Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06327/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This information is derived from the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Respondent’s Answer to the Petition, and 1

the exhibits attached to Respondent’s Answer.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 DENNIS ALLEN CANNON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

A. K. SCRIBNER, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-6327 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

trial on August 30, 2001, of one count of larceny (Cal. Penal Code § 460(b)), and four counts of

forgery (Cal. Penal Code § 470(d)). See Exhibit 1, Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Answer”). Additionally, the court found true the allegations that

Petitioner had suffered seven prior strike convictions within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

§§ 667(c)-(j), 1170.12(a)-(e). Id. On October 17, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate

term of 25 years to life. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”). On April 16, 2003, the 5 DCA issued an unpublished th th

opinion affirming the judgment. See Exhibit 3, Answer.

On May 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See

Exhibit 4, Answer. The petition was summarily denied on June 25, 2003. See Exhibit 4, Answer.

On or about November 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Kern County Superior Court; the petition was denied on June 25, 2003. See Exhibit 5, Answer.

On or about December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the Kern County Superior Court; that petition was denied on January 26, 2004. See Exhibit 6,

Answer.

On September 29, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court. The

petition raises the following four claims: 1) Petitioner contends he has twice been placed into

jeopardy for crimes which happened around the same time in violation of the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the United States Constitution; 2) Petitioner alleges his convictions violate state law as set

forth in Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 822 (1966); 3) Petitioner claims the admission of

evidence of Petitioner’s prior misdemeanor conviction violated his due process rights; and 4)

Petitioner contends his due process rights were violated when the State prosecuted Petitioner for the

underlying crimes after the State had promised Petitioner he would not be charged for additional

crimes if he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor forgery. See Memorandum in Support of Petition at 2.

On January 6, 2005, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes

Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.

On March 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the facts as summarized by the 5 DCA in its opinion dated th

April 16, 2003:

Appellant was charged with passing a number of forged checks in the name of

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

Mildred D. Ritter. Ritter passed away on February 26, 2000, and the forged checks at issue

were passed in July 2000. The prosecution introduced evidence indicating that Ritter did not

sign the checks in question.

Floyd Harl worked as the manager of Foodland Market in 2000. He testified that he

cashed a check for appellant, which was signed with the name Mildred D. Ritter and bore the

date July 13, 2000. Harl initially declined to cash the check for appellant because he did not

know him, but changed his mind when appellant told him his mother was Opal, a customer

known to Harl. Appellant signed the name “David Costello” on the back of the check, and

Harl authorized the transaction. Harl subsequently identified appellant from a photographic

lineup as the man who passed the check. He noted that appellant looked different in court

than he did in the photograph.

John Payne worked at a fireworks stand on July 1, 2000. Payne identified a check he

received on that day for fireworks. The check was signed with the name Mildred D. Ritter

and was for $195. The man who gave him the check told him it was filled out by his mother

or his aunt. Subsequently, Payne identified appellant in a photographic lineup as the man who

had given him the check.

Levi Muncy was working at a fireworks stand on July 2, 2000. On that day, appellant

gave him a check purportedly signed by Mildred D. Ritter in the amount of $190 in exchange

for fireworks. Appellant stated that Ritter was unable to come to the fireworks stand to buy

the fireworks and asked if Muncy would accept the check. He stated he would. Subsequently,

Muncy was shown a photographic lineup and identified appellant as the man who had given

him the check.

Diane O’Dell was working at a fireworks stand on July 1, 2000. On that date she

accepted a check in the amount of $265 in exchange for fireworks. The check was signed

with the name Mildred D. Ritter. Subsequently, O’Dell viewed a photographic lineup and

identified two pictures as resembling the man who had given her the check. She was not sure

which man it was although she thought appellant’s picture looked more like the man.

Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy Stephen West was assigned to investigate possible

forged checks in the name of Mildred D. Ritter. West prepared a photographic lineup that

included a photograph of appellant. He presented this photographic lineup individually to

Harl, Payne, and Muncy, who each identified appellant as the man who passed the check. He

also presented the lineup to O’Dell who chose two photographs, but stated she thought

appellant was the man in question.

Opal Costello, appellant’s mother, testified that she purchased a truck from Thomas

Greers in 2000. At the time of the purchase, she filled out a bill of sale noting the license

plate number of the vehicle. In June or July of 2000, Costello loaned the truck to appellant. 

West searched a truck in connection with this case. In the cab of the truck he found a

photo of appellant, a Gottschalks credit card in the name of Mildred Ritter and a handwritten

note addressed to “Dennis.” The license plate of the truck matched the license number on the

bill of sale prepared by Costello. The pickup truck was registered to Thomas Greers.

