Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05101/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC., NATIONAL 

RECOVERIES, INC., PIONEER CREDIT 

RECOVERY, INC.,

Plaintiffs

ENTERPRISE RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

SYSTEMS, INC., ACCOUNT CONTROL 

TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

CONTINENTAL SERVICE GROUP, INC., GC 

SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

Defendants-Appellees

WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS, INC.,

Defendant

______________________ 

2015-5077

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 1:15-cv-00207-FMA, 1:15-cv-00242-FMA, 

1:15-cv-00249-FMA, 1:15-cv-00265-FMA, Senior Judge 

Francis M. Allegra.

------------------------------------------------------

Case: 15-5101 Document: 63-2 Page: 1 Filed: 07/12/2016
2 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC., NATIONAL 

RECOVERIES, INC., ENTERPRISE RECOVERY 

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiffs

PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEMS, INC., ACCOUNT CONTROL 

TECHNOLOGY, INC., CONTINENTAL SERVICE 

GROUP, INC., GC SERVICES LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP,

Defendants-Appellees

WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS, INC.,

Defendant

______________________ 

2015-5101

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 1:15-cv-00207-FMA, 1:15-cv-00242-FMA, 

1:15-cv-00249-FMA, 1:15-cv-00265-FMA, Senior Judge 

Francis M. Allegra.

______________________ 

Decided: July 12, 2016

______________________ 

 ROBERT J. SNECKENBERG, Crowell & Moring, LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant Enterprise 

Recovery Systems, Inc. in 2015-5077. Also represented by 

DANIEL RUBEN FORMAN, JAMES G. PEYSTER. 

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COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 3

 JONATHAN DAVID SHAFFER, Smith, Pachter, McWhorter, PLC, Tysons Corner, VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant 

Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. in 2015-5101. Also represented by MARY PAT BUCKENMEYER, NICHOLAS J. SURACE. 

 MICHAEL D. SNYDER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United 

States. Also represented by JANA MOSES, REGINALD T.

BLADES, JR., ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C.

MIZER; JOHN K. DIPAOLO, JOSE OTERO, United States 

Department of Education, Washington, DC.

 JEREMY CHARLES MARWELL, Vinson & Elkins LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees Financial Management Systems, Inc., Account Control Technology, Inc., Continental Service Group, Inc., GC Services 

Limited Partnership. Defendant-appellee Financial 

Management Systems, Inc. also represented by DAVID R.

JOHNSON, JASON ALAN LEVINE. 

 BENJAMIN G. CHEW, Manatt Phelps & Phillips, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee Account Control Technology, Inc. Also represented by RORY EDWARD ADAMS. 

 EDWARD H. MEYERS, Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone & 

Beato LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee 

Continental Service Group, Inc. Also represented by 

REBECCA ANZIDEI. 

 STEPHEN E. RUSCUS, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee GC Services 

Limited Partnership. Also represented by ARNOLD 

BRADLEY FAGG. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

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4 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”) and Enterprise Recovery Systems, Inc. (“Enterprise”) separately 

appeal from a decision by the Court of Federal Claims

dismissing their claims against the government for lack of 

jurisdiction. We vacate and remand.

BACKGROUND

Since 1981, the Department of Education (“Education”) has contracted with private collection agencies for 

services related to resolving defaulted student loans 

through the General Services Administration (“GSA”) 

Federal Supply Schedule for Financial and Business 

Solutions. See 48 C.F.R. (Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(“FAR”)) Subpart 8.4. “The Federal Supply Schedule 

program is directed and managed by GSA and provides 

Federal agencies (see 8.004) with a simplified process for 

obtaining commercial supplies and services at prices 

associated with volume buying.” FAR 8.402. The GSA 

Federal Supply Schedule contracts at issue are indefinite 

delivery, indefinite quantity contracts with the government. This type of contract allows agencies like Education to order supplies and services in a streamlined 

process because the contractors are pre-approved and 

must publish their pricing and terms for each type of 

supply or service (called a “Special Item Number”). See

FAR 8.402(a), (b). Orders placed against GSA Schedule 

contracts are “considered to be issued using full and open 

competition” even though they are not subject to FAR 

Part 15, which prescribes procedures for most negotiated 

contracts. FAR 8.404(a).

