Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01071/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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• PILED 

Urutcd Stiia~ ~urt ef Appct.ls 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AU 

JIM CONSIDINE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY ) 

COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF ADAMS, ) 

STATE OF COLORADO, STEVE CRAMER, LEO ) 

YOUNGER, and RON NICHOL, individually ) 

and as present or former members of ) 

the Board of County Commissioners of ) 

the County of Adams, and ROBERT CLIFTON) 

individually and as the former County ) 

Administrator of the County of Adams, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-1071, 89-1118 

and 89-1119 

(D.C. NO. 88-F-502) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, ** 

District Judge. 

This matter is appealed from the order of the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado granting defendants' 

motion for summary judgment as to certain claims of the plaintiff. 

Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee ( 11 appellant 11 ) is the 

former director of the division of community and recreational 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1071 Document: 010110039616 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 1 
' 

resources for Adams County, Colorado ("the county"), and was 

employed by the county in various capacities from November 14, 

1977, until June 30, 1985. Plaintiff was employed without a 

written contract until May 1984, when he signed a written contract 

that was to expire by its terms on June 30, 1985. At the close of 

the period covered by the written contract, plaintiff's employment 

was not renewed. In 1988, plaintiff brought a civil action 

pursuing eight claims against defendants based on the following 

theories: (1) freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First 

Amendment; (2) breach of contract; (3) due process as guaranteed 

by the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) promissory estoppel; (5) 

defamation; (6) interference with contractual relationships; (7) 

civil conspiracy; and (8) exemplary damages. All claims were made 

against each defendant, both individually and in his official 

capacity. 

Eventually, cross motions for summary judgment were filed. 

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in his favor on his third 

(due process) and fourth (promissory estoppel) claims for relief. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment in their favor on all eight 

claims for relief. The district court denied plaintiff's motion 

and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the 

second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh claims for relief. 

The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment 

as to plaintiff's first (First Amendment) and eighth (exemplary 

damages) claims for relief, determining that plaintiff's 

statements were protected by the First Amendment and that there 

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were issues to be resolved by the trier of fact relating to 

plaintiff's First Amendment claim. 1 

On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in 

failing to consider whether the 1984 contract of employment was a 

contract of adhesion and contends that the trial court erred in 

dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, sixth and seventh claims at 

the summary judgment stage. 

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies 

the same standard employed by the trial court under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). Osgood v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) directs that 

summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if ... there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Thus, "[w]hen a 

motion for summary judgment is granted, it is the appellate 

court's duty to examine the record to determine if any genuine 

issue of material fact was in dispute; if not, the court must 

decide if the substantive law was correctly applied." Osgood, 848 

F.2d at 143. "As to materiality, the substantive law will 

identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

1 Defendants-appellees' challenges to the district court's 

summary judgment determination as to the First Amendment and 

exemplary damages claims were considered in a separate opinion in 

Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, F.2d (Nos. 89-1016 

and 89-1017, filed August 3, 1990). We affirmed the decision of 

the district court. 

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properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As to 

genuineness, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a 

material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Id. at 248. 

Plaintiff's third claim for relief alleged a violation of due 

process. The district court found that "[p]laintiff has failed to 

present any 

interest." On 

persuasive evidence 

appeal, plaintiff 

of a protectable 

contends that the 

property 

evidence 

presented to the trial court establishes "a legitimate objective 

expectation of continued employment." Appellant contends that the 

due process claim contains genuine issues of material fact that 

should be resolved by the trier of fact and not by the trial judge 

on summary disposition. Appellant contends that his "expectation" 

was created by, inter alia, a resolution that contract employees 

could be discharged only for just cause, the county's personnel 

policies and procedures, and the terms of the May 8, 1984, written 

contract which stated that Considine's position could be 

terminated prior to July 1, 1985, only for just cause. 

However, the district court found that "the contract had 

expired when plaintiff was terminated, and the 'just cause' 

limitation applied only during the term of the contract" and that 

plaintiff, in his testimony, "did not state whether [the] 

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understanding would extend beyond his employment contract." To 

the contrary, the district court found that plaintiff's testimony 

clearly indicated that plaintiff understood that defendants "could 

and would decline to renew his contract on its expiration." The 

district court cited the following testimony of plaintiff: 

Q. What's your understanding of the contract? 

A. In terms of just cause? 

Q. In terms of non-renewal. Could you be not nonrenewed [sic] with or without cause, according to your 

understanding of the contract? 

A. It seems, according to that contract, that it can 

just expire and that's it, it's gone. 

Q. And that amounts to a non-renewal without cause, 

doesn't it? 

A. I would say so. 

Accordingly, and based upon our review of the record, we 

agree with the district court's determination that plaintiff 

failed to demonstrate a genuin~ issue of material fact as to 

whether he had a legitimate, objective expectation of continued 

employment. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564 (1972). 

In another argument related to plaintiff's due process claim, 

appellant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to 

consider and determine whether the contract of employment was a 

contract of adhesion and, therefore, without effect or whether 

such employment contract was valid, thus entitling plaintiff to 

any benefits thereunder." Plaintiff asserts that, prior to being 

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"forced to enter" the contract on May 8, 1984, he had a "preexisting employment contract and relationship with Adams County" 

that was "implied from various oral declarations, as well as a 

chart of responsibilities, authorities and standards of 

performance." 

