Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02423/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United St.a.tss Court of Appeals 

%nth Cirriiit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY l3 219B9 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ROSE MARIE STARRETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

and Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

ROBERT W. WADLEY, Individually 

and in his Official Capacity as 

Creek County Assessor; and 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 

CREEK COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, 

Defendants-Appellants 

and Cross-Appellees. 

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Nos. 86-2002 

86-2067 

86-2423 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 84-C-695-B) 

D. Gregory Bledsoe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant. 

Keith Harn, Bristow, Oklahoma (Lantz McClain, _District Attorney, 

Sapulpa, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for DefendantsAppellants and Cross-Appellees. 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 1 
This is a sexual harassment case brought by a former county 

employee, Rose Marie Starrett, against her supervisor, the former . Assessor for Creek County, Oklahoma, and against the County. 

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for 

plaintiff on some of her qlaims, and both sides have appealed. We 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

Defendants raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 provides an independent remedy for sexual 

harassment separate from that provided by Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e to e-17; (2) whether 

plaintiff presented adequate proof of a violation of her 

constitutional rights; (3) whether the County can be held liable 

under Section 1983 for the Assessor's acts; (4) whether the 

district court erred in excluding evidence regarding plaintiff's 

unemployment compensation application; (5) whether the damages 

were excessive; and (6) whether the award of attorney's fees was 

excessive. 

Plaintiff has cross-appealed, raising the following issues: 

(1) whether the district court erred in holding that plaintiff was 

a member of the Assessor's personal staff and, hence, exempt from 

Title VII's coverage; (2) whether the district court should have 

ordered reinstatement or front pay; (3) whether the district court 

erred in its award of post-judgment interest; and (4) whether the 

award of attorney's fees was inadequate. 

The underlying facts relevant to this appeal are largely 

undisputed. Plaintiff Rose Marie Starrett worked as a deputy 

assessor in the Creek County Assessor's office from March 1982 to 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 2 
October 1983. Her principal duty was to inspect and value real 

property in Creek County. Her supervisor, defendant Robert w. 

Wadley, had been elected to his post as County Assessor. 

During plaintiff's one-and-a-half year tenure with the 

Assessor's office, Wadley repeatedly made sexual advances toward 

plaintiff and other female employees, often while he appeared to 

be intoxicated. Those advances included propositioning plaintiff, 

requesting that she meet him at his house or at other secluded 

locations, making obscene gestures toward her, and pinching her on 

the buttocks. 

After plaintiff had spurned his advances, Wadley became 

hostile towards plaintiff and began scrutinizing her work more 

closely than the work of the other employees. He also repeatedly 

told her that at least one member of the office might .have to be 

terminated for budgetary reasons, implying that it might be she. 

Plaintiff complained first to Wadley, then to Wadley's 

attorney, and then to the Chairman of the Board of County 

Commissioners about Wadley's sexual harassment and his drinking 

problems. 1 After those complaints, Wadley continued his threats 

about terminating plaintiff.· 

Eventually plaintiff contacted her own lawyer who wrote a 

letter to Wadley stating that Wadley's sexual harassment of 

plaintiff violated Title VII and warning Wadley not to retaliate 

against her for asserting any right protected by federal law. 

1 Although plaintiff personally complained to the Chairman of the 

Board of County Commissioners, she did not attempt to bring her 

grievance to the attention of the Board by placing it on the 

Board's agenda, as she could have done. (Tr. at 361-62.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 3 
Approximately two months after plaintiff's lawyer sent the letter 

to Wadley, Wadley terminated plaintiff's employment for purported 

"budgetary'' reasons. When Wadley terminated her employment, he 

told her in a telephone conversation, which was overheard by coworkers, "I don't like you going to an attorney." (Tr. at 120.) 

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against 

Wadley and the County. 2 She alleged that defendants had violated 

Section 1983 by acting under color of state law to violate her 

First Amendment right to freedom of speech and her Fourteenth 

Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. 3 Plaintiff 

further alleged that defendants had violated Title VII. 4 

2 Plaintiff sued Creek County in the name of its Board of County 

Commissioners, as required by Oklahoma law. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

19 § 4 (West 1988). 

3 42 u.s.c. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ••• 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

4 Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the following 

provision of Title VII: 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer --

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin 

42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 4 
Plaintiff also brought pendent state claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination, and breach 

of contract. 5 

Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims were tried to a jury and her 

Title VII claims were tried to the district court. The jury 

rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendants 

for $75,000. The district court entered judgment in that amount 

plus interest. The district court also awarded plaintiff $84,004 

' in attorney's fees and $2,391 in expenses. The district court 

denied plaintiff any recovery under Title VII, holding that 

plaintiff was employed as part of Wadley's "personal staff'' and 

thus was exempt from Title VII's coverage pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000e(f). The court also ruled against the County on its 

counterclaim against plaintiff for $1~,895.26 in back wages. 

Wadley in his individual capacity has not appealed. (Doc. 

263, Amended Notice of Appeal.) Thus, the judgment is final as to 

him. The County and Wadley "in his official capacity" have 

appealed, but they are essentially the same entity. Brandon v. 

Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) ("[A] judgment against a public 

5 Plaintiff withdrew her claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress shortly before the case went to the jury. (Tr. 

at 1189.) The district court concluded that plaintiff's breach of 

contract claim "for all practical purposes, [adds] nothing'' to the 

case and essentially dropped it from the jury instructions, 

without objection. (Tr. at 1131.) The district court instructed 

the jury, without objection, that plaintiff's wrongful termination 

claim hinged on the jury's conclusions about plaintiff's federal 

claims: "As an employee at will, plaintiff Rose Marie Starrett 

could be terminated at any time at the election of defendant 

Robert E. Wadley as long as that action did not violate 

plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights." (Doc. 155.) On 

appeal, the parties do not contest the district court's handling 

of the wrongful termination claim or the breach of contract claim. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 5 
servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity 

that he represents"). See also,~, McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 

639, 642 (10th Cir. 1981) ("(O]fficial-capacity suits generally 

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity 

of which an officer is an agent.") (quoting Monell v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Therefore, 

despite the fact that the County and Wadley "in his official 

capacity" filed separate, complementary briefs in this appeal, the 

appeal effectively is between only two parties: the County and 

plaintiff. 6 

I. SECTION 1983 ISSUES 

A. Concurrent Application Of Title VII 

The County argues that the district court should not have 

submitted plaintiff's Section 1983 claims to the jury because a 

Section 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a Title VII violation. 

