Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03893/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03893-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHERINE E. SULLIVAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KELLY SERVICES, INC. and DOES 1 TO

10, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-3893 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

This case concerns whether California law requires a temporary

staffing agency to pay its employee for time and expenses relating

to interviews with a staffing agency’s customer. On October 16,

2009, the Court decided the parties’ cross motions for summary

judgment and concluded that Plaintiff Catherine Sullivan should be

compensated for the time she spent in her interviews, but not for

her time preparing for and traveling to the interviews or her

commuting expenses. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for

class certification. Defendant Kelly Services opposes the motion. 

Having considered all of the parties papers, the Court hereby

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1

The Court overrules Defendant’s objection to the evidence

Plaintiff submitted with her reply brief. The evidence submitted

was in response to arguments Defendant raised in its opposition. 

The Court overrules Defendant’s objection to the expert declaration

of William Lepowsky. At the class certification stage of the

proceedings, “robust gatekeeping” of expert evidence is not

required; rather, the Court must assess only whether expert

evidence is useful in evaluating whether class certification

requirements have been met. In re Static Random Access Memory

Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 4263524, at *13 (N.D. Cal.); Kurihara v.

Best Buy Co., 2007 WL 2501698, at *5 (N.D. Cal.). The Court

concludes that Lepowsky’s opinions are reliable and admissible at

the class certification stage. Accordingly, the Court denies as

moot Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a response to Defendant’s

objections.

2

The SOF was submitted with the summary judgment moving

papers.

3Unless otherwise noted, the declarations this order cites

were filed in connection with the summary judgment motions.

2

grants Plaintiff’s motion.1 

BACKGROUND

Defendant is a temporary staffing agency. Stipulation of

Facts (SOF)2 ¶ 1. Defendant employs individuals, and then assigns

those individuals to work in various settings. Id. Last year,

Defendant assigned more than 750,000 employees in thirty-six

countries. Id. Between 2004 and the present, approximately

150,000 employees completed temporary assignments in California for

Defendant. Id. Approximately fifty percent of Defendant’s

customers require interviews prior to offering an assignment. Eric

Grover Decl., Exh. B at 27-28; Exh. F. At 65.3

On February 28, 2006, Plaintiff applied for employment with

Defendant. SOF ¶ 17. 

Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant officially

began on March 16, 2006, which was her first day of her first

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4On February 29, 2008, CMP Technologies became United Business

Media, LLC. 

3

temporary assignment with Defendant’s customer, Managed Health

Network. During her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff attended

four interviews with three of Defendant’s customers: Wells Fargo,

CMP Technologies,4 and Animation Mentor. Plaintiff was not paid

for the time she spent preparing for, traveling to and from or

attending the interviews. SOF ¶ 31. Plaintiff was also not

reimbursed for travel and parking costs related to her attendance

at the interviews. Grover Decl., Exh. X at 367, 369-370, 377-78;

Exh. Y at 386-87. Defendant did not charge its customers for the

time they spent interviewing Plaintiff. SOF ¶¶ 20, 23, 30.

Before sending an employee on an interview, Defendant usually

provides a customer with a copy of the employee’s résumé. If an

employee does not have a résumé, Defendant helps the employee

construct one. Eric Grover Decl., Exh. F at 129, 145. Defendant

edits every résumé that is sent to a customer by removing the

employee’s personal contact information and sometimes adding

Defendant’s logo and contact information. The employee is not

permitted to submit the résumé directly to the customer. Defendant

controls the process this way because, as one of Defendant’s

staffing supervisors testified, Defendant “really doesn’t want the

customer to contact the employee. We want the customer to come

through us to talk to us about those employees, and we pretty much

relay the information to the employee.” Grover Decl. Exh. T at

260. 

Defendant also tightly oversees the interview process. 

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Defendant prohibits employees from communicating directly with the

customer outside of the actual interview. Defendant sets the date,

time and place of the interview. If an employee is going to be

late for an interview, the employee must call Defendant, not the

customer. Defendant then calls the customer to notify it of the

delay. 

