Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ernest Valencia Gonzales, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM

 O R D E R 

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

 Before the Court is Petitioner’s First Amended Habeas Petition. (Doc. 28.) 

Petitioner filed a memorandum addressing the merits of his claims and requesting 

evidentiary development. (Doc. 214.) Respondents filed a response to the memorandum 

and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs. 217, 220.) For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner 

is entitled to neither habeas relief nor evidentiary development. 

BACKGROUND 

 In 1991, Petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of felony murder, armed 

robbery, aggravated assault, first-degree burglary, and theft. The trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to death on the murder charge and to various prison terms for the other crimes. 

The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows: 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 1 of 73
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on February 20, 1990, Roger Daughtry 

returned home from work and noticed that his porch light was on. He went 

inside and saw that someone had disassembled his stereo and moved his 

speakers. Suddenly, a man appeared from behind the speakers, looked at 

Daughtry, and ran out of the house. Daughtry later identified that man as 

Ernest Gonzales. 

 Minutes later, Jeri Sheer, Daughtry’s neighbor, took out her trash 

with her dog, which ran toward a man holding what looked like a tire iron. 

Sheer looked at the man, grabbed her dog, and went back into her house. 

When she looked out the window, she noticed the man heading west, the 

direction of Darrel and Deborah Wagner’s townhouse. Sheer later identified 

the man as Gonzales. 

 About 7:10 p.m., Darrel Wagner, his wife Deborah, and Deborah’s 

seven-year-old son arrived home from dinner. As they walked into the 

small courtyard of their townhouse, they noticed that their front door was 

ajar. Darrel went to investigate while Deborah and her son waited at the 

gate. As Darrel pushed open the front door, both he and Deborah saw 

Gonzales standing on the stairway holding their VCR under his arm. 

Deborah immediately told her son to run to the neighbor’s house and call 

911. When she turned back toward her home, she saw Gonzales shove her 

husband out the front door. Darrel lost his balance and fell backward. 

Gonzales began to stab him repeatedly (seven times in all). 

 Deborah pleaded with Gonzales to leave. When he did not, Deborah 

jumped on Gonzales’s back and wrapped her arms around him to keep him 

from stabbing Darrel. Gonzales then swung at Deborah and stabbed her 

twice. He also apparently wounded himself as he was flailing at Deborah. 

When Deborah fell off his back, Gonzales left with her purse. A few 

minutes later, Darrel helped his wife up and both went inside to call 911. 

Darrel collapsed on the floor during the call and died later that night. 

Deborah spent five days in intensive care. 

 Gonzales went from the Wagner residence to his girlfriend [Gloria 

Alvarez’s] house. She helped clean his wound. Her daughters, Catherine 

and Martha Trinidad, were there and testified at trial about comments 

Gonzales made the night of the murder, his clothing, and the “bag” he had 

with him containing a woman’s driver’s license and pictures of a boy with 

red hair—the color of Deborah’s son’s hair. 

State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 506, 892 P.2d 838, 842 (1995). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 2 of 73
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner was represented at trial by appointed counsel. Following a mistrial, 

Petitioner requested, and the Court granted, his motion to represent himself. Petitioner 

subsequently withdrew his pro per request and original trial counsel was reappointed to 

represent Petitioner during the second trial that led to his conviction. 

 Thereafter, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for a new trial. (ROA 131.)1 In 

response, Petitioner filed a new motion to proceed pro per and a motion to strike 

counsel’s motion for a new trial, both of which were granted. (Id. 134, 135; ROA-ME 

68.) Petitioner also filed a supplemental motion for a new trial, which included numerous 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (ROA 138.) The trial court held a threeday hearing, at which Petitioner’s ineffective assistance allegations were considered and 

denied. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and a supplemental 

petition. (ROA-PCR 441, 499, 500.) The trial court denied the petitions and denied a 

motion for rehearing. (ROA-PCR 518, Ex’s. D, E.) Petitioner filed a petition for review, 

which the Arizona Supreme Court denied in October 1999. (See ROA-PCR 517).

 On November 15, 1999, Petitioner commenced these proceedings by filing a pro 

forma petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) The Court appointed the Federal 

Public Defender’s Office as counsel. (Doc. 8.) On December 27, 1999, the Court issued a 

case management order setting a deadline for the filing of an amended petition. (Doc. 

 1

 “ROA” refers to the four-volume record on appeal from trial and sentencing, 

including minute entries (ME) prepared for Petitioner’s direct appeal to the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Case No. CR-92-0154-AP). “ROA-PCR” refers to the 11-volume record 

on appeal from post-conviction proceedings prepared for Petitioner’s petition for review 

to the Arizona Supreme Court (Case No. CR-98-0422-PC). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 3 of 73
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

17.) The order required the amended petition to “include every known constitutional error 

or deprivation entitling Petitioner to habeas relief” and to provide a “Statement of 

Exhaustion” noting where each claim for relief was raised in state court. (Id. at 2.) 

 On July 17, 2000, Petitioner filed a 237-page amended petition raising 60 claims 

for relief. (Doc. 28.) He failed, however, to file the required Statement of Exhaustion. 

The Court directed Petitioner to comply with its case management order. (Doc. 34.) On 

September 14, 2000, Petitioner notified the Court that he had filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 35.) The Court denied 

Petitioner’s request for a stay of the proceedings and for additional time to file the 

Statement of Exhaustion. (Doc. 40.) 

 On October 6, 2000, Petitioner filed the Statement of Exhaustion. (Doc. 42.) He 

simultaneously filed a notice of withdrawal of claims, voluntarily withdrawing 13 

unexhausted habeas claims, including claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. 43.) The notice indicated that Petitioner had initiated a PCR proceeding in state 

court to exhaust the withdrawn claims, but did not request a stay of the federal 

proceedings. (Id. at 2.) On October 16, 2000, the Ninth Circuit denied the mandamus 

petition as moot.

 In February 2001, Petitioner requested that his PCR counsel be removed and that 

he be permitted to represent himself in his successive PCR proceeding. (Doc. 102-1 at 3–

5.) The state court ordered a mental health examination to determine whether Petitioner 

was competent to waive counsel. (Id. at 6–7.) A court-appointed expert determined that 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 4 of 73
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner was paranoid and delusional. (Id. at 10.) In August 2001, the state court found 

Petitioner incompetent to waive counsel and represent himself. (Id. at 26.) 

 In December 2001, on the day Petitioner’s successive PCR petition was due, 

counsel filed a motion to hold the case in abeyance pending restoration of Petitioner’s 

competency. (Doc. 102-1 at 30–36.) The motion asserted that Petitioner’s inability to 

rationally communicate with counsel precluded counsel from developing a claim of 

incompetency at the time of trial and sentencing. (Id.) The state court denied the motion.

(Id. at 45.) 

 In February 2002, state counsel filed a successive PCR petition asserting four 

claims, including claims that Petitioner had a right to be competent to assist counsel in a 

second PCR proceeding, that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine his 

current competency, and that he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. 

(Doc. 108-1 at 3–24.) PCR counsel did not raise any of the claims withdrawn from the 

amended federal habeas petition. (Id.) The state court denied the petition, and the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied a petition for review. (Id. at 40; Doc. 108-2 at 6.) 

 Following Petitioner’s withdrawal of the 13 unexhausted claims in October 2000, 

the parties briefed the procedural status of Petitioner’s remaining habeas claims. Briefing 

concluded in February 2001. (Doc. 59.) The procedural status of Petitioner’s claims 

remained under advisement until September 2002, when the Court stayed Petitioner’s 

sentencing-related claims pending exhaustion in state court of a claim based on the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). (Doc. 

75.) Petitioner initiated another state PCR proceeding. The state court consolidated it with 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 5 of 73
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the already-pending PCR petition. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in October 

2003. (Doc. 81.) In July 2004, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), this Court lifted the stay. 

 Over the next 18 months, while the matter was under advisement, Petitioner did 

not seek amendment to reincorporate the 13 withdrawn claims or to add the claims 

litigated in the second PCR petition. 

 On January 12, 2006, the Court entered its order regarding the procedural status of 

Petitioner’s habeas claims. (Doc. 97.) The Court dismissed some of the claims on 

procedural grounds or as plainly meritless, and established a deadline for Petitioner to 

submit briefing on the merits of the remaining claims. (Id.) 

 On the eve of the deadline for filing his merits brief, Petitioner’s counsel instead 

moved to stay this action pursuant to Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th 

Cir. 2003), abrogated by Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013), contending that 

Petitioner was incapable of rationally communicating with or assisting habeas counsel. 

(Doc. 102.) 

 After two years of litigation regarding Petitioner’s competency, the Court entered 

an order on April 23, 2008, denying Petitioner’s motions for a competency hearing and a 

stay of these proceedings.2

 (Doc. 187.) The Court determined that Petitioner’s remaining 

claims were record-based or involved purely legal issues and therefore would not benefit 

 

2

 During this period the Court granted Petitioner’s motion that he be transferred to 

the Arizona State Hospital for an extended mental health assessment. (See Doc. 187 at 3–

4.) Petitioner was prescribed an anti-psychotic medication which improved capacity for rational thought. (Id. at 4.) However, Petitioner voluntarily discontinued treatment, 

complaining of back pain. (Id.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 6 of 73
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

from Petitioner’s ability to communicate rationally with counsel. (Id.) Petitioner filed an 

emergency petition for writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit, which issued a stay on 

June 19, 2008. (Doc. 199.) The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted mandamus. In re 

Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010). On January 8, 2013, the United States Supreme 

Court reversed. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 696. The case was returned to this Court on June 

6, 2013. (Doc. 206.) 

 The Court ordered Petitioner to file his merits brief no later than September 20, 

2013. (Doc. 208.) Instead, Petitioner filed a motion for recusal/reassignment, which the 

Court denied. (Docs. 210, 211.) Petitioner then filed an emergency motion with the Ninth 

Circuit panel to stay the proceedings, as well as a petition for a writ of mandamus and a 

motion for reassignment of the case. On September 30, 2013, the Ninth Circuit panel 

denied the mandamus petition and denied the stay. (Doc. 216.) 

 Petitioner filed his merits memorandum on September 20, 2013. (Doc. 212; see 

Docs. 213, 214, 215.) Briefing was completed on November 22, 2013. (Doc. 220.) 

 In February 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to amend, seeking to add eight claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, including ineffective assistance at sentencing. (Doc. 

228.) The Court denied the motion (Doc. 234) and now addresses the remainder of 

Petitioner’s claims. 

APPLICABLE LAW 

 Federal habeas claims are analyzed under the framework of the Antiterrorism and 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 7 of 73
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a petitioner 

is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 410 (2000). In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), the Court clarified 

that under § 2254(d), “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of 

the state court’s decision.” Id. at 101. Accordingly, to obtain habeas relief from this 

Court, Petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 

103; see Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f all fairminded 

jurists would agree the state court decision was incorrect, then it was unreasonable . . . If, 

however, some fairminded jurists could possibly agree with the state court decision, then 

it was not unreasonable and the writ should be denied.”). 

 

3

 Petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of the AEDPA is meritless. See 

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that AEDPA violates neither the Suspension Clause nor separation of powers). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 8 of 73
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual 

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable 

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable 

merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the 

first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Even if “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” about the finding in question, “on habeas review 

that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 

U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006); see Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(explaining that on habeas review a court “cannot find that the state court made an 

unreasonable determination of the facts . . . simply because we would reverse in similar 

circumstances if this case came before us on direct appeal”). 

 To find that a factual determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court 

must be “convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). “This is a daunting standard—one 

that will be satisfied in relatively few cases.” Id.

 Significantly, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before 

the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 

1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that “the record under review is limited to the record in 

existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court”); see Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Along with the significant deference 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 9 of 73
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

AEDPA requires us to afford state courts’ decisions, AEDPA also restricts the scope of 

the evidence that we can rely on in the normal course of discharging our responsibilities 

under § 2254(d)(1).”). The Ninth Circuit has observed that “Pinholster and the statutory 

text make clear that this evidentiary limitation is applicable to § 2254(d)(2) claims as 

well.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n.6 (2013) (citing § 2254(d)(2) and 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 n.7). Therefore, as the court explained in Gulbrandson: 

for claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, petitioners can 

rely only on the record before the state court in order to satisfy the 

requirements of § 2254(d). This effectively precludes federal evidentiary 

hearings for such claims because the evidence adduced during habeas 

proceedings in federal court could not be considered in evaluating whether 

the claim meets the requirements of § 2254(d). 

