Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02767/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02767-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL AARON JAYNE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

TOM BOSENKO, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 2:08-cv-02767-MSB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART,

AND DENYING IN PART,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkts.

#90, 97), AND GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

AN EXTENSION OF TIME (Dkt.

#121)

In November 2008, Plaintiff Michael Aaron Jayne filed a pro se civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding the conditions of his

confinement in Shasta County Jail from the fall of 2007 through late 2008. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) Although Jayne raised a number of claims, he has proceeded to

litigate only: (1) his claim that three Shasta County Jail officers violated his

constitutional rights by placing him on a disciplinary diet for ninety-two days,

and (2) his claims that Deputy District Attorney Eric Anderson and ten Shasta

County Jail officers interfered with his constitutional rights by recording or

listening to recordings of his attorney-client phone calls. (Dkt. No. 114.) This

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Order addresses Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on these

remaining claims.1

I. Factual and Procedural History

Jayne filed his complaint on November 18, 2008, seeking monetary

damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 3.) At

that time, Jayne was a pretrial detainee at the Shasta County Jail in Redding,

California, where the events of which he complains are alleged to have

occurred.2

 (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) On November 20, 2009, the Court dismissed

several of Jayne’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires judicial

screening of complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or an employee of a governmental entity. (Dkt. No. 19.)

This Court determined, however, that the complaint states a cognizable

claim against Defendants Tom Bosenko, Eric Anderson, Donald Van Buskirk,

Sheila Ashmun, Carl Champagne, Jose Gonzalez, Steven Heyde, Randy Joiner,

Rene Meek, Matthew Mitchell, and Jesse Penland. (Dkt. No. 19.) On January

28, 2011, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the

alternative, summary adjudication of issues, on Jayne’s remaining claims

against them. (Dkt. No. 97.) Mainly, Defendants assert that Jayne cannot

1

 Jayne also alleged that Dr. Stan Johnson provided him with deficient

medical care, and Johnson subsequently moved for summary judgment. (Dkt.

No. 90.) Because Jayne has abandoned all of his claims aside from those

involving the disciplinary loaf diet and the attorney-client phone calls, (Dkt.

No. 114), no claims against Johnson remain. Johnson’s motion for summary

judgment is therefore granted.

2

 Although Jayne’s transfer from Shasta County Jail moots his claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief, he retains a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome of this case because of his request for monetary damages. See Wiggins

v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Incumaa v. Ozmint,

507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007).

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establish that there is any genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his

favor, would prove that his civil rights have been violated. (Dkt. No. 97.) 

Alternatively, Defendants maintain that they are entitled to absolute or qualified

immunity for their conduct. (Dkt. No. 97 at 2.) 

On April 7, 2011, Jayne filed an opposition to summary judgment in

which he abandoned all but two of his claims. (Dkt. No. 114.) Specifically,

Jayne maintains: (1) that Defendants Bosenko, Van Buskirk, and Ashmun

violated his due process rights by placing him on a disciplinary diet for ninetytwo days as punishment, and (2) that Deputy District Attorney Eric Anderson

and ten Shasta County Jail officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

recording or listening to recordings of telephone communications between him

and his criminal attorney. (Dkt. No. 114.) Defendants have since filed a reply

in support of summary judgment, reiterating that Jayne has failed to adduce any

evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact with respect to these two

remaining claims.3

 (Dkt. No. 124.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772,

780 (9th Cir. 1998). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine”

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The Court may not weigh the evidence, and is required to view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, Jayne. Id. at 249; Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

3

 Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file their reply in

support of their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 121.)

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The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If

the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it may

discharge its burden of production in one of two ways:

The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery,

the moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not

have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or

defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). If the moving party discharges his burden through the first method, it

must produce affirmative evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim or

defense. Id. at 1105-06. It is not required to support its motion with such

evidence if it discharges its burden through the second method. Id.

If the moving party satisfies his initial burden by either method, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine dispute

exists. Id. at 1106-07. To do so, “the opposing party may not rely on denials in

the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME

Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).

 III. Disciplinary Loaf 

A. Background

 Jayne alleged in his complaint that, under Lieutenant Ashmun’s orders,

and under a policy supported by Sheriff Bosenko and Captain Van Buskirk, he

was served a disciplinary diet consisting of two servings per day of

“disciplinary loaf” for 92 out of 120 days, and as a result he was harmed in

violation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4; Dkt. No. 114 at 2.) A

disciplinary loaf is a meatloaf prepared by a jail’s chef in accordance to a recipe

dictated by the California regulatory code, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1247(b). 

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(Dkt. No. 97-5 at 2.) Those regulations also set forth how the loaf must be

served: 

Such a diet shall be served twice in each 24 hour period and shall

consist of one-half of the loaf . . . along with two slices of whole

wheat bread and at least one quart of drinking water if the cell does

not have a water supply. The use of disciplinary isolation diet

shall constitute an exception to the three-meal-a-day standard. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1247(a). 

Defendants argue that imposition of the disciplinary diet did not violate

the Constitution. According to Ashmun and Van Buskirk, the disciplinary loaf

recipe “is guaranteed to meet or exceed the minimum daily nutritional and

caloric requirements of adults” and is followed by the chef at Shasta County

Jail. (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 2.) But Defendants have not

adduced any evidence showing that the particular loaves that Jayne was fed

comported with the recipe. See Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir.

2012) (“[N]utriloaf [i.e., a disciplinary loaf] could meet requirements for

calories and protein one day yet be poisonous the next if, for example, made

from leftovers that had spoiled. . . . Even an affidavit from an expert stating

after a detailed chemical analysis that ‘nutriloaf meets all dietary requirements’

would be worthless unless the expert knew and stated that nutriloaf invariably

was made the same way in the institution.”).

Jayne states in his affidavit that he was served neither milk nor other

fluids as part of the disciplinary diet, and that when he was served the loaf, it

was “[c]ommonly . . . not cooked all the way or cooked too much.” (Dkt. No.

115-2 at 95.) He attests that he lost weight and became ill as a result of being

on the loaf diet. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 95.) 

B. Discussion

1. Ashmun 

Ashmun prescribed the sequence of days within the 120-day period

during which Jayne would be fed the disciplinary loaf; the periods ranged from

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two to ten days at a time, for a total of 92 days. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 1; Dkt. No.

115-2 at 18.) Jayne avers in his complaint that the disciplinary diet was the

result of “rule violations,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4), but neither party has indicated what

those violations were or why Ashmun decided to serve Jayne the diet for so

many days. 

Jayne was a pretrial detainee during the events at issue here, so his claim

is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and not by the

Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment. See

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink,

322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (2003). The Due Process Clause prohibits punishment of

detainees like Jayne for the crimes that led to their detention but for which no

adjudication of guilt has yet been made. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; see also Demery

v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d

517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996). Prison officials may, however, discipline detainees

for violations of a facility’s rules; pretrial detainees are not “free to violate jail

rules with impunity.” Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 524. 

Thus, while the relevant regulations describe the loaf diet as a “punitive

action,” Cal. Code of Reg. tit. 15, § 1082, this designation does not itself

indicate that the diet qualifies as unconstitutional “punishment” within the

meaning of Bell. Jayne concedes that the sanction was ostensibly imposed in

response to his violations of the jail’s rules (Dkt. No. 1 at 4), rather than in

response to the crime for which he was charged. In other words, he admits that

there was no “expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility

officials,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, but argues that Ashmun imposed the diet with

an implied “intent to punish” that violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(Dkt. No. 114 at 58.) The Court’s inquiry thus shifts to “whether an alternative

purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for

it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose

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assigned [to it.]” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (alterations in original) (quoting

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 

Accordingly, the relevant question here is whether Jayne’s disciplinary

loaf diet crossed the line separating permissible discipline during pretrial

detention from unconstitutional “punishment” in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has held that a disciplinary measure crosses

this line when (1) it causes the pretrial detainee to suffer “some harm or

disability” and (2) “the purpose of the governmental action [is] to punish the

detainee.” Demery, 378 F.3d at 1029 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). If the

action “is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or

purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the

governmental action is punishment” and so is unconstitutional. Bell, 441 U.S.

at 539. Although “[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive

governmental objectives,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20, “maintain[ing] security

and order” at the facility is, id. at 540.

As to the first prong of the Demery test, there is no requirement that, “to

be punishment, a harm must be independently cognizable as a separate

constitutional violation . . . . Rather, to constitute punishment, the harm or

disability caused by the government’s action must either significantly exceed,

or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.” Demery, 378

F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). Defendants do not contest that Jayne was

prescribed the disciplinary diet as a result of rule violations.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) 

That jail officials imposed the loaf diet as a “punitive action,” Cal. Code of Reg.

tit. 15, § 1082, indicates that the diet is “independent of . . . the inherent

discomforts of confinement,” Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030, and thus constitutes a

harm or disability within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Jayne has, moreover, demonstrated that the disciplinary diet

“significantly exceed[s] . . . the inherent discomforts of confinement,” Demery,

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378 F.3d at 1030. He states in his declaration that he lost weight and fell ill as a

result of being served the loaf “for 92 days out of 120 days with the majority of

those days being served 10 days straight back to back.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 95.) 