Appellees argue in return that "[t]he question of whether 

Plaintiff's written employment contract was one of adhesion is 

immaterial. Plaintiff was an employee at-will before he signed 

his written contract, as the district court recognized 

Plaintiff's written contract, therefore, was all that stood 

between him and at-will status ... with no right to continued 

employment." We agree. 

Even if the written contract were determined invalid as an 

adhesion contract, plaintiff would be left with only his rights as 

an at-will employee. The "understandings" and "policies" that 

plaintiff contends created an oral contract are the same as those 

evaluated by the district court in ruling against plaintiff's 

claim of a due process property interest. The evidence that was 

insufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of the 

existence of a protectable property interest is also insufficient 

to establish an oral "contract." 

As to whether the district court failed to consider 

plaintiff's alleged rights to severance pay under the terms of the 

written contract, we agree with appellees that "[p]laintiff's 

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complaint does not seek recovery of severance pay; it actually 

disavows the written employment contract." Plaintiff's breach of 

contract claim as set forth in the complaint persistently asserts 

that the contract breached was the "oral contract" plaintiff 

alleges he had before being "forced" to sign the written contract. 

The complaint does not mount a claim upon the written contract or 

seek a remedy thereunder; instead, plaintiff's complaint attacks 

its validity. We will not consider for the first time a claim for 

relief that was not made before the district court. 

As to plaintiff's fourth claim based on promissory estoppel, 

appellant contends that "the evidence presented to the court below 

was replete with facts and evidence which established repeated 

representations and promises by defendants of continued employment 

'as long as plaintiff and other managerial personnel were doing a 

good job.'" The district court found that "[p]laintiff has failed 

to present any evidence of a contractual right to continue 

employment beyond the period of his contract, or of detrimental 

reliance on promises of continued employment." Appellant has 

failed to point to any specific evidence tending to refute the 

district court's findings, and we conclude the record supports the 

district court's conclusions. 

As to plaintiff's sixth claim for relief, based on the tort 

of interference with contractual relations, appellant contends 

that the trial court "impermissibly weighed the evidence" and 

"impermissibly rejected the issues of material fact placed before 

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it." Plaintiff's complaint alleges that after his employment was 

terminated by the county, defendants, through defendant Nichol, 

contacted plaintiff's new employer, the City and County of Denver 

( "Denver" ) ., to relay "false and def amatory information" to Denver 

about plaintiff. Plaintiff was fired by Denver less than one 

month after his employment commenced. 

Appellant contends that "[a]ll five elements of [the tort of] 

intentional interference with contractual relations were 

established" or, "[a]t a minimum, a genuine issue existed." The 

district court noted that Colorado has adopted the Restatement's 

definition of this tort (citing Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian 

Sales & Management Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo. 

1984)). One of the required elements of the tort is that action 

by the defendant must induce or cause nonperformance of the 

contract. Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 

P.2d 1082, 1084 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Restatement (Second) of 

Torts§ 766 (1977). The district court found that plaintiff could 

not demonstrate that any action by defendants caused plaintiff's 

termination by Denver. Again, we agree. 

Howard Mccann, the executive deputy manager of Denver's 

department of public works and the man who terminated plaintiff's 

employment with Denver, testified that he was informed of the 

conflict between plaintiff and defendant Nichol before plaintiff 

was hired by Denver, but that he 

because Denver officials did 

disregarded it as unimportant 

not have confidence in Nichol's 

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opinions. Mr. Mccann also testified as to 

for firing plaintiff: plaintiff's 

his specific 

objection to 

reasons 

Denver's 

disciplinary system, his violation of that system, his lack of 

experience in his new job, his need for instruction on how to 

perform his job and his general ineffectiveness in the position. 

The district court found, and we agree, that plaintiff has pointed 

to no specific evidence that indicates that plaintiff was 

terminated by Denver because of Nichol's statements. In fact, 

plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did not know whether 

the statements by Nichol were even considered in the decision to 

terminate him. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's 

determination to grant summary judgment against the plaintiff on 

his claim of interference with contractual relations. 

Finally, because we affirm the district court's determination 

to grant summary judgment on all of plaintiff's state law claims, 

we also affirm the district court's decision to grant summary 

judgment on plaintiff's seventh claim for relief based on a civil 

conspiracy theory. A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or 

more persons by some concerted action to accomplish an unlawful 

purpose or to accomplish some lawful purpose by criminal or 

unlawful means. McGlasson v. Barger, 163 Colo. 438, 431 P.2d 778, 

780 (1967). A party cannot be held liable merely for doing in a 

proper manner that which he had a lawful right to do. Mulei v. 

Jet Courier Serv. Inc., 739 P.2d 889, 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), 

judgment rev'd in part Qil other grounds, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 

1989). It is not unlawful to conspire to terminate an at-will 

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employee. Farmer v. Central Bancorporation, Inc., 761 P.2d 220 

(Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court 

granting defendants summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of 

contract, due process, promissory estoppel, defamation, 

interference with contractual relations and civil conspiracy 

claims. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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