Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02487/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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27 1 Citations to “AR” are to the administrative record.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Janice L. Lutz, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

 

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No. CV-12-2487-PHX-LOA

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s decision

denying her application for disabled widow’s benefits and supplemental security income. The

parties, who have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate

Judge, have filed briefs in accordance with the District Court’s Rule of Practice (“Local

Rule” or “LRCiv”)16.1. After review of the record, briefing and applicable law, the decision

of the Commissioner is reversed and the matter is remanded for an award of benefits.

I. Procedural Background

On August 6, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for Social Security Disabled Widow’s

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI, respectively,

of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and §§ 1381-1383c (AR1

 28, 183-192).

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Plaintiff was 51 years old when she filed the applications and has a high school education.

(AR 53, 183) Plaintiff claimed in the applications she became unable to work because of a

disabling condition on August 6, 2008, and that she remains disabled. (AR 183, 187)

Plaintiff identified severe pain in her legs and hands as conditions that limited her ability to

work. (AR 53, 220) 

Plaintiff’s applications were denied by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

on February 18, 2010. (AR 106-115) Following Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, the

SSA affirmed the denial of the applications on August 30, 2010. (AR 72-105, 127-130)

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, AR 131, a hearing was held on July 18, 2011, before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Kathleen Mucerino. (AR 44-65) In a decision dated

August 5, 2011, the ALJ ruled Plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits because she has

not been under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act from the alleged date of

onset through the date of the decision. (AR 25-37) On October 1, 2012, the Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-3) As a result of the

denial, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1)

Having exhausted the administrative review process, Plaintiff sought judicial review

of the Commissioner’s decision on November 19, 2012, by filing a Complaint in this District

Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1) On May 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Opening

Brief pursuant to LRCiv 16.1, in which she seeks a remand for an award of benefits. (Doc.

16)

On June 25, 2013, Defendant (the “Commissioner”) filed a Motion for Entry of

Judgment with Order to Remand along with an attached Memorandum in Support of

Remand. (Doc. 19) The Commissioner explained that the SSA Appeals Council further

reviewed Plaintiff’s case and determined a remand for further proceedings was appropriate.

According to the Commissioner, the ALJ would, upon remand, be directed to update medical

evidence, reevaluate medical source opinions, reevaluate Plaintiff’s residual functional

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capacity, and obtain further vocational expert testimony. (Doc. 19 at 2) By order of the

Court, doc. 20, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Judgment with

Order to Remand on July 25, 2010, in which Plaintiff opposed the Commissioner’s request

and asked the Court to remand the case for an award of benefits. (Doc. 24) On August 23,

2013, the Court denied the Motion for Entry of Judgment with Order to Remand. (Doc. 25)

The Court instead directed the Commissioner to file an answering brief and provided Plaintiff

the option to file a reply brief. On September 11, 2013, the Commissioner filed an

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief. (Doc. 26) Plaintiff then filed a Reply Brief on

October 29, 2013. (Doc. 29)

II. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review

The Court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by substantial

evidence and are free from reversible error. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.

1998); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is more

than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. In determining whether substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, a district court considers the record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions.

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ

is responsible for resolving conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.”

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21.

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B. Sequential Evaluation Process

To be eligible for Social Security disability benefits, a claimant must show an

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.

1999). The claimant bears the initial burden of proving disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5);

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). A five step procedure is used to

evaluate a disability claim: 

In step one, the Secretary determines whether a claimant is currently engaged

in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). In step two, the Secretary determines whether the claimant has

a “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments,” as defined

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled.

If the answer is yes, the Secretary proceeds to step three and determines

whether the impairment meets or equals a “listed” impairment that the

Secretary has acknowledged to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is met, the claimant is

conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Secretary proceeds to step four. At

step four, the Secretary determines whether the claimant can perform "past

relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such

work, she is not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the Secretary must show, at step five, that the

claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721.

III. ALJ Decision

Applying the five-step procedure in this case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of her disabling condition.

(AR 30) The ALJ found Plaintiff has the following “severe” impairments within the meaning

of the regulations: degenerative disc disease, alcohol dependence (remission), obesity, mood

disorder and anxiety disorder. (AR 31) The ALJ determined, however, that Plaintiff does not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the

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2 The term “residual functional capacity” means the most an individual can do after

considering the effects of physical and/or mental limitations that affect the ability to perform

work-related tasks. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1545(a)(1-2).

5

severity of a listed impairment. (AR 31) As a result, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity2

 (“RFC”). (AR 32-36) The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and § 416.967(b).

