Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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1

 When this action was removed to this District Court, Isaiah Martinez was also a

minor. Because he is now an adult, the Court will use his full name in this Order. The Court

identifies Plaintiffs’ two minor children by their initials herein to protect their privacy

interests. See Rule 5.2(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Martinez, Sr., etc.; et al,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Avondale, etc; et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-1837-PHX-LOA

ORDER

On March 3, 2014, Plaintiffs Marisol and Gregory Martinez, Sr., the parents and

court-appointed guardians ad litem of their two minor children, M.M., and L.M.,1

 filed a

Petition to Approve Minors’ Settlement. (Doc. 161) They request the Court’s approval of

their children’s settlement and a “finding that the settlement in this case is equitable to all

parties concerned and the attorneys’ fees and costs are reasonable.” (Id. at 2) Defendants

indicate they “do not object to Plaintiffs’ Petition. Plaintiffs’ counsel served his clients well

and it was a pleasure to work with such an august attorney.” (Doc. 162) All parties have

consented to this Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

I. Background

This is a fatal police shooting lawsuit that arises out of a 9-1-1 call to the Avondale

Police Department on October 28, 2011 by Plaintiff Marisol Martinez, requesting police

Case 2:12-cv-01837-LOA Document 164 Filed 03/06/14 Page 1 of 9
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assistance with her 20-year old son, Gregory Martinez, Jr., now deceased. The Second

Amended Complaint names as defendants the City of Avondale (“City”), Officer Kevin

Sapp, and seven other Avondale police officers who allegedly unreasonably detained the

decedent’s family members after the shooting. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Martinez

parents are the only claimants alleging a wrongful death claim because the three Martinez

siblings do not have a viable wrongful death claim under Arizona law for the loss of their

brother. (Doc. 161 at 1) All Plaintiffs, including the two minor children, have alleged similar

Section 1983 and false arrest causes of action for the alleged post-shooting unlawful

detention of the Martinez family by the City’s police. (Id.)

Marisol Martinez called 9-1-1 after her son had become violent within the family

home. Mrs. Martinez communicated to the 9-1-1 operator that her son was “on something,”

had just punched the wall, but he “didn’t hit anybody.” Officer Sapp was the first police

officer to arrive at the Martinez residence in response to the emergency call of a domestic

disturbance. Officer Sapp’s mother was a ride-along passenger in his marked patrol vehicle

when he responded to the call.

The parties agree that the decedent was holding two kitchen knives when Officer Sapp

arrived and encountered him outside the residence on a public street, but disagree on what

the decedent did immediately thereafter until the shooting. As Officer Sapp exited his police

vehicle, he drew his firearm from its holster, and moved south on 117th Drive, into the

middle of the street away from his patrol car. Defendants contend Gregory Martinez, Jr.

ignored all commands to drop the two large kitchen knives and continued to advance upon

Officer Sapp with the knives drawn. When he was 10 to 15 feet away, Officer Sapp

discharged his duty weapon two times, killing Gregory.

Plaintiffs have alleged that, shortly after the shooting, additional police officers

arrived at the Martinez home. The officers immediately separated the Martinez family

members, and took away their cell phones. The family members, including the children,

were prohibited from speaking to, and comforting, each other during their separation and

leaving their residence and traveling to the hospital to see their son and brother. According

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to Plaintiffs, his death was unknown to them for many hours after the shooting. Isaiah

Martinez testified that if any of them even spoke to another family member, “they’d arrest

us.” After the City’s police officers separated the children from their parents, M.M., age 15

at the time, wanted to comfort her mother, but a City police officer allegedly prohibited her

from doing so. (“[t]hey just separated us all, and I was just trying to run to my – to my mom.

She was next to me. They kept pushing me back. And I wanted – she was crying.”) Mr.

Martinez asked a City police officer if he could hold his children, but his request was denied.

The officers took physical custody of the family’s cell phones. Mrs. Martinez requested her

cell phone be returned, so she could call the family’s pastor, which was denied. Later, she

convinced a police officer to call the family’s pastor on her behalf, which he did. Mrs.

Martinez also claims her request to use the bathroom was denied. While an officer was

guarding Mrs. Martinez – at approximately 7:00 p.m., over three hours after the shooting –

she asked to use the bathroom, but she was told she could not use the restroom at that time.

As the evening of the shooting progressed, Plaintiffs claim the officers ordered pizza

and Gatorade for themselves, but they did not offer any to the Martinez family until after the

officers had eaten. Isaiah Martinez does not recall ever being offered any food, water, or

anything to drink. Plaintiffs allege they were treated substantially different than other

witnesses, like Officer Sapp’s mother.

On January 16, 2014, the Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion on

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to

procedural and substantive due process alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc.

