Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02816/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02816-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD F. GREENSPAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

TOWER C. SNOW, JR.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-02816 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STRIKE

Now before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to strike portions ofdefendant’s answer. For the following

reasons, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP

(“Brobeck”). On January 21, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in bankruptcy court against defendant Tower

Snow, Chairman of Brobeck from 1998 to 2001. Through its complaint, plaintiff sought the return of

approximately $2,741,289 in distributions that Brobeck made to Snow during 2001 and 2002. 

Snow answered plaintiff’s complaint and demanded a jury trial. In response, plaintiff filed a motion to

strike both the jury trial demand and 26 paragraphs offactualallegations in Snow’s answer. The bankruptcy

court denied plaintiff’s motion with respect to the jury trialdemand and transferred the case to this Court. The

bankruptcy court did not decide plaintiff’s motion with respect to the 26 paragraphs in Snow’s answer.

Instead, the bankruptcy court deferred to this Court for disposition of that issue. See In re Brobeck,Phleger

& Harrison, LLP, No. 05-32715 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 1, 2005).

Case 3:05-cv-02816-SI Document 11 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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LEGAL STANDARD

FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may order stricken from any pleading any

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

Because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal matters, motions to strike are generally disfavored.

Rosales v. Citibank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In most cases, a motion to strike should

not be granted unless “the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the

litigation.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Where the

motion involves background or historical material, it should not be granted unless the materialis prejudicial to

the opponent. LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the majority of the factual allegations in defendant’s answer are irrelevant to this

action and consist of nothing more than “Defendant’s personal recollections respecting the final years of his

relationship with the Brobeck law firm.” Pl. Mot. to Strike, at 19. This description is not wholly inaccurate.

The 26 paragraphs that are the subject of plaintiff’s motion are, at times, embellished with a style more

appropriate for a press release. See, e.g., Def. Answer, at ¶¶ 104 (“Brobeck flourished under Snow’s

leadership.”), 105 (“At the same time he was leading Brobeck to unprecedented revenues and profits, Snow

was also changing Brobeck’s culture.”), 106 (“Snow made other changes to Brobeck’s culture to ensure that

all personnel were treated fairly and thatthe firmwas run forthe benefit of everyone, not just for the benefit of

the senior and/or powerful partners.”).

Nonetheless, while Snow’s answer may be more flowery than plaintiff’s complaint, it is not so florid

as to merit the granting ofplaintiff’s motion. The factual allegations describe Snow’s departure from Brobeck

in abundant detail, but Snow’s departure, along with the distributions he received during that period, are of

centralrelevance to this case. In addition, many ofdefendant’s factualallegations are related to his affirmative

defenses. For example, Snow’s second affirmative defense alleges that the distributions Brobeck gave him

were in consideration for the work he did for the firm. Def. Answer at ¶ 145. Allegations concerning the

quality and amount ofwork he did for Brobeck are therefore relevant to this claim. Similarly, Snow’s eleventh

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For the Northern District of California

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affirmative defense allegesthat Brobeck defamed him. Id. at ¶¶ 159-60. Allegations regarding the animosity

between Snow and other partners constitute background material that is relevant to this claim.

Defendant’s answer maycontain some bomphiologia,but nothingsufficiently excessive to warrant being

stricken. Plaintiff’s motion to strike is therefore DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion to

strike.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-02816-SI Document 11 Filed 11/08/05 Page 3 of 3