Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00169/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00169-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRANDEN JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, SACRAMENTO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, 

LOU BLANAS, and DOES 1 to 100, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-0169 RRB GGH 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Branden Johnson alleges constitutional violations 

and state law tort claims against defendants Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Department, County of Sacramento, and Sheriff Lou 

Blanas for alleged mistreatment in the county jail following his 

arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendants 

filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the 

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reasons below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the 

motion.1 

I. 

 On October 30, 2005, two Sacramento City Police Officers 

arrested Branden Johnson on suspicion of driving under the 

influence of alcohol. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts 

(Defs. SUF) ¶ 1. In the hours before his arrest, Johnson had 

consumed alcoholic beverages and ingested marijuana. Id. ¶ 2. 

The officers transported Johnson to the Sacramento County Main 

Jail. Upon arrival, Johnson alleges that two officers pulled 

him from the patrol car and dropped him face first onto the 

jail’s concrete floor. Johnson Depo., 138:2-18. Johnson 

alleges his chest, stomach, face, and mouth struck the ground 

because his hands were cuffed behind his back. Id., 145:17-18. 

Following his removal from the patrol car, deputies escorted 

Johnson into the booking area. During this movement, Johnson 

alleges that deputies again forced him to the ground. Id., 

154:2-17. Johnson alleges that the deputies said that “a person 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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like me has no respect,” id., 154:15-17, and “a person like my 

kind . . . is not polite,” id., 155:17-19. Johnson believes 

that deputies treated him differently because of his “dreadlock” 

hairstyle and “mixed” racial heritage, although no deputy stated 

that he or she acted based upon these factors. Id., 226:1-

227:18. 

 Deputies next escorted Johnson from the booking area to a 

holding cell. He alleges that as he turned the corner to the 

cell, deputies picked him up off his feet, while he was still 

handcuffed, and threw him against a wall head first. Id., 

163:7-23. Johnson remembers his head hitting the wall, but then 

believes he lost consciousness. Id., 163:19-164:20. When he 

awoke, his hands and feet were shackled to a grate in the middle 

of the cell floor. Id., 165:1-15. Johnson also alleges that 

during his detention deputies forcibly drew blood to measure his 

blood alcohol level despite his request for a breathalyzer test, 

failed to return $130 taken from his person during booking, and 

intentionally destroyed his new shoes. Compl., 3-4. The 

deputies’ conduct, according to Johnson, left him with cuts and 

bruises across his face and body, nerve damage in his arms, and 

fractures in his ribs, nose, and shoulder. Id. 

 Based upon the above events, Johnson alleges that 

defendants: (1) violated his Fifth Amendment equal protection 

rights by assaulting him based, in part, upon his race; (2) 

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violated his civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments acting pursuant to policies condoning the use of 

excessive force and deliberate indifference to his well-being; 

(3) negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained unnamed 

employees; (4) engaged in negligent actions resulting in his 

injuries; (5) assaulted and battered him; and (6) intentionally 

inflicted emotional distress upon him. Defendants deny the 

allegations and move for summary judgment on all claims. 

II. 

 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with 

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 

moving party carries the initial burden of establishing the 

absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and can do so by 

demonstrating that the non-moving party cannot provide evidence 

to support an essential element upon which it will bear the 

burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322-23 (1986). Upon such a showing, the non-moving party 

must “go beyond the pleadings” to “designate specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In evaluating 

evidence, the court may not engage in credibility 

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determinations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). Johnson’s claims are discussed individually below. 

A. Federal Claims 

 Johnson alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

by infringing upon his constitutional rights. Johnson, however, 

does not allege that the named defendants Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Department, County of Sacramento, and Lou Blanas were 

directly involved in the conduct resulting in his injuries.2 

Johnson alleges direct action only by unnamed officers and 

deputies.3 “A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for 

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, 

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether 

 

2

 Whether a government official is sued in his official or 

personal capacity is to be determined in “[t]he course of the 

proceedings.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985). 

Because Johnson fails to allege any direct action by defendant 

Blanas against him, the court finds that Johnson sued Sheriff 

Blanas only as the head of his governmental department, 

responsible for the policies or customs on which he bases his 

§ 1983 claim. See Pino v. City of Sacramento, No. S-05-2080, 

2007 WL 214451, at 6 n.11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007). “[A]n 

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to 

be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

3

 Johnson filed his action against 100 Doe defendants, in 

addition to the named defendants. He does not dispute named 

defendants’ allegation that he has known the identity of the Doe 

defendants since April 2006 yet has failed to amend the 

complaint to include them. See Op. 7, Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF ¶ 

5. Because Johnson has neither amended the complaint nor served 

the Doe defendants, claims against them are not before the court 

on this motion. 

