Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00474/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00474-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

WOODROW WILLCOXON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv0474-DMS(POR) 

ORDER LIFTING STAY AND

DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2254

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Petitioner Woodrow Willcoxon ("Willcoxon"), a state prisoner serving an indeterminate life

sentence following his June 1976 conviction by a jury of first-degree murder, proceeding pro se, seeks

a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 writ of habeas corpus. He alleges the Board of Parole Hearings ("Board") violated

his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in denying him parole at his August 17, 2006

subsequent suitability hearing. In particular, his April 7, 2008 federal habeas petition ("Petition")

alleges as Ground One "the Board had no relevant, reliable or material evidence upon which to base

denial of parole for the eighth time and, therefore, the decision was arbitrary, capricious and

standardless in violation of the Due Process Clause." (Pet., Dkt No. 1, 9:17-20.) He alleges as

Ground Two the Board has a policy of denying parole to murder offenders or delaying parole until the

lifer has reached or exceeded terms the Board deems proportionate and uniform, purportedly depriving

"petitioner and other similarly-situated offenders . . . of their federally-protected liberty interests in

parole" through "unauthorized administrative enlargement of the parole statute." (Id. 9:22-10:3.)

Respondent filed an Answer, conceding Willcoxon's claims are exhausted and there is no time

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limitation or other procedural bar to reaching the merits of the Petition, but disputing he is entitled to

federal habeas relief. (Dkt No. 10.) Willcoxon filed a Traverse captioned "Denial To Respondent's

Answer." (Dkt No.11.)

By Order entered November 25, 2008, this case was reassigned from the Eastern District of

California to the undersigned visiting judge. (Dkt No. 12.) By Order entered March 13, 2009, the

Court stayed the matter in anticipation of the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision on rehearing of

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc granted by 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008), vacated by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). (Dkt No. 14.) The

en banc decision issued April 22, 2010. Among other things, that decision has answered the questions

for this Circuit "whether federal constitutional law imposes on the states a requirement for some

quantum of evidence to support a state's denial of parole," and "whether, even if there is no general

federal quantum of evidence requirement, applicants for parole in California, under the state's current

laws, may obtain federal habeas review of whether there is 'some evidence' supporting a negative

parole decision." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 549. The Court now lifts the stay in this case and reaches the

merits of Willcoxon's due process claim, applying the clarified review standards. In consideration of

the record and controlling authority, for the reasons discussed below, the Petition is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND AND NARROWED SCOPE OF REVIEW

Willcoxon was convicted of first degree murder for killing Roosevelt Evens in January 1976,

with the aggravated circumstances the shooting occurred in a public and crowded place, he shot the

victim several times, and one bystander received a non-fatal gunshot wound during the incident. As

summarized by the panel at his 2006 parole suitability hearing:

The inmate was received on June 3rd, 1976 from Santa Clara County.

The life term began on June 3rd, 1976 with a Minimum Eligible Parole

Date of January 14th, 1983. The controlling offense for which the

inmate has been committed is murder first with a firearm, Case Number

62211, Count One, Penal Code Section 187 slash12022.5. The inmate

received a term of seven years to life for this.

(Ans. Dkt No. 10-4, 14:2-9.)

The state courts prepared no statement of underlying facts in denying Willcoxon habeas relief.

He quotes from the November 2002 Parole Board Report statement which "was read into the record

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1

 In addition to the Roosevelt murder and the Pena assault on January 16, 1976, Willcoxon was also

tried on a separate Count Three robbery incident that occurred on December 29, 1975 involving his use of a

handgun with a shot fired, described in the excised portion of the quotation. (See Pet. 15:20-16:3)

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at the August 2006 parole suitability hearing" (Pet. p. 15) and does not dispute the accuracy of the

hearing transcript in any respect.

Count one, murder first. On 1/16/76 at approximately

12:50 a.m., Willcoxon was involved in a conversation with an

employee at the Disco Odyssey, located in San Jose. The victim,

Roosevelt Evens, E-V-E-N-S, became involved in a brutal

confrontation with Willcoxon. Willcoxon was said to have invited the

victim outside to settle the dispute. Once outside, Willcoxon produced

a 9-millimeter German Luger and fired one shot into the victim's

abdomen. The victim stumbled backwards and Willcoxon fired an

additional five to six rounds at the victim. Responding officers arrived

on the scene, checked the victim's vital signs, and . . . in finding none,

pronounced the victim dead. Count two, assault with a deadly weapon

in the commission of Count one, one of the rounds went astray and

struck Victim number two, Hector Pena, P-E-N-A, in the shoulder and

he was taken to Valley Medical Center. . . .[1]

(Pet p. 15; Dkt No. 10-4, 25:1-24.). 

Willcoxon also quotes his own version of events in his Petition as it was read into the record

from a June 2006 Board Report prepared for the hearing:

Willcoxon stated in an interview . . . on March 24, 2006, that he admits

to shooting both victims. However, he indicates that following the

confrontation with Victim number one, Roosevelt Evens, he asked the

bouncer of the Disco Odyssey to hold the victim until he left. He

claims the victim broke away from the bouncer. Willcoxon thought he

had a knife and shot the said victim. He admits shooting the victim

several times indicating it was self-defense. Willcoxon indicates that

. . . the incident occurred as reported with one exception, he states he

had no intention of shooting the victims. He fired above the – or fired

– fired above their heads to warn or scare them.

(Pet. p. 16; Dkt No. 10-4, 26:16-25-5.) 

The panel denied Willcoxon parole for an additional three years at the conclusion of his 2006

suitability hearing. He unsuccessfully petitioned the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme

Court after the Superior Court denied him habeas relief from that decision. (Pet. Appendices 1, 2.)

He represents here "the state court's decisions were contrary to, and an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal constitutional law, and an unreasonable application of the law to the facts

in this case." (Pet. 28:23-25.) Respondent contends the Superior Court properly denied Willcoxon's

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2

 See also Dkt No. 11 12:28-13:9 ("Evens came after Willcoxon, not the other way around . . . . It is

of no consequence to the gravity of the offense how many times Willcoxon shot him. He shot him until he was

dead . . . This is about murder, and whether the victim was shot once or 10 times, or stabbed once or 10 times,

or clubbed once or 10 times, . . . these do not elevate a crime to "especially" heinous, atrocious or cruel,

particularly when they were not simply gratuitous").

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petition, finding the Board legitimately determined he was unsuitable for parole and identifying "some

evidence" in Willcoxon's "numerous and recent disciplinary reports" that he was "not yet reformed."

