Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04421/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04421-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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No. 13-cv--7798 (KM) (MAH)

Plaintiff,

OPINION V.

APPLE INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before the Court on the motion (ECF No. 46) of

defendant Apple Incorporated to dismiss the Amended Complaint (“AC”, ECF

No. 4) for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim or, in the

alternative, to transfer venue to the Northern District of California, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 14O4. Because Mr. Gray has failed to meet his burden of

establishing personal jurisdiction, and because everything significant about

this case arises from an altercation between the plaintiff, Mr. Gray, and the

employees of an Apple store in Berkeley, California, the action will be dismissed

and venue will be transferred.’

I. The Amended Complaint

The plaintiff, Terell Gray, is a resident of Essex County, New Jersey. (AC

¶ 1) He is African-American, a fact of relevance to his claims. Apple, Inc. is a

I Apple originally moved to dismiss in May 2014. Thereafter, Mr. Gray’s counsel withdrew, and considerable delay ensued. Eventually, the Court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. In November 2015, plaintiff secured substitute counsel, and the court instructed

Apple to refile its motion.

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defendant Timothy Kaplan is a police officer of the Berkeley Police Department.

(AC ¶ 6, 7) Subject matter jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship

and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. (AC ¶J 11, 12)See 28

U.S.C. § 1332. I note, however, that the complaint also asserts federal civil

rights claims, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(federal question subject matter jurisdiction).

The complaint alleges that in December, 2012, Mr. Gray bought an

Apple MacBook computer at Best Buy. It arrived, he alleges, with a cracked

screen. He telephoned his complaint to Apple and received a case number. On

December 31, 2012, he went to the Apple store in Berkeley, California to returnor exchange the computer. (AC ¶J 18—22)

He approached an employee and sought to return the computer; the

employee refused. The implication is that the employee concluded or assumed

that the computer was stolen. Two police officers approached. They asked the

Apple employee if he wished for Mr. Gray to leave, and the employee said yes.

Mr. Gray was escorted from the store and handcuffed. He was taken to John

George Hospital, a psychiatric institution, and later released. The complaintalleges on information and belief that a white customer returned a computer to

the store at about the same time, without incident. (AC ¶f 24 —39)

Upon his release from the hospital, on January 1, 2013, Mr. Gray

returned to the Apple store. The police were called again, based on the belief

that the computer was stolen. Mr. Gray was held for several days, and then

transferred again to John George Hospital for over two weeks. On his release,

he decided to travel to New Jersey. There, he followed up with physicians and

was committed to Trenton Psychiatric Hospital for two months. (AC ¶f 40—45)

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battery, negligent hiring, training and supervision, and intentional infliction ofemotional distress. 2

II. Discussion

A. Personal jurisdiction

Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts to show that jurisdictionexists. Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2001). Absentdiscovery and an evidentiary hearing, a court must accept the plaintiff’s

allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff, Pinker

v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Miller YachtSales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (plaintiff “need only

establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction”). 3Here, because I resolve

this issue without discovery or an evidentiary hearing, I construe theallegations and facts proffered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

2 Plaintiff acknowledges that Counts 1, 5, 6, and 7 ( 1983, California Human Rights Law, false imprisonment, assault and battery) are not directed at Apple, but at

the Berkeley police, and consents to their dismissal as against Apple. (P1. Brf., ECF no.

48 at 6)

3 Once a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss has been made, the court must

examine any evidence presented with regard to disputed factual allegations. See, e.g.,

Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir.

2010) (examining the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s allegations). “Once the defense

has been raised, then the plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof in establishing

jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence.” Patterson v.

FBJ, 893 F.2d 595, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl.Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984)).

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Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 461-62 (D.N.J.

2015).

To assess whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a district

court must undertake a two-step inquiry. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert, AG, 155

F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). First, the court is required to use the relevant

state’s long-arm statute to see whether it permits the exercise of personal

jurisdiction. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). “Second, the court must apply the

principles of due process” under the federal Constitution. WorldScape, Inc. v.

Sails Capital Mgmt., Civ. 10-4207, 2011 WL 3444218 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2011)

(citing IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 259). In New Jersey, the first step collapses into

the second because “New Jersey’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction

coextensive with the due process requirements of the United States

Constitution.” Miller Yacht Sales, 384 F.3d at 96 (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(c)).

Accordingly, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is proper in

this Court if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.”’ Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan

Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 316 (1945)).

There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction that allow a district court to

hear a case involving a non-resident defendant: specific and general. See

Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-415 & n.

9, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984). Specific jurisdiction arises from the acts that give

rise to the particular claim asserted; general jurisdiction exposes the defendant

to jurisdiction for any and all claims.

