Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99001/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

California State Prison at San

Quentin,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-99001

D.C. No.

2:96-cv-00351-

WDK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

William D. Keller, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 17, 2017

Pasadena, California

Filed October 10, 2017

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski,

and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;

Dissent by Judge Kozinski

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2 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel vacated the district court’s order dismissing for

lack of exhaustion claims in William Kirkpatrick, Jr’s habeas

corpus petition challenging his murder conviction and death

sentence, and remanded to the district court so that it may

adjudicate those claims on the merits.

The district court dismissed the claims as unexhausted on

the ground that, although Kirkpatrick presented them to the

California Supreme Court, he subsequently waived them by

means of a handwritten, pro se filing. The California

Supreme Court ruled that the handwritten form constituted a

valid waiver despite the conclusion of the referee it appointed

that there was not enough evidence that the waiver was made

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The district court

agreed with the California Supreme Court. 

The panel held that there is insufficient evidence in the

record to support a finding that Kirkpatrick’s handwritten

form constituted a valid waiver of his right to proceed and

that the State of California failed to carry its burden to the

contrary. Consequently, the panel held that the district court

erred in dismissing the claims as unexhausted.

Dissenting, Judge Kozinski wrote that the majority failed

to defer to the California Supreme Court whose findings are

supported by more than enough evidence, and that under de

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 3

novo review Kirkpatrick would fare no better, but that none

of this matters because California has no functional death

penalty.

COUNSEL

Patricia A. Young (argued) and Mark R. Drozdowski, Deputy

Federal Public Defenders; Hilary Potashner, Federal Public

Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Robert C. Schneider (argued), A. Scott Hayward, and Jaime

L. Fuster, Deputy Attorneys General; Lance E. Winters,

Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief

Assistant Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,

Los Angeles, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

William Kirkpatrick, Jr., was convicted of murder and

sentenced to death in California more than thirty years ago. 

His case has followed a long and complicated procedural path

to this court. He now appeals the district court’s dismissal of

certain claims for relief in his federal habeas corpus petition. 

He contends that the district court was wrong to dismiss those

claims as unexhausted and should instead have adjudicated

them on the merits – something that has not yet happened in

any court, state or federal.

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4 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

The district court dismissed the claims as unexhausted on

the ground that, although Kirkpatrick presented them to the

California Supreme Court, he subsequently waived them by

means of a handwritten, pro se filing. The California

Supreme Court ruled that the handwritten form constituted a

valid waiver despite the conclusion of the referee it appointed

that there was not enough evidence that the waiver was made

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, as the Constitution

requires. The district court agreed with the California

Supreme Court.

We conclude that there is insufficient evidence in the

record to support a finding that Kirkpatrick’s handwritten

form constituted a valid waiver of his right to proceed and

that the State failed to carry its burden to the contrary. 

Consequently, we hold that the district court erred in

dismissing the claims as unexhausted. We remand the case

to the district court so that it may adjudicate the claims in

question on the merits.1

I. BACKGROUND

A.

In September 1983, two men were murdered at a Taco

Bell in Burbank, California. Both victims, who worked at the

restaurant, were shot in the head point blank. Police soon

arrested and charged Kirkpatrick with the double murder. He

was 23 years old at the time.

1 Kirkpatrick also appeals the dismissal of one other claim that was

admittedly exhausted, but for reasons we explain below, we do not reach

that claim here.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 5

In the three decades in which Kirkpatrick’s case has been

pending in various courts, he has repeatedly tried to represent

himself or to interfere with his defense when represented by

counsel and has repeatedlyexpressed dissatisfaction with and

distrust of his lawyers. Shortly after the State brought

charges against him, the trial court appointed two lawyers,

two psychiatrists, and an investigator to assist in

Kirkpatrick’s defense. Kirkpatrick, however, requested that

he be appointed as co-counsel for purposes of the trial.2 He

also insisted on proceeding to trial quickly – even after

another possible perpetrator, Eddie Salazar, was arrested in

connection with the same crimes. A few weeks after voir

dire, Kirkpatrick sent a letter to the court criticizing his

attorneys’ performance. The lawyers explained that they

were having problems with their client, whose desires clashed

with their legal advice.

The State’s theory of the case at trial was that Kirkpatrick

stole a .22 caliber gun from a Union 76 gas station, and used

it to murder the Taco Bell employees several days later, with

the help of Salazar, his co-conspirator. The prosecution also

said that Kirkpatrick told acquaintances about the crime after

it had been committed.

To support this theory, the prosecution called

42 witnesses. Several testified that they saw Kirkpatrick with

a gun that looked like the murder weapon in the days before

the shooting. One witness testified that he saw Kirkpatrick

and Salazar together shortly before the shootings, and another

witness testified that he saw the two men, with a gun,

immediately afterwards. The prosecution introduced

evidence of bullets found in Kirkpatrick’s car, and car stereo

2

 This request was denied.

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6 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

equipment that had allegedly been stolen from the Union 76

gas station. The prosecution also entered the .22 caliber gun

– the supposed murder weapon – into evidence, although the

firearms examiner could not be sure that that particular

weapon had fired the bullets collected at the crime scene.

Kirkpatrick testified in his own defense, despite counsel’s

advice that it was not in his best interest to do so. He

discussed his location the night of the crimes, and said that he

had intended to visit a friend in Whittier but was not able to

do so because his car battery died. He said that he purchased

a new car battery in the early morning following the time at

which the shootings occurred and then slept in a motel. The

defense’s three other witnesses corroborated his whereabouts

at several points in time, but did not provide any concrete

alibi. Kirkpatrick’s lawyer conceded that whoever committed

the crimes committed first degree murder, and apologetically

told the jury that lawyers “deal with . . . facts as best they

can.”

