Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01170/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Because the Notice of Removal is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to it using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

1 11cv01170 AJB (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN EDWIN CLAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENISE LANKFORD, LT. SAVALA,

CARLOS RAMOS, MARK GOMES, M.

HAWTHORNE, SILVA GARCIA,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 11cv01170 AJB (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

[ECF NO. 5] 

On April 12, 2011, Plaintiff Glenn Clay filed a complaint in

the Superior Court for the County of San Diego, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1983. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 2, 69, ECF No.

1.) On May 27, 2011, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal of

Action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, along with

the summons, the Plaintiff’s Complaint, fee waiver documents, and

Court Records Request [ECF No. 1].1

 On May 31, 2011, Defendants

filed an addendum to their Notice of Removal [ECF No. 2]. 

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2 The Defendants maintain that as of June 3, 2011, Defendant

Hawthorne had not been served. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 1, ECF No. 5.) A plaintiff has 120 days after filing the

complaint to serve each defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); S.D. Cal.

Civ. R. 4.1. Clay’s Complaint was filed on April 12, 2010. 

(Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Without an

explanation from Plaintiff excusing his failure to comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the district court should

DISMISS Hawthorne sua sponte and without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(m); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 4.1; Hicks v. Evans, No. C 08-1146 SI

(pr), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104457, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15,

2011).

2 11cv01170 AJB (RBB)

The events giving rise to this suit occurred while Clay was

incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in

San Diego, California. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges the

Defendants, correctional facility officials, violated his First,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

as well as state negligence standards by improperly terminating him

from his position as the “Lead Man” forklift operator at the

Donovan “Minimum Support Warehouse” and by refusing to reinstate

him. (Id. at 2, 5-7, 9.) 

On June 3, 2011, Defendants Savala, Gomes, Ramos, Lankford,

and Garcia filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with an attached

Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 5].2 Defendants

Lankford, Ramos, and Gomes assert counts one, three, and four

against them, respectively, should be dismissed because they are

barred by the statute of limitations. (Defs’ Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 5) Defendant Savala contends that the

claims against him in count two should be dismissed on the grounds

that Clay fails to state a claim, and Savala is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Id. at 1-3.) Chief Deputy Warden Garcia

likewise argues that Clay’s claims against her in count six should

be dismissed because Plaintiff does not state a claim, and Garcia

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is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 5.) Lastly, all

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state negligence claims for

failure to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act. (Id. at 15-

16.) Defendants Savala and Garcia additionally assert the defense

of discretionary immunity in response to Clay’s state negligence

claims. (Id. at 16.) 

To date, the Plaintiff has not opposed Defendants’ Motion. 

Although the failure to oppose a motion may constitute consent to

granting the motion, the Court will analyze the merits of the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(f)(3)(c). 

The Court has reviewed the Complaint and Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss and attachment. For the reasons discussed below, the

district court should GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’

Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The following facts are asserted on the face of the Complaint

or are contained in documents attached to the Complaint. Amtac

Mortg. Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 430 (9th

Cir. 1978) (stating that documents attached to the complaint may be

considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss); see Schneider v.

Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Quinn v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 470 F.3d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 2006)

(finding that the court may use exhibits attached to the complaint

for “all purposes”).

Clay alleges that in August 2005, he began working in the

Developmentally Disabled Program, a rehabilitation program at

Donovan. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 5, ECF No. 1; Addendum

Removal 4, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff worked as a forklift operator in

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the food department of the warehouse. (Id. at 5, 77.) He was

employed as “Lead Man” and was directly supervised by Defendant

Denise Lankford. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) 

Clay argues that before Lankford became the supervisor of the food

department, Plaintiff’s prior supervisor had warned Clay that

Lankford was racist and would fire Plaintiff at the “first

opportunity.” (Id. at 72.) 

On the afternoon of March 27, 2007, while lowering a pallet in

the warehouse with his forklift, the Plaintiff struck an overhead

water pipe. (Id. at 72, 77.) As a result, the pipe burst and

flooded the warehouse floor. (Id. at 77.) Clay submits that in

response, Defendant Lankford wrote up a Rules Violation Report for

Clay’s destruction of state property pursuant to section 3011 of

the California Code of Regulations, and Lankford attributed the

accident to Plaintiff driving the forklift too fast and with a

“lack of attention to safety.” (Id. at 5-6, 77.) The Plaintiff

states that Lankford requested and recommended that Clay be

“immediately removed from his present job assignment.” (Id. at

77.) Clay contends that he was told he was “fired” from the food

department, so after the accident, Clay took another job as a

forklift operator in the laundry department of the warehouse. (Id.

at 19, 57.)

A rules violation hearing commenced on April 19, 2007, before

the Senior Hearing Officer, Defendant Lieutenant Savala. (Id.) 

Clay argues that he appeared at the hearing, but it was postponed

pending witness availability. (Id.) Lieutenant Savala reconvened

the hearing the following day. (Id.) The Plaintiff again appeared

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3

 Although the typeface notes on the prison rules violation

report indicate that Clay entered a “guilty” plea, the word “not”

was handwritten immediately preceding the word “guilty” on the page

in the Plaintiff’s exhibit. (Id.) 

5 11cv01170 AJB (RBB)

at the hearing and entered a plea to the charges. (Id.)3 The

Plaintiff maintains that his witnesses appeared telephonically and

that Savala relayed Clay’s questions to the witnesses. (Id. at

11.)

