Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06771/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06771-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIKA RIVERA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

CITY OF MERCED, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-cv-6771-SMS

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF

DEFENDANTS CITY OF MERCED, POLICE

DEPARTMENT, AND OFFICERS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 79)

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF

DEFENDANT ELOY ROMERO FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOC. 73)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY’S

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (DOC.

84)

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

The motion for summary judgment, or, alternatively, summary

adjudication of Defendants City of Merced, City of Merced Police

Department, and Officers Scott Skinner, Ray Sterling, and Daniel

Dabney, as well as the motion for summary judgment or,

alternatively, summary adjudication of Defendant Eloy Romero came

on regularly for hearing on October 31, 2006, at 10:35 a.m. in

Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, United States

Case 1:04-cv-06771-SMS Document 115 Filed 11/16/06 Page 1 of 70
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Magistrate Judge. Norman C. Newhouse appeared on behalf of

Plaintiff. Dale L. Allen of Low, Ball & Lynch appeared on behalf

of Defendants City of Merced, City of Merced Police Department,

and City of Merced Police Officers Scott Skinner, Ray Sterling, 

and Officer Dabney (City Defendants). Jeffrey R. Vincent, Deputy

Attorney General, appeared on behalf of Defendant Eloy Romero.

After argument, the Court directed the City Defendants to file on

or before November 3, 2006, supplemental information regarding

the affidavit for arrest warrant that was the subject of a

request for judicial notice. Upon the filing of the supplemental

information by Defendants on November 2, 2006, the matter was

submitted to the Court.

BACKGROUND

Defendants City of Merced (City), City of Merced Police

Department (Police), and Officers Scott Skinner, Ray Sterling,

and Daniel Dabney (Officers) filed a notice of motion and motion,

separate statement of undisputed facts, memorandum in support of

the motion, declarations of Lesley L. Novotny and Antonio L.

Casillas or Cadillac with exhibits, and request for judicial

notice on July 28, 2006. Opposition consisting of the declaration

of Norman Newhouse with exhibits, statement of disputed and

undisputed facts, and memorandum in opposition were filed on

September 2, 2006. A reply was filed on September 8, 2006.

Defendant Eloy Romero filed a notice of motion and motion

for summary judgment, memorandum in support, statement of

undisputed material facts, exhibit list and exhibits, and lodged

deposition transcripts on July 25, 2006. Opposition in the form

of the declaration of Norman Newhouse with exhibits, statement of

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disputed and undisputed facts, and memorandum in opposition were

filed on September 1, 2006. A reply was filed on September 7,

2006.

Plaintiff filed her original complaint on December 30, 2004.

She filed a first amended complaint on May 20, 2005, in which she

alleges six causes of action against “defendants, and each of

them,” including (1) assault by a peace officer; (2) battery by a

peace officer; (3) false arrest with a warrant by a peace

officer; (4) unnecessary delay in processing and releasing; (5)

abuse of process; and (6) violation of her civil rights pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The complaint concerns Plaintiff’s arrest for being an

accessory after the fact of her son’s murder of a Merced police

officer and her subsequent custody; charges were filed and then

eventually dismissed for lack of evidence. Defendant Officer

Skinner applied for the arrest warrant which led to Plaintiff’s

arrest. City officers who are no longer in this action arrested

Plaintiff in accordance with the warrant. Defendants Officers

Sterling and Dabney interviewed Plaintiff after she was arrested

and brought into the police station.

It was stipulated on June 22, 2006, that Defendants County

of Merced, County of Merced Sheriff’s Department, and Officer

Vernon Warnke be dismissed pursuant to a settlement. The

settlement was determined to be in good faith on the same date.

By informal telephonic conference held on November 8, 2006, the

Court confirmed that all defendants other than the moving

defendants have been dismissed from the lawsuit.

///

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party: 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Where a party with the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial as to a matter moves for summary judgment, it must

demonstrate affirmatively by evidence each essential element of

its claim or affirmative defense and must establish that there is

no triable issue of fact as to each essential element such that a

rational trier of fact could render a judgment in its favor.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

888 (9 Cir. 2003). If a party moves for summary judgment with th

respect to a matter as to which the opposing party has the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, then the moving party

must show that the opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof

at trial by establishing that there is no genuine issue of

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material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party’s

claim or defense; the moving party must meet the initial burden

of producing evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well

as the ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000). In order to carry th

its burden of production, the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

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entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary

judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). The evidence of

the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). 

Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the

Court must not weigh the evidence, the Court must draw reasonable

inferences; evidence that is too insubstantial or speculative may

be insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250,

1255 (9 Cir. 1982). th

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9 Cir. 2001). th

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MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CITY, POLICE, AND OFFICERS

I. Late Opposition

Defendants request that the Court ignore Plaintiff’s

opposition, which Defendants represent was filed thirteen days

before the hearing date on September 2, 2006, after the close of

business on the Friday before the Labor Day weekend. A

declaration of Dale L. Allen, Jr., states that although the proof

of service of Plaintiff’s hard copy was dated August 31, 2006,

the postmark was September 5, 2006, mailed parcel post.

A court has inherent power to control its docket and the

disposition of its cases with economy of time and effort for both

the court and the parties. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S.

248, 254-255 (1936); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th

Cir. 1992). Further, a court has broad discretion to interpret

and apply its local rules. Dulange v. Dutro Construction, Inc.,

183 F.3d 916, 919 n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Local Rule 78-230 requires th

that opposition to a motion be filed not less than fourteen days

preceding the hearing date and served not less than fourteen or

seventeen days (personal service, or electronic and mail,

respectively) preceding the hearing date. The Court in its

discretion may refuse to consider matters that are not timely

filed as a result of inexcusable neglect. Cusano v. Klein, 264

F.3d 936, 950-51 (9 Cir. 2001) (not considering evidence th

submitted late in response to a motion for summary judgment). 

Here, the apparent tardiness was brief and did not result in

any prejudice. The Court exercises its discretion to deny the

request to disregard the late opposition.

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II. State Tort Claims Act

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on Plaintiff’s five state tort claims against

Defendants City, Police, and Officers because Plaintiff did not

comply with the Tort Claims Act, which requires that a claim be

submitted to identify with particularity the entities,

individuals, and causes of action that Plaintiff later alleges in

her complaint. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

filed a claim naming only the Merced Police Department, but filed

suit against the City of Merced and Officers Skinner, Sterling,

and Dabney; she added causes of action that were not included on

her tort claim; and she did not allege facts demonstrating or

excusing compliance with the Tort Claims Act in her complaint.

With respect to public entities, Cal. Govt. Code § 945.4

states:

Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no

suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefor has been presented to the public

entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has

been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in

accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this

division.

A failure to present a claim is fatal to a claimant’s cause

of action because failure to allege presentation results in a

failure to state a cause of action. State v. Superior Court

(Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004). Under California law, a

failure to file a required claim warrants a grant of summary

judgment. TrafficSchoolOnline, Inc. v. Clarke, 112 Cal.App.4th

736, 738 (2003.) Because compliance is an essential part of

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 The unverified amended complaint filed on May 20, 2005, states: 1

Defendants City of Merced and Merced Police Department are... public entities, being an incorporated city

and its police department in the State of California. Plaintiff is required to, and has complied with the Government

Tort Claims act by filing a claim against the City of Merced. Said claim was rejected on October 22, 2004. (Cmplt. ¶

6.)

10

Plaintiff’s claim, it must be the burden of the Plaintiff to show

either satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites or sufficient

facts to justify noncompliance on the ground of excuse, waiver,

or estoppel. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234,

1239 (2004) (essential element of cause of action); see, 1 CEB

California Government Tort Liability Practice § 5.18 (2006).

A. Defendant City of Merced 

With respect to presenting a claim to Defendant City of

Merced, except for specified exclusions not pertinent here, Cal.

Govt. Code § 905 specifically requires the presentation of a

claim against local public entities. Cal. Govt. Code § 915(a)

mandates that a claim shall be presented to a local public

entity; it describes the means of doing so as by delivering it to

the clerk, secretary , or auditor thereof, or mailing it to the

clerk, secretary, auditor, or governing body at is principal

office. Section 915(d) provides in pertinent part:

A claim... shall be deemed to have been presented in

compliance with this section even though it is not

delivered or mailed as provided in this section

if it is actually received by the clerk, secretary,

auditor, or board of the local public entity.... 

Here, Plaintiff alleged compliance with the claims statute

in the complaint. Plaintiff filed a claim form with the Central 1

San Joaquin Valley Risk Management Authority that was received on

September 27, 2004. (Decl. of Lesley L. Novotny, Ex. A.) The

claim was against the Merced Police Department and District

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Attorney Gordon Spencer; names of other employees were not yet

known. The substance of the claim was infringement of

constitutional rights in the form of false arrest, false

imprisonment, and false criminal charges.

Preliminarily the Court notes that at the hearing on the

motion, counsel for the City Defendants explained that due to the

identity of the governing bodies and risk management authority

for both the City and the Police Department, it is not disputed

that both Defendants City and Police were on notice, and further

that the officers were in the course and scope of employment.

Therefore, it appears that Defendants are not suggesting that

there was a complete lack of any filing of a tort claim that gave

notice to Defendant City of Merced. This is consistent with the

case law that has developed concerning the notice function of

filing a tort claim. See, Carlino v. Los Angeles County Flood

Control District, 10 Cal.App.4th 1526 (1992) (presentation to a

county board of supervisors was held to be sufficient where the

target agency involved was a flood control district that was

separate but was ultimately controlled by the board of

supervisors, there was no prejudice, and the notice purpose was

satisfied); Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control

District, 68 Cal.App.3d 70 (1977) (reasoning that presentation to

the county board of supervisors of a claim concerning condition

of a road that was owned by a flood control district was

substantial compliance because the county board and county

officers were responsible for the district and apparently

qualified as the governing body of the district); and Peters v.

City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 419, 426-27 (1953)

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(applying the doctrine of substantial compliance where although

the original claim was filed with the wrong entity (the city

controller), a carbon copy was delivered to the proper entity

(the board of supervisors), and the city attorney was also

copied; because the purpose of the requirement of presenting a

written claim is to give the appropriate municipal body timely

notice of the accident and an opportunity to investigate it,

providing the carbon to the board and city attorney met that

purpose). 

It is Plaintiff’s burden to show presentation of a claim

against the entity. Plaintiff has demonstrated presentation of a

claim to the Defendant City and the Defendant Police.

B. Officers Skinner, Sterling, Dabney

Although a claim need not be presented to a public employee

for an injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of

his public employment, Cal. Govt. Code § 950, a claim against a

public employee is barred if an action against the employing

public entity is barred, Cal. Govt. Code § 950.2. Further, a tort

claim against the public employer must be denied before a lawsuit

against the public employee may be maintained. Cal. Govt. Code §

950.6. A police officer is a public employee entitled to the

protection of the Tort Claims Act. Randle v. City and County of

San Francisco, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 455-56 (1986).

