Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02717/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02717-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CORY DEON MILES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CV 05-2717 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

WARDEN BARTOS and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On September 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. On December 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion [Docket

No. 8] seeking voluntary dismissal of his petition without

prejudice in order to return to state court to exhaust some of

his federal habeas claims.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus and Objection to Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss

Petition (“Answer”) on December 19, 2005. Docket No. 8.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and that Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were

not properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

Case 2:05-cv-02717-MHM Document 9 Filed 01/26/06 Page 1 of 18
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1

 Respondents and Petitioner assert Petitioner sought review

of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which allegedly denied

review in an order entered February 11, 2004. Petition at 2; Answer

at 2. However, neither party has supplied this Court with a copy of

the Arizona Supreme Court’s order regarding Petitioner’s direct appeal

and the docket available from the Maricopa County Superior Court

website does not indicate that the Arizona Supreme Court issued an

order regarding Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on or about

February 11, 2004.

2 Petitioner asserts he filed his first action for postconviction relief on April 21, 2004. Petition at 2. 

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denied and dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, Respondents

contend that Petitioner’s claims for relief may be denied on the

merits. Respondents also assert that Petitioner’s motion for

voluntary dismissal must be denied. 

I Procedural History

On September 30, 2002, Petitioner was found guilty by

a jury of theft of a means of transportation. See Petition at

1. On October 3, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

11.25 years imprisonment for this crime. Answer, Exh. D. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence, asserting a Batson violation occurred in the selection

of the jury. Id., Exh. D. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

this claim for relief and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence in an order filed September 11, 2003. Id., Exh. D.1

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on

or about November 12, 2003, and was appointed counsel. Id.,

Exh. E.2 On April 21, 2004, counsel was given leave to withdraw

from his representation because counsel averred to the court

that he could not find a legitimate issue to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. F. 

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3

 The state court had previously issued an order dismissing

the action for Petitioner’s failure to timely file an actual petition

for relief. Answer, Exh. H. In an order issued August 23, 2004,

apparently in contravention of an order allowing Petitioner until

September 6, 2004, to file a petition, the Arizona state court stated:

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Petitioner was given several extensions of the time to

file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief. Id., Exhs.

F, G, I. Petitioner filed a pro per petition for postconviction relief on December 14, 2004, which was denied on

January 28, 2005. Id., Exh. I. The Arizona court stated:

The court has reviewed a Notice of Post

Conviction Relief filed by defendant, Cory

Dean Miles.

Mr. Miles alleges that he is entitled to post

conviction relief because: 1) his sentence

was improperly enhanced by a 2001 conviction

for Possession of Narcotic Drugs; 2) that

statements made by defendant to the police

and elicited at trial were involuntary, and

thus inadmissible; and 3) he was denied his

right to a speedy trial.

Following his sentence on September 30, 2002,

defendant filed a timely appeal.

The only issue raised on appeal was whether

a single juror should have been kept on the

jury due to the court’s denial of a Batson

challenge. The Court of Appeals affirmed

defendant’s conviction.

On November 11, 2003, defendant filed his

most recent petition for Post Conviction

Relief (PCR). He was appointed counsel.

After the court granted two extensions of

time, on April 21, 2004, defendant’s counsel,

Tom Gorman, filed a Notice of Completion of

Post Conviction Relief of Counsel. Mr.

Gorman asserted that he could find no

colorable claim entitling defendant to post

conviction relief.

By order dated April 21, 2004, defendant was

given until June 6, 2004, to file a pro per

petition.

On June 2, 2004, defendant was given another

extension to file his pro per petition. He

was granted until August 2, 2004. On August

6, 2004, defendant was granted yet another

extension until September 6, 2004.3

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“The court ordered that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be

filed by August 2, 2004. This deadline has passed and the defendant

has not filed any petition. No good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED

dismissing the Rule 32 proceeding.” Id., Exh. H. It appears that the

Arizona court either further extended the September 6, 2004, deadline

or, nonetheless, considered Petitioner’s untimely petition filed

December 14, 2004, to the extent that it noted the petition was not

timely filed and the claims were precluded.

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No pro per petition was filed until December

14, 2004. Defendant’s pro per petition is

untimely. Furthermore, the issues now raised,

could have been raised on the direct appeal

previously considered by the Arizona Court of

Appeals or on post trial motion. Pursuant to

Rule 32.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

IT IS ORDERED summarily dismissing

defendant’s Petition for Post Conviction

Relief in accordance with the written formal

order signed by the court on January 18,

2005, and filed with the clerk on this date.

