Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01889/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01889-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. BROCK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CONCORD AUTOMOBILE DEALERSHIP 

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01889-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 64 and 66

This action was filed by nine former employees of Concord Automobile Dealership LLC 

dba Lexus of Concord LLC (Robert Brock, Jr., Amanda Bo Denton, Jeffrey Lao, Kamal Dayekh, 

Wilson Woo, Chirstopher Montoya, Francisco Ubaldo, Jamal Khan, and Christopher Navarro) as 

well as the spouses of Brock and Dayekh (Teresa Brock and Wissam Halhoul). Plaintiffs assert 24 

causes of action arising from the workplace environment at Lexus of Concord, Defendants’

alleged scheme to steal Plaintiffs’ bonuses, and death threats and other forms of retaliation made 

by the Defendants after Plaintiffs complained of Defendants’ conduct. The Defendants are Lexus 

of Concord and three high-level Lexus of Concord employees: Patrick Miliano, the General Sales 

Manager, Greg James, the General Manager, and Hank Torian, the owner of Lexus of Concord. 

Lexus of Concord, James, and Torian (collectively, the “Concord Defendants”) and Miliano each 

moved to dismiss certain causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs. See Dkt. Nos. 64 (“Miliano Mot.”) 

and 66 (“Concord Mot.”).

The Court has carefully considered the arguments and evidence offered by the parties, both 

in their briefs and during the hearing on this motion, and, for the reasons discussed below, 

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The operative complaint in this action (the “Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”) 

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spans over seventy pages and contains just shy of three hundred numbered paragraphs. The 

allegations center on three general subjects: (1) the hostile work environment at Lexus of Concord; 

(2) the “Spiff” bonus program and the Defendants’ alleged fraud and conversion of funds 

associated with that program; and (3) death threats and retaliation against certain Plaintiffs who 

discovered and complained of Defendants’ conduct. 

A. Hostile Work Environment

The SAC alleges that Miliano regularly directed racist, sexist, and homophobic insults at 

both Plaintiffs and customers. For example, Miliano frequently used the terms “Fish-heads,” 

“Niggers,” “Dog-eaters,” “Towel-heads,” “Faggots,” “Cunts,” and “Bitches,” to name a few. See

SAC ¶¶ 119 (“[Miliano] would regularly and freely use and repeat . . . ‘fish-heads’, ‘Niggers’, 

‘dog-eaters’, and ‘towel-heads’ . . .”); 167 (“Every time Mr. Khan went to [Miliano’s] office . . . 

Mr. Khan heard him refer to people as fucking low lives, Niggers, Turban Heads, Pussies, [and] 

Faggots.”); 175 (“[Miliano] repeatedly, and on a daily basis and on multiple occasions each day, 

made racial comments toward Mr. Navarro.”). Miliano is also alleged to have threatened some 

employees with violence. Specifically, Ubaldo and Montoya allege that Miliano threatened to 

“kick [Montoya’s] ass,” id. ¶ 139, and that he “could beat [Ubaldo] up,” id. ¶ 154.

James is alleged to have “participated and laughed about the derogatory remarks and the 

abuse inflicted on the employees by [Miliano].” Id. ¶ 149. Woo, Montoya, Ubaldo, Lao, Khan, 

and Navarro allege that they quit their jobs because of the constant abuse. Id. ¶ 271 (“[Miliano 

and James] engaged in such continuous abusive and humiliating conduct, including racist and 

violent remarks directed towards Mr. Woo, Mr. Montoya, Mr. Navarro, and Mr. Ubaldo, Asians, 

Latinos, African-Americans and other racial minorities, as well as women, that Mr. Woo, Mr. 

Montoya, Mr. Navarro and Mr. Ubaldo finally were compelled and did quit their jobs.”).

B. The Spiff Bonus Program

The SAC alleges that Lexus of Concord incentivized its sales employees through a “Spiff” 

bonus program. Id. ¶ 29. Each salesperson who sold a used car was entitled to $100, which was 

distributed every Friday by Miliano from a “cash bag” of several thousand dollars. Id. ¶ 29(a). 

An additional incentive was provided for weekend sales, called “Pyramid Spiff.” Id. at ¶ 29(b). 

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On weekends, the first salesperson to sell a car received $25 and an additional $25 for each 

additional car sold that day (regardless of the responsible salesperson), provided that the target 

sales goal (usually 10 cars) was met. Id. The second salesperson to sell a car received $25 for the 

car he or she sold, plus an additional $25 for each car sold later in the day, and so forth. Id. Spiff 

payments distributed to salespersons were recorded as taxable earnings, which Lexus Concord 

tracked with triplicate carbon copy vouchers. Id. ¶ 29(b)-(c). The salesperson and the sales 

manager were expected to sign each voucher, with the salesperson keeping one copy and the sales 

manager submitting the remaining two copies to Lexus of Concord’s business office. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that Miliano was in charge of the Spiff bonus program, and that Miliano 

conspired with James and Torian to use the bonus program to enrich themselves at the expense of 

the Plaintiffs. Specifically the SAC alleges two forms of misconduct related to the Spiff bonus 

program:

First, Plaintiffs allege that Miliano refused to pay employees the amount due under the 

Spiff bonus program. Id. ¶ 39. For example, the SAC alleges that Montoya was due $800 under 

the Spiff program, but that Miliano changed the amount to $550, explaining that there “were some 

uncalculated bills, resulting in the decrease of commission wages” and that “the Spiff money ran 

out and Mr. Montoya would have to wait until the following week to receive his wages.” Id. 

