Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00064/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00064-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY SALAS, CDCR No. AT-8924

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO JAIL MEDICAL STAFF; 

R.N. SALGADO,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-0064-BAS-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 4, 2016, Larry Salas (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

California Rehabilitation Center located in Norco, California, and proceeding pro se, filed 

a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff 

did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead, he filed two Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 3, 5). This Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motions and 

sua sponte DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could 

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be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff was 

granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading 

identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 7.) Once again, the Court found that Plaintiff had failed 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and DISMISSED his FAC. (ECF No. 

8.) Plaintiff was given one final opportunity to amend his pleading. (Id.) On May 25, 

2016, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 9.)

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court stated in its previous Orders, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or 

the payment of any filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the 

Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced 

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after 

docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 

must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

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a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n. 7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

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deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Due Process Claim

In his SAC, Plaintiff has added a “due process” claim that he did not raise in his 

previous filings. See SAC at 3. In this claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “John Doe 

Sheriff Deputy assumed Plaintiff was arguing and spitting on the nurse” and transferred 

him to Administrative Segregation (“ad-seg”) even though “no rules were broken by 

Plaintiff and he shouldn’t have been transferred to [ad-seg].” (SAC at 3.) 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of “a 

protected liberty interest” and “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although assessing the level of hardship involves a case-specific inquiry, courts 

look to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon 

inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege facts which show that any 

disciplinary punishment he faced subjected him to any “atypical and significant hardship 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff 

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does not compare the conditions of his confinement before or after placement in ad-seg. 

Nor does he clearly allege the duration of his placement in ad-seg, or the degree of 

restraint it imposed. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC contains no “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that the Defendant’s

actions “presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiff’s] 

indeterminate sentence,” or caused him to suffer an “atypical” or “significant hardship.” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584-85. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process 

claims are DISMISSED from this action for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

D. Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that at the time he was booked in the San Diego County Jail on 

July 2, 2015, he was having “heroin addiction withdrawal symptoms” which included 

“fever, in/out consciousness, dizziness.” (SAC at 6.) He claims that he “requested 

medical attention” from Defendant Salgado who denied his request for treatment of his 

withdrawal symptoms. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive medical attention for 

his withdrawal symptoms until July 15, 2015. (Id.) 

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, prison officials are liable only if they 

are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). For now, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has alleged 

facts sufficient to show that he had medical needs that were objectively serious. See 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical 

need” as one which the “failure to treat . . . could result in further significant injury or the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical 

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 

chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ 

need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

Even assuming Plaintiff had serious medical needs, however, Plaintiff’s SAC does 

not support a “reasonable inference that [any individual] defendant” acted with deliberate 

indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In order to show deliberate 

indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted 

with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The 

indifference to medical needs also must be substantial—inadequate treatment due to 

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 

732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Salgado denied him treatment on one day. 

He does not allege facts to show that she was responsible for the alleged delay in 

treatment from July 2, 2015 to July 15, 2015. Moreover, as the Court informed Plaintiff 

in the previous Orders, even if there was a delay in receiving medication, delays do not 

by themselves show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged to be harmful. See 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Again, Plaintiff’s SAC is devoid of any facts to describe how 

the alleged delay caused him actual harm. Without more, Plaintiff’s SAC amounts only 

to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” which “stop[] 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief’” as to any 

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purported medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

557).

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible 

claim for relief against any person subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

Therefore, his SAC is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

and 1915A(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); § 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 

Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to correct the deficiencies of his pleading despite being 

given several opportunities to do so, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs claims without leave to amend. See Cahill v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not 

an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. 

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since 

plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action 

should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing

Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

However, the Court will permit Plaintiff leave to amend his newly added due 

process claims as he has not been previously provided with the notice of the deficiencies 

of these claims. However, Plaintiff is cautioned that if he chooses to file an amended 

pleading, he may not raise any new claims.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failing to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him forty-five 

(45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file a Third Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading with regard to his due process claim. 

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Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his 

previous pleadings. Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Third 

Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 2, 2016

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