Defendant Mark Gomes, the warehouse manager, and “Mr.

Manning,” a Material and Store Supervisor II in the laundry

department, testified on Plaintiff’s behalf. (See id. at 11-13,

77.) Clay asked Defendant Gomes, through the hearing officer, if

Gomes had ever informed the inmates and staff in the warehouse

about a department policy that workers would not be fired for

accidents if they informed the staff. (Id. at 33, 77-78.)

Defendant Gomes replied, “No.” (Id. at 77-78.) Gomes further

testified that he had no knowledge of prior complaints or incidents

involving the Plaintiff operating the forklift unsafely. (Id. at

78.) Finally, Defendant Gomes stated that the rules violation did

not warrant Clay’s termination as a forklift operator. (Id.) 

Next, Plaintiff states that his supervisor, Manning, confirmed

that he was supervising Plaintiff at the time of the accident, that

it was indeed an accident, and that Manning had never heard of Clay

operating the forklift unsafely. (Id.) The Plaintiff maintains

that in light of the testimony by Manning and Gomes and in

“accordance with progressive discipline,” the senior hearing

officer reduced Clay’s offense from a CDCR-115 Rules Violation

Report to a less-serious CDCR-128A general chrono report. (Id. at

78.) Defendant Savala determined that Clay should be reinstated to

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his former position. (Id. at 56.) Following this ruling,

Plaintiff states that Defendant Lankford nevertheless prevented

Clay from returning to work in the laundry department and denied

him reinstatement to his “Lead Man” position. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff had submitted an inmate grievance against Lankford

on April 3, 2007, for improperly terminating Clay as a forklift

operator. (Id. at 70.) The grievance was denied at the informal

level on May 15, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that while his

grievances were proceeding, he accepted employment in the laundry

department of the warehouse to maintain his grade as a forklift

worker and to gain work experience. (Id. at 57.) 

On June 18, 2007, Defendant Lankford submitted a general

chrono report requesting that Plaintiff be removed from his job

assignment in the clothing department at the minimum support

facility and reassigned elsewhere. (Id. at 102.) Lankford

indicated that she filed the report out of concern for her safety

because Clay frequently entered her area since his reassignment,

glared at her, and made inflammatory comments. (Id. at 102.) 

According to Lankford, Plaintiff’s conduct created a hostile and

inappropriate work environment for her. (Id.) The Plaintiff

contends that Lankford’s chrono resulted in his “permanent removal

from the Support Warehouse.” (Id. at 7.) After submitting the

chrono, Lankford hired a Caucasian inmate to occupy Plaintiff’s

former position. (Id.) Clay maintains that Lankford discriminated

on the basis of race because she ultimately hired an “all White”

work crew. (See id. at 8.) 

Plaintiff appealed his grievance to the first formal level of

review on June 19, 2007. (Id. at 70.) Defendant Gomes authored

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the first-level response form denying Plaintiff’s appeal on August

15, 2007. (Id. at 71.) Gomes cited staff safety, particularly

Lankford’s safety, as his chief concern and stated that Clay was

being reassigned to another department. (Id.) On August 20, 2007,

Associate Warden of Business Services, Mardelouis Hawthorne,

interviewed Plaintiff regarding his complaints against Lankford and

discussed the reasons that Plaintiff’s appeal was denied. (Id. at

71, 88.)

On October 12, 2007, Defendant Garcia denied Plaintiff’s

appeal at the second level. (Id. at 71, 105-06.) Garcia

emphasized the monetary loss to the state that was caused by

Plaintiff’s accident and his unsafe operation of the forklift

despite prior counseling. (Id. at 105.) Clay’s subsequent appeal

to the director’s level of review was denied on March 14, 2008.

(Id. at 71.) 

In count one, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Lankford

violated his rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of

association, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.

at 5.) Clay insists that Lankford racially discriminated and

conspired against him, violated federal civil procedure, and was

negligent. (Id.) Lankford is alleged to have engaged in racial

discrimination by causing Clay’s termination and by hiring a

Caucasian inmate to replace him to create an “all White” workforce. 

(Id. at 8.) Also, Plaintiff asserts Lankford’s general chrono was

submitted in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance against her. 

(Id. at 7.) He further alleges that Lankford’s chrono was racially

motivated. (Id.)

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8 11cv01170 AJB (RBB)

In count two, Savala is claimed to have racially discriminated

and conspired against Clay, violated federal civil procedure, and

acted negligently. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff argues that Savala

violated his rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of

association, freedom of speech, and freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment. (Id.) Clay complains that Savala unnecessarily

postponed the rules violation hearing, failed to stop the hearing

at the required intervals, and prevented Plaintiff from

interviewing witnesses in person. (Id. at 11-15.) 

The Plaintiff argues in count three that Defendant Ramos, the

assistant warehouse manager on duty the day of the fork lift

accident, violated Clay’s rights to due process, equal protection,

freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom from cruel

and unusual punishment. (Id. at 17.) Ramos is said to have

racially discriminated and conspired against Plaintiff, violated

federal civil procedure, and was negligent. (Id. at 17.) Also,

Clay appears to contend that Ramos is liable as Lankford’s

supervisor for failing to use his authority to reinstate Plaintiff

to his job in the warehouse. (See id. at 22.)

