Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01981/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01981-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

WILLIAM FRANKLIN NAJAR, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-01981 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On or about September 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 15) on April 14, 2011.

Petitioner’s counsel in this matter entered a notice of

appearance on May 11, 2011. See Doc. 16. On June 17, 2011,

through counsel, Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 20) to the

answer. 

I Procedural History

On July 31, 1998, Petitioner and three co-defendants

were indicted on one count of first-degree premeditated murder

or, alternatively, first-degree felony murder; one count of

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder or armed robbery; one

count of armed robbery; one count of theft; and one count of

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1

 The possessions found by the jury to have been stolen were

a vehicle, an automatic weapon, a handgun, and marijuana and/or

methamphetamine. Answer, Exh. E.

2 At least one of the other co-defendants testified at the

trial of Petitioner and his co-defendant. A fifteen-year-old who

participated in the crimes but who was not charged in the indictment

also testified at the trial. The testimony indicated that the four

co-defendants discussed robbing and shooting the victim at least one

day prior to the date the victim was killed and that Petitioner

initially indicated an unwillingness to participate in murder. The

testimony indicated that on the day of the crime Petitioner aimed a

gun at the victim, lowered the gun, and then raised the gun again and

shot the victim in the back of the head or neck. The testimony

indicated that, after Petitioner shot the victim in the back of the

head, his trial co-defendant shot the victim in the face. The codefendants then buried the victim’s body and destroyed evidence of the

crime. The co-defendants then, as pre-arranged, each took an item of

the victim’s belongings. Petitioner later confessed his participation

in the crime to an individual who testified at his trial regarding

that confession. Petitioner’s trial co-defendant returned to the

scene of the crime after the crime, bringing along friends to whom he

confessed and to whom he displayed where the victim’s body was buried.

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arson of an occupied structure, i.e., a vehicle. See Answer,

Exh. A. Petitioner and his co-defendants were alleged to have

shot and killed Michael Decker and to have taken his belongings1

when they encountered their victim at a public campground within

Maricopa County. Id., Exh. K. The charge of theft was

dismissed prior to trial as being a lesser-included offense of

the charge of armed robbery. See id., Exh. K.

Petitioner was tried along with one co-defendant.2 At

the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial court dismissed

the charge of arson as against Petitioner because the

prosecution had failed to present sufficient evidence to give

this charge to the jury. Id., Exh. D. At the conclusion of the

thirteen-day trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of

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3In its notice of withdrawal of its intent to seek the death

penalty, the state indicated the jury had found Petitioner guilty of

first-degree murder under the theory of premeditation, rather than

pursuant to the theory of felony murder predicated on death caused in

the course of a robbery. See Answer, Exh. F. However, it appears

that the jury was instructed as to both theories of culpability and

that the jury did not specify under which theory it found Petitioner

guilty. See id., Exh. L (Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal to the

Arizona Supreme Court). Petitioner did not dispute, however, that he

had raised and lowered a gun aimed at the victim, although the victim

did not see him do this, prior to shooting the victim and that he

encouraged his co-defendant to also shoot the victim. Id., Exh. L.

4 Petitioner’s co-defendant was also found guilty of firstdegree murder and theft and acquitted on the charges of conspiracy and

armed robbery, and also found guilty of arson. Answer, Exh. E.

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first-degree murder. Id., Exh. E.3 Petitioner was acquitted on

the charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The

jury found Petitioner not guilty of armed robbery, but guilty of

theft as a lesser-included offense of armed robbery. Id., Exh.

E.4

The state originally noticed its intention to seek the

death penalty if Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder

but withdrew from this intention following Petitioner’s

conviction. Id., Exh. B & F. After a sentencing hearing, the

state court found as mitigating factors Petitioner’s age

(Petitioner was born in 1982 and was sixteen years of age at the

time of the crimes) and his dysfunctional family experience.

Id., Exh. G. Although the state court also noted there was some

evidence of Petitioner’s inability to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct, and some evidence of alcohol and

drug impairment and an underdeveloped prefrontal cortex, the

trial court found this evidence unpersuasive with regard to

establishing these mitigating factors as a matter of law. 

