Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00927/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00927-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On June 13, 2013, Alvin Bryant, an individual proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for screening. No other parties have 

appeared in this action. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that 

are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

ALVIN BRYANT,

 Plaintiff,

v.

M. PAYAN,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-0927-MJS

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS

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or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Facial plausibility demands more than the 

mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff is currently housed in Avenal State Prison in Avenal, California. He names M. 

Payan, a correctional officer at Avenal State Prison, as the sole defendant in this action. His

allegations are as follows:

On October 20, 2012, Defendant Payan insulted Plaintiff. She did not apologize. This 

served as an obstruction to Plaintiff’s ability to secure mental health services. Following the 

insult, Plaintiff had an “emotional paranoid relapse”.

Plaintiff asks for Defendant Payan’s duties to be “rerouted” and that she receive 

training on inmates’ rights. He also asks for $10,000 in punitive damages.

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Plaintiff does not identify the statutory or constitutional basis for his claims. From his 

factual allegations, his complaints conceivably could fall within the ambit an Eighth 

Amendment claim for inadequate medical care or excessive force. The Court will analyze 

them accordingly.

III. ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder 

v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). § 1983 is not 

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal 

rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

1987).

B. Claims

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standards applicable to the type of claims 

potentially applicable to the facts plead. Plaintiff should review these standards and follow 

them if he chooses to file an amended complaint.

a. Eighth Amendment - Excessive Force

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects 

prisoners from the use of excessive physical force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36 (2010) 

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(per curiam); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). To state an Eighth Amendment

claim, a plaintiff must allege that the use of force was “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001). The malicious and sadistic use 

of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of 

whether or not significant injury is evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 

289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard examines de 

minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries). However, not “every malevolent touch by a 

prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “The Eighth 

Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is 

not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks 

and citations omitted).

Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if the 

“force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. The Court must look at the need for 

application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the 

extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as 

reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the 

response. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. The absence of significant injury alone is not 

dispositive of a claim of excessive force. See Wilkens, 559 U.S. at 37. “Neither accident nor 

negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as ‘[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, 

not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel 

and Unusual Punishments Clause.’” Williams v. Ramirez, 2009 WL 1327515, *3 (E.D.Cal. 

May 12, 2009) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319).

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Plaintiff should also note that “‘the exchange of verbal insults between inmates and 

guards is a constant, daily ritual observed in this nation's prisons’ of which ‘we do not 

approve,’ but which do not violate the Eighth Amendment.” See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997)).

b. Eighth Amendment - Inadequate Medical Care

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The 

two part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ 

by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to 

the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 

104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)).

In addition to a serious medical condition, Plaintiff must also establish deliberate 

indifference. To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show “a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the 

indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the 

prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” 

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “‘If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth 

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 

1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies in 

his claim. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 

1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, 

unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 676-677. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and it 

must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 

220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed June 13, 2013, is dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

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action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2013 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC _Signature- END:

ci4d6

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