In the County's words, "[b]y enacting Title VII Congress created a 

specific administrative process and remedial framework through 

which individuals subjected to sexual harassment may seek relief," 

and the framework "may not be bypassed by prosecuting a Title VII 

action under the guise of a§ 1983 claim." (Wadley Br. at 11.) 

Although the County's assertion is technically correct, it is 

beside the point. It is true that a right created solely under 

Title VII cannot serve as the basis for an independent remedy 

6 In the remainder of this opinion, we will use the term "County'' 

to refer collectively to the County and to Wadley in his official 

capacity. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 6 
under Section 1983, lest Congress' prescribed remedies under Title 

VII be undermined. See Long v. Laramie County Community College 

Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 752 (10th Cir.) (right to be free from 

retaliation for filing a discrimination charge, created by Title 

VII, cannot be sole basis of Section 1983 action), cert. denied, 

U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 73, 102 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1988); Tafoya v. 

Adams, 816 F.2d 555, 558 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 

U.S. , 108 s. Ct. 152, 98 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1987); cf. Great 

American Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-

76 (1979) (rights created by Title VII cannot be the basis for an 

action under 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3)). 

However, that principle does not help the County here because 

plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is not predicated upon a violation 

of Title VII, but rather upon a violation of the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments. If a plaintiff can show a constitutional 

violation by someone acting under color of state law, then the 

plaintiff has a cause of action under Section 1983, regardless of 

Title VII's concurrent application. 7 See Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 

1370, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Title VII did not impair in any way 

[plaintiff's] independent, substantive rights created by the First 

and Fourteenth Amendments •••• '[S]ubstantive rights conferred 

in the 19th Century were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the 

subsequent passage of the modern statutes."') (quoting Novotny, 

442 U.S. at 377); Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 

7 The County stipulated in the pretrial order that both Wadley 

and the County "acted at all times material hereto under color of 

state law ••• within the meaning of Title 42 u.s.c. § 1983." 

(Doc. 148A at 9.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 7 
1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Where an employee esfablishes 

employer conduct which violates both Title VII and rights derived 

from another source -- the Constitution or a federal statute ••• 

the claim based on the other source is independent of the Title 

VII claim, and the plaintiff may seek the remedies provided by 

§ 1983 in addition to those created by Title VII."); cf. Meade v. 

Merchants Fast Motorline, Inc., 820 F.2d 1124, 1127 (10th Cit. 

1987) ("plaintiff may properly pursue his cause of action under 

§ 1981 for private employment discrimination despite the 

applicability of Title VII to the same conduct"). 8 

Therefore, the district court properly submitted plaintiff's 

Section 1983 claim to the jury. 

B. Existence Of Constitutional Violations 

The County further argues that there.was not sufficient 

evidence of a constitutional violation here. We disagree. 

We hold that sexual harassment of the sort alleged by 

plaintiff can violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 

protection of the laws. In so holding, we follow the Supreme 

Court's intimations on the subject and join the ranks of other 

circuits that have addressed the issue. ~' Bohen v. City of 

East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Sexual 

8 In order to complete its argument, the County requests that 

this Court actually go one step further. The County wants this 

Court to hold that Title VII constitutes plaintiff's exclusive 

remedy, but then to affirm the district court's holding that 

plaintiff cannot recover under Title VII because she was a member 

of Wadley' s "personal staff." See Part II.A below. Thus, in the 

County's view, victims of sexualharassment in plaintiff'~ 

position should have no remedy at all, under either Title VII or 

Section 1983. We reject that contention. 

- 8 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 8 
harassment of female employees by a state employer constitutes sex 

discrimination for purposes of the equal protection clause of the 

fourteenth amendment."); Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1274-75 

(8th Cir. 1987) (permitting Section 1983 claim for sexual 

harassment in addition to Title VII claim); cf. Davis v. Passman, 

442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979) (sex discrimination can violate right 

to equal protection); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 

73 (1986) (sexual harassment can constitute sex discrimination for 

Title VII purposes); see also Long v. Laramie County Community 

College Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 752-53 (10th Cir.) (allowing 

plaintiff to proceed "under§§ 1983 and 1985 on the sexual 

harassment theory" despite plaintiff's failure to prove Title VII 

claim for same conduct), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 

73, 102 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1988). 

The evidence here was sufficient for the jury to conclude 

that Wadley's conduct toward plaintiff deprived her of the right 

to equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff presented evidence 

that Wadley had made various sexual advances toward her. On 

repeated occasions, Wadley asked plaintiff to meet him during 

business hours at his house or at other secluded locations. 

(~, Tr. at 78-79, 83.) On one occasion, he asked her to go 

with him to a motel. (Tr. at 81-82.) At a hotel business 

reception, Wadley pinched plaintiff's buttocks with his full hand. 

(Tr. at 84-85.) Later that night, at a dance club, he put his arm 

on plaintiff's leg and invited her to his hotel room. (Tr. at 

87.) Wadley often _made obscene gestures to plaintiff during 

working hours. (~,Tr.at 91-93, 100.) Plaintiff also 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 9 
presented evidence that Wadley had sexually harassed other female 

employees in the office. (~,Tr.at 564-66; 705-09.) 

In addition, plaintiff presented evidence that Wadley's 

treatment of her changed after she spurned his advances and 

complained about his harassment. Wadley began scrutinizing her 

work more carefully than the work of other employees, singling out 

her work for special review and making changes on her work cards. 

(Tr. at 97, 102-03.) He also became hostile to plaintiff and 

began hinting that she might be terminated. (~r. at 98-99, 103.) 

Wadley ultimately made good on his threats and fired plaintiff. 

Based upon the evidence summarized above, we hold that the 

jury reasonably could have concluded that Wadley's conduct toward 

p1aintiff discriminated against her because of her sex and thereby 

deprived her of the right to equal protection of the laws. 9 

9 In arguing that there was not sufficient evidence to support 

the jury's finding, the County's brief on appeal demonstrates 

shocking obliviousness to the menace of sexual harassment in the 

workplace. The County writes: 

It is somewhat astonishing that in the most 

materialistic, if not hedonistic, culture ever created 

by man's ingenuity that rules of sexual conduct as 

stringent as any imagined by the Puritan fathers have 

suddenly been erected in the workplace. A pair of 

novelty glasses which picture a nude female when 

properly filled with water become relevant in 

determining whether a judgment should be rendered for 

sexual harassment. This in a culture whose highest 

court struggled with the difficulty of even defining 

obscenity and where billion dollar businesses 

(entertainment, advertising, publishing) are soundly 

founded upon female nudity and salaciousness. But if an 

improper -remark is passed in the office or if the boss 

gets drunk and makes a pass at a secretary, whether 

serious or not, it's a jury question and a feast of 

lawyer's fees. No wonder our courts complain of being 

overworked. 

