Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00823/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

YOLANDA TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

2:13-CV-823-WMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Yolonda Turner (“Turner”) brings this action against

defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), alleging disability

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and gender

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

UPS, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, has moved for summary judgment

on both of Turner’s claims. This court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated below, UPS’s motion is due to

be granted. 

SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Turner has been a UPS employee since 1990. She has held her

current position of Human Resources Supervisor since 2006, in the

company’s Birmingham-Roebuck location. Her immediate supervisor is

Area Human Resources Manager Lonzell Wilson, a male. As a Human

Resources Supervisor, Turner is responsible for the human resources

needs of four UPS facilities, primarily relating to recruiting,

hiring, and employee relations. As listed by UPS, the essential

1

FILED

 2014 Sep-10 PM 03:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 1 of 29
functions of the position include, among others, working in a

seated position for “9-10 hours per day, 5 days per week”;

reporting to work “on a regular and timely basis”; working

“additional hours depending on service needs”; and possessing the

cognitive ability to “concentrate, memorize, and recall.” (Doc. 19-

2 at 11).

Turner suffers from fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, cervical

degenerative disc disease, depression, and anxiety. Because of

these conditions, UPS approved Turner for intermittent leave in

accordance with the Family and Medical Leave Act. Because of her

continuing health issues, however, Turner approached Lonzell Wilson

concerning a permanent change in her schedule, requesting “some

flexibility in the morning” start time. (Doc. 19-1 at 164:19-21).

Wilson advised Turner that she must submit an ADA accommodation

request in order to receive such an accommodation; otherwise, she

must continue to use her allotted FMLA leave time.

Pursuant to UPS’s ADA protocol, Turner submitted a request for

accommodation on June 12, 2012, whereupon UPS requested Turner to

submit paperwork from her physician, which she did on July 10,

2012. The Request for Medical Information form, completed by Dr.

John Riser (Turner’s neurologist), stated that Turner was not

currently able to perform all the functions of her position, as

defined by the Essential Job Functions list. Specifically, Dr.

Riser stated that Turner had difficulty with concentrating and 

2

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 2 of 29
memorizing and recalling information; that she should avoid early

morning work hours (as this increased Turner’s fibromyalgia

symptoms); that she should have significant time for rest and

flexible work hours (for doctor’s appointments and otherwise); and

that she should avoid working long hours. (Doc. 19-2 at 7-9). Dr.

Riser also advised that Turner could perform her job duties “within

restrictions,” including flexible work hours, time off for

appointments, elimination of fluorescent lighting, and the ability

to work from home. (Doc. 19-2 at 9).

Upon receiving this information, UPS determined that Turner

possibly had a condition qualifying as a disability under the ADA.

UPS then scheduled what is known as a “checklist meeting” with

Turner. UPS describes the meeting as an opportunity “to review her

medical restrictions and discuss potential reasonable

accommodations that would enable her to perform the essential

functions of her current position or another position at UPS.”

(Doc. 18 at 7). In reality, the only “discussion” that occurred at

the meeting was a reading of the questions and answers on a form

that UPS requested Turner to fill out. (Doc. 19-1 at 199:22-24). On

the form and during the meeting, Turner reported that fatigue and

pain made it difficult to get up in the mornings and that she had

difficulty concentrating and remembering things. Turner requested

accommodations in the form of a flexible work schedule, time off to

attend appointments, elimination of fluorescent lights in her

3

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 3 of 29
office, periodic rest breaks, and the right to work from home.

(Doc. 26-3 at 11, 13). 

Based on the checklist meeting, UPS determined that Turner was

unable to perform the essential functions of a Human Resources

Supervisor or any other available position, either with or without 1

reasonable accommodations. UPS thereupon sent Turner home and told

her to apply for short-term disability benefits.

Turner grudgingly began a leave of absence on July 18, 2012.

She applied for short-term disability benefits through AETNA, the

third-party administrator of UPS’s short-term disability program.

She was initially denied short-term disability, though her appeal

was successful, allowing her to receive benefits for the period of

July 18, 2012, to October 17, 2012.2

After the initial denial of disability benefits, Turner, on

September 21, 2012, filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC,

alleging discrimination based on disability and gender. (Doc. 1-1).