Id. at 993–94. 

ANALYSIS 

 Twenty-five claims remain from the first amended petition. Petitioner seeks 

evidentiary development on each. However, because the claims were denied on the merits 

in state court, this Court’s review is limited to the state court record and Petitioner is 

entitled to evidentiary development only if a claim satisfies § 2254(d).4 Pinholster, 131 S. 

Ct. at 1398, 1400–01; see, e.g., Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1093 n.15 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(explaining that Pinholster bars evidentiary hearing unless petitioner satisfies § 2254(d)). 

 

4

 Claims 45, 47, and 48, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, were not 

considered on the merits in state court. However, the existing record is sufficient to resolve the claims and evidentiary development is unnecessary. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (explaining that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary when the state-court record “precludes habeas relief” under § 2254(d) limitations). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 10 of 73
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

As discussed next, relief on each of the claims is precluded by § 2254(d), so Petitioner’s 

requests for evidentiary development must be denied.5

Claim 4 

 Petitioner alleges that the photographic lineup shown to witnesses Roger Daughtry 

and Jeri Scheer was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable, and therefore their 

testimony identifying Petitioner should not have been admitted at trial.6

 (Doc. 214 at 42–

48.) 

 Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the identifications. The court conducted 

a “Dessureault hearing”7

 and concluded that there was “no evidence at all of undue 

suggestion.” (ME 132.) The identifications were admitted at trial. On direct appeal, the 

Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the identifications were admissible. Gonzales, 181 

Ariz. at 509–10, 892 P.2d at 845–46. 

 A pretrial identification violates due process where (1) the police-arranged 

identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, and (2) the suggestive procedure 

 

5

 Throughout his memorandum on the merits, Petitioner asserts that his 

incompetence prevents him from further developing his claims. (See, e.g., Doc. 212 at 1, 

40, 48.) For the reasons discussed in previous orders (Docs. 187, 235), and because Petitioner is not entitled to evidentiary development under Pinholster, his competence is not at issue in the resolution of his claims for habeas relief. While it is unnecessary at this point in the proceedings to address questions concerning Petitioner’s competency, the Court recognizes that the issue may arise if and when the State obtains a warrant of 

execution. 

6

 Daughtry, when shown the lineup three days after witnessing the burglary, chose Petitioner’s photo as the “most likely” or “most like the person.” (RT 1/17/90 at 9–10.) Scheer picked out Petitioner’s photo when she was shown the lineup a week after the incident. (Id. at 25–28.) She was 80 percent certain the photo showed the person she had seen outside her home. (Id. at 28.) Deborah Wagner was unable to identify her attacker in the photo lineup. (See RT 1/22/91 at 24–27; RT 5/28/91 at 108–111.) 

7 State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384, 453 P.2d 951 (1969), directs trial courts to hold an evidentiary hearing when a proposed in-court identification is challenged. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 11 of 73
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

gives rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 

188, 197 (1972); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). “[D]ue process 

concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is 

both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2012) 

(citing Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 107). Factors to be considered in assessing the reliability 

of the identification include the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time 

of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s description, 

the level of certainty, and the lapse of time between the crime and the identification. 

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 

 Petitioner contends that the photographic lineup shown to Daughtry and Scheer 

was improperly suggestive because Petitioner’s photo, one of five in the lineup, has a 

lighter background than the other photos and because the other men pictured “have 

normal facial expressions while Mr. Gonzales has his eyes squinted and effectuates a 

hostile glare.” (Doc. 214 at 42–43.) The Arizona Supreme Court addressed this argument 

and concluded that the line-up was not unduly suggestive: 

 To establish a due process violation, Gonzales must first establish 

that the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification “were so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification,” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 

(1968), and that the “state bore sufficient responsibility for the suggestive 

pretrial identification.” See State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 137, 800 P.2d 

1240, 1245 (1987). Gonzales argues that the line-up was suggestive 

because (1) the background in his photo was lighter than the others, (2) he 

had a “hostile glare” that gave him a more “criminal look,” (3) only three of 

the men in the line-up had “bushy” mustaches while the others had only 

thin mustaches, and (4) both Sheer and Daughtry knew that a suspect had 

been arrested before they viewed the photos. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 12 of 73
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 After reviewing the photographic line-up shown to Sheer and 

Daughtry, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that it was 

not impermissibly suggestive. While upon close examination, the lighting 

or flash may be brighter in Gonzales’s picture, the difference is almost 

imperceptible. All the persons shown stood against a solid white 

background. The facial expression Gonzales chose while being 

photographed was not a function of police conduct. Nor will different facial 

expressions or hair thickness render a line-up impermissibly suggestive. 

There is no requirement that the accused be surrounded by nearly identical 

persons. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 509–10, 892 P.2d at 845–46 (additional citations omitted). 

 The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. “When a witness identifies the defendant in a police-organized photo lineup . . . , 

the identification should be suppressed only where ‘the photographic identification 

procedure was so [unnecessarily] suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting Simmons v. 

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1968)). That is not the case here. The photo lineup 

shows five young Hispanic males with dark hair and mustaches. See United States v. 

Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no impermissible suggestion where 

the photospread showed six pictures of clean-shaven “Caucasian males in the same age 

range with similar skin, eye, and hair coloring”); United States v. Carabajal, 956 F.2d 

924, 929 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no impermissible suggestion where the photospread 

showed six pictures of “Hispanic males in the same age range, with similar skin, eye, and 

hair coloring” as well as similar hair length and facial hair). 

 The Ninth Circuit has explained that “insubstantial differences between the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 13 of 73
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

defendant’s photograph and the others do not in themselves create an impermissible 

suggestion.” United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352, 357 (9th Cir. 1999). In Burdeau, the 

court held that a photo array was not suggestive even though the defendant’s picture was 

placed in the center of the array, was “darker than the rest,” and was the only one 

showing a person with closed eyes. Id.; see United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 

1073 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding photographic array was not impermissibly suggestive when 

defendant’s photograph was hazier than others); United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 

284, 286 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding photographic array in which defendant’s photograph 

was darker and clearer was not impermissibly suggestive). 

 Neither Petitioner’s facial expression nor the fact that his photo was slightly 

lighter than the others is a substantial difference that renders the lineup impermissibly 

suggestive. The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Claim 4 is denied. 

Claim 5 

 Petitioner alleges that his confrontation and due process rights were violated by 

the trial court’s failure to appoint various experts. (Doc. 214 at 48–54.) 

 Before the second trial, Petitioner moved for the appointment of experts in 

serology, fingerprinting, and identification. (ROA 171.) The trial court denied the motion, 

explaining, “I don’t see the change in the trial warranting the appointment of new experts 

and changing the dynamic at all. It’s just another trial. That jury hung up, and, as I said 

when I mistried it before, we’ll just try it again. And in view of that, there’s nothing 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 14 of 73
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

new.” (RT 3/25/91 at 6.) 

 On appeal, Petitioner argued that that the trial court’s refusal to appoint the experts 

denied him due process under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The Arizona 

Supreme Court held that Petitioner had failed to make a threshold showing of “reasonable 

necessity” as required under Ake and the state statute governing the appointment of 

experts. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 511, 892 P.2d at 847. The court found that Petitioner “did 

not explain how a fingerprint expert would be helpful, let alone necessary, to his defense. 

The state did not offer fingerprint evidence against him.” Id. The court also noted that 

Petitioner “made only general references to the credibility of Deborah’s identification 

testimony to support his request for a serologist and an identification expert.” Id. Finally, 

the court explained that “it does not appear that the identification expert testimony would 

have been admissible under [state law].” Id. at n.4. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal 

law. In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has a constitutional 

right to the appointment of a psychiatrist when his sanity is a “significant factor at trial.” 

470 U.S. at 83. However, the Supreme Court has declined to consider whether the 

holding in Ake extends beyond psychiatrists to other expert witnesses and investigators. 

See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“We therefore have no need to 

determine as a matter of federal constitutional law what if any showing would have 

entitled a defendant to [a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, or a ballistics 

expert].”). The Ninth Circuit has limited the Ake holding to psychiatrists and specifically 

held that Ake does not extend to eyewitness identification experts. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 15 of 73
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails because the Supreme 

Court has not clearly established a constitutional right to the appointment of forensic 

experts. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from 

[the Supreme] Court regarding [the petitioner’s claim], it cannot be said that the state 

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.”) (internal quotation marks 

and brackets omitted).8

 

 Claim 5 is denied. 

Claim 7 

Petitioner alleges that his right to testify and his right to due process were violated 

when the trial court ruled that the prosecution could use his statements to the police for 

impeachment purposes if he chose to testify. (Doc. 214 at 57.) Petitioner contends that 

the statements, made while he was being treated in the hospital for an injury he received 

during his arrest, were involuntary and therefore inadmissible for all purposes. 

 Background 

 The trial court held a voluntariness hearing before Petitioner’s first trial. Phoenix 

Detectives Michael Chambers and Billy Butler testified. Petitioner did not. 

 Petitioner was arrested in the early morning hours of February 23, 1990. He was 

fleeing on foot from a traffic stop when an officer struck him in the head with a 

 

8

 Even if Ake extended to the type of experts sought by Petitioner, the Arizona Supreme Court reasonably determined that Petitioner failed to show there was a necessity for their appointment in his case. The State did not use fingerprint evidence against Petitioner, Petitioner offered no specific support for his request for a serology expert (see

ROA 171), and under Arizona law the general rule is that “the trier of facts needs no 

assistance from expert testimony on the question of reliability of identification.” State v. 

Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 296, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223 (1983). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 16 of 73
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

flashlight, knocking him to the ground. (RT 6/3/91 at 91.) Petitioner sustained an injury 

above his right eye. (Id. at 92–93.) Before Petitioner was transported to the county 

medical center at 6:47 a.m., Detective Butler advised him of his Miranda rights.9

 (RT 

1/16/91 at 61–62.) Petitioner indicated that he understood his rights. (Id. at 62.) When 

asked if he would like to give his side of the story, Petitioner responded that he had 

nothing to say. (Id.) 

 Later that morning, when Detective Chambers arrived at the homicide office, his 

supervisor asked him to relieve one of the two uniformed officers who were guarding 

Petitioner at the medical center. (Id. at 66–67.) When Chambers arrived at the hospital 

about 9:00 a.m., Petitioner was on a hospital bed while a physician was cleaning soil out 

of a deep laceration on Petitioner’s forehead. (Id. at 68–69, 76.) Petitioner complained 

about pain, but also said that pain was good because it kept his head clear. (Id. at 78.) 

 Detective Chambers again asked Petitioner whether he understood his rights, but 

he did not re-administer the Miranda warnings. (Id. at 70.) Petitioner indicated that he 

understood his rights and stated that he did not want to talk about his arrest until he had 

spoken with an attorney. (Id.) Detective Chambers offered to place a call, but Petitioner 

did not provide the name of an attorney. (Id.) 

Chambers continued speaking with Petitioner. Noting that Petitioner had a record 

as a burglar, not a violent criminal, Detective Chambers suggested a scenario in which 

Petitioner did not intend to harm anyone but only attacked Mr. Wagner because Wagner 

confronted him during the burglary and attempted to prevent his escape. (Id. at 71, 75.) 

 

9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 17 of 73
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner acknowledged that Detective Chambers’ description of the incident was 

correct. (Id. at 71–72.) He also indicated that he had been struck in the head during the 

confrontation and that he did not intend to harm the woman. (Id. at 72, 75.) 

The trial court found that the statements were taken in violation of Petitioner’s 

rights under Miranda and precluded their use in the State’s case-in-chief. However, the 

court ruled that the statements would be admissible for impeachment purposes if 

Petitioner were to testify. (RT 1/16/91 at 82–83.) Citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 

222 (1971), the court explained that “[a] statement plainly taken without giving Miranda 

rights nevertheless becomes admissible to impeach if it is fundamentally competent. And 

here, the issue of the competence of the defendant, based on his injury and so forth, 

would go to the weight, not the admissibility. So to that extent suppression is denied.” 

(Id. at 82.) 

