Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00154/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALAN EUGENE MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

KIM T. THOMAS, Commissioner

of the Alabama Department of

Corrections,

Respondent. 

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

2:13-00154-KOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court upon the petitioner Alan Eugene Miller’s “Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus By Prisoner In State Custody Under Sentence of Death,”

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Miller alleges that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal, and that his death sentence violates

the United States Constitution. 

I. THE OFFENSE CONDUCT

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals provided the following summary of

the evidence of the offense when it considered Miller’s direct appeal. The State has

adopted thissummary for the purpose of answering Miller’s petition. (Doc. 15, at 2).

1

FILED

 2015 Aug-04 PM 03:41

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00154-KOB Document 28 Filed 08/04/15 Page 1 of 159
The evidence presented at trial tended to establish the following. Around

7:00 a.m. on August 5, 1999, Johnny Cobb arrived at his place of

employment, Ferguson Enterprises in Pelham. Cobb, the vice president

of operations, recognized several other vehicles in the company's

parking lot as belonging to sales manager Scott Yancy and delivery

truck drivers Lee Holdbrooks and Alan Miller. As Cobb prepared to

enter the building, he heard some loud noises and what sounded like

someone screaming. Cobb opened the front door and sawMiller walking

toward him. Miller, who was armed with a pistol, pointed the pistol in

the general direction of Cobb and stated, “I'm tired of people starting

rumors on me.” Cobb tried to get Miller to put the pistol down, but

Miller told him to get out of his way. Cobb ran out the front door and

around the side of the building. Miller then left the building, walked

over to his personal truck, and drove away.

After Cobb heard Miller drive away, he went back inside the building.

He saw Christopher Yancy on the floor in the sales office and Lee

Holdbrooks on the floor in the hallway.Both men were covered in blood

and showed no signs of life. They appeared to have been shot multiple

times. Cobb used his cellular telephone to summon the police, who were

dispatched at 7:04 a.m. Minutes later, officers from the Pelham Police

Department arrived to investigate the shooting.

After Cobb told the police officers what he had seen, the officers entered

the building. There, they found the body of Christopher Yancy slumped

to the floor, underneath a desk in the sales office. Lee Holdbrooks was

lying face down in the hallway at the end of a bloody “crawl trail,”

indicating that he had crawled 20-25 feet down the hall in an attempt to

escape his assailant. The officers secured the scene and waited for

evidence technicians to arrive. Cobb provided a description of Miller's

clothing and the truck he was driving. This description was transmitted

to police headquarters and sent out over the police radio by the police

dispatcher.Evidence technicians recovered nine .40-caliber shell casings

from the scene.

While officers began investigating the crime scene at Ferguson

Enterprises, Andy Adderhold was arriving for work at Post Airgas in

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Pelham. Adderhold, the manager of the Pelham store, arrived shortly

after 7:00 a.m. Adderhold entered the office and talked with Terry

Jarvis, another employee, for a few minutes before continuing to another

office. At this point, Adderhold noticed Miller—a former employee of

Post Airgas—enter the building. Miller walked toward the sales counter

and called out to Jarvis: “Hey, I hear you've been spreading rumors

about me.” As Jarvis walked out of his office and walked into the area

behind the sales counter, he replied, “I have not.” Miller fired several

shots at Jarvis. As Jarvis fell to the floor, Adderhold crouched behind

the counter. Miller then walked behind the counter and pointed the

pistol at Adderhold'sface. Adderhold begged for hislife. Miller paused,

then pointed to a door, and told him to get out. Adderhold stood up and,

as he began to move toward the door, heard a sound from Jarvis. When

Adderhold paused and looked back at Jarvis, Miller repeated his order

to “get out-right now.” At this Adderhold left the sales area. As

Adderhold was leaving the building, he heard another gunshot.

Adderhold proceeded out of the back of the building, climbed over a

fence to a neighboring building, where he used someone's cellular

telephone to summon the police.

The second emergency call came in to the Pelham Police Department at

approximately 7:18 a.m. Upon arrival, officers entered the building

housing Post Airgas and found Jarvis's body on the floor behind the

sales counter. Jarvis had sustained several gunshot wounds to his chest

and abdomen. After securing the scene, officers recovered six .40-

caliber spent shell casings from the floor of the sales area. Adderhold

was interviewed, and he recounted the events surrounding Jarvis's

murder.

After a description of Miller and the vehicle he was driving was

transmitted over the police radio, law-enforcement officers combed the

area in search of Miller. Pelham police sergeant Stuart Davidson and his

partner were patrolling Interstate 65 near Alabaster when word of the

second shooting was broadcast. Upon hearing that Miller wasstill in the

vicinity of Pelham, Davidson exited I-65 to head back to Pelham. As

Davidson turned back toward Pelham, he spotted a truck matching the

description of Miller's entering I-65 from Highway 31 in Alabaster.

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Davidson radioed for backup and followed the truck south on I-65 into

Chilton County. Once additional officers were in place as backup, lawenforcement officers initiated a traffic stop of the truck. Following the

traffic stop, officers were able to positively identify the driver as Miller.

Miller was ordered to get out of the truck, and he was forcibly subdued

and handcuffed after resisting efforts to place him in custody. After

placing Miller in the back of a patrol car, officers secured his truck.

Inside the truck, they found a Glock brand pistol lying on the driver's

seat. The pistol contained 1 round in the chamber and 11 rounds in the

magazine. An empty Glock ammunition magazine was found on the

passenger seat. Miller wastransported to the Pelham Police Department

where he was charged with murder.

At trial, the State called various witnesses who testified concerning the

events of August 5, 1999. Evidence was also introduced regarding

ballistics testing of the spent shell casings found at both murder sites;

the testing matched all of the shell casingsto the .40-caliber Glock pistol

found on Miller. Dr. Stephen Pustilnik, a state medical examiner with

the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that the cause

of death for all three victims was multiple gunshot wounds. Lee

Holdbrooks-whose body wasfound in the hallway-wasshotsix timesin

the head and chest; although several of the wounds were nonfatal, one

of the head wounds was fired at very close range and would have been

immediately incapacitating and fatal. Based on “blood splatter” analysis

and the positioning of the body, Dr. Pustilnik concluded that

Holdbrooks wasturning his head and looking up when the fatalshot was

fired.

Scott Yancy was shot three times; one of the shots struck the aorta,

which would have caused Yancy to “bleed out” within 15-20 minutes,

while another wound would have caused paralysis. At the time he was

shot, Yancy was underneath a metal desk; there was no indication that

he ever moved from this position.

Terry Jarvis was shot five times; one of the shots struck Jarvis's liver

and another his heart. Jarvis had already fallen to the floor when he was

shot in the heart. Based on “blood splatter” analysis, Dr. Pustilnik

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concluded that Miller was standing over Jarvis as he shot him in the

heart. Despite the nature of this wound, Jarvis could have lived

anywhere from several minutes to 15 minutes after being shot.

Miller v. State, 913 So. 2d 1148, 1154–56 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). 

II. TRIAL: GUILT AND PENALTY PHASES

On August 13, 1999, the Grand Jury indicted Miller on one count of capital

murder under § 13A-5-40(a)(10) of the Code of Alabama for murdering two or more

persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. (C.R. Vol. 1,

Tab. 1, at 18).1 The Circuit Court of Shelby County initially appointed Mr. Mickey

Johnson and Mr. Roger Bass to represent Miller.2

 (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 1). 

On August 17, 1999, Miller pled both not guilty and not guilty by reason of

mental disease or defect. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 1). Accordingly, the State requested

that the Circuit Court order Miller to undergo a mental evaluation. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab.

1, at 19). On October 4, 1999, approximately two months afer the shooting, Dr.

James Hooper, a psychologist at Taylor Hardin medical facility, examined Miller.

1

 References to the record appear as follows: “C.R” refers to the Miller’s trial and Motion

for New Trial. “R” refers to Miller’s direct appeal. “Rule 32 C.R.” refers to the Rule 32

collateral proceedings. “PX” refers to Miller’s Rule 32 Hearing Exhibits. “Rule 32 R” refers to

the Appeal of the Rule 32 collateral proceedings. 

2

 On June 1, 2000, the Court granted Mr. Bass’s oral motion to withdraw and appointed

Ronnie Blackwood as co-counsel to Mr. Johnson. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 4). Because Mr. Bass

was not involved in the trial and because Mr. Blackwood did not play any active role, (Rule 32

C.R., Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 109), when the court refers to “trial counsel,” it refers to Mr. Johnson

unless otherwise specified. 

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(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 320). Dr. Hooper reportedly spent approximately

thirty minutes with Miller in conducting his evaluation, and ultimately found that

Miller was competent to stand trial and that Miller did not meet the legal standard for

insanity. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab. 59, at 681). The State subsequently hired Dr.

Harry McClaren, a forensic psychologist, to evaluate Miller’s sanity at the time of the

shooting. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab. 59, at 774). On November 29, 1999, Dr.

McClaren conducted a three-day evaluation of Miller and determined Miller wassane

at the time of the crime. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab. 59, at 781). 

On March 16, 2000, Miller’s trial counsel applied for funds to hire an expert

psychiatrist of their own to assist in Miller’s defense. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 50–55). 

On April 4, 2000, the Circuit Court granted such assistance. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at

57). TrialCounsel hired Dr. Charles Scott, a forensic psychiatristfromthe University

of California Davis, to evaluate Miller’s sanity at the time of the shooting. (Rule 32

C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 312). Dr. Scott began his three-day psychiatric evaluation

of Miller in late April of 2000, approximately eight-and-a-half months after the

August 5, 1999 shooting. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 315). In conducting his

evaluation, Dr. Scott consulted with Dr. Barbara McDermick, a psychologist, who

conducted psychological testing on Miller and prepared a report dated May 11, 2000. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 316–17). Dr. Scott asked Dr. McDermick to

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conduct psychological tests focusing on assessing Miller’s IQ and to assist Dr. Scott

in determining whether Miller was malingering when recollecting what happened on

the day of the shooting. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 317). Based on the

information provided to Dr. Scott and hisindependent evaluation of Miller, Dr. Scott

determined that Miller was not insane at the time of the shooting. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol.

31, Tab. 59, at 380).

After receiving Dr. Scott’s evaluation of Miller, Miller withdrew the insanity

plea and entered a simple plea of not guilty on May 24, 2000, less than a month

before the scheduled trial. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 6, at 66). On June 1, 2000, less than

two weeks before trial, Mr. Bass withdrew his representation to devote more time to

the Bobby Cherry (Birmingham Church bombing) case, which was brought 40 years

after the original offense. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 105). On the same day,

the Circuit Court appointed Ronnie Blackwood to assist Mr. Johnson. (C.R. Vol. 1,

Tab. 1, at 4). 

Miller’strial began asscheduled on June 12, 2000. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 7, at 69). 

Five days later, on June 17, 2000, the jury returned its verdict finding Miller guilty

of capital murder for murdering two or more persons pursuant to one act or scheme

or course of conduct. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 73); Ala. Code. § 13A-5-40. After the

jury returned its guilty verdict, the judge and the jury immediately transitioned to the

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penalty phase of the trial. In the penalty phase, the State bears the burden of proving

the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt

before the jury can recommend a sentence of death. Ala. Code. § 13A-5-45(e)–(f). 

The only aggravating circumstance the State argued was that the capital offense was

“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses.” Ala.

Code. § 13A-5-49(8). The State relied largely on the evidence presented during the

guilt phase and only introduced victim impact testimony from a survivor of each

victim during the penalty phase of trial. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 21, at 1335–41). 

Trial counsel’s penalty-phase defense waslimited to a single witness,Dr. Scott. 

(C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 21, at 1341–1403). Dr. Scott’s testimony, although addressing

Miller’s background, focused on establishing the existence of two mitigating factors.

First, Dr. Scott testified that even though he determined Miller to be sane at the time

of the shootings, he believed that Miller’s “capacity to appreciate the criminality of

his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially

impaired.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1383–88). Second, Dr. Scott provided testimony

that Miller committed the offense while “under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1391). The State stipulated to the

existence of a third mitigating circumstance— that Miller had no significant prior

criminal history. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1317). 

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At the end of hearing this evidence, the jury rendered an advisory sentencing

verdict, with ten jurors voting for the death penalty and two voting for life

imprisonment without parole. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 73–74). The verdict form only

allowed the jurors to indicate the number of votes for the death sentence and the

number of votes for a life sentence. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 74–75). The form did

not require the jury to indicate the number of jurors who found that the State met its

burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, as is now

required under Ex Parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024, 1039 (Ala. 2004). After receiving

the advisory verdict, the Circuit Court scheduled a sentencing hearing for July 31,

2000. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 77). 

III. SENTENCING HEARING

On July 31, 2000, the Circuit Court held a sentencing hearing and, after

hearing the evidence presented, accepted the jury’s July 17, 2000 recommendation

to sentence Miller to death. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 89; C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 28, at

1453). On August 24, 2000, the court issued its written order explaining its decision. 

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 71). The court determined that three mitigating factors applied

in Miller’s case: (1) Miller had no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2)

Miller committed the crime while “under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance”; and (3) Miller’s capacity to “appreciate the criminality of

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his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was

substantially impaired.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 71, at 106). 

Although the only aggravating factor the court found applicable was that the

offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the court ultimately determined

that the defendant “should suffer the punishment of death by electrocution as

provided for by law.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 71, at 106–07). The courtstated that prior

to rendering a decision, it examined the presentence report, Dr. Scott’s testimony,

and the mental evaluation performed, as well as “non-statutory mitigating

circumstance, [like] Defendant’s background and family history . . . includ[ing] . .

. that as a child, Defendant moved to a number of locations and had an estranged and

difficult relationship with his father.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 71, at 107).

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 31, 2000, the same day Miller received his death sentence, the

Circuit Court released Mr. Johnson as counsel and appointed Mr. William R. Hill to

assist Miller in his direct appeal. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 28, at 1473). Later, on August,

2, 2000, the court also appointed Haran Lowe as co-counsel. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1,

at 90). 

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A. Motion for a New Trial

On August 3, 2000, Miller moved for a new trial based solely on the ground

that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at

93). On the same day, Miller requested a transcript of the trial proceedings, in part

because appellate counsel did not witness the trial proceedings and could not

“adequately represent the Defendant in his Motion for New Trial or on appeal

without a transcript of the trial record.” (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 91). On August 25,

2000, Miller filed a motion to amend the motion for a new trial, outlining twentyfive new groundsfor relief. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 95). Although appellate counsel

did not yet have the trial transcript, Ground 24 of the amended motion for a new trial

alleged that Miller’s “due process rights under the United States and Alabama

Constitution were denied because his trial counsel was ineffective.” (C.R. Vol. 1,

Tab. 1, at 96). 

The hearing on the motion for a new trial was originally scheduled to take

place on September 5, 2000. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 108). However, because the

trial transcript was not yet available, appellate counsel filed a motion on August 30,

2000 to continue the hearing until after the transcript had been prepared. (C.R. Vol.

1, Tab. 1, at 108). The court granted the motion, and ultimately held hearings on

December 7, 2000 and again on January 31, 2001. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 7). 

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During the December 7, 2000 portion of the hearing on the new trial motion,

Miller’s trial counsel, Mickey Johnson, was the sole testifying witness. (C.R. Col.

9, Tab. 30, at 1–110). On January 31, 2000, Miller elicited additional testimony

from Dr. Bob Wendorf, a psychologist, regarding the sufficiency of Dr. Scott’s

testimony during Miller’s penalty phase. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 1964). Mr.

Aaron McCall from the Alabama Prison Programs discussed the importance and

relative ease of obtaining a mitigation expert at trial in a capital case. (C.R. Vol. 43,

Tab. 75, at 1964). After the hearing, the court gave the parties the opportunity to

brief the issues discussed at the hearing. On February 13, 2001, Miller filed a brief

supporting his motion for a new trial, which argued in support of his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 114–25). 

On February 21, 2001, the courtsummarily denied Miller’s Motion for a New

Trial without entering a written order or making specific findings of fact regarding

the evidence presented during the hearing. (C.R. Vol. 1, Tab. 1, at 7) (C.R. Vol. 43,

Tab. 73, at 7).

B. Direct Appeal

On May 7, 2001, Miller filed his appeal brief in the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals. (R. Vol. 16, Tab. 32). While the appeal was pending, on June 24,

2002, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536

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U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Court held that an Arizona statute allowing a trial

judge—acting alone—to determine the presence or absence of an aggravating factor

(required to impose the death penalty) violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendmentright

to a jury trial. Because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had not ruled yet on

Miller’s appeal of his conviction and motion for a new trial, the court required the

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Ring on Miller’s death

sentence. (R. Vol. 16, Tab. 34, at 1). On August 18, 2002, both Miller and the State

filed supplemental briefs addressing that issue. (R. Vol. 16, Tabs. 34 and 35

respectively). 

On January 6, 2004, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals decided to

remand the case for the limited purpose of requiring the Circuit Court both to make

specific findings of fact regarding its August 24, 2000 sentencing determination that

the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and to address each claim

Miller raised in his motion for a new trial that the court had previously summarily

dismissed. (R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73); Miller v. State, 913 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App.

2004). The Circuit Court made the required findings and denied the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims as meritless.

3

 (R. Vol. 43, Tab. 72, at 1–23). 

3

 The Circuit Court addressed each of the eight ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims

Miller alleged individually: that trial counsel (1) admitted Miller’s guilt during his guilt-phase

opening remarks; (2) failed to present insanity defense during the guilt phase of trial; (3) failed to

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On October 29, 2004, on return from remand, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s sentencing decision. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73,

at 10–25); Miller v. State, 913 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). Miller made a

timely petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court on February 8,

2005. (R. Vol. 17, Tab. 38). On May 27, 2005, the Alabama Supreme Court denied

Miller’s petition for writ of certiorari. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73). Miller filed a petition

for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on September 22, 2005, and

the Court likewise denied cert in a January 9, 2006 decision. Miller v. Alabama, 546

U.S. 1097 (2006); C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 74).

C. Rule 32 Proceedings in Shelby County Circuit Court

Having exhausted his appeals and obtained a final conviction, Miller obtained

new counsel and filed a timely Petition under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure on May 19, 2006. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 19, Tab. 44, at 1–93). 

Miller’s Rule 32 petition alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, and various violations of Miller’s constitutional

rights. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 19, Tab. 44, at 1–93). The State answered Miller’s

move for a change of venue; (4) failed to present a defense during the guilt phase of trial; (5)

undermined the mitigation case during his penalty-phase opening argument; (6) failed to object

to victim impact testimony during the penalty phase; (7) failed to adequately investigate and

present a penalty phase defense; and (8) failed to challenge the constitutionality of the heinous,

atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 72, at 9–10). 

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petition on August 18, 2006, arguing that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims were barred from review and all of Miller’s claims should be rejected on the

merits. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 19, Tab. 45). On April 4, 2007, Miller filed his First

Amended petition, responding to some of the State’s criticisms of his original

petition. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 20, Tab. 46, at 1–100). On April 18, 2007, the State

answered Miller’s amended petition and moved to dismiss his claims. (Rule 32 C.R.

Vol. 23, Tab. 49, at 925–1006). On June 25, 2007, the Circuit Court held a hearing

on the State’s motion to dismiss and some outstanding discovery disputes. (Rule 32.

C.R. Vols. 36–37, Tab. 61–62). On July 31, 2007, the Circuit Court issued a

preliminary ruling on Miller’s Rule 32 petition denying certain claims

4

as

procedurally barred, granting Miller’s request for “necessary” discovery, and

scheduling an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the facts supported Miller’s

claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 25, Tab. 55, at

1327–29).

4 The court summarily dismissed Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims

(Claim I(A)); his claim that the imposition of the death penalty in his case would violate Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (Claim II); and his claim that lethal injection (a change in the law

made lethal injection the method of execution instead of electrocution) is unconstitutional (Claim

III). (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 25, Tab. 55, at 1327); (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 1957). In addition, the

court dismissed both Miller’s Brady claim (Claim IV) and his claim of juror misconduct (Claim V)

for failing to plead the claims with specificity. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 1957). 

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The court held hearings on the remaining claims on February 11, 2008 and

August 6, 2008. (See Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 26, Tab. 55, at 1403–05 & Rule 32 C.R.

Vol. 34, Tab. 60, at 4, respectively). 

Following the hearings, both parties submitted extensive briefing to the

Circuit Court.

5 On May 5, 2009, the Circuit Court issued its final order denying

Miller’s Amended 32 Petition and summarily dismissing all of Miller’s claims with

the exception of his claim that he was denied effective assistance of appellate

counsel. (Rule 32 C.R. Vols. 28–29, Tab. 58, at 1951–2107). As to that claim, the

court considered the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearings and denied relief

on the merits. (Rule 32 C.R. Vols. 28–29, Tab. 58, at 1951–2107). 

The Circuit Court adopted the State’s proposed order, which wasitself almost

a verbatim copy of the State’s post-Rule-32-hearing response brief. (Compare Rule

32 C.R. Vols. 27–28, Tab. 57, at 1702–1800 (State’s Post-Rule-32-Hearing

Response Brief) with Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 35, at 29–185 (State’s Proposed Order) and

Rule 32 C.R. Vols. 28–29, at 1951–2107 (Rule 32 Circuit Court’s Final Judgment). 

On May 18, 2009, Miller objected to the Court’s adoption of the State’s proposed

5

 On October 9, 2008, Miller filed a post-hearing brief in support of his First Amended

Petition for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure. (Rule 32 C.R. Vols. 26–27, Tab. 56, at 1520–1695). The State issued its response to

Miller’s brief on December 8, 2008. (Rule 32 C.R. Vols. 27–28, Tab. 57, at 1702–1800). On

February 10, 2009, Miller filed his reply brief. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 28, Tab. 58, at 1895–1950). 

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final order denying Rule 32 relief. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 29, Tab. 58, at 2108). On

June 4, 2009, the court denied the objection, pointing out that it had authority to

adopt a proposed order in whole. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 29, Tab. 58, at 2117). 

On June 9, 2009, Miller filed a notice indicating that he was appealing both

the Circuit Court’s final order denying Rule 32 relief and the Court’s order denying

Miller’s objection to adopting the proposed order nearly verbatim. (Rule 32 C.R.

Vol. 29, Tab. 58, at 2119;see also Rule 32 R. Vol. 38, Tab. 63). The Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals denied his appeal on July 8, 2011. (Rule 32 R. Vol. 43, Tab.

76). Miller subsequently filed an application for rehearing on August 17, 2011,

which was denied by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on October 21, 2011. 

(Rule 32 R. Vol. 40, Tab. 66).

On November 30, 2011, Miller filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the

Alabama Supreme Court, citing two grounds for issuance of a writ. (Rule 32 R.