154) The Court, however, denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Defendants’

claims of qualified immunity and found disputed issues of fact for jury resolution on

Plaintiffs’ allegations of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights of use of excessive and

deadly force, unreasonable seizures and detentions after the shooting, and on their claims of

false arrest under Arizona law. Less than a month later, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Settlement. (Doc. 156) 

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II. Legal Standard for Compromise of Minor’s Claim

“District courts have a special duty, derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

17(c), to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.” Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638

F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) provides, in pertinent

part, that a district court “must appoint a guardian ad litem - or issue another appropriate

order - to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” A

district “court must independently investigate and evaluate any compromise or settlement of

a minor’s claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are protected, even if the settlement

has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or guardian ad litem.” Salmeron

v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983). In accordance with this special duty

regarding proposed settlements involving minor plaintiffs, a district court must “[c]onduct

its own inquiry to determine whether the settlement serves the best interests of the minor.”

Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.

1978) (internal citation marks omitted)). “While [a guardian ad litem] may negotiate a

proposed compromise to be referred to the court, he cannot render such a compromise

effective merely by giving his consent.” Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1079 (citations omitted). It

is, however, the district “[c]ourt’s order approving the settlement that vests the guardian ad

litem with the legal power to enforce the agreement.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In Robidoux, the Ninth Circuit provided specific guidance “on how to conduct this

independent inquiry.” 638 F.3d at 1181. In cases involving the settlement of a minor’s

claims, “district courts should ‘limit the scope of their review to the question whether the net

amount distributed to each minor plaintiff in the settlement is fair and reasonable, in light of

the facts of the case, the minor’s specific claim, and recovery in similar cases,’ and should

‘evaluate the fairness of each minor plaintiff’s net recovery without regard to the proportion

of the total settlement value designated for adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ counsel—whose

interests the district court has no special duty to safeguard.’” R.J. ex rel. Jain v. Mitsubishi

Motors North America, Inc., 2013 WL 2303784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2013) (quoting

Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181-82 (citing Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1078) (footnote omitted)); see

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also Reyes ex rel. Servin v. City of Pinole, 2013 WL 3157902 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2013)

(approving structured settlement of minor’s action for civil-rights violations that resulted in

the death of minor’s father caused by police use of excessive and unreasonable force). 

While the Ninth Circuit noted that district courts have typically applied state law and

the local rules governing the award of attorney’s fees to make the reasonableness and

fairness determination, the court held that “this approach places an undue emphasis on the

amount of attorney’s fees provided for in a settlement, instead of focusing on the net

recovery of the minor plaintiffs under the proposed agreement.” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181-

82. Further, the fairness of each minor plaintiff’s net recovery should be evaluated “without

regard to the proportion of the total settlement value designated for adult co-plaintiffs or

plaintiffs’ counsel - whose interests the district court has no special duty to safeguard.” Id.

at 1182 (finding “[t]he district court erred when it focused on the admittedly large proportion

of the total settlement value going to Plaintiffs’ counsel, instead of reviewing the fairness of

each minor’s net recovery in isolation.).

III. Terms of the Compromise Settlement

Defendants have tendered a global settlement offer to Plaintiffs of $750,000.00,

which includes payment of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. 161 at 2) The

settlement is inclusive of all claims against all Defendants and is intended to resolve the

action in its entirety. If approved by the Court, Plaintiffs’ counsel agrees to reduce his 40

percent written contingency fee agreement to 33 1/3 percent ($250,000.00) and recover his

costs advanced in the amount of $69,490.20. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel has attached to the

Petition, marked as Exhibits 1 and 2, an attorneys’ fees affidavit and itemization of costs

advanced on behalf of Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel proposes, and represents that his clients approve, the net recovery

of $430,509.80, after deducting fees and costs, be divided between the two main, but

separate, causes of action, the wrongful death of Gregory Martinez, Jr. and the unlawful

detention of the Martinez family. As is measured between these two, Plaintiffs’ counsel

opines that the parents’ wrongful death claim ($305,509.80) has more value than the

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2

 The minors’ cause of action for the Arizona claim for false arrest and their § 1983

claim to vindicate their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures are

“substantially the same.” See Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). “The

Supreme Court of Arizona defined false arrest and imprisonment ‘as the detention of a

person without his consent and without lawful authority.’” Mohajerin v. Pinal County, 2007

WL 4358254, *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007) (quoting Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550,

552 (Ariz. 1975)). “As a result, ‘[a] detention which occurs pursuant to legal authority . . .

is not an unlawful detention.’” Id.

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unlawful seizure claims ($125,000.00 or $25,000.00 net to each of the five Plaintiffs). In

other words, Plaintiffs and their counsel propose the following disbursements from the gross

settlement amount of :

M.M., a minor, $25,000.00

L.M., a minor, $25,000.00

Isaiah Martinez, $25,000.00

Gregory Martinez, Sr., $25,000.00

Marisol Martinez, $25,000.00

Marisol and Gregory Martinez, Sr., $305,509.80

Robbins & Curtin, p.LLc. $319,490.20 ($69,490.20 in costs advanced and

$250,000.00 in attorney’s fees).

