

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 24, 2015, making the 

ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final determination for purposes of judicial review. (AR 1-4.) 

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D. Plaintiff’s Complaint

On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ’s 

decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to determine whether Plaintiff was 

disabled as of the date of the written decision as required by Social Security Ruling613-3p, failed 

to fully consider the medical opinion evidence of Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Seo, and 

improperly discredited Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony. (Doc. 20.) 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ’s decision denying benefits “will be disturbed only if that decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 

601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards 

and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See 

Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence” means “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

 

6

 Social Security Rulings (“SSR”) are final opinions and statements of policy by the Commissioner of Social 

Security, binding on all components of the Social Security Administration. 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(1). They are “to 

be relied upon as precedent in determining cases where the facts are basically the same.” Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 

1249, 1252 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).

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mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 

1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or 

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are 

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of 

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that 

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic 

work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is 

therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations 

to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers 

in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled as of the date 

of the written decision as required by SSR 13-3p, failed to fully consider the medical opinion 

evidence of Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Seo, and improperly discredited Plaintiff’s subjective 

pain testimony. (Doc. 20.) 

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A. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Disability under SSR 13-3p

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to adjudicate Plaintiff’s disability status through 

the date of her decision. (Doc. 13, pp. 5-6.) This contention is without merit. As of the date of 

the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s disability “ended on January 1, 2012,” and that 

Plaintiff “has not become disabled again since that date.” (AR 12.) Plaintiff’s assertion that “[t]he 

ALJ only considered [her disability] up to January 1, 2012” (Doc. 13, p. 6) is without basis or 

support in the record. The ALJ summarized and discussed evidence gathered throughout 2012 and 

2013 in reaching her RFC assessment (AR 17-19), and it is unclear on what basis Plaintiff asks the 

Court to find otherwise. Throughout her opinion, including her review of the Plaintiff’s testimony 

and the medical evidence, it is clear the ALJ fully considered the evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s 

impairment through the date of her decision. The Court cannot find it a violation of SSR 13-3p to 

not use the magic words “through the date of this decision” when virtually all the evidence and 

testimony mentioned and analyzed comes from the period after the Plaintiff’s disability was found 

to have ceased (see AR 17-19). “That is not to say that it could not have been made more 

technically clear, but it is doubtful that this oversight alone would justify a remand.” Murr v. 

Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-161, 2015 WL 1746162, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2015). 

Even though the ALJ did not use the precise “magic words” “through the date of the 

decision,” there is no question that the ALJ specifically considered whether Plaintiff had been 

disabled as of January 1, 2012, or at any date between January 1, 2012, and the date of the 

decision. (AR 12.) Plaintiff’s argument the ALJ committed reversible error is without merit.

B. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Evidence

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by refusing to credit a portion of Dr. Seo’s opinion 

without providing any legitimate or specific reason for doing so. Plaintiff argues Dr. Seo found 

her to be severely limited in social functioning and unable to work, but the ALJ ignored this 

significant limitation in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC and did not address Dr. Seo’s opinion in this 

regard at all. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Seo’s opinion as 

internally inconsistent and unsupported by his own clinical findings, and that any error in failing 

to explicitly address each portion of Dr. Seo’s opinion was harmless.

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The RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical 

and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 

days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. The RFC 

assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual’s 

medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. 

“In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the 

record including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and ‘the effects of symptoms, including 

pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.’” Robbins v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ “is responsible for translating and 

incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d. 

996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). The determination of a claimant’s RFC is wholly within the province 

of the ALJ. See SSR 96-8p. The RFC assessment is based on all the evidence in the record, and it 

is the ALJ’s duty to consider and weigh that evidence. See id.

