Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06632/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN DALE JENAN, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

BERNARD ALAN TEVELDE, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-6632 REC SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE

OF PENDENCY OF ACTION.

On April 25, 2005, the Court heard a motion to dismiss filed

by Defendants Bernard Alan Tevelde and Rebecca Dee Tevelde. Upon

due consideration of the written and oral arguments of the

parties and the record herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion as set forth herein.

I. Relevant Background

On December 1, 2004, Plaintiffs Alan Dale Jenan and Otis

Oren Gillis filed a “Verified Complaint for Ejectment, Mesne

Profits, and Damages in Law” against Defendants. On March 10,

2005, Plaintiff Jenan was voluntarily dismissed from the case.

The facts as set forth in the Complaint are difficult to

follow at best. This action involves the foreclosure sale of

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property in Tulare County in which Plaintiff Gillis (“Plaintiff”)

purportedly has an ownership interest. While the Court will

confine any decisions involving the facts of the case to those

alleged in the Complaint, in order to present the background of

this case the Court will supplement those facts with information

from other filings. 

The dispute between these parties dates back to 1997 and

involves a number of cases in state and federal court. In sum,

Bank of the Sierra made several loans secured by property

belonging to Roger Lewis Jenan and the Linda Loma Ranch. Various

foreclosures have taken place through which Defendants purchased

the properties in question. Plaintiffs or parties connected to

Plaintiffs filed actions in the bankruptcy court in an attempt to

avoid foreclosure and filed various actions in state court

challenging the foreclosure. These actions alleged fraud on the

part of Defendants and the Bank and sought to quiet title to the

property. All the cases were dismissed and the state court has

declared Plaintiffs Gillis and Jenan to be vexatious litigants. 

Plaintiffs filed various cases in federal court as well, all

of which have been dismissed, CV-F-96-6343 REC DLB, CV-F-01-5465

OWW SMS, and CV-F-04-6615 AWI LJO.

Defendants also sought relief via the state courts and in

1997 obtained a judgment in their favor for unlawful detainer

against Plaintiff Jenan as well as others.

The present action apparently arises from the foreclosure by

Defendants on property located at 4912 S. Santa Fe, Visalia, CA

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93292, Tulare County Assessor’s Parcel Number 126-090-05. In

July 2004, Defendants purchased a series of promissory notes and

the corresponding deeds of trust burdening the property. At the

time of the purchase, the notes were in default and the debtors

on the note were former Plaintiff Alan Dale Jenan and his

brother. Defendants began foreclosure proceedings and Plaintiffs

filed the instant action as well as case number CV-F-04-6615 AWI

LJO, in which a motion to dismiss has been granted. 

Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds

that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as well as

other bases, or, in the alternative, a more definite statement

pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Defendants also suggest that the Court, on its own motion, impose

sanctions on Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 11.

On April 25, 2005, Plaintiff lodged with the Court a notice

of pendency of action. 

II. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a motion to dismiss may be based on a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A

plaintiff must establish that subject matter jurisdiction exists,

and the Court begins the inquiry presuming that a case is outside

its limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391

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(1994). Jurisdiction in a federal district court may be based on

either a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity, 28

U.S.C. § 1332. 

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made

as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Pub. Co. v. General Tel. &

Elec. Corp. 594 F.2d 730, 734 (1979). In the latter case, there

is no presumption of truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations. 

Id. (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). 

2. Application

The Complaint alleges that subject matter jurisdiction in

this case is properly based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1354, 1338 and 1400;

the United States Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and various acts

of Congress relating to public land grants. The Complaint also

lists four issues allegedly involving federal questions. 

As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit has held that

“[f]ederal land patents and acts of Congress do not provide bases

for federal question jurisdiction.” Virgin v. San Luis Obispo,

201 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The various

congressional acts cited by Plaintiff that relate to grants of

public land do not provide a basis for subject matter

jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff’s claims do not arise under

federal patent laws pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a) and 1400(b). 

Plaintiff confuses a “land patent” with a “patent” right. A

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patent must concern a “new and useful process, machine,

manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful

improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. 

At oral argument, Plaintiff asserted that his “strongest”

basis for federal jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1354. Section 1354

provides that: “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of actions between citizens of the same state

claiming lands under grants from different states.” 28 U.S.C. §

1354. Plaintiff asserts that his grant of land is from the

United States and that Defendants’ grant is from the state of

California. Plaintiff claims that the District Columbia has been

recognized as a state and apparently argues that because Congress

is situated in the District of Columbia, Plaintiff’s land grant

is from a different state. This argument is frivolous. Congress

acts under the authority of the United States Constitution, not

the District of Columbia. That the building in which Congress

operates is physically within the District of Columbia is

irrelevant to Congressional authority. An act or grant by

Congress is not an act or grant by the District of Columbia and

there can be no assertion that Congress is a state. Accordingly,

section 1354 is inapplicable in this case.

