Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01277/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01277-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fox Salerno, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-1277-PHX-ROS

ORDER

On January 3, 2007, Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson issued a Report and

Recommendation ("R&R) recommending the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Petitioner filed a lengthy objection. For the following reasons, the Court will adopt the R&R

and the petition will be denied. 

I. Standard

The Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is "clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Petitioner objected to practically all aspects of the R&R, meaning

the Court must review the facts and issues de novo. 

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 The R&R sets forth the factual background in much greater detail. Only the facts

essential to a resolution of Petitioner's objections are recited in this Order. 

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II. Background1

On November 12, 2000, Petitioner was charged with theft, a class 3 felony.

According to the State of Arizona, Petitioner misappropriated funds and made unauthorized

purchases while he was a manager of a Taco Bell restaurant. The original indictment alleged

that Petitioner "without lawful authority, knowingly, obtained by means of a material

misrepresentation, Taco Bell's U.S. Currency, of a value of $3,000 or more, but less than

$25,000, with the intent to deprive Taco Bell of such property or services." The state also

alleged four prior felony convictions. On May 10, 2001, and before jury selection began, the

trial court questioned the state regarding the nature of the crime Petitioner allegedly

committed. According to the state, Petitioner went to various businesses and purchased items

on Taco Bell's accounts. Thus, Taco Bell lost money but Petitioner obtained goods, not

currency. The trial court observed that "the way [the state] charged it in the indictment is that

[Petitioner] received–without lawful authority he obtained, by means of a material

misrepresentation Taco Bell's, U.S. Currency." The court believed this was a "curious way

to charge" the crime because an indictment usually reflects what the defendant obtained, not

what the victim lost. The court, however, decided to deal with the issue later. Jury selection

then began.

Once the jury was selected, the clerk read the original indictment aloud. After giving

the jury some preliminary instructions, the jurors were dismissed for the day. After the jurors

had left, the trial court denied a motion to suppress filed by Petitioner.

At the start of the next trial date the judge granted the state's motion to amend the

indictment. After the jury entered the courtroom, the clerk read the amended indictment.

The amended indictment alleged Petitioner "obtained by means of a material

misrepresentation, Taco Bell's U.S. Currency, that is money and/or property." The parties

then gave their opening statements. Petitioner had chosen to represent himself. During his

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opening statement, Petitioner stated he suffered from dyslexia. After opening statements, the

state presented its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the court took a break. 

When the trial reconvened, the court told the parties that the jurors had given the

bailiff a document on dyslexia they had found in the jury room. Petitioner denied bringing

the document to the courthouse or placing it in the jury room. The state also denied any prior

knowledge of the document. The court told the jurors not to consider the document and

reminded them not to conduct any outside research. Petitioner testified on his own behalf.

During his testimony he admitted he had two prior felony convictions. The case concluded

and the jury began its deliberations. The verdict form directed the jury to indicate the value

of the property stolen by Petitioner if they found him guilty.

On May 18, 2001, the jury submitted two questions to the court. The first asked if the

value of the stolen items had to be determined unanimously. The second asked whether the

value of the stolen property could range from $3,000 to $5,000. The judge responded by first

stating that the decision had to be unanimous. As for question two, the judge responded that

the verdict form already gave as a possible range the value of $3,000 to $5,000. The judge

also stated that the jury could indicate if they found that the value was less than $25,000 but

more than $3,000. Apparently the parties were not consulted prior to these answers being

given. Also, it is unclear which judge gave these answers. The minute entry and transcript

identify the Honorable Michael Jones as the judge present the day the questions were

answered. It now appears, however, that Judge Jones was ill that day and a substitute judge

answered the questions.

The jury returned a guilty verdict. The jury stated the value of the property Petitioner

had stolen was between $3,000 and $25,000. The jury also stated "[w]e believe the amount

should be between $3,000 and $3,500." Petitioner later escaped from custody, but was

apprehended a short time later. After determining that Petitioner had admitted two prior

convictions during his testimony, the trial court sentenced him to a 20-year term of

imprisonment.

Petitioner raises the following issues in his petition for writ of habeas corpus:

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 Because most of Petitioner's claims fail on the merits, the Court will not address the

procedural bars applicable to all those that fail.

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1) The trial court erred in failing to strike two prospective jurors

for cause.

2) The indictment was improperly amended after jury selection

but before opening statements.

3) Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial trial because: (a) the

substitution of the judge was error; (b) defense counsel was not

informed of jury questions and the court's responses; (c) an

undisclosed answer to a jury question altered the verdict form;

(d) jury questions were answered by the court clerk.

4) Petitioner was denied a fair trial because jurors were exposed

to extra-record evidence.