Here, the evidence warrants the inference that the action of

the officers in question was undertaken within the scope of the

employment. Further, there is no evidentiary basis for a

conclusion that the claim against the officers’ alleged employer,

namely, the Merced Police Department or Defendant City, is

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barred.

With respect to the failure to name the individual officers

in the tort claim, Cal. Govt. Code § 910 states:

A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a

person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all

of the following:

(a) The name and post office address of the

claimant.

(b) The post office address to which the person

presenting the claim desires notices to be sent.

(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim

asserted.

(d) A general description of the indebtedness,

obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as

it may be known at the time of presentation of the

claim.

(e) The name or names of the public employee or

employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if

known.

(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten

thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of

presentation of the claim, including the estimated

amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss,

insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim

computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds

ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be

included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the

claim would be a limited civil case. (Emphasis added.)

Here, the claim named Gordon Spencer and further stated,

“The names of other employees are not yet known.” The claim was

not a sworn or notarized document and does not appear to be

testimonial in nature. However, Plaintiff testified in her

deposition that she did not know the names of the officers who

came to arrest her (Dep. p. 30) or to interrogate her (Dep. pp.

34-35). It thus appears that the evidence supports a reasonable

inference that Plaintiff did not know the names of Officers

Sterling and Dabney. Further, given the nature of the arrest

warrant process, it is reasonable to infer that for some period

of time, Plaintiff lacked information regarding the identity of

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Officer Skinner. 

In any event, even if the evidence does not warrant an

inference that Plaintiff lacked knowledge of Skinner’s name when

the tort claim was filed, the failure to name Skinner in the

claim does not render Plaintiff’s compliance insubstantial. A

court may hold that a claimant substantially complied with the

statutory requirements for a valid claim, and thus the claim is

valid, if 1) a claim has been presented such that there is some

compliance with all the statutory requirements, and 2) despite

technical deficiencies, the claim is sufficient to give the

public entity timely notice of the nature of the claim to permit

it to investigate adequately and settle it without the expense of

litigation if appropriate. City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12

Cal.3d 447, 454-57 (1974); Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of

Educ., 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713-14 (1990). 

Here, the Plaintiff achieved some compliance by naming the

District Attorney and stating that other names were unknown. The

claim as presented was sufficient to put the Defendants on notice

of the date and location of the loss and the general facts of the

claim. The description of the claim in the tort claim filed

against Defendants Merced Police/City and the District Attorney

is virtually identical to that which was filed with the County

and analyzed by Judge Coyle in his order of May 13, 2005, in

which he ruled that the claim was sufficient to permit

investigation of the claim and a determination of it. (Order p.

13.) As is noted in Stockett v. Association of California Water

Agencies 34 Cal.4th 441, 447 (2004), relied on by Judge Coyle,

the claim need not specify each act or omission, but rather

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should set forth the fundamental actions of the defendants; the

subsequent complaint should allege only factual bases for

recovery that are fairly reflected in the written claim, but it

may elaborate or add further detail. Although no case is found

applying the substantial compliance doctrine to the naming of

defendants, the Court concludes that although Plaintiff did not

name Officer Skinner in the claim, Plaintiff’s claim

substantially complied with the requirements of § 910.

C. New Causes of Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiff added new causes of action

to the complaint that were not in the claim. As Judge Coyle ruled

with respect to the County’s claim and the original complaint,

the precise nature of the causes of action is not determinative;

rather, it is the factual and not the legal bases that are the

concern reflected in the requirements of the Tort Claims Act.

(Order of May 13, 2005 p. 13.) Here, Plaintiff’s amended

complaint sets forth essentially the same claims as the original

complaint. Further, the claims all concern the legality of

Plaintiff’s arrest, imprisonment, and criminal charges, which in

turn constitute the essential factual matters upon which the

causes of action are based.

Thus, the Court concludes that there is no undue variance

between the claims alleged in the first amended complaint and the

tort claim.

In summary, the Court concludes that Defendants have not

demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment or

adjudication based on any lack of compliance by Plaintiff with

the state tort claims statute concerning her claims against

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Defendants City, Police, or officers. 

III. Assault and Battery

Defendants contend that because none of the individually

named defendants participated in Plaintiff’s arrest, she does not

have a claim for assault or battery based on her arrest.

Plaintiff stated that the argument that the first cause of action

for assault and battery is without merit is not opposed. (Opp. p.

9.) At the hearing on the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel expressly

conceded that there are no facts to support an assault and

battery claim or a claim of unreasonable use of force with

respect to Plaintiff’s arrest and being taken to jail. When asked

if, separate and apart from an unreasonable use of force, there

were any facts to support a claim of any other form of assault

and battery, Plaintiff’s counsel responded that his only argument

was that if one is incarcerated on a bogus warrant, it is an

unreasonable use of force. However, as will be discussed in

detail hereinbelow, there is no issue of fact as to the validity

of the warrant. It thus does not appear that Plaintiff has set

forth facts to support a claim of assault or battery against any

Defendant.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not set forth facts

raising an issue of fact as to Plaintiff’s being the victim of an

assault (first claim) or battery (second claim). Accordingly, the

City Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s first and

second claims, assault and battery, respectively.

IV. False Arrest

Plaintiff claims that Defendants caused her to be wrongfully

arrested because they intentionally authorized, encouraged,

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directed, and assisted a peace officer in procuring an unlawful

arrest by knowingly providing false information of a character

that could be expected to stimulate an arrest by knowingly,

oppressively, maliciously, and despicably concealing true facts

and providing false facts to obtain a warrant; and they falsely

obtained a warrant. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 35.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants acted in bad faith, with malice, and without a

reasonable belief that the warrant was valid; Defendants

purposely withheld exculpatory evidence from the magistrate who

issued the warrant and failed to exercise ordinarily intelligent

and informed judgment.

California law defines the tort of false imprisonment as the

intentional confinement of another against the person’s will; the

elements are 1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a

person, 2) without lawful privilege, 3) for an appreciable period

of time, however, brief. Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80

Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (2000). False arrest is a form of false

imprisonment and not a separate tort. Collins v. City and County

of San Francisco, 50 Cal.App.3d 671, 674 (1975). A person is

liable for false imprisonment if he or she authorizes,

encourages, directs, or assists an officer to do an unlawful act,

procures an unlawful arrest, without process, or participates in

the unlawful arrest. Du Lac v. Perma Trans Products, Inc., 103

Cal.App. 3d 937, 941 (1980) (overruled on another point

concerning the privilege of a private person to communicate

information to the police in Hagberg v. California Federal Bank

FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 377 (2004)). Wilfully, maliciously, or

knowingly giving the police wrong information of a character that

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foreseeably could be expected to induce an arrest, such as

identifying the wrong person as a criminal, for the purpose of or

with the intent to induce an arrest and prosecution, or with

knowledge that confinement will, to a substantial certainty,

result from it, constitutes false imprisonment because the

provider of information is aiding and assisting in the arrest and

is performing the necessary active role in bringing about the

arrest. Du Lac, 103 Cal.App.3d at 942-43. 

Accordingly, a California cause of action for false arrest

with a warrant has the following elements: 1) Defendant

wrongfully arrested the Plaintiff or intentionally caused

Plaintiff to be wrongfully arrested; 2) the warrant was invalid

because of false facts; 3) Plaintiff was actually harmed; and 4)

Defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing

Plaintiff’s harm. See, CACI No. 1405 (January 2006).

Further, if the Defendant is a police officer, Cal. Civ.

Code § 43.55(a) applies and provides:

(a) There shall be no liability on the part of, and no

cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer

who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest

regular upon its face if the peace officer in making

the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable

belief that the person arrested is the one referred to

in the warrant.

Further, Cal. Pen. Code § 847(b) provides:

(b) There shall be no civil liability on the part of,

and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace

officer or federal criminal investigator or law

enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d)

of Section 830.8, acting within the scope of his or her

authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment

arising out of any arrest under any of the following

circumstances:

(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace

officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable

cause to believe the arrest was lawful.

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(2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge

made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a

felony by the person to be arrested.

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that the warrant

was based on false facts known to be false by the officers at the

time of the warrant application; the warrant was supported by

probable cause, and thus the arrest was lawful; and Plaintiff is

unable to prove malice.

A. Probable Cause

1. Legal Standard

The law pertinent to a determination of reasonable or

probable cause to arrest has recently been summarized:

Reasonable cause to arrest exists when the facts

known to the arresting officer would lead a reasonable

person to have a strong suspicion of the arrestee's

guilt. (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473, 122

Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067.) This is an objective

standard. (People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895,

904-905, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799, 62 P.3d 45.) Where the

facts are undisputed, the issue of reasonable cause for

an arrest is a question of law. (Giannis v. City and

County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 219,

224-225, 144 Cal.Rptr. 145.)

O’Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 511 (2006), rev.

denied September 20, 2006. An officer may rely on information

communicated to him by fellow officers to establish probable

cause to arrest. People v. Willis, 28 Cal.4th 22, 48 (2002). 

Absent additional evidence, because the issue of reasonable cause

to arrest involves an objective standard, there can be no false

arrest if the officers had at least one reasonable ground to

arrest an individual. O’Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.App.4th 

512.

Here, the offense for which Plaintiff was arrested was a

violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 32, which provides:

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Every person who, after a felony has been committed,

harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony,

with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape

from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having

knowledge that said principal has committed such felony

or has been charged with such felony or convicted

thereof, is an accessory to such felony.

2) Facts

It is undisputed that Cuitlahuac “Tao” Rivera (Tao) was

identified as a suspect in the murder of Merced Police Officer

Stephan Gray; surveillance was being conducted on April 16, 2004,

to locate Tao, and Defendant Merced Police Department was

involved in the investigation and surveillance. Plaintiff Erika

Rivera is Tao’s mother.

a. Surveillance:

Skinner’s deposition testimony establishes that it was

broadcast over the police radio before he arrived at Midge Street

on the sixteenth that Tao was in front of 2560 Midge Street,

Number 20. (Decl. of Newhouse, Ex. 6, p. 16.) When he arrived, he

learned via police radio from someone at the location that Tao

was running. (Id. p. 18.) Skinner observed a man in a black

hooded sweatshirt with the hood up running from the area and

being chased by two agents, but Skinner lost sight of him. (Id.

p. 19-20, 28-29.) He could not tell who the man was. (Id. p. 29.)

Skinner went over to another area a couple of minutes later where

the man was seen and observed several other officers arriving.

