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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1404

VAUGHN NEITA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

JANE N. RADDATZ,

MELISSA ULDRYCH, and

CHERIE TRAVIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 1107 — James F. Holderman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Vaughn Neita was arrested and 

charged with multiple counts of animal cruelty and neglect 

under Illinois law after surrendering two dogs to Chicago’s 

Department of Animal Care and Control. An Illinois judge 

found him not guilty on all counts. Neita maintains that the 

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officials who arrested and prosecuted him had no basis to do 

so; he brought this suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Illinois law. The district court dismissed Neita’s federal 

claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Because 

the allegations in Neita’s complaint are sufficient to state 

claims for false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, we reverse. 

I. Background

Neita formerly owned and operated a dog-grooming 

business and rescue shelter called A Doggie Business. On 

February 14, 2012, he brought two dogs to Chicago’s Department of Animal Care and Control. One of the dogs, Osa,

had become overly aggressive and attacked and killed 

another dog in Neita’s care. The other dog, Olive Oil, had 

become ill after whelping a litter of puppies.

When Neita arrived with the dogs, Cherie Travis, an Animal Control employee, called the police. Chicago Police 

Officers Jane Raddatz and Melissa Uldrych responded to the

call and, after speaking with Travis, arrested Neita. The 

officers then searched Neita, his vehicle, and later his business premises. The State’s Attorney charged Neita with two 

counts of animal cruelty and thirteen counts of violating an 

animal owner’s duties under Illinois law. An Illinois judge 

found him not guilty on all counts.

After his acquittal Neita filed this action against Travis, 

Officers Raddatz and Uldrych, and the City of Chicago,

among others.1 The complaint alleged that the individual

 1 The original complaint also named the Cook County Assistant State’s 

Attorney as a defendant and sought indemnification from Cook County. 

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No. 15-1404 3

defendants were liable under § 1983 for false arrest and 

illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 

under Illinois law for malicious prosecution and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The complaint also sought

statutory indemnification from the City of Chicago for the 

acts of its employees. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9-102. Neita 

twice amended his complaint, and the defendants moved to 

dismiss each iteration for failure to state a claim. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

The judge granted the motions. He dismissed the first 

amended complaint without prejudice, giving Neita an 

opportunity to replead. But the second amended complaint

fared no better. The judge dismissed the federal claims with 

prejudice, holding that Neita had failed to adequately plead 

any constitutional violation and that further amendment

would be futile. The judge then relinquished supplemental 

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing

them without prejudice to refiling in state court. This appeal 

followed. 

II. Discussion

Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is de novo. Olson 

v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2015). To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief that is 

legally sound and plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The federal claims in Neita’s second 

amended complaint consist of a false-arrest claim against the 

 

These defendants were dismissed, and that ruling is not challenged on 

appeal.

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individual defendants and several illegal-search claims 

against Officers Raddatz and Uldrych.

A. False Arrest

To prevail on a false-arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff 

must show that there was no probable cause for his arrest. 

Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012). Neita’s

claim thus requires us to decide whether he has adequately 

pleaded a lack of probable cause.

An officer has probable cause to arrest if “at the time of 

the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or 

one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances 

shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is 

about to commit an offense.” Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. City of 

Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009)). That determination 

depends on the elements of the underlying criminal offense.

Stokes v. Bd. of Educ., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). Neita

was arrested for violating Illinois statutes on animal cruelty 

and an animal owner’s duties. The former provides in 

relevant part that “[n]o person or owner may beat, cruelly 

treat, torment, starve, overwork or otherwise abuse any 

animal.” 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01. The latter requires 

animal owners to provide “(1) a sufficient quantity of good 

quality, wholesome food and water; (2) adequate shelter and 

protection from the weather; (3) veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering; and (4) humane care and treatment.” 

Id. § 70/3. 

Neita has adequately pleaded that the defendants lacked 

probable cause to arrest him for either offense. The operative 

version of the complaint alleges that Neita arrived at Animal 

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Control with two dogs: one was physically healthy and well

nourished but overly aggressive, and one was sick from 

whelping puppies. It further alleges that Neita had taken the 

second dog to a veterinarian but ultimately had to turn it 

over to Animal Control to protect the puppies’ health.

Finally, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the second amended complaint state: 

18. Nothing [p]laintiff said or did on February

14, 2012, indicated that he caused any injury to 

any animal, or that he had neglected any animal.

19. Nothing the defendants could have seen on 

February 14, 2012, indicated that [p]laintiff 

caused any injury to any animal, or was neglecting any animal.

In short, Neita alleges that he showed up at Animal 

Control to surrender two dogs, neither of which showed 

signs of abuse or neglect, and was arrested without any 

evidence that he had mistreated either dog. If these 

allegations are true, no reasonable person would have 

cause to believe that Neita had abused or neglected an 

animal. Nothing more is required to permit this straightforward false-arrest claim to proceed. Cf. Adams v. City of 

Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (requiring 

greater factual specificity to state a plausible claim for 

relief in a “complex” disparate-impact employmentdiscrimination case). Of course, we express no view on 

the ultimate merits. The defendants vigorously maintain 

that the condition of the dogs was dire and patently 

indicative of abuse or neglect. That may turn out to be 

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true, but it’s not a question to be resolved on the pleadings. 

