Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00472/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Death Penalty)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER LEE PRICE, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 14-0472-KD-C

KIM THOMAS, COMMISSIONER, :

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, in his official capacity,1:

et al.,

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), on the complaint (Doc. 1), the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10), plaintiff’s response in opposition (Doc. 12), the 

moving parties’ reply (Doc. 13), and plaintiff’s notice of supplemental authority (Doc. 

14). Upon consideration of the foregoing pleadings, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the Court DENY the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10).

 1 Kim Thomas resigned as the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections (“ADOC”) on or about January 27, 2015. See 

http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/alabama_prison_conditions (last visited 

February 9, 2015). Ultimately, Air Force Colonel Jefferson Dunn will take over as the 

Commissioner of the ADOC when he retires from the Air Force in March, see id.; in the interim, 

William G. Sharp, Jr. was appointed Interim Commissioner of the ADOC in January of 2015. See 

http://governor.alabama.gov/cabinet/department-of-corrections (last visited February 9, 

2015). Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sharp should be 

substituted for Kim Thomas as the proper lead defendant in this action, see FED.R.CIV.P. 25(d) 

(“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, 

resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending.”), to be followed by the 

substitution of Dunn for Sharp once Dunn officially assumes the position of Commissioner of 

the Alabama Department of Corrections, see id. (“The officer’s successor is automatically 

substituted as a party.”). 

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FINDINGS OF FACT

When Christopher Lee Price was a senior in high school, “he participated in a 

burglary2 during which the homeowner, William Lynn, was killed.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 15.) Price 

was convicted of capital murder and received a death sentence (see id.); he is a “death 

row inmate” housed at Holman Correctional Facility in Atmore, Alabama (see id. at ¶¶ 1 

& 9).3 “On September 11, 2014, the State [of Alabama] asked the Alabama Supreme 

Court to set an execution date” for the plaintiff (Doc. 1, at ¶ 16), one day after the then 

Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, Kim Thomas, “unilaterally decided to 

adopt” an “untested three-drug [lethal injection] protocol[.]” (Id. at ¶ 12.)4 According to 

plaintiff, “the new three-drug protocol that the State now intends to use on [him] 

materially differs from the lethal injection protocols that Alabama has used on all 

previous inmates[,]” thereby making his “constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . 

. timely.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) The primary relief sought by Price is an order from this Court 

 2 In truth, Price participated in the first-degree robbery of Lynn’s home during 

which Lynn was killed. Price v. State, infra, 725 So.2d at 1011.

3 The procedural course of Price’s conviction has been well-explained in detail by 

the defendants. (See Doc. 10, at 8.) Price’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct 

appeal, Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff’d, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998); his 

conviction and sentence became final when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition 

for writ of certiorari, Price v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999). The 

Circuit Court of Fayette County, Alabama summarily dismissed Price’s Rule 32 collateral attack 

on his conviction and sentence; “the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal 

in an unpublished decision[,] . . . [and t]he Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review.” 

(Doc. 10, at 8.) Price then filed a federal habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Id.) “After briefing, the 

district court issued a memorandum opinion and final judgment denying Price’s petition with 

prejudice[.]” (Id.) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, 

Price v. Allen, 679 F.3d 1315 (2012) and the United States Supreme Court denied Price’s petition 

for writ of certiorari on March 4, 2013, Price v. Thomas, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1493, 185 L.Ed.2d 

548 (2013).

4 “Alabama abandoned the use of the electric chair in favor of lethal injection[]” in 

2002. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

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enjoining the defendants from executing him using the protocol the State adopted on 

September 10, 2014 and declaring that the defendants’ new lethal injection execution 

protocol violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment. (See id. at ¶ 55 a. & c.) 

49. The State of Alabama has announced the intention to execute 

Mr. Price using a new three-drug protocol consisting of (a) 500 milligrams 

of midazolam hydrochloride,5 (b) 600 milligrams of rocuronium bromide, 

and (c) 240 milliequivalents of potassium chloride.

50. Defendants are acting under the color of Alabama law in 

undertaking to execute Mr. Price using the DOC’s new three-drug 

protocol.

