Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01999/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01999-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NICOLAS QUINTERO ALVAREZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1999 PHX JWS (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK:

On June 8, 2005, Petitioner, who is incarcerated in

Pecos, Texas, filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his criminal

conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) on November 10, 2005. Docket No. 9.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and that Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were

not properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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I Procedural History

In November of 1991, Petitioner was convicted in

absentia by a jury of one count of sexual conduct with a minor

in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-1405.

Answer, Exh. C & Exh. D. Petitioner was apprehended on a bench

warrant on August 31, 1998, and, on December 9, 1998, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of 22 years imprisonment pursuant to his

1991 in absentia conviction. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment, which was

granted by the Superior Court on June 4, 1999. Id., Exh. F. 

Petitioner was retried in May of 2000. Id., Exh. J & K.

Petitioner was again found guilty by a jury of one count of

sexual conduct with a minor in violation of Arizona Revised

Statutes Annotated § 13-1405. Id., Exh. L. On June 30, 2000,

after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 22 years

imprisonment for this crime. Id., Exh. M-N. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of this conviction and

sentence, and his appointed counsel filed an Anders brief

representing to the state court that she could find no

meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner

filed a pro se appellate brief, styled as a brief in support of

a petition for post-conviction relief, on January 11, 2001.

Id., Exh. R. The Arizona Court of Appeals construed the pro se

brief as Petitioner’s opening brief on direct appeal. Id., Exh.

S at 4. In his pro se brief, Petitioner asserted only that his

rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by his

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1

 Petitioner did file an untimely motion for reconsideration

of the Court of Appeals’ decision, which was denied because it was not

timely filed. See Answer at 5. Additionally, the claim asserted by

Petitioner was recently rejected as a basis for a federal habeas

relief by the United States Supreme Court in Kane v. Garcia Espitia, which reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a

state defendant who represents himself at trial has a federal right

to access to a law library.

A necessary condition for federal habeas relief

here is that the state court’s decision be

“contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Neither the

[Ninth Circuit’s] opinion below, nor any of the

appellate cases it relies on, identifies a source

in our case law for the law library access right

other than Faretta. See 113 Fed. Appx., at 804

(relying on Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015,

1020 (9th Cir. 2000)) (quoting Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1985))...

The federal appellate courts have split on

whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation, implies

a right of the pro se defendant to have access to

a law library. Compare Milton, supra, with

United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.

1990)[]; United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1983) [] That

question cannot be resolved here, however, as it

is clear that Faretta says nothing about any

specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se

criminal defendant. The Bribiesca court and the

court below therefore erred in holding, based on

Faretta, that a violation of a law library access

right is a basis for federal habeas relief.

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

126 S. Ct. 407, 408-09 (2005).

-3-

lack of access to a law library while incarcerated. Id., Exh.

R. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s appeal in

a decision issued February 8, 2001. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court.1

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2

 Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because he

did not receive a complete copy of the trial transcript; because his

counsel was ineffective in failing to hire a medical expert and a

forensic expert; because of prosecutorial misconduct; and because he

had “newly discovered evidence on facts of penetration.” Answer, Exh.

BB at 3.

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On February 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of

post-conviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court, pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. U.

Appointed counsel for Petitioner averred to the state court that

he could find no meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. V & Exh. W. Although Petitioner was given

leave to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner failed to file a petition. The Arizona Superior

Court dismissed the Rule 32 action on December 12, 2001, noting

Plaintiff’s failure to file an actual petition for relief in

compliance with the rule. Id., Exh. AA.

Petitioner initiated a second action for postconviction relief on October 22, 2002. Id., Exh. BB. The

Arizona Superior Court concluded that the action was not timely

filed and that the claims stated did not fall into any exclusion

from the timeliness rule stated in Rule 32.2(b), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure and dismissed the petition on November 8,

2002. Id., Exh. CC.2 The court stated:

Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that any notice not timely

filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule

32.1(d),(e), (f), (g) or (h). Defendant has

not provided the court with any specifics

excusing him from the timeliness requirement,

as required by Rule 32.2(b). 

Id., Exh. CC at 1.

