Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55856/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55856-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA EX REL. IMPERIAL

COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

DISTRICT; IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR

POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT;

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

United States Department of

Interior; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF

RECLAMATION; MICHAEL L.

CONNOR, Commissioner, Bureau of

Reclamation,

Defendants-Appellees,

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT; SAN

DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY;

COACHELLA VALLEY WATER

DISTRICT; METROPOLITAN WATER

DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA,

Intervenor-Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12-55856

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-02233-

AJB-PCL

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2 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA EX REL. IMPERIAL

COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

DISTRICT; IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR

POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT;

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

United States Department of

Interior; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF

RECLAMATION; MICHAEL L.

CONNOR, Commissioner, Bureau of

Reclamation,

Defendants,

And

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT; SAN

DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY;

COACHELLA VALLEY WATER

DISTRICT; METROPOLITAN WATER

DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA,

Intervenor-Defendants–Appellants.

No. 12-55956

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-02233-

AJB-PCL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 3

Argued and Submitted

December 4, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed May 19, 2014

Before: Paul J. Watford and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit

Judges, and William E. Smith, Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY**

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of federal defendants and intervenor water districts

in an action challenging an environmental impact statement

prepared by the Secretary of the Interior that analyzed the

effects of water transfer agreements on the Salton Sea in

southern California.

The panel disagreed with the district court and held that

the plaintiffs, Imperial County and the Imperial County Air

Pollution Control District, had standing to sue. The panel

nonetheless affirmed the judgment because the district court

correctly found in the alternative that the Secretary of the

* The Honorable William E. Smith, Chief District Judge for the U.S.

District Court of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

Interior did not violate the National Environmental Policy

Act. The panel also held that the record below made plain

that the Secretary did not violate the Clean Air Act.

COUNSEL

Michael L. Rood and Katherine Turner, County of Imperial,

County Counsel, El Centro, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants–Cross-Appellees.

Alene M. Taber (argued), Michael L. Tidus, Kathryn M.

Casey, and Jonathan E. Shardlow, Jackson, DeMarco, Tidus,

Peckenpaugh, Irvine, California, for PlaintiffsAppellant–Cross-Appellee People of the State of California

ex rel. Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, and

Imperial County Air Pollution Control District.

Antonio Rossmann, Roger B. Moore, and Barton Lounsbury,

Rossmann and Moore, LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants–Cross-Appellees County of Imperial.

Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, David C.

Shilton, Stephen M. MacFarlane, Norman L. Rave, Jr., and

Peter J. McVeigh (argued), United States Department of

Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,

Washington, D.C.; Robert Snow, M. Rodney Smith, Jr.,

Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of the

Interior, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.

Kurt R. Wiese, General Counsel, and Barbara Baird, District

Counsel, Diamond Bar, California, for Amicus Curiae South

Coast Air Quality Management District.

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 5

Catherine Redmond, District Counsel, Fresno, California, for

Amicus Curiae San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution

Control District.

Katherine C. Pittard, District Counsel, Sacramento,

California, for Amicus Curiae Sacramento Metropolitan Air

Quality Management District.

Dennis Marshall, County Counsel, and William M. Dillon,

Senior Deputy, Santa Barbara, California, for Amicus Curiae

Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District.

Nancy Diamond, District Counsel, Law Offices of Nancy

Diamond, Arcata, California, for Amicus Curiae North Coast

Unified Air Quality Management District.

David D. Cooke, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory &

Natsis LLP, San Francisco, California; David L. Osias and

Mark J. Hattam, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory &

Natsis LLP, San Diego, California; Jeffrey M. Garber,

General Counsel, Imperial Irrigation District, Imperial,

California, for Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee–CrossAppellant Imperial Irrigation District.

Marcia L. Scully, General Counsel, John D. Schlotterbeck,

Senior Deputy Counsel, Adam C. Kear, Senior Deputy

General Counsel, LosAngeles, California; Linus Masouredis,

Chief Deputy General Counsel, Sacramento, California, for

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee–Cross-Appellant The

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.

Steven B. Abbott and Julianna Strong, Redwine and Sherrill,

Riverside, California; Michelle Ouellette and Melissa R.

Cushman, Best Best & Krieger, LLP, Riverside California,

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6 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

for Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee–Cross-Appellant

Coachella Valley Water District.

Lisabeth D. Rothman and Amy M. Steinfeld, Brownstein

Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Los Angeles, California; Daniel

S. Hentschke, General Counsel, San Diego County Water

Authority, San Diego, California, for IntervenorDefendant–Appellee–Cross-Appellant San Diego County

Water Authority.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

The Salton Sea—the largest inland body of water in

California—is a creature of accident. In 1905, water from the

Colorado River breached an irrigation canal and flooded the

then-dry Salton Basin. After the initial flood, irrigation

runoff from the Imperial and Coachella Valleys—supplied by

the Colorado River—sustained the Sea for more than a

century. The Sea has become a unique attraction for waterbased recreation in the harsh southern California desert.

The Sea’s continued access to Colorado River water is in

jeopardy. Over the last few decades Arizona and Nevada

began to claim their full entitlements to the stream. 

