Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00360/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00360-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arnold R. Ohton, Sr.,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, a Municipality within

the State of Arizona; Melvin Schlink,

personally and in his capacity as

Supervisor of Defendant.

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-360-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Defendants City of Phoenix and Melvin Schlink’s

unopposed Motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #54) and Defendants’ unopposed Motion

summary disposition of their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #56). After reviewing

the record and Defendants’ unopposed Motions, the Court issues the following Order.

I 

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff Arnold Ohton, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint

against Defendants City of Phoenix and Melvin Schlink (“Defendants”) (Dkt. #1). 

Plaintiff asserts multiple claims including race discrimination and retaliation under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and age

discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §

621 et seq. Defendants filed their Answer on June 23, 2006 (Dkt. #5). 

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On September 15, 2006, Plaintiff filed an Amended complaint (Dkt. #15), to which

Defendants filed their Answer on October 2, 2006 (Dkt. #16). 

On August 22, 2006, the Court issued a Rule 16 Scheduling Order, setting the

discovery deadline for March 30, 2007, and the dispositive motions deadline for May 18,

2007 (Dkt. #14). Three days before the end of the dispositive motions deadline,

Plaintiff’s counsel moved to withdraw (Dkt. #49). The next day, Defendants moved to

extend the time to file dispositive motions (Dkt. # 51). On May 21, 2007, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s Motion to withdraw and extended the dispositive motions

deadline to June 25, 2007 (Dkt. #53). 

On June 25, 2007, Defendants filed the instant Motion for summary judgment

challenging Plaintiff's claims on multiple grounds (Dkt. #54). Plaintiff did not respond to

Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment, and on August 22, 2007, Defendants filed a

Motion for summary disposition of their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #56). On

August 29, 2007, the Court instructed Plaintiff to file any responsive memoranda

opposing the relief sought by Defendants by September 7, 2007 (Dkt. #58). To date,

Plaintiff has not responded to either Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment or

Defendants’ Motion for summary disposition.

II

A. LRCiv 7.2(i)

Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 56.1 states that “the opposing party . . .

[has] 30 days after service within which to serve and file a responsive memorandum in

opposition” to the moving party’s motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to LRCiv

56.1 and the Court’s May 21, 2007 order, Plaintiff should have filed a response to

Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment by June 25, 2007. Furthermore, on August

29, 2007, the Court instructed Plaintiff to file any responsive memoranda opposing

Defendants’ Motions for summary judgment and summary disposition by September 7,

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2007. Two months later, Plaintiff still has yet to respond to the instant Motions for

summary judgment and summary disposition; Plaintiff’s time to respond has long past. 

Defendants’ Motion for summary disposition of their motion for summary

judgment, and Plaintiff’s failure to respond to either of Defendants’ Motions, raises the

applicability LRCiv 7.2(i), which provides in pertinent part:

If a motion does not conform in all substantial respects with the

requirements of this Local Rule, or if the unrepresented party or counsel

does not serve and file the required answering memoranda, . . . such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the

motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.

As such, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i), the Court may consider Plaintiff’s failure to

respond as consent to the granting of Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment Henry

v. Gill Indus., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.1993). However, a district court may not grant

an unopposed motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party has failed

to file an opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994). A

district court abuses its discretion when it grants a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to a local rule such as LRCiv 7.2(i) where the movant's papers are insufficient to

support the motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; Martinez

v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-1183 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court may not

summarily grant Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment, but must instead review the

sufficiency of Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

 The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact; the moving party must present the basis for its summary

judgment motion and identify those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). A material fact is one

that might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And in order to preclude summary judgment, a

dispute about a material fact must also be “genuine,” such that a reasonable jury could

find in favor of the non-moving party. Id.; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage

Distrib., 69 F.3d 337, 345 (9th Cir. 1995).