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3

 Petitioner asserted his conviction and sentence were

improper because of errors in allowing and excluding testimony;

because of errors in the presentence report process; because his

sentence was improperly aggravated; and because his counsel was

ineffective for failing to acquire expert medical testimony to rebut

the state’s expert’s testimony. Answer, Exh. DD.

4

 Respondents note the ambiguity regarding Petitioner’s

appeals of the trial court’s denial of his third action for postconviction relief. See Answer at 5 n.3. Because the resolution of

this issue does not affect the timeliness of the habeas petition, the

Court will use the information available from the Maricopa County

Superior Court database. 

-5-

 On October 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a third action

for post-conviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court. Id.,

Exh. DD. The state court dismissed the action on November 19,

2003, finding the claims precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a),

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. EE.3 Petitioner

filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision, which was

denied on January 1, 2004. Id., Exhs. FF & GG. Petitioner

sought review of the denial of relief by the Arizona Court of

Appeals, which presumably dismissed the request for relief on

June 13, 2005. See Case information CR1991-092197 available at

the Maricopa County Superior Court website at:

www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/criminal/caseInfo.4

Petitioner filed a fourth notice of post-conviction

relief on October 15, 2004, which was dismissed on November 9,

2004. See id. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, which denied review in a decision issued

November 15, 2005. See id. In the interim, Petitioner filed

his federal habeas petition on June 8, 2005. 

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II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA requires state prisoners whose convictions

become final after April 24, 1996, to file any petition for

federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date that

their state court conviction becomes “final.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2005) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). The federal habeas petition “must be filed

within one year of the latest of the date on which ... the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or

the time passed for seeking direct review ...” Id. The running

of this one-year statute of limitations is tolled during any

period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in any state court. See

id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on

other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc).

 Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations on

Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief began to run on

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5

 Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, and one

published opinion issued by the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, have concluded that the relevant statute of

limitations begins to run on a federal habeas action when a petitioner

stands convicted by a state court and the time for seeking certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether or

not the petitioner actually sought certiorari. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920,

924 (9th Cir. 2002); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345 (1st Cir. 2003);

Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v.

Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 400

(4th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2nd Cir. 1998); Souch

v. Harkins, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (D. Ariz. 1998); Smith v.

Lord, 230 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F.

Supp. 2d 901, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1525 (1997) (noting that the

defendant’s conviction became final when his time for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari expired).

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May 8, 2001, when the time expired for seeking certiorari from

the United States Supreme Court at the conclusion of state court

proceedings on Petitioner’s direct appeal. See Wixom v.

Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999);5 Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d

1153, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1999). 

On May 8, 2001, when his conviction became final for

the purpose of beginning the running of the statute of

limitations on his federal habeas action, Petitioner had a

timely filed petition for post-conviction relief pending in the

Arizona state courts, which tolled the statute of limitations

until December 12, 2001, when the Arizona Superior Court

dismissed the petition for relief. Petitioner had thirty days

to seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals

and, therefore, the statute of limitations on his federal action

was further tolled until January 10, 2002. See Gibson v.

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Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold

today that, regardless of whether a petitioner actually appeals

a denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations

period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner could

have sought an appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204

F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a

judgment is not final until the time for seeking review expires,

the word “pending” includes that time period, whether or not

such review is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See

also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n.3 (7th Cir.

2001) (declining to decide issue but collecting cases so

holding).

 The one-year statute of limitations then ran against

Petitioner from January 10, 2002, and expired on January 9,

2003, and, therefore, Petitioner’s federal habeas action, filed

June 8, 2005, was not filed within the applicable statute of

limitations. 

Pursuant to a recent decision of the United States

Supreme Court, the statute of limitations was not tolled on

October 22, 2002, when Petitioner initiated his second state

action for post-conviction relief, because the Arizona court

concluded this action was not timely filed. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-14 (2005); Bonner v. Carey,

425 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, any further

state court action filed after January 9, 2003, could not revive

the already-expired time limit for filing Petitioner’s federal

habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

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28 -9-

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 328 (2003); Preston v.

Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition for

habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time limitation

may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v. Lewis, 255

F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the filing

deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only if

extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make

it impossible to file a petition on time. See Malcom v. Payne,

281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, equitable

tolling is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

B. Exhaustion

Should the Court conclude that Petitioner is entitled

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the petition

may also be denied without reaching the merits of the claims

asserted because Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his

federal habeas claims in the state courts.

A state prisoner must “exhaust,” in state court, the

claims raised in his petition for federal habeas relief, before

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28 -10-

this Court may consider the merits of the prisoner’s application

for relief. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111

S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To properly exhaust his

claims in the state courts, the petitioner must afford the state

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of each federal

constitutional claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the

state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner.

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Kim v. Villalobos,

799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1999, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals concluded that, in Arizona, in the context of

a petitioner who is not sentenced to death or life in prison, the

“highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has

presented his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005).

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his claims in the

state courts because Petitioner did not fairly present any of his

federal habeas claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals as

asserting a claim for violation of a specific federal

constitutional right, either in his direct appeal or in a

properly-filed action for post-conviction relief. Because

Petitioner did not fairly present his federal habeas claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals as federal constitutional claims in

a procedurally correct manner, Petitioner has not properly

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exhausted his federal habeas claims.

2. Procedural default

Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

an action for federal habeas relief, it is also satisfied if the

habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their

claim in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp.

2005); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Gray, 518

U.S. at 161-62, 116 S. Ct. at 2080. A federal habeas petitioner

has not exhausted his claims if he has the right to raise the

claim, “by any available procedure,” in the state courts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2005). Therefore, if it is clear

that the habeas petitioner’s claims are now procedurally barred

under state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the

petitioner’s procedural default of the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

properly presented a claim in state court and is now barred from

doing so by state court procedural rules. See Castille, 489 U.S.

at 351-52; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.

1988). Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did

present a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not

address the merits of the claim because the petitioner failed to

follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501

U.S. at 727-28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d

392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A state is entitled to treat as

forfeited a proposition that was not presented in the right

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court, in the right way, and at the right time--as state rules

define those courts, ways, and times. Failure to comply with the

state’s procedural rules furnishes an independent and adequate

state ground of decision that blocks federal collateral

review.”). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Wells v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Defendants do not assert Petitioner has further remedies

to exhaust his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

Because Arizona’s rules of criminal procedure bar Petitioner from

now returning to state court to exhaust his federal habeas

claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted

these claims. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2003). Because the procedural bar that satisfies the exhaustion

requirement in this matter, i.e., Rule 32.2, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, also provides an independent and adequate

state-law basis for upholding a petitioner’s convictions and

sentences, the Court need not review the merits of Petitioner’s

procedurally defaulted claims unless he can demonstrate cause for

his failure to follow reasonable state procedures for fair

presentment of his claims and prejudice arising from his

procedural default of the claims. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62,

116 S. Ct. at 2080; Murray, 477 U.S. at 485, 106 S. Ct. at 2643.

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6

 Review is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates

that habeas review is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. A

fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent. See id.

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See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860-61, 122 S. Ct. 2578,

2581-82 (2002) (concluding that a state court’s finding that a

post-conviction claim was barred as waived, pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3), was a decision independent of federal law and

adequate to bar federal review of state prisoner’s federal habeas

claim on the merits).6

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default, and

“prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged

constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119,

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must

show the existence of some objective factor external to the

defense which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1305 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has explained that “a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available..., or that some interference by officials

made compliance impracticable would constitute cause under this

standard.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. 

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedural default of his claims in the state

courts.

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III Conclusion

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not timely

filed because the applicable statute of limitations ran for more

than 365 days from the date that Petitioner’s conviction became

final until the time he filed his federal habeas petition, absent

statutory tolling of the time that Petitioner had properly filed

applications for state post-conviction relief pending in the

Arizona courts. Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Additionally, Petitioner did not properly exhaust his

federal habeas claims by fairly presenting them to the Arizona

Court of Appeals as federal constitutional claims in a

procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted the claims and has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedural default of these claims. Because

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from,

his procedural default of these claims, the claims may be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Alvarez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 20th day of December, 2005.

 

Case 2:05-cv-01999-JWS Document 10 Filed 12/21/05 Page 15 of 15