After an interview, Defendant obtains feedback on the

interview from the customer and the employee. If an employee does

not choose to participate in this feedback process, Defendant will

likely attempt to place a different employee in the assignment. 

Grove Decl., Exh. F at 86. If Defendant receives negative feedback

about the employee from a customer after an interview, Defendant’s

staffing supervisor counsels that employee. If both the customer

and an employee agree to an assignment, Defendant may place the

employee with the customer. SOF ¶¶ 15-16. When a customer offers

an assignment to Defendant, Defendant, not the employee, negotiates

the salary and assignment terms. Id. ¶ 7. 

Defendant’s staffing employees’ performance is evaluated, in

part, on their ability successfully to place employees with

customers. Id., Exh. W at 335-37. The staffing employees have an

incentive to ensure that Defendant’s employees prepare for and do

well at interviews because they want to place them in assignments

and generate revenue for Defendant. Id., Exh. F at 75, 98-103,

107-110. Every interview that an employee attends is an

opportunity for Defendant to show off its “product” and make a good

impression. Id. at 91-92, 98; Exh. T at 261-63; Exh. W at 361-62.

Prior to filing this action, on April 20, 2007, Plaintiff

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5The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice

of the Court’s November 12, 2008 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in C-07-2748 and Defendant’s September 25,

2008 Motion for Summary Judgment filed in the instant case. 

5

filed a class action complaint alleging Defendant violated

California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 by failing immediately to pay

all wages due at the end of each temporary assignment. Sullivan v.

Kelly Services, Inc., C 07-2874 CW (N.D. Cal.). Instead of paying

Plaintiff’s wages immediately after her temporary assignment ended,

Defendant paid her wages in accord with its routine schedule. On

November 12, 2008, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, concluding that Defendant did not “discharge” Plaintiff

within the meaning of § 201 and, therefore, Plaintiff was not

entitled to immediate payment of wages.5 The Court held that

“after Plaintiff’s last day of work with MHN, Plaintiff remained an

active Kelly employee by going on multiple job interviews for other

temporary assignments.” Order at 7. The Court based its holding,

in part, on Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff “understood that

her employment relationship with Kelly remained ongoing through

individual temporary employee assignments and persisted until she

resigned or Kelly terminated the relationship.” Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in C 07-2874 at 1-2. Defendant also claimed

that “unless either Kelly or the employee affirmatively acts to

terminate the employment relationship, an individual remains a

Kelly employee even if they are not actively working at a customer

location.” Id. at 3-4; see also Defendant’s Reply in Support of

Its Motion for Summary Judgment in C 07-2874 at 2 (“Plaintiff

remained employed following the end of her temporary assignment.”).

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On August 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed this action against

Defendant on behalf of herself and a proposed class of Defendant’s

employees in California. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

(1) failed to pay her minimum wage for the time she spent

attending, preparing for and traveling to and from interviews with

Defendant’s customers in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194

and 203, (2) failed to reimburse her for business expenses incurred

in connection with these interviews in violation of Labor Code

§ 2802, (3) issued inaccurate wage statements in violation of Labor

Code § 226 and (4) committed unfair and unlawful business practices

under California Business & Professions Code §§ 1722 et seq.

On October 16, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiff’s summary

judgment motion in this case on her claims under Labor Code § 1194

and Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. for the time she

spent attending interviews with Kelly customers. The Court

concluded that Plaintiff was subject to Defendant’s control when

she attended interviews with Defendant’s customers, based on

Defendant’s practices and policies regarding the interview process. 

The Court also held that the interview time was compensable under

the “suffered or permitted to work” test because Defendant knew or

should have known that work was being performed when she attending

the interviews. The Court granted Defendant’s summary judgment

motion on Plaintiff’s Labor Code § 2802 expense claim. The Court

denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the remaining

claims pertaining to violations of Labor Code §§ 201-203 and 206.

Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class:

All individuals who were or are employed by Kelly Services,

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Inc. as a temporary employee within the State of California

at any time between August 14, 2004 and the date the trial

commences in this action, and who attended at least one

interview with a Kelly consumer.

