Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-227/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) 

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Document Relates to:

Tech Data Corp. v. Hitachi, 

Ltd., No. 13-cv-00157;

Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Hitachi, 

Ltd., No. 13-cv-01173;

Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. 

Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., No. 13-cv-02776.

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Case No. C 07-5944 SC

MDL No. 1917

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is the Defendants' joint motion to 

dismiss claims asserted in the above-captioned cases1 by Tech Data 

 1 The operative pleadings were originally filed in Case No. 07-5944 

at ECF Nos. 1604-2 ("Sharp Compl."), 1741-2 ("Sharp-Philips 

Compl."), and 1911 ("Tech Data Compl."). However, pursuant to 

stipulation, ECF No. 2240, the Joint Motion to Dismiss as to Sharp 

is deemed to apply to Sharp's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), filed under seal at ECF No. 2030.

The Sharp-Philips Complaint is an outlier in this matter because it 

is subject to a separate tolling agreement between Sharp and 

Koninklijke-Philips N.V. and its related entities (the "Philips 

Defendants"). Under that agreement, any claims based on the 

Philips Defendants' actions before April 29, 2009 are barred by 

applicable statutes of limitations. Per this order's analysis, 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2433 Filed 03/13/14 Page 1 of 20
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

and Sharp.2 The matter is fully briefed3 and appropriate for 

decision without oral argument, per Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). As 

explained below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the

motion.

II. BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with this case's facts. Accordingly,

the Court will only summarize some of the facts that are relevant 

to the instant motion, which only concerns whether any of Sharp or 

Tech Data's claims are barred by an applicable statute of 

limitations, and whether any relevant tolling doctrines apply to 

avoid that bar.

The underlying antitrust conspiracy in this MDL -- to fix 

prices of cathode ray tubes ("CRTs") and products containing CRTs -

- is alleged to have lasted between March 1, 1995 and December 2007 

(the "Relevant Period"). The plaintiffs in all of the MDL's cases 

contend that Defendants kept the conspiracy secret, to avoid 

putting the plaintiffs (and anyone else) on notice. But on 

November 8, 2007, the European Commission ("EC") issued a press 

release stating that its officials had raided several unnamed CRT 

manufacturers. Shortly thereafter, other countries' law 

enforcement agencies conducted similar raids, and within a few 

 

this changes little, and the parties do not discuss this point 

much.

2 "Sharp" collectively includes Sharp Electronics Corporation 

("SEC") and Sharp Electronics Manufacturing Company of America, 

Inc. ("SEMA"). Tech Data Corporation and Tech Data Product 

Management, Inc., are collectively called "Tech Data."

3 Case No. 07-5944 ECF Nos. 1992 ("MTD"), 2194 ("Sharp Opp'n"), 

2197 ("Tech Data Opp'n"), 2231 ("Reply"). 

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United States District Court

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weeks, Defendants Panasonic, Samsung SDI, and Philips all 

acknowledged that they were under investigation. 

A major point of contention as to this motion is whether Sharp 

or Tech Data were parts of any of the earlier-filed class actions: 

the direct purchaser plaintiff ("DPPs") class, the indirect 

purchaser plaintiff ("IPP") class, or any of the state classes that 

were later subsumed by the DPP or IPP actions. Sharp filed an 

individual complaint on March 15, 2013, opting out of the putative 

DPP class. It filed another separate complaint against the Philips 

Defendants on June 17, 2013. Both of Sharp's complaints assert

claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. et seq.; the 

California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq.;

the California UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; New 

York's Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 340 et seq.; the New York 

UCL, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 et seq.; the New Jersey Antitrust Act,

N.J. Stat. § 56:9-1 et seq.; and the Tennessee Antitrust Act, Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 47-25-101 et seq.

Tech Data filed its first complaint on December 11, 2012. 

Tech Data asserts claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the 

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat. §

501.201 et seq., the Cartwright Act, and the California UCL.

All of Tech Data and Sharp's claims are subject to four-year 

statutes of limitations, except the New York UCL and the Tennessee 

Antitrust Act, which have three-year statutes of limitations. 

