Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00063/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela Ann Wood, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

University Physicians Healthcare, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00063-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the 

“Motion”). (Doc. 53). Defendant has also filed a Separate Statement of Facts. (Doc. 54). 

Plaintiff has filed a Response to the Motion (Doc. 57) and a Controverting Statement of 

Facts in Support of Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 58). Defendant has filed a Reply. 

(Doc. 59). The Court now rules on the Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

For purposes of the Court’s resolution of the pending Motion, the Court considers 

the relevant facts and background, viewed in Plaintiff’s favor,1

 to be as follows. 

 On September 2, 2008, Pamela Ann Wood (“Plaintiff”) began working as an Adult 

Nurse Case Manager for University Physicians Healthcare (“Defendant”). (Plaintiff’s 

Controverting Statement of Facts (“PCSOF”), Doc. 58 ¶¶ 20, 22; Defendant’s Statement 

of Facts (“DSOF”), Doc. 54 ¶¶ 20, 22). As an Adult Nurse Case Manager, Plaintiff was 

 

1

 In the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

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responsible for documenting and caring for patients who were members of Defendant’s 

Health Plan, including advising the patients on hospital discharge, follow-ups, calls to 

patients, and problem solving with respect to health care and other issues. (PCSOF ¶ 35). 

Plaintiff’s salary was set at $30.00 per hour. (PCSOF ¶ 32). Additionally, until January 

2009, Deb Keller (“Keller”) served as Plaintiff’s supervisor. (PCSOF ¶ 36). 

 Plaintiff suffered from Crohn’s Disease throughout her employment with 

Defendant. (PCSOF ¶¶ 14, 18). Keller was unaware, however, of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s 

Disease when Plaintiff accepted employment with Defendant and when Plaintiff’s salary 

was set. (PCSOF ¶¶ 32, 103). Plaintiff’s condition ordinarily causes her to “go to the 

bathroom a lot” with “major diarrhea,” “fatigue,” and “joint aches” and is aggravated by 

stress. (PCSOF ¶ 15). 

 Prior to an October 2008 meeting between Plaintiff and Keller, Keller conferred 

with Defendant’s Medical Director regarding Plaintiff’s health. (PCSOF ¶ 55). Keller and 

the Medical Director decided that there was a chance they would have to reduce 

Plaintiff’s working hours and, as a result, possibly release Plaintiff from her employment 

obligations altogether. (PCSOF ¶¶ 55, 56). During the October 2008 meeting, after 

Plaintiff requested time off to attend medical treatment at the Mayo Clinic, Keller 

commented, “you were sick when I hired you and you didn’t tell me?” (PCSOF ¶¶ 71, 

73; DSOF ¶ 73). During the meeting, Keller also denied Plaintiff’s request to work from 

home. (PCSOF ¶ 53). At the close of the meeting, Keller asked Plaintiff to send an e-mail 

to both Keller and Martha Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), who replaced Keller as Plaintiff’s 

supervisor in early 2009 (PCSOF ¶ 78), which discussed Plaintiff’s medical condition 

and the possibility that Plaintiff would need to “flex [her] working hours outside of the 

parameters of the Human Resources guidelines from time to time” due to medical 

treatment. (PCSOF ¶¶ 59–63; Doc. 54-2 at 30). Following the October 2008 meeting, 

Plaintiff learned that Keller allowed Tonisha Adams, who did not have the same type of 

job, certifications, or degree as Plaintiff, to work from home. (PCSOF ¶¶ 64–66). 

 In summer 2009, Rodriguez hired Dyana Carnes (“Carnes”) and Margarita 

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Wellman (“Wellman”) as Adult Nurse Case Managers for Defendant. (PCSOF ¶ 99). 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff learned that Carnes and Wellman earned $34.00 and $32.00 

per hour, respectively. (PCSOF ¶ 106; DSOF ¶ 106). After Plaintiff raised the disparate 

pay issue with her, Rodriguez informed Plaintiff that she considered Carnes’, Wellman’s, 

and Plaintiff’s salaries to be fair based on each employee’s respective qualifications. 

(PCSOF ¶¶ 108–10; DSOF ¶¶ 108–10). Rodriguez also informed Plaintiff that she may 

be eligible to receive a raise at her annual performance review in November 2009. 

(PCSOF ¶ 110; DSOF ¶ 110). 

 On August 3, 2009, shortly after learning about Carnes’ and Wellman’s higher 

salaries, Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s Ethics Hotline that Wellman and Carnes 

were not qualified to make more money than her. (PCSOF ¶¶ 111, 114; DSOF ¶¶ 111, 

114). During the hotline call, Plaintiff also complained about being “mistreated and 

harassed” by Keller and not being allowed to work from home. (Id.). Plaintiff’s call was 

referred to Human Resources Partner Cathy Coulter (“Coulter”) who investigated and 

discussed the substance of the issues raised by Plaintiff with Keller and Rodriguez. 

