Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02666/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02666-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:553 Unauthorized Reception of Cable Service

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ARMANDO ANGULO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-02666-KJM-DAD 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the motion by plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, 

Inc. (J & J Sports) to strike defendant Armando Angulo’s affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 11.) 

Plaintiff contends that all thirteen affirmative defenses in defendant’s answer should be stricken 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Id. at 5.) Defendant has filed neither an opposition 

nor a notice of non-opposition. The court submitted the matter without a hearing. As explained 

below, the court GRANTS the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff J & J Sports alleges it was granted the exclusive nationwide commercial 

distribution (closed-circuit) rights to “The Clash in Cotai”: Manny Pacquiao v. Brandon Rios, 

WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program (Program), telecast nationwide on November 

23, 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 20–21, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a California corporation. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Defendant is the owner of a commercial establishment, Taqueria El Portal. (Id. ¶¶ 7–9.) Plaintiff 

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claims “defendants unlawfully intercepted the Program at the time of its transmission at their 

commercial establishment in North Highlands, California.” (Id. ¶ 23.) The complaint alleges 

four claims: (1) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; (2) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; (3) conversion; 

and (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendant Armando Angulo answered and denied the allegations 

on March 9, 2015. (See generally ECF No. 7.) Defendant also raised thirteen affirmative 

defenses, (id.), which plaintiff now moves to strike. (ECF No. 11.) 

II. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO STRIKE 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court “may strike from a pleading 

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A 

motion to strike allows a litigant “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise 

from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Sidney Vinstein 

v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). A motion to strike “may be proper if it 

will make trial less complicated or eliminate serious risks of prejudice to the moving party, delay, 

or confusion of the issues.” Taheny v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10–2123, 2011 WL 1466944, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011). However, “[m]otions to strike are disfavored and infrequently 

granted.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). A motion to 

strike “should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible 

bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues this court should apply the heightened pleading standard set forth 

in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), to determine the sufficiency of 

defendant’s affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 11 at 4.) In the alternative, plaintiff argues the court 

need not address the Twombly standard because the affirmative defenses must be stricken even 

under a lower standard. (Id. at 5–6.) 

 As an initial matter, the court notes that the Ninth Circuit has yet to address 

whether the heightened pleading standard applies to pleading affirmative defenses. See Hayden v. 

United States, No. 14-1060, 2015 WL 350665, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2015). This court need not 

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reach that issue because, as set forth below, the challenged affirmative defenses do not meet the 

lower pleading standard. Accord J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Luhn, No. 10-03229, 2011 WL 

5040709, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Montanez, No. 10-01693, 

2010 WL 5279907, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010). 

A. Affirmative Defenses in General 

 “An affirmative defense, under the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(c), is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes 

liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.” Barnes v. AT & T Pension 

Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “It is a defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof.” 

Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. On the other hand, “[a] defense which demonstrates that 

plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense,” but a negative defense. 

Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). While courts rarely 

grant Rule 12(f) motions to strike affirmative defenses, if an affirmative defense is a negative 

defense and should instead be included as a denial in the answer, the motion to strike will be 

granted. See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. 

B. First Affirmative Defense: Failure to State a Claim 

 Defendant’s first affirmative defense provides, “Plaintiff fails to state facts 

sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant.” (ECF No. 7 at 7.) Failure to state a 

claim is not an affirmative defense, rather it is an assertion of a defect in a plaintiff’s prima facie 

case. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Estradda, No. 10-02165, 2011 WL 2413257, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. June 8, 2011); see also Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. Accordingly, defendant’s first 

affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

C. Second and Third Affirmative Defenses: Individual Liability 

 Defendant’s second affirmative defense provides, “Defendant cannot be held 

‘individually liable for actions, if any, of other individuals,’ and Defendant did not reap any 

commercial profit from any alleged violation.” (ECF No. 7 at 7.) Defendant’s third affirmative 

defense alleges, “Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficiently pled for purposes of a claim against 

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Defendant in his individual capacity.” (Id.) Both of those defenses are essentially the same as the 

first affirmative defense. See Estradda, 2011 WL 2413257, at *2 (striking the same affirmative 

defenses). Accordingly, defendant’s second and third affirmative defenses are STRICKEN. 

D. Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Affirmative Defenses: Damages 

 Defendant’s fourth, fifth, and eighth defenses raise issues of double recovery and 

calculating damages. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) Defendant asserts plaintiff cannot recover under 47 

U.S.C. § 553 or § 605, and cannot recover damages for conversion because such a recovery 

would otherwise result in duplicative recovery. Id. In a similar case, the court granted plaintiff’s 

motion to strike defendant’s affirmative defense asserting that plaintiff’s recovery for conversion 

would be duplicative of damages awarded under Sections 553 or 605. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. 

v. Garcia, No. 11-02030, 2012 WL 1413940, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 11-02030, 2012 WL 1720244 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2012). Here as 

well, defendant is free to raise the duplicative recovery theories in defenses four and five during 

the litigation, but these are not accurately characterized as affirmative defenses. Estradda, 2011 

WL2413257, at *3; see also Abou–Khadra v. Mahshie, 4 F.3d 1071, 1079 n.7 (2d Cir. 1993) 

(defense that damages cannot be awarded for both breach of release and underlying claim 

concerns propriety of full damages on mutually exclusive claims rather than affirmative defense). 

 The eighth defense, asserting that damages should be capped, also is stricken. See

Pickern v. Chico Steakhouse, LP, No. 12-02586, 2013 WL 4051640, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 

2013) (such a defense not an affirmative defense). Accordingly, defendant’s fourth, fifth, and 

eighth defenses are STRICKEN. 

E. Sixth Affirmative Defense: No Cable System 

 Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense alleges: “Defendant cannot be liable as a 

matter of law under Section 605 because there was no cable system at the establishment.” (ECF 

No. 7 at 7.) On its face, this defense as pled points to an alleged deficiency in plaintiff’s prima 

facie case. See Estradda, 2011 WL 2413257, at *4; see also Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1088 (“A 

defense which points out a defect in the plaintiff’s prima facie case is not an affirmative 

defense.”). Accordingly, defendant’s sixth affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

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F. Seventh Affirmative Defense: Causation and Third-Party Liability 

 Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense states: “Any damages to Plaintiff were 

not caused by Defendant, but were the result of Plaintiff’s own actions or breaches, or the acts of 

third parties over which Defendant has no control.” (ECF No. 7 at 7.) This too is “an attack on 

the prima facie elements of Plaintiff’s claim and is not an affirmative defense.” Estradda, 2011 

WL 2413257, at *4. Even assuming this were an affirmative defense, it would be immaterial, as 

it is not a proper defense to any of plaintiff’s claims. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Enedina 

Soto, No. 10-885, 2010 WL 3911467, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010) (striking defendant’s 

affirmative defense asserting that plaintiff or third-party caused damages because no negligence 

pled). See also Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Delaware Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 442 (C.D. 

Cal. 2013) (striking defenses asserting third-party responsibility and comparative negligence 

because they did not absolve defendant of liability); Richter v. City of Des Moines, No. 10-461, 

2012 WL 1099179, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2, 2012) (“The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that there 

is no formal affirmative defense of ‘third-party liability,’” however, defendant may pursue theory 

at trial, asserting plaintiff or its agents caused damages). Accordingly, the seventh affirmative 

defense is STRICKEN. 

G. Ninth Affirmative Defense: Conversion 

 The ninth affirmative defense states, “A broadcast signal is not the proper subject 

for a claim for conversion under California law.” (ECF No. 7 at 7.) “This does not constitute an 

affirmative defense[;]” rather, this too is an attack on plaintiff’s prima facie case. Estradda, 2011 

WL 2413257, at *4. Furthermore, this legal assertion is insufficient as a matter of law. The 

interception of a broadcast signal can sustain a claim for conversion under the relevant case law. 

