Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00423/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00423-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DAVID MOORE and VERONICA

MOORE,

NO. CIV. S-04-0423 FCD JFM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs David and

Veronica Moore’s (“plaintiffs”) motion for reconsideration and/or

motion for relief from judgment. By the motion, plaintiffs

request that the court vacate the judgment, entered June 9, 2005,

in favor of defendant United States of America; said judgment was

entered pursuant to the summary grant of defendant’s motion for

summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ failure to file an

opposition thereto. 

The court heard oral argument on the instant motion on

August 12, 2005. It hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion as they

have not demonstrated any grounds for relief, namely any

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1 While Callaham does not specifically recall registering

in the court’s electronic filing system, the court confirmed his

registration which took place on November 23, 2004. 

Additionally, while he claims to have never received a password

for the court’s system, the court confirmed that on December 3,

2004, he was sent an e-mail from the court, at the address he

provided when registering, providing him with his password. The

court did not receive a “failed delivery” response to this 

e-mail.

2 Exhibit A-1 is a copy of the standard “electronic case

file system (ECF) registration” form for attorneys in the Eastern

District. In order to register for online filing, the attorney is

required to check a box stating "I accept the above rules and

guidelines," which include: (a) that registration constitutes

consent to receive service electronically and waiver of the right

to receive personal service or service by mail; (b) that this

waiver of mail service includes notice of the entry of an order

or judgment; and (c) that "[s]ervice by electronic means is

complete upon transmission of the Notice of Electronic Filing."

(Emphasis added.)

2

“extraordinary circumstances” which would justify relief. The

judgment previously entered in defendant’s favor is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication. (Docket #10.)

Pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule (“L.R.”)

3-135, the motion was served electronically, through the court’s

server, on plaintiffs’ counsel at the same time it was filed.

(Notice of Electronic Filing [“NEF”], Ex. A-2 to Def.’s Opp’n.,

filed July 26, 2005.) Plaintiffs' counsel, William C. Callaham

(“Callaham”) is registered with the court for electronic filing.1

In the process of registering, he expressly consented to be

served electronically; he expressly waived all other forms of

service; and he expressly acknowledged that service is complete

upon transmission of a notice of electronic filing. (L.R. 3-

135(g)(1); Ex. A-1 to Def.’s Opp’n2.)

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The motion was initially noticed for hearing on April 27,

2005. However, on March 29, the court issued a minute order

postponing the hearing, due to the unavailability of the court,

until May 27, and directing the parties to submit briefs on the

schedule dictated by L.R. 78-230. (Minute Order, filed March 27,

2005, Ex. A-3 to Defs.’s Opp’n.) This minute order also was

served electronically on Callaham at the e-mail address he had

registered with the court. (NEF, Docket #12, entered March 29,

2005.)

Local Rule 78-230 required plaintiffs to file either an

opposition or notice of non-opposition to the motion for summary

judgment no later than May 13, 2005 (fourteen days before the

hearing date of May 27). However, as of May 16, they still had

not filed a response. Therefore, pursuant to its order of May

17, 2005, the court: (a) continued the hearing on the motion to

June 10, (b) ordered plaintiffs to file an opposition or

statement of non-opposition by May 27, and (c) ordered Callaham

to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for his

violation of Rule 78-230 and the order of March 29. (Amd. Order

& OSC re Sanctions, filed May 17, 2005.) This second

continuance of the summary judgment hearing required the court to

postpone the final pretrial conference (previously set for June

25) to July 29, 2005. (Id.) Again, this order was served

electronically on Callaham at the e-mail address he had

registered with the court. (NEF, Ex. A-4 to Def.’s Opp’n.)

Plaintiffs again did not comply; indeed no response

whatsoever was received by the court. However, rather than

immediately issue a sanctions order, the court directed his

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4

Courtroom Deputy Clerk to telephone Callaham to give him an

additional opportunity to respond to the court’s orders. Early

on Tuesday morning, May 31, the Deputy Clerk telephoned Callaham

to verbally order a response. The Deputy Clerk spoke with

Callaham’s legal assistant and specifically directed her to

inform Callaham to file a response or call the court by noon. 

(Sanctions Order & Further OSC, filed June 1, 2005 at 1 n.1.) 

Callaham was advised of the court’s call on that date because

shortly after the call, Callaham telephoned defendant’s counsel

inquiring about the pending motion and the order to show cause

and told him that a “court clerk” had directed him to file a

response by noon that day. (Callaham Decl., filed June 21, 2005,

¶s 25-26; Shelledy Decl., filed July 26, 2005, Ex. A, ¶ 2.) 

Defendant’s counsel offered to prepare copies of the summary

judgment motion and the May 17 order to show cause for Callaham. 

Later that day, Callaham had a runner pick up the copies of the

motion and order from defendant’s counsel’s office. (Shelledy

Decl., ¶ 3.) 