(PCSOF ¶¶ 117, 118; DSOF ¶¶ 117, 118). Coulter, along with Keller and Rodriguez, 

reviewed Plaintiff’s salary in comparison to Defendant’s other Case Managers and 

determined that no adjustment was necessary. (PCSOF ¶ 119; DSOF ¶ 119). Coulter told 

Plaintiff to meet with Keller on August 24, 2009 to discuss Plaintiff’s concerns about 

Keller’s alleged unfair treatment. (PCSOF ¶¶ 127, 128; Doc. 57 at 3). 

 Unbeknownst to Keller, Plaintiff recorded the August 24, 2009 meeting. (PCSOF 

¶ 132; DSOF ¶ 132). During the meeting, Keller asked to have Plaintiff’s doctor fill out a 

Medical Provider Documentation of Disability form to determine whether Plaintiff 

required accommodation for her medical condition. (PCSOF ¶¶ 122, 135; DSOF ¶¶ 122, 

135). Defendant regularly used this form for Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 

accommodation requests. (PCSOF ¶ 122; DSOF ¶ 122). Keller premised a decision on 

whether Plaintiff could work from home on receiving this documentation from Plaintiff’s 

doctor. (Doc. 54-2 at 33). Also during the meeting, Keller stated that she would ask 

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Rodriguez to have weekly one-on-one meetings with Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could 

receive Rodriguez’s “feedback” and so that Rodriguez would be “more available” to 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 54-2 at 34, 37). Keller also stated that Rodriguez would review Plaintiff’s 

salary at an upcoming annual performance review in November 2009 and make any 

warranted adjustments. (Id. at 34). On August 27, 2009, three days after her meeting with 

Keller, Plaintiff submitted her resignation letter to Rodriguez. (PCSOF ¶ 150). Plaintiff 

volunteered to work an additional two weeks after her resignation despite knowing that 

she would be paid for that time period regardless of whether she worked. (PCSOF ¶¶ 158, 

159; DSOF ¶¶ 158, 159). Rodriguez declined Plaintiff’s offer to work for the additional 

two weeks. (PCSOF ¶ 160; Doc. 57 at 4). 

 On September 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Defendant. 

(PCSOF ¶ 3; Doc. 58-1 at 25). The EEOC referred the Charge to the Arizona Civil Rights 

Division (“ACRD”) pursuant to a work sharing agreement between the two agencies. 

(Doc. 58-1 at 48). The EEOC issued its notice of right to sue on March 27, 2012 (id. at 

40–41), a “number of . . . months” after the “[ACRD] issued the Right to Sue” (Doc. 57 

at 11). On November 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court, and on January 10, 2013, Defendant removed this action to this Court. (Doc. 1). 

On December 4, 2013, Plaintiff amended the Complaint alleging two claims under the 

ADA and one claim under the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 41-1461–1465. (Doc. 50). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of § 102 of Title I of the ADA, 42 

U.S.C. § 12112. (Id. at 5). Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully retaliated 

against Plaintiff in violation of § 503(a) of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 

(Id. at 5–6). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged by Defendant 

in violation of A.R.S. § 23-1502 and that Defendant unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff 

in violation of the ACRA. (Id. at 6–7). 

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or 

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by 

“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 

Id. at 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the 

nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at 

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the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 

398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit “has set a high standard for the granting of summary 

judgment in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 

F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “ ‘[w]e require very 

little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a discrimination case, ‘because the 

ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a ‘searching inquiry’—one that 

is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record.’ ” Lam v. Univ. of 

Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. 

College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

III ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges three counts: (1) disability discrimination 

in violation of the ADA; (2) retaliation in violation of the ADA; and (3) retaliation and 

constructive discharge in violation of the ACRA and A.R.S. § 23-1502. (Doc. 50 at 5–7).

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all three counts. (Doc. 53). The Court will 

consider each count in turn. 

 A. Count I: Disability Discrimination (ADA) 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendant violated the ADA, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, by discriminating against Plaintiff in its employment 

decisions because of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s Disease. (Doc. 50 at 5). The ADA makes it 

unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 

disability of such individual in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 

 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff is barred from asserting a disability discrimination 

claim under the ADA because “she did not pursue, let alone exhaust, her administrative 

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remedies.” (Doc. 53 at 6). Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not fulfill 

the administrative charge requirement for the disability discrimination claim and, 

alternatively, that claims accrued during and before Plaintiff’s October 2008 meeting 

with Keller are time-barred because they occurred over 300 days before Plaintiff filed her 

charge with the EEOC on September 22, 2009. (Id. at 6–9). 

 a. Fulfillment of the Administrative Charge Requirement 

 Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination should be 

dismissed because Plaintiff’s Charge identified “Retaliation” as its sole basis and 

contained factual allegations focusing “exclusively on retaliatory constructive discharge.” 

