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Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided September 7, 2001

No. 00-5438

Alternative Research and Development Foundation, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Ann M. Veneman, Secretary,

U.S. Department of Agriculture, et al.,

Appellees

National Association for Biomedical Research,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv0581)

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On Motion to Dismiss

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John Mendelson, III, was on the motion to dismiss filed by

plaintiffs-appellees Alternative Research and Development

Foundation, et al.

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Michael Jay Singer and John S. Koppel, Attorneys, U.S.

Department of Justice, for federal appellees, were on a

pleading in support of the motion to dismiss.

Michael P. Socarras and Elliot H. Scherker, for appellant

National Association for Biomedical Research, were on the

response to appellees' motion to dismiss.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge; Williams and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Alternative Research and Development Foundation filed a petition for rulemaking requesting that the

Secretary of Agriculture amend the definition of "animal" in

regulations promulgated pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act

("Act") to remove the current exclusion of birds, mice, and

rats bred for use in research. Under the Act, the Secretary

of Agriculture is authorized to promulgate standards and

other requirements to govern the handling, care, and treatment of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors.

7 U.S.C. s 2143(a)(1). On January 28, 1999, the United

States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") published the

petition and requested comments. See 64 Fed. Reg. 4356

(1999). While its agency petition was pending, Alternative

Research and Development Foundation, as well as In Vitro

International, and Kristine Gausz (collectively, "Alternative

Research") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive

relief in the district court, alleging that the USDA's exclusion

of birds, rats, and mice from the definition of "animal" in 9

C.F.R. s 1.1 violates the Act. It sought an order enjoining

the exclusion and directing USDA to amend the regulation by

eliminating the exclusion.

After the district court denied a motion to dismiss filed by

USDA, see Alternative Research v. Glickman, 101 F. Supp.

2d 7, 11-14 (D.D.C. 2000), the National Association for

Biomedical Research ("NABR"), an association engaged in

research using birds, rats, and mice, sought intervention as of

right or, alternatively, permissive intervention. Subsequently, Alternative Research and USDA entered into a stipulation

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of dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(1). The stipulation provides, in pertinent

part, that USDA will grant Alternative Research's petition for

rulemaking to amend the USDA regulation, and USDA

agrees to initiate and complete a rulemaking on the regulation of birds, rats, and mice within a reasonable time. NABR

then filed a motion to vacate the stipulation under Rule

60(b)(4). After a hearing, the district court filed the stipulation of dismissal and denied the motions to intervene and to

vacate the stipulation under Rule 60(b), concluding that it

lacked jurisdiction to decide the motions in light of the

stipulated dismissal. Alternatively, the district court denied

the motion to intervene as of right on the merits, concluding

that NABR's interests would not be impaired by the proposed

rulemaking.

NABR appeals from the stipulated dismissal and the order

denying intervention and Rule 60(b) relief. Alternative Research moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The district court's order denying intervention is appealable,

but was not in error; we therefore grant summary affirmance

of that ruling. Because intervention was properly denied,

NABR is not a party to the action and lacks standing to

appeal from the stipulated dismissal and from the order

denying relief under Rule 60(b); we therefore grant the

motion to dismiss as to those appeals.

* * *

Appealability of denial of intervention as of right. In

considering whether it had jurisdiction to review an order of

the district court denying intervention to a would-be intervenor, the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947),

stated:

Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order

denying intervention ... depends upon the nature of the

applicant's right to intervene. If the right is absolute,

the order is appealable and we may judge it on its

merits.... [O]ur jurisdiction is identified by the necessary incidents of the right to intervene in each particular

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instance. We must therefore determine the question of

our jurisdiction in this case by examining the character

of the [would-be intervenor's] right to intervene in the

proceeding....

Id. at 524-25.

In Brotherhood, and certain subsequent cases, the Supreme

Court postponed consideration of whether the denial of intervention as of right was appealable until it decided the appeal

on the merits, thus suggesting that the appealability of the

denial turned on the merits of the applicant's right to intervene. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366

U.S. 683, 687-88 (1961) (noting that answer to question

whether court has jurisdiction to review order denying intervention as of right also determines merits of appeal from

denial); Brotherhood, 331 U.S. at 524-32; see also Sutphen

Estates v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1951). Upon

concluding that intervention as of right was properly denied,

the Court in Sam Fox Publishing and Sutphen Estates

dismissed the appeals. See Sam Fox Publishing, 366 U.S. at

695; Sutphen Estates, 342 U.S. at 22-23. More recently,

however, the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over an

appeal from the denial of intervention as of right without first

determining the merits of the applicant's right to intervene,

and, after concluding that a lower court's denial of intervention was correct, affirmed the decision. Donaldson v. United

States, 400 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1971).