No response nor motion for continuance was filed nor other

contact made with the court by Callaham or anyone from his office

on May 31.

On the following day, June 1, having received no response to

the order to show cause or the motion for summary judgment (as

due May 27) or the phone call to Callaham’s assistant, the court:

(a) imposed sanctions of $150.00 on Callaham, (b) ordered him to

show cause why further sanctions should not be imposed for

noncompliance with the court’s prior orders, (c) directed him to

file a declaration within 30 days attesting to his compliance

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3 Essentially the same warning appeared in the

court’s pretrial scheduling order: "Failure to comply with Local

Rule 78-230(c), as modified by this order, may be deemed consent

to the motion and the court may dispose of the motion summarily.

Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1994). Further,

failure to timely oppose a summary judgment motion may result in

the granting of that motion if the movant shifts the burden to

the nonmovant to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material

fact remains for trial. Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722 (9th Cir.

1995)." (Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order at 3-4, filed June

14, 2004.)

4 Thereafter, on June 10, the court entered an order

vacating the judgment as having been entered in error. However,

on June 14, the court reinstated the judgment, explaining that

the order vacating it was based on a mistaken interpretation of

defendant's motion as requesting only summary adjudication of

discrete damages issues, whereas the motion actually,

alternatively, requested summary judgment on the case as a whole. 

(Order re: Req. for Clarification, filed June 14, 2005.)

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with the order, (d) directed plaintiffs to file an opposition or

statement of non-opposition to the summary judgment motion on or

before June 8, 2005, and (e) specifically warned plaintiffs that

failure to file an opposition by June 8 "will result in the

summary grant of the motion."3 (Sanctions Order & Further OSC,

filed June 1, 2005.) This order was served electronically on

Callaham at the e-mail address he had registered with the court. 

(NEF, Ex. A-5 to Def.’s Opp’n.) There was no response from

Callaham to this order by June 8.

As a result, on June 9, 2005, the court granted defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and further sanctioned Callaham

$300.00. In addition, the court thereupon entered judgment in

favor of defendant. (Clerk’s Judgm., entered June 9, 2005.)4 

On June 9, 2005, Callaham paid the $150.00 sanction per the

June 1 sanctions order. Thereafter, on June 20, he filed the

requisite declaration attesting to review of the Local Rules, and

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6

on June 21, he paid the $300.00 sanction per the court’s order of

June 9.

STANDARD

Plaintiffs bring the instant motion alternatively pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)/L.R. 78-230(k),

addressing motions for reconsideration, or Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b), addressing motions for “relief from judgment or

order.” A district court may reconsider its grant of summary

judgment under either rule. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.

1993). Here, the court finds that plaintiffs’ showing is more

amendable to analysis under Rule 60(b). Rule 59(e) generally

considers whether reconsideration is appropriate due to “newly

discovered evidence,” “clear error” by the court, or an

“intervening change in the law.” Id. Such considerations are

not directly applicable in this case. Rather, the matter falls

more easily within a Rule 60(b) inquiry where reconsideration is

appropriate upon a showing of “(1) mistake, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4)

a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6)

extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.” Id. at

1263 (internal quotations and citation omitted.) More

specifically, category (1) or, generally, category (6) appear to

apply most directly to the facts here.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ counsel maintains that he first became aware of

defendant’s motion and the court’s May 17 order to show cause on

May 31, 2005. Prior to that time, he explains that he never

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5 It would seem that if Callaham were able to locate the

court’s domain in his “spam folder,” he would have been able to

open the relevant documents, but for some unexplained reason that

was not possible. 

7

received, via electronic means, the motion papers or any

notifications or orders from the court. Apparently, according to

Callaham, said filings were “blocked by the automatic systems of

[his computer].” (Mem. of P.& A., filed June 21, 2005, at 3:27.) 

He did not learn of these filings until after the Courtroom

Deputy Clerk’s telephone call on May 31. Thereafter he

discovered that his “spam/junk mail blocker had blocked all 

e-mail from the court’s domain,” and that while he “un-blocked

[the] domain and determined that five “communications” had been

sent from the court but [were] blocked,” he was, however, “unable

to retrieve” the documents.5 (Callaham Decl., filed June 21,

2005, ¶ 27.) Simply put, Callaham argues that his failure to

file an opposition to the motion or to the court’s orders was the

result of “a lack of notice of [their] existence” caused by a

mistake in the “transition to the [court’s] electronic filing

system.” (Mem. of P. & A. at 2:24-25, 5:3.)

While the court would prefer to simply accept Callaham’s

version of the facts, serious questions cast doubt on his

explanation. First, when an e-mail is “blocked” from the court’s

domain, an e-mail response is generated back to the court

indicating “failed delivery.” No such e-mail responses were

received by the court. Second, Callaham’s protestations ignore

his personal registration in the court’s electronic filing system

and his resulting professional obligations to his clients and the

court. Through that process he registered the e-mail address

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used by the court and opposing counsel; he was thereafter sent a

confirming e-mail by the court, providing the court’s e-mail

address, and a password for use of the system. It was thus

Callaham’s obligation to ensure that his computer system would

not “block” or otherwise “filter” court notifications of motions

and orders to some “unretrievable” folder.