(Id. at 7). 

 A plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies before filing an ADA 

civil complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting Title VII remedies and procedures 

for implementing the ADA); see also B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 

(9th Cir. 2002) (summarizing the steps a plaintiff must take to exhaust administrative 

remedies under a Title VII claim). The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to 

“allegations of discrimination that either ‘fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of 

the charge of discrimination.’ ” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100 (quoting EEOC v. Farmer Bros. 

Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). While the EEOC charge 

should be liberally construed, the claims in the civil complaint must at least be “like or 

reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge” and consistent with 

the plaintiff’s original theory of the case. Id. (quoting Green v. L.A. Cnty. Superintendent 

of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In assessing whether a claim is within the scope of the EEOC investigation and 

can be reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination, a court should 

examine whether the plaintiff described “the facts and the legal theory with sufficient 

clarity to notify the [EEOC].” Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 

Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

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accord Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1995). “The crucial element of 

the charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein.” Kaplan v. Int’l 

Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Emps., 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing 

Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462 (9th Cir. 1970)). Additionally, when 

construing whether a charge is within the scope of the EEOC investigation, a court may 

examine evidence contained in the EEOC Intake Questionnaire or explicit notifications 

within the EEOC’s investigation. See Liaosheng Zhang v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. CV06-1181-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 2220490, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2007) (evaluating a 

plaintiff’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire and overall notice to the EEOC where plaintiff 

failed to check a box on the charge of discrimination). 

 In her EEOC Charge, Plaintiff marked only the box indicating that she complained 

of retaliation under the ADA; the box entitled ‘Disability’ was left blank. (PCSOF ¶ 5; 

Doc. 58-1 at 25). In her Intake Questionnaire, however, Plaintiff filled out sections that 

were to be filled out only by those “alleging discrimination based on your disability.” 

(PCSOF ¶ 167; Doc. 58-1 at 26) In this section, Plaintiff explained how her Crohn’s 

Disease affected her work activities (PCSOF ¶ 167; Doc. 58-1 at 26), and Plaintiff also 

alleged that Keller subjected her to “discriminatory treatment based upon a disability” 

(PCSOF ¶ 5; Doc. 58-1 at 48). Elsewhere in her Intake Questionnaire, Plaintiff noted 

that Keller “had discriminated against [Plaintiff] for [her] disability” and made references 

to receiving “different benefits, treatment, and pay than other colleagues.” (See Doc. 58-1 

at 25). Additionally, following an EEOC investigator’s interview with Plaintiff, the 

investigator noted that Plaintiff’s Charge was based on both disability discrimination and 

retaliation. (PCSOF ¶ 171; Doc. 58-1 at 36). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

disability discrimination claim was within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation. As a 

result, Plaintiff fulfilled the administrative charge requirement prior to filing the instant 

claim for disability discrimination. 

 b. Timeliness of Disability Discrimination Claim 

 Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims which 

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accrued during and before the October 2008 meeting between Plaintiff and Keller are 

time-barred because they occurred over 300 days before Plaintiff filed her charge with 

the EEOC on September 22, 2009. (Doc. 53 at 8). In response, Plaintiff argues that the 

October 2008 meeting with Keller and acts occurring prior to that meeting are timely 

because of the continuing violations theory. (Doc. 57 at 8). 

Before filing a civil suit under the ADA, a plaintiff “must file a charge within the 

statutory time period and serve notice upon the person against whom the charge is made.” 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). In Arizona, an employee must file a charge with the EEOC 

within 300 days of the employment practice. Rush-Shaw v. USF Reddaway, Inc., 

No. CV-12-0941-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 3455723, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2013).

 The continuing violations theory allows a plaintiff to pursue an ADA claim for 

employment practice which began outside the limitations period if she can demonstrate 

that the conduct alleged is part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination effected by the 

employer. Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). However, 

the continuing violations theory is inapplicable to discrete discriminatory acts. Morgan, 

536 U.S. at 114. A discrete discriminatory act consists of conduct that “occurred” on the 

day it “happened,” which includes, for example, “termination, failure to promote, denial 

of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id. For discrete discriminatory acts, “[e]ach incident of 

discrimination . . . constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ ” Id.

As a result, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when 

they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113. In contrast to discrete 

discriminatory acts, the continuing violations theory may be applicable to hostile work 

environment claims. Id. at 117–18. Hostile work environment claims do not happen on a 

particular day as with discrete acts but instead develop over time and each “act of 

harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Id. at 114 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 

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 Plaintiff’s ADA claims which accrued during and before the October 2008 

meeting include: (1) “derogatory comments made by Ms. Keller (i.e. ‘you knew you were 

sick when I hired you’)” (Doc. 57 at 8–9); (2) “the discussion of [Plaintiff’s] disability by 

members of management staff without her permission” (id. at 9); (3) the “discussion of 

[Plaintiff] taking a ‘lesser position’ based on her disability” (id.); (4) “not being allowed 

to work from home” (id.); and (5) Plaintiff being “both segregated and classified 

different[ly] from other employees while working for [Defendant]” 2 (id. at 10). Because 

Plaintiff filed her EEOC claim over 300 days after the October 2008 events, these five 

claims for disability discrimination are time-barred if the employment practices are 

considered discrete. However, if the events fall under the continuing violations theory, 

then the claims may be considered. 