The jury deliberated for five days and, during their

deliberation, asked for a read-back of the testimony of four

witnesses. The jury found Kirkpatrick guilty on all counts

and found true all death-qualifying special circumstances. 

During the jury’s deliberations, the court received another

letter from Kirkpatrick complaining about his lawyers; he

said that he no longer considered them his attorneys.

B.

Kirkpatrick asked to represent himself at the penalty

phase of the trial – the proceeding at which the jury would

decide whether to sentence him to life with the possibility of

parole, or to death. The court denied Kirkpatrick’s request on

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 7

the grounds that his request was untimely and that there was

no overwhelming reason for the court in its discretion to

allow Kirkpatrick to proceed pro se. The court nevertheless

granted him co-counsel status when he threatened not to

appear unless he could proceed pro se. The court asked about

his letter and complaints against his attorneys, and

Kirkpatrick said that at some points the lawyers “went

completely against everything [he] requested,” including

requests to subpoena witnesses that were ignored. His

lawyers did not dispute these claims.

To support a sentence of death, the prosecution presented

evidence of Kirkpatrick’s troubling past actions as

aggravating circumstances. The defense’s mitigation

presentation took place the same day, and consisted solely of

Kirkpatrick’s brief testimony, in which he simply reasserted

his innocence and said that he was from New York and

aspired to be a writer.

Beyond that, the defense essentially prepared no case for

mitigation at the penalty phase. The lawyer and investigator

spoke to only one person, Kirkpatrick’s mother, in

preparation for their presentation of mitigating evidence. 

They believed that she would be “very, very helpful to the

defense,” but she was never called to testify. This may have

been at Kirkpatrick’s insistence, as he instructed his lawyers

not to interview or present any family members as witnesses. 

Kirkpatrick also stated that he did not want any of his family

members brought to court or even contacted at all, and the

investigator did not interview any of Kirkpatrick’s other

family members or friends. Although his lawyers stated that

Kirkpatrick should be evaluated psychiatrically, Kirkpatrick

said that he did not want to meet with a psychiatrist, and the

court “accept[ed] Mr. Kirkpatrick’s position on that.” In any

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8 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

event, no evidence of Kirkpatrick’s difficult upbringing, his

disadvantaged social background, his history of mental health

problems and drug abuse, or his relationships with friends and

family was ever presented to the court or even investigated by

the defense team.

All that Kirkpatrick said in his closing statement was that

he had not received a fair trial. He said that his attorneys

failed to call certain witnesses and failed to ask specific

questions. He said he was “frightened” and “mad” that

prosecutors were sending an innocent person to jail. He also

told jurors that he did not blame them for finding him guilty

and that he would have done the same thing if he had been in

their position.

The prosecution replied that Kirkpatrick was “an

anarchist,” and that “[h]is contribution to society has been

pain, suffering, and misery.” It said that “the circumstances

in aggravation far outweigh any circumstances in mitigation,

if any” and that the jury could impose a sentence of life

without parole, rather than a sentence of death, only if it

ignored the aggravating factors.

Two days after the jury began its penalty selection

deliberations, it returned a death verdict for both murders. 

The court proceeded to hold a sentencing hearing at which it

reviewed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and

found that the only mitigating factors were the defendant’s

lack of prior felony convictions and his young age. It

sentenced Kirkpatrick to death.3

3 Kirkpatrick’s supposed co-conspirator, Eddie Salazar, was also

convicted for his participation in the Taco Bell crimes and was later

sentenced to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 9

C.

Kirkpatrick filed a direct appeal in the California Supreme

Court and a state habeas petition claiming penalty phase

ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme

Court affirmed Kirkpatrick’s conviction in a lengthy opinion. 

People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248 (1994). It also

summarily denied the habeas petition, although two of the

justices voted to grant relief for penalty phase ineffective

assistance.

Kirkpatrick later filed a federal habeas petition in the

Central District of California raising numerous claims for

relief. This time, he was represented by Federal Public

Defenders rather than the lawyers appointed by the state

court. The district court found that a number of the claims in

the federal petition had not been exhausted in state court. 

Accordingly, it stayed consideration of the petition to permit

Kirkpatrick to return to state court. Kirkpatrick then filed a

petition in the California Supreme Court raising the claims

that the district court had found to be unexhausted; he

presented more than twenty such claims.

A year and a half later, while his petition was pending in

the California Supreme Court, Kirkpatrick sent that court a

letter and attached a handwritten document entitled “Waiver

Form.” The form stated, in its entirety: “I do not wish to

proceed with my petition for writ of habeas corpus review in

this matter. I wish the sentence and the judgement [sic] of

execution in People v. William Kirkpatrick, Jr. 1459044 to be

carried out at this time.” The document was signed and dated

by Kirkpatrick.

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10 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

The California Supreme Court then confronted the

question whether this document constituted a valid waiver of

Kirkpatrick’s petition. The Court appointed a referee, Marin

County Superior Court Judge Stephen Graham, to examine

whether the waiver satisfied the Constitution’s requirements

– that is, whether Kirkpatrick was competent to waive the

petition and whether the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent.

