Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_18-cv-00814/USCOURTS-ared-4_18-cv-00814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

JAMES ALBERT HODGE, JR. PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:18-cv-00814-KGB

TWIN CITY TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendants Twin City 

Transportation, Inc. (“Twin City”) and Bruce Stewart (Dkt. No. 29). In opposition, plaintiff Albert 

Hodge, Jr., has moved to deny defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 35). 

Mr. Hodge also has pending a motion for defendants to rebut Counts One and Two of his 

complaint, a motion for jury trial, and a motion for judgment (Dkt. Nos. 32, 33, 42). For the 

following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies 

Mr. Hodge’s motion to deny defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 29).

Additionally, the Court denies Mr. Hodge’s motion for defendants to rebut Counts One and Two 

of his complaint, motion for jury trial, and motion for judgment (Dkt. Nos. 32, 33, 42).

I. Background

Mr. Hodge originally filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Dkt. No. 2, at 3). Mr. Hodge has supplemented his initial 

complaint with several additional filings that the Court has construed as attempts to amend his 

complaint (Dkt. Nos. 2, 8, 14, 16, 17, \). These supplements allege defamation in violation of 

Arkansas Law; a violation of the Fourth Amendment for being subjected to an illegal search; a 

violation of the Fifth Amendment for being denied due process; and a violation of the Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -9

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(Id.).1

 Among the relief he seeks, Mr. Hodge, a citizen of Louisiana, seeks the following: 

“defendant[s] be directed to retract [their] statement to former [potential] employers”; “DOT one 

reporting office of drivers record as to having failed a drug test”; and “pay all legal fees/lost wages 

and [hardship] caused by defendant[s], in the amount of $250,000.00 or what may be appropriate”

(Dkt. Nos. 14-1, at 4). The following facts come from these various filings.

Mr. Hodge states that he was an employee at Twin City on or around August 7, 2018, when 

he witnessed an accident while out making a delivery to Alweld Commercial Boats located at 1705 

Hwy 88 E, Lonsdale, AR 72087 (Dkt. No. 2, at 4; 29, at 6, 8). Mr. Hodge spoke with law 

enforcement at the scene of the accident about what happened (Dkt. No. 29-2, at 8). The following 

day, Mr. Stewart had Mr. Hodge take a post-accident drug test pursuant to Department of 

Transportation (“DOT)” drug-testing regulations (Dkt. No. 2, at 4). Mr. Hodge failed that drug 

test and was terminated (Dkt. Nos. 2, at 4, 8; 29-1, at 10). Initially, Mr. Hodge only alleged that

he was wrongfully ordered to take this post-accident drug test and that DOT guidelines did not 

require him to take a post-accident drug test as a result of the accident (Dkt. No. 2, at 4). Mr. 

Hodge supplemented his allegations, however, and now claims that Mr. Stewart: (1) subjected 

him to an unlawful DOT post-accident drug test because of a previous political argument between 

Mr. Stewart and Mr. Hodge regarding former President Barack Obama and current President 

Donald Trump; (2) defamed him by writing letters to potential employers indicating that Mr. 

Hodge failed a random drug test in violation of Arkansas law; (3) required an unreasonable drug 

test in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (4) denied him due process of law under the Fifth 

 1

 Mr. Hodge cites the Arkansas Drug-Free Workplace Act, Arkansas Code Annotated §

11-14-106(a), in his supplemental filing (Dkt. No. 17, at 12). To the extent Mr. Hodge attempts 

to assert a claim under this statute, the Court dismisses the claim because there is no private right 

of action under that law. See generally Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-14-101, et seq.

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Amendment, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) required a 

consent form to be signed before conducting the drug test in violation of HIPAA (Dkt. No. 16, at 

2-3). Mr. Hodge alleges that Mr. Stewart’s actions were also based on race or color (Dkt. No. 17, 

at 5).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but 

early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(c). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts “may consider the pleadings 

themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters 

of public record.” Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Porous 

Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Noble Sys. Corp. v. 

Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008) (courts may consider some public records, 

materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are necessarily embraced by the 

pleadings). Such a motion is evaluated in the same manner as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

McIvor v. Credit Control Serv., Inc., 773 F.3d 909, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2014). As a result, the Court 

will evaluate the instant motion under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “While a complaint attacked by a [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 

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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(alteration in original) (citations omitted). “[T]he complaint must contain facts which state a claim 

as a matter of law and must not be conclusory.” Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 627 

(8th Cir. 1999). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept the allegations 

contained in the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn 

in favor of the nonmoving party.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001).

III. Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the following five grounds: (1) there 

is no individual liability under Title VII as to separate defendant Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Hodge has 

admittedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII; (2) federal law preempts 

or otherwise bars any state common law claim relating to a DOT drug test or reporting the results 

of a DOT drug test in compliance with federal law; (3) there are no allegations of a false or 

defamatory statement made to a third party by defendants, and any statements made were 

privileged; (4) defendants are not state actors for purposes of plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth 

Amendment claims; and (5) there is no private right of action under HIPAA (Dkt. No. 29, ¶ 3). 

Defendants argue that these deficiencies prove fatal to Mr. Hodge’s claims (Id.). In response, Mr. 

Hodge notes that this matter has been set for trial and argues that it is up to the jury to decide the 

facts of this case, including whether he was appropriately drug tested and whether he suffered 

discrimination or retaliation (Dkt. No. 35, at 2). Among the arguments he makes in opposition to 

defendants’ motion, Mr. Hodge asserts that federal statutory law permits individual liability in the 

employment context (Id., at 3).

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Accepting all allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences from the complaint in Mr. Hodge’s favor, the Court considers defendants’ asserted 

grounds for judgment on the pleadings in turn.

A. Title VII

The Court grants defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Mr. Hodge’s Title 

VII claims and grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Hodge’s Title VII claims. 

Under Title VII, “[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting 

commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e(b). “[T]he obvious purpose of th[e] agent provision [of § 2000e(b)] was to 

incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute.” Grissom v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 902 

F. Supp. 867, 870 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit 

Court of Appeals has consistently held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under 

Title VII. See Griffin v. Webb, 653 F. Supp. 2d 925, 933 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (quoting Clegg v. Ark. 

Dep't of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 

821 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000))). Thus, “if a Title VII plaintiff names his or her employer as a defendant, 

any of the employer’s agents also named in the complaint may be dismissed from the 

action.” Moss v. W & A Cleaners, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Accordingly, 

the Court grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Hodge’s Title VII discrimination and

retaliation claims against Mr. Stewart in his individual capacity.

Additionally, “[a] Title VII plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing 

suit in federal court. A claimant must first timely file an administrative charge with the [Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’)].” Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 634 (8th 

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Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 886 (8th 

Cir. 1998)). A claimant must “set[] forth the facts and nature of the charge within 180 days of the 

discrimination and receive notice from the EEOC of the right to sue.” Lee v. Nucor-Yamato Steel 

Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (citing Cottrill, 443 F.3d at 634); see also 

Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Under Title VII, 

an administrative charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory incident.” 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1))). Mr. Hodge admits that he has not written the EEOC or the 

Arkansas State Human Rights Commission, and Mr. Hodge admits that he did not file charges 

against defendants with the EEOC (Dkt. Nos. 8, at 4; 14-1, ¶ 6). Because Mr. Hodge was fired in 

August 2018, more than 180 days have passed since the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory 

incident. This delay leaves Mr. Hodge time-barred from now filing timely an administrative 

charge with the EEOC regarding the events about which he complains. Accordingly, the Court 

grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Hodge’s Title VII claims and dismisses with 

prejudice Mr. Hodge’s Title VII claims against defendants.

B. Defamation

Mr. Hodge alleges that defendants defamed him in violation of state law by informing 

potential employers that he failed a random drug test (Dkt. No. 16, at 3). Mr. Hodge claims this 

information is a lie because he failed a post-accident drug test, and Mr. Hodge claims the two tests 

are “quite different” (Id.). Defendants make three separate arguments regarding Mr. Hodge’s 

defamation claims: (1) his defamation claim is preempted by federal law; (2) because his drug test 

results were reported in accordance with DOT regulations, he is barred from asserting a defamation 

claim against defendants under the facts alleged; and (3) he has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

state a defamation claim (Dkt. No. 30, at 6-12). Without ruling on defendants’ first two arguments, 

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the Court agrees with defendants’ argument that Mr. Hodge has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

state a defamation claim and dismisses Mr. Hodge’s defamation claim on this ground.

Under Arkansas law, “[a] viable action for defamation turns on whether the communication 

or publication tends or is reasonably calculated to cause harm to another’s reputation.” Faulkner 

v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Ark. 2002) (citations omitted). The following

elements must be proved to support a claim of defamation, whether it be by the spoken word, 

which is slander, or the written word, which is libel: (1) the defamatory nature of the statement of 

fact; (2) that statement’s identification of or reference to the plaintiff; (3) publication of the 

statement by the defendant; (4) the defendant’s fault in the publication; (5) the statement’s falsity; 

and (6) damages. See id. (citations omitted). “Truth is a complete defense to a charge of 

defamation.” Quinn v. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, 470 F.3d 1240, 1246 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Wirges 

v. Brewer, 389 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Ark. 1965)). “It is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the 

accusation in every detail but that the imputation is substantially true, or as it is often put, to justify 

the gist, the sting, or the substantial truth of the defamation.” Boellner v. Clinical Study Ctrs., 

LLC, 378 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ark. 2011) (citing Pritchard v. Times Sw. Broad., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 

877 (Ark. 1982)).