Vols. 40–42, Tab. 67). The Alabama Supreme Court initially granted review

regarding whether “the Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of Miller’s claim that

the Circuit Court’s verbatim adoption of the State’s proposed order, which was

word-for-word identical to the State’s Post-Hearing Brief, denied him due process

in conflict with [the Alabama Supreme]Court’s decisionsin Ex Parte Ingram, 51 So.

3d 1119 (Ala. 2010), and Ex Parte Scott, 2011 Ala. LEXIS 37 (Ala. March 18,

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2011)?” The Alabama Supreme Court quashed the writ on July 22, 2012 without

opinion. (Rule 32 R. Vol. 43, Tab. 77).

V. LEGAL STANDARD

“The habeasstatute unambiguously providesthat a federal court may issue the

writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 526 U.S.

1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). As such, this court’s review of claims

seeking habeas relief is limited to questions of federal constitutional and statutory

law. Claims that turn solely upon state law principles fall outside the ambit of this

court’s authority to provide relief under § 2254. See Alston v. Dep’t of Corrs., 610

F. 3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010). 

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies: The First Condition Precedent to

Federal Habeas Review 

A habeas petitioner must present his federal claims to the state court, and to

exhaust all of the procedures available in the state courtsystem, before seeking relief

in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666

(2005) (holding that a petitioner “can seek federal habeas relief only on claims that

have been exhausted in state court”). This requirement serves the purpose of

ensuring that state courts are afforded the first opportunity to address federal

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questions affecting the validity of state court convictions and, if necessary, correct

violations of a state prisoner’s federal constitutional rights. Snowden v. Singletary,

135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). 

In determining whether a claim is properly exhausted, the Supreme Court has

stated that “[i]t is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim

were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5–6 (1982) (citations omitted). Instead, “an issue

is exhausted if ‘the reasonable reader would understand [the] claim’s particular legal

basis and specific factual foundation’ to be the same as it was presented in state

court.” Pope v. Sec’y for Dep’t. Of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Kelley v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

B. The Procedural Default Doctrine: The Second Condition Precedent to

Federal Habeas Review

Under the procedural default doctrine, federal review of a habeas petitioner’s

claimis barred if the laststate court to examine the claim states clearly and explicitly

that the claim is barred because the petitioner failed to follow state procedural rules,

and that procedural bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for

denying relief. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009); Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The Supreme Court defines an “adequate and

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independent” state court decision as one that “‘rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Lee v.

Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (quotingColeman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729

(1991)) (emphasis in Lee)). 

To be considered “independent,” the state court’s decision “must rest solidly

on state law grounds, and may not be ‘intertwined with an interpretation of federal

law.’” Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Card v.

Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)). To be considered “adequate” to

support the state court’s judgment, the state procedural rule must be both “‘firmly

established and regularly followed.’” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. at 375 (quoting James

v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984)).

C. Overcoming procedural default: The Cause and Prejudice Analysis

“A federal court may still address the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim

if the petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir.

2010) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977)) (emphasissupplied). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal can constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default. 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493–94 (1991). However, any attorney error short

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of ineffective assistance does not constitute cause and will not excuse a procedural

default. Id. 

In addition to proving the existence of “cause” for a procedural default, a

habeas petitioner must show that he was actually “prejudiced” by the alleged

constitutional violation. To show prejudice, a petitioner mustshow “not merely that

the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)

(emphasis supplied); see also McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir.

1992) (per curiam). In the context of a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim, a petitioner must show now only “cause,” but also “that the

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial -counsel claim is a substantial one, which

isto say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claimhassome merit.” Martinez

v. Ryan, 566 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2012). 

D. The Statutory Overlay: The Effect of “the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996” on Habeas Review

Miller’s case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). To “prevent

federal habeas‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to

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the extent possible under the law,” the AEDPA establishes a deferential standard of

review of state habeas judgments. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). 

1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

Section 2254(e)(1) requires district courts to presume that a state court’s

factual determinations are correct, unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); see also, e.g., Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001)

(observing that § 2254(e)(1) provides “a highly deferential standard of review for

factual determinations made by a state court”). The deference that attendsstate court

findings of fact pursuant to Section 2254(e)(1) applies to all habeas claims,

regardless of their procedural stance. Thus, a presumption of correctness must be

afforded to a state court’s factual findings, even when the habeas claim is being

examined de novo. See Mansfield v. Secretary, Department ofCorrections, 679 F.3d

1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012). 

2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

The presumption of correctness also applies to habeas claims that were

adjudicated on the merits by the state court and, therefore, are claims subject to the

standards of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). “By its terms §

2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court,

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subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. Richter,

— U.S.—, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) provide that when a state

court has made a decision on a petitioner’s constitutional claim, habeasrelief cannot

be granted, unless the federal court determines that the state court’s adjudication of

the claim either: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the factsin light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis supplied). 

The Supreme Court has explained the deferential review of a state court’s

findings:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by

this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 519 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). 

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The court should remember that “an unreasonable application of federal law

is different from an incorrect application.” Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). A

federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,that applicationmust also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411 (emphasissupplied).6o demonstrate that a state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable,” the

habeas petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility forfairminded

disagreement.” Id. at 786–87 (emphasis supplied). 

6

 The Eleventh Circuit has observed that § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application”

provision is the proper statutory lens for viewing the “run-of-the-mill state-court decision

applying the correct legal rule.” Alderman v. Terry, 468 F.3d 775, 791 (11th Cir. 2006). 

In other words, if the state court identified the correct legal principle but

unreasonably applied it to the facts of a petitioner’s case, then the federal court

should look to § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause for guidance. “A

federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

objectively unreasonable.” 

Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409) (emphasis in original). 

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E. An Introduction to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

An introduction to ineffective assistance of counsel claims is included here

because of the relationship between such claims — which are governed by a highly

deferentialstandard of constitutional law — and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which isitself

an extremely deferential standard of habeas review. Additionally, because the

majority of Miller’s petition is based on allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a general discussion also provides a central reference point. 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court

established a two-pronged analysis for determining whether counsel’s performance

was ineffective. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Both parts of the Strickland standard must be

satisfied: that is, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving, by “a

preponderance of competent evidence,” that the performance of histrial or appellate

attorney was deficient; and, that such deficient performance prejudiced his defense. 

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Thus,

a federal court is not required to address both parts of the Strickland standard when

the habeas petitioner makes an insufficientshowing on either one of the prongs. See,

e.g., Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Because both parts

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of the test must be satisfied to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court

need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice

prong, or vice versa.”) (citation to Strickland omitted). 

1. The performance prong

To satisfy the performance prong, the petitioner must “prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s performance was unreasonable.” 

Stewart v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.

2007) (citing Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)). The

Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the very best counsel or the most

skilled attorney, but only an attorney who performed reasonably well within the

broad range of professional norms. Steward, 476 F.3d at 1209. “The test has

nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor isthe test even what

most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer

at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” 

White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992). Judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential,” because representation is an art,

and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even

brilliant in another. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

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Indeed, reviewing courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at

689. “Based on this strong presumption of competent assistance, the petitioner’s

burden of persuasion is a heavy one: ‘petitioner must establish that no competent

counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.’” Stewart, 476 F.3d

at 1209 (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315) (emphasis supplied). “Even if many

reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can

be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer,

in the circumstances, would have done so.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th

Cir. 1994) (emphasis supplied). 

2. The prejudice prong

“A petitioner’s burden of establishing that hislawyer’s deficient performance

prejudiced his case is also high.” Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318,

1322 (11th Cir. 2002). “It is not enough for the [habeas petitioner] to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693 (alteration supplied). Instead, to prove prejudice, the habeas

petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

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outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When that standard is applied in the context

of the death sentence itself, “‘the question is whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer [i.e., in Alabama, the trial court

judge] . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.’” Stewart, 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695) (alteration supplied). 

That standard is high and to satisfy it a petitioner must present competent

evidence proving that trial counsel’s errors were “so egregious that the trial was

rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d

1156, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001). 

3. Deference accorded state court findings of historical fact, and decisions

on the merits, when evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims

A reviewing court must give state court findings of historical fact made in the

course of evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a presumption of

correctness under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). See, e.g., Thompson v. Haley,

255 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). To overcome a state-court finding of fact, the

petitioner bears a burden of proving contrary facts by “clear and convincing

evidence.” 

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Additionally, under the AEDPA, a federal habeas court may grant relief based

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the state-court determination

involved an “unreasonable application” of the Strickland standardsto the facts of the

case. Strickland itself, of course, also requires an assessment of whether counsel’s

conduct was professionally unreasonable. Those two assessments cannot be

conflated into one. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 77, 786 (2011). Thus, habeas relief

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be granted with respect to a claim

actually decided by the state courts only if the habeas court determines that it was

“objectively unreasonable” for the state courtsto find that counsel’s conduct was not

“professionally unreasonable.” Id. at 788. (“The standards created by Strickland and

§ 2254(d) are ‘highly deferential,’ . . . and when the two apply in tandem, review is

‘doubly’ so.”).

VI. THE LIST OF MILLER’S CLAIMS

Miller’s habeas petition alleges three primary grounds for relief—ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and that his

death sentence violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments under Ring

v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claim and his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim each contain

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numerous distinct subclaims. These subclaims, as stated by Miller, are set forth

below.

A. Mr. Miller was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel in

violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution. (Doc. 1, 15–123).

I. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance when he failed to

conduct an adequate investigation and, as a result, failed to uncover a

wealth of relevant evidence that could have led the jury to find Mr.

Miller not guilty of capital murder or to recommend that he not receive

the death penalty or could have led the Court to sentence him to life in

prison rather than death. (Doc. 1, 16–48)

a. Mr. Miller’s impoverished and unstable upbringing. (Doc. 1,

25–27).

b. The Miller family history of mental illness. (Doc. 1, 27–33).

c. The physical and emotional abuse Mr. Miller received from his

father. (Doc. 1, 33–36).

d. Mr. Miller’s exposure to the criminal and antisocial behavior of

members of his family. (Doc. 1, 36–38).

e. Mr. Miller’s good employment history. (Doc. 1, 38–39).

f. Mr. Miller’s loving relationship with family members. (Doc. 1,

39–45).

g. The changes in Mr. Miller’s behavior prior to the shootings. 

(Doc. 1, 45–46).

h. Mr. Miller’s behavior in connection with the shootings at

Ferguson Enterprises and Post Airgas. (Doc. 1, 46–48).

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ii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by sabotaging the

work of the defense psychiatric expert, Dr. Scott, and then withdrawing

Mr. Miller’s insanity defense. (Doc. 1, 48–66).

iii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to

investigate or develop mitigation evidence following the withdrawal of

the insanity defense. (Doc. 1, 66–67).

iv. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance during juror voir

dire. (Doc. 1, 67–78).

v. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in his guilt-phase

opening statement. (Doc. 1, 78–80).

vi. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance during the

presentation of the State’s guilt-phase evidence. (Doc. 1, 80–87).

vii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to

present available mental health evidence during the trial’s guilt phase. 

(Doc. 1, 87–90).

viii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to object

to improper statements in the State’s guilt-phase closing argument. 

(Doc. 1, 90).

ix. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance during his guiltphase closing argument. (Doc. 1, 90–92).

x. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to

request guilt-phase jury instructions necessary to protect Mr. Miller’s

rights. (Doc. 1, 92–94).

xi. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance during their lastminute penalty-phase “preparation.” (Doc. 1, 94–96).

xii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in his penaltyphase opening statement. (Doc. 1, 96–101).

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xiii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to

present readily available mitigating evidence during the trial’s penaltyphase. (Doc. 1, 101–08).

xiv. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in connection with

his penalty-phase directed verdict motion. (Doc. 1, 108–12).

xv. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in his penaltyphase closing argument. (Doc. 1, 112–15).

xvi. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by failing to object

to improper penalty-phase jury instructions. (Doc. 1, 115–18).

xvii. Trial counsel failed to request a special verdict form that was necessary

to protect Mr. Miller’s rights. (Doc. 1, 118–20).

xviii. Trial counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in connection with

the sentencing hearing. (Doc. 1, 120–23).

B. Mr. Miller was denied effective assistance of counsel by his appellate counsel

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 1, 123–149).

I. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance by raising the

issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in the Motion for New Trial,

thereby precluding Mr. Miller from raising this issue in his Rule 32

proceedings. (Doc. 1, 124–28).

ii. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance when they

failed to conduct an adequate investigation concerning the ineffective

assistance Mr. Miller had received from trial counsel. (Doc. 1,

128–132).

iii. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance when they

failed to present evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial

establishing the prejudice Mr. Miller had received as a result of trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness. (Doc. 1, 132–34).

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iv. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in the

arguments they presented to the Circuit Court in support of the few

aspects of trial counsel ineffectiveness they had identified. (Doc. 1,

134–42).

v. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance when they

failed to raise the many other ways in which trial counsel had

ineffectively represented Mr. Miller. (Doc. 1, 142–45).

vi. Appellate counsel denied Mr. Miller effective assistance in their appeal

to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 1, 145–49). 

C. Mr. Miller’s death sentence violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1, 149–54).

VII. MILLER’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

CLAIMS

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims can be divided into three

distinct categories. First, Miller presents claimsthat were properly exhausted before

the Alabama state courts on direct appeal. Second, Miller presents claims that he

raised for the first time on collateral appeal. Finally, Miller presents claims that he

failed to raise before the state courts on either direct or collateral appeal. This court

will address each group of claims in turn.

A. Claims Raised and Exhausted On Direct Appeal

Five of Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are properly

before this court because Miller fully exhausted the claims on direct appeal. See

Claims A(ii), A(v), A(vi), A(vii), & A(xii). Miller asserted these claims before the

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Circuit Court in his motion for new trial. The Circuit Court conducted a hearing on

these claims and subsequently denied all of the claims on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43,

Tab. 72). Miller then appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which

upheld the lower court’s determination. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73). Finally, Miller

soughtreview of these claims before the Alabama Supreme Court, which denied cert. 

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 74). Because these claims were fully exhausted on direct appeal,

this court will review the state court’s determination under AEDPA deference. See

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (recognizing that a petitioner need

only present a claim through a single state proceeding to properly exhaust it).

In reviewing the state court’s decision, this court is limited to consideration

of the record as it was before the state court on direct review. See Cullen v.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011) (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the

merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of

§ 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.”). Miller presented a

large amount of evidence at the Rule 32 hearings, and Miller’s habeas petition relies

heavily on this evidence. Nevertheless, this court must limit its review of Miller’s

fully exhausted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to the record before the

state court on direct appeal. 

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For Miller to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim,

he must demonstrate that his underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims have merit. Because the state court reviewed Miller’sineffective-assistanceof-appellate-counsel claims on collateral appeal, this court will consider the fully

developed record that was before the Rule 32CircuitCourt in reviewing Mr. Miller’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-claims. Further, because review of Mr. Miller’s

ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims will require this court to review

his underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, the court will review

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in light of the record before

the Rule 32 Circuit Court. Having set forth the parameters of this court’s review,

this court will now address Miller’s fully exhausted claims.

1. ClaimA(ii): Miller’s ClaimThat Trial CounselWasIneffective For

Sabotaging the Work of the Defense Psychiatric Expert and For

Withdrawing the Plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease

or Defect

Within this claim, Miller combinestwo different instancesin which he alleges

trial counsel was ineffective. First, Miller alleges that trial counsel provided

ineffective counsel by failing to provide sufficient evidence to the defense

psychiatric expert, Dr. Scott, to allow Dr. Scott to determine whether Miller wassane

at the time of the shootings. (Doc. 1, at 48–66). Second, Miller alleges that trial

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counsel was ineffective for subsequently withdrawing Miller’s insanity defense. 

(Doc. 1, at 66). 

On direct appeal, Miller only asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for

withdrawing Miller’s insanity defense and did not allege that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to provide specific documents to defense expert, Dr. Scott. 

(C.R. Vol. 16, Tab. 32, at 20–21). Not until collateral appeal did Miller add within

this claim the argument that trial counsel should have provided additional

information to Dr. Scott. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 19, Tab. 44, at 38–41). Because Miller

failed to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

provide documents to Dr. Scott, this portion of the claim is procedurally defaulted.

7

See Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998) (“A habeas corpus

petitioner may not present instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in hisfederal

petition that the state court has not evaluated previously.”); Hunt v. Commissioner,

Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 666 F.3d 708, 730–31 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that “[t]o satisfy

the exhaustion requirement, petitioners must present their claims to the state courts

such that the reasonable reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis

7

 Alternatively, this court finds this claim due to be denied on the merits. This court will

address the underlying merits of the claim in connection with Miller’s ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claims. See Part VIII.

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and specific factual foundation”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1170 (11th

Cir. 2001). 

To the extent that Miller did raise this claim on direct appeal, this court finds

that the state court’s rejection of the claim was reasonable under Strickland. In

addressing this claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, 

After talking with Dr. Scott and reviewing Dr. Scott’s written report,

[trial counsel] determined that there was insufficient evidence to raise

an insanity defense during the guilt phase. In his opinion, it was better

to present Dr. Scott’stestimony at the penalty phase because presenting

his testimony during the guilt phase would have negated Dr. Scott’s

credibility and lessened the impact of the evidence during the penalty

phase. [Trial counsel] made this decision after reviewing the reports

from other mental-health evaluations of Miller, which were consistent

with Dr. Scott’s findings.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 15). The court stated that trial counsel’s decision to

withdraw the insanity defense was part of a “well-reasoned decision” to focus on the

penalty phase of trial. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 16). 

Miller fails to meet his heavy burden of proving that his trial counsel

performed unreasonably by pursuing the strategy that he did. On the record before

the state court, the strategic choices made by trial counsel were reasonable and

constitutionally adequate in the circumstances. In preparation for Miller’s trial, trial

counsel hired Dr. Scott to conduct an evaluation of Miller to determine whether

Miller was legally insane at the time of the murders. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at

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17–18). After evaluating Miller, Dr. Scott concluded that Miller did not meet the

definition of insanity under Alabama law. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at 28–29). Trial

counsel also reviewed the reports of a state psychologist and state psychiatrist, both

of which were consistent with Dr. Scott’s determination. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at

93–94). Given that no mental health expert determined Miller to meet the definition

of insanity, trial counsel’s decision to withdraw the insanity defense wasreasonable. 

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (“[T]his court has never

required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit,

viability, or realistic chance of success.”). Likewise, the state court’s determination

that trial counsel was not ineffective for withdrawing the insanity defense was also

reasonable. 

2. Claim A(v): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In

His Guilt-Phase Opening Statement

Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in his opening statement and

“did little more than act as a second prosecutor.” (Doc. 1, at 78). Specifically,

Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the

facts as presented by the State and failed to present any defense theory to the jury. 

(Doc. 1, at 78–80; Doc 22, at 152–53). Miller also claims that trial counsel

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encouraged the jury to feel contempt for Miller by describing the killings as “brutal”

and “inhumane.” (Doc. 1, at 80). 

In his opening statement, trial counsel said:

We are at a part of the process here that the law says is necessary. We

all, at this point, have been assigned responsibilities. My responsibility

and Mr. Blackwood's responsibility is to make sure that in this case, as

in any other case, that we keep the burdens where the law says the

burdens belong, that we challenge any evidence or any statement that

is made that we think is wrong. 

Our responsibility, however, is not—and is not ever the responsibility

of a lawyer to do things frivolous. And we will not do that in this case. 

Since August the 5th of 1999, I have probably had dozens, if not

hundreds, of cameras and microphones and tape recorders stuck in my

face asking me what happened here, I guess presumably on the theory

that I would disclose something that would make all of this seem

logical. 

I have not said anything that makes this seem logical and reasonable

because I don't know anything. You won't hear anything coming from

the defense that makes this seem logical and reasonable. To present

anything in that regard would be frivolous. We will not engage in

frivolity. 

The responsibility that Mr. Blackwood and I have we accept and we

will do what our responsibility is, but we will not do anything frivolous.

That would be irresponsible.

I will not offer you any evidence in this case that would make this act

seem any less brutal and any less inhumane than it was. If you want to

know what happened in this case, I think you just got a pretty good

recitation of what happened in this case. I think Mr. Owens [the

prosecutor] got most of it right. Some of it seems to me to be a little

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embellished, but so what. Fundamentally, you heard what happened.

Now, the most serious responsibility in this case is placed on you. And

you have gone through the process of jury selection and you are the

ones who survived the process of jury selection.

And you did not survive because you don't have opinions about this

case. You would be—it would be unnatural, from what most of you

have seen and heard, not to have an opinion in this case. You survived

because you have said we will not let our opinions affect the

responsibility that is placed on us in this case.

The responsibility that is placed on you in this case will be an awesome

one, but I suggest this to you, at the end of this case—you will have to

make at least two decisions in this case that places more responsibility

on you than I will ever have in any case I will ever stand for in a

courtroom.

But at the end, if you accept your responsibility in the same way I—that

everyone else, not just me, that everyone else in this courtroom is

accepting theirs, then at the end of this, when this is all over, you will

be proud. You won't be ashamed, you will be proud of at least what you

have done.

I don't expect that at any point in this case you will ever be anything but

ashamed of what happened that caused us to be here. I'm not going to

ask—for me to suggest anything to the contrary would be frivolous.

You won't see anything frivolous done in this case.

You will see a lot of meaningful things, though, presented to you. There

will be a lot of meaningful evidence and a lot of meaningful arguments

made to you. The only thing I ask at this point is that you accept your

responsibility as jurors and then we will all be proud that we

participated in this. Thank you.

(R. Vol. 5, Tab. 8, at 813–15). 

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In reviewing trial counsel’s opening statement, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals stated: “[Trial counsel] focused his efforts during the guilt phase on

maintaining credibility with the jury. In accordance with this strategy, he admitted

to the jury early on in the proceedings that the evidence of Miller’s guilt was strong

because he wanted to lessen the impact of the evidence against Miller.” (C.R. Vol.

43, Tab. 73, at 15). The court described thisstrategy as “well-reasoned.” (C.R. Vol.

43, Tab. 73, at 16).

After reviewing the record, this court finds the state court’s determination

reasonable under Strickland. Trial counsel faced the significant challenge of

defending a client who had murdered three individuals at two different locations,

was observed by eye-witnesses at both locations, and was determined to be sane by

every expert who examined him. Under the circumstances, trial counsel’s decision

to acknowledge the evidence against his client to save credibility for the penalty

phase does not constitute deficient performance. See Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831,

840 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that counsel’s strategic decision to concede the

defendant’s guilt during opening statement to maintain credibility with the jury was

reasonable in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant); Florida v.

Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191–92 (2004) (recognizing that in light of substantial

evidence of guilt in a capital trial, “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for

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attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in ‘a

useless charade’”). 

