Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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1

 When this action was removed to this District Court, Isaiah Martinez was a minor.

Because he is now an adult, the Court will use his full name in this Order and counsel are

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Martinez, Sr., etc.; et al,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Avondale, etc; et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-1837-PHX-LOA

ORDER

On November 1, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 143)

 Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Response in opposition to the Motion and Defendants filed a

Reply. (Docs. 149, 152) All parties have consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 7-8) 

I. Background

Because of the parties’ familiarity with the facts surrounding this most unfortunate

shooting and the various versions of those facts provided by the parties and witnesses, the

Court will not repeat them except as may be necessary to rule on the Motion.

This is a fatal police shooting lawsuit that arises out of a 9-1-1 call to the Avondale

Police Department on October 28, 2011 by Plaintiff Marisol Martinez, requesting police

assistance with her 20-year old son, Gregory Martinez, Jr., now deceased. Plaintiffs are the

decedent’s parents, his three minor siblings (I.M.,1

 M.M., and L.M.), and the Estate of

Case 2:12-cv-01837-LOA Document 154 Filed 01/16/14 Page 1 of 14
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are hereby authorized to refer to him by his full name, and not his initials, in future public

filings. Counsel must continue to use of the two other minor children’s initials in all public

filings to protect their privacy interests. See Rule 5.2(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.

2

 Specifically, these defendants are: Officers Albert Bates, Robert Clement,

Christopher Beckett, Reginald Sayles, Michael Unger, Edward Toxqui, and Raymond

Harris.

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Gregory Martinez, Jr., by and through its personal representative, Gregory Martinez, Sr., the

decedent’s father. The Second Amended Complaint names as defendants the City of

Avondale (“City”), Officer Kevin Sapp, and seven other Avondale police officers2

 who

allegedly unreasonably detained the decedent’s family members after the shooting.

Plaintiff Marisol Martinez called 9-1-1 after her son had become violent within the

family home. Mrs. Martinez communicated to the 9-1-1 operator that her son was “on

something,” had “just punched the wall,” but he “didn’t hit anybody.” (Doc. 144,

Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), ¶ 6, Deposition of Gregory Martinez, Sr., Exhibit

(“Exh.”) 5 at 22) Officer Sapp was the first police officer to respond to the emergency call

of a domestic disturbance. (Id., ¶ 7) Officer Sapp’s mother, Terry Sapp, was a ride-along

passenger in Officer Sapp’s patrol vehicle when he responded to the call. (Id.) 

The parties agree that the decedent was holding two kitchen knives when Officer Sapp

arrived at the Martinez residence and encountered the decedent outside the residence on the

public street, but they disagree on what the decedent did immediately thereafter until the

shooting. According to Plaintiffs, the decedent walked around a pickup truck parked in the

street, “moving really slow” and “dragging his feet,” in the general direction of Officer

Sapp’s patrol car stopped across from the parked truck. (PSOF, at 5, Exh. 8, Deposition of

Sharon Nunez at p. 32.1; see diagrams in PSOF at 3-4) As Officer Sapp exited his vehicle,

he drew his firearm from its holster, and moved south on 117th Drive, into the middle of the

street away from his patrol car. (Id., Exh. 4 Jesse Wobrock Report; Exh. 9, Deposition of

Kevin Sapp at pp. 87-89) Officer Sapp and eyewitnesses report varying distances between

Officer Sapp and the decedent, ranging from 10 to 30 feet, at the time of the shooting. (Id.

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3

 Defendants contend the facts are that Gregory Martinez, Jr. ignored all commands

to drop the two large kitchen knives and continued to advance upon Officer Sapp with the

knives drawn. When he was 10 to 15 feet away from Officer Sapp, Officer Sapp discharged

his duty weapon two times, killing him. (DSOF, ¶¶ 8, 11-12)

4

 Contrary to their arguments in the Response, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint

has mixed their § 1983 claims in Counts 4 and 5, adding confusion to these allegations. The

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¶ 12 at 9) In addition to Gregory Martinez, Sr., and possibly Mrs. Martinez, Officer Sapp

twice shouted at the decedent to drop the knives, but he never dropped the knives to the

ground before he was shot. (Id., ¶ 10; DSOF, ¶ 10) Officer Sapp also yelled “show me your

hands,” and the decedent puts his hands up with the knives in them. He was not holding the

knives in a combative manner nor was he charging or advancing upon Officer Sapp when

he was shot. Witnesses indicate the decedent was holding the knives in the air over his head,

with the tips pointed upward, and then he lowered them to his waist. (Id., ¶ 9, Exh. 6,