Although there are no Fourteenth Amendment cases directly addressing when a

disciplinary loaf diet significantly surpasses the “inherent discomforts of

confinement,” id., the Eighth Amendment case law is instructive here, because

it sets a floor below which treatment of pretrial detainees like Jayne may not

dip. See Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1120. Because “the due process rights

of pretrial detainees are ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections

available to a convicted prisoner,’” id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)); see Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th

Cir. 1998), actions that constitute actionable harm under the Eighth Amendment

necessarily go beyond the discomforts inherent in confinement. 

The Eighth Amendment cases establish that prisoners may demonstrate

actionable harm from food-related restrictions by showing that those restrictions

interfered with their ability to maintain health. While moderate weight loss

alone may not be sufficient to constitute harm, weight loss leading to or

accompanied by other maladies may suffice. 

In Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 813 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), for example,

the Ninth Circuit held that an inmate’s allegations of weight loss, headaches,

and dizziness due to inadequate nutrition during the period in which he was

denied meals stated a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. In

contrast, in McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2004), the

Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment against a prisoner who

claimed that a week-long loaf diet violated the Eighth Amendment. In so

holding, the court explained that the prisoner had failed to allege that the diet

was nutritionally inadequate, or posed a health risk, or that he suffered any

physical harm from it. Id. at 199. 

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Here, Jayne stated in his declaration that he both lost weight and became

ill, so he has demonstrated harm that would be cognizable under the Eighth

Amendment, regardless of whether his weight loss, in itself, can constitute such

a harm. See, e.g., Prude, 675 F.3d at 733-34 (holding that evidence of inmate’s

weight loss, stomach pains, and vomiting due to a loaf-diet were sufficient to

defeat summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim). Jayne’s

declaration that the diet made him sick supports a reasonable inference that the

loaves fed to him were, at least sometimes, unhealthy or even inedible. See id.

at 734 (observing that evidence that prisoners vomited after eating the nutriloaf

“suggests that it was indeed inedible”). As discussed, any harm that would be

cognizable under the Eighth Amendment “significantly exceed[s] . . . the

inherent discomforts of confinement,” Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030, within the

context of pretrial detention.

In short, Jayne has shown adequately that the loaf diet was “independent

of[] the inherent discomforts of confinement,” id., insofar as Ashmun put him

on it as a result of his rule violations. This showing alone is sufficient to

demonstrate a cognizable harm of disability under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In addition, Jayne also has provided evidence that the disciplinary diet

“significantly exceed[s] . . . the inherent discomforts of confinement,” id. 

While meals that taste unpleasant but are sufficiently nutritious do not meet this

standard, Jayne’s declaration that he lost weight and fell ill as a result of the diet

creates a reasonable inference that the diet was not, in fact, adequate to sustain

health. His statement conflicts with Ashmun’s declaration that the loaf was

nutritionally adequate (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 2), and thus raises a triable issue as to

whether Ashmun subjected him to a harm significantly exceeding the routine

discomforts of jail life.

Moving to the second prong of the Demery test, the Court now addresses

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether imposition of the

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loaf diet was “reasonably related to a legitimate goal,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 

Jayne admitted in his complaint that Ashmun put him on the disciplinary diet

for “rule violations.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) But neither party has provided evidence

regarding the nature of these violations. Although the absence of such evidence

makes it difficult to assess whether the disciplinary diet reasonably furthered a

permissible goal, the particular circumstances here give rise to a triable issue of

fact.

Specifically, the record shows that Jayne was subjected to the loaf diet

for an exceptionally lengthy period of time: 92 out of 120 days. (Dkt. No. 1 at

4; Dkt No. 114 at 2; Dkt No. 115-2 at 95.) Although withholding nutritionally

adequate food is not a per se constitutional violation, the “amount and duration

of the deprivation” is relevant to determining whether there has been a

violation. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999). Notably, this

Court has been unable to locate any case in which officials prescribed a

disciplinary diet for such a lengthy period of time. While courts have

determined that disciplinary diets comported with constitutional requirements in

a number of cases, the diets in those cases were imposed for significantly

shorter periods of time. See, e.g., LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1993) (holding that feeding inmate nutri-loaf for no more than seven days

did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation); Wingo v. Jenkins, No. 3:10-

cv-00167, 2010 WL 4395446, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 2010) (seven days);

Daniels v. Neven, No. 2:09-cv-01906, 2010 WL 3385366, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug.

23, 2010) (four days); Gordon v. Barnett, No. C03-5524KLS, 2010 WL

597474, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 16, 2010) (two weeks); Allinger v. McDaniel,

No. 03:06CV00139LRHVPC, 2007 WL 2875114, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 26,

2007) (three days); Arnett v. Snyder, 769 N.E.2d 943, 950 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)

(six days maximum); Adams v. Kincheloe, 743 F. Supp. 1385, 1391-92 (E.D.

Wash. 1990) (five days); United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 270, 273

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(W.D. Mich. 1988) (fourteen days); Borden v. Hofmann, 974 A.2d 1249, 1251

(Vt. 2009) (seven days maximum). 

In contrast, courts have reversed determinations that officials acted

constitutionally where those officials deprived inmates of adequate and

healthful food for lengthier periods of time, particularly where there was

evidence that the diet caused negative physical effects on the inmate. In Prude,

for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant

prison officials who had forced the plaintiff to subsist on a nutriloaf diet for a

total of seventeen days, over two separate time periods. 675 F.3d at 733. Like

Jayne, the plaintiff in Prude provided evidence that he both lost weight and fell

ill as a result of being subjected to the loaf diet. Id. at 733-34. Similarly, the

Second Circuit held that a prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim where he

alleged that prison officials deprived him of a nutritionally adequate diet by

providing him with meals consisting “solely of raw cabbage and a bread-like

loaf that appeared to contain ground vegetables” for fourteen straight days. 

Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 182, 185-87 (2d Cir. 2002). The prisoner in

Phelps alleged that he both lost weight and experienced severe abdominal pain

as a result of the diet. Id. at 182. And in Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653,

654 (6th Cir. 1977), the Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of a prisoner’s

complaint alleging that the defendant officials had caused him “to be deprived

of food for four (4) full days, and thereafter allowed him one (1) full meal every

third day for approximately sixteen (16) days, which meal consisted of watery

soup or boiled potatoes.” See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87

(1978) (observing that a diet of “grue,” a substance created by mashing meat,

potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking

the mixture in a pan, “might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for

weeks or months”); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 730, 734 (7th Cir.

2001) (suggesting that a prisoner who was restricted to an allegedly inedible

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“nutri-loaf” diet during the final month of his life may have stated an Eighth

Amendment claim); Hazen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226, 228 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985)

(noting that the district court concluded that the defendants had violated the

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by providing them with a diet that resulted in

“notable weight loss and mildly diminished health” over approximately four

months, even though “the difference between the number of calories provided

and the number of calories which ideally should have been provided may [have

been] small”);4 Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1970)

(holding that a prisoner who alleged that prison officials refused to provide him

food for 50.5 hours stated a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Jayne, as required by the

summary judgment posture, the unusually long duration for which Jayne was

administered the disciplinary loaf diet, combined with his resulting illness,

creates a triable issue regarding whether the measure was “reasonably related”

to a legitimate nonpunitive interest. On the current record, a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that Jayne fell sick due to extended application of the

disciplinary diet, and that such a prolonged sanction was excessive in relation to

whatever infractions he committed. In other words, even though jail officials

undoubtedly have a serious need to maintain order by sanctioning rules

violations, there are both legitimate and illegitimate ways to do so. Construing

the facts most favorably to Jayne, a reasonable juror could determine that forced

subsistence on a loaf diet for three out of four months rendered Jayne unable to

maintain health and a safe level of physical well-being, thereby constituting an

impermissible means through which to accomplish the otherwise legitimate

goal of maintaining prison discipline.

4

 Unlike in this case, the meager diet in Hazen was a general condition of

confinement and was not imposed as a disciplinary measure. See 768 F.2d at

227-28.

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Accordingly, Ashmun’s motion for summary judgment is denied. 

2. Bosenko and Van Buskirk

Jayne accuses Bosenko and Van Buskirk of maintaining a policy under

which jail officials “made [Jayne] eat 92 days of a cruel and unusual

disciplinary diet.” (Dkt. No. 114 at 6.) Superiors can be liable for an

unconstitutional policy “officially adopted and promulgated.” City of St. Louis

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

disciplinary loaf diet does not constitute a per se violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, see LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1462; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128, so a policy

allowing use of the loaf as a disciplinary measure is not an unconstitutional

policy unless it dictates that the diet be prescribed in ways that are excessive or

not legitimately related to disciplinary violations. See, e.g., Prude, 675 F.3d at

733 (reversing summary judgment for prison officials where the plaintiff inmate

produced evidence of weight loss and other infirmities arising from being on a

loaf diet for seventeen days “pursuant to a new policy the jail had adopted of

making nutriloaf the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation in

prison at the time of their transfer to the jail, even if their behavior in the jail

was exemplary”). Other than referring to Ashmun’s orders (Dkt. No. 114 at 56;

Dkt. No. 115-2 at 95), Jayne provides no evidence demonstrating that Bosenko

and Van Buskirk adopted or maintained an unconstitutional policy regarding

the use of the loaf on pretrial detainees. Ashmun’s orders, alone, are

insufficient to demonstrate that the policy was unconstitutional. A

subordinate’s unconstitutional application of a constitutional policy does not

give rise to § 1983 claim against those who devised the constitutional policy. 

