Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00471/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Lamar Carpenter,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-16-0471-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckeye, Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on April 11, 2016 (Doc. 10). On April 28, 2016, Respondents filed their 

Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Reply on May 16, 2016 (Doc. 15), supplemented 

with an “Amended Reply” with omitted pages on May 23, 2016 (Doc. 17). Respondents 

filed a Supplemental Answer (Doc. 19) on October 6, 2016, and Plaintiff filed his 

Supplemental Reply (Doc. 20) on October 17, 2016.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On August 31, 2009, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court, 

case number CR2009-007454. (Exhibit A, Indictment) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 

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12 (Exhibits A to L) and the Supplemental Answer, Doc. 19 (Exhibits M to O), are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

Carpenter was charged with five counts of fraudulent schemes and 

artifices and five counts of fraudulent schemes and practices after 

causing several individuals to participate in a "mortgageelimination" or "mortgage-abatement" program from which he 

profited financially. 

(Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. 10/16/12 at ¶ 2.) 

Petitioner eventually proceeded to a jury trial, and was convicted as charged, and 

was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years' imprisonment. (Id.; Exhibit D, Sentence 

1/14/11.) The trial court enhanced the range of sentence based on Petitioner’s prior class 

6 felony conviction in 2005 for presenting a false instrument for filing on October 4, 

2002. (Exhibit D, Sentence 1/14/11 at 4.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal arguing the trial court erred in three ways: 

(1) improperly commenting on the evidence in a final jury instruction; (2) not sua sponte

ordering a mistrial as a result of questioning by the prosecutor about prior conduct; (3) 

limiting his testimony about the prior conviction. (Exhibit J, Opening Brief.) 

On October 16, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum 

Decision (Exhibit C) affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The 

court concluded that the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence, but 

properly instructed the jury. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-10.) The court concluded the question by the 

prosecution was about prior conduct, not a prior conviction, and the court properly struck 

the question and directed the jury to disregard, and thus a mistrial was not appropriate. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling on the use of the sanitized prior conviction, allowed Petitioner to 

testify as he wished and merely cautioned Petitioner that the prosecution would be 

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allowed rebuttal if Petitioner went into the particulars of the prior. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.) 

In his Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges he sought review of his direct appeal 

by the Arizona Supreme Court, but provides no details on its filing. (Doc. 10 at 3.) 

Respondents allege none was filed. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 3.) Petitioner appends to his 

Reply (Docs. 15/17) as Exhibit C what he identifies as his “Direct Appeal Appellants 

Opening Brief and Petition for Review.” (Id. at 7.) What is appended is his June, 2014 

Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals in case 1 CA-CR 13-

0811.PRPC. (Id. at 103.) That is the case number for his PCR proceeding. (See Exhibit 

B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15.) 

The mandate of the Arizona Court of Appeals reflects no motion for 

reconsideration or petition for review was filed. (Exhibit E, Mandate 11/30/12.) 

Petitioner did file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court in his PostConviction Relief Proceedings addressed below. (Exhibit I, Order 10/30/15 (denying 

PFR).) Based on this record, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not seek review by 

the Arizona Supreme Court in his direct appeal proceedings. 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On or about November 7, 2012, shortly after the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

decision rejecting Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post- Conviction 

Relief (PCR). (Exhibit F, M.E. 11/71/12 (appointing counsel).). Counsel was appointed, 

who eventually filed a notice of inability to bring a colorable claim on appeal. (Exhibit

B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner proceeded to file a pro se PCR petition (Exhibit 

G.) His petition raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims and an appellate 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, all under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). 

In a detailed seven-page minute entry, the judge, who had presided over 

Petitioner’s trial, did not find any of Petitioner’s claims colorable and dismissed his PCR 

petition. (Exhibit H, M.E. 7/19/13.) 

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Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, filing an original 

Petition for Review (Exhibit L) on November 12, 2013, and then submitting an 

Amended Petition for Review on or about June 6, 2014 (Exhibit M), which was not 

accepted for filing. (Amend. Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit D, Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1-2.) 

Petitioner asserted the following bases for relief in the original Petition for 

Review: (1) the trial court erred in concluding trial counsel was not ineffective; (2) the 

trial court erred in concluding that appellate counsel was not ineffective; and (3) the trial 

court erred in failing to designate Petitioner’s prior conviction as a misdemeanor. 

(Exhibit L). 