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the exercise ofjurisdiction otherwise comports with traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not argue that the court possesses

specific jurisdiction, and the issue may be disposed of quickly. The refusal to

exchange the computer and the detention of the plaintiff took place at the

Apple store in Berkeley, California. Every allegedly wrongful act by Apple and

its employees took place in California. No allegedly wrongful act took place in

New Jersey.

What Mr. Gray is claiming is that this court possesses general

jurisdiction over Apple because of its nationwide business activities. 4To

support general jurisdiction, the defendant’s “contacts [with the forum statej

need not relate to the subject matter of the litigation,” Ameripay, LLC v.

Ameripay Payroll, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633 (D.N.J. 2004), but must rise

to “a ‘very high threshold of business activity,’” id. at 633 (quoting Compagnie

des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 651 F.2d 877, 891 (3d Cir.

1981)).

Just how high was recently established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the

watershed case of DaimlerAG v. Bauman, — U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

Daimler held that it is not sufficient that corporate defendants be engaged in a

“substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” in the forum

state. That formulation, said the Court, “is unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 761.

4 The relevant point of plaintiffs brief Point VI, is entitled “Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal Juridiction Must be Denied as

General Jurisdiction is Found”. (P1. Br., ECF no. 50 at 16)

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exceptional case ... a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal

place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and

of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at 761

n. 19. The clear implication of is that, except perhaps in an “exceptional case,” a

corporation will be deemed to be “at home” only in its state of incorporationand its principal place of business. These “paradigm,” “easily ascertainable”

forums “afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in

which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.” Id. at 760.

Courts within this district, interpreting Daimler, have agreed. Display Works,

LLC v. Bartley, — F. Supp. 3d —‘ No. CV 16-583, 2016 WL 1644451, at *3_4

(D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2016); Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 464—65.

Plaintiff proffers that Apple has 12 stores in New Jersey, that it ships its

products here, and that its sales to New Jersey customers amount to $182.8

billion, according to a 2015 press release. (ECF no. 50 at 17)5 If these contactsmean that Apple is subject to jurisdiction here, then it probably would besubject to jurisdiction everywhere. The only contact between this case and New

Jersey is that the plaintiff, following the California events giving rise to the

action, traveled back to New Jersey and sued here. The plaintiff has not set

forth sufficient facts to indicate that Apple is “at home” in New Jersey or“exceptional” indications that it should reasonably expect to be haled into a

Plaintiff also cites two cases in which Apple has been sued in the District of New Jersey. However persuasive as evidence of “contacts,” these do not constitute

precedent for the assertion of general jurisdiction. As Apple points out, both were

patent cases in which the infringement occurred in New Jersey, so they do not support general jurisdiction. (Def. Reply Brf., ECF no. 51 at 9)

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granted. The matter, however, is not free from doubt. Although plaintiff does

not say so in so many words, I cannot ignore that, measured by market

capitalization, Apple is the largest publicly traded corporation in the world, and

that its national, not to say global, presence is pervasive. 6I therefore consider

in the alternative the transfer of venue to the Northern District of California.

B. Transfer of Venue

The venue analysis gets me to much the same place. First, I optionally

transfer venue from this district, which does not have personal jurisdiction, to

the Northern District of California, which indisputably does. Second, I find that

venue in this district is improper, and transfer the case on that basis. And

third, I grant Apple’s motion for a discretionary transfer of venue.

1. Transfer based on lack of personal jurisdiction

First, “[al court without personal jurisdiction over the defendants or

venue over a case has the option of dismissing the action or transferring the

case to another district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).” China Am. Co-op.

Auto., Inc. v. Estrada Rivera Enterprises Corp., No. 07-5 156, 2008 WL 305744

(D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2008) (citing Goldllawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962)).

Because the withdrawal of plaintiff’s counsel has caused significant

delay, which I do not wish to compound, I will transfer venue to minimize the

time lag of refiling and starting over in the proper forum. Should the plaintiff

decline to prosecute the case in California, dismissal is easily accomplished,

but he will have had his chance.

6 See FT 500, www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1fda5794- 169f- 1 1e5-bO7f00 l44feabdc0.html#axzz4GHZ5JQvN.

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(

) 

j

y 

resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in

which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in

which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part

of property that is the subject of the action is situated;

or (3) if there is no district in which any action may

otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any

judicial district in which any defendant is subject to

the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such

action.

Alternatives (1) and (3) appear to have no application here. I consider,

however, whether New Jersey is “(2) a judicial district in which a substantial

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Id.

