Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_16-cv-00299/USCOURTS-alnd-7_16-cv-00299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

Before the Court is the United States of America’s (“USA”) Motion 

to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19). On 

February 22, 2016, Plaintiff Marcus Geoward Woods (“Woods”) filed suit 

against the Birmingham VA Hospital (“the VA”), Dr. Mulcahy, and Dr. 

Terry (collectively “the doctors”) for medical malpractice based on 

injuries he allegedly suffered during a surgical procedure at the VA. All 

claims against the VA were dismissed on August 8, 2016, and USA was 

added as a defendant on August 12, 2016. On October 26, 2016, USA was 

substituted as a party for Dr. Mulcahy and Dr. Terry pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2679(d)(2). USA filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for 

MARCUS GEOWARD WOODS,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

7:16-cv-00299-LSC

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FILED

 2017 Jan-09 PM 04:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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Summary Judgment on August 19, 2016. Because both parties have 

submitted matters outside the pleadings in support of their briefs, the 

Court will treat this Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 

under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) & 56. For the reasons stated below, 

USA’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

Woods is a veteran who sought medical services at the VA to treat 

an existing gunshot wound. (Doc. 1-1 at 14.) On November 3, 2011, he 

received surgery to insert an inflatable penile prosthesis (“IPP”), which 

led to severe pain. (Doc. 1-2 at 33.) The IPP was then replaced on April 

13, 2012 with a malleable rod implant, which led to complications 

including swelling, fever, and pain. (Doc. 1-2 at 33.) Due to the 

malfunction of the implant, on December 14, 2012, Woods had another 

surgery at the VA.

According to Woods, the doctors “change[d] the original procedure 

of surgery without [his] knowledge or consent” and “did not provide the 

proper treatment for [his] recovery.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) He provides testimony 

from Abreyanna Maxtion (“Maxtion”), who attended a pre-operative 

appointment at the VA with him, during which Dr. Tann (“Tann”) 

explained the procedure. (Doc. 1-1.) Maxtion professes that at this 

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meeting, Tann understood and confirmed that Woods did not want—and 

would not get—another IPP because the previous one had given him 

trouble. (Id. at 2.) Instead, Maxtion avers, Tann stated that the surgery 

would repair the harm from the previous IPP and insert a semi-rigid 

penile prosthesis. (Id.) 

However, an addendum to a Nurse Intraoperative Report states that 

the surgery was changed “from left corporal body reconstruction with 

graft to insertion of [IPP],” and Woods provides a copy of the consent 

form for his surgery, which also lists the procedure as “left corporal body 

reconstruction.” (Id. at 6 & 9.) Woods maintains that he was not 

“properly monitored” or given any medications for pain or infection after 

this surgery. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Instead, he recounts that “they just let [him] 

lie there and bleed,” despite the fact that he “ask[ed] for the doctors 

several times,” and that he “could barely get a nurse to bring towels and 

sheets for the blood.” (Id.) Maxtion claims that she “changed his towels 

as they become soaked with blood” as he bled profusely, and that the 

nurses did not. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) She further professes that “[n]othing was 

done to stop the bleeding” before he was discharged from the hospital. 

(Id.) 

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Woods advances that the doctors told him that he was bleeding 

because his “urethra tube was cut” because they changed the procedure. 

(Doc. 1 at 5.) However, he does admit that he was given pain medications 

and antibiotics when he was sent home from the VA—purportedly still 

“bleeding uncontrollably.” (Id.) Further, the Surgical Information report 

that Woods provides states that Woods was administered antibiotics 

through irrigation on December 14, 2012. (Doc. 1-1 at 20.)

