Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01676/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01676-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHRISTOPHER TINSLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV 07-1676-NVW-CRP

)

vs. )

) REPORT AND 

)

) RECOMMENDATION

DORA SCHRIRO, et. al., )

)

Defendants. ) _______________________________ )

Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Request for Preventive Relief/Preliminary

Injunction. (Doc 5). Plaintiff’s request underlies his Section 1983 claim against Defendants.

In his Request for Preventive Relief, Plaintiff argues that a Preliminary Injunction should

be granted because he can demonstrate probable success on the merits of the Section 1983

claim. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety

when they failed to place him in protective segregation in spite of his assertions that he was

viewed as an informant, and that there were Security Threat Group (“STG”) green light hits

placed on his life. Plaintiff also argues that there is a possibility of irreparable injury,

because two STGs have placed a hit on his life. 

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Request for Preventive Relief/Preliminary Injunction,

contending Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is low. Defendants argue they did

not act with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety because they conducted an

investigation and found little to no corroboration of Plaintiff’s assertions. Defendants also

claim there is not a sufficient possibility of harm to merit the granting of a Preliminary

Injunction because Plaintiff is currently in maximum custody housing and has little

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interaction with other inmates. Defendants stress that this case involves a heightened standard

for Preliminary Injunction because a granted motion will change the status quo. For the

reasons outlined below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after his

independent review and analysis, deny Plaintiff’s Request for Preventive Relief/Preliminary

Injunction. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, while residing at the Florence prison complex, voluntarily requested that he

be placed in protective segregation on March 26, 2007. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 4). Earlier

in the month of March, Plaintiff, who is a Caucasian, stabbed a Mexican-American inmate

through his cell. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4). The stabbing was not sanctioned by the Aryan

Brotherhood. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4). Plaintiff alleges that following the unsanctioned

stabbing, many of his fellow inmates informed him that two STGs, the Aryan Brotherhood

and the Mexican Mafia, had placed a green light hit on him. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4).

Plaintiff alleges that these STG threats were one basis for his request for protective

segregation. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 5). Plaintiff also alleges that he requested to be placed in

protective segregation because other inmates believed that he was at one time an informant

for the Chandler Police Department, and was involved in the conviction of several other

inmates. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 5). Plaintiff felt that his safety was in jeopardy because other

inmates identified him as a snitch. According to Plaintiff, at nearly every Arizona

Department of Corrections (“ADC”) complex he was housed at between 2003 and 2007, he

was inevitably confronted with the belief that he was previously an informant for the police.

(Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 1-4). 

Plaintiff notified the ADC of his security concerns in his request for protective

segregation, and the ADC subsequently attempted to address those concerns. After Plaintiff

requested protective segregation in March, 2007, he was temporarily placed in investigative

detention. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 44). Acting Deputy Warden Yolanda Elliot then

determined on March 27, 2007 that a full protective segregation review was required for

Plaintiff. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 45). Corrections Officer IV David Berry then further

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recommended that the Criminal Investigation Unit (“CIU”) administer a review of Plaintiff’s

request. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 43). The Florence CIU employed Investigator Michael

Dennison to conduct a protective segregation investigation regarding Plaintiff. (Doc 10,

Attachment B, p 5-8). This investigation was ongoing from March 29, 2007 through April

11, 2007. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 5-8). During the investigation, Plaintiff informed

Investigator Dennison that he felt threatened both because of his past as an informant, and

because of his unsanctioned assault on an inmate of a different race. (Doc 10, Attachment

B, p 5). Investigator Dennison contacted the detective at the Chandler Police Department

whom Plaintiff identified as the individual he informed, yet this detective confirmed that

Plaintiff had never been an informant for the Police Department. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p

7). An ADC report from May 20, 2003, did confirm that Plaintiff once implicated an

accomplice who was ultimately given probation. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 120). 

Deputy Warden Edward L. White reviewed Investigator Dennison’s completed report,

and on April 18, 2007, recommended alternative placement rather than protective segregation

for Plaintiff. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 33). Warden Carson McWilliams affirmed the

Deputy Warden’s decision on April 20, 2007, noting that the “threat of risk to [Plaintiff] is

serious, but not so serious as to require full protective segregation measures.” (Doc 10,

Attachment B, p 32). 