Defendants now jointly move to dismiss Sharp and Tech Data's 

claims, arguing that under no theory -- fraudulent concealment, 

cross-jurisdictional tolling, American Pipe tolling,4 equitable 

 4 So called because it is derived from the case American Pipe & 

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tolling, or government tolling -- can Sharp or Tech Data avoid 

their claims' being barred, since they bring their claims so many 

years after the alleged conspiracy had been revealed. Sharp's 

claims against the Philips Defendants before April 29, 2009 are 

time-barred under those parties' tolling agreement. Defendants' 

arguments address only Sharp and Tech Data's state law claims, not 

their federal claims.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "Dismissal can be based 

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1988). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court 

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The allegations made in a 

complaint must be both "sufficiently detailed to give fair notice 

to the opposing party of the nature of the claim so that the party 

may effectively defend against it" and "sufficiently plausible" 

 

Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 

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such that "it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be 

subjected to the expense of discovery." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened 

pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 

which requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud "must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." See Kearns v. 

Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). "To satisfy 

Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and 

how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or 

misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it 

is false." United States ex rel Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Fraudulent Concealment

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment focuses on actions that 

a defendant took to prevent a plaintiff from learning of grounds 

for filing a suit. See Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 

1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). To invoke the doctrine, plaintiffs 

must allege facts demonstrating that they could not have discovered 

the alleged violations by exercising reasonable diligence. 

Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 

(N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Hubbard v. Fid. Fed. Bank, 91 F.3d 75, 

79 (9th Cir. 1996). A fraudulent concealment claim must be alleged 

with particularity under Rule 9(b). Noll v. eBay, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 

462, 468 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

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Defendants argue that neither Sharp nor Tech Data can 

plausibly allege that they had no actual or constructive knowledge 

of their claims as of December 11, 2008 (for Tech Data) or March 

15, 2009 (for Sharp). Defendants contend that because of the fact 

that litigation in this high-profile MDL had been proceeding apace, 

and since both Sharp and Tech Data's pleadings refer to the very 

public investigations of some of these Defendants, there is no 

plausible excuse for Tech Data or Sharp's statement that they had 

no knowledge of their claims' bases, absent any further facts. See

MTD at 9-12. Further, Defendants claim that Tech Data and Sharp 

fail to meet their burden to plead fraudulent concealment with 

particularity, since their complaints do not allege any affirmative 

acts following the end of the alleged conspiracy period or the 

announcement of the government investigations. Id. at 12-13. 

The Court finds that both Tech Data and Sharp have 

sufficiently pled fraudulent concealment until November 14, 2007, 

the latest date this Court has held to provide actual or inquiry 

notice to the DAPs. See In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust 

Litig., No. C-07-5944, 2013 WL 4505701, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 

2013). This renders their claims time-barred unless they are able 

to invoke a tolling doctrine or some equivalent.

i. American Pipe Tolling

American Pipe held that commencement of a class action 

suspends the statute of limitation as to all putative members of 

the class up to and until class certification is denied or the 

plaintiff opts out of the class. 414 U.S. at 554; Williams v. 

Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008); Emp'rs-Teamsters 

Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 

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498 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2007). "Tolling is fair in such a case 

because when the complaint is filed defendants have notice of the 

'substantive claims being brought against them.'" Williams, 517 

F.3d at 1136 (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 

345, 352-53 (1983)). "However, the tolling rule does not 'leave[] 

a plaintiff free to raise different or peripheral claims following 

denial of class status.'" Id. at 1136 (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 

354 (Powell, J. concurring)) (alterations in original).

The parties first dispute whether Crown limits the rule of 

American Pipe in a way that would toll only later-filed claims that 

are identical to those asserted in the earlier-filed class actions, 

as opposed to tolling new claims asserted by putative class 

members. Tech Data Opp'n at 5; Sharp Opp'n at 13. Sharp and Tech 

Data contend that it is the substantive similarity of the claim 

that matters for American Pipe tolling, not their actual identity. 

Id. Defendants claim that the causes of action asserted in the 

arguably tolled complaints have to be identical to those from the 

class action complaints in order for American Pipe to apply. Reply 

at 4-5.

The Court finds for Defendants on this point. Justice 

Powell's concurrence from Crown indicates that while courts should 

permit tolling when a lawsuit raises claims that "concern the same 

evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the 

original class suit," it is still important to "make certain . . . 

that American Pipe is not abused by the assertion of claims that 

differ from those raised in the original class suit." 462 U.S. at 

354; see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 

07-1827 SI, C 12-4114 SI, 2013 WL 254873, at *2 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 

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Jan. 13, 2013) (declining to apply American Pipe to state law 

claims not asserted in the original class complaint); accord In re 

Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 793-97 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(same). 