The referee did not recommend that the court find the

waiver valid. He told the court that he was unable to

conclude that the waiver was “knowing” or “intelligent”

because Kirkpatrick “refused to engage in sufficient

discussion with the Referee to permit the Referee to

determine whether the request to withdraw the pending

habeas corpus petition is made knowingly and intelligently.” 

The report continued, “The Referee . . . is not able to assess,

with the limitations imposed by Mr. Kirkpatrick, whether the

act is done in the context of sufficient information and

understanding of present circumstances and potential

consequences to be found to be knowing and intelligent.”

The referee’s investigation was fatally impeded by

Kirkpatrick’s refusal to participate. Initially, Kirkpatrick

cooperated with the referee. He appeared for status

conferences on four occasions, and was evaluated by a courtappointed psychiatrist for two and a half hours. Following

that examination, however, Kirkpatrick refused to participate

further. He refused to be interviewed by three different

experts retained by the Federal Public Defender. He also

refused to attend the referee’s evidentiary hearing in March

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 11

2001.4 At no point in the investigation was he interviewed

under oath or on the record about his understanding of the

waiver’s significance. As a result, the referee concluded that

there was no evidentiary basis on which to determine that

Kirkpatrick’s waiver was valid.

Notwithstanding the referee’s report, the California

Supreme Court approved the waiver. It reversed the referee’s

recommendationwithouttaking anyfurther evidence, without

giving any reasons for its decision, and without interviewing

Kirkpatrick under oath or otherwise about his intentions or

understanding of the waiver’s legal effect. In a two sentence

order, it simply stated that Kirkpatrick “made a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed.” 

Having found the waiver valid, the court dismissed

Kirkpatrick’s petition, which if resolved on the merits would

have served to exhaust his claims.

D.

The case returned to federal court. Following the

California Supreme Court’s dismissal of the petition,

Kirkpatrick’s lawyers filed an amended federal habeas

petition. This petition included the claims presented in his

state court petition – that is, the claims that the state court

decided that Kirkpatrick had waived.

4 At that hearing, the court-appointed psychiatrist testified that

Kirkpatrick had no “mental disease, disorder or defect.” Although the

experts supplied by the Federal Public Defender never had the opportunity

to meet with Kirkpatrick themselves, they reviewed the report prepared by

the psychiatrist and “expressed doubt as to the value of [her] opinions”

because they disputed her methodology and believed that she “fail[ed] to

address issues . . . raised by her report.”

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The State then moved in district court to dismiss the

purportedly waived claims. Kirkpatrick objected, arguing

that the California Supreme Court was wrong to find that his

waiver was valid; he asserted that the waiver was not actually

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The district court,

however, upheld the state court’s conclusion that the waiver

was valid and dismissed the claims that had been the subject

of the waiver.

These more than twenty-odd claims have not been

adjudicated on the merits by any court. The claims challenge

numerous aspects of Kirkpatrick’s conviction and sentence. 

They include: the claim that law enforcement officials failed

to investigate or provide exculpatory evidence; the claim that

law enforcement officials conducted unconstitutional

interrogations of Kirkpatrick; the claim that the decision to

pursue the death penalty was based on Kirkpatrick’s race; the

claim that the trial court failed to provide Kirkpatrick with

alternate counsel; the claim that the trial court was biased

against Kirkpatrick; the claim that Kirkpatrick was

improperly excluded from courtroom proceedings; the claim

that Kirkpatrick was actually innocent; the claim that the

prosecution improperly joined separate allegations in a single

trial; the claim that Kirkpatrick was not competent to stand

trial; the claim of numerous instances of prosecutorial

misconduct prior to and during the guilt phase; the claim that

the statute under which Kirkpatrick was charged is

unconstitutional; the claim that the guilt phase jury

instructions were unconstitutional; the claim of cumulative

error prior to and during the guilt phase; the claim that the

trial court erroneously allowed the jury to consider lack of

remorse as an aggravating factor; the claim that trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to

present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase; the claim

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 13

that other mistakes at the penalty phase rendered counsels’

assistance ineffective; the claim that trial counsel abandoned

Kirkpatrick; the claim of numerous instances of prosecutorial

misconduct during the penalty phase; the claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel; the claim of Due Process and

Equal Protection violations in the appellate process; the claim

that the death penalty as applied to Kirkpatrick is

unconstitutional; and the claim that the cumulative impact of

these numerous errors renders Kirkpatrick’s conviction and

sentence unconstitutional.

In dismissing these claims, the district court applied

deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the California

Supreme Court’s determination that Kirkpatrick’s waiver had

been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. It stated that

“[u]nder AEDPA, the decision of the California Supreme

Court must be given deference, and cannot . . . be reviewed

de novo by this court.” Applying the highly deferential

standard, the district court concluded that because “there is

[some] evidence to support the conclusory findings of the

California Supreme Court,” its conclusion must be upheld. 

“There has been no unreasonable determination of the facts

or a decision contrary to, or involving an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law,” it said. The

district court also held, in the alternative, that the California

Supreme Court’s decision that the waiver was valid was

actually correct.

Kirkpatrick filed a revised amended petition, which

omitted the claims that the district court deemed unexhausted,

but reasserted other claims that had been resolved by the state

court on direct appeal. The district court dismissed those

claims as well, on the ground that none entitled Kirkpatrick

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14 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

to relief under AEDPA. The district court granted a

Certificate of Appealability as to one claim only – a

reasserted claim that related solely to a penalty issue – and

Kirkpatrick timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

We consider here only the question whether the district

court was wrong to dismiss as unexhausted the twenty-plus

claims that the state court dismissed because of Kirkpatrick’s

purported waiver. Kirkpatrick maintains that the district

court erred in upholding the waiver of those claims because

the waiver was not valid. He asks that we review – and

vacate – the district court’s order dismissing the claims, and

requests that they be remanded to that court for adjudication

on the merits.