She received a “right to sue” letter on February 1, 2013. (Doc. 1-

2).

In January of 2013, despite her EEOC complaint, Turner

contacted UPS about returning to work. Turner provided UPS with a

new Request for Medical Information form that was completed by

Turner’s rheumatologist, Dr. Elizabeth Perkins. Dr. Perkins stated

Turner requested that only full-time positions in the Birmingham area

1

be considered as a potential accommodation. (Doc. 26-3 at 12).

Turner did not actually return to work until April 22, 2013. 2

4

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 4 of 29
that Turner was not currently able to perform all of the functions

of her position — namely, that Turner was unable to properly

concentrate, memorize or recall information, or work more than an

eight-hour shift. Dr. Perkins advised that Turner required a

daylight shift with a flexible start time, limited to eight hours

with a 30-minute break. Starting after 8 am and requiring a

flexible work schedule were deemed to be permanent restrictions.

(Doc. 26-3 at 40-41).

Following receipt of this form, UPS conducted another

checklist meeting with Turner, who once again requested a flexible

work schedule, indicating that she could work up to eight hours per

day, so long as those hours were between 7 AM and 7 PM. (Doc. 26-3

at 45-48). She also requested to be allowed to work from home. UPS

reviewed this information and again determined that Turner was not

able to perform the essential functions of the HR Supervisor or any

available position, with or without reasonable accommodations. UPS

then informed Turner that no positions were available.

On March 8, 2013, after receiving her “right-to-sue” letter

but before she filed this suit, Turner submitted a work release

form to UPS, completed by Dr. Perkins, indicating that Dr. Perkins

had reviewed the essential functions of Turner’s position and was

releasing her to return to work on March 18. (Doc. 19-2 at 54).

 UPS then required Turner to submit to an examination by its

doctor, Dr. Michael Cloyd, because previous documents from Dr.

5

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 5 of 29
Perkins indicated that Turner’s restrictions were permanent. Dr.

Cloyd examined Turner on March 20, 2013, and initially reported

that Turner must avoid fluorescent lighting and prolonged sitting

or standing, must work a daytime shift, and must not lift more than

10-20 pounds repetitively. (Doc. 19-5 at 39). After receipt of this

report, UPS sought clarification from Drs. Cloyd and Perkins. Dr.

Perkins indicated that “decreased exposure to fluorescent lighting

in her personal office would be helpful,” and frequent lifting and

strenuous movement (stooping, squatting, and climbing stairs)

should be avoided, but otherwise Turner could return to work

without restrictions. (Doc. 19-5 at 50). Based on this

clarification, UPS allowed Turner to return to work as a Human

Resources Supervisor, and she did so on April 22, 2013. UPS

replaced the lights in her office upon her return but made no other

accommodations.

After returning to work, Turner filed suit in this court on

May 1, 2013, alleging discrimination based on disability under the

Americans with Disabilities Act, and based on gender under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is impossible to tell from

the pleadings whether Turner is pursuing a claim under a mixed

motive theory or under alternative theories. UPS moved for summary

judgment on both claims on June 26, 2014.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine

6

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 6 of 29
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must

“examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party,” drawing all inferences in favor of such party. Earl v.

Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A] ‘judge’s

function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866

(2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

Because the court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and UPS is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on both claims, summary judgment is due to be granted.

A. Turner’s ADA Claim

Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from

“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability” in any one of a number of employment areas. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a) (2012). Discrimination is defined to include failing to

make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations of a

qualified individual, unless doing so would impose an undue

hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, in

order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA, Turner must prove that “(1) [s]he has a disability; (2) [s]he

is a qualified individual; and (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful

7

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 7 of 29
discrimination because of [her] disability.” Holbrook v. City of

Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997).

UPS does not deny that Turner satisfies the first prong at

this stage but challenges Turner’s ability to prove the second and

third. Because Turner cannot establish that she is a qualified

individual under the statute or that UPS unlawfully discriminated

against her, Turner’s ADA claims fails.

1. Qualified Individual

Under Title I of the ADA, a “qualified individual” is defined

as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of the employment position that

such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).