While the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, the Court denied any relief to 

petitioner. The court rejected claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on: (a) 

failure to call lay and expert witnesses (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 4); (b) failure 

to investigate other mortgage programs (id.); (c) failure to offer evidence of a promissory 

note, 1933 congressional resolution, and an internet article (id. at 5, 6); (d) failure to 

object to testimony about other conduct by Petitioner (id. at ¶ 7); (e) failure to adequately 

advise Petitioner on testimony permitted at trial (id. at ¶ 8); (f) failure to move for a 

mistrial based on the court’s comments on the evidence (id. at ¶ 9); (g) failure to object 

to a question regarding previous conduct by Petitioner (id.); and (h) failure to object to 

questions regarding Petitioner’s religion (id.). The court also rejected the claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The court denied review of the 

claim regarding the prior conviction because Petitioner “did not raise this issue as part of 

his Rule 32 proceedings below.” (Id. at 11.) Additionally, the Court noted that if 

Petitioner wished to challenge the prior conviction, he had to do it with a timely petition 

for post-conviction relief in that specific case, not the case in which the conviction was 

used to enhance the sentencing range. (Id.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Amend. Petition, 

Doc. 10 at Exhibit D, Petition for Review 6/17/15.) On October 30, 2015, that court 

summarily denied review. (Exhibit I, Order 10/30/15).

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D. SPECIAL ACTION PROCEEDINGS

On February 3, 2014, during the pendency of his PCR proceedings before the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action (Exhibit N), 

arguing that the PCR court judge violated his due process rights by ruling against him in 

his PCR petition. On February 7, 2014, The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to 

accept jurisdiction of the Petition. (Exhibit O)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 22, 2016 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserted the following two grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel and that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection were violated. In Ground 

Two, he claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated because the trial court treated a prior conviction, which Petitioner 

claims was supposed to have been reduced to a misdemeanor following the 

successful completion of probation, as a felony and used it to enhance 

Petitioner’s sentences in this case. 

(Order 3/15/16, Doc. 6 at 2.) Service and an answer were ordered. (Id. at 3.) 

On April 11, 2016, before an answer was filed, Petitioner filed an Amended 

Petition (Doc. 10). In his Amended Petition, Petitioner repeated his Grounds 1 and 2, 

but added a new Ground 3 and 4, as well as attaching a variety of exhibits. Grounds 3 

and 4 added the following claims:

Petitioner’s new Ground 3 asserts claims of malicious prosecution and false 

imprisonment in violation of the 14th Amendment, based upon the 

expiration of the statute of limitations, and reliance upon the misdemeanor 

prior. Petitioner’s new Ground 4 asserts a violation of the 6th and 14th 

Amendments based upon the prosecution’s questioning Petitioner about a 

prior bad act, the trial court’s commenting on the evidence, and improperly 

limiting the scope of Petitioner’s testimony. 

(Order 4/13/16, Doc. 11).

Response - On April 28, 2016 Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”)

(Doc. 12) to the Amended Petition. Respondents concede that the Petition is timely, but 

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argue Petitioner’s claims are either unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, without 

merit, or non-cognizable state law claims.

Reply – Petitioner filed a Reply on May 17, 2016 (Doc. 15). The Court observed 

that there appeared to be pages missing and granted leave to Petitioner to supplement his 

reply to provide the omitted pages. (Order 5/19/16, Doc. 16.) Petitioner did so on May 

23, 2016, by filing an Amended (“Corrected”) Reply (Doc. 17). Petitioner argues the 

merits of his claims and that he presented his arguments to the state courts to the best of 

his ability.

Supplements – In an Order filed September 28, 2016 (Doc. 18), the Court 

directed Respondents to supplement their Answer to identify which procedural bars they 

contend applied to the various claims, and to provide additional records.

On October 6, 2016, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 19), 

providing additional records (Exhibits M, N, and O), raising Arizona’s time bar and 

waiver (“preclusion”) bar (id. at 3), and arguing that Petitioner’s claims are precluded 

under Arizona’s waiver bar, Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3) (id. at 4-6).

On October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 20), arguing 

his pro se status without benefit of a law library as a basis for “leniency in Petitioners 

Response’s [sic],” the merits of his claims, his attempts to exhaust state remedies, and 

the constitutional nature of his claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that some of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and 

thus are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

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available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

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Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Proper Mode - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim to a 

state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that 

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

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The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s waiver bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a). (Supplemental Answer, Doc. 19 at 4-6.) Although Respondents 

have also referenced Arizona’s time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (id. at 3), 

Respondents make no argument that it applies to Petitioner’s claims (id. at 4-6).