Additionally, even if trial counsel’s opening statement was unreasonable,

Miller cannot show prejudice. In view of the entire record, Miller has not shown a

reasonable probability that trial counsel’s opening statement affected the jury’s

guilty verdict. See United States v. Hatcher, 541 F. App’x 951, 953 (11th Cir. 2013)

(holding that a petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim failed because petitioner

failed to prove prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt). The evidence

of Miller’s guilt is simply overwhelming. One eye-witness saw Miller with a pistol

at the location where the bodies of the first two victims were discovered. At the

second location, an eye-witness saw Miller shoot the third victim. Finally, police

found a firearm in Miller’s truck that matched the spent shell casings found at the

crime scenes. In light of the strong evidence of his guilt, Miller cannot establish any

prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s opening statement.

Miller fails to demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of the claim

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law or that it resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

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court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Miller is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim. 

3. Claim (vi): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective

During The Presentation of The State’s Guilt-Phase Evidence

Within this claim, Miller asserts two different instances in which he alleges

trial counsel was ineffective. First, Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the admission of crime scene photographs as well as to

testimony from State experts Dr. Stephen Pustilnik and Dr. Angello Della Manna. 

(Doc. 1, 81). Miller alleges that such evidence was irrelevant, inadmissible and

“served no purpose other than to inflame the jury against Mr. Miller.” (Doc. 1, 81). 

Second, Miller alleges that his trial attorney failed to adequately cross-examine

numerous state witnesses. (Doc. 1, 80–87)

In his motion for new trial and on direct appeal, Miller only raised the claim

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine the State’s

witnesses. (R. Vol. 16, Tab. 32, at 22–23). Miller’s direct appeals briefs contain no

mention of trial counsel’sfailure to object to any of the State’s evidence. Therefore,

to the extent that Miller asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the State’s evidence, this court finds the claim procedurally barred.

8

See

8

 Alternatively, this court finds this claim due to be denied on the merits. This court will

address the underlying merits of the claim in connection with Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of43

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Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Turning then to Millers contention that trial counsel wasineffective for failing

to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses, this court finds that the state

court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable under Strickland. In rejecting the

claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated that trial counsel realized that

the evidence of guilt in Miller’s case was “too overwhelming to seriously contest,” 

and therefore, trial counsel made the strategic decision to concede guilt early on and

focus on the penalty phase of trial. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 16). The Court’s

determinations are supported by the record. Additionally, even assuming that trial

counsel was ineffective in his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, the claim

is due to be denied because he has not shown a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different if trial counsel had conducted

a more thorough cross-examination. The evidence leaves no doubt of Miller’s guilt

in the case. See United States v. Hatcher, 541 F. App’x 951, 953 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable, and Miller is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

4. ClaimA(vii): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel wasIneffective for

Failing to Present Mental-Health Evidence During the Guilt Phase

appellate-counsel claims. See Part VIII.

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Miller claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence

during the guilt phase to allow the jury to convict Miller of anything lessthan capital

murder. (Doc. 1, 87–90). The capital murder offense with which Miller was charged

required the jury to find that Miller had the specific intent to cause the death of at

least two of his three victims pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. Ala.

Code § 13A-3-1. Miller contends that his trial counsel should have called Dr. Scott

to testify that Miller suffered from a severe mental illness that prevented him from

appreciating the nature and quality of his actions during the first two shootings.

9

Miller argues that Dr. Scott’s testimony could have shown that Miller lacked the

specific intent to cause the death of at least two of his three victims.

Both the Circuit Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected

this claim, finding that Miller failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to present a guilt phase defense, and finding that Miller suffered no resulting

prejudice. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 72, at 17–18; C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 16–17). For

the reasons discussed below, the state court’s rejection of this claim wasreasonable. 

9

 Dr. Scott stated in his report that, “It is also my opinion that at the moment of the first

shooting, Mr. Miller may not have appreciated the nature and quality of his actions as he

expressed that he suddenly found himself shooting without the intention of doing so.” PX 29-

0022. Dr. Scott’s report also stated that Miller heard “noises” and experienced tunnel vision at

the time of the first two shootings. PX 29-0009–0010. 

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A review of the record shows that trial counsel chose not to present the

testimony of Dr. Scott or challenge the mens rea element of the murders for sound

strategic reasons. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Miller asked trial

counsel why he did not present Dr. Scott’s testimony during the guilt phase of trial:

Q. Let me ask you this. Was there a particular reason why you decided to

introduce Dr. Scott’s testimony only in the mitigation phase and not in

the trial in chief?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why is that?

A. Actually I discussed it with Dr. Scott as to what my thinking was. 

What my thinking was was that I did not want him to lose his

credibility in the guilt phase when I did not think that that testimony

would have any particular bearing at that point in time. If the jury

heard it in the guilt phase at a time when I believed that the evidence

would have been pretty much conclusory at that point, then I thought

it would have lost its impact for whatever benefit I could get out of it

in the sentencing phase.

(C.R. Vol. 9, at 21).

Trial counsel Johnson also testified at the Rule 32 hearing that he chose to

limit Dr. Scott’s testimony to the penalty phase because much of Dr. Scott’s

testimony was based on hearsay, which was only admissible during the penalty

phase. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 285). He also considered the fact that Dr.

Scott would be subject to a more thorough cross-examination if he was called to

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testify during the guilt phase. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 284). Additionally,

trial counselBlackwood testified that he did not want to raise mental health evidence

during the guilt phase because Shelby County jurors “are very solid people, hard

working, that don’t believe a lot of hullabaloo about these things they can’t see.” 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol 34, Tab. 59, at 892–93). 

Based on these concerns, as well as the strong evidence that the shootings

were part of a single course of conduct, Miller’s trial counsel chose to forego a guilt

phase defense to focus on saving Miller’s life during the penalty phase. As

recognized by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, this decision was “made only

after a thorough investigation of the relevant law and facts of Miller’s case.” (C.R.

Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 16). The Supreme Court has recognized this exact type of

strategic trial decision to be “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690–91. Because Miller failsto show that no reasonable attorneywould have chosen

to defer Dr. Scott’s testimony to the penalty phase of trial, Miller cannot show that

his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard. 

Miller also failsto show that he suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s

decision to not present mental health evidence during the guilt phase. Significant

evidence shows that Miller intended to commit at least two of the three murders

pursuant to a single course of conduct. Miller specifically sought out Christopher

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Yancy and Lee Holdbrook and shot them multiple times. He then drove to a second

location where he specifically sought out Terry Jarvis and shot him multiple times. 

A reasonable jurist could conclude that a different outcome of the trial was not a

reasonable probability had trial counsel argued that Miller lacked the mens rea for

capital murder. Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an

unreasonable application of Strickland. 

5. Claim A(xii): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel Denied Miller

Effective Assistance in His Penalty-Phase Opening Statement

Miller next alleges that trial counsel failed to present an effective penaltyphase opening statement by failing to present a coherent preview of the mitigation

case, undermining Dr. Scott’s credibility, and conceding the aggravating

circumstance required for Miller to be eligible for the death penalty. (Doc. 1, at 96). 

In support of his argument, Miller points to trial counsel’s statement made in

response to the state’s query regarding what was in Miller’s heart at the time of the

shooting: “I think I can answer what was in Mr. Miller’s heart . . the overwhelming

desire to take a life, that’s what was in Alan Miller’s heart.” (Doc. 22, at 143). 

Miller also faultstrial counsel for stating that Miller “believed in the death penalty.” 

(Doc. 22, at 144). Finally, Miller argues that trial counsel described Miller as

“atrocious” and “vile” by telling the jurors, “And I want you to be able to say . . .

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what my vote meant was no matter what anybody does, no matter how vial [sic] they

are, they don’t deserve to die.” (Doc. 22, at 145). 

The following is trial counsel’s penalty-phase opening statement:

Ladies and gentlemen, let me see if I can help the state in one respect

and that is I think I can answer what was in Mr. Miller’s heart. Same

thing that this kind of impassion the [sic] argument was designed to put

in your heart and that is the desire, the overwhelming desire to take a

life, that’s what was in Alan Miller’s heart. 

I don’t think we need any experts up here to tell us that, I think every

one of you will come to that conclusion and it would be a very logical

one. 

But there are a couple of words that have been used here too that I just

want to talk about briefly. First one being, first question that was posed

is what is justice?

Well, I really think that there is only one way to get real justice out of

this and that would be the taking Alan Miller’s life would restore those

other three, that would be real justice. And if you had - - if there was

some option, some verdict form that could be given to you that would

bring that back, make that happen, then I would sit here and beg you to

sign that and not even go back to the room before you did, that all

twelve of you do that and if you needed thirteen, I would sign it with

you because that would be real justice. Anything else that comes out

of this case is going to be imperfect justice.

Mr. Bostick talked about mercy. Now, there is no secret to you that the

State of Alabama is asking you to recommend that the state take the life

of Alan Miller. 

I am asking you to recommend that the state not take his life, that is not

mercy because I will never stand here and define merciful with locking

someone up in a cage for the rest of their life. I see nothing merciful

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about that. This is not about mercy. It’s about some form of imperfect

justice that we have in our - - in the wisdom of those minds that we

have elected to send to our legislatures, they have decided that this is

our system of justice. 

Now, it is no great surprise to me what your verdict was going to be in

this case, but still when I hear it it hurts me, shocks me because your

verdict is already decided, you have already decided by your verdict

that Mr. Miller will die in prison. It’s just a question now of whose

hands will it be at, will it be at your hands or at the hands of someone

who I think wants to withhold - - to keep those decisions for

themselves.

So that’s the decision that you have to make now, not whether Mr.

Miller diesin prison because he will, you’ve already - - you’ve dictated

that by your verdict.

What we have now, though, is that part of the trial that has been what

this trial has been about from the start, and that is what do we do about

this man, what do we do in our service here for an imperfect justice.

And at this point we will be a little more active than we have been until

now. We will put on a witness, Dr. Scott, who is a psychiatrist. Dr.

Scott was employed to be perfectly frank with you in the hope that he

would find that Alan Miller met the legal definition of being insane,

because had he done that, and had we been able to prevail, none of this

would have happened, he wouldn’t be dying in prison, that’s why he

was brought here.

But Dr. Scott enjoys a very good reputation of being thorough and

being objective. And despite what I know his efforts were to try to get

there, he couldn’t, he just couldn’t be objective about it.

Because of that - - but he did learn a lot of things and this is where this

case rests at this point and that is, why did all of this happen and what

meaning can we make of any of this?

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And Alan Miller has shared with Dr. Scott and he will share with you

what was on his mind that day and he will tell you that despite all of

these things that were on his mind and despite the rather significant

emotional and psychological problems that disturb Alan Miller, he

wasn’t insane but he was suffering from a personality disorder and that

personality disorder is one that the law recognizes not as a defense to

doing what Alan Miller did, there is no defense to that, but as a

mitigating circumstance.

Now, Mr. Bostick challenged me to explain to you why this was not

atrocious, especially atrocious, cruel, heinous and I really don’t - - I

mean, I will accept that challenge by saying this, I’ve never seen a

murder that wasn’t. And I don’t think that Mr. Bostick or any

prosecutor that I have ever known has ever stood up in a trial where

their job was to prosecute someone who murdered someone and say,

well, this one is not too bad; as murders go, this one is on the light side. 

You’re not going to see that in any case. Murder is just not that way.

What you have been failed - - or what you have failed to be informed

of at this point is, that in a capital sentence, the type of exceptional

cruelty, heinousness, atrocity that we’re talking about issomething that

goes above and beyond those facts which simply amount to capital

murder. Because we continue here to strain in trying to reach some

balance, we continue to strain, we’re trying to quantify which type of

murder is heinous, which type - - I guess contrary that, well, which type

is just okay, as if there is such a thing. I don’t even know how you

explain all of that. I don’t know how the law explains that in all

honesty.

Nonetheless, we sit here with this to face in our system of justice. If

anyone, Alan Miller or anyone else, had shot one of these victims on

Monday, come back the next day and for a completely different reason

shot another one, and come back the next day and for a completely

different reason shot another one, we wouldn’t be in this part of the trial

because that wouldn’t be capital murder. 

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Now, somebody explain to me what sense that makes. Somebody

explain to me you leave the same number of victims out there, the same

number of victims’ families out there but by some definition of justice

those victims and those families don’t deserve the same treatment.

So I am saying that any effort we make to quantify what is atrocious

and cruel and heinous is a folie, it all leaves.

What Dr. Scott will tell you, though, is that on August the 5th and

probably for many years prior to August the 5th that Alan Miller was

just a tortured soul. You’ve heard the testimony about Alan Miller’s

belief, and I think Dr. Scott’s opinion will be that to a great extent Alan

Miller’s belief was on perceived events and probably not even real

events, but you will hear him talk about how Alan believed and you’ve

heard the testimony that people were spreading rumors about him,

people were picking on him, that type of thing. Because of that belief,

whether it’s a fact or not, it was a belief, and based on that belief his

tortured soul took the lives of three people that day. 

And this is - - this is where - - I don’t know any other fact that

demonstrates the falling [sic] of this part of the law in this, if Alan

Miller were notsitting at that table right there, it’s been stated that Alan

Miller had been called here like he might have been on August the 4th

of last year to be a juror because he would have been the state’s ideal

pick. He would have been the foreman of a capital murder jury because

he believed in the death penalty. He just decided that he couldn’t

impose it.

And we can labor all we want to in this courtroom, he’d be ideal,

because that’s the right that is reserved to the state and I will reject that

today, I reject it out, I will reject if for the rest of my life. I don’t

believe that that is a decision that can be made by anyone and still

justify a value system that we want everybody out there to have. We

want our children to have it. But more than that, we want everybody

else’s children to have it because if all children had that, we wouldn’t

see children killing other children, it would just make no sense. 

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Because a couple of years ago I would have been - - I know how all of

you feel about the death penalty because we asked questions about it

and you answered the questions about it.

A couple of years ago I would have been one of those that said I was

strongly in favor of that and I would not be sitting here today saying

things that I’m saying. But today I am opposed to it and not because

I’m representing Alan Miller, it wasn’t that at all, it hasn’t been this

event that caused me to change my mind. It is because I come to the

realization of something when I watched children killing children

because they were tortured souls. 

And there is one fundamental notion that is necessary to explain what

all of this is about and that is that we all, there are always going to be

people out there, always going to be tortured souls out there who agree

with the notion that the death penalty is appropriate. And we can sit

here and try to make - - define that to a sophisticated system, if we want

to, but we won’t. Unless we live in a world where everyone has one

value in their value system and that is no matter how atrocious, no

matter how vial [sic] a person is, they don’t deserve to die, they deserve

to live.

As long as we attempt to try to quantify the way that you will have to

try to quantify in your deliberations whether this is a person who

deservesto live, then we will always have that. We can’t eliminate that

idea from our system of values. We can’t eliminate it from our national

conscience, it seems to me. And we can believe that, well, it might

work out fine if we could confine it to a courtroom but we can’t.

So we will put on one witness. We’ll put on Dr. Scott who will take

you through, and I think you will find his testimony most interesting

because of the openness of which Alan talked to him about what was

on his mind, about why. And I just know you’ve got to be sitting here

in puzzlement like I am, how can something like this happen.

Well, explanation is not a justification, is not an excuse, it’s not to

arouse sympathy for Alan Miller. It is to try to explain to you that yes,

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there are tortured souls out there that believe in the death penalty and

they are willing everyday to administer that somebody does not satisfy

their definition of a good person. Once you cross that line of being

violent, once you cross that line of being mean and cruel, then it’s time

to invoke the death penalty.

And at the end I will ask you to consider that your verdict would be

most meaningful in this case. And you’re on stage, you know that. The

media is out here. When you get through, they will probably want to

ask you questions and you can answer their questions, if you want to,

of whatever your verdict is.

But the question that you will have - - in my heart of hearts I believe the

only question that really matters that you will have to answer is to your

children or your grandchildren what did you do, what did your vote say,

not what you selectively do as a jury but what you, every one of you,

what your vote meant.

And I want you to be able to say and this is what I’m asking you to say,

to go home and you say, what my vote meant was no matter what

anybody does, no matter how vial [sic] they are, they don’t deserve to

die. And that I suggest to you is what this part of the case is about and

what this case have been about from the start. 

Thank you very much. 

(C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 20, at 1323–34). 

In addressing the claim, the Circuit Court held:

A review of the penalty phase opening argument reveals that counsel

did not undermine the mitigation case. Instead, the opening argument

was consistent with counsel’s strategy to ask the jury to spare Miller’s

life. [Trial counsel] acknowledged the overwhelming evidence of his

client’s guilt. He then asked the jury to be merciful and spare Miller’s

life. Contrary to Miller’s assertion, counsel did not attack Dr. Scott’s

credibility but emphasized his credibility. (R. 1326–27) Counsel

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informed the jury that, after conducting his review, Dr. Scott could not

testify that Miller met the legal definition of insanity. However, [trial

counsel] then informed the jury that Dr. Scott was going to testify to

matters that were pertinent for the jury’s penalty phase deliberations. 

(R. 1326–27). Finally, while Mr. Johnson acknowledged that he was

notsurprised at the jury’s verdict, he then explained to the jury that they

had already found that Miller would spend the rest of his life in prison.

[Trial counsel] portrayed Miller as a “tortured soul” and then asked the

jury to spare his life.

Counsel’s penalty phase closing argument was not deficient nor was

Miller prejudiced by this argument. [Trial counsel] did not undermine

the mitigation case. Instead, he asked the jury to extend mercy to

Miller even though Miller had not extended mercy to his victims. [Trial

counsel]’s argument was an impassioned plea that, despite Miller’s

actions, the jury should refuse to participate in recommending that he

be sentenced to death. 

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 72, at 17–18). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the denial of this claim. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 73, at 18). 

This court findsthat, although trial counsel’s opening statement may not have

been perfect, a reasonable jurist could conclude that trial counsel’sstatement was not

professionally unreasonable. In his opening statement, trial counsel argued the

absence of any good reason for the jury to recommend the death penalty in Miller’s

case. Trial counsel pointed out that taking Miller’s life could not bring back the

lives of any of the three victims and that the jury, by finding Miller guilty, had

already sentenced Miller to life in prison. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 20, at 1323–26). Trial

counsel then argued that, regardless of what the jury might think of Miller

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personally, he did not deserve the death penalty. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 20, at 1327–32). 

Finally, trial counsel previewed Dr. Scott’s testimony and stated that, although Dr.

Scott was hired by the defense to determine whether Miller was sane, Dr. Scott

ultimately concluded that Miller did not meet the definition of insanity under

Alabama law. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 20, at 1332–33). Although some of trial counsel’s

statements seem odd when viewed individually, the statements are reasonable when

placed in the context of trial counsel’s entire statement.

10

See Harvey v. Warden,

Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1253 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that counsel’s

individual statements were not unreasonable when placed in context). 

Having reviewed the transcript, this court finds that a reasonable jurist could

conclude that trial counsel’s penalty-phase opening statement was not unreasonable. 

Additionally, this court concludes that given the brutal nature of this crime, a

reasonable jurist could conclude that the outcome of the penalty phase would not

have been different but for trial counsel’s statement. Therefore, Miller fails to

demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was unreasonable. 

10

 When asked about his statement that all murders were atrocious, trial counsel stated, 

“I was telling the jury that Alan Miller didn’t deserve to die whether [the jury] thought he was

atrocious or not.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 152). 

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B. Claims Raised For the First Time On Collateral Appeal

Miller raised eleven of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for

the first time on collateral appeal. In reviewing these claims, the Rule 32 Circuit

Court determined that the claims were procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a) of the

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure because Miller could have raised the claims

on direct appeal but failed to do so. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 1968–70). Federal

review of a habeas petitioner’s claim is barred by the procedural default doctrine if

the last state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its judgment

rests on a procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). Because the

Rule 32 Circuit Court was the last state court to address these claims and because it

determined that the claims were procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a), this court

findsthe claims are barred fromfederal habeasreview.11

See Brownlee v. Haley, 306

11

 Miller argues in his reply brief that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on the merits, and, therefore, the claims are

not procedurally barred. (Doc. 22, at 100–01). However, this argument lacks merit. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals examined Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims, but did so for the limited purpose of reviewing Miller’s ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claims. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 38, Tab. 63, at 1–148). The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals never addressed Miller’s trial-counsel claims independently because Miller

abandoned his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims following the Rule 32 Circuit

Court’s determination that the claims were procedurally barred. Miller only raised claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his brief to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 38, Tab. 63, at 1–148). Therefore, the Rule 32 Circuit Court was the last

court to address these claims on the merits, and its express invocation of a state procedural bar is

sufficient to preclude habeas review. See Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir.

1991). Additionally, as will be discussed in connection with Miller’s ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claims, these ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims would be due to be

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F.3d 1043, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Rule 32.2(a) of the Alabama

Rules of Criminal Procedure is an independent and adequate state law ground);

Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 814 (11th Cir. 2011).

With this backdrop, the court finds the following of Miller’s ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims are procedurally barred:

1. Claim A(I): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel Failed to Conduct an

Adequate Investigation and Failed to Uncover Evidence That Would

Have Led the Jury to Find Him not Guilty of Capital Murder or Would

Have led the Trial Court to Sentence Him to Life Without Parole 

2. ClaimA(iv): Miller’sClaimThat TrialCounselWasIneffective During

Jury Voir Dire.

3. Claim A(viii): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to Object to Improper Statements Made in the State’s GuiltPhase Closing Argument

4. Claim A(ix): Miller’s ClaimThat Trial Counsel wasIneffective During

the Guilt-Phase Closing Arguments

5. Claim A(x): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel was Ineffective During

the Guilt-Phase Closing Arguments 

6. Claim A(xi): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel was Ineffective in

Preparing for the Penalty Phase 

7. Claim A(xiii): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel Failed to Present

Readily Available Evidence During the Penalty Phase

denied on the merits even if not procedurally barred.

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8. Claim A(xv): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel was Ineffective during

Penalty-Phase Closing Arguments 

9. Claim A(xvi): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to Object to Improper Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions

10. Claim A(xvii): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to Request a Special Verdict Form

11. Claim A(xviii): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel was Ineffective in

Connection with the Sentencing Hearing

Miller argues in his reply brief that the procedural default is excused because

his appellate counsel’s performance constitutes cause and prejudice. (Doc. 22, at

101–04); see Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A

petitioner can establish cause by showing that a procedural default was caused by

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 690 . . . (1984).”). However, as will be discussed in Part VIII, Miller

does not have any meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. 

Therefore, he cannot show cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default.

12

12

 Analysis of Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims will be identical

to the cause and prejudice analysis. To determine whether Miller is correct that cause and

prejudice exists, this court must determine whether appellate counsel’s performance was

ineffective. Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). To determine whether

appellate counsel was ineffective in raising issues concerning trial counsel’s performance, this

court must determine whether Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are

meritorious. Id. Thus, this court’s review, whether for the purposes of establishing cause and

prejudice or for the purpose of analyzing Miller’s independent ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claims, ultimately turns on whether Miller’s underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claims are meritorious. Id. Because the review will be the same, this court will

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Alternatively, these ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims would be due to

be denied notwithstanding the procedural bar because the claims lack merit.