B. Illegal Searches

Neita next alleges that Officers Raddatz and Uldrych illegally searched his person, vehicle, and business. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully defined exceptions. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 

(2009). One exception is for searches conducted incident to a 

lawful arrest. Id.; see also Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 542 

(7th Cir. 2014). The judge held that the warrantless search of 

Neita’s person fell within this exception and dismissed the 

claim accordingly. Because Neita has stated a plausible claim 

for false arrest, his claim for illegal search incident to his 

arrest also may go forward. 

The claims for illegal search of Neita’s vehicle and business require somewhat more attention. Neita alleges that 

after arresting and searching him, Officers Uldrych and 

Raddatz retrieved his keys from his pocket and searched his

vehicle. The judge held that this claim was time-barred 

because it first appeared in the second amended complaint, 

which Neita filed well after the statute of limitations had 

run.

Neita did file his second amended complaint after the 

statute of limitations had run. Claims brought under § 1983 

are governed by the statute of limitations for personal-injury 

claims in the state where the plaintiff’s injury occurred. 

Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006). In Illinois 

the statute of limitations for personal-injury actions is two 

years from when the cause of action accrued, id.; 735 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/13-202, and a Fourth Amendment claim 

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accrues at the time of the search or seizure, Wallace v. Cato, 

549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007); see also Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 

363 (7th Cir. 2010). Neita was arrested and his vehicle 

searched on February 14, 2012. He filed his initial complaint 

on February 14, 2014, exactly two years later. While his

initial complaint was thus timely, it did not allege that the 

officers illegally searched his vehicle; that claim first appears 

in the second amended complaint, which Neita filed on 

November 25, 2014, more than nine months after the limitations period had run. 

Conceding this point, Neita argues that his claim relates 

back to the date of the original pleading under 

Rule 15(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We 

agree. Rule 15(c)(1)(B) provides that an amendment relates 

back to the date of the original pleading when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set 

out—in the original pleading.” “The criterion of relation 

back is whether the original complaint gave the defendant 

enough notice of the nature and scope of the plaintiff’s claim 

that he shouldn’t have been surprised by the amplification of 

the allegations of the original complaint in the amended 

one.” Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 573 

(7th Cir. 2006). 

Here the relevant transaction is properly understood as 

Neita’s arrest at Animal Control on February 14, 2012. The 

searches all flowed directly from that arrest. The original 

complaint, which described Neita’s arrest and the subsequent searches of his person and business, was sufficient to 

put the defendant officers on notice that they would have to 

defend against all claims arising out of this encounter, 

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including the related search of Neita’s vehicle. See FDIC v. 

Knostman, 966 F.2d 1133, 1139 (7th Cir. 1992).

Neita’s third illegal-search claim challenges the warrantless search of his business. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches extends to commercial 

properties, albeit to a lesser extent than private residences. 

Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986) 

(citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981)). “While a 

search of a private residence generally must be conducted 

pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable, a warrantless administrative search of commercial property does not 

per se violate the Fourth Amendment.” Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 

Without deciding whether the officers’ search of Neita’s 

business violated the Fourth Amendment, the judge dismissed this claim on qualified-immunity grounds. He did so 

in light of section 10 of Illinois’s Humane Care for Animals 

Act, which permits law-enforcement officers who receive a 

complaint of suspected animal abuse or neglect to “enter 

during normal business hours upon any premises where the 

animal or animals described in the complaint are housed or 

kept, provided such entry shall not be made into any building which is a person’s residence, except by search warrant 

or court order.” 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10. The judge concluded that “by following Illinois law as it existed at the time 

of the search and as it still exists today, [Officers] Raddatz 

and Uldrych did not violate any clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.”

That conclusion fails to give Neita the benefit of all reasonable inferences, as required at the motion-to-dismiss

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stage. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). An 

official who reasonably relies on a facially valid state law 

may be entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct is later 

challenged. See, e.g., Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 659 F.3d 

626, 636 (7th Cir. 2011); Sherman v. Four Cnty. Counseling Ctr., 

987 F.2d 397, 401–02 (7th Cir. 1993). But Neita has alleged 

that the officers never received a complaint of animal abuse 

or neglect, or alternatively, that they knew that any such 

complaint was false. Accepting these allegations as true, 

section 10 of the Illinois Act is not implicated, and the officers cannot invoke reliance on it as a basis for qualified 

immunity. Dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds was

unwarranted at this stage of the litigation. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the dismissal of 

Neita’s false-arrest and illegal-search claims and REMAND for 

further proceedings. With the federal claims now reinstated, 

the state-law claims are revived.2

 2 We note the judge’s order contains an extensive discussion of the merits 

of Neita’s state-law claims. That discussion was gratuitous in light of the 

decision to relinquish jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c). Because the state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice, 

we do not address them here. See Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 

(7th Cir. 2008). 

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