The Third Circuit has repeatedly held that “in determining whether a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a cause of action

occurred in a specific jurisdiction, ‘[t]he test . . . is not the defendant’s contacts’

with a particular district, but rather the location of those events or omissions

giving rise to the claim.” Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. App’x 157,

161 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential; quoting Cottman Transmission Systems,

Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994)). “[I]n assessing whether events

or omissions giving rise to the [plaintiffs] claims are substantial, it is necessary

to look at the nature of the dispute.”’ Id. (quoting Cottrnan, 36 F.3d at 295). The

Third Circuit has “observed that the venue provision ‘favors the defendant in a

venue dispute by requiring that the events or omissions supporting a claim be

substantial,’ and that ‘[s]ubstantiality is intended to preserve the element of

fairness so that a defendant is not haled into a remote district having no real

relationship to the dispute.” Id. (quoting Cottman, 36 F.3d at 294 and citing

Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183—84 (1979)).

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defendant is not haled into a remote district having no real relationship to the

dispute.” Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir.

1994).

Surveying a handful of cases decided by sister circuits, Cottman

concluded:

The test for determining venue is not the defendant’s ‘contacts’

with a particular district, but rather the location of those “events or

omissions giving rise to the claim,” theoretically a more easily demonstrable circumstance than where a “claim arose.” Although the statute no longer requires a court to select the “best” forum, the weighing of “substantial” may at times seem to take on that

flavor.

Id. Accord Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. Appx 157, 161 (3d Cir.

2012). In addition, the Third Circuit instructed that when “assessing whether

events or omissions giving rise to the claims are substantial, it is necessary to

look at the nature of the dispute.” Cottman Transmission Sys., 36 F.3d at 295.

See also GufIns. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005) (“for

venue to be proper, significant events or omissions material to the plaintiffs

claim must have occurred in the district in question, even if other material

events occurred elsewhere”).

Here, the venue test is not met. All of the events occurred in and around

the Apple store in Berkeley, California. They did not involve anything remotelyconnected to New Jersey, did not arise from any sale of a product in New

Jersey, and did not involve Apple’s New Jersey operations in any way. The onlyconnection between New Jersey and the events of the case is that, after the

events in suit occurred in California, Mr. Gray traveled back to New Jersey and

sued Apple here.

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dismiss but to transfer venue to the Northern District of California pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

3. Transfer for convenience of parties and witnesses

Finally, Apple moves to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As a

third alternative, I would grant that motion as well.

Section 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses,

in the interest of justice, a ... court may transfer any civil action to any other

district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).“Section 1404(a) transfers are discretionary determinations made for theconvenience of the parties and presuppose that the court has jurisdiction and

that the case has been brought in the correct forum.” Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495

F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2007). A court may make a discretionary Section 1404(a)

determination, however, without first establishing personal jurisdiction. See

Lafferty, 495 F.3d at 80 (citing the holding in United States v. Berkowitz, 328F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964) “that a § 1404(a) transfer was available even though

there was no personal jurisdiction.”).

The Third Circuit, as well as courts within this Circuit considering

motions for permissive transfer, have been guided by a number of nonexclusive public and private interest factors:

The private interests have included: plaintiffs forum preference as

manifested in the original choice, the defendant’s preference,

whether the claim arose elsewhere, the convenience of the parties

as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; the

convenience of the witnesses—but only to the extent that the

witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora,

and the location of books and records (similarly limited to the

extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative

forum).

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Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879—80 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal

citations omitted).

There is no dispute that venue would be proper in the Northern District

of California under 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(b)(1), (2), or (3), and that that court, no

less than this, would possess subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 and 1332. The plaintiff’s choice of forum is New Jersey, but that arises

solely from the happenstance that he moved back here after the events in suit.

All, or virtually all, of the relevant facts concern events that occurred in

Berkeley, California. Defendant’s choice of forum is therefore not arbitrary, but

is entitled to some weight. The defendants—including store employees, and the

police, who apparently have not even been served—are all located in California.

The fact witnesses, or substantially all of them, are in California and subject to

subpoena there. So, for what it is worth, are the documents (although modern

communications have dissipated the significance of this factor). The law

applicable to the tort claims will surely be California law, and California has a

substantial interest in adjudicating this local event, involving a business and

the conduct of a police department. On the other side is the obvious

inconvenience to plaintiff (although that arose from his decision to move back

to New Jersey before filing), and the extremely disparate financial resources of

the parties. The public factor relating to expeditiousness and the enforceability

of judgment also points to transfer: I refer to the fact that in personam is, at the

very least, debatable. See Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 16 (3d Cir. 1981)).

Other factors seem neutral.

All in all, the discretionary factors establish that the Northern District of

California is a far more convenient venue than the District of New Jersey for

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District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and 1406.

Dated: August 3, 2016

&

Hon. Kevin McNulty () United States District Judé

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