Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01189/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JAVAY BOYD, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cr4437-LAB and 

19cv1189-LAB 

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

 Defendant Javay Boyd pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count 

of importation of methamphetamine and one count of of cocaine. Because she 

imported 6.9 kilograms of methamphetamine (actual), she was subject to a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. The second count involved 2 kilograms 

of cocaine, and carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. Because the 

two sentences would run concurrently, the mandatory minimum for the second 

count did not affect the sentence she ultimately received. The Court departed 

downward based on a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and USSG 5K1.1, and 

sentenced her to 84 months’ imprisonment. She did not file an appeal, but instead 

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the Court to sentence her to time 

served. 

/ / / 

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Boyd’s motion is entirely conclusory, and gives no cognizable reasons for 

her claims. 

First Claim 

 Boyd’s first claim involves the Court’s reliance on her criminal history and the 

nature of the offense at sentencing, but she does not explain how she thinks the 

Court erred. According to the presentence report as well as both sides’ sentencing 

summary charts, she was in criminal history category IV. The report also discussed 

the nature of the offense Boyd was being sentenced for. She does not argue that 

her criminal history or the description of her offense was inaccurate, nor does she 

explain why the Court should not have taken them into account at sentencing. 

Boyd may be asserting that when sentencing her, the Court could not 

permissibly rely on past convictions or the nature of the offense she pled guilty to. 

If this is what she means, her claim fails. The Court is required to take into account 

a defendant’s criminal history as well as the nature of the offense she is being 

sentenced for. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1). 

But even if Boyd is claiming that the Court erred in some way when 

calculating her criminal history category or when it took into account the facts of 

her offense, such a claim would also fail. Boyd waived collateral attack on a 

sentence at or below the statutory mandatory minimum term. (Plea Agreement 

(Docket no. 21) at 11:23–12:2.) Because she was sentenced below the mandatory 

minimum, she waived her first claim. Furthermore, claims based on the Court’s 

calculation of the criminal history and consideration of the nature of the offense are 

ordinarily raised on direct appeal. With exceptions not applicable here, such claims 

may not be raised in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 

483, 485 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that nonconstitutional sentencing errors not 

raised on direct appeal generally may not be reviewed by way of a § 2255 motion). 

 Furthermore, this claim is entirely conclusory, and is unsupported by any 

factual allegations. See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 

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1980) (holding that mere conclusory assertions in a § 2255 motion are insufficient 

to warrant a hearing). 

Second Claim

 Boyd also argues that her lawyer was ineffective, because he “did not fight” 

for her. (Mot. (Docket no. 40) at 5.) Instead, she says, he told her there was no 

way he could have gotten a better deal than she did, and she was lucky to be 

sentenced to only 84 months. (Id.) Boyd’s plea agreement did not waive this claim. 

(See Docket no. 21 at 11:27–28.) 

 The record confirms that Boyd’s lawyer’s advice was accurate, and that in 

fact he advocated for an even lower sentence than the Court imposed. (See 

Docket nos. 29 (government’s sentencing summary chart); 30 (Boyd’s sentencing 

summary chart).) She got the benefit of adjustments for minor role and acceptance 

of responsibility. (Id.) Even with these, the guideline range was 121 to 151 months. 

(Id.) But with the benefit of a downward departure, the resulting guideline range as 

calculated by her lawyer was 84 to 105 months. (Docket no. 30.) And even after 

this, her lawyer asked for a sentence of only 77 months. (Id.) By contrast, the 

government calculated the guideline range at 120 to 120 months, and 

recommended a sentence of 120 months. (Docket no. 29.) 

 To set aside a sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). This requires a showing that counsel’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable, and that as a result, the defendant was prejudiced. Id. 

Boyd supports her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with nothing but a 

conclusory assertion that her counsel “did not fight” for her. But her claim is 

unsupported by any factual allegations suggesting that his performance was 

anything other than competent. Furthermore, the record shows he obtained 

excellent results for her, and advocated for an even lower sentence than the Court 

imposed. No hearing is required, and this claim can be denied on the basis of the 

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record. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 

that a district court need not hold a hearing on a § 2255 motion where the record 

conclusively shows the prisoner is entitled to no relief); Hearst, 638 F.2d at 1194. 

The motion is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 1, 2019 

 Hon. Larry Alan Burns 

Chief United States District Judge

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