 On appeal, Petitioner argued that under Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 

(1978), the statements should have been excluded for all purposes because his medical 

condition at the time rendered the statements involuntary. He also contended that the trial 

court’s ruling prevented him from taking the stand in his own defense. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court denied the claim, holding that Petitioner’s statements 

were voluntary: 

Our inquiry is whether the confession was the product of “a rational 

intellect and a free will.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398. Gonzales was in the 

hospital having his wound cleaned. He was not strapped down, sedated, or 

incoherent. In fact, he stated that the pain from his wound “kept his head 

clear.” Gonzales understood and responded to the questions and even asked 

questions about statements he believed his girlfriend had made. Gonzales’s 

will was not overborne. This case is not like Mincey where the defendant 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 18 of 73
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

was in intensive care, confined to bed, in extreme pain, heavily sedated, 

confused, incoherent, and eventually unconscious. Gonzales’s statements 

were not coerced. The trial court did not err in ruling them admissible to 

impeach. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512–13, 892 P.2d at 848–49 (additional citations omitted).10 This 

decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 Analysis 

 While a statement taken in violation of defendant’s Miranda rights may not be 

used in the prosecution’s case in chief, it is admissible for impeachment so long as “the 

trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. Any 

use of a defendant’s involuntary statement is a denial of due process. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 

398. 

To determine whether a statement was voluntary, a court considers whether, under 

“the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or 

psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was 

overborne.” United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). A statement 

is involuntary if it is “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any 

direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper 

influence.” Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 

U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897)). 

 

10 The Arizona Supreme Court also found that Petitioner had waived the claim by failing to testify, Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848, but this Court held that the 

procedural ruling was not adequate to bar habeas review. (Doc. 97 at 13.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 19 of 73
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

There is no evidence that Petitioner’s statements were extracted by threats, 

violence, promises, or the exertion of improper influence. He was not subjected to 

violence, promised leniency in exchange for making a statement, or lied to. 

 As the Arizona Supreme Court observed, the circumstances in which he made his 

statements bear little resemblance to those in Mincey, where “[t]he statements at issue 

were . . . the result of virtually continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully 

wounded man on the edge of consciousness.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 400. 

 Mincey had been seriously injured in a shootout with police, sustaining a wound in 

his hip, which resulted in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right 

leg.11 437 U.S. at 396. When he arrived at the hospital, he was “depressed almost to the 

point of coma.” Id. at 398. Tubes were inserted into his throat and through his nose into 

his stomach, and a catheter was inserted into his bladder. Id. at 396. He was unable to 

speak, and had to write out his answers to the detective’s questions. Id.

While Mincey was in the intensive care unit, in a “debilitated and helpless 

condition,” a detective arrived and, after administering the Miranda advisory, proceeded 

to interrogate Mincey over the course of four hours. Id. The United States Supreme Court 

described the interrogation: 

As soon as [Detective] Hust’s questions turned to the details of the 

afternoon’s events, Mincey wrote: “This is all I can say without a lawyer.” 

Hust nonetheless continued to question him, and a nurse who was present 

suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Mincey gave unresponsive 

or uninformative answers to several more questions, and then said again 

that he did not want to talk without a lawyer. Hust ignored that request and 

another made immediately thereafter. Indeed, throughout the interrogation 

 

11 Mincey remained hospitalized for almost a month. 437 U.S. at 398 n.14. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 20 of 73
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Mincey vainly asked Hust to desist. Moreover, he complained several times 

that he was confused or unable to think clearly, or that he could answer 

more accurately the next day. But despite Mincey’s entreaties to be let 

alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals when Mincey lost 

consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each such 

interruption returned relentlessly to his task. 

Id. at 399–401 (footnotes omitted). The Court concluded that “[i]t is hard to imagine a 

situation less conducive to the exercise of ‘a rational intellect and a free will’ than 

Mincey’s.” Id. at 398 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)). 

Petitioner, unlike Mincey, was not in a debilitated condition, physically or 

mentally, when he made his statements to Detective Chambers. While Petitioner was in 

pain and being treated for a laceration on his forehead, he was, by his own account, able 

to think clearly. He was not confused, passing into and out of consciousness, or offering 

incoherent statements to his interrogator. 

Detective Chambers’ conduct was not coercive or overbearing. Although 

Petitioner was in pain as his laceration was being treated, “it was not so severe as to 

render him unable to make a voluntary statement or unduly susceptible to manipulation 

by his interrogator[].” Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) 

(upholding district court’s voluntariness finding where defendant was in intensive care 

with knife wound but was “alert and awake despite his pain”); see United States v. Khalil, 

214 F.3d 111, 115, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding statement voluntary where defendant 

was in hospital, suffering from a gunshot wound and awaiting surgery). Under the totality 

of the circumstances, Petitioner’s inculpatory statements were not the product of 

unconstitutional coercion, and his will was not overborne. Claim 7 is denied. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 21 of 73
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Claim 9 

 Petitioner alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 

because the trial judge was openly hostile toward Petitioner and refused to recuse 

himself. (Doc. 214 at 64.) 

 Background 

 Petitioner’s first trial ended in a hung jury. Before his second trial, Petitioner, 

acting pro per, moved to disqualify the trial judge, Judge Joseph Howe, arguing that he 

was biased and prejudiced against Petitioner. (ROA 104, 105.) Petitioner cited adverse 

rulings issued by Judge Howe, particularly the denial of expert assistance on the issue of 

eyewitness identification, and on-the-record comments made by the judge to Petitioner. 

(ROA 105.) 

 Judge Howe initially denied the motions (RT 3/25/91 at 7, 9) but subsequently 

vacated his ruling (ME 3/25/91). The matter was then assigned to Judge Rufus Coulter, 

who held a hearing at which Petitioner explained his position: 

[Judge Howe] is prejudicing me in a lot of motions that I bring forward. He 

just keeps denying all my motions. And I just feel there is going to be a big 

effect in this next trial because he was present, and he made a lot of 

decisions in my last trial. And there was a lot of prejudicial remarks that he 

has stated to me in court on previous hearings on my motions, and he just—

he just keeps determining to just take me to trial in front of him. He has 

stated this to me, that he will not let me go to no other judge, just in front of 

him. And I’ve made many attempts to get a change of judge, but he just 

calls me a fool. He don’t want to listen to me, whatever I have to present to 

him. He says I’m just a stubborn brat. And I’m just being prejudiced. There 

ain’t no way I’m going to get a fair trial with Judge Howe anymore. 

(RT 5/15/91 at 3.) 

 The prosecutor acknowledged that “there is some type of attitude problem 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 22 of 73
- 23 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

between Judge Howe and the defendant. I’m not sure why it started, how it started or 

what effect it has had on this trial. Every time we appear in court, they snap and snarl at 

each other. And I have no position, nor do I have any indication as to whether or not that 

behavior will deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (Id. at 4.) Judge Coulter denied the 

motion, explaining, “I snap and snarl at a lot of attorneys, but I simply don’t—it doesn’t 

mean it’s prejudice. Based on what has been presented, it will be ordered denying the 

disqualification of Judge Howe.” (Id.) 

 After his conviction in the second trial but prior to sentencing, Petitioner filed 

another pro se motion seeking to disqualify Judge Howe. (ROA 150.) Petitioner again 

cited adverse rulings and the judge’s disparaging courtroom comments. In addition to 

these criticisms, Petitioner noted that he had filed a complaint against Judge Howe with 

the Judicial Conduct Commission. (ROA 150.) Judge Ronald Reinstein denied the 

motion, finding that the previous allegations of bias had been ruled on and that the filing 

of a complaint against a judge is not a basis for removal. (ME 10/1/91.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised the issue of judicial bias, 

alleging that “[t]hroughout the proceedings in this matter, the trial judge’s impartiality 

[sic] and bias were apparent” and citing a number of contentious exchanges between 

Judge Howe and Petitioner. (Opening Br. at 56.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected 

Petitioner’s claim, finding that the reported exchanges between Petitioner and Judge 

Howe did not indicate bias: 

Gonzales points to several exchanges that he claims demonstrate the 

judge’s animosity toward him, and argues that he was denied a fair trial and 

sentencing. But Gonzales was a difficult litigant, and while the judge 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 23 of 73
- 24 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

understandably became impatient with him, particularly while he was 

acting pro per, none of the exchanges would support Gonzales’s claim of 

bias. Nor did any of the exchanges take place in front of the jury. Other 

than pointing to the motions the judge denied and the sentence he imposed, 

Gonzales has not shown how he was prejudiced. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 511–12, 892 P.2d at 847–48. Citing Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 555 (1994), the court concluded “that Judge Coulter properly denied 

Gonzales’s motion for disqualification of Judge Howe.” Id. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848. 

 Analysis 

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and 

impartial judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Rhoades v. Henry, 598 

F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Due process requires that trials be conducted free of 

actual bias as well as the appearance of bias.”). Judicial bias reaching the level of a due 

process violation, and therefore requiring recusal, is presumed in cases “in which the 

adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of 

personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 

47 (1975). Due process also requires recusal “if the judge acts as ‘part of the accusatory 

process.’” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Murchison, 

349 U.S. at 137). “To succeed on a judicial bias claim, however, the petitioner must 

overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.’” 

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 

47). 

In Liteky, the Supreme Court explained that a judge’s conduct at trial may be 

“characterized as bias or prejudice” only if “it is so extreme as to display clear inability to 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 24 of 73
- 25 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

render fair judgment” or “display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment impossible.” 510 U.S. at 551, 555. “[J]udicial remarks during the 

course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, 

or their cases” do not establish bias unless “they reveal such a high degree of favoritism 

or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. The Court elaborated: 

Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of 

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the 

bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been 

confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts 

at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s 

ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune. 

Id. at 555–56; see Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (“In the absence of any evidence of some 

extrajudicial source of bias or partiality, neither adverse rulings nor impatient remarks are 

generally sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity.”). 

 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly concluded that a ‘state court’s finding that the 

trial judge was impartial . . . is a finding of historical fact that is entitled to a presumption 

of correctness’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 938 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 This Court, applying the “twin presumptions,” Sivak, 658 F.3d at 924, of 

deference to the state courts’ determination that Judge Howe was not biased and the 

presumption of judicial integrity, concludes that Petitioner’s judicial bias claim is 

meritless. 

 Petitioner’s claim of bias is based on what he characterizes as a hostile 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 25 of 73
- 26 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

relationship between himself and Judge Howe. As evidence of bias, Petitioner cites a 

handful of testy comments by Judge Howe in courtroom proceedings outside the presence 

of the jury. (See, e.g., RT 8/6/90 at 5; RT 4/18/91 at 21–22; RT 5/25/91 at 7–9.) 

However, the record as a whole discloses nothing more than the “rare flareup” and “show 

of evanescent irritation—a modicum of quick temper that must be allowed even judges.” 

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954); see Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (“Because 

Larson has provided no evidence of the trial court’s alleged bias outside of these rulings 

and remarks—which themselves revealed little more than the occasional mild frustration 

with Larson’s pro se lawyering skills—his claim that he was denied a fair trial also 

fails.”); Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that trial 

judge’s expressions of anger and annoyance towards defense counsel did not rise to the 

level of judicial bias where there was no showing that the judge was biased against 

defendant or the merits of the case, or that judge’s demonstration of anger or annoyance 

infected jurors). 

 While Petitioner was by his own admission a “difficult litigant” (Doc. 220 at 17), 

on a number of occasions Judge Howe showed patience and forbearance. For example, 

when Petitioner represented himself during a hearing on his motion for a new trial, Judge 

Howe offered guidance on how to proceed (RT 12/16/91 at 75–76, 140), interacted with 

Petitioner in a collegial manner (id. at 163), and even complimented Petitioner on his 

performance (RT 12/17/91 at 128). Judge Howe’s occasional flareups when dealing with 

Petitioner did not “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair 

judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 at 555; cf. Crater, 491 F.3d at 1132 (finding recusal 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 26 of 73
- 27 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

not required where judge’s comments advising defendant to accept plea deal were 

“founded upon his legitimate knowledge of the proceedings and outcome in [the] case” 

and offer[ed] no evidence to overcome the ‘presumption of honesty and integrity’ that we 

accord to the determinations of a judge”) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47). 

 Finally, Petitioner asserts that “Judge Howe’s partiality was apparent” in his legal 

rulings, most of which were adverse to Petitioner. (Doc. 214 at 69.) In Liteky, however, 

the Court emphasized that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute [a] valid basis 

for a bias or partiality recusal motion.” 510 U.S. at 555. Moreover, Judge Howe also 

made key rulings that favored Petitioner, including his decision to suppress Petitioner’s 

confession and the recording of Ms. Wagner’s 911 call. 

 In sum, Petitioners allegations of judicial bias, based solely on Judge Howe’s legal 

rulings and in-court comments, are insufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial 

integrity and support a due process violation. The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this 

claim was not contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Claim 9 is denied. 