(AR 32) She found Plaintiff is able to lift or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten

pounds frequently; stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday; frequently climb

ramps or stairs, but never ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally bend, stoop, kneel,

crouch and crawl. (AR 32) The ALJ further determined that although Plaintiff has no past

relevant work, she is able to do unskilled work, and there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (AR 32, 36) Based on these

findings, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff has not been under a “disability,” as defined in the

Social Security Act, from the alleged date of onset, August 6, 2008, through the date of the

ALJ’s decision. (AR 37) Consequently, the ALJ ruled Plaintiff is not entitled to disabled

widow’s benefits or supplemental security income. (AR 37)

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff contends in her opening brief the Commissioner’s decision should be

reversed and the case remanded for an award of benefits. (Doc. 16) Plaintiff argues the ALJ

erred by rejecting the assessment of a treating physician and relying instead on the opinion

of a non-examining state agency physician who reviewed only part of the record. Plaintiff

further claims the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in the absence of

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Lastly, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by relying

on the medical-vocational guidelines when determining Plaintiff could perform other jobs

in the national economy. 

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In the responsive brief, the Commissioner states her position has not changed with

regard to her prior motion to remand for further proceedings. (Doc. 26) The Commissioner

asks the Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand the case for further administrative

proceedings. The Commissioner concedes the ALJ failed to address a treating physician’s

“Pain Functional Capacity (RFC) Questionnaire” in which the treating doctor assessed

Plaintiff’s pain at a level that would preclude her from working. (AR 713) The Commissioner

argues, however, that remand is necessary for the ALJ to evaluate the treating physician’s

pain assessment and address other outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper

disability determination can be made.

Plaintiff argues in the reply brief that the ALJ’s failure to consider the treating

physician’s pain assessment is not a basis to remand for further proceedings. Plaintiff

contends the Court should credit the treating physician’s pain assessment as true and remand

the case for an award of benefits.

A. Treating Physician’s Assessments

The opinion of a treating physician is generally entitled to more weight than the

opinion of a non-treating physician, as “these sources are likely to be the medical

professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a claimant’s medical

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). “Because treating physicians are employed to cure

and thus have a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual, their

opinions are given greater weight than the opinions of other physicians.” Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). A treating physician’s opinion, however, is not

necessarily conclusive and an ALJ may disregard the opinion whether or not the opinion is

contradicted. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a treating

physician’s opinion is uncontradicted, an ALJ may reject it only by presenting clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Id. If a treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the ALJ can reject it only by providing “‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported

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by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ can “meet this burden by setting out a detailed and

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation

thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.

Medical records from Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Joseph Collins, D.O., show

Plaintiff met with him twelve times between January 2011 and July 2011. (AR 684-709)

Although the administrative record contains no other treatment records from Dr. Collins, it

appears he served as Plaintiff’s primary care physician for longer than that six-month period.

Records from George Wang, M.D., dated October 2010, show Dr. Collins referred Plaintiff

to Dr. Wang for nerve conduction testing, which suggests Dr. Collins was Plaintiff’s primary

care doctor before January 2011. (AR 647-659) Regardless, on July 15, 2011, Dr. Collins

prepared a Medical Assessment Of Ability To Do Work Related Physical Activities. (AR

710-712) He identified Plaintiff’s diagnosed physical impairments as low back pain, leg pain

and weakness, and arthritis in hands and back. (AR 710) Based on the work-related

limitations identified by Dr. Collins in the assessment, there are no jobs Plaintiff could

perform. (AR 710-12; AR 60-61 (testimony of vocational expert based on the limitations

identified by Dr. Collins)) When asked to describe the findings that support the identified

limitations, Dr. Collins wrote Plaintiff is “losing muscle mass [and] strength in legs [and]

grip.” (AR 712) He also wrote Plaintiff is “needing high doses of narcotics and

tranquilizers.” (Id.)

Dr. Collins also completed a Pain Functional Capacity (RFC) Questionnaire on July

15, 2011, in which he concluded Plaintiff suffers from “moderately severe” pain, which

means the pain “seriously affects ability to function.” (AR 713-714) He indicated Plaintiff

frequently experiences pain “sufficiently severe to interfere with attention and concentration”

and she frequently experiences “deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting

in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhere).” (Id.) 

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3

 Because this matter is being remanded based on the ALJ’s legal error for

disregarding Dr. Collins’ pain assessment, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s other alleged

errors.

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The ALJ addressed Dr. Collins’ Medical Assessment Of Ability To Do Work Related

Physical Activities and gave the assessment “little weight” for the reasons set forth in the

ALJ’s decision. (AR 35-36) Plaintiff challenges that determination, arguing the ALJ rejected

the treating physician’s opinion without proving clear and convincing reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record. (Doc. 1 at 13-16) 

The record reflects the ALJ failed to address Dr. Collins’ other assessment, the Pain

Functional Capacity (RFC) Questionnaire. The Commissioner concedes “the ALJ did not

discuss or discount Dr. Collins’ pain questionnaire response” and “it is unclear whether the

ALJ considered the opinion.” (Doc. 26 at 11) The Commissioner acknowledges the ALJ’s

failure to address Dr. Collins’ pain assessment constitutes legal error that requires remand.