California, which has long used more than its share, has been

required to conserve. The affected California water districts

ultimately agreed to transfer some Colorado River water from

the Imperial Valley to urban areas in southern California. 

The Secretary of the Interior—who controls the delivery of

River water—prepared an environmental impact statement

(“EIS”), which, among other things, analyzed the effect of

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 7

these agreements on the Salton Sea. Despite noting some

potentiallyserious environmental consequences, theSecretary

eventually approved the agreements and implemented a new

water delivery schedule.

Plaintiffs Imperial County and the Imperial County Air

Pollution Control District (the “Air District”) then sued the

Secretary, claiming that the EIS did not comply with either

the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) or the

Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The Imperial Irrigation District

(“Imperial Irrigation”), San Diego County Water Authority

(“San Diego Water”), Coachella Valley Water District

(“Coachella”), and Metropolitan Water District of Southern

California (“Metropolitan”), parties to the transfer

agreements, intervened as defendants. The district court

granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that

neither plaintiff had standing to sue. We disagree as to

standing, but nonetheless affirm the judgment, because the

district court correctly found in the alternative that the

Secretary did not violate NEPA; the record below also makes

plain that the Secretary did not violate the CAA.

I. Background

In 1922, the Colorado River basin states agreed to divide

the River’s waters among upper- and lower-basin states. 

Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928). In

1928, Congress ratified the compact in the Boulder Canyon

Project Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as

amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–619b). California, Arizona,

and Nevada are the lower-basin states.

In 1931, various southern California irrigation and water

districts agreed to a framework for distributing the State’s

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8 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

share of Colorado River water. This “Seven Party

Agreement” created seven priorities and—unrealistically

assuming an everlasting surplus of river water—divided

5.362 million acre feet per year (“mafy”)1among the

contracting districts. Priorities 1, 2, 3(a), 3(b), 6(a), and 6(b)

in the Seven Party Agreement were either unquantified or

shared among the districts. Agreement Requesting

Apportionment of California’s Share of the Waters of the

Colorado River Among the Applicants in the State (Aug. 18,

1931), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/

pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf. The Secretary and the California districts

then incorporated the terms of the Agreement into water

delivery contracts. See 43 U.S.C. § 617d.

In 1963, the Supreme Court held that the Boulder Canyon

Project Act limited California’s Colorado River allotment to

4.4 mafy. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–65

(1963). California could exceed this annual allowance only

if (1) the other lower-basin states did not use their allotments

or (2) there was actually surplus water. Id. at 560–61. The

Secretary then promulgated regulations defining surplus. See

43 C.F.R. pt. 417.

The immediate effects of Arizona v. California on

California were mitigated, however, because the Secretary

designated water as “surplus” rather liberally, proclaiming

surpluses when none truly existed. But eventually the

Secretary made plain that it was time for California to live

within its 4.4 mafy means. In response, the lower-basin

states, the California water districts, and the Secretary

considered methods to reduce California’s dependence on

Colorado River water.

 

1

 An acre-foot of water covers an acre with one foot of water.

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 9

In 1998, Imperial Irrigation and San Diego Water reached

a preliminary agreement under which Imperial Irrigation

would conserve up to 300 thousand acre-feet per year

(“kafy”) of water, which would then be “transferred” to San

Diego Water. In 1999, the Secretary and Imperial Irrigation

initiated a joint NEPA and California Environmental Quality

Act (“CEQA”) study to consider the effects of the proposed

transfer.2Imperial Irrigation District/San Diego County

Water Authority Water Conservation and Transfer Project,

64 Fed. Reg. 52,102 (Sept. 27, 1999). This “Transfer EIS,”

which is not at issue today, considered off-river impacts of

the transfer and possible environmental mitigation measures. 

See id.

In 1999, several water districts negotiated preliminary

“Quantification Settlement Agreements” to reduce Colorado

River water usage, to quantify and cap Priorities 3 and 6 in

the Seven Party Agreement, and to authorize interdistrict

transfers of conserved Imperial Irrigation water. These

agreements would have limited Imperial Irrigation’s Priority

3(a) to 3.1 mafy.

In 2001, prompted by the proposed Quantification

Settlement Agreements, the Secretary announced that she

would prepare the EIS challenged here (the “Implementation

Agreement EIS”) to consider the consequences of delivering

a portion of Imperial Irrigation water at different diversion

points on the Colorado River for use outside the Imperial

Valley. See The Implementation Agreement for Secretarial

Actions Associated With California Parties’ Quantification

Agreement, 66 Fed. Reg. 14,211 (Mar. 9, 2001). The Bureau

2 CEQA is the California version of NEPA. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code

§§ 21000–21177.

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10 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

of Reclamation proposed studying (1) the on-river

consequences of changing the points of delivery of up to 400

kafy, (2) the implementation of an overrun accounting and

payback policy, and (3) potential biological conservation

measures. Id. The Bureau filed a Draft Implementation

Agreement EIS and Notice of Availability in January 2002. 

The comment period for theDraftImplementation Agreement

EIS and the Draft Transfer EIS overlapped; after the

comment period ended, the Secretary filed both final EISs in

November 2002.