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Lexus of Concord would issue a voucher to a salesperson for 

the actual amount due pursuant to the program, but that Miliano would submit a voucher with a 

higher dollar amount for the same transaction and pocket the difference. Id. ¶ 30. For example, 

Plaintiffs allege that Lao signed a voucher for $875, but that Miliano turned in an unsigned or 

forged voucher of $1,375 for that same transaction. Id. The SAC alleges that Defendants—by 

submitting fraudulent vouchers for Spiff bonuses that Plaintiffs did not receive—inflated 

Plaintiffs’ reported earnings and caused them to pay a greater amount in taxes than they would 

have paid but for Defendants’ fraudulent scheme. Relatedly, Plaintiffs allege that Miliano would 

submit duplicate vouchers for the same car, which increased Plaintiffs’ reported earnings (and thus 

tax liability) even though Plaintiffs did not receive the inflated bonus amounts. Id. ¶ 31.

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C. Death Threats and Brock’s Terminations

In February of 2014, Brock complained to James of Miliano’s alleged bonus scheme, as 

well as his “history, pattern, and practice of creating a hostile and violent work environment.” Id. 

¶ 35-36. On March 13, 2014, Dayekh sent James, Brock, and various other managers at Lexus of 

Concord an (apparently anonymous) email accusing Miliano of perpetrating the Spiff scheme. 

Id.¶ 37. That same day, Miliano “stormed” into Brock’s office and stated “I know you sent this 

fucking email to management. I’m going to kill you, I am going to hunt you down, and I’m going 

to kill your wife, and I’m going to kill your kids!!!” Id. ¶ 55. Miliano is alleged to have made 

similar threats against Lao and Dayekh. See id. ¶ 76 (“If I cut you up into little pieces and throw 

you down the ravine, no one will ever find you.”); ¶ 98 (“I will kill you if I find out that it was 

you, and if I lose my job I will hurt you so bad and your family, too. I will hunt you and kill you. 

Greg will never fire me because of this email.”).

Each of the Plaintiffs who worked at Lexus of Concord alleges that they were either: (1) 

terminated in retaliation for exposing Defendants’ misconduct; or (2) were constructively 

discharged by the Defendants’ discriminatory, retaliatory, and hostile conduct. As is relevant to 

this motion, Brock alleges that he agreed to discuss Miliano’s conduct with Torian on or around

April 20, 2014 because Torian promised him he would not be fired, stating: “I own Lexus of 

Concord. I will not fire you. You will not be fired.” Id. ¶64. Despite this reassurance, Miliano 

alleges that Torian never intended to stand by his promise, and that he was fired several days later

based on the information he disclosed during that meeting. Id. ¶ 70. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when it 

does not contain sufficient facts to state a plausible claim on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “While a complaint 

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attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may also challenge a complaint’s 

compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) where fraud is an essential element of a 

claim. See Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 9(b), 

which provides a heightened pleading standard, states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 

state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, 

and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). These 

circumstances include the “‘time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as 

the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 

(9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 

1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, 

where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”). “Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances 

constituting the alleged fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular 

misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done 

anything wrong.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124.

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 550; Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). If the Court dismisses the complaint, it will generally grant

leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 

When a party repeatedly fails to cure deficiencies, however, the court may order dismissal without 

leave to amend. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. First Cause of Action: Fair Labor Standards Act

Brock and Lao assert that their termination and demotion, respectively, from Lexus of 

Concord, were in retaliation for filing an April 2014 civil action under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. They allege that this retaliation violates Section 215(a)(3) 

of the FLSA, which makes it unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against 

any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 

instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 

The Concord Defendants move to dismiss Brock and Lao’s retaliation claim on the ground 

that the complaint that allegedly triggered the negative employment consequences sought relief 

under a provision of the FLSA that does not provide a private cause of action. See Concord Mot. 

at 5. In other words, the Concord Defendants argue, without citing any legal authority, that 

because Brock and Lao did not properly plead an FLSA violation upon which they could recover, 

any alleged retaliation committed by the Defendants does not violate Section 215(a)(3). See id. 

The Court disagrees. Section 215(a)(3) prohibits employers from retaliating against 

employees who file a complaint “under or related to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The 

statute does not require the employee’s complaint to be meritorious, or even to survive judgment 

on the pleadings. In fact, the inclusion of both “under” and “related to” suggest that even 

complaints that do not squarely fall “under” the FLSA may provide an adequate ground for a 

retaliation claim under Section 215(a)(3). Here, the first cause of action in Plaintiffs’ original 

complaint qualifies under Section 215(a)(3) in that it expressly identifies the FLSA as the 

authority supporting relief. Dkt. No. 1 at 50. Regardless of whether the facts alleged supported 

that relief (or whether the Plaintiffs had standing to assert the particular claim alleged), the first 

cause of action was clearly “under or related to [the FLSA].” The plain language of Section 

215(a)(3) requires no more. 

The Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Cause of Action is DENIED.