13

C. Claims Raised For the First Time Before This Court

Miller assertstwo ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claimsin his petition

that he failed to raise either on direct or collateral appeal. Miller’s failure to present

these claims to the state courts precludes Miller from now raising these claims for

the first time before this court. See Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207, 1211

(11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] habeas petitioner may not present instances of ineffective

assistance of counsel in his federal petition that the state court has not evaluated

previously.”). This court finds the following of Miller’s claims to be procedurally

barred for failure to exhaust them:

1. Claim A(iii): Miller’s Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For

Failing to Investigate or Develop Mitigation Evidence Following the

Withdrawal of the Insanity Defense

2. Claim A(xiv): Miller’s Claim that Trial Counsel was Ineffective in

Connection with His Penalty-Phase Directed Verdict Motion

14

not address the cause and prejudice analysis at this time but, instead, will do so in connection

with Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. See Part VIII. 

13

See Part VIII.

14

In his brief to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on collateral appeal, Miller argued

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim. (Rule 32 R. Vol. 38, Tab. 63,

at 139–42). However, Miller never presented this claim as an independent ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim before any of the state courts. Thus, the claim is not exhausted. 

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Although these claims are procedurally barred, this court will nevertheless

addressthe underlyingmerits of these claims in connection with Miller’sineffectiveassistance-of-appellate-counsel claims in Part VIII. 

VIII. MILLER’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE

COUNSEL CLAIMS

Before reviewing Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims,

this court will address Miller’s contention that the determinations of the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals in the Rule 32 proceeding do not deserve deference under

the AEDPA because the decision does not constitute an adjudication on the merits. 

(Doc. 22, at 104). 

Miller asserts that the decision of the Alabama Court of Appeals was not an

adjudication on the merits because the Court adopted large portions of the Rule 32

Circuit Court’s opinion, which was itself an almost verbatim adoption of the State’s

proposed order. (See Doc. 22, at 104). However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that

a state court’s verbatim adoption of a state’s proposed order is an “adjudication on

the merits” and is entitled to AEDPA deference when both the petitioner and the

State had an opportunity to present their version of facts to the court. See Jones v.

GDCP Warden, 746 F.3d 1170, 1183–84 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Considering that a

summary disposition of a Strickland claim qualifies as an adjudication on the merits,

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. . . , we can discern no basis for saying that a state court’s fuller explanation of its

reasons—albeit reasons drafted for the court by the State—is not entitled to AEDPA

deference.”); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1067 n.19 (11th Cir. 2002)

(upholding the use of proposed orders adopted verbatim by trial judges “as long as

they were adopted after adequate evidentiary proceedings and are fully supported by

the evidence”) (citations omitted); Rhodes v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 (11th

Cir. 2009).

In the case at hand, the determinations of the Rule 32 Circuit Court were

made after conducting multiple days of hearings and allowing the parties to submit

extensive briefing on all of Miller’s claims. Likewise, the determinations of the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals were made after each party submitted extensive

briefing. Therefore, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determinations are

entitled to AEDPA deference. Having concluded that the determinations of the state

court are entitled to deference, this court turns to the applicable standard of review

for Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are analyzed under the

same Strickland standard that is applicable to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1188 (11th Cir. 2001). To show

entitlement to relieffor his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims, Miller

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must demonstrate both that appellate counsel performed deficiently and that the

deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130

(11th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate prejudice, Miller must show a reasonable

probability that, but for his appellate counsel’s performance, Miller would have

prevailed on appeal. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). To

demonstrate a reasonable probability that Miller would have prevailed on appeal, he

must demonstrate that at least one of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims is meritorious. See Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d 1297, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[T]o determine whether [petitioner] has shown ineffective appellate counsel, we

must determine whether [petitioner] has shown underlying meritorious ineffectivetrial-counsel claims.”). BecauseMiller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel

claims require this court to determine whether Miller’s ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claims are meritorious, much of this court’s review will focus on

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. With this introduction, the

court turns to Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. 

A. Claim B(I): Miller’s Claim That Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for

Raising the Issue of Ineffective Assistance of Trial CounselIn the Motion

for New Trial

Miller claimsthat appellate counsel acted unreasonably by presenting Miller’s

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal at the expedited

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motion-for-new-trial stage, thereby precluding appellate counsel from raising

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims before the Rule 32 Circuit

Court. (Doc. 1, at 125–28). Miller argues that under the Alabama Supreme Court

decision in Ex parte Ingram, 675 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1996), the proper procedure for

presenting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for appellate review was to

present the claims on collateral appeal. Miller alleges that as a result of appellate

counsel’s decision to raise the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims at the

motion for new trial stage, the claims were found to be procedurally barred under

Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2) and (a)(4) at the Rule 32 proceeding. Miller contends

that appellate counsel’s decision was especially egregious given the fact that

appellate counsel did not have a copy of the trial transcript at the point that they

raised the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

1. No Procedural Default

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Miller

did not raise the claim in his Rule 32 petition to the Circuit Court. (Doc. 16, 63). 

However, as Respondent concedes, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found

that Miller raised this claim before the Circuit Court, and the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (Rule 32 R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76,

at 17). Because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not rely on a state

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procedural bar in addressing this claim, but addressed this claim on the underlying

merits, the claim is not procedurally defaulted. This court will review the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision under AEDPA deference. See Judd v. Haley,

250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).

2. Merits

The laststate court to issue a reasoned opinion on this claim was the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals, which found that appellate counsel could properly assert

the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal. (C.R. Vol. 43,

Tab. 76, at 18–21). The Court pointed to Rule 32.2 of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which statesthat “[a]ny claimthat counsel wasineffective must

be raised as soon as practicable, either at trial, on direct appeal, or in the first Rule

32 petition, whichever is practicable.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(d). The Court also

concluded thatregardless of whether appellate counsel’s performance was defective,

Miller suffered no prejudice because none of his ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claims were meritorious. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 21). Because this court

finds that Miller did not suffer any prejudice, this court will not address whether

appellate counsel performed unreasonably by raising the ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claims at the motion-for-new-trial stage. See Duren v. Hopper, 161

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F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f a defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong,

the court need not address the performance prong.”). 

Although the Rule 32 Circuit Court found that Miller’s claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred, the court nevertheless heard

evidence regarding trial counsel’s performance because Miller incorporated all of his

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims into his ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claims. Indeed, the majority of the evidence presented at the Rule

32 hearing was related to trial counsel’s performance. After hearing evidence

regarding the trial counsel claims, the Circuit Court reviewed and denied all of

Miller’s trial counsel claims for the purpose of establishing that Miller was not

prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s performance. 

Because Miller had the opportunity to present evidence related to the

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, and because the Rule 32CircuitCourt

reviewed Miller’sineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims and found the claims

to be without merit, Miller did not suffer any resulting prejudice. Whether the Rule

32 Circuit Court denied the trial-counsel claims in connection with Miller’s

appellate-counsel claims or denied the trial-counsel claims outright, the result of the

proceeding would have been the same—Miller’s appeal would have been denied. 

Thus, Miller suffered no prejudice and is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

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B. Claim B(ii & iii): Miller’s Claim That Appellate Counsel was Ineffective

for Failing to Conduct an Adequate Investigation Concerning the

Ineffective Assistance Miller Received from Trial Counsel AND Failing

to Present Sufficient Evidence During the Hearing on the Motion for New

Trial to Establish That Miller Suffered Prejudice as a Result of Trial

Counsel’s Performance15

Miller contends that appellate counsel, having raised the issue of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel during the motion for new trial, was ineffective in

investigating and presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims.

16

(Doc. 1, at 128). Specifically, Miller contendsthat appellate counsel wasineffective

for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence related to any prejudice

that Miller suffered as a result of trial counsel’s performance. Miller contends that

15Miller’s brief to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not discuss appellate

counsel’s presentation at the hearing, but the Court nevertheless addressed the issue because it

was raised before the Rule 32 Circuit Court. (C.R. Vol 43, Tab. 76, at 21–22). Miller now

separates appellate counsel’s investigation and presentation into two separate claims, Claim

(B)(ii) and Claim (B)(iii). Because the state court’s decision does not lend itself to piecemeal

review and the analysis of the claims is similar, this court will address the two claims in tandem.

16 Miller alleges that appellate counsel was deficient in the following ways: (1) appellate

counsel only spent one hour with Miller prior to the motion-for-new-trial hearing; (2) appellate

counsel did not conduct sufficient legal research to prepare for the case; (3) appellate counsel did not

interview any of Miller’s family or friends and thus did not learn of possible mitigating evidence that

trial counsel failed to present at trial; (4) appellate counsel failed to speak with Dr. Scott and thus

did not learn that trial counsel had retained Dr. Scott only to evaluate Mr. Miller’s sanity; (5)

appellate counsel failed to gather any records, mitigation information, or materials that trial counsel

should have gathered but did not; (6) appellate counsel did not effectively evaluate trial counsel’s

performance; and (7) appellate counsel failed to present evidence at the hearing to demonstrate that

trial counsel’s performance prejudiced Miller. (Doc. 1, at 128–32).

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but for these deficiencies, appellate counsel would have been able to show that trial

counsel was ineffective under Strickland. (Doc. 1, at 131–32). 

1. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

21–26). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

2. Merits

The Rule 32 Circuit Court rejected this claim, holding that Miller failed to

demonstrate that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient or that Miller

suffered any resulting prejudice. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 27–40). The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit Court, finding both that

appellate counsel was not ineffective and that, even if appellate counsel were

ineffective, Miller suffered no prejudice. (C.R. Vol 43, Tab. 76, at 26). 

Although the state court found that appellate counsel reasonably investigated

and presented Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on appeal,

serious questions remain regarding appellate counsel’s performance. One of the

main argumentsthat appellate counsel presented on appeal wasthat trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence. 

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(See R. Vol. 16, Tab. 32, at 22). However, appellate counsel did not attempt to

investigate or present evidence demonstrating any prejudice that Miller may have

suffered as a result of trial counsel’s performance. 

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, appellate counsel called Aaron McCall

of the Alabama Prison Project to testify that he had been available to conduct a

mitigating investigation for Miller’s case and had offered his services to trial

counsel. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 34, Tab. 60, at 36–37). Appellate counsel, however,

never requested that McCall conduct an investigation into what mitigating evidence

could have been presented. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 34, Tab. 60, at 48–49). Appellate

counsel also called clinical psychologist Dr. Bob Wendorf, who reviewed Dr. Scott’s

report and testified about a “distinct possibility” that Miller and his father suffered

from schizophrenia. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at 122). Dr. Wendorf also testified that

Miller may have had some other mental illnesses. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at 112–19). 

However, appellate counsel never asked Dr. Wendorf to perform an independent

assessment of Miller to diagnose whether Miller did in fact have a mental illness. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 34, Tab. 60, at 48–50). When asked about his strategy, appellate

counsel Hill testified, “In retrospect[,] . . . it would have probably been a better

practice” to have had Dr. Wendorf actually perform an assessment of Miller. (Rule

32 C.R. Vol. 34, Tab. 60, at 48). This court agrees. 

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Because appellate counsel failed to investigate any of the mitigating evidence

that they argued should have been presented, appellate counsel could not show that

Miller suffered any prejudice—one of the two prongs required to demonstrate

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court questions whether any reasonable jurist

could conclude that appellate counsel’s failure in this regard would constitute

reasonable performance under Strickland. See Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199,

1236–39 (holding appellate counsel’s performance unreasonablewhen counsel failed

to sufficiently investigate the petitioner’s background and mental health). However,

this claim is still due to be denied because, as will be discussed below, none of

Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are meritorious.

17 Therefore,

Miller cannot demonstrate any resulting prejudice. 

C. Claim B(iv): Miller’s Claim that Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to AdequatelyPresent the Claims ofIneffectiveAssistance of Trial

Counsel That Were Raised in Miller’s Motion for New Trial

Miller alleges that appellate counsel ineffectively presented and argued the

following claims in his motion for new trial: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective in

his guilt phase opening statement; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for

withdrawing the insanity defense; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present mental health evidence during the guilt phase; (4) that trial counsel was

17

See infra Parts VIII C & D.

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ineffective in his penalty phase opening statement; and (5) that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence

during the penalty phase. (Doc. 1, at 134–42). Miller presented this same claim

before the state court, and therefore this court must determine whether the state

court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable under AEDPA deference. 

In reviewing this claim, the Alabama Court of Appeals recognized that for

appellate counsel to have been ineffective in the manner in which they presented the

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, Miller had to demonstrate that he

suffered prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s performance—i.e., that Miller’s

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims had merit. (C.R. Vol. 43,

Tab. 76, at 27). Thus, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals turned its attention

to Miller’s trial counsel claims. This court will do the same, giving AEDPA

deference to the state court’s determination.

1. Miller’s claim that trial counsel’s opening statement during the

guilt phase was ineffective

Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in his opening statement and

“did little more than act as a second prosecutor.” (Doc. 1, at 78). Miller contends

that trial counsel wasineffective because he failed to challenge the facts as presented

by the State and failed to present any defense theory to the jury. (Doc. 1, at 78–80;

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Doc 22, at 152–53). Miller also asserts that trial counsel encouraged the jury to feel

contemptfor Miller by describing the killings as “brutal” and “inhumane” and telling

the jurors that he did not believe they would feel “anything but ashamed of what

happened that caused all of us to be here.” (Doc. 1, at 80).18

a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

45–48). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

The Rule 32 Circuit Court denied this claim, holding that trial counsel’s

opening statement was “the product of a reasonable, strategic decision to win favor

with the jury by not presenting frivolous arguments to spare Miller’s life.” (C.R.

Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 98). The Court also held that Miller failed to establish prejudice

because he did not point to any evidence that the outcome of the trial would have

been different but for trial counsel’s opening statements. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the determinations of the Rule 32 Circuit Court,

18

 For the full text of trial counsel’s guilt-phase opening statement, see supra Part 

VII.A.1.

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emphasizing the difficult task trial counsel faced in defending a case in which the

evidence clearly established Miller’s guilt. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 47–48). 

After reviewing trial counsel’s opening statement, this court cannot say that

the state court’s decision was unreasonable. At the Rule 32 hearing, trial counsel

explained that histrialstrategy throughout the trial wasto focus on the penalty phase

of trial and avoid presenting frivolous arguments to the jury that would diminish his

credibility. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 220). This strategy was based in part

on the fact that a veniremember told the Circuit Court that he had overheard another

veniremember expressing his opinion that the trial was a waste of time because the

evidence in the case was overwhelming. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 236). 

Trial counsel stated that his purpose in making his opening statement was to

emphasize to the jury that although the evidence of Miller’s guilt was “largely

uncontradicted,” the jury process was not a waste of time. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at

63). 

Trial counsel’s opening statement followed thisstrategy. He emphasized that

he would not present any “frivolous” arguments to the jury and emphasized the

important role the jury played in the trial. (C.R. Vol. 5, Tab. 9, at 813–16). Trial

counsel’s decision not to contest guilt to maintain credibility with the jury and focus

on the penalty-phase of trial was not unreasonable. See Harvey. v. Warden, Union

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Corral. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “conceding guilt

and focusing on the penalty phase is a valid trial strategy for Strickland analysis”). 

To the extent that Miller faults trial counsel for stating that, “I will not offer

you any evidence in this case that would make this act seem any less brutal and any

less inhumane than it was,” this court finds trial counsel’s statement not to be

unreasonable when viewed in context of trial counsel’s full opening statement. At

the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that his purpose in making

this statement was to communicate to the jury that he was not contesting the terrible

nature of the crime. (C.R. Vol. 9, at 58). Thistheme wasin keeping with that of trial

counsel’s opening statement as a whole.

Additionally, even if trial counsel’s performance in connection his guilt-phase

opening statement was defective, Miller cannot show that the outcome of the guilt

phase would have been different but for trial counsel’s statements. Asthis court has

stated repeatedly, the evidence of Miller’s guilt was overwhelming. Therefore, this

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim lacks merit.

2. Miller’s claimthat trial counsel wasineffective for withdrawing the

insanity defense

Miler allegesthat trial counsel wasineffective for failing to present an insanity

defense during the guilt phase of trial. (Doc. 1, at 135). 

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a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

28–45). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

The Rule 32 Circuit Court denied this claim, finding that Miller failed to show

both that trial counsel’s withdrawal of the insanity defense was unreasonable and

that trial counsel’s withdrawal of the insanity defense prejudiced Miller. (C.R. Vol.

43, Tab. 75, at 99). In determining that trial counsel was not ineffective for

withdrawing the insanity defense, the Rule 32 Circuit Court stated:

Miller'strial counsel could not be deficient for withdrawing the insanity

defense because none of the psychological or psychiatric experts who

evaluated Miller before trial concluded that Miller met the legal

definition for insanity. 

Miller, through counsel, originally pled not guilty by reason of mental

disease or defect. [Direct Appeal, C. 1.] To qualify under the legal

definition of insanity, Miller bore the burden [of] demonstrating that he

‘was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his

acts.’ Ala. Code § 13A–3–1. However, as demonstrated during trial and

the [Rule 32] evidentiary hearing, none of the four mental health

experts who examined Miller concluded that he was unable to

appreciate the nature and quality of his actions. [Direct Appeal, R.

1384; Motion for New Trial Hearing,R. 72–74; February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 248.] . . .

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Thus, trial counsel could not have provided any expert opinion

testimony to credibly argue to the jury that Miller was legally insane.

Any argument that Miller was legally insane could have been

effectively rebutted from Miller's own expert's conclusion that he was

not insane. [Direct Appeal, R. 1384.] Johnson testified that he was

aware of each of these reports and that neither Dr. Hooper's, nor Dr.

McClaren's, nor Dr. Scott's reports conflicted on the issue of Miller's

sanity at the time of the offense. [Motion for New Trial Hearing, R.

73–74; February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 251.]Johnson testified that

after receiving Dr. Scott's report, he discussed the findings with Dr.

Scott and ultimately decided to withdraw the insanity defense on May

24, 2000 [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 91–92.] Johnson stated

during the [Rule 32] evidentiary hearing that if any of the four doctors

who evaluated Miller had declared that Miller wasinsane at the time of

the offense, such a finding would have altered his strategy and that he

would have used that opinion as part of his defense. [February 2008

Rule 32 Hearing, R. 248.]

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 80–83).

The Rule 32 Circuit Court also found that Miller failed to establish any

resulting prejudice:

Although Miller now claimsthat his trial counselshould have presented

more information to Dr. Scott or obtained additional expert opinion

regarding Miller's sanity, the record indicates that even if such

additional measures were taken, the result would be the same: that

Miller does not meet the requirements for insanity under Alabama law.

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. [Catherine] Boyer [Miller's Rule 32

psychologist] testified that in her opinion, Miller experienced a

dissociative episode at the time of the shootings and that this opinion

would be important as a mental health professional in determining

whether Miller was sane or insane at the time of the shootings.

[February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 719–20.]

However, incredibly, Dr. Boyer never testified that in her opinion,

Miller was legally insane at the time of the shootings. When pressed on

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this crucial question by counsel for the State, Dr. Boyer stated ‘I really

don't know if I can answer it.’ [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R.

757.] ) Most importantly, Dr. Boyer testified that after her complete

investigation, if she had been called to testify asto Miller'ssanity at the

time of trial, she would have had no opinion. [February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 758.] Therefore, Miller has failed to present any evidence

that a mental health expert would have been available to testify at trial

that Miller was insane at the time of the shootings.

Miller also failed to present any evidence during the evidentiary

hearing that conflicts with the evidence and expert opinion regarding

Miller's sanity at the time of trial. Dr. Scott never testified that his

opinion at the time of trial that Miller was not unable to appreciate the

nature and quality or wrongfulness of his actions had changed.

Although Dr. Scott stated that it was ‘possible’ that had he obtained

additional information and conducted additional testing relating to a

dissociated disorder his diagnosis could have changed, he failed to

testify that such information did in fact change his opinion. [February

2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 364.] Like Dr. Boyer, Dr. Scott never

testified that in his opinion, Miller met the requirements for insanity

under Alabama law.

Equally as important in determining that Miller was not prejudiced by

the withdrawal of the insanity plea was the testimony of Dr. McClaren

during the [Rule 32] evidentiary hearing. Before trial in the fall of

1999, Dr. McClaren was hired to conduct a forensic psychological

evaluation of Miller. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 773.] After

conducting his evaluation, Dr. McClaren concluded that Miller was a

‘non psychotic man of average intelligence.’ [February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 778.] Dr. McClaren also concluded that Miller was not

insane under Alabama law at the time of the offense. [February 2008

Rule 32 Hearing, R. 780.]

After becoming involved in the case again for purposes of this Rule 32

proceeding, Dr. McClaren testified that he reviewed additional

testimony, the reports of Dr. Scott and Dr. McDermott, additional

psychological testing, school records as well as the testimony during

the evidentiary hearing. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 783–84.]

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Dr. McClaren then testified that after his review of this new

information, nothing had changed his opinion that Miller was not

legally insane at the time of the shootings. [February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 792–93.]

The testimony of all three mental health experts during the evidentiary

hearing as well as the evidence contained in the mental health reports

issued during the trial and the trial record itself are consistent: all

indicate that Miller was not unable to appreciate the nature and quality

or wrongfulness of his actions. No testimony has even been presented

during trial or in this Rule 32 proceeding that Miller was insane at the

time of the shootings under Alabama law. Therefore, Miller has failed

to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his

proceeding would have been different had trial counsel not withdrawn

the insanity plea because the record resoundingly evidencesthat Miller

was in fact not insane at the time of the shootings. Accordingly,

because Miller has failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland,

this claim is denied.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 84–87). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit Court’s determinations. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76,

at 31).

After reviewing the record, this court finds that the state court’s determination

was reasonable under Strickland. The record reflects that trial counsel considered

presenting an insanity defense and retained Dr. Scott for the express purpose of

determining whether Miller met the legal definition of insanity at the time of the

shootings. However, Dr. Scott determined that Miller did not meet the legal

definition of insanity under Alabama law. Dr. Scott’s determinations were the same

as those of the three other mental health experts who examined Miller prior to the

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start of trial. Trial counsel’s decision to withdraw the insanity defense after

reviewing the opinions of four experts is by no means an unreasonable decision. 

See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1061 (11thCir. 2002) (finding that a defense

attorney’s decision not to pursue an alibi defense he deemed to be implausible and

unlikely to succeed to be the type of strategic decision on which a court should

defer to the judgment of counsel); Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1237 (11th Cir.

1999) ([T]o be effective a lawyer is not required to pursue every path until it bears

fruit or until all hope withers.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

Further, as highlighted by the Circuit Court, Miller cannot demonstrate any

prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s decision to withdraw the insanity defense. 

Miller failed to produce a single expert willing to testify that Miller was legally

insane at the time of the shootings. No evidence was ever presented that would

demonstrate that Miller met the legal definition of insanity at the time of the

murders. Thus, the court finds no reasonable probability that the jury would have

found Miller to be legally insane, and Miller cannot show a reasonable probability

that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for trial counsel’s

decision to withdraw the insanity defense. 

