Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02066/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVELL WILLIAMS,

CDCR #AD5315,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DONALD TRUMP; ANGELINA JOLIE; 

HULK HOGAN,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02066-MMA-JLB

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2] 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Travell Williams (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action. See Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff 

has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence a civil action pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the 

plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be granted leave to proceed IFP, but he 

nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 

847 (9th Cir. 2002). A “prisoner” is defined as “any person” who at the time of filing is 

“incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).

In order to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 

104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must 

also submit a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional 

equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an 

initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six 

months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, 

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); 

see Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

While Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), 

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District 

Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative 

fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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he has not attached a certified copy of his prison trust account statements for the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly requires that prisoners “seeking to bring 

a civil action ... without prepayment of fees ... shall submit a certified copy of the trust 

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis 

added). Without Plaintiff’s trust account statements, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is incomplete 

and must be DENIED because the Court is unable to assess the appropriate amount of 

the initial filing fee statutorily required to initiate the prosecution of this action. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

SCREENING OF COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

In addition, while the Court would ordinarily grant Plaintiff leave to correct his IFP

Motion’s deficiencies, it instead finds it appropriate to screen his Complaint pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A because at the time of filing Plaintiff was, and remains, “incarcerated 

or detained in any facility [because he] is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of 

Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 

Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 

practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 

Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)). The 

mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee 

status, who bring suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “‘On review, the court shall ... 

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,’ if it ‘(1) is frivolous, malicious, 

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous 

or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 

F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 

F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

A pleading is factually frivolous if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the 

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts 

available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). Section 

1915 gives courts “the unusual power to pierce the veil” of a Complaint like Plaintiff’s 

and to “dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). Clearly baseless factual allegations include those 

“that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting 

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328).

Plaintiff invokes no arguable legal basis for his suit. What is more, his factual 

allegations are plainly frivolous. See id.; see also O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 

(9th Cir. 1990) (“An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if it has ‘no arguable basis 

in fact or law.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff names 

Defendants Donald Trump, Angelina Jolie, and Hulk Hogan and claims these Defendants 

have told Plaintiff to commit suicide “for years.” Compl. at 3-4. 

While conclusory, disjointed, and incoherent, these allegations also appear 

grounded in delusion, are facially irrational, and wholly incredible. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint demands sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Denton, 504 U.S. at 25-26; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324; see also Suess v. Obama, No. CV 

17-01184-JAK (DTB), 2017 WL 1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (dismissing as 

frivolous complaint alleging conspiracy among President, CIA, and FBI to torment 

plaintiff over six year period.)

If a Plaintiff’s claims are classified as frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to 

the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 

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F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2];

2) DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and 

to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2018

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