Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01280/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SEVILLA,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 15cv1280-DMS (JLB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

AMY MILLER, Warden,

Respondent.

Michael Sevilla (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a California prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) He challenges a November 25, 2013, prison disciplinary

proceeding at which he was found guilty of possession of dangerous contraband (a cell

phone), which resulted in the forfeiture of 61 days of earned custody credits and the loss

of 30 days of yard privileges. (Id. at 35.) He claims his federal due process rights were

violated by the guilty finding, and by the deprivation of his state-created liberty interest

in his earned custody credits, because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding

at the disciplinary hearing that he possessed the contraband. (Id. at 19-31.)

Respondent has filed an Answer (“Ans.”) and lodged portions of the state record. 

(ECF Nos. 20-21.) Respondent argues that because success on Petitioner’s claims,

including restoration of his custody credits, will not necessarily result in a speedier

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release from custody, his claims are not cognizable on federal habeas. (Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 2-4.) Respondent

alternately argues that to the extent the claims are cognizable on habeas, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief because the adjudication of the claims by the state court (on the

basis that sufficient evidence supports the guilty finding), is neither contrary to, nor

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 4-7.) 

Although Petitioner was granted leave to do so, he has not filed a Traverse.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that because success on the merits of

Petitioner’s claims will not necessarily result in is immediate or speedier release from

custody, his claims are not cognizable on federal habeas, and must be brought, if at all,

in a Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Court has discretion to

construe such a petition as a § 1983 Complaint, the Court finds the current Petition is not

amenable to such a construction, and recommends against so construing the Petition. The

Court alternately finds that, to the extent the claims sound in habeas, they fail on their

merits. The Court therefore recommends the Petition be denied. 

I. Background

On October 3, 1997, Petitioner was convicted of one count of violating California

Vehicle Code § 20001(a) (hit and run causing death or injury) for which he was

sentenced to a determinate term of four years in prison, and one count of violating Penal

Code § 187 (murder) for which he was sentenced to a consecutive indeterminate term of

15 years-to-life with the possibility of parole. (Lodgment No. 1 at 1-2.) Petitioner began

serving his indeterminate life sentence as soon as he completed serving his four-year

determinate sentence. See Cal. Penal Code § 669(a) (West Supp. 2016). 

On November 13, 2013, while housed at Centinela State Prison in Imperial,

California, a search of the cell Petitioner shared with Inmate Lopez revealed, hidden in

a light fixture, four cell phones, four cell phone chargers, two cell phone batteries, two

“SD cards,” and one pair of metal tweezers. (Lodgment No. 2 at 3.) Petitioner was

charged with possession of dangerous contraband, a cell phone, and a disciplinary hearing

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was held on November 25, 2013. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner pleaded not guilty and denied

knowledge of the presence of the cell phone in his cell. (Id.) Petitioner’s cellmate,

Inmate Lopez, testified at the hearing that the confiscated items belonged to him and

Petitioner did not know they were in their cell. (Id.) Petitioner was found guilty of

“dangerous contraband possession of cell phone,” and was assessed 61 days forfeiture of

accrued behavioral custody credits and 30 days loss of afternoon and night yard

privileges. (Id. at 3.) He unsuccessfully appealed the guilty finding and loss of credits

through the prison administrative appeal process, ending with a Director’s Level decision

dated July 23, 2014. (Lodgment Nos. 3-4.) 

While the administrative appeal process was proceeding, Petitioner’s first parole

hearing was held on June 6, 2014, and he was denied parole for five years. (Lodgment

No. 11 at 1.) His next scheduled parole hearing is set for June 6, 2019.1

 (Id.)

On December 3, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court,

raising the same claims he presents here. (Lodgment No. 5.) After noting a failure to use

the proper form and a four-month filing delay, the superior court stated:

Petitioner appears to take issue with the concept of “constructive possession” which is frequently the basis for finding of guilt in CDCR Form 115 proceedings involving the existence of contraband in relatively confined

areas shared by more than one inmate, for example two inmate cells. Petitioner’s argument and citation to a Sacramento County Superior Court case from 1991 notwithstanding, the case that provides the answer to

Petitioner’s question is In re Zepeda (4th Dist., 2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, which remains good law, binding on this court. That case involved

a similar situation involving razor blades, which had the potential for use as weapons, which were present in a shared cell. Even though the petitioner’s cell mate affirmed ownership of the blades and both he and the petitioner denied petitioner had any knowledge of them, the petitioner was held to

have constructive possession of them in violation of Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006, subd. (a) sufficient to warrant the disciplinary measures imposed. (Id. at 1499-1500.) Because section 3006(a) equates cellular phones with weapons, the constructive possession rule would also apply to cases involving cellular phones.