The Final Implementation Agreement EIS discussed,

among other things, the on-river environmental impacts of

alteringColorado River deliverydiversion points, the indirect

effects of changing the amount of water received by the

California districts, and potential mitigation measures to

reduce off-river ecological consequences. Because the

various proposed mitigation agreements were discussed

extensively in the Transfer EIS, the Final Implementation

Agreement EIS also summarized and cross-referenced those

findings.

In October 2003, the Secretary, Imperial Irrigation, San

Diego Water, Metropolitan, and Coachella ratified several

revised Quantification Settlement Agreements. Minor

changes to the proposed master implementation

agreement—the Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement

(“CRWDA”)—and to proposed environmental mitigation

measures had not been discussed in the Final Implementation

Agreement EIS. These included an amendment by various

districts of water-transfer timelines, a modification by

Imperial Irrigation and Coachella of their Salton Sea

environmental mitigation plan, and a revision by the Bureau

of Reclamation of its proposed species conservation plan after

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 11

consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service. The

Secretary prepared an environmental evaluation of the

modifications, determined that a supplemental EIS was

unnecessary, and issued a final record of decision.

This action, in which the plaintiffs allege violations of

NEPA and the CAA, ensued. After the water districts

intervened, all parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the

defendants, holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing

and alternatively rejecting their NEPA (but not CAA) claims

on the merits. This appeal followed.

II. Standing

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s standing determination de

novo. La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City

of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010). At the

summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must identify “specific

facts” establishing standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,

133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149 (2013). We analyze standing claim by

claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996). We

need not address the standing of each plaintiff if we conclude

that any plaintiff has standing. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists &

Opticians v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 2009).

A plaintiff must show a “threat of suffering ‘injury in

fact’ that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be

actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must

be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;

and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will

prevent or redress the injury.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,

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12 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). If, as here, plaintiffs are not the

object of government action or inaction, “standing is not

precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to

establish.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562

(1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).

Plaintiffs assert that the Secretary violated NEPA and the

Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations

interpreting it.3 Plaintiffs also allege that the Secretaryshould

have made a CAA conformity determination because the

CRWDA will expand the Salton Sea’s shoreline and thus

increase airborne levels of particulate matter with a diameter

of ten microns or less (“PM10”). Both alleged injuries are

procedural. Thus, plaintiffs must establish that the Secretary

violated procedural rules designed to protect their concrete

interests, and that the challenged action will threaten those

interests. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

341 F.3d 961, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2003). For procedural rights,

“our inquiry into the imminence of the threatened harm is less

demanding,” Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir.

2001), and “the causation and redressability requirements are

relaxed,” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682

(9th Cir. 2001).

3 The CEQ regulations interpreting NEPA are “entitled to substantial

deference.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 13

B. Procedural Injury

Plaintiffs established Article III standing.

4 First, they

plainly alleged that the Secretary violated procedural rules. 

NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze the environmental

impacts of their actions, Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen,

541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004), and the CAA mandates a

“conformity determination” when an agency action increases

pollutants in nonattainment regions, 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1);

40 C.F.R. § 93.150. Imperial County argued, both to the

agency and in the courts, that the Implementation Agreement

EIS was insufficient under NEPA and the CAA.

Second, NEPA and the CAA were designed to protect the

plaintiffs’ interests. “NEPA provides that ‘local agencies,

which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental

standards’ may comment on the proposed federal action.” 

Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(v)). Under California law,

the Air District may sue on behalf of the State for a violation

of the state implementation plan (“SIP”). Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 41513. We have also held that the CAA

conformity requirement was designed to protect a sub-state

4 The Secretary does not challenge causation or redressability. In any

event, “plaintiffs asserting procedural standing need not demonstrate that

the ultimate outcome following proper procedures will benefit them.” 

Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001); see

also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, No. 09-17661, 2014 WL

1465695, at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014) (en banc). Both prongs are met

here. Moreover, because the Secretary does not dispute that plaintiffs’

claims fall within the “zone of interests” of NEPA and the CAA, that issue

is waived. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.6 (9th

Cir. 2003).

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14 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

actor’s interest in clean air. City of Las Vegas v. FAA,

570 F.3d 1109, 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009).

Third, the challenged action threatens plaintiffs’ concrete

interests. A sub-state actor may “sue to protect its own

‘proprietary interests’ that might be ‘congruent’ with those of

its citizens . . . .” Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d

1161, 1178 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004));

see also Douglas, 48 F.3d at 1500–01. Those interests are “as

varied” as the actors’ “responsibilities, powers, and assets.” 

Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197.

The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has

classified Imperial Valley as a serious nonattainment area for

PM10. Plaintiffs provided declarations asserting that the

CRWDA will increase PM10 levels, thus risking

noncompliance with California’s SIP. Failure to complywith

the SIP risks a federal enforcement action, loss of highway

funds, and mandatory emission offsets. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 7509. Such risks sufficiently demonstrate a threat to

concrete interests. Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir.

2003); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA,

489 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (D.C. Cir. 2007); West Virginia v.

EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs also adequately alleged that the Secretary’s

action will undermine land management in the Imperial

Valley. A county’s “concrete interests” in its “environment

and in land management” can establish Article III standing. 

