Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05602/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05602-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO MGD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric Perez,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 19-05602-PHX-MTL (JFM)

ORDER

Plaintiff Eric Perez, who is in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections, 

Rehabilitation, and Reentry (ADCRR) and is represented by counsel, has filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion 

for Preliminary Injunction & Declaration Re: Legal Calls (Doc. 32).

The Court will deny the Motion.

I. Background

On screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court 

determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect and failure-to-train 

claims in Counts One and Two against various ADCRR employees. (Doc. 5.) 

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A. Background

Prior to filing the instant Motion, on April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document titled 

“Emergency—Notice of Stabbing” (Doc. 30), which related the following events. On April 

1, 2020, while Plaintiff was in the shower, a prisoner named “Rudy” stabbed Plaintiff 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 1 of 7
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

repeatedly in the leg and heart. (Id. at 1-2.) Rudy, who was housed in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, Rast Unit, 3 Able 3, had been allowed out of his cell, and 

he stabbed Plaintiff with a shank attached to a broomstick. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff lost a large 

amount of blood and was taken the emergency room. (Id. at 2.) While at the hospital, 

guards told Plaintiff that he would be sent to the Rast Max unit, where two other 

prisoners—Dewon Hurd (aka “Insane”) and Armando Garcia (aka “Monster”)—would 

have the ability to have Plaintiff assaulted again. (Id. at 2.) At the time, Plaintiff was 

wearing a face mask due to the risk of COVID 19, and he took the mask off his face “in 

order to force them to move him to a medical quarantine instead of back into danger.” (Id.)

Plaintiff was moved to the ASPC-Lewis, Stiner Detention Unit, where, on April 3, 

he had an emergency legal call with his attorney, Stacy Scheff. (Id.) During the call, 

Plaintiff waived attorney-client privilege in order to have CO III Vargas present. (Id.) In 

addition, Scheff conferenced into the call the ADCRR’s Criminal Investigations Unit and 

the Warden’s office to get information about the assailant’s identity and to alert them about 

the ongoing danger to Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff did not seek any particular relief in the Notice, but in an abundance of 

caution, the Court ordered Defendants to file a response to the Notice by April 16, 2020 

and allowed Plaintiff 7 days thereafter to file a reply. (Doc. 31.) The Court will address 

the Notice and responses once briefing is complete.

B. Emergency Motion

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on April 6, 2020, seeking an order that Plaintiff be 

allowed to have legal calls while he is in quarantine. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff asserts that, after 

the April 3, 2020 phone call with Scheff and prison officials, Scheff received an email from 

ADCRR Deputy General Counsel Courtney Glynn “threatening to revoke all phone calls 

between Plaintiff and [his attorney].” (Id. at 2.) When Scheff requested another call with 

Plaintiff to check on his wellbeing and to continue taking his statement about the events 

surrounding the stabbing, “Glynn responded that Plaintiff’s legal calls were to be 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 2 of 7
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

suspended for the remainder of his quarantine, which is scheduled to end in 10−11 days.” 

(Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff requests an “emergency order allowing phone calls with [Scheff] and 

declaring that Plaintiff may waive attorney/client privilege for the purpose of resolving the 

imminent threat to his life.” (Id.) The Court ordered expedited briefing from the parties 

and that briefing is now complete.

C. Defendant Shinn’s Response

Defendant ADCRR Director Shinn responded on April 8 that Plaintiff “intentionally 

subjected himself to a 14-day COVID-19 quarantine by deliberately removing his personal 

protective equipment at the hospital” and afterwards, Scheff “willfully violated ADCRR

policy by initiating a three-way call—not a legal call—between herself, [Plaintiff], and 

ADCRR officers.” (Doc. 34 at 1.) Shinn states that “[b]ecause of the unprecedented 

complications of dealing with two repeat policy violators amid a growing global health 

pandemic, the ADCRR is unable to facilitate any additional legal calls between this 

attorney and this inmate until his COVID-19 quarantine expires in a mere nine days.” (Id.) 

Shinn asserts that Plaintiff’s quarantine will remain in place until April 17, unless he 

develops any symptoms indicative of COVID-19, and that Plaintiff still has access to 

standard legal mail and his access to the courts is not adversely impacted. (Id. at 1-2.) 

Shinn explains that ADCRR’s legal call policy is outlined in Department Order 

(DO) 902-12 and that legal calls cannot be monitored. (Id. at 3.) Under DO 902-12, legal 

calls can be discontinued or denied to accommodate security concerns as long as other 

means of legal communication remain available to the prisoner. (Id.) DO 915 prohibits 

prisoners from participating in three-way calls “in order to prevent unauthorized use of the 

prisons’ phone systems that can be detrimental to institutional security.” (Id. at 3-4.) 

According to Shinn, on April 3, Scheff arranged to have a legal call with Plaintiff 

due to the recent assault, but “[r]ather than confidentially discussing legal matters, 

[Plaintiff] and his attorney used the phone to hector ADCRR officers for documents and 

information relating to [Plaintiff’s] April 1 assault, which the ADCRR is currently actively 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 3 of 7
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

investigating.” (Id. at 4.) Schinn says Scheff was informed that this was an inappropriate 

means of obtaining information about a case and that Plaintiff and Scheff’s request to the 

speak to the Warden additionally violated ADCRR policy regarding inmate-staff 

communications. (Id.) 