1

 A prisoner’s minimum parole eligible date (MPED) is set by taking into account any credits

earned or lost. In re Jenkins, 50 Cal.4th 1167, 1179-80 (Cal. 2010). As discussed below, the record is

unclear if Petitioner’s 2014 MPED was delayed 61 days by the loss of his custody credits in 2013, or

if success on his claims and restoration of his credits would advance his next parole hearing. However,

it is clear that his MPED has passed and that the disciplinary infraction is only one of several factors

available for the Parole Board to consider. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a).

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This court’s task is to apply the law as established by the legislature and decisions of the appellate courts. Until the law changes, Petitioner’s argument is not well taken. [¶] The petition is therefore denied.

(Lodgment No. 6, In re Sevilla, EHC01883, order at 1-2 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Dec. 12, 2014).)

Petitioner then presented the same claims to the state appellate court in a habeas

petition filed on February 24, 2015. (Lodgment No. 7.) The appellate court denied the

petition, stating: 

Sevilla contends the evidence does not support a finding of guilt because the cell phones and their accessories belonged to his cellmate and he did not know that they were hidden in his cell. The Legislature has given the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation broad authority to

discipline persons confined in state prisons. (Pen. Code, § 5054.) Generally, prison discipline falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by the court of law and does not implicate the due process

clause or create a right to judicial review. (Sandin v. Conner (1995) 515 U.S. 472, 482-483.) Prison disciplinary findings must be supported by

“some evidence.” (In re Rothwell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 160, 165, citing Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 455.) The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the prison authorities. (Superintendent v. Hill, supra, at pp. 455-456.)

Here, the correctional officer found the cell phones hidden in a common area of the cell equally accessible to both Sevilla and his cellmate. 

Under our limited review, this constitutes “some evidence” to support a

finding of constructive possession even if Sevilla’s cellmate acknowledged that the contraband was his and Sevilla maintains that he did not know about

it. (In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500.) 

(Lodgment No. 8, In re Sevilla, No. D067575, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal.App.Ct. Mar. 10,

2015).)

Petitioner presented the same claims in a habeas petition filed in the state supreme

court on March 30, 2015. (Lodgment No. 9.) That petition was denied with an order

which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment No. 10, In re

Sevilla, S225517, order at 1 (Cal. June 10, 2015).) 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges here, as he did in state court, that his federal due process rights

were violated by the guilty finding (Claim 1), and by the deprivation of his state-created

liberty interest in the 61 days of good time credits he forfeited (Claim 2), because there

is no evidence he was aware the cell phone was in his cell. (ECF No. 1 at 19-31, citing

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Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1985) (holding that revocation of good

time custody credits in which a state prisoner has a protected liberty interest “does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings

of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.”), quoting

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (holding that federal due process requires

procedural protections before a prisoner can be deprived of a state-created liberty interest

in good time custody credits).) He argues that the cell phone was not found in plain sight,

but was hidden in a light fixture which was accessible only from the top bunk, which was

assigned to his cellmate and therefore not in his area of control, precluding an inference

he was aware it was there, and without that inference there is no evidence of constructive

possession. (Id.) Petitioner presents an affidavit by his cellmate Inmate Lopez who states

that he only accessed the contraband when Petitioner was not in their cell, and repeats his

testimony from the disciplinary hearing that Petitioner had no knowledge the contraband

was in their cell. (Id. at 43.)

III. Discussion

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on federal habeas

because success on the merits of the claims will not necessarily result in his speedier

release from custody. (Ans. Mem. at 2-4.) Respondent alternately contends that, to the

extent the claims are cognizable on federal habeas, relief is not available because the

adjudication of the claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 4-7.)

A. Cognizability of Petitioner’s Claims

“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a

complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . ., 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.” An inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983. 