The waiver issue was not mentioned in the Certificate of

Appealability granted by the district court. It was, however,

properly raised by Kirkpatrick in his briefs on appeal. At our

invitation, the State responded to Kirkpatrick’s briefing of the

issue, and Kirkpatrick replied to the State’s response. Thus,

the issue is fully briefed before us. We now expand the

Certificate of Appealability and proceed to consider whether

the district court erred in dismissing Kirkpatrick’s

purportedly unexhausted claims.5Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000).

5 Because we expand the Certificate of Appealability to include the

dismissal of the claims that the district court deemed unexhausted, and

resolve that issue in the manner described below, we do not reach the

originally certified issue regarding a penalty question.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 15

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas

petition, or any part of it, as unexhausted. Rhoades v. Henry,

638 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, we review de

novo mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether

Kirkpatrick’s waiver of the claims was knowing, voluntary,

and intelligent and therefore constitutionally valid. Moran v.

Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 698 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Whether a

waiver of constitutional rights was made knowingly and

voluntarily is a mixed question of law and fact which we

review de novo.”); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 672 (9th

Cir. 1994) (en banc).

A.

A defendant’s waiver of “his right to proceed” must be

“knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Whitmore v. Arkansas,

495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990). A court must inquire into whether

a waiver meets these conditions in order “to determine

whether the defendant actually does understand the

significance and consequences of a particular decision and

whether the decision is uncoerced.” Godinez v. Moran,

509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993).

There are “two distinct dimensions” to the knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent requirement. Moran v. Burbine,

475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). “First, the relinquishment of the

right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id.; see also Comer v.

Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (per

curiam) (“A waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary if,

under the totality of the circumstances, it was the product of

a free and deliberate choice rather than coercion or improper

inducement.”). “Second, the waiver must have been made

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16 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.

In its briefs, the State agreed that Kirkpatrick’s waiver is

valid only if it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. At

oral argument, however, the State took “inconsistent

positions” on whether the waiver needed to satisfy these

requirements, and eventually, in a post-argument letter,

firmly changed its position and stated that it did not. 

Assuming that the state did not waive its right to make this

tardy and inconsistent argument, its solitary citation to

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), does not

compel or even support its newfound position. Schneckloth

observed that the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

requirement does not necessarily apply “in every situation

where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional

protection” and is most often applied in the context of

constitutional trial rights. Id. at 235–37. The Supreme Court

has made clear, however, and we have long recognized, that

the requirement does apply to a habeas petitioner’s waiver of

his right to proceed further with his case or claim. See

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 732–36 (1990) (applying

the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent requirement to a

habeas petitioner who had “filed a petition for state

postconviction relief, but, prior to the hearing, changed his

mind and withdrew the petition”); Dennis ex rel. Butko v.

Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent requirement to a habeas

petitioner who wrote a letter to the Nevada Supreme Court

stating, “I no longer wish to pursue any appeals and want my

sentence to be carried out”); Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910,

912, 917 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the knowing, voluntary,

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 17

and intelligent requirement to a habeas petitioner who

allegedly “[did] not wish to pursue further legal remedies”).

Accordingly, Kirkpatrick’s waiver “must have been made

with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. In short, the waiver is

constitutionally valid only if it was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165.

In deciding whether a waiver meets this constitutional

requirement, “courts indulge in everyreasonable presumption

against waiver.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404

(1977). “[T]he proper standard to be applied in determining

the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional

law” is that it is “incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right

or privilege.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464 (1938), and noting that this “standard has been reiterated

in many cases”). In other words, “the burden of proving the

validity of a waiver of constitutional rights is always on the

government.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 450.

B.

The California Supreme Court understood that the

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard applied. 

Contrary to the recommendation of its referee, however, it

decided that Kirkpatrick’s waiver met those requirements and

was therefore constitutionally valid. The district court

believed that it was required to defer to this conclusion under

AEDPA. We turn now to the question of what level of

deference, if any, the district court must apply to the state

court’s determination under that statute.

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When a district court reviews a state court’s decision in a

habeas case, it ordinarily defers to its conclusions and asks

only whether the state court’s adjudication “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The district court reviewed the California Supreme

Court’s approval of Kirkpatrick’s waiver under this

deferential regime. It stated that because “there is [some]

evidence to support the conclusory findings of the California

Supreme Court,” its conclusion must be upheld. It further

stated, “There has been no unreasonable determination of the

facts or a decision contrary to, or involving an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law.” “Under

AEDPA,” the district court explained, “the decision of the

California Supreme Court must be given deference, and

cannot . . . be reviewed de novo by this court.” It declared

that its “power to review the decision of the California

Supreme Court is extremely limited” (by AEDPA) and that

its approach must be “highly deferential.”

This is where the district court went wrong. Contrary to

its belief, Section 2254(d) of AEDPA applies only to the

review of claims that have been adjudicated on the merits. 