Under this definition, if Turner cannot perform the essential

functions of her position, even with reasonable accommodations, she

is not a “qualified individual” and the ADA offers her no

protection. See Holly v. Clairson Industries, 492 F.3d 1246, 1256

(11th Cir. 2007). This court will first determine the essential

functions of her position, and then determine whether Turner was

capable of performing them, either with or without reasonable

accommodations.

a. Essential Job Functions

The essential functions of a job are the “fundamental job

duties of the employment position the individual with a disability

holds or desires,” but not the “marginal functions of the

8

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 8 of 29
position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2014). Among other reasons, a

function may be deemed essential if “the reason the position exists

is to perform that function,” there are a “limited number of

employees available among whom the performance of that job function

can be distributed,” or the function is “highly specialized so that

the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or

ability to perform the particular function.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(n)(2).

“[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as

to what functions of a job are essential . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §

12111(8). Other evidence of essentiality includes job descriptions

prepared before advertising or interviewing for the position, the

amount of time spent performing the function, the consequences of

not requiring the individual to perform, the terms of a collective

bargaining agreement, and the work experience of past or current

employees in the same or a similar job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

UPS has a prepared list of essential job functions that it

provided to each of the physicians to aid in their opinions as to

Turner’s ability to work. (Doc. 19-2 at 11). UPS contends that

working 9-10 hours per day; reporting to work on a regular and

timely basis (by 8 AM); the ability to work additional hours; and

the ability to concentrate, memorize, and recall are all essential

functions of Turner’s position, just as for all full-time nonoperations supervisor positions. Turner is also solely responsible

9

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 9 of 29
for facility tours, interviewing, and hiring for many workers in

her facilities. (Doc. 26-2 at 79:5-6, 149:3-7). 

UPS’s view that these functions are all essential is entitled

to “substantial weight in the calculus,” D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods,

Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005), but at the summary

judgment stage, “this factor alone may not be ‘conclusive,’” Holly,

492 F.3d at 1258 (quoting D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1233). Even if such

evidence is not conclusive, it is sufficient upon which to grant

summary judgment unless Turner “present[s] affirmative evidence to

show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Porter v. Ray,

461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).

Turner does not appear to challenge whether the functions

listed above are essential to her job and presents little to no

evidence that could support such a contention. Therefore, this 3

court finds that no dispute as to material fact exists on the issue

and considers the functions listed above and on UPS’s Essential Job

Functions sheet to be essential. 

b. Turner’s Ability to Perform

As stated above, a qualified individual must be able to

perform the essential functions of her position, either with or

The only evidence presented by Turner that is arguably on topic is her 3

assertion that Mike Johnson, another HR Supervisor in a different facility,

was given flexibility in his work schedule because of long-term medical

issues. (Doc. 19-1 at 279:3-10). Turner, however, only presents this evidence

for separate purposes, and it is in any case insufficient standing alone to

allow a reasonable jury to find the listed functions to be nonessential;

therefore, the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2005). 

10

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 10 of 29
without reasonable accommodations granted by the employer. 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8). Therefore, Turner “must show either that [s]he

can perform the essential functions of [her] job without

accommodation, or, failing that, show that [s]he can perform the

essential functions of [her] job with a reasonable 

accommodation.” Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301,

1305 (11th Cir. 2000).

UPS has presented evidence that, because of Turner’s

conditions, she had difficulties arriving at work on time,

concentrating, and memorizing and recalling information. (Doc. 19-2

at 8, 12, 14.). Turner’s doctors also advised UPS that she should

avoid working early morning hours and needed a flexible work

schedule. Most if not all of these difficulties, however, conflict

with the essential functions of her job as an HR Supervisor, and

thus would prevent her from performing them.

Turner’s only evidence to the contrary are her statements that

these issues are only based upon a “worst-case day scenario,”

meaning that these problems only arose occasionally, so on most

days she could perform the essential functions of the position

without issue. (Doc. 19-1 at 198:25). The problem here is that

4

In its reply brief, UPS seeks to discredit this testimony in its 4

entirety because it is contradicted by medical evidence Turner provided to UPS

from her doctors. (Doc. 32 at 8). In support, UPS cites cases for the

proposition that an employer is entitled to accord conclusive weight to

medical evidence from a plaintiff’s physicians, even over contrary assertions

from the plaintiff herself. See, e.g., Davis v. Lockheed Martin Operations

Support, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (D. Md. 2000). Particularly at the

summary judgment stage, this court does not find such weighing and favoring of

particular evidence to be proper. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (“[A] ‘judge’s

11

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 11 of 29
this argument ignores the fact that her consistent and dependable

presence is in itself an essential function of the position. (Doc.

