Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01637/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01637-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH RINALDI, Civil No. 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS BE DENIED

[Document No. 1]

v.

M.E. POULOS, et al.,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 8, 2008, Petitioner Joseph Rinaldi, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) The

Petition raises six ground for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) improper denial of

pretrial motions, (3) violations of ex post facto laws by the prosecution’s imposing a five-year

enhancement for Petitioner’s serious-felony prior conviction pursuant to California Penal Code §

667(a), (4) denial of due process in calculation of custody credits, (5) the prosecution breached

Petitioner’s plea agreement, and (6) abuse of power by the prosecution. (Id.) 

On June 18, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer, asserting (1) Petitioner has failed to present

a viable claim because he cannot demonstrate that the state court’s resolution of his claims was

unreasonable, (2) Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus because Petitioner

pled guilty in state court, and (3) the state courts reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claims, finding

they were precluded by Petitioner’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. (Doc. 27.) 

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 1 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

On July 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a traverse, asserting (1) his claims are viable under

AEDPA, (2) his claims are all cognizable on federal habeas corpus because his plea was coerced and

breached, and (3) the state courts were unreasonable and acted contrary to AEDPA standards. (Doc.

28.) 

Based upon a review of the parties’ pleadings, and in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d),

this Court RECOMMENDS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 28, 2006, Petitioner entered a negotiated guilty plea to burglary, two counts of

grand theft of a firearm, and grand theft of personal property. (Lodgment 2, Volume 3.) Petitioner

also admitted the truth of a strike prior allegation, a serious-felony-prior-conviction allegation, and a

prior-prison-term allegation. (Id.) At Petitioner’s sentencing hearing on October 31, 2006, the trial

court dismissed the strike and the prison prior, and sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of six

years and four months. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4.) 

Petitioner appealed the judgment. On September 5, 2007, the state appellate court

unanimously affirmed the judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for a minor correction

of the abstract of judgment. (Lodgment 1.) Petitioner did not seek further direct review of the

judgment in the California Supreme Court.

On January 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Supp. Lodgment 1.)

On August 13, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or

citation. (Lodgment 3.) 

On September 8, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition. (Doc. 1.) On September

11, 2008, the Court issued an Order requiring a response to the Petition. (Doc. 5.) On September

22, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Request for Voluntary Dismissal of his unexhausted claims. 

(Doc. 7.) On October 17, 2008, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for voluntary dismissal

without prejudice based on his failure to state which claims he perceived to be unexhausted. (Doc.

8.) 

On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 2 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be denied. (Doc. 19.) On April 3, 2009, a district court judge

adopted the Report and Recommendation, and denied Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 21.) 

On June 18, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer. (Doc. 27.) On July 20, 2009, Petitioner

filed a Traverse. (Doc. 28.) 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People v.

Rinaldi, No. SCD196182 (Cal. Ct. App. September 5. 2007). (Lodgment 1.) The Court presumes

these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). 

In August 2005, Rinaldi lived with Charles Begley’s mother in her house on Mount

Durbin Drive during her final illness. Rinaldi then lived in a house on Emerald Street with

Begley and others. Rinaldi did not come home on the nights of January 10 and 11, 2006. On

January 12, Begley went to the Mount Durbin Drive house and noticed certain items were

missing. The missing items included four firearms (a long-barreled Winchester .33, a .16-

gauge double-barreled shotgun, a .22 rifle with a scope, and a 30-30 Winchester lever-action

short-barrel), jewelry (Begley’s mother’s wedding ring, a pearl necklace, and a turquoise and

silver necklace), two bronze statues, a turtle sculpture, an antique teapot, two antique clocks,

an abalone shell, tools, a weed whacker, and seven or eight bottles of liquor and wine. 

Begley found the statues, one of the clocks, the teapot, the abalone shell, the weed

whacker, and the bottles of liquor and wine at Rinaldi’s friend’s house with Rinaldi. Rinaldi

told Begley he had buried the guns in the park. They went to the park and Rinaldi produced

the 16-gauge double-barreled shotgun and the short-barreled Winchester. Rinaldi

acknowledged that he had entered Begley’s mother’s house and taken the missing items, but

claimed his friend had put him up to it and the friend and a third person had helped him. 

Begley found two of his mother’s watches and other jewelry stuffed in a chair in Rinaldi’s

room in the Emerald Street house. The police found two earrings in Rinaldi’s pants pocket. 

