Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01675/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01675-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STANLEY SWENSON

NO. CIV. S-08-1675 FCD CMK

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

SISKIYOU COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Stanley Swenson (“plaintiff”) proceeding pro se,

filed a civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 72-

302(c)(21). On December 10, 2008, plaintiff filed objections to

the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations (“F&R”),

filed November 21, 2008, granting defendants’ motion to dismiss

with prejudice. 

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Upon review of the file, the court does not adopt the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations with respect to

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based upon alleged violations of his

substantive due process rights and the Takings Clause. The court

adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in all

other respects.

When timely objections to findings by a magistrate judge are

filed, the district court must conduct a de novo determination of

the findings and recommendations as to issues of law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court may adopt, reject, or modify in

part or in full the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). 

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

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with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). Moreover, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be

liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

The Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the

government from taking “private property . . . for public use,

without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Whether a

particular restriction amounts to a taking depends largely upon

the particular circumstances of each case – that is, on

essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Tahoe-Sierra

Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216

F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co.

v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). Courts have looked

at three primary factors in conducting the balance of public and

private factors at stake: “(1) the economic impact of the

regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the

regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed

expectations; and (3) the character of the government action.” 

Id. Moreover, if the property owner seeks to press a claim based

upon a denial of just compensation and a state provides an

adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, “the property

owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause

until [he] has used the procedure and been denied just

compensation.” Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985).

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To state a claim for violation of the substantive due

process clause, plaintiff must allege that “a state actor

deprived [him] of a constitutionally protected life, liberty or

property interest.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th

Cir. 2008) (citing Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica

Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007). Such a

violation is not preempted by the Takings Clause where the land

use action challenged is “so arbitrary or irrational that it runs

afoul of the Due Process Clause.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1087

(quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542

(2005)).

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants violated his

constitutional rights when the Siskiyou County Planning Director

informed him that a Use Permit relating to his property was no

longer valid. (Compl., filed July 21, 2008, ¶ 13.) The Siskiyou

County Planning Commission and the Siskiyou County Board of

Supervisors upheld this position. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.) Taking

plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences therefrom, plaintiff has sufficiently set forth a

claim for a violation of his constitutional rights. The court

cannot determine as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss the

nature of the alleged taking or the nature of the government

action. Nor can the court determine, as a matter of law on the

record before it, whether plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to

obtain just compensation through State procedures. Therefore,

defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims on the bases relied

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1 The court makes no findings with respect to other

arguments raised in defendants’ motion to dismiss but not relied

upon by the magistrate judge.

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upon by the magistrate judge is DENIED.1 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 3, 2009

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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