Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298-35/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF

E-filed: 11/26/07 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON

PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 

[Re Docket Nos. 2626, 2632]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-02298 RMW

[Re Docket Nos. 387, 395]

Case 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 572 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 11
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For the Northern District of California

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1 For the purposes of this order, "the Manufacturers" jointly refers to all of the Hynix,

Samsung, Micron, and Nanya entities.

ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 2

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket Nos. 540, 550]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

 No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket Nos. 228, 237]

This order addresses two motions related to prosecution laches. The Manufacturers1

 jointly

oppose the motions. The court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel

heard on November 21, 2007. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Rambus's motion for

summary judgment on prosecution laches, except as to the Ware patents-in-suit. The court denies

Rambus's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Gerald Mossinghoff and R. Polk Wagner.

I. ANALYSIS

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

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A. Equity Practice in the Patent Law Preventing Holdup

Commenting in the recent case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Chief Justice Roberts

stressed the importance that the "long tradition of equity practice" has on the patent laws. 126 S. Ct.

1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). When it comes to discerning that practice and

applying it to the facts of each case, he repeated that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 

Id. at 1842 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (opinion for the Court

by Holmes, J.)).

Equity practice in patent law has long been concerned with preventing a patent owner from

using the patent's property right to expropriate another's investments made in reliance on the absence

of patent rights. This principle was amply demonstrated in Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., where

the Supreme Court came down firmly against the abuse of the reissue process to broaden claims to

cover existing industries. 104 U.S. 350 (1881). The Court explained,

But by a curious misapplication of the law [the reissue process] has come to be

principally resorted to for the purpose of enlarging and expanding patent claims. And

the evils which have grown from the practice have assumed large proportions.

Patents have been so expanded and idealized, years after their first issue, that

hundreds and thousands of mechanics and manufactures, who had just reason to

suppose that the field of action was open, have been obliged to discontinue their

employments, or to pay an enormous tax for continuing them.

Id. at 354-55. After further lamenting how the process affects "every independent inventor" who

relies on the prior narrow patent, the Court remarked that, "It will not do for the patentee to wait

until other inventors have produced new forms of improvement, and then, with the new light thus

acquired, under pretence of inadvertence and mistake, apply for such an enlargement of his claim as

to make it embrace these new forms." Id. at 355. In holding the patent at issue unenforceable, the

Court held that, "the rule of laches should be strictly applied; and no one should be relieved who has

slept upon his rights, and has thus led the public to rely on the implied disclaimer involved in the

terms of the original patent." Id. As it recommended, the Court strictly applied this version of

laches to stamp out the abusive practice. See Wollensak v. Reihar, 115 U.S. 96, 100 (1885) (noting

that "[t]his doctrine has been reiterated in many cases since, and at the present term has been

reconsidered, and emphatically repeated as the settled law").

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

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A more familiar application of the equitable principle of laches comes from Lane & Bodley

Co. v. Locke, where an employee patented an invention and allowed his employer to use it for years

without complaint. 150 U.S. 193 (1893). While this fact pattern may now more commonly be

addressed under an implied license theory, the Court expressly declined to address a license theory

of the case. See id. at 196-97. Instead, the Court considered the employee's behavior and held that:

Courts of equity, it has often been said, will not assist one who has slept upon his

rights, and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. The plaintiff's excuse

in this instance, that he preferred for prudential reasons to receive a salary from the

defendant rather than to demand a royalty, is entitled to a less favorable

consideration by a court of equity than if his conduct had been that of mere inaction.

Id. at 201. In light of the patentee's financially-motivated delay, the Court reversed the lower court

decree and ordered the case dismissed. Id.

The laches issues raised by the motions before the court deal with delay in prosecuting patent

applications. The Supreme Court considered this context in a variety of cases, starting with

Woodbridge v. United States. 263 U.S. 50 (1923) (Taft, C.J.). The prosecution laches case law has

been well-summarized elsewhere, see Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education &

Research Foundation, L.P., 277 F.3d 1361, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech,

Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142-43 (E.D. Cal. 2002), but a few details bear repeating. The patentee

in Woodbridge delayed issuance of his patent claims for over nine years because "it being only lately

that any immediate opportunity of rendering it pecuniarily available has occurred." 263 U.S. at 51-