(Id. pp. 23, 27.) Skinner later learned that the man ran through

or over a fence. (Id. p. 22.) They set up a perimeter around four

apartment complexes. (Id. p. 39.) From his own experience,

Skinner understood that Tao was outside the apartment, took off

running, and there was a chase after him in which the area was

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searched. (Id. p. 31.) Skinner did not see the man in the

sweatshirt again during the time that the perimeter was set up,

and he did not see the sweatshirt after it was off the man. (Id.

pp. 40, 81-82.) He estimated that the search lasted an hour or

two. (Id. p. 41.) Skinner was at the scene until late afternoon,

saw at least eight SWAT team members searching for the person in

the black sweatshirt, and about twenty law enforcement personnel.

(Id. p. 35, 37.)

Romero testified that with a clear view from a distance of

150 feet he observed the height of the person in the black

sweatshirt; he was able to see the person’s face and recognized

it from pictures as Tao’s. (Newhouse Decl., Ex. 2, Dep. of Romero

pp. 17-18, 24-25, 40, 47.) He observed a picture of Plaintiff

later. (Id. pp. 48-49.) Dispatch from Merced Police stated that

they had just received an anonymous 911 telephone call saying

that Tao was at the Midge apartments. (Id. p. 67.)

Agent Alfredo Cardwood also testified to observing Tao and

Plaintiff together while with Romero. (Newhouse Decl., Ex. 1,

Dep. of Cardwood, pp. 17-18, 20.) He got a good look at the man’s

face. (Id. p. 21.) 

b. Arrest Warrant

It is undisputed that Skinner was assigned to write or apply

for a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, and that Detective Skinner

was informed that Tao was a suspect in Gray’s murder. Skinner

testified that Defendant Commander Martin informed him it was for

aiding and assisting her son in connection with the murder of

Officer Gray. (Dep. p. 79.) 

Skinner testified that later around 8:00 p.m. on the

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sixteenth at the Merced Police Department he was told by

supervisor Eloy Romero over the telephone that the man in the

sweatshirt was Tao. (Dep. of Skinner pp. 29-30.) The basis for

the warrant Martin requested was what had gone on earlier in the

morning; although Skinner could not remember Martin’s exact

words, what went on earlier in the morning was that Plaintiff had

been seen with Tao by Defendant Agent Romero. (Id. p. 79.)

Skinner was asked if he had told the examiner at deposition

everything on which he based his statement (Exhibit 6, to the

deposition, apparently his affidavit for probable cause which

appears in the record of this motion as the basis for Defendants’

request for judicial notice, Ex. A); he replied that he had.

(Dep. pp. 84-85.)

Commander Martin testified that he discussed with Skinner

the probable cause facts for the warrant, including Warnke’s

visit to Plaintiff and his transmission of information to her

that her son was wanted and that her assistance would constitute

criminal aiding and abetting; identification of the man with

Plaintiff on Midge Street as her son, Tao, by two agents

(Cardwood and Romero) from the Department of Justice who had a

“high comfort level” with their identification; and Plaintiff’s

and Tao’s having walked off together from the apartment. (Dep. of

Martin pp. 7-9, 26.) Martin also testified that Warnke’s visit to

Plaintiff was documented in a report authored by Detective

Sterling stating that Warnke contacted Plaintiff at about eleven

in the evening on April 15, 2004, and explained in English and

Spanish that her son was wanted and that she would be arrested

for any assistance in eluding the police; she understood. (Dep.

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pp. 90-91.) Further, Sterling testified that Warnke told him that

he had explained it in English and Spanish and that Plaintiff had

understood. (Decl. of Novotny, Ex. F, Dep. of Ray Sterling p.

59.)

The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice of

Defendant Skinner’s affidavit. The Court may take judicial notice

of court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. BernalObeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9 Cir. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade th

Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d

699 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Skinner’s subscribed and sworn affidavit dated April 16,

2004, states that it was subscribed and sworn to the Merced

County Magistrate at 10:47 p.m. The affidavit stated that after

Officer Gray’s murder on April 15, 2004, Detective Gorman

informed Skinner that two witnesses observed Tao raise a handgun

and fire twice at Gray; they identified him in a photographic

lineup. Sergeant Warnke of the Merced County Sheriff’s Department

told Skinner that on April 15, 2004, at approximately 2300 hours,

he made contact with Plaintiff at her address in Merced, informed

her in English and Spanish that her son was wanted for Gray’s

murder and that she would be arrested if she assisted him in any

way; she acknowledged that she understood. At approximately 8:00

p.m. on April 16, Skinner spoke with Defendant Agent Eloy Romero

of the Department of Justice B.N.E. Division, who informed

Skinner that he saw Plaintiff standing outside the Midge Avenue

residence when Tao walked up, entered the residence, exited the

residence, then entered again, then exited with his girlfriend,

met up with Plaintiff, and all three of them started to walk away

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from the residence together. As undercover officers approached

the area, Tao ran off, eluded officers, and remained at large. A

criminal complaint was being sought against Tao for the murder.

Skinner opined that based on the aforesaid facts, he

believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for the

crime of violating California Pen. Code § 32, accessory to a

felony; he believed that there was a great possibility that

Plaintiff was assisting Tao in leaving the area or was arranging

his transportation out of the area at the time. 

Merced Police Commander Martin testified that he had

received information that persons associated with Tao, including

Plaintiff, were hiding him and transporting him. Once source was

an anonymous telephone call that came through late on the

fifteenth or early in the morning on the sixteenth on a business

line, was not recorded, traced, or documented, and in which a

woman stated that Plaintiff was going to get her son out of

Merced and should be watched. (Decl. of Newhouse, Ex. 4, Dep. of

Martin, pp. 83-85, 75.) Martin happened to answer the telephone

call, which was not routed through the dispatch center, and he

held on to the generic information; they were already watching

Plaintiff as a person of interest. Further, they had sent out

Warnke and his crew for a first contact. (Id. p. 87-89.) Martin

did not testify that he had told Skinner about this first

anonymous telephone call, and Skinner did not mention it in his

deposition. Martin testified that he did not remember the exact

words of what he had told Skinner, but he did recall discussing

the probable cause facts. After Tao was observed at and near the

Midge Street apartment with Plaintiff and walking off together,

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 Defendants offered only Casillas’ declaration in support of the motion; Plaintiff offered his deposition, 2

which is consistent with his opinion as stated in his declaration. The deposition terminated when Casillas, an expert

witness disclosed only on the standard of care with respect to the warrant, was instructed by counsel for Defendants

not to answer questions regarding the typicality and mode of surveillance of persons because it was outside the scope

of disclosure of his expertise. (Dep. of Casillas pp. 28-34.) The lack of cross-examination of Casillas on his subject

of expertise does not affect the evidentiary status of his declaration; and it was Plaintiff’s counsel, not Defendants’

counsel, who terminated the deposition without asking further questions within the scope of disclosed expertise.

(Dep. p. 33.) 

25

and after a search for him lasting an hour or two, it was

concluded that Tao had escaped the perimeter. (Id. pp. 33-42.)

Martin did not know any additional facts other than his testimony

that provided the basis for Skinner to opine that there was a

great possibility Plaintiff was assisting her son. (Id. p. 42.) 

Antonio L. Casillas, a police officer and inspector in the San

Francisco Police Department Homicide Detail, stated in his

declaration that in applying for the warrant, Skinner and the

Merced Police Department proceeded in accordance with the

standard of care expected of police officers seeking a warrant

before a magistrate. (Decl. ¶ 1.) He stated that Skinner was

entitled to rely on what was essentially the information he

mentioned in the affidavit and the anonymous telephone call

received before the alleged sighting of Tao to the effect that

his mother was going to try to get him out of Merced. (Decl. p.

2.)

In his deposition, Casillas related that he originally 2

opined that the warrant was based on probable cause due to the

murder, advice to Plaintiff regarding Tao’s being wanted and any

assistance being a crime, and officers’ observations of Plaintiff

assisting Tao. (Dep. of Casillas p. 17.)

Martin testified that a document indicated that Plaintiff

was arrested by the Merced Police Department SWAT team led by

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Sergeant Williams. (Dep. p. 96.) Martin’s responsibility was

being in charge of the search for Tao. (Dep. p. 14.)

Officer Sterling testified that he did not participate in

the arrest of Plaintiff. (Dep. p. 62.)

3. Analysis

Skinner’s affidavit contains sufficient facts to cause one

to entertain a reasonable and strong suspicion that Plaintiff had

committed a violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 32.

Skinner was told by a detective that two witnesses had

observed Tao raise a gun and fire twice at Officer Gray, who

subsequently died of a gunshot wound; further, he was informed

that the witnesses also made a positive identification of Tao in

a photo line-up. These data warrant a reasonable belief that Tao

committed homicide, and thus that a felony had been committed.

Skinner also was told by Warnke that shortly following the

homicide, he had informed Plaintiff in English and Spanish that

her son was wanted for the murder and that if she assisted, she

would be arrested. Further, Warnke told Skinner that Plaintiff

acknowledged that she understood. These facts warrant a strong

and reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff knew that a felony had

been committed and that her son had committed the felony.

Skinner was told by Romero, a special agent, that he saw

Plaintiff standing outside when Tao approached, entered the

residence, came out, re-entered, and exited with his girlfriend,

and met up with his mother; then all three started to walk away

from the residence together. Reliance on Romero’s sighting was

reasonable given Skinner’s own personal knowledge of the

surveillance on the day in question. Further, there does not

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appear to be any evidence suggesting that Skinner’s reliance on

Romero’s identification was unreasonable at the time. 

These facts warranted a reasonable belief that Plaintiff had

assisted her son. The gist of the offense proscribed by § 32 is

that the accused harbors, conceals, or aids the principal with

the requisite knowledge and with the intent that the principal

may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or

punishment. People v. Duty, 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 100-01 (1969). Any

kind of overt or affirmative assistance to a known felon to

conceal the crime or elude punishment falls within the scope of

the statute, including an affirmative falsehood to a public

investigator, made with intent to shield the perpetrator of the

crime. Id. p. 103. In determining the knowledge and intent of the

aider, the jury may consider such factors as his possible

presence at the crime or other means of knowledge of its

commission, as well as his companionship and relationship with

the principal before and after the offense. Id. p. 104. Likewise,

all the pertinent circumstances may be considered together in

order to draw inferences regarding aid and intent. See, In re

I.M., 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203-05 (2005) (where the evidence

considered regarding intent included the defendant’s conduct in

being present with the perpetrator of the felony, cultural

factors such as gang habits and membership, and running away with

the perpetrator, which suggested knowledge of guilt and fear of

apprehension).

Here, Plaintiff was seen in the presence of her son, a man

believed to be the perpetrator of a murder, despite the warning

having been given to her. Plaintiff stayed at the apartment for

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the remainder of the day. The man, who was identified as Tao, was

with his girlfriend and mother at the home of his girlfriend, her

parents, and the daughter of the perpetrator and the girlfriend;

he was wearing clothing which covered much of his head and some

of his face and thus functioned to conceal his identity to some

extent. He conversed with the Plaintiff for a minute. The man was

observed repeatedly entering and leaving the apartment. They all

walked off together. At some point, the man ran, removed his

sweatshirt, and succeeded in eluding the officers. 

