Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00315/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 1 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON ANTHONY DONNAN,

CDCR #T-73830,

Civil No. 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF No. 2]; and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; EDNA

MILLOY; STEVEN MANNIS;

JOHN GILL,

Defendants.

Leon Anthony Donnan (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard

J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding in pro se, has

filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights

were violated when he was housed at the Vista Detention Facility.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF

No. 2]. 

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 2 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 3 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)

(§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a

pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 4 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

B. Access to Courts claim

Plaintiff claims that while he was housed at the Vista Detention Facility, jail officials

failed to provide him with adequate access to the jail’s law library. Prisoners do “have a

constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a

reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir.

1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817,

the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are

trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the

right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1)

a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been

frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present

a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v.

Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 5 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); see also Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as

much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”). Moreover,

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been actually injured by any specific

defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a

complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ...

the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show

that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983

relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

C. Inadequate medical care claims

Plaintiff also alleges that jail officials denied him adequate medical care for his Hepatitis

and a nail fungus problem. (See Compl. at 3-5.) A court “may take notice of proceedings in

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a

direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court finds that Plaintiff has already

litigated these claims in Donnan v. Cook, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 08cv2157 DMS (AJB).

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely

repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2

(9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations

omitted). Because Plaintiff has already litigated the same claims presented in the instant action

in Donnan v. Cook, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 08cv2157 DMS (AJB), the Court hereby

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claims. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick,

213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 6 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in

this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%)

of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the

date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies

of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference

to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Anello\ODD # CIVIL CASES\PRO SE LAW CLERKS ORDERS\11cv0315-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 7 11cv0315 MMA (BGS)

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00315-MMA-BGS Document 4 Filed 03/30/11 Page 7 of 7