Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00001/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00001-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e-2ra Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVESTER T. OLIVER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRON WORKERS UNION LOCAL 229, et 

al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17-cv-1-LAB (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS [Dkts. 67, 68]

After retaining counsel in this workplace discrimination and retaliation suit, Plaintiff 

Sylvester Oliver filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Now before the Court are 

motions to dismiss by Iron Workers Union Local 229 (“the Union”) and the two SME 

entities (together, “SME”). Dkts. 67, 68. For the reasons below, those motions are 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

This case is more than two years old and Oliver is now on his Third Amended 

Complaint (“TAC”)—needless to say, the parties are familiar with the facts. The gist of 

this case is that Oliver, an African-American ironworker, claims he was the subject of

retaliation and racial discrimination at the hands of two steel contractors and his own 

union. According to Oliver, the Defendants routinely denied him the opportunity to work

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on new construction projects based on his history of filing administrative complaints and 

his reputation as a “troublemaker.” 

In October 2017, the Court dismissed Oliver’s initial complaint, finding that his 

allegations were insufficient to state a claim for relief. Dkt. 20. Oliver then filed an 

amended complaint, which Defendants again moved to dismiss. The Court partially 

granted Defendants’ motion, dismissing most of the claims but finding that Oliver had 

stated a claim for hostile work environment against the Union and for retaliation against 

both sets of Defendants. Dkt. 40. Not content to proceed on those claims alone, Oliver—

who had to that point represented himself pro se—hired an attorney and filed a 77-page 

second amended complaint that contained a laundry list of eleven different causes of 

action. Dkt. 64. In an effort to avoid further motion practice, the parties stipulated to 

Oliver withdrawing his second amended complaint so that he could file a shorter 

complaint with a narrower focus. Dkt. 65. The result is Oliver’s current pleading: a 56-

page TAC with four causes of action: (1) Title VII retaliation against the Union; (2) Section 

1981 retaliation against both sets of Defendants; (3) Section 1981 discrimination against 

the Union; and (4) Section 1981 hostile work environment against the Union. See TAC, 

Dkt. 66.

DISCUSSION

Defendants jointly move to dismiss the TAC in its entirety, arguing that it violates 

Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement. In the alternative, they argue, 

portions of Oliver’s TAC should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6). 

1. Rule 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FRCP 8(a)(2). In certain situations, the

Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 41(b) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that violates 

Rule 8’s requirements. See, e.g., Van Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling 

Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1971). Dismissal may be appropriate, for 

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example, where the complaint fails “to advise defendants sufficiently of the basis of [the] 

claim[s]” because it is unnecessarily “prolix, confused and obscure.” Id. at 1049. But 

dismissal in such circumstances is a “harsh remedy,” so the court should generally adopt 

“less drastic alternatives” if possible. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 

1996).

It is certainly true that Oliver’s TAC is long and contains extraneous information—

for example, while the Court appreciates a good story, a history on the evolution of

medieval trade guilds is of no practical use in a race discrimination suit. See TAC at 

¶¶ 32-33. At the end of the day, though, these literary flourishes are as harmless as they 

are unnecessary. Apart from being forced to slog through the 56-page complaint, the 

only concrete harm the Defendants have identified is that certain causes of action are 

directed towards only one party and yet contain references to other parties, thus leading 

to confusion as to whether the second party should have been named or whether Oliver 

is attributing the second party’s actions to the first.

1

 While this is not ideal, it is also not 

uncommon. Even in the modern age of plausibility pleading, complaints are often subject 

to some degree of ambiguity before discovery begins. The ambiguity here does not

warrant wholesale dismissal, especially in light of the Court’s prior determination that 

Oliver has plausibly pled at least some of his claims. Further, as discussed below, 

portions of Oliver’s TAC are subject to dismissal, which should help to narrow the scope 

of the claims Defendants must defend. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC in its 

entirety is DENIED.

2. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants ague that even if Oliver’s complaint survives the Rule 8 challenge, 

certain portions should still be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

 

1

In Oliver’s second cause of action, for example, Defendants claim that the complaint 

capitalizes the names of the business manager and business agent as if they are parties, 

even though they are not. See TAC at ¶¶ 108-09. Likewise, in his third cause of action, 

Oliver makes allegations about Local 441, a union that is not a party to this case. Id. at 

¶¶ 130. 