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B. Second and Fourth Causes of Action: Cal. Labor Code 1102.5 and Retaliation in

Violation of Public Policy under Tameny

Brock, Lao, Denton, and Dayekh assert claims under California Labor Code Section 

1102.5, and for retaliation pursuant to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (Cal. 

1980), against Lexus of Concord. The Concord Defendants observe that, in order to prevail on a 

retaliation claim under Tameny, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her termination violated 

public policy, and point out that the violation of public policy Plaintiffs allege is a violation of 

California Labor Code 1102.5—the very subject of their second cause of action. See Concord 

Mot. at 6. The Concord Defendants argue that, given this overlap, causes of action two and four 

are redundant and that one of them should be dismissed.

Plaintiffs respond that while there is some overlap between these claims, there are several 

important differences. First, Plaintiffs argue that the elements necessary to establish liability 

under each cause of action are different. Opp. to Concord Mot. at 6. Second, Plaintiffs assert that 

the “focus” of a wrongful termination claim is broader than the “focus” of Section 1102.5: the 

former concerns public policy generally while the latter concerns only whistleblowing activity. Id. 

at 6-7. Third, Plaintiffs argue that unlike Section 1102.5, there is no exhaustion requirement to 

pursue a common law wrongful termination claim. Id. at 7. Fourth, Plaintiffs direct the Court to 

lawsuits where these causes of action have been pursued in tandem by other plaintiffs. Id. 

Finally, at the hearing on the instant motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel also represented that attorneys’ 

fees would be available under Section 1102.5, but not under a Tameny claim.

The Concord Defendants offer no legal authority permitting the Court to dismiss one cause 

of action simply because it shares elements with or is similar to another cause of action. In fact, 

the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the proprietary of dismissing “duplicative” or “superfluous” 

claims on those grounds. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 1600205, 

at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (“To the extent the district court concluded that the cause of action 

was nonsensical because it was duplicative of or superfluous to Astiana’s other claims, this is not 

grounds for dismissal.”).

The Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second and/or Fourth Cause of Action is 

DENIED.

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C. Fifth and Eleventh Causes of Action: Fraud and Conversion Relating to the Spiff 

Bonus Program

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ schemes related to the Spiff bonus program support 

causes of action for both fraud and conversion. In order to plead the elements of fraud that give 

rise to the tort action for deceit, a plaintiff must allege “(a) misrepresentation (false representation,

concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., 

to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 

Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996). “The elements of a conversion claim are: “(1) the plaintiff's 

ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act 

or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora, 223 Cal. 

App. 4th 202, 208 (Cal. App. 2014) (citation omitted). “Money cannot be the subject of a cause of 

action for conversion unless there is a specific, identifiable sum involved[.]” PCO, Inc. v. 

Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs. Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP, 150 Cal. App. 4th 384, 395 

(2007). 

Both Miliano and the Concord Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fifth and eleventh causes

of action arising out of the alleged Spiff bonus program should be dismissed. As to the fraud 

cause of action, Miliano argues that: (1) the SAC fails to allege that he made a misrepresentation 

relating to Plaintiffs’ bonuses; (2) Dayekh and Khan were not salespersons and thus were not 

eligible for Spiff bonuses; and (3) the SAC does not allege that any Plaintiff relied on a 

misrepresentation to their detriment. See Miliano Mot. at 3-4. As to the conversion cause of 

action, Miliano and the Concord Defendants assert that the SAC does not state a claim for 

conversion because: (1) Plaintiffs do not identify the exact amount of money Miliano allegedly 

stole, and thus there is not an “identifiable sum” upon which a conversion claim may be based; (2) 

some Plaintiffs were never entitled to bonuses, and thus cannot plead a claim for conversion; and 

(3) Plaintiffs’ increased tax liability is not an amount in any of the Defendants’ possession. 

The Court’s analysis of these issues is hampered by the formatting of the SAC, which lists 

almost fifty pages of allegations before reaching the individual causes of action. Each cause of 

action incorporates all preceding paragraphs—whether or not those paragraphs are relevant to the 

particular cause of action asserted—and then, without distinguishing the facts that support the 

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asserted cause of action by each Plaintiff against each Defendant, summarize the legal elements of 

each claim with threadbare factual support. For example, the only substantive paragraph of the 

fifth cause of action related to the Spiff bonus program reads:

DEFENDANT MILIANO intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs, 

and each of them, the amount of Spiff wages Plaintiffs had earned. 

Further, DEFENDANT MILIANO falsified and forged employment 

records intentionally and with knowledge to deceive and deprive 

Plaintiffs of their legitimate earned wages and to cause Plaintiffs to 

pay taxes on wages DEFENDANT MILIANO pocketed. Plaintiffs 

justifiably relied on DEFENDANT MILIANO’S representation 

regarding Spiff wages because DEFENDANT MILIANO was a 

supervisor and DEFENDANT JAMES sanctioned his conduct. As a 

result of Plaintiffs’ justifiable reliance, Plaintiffs suffered injuries, 

losses, and damages including lost wages and overpayment of taxes.

SAC ¶ 214. Plaintiffs’ only substantive paragraph in the eleventh cause of action is even less 

illuminating:

DEFENDANT MILIANO stole, took, converted, embezzled 

Plaintiffs’ wages with the specific intent to keep and convert their 

wages for his own use and benefit. Plaintiffs did not consent to 

DEFENDANT MILIANO’s illegal conversion of their earned 

wages.