Id., Exh. I. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by

the Arizona Court of Appeals.

On September 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to federal habeas relief

because his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury was violated;

because his Fifth Amendment right to be free of selfincrimination was violated; because his sentence violates the

United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Blakely and Apprendi

because he was sentenced pursuant to a repeat offender statute;

and because his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise his Fifth Amendment and Blakely claims in Petitioner’s

direct appeal.

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II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not barred by

the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA requires state prisoners to file any petition

for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date

that their state court conviction becomes “final.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2005) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). The federal habeas petition “must be filed

within one year of the latest of the date on which ... the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or

the time passed for seeking direct review ...” Id. The running

of this one-year statute of limitations is tolled during any

period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in any state court. See

id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on

other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc).

 Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations on

Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief began to run on

December 9, 2003, when the time expired for seeking certiorari

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4

 Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, and one

published opinion issued by the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, have concluded that the relevant statute of

limitations begins to run on a federal habeas action when a petitioner

stands convicted by a state court and the time for seeking certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether or

not the petitioner actually sought certiorari. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920,

924 (9th Cir. 2002); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345 (1st Cir. 2003);

Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v.

Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 400

(4th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2nd Cir. 1998); Souch

v. Harkins, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (D. Ariz. 1998); Smith v.

Lord, 230 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F.

Supp. 2d 901, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1525 (1997) (noting that the

defendant’s conviction became final when his time for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari expired).

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from the United States Supreme Court at the conclusion of state

court proceedings on Petitioner’s direct appeal. See Wixom v.

Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999);4 Balsewicz v. Kingston, 425

F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2005); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153,

1155-56 (10th Cir. 1999). 

Prior to December 3, 2003, when Petitioner’s conviction

became final, on November 23, 2003, Petitioner initiated a

properly-filed action for post-conviction relief which tolled

the statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas

action. The statute of limitations was tolled until January 28,

2005, when the Arizona Superior Court dismissed the action,

citing Petitioner’s failure to timely file an actual petition

delineating his claims for relief and concluding that the claims

finally stated were precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise

the issues in his direct appeal. 

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Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals and, therefore, the

statute of limitations on his federal habeas action was further

statutorily tolled until February 27, 2005. See Gibson v.

Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold

today that, regardless of whether a petitioner actually appeals

a denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations

period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner could

have sought an appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204

F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a

judgment is not final until the time for seeking review expires,

the word “pending” includes that time period, whether or not

such review is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See

also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n.3 (7th Cir.

2001) (declining to decide issue but collecting cases so

holding).

The statute of limitations then began to run against

Petitioner from February 27, 2005, and expired on February 26,

2006, unless the statute of limitations was tolled by any other

properly-filed action for state post-conviction relief.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on September 6, 2005,

and, therefore, his petition is timely filed. 

B. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must “exhaust,” in state court, the

claims raised in his petition for federal habeas relief, before

this Court may consider the merits of the prisoner’s application

for relief. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111

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5 Because it is not necessary to the Court’s resolution of

Petitioner’s claims for relief, the Court declines to reach the issue of

whether Swoopes was effectively overruled by Baldwin v. Reese. In Crook v.

Arizona, 2005 WL 3455110, *3 n.2 (D. Ariz.), J. Teilborg concluded:

Respondents argue that Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,

124 S.Ct. 1347, [] (2004), overruled Swoopes.

However, in Castillo v. Mcfadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit court directly

quotes the applicable passage in Swoopes, and

mentions Baldwin in a different capacity. It is

unclear whether Baldwin overrules Swoopes, and this

Court declines to issue an opinion on the matter.

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S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To properly exhaust his

claims in the state courts, the petitioner must afford the state

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of each federal

constitutional claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the

state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner.

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Kim v.

Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1999, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, in Arizona, in

the context of a petitioner who is not sentenced to death or

life in prison, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005).5

C. Procedural default

Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

an action for federal habeas relief, it is also satisfied if the

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habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their

claim in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 &

Supp. 2005); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060;

Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62, 116 S. Ct. at 2080. A federal habeas

petitioner has not exhausted his claims if he has the right to

raise the claim, “by any available procedure,” in the state

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2005). Therefore, if

it is clear that the habeas petitioner’s claims are now

procedurally barred under state law, the claim is exhausted by

virtue of the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

properly presented a claim in state court and is now barred from

doing so by state court procedural rules. See Castille, 489

U.S. at 351-52; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.