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Specifically, the Union argues that Oliver (1) failed to exhaust administrative remedies as 

to certain portions of his Title VII claim; (2) fails to state a Section 1981 claim for retaliation 

in connection with certain work projects; (3) fails to state a Section 1981 claim for a hostile 

work environment; and (4) fails to state a Section 1981 claim for discrimination. SME 

moves to dismiss portions of the one cause of action in which it is named—Oliver’s claim 

for retaliation under Section 1981.

a. The Union

i. Title VII

The Court previously allowed to go forward Oliver’s claims for Title VII retaliation 

as to the San Ysidro and San Clemente job projects, both of which were alleged in his 

EEOC charges. Oliver’s TAC, however, contains new allegations of retaliation related to 

several projects that were not raised in his prior complaints nor his EEOC charges, such 

as the San Diego Central Public Library (“Library”), the Carter/Keep United States 

Courthouse (“Courthouse”), the UCSD Altman Clinical and Translational Research 

Institute2(“Research Institute”), the LA Stadium, the Solar Gen 2 Calipatria (“Calipatria”), 

and the Herrick Kaiser Hospital (“Kaiser Hospital”) projects. See TAC at ¶ 7, 72-78, 95, 

122. The Union argues that these claims must be dismissed because Oliver did not 

administratively exhaust his remedies as to these instances of retaliation and is now timebarred from doing so.

In Title VII cases, district courts may only hear claims related to charges alleged in 

the administrative action, or conduct that is “like or reasonably related to” the charges 

described in the administrative allegations. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 

896–97 (9th Cir. 2001). “This standard is met where the allegations in the civil suit are 

within the scope of the administrative investigation which can reasonably be expected to 

grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 897 (citation and internal quotation marks 

 

2 This project is alternatively referred to as “UCSD Clinical Research Facility and Jacobs 

Hospital” and “UCSD Altman Clinical and Translational Research Institute.” Compare

TAC ¶ 7 with TAC ¶ 122. The Court assumes these references are to the same project. 

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omitted). In assessing the relatedness of claims, district courts construe EEOC charges 

“with the utmost liberality . . . .” Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 

F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997).

Oliver’s EEOC charges here referenced only retaliation related to the San Ysidro 

project from July 2, 2013 through August 8, 2013 and the San Clemente project on 

September 8, 2014. See Dkt. 1-8 at 60, 85-86. The charges did not specifically reference 

any of the new projects Oliver now lists in his TAC, nor retaliation related to the San Ysidro 

and San Clemente projects that occurred after 2014. 

As to the projects that were referenced for the first time in Oliver’s TAC, the Court 

concludes that these allegations are not “reasonably related” to the EEOC charges and 

are therefore subject to dismissal. This is especially true because, according to the TAC, 

many of these projects began before Oliver filed his EEOC charges: the Library project 

began in 2010, the Courthouse project began in 2009, and the Research Institute project 

began in 2014. See TAC at ¶ 7. Had Oliver intended for these instances of retaliation to 

be considered by the EEOC, he could have listed them in his charges. Accordingly, any 

Title VII allegations of retaliation related to projects other than San Ysidro and San 

Clemente are DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

But Oliver is not, as the Union would have it, precluded from alleging Title VII 

retaliation related to the San Ysidro and San Clemente projects that occurred after he 

filed his charges. Oliver specifically checked the box labeled “continuing action” on his 

EEOC charges. See Dkt. 1-8 at 86. Had the EEOC conducted an investigation into San 

Ysidro/San Clemente retaliation, an investigation into subsequent retaliation “would 

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897. To that 

extent, the Union’s Motion is DENIED.

In short, Oliver’s Title VII claims are limited to retaliation related to the San Ysidro 

and San Clemente projects. In proving Title VII retaliation, however, he may rely on 

instances of retaliation related to those projects that occurred after he filed his EEOC 

charges.

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ii. Section 1981 Retaliation

The Union next argues that allegations of retaliation related to projects other than 

the San Ysidro and San Clemente projects are insufficiently pled and therefore cannot 

form the basis of Oliver’s Section 1981 claim. Courts generally analyze Title VII and 

Section 1981 claims the same, and “facts sufficient to give rise to a Title VII claim are also 

sufficient for a section 1981 claim.” Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 

(9th Cir. 1987). Unlike Title VII claims, though, Section 1981 claims are not subject to 

administrative exhaustion, so the Court must look to the merits of the claims, not whether 

they were raised in the EEOC charges. 

The Union says Oliver’s TAC is deficient as to the Library, Courthouse, and 

Research Institute projects because the TAC only alleges that Oliver was “eligible for 

dispatch to work on” those projects and was not ultimately dispatched. According to the 

Union, this does not plausibly support an inference of retaliation. The Court agrees. 

Especially contrasted with the detailed description Oliver provides regarding retaliation 

vis-à-vis the San Ysidro and San Clemente projects, the threadbare allegation that he 

was “eligible for dispatch to work on” these other projects does not survive muster. The 

same is true with his allegations as to the LA Stadium project – Oliver alleges that he was 

“prevented from being dispatched to the SME LA stadium job that a number of [Union] 

members worked on,” but does not plead any other facts that would support an inference 

that he was deliberately passed over for this project in retaliation for filing complaints. 

