Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02715/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02715-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Harvey Gass, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-2715-PHX-ROS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Harvey Gass has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges his state court convictions for sexual conduct with a

minor and child molestation. Doc. #1.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2001, Petitioner was

convicted of four counts of Sexual Conduct with a Minor and two counts of Molestation of

a Child. Doc. #1, Attachments (Minute Entry dated 6/22/01). At the sentencing hearing on

June 22, 2001, Petitioner received two terms of imprisonment for life, two 20-year prison

terms and two 17-year prison terms, some of which are to run consecutively and some

concurrently. Id. Petitioner filed a direct appeal and on May 9, 2002, the Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences in a Memorandum Decision. Doc. #1,

Attachments (Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision). Petitioner filed a petition for

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review in the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied on January 7, 2003. Doc. #1,

Attachments (Notice from Arizona Supreme Court dated January 9, 2003). 

On June 4, 2004, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief. Doc. #19, Exh. B. The trial court dismissed the petition in an order filed on October

5, 2004. Doc. #1, Attachments (Minute Entry dated 9/30/04). Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was denied on September 1, 2005. Doc. #1,

Attachments (Court of Appeals Order dated September 1, 2005). Petitioner's subsequent

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on March 14, 2006. Doc. #1,

Attachments (Notice from Arizona Supreme Court dated March 15, 2006).

Petitioner, through counsel, filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court

on November 13, 2006. Doc. #1. Petitioner alleges two grounds for relief: (1) that his trial

attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment by

failing to present evidence of Peyronie’s Disease, a bent penis condition that Petitioner

suffers from; and (2) that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to present expert testimony to rebut the State’s

DNA evidence. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April

20, 2006. Doc. #14. Petitioner filed a Reply in Support fo Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on May 29, 2007. Doc. #21.

DISCUSSION

Respondents concede in their answer that Petitioner’s habeas petition is timely and

that he properly exhausted his state court remedies. They argue, however, that Petitioner has

failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore the claims

should be rejected on the merits. Petitioner claims that he has presented sufficient

information to show that his trial attorney performed deficiently and that but for the

attorney’s errors the result of the trial would have been different. Alternatively, Petitioner

contends that he should be granted an evidentiary hearing.

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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A. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA1

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). "When applying

these standards, the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court

...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

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proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.

3. Ground One

 Petitioner contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel

when he failed to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s bent penis condition, known as

Peyronie’s disease. Petitioner contends that such evidence would have undermined the

victim’s credibility because she made no mention of this significant deformity in her

statements to police. Additionally, he claims such evidence would have established that he

would have suffered extreme pain if he had engaged in the sexual conduct for which he was

convicted, making it less likely that he committed such acts.

Petitioner presented this claim in his state petition for post-conviction relief and the

trial court judge addressed it. The trial court applied the Strickland ineffective assistance

test and found that Petitioner failed to meet either prong of the test. The court stated that

defense counsel’s performance was “not sub-par” and that “the defense associated with the

defendant suffering from Peyronie’s disease, to be charitable, is rather thin.” Doc. #1,

Attachments (Minute Entry dated 9/30/04). The judge went on to say that the proffered

evidence regarding Petitioner’s condition does nothing to persuade the court that the outcome

would have been different if defense counsel had presented such evidence. Id.

Petitioner presents affidavits from a physician, himself and his wife to support his

claim, all of which were presented to the state court on post-conviction relief. The

physician’s affidavit reflects that Petitioner has Peyronie’s disease in that his penis has an

abnormal curvature of approximately 30 degrees. Doc. #21, Exhibit 2. The doctor notes that

Petitioner, during the examination on April 22, 2004, complained of “fullness in his penis

during an erection as well as an inability to have intercourse.” Id. The doctor’s report does

not show Petitioner complained of pain during an erection. In an affidavit from Petitioner’s

wife dated June 3, 2004, she states that after the accident that caused this condition,

Petitioner did “appear to be in pain as a result of his erections” and “was in obvious pain

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2

 Petitioner did not attach his affidavit to his habeas petition or reply but it was

attached as an exhibit to his state petition for post-conviction relief, which Respondents

provided with their answer.

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when [she] attempted to stimulate his penis.” Doc. #21, Exh. 4. She further states that as a

result, they gave up all attempts to engage in sexual activity. Id. In Petitioner’s affidavit,2

he contends that after an air compressor was dropped on his groin area in March 2000, his

penis was bent. Doc. #19, Exh. B. He further claims that he attempted sexual intercourse

with his wife after the accident but the pain from an erection prevented it. Id. 

Petitioner has failed to meet the standard for habeas relief on this claim. First,

Petitioner has presented no evidence that he even informed his trial attorney about his bent

penis condition. Although Petitioner’s counsel alleges in ground one of the habeas petition

that Petitioner asked his lawyer to present such evidence, he provides no evidence to

establish that fact. Petitioner’s own affidavit is silent on whether he told his lawyer of his

condition, as is his wife’s affidavit. Moreover, Petitioner fails to provide an affidavit from

the lawyer indicating that he was told of the condition. Obviously, a lawyer cannot be held

responsible for presenting evidence such as this if he knew nothing about it. Petitioner has

offered nothing to establish that his lawyer knew about the condition and decided not to

present evidence of it.

