Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00336/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Although petitioner’s thirteen year sentence for this conviction has long since expired,

he is nevertheless in custody as a result of a 1987 Santa Cruz County conviction of seven-years

to life. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY LYNN TAYLOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0336 LKK KJM P

vs.

JAMES A YATES, Warden,

Respondent. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, together with an application to proceed in forma

pauperis.

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable

to afford the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Petitioner challenges his 1985 Amador County conviction following his plea of

guilty to voluntary manslaughter with use of a firearm.1

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I. The Statute Of Limitations

One of the changes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

made to the habeas statutes was to add a statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

A conviction is final for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations at the

expiration of the ninety day period for seeking certiorari. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159

(9th Cir.1999). Petitioner does not provide the date the California Supreme Court denied his

petition for review, but does list April 11, 1986 as the date the Court of Appeal denied his direct

appeal. It appears, then, that the statute of limitations began to run at the very latest in early

1987 and expired in 1988. The current petition is not timely.

The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed”

state collateral attack on the judgment. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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However, a state collateral attack filed after the statute of limitations has expired does not revive 

the limitations period. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2003). It appears that

petitioner’s superior court petition was not filed until 2004, long after the expiration of the

statute of limitations. 

Petitioner argues, in essence, that he did not discover the legal significance of

ground one in the petition -- that the seizure of some of his personal property prevented him from

selling it to hire counsel of choice -- until recently when he found several cases on the subject. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(D). However, a petitioner’s failure to understand the legal

significance of a known fact does not delay the running of the statute of limitations. Hasan v

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Mem.

P. & A.) at iii. 

II. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held: 

We will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period

only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. When external

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate. 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations, citations omitted). It

is petitioner’s burden to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews v. People of

the State of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). To meet his burden, petitioner must

demonstrate "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

Petitioner suggests he is entitled to equitable tolling, because he is “a layperson at

law,” was required to undertake “further research” to develop his claims, and did not understand

habeas procedures. Mem. P. & A. at iv. As the Ninth Circuit and other Courts of Appeals have

recognized,“pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy v.

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Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.

2000) (ignorance of the law); Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (pro per status). 

 Petitioner’s unfamiliarity with the law, substantive or procedural, is not a basis for equitable

tolling.

Petitioner then claims he could not timely prepare his petition because his law

library time was limited as the result of lockdowns, the time required by his prison job and

problems with obtaining the necessary photocopies. Several courts have rejected the impact of a

lock-down or of restrictions on law library access as bases for equitable tolling unless the

petitioner can show actual harm. Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000)

(no connection shown between lockdown and inability to file); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp.

2d 347, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (limited access to library); Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659,

663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). Petitioner has not made any attempt to link lockdowns and limited

law library hours to his inability timely to file his petition. Nor does it appear likely that he

could do so, given the gap between the expiration of the statute of limitations and the

commencement of petitioner’s collateral attacks. 

Two of petitioner’s claims merit further attention. First, he contends that the

delay is justified because of “the inaccessibility of reliable legal materials.” The Ninth Circuit

has recognized that the unavailability of legal materials about the AEDPA may be a basis for

equitable tolling. Roy, 465 F.3d at 974. Petitioner has not, however, described what legal

materials he sought or when they became available or presented anything but conclusory claims

that he could not file in a timely fashion because of problems obtaining legal materials. 

Second, petitioner avers that appointed counsel and the courts were not

“responsive to . . . past requests for . . . trial transcripts, police reports, sworn depositions, court

exhibits and other documents of evidentiary value. . . .” Mem. P. & A. at v. The Ninth Circuit

has recognized that equitable tolling may be justified when, through no fault of his own, a habeas

petitioner was separated from his legal files and transcripts. Thus, in Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d

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918 (9th Cir. 2002), the court recognized that if petitioner was able to bear his burden of

showing that he was deprived of his legal material for a period of eighty-two days when he was

away from the prison, he might be entitled to equitable tolling. See also Espinoza-Matthews,

432 F.3d at 1024 (“it is 'unrealistic to expect [a habeas petitioner] to prepare and file a

meaningful petition on his own within the limitations period' without access to his legal file." Id.

at 1027; United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2004) (habeas petitioner may

be entitled to equitable tolling if he can show how lack of transcripts hampered his ability timely

to file). Once again, petitioner has presented nothing but conclusory allegations. He will be

given an opportunity to submit additional argument and exhibits, if any, on these two points. 

III. Actual Innocence

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a

habeas petitioner who makes “a colorable showing of actual innocence” that would implicate a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” may be entitled to have “otherwise barred constitutional

claim[s]” considered on the merits. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that a sufficient Schlup

showing might overcome the bar of the statute of limitations. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-

76 (9th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, it is petitioner’s burden to demonstrate actual innocence. 

Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that this exception to the statute of limitations

is concerned with actual, as opposed to legal, innocence and must be based on reliable evidence

not presented at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559

(1998). A petitioner’s own “late-offered testimony is not ‘new’ because it was available at trial,”

nor is a mere “repackaging of the record as presented at trial.” Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d

333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Hubbard v. Moore, 543 U.S. 1070 (2005). 

Once petitioner has presented such evidence, a court must consider the new

evidence in light of the evidence as a whole, and must determine whether in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

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 He refers to various exhibits in support of his claim of innocence; none are attached to

the lengthy habeas petition. However, even if they were, the court’s determination would not

change, for petitioner’s own narrative account of the facts shows that the materials all were

available and known to him at the time of the aborted trial and his plea. 

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beyond a reasonable doubt. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 166 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 489 (2005). The same standard is applied even when, as here, the

conviction is based on a plea. United States v. Torres, 163 F.3d 909, 912 n.15 (5th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner has offered a “repackaging of the facts,” based on evidence that was

available to him at trial;2

 indeed, he refers at length to police reports, witness accounts and

testimony, all of which were presented at trial or were available to him at the time. See, e.g., Pet.

at 24-25, 27, 31. Because he has not presented new, reliable evidence, there is no need for the

court to consider it in light of the evidence as a whole. And because petitioner has not borne his

burden of demonstrating actual innocence, he is not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. 

IV. Appointment Of Counsel

Petitioner has requested the appointment of counsel. There currently exists no

absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d

453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of counsel at

any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing

§ 2254 Cases. In the present case, the court does not find that the interests of justice would be

served by the appointment of counsel at the present time. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days of the date of this order, petitioner show cause why his

petition should not be dismissed for untimeliness. Petitioner is directed to respond only to the

two issues identified by the court in the body of this order, on pages 4 and 5, and to limit his

argument to ten pages; supporting exhibits, if any, will not be counted as part of the ten pages. 

2. Petitioner’s February 20, 2007 request for the appointment of counsel is

denied. 

DATED: April 16, 2007.

2

tayl0336.osc

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