The section reads: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless” the deferential requirements of AEDPA are satisfied. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 19

has defined the word “claim” in the AEDPA statute as “an

asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment

of conviction.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530

(2005). See also Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 418 (3d

Cir. 2002) (“By stating that an ‘application for a writ of

habeas corpus’ can be granted ‘with respect to any claim,’ the

sentence clearly implies that Congress used the term ‘claim’

as a substantive request for the writ of habeas corpus.”). By

its terms, therefore, AEDPA only provides for deferential

review of a state court’s adjudication on the merits of a claim

for relief – that is, a claim that could provide a “basis for

relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” Crosby,

545 U.S. at 530. With respect to such “claims,” a federal

court may grant the application only if the deferential

requirements of AEDPA are satisfied. A federal court’s

determination is not subject to the deferential framework of

AEDPA, however, when it simply reviews a state court’s

disposition of a question that does not constitute a claim for

relief, does not decide the merits of such a claim, and does

not provide a “basis for relief from a state court’s judgment

of conviction” (or imposition of a sentence). Id. A decision

regarding the validity of a waiver of a defendant’s right to

pursue a claim is by no stretch of the legal imagination a

decision on the merits of the claim itself.

Kirkpatrick’s assertion that his waiver was not knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent is simply not an affirmative “claim”

for relief. Although Kirkpatrick does contend that the state

court made a legal error, he does not, on the basis of that

error, claim entitlement to the writ of habeas corpus. If we

agree with Kirkpatrick, our agreement would not provide him

with “relief from the state court’s judgment of conviction” or

with a vacatur of his sentence. It would simply enable him to

pursue the claims that the district court ignored – claims that

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20 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

might themselves provide the “basis for relief” if they were

decided in Kirkpatrick’s favor “on the merits” (or the basis

for no relief whatsoever if they failed “on the merits”). As a

result, the district court was wrong to apply AEDPA

deference to the state court’s determination of the

constitutional validity of Kirkpatrick’s waiver. It should,

instead, have reviewed the state court’s decision as to the

validity of the waiver by determining de novo whether the

state had carried its burden of proving that the waiver was

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.6

The Third Circuit has reached the same conclusion. A

district court, it held, “need not defer under § 2254(d) to the

state court’s determination that [petitioner’s] waiver was

valid.” Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2008). The

court reasoned that “a ‘claim’ is that which, if granted,

provides entitlement to relief on the merits. Because

6 The dissent contends that the finding of “a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary waiver” constitutes a finding of fact to which we must accord

deference under 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1). However, in United States v.

Cazares, we explained:

A waiver is an “intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.

1461 (1938). The finding of a knowing and voluntary

waiver is a mixed question of law and fact which we

review de novo. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424,

427 (9th Cir.1988). The ultimate issue of voluntariness

is a legal question requiring independent federal

determination. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

286, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

788 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Campbell, 18.F3d at 672); see

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (Section

“2254(e)(1) is restricted to pure questions of historical fact.”).

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 21

resolution of the question as to whether [petitioner’s] waiver

was valid will not entitle him to relief on the merits of his

habeas petition, the waiver question is not a ‘claim.’

Therefore, the state court's determination that the waiver was

valid is not entitled to deference under § 2254(d).” Id.

(citation omitted). We agree with our fellow circuit without

the slightest reservation.

C.

When a district court applies the wrong legal standard, as

it did below, we ordinarily remand the case so that it may

apply the correct one in the first instance. Here, however, we

find it unnecessary to do so because the parties agree that the

district court held in the alternative that, putting AEDPA

deference aside, Kirkpatrick’s waiver was actuallyvalid. The

district court stated that it “conducted its own review of the

proceedings underpinning the referee’s report and the

decision of the California Supreme Court to be certain that

there has been no improper result,” and concluded that it

“agrees with the findings of the California Supreme Court.” 

We review the district court’s alternate holding de novo,

because the validity of the waiver is, as we have noted above,

a mixed question of fact and law. Godinez, 57 F.3d at 698.

We hold that the district court’s conclusion that

Kirkpatrick’s waiver was valid lacks a sufficient basis in the

record and accordingly remand for an adjudication of the

merits of the claims at issue.

1.

The record does not supply an adequate basis upon which

to conclude that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and

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22 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

intelligent because it contains good reason to believe that

Kirkpatrick did not understand the legal implications of the

waiver. Kirkpatrick’s handwritten filing stated: “I do not

wish to proceed with my petition for writ of habeas corpus

review in this matter. I wish the sentence and the judgement

[sic] of execution . . . to be carried out at this time.” There is

substantial evidence in the record that he believed that the

waiver would not result in his abandonment of his claims

altogether but would, instead, permit him to take over his case

personally and pursue those claims pro se. More specifically,

there is clear evidence that he did not wish to have the State

proceed with his execution forthwith but rather that he

intended to litigate his case further on the merits. This

evidence undermines any finding that the waiver was “made

with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.

As an example, there are Kirkpatrick’s statements to the

referee. Before Kirkpatrick refused to engage further with

him, the two men met for an initial conference at which the

referee explained that he was brought in to assess whether

Kirkpatrick’s waiver had been made knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently. The referee explained the purpose and legal

effect of his inquiry as follows: “they [i.e., the court] want to

be sure that before they allow you to effectually relieve your

attorney, who is currently appointed and in place, they want

to be sure that you are competent and that you understand

what’s going on.” Kirkpatrick replied, “I believe it is the

Court’s intent to give me full control of my case. . . . I think

if they’re fair and honest, they will agree with me that I am

entitled to my day in court. . . . I believe it is their intention to

give me that control of the case.” The referee seemed to

agree: “If we end up concluding and they’re satisfied with the

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 23

factual conclusion that you are competent and that you

understand what’s going on and that you are making a

knowing and voluntary waiver, then I suspect that they

probably will give you your wish and relieve counsel and let

you go on your way.” This exchange appears clearly to

reveal a desire by Kirkpatrick to proceed further with his

claims, not to withdraw them, and certainly not to have his

death sentence “carried out at this time.”