See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (while conversion 

generally applied to tangible property, “programming” constitutes personal property protected by 

common law tort); see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 570 (1978). 

Accordingly, the ninth affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

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H. Tenth Affirmative Defense: Unjust Enrichment 

 The tenth affirmative defense alleges plaintiff will be unjustly enriched if awarded 

the relief sought. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an 

affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. 

Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979). “A defense may be struck if it fails to provide ‘fair 

notice’ of the basis of the defense.” Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 

(N.D. Cal. 2004). Here, defendant provides no factual basis supporting the defense, thereby not 

meeting the standard set out in Wyshak. See Qarbon.com Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1049–50 

(striking affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel where defendant failed to provide any 

factual basis). Accordingly, defendant’s tenth affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

I. Eleventh Affirmative Defense: Mitigation of Damages 

 The eleventh affirmative defense asserts plaintiff’s claims are barred because it did 

not mitigate damages. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) However, mitigation of damages is immaterial to the 

claims here. See G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Nguyen, 2010 WL 3749284, *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 23, 2010). In Nguyen, plaintiff alleged interception of a program over which plaintiff 

owned exclusive commercial rights. Id. at 1. The court held that the defendant’s affirmative 

defense regarding the mitigation of damages was irrelevant where the plaintiff had alleged the 

same claims as in this case. Id. at 5; see also J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Coyne, 2011 WL 

227670, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011) (striking failure to mitigate defense with prejudice as 

irrelevant to claims alleging defendant’s display of program when plaintiff had exclusive 

distribution rights). Accordingly, defendant’s eleventh affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

J. Twelfth Affirmative Defense: Statute of Limitations 

 The twelfth affirmative defense states plaintiff’s claims are barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 7 at 8.) This defense cannot proceed as a matter of 

law. The statute of limitations for violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 605 and 553 is one year. DirecTV, 

Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2008). The statute of limitations for conversion is 

three years, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338(c); AmerUS Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, N.A., 143 

Cal. App. 4th 631, 639 (2006), and the statute of limitations for claims under the California 

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Business and Professions Code is four years, Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17208. In evaluating a 

motion to strike, the court must treat all well-pleaded facts as true. Sepra v. SBC Telecomms., 

Inc., No. 03-4223, 2004 WL 2002444, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004). As in Estradda, if the 

defendant fails to offer any factual assertion that the program was televised on a day other than 

that alleged by plaintiff, the court is obligated to assume the broadcasting date is accurate. 

Estradda, 2011 WL 201466, at *1–2. Here, the complaint alleges the broadcast was intercepted 

on November 23, 2013. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Defendant does not assert the broadcasting occurred on 

any other day. The complaint was filed on November 14, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) This satisfies all 

applicable statutes of limitations. Accordingly, defendant’s twelfth affirmative defense is 

STRICKEN. 

K. Thirteenth Affirmative Defense: Lawful License 

 In the thirteenth defense, defendant asserts he believed he obtained a lawful license 

to broadcast the program when it was purchased through Dish Network. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) An 

affirmative defense presumes all allegations of the complaint are true. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Catano, No. 12-00739, 2012 WL 5424677, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012) (“A denial of 

allegations in the complaint . . . is not a proper affirmative defense); see also Solis v. Couturier, 

08-02732, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63271, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2009). “Affirmative defenses 

plead matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case, which deny plaintiff’s right to 

recover, even if the allegations of the complaint are true.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main 

Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Walia, No. 10-

5136, 2011 WL 1134458, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011). In the complaint, plaintiff alleges 

defendant did not obtain a license. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–23, ECF No. 1). Here, defendant is not 

denying liability irrespective of the allegations in the complaint, but directly attacks plaintiff’s 

assertions. Accordingly, defendant’s thirteenth affirmative defense is STRICKEN. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

 The court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s affirmative defenses 

with leave to amend. Defendant Armando Angulo may file an amended answer within thirty (30) 

days of the date of the filing of this order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 21, 2015. 

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