(Dkt No. 10, Answer 1:23-2:6.) Respondent further argues state prisoners have no federally protected

liberty interest in release on parole, the United States Supreme Court "has not clarified the

methodology for determining whether a state has created a federally protected liberty interest in

parole" (Id. 2:24-27), and "California's parole statute does not contain mandatory-language giving rise

to a protected liberty interest in parole" (Id. 3:5-6 (citations omitted)), all issues that have now been

decided for this Circuit. (See Section II.B, below, discussing Hayward, 603 F.3d 546). Finally,

Respondent argues even if Willcoxon "has a federal liberty interest in parole, he received all due

process to which he is entitled . . . because he was provided with an opportunity to be heard and a

statement of reasons for the Board's decision" (Id. 3:18-20), another issue clarified by Hayward. 

 Willcoxon disputes each of Respondent's arguments as well as various findings the Board

made in denying him parole. For example, he argues the Board's reliance on the circumstances of the

crime/gravity of the offense unsuitability factor violated his due process rights because he

characterizes the murder as "not especially egregious, callous or cruel under the circumstances" and

describes the confrontation as arising from "a case of mistaken identity."2

 (Dkt No. 11, 12:23-28.)

He exercised his right not to discuss the commitment crime at the hearing. (Dkt No. 10-4, 27:14-17.)

Nevertheless, he recounts at length in his Petition the evidence against him, including witness

statements and investigation reports, and continues to argue the merits of his self-defense version of

events. (Pet. pp. 15-19.) He states he "has served 30-plus years on a 'barroom brawl' type of murder,

where the victim was a dangerous and violent individual who mistook Willcoxon for someone else,

provoked a challenge, and would likely have stabbed Willcoxon had he not shot him first." (Pet.

28:25-19:4.) However, those arguments are irrelevant to this proceeding. A jury convicted Willcoxon

of first-degree murder for which he is serving an indeterminate life sentence. Federal habeas

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proceedings provide no forum to challenge the underlying conviction. The sole questions before the

Court are whether the California judicial decision approving the Board's 2006 decision to deny

Willcoxon parole entailed an unreasonable application of the "some evidence" of current

dangerousness standard codified under California's parole scheme, discussed below, or whether the

result was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence." Hayward,

603 F.3d at 562-63, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2).

Willcoxon insists that despite evidence of unsuitability the Board identified from his social

history, "despite this crime, despite the disciplinary infractions, the record showed that Willcoxon had

made a concerted effort for many years to not get into trouble and to program in a positive manner,"

and summarily argues "there was not a shred of reliable evidence that he posed a threat of danger to

society if released to parole." (Dkt No. 11, 7:7-12.) He relies for his legal arguments on a number of

federal cases which have been modified or rejected with respect to their applicability to parole denials

in the wake of Hayward, insofar as they purport to rely on a federal constitutional due process right

to release on parole independent of state law. He does, however, correctly identify the dispositive

question under California law: "whether the inmate poses a current unreasonable risk of danger to

public safety if released." (Id. 12:13-14.) 

The Court rejects all Willcoxon's arguments challenging the state's codified parole scheme as

presenting no question cognizable on federal habeas review, including his attempt to stretch the

general due process prohibition against arbitrary decisions and mere pro forma process to a wholesale

denunciation of the suitability and unsuitability factors that guide California's parole review system.

(See Dkt No. 11, 14:5-21.) Although Willcoxon acknowledges the "statute does direct the Board to

'establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates' " (Dkt No. 11, 14:6-8, citing CAL.PENAL CODE

§ 3041(a)), he pretends "nothing in that language authorizes the Board to establish criteria for

determining parole 'suitability' based on a litany of reasons that are unrelated to the 'timing' or 'gravity'

of the factors expressly specified by subd. (b)" (Id., 14:8-11). These are state-law issues a federal

habeas court may not address. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921

F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). Similarly, the Court rejects his conclusory argument, on behalf of

himself and "similarly-situated offenders" -- replete with statistics he contends "speak for

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3

 Willcoxon "requests that an evidentiary hearing be ordered on the matters involving the question of

systemic malfunctioning of the Board." (Dkt No. 11, 5:19-21.) The determination the Court will not reach

Ground Two of his petition also disposes of his request for an evidentiary hearing associated with that claim.

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themselves," unsupported by any evidence (Dkt No. 11, 17:25) -- that the Board has a policy of

"denying parole to murder offenders in nearly all cases, and in ALL cases until the lifer had reached

or exceeded" some uniform and arbitrary term in violation of "their federally-protected liberty

interests in parole." (Id., 16:1-7, pp. 16-18; Pet. Dkt No. 1, 9:22-10:3; Pet. P&A Dkt No. 2, pp. 15-19

(raising state law issues associated with California's implementation of its parole statute).) To the

extent Willcoxon is arguing he has a right to release on parole arising under the federal Constitution,

Ninth Circuit authority binding on this Court now forecloses recognition of such a right, defeating that

component of his claims. (Pet. P&A Dkt No. 2, pp. 2-3); see Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561, 563 (holding

there is no independent federally-protected liberty interest in parole arising under the Constitution).

Those foreclosures dispose of his Petition Ground Two.3 Moreover, his general characterization of

the Board's suitability hearings as a "sham" of "perfunctory questions," with purportedly

predetermined denial outcomes, is belied by the transcript of his 2006 hearing, which exceeds 100

pages in length, not counting the multiple exhibits the panel discussed on the record. Accordingly,

there remain only the merits of Ground One, Willcoxon's due process challenge on evidentiary

grounds to the state courts' upholding of the Board's denial of parole at his 2006 subsequent suitability

hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards For Federal Habeas Relief

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas

courts are bound by a state's interpretation of its own law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68 (federal courts may

not reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885 (federal

courts "have no authority to review a state's application of its own laws"); see Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) ("errors of state law do not concern us unless they

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rise to the level of a constitutional violation").

Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

AEDPA establishes a " 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' " requiring "that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7. The petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Federal

habeas relief is warranted only if the result of a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court "was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court's adjudication "based on a factual determination will

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003), citing 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A federal court applies AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned decision" by a

state court. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005); see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803 (1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground").

B. Due Process And Review Standards Applicable To Denials Of Parole

1. Federal Standards Of Review

A due process claim raises two questions: "the first asks whether there exists a liberty or

property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). "[A]n individual claiming

a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it" arising either from "the Due

Process Clause itself " or from "the laws of the States." Id. (citation omitted). The en banc Hayward

decision has clarified the standards federal habeas courts in this Circuit must apply in reviewing

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4

 The Hayward en banc court also held petitioners need a Certificate Of Appealability in order to

appeal a district court's Order denying a writ of habeas corpus arising from the state's denial of parole.