City of Las Vegas, 570 F.3d at 1114; see also Sausalito,

386 F.3d at 1198 (finding a concrete injury because a project

would “result in a detrimental increase in traffic and crowds”

and affect “municipal management and public safety

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 15

functions” (quoting City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 211 F. Supp.

2d 1175, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2002))) (internal quotation marks

omitted); City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671 (holding that

declarations claiming that agency action “will frustrate the

city’s policy of ‘controlled growth’ and render its planning

efforts to date obsolete” established a concrete injury).

C. Identification of Facts

The Secretary claims that plaintiffs did not identify

sufficient facts below to establish standing. We reject the

argument. Plaintiffs argued below that the CRWDA will

increase PM10 levels and undermine the Air District’s ability

to enforce air quality regulations. Their summary judgment

motion included a declaration from the Air Pollution Control

Officer documenting that the CRWDA would increase

fugitive dust by expanding the Salton Sea shoreline and thus

undermine the Air District’s ability to develop an attainment

strategy and comply with its SIP.

Plaintiffs also identified specific facts in support of their

claim that the Secretary’s action will undermine Imperial

County’s land management. The Planning Director of the

Imperial County Land Use Department declared that the

project would frustrate the County’s land-use plans, reduce its

water supply, and impair its housing development. This

declaration is no less “specific” than that of the city manager

in Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1198–99.

D. Mechanism of Review

The district court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to

assert a CAA claim because they (1) “recharacterized” their

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16 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

complaint as an enforcement action and (2) failed to identify

an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity. We disagree.

Plaintiffs’ claim arose from the Secretary’s alleged CAA

violations. The complaint stated that the Secretary’s action

will increase PM10 levels, interfere with the California SIP,

exceed de minimis emission thresholds, and be regionally

significant. Thus, the complaint asserted, the Secretary

should have conducted a conformitydetermination. Plaintiffs

made identical arguments in their summary judgment

briefing.

Plaintiffs and the Secretary agree that the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”) is the proper statutory mechanism to

challenge the Secretary’s action. The APA creates a right of

action for persons “suffering legal wrong,” 5 U.S.C. § 702,

but provides review only if “there is no other adequate

remedy in a court . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Although we have

not held that the APA authorizes judicial review when an air

district asserts a federal conformity violation, we have

assumed as much. See S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v.

FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010); Sierra Club v.

EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 961, amended by 352 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.

2003); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1020

(9th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 

That assumption has solid statutory grounding—the CAA

provides a cause of action against a federal agency which

violates an “emission standard or limitation under this chapter

. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)(A). As relevant here, an

“emission standard or limitation” is in turn defined as “a

schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,

standard of performance or emission standard.” § 7604(f)(1). 

The CAA clause requiring a conformity determination,

however, is not a schedule or timetable of compliance, an

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 17

emission reduction, a standard of performance, or an emission

limitation. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d

1250, 1257–60 (1st Cir. 1996), cited with approval by

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt.

Dist., 651 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011). Judicial review

thus is available under the APA, as “no other adequate

remedy” exists. Id. at 1260–62; see also City of Olmsted

Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

The APA also waives the Secretary’s sovereign

immunity. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive

relief, and the Act abrogates immunity for actions seeking

relief “other than money damages . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see

also Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1032 (ordering equitable relief

under the APA for a CAA conformity violation).

III. NEPA Claims

A. Standard of Review

“We review de novo the district court’s determination that

the EIS complies with NEPA and that no [supplemental EIS]

was required.” Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1994). Although the

adequacy of an EIS is reviewed for “reasonableness” and the

Secretary’s no-supplemental-EIS determination for “abuse of

discretion,” the standards are the same. Or. Natural Res.

Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 528–29 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Under either rubric, we must decide whether the Secretary

took a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the

proposed actions and reasonably evaluated the relevant facts. 

Id. at 526. For issues requiring agency expertise, “we must

defer to ‘the informed discretion of the responsible federal

agencies.’” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360,

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18 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

377 (1989) (quotingKleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412

(1976)).

B. Tiering and Incorporation

CEQ regulations encourage agencies to “tier” with a

previous EIS to “eliminate repetitive discussions of the same

issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision . . . .” 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. An agency may tier to a NEPA

document, Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of

Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2004), if the

subsequent statement is either of “lesser scope” or a

“statement or analysis at a later stage.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28.

The CEQ regulations also require agencies to incorporate

by reference NEPA and non-NEPA documents. 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.21 (“Agencies shall incorporate material into an

environmental impact statement by reference when the effect

will be to cut down on bulk without impeding agency and

public review of the action.”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(j)

(“Agencies shall reduce excessive paperwork by . . .

[i]ncorporating by reference (§ 1502.21).”). Any material

incorporated by reference must be “cited in the statement,”

“briefly described,” and “reasonably available for inspection

by potentially interested persons,” § 1502.21, but need not be

physically attached to an EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.18(a)

(requiring an appendix to “[c]onsist of material prepared in

connection with an environmental impact statement (as

distinct from material which is not so prepared and which is

incorporated by reference (§ 1502.21))”); Forty Most Asked

Questions ConcerningCEQ’s National Environmental Policy

Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,034 (Mar. 23, 1981)

(“[T]he material which is incorporated by reference does not

accompany the EIS.”).