51. It is substantially likely that midazolam hydrochloride will 

fail to render Mr. Price unconscious and insensate during the remainder of 

the execution, and that Mr. Price will therefore experience prolonged, 

excruciating, and needless pain while the rocuronium bromide forcibly 

 5 “[T]he ‘first drug’ in every three-drug [lethal injection] protocol [utilized in the 

United States] is intended not to kill the inmate, but rather to render the inmate unconscious 

and insensate. [] From 2002 through 2013, the Alabama DOC used either sodium thiopental or 

pentobarbital to render the inmate unconscious and insensate prior to the administration of 

potassium chloride.” (Id. at ¶¶ 21 & 22.)

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suffocates him6 and the potassium chloride burns his veins and internal 

organs and stops his heart7.

52. Defendants are acting knowingly and with deliberate 

indifference.

53. The violation of Mr. Price’s constitutional rights is 

exacerbated by (a) the risk that the State of Alabama will use compounded 

drugs or other drugs from non-FDA approved sources, and (b) the secret 

process through which the Alabama DOC adopts and implements its 

lethal injection protocol, and (c) the inadequacy of whatever 

“consciousness checks” the Alabama DOC intends to perform prior to 

administering the rocuronium bromide and potassium chloride.

54. If Alabama’s recently adopted protocol is used to execute 

Mr. Price, Mr. Price will be subject to cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Id. at ¶¶49-54 (footnotes added).) Plaintiff bases his allegation that midazolam 

hydrochloride8 will fail to render him unconscious and insensate during the remainder 

 6 “[Rocuronium bromide] does not affect consciousness or the perception of pain. 

Instead, it causes paralysis of the muscles, including the diaphragm. If an individual who is not 

fully unconscious and insensate is given the drug, the individual will feel as though he is being 

forcibly suffocated. The individual’s suffering, however, is invisible to observers because the 

total body paralysis prevents the individual from crying out in pain.” (Id. at ¶ 19; see also id. at 

¶¶ 35-36 (“Midazolam hydrochloride is a benzodiazepine. Its FDA approved uses include 

sedation, anxiolysis (relief of fear and anxiety), and amnesia (including loss of memory). 

Midazolam hydrochloride can also depress respiration when administered in sufficient doses. [] 

Unlike sodium thiopental and pentobarbital, midazolam hydrochloride is not a barbiturate. It is 

not generally administered to suppress responses to noxious stimuli and does not act as an 

analgesic. The sedative properties of midazolam hydrochloride do not suppress responses to 

noxious stimuli. A person who is sedated can still experience stimuli, including painful stimuli. 

The amnesia-inducing properties of midazolam hydrochloride may prevent a person from 

remembering the pain and suffering he experienced while under the effects of the drug. 

However, even if the individual suffers from a lack of memory after the fact, the individual is 

absolutely experiencing pain and suffering during the fact. Unlike sodium thiopental, even at 

high does[] midazolam hydrochloride will not induce a state of anesthesia sufficiently deep to 

prevent an individual from perceiving and feeling the pain and suffering associated with 

rocuronium bromide and potassium chloride.” (emphasis in original)).)

7 “Medical experts and law enforcement authorities agree that, unless the inmate is 

completely unconscious and insensate, the administration of potassium chloride will cause the 

inmate prolonged pain, including an excruciating burning sensation throughout the entire 

body[.]” (Id. at ¶ 18.)

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of the execution not only on the properties of the drug itself (compare id. at ¶ 24 

(“Midazolam hydrochloride is a sedative that is not generally used clinically as a standalone general anesthetic. Midazolam hydrochloride is not an analgesic and does not 

suppress responses to noxious stimuli. Unlike sodium thiopental, midazolam 

hydrochloride will not induce general anesthesia sufficient to prevent an individual 

from perceiving and feeling pain from noxious stimuli such as rocuronium bromide 

and potassium chloride, even at high doses.”) with id. at ¶ 29 (“[E]ven where a large 

dose of midazolam hydrochloride induces a state of anesthesia in an inmate, it is not a 

deep state of anesthesia, and the rocuronium bromide and potassium chloride are 

substantially likely to cause pain and suffering that will ‘break through’ the midazolam 