Claim 13 

Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were 

violated when the trial court permitted Deborah Wagner to remain in the courtroom 

during jury selection and after her testimony. (Doc. 214 at 71.) 

 At Petitioner’s second trial, Ms. Wagner was present for voir dire, seated in the 

back of the courtroom. (See RT 5/28/91 at 8.) Subsequently, after the jury had been 

selected, defense counsel asked the court to ask the jurors if they had been tainted by 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 27 of 73
- 28 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

their exposure to Ms. Wagner’s presence. (Id.) The court declined, explaining that asking 

such questions would “do more damage” than good and finding that there was no 

evidence of misconduct and that Ms. Wagner had a right to be present under the Arizona 

Constitution. (Id. at 8, 11.) The prosecutor indicated that, with respect to the remainder of 

the proceedings, Ms. Wagner, who would be the State’s first witness, intended to be 

present only for the opening statements and her own testimony. (Id. at 10.) Over the 

prosecutor’s objection, the court barred Ms. Wagner from the courtroom during opening 

statements but ruled that she could be present after her testimony. (Id. at 13.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. (Opening Br. at 54.) The claim was 

based upon the assumption that Ms. Wagner was present in the courtroom after her 

testimony—an assumption that, Petitioner conceded, was supported by nothing in the 

record. (Id. at n.19.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the claim, finding that Ms. 

Wagner had a right to be present as a crime victim under the Arizona Constitution. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848. The court then stated: 

Deborah, on her own initiative, attended jury selection. She sat in the back 

row of the courtroom, and neither the court nor counsel knew she was there 

until several days later. Nor is there any evidence that prospective jurors 

noticed Deborah or knew who she was during jury selection. Gonzales has 

not shown that Deborah’s presence during jury selection was prejudicial. 

There is no evidence that Deborah intended to or did remain in the 

courtroom after she testified, and therefore we consider the matter no 

further. 

Id. 

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 13 because the Arizona Supreme 

Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to or based on an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, citing Carey v. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 28 of 73
- 29 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006), there is no clearly established federal law holding “the 

mere presence of a murder victim’s family members in the courtroom can result in 

inherent prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” United States v. Lawrence, 735 

F.3d 385, 441 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 In Carey, the Supreme Court observed that some “government-sponsored 

practices” have been held inherently prejudicial, but noted that it has never held that 

“private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a 

defendant of a fair trial.” 549 U.S. at 76. The Court therefore vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 

grant of habeas relief where the trial court had allowed a murder victim’s family 

members to wear buttons displaying the victim’s photograph during trial. Id. at 77. 

 Petitioner also contends that the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Arizona Supreme Court stated 

that counsel did not know Ms. Wagner was present during jury selection “until several 

days later,” but both defense counsel and the prosecutor told the judge they had been 

aware of Ms. Wagner’s presence during voir dire. (RT 5/29/91 at 8, 11.) Gonzales, 181 

Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848. The Court finds that this erroneous observation is 

insufficient to satisfy § 2254(d)(2) because it was not relevant to the supreme court’s 

analysis and was not the basis of the court’s conclusion that “Gonzales has not shown 

that Deborah’s presence during jury selection was prejudicial.” Id. 

 Claim 13 is denied. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 29 of 73
- 30 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Claims 14/1512

 Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were 

violated when the trial court determined that witness Martha Trinidad was unavailable 

and allowed her previous testimony to be read into the record at his retrial. (Doc. 214 at 

76.) He contends that the State failed to show that it had made a good faith effort to 

secure Martha’s presence and that the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of the claim on 

appeal was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id. at 78–82.) 

 Facts 

 Martha Trinidad, the 14-year-old daughter of Petitioner’s girlfriend Gloria 

Alvarez, testified and was cross-examined at Petitioner’s first trial. (RT 6/28/91 at 39–

78.) Before the second trial, the prosecutor personally served subpoenas on both Martha 

and Ms. Alvarez on Martha’s behalf. During Petitioner’s second trial, Ms. Alvarez 

testified that Martha was supposed to be living with her but had run away from home. 

(RT 5/30/91 at 151.) Ms. Alvarez did not know where Martha could be found. (Id.) She 

had run away twice before. (Id. at 152.) On one occasion, Ms. Alvarez’s brother was able 

to locate Martha, but after being returned home, she ran away again. (Id.) 

 Four days after Ms. Alvarez’s testimony, the parties met with the trial court. The 

prosecutor informed the court that he had spoken with Ms. Alvarez during a break and 

she informed him that Martha had not returned home. (RT 3/3/91 at 100.) He also told the 

court that the previous week he had requested Detective Butler to drive by the areas 

 

12 Petitioner merged Claims 14 and 15 into a single claim. (Doc. 215 at 76 n.41.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 30 of 73
- 31 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Martha was known to frequent, but the detective was unable to locate her.13 (RT 6/3/91 at 

100, 104.) Petitioner’s counsel, while acknowledging that the prosecutor had been “real 

up front” about Martha’s runaway episodes, questioned whether she was “unavailable” 

under the rules and objected to the admission of her previous testimony. (Id. at 101.) The 

court found Martha was “unavailable” and ruled her prior testimony admissible. (Id. at 

102.) It was read into the record the next day. (RT 6/4/91 at 25–64.) 

 On appeal, Petitioner alleged that the State failed to make a good-faith effort to 

secure Martha’s presence at retrial. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 508, 892 P.2d at 844. The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied the claim: 

Gonzales first argues that the state failed to make a good-faith effort 

to secure Martha Trinidad’s presence at trial, and thus Martha was not 

“unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5), Ariz.R.Evid. Gonzales claims that the 

state knew that Martha had a history of running away and should have tried 

to hold her in some manner. He argues that, at the very least, the state 

should have done more than simply drive by places where Martha “hung 

out.” 

Most “good-faith efforts” challenges involve unserved witnesses 

who cannot be located. But here, Martha and her mother were personally 

served. While nothing in Rule 804 suggests that service of a subpoena is a 

per se showing of good-faith efforts, we have said that “the true issue is 

whether the state made a good-faith effort to locate the witness so that he or 

she could be put under subpoena.” State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 182, 

665 P.2d 59, 64 (1983) (citing State v. Pereda, 111 Ariz. 344, 345, 529 

P.2d 695, 696 (1974) (“If a witness cannot be served by subpoena, it then 

becomes a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine 

whether a sufficient effort has been made to place the witness under 

subpoena.”). Service of process and the efforts made to locate Martha upon 

learning that she was missing satisfy the unavailability requirement of the 

rule. 

 

13 At the hearing on Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, defense counsel testified 

that he had also unsuccessfully searched for Martha at one of the locations provided by her mother. (RT 12/16/91 at 46.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 31 of 73
- 32 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Id. at 508–09, 892 P.2d at 844–45. 

 Analysis 

 The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness 

who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . 

a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 

(2004). The unavailability requirement is not met unless the government made a goodfaith effort to obtain the witness’s presence at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 

(1980), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; see Barber v. Page, 390 

U.S. 719, 725 (1968). While the prosecution need not take every conceivable measure to 

secure a witness, it must demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to do so. See Roberts, 

448 U.S. at 74–77. 

In Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 495 (2011) (per curiam), the Supreme Court, 

citing Roberts, reiterated that “when a witness disappears before trial, it is always 

possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the 

witness’ presence, but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust 

every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” The Court further noted that on 

habeas review: 

the deferential standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not 

permit a federal court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of 

unavailability merely because the federal court identifies additional steps 

that might have been taken. Under AEDPA, if the state-court decision was 

reasonable, it cannot be disturbed. 

Id.

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 32 of 73
- 33 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was reasonable. In Roberts, the 

prosecution attempted to locate the witness by contacting her mother and family, who 

reported that they did not know of her whereabouts, and by issuing a subpoena at her 

parents’ home on five separate occasions over the course of four months. 448 U.S. at 74–

77. The Supreme Court, on direct review, found these good faith efforts sufficient to 

show that the witness was unavailable. Id.; see Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1083 

(9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the state made reasonable efforts where it served the witness 

while she was in custody, checked a database of aliases, and visited the street corner 

where she worked as a prostitute). 

 In this case, the prosecution actually served Martha with a subpoena, and served 

Mrs. Alvarez on behalf of Martha. When Martha ran away from home again and her 

mother testified that she did not know where Martha was, the prosecutor directed a 

detective to search the areas she was known to frequent. Under these circumstances, the 

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision upholding the trial court’s unavailability 

determination was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. This claim is denied. 

Claim 17 

Petitioner alleges that his rights were violated when the trial court improperly 

admitted Ms. Wagner’s in-court identification, which was unreliable and tainted by her 

exposure to Petitioner during the first trial. (Doc. 214 at 83.) 

Prior to trial, following the Dessureault hearing, the court determined that Ms. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 33 of 73
- 34 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Wagner’s in-court identification of Petitioner would be admissible. The court found that 

exposure to a newspaper photograph of Petitioner was insufficient to taint her in-court 

identification of Petitioner. (RT 1/15/91 at 22–27.) The court explained that Ms. Wagner 

“was present at the assault upon herself and had a considerable amount of time in which 

to observe firsthand the assailant. There was absolutely nothing in police conduct and 

nothing in the newspaper that would in any way taint her testimony.” (Id. at 27.) 

At Petitioner’s first trial, Ms. Wagner, when asked on direct examination whether 

the person who attacked her was in the courtroom, replied “Yes, I think he is” and 

pointed to Petitioner. (RT 1/21/91 at 61.) On cross-examination, however, she suggested 

that her identification of Petitioner had become more certain, explaining, “I didn’t get any 

kind of feelings until I come into this courtroom yesterday and looked at the man you’re 

trying to defend.” (RT 1/22/91 at 23.) On redirect examination, Ms. Wagner did not 

hesitate when asked how certain she was that Petitioner was the attacker: “That man is 

the man that was in our house and killed us [sic].” (Id. at 28.) The first trial ended in a 

hung jury. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges, citing 

the change in the strength of Ms. Wagner’s identification of Petitioner during the first 

trial and his concern that she was “obviously going to identify [Petitioner] as the 

perpetrator” at the next trial. (RT 3/25/91 at 3–4.) The court denied the motion. (Id. at 8.) 

During her testimony at Petitioner’s retrial, Ms. Wagner identified Petitioner without 

hesitation. (RT 5/28/91 at 59.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred by admitting Ms. 

Wagner’s identification testimony because it “was tainted by her inability to identify him 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 34 of 73
- 35 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

at the first trial and her identification did not have sufficient indications of reliability.” 

(Opening Br. at 25.) He argued that the “suggestive position of Mr. Gonzales during the 

first trial, seated next to defense counsel,” allowed her to make a positive in-court 

identification during the second trial. (Id.) Petitioner also contended that the identification 

was unreliable under the Biggers factors. (Id. at 26–28.) The Arizona Supreme Court held 

that the claim was waived because Petitioner did not object prior to trial. Gonzales, 181 

Ariz. at 510, 892 P.2d at 846. The court also found, in the alternative, that “merely sitting 

at the defense table during trial where the defendant is neither shackled nor dressed in 

prison garb is not unduly suggestive.” Id. Petitioner alleges that this decision was 

contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. 214 at 84.) 

 The Court disagrees. Petitioner does not cite, and this court has not found, a 

Supreme Court case that extends the protections of Biggers and its progeny to cases 

where the eyewitness first identifies a defendant at trial. See United States v. Domina, 

784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (“None of these cases has set any guidelines for incourt identification procedures nor indicated that in-court identification must be made in 

a way that is not suggestive.”); see also Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720–21 (“We have not 

extended pretrial screening for reliability to cases in which the suggestive circumstances 

were not arranged by law enforcement officers.”). As a result, the Court cannot conclude 

that the state courts’ resolution of Petitioner’s claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court precedent. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 77. 

 In addition, the mere fact that Ms. Wagner definitively identified Petitioner for the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 35 of 73
- 36 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

first time at trial does not establish a constitutional violation. In Johnson v. Sublett, 63 

F.3d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1995), the victim-witness, Jones, identified the defendant, 

Johnson, at trial. Johnson challenged the in-court identification. Id. He noted that Jones 

had been unable to pick Johnson’s photo from a photographic lineup. Id. He also argued 

that his presence at a suppression hearing, where he was identified by Jones, was unduly 

suggestive and “this pretrial exposure to the victim rendered inadmissible the victim’s incourt identification of Johnson before the jury.” Id. 