IV. The Reasonableness and Fairness of the Settlement Amount

Here, the settlement agreement was reached after the conclusion of all discovery, and

the Court finding that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create a question of

fact for jury resolution, and prior to setting the case for a jury trial. Additionally, there is

little precedent in the Ninth Circuit, defining how long police may lawfully and reasonably

detain witnesses, not accused or suspected of criminal activity, to conduct an investigation

of a recent crime before such detention becomes an unconstitutional violation of the

witnesses’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.

2006) (finding qualified immunity applicable to police officers who detained decedent’s

family members in their home for questioning who did not consent to their detention, which

lasted approximately one and one-half hours and prevented them from being with the

decedent before he died). This relatively novel issue, the minors’ only claim withstanding

summary judgment,2

 may not have withstood appellate review if the minors were to obtain

a favorable verdict.

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3 In Arizona, a cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory. Under the terms

of Arizona’s wrongful death act, such an action can only be brought in the names of the

categories of persons specifically listed in A.R.S. § 12-612. See Solomon v. Harman, 107

Ariz. 426, 489 P.2d 236 (Ariz. 1971)

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Importantly, the Court notes the two minor Plaintiffs did not sustain physical injury

by the police, do not have a legal cause of action for the alleged wrongful death of their

brother under Arizona law,3

 and were allegedly unlawfully detained after the shooting for

no more than seven hours. The Court has not been provided any records or information the

minors underwent any counseling and treatment for their alleged unlawful detention and, if

they did, it would seem very difficult to separate any emotional or behavioral issues between

the sudden, traumatic, and violent loss of their brother and their alleged unlawful detention.

The docket reflects the parties have taken dozens of depositions and engaged in

significant discovery until the discovery deadline closed. Though he acknowledges he did

not keep track of his time in his affidavit, Plaintiffs’ counsel estimates that he expended

approximately 270 hours on this action. (Doc. 161, ¶¶ 14, 17) Plaintiffs’ counsel explains

the risks he assumed in taking this case on a contingency fee arrangement. “[A] jury may

empathize with the police officer, particularly in a situation where the decedent is armed

(albeit with knives) and is under the influence of drugs (albeit sleeping pills) and has a

criminal history.” (Id., ¶ 13) “The necessity of expensive experts to sort through the

investigation of sometimes deceptive officers is another risk. Civil rights cases require a

substantial amount of experience and knowledge of Federal practice and the myriad of legal

issues involved in the claims, as well as the defenses, and the unique discovery.” (Id.) 

Considering the substantial experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel in similar cases, the

disputed and undisputed facts surrounding the shooting and alleged post-shooting detention

claims, the numerous risks Plaintiffs’ counsel assumed in taking this case, and the substantial

costs he advanced to finance this action, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees are

reasonable, the division of the fees are fair amongst the five Plaintiffs, and the costs

advanced by Plaintiffs’ counsel were reasonable and necessary to properly prepare this

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action for trial.

V. Conclusion

The Court finds the minors’ net settlement amounts are fair and reasonable in light

of the risks of further litigation, the undisputed facts and contested allegations, Plaintiffs’

overall claims, and the Court’s experience and recoveries in similar cases. The Court further

finds the proposed settlement to be in the best interest of both minors. Accordingly, the

Court will approve the proposed settlement and grant Plaintiffs Petition.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. The proposed settlement between the minor Plaintiffs and Defendants is hereby

APPROVED as fair and reasonable;

2. Plaintiffs’ Petition to Approve Minors’ Settlement, doc. 161, is GRANTED;

3. Minors M.M. and L.M. shall each receive $25,000.00 net after payment of all

attorney’s fees and costs approved herein;

4. Within 72 hours of receipt of a check or draft payable to the order of Marisol and

Gregory Martinez, Sr., as guardians ad litem for and on behalf of the minor Plaintiffs M.M.

and L.M., Plaintiffs’ counsel shall deposit separate checks from his law firm’s trust account

in the amount of $25,000.00 each into separate, interest-bearing restricted accounts at a

federally-insured bank or credit union located in Maricopa County, Arizona;

6. The separate settlement amounts plus interest shall be transferred to each minor

Plaintiff when each reaches the age of 18 years or as otherwise ordered by the Maricopa

County Superior Court. When each minor Plaintiff attains the age of 18 years, the respective

depository, without further order of this District Court, is hereby authorized and directed to

pay by cashier’s check directly to the former minor Plaintiff, upon proper demand and

identification, all money and interest deposited pursuant to this Order. The money on deposit

is not subject to escheat;

7. Marisol and Gregory Martinez, Sr. and Plaintiffs’ attorney shall deliver to the

federally-insured bank or credit union a complete copy of this Order at the time of deposit;

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8. The parties’ must provide the Court with a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice

and separate order no later than May 9, 2014, unless extended by the Court upon a showing

of good cause.

Dated this 6th day of March, 2014.

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