Kirkpatrick’s statements to the psychiatrist, who

examined him for two and a half hours at the referee’s

request, support the same conclusion. In her postexamination report, the psychiatrist stated that Kirkpatrick’s

“ultimate goal” is “a re-trial.” “[H]e makes it plain that he

wants to run his own case, to be in charge of his own defense,

to represent himself.” Later in the report, the referee

reiterated the same conclusion: “He wants to represent

himself, plans to ‘hire Black lawyers,’ who will go to the

media and get a re-trial on the original conviction.”

As for the waiver form itself, the psychiatrist concluded

that Kirkpatrick did not understand that the waiver would

relinquish his claims. She wrote, “He gives one the clear

impression that his wish to withdraw the Petition does not

indicate that he wants to speed the process toward execution. 

In his 7/23/00 request [i.e., the waiver form], he wrote ‘I wish

the sentence and judgment of execution . . . to be carried out

at this time.’ But he tells me that he has no intention of

discontinuing litigation.”

These statements to the referee and to the psychiatrist are

entirely inconsistent with the state court’s conclusion that the

waiver form demonstrated Kirkpatrick’s knowing and

intelligent decision to abandon the claims entirely. To the

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contrary, they show that Kirkpatrick did not fully understand

“the consequences of the decision to abandon” his right to

proceed – in direct contravention of the Constitution’s

requirements. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. His own conduct

further supports this conclusion. Kirkpatrick told the court,

“my intention is to stay alive as long as possible, Judge,” thus

communicating a desire that was the precise opposite of what

his waiver would have accomplished. Of equal importance,

Kirkpatrick gave no indication at any point in the proceedings

that he was aware of the contents of his exhaustion petition. 

On the basis of the record, therefore, it is clear that the State

failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Kirkpatrick’s

waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

2.

There is another deficiency in the record that also

precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick’s waiver was valid. 

Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims

to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid,

they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts

a colloquy to assess the petitioner’s intentions and whether he

understands the consequences of the waiver. See, e.g.,

Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732–33 (concluding that a state

court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the

petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the

waiver was intelligently executed); Dennis, 378 F.3d at 884

(accepting a state court waiver as valid because that court

“engaged in a comprehensive colloquy” with the petitioner

during which “[t]he court had [petitioner] re-read his initial

habeas petition . . . and the court reviewed with [petitioner]

the assignments of error alleged in the petition” and the

petitioner in court “asserted his desire to give up his right to

pursue each of these claims”); Fahy, 516 F.3d at 183–85

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(holding that even though the state court did engage in a

colloquy with the petitioner, that colloquy was insufficient to

establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because

the state court had refused to permit petitioner’s counsel to

ask him questions that would probe the waiver’s validity); see

also St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 2000)

(finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had

a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his

intentions and understanding).

Here, the state court never questioned Kirkpatrick on the

record as to whether he understood the consequences of the

waiver or the nature of the claims he was waiving. As a

result, the court had no opportunity to assess Kirkpatrick’s

state of mind or to assure itself that the handwritten “Waiver

Form” reflected his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

choice. All that the court could possibly have relied on in

finding the waiver valid was the form itself and the record of

the referee’s investigation – which concluded that there was

not enough evidence to find the waiver valid.

Under the circumstances, it is clear that an independent

review of the record necessarily reveals that the state wholly

failed to carryits burden of showing that Kirkpatrick’s waiver

was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We therefore hold

that the district court erred in concluding that the purported

waiver was valid, whether as a result of applying AEDPA

deference to the state court’s determination or as a result of

its independent review of the record before the state court.

We recognize that it was the petitioner who rendered

difficult or impossible the judicial examination that might

have enabled the court to determine the validity of his waiver. 

This is not, however, a case in which a petitioner is being

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rewarded for obstructionism at the State’s expense. If

Kirkpatrick’s intention truly were to abandon his claims, his

failure to participate in the orderly judicial process designed

to determine that intent would serve only to frustrate his own

effort; it is he who would suffer most from his

noncooperation. If his intention were not to abandon those

claims but rather to continue to pursue them, a conclusion

that the waiver form was not valid would serve principally to

enable the court to arrive at the right result under the

Constitution. Either way, the State suffers little if any injury

from proceeding to a determination of the merits of

Kirkpatrick’s claims rather than relying on a dubious waiver

of critical constitutional rights that is unsupported by the

record. In any event, Kirkpatrick’s refusal to cooperate with

the referee’s investigation provides another reason to believe

that his intent was not to waive his claims and that his

purported waiver was not fully knowing and intelligent as the

Constitution requires.

D.

In view of the above, we vacate the district court’s order

dismissing the claims that Kirkpatrick purportedly waived,

and remand those claims to the district court for adjudication

on the merits. That court shall consider the claims de novo

on remand. Because the claims were erroneously dismissed

as waived by the California Supreme Court, they were never

adjudicated on the merits in state court. Thus, they must be

considered de novo because there is no state court judgment

to which the federal court might properly defer. Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S.

449, 472 (2009).

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III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s order dismissing the claims in

Kirkpatrick’s petition for lack of exhaustion is VACATED,

and the case is REMANDED to the district court so that it

may adjudicate those claims on the merits.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

My colleagues err repeatedly but it doesn’t much matter.