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5

 At the sentencing hearing Petitioner also entered a guilty

plea in a different 1998 criminal matter, to one count of burglary,

one count of theft, and one count of criminal damage. The charges

arose from an incident in which Petitioner took weapons and a vehicle

from the home of an acquaintance. Answer, Exh. F. 

-4-

As aggravating factors, the state court found the

presence of accomplices and that the murder was committed in

expectation of the receipt of items of pecuniary value. The

state court also found as aggravating factors the severe

emotional harm caused the victim’s mother at the loss of her

only son and the helplessness of the victim. Id., Exh. G. 

The state court found the aggravating factors

outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Petitioner to

natural life without the possibility of parole pursuant to his

conviction on the charge of first-degree murder. The state

court sentenced Petitioner to a concurrent one-year term of

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on the theft charge.5

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner argued

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed

judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to

demonstrate that he intended to rob his victim at the time of

the shooting. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner asserted the trial court

should have granted his motion for a directed verdict of not

guilty as to the armed robbery charge as well as the

felony-murder theory, because that charge was predicated upon

the armed robbery. Id., Exh. I. In response to Petitioner’s

appellate brief, the state argued that there was sufficient

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6

 Petitioner’s argument was predicated on the fact that

Petitioner had initially repudiated the idea of killing the victim in

order to take his property when the idea was suggested by a codefendant, and that his intent in going to the victim’s campsite with

the others was to smoke marijuana with the victim. The testimony

indicated that, after the co-defendants smoked marijuana with the

victim they engaged in shooting guns at targets with the victim and

then, after a brief time, killed the victim and took his property.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that “the manner in which the

murder occurred and the actions of the group immediately afterward

supported a conclusion that the killing was perpetrated as part of a

robbery.” Answer, Exh. K at 6.

-5-

evidence to find Petitioner guilty under either the theory of

premeditated murder or the theory of felony murder.

Additionally, the state asserted that Arizona law did not

require the jury to establish under which theory it found

Petitioner guilty of murder, nor did Arizona law require that a

defendant could not be found guilty of felony murder when also

acquitted of the underlying felony in favor of a lesser-included

offense. See id., Exh. J.

On November 14, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a memorandum

decision. The appellate court concluded the evidence

sufficiently supported the inference that Petitioner, and his

co-defendants, had formulated the intent to take the victim’s

property before or at the time of the shooting. Id., Exh. K.6

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals determined, the trial court

did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion for judgment of

acquittal on the theory of first-degree felony murder.

Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeals’

decision affirming his convictions and sentences by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which denied review on February 12, 2003. Id.,

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7

 Petitioner argued that his mathematical calculations

proved that he could not have shot the victim as the co-defendant

testified, with regard to the angle of the bullet entry wound and the

victim’s height, etc.

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Exh. O. Petitioner did not, apparently, seek a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.

On March 11, 2003, Petitioner commenced a timely action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner was

appointed counsel in his Rule 32 proceedings, who notified the

state court that Petitioner wished to represent himself because

they had disagreed on what issues should be raised in the

petition. Id., Exh. S. 

On October 23, 2003, and again on March 5, 2004,

Petitioner filed pro per briefs in his Rule 32 action alleging:

(1) he was entitled to re-sentencing pursuant to Arizona Revised

Statutes § 13-703 and Rule 32.1(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, because he was improperly sentenced for first-degree

murder under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-702; (2) his

conviction should be vacated pursuant to Rule 32.1(a), because

he was “ineffectively represented by incompetent counsel during

the trial process” in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights;

and (3) his conviction should be vacated pursuant to Rule

32.1(e), because newly discovered evidence existed that

substantially undermined “critical” trial testimony.7 Id., Exh.

R & Exh. U.

On July 19, 2004, the state trial court issued a minute

entry granting Petitioner relief with regard to his sentencing.

