Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10907/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10907

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

HILTON GERMANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

JONNIE BEY,

Plaintiff,

versus

CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, et al.,

Defendants,

OFFICER SLATER,

Individually, 

RICHARD FLANNERY, 

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23-10907 Opinion of the Court 2

OFFICER WILLIAM HALL,

Individually, 

OFFICER KEITH WOODEN,

Individually, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cv-01745-LCB

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Hilton Germany, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal with prejudice of his pro se civil rights suit, as a 

sanction for misconduct during the litigation. Germany also 

appeals the district court’s failure to recuse and the district court’s 

order grating partial summary judgment against him. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

I.

Although this is an appeal of a dismissal, it is not (as we will 

explain) an appeal arising from a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12. That is to say, we need not take the 

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23-10907 Opinion of the Court 3

well-pled allegations as true for our purposes. Instead, we recite 

the undisputed facts as they were established at the time of 

summary judgment.1

On October 23, 2016, Germany called 911 and asked for 

police to come to his home and remove his wife. He began the call 

by telling the dispatcher, “I’m not trying to be funny. I’m fucking 

serious. . . . I need a police officer to come out here.” The 

dispatcher took down his address and asked what happened. 

Germany responded, “I just need a police officer to come out here. 

That’s what I’m requesting.” When the dispatcher asked again, 

“what happened?”, Germany doubled down, replying “No, 

motherfucker. I just told you what the fuck I need, right? So that’s 

what I need you to do.” “I don’t give a fuck about your job,” he 

continued, demanding “Look man, just send the fucking police out. 

1 The events underlying this suit were captured on video by the officers’ 

bodycams. That video footage, along with recordings of 911 calls that 

Germany placed, were filed on the record as summary-judgment exhibits. 

Because neither party disputed the authenticity of those video and audio 

recordings, the district court treated the recordings as undisputed evidence. 

This is consistent with the Supreme Court and our Circuit’s precedents. See 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (holding that, where a video—

whose authenticity the plaintiff hadn’t attacked—“so utterly discredited” the 

plaintiff’s version of events, “the Court of Appeals should not have relied on 

such visible fiction [as the plaintiff’s testimony]; it should have viewed the facts 

in the light depicted by the videotape.”); Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 

1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here an accurate video recording completely and 

clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony becomes incredible.”); 

id. (“At times, we too have discarded a party’s account when the account is 

inherently incredible and could not support reasonable inferences sufficient to 

create an issue of fact.”). 

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That’s all I asked for.” Then Germany hung up. He called back a 

few minutes later and reached a different dispatcher. This time, he 

identified himself, gave his address, and repeated his request to 

have someone removed from his home. He told this dispatcher, “I 

need someone to bring a police officer. I’m trying to restrain 

myself from killing anybody. . . . I just need someone to come to 

remove a person.” 

Officer Hall was the first to arrive at the scene. He found 

Germany standing in the front yard and asked Germany what was 

going on. Germany explained that he wanted his wife removed 

from the home. Hall told Germany that, because the couple was 

married, he could not make Germany’s wife leave her own home. 

To that, Germany replied “Well, I’m just letting y’all know, I don’t 

want to have no problem with someone getting killed.” Hall 

counseled Germany to be careful with his words because “if she 

hears you saying that, she can press charges.” Hall then tried to ask 

Germany what exactly happened and whether Germany had any 

injuries, but Germany refused to provide any details—he merely 

reiterated his desire to have his wife removed. Hall asked for 

Germany’s name, and he replied “Hilton.” Hall then asked for 

Germany’s last name, and Germany became irate, telling Hall that 

he does not like to repeat himself. Hall told Germany there was no 

need to become disrespectful and that he was there to help, and 

Germany began shouting, “I don’t give a fuck. Get the fuck up out 

of here.” At this point, Jonnie Bey (Germany’s mother) came out 

of the house and approached Germany and Hall, explaining, “My 

son has PTSD. . . . I’m trying to explain to you, my son has PTSD. 