Within Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

an insanity defense, Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

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provide Dr. Scott with various documents that Miller claims were necessary to

determine Miller’s sanity. Miller contends that trial counsel should have provided

Dr. Scott with the following: (1) a file created by Dr. Hooper following his

evaluation of Miller; (2) Dr. McClaren’s report of his evaluation of Miller; (3) the

recording of Miller’s post-arrest police interrogation; (4) records of Miller’s

medical/psychological records and those of his family; and (5) information

concerning the abuse Miller suffered at the hands of his father. (Doc. 1, 48–66). 

The Rule 32 Circuit Court rejected this argument and found that Miller failed

to show both that trial counsel was deficient and that Miller suffered any resulting

prejudice. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 59–73). Although the Rule 32

Circuit Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the

performance prong of Strickland at length in relation to this ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim, this court will limit its discussion of the claim to the

prejudice prong, Miller clearly failed to meet this prong. See Duren v. Hopper, 161

F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f a defendant cannotsatisfy the prejudice prong,

the court need not address the performance prong.”). 

In discussing the prejudice prong, the Rule 32 Circuit Court stated:

Miller has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

outcome of his proceeding would have been different had his trial

counsel investigated more mental health evidence because he hasfailed

to prove that he met the legal definition of insanity under Ala. Code

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[1975] § [13A–3–1]. None of the five psychological and psychiatric

experts who evaluated Miller during the course of his trial or his Rule

32 proceedings, including Drs. Hooper, Scott, McDermott, McClaren,

and Boyer concluded that Miller was legally insane. Therefore, even if

trial counsel had conducted a more thorough mental health

investigation, the result would be the same: Miller could not have

proven that he did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and

thus could not have sustained a not-guilty by reason of insanity defense.

Miller'sfailure to demonstrate prejudice is highlighted by the testimony

of Miller's own expert, Dr. Boyer, during the evidentiary hearing.

Despite her opinion that Miller suffered from post-traumatic stress

disorder, incredibly, Dr. Boyer failed to testify that Miller was legally

insane. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 757–58.] Notably, Dr.

Boyer failed to even provide an opinion. Clearly evading the issue of

Miller's sanity, in response to a question regarding whether she

disagreed with Dr. Scott's testimony during trial that Miller was not

insane, Dr. Boyer testified ‘I really don't know if I can answer it.’

[February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 757.]

As Dr. Boyer stated in response to a question from counsel for the

State, if she had been called to testify on Miller's behalf during trial, she

would have had no opinion as to whether he could appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the shootings:

Q: So in this case it's fair to say that had you been there you

would have said I have no opinion [as to Miller's sanity] one way or the

other?

A: Yes.

[February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 758.] Without offering an opinion,

let alone an opinion that conflicted with the evaluations performed

during trial, even if a mental health investigation was performed in the

manner in which Miller now alleges it should have been conducted,

Miller hasfailed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that additional

mental health evidence would have been uncovered that would have

affected the outcome of his trial. It is also significant that Dr. Scott

failed to state during the evidentiary hearing that his opinion that Miller

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was not insane at the time of the shootings had changed. No evidence

has been presented that Miller was legally insane and ample mental

health evidence was already available for trial counsel to effectively

argue during the penalty phase that Miller satisfied the requirementsfor

the statutory mitigating circumstances under Ala.Code [1975] §

13A–5–51(2) and (6).

Three psychologists and one psychiatrist evaluated Miller at the time

of trial; none of these four doctors, whether hired by the defense or

appointed by the trial court, found that Miller was insane. [February

2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 248.] Miller has offered nothing in the

testimony of either Dr. Boyer or Dr. Scott to call these evaluations into

question. There is no evidence that Dr. Boyer's testimony would have

benefitted Miller's defense, nor would it have impacted the outcome of

the proceedings. Miller has failed to meet his burden of proof of

demonstrating how he was prejudiced under Strickland by his trial

counsel'sinvestigation into his mental health. Therefore, Miller cannot

demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance in this regard was

constitutionally ineffective. . . .

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 73–76). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit Court’s determination. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 39). 

This court agrees with the state court’s conclusion. As noted previously,

Miller fails to point to a single expert who determined that he was unable to

appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts at the time of the

shootings. Dr. Boyer conducted an extensive review of Miller’s record, including

the items that Miller alleges trial counsel should have provided to Dr. Scott. (Rule

32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 599–630). Based on her investigation, Dr. Boyer

concluded that Miller suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder. (Rule 32 C.R.

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Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 757–58). However, Dr. Boyer refused to testify that Miller was

unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts at the time

of the shootings. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 757–58). Miller also called Dr.

Scott at the Rule 32 hearing, and he likewise failed to state that he believed Miller

was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts at the

time of the shootings. In total, Miller was examined by five different mental health

expertsin the course of histrial and the Rule 32 proceedings. None of these experts

testified that Miller was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness

of his acts at the time of the shootings. 

Because Miller fails to point to any evidence that he met the legal definition

of insanity, he has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of

his trial would have been different had trial counsel provided Dr. Scott with

additional evidence and decided not to withdraw the insanity defense. Therefore,

Miller has failed to show that histrial counsel wasineffective and cannotshow that

his appellate counsel was ineffective in presenting this claim on direct appeal. 

3. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present mental health evidence during the guilt phase of trial

Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental

health evidence to the jury that would have allowed them to find that Miller lacked

the mens rea required for a conviction of capital murder. (Doc. 1, at 87–90, 138). 

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Miller maintainsthat trial counselshould have presented the findings of Dr. Scott’s

that Miller, although not legally insane, suffered from a mental illness and

experienced tunnel vision and heard “noises” at the time of the first two shootings. 

Miller argues that had this testimony been presented at the guilt phase of trial, trial

counsel could have argued that Miller lacked the necessary mens rea to be guilty of

capital murder. 

a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

40–45). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

TheRule 32 CircuitCourtrejected Miller’s argument that trial counselshould

have presented a defense during the guilt phase. The court stated:

Trial counsel Johnson had reasonable strategic reasons for not

presenting evidence during the guilt phase of trial. Johnson testified

that his trial strategy focused on presenting the best evidence and

testimony that would save Miller's life. [Motion for New Trial hearing,

R. 80.] Based on the facts and circumstances of his case, Johnson

determined that his best opportunity and most effective method of

presenting such testimony would be during the penalty phase. [Motion

for New Trial Hearing, R. 80; February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 219.]

Part of thisstrategy also involved gaining credibility and favor with the

jury by not presenting frivolous arguments during the guilt phase such

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as challenging the blood spatter expert's testimony. [February 2008

Rule 32 Hearing, R. 219–26.] . . . 

[T]his decision was made ‘after a thorough investigation of the relevant

law and facts of Miller's case’ and Johnson'sfocus on the penalty phase

‘was part of his strategy to spare Miller's life.’ Miller, 913 So.2d at

1161 (holding that ‘[u]nder the circumstances of this case, defense

counsel made a well-reasoned decision to focus his efforts on that part

of the trial that he believed offered the greatest chance of success. We

see no reason to second-guess defense counsel's decisions regarding

this strategy.’). Miller has failed to offer any proof that this trial

strategy was not the product of a reasonably competent attorney.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 99–104). 

The Rule 32 Circuit Court also held that Miller suffered no prejudice as a

result of trial counsel’s decision to not present a defense during the guilt phase,

reasoning that any argument that Miller lacked the intent to commit capital murder

“would have run contrary to the overwhelming evidence indicating Miller’s intent

to commit murder.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 104–05). In support of this

conclusion, the Rule 32 Circuit Court noted that Miller “specifically sought out two

victims,shot themmultiple times, proceeded to another location, specificallysought

out another victim, and shot him multiple times.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 105). 

Based on the significant amount of evidence supporting Miller’s conviction of

capital murder, the Rule 32 Circuit Court found that Miller failed to demonstrate a

reasonable probability that the jury would have found him not guilty of capital

murder. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 105). The Court, therefore, concluded that

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Miller failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at

105). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court’srejection

of this claim. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 43). 

This court cannot say that the determinations of the state courts as to either

prong of the Strickland analysis are unreasonable. In this case, trial counsel made

a strategic decision not to contest Miller’s guilt and to limit Dr. Scott’s testimony

to the penalty phase portion of the trial. Trial counsel had sound reasoning for

adopting this approach. At the Rule 32 hearing, trial counsel testified that he

decided not to present mental health evidence during the guilt phase because he

believed it would have had less of an impact on the jury than if it was presented

during the penalty phase. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 225). He also testified

that he was concerned that contesting Miller’s guilt could have appeared to be

frivolousto the jury in light of the great weight of the evidence establishing Miller’s

guilt. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 220). Finally, trial counsel testified that

he believed Dr. Scott’s testimony was more valuable at the penalty phase because

Dr. Scott would have been allowed to testify more freely and would be subject to

a less rigorous cross-examination. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 285). 

These concerns are all valid. Recognizing that the evidence of his client’s

guilt was significant, trial counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue the ill86

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supported argument that Miller was not guilty of capital murder. This strategy was

by no means an unreasonable decision. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002)

(holding that a “tactical decision about which competent lawyers might disagree”

does not qualify as objectively unreasonable). 

Miller also fails to prove that he was prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s

decision to not present any mental health evidence at the guilt phase. Even looking

to Dr. Scott’s testimony that Miller experienced tunnel vision and heard “noises”

during the first two shootings, not enough evidence shows a reasonable probability

that the jury would not have found Miller guilty of capital murder. The evidence

in this case establishes that Miller entered Ferguson Enterprises and shot

Christopher Yancy and Lee Holdbrooks multiple times at close range. Miller then

got into his vehicle, drove to another location, sought out Terry Jarvis and shot Mr.

Jarvis multiple times. Given the factual circumstances of this case, Miller has not

shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been

different if trial counsel had presented Dr. Scott’stestimony during the guilt phase.

Therefore, because this ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is

without merit, Miller cannot show that his appellate counsel was ineffective in the

manner in which they presented this claim in the post-sentencing proceedings. 

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4. Miller’s claimthat trial counsel’s penalty-phase opening statement

was ineffective

Miller alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his

penalty-phase opening statement. (Doc. 1, at 96–101, 138–39). Miller contends

that trial counsel “vilified Mr. Miller, undermined the credibility of Dr. Scott, and

effectively conceded the only aggravating factor on which the State relied.” (Doc.

1, at 138–39).19 

a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

67–68). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

The Rule 32 Circuit Court rejected this claim, finding that trial counsel’s

penalty-phase opening statement was an “impassioned plea that the jury spare

Miller’s life.” (C.R. Vol 43, Tab. 75, at 120). The Rule 32 Circuit Court noted that

the purpose of trial counsel’s opening statement was to convey to the jury that

Miller did not deserve the death penalty regardless of whether they thought he was

19

 For the full text of trial counsel’s opening statement, see PART VII.A.5.

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atrocious or not, and that Miller did not deserve death regardless of how the jurors

might feel about him. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 118). The Court also found that

trial counsel attempted to portray Miller as a “‘tortured soul’ whose delusions drove

him to commit a series of horrific acts.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 120). The Court

concluded that Miller failed to meet his burden of establishing that no reasonable

attorney would have pursued this course of action, and that Miller failed to show

that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different but for trial

counsel’s opening penalty-phase statement. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 122). The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit Court’s

determination. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 68). 

After reviewing the record, this court finds the state court’s determination

reasonable under Strickland. The record reflects that trial counsel argued in his

opening statement that Miller should not be put to death regardless of the jurors’

personal feelings about Miller. Trial counsel pointed out that Miller’s execution

could not bring back the lives of his three victims and that Miller would already

receive punishment for his actions by spending the remainder of his life in prison. 

Contrary to Miller’s contentions, trial counsel did not undermine Dr. Scott’s

credibility, but presented him as a competent neutral expert. Trial counsel stated

that, although Dr. Scott had been hired to determine whether Miller was insane, he

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ultimately concluded that Miller did not meet the legal definition of insanity. Trial

counsel then previewed to the jury Dr. Scott’s testimony that Miller suffered from

a mental and emotional disturbance on the day of the shootings.

After reviewing trial counsel’s opening statement as a whole, this court finds

that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that Miller failed to

establish that trial counsel was ineffective was a reasonable application of

Strickland. Thus, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective in the manner

in which they presented this ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

5. Miller’s claim that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate

and present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase

Miller alleges that trial counsel should have investigated and presented a

“veritable mountain of mitigating evidence” during the penalty phase of trial. (Doc.

1, at 139). In particular, Miller alleges that trial counsel’s investigation was

ineffective because it failed: 1) to adequately interview Miller and Miller’s close

relatives and 2) to collect Miller’s “employment, education, and medical records,

and medical records of his numerous family members with documented serious

mental illness.” (Doc. 1, at 17). Miller alleges that as a result of this inadequate

investigation, trial counsel did not learn about the following evidence:

(I) the extent of instability, poverty and hardship Mr. Miller suffered in

childhood as a result of his father’s constant uprooting of the family

and erratic employment history; (ii) the well-documented history of

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mental illness that traced back through at least four generations of the

Miller family; (iii) the extreme physical and psychological abuse Ivan

[Miller’s father] inflicted on the family, including the particular wrath

he reserved for Mr. Miller; (iv) the criminal behaviors to which Mr.

Miller was exposed during hisformative years;(v) notwithstanding this

adversity, Mr. Miller’s strongwork ethic and good employment history;

(vi) the financial support he provided his family and the loving

relationships he had with his brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews; (vii)

the radical changes in Mr. Miller’s behavior in the days leading up to

the shootings; and (viii) Mr. Miller’s bizarre behavior at the time of the

shootings.

(Doc. 1, at 24). According to Miller, he would not have been sentenced to death if

trial counsel had presented this mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. (Doc.

1, at 101–08). 

a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

48–67). Therefore, this court will review the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

This court begins and ends its analysis of this claim with the prejudice prong

of Strickland. Both Miller’s contention that trial counsel failed to conduct an

adequate investigation and his contention that trial counsel failed to adequately

present mitigating evidence require this court to reweigh the aggravating and

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mitigating evidence to determine whether Miller suffered prejudice. See Brooks v.

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t. of Corrs, 719 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). Therefore, this

court will address these claims together. Since Miller fails to establish prejudice,

this court need not determine whether trial counsel’s performance in connection with

his investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence was deficient. See

Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000). 

“When a [petitioner] challenges a death sentence. . ., the question is whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have

concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not

warrant death.” Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t. Of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (11th Cir.

2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals held that even if Miller had presented all of the additional

mitigating evidence that Miller alleges should have been presented, no reasonable

probability suggested that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been

different. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 67). In reviewing the opinion of the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals, this court must determine whether a reasonable jurist

could conclude that no reasonable probability existed that the totality of Miller’s

mitigating evidence would have altered the outcome of the penalty phase. See

Cummings v. Sec’y of Dep’t. of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Given

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the strength of the . . . aggravating circumstances, the proposed mitigation evidence

must be strong enough to outweigh them, and therefore to raise a reasonable

probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not

warrant death.”). Thus, this court will compare the evidence elicited during the Rule

32 hearings that Miller alleges should have been presented at trial with the evidence

that actually was presented at trial.

I. The abuse Miller suffered at the hands of his father

Testimony from the Rule 32 hearings showed that Miller suffered extensive

abuse at the hands of his father, Ivan. Ivan frequently hit his wife and children for

no reason and was especially abusive towards Miller. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab.

59, at 546). Ivan would also threaten his children with guns and knives; on one

occasion he threatened Miller and hissiblings with a gun, telling them that he did not

know which of them he wanted to kill. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 406). Ivan

was also verbally abusive, calling Miller a “little bastard” and a “little son of a

bitch.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 550–52). He also abused Miller’s mother,

Barbara, and would frequently call her a “fucking whore, a fucking slut, [and]

tramp.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 395).

At trial, Dr. Scott presented the following testimony to the jury regarding the

abuse Miller suffered:

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To try to understand a little bit more about his relationship with his

father, I asked [Miller] to describe his dad, what was it like growing up

with his father. And rather kind of quietly, reluctantly but in a straight

forward manner he described him as verbally abusive. I said, give me

an example. He would frequently, even at a very young age, say things

like you’re no good, you’ll never amount to nothing, you’re a God

damn son of a bitch. He was very physically abusive to him, hit him on

various areas of his body and he was frequently bullied and left bruises

on him. 

. . . 

[Miller] described that when he was a junior in high school one time his

father came home and had a large butcher knife from the kitchen and

began lounging [sic] at him and he would say things like, it’s only

God’s will that is keeping me from cutting you now. 

. . . 

His father was also described as very verbally abusive to his mom,

frequently called her a whore. And he witnessed his father physically

abusing his mom and hitting her very hard. 

(C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1350–51). 

ii. Miller’s impoverished childhood and exposure to the

criminal behavior of his family members

Miller grew up in an impoverished environment and the family lived in a

rent-controlled community. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 398–99). Barbara

Miller and her children were on welfare, and Barbara’s father and brother had to

provide necessities to the family. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 460–61). 

Barbara Miller described the homesthe family lived in as “junky, rat infested, roach

infested, just falling in.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 416). 

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Ivan provided little support to the family, moving from job to job with

periods of unemployment. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 414). He also would

pawn valuables from the house to pay for drugs. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab.59, at

414). Ivan was frequently in and out of prison for drunken disorderly conduct and

had a criminal record. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 421–22). As a child,

Miller observed his father and uncles using marijuana, cocaine, and intravenous

drugs. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 419–20). 

At the penalty phase of trial, Dr. Scott presented testimony relating to the

poverty that Miller suffered as a child. Dr. Scott testified that Ivan would frequently

quit jobs and that the family was frequently on the verge of poverty. (C.R. Vol. 8,

Tab. 22, at 1349). He also stated that Miller was forced to drop out of high school

to work a job to earn money for his family. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1350).

Additionally, Dr. Scott also testified that Ivan frequently used marijuana and that

on one occasion Miller witnessed his father inject a substance into his arm

intravenously. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1350). 

iii. The Miller family history of mental illness

During the Rule 32 hearings, Miller present evidence that numerousmembers

of his family suffered from mental illness, including his great-grandmother, his

grandfather, and two of Miller’s uncles. (Rule 32C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 646–48). 

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Ivan, although not diagnosed with a mental illness, was often paranoid that people

were plotting again him. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 403). He believed that

his wife had tried to poison him and accused her of having affairs. (Rule 32 C.R.

Vol. 31, Tab.59, at 403 & 393). He also believed that he had the power to heal and

would try to “heal” his children’sillnesses. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 410). 

He also would tell his children that God had told him to kill them and he hoped that

God would tell him to stop. (C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 550–51). 

At the penalty phase of trial, Dr. Scott presented testimony related to the

history of mental illness present in Miller’sfamily. Dr. Scott testified that, although

Ivan had never been diagnosed with a mental illness, Ivan was often suspicious of

other people and believed that Miller’s mother had tried to poison him. (C.R. Vol.

8, Tab. 22, at 1362). Additionally, Dr. Scott testified that Miller’s grandfather was

committed to a psychiatric institution and that Miller’s younger brother, Richard,

was “slow.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1363). He also told the jury that Ivan had an

“interesting take on religion.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1350). He told the jury that

Ivan believed he had the power to heal and would tell his children that he believed

they were devils. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1351). He also told the jury that Ivan

would walk around the house and spray “holy water.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at

1351). 

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iv. Miller’s good employment history and relationship

with his family

The evidence presented during the Rule 32 hearings showed that Miller went

to work at an early age to support his family and typically would only leave a job

when he had found a better paying position. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 425;

Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 560). The evidence also showed that Miller had

a close relationship with his siblings and would provide financial assistance when

a family member was in need. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 511 & 560). 

Miller had a strong relationship with his niece, Alicia Sanford, and his nephew, Jake

Connell. Alicia Sanford testified thatshe considered Miller to be like a father to her

and felt that Miller had raised her. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31, Tab. 59, at 474–75). 

Jake Connell testified that he spent a great deal of time around Miller and that

Miller was like an older brother to him. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 579). 

Regarding Miller’s employment history, Dr. Scott testified that Miller had

been fired from a couple of jobs for fights at work, but he usually left jobs to take

a better paying position elsewhere. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at 1363). Dr. Scott’s

testimony relating to Miller’s relationship with his family members was limited to

discussing Miller’s strong relationship with his mother. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at

1354). 

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v. Miller’s behavior prior to the shootings

At the Rule 32 hearing, Miller’s niece, Alicia Sanford, testified that Miller

began to act strangely in the weeks leading up to the shooting, and that he would

often daydream and suffered from frequent headaches. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab.

59, at 511–13). She also testified that Miller also spoke about a ringing in his ears

and let his beard grow long. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab. 59, at 511 & 562). 

Dr. Scott did not present testimony at trial related to any of these specific

facts. 

vi. Miller’s behavior on the day of the shootings

Although Miller alleges that trial counsel should have presented additional

evidence related to Miller’s behavior on the day of the shootings, he does not point

to any new information in his petition that was not addressed by Dr. Scott in his

penalty-phase testimony.

vii. Prejudice analysis

After comparing the evidence that was presented at the Rule 32 hearings with

the evidence actually presented at trial, this court findsthat a reasonable jurist could

conclude that no reasonable probability suggested the outcome of the penalty-phase

would have been different if the addition mitigating evidence had been presented. 

The only additional information that could have been presented at trial was

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additional instances of abuse Miller suffered, additional information related to the

history of mental illness present in some of Miller’s extended family members,

additional evidence related to Miller’s employment history (including that he had

been fired numerous times), and additional information related to Miller’s close

relationship with his family. Because Dr. Scott, in his penalty-phase testimony,

presented similar information regarding Miller’s background, those additional

accounts would be merely cumulative of the testimony already presented and

insufficient to establish prejudice. See Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1243 (11th

Cir. 2011) (“Obviously, a petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test with evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already

presented at trial.”); Holsey v. Warden, GA Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230,

1260–61 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that “evidence presented in postconviction

proceedings is ‘cumulative’ or ‘largely cumulative’ to . . . that presented at trial

when it tells a more detailed version of the same story told at trial or provides more

or better examples or amplifies the themes presented to the jury”); Boyd v. Allen,

592 F.3d 1274, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that much of the evidence

presented by the petitioner during postconviction proceedings “was in some

measure cumulative” of the trial evidence because “much (although not all) of the

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‘new’ testimony introduced at the post-conviction hearing would simply have

amplified the themes already raised at trial”) (emphasis added). 

Additionally, the value of the mitigating evidence Miller allegesshould have

been presented at trial is minimal when weighed against the brutal nature of Miller’s

crime. In its order denying Miller’s motion for new trial, the trial court provided the

following description of the crime in support of its determination that the murders

were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”: 

On the morning of August 5, 1999, [Miller] shot and killed three men,

namely, Christopher Yancy (“Yancy”), age 28 years; Lee Holdbrooks

(“Holdbrooks”), age 32; and Terry Jarvis (“Jarvis”), age 39 years.

