Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00961/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00961-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Israel Mata-Camacho, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Jeffrey Van Winkle, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00961-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Israel Mata-Camacho’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) in which she recommended that the Court deny the Petition 

with prejudice. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R. (Doc. 14.) Because 

an objection has been filed, the Court will review the Petition de novo. See United States 

v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc.) For the following 

reasons, the Court accepts the R&R and denies the Petition. 

BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Pinal County Superior Court (case number 

CRE 2007–01457) of two counts of molestation of a child under the age of 15 and sexual 

conduct with a minor under the age of 15. (Doc. 9 Ex. A.) Petitioner was sentenced on 

March 18, 2009 to two terms of 17 years and one term of 35 years, to be served 

consecutively. (Id.) Petitioner appealed his sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

the basis of alleged coercion of a juror into rendering a guilty verdict. (Doc. 9 Ex. C.) 

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The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 9 

Ex. D.) Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 9 Ex. E.) 

 Petitioner initiated pro se post-conviction relief proceedings after his direct appeal, 

pursuant to Rule 32 of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 9 Ex. F.) Petitioner 

claimed that his counsel at trial was ineffective in 11 areas. (Doc. 9 Ex. I.) Harriette P. 

Levitt, counsel for Petitioner, filed a notice with the Pinal County Superior Court stating 

that she reviewed the record and “can find no colorable claims pursuant to Rule 32” for 

Petitioner, and urged that Petitioner be allowed to filed his Rule 32 petition pro se. (Doc. 

9 Ex. G.) Petitioner’s Rule 32 arguments concerned the expert witness testimony of 

Wendy Dutton and the testimony of the sexual abuse nurse examiner who examined the 

victim. (Doc. 9 Ex. J.) On December 8, 2011, Judge Robert C. Brown of the Pinal 

County Superior Court issued an order evaluating and denying Petitioner’s Rule 32 postconviction relief. (Id.) Petitioner then requested a review of his Rule 32 post-conviction 

request from the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9 Ex. K.) The Court of Appeals 

denied Petitioner’s petition for review because it “contains no description of the issues 

decided by the trial court, facts material to the consideration of those issues, or reasons 

why the petition should be granted.” (Doc. 9 Ex. L at 2.) 

 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 9, 2013. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner cites four grounds for relief in his Petition: (1) Petitioner was denied an 

impartial judge, in violation of his due process rights; (2) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 

due process rights were violated when a probation officer read notes from a juror’s 

notebook while the jury was out of the room, and the trial judge failed to declare a 

mistrial; (3) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment due process rights were violated when the 

bailiff took notes out of a juror’s notebook; and (4) The trial judge issued an impasse 

instruction which had the effect of coercing a juror to agree with other jurors and enter a 

verdict of guilty. (Id.) 

 The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Steven P. Logan (Doc. 2) and later to 

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Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns (Doc. 12). After the Answer filed by Respondents 

(Doc. 9), Judge Burns issued the R&R on June 14, 2013 recommending that the Court 

deny the Petition with prejudice. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner filed an Objection to the R&R on 

June 26, 2013, stating that “his U.S. and Arizona constitutional rights have been violated 

by the action of the Maricopa County Superior Court system,” and asking for an 

evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 13 at 1.) Petitioner did not state any particular objections to 

the R&R or any specific ways that his constitutional rights were violated. Nevertheless, 

the Court will review the Petition de novo. 

DISCUSSION 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 

Review of Petitions for Habeas Corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Id.; U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. A state prisoner must 

exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in 

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

839–46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or 

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 

(9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Proper exhaustion 

requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts the exact federal claim 

he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal theory upon which 

the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–78 (1971). 

I. Grounds One, Two, and Three

 In Grounds One, Two, and Three, Petitioner admits that he did not raise the issue 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 6–8.) Raising the issue to the state’s highest 

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court is required for exhaustion in order to qualify for federal habeas relief. O’Sullivan, 

526 U.S. at 839–46. Additionally, Arizona state courts would now bar consideration of 

these issues, making a return to state court futile.1

 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 

(1989); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

 Plaintiff states several reasons for not raising the issues on appeal, however, none 

of these reasons establish cause to excuse the failure to exhaust. A federal court will not 

consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner can demonstrate 

that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and 

actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750-51. Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some 

external cause that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court 

and fairly presenting his claim. 

A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the 

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the 

State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external 

impediment such as government interference or reasonable 

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis. 

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted). Plaintiff states that he did not raise the issue in Ground One because 

“[m]y appellate attorney failed to disclose this issue, stating it wasn’t important.” (Doc. 1 

at 6.) Advice of counsel is not a factor external to the defense. There is no cause 

showing that Ground One should not be procedurally defaulted. Petitioner states that he 

failed to present Ground Two to the Court of Appeals because “[m]y defense attorney 

 

1

 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 presents a procedural bar for a claim that was or could have been raised in the prior proceedings. Rule 32.4(a) presents a time bar that would make a return to state court futile. 

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again stated it wasn’t sufficient to file for a mistrial, and my appellate attorney didn’t 

even communicate with me to disclose this information.” (Id. at 7.) Likewise, this is not 

a factor external to the defense. There is no cause showing that Ground Two should not 

be procedurally defaulted. Similarly, Petitioner states that he did not raise Ground Three 

on appeal because “[t]he trial judge declared it was a harmless error, and the appellate 

defense attorney neglected to disclose, even though defendant brought this issue to his 

attention.” (Id. at 8.) Once again, this reason for not raising the issue on appeal is not a 

factor external to the defense. There is no cause showing that Ground Three should not 

be procedurally defaulted. 

 Grounds One, Two, and Three are all procedurally defaulted for failure to exhaust 

the state appellate remedies for those issues. Petitioner has not stated a factor external to 

the defense that impeded Petitioner’s efforts to comply with the state procedural rule. As 

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause to excuse his procedural default, the Court need not 

consider whether he also suffered actual prejudice. Therefore the portion of the R&R 

denying Grounds One, Two and Three is accepted. 

II. Ground Four

 Ground Four of the Petition asserts a claim of juror coercion and juror misconduct. 

(Doc. 1 at 9.) But Petitioner does not allege a federal basis for this claim, only an 

Arizona statute. There is no federal habeas relief for errors of state law. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). “The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a 

federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S.Ct. 13, 15 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). “A 

habeas petition must allege the petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal 

statute, or a treaty.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989). Ground Four of 

the Petition does not allege a federal basis for habeas relief and therefore must be 

dismissed. This portion of the R&R is accepted. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner’s Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally defaulted, and 

Petitioner has failed to provide a basis to excuse that default. Petitioner’s Ground Four 

fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Burns’ Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 13) is ACCEPTED.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Israel Mata-Camacho’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines 

to issue a Certificate of Appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the 

Court’s procedural ruling debatable, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), 

and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 Dated this 14th day of August, 2014. 

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