Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00614/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00614-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER D. SAMMONS,

CDCR #F-17684,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden of R. J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On March 26, 2018, Alexander Sammons (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at 

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, 

and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action (ECF No. 1), together with a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 15, 2018, this Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading 

in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On 

June 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 7.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875

F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of 

[screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On April 2, 2017, Plaintiff “exited the building he lived in and began walking 

towards the C-yard facility chow hall.” (FAC at 3.) When two inmates began to argue, 

Plaintiff decided to “separate” himself and “walked across a small area of grass.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff “fell in an unseen hold that was covered up by overgrown grass.” (Id.) When 

Plaintiff tried to stand up, he heard “3 loud pops” and “collapsed.” (Id.) Two inmates 

“ran back to Building 12 to get Officers c/o K. Juarez and c/o Zakaryan1.” (Id. at 3-4.) 

Juarez and Zakaryan “called medical” and Plaintiff was taken to the “Central Treatment 

Center.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff was given medication and “sent back to his cell after briefly being seen by 

a nurse.” (Id.) Plaintiff was later given an x-ray that “showed nothing.” (Id.) Later, 

Plaintiff was given an MRI and the results showed “serious injury” to Plaintiff’s knees. 

(Id.) 

Several weeks following Plaintiff’s accident, he claims he was told by Juarez and 

Zakaryan “that’s why you should have kept you [expletive] on the concrete, don’t go in 

places you don’t belong.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Zakaryan told him that “there 

used to be an orange cone on the top of the hole Plaintiff fell in.” (Id. at 4-5.)

 

1 Neither Juarez nor Zakaryan are named Defendants in this action.

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Personal Causation

First, the Court finds, once again, that Plaintiff’s FAC requires sua sponte 

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it 

seeks relief under § 1983 against Warden Paramo, the only named Defendant. “To state 

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell 

v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum 

v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The FAC contains no factual 

allegations describing what Defendant Paramo did, or failed to do. To the extent Plaintiff 

seeks to hold him liable for the actions of his subordinates, there is no respondeat 

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 

(9th Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring 

proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a 

failure-to-train claim ‘would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on 

municipalities . . . .’”), quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 

460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person 

deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim against Defendant Paramo because he has failed to allege facts regarding 

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendant which caused the alleged 

constitutional violations. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and 

vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.

D. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Paramo failed to protect the health and safety of 

inmates under his watch” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (FAC at 8.) “The 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners 

not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

However, not every injury sustained while in prison rises to the level of cruel and 

unusual punishment. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Instead, a prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must allege: (1) that the 

deprivation he suffered was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2) that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to his health or safety in allowing the deprivation to take 

place. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to “contain sufficient factual 

matter,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to show that the conditions in the prison’s yard were so 

objectively serious as to deprive him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 298-300 (1991). Minor safety hazards do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See 

Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938 (citing Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F. Supp. 87, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 

(greasy staircase which caused a prisoner to slip and fall did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment).

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide any “further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557), which might show that any individual 

prison official acted with conscious disregard to any “known or excessive risk to inmate 

health and safety” in the prison yard. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To be deliberately 

indifferent, “the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be 

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Id. (emphasis added); see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303. There are no specific factual 

allegations that Defendant Paramo had any knowledge of the maintenance issue raised in 

Plaintiff’s FAC.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state plausible Eighth Amendment 

violation as to his prison conditions, and that this claim must be dismissed sua sponte 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 

Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety for 

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d 

at 1004. The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s FAC is nearly identical to his original 

Complaint and it does not appear that Plaintiff made any significant attempt to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s May 15, 2018 Order. Therefore, 

because Plaintiff has already been provided an opportunity to amend his claims to no 

avail, the Court denies further leave to amend as futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned 

Parenthood, 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, 

justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 

(9th Cir. 1995)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted and DISMISSES this civil action without 

further leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order of dismissal would 

not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United 

States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) 

(indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be 

frivolous).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2018

Case 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/27/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7