Next, Clay complains in count four that Defendant Gomes

violated his rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of

association, freedom of speech, and freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment. (Id. at 29.) Gomes also racially discriminated and

conspired against Plaintiff, violated federal civil procedure, and

acted negligently. (Id.) As a supervisor, Defendant Gomes should

have overruled his subordinates and reinstated Plaintiff to his

position as a forklift operator. (Id. at 32.) Clay maintains that

Gomes lied while testifying at Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. 

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(Id. at 33.) Finally, Plaintiff urges that the prison policy

enabling a staff member to displace an inmate from his job

assignment by submitting a chrono alleging safety concerns is

misused to racially discriminate. (Id. at 36.) 

Plaintiff advances count five against Hawthorne for failing to

exercise her supervisory authority. (Id. at 48-49.) In addition,

Clay contends that Hawthorne should have conducted the interview

with Plaintiff in person rather than telephonically. (Id. at 43.) 

The Defendant also should have been aware of the racial

discrimination occurring among staff within the CDCR and at

Donovan. (Id. at 46-47.) As noted previously, Defendant Hawthorne

has not been served in accordance with Rule 4(m) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and should be dismissed.

Lastly, in count six, Garcia is alleged to have violated

Clay’s rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of

association, freedom of speech, and freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment. (Id. at 55.) Plaintiff argues that the Defendant

racially discriminated and conspired against him, violated civil

procedure, and was negligent. (Id.) Clay charges the chief deputy

warden with being aware of her subordinates’ discriminatory

motivations behind their acts. (Id. at 55-66.) 

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

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without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is generally proper

only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988)). 

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The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is not required to accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”) 

“Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the court may not generally consider materials

outside of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151

F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc, 51 F.3d at

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1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

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Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se

civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a pro se

litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

These guidelines apply to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Defendants Lankford, Ramos, and Gomes

These Defendants briefly contend that counts one, three, and

four against them should be dismissed because the Plaintiff did not

file his Complaint within the statute of limitations. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 5.) Defendants argue

that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from

the analogous California statute for personal injury lawsuits,

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which is two years from the date of the incident. (Id. (citing

Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999); Cal. Code. Civ.

Proc. § 335.1 (West 2006).) California Code of Civil Procedure

section 352.1(a) provides that the statute of limitations is tolled

during a prisoner’s incarceration, not to exceed two years. (Id.);

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1(a) (West 2006). Lankford, Ramos, and

Gomes maintain that Clay’s allegations against them in counts one,

three, and four arise from events that occurred on March 28, 2007. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 5.) Thus,

Plaintiff had at most four years, until March 28, 2011, to file a

lawsuit against these Defendants. (Id.) They conclude that the

statute of limitations bars Clay’s claims because he waited until

April 12, 2011, to file his Complaint. (Id.) 

Section 1983 does not explicitly contain a statute of

limitations. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Indeed,

federal courts typically apply the personal injury limitation

period and applicable tolling statutes of the state in which they

sit. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Douglas v.

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009); Silva v. Crain, 169

F.3d at 610. Nonetheless, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of

action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by

reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. “Under federal

law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the

injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” Douglas, 567

F.3d at 1109 (citing Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th

Cir. 2000)). This occurs “when the plaintiff has 'a complete and

present cause of action.'" Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (quoting Bay

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Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of

Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). 

Where a plaintiff “alleges a number of discrete acts . . . ,

each of which allegedly violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional

rights[,]” claims based on acts that occurred beyond the statute of

limitations period are time-barred. Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd.

v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003)

(affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s time-barred claims that were

related to his timely-filed claims in a § 1983 action); see also

Rivas v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 619 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (E.D.

Cal. 2008) (refusing to apply continuing violation theory because

defendants’ discrete acts during an ongoing investigation gave rise

to independent, actionable claims). A plaintiff may use the timebarred acts, however, “as evidence to establish motive and to put

his timely-filed claims in context.” Carpinteria Valley Farms, 344

F.3d at 829; Rivas, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. This principle

applies to alleged acts of racial discrimination “even when they

are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete

discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging

that act.” AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).

In California, the statute of limitations for personal injury

claims is two years, which can be tolled for up to two years during

a prisoner’s incarceration. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 335.1,

352.1(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘actual, uninterrupted

incarceration is the touchstone’ for applying California's tolling

provision for the disability of imprisonment.” Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also King v. Fresno

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Police Officers, No. CV F 07-1078 LJO DLB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

27035, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008) (concluding that plaintiff

was not entitled to tolling because he was not continuously

incarcerated for the entire two-year period after the accrual of

his cause of action). “It is defendant's burden to prove that

plaintiff filed his claims after the expiration of the statute of

limitations, but it is plaintiff's burden to show he is entitled to

equitable tolling.” Sumahit v. Parker, No. CIV S-03-2605 FCD KJM

P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009)

(discussing the defendant’s burden in the section 352.1 context). 

1. Count One: Defendant Lankford

Clay alleges that Defendant Lankford violated his right to

equal protection by removing Plaintiff from his job in Lankford’s

department and replacing him with a Caucasian inmate. (Notice

Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 5-8, 57, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further

contends that Defendant infringed his right to freedom of speech by

submitting a false general chrono in retaliation for Clay’s

decision to file an inmate appeal against Lankford. (Id. at 7.) 

Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lankford violated

his rights on March 28, 2007, Lankford’s actions occurred on

several different dates. (Id. at 2, 7, 72.) Clay’s forklift

accident took place on March 27, 2007, which resulted in his

initial removal as well as Lankford’s filing of a rules violation

report. (Id. at 72, 75.) Defendant’s refusal to allow Clay to

return work after the disciplinary hearing necessarily occurred

sometime after April 20, 2007. (Id. at 77-78.) It was not until

June 18, 2007, that Lankford filed the general chrono report

complaining of Clay’s hostile and angry demeanor, which resulted in

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Clay’s ultimate removal from the warehouse. (Id. at 102.) These

allegations constitute separate, discrete events. See Carpinteria

Valley Farms, 344 F.3d at 829 (applying the discrete acts

framework).

Defendant Lankford has carried her burden of establishing that

the statute of limitations bars claims based on Clay’s initial

March 27, 2007 removal from his position in the food department and

the March 27, 2007 rules violation report. Because Plaintiff filed

his Complaint on April 12, 2011, more than four years after March

27, 2007, he may not complain of the events on March 27 -- Clay’s

initial removal from the food department and Lankford’s violation

report -- as an independent basis for any cause of action against

her. (See Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) The

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lankford

in count one be DISMISSED without leave to amend to the extent the

allegations derive from Lankford’s March 27, 2007 conduct. See

Carpinteria Valley Farms, 344 F.3d at 829; Rivas, 619 F. Supp. 2d

at 1002. 

The Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant Lankford

concerning her refusal to reinstate him to his job and her filing

of a general chrono against Plaintiff, accrued less than four years

prior to the April 12, 2011 filing. (Notice Removal Attach. #2

Compl. 2, 77-78, 102, ECF No. 1.) Yet, it is unclear from the

Complaint when Clay was released from state custody and, 

consequently, whether the California tolling provision applies to

his claims. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, 7, ECF

No. 5); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (holding that tolling based on

imprisonment does not apply to a civil detainee). For instance,

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Clay lists an address other than Donovan on the Complaint, and

Defendants acknowledge he is no longer a state prisoner. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 5; Notice Removal

Attach. #2 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Lankford has not met her burden

of demonstrating that the Plaintiff’s remaining claims against her

based on these events are beyond the limitations period. See

Sumahit, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973, at *5-6. Lankford fails to

address these additional event dates altogether in her Motion to

Dismiss count one. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7,

ECF No. 5.)

The allegations that arise from Lankford’s refusal to

reinstate Plaintiff after the April 20, 2007 hearing and from her

June 18, 2007 chrono were not beyond the maximum four-year

limitation period. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7,

ECF No. 5.) Defendant Lankford’s Motion to Dismiss count one based

on events occurring after April 10, 2007, should be DENIED. 

2. Count Three: Defendant Ramos

Ramos also argues in a cursory manner that the statute of

limitations bars Plaintiff’s claims against him in count three. 

(Id.) The Defendant similarly relies on Plaintiff’s statement that

the violations by Ramos in count three occurred on March 28, 2007. 

(Id. (citing Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 2, ECF No. 1).) 

Plaintiff attempts to establish Ramos’s liability by arguing

that Defendant Ramos supported his subordinate, Lankford, during

Clay’s initial removal on March 27, 2007, and failed to reinstate

him after the disciplinary hearing on April 20, 2007. (Notice

Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 19, ECF No. 1.) Each of these

occurrences constitutes a separate and discrete event for the

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purposes of the statute of limitations. See Carpinteria Valley

Farms, 344 F.3d at 829; Rivas, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. 

The contention that Ramos improperly supported Lankford in

removing Clay from his post in the food department on March 27,

2007, is time-barred because the Complaint was not filed until

April 12, 2011, which is beyond the maximum four year period. See

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 335.1, 352.1(a). Ramos’s March 27, 2007

conduct may not serve as an independent basis for liability. The

district court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claim against Ramos in

count three without leave to amend to the extent it is predicated

on injuries stemming from the Defendant’s actions on March 27,

2007. 

The Defendant has not met his burden of asserting that

Plaintiff’s claims against him accruing after the April 10, 2007

disciplinary hearing are time-barred. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 5 (discussing the March 28, 2007 accrual

date only).); see also Sumahit, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973, at

*5-6. The district court should DENY Defendant Ramos’s Motion to

Dismiss count three with regard to injuries derived from Ramos’s

role in preventing Clay’s reinstatement after April 10, 2007. 

3. Count Four: Defendant Gomes

As with Defendants Lankford and Ramos, Defendant Gomes asserts

the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to Clay’s

claims against him in count four that accrued on March 28, 2007. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 5.) In the

Complaint, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Gomes violated his

constitutional right to equal protection at the rules violation

hearing on April 20, 2007, in addition to his supervisory role in

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the initial termination on March 27, 2007. (Notice Removal Attach.

#2 Compl. 77-78, ECF No. 1.) 

Clay’s allegations against Gomes involve similarly separate,

discrete acts. See Carpinteria Valley Farms, 344 F.3d at 829;

Rivas, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. Plaintiff’s claims against Gomes

that are based on his conduct during the initial removal on March

27, 2007, are untimely because the Complaint was not filed within

the four-year limitations period. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

352.1(a). Allegations in count four that derive from Gomes’s

conduct on this date should be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 

Gomes has failed to meet his burden with respect to the

contentions concerning his testimony at the disciplinary hearing on

April 20, 2007. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF

No. 5) (discussing only the March 28, 2007 accrual date); Sumahit,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973, at *5-6. Defendant Gomes’s Motion to

Dismiss should be DENIED with respect to claims arising from the

April 20, 2007 disciplinary hearing and later.