The prosecutor was permitted to introduce evidence establishing that appellant had

previously passed a check on Ritter’s account. Joseph Trainor testified that he was working at

a fireworks stand for the Knights of Columbus Church on July 3, 2000. While working he

accepted a check in the name of Mildred D. Ritter in exchange for fireworks. The man who

passed the check stated that Ritter was his mother. Trainor stated that the man produced his

driver’s license when he presented his check and Trainor wrote the number on the check. In

addition, Trainor wrote the license plate number of the man’s truck on the check.

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

Subsequently, Trainor identified appellant in a photographic lineup as the man who passed

the check. He described the man as white, in his 30's, five feet 10 inches tall and weighing

150 pounds. 

Bakersfield Police Detective Steve Griffith investigated the check submitted to

Trainor. He testified that he prepared a photographic lineup to present to Trainor and Trainor

selected appellant’s photo as the man who had passed the check. Griffith also noted that

appellant’s appearance had changed quite a bit from the time the photograph was taken to the

time of trial.

Defense

Appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant met a man named Thomas Greers in

March of 2000. Greers told appellant that he needed money to bail his girlfriend out of jail

and to get his truck out of impoundment. Greers offered to give appellant and his mother

$2,000 worth of tools if they would loan him the money. To insure the deal, Costello made

out a bill of sale for Greer’s truck. From that time until mid-August, Greers stayed with

appellant off and on and worked with appellant cleaning Costello’s rental houses. Appellant

used the truck during the months of June and July 2000, as did Greers.

During appellant’s association with Greers, Greers asked if appellant could cash a

check for him because he did not have any identification. Appellant agreed to cash the check

in the amount of $23 for him at Foodland Market. Appellant testified that Greers assured him

the check was good and was from his aunt. On another occasion, shortly before the Fourth of

July, Greers asked appellant if he wanted to go with him to buy fireworks. Appellant stated

he did and the two made a purchase together at a fireworks stand. Greers stated the check

used to purchase the fireworks was from his aunt, but the aunt could not purchase the

fireworks herself because she was sick.

Sometime after these incidents, appellant was arrested for passing checks in the name

of Mildred Ritter. He was arraigned later that day and told that if he pleaded guilty he would

receive a misdemeanor conviction and 120 days in jail. Appellant accepted the offer because

he did not want to have a felony conviction. In addition, appellant denied forging the checks,

but stated that he had passed them.

Appellant denied passing any other checks on Ritter’s account. In addition, he denied

signing the name “David Costello” on the back of the Foodland check. He insisted he

believed the checks he did pass for Greers were genuine.

Appellant described Greers as 33 years old, five feet 10 inches in height, 145 to 160

pounds, with blonde hair. Appellant stated that it was Greers who had passed the other

checks in issue and Greers and his girlfriend left town after appellant was arrested. Appellant

opined that Greers obtained the checks from one of the rental houses they worked on for

Costello because Ritter’s niece lived there. Appellant stated that Ritter’s belongings were left

in the garage of the house after she passed away and Greers was in charge of taking the items

to the dump.

See pp. 2-6, Exhibit 3, Answer (footnotes omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

There is no dispute on appeal that Kobby Michael Layne is appellant’s alias. During the arraignment of the 2

misdemeanor charge, appellant answered to his true name of Dennis Allen Cannon.

Count two alleged appellant forged check No. 1156 in the amount of $23.00 on or about July 13, 2000. Count three

3

alleged appellant forged check No. 1147 in the amount of $265.00 on or about July 1, 2000. Count four alleged appellant

forged check No. 1296 in the amount of $195.00 on or about July 1, 2000. Count five alleged appellant forged check No.

1153 in the amount of $190.00 on or about July 2, 2000.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims the underlying convictions are barred by the

principles of double jeopardy. 

1. Factual Background

The Court hereby adopts the factual summary set forth in the 5 DCA’s opinion: th

On August 29, 2000, the Kern County District Attorney’s Office filed a complaint

against appellant alleging one count of forgery. The complaint stated:

“ . . . On or about July 3, 2000, Kobby Michael Layne, did willfully and unlawfully

2

with the intent to defraud, falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit checks in the name

of Mildred Ritter, or did utter, publish, pass, or attempt to pass said checks as true or

genuine knowing said checks to be counterfeit, in violation of Penal Code Section

470(d).

As to Kobby Michael Layne, the above charge is filed as a misdemeanor pursuant to

Penal Code Section 17(B)(4).”

On the same day, appellant was arraigned on this charge, waived his right to counsel and to

trial, and entered a plea of guilty. Appellant requested immediate sentencing, and was placed

on three years’ probation and ordered to serve 120 days in the county jail.