Mr. Hodge admits that he failed the drug test. He asserts defendants defamed him by 

informing potential employers that he failed a random drug test rather than a post-accident drug 

test (Dkt. Nos. 2, at 4; 16, at 3). He does not allege or attempt to explain why he believes this 

difference matters under the circumstances. Even construing all allegations contained in the 

complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from the complaint in Mr. Hodge’s failure, 

the Court does not see how this difference in the type or timing of the drug test gives rise to an 

actionable defamation claim against defendants. If defendants did tell potential employers that 

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Mr. Hodge failed a random drug test, that statement is still “substantially true” and “justif[ies] the 

gist, the sting, or the substantial truth of the defamation” given Mr. Hodge’s admission that he 

failed the drug test in question. Boellner, 378 S.W.3d at 757 (citing Pritchard, 642 S.W.2d at 

877). The Court sees no practical, legal, or factual difference between defendants telling potential 

employers that Mr. Hodge failed a random drug test and defendants telling potential employers 

that Mr. Hodge failed a post-accident drug test. The Court also sees no difference in the type or 

amount of potential harm to Mr. Hodge between defendants telling potential employers that Mr. 

Hodge failed a random drug test and defendants telling potential employers that Mr. Hodge failed 

a post-accident drug test. Accordingly, the Court grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. 

Hodge’s state law defamation claims against defendants. 

C. Fourth And Fifth Amendment Violations

Mr. Hodge appears to allege that defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 

rights by requiring him to take a DOT post-accident drug test (Dkt. No. 17, at 3). Citing National 

Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), Mr. Hodge claims that requiring 

employees to produce urine samples constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment and, as such, must meet the “reasonableness” requirements of the Fourth Amendment

(Id.). Additionally, Mr. Hodge argues that the drug test involves the Fifth Amendment, made 

applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits denial of life and property 

without due process of law (Id.).

The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. 

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Const. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, protects any individual from 

“depriv[ation] of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 

The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, prohibits “any State [from] depriv[ing] any person 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

“The Fourth Amendment applies only to state action, so it does not constrain private parties 

unless they act as agents or instruments of the government.” United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 

826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 

Additionally, “[i]t is well settled that the prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do 

not apply to private actions.” Florey v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern., 575 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 

1978); see also Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Baxter County, Ark., 143 F. Supp. 3d 816, 823 (W.D. Ark. 

2015) (“With a few exceptions, . . . constitutional guarantees of individual liberty . . . do not apply 

to the actions of private entities.” (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 

619 (1991))); Simpson v. Anthony’s Funeral Home, No. 3:07CV00064 JMM, 2007 WL 1626345, 

at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 5, 2007) (“With no state actor there can be no constitutional violation; 

therefore, there is no basis to award Plaintiff the relief he seeks.” (citing Williams v. Davis, 200 

F.3d 538, 539 (8th Cir. 2000))).

Nothing in the pleadings or attendant filings suggests that Twin City or Mr. Stewart should 

be considered state actors. Twin City is a private employer, as evidenced by its registration with 

the Arkansas Secretary of State (Dkt. No. 29-3). Mr. Stewart is a private citizen. Neither Twin 

City nor Mr. Stewart acted as agents or instruments of the government. Because Twin City is a 

private employer and Mr. Stewart is a private citizen, Mr. Hodge alleges no state action in this 

matter. Accordingly, the Court grants judgment in favor of defendants on any Fourth, Fifth, or 

Fourteenth Amendment claims Mr. Hodge alleges.

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D. HIPAA

Mr. Hodge appears to allege a HIPAA violation regarding defendants’ requirement that 

consent forms be signed before his drug test (Dkt. No. 16, at 3). However, “HIPAA does not create 

a private right of action.” Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Adams v. 

Eureka Fire Prot. Dist., 352 Fed. App’x 137, 139 (8th Cir. 2009); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 

571-72 (5th Cir. 2006)). Because HIPAA does not create a private right of action, Mr. Hodge may 

not sue defendants for an alleged violation of HIPAA related to the consent forms. Accordingly, 

the Court grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Hodge’s claims under HIPAA.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 

and denies Mr. Hodge’s motion to deny defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 

Nos. 29, 35). The Court grants judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Hodge’s Title VII; 

defamation; Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment; and HIPAA claims and denies the 

requested relief. Additionally, the Court denies Mr. Hodge’s motion for defendants to rebut 

Counts One and Two of his complaint, motion for jury trial, and motion for judgment (Dkt. Nos. 

32, 33, 42). Judgment will be entered accordingly.

It is so ordered this 7th day of April, 2020.

_______________________________

Kristine G. Baker

United States District Judge

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