Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02235/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The Honorable Boyd T. Johnson presided over Petitioner’s trial in the Superior Court

of Arizona, Pinal County. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Matthewson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-2235-PHX-NVW (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1) Respondents filed an

Answer, doc. 14, to which Petitioner has replied, doc. 15. An evidentiary hearing is not

warranted in this case. See Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (holding

that, when a petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts are

restricted to the state court record when deciding claims previously adjudicated on the merits

by the state courts.). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Facts, Trial and Sentencing

The following incident gave rise to Petitioner’s challenged conviction.1

 On the

morning of April 6, 2007, Petitioner and several friends drove from Tucson to Saguaro Lake

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2 Citations to “Respondents’ Exh. __” are to exhibits attached to Respondents’ Answer,

doc. 14. The Court cites the page numbers as they appear in each individual exhibit. 

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to go boating. (Doc. 14 at 2; Respondents’ Exh. M at 342) Petitioner towed his boat behind

his car. (Doc. 14 at 2) On the way to lake, Petitioner’s friends bought wine coolers and beer.

(Respondents’ Exh. O at 35) He testified that he drank about five cans of beer and two

alcoholic Jello shots while on the lake and after returning to the boat launch. (Respondents’

Exh. O at 36-40) “[P]retty quick[ly] after” drinking the Jello shots, Petitioner began driving

back to Tucson. (Id. at 40) He testified that he never felt “buzzed or drunk.” (Id. at 41)

On the drive back to Tucson, Petitioner and his passengers stopped once to eat and

another time to use the restroom. (Id. at 41-42) After the second stop, Petitioner did not stop

again before the accident that killed John Gaylord. (Respondents’ O at 42-43)

That same day, at about 3:45 in the afternoon, Richard Husk and John Gaylord

began traveling south from Chandler on their motorcycles to go out to eat. (Respondents’ Exh.

M at 11-12) Husk had one beer at approximately noon, and testified that he did not consume

any other alcohol that day. (Id. at 13-14) Husk also testified that, to the best of his knowledge,

Gaylord did not consume any alcohol that day. (Id.) After eating dinner, Husk and Gaylord

headed back to Chandler on their motorcycles. (Id. at 13) They left the restaurant at dusk. (Id.)

At trial, Husk testified that he and Gaylord stayed in the same formation while riding

their motorcycles. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 13-15)

Q. Did you guys have a plan for your ride in terms of how you were

going to ride?

A. Yes. We had set that time out in prior rides and re-established it

prior to this ride. . . . He was going to ride behind me, and we

were going to slow down if cars came up behind us in order to

allow them to pass more safely and pass both motorcycles at one

time as we were riding staggered approximately two car lengths

apart.

Q. Which side of the road were you riding on?

A. I was riding on the right side of the road where the passenger

side of a car tire would be.

Q. And which side was [Gaylord] on?

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A. He was on the left side of the northbound lane where the driver

side tire would be.

Q. And was that the pattern you rode the entire way?

A. Both directions, yes.

(Id. at 13-14)

Petitioner gave a different version of the incident:

Q. Well, I’m just going to ask you to describe in as much detail as

you can just from the first time that you noticed something in the

roadway or somebody coming towards you and just walk us

through what happened and what you saw.

A. I remember driving down the right side of the road . . . . I saw

two headlights coming my direction, I thought it was a car that

I had seen pass by. Then two headlights split and one came in

my lane. . . . I just yanked the wheel . . . . The next thing I know,

we were upside down and I was yelling at everybody in the car

if they were okay.

(Respondents’ Exh. O at 43)

A witness, an off-duty police officer William Tatlock, also gave an account of the

events that differed from Husk’s testimony. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 167) Tatlock testified

that he followed the motorcycles for a mile or two before passing them. (Respondents’ Exh.

N at 176) He testified that when he passed them, the orange (Gaylord’s) motorcycle was in the

lead and the black (Husk’s) motorcycle was behind. (Id. at 170) After passing the motorcycles,

Tatlock pulled into a rest area. (Id. at 171) He heard, but did not see, the accident. (Id.)