See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). 

Even if superiors are not responsible for an unconstitutional policy, they

can still be liable under § 1983 if they were directly involved in the

unconstitutional implementation of a policy. However, Jayne neither provides

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evidence nor alleges that either Bosenko or Van Buskirk were directly involved

in the order he challenges. Bosenko acknowledged he was aware that Ashmun

ordered Jayne to be served the disciplinary diet, but declares he “had no

personal involvement in that [o]rder.” (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 1-2.) Nor does the

record suggest that Van Buskirk was directly involved in ordering Jayne to be

put on the disciplinary diet. (Dkt. No. 97-15 at 2.) Because they were not

directly involved in the decision and because respondeat superior liability is

unavailable under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), Bosenko’s and Van Buskirk’s motions for

summary judgment are granted.

IV. Recording of Phone Calls

Jayne alleges that each Defendant was responsible for intentionally

recording or listening to phone calls between him and his criminal defense

attorney in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights and in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. (Dkt. No. 114 at 2.) All

Defendants move for summary judgment on these claims.

As an initial matter, the Court understands Jayne’s claims under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to be premised on substantive due process and to

assert a right to confidentiality in conversations with his attorney under that

rubric. (Dkt. No. 114 at 41.) “Where a claim can be analyzed under ‘an

explicit textual source’ of rights in the Constitution, a court may not also assess

the claim under another, ‘more generalized,’ source.” Ramirez v. Butte-Silver

Bow Cnty., 298 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989)). Because the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition

on unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of

counsel governs Defendants’ conduct here, Jayne cannot “double up” on his

constitutional claims by references to substantive due process. See id. 

Accordingly, those claims are dismissed. 

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The Court addresses the remaining claims in turn.

A. Background 

The Shasta County Jail records outgoing phone calls made by inmates

from the jail housing facility via an automated, unmonitored system. (Dkt. No.

97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2.) Access to the recordings is limited to

authorized personnel; however, these calls are not routinely monitored or

reviewed. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2.) The recording system is

operated and maintained by an outside vendor, known as GTL, which handles

all program changes to the system, including the programming of the system (a)

to prevent toll charges for calls to attorneys, and (b) to prevent the recording of

phone calls between inmates and their attorneys. (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 3; Dkt. No.

97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 3.) To protect the

confidentiality of attorney-client communications, the automated system can be

programmed with the phone numbers of attorneys who are representing inmates

at the facility. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2.) When properly

entered into the automated system, attorney telephone numbers can be removed

from the recording system and can also be exempted from the collect call fees

otherwise imposed on calls from inmates. (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 97-6

at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 3-4.) It is the policy of Shasta

County Jail to provide inmates unmonitored, unrecorded and free calls to their

attorneys from the jail facilities. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2.)

Inmates are permitted to make free, non-collect calls only to attorneys. (Dkt.

No. 117 at 825-26.) Because payment for collect calls must be accepted by the

call’s recipient, voicemail machines cannot ordinarily accept collect calls. 

On March 7, 2008, Beverly Strand, an Agency Staff Services Analyst for

the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department, sent an e-mail to an authorized GTL

staff member stating that Cindy Campbell, Jayne’s criminal attorney, needed to

be added to the “Free Access Telephone Calls” category. (Dkt. No. 97-14 at 2.) 

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In her declaration, Strand states that she did not know that a separate request to

remove Campbell’s number from the recording system was also required. (Id.

at 3.) As a result, calls from Jayne to Campell were automatically recorded by

the system, even though the calls were not subject to collect charges. (Id.; Dkt.

No. 115-2 at 72.) Jayne has submitted evidence that his recorded calls to

Campbell included communications about defense strategy for the criminal

cases that were pending against him at the time. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16.)

On March 28, 2008, Deputy Sheriff Joiner escorted Jayne to a booking

area within the jail to allow Jayne to make a call to Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-16

at 1.) Because that phone is “not monitored or recorded, . . . it is sometimes

used to allow inmates to call their attorneys in private.” (Id.) A short time

later, Sergeant Meek of the Shasta County Sheriffs Department received a

complaint from Shawna Jayne, Jayne’s wife or ex-wife, alleging that Jayne had

made threatening calls to her in violation of a no-contact restraining order. 

(Dkt. No. 97-11 at 1.) Responding to Shawna’s complaint that Jayne had made

several threatening phone calls to her from the jail, Meek assigned Joiner to

investigate Shawna’s complaint for possible disciplinary sanctions against

Jayne, as such actions, if proven, would constitute jail disciplinary violations. 

(Id.; Dkt. No. 97-16 at 1-2.) 

Joiner had access to the jail’s telephone monitoring system and listened

to recorded calls placed from Jayne’s housing area to determine whether any of

those calls had been made in violation of the jails’ rules. (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2.) 

The only way to do so that Joiner knew of was by “identifying Jayne’s voice or

by the subject discussed.” (Id.) One of the recordings to which Joiner listened

captured Jayne leaving a voicemail to “Cindy” and informing her that he had

called Shawna. (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2; Dkt. No. 115-2 at 77.) Joiner declared

that he did not know, at the time, that “Cindy” was Jayne’s attorney. (Dkt. No.

97-16 at 2; Dkt. No. 115-2 at 77.) Based on Jayne’s admission in this voicemail

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that he had called Shawna, Joiner prepared a disciplinary report. (Dkt. No. 97-

16 at 2.) 

Joiner’s report led to a disciplinary hearing conducted by Officer Penland

“regarding Mr. Jayne’s alleged misuse of the telephones at the jail to place

improper phone calls to his ex-wife.” (Dkt. No. 97-13 at 1.) As part of the

hearing process, Penland listened to the voicemail that Jayne had left for

“Cindy.” (Id. at 2.) Penland’s supervisor, Officer Heyde, also listened to the

voicemail. (Dkt. No. 97-10 at 2.) Both Penland and Heyde declared that they

did not know that the message had been left for Jayne’s attorney. (Dkt. No. 97-

10 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2.). After the hearing, Penland sanctioned Jayne with

“30 days lock down [and] loss of all privileges” based on Jayne’s admission in

his voicemail to Campbell that he had called Shawna. (Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2, 5.) 

Upon learning that jail officials had listened to his phone calls to

Campbell, Jayne filed a jail complaint. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 49.) Sergeant

Gonzalez was assigned to conduct an internal affairs investigation of the

complaint, and was assisted by Sergeant Champagne. (Dkt. No. 97-8 at 1; Dkt.

No. 97-9 at 1.) As part of the investigation, Gonzalez and Champagne sought

to “determine whether an inmate call to an attorney had been recorded . . . and

who had access to or listened to any such telephone calls.” (Dkt. No. 97-9 at 2.) 

Gonzalez and Champagne both declared that they did not actually listen to tape

recordings of any calls between Jayne and Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-8 at 1-2;

Dkt. No. 97-9 at 2.) 

Ultimately, the investigation revealed that forty-five of Jayne’s phone

calls to Campbell had been recorded, and that eleven of these were played at

some point. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 27-29.) The voicemail that led to Jayne’s

disciplinary hearing before Penland numbered among those eleven recordings. 

As for the other ten recordings that jail officials played, the record suggests that

they also captured free calls; like the call that led to Jayne’s disciplinary

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hearing, those calls cost nothing and are annotated with the phrase “call

complete” rather than “call accepted” on a call detail report produced by

Defendants. (Id. at 30-34.) In addition, the record suggests that at least some

of those recordings captured conversations rather than voicemails; in particular,

two of the recordings exceeded eight minutes in length. (Id. at 27-29). 

However, the record does not indicate whether it was any of the Defendants,

or, instead, other jail officials, who listened to the other ten recordings.

Lieutenant Ashmun was also informed that jail staff had monitored

Jayne’s calls to Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 3-4.) She investigated the incident

and documented her actions and findings in an interdepartmental memorandum. 

(Dkt. No. 115-2 at 61.) According to the memorandum, Ashmun asked

Champagne to play one of the recordings to confirm that the call had been made

by Jayne rather than by another inmate. (Id. at 62.) Ashmun described what

she heard as follows:

We immediately heard a voice recording from the phone provider,

GTL, giving notice about the call being monitored, etc. After the

recording was finished we heard a female voice saying, ‘We are

not available right now, please leave a message,’ or something similar to this. There was no announcement that the voice mail

was for an attorney’s office. Inmate Jayne’s voice came on and started talking. He said something to the effect of ‘Hey Cindy, this

is Mike[.’] If I had not already known that Cindy Campbell had

been his attorney I would not have known this was an attorney’s

office. 

