Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02074/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

---

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

MICHAEL LACKEY and KALIN LACKEY, )

husband and wife, )

) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

)

DISNEY VACATION DEVELOPMENT, INC., )

et al., )

) No. 2:13-cv-2074-HRH

 Defendants. )

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment.1 This motion is opposed.2 Oral argument 

was requested and has been heard. 

Facts

Plaintiffs are Michael and Kalin Lackey. Defendants are Disney Vacation

Development, Inc. and Disney Vacation Club Hawaii Management Company, LLC.

1Docket No. 67. 

2Docket No. 74. 

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 1 of 15
On October 15, 2011, plaintiffs flew from Arizona to Portland, Oregon, where they

stayed overnight at the Ramada Airport Hotel. The next day, on October 16, 2011,

plaintiffs flew to Honolulu, Hawaii. Upon arrival in Honolulu, plaintiffs checked in to the

Aulani, a Disney Resort and Spa, which had opened on August 29, 2011. 

Plaintiffs stayed at the Aulaniuntil October 21, 2011. While there, plaintiffs changed

rooms three different times because, as Mrs. Lackey explained, the Aulani “didn’t have

openings continually in one room, so we had to switch to whatever they had available to

fit our schedule.”3 Each time plaintiffs switched rooms, they packed their own bags and

handed them to the bellman for transfer to their new room.4 Plaintiffs never saw a spider

or any other bugs in any of the rooms in which they stayed.5 During their visit, plaintiffs

spent time off the Aulani property.

On the morning of their departure, Mr. Lackey noticed a small red mark on his right

middle finger, which felt like it was tingling. Plaintiffs thought it looked like a bug bite. 

Plaintiffs did not mention the mark to any employee of the Aulani. 

3Deposition of Kalin Lackey at 9:6-24, Exhibit 1, Defendants’ Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. 

4Plaintiffs contend that their bags were placed in an outdoor storage area during the

transfers, but plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support this contention. 

5

In fact, plaintiffs do not recall seeing a spider anywhere on the Aulani property. 

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On October 21, 2011, plaintiffs stayed overnight in Portland, Oregon and then flew

home to Phoenix on October 22, 2011. Over the next two days, Mr. Lackey’s finger began

to swell and became redder. On Monday, October 24, 2011, Mr. Lackey saw his primary

care provider, Dr. Deb Grischo. Mr. Lackey testified that Dr. Grischo told him that he had

“some kind of a bite, it could be a possible infection. She took a culture of it and put me on

some antibiotics.”6 The lab culture revealed that Mr. Lackey had a Staphylococcus aureus

infection.

Over the course of the week, Mr. Lackey’s finger worsened and on Friday, October

28, 2011, he went to the emergency room. He was transferred to a different hospital, where

Dr.Reece, ahand surgeon, performed surgery (radical debridement) to remove the infected

tissue from Mr. Lackey’s finger. Due to an infection that developed, Dr. Reese performed

a second “radical debridement of tissue that almost resulted in the loss of [Mr. Lackey’s]

right middle finger.”7 Dr. Reece opined that Mr. Lackey’s wound was “consistent with

what I’ve seen from brown recluse spider bites.”8 Dr. Reese also opined that Mr. Lackey’s

6Deposition of Michael Lackey at 27:15-17, Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs’ Response to

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

7March 15, 2013 Letter from Dr. Reece to Sal J. Riveria at 1, Exhibit 2, Plaintiffs’

Response to Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74.

8Deposition of Edward M.Reece, M.D., at 17:20-22, Exhibit 9, Defendants’ Amended

Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. Plaintiffs now contend that Mr. Lackey

was bitten by a brown violin spider (also called the Mediterranean recluse spider), rather

(continued...)

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 3 of 15
“Staph aureus infection ... was consistent with a spider bite as 90 percent of spider bites will

have a Staph aureus type contamination in their jaws.”9

 

On August 28, 2013, plaintiffs commenced this action in state court. The action was

subsequently removed to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In their amended

complaint, plaintiffs assert a claimof negligence-premises liability, and Mrs. Lackey asserts

a loss of consortium claim. Plaintiffs allege that defendants owed them a duty to ensure

that the areas they occupied at the Aulaniwere free of dangerous spiders.10 Plaintiffs allege

that defendants breached this duty of care by, among other things, failing to inform them

of this dangerous condition, by failing to keep the premises free of dangerous spiders, and

by failing to have an adequate pest control program. 