26-2 at 78:20-79:11). For example, Turner is the sole person

responsible for facility tours, interviewing, and hiring of preload

(early-shift) workers at the Roebuck UPS facility. (Doc. 26-2 at

79:5-6, 149:3-7). It is therefore essential that Turner be present

and prompt, whether she is having a good health day or a “worstcase day.” Thus, even though she may be able to perform the 5

functions of the position most of the time, this part-time known

inability still renders her unable to perform the essential

functions of her position without an accommodation.

Further, the accommodations suggested by Turner do not qualify

under the ADA as reasonable. “An accommodation is reasonable, and

thus required under the ADA, only if it allows the employee to

perform the essential functions of the job.” Earl, 207 F.3d at

1365. This is so because a contrary rule would require employers to

eliminate aspects of a job that are deemed essential; but under the

ADA, “employers are not required to transform the position into

another one by eliminating functions that are essential to the

nature of the job as it exists.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257

function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.’”) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

This is not to say that intermittent leave is impermissible, since

5

Turner has been properly approved for intermittent FMLA leave when needed.

This is only to say that, for purposes of a permanent ADA accommodation,

prompt presence cannot be treated as anything but essential to the position.

12

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 12 of 29
F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001).

Turner “bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and

of demonstrating that the accommodation allows [her] to perform the

job’s essential functions.” Id. at 1255-56. In this case, Turner

has suggested two accommodations: modifications to her schedule and

changing of light bulbs in her office. (Doc. 25 at 19). As to

changing of the light bulbs, it is a simple accommodation (and one

that was actually done upon Turner’s return to work), but it would

not in any way alleviate Turner’s problems with consistently

reporting to work on time; standing alone, then, it does not

constitute a reasonable accommodation because it would not enable

her to perform all the essential functions of her position.

A shortened and flexible schedule, on the other hand, is not

a reasonable accommodation at all — allowing this schedule change

would not enable Turner to perform the essential functions of her

job; rather, it would thwart such performance. As already decided,

reporting to work promptly and reliably is an essential function of

the position because of Turner’s admitted responsibilities. Instead

of allowing her to perform the job’s essential functions, this

accommodation would impermissibly change the position’s essential

functions and force UPS to transform her position, which the ADA

explicitly does not require employers to do. Lucas, 257 F.3d at

1260. 

Because of this, Turner could not perform the essential

13

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 13 of 29
functions of the HR Supervisor position, either with or without

reasonable accommodations, so she is not a “qualified individual”

under the statute, and her ADA claim fails.

2. Discrimination Because of a Disability

UPS flatly denies that it discriminated against Turner, an

absence of motive that would negate the third requirement for

liability under the ADA. An employer may discriminate against an

individual in several different ways, but at issue in this case is

whether UPS discriminated against Turner by “not making reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an .

. . employee, unless [UPS] can demonstrate that the accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Again, “[a]n accommodation is

‘reasonable’ and necessary under the ADA only if it enables the

employee to perform the essential functions of the job.” Lucas, 257

F.3d at 1259-60. “The plaintiff retains at all times the burden of

persuading the jury that reasonable accommodations were available.”

Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1526.

Turner’s claim fails under this prong for much the same reason

as under the “qualified individual” prong — no accommodation exists

that would enable her to perform the essential functions of her

position, meaning no accommodation is reasonable. As stated above,

allowing Turner a flexible work schedule would be in irreconcilable

conflict with the essential functions of the job — primarily the

14

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 14 of 29
responsibility to be promptly and reliably present. Because of

this, Turner has failed to satisfy her burden of identifying a

reasonable accommodation, so UPS could not possibly have

discriminated against her by failing to provide such a nonexistent

accommodation. Therefore, Turner cannot satisfy the third

requirement of liability under the ADA.6

Turner claims that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate her by

failing to engage in a true “interactive process” as required by

the ADA. (Doc. 25 at 23-24). Assuming arguendo that such a failure

occurred, such failure still does not constitute a violation of 7

the ADA, and thus does not save her cause of action. See McKane v.