Upon reviewing Warden McWilliams’ recommendation, the Protective Segregation

Committee determined on June 4, 2007 that the “degree of risk is Low-Moderate” and

subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation and approved his return to

his original unit. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 31). On June 8, 2007, Plaintiff submitted an

appeal of this decision to Defendant Bennie H. Rollins, the Northern Region Operations

Director of the ADC. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 26-28). Defendant Rollins denied Plaintiff’s

appeal on July 24, 2007, citing the following factors as relevant in his decision: (1) that there

was no corroboration of Plaintiff’s claim that he was an informant for a police detective, (2)

that there was no corroboration of Plaintiff’s claim that there was a STG hit on him, (3) that

there was no new information regarding Plaintiff’s safety in his appeal, and that Plaintiff’s

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disciplinary history was of issue, (4) that inmates Plaintiff identified as a threat had already

been placed on his Do Not House With (“DNHW”) list, and (5) that there was no information

provided to compel Defendant Rollins to change the approval of the Committee. (Doc. 10,

Attachment B, p 25). 

After Defendant Rollins’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s appeal, on August 27, 2007,

Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Dora B. Schriro, the Director of the ADC. (Doc 20,

Exhibit C, p 1). The letter relayed to Defendant Schriro Plaintiff’s concerns for his safety,

as well as the procedural history of his request for protective segregation. (Doc 20, Exhibit

C, p 1-3). 

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants under Section

1983. (Doc 1). While temporarily housed in protective custody, he filed a Request for

Preventive Relief/Preliminary Injunction on September 18, 2007. (Doc 5). Plaintiff was

returned to the general population at the Florence prison complex on September 19, 2007,

where he was classified as a maximum custody inmate. (Doc 21, Exhibit B, p 2). As proof

that his safety is at risk, Plaintiff offers that Special Services Unit Sergeant Chavez told him

that given his predicament between the two STGs, he would not make it out of prison alive

unless placed in protective segregation. (Doc 20, Exhibit 1, p5). Plaintiff also suggests that

fellow inmate Kenneth Schwan can testify and corroborate Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

the STG hits. 

Plaintiff made three requests for protective segregation prior to his March 26, 2007

request. His April 30, 2003 and July 16, 2003 requests for protective segregation resulted

in alternative placement. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 4). Plaintiff’s June 8, 2004 request for

protective segregation was fully denied. (Doc 10, Attachment B, p 4). Plaintiff has been

relocated within the ADC system multiple times since his initial incarceration for both

protective and disciplinary concerns. Following Plaintiff’s first request for protective

segregation, he was transferred from the Lewis prison complex to the Douglas prison

complex. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 2). Following Plaintiff’s second request for protective

segregation, he was relocated to the Safford prison complex. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 2). In late

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2003, Plaintiff was transferred to the Yuma prison complex, this time as a disciplinary

measure for drug and tattoo paraphernalia violations. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 2). After

subsequently being relocated to the Lewis prison complex, Plaintiff disobeyed a direct order

and was transferred to the Florence prison complex in 2004. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 3). While

at Florence, prison guards found a nail in Plaintiff’s cell, and he was accordingly disciplined

and moved to a detention unit. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 3). While at the Eyman prison complex

in 2006, Plaintiff physically assaulted another inmate, and as a result was moved to a higher

custody level. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 3-4). Plaintiff alleges he conducted this assault in order

to receive more protection in higher custody. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4). In January, 2007,

Plaintiff moved back to the Florence prison complex, where in March he stabbed a MexicanAmerican inmate through the bars of his cell. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4). Again, Plaintiff

alleges he conducted this assault in order to receive more protection in higher custody. (Doc

20, Exhibit A, p 4). Shortly after Plaintiff stabbed the inmate in an adjacent cell, the inmate

attempted to retaliate and stab Plaintiff through the bars of his cell. (Doc 20, Exhibit A, p 4).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks a Preliminary Injunction requiring that he be returned to protective

segregation pending the outcome of his case. A Preliminary Injunction is available to a

plaintiff who can demonstrate either (1) probable success on the merits coupled with the

possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in his favor. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates v. PPR Realty, Inc.

204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir.2000). “These two formulations represent two points on a

sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability

of success decreases.” Id. 

The burden for the movant requesting a Preliminary Injunction may be higher

where, if granted, the injunction will change the status quo. When a “party seeks

mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the status quo pendente

lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing a preliminary injunction.” Stanley

v. University of S. Calif., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir.1994). Mandatory Preliminary

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Injunctions, as opposed to Prohibitory Preliminary Injunctions, are particularly

disfavored, and are issued only where the “facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”

Anderson v. U.S., 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Martinez v. Mathews, 533

F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976). There is a heightened burden of showing that the

Preliminary Injunction factors weigh compellingly in the movant’s favor when a

Preliminary Injunction disturbs the status quo. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar

Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (10th Cir.2001). 

