Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00764/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00764-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Recent court orders served on petitioner’s address of record have been returned by the 1

U.S. postal service. It appears that petitioner has failed to comply with Local Rule 83-182(f),

which requires that a party appearing in propria persona inform the court of any address change. 

Petitioner is cautioned that sanctions may be imposed for failure to comply with the Local Rules

of Court. See Local Rule 11-110.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOUNNHONG DOUANGPANGNA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-0764 GEB JFM P

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden, ORDER AND 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 conviction on 1

charges of second degree murder with enhancements for personal use of a firearm and

discharging a firearm causing injury. Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated

by (1) the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction on petitioner’s theory of the case; (2) a 

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 Petitioner raises three separate claims of error from the supplemental jury instruction. 2

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 3

Appellate District in People v. Douangpangna, No. C031036 (Oct. 11, 2000), a complete copy of

which was filed by respondents on February 9, 2007. 

2

supplemental instruction given by the trial court after six and one-half hours of deliberation; and 2

(3) the trial court’s failure to give sua sponte an antecedent threats jury instruction.

FACTS3

 There is no dispute that on April 4, 1998, [petitioner] shot and

killed Khamphet Chanthavong. The facts at issue involve

[petitioner]’s mental state at the time of the shooting.

 [Petitioner] married Loommany Douangpangna in 1975 in a

refugee camp in Thailand. They divorced in 1996. Loommany

moved out of their home and obtained a restraining order against

[petitioner]. Their two children continued to reside with

[petitioner]. Neither Loommany nor the children told [petitioner]

where Loommany was living.

 [Petitioner] was distraught. Loommany testified [petitioner]

threatened to kill her and her new boyfriend, Khamphet, saying

such things as he wanted to “blow [their] blood out” and he would

not let her and her boyfriend live in peace. He repeated the threats

many times on the telephone, and left at least two messages on

Loommany’s telephone answering machine threatening to kill her

and her boyfriend.

 Loommany and [petitioner]’s daughter, Bobby, corroborated her

mother’s testimony that [petitioner] threatened to kill them many

times. Bobby heard her father threaten to kill Khamphet more than

10 times. She also heard him threaten to kill her mother. When he

was drinking he often said things like, “If I see them, I’m going to

kill both of them, shoot both of them in the head, I don’t care what

anybody else says, I’m going to do it.”

 On April 4, Loommany and Khamphet stopped in Stockton on

their way to Sacramento to have lunch with some of Khamphet’s

relatives. Loommany did not know in advance that Khamphet was

going to stop in Stockton. Bobby came home from a friend’s

house around 10:40 a.m., saw her father dressed in his work attire,

and heard him say something like, “Man, I don’t care about

anything, nothing’s going to stop me.”

 Various witnesses saw Loommany and Khamphet leaving am

apartment when [petitioner] stopped his truck and ran after

Khamphet with a gun in his hand. Loommany heard [petitioner]

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say, “I’m going to kill you today.” She saw Khamphet run toward

the apartment and say, “Calm yourself down and we [can] talk

about it.”

 [Petitioner] chased Khamphet to the apartment, where,

according to an 11-year-old neighbor, Khamphet tried

unsuccessfully to open the door. She heard the man who was

unable to get into the apartment say “stop” several times in

Laotian. Her brother testified the victim looked “very scared” and

[petitioner] looked “really mad.” According to this witness, it

looked as though the victim was attempting to avoid the gun, and

at one point, it looked as though he attempted to grab it or to move

it away.

 [Petitioner] shot Khamphet three times. The coroner believed

the last shot was the fatal shot to the head. [Petitioner] put the gun

into the bag he was carrying, ran to the driver’s side door of his

white pickup, attempted to open the door from the outside, ran to

the passenger side of the pickup, threw the bag into the truck,

crawled through the passenger side into the driver’s side, and sped

away. He spent the night with friends and told them he had killed

his ex-wife’s boyfriend with a gun. His friends did not believe him

until the next morning when they saw a story about the shooting on

the news. [Petitioner] did not say why he killed the victim.

 [Petitioner] testified on his own behalf. He believed the victim

had put him under a black magic spell about 15 months before the

shooting. At that time, the victim gave him a liquid, which

[petitioner] drank. He thereafter felt different, “heavy,” and like

the world was on his shoulders. A week after he drank the liquid,

[petitioner] ate some fish Loommany brought him, which also

affected the way he felt. He was sad and confused and had

difficulty sleeping and eating. Because of his familiarity with

black magic as a child in Laos, he believed the victim had put him

under a black magic spell.

 He sought help at a temple, where he was told that Khamphet

had evil spirits. However, he could not afford the recommended

treatment. He testified that evil spirits can kill people over a long

period of time; if the person was not dead in three months, he

would die within six months, and if not within six months, he

would die within a year.