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 19

Plaintiffs argue that the Final Implementation Agreement

EIS either (a) did not clarify whether it incorporated the state

Transfer Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) or the federal

Transfer EIS, or (b) improperly cited to a non-NEPA

document—the Transfer EIR. They are incorrect on both

counts.

The Secretary and Imperial Irrigation originally agreed to

conduct a joint NEPA and state-CEQA study for the 1998

Imperial Irrigation/San Diego Water transfer agreement. 

Imperial Irrigation, however, later prepared a separate study

in June 2002 (the “Transfer EIR”) because CEQA has slightly

different reporting requirements than NEPA. The Bureau of

Reclamation prepared its own Transfer EIS in November

2002 (the “Final Transfer EIS”).5 The Secretary then

approved a Final Transfer EIS.6Imperial Irrigation District

Water Conservation and Transfer Project, California, 67 Fed.

Reg. 68,165 (Nov. 8, 2002).

The Final Implementation Agreement EIS clearly

distinguished between the Transfer EIR and the Transfer EIS,

explaining that “[i]n order to comply with CEQ regulations

. . . Reclamation is preparing a fully integrated, stand alone

Final EIR/EIS,” and incorporating the Transfer EIS by

reference. As plaintiffs note, the Secretary, in an apparent

5 The Final Transfer EIS incorporated errata revisions, excluded analysis

of Habitat Conservation Plan Approach 1, and estimated the Salton Sea’s

exposed shoreline for Alternatives 2 and 3.

6 The Secretary’s record of decision for the Implementation Agreement

EIS stated that “this ROD is not based on [the Transfer EIR/EIS].” That

statement is consistent with the Secretary’s position that she incorporated

the Transfer EIS’s discussion of the Salton Sea impacts but did not “tier

to” it.

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20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

effort to avoid confusion, cited to the Transfer EIR (CEQA

version) and the Transfer EIS (NEPA version) as if they were

a single document in the Final Implementation Agreement

EIS. But, plaintiffs fail to identify relevant material discussed

solely in the Transfer EIR orsignificant information excluded

from the Transfer EIS.7See Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman,

817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The reviewing court may

not ‘fly speck’ an EIS and hold it insufficient on the basis of

inconsequential, technical deficiencies.”)(quotingNw. Indian

Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 695

(9th Cir. 1986)). And although the Secretary once cited the

Transfer EIR and Transfer EIS as a single document in her

district court briefing, that minor misstatement does not

prejudice our review.8

Plaintiffs next argue that the Secretary improperly tiered

to “19 non-NEPA documents,” citing to ten pages in the

Implementation Agreement EIS. These “non-NEPA

documents” are federal statutes, state environmental impact

reviews, and EISs from other Colorado River projects; they

are cited to provide a “road map” of Colorado River

programs, not to sidestep the Secretary’s NEPA obligations. 

7 Plaintiffs note that the Transfer EIR and Transfer EIS have different

assessments of the impact that changes in water delivery will have on the

Salton Sea’s shoreline. But plaintiffs fail to identify any flaw in the

Transfer EIS assessment.

8 Because the Implementation Agreement EIS incorporated only the

Transfer EIS, we need not consider the Transfer EIR’s alleged

shortcomings. Plaintiffs also argue that the Secretary never made a record

of decision for the Transfer EIS. This argument was waived, as it was not

made below or in the opening brief. Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 858 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, any such

failure would not prevent the Secretary from incorporating the Transfer

EIS by reference into the Implementation Agreement EIS.

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 21

The Implementation Agreement EIS at most incorporated

these documents, which are properly “cited in the statement,”

“briefly described,” and “reasonably available for inspection

by potentially interested persons.” § 1502.21

More specifically, plaintiffs argue that the Final

Implementation Agreement EIS cited to the Coachella Valley

Water Management Plan Program EIR, which was not

released for public review during the comment period for the

Implementation Agreement EIS.9 However, a final EIS may

include information not cited in a draft; recirculation is

required only if there is significant new information or

circumstances relating to the proposed action. Westlands

Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 873 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii)). The

Secretary cited the Coachella Valley Water Management

Program EIR only to respond to comments from the Bureau

of Indian Affairs and to further discuss secondary

environmental consequences of the CRWDA, not to identify

a new proposal or to describe previously unconsidered

environmental consequences. Plaintiffs’ interpretation of

NEPA would require an agency to submit a new draft EIS or

supplemental EIS for any update, regardless of its

9 Plaintiffs also assert that a number of cited documents were not

publicly available. The assertion is belied by the public record. See

Imperial Irrigation District Water Conservation and Transfer Project,

67 Fed. Reg. at 68,165; Imperial Irrigation District Water Conservation

and Transfer Project, Draft Habitat Conservation Plan, California, 67 Fed.

Reg. 3732 (Jan 25, 2002); Quantification Settlement Agreement Final

PEIR Preface at 2 (June 2002) (“The Draft PEIR was released for public

review on January 30, 2002.”); Coachella Valley Final Water

Management Plan § 1-5 (Sept. 2002) (“The draft PEIR was released to all

interested public agencies and individuals for review and comment for a

45-day review period that concluded on August 9, 2002.”).