Hayward, 603 F.3d. at 554-55. 

5

 "The proposition that the Supreme Court has required 'some evidence' of anything derives from a

misunderstanding of the differences between 'good time' and 'parole.' " Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555, n.44

("Compare Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) (assessing a Massachusetts good time statute) with

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (assessing the Montana parole system) and Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (assessing the Nebraska parole system)") (parallel

citations omitted). 

6 The "right in California to parole in the absence of some evidence of one's future dangerousness to

the public arises from California law." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563. The en banc majority declined to decide

"whether the California parole scheme establishes a predicate for imposing [the liberty interest] as a matter of

federal constitutional law." Id. at 562 (finding it need "not decide whether a right arises in California under the

United States Constitution to parole in the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness" because "State

law already does what Hayward would have federal constitutional law do"). 

7 "To the extent our prior decisions including Biggs v. Terhune[, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003)], Sass

v. California Board of Prison Terms[, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006)], Irons v. Carey[, 505 F.3d 846, 850-51

(9th Cir. 2007)] and our panel decision in this case might be read to imply that there is a federal constitutional

right regardless of whether state law entitles the prisoner to release, we reject that reading and overrule those

decisions to the extent they may be read to mean that." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555 (footnotes omitted) (vacating

the Hayward panel decision).

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California prisoners' due process challenges to parole denials.4 Hayward, 603 F.3d 546. That Opinion

acknowledged that both the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court "have been engaged in

modification of the law to determine what limits there are on denial of parole." Id. at 552 ("Hayward's

appeal addresses what if anything the federal Constitution requires as a condition of denial of parole"),

citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

In particular, one question presented was whether "federal constitutional law imposes on the

states a requirement for some quantum of evidence to support a state's denial of parole." Hayward,

603 F.3d at 549. The majority opinion distinguished the deprivation of good time credits earned by

prisoners while incarcerated, creating "a liberty interest of the most fundamental sort," from denial

of release on parole, a decision entailing the "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of

imponderables."5

 Id. at 557. The Hayward majority held: "in the absence of state law establishing

otherwise, there is no federal constitutional requirement that parole be granted in the absence of 'some

evidence' of future dangerousness or anything else."6

 603 F.3d at 561, 563 ("We overrule any

decisions suggesting that the federal constitution imposes a requirement of 'some evidence' of future

dangerousness without regard to state law").7 Nevertheless:

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8

 The Governor may review the Board's parole decisions and is authorized to reverse or modify them,

applying the same standards as the Board. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8, subd. (d); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.2.

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Although the due process clause does not, by itself, entitle a

prisoner to parole in the absence of some evidence of future

dangerousness, state law may supply a predicate for that conclusion.

"[D]espite the necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the

parole-release decision, state statutes may create liberty interests in

parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due Process

Clause."

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561, adding emphasis and quoting Allen, 482 U.S. at 371.

The Ninth Circuit succinctly extracted pertinent holdings from the Hayward opinion in Pearson

v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2010). Federal courts "must apply the California 'some evidence'

test on federal habeas review under AEDPA." Id. at 608. It is the "state law that gives rise to

'interests' on the part of state prisoners that may be enforced as a matter of federal law." Id. at 609.

"[F]ederal habeas courts must 'decide whether the California judicial decision approving the governor's

decision rejecting parole [8

] was an "unreasonable application" of the California "some evidence"

requirement, or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence."

' " Id. at 608, quoting Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563. "By holding that a federal court may review the

reasonableness of the state court's application of the California 'some evidence' rule, Hayward

necessarily held that compliance with the state requirement is mandated by federal law, specifically

the Due Process Clause." Id. at 609.

 Inasmuch as "Hayward specifically commands federal courts to examine the reasonableness

of the state courts' application of the California 'some evidence' requirement, as well as the

reasonableness of the state court's determination of the facts in light of the evidence," the federal court

must examine "how the state court applied the requirement." Pearson, 606 F.3d at 609, quoting

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63. A parole denial is not justified "merely because the state court

purported to identify some evidence of future dangerousness;" there must actually be " 'some evidence

of future dangerousness' justifying the denial of parole." Id.

2. California Parole Statute And Standards

Under California law, prisoners subject to indeterminate life sentences "may serve up to life

in prison, but they become eligible for parole consideration after serving minimum terms of

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9

 Willcoxon's pre-DSL sentence of seven-years-to-life set only a minimum and a maximum period of

confinement. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1077-78 (discussing the history of California's sentencing scheme,

which had "for decades before 1977" employed an indeterminate sentencing system until the enactment of its

Determinate Sentencing Law ("DSL") in 1976). Under the indeterminate scheme, the offender would receive

"a statutory sentence expressed as a range between a minimum and a maximum period of confinement – often

life imprisonment – the offender must serve." Id., at 1077. The DSL "largely abandoned this system," so that

"most felonies are now subject to three precise terms of years," with the sentencing court selecting from among

the three alternatives (the lower, middle, or upper term). Id. at 1078.

10 "The two sections are identical." In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1202 n.5 (2008). CAL.CODE

REGS., tit. 15, § 2402 provides the Parole Consideration Criteria And Guidelines For Murders Committed On

Or After November 8, 1978." CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2281(a) provides the parole criteria and guidelines

applicable to murderers whose crime was committed before then. The Lawrence court applied section 2281;

the Rosenkrantz court applied section 2402.

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confinement." In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078 (2005). "[L]ife inmates' actual confinement

periods within the statutory range are decided by [the Board of Prison Terms]."9 Id. The manner in

which the Board is to make parole decisions is addressed in CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 and

implementing regulations. "Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel [or the Governor] the prisoner will

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§

2281(a), 2402(a).10 The Board "must apply detailed standards when evaluating whether an individual

is unsuitable for parole on public safety grounds." Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1096 n. 16; see also In

re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 677 (2002) (the Board's discretion is circumscribed by the

requirement "the decision must reflect an individualized consideration of the specific criteria and

cannot be arbitrary and capricious"). The regulations prescribe the treatment of evidence:

All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be

considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and

present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during, and

after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's

suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern

which results in a finding of unsuitability.

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2281(b), 2402(b).