UPS claims that it reasonably accommodated Turner by allowing her a

6

leave of absence, which it contends is almost a per se reasonable

accommodation. Several of the cases UPS cited, however, found leave to be an

inappropriate accommodation in the situation. See, e.g., Carroll v. City of

Stone Mountain, 544 Fed. App’x 926, 927 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Although a leave of

absence can be a reasonable accommodation, Carroll’s requested accommodations

in this case were not reasonable.”); Santandreu v. Miami Dade County, 513 Fed.

App’x 902, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (“While a leave of absence may be a reasonable

accommodation, the ADA does not require an employer to provide leave for an

indefinite period of time because an employee is uncertain about the duration

of his condition.”). The cases cited by UPS finding leave to be reasonable are

distinguishable from this case because the leave was given for a limited

duration and the employer guaranteed the employee’s full salary. See Jackson

v. Fujifilm Mfg. USA, No. 8:09-1328-RBH-BHH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141130, *26

(D.S.C. June 18, 2010); Carter v. First Energy Nuclear Operating Co., No.

1:06-CV-2137, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58586, *28 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2007).

Further, this court could not find leave to be a reasonable accommodation in

this case, because a reasonable accommodation must enable the employee to

perform the essential functions of the position “presently, or in the

immediate future.” Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997)).

But no evidence has been presented that leave would have enabled Turner to

perform her job’s essential functions, especially in light of the undisputed

evidence that the conditions were permanent.

UPS contends that the interactive process employed in this case was 7

sufficient, (Doc. 32 at 12-16), and this court reaches no conclusion on the

issue, although Turner’s criticism of the rather extensive interactive process

was that it did not produce the result she wanted.

15

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 15 of 29
UBS Financial Services, Inc., 363 Fed. App’x 679, 682 (11th Cir.

2010) (“Furthermore, even assuming that UBS failed to engage in an

interactive process, that failure neither amounted to a violation

of the ADA nor relieved McKane of his burden of demonstrating the

availability of a reasonable accommodation.”); Willis v. Conopco,

Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a plaintiff

cannot demonstrate ‘reasonable accommodation,’ the employer's lack

of investigation into reasonable accommodation is unimportant.”).

Turner is required by the ADA to identify a reasonable

accommodation independent of any interactive process, but she has

failed to do so, thus negating ADA liability.

This court is sympathetic to one of Turner’s complaints about

UPS’s ADA process — that she was told to go home immediately after

requesting an ADA accommodation, even though she had been doing her

job at the time without major issue and believed herself to still

be capable of doing so. Unfair as it may seem, it is simply not a

situation the ADA was designed to remedy, since Turner was unable

to perform several of the essential functions of her position, and

no accommodation from UPS would allow her to do so. The ADA is a

limited remedy and simply does not allow courts to “sit as a ‘super

personnel department that will second-guess an employer’s

decision.’” Lloyd v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 857 F. Supp. 2d

1252, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)). Thus, summary judgment on

16

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 16 of 29
Turner’s ADA claim is due to be granted. 

B. Turner’s Title VII Claim

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to

“discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(2012). To prove such discrimination, an individual may rely on

either direct or circumstantial evidence. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents

of Univ. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir.

2003). Direct evidence is “‘evidence, which if believed, proves

existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.’”

Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 883 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1987)). “In the usual case, however, direct evidence is not

present, and the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence to

prove discriminatory intent, using the framework established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d

1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Turner relies on circumstantial evidence, and

thus upon the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method, to prove

her claim. Under McDonnell Douglas, “the plaintiff has the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.” Combs

v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1997). If

the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts “to the employer

17

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 17 of 29
. . . [to] produc[e] legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

challenged employment action.” Id. at 1528. If the defendant meets

this “exceedingly light” burden, Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564

(quoting Turnes v. Amsouth Bank, NA, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir.

1994)), the plaintiff then “bears the burden of showing that the

reasons offered were merely pretext,” Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d

1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002). “In other words, the plaintiff has the

opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the previously

produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given

by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse

employment decision.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528.

