Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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28 1 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 

Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

**E-Filed 5/8/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICHARD LYTEL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JANET SIMPSON,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-01937 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[re: docket no. 183]

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

I. BACKGROUND

In December, 2000, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) employed Janet Simpson

(“Simpson”) as a Strategic Sales Development Representative in Dallas, Texas. Declaration of

Richard Lytel (“Lytel Decl.”), ¶ 3. In August, 2003, Sun employed Richard Lytel (“Lytel”) as

Vice President of the Advanced System Development (“ASD”) Center in Menlo Park, California. 

Id., ¶ 2. Lytel was responsible for three research and development projects, one of which was the

Life Sciences project. Id. After Lytel received approval to expand the Life Sciences project,

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

Lytel and Simpson discussed an opportunity for Simpson to work on the project. Id., ¶¶ 3-5. On

September 18, 2003, Simpson transferred to the Life Sciences project with the understanding that

she would work under the direct supervision of Lytel but would continue to work out of Sun’s

offices in Dallas and travel as needed to Sun’s offices in Menlo Park and laboratory facilities in

San Diego. Id., ¶¶ 5, 8.

Simpson alleges that while working under Lytel’s supervision she was the victim of

sexual harassment. See Declaration of Janet Simpson (“Simpson Decl.”). Simpson reported

Lytel’s alleged harassment to Sun’s Human Resources Department (“HRD”). Declaration of

Jeffrey F. Ryan (“Ryan Decl.”), Ex. A at 1. HRD subsequently issued a report finding that Lytel

had engaged in inappropriate conduct, including kissing Simpson on the head, hugging her

frequently, sending her personal e-mails and flowers, and providing her copies of two short

fictional stories written by Lytel that contained explicit sexual content. Id., Ex. A at 1-4. HRD

concluded that Lytel’s behavior was inappropriate and that disciplinary action should be taken,

“up to and including, termination.” Id., Ex. A at 9. 

In April, 2005, Simpson filed a complaint against Lytel with the California Department of

Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), alleging sexual harassment, retaliation and gender

based discrimination. Counterclaim of Janet Simpson (“Counterclaim”), Ex. B. On the same

date, Simpson filed a DFEH complaint against Sun containing substantially similar allegations. 

Id., Ex. A. The DFEH complaints contain allegations that Lytel promised Simpson a pay raise if

she was responsive to his romantic requests, made romantic overtures toward Simpson,

repeatedly touched Simpson without her consent, represented to third parties that he was having a

romantic relationship with Simpson, and threatened Simpson with demotion, transfer, or

termination in retaliation for her communications with HRD. Id., Exs. A and B. 

On May 10, 2005, Lytel filed the instant federal complaint against Simpson alleging: (1)

defamation by libel in violation of California Civil Code § 44 et seq.; (2) defamation by libel in

violation of California Civil Code § 45 et seq.; (3) intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage; (4) and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint, ¶¶ 39-60. 

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2 Simpson previously filed suit in San Mateo Superior Court against Lytel and Sun

on May 23, 2005, alleging the same ten causes of action. This case was voluntarily dismissed.

3

Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

On June 21, 2005, Simpson filed ten counterclaims against Lytel and Sun.2 Counterclaim, ¶¶ 26-

104. Simpson claims: (1) harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12900 et seq., against both defendants; (2) retaliation

in violation of FEHA against both defendants; (3) breach of contract against Sun; (4) breach of

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Sun; (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress against both defendants; (6) negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision/

unlawful policy, custom or habit against Sun; (7) assault against both defendants; (8) battery

against both defendants; (9) sexual battery in violation of California Civil Code § 1708.5 against

both defendants; and (10) gender based discrimination in violation of FEHA against Sun. Id.

On March 24, 2006, Lytel filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that

there is no triable issue of material fact relating to Simpson’s six claims against him and that

Simpson cannot establish every element of her six claims. Simpson opposes the motion. Having

considered the briefs, relevant evidence, and the oral arguments at the hearing on April 28, 2006,

the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ.