This holding comports with other post-American Pipe rulings, 

such as Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 467 

(1975), in which the Supreme Court held that American Pipe tolling 

did not apply to a later-filed claim that was not identical to the 

earlier-filed class claims. The Court stated: "Finally, and 

perhaps most importantly, the tolling effect given to the timely 

prior filings in American Pipe and [Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 

380 U.S. 424 (1965)] depended heavily on the fact that those 

filings involved exactly the same cause of action subsequently 

asserted. This factor was more than a mere abstract or theoretical 

consideration because the prior filing in each case necessarily 

operated to avoid the evil against which the statute of limitations 

was designed to protect." Id.; see also Int'l Union of Elec., 

Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, 

Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (declining to toll a later-filed 

claim that was not identical to the earlier-filed claim, citing 

Johnson).5

a. Direct Purchaser Cases

None of the direct purchaser complaints asserts a state law 

cause of action. Therefore, based on the above reasoning, the 

Court does not find that American Pipe tolling extends to any of 

 5 In an unpublished 2005 opinion, the Ninth Circuit found 

similarly. Card v. Duker, 122 Fed. App'x 347, 349 (9th Cir. 2005) 

("The Supreme Court has thus not extended tolling due to class 

litigation beyond American Pipe's narrow allowance for identical 

causes of action brought where the class was decertified.").

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Tech Data or Sharp's state law causes of action based on direct 

purchases. Based on this conclusion, it is not necessary to reach 

the issue of whether those states' laws would apply American Pipe

in the cross-jurisdictional context. Further, to the extent Sharp 

and Tech Data rely on indirect purchases for standing, they would 

not be able to toll claims based on direct purchaser complaints, 

which were exclusively brought on behalf of direct purchasers.

In any event, none of the states in which Sharp or Tech Data 

purports to bring claims would adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling.6

 

The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "[a]doption of [crossjurisdictional tolling] would run the risk that Tennessee courts 

would become a clearinghouse for cases that are barred in the 

jurisdictions in which they otherwise would have been brought." 

Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tenn. 

2000). New Jersey limits tolling to former class members, and only 

to the extent their claims were raised in the original putative 

class actions, so Sharp cannot rely on that case since the DPP 

class did not assert a New Jersey claim. Del Sontro v. Cendant 

Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (D.N.J. 2002). New York law is 

unsettled, but the Court follows the Southern District of New York 

in declining to import American Pipe into New York state law. 

Soward v. Deutsche Bank AG, 814 F. Supp. 2d 272, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 

2011). California explicitly forecloses American Pipe's 

application to cross-jurisdictional actions. Hatfield v. Halifax 

 6 In encouraging the Court to apply cross-jurisdictional tolling to 

the state claims, Sharp asks the Court to adopt the case-by-case 

test from In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 223 F.R.D. 335 

(E.D. Pa. 2004). The Court declines to do so. That case is not 

binding on the Court.

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PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1025 ("California's interest 

in managing its own judicial system counsel[s] us not to import the 

doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling into California law.").7

 

Finally, Tech Data's Florida claim is a special case, which the 

Court addresses (and dismisses) below, but regardless of that, 

Florida Statute section 95.051(1) sets out the exclusive list of 

Florida tolling doctrines, which does not include crossjurisdictional tolling.

b. The Special Case of Equitable Tolling in 

California

Equitable tolling under California law is a judicially created 

doctrine that suspends or extends statutes of limitations in order 

to ensure that limitations periods are not used to bar claims 

unfairly. Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185. Courts apply three factors 

in deciding whether to apply equitable tolling in California: "(1) 

timely notice to the defendant in the filing of the first claim; 

(2) lack of prejudice to the defendant in gathering evidence to 

defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable 

conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim." Id. 

Equitable tolling overlaps with American Pipe tolling to some 

extent, though the two doctrines are not congruent, so this 

analysis falls outside the discussion of American Pipe tolling and 

its limitations. Id. at 1188. 

The Court is not completely convinced by Tech Data and Sharp's 

contentions that the Court should apply California's equitable 

 7 The Court addresses California's equitable tolling doctrine 

separately.