(Lodgment 1 at 2-3.)

On October 27, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to burglary, two counts of grand theft of a

firearm, and grand theft of personal property. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4.) At his sentencing hearing,

Petitioner’s counsel, Frank Sanchez, indicated Petitioner did not know he was pleading to two

strikes and a serious felony prior when he signed his original change-of-plea form on September 28,

2006. (Id. at 101-102.) Further, the judge informed Petitioner his attorney had “misadvised” him as

to the maximum sentence he would face if he were convicted. (Id. at 106-107.) Rather than face a

potential 16 years in state prison if he were convicted, the judge informed Petitioner the maximum

sentence he faced was 13 years, 8 months. (Id.) 

In light of the question raised as to whether or not Petitioner was aware of the strikes, the

serious felony prior, and the “misadvisal as to the penalties” at the time of entering his plea, the

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 3 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

judge asked Petitioner whether he wanted to withdraw his plea. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 104,

107.) Petitioner responded, “Not at this time, no, your Honor.” (Id. at 107.) Concerned with

Petitioner’s conditional response of “not at this time,” the judge suggested Petitioner speak with his

attorney. (Id. at 107-108.) After conferring with counsel, Petitioner affirmed his guilty plea. (Id. at

109.)

On Petitioner’s behalf, attorney Frank Sanchez asked the Court to consider a lenient

sentence. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 111.) Mr. Sanchez told the Court Petitioner assisted in the

recovery of the stolen items and indicated Petitioner’s most serious offense dated back to 1977,

when he acted as an accessory, not a principal. (Id. at 110-111.) 

The judge sentenced Petitioner to state prison for 6 years, 4 months. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4

at 115.) However, based on the “nature of the strike in the past, the limited criminality in the

intervening years, and the nature of the conduct in this case, in the exercise of [his] discretion,” the

judge ordered the strike stricken. (Id. at 114.) The judge noted Petitioner’s total sentence

incorporated the application of the serious felony prior, which adds five years to the sentence, and

indicated, “[t]he Court has not discretion to strike that.” (Id. at 115.) Further, the judge stated

Petitioner’s current credit calculation, which is calculated by the probation department, was zero

“because he [had] been in custody on parole violations for matters not related.” (Id.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 4 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either §2254(d)(1) or §2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). With regard to §2254(d)(1), the threshold

question is whether the rule of law was clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court

conviction became final. Id. at 406. Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be "persuasive authority for purposes of

determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’" Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). Only after the clearly established federal law is

identified can the court determine whether the state court’s application of that law "resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of" that clearly established

federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72.

 A state court decision is "contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state-court

decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies

the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular state prisoner’s case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407. Under Williams, an application of

federal law is unreasonable only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

Further, with regard to §2254(d)(2), a state court’s decision results in a "decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding" if it "is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 5 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea, during the plea

process, and later on appeal. (Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-4; Doc. 1-5; Doc. 1-6.) For the sake of clarity, this

Court will address each alleged instance of ineffective assistance of counsel separately. 

2

 In his Petition, Petitioner sets forth five grounds for relief. Petitioner does not set forth abuse of power

by the prosecution as a separate ground. Rather, Petitioner makes reference to abuse of power by the

prosecution throughout his entire Petition. (Doc. 1.) For the sake of clarity, this Court will address this

claim separately and will construe it as Ground 6 of the Petition. 

- 6 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). A

state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state court decision will not be “contrary to”

clearly established federal law. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. If a state court fails to provide a reasoning for

its decision, habeas review is not de novo, but requires an independent review of the record to assess

whether the state court erred in its application of controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

V. DISCUSSION

The Petition raises six grounds for relief. Petitioner alleges (1) ineffective assistance of

counsel,1

 (2) improper denial of pretrial motions, (3) violations of ex post facto laws by the

prosecution’s imposing a five-year enhancement for Petitioner’s serious-felony prior conviction

pursuant to California Penal Code § 667(a), (4) denial of due process in calculation of custody

credits, (5) the prosecution breached Petitioner’s plea agreement, and (6) abuse of power by the

prosecution.2

 (Doc. 1.) 

Respondent contends (1) Petitioner has failed to present a viable claim because he cannot

demonstrate that the state court’s resolution of his claims was unreasonable, (2) Petitioner’s claims

are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus because Petitioner pled guilty in state court, and (3) the

state courts reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claims, finding they were precluded by Petitioner’s

waiver of his right to a jury trial. (Doc. 27.)