Id. ¶ 244. Plaintiffs make no effort to tie the facts of each alleged scheme described in the 

preceding paragraphs to the legal elements required to plead each cause of action. Nor does the 

SAC identify which allegations support each individual Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants. 

In short, the Court has been left to pick through the SAC to determine whether each Plaintiff has 

asserted sufficient facts to satisfy each element of each cause of action. Plaintiffs’ briefing fails to 

alleviate the problem, as it similarly discusses the alleged schemes in a general manner without 

parsing the factual allegations that support the causes of action asserted by each individual 

Plaintiff. In fact, during the April 23, 2015 hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs conceded that the SAC 

does not allege facts supporting that Dayekh and Khan were victims of the alleged Spiff Bonus 

schemes (arguing instead that discovery will likely lead to information supporting the assertion of 

their claims). 

Accordingly, as currently pled, the Spiff-related fraud and conversion causes of action 

asserted in the SAC cannot survive Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Although the SAC is an 

improvement from the First Amended Complaint—which Judge Gonzalez Rogers refused to even 

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consider because doing so would “waste judicial resources,” Dkt. No. 55 at 3—the SAC still blurs 

alleged facts supporting causes of action asserted by some Plaintiffs as supporting causes of action 

asserted by others. Plaintiffs are directed to reorganize their complaint to allege which facts 

support each cause of action as to each individual Plaintiff. In other words, both the fifth and 

eleventh causes of action should be divided into nine separate subheadings (one for each Plaintiff 

asserting each claim), which should in turn delineate the alleged facts that support each element of 

each Plaintiff’s claim. To the extent that some Plaintiffs cannot at this time assert in good faith 

that they were victims of the alleged scheme, they should not assert those claims. If, as Plaintiffs 

expect, discovery in this action uncovers evidence suggesting that they were also victims, the 

liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) would clearly permit Plaintiffs 

to amend upon a timely motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (courts “should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.”). Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Fifth and Eleventh 

Causes of Action are GRANTED.

Although Plaintiffs’ fraud and conversion causes of action will ultimately rise or fall based 

on the facts asserted in the Third Amended Complaint, the Court provides the following guidance 

to the parties:

1. Non-Payment of Bonuses to Which Plaintiffs Were Entitled

As to Plaintiffs allegation that Miliano “pocketed” bonus money to which Plaintiffs were

entitled, there does not appear to be a reasonable argument that Miliano’s alleged misconduct 

supports a claim for fraud. In essence, Plaintiffs allege that Miliano stole a portion of their 

bonuses and (in some instances) didn’t tell them about it. That is conversion, not fraud. 

Plaintiffs’ concession that it is only “arguabl[e]” that they would have reconsidered their 

participation in the bonus program were they aware of Miliano’s scheme, Opp. to Miliano Mot. at 

6, demonstrates that they have not pled an actionable misrepresentation or reliance on that

misrepresentation to their detriment. To the extent Miliano did steal all or some portion of 

Plaintiffs’ bonuses, their remedy lies under a theory of conversion.

Of course, Plaintiffs will eventually need to identify the amount of money allegedly stolen 

by Miliano in order to prevail on their conversion claims, but—contrary to Defendants’ 

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assertion—they need not do so at the pleading stage. Instead, plaintiffs are only required to allege

conversion of “a sum that is ‘capable of identification.’” in order to survive judgment on the 

pleadings. Natomas Gardens Inv. Grp., LLC v. Sinadinos, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1023 (E.D. Cal. 

2010) (“In this case, plaintiffs may have stated a cause of action for conversion by alleging, in 

effect, an amount of cash ‘capable of identification.’”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a scheme whereby Miliano stole bonuses related to the sale 

of specific automobiles sold at Lexus of Concord. Those specific amounts appear to be at least 

“capable of identification” and are thus sufficient to support a claim for conversion at the pleading 

stage.

2. Over-Reporting of Bonuses to Which Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled

Whether and under what theory of liability Plaintiffs’ second alleged bonus scheme is 

actionable will largely depend on how the Third Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiffs were 

injured. In the SAC, Plaintiffs assert that, by secretly submitting inflated or duplicative bonus 

vouchers in their name, but keeping the money for himself, Miliano inflated Plaintiffs’ reported 

earnings to the IRS and thus increased their tax liability. Exactly how this alleged misconduct 

resulted in injury to the Plaintiffs is less clear. If, for example, Plaintiffs assert that they relied on 

inflated earning reports provided by Defendants when paying their taxes, Plaintiffs may well state 

a cause of action for fraud. In contrast, if Plaintiffs assert that Lexus of Concord simply overwithheld their wages because of those over-reported earnings, Plaintiffs may more appropriately 

plead a cause of action for conversion. Of course, not all of the nine Plaintiffs asserting these 

claims may have been injured in the same way. Each Plaintiff must assert facts supporting why

and how he or she was injured by Miliano’s alleged misconduct in order to survive the pleading 

stage. 

D. Fifth Cause of Action: Fraud Claims Against James and Torian

The Concord Defendants further argue that the fraud claims brought against James and 

Torian do not state facts upon which relief can be granted. 

1. James

The Concord Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action fails against James for 

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two reasons: (1) James is not identified as a defendant under the fifth cause of action; and (2) 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged reliance or damages. The Court agrees on both counts.

