Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Martial Ledvina, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Town of Marana, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-01989-TUC-CKJ (DTF) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Clarence W. Dupnik’s Motion to Dismiss 

First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff filed a Response and Defendants Replied. 

(Docs. 33, 34.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Oral argument was held on 

May 19, 2015, after which the matter was taken under advisement. Pursuant to request by 

Plaintiff’s counsel, the parties submitted supplemental briefs. (Docs. 39, 40.) The 

Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the 

record, dismiss the First Amended Complaint. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Town of Marana, 

Marana police officers Terry Rozema (and Jane Doe Rozema) and William Dittiger (and 

Jane Doe Dittiger), and Pima County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik. (Doc. 1.) The parties 

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stipulated to the dismissal of Defendants Town of Marana, Rozema and Dittiger. (Docs. 

26, 29.) On motion, the Court dismissed the state-law claims against Defendant Dupnik 

with prejudice and dismissed the federal constitutional claim against him with leave to 

amend. (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Dupnik and three 

Doe Defendants, which Defendants have moved to dismiss.1

 At oral argument, Plaintiff 

clarified that Dupnik was sued solely in his official capacity and the Doe Defendants 

were sued in their individual and official capacities.

 The following facts are taken from the amended complaint. On January 14, 2013, 

Plaintiff was an 83-year-old, 140-pound man with a heart condition. (Doc. 31 at 2.) 

Fifteen months prior to that date, Plaintiff underwent open heart surgery and began taking 

numerous medications to prevent complications. (Id.) On January 14, Plaintiff was 

arrested and booked into the Pima County Jail at 8:16 p.m. (Id.) During the intake 

screening interview, Plaintiff’s medical conditions and prescription doses were verified. 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff promptly advised a correctional officer at the jail of his need to “see 

the nurse.” (Id.) Unheeded, Plaintiff called out to the nurse directly, but she too rebuffed 

his pleadings and he was subsequently removed to a cell. (Id.) On multiple occasions 

during the intervening hours of his detention, he reminded officers he needed to see the 

nurse and take his medication to no avail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he experienced 

“much anxiety” from missing his evening and morning doses of medication. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was released at noon, at which time his medication was returned. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges there are no policies or procedures at the Pima County jail governing the 

administration of prescription medication to newly arrested inmates. (Id. at 4.) 

 Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks nominal and punitive damages. 

 

1

 At oral argument, a Deputy Pima County Attorney confirmed that the 

motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of all the remaining defendants. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is only appropriate if the 

complaint’s factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences drawn in the 

plaintiff’s favor, fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678; see also Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (allegations in the complaint must be construed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff). While a complaint need not plead “detailed factual 

allegations,” the factual allegations it does include “must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The plausibility standard 

does not amount to a probability requirement, however, it demands “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A mere 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient to establish a 

claim, and legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 679. Further, 

specifically pertaining to § 1983 claims, “a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Id. 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim should be 

dismissed for two reasons: (1) the claim is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(PLRA) because Plaintiff failed to allege more than a de minimis physical injury; and 

(2) Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a physical injury or real pain as necessary to 

establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

PLRA 

 In the motion, Defendants argue the complaint is subject to dismissal under the 

PLRA because it alleges a mental or emotional injury without alleging more than de 

minimis physical injury. The PLRA provides, “[n]o federal civil action may be brought 

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by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or 

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(e). A “prisoner” is defined in the PLRA as “any person incarcerated or 

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 

delinquent for, violations of criminal law . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). A person who is not 

incarcerated, as identified in the statute, at the time he files the action is not a “prisoner” 

for purposes of the PLRA. Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(interpreting the term “prisoner” from the PLRA with respect to the exhaustion 

requirements of § 1997e(a)). Because Plaintiff filed this action after his detention ceased, 

the PLRA does not apply to him and he is not restricted from asserting a mental or 

emotional injury. See Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998); Harris v. 

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 979-80 (11th Cir. 2000); Kral v. King Cnty, No. C10-1360-MAT, 

2012 WL 726901, *7 (W.D. WA Mar. 6, 2012) (applying Talamantes, 575 F.3d at 1023-

24, to § 1997e(e)). 

 At oral argument, in light of Talamantes, Defendants withdrew their argument that 

§ 1997e(e) applies to Plaintiff’s case. They affirmed the withdrawal in their supplemental 

brief. (Doc. 40 at 2.) 