Petitioner’s boat struck and killed John Gaylord. (Doc. 1 at 3; Respondents’ Exhs. M at 160)

At approximately 8:22 that evening, Officer Vernon Havens of the Arizona Department of

Public Safety responded to a call regarding a car versus motorcycle collision. (Respondents’

Exh. M at 157) Officer Havens arrived at the scene at approximately 8:45. (Id. at 158)

Petitioner told Officer Havens he was driving the car that was involved in the accident. (Id. at

161-62) Officer Havens secured the scene and returned to speak with Petitioner, but this time

Officer Havens “detected a very faint odor of intoxicating liquor emitting from [Petitioner’s]

breath.” (Id. at 167) Officer Havens asked Petitioner if he had consumed any alcohol that day,

and Petitioner replied that he had but that he did not feel any effects of the alcohol. (Id. at 167-

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3 Horizontal gaze nystagmus is the involuntary jerking of eyes, which can be a sign of

ingestion of alcohol or drugs. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 169)

4 Officer Havens testified that four cues or more mean there is approximately an 80

percent chance that the person is over the .08 legal limit for alcohol. (Respondents’ Exh. M at

177) Officer Havens has a 93 percent accuracy rating regarding HGN tests, meaning his

conclusion from an HGN test of whether a subject is over the legal alcohol limit is correct 93

percent of the time. (Id. at 178-79)

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168) After Petitioner consented, Officer Havens administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus

(HGN) test3

 and observed two clues of HGN.4 (Respondents’ Exh. M at 169-76) After

administering the HGN test, Officer Havens conducted a non-evidentiary breath test that

showed the presence of alcohol. (Id. at 180) With Petitioner’s consent, Officer Havens also

took blood samples at 9:43 p.m., 11:25 p.m., and 12:20 a.m. (Id. at 180-184, 190) The blood

was analyzed and returned a blood alcohol concentration of .088 for the 9:43 p.m. sample,

Respondents’ Exh. S at 6, .037 for the 11:25 p.m. sample, id. at 10, and .022 for the 12:20 a.m.

sample, id. at 10-11.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was indicted on one count of dangerous

manslaughter, a class 2 felony; one count of criminal damage, a class four felony; three counts

of endangerment, class 6 felonies; and two counts of misdemeanor driving under the influence

(“DUI”). (Respondents’ Exh. A) Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him

of the lesser included crime of negligent homicide, dangerous nature (Count 1); and two counts

of DUI, finding that Petitioner was impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration

above .08 (Counts 6 and 7). (Respondents’ Exh. B at 2; Exh. C) The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to a mitigated term of five years’ imprisonment for the negligent homicide, suspended

the imposition of sentence on the remaining offenses, and imposed a three-year term of

supervised probation to begin after his release from prison. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 2)

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court

improperly admitted evidence of the blood test results. (Respondents’ Exh. A, doc. 14-1) On

April 30, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected that argument and affirmed Petitioner’s

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convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. B) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Id.)

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On May 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. C, doc. 14-1) On July 22, 2009, Petitioner, through

counsel, filed his petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. D, doc. 14-1)

Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that trial counsel “[g]enerally failed

to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (Id.at 2) Specifically, Petitioner

argued that counsel (1) “failed to challenge the core of the State’s case, i.e.[,] a blood alcohol

reading barely above the legal presumption when in fact all the other evidence strongly

suggested the [Petitioner] was below the presumption of intoxication or even presumed not to

be intoxicated;” (2) “[d]id not present his own expert whose testimony could have made a

significant case to the jury that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the [Petitioner] was

intoxicated;” (3) “[f]ailed to submit a theory of defense instruction concerning supervening and

intervening cause which instruction was justified by the evidence;” and (4) “[f]ailed to object

to the State’s video reenactment of the accident and failed to object to the State’s animations

which were unfair and inaccurate representations of the event in question.” (Id. at 2-3) The trial

court denied relief on November 5, 2009, finding that while Petitioner “did not receive a

‘perfect’ trial, he did receive a fair trial.” (Respondents’ Exh. F) The court further found that

“no single issue . . . nor all the issues in conjunction, could lead [the] Court to find that

Defendant’s trial counsel was so ineffective as to mandate setting aside the jury’s verdict, the

convictions, and ordering a new trial.” (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied

relief on April 8, 2010. (Respondents’ Exhs. G, H) On May 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on September 7, 2010.

(Respondents’ Exhs. I, J).

/ / /

/ / /

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5

 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely in accordance with the applicable oneyear statute of limitations. (Doc. 14 at 4); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). The record supports

Respondents’ conclusion that the Petition is timely. 