In 2008, Education issued a Request for Quotations

(“RFQ”) for debt collection services under Special Item 

Number 520-4 seeking to issue Task Orders to contractors 

under the existing GSA Schedule contract. The RFQ 

contained a detailed Statement of Work explaining the 

required activities and standards applicable to collection 

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COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 5

on defaulted student loans and detailed how the contractors would be evaluated. The RFQ also explained that the 

Task Order would include a base term and options periods 

but that the total term of performance under the RFQ 

would not exceed 60 months: 

The ordering period for the task orders will 

be from the date of award through March 31, 

2011, and an additional option period of up 

to 24 months. The total ordering period will 

not exceed 60 months from the date of the 

task order award. This is not a multiyear 

contract as defined in FAR Sub part 17.1. 

J.A. 1017.1 

Pioneer, Enterprise, and various other agencies holding GSA Schedule contracts with Education submitted 

proposals. In 2009, Education awarded identical Task 

Orders pursuant to the RFQ to Pioneer, Enterprise, and 

twenty other contractors. The Task Orders contained all 

of the standard contract details and material terms—

price, duration, obligations, and various other clauses as 

set forth in the RFQ—though some of those terms 

changed from the RFQ. 

The parties agree that the Task Orders contain a base 

term and that Section H.1 of each Task Order sets forth 

an Option that permits the government to unilaterally 

extend the term of the Task Order pursuant to that option 

up to 24 months for a total ordering period (base term + 

optional extensions) that does not exceed 60 months: 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all citations to the 

parties’ briefs and the J.A. refer to the materials in Case 

No. 2015-5101. 

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6 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

H.1 FAR 52.217-9, Option to Extend the 

Term of the Task Order (March 2000) 

Tailored

(a) The Government may extend the term of 

this Task Order . . . 

(b) If the Government exercises this option, 

the extended Task Order shall be considered 

to include this option clause.

(c) The total duration of the first Ordering 

Period of performance of this Task Order, including the exercise of any optional Ordering 

Periods under this clause, shall not exceed 

60 months from the date of contract award, 

excluding any award term(s) earned.

(d) The Government may, at its discretion, 

exercise option periods of up to 24 months, 

provided that the total Task Order period of 

performance does not exceed 60 months from 

the date of the award.

J.A. 1419. This option in the Task Order parallels the 

FAR which it expressly cites. It is undisputed that if the 

government exercises an option under H.1 to extend the 

Task Order, no new Task Order is issued. See J.A. 1419. 

Section “H.3 FAR 52.217-8 Option to Extend Services” 

similarly permits the government to unilaterally require 

continued performance under the Task Order for up to 

6 additional months. This extension provision likewise 

parrots the language of the FAR which it expressly cites. 

Education exercised its options under Sections H.1 and 

H.3 for both Pioneer and Enterprise, unilaterally extending their 2009 Task Orders to February 21, 2015 and 

April 21, 2015, respectively.

Each Task Order also included a clause entitled “H.4 

Award Term Extension,” which provided that the contracCase: 15-5101 Document: 63-2 Page: 6 Filed: 07/12/2016
COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 7

tor could earn award-term extensions in addition to the 

base period and any options exercised pursuant to Sections H.1 and H.3: 

the Contractor may earn performance extensions (hereinafter called “award terms”), 

based upon the quality of performance during the evaluation periods. If the Contractor 

has an average [Contractor Performance and 

Continuous Surveillance (“CPCS”)] rating of 

752 or greater over the life of the Task Order, 

or the last 12 CPCS periods (whichever is 

shorter), the Government may[] award the 

Contractor an award-term extension in accordance with the terms of this clause in 

recognition of the Contractor’s excellent or 

better quality performance.

