Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00780/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00780-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

WALLACE ROBINSON PLAINTIFF 

ADC #169328 

v. No. 4:19CV00780-DPM-JTR 

MUNYAN, Nurse, 

Faulkner County Detention Center, et al. DEFENDANTS 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to Chief United 

States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part 

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain 

the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of 

this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do 

not file objections, Judge Marshall may adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff Wallace Robinson (“Robinson”), an Arkansas Division of Correction 

(“ADC”) inmate, has filed a pro se § 1983 Complaint and Amended Complaint. He 

alleges that, while he was being temporarily held at the Faulkner County Detention 

Case 4:19-cv-00780-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/30/20 Page 1 of 9
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Center (“FCDC”), Defendants violated his constitutional rights by refusing to 

approve and administer his prescribed medications. Docs. 2 & 9. 1 Before Robinson 

may proceed with this case, the Court must screen his claims.2

II. Discussion 

 Robinson alleges that, before he arrived at the FCDC, medical personnel at 

the ADC had prescribed three medications for his “very unstable blood pressure”: 

(1) HCTZ (hydrochlorothiazide), 25 mg. once a day; (2) amlodipine, 10 mg. once a 

day; and (3) carvedilol, 25 mg. twice a day.3

 While at the FCDC, on June 14, 2019, 

his head started hurting and he felt light-headed. He asked Defendant Corporal 

Huang (“Huang”) for his “blood pressure and heart meds,” and she said they had not 

been approved by “the nurse.” Huang then called Defendant Nurse Munyan 

 1

The Court has read Robinson’s pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint, together, as 

constituting his claims. See Kiir v. N.D. Pub. Health, 651 F. App’x 567, 568 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(amendment “intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, the original complaint,” should be 

read together with original complaint); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (pro 

se pleadings must be liberally construed). 

2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints 

seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are 

legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When 

making this determination, a court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint, and it may consider documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). 

3

These medications are all used to treat hypertension. See https://www.drugs.com/ 

drug_information.html. 

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(“Munyan”), who told Huang to give Robinson ibuprofen, and said he had already 

told someone else not to issue Robinson his prescribed medications. According to 

Robinson, Munyan later denied that Huang ever called him. Robinson alleges that 

Munyan inaccurately characterized his prescribed medications as “controlled 

substances” and that ibuprofen, the only medication which Munyan allowed 

Robinson to have, “actually raises blood pressure.” Robinson wrote a grievance 

about the matter. Doc. 2 at 4-5, 7-9; Doc. 9 at 4. 

 On June 15, 2019, Robinson again had a headache, felt dizzy, and had “mild” 

chest pains. Defendant Officer Kilpatrick (“Kilpatrick”) took Robinson’s blood 

pressure, which was “highly elevated” (157/118). Kilpatrick called Munyan and, 

after talking to him, offered Robinson ibuprofen. Robinson wrote another grievance 

about Munyan’s refusal to approve his prescribed medications. Doc. 2 at 5, 8-9; Doc. 

9 at 5. 

 According to Robinson, the actions of Munyan, Huang and Kilpatrick caused 

him to miss three doses of HCTZ and amlodipine, and five doses of carvedilol, which 

constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Doc. 9 at 4. 

 He also alleges that Defendants Faulkner County and the FCDC “Medical 

Contractor” contributed to the alleged constitutional violation by refusing to have 

medical staff present on weekends and by failing to properly train their officers and 

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medical staff. Robinson seeks damages and an injunction “ordering [the FCDC] to 

have medical staff on premises seven days a week.” Doc. 2 at 6; Doc. 9 at 4 & 6. 

A. Defendant Kilpatrick

 In his Amended Complaint, Robinson asks that Kilpatrick be dismissed as a 

Defendant. Doc. 9 at 5. Accordingly, all claims against Kilpatrick should be 

dismissed, without prejudice. 

B. Defendants Munyan and Huang

 “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes 

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth 

Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To plead a viable 

inadequate medical care claim against Munyan and Huang, Robinson must allege 

facts establishing that: (1) he had “objectively serious medical needs”; and (2) 

subjectively, Munyan and Huang “actually knew of but deliberately disregarded 

those needs.” Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019). 

 A medical need is objectively serious if it has been “diagnosed by a physician 

as requiring treatment” or if it is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 

1124 (8th Cir. 2018). When a prisoner alleges that a delay in medical treatment has 

violated his constitutional rights, the “objective seriousness of the deprivation should 

also be measured ‘by reference to the effect of delay in treatment.’” Laughlin v. 

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Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005); see Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 

645, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (a prisoner must demonstrate that the delay in obtaining 

medical treatment adversely affected his prognosis, or that defendants ignored an 

acute or escalating situation). Importantly, “the Constitution does not require jailers 

to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” Jenkins 

v. County of Hennepin, Minnesota, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). 