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D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On October 19, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely5

 Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, raising the following four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1)

failure to present expert testimony to challenge the blood-test evidence; (2) failure to request

a theory of defense instruction regarding causation; (3) failure to ask questions concerning the

correlation between the HGN test and a blood alcohol reading in a pretrial interview; and (4)

failure to ask an eyewitness about the positioning of the motorcycles in a pretrial interview.

(Doc. 1) Respondents concede that Petitioner presented his claims to the State courts and that

they are properly before this Court on habeas corpus review. (Doc. 14) 

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s review of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the applicable standard

of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role

in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure

that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in § 2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.”

Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S., ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of

imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court

proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is

a ‘guard against extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for

ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332

n. 5 (1979)).

If an habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings,” federal habeas relief is not available unless it is shown that the state

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court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the

United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Green v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 2011 WL 5335411, at

* 3 (Nov. 8, 2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (or that it “involved an

unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 785; see also Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). This is a

“difficult to meet,” Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 786, and “highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proof. Id. at 25.

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the

Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Green, 2011 WL at * 3;

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866

(2010)). Even if the state court neither explains its ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court

authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to

determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784

(citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). The Supreme Court held in Early, and reaffirmed

in Richter, that citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute

“does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s

burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny relief.

This is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it

found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim’, not a component of one, has been

adjudicated.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

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confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell

v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal

rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Id. at 405; Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect application of federal law does not satisfy this

standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is

available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable.”).

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long

as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule

application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the

rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Id. .

 The Court will consider Petitioner’s claims in view of the foregoing standard. 

However, the Court first notes that an evidentiary hearing is not appropriate in this case. The

Supreme Court recently held “that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was

before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S.

___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (explaining that § 2254(d)(1) “refers, in the past tense, to a

state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an

unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under

review is limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state

court.”) Here, Petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits on post-conviction review.

The state court “identifie[s] the correct governing legal principle,” thus, this Court must assess

whether that decision “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 413. “It would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether

a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts

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not before the state court.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1399. Thus, this Court’s review is limited

to the record that was before the state court. 

III. Analysis

Petitioner presents three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The controlling

Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

petitioner. Id. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient,

counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court

engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised

reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely limited.”

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S.

141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show

prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694;

Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The prejudice

component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result

of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.

364, 372 (1993). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson v. Calderon,

211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The court,

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however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.

Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

 “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). Establishing that a

state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more difficult,

because both standards are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland’s general standard has

a substantial range of reasonable applications. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citations omitted).

The issue under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but “whether there

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

A. Failure to Present Expert Testimony

In Ground One, Petitioner contends that defense counsel, Bradley Roach, was

ineffective for failing to retain an expert to challenge the first blood alcohol reading of .088

when the other evidence strongly suggested that Petitioner was below the presumption of

intoxication. (Doc. 1 at 6) 

Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted this claim in state court.

(Doc. 14 at 6) On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge the “blood alcohol reading barely above the legal

presumption when in fact all of the other evidence strongly suggested the Defendant was below

the presumption of intoxication,” and for failing to present expert testimony regarding the “lack

of impairment.” (Respondents’ Exh. D) The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claims and the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed finding that, “it appears trial counsel chose to challenge the

state’s evidence by, inter alia, establishing during his cross-examination of the state’s expert

that the officer’s detection of only two out of six cues of intoxication under the horizontal gaze

nystagmus test did not correlate with [Petitioner’s] [B]AC of .088. That counsel did not present

his own expert appears to have been neither deficient nor prejudicial.” (Respondents’ Exh. H)

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was the last reasoned decision of the state court. (Id.)

Thus, this Court will review the appellate court’s decision to determine whether its rejection of

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to, or an objectively

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unreasonable application of, Strickland, or whether it was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055. 