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. . . If you keep asking him the same things, he is going to have a 

problem.” After Germany began screaming obscenities on the 

front lawn, Hall told Germany to put his hands behind his back. 

Rather than comply with Hall’s order, Germany turned away from 

Hall and walked back toward the house, yelling “this is my 

motherfucking property.” Hall followed Germany to the front 

porch and, as Germany reached the door, Hall told Germany “you 

need to come back down here.” Germany shouted back that Hall 

needed to “get the fuck up out my property,” and walked inside the 

house. 

Hall stated in a sworn declaration that, based on Germany’s 

“loud, profane, and violent language and his repeated statements 

that he wanted his wife out of the house, [Hall] was concerned that 

Germany’s earlier threats that he might kill someone might be 

directed at his wife.” Based on that fear and the Huntsville Police 

Department’s domestic violence policy, which requires officers to 

“take reasonable measures to assist and/or assure the immediate 

safety of every person who may be affected,” Hall decided he 

needed to keep Germany away from anyone else in the house to 

deescalate the situation. Hall, therefore, followed Germany to the 

front porch, but Bey stepped in to block his path. When Hall 

(again) instructed Germany to come back down to the yard, 

Germany yelled back, “Get the fuck up out of here. . . . Get the fuck 

off my property.” Germany then entered the home and stood, in 

Hall’s view, behind the glass door. Backup then began to arrive. 

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Bey positioned herself between Germany (in the front door) 

and Hall (at the front steps), blocking Hall’s pathway. She 

reiterated Germany’s distaste for answering questions; Hall’s 

questions, she said, pushed Germany “from 0 to 1000,” and she was 

unable to control Germany when he was “at this level” because of 

his size. Bey also told Hall that Germany could not control himself 

when he is “out of control” and angry. When Germany yelled over 

his mother with another profanity-laced tirade, Bey begged her 

son, “I’m your voice of reason, let me talk, please.” 

Hall explained that as a matter of state law, because the 

situation involved domestic violence, he needed Germany to come 

back outside and talk. Hall made clear to Bey that if Germany did 

not come out, Hall would have to go in. As Germany turned away 

from the door and started pacing inside the house, Hall asked Bey 

if there were any weapons in the house, and Bey said she was not 

aware of any. 

During most of this interaction, Germany was standing 

immediately inside the glass front door, in Hall’s line of sight. But 

as Hall spoke to Bey, Germany moved further into the house and 

disappeared from view. Hall ordered, “Sir, I need you to come 

back here,” to no avail. Then, over Bey’s protests, Hall (followed 

by Officers Wooden, Flannery, and Slater—all of whom had 

arrived while Hall was talking to Germany and Bey) entered the 

home. Inside, the officers found Germany walking down a 

staircase next to the kitchen. Hall told Germany he was under 

arrest and ordered him to put his hands behind his back. When 

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Germany questioned why (“I ain’t turning around. For what?”), 

Hall told him he was being arrested for disturbing the peace. 

Germany, increasingly argumentative, responded “It’s my fucking 

property. I can say whatever I want.” Flannery chimed in and told 

Germany to cooperate with Hall, but Germany turned his anger 

on Flannery, telling him to “shut the fuck up. Like I said, I’m not 

about to fucking go nowhere.” 

Faced with Germany’s increasing anger and lacking 

cooperation, Wooden sprayed Germany with oleoresin capsicum 

(“OC,” or pepper spray). A struggle then ensued as the officers 

tried, for approximately one minute, to handcuff Germany. The 

bodycam footage shows a chaotic scene, with multiple officers 

grappling with Germany, their commands to “put your hands 

behind your back” muddled with screams from Germany’s family 

members and a crying baby. After about 35 seconds, the officers 

got Germany down to the ground where he continued to struggle. 

After another 30 seconds or so on the ground, the officers 

handcuffed Germany. 

