Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02365/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MANUEL GUTIERREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

GREG LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv2365 JLS (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DISMISSING PETITION

WITH PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 8]

Jose Manuel Gutierrez is a California prisoner serving a term of 15 years to life, plus 13 years

and eight months, for murder and related offenses. Through counsel, he filed this Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Gutierrez claims that he was deprived of his sixth

and fourteenth amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel at his 1994 trial. Pet’n at 1, 6. He

alleges his counsel failed to present testimony that showed his girlfriend’s red Ford Mustang--from

which the prosecution said he did the shooting--was impounded and searched, and that no evidence of

bullets or casings were found in the car.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition as time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner filed an opposition, arguing that he is entitled to a later start date of the statute of limitations

because he did not discover the basis of his claim until March 2011, and alternatively, because he is

entitled to equitable tolling. After thorough review, the court RECOMMENDS that the motion to

dismiss be GRANTED and that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Conviction.

On August 22, 1994, Gutierrez was convicted of murder, discharging a firearm at an occupied

vehicle, and possessing a firearm as an ex-felon. Lodgment 1 at 153-154. His trial counsel moved for a

new trial. Lodgment 1 at 202. The motion was denied, and Gutierrez was sentenced to 15 years to life,

plus 10 years and eight months. Lodgment 1 at 230-231. 

The Direct Appeal.

Gutierrez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) allowing tainted in-court

identifications of Gutierrez, (2) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on CALJIC no. 17.01, and (3)

sentencing errors. Lodgment 2. The People raised their own sentencing issue on appeal. Lodgment 3 at

28. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but remanded to address the People’s

sentencing issue. Lodgment 5. On remand, the trial court added three years to the sentence, for a total

of 15 years to life, plus 13 years and eight months. Lodgment 6 at 39. 

On a second appeal from the remand, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende,

25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). Lodgment 7. The court gave Gutierrez an opportunity to file his own brief. 

Lodgment 8. He did not. Lodgment 9 at 2. The court affirmed the conviction and sentencing. 

Lodgment 9. Gutierrez did not file a petition for review with the California Supreme Court.

Petitions for Collateral Review.

1. State Habeas Corpus Petition in California Court of Appeal.

 On June 15, 2011, Gutierrez, through counsel, filed a habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He argued that trial counsel failed to present

testimony that the police impounded his girlfriend’s red Ford Mustang--from which the prosecution said

the shooting took place--and that no evidence of any bullets or casings were found. Lodgment 10. The

court denied the petition, saying that even if Gutierrez could show his counsel’s performance was

objectively unreasonable, he could not show prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of a

different outcome. Lodgment 11.

2. State Habeas Corpus Petition in California Supreme Court.

 On July 19, 2011, Gutierrez filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court for the

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Lodgment 12. On September 21, 2011 the court denied the

petition without comment. Lodgment 13.

3. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition in District Court.

On October 13, 2011 Gutierrez, through counsel, filed this Petition. He alleges the same

ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in the state habeas. 

The only underlying fact pertinent to this motion, for purposes of understanding Gutierrez’s

claim, is that some of the evidence presented at trial included identification of Gutierrez driving his

girlfriend’s car on the night of, and at the time of, the shooting. See Lodgment 5 at 2-8. The car in

question was a red Mustang with a black convertible top. Id.

In this Petition, Gutierrez argues that it was not until March 7, 2011 that he obtained grand jury

transcripts from his proceedings. While reviewing those transcripts he discovered allegedly exculpatory

evidence. The evidence is that the car from which the shots were allegedly fired was--28 days after the

shooting--impounded by police, and no bullets, casings or other evidence of the shooting were found. 

Lodgment 11 at 2.

Gutierrez argues that this recent discovery of evidence is a basis for deeming his Petition timely,

because it entitles him to either a later start date for the statute of limitations, or to equitable tolling.

DISCUSSION

I. Statute of Limitations.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this Petition. 

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on

petitioners to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The relevant section

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run

from the latest of 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action. 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

A. Date Conviction Became Final.

Absent exceptions, the statute of limitations started the date the judgment became final. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The California Court of Appeal made a decision on Gutierrez’s direct appeal

on November 26, 1997. Lodgment 9. He did not file a petition for review. Therefore, his conviction

became final forty days after the Court of Appeal filed its opinion. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, unless Gutierrez is entitled to a later start date under a later discovery of the factual

predicate of his claim, or under equitable tolling, the statute of limitations for the filing of his federal

habeas petition expired on January 5, 1998.