Yancy and Holdbrooks were both shot at one location and thereafter

Jarvis was shot at another location. Each of those victims sustained

multiple wounds.

Yancy suffered three wounds to his body. It appears the first shot

entered his leg and traveled through his groin and into his spine,

paralyzing him. He was unable to move, unable to defend himself and

was trying to hide from [Miller] under a desk. Yancy had a cell phone

an inch or two from his hand, but because of his paralysis was unable

to reach it and call for help. Yancy had to have been afraid his life was

about to be taken. Moments elapsed. [Miller] appeared to have then

stooped under the desk and have made eye contact with Yancy before

shooting him twice more causing his death.

Holdbrooks suffered six wounds to his body. [Miller]shot Holdbrooks

several times. Holdbrooks crawled down a hallway for about

twenty-five feet. Holdbrooks was uncertain whether he would live or

die as he crawled down the hallway and quite possibly his life was

flashing by in his mind. [Miller] took his gun and within two inches of

Holdbrooks' head, pulled the trigger for the sixth and final time, the

bullet entering Holdbrooks' head causing him to die in a pool of blood.

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Jarvis was shot five times, the last shot being no more than 46 inches

away from his body. Before Jarvis was shot, [Miller] had pointed a gun

at him in the presence of a witness. [Miller] had accused Jarvis of

spreading rumors about him which Jarvis had denied. [Miller] shot

Jarvis four times in the chest. [Miller] allowed the witness to leave. No

one knows at that point what went through Jarvis' mind. Having denied

he spread any rumors, he must have wondered why [Miller] had not

believed him and as the witness was allowed to leave that maybe there

would be no more shooting and his life would be spared. [Miller] then

shot Jarvis through his heart ending Jarvis' life.

It appears all three of [Miller's] victims suffered for a while not only

physically, but psychologically. In each instance, there appeared to

have been hope for life while they were hurting, only to have their fate

sealed by a final shot, execution style.

Based upon the facts presented at this trial, these murders were

calculated, premeditated and callous,with utter disregard of human life.

The taking of these lives was among the worst in the memory of this

Court and was well beyond the level of being especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 72, at 1–3). 

In light of the extensive evidence presented regarding the brutal nature of this

crime, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably concluded that no

reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the penalty-phase would have

been different if trial counsel had presented additional mitigating evidence. See

Brooks v. Comm’s Ala. Dep’t. of Corr., 719 F.3d 1292, 1302–03) (finding no

prejudice from counsel’s failure to present evidence showing that defendant was

nice, good natured, and nonviolent, in light of the heinousness of the defendant’s

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crime); Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1303 (11th Cir. 2010); Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d

1344, 1360 (11thCir. 2007). Thus,this ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim

lacks merit, and appellate counsel could not be ineffective in the manner in which

they presented this claim. 

D. Claim B(v): Miller’s Claim that Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to Raise Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

following claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (a) trial counsel’s

ineffective performance during the jury voir dire; (b) trial counsel’s ineffective

performance in failing to object to the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial

testimony and photographs during the guilt phase of trial; (c) trial counsel’s

ineffective cross-examination of crucial prosecution witnesses; (d) trial counsel’s

failure to object to misleading portions of the State’s guilt-phase closing argument;

(e) trial counsel’s ineffective guilt-phase closing argument;(f) trial counsel’sfailure

to request guilt-phase jury instructions necessary to protect Mr. Miller’s rights; (g)

trial counsel’s reliance on Dr. Scott as the sole mitigation witness during the

penalty-phase of trial; (h) trial counsel’sfailure to move for a directed verdict based

on the State’s failure to present comparative evidence necessary for the jury to

determine that the killings were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared

to other crimes;” (I) trial counsel’s penalty phase closing argument; (j) trial

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counsel’s failure to object to the court’s penalty phase jury instructions; (k) trial

counsel’s failure to request a special verdict form to establish that the jury had

unanimously found the sole alleged aggravating circumstance; (l) trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the sentencing hearing; and (m) trial counsel’sfailure to bring the

Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey to the attention of the Circuit

Court prior to the sentencing phase.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim, holding that

appellate counsel could not have been deficient for failing to raise these claims

because none of Miller’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were

meritorious. This court, therefore, will examine the state court’s determinations

regarding each of Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims with

deference.

1. Trial Counsel’s performance during jury voir dire

Miller claims that appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel’s

voir dire was inadequate and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask

questions related to the jurors’ exposure to media coverage of the trial. Miller also

contends that trial counsel did not effectively ask questions designed to uncover

potential bias against Miller’s case. 

a. No Procedural Default

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This claim was properly raised on collateral appeal and fully exhausted. 

Therefore, this court willreview the determinations of the state court under AEDPA

deference. 

b. Merits

In addressing the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim,the

Rule 32 Court held:

This Court denies Miller's claim because he has failed to meet his

burden of proof of demonstrating that his trial counsel's performance

was deficient under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Ala. R. Crim. P.,

32.7(d). Because of the extensive publicity in this case, Johnson, along

with the District Attorney's office, developed a written questionnaire

that was provided to the entire jury panel. [February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 236.] Within the questionnaire, question # 68 specifically

asked the jurors to answer whether they had seen anything about the

case in any newspaper. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 237.]

Additional questions were included in the questionnaire to determine

whether a particular juror had such strong fixed opinions about the case

or could not be fair or impartial as a juror. [February 2008 Rule 32

Hearing, R. 238.]

Johnson testified that he had an opportunity to review the responses to

the questionnaires for all members of the jury panel and that he knew

the jurors' responsesidentifying what they saw in the newspapers about

the case. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 237–38.] During trial, the

trial court and counsel for both parties conducted an extensive

individual voir dire of the jury panel. [Direct Appeal, R. 130–763.]

As the record indicates, Johnson strategically conducted voir dire to

determine whether any juror had a fixed opinion, for any reason, of the

case. Johnson alerted the trial court to questions # 68, # 69 and # 70 of

the juror questionnaire that pertained to the juror's opinions of the case

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and implored the trial court to focus its questions on whether the jurors

had ‘fixed opinions' of the case. [Direct Appeal, R. 146–47.] As a

result, the trial court determined that it would examine each juror's

response to question # 68 and if the juror indicated they had heard

something about the case, the trial court would inquire what the juror

heard and whether the juror could set aside what they had heard. [Direct

Appeal, R. 148.]

During the evidentiary hearing, Miller's [Rule 32] counsel questioned

Johnson aboutspecific newspaper articles and then questioned Johnson

on whether he asked eight jurors about what they had read about the

case in the newspaper. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 127–34.]

However, as the record indicates, as a result of Johnson's effort, during

individual voir dire, the trial court noted each of the eight juror's

responses to question # 68 indicating that the juror had seen or read

something about the case and then asked each juror whether they could

set what they had learned aside and base their verdict solely on the

evidence presented. [Direct Appeal, R. 337–38, 345–46, 376–77,

446–47, 449–50, 625–26, 638–39, 666–67.] All eight jurors indicated

that they could set aside what they had learned and sit as a fair and

impartial juror. Id.

Therefore, information about the jurors' opinions about the case was

brought out during the voir dire and Miller has failed to demonstrate

thatJohnson's method of conducting voir dire was deficient. Miller has

failed to present any evidence that a reasonable attorney would have

asked these eight jurors aboutspecific newspaper articles. Furthermore,

Miller failed to ask Johnson why he did not strike these eight jurors

from the panel, nor did Miller ask any specific question regarding

Johnson's strategyfor using the defense's peremptory strikes. Therefore,

because the record issilent, trial counsel's questioning of the jury panel

and the subsequent peremptory strikes is presumed to be reasonable.

See Chandler [v. United States], 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 n. 15 [ (11th Cir.

2000) ].

In paragraph 162 of his amended petition, Miller claims that his trial

counsel failed to question and remove Juror [G.J.] who Miller alleges

was biased because Juror [G.J.] favored the death penalty. [Amended

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Rule 32 Petition, C. 315.] However, trial counsel's questioning of Juror

[G.J.] was not deficient and the record directly refutes Miller's claim

that Juror [G.J.] was biased. Juror [G.J.] stated during voir dire that he

could follow the trial court's instructions and listen to the evidence in

recommending a sentence in Miller's case. [Direct Appeal, R. 377–78.]

Juror [G.J.] also stated that where it was appropriate under the law and

evidence he could vote for either life imprisonment or the death

penalty. [Direct Appeal, R. 378.] Furthermore, trial counsel Johnson

specifically questioned Juror [G.J.] about his views on the death penalty

and elicited from Juror [G.J.] that he had no fixed opinions about what

an appropriate punishment should be. [Direct Appeal, R. 387–90.]

Accordingly, Miller's claim is directly refuted by the record and is

denied. See Gaddy v. State, 952 So.2d 1149, 1161 (Ala. Crim. App.

2006).

. . . .

This claim is also denied because Miller has utterly failed to meet his

burden or proof of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by his trial

counsel's performance during voir dire. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695;

Ala. R. CRIM. P., 32.7(d). Although Miller claims that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to asks [sic] eight of the fourteen jurors

seated in his case about what they read or remembered about Miller's

case, Miller has failed to present any evidence whatsoever about what

these eight jurors actually read or remembered about Miller's case prior

to trial. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 134.] None of the jurors

who sat at Miller's trial testified during the evidentiary hearing.

Therefore, no evidence was presented that the eight jurors actually read

or were exposed to the newspaper articles introduced into evidence by

Miller during the evidentiary hearing. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing,

R. 127–34, 289–95.] Even if the eight jurors had read these newspaper

articles, no evidence was presented that the jurors considered these

articles harmful to Miller or that they had fixed opinions about Miller

because of these articles.

There is nothing in the record regarding what the jurors read about

Miller's case; accordingly, ‘[t]he mere fact that some of the jurors that

sat for [Miller's] trial had pretrial knowledge of his case is not enough

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to establish they were biased against him.’ Duncan v. State, 925 So.2d

245, 267 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). Therefore, because there is no

evidence about what the jurors read and whether they were actually

biased against Miller because of what they read, Miller has failed to

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this trial counsel's performance

during voir dire. Miller's claim is denied.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2039–45).

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Rule 32CircuitCourt’s

determination that trial counsel was not ineffective. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 70). 

The record supports the determinations of the state courts. 

In examining an attorney’s performance during jury selection, this court must

begin with the strong presumption that trial counsel acted properly and that his jury

selection decisions were sound trialstrategy. Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst.,

629 F.3d 1228, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that trial counsel’s actions

during voir dire are presumed to be reasonable); Manning v. State, 373 F. App’x

933, 935 (11thCir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of ineffective-assistance-of-counselclaim when counsel failed to strike juror who did in fact express a bias on ground

that petition failed to establish prejudice). To overcome this presumption, Miller

bearsthe burden of demonstrating that trial counsel’s actions were so unreasonable

that no competent attorney would have taken the actionsthat trial counsel took. See

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). Miller cannot

meet this burden.

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The record reflects that trial counsel took steps to insure that the jurors

selected could be fair and impartial. Potential jurors were first required to fill out

an extensive juror questionnaire created by trial counsel and the District Attorney’s

Office. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 30, Tab. 59, at 237). Trial counsel reviewed the jurors’

completed questionnaires prior to individual juror voir dire and considered the

information that he learned from the questionnaire in making his decision to strike

jurors. (Rule 32 R. Vol, 30, Tab. 59, at 239–40). 

After reviewing the jury questionnaire, trial counsel engaged in the voir dire

process. He understood that many of the jurors likely had been exposed to some

media coverage. Because of this concern, trial counsel asked the Circuit Court to

focus on whether the specific juror had developed a “fixed opinion” about the case. 

(C.R. Vol. 2, at 146–47). The court agreed to do so, and stated that it would

specifically examine each potential juror on whether the juror had heard anything

regarding Miller’s case, and if so, whether the juror had formed any opinion as a

result. (C.R. Vol 2, at 148–49). 

Although Miller alleges that trial counsel should have asked the jurors

additional questions, Strickland does not ask whether an attorney could have done

more, but only whether the attorney’s performance was so unreasonable that no

competent attorney would have performed as trial counsel did. See Chandler, 218

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F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every

case, could have done something more or something different. . . . But, the issue is

not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is

constitutionally compelled.’”) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). 

After reviewing the record, this court concludes that no evidence shows that trial

counsel’s performance during voir dire wassuch that no reasonable attorney would

have approached voir dire in this manner. 

Further, Miller fails to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland. To

establish prejudice resulting from counsel’s performance during voir dire, a

petitioner “must show that at least one juror was biased” because “if no juror [was]

biased, then there is no ‘reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding

would have been different.’” Owen v. Florida Dep’t. Of Corrs., 686 F.3d 1181,

1201 (11th Cir. 2012). All eight of the jurors who were exposed to pretrial publicity

were questioned regarding whether they could put aside anything they had learned

from the publicity the case received, and all eight jurors responded that they could

be impartial.

20

(C.R. Vol. 3, Tab. 6, at 337–38, 345–46, 376–77, 446–47, 449–50,

20

 Juror E.H. indicated in his juror questionnaire that he had formed an opinion as to who

was responsible for the deaths of Holdbrooks, Yancy, and Jarvis. (C.R. Vol. 3, Tab. 6, at 337). 

When asked by the Circuit Court whether he could put aside any pre-existing opinions or

impressions and base his decision solely on the evidence presented in court, Juror E.H. responded

that he could do so. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “‘the mere existence of any preconceived

notion [by a juror] as to . . . guilt or innocence, without more’ is insufficient to establish a claim

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625–26, 638–39, 666–67). Miller fails to offer any evidence that any of the jurors

were biased against him. Instead, he simply points out that some of the jurors were

exposed to pretrial publicity about the case. However, the mere fact that some

jurors were exposed to pretrial publicity about Miller’s case does not establish that

any juror was biased again him. See Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1521

(11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f jurors can lay aside preconceptions and base their verdict on

the evidence adduced at trial, they need not be completely unaware of the facts of

a given case.”). 

Based on the lack of evidence demonstrating bias, this court concludes that

the state court reasonably determined that trial counsel’s performance during voir

dire did not prejudice Miller. See Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir.

2001) (holding that petitioner did not establish prejudice when he failed to adduce

any evidence that a juror was biased in favor of the death penalty); Van Poyck v.

Fla. Dep’t. Of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1328–29 (11thCir 2002) (finding no prejudice

when each juror unequivocally stated that he or she could render a verdict based

solely on the evidence and instructions given by the trial judge). Likewise, the state

of prejudicial pretrial publicity.” Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1462 (11th Cir. 1993) (alterations

in original) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).

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court reasonably determined that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing

to present this claim.

2. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object

to the admission of testimony and photographs during the guilt

phase of trial 

Miller alleges that appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to gruesome testimony and photographs of the

victims introduced during the testimony of the state’s forensic scientists, Dr.

Angello Della Manna and Dr. Stephen Pustilnik. (Doc. 1, at 143, 80–87). During

the guilt phase, Dr. Della Manna presented testimony concerning blood patterns at

the crime scene. The State used Dr. Della Manna’s testimony to introduce graphic

photographs of the victims and the crime scenes. Similarly, Dr. Pustilnik analyzed

photos of the gunshot wounds and testified as to the pain the victims would have

suffered prior to death. Miller argues that the evidence admitted through the

testimony of Dr. Della Manna and Dr. Pustilnik was irrelevant to the issue of

Miller’s guilt and only served to inflame the jury against Miller. 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted from habeas

review because the state court determined that Miller failed to comply with state

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procedural rules by abandoning the claim on appeal. Respondent is correct. The

Rule 32 Circuit Court observed:

Miller failed to ask trial counsel a single question regarding why trial

counsel did not object to certain testimony or allegedly prejudicial

photographs. Nor did Miller offer any evidence that would establish

that the testimony and photographs of the victims and crime scene were

actually irrelevant and inflammatory in this case. Therefore, this Court

denies this claim because Miller has abandoned the claim.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2057) (citing Brooks v. State, 929 So. 2d 491, 498 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2008) (holding that a Rule 32 petitioner’s failure to ask counsel “any

questions concerning her reasons for not pursuing any of the claims” in the Rule 32

petition constituted an abandonment of those issues)). See also, e.g., Hooks v. State,

21 So. 3d 772, 788 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that when an appellant does not

present evidence addressing certain claims at an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 32

petition, the state court can conclude that he has abandoned the claims, and is no

required to review them). Because the Rule 32 Circuit Court determined that Miller

abandoned this claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted from habeas review. See

Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that state

court’s determination that a claim was abandoned barred federal habeas review). 

b. Merits

Alternatively, the claimwould be due to be denied because it is without merit. 

Although finding the claim to be procedurally barred, the Rule 32 Circuit Court

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stated that this claim was also due to be denied because the testimony and

photographs relating to the crime scene were properly admissible under Alabama

law. The court pointed out that under Alabama law, “gruesome and ghastly”

photographs showing external wounds, even though cumulative or related to

undisputed matters, are nevertheless admissible “so long asthey shed some light on

the issues being tried.” (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2058) (citing Sneed v. State, 1 So.

3d 104, 132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)). The court concluded that because the

evidence would have been admitted notwithstanding trial counsel’s objection, trial

counsel could not be ineffective for failing to make such an objection. (C.R. Vol.

43, Tab. 75, at 2059). 

This court agrees with the state court’s reasoning. Because counsel had no

basis for objecting to the admission of the photographs and testimony under

Alabama law, trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to object. See

Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel was

not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious objection). Because no

objection would have been successful, Miller was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s

failure to object. Therefore, this ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is

without merit, and appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to

raise it.

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3. Miller’s claim that trial counsel conducted an ineffective crossexamination of crucial prosecution witnesses.

Miller allegesthat appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine crucial prosecution witnesses. 

(Doc. 1, at 83–87, 144). Specifically, Miller argues that trial counsel should have

cross-examined: (1) Dr. Angello Della Manna; (2) Dr. Steven Pustilnik regarding

his foundation for asserting that the victims felt severe pain as result of the gunshot

wounds they suffered; (3) Johnny Cobb regarding the fact that neither Holdbrooks

nor Yancy had been spreading rumors about Miller; (4) David Andrew Adderhold

regarding, (a) the fact that Miller allowed Adderhold to leave the scene of the

shootings unharmed, and (b) Miller’s good work performance at Post Airgas prior

to the shootings; and (5) Sergeant Stuart Davidson regarding the fact that Miller did

not attempt to escape during the lengthy time period that police pursued him down

the interstate after he committed the shootings. (Doc. 1, 80–87).

a. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted because the

state court determined that this claim was abandoned. (Doc. 16, at 91). This court

agrees.

The Rule 32 Circuit Court observed that Miller failed to ask trial counsel any

questions regarding trial counsel’s strategy or offer any evidence as to how he was

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prejudiced by trial counsel’s lack of a cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. 

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2059). The court concluded that Miller had abandoned

the claim, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit

Court’s determination. 

As discussed previously, the state court’s determination that a petitioner

abandoned a claim on appeal bars habeas review. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d

1043, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, to the extent that Miller alleges that

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that trial counsel was

ineffective in the manner in which he conducted cross-examination, the claim is

procedurally barred under adequate and independent state grounds. 

b. Merits

Additionally, even if not for the procedural bar, this claim would be due to

be denied. The record reflects that during the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Miller

questioned trial counsel regarding his performance in cross-examining the State’s

witnesses. However, Miller only asked trial counsel about his decision not to crossexamine Dr. Della Manna, and his decision not to question Dr. Pustilnik about Dr.

Pustilnik’s testimony that Miller shot Holdbrooks at close range. 

When asked about his decision to not cross-examine Dr. Della Manna, trial

counsel stated that he believed that Dr. Della Manna’s testimony was frivolous and

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that the best approach to countering Dr. Della Manna’s testimony was to “mock”

histestimony before the jury in trial counsel’s closing statement. (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab.

30, at 41). When asked about his decision not to challenge Dr. Pustilnik’s

testimony regarding the distance from which Miller shot Holdbrooks, trial counsel

stated that he believed the important thing to the jury would have been that Miller

killed Holdbrooks while Holdbrooks was struggling for his life, not the distance

from which Miller fired the final shot.

21

 (C.R. Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at 43–45). 

Thus, to the extent that Miller questioned trial counsel about his performance

in connection with cross-examination, the record reflects that trial counsel made a

strategic decision to limit his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. 

Additionally, because the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy in not

questioning the remainder of the State’s witnesses, this court must assume that trial

counsel had sound reasons for limiting his cross-examination. See Chandler v.

United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An ambiguous or silent

record is not sufficient to disprove the strong and continuing presumption [of

effective representation.]”). 

21

 Appellate counsel could not remember Holdbrooks’ name during his questioning of

trial counsel, but instead referred to him as “the gentleman that was crawling up the hall.” (C.R.

Vol. 9, Tab. 30, at 42).

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Finally, the claim is due to be denied because Miller cannot show any

resulting prejudice. Overwhelming evidence supports Miller’s guilt that crossexamination of these witnesses could not overcome. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d

1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1995). Because this trial-counsel claim is without merit,

appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise it.

4. Miller’s claim that trial counsel wasineffective for failing to object

to portions of the State’s guilt phase closing argument

Miller allegesthat his appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s statements in the guiltphase closing argument that Miller made eye contact with Yancy and Holdbrooks

at the time that he fatally shot each of them. (Doc. 1, at 90). 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent again contendsthat this claim is procedurally barred because the

Rule 32 Circuit Court found the claim to be procedurally barred. Respondent is

again correct. The Rule 32 Circuit Court observed that Miller failed to present any

evidence regarding this claim at the Rule 32 hearings and held that Miller had

abandoned the claim. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2064–65). Therefore, habeas

review of this claim is barred.

b. Merits

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Alternatively, this claim would also be due to be dismissed on the merits

because, even assuming that the State’s guilt-phase argument was improper, Miller

fails to allege any prejudice stemming from trial counsel’s decision not to object. 

Indeed, Miller cannot establish any resulting prejudice as the outcome of the guilt

phase would not have been different if trial counsel would have objected. Because

Miller cannot show the requisite prejudice to establish his underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim, he cannotshow prejudice resulting fromappellate

counsel’s failure to present this claim.

5. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in his guilt-phase

closing argument

Miller alleges that his appellate counsel should have argued that his trial

counsel was ineffective in his guilt-phase closing argument. (Doc. 1, at 143). 

Specifically, Miller contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

argue that Miller lacked the mens rea to commit capital murder, for essentially

conceding that Miller was responsible for the killings, and for distancing himself

from Miller by stating that he was not proud to represent Miller. (Doc. 1, 91–92). 

a. No Procedural Default

This claim was properly raised on collateral appeal and fully exhausted. 