 Under the subjective component of an inadequate medical care claim, prison 

officials may not “deliberately delay or deny prisoners’ medical care,” but a prisoner 

“must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence,” to make out a 

constitutional violation. Hamner, 937 F.3d at 1177; see Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 

1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019) (deliberate indifference requires a mental state “akin to 

criminal recklessness”). Significantly, prisoners “have no right to receive a particular 

or requested course of treatment,” and prison medical personnel “remain free to 

exercise their independent medical judgment.” Barr v. Pearson, 909 F.3d 919, 921 

(8th Cir. 2018). It is well-settled that a prisoner’s “mere difference of opinion over 

matters of expert medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fails to rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. at 921-22 (citation and alterations 

omitted). 

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 1. Defendant Munyan 

 For purposes of this Recommendation, the Court accepts that Robinson’s high 

blood pressure, for which he was prescribed three medications, constitutes an 

objectively serious medical need. However, nothing in Robinson’s pleadings 

establishes that Munyan ignored an acute or escalating medical condition or that 

Robinson’s prognosis was adversely affected by the at most three-day delay in 

approving his prescribed medications.4

 Furthermore, Munyan did not deny all 

medical treatment to Robinson, instead authorizing the use of ibuprofen for his 

symptoms, which included a headache (on June 14) and mild chest pains (on June 

15). Robinson’s disagreement with Munyan’s recommended course of treatment 

does not give rise to a constitutional violation. In short, Robinson’s allegations fail 

to demonstrate that Munyan was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs 

on June 14-15, 2019. 

 Because Robinson has not pled a viable inadequate medical care claim against 

Munyan, the Court recommends that Robinson’s claim against Munyan be 

dismissed, without prejudice, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 

 4

According to Robinson, he first requested his medications on Friday, June 14, 2019, and 

Huang allegedly called Munyan between 8:40 and 8:50 p.m. that night. See Doc. 2 at 5, 7 & 9. 

Robinson’s second request was on Saturday, June 15. Id. at 8. He alleges that, in all, he missed 

three doses of HCTZ and amlodipine, which he was to receive once a day, and five doses of 

carvedilol, which he was to receive twice a day. Doc. 9 at 4. Thus, he apparently started receiving 

his medications on Sunday, June 16 or, at the latest, Monday, June 17. 

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 2. Defendant Huang 

 Robinson’s only allegation against Huang is that, after Robinson asked for his 

medications on June 14, Huang called Munyan, who said the medications had not 

been approved but that Robinson could have some ibuprofen. Rather than indicating 

that Huang deprived Robinson of any constitutional right, these facts show that 

Huang immediately took affirmative steps to facilitate Robinson’s receipt of medical 

care. As a layperson, Huang was entitled to rely on the determination by Munyan, a 

trained medical professional, that the requested medications had not been approved 

but that ibuprofen could be offered. See Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038, 

1042-43 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the law does not require a jailer to secondguess or disregard a [trained medical professional’s] opinions or treatment 

recommendations”). 

 Because Robinson has not pled a viable inadequate medical care claim against 

Huang, the Court recommends that Robinson’s claim against Huang be dismissed, 

without prejudice, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

C. Defendants Faulkner County and FCDC Medical Contractor 

 Finally, Robinson alleges that Faulkner County refused to have medical staff 

present on weekends, and that the County and the FCDC Medical Contractor failed 

to properly train their officers and medical staff, all of which contributed to the 

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allegedly unconstitutional denial of medical care.5

 In this regard, he seeks an 

injunction “ordering [the FCDC] to have medical staff on premises seven days a 

week.” Doc. 9 at 4 & 6. 

Without a constitutional violation by the individual Defendants, there can be 

no liability on the part of Faulkner County or the FCDC Medical Contractor. Smith 

v. Kilgore, 926 F.3d 479, 486 (8th Cir. 2019); Schoettle v. Jefferson County, 788 

F.3d 855, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2015) (“We have long held that neither municipal nor 

supervisory liability may attach in section 1983 actions unless individual liability is 

first found on an underlying substantive claim.”). In addition, because Robinson is 

no longer incarcerated at the FCDC, his request for injunctive relief is moot. Zajrael 

v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that a prisoner’s request for 

injunctive relief is rendered moot when he is transferred to another facility and is no 

longer subject to the allegedly unconstitutional conditions). 

 Accordingly, Robinson’s claims against Faulkner County and the FCDC 

Medical Contractor should be dismissed, without prejudice, for failing to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

 5

Robinson’s “official capacity” claims against Munyan and Huang are also treated as 

claims against the County. See Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). 

Case 4:19-cv-00780-DPM Document 12 Filed 04/30/20 Page 8 of 9
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 1. Robinson’s request to dismiss Officer Kilpatrick be GRANTED, and 

that he be DISMISSED, without prejudice, from this action. 

 2. Robinson’s remaining claims against Corporal Huang, Nurse Munyan, 

Faulkner County, and the FCDC Medical Contractor, be DISMISSED, without 

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 3. The dismissal of this case count as a “STRIKE,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). 

 4. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in 

forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be 

taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 30th day of April, 2020. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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