J.A. 1419–20. Section H.4 also specified that “[a]ny 

award term extensions awarded under this clause will be

executed in the form of a new Task Order issued by the 

Contracting Officer under the Contractor’s then current 

GSA schedule contract.” J.A. 1420. 

In December 2014, Education began secretly auditing 

the contractors based on recommendations by the Government Accountability Office for improved oversight. 

Reviewers from Education listened to roughly one hundred phone calls that each contractor made to defaulted 

borrowers and counted the number of times the contractor 

violated consumer protection laws. Education then calcu-

 

2 In 2011, Pioneer’s and Enterprise’s 2009 Task Orders were each modified via a “Modification of Contract” 

document to change the requisite CPCS score in H.4 from 

75 to 85. The modification to the Pioneer Task Order 

required Pioneer’s signature, but the modification to the 

Enterprise Task Order did not.

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8 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

lated an “error rate” for each contractor based on the 

number of phone calls containing at least one violation. 

Based on their error rates, Education decided not to issue

award-term Task Orders to Pioneer or Enterprise even 

though they scored “excellent or better” under the CPCS 

system.

On February 20, 2015, Education notified Pioneer and 

Enterprise of its decision not to issue award-term Task 

Orders to them. One day later, Education notified five 

other contractors (collectively, “the competitors”) that it 

intended to issue award-term Task Orders to them for a 

period not to exceed a specified number of months. These 

letters, titled Notification of Award Term Extension and

each signed by the Contracting Officer, expressly stated: 

“If the contract is extended pursuant to H.4, it will be 

accomplished via a contracting action, which will specifically identify all of the terms and conditions.” J.A. 2107

(emphasis added). 

In March 2015, Pioneer and Enterprise filed suit

against the government in the Court of Federal Claims, 

based on, inter alia, Education’s proposed issuance of 

award-term extensions under H.4 to the competitors. The 

complaints alleged that the Court of Federal Claims had 

jurisdiction over the claims under the Tucker Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). The competitors intervened as defendants and they, along with the government, argued 

that the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the 

complaints. Pioneer and Enterprise appeal. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Distributed

Sols. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). We review its factual findings for clear error. Id. 

We review its interpretation of contracts without deferCase: 15-5101 Document: 63-2 Page: 8 Filed: 07/12/2016
COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 9

ence, giving unambiguous contract terms their plain and 

ordinary meaning. Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. 

United States, 596 F.3d 817, 824 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We 

review questions of statutory interpretation without 

deference. Res-Care, Inc. v. United States, 735 F.3d 1384, 

1387 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Under the Tucker Act, as amended, the Court of Federal Claims has bid protest jurisdiction over “action[s] by 

an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal 

agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a 

proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged 

violation of statute or regulation in connection with a 

procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(b)(1).3 We conclude that the proposed issuance of 

award-term extensions under H.4 to the five contractors 

to permit them to continue offering debt collection services under the GSA Schedule contract constitutes “a 

proposed award or the award of a contract” pursuant to 

§ 1491 and thus the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over the bid protest. The government’s decision to 

 

3 We have previously interpreted “an interested 

party” under § 1491(b)(1) as “an actual or prospective 

bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be 

affected by the award of the contract or by failure to 

award the contract,” based on the definition provided in 

the Competition and Contracting Act (“CICA”), 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 3551–56. CGI Fed., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 

1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And we have interpreted “in 

connection with a procurement or proposed procurement” 

as “involv[ing] a connection with any stage of the federal 

contracting acquisition process, including the process for 

determining a need for property or services,” based on the 

definition provided in the statute governing the Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy, now 41 U.S.C. § 111. Distributed Sols., 539 F.3d at 1346.

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10 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

issue new Task Orders to contractors under the GSA 

Schedule contract falls within the plain language of 

§ 1491. 