The parties all agree that Flannery, Hall, Wooden, and Slater 

all struck, punched, or used pressure-point holds on Germany 

during the scuffle, but because of the chaotic scene and close range, 

the bodycam footage does not show precisely what happened after 

Germany was on the ground. After Germany was cuffed, he first 

refused to move outside voluntarily. But once the officers lifted 

him to his feet, he cooperated with their effort to walk him outside

to a patrol car.

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The day after his arrest, Germany went to the hospital. He 

had some bruising below his right eye and on his upper arms; he 

complained of “mild pain on multiple locations”; and he denied 

ever having lost consciousness. The physician who treated 

Germany prescribed medication to treat his pain and sent him 

home. 

Germany was charged with resisting arrest and disturbing 

the peace, but the Huntsville prosecuting attorney filed a motion

for nolle prosequi, which the state court granted.

In 2018, Germany and Bey paid the requisite fee and filed 

their suit alleging false arrest, excessive force, and assault and 

battery. In the complaint, Germany and Bey named Officers Slater, 

Flannery, Wooden, Hall, and Sellers as defendants, all in their 

individual capacities.2 In their Second Amended Complaint, 

Germany and Bey asserted fourteen claims, falling into five 

categories: (1) a false arrest of Germany by Officer Hall (Count 1); 

(2) excessive force against Germany by Officers Slater, Flannery, 

Wooden, Hall, and Sellers (Counts 2 to 6); (3) excessive force

against Bey by Officer Hall (Count 7); (4) assault and battery against 

2 Germany also named the City of Huntsville, Alabama (“the City”), as a 

defendant. The district court later granted summary judgment to the City 

based on a state law grant of immunity. But Germany does not challenge the 

ruling in favor of the City on appeal, so he has abandoned the issue. See United 

States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[F]ailure to raise an issue 

in an initial brief . . . should be treated as a forfeiture of the issue, and therefore 

the issue may be raised by the court sua sponte [only] in extraordinary 

circumstances.”).

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Germany by Officers Slater, Flannery, Wooden, Hall, and Sellers, 

and the City of Huntsville (Counts 8 to 13); and (5) assault and 

battery against Bey by Officer Slater (Count 14). The Defendants 

answered, denied liability, and asserted defenses. 

Following discovery, each of the Defendants moved for 

summary judgment.3 The Defendants all argued that, among 

other things, they were entitled to qualified immunity from the 

§ 1983 claims and state-agent and statutory immunity from any 

state law claims. In support, they submitted joint evidentiary 

materials, including police policies, bodycam videos from the 

officers, transcripts and recordings of Germany’s calls to 911, 

depositions of the parties, and Germany’s arrest report. 

Following a hearing, the district court issued an order on the 

summary judgment motions.4 After reviewing bodycam footage 

of the underlying incident—the authenticity of which was not in 

dispute—the district court found that the officers were entitled to 

qualified immunity on all of Bey’s claims and many of Germany’s. 

Officer Hall, the district court concluded, was entitled to 

qualified immunity on Germany’s false arrest claim because at least 

3 Officers Sellers and Flannery also moved for judgment on the pleadings. 

That motion does not feature in the present appeal.

4 The district court granted summary judgment to all Defendants as to Bey’s 

claims. Bey did not file a notice of appeal or join in Germany’s notice and is 

not a part of this appeal. And, as we’ve said, Germany has not appealed the 

district court’s grant of state-law immunity to the City. We consider, 

therefore, only the summary judgment rulings relevant to Germany’s claims 

against the officers. 

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arguable probable cause existed for Germany’s arrest under the 

City’s ordinance for disturbing the peace. Further, the district 

court found that Officer Hall was permitted to enter Germany’s 

house without a warrant under the exigent-circumstances and 

rendering-aid exceptions. Thus, the district court granted Officer 

Hall’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity 

as to Count 1. 

The district court also found that all the officers were 

entitled to partial summary judgment on Germany’s excessiveforce claims (counts 2 to 6) because most—but not necessarily all—

of their conduct during his arrest merited qualified immunity. The 

district court, having already determined that Germany’s arrest 

was proper, turned to whether the force used was proper. 

