Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01807/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01807-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:552 Right to Privacy Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE HUDSON,

Plaintiff,

NO. 13-CV-1807-MMA (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 42]

v.

SHARP HEALTHCARE,

Defendant.

Defendant Sharp Healthcare (“Defendant” or “Sharp”) moves for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56. [Doc. No. 42.] Plaintiff Jane Hudson (“Plaintiff”) filed an

opposition to the motion, to which Defendant replied. [Doc. Nos. 54–55.] The

Court, in its discretion, took the matter under submission pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND1

On September 24, 2012, Plaintiff and her minor child, S.H., went to Sharp

Grossmont Hospital to receive treatment for possible food poisoning. Upon

1

 The following facts are not reasonably in dispute, unless otherwise noted. The facts cited herein are taken from the parties’ separate statements of undisputed facts, and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007).

- 1 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

admission, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and S.H., received and acknowledged

receipt of Sharp’s Conditions of Admission (“COA”) paperwork including: (1)

Admission Agreement for Inpatient and Outpatient Services; (2) Attestation; and (3)

Notice of Privacy Practices. [Def.’s Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts

(“DSSUF”) Nos. 21–23.] Plaintiff executed the Attestation document, verifying her

cellular telephone number ending in 5954 as her sole point of contact with Sharp. 

The COA paperwork included a payment provision, which stated:

13. Financial Agreement: You agree, whether you sign as agent or as patient, that in consideration of the services to be rendered to the

patient, you hereby individually obligate yourself to pay all the

hospital bills in accordance with the rates as indicated in the

hospital charge description master and terms of the hospital to include service charges and/or interest bearing payment plans. The hospital, or other entity contracting with the hospital, may obtain credit reports from national credit bureaus. Should the account be

referred to an attorney or collection agency for collection, you shall pay all related fees and collection expenses. All delinquent accounts shall bear interest at the legal rate.

[Kiesendahl Decl., Exs. D, G.]

The Notice of Privacy Practices form also included a “Payment” section,

which stated: 

We may use or disclose your information for billing and to arrange for payment from you, an insurance company, a third party or a collection

agency.

[Id., Ex. C.]

Upon admission to the hospital, Plaintiff believed that both she and S.H. had

active Medi-Cal coverage. However, Sharp advised Plaintiff this was incorrect. 

Although S.H. had coverage at that time,2

 Plaintiff’s coverage had lapsed. 

2 Sharp’s computerized medical records showed that Medi-Cal reported S.H. owed a Share of Costs, patient deductible, of $737.00. On or about October 22, 2012, Sharp received a $34.10 payment from Medi-Cal on S.H.’s account. 

However, Sharp refunded that payment because it did not reflect the appropriate Share of Costs. Medi-Cal later provided retroactive coverage for S.H. without a Share of Costs. However, $34.10 was and is still due on S.H.’s account. Currently, Sharp has an appeal pending with Medi-Cal to obtain payment. Until paid, Sharp contends that Plaintiff is individually obligated for the debt pursuant to the COA payment provisions. [Mot. at 9–10.]

- 2 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After discharge that same day, Plaintiff sought to reinstate her Medi-Cal

coverage, but was not immediately successful. In the interim, beginning on or about

October 22, 2012, Sharp made a series of autodialed calls to Plaintiff’s cellular

telephone number, attempting to collect payment for the treatment provided in

September 2012. Plaintiff admitted at her deposition that she does not recall Sharp

demanding payment from her. [Vanden Heuvel Decl., Ex. A (“Hudson Dep.”)

84:20–85:2.] Rather, the phone calls between Plaintiff and Sharp from October

2012 through January 2013 were made with the goal of obtaining Medi-Cal

coverage to pay the bills. [Id. at 88:7–89:12.] 

On January 23, 2013, Medi-Cal notified Plaintiff that she was retroactively

approved for coverage. At that time, Plaintiff informed Sharp that she had obtained

coverage, and Sharp made no further calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number

regarding Plaintiff’s account. [See DSSUF Nos. 53–54; Hudson Dep. 84:20–85:2.] 

However, after January 23, 2013, and until August 24, 2013, Sharp continued to call

Plaintiff regarding the outstanding balance due on S.H.’s account. [DSSUF No. 54;

Sevenikar Decl., Exs. F, G.] 