There is no dispute that the award-term extension 

under H.4 requires the government to issue a new Task 

Order for the extension of debt collection services for the 

competitors. The Supreme Court recently held that 

issuance of a new Task Order against a GSA Federal 

Supply Schedule contract constitutes an award of a contract. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 

No. 14-916, 2016 WL 3317563, at *8–9 (U.S. June 16, 

2016). It is thus a protestable event under § 1491(b). 

Data Mgmt. Servs. JV v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 366, 

371 (2007) (“The court’s protest jurisdiction extends to 

protests of task or delivery orders placed against a GSA 

schedule contract.”); IDEA Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 74 

Fed. Cl. 129, 135–37 (2006) (holding that the Court of 

Federal Claims has jurisdiction over protests relating to 

issuance of Task Orders under GSA Federal Supply 

Schedule contracts).4

 

4 The Data Management and IDEA decisions distinguish task and delivery orders issued pursuant to The 

Federal Acquisition and Streamlining Act (“FASA”) of 

1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243, in which protests are expressly prohibited from task and delivery 

orders pursuant to a GSA Federal Supply Schedule contract where no similar prohibition exists. Compare Data 

Mgmt., 78 Fed. Cl. at 371 n.4 and IDEA, 74 Fed. Cl. at 

135–37 with SRA Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 

1409, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the Court of Federal 

Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a protest to 

a task order issued pursuant to a Government-Wide 

Acquisition Contract, not a Federal Supply Schedule); see 

also John Cibinic, Jr., Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & Christopher 

R. Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts 1171–72

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COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 11

In this case, however, the Court of Federal Claims 

concluded that these proposed new Task Orders (for the 

award-term extensions) should not be considered “the 

award of a contract.” It acknowledged that the awardterm extensions would be issued as new Task Orders, but 

concluded that treating them as such for purposes of bid 

protest jurisdiction would “elevate[] form over substance.” 

Coast Prof’l, Inc. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 727, 734 

(2015). It held that “the award-term extensions added 

more work to the existing contract only in the context of 

those task order provisions-but nothing more.” Id. 

On appeal, the government defends the Court of Federal Claims’ decision arguing that using a new Task 

Order is a “mere formality.” Gov’t Br. 30. The government reasons that because the new Task Order will be 

subject to the same terms and conditions as the old Task 

Order, it should not be considered a new contract. The 

government argues that instead, the award-term extension issued in a new Task Order should be considered an 

option. Gov’t Br. 27–30. And the government argues that 

it is well-settled that an agency’s decision whether to 

exercise an option is a matter of contract administration 

which can only be challenged under the Contract Disputes 

Act (“CDA”). Gov’t Br. 20–26. On this latter point, the 

government is correct. If a contractor wishes to contest 

an agency’s decision regarding exercising an option under 

the contract, such a challenge is a matter of contract 

administration governed by the CDA. See Jones Automation, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 368, 371–72 (2010) 

(failure to exercise an option is a matter of contract administration outside the court’s bid protest jurisdiction);

Gov’t Tech. Serv., LLC v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 522, 

 

(4th ed. 2011). We agree that Task Orders issued pursuant to a GSA Federal Supply Schedule are actions over 

which the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction. 

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12 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

526 (2009) (failure to exercise an option is governed by the 

CDA and is not a bid protest). 

We cannot agree however that the award-term extension issued in the form of a new Task Order is properly 

treated as an option governed by the CDA. Even when a 

new Task Order contracts for the same work previously 

performed by the same contractor under the GSA Schedule contract, this new Task Order is the award of a new 

contract. Although the government recognizes that new 

rounds of Task Orders under the same GSA Schedule 

contract amount to a new procurement, it attempts to 

distinguish the award-term extension at issue from “the 

next round of PCA Task Orders” by arguing the awardterm extensions are not the subject of a separate procurement. Gov’t Br. 30 n.8. But H.4 expressly anticipates 

that the Task Orders issued for the award-term extensions will issue concurrently with Task Orders issued 

pursuant to additional rounds of procurement beyond the 

60 months permitted under the 2009 Task Orders. “It is 

the Government’s intent to time any award-term extension so that the extension period will coincide with the 

award date of the next round of Task Orders.” J.A. 1419. 