(Id.) After hearing Jayne identify himself, Ashmun immediately had

Champagne “stop the call and close the session.” (Id.) She then called

Campbell and played the recording for her twice so that Campbell “could hear

that the voice recording from her office . . . was not heard because the GTL

disclaimer talked over it.” (Id.) 

Other jail officials, including Sergeant Mitchell, Sheriff Bosenko, and

Captain Van Buskirk, were also informed of the interception of Jayne’s phone

calls to Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at

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4.) Jayne stipulated that Mitchell did not listen to any of the calls, (Dkt. No.

115-1 at 6), and Mitchell declared that he had no involvement in the

investigation of the claim, (Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2). In addition, Bosenko declared

that he “had no personal involvement in the recording of telephone calls or the

investigation of that claim”; nor did Bosenko listen to any of Jayne’s recorded

conversations. (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2.) Van Buskirk also declared that he never

listened to any of the contested recordings and that he did not order the

recordings to be made. (Dkt. No. 97-15 at 4.)

Deputy District Attorney Anderson was the prosecutor assigned to handle

the criminal complaints filed and pending against Jayne in 2008. (Dkt. No. 97-

4 at 1.) Anderson stated that the jail notified him of Jayne’s calls to Shawna

Jayne and that he subsequently “made contact with parole to check into this

investigation.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 53.) Jayne’s parole officer, Randy Abney,

informed Anderson that Shawna had complained of Jayne’s calling her from jail

and leaving threatening messages on her answering machine. (Dkt. No. 97-4 at

1-2.) Anderson confirmed Abney’s report with Shawna. (Id. at 2.) The reason

why Jayne was able to leave these messages appears to be as follows: 

Previously, Joiner had allowed Jayne to make calls from a phone in the booking

area of the jail, presumably after Jayne represented to Joiner that he intended to

use that phone to call Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 1.) As Joiner explained in

his declaration, “[t]he phone in the booking area is not monitored or recorded,

which is why it is sometimes used to allow inmates to call their attorneys in

private. (Id.) Calls made from that phone, moreover, appear to be free, thereby

allowing Jayne to leave voicemails for Shawna. 

After speaking with Shawna, Anderson asked jail staff to determine if

any recordings had been made of Jayne’s calls to Shawna, because such

recordings would constitute evidence supporting additional charges of criminal

harassment against Jayne. (Dkt. No. 97-4 at 2.) In response to Anderson’s

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request, jail staff prepared a CD containing recorded phone calls by Jayne. (Id.)

Anderson asserted in his declaration that he did not ask anyone to record

calls between Jayne and his attorney. (Id.) According to Anderson, “[t]he CD

did not contain a recording of any message by Mr. Jayne left on his attorney’s

or Cindy Campbell’s message machine.” (Id.) Anderson further declared that

he “never listened to any recording of a message or a telephone call between

Mr. Jayne and an attorney or between Mr. Jayne and the message machine for

Cindy Campbell.” (Id.)

Jayne contends that Anderson used recordings of his calls to Campbell as

the basis for filing additional charges against him in April 2008. (Dkt. No. 1 at

3; Dkt. No. 114 at 8.) At Jayne’s bail hearing on April 2, 2008, Anderson stated

that the government had reason to believe that Jayne had committed “new

offenses.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 52.) Anderson’s reference to these “new

offenses” constituted one of several reasons he gave as to why Jayne posed a

danger to society, was a flight risk, and should accordingly have his bail raised

in his two then-open cases. (Id. at 51-53.) However, there is no information in

the record as to what the “new offenses” were, and no indication that Anderson

did file new criminal charges against Jayne based on those offenses. In

response to defense attorney Campbell’s concerns about the constitutionality of

the jail’s recordings, the court clarified at the bail hearing that Anderson’s

statements would be used only to assess Jayne’s bail and not to charge him with

any additional crimes. (Id. at 57.) In his opposition to summary judgment,

Jayne states that the criminal charges filed against him “as a result of

information gained from the attorney client privilege” were dismissed. (Dkt.

No. 114 at 39-40.)

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B. Discussion

1. Fourth Amendment

Defendants move for summary judgment on Jayne’s claim that they

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by recording and listening to calls he

made to his attorney.5

 They argue that either there was no constitutional

violation or that, if there was, Defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified

immunity. (Dkt. No. 97-1 at 3, 7.)

a. Absolute immunity

Anderson asserts a defense of absolute immunity, arguing that his actions

fall within the scope of his prosecutorial authority. (Dkt No. 97-1 at 3.); see

Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.

1984). The Court, however, need not decide whether Anderson was entitled to

absolute immunity, because it finds that his challenged actions did not violate

the Constitution. See infra Section IV.B.1.b.i.6.

b. Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

qualified immunity inquiry is two-pronged: the Court “must ask whether ‘the

5

 Jayne also accuses Defendants of breaching the attorney-client

privilege, (Dkt. No. 114 at 18-20), but that analysis is inapposite here. The

privilege is an evidentiary rule preventing compelled testimony from either a

client or an attorney regarding communications about legal advice between the

two, not a protection against surveillance by third parties of attorney-client

communications. “Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely a rule

of evidence; it has not yet been held a constitutional right.” Clutchette v.

Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right’ and whether ‘the right was

clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Id. (quoting Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The Court may exercise its “sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular

case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The Court begins with the first prong. 

 i. First prong: unconstitutional “search”

The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part inquiry for determining

whether a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment: “[F]irst, has the

individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the

challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as

reasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search

occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that

society recognizes as reasonable.”). “Only if both the subjective and objective

tests are met can we find that a Fourth Amendment interest has been violated.” 

United States. v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2000).

The warrantless interception or surveillance of individuals’ phone calls

can constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. In Katz, the Supreme Court held

that the government’s activities in “electronically listening to and recording [a

person’s] words” spoken in a public phone booth violated the Fourth

Amendment. 389 U.S. at 353. Similarly, in United States v. United States

District Court, the court recognized that “unsuspected governmental incursions

into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the

application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.” 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 

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In addition, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “‘there is an enhanced

privacy interest underlying the attorney-client relationship which warrants a

heightened degree of judicial protection and supervision’” when searches

involve attorney-client files or documents. DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505,

1507 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley v.

MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo. 1982)). This principle applies with

no less force in the context of attorney-client phone calls; the confidential

relationship between attorneys and clients would be no less impaired by

intrusions into telephone communications than they would be by the monitoring

of written documents. This conclusion accords with the Ninth Circuit’s

observation that it is “axiomatic” that the attorney-client privilege gives the

client “an expectation of privacy in his or her confidential communications with

the attorney.” Id. at 1506 (emphasis added).

Pretrial detainees and prisoners, however, do not enjoy the same

constitutional rights as unincarcerated individuals. “The fact of confinement as

well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution” limit the

constitutional rights that detainees and prisoners retain. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. 

Consistent with this principle, the Ninth Circuit has held that an expectation of

privacy in outbound calls from prison is not objectively reasonable, and that the

recording of such calls does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States

v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the Van

Poyck court specifically excepted from its analysis “‘properly placed’ telephone

calls between a defendant and his attorney.” Id. at 291 n.9; see also United

States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e rejected a Fourth

Amendment attack on the interception of telephone calls made by certain

convicted prisoners, ruling that they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in

their calls to nonattorneys on institutional telephones.”) (emphasis added). Van

Poyck’s qualification accords with the principle that “inmates’ . . . rights

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pertaining to privileged correspondence are ‘not inconsistent with [their] status

as . . . prisoners or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional

system.’” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).

Here, the record establishes that Jayne had an objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in his telephone communications with Campbell, despite

his status as a pretrial detainee. Significantly, the Shasta County Jail had a

“policy of . . . provid[ing] inmates unmonitored, unrecorded, and uncharged

phone calls to their attorneys.” (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2.) To implement this policy,

the jail maintained a phone system with the capacity automatically to remove

calls from an inmate to a recognized attorney’s number from both the recording

system and the collect-call charge system. (Dkt. No. 97-5 at 3; Dkt. No. 97-6 at

2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 3.) In addition, the jail made available

to inmates a list of Shasta County Public Defenders who could be contacted for

legal assistance; calls to those defenders were to be free and unrecorded. (Dkt.

No. 115-2 at 23; Dkt. No. 117 at 850.) Campbell’s name and number were

included on that list. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 23.) The jail’s policy of not recording

or monitoring attorney-client calls conferred upon Jayne an objectively

reasonable expectation that his calls to Campbell would be private.

In addition, Jayne has sufficiently established a subjective expectation

that his calls to Campbell would remain private. On March 5, 2008, Jayne

requested in writing to prison officials that Campbell’s number be added to the

system so that he could “speak to her confidentially like other conflict lawyers.” 

(Dkt. No. 115-2 at 37.) Jayne’s request demonstrates a subjective expectation

that his calls to Campbell would be unrecorded and unmonitored. Jayne has

also submitted a declaration stating, “I did not consent to anyone listening to

my attorney client phone calls ever.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 93.) He likewise

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specified that he “never gave consent implied or otherwise to having [his]

attorney client calls recorded by the jail.” (Id.) 

Because Jayne had an objectively reasonable and subjective expectation

of privacy in his calls to Campbell, summary judgment must be denied as to any

defendants who recorded or listened to those calls. 