On August 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action under the Telephone Consumer

Protection Act (“TCPA”) against Defendant on behalf of herself and “all persons

within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or their

agents to said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone

dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice who did not provide prior

express consent during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed, within the four

years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action.” [See Doc. No. 1.] The

operative complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendant: (1) negligent

violations of the TCPA, and (2) knowing and/or wilfull violations of the TCPA. [Id.

¶¶ 37–44.] Defendant now moves for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s

claims. [Doc. No. 42.]

- 3 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of

Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 325.

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.” Id. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any

material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,

288–89 (1968). The opposing party must support its assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations . . . or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986);

Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355

(9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also demonstrate the dispute about a

material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In other

words, before the evidence is left to the jury, the judge needs to answer the

preliminary question of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there

is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

- 4 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Id. at 251 (quoting

Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). As

the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.

Therefore, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh

conflicting evidence. See id. The ultimate question on a summary judgment motion

is whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 251–52.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. It

argues that it had prior express consent to call Plaintiff at her cellular telephone

number, and that the purpose of the calls was within the scope of consent. 

A. Telephone Consumer Protection Act

The TCPA makes it unlawful for a person to call the cellular telephone

number of any other person using an automatic telephone dialing system without the

recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); see also Meyer v.

Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). Defendant

bears the burden of proving prior express consent as an affirmative defense. See In

re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23

F.C.C.R. 559 ¶ 10 (Jan. 4, 2008); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, --- F.

Supp. 2d ---- (2014); 2014 WL 2116602, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (citations

- 5 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

omitted). Although the TCPA does not define “prior express consent,” Congress has

“delegated authority to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to

prescribe regulations that implement TCPA’s provisions.” Olney v. Job.com, Inc.,

2014 WL 1747674, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(2),

(f)). “The FCC’s interpretations of TCPA are controlling unless invalidated by a

court of appeals.” Id. (citations omitted).

B. Prior Express Consent

As noted, the TCPA makes it unlawful for a person to call the cellular

telephone number of any other person using an automatic telephone dialing system

without the recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); see also

Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Thus, the TCPA expressly exempts from liability a caller who has consent to call the

cellular telephone number. 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(A). Although the TCPA does not

define “prior express consent,” Congress has “delegated authority to the Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) to prescribe regulations that implement

TCPA’s provisions.” Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 2014 WL 1747674, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

May 1, 2014) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(2), (f)). “The FCC’s interpretations of

TCPA are controlling unless invalidated by a court of appeals.” Id. (citations

omitted).3

In a 1992 Report and Order, the FCC stated that “persons who knowingly

release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be

3 Plaintiff contends that the FCC Orders governing prior express consent do not control, because the Ninth Circuit defined express consent as “[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated.” [Opp’n at 8 (citing Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2009).] However, Satterfield did not

invalidate the FCC Orders. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., 2014 WL 320205, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (recognizing that the court in Satterfield “had no occasion to

consider the validity of the FCC’s interpretation of express consent”). Accordingly, the FCC Orders control. See id. (citations omitted); see also Olney, 2014 WL

1747674, at *4 (finding FCC Order controls when interpreting what constitutes

“prior express consent” under the TCPA).

- 6 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

called at that number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In

re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7

F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (Oct. 16, 1992). In a subsequent ruling, the FCC clarified

that “autodialed and prerecorded message calls to wireless numbers that are provided

by the called party to a creditor in connection with an existing debt are permissible

as calls made with the ‘prior express consent’ of the called party.” In re Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C.R. 559 ¶¶

1, 9 (Jan. 4, 2008). In such a case, “[p]rior express consent is . . . granted only if the

wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor, and that such number

was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed.” Id. ¶ 10. The

FCC also concluded that the creditor bears the burden of proving prior express

consent. Id.; Van Patten, 2014 WL 2116602, at *3 (citations omitted).

Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff provided prior express consent to call

her cellular telephone number when she provided that number during the admissions

process into Sharp Hospital. In support of this assertion, Defendant provides

evidence of its specific written policies and procedures regarding requesting or

validating patient demographics in COA paperwork, including cellular telephone

numbers. [See Kiesendahl Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, 16–20.] Moreover, Defendant offers

evidence that it followed those procedures with respect to Plaintiff and S.H. on

September 24, 2012. [See id.] Specifically, Sharp’s Access Service Representative

asked Plaintiff for her address and telephone number, and Plaintiff stated “she had

no home telephone number, only a cellular telephone number.” [Id. ¶¶ 5, 18.] Then,

Plaintiff orally stated that her telephone number was the number ending in 5954. 

[Id. ¶¶ 7, 20.] Thereafter, Plaintiff signed the COA paperwork on behalf of herself

and S.H., including the Attestation. [Kiesendahl Decl., Ex. E (“Attestation”).] 

Plaintiff’s signature appears on the same form as her cellular telephone number, and

she placed her initials next to the cellular telephone number on the form. [Id.] 

Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of fact remain with respect to whether she

- 7 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provided her cell phone number to Sharp. She contends that her number may have

been obtained by Sharp prior to her signing the Attestation form, or obtained from a

source other than Plaintiff. [Opp’n at 8.] For example, Plaintiff contends that the

account notes only reflect a phone number deletion, but that if she had provided her

cellular telephone number, a phone number addition would have been reflected in

her account notes. [Id. at 10.] Also, Plaintiff contends that she did not provide

Sharp with her information on September 24, 2012, but rather, the information

“autopopulated” from previously collected data or some other source, such as MediCal. [Id. at 11.] To support this, Plaintiff argues that the Attestation form does not

note a change in the phone number field, and that Sharp’s representatives have no

specific recollection of Plaintiff or S.H. [Id. at 11–14.]

The Court is not persuaded. Sharp has provided substantial evidence that

Plaintiff provided the information contained in the Attestation on behalf of herself

and S.H. Moreover, her initials appear directly adjacent to her telephone number on

the form. In addition, in her deposition, Plaintiff conceded that she may have

provided her number to Sharp, and simply did not recall doing so. [Hudson Dep.

60:8–12, 61:10–23.] In light of this evidence, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant

obtained her number from another source fails to create a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must identify

“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e)). Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant

obtained her cellular telephone number from Medi-Cal or some other source is

wholly speculative. See generally, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (establishing a

genuine dispute cannot be established by metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts). The record demonstrates that Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number is not on

her Medi-Cal card, and none of Sharp’s representatives has ever retrieved a cellular

telephone number from Medi-Cal. [Kiesendahl Decl. ¶ 15; Seaman Decl. ¶ 10;

Fransway Decl. ¶ 7.] 

- 8 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The authority cited by Plaintiff is to no avail. First, Plaintiff cites Pollock v.

Bay Area Credit Service, LLC, 2009 WL 2475167, at *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13,

2009). In Pollock, the court denied summary judgment on the issue of consent

because, although plaintiff’s cell phone number was on a medical provider’s records,

“she did not provide it and [was] unsure how it came to be on the form.” Id.

However, the plaintiff’s signature appeared on a page separate from her cellular

telephone number, and there was no evidence the forms were connected in any way. 

Id. at *11. As such, the court concluded it was a “factual issue for the jury as to

whether the form could lead to a reasonable conclusion that Plaintiff expressly

consented to the use of her cell phone number.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s signature

appears on the same form as her cellular telephone number, and she placed her

initials next to the cellular telephone number on the Attestation form.

Second, Plaintiff cites Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F.

Supp. 2d 1226 (S.D. Fla. 2013). There, the court declined to follow the FCC Orders 

and denied summary judgment because it found that providing a cellular telephone

number to a health care provider did not constitute “prior express consent.” 

However, Mais is viewed as an outlier decision and is not otherwise binding on this

Court. See Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, 2013 WL6865772, at *8

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2013). In line with other courts in this district, this Court treats

the FCC Orders as binding. See, e.g., Van Patten, 2014 WL 2116602, at *2–*3.

Next, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that there was no

prior express consent because her cellular telephone number “autopopulated.”