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8

 The initial sentencing court had found aggravating factors

which were specified in Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-702. In

Viramontes, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that a defendant

convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced pursuant to section

13-703 rather than section 702.

We believe that sections 13-702, 13-703, and

13-1105 are clear. Section 13-1105 provides that

any person guilty of first degree murder must be

sentenced pursuant to section 13-703. Section

13-703(A) expressly states that a person guilty

of first degree murder shall suffer death or

imprisonment pursuant to its terms. And, section

13-702 expressly applies only to class 2 through

class 6 felonies, with subsection (F) thereof

stating that the statute has no effect on first

degree murder sentencings.

 ... Nothing in the statutes expresses or

implies that the procedures and aggravators of

section 13-703 apply only to cases in which the

state has sought the death penalty. Rather, it is

clearly the nature and classification of the

crime that determines the appropriate sentencing

statute.

Arizona v. Viramontes, 204 Ariz. 360, 361-62, 64 P.3d 188, 189-90

(2003). The Arizona legislature changed the statutory sentencing

scheme after Viramontes. In May 2003, about five months after the supreme

court decided Viramontes and presumably in

response to that case, the legislature amended §

13-703.01, adding subsection (Q), which states:

 If the death penalty was not alleged or was

alleged but not imposed, the court shall

determine whether to impose a sentence of life or

natural life. In determining whether to impose

a sentence of life or natural life, the court:

 1. May consider any evidence introduced

before sentencing or at any other sentencing

proceeding.

 2. Shall consider the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances listed in § 13-702 and

any statement made by a victim.

Arizona v. Fell, 209 Ariz. 77, 80-81, 97 P.3d 902, 905-06 (Ct. App.

2004).

-7-

Id., Exh. X. Specifically, the appellate court accepted

Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a new sentencing

pursuant to Arizona v. Viramontes, 204 Ariz. 360, 361-62, 64

P.3d 188, 189-90 (2003). Id., Exh. X.8

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However, the state court denied Petitioner’s claims regarding

his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness and his claim of newly

discovered evidence, determining Petitioner had failed to

establish a colorable claim for relief on those bases. 

Petitioner was, accordingly, re-sentenced on December

2, 2005. Id., Exh. AA. Petitioner was represented by counsel

at the sentencing hearing, and a different judge presided over

the sentencing hearing than the initial trial and sentencing

judge. At the sentencing hearing the judge noted that, after

Petitioner’s initial sentencing, he “went through a restoration

competency,” i.e., he was evaluated and treated by mental health

experts. At the sentencing hearing Petitioner’s mother,

grandmother, and aunt averred that Petitioner had a troubled

youth, suffered from hereditary mental illness, and began using

drugs at a young age. Petitioner’s counsel argued that

Petitioner’s mental condition at the time of the crime rendered

him unable to form the requisite mens rea of first degree

murder, i.e., that his “reduced capacity” was a mitigating

factor. Counsel argued that Petitioner should be resentenced to

a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

At the re-sentencing, the state court found as

aggravating factors that the offense was committed in

consideration for the receipt of anything of pecuniary value,

i.e., that Petitioner and the co-defendants had determined to

take the victim’s belongings and Petitioner did receive the

victim’s drugs, and that Petitioner’s actions caused extreme

emotional trauma to the victim’s mother. Id., Exh. AA. As

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9

 “This was a very calculated, planned exercise by you and

the others as detailed in the pre-sentence reports as of trial. I

won’t go through the chapter and verse, but it’s obvious that that’s

what happened.” Answer, Exh. AA.

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mitigating factors, the state court noted Petitioner’s age,

emotional and physical immaturity, and dysfunctional upbringing.

Id., Exh. AA. Although the state court also noted that

Petitioner was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the

time of the offense, it rejected the claim that Petitioner was

incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id.,

Exh. AA.9 “On balance, the Court [found] nothing significant

[had] changed to cause the Court to change the sentence of that

originally imposed.” Id., Exh. AA. The state court again

ordered Petitioner to be committed for his natural life pursuant

to his conviction for murder.