I

The majority’s first blunder is failing to defer to the

California Supreme Court, which found unanimously that

Kirkpatrick made a “rational choice with respect to

withdrawing” his habeas petition and “a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed.” The

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

requires deference to that finding. Under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a

State court” in a state habeas proceeding “shall be presumed

to be correct.” This is true “whether the court be a trial court

or an appellate court.” Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547

(1981).

The majority quotes selectively from Lambert v. Blodgett

that “2254(e)(1) is restricted to pure questions of historical

fact.” 393 F.3d 943, 976 (9th Cir. 2004). But we also said

that “an issue that involves inquiry into a state of mind may

be considered a question of fact.” Id. “Knowing, intelligent

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and voluntary” are all states of mind. So Blodgett requires us

to defer.

Plenty of evidence supports the state court’s finding. 

After receiving Kirkpatrick’s waiver letter, the California

Supreme Court appointed Judge Stephen Graham to assess its

validity. He, in turn, appointed Dr. Diane McEwen—a

forensic psychiatrist of thirty years experience—to interview

Kirkpatrick. Dr. McEwen found that Kirkpatrick “indeed

made his decision to withdraw the petition in a conscious,

goal-directed manner, free of any intervening mental illness.” 

Kirkpatrick appeared “intelligent, self-determined, oriented,

consistent, deliberate and unwavering in his positions.” 

Consistent with his medical records, Kirkpatrick showed “no

evidence of mental impairment.”

Judge Graham questioned Kirkpatrick about what he

intended to accomplish with his waiver. Kirkpatrick

answered: “Competency and vacating of the appeal.” Judge

Graham advised Kirkpatrick that his appeal contained “some

possibility of ultimately preventing [his] execution.” The

government attorney then further explained to Kirkpatrick

that waiving his state appeal could limit his federal claims. 

Kirkpatrick said: “I can appreciate that.”

JudgeGraham reported that Kirkpatrick wasn’t “suffering

from any mental disease, disorder or defect which may

substantially affect his capacity to appreciate his position and

to make a rational choice with respect to continuing or

abandoning further litigation.” The CaliforniaSupreme Court

acknowledged Judge Graham’s report, adopted his findings

as to mental capacity and voluntariness, and further found

that Kirkpatrick acted knowingly and intelligently. It

therefore granted his request to withdraw the petition. My

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 29

colleagues don’t agree with the California Supreme Court’s

findings but there’s more than enough evidence to support

them.

II

Were I to review de novo, Kirkpatrick would fare no

better. To me, Kirkpatrick seems crazy like a fox. As he told

Judge Graham with a smile, his “intention is to stay alive as

long as possible.” The majority cites this as proof that

Kirkpatrick didn’t grasp the consequences of waiving his

appeals. More likely, Kirkpatrick well understood that

withdrawing his petition would trigger this protracted

litigation. This was a savvy move: It’s been seventeen years

since Kirkpatrick sent his letter to the California Supreme

Court. Now he’ll spend manymore years litigating his merits

claims. According to Dr. McEwen, Kirkpatrick is “living

with what he’s got” and “trying to drive everybody else

crazy.” This man is playing us.

III

The majority also invents a colloquy requirement and

faults the state courts for failing to comply. Maj. Op. 24–26. 

But courts have “discretion in affording a hearing that is

suitable in the circumstances.” Dennis ex rel. Butko v.

Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 894 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts need this

flexibility to deal with troublemakers like Kirkpatrick who

refuse to attend hearings. Furthermore, we’re bound by the

Supreme Court case law as it stood at the time of the state

court’s decision in 2001. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

71–72 (2003). No such case requires a colloquy.

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The majority points to cases where a colloquy was held

sufficient, but none says a colloquy is necessary. 

Demosthenes v. Baal1noted that the state court found a valid

waiver after defendant was questioned in open court, but

doesn’t say there must be a colloquy. 495 U.S. 731, 735

(1990). Nor does Dennis, where we accepted a waiver that

followed a “comprehensive colloquy” with the petitioner, but

never hinted that the waiver would be invalid without the

colloquy. 378 F.3d at 884. Dennis is, in any event, irrelevant

because it’s not a Supreme Court case. See Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 71–72.

IV

But none of this matters because California doesn’t have

a death penalty. Sure, there’s a death row in California—the

biggest in the Western Hemisphere. Evelyn Nieves, Rash of

Violence Disrupts San Quentin’s Death Row, N.Y. Times

(May 22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/22/us/ra

sh-of-violence-disrupts-san-quentin-s-death-row.html. At last

count, it housed 747 inmates. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

Death Row Tracking System Condemned Inmate List at 29

(June 2017), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/capital_p

unishment/docs/condemnedinmatelistsecure.pdf. But there

have been only thirteen executions since 1976, the most

recent over ten years ago. Arthur L. Alarcün & Paula M.

Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to

Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-BillionDollar Death Penalty Debate, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 41, 51

(2011). Death row inmates in California are far more likely

1

I remember that case well. See Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with

Death, New Yorker, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48.

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to die from natural causes or suicide than execution. Id. at

53.

There are plausible reasons to oppose the death penalty. 

Some think it barbaric. It’s also exceptionally expensive: 

California taxpayers have lavished approximately $5 billion

on their capital punishment system. Jazmine Ulloa, Will

ending the death penalty save California more money than

speeding up executions?, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 2016,

http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-death-penaltycosts-snap-20161101-story.html. Then, there’s the risk that

we might be putting innocent people to death. See Glossip v.

Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756–59 (2015) (Breyer, J.,

dissenting). Or that race may be a factor in how the death

penalty is imposed.2 And there’s the impulse to follow other

Western democracies that have abandoned this hoary

punishment. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,

Courting Death 22 (2016). But it’s “settled that capital

punishment is constitutional.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732. 

So the people of California are entitled to have a death

penalty if they choose. Vox populi, vox dei.

2

See, e.g., GAO, Report to the Senate and House Committees on the

Judiciary:Death PenaltySentencing 5–6 (1990) (synthesizing studies from

1972 to 1990 and finding that victim race influences death sentencing rate

but defendant’s race may not); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet,

Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for

California Homicides, 1990–1999,TheEmpiricalAnalysis, 46 Santa Clara

L. Rev. 1, 19 (2005) (“[H]omicides [inCalifornia] involving non-Hispanic

white victims are 3.7 times as likely to result in a death sentence than

those with non-Hispanic African American victims.”). But see Richard

Berk et al., Statistical Difficulties in Determining the Role of Race in

Capital Cases: A Re-analysis of Data from the State of Maryland, 21 J.

Quantitative Criminology 365, 386 (2005) (finding that race appears to

have little or no impact on capital sentencing rates).

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The people have made their views plain by voting for the

death penalty ten times in the last forty-five years. In 1972,

the California Supreme Court held that the state constitution

didn’t permit capital punishment. People v. Anderson,

493 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972). Voters swiftly amended the

constitution to say it does. Prop. 17 (Cal. 1972). After the

United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty is

constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87

(1976), California voters greatly expanded the list of deatheligible crimes. Prop. 7 (Cal. 1978). Ballot measures in

1990, 1996 and 2000 further added to this list. Prop. 114

(Cal. 1990); Prop. 115 (Cal. 1990); Prop. 195 (Cal. 1996);

Prop. 196 (Cal. 1996); Prop. 18 (Cal. 2000). In 2012, voters

were asked to repeal the death penalty. Prop. 34 (Cal. 2012). 

They said no. And last year they rebuffed another repeal

effort and, instead, approved a counter-proposition designed

to speed up the appeals process and presumably bring about

swifter executions.3

Nonetheless, California has no functional death penalty. 

How this came about is no mystery. As part of a nationwide

campaign to have lethal injection declared unconstitutional,

California death row inmates challenged the state’s execution

protocol in 2006. A district court eventually held that

California’s execution method was “broken.” Morales v.

Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). That ruling

likely was wrong in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases. 

In Baze v. Rees, the Court held that Kentucky’s lethal

3 Whether this purpose will be achieved remains to be seen. The

California Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of this

proposition. It upheld most of it but declared its five-year time limit on

capital appeals aspirational. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 57 (Cal.

2017).

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injection protocol, which mirrored California’s, was

constitutional. 553 U.S. 35, 49–56 (2008); see also Glossip,

135 S.Ct. at 2737–38. Regardless, the state did not appeal. 

Instead, state officials set about revamping California’s

execution protocol. They have been busy with that task since

2006. Other states have managed to amend their protocols

and the Supreme Court has consistently brushed aside

challenges to execution drug cocktails. See Glossip,

135 S.Ct. 2726. But California officials haven’t managed to

come up with a workable protocol.

Meanwhile, the people of California labor under the

delusion that they live in a death penalty state. They may

want capital punishment to save innocent lives by deterring

murders.4 But executions must actually be carried out if

they’re to have any deterrent effect.5 Maybe death penalty

4

See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh, et al., Does Capital Punishment

Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Post-moratorium Panel

Data, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 344 (2003) (estimating that each execution

results in eight to eighteen fewer murders); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian

Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?Acts, Omissions, and

Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 713 (2005) (“the recent evidence

of a deterrent effect from capital punishment seems impressive”). Butsee

John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical

Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 791, 794 (2005)

(the death penalty “is applied so rarely that the number of homicides it can

plausibly have caused or deterred cannot be reliably disentangled fromthe

large year-to-year changes in the homicide rate”).

5

Joanna M. Sheperd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the

Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. Legal Stud. 283, 313 (2004)

(executions appear to have a larger deterrent effect than do death

sentences); Kenneth C. Land, et al., The Short-term Effects of Executions

on Homicides: Deterrence, Displacement, or Both?, 47 Criminology

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supporters believe in just retribution; that goal, too, is

frustrated if there’s no active execution chamber. Or perhaps

the point is closure for victims’ families, but these are surely

false hopes. Kirkpatrick murdered Rose Falconio’s sixteenyear-old son more than thirty years ago, and her finality is

nowhere near. If the death penalty is to serve whatever

purpose its proponents envision, it must actually be carried

out. A phantom death penalty is a cruel and expensive hoax.

Which is why it doesn’t matter what we hold today. One

way or the other, Kirkpatrick will go on to live a long life

“driv[ing] everybody else crazy,” while copious tax dollars

are spent litigating his claims. And my colleagues and I will

continue to waste countless hours disputing obscure points of

law that have no relevance to the heinous crimes for which

Kirkpatrick and his 746 housemates continue to evade their

lawful punishment. It’s as if we’re all performers in a Gilbert

and Sullivan operetta. We make exaggerated gestures and

generate much fanfare. But in the end it amounts to nothing.

1009, 1038 (Oct. 2009) (concluding that “evidence exists ofmodest, shortterm reductions in the numbers of homicides in Texas in the months of or

after executions”).

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