On February 26, 2001, appellant was charged with the crimes at issue in the present

case. For each of the forgery counts, the complaint specified a specific check number and

specific amount. The complaint further alleged that each of the checks were forged in the 3

name of Mildred D. Ritter. Appellant initially pleaded not guilty to these charges, but

subsequently moved to withdraw his plea to enter a plea of once in jeopardy and to dismiss

the charges against him. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

See pp. 6-7, Exhibit 3, Answer.

2. Review by the State Courts

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA. The 5 DCA denied the claim th th

on April 16, 2003, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit 3, Answer. The claim was then presented to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; however, the petition was summarily denied

on June 25, 2003. See Exhibit 4, Answer. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order”

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

denying review of the 5 DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the th

same reasons stated in the opinion of the 5 DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). th

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the 5 DCA stated: th

The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and article I,

section 15, of the California Constitution provide that no person shall be “twice put in

jeopardy” for the same offense. These provisions protect a criminal defendant from both

multiple punishments for the same offense as well as successive prosecutions for the same

offense after acquittal or conviction. (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 717;

People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563.) A guilty plea is the equivalent to a conviction

and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th

1188, 1201.) Offenses are considered the “same offense” for the purpose of double jeopardy

analysis if one offense contains all the elements of the other. (United States v. Dixon (1993)

509 U.S. 688, 696-697.) The burden is on the defendant to prove that the current conviction

is barred double jeopardy. (People v. Lazarevich (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 416, 421.) 

Appellant’s claim is premised upon the notion that, when he pleaded guilty to the

misdemeanor forgery charge, he had been convicted for the present offenses. However, at the

hearing on the motion to dismiss the action, the prosecution introduced into evidence police

reports supporting the misdemeanor charge. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to demonstrate

the crime of which the defendant was previously convicted. (People v. Braddock (1953) 41

Cal.2d 794, 800.) These reports stated appellant had passed three checks in the name of

Mildred Ritter: check No. 1150 in the amount of $200.00 dated July 3, 2000; check No. 1291

in the amount of $107.00 dated July 1, 2000; and check No. 1295 in the amount of $160.86

dated July 1, 2000. There was no dispute that these were the checks that supported the

misdemeanor charge. As each of the checks was different from the checks that formed the

basis of the current convictions, appellant has not demonstrated that he was prosecuted twice

for the same offense. (See, e.g., People v. Tenner (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 360, 364-365 [no

double jeopardy bar where defendant subjected to two successive prosecutions for sex acts

against same victim occurring on same night, as each incident was a separate crime]; People

v. Lachuck (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 729, 731 [previous acquittal for rape and incest did not bar

subsequent prosecution for incest occurring two weeks later, as each act was separate and

distinct from the other].) Thus, his double jeopardy claim fails.

See pp. 7-8, Exhibit 3, Answer.

3. Analysis of Claim

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and

the state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. As stated by the appellate court,

the underlying convictions in this case stem from separate and distinct incidents from the prior

convictions. The checks Petitioner passed with respect to his prior convictions are not the same

checks for which Petitioner was prosecuted in this case. Thus, the state court rejection of this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The claim should be denied. 

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 9

B. Ground Two

Petitioner next argues the charged offenses in this case were too interrelated to his prior

convictions to be charged separately and therefore violate Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 822

(1966). Respondent correctly argues that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas.

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

The instant claim does not present a cognizable federal claim. The claim centers on a

violation of state law, and generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief

does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore

v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”);

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal

courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law).

Moreover, as previously discussed, Petitioner’s claim that the multiple prosecutions violated

double jeopardy principles is without merit. Petitioner’s claim that the multiple prosecutions violated

due process is also without merit, because his due process claim is nothing more than his double

jeopardy claim in different clothing. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 116 (2003)

(declining to hold that the Due Process Clause provides greater double jeopardy protection than the

Double Jeopardy Clause). Therefore, this claim should be rejected.

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 10

C. Ground Three

Petitioner next claims the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the prosecution

to present the jury with evidence of Petitioner’s prior forgery conviction without allowing Petitioner

to inform the jury he only pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor to avoid the risk that he would be

prosecuted for a felony, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Three Strikes law.

1. Clearly Established Supreme Court Precedent

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not reviewable in a

federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1985). Nevertheless, there can be habeas relief for the th

admission of prejudicial evidence if the admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a denial

of due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62; Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Walters v. Maas, 45

F.3d 1355, 1357 (9 Cir. 1995); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

th th

510 U.S. 1191 (1994); Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9 Cir.1990). However, the failure to th

comply with state rules of evidence alone is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting

federal habeas relief on due process grounds. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-920 (9th

Cir. 1991). Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can

its admission rise to the level of a due process violation. Id. at 920. Intent is a permissible inference

that the jury may draw from the evidence of prior bad acts. See Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910

n. 6 (9 Cir. 1999). th

2. Review by the State Courts

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA. The 5 DCA denied the claim th th

on April 16, 2003, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit 3, Answer. The claim was then presented to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review, which was then summarily denied on June 25,

2003. See Exhibit 4, Answer. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the 5 DCA stated: th

. . . [Appellant] claims that he was prejudiced because the jury was more likely to

believe his claim that he only pleaded guilty to the prior misdemeanor forgery charge because

he wanted to avoid a felony conviction if they knew that this was a three strikes case.