 Petitioner initiated a second state Rule 32 action on

November 3, 2006. Id., Exh. BB. Petitioner asserted that he

was resentenced to an aggravated term of imprisonment in

violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because

he was ordered to serve natural life in prison on the basis of

aggravating factors not admitted or found beyond a reasonable

doubt by a jury. Id., Exh. CC. Petitioner argued that the

Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 554,

115 P.3d 594 (2005), finding that a natural life sentence was

not an aggravated term and could be imposed without a jury

finding of aggravating factors, was incorrectly decided. 

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second

Rule 32 action on November 5, 2008, concluding that it was

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required to follow the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court,

i.e., Fell. Id., Exh. FF. The state trial court reasoned that,

therefore, Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the

sentencing court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury

determination of aggravating factors under Blakely. In denying

relief the court noted that Petitioner appeared to be

challenging the effectiveness of his trial and appellate

counsel. The trial court determined that, to that extent

Petitioner had asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, Petitioner should have raised all of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in his prior Rule 32 proceeding and

was now precluded from asserting such a claim. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on February 3,

2010. Id., Exh. JJ. Petitioner filed a petition for review in

the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on July 7, 2010.

Id., Exh. MM. 

In his federal habeas petition, filed September 15,

2010, Petitioner advances the following grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner alleges he was denied a jury finding of

aggravating factors at his 2005 re-sentencing, in violation of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). 

(2) Petitioner alleges he was denied his constitutional

right to have the aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable

doubt at his 2005 re-sentencing.

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(3) Petitioner alleges he was illegally re-sentenced to

a term greater than that authorized by the finding of guilt and

absent jury findings of aggravating factors. 

(4) Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel at his 2005 re-sentencing because counsel

failed to protect his right to a jury finding of the aggravating

factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

(5) Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to seek a

determination of Petitioner’s competence to be tried. 

(6) Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process because he was convicted of felony murder when there was

insufficient evidence to support the predicate felony.

(7) Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process because, during voir dire, the jury panel was

misinformed about their role in sentencing and Petitioner was

denied the full use of his peremptory challenges.

Respondents argue:

While Grounds I, II, III, and IV of the

instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

are timely, Grounds V, VI, and VII are

untimely and this Court should therefore deny

them and dismiss them with prejudice. ...

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005) (“If

claims asserted after the one-year period

could be revived simply because they relate

to the same trial, conviction, or sentence as

a timely filed claim, AEDPA’s limitation

period would have slim significance.”); see

also Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 983–84

(6th Cir. 2007) (finding § 2244(d)(1) must be

applied on a claim-by-claim basis); Fielder

v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2004)

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II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The Magistrate Judge does not agree with Respondents

that some of Petitioner’s claims are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations found in the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). “The ‘limitation period shall run from ...

the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.’” Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir.

2010), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can

file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such

a petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir.

1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court

grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d

921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a

notice of post-conviction relief is filed, even though the

petition is not filed until later. See, e.g., Isley v. Arizona

Department of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An

application for post-conviction relief is also pending during

the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a

higher court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th

Cir. 2003).

 The statute of limitations under AEDPA is

subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. Holland v. Florida, [] 130 S. Ct.

2549, 2560 (2010). However, for equitable

tolling to apply, a petitioner must show

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“‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way’” and

prevented him from filing a timely petition.

Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2010).

At the time that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the conclusion of his direct appeal proceedings,

i.e., when the time expired for Petitioner to seek a writ of

certiorari from the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of relief in

his direct appeal, Petitioner had filed a timely action for

state post-conviction relief which tolled the statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action until the

resolution of the state action for post-conviction relief. The

end result of Petitioner’s first action for state postconviction relief was his resentencing on December 2, 2005.

Accordingly, the statute of limitations with regard to

Petitioner’s federal habeas action was tolled until Petitioner’s

resentencing. 