[continued on next page ..• ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 10 
The evidence here also was sufficient to support the jury's 

conclusion that plaintiff "established her claim qf retaliation in 

the exercise of her First Amendment right of freedom of 

expression.'' (Doc. 156, Special Interrogatory# 2.) 

The Supreme Court has established a two-part test·for 

evaluating the First Amendment rights of public employees. Under 

this test, courts must determine (1) whether the plaintiff's 

statements can be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on 

a matter of public concern," and (2) whether the ''interests of the 

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

How much is it worth to a plaintiff if her boss 

flips her the finger? How much if sbe "thinks" he made 

an obscene gesture? How much for saying lets spend the 

afternoon at the Blue Top Motel in circumstances in 

which it would be almost impossible to take him 

seriously? How much per pinch on the rear? How much 

for spending an afternoon at the Cue Spot in Mannford 

drinking a few beers when he probably should have been 

working? Is this the sort of raw meat that should be 

thrown to a jury with no more education and instruction 

than to do right? And what more is an instruction that 

"sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual advances, 

requests for sexual favors and other verbal and physical 

conduct of a sexual nature." 

What the jury is really invited to do under such 

circumstances is to conduct a popularity poll. Do they 

approve or disapprove of the particular public official 

on trial. And of course, counsel are aware of this. It 

becomes a question of can we throw this thing on the 

wall and will it stick? Can we get enough of the 

opinions and rumors of his enemies, political opponents 

and dissatisfied employees through the hedge of the 

rules of evidence to make him look bad. If we can, we 

may walk away with a verdict. 

It is submitted to the Court that the facts in the 

case fail to show that Starrett was denied equal 

protection. 

(County Br. at 8-10.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 11 
concern" outweigh the ''interest of the State, as an employer, in 

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 146 

(1983). See also Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th 

Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 

L. Ed. 2d 250 (1988). 

U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 962, 102 

With regard to the first part of the test, an issue is a 

matter of "public concern" if it is a "matter of political, 

social, or other concern to the community." Connick, 461 U.S. at 

146. However, a public employee's statements about personal 

grievances are not automatically matters of public concern just 

because the employer is a governmental entity. A public 

employee's disputes and grievances may be private matters with no 

relevance to public interests, and speech concerning those private 

matters would not be protected by the Constitution: 

[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon 

matters of public concern, but instead as an employee 

upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most 

unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the 

appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 

personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in 

reaction to the employee's behavior. 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 

Among other factors, "[c]ourts have focused on the motive of 

the speaker in analyzing whether the speech qualifies as a matter 

of public concern, i.e., whether the speech was calculated to 

disclose misconduct or dealt with only personal disputes and 

grievances with no relevance to the public interests." Conaway, 

853 F.2d at 796 (emphasis in original). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 12 
In general, whether an employee's speech is a matter of 

public concern "must be determine~ by the content, form, and 

context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148. The ultimate issue of whether an 

employee's speech has protected status is an inquiry "of law, not 

fact." Id. at 148 n.7. 

Here, plaintiff contends that she was fired because she 

"spoke out" about two matters of alleged public concern: 

(1) "Wadley's sexual harassment of [her] and the retaliation that 

was occurring to her," and (2) her "concern about the County 

Assessor's drinking problems and the proper functioning of the 

office." (Starrett Br. at 19.) 

We need not decide whether plaintiff's complaints about 

Wadley's harassing conduct were matters of public concern because 

defendants never objected to the district court's jury instruction 

on the issue. The jury was instructed that plaintiff's 

expressions concerning sexual harassment and related retaliation 

were matters of public concern. Given defendants' failure to 

object the district court's instruction, we accept for the 

purposes of this case that plaintiff's expressions were matters of 

public concern. 10 

lO The district court's instruction stated: "You are instructed 

that expressions by the plaintiff concerning sex discrimination or 

sexual harassment and related retaliation and/or abuse of alcohol 

on the job are matters of public concern." (Doc. 155.) Although 

plaintiff presented evidence showing that Wadley had harassed 

other female employees of the department, plaintiff has not 

pointed us to any evidence that she spoke out about Wadley's 

harassment of others. Our own review of the record reveals that 

plaintiff's complaints focused on Wadley's harassment of her, not 

on Wadley's harassment of others. Nonetheless, we accept the 

unobjected-to jury instruction for purposes of this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 13 
With regard to plaintiff's complaints concerning Wadley's 

alleged alcohol problems, the record is less clear. Defendants 

may have objected to the portion of the instruction that related 

to Wadley's alleged abuse of alcohol on the job. See Tr. at 1248 

(Wadley's attorney: "I am still troubled by the concept that the 

comments of the nature that were made here with respect to the use 

of alcohol •• are constitutionally protected expression of free 

speech • • • • 11 ); 1199-1200. 

Plaintiff testified that she spoke out about Wadley's alc6hol 

problems on repeated occasions. First, she complained directly to 

Wadley about his "drinking problem" and its effect on the office. 

(Tr. at 110; see also id. at 94-95.) 11 Second, she sought 

assistance from Wadley's lawyer in correcting Wadley's drinking 

problem: "I told him about Bob coming to work very 

intoxicated •••• I told him about being concerned about Bob's 

drinking." (Tr. at 112-13.) The lawyer told her that he "would 

talk to Mr. Wadley and some of the other representatives and get 

back" with her. (Tr. at 114.) The next day, plaintiff and some 

other women from the office went to the lawyer and complained 

further about "[t]he drinking problem." (Id.} Third, plaintiff 

went to the Chairman of the County Commissioners and again 

11 It is settled that when the First Amendment otherwise would 

protect an employee's statements, the fact that the employee makes 

the statements privately to the employer rather than publicly does 

not eliminate the Constitution's protections: "The private nature 

of the statement does not .•• vitiate the status of the 

statement as addressing a matter of public concern." Rankin v. 

McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 107 s. Ct. 2891, 2898 n.11 (1987) (citing 

Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 

414-16 ( 1979)). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 14 
complained "about Bob's drinking, and that he was •.• working 

very intoxicated." (Tr. at 101.) 

Plaintiff testified that her motive in speaking out about 

Wadley's drinking problems was not purely personal, but stemmed 

from her concerns as a·member of the community: 

I talked to [Wadley] about my concern for him as a 

person, for him as Creek County Assessor, his drinking 

problem. My concern was Creek County. 