First, the Concord Defendants are correct that James is not identified as a defendant under 

the fifth cause of action. No cause of action for fraud lies against James unless it is asserted in the 

operative complaint.

Second, Plaintiffs’ fraud claim against James is based on the allegation that, when Brock, 

Lao, and Dayekh reported Miliano’s conduct, James stated that “he would deal with the situation,” 

SAC ¶ 80, “that all of the employees would get their money back,” id., and to not “go to the 

police,” id. at ¶ 101. Plaintiffs further allege that James had no intention of investigating the 

scheme given his own participation, and that Brock, Lao, and Dayekh justifiably relied on James’ 

statements by: (1) remaining employed at Concord; and (2) refraining from calling the police. 

Opp. to Concord Mot. at 8-9. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a claim for fraud. Although misrepresentations that lull 

a victim into inaction may support a cause of action for fraud in some circumstances, a plaintiff 

must still allege that he or she suffered harm as a result of his or her reliance. Here, Plaintiffs have 

alleged that they refrained from certain actions, but not how their inaction resulted in harm. 

The Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action against James is 

GRANTED.

2. Torian

The Concord Defendants argue that Brock’s fraud claim against Torian fails because: (1)

Brock does not allege that he reasonably relied on or suffered damages as a result of Torian’s

alleged misstatement; and (2) the SAC does not contain facts identifying the “who, what, and 

where” of the alleged fraud as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 

Plaintiffs respond that Brock has sufficiently pled the elements of fraud in the detail 

required by the Federal Rules. In the SAC, Brock alleges that Torian stated that “he would not 

fire him if Mr. Brock divulged information about Mr. Brock’s complaints.” SAC ¶ 212. Brock 

alleges that he agreed to meet with Torian and discuss the alleged misconduct at Lexus of Concord 

based on Torian’s promise. Id. ¶¶63-66. Brock further alleges that Torian had no intention of 

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fulfilling his promise, and that Torian then used the information Brock disclosed as a basis to 

wrongfully terminate his employment. Id. ¶ 213. In short, Brock asserts that Torian induced him 

to share information with a false promise not to fire him, which allegedly “resulted in the very 

harm that Torian promised would not occur, i.e. termination.” Opp. to Concord Mot. at 12. 

Accordingly—and contrary to the Concord Defendants’ assertion—Brock has alleged that 

he changed his position in reliance on Torian’s statement (i.e., by agreeing to meet with Torian 

and discuss Miliano and James’ alleged misconduct) and resulting damages (i.e., his termination 

because of that disclosure). The “who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud are alleged in 

detail in paragraphs 63 through 70 of the SAC. In those paragraphs, the SAC explains how Torian 

induced Brock to accept the meeting, described in detail the subject matter of their discussion 

(along with specific quotations of what was said), and the facts surrounding his resulting 

termination. This information is sufficient to provide Defendants the notice required by Rule 9(b). 

See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 (“Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged 

fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they 

can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.”). The 

Concord Defendants do not address why these allegations are insufficient to support a claim of 

fraud. Instead, both their motion and reply brief appear to simply deny the existence of these 

allegations altogether. See Concord Reply at 4 (“[Brock] has not pointed out any legally 

cognizable change in position, other than maintaining the status quo ante, resulting from this 

alleged promise.”). While Brock’s claim of fraud against Torian may fail for other reasons, it does 

not fail on the grounds asserted by the Concord Defendants.

The Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action asserted by Brock 

against Torian is DENIED.

E. Sixth Cause of Action: Assault

Although Lao, Dayekh, and Brock allege they were assaulted by Miliano, Miliano only 

moves to dismiss the cause of action as to Lao. Specifically, Miliano argues that Lao’s allegations 

do not satisfy the elements of assault because the facts alleged do not suggest that Lao reasonably 

anticipated imminent contact. See Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1604 (Cal. App. 

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2012) (“while apprehension of that contact is the basis of assault, [m]ere words, however 

threatening, will not amount to an assault”) (citation omitted).

The Court agrees. Lao alleges that while standing next to a car, Miliano “smirked and 

stated, ‘[i]f I cut you up into little pieces and throw you down the ravine, no one will ever find 

you.’” SAC ¶ 75. This threat does not rise to the level of an assault. That Mr. Lao allegedly 

knew that Miliano brought a sword and firearms to the workplace and claimed to be a mixedmartial artist, see Opp. to Miliano Mot. at 8, does not transform Miliano’s “mere words” into a 

legally cognizable assault. Lao does not allege any action by Miliano at the time of the threat that 

could place a reasonable person in apprehension of imminent contact. 

Accordingly, Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action is GRANTED solely 

as to Plaintiff Lao.

F. Seventh Cause of Action: Workplace Violence

The Ralph Act, California Civil Code § 51.7, provides that “all persons within California 

have the right to be free from any violation, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed 

against the person on account of race.” 1 Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1167 

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Civil Code § 51.7). A claim brought under Section 51.7 requires a 

plaintiff to plead four elements: (1) the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the 

plaintiff; (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff’s race; (3) the plaintiff was 

harmed; and (4) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. 

See Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 880-81 (Cal. App. 2007).