Essentially, appellant argues that the jury would be more likely to believe him if it knew that

he was a seven-time felon. We disagree. Appellant was permitted to testify that he pleaded

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 11

guilty to the misdemeanor charge because he did not want to have a felony conviction on his

record, and appellant further informed the jury that when he was arraigned on the

misdemeanor complaint the probation officer told him he could not [sic] “afford no felonies.”

Thus, the jury was adequately informed as to the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea. 

Appellant’s reliance on Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683 and People v. Basuta

(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370 is misplaced. In each of those cases the trial court prevented the

defendant from presenting evidence tending to indicate that the defendant was not guilty of

the crime accused. In Crane, the trial court prohibited the accused from establishing the

circumstances surrounding his confession to demonstrate that the confession itself was

unreliable. (Crane, supra, at p. 684.) In Basuta, the trial court would not allow the defendant

to produce evidence tending to establish that another person had committed the crime at

issue. (Basuta, supra, at p. 386.) Appellant was not prevented from presenting such evidence

in this case. The trial court allowed appellant to testify, consistent with his defense, that he

did not commit the crimes at issue and that he did not commit the previous misdemeanor

forgery to which he had pleaded guilty. Appellant was permitted to inform the jury that he

had pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor forgery, not because he had forged the checks, but

because he had passed them. In addition, he testified that at the arraignment the probation

officer told him that if he pleaded guilty to the one count he would avoid a felony conviction

which he “did not want to have.” Thus, the jury was informed regarding the circumstances of

his plea and could evaluate appellant’s explanation.

See pp. 15-16, Exhibit 3, Answer.

3. Analysis of Claim

Respondent correctly argues that this ground fails to present a cognizable federal claim. As

noted above, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and is not reviewable in a federal

habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62. Furthermore, the evidence of Petitioner’s prior was

admissible to show intent. The appellate court properly rejected Petitioner’s contention that intent

was not shown from his prior bad act:

Appellant contends that his prior conviction for forgery had no tendency to prove that

he had the intent to defraud in the present case because there “was nothing about the way in

which appellant passed the check to Trainor which showed he did so with the intent to

defraud.” Appellant is mistaken. Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor

forgery. By pleading guilty he admitted every element of the charged offense. Among other

elements, the crime of forgery requires a person to alter, forger, publish, or utter a check with

the intent to defraud. Consequently, appellant necessarily admitted through his guilty plea

that he passed the forged check to Trainor with the intent to defraud him. That appellant had

previously passed a check with the intent to defraud was probative of whether he harbored

the intent to defraud the victims in this case. 

Here, appellant admitted that he had cashed the Foodland check and passed the check

at the fireworks stand, but claimed that he believed Greers had the right to pass them. Thus

he contended that he did not harbor the intent to defraud the victims by passing the checks.

Appellant’s guilty plea of passing the forged check to Trainor, which was written on the same

account as the checks at issue in this case, was highly probative of appellant’s intent in

passing the checks at issue. Thus, appellant’s guilty plea was admissible to prove appellant’s

intent in passing the checks at issue in the present case.

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 12

See pp. 12-13, Exhibit 3, Answer (citations and footnotes omitted).

Petitioner also argues his due process rights were violated because he was assured when he

pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor forgery charges that all other forgery counts would be dropped.

The appellate court pointed out that there was no evidence of such a deal; on the contrary, the court

pointed out that “the minute order from the plea proceeding stated that his conviction could be used

against him as a prior offense.” See p. 14, Exhibit 3, Answer. 

Accordingly, the rejection of this claim by the state courts was neither contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented, and so it should be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Ground Four

In his last ground for relief, Petitioner claims the State breached a plea agreement wherein the

State allegedly agreed not to prosecute Petitioner on other forgery charges or use the conviction as

evidence against him if Petitioner pleaded guilty to misdemeanor forgery.

As noted above, other than Petitioner’s own testimony, there is no record of such a plea

agreement in the state records. See p. 14, Exhibit 3, Answer. The trial court found no evidence of

such a deal, and the appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings. The state court's factual findings

are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has presented no evidence showing the

existence of such a plea agreement. Accordingly, the claim should be rejected.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy,

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 13

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06327-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 09/18/06 Page 13 of 13