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11 Guideline circumstances tending to show unsuitability include: (1) the heinousness or cruelty of

the commitment offense; (2) the prisoner's previous record of violence, "particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age;" (3) unstable social history in relationships with

others; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological factors; and (6) engaging in serious misconduct while

incarcerated. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2402(c), 2281(c).

12 Guideline circumstances tending to show suitability include: (1) no juvenile record; (2) reasonably

stable social history; (3) signs of remorse, such as performing acts or giving "indications he understands the

nature and magnitude of the offense;" (4) the crime was the result of significant personal stress; (5) lack of any

significant history of violent crime; (6) the prisoner's present age as reducing the probability of recidivism; (7)

realistic plans for the future upon release, or development of marketable skills usable upon release; and (8)

institutional behavior "indicating an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release." CAL. CODE

REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2402(d), 2281(d).

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The Board must consider both circumstances tending to show unsuitability11 and circumstances

tending to show suitability12 in the particular case. The codified factors "are set forth as general

guidelines" with "the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case . . . left to the judgment of the panel." Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1203, quoting CAL.

CODE REGS, tit. 15, § 2281, subds. (c), (d); see also CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2401 ("A parole date

shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d)," but "[a] parole date

shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c)"). Although the

Board must consider all available information pertinent to the codified factors in making its parole

decision (see Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1086), "[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of suitability

or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how

those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the public." Lawrence,

44 Cal.4th at 1212. "[I]t is not enough that there is some evidence to support the factors cited for the

denial; that evidence must also rationally support the core determination required by the statute before

parole can be denied, i.e., that a prisoner's release will unreasonably endanger public safety." In re

Roderick, 154 Cal.App.4th 242, 263 (2007) A decision denying parole must articulate reasons that

are both grounded in evidence and rationally related to the statutory public danger basis for denial.

Id. at 264, citing In re Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409 (2006) ("Some evidence of the existence of

a particular factor does not necessarily equate to some evidence the parolee's release unreasonably

endangers public safety"). Due process of law is satisfied as long as the "decision is supported by"

at least "a modicum of evidence." Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 676-77 (emphasis added).

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The Hayward court summarized: "The California parole statute provides that the Board of

Prison Terms 'shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual.' " Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561, quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b). 

As a matter of California law, "the paramount consideration for both

the Board [of Prison Terms] and the Governor under the governing

statutes is whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety."

There must be "some evidence" of such a threat, and an aggravated

offense "does not, in every case, provide evidence that the inmate is a

current threat to public safety." The prisoner's aggravated offense does

not establish current dangerousness "unless the record also establishes

that something in the prisoner's pre- or post-incarceration history, or his

or her current demeanor and mental state, supports the inference of

dangerousness. Thus, in California, the offense of conviction may be

considered, but the consideration must address the determining factor,

"a current threat to public safety." 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (footnotes omitted), quoting Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at1210, 1213-14.

Willcoxon offers no authority for his contention "competing evidence" should have been

"weighed . . . in a light most favorable to Mr. Willcoxon" (Pet. P&A Dkt No. 2, 20:3-4), an approach

in conflict with the paramount consideration of public safety in determining parole suitability.

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561-62 (the "crucial determinant of whether the prisoner gets parole in

California is 'consideration of the public safety' "), citing Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 and In re

Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241 (2008) ("[T]he California Supreme Court established in [those] two

decisions . . . that as a matter of state law, 'some evidence' of future dangerousness is indeed a state

sine quo non for denial of parole in California," creating a liberty interest). Once that "necessary

predicate for denial of parole" is established by the evidence, the due process standard is satisfied. 

Id. at 552. "There was some evidence of future dangerousness, so [Hayward's] parole was [properly]

denied, and the district court correctly denied the writ." Id. at 563.

While judicial review of a parole denial is "extremely deferential," the purpose of the review

is to ensure the result was supported by "some evidence." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562; see also

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 660; Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212 ("when a court reviews a decision of

the Board or the Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the decision of the

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Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely

whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings") citing, inter alia,

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 658 and Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1071. Thus, a reviewing court need

only verify that evidence of the factors recited as the reasons for denial supports the "core

determination" the prisoner remains dangerous. Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212.("Under the statute and

governing regulations, the circumstances of the commitment offense (or any of the other factors

related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to the

determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public"). The standard therefore requires a

rational nexus between the prisoner's "current circumstances" and his or her current dangerousness

in order "to provide the 'modicum of evidence' necessary" for a legitimate denial of parole. Id. at 1227

(setting aside the Governor's action in vacating the Board's grant of parole through reliance on the

"immutable and unchanging" circumstances of the "egregious" commitment offense, on grounds that

decision was not supported by "some evidence" of the prisoner's current dangerousness). 

In summary, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution prohibits states from depriving persons of protected liberty interests without due process

of law. As construed by the Ninth Circuit in Hayward, California has created by statute a liberty

interest in the release on parole of eligible prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences cognizable

on federal habeas review. Denial of parole must comport with the state's "some evidence" criteria

linking the prisoner's current circumstances to the ultimate finding of present dangerousness. The

Hayward opinion articulates the standard for federal habeas review of state court decisions upholding

parole denials:

Since the "some evidence" requirement applies without regard

to whether the United States Constitution requires it, we in this case,

and courts in this circuit facing the same issue in the future, need only

decide whether the California judicial decision approving the

governor's decision rejecting parole was an "unreasonable

application" . . . of the California "some evidence" requirement,

or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence."

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Id. at 569, Berzon, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part (the "some evidence" rule must be applied in light of the

deference owed to the factual determinations of state courts under AEDPA).

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C. August 2006 Subsequent Parole Suitability Hearing

Willcoxon's lengthy suitability hearing transcript and supporting documentation are provided

as Exhibits to the Answer. (Dkt No. 10, Exh. C, Parts 2-5.) The 2006 hearing was the first since

Willcoxon's June 3, 1997 five-year parole denial, which had been followed by extension Stipulations.

(Dkt No. 10-4, 36:9-15.) The delay in convening a subsequent hearing arose from the previous panel's

recommendation that he "become and remain discipline free, that [he] participate in self-help, that [he]

reduce [his] custody level [to a Level 3], and upgrade vocationally and educationally." (Id., 37:11-15.)

A Deputy Commissioner reviewing his case in 2000 determined he "had had a disciplinary and that

[he was] not programming, so that the 5-Year Denial held." (Id., 37:15-21.) 