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made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury 

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 

658, 694 (1978). Therefore, to state a valid § 1983 claim, 

Johnson must allege that defendants are responsible for or have 

acted upon a policy or custom that is “the moving force of the 

constitutional violation found by the District Court.” Id. 

1. Claim One: Racial Discrimination 

 Johnson claims that defendants violated his Fifth Amendment 

right to equal protection when they assaulted him based, in 

part, upon his race. Regardless of whether Johnson’s 

allegations are sufficient to create a material dispute of fact 

regarding the actions of the unnamed defendants, he has failed 

to allege a policy or custom of racial discrimination. Because 

Johnson presents no evidence supporting either “a conscious, 

affirmative choice” by defendants to support a policy of racial 

discrimination, Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th 

Cir. 1992), or a pattern of rights violations similar to those 

alleged, id. at 1349, his claim lacks a legal basis. Therefore, 

the court GRANTS summary judgment as to Claim One. 

2. Claim Two: Excessive Force and Deliberate Indifference 

Johnson claims that defendants violated his Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting pursuant to policies 

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condoning the use excessive force and deliberate indifference to 

his well-being. As in Claim One, Johnson alleges no direct 

action by the named defendants. Rather, he argues that they are 

responsible for policies and customs that are the “moving 

force[s]” behind the alleged violations. Monell, 436 U.S. at 

694. Defendants argue only that Johnson does not meet this 

burden and do not dispute whether the alleged actions of the 

unnamed officers and deputies violate the constitution. 

The court finds that Johnson has presented sufficient 

evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to create a 

material dispute of fact. Johnson’s expert witness, Timothy G. 

Twomey, states in his Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure 

that “Jail Management does not have, or simply failed to 

provide, Operations Orders that detail the degree to which 

deputies may get involved in assisting other agencies remove, 

control, and/or escort a subject who is combative, belligerent, 

and/or non-compliant.” Twomey Disclosure, ¶ 101. Twomey 

further states that he believes the injuries suffered by Johnson 

occurred during a hand-off between Sacramento Police Officers 

and Sacramento Sheriff’s Deputies, id., ¶ 64-66, and were the 

result of excessive force, id., ¶ 96. Although defendants argue 

that Twomey fails to cite or criticize any existing policies or 

procedures of the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, he states 

that he has considered such policies in reaching his conclusion. 

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Twomey Depo., 43:2-12. Disputes as to the expert’s 

qualifications or credibility are not before the court on this 

motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Therefore, Johnson 

presents sufficient evidence to create a material dispute of 

fact as to whether Johnson was injured by officers operating 

under a policy or custom that provided a constitutionally 

insufficient degree of protection from the use of excessive 

force. Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(finding an expert opinion sufficient to create a material 

dispute of fact as to the existence of a constitutionally 

objectionable policy or custom). A reasonable jury, balancing 

“the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government 

interests at stake,” could conclude that the force used to 

subdue Johnson while he was handcuffed, surrounded by deputies, 

and within the jail was excessive. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 396 (1989); Blakenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 

477-80 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the tackling and punching 

of plaintiff could support a constitutional excessive force 

claim). The court DENIES summary judgment as to Claim Two. 

B. State Claims 

 Johnson alleges multiple state claims regarding his 

treatment while in custody at the Sacramento County Jail. The 

California Tort Claims Act states: “Except as otherwise provided 

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by statute[,] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, 

whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the 

public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. 

Gov. Code § 815. California courts have interpreted § 815 to 

require a specific statutory basis for either direct or indirect 

claims against a public entity. See Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire 

Prot. Auth., 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179-82 (2003); Munoz v. City of 

Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1110-12 (2004). 

For indirect claims, California Government Code § 815.2(a) 

provides statutory authorization: “A public entity is liable for 

injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee 

of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the 

act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise 

to a cause of action against that employee or his personal 

representative.” A plaintiff need not “identify the particular 

employee upon whose act the liability of the public entity is to 

be predicated. All that will be necessary will be to show that 

some employee of the public entity tortiously inflicted the 

injury in the scope of his employment under circumstances where 

he would be personally liable.”4

 Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 

Legislative Comm. Comment. 

 

4

 Based upon the language of the Legislative Committee 

Comment, the court disagrees with the Munoz court’s holding that 

“unless the employee is identified, the trier of fact will not 

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1. Claims Three: Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, 

and Retention 

 Johnson alleges that named defendants were negligent in 

hiring, training, supervising, and retaining the unnamed 

employees he accuses of harming him during his detention. Such 

allegations are direct claims against the named defendants, not 

vicarious claims based upon the employee’s conduct. See Munoz, 

120 Cal. App. 4th at 1111 (holding claims against public 

agencies for negligent training and promulgation of guidelines 

to be direct claims against the agencies). Johnson argues that 

such claims are authorized under California Government Code 

815.2(a). His argument, however, renders “the distinction 

between direct and vicarious liability completely illusory.” 

Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. Because Johnson fails to 

allege any other statutory basis for such direct claims, they 

cannot be brought against the agencies (or defendant Blanas in 

his official capacity) under California Government Code § 815. 

Therefore, the court GRANTS the motion as to Claim Three. 

 

 

be able to determine if the elements needed to assert vicarious 

liability have been provided.” Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 

1113. For purposes of vicarious liability, Johnson’s 

description of an employee’s position and conduct is sufficient. 

See Ortland v. County of Tehama, 939 F.Supp. 1465, 1472 (E.D. 

Cal. 1996). 

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2. Claim Four: Officer and Deputy Negligence 

 Johnson argues that defendants are vicariously liable for 

the alleged negligence of the officers and deputies encountered 

during his detention. Defendants argue that Claim Four is 

indistinguishable from Claim Three. Claim Four, however, 

differs in its discussion of the deputies’ use of excessive 

force, Compl. ¶ 31, and the injuries directly resulting from the 

deputies’ conduct, id. ¶ 33. Because Johnson bases Claim Four 

on the actions of the named defendants’ employees, it is 

authorized under California Government Code 815.2(a). 

Defendants rest their summary judgment argument entirely on the 

mistaken assumptions that such a vicarious liability claim lacks 

statutory authorization and, in the alternative, that plaintiff 

must name the particular employee to use him or her as a basis 

for a vicarious liability claim. See Cal. Gov. Code 815.2(a) 

(public entity vicarious liability); Ortland v. County of 

Tehama, 939 F.Supp. 1465, 1472 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a 

public entity vicarious liability claim need not name particular 

employees). Johnson presents undisputed evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that officers and deputies 

breached common law duties of care in handling him during his 

detention. See, e.g., Pls. SUF ¶¶ 46-49. Therefore, the court 

DENIES the motion as to Claim Four. 

 

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3. Claim Five: Assault and Battery 

 Johnson alleges that officers and deputies employed by the 

named defendants assaulted and battered him during his 

detention. Again, defendants rest their summary judgment 

argument entirely on the mistaken assumptions that such a 

vicarious liability claim lacks statutory authorization and, in 

the alternative, that plaintiff must name the particular 

employee to use him or her as a basis for a vicarious liability 

claim. See Cal. Gov. Code 815.2(a) (public entity vicarious 

liability); Ortland, 939 F.Supp. at 1472 (holding that a public 

entity vicarious liability claim need not name particular 

employees). Johnson presents undisputed evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that deputies assaulted and 

battered him during his detention. See, e.g., Pls. SUF ¶¶ 46-

49. Therefore, the court DENIES the motion as to Claim Five. 

4. Claim Six: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 Johnson alleges that deputies and officers employed by the 

named defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon 

him during his detention. Defendant, in addition to the already 

rejected arguments regarding statutory authorization for the 

suit and the identification of particular employees for 

vicarious liability claims, argues that the alleged conduct is 

not sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED claim. This 

argument lacks merit as well. A reasonable jury could find that 

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deputies acted outrageously when they allegedly, among other 

actions, dropped Johnson on his face with his hands cuffed 

behind his back and slammed his head into a cell wall, knocking 

him unconscious. Therefore, the court DENIES the motion as to 

Claim Six. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants argue that Blanas is entitled to qualified 

immunity. “A municipality (and its employees sued in their 

official capacities) may not assert a qualified immunity defense 

to liability under Section 1983.” Hallstrom v. City of Garden 

City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, defendant 

Blanas is sued in his official capacity because plaintiff fails 

to allege any action by Blanas, except for a general allegation 

that he was involved in setting policy or establishing custom. 

See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (1985). Therefore, defendant Blanas 

has not presented sufficient evidence to support a qualified 

immunity defense. 

D. Punitive Damages 

 Johnson seeks punitive damages. Such damages, however, are 

not available against a public entity, including individuals 

named in their official capacity under federal law, Graham, 473 

U.S. at 167 n.13, or California law, Cal. Gov. Code § 818. 

Therefore, having named only public entities and an individual 

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in his official capacity as defendants, Johnson may not seek 

punitive damages. 

III. 

 For these reasons, the court GRANTS the motion as to Claims 

One and Three and DENIES the motion as to CLAIMS Two, Four, 

Five, and Six. Additionally, the court STRIKES plaintiff’s 

request for punitive damages. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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