In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, the Court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allen v. City of Los

Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must not make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394

(9th Cir. 1990). Further, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmovant. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion for

summary judgment, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific

facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rest

on bare allegations or denials in his pleading, but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248-49. Conclusory allegations, unsupported

by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

In sum, the ultimate question on a motion for summary judgment is whether the

evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it

is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251-52. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant's

position is insufficient; there must be evidence from which the trier of fact could

reasonably find for the non-movant. Id. at 252. If the nonmoving party's evidence is

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merely colorable or not significantly probative, the Court may grant summary judgment. 

Id. at 249. Indeed, a district court may grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment

if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their

face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. Henry, 983 F.3d at 950.

A district court is not required to probe the record in search of a genuine issue of

triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party

has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment. Id.; see Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d

1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001) (even if there is evidence in the record that creates a

genuine issue of material fact, a district court may grant summary judgment if the

opposing party’s papers do not include or conveniently refer to that evidence).

III

Plaintiff has filed no opposition to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“DSF”) in support of their Motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s original and

amended complaints contain only bare allegations; Plaintiff has set forth no specific facts

in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment, by affidavit or otherwise as

provided by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court

adopts Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in its entirety.

Plaintiff, a 63 year old Hispanic male, worked for the City of Phoenix at the Val

Vista Water Treatment Plant from June 1993 until his scheduled retirement in December

2005 (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, “DSF” ¶¶ 1-4, 12, 298). Prior to

retirement, Plaintiff worked as an Operations Maintenance Technician (“O&M Tech”)

(DSF ¶¶ 7, 9).

Depending on their skill levels, O&M Techs performed a combination of

maintenance, operations, or electrical and instrumentation work (DSF ¶ 8). As an O&M

Tech, Plaintiff performed a combination of operation and maintenance duties (DSF ¶ 9),

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and in February 2004, Plaintiff was given the duties of a “shift responsible” O&M Tech

(DSF ¶ 11).

In the 1990s, several Hispanic subcontractors working at the Val Vista Water

Treatment Plant were not allowed to use the Plant’s cafeteria pursuant to Plant policy that

contract workers are not permitted to use Plant facilities (DSF ¶¶ 31-33). Also in the

1990s, Plaintiff reported to his supervisor, Kevin Williams, that someone defaced a Cesar

Chavez poster in one of the Plant hallways by writing “WP” on the poster (DSF ¶¶ 39-

40). Williams investigated the incident and determined that Plant employee Kurt Gregory

was responsible (DSF ¶ 42). Williams made Gregory submit a written apology to

Plaintiff (DSF ¶ 43).

Around April 1997, Plaintiff discovered a certificate in his Plant mailbox that read

“Val-Vista Water Plant take[s] pride in proclaiming that [Plaintiff] has fulfilled the

requirements of Snitching, Sniveling & Crying . . . . We can only hope he will grow up to

be a man someday” (DSF ¶ 46). Sometime after February 2000, some of Plaintiff’s coworkers mocked Plaintiff after he returned to work following heart surgery (DSF ¶ 51).

In June 2004, Plaintiff informed a Personnel Analyst with the Water Services

Department that he planned to retire in a year and a half (DSF ¶ 298).

At 7:00 p.m. on January 2, 2005, Val Vista Water Treatment Plant O&M Techs

Jason McDonald and Larry Reichel – who is approximately the same age as Plaintiff –

were releasing treated water from the plant’s water filters into the distribution system to

the public (DSF ¶¶ 64, 67). One hour later, McDonald and Reichel noticed that water

turbidity levels – the levels of cloudiness or haziness in water caused by individual

particles – were exceeding the state and federal maximum turbidity levels of 0.5

nephelometric turbidity units (NTU’s) (DSF ¶ 71). In response, McDonald and Reichel

placed some of the plant’s water filters off-line (DSF ¶ 71). Neither McDonald nor

Reichel released excessively turbid water – water with turbidity levels greater than 0.5

NTU’s – into the distribution system (DSF ¶ 72). 