Shinn states that in August 2018, the ADCRR imposed special protocols on Scheff

“to account for her repeated use of legal calls to flout its policies forbidding three-way calls 

and inappropriate inmate-staff communications.” (Id.) Scheff challenged these special 

protocols in Arizona state court, and the state court upheld them. (Id.) The special 

protocols require Scheff to communicate with her incarcerated clients via Polycom—a 

computer-based, secure and confidential system—in lieu of phone calls to ensure that “no 

inappropriate three-way calls are conducted under the guise of a legal call.” (Id.) 

Shinn argues that Scheff “appears to have taken advantage of the exigent 

circumstances attending the COVID-19 crisis to circumvent the Polycom system and 

resume her deliberate and unethical abuse of the ADC[]’s legal call policies.” (Id.) 

Because Plaintiff could not be moved to a Polycom equipped room due to his quarantine 

status, staff allowed a standard legal call due to the serious nature of his recent assault. (Id. 

at 4-5.) The prison cannot allow Plaintiff to use a community phone for legal calls because 

ADCRR is experiencing “unprecedented stress and requiring laborious disinfection and 

isolation protocols for the safety of its inmates and staff.” (Id. at 5.) Shinn asserts that

Plaintiff “potentially contaminating an office or community phone is simply untenable” 

because the Department “lacks the resources to effectively decontaminate the areas that 

would be impacted by allowing such a call during [Plaintiff’s] current quarantine.” (Id.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Reply

Plaintiff replies that Shinn is trying to impeach counsel “with evidence of prior 

issues regarding conferencing in third-parties on legal calls,” which counsel contends are

“irrelevant to the issues before the Court regarding the danger to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 37 at 4.) 

Counsel argues that the Court would have to conduct a collateral issue trial to determine if 

counsel was in violation of any lawful ADCRR rule, that she has “requested a Declaration 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 4 of 7
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

regarding this issue, and would bifurcate that action in order to allow the Court to rule in a 

timely manner on the more urgent issue of calls with Plaintiff for the remainder of his 

quarantine.” (Id.) 

Counsel further asserts that the Polycom system does not prevent three-way calling 

and she “has frequently conferenced in necessary people to Polycom calls without issue.” 

(Id.) And she states that she is attempting to appeal the state court decision which she says 

only ruled “that the statutory exemption for ADC mandate[d] that the case be dismissed.” 

(Id.)

Plaintiff states that he “does not trust the prison staff who Director Shinn claims 

should be allowed to investigate to the exclusion of anyone else.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff 

contends that he has no other means of communication during the quarantine period and 

that “mail would not get there until the end of the quarantine period, and there is no 

guarantee that Plaintiff will not be put in harm’s way again in that time.” (Id.) The 

emergency situation, Plaintiff says, “is not just the recent stabbing, but the repeated failure 

to protected Plaintiff.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he was not badgering or hectoring 

anyone during the legal call and was only trying to get information to support the Notice 

of Stabbing filed with the Court. (Id. at 6.) 

III. Legal Standard

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 

never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that 

(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without 

an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 

public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 5 of 7
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Generally, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the 

complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.” Pac. Radiation 

Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015); see De Beers 

Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (preliminary injunctive relief is 

inappropriate for matters “lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”). An exception to 

this rule arises where the injunctive relief sought is related to access to the courts. See 

Prince v. Schriro, et al., CV 08-1299-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 1456648, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 

22, 2009) (where the relief sought relates to a prisoner’s access to the court, “a nexus 

between the preliminary relief and the ultimate relief sought is not required[,]” and the 

court need not consider the merits of the underlying complaint) (citing Diamontiney v. 

Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990)). The First and Fourteenth Amendment right of 

access to the courts encompasses a right to litigate without active interference by prison 

officials. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other 

grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015). In analyzing an 

“active interference” claim, “the court must consider whether the plaintiff has alleged an 

actual injury to court access.” Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). With respect to an existing case, the actual injury must be “actual 

prejudice . . . such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1996).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff does not address any of the Winter factors necessary for obtaining 

injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Although Plaintiff’s Motion is unrelated to the claims currently before the Court, 

because his Motion potentially relates to his access to the court, the Court may entertain 

his request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff, though, is not entitled to relief under an accessto-courts claim because he has not alleged sufficient facts to establish actual injury such as 

the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim. Plaintiff’s attorney had an 

opportunity to interview Plaintiff about the April 1, 2020 stabbing during the legal call on 

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 6 of 7
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

April 3, 2020. It is also not clear why Plaintiff’s counsel needed to contact prison officials 

while Plaintiff was on the legal call rather than conducting her investigation of the stabbing 

on her own. 

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming he needs to speak with his attorney while he is in 

quarantine for his own safety, he does not present any facts showing he is in danger while 

he is in quarantine, which is set to expire on April 17, 2020. Thus, Plaintiff’s fear of harm 

appears speculative. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-49; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. 

Baldrige, 844 F. 2d 668, 674-675 (9th Cir. 1988) (speculative injury does not constitute 

irreparable harm sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction). 

Accordingly, based on this record, Plaintiff has made no showing of irreparable 

harm that would justify the “extraordinary remedy” of granting preliminary injunctive 

relief. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that prison 

officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of 

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 

discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). 

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Declaration Re: Legal Calls

(Doc. 32), and the Motion is denied.

Dated this 13th day of April, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-05602-MTL-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/13/20 Page 7 of 7