//

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 6 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Petitioner’s pre-plea claims include: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea; (2)

the trial court’s improper denial of his § 995 motion; (3) the trial court’s violation of ex post facto laws;

and (4) the prosecution’s abuse of power.

4

 Petitioner’s plea-related claims include: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the plea

process; and (2) breached plea agreement.

5

 Petitioner’s post-plea claims include: (1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (2) denial of

due process in calculation of custody credits.

- 7 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

In his Petition, Petitioner raises claims of alleged pre-plea constitutional errors,3 claims

contesting the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea itself,4

 and claims alleging post-plea

constitutional errors.5

 For the sake of clarity and based upon the law with regard to guilty pleas in

the federal habeas corpus context, this Court will address Petitioner’s pre-plea, plea-related, and

post-plea claims separately. 

1. Pre-Guilty Plea Claims

In his Petition, Petitioner raises four claims of alleged constitutional error which occurred

prior to him pleading guilty: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea; (2)

improper denial of pretrial motions; (3) violation of ex post facto laws; and (4) abuse of power by

the prosecution.

Generally, one who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not

subsequently challenge constitutional violations in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). A

petitioner who has pleaded guilty may only argue that his guilty plea was not voluntary and

intelligent, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), or contend that the advice he received from

his counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See McMann v. Richardson, 397

U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. In Tollet, the United States Supreme Court

held: 

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is

in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of

the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea

by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in

McMann.

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 7 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

 Petitioner did raise ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process on direct review, which

this Court will address in the following section.

- 8 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Tollet, 411 U.S. at 267; McMann , 397 U.S. at 771 (holding that a defendant who pleads guilty on

the advice of counsel may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea by showing

that his counsel’s advice was below the range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys).

A. Ground 1: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Prior to Guilty Plea

In Ground 1, Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his

guilty plea. (Doc. 1-2 at 3, 15.) Specifically, Petitioner contends public defender John Stathis

“failed to object to many conflicting statements at the preliminary hearing” and “refused to file any

motions or a 995 motion” (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 1-2 at15.) Further, Petitioner contends public defender

Mr. Hochman failed to file any motions, and was “ineffective and incompetent,” ultimately

depriving Petitioner his constitutional rights and forcing him into “a trial by ambush” (Id.) 

Respondent contends that, to the extent Petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance

of counsel before the entry of his guilty plea, such claims are precluded and have been waived by his

plea. (Doc. 27-1 at 6.)

Petitioner did not raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea

on direct review. (Lodgment 1 at 3-5.)6 Thus, the California Court of Appeal did not render a

decision on this claim. Petitioner did raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his

guilty plea in his habeas corpus petition submitted to the California Supreme Court. (Supp.

Lodgment 1 at 31.) The California Supreme Court, however, denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus

petition without citation of authority or analysis. (Lodgment 3.) Thus, with respect to the claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea in Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, there

is no reasoned state court decision to which this Court can “look” from the California Supreme

Court’s postcard denial. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Therefore, this Court must independently review

the record to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was

objectively reasonable. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. 

In light of his guilty plea, in order for Petitioner to succeed on this claim, Petitioner must

show the ineffective assistance of counsel he allegedly received prior to the plea process resulted in

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 8 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

an involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. After an independent review of

the record, this Court finds Petitioner has failed to allege facts indicating the allegedly ineffective

assistance of counsel prior to the plea process contributed to an involuntary or unintelligent guilty

plea. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. Although Petitioner alleges public defender John Stathis “failed

to object to many conflicting statements at the preliminary hearing” and “refused to file any motions

or a 995 motion,” Petitioner fails to demonstrate how this led to an involuntary or unintelligent

guilty plea. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 1-2 at15.) Similarly, although Petitioner contends public defender

Mr. Hochman failed to file any motions, and was “ineffective and incompetent,” ultimately

depriving Petitioner his constitutional rights and forcing him into “a trial by ambush,” Petitioner

fails to set forth facts that these alleged violations led to an involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. 

(Doc. 1-2 at 5; Doc. 1-3 at 1,3.) Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel by attorneys John Stathis and Mr. Hochman be DENIED. 