It was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that

Plaintiff was present; permitted or participated in permitting

the perpetrator to enter the residence repeatedly and thus

conceal himself; accompanied him in an effort to leave the

vicinity, which, in view of the family relationship among those

present at the apartment, was an area which could be expected to

be watched by the authorities and to have presented a risk of

apprehension; and made no apparent effort to help the authorities

after the man ran. A reasonable officer could believe that given

the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff had given

affirmative aid to a known perpetrator with the intent to aid him

in evading apprehension.

The Court notes that Officer Casillas concluded that in

proceeding to investigate and obtain a warrant, Defendants

Skinner and Merced Police Department acted within the standard of

care expected of police officers in seeking a warrant before a

magistrate. Further, in his deposition, Casillas opined that the

facts relied on by Skinner in the affidavit constituted probable

cause. 

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Plaintiff claims there is an issue as to whether or not

Skinner was told by Martin that two agents of DOJ had identified

the man with Plaintiff as Tao and whether Martin told Skinner

about the anonymous phone call. Only one identification shows up

in the affidavit (Romero’s, not Cardwell’s), and the anonymous

telephone calls were not mentioned. Even if Skinner was not told

of a second identification, Skinner was told of Romero’s 

identification, which was the one mentioned in the affidavit for

the arrest warrant and which further was sufficient to support a

reasonable belief that Tao was with Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff also characterizes Skinner’s deposition testimony

as being to the effect that in preparing the warrant application,

he relied on only one fact, namely, that Martin told Skinner that

Plaintiff had been seen in front of the apartment with her

daughter and her granddaughter with a man in a black hooded

sweatshirt. Skinner’s testimony was that the way Martin knew that

Plaintiff had aided and assisted Tao for Gray’s murder was

“[f]rom what went on earlier that morning.” (Skinner Dep. p. 79.)

When asked if Martin had told him that, Skinner replied that he

did not remember the exact words; when asked what had gone on

earlier in the morning, Skinner replied that Plaintiff was seen

with Tao by Romero. (Id.) Further questions concerning other

matters, including the surveillance, the execution of the warrant

and unrelated facts concerning Erika Rivera, followed. (Id. pp.

79-81.) Later in the deposition Skinner was asked if there was

anything else significant about “the event” he wanted to tell

Plaintiff’s counsel that counsel had not asked him; he replied in

the negative. (Id. p. 81.) Given the content and context of

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Skinner’s testimony, it appears that Skinner’s testimony did not

amount to a representation that the only fact relied on in

issuing the warrant was Romero’s observations; rather, it was

more of a general description of Martin’s communication with

Skinner. Skinner’s deposition and his affidavit clearly reveal

that at the least he relied on reports of witnesses to the

killing of Gray; Skinner’s own knowledge of what had taken place

that day; Romero’s identification, which was communicated to

Skinner by Romero independently of Skinner’s conversation with

Martin; and information regarding Warnke’s contact with

Plaintiff. (Skinner Dep. pp. 30-31; Affidavit.)

As to the first anonymous telephone call, even assuming that

Skinner was not told of the anonymous telephone call or calls,

the other information relied upon constituted probable cause to

arrest. Further, given the totality of the facts and

circumstances, there was ample basis independent of the first

call to warrant a belief that Plaintiff had been or was helping

Tao leave the area or arrange his transportation out of the area

at the time. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that there was probable

cause for the arrest warrant.

B. False Facts and Malice

Plaintiff argues that she has raised triable issues of fact

regarding whether or not Martin and/or Skinner intended her to be

falsely arrested and whether Skinner intentionally obtained an

excessive bail of $500,000.00.

1. Intention Falsely to Arrest 

The Court has previously rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that

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Skinner relied only on the observation of Plaintiff with Tao. 

Plaintiff points to a variety of other facts in an effort to

raise an issue of fact as to Skinner’s intent in seeking the

warrant. Plaintiff offers numerous other facts pertaining to the

surveillance (see Pltf.’s Sep. Stmt., items 34-68, 74-75, 77),

some of which are summarized elsewhere herein. Plaintiff cites to

portions of the depositions of Agent Cardwood and Defendants

Romero and Skinner reflecting that at the time of Romero’s

observations, Romero was relieving Cardwood’s team, although

Romero’s team members were not yet in the surveillance positions;

they learned that there was an anonymous telephone call saying

Tao was in the area where his girlfriend lived; Romero saw a man

in a black hooded sweatshirt covering the sides and top of the

face down to the forehead; from a distance of eighty to 100 yards

Romero saw Tao and his mother appear at the apartment front door,

identifying the man from a picture; the man and Plaintiff stood

and talked a minute; the man went inside for thirty seconds, came

out and talked to two black men and a woman, then returned to the

apartment for another thirty seconds, and then came out and

walked on the sidewalk towards Midge Street; Jamilih Graham

(Tao’s girlfriend), Plaintiff’s three-year-old granddaughter, and

Plaintiff also walked along the same sidewalk towards Midge

Street; law enforcement personnel saw a man in the sweatshirt run

to the second floor landing of an apartment building, remove the

shirt and drop it on the landing; and law enforcement personnel

numbering approximately fifty arrived, attempted to find and

arrest the man, but never saw him again despite having set a

perimeter. Romero told unidentified Merced Police Department

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personnel later in the day that the man in the sweatshirt was

Tao, who had been with his mother. Cardwood was later unable to

identify as Tao a picture of Tao as he actually looked on the day

of the incident. 

Further, Plaintiff and Diana Smith, a paralegal, declared

that the man in the sweatshirt was not Tao, but was instead a man

named Gustavo Reyes who had an outstanding warrant or warrants

for his arrest when he ran on April 16, 2004. Defendants object

on grounds of hearsay, irrelevance, and lack of foundation to

Smith’s statement that she had determined that Gustavo Reyes was

not in custody on April 16, 2004 and was not arrested until June

2004 from charges stemming from April 11, 2004; they object on

hearsay grounds to the statement that he had cases prior to 2004

with case numbers MF28972, MM18129, MM176998, and MM181760. 

Hearsay is defined as a statement made by one other than the

declarant testifying at the current hearing, which is offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid.

801. Smith’s reference to cases and case numbers indicates that

she obtained the information about Reyes’ custody and cases from

some unidentified data base. A “statement” within the meaning of

the hearsay rule includes an oral or written assertion. Fed. R.

Evid. 801(a); Advisory Comm. Note (1972). Out-of-court documents

reflecting data constitute statements of data. Pelster v. Ray,

987 F.2d 514, 525 (8 Cir. 1993). Here, the basis of Smith’s th

knowledge is not set forth, but it does not appear logically

possible that Smith obtained the information from a source that

did not constitute oral or written assertions. Accordingly, the

Court sustains the objection and excludes Smith’s declaration.

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Further, Defendants’ objection on the basis of lack of

foundation (personal knowledge in this case) is well taken.

Subject to the provisions relating to expert opinion testimony

(Fed. R. Evid. 703), a witness may not testify to a matter unless

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the

witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Fed. R. Evid. 602.

The burden is on the proponent to establish personal knowledge to

the extent that a reasonable trier of fact could believe that the

witness had personal knowledge about the fact. United States v.

Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 767 (7 Cir. 1999). Personal knowledge must be th

established by admissible evidence, including the witness’s own

testimony or extraneous sources. Fed. R. Evid. 602; United States

v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). Personal knowledge

consists of what a witness actually directly observed or

perceived through his or her own senses. Fed. R. Evid. 602, Adv.

Comm. Notes (1972). Thus, both opportunity to observe and actual

observation must be established. McCrary-El v. Shaw, 992 F.2d

809, 810-11 (8 Cir. 1993). Further, the source of the knowledge th

must be disclosed; it is not sufficient for a witness merely to

say that he or she is aware of a fact. Ward v. First Federal

Savings Bank, 173 F.3d 611, 617-18 (7 Cir. 1999) (mere statement th

that a witness was aware of something was held to be insufficient

to establish personal knowledge to render the evidence admissible

in connection with a summary judgment motion). Personal knowledge

may include inferences so long as they are appropriately grounded

in personal observation and first-hand experience, United States

v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Here, although it is reasonable to infer that some

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documentary source was used, the source is not identified. The

basis for Smith’s knowledge is not established. Smith’s

assertions are thus also excluded because a foundation is

lacking.

The relevance objection to Smith’s information regarding

Reyes’ custodial status is overruled; evidence is relevant if it

has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R.

Evid. 401. The evidence tends to demonstrate that the

observations of Romero and Cardwood of the man in the sweatshirt

were incorrect.

Even though Smith’s declaration is excluded, Plaintiff

herself declared that she had not communicated with, seen, or

been informed by intermediaries regarding her son between the

shooting and her arrest, and she did not take any action in that

time to arrange transportation or to do anything else to help her

son. She was not with her son when the police chased Gustavo

Reyes; she had gone to the apartment at Midge Street to visit her

granddaughter, and Reyes, whom Plaintiff knew as Tao’s friend,

happened to arrive; his visit did not have anything to do with

Plaintiff or assisting her son as far as Plaintiff knew. (Decl.

p. 2.) Reading Plaintiff’s declaration liberally, it raises an

issue of fact as to whether or not the man in the sweatshirt was

Tao.

That Romero might have been mistaken as to the

identification does not vitiate probable cause because under all

the circumstances, it was reasonable for Romero, who was able to

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see the face of the man in the sweatshirt, to have identified Tao

from photographs that he had recently observed. 

As to whether an issue of credibility is present, it is

established that a general challenge is insufficient to raise an

issue of fact regarding credibility; rather, specific facts must

be set forth that raise an issue of fact. Department of Commerce

v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330-31

(an expert’s mere statement that another expert’s assertion was

of dubious credibility, or that the latter used outdated data,

unsupported by specific facts, held not to raise a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the subject of the expert opinions);

National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Argonaut Ins.

Co., 701 F.2d 95, 96-97 (9 Cir. 1983) (assertions of bias of th

witnesses based on interests identical with a party, and of a

dispute as to the intent of parties to an ambiguous contract,

were insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

interpretation absent some evidentiary support). A mere desire to

cross-examine witnesses or a hope to undermine their credibility

at trial is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment. National

Union Fire Ins. Co., 701 F.2d at 96-97.

Here, Romero’s identification of the person with Plaintiff

was communicated to Skinner. Romero, an officer, testified that

he had a clear view of the person from 150 feet, saw the person’s

face, and recognized it from pictures. Romero was secure with the

identification. 