The 2006 panel conducted the suitability hearing interactively with Willcoxon, who chose to

represent himself, although he had been represented by counsel at prior hearings. A Deputy District

Attorney ("DA") participated via videoconferencing. (Dkt No. 10-4, 4:5-9, 5:1-3.) Exploring his

personal background, the Board elicited from Willcoxon that he had completed the third grade, but

obtained his GED and had completed about three years of Bible college while incarcerated. (Id., 7:15-

21.) He stated he had never participated in the mental health services delivery program because he

had no mental problems. (Id., 8:5-11.) The Board summarized Willcoxon's undisputed juvenile and

arrest records, quoting from the 2002 Board Report:

"Willcoxon's social evaluation indicates that he came under the

supervision of juvenile authorities at approximately the age of six, and

was deemed beyond the control of his mother. At age 10 he was

committed to the Napa State Hospital for an observational study

because of uncontrollable temper and behavioral problems. He was

committed to the Youth Authority at the age of 12 by being beyond

control. He was released on a 12-day furlough seven months later, but

was returned to Ramel's School for Boys for threatening a man with a

knife, running away, and stealing. A year and a half later he was

released on parole which lasted less than a month when h[is] parole

was suspended for threatening his grandparents with a knife. While

being detained at a local hall. Willcoxon escaped without force by

stealing a car. During the subsequent chase he was involved in an

accident which resulted in the death of a five year old boy. He was

subsequently convicted of murder, escape, and auto theft and

committed to the C.Y.A. During his four years at C.Y.A., he had two

attempted escapes and a horrendous behavior record. He was released

from C.Y.A. in 11/1966. In terms of adult convictions, Willcoxon

lasted only a couple of months before becoming involved in a series of

robberies. These robberies led to his first commitment offense on

2/17/1967. This was the result of a robbery that – which took place on

12/10/1966 at approximately 8:28 p.m. at the San Jose Lodge.

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Willcoxon entered the lodge and inquired about another party of

supposedly a guest at the motel. The manager indicated this party in

question was not registered there. At this point Willcoxon produced a

revolver, cocked it, and demanded money. He was arrested on

12/13/1966 and further investigation revealed that he was responsible

for another robbery at the Shamrock Hotel. [Willcoxon] was on parole

for this offense when he was convicted of the life crime."

(Dkt No. 10-4, 28:6-29:22.)

Turning to social factors, the Board confirmed that Willcoxon was the oldest of two children,

his parents divorced when he was five years old, and he had been moved around to about fourteen

foster homes "from the age of about three to maybe ten." (Dkt No. 10-4, 30:1-31:1.) Most of his life

had been spent in a variety of California correctional institutions. (Id.. 31:4-7.) He kept in contact

with his sister, Sharon, who visited him in prison from time to time, and one of his two half-sisters.

(Id., p. 32.) He characterized Sharon as his "closest advocate." (Id., 34:26-27, 35:7-9.) Alcohol or

drugs were not a factor in any of his crimes. (Id., 33:18-22.) He denied ever being a member of a

prison gang. (Id., 40:11-27.) When asked to explain what he thought accounts for the problems he had

with law enforcement starting at a very young age and with following rules in jail, he responded "I

never cared for authority," and "I was just angry that my family probably broke up." (Id., 34:11-17.)

The Board reviewed with Willcoxon his institutional record since his 1976 conviction. By his

own admission, his "imprisonment has not been stellar." (Pet. Dkt No. 1, 13:1; see also Id., 21:19-21

("Petitioner had a rocky start in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation," committing

multiple disciplinary infractions during his first 21 years of confinement.) The record revealed he had

a total of twenty-five 115's, with the last in March 1998 for disrespecting staff. He had a total of

twenty-six 128's, most recently in June 2006 for "out of bounds," and another in February 2006 for

delaying count. (Dkt No. 10-4, 39:7-13.) The panel noted his disciplinary record, "which was

dismal," had improved, and he had been "doing very well since [his] last hearing" with only the one

115 and the two 2006 128's. (Id., 39:13-19.) When asked how he accounted for the improvement,

Willcoxon responded he thought he had matured and was taking responsibility for himself. He

acknowledged that when he was young, he would react to situations "in an angry manner, or a violent

manner," but represented he now handled situations "verbally – discuss it." (Id., 66:15-24.) He

credited some self-help programs that gave him more perspective on life. (Id., 39:19-40:4.) He stated

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he had learned through his studies that "there's something better in life and there's things that I want

to do. . . to have a life." (Id., 61:15-22.) Willcoxon had completed a 14-week IMPACT Program

designed around outside speakers and role-playing to encourage empathy for victims and how to deal

with violent situations. He found the program "intense" and stated he gained perspective on the

victims he had created in his criminal life, feeling "sadness and sorrow and remorse for the things" he

did. (Id., 43:19-44:12.) He had also completed a 44-week "Change" course. (Id., 45:10-11.) He had

tried to express remorse to his victim's family through the District Attorney's Office Victim Witness

Unit by writing "a few letters, but they came back." (Id., 44:13-17.)

The Board examined his vocational education, identifying prison trades completion certificates

in Silk Screening and Janitorial. (Dkt No. 10-4, 41:13-20.) Willcoxon stated he had also taken "two

other trades" (Photography and Clinical Hypnosis) on his own. (Id., 41:20-24.) He was currently

working as a Library Clerk, a job he enjoyed. He told the Board he reads "everything" he can in many

genres. (Id., 45:27-46:5.) He also likes to write and had completed a novel. (Id., 46:22-47:5.) He

had also worked in Culinary, had been a Porter, had worked in a Dining Room, and had been an

Education Clerk where he received excellent reviews from his supervisors. (Id., 42:19-43:4.) 

The most recent Psychological Report had been prepared about three months before Willcoxon

came from Salinas Valley to Soledad on June 26, 2003. (Dkt No. 10-4, 47:10-13; see Dkt No. 10-5,

pp. 14-22.) The doctor gave him a Global Assessment Functioning Score of 80, "which means you

are a highly functioning individual." (Dkt No. 10-4, 48:2-3.) However, as read into the hearing

record, under Assessment of Dangerousness, the doctor stated:

"Inmate Willcoxon is an extremely dangerous man. This writer has

written in excess of 40 BPT Reports for 'Lifer Hearings' and rarely have

I come across a record or interviewed an inmate whose life was so

committed to violence, and/or disregard for the rules, regulations, and

social morays [sic] and the law over such an extended period of time.

Since the age of six – there is only when the official record begins – the

inmate has spent about 50 years either incarcerated under juvenile

specific supervision, on probation, or parole. In other words, since age

eight, it is staggering to think he has only spent somewhere between in

slight excess of four months to less than one full year as a free person

in society. He is presently serving his third term and spent the last 27

years incarcerated."