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tolling and allow them collectively to extend the tolling periods 

for state law claims not asserted in the DPP action. Only Sharp 

Plaintiff SEMA is a California resident, since it is organized 

under California law and has its principal place of business in San 

Diego. No other plaintiffs are entitled to equitable tolling, 

which is limited to California residents. Id. at 1189 ("Although 

we conclude that California would allow its resident class members 

to reap tolling benefits under its equitable tolling doctrine, the 

same cannot be said for the non-resident class members."). To the 

extent that Sharp's complaint brings claims on behalf of SEMA's 

direct purchases from Defendants, however, the Court finds that

equitable tolling should apply, because (1) Defendants have had 

timely notice of the DPP action; (2) Defendants are not prejudiced 

in gathering evidence to defend against SEMA's claim, since the DPP 

cases (though now nearing settlement) have been underway for years; 

and (3) it does not appear that Sharp has acted in bad faith in 

filing this opt-out case. See Hatfield, 564 F.3d at 1185. 

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' arguments against 

the application of the doctrine to SEMA. First, Defendants' cases 

denying equitable tolling on the basis of a state-law claim having 

been filed first refer to the same named plaintiffs bringing cases 

first in state court and later pursuing a federal case, relying on 

the earlier-filed state action to toll their claims -- the present 

case's fact pattern is different. See Eichman v. Fotomat, 880 F.2d 

149, 155-56 (9th Cir. 1989); Mir. v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988). Second, the Court is also not 

convinced by Defendants' argument that equitable estoppel does not 

apply when plaintiffs file a subsequent action in the same court as 

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the prior action. Reply at 8 (citing, among other cases, Centaur 

Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Grp., 

878 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). Defendants' cases 

again refer to named plaintiffs, or putative class members after 

the denial of class certification, and the Court does not find that 

the equities in those cases are the same as those at work in this 

one.

Therefore, Sharp's California claims on behalf of SEMA's 

direct purchases from Defendants remain in the case pursuant to 

equitable tolling. Sharp's California claims on behalf of any 

other Sharp entities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

c. Indirect Purchaser Cases

Sharp and Tech Data also assert that to the extent they allege 

causes of action based on indirect purchases, they are entitled to 

tolling based on earlier-filed indirect purchaser plaintiffs' 

("IPPs") class actions. As noted above, the Court holds that 

American Pipe tolling is inapplicable to state law claims not 

asserted in previous actions, so the Court will evaluate tolling 

here only as to claims actually asserted in the IPP cases. Both

Sharp and Tech Data refer to two earlier-filed IPP cases that 

asserted California state law claims,8 which they contend

separately entitle them to toll their California state law claims 

from those cases' filings dates until March 16, 2009, when the IPP 

consolidated class complaint was finalized to exclude resellers 

like Sharp and Tech Data. The first case, Juetten, was filed 

 8 Juetten v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd., No. 07-cv-6225 (N.D. 

Cal.) and Gonzalez v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd., No. 08-cv- 01108) (N.D. Cal.)

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December 10, 2007; the second, Gonzalez, was filed on February 25, 

2008. 

The Court finds that neither Sharp nor Tech Data can assert 

tolling based on the IPP cases. First, the plaintiff in Juetten

brought his case only on behalf of purchasers who bought CRTs "for 

their own use and not for resale." ECF 1 ("Juetten Compl.") ¶ 84, 

No. 07-cv-6225. This excludes Tech Data and Sharp's claims based 

on indirect purchases, since they acknowledge that they are 

resellers.9 

Second, Gonzalez does not rescue either Tech Data or Sharp's 

claims because it does not extend the tolling period long enough. 

It was filed on February 25, 2008, and is relevant for tolling 

purposes only until March 16, 2009, when the IPP Consolidated 

Amended Complaint ("IPP CCAC"), was filed. ECF No. 437. Tech Data 

must account for tolling between November 14, 2007, and December 

11, 2012, when it filed its complaint. Sharp must account for 

tolling between November 14, 2007, and March 19, 2013. "[U]nder 

American Pipe the limitations period applicable to [a plaintiff's 

claims] could have been tolled only until such time as he was no 

longer a class member, that is . . . when [the amended complaint] 

in the consolidated class action was filed." Chardon v. Soto, 462 

U.S. 650, 654 (1983). 385 days passed between Gonzalez's filing 

date and the IPP CCAC's filing date. This leaves both Tech Data 

and Sharp still in excess of four years between dates on which they 

would have had notice of their claims, and their actual filing 

 9 Defendants contend that the Court should find that the same 

exclusion applies to Gonzalez even though its complaint does not 

expressly limit the proposed class in the way that Juetten's did. 

The Court declines to speculate on what the named plaintiff from 

Gonzalez planned to do.