Deposition of Marisol Martinez at p. 22) A few seconds later, while the decedent was not

moving at all, Officer Sapp shot the decedent twice.3

 (Id. at 7, Exh.10, Deposition of Isaiah

Martinez, at pp. 53-54; ¶ 11, Exh. 6, Deposition of Marisol Martinez at p. 26) Gregory

Martinez, Jr. was transported by helicopter to St. Joseph’s Hospital, where he was

pronounced dead. (DSOF, ¶ 14)

No evidence has been presented that Officer Sapp warned the decedent that if the

decedent did not drop the knives immediately or if he came any closer, Officer Sapp would

shoot him. In addition to his firearm, Officer Sapp possessed other non-deadly weapons on

him at the time of the shooting, including a Taser, baton, and OC (pepper) spray. (Id., ¶ 35,

Exh. 20, Roger Clark Report at p. 4; Exh. 9, Deposition of Officer Sapp at p. 54) None of

the Taser’s capabilities are presented by the parties.

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and false arrest

claims, as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, that 

1) Defendant Officer Kevin Sapp used excessive force when he shot and killed the

decedent in violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of

unreasonable force (Count 44

); 

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28 Court will construe Counts 4 and 5 in the Second Amended Complaint as Plaintiffs do in the

Response. See doc. 149 at 5.

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2) the Defendant City of Avondale (“City”) and several Defendant police officers

wrongfully seized the Plaintiffs after the shooting in violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment right to protection against unreasonable seizures and Fourteenth Amendment

right to procedural and substantive due process of law (Count 5); 

3) assuming arguendo violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity for Officer Sapp’s use of excessive force. Defendants,

however, do not raise the issue of qualified immunity in the Motion for Summary Judgment

regarding Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action for unreasonable seizures of the Plaintiffs after

the shooting; and 

4) on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim, Defendants unlawfully and unreasonably detained,

falsely arrested, or imprisoned the Plaintiffs after the shooting in violation of Arizona law

(Count 3).

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude

summary judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied his burden, he

is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to present, by affidavits,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see

also Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

non-moving party’s position is not sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome

of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

III. Fourth Amendment - Excessive Force - Claim (Count 4)

After considering the parties’ briefings, statements of facts, written arguments of

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counsel, admissible evidence, and viewing the facts, as the Court must, in the light most

favorable to the non-moving parties, the Court will deny the Motion as to Count 4. The

Court concludes that there are genuine disputes of material fact that require jury resolution.

“Whether the use of deadly force is reasonable is highly fact-specific, . . . but the

inquiry is an objective one[.]” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting, inter alia, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

(“Because [the excessive force inquiry] nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed

factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that

summary judgment . . . in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” ). 

The Court finds Plaintiffs have made a sufficient factual showing to create a question

of fact whether Officer Sapp’s use of deadly force was unreasonable under the

circumstances. See, e.g., Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1232-1233 (9th Cir.

2013) (Among the Graham factors to consider, “[t]he central issue is whether it was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances for the deputies to believe that [the decedent]

posed an immediate threat to their safety, warranting the immediate use of deadly force,

rather than less severe alternatives - such as an order to stop, an order to drop the knife, or

a warning that deadly force would be used if [the decedent] came any closer to the

deputies.”) (footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397; Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Law enforcement officers may not shoot

to kill unless, at a minimum, the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officer or others,

. . . .”) (emphasis added); Smith, 394 F.3d at 702 (noting that the second factor under

Graham - whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others - is the “most important”) (quoting Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.

1994)). 

IV. Post-Shooting Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims (Count 5)

“[P]arents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship and

society of their children.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554 (citing Curnow ex rel. Curnow v.

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Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991)). No such liberty interest, however, has

been recognized for brothers and sisters in the Ninth Circuit or established by the Supreme

Court. See Ostling v. City of Bainbridge Island, 872 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1127 (W.D. Wash.

2012) (citing Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Neither the

legislative history nor Supreme Court precedent supports an interest for siblings consonant

with that recognized for parents and children.”) (affirming dismissal of siblings’ substantive

due process claim). “Official conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents of

that interest is cognizable as a violation of due process.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554 (citing

Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). “In determining whether excessive

force shocks the conscience, the court must first ask ‘whether the circumstances are such that

actual deliberation [by the officer] is practical.’” Id. (quoting Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137;

Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). “Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer’s

‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience.” Id. “On the other hand, where

a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his

conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id. (citing Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140).

