Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00458/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00458-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGER MUNYRORO,

Petitioner,

Case No. 18-cv-00458-BAS-KSC

ORDER: 

(1)ADOPTING REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION

[ECF No. 13];

(2)GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 8];

(3)DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED PETITION WITH 

PREJUDICE

[ECF No. 1]

AND

(4)DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

v.

RICK HILL, Warden,

Respondent.

On January 9, 2013, Petitioner Roger Munyroro (“Petitioner”) entered a guilty 

plea to the charges of assault with the intent to produce great bodily harm, Cal. Penal 

Code § 245(a)(4)), and possession of a firearm by a felon, Cal. Penal Code 

§29800(a)(1)). He also admitted to firearm use and a prior conviction allegation and 

on March 14, 2013, was sentenced to a total of fifteen years and four months in state 

prison. (ECF Nos. 3, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3.) 

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On February 20, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively filed the 

original federal habeas petition in this matter. (ECF No. 1.) After this Court 

dismissed the original petition without prejudice, Petitioner, proceeding in forma 

pauperis, constructively filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”) for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 25, 2018. (ECF No. 3.) The FAP

alleges sentencing errors pursuant to California law and in violation of the Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 14–17.) On 

August 6, 2018, Respondent Hill filed a motion to dismiss the Petition as barred by 

the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner failed to oppose the motion, either 

by the original September 26, 2018 deadline or the extended November 2, 2018

deadline set by Magistrate Karen S. Crawford. (ECF Nos. 6, 10.) 

Magistrate Judge Crawford issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on 

December 6, 2018, recommending that the Court grant Respondent Hill’s motion to 

dismiss the FAP as time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (ECF No. 13 at 

3–6.) Magistrate Judge Crawford also determined that Petitioner’s claim of 

sentencing error is procedurally defaulted and any review of sentencing error is 

barred pursuant to Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), because Petitioner 

pleaded guilty. Petitioner had not filed any opposition to the motion to dismiss at the 

time the R&R issued. (Id. at 1.) The deadline for the parties to file any written 

objections to the R&R was December 28, 2018. (Id. at 8.) No objections have been 

lodged as of the date of this Order. For the reasons herein, the Court: (1) approves 

and adopts the R&R in its entirety, (2) grants Respondent Hill’s motion to dismiss

the FAP as time-barred, (3) dismisses the FAP with prejudice, and (4) denies a 

certificate of appealability, 

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ANALYSIS1

A. The R&R’s Conclusions are Proper

The Court reviews de novo those portions of an R&R to which objections are 

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or 

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. “The 

statute makes it clear,” however, “that the district judge must review the magistrate 

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) (emphasis in original); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district 

court had no obligation to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the 

Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d at 1121. This legal rule is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this District. 

See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo 

review of a[n] R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); 

Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting 

report in its entirety without review because neither party filed objections to the 

report despite the opportunity to do so); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 

1155, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (Benitez, J.).

In this case, the deadline to file written objections to the R&R was December 

28, 2018. (ECF No. 13.) However, no objections have been filed and neither party 

has requested additional time to do so. Consequently, the Court may adopt the R&R 

on that basis alone. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Nonetheless, having 

conducted a de novo review of the FAP (ECF No. 3), Respondent Hill’s motion to 

 1 The Court adopts and incorporates the procedural and factual background set forth in the 

R&R and does not recount it here. (ECF No. 13 at 2–3.) 

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dismiss (ECF No. 8), and the R&R (ECF No. 13), the Court concludes that Judge

Crawford’s recommendation to dismiss the FAP as time-barred is proper.2

Judge Crawford properly concluded that dismissal is warranted based on the 

statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 13 at 3–6.) A federal habeas petition 

may be dismissed with prejudice if it is not filed within the appropriate time period 

pursuant to AEDPA. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2001). AEDPA 

establishes a 1-year statute of limitation to file a federal habeas petition for “a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” which begins to run, in relevant 

part, from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). Although the 1-year statute of limitations can be calculated based on 

the “latest” of several other grounds in addition to the ground identified in Section 

2244(d)(1)(A), see 28 U.S.C. § 2224(d)(1)(B)–(D), the FAP does not set forth any 

facts or arguments that suggest any of these other grounds are applicable. (See 

generally FAP.) Therefore, the FAP is subject to the 1-year statute of limitations 

calculated from the date on which the judgment Petitioner challenges became final. 

Judge Crawford correctly applied the statute of limitations in this case. The 

relevant date for computation of the statute of limitation is the expiration of the time 

for Petitioner to file an appeal from his March 14, 2013 sentencing in connection 

with his plea agreement. (ECF No. 13 at 4.) Petitioner had sixty days to appeal that 

judgment pursuant to California appeals procedure, which means that his conviction 

 2 In addition, even if Petitioner could show the Petition is not time-barred, the Court 

approves and adopts Judge Crawford’s second conclusion that Petitioner’s claim of sentencing error 

is procedurally defaulted because the summary denial by the California Supreme Court of 

Petitioner’s state habeas petition indicates that that petition was denied as untimely. (ECF No. 13 

at 6–7); see Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993). 

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became “final” on May 13, 2013. (Id. (citing Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a); Cal. Pen. Code § 

1237(a).) Judge Crawford correctly reasoned that although AEDPA permits for 

tolling of its 1-year statute of limitations during the pendency of state post-conviction 

or other collateral review, Petitioner is not entitled to such tolling because he did not 

file his first state petition until December 8, 2015—over one and a half years after 

the AEDPA statute of limitations period ended. (Id. at. 5); see Jiminez, 276 F.3d at

482 (finding that statutory tolling is not available when first state habeas petition is 

filed after the AEDPA limitations period has expired). Thus, Petitioner’s collateral 

state filings cannot save his federal habeas petition from the statute of limitations.

Finally, Judge Crawford soundly reasoned that Petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations because Petitioner has not set 

forth any facts or arguments that equitable tolling should apply. (ECF No. 13 at 6); 

Luu v. Beard, No. 13cv1182–MMA (RBB), 2014 WL 2616878, at *2, 13 (S.D. Cal.

June 12, 2014). Accordingly, it is proper to approve and adopt the R&R’s 

recommendation to grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition as time-barred. 

B. The Court Declines to Issue a Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court 

“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse 

to the applicant.” The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the 

petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) 

the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the 

issues in a different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further. Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Based on a review of the FAP, the record, and the R&R (ECF Nos. 3, 13) as well as 

Petitioner’s failure to pursue his FAP, the Court cannot find that any of these grounds 

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applies. Reasonable jurists would not find debatable or wrong that the FAP is timebarred by AEDPA or that Petitioner has not met his burden to show that equitable 

tolling is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue Petitioner a certificate 

of appealability.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby: (1) APPROVES and ADOPTS 

the R&R in its entirety (ECF No. 13); (2) GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 8); (4) DISMISSES the FAP WITH PREJUDICE (ECF No. 3); and (5) 

DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2019

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