Therefore, this court willreview the state court’s decision under AEDPA deference. 

b. Merits

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The Rule 32 Circuit Court held:

This Court denies Miller's claim because he has failed to meet his

burden of proof of demonstrating that his trial counsel's performance

was deficient under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Ala. R. CRIM. P.,

32.7(d). Johnson's closing argument was reasonable based both on the

tactical decision to focus on the penalty phase of trial and his overall

strategy of not presenting frivolous arguments in order to win

credibility with the jury. [Direct Appeal, R. 1261–64.] As noted above,

Johnson continually testified that he strategically chose to focus on the

penalty phase of Miller's trial in order to save Miller's life. [Motion for

New Trial Hearing, R. 80; February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 219.] In

an attempt to bolster his chances of success during the penalty phase,

Johnson made a tactical decision to emphasize to the jury that he would

not be presenting frivolous evidence or arguments during the guilt

phase. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 143, 219.]

Similar to his comments during opening statements, Johnson echoed to

the jury during closing arguments that he was not going to present a

frivolous defense such as arguing a second gunman existed or

challenging the fact that the prosecution could not match the bullets

taken from the victims to Miller's gun. [Direct Appeal, R. 1261–62.]

Johnson reminded the jury of the State's burden and implored the jury

to listen to the judge'sinstructions on the law and render a verdict based

on the facts and consistent with their oath. [Direct Appeal, R. 1263.]

Miller has failed to present any evidence which would establish that

[Johnson's] continual effort during closing argumentsto gain credibility

with the jury in order to make an effective penalty phase argument was

unreasonable.

Johnson's decision to not argue that Miller did not have intent to

commit capital murder during closing arguments was consistent with

his overall trial strategy of focusing on the penalty phase of the trial.

[February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 219.] Moreover, Johnson's

comments about his representation of Miller were consistent with this

strategy as well. Johnson told the jury that he was proud of his

representation of Miller, but in an effort to win favor with the jury, also

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stated he was still not proud of what happened during the shootings:

‘And I at least am proud at this point that I have participated in this. It

does not remove any degree the shame of what happened. It does not

make me proud that I'm representing someone who the evidence is

fairly convincing, I must concede to you, did what he did.’

[Direct Appeal, R. 1263–64.] During the evidentiary hearing, Johnson

explained that this statement could not be viewed in isolation, but as

part of a larger goal of not alienating the jury during the guilt phase to

attempt to win favor with the jury. [February 2008 Rule 32 hearing, R.

142–43.]

When viewed in the context of Johnson's entire trialstrategy, Johnson's

closing argument was reasonable attempt to gain credibility with the

jury during the guilt phase in order to attempt to get a favorable result

in the penalty phase—the focus of Johnson's strategy. Based on this

approach, Miller has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's decision

was unreasonable or that his performance during closing arguments was

deficient under Strickland. Therefore, this claim is denied.

This claim is also denied because Miller failed to meet his burden of

proof of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's

closing argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Ala. R. CRIM. P;

32.7(d). Miller has presented no evidence concerning the impact of

Johnson's statements on the jury, nor has Miller demonstrated a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase of his trial

would have been different had Johnson not conducted his closing

argument in this manner. In general, statements of counsel ‘are usually

valued by the jury at their true worth and are not expected to become

factorsin the formation of the verdict.’ Minor, 914 So.2d at 417. Miller

offered nothing more in support of his claim of ineffectivenessthan the

bare, conclusory allegation that Johnson's closing argument was

improper and that it prejudiced the jury, without proving specific facts

that demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, Miller has not met his burden

of demonstrating prejudice under Strickland and therefore, this claim

is denied.

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(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 110–14).

The Rule 32 Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court’sruling, holding that

“[b]ecause [Miller]failed to establish that hisineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claim is meritorious, he has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present this claim.” (C.R. Vol.

43, Tab 76, at 72) (internal citation omitted). 

After reviewing the record, this court concludes that the state court’s

determination was reasonable. Trial counsel’s guilt-phase closing argument was

consistent with trial counsel’s overall strategy of maintaining credibility with the

jury for the penalty phase of trial. This court has already stated that this approach

to trying the case was not unreasonable, and Miller fails to demonstrate that trial

counsel’s performance was a professionally unreasonable error under Strickland.

Moreover, as the Rule 32 Circuit Court found, Miller failed to demonstrate

that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for trial counsel’s

closing statement. The evidence of Miller’s guilt is overwhelming, and he has not

offered a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different but for trial counsel’s statement. 

Because the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is not

meritorious, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise the

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claim. Therefore, the state court’s determination was reasonable, and Miller is not

entitled to habeas relief. 

6. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

request jury instructions to protect Miller’s rights.

Miller claims that appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for requesting certain jury instructions and failing to request others. 

(Doc. 1, 92–94, 144). First, Miller faults trial counsel for requesting that the court

instruct the jury that even if a defendant pleads guilty to capital murder, the state

must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller contends that

this instruction implied that Miller was not contesting his guilt of capital murder. 

Next, Miller argues that trial counsel was ineffective for asking the court not to

instruct the jury on the impermissibility of drawing an adverse inference from

Miller’s decision not to take the stand. Miller argues that the court’s failure to

provide this instruction would also have misled the jury into believing that Miller

was not contesting his guilt. Finally, Miller arguesthat trial counsel wasineffective

for failing to request a clarifying instruction on the heightened mens rea

requirement for the offense of capital murder, which Miller argues was necessary

for the court to distinguish between capital and non-capital intentional murder.

 (Doc. 1, at 144). 

a. Procedural Default

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The Rule 32 Circuit Court denied this claim, holding that Miller had

abandoned this claimbecause he failed to present any evidence relating to this claim

during the Rule 32 hearings. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2066-67). The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals also denied the claim because Miller failed to comply

with state procedural rules. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 76). Therefore, this court

findsthat this claim is barred from habeas review. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d

1043, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 2002).

b. Merits

Even assuming this claim were not procedurally defaulted and reviewing the

claims de novo, Miller still has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas

relief because he has failed to produce evidence sufficient to meet either prong of

Strickland. As the Rule 32 Circuit Court pointed out, Miller failed to present any

evidence at the Rule 32 hearing regarding trial counsel’s strategy in requesting or

failing to requestspecific jury instructions. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 116). A silent

record as to an attorney’s motives for taking a particular action is insufficient to

overcome the presumption that the attorney had good reasons for acting as he did. 

See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (“The appellate court may

have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by

counsel had a sound strategicmotive or wastaken because the counsel’s alternatives

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were even worse.”). Thus, this court must assume that trial counsel pursued a

reasonable strategy in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 

Additionally, Miller fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the jury instructions

that were given. The jury instructions clearly stated that Miller was not pleading

guilty to the charged offenses and that the jurymust determine Miller’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. The Circuit Court provided the following instruction:

Now, to the charge of capital murder, the defendant has entered a plea

of not guilty. And, of course, that applies to the charge of capital

murder and any lesser included offenses. 

The plea of not guilty casts the burden of proof on the State of Alabama

to convince you, the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the

defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment. 

(C.R. Vol. 8, R. 16, at 1287–88) (emphasis added). 

The Circuit Court also distinguished between the elements of capital murder

and the elements of the lesser offense of intentional murder:

Now, in order to find the defendant guilty of this lesser included

offense of intentional murder, you must find the defendant committed

an intentional murder of only one person or that, should you find an

intentional murder or two or more persons, that the state failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders of two or more persons

were not - - were pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.

(C.R. Vol. 8, R 16, at 1286). Thus, the Circuit Court’s guilt-phase jury instructions

sufficiently informed the jury that Miller was not pleading guilty and provided the

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jury with the necessary information to differentiate between capital and non-capital

murder. Because the Circuit Court correctly instructed the jury, and the jury still

found Miller guilty, this court findsthat Miller would not be entitled to habeasrelief

even if his claim were not procedurally defaulted.

7. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for relying on Dr.

Scott as the sole mitigation witness during the penalty phase of

trial

Miller contends that appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel

was ineffective for relying solely on Dr. Scott during the penalty phase. (Doc. 1,

at 144). First, Miller argues that Dr. Scott’s testimony was insufficient because he

was not hired as a mitigation expert and had not conducted a sufficient investigation

to present the full range of evidence that a mitigation expert would be expected to

present at trial.

22

(Doc. 1, 101). Next, Miller arguesthat trial counsel was deficient

for failing to call the following members of Miller’s family: “Mr. Miller’s mother,

Barbara Miller, half-sister, Cheryl Ellison, half-brother, Jeff Carr, Jeff’s wife,

Sandra Carr, Barbara’s brother, George Carr, aunt Hazel Miller, and cousin, Cindy

Carr . . . Mr. Miller’s brother, Richard Miller, niece, Alicia Sanford, nephew, Jacob

22

 Trial counsel did not employ Dr. Scott to put on a mitigation case. Instead, he hired Dr.

Scott for the purpose of establishing two mitigating factors under Alabama law—first, that Miller

was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the

shootings, and second, that Miller’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. (C.R. Vol. 8,

Tab. 30, at 187–88). 

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Connell, and cousin Brian Miller . . . .” (Doc. 1, at 106). Miller contends that as a

result of trial counsel’s decision to only present Dr. Scott’s testimony during the

penalty phase, the jury never heard about the criminal environment Miller

experienced as a child, the extent of physical abuse Miller suffered, Miller’s

positive work history, Miller’s good character, and Miller’s positive relationships

with his family. 

a. No Procedural Default

Respondent contendsthat this claimis not properly exhausted because Miller

never argued that trial counsel was ineffective for relying on Dr. Scott as the sole

mitigation witness. (Doc. 16). However, after reviewing the record, this court finds

that Miller did raise this claim in both his Rule 32 petition as well as his petition to

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 21, Tab. 46, at 443–51;

Rule 32 R. Vol. 32, Tab. 63, at 82–104). Thus, this court will review the state

court’s rejection of this claim under AEDPA deference. 

b. Merits

In discussing this claim, the Rule 32 Circuit Court addressed both the

prejudice and performance prong of Strickland, and the Rule 32 Appellate Court

affirmed the Circuit Court’s reasoning as to both prongs. However, because lack

of prejudice is clear, this court will limit its analysis to the prejudice prong. The

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Rule 32 Circuit Court found that Miller failed to establish prejudice because the

evidence that Miller alleges should have been presented through Miller’s family

members or through a mitigation expert would simply be cumulative of the evidence

presented by Dr. Scott and would have been insufficient to establish any other

mitigating factor. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2085–95). The court concluded by

stating that Miller failed to show that the admission of additional mitigating

evidence would have altered the outcome of the proceeding in light of the strength

of the aggravating circumstances that the murders were heinous, atrocious, and

cruel. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2096–97). 

As discussed by this court in Part VIII.C.5, Miller cannot show a reasonable

probability that the admission of additional mitigating evidence would have altered

the court’s decision to sentence Miller to death. Therefore, regardless of whether

trial counsel acted unreasonably in only calling Dr. Scott to testify during the

penalty phase, Miller cannot establish prejudice. See Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d

1288, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that even if trial counsel acted unreasonably,

petitioner was not entitled to habeasrelief because no reasonable probability existed

that additional mitigating evidence would have led the jury to sentence the

petitioner to life rather than death. Accordingly, the state courts reasonably

determined that Miller’s trial counsel was not ineffective, and, therefore, the state

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courts reasonably determined that Miller’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claim was also without merit.

8. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move

for a directed verdict during the penalty phase

Miller allegesthat appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict based on the State’s failure to

present comparative evidence necessary for the jury to determine that the killings

were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital crimes.” 

(Doc. 1, at 144). Miller argues that by its very terms, the “especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel” aggravating factor requires the jury to compare the heinousness

of the crime with the heinousness of other capital offenses. 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted from habeas

review based on Miller’s failure to comply with state rules. (Doc. 16, at 96). 

However, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, although noting that Miller

failed to raise this claim sufficiently in his Rule 32 petition, nevertheless addressed

the claim on the merits. Because the last state court to examine this claim did not

rely on a procedural rule, this court finds that the claim is not procedurally

defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (recognizing that

a claim is procedurally defaulted when the last state court to examine a claim states

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clearly and explicitly that the claim is barred based on petitioner’s failure to follow

state procedural rules). Therefore, the court will review the state court’s

determination under AEDPA deference.

b. Merits

In addressing the claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out

that the Alabama Supreme Court had previously rejected a defendant’s argument

that the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating factor required a

comparative case. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 74); see Ex Parte Bankhead, 585 So.

2d 112, 125 (Ala. 1991). In Bankhead, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that

“[a]lthough a very narrow and literal reading of the statute may suggest that such

a comparison is required, it would be virtually impossible for [Circuit Courts] to

implement.” 585 So. 2d at 125. Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court instructed

that the question under the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating

factor was whether the murder was “conscienceless or pitiless” and “unnecessarily

torturous to the victim,” and that the statute did not require the state to present

comparator cases to establish the factor. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Relying

on Bankhead, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that trial counsel

could not have been ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on this

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ground because the State was not required to present other capital cases for

comparison under Alabama law. 

In his reply brief, Miller argues that, although Bankhead recognized that

Alabama law did not require a comparative case to establish the aggravating factor,

subsequent cases have reached the opposite conclusion. (Doc. 22, at 170). 

Specifically, Miller points to Smith v. State, 756 So. 2d 892, 912–13 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1998), aff’d, 756 So. 2d 957 (Ala. 2000). 

The issue in Smith was whether the State improperly solicited testimony from

a police officer comparing the murder in that case with murders in other capital

crimesin terms of heinousness, atrociousness, and cruelty. Id. at 912. The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the police officer’s testimony was

properly admissible because “[i]n determining whether a capital crime is especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the fact finder can compare the murder at issue with

other capital crimes.” Id. at 912 (emphasis added). However, contrary to Miller’s

contention, Smith does not stand for the proposition that Alabama law requires a

comparative case to establish the “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel”

aggravating factor. Instead, Smith standsfor exactly what it saysitstandsfor—that

“the factfinder can compare the murder at issue with other capital crimes.” Id. 

Indeed, subsequent to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Smith,

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the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed its decision in Bankhead that the “especially

heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating factor did not require that the State to

present comparative criteria for the jury to find the aggravating factor. See Ex parte

Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 389 (Ala. 2004). 

Because Alabama law does notrequire the State to present a comparative case

to establish the “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating factor, Miller

was not entitled to a directed verdict based on the lack of a comparative case. See

Hallford v. Culliver, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1268–69 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (rejecting

argument that Alabama law requires a comparative case to determine whether a

crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”). Thus, trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to argue that Miller was entitled to a directed verdict on this

ground, and appellate counsel could not be ineffective for failing to present this

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on appeal. Thus, the court finds that

the states courts reasonably determined this claim to be without merit.

9. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in connection with

his penalty-phase closing argument

Miller next contends that appellate counsel should have argued that trial

counsel was ineffective in his penalty-phase closing argument for failing to focus

on Miller’s good character and his diminished capacity at the time of the offense. 

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(Doc. 1, at 144). Miller contends that trial counsel made numerous unreasonable

statements in his penalty-phase closing argument. (Doc. 1, at 112–15). 

First, Miller argues that trial counsel conceded the existence of the

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating factor when he stated:

[T]here is only one possible aggravating circumstance in this case and

that is that this is an extremely heinous, atrocious or cruel crime as

compared to other capital murders . . . I can’t imagine any crime where

a life is taken that wouldn’t be cruel. I can’t imagine any crime where

victims don’t suffer and their families don’t suffer.

(Doc. 1, at 113). Next, Miller alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to point out that the State had failed to produce any evidence showing how Miller’s

case compared to other capital offenses. Miller also faults trial counsel for failing

to argue that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factor. Finally,

Miller argues that the theme of trial counsel’s argument—that “no matter what

someone does, they don’t deserve to die”—was unreasonable given the fact that 10

out of the 14 jurors and alternates had stated during voir dire that they were not

opposed to the death penalty. 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally barred because Miller

failed to comply with state procedural rules. The record supports Respondent’s

contention. The Rule 32 Circuit Court held that Miller had abandoned this claim

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because he failed to ask trial counsel a single question regarding why trial counsel

adopted this particular approach to his closing argument. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75,

at 2098–99). The court also pointed out that Miller failed to present any evidence

showing what a reasonable attorney would have argued during closing arguments

or how Miller suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s actions. (C.R. Vo. 43,

Tab. 75, at 2099). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appealslikewise found that this

claim was procedurally barred from review because Miller had abandoned the

claim. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 76). Thus, this court finds that this claim is

procedurally barred from habeas review. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,

1066–67 (11th Cir. 2002).

b. Merits

Even without the procedural bar, this claim would still be due to be dismissed

on the merits under a de novo review. Miller’s argument is essentially that trial

counsel should have presented different arguments to the jury. However, because

Miller failed to question trial counsel about his strategy regarding his closing

statement, no evidence regarding why trial counsel adopted this particular approach

to his closing argument. This silent record cannot overcome the presumption that

trial counsel acted reasonably in choosing his approach to his closing argument. 

See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (“Counsel’s competence .

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. . is presumed and the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his

attorney’srepresentation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and

that the challenged action was not sound strategy.”). 

Additionally, a review of Miller’s closing statement demonstrates that it was

not so poor as to be objectively unreasonable. The following is the entirety of trial

counsel’s closing argument:

May it please the court, ladies and gentlemen.

I know by now you have been sitting for a long time, a long number of

days and you don’t want anybody else to be long winded; however,

please grant me whatever time it takes, and I will be just as brief as I

can, to say what I’ve got to say and what I’m feeling about this at this

point.

We are at thatstage where it is - - something of a balancing act here and

- - but there is a very mechanical part of this and it almost seems to me

to be obscene to talk about the mechanics of doing this, but here are the

mechanics and the judge will tell you what they are after we get through

here, but here are the mechanics.

You first have got to make a decision as a group and it has to be a

unanimous decision, the same way your verdict was unanimous, but

there is an aggravating circumstance in this case. The judge will tell

you if you cannot first unanimously agree that there is an aggravating

circumstance in this case, then you mustsimply say life, we recommend

life without parole.

If you unanimously agree that there is an aggravating circumstance,

then at that point the team effort is over, everything you’ve done up

until this point has been something of a team effort, you had to have a

unanimous verdict of guilt, you have to have a unanimous verdict on

the aggravating circumstance, but at that point you are one on one with

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Alan Miller because at that point you are deciding what you in your

conscience to do with him. 

And if it was humanly possible to make eye contact with twelve people

at once, that’s what I would be doing at this point because I want to talk

to you now about that decision if you get that far.

Remember to get that far you’ve got to unanimously decide that there

is an aggravating circumstance and there is only one possible

aggravating circumstance in this case and that is that this is an

extremely heinous, atrocious or cruel crime as compared to other capital

murders.

There again, it seems obscene to me to talk about the atrocity of crimes

of the heinousness of the crime.

I can’t imagine any crime where a life is taken that wouldn’t be cruel. 

I can’t imagine any crime where victims don’t suffer and their families

don’t suffer. But what you’re dealing with here now is not whether a

crime in and of itself is atrocious, heinous and cruel, it’s whether this

particular crime is extremely heinous, atrocious or cruel as compared

to other capital murders.

So already you’ve got a relative term there. If you find unanimously

that yes, this one is, then you consider mitigating circumstances. Some

of them are set out in the law. I have read to Dr. Scott two of them. 

There is a third one, the judge will charge you that there are three

mitigating circumstances that have been presented to you for your

consideration. One of them has been - - at least one has been agreed

upon and that isthat Alan Miller has no prior criminal history. The law

considers that a mitigating circumstance.

Another one has to do - - I will have to read them because I just can’t

recall them. Second one if it was committed while the defendant was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; that is

a mitigating circumstance.

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The rational [sic] I don’t need to sit here and tell you. Greatest injustice

of all is the equal treatment of unequals. If you think that you are

dealing with an unequal here, don’t treat them equally, the same way

you would to me.

The third one of the statutory mitigating circumstances is whether

capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or

to conform his conduct to requirements of law which was substantially

impaired.

For reasons that Dr. Scott stated to you and he can present those to you

much more eloquently than I can and did. Those are three that at this

point I suggest to you are rebutted.

Now, it’s not a mathematical test anyway. The fact that we have three

to possibly their one doesn’t mean that this- - that you can’t impose the

death penalty. But actually Mr. Ladner - - what I suggest to you is the

most mitigating of all circumstance is that we’re on the same page on

one thing, what Mr. Ladner said was the reason that you impose this

death penalty is to prevent Mr. Miller and others like him from doing

these kinds of things.

Now, think about that a minute. Is that going to prevent what Mr.

Miller did? Is it going to prevent anyone else from doing it? It has

nothing to do with prevention. But perhaps we can do something here

that might and wouldn’t that be the most mitigating circumstance of all

because the only way it seems to me that you can prevent an offense

from being committed is to impose the penalty before the crime and

surely we haven’t become that blood thirsty.

But there perhaps may be a way to use this to prevent something and

that would be somewhere we have to start, we have to work into our

national character, this notion that it really doesn’t matter what you do,

you deserve to live. That is not a sympathetic approach. That, I

suggest to you, is the only approach that keeps anyone from going out

and doing what we see and hear and read about in the papers day after

day and we keep pulling our hair out and we keep sitting around and

saying, how in the world, what is wrong. Because in all my young life,

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I grew up like all of you did, I’m sure, around all types of people, some

of them pretty doggone mean, I wouldn’t fool with them.

But not one person in my young life do I ever remember suggesting that

they wanted to kill their parents, that they wanted to blow up a school,

that they wanted to just go in and mow down people because theymight

belong into a particular group.

And that mentality, however, has become pervasive in our society. And

when I struggle, like I’m sure you must, with how do we stop this stuff,

I can only come to one answer and that is we have to set as our number

one priority when we define values for ourselves and our children that

no matter what someone does, they don’t deserve to die because any

other - - by any other definition, we get down to quantifying this stuff

which seems to me just not to make good sense. 

Because if we believe, if we continue to believe that we can refine our

system here and we can sit here and use terms like I’ve used, I can’t

even remember the terms that I’ve already said here, and say, okay, this

is death, this is life, this is death, this is life, depends on whether these

words mean what they mean or this particular situation fits into these

words. As long as we’re willing to do that, and as long as we can

confine that analysis to the sophistication of a courtroom, then we’re

going to continue to see what we see every day. And we’re going to

struggle with children when we try to explain or understand how in the

world could you kill a classmate, well, they deserve to die.

Just like I said to you before, the only way to have prevented this crime

- - and I know everyone of you right now just like - - all of your hearts

have got to hurt, wishing that you could have prevented this crime. Just

like I wish I could have prevented this crime.

But I suggest to you that the only way this crime could have been

prevented was on the morning of August the 5th, I believe that if Alan

Miller, if I had known what was going to go on, and I’m sure

everybody in here would do the same thing, if you had known that this

was about to happen, you would have done what you could to prevent

it.