On habeas review, the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments. The court explained 

that “the photo spread had no significance. If anything, Jones’ failure to pick Johnson out 

of the photo spread was a benefit to the defense.” Id. at 929. Likewise, Ms. Wagner’s 

inability to identify Petitioner in a photo lineup benefited the defense when she was 

cross-examined at Petitioner’s second trial. (See RT 5/28/91 at 108–111.) 

 With respect to Jones’s exposure to Johnson at the suppression hearing, the Ninth 

Circuit explained that “[t]he bare fact that a confrontation was suggestive does not alone 

establish constitutional error. The confrontation must be impermissibly or unduly 

suggestive under the totality of the circumstances.” Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929 (citing 

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196). While in-court identifications may be subject to some 

suggestion, “the suggestive character of courtroom logistics [is] not unnecessarily

suggestive.” Id. (citing Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1974)). Petitioner 

does not suggest how his presence at the first trial was impermissibly or unduly 

suggestive. 

 Moreover, any possible prejudice from Ms. Wagner’s in-court identification of 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 36 of 73
- 37 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner during his retrial was mitigated by counsel’s cross-examination. See id. Ms. 

Wagner conceded that she had “been in court several times and [had] looked at this 

person sitting next to [defense counsel].” (RT 5/28/91 at 97.) Counsel also questioned 

Ms. Wagner about her tentative identification of Petitioner during the first trial and her 

inability to identify him from the photo lineup. (Id. at 97–99, 108–11.) This was 

sufficient to test the reliability of the in-court identification. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721. 

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 17.

Claim 19 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights 

when it failed to call a mistrial or strike the testimony of two prosecution witnesses after 

they failed to obey an order of exclusion. (Doc. 214 at 87.) 

 At the start of Petitioner’s second trial, the court granted defense counsel’s request 

under Rule 9.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal of Procedure to exclude Ms. Wagner 

from the courtroom until after her testimony. (RT 5/28/91 at 12.) The court also stated 

that its ruling on the sequestration of witnesses remained in place from the first trial. (Id.

at 12–13.) 

 Ms. Wagner was the prosecution’s first witness. Roger Daughtry testified directly 

after her. At the end of his cross examination, he admitted that he had spoken with Ms. 

Wagner outside the courtroom the day before. (RT 5/29/91 at 43.) On redirect 

examination, Daughtry testified that the “general subject matter” of their conversation 

was that “basically we were positive in our minds it’s the right man and we have no 

doubt about it.” (Id. at 44.) Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, arguing that the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 37 of 73
- 38 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

witnesses violated the court’s order and their encounter bolstered Ms. Wagner’s 

confidence in her identification of Petitioner. (Opening Brief at 37–38.) 

 The Arizona Supreme Court found the issue waived and held there was no 

fundamental error: 

Gonzales was notified well in advance of the second trial and [sic] this 

conversation that Deborah would identify Gonzales without hesitation. 

Gonzales made no objection at trial. The court did not commit fundamental 

error by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 508, 892 P.2d at 844. 

 Petitioner contends that the court’s ruling was an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law because the court “failed to identify the controlling 

constitutional authority” and “fundamentally failed to recognize the impact of the legal 

principles made relevant by the facts of this case.” (Doc. 214 at 91.) The Court disagrees. 

 First, the United States Supreme Court has explained that to withstand analysis 

under 2254(d)(1), a state court decision “does not require citation of our cases—indeed, it 

does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) 

(per curiam). 

 More significantly, there is no clearly established law holding that the failure to 

exclude or sequester witnesses violates due process.14 In Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 

 

14 As clearly established federal law governing this claim, Petitioner cites Geders 

v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), and Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). Geders

and Perry address the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the specific context of 

defendants who were prohibited by a judge from conferring with their attorney during a recess from their testimony. The cases discuss the general principle that judges have the authority to sequester witnesses and order them not to discuss their testimony in order to 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 38 of 73
- 39 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

at 1065, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has 

ever held that the failure to exclude witnesses can violate due process.” Id. at 1065. The 

trial court has the discretion to exclude the testimony of a witness who disobeyed an 

exclusion order. See Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893). However, “[s]ince 

the purpose of the order is to gain assurance of credibility and its violation is a legitimate 

subject of comment in this respect, it seems proper that unless the violation has somehow 

so discredited the witness as to render his testimony incredible as a matter of law he 

should not be disqualified from testifying.” Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786, 788 

(9th Cir. 1967). 

 For purposes of habeas review, the question is whether the contact between 

Daughtry and Ms. Wagner “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due 

process.” Larson, 515 F.3d at 1064 (citing Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 1998)). It did not. Ms. Wagner did not “tailor” her testimony to fit Daughtry’s. Her 

testimony preceded his. They each repeated their description of Petitioner’s appearance, 

including his clothing, from the first trial. Daughtry again testified that the man 

burglarizing his home wore a plaid shirt or jacket, beige with big red squares, with some 

gray or green mixed in, jeans, white tennis shoes, and a baseball cap. (RT 5/59/91 at 16; 

see RT 1/17/91 at 45, 55, 73.) Ms. Wagner again testified that her assailant wore “all dark 

clothing” with light colored tennis shoes and a hat without a brim, like a “stocking cap.” 

(RT 5/28/91 at 69–70; see RT 1/21/91 at 60, RT 1/22/91 at 4, 11–13.) 

 “to lessen the danger that their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own recollections.” Perry, 488 U.S. at 281–82. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 39 of 73
- 40 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 While Petitioner asserts that the conversation between Daughtry and Ms. Wagner 

bolstered the confidence with which Ms. Wagner identified Petitioner during the second 

trial, the record shows that she had become positive in her identification of Petitioner by 

the time she was cross-examined in the first trial. When defense counsel asked about her 

failure to pick Petitioner from the photographic lineup, Ms. Wagner stated “I didn’t get 

any kind of feeling until I came into this courtroom yesterday and looked at the man 

you’re trying to defend.” (RT 1/22/91 at 23.) 

 In U. S. ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), the Seventh Circuit on 

habeas review considered the petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of a fair trial when 

prosecutors held a pretrial meeting with their major witnesses in violation of the trial 

court’s sequestration order. At the meeting, the witnesses “discussed their general 

impressions of the petitioner,” including the fact that he was younger than the age 

reported by one of the witnesses. Id. at 757. “However, discrepancies were not ironed 

out, nor did the witnesses have a general discussion of their prospective testimony among 

themselves.” Id. at 757. The petitioner’s trial counsel used the meeting to impeach the 

witnesses, but made no objection to the meeting during trial and did not raise the issue on 

appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief, 

explaining: 

That the witnesses in this case did meet together, and did discuss some 

aspects of their testimony was a proper subject for impeachment on crossexamination and for comment during closing argument. However, the 

violation here is not so extreme as to render the witnesses’ testimony 

incredible as a matter of law, nor is it so extreme as to deny the petitioner 

fundamental fairness in his trial. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 40 of 73
- 41 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Id. at 758. 

 Here, the meeting between Daughtry and Ms. Wagner did not render Petitioner’s 

trial fundamentally unfair. The discrepancies in their testimony concerning Petitioner’s 

appearance remained, and any increase in the certainty with which Ms. Wagner identified 

Petitioner at the second trial was not attributable to her discussion with Daughtry. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, Claim 19 is denied. 

Claim 20 

Petitioner alleges the trial court denied his right to counsel by discussing a jury 

note without summoning counsel. (Doc. 214 at 92.) 

 During an afternoon break on the second day of Petitioner’s retrial, one of the 

jurors submitted a note to the bailiff. (ME 5/29/91.) The note, which was unsigned and 

marked 3:06 p.m., asked if any hair samples were found in the cap in the Wagners’ 

courtyard and whether any fingerprints were found on the lighter at Daughtry’s home. 

(ROA 110.) The judge showed the note to counsel. (RT 5/29/91 at 119.) At 3:28 p.m., the 

court went back on the record to discuss the note with counsel and Petitioner, outside the 

presence of the jury. (RT 5/29/91 at 118; ME 5/29/91.) Defense counsel expressed 

concern that the letter indicated the jurors were already discussing the case. (Id. at 118–

19.) The judge told the parties that the note “came from one juror. I talked to them about 

it.” (Id. at 119.) Counsel again expressed concern that the jurors were disobeying the 

court’s admonition. (Id.) The judge responded, “I’ll find out.” (Id.) 

 After the jurors returned to the courtroom, the judge addressed them as follows: 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 41 of 73
- 42 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Welcome back, jurors. One of you handed me a written question. May I 

inquire whether that was just from one juror [sic] talked to each other 

before I got a no [sic] from question writer. It’s okay if you write down a 

question and give it to me. What I did in this case was show it to counsel. 

Remember, you haven’t heard the whole case. 

(Id. at 119–20.) The judge then cautioned the jurors to be patient and to keep an open 

mind while the evidence came in. (Id. at 120.) 

 On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found the issue waived and held 

there was no fundamental error: 

Gonzales argues that he was denied his right to counsel when the court 

discussed a juror note with the jury outside the presence of counsel. It 

appears from the record that the judge simply inquired about the source of 

the note and did not discuss its contents. Thereafter, he discussed the note 

with the lawyers, and all agreed that the judge should simply admonish the 

jury not to form any opinions until all the evidence was in and instruct them 

on the proper procedure for juror notes. Gonzales made no objection at 

trial. There was no error, let alone fundamental error. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 508, 892 P.2d at 844.

 Petitioner contends that the court’s statement that the trial judge “simply inquired 

about the source of the note and did not discuss its contents” is an unreasonable 

determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (Doc. 214 at 94.) He also asserts 

that the court’s conclusion that there was no error was contrary to and an unreasonable 

application of clearly-established federal law “regarding the right to have counsel present 

at all critical stages of the proceedings.” (Id.) 

 Neither of these arguments is convincing. First, the record is ambiguous with 

respect to the substance of the judge’s discussion with the jurors. Textual ambiguity does 

not render the Arizona Supreme Court’s factual determination objectively unreasonable. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 42 of 73
- 43 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. at 341–42 (explaining that the fact that “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” about the finding in question is not sufficient on 

habeas review to supersede the state court’s determination). Contrary to Petitioner’s 

argument, it is not implausible that the judge spoke with the jurors to determine who 

wrote the unsigned note without discussing its contents and subsequently addressed the 

jurors to “find out” if they had discussed the note among themselves. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court’s finding of “no error” was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner’s reliance on 

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) is misplaced. In Rushen, the Supreme Court 

vacated the granting of a writ of habeas corpus by lower federal courts, and 

“emphatically disagree[ed]” with the lower courts’ view that unrecorded ex parte

communications between a trial judge and juror can never be harmless error. Id. at 117. 

The Court noted that few trials occur “in which one or more jurors do not have occasion 

to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal 

comfort or to some aspect of the trial.” Id. at 118. 

 Accordingly, ex parte contacts are subject to the rule of harmless error. Id. at 120. 

In order to grant relief, the error must have “had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 

(1993); see Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 In Rushen, the Court instructed that “[w]hen an ex parte communication relates to 

some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to 

counsel for all parties.” Id. at 119. That is what happened here. The judge disclosed the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 43 of 73
- 44 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

communication immediately after it occurred. Defense counsel did not object to the ex 

parte communication. He was concerned not with the subject matter of the 

communication but with the possibility that the jurors had improperly begun discussing 

the case. The court questioned the jurors and determined that they had not done so. 

 On this record, even assuming the trial court erred in having the ex parte

communication, such error was harmless given the absence of any evidence that the 

substance of the communication had an effect on the jury’s impartiality. Rushen, 464 

U.S. at 120. Claim 20 is denied. 

Claim 26 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court committed fundamental error by not properly 

defining reasonable doubt in the jury instructions. (Doc. 214 at 95.) 

 At the conclusion of the trial, the court provided the following instructions: 

 The defendant has pled not guilty. The defendant’s plea of not guilty 

means that the State must prove every part of the charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

 The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence. He is 

presumed by law to be innocent. This means the State must prove all of its 

case against the defendant. 

 The State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

 The State must prove all of its case against the defendant with its 

own evidence. 

(RT 6/6/91 at 44.) 

 According to Petitioner, because the court failed to define the phrase “reasonable 

doubt,” “the jury was unable to accurately apply the state’s burden to the facts presented 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 44 of 73
- 45 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in this case.” (Doc. 214 at 96.) Petitioner raised the claim on direct appeal. The Arizona 

Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim, Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 508, 892 P.2d at 844, was 

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the 

Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires 

them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). Claim 26 

is denied. 