(Dkt No. 10-4, 48:7-25.)

\\

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Other portions of the Psychological Report read into the record provided details in support of

the dangerousness assessment, transcribed as follows:

"The extreme hatred for African-Americans is well documented, but he

feels that this has been greatly reduced and does not bother him as

much as before. When asked if the murder in his present commitment

offense may have been different had the victim not been Black he

replied . . . that was not an issue. And at the time together with temper

out of control and having a gun on himself and to a minor extent some

fear one heard [sic] footsteps behind me – him – he acknowledged that

the incident would have occurred regardless – no matter who the victim

was and whether they had a weapon or not. . . . However, he takes full

responsibility and admitted that he would have killed whomever it was,

regardless of being armed or not. As far as remorse was concerned, the

inmate said that he was sad about both people; himself and the victim.

Not being with both our families, but mainly, I am remorseful not being

with mine. I can, therefore, only conclude that the inmate is less than

genuinely remorseful, and I was left with the feeling that to this day he

still fails to fully grasp the gravity of his actions 27 years ago or even

since he was a young boy. Consequently, while Inmate Willcoxon has

mellowed some over the years, has survival instincts, primarily in

detention but also on the street, which was almost always self-serving

and unlawful, are so ingrained that if released to society, the threat and

risk of recidivism remains unacceptably high. What is of little doubt

is that the traumatic childhood including abuse and neglect, may have

contributed greatly to the personality disorder, psychopathy, and

violence he would demonstrate for the rest of his life. However, while

the etiology may be understood, society could not live with the

consequences of such extensive and pervasive sociopathy."

(Dkt No. 10-4, 49:11-51:9.) 

Turning to his parole plans, the Board acknowledged a June 2, 2006 letter in the file from

Willcoxon's father who offered him temporary housing. (Dkt No. 10-4. 52:20-24.) The father

described his circumstances as retired, living in a retirement community, and caring for himself and

his wife, both in their late 70's. He expressed their willingness and ability "to provide temporary start

up support for Woody . . . upon his release." (Id., 53:19-24.) The commitment was for "housing and

board for a short period of time to enable Woody to get a successful start for his life as a free man."

(Id., 53:25-27.) Willcoxon was happy his father was "still behind me," but he felt "strongly that it

would be better for me to go to a halfway house" to put less of strain on his family while he made

some money working, describing alternative housing options and a job only as "goals." (Id., 52:24-

53:2.)

The panel asked Willcoxon specifically what he planned to do in terms of work if released.

His plans were vague. He identified as possibilities a recycling company in San Jose, but stated they

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would not give him a firm answer until he showed up there and they observed his work. (Dkt No. 10-

4, 83:5-18 ("They said . . . if I showed up I could maybe get a job").) He had no documentation of

even that speculative level of commitment.. His "desires" were for placement in a parole program in

either Sacramento or San Jose in some sort of halfway house where he could get a job, save money,

then get a place of his own. (Id., 53:4-18.) He stated he had written many letters to inquire about

halfway house programs, but got few answers, and those indicated they "don't handle it like that." (Id.,

84:1-11.) He gave the Board "50 or 60" program addresses, indicating he had written to about ten

of them, all within "the last two months." (Id., 84:24-85:14.) On June 28, 2006, the Alameda Parole

Office had sent him the requirements to enter their Clean and Sober Program, but with no

acknowledgment he was eligible for the program or of placement availability. (Dkt No. 10-4, 63:3-6.)

A personal friend of Willcoxon's, Eleanor Crabbe, wrote a letter dated May 26, 2006

supportive of his release. She identified herself as an attorney living in Palo Alto who had known

Willcoxon for over 30 years. She gave her personal opinion he had been more than sufficiently

punished, and she believed he would be a constructive member of society, with family willing to assist

him. She represented generally she would help him find employment and appropriate living

arrangements. (Dkt No. 10-4, 56:14-22.) A retired teacher from Salinas Valley State Prison, Glen

McMillan, wrote a very supportive letter, describing Willcoxon as "punctual, well groomed, very

knowledgeable, reliable, industrious," worked well with the students, "trustworthy, honest, showed

thoughtfulness" and the like for the period Willcoxon served as his Clerk, from September 1996 until

his retirement in December 2000. (Id., 63:9-19.) Mr. McMillan gave his opinion Willcoxon would

maintain "respectful, honest, law abiding and desirable lifestyle activities" if returned to society, based

on his "work ethic of very high quality." (Id., 63:20-26.) Willcoxon identified several letters in the

file from John D. Cahners, the prosecutor in his murder case with whom he had kept in contact. (See

Ans. Exh. H, Dkt No. 10-5, pp. 52-58.) Although none was current, the panel agreed to look at them.

(Dkt No. 10-4, 56:24-57:6.)

A letter from a Father at Orthodox Christian Prison Ministry in Hollywood, California, with

whom Willcoxon had communicated for 30 years, also wrote in support of his parole. The clergyman

characterized him as "a changed man" with the "potential for living an exemplary life in society,"

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a base term for life prisoners after a prisoner is found suitable for parole.

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based on his observations of Willcoxon's "ups and downs along with his many positive changes." He

represented their "Aftercare Community is prepared and available to continue to provide him with

both emotional and spiritual support, both now and following his release" (Dkt No. 10-4, 64:5-25),

but appears to have no practical support to offer. A woman from Carmichael, California who had

known Willcoxon for several years, also wrote to "recommend his release." (Id., 64:25-65:4.) The

record also contained older letters of a generally supportive nature. (Id., 54:25-55:19.) However,

Willcoxon had no evidence of an actual job or residence for any appreciable length of time awaiting

him upon release.

 The panel deflected Willcoxon's presentation of his calculations under a sentencing matrix he

offered to demonstrate he was long overdue for release on parole by reminding him the upper end of

his sentence is life.13 (Dkt No. 10-4,, 60:2-9, 60:17-21 ("your term includes life. So . . . absent your

demonstrating that you are no longer a threat to public safety . . . your term is life. So it's anywhere

from . . . seven years to life").) Similarly the DA participating in the hearing commended Willcoxon's

progress while incarcerated, his GED, his ability to represent himself in an "educated fashion," and

his motivation to get out of prison to live in a free society (Id., 91:6-25) and acknowledged

Willcoxon's problem was not drugs or alcohol (Id., 92:18-20), but emphasized "parole is not a matter

of entitlement given X number of years served," but rather "it is something that needs to be earned."