B. Defendant Savala

Defendant Savala moves to dismiss the due process violation

alleged in count two because Clay fails to state a claim, and

Savala is entitled to qualified immunity. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff contends that Savala

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by postponing the rules

violation hearing, preventing Clay from interviewing witnesses in

person, failing to stop the hearing, issuing a disciplinary action,

and conspiring with the other Defendants to deny reinstatement. 

(Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 11-14, ECF No. 1.)

// 

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1. Failure to State a Claim

Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff asserts that Savala’s

conduct violated Clay’s rights to due process, free speech, equal

protection, freedom of association, and constituted racial

discrimination, cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the First, Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 8, ECF No. 5.) Savala contends that none of Plaintiff’s

allegations against him state a claim, yet Defendant focuses on

Clay’s due process charge because Savala believes it is the only

argument with potential merit. (Id.) Lieutenant Savala asserts

that the Complaint violates the pleading requirements because it

does not provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief” beyond an “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” (Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(2009)).) 

Next, Savala argues that Clay cannot sustain a due process

claim because there is no liberty interest that attaches to an

inmate’s right to work, and the rules violation hearing process did

not result in a “typical and significant” change in the conditions

of Clay’s confinement. (See id. at 8-9.) In particular, a

prisoner must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic

conditions” of his incarceration to state a claim under the Due

Process Clause, such as a loss of good-time credits. (Id. at 8

(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).) Savala submits

that the Plaintiff cannot meet this burden where he admittedly

“bumped an old water pipe with a forklift,” which resulted in a

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hearing reducing the discipline from actual termination to a

“write-up” and a recommendation that Clay be reinstated. (Id. at

9.) The Defendant concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment due

process claims in count two should be dismissed because Plaintiff

suffered no actual loss from Savala’s actions. (Id.) 

 To properly plead a due process violation, an inmate must

allege that the challenged conduct “present[s] the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472, 486 (1995). As an initial matter, prisoners have no federal

statutory or constitutional right to employment, although state

statutory rights may create a liberty or property interest to which

due process may attach. Id. at 480; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

224 (1976) (holding that not every “grievous loss visited upon a

person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural

protections of the Due Process Clause”); Coakley v. Murphy, 884

F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989); Gray v. Hernandez, No. 08-CV-1147-

JM(WVG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29163, at *15-16 (S.D. Cal., Mar.

22, 2011) (“Whether an inmate loses prison employment for an unjust

reason or a just reason, there is no liberty interest in prison

employment.”). 

In California, the state obligates able-bodied inmates to

work, but it retains discretion to assign and remove prisoners from

employment. Gray, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29163, at *15-16. 

Although California enacted a regulation requiring “[e]very ablebodied person committed to the custody of the Secretary of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . to work,” the

Ninth Circuit has stated that inmate labor “is penological, not

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pecuniary,” and “belongs to the institution.” See Hale v. Arizona,

993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3040(a). 

Clay has not complained that the alleged procedural defects in

the disciplinary hearing — postponing the rules violation hearing,

preventing Clay from interviewing witnesses in person, failing to

stop the hearing, and issuing a disciplinary action — caused an

atypical, significant hardship beyond the ordinary incidents of

prison life. In addition, as no due process right attaches to a

prisoner’s employment, Clay cannot allege a constitutional injury

from the fact of his termination. See Gray, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

29163, at *15-16. Although “due process requirements for a prison

disciplinary hearing are . . . less demanding than those for

criminal prosecution, . . . they are not so lax as to let stand the

decision of a biased hearing officer who dishonestly suppresses

evidence of innocence.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647

(1997). 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Savala discriminated against him

and impeded his right to a fair hearing on the rules violation by

frustrating his efforts to confront and question his witnesses,

failing to stop the hearing, and issuing him a disciplinary general

chrono. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 14, ECF No. 1.) Even

so, Clay has not provided specific allegations beyond cursory

statements to substantiate the claimed “grave deprivation of his

constitutional rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s factual allegations,

liberally construed, demonstrate that the disciplinary hearing

comported with due process requirements. Savala held the

disciplinary hearing, provided Plaintiff with notice, allowed Clay

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to call witnesses, and on the basis of the evidence received,

Savala reduced the rules violation to a less-severe general chrono. 

(Id. at 11-14); see also Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (holding that due process is

satisfied if “some evidence” supports the decision by the prison

disciplinary officials). Savala recommended that Plaintiff be

reinstated to his position as “Lead Man.” (Notice Removal Attach.

#2 Compl. 14, ECF No. 1.) Clay’s contentions are insufficient to

state a claim that Savala’s conduct at the hearing subjected

Plaintiff to an atypical or significant hardship. Accordingly, the

district court should GRANT Lieutenant Savala’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim. Courts should, however,

grant leave to amend unless “the pleading could not possibly be

cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

Defendant has only specifically moved to dismiss the due

process claim. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF

No. 5 (“The only potential claim containing more than naked

assertions is due process.”).) Savala does not substantively

address any of Plaintiff’s other claims. The Defendant does not

discuss the factual allegations contained in count two in the

context of other theories of liability urged by Clay. 

Consequently, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Savala has not carried his burden of showing that

Plaintiff has failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570; see Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Accordingly, only the due process claim asserted in

count two should be dismissed.