Petitioner argues that the initial BAC reading of .088, taken approximately 1.5 hours

after the accident, was inconsistent with later readings that were much lower, indicating that the

first reading was flawed or otherwise contaminated. (Doc. 1 at 3-4) He further argues that

finding only two of six cues on the HGN test was inconsistent with the .088 BAC finding,

further undermining the reliability of the first BAC test. (Id.) Thus, Petitioner argues, expert

testimony was necessary to demonstrate these inconsistencies to the jury. In support of his first

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner cites the affidavit of criminalist Chester

Flaxmeyer which he presented on post-conviction review. (Doc. 1 at 4; Respondents Exh. I at

5-6) Petitioner contends that, had defense counsel retained a qualified expert, such as

Flaxmeyer, he would have presented the following testimony:

(A) HGN validation studies indicate that three or fewer cues are

indicative of passing the HGN test;

(B) depending on which of two HGN validation studies is relied upon,

a finding of only two cues, such as is the case here, is consistent with

[Petitioner]’s blood alcohol being below the presumption of intoxication

level of .08 or even .05;

(C) that based upon the standard elimination rates that are expected from

such a low blood alcohol blood reading, the first blood alcohol reading

of .088 is inconsistent with the two cues found on the HGN test; and

(D) that second and third blood alcohol results .037 and .022 are

consistent with each other and with the two cues found on the HGN test.

(Doc. 1 at 4)

Although Roach did not present a defense expert, he elicited testimony from the

State’s expert regarding these inconsistencies. Officer Havens, who conducted the HGN test,

testified that he “observed two cues of nystagmus,” and that “[f]our cues or more means there’s

about an 80 percent [chance] . . . that person is going to be over the .08 legal limit.”

(Respondent’s Exh. M at 177). On cross-examination, the State’s expert, Michael Sloneker,

testified that he “would be surprised to see only two cues at an [sic] .08 [BAC] level” and that

he “would expect to see four, most likely even six [cues].” (Respondents’ Exh. O at 21)

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 Petitioner argues that his statement “turned a favorable HGN result on its head.”

(Doc. 1 at 5) However, the record does not support this argument. During an interview with

Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel, defense counsel Roach stated that Sloneker’s testimony

“was exactly what he was looking for” and that the State’s expert pointed out the discrepancy

between the HGN results and the first blood test result. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 24) Roach

further explained why he did not retain an expert for the defense:

My experience with juries and experts the defense calls . . .has been

spotty at best . . . I’ve seen lots of cases, this was both as a prosecutor

and a defense attorney, where the defense expert has hurt more than 

helped. It either appeared liked, quote, unquote, a prostitute, an 

intellectual prostitute or . . . helped the State’s case and so I bring in 

experts, but my general rule is if I can prove it by the State’s experts,

I don’t. 

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 9) 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.

1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s

performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance

and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. 

Under Strickland’s deferential standard, although Petitioner’s counsel could have

retained a defense expert to testify regarding the discrepancies between the first blood test and

HGN results, his decision to follow a different strategy - eliciting testimony from the State’s

expert to show that the HGN evidence was inconsistent with the .088 BAC result - was not

objectively deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In deciding not to call a defense expert,

Roach relied upon his experience as a prosecutor and a defense attorney, and determined that

the better approach was to elicit the testimony from the State’s expert. In determining whether

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counsel’s performance was deficient, tactical decisions of trial counsel deserve deference when

counsel makes an informed decision based on strategic trial considerations and the decision

appears reasonable under the circumstances. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.

1994). Here, defense counsel’s strategic decision not to call his own expert did not constitute

ineffective assistance “simply because in retrospect [what might have been a better] tactic [is]

known to have been available.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also United States v. Mayo,

646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[Petitioner’s] allegations amount to nothing more than a

difference of opinion with respect to trial tactics. That alone generally does not constitute a

denial of effective assistance of counsel”). The ultimate decision not to call witnesses at trial

is well within counsel’s “full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois,

 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988) (“Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is

ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision . . . not to put

certain witnesses on the stand. . . . ”). The record reflects that counsel’s decision not to call an

expert witness was a reasonable strategic choice, and Petitioner has not shown that the state

court’s rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance based on the failure to offer expert

testimony was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. 

Having determined that counsel’s performance was not deficient, and that the State

court’s determination on that prong was not an unreasonable application of Strickland, the Court

need not consider Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that

course should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.”). However,

the Court notes that even if counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to present expert

testimony emphasizing the inconsistencies between the .088 BAC and the HGN test, Petitioner

has not carried his heavy burden of showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466

U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). As previously discussed, although defense counsel did not call

his own expert to testify regarding the inconsistencies between the HGN test and the .088 BAC

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result, he elicited such testimony from the State’s expert. Additionally, whether Petitioner “was

under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” was a jury question. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 24)

 The court instructed the jury that:

If there was at that time 0.08 percent or more concentration of alcohol

in the defendant’s blood, it may be presumed that the defendant was under

the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The law further provides that the foregoing provisions shall not be 

construed as limiting the introduction and consideration of any other

competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the

defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 

You are instructed to look at all the facts in this case. These are

rebuttable presumptions; the jury is free to accept or reject those

presumptions as triers of fact. 