Therefore, assuming the one-year statute of limitations

on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run on the day

after he was resentenced, i.e., December 3, 2005, the statute of

limitations ran for approximately eleven months, until it was

tolled by the filing of a state action for post-conviction

relief on November 3, 2006. The statute of limitations was

tolled until September 10, 2010, when the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review of the trial court’s and Arizona Court of Appeals’

decisions denying post-conviction relief. When Petitioner filed

his habeas petition on September 15, 2010, a total of eleven

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10 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2010). 

-15-

months and five days of untolled time had passed since

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final. 

B. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).10

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

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constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a

petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full

and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement

of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v.

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Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.

1014 (2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir.

2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-

13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to

support the federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,

6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

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state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

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C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

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properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness

will constitute cause only if it is an independent

constitutional violation”); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809

(6th Cir. 2004) (“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to

excuse a procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.”). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

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miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

E. Adequate and independent state-law basis

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221

n.6 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a

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procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, comply[]

with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.”

Id., 567 F.3d at 581-82, quoting Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). It is Respondents’ burden to prove

the rule cited and relied upon by the state court in denying

relief was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time the rule was applied to Petitioner’s case. Id. 

Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to

preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985)

(emphasis added). See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

261-62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989). 

“[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state

court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038 [].

... Sanders v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th

Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate court’s

discussion of waiver is intertwined with its

merits analysis, the state court’s decision

does not rest on an independent and adequate

state law ground)....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567

F.3d at 581-82.

F. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

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court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006).

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a

state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes

the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S.

Ct. 1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000).

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A state court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if it arrives at a

conclusion of law opposite to that of the

Supreme Court or reaches a result different

from the Supreme Court on materially

indistinguishable facts. Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law if it correctly identifies a governing

rule but applies it to a new set of facts in

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if

it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly

established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable. Id. An unreasonable

application of federal law is different from

an incorrect application of federal law. Id.

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 2011 WL 1527339 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-10109). 

For example, a state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47

(2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d

1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

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11 “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court

to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011).

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2113, 2120 (2000). See also Norris, 622 F.3d at 1289; Cheney

v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v.

Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129

S. Ct. 1033 (2009). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. Renico v.

Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409,

120 S. Ct. at 1521; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74-75, 127 S. Ct. at 653.

An unreasonable application of law is different from an

incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct.

1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th

Cir. 2005).11

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286.

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G. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner alleges he was denied a jury finding of

aggravating factors at his 2005 re-sentencing, in violation of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). 

The claim is timely and was exhausted in the state

courts. See Answer, Exh. BB & FF. The Arizona state courts

determined that Petitioner’s re-sentencing did not violate the

doctrine set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Blakely v. Washington, i.e., that Petitioner’s sentence did not

violate his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine his

guilt. This decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of federal law.

The Blakely opinion arose from a previous decision of

the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey. See

530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The Supreme Court held in

Apprendi that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

legislatively-prescribed “statutory maximum” must be submitted

to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at

488-90, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-63. The Supreme Court concluded

that, otherwise, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a

jury determine their guilt was violated. The federal courts

interpreted Apprendi to mean that a sentencing judge may not

aggravate a sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” proscribed

by the state legislature. 

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court clarified

that the term “statutory maximum,” as used in Apprendi, was to

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be interpreted as the presumptive sentence, or the presumptive

sentence given the facts as found by the jury or admitted by the

defendant, rather than the maximum statutory sentence allowed

after judicial fact-finding. See 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S. Ct.

at 2537; Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In

other words, [after Blakely,] the relevant ‘statutory maximum’

is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any

additional findings.”).

