Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02532/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02532-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGER M. KEITHLY, III, 

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-cv-2532-W(WMC)

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

TO STATE COURT FOR LACK

OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION

v.

KONINKLIJK HET FRIESCH

PAARDEN-STAMBOEK “KFPS”, et

al., 

Defendants.

On September 27, 2013, Plaintiff Roger M. Keithly, III commenced this action

against Defendants Koninklijk Het Friesch Paarden-Stamboek (“KFPS”), Friesian

Horse Association of North America (“FHANA”), and Fetze Veldstra in the San Diego

Superior Court. Plaintiff asserts four causes of action arising from dealings involving

breeding privileges for a Friesian horse stallion. Thereafter, FHANA removed this

action to this Court. The notice of removal is based on diversity jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b).

For the following reasons, the Court finds that FHANA’s Notice of Removal is

facially deficient and REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized

by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow

Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

(9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002);

O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong

presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the

burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also

Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990);

O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

Although there has not been a request to remand, it is well-established that “a

district court’s duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the

parties’ arguments.” See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360

F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v.

Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

emphasized that “district courts have an ‘independent obligation to address subjectmatter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S.

567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972

(E.D. Cal. 2004)).

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II. ANALYSIS

In attempting to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must

prove that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To determine whether the

amount in controversy has been met on removal, “[t]he district court may consider

whether it is ‘facially apparent’ from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount is in

controversy.” Singer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir.

1997). The defendant “must provide evidence that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the

amountin controversy” satisfies the federal diversity jurisdictional amountrequirement. 

Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). Defendant

fails to satisfy that requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1332.

Here, FHANA asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

(Removal Notice ¶ 3.) It elaborates by also asserting the following:

Plaintiffs seeks compensatory, consequential, and general

damages in this action, arising from allegations that his

specialized show horses were not certified for purposes of

breeding, thus significantly diminishing the value of the

horses and depriving Plaintiff of significant breeding fees that

would have accompanied certification. Additionally,

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages arising from alleged sexual

extortion claims against all Defendants. The amount of

damages is to be proven at trial, but it is reasonable to

estimate that, based upon these allegations, the amount in

significantly exceeds $75,000.

(Id. ¶ 4.) This is not an adequate explanation for the Court to reasonably estimate that

the amount in controversy “significantly exceeds $75,000.” FHANA provides nothing

more than the vague aforementioned paragraph to support its contention. See Sanchez,

102 F.3d at 404. The declaration of Thomas E. Daugherty and the other attachments

to the removal notice do not provide any additional insight into what the value of the

amount in controversy is. (See, e.g., Daugherty Decl. ¶¶ 1–5.) The complaint is also

devoid of any detailed information from which the Court could reasonably infer the

amount in controversy. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege a single monetary value

anywhere in the complaint. For example, the value of the Friesian horse stallion, the

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costs for breeding, including the breeding fees, or any other monetary value associated

with this action are all unknown.

Without more, FHANA’s vague assertion is inadequate, and the Court cannot

conclude that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy satisfies the

federal diversity jurisdictional amount requirement. See Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 404. 

Because there is doubt as to the right of removal, federal jurisdiction must be rejected. 

See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

FHANA fails to provide an adequate explanation supported by evidence that

the amount in controversy “significantly exceeds $75,000.” Therefore, the Court

REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If

at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: October 22, 2013

HON. THOMAS J. WHELAN

United States District Court

Southern District of California

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