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848),

formally ended the war between the United States and Mexico and

established the Rio Grande river from New Mexico to the Gulf of

Mexico as the land boundary between the United States and Mexico. 

See Summa Corp. V. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n, 466

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U.S. 198, 202, 104 S. Ct. 1751, 1754 (1984). Under the treaty,

“the United States undertook to protect the property rights of

Mexican landowners at the same time settlers were moving into

California in large numbers to exploit the mineral wealth and

other resources of the new territory.” Id. at 202 (citing Treaty

of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Art. VIII, 9 Stat. 929). 

Here, Plaintiff appears to assert that because the United

States acquired California from Mexico, the Treaty of Hidalgo

applies to all subsequent land grants from Congress. There is no

basis for this assertion. The treaty specifies that Mexican

landowners and their heirs shall enjoy the same rights and

protections as citizens of the United States. 9 Stat. 929-930. 

Congress is not an heir of a Mexican landowner and the Complaint

does not allege that Plaintiff is a Mexican landowner or the heir

thereof who is eligible for protection under the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo. Accordingly, the treaty does not provide a

basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 

The four “federal questions” asserted by Plaintiff likewise

do not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In

question one Plaintiff makes a vague reference to the dismissal

and appeal that were taken in case CV-F-01-5465, which has no

impact on whether this Court has jurisdiction. In question two

Plaintiff challenges the validity of the acts of the Tulare

County Superior Court on the grounds that the state court lacked

jurisdiction because the property is subject to federal

jurisdiction based on various Congressional acts, and 28 U.S.C.

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§§ 1338, 1400 and 1354, which, as discussed do not provide a

basis for jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiff uses the federal

buzz words “due process” in framing this question, the Complaint

makes no mention of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment and

does not purport to make a due process claim. Question three is

relates to the “nature, quality and extent of the title to

Plaintiffs’ properties,” and presents no basis for this Court’s

jurisdiction. Question four is based on the land grants and

whether it “protects from patent infringement;” as discussed, the

patent laws have no relevance in this suit. 

Accordingly, because the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction and because there is no conceivable basis on which

subject matter jurisdiction may be based, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. A court lacking jurisdiction

is without authority to rule on the merits of a case, and thus

the Court will not address Defendants’ alternate arguments.

B. Sanctions

Citing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Defendants argue that “it is quite clear that Plaintiffs have

violated the spirit and purpose of FRCP 11(b). They have only

brought this action, in this court/venue, in an attempt to

relitigate previous issues and to annoy, harass and vex TEVELDE.” 

Defs.’ Mot. at 8.

Sanctions based on the filing of a complaint may be

appropriate where the complaint is “neither well-grounded in

fact, nor warranted by existing law, or any good faith argument

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for extension or reversal of existing law.” Schutts v. Bently

Nev. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1549, 1561 (D. Nev. 1997). Further,

“Rule 11 provides for the imposition of sanctions when a motion

is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual

foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Warren v.

Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994). Rule 11 applies to

pro se litigants, although “the court must take into account a

plaintiff’s pro se status when it determines whether the filing

was reasonable.” Id. at 1390. 

A court may also use its inherent power to impose sanctions

such as the award of attorneys’ fees. This is appropriate “when

a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for

oppressive purposes.” Schutts, 966 F. Supp. at 1561 (citing

Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27, 111 S.

Ct. 2123 (1991)); see also Mark Indus. Ltd. v. Sea Captain’s

Choice, Inc., 50 F.3d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1995) (sanctions under

court’s inherent power may be imposed for “willful abuse of the

judicial process or bad faith conduct”). 

Due process requires that before a court imposes sanctions

the party to be sanctioned must be given adequate notice of the

possibility of sanctions and an opportunity to respond, either in

writing or orally. Schutts, 966 F. Supp. at 1562 (citing PanPacific & Low Ball Cable Television Co. v. Pacific Union Co., 987

F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993)).

The Court will not impose sanctions at this time. The Court

notes, however, that Plaintiff Gillis was provided notice of the

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possibility of sanctions by Defendants’ motion and did not

respond in either his opposition or at oral argument. The Court

further notes that should either Plaintiff Gillis or Plaintiff

Jenan file further pleadings unwarranted in fact or law, the

Court will not hesitate to impose appropriate sanctions.

ACCORDINGLY, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

FURTHER, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

FURTHER, Plaintiff’s notice of pendency of action is DENIED

as moot.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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