1. Meek

Jayne has provided evidence that Meek had access to the GTL system,

and that, upon receiving Shawna’s complaint, she initiated an investigation that

ultimately led to the alleged monitoring of his attorney-client conversations.

(Dkt. No. 115-2 at 83; Dkt. No. 97-11 at 1.) Meek, however, has submitted a

declaration stating that she did not monitor or listen to Jayne’s calls, nor did she

order Jayne’s attorney-client calls to be recorded, intercepted, or overheard.

(Dkt. No. 97-11 at 2.) Jayne has failed to provide any evidence that contradicts

Meek’s declaration. There is thus no triable issue of fact as to whether she

violated Jayne’s Fourth Amendment rights by recording or listening to the calls

in question, and summary judgment is granted to Meek. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252.

2. Ashmun, Gonzalez, and Champagne

Jayne next argues that Lieutenant Ashmun, with the assistance of

Sergeants Gonzalez and Champagne, violated his rights by conducting an

internal affairs investigation regarding the interception of his attorney-client

calls. (Dkt. No. 114 at 5-6.) Jayne alleges that in the process of conducting the

investigation, these defendants listened to his confidential phone calls to

Campbell without his consent. (Dkt. No. 114 at 13-14.) However, these three

Defendants each declare that they were not involved in the recording of Jayne’s

calls; nor did they listen to the content of any of Jayne’s voicemails or calls. 

Sergeant Gonzalez declared that, prior to his investigation, he had no

involvement in the call monitoring process at the jail and that he did not listen

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to the voicemail left to Campbell. (Dkt. No. 97-9 at 2.) Sergeant Champagne

declared that he determined which of Jayne’s calls had been recorded and who

had accessed those recordings, but did not listen to any calls. (Dkt. No. 97-8 at

2.) In an interdepartmental memorandum in which she documented her

investigation into whether Jayne’s calls to Campbell had been recorded,

Ashmun stated that she listened to the greeting of Campbell’s voicemail and

Jayne’s response to that greeting but had Champagne stop the recording

immediately thereafter. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 62.) She then called Campbell to

alert her that the GTL phone system disclaimer spoke over the voice recording

from Campbell’s office identifying it as a law office. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 62.) 

Although Jayne makes allegations to the contrary, he has failed to provide any

evidence supporting these allegations. There is therefore no genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Ashmun, Gonzalez, or Champagne recorded or

listened to the calls. 

3. Mitchell

Jayne stipulates that Sergeant Mitchell at no time listened to any

recording of any call placed by Jayne, but alleges that Mitchell, in his capacity

as a supervisor, authorized numerous users at the jail to access the system to

monitor Jayne’s attorney-client phone conversations. (Dkt. No. 115-1 at 6.) 

Because Jayne has stipulated that Mitchell did not listen to his calls, because he

has provided no evidence that Mitchell authorized the recordings, and because

respondeat superior liability is unavailable under § 1983, see Monell, 436 U.S.

at 691, Jayne has failed to establish an issue of triable fact as to this defendant. 

4. Heyde, Penland, and Joiner

Penland, Heyde, and Joiner each admit listening to some or all of the

voicemail Jayne left for Campbell, but assert that they were unaware that

Campbell was an attorney and that the phone call was subject to the attorneyclient privilege. (Dkt. No. 97-10 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2.) 

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Specifically, they state that no information was included in the recording to

identify the message as being left on an attorney’s phone, as Campbell’s

greeting identified her as “Cindy.” (Dkt. No. 97-10 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2;

Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2.) Jayne disputes that their listening was unintentional but

provides no evidence that the recording captured Campbell’s announcement

indicating that the caller had reached a law office. (Dkt No. 114 at 33-35.) To

the contrary, Defendants have submitted a report from Ashmun documenting

her investigation of why Jayne’s calls to Campbell were recorded. (Dkt. No.

115-2 at 62.) Ashmun noted in that report that the GTL disclaimer “talked

over” the voice recording from Campbell’s office, such that the portion of the

recording identifying Campbell’s association with a law office could not be

heard. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 62.) 

Jayne, however, also argues that Heyde, Penland, and Joiner knew or

should have known that under the GTL system, voicemails can only be left on

pre-approved attorney lines. (Dkt. No. 114 at 34.) He contends that these

Defendants knew or should have known that the only non-collect calls from the

jail are those placed to attorneys; because the recording in question did not

begin with an announcement that the call was being billed as a collect call from

the jail, any reasonable official should have known that the recording

Defendants listened to was an attorney call. (Dkt. No. 114 at 34-35.) Jayne has

put forth evidence to suggest that the only person to whom he could have made

a free, non-collect call, and therefore for whom he could have left a voicemail,

is an attorney. (Dkt. No. 117 at 823-26.) He also has submitted evidence of a

written inmate request form to have the number of his “appointed conflict

lawyer Cindi [sic] Campbell” added to the system in order to “speak to her

confidentially.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 37.) In addition, Jayne has provided

evidence that jail officials made available to inmates a list of public defenders

who could be reached for legal assistance. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 23.) Calls to

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those defense attorneys were to be free and unrecorded, and Campbell’s name

and number were on that list. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 23; Dkt. No. 117 at 850.) 

Thus, the question is whether Defendants knew or should have known that the

voicemail to “Cindy” was a voicemail to Jayne’s attorney. 

This inquiry follows from the principle that “[t]he touchstone of our

analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the

circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal

security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Where the existence of a Fourth

Amendment violation turns on an official’s factual knowledge, the Ninth

Circuit has interpreted the reasonableness inquiry to require an assessment of

whether that official had or should have had the requisite knowledge.

In Torres v. City of Madera, for example, the court addressed whether a

defendant officer applied unreasonable force when she shot an arrestee with a

semiautomatic pistol that she mistook to be her taser. 648 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

2011). The court held that, if the officer “knew or should have known that the

weapon she held was a Glock rather than a Taser, and thus had been aware that

she was about to discharge deadly force on an unarmed, non-fleeing arrestee

who did not pose a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to

others, then her application of that force was unreasonable.” Id. at 1124. 

“Where an officer’s particular use of force is based on a mistake of fact,” the

Ninth Circuit explained, “we ask whether a reasonable officer would have or

should have accurately perceived that fact.” Id. (citing Jensen v. City of

Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the mistaken

shooting of a fellow police officer was unreasonable if, based on the

circumstances, the defendant officer should have been able to recognize the

victim at the time of the shooting); accord Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 532

(4th Cir. 2011) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant officer on a

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Fourth Amendment excessive force claim where “[t]here were several facts that

[the officer] knew or should have known that would have alerted any reasonable

officer to the fact that he was holding his Glock” rather than his taser); see also

Humprhey v. Mabrey, 482 F.3d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that

“the use of force to effect a seizure after officers knew or should have known

that they had the wrong person is inherently unreasonable” under the Fourth

Amendment); Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 482 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding

that a reasonable juror could conclude that officers who pursued a vehicle

“knew or should have known” that the vehicle had passed them without veering

in their direction, and that the juror could thus conclude that any continuing

belief on the part of the officers that they still faced an imminent threat of

serious physical harm would have been unreasonable); Liston v. County of

Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment

for defendant officers on a Fourth Amendment unreasonable detention claim

because a reasonable jury could conclude that the detention persisted well

beyond the time when a reasonable officer “would have known” that they had

the wrong people in custody).

Of particular significance here, the Ninth Circuit has applied the “knew

or should have known” standard in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure

context when assessing the reasonableness of officers’ factual mistakes. The

court held in Navarro v. Barthel that the correct reasonableness standard for

determining whether officers violated the Fourth Amendment in searching the

wrong location is “whether the officers knew or should have known that a

mistake had been made in designating the place to be searched.” 952 F.2d 331,

332 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court also articulated this standard in

Maryland v. Garrison, when it upheld a search as constitutional on the basis

that the officers executing the search neither knew nor should have known that

the defendant’s residence covered only part of an apartment floor. 480 U.S. 79,

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85 (1987). Although Navarro and Garrison involved the mistaken search of a

place rather than the mistaken search of a thing, this is a difference without a

distinction. See United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir.

2000) (explaining that a plaintiff asserting a Fourth Amendment violation must

demonstrate an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy “in the place

searched or the thing seized”) (emphasis added); see also United States v.

Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that an officer who submits an

affidavit to secure a search warrant cannot avoid liability under the Fourth

Amendment “when the magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit

the affiant knew or should have known was false”); United States v. Hughes,

441 F.2d 12, 18 n.18 (5th Cir. 1971) (distinguishing a case in which the court

held that officers had undertaken an unreasonable search on the basis that, in

that case, “the police knew or should have know that the cabinet [searched] did

not belong to appellant’s daughter,” who had consented to the search).

Here, as in Torres and Navarro, Defendants argue that their intrusion was

based on a factual error: they mistook Jayne’s attorney-client communication to

be an ordinary, non-privileged communication. The Court therefore must

determine whether there is a triable issue as to whether Joiner, Penland, and

Hyde mistook—and, if so, whether they reasonably mistook—the contested

voicemail to be a non-attorney-client communication. In doing so, the Court

takes heed of the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that “[n]ot all errors in perception

or judgment . . . are reasonable,” Torres, 648 F.3d at 1124, in the context of

assessing whether officers have committed a Fourth Amendment violation.