8

(...continued)

than a brown recluse spider. Although neither of these spiders are native to Hawaii, the

Mediterranean recluse spider is “present” in Hawaii. Deposition of Richard S. Vetter

(defendants’ spider expert) at 19:1-2, Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. Vetter testified that it is “safe

to say that ... both of these spiders are medically important and I would not be surprised

if the Mediterranean recluse was similar to the brown recluse in its venom capacity.” Id.

at 19:19-22. 

9May 15, 2013 letter from Dr. Reece to Sal J. Riveria at 1, Exhibit 2, Plaintiffs’

Response to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

10

First Amended Complaint at 4, ¶ 27, Docket No. 14. 

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 4 of 15
The Aulani’s pest control program includes quarterly treatment of guestrooms for

pests, including spiders.11 Tanya Peak Smith, referred to by plaintiffs as defendants’

internal pest control expert, acknowledged that this suggested that defendants “had an

understanding that there could be venomous and nonvenomous spiders in guest

rooms[.]”12 The guestrooms at the Aulani were treated on August 9 and August 23, 2011.13

The grounds of the Aulani are treated on a monthly basis for pests that may invade

the indoors, including spiders.14 Peak Smith testified that she has “seen spiders on the

Aulani property[.]”15She testified that she saw “[g]arden spiders”, which are spiders that

“mostly live outside. They build big elaborate webs, catch insects.”16 Peak Smith testified

that garden spiders are the only type of spider she has ever seen on the Aulani property

and that unless “they were like on every single bush or something”, no particulartreatment

11Exhibit A to Ecolab Service Agreement, Exhibit 4 at DVD-LACKEY000044-45,

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. 

12Deposition of Tanya Peak Smith at 37:13-21, Exhibit 4, Plaintiffs’ Response to

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

13Ecolab Invoices, Exhibit 5, Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment,

Docket No. 67. 

14Exhibit A to Ecolab Service Agreement, Exhibit 4 at DVD-LACKEY000044-45,

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. 

15Peak Smith Deposition at 10:2-4, Exhibit 4, Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

16

Id. at 10:5-9. 

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would be done.17

She testified that “one or two, which is all that I ever saw, you know, is

not enough to do anything.”18 Peak Smith also testified that she had “read some papers”

about reports of the Mediterranean recluse spider being present in Hawaii but had “never

seen one or heard a complaint of one[.]”19

Housekeepers at the Aulani are trained to look for and report any pest activity they

might observe in a guestroom.20 Peak Smith was asked how one “inspects” for brown or

Mediterranean recluse spiders and she replied that “I guess it’s not something I think that

you would do in areas where they’re not, you know, common or not known, or if you

didn’t have a reason to inspect. Usually someone would see something and that would

cause you to look further.”21She also testified that the pest control training that was

provided to housekeeping “was primarily bed bug training” and that housekeepers were

not taught specifically about spiders.

22 Peak Smith testified that spiders, including

venomous spiders, can be brought into a room by a guest or might come in with the

17

Id. at 10:13-14 & 26:9-16. 

18

Id. at 26:15-16. 

19

Id. at 16:1-8. 

20Telephonic Deposition of Arlene Kalani at 15:23-16:9, Exhibit 6, Defendants’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. 

21Peak Smith Deposition at 26:23-27:5, Exhibit 4, Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

22

Id. at 17:17-21. 

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 6 of 15
furniture and that she had no idea if there was a “comprehensive inspection of the

furniture in the guest rooms before the Aulani was opened to the public[.]”23

She also

testified that it is possible that spiders could enter a room from the outside by using trees

or shrubs that are next to the building.24 Defendants’ retained expert agreed that it was

“possible” that spiders could be brought into a guestroom via luggage or furniture.25

Guest complaints about pests are noted in the Aulani’s maintenance database called

“Maximo.”26 There were no reports of a spider in a guestroom from August 29, 2011

through October 23, 2011.27

Defendants now move for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence claim. If

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence claim, then

defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Mrs. Lackey’s loss of consortium

claim because “a loss of consortium is a derivative claim” and “all elements of the

underlying cause must be proven before the claim can exist.” Barnes v. Outlaw, 964 P.2d

484, 487 (Ariz. 1998). 

23

Id. at 40:3-13. 

24

Id. at 55:8-17. 

25Deposition of Richard S. Vetter at 24:5-26:17, Exhibit 5, Plaintiffs’ Response to

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 74. 

26Telephonic Deposition of Ken Poynter at 19:24-20:17, Exhibit 2, Defendants’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67. 