Motion at 14. Plaintiff defines “temporary employee” as a person

“who worked at least one day on an assignment with a Kelly customer

within Kelly’s commercial or non-commercial divisions.” Id. at 1

n.3. Plaintiff also seeks to certify a sub-class of class members

who are no longer employed by Defendant. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs seeking to represent a class must satisfy the

threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the requirements

for certification under one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Rule

23(a) provides that a case is appropriate for certification as a

class action if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members

is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the

class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b) further provides that a case may

be certified as a class action only if one of the following is

true:

(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual

class members would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with

respect to individual class members that would

establish incompatible standards of conduct for the

party opposing the class; or

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(B) adjudications with respect to individual class

members that, as a practical matter, would be

dispositive of the interests of the other members

not parties to the individual adjudications or would

substantially impair or impede their ability to

protect their interests;

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to

act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that

final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact

common to class members predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and that a class

action is superior to other available methods for fairly

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The

matters pertinent to these findings include:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already begun by or

against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of

concentrating the litigation of the claims in the

particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class

action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs assert that this case qualifies

for class certification under subdivisions (b)(3).

A plaintiff seeking class certification bears the burden of

demonstrating that each element of Rule 23 is satisfied, and a

district court may certify a class only if it determines that the

plaintiff has borne its burden. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457

U.S. 147, 158-61 (1982); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d

1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977). In making this determination, the

court may not consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. 

Burkhalter Travel Agency v. MacFarms Int’l, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 144,

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152 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Rather, the court must take the substantive

allegations of the complaint as true. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d

891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the court need not accept

conclusory or generic allegations regarding the suitability of the

litigation for resolution through class action. Burkhalter, 141

F.R.D. at 152. In addition, the court may consider supplemental

evidentiary submissions of the parties. In re Methionine Antitrust

Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161, 163 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Moore v.

Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting

that “some inquiry into the substance of a case may be necessary to

ascertain satisfaction of the commonality and typicality

requirements of Rule 23(a)”; however, “it is improper to advance a

decision on the merits at the class certification stage”).

Ultimately, it is in the district court’s discretion whether a

class should be certified. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 946

(9th Cir. 2003); Burkhalter, 141 F.R.D. at 152.

DISCUSSION

I. Ascertainable Class

Defendant first argues that class certification must be denied

because the identity of the class members is not objectively

ascertainable. “An adequate class definition specifies ‘a distinct

group of plaintiffs whose members [can] be identified with

particularity.’” Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 253

F.R.D. 586, 593 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Lerwill v. Inflight

Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). “The

identity of class members must be ascertainable by reference to

objective criteria.” 5 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice,

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6“[A]n individual is a Kelly ‘employee’ after completing the

first day of his or her first assignment with a Kelly customer and

continues to be a Kelly employee between assignments.” Motion at 2

n.2; SOF ¶ 11; October 16, 2009 Summary Judgment Order at 16:12-24.

10

§ 23.21[1] (2001). Thus, a class definition is sufficient if the

description of the class is “definite enough so that it is

administratively feasible for the court to ascertain whether an

individual is a member.” O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184

F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 

Here, the class definition meets this standard. The

definition of the class is relatively straightforward. Class

members must (1) be employed6

 by Defendant during a specific period

of time and (2) have attended at least one interview with one of

Defendant’s customers. This definition is not subjective or

imprecise. Defendant keeps records of most of its employees who

attend customer interviews. As for any class members who cannot be

identified through Defendant’s records, Plaintiff’s definition

provides objective criteria by which prospective plaintiffs can

identify themselves as class members. 

II. Rule 23(a) Requirements

A. Numerosity

“The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if ‘the class is

so large that joinder of all members is impracticable.’” Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). See also 1 Alba Cone & Herbert B. Newberg,

Newberg on Class Actions § 3.3 (4th ed. 2002) (where “the exact

size of the class is unknown, but general knowledge and common

sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is

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satisfied”). Plaintiff estimates that the class size is

approximately 75,000 based on the fact that Defendant employed

150,000 temporary employees during the class period and at least

fifty percent of Defendant’s customers require interviews. 