As to Skinner, there is no evidence tending to show that

Skinner was aware of any circumstances that would render Romero’s

identification unsound or that he was aware of any mistake on the

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part of Romero. Skinner testified that Romero had told him that

Romero got a good look at both Plaintiff and Tao. (Dep. of

Skinner, p. 77.) Even if one interprets Plaintiff’s declaration

to indicate that it was Reyes and not Tao present with her, the

evidence establishes at best a mistake on the part of Romero that

was apparently unknown to Skinner. A reasonable fact finder could

not infer simply from a mistake or lapse of judgment of Romero

that Skinner’s reliance on Romero’s apparently sound

identification was in bad faith or was intentionally false. See,

McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10 Cir. th

1998) (where there was no evidence of a basis for doubting

sincerity at the time of an articulated motivating reason for an

employment action, the reason was not converted into pretext

merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out to

be poor business judgment); Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of

Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1178-79 (9 Cir. 2006) (an assertion that th

an employer’s time estimates were unreasonable and thus a basis

for a retaliatory motive for later termination may have shown a

mistake but did not raise a genuine issue of material fact where

undisputed evidence in the record revealed that the estimates had

been reviewed for reasonableness and approved by others).

Plaintiff argues that the fact that Skinner asked for

$500,000 in bail demonstrates an intent falsely to arrest

Plaintiff or malice. Defendants argue that the bail request was

made only after the warrant issued, but the affidavit itself

shows that $500,000 bail was requested by Skinner. This evidence

warrants an inference that the bail was requested before the

warrant issued.

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Martin testified that he did not discuss with Skinner how to

set the bail at all; it was Skinner’s decision to ask for the

amount set. (Dep. pp. 26-27.) There was no specific bail section

for a violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 32; the bail schedule

indicated that for unspecified offenses for which no presumptive

bail was specified in the schedule, the presumptive bail should

be set according to state prison top term potential; it listed

specific prison terms, and for homicide listed $500,000.00 as the

amount. However, it was not thought that Plaintiff committed

homicide. (Dep. of Martin pp. 27-28.) 

It is established that one who is falsely arrested,

imprisoned, and prosecuted may obtain damages for the period of

arrest until the lawful process (such as filing an information or

an indictment) begins. Laible v.Superior Court, 157 Cal.App.3d

44, 47-48 (1984). Plaintiff claims that she was in custody for

seven days. 

The only evidence regarding bail submitted with respect to

the motion of Defendants City and officers is that in praying for

the warrant of arrest, Skinner prayed “that bail be set at

$500,000.” (Affid. p. 2.) Without further evidence, there is no

context within which to evaluate the significance of the amount

of bail. Given the state of the evidence, this does not warrant

an inference of intent to arrest falsely or malice.

The transcript of Skinner’s deposition lodged in connection

with the motion of Defendant Romero (but not introduced with

respect to the motion of Defendants City, Police, and Officers)

reveals that Skinner had never seen a felony bail schedule but

had heard that it existed; what he did as a common practice and

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thus was sure that he had done so in Plaintiff’s case was to call

the Merced County Jail, and they would tell him the bail amount;

he did not know how they obtained the information.(Dep. of

Skinner, pp. 59-65.) He was sure that they told him some amount,

but he did not know if it was half a million dollars. When asked

where the figure of half a million dollars came from, he

responded, “I think in combination of the amount I was told by

the jail and myself.” (Id. p. 66.) He further explained that as

to the amount that they told him, he did not know if he put two,

accessory or homicide together; he himself just put the amount

they told him in there. (Id. p. 67.) He could not recall what

exact amount of bail was for accessory, and he knew that there

was some type of bail for homicide, but he did not know what it

was. He did not know if the jail told him that the bail for

accessory after the fact of homicide was as high as half a

million dollars; he could not remember if that was what they gave

him or not. (Id. pp. 68-69.) He figured it was an appropriate

bail because Plaintiff had assisted her son, who in turn had

killed Officer Gray; he never saw that the amount was a little

high. (Id. p. 69.) Before Plaintiff’s case, he had never prepared

a warrant for, or arrested, one accused of being an accessory

after a homicide. (Id. p. 65.)

Even if this evidence were considered, it permits an

inference of ignorance, mistake, negligence, or imperfect

judgment, but it does not warrant an inference of bad faith or

malice.

Likewise, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the

circumstances of the surveillance and chase of the man in the

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sweatshirt warrant an inference that Romero or Skinner must have

known that it was not Tao or otherwise intended falsely to arrest

Plaintiff. The circumstances warranted a reasonable inference

that the chase was vigorous but unsuccessful. However, there is

no evidentiary basis for a conclusion that it was insincere,

malicious, or otherwise intended to result in a false arrest of

Plaintiff or any other person. It is mere speculation to conclude

from Tao’s not being apprehended that the man in the black

sweatshirt was not or could not have been Tao, or that Romero or

Skinner or others involved must necessarily have known that it

was not Tao.

With respect to Martin, Plaintiff has not set forth evidence

warranting an inference that Martin participated in obtaining

Plaintiff’s arrest warrant or arrest with knowledge of any

falsity of any identification or other evidence, or with any

intention falsely to arrest her. There is no evidence raising an

issue of credibility with respect to Martin’s good faith.

Plaintiff notes the unusual circumstances of the first anonymous

telephone call on the evening of Gray’s murder and argues that

they warrant an inference that Martin intended falsely to arrest

Plaintiff. However, there is no evidence that Skinner was

informed of the first call or that the first call was included in

the circumstances upon which issuance of the warrant was based.

Further, the evidence in context is not such that an inference of

improbability or impossibility is warranted; the record does not

present a basis warranting an inference that the likelihood of

such a call being received was so low that it reflects on

Defendant Martin’s credibility. Further, it is undisputed that

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40

Martin testified that he simply held on to that generic

information and that Plaintiff was already being watched. (Dep.

of Martin, pp. 87-89.) As to the second call, this information

was broadcast and did not emanate from Martin. (Romero Dep. p.

67.) Plaintiff has not produced evidence warranting an inference

that Martin was dishonest with respect to the information he

received or transferred or that he otherwise harbored an intent

falsely to arrest Plaintiff.

The state of mind of Defendant Romero will be discussed in

more detail in connection with Defendant Romero’s own motion. 

2. Absence of Malice

Cal. Civ. Code § 43.55 provides: 3

(a) There shall be no liability on the part of, and no

cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer

who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest

regular upon its face if the peace officer in making

the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable

belief that the person arrested is the one referred to

in the warrant.

(b) As used in this section, a "warrant of arrest

regular upon its face" includes both of the following:

(1) A paper arrest warrant that has been issued

pursuant to a judicial order.

(2) A judicial order that is entered into an

automated warrant system by law enforcement or court

personnel authorized to make those entries at or near

the time the judicial order is made.

This section does not preclude liability on the part of an

officer who gave false information in order to obtain a warrant

or obtained the arrest warrant if the action was otherwise

malicious or without a reasonable belief in the arrestee’s

identity. Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,

215 Cal.App.3d 7, 14-15 (1989).

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“Malice” within the meaning of § 43.55 has been described as

follows:

Malice may be proved by circumstantial evidence,

and is defined as “that attitude or state of mind which

actuates the doing of an act for some improper or

wrongful motive or purpose. It does not necessarily

require that the defendant be angry or vindictive or

bear any actual hostility or ill will toward the

plaintiff.” (BAJI No. 6.94.)

Laible v. Superior Court, 157 Cal.App.3d 44, 53 (1984). Further,

knowingly or recklessly giving false or materially incomplete

information to the police with the intent to induce an arrest

also suffices to establish malice. Harden v. San Francisco Bay

Area Rapid Transit Dist., 215 Cal.App.3d 7, 15 (1989).

Here, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that raises a

genuine issue of material fact as to malice with respect to

Martin or Skinner. With respect to their awareness and use of the

information constituting probable cause to arrest, there is no

evidence that there was any knowledge of falsity, any

circumstances sufficient to put them on notice of a risk of

falsity, or any improper or wrongful motive or purpose. The

evidence warrants an inference that Martin and Skinner undertook

to procure an arrest warrant because there was probable cause to

believe that Plaintiff had committed a public offense, and

because they reasonably believed Plaintiff had committed the

offense. As to Skinner’s request for $500,000 bail, under the

circumstances, it does not warrant an inference of an improper

purpose, such as to keep Plaintiff in jail as long as possible. 

As to Defendant Romero, again, his state of mind will be

considered in connection with his own motion. It is sufficient to

state at this juncture that there are no circumstances present

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that warrant an inference that Romero believed or knew that his

identification was erroneous or that otherwise raise an issue of

fact as to Romero’s credibility regarding his reasonable and good

faith reliance on his observations.

C. Liability of Defendants City and Police Department

Defendants argue that pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code §

815.2(b), neither Defendant City nor Defendant Police is liable

for false imprisonment.

Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2 provides:

(a) A public entity is liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee

of the public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omission would, apart from this section,

have given rise to a cause of action against that

employee or his personal representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public entity is not liable for an injury resulting

from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability.

(Emphasis added.) Here, Defendants City and Police would not be

liable for false arrest. Although Plaintiff is correct in

maintaining that Cal. Govt. Code § 820.4 specifically provides

that an employee is not immune for liability for false arrest or

false imprisonment, the other statutory provisions mentioned

hereinabove (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.55 and Cal. Pen. Code § 847)

specifically provide for nonliability for arrests made upon

probable cause, lawful process with a reasonable belief in the

lawfulness of the arrest, and with an absence of malice.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not produced evidence

raising a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any

Defendant’s liability for false arrest and imprisonment of

Plaintiff. There is no issue concerning whether or not Officers

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 Section 821 requires that if the offense charged is a felony pursuant to a warrant, the officer making the 4

arrest must take the defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other magistrate of the same

county.

 Section 825 provides that with certain exceptions, a defendant shall in all cases be taken before the 5

magistrate without unnecessary delay and, in any event, within forty-eight hours after his or her arrest.

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Martin or Skinner proceeded in good faith and in reasonable

reliance on reliable information constituting objective probable

cause and with an absence of wrongful purpose or intent or

malice. There is no evidence raising a genuine issue of fact

regarding whether or not Defendants Dabney and Sterling

reasonably relied on a valid warrant based on probable cause in

proceeding to interrogate Plaintiff after arrest. Further, as

will be discussed in more detail in connection with Defendant

Romero’s motion, there is no evidence raising a genuine issue of

fact concerning Romero’s belief, good faith, and reasonable

reliance on his observations and identification of Plaintiff and

Tao.

V. False Imprisonment in the Form of Delay in Processing

As the Court noted in its order of May 13, 2005, a cause of

action under California law exists for damages for false

imprisonment in the form of unreasonable, unnecessary delay in

taking an arrested person before a magistrate. Cal. Pen. Code §§

821 , 825 ; Dragna v. White, 45 Cal.2d 469, 472-73 (1955) (noting 4 5

that a delay of less than forty-eight hours could be

unnecessary). Damages are awarded for the amount of false

imprisonment that occurs after the period of necessary or

reasonable delay has expired. Id. p. 473.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for unnecessary

delay was not included in the claim to the public entity.