Woods charges that his pain and suffering from this surgery was 

“beyond disregard of human life,” that he contracted E. coli during the 

surgery, and that he had to undergo three other operations to correct the 

damage it caused. (Doc. 1 at 5.) One of these surgeries occurred on 

December 26, 2012, when he was admitted to UAB Hospital with “fever, 

chills, increasing scrotal tenderness and bleeding” and physicians 

conducted emergency surgery to remove his IPP, which was infected with 

E. coli. (Doc. 1-1 at 22-23.) According to Woods, when he was admitted 

to UAB on December 26, he was still bleeding from the December 14 

surgery. (Doc. 1 at 5.) The record demonstrates another surgery was 

performed on November 18, 2013, in order to insert a semi-rigid 

prosthesis. (Doc. 1-2 at 21.) However, per the record, this surgery was 

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conducted in order to treat erectile dysfunction (“ED”) and not to repair 

any damage from previous surgery. (Doc. 1-2 at 23.)

Woods also avers that despite multiple requests, he was unable to 

obtain his consent form for the original surgery because the VA and one 

of its representatives named Ronald Crook (“Crook”) withheld it from 

him. (Doc. 24.) He further asserts that Crook convinced his attorney to 

drop the case because it “would take [$]20,000 to take this case to 

district court,” and that the VA is continuing to send him bills and charge 

him for the December 14 surgery. (Id.) Woods filed an administrative 

claim with the Department of Veteran Affairs (“DVA”) based on this 

surgery on January 4, 2013. (Doc. 19 at 24.) In this claim, Woods alleged 

that the doctors had performed a procedure he had not consented to. 

(Id.) This claim was denied by a letter dated July 11, 2013, which stated 

that Woods could either institute a tort action with the district court 

within six months of that date or within those same six months, file a 

request for reconsideration with the DVA. (Id. at 28.) Woods filed a 

request for reconsideration by a letter from his attorney dated December 

10, 2013. (Id. at 32.) DVA once again denied this request, asserting that 

Woods could choose to file a suit in the district court within six months of 

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August 27, 2014. (Id. at 35.) Woods subsequently filed this lawsuit on 

February 22, 2016, alleging negligence by the doctors and the VA. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 

“material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). There is 

a “genuine dispute” as to a material fact “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The trial judge should not weigh the evidence 

but must simply determine whether there are any genuine issues that 

should be resolved at trial. Id. at 249.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must 

give deference to the nonmoving party by “considering all of the 

evidence and the inferences it may yield in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). In making a motion for 

summary judgment, “the moving party has the burden of either negating 

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that there 

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is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party’s case.” 

Id. Although the trial courts must use caution when granting motions for 

summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded 

not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of 

the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

327 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) gives United States district 

courts “exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages against the United 

States arising from personal injury ‘caused by the negligence or wrongful 

act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within 

the scope of his office or employment.’” Swafford v. United States, 839 

F.3d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). It 

functions as a “limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity,” 

and also sets up a requirement that “the claimant file[] an 

‘administrative claim with the appropriate agency’ . . . within two years 

from the time the claim accrues.” Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 

1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Suarez v. United States, 22 F.3d 

1064, 1065 (11th Cir. 1994). A prospective plaintiff must then file the 

action against the United States “within six months after the date of 

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mailing . . . of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency,” or the 

claim “shall be forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401. 

Here, the charged negligence occurred on December 14, 2012, and 

Woods filed an administrative claim with the DVA on January 4, 2013, 

well within the two-year statutory deadline. However, the DVA sent 

Woods a final denial of the claim on August 27, 2014, but he did not file 

this action in federal district court until February 22, 2016, almost 

eighteen months after the denial letter was mailed. The untimeliness of 

this suit, however, does not strip this court of jurisdiction over the 

action. See United States v. Kwain Fun Wong, _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 

1628 (2015) (§ 2401(b) is “a mere claims-processing rule” and is not 

jurisdictional, and therefore, the limitations period may be tolled “when 

circumstances warrant.”). 

The Court interprets Woods’s Motion to Stay as an argument that 

the statute of limitations should be tolled because of “concealment of 

evid[e]nce by the VA hospital and intentional misrepresentation of VA rep 

Ronald Cook.” (Doc. 24 at 1). Woods cites to Alabama law which tolls 

actions when “the cause of action . . . could not reasonably have been 

discovered within such period.” Ala. Code § 6-5-482. However, state 

tolling provisions are not applicable to § 2401(b) because “the accrual of 

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a cause of action under section 2401(b) is a matter of federal law.” 