Joiner admits in his declaration that one of the calls he listened to while

conducting his investigation “was a voice mail message that Mr. Jayne had left

for someone named ‘Cindy,’” (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2), but testified that “[t]here

was no last name in the call,” (Dkt. No. 117 at 174.) Joiner said that he did not

know that “Cindy” was Jayne’s attorney, but rather assumed that “it was some

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girl named Cindy.” (Id. at 211.) He also testified that the call consisted of

Jayne “leaving a message. Because there was nobody else on the line.” (Id. at

176.) When questioned about inmates’ ability to make non-collect calls and

leave voicemails for persons other than attorneys, Joiner stated that he did not

know if the GTL system limited inmates calls in that way. (Id. at 215.) In

addition, Joiner stated in his interview with Gonzalez, who was investigating

the recordings of Jayne’s phone calls, that he did not know that Campbell was

Jayne’s attorney. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 77.)

Penland served as the hearing officer who conducted the disciplinary

hearing regarding the harassing calls that Jayne allegedly placed to Shawna. 

(Dkt. No. 97-13 at 1.) As part of that investigation, he listened to a voicemail

left on “Cindy’s” phone. (Id. at 2.) Penland stated that, at the time, he did not

know that “Cindy” was Jayne’s attorney or that the call was subject to attorneyclient privilege. (Id.) Like Joiner, Penland also stated during his interview with

Gonzalez that he did not know that Campbell was Jayne’s attorney. (Dkt. No.

115-2 at 73.)

Penland’s training supervisor at the time, Heyde, testified that he “did not

listen to a call specifically on Cindy Campbell’s voicemail.” (Dkt. No. 117 at

832, 850.) Heyde testified that he missed the beginning of the recording, so he

did not know whom Jayne had called. (Id. at 832-33.) He also attested that

Joiner never identified the call as one to an attorney, and instead identified it as

one made in violation of Jayne’s restraining order. (Id. at 837.) In his

interview with Gonzalez, Heyde stated that he did not know that Campbell was

Jayne’s attorney and that nothing in the recorded call indicated that “Cindy”

was an attorney. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 76.) Heyde acknowledged that only preapproved calls to attorneys are not subject to GTL’s collect-call charge (Id. at

826, 832), but stated that, at the time, he did not think it odd that he had listened

to a voicemail or that he had listened to a free call (Id. at 832). 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘[q]uestions involving a person’s state of

mind, e.g., whether a party knew or should have known of a particular

condition, are generally factual issues inappropriate for resolution by summary

judgment.’” FTC v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Braxton–Secret v. A.H. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.

1985)). In other words, “‘summary judgment should not be granted where

contradictory inferences may be drawn from [the] facts.’” Id. (quoting

Braxton–Secret, 769 F.2d at 531). Jayne has submitted evidence that jail

officials knew that “Cindy Campbell” was a public defender whom inmates

could call free of charge. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 23.) In addition, he has adduced

evidence creating a reasonable inference that voicemails can be left only for

attorneys, because, under the jail’s policies, inmates can make free, non-collect

calls only to attorneys. (Dkt. No. 117 at 826.) Because payment for collect

calls must be accepted by the call’s recipient, voicemail machines cannot

ordinarily accept collect calls. Together, these facts support a reasonable

inference that Joiner, Penland, and Heyde knew or should have known that the

recording of Jayne’s voicemail to “Cindy” was, in fact, a message to his

attorney.6

6

 There is no independent state of mind requirement in a § 1983 claim.

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986); Tennison v. City and Cnty. of

San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must only

prove that the defendant had the state-of-mind “necessary to state a violation of

the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330; Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997). “[I]n Fourth Amendment

violations claims a plaintiff must prove that the official conduct was

‘unreasonable.’” Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir. 1996). 

Here, if Defendants Heyde, Joiner, and Penland knew that “Cindy” was Jayne’s

attorney, or if they should have known the call was to Jayne’s attorney because

the GTL system allows free calls only to attorneys, (Dkt. No. 117 at 826), then

their conduct was unreasonable.

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Jayne has therefore established a triable issue of fact as to whether these

defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

5. Van Buskirk, Bosenko, and Ashmun

Jayne argues that Captain Van Buskirk, Sheriff Bosenko, and Lieutenant

Ashmun violated his rights by ordering the recording of his attorney-client

calls. Jayne’s only support for this claim is that Van Buskirk, Bosenko, and

Ashmun are policy makers at the jail. Jayne fails to put forth any facts that are

not conclusory to challenge Defendants’ evidence that the policy of the jail is

not to record or charge for calls to specified attorney phone numbers. (Dkt. No.

97-5 at 3; Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 3-4.) Jayne stipulates that

Captain Van Buskirk and Sheriff Bosenko did not listen to the recording in

question. (Dkt. No. 115-1 at 23-24.) The Court found previously that there is

no genuine dispute of facts as to whether Ashmun recorded or listened to the

contents of the calls. Because they did not directly listen to the calls, or order

that the calls be recorded, and because respondeat superior liability is

unavailable under § 1983, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, Jayne has failed to

establish a triable issue of fact as to whether Van Buskirk, Bosenko, and

Ashmun, in their role as policy makers, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 

6. Anderson 

Jayne contends that Deputy District Attorney Eric Anderson interfered

with his rights by recording and listening to communications between him and

Campbell. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 114 at 8.) He first alleges that, upon

Anderson’s instructions, his calls to Campbell were listened to and then “used

as evidence to find Mr. Jayne guilty in a jail misconduct report.” (Dkt. No. 114

at 7-8.) Jayne also alleges that the privileged call described in the jail report

was sent to the prosecutor as part of a CD that contained attorney-client

communications, and that Anderson used the content of those calls to file a new

criminal case against him (since dismissed). (Id. at 8.)

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But Anderson has declared, “The CD did not contain a recording of any

message by Mr. Jayne left on his attorney’s or Cindy Campbell’s message

machine.” (Dkt. No. 97-4 at 2.) Anderson further stated that he “never listened

to any recording of a message or a telephone call between Mr. Jayne and an

attorney or between Mr. Jayne and the message machine for Cindy Campbell.” 

(Id.) In addition, Anderson asserted that he “did not ask anyone at the jail to

record or attempt to record any phone calls between Mr. Jayne and his

attorneys.” (Id.) 

Other than bare allegations, Jayne fails to provide any evidence that

Anderson in fact listened to any of his attorney-client communications. There

is nothing in the record that contradicts Anderson’s declaration; Jayne fails to

substantiate in any way his assertion that Anderson listened to the voicemail to

Campbell in which Jayne mentioned having called Shawna. Jayne has not

provided a copy of the CD to the Court nor any other proof that Anderson heard

the voicemail that Joiner heard. Jayne thus fails to raise a triable issue of fact as

to whether Anderson violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

 ii. Second prong: clearly established law

 Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity if it was “clearly

established” that Jayne had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his calls from

prison to his criminal attorney. See Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1154

(9th Cir. 1998). To determine “whether the constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the conduct[,] we ask whether its contours were

‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that

what he is doing violates that right.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, — U.S. —

(2011)). In other words, a right is clearly established when “existing precedent

[has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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At the same time, there need not be “a case directly on point” in order for

the law to be clearly established. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court has made ‘clear that officials can still be on

notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). This

principle is particularly important when courts address Fourth Amendment

cases, where the constitutional standard of reasonableness is always a very

fact-bound inquiry. Id. “If qualified immunity provided a shield in all novel

factual circumstances, officials would rarely, if ever, be held accountable for

their unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citing Deorle v.

Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1286 (2001)). “Otherwise, officers would escape

responsibility for the most egregious forms of conduct simply because there

was no case on all fours prohibiting that particular manifestation of

unconstitutional conduct.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1286. 

Here, there is no case directly holding that pretrial detainees have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone calls to their attorneys. 

Nevertheless, any reasonable official should have known that listening to

Jayne’s calls to Campbell would violate the Fourth Amendment. In Van Poyck,

the Ninth Circuit explicitly qualified its holding that inmates lack a reasonable

expectation of privacy in their outbound telephone calls by noting that the same

analysis “does not apply to ‘properly placed’ telephone calls between a

defendant and his attorney,” 77 F.3d at 291 n.9; see also Willoughby, 860 F.2d

at 20 (“[W]e rejected a Fourth Amendment attack on the interception of

telephone calls made by certain convicted prisoners, ruling that they had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in their calls to nonattorneys on institutional

telephones.”) (emphasis added); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 427 (7th Cir.