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So ask yourself this, if you had seen Alan Miller that morning and had

a clue that this was going to go on and you could have told him one of

two things, you could have said, Alan, if you go in there and do this,

you may lose your own life or you could have said, Alan, no matter

what anyone has done to you, they don’t deserve to die for it.

Now, which one of those two ideas would have prevented this from

happening. I will reiterate what I said earlier and that is that you’re on

a stage, there’s a crowd out here and the crowd is screaming for you to

kill him, but you have got to think long and hard, please, about what I

have said.

Now, you may have noticed that every time I have spoken here the state

has come up right behind me, they will do it again. That’s because

that’s the mechanics of a trial. And then I will sit there and I will bite

my tongue while they talk to you and bite my lip and I won’t get a

chance to stand back up, it won’t be because that I agree with what

they’re saying, it won’t be because I do not believe I have a better

answer for anything they might say, it will be because there has to be

a stopping point and that is it.

Please, all I ask of you is to consider those things that you have heard

in this courtroom in this phase of the hearing, consider those thingsthat

I have suggested to you might not just mitigate this offense but that

might mitigate any future victims. Let’s think about those people,

okay.

Thank you very much.

(C.R. Vol 8, Tab. 24, at 1409–17).

Trial counsel’s theme in his penalty-phase closing argument echoed that of

his penalty-phase opening statement—that no one deservesto die regardless of what

they have done or what the jurors might think about them. Although Miller

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contends that this approach was unreasonable given that ten of the fourteen jurors

and alternates had stated they favored of the death penalty, this court findsthatsuch

an approach falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. 

Additionally, given the strength of the State’s case showing the brutal nature of

Miller’s crimes, the court finds that a different closing argument would not have

resulted in a lesser sentence or that Miller’s remarks in any way undermined the

reliability of the outcome of the penalty phase. See Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t. Of

Corrs, 578 F.3d 1227, 1251–52 (11th Cir 2009). Therefore, the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claimwould be due to be denied on the merits even if not

procedurally barred.

10. Miller’s claim that trial counsel wasineffective for failing to object

to the court’s penalty-phase jury instructions

Miller allegesthat appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the court’s instruction that the jury was making

a “recommendation.” (Doc. 1, at 144). Miller alleges that the Circuit Court

diminished the jury’ssense of sentencing responsibility by repeatedly emphasizing

that the jury would be making only a recommendation to the court regarding the

death sentence and failing to advise the jurors that any aspect of their decision was

binding on the Circuit Court. According to Miller, these actions violated Miller’s

Eighth Amendment rights under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328–29

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(1985) (holding that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on

a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the

responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests

elsewhere”). 

a. Procedural Default

This claim is procedurally defaulted for failure to exhaust because Miller,

although raising this claim in his Rule 32 petition, failed to raise this claim before

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (See Rule 32 R. Vol. 38, Tab. 63, at viii). 

Thus, this claim is barred from habeas review. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

92 (2006) (“A state prisoner is generally barred fromobtaining federal habeasrelief

unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claim through one ‘complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.’”) (quoting O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).

b. Merits

Alternatively, this claim is due to be dismissed on the merits under a de novo

review because the CircuitCourt’sjury instructions were proper, and therefore, trial

counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to object. Under Alabama law,

the jury’s role in sentencing is to render an advisory verdict recommending a

sentence to the trial judge. Ala. Code 1975 §13A-5-46. Alabama courts have

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repeatedly recognized that “the instructions of the trial court accurately informing

the jury . . . that its sentence verdict was ‘advisory’ and a ‘recommendation’ . . .

does not violate Caldwell.” Martin v. State, 548 So. 2d 488, 494 (Ala. Crim. App.

1988), affirmed, 548 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 (1989); see

also Harris v. State, 2 So. 3d 880, 906 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Because the Circuit

Court’s instructions were proper, trial counsel could not have been ineffective for

failing to raise an objection. See Bearden v. State, 825 So. 2d 868, 872 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2001) (“[C]ounsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise a baseless

objection.”); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001) (counsel is not

ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious objection). Thus, Miller cannot

demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective based on his failure to raise this

claim, and Miller is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. See Hallford v.

Culliver, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1281–82 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (rejecting identical

argument). 

11. Miller’s claimthat trial counsel wasineffective in failing to request

a special verdict form

Miller next alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue

that trial counsel was ineffective regarding the verdict form the trial court provided

to the jurors. (Doc. 1, at 11, 144). At the close of the penalty phase, the court

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provided the jurors a general jury form that asked only the number of votes for life

imprisonment and the number of votes for the death penalty. 

Miller alleges that trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form

that would have required the jurors to first explicitly indicate whether they had

unanimously found the existence of the aggravating circumstance—a prerequisite

finding necessary for Miller to be eligible for the death sentence—before

determining whether to recommend life or death. (Doc. 1, at 118). Miller

highlights the fact that only ten out of the twelve jurors voted for death, and argues

that because of trial counsel’s failure to request a special verdict form, the record

is unclear whether all twelve jurors found the existence of an aggravating factor. 

(Doc. 1, at 144). 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent correctly asserts that this claim is procedurally barred from

review because Miller failed to raise the claim in compliance with state procedural

rules. (Doc. 16, at 96). The Rule 32 Circuit Court determined that Miller had

abandoned this claim because he failed to ask trial counsel any questions regarding

his decision not to request a special verdict form and because Miller failed to ask

any questions that would establish how he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s

decision. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2100–01). The Alabama Court of Appeals also

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found that this claim was procedurally barred from review because Miller had

abandoned the claim. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 76). Thus, the claim is barred from

habeas review. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 2002). 

b. Merits

Absent a procedural bar, this claim would also be due to be dismissed

because the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is without merit. The trial

court adequately instructed the jury that they must first unanimously find the

existence of an aggravating factor before determining whether to recommend the

death penalty. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that

the burden of proof is on the State of Alabama to convince each of you

beyond a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any aggravating

circumstance considered by you in determining what punishment is to

be recommended in this case. This means that before you can even

consider recommending the defendant’s punishment to be death, each

and every one of you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

based on the evidence that an aggravating circumstance exists.

. . . 

In order to consider an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary that

the jury unanimously agree upon its existence. All twelve of you must

be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating

circumstance exists in order for any of you to consider that

aggravating circumstance in determining what the sentence should be.

. . .

There must be a unanimous agreement on the existence of a particular

aggravating circumstance before it can be considered by any juror. 

There need not be a unanimous agreement on the existence of any

particular mitigating circumstance before it can be considered.

(R. Vol. 8, Tab. 27, at 1433, 1438) (emphasis added). 

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Thus, the court adequately informed the jurors that they must first

unanimously find the existence of an aggravating circumstance before

recommending death. Additionally, the State’s penalty-phase opening statement as

well as Miller’s counsel’s penalty-phase closing argument reminded the jurors that

the existence of an aggravating factor was a prerequisite to recommending a death

sentence. (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 19, at 1314–15;C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 24, at 1409–10). In

the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor stated that the State bore the burden

of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating

circumstance and that the jurors must first find the “existence of an aggravating

factor to even consider the imposition or the recommendation of the death penalty

in this case.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 19, at 1314–15). Miller’s trial counsel reiterated

this rule in his closing argument when he stated, “[t]he judge will tell you if you

cannot first unanimously agree that there is an aggravating circumstance in this

case, then you mustsimply say life, we recommend life without parole.” (C.R. Vol.

8, Tab. 24, at 1409–10). 

Based on the instructions of the court, as well as the repeated reminders of

both the prosecution and defense, Miller has offered nothing to raise even a doubt

that the jurors understood the determinations they had to make during the penalty

phase. See Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t. Of Corr., 699 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir.

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2012) (“The jury’s verdict necessarily contained [findings than an aggravating

circumstance existed] because the jury was instructed that it could not recommend

a death sentence unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more

aggravating circumstances existed.”). The jury’s recommendation of death,

although not unanimous, proves that the jury must have unanimously found the

existence of the aggravating circumstance. Thus, regardless of whether a special

verdict form had been provided to the jury, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been the same. Because Miller suffered no prejudice under Strickland, the

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is without merit and appellate counsel

cannot be ineffective for failing to raise it. Therefore, the court concludes that this

claims is due to be dismissed.

12. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing

hearing

Miller alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at the

sentencing hearing. (Doc. 1, 145; 120–23; Doc. 22, 172–78). He alleges that the

pre-sentencing investigative report prepared by the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles “woefully understated the horrible abuse Mr. Miller had suffered at the

hands of hisfather.” (Doc. 1, at 121). Miller also points out that trial counsel failed

to introduce either Dr. Scott’s or Dr. McDermott’s reports that contained detailed

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summaries of Miller’s family and background. Miller argues that the prejudice he

suffered as a result of trial counsel’s failure to present additional mitigating

evidence is apparent from Judge Crowson’s statement at sentencing that his

decision was “probably the most difficult sentence that I’ve ever had to consider”

and that “I’ve been wrestling with it for a long time.” (C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 28, at

1471, 1472). 

 a. No Procedural Default

Miller properly raised this claim on collateral appeal, and the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at

74–76). Therefore, the court reviews the determinations of the state court under

AEDPA deference. 

b. Merits

The Rule 32 Circuit Court denied this claim, making the following

determinations:

The Court denies Miller's claim because he has failed to meet his

burden of proof of demonstrating that his trial counsels’ performance

was deficient under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Ala. R. Crim. P.,

32.7(d). Alabama courts have held that ‘counsel does not necessarily

render ineffective assistance simply because he does not presented all

possible mitigating evidence.’ McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 221

(Ala. Crim. App. 2003). However, as noted above, trial counsel

presented a competent mitigating case concerning Miller's mental

health and background during the penalty phase of the trial. The trial

court presided over Miller's trial and heard all of the mitigating

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evidence presented. Simply the fact that Miller's trial counsel could

have presentedmore mitigation evidence during the sentencing hearing

does not establish deficient performance under Strickland, See

McGahee, 885 So.2d at 221 (‘Trial counsel could have called more

witnesses at the penalty-phase hearing before the trial judge, with the

hope that the additional information would have convinced the trial

judge to agree with the jury's recommendation and to sentence

McGahee to life imprisonment without parole. The same can be said

after any sentencing hearing in a capital case in which a death sentence

isimposed after the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment

without parole.’ (emphasis in original)).

Miller failed to ask trial counsel any questions regarding the reasons

why he did not call any witnesses or present evidence during the

sentencing hearing. [February 2008 Rule 32 Hearing, R. 200–01.]

Therefore, trial counsel's performance must be presumed to be

reasonable. . . .

This claim is also denied because Miller has failed to meet his burden

of proof of demonstrating that he was prejudiced. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 695; Ala. R. Crim. P., 32.7(d). Miller failed to establish what

additional evidence could have been submitted during the sentencing

hearing. Miller asked trial counsel whether he submitted Dr. Scott or

Dr. McDermott's report during the sentencing hearing before the trial

court; however, the substance of both reports had already [been]

presented during the penalty phase. Furthermore, the trial court found

three statutory mitigating circumstances to exist. Miller, 913 So.2d at

1169. Miller has failed to demonstrate what additional mitigating

circumstances could have been proven during the sentencing hearing.

Accordingly, Miller hasfailed to establish proof that he was prejudiced,

and this claim is denied.

(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 2103–05). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed the Rule 32 Circuit Court. (C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 75, at 76). 

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Although the state court addressed both the performance and prejudice prong

of Strickland, this court will limit its analysisto determining whether Miller suffered

any prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s performance. See Waters v. Thomas, 46

F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[a] court may decline to reach the performance

prong of the ineffective assistance test if convinced that the prejudice prong cannot

be satisfied”). To establish prejudice under Strickland, Miller bears the burden of

demonstrating a “reasonable probability” that he would not have received a death

sentence if trial counsel had presented the mitigating evidence that was presented

during the Rule 32 hearings. This burden becomes even greater in the context of the

AEDPA, where Miller must demonstrate that no reasonable jurist could determine

that there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different but for trial counsel’s performance. See Brooks v. Comm’r, Ala.

Dep’t. of Corrs, 719 F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the prejudice

question in this case may be close given the Circuit Court’s statements about its

struggle in deciding to sentence Miller to death, the court is persuaded that a

reasonable jurist could conclude that Miller did not suffer any prejudice. 

As this court discussed previously, the additional evidence that Miller

presented during the Rule 32 hearings was largely cumulative of the evidence that

trial counsel presented through the testimony of Dr. Scott in the penalty phase. 

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Although the pre-sentencing report did not accurately portray the abuse that Miller

suffered at the hands of his father, the Circuit Court judge heard Dr. Scott’s penaltyphase testimony during which he testified about the physical and emotional abuse

that Miller suffered. Although the court may not have heard of all of the specific

examples of abuse that Miller suffered, the court was aware that Ivan frequently hit

Miller and had even threatened him with a knife. (See C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 22, at

1350–51). The court was also aware that Miller had observed Ivan using

intravenous drugs and that Miller was raised in poverty. (See Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 31,

Tab. 59, at 416).

Given the largely cumulative nature of the mitigating evidence Miller

presented at the Rule 32 hearings, this court concludes a reasonable jurist could

conclude that the “new” mitigating evidence—evidence of Miller’s loving

relationships with his family members, his strong work history, and his family’s

history of mental illness—would have been insufficient to sway the sentencing judge

to recommend a different sentence. Thus, a reasonable jurist could concludes that

Miller’s trial counsel was not in ineffective, and, likewise, that appellate counsel was

not ineffective for failing to this claim. Accordingly, Miller fails to show that the

state court’s rejection of this claim was unreasonable, and Miller is not entitled to

habeas relief on this ground.

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13. Miller’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to bring

the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey to the trial

court’s attention

Miller allegesthat appellate counselshould have argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to notify the trial court of the Supreme Court’s decision in

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). (Doc. 1, at 145). In Apprendi, the

Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 492. Miller argues that if trial counsel had presented this

argument at the sentencing hearing, he would have been able to obtain a new

penalty-phase trial before a jury that had been informed that their determination

regarding the aggravating factor was not merely a “recommendation.” (Doc. 1, at

122). 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent correctly contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted

because Miller failed to comply with state procedural rules. (Doc. 16, at 96). Miller

failed to raise this claim in his Rule 32 petition or in the Rule 32 hearing, raising this

claims for the first time before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. In

reviewing the claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that Miller’s

failure to raise the claim before the Rule 32 Circuit Court barred review of the claim. 

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(C.R. Vol. 43, Tab. 76, at 76) (citing Arrington v. State, 716 So .2d 237, 239 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1997) (“An appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of

a Rule 32 which was not raised in the Rule 32 petition.”). Because the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appealsstated clearly that this claimis barred based upon Miller’s

failure to follow state procedural rules, the procedural default doctrine precludes

federal review of this claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991)

(“When a petitioner failsto raise his federal claimsin compliance with relevantstate

procedural rules, the state court’s refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies

as an independent and adequate ground for denying federal review.”); Cone v. Bell,

556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009).

b. Merits

Even without the procedural default, this claim is without merit. If trial

counsel had brought Apprendi to the attention of the court, Miller still would not

have been entitled to a new penalty-phase trial because the court and both counsels

informed the jurors that they must find the existence of the aggravating factor—that

the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel—beyond a reasonable doubt

before they could even consider whether to recommend the death penalty. The

Circuit Court instructed the jurors:

Now, as I stated to you before, the burden of proof is on the State of

Alabama to convince each of you beyond a reasonable doubt as to the

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existence of any aggravating circumstance considered by you in

determining what punishment is to be recommended in this case. This

meansthat before you can even consider recommending the defendant’s

punishment be death, each and every one of you must be convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence that an aggravating

circumstance exists. 

(C.R. Vol. 8, Tab. 27, at 1433). 

Based on this instruction, the court submitted to the jurors the question of

whether the state proved the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a

reasonable doubt. This instruction reflects what Apprendi requires. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 490 (“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.”). The fact that ten out of the twelve jurors recommended

sentencing Miller to death demonstrates that all of the jurors must have determined

that the aggravating circumstance existed beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brown v.

Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[J]urors are presumed to follow the

court’s instructions.”); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 876 (11th Cir. 1985

(“Jurors are presumed to follow the law as they are instructed.”); Ingram v. Zant, 26

F.3d 1047, 1053 (11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, because Miller was not entitled to a

new trial under Apprendi, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring the

case to the attention of the court. Likewise, appellate counsel could not be

ineffective for failing to present this ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

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Therefore, this court finds this claim would be due to be denied on the merits even

if it were not procedurally defaulted.

E. Miller’s Claimthat Appellate Counsel wasIneffective in the Appealto the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

In this claim, Miller sets forth numerous arguments as to appellate counsel’s

ineffectivenessregarding the brief appellate counselsubmitted to the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 1, at 145–49). Specifically, Miller allegesthat appellate

counsel’s brief presented truncated and cursory challenges to trial counsel’s guiltphase opening statement, trial counsel’s failure to present an insanity defense, trial

counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, and trial counsel’s

penalty-phase opening statement. Miller contends that but for appellate counsel’s

unreasonable representation, a reasonable probability existsthat he would have been

granted either a new trial or a new sentencing hearing. 

1. Procedural Default

Miller failed to present this claim before either the Rule 32 Circuit Court or

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. His failure to properly exhaust this claim

bars this court from granting habeas corpus relief. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135

F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state

prisoner ‘fairly presen[t] federal claims to the State courts to give the State the

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opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal

rights.’”) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). 

2. Merits

Alternatively, this claim would also be due to be denied on the merits under

a de novo standard of review. This court has examined all of the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims that Miller alleges appellate counsel failed to

adequately present in his brief and has determined all of the claims lack merit. 

Therefore, this courtfinds this ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claimalso

lacks merit.

VIII. MILLER’S CLAIM THAT HIS DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES

THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

Miller presents numerous arguments that his death sentence is

unconstitutional. First, Miller allegesthat the trial judge’s penalty-phase instructions

improperly reduced the jury’s sense of responsibility by repeatedly reminding the

jurorsthat their verdict was merely a recommendation. (Doc. 1, at 149–50). Second,

Miller contends that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536

U.S. 584 (2002), the jury was required to determine beyond a reasonable doubt both

that an aggravating circumstance existed and thatthe aggravating factors outweighed

the mitigating factors. (Doc. 1, at 150–52). Finally, Miller argues that “Miller’s

death sentence is unsupported by any verifiable jury findings as required under

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Ring.” (Doc. 1, at 152–54). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed and

rejected these arguments on direct appeal, and, as discussed below, the state court’s

rejection of these claims did not result “in a decision that was contrary to, or involve

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

States court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(d)(2).

In his first argument, Miller cites Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,

328–29 (1985) for the proposition that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest

a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe

that the responsibility for the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” To establish a

Caldwell violation, “a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury

improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.” Duggers v. Adams,

489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). In this present case, Miller’s claimof Caldwell error must

fail because the Circuit Court correctly informed the jurors of their advisory function

under Alabama law. Under Alabama law, the jury’s sentencing determination is

“advisory.” See Ala. Code § 13A–5–46 ( describing the jury’s sentencing role as

“advisory” ten separate times). Thus, the Circuit Court’s instruction informing the

jury that they were making a recommendation as to Miller’s sentence does not

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constitute a Caldwell violation. See Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th

Cir. 1997) (“The infirmity identified in Caldwell issimply absent in a case where the

jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing process.”)

(internal quotation omitted). Therefore, this argument is without merit.

Next, Miller argues that Ring requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable

doubt both the existence of an aggravating circumstance and that the aggravating

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Miller contendsthat, because

the jury was not instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors, his death sentence violates

Ring. This claim is also without merit. 

Ring only requires that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s

authorized punishment contingent on [a] finding of fact, that fact—no matter how

the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 536 U.S.

at 602. Under Alabama’ssentencing scheme, the jury’s weighing of the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances does not make a defendant eligible for a death

sentence. Instead, the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance is

determinative. See Ala. Code § 13A–5–45(f) (“Unless at least one aggravating

circumstance as defined in Section 13A–5–49 exists, the sentence shall be life

imprisonment without parole.”). The trial judge may disregard the jury’s balancing

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of the mitigating and aggravating factors. See Ala Code § 13A–5–47(e) (“While the

jury’s recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not

binding upon the court.”). Accordingly, the jury’s determination of whether the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors could not have increased the

maximum sentence for which Miller was eligible. Therefore, Ring does not require

a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the

mitigating factors, and this claim lacks merit. 

Finally, Miller contendsthat “[t]he jury’s 10-2 vote, asreflected in the general

verdict form used in Mr. Miller’s case, failed to indicate what findings, if any, the

jury made in support of Mr. Miller’s death sentence.” (Doc 1, at 152). Miller argues

that verifiable jury findings do not support his death sentence as required by Ring

because the jury was not required to enumerate explicitly in its advisory verdict that

it unanimously found the existence of a statutory aggravating factor beyond a

reasonable doubt. Miller contendsthat the jury’s splitrecommendation creates doubt

asto whether all of the jurorsfound the aggravating circumstance. In support of this

contention, Miller points out that during the course of the jury’s deliberations, the

jury sent a note to the court that read, “[C]an we have a sentence if we have the

appropriate number of required votes but we have one juror undecided?” (C.R. Vol.

8, Tab. 27, 1446). 

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This court recognizes that a system in which the jury must explicitly indicate

that it found the existence of an aggravating factor would be preferable. Indeed, the

Alabama Supreme Court has recognized as much. See Ex Parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d

1024, 1038 (Ala. 2004) (directing lower court to provide a jury form requiring the

jury to indicate whether it found the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a

reasonable doubt). However, as addressed previously, the Circuit Court instructed

the jury that before determining whether to recommend the death sentence, the jury

must first unanimously find the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a

reasonable doubt. (R. Vol. 8, Tab. 27, at 1433, 1438). The fact that ten out of the

twelve jurors recommended death demonstrates that the jurors must have found the

existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Evans v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t. Of Corr., 699 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The jury’s

verdict necessarily contained [findings than an aggravating circumstance existed]

because the jury was instructed that it could not recommend a death sentence unless

it found beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more aggravating circumstances

existed.”); United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1013–14 (11th Cir. 2011)

(finding that because the court instructed the jury that it must make a prerequisite

finding as to the existence of an element before convicting the defendant, the jury’s

guilty verdict necessarilymeant the jurorsfound the element). Because the jurymust

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have found the existence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt,

Miller’s death sentence does not violate Ring. Therefore, the state court’s rejection

of this claim was reasonable, and Miller is not entitled to relief. 

IX. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, all ofMiller’s underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims are without merit. Accordingly, Miller is not entitled to habeas relief for

either hisineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims or hisineffective-assistanceof-appellate-counsel claims. Therefore, this court ORDERS that Miller’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 2015.

 

___________________________________

KARON OWEN BOWDRE

CHIEFUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTJUDGE

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