Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02931/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02931-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LAMBERT, an individual;

BEVERLY LAMBERT, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SANTA ROSA, a chartered city;

SANTA ROSA POLICE DEPARTMENT, a

police agency; EDWIN F. FLINT, Santa

Rosa Police Chief; MATTHEW A.

SANCHEZ, individually and as a police

officer of the Santa Rosa Police

Department; ALISSA JOHNSON,

individually and as a police officer

of the Santa Rosa Police Department;

and DOES 1 to 25,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02931 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DENYING IT IN

PART 

Defendants move to dismiss several of Plaintiffs' causes of

action. Plaintiffs William and Beverly Lambert oppose this motion

but agree to dismiss some claims. The matter was heard on November

4, 2005. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties

and oral argument on the motion, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiffs' complaint, on or about March 22,

2004, at approximately 8:04 p.m., Santa Rose police officers,

Defendants Matthew Sanchez and Alissa Johnson, responded to a 911

call made by Mrs. Lambert. Plaintiffs allowed Sanchez and Johnson

peaceably to enter their home in Santa Rosa. Sanchez and Johnson

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questioned Plaintiffs and their adult son Jon. Plaintiffs have

been married for forty-one years and, before this incident, there

had been no incidents of domestic violence.

Following a brief discussion, Sanchez and Johnson separated

Plaintiffs. Initially, Johnson accompanied Mr. Lambert into the

family room and Sanchez remained with Mrs. Lambert in the adjacent

area of the house. Jon was left alone at the time and was able to

see and hear Mr. Lambert's discussion. After approximately ten or

twenty minutes, Sanchez and Johnson switched positions.

Sanchez questioned Mr. Lambert for approximately ten minutes,

asking him for his date of birth and whether he had been drinking

alcohol that evening. Mr. Lambert informed Sanchez of his age and

birth date. He explained that his wife had a couple of drinks

prior to dinner and that he and Jon had not, but that he had

consumed one glass of wine with dinner. Sanchez asked to see Mr.

Lambert's driver's license. Mr. Lambert replied that it was in his

wallet in the dining room. When Mr. Lambert attempted to enter the

dining room to retrieve his wallet, Sanchez stood in his path and

raised his hand towards Mr. Lambert stating that he did not need to

see the driver's license. Mr. Lambert explained that it was not a

problem to get the license for him. Sanchez then stepped toward

Mr. Lambert and ordered him to turn around and put his hands behind

his back. Mr. Lambert replied that if Sanchez was going to

handcuff him, he would like to use the bathroom first. Plaintiffs'

bathroom was approximately five feet from where Sanchez and Mr.

Lambert were standing.

Without warning, Sanchez grabbed Mr. Lambert by the left

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shoulder and spun him around while twisting his left arm behind his

back. Mr. Lambert then renewed his request to use the bathroom and

suggested that Sanchez could leave the door open but that he needed

to relieve himself. Sanchez did not respond verbally. He kicked

Mr. Lambert's right leg out from under him, causing Mr. Lambert to

fall to the ground and crushing and breaking his right leg. 

Sanchez then twisted Mr. Lambert's right leg behind him causing him

further pain. Mr. Lambert screamed and pleaded for Sanchez to

release his leg. Sanchez released his leg but stood over Mr.

Lambert holding what felt to Mr. Lambert like a gun against his rib

cage. Mr. Lambert believed he was going to be shot and killed.

Sanchez was holding a taser pistol and used the taser on Mr.

Lambert's right leg. Mr. Lambert screamed in pain again. Sanchez

then handcuffed Mr. Lambert's hands behind his back and ordered him

to stand. Mr. Lambert was not able to stand on his own and fell to

the floor a second time.

During these events, Mrs. Lambert, Jon and Johnson were in the

dining room. Johnson came into the family room after Sanchez

pulled Mr. Lambert off the floor. Johnson entered the family room

and assisted Sanchez in lifting Mr. Lambert's upper body off the

floor and dragging his lower body, including his broken leg. 

Sanchez and Johnson then propped Mr. Lambert against a couch with

his broken leg under him. They ignored Mr. Lambert's request to

help him remove his broken leg out from under him.

Mr. Lambert again asked if he could use the bathroom; he

advised Sanchez and Johnson that he could not get there on his own

strength and that he needed help relieving himself. Sanchez and

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Johnson discussed Mr. Lambert's request during which time Johnson

advised Sanchez to remove the handcuffs and allow him to use the

bathroom. Sanchez and Johnson helped Mr. Lambert to the bathroom,

which was approximately eight feet away from the couch. Both

Sanchez and Johnson witnessed Mr. Lambert relieve himself.

