Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06037/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

December 6, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 90-6037 Walter v. International Association of 

Machinists, et al 

Filed November 12, 1991 

By Judge Ebel 

Please be advised that attorney James D. Thomas was 

incorrectly identified as John D. Thomas in the captioned opinion. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By: 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 1 
FILED 

United States Court of Appealn PUBLISH Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS l~QV 12 1991 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

J. W. WALTER; JOHN ALLEN; 

ROBERT JONES; NORAH WALKER, JR.; 

EUGENE GILLILAND; SYLVESTER 

GRAYSON; DANIEL LOONEY; LEALUS 

THOMAS; LLOYD FORTUNE; JOHN 

DAVENPORT; ALONZO ANDERSON; I.B. 

BOYD; L.V. DAVIS; CLEOPHUS FROST; 

CARNELL GENTRY; GERALD GOAD; 

DONALD F. KENNEDY; NORVELL 

LANCASTER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 

MACHINISTS PENSION FUND; CENTRAL 

STATES, SOUTHEAST AND 

SOUTHWEST HEALTH AND WELFARE 

AND PENSION FUNDS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-6037 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-86-1017-W) 

E. w. Keller of Keller, Fernald & Keller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

William J. Nellis, Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas 

Pension Fund, Rosemont, Illinois (Ronald L. Ripley and John D. 

Thomas, Linn & Helms with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee 

Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. 

Denis F. Gordon, Gordon & Barnett, Washington D.C. (Anne S. 

McCulloch, and Susan J. Bannell, Gordon & Barnett, Washington, 

D.C. and Robert T. Osgood and Joseph P. Martocci with him on the 

brief) for Defendant-Appellee I.A.M. National Pension Fund. 

Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 2 
Before MOORE, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

The primary issue we decide is whether a forfeiture clause 

contained in a multiemployer pension agreement violates the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 1 as 

amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. 2 

The forfeiture clause at issue provides that credit for years 

worked prior to the date the employer starts contributing to the 

plan on behalf of its employees is forfeited in the event the 

employer ceases making contributions to the plan. We hold that 

the clause does not violate ERISA. 

FACTS 

The plaintiff-appellant, J. w. Walter ("Walter"), 3 was hired 

by Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. (Lee Way) on March 30, 1955. He 

worked for Lee Way until it closed in November of 1984 (a total of 

29 years). Sometime in 1973, Lee Way began contributing to the 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, District Judge for the District 

of Kansas sitting by designation. 

1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 

scattered sections of the u.s.c. including titles 29 and 26). 

2 Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended in 

scattered sections of the u.s.c. including Titles 29 and 26). 

3 There were eighteen plaintiffs in the case below. 

because Walter was the only plaintiff who perfected 

this court (see infra, Discussion, Part I), we will 

recitation of the facts to those that are pertinent 

appeal. 

- 2 -

However, 

an appeal to 

limit our 

to Walter's 

Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 3 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 

Pension Plan (IAM Plan) on Walter's behalf. During this time, the 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers was 

a certified collective bargaining representative for Lee Way's 

employees. Lee Way's contributions to IAM Plan on Walter's behalf 

continued until March, 1982, when the Oklahoma Lee Way employees 

voted to change unions and to make the Teamster's Union their 

certified collective bargaining agent. As a result of their vote 

to change authorized collective bargaining representatives, the 

Lee Way employees voted to make Central States Pension Plan 

(Central States Plan)--a plan operated by the Teamsters' Union--

the exclusive plan for all of the Oklahoma Lee Way employees. On 

April 30, 1982, Lee Way notified IAM that it would no longer 

contribute to the IAM plan on behalf of its employees. On June 7, 

1984, IAM notified Central States that it was transferring the 

accrued assets and liabilities to Central States. 4 

Central States refused to accept responsibility for payment 

of the benefits to the employees on the ground that IAM improperly 

transferred the assets and liabilities. IAM filed suit in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking 

a declaratory judgment that the transfer was effected in 

compliance with ERISA. The district court held that the transfer 

was proper, and Central States appealed. The United States Court 

4 Because employees at other Lee Way facilities were still 

represented by IAM, the transfer was not completed for 

approximately two years. See ERISA § 4206, 29 U.S.C. § 1386(a); 

29 U.S.C. § 1415; I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan Av. 

Central States S.E. & s.w. Areas Health & Welfare & Pension Funds, 

830 F.2d 1163, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 4 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the 

district court on the grounds that Central States had waived its 

right to contest the transfer under 28 u.s.c. § 1415(b)(3). 

However, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district 

court with instructions that it allow Central States to pursue a 

counterclaim for an accounting. 

During the time Central States and IAM were litigating the 

transfer, the former Lee Way employees were unable to obtain their 

pension benefits. Thus, on April 16, 1986, eighteen former Lee 

Way employees filed suit in the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Oklahoma against both IAM and Central 

States seeking to recover their pension benefits. In addition, 

the employees claimed that the forfeiture provision contained in 

the IAM pension contract violated ERISA, that the defendants were 

liable for failing promptly to process their pension applications 

as well as their requests for information, and that the defendants 

breached their fiduciary duties owed to the employees. At the 

request of IAM and Central States, the Oklahoma federal district 

court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the District 

of Columbia litigation. Ultimately, the district court granted 

summary judgment for IAM against the plaintiffs based on the IAM 

Nat'l. Pension Fund holding by the D.C. Circuit and based on the 

failure of the plaintiffs to come forward to show that there was a 

genuine dispute on any material fact pertaining to plaintiffs' 

claims against IAM. A one day trial was held on June 21, 1989 

against Central States. The district court, in an order dated 

January 5, 1990, resolved all of the plaintiffs' claims against 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 5 
plaintiff and in favor of Central States. The employees then 

sought to appeal to this court. 

DISCUSSION 

We have raised, sua sponte, the issue whether all eighteen 

plaintiffs perfected their appeal to this court under Torres v. 

Oakland Scavenger Company, 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988). This issue 

will be covered in Part I of this opinion. 

In addition, the employees have raised three principal 

issues: first, they contend that the district court erroneously 

upheld the validity of the forfeiture clause contained in the IAM 

pension contract; second they contend that the district court 

erred in dismissing their claim for money damages to compensate 

them for the defendants' failure promptly to process their pension 

applications and requests for information; and third, they contend 

that the district court failed to address the breach of fiduciary 

duty claim. These issues will be covered in Parts II, III and IV 

of this opinion respectively. 

I 

The Supreme Court in Torres held that under Fed. R. App. P. 

3(c), a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to 

consider claims of parties below who are not specifically named as 

appellants in the notice of appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318. 

Specifically, the Court noted that an "et al." designation of 

appellants does not meet the specificity requirements of Rule 

3(c). Similarly, we held in Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 6 
1389 (10th Cir. 1990), that a statement that "plaintiffs hereby 

appeal" is insufficient to list the appellants. 

In the instant case, the eighteen putative appellants were 

named on the notice of appeals as follows: "J. W. Walter, et al., 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs [sic) International Association of 

Machinists Pension Fund, et al., Defendants." Underneath the 

heading "Notice of Appeal" the notice states "Notice is hereby 

given that J. w. Walter, et al., Plainiffs [sic) aboved [sic) 

named, hereby appeal .• II Under Torres and Laidley, this 

notice is not sufficient to vest this court with jurisdiction over 

any appellant other than J. w. Walter. 