A. Mandatory Preliminary Injunction

A Preliminary Injunction that will change the status quo if granted should be 

examined with a higher degree of scrutiny. In the case pending before this court, Plaintiff

was in protective custody when he filed for a Preliminary Injunction, yet was moved back

to the general population the following day. Plaintiff now asks to be moved to protective

segregation pending the resolution of his case. 

Plaintiff asserts that there is no heightened standard for his request for a

Preliminary Injunction because Plaintiff was held in protective segregation, or something

similar to protective segregation, at the time he filed for the Injunction. Plaintiff further

argues that it would give too much power to prison officials if they could simply change

the status quo, and thereby heighten the Preliminary Injunction standard, by returning a

prisoner to the general population before there is a decision on his Request. Defendants

assert that a heightened standard should apply because Plaintiff does in fact request a

Mandatory Preliminary Injunction. Though Plaintiff was in protective custody when he

filed, no avenue of appeal remained for Plaintiff. Defendant Rollins had already made a

final decision on Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

housing in protective custody at the time of filing was temporary and merely coincidental.

At that time Plaintiff was awaiting a return to general population. In addition, the

protective custody provided to the Plaintiff at the time of filing differed from placement

in a separate protective segregation unit, which Plaintiff now requests.

Requiring the ADC to affirmatively remove Plaintiff from general population and

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place him in a protective segregation unit would upset the status quo. Plaintiff’s

argument that he was in protective custody when he filed is not compelling, as his

residence in protective custody at the time of filing was only coincidental. At the time of

filing, Plaintiff was in the process of leaving protective custody and moving to general

population. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests a Mandatory Preliminary Injunction, and is

thus subject to a heightened scrutiny. Plaintiff must show that the facts and law clearly

favor him. However, though the heightened standard of a Mandatory Preliminary

Injunction is applicable to the case pending before this Court, this conclusion is not

necessary for a decision on Plaintiff’s Request for Preventive Relief/Preliminary

Injunction. Even in the absence of a heightened standard, Plaintiff does not meet his

burden. Plaintiff fails to show probable success on the merits. 

B. Probable Success on the Merits

Plaintiff has filed a claim against Defendants under Section 1983. A Section 1983 

claim against a prison official may be sustained under the Eighth Amendment, as prison

officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This duty includes protecting inmates from violence at the

hands of other inmates. Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842

F.2d 556, 559 (1st Cir.1988)). The Supreme Court has held that two requirements must be

met in order to sustain a Section 1983 claim against a prison official. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

833. First, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” when evaluated

objectively. Id. at 834. Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind,” when evaluated subjectively. Id. In other words, the prison official must act

with “deliberate indifference” towards an inmate’s health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-303 (1991)). The United States Supreme Court equates

deliberate indifference to recklessness. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. In finding that a prison

official acted with deliberate indifference, it must be shown that the prison official is

“aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prison official

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must not necessarily believe that the inmate will be harmed; rather, it is enough that the

prison official “acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id. at 842. 

In the case pending before this Court, Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference when they denied Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation in

light of his assertions that other inmates believed he was an informant, and placed green

light hits on him. Defendants counter that they did not act with deliberate indifference. 

When Plaintiff requested protective segregation, Defendants conducted a full

investigation of Plaintiff’s assertions, and did not deny Plaintiff’s request until concluding

that there was little corroboration of Plaintiff’s concerns. Defendants also concluded that

Plaintiff would remain sufficiently safe in his present, maximum custody housing. 

Defendants act with deliberate indifference if they act or fail to act despite 

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. When Plaintiff in this case complained

about various threats in his request for protective segregation, CIU conducted an

investigation to evaluate whether these alleged threats were sufficient to justify placing

Plaintiff in protective segregation. There was little to no corroboration of Plaintiff’s

assertion that he was in danger because other inmates believed he had been an informant

and that his testimony led to the conviction of others. Investigator Dennison verified that

Plaintiff was never an informant for the detective he identified at the Chandler Police

Department. A previous ADC report suggested that at most Plaintiff implicated an

accomplice who was eventually given probation. It is unlikely that Plaintiff would

experience retaliation on the basis of these facts. 