A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in the

State of Arizona may be sentenced to a term of natural life or

a term of 25 years to life imprisonment, i.e., a sentence of

life imprisonment but with the possibility of parole after

serving 25 years. The Arizona courts have determined that a

sentencing court may impose a sentence of natural life for

first-degree murder based solely on the facts reflected in the

jury’s guilty verdict, i.e., the elements of that crime. E.g.,

Arizona v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 554, 558-60, 115 P.3d 594, 598-600

(2005)(en banc). The Arizona courts have reasoned that, because

there is no requirement that any aggravating factor be found

before natural life may be imposed, a trial court does not

unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, i.e.,

Blakely, in sentencing a defendant convicted of first-degree

murder to natural life without a jury determination of

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., 210

Ariz. at 560, 115 P.3d at 600 (“We therefore conclude that the

Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury find an aggravating

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Neither the statute nor case law requires a

sentencing judge to enter factual findings on the

aggravating or mitigating factors in this

context. Compare § 13-703 (containing no language

requiring findings of fact on circumstances judge

considers in imposing prison term of natural life

or life with the possibility of parole) with §

13-702(B) (requiring factual findings on

aggravating or mitigating factors); [ ] And, we

find both unsupported and unpersuasive [the

defendant’s] suggestion that a life term of

imprisonment with the possibility of parole is

the “presumptive” prison term in this context or

the “statutory maximum” for purposes of Blakely

and that a natural life term is tantamount to an

aggravated, upward adjustment from that

presumptive term.

209 Ariz. 77, 86, 97 P.3d 902, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2004).

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circumstance before a natural life sentence can be imposed”);

Arizona v. Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, 333, 206 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct.

App. 2008) (“Our supreme court ruled in Fell that neither before

nor after the legislature amended the statutes in 2003 was a

trial court required to make any specific finding before

imposing a natural life sentence.”). See also Arizona v. Fell,

209 Ariz. 77, 86, 97 P.3d 902, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2004).12

In Fell, the en banc Arizona Supreme Court held that

Arizona’s non-capital murder sentencing scheme does not offend

Apprendi or Blakely because “nothing in § 13-703 require[s] the

finding of any fact beyond those reflected in the jury’s verdict

of guilt as a prerequisite to the imposition of a natural life

sentence.” 210 Ariz. at 558-59, 115 P.3d at 598-99. The court

rejected the argument that a sentence of life with the

possibility of parole is the “presumptive” sentence and,

accordingly, that a sentence of natural life constitutes an

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“aggravated” sentence for first-degree murder. Id. “Had the

legislature intended to require a specific finding be made

before a natural life sentence could be imposed, it surely would

have said so specifically, as it did in the statutes governing

sentencing for felonies other than first-degree murder.” Id.,

210 Ariz. at 559, 115 P.3d at 599. 

 The Arizona courts have interpreted the law applicable

at the time of Petitioner’s sentencing as allowing an individual

convicted of first-degree murder to be sentenced to natural life

“based solely on the jury’s guilty verdict, without additional

findings.” Fell, 209 Ariz. at 85, 97 P.3d at 910. This

interpretation of state law is binding on this Court. The

Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that a state court’s

interpretation of state law ... binds a federal court sitting in

habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 126 S. Ct.

602, 604 (2005). Because, as a matter of law, the jury’s

verdict of guilty of first-degree felony murder, without further

findings, provided a sufficient factual basis for the sentence

imposed on Petitioner, he is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on the merits of his Blakely claim.

Additionally, in Arizona v. Martinez the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied a Blakely claim and affirmed a defendant’s

sentencing in accordance with Viramontes, concluding:

In Blakely, the Court specifically

distinguished the situation where judicial

sentencing factors merely impact the minimum

punishment available from that where they

increase the maximum punishment above that

authorized by the verdict. [ ] It is only in

the latter case that a defendant’s due

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13 The Magistrate Judge reached a similar conclusion in a

Report and Recommendation in another section 2254 matter, Williams v.

Perkins, available at 2007 WL 433575. The Honorable Earl H. Carroll

adopted the Report and Recommendation in that matter, which decision

was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see 399 Fed. App.

210 (Oct. 06, 2010), and the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari in the matter on March 21, 2011. See 131 S. Ct. 1681

(2011). 

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process right to trial by jury is implicated.