// 

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2. Qualified Immunity

Next, Lieutenant Savala maintains that he is entitled to

qualified immunity because “there is no controlling authority.” 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF No. 5.) Also, Savala

argues, “[I]t is not beyond debate that it would be unlawful to

assess the progressive discipline of a write-up, as opposed to no

discipline, in connection with a forklift accident that actually

occurred, where the official ruled to reinstate the inmate worker

to his position.” (Id.) Savala further contends that no

reasonable official would have known that this was

unconstitutional. (Id.) 

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see

also Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). It

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts engage

in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, and was the right clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s purported misconduct? 

Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Courts

consider whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s

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conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 555

U.S. 223. A right is clearly established if the contours of the

right are so clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right. Id. at 202 (quotation

omitted). This standard ensures that government officials are on

notice of the illegality of their conduct before they are subjected

to suit. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206). “This is not to say that an official

action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful . . . .” Id.

“[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see

also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1075 (citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d

1018, 1022 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & County of San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If the Officers’

actions do not amount to a constitutional violation, the violation

was not clearly established, or their actions reflected a

reasonable mistake about what the law requires, they are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007));

see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236). 

The Court should attempt to resolve this threshold immunity

question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation “before

expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and

novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that

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will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” Al-Kidd, __

U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-

37); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)

(noting that the purpose of resolving immunity issues early is so

that officials are not subjected to unnecessary discovery); Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (citations omitted). 

As noted above, the Court has recommended that Plaintiff’s due

process claim against Savala be dismissed with leave to amend. Any

discussion of qualified immunity is premature until, and if, the

Plaintiff amends his Complaint. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ.,

313 F.3d 768, 793-94 (2nd Cir. 2002) (explaining that ruling on

qualified immunity in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would

be premature because the issue “turns on factual questions that

cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceedings[]”); see also

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating government

officials are shielded from liability if their conduct does not

violate a constitutional right that was clearly established). 

Defendant Savala’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s due process

claim against him in count two based on qualified immunity should

be DENIED without prejudice as premature.

C. Defendant Garcia

Chief Deputy Warden Garcia moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claims against her in count six for failure to

state a claim and because she is entitled to qualified immunity. 

(See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF No. 5.) 

//

//

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1. Due Process

a. Procedural due process

Garcia moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s procedural due process

claim against her on the ground that prisoners have no

constitutional right to work in prison. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 12-13, ECF No. 5 (citing Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d

480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982)).) The Defendant submits that no liberty

interest attached to protect Clay’s preference for job placement in

the minimum support warehouse as opposed to a job in a different

department. (Id. at 13.) 

To state of cause of action for a violation of procedural due

process, an inmate must plead facts demonstrating an “atypical and

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life” caused by the defendant’s procedural omissions. 

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir.

1997). The Ninth Circuit has held that prison employment is

penological in nature, and prison officials retain discretion in

employment practices. Hale, 993 F.2d at 1395; Gray, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 29163, at *15-16. 

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act does not authorize a

plaintiff to bring a cause of action based on respondeat superior

liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978) (“[T]he fact that Congress did specifically provide that A’s

tort became B’s liability if B ‘caused’ A to subject another to a

tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to

attach where such causation was absent.”); see also Motley v.

Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005). State officials are

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subject to suit in their personal capacity if “they play an

affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987). A

plaintiff must allege “a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation,” or

that “the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or

knew of the violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to

prevent them.” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479

F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646

(9th Cir. 1989). 

“[W]here a defendant’s only involvement in allegedly

unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative

grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to

remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to

active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983.” Trueman

v. State, No. CV 09-2179-PHX-RCB (DKD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

67847, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2010) (citing Shehee v.

Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). “Only persons who

cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling

against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or

contribute to the violation.” K’Napp v. Adams, No.

1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *10-11

(E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009) (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,

609-10 (7th Cir. 1007)).

Clay primarily pleads that Garcia’s procedural missteps

resulted in Plaintiff not being reinstated to the forklift operator

position. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 64, ECF No 1.) Clay

attempts to establish Garcia’s liability by arguing that, as a

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supervisor, Garcia is responsible for the purported procedural

defects associated with his disciplinary hearing. (Id. at 59-62.) 

Also, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable for denying his

inmate grievance. (Id. at 61-62.) 

Because prisoners have no property interest in their

employment, Plaintiff may not maintain a procedural due process

claim for the removal from his job. Gray, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

29163, at *15-16. Moreover, Clay has not alleged that Garcia’s

direct involvement in any procedural defects in the disciplinary

hearing or in processing his inmate appeal led to a significant

hardship. Plaintiff instead asserts that Garcia became aware of

the procedural defects in the disciplinary hearing through Clay’s

administrative appeal, yet Garcia failed to take corrective action. 

(Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 59-62, ECF No. 1.) Merely

alleging that a prison official knew about a subordinate’s past

misconduct, however, is insufficient to establish the liability of

the supervisor. See K’Napp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *11. 

