Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03655/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03655-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WILLITS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-03655 JSW

ORDER GRANTING DISTRICT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Willits

Unified School District (“District”). The Court finds the motion appropriate for decision

without oral argument and HEREBY VACATES the hearing set for June 4, 2010. See N.D.

Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal authority, for the

reasons set forth in the remainder of this Order, the Court GRANTS the District’s motion for

summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was a minor student at Willits Charter School (“WCS”) when she was allegedly

subjected to sexual molestation by her teacher Clint Smith, beginning in March 2008 and

continuing through January 2, 2009. Defendant WCS is a charter school established pursuant to

The Charter Schools Act of 1992, California Education Code § 47600 et seq. Defendant

District is the school district that approved the WCS Charter. According to the uncontested

evidence submitted in connection with this motion, the District is a separate legal entity from

WCS. Based on this legal independence, the District moves for summary judgment on the 

Case 3:09-cv-03655-JSW Document 93 Filed 05/27/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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remaining claims for violation of Title IX and for negligent hiring and supervision. Plaintiff

argues that because Smith’s sexual molestation of Plaintiff was reported to a teacher employed

by the District at a school-sponsored party, the District may be held liable.

The Court will address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this Order.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment.

A court may grant summary judgment as to all or a part of a party’s claims. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case.

Id. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997). 

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The

party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for

the moving party. Id. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party

must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party must “identify

with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task to “scour the record in search of a

genuine issue of triable fact”). If the non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff contends that Gina Hirsch, a teacher with the District, received reports from

witnesses indicating that Smith, a WCS teacher, sexually molested Plaintiff at a school party. 

Plaintiff argues that Hirsch had a duty to report the incident and had authority to take corrective

action, and her liability is imputed to her employer, the District. 

According to the undisputed facts in the record presented to the Court, Gina Hirsch,

while employed as a teacher with the District, attended a private party which was promoted by

the charter school, in her role as a parent of a student who also attended the charter school. The

party, which was held annually in memorial of Steven Graham and promoted exclusively by the

charter school, occurred in June 2008. At the party, two students observed Smith fondling

Plaintiff and reported the inappropriate behavior to another parent attending the party, Tamara

Pearn, who then reported the information to Hirsch. Following the party, the sexual molestation

of Plaintiff continued and escalated in intensity.

Plaintiff contends that Hirsch, who was informed of the alleged sexual molestation early

on and as a teacher employed by the District, had the duty to report the incident to authorities as

required under the Child Abuse Reporting Act. See Cal. Penal Code § 11166. The Act requires

the reporting of known or reasonably suspected incidents of “child abuse” to a “child protective

agency” which would include law enforcement agencies. Cal. Penal Code § 11166(a). The

duty to report “applies to a ‘child care custodian’ (which would include a school district) ‘who

has knowledge of or observes a child, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of

his or her employment, whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of

child abuse’ (which includes sexual abuse). Reasonably construed, the act was intended to

protect only those children in the custodial care of the person charged with reporting the abuse

....” Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 1087 (1997) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Because it is undisputed that Hirsch attended the WSC party as a parent of a student at

the charter school and not in her professional capacity or within the scope of her employment as

a teacher for the District, she does not qualify as a child care custodian in that context and was

under no legal obligation to report the alleged molestation that was reported to her. Although

the Court finds the allegations regarding Hirsch’s conduct to be morally reprehensible, there is

no legal consequence of her inaction on behalf of her employer, the District. 

As both Plaintiff and the District have repeatedly contended, there is no other legal

relationship of responsibility or imputed knowledge of the alleged molestation of Plaintiff to the

District. (See, e.g., Declaration of Counsel, Ex. 4 at 6; Ex. 5 at 14.) Accordingly, without being

able to consider the conduct of Hirsch, the allegations made against the District cannot stand

and the District’s motion for summary judgment of the remaining claims is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the District’ motion for summary

judgment on all remaining claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-03655-JSW Document 93 Filed 05/27/10 Page 4 of 4