Examining reasonableness under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 

(1989), the district court concluded that the officers were forced to 

respond quickly to Germany’s hostile behavior and that their initial 

use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Accordingly, they were entitled to qualified immunity for their 

actions up until the time that Germany was prone on the ground.

The district court also found that the Defendants’ actions of 

spraying Germany with OC, using hand strikes before he was taken 

to the ground, and wrestling him to the ground were justified 

under the circumstances. 

The district court noted, however, that Germany testified 

that the officers continued to choke and punch him after he had 

given up and was handcuffed, and, if Germany’s allegations were 

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proven true, the officers would not be entitled to qualified 

immunity for this conduct. While the officers denied this 

allegation, the video footage during the approximately thirtysecond period after Germany was taken to the ground was unclear 

because of the physical struggle and chemic spray. The video did 

not clearly show when Germany was handcuffed or whether he 

was choked. Thus, the district court found that a genuine dispute 

existed as to whether Defendants used excessive force in 

completing the arrest, and, accordingly, it denied summary 

judgment as to whether the officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity for their actions after Germany was taken to the ground, 

as alleged in Counts 2 to 5. Thus, the district court granted 

summary judgment, in part, to Defendants as to Counts 2 to 6, 

based on qualified immunity for their conduct before wrestling 

Germany to the ground. 

The district court also found that the officers were entitled 

to summary judgment on Germany’s assault and battery claims, 

with a similar limited exception, because most of their conduct 

during his arrest merited qualified immunity. Germany’s assault 

and battery allegations were essentially the same as his excessive 

force allegations, so the district court analyzed the claims together. 

The court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part 

as to Counts 9 to 13, with the same distinction as the counts for 

excessive force.5 

5 Officer Sellers later moved to reconsider its denial of his motion. The district 

court agreed and entered summary judgment in his favor because “the 

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The remaining Defendants—Officers Slater, Flannery, 

Wooden, and Hall—prepared to defend themselves at trial 

concerning whether they committed assault and battery, or used 

excessive force, after wrestling Germany to the ground. In October 

2021, Germany’s counsel withdrew from the case with leave of the 

court. After pushing back the trial date a few times, the district 

court held a status conference in July 2022, during which it ordered 

the parties to exchange certain trial-related documents by October 

1, 2022. 

Sometime after this deadline passed, the remaining 

Defendants moved the district court to sanction Germany under 

Rule 41(b) based on his alleged refusal to comply. They argued 

that sanctions were warranted because Germany failed to follow 

the district court’s instruction to submit his opening statement, 

and, instead, left a voicemail threating to defame defense counsel, 

their staff, and their law firm. The district court held a hearing on 

the motion in November 2022 but held it in abeyance, warning 

Germany to (1) maintain a high standard of civility for the rest of 

the proceedings, (2) not make faces or giggle in court, and (3) not 

argue outside the narrow issue remaining at trial. 

The district court then scheduled a pretrial conference for 

February 24, 2023. Germany did not appear at this conference. 

The remaining Defendants responded by renewing their motion 

for sanctions, because, in addition to their previous reasons, 

bodycam footage at issue clearly shows that he did not touch Germany in any 

way during the process of German’s arrest.” 

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Germany continued to defy court orders and wrongly accuse 

defense counsel of perjury. They noted that Germany had failed 

to file a statement of damages or a witness list on time, had not 

produced his exhibits, and had not attended the pretrial conference 

in the case, all of which were required by duly issued orders.

Germany responded by arguing only that the Defendants 

improperly submitted motions “when court is not in operating 

hours and during the weekends and this should not be acceptable.” 

The case proceeded to trial on February 27, 2023). After the 

jury was selected, the district court heard oral argument on the 

pending motions. The Defendants argued in support of their 

renewed motion for sanctions, reiterating their written arguments 

and highlighting how Germany’s noncompliance with pretrial 

deadlines had limited their ability to adequately prepare for trial. 