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (citations omitted), quoting Muhammad

v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).

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In determining whether a state prisoner’s claim should be brought under § 1983

or habeas, the Supreme Court has held that the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner

seeking restoration of good-time credits which would result in immediate release from

custody is a writ of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-89 (1973),

and that habeas is the sole vehicle for a damages claim challenging a prison disciplinary

proceeding which “would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the

deprivation of good-time credits,” even where the prison was not seeking restoration of

the credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997). In fact, when a state prisoner

brings a § 1983 action alleging a due process violation in connection to the loss of

custody credits which, if successful, necessarily requires earlier release from custody, the

district court must dismiss the action without prejudice to the petitioner to first seek

habeas relief in order to invalidate the state judgment. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 481-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner may not seek damageas under § 1983

if “establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity

of . . . any outstanding criminal judgment.”); but see Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751

(“Heck’s requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not,

however, implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his

conviction or duration of his sentence.”) 

In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Court reiterated its previous

holding that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact

or duration of his confinement. . . . [but] must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or

appropriate state relief) instead.” Id. at 78, citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489, Wolff, 418

U.S. at 554, Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 and Balisok, 520 U.S. at 618. The Court rejected the

argument that habeas was the “sole avenue for relief” for claims challenging the

constitutionality of parole proceedings, because there was no showing that success on

such claims “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

duration.” Id. at 82. Most recently, the Supreme Court stated in dicta in a § 1983 case

seeking DNA testing that: “Dotson declared, however, in no uncertain terms, that when

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a prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ that claim does not lie

at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ and ‘may be brought, if at all, under § 1983.’” Skinner v.

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011), quoting Dotson, 544 U.S. at 82. 

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit recently conducted a survey of those cases

and noted that the Supreme Court “has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for

claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may

not be brought in a § 1983 action.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016)

(en banc), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 21, 2016 (No. 16-6556). The Nettles court found

that: “Based on our review of the development of the Court’s case law in this area, we

now adopt the correlative rule that a § 1983 action is the exclusive vehicle for claims

brought by state prisoners that are not within the core of habeas.” Id. Thus, the Ninth

Circuit has held that § 1983 and habeas are mutually exclusive, and a state prisoner’s

claims either lie at “the core of habeas corpus” and are subject to the provisions of the

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), or they “challenge[] any

other aspect of prison life” and are subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) and “must be brought, if at all, under § 1983.” Id. at 931, citing

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487, and Skinner, 562 U.S. at 535 n.13. The Nettles Court went on

to state that the district court may construe a habeas petition which presents claims which

do not lie at the core of habeas as a § 1983 action “after notifying and obtaining informed

consent from the prisoner.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (“If the complaint is amenable to

conversion on its face, meaning it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct

relief, the court may recharacterize the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of

the consequences of the conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to

withdraw or amend his or her complaint.”) 

The California state prisoner in Nettles was serving an indeterminate term of life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole when he was denied parole at his first parole

hearing held in 2004, and denied parole again at his second hearing in 2009. Id. at 925.

He filed a federal habeas petition in 2011 alleging that the parole board’s decision was

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based at least in part on a 2008 disciplinary hearing during which he was denied his

federal due process rights, and which resulted in a four-month term in the segregated

housing unit and a loss of 30 days custody credits. Id.

The Ninth Circuit found that Nettles’ claim did not lie within the core of habeas

corpus, irrespective of his request for restoration of his custody credits, because success

on the claim “would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release because the

expungement of the challenged disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to a

grant of parole.” Id. at 934-35. The Court considered the reasons Nettles had been

denied parole, and noted that “[a] rules violation is merely one of the factors shedding

light on whether a prisoner” is suitable for parole. Id. at 935. The Court found that

“[b]ecause the parole board has the authority to deny parole ‘on the basis of any of the

grounds presently available to it,’ the presence of a disciplinary infraction does not

compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of an infraction compel the grant of

parole.” Id., quoting Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Here, if

successful, Ramirez will not necessarily shorten the length of his confinement because

there has been no showing by the State that the expungement Ramirez seeks [of a

disciplinary infraction for battery on his cell mate with a weapon with serious bodily

injury] is likely to accelerate his eligibility for parole.”)

