Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00037/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EDWARD SCOTT BECHTEL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CV 06-0037 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

On January 4, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on March 13, 2006. Docket No. 12.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and that Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were

not properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a Reply

to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 11,

2006. Docket No. 15.

Case 2:06-cv-00037-ROS Document 16 Filed 04/19/06 Page 1 of 8
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I Procedural History

In 1987 Petitioner was indicted on three counts of

sexual assault, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of

theft. Answer, Exh. A. A jury found Petitioner guilty of two

counts of sexual assault, two counts of kidnapping, and one

count of theft. Id., Exh. B. On July 22, 1988, Petitioner was

sentenced to consecutive terms of 10 1/2 years imprisonment on

each of the convictions for sexual assault and kidnapping, and

a concurrent term of 7 1/2 years imprisonment for theft. Id.,

Exh. C.

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal on August 11,

1988. Id., Exh. D. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a decision issued

April 17, 1990. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner sought reconsideration

of this decision, which was denied on June 8, 1990. Id., Exh.

H. Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeals’ denial of

relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for

review on February 14, 1991. Id., Exh. K. 

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

on May 16, 1997. Id., Exhs. L & M. The trial court dismissed

the petition on June 30, 1997. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner filed

a further pleading in this action on February 23, 1998, which

the trial court dismissed on March 25, 1998, noting its prior

dismissal of Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief and

that any new claims for relief were precluded because Petitioner

had not raised them in his direct appeal or in his action for

post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. P. 

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1 Petitioner also initiated a second action for postconviction relief in the Arizona trial court on May 11, 1998, which

was dismissed on July 21, 1998. Answer, Exh. S.

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Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s denial of

relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals on May 11, 1998. Id.,

Exh. Q.1 The appellate court determined that the trial court

erred by dismissing Petitioner’s first action for postconviction relief without appointing counsel to represent

Petitioner in that matter. Id., Exh. T. The matter was

remanded to the Arizona Superior Court, which appointed counsel

for Petitioner on February 8, 2000. Id., Exh. T. 

On December 19, 2000, Petitioner’s counsel notified the

court that he could find no meritorious issues to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf in addition to those raised in Petitioner’s

pro per petition. Id., Exh. U. Petitioner filed a pro per

supplemental petition for relief on September 26, 2001. Id.,

Exh. V. The Arizona Superior Court conducted an evidentiary

hearing regarding Petitioner’s claims for relief. Id., Exh. W.

The trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief

in a decision issued April 29, 2002. Id., Exh. W. Petitioner

filed a timely appeal of this decision, which appeal was denied

by the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 20, 2003. Id., Exh.

Y.

On January 13, 2005, Petitioner filed an action for

state habeas corpus relief in the Arizona Superior Court. Id.,

Exh. Z. The court construed the action as one seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

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Procedure, and denied the petition on January 27, 2005. Id.,

Exh. AA. Petitioner sought a rehearing regarding this decision,

which was denied on February 25, 2005. Id., Exh. CC.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with regard to this decision

on March 16, 2005, id., Exh. DD, but filed no further pleadings

with regard to his notice of appeal. Id. at 4.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on January

4, 2006.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA requires state prisoners to file any petition

for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date

that their state court conviction becomes “final.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2005) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). The federal habeas petition “must be filed

within one year of the latest of the date on which ... the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or

the time passed for seeking direct review ...” Id. The running

this one-year statute of limitations is tolled during any period

when “a properly filed application for state post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

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2 Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of this decision

by the Arizona Supreme Court and, therefore, the statute of

limitations on his federal habeas action was further statutorily

tolled during this time. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04

(10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold today that, regardless of whether a

petitioner actually appeals a denial of a post-conviction application,

the limitations period is tolled during the period in which the

petitioner could have sought an appeal under state law.”); Swartz v.

Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a

judgment is not final until the time for seeking review expires, the

word “pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review

is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See also Johnson v.

McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (declining to decide

issue but collecting cases so holding).

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or claim is pending” in any state court. See id. § 2244(d)(2);

see also Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds

by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Petitioner did not have any action for post-conviction

relief pending in the Arizona state courts for a period of more

than one year after his conviction because final and before he

filed his federal habeas petition. The statute of limitations

ran against Petitioner from November 20, 2003, when the time for

seeking review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision

regarding his action for post-conviction relief by the Arizona

Supreme Court expired,2 until at least January 13, 2005, when

Petitioner filed an action for state habeas corpus relief in the

Arizona Superior Court, a period of more than one year.

However, this latter state court action, filed after the federal

habeas statute of limitations expired, could not revive the

already-expired time limit for filing Petitioner’s federal

habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

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(9th Cir. 2003); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000).

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne,

281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is only

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. 

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition. In

reply to Respondents’ answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends that constitutional claims should not be subject to the

doctrines of timeliness and exhaustion. Petitioner contends the

trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to sentence

him to an aggravated sentence because he is entitled to have a

jury decide each factor contributing to his sentence beyond a

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reasonable doubt. Docket No. 15 at 3. Petitioner does not

offer any reason why the relevant statute of limitations

applicable to his federal habeas action should be equitably

tolled.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Bechtel’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 17th day of April, 2006.

 

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