1977) (holding that jail officials do not violate inmates’ Fourth Amendment

rights when they inspect inmates’ “outgoing nonprivileged mail”) (emphasis

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added). Each court thereby articulated an understanding that incarcerated

individuals retain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in calls to

their attorneys. This understanding is consistent with the principle that

prisoners and detainees “do not forfeit all their privacy rights at the jailhouse

steps,” although those rights may be curtailed. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 291. As

the Supreme Court has recognized, “there must be mutual accommodation

between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the

Constitution.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

That inmates do retain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy

in telephone communications with their attorneys finds clear support in a wide

range of precedent existing at the time of the alleged violations here. As an

initial matter, “inmates’ . . . rights pertaining to privileged correspondence are

‘not inconsistent with [their] status as . . . prisoners or with the legitimate

penological objectives of the correctional system.’” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1133

(quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822). In addition, an expectation of privacy is

objectively reasonable if it derives from “‘a source outside of the Fourth

Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or

to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’” 

Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d at 458 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,

143-44 (1978)). The Ninth Circuit has held that protections in “federal and

state statutes, in codes of professional responsibility, under common law, and in

the United States Constitution” rendered clients’ expectation of privacy in their

attorneys’ files objectively reasonable. DeMassa, 770 F.2d at 1506. Here,

similar sources unequivocally established the objective reasonableness of

Jayne’s expectation of privacy in his phone communications to Campbell.

To begin, constitutional guarantees retained by incarcerated individuals

support the legitimacy of Jayne’s expectation of privacy. The Ninth Circuit has

maintained that “[t]o the extent that the right to effective assistance of counsel

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in a separate criminal case is at stake, the Sixth Amendment provides [a]

‘source’ and ‘understanding’ of [an objectively reasonable] expectation of

privacy.” Id. at 1507. There is no question that inmates retain the right to

effective assistance of counsel in “all criminal prosecutions,” U.S. Const.

amend. VI; see, e.g., Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993), and

“government interference with the confidential relationship between a

defendant and his counsel may implicate Sixth Amendment rights,” Clutchette,

770 F.2d at 1471. This principle applies with equal force to pretrial detainees,

as reflected in courts’ recognition that “[d]etainees’ right to counsel and due

process can . . . be compromised by a lack of privacy in consultations with

counsel.” Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052 (8th Cir. 1989). 

Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has held that jail officials’ alleged role in making it

impossible for pretrial detainees privately to consult with attorneys by phone

would, if true, violate clearly established rights. See id. at 1052-53. In so

holding, the court explained:

Forcing prisoners to conduct their meetings with their attorneys in

the open or to yell over the phone obviously compromises the

consultation. Detainees might be hesitant to disclose names and

information relevant to the attorney’s investigation and necessary to the advice sought. Often pleas are changed in the months before

trial based on counsel’s assessment of the strength of each side’s

case. The right to an attorney would mean little if it did not

effectively attach until the hushed whispers at the defense table the morning of trial, after counsel has selected her strategy and witnesses. Thus, as we have already stated, [i]t is clear that an accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied

the right of private consultation with him.

Id. at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Greater Newburyport

Clamshell Alliance v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1988)

(“[U]tmost candor between an attorney and client is essential to effective

assistance of counsel.”); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir.

1973) (“[T]he essence of the Sixth Amendment right is, indeed, privacy of

communication with counsel.”). At the time of the alleged violations, Jayne had

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criminal charges pending against him, and Campbell was serving as his public

defender with respect to those charges. Jayne’s right to effective assistance from

his criminal defense attorney, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, thus gave

rise to an unambiguously reasonable expectation of privacy in his

communications with Campbell. See also DeMassa, 770 F.2d at 1507 (“Because

the Fifth Amendment’s protection against testimonial self-incrimination may be

threatened by the act of disclosure of legal files, that constitutional guarantee

also supports the clients’ legitimate expectations of privacy.”).

The clear contours of Jayne’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his

calls to Campbell also finds support in state law, even though violations of state

law do not necessarily translate into Fourth Amendment violations, see Virginia

v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168-170 (2008). Notably, the California Supreme Court

invalidated the state Department of Corrections’ rules permitting inspection of

inmate attorney-client correspondence. In doing so, it explained, “A long line of

cases firmly establishes the general principle that a prisoner has a right to consult

with his attorney in absolute privacy.” In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 879 (Cal.

1972) (citing cases)); accord People v. Urbano, 128 Cal. App. 4th 396, 402-03

(2005). As the Jordan court explained, the contested prison regulations “abridge

the statutory right to refuse to disclose the contents of a confidential

communication between a client and his attorney”; they moreover infringe on

inmates’ right under the California Penal Code to be free of deprivations that are

not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. at 875 (citing Cal.

Evid. Code §§ 952, 954; Cal. Penal Code § 2600)); see also Cal. Penal Code §

636(a) (“Every person who, without permission from all parties to the

conversation, eavesdrops on or records, by means of an electronic device, a

conversation, or any portion thereof, between a person who is in the physical

custody of a law enforcement officer or other public officer . . . and that person’s

attorney . . . is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment . . . .”). Because

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Shasta County Jail is located in California, California law buttresses the

reasonableness of Jayne’s expectation that his communications with Campbell

would be private. 

The doctrine of attorney-client privilege also contributes to the wellestablished nature of Jayne’s expectation of privacy in his calls to Campbell. 

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential

communications known to the common law. See Upjohn v. Co. v. United States,

449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). It is, moreover, a privilege to which incarcerated

individuals remain entitled. “[T]o conclude that the reduced privacy required by

penological necessity renders it impossible for inmates to keep privileged

[information] confidential . . . would undermine a critical component of the right

of access to the courts, namely, the opportunity to receive privileged

communications from counsel.” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1133. That the privilege is

an evidentiary one does not render it irrelevant to Jayne’s reasonable expectation

of privacy in his attorney-client communications. On the contrary, the Ninth

Circuit has held in the Fourth Amendment context that “[i]t is axiomatic” that

the privilege confers upon a client “an expectation of privacy in his or her

confidential communications with the attorney.” DeMassa, 770 F.2d at 1506

(citing authorities); accord In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)

(explaining that the purpose of the privilege is “to protect every person’s right to

confide in counsel free from apprehension of disclosure of confidential

communications”). The Seventh Circuit has similarly explained that “[t]he basis

for the privilege is to afford the client a reasonable expectation of privacy and

confidentiality with regard to disclosures made during the course of consultation

with his attorney.” In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir.

1976); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (explaining

that the privilege “rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all

that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional

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mission is to be carried out”); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 723 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the attorney-client privilege helps to ensure a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to “effective assistance” of counsel). That

inmates are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege reflects society’s clear

willingness to recognize the reasonableness of even incarcerated individuals’

expectations of privacy in their attorney-client communications.

Turning to the particular facts of this case, any official should have been

on notice that listening to recordings of Jayne’s calls to Campbell was

impermissible. In particular, the record establishes that Shasta County Jail had a

“policy of . . . provid[ing] inmates unmonitored, unrecorded, and uncharged

phone calls to their attorneys.” (Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2.) Bosenko, the Sheriff of

Shasta County, acknowledged the existence of this policy in his declaration. 

(Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2.) The uncontroverted facts also show that jail officials

actively implemented this policy through their use of the GTL phone system that

automatically removed calls from inmates to recognized attorneys’ numbers

from both the recording system and the collect-call charge system. (Dkt. No. 97-

5 at 3; Dkt. No. 97-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-12 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-15 at 3.) Inmates

could request that attorneys’ numbers be added to the no-recording list, which

Jayne did with respect to Campbell. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 37.) In addition, the

Sheriff’s Department had an employee whose duties included adding attorneys

to that list (Dkt. No. 97-14 at 2.), and jail officials even made available to

inmates a list of Shasta County Public Defenders, including Campbell, who

could be contacted for legal assistance (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 23.). 

The clearly established nature of Jayne’s right to privacy in his calls to

Campbell is further substantiated by consistent statements by individual

Defendants that they would not have knowingly listened to Jayne’s calls to an

attorney. For example, Heyde, Joiner, and Penland all declared that, had they

known that Jayne’s voicemail to “Cindy” was to his attorney, they would not

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have listened to the call. (Dkt. No. 97-10 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-

16 at 2.) Heyde testified that he was aware of “an absolute expectation of

privacy with attorney-client phone calls.” (Dkt. No. 117 at 838.) Joiner also

stated that the phone in the booking area, where he had escorted Jayne on at least

one occasion, is used by “inmates to call their attorneys in private” because it “is

not monitored or recorded.” (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 1.) Van Buskirk recognized that

it was a “technical violation of the law” for his officers to have “listened to a

recorded call from the jail by Inmate Jayne to Public Defender Cindy

Campbell’s voice mail.” (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 71.) In sum, Defendants’ reactions

to the intrusions into Jayne’s attorney-client communications reflect that they

did recognize, as any reasonable officer would have, the objective

reasonableness of Jayne’s expectation of privacy in his calls from jail to his

criminal attorney.

In short, it is “clearly established” that pretrial detainees have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in phone calls to their attorneys, especially when a prison

has an actual policy of not recording or listening to such calls. Defendants are

therefore not entitled to qualified immunity for Jayne’s claims on this issue. The

motion for summary judgment on Jayne’s Fourth Amendment claim is denied as

to Defendants Heyde, Penland, and Joiner and granted as to Defendants

Ashmun, Gonzalez, Champagne, Bosenko, Van Buskirk, Meek, Mitchell, and

Anderson.