The employees argue that to the extent the notice was 

defective, the defects were cured when they filed their docketing 

statement. In support of this argument, they cite Hubbert v. City 

of Moore, 923 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1991). However, in Hubbert we 

held that a docketing statement, whic-h identified by name the 

parties taking the appeal, could cure a defective notice of appeal 

if it was filed before the deadline for filing the notice of 

appeal had passed. Id. at 771-72. In the instant case, the 

docketing statement was not filed before the filing deadline for 

the notice of appeal had passed. Therefore, the remaining 

seventeen plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of the Hubbert 

"curative" docketing notice exception. See id. at 772; Laidley, 

914 F.2d at 1389. Throughout the remainder of this opinion, we 

will therefore analyze the issues only insofar as they pertain to 

J. W. Walter. With regard to the other plaintiffs, the district 

court order is final. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 7 
II 

The first argument raised by Walter is that the forfeiture 

provision of the IAM pension plan violates ERISA, specifically 29 

u.s.c. § 1411(b). In order to understand this argument, we need 

to review the basic details of the IAM pension plan. The IAM 

pension plan recognizes two different types of service years that 

are credited towards the employee's vesting date as well as 

towards determining the amount of the monthly benefit. The first 

is called "Past Service Credit" and is defined as credit earned 

for the years worked with the employer prior to the date the 

employer begins contributing to the pension plan on the employee's 

behalf. The second is called "Future Service Credit" and is 

defined as credit for the years worked with the employer after the 

date the employer begins contributing to the pension plan on the 

employee's behalf. Under the IAM pension plan, Future Service 

Credit and Past Service Credit apply equally towards vesting and 

towards calculating the employee's monthly retirement benefit. 

The only difference between the two is that Past Service Credit is 

subject to forfeiture: 

If the participation of a Contributing Employer 

terminates and should that employer, or its successor, 

thereafter continue in the same or related business, 

then the actuarial limitations of this Section shall 

apply. 

Past Service Credit based upon employment with such 

employer shall be cancelled retroactively, 

notwithstanding any contrary provision of this Plan 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 8 
IAM Pension Plan§ 9.04, at 112 (contained in Addendum to 

Appellants' Br. at 28). 5 Pursuant to§ 9.04 of the pension plan, 

IAM cancelled nine years of Past Service Credit Walter had earned 

for the years he had worked at Lee Way prior to the date when Lee 

Way began contributing to the IAM Plan on his behalf. This 

forfeiture did not divest Walter of all of his pension rights 

because under the IAM Plan, a pensioner's rights vest at ten 

years--Walter had approximately sixteen years of Future Service 

Credit that were unaffected by the forfeiture provision. However, 

according to Walter's figures, the loss of nine years of Past 

Service Credit reduced the amount of Walter's monthly pension 

award at normal retirement by $184 per month. Appellants' Br. at 

12. 

Walter argues that the forfeiture provision violates 29 

u.s.c. § 1411, which is entitled "Mergers and transfers between 

multiemployer plans." Section 1411 governs mergers and transfers 

in general: "Unless otherwise provided in regulations prescribed 

by the corporation, a plan sponsor may not cause a multiemployer 

plan to ..• engage in a transfer of assets and liabilities to • 

• • another multiemployer plan, unless such .•• transfer 

satisfies the requirements of subsection (b) of this section." 29 

u.s.c. § 14ll(a). Walter contends that the forfeiture provision 

is invalid because it fails to meet section 14ll(b)'s requirement 

that "no participant's or beneficiary's accrued benefit will be 

lower immediately after the effective date of the ••• transfer 

5 The remaining portion of§ 9.04 includes a number of exceptions 

to the forfeiture requirement--none of which applies or are at 

issue in this case. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 9 
than the benefit immediately before that date II 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1411(b). Clearly, if section 1411 applies, the forfeiture 

provision is invalid because the provision retroactively reduced 

Walter's accrued benefit by eliminating his Past Service Credit. 6 

The flaw in Walter's argument is that section 1411 does not 

apply--the relevant provision is section 1415 entitled "Transfers 

pursuant to change in bargaining representative." Section 1415(a) 

requires that "[i]n any case in which an employer has completely 

or partially withdrawn from a multiemployer plan ••• as a result 

of a certified change of collective bargaining representative 

. , the old plan shall transfer assets and liabilities to the new 

plan in accordance with this section." 29 u.s.c. § 1415(a) 