(Id.) The evidence presented at trial included the .088 BAC, which allowed the jury to presume

Petitioner was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. However, even without additional

expert testimony that Petitioner argues counsel should have presented, the record contained

evidence which the jury could have relied upon to reject that presumption. Specifically, as

defense counsel emphasized, Petitioner exhibited only two cues on an HGN test which was

administered by Officer Havens, who was HGN-certified and had a 93% accuracy rate

administering the HGN test. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 155, 176, 178-79, Exh. P at 24) Counsel

also emphasized that, other than the faint odor of alcohol, Officers Havens did not notice signs

of impairment in Petitioner. Specifically, Officer Havens testified that he noticed “no slurring

of [Petitioner’s] speech, no swaying, no difficulty walking, no staggering . . . no red, watery,

bloodshot eyes.” (Id. at 24) Officer Havens did not perform any other field sobriety tests on

Petitioner. (Id. at 25) 

In short, Petitioner has not shown that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s [failure to present expert testimony], the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069. The record included evidence indicating

that the .088 BAC reading was inconsistent with finding only 2 cues on the HGN test. Expert

testimony would have been cumulative of the evidence actually presented during trial. Thus,

there is no reasonable probability the jury would have changed its verdict in light of expert

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testimony. The jury was instructed that it could reject the presumption that a .08 more BAC

meant Petitioner was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. As a general rule, it is

presumed that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163

(2006). The jury considered the evidence, and made a determination. Petitioner, understandably,

is unhappy with the way the jury weighed the evidence. However, Petitioner has not shown

there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had defense

counsel presented expert testimony pointing out the inconsistencies between the .088 BAC and

the results of the HGN test because those inconsistencies were already presented through other

testimony. Finally, on the most serious charge - manslaughter - the jury convicted Petitioner

of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide. And, the jury could not reach verdicts on

four other counts. Thus, defense counsel’s strategy was effective and Petitioner has not shown

that the State court’s rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s decision not to call an expert was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Strickland. 

B. Causation Instruction 

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to

request a jury “instruction regarding causation when the evidence justified such an instruction

and the failure to request such an instruction would have constituted a reversible error.” (Doc.

1 at 6) Petitioner presented this claim on post-conviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. D) The

trial court rejected this claim and the appellate court affirmed. Because neither court

specifically discussed the jury-instruction issue, this Court independently reviews the record to

ascertain whether the state court decision was an objectively unreasonable application of

Strickland. Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109.

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to request a jury instruction on supervening cause based on Tatlock’s testimony regarding the

positioning of the motorcycles which supported Petitioner’s contention that a motorcycle

crossed into his lane “causing him to execute an accident avoidance maneuver.” (Doc. 1 at 6)

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At trial, Petitioner testified that he saw a headlight coming towards him in his lane and that he

swerved to avoid the vehicle. (Respondents’ Exh. O at 43) Petitioner argued that he did not

drift off the road, but that he was attempting to avoid an accident. One of the State’s witnesses,

off-duty police officer Tatlock, testified that he observed the motorcycles on the road shortly

before the accident. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 170-71) Tatlock testified that Gaylord’s orange

motorcycle was in front of Husk’s black one, contrary to Husks’ testimony that he was always

in front of Gaylord. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 170-73) Based on this testimony, Petitioner

infers that Husk must have passed Gaylord at some point, and that this was the headlight

Petitioner saw coming toward him and that he attempted to avoid. (Doc. 1 at 9) Petitioner

presented this theory at trial, and now states that “trial counsel’s final argument was essentially

premised on the [fact] that Husk’s conduct caused Petitioner to make a hard right turn to avoid

Husk, and in doing so was unable to regain control of the vehicle which crossed the highway

and collided with Gaylord’s motorcycle[,] causing his death.” (Id. at 10) 

Petitioner admits that defense counsel adequately presented this theory to the jury.