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22 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

significance. Every draft EIS would then be, in effect, a final

EIS.

Plaintiffs next argue that the Implementation Agreement

EIS improperly stated that it “tiers to and incorporates by

reference” the Quantification Settlement Agreement Program

EIR and the Coachella Valley Water District Management

Plan Program EIR. The Secretary would indeed have erred

if she had tiered to these documents, as they are state

environmental reports, not NEPA documents. KlamathSiskiyou, 387 F.3d at 997–98. However, the Secretary’s

“tiers to” language is a scrivener’s error. The non-NEPA

documents were plainly incorporated by reference, and

accidently referring to a document as “tiered to and

incorporated” rather than just “incorporated” is harmless. See

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,

551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (declining to remand when an

agency made a “stray statement, which could have had no

effect on the underlying agency action being challenged”).

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Pacific Rivers Council v.

United States Forest Service, 689 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2012),

requires all discussion of environmental impacts to be in the

text of an EIS, rather than incorporated by reference. 

Plaintiffs also contend that the Secretary too heavily

incorporated indirect impact analysis when discussing the

Salton Sea. Our Pacific Rivers opinion, however, was

vacated as moot, 133 S. Ct. 2843 (2013), and, in any event,

provides little help. The court there determined that a Forest

Service supplemental EIS failed to discuss the impact of

logging on individual species of fish. Pac. Rivers, 689 F.3d

at 1029–30. The Forest Service attempted to “save” the

supplemental EIS by claiming that it had incorporated two

biological assessments which discussed these impacts. Those

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 23

assessments, however, were not “described and analyzed in

the text” of the supplemental EIS, contained “no analysis . . .

of the manner or degree to which the alternatives may have

affected these fish,” and “applied to only one group of fish

species.” Id. at 1031–32. Unlike the Forest Service’s

supplemental EIS in Pacific Rivers, the text of the

Implementation Agreement EIS extensively considered the

environmental effects that the CRWDA will have on the

Salton Sea.

C. Segmenting

Plaintiffs next argue that the Secretary improperly

“segmented” the Quantification Settlement Agreements by

preparing two EISs. “Proposals or parts of proposals which

are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a

single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact

statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a). To prevail, plaintiffs

must show that the Secretary acted arbitrarily by not

preparing a single EIS. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412 (“Resolving

these issues requires a high level of technical expertise and is

properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible

federal agencies.”). “We apply an ‘independent utility’ test

to determine whether multiple actions are so connected as to

mandate consideration in a single EIS. The crux of the test is

whether ‘each of two projects would have taken place with or

without the other and thus had independent utility.’” Great

Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Wetland Actions Network v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).

The Secretary did not act arbitrarily by separately

preparing a Transfer EIS and an Implementation Agreement

EIS. The Implementation Agreement EIS analyzed the on-

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24 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

river effects of altering the Colorado River diversion points,

and the Transfer EIS considered a separate water-transfer

agreement among the districts and proposed habitat

conservation programs. The Secretary did not prepare two

EISs to “avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on

the environment.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d

1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, the Implementation

Agreement EIS considered both the on-river impact of

changing the Colorado River diversion points and the

secondary, off-river consequences of reducing Imperial

Irrigation’s water.

D. Supplemental EIS

The Secretary also did not abuse her discretion by

concluding that a supplemental EIS was unnecessary. A

supplemental EIS is required if (a) the “agency makes

substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to

environmental concerns;” or (b) there are “significant new

circumstances or information relevant to environmental

concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c). But, “supplementation is not required

when two requirements are satisfied: (1) the new alternative

is a ‘minor variation of one of the alternatives discussed in

the draft EIS,’ and (2) the new alternative is ‘qualitatively

within the spectrum of alternatives that were discussed in the

draft [EIS].’” Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 668 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in

original) (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions, 46 Fed. Reg.

at 18,035).

We defer to the Secretary’s decision not to prepare a

supplemental EIS when, as here, the “new alternative” is a

third-party plan to mitigate environmental impacts. As the

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 25

Supreme Court has explained, although an agency must

provide a “reasonably complete discussion of possible

mitigation measures,” there is no “substantive requirement

that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and

adopted . . . .” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989). When federal action ultimately

depends on “state and local governmental bodies that have

jurisdiction over” the mitigation measures, “it would be

incongruous to conclude that the [federal agency] has no

power to act until the local agencies have reached a final

conclusion on what mitigating measures they consider

necessary.” Id. at 352–53. Accordingly, a supplemental EIS

is unnecessary when an agency’s final decision falls “within

the range of alternatives” considered in an EIS. Russell

Country Sportsmen, 668 F.3d at 1046.

Plaintiffs argue that a supplemental EIS was required after

the water districts altered their proposed Salton Sea Habitat

Conservation Strategy (“SSHCS”). Under the originally

proposed SSHCS, the Salton Sea could have received

mitigation water directly from the Colorado River until 2030. 

The water districts instead ultimately agreed to decrease over

time the amount of water transferred from Imperial Irrigation,

rather than provide direct “mitigation water” to the Sea. 