 [Petitioner] claimed the victim had threatened him over the

telephone for approximately a year although he did not tell anyone

about these conversations. Ultimately, he bought a gun for his own

protection.

 He testified the victim wanted to meet him at the apartment in

Stockton on April 4. The victim told him he had a gun and would

not die because he had black magic to protect himself. He agreed

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to meet him even though he was afraid. When he saw the victim

walking with Loommany, he stopped and got out of his truck. 

[Petitioner] saw the victim try “to look for something” in his jacket

and he thought the victim was going to take out a gun. The victim

reached for [petitioner]’s gun and yelled in Laotian, “Mother

fucker.” [Petitioner] testified he grabbed the gun and shot the

victim in self-defense. He believed that if he did not shoot the

victim, the victim would “probably kill met later . . . then I

probably die later on.” He buried the bag with the gun inside it

behind the temple.

 A cultural anthropologist testified about commonly held Laotian

beliefs in black magic. According to the anthropologist, a majority

of people in Laos still believe black magic exists, and many of

those who migrate to the United States retain their belief that

sorcerers can use bad spirits with black magic. These sorcerers can

use black magic to put a spell on someone by giving the person a

liquid or by obtaining a personal item, such as hair or clothing. If

the victim of the black magic is unable to get relief from the spell,

he or she might die. It is also a commonly held belief that a

sorcerer can kill the victim through use of a spell.

 The anthropologist remembered seeing three persons under the

influence of spells when he was a young boy in Laos. He had not

encountered a person under a spell in the United States since his

arrival in this country approximately 15 years earlier. He testified

that a person from Laos who believes in Buddhism or black magic

can experience feelings of jealousy and that a Laotian man who

learned his ex-wife was having sex with another man might

become “sad, mad or angry.”

(People v. Douangpangna, slip op. at 1-5.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. General Standards

All three of petitioner’s claims challenge jury instructions given or omitted by the

trial court. A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. 

See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986)

(citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th

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Cir. 1983). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir.

1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a “claim of error

based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution may nonetheless form a ground

for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so infects the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673

(9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922

(1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). 

Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). In order to warrant federal habeas

relief, a jury instruction error must have “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at

147). 

B. Failure to Instruct on Defense Theory

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court erred in failing to give a jury

instruction requested by the defense that went to the heart of his defense. This claim was raised

and rejected by the state courts on direct appeal from petitioner’s conviction. (See Exs. E, F and

G to Answer.) The last reasoned rejection of the claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (See People v. Douangpangna, slip op. at 13-17.) The

state court set forth the relevant facts, as follows:

 [Petitioner] requested a pinpoint instruction to allow the jury to

correlate the evidence of Laotian cultural beliefs to his mental

state. The instruction reads: “You have received evidence of

[petitioner]’s cultural background and the relationship of his

culture to his mental state. You may, but are not required, to

consider that evidence in determining the presence or absence of

the essential mental states of the crimes defined in these

instructions, or in determining any other issue in this case.” The

trial court refused to give the defense instruction.

(Id. at 13-14.) Applying state law standards, the court of appeal found that the trial court erred in

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refusing to give the requested instruction. 

 A defendant is entitled, upon request, to an instruction that

relates the evidence to any legal issue or pinpoints the crux of a

defendant’s case. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864,

885; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190.) While the court

must give a defense instruction that pinpoints the theory of the

defense, it may refuse an instruction that is argumentative. (People

v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886.) The Attorney General insists

[petitioner]’s proffered instruction is argumentative and

cumulative. We disagree.

 We conclude the instruction does not, as the Attorney General

contends, invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to the

defense from specified items of evidence. (People v. Earp, supra,

20 Cal.4th at p. 886.) It does not, in fact, point to any specified

items of evidence. It does allude to the crux of the defense, that is,

“defendant’s cultural background and the relationship of his culture

to his mental state.” The language itself is not argumentative. The

instruction simply permits the jury to “consider that evidence in

determining the presence or absence of the essential mental states

of the crimes defined in these instructions . . . .”

 Nor do we find the instruction cumulative. While the jury was

indeed instructed on the law of self-defense and imperfect selfdefense, the court did not provide an analytical vehicle for applying

the evidence on Laotian cultural acceptance of black magic to the

elements of murder or manslaughter. The instructions are

completely devoid of any directive to the jury regarding the

appropriate use of cultural evidence about [petitioner]’s belief in

the powers of black magic to destroy those who are under such a

spell. We agree that the application of the cultural evidence to

[petitioner]’s mental state at the time of the crime requires the jury

to understand [petitioner]’s subjective frame of mind as a person

steeped in Laotian culture. Since the cultural anthropologist’s

testimony supports the defense theory that Laotians genuinely fear

the potency of black magic spells, [petitioner] was entitled to

clarify the relevancy of the cultural evidence to a determination of 

his actual mental state at the time of the shooting.