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver bar, Petitioner 

can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

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32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Exceptions - Rule 32.2 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category 

of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his 

claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

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facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s waiver bar would prevent 

Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that were not fairly 

presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

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actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 32.2(a) is not an 

independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas review of claims 

a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The federal courts have 

routinely held that it is. “Arizona's waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 

(2014). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (Arizona’s waiver rule is 

independent of federal law); and Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(adequate because consistently and regularly applied).

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Here, Petitioner has made three forays to the Arizona Court of Appeals, on direct 

appeal, on post-conviction relief, and in his Petition for Special Action. 

a. Petition for Special Action Irrelevant 

Where a claim is cognizable in the Arizona courts on direct appeal or in a Rule 32 

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post-conviction relief proceeding, presenting it in a state habeas petition or petition for 

special action is not adequate to exhaust state remedies. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. 

"Submitting a new claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its 

merits will not be considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair 

presentation." Id. (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).1 Here, 

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that any of his federal claims were not cognizable on 

direct appeal or in his PCR proceeding. The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to 

exercise jurisdiction over the special action petition, and thus did not actually consider 

on the merits any of Petitioner’s claims raise therein. Accordingly, this proceeding could 

not have resulted in the proper exhaustion of any of Petitioner’s claims.

b. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that (a) he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel, based on counsel’s failure to: (1) present a competent defense, (2) call expert 

witnesses, (3) offer evidence on Petitioner’s behalf, (4) object to hearsay, (5) allow 

Petitioner to testify, and (6) move for a mistrial upon admission of evidence on a 

sanitized historical prior. He also asserts that (b) his Sixth Amendment right to 

compulsory process and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection were 

violated because counsel prevented him from testifying. 

(1). Ineffective Assistance – Ground 1(a)

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance was not 

properly exhausted and is now procedurally defaulted under Arizona’s waiver bar. 

(Supp. Ans., Doc. 19 at 4-5.) 

Petitioner replies that he attempted to exhaust. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 20 at 2.)

 

1 One exception recognized in Arizona is an interlocutory double jeopardy claim. See 

State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1133 (Ariz. 2004). Petitioner did not assert such a claim 

in his Petition for Special Action (Exhibit N). 

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Petitioner did not raise any claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. (See 

Exhibit J, Opening Brief.) He did, however, raise various claims of ineffective 

assistance in his Petition for Review (“PFR”) (Exhibit L) in his PCR proceeding. 

Ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but must each be specifically 

argued. See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982) (presentation 

of “additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed claim into one not presented 

to state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 

argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness results in fair presentation of 

all claims of ineffective assistance).

(a). Competent Defense – Ground 1(a)(1)

In Ground 1(a)(1), Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

a defense. Petitioner argued in his PFR that trial counsel failed to call any witnesses in 

his behalf. (Exhibit L at 6.) The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed this claim 

(referring to the failure to call “lay and expert witnesses). (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 

4/28/15 at ¶ 4.) Thus, to the extent that Petitioner’s present claim relates to the failure to 

call witnesses, his claim was fairly presented and addressed on the merits, and thus his 

state remedies were exhausted. 

However, to the extent that Petitioner now intends to assert that there were other 

unspecified failures that amounted to failure to present a competent defense, Petitioner 

did not fairly present such a claim and it is now procedurally defaulted.

(b). Expert Witnesses - Ground 1(a)(2)

In Ground 1(a)(2), Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to call 

expert witnesses. Petitioner argued in his PFR that counsel failed to call an expert 

witness from the banking industry. (Exhibit L at 6-7, 8.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

addressed this claim, albeit concluding that it was conclusory because Petitioner had 

failed to provide affidavits from the proposed witnesses. (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 

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at ¶ 4.) Thus, to the extent that Petitioner’s present claim relates to the failure to call a 

banking expert, his claim was fairly presented and addressed on the merits, and thus his 

state remedies were exhausted. 

However, to the extent that Petitioner now intends to assert that there were other 

expert witnesses that counsel should have called, Petitioner did not fairly present such a 

claim and it is now procedurally defaulted.