Accordingly, his Section 1981 retaliation claim as related to those projects is 

DISMISSED.

3

 

The Union also argues that Oliver’s allegations of retaliation related to the Kaiser 

Hospital project are insufficient because he does not adequately demonstrate that it was 

the Union who took adverse action against him, as opposed to the contractor who fired 

 

3 For the same reasons, Oliver’s Section 1981 retaliation claims against SME are 

DISMISSED to the extent they are predicated on these projects. Oliver may proceed with 

his claims against SME related to the San Ysidro and San Clemente projects. 

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him. Here, however, the Court disagrees. Oliver’s TAC describes how Cesar Cabrera, 

the Union’s Business Agent who routinely retaliated against Oliver for filing “paperwork,” 

appointed his cousin Humberto Olmos as the job steward for the Kaiser Hospital project. 

Oliver also describes conversations on the jobsite between himself and Olmos, in which 

the two discuss Cabrera’s dislike of Oliver and the need for Oliver to get along with 

Cabrera. In light of these facts, it is plausible that the foreman’s subsequent decision to 

terminate Oliver from that project was directly related to pressure from Cabrera and, by 

extension, the Union. The Union’s motion is DENIED with respect to this project, and 

Oliver may proceed with his Section 1981 retaliation claim as related to the San Ysidro, 

San Clemente, Kaiser Hospital, and Calipatria4 projects. As noted in the Court’s previous 

Order, Oliver may also rely on the charges filed against him by Cabrera and Brandon 

Gates as “adverse actions” giving rise to a Section 1981 retaliation claim. See Dkt. 40 

at 4.

iii. Section 1981 Hostile Work Environment Claim

The Union next argues that even if Oliver has stated a claim for retaliation, he has 

not adequately alleged that this retaliation had anything to do with his race, and so his 

hostile work environment claim must be dismissed. The Court previously rejected this 

same argument, explaining: “[Oliver] alleged multiple instances of Union conduct that flow 

from his complaints about racial discrimination: from Cabrera ‘physically invading Mr. 

Oliver’s personal space’ and asking the invective rhetorical ‘who the fuck do you think you 

are?’; to Juan Galvan putting ‘his face within inches of Mr. Oliver’s face and yell[ing] at 

Mr. Oliver to “get out of my hall.”’ Oliver’s sufficiently alleged that these incidents, and 

others, taken together were ‘part of the same actionable hostile environment claim.’ Nat'l 

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120-21 (2002).” Like before, the Union’s 

motion to dismiss these claims is DENIED.

 

4 The Union does not address the sufficiency of OIiver’s allegations related to the 

Calipatria project, but the Court finds that his allegations related to this project are 

sufficient to state a claim.

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iv. Section 1981 Discrimination Claim

Finally, the Union moves to dismiss Oliver’s Section 1981 discrimination claim in 

its entirety. The Court previously dismissed this same claim without prejudice, noting that 

unlike his other Section 1981 causes of action, claims of discrimination under Section 

1981 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations and that Oliver had failed to 

specifically plead discriminatory acts that took place in the two years leading up to this 

lawsuit. He still hasn’t done this. The Court even offered Oliver guidance on how he 

might plead such discrimination, pointing out that he claims to have filed complaints with 

the NLRB on three occasions in 2015 and 2016—if he could provide the Court with the 

facts underlying those complaints, he might be able to plead actionable discrimination 

that occurred within the statute of limitations. He didn’t do that, so this claim is 

DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART 

and DENIED IN PART. Oliver may proceed with: (1) his Title VII retaliation claim as 

related to the San Ysidro and San Clemente projects; (2) his Section 1981 retaliation 

claim as related to the San Ysidro, San Clemente, Kaiser Hospital, and Calipatria

projects; and (3) his Section 1981 hostile work environment claim. His Third Cause of 

Action for Section 1981 discrimination is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as are his other 

claims to the extent they are predicated on projects other than San Ysidro, San Clemente, 

Kaiser Hospital, and Calipatria.

By February 15, 2019, the parties should inform Magistrate Judge Michael Berg if 

an additional settlement conference would be helpful before discovery begins.5 

 

5 A Mandatory Settlement Conference is currently scheduled for May 15, 2019. That will 

remain on the calendar. The Court is simply offering the parties an additional conference 

prior to discovery if it would help avoid the costs of discovery and expedite the resolution 

of this case. 

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Otherwise, given how long this case has been pending, the parties should immediately 

proceed to discovery. The Court anticipates trial will be held by the end of 2019. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2019

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

Chief United States District Judge

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