Miliano moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action on the grounds that: (1) 

Denton, Ubaldo, and Montoya do not allege that they were threatened; and (2) Brock, Lao, and 

Dayekh do not allege they were threated based on a protected status or protected activity. 

Plaintiffs respond that Denton, Ubaldo, and Montoya pled that they were threatened by Miliano, 

and that the threats against Brock, Lao, and Dayekh were based on their subject classifications. 

 1 The Ralph Act also protects individuals based on sex, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 

disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, and sexual orientation. See Cal. 

Civ.Code §§ 51.7(a), 51(b).

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See Opp. to Miliano Mot. at 9. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Brock was threatened “due 

to his association with Lao and Dayekh.” Id. at 10. The Court agrees with Miliano that Denton, 

Brock, Lao, and Dayekh do not state a claim under Section 51.7, but finds that Ubaldo and 

Montoya’s claims survive.

First, while Plaintiffs allege that Miliano directed rude and aggressive language at Denton, 

the conduct alleged does not rise to “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence” prohibited by 

Civil Code Section 51.7. Yelling “[p]ack your shit and leave if you don’t like it. My job is to 

torture you! Get the fuck out of my office,” see SAC ¶ 118, is not violence or intimidation by 

threat of violence. In contrast, Ubaldo and Montoya allege that Miliano threatened to “kick 

[Montoya’s] ass,” id. ¶ 139, and that he “could beat [Ubaldo] up,” id. ¶ 154. These statements 

plausibly constitute threats of violence under Section 51.7. 

Second, the Court agrees that the SAC does not allege facts supporting the Section 51.7 

cause of action as to Brock, Lao, and Dayekh. While the SAC alleges that Miliano used offensive, 

racist, and sexist language in the workplace, the threats allegedly made to Brock, Lao, and Dayekh 

concerned and were made in direct response to complaints about Miliano’s alleged misconduct. 

See SAC ¶¶ 55, 75, 98. No reasonable reading of the SAC supports the inference that those 

specific threats were based on Brock, Lao, or Dayekh’s membership or perceived membership in a 

protected class. In fact, Miliano made similar threats to Brock, who is Caucasian, Lao, who is 

Filipino-American, and Dayekh, who is Indian-American. The common thread is Miliano’s 

perception that Brock, Lao, and Dayekh may have “blown the whistle” on his bonus scheme, not 

their protected characteristics. The SAC does not plead sufficient facts to suggest otherwise.

Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED solely as to 

Denton, Brock, Lao, and Dayekh. 

G. Eighth Cause of Action: Hostile Work Environment

In order to establish a prima facie claim of hostile work environment under Title VII, a 

plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of 

his or her protected characteristic, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work 

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environment. Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to be 

perceived as hostile, a working environment must be “subjectively and objectively” hostile. 

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). A determination of whether 

conduct qualifies as hostile includes its frequency, severity, nature, and whether it is physically 

threatening or humiliating as opposed to merely verbally offensive. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 

F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, unless 

extremely serious, fall into the category of nonactionable discrimination. See, e.g., Manatt, 339 

F.3d at 798. “The required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies 

inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 926. 

California courts apply the same standard in claims for harassment under FEHA. See Cozzi v. 

County of Marin, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

Both Miliano and the Concord Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ hostile work 

environment cause of action on three grounds: (1) Brock cannot prevail because he is not a 

member of a protected class targeted by Miliano; (2) Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to 

show they were harassed because of their membership in a protected class; and (3) Plaintiffs have 

not alleged that Miliano’s harassment was severe or pervasive. The Court agrees that Brock’s 

hostile work environment claim may not go forward, but rejects the other arguments asserted by 

the Defendants.

First, the Court agrees that Brock cannot state a claim for relief under Title VII or FEHA. 

While third parties may have a cause of action for hostile work environment where they observe or 

learn of workplace harassment, those third parties must be a member of the protected class 

targeted by the hostile conduct. Cf. Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 803 F.2d 476, 

478 (9th Cir. 1986) (wage discrimination claim brought by men related to conduct directed at 

women in their workplace was not viable for lack of standing); see also Treadwell v. IPC Int’l 

Corp., 302 F. App’x 595, 596 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s dismissal of male 

employee’s hostile work environment claim based on co-worker’s alleged sexual harassment of 

female employees for lack of standing). Plaintiffs’ citation to Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 

Cal. App. 4th 511 (1998), is inapposite. In Beyda, the California Court of Appeal permitted a 

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female plaintiff to present evidence of harassment of other women to show that she perceived her 

environment to be hostile to women. Id. at 519. Beyda does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that 

Brock may state a claim based on hostile conduct directed at a protected class of which he is not a 

member. 

Second, the SAC amply alleges facts demonstrating that Plaintiffs besides Brock were 

harassed because of their membership in a protected class. Miliano allegedly hurled Asian-related 

and sexist slurs at Denton, a woman of Thai descent, see SAC ¶¶ 71,121; Asian-related slurs at 

Lao and Woo, who are a Filipino-American and Chinese-American, respectively, see id. ¶¶ 83, 

145; Middle Eastern-related slurs at Dayekh, who is of Lebanese descent, see id. ¶112; Hispanicrelated slurs at Montoya and Navarro, who are Mexican-American, see id. ¶ 137, 175; AfricanAmerican-related slurs at Ubaldo, who is of African descent, see id. ¶ 154; and Indian-related slurs 

at Khan, who is Indian-American, see id. ¶ 135. That Miliano’s alleged verbal abuse also included 

some slurs and insults that were not expressly tied to a protected class does not defeat Plaintiffs’ 

claims. Miliano’s alleged verbal abuse was replete with express insults couched in terms of the 

Plaintiffs’ protected characteristics. That Miliano allegedly insulted all women and non-white 

racial and ethnic groups does not constitute “equal opportunity offensiveness” as Defendants 

suggest, see Concord Mot. at 10; instead, it is the exact sort of virulent sexism and racism that 

Title VII and FEHA were enacted to address.