hydrochloride.”)) but, as well, on the details of a series of “botched” executions across 

the country that unsuccessfully attempted to utilize midazolam hydrochloride to render 

executed inmates unconscious and insensate (id. at ¶¶ 26, 38 & 40-42). According to 

plaintiff, because midazolam hydrochloride will not render him unconscious and 

insensate, he will experience physical pain and suffering despite the amnesia-inducing 

properties of the drug and his inability to audibly or visibly express pain due to 

administration of the paralytic agent rocuronium bromide. (Compare id. at ¶ 19 

(“[Rocuronium bromide] causes paralysis of the muscles, including the diaphragm. If 

an individual who is not fully unconscious and insensate is given the drug, the 

individual will feel as though he is being forcibly suffocated. The individual’s suffering, 

however, is invisible to observers because the total body paralysis prevents the 

 

8 Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner’s decision to utilize midazolam 

hydrochloride as part of its lethal-injection protocol stems from “the fact that sodium 

thiopental, pentobarbital, and all other similar general anesthetics are presently unavailable to 

the Alabama DOC for use in executions.” (Id. at ¶ 25 (citation omitted).)

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individual from crying out in pain.”) with id. at ¶ 32 (“The Constitution does not allow a 

state to subject a death row inmate to prolonged and excruciating pain and suffering, 

regardless of whether the state takes steps to ensure that the inmate’s pain is invisible to 

third-party observers.”).). 

Price filed his § 1983 complaint in this Court on October 8, 2014 (Doc. 1, at 1), less 

than one month after the defendant Commissioner of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections (“DOC”) amended the Department’s lethal injection protocol (compare id. 

with id. at ¶ 23).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint (or portions 

of a complaint); therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court 

must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); 

Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, all factual allegations 

are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County 

of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1382, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).

Rule 8(a)(2) generally sets the benchmark for determining whether a complaint’s 

allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 677-678 & 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ As the Court held in Twombly, . . . 

the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ 

but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.”). Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, 

quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-1965, 167 

L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 

at 1955.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face. A claim that has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the 

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the 

hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not 

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 

than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for 

relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged–but it has not show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id. at 678-679, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see 

also id. 680, 129 S.Ct. at 1951 (a plaintiff must nudge his claims “‘across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.’”); see Speaker v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Services 

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1381 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[G]iven the 

pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal, [plaintiff] must do more than 

recite [] statutory elements in conclusory fashion. Rather, his allegations must proffer 

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enough factual content to ‘raise a right to belief above the speculative level.’”); 

Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although it must 

accept well-pled facts as true, the court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions. In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, we make reasonable 

inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor, but we are not required to draw plaintiff’s inference. 

Similarly, unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for 

the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff’s allegations. A complaint may be 

dismissed if the facts as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds as stated in 

Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012).

B. Whether Plaintiff’s Claim is Time-Barred. It is clear in the Eleventh 

Circuit that “’a method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state 

review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or 

substantially changed execution protocol.’” Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th 

Cir.) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, U.S. 

 , 133 S.Ct. 1752, 185 L.Ed.2d 806 (2013). Here, Price’s state review was complete on 

May 24, 1999, the date upon which the United States Supreme Court denied his petition 

for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court on direct appeal of the entry of his 

death sentence. See Price v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 

(1999). At that time, of course, the method of execution of death row prisoners was by 

means of the electric chair. (See Doc. 1, at ¶ 17.) 

In 2002 (id.), specifically on July 31, 2002 (Doc. 10, at 12), Alabama changed its 

method of execution to lethal injection (compare id. with Doc. 1, at ¶ 17) and, therefore, it 

is the defendants’ position that Price’s statute of limitations began to run on July 31, 

2002 and expired two years later on July 21, 2004 (see Doc. 10, at 12). See Jones v. Preuit & 

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Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he two-year limitations period . . . 

applies to section 1983 actions in Alabama.”); see also McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 

1173 (11th Cir.) (“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject 

to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 

1983 action has been brought. . . . [Plaintiff’s] claim was brought in Alabama, where the 

governing limitations period is two years. . . . Therefore, in order to have his claim 

heard, [plaintiff] was required to bring it within two years from the date the limitations 

period began to run.”), cert. denied sub nom. Callahan v. Allen, 553 U.S. 1098, 128 S.Ct. 