(Id. at 25) See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining

that an ALJ cannot avoid the deference owed to treating physicians’ opinions simply by not

mentioning the opinion and making findings contrary to it) The parties agree the ALJ’s

decision must be reversed and the case must be remanded. The only issue before the Court

is whether the case should be remanded for further proceedings or remanded for an award

of benefits.3

B. Remand for Further Proceedings or Award of Benefits

The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or for an award of

benefits is within the discretion of the court. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 728; Swenson v. Sullivan,

876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989). “If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the

original administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded. Where,

however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt of benefits, reversal [and an award of

benefits] is appropriate.” Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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4

 The Commissioner argues the credit-as-true rule is inconsistent with the Social

Security Act and the dissenting opinion in Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 572, 586 (9th Cir.

2009) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (stating that the Commissioner’s argument that the

“credit-as-true” rule is invalid as contrary to the statute and Supreme Court precedent

appeared “strong.”). (Doc. 26 at 24 n.8) The dissent in Vasquez, however, also noted that

“because the crediting-as-true rule is part of [the Ninth] circuit’s law, only an en banc court

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Importantly, “[w]here the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for

rejecting the opinion of a treating or examining physician, we credit that opinion ‘as a matter

of law.’” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen,

879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989)). Courts credit improperly rejected evidence and remand

for benefits when: “(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting

such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.” Harman v.

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292

(9th Cir. 1996)). If this test is satisfied with respect to a treating physician’s opinion, “then

remand for determination and payment of benefits is warranted regardless of whether the

ALJ might have articulated a justification for rejecting [the treating physician’s] opinion.”

Id. at 1179 (emphasis in original); see also Varney v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 859

F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “[i]n cases where there are no outstanding issues

that must be resolved before a proper determination can be made, and where it is clear from

the record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant’s excess pain

testimony were credited, we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific

findings regarding that testimony.”). The Ninth Circuit has consistently reaffirmed the legal

principle that improperly rejected evidence should be credited as true. See McCartey v.

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178; Lester, 81

F.3d at 834; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 729.4

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can change it.” Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 602 (O’Scannlain, J. dissenting). This Court cannot

ignore the rule and controlling precedent based on the Commissioner’s claims that it conflicts

with the Social Security Act. (Doc. 26 at 24-25).

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The Commissioner argues remand for further proceedings is necessary so the ALJ can

evaluate the pain questionnaire completed by Dr. Collins; specify the weight to be given to

that evidence; reevaluate Plaintiff’s RFC in light of the updated record; and obtain vocational

expert testimony regarding the effect of Plaintiff’s functional limitations on her ability to

work. (Doc. 26 at 11) The Court disagrees.

Applying the three-part test for crediting improperly rejected evidence, the first part

is easily satisfied in that the ALJ necessarily rejected Dr. Collins’ pain assessment when the

ALJ failed to address it. See Embry v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The

ALJ must either accept the opinions of [claimant’s] treating physicians or give specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting them.”). Moreover, by not addressing it, the ALJ failed to

provide any legally sufficient reason for rejecting the evidence. 

Regarding the second part of the test, the Court is aware of no outstanding issues that

must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made. At the administrative

hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel specifically questioned the vocational expert about whether a

hypothetical claimant suffering from pain at the level set forth in Dr. Collins’ pain

assessment would be able to work. (AR 62) The vocational expert testified, “I believe with

that level of pain, you’d be concentrating on the pain and not on your work and you would

not be completing the work that you would be assigned.” (Id.) Thus, with that evidence from

the vocational expert about the impact of Plaintiff’s pain on her ability to work, there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be made.

With respect to the third part of the test, relying on the same testimony from the

vocational expert, the Court finds it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required

to find Plaintiff disabled if Dr. Collins’ pain assessment were credited as true. The vocational

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expert’s testimony demonstrates that, with Plaintiff’s level of pain as assessed by Dr. Collins,

Plaintiff would be precluded from all work. (AR 62) The ALJ would, therefore, be required

to find Plaintiff disabled. For these reasons, the Court finds the three-part test is satisfied here

and, consequently, remand for an award of benefits is appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the ALJ committed legal error when she

failed to consider the treating physician’s pain assessment which concluded that Plaintiff

suffers from a level of pain that precludes her from working. The Court further finds that

based on this error, remand for an award of benefits is warranted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this

case is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for an award of benefits. The

Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and terminate this

appeal.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2014.

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