Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00061/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00061-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 1

petition.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGEL A. DIAZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

CHRIS CHRONES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:07-CV-00061 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at

California State Prison, Solano, serving a term of 16 years for his 1998 convictions of sale of P.C.P.,

being under the influence of P.C.P., and robbery. See Petition at 2. Petitioner is challenging a 2004

prison disciplinary hearing wherein Petitioner was found guilty of possessing inmate-manufactured

alcohol. See Exhibit 1, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion”). At the conclusion of

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Although the petition was filed in the Lassen County Superior Court on December 5, 2005, the petition was dated 2

December 1, 2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on

the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001), citing th

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the

petition filed on December 1, 2005, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing. 

Although the petition was filed in this Court on January 11, 2007, it was dated January 10, 2007. Pursuant to the 3

mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition filed on January 10, 2007. 

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

the hearing, Petitioner was assessed a 120-day credit forfeiture. Id. 

Petitioner administratively appealed the decision to the director’s level of review. See Exhibit

2, Motion. The administrative appeal was denied on November 29, 2004. Id. 

On December 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lassen 2

County Superior Court. See Exhibit 3, Motion. The petition was denied on April 24, 2006. See

Exhibit 4, Motion. On May 19, 2006, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of

Appeals, Third Appellate District. See Exhibit 5, Motion. That petition was denied on June 1, 2006.

See Exhibit 6, Motion. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on

July 26, 2006. See Exhibit 7, Motion. The petition was denied on September 20, 2006, with citation

to In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949), and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). See

Exhibit 8, Motion. 

On January 10, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

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Court. On June 25, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for violating the statute

of limitations, failure to properly exhaust state remedies, failure to state a federal claim for relief, and

failure to plead a cognizable claim. Petitioner filed an opposition on July 17, 2007. Respondent filed

a reply to the opposition on July 24, 2007. Petitioner responded to Respondent’s reply on August 6,

2007.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

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U.S. District Court

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The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period, a failure to exhaust, and a failure to state a cognizable federal claim. 

Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under

Rule 4. 

II. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 10, 2007, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

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U.S. District Court

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a prison

disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of

limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1079 (9 Cir.2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s

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administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered the

commencement of the limitations period). Therefore, the limitations period commenced on

November 30, 2004, the day after Petitioner’s administrative appeal had been denied. See Exhibit 2,

Motion. Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had one year until November 29, 2005, absent

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner did not

file his federal petition until January 10, 2007, over one year after the limitations period had expired.

A. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214 (2002).

As stated above, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on December 1, 2005.

However, the limitations period had expired two days earlier on November 29, 2005. Because the

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Petitioner should not be granted tolling for ninety days following the California Supreme Court’s denial as

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Respondent would allow, because orders issued by the California Supreme Court on habeas petitions after December 31,

2002, are final on filing. Cal. R. Court § 8.532(b)(2)(c); Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 n.1 (9 Cir.2004). th

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenges could have no tolling consequence. 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the th

limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000);

Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

Petitioner argues he should be entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(D) from

November 29, 2004, until December 9, 2004, because that is the date he was served with the denial

of the administrative appeal by prison officials. Therefore, he argues, the factual predicate could not

have been discovered through due diligence until December 9, 2004. Nevertheless, as Respondent

correctly points out, the instant petition would continue to be untimely even if Petitioner were to be

granted tolling for this additional time. Provided the statute of limitations was triggered on

December 9, 2004, as Petitioner argues, 357 days of the limitations period would have elapsed when

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on December 1, 2005. Given the statute would then be

tolled pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) until the California Supreme Court denied the final habeas petition

on September 20, 2006, the limitations period would have expired 8 days later on September 28,

2006. Thus, the instant petition filed on January 10, 2007, remains untimely under either scenario. 4

B. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

In this case, Petitioner should not be entitled to equitable tolling because he has failed to

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, or that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.

III. Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

As further grounds for dismissal, Respondent claims Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

remedies. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

In this case, Petitioner did not provide the California Supreme Court with a full and fair

opportunity to consider his claims. The petition he filed was denied with citation to In re Swain, 34

Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949), and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). See Exhibit 8, Motion. In

re Swain articulates the procedural requirements that a California habeas petitioner allege with

particularity the facts supporting his claims and explain and justify the delay in the presentation of

those claims. In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793 (1949). The Ninth Circuit has held that

an In re Swain citation is a denial on procedural grounds, because such a deficiency, when it exists,

can be cured in a renewed petition. Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9 Cir. 1986); Harris th

v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128, (9 Cir. 1974). Further, Duvall reiterates the requirement th

that an application for habeas corpus “should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on

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which relief is sought, as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence

supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations.”

Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474 (citations omitted). Because Petitioner has not given the California Supreme

Court a full and fair opportunity to consider his claims, they remain unexhausted. Thus,

Respondent’s motion to dismiss on this basis should also be granted.

IV. Failure to State a Cognizable Federal Claim

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). 

In the instant case, contrary to Respondent’s contentions Petitioner has presented a

cognizable federal claim. Petitioner claims a violation of his due process rights citing Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984). He

claims he was denied his due process rights when the prison hearing officer denied his request to 

call witnesses on his behalf. This is a cognizable federal claim.

However, the Court agrees that the rest of the petition is based solely on the application of

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state procedural rules and guidelines. Issues of state law generally are not cognizable on federal

habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,

780 (1990). The claims are also conclusory in that Petitioner fails to state how the state’s failure to

abide by certain procedures resulted in any prejudice. Normally, the Court would recommend

striking that portion of the petition that fails to state a claim and then proceeding with the viable

claims; however, in this case the petition also suffers from several other defects discussed above.

Therefore, the Court will recommend dismissal on those bases.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for Petitioner’s failure to comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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