53. The patentee also tried to amend the delayed application to cover inventions that had occurred

while the application lay dormant. Id. at 53-54. As Chief Justice Taft made clear, it was the

patentee's "designed delay" that forfeited his right to a patent. Id. at 56. To be clear, the Court

explained:

Many inventors were at work in the same field, and had made advances in the art,

and the government had used them. When Woodbridge conceived that the time for

him had come to assert his monopoly, he became aware of the fact that in his

specifications and claims, as allowed, he had not covered the real advance made by

his unconscious competitors, and that was the use in a rifled gun of a ring or sabot

without projections to fit into the rifling of the bore, which because of the softness

of the metal of the ring under the heat and pressure would do so without projections;

and so 9 1/2 years after his patent had been allowed, but not issued, he applied for

a change of specifications and claims, so that he might cover the patents of these

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 5

subsequent inventors.

Id. at 57.

The Federal Circuit's guidance in the field of prosecution laches is sparse, but in affirming

the district court's finding of prosecution laches in Symbol Technologies, the court noted a few

factors to guide the lower courts' equitable discretion. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,

Education & Research Foundation, L.P., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court noted

that the doctrine should be used "sparingly" and "only in egregious cases of misuse of the statutory

patent system." Id. at 1385. The court emphasized that various prosecution practices, such as filing

divisional and continuation applications, are both legal and legitimate. Id. Nonetheless, the inquiry

is bound up with the individual facts of each case, and even legitimate prosecution can trigger laches

if the facts reveal a pattern of repeated delay. Id. at 1385-86 ("On the other hand, an examination of

the totality of the circumstances, including the prosecution history of all of a series of related patents

and overall delay in issuing claims, may trigger laches.").

This court's case law further illustrates the proper use of equitable discretion in the context of

prosecution laches. Judge Walker noted that the reasonableness of a patentee's prosecution turns on

whether their delay in issuing claims can be explained by legitimate considerations. Reiffin v.

Microsoft Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The first factor to place a

prosecution laches claim in context is whether "the prosecution history of plaintiff's patents was

typical of patents in that field or patents generally." Id. Various circumstances within the

prosecution history can also explain the reasonableness of prosecution, such as whether there are

any unexplained gaps, whether the plaintiff took any unusual steps to speed or delay prosecution, or

whether the PTO unusually delayed the application process. Id. The inquiry is not limited to the

confines of the prosecution file wrapper, however. In light of equity's concern with preventing

patent holdup, factors external to prosecution also affect the inquiry. In particular, relevant factors

also include whether the patentee "took any steps to limit public awareness of his pending

applications or the inventions he sought to patent" or whether "any changes in plaintiff's prosecution

of the application coincide with or directly follow evolutions in the field that relate to the claimed

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2 The court is aware that the Federal Circuit has suggested that "there is nothing improper,

illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a

known competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims

intended to cover a competitor's product the applicant's attorney has learned about during the

prosecution of a patent application." Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d

867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This statement was made in the context of whether such acts could support

a finding of intent to deceive the Patent Office. Id. The court believes this statement should not be

understood to extend beyond that specific context, because whether a patentee has tried to expand his

claims to cover other developments in a field has often been deemed relevant, as demonstrated by the

Supreme Court cases discussed above. See also Chiron, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43 ("Kingsdown

therefore does not preclude an alleged infringer from asserting these kind of circumstances as grounds

for a prosecution laches defense.").

ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 6

invention."2 Id. After holding a bench trial, Judge Walker concluded that the patentee had not

unreasonably delayed in prosecuting his patents. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1149

(N.D. Cal. 2003). The court's findings noted that "[t]he most troubling aspect of plaintiff's

prosecution is the fact that changes in claim scope closely tracked external developments in the

field. The correspondence between the invention(s) plaintiff claimed with the evolution of the field

of computer science is highly suspicious and suggestive of opportunism." Id. at 1153. accord

Chiron, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. On the other hand, the patentee's efforts to publicize his invention

militated against inferring that the patentee was trying to "ambush" the field. See id. Similar

concerns about patent holdup motivated the Eastern District to deny summary judgment on

prosecution laches in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. See 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1144 ("Genentech

argues that the reason for Chiron's delay was that it was waiting for Genentech or some other

company to develop a lucrative product so that it could craft broader claims designed specifically to

cover that product, and Chiron has not offered an alternative explanation.").

B. Rambus' Prosecution of its Family of Patents

After reviewing these "pages of history," the court turns to the circumstances of the present

case, drawing all inferences in favor of the Manufacturers as the non-movants on this summary

judgment motion.