That the government has preselected some of the contractors who will receive the new Task Orders through the 

award-term extension clause does not nullify the contractual effect of these Task Orders. Each new round of Task 

Orders under a GSA Schedule contract is a “proposed 

award or the award of a contract” falling under the plain 

language of § 1491. See Data Mgmt. Servs. JV, 78 Fed. 

Cl. at 371; IDEA Int’l, Inc., 74 Fed. Cl. at 135–37. 

The government asks us to deviate from the established rule that new Task Orders are new contracts, and 

instead conclude that new Task Orders resulting from 

award-term extensions are “akin to options.” Gov’t Br. 27. 

We do not agree that the award-term extension at issue in 

H.4, which requires a new Task Order to be issued, should 

be treated like an option. The FAR expressly defines an 

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COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US 13

Option: “Option means the unilateral right in a contract 

by which, for a specified time, the Government may elect 

to purchase additional supplies or services called for by 

the contract, or may elect to extend the term of the contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (definition of Option). Unlike an 

option, the award-term extensions cannot be issued 

unilaterally by the government. Instead, the award-term 

extensions can issue only if, inter alia, “[t]he contractor 

accepts the Government’s target pricing and terms.” 

J.A. 1419. Section H.4 specifies that the government 

“target prices for the current PCA Task Orders will apply 

to the award-term extension,” so it is anticipated that the 

same pricing will apply; however, the contractor has the 

right to accept or reject the award-term extension. This is 

the opposite of a unilateral right. 

The government points us to FAR 17.2, which governs 

the use and exercise of options. Gov’t Br. 28. The government is correct that like an option, which requires 

written notice to a contractor, H.4 requires the government to give written notice of its intent to extend. See 

FAR 17.207(a). And like an option, the award-term 

extension is conditioned on the availability of funds and 

the requirement that the award will fulfill a government 

need. See FAR 17.207(c). All of these conditions exist for 

all new contracts to be issued: there must be government 

funds, the new Task Order must fulfill a government 

need, and it must be in writing. 

Precedent counsels against treating Section H.4 as an 

option because the contract in fact has two separate 

options clauses already. The 2009 Task Orders contained 

two other provisions, H.1 and H.3, which are expressly 

called options. J.A. 1419. The appearance of the term 

“option” in only some of the provisions that extend the 

duration of the 2009 Task Orders indicates that the 

parties did not intend to treat “option” and “extension” as 

synonymous. See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. 

Hyundai Motor Am., Nos. 2015-1844, -1861, 2016 WL 

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14 COAST PROFESSIONAL, INC. v. US

2865704, at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 2016) (explaining that a 

contract’s use of a term in some provisions, but not others, 

reflects the parties’ intent to limit the term in question). 

And as stated above, the substance of Section H.4 is 

different from provisions that meet the definition of 

“option” under the FAR. Compare J.A. 1419–20, with 

FAR 2.101 (defining “option” as, inter alia, a provision 

that the government may invoke unilaterally).

The government has not convinced us that we ought 

to deviate from the definitions and conditions in the FAR 

to conclude that the new Task Orders which would issue 

pursuant to an award-term extension ought to be treated 

as options rather than new contracts. We will not deviate 

from the definition in the FAR of option to contort these 

new Task Orders into “mere formalities” in this case. 

Section 1491 gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “the award or proposed award of a contract.” 

We conclude that issuance of a new Task Order pursuant 

to a GSA Federal Supply Schedule contract constitutes 

the award of a contract and is thus an action over which 

the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction. We see no 

reason to create an exception when the new Task Orders 

arise from an award-term extension.

CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that the Court of Federal Claims

erred in concluding that the award-term Task Orders 

were not new Task Orders for purposes of § 1491(b)(1), we 

vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Pioneer and Enterprise.

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