Third, the SAC alleges that Miliano’s racist and sexist slurs were sufficiently severe and

pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. See

SAC ¶¶ 119 (“[Miliano] would regularly and freely use and repeat . . . ‘fish-heads’, ‘Niggers’, 

‘dog-eaters’, and ‘towel-heads’ . . .”); 167 (“Every time Mr. Khan went to [Miliano’s] office . . . 

Mr. Khan heard him refer to people as fucking low lives, Niggers, Turban Heads, Pussies, [and] 

Faggots.”); 175 (“[Miliano] repeatedly, and on a daily basis and on multiple occasions each day, 

made racial comments toward Mr. Navarro.”). Plaintiffs have alleged substantially more than 

“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents.” Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798. Miliano’s 

alleged conduct was both severe and ubiquitous at Lexus of Concord. Plaintiffs have pled facts 

sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment.

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Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action is GRANTED solely as to Brock

and DENIED as to all other Plaintiffs. 

H. Twelfth Causes of Action: Conspiracy to Commit Conversion

Plaintiffs allege that James and Torian conspired with Miliano to steal all or a portion of 

their Spiff bonuses, but have not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim of conspiracy. At best, 

Plaintiffs allege that, when they informed James and Torian of Miliano’s alleged scheme, neither 

James nor Torian responded to or investigated their claims, and (in James’ case) asked Plaintiffs 

not to report Miliano’s conduct to the police. Although it is possible that members of a conspiracy 

would act as James and Torian are alleged to have acted, their conduct is also consistent with 

managers who bury their heads in the sand and/or seek to minimize liability to the company. 

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the allegations do not reflect well on either James or Torian, 

they do not support a claim for conspiracy to commit conversion.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Twelfth 

Cause of Action. Should discovery reveal evidence of James or Torian’s involvement, Plaintiffs 

may move the Court to permit amendment of the complaint to re-allege this claim.

I. Fifteenth Cause of Action: Constructive Trust

The Concord Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifteenth cause of action solely on the 

ground that, because there is no valid conversion claim, there can be no constructive trust claim. 

See Concord Mot. at 13. Because the Court has granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

eleventh cause of action with leave to amend, the Court will similarly GRANT the Concord 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Fifteenth Cause of Action with leave to amend.

J. Seventeenth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) exists when 

there is “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering 

severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

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distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (Cal. 

2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when 

it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. . . . 

[T]he defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that 

injury will result.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Miliano and the Concord Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for 

IIED because: (1) Plaintiffs allegations are not sufficiently specific; and (2) alleged wage theft, 

conversion, and wrongful termination cannot support a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. Plaintiffs’ opposition to Miliano’s motion argues that Miliano’s death threats 

constitute extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state a claim, but does not address the 

IIED claims of the Plaintiffs to whom Miliano’s death threats were not directed. See Opp. to 

Miliano Mot. at 21-22. Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Concord Defendants’ motion focuses solely 

on the IIED claims purportedly alleged by Mrs. Brock and Mrs. Halhoul (discussed in detail 

below), with no reference to the other Plaintiffs. See Opp. to Concord Mot. at 17-18. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that many of the Plaintiffs may not state a claim for 

IIED. Plaintiffs tacitly concede this point by defending only the IIED claims arising out of 

Miliano’s death threats, which were not directed at all Plaintiffs. See Opp. to Miliano Mot. at 21-

22; Opp. to Concord Mot. at 17-18. The only acts alleged in the SAC sufficiently outrageous to 

support a claim of IIED are the death threats made by Miliano against Brock, Lao, and Dayekh. 

Brock, Lao, and Dayekh each allege that Miliano threatened to kill them, and in some cases, their 

families, when he learned that they had reported or were considering reporting his alleged scheme. 

See SAC ¶¶ 55, 75, and 98. Similar threats have been held to state a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. See Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal. 

App. 3d 222, 230 (Cal. App. 1983) (“The threats alleged in this case do not constitute mere 

violations of the niceties of polite conversation. They constitute outrageous conduct intended to 

inflict emotional distress in order to compel behavior through threats of physical violence or death, 

which our law wisely proscribes.”).

At the hearing on the instant motion, the Court questioned Plaintiffs’ counsel concerning 

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whether Mrs. Halhoul and Mrs. Brock could state a claim for IIED when they only heard of 

Miliano’s alleged threats through their husbands. In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed 

surprise that the Court believed Mrs. Holhoul and Mrs. Brock asserted claims for IIED, given that 

both the body of the SAC and Exhibit 1 to SAC clearly excluded them from the group of Plaintiffs 

asserting those claims. Plaintiffs’ confusion is curious, given that Plaintiffs spent almost a page of 

their opposition to Miliano’s motion arguing that Mrs. Halhoul and Mrs. Brock’s IIED claims 

should survive the pleading stage:

The SAC pleads sufficient facts to establish IIED as to all Plaintiffs, 

including Wissam Halhoul and Teresa Brock. Mrs. Halhoul received 

a phone call from a woman who stated she had sex with her 

husband, Plaintiff Daykeh. (SAC ¶ 107). In the context of the 

Complaint, the only inference that can be drawn is that Defendant 

Miliano orchestrated the phone call with the intent of causing Mrs. 