Finally, Clay cannot sustain a procedural due process claim on the

basis of Garcia’s denial of his grievance because ruling on an

appeal did not cause or contribute to the alleged due process

violations. Id. at *10-11 (“A guard who stands and watches while

another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard

who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of

misconduct does not.”); Trueman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67847, at

*10-11. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim against

Defendant Garcia in count two should be DISMISSED. Because it is

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unclear whether Clay could amend his claim to overcome these

deficiencies, he should be given leave to amend. 

b. Substantive due process

Garcia maintains that if Plaintiff is attempting to allege a

substantive due process claim, it should be dismissed because his

equal protection cause of action represents the more specific

source for the claim against Garcia. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 12-13, ECF No. 5.) 

The Plaintiff may not “double up” on his constitutional claims

by advancing a substantive due process claim if “a particular

Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection’” against government misconduct. Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, (1989)); Ramirez v.

Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 283 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95). As the Court notes above, there is no

liberty interest in prison employment, but “racial discrimination

in the assignment of jobs violates equal protection.” Walker, 370

F.3d at 973. 

Clay’s equal protection claim against Garcia stems from the

same concerns and conduct underlying his due process complaint. 

(Id.) To the extent that a substantive due process violation is

asserted, the Equal Protection Clause is an explicit textual source

for relief. Consequently, any substantive due process claim

against Chief Deputy Warden Garcia in count two should be DISMISSED

without leave to amend.

//

//

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2. Equal Protection

Defendant Garcia characterizes Clay’s equal protection cause

of action against her in count six as a claim based on supervisory

liability. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 13, ECF No. 5.) 

Garcia asserts that Clay has not alleged Garcia’s direct or

personal involvement in the discrimination. (Id. at 13.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff must identify the particular overt

acts that were committed against Clay due to his membership in a

class. (Id. at 13-14.) Mere knowledge of the possibility that

racial animosity influenced a staff complaint against the Plaintiff

is insufficient to establish liability for Garcia’s alleged failure

to fully investigate Clay’s appeal. (Id. at 14.) Garcia maintains

that although the removal of one inmate from his job placement in

response to a staff safety complaint might disrupt the ethnic

balance in violation of the Work Incentive Program, it does not

constitute impermissible discrimination. (Id. at 14-15.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “‘does not

create a property or liberty interest in prison employment,’” but

the Equal Protection Clause does protect prisoners “from invidious

discrimination based on race” in employment decisions. Walker v.

Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ingram v.

Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); Serrano

v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). Unintentional

conduct that may have a disparate impact does not violate the

Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239

(1976). “[A] plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an

intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

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1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Protected classes include race,

religion, national origin, and poverty. Damiano v. Fla. Parole &

Probation Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986). But

“neither prisoners nor ‘persons convicted of crimes’ constitute a

suspect class for equal protection purposes.” United States v.

Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Glauner v.

Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To state a claim against a supervising official under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege that the official “personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

‘implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of

the constitutional violation.’” K’Napp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

38682, at *9 (quoting Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646); see also

Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1182. Further, a plaintiff’s complaint

must include facts indicating that the defendant’s conduct caused

or contributed to the alleged constitutional deprivations. K’Napp,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *10-11. A complaint is deficient

if the only nexus between the defendant and the alleged

constitutional misconduct is the denial of an administrative

grievance and failure to intervene. See Trueman, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 67847, at *10-11.

Here, Plaintiff does not allege direct participation by

Defendant Garcia in Clay’s constitutional deprivation. Clay does

not assert that Garcia personally acted with racial prejudice or

participated in her subordinates’ purported racial bias. (See

Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 55-62, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff

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attempts to show that Garcia is liable because she denied his

appeal at the second level of review. (Id. at 60-62, 65.) Clay

contends that Garcia’s denial of the appeal contributed to her

subordinates’ wrongdoing because she knew that Plaintiff was

terminated, denied reinstatement, and did not receive a face-toface interview during the course of his inmate appeal. (Id. at 55-

62.) Clay cannot state a claim merely by arguing that Garcia

improperly found that his allegations of racism were unfounded and

that Garcia should have known of and corrected the other

Defendants’ purported discriminatory acts. The Plaintiff has not

alleged facts that demonstrate Garcia’s personal involvement in his

alleged constitutional deprivation. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194;

K’Napp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *11 (“Concluding that a

supervisory defendant knew of events . . . , but did not take

corrective action is not sufficient to show that a specific

defendant's inaction caused an alleged violation.”) 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s suggestion that Garcia’s policies

enabled “racial animosity” to influence her staff’s disciplinary

and employment actions lacks facts demonstrating Garcia’s direct

involvement. (Notice Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 59, ECF No. 1.) A

plaintiff may maintain a supervisory liability claim for a state

actor’s policy initiative without alleging overt personal

participation if the supervisor implements a policy so deficient

that the policy itself is unconstitutional and is “the moving

force” of the violation. Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Liberally

interpreting the Plaintiff’s arguments, Clay submits that the

Donovan policy regarding disciplinary write-ups is susceptible to

the infiltration of prison officials’ prejudice. (See Notice

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Removal Attach. #2 Compl. 59-60, ECF No. 1.) But Clay has not

provided facts showing that Garcia played a specific role in

implementing the policy or that alleged the policy itself was

unconstitutional. Accordingly, Clay’s equal protection claim

against her in count six should be DISMISSED.

The district court should give Plaintiff leave to amend his

equal protection claim against Garcia to assert facts demonstrating

Garcia’s direct involvement.

3. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendant Garcia asserts that she is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF

No. 5.) “[T]here is no controlling authority and it is not beyond

debate that it would be unlawful to decline to reinstate an inmate

to be supervised by someone who had indicated the inmate made her

feel unsafe . . . .” (Id.) Defendant argues that Clay was given

another job in a different area of the prison, but concedes that

staff members could have improper motives for stating that an

inmate made them feel unsafe. (Id.) 