Although 75,000 may not be an entirely accurate estimate, the Court

is satisfied that the estimate is not so far off the mark to defeat

numerosity. If the class turns out to be smaller than legally

required under Rule 23(a)(1), Defendant may move to decertify it.

B. Commonality

Rule 23 contains two related commonality provisions. Rule

23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to

the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Rule 23(b)(3), in turn,

requires that such common questions predominate over individual

ones.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that Rule 23(a)(2) does not

preclude class certification if fewer than all questions of law or

fact are common to the class:

The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less

rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule

23(b)(3). Indeed, Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed

permissively. All questions of fact and law need not be

common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared

legal issues with divergent factual predicates is

sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled

with disparate legal remedies within the class.

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

Rule 23(b)(3), in contrast, requires not just that some common

questions exist, but that those common questions predominate. In

Hanlon, the Ninth Circuit discussed the relationship between Rule

23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3):

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The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether

proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant

adjudication by representation. This analysis presumes

that the existence of common issues of fact or law have

been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2); thus, the

presence of commonality alone is not sufficient to

fulfill Rule 23(b)(3). In contrast to Rule 23(a)(2),

Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the relationship between the

common and individual issues. When common questions

present a significant aspect of the case and they can be

resolved for all members of the class in a single

adjudication, there is clear justification for handling

the dispute on a representative rather than on an

individual basis.

Id. at 1022 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although Defendant asserts that this case does not satisfy

Rule 23(a)’s commonality provision, its arguments actually focus on

whether common issues predominate, and thus are more appropriately

directed at the issue of certification under Rule 23(b)(3),

discussed below. Rule 23(a) only requires that there be some

common issues of fact and law. The class members’ claims clearly

have something in common: all class members are or were Defendant’s

employees and have attended at least one customer interview while

employed; and their claims are based on common theories of

liability. Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement has therefore been

satisfied.

C. Typicality

The typicality prerequisite of Rule 23(a) is fulfilled if “the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The

test for typicality is "whether other members have the same or

similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not

unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members

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have been injured by the same course of conduct." Hanon v.

Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). “Under

the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are

‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent

class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon,

150 F.3d at 1020. Class certification is inappropriate, however,

“where a putative class representative is subject to unique

defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.” 

Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508 (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991)). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the

typicality requirement because the class is not ascertainable and

the circumstances surrounding class members’ interviews vary

tremendously. However, Plaintiff has shown that she and the

putative class members were allegedly injured by the same course of

conduct, Defendant’s uniform practices and procedures regarding

interviews with Defendant’s customers. Further, Plaintiff and all

class members seek the same relief. The Court finds that

Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the putative class members’

claims.

D. Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s assertion

that this action satisfies the adequacy requirement and the Court

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finds that it does.

III. Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)

A. Predominance

Plaintiff’s motion for certification under Rule 23(b)(3)

centers around the issue of predominance. “The Rule 23(b)(3)

predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). “When

common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they

can be resolved for all members of the class in a single

adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute

on a representative rather than an individual basis.” Hanlon, 150

F.3d at 1022 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The common

issues must only predominate; they do not have to be dispositive of

the litigation.” In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.,

202 F.R.D. 12, 29 (D.D.C. 2001). 

To determine whether the predominance requirement is

satisfied, “courts must identify the issues involved in the case

and determine which are subject to ‘generalized proof,’ and which

must be the subject of individualized proof.” In re Dynamic Random

Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 1530166, at *6 (N.D.

Cal.). 

Defendant argues that common issues do not predominate because

the “control test” used to determine whether class members must be

compensated for their time spent interviewing requires a factspecific analysis to assess the level of Defendant’s control over

each class member. See e.g., Madera Police Officers Ass’n v. City

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of Madera, 36 Cal. 3d 403, 411 (1984). However, a fact-specific

inquiry does not necessarily prevent common issues from

predominating. Under the control test, courts must examine the

employer’s “restrictions cumulatively to assess their overall

effect” on an employee’s time. Id. Contrary to Defendant’s

assertion, uniform corporate practices and policies that

cumulatively impact the class in a particular manner can satisfy

the predominance requirement. 