In particular, the Defendants said, “we never received the medical 

records . . . We never got a damages statement. There’s been 

various other orders of the Court that have been violated. And so 

certainly it’s well within the Court’s discretion to dismiss this case 

on any number of those issues, but here we have all of them 

combined.” Germany argued against the renewed motion for 

sanctions, claiming that he understood the judge to mean that if he 

submitted the documents, he would not have to attend the pretrial 

conference. He claimed that he suffered from memory loss and 

blamed the judge for his noncompliance, because “you were not 

allowing me to write down anything.” Germany also insisted that 

he “didn’t know [he] needed to provide a statement of damages.” 

During Germany’s argument, the district court had to remind him 

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to act and perform in a civil manner and to show respect for the 

proceedings rather than “shak[ing] his head or tak[ing] an attitude” 

with the court.6 The court again held the motion for sanctions in 

abeyance but warned Germany that he had must follow court 

orders and that it was “up to [him] going forward whether [he] 

want[s] this case to survive or not.”

Germany’s pattern of noncompliance continued throughout 

trial as he repeatedly disregarded the district court’s orders 

regarding form, procedure, prohibition of certain topics and words, 

and submission of a damages statement. The court warned 

Germany throughout trial about his behavior and comments and 

repeatedly told Germany that, if an attorney had acted anywhere

close to his behavior, he or she would have been held in contempt 

and sanctioned upon the first refusal to follow orders. As one 

example, after Germany violated a motion in limine order by 

referring to his arrest as “police brutality” in front of the jury, the 

district court admonished Germany (out of the presence of the 

jury) that “Your comments right there in front of the jury were 

absolutely 100 percent improper. You do that again, then I’m 

going to have to decide whether I let this case go forward.” 

During Germany’s own testimony, he repeatedly discussed

matters which had been excluded as improper. Eventually, in the 

6 At this point, the district court specifically cautioned Germany that “If Mr. 

Canupp shook his head at me, I would probably have him dragged out of here 

by the marshals. But I am not going to do that to you. I just need you to act 

in a civil and kind way until we get through this trial.” 

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presence of the jury, the district court cautioned Germany, “Sir, 

you are trying my patience, I will advise you, sir, that I can dismiss 

this action if you fail to obey my orders. Now, I am going to ask 

you to comply with my orders. I do not want to dismiss this action. 

I want the jury to be able to decide it. But I will use the powers 

that I should fairly use, because everybody in this trial – you and 

these officers – deserve a fair trial. And that’s what we’re going to 

have.” After that last exchange, the district court excused the jury 

for a recess and the Defendants renewed their motion for 

sanctions, requesting dismissal because Germany had continuously 

violated orders and had yet to produce the required damages 

statement. The district court then summarized all of the actions by 

Germany that had warranted sanctions and dismissal through day 

two of the trial. Nevertheless, Germany was permitted to proceed,

under threat of sanctions and dismissal upon another violation. 

On the third day of trial, in regard to the still-missing 

damages statement, the district court warned Germany “very 

honestly, if an attorney was standing there representing you, I can’t 

think of a reason that I would not sanction him, and possibly with 

dismissal of the case. And so, obviously, Mr. Canupp has made that 

motion, and I would say that issue is still very much in play.” 

Germany, seemingly nonplussed, replied “I’d just like to say can 

you please do what you’re going to do? Because you keep 

threatening me. Just do what you are going to do. Are you going 

to dismiss the case? Dismiss the case. It’s fine with me. I’m not 

going to disagree with you. I am not going to argue.” The district 

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court again held the motion for sanctions and motion to dismiss 

under advisement. 

Later that day, defense counsel raised to the district court 

that Germany had (again) violated the district court’s in limine 

order excluding any discussion of the disposition of his arrest and 

criminal charges. After the district court reiterated its order 

excluding that topic, Germany reiterated that if the Defendants 

mentioned his charges (they had not), “I’m definitely going to tell 

[the jury] I’m not guilty.” The court responded, “You’re going to 

continue to defy this order? You’re going to continue to refer to 

the criminal charges? Is that what you’re telling me?” Germany 

replied that he would do as he believed the Defendants had done, 

which was to discuss the dropped charges. 