 Clay has not adequately alleged that Garcia’s conduct

amounted to a constitutional violation. Because the Court has

recommended that Plaintiff’s procedural due process and equal

protection claims in count two be dismissed with leave to amend, a

qualified immunity analysis is premature until, and if, Clay amends

these charges. See Taylor, 313 F.3d at 793-94; Proctor v. Felker,

No. Civ. S-08-3158-JAM GGH P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114490, at *10

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

Defendant Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s procedural due

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process and equal protection claims against her based on qualified

immunity should be DENIED without prejudice as premature.

The Court has recommended that any substantive due process

claim against Garcia be dismissed without leave to amend. The

qualified immunity inquiry may end here. Al-Kidd, at __ U.S. __,

131 S.Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201; James, 606 F.3d at 651. 

E. Plaintiff’s State Negligence Claims

All Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s supplemental state

negligence claims against them on the ground that Clay failed to

file an administrative claim, as required by the Government Tort

Claims Act. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 5.) 

The California Supreme Court has recognized the claim

presentment requirement as an “element[] of the plaintiff's cause

of action and [a] condition[] precedent to the maintenance of the

action.” California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240, 90

P.3d 116, 119, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 538 (2004) (quoting Williams

v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 839, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453

(1976)). A complaint that fails to “allege facts demonstrating or

excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement” fails

“to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Id.

at 1243, 90 P.3d at 122, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541. 

Defendants contend that Clay has not pleaded facts

demonstrating his compliance with the claim presentation

requirement, rendering his negligence causes of action deficient. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff

has not opposed Defendants’ Motion, and the Court cannot discern

compliance with the claim presentment requirement from Clay’s

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Complaint. The district court should GRANT Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s supplemental state negligence claims with leave

to amend to allege whether he complied with the Government Tort

Claims Act. 

F. Discretionary Immunity

Defendants Savala and Garcia alternatively assert

discretionary immunity as an affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s

supplemental state negligence claims against them. (Id. at 16.) 

They argue that California Government Code section 820.2 immunizes

them from state tort liability because their challenged conduct

consisted of law enforcement decisions, which are discretionary in

nature. (Id. (citing McCarthy v. Frost, 109 Cal. Rptr. 470, 471-72

(Cal. Ct. App. 1973)).) Defendants further assert that

discretionary immunity shields their actions conducting

investigations, and acting upon the knowledge they gained. (Id.

(citing Watts v. County of Sacramento, 186 Cal. Rptr. 154, 155

(Cal. Ct. App. 1982).) According to Savala, he used discretion at

the disciplinary hearing to determine the method in which witnesses

would testify, when to conclude the hearing, to elect to use

progressive discipline in his disposition, and to recommend Clay’s

reinstatement to his job. (Id.) Garcia argues that she performed

discretionary functions when she reviewed and decided Clay’s inmate

appeal based on the evidence presented to her in the administrative

record. (Id.) 

This Court has already recommended that Plaintiff’s state

negligence claims be dismissed with leave to amend so that Clay may

alleged compliance with the Tort Claims Act. Any analysis

regarding Defendants’ discretionary immunity defense would be

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premature until, and if, Plaintiff amends to allege compliance. 

For this reason, the Motion to Dismiss the state claims against

Savala and Garcia based on discretionary immunity should be DENIED

without prejudice as premature. 

 V. CONCLUSION

The district court should DISMISS Defendant Hawthorne from the

lawsuit sua sponte for Plaintiff's failure to timely serve

Hawthorne in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 

Defendants Lankford, Ramos, and Gomes's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's first, third, and fourth causes of action against them,

respectively, for failing to comply with the statute of limitations

should be GRANTED in part. Plaintiff should be given leave to

replead those claims against Lankford, Ramos, and Gomes he contends

accrued after April 10, 2007.

Defendant Savala's Motion to Dismiss Clay's due process clause

allegations again him in count two should be GRANTED. Because it

is unclear whether amendment would be futile, Plaintiff should be

given leave to amend. Savala's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's due

process claims based on qualified immunity should be DENIED without

prejudice as premature.

As to Defendant Garcia, her Motion to Dismiss the procedure

due process claims in count six should be GRANTED with leave to

amend. Her request that any substantive due process allegations in

count six be dismissed should be GRANTED without leave to amend. 

Garcia's Motion to Dismiss Clay's equal protection charges should

be GRANTED with leave to amend. Defendant Garcia's Motion to

Dismiss based on qualified immunity should be DENIED without

prejudice as premature for the procedural due process and equal

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protection claims, but GRANTED for any substantive due process

contention.

Finally, the Motion to Dismiss Clay's state negligence causes

of action against all of the Defendants should be GRANTED. The

district court should give Plaintiff leave to amend to plead

compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act. Therefore,

Defendants Savala and Garcia's request to dismiss the state

negligence on discretionary immunity grounds should be DENIED

without prejudice as premature.

As discussed previously, the Defendants have not specifically

moved to dismiss Clay's remaining constitutional violation

allegations and have not provided the Court with substantive

arguments outlining the basis for their dismissal. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before November 21, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before December 9, 2011.

 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2011 ______________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

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cc: Judge Anthony J. Battaglia 

All Parties of Record 

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