Respondent argues that Nettles and Petitioner are similarly situated because they

have both reached their MPED, and both challenge prison disciplinary proceedings which

resulted in the loss of custody credits which have no effect on the length of their

confinement because they are serving indeterminate life sentences. (Ans. Mem. at 3.)

Respondent contends neither can show that expungement of their disciplinary finding will

necessarily shorten their prison term or lead to an earlier release. (Id.) 

Although Nettles’ MPED was already set when his credits were forfeited,

Petitioner here forfeited his credits in 2013, and reached his MPED in 2014. (Ans. at 3.) 

Nevertheless, even if restoration of the credits would would advance Petitioner’s next

parole hearing by 31 days, there is no indication it would affect Petitioner’s release date. 

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See Jenkins, 50 Cal.4th at 1179-80 (noting that a prisoner serving an indeterminate life

sentence has his or her MPED advanced though custody credits, but their actual release

from prison is wholly dependent on the parole decision). 

Rather, this case is similar to Dotson, relied on by Nettles, where success on the

prisoners’ claims would have merely provided new parole eligibility and suitability

hearings. In Dotson, one of the petitioners was found ineligible for parole consideration

and one was found ineligible for parole release; both brought challenges under § 1983 to

the procedures used by their respective parole boards and both sought new hearings under

what they alleged to be the proper standards. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 76-77. The Supreme

Court noted that under its precedents a state prisoner is precluded from bringing a § 1983

action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement,” and seeks either “immediate

release from prison” or the “shortening” of his term of confinement. Id. at 78-79. The

Court allowed the § 1983 action to proceed because success on the claims would only

provide new parole hearings, which would not “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration.” Id. at 82. Here, even if success would require Petitioner’s

MPED to be recalculated or advance his next parole hearing, there is no indication that

the invalidation of his disciplinary infraction would necessarily result in his release on

parole. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. 

In sum, Petitioner’s claims do not lie at “the core of habeas corpus” and “must be

brought, if at all, under § 1983,” because there is no showing that success on the merits

would “necessarily” have an effect on the duration of his confinement. Nettles, 830 F.3d

at 927. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing the Petition on the basis that the

claims are not cognizable on habeas, without prejudice to Petitioner to present his claims,

if he wishes, in a separate civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Although the Court may construe a habeas petition which presents claims which

do not lie at the core of habeas as a § 1983 action “after notifying and obtaining informed

consent from the prisoner,” the Court recommends declining to so construe this action

because it is not amenable to reconstruction on its face. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (“If

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the complaint is amenable to conversion on its face, meaning it names the correct

defendants and seeks the correct relief, the court may recharacterize the petition so long

as it warns the pro se litigant of the consequences of the conversion and provides an

opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or amend his or her complaint.”) Although it

appears Petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirements for both habeas and civil

rights actions, there are no allegations against the only named Respondent in this action

(the Warden of the correctional institution where Petitioner is and was confined at the

time of the disciplinary action), and it is unclear who Petitioner seeks to hold personally

responsible for the alleged denial of his federal due process rights. See e.g. Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”), citing

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Accordingly, the Court recommends

declining to construe this action as a civil rights complaint because it is not amenable to

reconstruction on its face. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936.

B. Merits

Respondent alternately argues that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because

the adjudication of his claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 4-7.) The

Court alternately finds that, to the extent Petitioner’s claims sound in habeas, he is not

entitled to federal habeas relief. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief for claims which were adjudicated

on their merits in state court unless he can first show that the state court adjudication of

the claims: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). A state court’s decision may be

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“contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent (1) “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the

state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision may involve an

“unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies

the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Relief under the “unreasonable

application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly

established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded

disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-

07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). To satisfy

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state

court adjudication rests, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, are

objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

As set forth above, Petitioner presented his claims to the state supreme court in a

habeas petition which was summarily denied, as well as to the state appellate court which

denied the petition in a reasoned opinion. This Court applies a presumption that: “Where

there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained

orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). The last reasoned opinion here is the

appellate court order denying habeas relief, which, as quoted above, denied Petitioner’s

claims, stating in relevant part:

Prison disciplinary findings must be supported by “some evidence.” (In re

Rothwell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 160, 165, citing Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 455.) The relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the prison authorities. (Superintendent v. Hill, supra, at pp. 455-456.) [¶] Here, the correctional officer found the cell phones hidden in a common area of the cell equally accessible to both Sevilla and his cellmate. Under

our limited review, this constitutes “some evidence” to support a finding of 

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constructive possession even if Sevilla’s cellmate acknowledged that the contraband was his and Sevilla maintains that he did not know about it. (In

re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500.)

