Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00166/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SAM CHAN, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-00166 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

KATRINA KANE, )

 ) 

Respondent. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Mr. Sam Chan (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 25,

2011. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) (Doc. 8) on April 4, 2011.

Petitioner filed a reply to the response on April 29, 2011. See

Doc. 9. At the time Petitioner filed this action and his reply

to the response to his petition he was confined in the Pinal

County Jail.

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I Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cambodia. In

1981 Petitioner was paroled into the United States as a refugee

by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Response, Exh. 1. In May of 1984 the INS adjusted Petitioner’s

status to that of a lawful permanent resident, pursuant to

Section 209(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).

Id., Exh. 1. 

On October 22, 1996, the Municipal Court of California,

Monteca County, convicted Petitioner of burglary, a felony, and

sentenced him to 180 days incarceration. Id., Exh. 2. On April

25, 2001, the Superior Court of California, Stockton County,

convicted Petitioner of theft, a felony, and sentenced him to

ninety days incarceration. Id., Exh. 3. On April 25, 2001, the

Superior Court of California, Stockton County, convicted

Petitioner of battery, a felony, and sentenced him to three

years of probation. Id., Exh. 4. 

On November 13, 2001, the government issued a Notice to

Appear (NTA), charging Petitioner as removable pursuant to

section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien who

had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not

arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The NTA

also charged Petitioner was removable pursuant to section

237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who at any time after admission

had been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Id., Exh.

5.

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On November 13, 2001, Petitioner was taken into the

government’s custody and held without bond. Id., Exh. 6.

Petitioner requested a custody re-determination hearing. On

November 29, 2001, the IJ held a hearing and denied a change in

custody. Petitioner reserved his right to file an appeal, but

failed to file one. Id., Exh. 7. On January 30, 2002, the IJ

granted Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal

under section 240A(a) of the INA. Petitioner and the government

waived appeal. Id., Exh. 8. 

On February 21, 2007, the Superior Court of California,

Stockton County, convicted Petitioner of misdemeanor possession

of methamphetamine and sentenced him to three years probation.

Id., Exh. 9. 

On March 25, 2010, the government issued a second NTA

charging Petitioner as removable pursuant to section

237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who had been convicted of a

violation of (or a conspiracy or an attempt to violate) any

state law or regulation relating to a controlled substance.

Id., Exh. 10. On March 25, 2010, the government took

Petitioner into custody and held him without the opportunity for

bond. Id., Exh. 11. 

On May 5, 2010, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed to

Cambodia. Petitioner and the government waived appeal. Id.,

Exh. 12. 

On November 9, 2010, the government served Petitioner

with a Decision to Continue Detention. Id., Exh. 13. On May

14, 2010, the government sent a travel document request to the

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Royal Embassy of Cambodia, in order to effect Petitioner’s

removal from the United States. Id., Exh. 14. On September 16,

2010, the Cambodian government interviewed Petitioner. Id.,

Exh. 14. Respondents aver Petitioner is on the Cambodian

approved travel document list and his travel document will be

forthcoming. Id., Exh. 14.

Petitioner has been detained since March 25, 2010,

approximately one year and two months. Petitioner’s order of

removal became final May 5, 2011, approximately one year ago.

In the section 2241 petition Petitioner asserts that his

continued detention pending his removal to Cambodia, for a time

period beyond the statutory “removal period,” violates his

constitutional rights pursuant to the United States Supreme

Court’s opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis. Petitioner avers he has

cooperated with efforts to remove him to Cambodia. 

II Analysis

The Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2010). 

Federal law provides for the detention of removable

aliens in two separate circumstances. Section 236(c) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1226, governs the detention of aliens who are not under an

administratively final order of removal. Section 231 of the

INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs the detention of

aliens whose order of removal is administratively final.