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Plaintiff and Raphael Frias, a newly-hired young Hispanic trainee, relieved

McDonald and Reichel and began their shifts at the Val Vista Water Treatment Plant at

10:00 p.m. on January 2, 2005. Before leaving, McDonald advised Plaintiff that the

water turbidity levels were “bad” (DSF ¶¶ 75-76, 78, 80). At approximately 11:00 p.m.,

Plaintiff released excessively turbid water into the distribution system (DSF ¶ 82, 84). 

Plaintiff also directed Frias to do the same (DSF ¶ 83). According to the City of Phoenix

Water Service Department’s internal policies, excessively turbid water must be sent back

into the system for re-filtering (DSF ¶¶ 61-62). Plaintiff was aware of this policy (DSF ¶

85). However, Plaintiff released the excessively turbid water into the distribution system

“because an unsigned message on a plant chalkboard stated, in its entirety, ‘twenty

million pickup mandatory’” (DSF ¶ 87).

Emergency alarms sounded immediately after Plaintiff released excessively turbid

water into the distribution system at approximately 11:00 p.m. (DSF ¶¶ 82, 92). 

However, Plaintiff did not contact Kevin Williams, the Water Facilities Supervisor, until

approximately 3:00 a.m. (DSF ¶ 93). Plaintiff violated City policy by not immediately

notifying the Water Facilities Supervisor about the situation (DSF ¶ 94). Based on this

incident, Plaintiff received a Notice of Inquiry at the end of January 2005 (DSF ¶ 100). 

In February 2005, Williams met with Plaintiff and informed him that based on the

January 2, 2005 incident, Plaintiff would be assigned to solely maintenance, nonoperations duties in the future (DSF ¶¶ 110, 112-113). Williams did not mention

Plaintiff’s age, national origin, or race during the meeting (DSF ¶ 115). Despite

Plaintiff’s reassignment to maintenance, Plaintiff’s job title, work schedule, hourly wage,

and overtime hours remained the same (DSF ¶¶ 122-127, 130). 

In January 2005, O&M Techs Paul Yanez and Bill Wlodwiski accidentally caused

a flood at the Val Vista Water Treatment Plant (DSF ¶ 132). Yanez and Wlodwiski were

not reassigned after this incident (DSF ¶ 141). Yanez is Hispanic, and both men are only

approximately 10 years younger than Plaintiff (DSF ¶¶ 137, 139).

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In July 2005, Plaintiff received a written reprimand for, among other things, failing

to complete his weekly work order report by not inspecting a lime storage and feed room,

which caused an overflow of an extremely hazardous chemical (DSF ¶ 189). Despite the

July 2005 written reprimand, Plaintiff’s work schedule, hourly wage, overtime hours, and

benefits remained the same (DSF ¶¶ 202-04).

In July 2005, Plaintiff found a tampon in his Plant mailbox (DSF ¶ 206). In

addition, at some point after July 2005, Plaintiff found a “porno booklet” in the paper

towel dispenser in one of the Plant bathrooms (DSF ¶¶ 215-218). Further, at one point

during Plaintiff’s employment at the Val Vista Water Treatment Plant, a number of

Plaintiff’s co-workers blew kisses at Plaintiff (DSF ¶¶ 222-23).

In August 2005, Plaintiff received nine “not met” ratings on his Performance

Management Guide Review (“PMG”) (DSF ¶¶ 249, 256). Despite the negative August

2005 PMG, Plaintiff’s work schedule, hourly wage, and benefits remained the same (DSF

¶¶ 202-04).

IV

A. Title VII & the ADEA

i. Age, Race, and National Origin Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of age, race, or national origin discrimination under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e et seq., or the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), a plaintiff must show that (1)

he belongs to a protected class; (2) he performed his job satisfactorily; (3) he was

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees not in

his protected class received more favorable treatment. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753

(9th Cir. 2006); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 2000)

(stating that in order to establish a violation of the ADEA, employees must first establish

a prima facie case of discrimination).

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To be “similarly situated,” an employee must have the same supervisor, be subject

to the same standards, and have engaged in the same conduct. Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188

F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class. However,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to meet any of the other elements necessary to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.

