Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_03-cv-03174/USCOURTS-cand-1_03-cv-03174-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTHA BERNDT et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al,

Defendants.

/

No C 03-3174 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action move to certify

a class under FRCP 23. Doc #277, amending Doc ##273 & 217. 

Because the class proposed by plaintiffs is not objectively

ascertainable, the court cannot reach the merits of plaintiffs’

motion under FRCP 23. Plaintiffs’ motion, Doc #277, therefore is

DENIED.

I

On July 9, 2003, plaintiff Martha Berndt filed suit

against defendants California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and several CDCR employees for alleged

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Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ case has been rendered

moot because the CDCR has voluntarily instituted a statewide policy

that controls exhibitionist masturbatory behaviors and ensures prompt

corrective action. See Doc #279 at 16-17. The Ninth Circuit has

recently opined, however, that mootness should not be considered in

the class certification context. See Rodriguez v Hayes, 591 F3d 1105,

1117 (9th Cir 2010) (“In fact, mootness * * * is not a basis for

denial of class certification, but rather is a basis for dismissal of

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violations of two civil rights statutes and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. See Doc #1. Several motions to dismiss and

amended complaints followed; the operative complaint, plaintiffs’

fourth, was filed on July 5, 2005. Doc #153. At the parties’

request, the court dismissed plaintiff Linda Scott Sutter and

defendant Mario Ortiz from this action in February 2008. See Doc

#207.

The plaintiffs, current and former female employees of

CDCR institutions and facilities, seek injunctive relief and

damages for discrimination based on sex (and in the case of one

plaintiff, race). Doc #153. Plaintiffs allege that from “at least

November 1989,” they were subjected to sexual harassment by male

inmates in the form of exhibitionist masturbatory behaviors. Id. 

Plaintiffs further allege that supervisory and administrative

officials at CDCR failed to take effective or prompt corrective

action to end such practices.

On November 17, 2008, plaintiffs moved to certify a

class. Doc #217. The parties thereafter conducted additional

discovery and plaintiffs amended their motion in October and

December 2009. Doc ##273 & 277. Defendants oppose the motion,

arguing that plaintiffs fail to carry their burden of establishing

a single class certification factor under FRCP 23(a) or (b) and

that plaintiffs’ proposed class is not ascertainable.1

 Doc #279. 

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[the] action.”). If defendants seek to raise a mootness argument,

they should therefore file an appropriate motion seeking dismissal on

such grounds.

3

Because, for the reasons set forth below, the court finds the class

is not ascertainable, it cannot evaluate the merits of plaintiffs’

motion for class certification under the factors set forth by FRCP

23(a) or (b).

II

A court may certify a class only if: (1) the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there

are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or

defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FRCP

23(a). In addition to meeting these requirements, parties seeking

certification must meet at least one requirement of FRCP 23(b). 

Rodrigues v Hayes, 591 F3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir 2010) (citing Zinser

v Accufix Research Inst, Inc, 253 F3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir) amended

by 273 F3d 1266 (9th Cir 2001)).

“‘Although there is no explicit requirement concerning

the class definition in FRCP 23, courts have held that the class

must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable before a class

action may proceed.’” Schwartz v Upper Deck Co, 183 FRD 672, 679-

80 (S D Cal 1999) (quoting Elliott v ITT Corp, 150 FRD 569, 573-74

(N D IL 1992)). “A class definition should be ‘precise, objective

and presently ascertainable.’” Rodriguez v Gates, 2002 WL 1162675,

at *8 (C D Cal 2002) (quoting O'Connor v Boeing North American,

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Inc, 184 FRD 311, 319 (C D Cal 1998)); see also Manual for Complex

Litigation, Fourth, §21.222 at 270-71 (2004). While the identity

of the class members need not be known at the time of

certification, class membership must be clearly ascertainable. 

DeBremaecker v Short, 433 F2d 733, 734 (5th Cir 1970). The class

definition must be sufficiently definite so that it is

administratively feasible to determine whether a particular person

is a class member. See, e g, Davoll v Webb, 160 FRD 142, 144 (D

Colo 1995).

Before engaging in the analysis required by Rule 23, the

court must first determine whether plaintiffs’ purported class is

ascertainable.

III

 In their motion for class certification, Doc #277,

plaintiffs proposed a class definition as follows:

all past, and present female employees employed by the

defendant California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation during the period from November 1989 to the

present, as well as future female employees, who have been or

will be subjected to inmate exhibitionist masturbation at any

prison facility in the State of California and whose complaint

did not result in prompt effective remedial steps to address

the hostile environment, as well as the sub-class of past,

present, and future employees of CDCR at Pelican Bay State

Prison.

Doc #277 at 8; see also variations at 9 & 28.

In opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, defendants

criticized the definition offered by plaintiffs as “subjective,”

and suggested that the “actual composition of the class and

subclass is determinable only at the conclusion of the merits

proceedings.” Doc #279 at 14-16. Plaintiffs do not address

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directly the question whether their initial proposed class is

ascertainable or distinguish the case law cited by defendants in

their reply. See Doc #290. Instead, plaintiffs, apparently

recognizing that their proposed class definition was unworkable,

tweaked the class and sub-class definitions:

[all] present and former female correctional officers and

other female employees who are and have been employed by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at

male institutions and who have or may come into contact with

male inmates and be exposed to exhibitionist masturbatory

behavior and who have suffered or may suffer injury because

the CDCR failed to take prompt and effective remedial steps to

address the hostile environment during the period from January

1, 1989 to the present. The class shall also include female

correctional officers and other female employees who may be

employed in the future up to the time of entry of judgment.

Doc ##290 at 14; 291 at 2. The Pelican Bay amended sub-class

definition largely mirrors that of the class, with the exception

that the sub-class, while allowing for future female employees,

does not contain the final sentence quoted above. See Doc #291 at

2.

Plaintiffs adjustments in reply, however, do not remedy

the problems highlighted in defendants’ opposition. At varying

times the class definition is subjective, imprecise and overbroad;

the class and the sub-class are not ascertainable.

The class and sub-class definitions are imprecise

because, among other things, potential future events are

insufficiently defined. For instance, included in the class

definition are female correction offers who “may come into contact”

with male inmates and “may suffer injury.” Such potential

eventualities render the definition vague. “May” denotes merely a

possibility. The court therefore is left wondering how it would

ascertain exactly which female employees “may suffer injury because

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the CDCR failed to take prompt and effective remedial steps to

address the hostile environment,” Doc #291 at 2, without asking, on

an individual basis: (1) whether the employee witnessed

“exhibitionist masturbatory behavior”; (2) whether the employee

reported the incident; (3) what steps, if any, CDCR took in

response to the employee’s report; and (4) whether remedial action

constituted “prompt and immediate” relief. Moreover, what kind of

objectively verifiable proof would prospective class members be

able to produce to verify that they fit within such a framework? 

Furthermore, the class definition seems to be premised on

the existence of a “hostile [work] environment”——something that

will not be determined, if ever, until the merits are resolved. 

See id (“failed * * * to address the hostile environment”).

The class definition also is overbroad. The final

sentence of the class definition explains “[t]he class shall also

include female correctional officers and other female employees who

may be employed in the future up to the time of entry of judgment.” 

Doc ##290 at 14; 291 at 2. Such a class cannot be ascertained not

only because it includes nebulous sub-groups of current and former

female employees, but also because it encompasses all future female

employees. Because the nature of these future employees’ exposure

to a hostile work environment is undefined and purely conjectural,

the court cannot determine from the class definition whether such

members would have an injury and standing to sue. See, e g, La Mar

v H & B Novelty & Loan Co, 489 F2d 461 (9th Cir 1973) (noting that

class actions “must be structured so as to conform in the essential

respects to the judicial process, [which dictates, among other

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things] that the courts not be available to those who have suffered

no harm at the hands of them against whom they complain.”). Some

of these employees will no doubt have little or no contact with

male inmates——indeed, the future employees clause does not appear

limited to male inmate facilities only. The court therefore

concludes that it would have to conduct an individual factual

inquiry as to each future female employee to determine whether she

is a class member. Such a class definition is overbroad and

unworkable.

Moreover, the class and sub-class definitions are

minefields of subjectivity. How is the court to determine

objectively whether a potential class member “has suffered or may

suffer injury” or whether the CDCR “failed to take prompt and

effective remedial steps” to address the situation? Id. Given the

problems with the proposed class definition discussed above, the

court agrees with defendants that there would be no easy way to

determine class membership (or for an objective method for an

employee to determine her class membership) without the court

conducting individualized analyses based on the merits of each

case.

While district courts have the power to modify proposed

class definitions to make them sufficiently definite, Mazur v eBay

Inc, 257 FRD 563 (N D Cal 2009) (Patel, J) (citing Hagen v City of

Winnemucca, 108 FRD 61, 64 (D Nev 1985)), such modification is

inappropriate in this case given the fact that the problems with

the class definition are multiple and substantial. The court could

not simply perform a minor facelift on the class definition; major

surgery is required. Furthermore, because it only recently was

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transferred this long-running case, the court is not in a position

to craft, sua sponte, a workable class definition.

III

For the above reasons, the court finds the class proposed

by plaintiffs cannot be ascertained. Without a workable

definition, the court cannot move to the next step and undertake a

rigorous analysis to determine whether plaintiffs have demonstrated

that they meet FRCP 23's requirements, as required by the Ninth

Circuit. See, e g, Dukes v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, --- F3d ---, 2010

WL 1644259, at *5 (9th Cir 2010) (“When considering class

certification under Rule 23, district courts are not only at

liberty to, but must, perform a rigorous analysis to ensure that

the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”). 

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, Doc #277, therefore

must be DENIED without prejudice.

The hearing previously scheduled for May 27, 2010 at 10AM

will remain on calendar. During the May 27 hearing, the parties

are directed to limit their arguments to plaintiffs’ motions for a

preliminary injunction and to substitute Judy Longo’s estate, Doc

##302 & 310. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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