I went to [Wadley's lawyer] as a concerned employee 

or concerned citizen to talk to him about some of these 

problems to see if he could talk to Mr. Wadley and see 

if some of them couldn't be worked out. 

(Tr. at 110, 112.) 

We agree with the district court that plaintiff's statements 

about Wadley's alcohol problems were matters of public concern. 

As we held in Conaway, "[s]peech which discloses any evidence of 

corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of city 

officials, in terms of content, clearly concerns matters of public 

import." Conaway, 853 F.2d at 796. See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 

148 ("actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust'' by 

a public official constitutes a matter of public concern). 

Plaintiff's statements about Wadley's drinking problems fall into 

that category. Cf. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1181 (West 1988) 

(declaring "habitual drunkenness" to be ground for involuntary 

removal of elected officials). 

We also agree with the district court that plaintiff's 

interests in free speech outweighed Wadley's interests in stifling 

her comments. Defendants have not met their burden of showing 

that restriction of plaintiff's comments was "necessary to prevent 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 15 
the disruption of official functions or to insure effective 

performance by the employee." Conaway, 853 F.2d at 797 (quoting 

Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987)). 

Our review of the record satisfies us that there was 

sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury verdict 

that Wadley fired plaintiff because of her exercise of her First 

Amendment rights. The jury expressly found by way of a special 

interrogatory that plaintiff had established her First Amendment 

claim. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment that 

Wadley's conduct deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights 

and entitled her to a remedy under Section 1983. 12 

c. Liability Of County 

The County argues that even if Wadley's acts violated Section 

1983, the County was not responsible for them. We affirm the 

finding of County liability under Section 1983 for Wadley's act of 

firing plaintiff, but we reverse the finding of County liability 

12 Our conclusion that plaintiff can recover under Section 1983 

for a retaliatory termination based upon First Amendment 

violations is not inconsistent with Tafoya v. Adams, 816 F.2d 555 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 152, 98 L. Ed. 

2d 108 (1987). In Tafoya, we held that a Section 1983 action 

cannot be based solely upon a violation of the right to be free of 

retaliatory discharge created by Title VII. Id. at 558; see also 

Long v. Laramie County Community College Dist:-;-840 F.2d 743, 752 

(10th Cir.) ("a theory of liability under federal law for 

retaliatory conduct ••• does not give rise to a viable claim 

under Section 1985 [or Section 1983], and instead supports only a 

Title VII claim"), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 s. ct. 73, 102 

L. Ed. 2d 50 (1988). Here, as shown in Parr-I.A above, 

plaintiff's claim under Section 1983 is not based upon any 

substantive rights afforded by Title VII, but rather is grounded 

upon substantive rights granted by the First Amendment. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 16 
for Wadley's other acts of harassment. Consequently, we remand 

for a redetermination of damages on the Section 1983 claim. 13 

In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 

U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities can be 

sued as "persons'' under 42 u.s.c. S 1983. However, the Court held 

that municipalities cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a 

respondeat superior theory for merely employing a tortfeasor. Id. 

at 691. Rather, municipalities are subject to liability only for 

their official policies or customs: 

[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an 

entity is responsible under S 1983. 

Id. at 694. 

The Court in Monell distiQguished between municipal policy 

and municipal custom. It described municipal policy as a "policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 

and promulgated by [a municipality's] officers." Id. at 690. It 

described municipal custom as "persistent and widespread 

practices of ••• officials." Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S. 

H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). 

Since Monell, the Supreme Court has explained that a 

municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for the acts of a 

municipal official only when the official possesses "final 

13 The parties have not raised on appeal the possible effect of 

the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, which provides that 

counties are liable for the acts of their officials in certain 

circumstances. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51 SS 151-71 (West 1988). 

As a result, we do not consider the issue. See F.D.I.C. v. 

Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961,%°3 n.l (10th Cir. 

1986); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984). 

- 17 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 17 
policymaking authority" to establish municipal policy with respect 

to the acts in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 483 (1986) (plurality); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988) 

(plurality). The Court in Pembaur and Praprotnik emphasized that 

municipal liability is limited to "acts that are, prop~rly 

speaking, acts 'of the municipality' -- that is, acts which the 

municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.'' Pembaur, 475 

U.S. at 480; see also Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 924. 

The mere exercise of discretion by a county official is not 

sufficient, by itself, to generate municipal liability: 

The fact that a particular official -- even a 

policymaking official -- has discretion in the exercise 

of particular functions does not, without more, give 

rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that 

discretion. [Citation omitted.] The official must also 

be responsible for establishing final government policy 

respecting such activity before the municipality can be 

held liable. 

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83; see also Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 

925. However, if a county official has been delegated the power 

to make final policy in an area of the city's business, then the 

official's acts in that area are the acts of the county. Pembaur, 

475 U.S. at 482-83; Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 924. 

Whether an official has final policymaking authority in a 

particular area is a question of state law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 

483; Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 924. Here, we conclude that 

Wadley's act of firing plaintiff was an act of the County because 

Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to the 

hiring and firing of his staff. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.l~ 

("[I]f the Board delegated its power to establish final employment 

- 18 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 18 
policy to the Sheriff, the Sheriff's decisions would represent 

county policy and could give rise to municipal liability."). 14 

Although Creek County officially is represented by its Board of 

County Commissioners, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 §§ 3, 4 (West 

1988), the record does not indicate that the Board established any 

relevant employment policies or regulations concerning the 

Assessor's staff. Moreover, aggrieved staff members such as 

plaintiff had no meaningful avenues of review of Wadley's 

employment decisions. The County points out that the Board did 

have the power to institute removal proceedings against Wadley for 

"willful neglect of duty," "oppression in office," "willful 

maladministration," and "habitual drunkenness," Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 22 §§ 1181, 1194 (West 1988), and that the Board eventually 

exercised that power. However, we find that the power of ouster 

was too general to eliminate Wadley's status as an official 

policymaker concerning employment practices in his office. 

Indeed, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners 

testified at trial that he "did not think we had ••• control 

over Mr. Wadley's office. He was an elected official just as we 

14 See also,~, Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 

1988) (en bane) (city could be liable for the actions of an 

elected municipal judge in harassing and firing one of his clerks 

because the city delegated to the judge final policymaking 

authority on employment matters in his court); Meade v. Grubbs, 

841 F.2d 1512, 1530 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Since [the sheriff] was 

responsible for establishing the county's policy regarding the use 

of force in the Oklahoma County jail, the complaint sufficiently 

attributed the wrongdoing to a county policy so as to withstand a 

motion to dismiss."); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th 

Cir. 1984) ("DeLuca, as Sheriff, was the official responsible for 

the policies and procedures of the Routt County Sheriff's Office. 