(Id., 89:12-14). The DA asked Willcoxon a number of clarifying questions raised by the

documentary evidence. For example, Willcoxon had said he had a problem with authority in the past.

The DA asked if he still thought he does, to which Willcoxon replied: "No, but I have -- I still always

have a problem with the negative authority. Because you deal with all kinds of people. So I -- I

always like to make sure that they know what they're talking about." (Dkt No. 10-4, 81:6-13.) The

DA's closing statement highlighted Willcoxon's unsettled childhood and youth, emotional problems,

criminal history, life-long problems with authority, and his lack of opportunity to develop into a lawabiding citizen. (Id. pp. 88-95.) The DA expressed concern his parole plans were not yet solid

enough. (Id., 93:26.) He emphasized Willcoxon had no concrete options to support himself if

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released, posing the risk "where he goes out and finds out that he can't support himself and he falls

back into old habits which has [sic] existed for him throughout his life." (Dkt No. 10-4, 91:25-92:11.)

"[H]is problem was how to adjust to another society" because he "has never really lived in society on

the outside," and "he needs to be prepared to deal and operate in that world." (Id., 92:20-25.)

Recalling Willcoxon's admission he still has difficulty dealing with negative authority, the DA noted

he would face that same challenge outside prison. He observed Willcoxon's demeanor during the

hearing was at times relaxed, and at times heated, even somewhat angry. (Id., 92:26-93:19.) He was

also troubled by the unfavorable psychological evaluation indicating Willcoxon posed an unacceptably

high risk of danger to the public. (Id., 94:24-95:2.) He believed Willcoxon still has "work that he has

to do" and urged the panel to find him "not yet suitable for release because he doesn't want to be set

up for failure when he gets out there." (Id., 95:4-12.) The Board read into the record a July 21, 2006

letter from the Chief of the San Jose Police Department also opposing Willcoxon's release. (Dkt No.

10-4, 57:11-58:21.)

In his closing statement, Willcoxon stated he had completed programming in trades, schooling

and self-help when available and believes he has earned his way out. (Dkt No. 10-4, 97:2-6.) He

represented his father is "well-known in San Jose," having had his own business there, and could put

him in touch with people for jobs, although his father made no such commitment in his letter to the

Board. Willcoxon also told the panel his doctors informed him he may not have to work at all due to

his age, his diabetes, and "a couple of heart attacks," so he thought it "more than likely what I will do

is go on General SSI because of my heart condition," despite the small income from that source. (Id.,

95:25-96:11.) In response to the DA's concern he will lapse back into old outside habits, he repeated

his desire to go to a halfway house for several months to adjust, and "maybe get a job and do

something." (Id., 96:21-27.) He stated he understands life in prison and life outside are not the same,

and he intends now not to deal with people on the streets who confront him "from a prison standpoint."

(Id., 97:24-98:3.) He persisted in the misconception that the Board must fix "the time of my term,"

and the "primary term does not depend upon . . . findings of suitability." (Id., 99:4-12.)

After the panel's recess for deliberations, it presented its conclusion Willcoxon "is not suitable

for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

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released from prison." (Dkt No. 10-5, 1:21-24.) The Board identified the circumstances it relied on

to reach that result in consideration of the codified factors of suitability and unsuitability. It found he

carried out the commitment offense in an especially cruel and callous manner and for a very trivial

motive "when the prisoner for reasons still best known to himself chose to end the fight by shooting"

the victim, who "staggered back" as "you continued to shoot the victim," with the multiple shots also

resulting in injury to a second victim. ( Id., 1:24-2:12.) The Board found his prior record reflects

violence, assaultive behavior, an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and violence, a failure of

previous grants of parole, demonstrating he "can not be counted upon to avoid criminality." (Id., 2:13-

18.) The Board noted his failure to profit "from society's previous attempts to correct his criminality

specifically parole, CYA commitment, prior prison terms, a state hospital commitment" and observed

he was on parole at the time of the commitment offense. (Id., 2:18-24.) The Board found the record

of his institutional behavior revealed a history of disciplinary problems, with a high number of 115's

and 128's. (Id., 2:24-3:3; see also Id., 6:6-7:23.) The Court finds from its review of the record the

Board's findings on all those factors are supported by the evidence and are objectively reasonable.

The Board quoted from the 2003 Psychological Report, in particular the Diagnostic Impression

under Axis II, an Anti-Social Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Traits and the Assessment of

Dangerousness: "Inmate Willcoxon is an extremely dangerous man. . . ." (Dkt No. 10-5, 3:3-11; see

Report quotation transcribed above.) Willcoxon had objected to the unfavorable portions of the 2003

Psychological Report on grounds the doctor "spent maybe 40 minutes talking to me" and had argued

"he also states inmate is confident and responsible for his own behavior, and therefore programming

and parole decisions can be based on custody issues rather than on mental and psych issues." (Dkt

No. 10-4, 51:11-21.) "And '91, '93, '95, and '97 Psych Reports as well as the April 11th, 1995 report

by Jack Fleming basically says there ain't nothing wrong with me" in the way of "severe mental

disorders." Id., 52:7-10.) Those evaluations are also provided as Exhibits to the Answer. The panel

acknowledged prior evaluations contained more positive statements, but found "this most recent

evaluation is very clear and unfavorable." (Id., 4:22-25.) In addition, "[w]ith regard to Parole Plans,

we find that you do not have viable residential plans, nor do you have acceptable employment plans."

(Id., 4:25-5:1.) The Court finds from its review of the record the Board's findings on those factors are

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supported by the evidence and are objectively reasonable.

The Board acknowledged and commended Willcoxon for his vocational training in Janitorial

and Silk Screening, the work he had done in the IMPACT Program and Change Program which they

credited as contributing to "the positive nature of your discipline since 1998," his "work as a Library

Clerk, Culinary, Porter, Dining Room, and Education Clerk, all with excellent work reports," and

encouraged him to stay on the path he had changed to. (Dkt No. 10-5., 5:9-25.) "However, these

positive aspects of behavior do not outweigh the factors for unsuitability." (Id., 5:25-6:6.) The

Board concluded Willcoxon would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released, with the

negative factors of record all bearing on his ability to remain law-abiding if paroled. The Board's

recommendations were: have no more 115's or 128's; work towards reducing his Custody Level

points; continue to participate in self-help programs as available; earn positive chronos; and work on

developing appropriate parole plans. (Id., 7:24-8:5.) The panel gave Willcoxon additional, specific

advice about how to demonstrate progress toward those objectives at his next hearing. (Id., pp. 8-10.)

