Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08117/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08117-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Raymond Erwin, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-08117-PCT-MTL

ORDER 

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge John Boyle’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) (Doc. 11) to deny and dismiss Raymond Erwin, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner filed an Objection. (Doc. 12.) Respondents replied to the 

Objection. (Doc. 13.) For the reasons expressed herein, the Court overrules the Objection 

and adopts the recommendation to dismiss the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Petitioner of child molestation and indecent exposure. (Doc. 11 at 

2.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. (Id. at 3.) He did not seek review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court within the allotted 35 days. (Id. at 4.) The judgment in his case 

thus became final on September 5, 2006. (Id.)

About a decade later, Petitioner filed his first Post-Conviction Relief petition, 

arguing that new Brady material had been discovered which impeached the testimony of a 

prosecution witness. (Id. at 3.) The post-conviction court denied the petition. (Id.) He 

later filed a second petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an 

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expert to evaluate Petitioner and to assess and rebut the State’s case against him. (Id.) The 

post-conviction court also denied the second petition. (Id. at 4.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review but denied relief. (Id.) Later, Mr. Erwin filed a habeas petition, 

which argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use rebuttal experts. (Doc. 1 

at 6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a federal district court reviews a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “it must decide whether the petitioner is ‘in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). When reviewing a 

Magistrate Judge’s R&R, this Court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which 

an objection is made and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). District 

courts are not required to “review . . . any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). 

Habeas petitions are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations 

concerning habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), (d)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

The R&R concluded that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s conviction 

became final after the time for him to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court ended. 

(Doc. 11 at 4.) Thus, according to the R&R, the petition was due by September 6, 2007.

(Id. at 5.) Yet he did not file the habeas petition until 2019. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner sought

post-conviction relief on two occasions. The R&R, however, found that the PCR petitions 

were untimely, precluding tolling while those petitions were pending in the state court 

system. (Id. at 5.) 

Equitable tolling is inappropriate, according to the R&R, because Petitioner has not 

shown, as he must, that he faced extraordinary circumstances that inhibited his filing a 

timely petition. (Id. at 6.) As to the evidentiary hearing Petitioner requested, the R&R 

found that the record is sufficiently developed in this case. (Id.)

Petitioner objects that ADEPA’s statute of limitations is “a recommendation and not 

strictly followed.” (Doc. 12 at 2.) A statutory text is more than a recommendation. Courts 

“begin [] with the statutory text, and end[] there as well if the text is unambiguous.” 

BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). That said, the Supreme 

Court has recognized that Congress passed ADEPA against the backdrop of courts’

traditional equitable authority in this area. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010). 

Thus, this Court may apply equitable tolling under appropriate circumstances, as discussed 

in further detail in the next paragraph. Id. at 645. The R&R correctly calculated the 

statutory due date for this Petition. The Court denies this objection and accepts the R&R’s 

finding concerning the statutory due date. 

Petitioner’s next objection argues that because he hired an attorney and an 

investigator, he has shown that he diligently sought evidence to pursue his claim and the 

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Court should allow equitable tolling. (Doc. 12 at 2.) This type of tolling requires Petitioner

to show that he has diligently pursued his rights and an extraordinary circumstance stood

in the way of his timely filing a habeas petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 449. The R&R 

correctly noted that equitable tolling is not appropriate here because nothing prevented 

Petitioner from bringing his ineffective assistance claim on time. (Doc. 11 at 5-6.) The 

Court will deny this objection and accept the recommendation concerning equitable tolling. 

Petitioner also renews his request for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 12 at 4.) He 

cites a case in which the appeals court ordered an evidentiary hearing after the district court 

decided the substance of a petition. (Id. (citing Juniper v. Zook, 876 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 

2017).) Here, the R&R applied a procedural requirement rather than looking to the 

substance of the petition. In addition, the Juniper case requires petitioners to diligently 

pursue claims in state court. Petitioner did not seek review of his first PCR action, so he 

did not diligently pursue the claim. Juniper, 876 F.3d at 563-64. Thus, the case Petitioner 

cited is inapposite. So too is the California case that Petitioner cites in which the California 

Supreme Court explained the meaning of the California Constitution for purposes of a state 

habeas petition. Because this case can be disposed of on timeliness grounds, the Court 

accepts the R&R’s conclusion that the record is sufficiently developed and an evidentiary 

hearing is unnecessary.

Petitioner also cites cases that go to the merits of the petition. The Court need not 

reach those arguments because they are not objections to the findings in the R&R.

Finally, a certificate of appealability may only issue when the petitioner “has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that dismissing the Petition would deny him 

a constitutional right. The Court therefore will not issue a certificate of appealability.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 11.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition (Doc. 1) and dismissing it with 

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prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED declining to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment,

terminating this case.

Dated this 11th day of May, 2020.

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