Mr. Lambert does not recall what transpired between the time

he was allowed to use the bathroom and the time the paramedics

arrived. Nor does he know who called the paramedics. Mr. Lambert

was taken by ambulance to Kaiser Permanente Hospital. He was

treated in the emergency room for a fractured tibia and his leg was

placed in a full brace. Johnson stayed in the room initially but

was replaced by Sanchez. Sanchez insisted that emergency room

staff release Mr. Lambert to him so that he could take him to jail. 

At no time during these incidents did Defendants read Mr. Lambert

his rights, tell him why he was arrested or inform him why Sanchez

used force against him.

While in the emergency room, Mr. Lambert asked Sanchez for

water. Sanchez responded that he was not a nurse. Mr. Lambert

called a nurse and requested water. Mr. Lambert also asked Sanchez

to call Mrs. Lambert. But Sanchez refused and stated that Mr.

Lambert was under arrest and did not have a right to speak on the

phone. 

Mr. Lambert was released from the emergency room. His

attending physician, in Sanchez' presence, requested that Mr.

Lambert not place any weight on his right leg. Sanchez ordered Mr.

Lambert off the examination table and did not allow him to wear a

jacket or robe of any kind. Sanchez forced Mr. Lambert to leave

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the hospital on crutches with his gown open in the back exposing

Mr. Lambert's underwear. Mr. Lambert walked approximately seventyfive feet down the sidewalk to the patrol car. Sanchez did not

offer to assist Mr. Lambert or to get a wheelchair.

Mr. Lambert arrived at the Sonoma County Jail at approximately

11:30 p.m. Sanchez went into the jail and returned twenty minutes

later with a wheelchair. Sanchez helped Mr. Lambert into the

wheelchair. While in the jail waiting room, another officer told

Mr. Lambert that he could watch television and use the telephone to

make a call. Sanchez was no longer with Mr. Lambert.

After these events, Sanchez and Johnson falsified their arrest

reports. Mr. Lambert alleges that Defendants City of Santa Rosa,

Santa Rosa Police Department and various officials know of

Sanchez's use of excessive force, and of Sanchez and Johnson's

falsification of their reports. On or about June 11, 2004, Mr.

Lambert submitted a statement to Defendant Santa Rosa concerning

the events of March 22, 2004. On or about June 21, 2004,

Lieutenant Zboralske and Sergeant Swartz from Defendant Police

Department met Plaintiffs at their home in the presence of

Plaintiffs' attorney. The officers discussed Defendant Police

Department's cooperation and public support. As of March 31, 2005,

Plaintiffs did not know if any investigation had been completed.

As a result of the injuries Mr. Lambert sustained on March 22,

2004, he has undergone surgery on his right leg and may need

further surgeries in the future. Plaintiffs have had to move from

their two-story home in Santa Rosa to a smaller single-story home

in Cloverdale, California. They moved because of Mr. Lambert's

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difficulty walking, his period of recuperation following surgery,

his loss of income and because they fear additional harm from

Defendant Police Department.

During the events of March 22, 2004, Mrs. Lambert was at all

times in the adjacent room and heard and/or observed incidents

which occurred in the hallway next to the bathroom. Mrs. Lambert

could hear Mr. Lambert's screams. Following Mr. Lambert's fall to

the ground, Mrs. Lambert and her son entered the hallway and

witnessed Mr. Lambert in pain. She also observed as Sanchez and

Johnson hauled Mr. Lambert over to the couch. This caused Mrs.

Lambert severe emotional trauma for which she has received

treatment and incurred monetary damages, including three months of

lost wages.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged twelve causes of action;

however, in their opposition, Plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to

dismiss the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth and eleventh causes

of action against all Defendants and to dismiss all claims against

Defendant Police Chief Edwin Flint. In addition, Plaintiffs do not

intend to pursue the seventh cause of action and, therefore, it is

dismissed. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have clarified that Mrs.

Lambert's sole claim is based on loss of consortium (twelfth cause

of action) as a result of the assault on Mr. Lambert. At hearing

the parties also agreed that Santa Rosa Police Department was

included erroneously as a defendant in that it is not a separate

legal entity. Thus, all claims against the Santa Rosa Police

Department are dismissed.

The remaining causes of action brought by Mr. Lambert, as

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originally numbered in the complaint, are: (first) violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and

Johnson, individually and in their official capacities; (second)

assault and battery against Defendants Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and

Johnson, individually and in their official capacities; (eighth)

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants

Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and Johnson, individually and in their

official capacities; (ninth) failure to intervene against Defendant

Johnson. Mrs. Lambert brings the twelfth cause of action for loss

of consortium against Defendants Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and

Johnson, individually and in their official capacities. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These rules “do not require a

claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and

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1 Defendants' reliance on Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382

(9th Cir. 1991), to support the proposition that Plaintiffs must

allege with particularity facts to overcome an official's qualified

immunity was improper. Branch was overruled. Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus,

Defendants' citation of Branch for this proposition was negligent. 