(c). Evidence Not Offered - Ground 1(a)(3)

In Ground 1(a)(3), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

offer evidence in Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner argued in his PFR that counsel failed to 

investigate and present various documentary evidence. (Exhibit L at 7, 9.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals addressed this claim, concluding that counsel could have made a 

reasonable strategic decision to not offer the documents. (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 

at ¶ 5.) Thus, this claim was fairly presented and addressed on the merits, and thus 

Petitioner’s state remedies on it were properly exhausted. 

(d). Hearsay Objection - Ground 1(a)(4)

In Ground 1(a)(4), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for filing to 

object to hearsay. Petitioner made no argument in his PFR regarding a failure to object 

to hearsay. (See generally Exhibit L.) At most, Petitioner complained that counsel 

“failed to object to FBI agent’s testimony,” (id. at 7), but made no reference to a basis for 

a hearsay objection. Nor did the Arizona Court of Appeals address such a claim. (See 

generally Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15.) Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present 

such a claim and it is now procedurally defaulted.

(e). Petitioner’s Testimony - Ground 1(a)(5)

In Ground 1(a)(5), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

allow Petitioner to testify. Petitioner made no such argument in his PFR, and at most 

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complained that counsel inadequately advised Petitioner about what he could and could 

not say. (Exhibit L, PFR at 9.) Nor did the Arizona Court of Appeals address such a 

claim. (See generally Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15.) Accordingly, Petitioner did not 

fairly present such a claim and it is now procedurally defaulted.

(f). Mistrial on Prior - Ground 1(a)(6)

Finally, in Ground 1(a)(6) Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved 

for a mistrial “when State inquired about a historical prior that was sanitized.” (Amend. 

Pet. Doc. 10 at 6.) In his PFR, Petitioner did argue that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for a mistrial, but that was limited to a motion based on “when the court 

improperly commented on the evidence” by admonishing that the law did not authorize 

Petitioner’s actions, and based on “questions that referenced religion and...questions re 

fraudulent documents.” (Exhibit L, PFR at 9, 7.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

addressed those claims, but did not address a claim regarding a sanitized prior. (Exhibit 

B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 9.) Those are fundamentally different claims from the one 

Petitioner now raises, focusing on very different events, i.e. questioning about a sanitized 

prior conviction vs. admonishments by the court or questions about other fraudulent 

documents or religion. 

Additionally, Petitioner did assert a claim on direct appeal that questions which he 

described as being directed to a prior conviction should have resulted in a mistrial. But 

he did not present this as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Presenting the 

related underlying claim does not exhaust the claim of ineffective assistance. “While 

[the ineffective assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] admittedly related, 

they are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have 

been separately and specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present this claim and it is now procedurally 

defaulted.

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(2). Petitioner’s Testimony – Ground 1(b)

Despite it being recognized in the Service Order (Doc. 11), Respondents do not 

separately address the exhaustion of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process 

and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Petitioner argues that the State violated his Sixth 

Amendment and Due Process “right to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses” and denied Petitioner equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 10 at 6.) 

In his PFR, Petitioner did reference his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 

process, but did so only as part of his argument that counsel was deficient for failing to 

call witnesses. (Exhibit L, PFR at 6.) The Arizona Court of Appeals did not address a 

compulsory process claim. (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15.) Presenting the related 

underlying claim does not exhaust the claim of ineffective assistance. Rose, 395 F.3d at 

1112. Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present this claim and it is now procedurally 

defaulted.

Finally, Petitioner did argue in his PFR that he was denied his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights, but the arguments he raised were under the due process clause, not 

an equal protection claim. (Exhibit L, PFR at 9, 13.) The Arizona Court of Appeals did 

not address an equal protection claim. (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15.) Accordingly, 

Petitioner did not fairly present this claim and it is now procedurally defaulted.

c. Ground Two – Sentencing Error

In Ground 2, Petitioner argues that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated because the trial court treated a prior conviction, which Petitioner claims 

was supposed to have been reduced to a misdemeanor following the successful 

completion of probation, as a felony and used it to enhance Petitioner’s sentences in this 

case. 

Respondents argue that this claim was procedurally barred by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals based upon Petitioner’s failure to raise it to the trial court. (Supp. Answer at 

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5.) Petitioner simply replies on the basis of the merits of the claim. (Supp. Reply at 2.)

Indeed, Petitioner argued the purported sentencing error and argued that it 

amounted to a violation of “Due Process of the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment.” 