Plaintiff argues that “numerous examples of discrimination based on her 

disability” have demonstrated a “pattern of discrimination” which constitutes a 

continuing violation. (Id.). However, Defendant’s five allegedly-discriminatory acts are 

discrete, including: (1) Keller’s derogatory comment;3

 (2) Keller’s discussion with 

Defendant’s Medical Director regarding Plaintiff’s disability;4

 (3) Keller’s discussion 

with Plaintiff that Plaintiff may lose her position if she works less;5

 (4) Keller’s denial of 

 

2

 Plaintiff does not articulate in what way she was “segregated or classified different[ly].” (Doc. 57 at 10). The Court will assume that Plaintiff alludes to Defendant 

providing her with less training than the Tucson Case Managers which resulted in her “lagging behind the rest of the people that were hired.” (PCSOF ¶ 58). 

3 See Bailey v. Synthes, 295 F. Supp. 2d 344, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is clear 

from Morgan . . . [that] the allegedly unwarranted criticisms, and the crude sexist 

statements are discrete acts that cannot be lumped together to form a ‘continuing violation.’ ” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113)); see also Lucke v. Multnomah Cnty., 2008 WL 4372882, at *39 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that isolated comments fall 

short of establishing an abusive working environment). 

4 See Polk v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 2009 WL 455261, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2009) 

(noting that the dissemination of a plaintiff’s medical condition to other employees is a discrete act). 

5 See Ramsdell v. Huhtamaki, Inc., 2014 WL 185331, at *12 (D. Me. Jan. 15, 

2014) (“[S]uspension and threat of termination, are easily identified as ‘discrete acts.’ ” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101)); see also EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., 751 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing demotions and reductions in responsibility as discrete actions). 

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Plaintiff’s accommodation request to work from home;6 and (5) Keller’s dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s request for additional training.7

 While Plaintiff uses “pattern of discrimination” 

as a conclusory label (Doc. 57 at 9), “discrete discriminatory acts will not create a pattern 

of discrimination without more; pattern-or-practice claims cannot be based on ‘sporadic 

discriminatory acts’ but rather must be based on ‘discriminatory conduct that is 

widespread.’ ” The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 

583 F.3d 690, 701 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1247 

(9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the continuing violations 

theory does not apply to discrete acts, Plaintiff’s five claims accruing during or before 

October 2008 are time-barred. Accordingly, Plaintiff may only use these prior acts as 

“background evidence” to support her timely claims. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.

 2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Operative ADA Claims 

 The remaining discriminatory acts Plaintiff alleges include being: (1) paid at a 

“rate less than other Case Managers”; (2) “required to fill out ADA paperwork to 

continue her employment”; and (3) “subjected to weekly one-on-one meetings with her 

supervisor.” (Doc. 57 at 9). 

 Courts have consistently utilized the burden-shifting approach established by the 

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), when 

reviewing motions for summary judgment in claims for disparate treatment under the 

ADA. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2003) (adopting 

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting rules for retaliation claims under the ADA); see 

also Pardi v. Kaiser Permanente Hosp. Inc., 389 F.3d 840, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2004) 

 

6 See Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 

employer’s rejection of an employee’s proposed accommodation . . . does not give rise to a continuing violation. Rather, the rejection is the sort of ‘discrete act’ that must be the 

subject of a complaint to the EEOC within [the statutory period.]” (modifications in original) (quoting Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 134–35 (2d Cir. 

2003)). 

7 See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing an employer’s failure-to-train as a discrete act). 

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(applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting rules for an ADA discrimination 

claim). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework: 

[T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory 

conduct. If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. 

Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802–05). 

 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that she: (1) is a qualified individual with a disability;8

 (2) can perform the 

essential functions of her job; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of9

the disability. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 

Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). “An adverse 

employment action is one that materially alters the ‘terms and conditions’ of the 

plaintiff’s employment.” Mamola v. Group Mfg. Servs., No. CV-08-1687-PHX-GMS, 

2010 WL 1433491, at *6 (D.Ariz. Apr. 9, 2010) (citing Kang v. U. Lim. Am., Inc., 

296 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

 To carry the burden of establishing pretext in a disability discrimination claim, a 

plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence showing that a “discriminatory 

reason more likely motivated the employer” than the legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason the employer provided. Brown, 336 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Villiarimo v. Aloha 

 

8

 The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as “an individual with a 

disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 

9

 Here, “because of” is read to require “but for” rather than “proximate” causation. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shalter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1017 n.7 

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 301 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007), for the proposition that “the ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual ‘by reason of such disability’ . . . . [T]his 

language . . . clearly establishes that the . . . ADA . . . requires only but for causation.”). 