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dates. In Sharp's case, five years, four months, and five days --

1,952 days in total -- passed between the notice date and the day 

Tech Data filed its complaint. For Tech Data, five years and 

twenty-seven days -- 1,854 days total -- passed between those two 

dates. Gonzalez could have provided, at most, one year and twenty 

days of tolling, leaving both Sharp and Tech Data outside the 

limitations period. 

Therefore, even if Gonzalez could toll Sharp or Tech Data's 

California claims, with the exception of SEMA's California claims 

related to direct purchases, those claims would remain time-barred.

ii. Governmental Action

a. New York

Sharp argues that the federal government's actions on the CRT 

conspiracy toll the statute of limitations for its Donnelly Act 

claims, beginning with the DOJ's criminal actions against CRT 

conspirators in February 2009. Sharp Opp'n at 11-12. They base 

this argument not on federal antitrust tolling provisions, but on 

the Donnelly Act's own tolling provision, which tolls Donnelly Act 

limitations periods pending federal antitrust proceedings:

Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted 

by the federal government to prevent, restrain, or 

punish violations of the federal antitrust laws, the 

running of the period of limitations in respect of every 

right of action arising under sections three hundred 

forty, three hundred forty-two and three hundred forty- two-a of this article, based in whole or in part on any 

matter complained of in the federal proceeding, shall be 

suspended during the pendency of said proceeding and for 

one year thereafter . . . .

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 342-c. Sharp further notes that, elsewhere in 

this litigation, Defendants have conceded that Donnelly Act claims 

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are tolled due to pending federal investigations. Opp'n at 12 

(citing ECF No. 1422 ("Defs. Joint Reply ISO MTD DAP Claims")). 

Defendants contend that their earlier motion was directed 

toward other DAPs, whose complaints were filed in November 2011. 

Reply at 15. They also argue that the New York tolling provision

does not save Sharp's claim. Id. at 14-15. According to 

Defendants, tolling under that statute commences only as of the 

date an indictment was filed, and lasts through the pendency of 

prosecution. Id. at 15 (citing Hinds Cnty., Miss. v. Wachovia Bank 

N.A., 885 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying tolling 

under the federal provision, not Section 342-c); Dungan v. Morgan 

Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1978) (same)). 

Defendants claim that because Sharp has alleged nothing as to the 

duration of any criminal proceedings, except fifty-five days 

between March 18, 2011 and May 12, 2011 when two defendants entered 

plea agreements, there is no way for Sharp to account for the 

period between November 2007 and March 2013. Id. Defendants state 

that even if Sharp's Donnelly Act claim were tolled for a year and 

fifty-five days, Sharp's March 2013 complaint is still untimely. 

Id.

The Court is not convinced by Defendants' argument. The Court 

finds that § 16(i) tolling applies based on the open indictments in 

this case. First, one criminal matter, pending between March 18, 

2011 until its closure in August 30, 2012, tolls claims under §

16(i) for that time period plus a year. Further, based on J.M. 

Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1978), 

tolling under § 16(i) begins at least at the indictment stage, 

though the Court notes that Dungan had the benefit of at least one 

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completed criminal case. However, the Ninth Circuit's holding was 

in fact based on the court's reasoning that the return of a grand 

jury indictment fits the statutory language of § 16(i) more 

comfortably than empanelling alone would, since the purpose of an 

indictment is the prevention, restraint, or punishment of antitrust 

violations. In this case, the open indictments Sharp references 

remain pending, and the Court finds Dungan instructive here: 

tolling under § 16(i) may begin at least with the return of an 

indictment, and absent facts or law indicating that the Court 

cannot apply tolling because not much has happened in those cases, 

the Court finds that under current precedent tolling will apply 

from February 10, 2009 to the present as to Sharp's Donnelly Act 

claims.

b. Florida

Tech Data argues that its FDUTPA claim is tolled because in 

2011, the State of Florida filed a complaint, ECF No. 2349-1 ("Fl. 

Compl."), alleging that Defendants' alleged conspiracy violated the 

FDUTPA. Tech Data relies on Section 501.207(1)(c) of the Florida 

Statutes, which gives the State the authority to bring actions on 

behalf of consumers or governmental entities for damages caused by 

FDUTPA violations. Tech Data Opp'n at 8-9. The Florida Complaint 

was not filed under Rule 23 or a comparable state class action 

statute, see Fl. Compl., but Tech Data, a Florida-based business, 

would have fallen under the group of "consumers" on behalf of whom 

Florida could sue. Id. It contends that Florida would recognize 

American Pipe tolling, so the Court should toll the statute of 

limitations based on the State's complaint. Id. at 9. 