B. Ground 2: Improper Denial of Pretrial Motions

In Ground 2, Petitioner contends the trial court improperly denied various pretrial motions. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 1.) Specifically, Petitioner contends the trial court improperly denied his continuance

motions, (Doc. 1-2 at 1), his discovery motions (Doc. 1-2 at 1), and his California Penal Code § 995

motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause. (Doc. 1-3 at 1-45.)

Respondent contends Petitioner has waived these pre-plea constitutional errors and his claim

is not cognizable on federal habeas in light of his voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. (Doc. 27-1 at

10-11.)

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court "looks through"

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). As

there was no reasoned decision from the California Supreme Court, the Court "looks through" to the

decision of the California Court of Appeal, which held Petitioner cannot challenge denial of his

pretrial motions as they are pre-plea matters. (Lodgment 1 at 5.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal

held:

//

//

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 9 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

As part of the plea agreement, Rinaldi waived issues relating to the denial of any

suppression motion (§ 1538.5) and issues relating to strikes. Furthermore, his request for a

certificate of probable cause was denied. Absent a certificate of probable cause, a defendant

cannot challenge the validity of a guilty plea on appeal. (§ 1237.5; People v. Mendez (1999)

19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) On December 28, 2006, this court accordingly ordered that issues

on appeal would be “limited to sentencing questions or other matters occurring after the plea,

except for issues involving prior strike convictions.”

...

His contentions that the denial of his September 15, 2005, continuance motion forced

him into a trial without time to prepare; court-ordered discovery was incomplete; he was

denied vital witnesses; and there was false hearsay testimony by a discredited witness with a

criminal record are also pre-plea issues. We therefore address only his contentions regarding

custody credits and ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Lodgment 1 at 4-5.) 

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s decision--to not address

Petitioner’s pretrial motions allegations–is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. As the Court of Appeal noted,

Petitioner’s contention the trial court improperly denied his pretrial motions is a pre-plea issue. 

(Lodgment 1 at 5.) Further, in claiming the trial court improperly denied his pretrial motions,

Petitioner does not dispute the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea he entered in this

case. Thus, in accordance with Tollett, the Court of Appeal properly determined Petitioner could not

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to his

entry of a guilty plea. 411 U.S. at 267. Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground 2 of the

Petition relating to Petitioner’s pretrial motions be DENIED.

C. Ground 3: Ex Post Facto

In Ground 3, Petitioner contends imposition of a five-year enhancement for his serious -

felony prior conviction pursuant to California Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) violates ex

post facto laws. (Doc. 1-4 at 1-6.) 

Respondent contends Petitioner cannot challenge this enhancement because it was a

negotiated aspect of his sentence. (Doc. 27-1 at 12.) Moreover, Respondent contends the United

States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld challenges to claims that a recidivist-punishment statute

operates as an ex post facto law merely because it considers convictions suffered before the statute

was enacted. (Id.)

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal held Petitioner’s “challenge to

the imposition of the five-year enhancement [is a] pre-plea matter[] that [Petitioner] cannot now

challenge.” (Lodgment 1 at 5.)

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s decision rejecting Petitioner’s

enhancement claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or

an unreasonable determination of the facts. As the Court of Appeal noted, Petitioner’s contention

the trial court improperly imposed a five-year enhancement is a pre-plea issue. (Lodgment 1 at 5.) 

Further, in claiming the trial court improperly imposed a five-year enhancement, Petitioner does not

dispute the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea he entered in this case. In fact,

Petitioner was aware of the five-year enhancement at the time he pled guilty. (Lodgment 2, Volume

4 at 104.) Thus, in accordance with Tollett, the Court of Appeal properly determined Petitioner

could not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred

prior to his entry of a guilty plea. 411 U.S. at 267. Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS

Ground 3 of the Petition relating to Petitioner’s five-year enhancement be DENIED.

D. Ground 6: Abuse of Power by Prosecution

In Ground 6, Petitioner contends the prosecution abused its power. (Doc. 1-6 at 1.) 

Specifically, Petitioner contends the prosecution suppressed a photograph of an unburied rifle, and

engaged in discriminatory prosecution. (Doc. 1-3 at 1,3.) 

Respondent contends Petitioner has waived this pre-plea alleged constitutional error and his

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas in light of his voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. (Doc.

27-1 at 10-11.)

Petitioner did not raise the abuse of power by the prosecution claim on direct review. 

(Lodgment 1 at 4-5.) Thus, the California Court of Appeal did not render a decision on this claim. 