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Section 241(a)(1)(A) of the INA states that “[e]xcept

as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered

removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the

United States within a period of 90 days (in this section

referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

(1)(A). During the removal period, continued detention is

required. See id. 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the

Attorney General shall detain the alien.”). Under section

241(a)(6), the Attorney General may detain an alien beyond the

90-day removal period. See id. § 1231(a)(6).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491

(2001), the Supreme Court considered whether the

post-removal-period statute, INA § 241(a)(6), authorizes the

government “to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the

removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to

secure the alien’s removal.” 533 U.S. at 682. The petitioners

in Zadvydas could not be removed because no country would accept

them. Thus, removal was “no longer practically attainable,” and

the period of detention at issue was “indefinite” and

“potentially permanent.” Id. at 691. The Supreme Court held

that INA § 241(a)(6), which permits detention of removable

aliens beyond the 90-day removal period, does not permit

“indefinite detention.” Id. at 689-97. The Court explained that

“once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued

detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.

The Supreme Court further held that detention remains

presumptively valid for a period of six months. Id. at 701.

After this six-month period, an alien is eligible for

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conditional release upon demonstrating “good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. The burden then shifts to

the government to respond with sufficient evidence to rebut that

showing. Id. The six-month presumption “does not mean that

every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has

been determined that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Because Petitioner waived appeal of the IJ’s order of

May 5, 2010, ordering him removed from the United States to

Cambodia, the order of removal became administratively final on

that day. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(47)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(b).

The ninety-day “removal period”, therefore, began on May 5,

2010, the date his removal order became administratively final,

and ended on or about August 5, 2010. See 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (“The removal period begins...[t]he date the

order of removal becomes administratively final”). 

Thus, the presumptively reasonable six-month postremoval-period of detention expired on or about February 3,

2011. Petitioner has now been detained for approximately three

months beyond the time established by the Supreme Court as

presumptively reasonable and the issue has become whether there

is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future. 

The burden of showing that there is no significant

likelihood that a habeas petitioner will be removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future rests with the petitioner seeking

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relief. See Pelich v. INS, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003).

If the petitioner meets his burden, the government must then

introduce evidence to refute that assertion. See id.; Lin Guo

Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2002). A petitioner

may make such a showing by establishing that there is an

“institutional barrier” to his repatriation, i.e., that the

country of removal does not have an agreement with the United

States to accept repatriation of its nationals. See Kim Ho Ma

v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding

that, because the United States had no functioning repatriation

agreement with Cambodia, the designated country of removal, and

because the Cambodian government did not accept the return of

its nationals from the United States, there was no reasonable

likelihood that the INS would be able to accomplish the

petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future);

Fahim v. Ashcroft, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

Petitioner must demonstrate that “the circumstances of his

status” or the existence of “particular barriers to his

repatriation” to his country of origin are such that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future. Fahim, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.

In reply to the response to his habeas petition,

Petitioner states that the “Royal Embassy of Cambodia has

recently informed Petitioner that it is ‘not authorized to issue

a new Cambodian passport and other travel document concerned.’”

Doc. 9 at 3. Petitioner argues that, because he was placed on

the “approved travel document list” at the latest on October 28,

2010, his removal is per se not reasonably foreseeable because

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28 1 In 2002, Cambodia signed a repatriation agreement to accept

deportees from the United States. 

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over six months have passed since this event occurred.

Petitioner contends that, notwithstanding the information

received by Respondent from the Cambodian government, Cambodia

has told Petitioner that it will not issue him a “new” Cambodian

passport. Petitioner argues that, because the Cambodian

government has refused to issue him travel documents, he has

established evidence “sufficient for a showing of good reason as

to why his removal is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Id. at 5. 

Petitioner has not established that his particular

circumstances make it unlikely that he will be removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Neither has Petitioner

established that there are particular barriers to his

repatriation, such as the lack of a state government to

repatriate him, as is the case in Somalia, or that there is no

governmental cooperation with Cambodia with regard to the

repatriation of its citizens. Compare Thai v. Ashcroft, 366

F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting Zadvydas claim based on lack

of a repatriation agreement with Vietnam).1 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Chan’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 4th day of May, 2011.

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