In support of his claims of age, race, and national origin discrimination, Plaintiff

only offers the conclusory allegations contained in his original and amended complaints -

that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because they issued Plaintiff a Notice of

Inquiry in January 2005; modified Plaintiff’s duties following the January 2 and 3, 2005

incident; failed to discipline other, non-Hispanic, O&M Techs after the January 2 and 3,

2005 incident; issued Plaintiff a July 2005 written reprimand and a negative August 2005

Performance Management Guide Review (“PMG”) without justification; failed to issue a

written reprimand or negative PMG to other, non-Hispanic, O&M Techs; and increased

supervision over Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination primarily stem from the fact that Plaintiff

was reassigned to perform only maintenance duties after the January 2 and 3, 2005

incident, whereas McDonald and Reichel, the two employees who worked the shift prior

to Plaintiff’s shift on the night of the January 2 and 3, 2005 incident, were allegedly not

similarly reassigned. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff acknowledged that McDonald

and Reichel were not engaged in the same conduct that Plaintiff was engaged in during

the January 2 and 3, 2005 incident (DSF ¶¶ 72-73). Thus, these employees are not

similarly situated to Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff acknowledged that he did not know

whether or not McDonald and Reichel were non-Hispanic (DSF ¶¶ 66, 69). Plaintiff also

acknowledged that Reichel is approximately his same age (DSF ¶ 67). There is no

evidence in the record to indicate that McDonald or Reichel are outside Plaintiff’s

protected class.

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Plaintiff’s discrimination claims also arise from the fact that two other employees,

Paul Yanez and Bill Wlodwiski, were not disciplined after they flooded the Val Vista

Water Treatment Plant in a different January 2005 incident. However, Yanez and

Wlodwiski were not engaged in the same conduct that Plaintiff was engaged in during the

January 2 and 3, 2005 incident (DSF ¶¶ 132-135). Thus, these employees are not

similarly situated to Plaintiff. In addition, Yanez is Hispanic and both men are only about

10 years younger than Plaintiff (DSF ¶¶ 137, 139). There is no evidence in the record to

indicate that Yanez or Wlodwiski are outside Plaintiff’s protected class. 

In sum, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether similarly situated employees not in Plaintiff’s protected

class received more favorable treatment.

In addition, while Plaintiff alleges that he lost advancement opportunities and

opportunities to earn overtime pay, Plaintiff offers no evidence to support these

allegations. Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition testimony that although his duties

changed after the January 2 and 3, 2005 incident from a combination of maintenance and

operations duties to maintenance duties only, his job title, hourly wages, work schedule,

and overtime all stayed the same (DSF ¶¶ 123-130). However, since Plaintiff’s own

statements in his deposition testimony acknowledge that the other employees in question

are neither similarly situated nor outside Plaintiff’s protected class, the Court finds it

unnecessary to determine whether Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment

action. For those same reasons, the Court also finds it unnecessary to determine whether

Plaintiff performed his job satisfactorily.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie claim of age, race, or

national origin discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA.

ii. Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must

establish the following three factors: (1) involvement in a protected activity; (2) an

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adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the activity and the

employment action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Employment decisions that constitute an adverse employment action include

termination, a significant change in employment status, dissemination of a negative

employment reference, issuance of an undeserved negative performance review, refusal to

consider an employee for promotion, and a significant change in benefits. Burlington

Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (emphasis added); Brooks v. City of San

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “mere ostracism” by co-workers

does not constitute an adverse employment action. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241 (citation

omitted). In the context of retaliation, an employment decision constitutes an adverse

employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in

protected activity. Id. at 1242-43.

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity when

he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and internal grievances with his union,

which he did on March 7, 2005, and July 5, 2005, respectively (DSF ¶¶ 243, 262). In

addition, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff received a written reprimand in July

2005 and a Performance Management Guide Review (“PMG”) in August 2005, which

stated that Plaintiff failed to meet performance expectations in nine categories (DSF ¶¶

189, 256). Thus, Plaintiff has met the first factor for a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII is met. However, Defendants contend that these do not constitute an

adverse employment action because they were not undeserved. 