Therefore, the Sheriff's Office will be liable under Monell for 

implementing an unconstitutional act if DeLuca knowingly was 

involved in an intentional constitutional deprivation."). 

- 19 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 19 
were. He could handle his personnel, you know, more or less how 

he wanted to handle them." (Tr. at 819.) 

We hold that Wadley's termination of plaintiff's employment 

was a final policy decision for the County. Wadley could not have 

fired plaintiff except for the fact that the County vested him 

with that authority, and Wadley was acting in his official 

capacity for the County when he performed the act. Because the 

County had delegated to Wadley the power to establish final policy 

concerning hiring and firing personnel within his department, the 

County is liable for Wadley's conduct in that regard. 15 

By contrast, we do not believe that Wadley's acts of 

harassment of plaintiff, separate from the firing, constituted 

official policy, and therefore we conclude that it was error for 

the district court to deny the County's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on this issue. 16 Whereas Wadley's 

15 Our conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that 

defendants never objected to the portion of the jury instruction 

on municipal liability instructing the jury that Wadley was 

implementing County policy when he terminated plaintiff's 

employment. (Tr. at 1199-1200, 1248-49.) The relevant portion of 

the instruction provides: 

[I]f you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 

Mr. Wadley, as County Assessor of Creek County, 

Oklahoma, terminated the plaintiff in retaliation for 

her rejection of or her refusal to accept his alleged 

sexual advances, or exercising her first amendment right 

of freedom of expression concerning sexual harassment or 

alcohol, then Mr. Wadley, as the duly elected Creek 

County Assessor, would be implementing the policy of 

Creek County, Oklahoma, and the County through its Board 

of County Commissioners would be liable to the plaintiff 

therefor. 

(Doc. 155.) 

16 Although, as noted above, the jury was instructed that 

[continued on next page 

- 20 -

C • • ] 

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 20 
ability to .hire and fire necessarily carried with it official 

authority and sanction, the other acts of sexual harassment 

complained of here were private rather than official acts. Those 

acts did not concern any official terms of employment, such as job 

title or description, salary levels, or other conditions that 

Wadley could establish only because the County delegated final 

policy authority over those matters to him. Rather, Wadley's acts 

of harassment were personal in nature without any indicia of being 

"officially sanctioned or ordered." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480. 

Although Wadley undeniably bears personal responsibility and 

liability for those acts, the County should not be liable for them 

unless they were so widespread and pervasive as to establish a 

"custom" within his office. We will address custom below but 

conclude here that Wadley's acts of personal harassment of 

plaintiff did not rise to the level of official County "policy." 

To analogize to a distinction that has developed in Title VII 

cases, Wadley's acts of sexual harassment, other than the act of 

termination, did not constitute what some courts have termed "quid 

pro quo" sexual harassment. "Quid P!_Q quo sexual harassment 

occurs when an employer alters an employee's job conditions as a 

result of the employee's refusal to submit to sexual demands." 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

Wadley's act of terminating plaintiff's employment was the 

official policy of the County, the district court did not 

similarly instruct the jury regarding Wadley's other acts of 

sexual harassment. As to those matters, the district court left 

it up to the jury to determine whether "Wadley's alleged acts of 

sexual harassment with respect to the plaintiff, Rose Marie 

Starrett, and other female employees in the County Assessor's 

Office were part of a pattern of action sufficient to establish 

custom or policy of Creek County, Oklahoma." (Doc. 155.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 21 
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (addressing issue of company's liability under Title 

VII for supervisor's acts of sexual harassment). See also Meritor 

Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Hicks v. 

Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987); Crimm v. 

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 750 F.2d 703, 710 (8th Cir. 1984); 

Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City 

of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir. 1982). 

Although there was evidence that Wadley was hostile to 

plaintiff and singled her work out for special review after she 

rejected his sexual advances, he did not materially alter her 

employment duties or status prior to the termination. Any person 

in an employment situation, whether a supervisor or a subordinate, 

can create a hostile working environment. But it is only by using 

the power of his office to establish employment policy that a 

final policymaker can establish municipal "policy." 

Even if acts of harassment do not rise to the level of 

"official policy," it is still possible that a widespread and 

persistent practice of sexual harassment in a municipal department 

could constitute the "custom" of a municipality. However, the 

evidence in this case did not demonstrate that a widespread 

practice existed. (~, Tr. at 485, 866, 876, 885, 932, 937, 

1086, 1092.) Instead, the evidence suggests that Wadley engaged 

in isolated and sporadic acts of sexual harassment directed at a 

few specific female members of his staff. There is no indication 

that sexual harassment by others in the office was tolerated or 

occurred. The sole evidence related to Wadley's personal 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 22 
behavior, usually when he appeared to be intoxicated. We find 

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Creek 

County Assessor's Office had a "persistent and widespread 

practice[]" of permitting sexual harassment or that sexual 

harassment was a "[d]eeply embedded traditional way[]" of 

operating in the office. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 & n.56. Indeed, 

as we noted above, the County Commissioners ultimately began 

ouster proceedings against Wadley for his conduct, and Wadley 

resigned shortly thereafter. (Young Aff., Doc. 201.) 

In light of our disposition of this issue, we are compelled 

to vacate the damage award against the County because some of the 

award may have been based upon prior acts of sexual harassment 

other than the termination. Accordingly, we remand for a 

determination of the amount of damages against the County stemming 

solely from the unlawful termination. 

II. TITLE VII ISSUES 

A. Personal Staff Exemption 

In her cross-appeal, plaintiff contends that the district 

court erred in ruling that she fell within Title VII's "personal 

staff" exemption, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(f). 17 We agree. 

17 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(f) provides, in pertinent part: 

The term "employee" means an individual employed by an 

employer, except that the term "employee" shall not 

include any person elected to public office in any State 

or political subdivision of any State by the qualified 

voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to 

be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on 

the policy making level or an immediate adviser with 

[continued on next page ••• ] 

- 23 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 23 
Title VII exempts from its definition of employee "any person 

chosen by [an elected] officer to be on such officer's personal 

staff" or the officer's "appointee on the policy making level" or 

the officer's "immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of 

the constitutional or legal powers of the office." Id. 18 The 

district court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim because it 

found that plaintiff was a member of Wadley's personal staff. In 

support of its conclusion, the district court noted that plaintiff 

was under Wadley's supervision, she worked closely with Wadley, 

Wadley could terminate her at will, Wadley periodically would 

accompany her in her field assessment work, and she often reported 

directly to Wadley. {November 27, 1985 Findings at p. 3.) 