Although the Implementation Agreement EIS did not

consider this exact mitigation mechanism, it did consider the

consequences of providing the Salton Sea with no mitigation

water at all. The changes to the SSCHS thus: (1) were

qualitatively considered through a no-mitigation alternative;

(2) were a secondary aspect of the Implementation

AgreementEIS; (3) reduced overall an adverse environmental

impact; and (4) did not alter the project’s cost-benefit

analysis. Russell Country Sportsmen, 668 F.3d at 1048–49.

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26 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

Two other post-EIS changes discussed by

plaintiffs—modifications to the water sell and payback

programs—are moot, as they were scheduled to occur in

2006, 2009, and 2012. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of

Land Mgmt., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 1990). And,

plaintiffs’ claim that the Implementation Agreement EIS did

not recognize that the CRWDA will reduce Imperial

Irrigation’s water up to 575.2 kafy in 2017—rather than 300

kafy—assumes water “loss” from prior water exchanges and

conservation measures not at issue here.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Implementation Agreement

EIS relied on the original SSHCS alone to reduce species loss

at the Salton Sea, while the Secretary instead ultimately

requested a biological assessment from the Fish and Wildlife

Service and “adopted” an Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)

Section 7 approach. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires

consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure that

an action will not jeopardize listed species or their designated

habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. “Once Section 7(a)(2)

consultation is complete, the FWS or the Service must

provide the agency with a written biological opinion ‘setting

forth the Secretary’s opinion, and a summary of the

information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the

agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.’” 

Jewell, 2014 WL 1465695, at *2 (quoting § 1536(b)(3)(A)). 

The Implementation Agreement EIS discussed using either

the SSHCS or Section 7 to mitigate environmental harm in

and around the Salton Sea. The Secretary initiated Section 7

consultations because it appeared that Imperial Irrigation

would not agree to all of the terms in the proposed SSHCS. 

Because any mitigation strategy ultimately depended on

“state and local governmental bodies,” it would be

“incongruous” to conclude that the Secretary erred by

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 27

discussing the environmental impacts of using a SSCHS,

Section 7, or no-mitigation approach in the Implementation

Agreement EIS. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352. And, given the

Secretary’s consideration of the project’s environmental

impacts without mitigation, adopting the Section 7 approach

in the environmental evaluation fell within the “range” of

options that the Secretary had previously considered. Russell

Country Sportsmen, 668 F.3d at 1046.

Plaintiffs further contend that the Implementation

Agreement EIS and record of decision failed to discuss

potential mitigation measures. An EIS must contain “a

reasonably complete discussion of possible mitigation

measures,” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, and a record of

decision must state whether “all practicable means to avoid

orminimize environmental harm from the alternative selected

have been adopted, and if not, why they were not.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 1505.2(c). The Implementation Agreement EIS and the

Secretary’s record of decision sufficiently considered

potential mitigation measures.

In the alternative, plaintiffs claim that the Secretary

abused her discretion by using an “environmental

evaluation”—a memorandum made available to the

public—rather than an environmental assessment, to explain

her decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS. But CEQ

regulations do not dictate the form that an agency must use

when deciding whether to prepare a supplemental EIS, and

we have approved the use of various documents. Idaho

Sporting Cong. Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565–66 (9th

Cir. 2000) (endorsing the use of supplemental information

reports, reevaluations, memorandums of record, and secretary

issue documents). Moreover, the Secretary did not err by

writing the environmental evaluation without prior public

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28 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

input, as “there is no such requirement for the decision

whether to prepare [a supplemental EIS].” Friends of the

Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000).

E. Alternatives

The Secretary’s decision to discuss only one

alternative—no action—was not arbitrary and capricious. 

NEPA regulations require an EIS to “[r]igorously explore and

objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for

alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study,

briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). Whether the Secretary evaluated all

reasonable alternatives depends on the “stated goal of a

project.” City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997). “This is all

NEPA requires—there is no minimum number of alternatives

that must be discussed.” Laguna Greenbelt, 42 F.3d at 524.

The Implementation Agreement EIS only compared the

CRWDA to a no action alternative because the CRWDA is a

negotiated agreement. Discussing a hypothetical alternative

that no one had agreed to (or would likely agree to) would

have been unhelpful, and as a result, the Implementation

Agreement EIS reasonably compared a hard-fought

negotiated agreement to no agreement at all.

In any event, the Implementation Agreement EIS properly

compared the future environmental consequences of no action

to the effects of the CRWDA. An agency must consider a no

action alternative when discussing the effects of a proposed

project. § 1502.14(d). “The ‘no action’ alternative may be

thought of in terms of continuing with the present course of

action until that action is changed.” Ass’n of Pub. Agency

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 29

Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158,

1188 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions,

46 Fed. Reg. at 18,027). The Secretary acted reasonably by

creating a model to compare the predicted conditions at the

Salton Sea under the CRWDA with “no action.”