Defendant relies on inapposite overtime cases in which an

employer’s liability was based on whether class members engaged in

duties during the work day that would make them exempt from

overtime pay. See In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay

Litig. (Wells I), 571 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2009); Vinole v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2009); In

re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig. (Wells II), 2010 WL

174329, at **6-7 (N.D. Cal.). In these cases, the courts held that

predominance cannot be based solely on an employer’s blanket

exemption policy but that other uniform corporate policies could

satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). In Vinole, the Ninth Circuit noted that a

focus on “whether the employer exercised some level of centralized

control in the form of standardized hierarchy, standardized

corporate policies and procedures governing employees, uniform

training programs, and other factors susceptible to common proof”

could satisfy the predominance requirement. Vinole, 571 F.3d at

946; see also Wells I, 571 F.3d at 959 (facing a “fact-intensive

inquiry” regarding application of overtime exemption, the court

noted, “A centralized policy requiring employees to be at their

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desks for 80% of their workday would change this individual issue

into a common one.”); Wells II, 2010 WL 174329, at **6-7 (in

exemption case, predominance can be shown by “some form of common

proof, such as a standard policy governing how and where employees

perform their jobs.”). Here, Defendant’s liability is based on its

uniform corporate practices and policies regarding the interview

process, which subjected temporary employees to Defendant’s control

during the interviews. Unlike the employees seeking overtime pay

in Wells I, Wells II and Vinole, Plaintiff in the instant case has

presented evidence of common proof that will resolve the question

of whether class members were subject to Defendant’s control when

attending interviews. 

Additionally, common issues predominate as to the “suffered or

permitted to work” test. Plaintiff has established that she can

prove, through common proof, that Defendant knew or should have

known that work was being performed by temporary employees when

they attended interviews. There is common evidence that

Defendant’s practice was to arrange the interviews between its

customers and the temporary employees and control the manner in

which the customers and temporary employees communicated both

before and after the interviews. 

Defendant argues that class certification should be denied

because Plaintiff has not submitted a viable trial plan for

proceeding as a class action. The Court disagrees. Nothing in

Rule 23 requires Plaintiff to submit a formal trial plan along with

her motion for class certification. See Chamerlan v. Ford Motor

Co., 402 F.3d 952, 961 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Nothing in the

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7

Many of Defendant’s arguments regarding predominance are

misguided because they attack whether an individual could be a

class member, not whether common issues predominate. For instance,

Defendant asserts that its control over the interviews is subject

to numerous factors, including the fact that many of its employees

are not required to interview with customers. Employees that do

not interview with customers simply do not fall within the class

definition. Similarly, Defendant argues that some customers

interview employees on their own, with no involvement by Defendant,

until after the interview has occurred. After the interview has

occurred and the customer decides to hire the employee, the

customer contacts Defendant. In those situations, Defendant merely

acts “as the ‘payroll agent’ for the employee.” Opp. at 10. Those

interviewees could not be class members either. 

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Advisory Committee Notes suggests grafting a requirement for a

trial plan onto the rule.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted a

viable method for managing this case as a class action. As noted

above, common proof can be used to determine Defendant’s liability. 

Further, Plaintiff plans to use statistical evidence, including

surveys or representative testimony, or both, of class members to

determine damages at trial. This type of evidence is commonly

accepted by courts for calculating damages in large class actions. 

See e.g., Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 901, 914-15 (9th Cir.

2003); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp.

1460, 1464-65, 1469 (D. Haw. 1995); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,

115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 747-755 (2004). 

In sum, Plaintiff has carried her burden to prove that common

questions of law and fact will predominate in this case.7

B. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that class resolution must be

“superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “The

policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to

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overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the

incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his

or her rights.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. The small amount of

money at issue in each individual case makes it highly unlikely

that individual litigation would be undertaken, but a class action

would offer those with small claims the opportunity for meaningful

redress. Therefore, certifying the class is superior to, and more

manageable than, any other procedure available for the treatment of

factual and legal issues raised by Plaintiff’s claims. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion

for class certification (Docket No. 51). The Court denies as moot

Plaintiff’s motion to file a response to Defendant’s objections. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 04/27/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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