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3

In order to pursue a civil cause of action under FEHA, an individual first must

follow certain procedural steps set forth in the statute. “Under the FEHA, the employee must

exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint with the [DFEH]

and must obtain from the [DFEH] a notice of right to sue in order to be entitled to file a civil

action in court based on violations of the FEHA.” Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th

479, 492 (Cal. 1996). The DFEH complaint must be filed within one year of the date on which

the last alleged unlawful practice occurred. Cal. Gov. Code § 12960(d). 

DFEH records indicate that the Department received Simpson’s administrative complaint

on April 22, 2005, well before the statutory deadline. Counterclaim, Exs. A and B. Lytel does

not contest that the date on which the DFEH complaint was received. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Simpson exhausted her administrative remedies and is permitted to pursue a civil

action under FEHA against Lytel on her harassment and retaliation claims.

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is not

appropriate if the non- moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury could

resolve the disputed issue of material fact in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Barlow

v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. First and Second Claims: Unlawful Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

Simpson’s first and second claims for relief allege harassment and retaliation under

FEHA. Lytel challenges these claims, arguing that Simpson was not subjected to harassment or

retaliation.3

1. Harassment

FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, “because of the . . .

sex . . . of any person, . . . to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov. Code. § 12940(a). Under FEHA, it is

unlawful for an employer, or any other person, to harass an employee based on sex. Cal. Gov.

Code § 12940(j)(1). Section 12940(j)(3) explicitly provides that an employee is personally liable

for harassment “regardless of whether the employer or covered entity knows or should have

known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” Cal. Gov.

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Code § 12940(j)(3). “These prohibitions represent a fundamental public policy decision

regarding ‘the need to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek and

hold employment free from discrimination.’” Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., No.

S125171, 2006 WL 1028558, at *4 (Cal. Apr. 20, 2006) (quoting Brown v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal.3d

477, 485 (Cal. 1984)). 

“[T]he prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad range of

conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to

or tolerance of unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile

or abusive on the basis of sex.” Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 36 Cal.4th 446, 461 (Cal. 2005)).

“[P]rohibited harassment includes verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted

sexual advances.” Lyle, 2006 WL 1028558, at *7 (citation and quotations omitted). Verbal

harassment includes “epithets, derogatory comments,” or sexual slurs. Id. Physical harassment

includes “assault, impeding or blocking movement, or any physical interference with normal

work or movement,” when directed on the basis of sex. Id. Visual harassment includes

“derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings on the basis of sex.” Id.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., to prevail on

a hostile work environment claim an employee must show that “she was subjected to sexual

advances, conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome; (2) because of sex; and (3)

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive

work environment.” Id. at *6 (citations omitted). California has adopted Title VII’s standard for

hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under FEHA. Id. Thus, to prevail on a

claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, an employee “must demonstrate that the

conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of

employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees

because of their sex.” Id. at *5.

In the instant action, Simpson alleges that Lytel created a hostile or abusive work

environment. Simpson alleges six incidents of sexual harassment, claiming that Lytel: (1)

hugged and kissed her, and touched her breasts; (2) sent her e-mails with inappropriate remarks

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

and questions concerning her personal life; (3) told others that he was in a romantic relationship

with her; (4) sent e-mails to her personal e-mail account without her permission; (5) expressed

resentment in response to her attempts to discourage a personal relationship, refusal to travel

with him, and refusal to meet with him on occasions not related to business; and (6) suggested

that she transfer to a different position within Sun. See Simpson Decl., ¶¶ 4-9, 11-13, 15-29, 31,

35-39. The only issue on summary judgment is whether a reasonable jury could find that these

alleged incidents were undertaken because of Simpson’s sex, and that the conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Simpson’s employment. 

This Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Simpson was repeatedly

subjected to verbal and physical harassment based on her sex. To cite just one piece of evidence,

Lytel sent two sexually explicit short stories to Simpson, attached to an e-mail in which Lytel

wrote:

It’s 11 pm your time, so I am guessing you are sleeping or enjoying a late movie

with a friend or a good book. I know you’re not drinking wine -- I had one glass,

but that’s it. . . . [Our steak dinner] was fun -- especially the Raymond Merlot at

the bar and talking with you. . . . Am feeling like we will have to do that again

soon, though -- I really enjoy your company. 