(Lodgment No. 8, In re Sevilla, No. D067575, slip op. at 1-2.)

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due

process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976), citing Wolff, 418

U.S. at 558 (noting that “the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual

against arbitrary action of government, . . . and the minimum requirements of procedural

due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.”) 

In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that the liberty interest arising from prison

regulations regarding disciplinary hearings entitle the prisoner to certain procedural

protections, including: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24 hours in advance of

the hearing; (2) a written statement indicating upon what evidence the fact finders relied

and the reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence when doing so will not be unduly hazardous to

institutional safety or correctional goals; and (4) an impartial fact finder. Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 564-71. In Hill, the Court held that “revocation of good time does not comport with

‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process’ . . . unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S.

at 454, quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. No due process violation occurs if “there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The “some evidence” standard assures that “the record

is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. at 457. 

Petitioner does not allege he was deprived of any of the Wolff procedural

protections. Rather, he alleges that he was denied his federal due process rights under

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Hill because there is no evidence to support the guilty finding or the forfeiture of his

earned good time custody credits. (ECF No. 1 at 19-31.)

The state appellate court found that under California law the fact that the cell phone

was found in a common area of a shared cell provides sufficient evidence that Petitioner

constructively possessed the contraband. The appellate court relied on In re Zepeda, 141

Cal.App.4th 1493 (2006), which held that despite the fact that the prison authorities never

negated the possibility that the contraband was in the cell without the petitioner’s

knowledge, its presence in a common area equally accessible to both inmates who shared

the cell provided “some evidence” to support the disciplinary infraction, irrespective of

the petitioner’s denial of its existence and the acknowledgment of ownership by his

cellmate. Id. at 1500 (noting that Hill emphasizes that a reviewing court should not

engage in an “examination of the entire record” or “weighing of the (conflicting)

evidence.”), quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.

Federal courts “are bound by a state court’s construction of its own” laws. Aponte

v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76

(2005) (“[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct

appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”),

citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”) This

Court must defer to the state court’s construction unless it is “untenable or amounts 

to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.” Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Zepeda from his situation by arguing that the

light fixture in his cell where the cell phones were hidden was accessible only from the

top bunk where his cellmate slept, rather than on a shelf which both inmates used as in

Zepeda. (ECF No. 1 at 26-27.) Because Petitioner had access to the light fixture, he has

not shown that the state court’s reliance on Zepeda is “untenable or amounts to a

subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.” Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at

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1399; see People v. Rice, 59 Cal.App.3d 998, 1002 (1976) (holding that possession,

whether actual or constructive, requires “that the accused had the right to exercise

dominion and control over the place where it was found.”) 

The Court finds that the adjudication of Petitioner’s claims by the state supreme

court is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in state court. Furthermore, even if the Court were conducting a de

novo review of Petitioner’s claims, it is clear that he received all the process he was due

both in connection to his guilty finding and the loss of his custody credits, because “some

evidence” exists in the record that he was in constructive possession of the contraband. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (“[T]he State having created the right

to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major

misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within

Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate

under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the statecreated right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”); see also Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705

(9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the Hill standard is “minimally stringent,” and “the court is

not to make its own assessment of the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.”),

citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

To the extent Petitioner challenges the 30-day loss of his yard privileges, he has

failed to allege the existence of a liberty interest protected by federal due process. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (holding that a state prisoner can show

a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

regarding the loss of privileges only if he of she alleges a change in confinement that

imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life,” which requires a showing of “a dramatic departure from the basic

conditions” of his or her confinement).

/ / /

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner received all the process he was due in

connection to his disciplinary hearing and the forfeiture of his custody credits, and that

his claims are therefore without merit under any standard of review. The Court therefore

recommends the Petition be denied.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2)

directing that the Petition be DENIED. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 20, 2017 any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 27, 2017. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 28, 2016

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge 

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