 The Supreme Court has also stated that, because it has “always been reluctant to

expand the concept of substantive due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment, where a

particular “Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection

against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized

notion of substantive due process” must be the guide for analyzing such claims. Pryor v. City

of Clearlake, 877 F.Supp.2d 929, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has indicated, “It is

reversible error to give a substantive due process instruction in an excessive force case after

Graham.” Ward, 967 F.2d at 284.

For the reasons that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a question of fact that Officer Sapp’s

conduct shocks the conscience of a reasonable juror or acted with the purpose to harm the

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decedent for reasons unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives; Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims under the Fourth Amendment adequately address Plaintiffs’ claims for excessive use

of force in fatally shooting the decedent and Plaintiffs’ unreasonable detention post-shooting;

and the decedent’s siblings clearly have no Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty interest

in the companionship of their brother, the Court will grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. Issues of fact for jury resolution, however, exist

on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims that the Defendant City and other Defendant police

officers wrongfully seized the Plaintiffs after the shooting.

V. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “shields an officer from suit when [he] makes a decision that,

even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances [he] confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). The

Supreme Court has endorsed a two-part test to resolve claims of qualified immunity: a court

must decide (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged “make out a violation of a

constitutional right,” and (2) whether the “right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time

of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

Because “it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but

mistakenly conclude that probable cause [to arrest] is present [or they may lawfully detain

persons clearly not involved in criminal conduct],” qualified immunity protects officials

“who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful.” Garcia v. County of Merced, 639

F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

seizures was sufficiently established by October 2011, that a reasonable police officer would

have had fair notice that the deadly force employed by Officer Sapp under the circumstances

presented by Plaintiffs was unlawful. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir.

2012) (finding the district court did not err when it denied the officers qualified immunity

for their use of force against Nelson.); Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir.

2004) (“In excessive force cases, the inquiry remains whether, under the circumstances, a

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reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was unlawful, and

[whether] any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.”) (alteration in

original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

While they pled qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in their Second

Amended Answer, doc. 95, ¶ 78 at 12, Defendants did not raise the issue of qualified

immunity in the Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action

for the alleged unreasonable seizures of the Plaintiffs after the shooting. In the interests of

justice and because qualified immunity seeks to avoid making police officers defendants in

lawsuits based on their official actions, the Court will address it here sua sponte. See Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)

(qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law”). Because a district court has an interest in preventing repetitive litigation, it may

raise qualified immunity sua sponte even though it was not raised in the Defendants’

summary judgment motion on Plaintiffs’ post-shooting § 1983 detention claim. See Walls

v. Schriro, 2008 WL 2463671, at *12 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2008) (citing Graves v. City of

Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 845-46 n. 23 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing qualified immunity

issue sua sponte because the defendants asserted the defense in their answer), abrogated on

other grounds by U.S. v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2007); Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d

1035, 1040 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing a district court’s sua sponte grant of qualified

immunity where the defendants raised a qualified immunity defense in their answer).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create a question

of fact for jury resolution that, based on the totality of the objective circumstances, Plaintiffs

were unreasonably seized and detained after the shooting in violation of the Fourth

Amendment and qualified immunity does not apply. While Plaintiffs were not placed in

handcuffs or other physical restraints and there is no evidence the officers used physical

force, sufficient evidence has been presented that reasonable persons under Plaintiffs’

circumstances would believe that they were not free to leave the residence. The Supreme

Court has established that “[a]n arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is

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absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626

(1991) (emphasis in original). “A seizure results in a constitutional violation only if it is

unreasonable.” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 878. (citation omitted).

 “The standard for determining whether a person is under arrest is not simply whether

a person believes that he is free to leave, . . . but rather whether a reasonable person would

believe that he is being subjected to more than the temporary detention . . . Thus, whether

an individual is in custody depends upon the objective circumstances of the situation,

[including the extent to which liberty of movement is curtailed and the type of force or

authority employed] or whether a reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would

conclude that after brief questioning he or she would not be free to leave.” United States v.

Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28. Once an encounter rises to a level such that an

individual does not feel free to leave, it becomes a “seizure,” and the investigating officer

must therefore have reasonable suspicion to justify his actions. United States v. Ayarza, 874

F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffs have presented the following evidence in opposition to the summary

judgment motion. Shortly after the shooting, additional Avondale police officers arrived at

the Plaintiffs’ home. (Doc. 149 at 4) The officers immediately separated the decedent’s

family members, and took away their cell phones. (Doc. 150, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts

(“PSOF”) at ¶¶ 15-16) The Martinez family members, including the children, were

prohibited from speaking to and comforting each other during their separation and from

leaving their residence and traveling to the hospital to see their son and brother (according

to Plaintiffs, his death was unknown to the Plaintiffs for many hours after the shooting). (Id.

at ¶16 at 13-14, Exh. 12, Deposition of M.M. at pp. 32-33; ¶ 19 at 16, Exh. 10, Deposition

of Isaiah Martinez at p. 47) Isaiah Martinez testified that if any of them even spoke to

another Martinez family member, “they’d arrest us.” (Id. at ¶ 19 at 16, Exh. 10, Deposition

of Isaiah Martinez at p. 47) After the police officers separated the Martinez children from

their parents, M.M., age 15 at the time, wanted to comfort her mother, but an Avondale

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police officer prohibited her from doing so. (“[t]hey just separated us all, and I was just

trying to run to my – to my mom. She was next to me. They kept pushing me back. And I

wanted – she was crying.”) (Id. at ¶ 45) Mr. Martinez asked an Avondale police officer if he

could hold his children, but his request was denied. The officers took physical custody of the

family’s cell phones. (Id. at ¶ 16) The decedent’s mother requested her cell phone be

returned, so she could call the family’s pastor, which was denied. (Id. at ¶ 16 at 12, Exh. 6,

Deposition of Marisol Martinez , at p. 54) Later, she convinced a police officer to call the

family’s pastor on Mrs. Martinez’s behalf, which he did. (Id., Exh. 14, Supplemental Report

of Officer Unger at p. 000818) Marisol Martinez’s request to use the bathroom was denied.

(While Officer Unger was guarding Mrs. Martinez – at approximately 7:00 p.m., over three

hours after the shooting – she asked to use the bathroom, but she was told she could not use

the restroom at that time.) (Id. at 11, Transcript of Officer Unger Recording, Exh. 26, at p.

26) 

As the evening progressed, the officers ordered pizza and Gatorade for themselves,

but did not offer any to the family until after the officers had eaten. (Id. at ¶ 15 at 10, Exh.

5, Deposition of Gregory Martinez, Sr. at p. 85) Isaiah Martinez does not recall ever being

offered any food, water, or anything to drink. (Id., Exh. 10 at pp. 48-49) The Plaintiffs and

other witnesses were treated substantially different. Unlike the Plaintiffs, Officer Sapp and

his mother, who was a witness to the shooting, were permitted to sit in a police car together

and were taken to a police station so that they could be together. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44, 46) When

Officer Sapp’s mother asked to call her husband, the Avondale police officers immediately

provided her with a phone. (Id., Exh. 15, Deposition of Terry Sapp at p. 29)

The Plaintiffs’ inability to leave their residence or the shooting scene as they wished

lasted for seven hours, from the time of the shooting at approximately 4:00 p.m. until the

conclusion of Mr. Martinez’s interview at a Goodyear police facility that night

(approximately 11:00 p.m.). (Id. at ¶ 17) According to Isaiah Martinez, the police didn’t let

us talk to each other for about eight, nine hours separated.” (Id. at ¶ 16 at p. 14, Deposition

of Isaiah Martinez, Exh. 10, at p. 19)

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Additionally, by October 2011, a reasonable police officer would have also known

that detaining Plaintiffs as mere witnesses after the shootings for an unreasonable period of

time and under the circumstances presented by Plaintiffs without probable cause or even

reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs had engaged in criminal conduct was unlawful.

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (To be clearly established, the “contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (there is no requirement that “the

very action in question [have] previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light

of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”) (citation omitted); United States

v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162, 169-70 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (finding as unreasonable seizure

and a Fourth Amendment violation for FBI to conduct a Terry stop in a non-emergency to

question witness, not suspected of criminal activity, about a third person regarding an

investigation that was several months old); Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.

2006) (finding qualified immunity applicable to police officers who detained decedent’s

family members in their home for questioning who did not consent to their detention, which

lasted approximately one and one-half hours and prevented them from being with the

decedent before he died. The 10th Circuit’s ruling was issued and published more than 5

years before the subject shooting and subsequent detention of Plaintiffs).

VI. False Arrest or Imprisonment (Count 3)

Under Arizona law, the intentional torts of false arrest and false imprisonment differ

only in terminology and are defined as “the detention of a person without his consent and

without lawful authority.” Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552

(Ariz. 1975) (citation omitted); see also Al-Asadi v. City of Phoenix, 2010 WL 3419728, at

*3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2010). “The essential element necessary to constitute either false arrest

or false imprisonment is unlawful detention.” Id., 112 Ariz. at 300, 541 P.2d at 552.