Plaintiff states in his Amended complaint that his July 2005 reprimand and August

2005 PMG were issued without justification. However, Plaintiff acknowledged in his

deposition testimony that he engaged in the various instances of misconduct on which

Defendants claim that the July 2005 reprimand and August 2005 PMG were based (DSF

¶¶ 82-86, 93-94, 160, 176, 186-87, 290). Moreover, after discussing the August 2005

PMG with his O&M Tech supervisor, Plaintiff signed the PMG and wrote, “I believe I

now have a real supervisor that is honest and fair and open-minded” (DSF ¶ 294). There

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is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s allegation that his July 2005 reprimand

and August 2005 PMG were undeserved. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether Plaintiff’s July 2005 reprimand or August 2005 PMG constitute an adverse

employment action. As such, Plaintiff has not met the second factor for a prima facie

case of retaliation under Title VII; and the Court finds it unnecessary to determine

whether the third factor is met, i.e., whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether a causal link exists between either Plaintiff’s July 2005 reprimand or August

2005 PMG, and the fact that Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and

internal grievances with his union.

In addition, Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition testimony that his July 2005

reprimand and August 2005 PMG had no effect on his compensation, his benefits, or any

other condition of his employment (DSF ¶¶ 202-04, 265-68). Therefore it is unlikely –

and there is no indication in the record – that either Plaintiff’s July 2005 reprimand or

August 2005 PMG constitute an employment action that is reasonably likely to deter

employees from engaging in a protected activity.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII or the ADEA.

//

//

//

iii. Hostile Work Environment

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show that (1) he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing

nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work

environment. Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Vasquez v.

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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To determine whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive, the Court looks

to “all of the circumstances, including the frequency, severity, and nature (i.e., physically

threatening or humiliating as opposed to merely verbally offensive ) of the conduct.” Id.;

Kortan v. Cal. Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Conduct must be

extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”) (citation

omitted). In addition, the “hostility of the environment must be considered ‘from the

perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the

plaintiff.’” Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1023 (citing McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d

1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Plaintiff’s claim of harassment resulting in a hostile work environment seems to be

based on the following facts: (1) at some point after July 2005, Plaintiff discovered a

“porno booklet” inside a paper towel dispenser at work; (2) in July 2005, Plaintiff

discovered a tampon in his mailbox at work; (3) at some point after February 2000, a

group of co-workers made disparaging remarks to Plaintiff when he returned to work

after heart surgery; (4) at some point during Plaintiff’s employment at the Val Vista

Water Plant, a group of co-workers blew kisses at Plaintiff; (5) in 1997, Plaintiff

discovered a disrespectful certificate in his work mailbox; (6) at some point in the 1990s,

a Cesar Chavez poster was defaced with the letters “WP,” which Plaintiff believes meant

“white power”; and (7) at some point in the 1990s, several Hispanic subcontractors

performing work at the Val Vista Water Treatment Plant were not permitted to use the

Plant’s cafeteria (DSF ¶¶ 31-41, 46, 51-54, 206-07, 215-18, 222-23, 308).

Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition testimony that he has no evidence that

Defendants or his co-workers intended that Plaintiff discover or be exposed to the “porno

booklet” (DSF ¶ 219). In addition, Plaintiff did not report the instances involving the

certificate or his co-workers’ remarks to anyone (DSF ¶¶ 50, 56). Further, all contract

workers are not permitted to use plant facilities, and Plaintiff acknowledged that Hispanic

City employees are permitted to use the Plant’s facilities (DSF ¶¶ 33, 36). Moreover,

Plaintiff acknowledged that the tampon, kiss-blowing, certificate, and disparaging

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remarks made by his co-workers had nothing to do with his age, race, or national origin

(DSF ¶¶ 47, 55, 225-26, 265-68). And after the tampon incident, the employee mail slots

were modified to make it more difficult to place such items in the slots (DSF ¶ 214).