UPS presents three challenges to the viability of Turner’s

Title VII claim. Each will be discussed in turn.

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

UPS first claims that some if not all of Turner’s Title VII

claim should be dismissed for a failure to exhaust her 

administrative remedies. “Prior to filing a Title VII action . . .

a plaintiff first must file a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279

(11th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by

the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Anderson v.

Embarq/Sprint, 379 Fed. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2010).

18

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 18 of 29
“[A]llegations of new actions of discrimination are inappropriate,”

id., but claims are permissible if they “‘amplify, clarify, or more

clearly focus’ the allegations in the EEOC complaint,” Gregory, 355

F.3d at 1279 (quoting Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.

1989)). “Courts are nonetheless ‘extremely reluctant to allow

procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under [Title

VII],’” so “‘the scope of an EEOC complaint should not be strictly

interpreted.’” Id. at 1280 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands,

Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61, 465 (5th Cir. 1970)).

Under this standard, this court finds that Turner successfully

exhausted her administrative remedies. UPS contends that Turner’s

current allegations go beyond the scope of her EEOC charge, so that

her cause of action should be limited appropriately. It claims that

the EEOC charge was limited to UPS’s alleged “sex stereotyping [of

Turner] by requiring her to take a leave of absence.” (Doc. 18 at

33). Turner now complains of intimidating and derogatory statements

made by her supervisor, Lonzell Wilson. Construing the scope

liberally in favor of the non-movant, the EEOC charge contains

allegations concerning the exceedingly broad issue of a maledominated and gender-discriminatory culture. While the charge does

not specifically mention conduct by Wilson, it could “reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination,” so the

allegations are not barred. Anderson, 379 Fed. App’x at 926.

Similarly, the complaint alleges that “Defendant subjected

19

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 19 of 29
Plaintiff to intimidation and harassment because of her gender.”

(Doc. 1 at 5). Contrary to UPS’s argument, harassment by Wilson was

sufficiently alleged by this statement in Turner’s complaint, as

well as in the EEOC charge, so the issue is properly before the

court as part of Turner’s Title VII claim.

2. Prima Facie Case

To set out a prima facie case for disparate treatment in

a [gender] discrimination case, the plaintiff may show

that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) she was . . . treated

less favorably than a similarly-situated individual

outside her protected class.

Bentley v. Orange Cnty., 445 Fed. App’x 306, 308 (11th Cir. 2011).

UPS only disputes the third and fourth requirements of the prima

facie case — that Turner was subjected to an adverse employment

action and that by that action she was treated less favorably than

a comparable male employee. Turner fails to establish such a prima 8

facie case.

a. Adverse Employment Action

UPS first argues that Turner did not suffer an adverse

employment action. An adverse employment action is “a serious and

UPS also sets forth a cursory argument that Turner was not qualified 8

for her position. This argument, however, appears with no citation of

authority and is entirely set out in a footnote. This court will not consider

such an argument and deems it waived. See Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 373 Fed. App’x 989, 992 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause Bell mentions

its Rule 60(b)(5) argument in passing in a footnote only and does not

elaborate on it in any further detail in either one of its briefs, we deem

this argument waived.”); PeoplesSouth Bank v. Farmer & Malone, P.A., 542 Fed.

App’x 810, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2013).

20

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 20 of 29
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th

Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “[T]he employee's subjective view of

the significance and adversity of the employer's action is not

controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as

viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. “[W]hether

an action is sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action

must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Webb-Edwards v. Orange

Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1031 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir.

2000)).

UPS claims that Turner’s leave of absence did not constitute

an adverse employment action because it was an attempt to

reasonably accommodate Turner under the ADA and therefore cannot be

considered an adverse employment action. But, as reasoned above,

the leave was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA because

there is no evidence before the court that the leave would enable

Turner to perform the essential functions of her position. Neither

this circuit’s definition of adverse employment action nor any

authority cited by UPS connects ADA accommodations to the

determination of adverse employment actions. Thus, the

classification of the action under the ADA has no real bearing on

an analysis under Title VII.