Phillips v. United States, 260 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Further, Woods cannot claim that he did not discover the purported 

tortious conduct before February of 2016, because he filed an 

administrative complaint based on this injury in January of 2013. 

Therefore, he knew of the conduct by, at the latest, January 2013. 

However, the limitations period may be tolled “where the plaintiff 

is prevented from filing a timely cause of action because of some action 

of the defendant.” Price v. United States, 775 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 

1985) (citing Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980)). In 

Waits, the plaintiffs made various efforts to obtain medical records 

beginning in July of 1974, but the hospital did not comply with these 

requests until October of 1974. The Court held that the action did not 

accrue until the plaintiff obtained the records because “[p]rior to that 

time, [the plaintiff] knew only that his treatment at the VA Hospital had 

been unsuccessful. . . . [D]issatisfaction . . . however, is not to be 

equated with knowledge of negligence. . . . To recover damages, the 

patient must prove that the disappointing outcome of the surgery 

resulted from a breach of care.” Waits, 611 F.2d at 553. Further, the

Court held that the hospital was to blame for failing to provide the 

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records in a timely fashion, therefore keeping the plaintiff from 

discovering and filing the cause of action at an earlier time, and that “no 

. . . attorney could advise him of the merits of his claim while the facts 

of the . . . negligence remained lost in inaccessible hospital files.” Id.

1

In the case at hand, Woods maintains that he could not file the 

instant action without the consent form for his December 14, 2012 

surgery, because the negligence of the doctors consisted of changing the 

surgical procedure at the last minute, therefore subjecting him to surgery 

which he had not consented to. Woods cannot claim that he was not 

aware of this conduct before he obtained the form, because he filed an 

administrative claim based on that conduct in January of 2013. (Doc. 19 

at 25.) Unlike the Plaintiff in Waits, Woods knew exactly what conduct he

was basing his legal claim on—he described it in his administrative claim—

and therefore did not need this form to present “the facts of the . . . 

negligence” to an attorney. Waits, 611 F.2d at 553. 

In McCullough v. United States, the plaintiff argued that “he could 

not have known about the . . . cause [of the injury] until he had 

 1 Waits analyzes the accrual of an action under the first clause of § 2401, and 

does not mention equitable tolling. However, in Price, the Eleventh Circuit 

interpreted Waits as discussing equitable tolling of the limitations period, and this 

Court will follow that interpretation. 

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reasonable opportunity to obtain his medical records.” 607 F.3d 1355, 

1360 (11th Cir. 2010). The court disagreed, holding that “[h]e did not 

need his medical records to learn the ‘critical facts’ indicating that he 

had been hurt and who had inflicted the injury.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979)). Even Mr. McCullough’s 

“commendable diligence in requesting his records” did not save him from 

the statute of limitations because he had the facts he needed to file suit. 

Id. at 1361. 

Woods advances that he was unable to successfully maintain legal 

representation because of USA’s affirmative misconduct in refusing to 

give him his consent form, and in intimidating his attorney. Yet, he fails 

to show that he needed his medical records in order to file a viable 

action, as he clearly knew the “critical facts” of his case. He also fails to 

allege any facts that demonstrate that the alleged “intimidation” of his 

attorney prevented him from timely filing this action. The only conduct 

that Woods seems to allege “intimidated” his attorney was statements 

about the cost of maintaining this action. There is no support in Eleventh 

Circuit precedent for Woods’s argument that a misstatement about the

price of litigation—even when it leads to the withdrawal of an attorney—

should result in equitable tolling. Therefore, as Woods has shown no 

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reason why the statue of limitations should be tolled, summary judgment 

based on the untimeliness of this suit is due to be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, summary judgment in USA’s favor is due 

to be GRANTED. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be 

entered. Further, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 24) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of January 2017.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

186291

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