The legislative history of§ 2000e{f) reveals that "Congress 

intended the [personal staff] exemption to be narrowly construed." 

Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 800 (10th Cir. 

1982). The House and Senate conference committee report on this 

section provides, in pertinent part: 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal 

powers of the office. 

(Emphasis added.) 

18 Although not raised by the parties in this case, the "personal 

staff" exemption found in Title VII's definition of "employee" 

arguably does not apply here under a literal reading of the 

statute. The section of Title VII upon which plaintiff's claims 

are based makes it illegal to "discriminate against any 

individual," rather than any "employee." 42 u.s.c. § 2000e2(a)(l) (emphasis added). However, we agree with the Eighth 

Circuit's comment, construing an identical definition of 

"employee" from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, that "it 

was clearly the intent of Congress that the term 'employee' •.. 

should apply to any person who has a right to bring an action 

under the Act, including an applicant for employment." Stillians 

v. State of Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 278 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 24 
It is the intention of the conferees to exempt 

elected officials and members of their personal staffs, 

and persons appointed by such elected officials as 

advisors or to policymaking positions at the highest 

levels of the departments or agencies of State or local 

governments, such as cabinet officers, and persons with 

comparable responsibilities at the local level. It is 

the conferees [sic] intent that this exemption shall be 

construed narrowly. Also, all employees subject to 

State or local civil service laws are not exempted. 

1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2180. As we have previously 

observed, it appears that Congress wanted the exemption "to apply 

only to those individuals who are in highly intimate and sensitive 

positions of responsibility on the staff of the elected official." 

Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981). See also 118 

Cong. Rec. at 4492-93 (1972) (The purpose of the personal staff 

exemption was "to exempt from coverage those who are chosen by the 

Governor or the mayor or the county supervisor, whatever the 

elected official is, and who are in a close personal relationship 

and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first 

line of advisers."). 

Here, plaintiff was one of several lower-level deputies in 

the County Assessor's office. The record reveals that plaintiff's 

salary was approximately $10,000 per year. Oklahoma law required 

Wadley to appoint a "first or chief deputy" to act for him in his 

absence, and he did so. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 § 180.65(B) 

(West 1988). But that person was not plaintiff. Most important, 

Wadley himself testified that plaintiff worked as one of the 

office's "field personnel" and was not a close personal advisor to 

him: 

Q. Was she a close personal adviser -- and I'm 

talking about Rose Starrett -- to you in the operation 

of the office? 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 25 
A. Advised me of what to do? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No, sir. 

(Tr. at 44.) 

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that 

plaintiff did not "formulate policy or advise [Wadley] so as to 

create the immediate and personal relationship" that is required 

for the ''narrow exemption intended by Congress." Anderson, 690 

F.2d at 801. See also,~, United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 

1114, 1117 (4th Cir.) (road deputy was not a member of sheriff's 

personal staff), cert. denied, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 143, 98 L. 

Ed. 2d 99 (1987); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 

729 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1984) (state court hearing officer was 

not an immediate .adviser exempt from Title VII's coverage). 

Therefore, we reverse the district court's dismissal of 

plaintiff's Title VII claims and we remand for further 

proceedings. If the district court ultimately finds a Title VII 

violation, then the district court should address plaintiff's 

request for reinstatement or front pay. See,~, Fitzgerald v. 

Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1980) 

(front pay may be part of appropriate equitable relief under Title 

VII). 19 

19 We express no op1n1on as to whether, for Title VII purposes, 

there is any collateral estoppel effect stemming from the nowfinal jury determination that Wadley's discriminatory acts 

violated plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

As to plaintiff's damages, we note that plaintiff should not 

[continued on next page ••• ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 26 
B. Statute Of Limitations 

The County asserts in its reply brief that some of 

plaintiff's Title VII claims should be barred because of the time 

limits contained in 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5. Under that section, 

Title VII claims must be brought within 240 days, which can under 

some circumstances be extended to 300 days, after the all~ged 

discriminatory employment practice. Smith v. Oral Roberts 

Evangelistic Assn., 731 F.2d 684, 689 (10th Cir. 1984). 

With regard to plaintiff's claim under Title VII that Wadley 

illegally terminated her employment because she had rejected his 

sexual advances, the district court properly ruled that the claim 

was timely. (Tr. at 1119.) The parties stipulated that plaintiff 

filed a written sex discrimination charge with both the Oklahoma 

Human Rights Commission and the federal Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission approximately 25 days after plaintiff's 

employment was terminated, well within Title VII's limitations 

period. 

The more difficult issue is whether plaintiff can recover 

under Title VII for Wadley's earlier acts of sexual harassment, 

separate and apart from the termination. At trial, plaintiff's 

attorney conceded that, other than the termination itself, there 

were no "significant acts of sexual harassment" by Wadley in the 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

be allowed "double recovery'' under Section 1983 and Title VII. 

For example, if plaintiff is awarded damages under Section 1983 

for lost backpay, she cannot recover backpay damages under Title 

VII. Cf. Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1445 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

- 27 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 27 
300 days before the termination. (Tr. at 77.) Thus, to the 

extent that plaintiff asserts claims for prior misconduct that is 

separate from the eventual termination, those claims are barred 

I 

under Title VII. However, plaintiff at trial argued that Wadley's 

prior acts were not separate from the termination, but rather Jere 

part of a continuing course of sex discrimination toward plaintiff 

that culminated in plaintiff's firing. 

(- Because the "continuing violation'' issue has not been briefed 

on appeal, we leave it for the district court to address on 

remand. Compare Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 

n.15 (10th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff seeking injunctive relief based 

on "a continuing violation of Title VII may file charges with the 

EEOC at any time during which the alleged continuing violation has 

taken place") with United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.:$. 553, 

558 (1977) ("A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for 

a timely charge is the legal equivalent of _a discriminatory act 

which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute 

relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status 

of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it 

is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present 

legal consequences."). See generally Perez v. Laredo Junior 

College, 706 F.2d 731, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 1042 (1984); Serpe v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 718 F.2d 935, 

937 (9th Cir. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 28 
III. OTHER ISSUES 

A. Exclusion Of Evidence 

The County asserts that the district court improperly 

excluded evidence of a purported admission by plaintiff in her 

application for unemployment insurance. The County contends that 

the application form shows that plaintiff _"voluntarily left her 

employ due to lack of work," rather than harassment. (Wadley Br. 

at 16.) We review the district court's exclusion of this evidence 

under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 

Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). 