“Further, false arrest or imprisonment does not require physical detention - the tort may be

committed by intimidation.” Gortarez v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 140 Ariz. 97, 101 n.2,

680 P.2d 807, 811 n.2 (Ariz. 1984) (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 11, at 42-43 (4th ed.

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5

 Defendants have not raised Arizona’s justification statute, A.R.S. § 13-413, in their

Motion vis a vis Plaintiffs’ false arrest or imprisonment claim. The Court will not do so

unilaterally.

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1971) (finding trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendants on false arrest and

imprisonment counts alleged against a shopkeeper brought by a customer suspected of

shoplifting as issues whether the detention was carried out in a reasonable manner and for

a reasonable length of time were for the jury). “To prove a false imprisonment claim, a

plaintiff must allege and prove: ‘(1) the defendant acted with intent to confine another person

within boundaries fixed by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s act resulted in such

confinement, either directly or indirectly; and (3) the other person was conscious of the

confinement or was harmed by it.’” Allen v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 2009 WL

2382026, at *4 (Az. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2009) (“The essential element of false imprisonment

is the direct restraint of personal liberty or the freedom of locomotion.”) (quoting Hart v.

Seven Resorts, Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 281, 947 P.2d 846, 855 (Az. Ct. App. 1997); Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 35 (1965)). “The restraint may be accomplished by physical force, by

threats of force or intimidation or by assertion of legal authority.” Hunt ex rel. DeSombre

v. State, Dept. of Safety and Homeland Sec., Div. of Delaware State Police, 69 A.3d 360,

368 (Del. Supr. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S”) § 13-1303(A) provides that “[a] person commits

unlawful imprisonment by knowingly restraining another person.” A.R.S § 13-1303(B)

provides in relevant part as follows:

In any prosecution for unlawful imprisonment, it is a defense that:

1. The restraint was accomplished by a peace officer acting in good faith in the lawful

performance of his duty; . . . 

A.R.S § 13-1303(B)(1) (emphasis added) Defendants claim it is “[a] defense to the claim

of false imprisonment . . . if the restraint was accomplished by a peace officer acting in good

faith in the lawful performance of his duty.”5

 (Doc. 143 at 10) Defendants also contend that

“[n]o arrest was made of any of the Plaintiffs and there are no facts evident to show that

Plaintiffs could have reasonably believed they were detained and under arrest. . . [A]t no

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state-law claims linked to a claim based on federal law. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546

U.S. 500, 506 (2006)

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time were Plaintiffs restrained, told they were under arrest, nor were they told they could not

leave.” (Id. at 11) Thus, Defendants argue, summary judgment should be granted on

Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim because “[n]o issue of material fact is present and no

reasonable person would believe they were under arrest or detained by the officers.” (Id.) 

The Court disagrees. 

Arizona’s unlawful imprisonment statute and cases relied upon by Defendants are

unpersuasive because, by their own terms, they apply to a criminal “prosecution for unlawful

imprisonment,” not a common-law civil action for false arrest or imprisonment. Of course,

federal district courts are bound by the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court on pendent

State law claims.6

 The parties, however, have not provided, nor has the Court’s independent

research discovered, any Arizona civil case that directly or indirectly addresses the liability

of an Arizona peace officer for false arrest in a similar factual scenario. When a state’s

highest court has not squarely addressed an issue, district courts must predict how the highest

state court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions

from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises and restatements for guidance. See Glendale

Assocs., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v.

Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 186 (9th Cir. 1989).

 Claims for false arrest brought under § 1983 to vindicate the Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable seizures, are “substantially the same” as claims for false

arrest under state law. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003).

Accepting Plaintiffs’ facts as true, the Defendant police officers lacked probable cause

or reasonable suspicion to detain the Plaintiffs for any crime up to seven hours after the

shooting. Under such circumstances, the Defendant officers arguably lacked the lawful

authority or legal justification to detain the Plaintiffs for as long as they did and under the

circumstances presented by Plaintiffs. It is factually undebatable that the Defendant police

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officers intended to restrict Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement after the shooting for a period

of hours. See Allen, 2009 WL 2382026, at *4. Whether the other elements of Plaintiffs’

claims of false arrest, whether reasonable persons would believe that they were subjected to

more than the temporary detention, and whether Plaintiffs’ detentions were carried out in a

reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time are for a jury to decide.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 143, is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is hereby granted on

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims of violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural

and substantive due process as either alleged in Count 5 or otherwise alleged in Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint. All other grounds for summary judgment is denied.

Dated this 15th day of January, 2014.

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