(Exhibit L, PFR at 13.) The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the claim, and opined:

Finally, Carpenter argues the trial court erred when it failed to 

designate as a misdemeanor a prior conviction in a 2003 case. We 

deny review because Carpenter did not raise this issue as part of the 

Rule proceedings below. Carpenter raised this issue in a "Motion for 

Correction of Error" he filed pursuant to Rule 24 .4 after the court 

dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. A petition for 

review from the denial of post-conviction relief may not present 

issues not first presented to the trial court in the petition for postconviction relief.

(Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 11 (citing inter alia Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.9(c)(l)(ii)).)

Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) requires that a petition for review contain: “The issues which 

were decided by the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate 

court for review.” See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 

(Ariz.App., 1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial 

court not subject to review).

Respondents have not identified or argued Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) as a procedural bar. 

If Respondents were now relying upon it as a basis for procedural default of an 

unpresented claim, the undersigned would treat the failure to argue the rule as a waiver 

of the procedural default for two reasons. First, the defense would be deemed waived 

based upon failure to comply with the Court’s order mandating that the procedural bars 

relied upon as a bases for procedural default be explicitly identified for each claim. (See 

Order 4/4/16, Doc. 9 at 2; Order 9/28/16, Doc. 18 at 3.) Second, the failure to identify 

such bases deprives Petitioner of a fair opportunity to refute the defense. (See Order 

9/28/16, Doc. 18 at 2.) 

But here the actual application of the bar is explicit within the opinion of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus, Petitioner has had a fair opportunity to identify and 

address the issue.

Thus, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s due process claim in Ground 2 

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was procedurally barred by application of Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii). Petitioner presents 

nothing to suggest that Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii) is not an independent and adequate state bar.

d. Ground Three – Malicious Prosecution

In Ground 3, Petitioner argues claims of malicious prosecution and false 

imprisonment in violation of the 14th Amendment, based upon the expiration of the 

statute of limitations, and reliance upon the misdemeanor prior.

Respondents again recognize only a portion of Petitioner’s claim, casting it as a 

simple argument that the state violated the statute of limitations. (Supp. Ans., Doc. 19 at 

2.) Respondents argue this abbreviated claim was unexhausted and is now waived. (Id.

at 5.) Petitioner replies based on the merits. 

Petitioner raised no arguments regarding the statute of limitations, malicious 

prosecution, or false imprisonment on direct appeal (see generally Exhibit J, Opening 

Brief), or in his PFR (see generally Exhibit L). The Arizona Court of Appeals did not 

address any such claims on direct appeal (see generally Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. 10/16/12), 

or on petition for review in the PCR proceeding (see generally Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 

4/28/15). 

The only portion of Ground Three ever presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

was Petitioner’s arguments regarding the classification of the prior as a misdemeanor 

addressed herein above with regard to Ground 2. However, Petitioner did not case that 

error in terms of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not address it on that basis.

Accordingly, none of Ground Three was fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and the entire ground is now procedurally defaulted.

e. Ground Four – Trial Court Errors

In Ground 4, Petitioner argues that various constitutional rights were violated 

based on the trial court’s purported comments on the evidence, failure to declare a 

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mistrial based upon questions about prior bad acts, and by improperly limiting the scope 

of Petitioner’s testimony. 

Respondents argue, in essence, that Petitioner raised the underlying facts as state 

law claims on direct appeal, but did not raise them as a federal claims, and his federal 

claims are now waived under Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Supp. Ans., Doc. 19 at 5-6.) 

Petitioner complains that Respondents are inconsistent on whether these claims 

were argued and then asserts that exhaustion was attempted through his special action. 

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 20 at 3.) As discussed hereinabove, presentation in the petition for 

special action did not result in proper exhaustion of state remedies.

It is true that the underlying facts and state law claims of Ground 4 were raised by 

Petitioner on direct appeal. He argued that the trial court improperly commented on the 

evidence (Exhibit J, Opening Brief at 28-30), erred in not declaring a mistrial based on 

the prior bad acts questions (id. at 31-33), and improperly limited Petitioner’s testimony 

(id. at 34-36). However, Petitioner did not assert any federal constitutional basis for any 

of these claims. Instead, he raised them solely as state law claims. Failure to alert the 

state court to the federal, constitutional nature of the claim will amount to failure to 

exhaust state remedies. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. It is not enough that a “somewhat 

similar state law claim was made.” Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6. 

f. Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner properly 

exhausted his state remedies as to: (1) the portion of Ground 1(a)(1) based upon 

counsel’s failure to call witnesses; (2) the portion of Ground 1(a)(2) based upon 

counsel’s failure to call a banking expert; and (3) Ground 1(a)(3) (ineffectiveness re 

documents). 

