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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 2, 2007 Decided November 16, 2007

No. 06-5167

LEONARD E. DUNNING,

APPELLANT

v.

PAUL A. QUANDER, DIRECTOR, COURT SERVICES AND

OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv01980)

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellant.

Beverly M. Russell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. 

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PER CURIAM: In this employment discrimination case,

appellant Leonard E. Dunning claims that the Court Services

and Offender Supervision Agency discriminated against him on

the basis of age and retaliated against him for filing an age

discrimination complaint. Specifically, he claims that the

Agency denied him a community supervision officer position

because he was older than the position’s stated age limit of

thirty-seven. While admitting that he exceeds the age limit,

Dunning disputes its applicability. He also claims that after he

filed an administrative age discrimination complaint, the Agency

retaliated by denying him a lead drug-testing technician

position. The Agency subsequently denied him a second lead

drug-testing technician position, which Dunning claims was also

based on age and in retaliation for his complaint. 

The Agency moved for summary judgment supported by

nine affidavits, including several from Agency officials involved

in the selection process. Responding to the Agency’s motion,

Dunning submitted no affidavits of his own. Instead, he filed a

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), pursuant to

which courts may allow discovery “[s]hould it appear from the

affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary

judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(f). In his Rule 56(f) affidavit, Dunning claimed

that in order to oppose the Agency’s motion for summary

judgment, he needed to (1) “obtain[] written discovery and

tak[e] depositions of the deciding officials,” and (2) “obtain

discovery on the selection” of one of the lead drug-testing

technician positions. The district court denied the Rule 56(f)

motion, explaining that Dunning had failed to “state with

sufficient particularity why he could not, absent discovery,

present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.”

Dunning v. Quander, 468 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006).

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The court then granted summary judgment in favor of the

Agency. 

On appeal, Dunning challenges both rulings. We review the

district court’s denial of the Rule 56(f) motion for abuse of

discretion and its grant of summary judgment de novo. Khan v.

Parsons Global Servs., Ltd., 428 F.3d 1079, 1082 (D.C. Cir.

2005). 

As to the Rule 56(f) motion, Dunning relies on ChappellJohnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), in which we

reversed the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion in an employment

discrimination case. There, the district court had denied the

Rule 56(f) motion because it believed that plaintiff had to

establish that someone outside her protected class ultimately

filled the contested position. Given that she failed to allege that

the position had been filled, the court found that the plaintiff

would be unable to prevail as a matter of law regardless of what

discovery might reveal. Finding this legally erroneous, we

explained that to establish a prima facie case a plaintiff need not

show “that the employer filled the sought-after position with a

person outside the plaintiff’s protected class.” Id. at 488.

Because a district court “abuses its discretion when it makes an

error of law,” we reversed the denial of the Rule 56(f) motion.

Id. at 487 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996)). In this case, Dunning points to no legal error by the

district court. Instead, he asserts only that he needs discovery to

respond to the Agency’s motion for summary judgment. 

This issue is therefore controlled by Strang v. U.S. Arms

Control & Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

in which we found no abuse of discretion in the denial of a Rule

56(f) motion because the plaintiff had failed to provide reasons

“why discovery was necessary.” Id. at 861. “Without some

reason to question the veracity of affiants,” we explained,

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“[plaintiff]’s desire to ‘test and elaborate’ affiants’ testimony

falls short; her plea is too vague to require the district court to

defer or deny dispositive action.” Id. 

Dunning has likewise failed to provide any persuasive

reason for needing discovery. He argues that discovery is

necessary “to determine if there was a legitimate reason for [the

Agency affiant’s] alleged concerns” about Dunning that

disqualified him from these positions, but he gives no reason for

questioning those affiants. Appellant’s Opening Br. 15. Instead,

Dunning seeks to rebut the Agency’s assertion that he was

denied the positions because of his “honesty and veracity,”

“conduct towards management,” and “behavior that did not make

him well suited for a leadership position.” But as we said in

Strang, “[w]ithout some reason to question the veracity of

affiants, [plaintiff]’s desire to ‘test and elaborate’ affiants’

testimony falls short.” 864 F.2d at 861. 

Dunning also argues that he needs discovery regarding his

claim that he was denied the community supervision officer

position because of his age. In his Rule 56(f) affidavit, however,

Dunning never mentioned the community supervision officer

position; he asked only about the two lead drug-testing

technician positions. At oral argument, Dunning’s counsel

pointed to a statement in his memorandum in opposition to the

summary judgment motion before the district court that refers to

the community supervision officer position. In that

memorandum, Dunning stated that he “ha[d] not had an

opportunity, through discovery, to gather sufficient information

on the policy and practice of the agency on restricting applicants

based on their age.” Even if this statement, made outside the

Rule 56(f) affidavit, was sufficient to present the issue to the

district court, we think the court acted within its discretion in

denying discovery. Exactly why Dunning needs discovery on

the Agency’s age restriction policy is unclear. Although he

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claims he needs it to challenge the very existence of the age

restriction policy, the Agency’s vacancy announcement for the

community supervision officer position expressly included the

age limit, and federal law authorizes the use of age limits for law

enforcement positions. 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d); Stewart v. Smith,

673 F.2d 485, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that Congress

intended to give agencies flexibility to set maximum age limits

for law enforcement positions).

At oral argument, Dunning’s counsel said discovery on the

policy was needed to show that despite exceeding the age limit,

Dunning should have been grandfathered into the position

because he was already in a law enforcement position at the time

he applied. In an affidavit, however, the Agency’s deputy

associate director of human resources explained that while

applicants had been grandfathered in when their current positions

were converted to federal law enforcement positions, an

applicant could not be grandfathered into a new law enforcement

position without satisfying the age requirement. Because

Dunning offers no reason to “question the veracity of [this]

affiant[],” no further discovery is required. Strang, 864 F.2d at

861. 

Finally, Dunning says he needs discovery on the age policy

to challenge the Agency’s need or justification for the age

restriction generally. But Dunning never raised this issue in the

district court, so it is waived. See Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Group,

494 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding an issue waived

because party failed to raise it before district court). 

Because the district court acted within its discretion in

denying Dunning’s Rule 56(f) request, we are left with nothing

more than the Agency’s uncontested motion for summary

judgment. Summary judgment is proper where the evidence is

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“so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

Because the Agency’s affidavits support summary judgment, we

affirm. 

So ordered.

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