Deliberate Indifference 

 In seeking dismissal of the constitutional claim, Defendants rely on the standard 

for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. In 

response, Plaintiff argues that his complaint is based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due 

Process Clause not the Eighth Amendment. However, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s claim is 

that his constitutional right to adequate medical care while incarcerated was violated. 

(Doc. 31 at 4 (First Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff had a “right to receive his 

medication as prescribed by a physician,” and “Defendants had a duty and obligation to 

ensure that Plaintiff received his prescription medication at the times prescribed”).) 

However, because Plaintiff only had been arrested, and not convicted of a crime, “his 

rights derive from the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment.” Gibson v. 

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Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). As the Ninth Circuit holds, 

these due process rights, with regards to medical needs while in custody, impose at least 

the same duty the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment 

necessitates. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Under this standard, a violation occurs when there is (1) a deliberate indifference to the 

serious medical needs of a prisoner that (2) results in “unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

 The First Amended Complaint alleges official capacity and individual capacity 

claims. An official capacity suit against Dupnik and the Doe Defendants is the same as 

suing the governmental entity they serve – Pima County. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 165 (1985); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). To state 

a claim against the county, Plaintiff must allege these elements: (1) Plaintiff was deprived 

of his Fourteenth Amendment right; (2) the county had a policy or custom; (3) the policy 

amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right; and 

(4) the policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Mabe v. San 

Bernardino Cnty, Dept. of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)). As to the Doe 

Defendants as named in their individual capacities, the First Amended Complaint must 

allege that each of them participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment right. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 646. 

 Defendants argue the First Amended Complaint is insufficient as to all defendants 

because it fails to allege the deprivation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not alleged a harm that satisfies the second part of 

the Estelle test. While Plaintiff does not have to prove substantial harm, the alleged 

indifference to a serious medical need must have resulted in a more than de minimis

Eighth Amendment harm. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 

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407 (9th Cir. 1985) (mere delay of surgery is insufficient to state a claim unless that delay 

was harmful); see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 In his response to the motion to dismiss and at oral argument, Plaintiff sought to 

assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim with a legal standard distinct from the Eighth 

Amendment standard set forth above. Plaintiff suggested there was a constitutional right 

to be given medication as prescribed and that a violation of such right would not require a 

showing of harm. Plaintiff cites no cases to support this theory in his supplemental brief. 

Instead, he cites Jett, notes that the required harm need not be substantial, and argues that 

he alleges sufficient harm to state a claim. (Doc. 39 at 4-6.) 

 Here, the only harm alleged in the amended complaint is “much anxiety” 

precipitated by the Doe Defendants refusal to provide Plaintiff’s heart medication in a 

timely fashion. Plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint any facts upon which a reasonable 

inference could be drawn that he did suffer non-de minimis harm. He did not allege that 

he experienced any pain, or that he suffered further medical complications due to this 

anxiety. 

 In his supplemental brief, Plaintiff alleges new facts and requests that the Court 

grant amendment if it finds these facts are necessary to state a claim. (Doc. 39 at 4-5 & 

n.1.) Plaintiff alleges “the chemical reactions and imbalances resulting from the lack of 

medication caused physical injury at the physiological and pharmacological level.” (Id. at 

4.) Plaintiff contends that missing doses of his medications can result in high blood sugar, 

risk of angina or heart attack, and arrhythmias. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the anxiety 

he experienced could have been the result of increased blood pressure and abnormal heart 

rhythm. These new allegations are merely a hypothesis of harms that could occur when 

the medications prescribed to Plaintiff are not taken, but Plaintiff does not allege that any 

of them did happen to him. In fact, the supplemental brief states, “[t]he extent to which 

the missed doses harmed Mr. Ledvina may never be determined.” (Id. at 5.) The 

additional facts set forth in the supplemental brief are speculative and do not create a 

reasonable inference that Plaintiff suffered more than de minimis harm. 

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 Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible claim that the Doe Defendants deprived him of 

his Fourteenth Amendment right. This finding resolves the individual and official 

capacity claims (against all Defendants), both of which require Plaintiff to allege the 

deprivation of a constitutional right. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 

(1986) (finding city could not be liable if no constitutional injury was inflicted). The First 

Amended Complaint fails to meet the standard set out in Rule 8, and dismissal pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686. Because Plaintiff has been 

provided an opportunity to amend, and he alleged additional facts in a supplemental brief 

that are inadequate to state a claim, further amendment is not warranted. 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 32). 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 19th day of June, 2015. 

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