8

plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

DISCUSSION

I. First Cause of Action for Excessive Force Under § 1983

A. Municipal Liability 

Defendants argue that the complaint must allege facts to

establish some affirmative link between Santa Rosa's policies and

the deprivation of Mr. Lambert's constitutional rights. Defendants

contend, however, that Plaintiffs have plead, in effect, a

respondeat superior theory of liability, which is insufficient to

establish a claim against a municipality.1

A municipality can be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only

where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation

at issue; respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not

attach under section 1983. Monell v. New York Dep't of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). Plaintiffs must allege that:

(1) Mr. Lambert was deprived of his constitutional rights by Santa

Rosa employees acting under color of State law; (2) that Santa Rosa

had customs or policies which "'amounted to deliberate

indifference' to [his] constitutional rights;" and (3) that these

policies were the "'moving force behind the constitutional

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violation[s].'" Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473, 1477 (9th

Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91

(1989))(alterations in original). 

In the Ninth Circuit, such a claim is sufficient to withstand

a motion to dismiss "even if the claim is based on nothing more

than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct

conformed to official policy, custom, or practice." Galbraith v.

County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th

Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743,

747 (9th Cir. 1986))). Further, acquiescence in a practice or

custom is a cognizable claim under Monell. Jett v. Dallas Indep.

Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). And, a municipality's

failure to train or supervise its employees properly can create

section 1983 liability where such a failure is "conscious" or

"amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons" with

whom its employees are likely to come into contact. City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89. 

Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient. It alleges that (1) Mr.

Lambert was deprived his constitutional rights; (2) Santa Rosa

maintained "a policy, custom, or practice" of excessive force and

its policymakers acted with "deliberate indifference" to Mr.

Lambert's constitutional rights; and (3) Santa Rosa's policies and

practices permitted and encouraged excessive force by its officers.

 Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Santa Rosa's failure "to

properly hire, train, supervise or discipline" its officers,

demonstrated its "ratification, condonation, and acquiescence in

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the use of excessive force." And, the complaint alleges that Santa

Rosa's policymakers acted with "actual knowledge, constructive

knowledge and/or deliberate indifference" to Mr. Lambert's

constitutional rights. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs' allegations against Santa Rosa are

sufficiently plead to withstand Defendants' motion to dismiss.

B. Defendant Johnson's Liability

Defendants contend that the complaint fails to allege that

Defendant Johnson personally engaged in the use of excessive force.

Defendants argue that, because Johnson was in another room during

the time Sanchez inflicted the alleged injuries to Mr. Lambert's

leg, the section 1983 claim against Johnson should be dismissed. 

Plaintiffs respond that Johnson failed to prevent Sanchez from

using the taser and contributed to the excessive force by dragging

Mr. Lambert across the floor. 

A police officer may be held liable under section 1983 for

failing to intervene if a fellow officer violates the

constitutional rights of a suspect. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d

1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). However, officers who are not present

or do not have a "realistic opportunity" to intercede cannot be

held liable. Id.

According to the complaint, Johnson was in the dining room

when Mr. Lambert’s leg was broken in the family room due to

Sanchez’s alleged use of excessive force. Because Johnson was in

the other room when the initial injury occurred and the complaint

does not indicate that she had any warning that Sanchez would use

force on Mr. Lambert, she had no realistic opportunity to intervene

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before Mr. Lambert’s leg was broken. However, Plaintiffs argue

that Johnson failed to act to prevent the taser injury to Mr.

Lambert after Mr. Lambert's leg was broken and he began screaming

and pleading with Sanchez to release his leg. Whether Johnson can

be held liable for a failure to intervene before Sanchez used his

taser on Lambert would, therefore, depend on facts such as 

(1) whether Johnson could hear from the dining room the altercation

between Sanchez and Mr. Lambert in the family room; (2) whether

what she heard indicated that excessive force had been and would

continue to be utilized against Mr. Lambert; and (3) whether the

duration of the altercation allowed Johnson a realistic opportunity

to intervene to prevent further injury. These issues are not

appropriately addressed at this stage in the proceedings. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Johnson's subsequent act

of dragging him across the floor while injured constituted

excessive force. The manner in which Mr. Lambert was allegedly

dragged through his family room could also establish excessive

force, depending on the circumstances of Mr. Lambert's arrest. 