Petitioner did raise the abuse of power by the prosecution claim in his habeas corpus petition

submitted to the California Supreme Court. (Supp. Lodgment 1 at 36-37.) The California Supreme

Court, however, denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition without citation of authority or analysis. 

(Lodgment 3.) Thus, with respect to the abuse of power claim in Petitioner’s federal habeas petition,

there is no reasoned state court decision to which this Court can “look” from the California Supreme

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Court’s postcard denial. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Therefore, this Court must independently review

the record to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was

objectively reasonable. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. 

In light of his guilty plea, in order for Petitioner to succeed on this claim, Petitioner must

show the prosecution’s alleged abuse of power resulted in an involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. 

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. After an independent review of the record, this Court finds Petitioner has

failed to allege facts indicating the prosecution’s alleged abuse of power contributed to an

involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. Although Petitioner alleges

the prosecution suppressed evidence of an unburied rifle and engaged in discriminatory prosecution

because he was gay, Petitioner fails to set forth facts that these alleged violations led to an

involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. (Doc. 1-2 at 5; Doc. 1-3 at 1,3.) Based thereon, the Court

RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claim related to abuse of power by the prosecution be DENIED. 

2. Guilty Plea-Related Claims

In his Petition, Petitioner raises two plea-related claims which contest the voluntary and

intelligent nature of the plea itself. First, in Ground 1, Petitioner contends he received ineffective

assistance of counsel during the plea process. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-66.) Second, in Ground 5, Petitioner

contends the prosecution breached the plea agreement. (Doc. 1-6 at 1-40.)

A. Ground 1: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Process

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the

plea process. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-66.) Specifically, Petitioner contends P.C.C. counsel Frank Sanchez

was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) He misled Petitioner into pleading guilty by failing to

mention the court may impose two strikes and deny him his pre-sentence custody credits (Doc. 1-2

at 3, Doc. 1-4 at 1, Doc. 1-5 at 1, Doc. 1-6 at 1); (2) He intimidated Petitioner into pleading guilty by

stating Petitioner would get sixteen years in prison if he did not plead guilty (Doc. 1-2 at 3, Doc. 1-4

at 1, 4, Doc. 1-6 at 1, 3-4); and (3) He failed to challenge the enhancement allegation. (Doc. 1-2 at

3, Doc. 1-4 at 1.) Petitioner contends these allegations demonstrate the “involuntary nature” of his

guilty plea. (Doc. 1-4 at 4.)

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Generally, Respondent contends Petitioner freely, voluntarily, and knowingly pled guilty so

that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Doc.

27-1 at 10-11.) Further, Respondent contends that even if Petitioner’s claim is cognizable on federal

habeas review, the appellate court reasonably determined Petitioner failed to make the required

showing of evidence to support any ineffective assistance claims arising after he pled guilty. (Id.

at 11.) 

The United States Supreme Court has delineated the test for ineffective assistance of counsel

in the context of a guilty plea:

The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether

the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of

action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 [citations

omitted] (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 [citations omitted]

(1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 [citations omitted] (1962).

...

Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process

and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends

on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 [citations

omitted] (1970). As we explained in Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267

[citations omitted] (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel

“may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in

McMann.” Id., at 267...[I]n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [citations

omitted] (1984), we adopted a two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel...[T]he same two-part standard seems to us applicable to

ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985).

First, to satisfy Strickland’s two-part standard, a petitioner must show that, considering all

the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are

alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The federal

court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions

were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. In the context of a guilty

plea, the Court must focus on whether the attorney’s advice was appropriate under the circumstances

existing at the time of the plea. (Id.) “We strongly presume that counsel’s conduct was within the

wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 

Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability

is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). In the context of

a guilty plea, in order to satisfy the second, or “prejudice,” requirement, “the defendant must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by

the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v.

Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 1 at 5-6.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal held:

Defendants have a constitutional right to effective counsel in criminal cases. (Gideon

v. Wainright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.) The burden is on the defendant to prove he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. To do so, the defendant must show counsel failed to act in

a manner to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel’s acts or

omissions prejudiced the defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-

688, 691-692.) When reviewing an appeal we are limited to the record before us. (People v.

Roberts (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 387, 394.) Here, the record does not support Rinaldi’s

claims that counsel guaranteed him a concurrent sentence, made any misrepresentation or

was incompetent. 