See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,

567, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524[ ]

(2002)[ ]. Because a guilty verdict for

first-degree murder authorizes the court to

impose a life sentence either with or without

the possibility of release, the court may

properly consider the statutory sentencing

factors, without the need for jury findings

regarding those factors, in deciding whether

to allow the possibility of release. See ... State v. Fell, 209 Ariz. 77, 86, ¶ 29, 97

P.3d 902, 911 (App. 2004) (“Blakely does not

apply to a trial court’s decision whether to

sentence a defendant convicted of

first-degree murder to a term of natural life

imprisonment or life with the possibility of

parole.”).

Arizona v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 283-84, 100 P.3d 30, 33-34

(Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1044, 126 S. Ct. 762

(2005).

Had the Arizona courts erred in their interpretation of

Blakely, the United States Supreme Court could have accepted

certiorari in Martinez to consider the issue.13 Because Blakely

is not applicable to Petitioner’s sentence for first-degree

murder, and the United States Supreme Court has indicated that

Arizona’s sentencing scheme does not violate the doctrine of

Blakely, the Arizona courts did not err by concluding that

Petitioner was not entitled to relief based on a claim that his

sentence violated the doctrine of Blakely. Accordingly,

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim. 

2. Petitioner alleges he was denied his constitutional

right to have the aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable

doubt at his 2005 re-sentencing.

As explained supra, Petitioner’s sentence upon resentencing satisfies the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in both Blakely and Apprendi. Therefore, Petitioner’s sentence

does not violate his constitutional rights and this claim may be

denied on the merits pursuant to the reasoning set forth with

regard to Petitioner’s first claim for relief. 

3. Petitioner alleges he was illegally re-sentenced to

a term greater than that authorized by the finding of guilt and

absent jury findings of aggravating factors. 

As explained supra, Petitioner’s sentence upon resentencing satisfies the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in both Blakely and Apprendi with regard as to whether

Petitioner’s sentence was authorized by the jury’s finding of

guilt. Therefore, Petitioner’s sentence does not violate his

constitutional rights and this claim may be denied on the merits

pursuant to the reasoning set forth with regard to Petitioner’s

first claim for relief. 

4. Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel at his 2005 re-sentencing because counsel

failed to protect his right to a jury finding of the aggravating

factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Respondents argue this claim should be denied on the

merits. Answer at 26 (“Because Blakely is inapplicable and no

sentencing error occurred, Petitioner cannot show that his

counsel at the 2005 resentencing was ineffective.”).

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To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

786-88 (2011). Counsel’s performance will be held

constitutionally deficient only if the defendant proves that it

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as

measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052. See also Cheney v. Washington,

614 F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2010).

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. Therefore, to

succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, either in

his trial proceedings or in his appeals, the petitioner must

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establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby

establishing that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission.

See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007);

Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). “It is

not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Accordingly,

prejudice from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is less

likely when the case against the defendant is strong. See,

e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009); Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2002); Godwin v. Johnson,

632 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2011). It is Petitioner’s burden to

establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and

that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at

384-85.

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not

unconstitutionally deficient because he “failed” to raise a nonmeritorious argument, i.e., that Petitioner’s sentence violated

Blakely, because the professional norm does not require that

counsel raise non-meritorious arguments. Additionally, because

Petitioner’s Blakely claim was without merit, as explained

supra, counsel’s “failure” to raise this claim was not

prejudicial. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, based on Petitioner’s assertion that

counsel failed to raise a Blakely claim, may be denied on the

merits. 

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5. Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to seek a

determination of Petitioner’s competence to be tried. 

Petitioner did not exhaust this claim in the state

courts. Petitioner has not established cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, the procedural default of this claims.

Additionally, after thoroughly reviewing the record in this

matter, there is no indication that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur absent the Court’s consideration of the

merits of this claim. 

Additionally, it appears from the record in this matter

that the issue of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial and the

fact of his age and alleged “intoxication” at the time of his

crimes was thoroughly explored by Petitioner’s counsel, in both

pretrial proceedings and regarding sentencing and re-sentencing.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that his counsel

failed to seek a determination of Petitioner’s competency to be

tried as a factual matter or that any alleged “failure” was

prejudicial. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 742-43 (2011).

