Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01494/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01494-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniela Geonkova, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 10-01494-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Doc. 13). Having

reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, as well as the response and reply thereto, the Court

issues the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2009, Plaintiff Daniela Geonkova (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against

Defendant Sunrise Senior Living Management (“Defendant”) in Maricopa County Superior

Court. (Doc. 1-4). Plaintiff alleged claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process.

(Id.). Defendant filed its Answer in November 2009. (Id.). Defendant then filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment in February 2010 (id.), which the trial court denied in April 2010.

(Doc. 1-5). 

On June 16, 2010, Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel an email stating that

Plaintiff was in violation of the court’s scheduling order because Plaintiff had not yet

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Plaintiff is a citizen of Arizona, and Defendant is a Virginia corporation with its principal

place of business in Virginia.

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provided Defendant with a Rule 26.1 initial disclosure statement. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. A). Later

that day, Plaintiff ‘s counsel sent an informal disclosure email to Defendant’s counsel. (Id.).

The email reads as follows:

[f]or a computation of economic damages, [Plaintiff] incurred

$750 in attorneys’ fees to defend the criminal proceeding, and

anticipates incurring between $50,000-$100,000 in attorneys’

fees with immigration attorneys (depending on the length of the

proceeding, appeals, etc.) to gain permanent citizenship in light

of her need to now respond on the citizenship application that

she’s been arrested and charged with a crime (and the attendant

problems that will come from that admission). We’re seeking

punitive damages in an amount to be determined (relative to

Sunrise’s annual income). Please consider this an informal

disclosure. If you need a more formal one, please advise. 

(Id.).

On July 15, 2010, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. 1), in which Defendant

alleged that removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1) because the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000, and the parties were both citizens of different states.1

Specifically, Defendant stated that “[t]he total amount in controversy, as disclosed for the

first time by Plaintiff’s counsel via email on June 16, 2010, is over $75,000. Accordingly,

this Court now has diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1332(a)(1).” (Id.). Defendant contends that it relied upon Plaintiff’s informal disclosure

email in determining that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. 14). 

On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff argues

that this Court should remand the case back to state court and grant Plaintiff an award of

attorney’s fees because Defendant did not satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that “[t]he determinable damage suffered (i.e., attorneys’s fees incurred to defend

the underlying criminal action) are nominal at best. All of [Plaintiff’s] other damages are at

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the sole discretion of the jury, and the mere possibility that reputational and/or punitive

damages might be awarded is not enough to meet federal jurisdictional requirements.” (Id.).

Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on August 30, 2010.

(Doc. 14). Defendant states that it does not oppose remanding the case in light of the

statement Plaintiff made in her Motion to Remand that her determinable damages are

“nominal at best.” Specifically, Defendant stated that “[i]n reliance upon Plaintiff’s current

admission that her claimed damages are insufficient to confer diversity jurisdiction on this

Court, Defendant does not oppose the Motion for Remand.” (Id.). Defendant does, however,

oppose Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees. Defendant argues that this Court

should not grant Plaintiff an award of attorney’s fees because Defendant reasonably relied

upon Plaintiff’s informal disclosure email in determining that the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000. Defendant argues that it was further justified in its belief that the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000 because Plaintiff opted out of compulsory arbitration, which

establishes at a very minimum that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 

Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of her Motion to Remand in September 2010. (Doc.

16). Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant an award of attorney’s fees because

Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Plaintiff claims that

Defendant’s decision to remove the case was objectively unreasonable because it was based

on a “blatant mischaracterization” of Plaintiff’s informal disclosure email. (Id.). In addition,

Plaintiff contends that this Court should grant an award of attorney’s fees because it appears

that Defendant filed its Notice of Removal for the purpose of delaying adjudication of the

case. Plaintiff states that that Defendant litigated this matter for approximately nine months,

including having filed an unsuccessful summary judgment motion, before seeking removal.

II. LAW 

The attorney’s fees statute at issue in this case, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), states that “[a]n

order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” “Absent unusual circumstances,

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courts may award attorney’s fees under §1477(c) only where the moving party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546

U.S. 132, 141 (2005). In addition, “district courts retain discretion to consider whether

unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case. For instance, a

plaintiff's delay in seeking remand or failure to disclose facts necessary to determine

jurisdiction may affect the decision to award attorney's fees.” Id. 

Courts may award attorney’s fees “when a defendant’s removal, while ‘fairly

supportable,’ was wrong as a matter of law.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,

208 F.3d 1102, 1106, n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). “The appropriate test for awarding fees under

§1477(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging

litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic

decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria

are satisfied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005). 

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, this Court finds that Defendant failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that

the removing defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000). Plaintiff’s informal disclosure email

states that Plaintiff incurred $750 in attorney’s fees and that Plaintiff anticipates incurring

between $50,000 - $100,000 in attorney’s fees with immigration attorneys in light of her

need to now respond on her citizenship application that she has been arrested and charged

with a crime. Plaintiff’s email also states that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in an

amount relative to Defendant’s annual income. Thus, the estimated range of future

economic damages, as set forth in Plaintiff’s informal disclosure email, falls both below

and above $75,000. 

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The certificate of compulsory arbitration establishes that the total amount in

controversy exceeds $50,000. The informal disclosure email and the certificate of

arbitration, taken together, do not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

Cir. 1992) (holding that “federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to

the right of removal in the first instance”). Regardless, Defendant does not oppose

Plaintiff’s request to remand the case. Accordingly, the Court will remand the case to

state court. 

The remaining issue is whether this Court should grant an award of attorney’s

fees to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant an award of attorney’s fees

because Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing the case. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s decision to remove the case was objectively

unreasonable because it was based on a “blatant mischaracterization” of Plaintiff’s

informal disclosure email. Defendant contends that it reasonably relied on Plaintiff’s

informal disclosure email in determining that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

Defendant also argues that it was further justified in its belief that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000 because Plaintiff opted out of compulsory arbitration,

establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 

This Court finds, in its discretion, that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees because Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for believing

that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The compulsory certificate of

arbitration merely establishes that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. See Carr

v. Esurance Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 65091 *7 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that the

“certificate of arbitration does nothing more than establish that the amount in controversy

is likely more than $50,000. . . . [T]he certificate does not prove that the amount in

controversy is greater than $75,000"). Plaintiff’s disclosure email merely establishes that

the amount in controversy might be more than $75,000. Plaintiff’s disclosure email and

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the compulsory certificate of arbitration, taken together, do not establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s decision to remove the case based solely on those two

documents was objectively unreasonable. 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Doc.

13). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s request for an award of

attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined upon Plaintiff’s compliance with the

requirements set forth in Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2. 

DATED this 16th day of December, 2010.

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