2914, 171 L.Ed.2d 850 (2008). And the defendants’ position in this regard would be welltaken unless Price can establish that “he filed his § 1983 complaint within two years of a 

significant change in Alabama’s method of administering lethal injections.” Arthur v. 

Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012), citing McNair, supra, 515 F.3d at 1177.

Here, of course, Price alleges a significant change in Alabama’s method of 

administering lethal injections when it (through its Commissioner of the Department of 

Corrections) substituted midazolam hydrochloride as the first drug in Alabama’s threedrug lethal injection protocol on September 10, 2014. (See Doc. 1, at ¶ 23.)9 Of particular 

import, plaintiff alleges that midazolam hydrochloride is not a barbiturate like its 

predecessors sodium thiopental and pentobarbital (rather, it is a benzodiazepine); it is a 

sedative as opposed to a general anesthetic; and, as a result, it will not necessarily 

render him unconscious and insensate by the time the other two drugs (rocuronium 

bromide and potassium chloride) act to suffocate and burn his veins and internal 

 9 Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on October 8, 2014 (Doc. 1, at 1) and, of course, is 

properly considered timely filed if the substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for 

pentobarbital (or sodium thiopental) is considered a significant change in Alabama’s method of 

execution by lethal injection.

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organs, as evidenced by several “botched” executions throughout the country. (See Doc. 

1.) Based upon the foregoing, Price contends that this Court should allow factual 

development of whether the change/switch from pentobarbital to midazolam 

hydrochloride is significant (see Doc. 12, at 9-15). See Arthur, supra, 674 F.3d at 1260 

(“Whether a significant change has occurred in a state’s method of execution is a factdependent inquiry, which we have treated as such in each of our recent cases 

addressing the lethal injection protocols of Alabama, Georgia and Florida. Although we 

concluded in Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011), DeYoung v. Owens, 646 

F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) and Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2011), that 

the replacement of sodium thiopental with pentobarbital did not constitute a 

‘significant change’ in the lethal injection execution protocol, each of these decisions is 

premised on the specific factual allegations and/or evidence presented and considered in 

each of those cases. None of the previous courts that were asked to decide whether the 

substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental is a ‘significant change’ in the lethal 

injection protocol could have resolved, nor did they resolve, that claim without 

considering the facts and evidence. Simply because no court, based on the allegations 

and evidence that has been presented in cases to date, has found a significant change 

does not mean that such evidence does not exist. To read our circuit decisions in Powell, 

DeYoung, and Valle as holding—no matter what new facts allege or new evidence 

reveals—that Alabama’s, Georgia’s and Florida’s substitutions of pentobarbital for 

sodium thiopental is not a significant change in their execution protocols is to ignore the 

reality that scientific and medical evidence that exists today may differ from that which 

new scientific and medical discoveries and research reveal tomorrow.”). 

For their part, of course, the defendants argue that the holding in Arthur was 

narrow, as recognized in Mann, supra, and, therefore, urge the Court to find that 

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plaintiff is not entitled to factual development and an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether the substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital is a substantial 

change in Alabama’s method of execution by lethal injection (see, e.g., Doc. 13, at 3-11).

To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit in Mann observed that “Arthur did not hold, nor could 

it have, that every inmate who files a complaint that challenges the use of pentobarbital 

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the substitution of 

pentobarbital is a substantial change in the method of execution.” 713 F.3d at 1314; see 

also id. (“We had already foreclosed that argument in Powell, where we had held that an 

inmate’s complaint was governed by our prior panel precedent that the substitution of 

pentobarbital for sodium pentothal did not constitute a significant change for the 

purpose of the statute of limitations.”). Important to this observation, is the panel’s 

recognition that “if the allegations or evidence in Arthur had been materially the same 

as those presented in Powell, the district court would have been obliged to dismiss 

Arthur’s complaint as untimely.” Id. at 1313-1314 (citations omitted). 

