Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06507/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06507-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE HOOD III, CASE NO. CV-F-04-6507 AWI LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 

vs.

FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Leslie Hood III (“plaintiff”) has been incarcerated and proceeds pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983"). Plaintiff proceeds with a

form complaint (“complaint”) to name as defendants the Fresno Police Department, Fresno Police

Officer Rivera and Fresno Police Officer Cooper. The complaint alleges that during a September 11,

2004 traffic stop and search, plaintiff was arrested for narcotics violations, and $19,000 and drugs were

confiscated. The complaint notes that the $19,000 was not placed in plaintiff’s prison trust account at

the Fresno County jail. For relief, the complaint asks “the Courts to clear this matter with the Fresno

Police Departmen (sic) and place my money on record or return money to me.”

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DISCUSSION

Standards For Screening

This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This Court

must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, which “is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). Moreover, “[a] trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot

possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see Wong v.

Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1981). Sua sponte dismissal may be made before process is served

on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss

frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte prior to service of process on defendants). 

Since plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, this Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may

have been paid, shall dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2005) Attacking the Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-65. A court

need not accept as true factual allegations in in forma pauperis complaints and may reject “completely

baseless” allegations, including those which are “fanciful,” “fantastic” or “delusional.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 325; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-1228. A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where

it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to “determine the . . . good

faith of the applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v.

Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is found most commonly in

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repetitive suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity

of suits. A complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process

by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1981); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629

(N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to

dismiss a case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of judicial process”). A lack of good faith or malice

also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements

made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984).

A complaint, or portion thereof, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294

(9th Cir. 1981). “[W]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of

any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).

As further explained below, the complaint demonstrates plaintiff is entitled to offer no evidence

for its vague, unsupportable claims.

The Complaint’s General Deficiencies

F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall

contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction

depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.

. . .

(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 

(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.

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A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v. United States

Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, “[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these elements exist.”

Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. ACB Business

Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6th Cir. 1998).

Despite the flexible pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must

give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev.

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

particularity overt facts which defendant engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.

Here, the complaint fails to comply with F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), to provide fair notice of claims against

defendants, and to demonstrate plaintiff is entitled to relief as to each defendant. The complaint fails

to set forth specific acts, omissions or wrongs by defendant. The complaint fails to allege with any

degree of particularity specific overt acts of defendants and in turn, resulting damages from defendants’

overt acts. The complaint fails to seek specific relief which this Court is able to award. The complaint

makes vague references to confiscation of property. Because the complaint fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2) requirements, it must be dismissed. 

The Complaint’s Section 1983 Deficiencies

The Civil Rights Act, under which this action was filed, provides:

Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendants deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The complaint fails to state colorable claims (or any claims

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for that matter) against defendants in that it makes vague allegations regarding plaintiff’s encounter with

defendants and seizure of property. The complaint articulates no deprivation of a right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of defendant

and deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[a] person

‘subjects’ another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). The complaint fails to satisfy the linking requirement as to defendants and to

articulate how defendants deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights and resulting harm. This Court

advises plaintiff of the specific need to satisfy the linking requirement.

Deficient Property Claims

As to deprivation of property claims, the complaint fails to allege facts that defendants’ conduct

resulted in loss of property. The complaint is unclear whether the alleged property losses were

intentional, negligent, authorized, or unauthorized. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 U.S. 3194

(1984), a Virginia prisoner brought a section 1983 action against a prison officer who allegedly

intentionally destroyed the plaintiff prisoner’s personal property during a search. The United States

Supreme Court held the plaintiff prisoner was not entitled to relief:

If negligent deprivations of property do not violate the Due Process Clause

because predeprivation process is impracticable, it follows that intentional deprivations

do not violate that Clause provided, of course, that adequate state postdeprivation

remedies are available. Accordingly, we hold that an unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the

procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a

meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for

negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete

until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531, 104 S.Ct. 3194.

Where a state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional

deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is

one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773

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F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.

1987). Authorized deprivations of property are permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that

is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).

The California Government Tort Claims Act, Government Code section 900, et seq., provides

process for plaintiff to redress claims for alleged loss or destruction of property. Although events as

alleged in the complaint are unclear, it appears plaintiff’s claims a better suited under California Tort

Claims Act procedures. In addition, the complaint notes there was a passenger in plaintiff’s car to infer

the confiscated money may be held as evidence in connection with criminal charges against the

passenger and/or plaintiff.

Deficiencies In Claims Against Fresno Police Department

The complaint appears to name the Fresno Police Department as a defendant but asserts no

claims against it. This Court advices plaintiff that a local government unit may not be held liable for the

acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Davis

v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991);

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). Because liability of a local

governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond

the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate the alleged constitutional violation was the product of

a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385,

109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

A “rule or regulation promulgated, adopted, or ratified by a local governmental entity’s

legislative body unquestionably satisfies Monell’s policy requirements.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443.

Official policy may derive from “a decision properly made by a local governmental entity’s authorized

decisionmaker – i.e., an official who ‘possesses final authority to establish [local government] policy

with respect to the [challenged] action.’” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at

481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299 (plurality opinion)). “Only if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from a

‘permanent and well-settled’ practice may liability attach for injury resulting from a local government

custom.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444.

“[O]fficial policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish

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the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct.

445 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018); see Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-377, 96 S.Ct.

598 (general allegation of administrative negligence fails to state a constitutional claim cognizable under

section 1983).

The complaint lacks allegations of a policy or custom and resulting constitutional violation to

set forth a Monell claim. In such absence, a claim against the Fresno Police Department is dismissed.

Malice

This Court is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and

attempts to take advantage of cost-free filing to vex defendants. Such attempt provides further grounds

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

Attempt At Amendment

Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to attempt to amend his complaint to cure deficiencies.

Plaintiff is further admonished that this Court’s Local Rule 15-220 requires an amended complaint to

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). After the filing

of an amended complaint, the original pleadings serves no further function. Thus, in an amended

complaint, each claim and involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint and GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend;

2. ORDERS plaintiff, no later than October 18, 2005, to file an amended complaint; 

3. Admonishes plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with

this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss this action for failure to obey

a court order; and 

4. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to serve a copy of this order on plaintiff at his new address

of P.O. Box 872, Fresno, CA 93712.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

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66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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