Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02224/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02224-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331cv Fed. Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA and CITY OF SAN 

DIEGO, a municipal corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JUDITH JEAN HOFFMAN, an 

individual; and DOES 1 through 

50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02224-WQH-JLB

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis. (ECF No. 2). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2017, Plaintiffsinitiated this action by filing a Complaint in the Superior 

Court of California for the County of San Diego, assigned case number 37-2017-00021581-

CU-MC-CTL, against Defendant Judith Jean Hoffman. (ECF No. 1-3 at 1).

On November 22, 2019, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 1). The 

same day, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 

2). 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has an independent duty to assess whether federal subject matter 

jurisdiction exists. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 

967 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the district court had a duty to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or 

not”); accord Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996). Because 

subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties, a district court must remand 

a removed case if it lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Kelton Arms Condominium Owners 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Sparta 

Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998); 

see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

In relevant part, the federal removal statute provides: 

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 

brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 

original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 

the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 

the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is 

proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th 

Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” id., 

and removal jurisdiction “‘must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 

in the first instance’” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 

1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 

curiam)).

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is the equitable owner of a single-family dwelling 

located in San Diego, CA. (ECF No. 1-3 at 3). Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2008,

Defendant’s property has a history of state and local law violations related to nuisance and 

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substandard housing. Id. Plaintiffs allege that, on September 21, 2016, the City Code 

Enforcement Division (“CED”) issued Defendant a Notice and Order to Vacate, Repair 

Substandard Building, and Abate Public Nuisance pursuant to California Health and Safety 

Code § 17980.6. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege that, on September 21, 2016, the City posted a 

copy of the Notice and Order at the property and mailed the Notice to Defendant via first 

class and certified mail. Id. Plaintiffs allege that City inspectors conducted compliance 

inspections on November 2, 2016 and April 5, 2017. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs allege that, during 

both inspections, inspectors observed that Defendant had not taken any action to remedy 

the nuisance and substandard conditions identified in the Notice and Order. Id. Plaintiffs 

allege that the nuisance and substandard conditions continue to exist at the property and 

the interior of the property remains extremely hoarded. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 

has not vacated the property as required in the Notice and order. Id. Plaintiffs allege that

on, April 21, 2017, the City served notice of its intent to seek the appointment of a receiver 

for the property on all parties with a recorded interest in the property. Id. Plaintiffs allege 

that, on April 25, 2017, a City Attorney Investigator personally delivered a written notice 

to Hoffman regarding the City’s intent to seek a receivership. Id.

Plaintiffs bring the following three causes of action: (1) appointment of a receiver 

pursuant to California Health & Safety Code § 17980.7(c); (2) maintenance of a public 

nuisance in violation of California Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480; and (3) violations of the 

San Diego Municipal Code and California Building Code. (ECF No. 1-3). Plaintiffs seek 

appointment of a receiver, injunctive relief, costs, and fees. Id. at 16-19. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE NOTICE OF REMOVAL

Defendant contends that “Defendant’s attorneys violated the Plaintiff’s rights under 

the color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 245; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (ECF No. 1 at 

3). Defendant contends that “Defendants have violated numerous Federal laws and 

statutes, acting under color of law where their usage of the California State Health and 

Safety Code was unconstitutionally vague.” Id. Defendant asserts that “[t]he city never 

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identified any EMERGENCY that is inherent in the usage of the state law to appoint a 

receiver.” Id. Defendant contends that after she 

requested an administrative hearing since the Nuisance Notice was itself 

vague, false, or misleading, the city denied her that opportunity and 

determined to bring the action under the state’s Health and Safety Code for 

the appointment of a receiver.

Id. Defendant contends that 

To underscore that the Nuisance Notice was vague or false, the appointed 

Receiver failed in his initial attempt to do what the city demanded by usage 

of just that Nuisance Notice. The court had ordered that the receiver work with 

Hoffman to remedy the matters yet he never provided any information to her 

on what the city specifically and LEGALLY was demanding. He himself 

failed his first inspection by the city code inspector. The state Health and 

Safety code specifies that whatever agency obtains a receivership is to provide 

a document that directs the receiver’s actions. The receiver claimed none was 

provided, thus he claimed the Nuisance Notice was what he had to utilize. 

Since the receiver failed in his first attempt, the city’s usage of the CA Health 

and Safety Code was therefore a failure. Hoffman contends the state Health 

and Safety Code is unconstitutionally vague.

Id. at 3-4. Defendant contends that 

any sale of the lien that has been inflated by incorporation of a lien pay-off of 

a lien generated through illegal actions is a violation of several federal laws 

including her rights to due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. at 4

DISCUSSION

District courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions that arise 

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case 

‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the 

vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal 

law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(modification in original) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 

463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983)). “[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 

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governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction 

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly 

pleaded complaint.” Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d at 1091; Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Dwelle, 

900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, the existence of federal question 

jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint.”). “In determining the existence 

of removal jurisdiction, based upon a federal question, the court must look to the complaint 

as of the time the removal petition was filed. Jurisdiction is based on the complaint as 

originally filed” Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has held that “a case may not be removed to federal court on the 

basis of a federal defense, ... even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint.” 

Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. Of Cal. v. 

Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). The 

federal element must be “direct and essential” to the claim, as opposed to “incidental” or 

“attenuated.” Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1994).

The underlying state action is based upon state and municipal law. Plaintiffs do not 

state any federal causes of action or prayers for relief. The constitutional issues arise only 

as a defense to Plaintiffs’ state and municipal law claims. The Court concludes that the 

underlying action does not include a federal issue and that removal is not permitted. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the Superior Court 

for the State of California, County of San Diego, where it was originally filed under case 

number 37-2017-00021581-CU-MC-CTL. 

IT IS FURTHERE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot. 

Dated: December 11, 2019

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