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However, as previously noted, it is the basic facts and not the

precise legal theories involved that must be set forth in a tort

claim due to the fact that the purpose of filing a tort claim is

to provide notice to the public entity. The basic facts mentioned

in the tort claim concerned the legality of Plaintiff’s arrest,

imprisonment, and criminal charges. A processing delay is part

and parcel of the arrest and imprisonment mentioned in the tort

claim-–the essential factual matters upon which the causes of

action are based. Accordingly, the claim for delay in processing

and releasing Plaintiff is not barred by a failure to file a tort

claim.

The moving Defendants argue that there is no evidence that

Plaintiff was held in custody by Defendants, and thus they cannot

be liable for the processing delay. Under California law, all who

assist or take part in the commission of a false imprisonment are

joint tortfeasors and may be joined as defendants without an

allegation or proof of a conspiracy. Harden v. San Francisco Bay

Area Rapid Tarnsit Dist., 215 Cal.App.3d 7, 15 (1989) However,

there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the

liability of Martin or any of the Defendant Officers for false

arrest or imprisonment. Plaintiff has not produced evidence

raising an issue of fact as to the participation by the City

Defendants in the unlawful imprisonment, including the aspect of

it that concerns any delay in processing Plaintiff.

Therefore, the moving City Defendants have established that

they are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against them

for false arrest or false arrest.

VI. Abuse of Process

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The Court notes that Defendant Skinner testified that after preparing 6

the warrant, he did not have any more to do with the incident as far as

arresting Plaintiff. (Dep. p. 80.) Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff has

not produced evidence concerning the length or circumstances of her

incarceration. 

45

Defendants City, Police, and officers argue that Plaintiff

did not address this cause of action in her tort claim; further,

Plaintiff did not present evidence creating an issue of fact

regarding Defendants’ liability for this tort, and in any event,

Defendants are entitled to immunity.

In California the tort of abuse of process consists of the

following elements: 1) the defendant used a legal procedure

pursuant to judicial authority; 2) defendant intentionally used

the legal procedure to achieve an improper purpose; 3) the

plaintiff was harmed; and 4) the defendant’s conduct was a

substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. Coleman v. Gulf

Insurance Group, 41 Cal.3d 782, 792 (1986); Adams v. Superior

Court, 2 Cal.App.4th 521, 530-31 (1992); see, CACI 1520 (January

2006). The term “process” has been broadly defined to include the

entire range of procedures incident to litigation. Younger v.

Solomon, 38 Cal.App.3d 289, 297 (1974). It has been held that

there must be a wilful act in the use of the process not proper

in the regular conduct of the proceeding that is subsequent to

the obtaining or seeking the process. Siam v. Kizilbash, 130

Cal.App.4th 1563, 1579 (2005).

Plaintiff argues that the abuse of process consists of the

arrest warrant and $500,000 bail, which Plaintiff alleges were

used by Defendant Police intentionally for the improper purpose

of keeping Plaintiff in jail as long as possible.6

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Plaintiff’s tort claim expressly referred to false arrest,

false imprisonment, and false criminal charges made in violation

of state and federal constitutional rights. The basic facts set

forth in the claim were sufficient to put the Defendants on

notice of a claim of abuse of process.

Initiation of the criminal process for an improper purpose,

as for debt collection, has been recognized as an abuse of

process. See, Klein, Use of Criminal Process to Collect Debt as

Abuse of Process. 27 A.L.R.3d 1202. Here, there is no issue of

fact as to the presence of probable cause and the reasonableness

and good faith of Martin or of any defendants in making and

communicating observations and in participating in obtaining the

warrant. As previously discussed, there is an insufficient

context within which to warrant an inference that Skinner’s

seeking $500,000 bail was intentionally excessive or was

unlawful, improper, or otherwise motivated by an improper purpose

or desire to inflict any injury or harm upon Plaintiff.

With respect to immunity, Defendants argue that pursuant to

statute, the police officers and the entity that employed them

are immune from liability. 

Cal. Govt. Code § 821.6 provides:

A public employee is not liable for injury caused

by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or

administrative proceeding within the scope of his

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.

It is established that officers who improperly investigate the

facts and thereby obtain a warrant and criminal prosecution later

found to be groundless are employees of a public entity who are

subject to this immunity; because they bring about the

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institution of the lawsuit, they are intended to be covered by

the broad statutory immunity. Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4

Cal.App.3d 82, 85-88 (1970). Investigation is considered an

essential step towards the institution of formal proceedings and

thus is cloaked with immunity. Baughman v. State of California,

38 Cal.App.4th 182, 190-192 (1995) (citing Amylou R. v. County of

Riverside, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 (1994) (immunity from liability

for tort of conversion from destruction of property while

executing a search with a warrant)).

Here, the actions of the City’s officers in investigating

and obtaining a warrant were related not to effectuating the

arrest, but rather to instituting the judicial proceedings. Cf.

Vivell v.City of Belmont, 274 Cal.App.2d 38, 39-40 (1969). Thus,

the City’s officers were cloaked with absolute statutory immunity

for their actions.

Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2 states:

(a) A public entity is liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee

of the public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omission would, apart from this section,

have given rise to a cause of action against that

employee or his personal representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public entity is not liable for an injury resulting

from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability.

Because the City officers were immune, Defendants City and Police

are also not liable for Plaintiff’s claim of abuse of process.

Plaintiff claims that Cal. Govt. Code § 822.2 provides for

an exception to the immunity of § 821.6. Section 822.2 states:

A public employee acting in the scope of his

employment is not liable for an injury caused by his

misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be

negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud,

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corruption or actual malice.

“Malice” within the meaning of § 822.2 has been defined as a

conscious intent to deceive, vex, annoy or harm the injured

party. Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo, 50 Cal.App.3d 401, (1975)

(overruled on another point in Morehart v.County of Santa

Barbara, 7 Cal.4th 725, 736-37 (1994)). As previously discussed,

Plaintiff has not presented evidence warranting an inference that

in making any representation, Officer Skinner acted with such an

intent or with actual fraud or corruption. Further, Plaintiff has

not brought to the Court’s attention any evidence that Officers

Sterling or Dabney made any representations, harbored any malice,

or were guilty of actual fraud or corruption.

As to Defendant Romero, pursuant to the analysis set forth

in connection with his motion, there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to his good faith belief in Tao’s identity or

the reasonableness of his identification. Even if Romero could be

considered a participant in the decision to charge, there is no

genuine issue as to his liability.

Therefore, Defendants have shown that they are entitled to

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for abuse of process.

VII. Claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants assert various grounds as invalidating

Plaintiff’s civil rights claim. 

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ assertion that

Plaintiff cannot support a claim of excessive force. (Opp. p.

14.) 

However, Plaintiff’s civil rights claim also includes

allegations that Defendants deprived her of civil rights as a

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result of official policy or custom; by deliberate indifference

to the need to train employees adequately and by having training

programs not adequate to train officers to handle unspecified

usual and recurring situations properly; and by exposing

Plaintiff to general conditions of confinement while falsely

imprisoned under conditions that exposed Plaintiff to a

substantial risk of serious harm of which Defendant knew and

disregarded by failing to take reasonable measures to correct in

the performance of their official duties. (FAC ¶¶ 45-46, 48.)

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See,

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that "[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

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does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983,

plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative

act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's

federal rights. A local governmental unit may not be held

responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory of liability; a municipality could be liable for

its own actions in the nature of policy or custom. See Bd. of

County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

A. Constitutional Violation

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against the City of

Merced and the Merced Police Department are without merit because

Plaintiff has not presented evidence raising a genuine, triable

issue of fact with respect to any individual officer’s violation

of any of her federally protected civil rights.

Plaintiff claims that the gravamen of her civil rights claim

is false imprisonment accompanied by Plaintiff’s attack on the

validity of the warrant pursuant to which Plaintiff was arrested;

she claims that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments support her

theory of liability. (Opp. p. 14.) 

In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), cited by

Plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged a § 1983 claim because he had

been mistakenly identified and was arrested by Defendants, a

county sheriff and his surety, pursuant to a warrant. He claimed

that his detention was unreasonably prolonged. It was held that

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although there might have been state tort liability, there was no

deprivation of constitutional rights because the Fourth Amendment

requires a fair and reliable probable cause determination, and

the facially valid warrant was issued pursuant to such a

determination. Absent an attack on the validity of a warrant, a

violation of the right to a speedy trial, or a prolonged

detention pursuant to the warrant in the face of repeated

protests of innocence, no claim for a violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments would have been stated. Mere innocence of a

charge contained in a warrant does not necessarily constitute a

deprivation of liberty without due process of law; a law

enforcement official is not required to investigate every claim

of innocence independently or to effect an error-free

investigation. Id. pp. 143-146. 

The analysis of probable cause previously set forth reveals

that the arrest warrant was based on probable cause. Further,

there is no evidence warranting an inference that Martin or

Defendants Romero, Skinner, Dabney, or Sterling knew that the

arrest was wrongful or were reckless as to the identity of the

man in the sweatshirt reasonably believed to be Plaintiff’s son.

Thus, the arrest was not wrongful in the constitutional sense. 

B. Policy or Custom

Plaintiff argues that Commander Martin, who was in charge of

the manhunt for Plaintiff’s son, created an official policy or

custom to obtain a warrant without probable cause. However, there

is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the absence of

probable cause. Thus, it cannot be inferred that Commander Martin

participated in creating or enforcing an official policy or

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custom to obtain a warrant without probable cause. 

C. Training 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not produced evidence

warranting an inference that Defendant City is liable for failure

to train its officers. A city is liable for failure to train if

its nonfeasance amounts to a deliberate or conscious choice by a

municipality and evinces in a relevant respect deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom police come into

contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989). 

If a training program is inadequate, then the question becomes

whether it may be considered city policy. Id. p. 390. In light of

duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the need for

more or different training may be so obvious, and the inadequacy

so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,

that the policymakers can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need, and the failure to train

may thus fairly be said to represent a policy of the city. Id. p.

390. Further, frequency of police officer’s exercise of

discretion resulting in violations of constitutional rights may

establish deliberate indifference. Id. However, a particular

officer’s inadequate training would not be enough for liability

for failure to train because the officer’s shortcoming may have

resulted from factors other than a faulty training program, such

as occasional negligent administration of training; the mere fact

that an accident could have been avoided if an officer had been

better trained is likewise insufficient because it does not

necessarily reflect upon the adequacy of the program. Further,

even adequately trained police officers occasionally make

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mistakes. Id. p. 391.