The undersigned, however, cannot agree with the defendants statute of 

limitations argument and, instead, RECOMMENDS that the Court allow factual 

development and thereafter conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 

substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital (or sodium thiopental) is a 

substantial change in Alabama’s method of execution. This conclusion is reached not 

only because the focus of Mann (and the focus of Arthur, Powell, Valle, and DeYoung)

was on the substitution of one barbiturate (pentobarbital) for another barbiturate 

(sodium pentothal) or because the Eleventh Circuit, to date, has not specifically 

determined that the substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital does not 

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constitute a significant change for the purpose of the statute of limitations.10 Although 

these are sufficient reasons, standing alone, to reject the defendants’ statute of 

limitations argument, the “clincher” is that every court in the Eleventh Circuit to have 

considered the question of whether the substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for 

pentobarbital constitutes a significant change in the method of execution by lethal 

injection did so only after at least a modicum of factual development and an evidentiary 

hearing conducted by a court. Compare Chavez v. Palmer, 2014 WL 521067, *7-8 (M.D. Fla. 

Feb. 10, 2014) (evidentiary hearing conducted which allowed expert witness testimony) 

with Muhammad v. Crews, 2013 WL 6844489, *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2013) (evidentiary 

hearing conducted over the course of two days, on November 21 and 22, 2013, by the 

state circuit court). The cautionary comment in Arthur v. Thomas, supra, that “relying on 

 10 As correctly observed by the Middle District of Alabama in Arthur v. Thomas, 

Case No. 2:11-cv-438-WKW (M.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished opinion), “Muhammad [v. 

Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 739 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 2014)] affirmed the dismissal of the 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on res judicata grounds, as the Florida Supreme Court had 

already held the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of serious harm, and Chavez 

dealt with the merits of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on review of a denial of a 

motion to stay executions[]” (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, at 9 n.3). Compare Chavez v. Florida SP Warden, 

742 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir.) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Chavez failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.”), cert. denied, 134 

S.Ct. 1156 (2014), with Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 739 F.3d 683, 688 & 689 

(11th Cir.) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to stay the 

execution and the amended motion to stay the execution, nor will we grant the application for a 

stay of execution filed in our Court. Muhammad cannot establish that he has a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits. The Supreme Court of Florida has already decided his 

Eighth Amendment claim . . ., and res judicata bars his federal complaint. . . . Because res 

judicata bars Muhammad from relitigating these claims in his federal complaint, Muhammad 

has failed to establish a substantial likelihood that can succeed on the merits. The district court 

did not err when it denied Muhammad’s motions to stay the executions, and we refuse to grant 

his application in our Court. Federal review of Muhammad’s Eighth Amendment claim, already 

decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, is available in the Supreme Court of the United States, 

in which his petition for a writ of certiorari is pending.”), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 894 (2014). 

Indeed, in Chavez the Eleventh Circuit specifically stated that it had no need to address, nor was 

it implying any view about, the State’s defenses, including the defense “based on the statute of 

limitations[.]” 742 F.3d at 1273 n.5. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has made no implicit or explicit 

statement regarding whether the substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital 

constitutes, or does not constitute, a significant change in Alabama’s method of execution for 

purposes of the statute of limitations.

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evidence presented in other cases without factual development and the opportunity to 

present potentially new scientific or medical evidence with respect to the use of 

midazolam in the context of Alabama’s lethal injection protocol is precisely what the 

Circuit cautioned against in Arthur, 674 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2012)[]” (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, 

at 9 n.3) is particularly relevant where, as here, the “botched” executions that occurred 

in Arizona, Ohio, and Oklahoma involving midazolam hydrochloride and referenced in 

the complaint (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38, 40 & 41 (botched executions occurred in April of 2014, 

on August 8, 2014, and on September 18, 2014)) all occurred after the district and 

Eleventh Circuit decisions in Chavez and Muhammad, supra, see, e.g., Chavez, 742 F.3d 

1267 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014); Muhammad, 739 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2014). 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court DECLINE to find 

Price’s Eighth Amendment claim barred by the applicable statute of limitations in 

absence of an opportunity for factual development, including discovery between the 

parties, and an evidentiary hearing.