Courts have found that similar knowing releases of information are sufficient to

constitute prior express consent under the FCC Orders. See, e.g., Van Patten, 2014

WL 2116602, at *1 (finding prior express consent where phone number was copied

by defendant onto membership agreement plaintiff signed); Kolinek v. Walgreen

Co., 2014 WL 518174 (N.D. Ill Feb. 10, 2014) (finding prior express consent ten

years after plaintiff provided cell phone number); Murphy v. DCI Biologicals

- 9 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Orlando, LLC, 2013 WL 6865772 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2013) (finding prior express

consent two years after plaintiff provided cell phone number). Accordingly, a prior

knowing release to Sharp is sufficient to establish prior express consent in this case. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that “verifying” her cellular telephone number did

not equate to “providing” that number for purposes of the FCC regulations. 

However, other courts have found prior express consent where plaintiffs have

verified or certified such information. See e.g., Van Patten, 2014 WL 2116602, at

*1 (finding phone number defendant copied onto a membership agreement plaintiff

signed constituted prior express consent); Elkins v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,

2014 WL 1663406, at *3, *7 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2014) (finding plaintiff identifying

her cellular telephone number as her home–and contact–number and signing to

certify the information was true and accurate constituted prior express consent). 

Thus, the Court finds that “verifying” a cellular telephone number does not

substantively differ from “providing” that number for purposes of determining prior

express consent.

The only affirmative evidence Plaintiff offers regarding whether she

“provided” her cellular telephone number to Sharp is her own self-contradicting

deposition testimony. [Compare Hudson Dep. 41:24–42:1, 47:23–48:5 (denying she

provided the number), with id. at 60:8–12, 61:10–23 (conceding she may have

provided the number and does not recall). The Ninth Circuit “has refused to find a

‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and

self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s

inconsistent deposition testimony is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material

fact.4

4

 Because the Court finds Plaintiff gave prior express consent under the TCPA to receive calls on her cellular telephone number, the Court need not decide whether

Defendant had separate authority to make those calls under HIPAA. See, e.g.,

- 10 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Scope of Consent

Next, Plaintiff argues that any consent she may have given was limited to

receiving phone calls regarding test result or medical information. Accordingly,

Plaintiff contends that Sharp’s phone calls exceeded the scope of her consent. 

The TCPA does not require that calls be made “for the exact purpose for

which the number was provided,” but rather that the call “bear some relation to the

product or service for which the number was provided.” See Olney, 2014 WL

1747674, at *7. Defendant argues that consent is based on an objective standard,

and extends to a wide range of calls “regarding” the transaction. [Mot. at 14.] 

Plaintiff, however, contends that any consent given did not encompass consent to be

robocalled with hospital collection calls. [Opp’n at 14.] Plaintiff asserts that she

believed Sharp only needed her cellular telephone number to follow up on test

results and provide her with medical information. [Id. at 15 (citation omitted).]

The Court concludes that the subject calls were within the scope of consent.

Plaintiff provided her cellular telephone number as the point of contact regarding the

care and treatment rendered to herself and S.H. on September 24, 2012. Defendant

then called Plaintiff at the number provided regarding Medi-Cal coverage or

payment for medical bills associated with her and S.H.’s hospital visits. Regardless

of what Plaintiff may have believed regarding Sharp’s reason for having her cellular

telephone number, the Court finds that the calls were directly related “to the product

or service for which the number was provided.” See Olney, 2014 WL 1747674, at

*7

 Plaintiff cites two cases holding that prior express consent under the TCPA

does not include consent to receiving marketing calls or materials. [Opp’n at 14

(citing Connelly v. Hilton Grant Vacations, LLC, 2012 WL 2129364 (S.D. Cal. Jun.

Mitchem v. Illinois Collection Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 170968, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2012) (declining to decide whether consent was afforded by HIPAA or the FCC, because the court determined plaintiff provided prior express consent). 

- 11 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11, 2012); Carlson & Nevada Eye Care Prof’ls, 2013 WL 2319143 (D. Nev. May

28, 2013)).] Here, however, Defendant called Plaintiff regarding her medical

billing, not for marketing purposes. As such, these cases are inapposite. Plaintiff

also relies, again, on Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., which, as discussed

previously, is not binding on this Court. 

The Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the relation

between the service provided and the purpose of Defendant’s phone calls. 