F. Air Quality

The Implementation Agreement EIS also took the

required “hard look” at the air quality impacts from the

project. “A ‘hard look’ should, of course, involve the

discussion of adverse impacts. A ‘hard look’ does not dictate

a soft touch or brush-off of negative effects.” Native

Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1241

(9th Cir. 2005). An agency must also “acknowledge and

respond to comments by outside parties that raise significant

scientific uncertainties and reasonably support that such

uncertainties exist.” The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d

981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

The Implementation Agreement EIS discussed the impact

that the CRWDA will have on air quality, responded to EPA

concerns about the Salton Sea’s shoreline, and incorporated

by reference the detailed air quality discussion in the Transfer

EIS. That was sufficient. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1001.10

G. Reclamation Project

The Implementation Agreement EIS sufficiently

discussed the relationship between the CRWDA and the

10 Plaintiffs cite a letter and a deposition transcript from a consultant. 

Neither, however, was submitted to the Secretary when she was drafting

the EIS. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764–65.

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30 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

Salton Sea reclamation project. An EIS must discuss a

project’s interaction with “other environmental laws and

policies.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(d). The Salton Sea

Reclamation Act of 1998 required the Secretary to conduct a

feasibility study on “various options that permit the continued

use of the Salton Sea” by January 1, 2000. Pub. L. No. 105-

372, § 101, 112 Stat. 3377, 3378. The Secretary reasonably

noted that a reclamation project can proceed with or without

the CRWDA.

H. Growth

An EIS must consider “growth inducing effects and other

effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use,

population density or growth rate, and related effects on air

and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). The Secretary adequately considered

how the CRWDA will interact with southern California land

use, population density, and economic growth.

IV. Clean Air Act Claims

Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary should have performed

a CAA conformity determination because the CRWDA will

expand the Salton Sea’s shoreline and thus increase PM10

levels. In light of its standing ruling, the district court did not

consider this claim. But when we review a final agency

action with a complete record, we may address this argument

in the first instance, City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 673, and we

conclude that the Secretary did not violate the CAA.

The CAA “conformity provision” requires that no federal

agency “shall engage in, support in any way or provide

financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve, any

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 31

activity which does not conform to an implementation plan

after it has been approved or promulgated under section 7410

of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1). The EPA has adopted

rules identifying when an agency must conduct a full-scale

conformity determination, 40 C.F.R. § 93.153, but also has

allowed state implementation plans to include “criteria and

procedures for assessing conformity of Federal actions,” as

long as those “provisions apply equally to non-Federal as

well as Federal entities,” 40 C.F.R. § 51.851(a), (e). Imperial

Air District adopted, and the EPA approved, such a

conformity rule: Imperial County Air Pollution Control

District Rule 925. Approval and Promulgation of

Implementation Plans for Arizona and California; General

Conformity Rules, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,916, 19,917 (Apr. 23,

1999). Although we have twice applied federal rules in CAA

cases against federal agencies, S. Coast Air Quality, 621 F.3d

at 1099–1100; City of Las Vegas, 570 F.3d at 1117, under

either rule, the outcome here is the same.

Neither the federal nor the state rule identify the form an

agencymust use when decidingwhether a project necessitates

a full-scale conformity determination. Here, the Secretary

announced her decision that a conformity determination was

unnecessary in the Implementation Agreement EIS. An

agency need not prepare a stand-alone document explaining

such a decision. City of Las Vegas, 570 F.3d at 1113, 1117

(approving use of a “Finding of No Significant Impact” to

explain why a CAA conformity determination was

unnecessary); see also Tinicum Twp., Pa. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., 685 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2012) (approving a

conformity determination located in an EIS).

Both the federal and state rules require a full-scale

conformity determination “where the total of direct and

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32 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I.

indirect emissions of the criteria pollutant” exceeds a certain

level. § 93.153(b); Air Rule 925(d)(2). Under both rules,

“direct emissions” only include emissions that “occur at the

same time and place as the action.” 40 C.F.R. § 93.152; Air

Rule 925(c)(7). And, both rules define indirect emissions as

being (1) caused by federal action but occurring at a different

time or place as the action, (2) reasonably foreseeable,

(3) practically controlled by the agency, and (4) under the

continuing program responsibility of the agency. § 93.152;

Air Rule 925(c)(16).

The Secretary did not abuse her discretion by concluding

that actions by the Interior Department will not directly cause

PM10 emissions. The CRWDA only commits the Secretary

to changing the delivery point of Colorado River water. The

Secretary’s real actions thus occur at the Parker and Imperial

Dams; any Salton Sea PM10 emissions would be far from

those diversion points.

Nor did the Secretary abuse her discretion in finding that

the project will not indirectly increase PM10 emissions. In

the absence of a new water delivery agreement, the Salton

Sea might decline at a slower rate. However, any resulting

emissions would not be “practicably controlled” by the

Secretary. See § 93.152; Air Rule 925(c)(16). Imperial

Irrigation, Imperial County, and the State of California, not

the Secretary, will ultimately determine how to allocate the

water they receive. If they so choose, they could allocate

every acre foot of their Colorado River water to the Salton

Sea. See S. Coast Air Quality, 621 F.3d at 1099–1101

(finding no practical control when a state ultimately causes

the emissions); Determining Conformity of General Federal

Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed.

Reg. 63,214, 63,221 (Nov. 30, 1993) (“The EPA does not

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. U.S. D.O.I. 33

believe that Congress intended to extend the prohibitions and

responsibilities to cases where, although licensing or

approving action is a required initial step for a subsequent

activity that causes emissions, the agency has no control over

that subsequent activity . . . .”).

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

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