That same afternoon, the district court admonished 

Germany for being “disrespectful” and “mak[ing] faces when you 

sisagree with my ruling,” and reminded him that “I expect you to 

conduct yourself with the same civility that any other person 

would in this courtroom.” When Germany made some mocking 

hand gesture towards the jury during this exchange, the district 

court told Germany “Do not use those hand moves. It is 

disrespectful. Mr. Canupp would be in the jail right now if – I’m 

talking. You’re not talking.” “At some point,” the district court 

warned Germany, “I’m not going to put up with this.” 

The district court then cautioned Germany to “tread lightly” 

with a witness, to which Germany responded, “Your Honor, can 

you stop threatening me?” The jury was excused from the 

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courtroom and the district court reprimanded Germany, 

explaining, “Sir, when I tell you to follow my orders and the law, 

that’s not a threat. . . . If you are going to keep this up, just go ahead 

and tell me now. If you are going to continue to not follow my 

orders, be disrespectful in front of this jury to the attorneys, the 

parties, and this Court, if you intend to continue to do that, I need 

to know right now.” The district court asked, “Do you intend to 

follow my orders or not?” Germany responded, “I don’t know.” 

The district court then asked, “Are you going to follow my orders 

and be civil and conduct yourself in a good manner if this trial 

continues?” Germany responded “I am being civil,” and then 

repeated the same answer three more times, dodging the district 

court’s question of whether Germany would follow orders for the 

rest of trial. The district court ordered him to be held in contempt. 

After a brief recess, the district court sanctioned Germany 

and dismissed his case with prejudice. The district court explained 

its rationale as follows:

For all of the reasons that we’ve covered in Mr. 

Canupp’s motion for sanctions, your complete 

disregard for decorum in this Court, your complete 

disregard for my motions in limine, your failure to 

comply with my pretrial order, and provide them 

even a statement of damages even to now, and then 

your absolute insulting behavior in front of this jury, 

in front of these parties, in front of this Court and 

your – and, let me say, and your own unwillingness 

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to commit to stop doing that, I find your behavior is 

willful. I find that there is no lesser sanction than the 

dismissal of your case. This case is dismissed with 

prejudice.

Then, in a written order memorializing the dismissal, the 

district court described Germany’s behavior as “the worst behavior 

this [c]ourt has ever observed of a pro se litigant, or for that matter, 

any litigant.” In the order, the court explained that it tried to work 

with Germany as a pro se plaintiff, but he made that impossible and 

showed no remorse for any of his actions). At some great length, 

the district court detailed Germany’sinappropriate behavior before 

and during trial. It determined there were at least three

independent bases for dismissing Germany’s case with prejudice as 

a sanction: (1) he failed to appear at a pretrial conference violating 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a); (2) he violated court orders 

repeatedly, including by continually referring to matters that were 

excluded by the its previous order; and (3) his inappropriate 

behavior at trial that was “hostile, argumentative, and insolent”

and “willful and designed to be provocative.” The district court 

noted that it had warned Germany many times regarding his 

defiance of court orders and inappropriate behavior, yet he 

disregarded those warnings. Accordingly, the district court 

dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Rules 16(f) and 41(b), 

and its inherent authority, and granted the Defendants’ renewed 

motion for sanctions. 

This appeal ensued.

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II.

First, we address Germany’s claim that the district court 

erred by failing to recuse from his case. We generally review a 

judge’s decision not to recuse himself for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). But if a 

party fails to invoke a federal recusal statute to the district court, 

we review for plain error. Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708 

F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Under the plain-error standard, an 

appellant must show that there was (1) an error, (2) that was plain, 

and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Higgs v. Costa 

Crociere S.P.A. Co., 969 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020). “If all three 

conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its 

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 

1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006)).

