Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00413/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00413-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAVENPORT,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0413 MCE KJM P

vs.

R. MCKEAN, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are

before the court. 

1. Plaintiff’s February 9, 2007 Request For An Extension Of Time

Plaintiff has filed a request for an extension of time to file his opposition to

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Good cause appearing, plaintiff’s request will be

granted and his February 9, 2007 opposition will be deemed timely.

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2. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be

entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so

long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

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dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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 Although defendants’ motion is filed on behalf of additional defendants who were not

screened in by the court’s November 1, 2004 order, the court resolves the motion only as to

those defendants on whom service was ordered. Also in the November 2004 order, the court

found that plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims under the Eighth Amendment against

defendants McKean, Eberle, Mancilla, Oschner, Speers, Braida and Lingerfelt. Defendants do

not seek summary judgment with respect to these claims.

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On December 7, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999);

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

3. Defendants’ October 6, 2006 Motion For Summary Judgment

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants Barnett, Erlich, Sandefur, Miranda,

Schirmer, Cook and Evans all participated in prison disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in

plaintiff being ordered to a term in segregated housing without cause. Compl. at 10-16. On

November 1, 2004, the court found that plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable Fourteenth

Amendment claims against all these defendants.1

B. Defendants’ Arguments And Analysis

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims because, among other things, plaintiff had no interest

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in not being placed in segregated housing. In the prison

context, liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are “generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citations omitted). Defendants present facts

indicating that plaintiff was held in segregated housing for approximately nine and a half

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 In his reply to defendants’ opposition, plaintiff asserts that, while in segregated

housing, he was denied programming activities, “essentially confined to a cell 24 hours a day,”

denied contact visits and denied vocational opportunities. Reply at 4:19-23. The court cannot

consider this assertion because plaintiff fails to point to any evidence susceptible of

consideration, such as a sworn affidavit provided by plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In any

case, the conditions of confinement of which plaintiff complains do not rise to the level of a

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months, with regular reviews of his classification status. Def’ts’ Statement of Undisputed Facts,

Ex. B at 14-16. 

Plaintiff does not counter that he was subjected to atypical and significant

hardship while in segregated housing. Rather, plaintiff asserts his placement in segregated

housing lengthened his prison sentence because he was not allowed to work for sentence credit. 

Opp’n at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts that because his prison sentence was lengthened as a result of his

stay in segregated housing, he should have had the benefit of due process before being placed

there. Id. at 5. Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in working

while in a California prison even if by working plaintiff would earn sentence credit. Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986). Because there are no facts before the court

suggesting plaintiff has been deprived of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, the moving defendants are entitled to summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

4. Plaintiff’s October 10, 2006 Motion For Summary Judgment

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to his claims against defendants

Schirmer, Cook and Evans, summarized above. However, in his motion, plaintiff fails to point

to any facts indicating he had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and was deprived of this interest at the disciplinary proceedings at issue. 

For this reason, the burden to establish that a genuine issue of material fact actually does exist

with respect to whether plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty interested has not shifted to

defendants. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, 475 U.S. at 586. Plaintiff’s motion should be

denied.2

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liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1092 (liberty

interest does not arise even when segregated housing imposes such hardships as denial of access

to vocational, educational, recreational and rehabilitative programs and confinement to one’s cell

for lengthy periods of time). 

6

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s February 9, 2007 request for an extension of time is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s February 9, 2007 opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is deemed timely.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The October 6, 2006 motion for summary judgment filed by defendants

Barnett, Erlich, Sandefur, Miranda, Schirmer, Cook and Evans be granted.

2. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed resulting in the

dismissal of defendants Barnett, Erlich, Sandefur, Miranda, Schirmer, Cook and Evans from this

action.

3. Plaintiff’s October 10, 2006 motion for summary judgment be denied. 

4. Plaintiff be ordered to file his pretrial statement within thirty days of any order

adopting the foregoing findings and recommendations.

5. Defendants McKean, Eberle, Mancilla, Oschner, Speers, Braida and Lingerfelt

be ordered to file their pretrial statement within fifteen days of service of plaintiff’s pretrial

statement. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 1, 2007. 

1/dave0413.57

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