Which brings me to a thought -- I’ve noticed this about myself, that I am having a

lot more fun in my work since hanging out with you. Why is that? Partly because

you challenge me -- you are very smart, and your experience is deep in areas

where mine is not. . . . And partly I am happier because you make me feel like I

am special. I don’t know if you really think I am extra special, but I do know that

you believe that all of us -- people -- are special and deserve to be treated well. 

This makes you extra special, by the way.

. . . .

So do you want to learn more about me? I have a couple of short stories I wrote a

few years back. . . .

Id., Ex. D. In the short story entitled “The Angry Young Man,” beginning in the second

paragraph Lytel writes with profanity and describes a sexually explicit situation. Id., Ex. E. The

short story goes on to describe numerous other occasions of sexually explicit situations. Id. 

In addition Simpson has stated that she received inappropriate hugs from Lytel. Id., ¶ 39. 

Lytel claims that the hugs were consensual. See Lytel Decl., ¶ 44. In an e-mail Lytel inquired

about the hugs when he asked, “Hey, you don’t mind the hugs, do you? ‘Cause I can stop doing

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

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so!” Id., Ex. 18. On August 21, 2003, Simpson e-mailed Lytel in response and said, “Are you

kidding, I love hugs . . .” Id. Simpson argues that the “I love hugs” e-mail is not authentic,

claiming that the evidence was manufactured or altered and that she never sent such an e-mail. 

Simpson’s Reply to John Simonson’s Declaration at 1-2. While Simpson provides no evidence

of this contention, the dispute ultimately is immaterial. Regardless of whether the hugs were

consensual or not, there was an incident in May, 2004, when Lytel grabbed Simpson’s breasts

with no evidence of consent. Declaration of John S. Simonson (“Simonson Decl.”), Ex. 1 at 191-

92; Supplemental Declaration of John S. Simonson (“Simonson Supp. Decl.”), Ex. 8 at 188-89;

Simpson Decl., ¶¶ 4, 31. 

Considering the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Simpson was subjected to

sexual advances, conduct, or comments because of her sex that were sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile work environment. Accordingly, the Court will deny Lytel’s motion

for summary judgment on this claim. 

2. Retaliation

California Government Code § 12940(h) “forbids employers from retaliating against

employees who have acted to protect the rights afforded by” FEHA. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA,

Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1035 (Cal. 2005). Section 12940(h) provides that it is unlawful “[f]or any

employer, . . . or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because

the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a

complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h). 

Under Section 12940(h) supervisors can be held liable for retaliation. Winarto v. Toshiba Am.

Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“The legislative purpose underlying FEHA’s prohibition against retaliation is to prevent

employers from deterring employees from asserting good faith discrimination complaints, and

the use of . . . retaliatory actions may certainly have this effect. Akers v. County of San Diego, 95

Cal.App.4th 1441, 1455 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). However, as the Akers court opined:

[T]o be actionable, the retaliation must result in a substantial adverse change in

the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. A change that is merely

contrary to the employee’s interests or not to the employee’s liking is insufficient. 

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Requiring an employee to prove a substantial adverse job effect guards against

both judicial micromanagement of business practices, and frivolous suits over

insignificant slights. Absent this threshold showing, courts will be thrust into the

role of personnel officers, becoming entangled in every conceivable form of

employee job dissatisfaction. 

95 Cal.App.4th at 1455 (emphasis added) (citation and quotations omitted). The court concluded

that, “[w]hile the Legislature was understandably concerned with the chilling effect of employer

retaliatory actions and mandated that FEHA provisions be interpreted broadly to prevent

unlawful discrimination, it could not have intended to provide employees a remedy for any

possible slight resulting from the filing of a discrimination complaint. Id. at 1455 (emphasis

added). 

A prima facie case for retaliation requires that the employee show that: “(1) he or she

engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse

employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s

action.” Id. at 1453. If the employee “establishes a prima facie case [for retaliation], the

employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment

action.” Id. Once the “employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment

action, the presumption of retaliation ‘drops out of the picture,’ and the burden shifts back to the

employee to prove intentional retaliation.” Id. 

In California, the “materiality” test is used to define an adverse employment action. 