D. Consent Revocation

Finally, Plaintiff contends that summary judgment is not warranted because,

even if she originally gave consent, she later revoked her consent. [Opp’n at 16–17.] 

The TCPA does not expressly allow consumers to revoke prior express consent. See

47 U.S.C. § 227; In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 15391, 15394 ¶ 8 (Nov.

26, 2012) (noting text nor legislative history of the TCPA directly addresses

circumstances where prior express consent is deemed revoked); Gutierrez v.

Barclays Grp., 2011 WL 579238, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011). However, courts

have recognized that consumers have the right to revoke consent, and may do so

orally. See Munro v. King Broadcasting Co., 2013 WL 6185233, at *3 (W.D. Wash.

Nov. 26, 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Gutierrez, 2011 WL

579238, at *4.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff never expressly revoked her consent in any

phone calls with its representatives. [Reply at 6.] Moreover, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff never requested that her number be removed from the autodialer or stated

that she did not wish to receive future calls on her cellular telephone number. [Id.;

see also Sevenikar Decl., Ex. G.] Plaintiff does not dispute that she never stated

words to the effect of “Don’t call me on this cell phone anymore!” [Opp’n at 16.] 

Instead, Plaintiff contends that through “mutual agreement” with Sharp

- 12 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

representatives, she effectively revoked any consent she may have given.5 [Id. at

17.] 

Defendant placed calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number regarding two

separate account numbers—one relating to Plaintiff and one to S.H. [Sevenikar

Decl., Ex. F (“Contact Trace Record”).] From October 22, 2012 to January 21,

2014, Sharp made 13 autodialed calls regarding Plaintiff’s account, account number

82017916. [Id.] No additional calls were made regarding that account after January

21, 2013. [Id.] During the same time period, Sharp made 2 autodialed calls

regarding S.H.’s account, account number 82017918. [Id.] After January 21, 2013,

Sharp made approximately 37 autodialed calls, only regarding S.H.’s account. [Id.] 

i. Revocation as to Plaintiff’s Account6

From October 22, 2012 to January 21, 2014, Sharp made 13 autodialed calls

regarding Plaintiff’s account, account number 82017916. [Contact Trace Record.] 

Plaintiff contends that she revoked her consent to be called during a January 23,

2013, conversation with Sharp. The record of the phone call, however, says

otherwise. During the call, Sharp’s agent acknowledged that Plaintiff’s Medi-Cal

insurance was reinstated without a Share of Costs and that Sharp no longer had a

need to contact her by phone regarding the bill. However, the agent told Plaintiff

that she may receive something in writing—or a phone call—if any issues arose in

processing the Medi-Cal payment on her account. [Sevenikar Decl., Ex G.] Plaintiff

did not request not to be called, and did not otherwise object to the information

provided by Sharp’s agent. Thus, no evidence supports Plaintiff’s claim that the

5 Plaintiff cites Gager v. Dell Financial Services, LLC, 727 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013), for the proposition that consent is revocable. However, Plaintiff offers no

other support for her assertion that an alleged mutual agreement constitutes revocation.

6

 Because Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number was linked to two separate patient accounts—Plaintiff and S.H.—some calls at issue were made regarding Plaintiff’s account, while others related to S.H.’s account. Because revocation is

necessarily account-specific, the Court addresses the phone calls made regarding each account separately.

- 13 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parties reached a mutual agreement whereby Sharp would stop calling Plaintiff.

Moreover, even assuming that this communication constituted a proper

revocation of consent, the record demonstrates that Defendant did not place any

future calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number regarding her account. 

Defendant’s Contact Trace record shows that all calls made after January 23, 2013

pertained to S.H.’s account number. [See Contact Trace Record.] Thus, the Court

finds that no genuine issues of fact remain with regard to the propriety of any calls

made to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number regarding her account.

ii. Revocation as to S.H.’s Account

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiff revoked consent with respect to

S.H.’s account. Again, Plaintiff contends that the parties reached a mutual

agreement whereby Sharp would stop calling her cellular telephone number. 

First, on February 6, 2013, Sharp made an autodialed phone call to Plaintiff’s

cellular telephone number regarding S.H.’s account. [Id.; Sevenikar Decl., Ex. G.] 