Claim 27 

 Petitioner alleges that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings on 

his motion for a new trial. (Doc. 214 at 98.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that he did not knowingly and intelligently 

waive his right to counsel, and, even if he did, he withdrew the waiver and was thereafter 

denied appointed counsel at the start of the hearing on his motion. The Arizona Supreme 

Court denied the claim. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 510, 892 P.2d at 846. Petitioner contends 

that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and was 

contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Court 

disagrees. 

 Background 

 Petitioner was represented at trial by Morton Rivkind. Following the first trial, 

Petitioner waived counsel and Rivkind moved to withdraw. (ROA 94, 96; RT 4/18/91.) 

The court found Petitioner competent to represent himself, granted the motion to 

withdraw, and appointed Rivkind as advisory counsel. (RT 4/18/91 at 8; ME 4/18/91.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 45 of 73
- 46 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner subsequently withdrew his request to proceed pro per, and Rivkind was 

reappointed prior to the second trial. (See ROA 106.) 

 Following Petitioner’s conviction, Rivkind filed a motion for new trial. (ROA 

131.) Petitioner then filed a motion to proceed pro per, a motion for a new trial, and a 

motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (ROA 134, 135, 138.) Rivkind filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel. (ROA 139.) At a status conference on August 6, 1991, 

the court addressed Petitioner to be sure he understood the proceedings and to determine 

if he was competent to represent himself. (RT 8/6/91 at 3–11.) The court found that 

Petitioner understood the risks and difficulties of proceeding pro per and again 

determined that he was competent to represent himself. (Id. at 11–13.) The court 

appointed Gene Stratford as advisory counsel. (ME 8/6/91.) Stratford was subsequently 

replaced by Jeffrey Ross. 

 The hearing on Petitioner’s motion for a new trial was held on December 9, 1991. 

At the outset of the hearing the court considered Ross’s motion to withdraw. (ME 

12/9/91.) Citing attorney-client privilege, Ross indicated that he was unable to disclose 

the basis of his need to withdraw. (RT 12/9/91 at 3–4.) Petitioner stated that Ross had 

told him he was too busy with other cases to competently assist Petitioner. (Id. at 4–5.) 

To support this contention, Petitioner explained that he had secretly recorded his 

conversation with Ross. (Id. at 6.) After the trial court listened to the tape, Ross indicated 

that his motion to withdraw was unrelated to his time commitments. (Id. at 10.) The court 

again explained the difference to Petitioner between an advisory attorney and one that 

represented the defendant. (Id. at 11–12.) The court then admonished Petitioner, noting 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 46 of 73
- 47 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Ross was “just trying to give you honest advice, and here you are secretly recording 

him, which is a way to destroy relationship between you and a lawyer.” (Id. at 15.) The 

court continued: 

You had the public defender, and for reasons they didn’t express, they 

moved to withdraw. 

You had Mr. Rivkind, you fired him twice. 

Mr. Stratford was on the case for a while, and then he withdrew. 

Now Mr. Ross moves to withdraw. 

The common element is you don’t get along with any lawyer, it appears, on 

the record that I have. 

(Id. at 15.) 

 The trial court granted Ross’s motion to withdraw. (Id. at 16.) The court told 

Petitioner to proceed with his motion for a new trial. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner repeated that 

he needed “counsel.” (Id. at 20–21.) 

 The hearing continued a week later. On the third day of the hearing, Petitioner 

requested “advisory” counsel, which the court again denied. (RT 12/17/91 at 2, 4–5, 6.) 

Following the hearing, the court denied Petitioner’s motion for new trial. (Id. at 121.) 

 Analysis 

 In denying this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found that 

Petitioner did not withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel: 

The record is clear that the judge made the appropriate inquiries and 

admonitions and properly found Gonzales’s waiver to be knowing and 

intelligent. 

 Even if his waiver of counsel were knowing and intelligent, 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 47 of 73
- 48 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Gonzales claims that he withdrew his waiver. He relies primarily on Rule 

6.1(e), Ariz.R.Crim.P., which states that a defendant may withdraw his 

waiver of the right to counsel at any time. But Gonzales asked for advisory 

counsel, which is discretionary under Rule 6.1(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P.FN3 He did 

not ask to have counsel appointed. He thus did not withdraw his waiver of 

counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue the 

hearing and by refusing to appoint new advisory counsel. The right to 

represent oneself is a constitutional right. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 819–20, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). A court may not 

interfere with that choice without an unequivocal revocation of the 

defendant’s waiver of counsel. State v. Rickman, 148 Ariz. 499, 503, 715 

P.2d 752, 756 (1986). “Once a defendant has waived his right to counsel, 

that waiver continues until he ‘clearly’ indicates a change of mind.” Id.

After reviewing the record, we find that Gonzales never withdrew his 

waiver of counsel. 

FN3. The record clearly indicates that Gonzales was seeking advisory

counsel only. (R.T. of Dec. 9, 1991, at 17–22; R.T. of Dec. 17, 1991, at 2, 

4). 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 510, 892 P.2d at 846. 

 Petitioner contends that the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of the claim was 

based on its unreasonable determination that Petitioner did not withdraw his waiver but 

only requested advisory counsel. 

 At the December 9 hearing, after Ross had withdrawn as advisory counsel, 

Petitioner insisted that he needed counsel in order to proceed with the hearing on his 

motion for a new trial. In context, it is clear that Petitioner was referring to advisory 

counsel. As Respondents note, he never stated that he wished to give up his pro per

status, as evidenced in his statements to the court that “I need counsel to advise me” and 

“that’s why I need advisory counsel.” (RT 12/9/91 at 18, 21.) Later, on the third day of 

the hearing, the court addressed a motion for reconsideration filed by Petitioner. When 

asked, “What is your motion?” Petitioner replied, “For counsel just to like advise me, 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 48 of 73
- 49 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

because I’m not understanding all these statutes that they’re talking about . . .” (RT 

12/17/91 at 2; see id. at 5.) The court explained that it had twice granted Petitioner’s 

motion to proceed pro per, each time appointing advisory counsel to assist Petitioner. (Id.

at 5–6.) Petitioner asked, “So that was your own doing, putting in advisory counsel?” The 

court responded, “It sure was. You didn’t ask for it,” to which Petitioner replied, “That’s 

what I’m asking for.” (Id. at 6.) 

 Based on this record, the Arizona Supreme Court’s factual determination that 

Petitioner did not withdraw his waiver is not objectively unreasonable. See Rice v. 

Collins, 546 U.S. at 341–42. Relief is precluded under § 2254(d)(2). 

 Petitioner also contends that the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of the claim was 

contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Because 

Petitioner did not withdraw his waiver of counsel, and instead only requested the 

appointment of advisory counsel, the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling was not contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The trial court’s refusal 

to appoint new advisory counsel did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights, because 

“a defendant who waives his right to counsel does not have a right to advisory counsel.” 

United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010); see United States v. 

Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “under our established 

precedent there is no right to the assistance of standby counsel”); see also McKaskle v. 

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (“Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit 

‘hybrid’ representation.”). 

 Even if Petitioner had withdrawn his waiver of counsel, § 2254(d)(1) would 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 49 of 73
- 50 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

preclude relief. There is no clearly established federal law requiring the appointment of 

counsel after a defendant has validly waived counsel. 

 In Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) (per curiam), the defendant waived 

his right to counsel on three occasions. After he was convicted, he requested the 

appointment of counsel to file a motion for a new trial. Id. at 1448. The trial court, 

exercising its discretion under California law, denied the motion. Id. The state appellate 

court affirmed. Id. On habeas review the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 

district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that the “Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel was violated when the trial court denied his timely request for representation for 

a new trial motion.” Rodgers v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). In 

reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court “assumed, without so holding,” that “after a 

defendant’s valid waiver of his right to trial counsel under Faretta, a post-trial, preappeal 

motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution.” Marshall, 133 S. Ct. at 1449. 

The Court noted, however, that it has not announced a “specific legal rule” regarding 

“postwaiver requests of appointment of counsel.” Id. at 1450. Therefore, the conclusion 

of the California state courts that there was no Sixth Amendment violation was neither 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. at 1451. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 27. 

Claims 29 and 30 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 50 of 73
- 51 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death based on two aggravating factors: that 

Petitioner knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the 

victim of the offense, under A.R.S. § 13–703(F)(3), and that the murder was committed 

for pecuniary gain, under § 13–703(F)(5).15 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 513–14, 892 P.2d at 849–50. Petitioner challenges the state courts’ 

application of these factors. (Doc. 214 at 106–15.) 

 Whether a state court correctly applied an aggravating factor is a question of state 

law, and federal habeas review is limited to determining whether the state court’s finding 

was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth 

Amendment violation. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). A state court’s finding 

of an aggravating factor is arbitrary or capricious only if it is a finding no reasonable 

sentencer could have made. Id. at 783. The question is “whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact” could 

have found the factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). A habeas court faced with a record of historical facts which supports conflicting 

inferences must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution. Id. at 326. 

 Applying these principles, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on Claims 29 and 30. 

 Claim 29 

 15 Arizona has since renumbered this statute. The current corresponding sections 

are 13–751(F)(3) and (5). 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 51 of 73
- 52 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner alleges that the state courts applied Arizona law in an arbitrary and 

capricious way by finding that Petitioner knowingly created a grave risk of harm to Ms. 

Wagner. (Doc. 214 at 106.) Petitioner also contends that the courts’ factual findings were 

unreasonable and violated the principle that aggravating factors must sufficiently narrow 

the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. (Id.) 

 The grave risk of death aggravating factor provides that, in determining whether to 

impose a death sentence, a trier of fact shall consider whether “[i]n the commission of the 

offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person or 

persons in addition to the person murdered during the commission of the offense.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-703(F)(3). 

 The trial court found that the factor had been proved. The court determined that 

“Deborah Wagner was not an intended victim of the murder of Darrel Wagner, but was, 

to the Defendant’s personal knowledge, within the zone of danger during the time the 

Defendant was stabbing Darrel Wagner, and quite aside from that time in which 

Defendant was deliberately and independently stabbing Deborah Wagner.” (RT 4/27/92 

at 59.) 

 On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme agreed that Petitioner “knowingly placed 

Deborah in grave risk of death even before turning his weapon on her.” Gonzales, 181 

Ariz. at 514, 892 P.2d at 850. The court explained that its “inquiry is whether, during the 

course of the killing, the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that created a real and 

substantial likelihood that a specific third person might suffer fatal injuries.” Id.

(quotation omitted). The court then reasoned: 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 52 of 73
- 53 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Deborah was confined in a small (10′ x 10′) courtyard with Gonzales as he 

repeatedly stabbed her husband. Moreover, Deborah was not just a 

bystander. She attempted to rescue her husband by jumping on Gonzales’s 

back as he was stabbing Darrel. Whether she could have instead retreated is 

irrelevant. One who murders knowing others are present can expect that 

someone may attempt to interfere, particularly when that person is the 

victim’s spouse. Gonzales’s actions created a “zone of danger” for Deborah 

in which there was a realistic possibility that she may have suffered fatal 

injuries. Indeed, she almost died. This grave risk occurred, as the statute 

requires, during the commission of the offense against Darrel. 

We reject Gonzales’s argument that § 13–703(F)(3) does not apply 

because Deborah was an “intended victim” of the offense. For Deborah to 

have been an intended victim, as contemplated by our cases, Gonzales must 

have acted with the intent to kill her. Moreover, the intent to kill must have 

been formed before Deborah was placed in grave risk of death. Gonzales 

argues that Deborah became an intended victim the moment she jumped on 

his back. But Deborah was placed in grave risk before she jumped on his 

back. Thus, even if Gonzales stabbed Deborah with the intent to kill her, 

the “intended victim” argument fails because that intent was not formed 

before Deborah was placed in grave risk. Additionally, there was no 

evidence that Gonzales intended to kill Deborah, and the state did not 

charge him with her attempted murder. Gonzales’s only intended murder 

victim was Darrel. When Deborah jumped on Gonzales’s back, his intent 

was to get her off. He did this by using his body and his weapon, seriously 

injuring her in the process. Once he threw her off his back, he fled the 

scene. Gonzales’s reliance on the “intended victim” cases is thus misplaced. 

We find that § 13–703(F)(3) is satisfied. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 Petitioner contends that the Arizona Supreme Court unreasonably found that Ms. 