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Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish pretext by identifying “specific inconsistencies, 

contradictions, implausibilities, or weaknesses in the employer’s explanation so that a 

reasonable fact finder could infer that the employer did not act for the asserted reason.” 

Mamola, 2010 WL 1433491, at *6 (citing Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 

424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005)). Circumstantial evidence of pretext must be 

sufficiently “specific and substantial” to “raise a genuine issue of material fact under 

Rule 56(c).” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

 a. Pay Disparity

 Plaintiff alleges that she was “paid less . . . [than] other Case Managers” working 

for Defendant. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a 

disability or that Plaintiff can perform the essential functions of her job. (Doc. 53 at 9–

11). Plaintiff, however, must show that, she suffered an adverse employment action 

(being paid less than Defendant’s similarly-situated employees) because of her disability. 

See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981) (“[I]t is the 

plaintiff’s task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated 

equally.”) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

paid Carnes and Wellman more than her and that Keller rejected her requests for a raise 

because of her disability. (PCSOF ¶¶ 98, 102). In support, Plaintiff provides only a 

statement that “when Ms. Keller found out [Plaintiff] had Crohn’s disease her whole 

attitude changed and that there were many times during the year when her pay could have 

been increased but was not.” (PCSOF ¶ 102). 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of pay disparity 

under the ADA because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendant paid any similarlysituated employees more than Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Wellman and Carnes were 

paid higher salaries than her. Wellman spoke Spanish, which was important to meet the 

needs of the Spanish-speaking members of Defendant’s Health Plans, and Carnes had 

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significant experience in health and medical management. (Doc. 54-2 at 47). Plaintiff 

does not provide any evidence that non-Spanish-speaking Adult Nurse Case Managers 

were paid more than Plaintiff. Plaintiff also does not provide any evidence that Adult 

Nurse Case Managers without significant experience in health and medical management 

were paid more than Plaintiff. Plaintiff offers no other employees with her similar 

responsibilities. As a result, Plaintiff’s support does not raise a genuine issue of material 

fact that Plaintiff and others were similarly-situated employees. Furthermore, Plaintiff 

fails to allege any facts that would support but-for causation between her disability and 

Keller denying her a raise. Despite finding that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie 

case, the Court will evaluate the remaining steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework to 

the extent that Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations support a prima facie case. 

 Assuming, in arguendo, that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the 

disparity in compensation. Defendant presents a Declaration of Martha Rodriguez, 

Manager of Case Management for Defendant (id. at 46–49), that states that both Carnes’ 

and Wellman’s negotiated salaries were based on unique qualifications including 

Wellman’s ability to speak Spanish and Carnes’ “significant experience in health and 

medical management.” (Id. at 47). Additionally, after Plaintiff expressed concern over the 

difference in salaries, Rodriguez and Keller evaluated Plaintiff’s salary in relation to her 

experience and found it fair. (Id. at 48). The Court finds the articulated differences in 

experience and qualifications between Plaintiff, Wellman, and Carnes constitutes a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the pay disparity. Thus, the burden shifts back 

to Plaintiff to show that the reason articulated by Defendant is pretext for a 

discriminatory motive. 

 Plaintiff provides no additional proof of pretext besides her own statements 

regarding Keller’s attitude and multiple opportunities to give Plaintiff a raise. As 

explained above, the factual inquiry regarding pretext requires Plaintiff to produce 

specific and substantial evidence that Defendant’s articulated reason for the pay disparity 

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was really pretext for discrimination. See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 

292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002). Speculations and subjective beliefs do not satisfy this 

heightened standard of specificity.

Thus, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s 

pay disparity claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged pay disparity 

cannot form the basis of her ADA disability discrimination claim. 

 b. Filling Out ADA Paperwork 

 Next, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered discrimination when Keller required her 

“to fill out ADA paperwork to continue her employment.” (Doc. 57 at 9). The Parties’ 

only disagreement is whether filling out ADA paperwork constitutes an adverse 

employment action. (Doc. 59 at 6–7). The Parties agree that, in response to Plaintiff’s 

Ethics Hotline complaint, Keller asked to have Plaintiff’s doctor fill out Defendant’s 

standard accommodation form. (PCSOF ¶ 122; DSOF ¶ 122). This standard form was 

used by Defendant to determine what, if any, accommodations are reasonable or 

necessary. (Id.). Plaintiff does not allege that Keller’s request to have Plaintiff’s doctor 

fill out the ADA paperwork changed Plaintiff’s hours, wages, benefits, or other 

conditions of her employment. As a result, filling out the ADA paperwork cannot amount 

to an adverse employment action. Furthermore, even if Defendant’s requirement for 

Plaintiff’s doctor to fill out the ADA paperwork altered the essential terms of Plaintiff’s 

employment in some unspecified way, Defendant’s need to accommodate Plaintiff’s 

disability constitutes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Plaintiff does not offer 

evidence showing that this reason was pretext for discrimination. 