(emphasis added). The inapplicability of section 1411 is further 

evidenced by section 1415(f), which provides "[n]otwithstanding 

subsections (b) and (e) of this section, the plan sponsors of the 

old plan and the new plan may agree to a transfer of assets and 

liabilities that complies with sections 1411 and 1414 of this 

title, rather than this section •••• 11 29 u.s.c. § 1415(f) 

(emphasis added). In other words, the specific (section 1415) 

trumps the general (section 1411) in the absense of a contrary 

6 Under 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (23), an accrued benefit is defined as 

"the individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan ••. 

expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal 

retirement age ...• 11 In this case, Walter contends that his 

accrued benefit immediately before the effective date of the 

transfer was $560.00 per month, and that after the forfeiture 

provision was triggered--immediately after the transfer--his 

accrued benefit dropped to $376.00 per month. Appellants' Br. at 

12. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 10 
7 agreement between the sponsors of the old and new Plans (and 

there is no such agreement here). 

Section 1415(b), which addresses the amount of benefits to be 

transferred from the old plan to the new plan, does not forbid a 

reduction in the accrued benefits as a result of the transfer. 

Instead, it requires only that the old plan transfer "the 

appropriate amount of assets and liabilities to the new plan." 

29 u.s.c. § 1415(b)(3). Under section 1415(g)(l), an "appropriate 

amount of assets" is "the amount by which the value of the 

nonforfeitable benefits to be transferred exceeds the amount of 

the employer's withdrawal liability to the old plan •. ,.8 

There is no language in section 1415(b) suggesting that a 

benefit cannot be forfeitable. To the contrary, the language of 

section 1415(b), supra, indicates a Congressional acceptance of 

7 The regulations support this interpretation. 29 C.F.R. § 2672.2 

is entitled "Requirements for mergers and transfers." One of the 

requirements listed is that "[n]o participant's or beneficiary's 

accrued benefit may be lower immediately after the effective date 

of the .•• transfer than the benefit immediately before the •• 

• transfer." 29 C.F.R. § 2672.2(a)(l). However, subsection (c) 

provides that plan sponsors involved in "[t]ransfers of assets and 

liabilities pursuant to a certified change in bargaining 

representative •.• are not required to comply with this part." 

29 C.F.R. § 2672.2(c). 

8 An employer's withdrawal liability is basically a liability that 

arises when the employer stops contributing to a plan. The 

purpose behind the liability is to guarantee the plan's financial 

stability. See H.R. Rep. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2 at 

15-16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 3004-3005. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 11 
these forfeiture provisions. 9 Thus, because section 1411 is 

inapplicable and because section 1415 does not require that an 

accrued benefit not be decreased following a transfer as a result 

of a certified change in collective bargaining representatives, we 

reject Walter's claim that the forfeiture provision of the IAM 

pension contract violates ERISA. 10 

III 

Walter's next argument is that Central States did not respond 

promptly to his application for pension benefits and to his 

requests for information. Walter argues that according to Central 

States' own records, Central States received Walter's application 

in August of 1985, and that it did not respond until September 8, 

1986. Walter also alleges that he requested Central States to 

9 The relevant legislative history behind the Multiemployer 

Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 is in accord. See generally 

H.R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 1, at 115, reprinted in 1980 

u.s.c.c.A.N. at 2983 ( "Under the bill·, a multiemployer plan would 

not fail to meet the vesting requirements of ERISA because the 

plan provides for the forfeiture of accrued benefits attributable 

to service with a participant's employer before the employer was 

required to contribute to the plan in the event that the employer 

ceases making contributions to the plan."); Id., pt. 2 at 73, 

reprinted in 1980 u.s.c.c.A.N. at 3059 ("Under the bill, a 

multiemployer plan does not fail to meet the vesting requirements 

of ERISA merely because the plan provides for the forfeiture of 

accrued benefits attributable to service with a participant's 

employer before the employer was required to contribute to the 

plan in the event that the employer ceases making contributions to 

the plan."). 

lO In his brief, Walter raises a constitutional claim and an 

unjust enrichment claim relating to the forfeiture provision. As 

these claims were not raised below, we will not address them here. 