The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing a range of sedentary work with postural and 

manipulative limitations and limited to simple, routine, repetitive and unskilled work. (AR 15.) 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to take into account Dr. Seo’s opinion that Plaintiff was severely 

limited in social functioning and would be unable to work. (Doc. 13, pp. 11-13.) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Seo twice in 2013. On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff complained that she had a 

lot of pain in her body, reported feeling depressed and anxious, and reported that “she has been 

adherent to Paxil and low dose Seroquel with good response.” (AR 533.) On examination, 

Plaintiff was appropriately dressed and made good eye contact, was cooperative, and her behavior 

was unremarkable. (AR 535.) Plaintiff’s speech was slow, with low tone, but the amount, clarity 

and fluency of her speech was normal; her thought process was logical, with unremarkable 

thought content; and Plaintiff was oriented to person, place, date and time. (AR 536-37.) Dr. Seo 

marked a box indicating that Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate was impaired and that her immediate 

and recent memory and insight were poor, and diagnosed Plaintiff with mood disorder, opioid

dependence, and personality disorder. (AR 538.) Dr. Song Seo assessed a GAF of 50, reflecting 

his assessment of Plaintiff’s global functioning at the high end of “serious symptoms.” (AR 539.) 

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Though Plaintiff had been responding well to her current medications, Dr. Seo recommended 

increasing Plaintiff’s dosage of Paxil. (AR 540.) When Dr. Seo saw Plaintiff for the second time 

on July 22, 2013, he opined that Plaintiff was “much improved,” recommended she continue with 

her medications, transferred her treatment back to her primary care physician, and marked two 

boxes on the form indicating Plaintiff could not work and that her expected length of treatment 

would be six months. (AR 531-32.) 

The ALJ discussed Dr. Seo’s opinion and found it less than fully credible, noting that Dr. 

Seo’s observations of Plaintiff’s symptoms and July 2013 note stating Plaintiff had responded well 

to her medications and was stable, undermined his low GAF scale score assessment of 50. 

(AR 18.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility finding, and the ALJ did not err in 

weighing Dr. Seo’s opinion. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (upholding rejection of 

physician’s opinion where “ultimate conclusions . . . did not mesh with her objective data or 

history”); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling). See also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (d)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (consistency of a medical opinion with the record 

as a whole is a factor to evaluate in giving weight to any particular medical opinion). Because Dr. 

Seo’s medical opinion was properly rejected, the ALJ was not required to explicitly incorporate it 

into his RFC assessment. 

The ALJ is entitled to formulate an RFC and resolve any ambiguity or inconsistency in the 

medical evidence, see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001), and to formulate the RFC 

based on the entire record, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (the RFC is based on all the relevant 

evidence, including diagnoses, treatment, observations, and opinions of medical courses, as well 

as observations by family members and the claimant’s own subjective symptoms). In considering 

Plaintiff’s mental abilities and limitations, the ALJ gave significant weight to the opinion of

agency psychiatric consultant Dr. Schmidt, who had specifically opined Plaintiff was malingering, 

assessed a GAF score of 71-80, indicating transient symptoms and no more than slight 

impairment, and opined Plaintiff would stabilize with the right combination and dosage of 

medications. (AR 20.) Based on this evidence, as well as other testimony and evidence in the 

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record, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff retains the ability to complete simple repetitive tasks. 

(AR 15.) Plaintiff’s mental health functioning was therefore adequately accommodated by the 

ALJ’s RFC when she imposed the restriction of simple, routine tasks. Sabin v. Astrue, 337 F. 

App’x 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ properly “determined the end result of 

[plaintiff’s] moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do 

simple and repetitive tasks”); see also Stanley v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-1743 SKO, 2010 WL 

4942818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (“in limiting Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks, the ALJ 

properly incorporated in his RFC finding [the doctor’s] opinion that Plaintiff had moderate 

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace”). 

Though Plaintiff is correct the ALJ was silent as to a portion of Dr. Seo’s opinion -- the 

checkmark indicating Plaintiff would be unable to work -- the determination of disability is an 

issue that is reserved to the Commissioner. Thornsberry v. Colvin, 552 F. App’x 691, 692 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“[A] doctor's opinion that a claimant is disabled is not itself a medical opinion but an 

issue reserved exclusively for the Commissioner”) (citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d); SSR 96-5p, at *15 (July 2, 1996) (a disability determination is a 

finding reserved to the Commissioner; a statement by a medical source that a person is “unable to 

work” does not mean they are disabled). Moreover, even were this an issue on which Dr. Seo 

could opine, the ALJ was not required to individually reference every word of Dr. Seo’s treating 

record in his decision, see Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (the ALJ 

does not need to discuss every piece of evidence when interpreting the record), where the ALJ 

noted the agency opinion of Dr. Schmidt and expressly adopted the limitation for simple repetitive 

tasks to address Plaintiff’s mental health functioning. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509 (ALJ resolves 

conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence). 