 Thus, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s 

ADA paperwork claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s requirement that 

Plaintiff fill out a standard accommodation form cannot form the basis of Plaintiff’s ADA 

disability discrimination claim. 

 c. Weekly One-on-One Meetings with Supervisor 

 Plaintiff alleges that she suffered discrimination through Keller “subject[ing] [her] 

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to weekly one-on-one meetings with [Rodriguez].” (Doc. 57 at 9). The Parties’ only 

disagreement is whether the weekly one-on-one meetings were adverse employment 

actions. (PCSOF ¶ 141; DSOF ¶ 141; Doc. 53 at 9–11). Defendant argues that, as 

evidenced in the transcript, Keller’s decision to have Plaintiff and Rodriguez meet 

weekly was in response to Plaintiff’s requests for more time with Rodriguez. (DSOF 

¶ 141). The undisputed record shows that, in a March 2009 Performance Management 

Form, Plaintiff asked for “time for communication” with Rodriguez in order to make 

Plaintiff more effective in her position. (PCSOF ¶¶ 81–83; DSOF ¶¶ 81–83). 

Furthermore, in discussing the basis for the one-on-one meetings, Keller notes that 

Plaintiff is “obviously having some distress as far as the priorities and what other people 

are doing and what you are doing, so my action is to say I’m going to make your manager 

more available to you.” (Doc. 54-2 at 37). Keller additionally noted that Plaintiff had 

“voiced very openly that [Plaintiff] had trouble figuring out how all of this is going to 

come together.” (Id.). Furthermore, Keller premised the continuation of the meetings on 

whether, after two weeks, Plaintiff and Rodriguez felt that Plaintiff was “prioritizing 

everything” to a satisfactory level. (Id. at 38). Plaintiff argues that Defendant 

mischaracterizes the transcript (PCSOF ¶ 142), but Plaintiff fails to articulate how short 

weekly meetings with her supervisor alter the essential terms of her employment. 

Because Plaintiff does not explain how the one-on-one meetings constitute adverse 

employment actions, she fails to establish a prima facie case. However, to the extent that 

the transcript is unclear and that these weekly one-on-one meetings altered the essential 

terms of Plaintiff’s employment in some way, the Court will evaluate the remaining steps 

of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 

 Defendant asserts that Keller’s desire to address Plaintiff’s communication skills 

constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to require one-on-one meetings 

between Rodriguez and Plaintiff. (PCSOF ¶¶ 140–42; DSOF ¶¶ 140–42). In light of the 

undisputed facts and transcript of the meeting detailed above, the Court agrees. Shifting 

to pretext, Plaintiff offers nothing but a vague, personal suspicion that Keller was actually 

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motivated by disability-based animus. Vague suspicions, alone, do not satisfy Plaintiff’s 

burden of specificity. See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 661. 

 Thus, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s 

one-on-one meetings claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s requirement 

that Plaintiff attend weekly meetings with Rodriguez cannot form the basis of Plaintiff’s 

ADA disability discrimination claim. 

 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient to raise 

a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant discriminated against her because of her 

Crohn’s Disease. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion with respect to 

Count I: Disability Discrimination under the ADA. 

 B. Count II: Retaliation (ADA) 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that, in violation of the ADA, Defendant 

retaliated against Plaintiff for “reporting potential Disability Discrimination to 

Defendant.” (Doc. 50 at 6). Under the ADA, “[n]o person shall discriminate against any 

individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this 

chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 

 The McDonnell Douglas framework and allocation of proof that governs disparate 

treatment claims also governs retaliation claims. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 

of retaliation. 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, 

the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its 

action. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005). Once the 

defendant has presented a purpose for the action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of 

providing evidence that the defendant’s reason is “merely a pretext for a retaliatory 

motive.” Id. 

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1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) she 

engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) 

there was a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment 

action. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

a. Protected Activity 

Plaintiff alleges that when she complained to Defendant’s Ethics Hotline about 

perceived disability discrimination, she engaged in a protected activity. (PCSOF ¶¶ 111–

14). “Pursuing one’s rights under the ADA constitutes a protected activity.” Pardi, 

389 F.3d at 850. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. See 

Chen v. Maricopa Cnty., No. CV-12-00814-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 105484 at *4 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 14, 2013) (leaving a message on an anonymous hotline constitutes a protected 

activity). 

 b. Adverse Employment Actions 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant subjected her to four adverse employment actions 

by: (1) requiring her to “fill out an ADA form to inform Defendant how much work 

Plaintiff was going to need”; (2) requiring her to “sit down and meet with Keller”; (3) 

accusing her “of missing work beyond the number of days allowed to an employee”; and 

(4) requiring her to “attend weekly one-on-one training meetings with her supervisor.” 