Rambus filed the original application giving rise to some of the patents-in-suit on April 18,

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3 The Manufacturers' experts do not address the two Ware patents, U.S. Pat. Nos.

6,493,789 and 6,496,897, at issue in this case. The Manufacturers do not appear to oppose Rambus'

motion with respect to these two patents. At oral argument, counsel for the Manufacturers conceded

that their prosecution laches allegations do not extend to the Ware patents.

4 Specifically, the patents accused of being unreasonably delayed are U.S. Patent Nos.

6,182,184 (issued Jan. 30, 2001); 6,266,285 (issued Jul. 24, 2001); 6,314,051 (issued Nov. 6, 2001);

6,546,446 (issued Apr. 8, 2003); 6,584,037 (issued Jul. 24, 2003); 6,697,295 (issued Feb. 24, 2004);

6,715,020 (issued Mar. 30, 2004); 6,751,696 (issued Jun. 15, 2004); 6,324,120 (issued Nov. 27, 2001);

6,426,916 (issued Jul. 30, 2002); 6,452,863 (issued Sept. 17, 2002); 5,915,105 (issued Jun. 22, 1999);

6,034,918 (issued Mar. 7, 2000); 6,038,195 (issued Mar. 14, 2000); and 6,378,020 (issued Apr. 23,

2002). See Opp. at 2.

ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 7

1990.3 After an eleven-way restriction requirement, this application spawned an enormously

complex prosecution history. See Mossinghoff Report, Ex. G. This resulted in fifteen patents that

the Manufacturers argue were unreasonably delayed in their prosecution. These patents issued

between nine and fourteen years after the original application was filed.4

 Taken singly, the delay in

issuing any of these patents likely cannot support a finding of prosecution laches. See Symbol

Techs., 422 F.3d at 1385-86. Taken together, long delays in issuing entire families of patents can

raise the specter of prosecution laches. Id. In this case, some evidence suggests that the patents-insuit took longer to issue than 99.9% of similar patents. See generally Mossinghoff Report, at 48-49.

Drawing all inferences in favor of the non-movants, the voluminous record developing in

these cases further raises genuine issues of material fact regarding prosecution laches that prevent

this court from entering summary judgment. While all of these claims were being prosecuted,

Rambus had disclosed to JEDEC an issued patent with the same specification but without the claims

covering the technologies at issue in this case. This disclosure raises reliance concerns similar to

those articulated by the Court in Miller. See 104 U.S. at 344-45.

Evidence also suggests that Rambus repeatedly delayed issuing its patents or informing

others about them until the DRAM industry committed to making infringing products. For example,

Rambus was possibly drafting claims to cover features of SDRAM in 1992 or 1993. See, e.g.,

Hersey Decl., Exs. 19 (internal Rambus email detailing claims directed at DRAM it wished to file);

20 (attorney notes on claims directed at programmable latency and PLL technologies); 21 (internal

Rambus email discussing claims to cover DRAM); Raz Decl., Ex. 4 (Steinberg email from 2001

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 8

suggesting Rambus was trying to patent SDRAM technologies in 1992 and 1993). Despite having

begun drafting claims against SDRAM in 1992 or 1993, Rambus may have still been filing and

prosecuting such claims in late 1998. See Hersey Decl. Ex. 57 at HTX 128.002. Rambus also once

ordered its prosecutors to "hold on patent issuances." Raz Decl., Ex. 1.

Internal Rambus documents also strongly suggest that Rambus was drafting its claims to

cover technologies as they developed. See, e.g., Hersey Decl., Ex. 28 (internal email stating "if it is

possible to salvage and get anything that helps us get a claim to shoot synclink in the head, we

should do it and file what ever divisional is necessary"); Ex. 57 at HTX 128.002 (internal update

from 1998 noting that prosecution strategy is to file continuations on 4/18/90 applications to "cover

SDRAM, DDR, SLDRAM, any and all forms of synchronous memory," new patents could be

"issued within one year," and to otherwise "continue in stealth mode during '99").

Unlike the patentee in Reiffin, evidence suggests that Rambus actively worked to prevent

others from learning about its patents. See, e.g., Hersey Decl., Ex. 50 (internal email instructing "do

*NOT* tell customers/partners that we feel DDR may infringe – our leverage is better to wait); Ex.