The Court's inconsistent treatment is mirrored in the federal courts of appeals. Some decisions make appealability of

the denial of intervention automatic once the district court

issues its denial; that is, the denial is held to be a final order

that is immediately appealable. This approach is followed by

a majority of the circuit courts. See Cotter v. Massachusetts

Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 219 F.3d 31, 33

(1st Cir. 2000); League of United Latin American Citizens v.

Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); Development

Finance Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d

156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995); Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 344-45

(7th Cir. 1994); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Electric

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Co., 581 F.2d 175, 176 n.1 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);

Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Everest Management

Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1238 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972). Having concluded that this type of order is appealable, these courts

review the order denying intervention on the merits and will

affirm the district court's ruling if they find no error.

The second approach makes appealability turn on the merits of the motion for intervention as of right, and the denial of

intervention is not automatically an appealable, final order.

This approach is followed by the Eleventh Circuit. See

EEOC v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635, 637 (11th Cir.

1984). Under its self-styled "anomalous rule," the Eleventh

Circuit has jurisdiction only to decide whether the district

court was correct in denying intervention. Under this rule, if

the circuit court concludes that the district court's order was

correct, the circuit court's jurisdiction evaporates because the

ruling was not a final order, and the circuit court must

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id. Conversely, if the circuit court concludes that the district court erred,

the circuit court retains jurisdiction and reverses the district

court ruling. Either way, the circuit court first decides

whether the motion to intervene was properly denied before

determining whether the order is appealable. See id. at 641

(concluding that trial court's denial of intervention was correct and that denial was thus not an appealable final order,

and dismissing appeal); see United States v. Georgia, 19 F.3d

1388, 1393 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).

Our circuit has not been entirely consistent in its approach.

In Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 473 F.2d

118, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1972), this court concluded that a district

court's denial of intervention as of right was "amenable to

review on the merits" and reversed the district court's denial.

The court stated that where intervention is sought as of right,

a denial of the application may be appealed, and that where

permissive intervention is sought, a denial may only be appealed where the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.

See id. And in Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers

International Union of America, 543 F.2d 224, 228-32 (D.C.

Cir. 1976), a would-be intervenor challenged the district

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court's orders denying a motion to intervene and approving a

settlement between the parties. On appeal, this court noted

that denial of intervention as of right is an appealable final

order and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention

as of right under Rule 24.

In United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph

Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980), on the other hand, we

suggested that the appealability of a district court order

denying intervention as of right depends on whether the

applicant had a "valid claim" for intervention as of right. See

id. at 1290-91. But in that case the court determined that

appellant had a right to intervene, and therefore the court did

not need to reach the issue whether the district court's order

denying intervention would be appealable in the absence of a

valid claim. Id. at 1290-91.

This court now clarifies that the denial of intervention as of

right is an appealable, final order regardless of the merits of

the claim for intervention as of right. This approach is in

accord with the majority of circuits and is consistent with two

recent rulings from this circuit. In Smoke v. Norton, 252

F.3d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2001), this court considered an appeal

from a district court order denying a motion to intervene as

of right under Rule 24(a). Appellants moved to intervene

after the district court granted summary judgment in order

to appeal from the underlying judgment, which remanded the

case to the agency. The district court denied the motion to

intervene as untimely. In reversing the district court's denial, this court stated that the denial of intervention as of right

is an appealable final order because it is conclusive with

respect to the distinct interest asserted by the movant. See

id. (quoting Brotherhood, 331 U.S. at 524). The court treated

the denial of intervention as immediately appealable and

independent from the underlying judgment, noting that the

question whether the underlying judgment is final would not

be before the court unless appellants were allowed to intervene and they appealed from that judgment. See id. at 470

n.1.

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Similarly, in In re: Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215

F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000), we also considered an appeal from

the district court's denial of intervention as of right under

Rule 24(a). Appellants, who were presumptive members of

the class but who had opted out, moved to intervene under

Rule 24(a) for the limited purpose of opposing a clause in the

proposed settlement of class claims. While the appeal from

the denial of intervention was pending, the district court

approved the settlement, which was not appealed. See id. at

28. This court affirmed the district court's denial of intervention, concluding that appellants were not entitled to intervene

as of right because their asserted interest in being able to opt

out of the class was insufficient to give them standing to

challenge the settlement agreement. Id.