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Defendants respond that a different Florida statute, Section 

95.051(1), provides an exclusive list of conditions that can toll 

the Florida statute of limitations. Reply at 11. They also argue 

that Tech Data's cited cases do not support their contention that 

Florida would recognize American Pipe tolling. Id. And in their 

supplemental brief, they add that since the Florida complaint is 

not a class action, it is not subject to American Pipe tolling in 

any event. See ECF No. 2360 ("Supp. Reply") at 1-2.

Tech Data's argument is essentially that it would have been a 

putative class member of the State of Florida's class action, and 

Florida would apply American Pipe tolling, so the Court should toll 

the claim. Defendants are right that Section 95.051(1) provides an 

exclusive list of Floridian tolling doctrines, and class-action 

American Pipe tolling is not on it. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. 

Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091, 1095-96 & n.7 (Fla. 2002) 

(affirming that Section 95.051 is exclusive, but distinguishing 

tolling doctrines from equitable estoppel). Defendants also argue 

that a parens patriae case brought on behalf of state consumers and 

businesses do not apply to toll actions under American Pipe, 

because they are not brought pursuant to Rule 23 or a similar state 

statute or rule of judicial procedure. Supp. Reply at 2 (citing 

Miss. ex rel Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 740-41 

(2014)). 

The Court finds this reasoning compelling in light of 

Mississippi v. AU Optronics. That case concerned, in part, whether 

a case brought by a state as sole plaintiff, on behalf of state 

consumers -- but not filed as a class action under either Rule 23 

or an equivalent state law or rule -- could qualify as a "mass 

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action" under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. §

1332(d). 134 S. Ct. 736, 740-41 (2014). Under CAFA, class actions 

are civil actions filed under Rule 23 or a similar state statute or 

procedural rule, and mass actions are civil actions in which 

"monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be 

tried jointly on the ground the plaintiffs' claims involve common 

questions of law or fact." Id. at 740. The Supreme Court noted 

that both the trial court and appellate court had held that the 

suit, in which the State of Mississippi was sole plaintiff, was not 

a class action. Id. at 741. After holding that the word "person" 

in CAFA referred to "plaintiffs," and "plaintiffs" were the actual 

named parties in the suit, the Supreme Court rejected the argument 

that the case's similarity to a class action -- being brought by 

one named party on behalf of other parties in interest, in this 

case the citizens of Mississippi -- merited its being analyzed as 

one under CAFA. Id. at 744-45. 

The Court finds this reasoning applicable to the present case: 

there must be a distinction between a class action and a case 

brought by a state on behalf of its citizens. Even if crossjurisdictional tolling were to apply in Florida, the State of 

Florida's complaint was not a class action, regardless of the 

state's authority to bring actions on behalf of consumers. See

Fla. Stat. § 501.207(1)(c). As the Supreme Court has held, when

consumers are parties in interest to a case in which the State is 

the sole plaintiff and has not brought the action as a class action 

(or when the action is not a mass action), the parens patriae 

case's similarity to those types of actions does not warrant courts 

analyzing all such cases as if they were the same. See Miss. v. AU 

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Optronics, 134 S. Ct. at 741. American Pipe does not apply here, 

and the Court makes no holding as to whether Florida would adopt it

even if it were applicable. The Court also declines to evaluate 

the parties' disputes over whether American Pipe tolling would save 

Plaintiffs' claims if it did apply.

In any event, Tech Data's claim would be untimely even if the 

Florida complaint tolled its cause of action. The parties made the 

relevant dates clear in their supplemental briefs, and the Court 

finds that the complaint could toll the relevant four-year 

limitations period if, assuming the longest possible tolling date, 

the period was tolled between the Florida complaint's filing on 

December 9, 2011, and December 11, 2012. Considering the period 

between November 14, 2007, and December 11, 2012 -- five years and 

twenty-seven days -- applying a tolling period of 367 days leaves 

Tech Data several weeks outside the limitations period. Finally, 

the fact that Florida law explicitly does not include crossjurisdictional class-action tolling also counsels rejecting Tech 

Data's argument on this point.

As this is not a dismissal that could be cured with amendment, 

it is WITH PREJUDICE.

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V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Sharp's state law claims are DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE, with the exception of Sharp Plaintiff SEMA's 

California claims and Sharp's Donnelly Act claim, which remain in 

the case. Tech Data's California and Florida claims are DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. All parties' federal claims are undisturbed. All 

holdings apply to the Philips Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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