(Respondents’ Exh. P at 12-40) However, he argues that counsel was ineffective for not

requesting a superseding cause instruction. As previously stated, Petitioner was charged with

manslaughter but the jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide.

The trial court instructed the jury that it could not find Petitioner guilty of negligent homicide

unless it found that he caused Gaylord’s death. Specifically, the court instructed the jury that:

The crime of Negligent Homicide requires proof that the defendant, by

criminally negligent conduct, caused the death of another person.

“Criminal negligence” means that the defendant failed to recognize a

substantial risk of causing the death of another person. The risk must be

such that the failure to recognize it is a gross deviation from what a

reasonable person would do in the situation.

(Respondent’s Exh. Q at 18) Thus, the jury could not have found Petitioner guilty of negligent

homicide unless it found that he had “failed to recognize a substantial risk” of causing

Gaylord’s death. Thus, had the jury believed Petitioner’s testimony that he was attempting to

avoid a collision, it is unlikely it would have found Petitioner guilty. Thus, even assuming trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on superseding cause, Petitioner

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has not established prejudice. In other words, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel requested a superseding

cause instruction. 

The State’s accident reconstructionist, Tim Moebus, testified that Petitioner’s

vehicle was “driven straight or drifted off the road. It initially moved right while it’s still on the

road and then counter-steered to the left. . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 40) Moebus also

testified that he saw no “pre-collision, going off the road braking” by Petitioner’s vehicle. (Id.

at 46) Additionally, Sergeant Havens testified that he could not “locate any evasive tire prints”

at the scene to corroborate Petitioner’s statement that “he had taken evasive action to possibly

avoid a vehicle.” (Respondents’ Exh. M at 202) Rather, Havens testified that he saw evidence

that Petitioner made “a very gradual exit” from the roadway, indicating he had drifted to the side

of the road. (Id. at 203) Havens also testified that he saw “what appeared to be left-hand

steering, so the vehicle had drifted off the right-hand side of the roadway, the driver had applied

the brakes to the vehicle and left-hand steering . . . in an attempt to gain the roadway.” (Id.) 

 The jurors heard Moebus’ and Havens’ testimony, and were able to consider for

themselves whether that testimony supported Petitioner’s evasive-action defense. Defense

counsel argued that Petitioner was taking evasive action to avoid an accident, which resulted

in the jury rejecting the most serious charge and, instead, convicting Petitioner of negligent

homicide and a hung jury on the three endangerment counts. The State court’s determination

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a superseding cause instruction was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. 

C. Pretrial Interview - Michael Sloneker/HGN Test

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because, during his

pretrial interview with the State’s criminalist, Michael Sloneker, he did not ask “any questions

concerning the correlation between the HGN test and a blood alcohol reading and thereafter

asking such a question at trial without knowing the answer and getting an answer supporting

the .088 BAC test and impugning the validity of the HGN test.” (Doc. 1 at 7) Petitioner

presented this claim on post-conviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. D) The trial court rejected

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this claim and the appellate court affirmed. Because neither court specifically discussed this

issue, this Court independently reviews the record to ascertain whether the State court decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109.

Even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to conduct a

more thorough pretrial interview of Sloneker, Petitioner has not established prejudice. At trial,

defense counsel asked the State’s expert, “[W]hat would . . . two cues of the six that you’re

looking for in HGN, what, if any, effect or interpretation do you make of that as a criminalist?”

(Respondent’s Exh. O at 20-21) The State’s expert answered that he “would be surprised to

see only two cues at an (sic) .08 level,” and that he “would expect to see four, most likely six.”

(Id. at 21) Petitioner argues that the expert’s answer “hurt the Petitioner immeasurably.” (Doc.

15 at 6) Petitioner contends that if counsel would have asked Sloneker that question during the

pretrial interview, counsel would have been able to establish at trial that the first blood test,

which returned a blood alcohol level over the legal limit, was flawed. (Doc. 15 at 10)

Consequently, Petitioner argues, the jury would not have convicted him.