Plaintiff argues that even if he is not a snitch, there are still concerns for his safety

because other inmates falsely perceive him to be a snitch. While those may be Plaintiff’s

fears, he presents no evidence to corroborate his assertion that other inmates perceived

him as a snitch. Plaintiff’s own assertions are the only evidence that he was confronted as

an informant at nearly every prison complex to which he was transferred. Plaintiff has

not been assaulted based on the belief that he is a snitch. The only violence Plaintiff has

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encountered during his time in the ADC system is the violence he initiated in 2006 and

2007 assaults on other inmates.

In their investigation about the threat to Plaintiff’s safety, Defendants did not

discover any evidence to corroborate Plaintiff’s belief that there were green light hits

placed on his life. Though Plaintiff anticipates testimony from both Special Services Unit

Sergeant Chavez and inmate Kenneth Schwan alleging that he was in danger, at the time

Defendants made their decisions there were no reported threats against Plaintiff after

Plaintiff’s unsanctioned stabbing of a Mexican-American inmate in 2007. The only

violence that resulted from the incident was an attempted stabbing by the victim that

Plaintiff stabbed a few days earlier. 

Thus Defendants, in light of the investigation conducted by CIU and other data

provided to them, had little to no corroborated information suggesting that Plaintiff faced

a substantial or serious risk of harm. Given the knowledge that Defendants had, they did

not respond to Plaintiff’s concerns with deliberate indifference. Though Plaintiff’s

request for protective segregation was denied, Defendants had reason to believe that

given Plaintiff’s current housing situation, there was only a small possibility that Plaintiff

would be confronted by other inmates who might injure him. In fact, inmates who

concerned Plaintiff previously were placed on his DNHW list. Furthermore, Plaintiff is a

maximum custody inmate, and thus has limited interaction with other inmates. 

Defendants did not act or fail to act in spite knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. 

Rather, they acted appropriately in light of the information provided to them. Upon

reviewing the same information that Defendants received, other prison officials also

concluded that it was appropriate to deny Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation. 

Warden McWilliams, for example, suggested alternative placement, noting that the

threats facing Plaintiff were not sufficient to merit placement in a protective segregation

unit.

Section 1983 claims against prison officials require that a defendant act with

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety. Defendants, in investigating Plaintiff’s

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concerns and finding that there was little corroboration of his assertions of potential harm,

did not act with deliberate indifference to inmate’s safety when they denied his request

for protective segregation. Plaintiff, therefore, does not have probable success on the

merits of the case at trial. Even without the heightened standard required in a request for

a mandatory preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to suggest

a high likelihood that he will succeed on the merits. Because Plaintiff is not able to

demonstrate probable success on the merits, it is not necessary to evaluate whether there

is a possibility of irreparable harm. Plaintiff must be able to demonstrate both elements in

order for a preliminary injunction to be available to him.

C. Balance of Hardships 

 When a plaintiff cannot satisfy the two elements necessary for a preliminary

injunction, he may still be granted one based on hardship. Plaintiff may be granted a

preliminary injunction if he can demonstrate that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Prudential, 204 F.3d at 874. In this case,

Plaintiff does not raise a frivolous case; serious questions are raised as to the merits of his

underlying claim. However, the balance of hardships does not tip sharply in Plaintiff’s

favor. 

Plaintiff argues that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor because he is

a prisoner with a hit placed on his life. After review of the record, this Court finds no

evidence to corroborate Plaintiff’s claim that both the Aryan Brotherhood and the

Mexican Mafia have placed green light hits on his life. Additionally, Plaintiff is currently

housed in a maximum custody facility, and the opportunities for other inmates to assault

him are minimal. The ADC placed individuals that Plaintiff specifically identified as

threatening to him on his DNHW list. Plaintiff argues that unknown inmates may be a

threat to his safety, and his DNHW list does not protect him from unknown individuals. 

This argument is purely speculative and does not lead to the conclusion that the balance

of hardships tips in Plaintiff’s favor. Though Plaintiff raises some concerns for his safety,

the balance of hardships do not tip sharply in his favor at this time. 

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At trial these factual issues may be more fully developed with live testimony from

the parties and key witnesses like Sergeant Chavez and inmate Kenneth Schwan. 

However, under the present facts it appears that corrections officials investigated Mr.

Tinsley’s claims promptly and thoroughly, as they had done several times before, and

once again determined that an alternative placement, or in this case the highly restrictive

current placement, was appropriate. Based on the current record, the ADC’s placement of

Plaintiff is not evidence of deliberate indifference. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons outlined above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Judge, after his independent review and analysis, deny Plaintiff’s Request for Preventive

Relief/Preliminary Injunction. (Doc 5). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: cv-07-1676-

NVW.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and counsel for Respondents. 

DATED this 26th day of June, 2008.

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