(Doc. 57 at 12). In the retaliation context, an adverse employment action is an action that 

is “reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Vasquez, 

349 F.3d at 646. 

First, asking an employee to fill out a standard accommodation request form in 

response to that employee’s oral request for accommodation surely does not deter a 

reasonable employee from engaging in a protected activity. 

Second, Plaintiff’s meeting with Keller was not an adverse employment action. 

The meeting was called to resolve differences between Plaintiff and Keller. 

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(PCSOF ¶ 127; DSOF ¶ 127). Also, in the meeting, Keller welcomed Plaintiff to call 

Defendant’s Ethics Hotline if any further issues arose. (PCSOF ¶ 144; DSOF ¶ 144). 

Thus, because it was not reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from engaging in future 

protected activity, the Court finds that the meeting was not an adverse employment 

action. See Panning v. Eureka Cnty., 2012 WL 3324197, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2012) 

(holding that a meeting, which neither substantially threatened the plaintiff against any 

future expression nor constituted discipline or reprimand, was not an adverse 

employment action). 

Third, Keller’s accusation that Plaintiff missed more days of work than allowed is 

not an adverse employment action. In Nunez v. City of L.A., the Ninth Circuit held that 

simply being “bad-mouthed” or “verbally threatened,” a stronger action than Keller’s 

equivocal comments about missed workdays, is insufficient to establish an adverse 

employment action. 147 F.3d 867, 875 (1998). 

Fourth, weekly one-on-one meetings with Plaintiff’s supervisor are not adverse 

employment actions. Plaintiff offers no facts that support as much as even a reasonable 

inference that weekly one-on-one meetings with Rodriguez would deter Plaintiff from 

complaining about future perceived ADA violations. Thus, Plaintiff fails to meet her 

prima facie burden. See Henry v. Potter, 2010 WL 2990197, at *13–14 (Dist. Or. July 23, 

2010) (finding that the plaintiff failed to raise a factual issue that a meeting was an 

adverse employment action where plaintiff provided no concrete evidence that a meeting 

deterred him from engaging in protected activity). However, to the extent that weekly 

one-on-one meetings caused Plaintiff’s “working conditions [to become] so difficult and 

unpleasant” that they would deter Plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (Doc. 57 

at 12), the Court will analyze causation. 

 c. Causation 

 To succeed in showing a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must prove a 

causal link between a protected activity and the employer’s action “according to 

traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in 

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§ 2000e-2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred 

in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. 

Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show 

that she would not have suffered the requirement of weekly one-on-one meetings with 

Rodriguez but-for her call to the Defendant’s Ethics Hotline. Here, Keller met with 

Plaintiff because of the issues Plaintiff raised in the Ethics Hotline call. (PCSOF ¶ 127; 

DSOF ¶ 127). Keller referenced Plaintiff’s Ethics Hotline complaints in her explanation 

for requiring the one-on-one meetings between Plaintiff and Rodriguez. (Doc. 54-2 at 37–

38). As a result, Plaintiff has established a but-for causal link between her complaint to 

Defendant’s Ethics Hotline and Keller’s requirement that Plaintiff attend one-on-one 

meetings with Rodriguez. 

 2. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory Reason 

Once a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the 

burden of production shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 

for undertaking the adverse employment actions. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 

(9th Cir. 2000). Defendant argues that Keller’s desire to address Plaintiff’s 

communication skills is a non-retaliatory reason for the one-on-one meetings between 

Rodriguez and Plaintiff. (PCSOF ¶¶ 140–42; DSOF ¶¶ 140–42). See supra Part 

III(A)(2)(c). The Court finds that Defendant has met its burden of production in stating a 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for requiring one-on-one meetings with Rodriguez. The 

burden now shifts back to Plaintiff to show that Defendant’s proffered reason for 

undertaking the adverse employment action is pretext for retaliation. 

 3. Pretext

 To show pretext, a plaintiff must “produce evidence in addition to that which was 

sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut [the defendant’s] showing.” Stegall v. 

Citadell Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Godwin v. Hunt 

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

plaintiff may show pretext either by “directly persuading the court that a discriminatory 

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reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s 

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). When “the plaintiff proffers only circumstantial 

evidence that the employer’s motives were different from its stated motives,” courts 

require “ ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.” 

Id. (quoting Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222). 

Similarly to the Court’s conclusion with respect to Plaintiff’s meeting-based ADA 

discrimination claim, see supra Part III(A)(2)(c), the Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

proffered sufficient evidence of pretext. The undisputed record shows that Plaintiff, 

herself, acknowledged her own communication and prioritization problems and requested 

more feedback from Rodriguez. Plaintiff offers no evidence that her own requests for 

time with Rodriguez are mere pretext for retaliation.