Plaintiff did not answer, and a recorded message—referencing S.H.’s account

number—was left on Plaintiff’s voicemail. [Sevenikar Decl., Ex G.] Plaintiff

returned Sharp’s call that same day. When she did so, Plaintiff provided her own

account information, and not S.H.’s account information. [Id.] As such, the

representative accessed Plaintiff’s account and, after reviewing it, informed Plaintiff

that she would place a 30-day suppression on the account and that Plaintiff could

disregard the previous call. [Id.] S.H.’s account was never mentioned, nor did

Plaintiff instruct Sharp not to call her phone number in the future. Thus, the Court

concludes that there are no genuine issues of fact outstanding with respect to

whether Plaintiff revoked her consent during the February 6, 2013 phone call.

Several weeks later, on February 26, 2013, Sharp autodialed Plaintiff’s

cellular telephone number regarding S.H.’s account again, and left a message. [Id.] 

When Plaintiff returned the phone call, Sharp’s representative informed Plaintiff

there was an outstanding Share of Costs on S.H.’s account. [Id.] When Plaintiff

- 14 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disputed that a Share of Costs was due, the agent independently verified S.H.’s

coverage and told Plaintiff the coverage information would be forwarded to an

insurance representative. [Id.] Again, there is no evidence of a “mutual agreement”

between the parties whereby Defendant was to stop calling Plaintiff. Nor did

Plaintiff expressly request that Sharp discontinue future calls. 

On April 17, 2013, Plaintiff answered an autodialed call from Sharp regarding

S.H.’s account. [Id.] The representative informed Plaintiff there was an appeal on

the account related to the unpaid Share of Costs, which could take 45 days to

resolve. [Id.] The agent asked whether Plaintiff had any questions, and Plaintiff

said, “no.” [Id.] Plaintiff contends that she and Sharp’s agent agreed that Plaintiff

should be taken off the dialer. [Opp’n at17.] However, in reviewing the

conversation, the Court finds this was not the case. Although the representative

indicated she did not think Sharp should be calling Plaintiff, the representative

merely stated she would send an email to see if Plaintiff could be taken “off the

dialer.” [Sevenikar Decl., Ex G.] There is no evidence of any agreement to actually

remove Plaintiff from the dialer, nor did Plaintiff ask to be removed from the dialer.

Based on its review of the relevant phone conversations, the Court finds that

no issues of fact remain with regard to whether Plaintiff revoked her consent to

receive phone calls from Sharp.7

 Plaintiff accepted and returned Sharp’s phone calls

to discuss the details of the two accounts, and engaged in a cooperative dialogue

with Sharp regarding payment on the accounts. There is no evidence that Plaintiff

7 Some courts require a lesser showing that a consumer has revoked consent. 

See, e.g., Van Patten, 2014 WL 2116602, at *8 (citing Beal v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 962, 977 (W.D. Wis. Jun. 20, 2013) (explaining that “consent is terminated when the actor knows or has reason to know that the other is

no longer willing for him to continue the particular conduct” manifested “by any words or conduct inconsistent with continued consent. . . ") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A, cmt. I (1979). This Court need not address which is the proper standard, because the record demonstrates that Plaintiff engaged in a cooperative dialogue with Sharp related to the accounts to assist Sharp and Medi-Cal in paying the medical bills. 

[Hudson Dep. 88:7–21, 122:1-10.] Thus, under either standard, Plaintiff has not

shown any genuine issues of fact remain as to whether she revoked her consent.

- 15 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demonstrated any unwillingness—through words or conduct—for Sharp to continue

calling her cellular telephone number to obtain payment. Although the Court

recognizes that Sharp agents believed Plaintiff should not have been called, those

agents merely indicated they would “send an email” or “suppress calls” for a period

of time. [Sevenikar Decl., Ex. G.] 

Plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations of mutual agreement to defeat

the instant motion. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). She

must designate specific facts in the record which demonstrate a genuine issue for

trial. See id. The Court finds that she has failed to do so. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and

terminate this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 25, 2014

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

- 16 - 13CV1807

Case 3:13-cv-01807-MMA-NLS Document 56 Filed 06/25/14 Page 16 of 16