Also based the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted

on: (1) the portion of Ground 1(a)(1) not based upon counsel’s failure to call witnesses; 

(2) the portion of Ground 1(a)(2) not based upon counsel’s failure to call a banking 

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expert; (3) Grounds 1(a)(4), (5) and (6); (4) Ground 1(b); (5) Grounds 3 and 4.

Finally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner was 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds from asserting Ground 

2. 

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner makes no explicit argument regarding cause and prejudice. He does, 

however raise several arguments that would suggest that this Court should find cause to 

excuse his procedural defaults, including: (1) his pro se status in this proceeding, and 

limited access to legal resources (Amend. Reply, Doc. 17 at 1); (2) with regard to 

Ground Three, he only recently learned of the statute of limitations and his constitutional 

right to equal protection (Id. at 4) and the court refused to take Petitioner’s documents 

(Amend. Petition, Doc. 10 at 8).

Pro Se Status in This Case – Petitioner raises his pro se status in this case, and 

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his limited legal resources. (Amend. Reply, Doc. 17 at 1.)

The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se litigants, 

Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho State Board 

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986), whether literate and assisted by 

“jailhouse lawyers”, Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 

909, or non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989). 

Of course, Petitioner’s filings in this action must be read in light of his pro se 

status. "We must construe pro se habeas filings liberally, and may treat the allegations of 

a verified complaint or petition as an affidavit." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 

(9th Cir. 2003). But that does not permit the Court to manufacture bases for cause and 

prejudice.

Moreover, any current difficulties Petitioner faces in litigating his claims would 

not excuse his failings to exhaust his state remedies in his state court proceedings. 

Further, Petitioner had the benefit of counsel in both his state direct appeal and his state 

petition for post-conviction relief.

Recent Discovery – Petitioner argues that he only recently discovered his claims 

in Ground Three. While the discovery of the factual predicate of a claim, if coupled with 

a showing of diligence, may justify a delayed start of the habeas statute of limitations, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), it does not of itself establish cause for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Further, Petitioner does not assert the discovery of facts, but of 

law. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not extend to a lack of knowledge of the law, unless it 

constitutes a decision in Petitioner’s own case. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 

1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between discovery of changes or clarifications in 

state law and discovery of “factual predicate”). Petitioner does not suggest that he still 

has state remedies available to him to raise these challenges as a result of his delayed 

discovery of the legal basis for his claims.

Refusal of Amended State Petition – Finally, Petitioner complains that the state 

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court denied his attempt to file an amended petition, justifying consideration of his 

Ground Three. It appears Petitioner refers to his attempted Amended Petition for 

Review (Exhibit M) in his PCR proceeding. However, Petitioner offers nothing to 

suggest that the denial of his attempt to amend was somehow wrongly decided. 

Nor does he show that the proffered amended petition fairly presented his claims 

in Ground Three. In Ground 3, Petitioner argues claims of malicious prosecution and 

false imprisonment in violation of the 14th Amendment, based upon the expiration of the 

statute of limitations, and reliance upon the misdemeanor prior. Petitioner’s Amended 

Petition for Review did not raise any claims of malicious prosecution or false 

imprisonment, nor did it raise a statute of limitation defense. Rather the Amended 

Petition for Review simply argued that the prior conviction was improperly designated as 

a felony in violation of his plea agreement (Exhibit M at 14, et seq.) and that PCR 

counsel was ineffective (id. at 19, et seq.).

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

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innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)..

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that no reasonable juror would have found him 

guilty. At best, Petitioner makes conclusory arguments that had a 1933 Mortgage 

Abatement Program and unspecified testimony by unidentified witnesses and Petitioner 

been presented at trial, he would not have been convicted. (Amended Reply, Doc. 17 at 

2.) Petitioner fails to explain how such evidence would show his innocence, let alone 

meet the exacting standards for a claim of procedural actual innocence. Such conclusory 

arguments do not meet Petitioner’s burden under Schlup.

Accordingly his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

B. MERITS OF EXHAUSTED CLAIMS

Petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies as to: (1) the portion of 

Ground 1(a)(1) based upon counsel’s failure to call witnesses; (2) the portion of Ground 

1(a)(2) based upon counsel’s failure to call a banking expert; and (3) Ground 1(a)(3) 

(ineffectiveness re documents). 