Wagner was not an intended victim. According to Petitioner, “it is impossible for a court 

to find that Gonzales attacked Mr. Wagner with a knife with the intent of killing him 

while simultaneously finding that Gonzales did not intend to kill Ms. Wagner when he 

attacked her with the same knife moments later.” (Doc. 214 at 109.) The Court disagrees. 

 In arguing that the Arizona courts “failed to apply a consistent and coherent 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 53 of 73
- 54 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

definition of intent” (Doc. 217 at 56), Petitioner conflates the legal element of intent 

required to prove the underlying offense in a felony murder charge with the assessment 

necessary to determine whether Ms. Wagner, like her husband, was an intended murder 

victim. There is nothing unreasonable about the Arizona Supreme Court drawing a 

distinction between Petitioner’s intent in attacking Mr. Wagner and his intent in attacking 

Ms. Wagner. Furthermore, a reasonable sentencer could have found, for the reasons set 

forth by the Arizona Supreme Court, that Ms. Wagner was in the zone of danger created 

by Petitioner’s attack on Mr. Wagner, and that if Petitioner ever intended to kill her, it 

was only after she jumped on his back in order to stop the ongoing attack on her husband. 

Petitioner’s intent in attacking Ms. Wagner was to free himself. When he accomplished 

that by knocking her from his back, he fled the scene. 

 Petitioner argues that the (F)(3) factor fails to narrow the class of death-eligible 

defendants. As Petitioner acknowledges, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the 

factor is not overbroad or arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 218, 141 

P.3d 368, 393 (2006) (“The (F)(3) factor still requires a defendant to have put a third 

party at grave risk of death in the commission of a murder, and, by distinguishing that act 

from murders in which no third parties are endangered, the (F)(3) factor adequately 

narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.”). Petitioner argues, 

however, that in his case the Arizona Supreme Court construed the factor “in an arbitrary, 

vague and overbroad way when it concluded that ‘[o]ne who murders knowing others are 

present can expect that someone may attempt to interfere, particularly when that person is 

the victim’s spouse.’” (Doc. 214 at 112.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 54 of 73
- 55 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Again, Petitioner mischaracterizes the court’s ruling. The court did not, as 

Petitioner asserts, find that “committing a murder in front of another person immediately 

qualifies that person as having placed another in a grave risk of harm.” (Id.) Instead, in 

finding that Petitioner created a “zone of danger,” the court took into account a variety of 

factors, including the small space in which the attacks occurred and the fact that Ms. 

Wagner was not simply a bystander but the victim’s wife and therefore especially likely 

to intervene. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 514, 892 P.2d at 850. The court’s ruling did not 

impermissibly expand the category of death-eligible defendants. 

 In sum, a “rational factfinder” could have determined, as the trial court and the 

Arizona Supreme Court found, that the intended victim of the murder was Mr. Wagner, 

and that Petitioner, as he attacked Mr. Wagner and stabbed him to death, knowingly 

placed Ms. Wagner at a grave risk of death. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

Claim 29. 

Claim 30 

 Petitioner alleges that the state courts improperly found that the pecuniary gain 

aggravating factor had been proven. (Doc. 214 at 113.) The Arizona Supreme Court 

rejected this claim on direct appeal: 

Gonzales argues that the evidence does not support a finding that he 

committed the murder in expectation of pecuniary gain. He claims that the 

robbery ended when he was confronted by Darrel Wagner and that the 

subsequent murder was “unexpected and accidental.” We do not agree. 

To prove the A.R.S. § 13–703(F)(5) aggravating factor, the state 

must show that a motivation for the murder was the expectation of 

pecuniary gain. We have held that when the defendant kills to facilitate his 

escape and to permit him to take and keep stolen items, he furthers his 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 55 of 73
- 56 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

pecuniary gain motive. The Wagners interrupted Gonzales during the 

burglary of their home. Gonzales was there to steal from them. 

The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzales 

intended to kill Darrel. His murder was not “accidental.” This is plainly 

evident from the number of stab wounds. Gonzales’s primary motivation 

was to steal the Wagner’s property. Darrel’s murder was directly connected 

to that goal. We agree with the trial court that the murder of Darrel Wagner 

was committed for pecuniary gain. 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 513, 892 P.2d at 849 (citations omitted). 

 Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 

murder was committed in the expectation of pecuniary gain. He also contends that the 

pecuniary gain aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Neither 

argument is persuasive. 

 First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner, who was burglarizing the Wagners’ 

home, committed the murder to facilitate his escape and keep the stolen items. See, e.g., 

Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 

1404, 1420 (9th Cir. 1998); State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 65, 859 P.2d 169, 175 

(1993). 

 Petitioner contends that the murder was “unexpected and accidental.” (Doc. 214 at 

113.) However, because “[t]he defendant does not have to intend to kill beforehand to 

satisfy the statute,” State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990), the fact 

that Petitioner did not “set out to murder anyone” (Doc. 219 at 57) does not prevent 

application of the pecuniary gain factor. Moreover, the argument that the murder was 

accidental is not supported by the record. When he was discovered burglarizing the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 56 of 73
- 57 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Wagners’ home, Petitioner attacked Mr. Wagner, pushing him out the front door and onto 

the ground and then stabbing him seven times. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 506, 892 P.2d at 

842.

 Second, regarding his vagueness facial challenge to (F)(3), the Ninth Circuit has 

consistently rejected the argument that the pecuniary gain factor fails to narrow the class 

of death-eligible defendants. See Williams, 441 F.3d at 1059; Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 

F.3d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Claim 30 is denied.

Claim 33 

Prior to sentencing Petitioner, the trial court reviewed a presentence report that 

contained letters from Ms. Wagner and family friends recommending that Petitioner 

receive the death sentence. (ROA 380; see RT 4/27/92 at 43, 57.) Petitioner alleges that 

the court’s review of these materials violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 214 at 

115.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim on direct appeal. Gonzales, 181 

Ariz. at 516, 892 P.2d at 852. The claim is without merit. 

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the 

introduction of a victim impact statement to a capital sentencing jury violated the Eighth 

Amendment. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), the Supreme Court 

revisited Booth and overruled it in part, holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 

erect a per se barrier to the admission of victim impact evidence but leaving intact 

Booth’s prohibition on the admission of characterizations and opinions from the victim’s 

family about the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence. Id. at 830 n.2. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 57 of 73
- 58 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Under Arizona law at the time of Petitioner’s trial, however, the trial judge, rather 

than a jury, determined the penalty in capital cases. In Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 

976, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit rejected the petitioner’s Booth claim, 

finding that there was no clearly established federal law directly addressing the question 

of whether a judge, as opposed to a jury, is prohibited from considering victim impact 

evidence. The court explained: 

We previously recognized this distinction in Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011), where we held that Booth’s concern that victim 

impact statements would “inflame the jury” is “not the same when . . . a 

judge does the sentencing.” Id. at 1055. As we have explained, courts “must 

assume that the trial judge properly applied the law and considered only the 

evidence he knew to be admissible.” Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 

1009 (9th Cir. 1997); Rhoades, 638 F.3d at 1055. 

Accordingly, because there is no Supreme Court case “squarely 

address[ing] the issue” whether a judge is barred from consideration of 

such victim impact evidence, it cannot be said that the Arizona Supreme 

Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied 

Gulbrandson’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

Id. at 966. 

 Moreover, there is no evidence that the trial court disobeyed or misapplied the law 

by improperly considering the opinions of the victim’s family when determining 

Petitioner’s sentence. Nor is there evidence that the Arizona Supreme Court in its 

independent review of Petitioner’s sentence improperly considered the victim impact 

evidence. Claim 33 is denied. 

Claim 34 

 Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s death penalty statute precludes the sentencer from 

considering all relevant mitigation, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 58 of 73
- 59 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Amendments. (Doc. 214 at 118.) 

 At the time of Petitioner’s sentencing, Arizona’s capital sentencing statute 

provided: 

Mitigating circumstances shall be any factors proffered by the defendant or 

the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence 

less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, 

propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, 

including but not limited to the following [enumerated circumstances]: 

A.R.S. § 13–703(G). 

 Petitioner contends that the statute “limit[s] the trial court in its consideration of 

mitigating circumstances to only those which are proffered by either the state or the 

defendant.” (Doc. 214 at 118–19.) The Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of this claim, 

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 507, 892 P.2d at 843, was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. 

 In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), the Supreme Court held that “the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of 

capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 

defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 

defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” The definition of mitigating 

circumstances set out in A.R.S. § 13–703(G) is consistent with this principle. The 

reference to “factors proffered by the defendant or the state” cannot reasonably be read as 

prohibiting a sentencer from considering any form of relevant mitigating evidence. 

Claim 36 

Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth and 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 59 of 73
- 60 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Fourteenth Amendments because it requires a death sentence to be imposed whenever an 

aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances are found. (Doc. 214 at 119.) 

The Supreme Court has rejected the claim that Arizona’s death penalty statute is 

impermissibly mandatory and creates a presumption in favor of the death penalty. Walton 

v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651–52 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring, 536 U.S. 

584; see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006). Accordingly, Claim 36 is 

denied. 

Claim 39 

 Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments because it requires a defendant to affirmatively prove that the 

court should spare his life. (Doc. 214 at 120.) The Supreme Court has rejected the 

argument that “Arizona’s allocation of the burdens of proof in a capital sentencing 

proceeding violates the Constitution.” Walton, 497 U.S. at 651. Claim 39 is denied. 

Claim 40 

 Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it 

lacks ascertainable guidelines for the sentencer to follow in weighing aggravating and 

mitigating factors, in violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 214 at 121.) 

 Arizona’s death penalty scheme allows only certain, statutorily-defined 

aggravating circumstances to be considered in determining eligibility for the death 

penalty. This scheme has been found constitutionally sufficient. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 

774–77; Walton, 497 U.S. at 649–56; Woratzeck, 97 F.3d at 334–35; Smith, 140 F.3d at 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 60 of 73
- 61 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1272. 

 There is no Supreme Court authority which constitutionally requires that a jury be 

instructed on a burden of proof in the sentence selection phase in a capital case; nor is 

there any Supreme Court authority which would require a burden of proof or persuasion 

be assigned to any of the jury’s penalty phase determinations. On the contrary, the 

Supreme Court has held that a “capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any 

particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 

979 (1994); cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (“[W]e have never held 

that a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital 

sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.”). Claim 40 is denied. 

Claim 41 

Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth 

Amendment because it does not afford capital defendants an opportunity to voir dire the 

sentencing judge. (Doc. 214 at 122.) This claim is meritless. 

 Petitioner cites “no authority for the proposition that a defendant has a 

constitutional right to voir dire a judge, let alone to inquire about a judge’s views on the 

death penalty.” Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F.Supp.2d 982, 1059 (D.Ariz. 2007). The rule 

providing for inquiry into prospective jurors’ views on capital punishment derives from 

the right to an impartial and unbiased jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726 (1992). Trial judges are presumed to follow the 

law. Walton, 497 U.S. at 653; see State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 248, 741 P.2d 1223, 1226 

(1987) (explaining that mere possibility of bias or prejudice does not entitle a criminal 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 61 of 73
- 62 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

defendant to voir dire the trial judge at sentencing). Because Petitioner has not shown 

that he has a constitutional right to voir dire a sentencing judge, the state court’s refusal 

to recognize such a right is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law. 

Claim 42 

Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments because it affords the prosecutor unbridled discretion to seek the 

death penalty. (Doc. 214 at 124.) The claim is meritless. Prosecutors have wide discretion 

in deciding whether to seek the death penalty. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 

296–97 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (explaining that presentencing decisions by actors in the criminal justice system that may remove an accused 

from consideration for the death penalty are not unconstitutional). The Ninth Circuit has 

rejected the argument that Arizona’s death penalty statute is constitutionally infirm 

because “the prosecutor can decide whether to seek the death penalty.” Smith, 140 F.3d at 

1272. 

Claims 45, 47, 48, and 5016

 Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He raised 

these claims in his first PCR proceeding. The state court found the allegations in Claims 

45, 47, and 48 precluded because Petitioner could have raised them on direct appeal. (ME 

4/21/98.) However, this Court found the claims were not defaulted because the state court 

 

16 In his memorandum on the merits, Petitioner states that he “dropped” Claim 46. (Doc. 215 at 128.) The Court will not consider the claim. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 62 of 73
- 63 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

did not apply an adequate procedural bar. (Doc. 97 at 30.) Because the state court did not 

reach the merits of Claims 45, 47, and 48, this Court’s review is de novo. See Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The state court addressed the allegations in Claim 50 on the merits and denied the 

claim. (ME 4/21/98; see Doc. 97 at 30.) Therefore, the Court will review Claim 50 under 

the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 674 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a 

petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. 