(Id. at 14-15.) The trial court also found, however, that under applicable state law standards the

error was harmless. The court made the following specific findings:

 First, the evidence of guilt was powerful. [Petitioner] clearly

had a compelling motive to avenge the man who had stolen his

wife’s affections, and for over a year he repeatedly threatened to

kill Loommany and the victim.[Petitioner]’s conduct during the

shooting suggested that he, not the victim, was the aggressor. By

his own admission, he went to the neighborhood to meet the

victim. Eyewitnesses observed him stop his truck, chase the

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victim, and ignore pleas to stop. They saw the victim running

away and attempting to retreat into the apartment. Even if the jury

accepted [petitioner]’s testimony that he was under a black magic

spell, the evidence that he was in fear of impending death was slim. 

[Petitioner] sought out Loommany and the victim even though he

was aware of the restraining order against him. Moreover, his

conduct following the shooting was inconsistent with his cultural

defense. He fled the scene, buried the gun, and spent the night

with friends, but never mentioned he shot the victim because he

was under a black magic spell.

 Secondly, defense counsel argued that [petitioner]’s cultural

background could be considered in determining the presence of a

mental state or whether he was in actual fear of the victim. She

argued in relevant part: “[I]t’s not a question of whether you really

believe that there was black magic, but [[petitioner]] believed

black magic because of his culture, because of his background . . .

.” Without question, effective advocacy does not replace proper

instructions. Argument can, however, help the jury focus on the

evidence pertinent to the theory of the defense and minimize the

potential for harm. . . . 

 Third, the jury was provided with a full complement of

instructions on the elements of murder and manslaughter as well as

the elements of justifiable homicide in self-defense and on the

actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend. The court

instructed on concepts relevant to justifiable homicide in selfdefense. 

(Id. at 15-17 (Citations to specific jury instructions omitted).)

The federal due process clause protects the right of a criminal defendant to jury

instructions that present the crux of his defense.

The Supreme Court has held: “Under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport

with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We have long

interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal

defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a

complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485,

104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (emphasis added).

Thus, [a] state court’s failure to correctly instruct the jury on the

defense may deprive the defendant of his due process right to

present a defense. See Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 875-76

(6th Cir.1999) (granting habeas relief under AEDPA because the

erroneous self-defense instruction deprived the defendant’s of a

“meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”) (relying

on Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528), cert. denied, 530

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U.S. 1229, 120 S.Ct. 2658, 147 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000). This is so

because the right to present a defense “would be empty if it did not

entail the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to

consider the defense.” Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448 (7th

Cir.1995).

Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir.2002). But there is no entitlement to tailormade instructions that pinpoint certain aspects of the defense. See United States v. HernandezEscarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1570 (9th Cir.1989) (internal citation omitted) (“Indeed, ‘[s]o long as

the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge’s formulation of those

instructions or choice of language is a matter of discretion.’”); see also United States v. Del

Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir.1996). Relief is available for this type of due process

violation only if the failure “had a ‘substantial or injurious effect in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Bradley, at 1099 (quoting California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 6 (1999)). 

The cultural evidence offered by petitioner went to his mental state at the time the

victim was killed. (See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings (RT), at 621.) As the state court of

appeal found, “the jury was provided with a full complement of instructions on the elements of

murder and manslaughter as well as the elements of justifiable homicide in self-defense and on

the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend.” (People v. Douangpangna, slip op.

at 16; see also Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT), at 176-206.) The instruction requested by

petitioner was a pinpoint instruction to which there is no entitlement under principles of federal

constitutional law. The error cited by the state court of appeal was one of state law, not a

violation of the federal due process clause. Errors of state law are not cognizable in federal

habeas corpus proceedings except where the errors are so egregious that they render a trial

“fundamentally unfair.” See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72-73. After careful review of the

record herein, this court finds that the failure to give the pinpoint instruction requested by

petitioner did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. 

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For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that the state court’s rejection of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established principles

of federal law. The claim should be denied.

C. Supplemental Instruction

Petitioner’s second claim is that his constitutional rights were violated by a

supplemental instruction given to the jury after six and one-half hours of deliberations. The last

reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the state court of appeal, which set forth the

relevant facts as follows:

 [Petitioner] contends the trial court’s self-styled supplemental

instruction delivered during jury deliberations contained an

incorrect statement of the law, improperly instructed the jury to

consider the issues in a particular order, and directed a verdict for

murder. Reviewing the instructions together with the many other

instructions given in this case, as we must, we do not believe the

supplemental instruction suffers any of the defects asserted by

[petitioner].

 We begin with the circumstances under which the supplemental

instruction was given. After six and one-half hours of

deliberations, the jury was deadlocked. The foreperson inquired of

the court how to proceed. The court made some rather innocuous

suggestions and asked the jury to continue to deliberate.