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1. Standard of Review

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every 

error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

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where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

2. Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

Applicable Standard on Ineffective Assistance Claims – Generally, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient 

performance - counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for 

reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his 

claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed 

error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

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defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

3. Merits of Ground 1(a)(1) – Ineffectiveness re Witnesses

In the exhausted portion of Ground 1(a)(1), Petitioner argues that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to testify in his behalf. Respondents argue 

that Petitioner has failed to adequately support this claim with testimony of the intended 

witnesses, and thus the state court properly rejected it. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 12-13.) 

Indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, stating: “Because 

Carpenter did not provide affidavits from the witnesses containing the testimony they 

would have provided, Carpenter has failed to present a colorable claim.” (Exhibit B, 

Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 4.) 

A petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony might be, 

but must adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 

F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness 

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must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on 

affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been favorable; 

self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 

932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Petitioner does not merely speculate about potential witnesses’ testimony, 

but leaves this Court, as he left the state court, to speculate on its own about such 

testimony. 

Under these circumstances, this claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory and 

without merit, and Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

4. Merits of Ground 1(a)(2) – Ineffectiveness re Banking Expert

Similarly, Petitioner fails to support his claim in Ground 1(a)(2) with anything 

more than bald speculation that banking experts would have proffered exculpating 

testimony. Indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals observed: “Carpenter conceded in the 

reply he filed below that he did not know what testimony any ‘banking experts’ could 

have provided.” (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶ 4 n.1)

Under these circumstances, this claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory and 

without merit, and Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

5. Merits of Ground 1(a)(3) – Ineffectiveness re Documents

In Ground 1(a)(3), Petitioner argues that counsel failed to present various 

documentary evidence. Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals properly 

concluded that Petitioner had failed to show deficient performance. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 

13.) 

The state court opined:

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Carpenter next argues his trial counsel was ineffective when 

she failed or refused to offer into evidence documents Carpenter 

provided to her. Carpenter claims the documents would have shown 

why he believed what he was doing was legal. The first document 

was a promissory note that was not related to any transaction at 

issue. Carpenter did not submit the document for inclusion in the 

record but referenced it during trial and in his affidavit. The second 

document was a copy of a 1933 joint resolution of the Congress of 

the United States "To Suspend The Gold Standard And Abrogate 

The Gold Clause." The third document was an article from the 

internet by an unidentified author who, among other things, instructs 

the reader that a court of law has no jurisdiction over the reader if 

the caption of the case spells the reader's name in capital letters. 

Carpenter has failed to present a colorable claim for relief. 

The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined by the 

information supplied to counsel by the defendant. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. A review of the documents shows counsel's failure 

and/or refusal to offer the documents into evidence was a sound 

strategic choice that did not fall below objectively reasonable 

standards. Strategic choices of counsel "are virtually 

unchallengeable." Id. at 690-691. Carpenter has also failed to 

present a colorable claim because he has failed to demonstrate these 

documents had any relevance to his defense or his case in general or 

that there is a reasonable probability their admission would have 

changed the outcome of the proceeding.

(Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 4/28/15 at ¶¶ 5-6.) 

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that this decision was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Nor does Petitioner show that it was an unreasonable application of or contrary to 

federal law. There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. United States v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 

F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); United States v. 

Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the 

attorneys made reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” 

United States v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000). The court need not 

determine the actual reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the 

range of reasonable representation. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-457 (9th 

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). Tactical decisions with which a defendant 

disagrees cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 

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456. "Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge 

of inadequate representation." Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 

1980). 

Petitioner still leaves this Court to speculate how the referenced documents would 

have been beneficial to his case, or that they would have altered the outcome. As such, 

this Court must presume that their exclusion was a reasonable strategic decision. 

Under these circumstances, this claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory and 

without merit, and Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

C. SUMMARY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s claims are 

either procedurally defaulted, or were procedurally barred on independent and adequate 

state grounds, and thus must be dismissed, or they are without merit. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the following portions of 

Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 11, 2016 (Doc. 10) 

be DENIED: (1) the portion of Ground 1(a)(1) based upon counsel’s failure to call 

witnesses; (2) the portion of Ground 1(a)(2) based upon counsel’s failure to call a 

banking expert; and (3) Ground 1(a)(3) (ineffectiveness re documents). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 11, 2016 (Doc. 10) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 31, 2016

16-0471r RR 16 06 23 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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