In sum, the ALJ did not err in his assessment of Plaintiff’s mental health functioning. 

C. The ALJ’s Consideration of Testimony

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

her statements regarding the severity and extent of his ongoing symptoms. The Commissioner 

contends the ALJ properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined the credibility of 

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Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.7 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Bunnell 

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The ALJ must first determine whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 

The claimant is not required to show that his impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause 

the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 

caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). If the 

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives “specific, clear and 

convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. 

The ALJ also may consider (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent 

statements, or other inconsistent testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 

seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-

27 (9th Cir. 2009); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 

416.929. “If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in 

second-guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. 

The ALJ reviewed the medical record and Plaintiff’s allegations that she is unable to 

perform all work due to her alleged impairments and other symptoms. (AR 16-19.) The ALJ 

found that while Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 

cause his alleged symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR 19.) The ALJ found that 

 

7

 The Commissioner heavily relies upon Dr. Schmidt’s finding of malingering in arguing Plaintiff’s subjective 

testimony was properly rejected. (Doc. 20, pp. 11-12.) However, the ALJ did not rely on the finding of malingering 

as a basis for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, and this Court is not permitted to accept post hoc explanations for the 

ALJ’s decision. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1981); Stout v. Commissioner, Social Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001))

(reviewing court cannot affirm an ALJ's decision denying benefits on a ground not invoked by the Commissioner). 

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. . . With respect to [Plaintiff]’s current level of functioning, I cannot accept that 

[she] is unable to perform all work. As noted above, the medical record shows 

that [Plaintiff]’s mental impairments have improved significantly and that her 

bilateral CTS does not preclude [her] from performing a range of work activities 

that accounts for her related functional limitation. While the medical record does

show abnormalities in the cervical and lumbar spines, these findings are not so 

significant as to justify a finding of disability. [Plaintiff] has also not received 

much treatment for her back pain other than medication, which is not what I 

would expect were she as disabled as she claims. And I have taken into account 

in my RFC [Plaintiff]’s alleged limitations in lifting and prolonged sitting, 

standing, and walking, and still find [Plaintiff] unable to perform work, even with 

these limitations. Moreover, [Plaintiff]’s activities of daily living are fairly full, 

and her ability to concentrate is enough to do puzzles, such that I do not find her 

pain to reduce her functioning below this. Finally, [Plaintiff]’s work history is not 

indicative of an individual who would be working if she could.

(AR 19.) 

While the inconsistency of objective findings with subjective claims may not be the sole 

reason for rejecting subjective complaints of pain, Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 

(9th Cir. 1997), it is one factor which may be permissibly considered with others, Moisa v. 

Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 

595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). An ALJ’s credibility finding may properly be based on the 

inconsistency between a claimant’s subjective complaints and the objective medical evidence. See 

Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony that she could 

not work as inconsistent with relative minimal objective findings. (AR 19; 407-08 (July 2012 

examination concluding Plaintiff had no limitations in standing, walking, or sitting, no postural 

limitations, could lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally, and 

was capable of frequent manipulative activities); 531 (July 2013 mental health treating notes 

opining Plaintiff was “much improved”).) 

Where a plaintiff “complains about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to 

follow prescribed treatment for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the 

complaint unjustified or exaggerated.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 638. Here, Plaintiff only received 

treatment for her hand pain through pain medications, and explicitly denied needing pain 

medication for her back pain. (AR 50.) Plaintiff’s argument that her reliance on pain medication 

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is not somehow “conservative treatment” (Doc. 13, pp. 12-13) is unconvincing. This is not a case 

where Plaintiff had a history of surgical intervention, repeated nerve blocks or trigger point 

injections, and “copious amounts of narcotic pain medications” together bolstering her allegations 

of disabling pain. Cf. Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 Fed. Appx. 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing 

ALJ’s adverse credibility finding as unsupported by substantial evidence based on plaintiff's 

history of cervical fusion surgery in an attempt to relieve her pain symptoms followed by narcotic 

pain medications, occipital nerve blocks, and trigger point injections); Christie v. Astrue, No. CV 