2. 6th Amendment

Jayne next contends that Anderson violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel by listening to his calls to Campbell and using them as a basis for

bringing additional criminal charges against him. (Dkt. No. 114 at 8.) He also

alleges that the jail personnel recorded, listened to, and used the content of these

calls (specifically, his admission that he had called Shawna despite the no-

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contact order) against him in a disciplinary proceeding, and that these actions

likewise violated his right to counsel. (Dkt. No. 114 at 7-8.) 

As before, the Court chooses to begin with the first prong of the qualified

immunity inquiry: whether Defendants violated Jayne’s Sixth Amendment right

to assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit has held that “mere government

intrusion into the attorney-client relationship . . . is not of itself violative of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,

1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980). In order to defeat summary judgment, Jayne must

adduce evidence that Defendants (1) “deliberately interfere[d] with the

confidential relationship” between him and Campbell; and (2) that the

interference “substantially prejudice[d]” him. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

567, 584-85 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Sixth Amendment’s application to only “criminal prosecutions,”

U.S. Const. amend. VI, is of particular significance here. Interpreting that

phrase, the Supreme Court has held that inmates do not have a right to “either

retained or appointed counsel” in “‘(p)rison disciplinary hearings (which) are

not part of a criminal prosecution.’” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315

(1976) (alterations in original) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 570). The clear

implication of Baxter’s holding is that disciplinary proceedings against criminal

defendants do not necessarily qualify as part of “criminal prosecutions” within

the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. “[F]or example, the prison disciplinary

hearings that deprive inmates of good time are not considered ‘criminal’” for

purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Sash v. Zenk, 439 F.3d 61, 63 (2d. Cir.

2006).7

 It follows that an adverse outcome in such a non-criminal jail

7

 Similarly, in United States v. Gouveia, the Supreme Court held that

inmates did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel before indictment on

murder charges, even though their conduct had already been the subject of

prison disciplinary hearings and resulted in their being placed in administrative

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proceeding does not constitute evidence of “substantial prejudice” that can

support a Sixth Amendment claim. Cf. Williams, 384 F.3d at 585 (“Substantial

prejudice results from the introduction of evidence gained through the

interference against the defendant at trial, from the prosecution’s use of

confidential information pertaining to defense plans and strategy, and from

other actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial.”). 

a. Anderson

Jayne alleges that Anderson purposefully sought out phone conversations

between him and Campbell (Dkt. No. 114 at 7), and used these conversations as

the basis for additional criminal charges against him (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No.

114 at 8). Jayne also stated, however, that Anderson dropped the additional

charges that were allegedly based on his recorded communications to Campbell. 

(Dkt. No. 114 at 8, 40.) Thus, even if Anderson listened to Jayne’s calls, even

if he did so deliberately, and even if he brought new charges against Jayne

based on those calls, Jayne has failed to submit evidence that he was

“substantially prejudice[d],” Williams, 384 F.3d at 585, in a criminal

prosecution as a result of Anderson’s actions. Accordingly, there is no triable

issue as to whether Anderson violated Jayne’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. 

b. Jail Personnel

Jayne also argues that the jail personnel Defendants who listened to his

calls to Campbell violated his Sixth Amendment rights by using the information

in those calls against him in a disciplinary proceeding. (Dkt. No. 114 at 2, 46.) 

Defendants do not contest Jayne’s allegation that disciplinary actions were

instituted against him at least in part as a result of his admission, in the

voicemail to Campbell, that he had called Shawna. (Dkt. No. 97-10; Dkt. No.

segregation. 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984).

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97-13 at 2; Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2; Dkt. No. 117 at 177.) Nonetheless, Jayne

cannot prevail on his claim that Defendants’ use of the voicemail in this manner

violated his right to counsel. 

As discussed, “substantial prejudice” within the meaning of the Sixth

Amendment does not encompass prejudice arising in the context of noncriminal jail disciplinary proceedings. Although Penland sanctioned Jayne with

“30 days lock down [and] loss of all privileges” at the end of the contested

hearing (Dkt. No. 97-13 at 5), these consequences do not constitute criminal

punishment. Jayne has not produced any evidence that the information gathered

in relation to his disciplinary hearing was then forwarded to Anderson for the

purposes of criminal prosecution. On the contrary, Penland has declared that he

“did not forward [his] knowledge of the recorded message to the District

Attorney’s Office for the purpose of any criminal charge against Mr. Jayne.” 

(Dkt. No. 97-13 at 2.) Heyde, Penland’s supervisor, also submitted a

declaration stating that he “did not forward or transmit [his] knowledge of the

contents of the call to any person in any form” nor “forward that information to

the District Attorney’s Office.” (Dkt. No. 97-10 at 2.) Joiner likewise

submitted a declaration to that effect. (Dkt. No. 97-16 at 2). Because Jayne has

not produced any evidence that he was prejudiced in a criminal proceeding by

the jail personnel’s actions, summary judgment is granted on this claim.

3. Federal Wiretap Act

Finally, Jayne argues that the recording of his phone calls violated the

Federal Wiretap Act (“FWA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20. The FWA prohibits the

intentional use of “any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any

oral communication.” Id. § 2511(b). It also proscribes the intentional disclosure

or the intentional use of the contents of any prohibited interception. 

Id. § 2511(c)-(d). Here, Jayne’s calls to his attorney were recorded by the jail’s

default system (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 27-29), and eleven of those calls were played

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back (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 28). The recording of the calls on the jail’s default

system is the original interception, whereas the playing and downloading of the

calls are “disclosures” or “uses.” See Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir.

2009). Liability for disclosure or use is contingent on the original interception

being unlawful. See id. at 751; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c)-(d). 

The FWA prohibits only intentional interceptions, meaning that,

regardless of whether recording calls to attorneys on the default system is or is

not within the “ordinary course of duties” such that they fit within the FWA’s

law enforcement exception, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a), if Defendants

unintentionally recorded the calls, they did not violate the law. See id.

§ 2511(1)(a); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the intent requirement, the First

Circuit’s analysis is instructive. 

In Pharmatrak, the First Circuit looked to the legislative history of

Congress’s 1986 amendment to the Act changing the state of mind requirement

from “willful” to “intentional.” 329 F.3d at 23. Noting that the legislative

history indicated that as used in the amendment “the term ‘intentional’ is

narrower than the dictionary definition” of the term, see S. Rep. 99-541, 26

(1986), the court concluded “the purpose of the amendment was to underscore

that inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for criminal or civil liability” under

the Act, 329 F.3d at 23. Thus, under the Act, “[a]n act is not intentional if it is

the product of inadvertence or mistake.” Id. 

Here, Defendants have produced evidence that the initial recording of

Jayne’s calls to his attorney on the default recording system was inadvertent. 

Beverly Strand, who was responsible for seeing that attorneys’ phone numbers

were removed from the default recording system, stated in her declaration that

because she was new to the position, she was unaware that she had to request

both that the attorneys calls be free and that they be unrecorded. (Dkt. No. 97-

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14 at 2.) She requested GTL not to charge calls to Jayne’s attorney’s number

but did not ask GTL not to record calls to that number. (Dkt. No. 97-14 at 2.) 

As a result, Jayne’s calls continued to be recorded. (Dkt. No. 97-14 at 2.) 

Jayne replies that Strand had worked for the Sheriff’s Department for

many years and therefore knew the jail’s policies and procedures. (Dkt. No.

114 at 39.) He supports that contention with her testimony in a state court

proceeding that she did, in fact, work for the department for over twenty-two

years. (Dkt. No. 117 at 82.) But, as Strand explained during that same hearing,

she had only worked for the jail for three months at the time she requested

Jayne’s calls to his attorney not be charged, and in the position she held for the

previous thirteen years, she did not handle such requests. (Dkt. No. 117 at 84,

87.) During those thirteen years, Strand asserted, she worked as a secretary for

the Sheriff, not in the jail, and therefore was unfamiliar with the jail’s policies. 

(Dkt. No. 117 at 84.) Other than pointing to Strand’s long-term employment

with the Sheriff’s Department, Jayne makes only a conclusory statement

regarding “intentional illegal misconduct” on the part of the system’s

administrator. (Dkt. No. 115-1 at 25.) He does not, however, point to facts to

support that conclusion. See Cafasso, ex rel. United States v. Gen. Dynamics,

637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a

plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping

conclusory allegations.”). 

Because Jayne has not produced any evidence creating a genuine dispute

regarding a material fact as to whether Defendants unlawfully intercepted his

calls to his attorney, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is

granted. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on the disciplinary diet

issue is denied as to Ashmun but granted as to Bosenko and Van Buskirk. 

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Summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment attorney-client calls issue is

denied as to Defendants Joiner, Heyde, and Penland but granted as to

Defendants Ashmun, Gonzalez, Champagne, Bosenko, Van Buskirk, Meek,

Mitchell, and Anderson. Summary judgment on Jayne’s Sixth Amendment and

Federal Wiretap Act claims is granted as to all Defendants.

This Order resolves Docket Nos. 90, 97, and 121.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2014.

/s/ Marsha S. Berzon 

MARSHA S. BERZON

United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation

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