1988). Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did

present a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did

not address the merits of the claim because the petitioner

failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v.

Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A state is entitled

to treat as forfeited a proposition that was not presented in

the right court, in the right way, and at the right time--as

state rules define those courts, ways, and times. Failure to

comply with the state’s procedural rules furnishes an

independent and adequate state ground of decision that blocks

federal collateral review.”). “If a prisoner has defaulted a

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state claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review

... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Wells v.

Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v.

Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because Arizona’s rules of criminal procedure governing

preclusion bar Petitioner from now returning to state court to

exhaust any of the unexhausted claims stated in his federal

habeas petition, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally

defaulted these claims. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987

(9th Cir. 2003). Because the procedural bar that satisfies the

exhaustion requirement in this matter, i.e., Rule 32.2, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing preclusion, also provides

an independent and adequate state-law basis for upholding

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, the Court need not

review the merits of Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims

unless he can demonstrate cause for his failure to follow

reasonable state procedures for fair presentment of his claims

and prejudice arising from his procedural default of the claims.

See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62, 116 S. Ct. at 2080; Murray, 477

U.S. at 485, 106 S. Ct. at 2643. See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860-61, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581-82 (2002) (concluding

that a state court’s finding that a post-conviction claim was

barred as waived, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), was a decision

independent of federal law and adequate to bar federal review of

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6

 Review is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates

that habeas review is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. A

fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent. See id. Petitioner does not assert that he is

actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.

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state prisoner’s federal habeas claim on the merits).6

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default, and

“prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged

constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119,

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must

show the existence of some objective factor external to the

defense which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has explained

that “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available..., or that some interference by

officials made compliance impracticable would constitute cause

under this standard.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at

2645. 

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner’s claim that his right to an unbiased

jury was violated.

The only properly exhausted claim for relief stated in

the federal habeas petition is the assertion of an error in jury

selection. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution improperly

struck a juror because she was a housewife, contending that this

gender-based act violated the Batson doctrine. Petitioner

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7

 During the selection of the jury, the prosecution struck

a juror with a Hispanic surname. Answer, Exh. D at 4. Petitioner is

African American.

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exhausted this claim by raising it in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals considered Petitioner’s claim that the

prosecution had used one of its peremptory juror strikes in

violation of Petitioner’s equal protection rights. Answer, Exh.

D.7 The Court of Appeals stated:

The trial court determined that the state’s

reasons for striking Mrs. Hernandez were

race-neutral and denied appellant’s Batson

challenge.

On appeal, appellant has abandoned his

assertion that the questioned strike was

based on ethnicity. Instead he argues for

the first time that the state discriminated

against Mrs. Hernandez on the basis of

gender. Appellant asserts that the reason

given for striking Mrs. Hernandez – that she

was a housewife – was blatant gender

discrimination in violation of Batson. Moreover, appellant maintains that he has

preserved a gender-based Batson objection for

appellate review because he responded to the

state’s race-neutral reasons for striking

Mrs. Hernandez in part by stating, “I don’t

think that the State should be allowed to

take [] every housewife off of the panel.”

We disagree that appellant made a genderbased objection below. Moreover, with regard

to the objection he now makes, its premise is

flawed. Appellant confuses Mrs. Hernandez’

occupation with her gender. While all

housewives are women, not all women are

housewives. Literally millions of women in

this country have a different status. Only

if all women were housewives could it be said

that a strike based on the status of

“housewife” was necessarily based on gender.

We conclude that not only did appellant waive

a gender-based discrimination claim by not

raising it below, [], the state’s strike did

not even qualify as gender discrimination.

Answer, Exh. D.

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The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court reached a

decision contrary to clearly established federal law, or one

involving an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, or unless the state court decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2005). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

Petitioner’s right to a fair jury was not violated by the

prosecution’s use of a peremptory strike based on the juror’s

occupation was not clearly contrary to established federal law

and, therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on this claim. See Rice v. Collins, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2006

WL 119293 (Jan. 18, 2006) (reversing a decision of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals and concluding that the state court’s

resolution of a Batson challenge was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

state court); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 n.14, 114 S.