Here, the previous analysis reveals that the arrest of

Plaintiff was not in itself a constitutional violation because

there is no issue of material fact as to the absence of probable

cause. There is no evidence that further training would have

avoided any harm. As to Skinner’s choice of $500,000 bail, even

if it is inferred that he personally was inadequately trained

regarding setting bail, there is no basis upon which to infer

that the training program was inadequate. A single instance of

inadequate auto theft investigation and use of excessive force

did not constitute substantial evidence of inadequacy of either

the training or investigation; further, there could be no

liability where there was an absence of other evidence of

awareness on the part of the municipal employer of any need for

other or different training. Merritt v. County of Los Angeles,

875 F.2d 765, 770-71 (9 Cir. 1989). th

Further, there is no basis for concluding that the

Defendants made a conscious choice regarding training. There was

no expert testimony regarding the training, and there was no

obvious inadequacy or other circumstances that would provide

constructive notice to Defendants City and Police of

unconstitutional conduct. 

There is no basis for a finding that a policy of inadequate

training caused any deprivation. Demonstration of causation is an

essential component of failure to train liability, City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391, and the causal link between the

nonfeasance and the actual constitutional violation must be

direct, Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma

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v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (where the particular

municipal action itself was not a violation of federal law, then

a single employment decision allegedly effected without adequate

screening held not sufficient to establish policy deliberate

indifference by the sheriff to a high risk that the hired deputy

would use excessive force).

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not raised a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Defendants’

policy or training officers with respect to identifications,

probable cause, or bail setting. 

Defendants are correct in contending that if there is no

violation of constitutional rights by an individual city officer,

then there is no liability on the part of the Defendants City and

Police. See, City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799

(1986).

D. Excessive Force during Custody

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants used excessive force and

exposed Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm of which

Defendants were aware but nevertheless failed to take reasonable

measures to correct. (FAC ¶¶ 47, 48.) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff produced no evidence that any Merced Police officer

interacted with Plaintiff in any way while she was confined in

the county jail. 

Plaintiff does not oppose the allegation that she has failed

to produce evidence of excessive force. Plaintiff does not

address the allegation that there is no evidence of any police

interaction with Plaintiff while in custody that exposed her to a

substantial risk of serious harm. There being no such evidence,

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Defendants have shown that they should prevail on such a claim.

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that even if there was a constitutional

violation, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

because they acted reasonably under the circumstances, and

Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof to show that Defendants

are not entitled to such immunity.

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil

damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the

initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the

defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can

be made out, the next step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established. Id. The inquiry "must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition...." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). 

"[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have

been ‘clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202 (citation omitted). In resolving these issues, the Court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and

resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. 

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Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).

Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986).

Plaintiff argues that she has raised a triable issue of

material fact regarding whether or not her constitutional right

to be free of unreasonable seizure was violated and whether or

not Martin’s and Skinner’s mistakes were reasonable. Plaintiff

argues that a jury should decide whether Romero, Martin, and

Skinner knowingly violated the law or were plainly incompetent.

With respect to Martin and Skinner, previous discussion

shows that there was no evidence to raise an issue of fact

regarding whether or not their reliance on Romero’s

identification was reasonable or in good faith. It must be

determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed that

the arrest was lawful in light of clearly established law and the

information that the officers possessed. Merriman v. Walton, 856

F.2d 1333, 1335 (9 Cir. 1988). It is established that with th

respect to a law enforcement officer’s assertion of qualified

immunity from liability for Fourth Amendment violations, even if

an officer acts unconstitutionally, the officer is entitled to

qualified immunity if the officer objectively could have believed

that his conduct was lawful. Act Up!/Portland v.Bagley, 988 F.2d

868, 871 (9 Cir. 1993) An officer who mistakenly but in good th

faith and reasonably believes that there is probable cause is

entitled to qualified immunity. See, Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189, 1198 (9 Cir. 1997); Merriman v. Walton, 856 F.2d 1333, th

1334-35 (9 Cir. 1988). th

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Here, even if Defendants Skinner and Martin might have

relied on a mistaken identification, there is no issue as to

whether or not their belief was in good faith and reasonable.

There is no basis for inferring that they should have known that

their conduct was unlawful. Thus, they were entitled to qualified

immunity on a claim of an unreasonable seizure in violation of

the Fourth Amendment. 

Likewise, as is analyzed more fully in connection with his

separate motion, there is no issue of fact as to whether or not

Defendant Romero reasonably and in good faith believed that he

had observed Plaintiff with Tao in an effort to conceal and/or

aid Tao in resisting apprehension.

Accordingly, Defendants City, Police, and Officers are

entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable search

and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on

qualified immunity. 

In summary, the Court concludes that Defendants City,

Police, and Officers Skinner, Dabney, and Sterling have shown

that they are entitled to judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s §

1983 claim based on excessive force or a Fourth Amendment

violation in connection with her arrest and imprisonment.

MOTION OF DEFENDANT ELOY ROMERO 

I. Background of Defendant Romero’s Motion

Defendant Eloy Romero, an agent and employee of the state of

California’s Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics

Enforcement, moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative,

for an order adjudicating that the following issues in this

action are established without substantial controversy as against

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Plaintiff: 1) Plaintiff’s failure to present a tort claim to the

Victims’ Compensation and Government Claims Board (formerly the

State Board of Control), which bars the state tort claims against

Defendant Romero (claims one through five); 2) Failure of proof

of personal involvement of Defendant Romero in any wrongful

conduct; 3) the legal insufficiency of conduct of Defendant

Romero in identifying a photograph of Plaintiff to constitute a

claim for violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights; and 4) Romero’s

entitlement to qualified immunity in connection with his

surveillance of Plaintiff’s son and his identification of

Plaintiff as being present at the scene. Defendant Romero has

submitted as exhibits declarations of Defendant Romero and of

Marlene Dederick as well as copies of excerpts of deposition

transcripts of Defendant Romero, Plaintiff Rivera, Alfredo

Cardwood, and Defendants Tommy Martin and Scott Skinner.

Defendant Romero has also lodged the complete transcripts of the

depositions of Defendant Romero, Plaintiff, Julia Rivera,

Marcella Arroyo, Alfredo Cardwood, Scott Skinner, and Tommy

Martin.

It is undisputed that Defendant Romero, a special agent

supervisor with the California Department of Justice’s Bureau of

Narcotics Enforcement (BNE), on April 16, 2004, was assigned to

lead a BNE team in surveillance of the apartment at Midge Avenue

that was believed to be the residence of the parents of Tao’s

girlfriend and of Plaintiff’s granddaughter. Supervising special

agent Aflredo Cardwood was leading a Merced Multi-Agency

Narcotics Task Force team and was already conducting surveillance

at the apartment. Romero and other personnel were given several

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photographs of Tao. An anonymous call was made that morning to

the police department to the effect that Tao was seen at the

location. Romero and Cardwood both saw Plaintiff and her son,

Tao, walking out of the Midge apartment while under surveillance;

they then pursued the suspect. Tao was also positively identified

by John Smothers and Jeremy Key, who immediately tried to

apprehend Tao, and by John Hoover, all of whom were also assigned

to surveillance of the apartment. Cardwood and Romero looked

directly at the suspect from approximately fifty to eighty yards

away and positively identified him; when Smothers and Keys

identified themselves, the suspect looked at them, turned, and

fled the scene. Plaintiff said nothing to any officers at the

scene, and the suspect evaded apprehension. 

That day Romero was shown a photograph of Plaintiff, and he

identified her as the woman seen at the apartment earlier that

day when the suspect was seen and pursued. Plaintiff testified

that she visited her son’s daughter at the Midge apartment on

April 16, 2004, and saw the agents run past her. Romero did not

apply for the arrest warrant or participate in the decision to

seek the warrant; and he did not participate in the arrest,

interrogation, search of Plaintiff’s residence, setting the bail

amount, the decision to charge Plaintiff, or the conditions of

Plaintiff’s incarceration or release from custody.

Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file a tort

claim with the Victim’s Compensation and Government Claims Board

(Board of Control). 

II. Noncompliance with the California Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff’s state tort claims (assault, battery, false

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28 The Court notes that the employing Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, or the state of California, has

7

not been named as a defendant.

60

arrest, unnecessary delay in release, and wrongful acquisition of

a warrant, arrest, imprisonment and prosecution, styled as an

abuse of process claim) are barred because the filing of a tort

claim against a public employee’s employing public entity is a

prerequisite to bringing an action against the employee.7

Cal. Govt. Code § 945.4 provides that with inapplicable

exceptions, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required

to be presented in according with the remainder of the statutory

scheme until a written claim has been presented to the public

entity and been either acted on by the board or deemed to have

been rejected. Cal. Govt. Code § 950.2 provides that with

inapplicable exceptions, a cause of action against a public

employee or former public employee for an injury resulting from

an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public

employee is barred if an action against the employing public

entity for such injury is barred. 

Here, it is undisputed that no claim was brought against the

state of California. Further, the declaration of Dederick, who is

the custodian of records of the government claims program of the

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, establishes that

no application to present a late claim was presented either.

(Decl. p. 3.) Thus, a claim against the employing public entity

is barred, and a claim against the public employee is likewise

barred. Submission of a claim is a condition precedent under

California law to a tort action against either the employee or

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28 Because Defendant Romero has shown entitlement to summary adjudication on the tort claims, the Court 8

does not reach the question of whether or not Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as insufficiently pleaded.

61

the public entity. Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838

(1976); Dennis v. Thurman, 959 F.Supp. 1253, 1264 (C.D.Cal.

1997).

Accordingly, Defendant Romero is entitled to judgment with

respect to Plaintiff’s state tort claims. 

8

III. Civil Rights Claim against Defendant Romero

There is no formal requirement for the exhaustion of state

judicial or administrative remedies for claims made under § 1983.

Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); a plaintiff need not

comply with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act

when bringing a federal civil rights action. Donovan v. Reinbold,

433 F.2d 738, 741 (9 Cir. 1970); Lacey v. C.S.P. Solano Medical th

Staff, 990 F.Supp. 1199, 1206-07 (E.D.Cal. 1997). A failure to

comply with California’s tort claims requirement does not vitiate

any claim of Plaintiff’s pursuant to § 1983. 

Pursuant to the undisputed facts set forth by Defendant

Romero in connection with his motion, the only involvement of

Defendant Romero in the arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution of

Plaintiff was Romero’s identification of Tao and Plaintiff as

having been together and then leaving the apartment together, and

Romero’s attempt to apprehend the fleeing suspect. Defendant

Romero was not otherwise involved in the obtaining of the arrest

warrant, arrest, interrogation, search, setting of bail, decision

to charge, or conditions of Plaintiff’s incarceration or release

from custody. Defendant Romero thus argues that he cannot be

liable under § 1983 because he is not personally involved in the

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 Defendant Romero also seems to argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to withstand a motion 9

to dismiss on this claim because the allegations concerning Defendant Romero’s involvement in the alleged civil

rights violation were vague and conclusory and set forth no facts to support the involvement in any of the conduct of

which the Plaintiff complains. See, Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 88 (9 Cir. 1988 (vague allegation that all th

defendants were somehow involved in a discriminatory selection of clergy for a church, and specification of

generalized blacklisting, malfeasance, failure to help, and retaliation held insufficient); Ivey v. Board of Regents of

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9 Cir. 1982) (failure to allege specific facts showing defendants’ th

participation in the alleged discriminatory employment practice other than giving monetary support or general

intervention in the operation held insufficient to state a claim). However, Defendant Romero has not moved to

dismiss, but rather has moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Because of the Court’s resolution of

Defendant Romero’s motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court does not reach the contention

regarding the state of the pleadings.