Although In re: Vitamins does not directly address whether the denial of intervention as of right is appealable, the

court's statement that it may exercise pendent jurisdiction to

reach the issue of permissive intervention because it is inextricably intertwined with the issue of intervention as of right,

see 215 F.3d at 31, and the court's affirmance of the district

court's denial of intervention (rather than dismissal of the

appeal), indicate it considered the denial of intervention as of

right independently appealable. Thus we conclude that the

district court's denial of NABR's motion to intervene as of

right is an independently appealable, final order. See Hodgson, 473 F.2d at 124 & n.29 (entry of final order starts time

period for filing notice of appeal as to that order under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)).

Furthermore, our jurisdiction to review that denial is not

affected by the fact that the district court denied intervention

after the stipulated dismissal was entered; the dismissal does

not render the appeal moot. See Massachusetts School of

Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 780-81

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (where would-be intervenor sought to challenge consent decree, appeal from denial of intervention as of

right reviewable even though district court denied intervention after it entered consent judgment). NABR appeals from

both the denial of intervention and the denial of its Rule 60(b)

motion, which challenged the dismissal. If this court were to

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conclude that NABR was entitled to intervene in the litigation, NABR would have standing to appeal the district court's

denial of the Rule 60(b) motion attacking the stipulated

dismissal, and we would review that Rule 60(b) denial. See

Purcell v. Bank Atlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1511 n.3

(11th Cir. 1996) (appeal from denial of intervention not mooted by district court's entry of judgment in underlying case);

see also League of United Latin American Citizens, 131 F.3d

at 1301 n.1 (appeal from denial of intervention not mooted

despite district court issuance of memorandum disposing of

claims). Because we can potentially grant NABR effective

relief, this appeal is not moot. See Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1511

n.3.

* * *

Entitlement to intervention as of right. An applicant seeking to intervene as of right must show, among other things,

that it is "so situated that the disposition of the action may as

a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect [its]

interest." Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d

1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The relevant inquiry here is

whether NABR's concerns about the terms of the stipulated

dismissal were sufficient to constitute an interest requiring

intervention. See Moten, 543 F.2d at 229, 232-34; see also

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904,

908-11 (D.C. Cir. 1977). NABR asserts that "USDA's collusive stratagem with [Alternative Research] to expand USDA's

regulatory jurisdiction without public comment or judicial

review" shows that USDA was not adequately representing

NABR's interest.

But NABR's rights were not impaired by the initiation of a

rulemaking. NABR is a non-profit association whose members are engaged in biomedical research that involves the use

of birds, rats, and mice. NABR's position is that the exclusion for birds, rats, and mice should be removed only if

regulations can be developed that take into account enforcement needs, current scientific practices, standards already

established in other policy statements, and administrative and

financial burdens on research facilities. As the district court

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noted during the hearing on the motion to intervene, NABR

will not be precluded from participating in the rulemaking

and, if USDA decides to issue a final rule, NABR is not

precluded from challenging that rule. Significantly, the stipulated dismissal does no more than what the agency could

have done by granting Alternative Research's pending agency

petition for rulemaking, and the stipulated dismissal does not

bind the agency in its rulemaking. Cf. Massachusetts School

of Law at Andover, 118 F.3d at 780-81 (noting that consent

decree "with res judicata, collateral estoppel, or stare decisis

effect might very well affect MSL's ability to protect its

interests," but because the consent decree had no such effect,

MSL's interest was not impaired). Accordingly, NABR's

concerns about the terms of the stipulated dismissal are

insufficient to constitute an interest requiring intervention

before the district court under Rule 24(a)(2).

* * *

Appeal from stipulated dismissal and denial of Rule 60(b)

motion. Finally, because the district court correctly denied

intervention, NABR is not a party to the action and lacks

standing to appeal from either the stipulation of dismissal or

the order denying its Rule 60(b) motion, which challenged the

stipulated dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (relief limited

to a party); Farmland Dairies v. Commissioner of the New

York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, 847 F.2d

1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that because court was

affirming district court order denying intervention, appellants

had no standing to appeal any other order entered by district

court, and court dismissed their appeals from those orders).

* * *

For the preceding reasons, we conclude this court has

jurisdiction to review the denial of intervention as of right

and affirm the denial because NABR has not shown that the

stipulated dismissal may impair its ability to protect its

interest. Because the district court correctly denied intervention, NABR is not a party to the action and does not have

standing to appeal from either the stipulated dismissal or the

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order denying its Rule 60(b) motion; the court dismisses the

appeal from those rulings.

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