In addition, Walter raises an estoppel claim. Although it does 

not appear that Walter formally raised the estoppal claim in the 

court below, the district court addressed it and dismissed it. 

The district court's decision was proper. See,~, Straub v. 

Western Union Telegraph Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(no liability under ERISA can be based upon a purported oral 

modification of the terms of a pension plan). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 12 
send him information regarding the status of his pension. 

Finally, Walter alleges that he did not begin receiving payments 

until late 1986 or early 1987. The district court did not 

disagree with Walter's recitation of the facts; however, it 

nonetheless ruled that Walter was not entitled to relief. For 

purposes of reviewing Walter's claim, we likewise will presume the 

accuracy of Walter's above mentioned factual allegations. 

Walter contends that he has a right to recover damages from 

Central States under 29 u.s.c. §§ 1025(a) & 1132(c), and 29 

C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(c). 29 u.s.c. § 1025 requires a plan 

administrator to respond to requests for information, and 29 

u.s.c. § 1132 provides for a $100 a day penalty against plan 

administrators who do not respond promptly to requests for 

information. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(e) requires the plan to 

inform applicants of the denial or partial denial of their claim 

within ninety days after receipt of their claim. 

Sections 1025 and 1132 do not address plan duties--instead, 

they only refer to the plan administrator's duties. 11 Therefore, 

11 Section 1132 provides in pertinent part: 

Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply 

with a request for any information ... may in the 

court's discretion be personally liable to such 

participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a 

day from the date of such failure or refusal ...• 

29 u.s.c. § 1132(c) (emphasis added). Section 1025 provides in 

pertinent part: 

Each administrator of an employee pension benefit 

plan shall furnish to any plan participant or 

beneficiary who so requests in writing, a statement 

indicating, on the basis of the latest available 

information--

[continued on next page ••• ] 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 13 
the district court correctly held that these two ERISA provisions 

cannot form the basis for Walter's claim against Central States 

and IAM. 12 Cf. Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan for Hourly 

Paid Employees of the Johns Manville Corporation and Subsidiaries, 

803 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that ERISA provisions 

providing for recovery against the "plan" cannot be used to 

recover against the "plan administrator" because "the terms 'plan' 

and 'plan administrator' refer to two entirely distinct actors 

• [and] are terms of art"). 

29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 was promulgated by the Secretary of 

Labor pursuant to 29 u.s.c. § 1133. Section 1133 reads as 

follows: 

In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, 

every employee benefit plan shall--

(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any 

participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits 

under the plan has been denied, setting forth the 

specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner 

calculated to be understood by the participant, and 

(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any 

participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for 

a full and fair review by the appropriate named 

fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. 

29 U.S.C. § 1133. Pursuant to section 1133, the Secretary 

promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(e) which provides: 

(1) If a claim is wholly or partially denied, 

notice of the decision ••. shall be furnished to the 

claimant within a reasonable period of time after 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

(1) the total benefits accrued, and 

(2) the nonforfeitable pension benefits, if any, 

which have accrued, or the earliest date on which 

benefits will become nonforfeitable. 

29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (emphasis added). 

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receipt of the claim by the plan. 

(2) If notice of the denial of a claim is not 

furnished ••. within a reasonable time, the claim 

shall be deemed denied ...• 

(3) For purposes of [the above] paragraphs ••• , a period of time will be deemed to be unreasonable if it 

exceeds 90 days after receipt of the claim by the plan 

29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(g). Walter argues that Central States 

violated 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(g): "By Central States' own 

admission, they have not complied with this important disclosure 

provision." Appellants' Br. at 3113 However, even accepting the 

facts as stated, ERISA does not provide a private cause of action 

for damages to compensate a pensioner for delay. See 

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 

146 (1985); Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 1975 Salaried 

Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1532 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting the 

general principle "that an employer's or plan's failure to comply 

with ERISA's procedural requirements does not entitle a claimant 

to a substantive remedy."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989). 