10-3448-PJW, 2011 WL 4368189, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (reversing ALJ’s adverse 

credibility finding as unsupported when plaintiff demonstrated a history of “many different 

treatment modalities, including narcotic pain medication, steroid injections, trigger point 

injections, epidural shots, and cervical traction,” which while not necessarily “the most aggressive 

available” treatments, in combination convinced the court that “they are certainly not what the 

Court would categorize as conservative”); Huerta v. Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1617-RC, 2009 WL 

2241797, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 22, 2009) (reversing ALJ’s adverse credibility finding as 

unsupported by substantial evidence based on plaintiff’s history of neck surgery, in combination 

with referral to an anesthesiologist for pain management and receipt of a series of epidural steroid 

injections into her cervical spine). 

Further, Plaintiff’s mental health treatment has been sporadic at best (see AR 17-18; 329 

(though Plaintiff reported she had not found counseling beneficial, Dr. Schmidt observed Plaintiff

“ha[d] been in and out of counseling for crisis intervention only and has not appeared to work on 

any root issues that have been promoting the marital discord”), and the ALJ appropriately 

considered her treatment history, or lack thereof, in assessing her credibility. Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“an ALJ may properly rely on ‘unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment’”) (quoting 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv), (v) (treatment history and 

medication regimen are relevant to assessing credibility). 

The ALJ permissibly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility based on her history of generally 

conservative treatment. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 (an “individual’s statements may 

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be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints”); 

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “evidence of ‘conservative 

treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment”) 

(citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 

(describing physical therapy as conservative treatment and noting that an ALJ may infer that a 

claimant's “response to conservative treatment undermines [his] reports regarding the disabling 

nature of his pain”); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended) (rejecting 

subjective pain complaints where petitioner’s “claim that she experienced pain approaching the 

highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the ‘minimal, conservative treatment’ that she 

received”).

The ALJ also properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility based on her inconsistent 

statements regarding her ability to engage in some degree of daily activity. (AR 19.) See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.(c(3)(i) (daily activities are relevant to assessing whether a 

claimant’s statements are true); SSR 96-7p (same); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (the ALJ may 

consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged 

symptoms”). While the mere fact that a claimant engages in certain daily activities does not 

necessarily detract from his credibility regarding overall disability, daily activities support an 

adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in 

pursuits involving the performance of physical functions or skills that are transferable to a work 

setting. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. A claimant’s performance of 

chores such as preparing meals, cleaning house, doing laundry, shopping, and interacting with 

others has been considered sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding when performed for 

a substantial portion of the day. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities, including doing light chores around the house, taking 

care of her personal needs, preparing simple meals, and concentrating long enough to complete 

puzzles undermine her allegations of disabling pain and suggest she is capable of performing the 

requirements of a reduced range of sedentary work. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (the claimant’s 

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ability “to perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes, and 

shopping” suggested the ability to perform a reduced range of light work); Light v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995). 

See also Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly recognized that 

daily activities “did not suggest [the claimant] could return to his old job” but “did suggest that 

[the claimant's] later claims about the severity of his limitations were exaggerated”). 

Finally, the ALJ permissibly found Plaintiff’s credibility was weakened by her overall poor 

work record. (AR 19.) The ALJ is entitled to consider Plaintiff's work history in making a 

credibility determination. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ 

properly found poor work history and lack of propensity to work in lifetime negatively affected 

claimant's credibility regarding her inability to work). Plaintiff earned a total of $19,461.11 from 

1996 through 2005, and only sporadic work history for the entire decade prior to her disability 

determination in 2006. (See AR 155.) Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work. (AR 20.) 

Plaintiff told consultative psychiatrist Dr. Schmidt that she stopped working in 2001 “after having 

quit because she did not have transportation anymore and has not sought work since.” (AR 329.) 

The ALJ was entitled to consider Plaintiff's overall work history in discrediting her statements, 

and such reasoning was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Kimbrough v. Astrue, 

No. 1:11-CV-01410-SKO, 2013 WL 268700, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013). 

In sum, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Irene Mendoza. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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