(Id.)

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s decision that Petitioner received

effective assistance of counsel is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. In weighing Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, the Court of Appeal applied the Strickland standard. (Lodgment 1 at 5.) 

The Court of Appeal’s decision that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel was neither

an unreasonable application of Strickland, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

facts. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s decision was neither an unreasonable application of

Hill, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

56-57 (1985). 

First, Mr. Sanchez’s alleged failure to inform Petitioner of his exposure to two strikes during

the plea process could fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland. 466 U.S.

at 687-88; 694. However, even if counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, Petitioner suffered no prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Although Petitioner

was unaware of his exposure to two strikes during the initial plea negotiations, Petitioner was

notified of this possibility at his sentencing hearing, prompting the judge to give Petitioner an

opportunity to withdraw his plea. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 107.) Also, the judge suggested

Petitioner speak with his attorney. (Id. at 107-108.) After conferring with counsel, Petitioner

affirmed his guilty plea with full knowledge of his exposure to two strikes. (Id. at 109.) Therefore,

Petitioner is unable to “show that there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Further, Petitioner fails to demonstrate he suffered prejudice because the sentencing judge ordered

the strike stricken. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 114.) 

Second, with regard to Petitioner’s contention Mr. Sanchez was ineffective because he did

not inform Petitioner the court may deny him his pre-sentence custody credits, Petitioner fails to set

forth facts to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard. The record does not support

Petitioner’s contention that Mr. Sanchez told Petitioner he would receive his pre-sentence custody

credits as part of his guilty plea. In fact, the sentencing judge points out that “custody credits are

calculated by the probation department.” (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 115.) Thus, Petitioner is

unable to demonstrate Mr. Sanchez’s advice was inappropriate under the circumstances existing at

the time of his plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, as to the prejudice prong, Petitioner

does not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about the possibility

of receiving no pre-sentence custody credits, Petitioner would have pleaded not guilty and insisted

on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Nor does Petitioner allege any special circumstances that

might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on receiving pre-sentence custody

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 Under California Penal Code section 667(a)(1), “any person convicted of a serious felony who

previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another

jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the

sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior

conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each

enhancement shall run consecutively.”

- 16 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

credits in deciding whether to plead guilty. Therefore, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate he

suffered prejudice as relates to his counsel’s failure to advise him he would not receive his presentence custody credits. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

Third, Mr. Sanchez’s statement to Petitioner he would potentially face sixteen years in prison

rather than thirteen years, four months if he did not plead guilty, could fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness under Strickland. (466 U.S. at 687-88; 694; Doc. 1-2 at 3, Doc. 1-4 at 1,

4, Doc. 1-6 at 1, 3-4.) However, even if counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, Petitioner suffered no prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The sentencing judge

informed Petitioner of the maximum sentence of 13 years, 4 months prior to Petitioner ultimately

pleading guilty. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 106-107.) Plus, Petitioner was given the opportunity to

speak with his attorney and withdraw his plea after discovering this new information. (Id. at 107.) 

Notwithstanding the reduction in the maximum sentence Petitioner could receive, Petitioner pled

guilty. (Id. at 109.) Therefore, Petitioner is unable to “show that there [was] a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted

on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Fourth, with regard to counsel’s failure to challenge the enhancement allegation, Petitioner

fails to set forth facts to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard. (Doc. 1-2 at 3, Doc. 1-4 at

1.) At Petitioner’s sentencing, the judge noted the application of California Penal Code section

667(a)(1),7 the serious felony prior, which adds five years to a sentence. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at

115.) The judge also informed Petitioner the “Court has not discretion to strike [the five year

enhancement].” Because the Court lacked discretion in striking the five-year enhancement,

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate Mr. Sanchez’s failure to challenge the enhancement was

inappropriate under the circumstances existing at the time of his plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690. Further, when Petitioner pled guilty, he knew the conviction in his case would also constitute a

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

serious felony prior under California law, therefore subjecting him to a potential 5 year enhancement

to his sentence. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 104. Therefore, as to the prejudice prong, Petitioner is

unable to “show that there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

In light of Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate Mr. Sanchez was ineffective under Strickland,

Petitioner is unable to establish his guilty plea was involuntary. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57. Thus, the

Court of Appeal’s finding that the record did not support Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel is neither an unreasonable application of Strickland or Hill, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS Ground One of the Petition relating to Petitioner’s claim of Frank Sanchez’s

ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED.