5) Petitioner's sentence is unconstitutional because (a) the

elements required to enhance Petitioner's sentence beyond the

statutory maximum were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt;

(b) the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence based on

bigoted religious beliefs; and (c) the enhanced sentence violated

the rule announced in Apprendi/Blakely.

6) Petitioner's conviction was obtained pursuant to an unlawful

search and seizure.

7) The prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and

(a) undisclosed supplemental police reports contained financial

records of the corporate victim which Petitioner had requested,

and (b) the undisclosed financial reports establish that Petitioner

was convicted of unindicted charges. 

III. Analysis2

A. Failure to Strike Jurors

Petitioner claims two jurors should have been struck for cause. The jurors Petitioner

believes should have been removed for cause were excused via peremptory strikes. The

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that even if the trial court erred by not striking the

jurors for cause, no error resulted because the jurors did not sit. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487

U.S. 81, 88 (1988) ("[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes

a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.").

B. Amendment of Indictment

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The indictment was amended to reflect that Petitioner obtained "money and/or

property," rather than simply "U.S. currency." Petitioner alleges the amendment to the

indictment immediately before he was to give his opening statement was prejudicial. The

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the original indictment described the alleged

offenses with sufficient specificity to enable Petitioner to prepare his defense and to allow

Petitioner to avail himself of the protection against double jeopardy. Based on the discovery

he sought and the evidence he sought to suppress, it is clear Petitioner was on notice that the

charges involved his illegal acquisition of Taco Bell's property. Petitioner has failed to show

he was prejudiced in any way by the technical clarification to the indictment. 

C. Substitution of Judge and Jury Questions

Judge Michael Jones presided over the trial. Based on the record, Judge Robert R.

Gottsfield substituted on one day of the trial due to Judge Jones being ill. The Magistrate

Judge correctly concluded that no constitutional violation occurred because of this

substitution.

Petitioner claims he was denied a fair trial because defense counsel was not informed

of the jury questions, the answers given to the jury were improper, and the court clerk, not

the judge, answered the questions. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that these

allegations are unfounded and insufficient to justify relief. Even if the Court were to agree

that defense counsel was not consulted prior to the answers being submitted to the jury, the

answers given to the jury were entirely appropriate. The only permissible answer to the first

question regarding the requirement of unanimity was "yes," which was the answer given.

Regarding the second question, the answer reminded the jury that the verdict form already

included various ranges and the jury was to indicate the appropriate range. See Wilson v.

Yarborough, No. CIV S-03-0703-MCE-CMK-P, 2006 WL 1582274 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2006)

(finding no constitutional violation where trial court did not consult with counsel but "merely

reiterated the correct instruction the court had already given"). Because the answers to the

jury questions were appropriate, no constitutional violation occurred by defense counsel not

being informed of the questions prior to the judge answering them. Finally, the record is

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unclear which Judge answered the jury questions. Petitioner has not presented sufficient

evidence that the court clerk, not the judge, answered the questions.

D. Evidence of Dyslexia

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the jury's exposure to a document

addressing dyslexia does not entitle Petitioner to relief. Dyslexia was not relevant to the case

and the only party to mention it was Petitioner. Also, the jury's exposure was very brief and

the trial judge specifically instructed the jury to disregard the document. Petitioner has not

shown he suffered any prejudice. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995)

(jury's exposure to evidence outside the record entitles individual to habeas relief "only if it

can be established that the constitutional error had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.") (quotations omitted). 

E. Sentence

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the facts in Petitioner's case supported

his sentence. The Apprendi/Blakely rule does not apply to prior convictions and Petitioner

admitted during his testimony he had two prior convictions. Thus, the state court did not err

by increasing Petitioner's sentence as a result of the prior convictions. Also, Petitioner has

presented no evidence the trial judge was biased against him as a result of his sexual

orientation. 

F. Search and Seizure

"[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth

amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his

trial." Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth

amendment claims in state court. Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined Petitioner

is not entitled to relief on these claims.

G. Exculpatory Evidence

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The Magistrate Judge correctly found that Petitioner's allegations regarding

exculpatory evidence were rejected by the state court on an independent and adequate

procedural ground. This procedural bar renders Petitioner ineligible for federal habeas relief

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004) (discussing "cause and prejudice" and "fundamental

miscarriage of justice" standards for avoiding procedural bar). Petitioner has not made such

a showing and he is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

Having reviewed the record and applicable law de novo where appropriate, the

Magistrate Judge's factual and legal conclusions are correct.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 61) is ADOPTED and this

case is DISMISSED.

DATED this 30th day of March, 2007.

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