B. Discovery of Factual Predicate for Claim.

Gutierrez argues he is entitled to a later start of the limitations period because he did not discover

the factual predicate of his claim until some time around March 7, 2011. He declares that as of March 7,

2011, he had only recently obtained the grand jury transcripts from his 1994 trial. Pet’n Ex. D. He

initially thought that these transcripts had never been provided to trial counsel. Id. He later learned

from habeas counsel that trial counsel must have had them, because he used them to impeach a witness

on another matter. Id. 

The one year statute of limitations may start on “ the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). The burden to show due diligence is on the petitioner. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770,

777 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute begins to run when the facts are known to the petitioner, and not

when their legal significance is discovered: “Time begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence

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In his defense, Gutierrez’s girlfriend testified that she drove her red Mustang home that night,

and that he stayed at her home and did not leave that evening. Lodgment 5 at 7; Pet’n, Mem. Ps&As,

p.13.

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could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)). Further,

“to have the factual predicate for a habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must have discovered (or with the exercise of due diligence could have discovered) facts

suggesting both unreasonable performance and resulting prejudice.” Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Gutierrez does not allege any facts showing he acted with due diligence to obtain the grand

jury transcripts. His trial occurred in 1994. He was present at the trial, and admits that his trial counsel

used the grand jury transcripts at trial to impeach a witness. Gutierrez does not explain the 13 year

delay between the expiration of the statute of limitations in 1998 and his obtaining the grand jury

transcripts in 2011. He simply says that while he may have been aware the transcripts existed, he did

not get a copy of them until recently. Opp’n, p.2. He also blames any lack of diligence on appellate

counsel, who was allegedly ineffective for not telling him about the exculpatory evidence. Id.

Because Gutierrez’s counsel used the grand jury transcripts at trial, and Gutierrez, who was

present at the trial, knew that they existed, and because Gutierrez does not show that he acted with due

diligence, Gutierrez is not entitled to a later start date under section 2244(d)(1)(D). To the extent

Gutierrez bases his claim on ineffective counsel, because counsel used the grand jury transcripts at trial,

Gutierrez would have been aware at the time of trial of the facts showing an alleged unreasonable

performance of counsel and of the resulting prejudice. 

Further, the fact that Gutierrez only recently learned of the grand jury testimony regarding the

red Mustang constitutes, at best, additional evidence of his defense that he did not drive the red Mustang

on the night of the shooting,1

 as opposed to new evidence, that could trigger the later start date of the

statute of limitations. See Stringer v. Marshall, 2011 WL 666897, *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13727,

*9-*10 (E.D.Cal. Feb 11, 2011) (stating that petitioner knew the important facts underlying his claim of

third-party culpability before trial); Hunt v. Hill, 2011 WL 1543045, *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44117,

* (C.D.Cal. Mar 10, 2011) (finding that additional evidence did not change the contour of petitioner’s

claim and was thus not a new factual predicate to justify a later start date under section 2244(d)(1)(D)).

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This court therefore finds that Gutierrez was aware of the facts supporting his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim at trial, and he is not entitled to a later start date of the statute of limitations

based on later discovery of the factual predicate of his claim.

II. Tolling.

A. Statutory Tolling.

A petitioner’s statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition

is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The “statute of limitations is tolled from the

time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final

collateral challenge,” provided the petitions are properly filed and pending that entire time. Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But once the statute is expired, it cannot be revived by

collateral proceedings. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 822-832 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, Gutierrez filed his first collateral state petition on June 15, 2011, over 13 years after the

statute expired. Thus, he is not entitled to any statutory tolling.

B. Equitable Tolling.

The one-year limitations period under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida,

__ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). Petitioner bears the burden to prove that equitable tolling is

appropriate, and must establish that (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way of timely filing a petition. Id.; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). The

determination of whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent.”

Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 102, citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Further, equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999).

This court has already established that Gutierrez did not diligently pursue his rights in trying to

timely file a federal habeas petition. He also does not point to any extraordinary circumstances that

stood in his way of filing. While Gutierrez says he was diligent in hiring an attorney and filing for

collateral relief after he reviewed the grand jury transcripts, he does not show any diligence or explain

any extraordinary circumstances for the 13 years between the finality of his conviction and his obtaining

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of the grand jury transcripts. Therefore, he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

Further, to allow the claim to go forward would undermine AEDPA’s purpose to promote

finality in state court judgments. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-179 (2001).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss; and, (3) dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 6, 2012, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than January 13, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 16, 2011

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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