Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00806/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MAURICE WASHINGTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00806 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On April 28, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on October 14, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims in

the state courts and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply

to the answer to his petition on December 3, 2008. See Docket

No. 13. 

I Procedural History

On October 29, 2001, a Maricopa County grand jury

indictment charged Petitioner with one count of first-degree

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murder. Answer, Exh. A. The indictment included the allegation

that the offense involved “the discharge, use, or threatening

exhibition of a gun, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,

and/or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical

injury.” Id., Exh. A.

On April 30, 2002, a jury found Petitioner guilty of

the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Id., Exh.

B. The jury determined that Petitioner “commit[ted] a dangerous

offense by the use or threatening exhibition of a deadly

weapon.” Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. On June 18, 2002, Petitioner

was sentenced to an aggravated term of twenty years imprisonment

pursuant to this conviction. Id., Exh. D. The trial court

imposed an aggravated sentence, inter alia, because Petitioner

had committed the offense for pecuniary gain. Id., Exh. E. The

trial court also found the death occurred in a particularly

cruel and heinous manner. Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner’s appointed

appellate counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v.

California, stating he had reviewed the record and could not

find a non-frivolous claim to raise on Petitioner’s behalf.

Id., Exh. H. Appointed appellate counsel also averred that he

had contacted Petitioner to “solicit” issues to raise on appeal,

but that Petitioner identified “no issues he wishes counsel to

raise.” Id., Exh. H. 

Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the

trial record for fundamental error, and affirmed Petitioner’s

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conviction and sentence in a decision issued January 7, 2003.

Id., Exh. J. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted Petitioner had

failed to file a supplemental pro se brief in his direct appeal,

even though he had been granted an opportunity to do so after

his counsel filed an Anders brief. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner

sought review of his conviction and sentence by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which denied relief on August 1, 2003. Id., Exh.

K. The mandate of the Court of Appeals affirming Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence issued September 4, 2003. Id., Exh. L.

On January 11, 2005, more than one year after his

conviction became final, Petitioner filed an action seeking

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner asserted, inter

alia, that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his

sentence, citing the United States Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion

in Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner also alleged

he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Id., Exh. M. 

The state trial court denied post-conviction relief in

a decision issued January 25, 2005. Id., Exh. N. The state

court determined Petitioner’s Rule 32 action was not timely.

Id., Exh. N. The trial court also concluded Petitioner was not

entitled to relief pursuant to Blakely: 

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court,

held that pursuant to its decisions in

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), a

[d]efendant is entitled to a jury’s

determination of any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

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1 Rule 32.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides

grounds for relief in post-conviction proceedings. Rule 32.1(g)

states that a defendant is entitled to relief if “[t]here has been a

significant change in the law that if determined to apply to

defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction

or sentence.”

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statutory maximum. However, in Schirro (sic)

v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. [348][,] 124 S.Ct.

2519 (2004), the Court also held that

although Ring and Apprendi constitute a

significant change in the law, this change is

procedural, but not a watershed procedural

rule, and does not apply retroactively to

convictions that are final. The Arizona

Appellate Courts also have declared that Ring

and Apprendi do not apply retroactively to

convictions that are final. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386 [] (2003); State v. Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158 [] (App. 2001)....

Id., Exh. N at 1.1

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on September 27,

2005. Id., Exh. O. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on April

28, 2008. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because

the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial by sentencing him to an aggravated term of imprisonment

based on facts found by the trial court and not the jury. See

Petition at 6.

II Analysis

Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

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The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final on or

about November 1, 2003, ninety days after the state Supreme

Court denied review, when the time expired for seeking

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly,

the one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal

habeas action expired on November 1, 2004, unless it was tolled

by any pending action for state post-conviction relief. See

Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not have any action for post-conviction

relief pending in the state courts from November 1, 2003,

through November 1, 2004. Petitioner allowed more than one year

of time to pass after the date that his conviction became final

and the filing of his first state action for post-conviction

relief on January 11, 2005. Petitioner’s first state Rule 32

action could not and did not re-start the expired statute of

limitations regarding his federal habeas action. See Ferguson

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker

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v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v.

Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court

petition that is filed after the expiration of the statute of

limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the

limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th

Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.

2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, the federal habeas action is not timely. 

Neither does Blakely provide for an alternative date

for beginning the statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s

habeas action. Section 2244 provides the statute of limitations

regarding a federal habeas claim may begin to run on the “date

on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(). This section is not applicable to Petitioner’s

Blakely claim because the United States Supreme Court has not

made Blakely retroactive to cases on collateral review. See

Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). See also

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001)

(holding that a new rule is “made retroactive to cases on

collateral review” only if the Supreme Court holds it to be

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). 

Even allowing that the statute of limitations on a

federal habeas action asserting a Blakely claim began to run

when Petitioner’s second state action for post-conviction relief

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concluded, on October 27, 2005, Petitioner’s federal habeas

action, filed in April of 2008, more than two years later, is

not timely filed. Additionally, the untimely-filed second state

petition for post-conviction relief could not toll the statute

of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action because a

state petition that is not filed within the state’s required

time limit is not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005).

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Harris,

515 F.3d at 1053-54 & n.4; Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

determined that equitable tolling is available only if

extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control made

it impossible to file a federal habeas petition on time. See

Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055-56 (discussing standard and holding

equitable tolling was warranted when the petitioner had relied

on prior Circuit Court of Appeals precedent regarding the timely

filing of his petition); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th

Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely claim. See Harris, 515 F.3d at

1055 (stating a petitioner’s “oversight, miscalculation,” or

“negligence” would not warrant equitable tolling); Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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A federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling

must also act with “reasonable” diligence throughout the period

he seeks to toll. See e.g., Bryant v. Arizona Att’y Gen., 499

F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007); Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. See Bryant, 499 F.3d at

1059-60 (holding the petitioner must establish a causal

connection between the cause of his delay and the delay itself).

In his reply to the answer to his petition Petitioner

asserts he was unable to file a pro se brief in his direct

appeal because he is uneducated in the law. See Docket No. 13.

Petitioner contends the statute of limitations did not begin to

run until he understood the factual predicate for his habeas

claim, which could not occur earlier because the “Arizona

Department of Corrections has permanently closed on all prison

law libraries...” Id. Petitioner also asserts the ADOC does

not provide legal assistance of any kind except for a “para

legal who hands out forms and helps you only with initial

filing.” Id. Petitioner contends he has been denied his right

to access the courts. Additionally, Petitioner contends there

were extraordinary circumstances that made it impossible to

timely file his habeas petition. Petitioner asserts the

extraordinary circumstances were the denial of access to “case

law.”

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

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made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the cause for his failure

to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

414; 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that the petitioner was not

entitled to equitable tolling because he was misled or confused

about timing of exhausting his state remedies and filing his

federal habeas petition); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling

has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”).

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Corjasso v. Ayers,

278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations. A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance

of the law, and lack of representation during the applicable

filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1066-67 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002); Fisher v. Johnson, 174

F.3d 710, 714–716 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d

595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that petitioner’s

misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and the time

period set forth therein do not justify equitable tolling”). 

Neither has Petitioner established that he acted with

diligence during the time period he seeks to toll, as Petitioner

allowed more than two years to pass without seeking any form of

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state or federal relief from his conviction and sentence prior

to filing his 2008 federal habeas action alleging a claim based

on a 2004 Supreme Court decision.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Washington’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

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of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 9th day of December, 2008.

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