Taking the allegations in the complaint as true and construing all

reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court cannot hold

that Mr. Lambert has not stated a claim of excessive force against

Johnson. 

Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the first cause of

action against Johnson is denied.

C. Falsification of Police Reports

In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the complaint

states a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants

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Sanchez and Johnson for falsification of police reports. 

Defendants respond that the complaint does not assert this cause of

action. 

Defendants correctly observe that the only allegations of

falsification of police reports are set forth in the tenth cause of

action, which has been voluntarily dismissed, and in the

complaint's introductory allegations, which are not incorporated by

reference into the other causes of action. The only remaining

section 1983 claim is the first cause of action for excessive

force, which does not allege that Defendants Sanchez and Johnson

falsified their police reports.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for falsification of police

reports. At the hearing, Plaintiffs declined leave to amend to

state such a claim.

II. Municipal Liability for State Law Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' State law tort claims

against Santa Rosa should be dismissed because Plaintiffs' original

claim filed with the City did not allege facts to establish any

action or inaction by Santa Rosa or make an independent claim

against it. Plaintiffs argue that their State law causes of action

against Santa Rosa arise from the same fundamental facts as set

forth in the pre-lawsuit claim.

California "Government Code section 945.4 requires, as a

prerequisite to maintenance of an action against a public entity

for damages arising out of an alleged tort, the timely filing of a

claim, and its rejection." Fall River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v.

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Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (1988). "[T]he factual

circumstances set forth in the written claim must correspond with

the facts alleged in the complaint . . . ." Nelson v. State of

California, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72, 79 (1982) (citations omitted). 

"Where a complaint is 'predicated on the same fundamental facts' as

those in the claim, courts have concluded the claim did not violate

section 945.4." Dixon v. City of Livermore, 127 Cal. App. 4th 32,

40 (2005) (quoting White v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1505,

1511 (1990)) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs' claim contains the same fundamental facts as

alleged in the complaint. Moreover, Defendants' assertion that

there are no independent claims made against Santa Rosa is directly

contradicted by the heading of the claim itself -- "William and

Beverly Lambert's Claim Against the City of Santa Rosa." (Caroline

Fowler Dec., Ex. C at 2).

Therefore, the claim satisfied section 945.4 and the Court

will not dismiss Plaintiffs' State law tort claims against Santa

Rosa. 

III. Second Cause of Action for Assault and Battery

A. Defendant Johnson's Liability

Defendants argue that California law precludes Defendant

Johnson's liability for assault and battery. Defendants claim that

"a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or

omission of another person." Cal. Gov't Code § 820.8 (2005). 

Defendants also point to section 820.4, which provides immunity to

public officials for conduct carried out "in the execution or

enforcement of any law." Id. at § 820.4. But section 820.8

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2

 Section 52.1 states, in relevant part:

(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color

of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or

attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion,

with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States, or of the rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state . . .

(b) Any individual . . . may institute and prosecute in his or

her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for

damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section

52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief

to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or

rights secured . . .

14

emphasizes: "Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee

from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent

or wrongful act or omission." Id. at § 820.8. Thus, section 820.4

only immunizes acts or omissions of police exercising "due care." 

Id. at § 820.4. Consequently, Johnson can be held liable for the

alleged unreasonable force she used against Mr. Lambert while

dragging him across the family room floor. Moreover, Plaintiffs

rely on Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.

2002), holding that police officers who use excessive force in

arresting a suspect are not immune from assault and battery under

California law. 

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the 

second cause of action against Johnson.

B. Bane Civil Rights Act Claim

In their opposition papers, Plaintiffs contend that there is a

valid cause of action under California law for assault and battery

as a violation of California Civil Code section 52.1,2

 popularly

known as the Bane Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs further assert that

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this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this cause of action

because Plaintiffs' assault and battery claims are factually

related to the section 1983 excessive force claims.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs admitted that the section 52.1

cause of action was poorly plead. Plaintiffs cite section 52.1

only once in their complaint under the heading of jurisdiction and

venue, which is not incorporated by reference into any other causes

of action. There is no citation to section 52.1 in the second

cause of action for assault and battery, or as an independent cause

of action. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend to

state a valid cause of action under section 52.1. 

IV. Eighth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction 

of Emotional Distress

Relying on California law, Defendants assert immunity for

Plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Without specifically addressing Defendants' contention, Plaintiffs

generally dispute Defendants' immunity. 

Under California law, "except as otherwise provided by

statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from

an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the

employee is immune from liability." Cal. Gov't. Code § 815.2(b). 

Furthermore, "[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused

by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative

proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts

maliciously and without probable cause." Id. at § 821.6. 