Second, even if Petitioner could present evidence that his lawyer knew of the

condition, he has not established that the decision to omit such evidence constitutes

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court does not agree that evidence of Petitioner’s

condition undermines the victim’s credibility given her failure to mention to police that his

penis was bent. Surely an 11-year-old victim cannot be expected to identify such a condition.

Her failure to do so in no way reduces the likelihood that she was telling the truth. 

Additionally, the court disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that such evidence

would have convinced the jury that sexual conduct with his granddaughter would have been

extremely painful, thus making it less likely he engaged in such conduct. The jury clearly

believed the victim’s statements to police about Petitioner’s conduct and rejected Petitioner’s

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testimony. There is no reason to believe the jury would have accepted additional self-serving

testimony from Petitioner that he could not have done the acts alleged because having an

erection caused him pain. This court agrees with the state trial court decision that presenting

such evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial. 

Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated that the trial court's order on postconviction relief regarding the claim in ground one was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court or that the order was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. This court

will therefore recommend that Petitioner's claim in ground one be denied.

4. Ground Two

Petitioner contends in ground two that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to present an expert witness to challenge the State’s DNA evidence.

He claims that a DNA expert would have undermined the only physical evidence provided

by the State to establish guilt. Respondents argue that the State’s DNA witness

acknowledged the limitations of the DNA evidence and that Petitioner’s trial counsel

conducted a thorough cross-examination in which he highlighted the problems. Respondent

contends that Petitioner has not shown a defense DNA expert would have changed the

outcome of the trial. 

Like his first claim, Petitioner presented this claim in his state petition for postconviction relief. The trial court found that defense counsel’s performance was “not sub-par”

and that “[d]efense counsel conducted a thorough and adequate examination of the State’s

DNA expert at trial.” Doc. #1, Attachments (Minute Entry dated 9/30/04). The court added

that the defendant’s proffered DNA evidence does not persuade the court that the outcome

would have been different if defense counsel had presented such evidence. Id. The court

found that the proof at trial was compelling. Id.

The proffered DNA evidence referenced by the state trial judge is a report from Simon

Ford, Ph.D., dated May 26, 2004. Doc. #1, Appendix Attachment C. Regarding the State’s

evidence that a stain containing a mixture of Petitioner’s and the victim’s DNA was found

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3

 Petitioner presents nothing more on this issue besides Dr. Ford’s opinion that “a

statistical calculation of this type may be inappropriate and could overstate the strength of

the evidence.” Doc. #1, Appendix Attachment C. Dr. Ford recommends having a qualified

statistician produce an independent estimate, which Petitioner has apparently not done.

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on the victim’s panties, Dr. Ford raised several concerns. He stated that other bodily fluids

could be responsible for the substance that the State’s expert concluded was Petitioner’s

saliva on the victim’s panties and that the mixture of DNA could be a result of co-laundering.

Dr. Ford also states that the statistical calculation regarding Petitioner’s DNA on the panties

may have been overstated.

The State’s expert addressed the first issue at trial. As Respondents point out in their

answer, the expert explained why the stain likely contained Petitioner’s saliva rather than

some other bodily fluid. He conceded that amylase, a substance that is present in saliva, is

also present in other bodily fluids but to a much lesser degree. Because Petitioner’s counsel

elicited this concession on cross-examination, the court agrees that retaining an expert to say

the same thing would not have made a difference. Similarly, the court agrees with the state

court that testimony regarding co-laundering as a potential cause of mixed DNA and that the

statistical calculation may have been overstated3 would not have affected the outcome. 

Dr. Ford also raised issues regarding the DNA evidence taken from Petitioner’s penis.

Doc. #1, Appendix Attachment C. He states that the lab reports show only Petitioner’s DNA

and not the victim’s. Id. However, the State’s expert testified that although he found a

mixture of Petitioner’s and the victim’s DNA on Petitioner’s penis, he conceded that the

amount contributed by the victim was minor and below a level at which a match can be

reported under Department of Public Safety guidelines. As a result, he acknowledged that

the victim was a possible contributor to the mixture and could merely not be excluded as a

match. Petitioner’s counsel elicited this information on cross-examination of the State’s

expert. Again, the court agrees with the state court that a defense expert to highlight the

same limitations that the State’s expert conceded would not have made a difference in the

outcome. 

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For these reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial court's order on postconviction relief regarding the claim in ground two was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court or that the order was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. This court

will therefore recommend that Petitioner's claim in ground two be denied.

Finally, the court finds no basis to hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter. The

evidence Petitioner claims his trial lawyer should have presented would not have affected the

outcome and therefore an evidentiary hearing to present such evidence would be futile.

B. Conclusion

Having concluded that Petitioner has failed to meet the standard for habeas relief in

grounds one and two of his petition, the court will recommend that the petition be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2007.

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