 Once the jury left, the prosecutor, concerned because many of

the jurors had been smiling and laughing, asked the court to

comment on the evidence to assist the jury (CALJIC No. 17.32). 

The court further instructed the jurors, over defense objection, as

follows: “As soon as you folks left I thought again about

something that I might say to you. [¶] The Court has given you

the instructions necessary to decide this matter, if you are able. 

However, in your deliberations you may find it useful to start by

considering the elements of the crime charged without reference to

the two concepts which concern self-defense or the one which

refers to heat of passion. [¶] Thereafter, consider whether the

killing was unlawful, whether the killing was not justified by selfdefense. Next consider whether malice was negated, that is, was

there either, one, a [sic] actual but unreasonable belief in the

necessity of self-defense, or, two, heat of passion. [¶] On the

subject of actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity of selfdefense, consider whether there was actual fear of imminent peril

as I have defined it for you. Note that fear of future harm, no

matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of

harm, is not enough for an imminent peril. [¶] I do not intend by

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 Petitioner does cite one decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 4

Circuit for the proposition that “if a jury, which has declared itself to be deadlocked, returns a

verdict after hearing erroneous supplemental instructions, it is likely that the erroneous

instructions were the factor which produced agreement.” (Attachment to Petition, at 15.) 

Petitioner’s claim that the supplemental instruction was error, however, is entirely grounded in

state law and the citation to the federal court of appeals’ opinion does not transform this claim

into a federal constitutional claim.

11

this instruction or by anything I’ve said or done to indicate to you

what your verdict should be or that I believe or disbelieve any

witness. You are the sole judges of the facts in this matter. [¶] 

And, again, if there is any assistance I can give you by way of

instructions or reread, I’ll be happy to do that. [¶] Thank you,

folks. You may continue your deliberations.”

 Later that day, the jury informed the court it had agreed to

convict defendant of murder but needed “some instruction and/or

guidance on how to decide 1 or 2 degree. This is our area of st nd

indecision.” The court repeated standard jury instructions without

indication of degree, and a verdict of second degree murder was

entered by operation of law.

(People v. Douangpangna, slip op. at 5-7.) 

Petitioner raises three claims of error from the supplemental instruction. First, he

contends that the supplemental instruction “misstated pertinent imminent peril instructions” and

that the error is not removed by the fact that correct instructions on the principle were given at

the start of deliberations. (Attachment to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 20,

2001, at 11.) Second, petitioner claims that the supplemental instruction improperly instructed

the jury to consider the issues in a specific order and in a manner that specifically suggested the

jury eliminate consideration of petitioner’s defense. (Id. at 16.) Finally, petitioner claims that the

instruction was “imbalanced, impliedly directing a verdict for murder.” (Id. at 19.)

The first and second challenges to the supplemental instruction are based solely

on state law. (See Attachment to Petition, at 11-18.) Consequently, they are not cognizable in 4

this action. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 780 (1990)) (“‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”).

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The third challenge was rejected by the state court of appeal, as follows:

 Again, we reject [petitioner]’s reading of the instructions and

conclude that a reasonable juror would not construe the

supplemental instruction as an implied directive to find murder.

 Unless a trial court elects to redeliver the entire package of jury

instructions, a supplemental instruction, taken in isolation, is likely

to sound unbalanced. But as we have explained above, the trial

court exercised its discretion to assist the jury by focusing their

deliberations and highlighting the difficult concept of imperfect

self-defense. We agree with the Attorney General the

supplemental instruction does not contain any improper comment. 

Nor did the court single out any particular evidence. In fact, the

court expressly admonished the jurors it had not intended to

indicate what their verdicts should be. The court’s comments, the

context of the supplemental instruction, were brief, fair, and

nonargumentative. They offered another possible guide for

reaching a verdict. We find in this instruction no implied direction

to disregard the defense nor any untoward comment on the

evidence or the manner in which the jury should complete its task.

(People v. Douangpangna, slip op. at 13.)

As noted above, petitioner is only entitled to federal habeas corpus relief if the

supplemental instruction rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. After review of the entire

record herein, this court finds no merit in the claim that the supplemental instruction violated

petitioner’s right to due process. The state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The claim should be denied.

D. Failure to Give Antecedent Threats Instruction

Petitioner’s final claim is that the trial court erred in failing to give sua sponte an

antecedent threats instruction. This claim is grounded in state law. See Attachment to Petition,

filed April 20, 2001, at 22-23. It is therefore not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. 

See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the

Court is directed to serve a copy of the court’s April 14, 2005 order and a copy of these findings

and recommendations on plaintiff at his address of record and at Centinela State Prison, P.O.

Box 911, 2302 Brown Road, Imperial, CA 92251-0731; and

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 5, 2007.

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doun0764.157

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