27Exhibit 7, Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 67.

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Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

initial burden is on the moving party to show that there is an absence of genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets

its initial burden,thenthe non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In

deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence of the non-movant

in the light most favorable to that party, and all justifiable inferences are also to be drawn

in its favor. Id. at 255. “[T]he court’s ultimate inquiry is to determine whetherthe ‘specific

facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background or

contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its

favor based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In orderto prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a duty requiring

the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) the defendant's breach of that

duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and

(4) actual damages.” McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 293 P.3d 520, 528 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2013). “Generally, a business owner ‘is not [the] insurer of [guests’] safety and is not

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 8 of 15
required at his peril to keep the premises absolutely safe.’” Id. (quoting Burke v. Ariz.

Biltmore Hotel, Inc., 467 P.2d 781, 783 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970)); see also, Preuss v. Sambo’s of

Ariz., Inc., 635 P.2d 1210, 1211 (Ariz. 1981)). “However, ‘a possessor of land is under an

affirmative duty to use reasonable care to make the premises safe for use by invitees.’”

McMurtry, 293 P.3d at 528 (quoting Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz.

1985)). “The standard of reasonable care generally includes an obligation to discover and

correct or warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions that the possessor of the premises

should reasonably foresee might endanger an invitee.” Id. “Generally, ‘where reasonable

people could differ as to whether the danger of some injury is foreseeable, the question of

negligence is one of fact for a jury to decide.’” Id. at 529 (quoting Markowitz, 706 P.2d at

369–70). “To establish a proprietor’s liability for injuries arising from a dangerous

condition of the premises, an invitee must prove either that the dangerous condition was

caused or permitted to develop by persons for whom the proprietor was responsible orthat

the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of its existence.” McDonald v.

Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 757 P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). see also, Andrews v.

Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., 770 P.2d 397, 399 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“The plaintiff must prove

that the proprietor created the dangerous condition resulting in the fall, or that the

proprietor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.”). 

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Case 2:13-cv-02074-HRH Document 79 Filed 04/01/15 Page 9 of 15
There is no dispute that defendants did not create the dangerous condition at issue

here. The dispute here focuses on whether defendant had actual or constructive notice of

the dangerous condition at issue.

Plaintiffs argue that there are questions of fact as to whether defendants had actual

notice of the presence of venomous spiders in the Aulani guestrooms. Plaintiffs contend

that the evidence shows that defendants knew there were brown recluse and Mediterranean recluse spiders in Hawaii and that defendants knew there were spiders on the Aulani

property. From these facts, plaintiffs argue that a reasonable jury could conclude that

defendants knew that venomous spiders could be in the guestrooms and that defendants’

response to this known danger was insufficient. 

“The [actual] notice requirement ... is only satisfied if the proprietor has notice of the

specific dangerous condition itself and not merely if the proprietor has general notice of

conditions producing the dangerous condition.” Chiara v. Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc.,

733 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987). Peak Smith’s testimony that she knew that Mediterranean

recluse spiders were present in Hawaii and that she saw a couple nonvenomous spiders

on the Aulani property at best suggests general notice. The same is true of her testimony

that because defendants had a pest control program, they understood that there could be

spiders, either venomous or nonvenomous, in the guestrooms of the Aulani. This

testimony suggests general notice, but it does not suggest that defendants had actual notice

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of the specific dangerous condition, namely the presence of venomous spiders in

guestrooms at the Aulani. Viewing Smith Peak’s testimony in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that defendants had actual

notice.

As for constructive notice, “[o]ne of the most important questions that must be

answered ... is the length of time that a given [condition] has been present.” Walker v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 511 P.2d 699, 702 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). Even assuming that

there was a venomous spider in plaintiffs’ room, plaintiffs have offered no evidence as to

how long that spider was there. Plaintiffs have also not offered any evidence that suggests

that there was an extensive problem with venomous spiders at the Aulani, either in its

guestrooms or on its grounds. The only evidence of any spiders being on the Aulani

property is Peak Smith’s testimony that she saw a couple of garden spiders on the grounds.

That testimony is not sufficient to suggest that defendants had constructive notice of a

venomous spider in plaintiffs’ room. 

This case is similar to Rodgers v. La Quinta Motor Inn, 873 S.W.2d 551 (Ark. 1994). 

There, while Rodgers was a guest at the defendant’s motel, she “felt pain in her lower leg. 