 The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 

the time.” Id. at 689; see Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (per curiam); Bobby v. 

Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam); Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 

2010). To satisfy Strickland’s first prong, a defendant must overcome “the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy.” Id. 

 With respect to Strickland’s second prong, a defendant must affirmatively prove 

prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 63 of 73
- 64 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010), and “[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland

was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. 788. As 

the Court explained in Richter: 

Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s 

representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the 

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the 

record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 

judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence.” [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 689. The 

question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence 

under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom. [Id.] at 690. 

Id. 

 Claim 45 

 Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed at a constitutionally ineffective level 

by failing to raise an objection or move for a mistrial when he discovered that Deborah 

Wagner and Roger Daughtry had a conversation prior to Daughtry’s testimony in the 

second trial. (Doc. 214 at 124.) This claim satisfies neither prong of Strickland. As 

discussed above, the record does not suggest that the conversation between Ms. Wagner 

and Daughtry affected either’s testimony. During his cross-examination of Daughtry, 

counsel brought out the fact that Daughtry had discussed the case with Ms. Wagner. 

Under these circumstances, counsel did not perform deficiently failing to object or move 

for a mistrial, and there was a not a reasonable probability of a different verdict if he had. 

Claim 47 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 64 of 73
- 65 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed at a constitutionally ineffective level 

when he failed to object or move for a mistrial in response to the hearsay testimony of a 

police detective regarding Cathy Trinidad’s previous statements. (Doc. 214 at 128.) 

 Cathy Trinidad, then 11 years old, testified in the second trial. (RT 6/3/91 at 18-

46.) During her testimony, the prosecutor asked, “when you talked to the police 

detectives, did you tell those detectives that Mr. Gonzales said that a man stabbed him 

while a woman tried to tie his legs together with the strap on her purse?” (Id. at 29.) 

Cathy responded “Yes.” (Id.) She testified that Petitioner said he was stabbed because 

“he was breaking in their house.” (Id. at 30.) She also testified that when he came to the 

apartment, Petitioner had a brownish colored purse. (Id.) Inside the purse, she saw a 

“cigarette thing with the lighter in it and just bank cards and stuff.” (Id. at 31.) She denied 

telling the police that Petitioner had a knife. (Id. at 31, 34.) She also denied telling the 

police that Petitioner had a hat when he left the apartment. (Id. at 25, 35–36.) 

 In his cross-examination, defense counsel used Cathy’s previous testimony to 

bring out inconsistences with the State’s theory of the case, including the time at which 

Petitioner left the apartment, what he was wearing, his explanation for why he was 

bleeding when he returned, and Cathy’s statement that a sketch shown on the television 

news did not look like Petitioner. (Id. at 38–42.) Counsel also impeached Cathy’s 

testimony about what Petitioner said about being in the house. (Id. at 42.) He asked, “Do 

you remember you [sic] giving this answer: He didn’t say nothing about that. I heard on 

the news that someone broke in someone’s house.” (Id.) Cathy agreed that she had said 

that. (Id.) 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 65 of 73
- 66 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The following day, the prosecution recalled Detective Charles Hodges to testify 

about his interview with Cathy. (RT 6/4/91 at 114–18.) Hodges testified that Cathy told 

him that Petitioner said he had been in the house “to get some money.” (Id. at 116.) When 

asked, “Did she tell you anything happened while Mr. Gonzales was in that home?” 

Hodges testified that Cathy told him that Petitioner said “he had had to stab a man and a 

woman because she tried to tie him up.” (Id.) The following exchange then occurred: 

Q: Did she tell you—did you ask her any questions about why Mr. 

Gonzales had to stab stab [sic] these people? 

A. Yes. I asked her why— 

[Defense Counsel]: I object. I don’t believe it’s proper. 

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. I think basis of my ruling [sic]. 

THE WITNESS: She told me the reason was because they had tried to tie 

him up. 

(Id. at 117.) 

 Petitioner argues that counsel performed ineffectively by making only a “general 

objection” that was “[p]redictably” overruled. (Doc. 214 at 129.) He contends that 

“reasonably effective counsel” would have raised a hearsay objection. (Doc. 220 at 83.) 

 Petitioner does not meet his burden of showing that counsel’s performance here 

was deficient or prejudicial. Counsel raised an objection, which the court overruled. 

Specifying that the objection was based on hearsay would not have changed the court’s 

ruling, particularly since Cathy’s testimony about why Petitioner was stabbed was 

inconsistent with her statement to Detective Hodges and therefore was likely 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 66 of 73
- 67 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

admissible.17 Also, as Respondents note, competent counsel could have determined that 

pursuing the matter would simply have highlighted Cathy’s damaging testimony. 

 Counsel’s performance was not deficient and did not prejudice Petitioner. Claim 

47 is denied. 

Claim 48 

 Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed at a constitutionally ineffective level 

when he failed to object to the hearsay testimony of a police officer regarding Gloria 

Alvarez’s statements to the police. (Doc. 214 at 133.) The claim is without merit. 

 In the second trial, Gloria Alvarez testified that when Petitioner came back to the 

apartment on February 20, 1990, she thought he was wearing a long white shirt with 

stripes and a short sleeved t-shirt underneath. (RT 5/30/91 at 130.) The prosecutor 

questioned her about her interview with the police: 

Q. Did you tell Detective Butler the defendant was wearing a white shirt 

with vertical stripes on it? 

A. When they were asking those questions I wasn’t too sure what he was 

wearing. They kept insisting I knew what he was wearing that night. I was 

tired so, you know, I kept telling them what I thought he was wearing. They 

kept saying he was wearing this, they kept insisting I was lying. 

(Id. at 143.) 

 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Alvarez about the circumstances of 

her police interrogation. She testified that she was handcuffed to a table inside a small 

room for four hours. (Id. at 153–54.) She felt like the detectives were threatening to 

 

17 Arizona Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) allows the admission of a statement that is 

inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 67 of 73
- 68 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

charge her. (Id. at 155.) According to her testimony, the detectives kept insisting that she 

was lying about what Petitioner wore on the night of the crimes: “I would mention the 

color of [sic] shirt he was wearing, the design, and they said that I was lying, they knew I 

was lying.” (Id. at 156.) She originally told them that it was a vertical striped shirt. (Id.) 

Later in the interview, the detectives suggested that it was a checked shirt. (Id.) When 

asked by defense counsel if she “recall[ed] today what kind of shirt it was?” Alvarez 

answered, “It was white with stripes on it.” (Id.) She testified that the detectives told her 

she would not be free to leave until she told them what they wanted to hear. (Id. at 157–

58.) 

 On re-direct, the prosecutor asked: 

Q: Did you tell Detective Butler Mr. Gonzales was wearing Levi’s, 

checkered flannel shirt, red with blue and black in it, white tennis shoes 

along with a dark cap when he left? 

A: I had mentioned what I thought he was wearing that night. After that 

they told me what they thought he was wearing and I agreed to it, because 

at that time they kept telling me I was not going out. I had been there for 

hours and I was not going to leave until they heard what they wanted to 

hear. 

(Id. at 166.) 

 Detective Butler testified later in the trial. During the prosecutor’s direct 

examination, the following exchange occurred: 

Q: During the course of your interview with Miss Alvarez did you ask her 

what clothes Mr. Gonzales was wearing the night of February 20, 1990. 

[Defense Counsel:] I don’t know where it was going. I don’t think his [sic] 

in [sic] impeachable area. 

THE COURT: Let’s take the afternoon recess. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 68 of 73
- 69 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(RT 6/4/91 at 132.) 

 During the recess, defense counsel explained the basis of his objection. (Id. at 

133–35.) He argued that the fact Alvarez had changed her testimony from what she said 

at the police station was already before the jury and it would be improper impeachment to 

allow Detective Butler to testify about her earlier statements. (Id. at 133.) The court 

overruled the objection. (Id. at 135.) It found there was a “material difference” between 

Alvarez’s trial testimony about what Petitioner was wearing and the statements she gave 

to the detectives. (Id.) The court also noted that Alvarez’s “testimony was in my view 

evasive as much as she could make it” and concluded that the testimony was inconsistent 

enough to be allowed under Rule 801. (Id. at 135.) 

 Detective Butler then testified that during his interview of Alvarez, she had 

“responded that Ernest was wearing a blue baseball cap, white tennis shoes, Levis, a 

flannel shirt and red, black or blue squares in it.” (Id. at 136.) Detective Butler also 

acknowledged that Alvarez had originally told him that Petitioner was wearing “a white 

shirt with vertical stripes in it.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner contends that counsel’s objection was “clumsy” (Doc. 214 at 134) and 

that counsel did an inadequate job explaining the legal basis for the objection when the 

parties met with the judge during the recess. (Doc. 220 at 75.) Notwithstanding 

Petitioner’s characterization of the objection, it is clear that counsel was challenging the 

State’s position that the testimony was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. It is 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 69 of 73
- 70 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

also clear, as the trial court found, that Alvarez’s trial testimony about Petitioner’s clothes 

was both evasive and inconsistent with her statement to the detectives. 

 A trial court “has considerable discretion in determining whether a witness's 

evasive answers or lack of recollection may be considered inconsistent with that witness's 

prior out-of-court statements.” State v. Salazar, 216 Ariz. 316, 319, 166 P.3d 107, 110 

(App. 2007); State v. Hines, 130 Ariz. 68, 71, 633 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1981) (explaining 

that “inconsistency is to be determined, not by individual words or phrases alone, but by 

the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done”). The trial court reasonably 

determined that Detective Butler’s testimony was admissible, and it is speculation to 

assert that a more detailed objection would have persuaded the court otherwise. Such 

speculation is insufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden under Strickland. 

 Counsel’s performance was not deficient and did not prejudice Petitioner. Claim 

49 is denied. 

Claim 50 

 Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed at a constitutionally ineffective level 

by failing to request the appointment of a second lawyer as recommended by ABA 

Standards. (Doc. 214 at 138.) 

 The PCR court denied this claim, explaining that “no authority other than ABA 

recommendation is cited; and, although the Arizona Supreme Court has amended the 

criminal rule on the point, effective Jan. 1, 1998, the law on the matter remains against 

defendant.” (ME 4/21/98.) The court cited State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 601, 944 P.2d 

1204, 1214 (1997), which noted that Rule 6.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 70 of 73
- 71 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Procedure, requiring the presiding judge to appoint two counsel in capital cases, became 

effective on January 1, 1998. At the time of Petitioner’s trial, however, Arizona law did 

not require the appointment of two attorneys. 

 Petitioner focuses his argument on the ABA guidelines. However, as the Seventh 

Circuit has noted when addressing a similar argument based on the guidelines, “[t]he key 

word here is ‘recommended.’ Trial counsel cannot be said to be constitutionally 

ineffective for deciding not to bring in co-counsel, unless there is some reason . . . why 

the first lawyer is unable to provide adequate representation.” Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 

141 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 1998). 

 Thus, failure to seek the appointment of second counsel can give rise to habeas 

relief only if this Court first determines that the absence of co-counsel prejudiced the 

defense. Cf. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining there can 

be no deficient performance unless the record shows that counsel was unable to try the 

case alone); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 306 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The Constitution does 

not specify the number of lawyers who must be appointed. If a single attorney provides 

reasonably effective assistance, the Constitution is satisfied, and if a whole team of 

lawyers fails to provide such assistance, the Constitution is violated.”). 

 The record does not show, and Petitioner does not argue, that counsel was unable 

to try this case alone. The PCR court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Claim 50 is denied. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an applicant 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 71 of 73
- 72 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

cannot take an appeal unless a certificate of appealability has been issued by an 

appropriate judicial officer. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 

provides that the district judge must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. If a certificate is issued, the court 

must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 Under § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only when the 

petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” This 

showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, a 

certificate of appealability will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the court’s 

procedural ruling was correct. Id.

 The Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of Claims 9, 

14/15, and 27. For the reasons stated in this order, the Court finds that reasonable jurists 

could not debate its resolution of the remaining claims. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing,

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 28) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 72 of 73
- 73 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered by this Court on 

November 16, 1999 (Doc. 3), is VACATED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting a certificate of appealability with respect 

to Claims 9, 14/15, and 27. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of 

this Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 

85007-3329. 

 DATED this 11th day of August, 2015. 

Honorable Stephen M. McNamee

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 238 Filed 08/12/15 Page 73 of 73