62

acts alleged in the civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, namely, use of excessive force in making the arrest,

deprivation of rights under official policy or custom, showing

deliberate indifference to the need to train and supervise the

employees of the other Defendants, use of excessive force in

imprisonment, or exposure to the general conditions of

confinement. (FAC ¶¶ 44-48.)9

As previously noted, Defendant Romero cannot be liable for a

violation of civil rights pursuant to § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory applied to the actions of others. Although there

is no express, particular state of mind requirement for a

violation of § 1983, state of mind may be relevant in determining 

if the conduct of a person acting under color of state law

deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor,

451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds

in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Depending on the

underlying constitutional right involved, merely negligent

conduct may not be enough to state a claim. Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 329-30, 333-34 (1986) (negligent handling of

prisoner’s property which resulted in personal injury held not

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sufficient to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment due process

violation).

Here, according to Plaintiff’s opposition, the

constitutional violations claimed by Plaintiff relate to the

Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable seizures of

the person related to the arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiff.

(Opp. pp. 6-9.) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Romero is

based on Plaintiff’s assertion that Romero lied to assist the

police department in obtaining a warrant, and Plaintiff

affirmatively states that there is no issue about whether or not

Defendant Romero was obligated to investigate further after he

provided the identification of Tao and Plaintiff. (Opp. p. 9.)

False imprisonment does not become a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment merely because the Defendant is a state

official. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). It is

established that it is the presence or absence of objective

probable cause, and not the subjective motivation of the

arresting officer, that is significant with respect to the

reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996). A false arrest claim

is governed by the Fourth Amendment prohibition against

unreasonable searches and seizures rather than the general

substantive due process clause because the Fourth Amendment and

Fourteenth Amendment provide an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against seizures and their consequences

on the part of the state and federal governments. Larson v.

Neimi, 9 F.3d 1397, 1399-1401 (9 Cir. 1993). The defense of th

undertaking an arrest in good faith and with probable cause is

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still available to officers in a § 1983 action because an officer

who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false

arrest simply because the factual innocence of the suspect is

later proved. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), overruled

on other grounds, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see,

United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.2001)

(reasonable suspicion). To prevail on a § 1983 claim for false

arrest and imprisonment, a plaintiff has to demonstrate that

there is no probable cause to arrest him or other justification.

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9 Cir. th

1998); Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959,

964-65 (9 Cir. 2001). th

As previously determined, considering the nature and

trustworthiness of the evidence of criminal conduct available to

the police, the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff

because the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of

which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient

to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had

committed or was committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.

89, 91 (1964). Skinner and Martin reasonably believed that the

facts and circumstances of which they had knowledge constituted

probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had, with the requisite

intent and knowledge, aided her son in evading apprehension. The

fact that Plaintiff mounts an attack on the warrant is not

determinative because Plaintiff’s challenge to the objective

basis for the warrant is without legal or factual merit.

Plaintiff argues that the evidence raises an issue of fact

as to whether or not Defendant Romero lied to the Merced Police

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Department and whether he lied “to give the Merced Police

Department the facts it needed for its warrant.” (Opp. p. 7.)

As previously analyzed, there is no basis for an inference

that any of the other officers participating in the arrest

warrant or service procedures had an improper motive or purpose. 

Likewise, there is no basis for an inference that Defendant

Romero had a wrongful motive or an intention to arrest Plaintiff

falsely either for the ulterior purpose of imprisoning her for as

long as possible without real grounds, or for any other invalid

purpose. With knowledge of the anonymous telephone call regarding

Tao’s presence at the apartment, Defendant Romero observed the

face of the man with Plaintiff from a distance of about fifty to

eighty yards after having observed several photographs of Tao. He

got a good look at Tao when he came out of the apartment from a

distance of fifty yards on the clear day. (Dep. pp. 47, 64.)

Romero later told Skinner that the person he saw was Tao. (Dep.

of Skinner p. 30), and his and his fellow officers’ conduct

thereafter (drawing weapons and attempting to apprehend the man

as he, his girlfriend, and Plaintiff were walking away from the

apartment and down or towards a driveway that led to where

vehicles were located [Dep. of Romero, pp. 62-67, 70-74, 78, 59,

80]) was consistent with a reasonable belief that the man was

Tao. Romero confirmed his identification and then instructed the

field supervisor to arrest Tao. (Dep. p. 62.) Romero testified

that he told Cardwood that he believed the man was Tao. (Dep. p.

48.) Romero saw the face and mustache as in the photo; hair and

weight were concealed due to the bulky black sweatshirt. (Id. pp.

48-49.) Romero and Cardwood correctly identified Plaintiff from

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28 The Court considers the fact that the identifications were made, not that they were necessarily correct. 10

66

relatively contemporaneous observation. Several other trained

officers also observed the man and identified him as Tao. Romero 10

testified that he used binoculars to confirm his observations and

passed them to Cardwood, who also used them. (Dep. p. 62.) Romero

was told by CHP Officer Key and Atwater Police Officer Smothers

that they also recognized Tao in the black hooded sweatshirt.

(Dep. pp. 70-71, 74.)

Plaintiff denies that the man with her was her son and that

she aided her son, but she does not contest Romero’s

identification of her or otherwise claim that she was not at the

apartment that day. The only affirmative acts on the part of

Defendant Romero shown by the evidence were identifications of

Tao and Plaintiff as being together when observed near the

apartment and then on the street and driveway moving away from

the apartment, and some participation in the hunt for the man in

the black hooded sweatshirt. 

It might be inferred from Plaintiff’s declaration that there

is an issue of fact as to whether or not the person Romero

identified was indeed Tao. However, there are no specific facts

set forth by Plaintiff to warrant an inference that the

identification was not merely mistaken but rather was

intentionally false, or that Romero knew that any person who

participated in the process of obtaining the arrest warrant,

arrest, prosecution, and/or detention of Plaintiff was proceeding

with any knowledge of the falsity or inaccuracy of the

identification or of any other fact relied on in obtaining and

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effecting service of the warrant or otherwise detaining or

prosecuting Plaintiff.

Plaintiff questions Defendant Romero’s credibility, but

Plaintiff has not cited to evidence, as distinct from bare

speculation, that would warrant an inference of intentionally

false identification or other intentionally false conduct on the

part of Romero. See, Department of Commerce v. United States

House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330-31 (1999); National

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701

F.2d 95, 96-97 (9 Cir. 1983); Gasaway v. Northwestern Mutual th

Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9 Cir. 1994) (assertions th

that an affiant’s conclusions were self-serving insufficient to

raise an issue of fact); see, McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,

149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10 Cir. 1998). Further, Plaintiff has not th

raised a genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of

Romero’s identification or of his or others’ reliance on that

identification.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not raised an issue of fact

concerning Defendant Romero’s liability for a violation of § 1983

concerning obtaining Plaintiff’s arrest warrant or the arrest of

Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Defendant Romero is entitled to judgment on the § 1983 claim.

XII. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Romero argues that he is entitled to qualified

immunity as a matter of law.

Where the facts are undisputed, as where there is no dispute

as to what an official did or did not do, qualified immunity is a

question of law for the Court. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988

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F.2d 868, 873 (9 Cir. 1993). th

It was clearly established that an arrest without probable

cause is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It must be

determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed that

the arrest was lawful in light of clearly established law and the

information that the officers possessed. Merriman v. Walton, 856

F.2d 1333, 1335 (9 Cir. 1988). It is established that with th

respect to a law enforcement officer’s assertion of qualified

immunity from liability for Fourth Amendment violations, even if

an officer acts unconstitutionally, the officer is entitled to

qualified immunity if the officer objectively could have believed

that his conduct was lawful. Act Up!/Portland v.Bagley, 988 F.2d

868, 871 (9 Cir. 1993) An officer who mistakenly but in good th

faith and reasonably believes that there is probable cause is

entitled to qualified immunity. See, Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189, 1198 (9 Cir. 1997); Merriman v. Walton, 856 F.2d 1333, th

1334-35 (9 Cir. 1988); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640- th

641 (1987). 

As previously discussed, there was no issue of fact as to

the good faith of Martin or Defendant Skinner or as to whether or

not their reliance on any mistaken identification was reasonable.

There is no basis for inferring that they should have known that

their conduct was unlawful. Thus, they were entitled to qualified

immunity.

As to Defendant Romero, Plaintiff has not pointed out

evidence warranting an inference that he proceeded in bad faith

or with any knowledge of any inaccuracy related to the

identification or with any wrongful intent with respect to the

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28 In view of this conclusion, the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s unnoticed, informal request, set forth in his 11

opposition, with respect to amending the complaint to add Martin as a defendant previously designated as a “Doe.”

69

arrest, questioning, custody, or charging of Plaintiff. Again,

even assuming that there is an issue of fact as to the ultimate

accuracy of the identification of Tao, there are no other facts

supporting an inference that Romero was dishonest or

intentionally false in identifying Tao. The circumstances of the

identification permitted a reasonable belief that the man was Tao

and do not give rise to a contrary inference. Under the

circumstances, Romero could reasonably have believed that his

conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the

information the officer possessed. Further, as detailed

hereinabove, parties relying on his conduct and the arrest

warrant and arrest also could reasonably have believed that their

conduct was lawful. See, Guerra v. Sutton, 783 F.2d 1371, 1375

(9th Cir.1986) (law enforcement officers may rely upon the

representation of a responsible law enforcement officer that a

proper warrant exists).

The Court concludes that Defendant Romero is entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to Defendant’s sixth claim

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DISPOSITION

In summary, the Court concludes that the moving Defendants

have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on all the claims against them.11

Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing analysis, it IS

ORDERED that

1. The motion of Defendants City of Merced, Merced Police

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Department, and Officers Skinner, Dabney, and Sterling for

summary judgment IS GRANTED; and

2. The motion of Defendant Eloy Romero for summary judgment

IS GRANTED; AND

3. The Clerk IS DIRECTED to enter a judgment in favor of

Defendants City of Merced, City of Merced Police Department, City

of Merced Police Officer Scott Skinner, City of Merced Police

Officer Ray Sterling, City of Merced Police Officer Dabney, and

Defendant Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement Special Agent

Supervisor Eloy Romero, and against Plaintiff Erika Rivera.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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