Rodgers was treated and later underwent surgery for her injury which she was told was

probably due to a bite from a brown recluse spider. No spider was everfound.” Id. at 551. 

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The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the Arkansas

Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that 

Rodgers failed to present evidence that La Quinta knew the

brown recluse spider was prevalent in the area where the

motor inn is located, and that La Quinta or its employees had

ever seen a brown recluse spider on the premises. Further,

Rodgers failed to show that either she or La Quinta employees

ever saw the spider that bit her. In addition, ... Rodgers was

unable to show that the spider which bit her was in her motel

room as the result of La Quinta’s negligence or whether it was

brought into the room by her. 

Id. at 552. Similarly here, plaintiffs have offered no evidence that venomous spiders were

prevalent in the area where the Aulani was located; they have offered no evidence that any

employee of defendants ever saw a venomous spider on the premises; and they have

offered no evidence that anyone saw the spider that bit Mr. Lackey. 

Plaintiffs suggest that defendants’ knowledge that it was possible that venomous

spiders could be in guestrooms somehow required defendants to properly inspect

guestrooms for such spiders, which, plaintiffs contend, defendants failed to do. See Piccola

ex rel. Piccola v. Woodall, 921 P.2d 710, 714 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Cummings v.

Prater, 386 P.2d 27, 31 (Ariz. 1963)) (“Actual knowledge of the dangerous condition is not

required. The duty to inspect arises when the landlord ‘has reason to suspect’ a defect.”). 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Piccola is, however, misplaced because that case involved landlordtenant liability, not premises liability. In order for defendants to be liable under a

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constructive notice theory of premises liability, plaintiffs must have some evidence that the

dangerous condition at issue here, the presence of venomous spiders in the Aulani’s

guestrooms, existed for a sufficient length of time that defendants, in the exercise of

reasonable care, should have known about it and taken appropriate action. Plaintiffs have

offered no such evidence. In order to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

constructive notice, plaintiffs had to offer some evidence that venomous spiders were a

regular problem on the grounds of the Aulani or evidence that venomous spiders had

previously been found in Aulani guestrooms. There is no evidence that anyone has ever

seen a venomous spider on the grounds or in the guestrooms of the Aulani and there is no

evidence that venomous spiders were prevalent in the area. There may be little doubt that

Mr. Lackey was bitten by a venomous spider and there is no dispute that Peak Smith saw

a couple of garden spiders on the Aulani grounds. There is also no dispute that defendants

had a general idea that there could possibly be spiders, both venomous and nonvenomous,

at the Aulani. But based on this evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that

defendants had constructive notice of the specific dangerous condition at issue here.

But even if defendants did not have actual or constructive notice of venomous

spiders in the guestrooms at the Aulani, which they did not, plaintiffs argue that

defendants are still not entitled to summary judgment because such notice is not required

under the mode-of- operation rule. “The ‘mode-of-operation’ rule looks to a business’s

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choice of aparticularmode of operation and not events surrounding the plaintiff’s accident. 

Under the rule, the plaintiff is not required to prove notice if the proprietor could

reasonably anticipate that hazardous conditions would regularly arise.” Chiara, 733 P.2d

at 285. “A plaintiff’s proof of a particular mode-of-operation simply substitutes for the

traditional elements of a prima facie case—the existence of a dangerous condition and

notice of a dangerous condition.” Id.

Under the mode-of-operation rule, the question in this case would be whether

defendants could have reasonably anticipated that venomous spiders would regularly be

found in guestrooms at the Aulani. “Regularly” has been defined as “‘[c]ustomary, usual,

or normal’” for purposes of the mode-of-operation rule. Borota v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 861

P.2d 679, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs appear to argue that Peak

Smith’s testimony that there were spiders on the Aulani property creates an issue of fact

as to whether defendants could have reasonably anticipated that venomous spiders would

regularly be found in the Aulani guestrooms. 

This argument is unavailing. There is no evidence that suggests that defendants

could have reasonably anticipated that venomous spiders would regularly be found in

guestrooms. In order for the mode-of-operation rule to have any application here, there

would have to be some evidence that employees or guests had regularly seen venomous

spiders in the guestrooms orthat venomous spiders could be found in large numbers in the

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area around the Aulani. Plaintiffs have offered no such evidence. Without such evidence,

the mode-of-operation rule does not apply. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment28is granted. 

The clerk of court shall enterjudgment dismissing plaintiffs’first amended complaint with

prejudice. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 1st day of April, 2015. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

28Docket No. 67. 

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