Because strategic decisions by counsel are virtually per se not

reviewable on habeas, Petitioner has not stated a claim for

relief. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011).

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6. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process because he was convicted of felony murder when there was

insufficient evidence to support the predicate felony.

At Petitioner’s trial, the jury was instructed both as

to first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury

was instructed that it need not form a unanimous opinion as to

which theory of murder had been proven. Only one form of

verdict was supplied for first degree murder, which did not

specify under which theory of murder the jury had voted to

convict. See Answer, Exh. I (Petitioner’s brief in his direct

appeal). Petitioner’s trial counsel argued to the jury that

Petitioner was guilty, at best, of second-degree murder. 

In his direct appeal Petitioner exhausted a claim that

there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he

formulated the mens rea to commit robbery because his

accomplice’s trial testimony indicated that Petitioner had

renounced any intent to rob the victim prior to shooting him.

See Answer, Exh. I. Petitioner argued in his appeal that,

accordingly, that he could not be convicted of felony murder

predicated on death occurring in the course of a robbery and

that he was entitled to a directed verdict on this charge.

Petitioner did not assert in his direct appeal that this error

violated his federal constitutional right to due process of law.

Regardless of any procedural default of this claim, it

may be rejected on the merits. The federal courts have

uniformly determined a defendant’s right to due process is not

violated when the jury is instructed on two alternate theories

of murder and need not reach a unanimous decision as to which

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theory of murder provided the basis for its verdict. The courts

have stated that, although a unanimous verdict is required to

convict a person of a crime, he is not entitled to a unanimous

verdict on the precise manner in which the act was committed.

See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630-31, 111 S. Ct. 2491,

2496 (1991); Gibson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008);

Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (D. Ariz. 1987). 

In Schad, the Supreme Court addressed the

constitutionality of the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that a

general verdict as to first-degree murder is permissible under

Arizona law, reasoning that premeditation and the commission of

a felony are not independent elements of the crime, but rather

are mere means of satisfying a single mens rea element. 501

U.S. at 637-38, 111 S. Ct. at 2500. The Supreme Court held that

a conviction under an instruction that did not require the jury

to unanimously agree upon one of the alternative theories of

premeditated murder and felony murder did not constitute a

denial of due process. The Court explained that it had “never

suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases the

jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of

commission.” Id., 501 U.S. at 631, 111 S. Ct. at 2496.

The trial testimony of Petitioner’s accomplice

indicated Petitioner raised and lowered and raised a gun aimed

at the back of the victim’s head and then shot the victim, and

then instructed another accomplice to shoot the victim again.

This is sufficient evidence to support a jury’s conclusion that

Petitioner committed first-degree premeditated murder. 

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14 The reply argues that Petitioner is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to any claim found

not timely, based on Petitioner’s mental condition after his

conviction and sentencing. The reply also reargues Petitioner’s claim

that Fell was incorrectly decided.

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7. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process because, during voir dire, the jury panel was

misinformed about their role in sentencing and Petitioner was

denied the full use of his peremptory challenges.

Petitioner did not exhaust this claim in the state

courts. In his reply to the answer to his section 2254

petition, Petitioner does not offer a reason for his failure to

exhaust this claim in the state courts.14 Because the claim was

procedurally defaulted in the state courts Petitioner must

establish cause and prejudice for his procedural default, or

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur, before the

Court may grant relief on the merits of the claim. Petitioner

has not established cause and prejudice regarding the procedural

default of this claim. Because sufficient evidence was

presented at trial from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that Petitioner was guilty, Petitioner has not established that

a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent

consideration of this claim for relief.

III Conclusion

The petition was timely filed. Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on the claim that his re-sentencing

violated his federal constitutional rights or the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely. Petitioner has not

established that he was denied his right to the effective

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assistance of counsel. Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the claim that he was improperly convicted of

first-degree murder because there was inadequate evidence to

support a predicate felony and, accordingly, a conviction based

on felony murder.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Najar’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

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of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 18th day of July, 2011.

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