Thus, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the oneon-one meetings claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s requirement that 

Plaintiff attend weekly meetings with Rodriguez cannot form the basis for Plaintiff’s 

ADA retaliation claim. 

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient to raise 

a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant retaliated against her because of her call 

to Defendant’s Ethics Hotline. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion with 

respect to Count II: Retaliation under the ADA.

 C. Count III: Constructive Discharge and Retaliation (ACRA) 

 Plaintiff’s third cause of action is that Defendant constructively discharged 

Plaintiff in violation of A.R.S. § 23-1502 and that Defendant unlawfully retaliated against 

Plaintiff in violation of the ACRA, A.R.S. §§ 41-1461–1465. (Doc. 50 at 6–7). 

 1. Timeliness of the ACRA Claim 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim arising under the ACRA is time-barred 

because Plaintiff filed this lawsuit over a year after Plaintiff filed charges with the 

ACRD. (Doc. 53 at 11). Plaintiff concedes that her ACRA claim is not timely; however, 

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Plaintiff urges this Court to apply equitable tolling to the ACRA’s statute of limitations. 

(Doc. 57 at 10–11). 

The Court concludes that there is no basis for equitable tolling in this case, and, 

therefore, Plaintiff’s ACRA claims must be dismissed as time-barred. The ACRA states 

that: 

Within ninety days after the giving of [a] notice [by the ACRD] a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge by the charging party . . . . In no event

shall any action be brought pursuant to this article more than 

one year after the charge to which the action relates has been 

filed. 

A.R.S. § 41-1481(D) (emphasis added). Even when the EEOC investigation extends 

close-to or longer-than one year, this Court has strictly interpreted the language of this 

statute as setting an absolute maximum amount of time to file suit and have not applied 

equitable tolling to the ACRA claims. See Strand v. John C. Lincoln Health Network, 

Inc., No. CV-10-02112-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 1253408, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) 

(dismissing the plaintiff’s ACRA claim because of the one-year statute of limitations 

even though the EEOC did not issue its notice of right to sue for nearly one-and-a-half 

years after the charge was filed); see also McElmurry v. Ariz. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV12-02234-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 2562525, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 11, 2013) (dismissing the 

plaintiff’s ACRA claim because of the one-year statute of limitations where the EEOC 

took ten months to issue its notice of right to sue). 

 Equitable tolling is “applied sparingly” and is generally allowed “when the statute 

of limitations was not complied with because of defective pleadings, when a claimant 

was tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s notice 

of the statutory period was clearly inadequate.” Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 268 

(9th Cir. 1992) (citing Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). Additionally, 

“[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of 

diligence.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per 

curiam). 

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 Here, on September 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC which was 

referred to the ACRD pursuant to a work sharing agreement between the two agencies. 

(PCSOF ¶ 3; DSOF ¶ 3; Doc. 58-1 at 48). The EEOC did not issue its notice of right to 

sue until March 27, 2012 (Doc. 58-1 at 40–41), a “number of more months” after the 

“[ACRD] issued the Right to Sue” (Doc. 57 at 11). Plaintiff did not initiate this lawsuit 

until November 16, 2012. (Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff asks the Court to embrace equitable 

tolling “[i]n the interest of judicial economy” because “it makes sense for Plaintiff to file 

one case and include all the causes of action that she deems fit.” (Doc. 57 at 11). Even if 

this Court generously allowed equitable tolling by departing from the strict interpretation 

of A.R.S. § 41-1481(D)’s one-year statute of limitation, Plaintiff’s claims would still be 

untimely. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit over 90 days after the EEOC’s, as well as the 

ACRD’s, notice of right to sue was issued. While the 90-day period to file suit after 

ACRD’s notice can be subject to equitable tolling,10 here the Court finds a lack of 

diligence in Plaintiff’s delayed filing of this lawsuit after the EEOC issued its notice of 

right to sue. Thus, the Court finds no reason to allow equitable tolling on both Plaintiff’s 

failure to comply with A.R.S. § 41-1481(D)’s one-year statute of limitations and 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with A.R.S. § 41-1481(D)’s 90-day period to file suit after 

receiving notice of right to sue. As a result, Plaintiff’s ACRA claim is time-barred under 

Arizona state law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion with respect to 

Count III: Constructive Discharge and Retaliation under the ACRA. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, 

/ / 

/ / 

/ / 

/ / 

 

10 See Kyles v. Contractors/Eng’rs Supply, Inc., 949 P.2d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (equitable tolling applied where notice of right to sue incorrectly stated deadline for filing action). 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant University Physicians Healthcare’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) is GRANTED. Because this Order resolves each of 

Plaintiff’s claims in this case, the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment for Defendant 

and Plaintiff shall take nothing. 

 Dated this 28th day of July, 2014. 

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