As for the incident with the Cesar Chavez poster, the question is whether a

reasonable Hispanic person in Plaintiff’s position would have viewed the incident as

resulting in a hostile work environment. While a reasonable Hispanic person might

consider the incident offensive, it is unlikely that a reasonable Hispanic person would

have viewed the incident as resulting in a hostile work environment. Plaintiff

acknowledged in his deposition testimony that other than this instance, he has never heard

or seen a co-worker make a racist comment (DSF ¶ 45). In addition, Plaintiff’s

supervisor investigated the incident, determined that one of Plaintiff’s co-workers was

responsible, and made that co-worker submit a written apology (DSF ¶¶ 42-43). 

A few apparently unrelated and isolated instances spread over approximately 15

years are not enough to create a hostile work environment; a few instances don’t create an

environment. Moreover, the alleged conduct was neither extreme nor pervasive. There is

simply no evidence in the record to indicate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as

to whether Plaintiff was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature that

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and

create an abusive work environment. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work

environment.

iv. Constructive Discharge

Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's decision to resign

because of unendurable working conditions constitutes a formal discharge for remedial

purposes. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007). “The inquiry is

objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the

employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?” Id. (citing Penn. State Police

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v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)). Constructive discharge occurs only “when the working

conditions deteriorate . . . to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary and

egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable

employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.” Id.

(citing Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930). Further, evidence of transfer and demotion is

insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish constructive discharge. Poland, 494 F.3d at

1184.

Here, Plaintiff offers no evidence to support his constructive discharge claim other

than conclusory allegations that Defendants’ alleged harassment and discrimination

created intolerable working conditions. The only evidence in the record regarding a

change in Plaintiff’s working condition is that he was not allowed to perform operationsrelated tasks due to his involvement in the January 2 and 3, 2005 incident (DSF ¶ 126). 

Plaintiff’s job title, work schedule, pay, overtime hours, and benefits remained unaffected

(DSF ¶ 122-25, 130, 202-04, 265-67). As discussed in the previous sections, there is no

evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination, retaliation, or

harassment. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s allegation

that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in his position

would have felt compelled to resign.

Moreover, in June 2004 – six months before Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

engaged in any discriminatory conduct – Plaintiff informed a Personnel Analyst with the

Water Services Department that he planned to retire in a year and a half (DSF ¶ 298). 

Basic addition instructs the Court that Plaintiff’s scheduled retirement would have

occurred at the end of 2005. And, in fact, Plaintiff retired in December 2005 (DSF ¶ 12).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of constructive discharge. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Discrimination based on “ancestry or ethnic characteristics” is prohibited under 42

U.S.C. § 1981. St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). Analysis of a

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discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in

a Title VII discrimination case. Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374

F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). Both § 1981 and Title VII require proof of discriminatory

treatment, and the same set of facts can give rise to both claims. Id. For the reasons

stated above, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants

discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his age, race, or national origin.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of discrimination under 42

U.S.C. § 1981.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Analysis of a discrimination claim under § 1983 follows the same legal principles

as those applicable in a Title VII discrimination case; “[u]nder section 1983, a plaintiff

claiming [] discrimination in employment must also prove that the employer was

motivated by a [] discriminatory purpose.” Stones v. Los Angeles Community College

Dist., 796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986). For the reasons stated above, there is no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis

of his age, race, or national origin.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of discrimination under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) - Conspiracy

To bring a successful cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), “a plaintiff must

allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this

conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of

any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978

F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights

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precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations.” Thornton

v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation and citation

omitted). For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff failed to establish a claim of

discrimination under § 1983.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3).

V

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

nonmoving party, the Court finds that Defendants City of Phoenix and Melvin Schlink

have established the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff has relied on

the conclusory allegations in his pleadings and has failed to present any specific facts to

support a finding that any genuine issues of material fact exist. Thus, Defendants are

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for summary disposition of

their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #56) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment

(Dkt. #54) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 13th day of December, 2007.

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