B. Ground 5: Breached Plea Agreement

In Ground 5, Petitioner contends his “plea agreement ‘was breached’ and ‘changed at the last

minute,’” which the Court construes as a claim that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent. 

(Doc. 1-6 at 1.) Specifically, Petitioner contends his attorney never mentioned two strikes could be

imposed as a result of his guilty plea or that his pre-sentence custody credits would be denied. (Id.) 

Further, Petitioner contends he was intimidated into signing the plea agreement by his attorney, was

under “extreme mental and psychological duress” and under “psychiatric treatment and psychiatric

medications.” (Id. at 1, 4, 7.) 

Respondent contends the record does not support the existence of a breached plea agreement. 

(Doc. 27-1 at 12.) Instead, Respondent contends “Petitioner achieved a significant benefit as a result

of entering his plea since he was only sentenced to an aggregate term of six years and fourth months

out of a possible maximum thirteen years and eight months.” (Id.) Further, Petitioner contends the

record demonstrates Petitioner knowingly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the

offenses with which he was charged. (Id.) 

As stated previously, typically, one who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a

criminal charge may not subsequently challenge constitutional violations in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

987 (9th Cir. 2004). A petitioner who has pleaded guilty may only argue that his guilty plea was not

voluntary and intelligent, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), or contend that the advice he

received from his counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.

Petitioner did not raise the claim of breached plea agreement on direct review. (Lodgment 1

at 3-4.) Thus, the California Court of Appeal did not render a decision on this claim. Petitioner did

raise the claim of breached plea agreement in his habeas corpus petition submitted to the California

Supreme Court. (Supp. Lodgment 1 at 16, 96-98.) The California Supreme Court, however, denied

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition without citation of authority or analysis. (Lodgment 3.) Thus,

with respect to the claim of breached plea agreement in Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, there is

no reasoned state court decision to which this Court can “look” from the California Supreme Court’s

postcard denial. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Therefore, this Court must independently review the

record to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was objectively

reasonable. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. 

In light of his guilty plea, in order for Petitioner to succeed on this claim, Petitioner must

show the allegedly breached plea agreement resulted in an involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. 

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. After an independent review of the record, this Court finds Petitioner fails

to allege facts indicating his plea was breached in the first place, or that the allegedly breached plea

agreement contributed to an involuntary or unintelligent guilty plea. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82. 

As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner admitted a serious felony prior and acknowledged that the

only inducement to the plea was the promise that count four (grand theft of a firearm), and count 6

(receiving stolen property) would be dismissed. (Lodgment 1 at 4.) Petitioner also stated he

understood his plea could result in revocation of parole in other cases, consecutive sentences, two

strikes, and a maximum sentence of 13 years eight months. (Id.; Lodgment 2 Volume 4, at 104.) 

Although Petitioner alleges his plea was breached because his attorney never mentioned two strikes

could be imposed and his pre-sentence custody credits would be denied, the record demonstrates the

sentencing judge explicitly told Petitioner about his exposure to two strikes and custody credits were

not discussed prior to Petitioner’s entry of his plea. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 104.) Moreover, the

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

judge gave Petitioner an opportunity to withdraw his plea and speak with his attorney after

informing Petitioner of the two strikes and before Petitioner pled guilty. (Id. at 105, 107.) Further,

the record does not support Petitioner’s allegation that he was under “extreme mental and

psychological duress” and under “psychiatric treatment and psychiatric medications.” (Doc. 1-6 at

1,4,7.) Ultimately, Petitioner’s plea agreement was honored and he was sentenced to six years four

months. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 115.) Therefore, Petitioner is unable to show his plea was

breached or that it was involuntary or unintelligent.

Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground 5 of the Petition relating to the breached

plea agreement be DENIED. 

3. Post-Guilty Plea Claims

In his Petition, Petitioner raises two post-guilty plea claims. First, Petitioner contends he

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 1-5 at 1.) Second, Petitioner contends the

trial court erred in calculating his custody credits. (Doc. 1-5 at 1-6.)

A. Ground 1: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In Ground 1, Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

(Doc. 1-5 at 1.) Specifically, Petitioner contends his appellate counsel failed to “state and use any

favorable case laws.” (Id.)

Respondent contends the state court reasonably determined Petitioner failed to show counsel

did not act in a manner to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel’s alleged

acts or omissions prejudiced him. (Doc. 27-1 at 11.)