In Massachusetts Mutual, the Court declined to craft a remedy 

under which "an employee benefit plan may be held personally 

liable to a plan participant or beneficiary for extra-contractual 

damages caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit 

claims: "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement 

12 The plan administrator is not a named defendant in this 

lawsuit. 

13 Throughout his brief, Walter's attorney miscites the relevant 

provision as 29 C.F.R. § 256.503-l(c). 

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. . 14 f d. provisions oun in. . • the statute as finally enacted, 

however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to 

authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 

expressly. 11 Id. (emphasis in original). There is no explicit 

provision providing a cause of action for damages caused by a 

delay in processing one's pension application, and we decline 

Walter's invitation to fashion one from 29 C.F.R. § 2650.503-l(e). 

14 The six enforcement provisions referred to in the Court's 

opinion fall under ERISA § 502(a) (codified at 29 u.s.c. § 

1132(a)): 

A civil action may be brought--

(!) by a participant or beneficiary--

(A) for the relief provided for in subsection 

(c) of this section, or 

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the 

terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms 

of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 

under the terms of the plan; · (2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, 

beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under 

section 1109 of this title; 

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) 

to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 

provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, 

or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) 

to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any 

provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; 

(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or 

beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a 

violation of 1025(c) of this title; 

(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) 

of this section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act 

or practice which violates any provision of this 

subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable 

relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce 

any provision of this subchapter; or 

(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty 

under subsection (i) of this section. 

29 u.s.c. § 1132(a). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 16 
IV 

Finally, Walter raises a breach of fiduciary duty issue. 15 

Walter bases his argument on 29 u.s.c. § 1109: 

(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a 

plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, 

obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 

subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to 

such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each 

such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of 

such fiduciary which have been made through use of 

assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be 

subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as 

the court may deem appropriate, including removal of 

such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a 

violation of section 1111 of this title. 

(b) No fiduciary shall be liable with respect to a 

breach of fiduciary duty under this subchapter if such 

breach was committed before he became a fiduciary or 

after he ceased to be a fiduciary. 

29 U.S.C. § 1109 (emphasis added). 

Walter is not entitled to relief under this section. Under 

section 1109, a fiduciary who breaches his fiduciary duty is 

liable to the plan--not to the beneficiaries individually. See 

Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 141-42; Bryant v. International 

Fruit Product Co., 886 F.2d 132, 135 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 

Therefore, even if we were to agree with Walter that the district 

court failed to address this issue, its oversight was not critical 

because Walter is not entitled to relief under section 1109. 16 

15 In his brief, Walter claims that the district court did not 

address this issue. Appellants' Br. at 33. Walter contends that 

it was raised in the Final Pretrial Order. Although the Final 

Pretrial Order was never made a part of the record on appeal, we 

nonetheless requested it from the court below. This issue was 

mentioned in the Final Pretrial Order, but we cannot tell whether, 

in fact, it was raised during trial. However, despite our 

reservations, we will nonetheless review this issue. 

16 We similarly find no error in the factual findings of the 

district court nor in its order awarding costs against plaintiffs. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 17 
CONCLUSION 

In Part I we held that of the eighteen original plaintiffs in 

the court below, only one--J. w. Walter--perfected an appeal to 

this court. In Part II we held that the forfeiture provision 

contained in the IAM pension contract does not violate ERISA. In 

Part III we held that the appellant's claim for monetary damages 

based upon Central States' failure promptly to process his pension 

application and to respond to his requests for information is 

without merit. Finally in Part IV we held that appellant is not 

entitled to damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1109. Therefore, the 

district court's orders are AFFIRMED. 

- 17 -

Appellate Case: 90-6037 Document: 010110096911 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 18