A judge must sua sponte recuse himself “in any proceeding in 

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or 

“[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 

28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). “The test is whether an objective, 

disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying 

the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a 

significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Parker v. Connors 

Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988).

“Ordinarily, a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case 

may not serve as the basis for a recusal motion.” McWhorter v. City 

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of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). “The judge’s bias 

must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from something 

other than that which the judge learned by participating in the 

case.” Id. “The exception to this rule is ‘when a judge’s remarks in 

a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice 

that it constitutes bias against a party.’ Mere ‘friction between the 

court and counsel, however, is not enough to demonstrate 

pervasive bias.’” Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 

293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hamm, 708 F.2d at 

651).

Here, because Germany did not seek recusal or invoke a 

federal recusal statute before the district court, we review the issue 

for plain error only. Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651. We easily conclude 

that the district court judge did not commit error, plain or 

otherwise, by failing to sua sponte recuse himself. Nothing in the 

record suggests that his impartiality could have been reasonably 

questioned or that he labored under any personal bias or prejudice. 

And notably, the judge granted Germany far more lenience on his 

improper behavior than an attorney would have received for the 

same conduct—a point which the district court repeatedly made 

on the record below.

Germany’s grievance on appeal is based, instead, on noncontroversial evidentiary rulings and comments on courtroom 

etiquette. Germany points to several moments at trial during 

which the district court judge made rulings that were unfavorable 

to him: first, Germany complains that “in the opening, the defense 

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was permitted to argue, over objection, that the plaintiff had 

reached for an officer’s gun, even though everyone knew that not 

to be the case.” The district court overruled Germany’s objection, 

explaining “this is just a statement of what she expects the evidence 

will show, just as yours was what you expected it would 

show.” There’s no appearance of bias or impropriety there. 

Second, Germany points to a moment during a witness 

examination during which he protested, “Your Honor, it seems 

that y’all rushing me. It been seven years that I been – been police 

brutalized,” and the district court instructed the jury to “disregard 

the word brutalized. That was an absolutely improper 

comment.” Again, there is no reasonable appearance of bias in a 

district court’s straightforward enforcement of its in limine 

rulings. 

Third, Germany insists the district court “went out of its 

way to intimidate” his mother when she was being impeached on 

cross-examination. Germany’s mother had contradicted her own 

deposition testimony and, when confronted with the deposition 

transcript, she accused defense counsel of misquoting her. The 

district court then excused the jury and admonished her about 

truthfulness on the stand, telling her “[I]f you tell something that’s 

not the truth, it is a felony. I am not going to allow something that 

is not the truth [to] come from this witness stand, and it is as simple 

as that . . . . If you do not give them a truthful answer, it would be 

my duty to forward this to the United States Attorney. I will leave 

it at that.” Germany’s mother responded, “I’m going to say my 

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truth because I don’t recall it,” prompting the district court to again 

explain that lying under oath is punishable by contempt and that 

he would have a marshal take her into custody if she weren’t 

truthful. As before, we see no appearance of bias or prejudice in 

the district court’s appropriate admonition of a recalcitrant witness.

Finding no error plain or otherwise, we affirm as to this 

issue.

III.

We turn, next, to Germany’s appeal of the Rule 41(b) 

dismissal. We review the dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) 

for an abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 

1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). Discretion means the district court has 

a “range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long 

as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of 

law.” Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 

420 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ameritas Variable Life 

Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Thus, when 

employing an abuse of discretion standard, we will leave 

undisturbed a district court's ruling unless we find that the district 

court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong 

legal standard.” Id. at 1325.

We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. Alba v. 

Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). But issues not 

briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.

Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). An appellant fails 

to adequately brief a claim when he does not “plainly and 

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prominently raise it.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 

678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 

517, 530 (11th Cir. 2013)). Further, when a district court order is 

based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must show 

that “every stated ground for the judgment against him is 

incorrect.” Id. 

Further, although pro se parties’ pleadings are liberally 

construed by courts, pro se litigants are not relieved from following 

procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 

2007). A district court may dismiss a case for failure to comply with 

court rules “under the authority of either Rule 41(b) or the court's 

inherent power to manage its docket.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. 

Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 n.10 (11th Cir. 2015). To dismiss 

with prejudice under Rule 41(b), the court must find that: “(1) a 

party engage[d] in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt 

(contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds 

that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, LTD. v. 

M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

World Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int’l Fam. Ent’mt, Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456 

(11th Cir. 1995)). A court also has the inherent authority to 

sanction parties for “violations of procedural rules or court orders,” 

up to and including dismissals with prejudice. Donaldson v. Clark, 

819 F.2d 1551, 1557 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987).

As to the first prong of a Rule 41(b) dismissal under Betty K, 

simple negligence will not suffice. McKelvey v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 

789 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986). As to the second prong, a 

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district court must “consider the possibility of alternative, lesser 

sanctions.” Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 484 (11th Cir. 2006). But 

although dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy, we have

found that “dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where 

the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of 

discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

Here we note that although the district court provided three 

independent bases for dismissal—Rule 41(b), Rule 16(f), and its 

inherent authority to manage the courtroom and docket—

Germany only argues on appeal that the sanctions were improper 

under Rule 41(b). Thus, he has abandoned any argument that 

dismissal was improper under either Rule 16(f) or the court’s 

inherent authority. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Because Rule 16(f) 

and the district court’s inherent authority both constituted 

independent, alternate grounds for dismissing Germany’s case with 

prejudice, we affirm the district court’s order. See id.

But even if we considerGermany’s arguments on the merits, 

they still fail. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing his case with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 41(b)

because Germany repeatedly failed to follow the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and the district court’s orders, both before and 

during trial. See Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1374; Betty K, 432 F.3d at 1337; 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Particularly, Germany’s inappropriate 

conduct included: threatening defense counsel; failing to attend a 

pretrial conference; making faces and giggling during proceedings;

falsely accusing defense counsel of perjury; repeatedly failing to file 

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his damages statement; repeatedly defying the order excluding 

mention of the dismissal of his criminal charges; and stating that he 

would continue to violate orders despite admonishment. This 

flagrant disregard for the Rules and the court’s orders showed a 

“clear pattern of . . . willful contempt (contumacious conduct).” 

See Betty K, 432 F.3d at 1337–38. Further, dismissal did not come 

easily, nor was it the result of a kneejerk reaction from the district 

court: the Defendants sought sanctions several times before and 

during trial. Each time, Germany had the opportunity to respond. 

And the district court also warned Germany several times before 

and during trial that his continued inappropriate behavior would 

lead it to grant the Defendants’ motion and dismiss the case. Given 

the record evidence we discussed above, we find that the district 

court’s explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice is 

amply supported. See Betty K, 432 F.3d at 1338.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing the case under Rule 41(b), and we affirm in this respect

as well.

IV.

Germany also challenges the district court’s grant of partial 

summary judgment to the Defendants. We conclude, however, 

that our affirmance of the dismissal with prejudice renders it 

unnecessary for us to review the merits of any prior interlocutory 

order. See, e.g., Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 569 F.3d 1174, 

1183 (10th Cir. 2009) (declining to address summary judgment 

order given affirmance of dismissal as a sanction for abusive 

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litigation practices); Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 852 F.2d 285, 

288 (7th Cir. 1988) (declining to review interlocutory Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b) dismissal order that preceded dismissal of 

remaining claim as sanction for discovery violation); Ash v. Cvetkov, 

739 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1984) (declining to review earlier 

interlocutory orders when affirming dismissal for failure to 

prosecute); Hughley v. Eaton Corp., 572 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1978) 

(declining to review previous interlocutory orders when affirming 

dismissal for failure to prosecute). We will not wade back into the 

merits of Germany’s case after the district court has seen fit to 

dismiss him for misconduct—a decision we affirm here. To do so 

would contravene the purpose of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

41(b) and 16(f) and undermine the district court’s authority to 

punish contemptuous and abusive conduct. 

For these reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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