Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01303/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MIRIAM RODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, INC. et al., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-01303-KJM-CMK 

ORDER 

Plaintiff moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a forty-five day 

extension of time to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 21. 

Defendant opposes the request. ECF No. 22. 

Generally, Rule 56(d) provides a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment 

when the non-movant needs to discover affirmative evidence necessary to oppose the motion. 

See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir.1987); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). In making a Rule 56(d) motion, a party opposing summary 

judgment must make clear “what information is sought and how it would preclude summary 

judgment.” Garrett, 818 F.2d at 1518. The movant must specifically identify relevant 

information and a basis for belief that the information exists, and must also indicate how the 

information sought could defeat summary judgment. United States v. Real Prop. & 

Case 2:15-cv-01303-KJM-CMK Document 24 Filed 04/19/16 Page 1 of 2
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Improvements Located at 2366 San Pablo Avenue, Berkeley, Cal., No. 13–02027, 2014 WL 

3704041, at *2 (N.D.Cal. July 24, 2014) (citations omitted). As the Ninth Circuit stated in 

Continental Mar. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades, 817 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.1987), under Rule 56 

“the party seeking a continuance bears the burden to show what specific facts it hopes to discover 

that will raise an issue of material fact.” Id.; see also Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

441 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.2006). 

Here, plaintiff expressly relies on Rule 56(d) in making his request for a 

continuance to depose a witness whose testimony she says is necessary to respond to the 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff’s counsel also explains the 

logistical hurdles associated with a recent sale of the building in which his law office has been 

located. Id. While this circumstance might warrant defendants’ accession to a modest extension 

of time, given that the dispositive motion deadline is some time off, it does not support a Rule 

56(d) continuance. 

Plaintiff satisfies Rule 56(d) in part, by pointing to information relevant to 

summary judgment that is likely to exist. She does not specify how that evidence will raise an 

issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s motion to continue the due date for a response to defendants’ 

motion is DENIED without prejudice to renewal or submission of a joint stipulation and proposed 

order, after a further meet and confer with defense counsel, during which the court expects both 

parties to confer reasonably and in good faith. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 19, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01303-KJM-CMK Document 24 Filed 04/19/16 Page 2 of 2