C. Whether Price has Stated a Plausible Eighth Amendment Claim. As 

recently reiterated by the Eleventh Circuit, “to prevail on an Eighth Amendment 

challenge to a lethal injection protocol, a condemned inmate must establish ‘an 

objectively intolerable risk of harm that prevents prison officials from pleading that 

they were subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’” Chavez, 742 

F.3d at 1272, quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1531, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 

(2008). “To demonstrate that, an inmate must show two things: (1) the lethal injection 

protocol in question creates ‘a substantial risk of serious harm,’ and (2) there are ‘known 

and available alternatives’ that are ‘feasible, readily implemented,’ and that will ‘in fact 

significantly reduce [the] substantial risk of severe pain.’” Id. at 1272, quoting Baze, 

supra, 553 U.S. at 50, 52 & 61, 128 S.Ct. at 1531-1532 & 1537.

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Here, the defendants contend that plaintiff’s complaint satisfies neither prong set 

forth by the Supreme Court in Baze (compare Doc. 10, at 18-25 with Doc. 13, at 11-16), as 

they did in Arthur v. Thomas, supra (see Doc. 12, Exhibit A, at 10-11). To avoid a split in 

the district courts of Alabama, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court 

ADOPT the reasoning of District Judge W. Keith Watkins from the Middle District of 

Alabama and REJECT the defendants’ arguments that Price has failed to sufficiently 

plead that the use of midazolam hydrochloride is surely or very likely to cause a risk of 

severe pain and that he has failed to plead a known and available alternative drug to 

midazolam hydrochloride. 

In support of th[e] argument [that plaintiff has failed on the first prong], 

the State points to cases that have recognized that a properly injected 500-

milligram dose of midazolam will effectively render an inmate 

unconscious prior to the administration of the second and third drugs in a 

three-drug protocol like Alabama’s. See Muhammad v. Crews, No. 3:13-cv1587-J-32JBT, 2013 WL 6844489, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2013); Chavez v. 

Palmer, No. 3:14-cv-110-J-39JBT, 2014 WL 521067, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 

2014); Howell v. State, 133 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2014); Henry v. State, 134 So.3d 

938 (Fla. 2014); and Muhammad v. State, 132 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2013).11

However, all of these cases, while addressing the efficacy of midazolam in 

the lethal-injection context, did so only after an evidentiary hearing. In 

this case, there is no evidence concerning whether the use of midazolam 

as the first drug in Alabama’s three-drug protocol will surely or very 

likely cause serious illness and needless suffering to [the plaintiff]. All that 

is before the court are [plaintiff’s] allegations that midazolam will have 

such an effect. Thus, without allowing [plaintiff] to . . . conduct discovery 

on the efficacy of midazolam in the lethal-injection context, this court 

cannot summarily dismiss his Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state 

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The court is also not persuaded by the [defendants’] argument that 

[plaintiff] failed to plead a known and available alternative drug to 

midazolam as required by Baze . . . . First, the court does not accept the 

State’s argument that this is a specific pleading requirement set forth by 

Baze that must be properly alleged before a case can survive a motion to 

dismiss.

 11 These are the very same cases to which the defendants cite in this case. (Doc. 10, 

at 20.)

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(Doc. 12, Exhibit A, at 10-11.) Indeed, nowhere in Baze is there the faintest of 

suggestions that a plaintiff is required to plead a known and available alternative, see 

553 U.S. at 50-62, 128 S.Ct. at 1531-1538, and, moreover, such contention by the 

defendants is arguably foreclosed by Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582, 126 S.Ct. 

2096, 2103, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006) (“The United States as amicus curiae contends that a 

capital litigant’s § 1983 action can proceed if . . . the prisoner identifies an alternative, 

authorized method of execution. . . . Although we agree courts should not tolerate 

abusive litigation tactics . . ., even if the United States’ proposed limitation were likely 

to be effective we could not accept it. It is true that the Nelson plaintiff’s affirmative 

identification of an acceptable alternative supported our conclusion that the suit need 

not proceed as a habeas action. . . . That fact, however, was not decisive. Nelson did not 

change the traditional pleading requirements for § 1983 actions. If the relief sought 

would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus 

might be proper. . . . Imposition of heightened pleading requirements, however, is quite 

a different matter. Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the 

federal courts.”). However, even if Baze does require a plaintiff to plead a known and 

available alternative to midazolam hydrochloride, and the Court determines plaintiff 

has not satisfied this pleading requirement, plaintiff should be allowed to amend his 

complaint in order to remedy such defect. See FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2) (“[A] party may 

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. 

