Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01640/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01640-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

31.63 ACRES OF LAND, More or Less, ) 

Situate in Oklahoma County, State ) 

of Oklahoma; C.M. FARIS, Admini- ) 

strator of CLARENCE R. FARIS, a/k/a ) 

CLARENCE RAY FARIS, a/k/a CLARENCE ) 

RAY FARRIS, Deceased; MARY NEKVAPIL, ) 

a/k/a MARY NEKVIPIL; WILLIAM c. ) 

PEDDICORD; THOMAS I. BAKER; CAROL B. ) 

CARDENAS; JERRY W. BAKER; MARGUERITE) 

BAKER; HENRY NEKVAPIL; IRA W. BAKER ) 

ESTATE; HEIRS OF IRA W. BAKER; COUNTY) 

TREASURER & BOARD.OF COUNTY ) 

COMMISSIONERS, OKLAHOMA COUNTY; ) 

SOUTHWEST TITLE & TRUST COMPANY, ) 

Trustee; RICHARD LEDBETTER, a/k/a ) 

RICHARD K. LEDBETTER; JAMES E. ) 

JORDAN; and JAMES GREGORY, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

TINKER AREA INVESTORS, ) 

) 

Defendant/Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Co~rt ~f Appeals Tenth r.1remt 

FEB 2 G 1988 

ROBERT L. HOOCKER 

Clerk 

No. 85-1640 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-82-619-T) 

Appellate Case: 85-1640 Document: 010110018328 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 1 
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

Thomas E. Hookano, Acting Assistant Attorney General, William S. 

Price, United States Attorney, and John E. Green, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Robert L. Klarquist and 

Jacques B. Gelin, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for 

Plaintiff/Appellee United States of America. 

LeRoy Powers and Charles D. Crandall, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant/Appellant Tinker Area Investors. 

Before MCKAY, LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal from the district court's order denying 

defendant lan_downer 's motion for relief under Fed. R. Ci v-. P. 

60(b) from an earlier-order that denied a request for attorney's 

fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2412. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court 

abused its discretion in denying relief. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm. 1 

On April 28, 1982 the United States initiated a condemnation 

action to acquire fee title to a 31.63 acre tract owned by Tinker 

Area Investors ("Tinker''). In 1983, the district court referred 

the trial to a commission appointed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

71. The commission awarded Tinker $664,230.00, or $21,000.00 per 

acre. On May 17, 1984 the district court confirmed the award and 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1640 Document: 010110018328 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 2 
entered judgment. Because Tinker was awarded more than the 

government's deposit, it then filed an application for attorney's 

fees and expenses under the EAJA. On November 27, 1984, the 

district court entered an order denying that application. Tinker 

did not appeal that order, but on December 21, 1984 filed a motion 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) 2 asking the district court to set 

aside the order denying attorney's fees. Tinker argued that the 

evidence did not support the court's finding that the government's 

position was "substantially justified. 113 On January 30, 1985 the 

district court denied Tinker's motion for relief. Tinker filed a 

timely notice of appeal from the January 30 order of the district 

court. 

A district court ruling on a motion under Rule 60(b) will not 

be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Morris v. AdamsMillis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1357 (10th Cir. 1985). Moreover, a 

motion under Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. 

Id. When a party appeals from an order denying a Rule 60(b) 

2 Rule 60(b) provides in part: 

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 

relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a 

final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ... or (6) any other reason justifying 

relief from the operation of the judgment. 

3 In denying the fee award, the district court found that 

Tinker was a prevailing party, but that the government's position 

was substantially justified. Under the terms of the EAJA, a 

prevailing party against the government is entitled to attorney's 

fees "unless the court finds the position of the United States was 

substantially justified." 28 u.s.c. 2412(d)(l)(A). See United 

States v. Charles Gyurman Land & Cattle Co., No. 86-129l~lip op. 

(10th Cir. Dec. 30, 1987). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1640 Document: 010110018328 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 3 
motion, the appeal "does not bring up the underlying judgment for 

review." Id. (quoting Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections 

of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978)); see also V.T.A., Inc. 

v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979). 

In order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) the appellant 

must show the existence of unusual circumstances that justify the 

extraordinary relief requested. Morris, 758 F.2d at 1359. See 

also Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1986) 

("relief under 60(b)(6) is warranted only upon a showing of 

extraordinary circumstances that create a substantial danger that 

the underlying judgment was unjust"), cert. denied, 107 s.ct. 2482 

(1987); Pierce v. Cook & Co. Inc., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 

1975) (relief under 60(b)(6) requires "extraordinary situation"), 

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). Here, Tinker makes no attempt 

to identify a basis for relief, but merely argues the merits of 

the underlying judgment. In his motion to the district court and 

on appeal, Tinker argues only that the district court incorrectly 

concluded that the government's position was 

justified. 114 

"substantially 

4 Tinker's motion to the district court relied explicitly on 

Rule 60(b)(6). R. Vol. I at 189. We decline to recast his motion 

under Rule 60(b)(l) to allege a legal mistake by the district 

court. In these circumstances, that approach would also be 

unsuccessful. If Tinker were seeking relief by alleging that the 

district court made such a mistake, that claim should have been 

raised on appeal from the judgment or by a motion to amend under 

Rule 59(e). See United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 

922, 925 (5th Cir. 1983). In this regard, Tinker's claim is 

distinguishable from other cases where courts of appeals have 

considered alleged mistakes of law under Rule 60(b)(l). See 

Morris, 758 F.2d at 1359; Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 

F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1640 Document: 010110018328 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 4 
Even if the district court's construction of the EAJA 

requirements was clearly wrong, Tinker would not be entitled to 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Tinker's claim here is indistinguishable from other decisions where Rule 60(b) was held to be an 

inappropriate vehicle for challenging substantive decisions on 

questions of attorney's fees. See Gary w. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 

804, 805 (5th Cir. 1980) ("even if the trial court applied an 

incorrect legal standard when assessing attorney's fees, the 

proper way to challenge its ruling in the court of appeals is by 

appeal of its ruling, not by appeal of a denial of a Rule 60(b) 

motion"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); O'Grady v. Secretary 

of United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 661 F. Supp. 

1030, 1034 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Purported deficiencies in the amount 

of and procedures for attorneys fee awards clearly do not constitute a circumstance or hardship that cries out for the unusual 

remedy of the reopening of a final judgment under Rule 

60~b)(6)."). Tinker is simply attempting to use Rule 60(b) as a 

substitute for a timely appeal on the merits and that is not 

permitted. 

Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's 

decision, we AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1640 Document: 010110018328 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 5