Halhoul and Mr. Daykeh severe emotional distress. Additionally, as 

with Mrs. Brock, Defendant Miliano threatened to kill Mrs. Halhoul 

and her children. This threat was communicated to Mr. Daykeh and 

directed at Mrs. Halhoul. Given the number of guns owned by Mr. 

Miliano, the death threats were more than mere annoyances. Yurick 

v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128. The Contra 

Costa Superior Court agreed that Defendant Miliano’s threats 

against Mr. Daykeh and his family were extreme and outrageous by 

issuing a permanent injunction against Defendant Miliano and 

ordering him to sell all of his guns. [Citation omitted].

Defendant Miliano also threatened to kill Plaintiff Teresa Brock and 

her children. (SAC ¶55). This intentional conduct caused severe 

emotional distress even though Mrs. Brock did not directly overhear 

it. There is nothing more personal than a death threat, no matter how 

it is delivered, and nothing more distressing than a threat to one’s 

children. Additionally, given Defendant Miliano’s ownership of 

many guns, the death threat caused Mrs. Brock to suffer severe 

emotional distress. The Contra Costa Superior Court agreed that 

Defendant Miliano’s threats against Mr. Brock and his family were 

extreme and outrageous by issuing a permanent injunction against 

Defendant Miliano and ordering him to sell all of his guns. [Citation

omitted].

Opp. to Miliano Mot. at 18. Because (as Plaintiffs’ counsel stated during oral argument) the SAC 

does not assert IIED claims on behalf of Mrs. Halhoul and Mrs. Brock, the Court will disregard 

the two paragraphs of argument cited above. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Seventeenth Cause of 

Action as to all Plaintiffs besides Mr. Brock, Dayekh, and Lao. The Motion is DENIED with 

respect to the IIED claims asserted by Mr. Brock, Dayekh, and Lao to the extent those claims arise 

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from Miliano’s alleged death threats.

K. Nineteenth Cause of Action: Constructive Discharge

The Concord Defendants argue that the constructive discharge claim asserted by Woo, 

Montoya, Ubaldo, Lao, Khan, and Navarro cannot survive for the same reasons that warrant 

dismissal of the hostile work environment claims asserted in the Eighth Cause of Action. See

Concord Mot. at 16. The Court has held that these six employees have stated a claim for hostile 

work environment and therefore rejects the Concord Defendants’ challenge to their constructive 

discharge claims for the same reasons.

The Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Nineteenth Cause of Action is DENIED. 

L. Twentieth Cause of Action: Loss of Consortium

Mrs. Brock’s and Mrs. Halhoul’s claims for loss of consortium are facially insufficient. 

The two paragraphs that allege the cause of action do not identify any facts supporting their

claims. See SAC ¶¶ 273-74. Instead, they merely cite the relevant legal standard and—based on 

unidentified facts alleged in the prior 272 paragraphs—assert that Defendants are liable. While 

Plaintiffs’ Opposition identifies paragraphs in the SAC that could potentially support a loss of 

consortium claim, see Opp. at Miliano Mot. at 21, Plaintiffs were obligated to identify the alleged 

facts supporting that cause of action in the SAC. 

The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Twentieth Cause of Action is GRANTED. 

M. Twenty-First Cause of Action: Negligence

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are facially insufficient. The four paragraphs that allege the 

cause of action do not identify any facts supporting their claims. See SAC ¶¶ 275-78. Instead, 

they merely cite the relevant legal standard and—based on unidentified facts alleged in the prior 

274 paragraphs—assert that Defendants are liable. Plaintiffs were obligated to identify the alleged 

facts supporting their negligence cause of action in the SAC. 

The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Twenty-First Cause of Action is GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby:

1. DENIES the Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Cause of Action;

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2. DENIES the Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second and/or Fourth 

Causes of Action;

3. GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action as to all 

Defendants besides Torian, and DENIES the Motion as to Torian; 

4. GRANTS Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action as to Lao, but 

DENIES the Motion as to all other Plaintiffs;

5. GRANTS Miliano’s Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action as to Denton, 

Brock, Lao, and Dayekh, but DENIES the Motion as to all other Plaintiffs; 

6. GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action as to 

Brock, but DENIES the Motion as to all other Plaintiffs; 

7. GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action;

8. GRANTS the Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Twelfth Cause of 

Action;

9. GRANTS the Concord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Fifteenth Cause of 

Action;

10. DENIES the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Seventeenth Cause of Action as 

to Mr. Brock, Lao, and Dayekh, but GRANTS the Motion as to all other Plaintiffs;

11. GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Twentieth Cause of Action;

12. GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Twenty-First Cause of Action.

All causes of action dismissed in this order are dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiffs 

are directed to file a Third Amended Complaint in accordance with the discussion above no later 

than 21 days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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