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Ct. 1419, 1428 n.14 (1994) (finding that peremptory challenges

made on the basis of a characteristic other than race or gender

(such as occupation) do not implicate the Equal Protection

clause); Jordan v. LeFevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the juror’s “type of employment” is an

acceptable race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge). 

2. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to federal

habeas relief because an involuntary statement was used against

him at trial in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth

Amendment.

Petitioner arguably raised his Fifth Amendment claim in

the Arizona Superior Court in his properly filed action for

post-conviction relief, which was ultimately denied for his

failure to timely file a petition supporting his claims for

relief and because his claims were found to be precluded.

However, Petitioner never presented this claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals in a properly filed action for post-conviction

relief and the Arizona Superior Court concluded that Petitioner

had procedurally defaulted his claim regarding the use of

Petitioner’s own statements against him at trial. Because the

Arizona Superior Court found these claims procedurally precluded

and because Petitioner did not seek review of this decision and

the time for doing so has passed, Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted these claims. Absent a showing of cause and

prejudice, the merits of this claim may not provide a basis for

habeas relief.

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3. Petitioner contends that he was improperly sentenced

because his sentence was based, in part, on prior convictions.

Petitioner arguably raised his sentencing claim, i.e.,

his Blakely and Apprendi claim, in the Arizona Superior Court in

his action for post-conviction relief. However, Petitioner

never presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

properly filed action for post-conviction relief and the claim

has been deemed precluded. 

The Arizona Superior Court concluded that Petitioner

had procedurally defaulted his claim that his sentence was

improper because he was sentenced pursuant to a repeat offender

statute. Because the Arizona Superior Court found this claim

procedurally precluded, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted

this claim. Because Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor

prejudice arising from his default of this claim, the claim may

not provide a basis for granting habeas relief.

4. Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right

to the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to federal

habeas relief because his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise Fifth Amendment, speedy trial, and Blakely

claims in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner never raised

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the Arizona

courts; the claim was not included in Petitioner’s pro per

petition for post-conviction relief. An ineffective assistance

of counsel claim would be properly raised in an action for postconviction relief, however Petitioner failed to raise this claim

in his actual petition for post-conviction relief and,

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therefore, this claim is procedurally precluded by Rule 32.2,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted this claim in the state courts and

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from,

his procedural default of his ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim in the state courts, federal habeas

relief may not be granted on this basis.

E. Petitioner’s motion to stay his habeas petition so

that he may return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted

claims.

Petitioner asserts that the procedural default of his

“unexhausted claim,” should be excused because his failure to

timely file a brief in support of his petition for postconviction relief was not his fault. See Docket No. 7.

However, Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief was not

dismissed solely on the grounds that the actual petition, rather

than the action, was not timely filed but instead was also

premised on the Superior Court’s conclusion that the claims

raised were precluded by Petitioner’s failure to present them in

his direct appeal. To the extent that Petitioner might be

arguing that his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness constituted

“cause” for the procedural default of the claims raised in his

state action for post-conviction relief, an ineffective

assistance of counsel must be separately exhausted in state

court before it can serve as “cause” for the procedural default

of another claim. See Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th

Cir. 2003). Pursuant to the decision in Edwards v. Carpenter,

529 U.S. 446, 120 S. Ct. 1587 (2000), a procedurally-defaulted

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim can serve as cause for

the procedural default of another claim only if the petitioner

can show cause and prejudice with respect to ineffective

assistance claim, a showing Petitioner has not made. See 529

U.S. at 450-51, 120 S. Ct. at 1590-91. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for federal habeas relief was

timely filed. Petitioner’s Batson claim was exhausted in the

Arizona state courts because Petitioner raised this claim in his

direct appeal. The Arizona state courts’ decision regarding

this claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of the relevant law and, therefore, Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief on this basis. With the exception of

his Batson claim, Petitioner failed to properly exhaust the

claims stated in his petition and has procedurally defaulted

these claims. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claims and,

therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Petitioner may not now return to the Arizona courts to

exhaust his procedurally defaulted federal habeas claims because

a state action for post-conviction relief would not be timely

filed and his claims are precluded by the failure to raise them

in his direct appeal or in his prior state action for postconviction relief. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion for voluntary

dismissal of his habeas petition to pursue exhaustion of his

claims should not be granted because the relief he seeks would

be futile.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Miles’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 24th day of January, 2006.

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