California courts have held that such prosecutorial immunity

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applies to acts by police officers, Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4

Cal. App. 3d 82, 86 (1970), during the course of an investigation. 

Baughman v. California, 38 Cal. App. 4th 182, 191-92 (1995).

Here, Sanchez and Johnson responded to a 911 call and

initiated an investigation concerning claims of domestic violence. 

During their investigation, Sanchez and Johnson allegedly caused

Mr. Lambert emotional distress. Similarly in Amylou R. v. County

of Riverside, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205 (1994), the plaintiff alleged

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress caused

by law enforcement officers investigating the plaintiff's rape. 

The court held that section 821.6 barred the plaintiff's claim. 

Id. at 1214. The immunity applied to the officers and, by

operation of section 815.2(b), the County of Riverside. Id.

As in Amylou, Defendants' alleged acts were "incidental" to

the investigation of a crime. Id. at 1211. Plaintiffs do not

attempt to distinguish Amylou. Therefore, Defendants Santa Rosa,

and Sanchez and Johnson are immune from Plaintiffs' eighth cause of

action.

V. Ninth Cause of Action for Failure to Intervene

Defendants argue that Johnson cannot be held liable under

California law for her failure to intervene. 

To establish the requisite duty for this tort under California

common law, a plaintiff must allege "that the officer took

affirmative action which contributed to, increased, or changed the

risk which would have otherwise existed" or establish "the

requisite factors to a finding of special relationship, namely

'detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on the officers' conduct.'"

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Stout v. City of Porterville, 148 Cal. App. 3d 937, 945 (1983)

(quoting Williams v. California, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 27-28 (1983)). 

Nothing in the complaint shows that Johnson took affirmative action

which contributed to the risk of Mr. Lambert sustaining an injury

from Sanchez nor have Plaintiffs shown any detrimental reliance

upon her conduct. 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the

ninth cause of action. At the hearing, Plaintiffs indicated that,

given the Court's findings, they did not wish leave to amend. 

VI. Twelfth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium

Defendants assert that Mrs. Lambert has failed to plead the

specific elements of damage that are required to state a claim for

loss of consortium. Plaintiffs argue that, under rules of liberal

pleading, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to put

Defendants on notice of this cause of action. 

Loss of consortium is the "loss of conjugal fellowship and

sexual relations" experienced by a person when his or her spouse is

injured. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 12 Cal. 3d 382,

385 (1974). The concept of consortium "embraces such elements as

love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, sexual relations

. . . moral support . . . and the deprivation of a spouse's

physical assistance in operating and maintaining the family home." 

Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 633 (1985) (citations

omitted). Loss of consortium can be complete or partial. Carlson

v. Wald, 151 Cal. App. 3d 598, 602 (1984) (citing Rodriguez, 12

Cal. 3d at 408)). 

Defendants rely upon Park v. Standard Chem Way Company, in

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which a California appellate court stated:

Rodriguez does not stand for the principle that the

injury to and the pain and suffering of a negligently

injured spouse creates a cause of action for loss of

consortium in the other spouse. . . . We think that loss

of consortium as defined above means a complete loss of

consortium for a definite period of time or a

nondeterminable length of time and is not to be confused

with the inevitable physical, mental, and emotional

damage normally or usually suffered by one spouse when

the other has been wrongfully injured.

60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 50 (1976).

This portion of the Park decision has since been described as

"colorful dicta," unsupported by the text of Rodriguez, and "not

followed by any subsequent California court." Carlson, 151 Cal.

App. 3d at 602. There is no requirement under California law that

Plaintiffs plead a complete loss of consortium because Rodriguez

allows recovery for "impairment to the rights of consortium." Id.

(citing Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 409) (emphasis in original). 

Because Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint for other

reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the twelfth

cause of action, and grants Mrs. Lambert leave to amend to

incorporate the relevant language from Rodriguez and perfect her

loss of consortium claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1) Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the claim of

excessive force in the first cause of action against Defendants

Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and Johnson.

2) Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the assault

and battery claim in the second cause of action against Defendant

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Johnson.

3) Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend is GRANTED to add a

claim under California Civil Code section 52.1. 

4) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED without leave to

amend as to all claims in the eighth cause of action against

Defendants Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and Johnson. 

5) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the failure

to intervene claim in the ninth cause of action against Defendant

Johnson.

6) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the loss of

consortium claim in the twelfth cause of action against Defendants

Santa Rosa, and Sanchez and Johnson. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to

amend to perfect the loss of consortium claim.

7) Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint on or before

November 11, 2005. Defendants shall notice any motion to dismiss

to be heard at the Case Management Conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/15/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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