The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” (emphasis supplied)). 

In light of the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court 

DECLINE to summarily dismiss Price’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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D. Whether Price is Precluded from Relief Based on his Alleged 

Inequitable and Unreasonable Delay in Seeking Relief under § 1983 and Because the 

Complaint is a Challenge to His Sentence Itself. The defendants’ final argument is 

that Price’s complaint “should be dismissed on equitable principles because he 

unreasonably delayed in filing his § 1983 action even though his execution has been 

imminent for some time[]” (Doc. 10, at 25; see also id. at 25-30) and because “the relief he 

seeks would necessarily bar his execution[]” (Doc. 13, at 16). 

In support of their “equitable principles” argument, the defendants contend that 

Price’s execution has been imminent since at least March 4, 2013 and, therefore, the 

plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing his complaint on October 8, 2014. (Doc. 10, at 

28.) The undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court find the defendants’ argument 

unavailing because this lawsuit was initiated on October 8, 2014 (Doc. 1, at 1) solely 

because of the ADOC Commissioner’s unilateral amendment of the DOC’s multi-drug 

protocol to substitute midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital (or sodium 

thiopental) on September 10, 2014 (Doc. 1, at ¶ 23); thus, there was no unreasonable 

delay by Price in filing his complaint. Moreover, the undersigned agrees with plaintiff 

that “[a]s a matter of basic logic (not to mention fairness), [his] . . . lawsuit challenging 

the State’s new lethal injection protocol cannot be dismissed on the ‘equitable’ ground 

that he did not also bring lawsuits against the State’s old lethal injection protocols.” 

(Doc. 12, at 18.)12

 12 Had Price filed a lawsuit on September 9, 2014 challenging Alabama’s lethal 

injection protocol that utilized pentobarbital, the defendants’ equitable argument would have 

been persuasive; however, that argument is rendered unpersuasive by the announced 

substitution of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital on September 10, 2014, particularly 

in light of the fact that no court in Alabama (nor, for that matter, the Eleventh Circuit) has 

specifically determined (following discovery and an evidentiary hearing) that the substitution 

(Continued)

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The defendants’ alternative argument, that Price’s complaint is nothing more 

than a challenge to his sentence “because the relief he seeks would necessarily bar his 

execution[]” (Doc. 13, at 16), should also be REJECTED. Granting the relief requested 

by Price, that is, enjoining the defendants from executing him using the protocol 

adopted on September 10, 2014 and declaring that protocol violative of his right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1, at 18 & 

19), would not forever bar his execution. Rather, “[i]t would simply bar the [defendants] 

from executing [him] in a constitutionally violate manner. This sounds in § 1983[.]” 

(Doc. 12, Exhibit A, at 6.) Such a finding by this Court would be in accord with Hill v. 

McDonough, supra, 547 U.S. at 580, 126 S.Ct. at 2102 (“In the case before us we conclude 

that Hill’s § 1983 action is controlled by the holding in Nelson. Here, as in Nelson, Hill’s 

action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State from executing him by 

lethal injection. The complaint does not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a 

general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin respondents ‘from executing [Hill] in the 

manner they currently intend.’” (emphasis supplied)); see also id. at 583, 126 S.Ct. at 2104 

(“Any incidental delay caused by allowing Hill to file suit does not cast on his sentence 

the kind of negative legal implication that would require him to proceed in a habeas 

action.”). Therefore, the defendants’ equitable arguments in favor of dismissal 

necessarily fail.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) be DENIED.

 

of midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital does not constitute a significant change in 

Alabama’s method of execution by lethal injection.

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit precedent, 

“the failure to object limits the scope of [] appellate review to plain error review of the 

magistrate judge’s factual findings.” Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 

2013) (emphasis in original). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 24th day of February, 2014.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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