As Respondents argue, Sloneker’s testimony supported the validity of the HGN teat

and called the .088 BAC finding into question. Sloneker testified that the HGN test is the best

field sobriety test available because “it’s not dependent upon the individual[’s] innate

coordination, it’s something they cannot control.” (Respondents’ Exh. O at 22) During closing

argument, defense counsel referred to Sloneker’s testimony when arguing that the HGN test was

reliable. (Respondents’ Exh. P. at 24-25) 

Petitioner has not shown that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a more

thorough pre-trial interview with Sloneker. During trial, counsel elicited testimony from

Sloneker which indicated that the HGN test is the most reliable field sobriety test, and that a

person with a BAC of .088 would be expected to exhibit more cues on the HGN test, and

Petitioner only exhibited two cues. Thus, even without asking Sloneker about the correlation

between two cues on the HGN test and a BAC reading of .088, counsel was able to elicit

favorable testimony from Sloneker at trial. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not shown

that the state court’s rejection of this claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland.

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D. Pretrial Interview - William Tatlock

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because, during his

pretrial interview of Tatlock, he failed to ask a “basic question [about the] positioning of the

motorcycles . . . and then learn[ed] for the first time at trial[] that [Tatlock’s] observation of the

positioning of the motorcycles totally contradicted the other State’s witness [Husk] which

precluded trial counsel from” cross-examining the State’s key witness on that issue. (Doc. 1 at

7) Tatlock’s testimony regarding the positions of the motorcycles contradicted Husk’s

testimony that he was always in the lead, and gave some support to Petitioner’s claim that he saw

a headlight in his lane and swerved to avoid a collision. Respondent argues that, contrary to

Petitioner’s assertion, Tatlock’s contradictory statements were elicited during his pretrial

interview. 

Husk testified that he was riding his motorcycle “on the right side of the road where

the passenger side of a car tire would be.” (Respondents’ Exh. M at 14) Gaylord, riding an

orange motorcycle, was behind Husk “on the left side of the northbound lane were the driver side

tire would be.” (Id. at 14-15) In other words, Husk testified that he was in front and to the right

of Gaylord. However, during his pretrial interview, Tatlock told defense counsel that the orange

motorcycle [Gaylord] was “on the fog line [on the right side of the lane,]” and that the “outside

vehicle” was a black motorcycle. (Respondents’ Exh. R at 4) Thus, although Tatlock did not

specifically state which motorcycle was in front, he described the positions of the motorcycles,

which contradicted Husk’s testimony. 

Even if counsel was deficient for failing to specifically ask Tatlock during the pretrial

interview which motorcycle was in front, Petitioner was not prejudiced thereby because Tatlock

testified at trial to the positions of the motorcycles. Tatlock testified that:

The two motorcycles, an orange one was on the fog line and the 

black one was near the centerline and they [were] cantered from 

each other, the orange one being the furthest one in the front and

the black one being the furthest one closest to me. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 170) Petitioner argues that, because counsel did not discover this

information during the pretrial interview, he was unable to cross-examine Husk - one of the first

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witnesses at trial - with this information. (Doc. 1 at 12) After Tatlock testified, however,

counsel could have recalled Husk to impeach him with Tatlock’s testimony. Counsel explained

that he chose not to do so, because “Husk [was] a very sympathetic witness.” (Respondents’

Exh. K at 35) Defense counsel explained that:

I thought [Husk] came across as sympathetic . . . [S]o I had . . . two

contradictory statements, both of which can’t be true. I could have 

chosen to call him back and say isn’t it true that it was the other way

and he would have said no. Isn’t it true that this guy said it was the 

other way and he would have said, no. I didn’t see any utility in doing

that.

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 35) Thus, for strategic reasons, counsel chose not to impeach Husk

with Tatlock’s testimony. There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A showing that

counsel could have done more or better does not meet the burden of showing that the State

court’s decision was unreasonable. See Valdez, 770 P.2d at 319 (stating “[d]efendants are not

guaranteed perfect counsel, only competent counsel”). Indeed, Petitioner admits that the “two

examples of trial counsel’s less than minimal competence [during the pretrial interviews], would

not, in and of themselves, justify the granting of a Habeas petition.” (Doc. 1 at 13) 

Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show that the cumulative effect of counsel’s alleged

deficient performance entitles him to habeas corpus relief. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628, 654 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider whether cumulative error violated defendant’s

constitutional rights because defendant did “not demonstrate[] prejudice as to the individual

claims.”). In summary, Petitioner has failed to show that the State court’s rejection of this claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel was an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly,

he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

IV. Conclusion

 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because

he has not met his burden of establishing that the State courts unreasonably applied Strickland.

Accordingly,

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc.

1, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties

shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2011.

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