D. The State Courts' Result Approving The Board's Denial Of Parole Satisfies Due

Process

The only reasoned state court decision associated with the Board's denial of parole at

Willcoxon's 2006 suitability hearing is from the Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara, filed

August 23, 2007. That decision upholding the result provides, in its entirety:

The California Supreme Court, in In re Dannenberg (2005) 34

Cal.4th 1061, finding the Parole Board's procedures lawful because the

Board is constrained by a framework within which to exercise

discretion, stated: "the regulations do set detailed standards and criteria

for determining whether a murderer with an indeterminate life sentence

is suitable for parole." (Dannenberg at p. 1080. See also page 1096,

footnote 16: "the Board must apply detailed standards when evaluating

whether an individual inmate is unsuitable for parole on public safety

grounds.") In this case, because there is 'some evidence' that

Petitioner's numerous and recent disciplinary reports (128 & 115)

suggest he is not yet reformed, Petitioner's post-crime actions appear

to show unsuitability under the "detailed standards." The habeas

petition is DENIED.

(Pet. Appendix 3 (emphasis added); Dkt No. 10-2.)

California's "some evidence" standard requires a rational nexus between the prisoner's "current

circumstances" and his or her current dangerousness in order "to provide the 'modicum of evidence'

necessary" for a legitimate denial of parole. Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1227. Federal habeas courts

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reviewing a state's judicial determination under AEDPA must accord considerable deference to the

state court's factual findings in support of its decision. See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24; 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). The Superior Court identified Willcoxon's documented disciplinary infractions while

incarcerated as providing the requisite evidence to support the result. Although the decision alludes

to the ultimate and essential "public safety" ground for denial of parole, one could question from the

terse statement of decision whether the state court actually applied California's "detailed standards"

for review of parole denials. The decision itself does not demonstrate the court considered the record

as a whole, as opposed to halting its review upon finding evidence of the single unsuitability factor

it cited. While judicial review of a parole denial is "extremely deferential," its purpose is to ensure

the result was supported by "some evidence," not merely whether some evidence confirms the

existence of particular unsuitability factors. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562. A reviewing federal court

must examine "how the state court applied the" some evidence requirement. Pearson, 606 F.3d at 609;

see also Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 660; Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212 ("the relevant inquiry is

whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes

a current threat to public safety"). "Under the statute and governing regulations, the circumstances of

the commitment offense (or any of the other factors related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if,

and only if, those circumstances are probative to the determination that a prisoner remains a danger

to the public." Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212.

Willcoxon summarily argues:

Prison disciplinaries in an artificial and volatile prison environment is

[sic] hardly reliable evidence of whether a prisoner would return to

criminality and be a recidivist. There is not a single study establishing

a nexus between misbehavior in prison and recidivism; thus any alleged

connection by a commissioner is purely speculative, not based on facts. . . .

Does this [i.e., the majority of the infractions resulting from

confrontations with prison guards] show disrespect for law enforcement

or the laws of the State or nation? Not necessarily. It shows a lack of

respect for prison guards who are often abusive under color of law and

state authority. Willcoxon may have difficulty "turning the other

cheek" with abusive prison guards, but that does not translate into an

unreasonable danger to public safety. Inmates are not "slaves" subject

to mistreatment at the whim and caprice of rogue or abusive prison

guards; they have a right to be treated fairly by the State's professionals

acting professionally. If Willcoxon did not kowtow to such abusive

guards, this does not make him a threat to society. Further, infractions

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for "threatening staff" or "disrespecting staff" may be entirely

unfounded and the result of his resistance to the provocation initiated

by the guard, and a guilty finding by a hearing officer backing up his

staff rather than evidence of guilt.

(Dkt No. 11, 13:16-21; 14:22-15:7.) 

Despite Willcoxon's argument his disciplinary record is not probative of a finding he would

pose a public safety risk if released from prison, common sense dictates confrontations with authority

are probative of how an individual deals with interpersonal conflicts. Willcoxon himself lists twentyfour discrete infractions from March 1977 to March 1998, several involving physical altercations or

conduct threatening correctional officers or institutional security. (Pet. pp. 18-19.) He acknowledges:

"Willcoxon's prison disciplinary record shows the majority of his infractions resulted from

confrontations with prison guards." (Dkt No. 11, 14:22-23.) Although the record reflects he is making

progress toward greater self-control, as evidenced by the decline in the number of 115's and 128's he

received in recent years, the DA had elicited from Willcoxon at the suitability hearing he still has

problems with "negative authority," reinforcing the Board's core determination he is not yet prepared

to safely reenter society.

As described above, the Board considered Willcoxon's circumstances associated with factors

tending to support parole suitability and factors tending to support unsuitability at his 2006 hearing,

as required under California's parole statute and regulations. Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1095, n.16;

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 677. Parole was denied based on several factors expressly and rationally

related to the ultimate decision Willcoxon would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released,

including but not limited to the ground the Superior Court recited in support of its decision: his

"numerous and recent disciplinary reports . . . suggest he is not yet reformed." (Pet. Appendix 3).

Although the Superior Court does not discuss them, several other unsuitability factors are supported

by the record which, in combination with his documented unsatisfactory post-incarceration conduct,

provide "some evidence" of Willcoxon's danger to public safety if released. These include vague and

unsettled post-parole housing and employment plans, posing a risk he would revert to his former

pattern of criminality, his pattern of volatility beginning at an early age, and the most recent

psychological evaluation concluding he remained dangerous. 

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State prisoners have no due process right to release on parole arising from the federal

Constitution. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561, 563. Applying the federal habeas review standard applicable

to parole denials for California state prisoners on due process grounds the Ninth Circuit has now

clarified, and according the requisite deference to state court factual determinations mandated by

AEDPA, the Court finds the state court result upholding the Board's decision to deny parole at

Willcoxon's eighth subsequent suitability hearing did not entail an unreasonable application of

California's "some evidence" standard, nor was it "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence." Pearson, 606 F.3d at 608, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 340; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Probative evidence in the record, including but not limited

to his post-incarceration disciplinary record singled out by the Superior Court, supports the conclusion

Willcoxon remained unsuitable for parole in 2006 on grounds he would pose an unreasonable public

safety risk if released. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212; see also Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Petition seeking habeas relief associated

with the only cognizable ground Willcoxon presents as a due process challenge to the Board's 2006

denial of parole as upheld by the state courts is DENIED. The Court finds no basis for a certificate

of appealability. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2010

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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