Judged by the Eleventh Circuit’s definition, this court finds

21

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 21 of 29
that Turner’s forced leave of absence qualifies as an adverse

employment action. UPS required Turner to leave work with only the

advice to seek short-term disability benefits, a process over which

UPS had no control. (Doc. 26-2 at 28:20-29:4, 31:19-21). If AETNA,

the ERISA disability benefits administrator, denied Turner’s claim,

the leave would be unpaid, and even if the claim was approved, she

would only receive 100% of her salary for thirteen weeks. (Doc. 26-

2 at 28:1-7). The action referring her to her ERISA rights

constituted a “serious and material change in the terms . . . of

employment," Davis, 245 F.3d at 1249, since she was forced to take

leave that would have either been unpaid or underpaid, so this act

qualifies as an adverse employment action. Turner, then, has

satisfied this element of the prima facie case. 

b. Less Favorable Treatment than a Comparator

UPS also contends that Turner has failed to show that she

received less favorable treatment than a similarly situated male

employee. In order to satisfy this requirement, Turner must present

evidence that (1) a similarly situated individual (also known as a

comparator) exists, and (2) the comparator received more favorable

treatment than Turner. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the

plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated

employee, and no other evidence of discrimination is present.” Amos

v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 Fed. App’x 637, 647 (11th Cir. 2005).

In order for another employee to be deemed a comparator,

22

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 22 of 29
Turner “must show that the ‘employees are similarly situated in all

relevant respects.’” Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330

F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Holifield, 115 F.3d at

1562). “The comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to

prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the

employer.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th

Cir. 2004).

Turner has offered Mike Johnson, another Human Resources

Supervisor in a different UPS facility, as a would-be comparator.

According to Turner, Johnson was permitted to work from home and

allowed a flexible schedule as an accommodation. (Doc. 19-1 at

279:3-10). This, however, was simply her deduction based upon

hearsay statements by coworkers about Johnson’s hours and the fact

that Johnson frequently sent late-night emails. (Doc. 19-1 at

279:23-280:6). Turner had no personal knowledge regarding any ADA

accommodations granted to Johnson. (Doc. 19-1 at 279:11-18). 

This “evidence” fails for a reason beyond its hearsay

character. Courts of this circuit require a much higher level of

comparability before finding someone to be similarly situated. In

Knight, the Eleventh Circuit found that two employees guilty of

rude and disrespectful conduct toward coworkers were not similarly

situated because the plaintiff also had a history of performance

and tardiness problems. 330 F.3d at 1317-18. In Silvera, two school

employees were both found to have decades-old child molestation

23

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 23 of 29
convictions, yet only one was fired. Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch.

Bd., 244 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit still

found the two not to be similarly situated, because the plaintiff

had a stronger record of recent convictions. Id. at 1259-60.

In this case, Turner has simply not produced evidence for the

court to be able to make such a determination, so she has not met

her burden. Turner has not presented evidence regarding Johnson’s

medical condition, whether he was granted ADA accommodations from

UPS, or the extent of any such accommodations. Because of this,

Turner has not met her burden of showing that a sufficient

comparator exists.

Further, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that the only

“evidence” presented regarding Johnson — merely repeating the

statements of others while lacking personal knowledge — is

insufficient as a matter of law to identify a similarly situated

individual. Amos, 153 Fed. App’x at 647-48 (“Gilbert, however, did

not personally witness anything that substantiates her position,

relying entirely on the statements of other workers. Such testimony

is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a comparator . . .

.”). Therefore, Turner has failed to identify a similarly situated

individual, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case of

gender discrimination.

3. Pretext

The court will assume only for the sake of argument that

24

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 24 of 29
Turner has made out a prima facie case. Once a plaintiff has

established a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination, the

burden shifts “to the employer . . . [to] produc[e] legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action.”

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. This burden on the defendant is

“‘exceedingly light’” — the reasons must only be identified.

Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 (quoting Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1061). UPS

has met this burden by stating that it placed Turner on a leave of

absence because it determined that she could not perform the

essential functions of her position, not because of her gender.

(Doc. 19 at 40-41).

After the defendant meets this intermediate burden, “the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the

employer's proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.”

Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264

(11th Cir. 2010). “‘[T]o avoid summary judgment [the plaintiff]

must introduce significantly probative evidence showing that the

asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.’” Brooks v.

Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.

2006) (quoting Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228

(11th Cir. 1993)).