We agree with the district court that the exclusion of the 

evidence was proper and was engendered by the County's own conduct 

at trial. Plaintiff had made a motion in limine to exclude any 

reference to the receipt of unemployment compensation ~nder the 

collateral source rule. During trial, defendants' counsel 

accepted plaintiff's views on the collateral source rule and 

agreed not to introduce or refer to any documents, such as tax 

returns and W-2 forms, indicating plaintiff's receipt of 

unemployment compensation. (Tr. at 282, 285, 343.) 

But -during the County's cross-examination of plaintiff, its 

lawyer asked her, in front of the jury: "And when you applied for 

unemployment compensation, is there a form that is filled 

out .••• " (Tr. at 342.) The County's stated purpose for 

seeking introduction of the form was to show that it contained- a 

purported admission about why plaintiff was no longer employed. 

Plaintiff's counsel immediately objected to the question and, 

outside the jury's presence, requested a mistrial. The district 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 29 
court denied the motion for a mistrial, but understandably was 

upset with the County's trial counsel: "It may very well be [an] 

admission against interest, but it would be sure nice if you had 

! 

come up here and talked to this court about it .before you blurted 

out unemployment insurance If you had come up and 

discussed it with this court, we might be able to skin this cat 

without talking about unemployment insurance." The district court 

i 

then sustained plaintiff's objection and told the County's lawyer 

to go on to another point. (Tr. at 342-45.) Given the 

circumstances, we see no prejudicial error in the district court's 

handling of the matter. Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 

600, 625-26 (10th Cir. 1980) (unemployment compensation is 

collateral and need not be offset against ~ackpay damages in 

action under Age Discrimination in Employ~~~t Act). 

The district court subsequently revisited the issue and 

examined the text of the unemployment compensation application. 

The district court noted that in one corner of the form, under 

"Reasons for Leaving," a box was checked saying "lack of work." 

But at the bottom of the form, in a space provided for additional 

information, plaintiff recited at length that she believed that 

she had been terminated in "retaliation [for] a claim I have for 

harassment and discrimination." (Tr. at 923-24.) The district 

court concluded that the information on the form cut both ways 

and, consequently, that its slight impeachment value was 

outweighed by the danger of jury confusion: "I just think it will 

be a bit of impeachment that won't advance the ball here in any 

way and for that reason, even though it were admissible, under 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 30 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, I think it will cause confusion that 

we needn't inject in this lawsuit." (Tr. at 925-26.) 

We agree with the district court's holding that the probative 

value of the proposed exhibit was minimal and that the value was 

outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury about the existence 

of unemployment compensation. The decision to exclude the exhibit 

was not an abuse of discretion. See Whiteley v. OKC Corp., 719 

F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1983) (trial court has the discretion 

to exclude evidence ·when it finds that the danger of prejudice 

outweighs the probative value of the evidence). 

B. Damages 

The County argues that the jury's compensatory damage award 

of $75,000 in this case is excessive. That argument is moot in 

light of our decision to vacate the damage award against the 

County and to remand for a new damage trial. 

In her cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court 

erred in denying her reinstatement or front pay. After the jury 

returned a verdict for plaintiff under Section 1983 for $75,000, 

plaintiff moved the district court for equitable relief in the 

form of reinstatement or front pay. The district court denied the 

motion, holding that (1) reinstatement and front pay are not 

mandatory remedies under Section 1983; (2) plaintiff found other 

employment soon after her termination from the Assessor's office; 

(3) reinstatement would generate hostilities at the office; and 

(4) the award of $75,000 made plaintiff whole. (June 18, 1986 

Order at pp. 10-11.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 31 
Regarding the denial of reinstatement, we agree with 

plaintiff that reinstatement usually will be granted when a 

plaintiff prevails in a wrongful discharge case brought under 

! 

Section 1983. See, ~' Reeve.s v. Claiborne County Bd. of I 

Education, 828 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Reinstatement is 

also normally an integral part of the remedy for a 

constitutionally impermissible employment action."); Allen v. 

i 

Autauga County Bd. of Education, 685 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 

1982) ("[R]einstatement is a basic element of the appropriate 

remedy in wrongful employee discharge cases and, except in 

extraordinary cases, is required"). However, plaintiff here 

submitted an affidavit from a psychologist with her motion for 

reinstatement stating that\·reinstatement was not appropriate at 

that time and would be det'i:imental to plaintiff's heal th. (Doc. '3 , ....... ,.., 

176 attachment.) In light of the affidavit of plaintiff's own 

expert, we _conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying plaintiff's request for reinstatement. Cf. 

Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 

1980) (denial of reinstatement was appropriate in a Title VII case 

where there was an atmosphere of hostility)~ 

As for the denial of front pay, we do not believe that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying front pay under· 

Section 1983. A front pay award is "discretionary with the trial 

court." Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1006 (3d Cir. 1984). 

Although front pay sometimes is appropriate when reinstatement is 

not possible, it is not a mandatory remedy. Shore v. Federal 

Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1985). Here, the 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 32 
district court found that front pay was not appropriate because 

(1) plaintiff found employment almost immediately after leaving 

her job at the Assessor's office, and (2) plaintiff was "made 

whole" by the jury's award of $75,000. (June 18, 1986 Order at 

10-11.) We conclude that those reasons were sufficient to support 

the district court's denial of front pay. However, the district 

court on remand has discretion to revisit the front pay issue if 

warranted by changes in the ultimate damage award or other 

dev~lopments. 

C. Attorney's Fees 

The district court awarded plaintiff attorney's fees of 

$84,004 pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1988. 20 The County contends that 

this award of attorney's fees was excessivea It argues that the 

district court erred in failing to reduce plaintiff's attorney's 

fees in light of the court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII 

claim and plaintiff's abandonment of her state tort claims. We 

disagree. 

First, as discussed above, plaintiff's Title VII claim should 

not have been dismissed. Thus, attorney's fees for the time spent 

on the Title VII claim were appropriate. Second, a fee award need 

not be reduced merely because a plaintiff failed to prevail on 

every claim raised in a lawsuit, especially where, as here, the 

claims all arise out of a common set of facts. Hensley v. 

20 Section 1988 provides that in actions to enforce the civil 

rights laws courts may, in their discretion, award the "prevailing 

party" a "reasonable attorney's fee." 

- 33 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 33 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). An award of attorney's fees 

is within the discretion of the district court, who is in a better 

position than an appellate court to determine the amount of effort 

I expended and the value of the attorney's services. Id. at 437; 

i Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1989); Brown v. 

Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 453 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 66, 102 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1988). We 

conclude that tte district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to reduce plaintiff's award of attorney's fees. 21 

In her cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that a higher hourly 

rate should :have been applied to the fees of one of plaintiff's 

attorneys. We disagree. In this case, a magistrate recommended 

to the district court that plaintiff's attorney Celia K. Skrivanek 

should rec~ive attorney's fees calculated at $100 per hour in 

light of h~r experience and the prevailing rates in the area. 

(Feb. 10, 1986 Finding and Recommendation at pp. 8-9.) The 

district 6ourt rejected the magistrate's suggestion, awarding Ms. 

Skrivanek only $85 per hour. The district court based its 

decision on the fact that $85 per hour was Ms. Skrivanek's 

standard billing rate and because the district court concluded 

that $85 per hour was "just and adequate compensation in this 

21 Our limited reversal on the issues of damages and municipal 

liability does not alter our conclusion that plaintiff is 

sufficiently the "prevailing party" to warrant statutory 

attorney's fees. See generally Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. 

Garland Indep. School Dist., __ U.S. __ , 109 s. Ct. 1486, 1493 

(1989) ("If the plaintiff has succeeded on 'any significant issue 

in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties 

sought in bringing suit' the plaintiff has crossed the threshold 

to a fee award of some kind.") (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 

F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). 

- 34 -

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 34 
case." (June 18, 1986 Order at p. 6.) We do not believe that the 

district court's decision was an abuse of discretion. Although 

attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. § 1988 generally should be 

calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the 

relevant community, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), the 

district court properly considered Ms. Skrivanek's ordinary 

billing rate as a relevant factor when determining the prevailing 

market rate for her particular services, Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 

546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983). We also find no abuse of discretion in 

the district court's refusal to enhance plaintiff's attorney's 

fees. 

D. Interest 

Plaintiff argues that the district court improperly delayed 

the accrual of interest on the award of attorney's fees. The 

court entered a judgment awarding $84,004 in fees on June 8, 1986, 

but the judgment stated that the interest was not to begin 

accruing until August 18, 1986. Not only did plaintiff lose 

interest during the delay, but the coupon rate upon which the 

interest rate is calculated also declined during that period. 

We conclude that the delay in awarding interest was improper. 

Section 1961 of Title 28 provides that "interest shall be 

calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment." 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1961. Thus, interest on the attorney's fees award should have 

started accruing on June 8, 1986 at the coupon rate at that time. 

We remand to the district court for a recalculation of the 

interest award accordingly. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 35 
IV. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the judgment for plaintiff under Section 1983 to 

the extent that it imposes liability on the County for the 

termination of plaintiff's employment. We VACATE the damage award 

against the County under Section 1983 and REMAND for a new trial 

1

on the issue of damages attributed solely to the termination. We 

REVERSE the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII 

claim based upon the "personal staff" exemption and REMAND for a 

resolution of that claim. We AFFIRM the district court's denial 

of reinstatement and front pay under Section 1983. We AFFIRM the 

district court's award of $84,004 in attorney's fees. We VACATE 

the district court's award of interest on those attorney's fees 

and REMAND for a recalculation of that interest award in 

accordance with this opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 36 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

June 23, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION. 

RE: 86-2002, 86~2067 & 86-2423 Starrettv. Wadley 

Attached is corrected page 18 to the opinion authored by 

Judge Ebel filed on May 22, 1989. On line 21, the line that 

begins with the numeral 925, the word "county" has been changed to 

"city." 

PF:\~ /.-

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

2 :lh_. ( / . r . .; / -! 

by: (/,() /ii l l t \ . ' ' . 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

l ' 

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 37 
policymaking authority" to establish municipal policy with respect 

to the acts in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 483 (1986) (plurality); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988) 

(plurality). The Court in Pembaur and Praprotnik emphasized that 

municipal liability is limited to "acts that are, properly 

speaking, acts 'of the municipality' -- that is, acts which the 

municipality has officiaily sanctioned or ordered." Pembaur, 475 

U.S. at 480; see also Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 924. 

The mere exercise of discretion by a county official is not 

sufficient, by itself, to generate municipal liability: 

The fact that a particular official -- even a 

policymaking official -- has discretion in the exercise 

of particular functions does not, without more, give 

rise to municipal liability based on ah exercise of that 

discretion. [Citation omitted.] The official must also 

be responsible for establishing final government policy 

respecting such activity before the municipality can be 

held liable. 

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83; see also Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 

925. However, if a city official has been delegated the power to 

make final policy in an area of the city's business, then the 

official's acts in that area are the acts of the county. Pembaur, 

475 U.S. at 482-83; Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 924. 

Whether an official has final policymaking authority in a 

particular area is a question of state law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 

483; Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 924. Here, we conclude that 

Wadley's act of firing plaintiff was an act of the County because 

Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to the 

hiring and firing of his staff. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 

("[I]f the Board delegated its power to establish final employment 

-18-

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 38 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

June 30, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 86-2002, 86-2067 & 86-2423; Starrett v. Wadley 

Attached is the second rev1s1on to page 18 of the opinion 

authored by Judge Ebel filed on May 22, 1989. On Line 21, the 

line that begins with the num~ral 925, the word "city'' has been 

changed to "county." Then on line 22, the word "city's" has been 

changed to "county's." 

PF:oac 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT}. HOECKER, Clerk 

( ' ~) : / . ; ./ \ l \ . 

By// td ,{[L,[/ ·.. d\,,v, 

\atrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 86-2423 Document: 01019963481 Date Filed: 05/22/1989 Page: 39 
policymaking authority" to establish municipal policy with respect 

to the acts in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 483 (1986) (plurality); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988) 

(plurality). The Court in Pembaur and Praprotnik emphasized that 

municipal liability is limited to "acts that are, properly 

speaking, acts 'of the municipality' -- that is, acts which the 

municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered." Pembaur, 475 

U.S. at 480; see also Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 924. 

The mere exercise of discretion by a county official is not 

sufficient, by itself, to generate municipal liability: 

The fact that a particular official -- even a 

policymaking official -- has discretion in the exercise 

of particular functions does not, without more, give 

rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that 

discretion. [Citation omitted.] The official must also 

be responsible for establishing final government policy 

respecting such activity before the municipality can be 

held liable. 

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83; see also Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 

925. However, if a county official has been delegated the power 

to make final policy in an area of the county's business, then the 

official's acts in that area are the acts of the county. Pembaur, 

475 U.S. at 482-83; Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. at 924. 

Whether an official has final policymaking authority in a 

particular area is a question of state law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 

483; Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 924. Here, we conclude that 

Wadley's act of firing plaintiff was an act of the County because 

Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to th~ 

hiring and firing of his staff. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 

("[I]f the Board delegated its power to establish final employment 

- 18 -

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