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard

set out in Strickland. Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, to demonstrate

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Petitioner must show counsel failed to act in a manner to

be expected of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel’s alleged acts or omissions

prejudiced Petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 691-692. 

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 1 at 5-6.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal held: “A

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 In Wende, the Court concluded that Anders requires the court to conduct a review of the entire record

whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as

frivolous. 25 Cal.3d at 441.

9

 In Anders, the Court held appointed appellate counsel who finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after

conscientious examination, should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw, supplying

a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. 386 U.S. at 744.

- 20 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende,

8 supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California,9

supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issue listed pursuant to Anders, has disclosed no

reasonably arguable appellate issues. Rinaldi has been competently represented by counsel on this

appeal.” (Lodgment 1 at 6.)

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s decision that Petitioner received

effective assistance of appellate counsel was either an unreasonable application of Strickland, or was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner asserts he was denied effective

assistance of appellate counsel because she failed to “state and use any favorable case laws.” (Doc.

1-5 at 1.) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, however, the Court of Appeal held a review of the

record “disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues.” (Lodgment 1 at 6.) Therefore, appellate

counsel Cindi Mishkin’s appellate brief setting forth a summary of the proceedings, but raising no

specific issues, complied with the procedures outlined in People v. Wende, and Anders v. California. 

(Lodgment 3.) Thus, Petitioner is unable to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland standard, that his

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. Further, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel because the Court of Appeal afforded Petitioner the opportunity to

file a brief on his own behalf. (Id.; Lodgment 1 at 3.) Petitioner presented his arguments in a

separate brief, which the Court of Appeal addressed in its decision. (Lodgment 1.) Therefore,

Petitioner is unable to establish “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground One of the Petition relating to Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel be DENIED.

//

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

B. Ground 4: Custody Credits

In Ground 4, Petitioner contends the trial court erred in calculating his custody credits. (Doc.

1-5 at 1.) Petitioner contends he was promised custody credits as part of his plea negotiation, so that

the trial judge erred in granting Petitioner zero days of credit because he had been in custody on a

parole violation on an unrelated matter. (Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 115.) 

Respondent contends Petitioner’s allegation fails to raise a federal question. (Doc. 27-1 at

12.) Further, Respondent contends the state appellate court reasonably rejected his claim. (Id.) 

To succeed on his habeas petition, Petitioner must show that the appellate court’s decision

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Generally, a state’s interpretation of its laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas

corpus relief when no federal constitutional question arises. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has indicated state laws can give rise to liberty interests

cognizable on federal habeas review, and that a federal due process violation can arise from arbitrary

rulings. See Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he failure of a state to

abide by its own statutory commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment against arbitrary deprivation by a state, [and] Ninth Circuit precedent generally

supports this proposition.”), citing Ballard v. Estelle, 937 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s custody

credit claim. (Lodgment 1 at 5.) The Court held: “Because Rinaldi’s pre-sentence custody was

attributable to his parole violation, and not solely attributable to the instant case, he was not entitled

to custody credits. (People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1191.)” (Id.)

To the extent Petitioner seeks a federal court determination the trial court erred in calculating

his custody credits, his request fails under Estelle v. McGuire. Further, Petitioner fails to

demonstrate arbitrary determinations by the appellate court. (Fetterly, 997 F.2d at 1300.) In ruling

the trial court properly found Petitioner was not entitled to pre-sentence custody credits, the Court of

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 - 08-cv-1637-L (POR)

Appeal applied People v. Bruner, which states, “A prisoner is not entitled to credit for presentence

confinement unless he shows that the conduct which led to his conviction was the sole reason for his

loss of liberty during the presentence period.” 9 Cal.4th at 1191. As the sentencing judge stated,

Petitioner was in custody on parole violations in an unrelated matter prior to being sentenced. 

(Lodgment 2, Volume 4 at 115.) In light thereof, the Court is unable to conclude the appellate

court’s decision was arbitrary. Based thereon, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a due process

violation. Fetterly, 997 F.2d at 1300. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground 4 of the

Petition relating to calculation of custody credits be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This Proposed

Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable M. James Lorenz,

pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than August 27, 2010, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 28, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable M. James Lorenz

all parties

Case 3:08-cv-01637-L-POR Document 29 Filed 07/29/10 Page 22 of 22