Yanowitz, 36 Cal.4th at 1036. The materiality test requires an employer’s adverse action to affect

materially the terms and conditions of employment. Id. The materiality test protects the

employee against not only “ultimate employment decisions,” such as terminations and

demotions, “but also the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to

materially and adversely affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in

his or her career.” Id. at 1053-54.

For instance, in Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School District, 134 Cal.App.4th 1378,

1381-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), a school principal sued a school district for retaliation after being

transferred from a large, underperforming middle school, to a smaller middle school with higher

achieving students. The school district claimed the transfer did not constitute an adverse

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4 During oral arguments at the hearing on April 28, 2006, Simpson admitted that

the loss of stock options was the only incident of a possible material adverse employment action

in retaliation to her harassment complaint. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

employment action because plaintiff was still a principal, her wages, benefits and duties

remained the same, and the transfer allowed her to use her skills in curriculum development. Id.

at 1389. The court found that the transfer constituted a material adverse employment action

because plaintiff was a young principal, with her entire career ahead of her, and the smaller, high

achieving school presented her with less of an opportunity to distinguish herself. Id.

Similarly, Simpson contends she was subject to a material adverse employment action as

retaliation for her harassment complaints when she did not receive stock options in 2004 and

2005.4 Simonson Supp. Decl., Ex. 8 at 29; Simpson Decl., ¶ 33. Regarding the loss of stock

options, Simpson states that “nearly” every year that she worked at Sun, she received stock

options of “some sort.” Simpson Decl., ¶ 32; Simonson Supp. Decl., Ex. 8 at 29. As to the loss

of stock options in 2004, Simpson testified that she received stock options in 2004, but not in

2005. Simonson Supp. Decl., Ex. 8 at 29. Nevertheless, Simpson fails to offer any evidence that

Lytel caused options to be withheld from her or that she was entitled to stock options in 2004 or

2005. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Simpson, there is an insufficient nexus

between her non-receipt of stock options and her complaints about Lytel to permit a reasonable

jury to conclude that the non-receipt of stock options was a material adverse employment action.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Lytel’s motion for summary judgment as to the retaliation

claim. 

B. Fifth Claim: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under California

law, Simpson must show that: (1) Lytel engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the

intent of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)

Simpson actually suffered emotional distress; and (3) Lytel’s outrageous conduct proximately

caused her emotional distress. Newberry v. Pac. Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.

1988). Lytel argues that Simpson cannot present evidence that Lytel engaged in the requisite

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extreme and outrageous conduct. 

The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Lytel’s conduct was extreme

and outrageous, that Simpson actually suffered from emotional distress, and that Lytel’s conduct

was the proximate cause of such emotional distress. In opposition to the instant motion,

Simpson submitted the Declaration of Dr. Roberts (“Roberts Decl.”). Dr. Roberts states that: (1)

since January, 2002, he has treated Simpson; (2) Simpson called his office because of tiredness,

insomnia, and crying; (3) Simpson said “her boss” was sexually harassing her; and (4) Simpson

said her mother had Alzheimer’s disease in 2002. Roberts Decl., ¶¶ 2-5. Lytel notes correctly

that Dr. Roberts never identifies his specialty, his license information, the location of his

practice, or the dates when he treated Simpson. Dr. Roberts does not state that Simpson’s

emotional distress — her crying, insomnia, and tiredness — was proximately caused by “her

boss” (which could or could not have been Lytel), nor does he diagnose Simpson as suffering

from emotional distress or any other psychological or physical condition related to Lytel’s

alleged harassment, or prescribe any medication to alleviate Simpson’s symptoms. However,

while these flaws in Simpson’s evidence properly may be pointed out to a jury, they do not defeat

Simpson’s claim altogether. A jury could find that given the specific conduct alleged, Lytel’s

actions rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, that Simpson suffered emotional

distress, and that Lytel’s actions were the cause of that emotional distress. Accordingly, the

Court will deny Lytel’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim. 

C. Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Claims: Assault, Battery, and Sexual Battery

Finally, Simpson claims that Lytel’s hugging, kissing, and touching of her breasts

constitutes assault, battery, and sexual battery. Simpson Decl. ¶¶ 4, 31, 38-39; Simonson Decl.,

Ex. 1 at 191-92; Simonson Supp. Decl., Ex. 8 at 188. Lytel moves for summary judgment as to

these claims, arguing that Simpson cannot meet the elements to establish assault, and that she

consented to the hugs and never complained “about any fondling of her breasts.” Mot. for

Summary Judgment at 23. 

Under California law, to make out a claim for assault Simpson must establish that: (1)

Lytel intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such

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contact, and (2) she was put in imminent apprehension of such contact. Austin v. Terhune, 367

F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In California, civil battery requires that: (1) defendant touched plaintiff’s person with the

intent to harm or offend; (2) plaintiff did not consent to be touched; and (3) defendant’s conduct

harmed or offended plaintiff. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 59 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 (Cal Ct. App.

1997). “A harmful contact, intentionally done is the essence of a battery. A contact is ‘unlawful’

if it is unconsented to.” Ashcraft v. King, 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citation

omitted).

A sexual battery claim “does not duplicate” a battery claim. Angie M. v. Super. Ct., 37

Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). A person commits a sexual battery in California if

he does any of the following:

(1) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an

intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person

directly or indirectly results.

(2) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another

by use of his or her intimate part, and a sexually offensive contact with

that person directly or indirectly results.

(3) Acts to cause an imminent apprehension of the conduct described in

paragraph (1) or (2), and a sexually offensive contact with that person

directly or indirectly results.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.5(a). An “intimate part” includes “the breast of a female.” Id. §

1708.5(d). “Offensive contact” is “contact that offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”

Id. § 1708.5(f). 

A sexual battery claim under Section 1708.5 “requires the batterer intend to cause a

‘harmful or offensive’ contact and the batteree suffer a ‘sexually offensive contact.’” Angie M.,

37 Cal.App.4th at 1225. Moreover, proof of sexual battery requires that plaintiff did not consent

to the contact. Lyons v. Williams, 91 F.3d 1308, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1996); Angie M., 37

Cal.App.4th at 1225. For example, in Jacqueline R. v. Household of Faith Family Church, Inc.,

97 Cal.App.4th 198, 207-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), Jacqueline challenged the trial court’s finding

that the sexual relationship was consensual. On appeal, however, the court found no evidence

that Jacqueline found the touching offensive. Id. “[E]vidence Jacqueline resisted the pastor’s

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

advances or, at times, told him to stop, was accompanied by her statements that she was afraid

they would be caught, not that she found his advances offensive or unwelcome.” Id. The court

concluded that “the trial court did not err by concluding the relationship was consensual.” Id.

In the instant case, Simpson states that Lytel “hugged [her] many times inappropriately

and [she] repeatedly told him to stop it but he did not stop.” Simpson Decl., ¶ 39. As stated

above, Lytel claims that an e-mail indicates that the hugs were consensual, and Simpson

challenges the authenticity of this e-mail. Regardless of whether the hugs were consensual or

not, the alleged incident in May, 2004, when Lytel grabbed Simpson’s breasts without consent, is

sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment as to Simpson’s assault, battery, and sexual

battery claims. Simonson Decl., Ex. 1 at 191-92; Simonson Supp. Decl., Ex. 8 at 188; Simpson

Decl., ¶¶ 4, 31. Accordingly, Lytel’s motion for summary judgment as to these claims will be

denied.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Lytel’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

 

DATED: May 8, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

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Case No. C 05-01937 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Matthew A. Bisbee mbisbee@ropers.com, pdunn@ropers.com

Koray J. Bulut kbulut@wsgr.com, jbertolani@wsgr.com

Gary Michael Gansle ggansle@wsgr.com, jbertolani@wsgr.com; kbulut@wsgr.com

Lindy Robin Gonzalez lgonzalez@ropers.com, ghuerta@ropers.com

Eric C. Kastner eck@kastnerbanchero.com, fh@kastnerbanchero.com

Ulrico S. Rosales urosales@wsgr.com

Jeffrey Filon Ryan jr@rslattorneys.com

John S. Simonson jsimonson@ropers.com, pdunn@ropers.com;

knguyen@ropers.com 

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 234 Filed 05/08/06 Page 13 of 13