57 at HTX 128.003 (internal update arguing "[Rambus] should not assert patents against Direct

partners until ramp reaches a point of no return"); Raz Decl., Ex. 15 (deposition of Joel Karp

discussing how Rambus named its IP strategy "Lexington" in reference to the "shot heard 'round the

world").

Rambus' opposition argues that Rambus lacked the resources to simultaneously apply for

patents on every claim it desired. Opp. at 14. Indeed, various patents issued from the original 1990

application prior to the patents-in-suit. This does not, however, require entering summary judgment

in Rambus' favor. On the contrary, a possible inference from such evidence is that Rambus

prosecuted unrelated or weak claims to keep the original application alive while waiting for the

DRAM industry to "lock in" to the JEDEC SDRAM standard. One could infer that only after lock

in occurred did Rambus begin earnestly prosecuting the claims it now asserts. If the evidence at trial

demonstrates such a plan, it may qualify as a "designed delay" to enhance the financial worth of the

patents, which can support a finding of laches.

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 9

Considering the totality of these circumstances, the court cannot say that there is no genuine

issue of material fact regarding whether Rambus unreasonably delayed in prosecuting this family of

patents. Accordingly, Rambus' motion for summary judgment on prosecution laches is denied.

C. Rambus' Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Wagner and Mossinghoff

Rambus also moves to exclude the testimony of R. Polk Wagner and Gerald Mossinghoff

under Rule 702. Rambus argues that because Prof. Wagner's report focuses only on pendency, it is

not helpful to the trier of fact. The court agrees that mere length of prosecution is not sufficient

alone to support a finding of prosecution laches. Symbol Techs., 422 F.3d at 1385 (noting that "there

are no strict time limitations" on prosecution laches). However, the length of prosecution, especially

compared to similar patents, is relevant to the inquiry. Id. at 1386; Reiffin, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 

Accordingly, Rambus' argument that "there is no causal link between the proffered expert testimony

. . . and the issue for which it is offered" is not persuasive.

Rambus next identifies a variety of errors or biases in Prof. Wagner's method of constructing

his data set on prosecution pendency. These alleged errors go to the weight of Prof. Wagner's

testimony, but are not so egregious as to render his testimony wholly unreliable. The court also

notes that Prof. Wagner's testimony will presumably be presented to the bench, not a jury, because

prosecution laches is an equitable defense.

Although a close call, for similar reasons, the court does not see the need to exercise its

"gatekeeper" function with respect to Mr. Mossinghoff's conclusions about the reasonableness of

Rambus' prosecution. As discussed above, prosecution laches is an equitable doctrine that can

encompass a variety of circumstances. Accordingly, Mr. Mossinghoff's conclusions are not based

on "markedly incorrect law." Furthermore, the court will not be prejudiced, nor have its "province

invaded" if Mr. Mossinghoff's testimony touches on the substance of the patent law and prosecution

laches in pointing out areas of delay.

On the whole, the court believes Wagner and Mossinghoff's testimony to be marginally

probative, though it may be of some help to the court. Regarding Mr. Mossinghoff's report, the

court will only hear testimony dealing with procedural aspects of prosecution history, and not his

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 10

opinion on whether any delay was unreasonable. With those limits, Rambus' motion to exclude the

testimony of Prof. R. Polk Wagner and Gerald Mossinghoff is denied.

II. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Rambus's motion for summary judgment on

prosecution laches, except as to the Ware patents-in-suit. The court denies Rambus's motion in

limine to exclude the testimony of Gerald Mossinghoff and R. Polk Wagner.

DATED: 11/26/07 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING RAMBUS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 6 ON PROSECUTION LACHES AND DENYING

RAMBUS' MOTION IN LIMINE No. 3 —C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com 

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com 

Brian K. Erickson berickson@dbllp.com, 

David C. Vondle dvondle@akingump.com 

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com 

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke luedtkech@mto.com 

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com 

Burton Alexander Gross burton.gross@mto.com, 

Steven McCall Perry steven.perry@mto.com

Jeannine Y. Sano sanoj@howrey.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com 

David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com 

Edward R. Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Kenneth L. Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com 

Geoffrey H. Yost gyost@thelenreid.com 

Susan Gregory van Keulen svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com 

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com 

Kai Tseng hlee@orrick.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered

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Dated: 11/26/07 TSF 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 572 Filed 11/26/07 Page 11 of 11