A plaintiff may prove pretext “either directly by persuading

the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the

employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

25

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 25 of 29
explanation is unworthy of credence.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248, 256 (1981). The court is not concerned

with whether the defendant’s given reasons are wise or fair, but

only if they make some sense and are nondiscriminatory. See

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (“We do not sit as a ‘super-personnel

department,’ and it is not our role to second-guess the wisdom of

an employer's business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is

irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a

discriminatory motive.”).

Turner points to two pieces of evidence to prove that UPS’s

stated reason for placing her on leave after finding that she was

unable to perform the essential functions of her position is

pretextual. First, Turner contends that UPS summarily found her

“too sick to work” and refused to accommodate her, but then changed

its position and allowed her to return to work after its own

doctor, Dr. Cloyd, examined her. Turner argues that the reason for

this inconsistency is that Dr. Cloyd’s recommendation made no

mention of Turner’s fibromyalgia, a condition that predominately

affects women, while previous reports mentioned it. This, according

to Turner, shows that UPS’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is

unworthy of credence and is also direct evidence that UPS’s conduct

was motivated by discriminatory animus against those with

fibromyalgia and, by extension, against women. (Doc. 25 at 26-28).

This argument strains credulity. It does not rise to the level of

26

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 26 of 29
significantly probative evidence. While at the summary judgment

stage this court must view all evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-movant, the court is not required to accept the nonmovant’s tortured characterization of the evidence. Beal v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 458-59 (11th Cir. 1994)

(“Evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party; this, however, does not mean that we are constrained to

accept all the nonmovant’s factual characterizations and legal

arguments.”) (internal citations omitted). 

Turner claims that the only difference between Dr. Cloyd’s

recommendation and that of previous doctors is that Dr. Cloyd did

not mention fibromyalgia in his report, but the record clearly

shows other key differences. Most notably, the previous medical

recommendations stated that Turner needed a flexible work schedule,

with one even calling the restriction permanent. (Doc. 19-2 at 8, 

33-34). Both reports also mentioned Turner’s issues with cognitive

processes, while Dr. Cloyd’s recommendation did not. (Doc. 19-5 at

39). Further, UPS presented uncontroverted evidence that it sought

further clarification from Drs. Cloyd and Perkins before allowing

Turner to return to work, and Dr. Perkins stated that the only

accommodations needed by Turner were decreased exposure to

fluorescent lighting and avoidance of heavy lifting. (Doc. 19-5 at

50). Thus, Turner’s assertion that a fibromyalgia diagnosis is the

only difference in the recommendations is unsupported by the

27

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 27 of 29
record, so the suggested inconsistency and discriminatory motive do

not exist, much less show any pretext.

Second, Turner contends that UPS’s denial of accommodations to

her while allowing accommodations to Mike Johnson is proof of

discrimination based on gender. Turner states that Johnson

frequently sent late-night emails and she heard from coworkers that

he sometimes came in late because of the heat. (Doc. 19-1 at

279:23-280:6). From this, Turner concludes that Johnson was given

an accommodation. (Doc. 19-1 at 279:3-10). This, on its own, does

not constitute “significantly probative evidence” required to

survive summary judgment. Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. Turner presents

no evidence regarding the exact nature of Johnson’s medical

conditions, the accommodations he requested, or the ways in which

UPS actually accommodated him. On this scant record, this court is

simply unable to locate an evidentiary basis upon which a jury

could find or be allowed to find a discriminatory motive. Turner

has failed to present significantly probative evidence that UPS’s

proffered facially legitimate reasons for its actions are

pretextual. Therefore, summary judgment is proper on Turner’s Title

VII claim.9

Although there is no prohibition against a plaintiff’s mounting 9

separate and distinct claims of wrongful conduct by an employer based on the

same set of facts, Turner's ADA claim is hard to reconcile with her Title VII

claim. This anomaly inherent in a mixed motive case was not a factor in this

court's analysis of either theory of liability. 

28

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 28 of 29
CONCLUSION

Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and UPS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of

Turner’s claims, summary judgment is due to be granted. A separate

order will be entered.

DONE this 10th day of September, 2014.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29

Case 2:13-cv-00823-WMA Document 33 Filed 09/10/14 Page 29 of 29