Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01346/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01346-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathan C. Bertanelli, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-1346-PHX-PGR (LOA)

ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First

Amended Complaint, doc. 36. Defendants oppose the motion, doc. 40. Plaintiff has also filed

a related motion in Opposition to Court’s Anticipated Pre-Screening Order Dismissing Doe

Defendants, doc. 39. 

I. Governing Law 

This matter arises on Plaintiff’s Motion to File a First Amended Complaint, doc. 15.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend a complaint once as a matter

of course within 21 days of service, or if a responsive pleading is required, within 21 days of

service of the responsive pleading or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). In view of the

procedural posture of this case, Plaintiff does not need leave to file an Amended Complaint.

However, because Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking leave, the Court will grant his motion.

 Because Plaintiff “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employees

of a governmental entity,” the Court must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint that “is frivolous, malicious,

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or fails to state a claim upon which relief must be granted. . . .” § 1915A(b)(1). A pleading must

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands

more than unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed -me accusations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, although

a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court

must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “continue to construe pro se filing

liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court screened the original

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 5) The First Amended Complaint is substantially

similar to the original complaint. 

II. Analysis

A. Count I

Plaintiff seeks to amend Count I to add additional facts to the policy claim asserted

in Count I of the original complaint. (compare docs. 1, 36) The Court previously screened

Plaintiff’s original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and dismissed the claim in

Count I, alleging that Defendant Ryan has a policy of prohibiting protective segregation inmates

from seeking protection from other inmates in the same unit because it is identical to Plaintiff’s

claim in Count III of CV-11-1340-PHX-PGR (LOA). (Doc. 5 at 3) In so doing, the Court

explained that a litigant “‘has no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same

subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant[s].’” (Doc. 5

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at 3) (quoting Oliney v. Garnder, 771 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). In the

proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff re-urges his policy claim and adds several facts.

Plaintiff’s minor retooling of Count I does not change the nature of that claim or the fact that

it is duplicative. Thus, although Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint, doing so does not

revive previously dismissed Count I of the First Amended Complaint. See Vanderburgh v.

Hendrix, 2009 WL 472360, at * 4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2009) (dismissing claims as part of

screening order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and noting that plaintiff should not reassert the

dismissed claims in an amended complaint unless he alleges facts that cure the deficiencies).

B. Count II

In Count II of the original complaint, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his equal

protection rights based on his allegations that Defendants Abelowiz, Hartsuck, and Does II and

III ignored Plaintiff’s requests that they add to Plaintiff’s Do Not House With list the names of

four inmates who assaulted Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “were fully aware when

they deliberately refused to add [the inmates] to Plaintiff’ [list that] they were intentionally

denying Plaintiff required departmental PS protection.” Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the

omission, he was again assaulted by one of the inmates. In the September 7, 2011 screening

order, the Court dismissed Count II, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim because

Plaintiff “failed to allege that he was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals

and that there was no rationale basis for treating him differently.” (Doc. 5 at 4) The allegations

in Count II of the first amended complaint do not create the deficiencies noted in the screening

order. 

Thus, although Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint, doing so does not revive

previously dismissed Count II of the Complaint because Plaintiff has not cured the defects noted

in the Court’s September 12, 2011 Order. (Doc. 5); See Vanderburgh, 2009 WL 472360, at *

4.

C. Claim to Which an Answer will be Required 

As the Court previously found, liberally construed, Plaintiff adequately states an

Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Defendants Abelowiz, Hartsuck, Doe II, and

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Doe III and those Defendants must answer Count I of the First Amended Complaint. Again, the

Court will not dismiss Doe II or III, but will not order service on Doe II or III at this time.

Rather, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend his Complaint to name those defendants if he

discovers their identity. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint also attempts to reassert claims against

previously dismissed Doe Defendants I, and IV through X. Plaintiff has not cured the

deficiencies noted in the September 12, 2011 screening order, doc. 5. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims

against Does I, and IV through X are not revived. See Vanderburgh, 2009 WL 472360, at * 4.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended

Complaint, doc. 36, is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Clerk of Court is directed to filed the First

Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended

Complaint, doc. 36 - attachment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Abelowiz, Hartsuck, Doe II, and

Doe III and must answer Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim asserted in

Count I of the First Amended Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in view of Plaintiff’s failure to cure the defects

noted in the Court’s September 12, 2011 Order, doc. 5, the policy claim asserted in Count I and

the Equal Protection claim asserted in Count II are not revived and remain dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in view of Plaintiff’s failure to cure the defects

noted in the Court’s September 12, 2011 Order, doc. 5, Plaintiff’s allegations against Doe

Defendants I, and IV through X are not revived by the amended complaint and remain

dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Court’s

Anticipated Screening Order, doc. 37, is DENIED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, doc. 34, and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Not to Respond to Motion to Dismiss, doc. 38, are DENIED as

moot in view of the filing of the First Amended Complaint.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2012.

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