Third, the court notes that Callaham’s law firm consists of

some 20 attorneys, two of whom, besides Callaham, are registered

in the court’s electronic filing system and have cases currently

pending in this court, yet they have not experienced any similar

problems with the court’s electronic system nor, importantly, has

the court received any “failed delivery” responses from

Callaham’s firm. During oral argument, Callaham offered the

possible explanation that his “spam filter” may have had

“individualized settings” (despite supervision by the same

Information Technology (“IT”) Manager for the firm utilized by

the other firm lawyers.) Significantly, Callaham did not provide

the court with any documentation supporting this explanation nor

did he submit a declaration from the IT Manager to explain this

anamoly. 

Importantly, Callaham argues that he was only “vaguely

aware” that the court converted to an electronic filing system in

January 2005. After over a year of well publicized continuous 

notices from the court to the bar of the January 2005 start date

for the electronic filing system, resulting in Callaham’s own

registration in the system, this characterization of awareness

seems implausible. Additionally, though he had been actively

litigating this matter he also claims surprise that any

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6 As a result of the order to show cause the original

date for the final pretrial conference was continued to July 29,

2005.

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dispositive motion was filed at the close of discovery. That he

was surprised to find (apparently in June) that five

“communications,” including a motion for summary judgment were

filed, since the inception of electronic filing in January

strains credulity. How could a veteran litigator in a major

plaintiffs’ firm not have anticipated such a motion or further

orders from the court at least from the close of discovery (March

15, 2005) and before the scheduled final pretrial conference

(June 24, 2005)6?

However even assuming justifiable ignorance of the motion

and orders, and the presence of some unique misapplication of

Callaham’s spam filtering system, plaintiffs cannot prevail on

this motion. Callaham admits he received notice of the motion

and the court’s OSC on May 31, 2005 when his secretary “relayed

[the information] to me.” (Callaham Decl., ¶ 25.) Indeed,

subsequent to the court’s telephone call, Callaham contacted

defendant’s counsel to inquire about the pending motion; he told

defendant’s counsel about the court’s telephone call and

specifically of his obligation to file a response with the court

by noon that day. (Shelledy Decl., filed July 26, 2005, ¶ 2.) 

As result of their conversation, defendant’s counsel prepared

copies of the motion papers and the order to show cause which was

picked up by Callaham’s runner later that day. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Yet, despite evidence of actual knowledge of the May 17

order to show cause, the motion, and specific request of the

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court for a response to its order, Callaham took no steps to

respond. 

Thereafter, shortly after issuance, Callaham received the

June 1 order, electronically served on him, because the docket

reflects that on June 9, 2005, he paid the $150.00 sanction.

Subsequently, on June 20 and 21, 2005, respectively, he filed the

requisite declaration of compliance, that specifically referred

to the June 1 order, and the $300.00 sanction per the June 9

order. Indeed, at oral argument he admitted that some time after

May 31 and before June 8, he knew that the court would summarily

grant defendant’s motion if no response was received by June 8. 

Despite this acknowledgment, Callaham chose not to respond by

June 8. 

Callaham offers a variety of excuses for his conduct.

First, he attempts to explain his behavior by stating that

during this time, he was involved in a “very large, complicated,

wrongful death” trial in Sacramento Superior Court that “consumed

all of [his] working time and attention.” (Callaham Decl., ¶

25.) He maintains that during the entirety of the trial (which

began in early May and concluded with a verdict on June 8, 2005),

he was working approximately “18 hours per day, including

weekends.” (Id.) Assuming this to be true, it is not

justification for repeatedly ignoring court orders. But the

statement is not true. In fact, Callaham admitted at oral

argument that he was not in trial on Tuesday, May 31. Moreover,

on that day, Callaham found time to have conversations with his

legal assistant and defendant’s counsel, yet inexplicably could

not find time to contact the court or file a brief response or 

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7 “PACER” (Public Access Court Electronic Records) is a

fee based service available to the public, nationwide, providing

access to court electronic records.

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request for continuance with the court. Indeed, he acknowledged

the jury began deliberations in the wrongful death case on June

7; therefore, at that point, Callaham’s presence in court was

likely unnecessary. Finally, at a minimum, Callaham could have

directed one of the firm’s 20 attorneys or his legal assistant to

inform the court of the situation. He did none of these things. 

Second, he argues he did not contact the court because he

believed he could obtain a “continuance of the motion and/or an

agreement to resolve the case by settlement” from defendant’s

counsel. (Callaham Reply Decl., filed Aug. 5, 2005, ¶s 5-6.) 

Third, he did not believe he could contact the court, “ex

parte;” therefore, he chose not to respond to the court’s orders. 

Fourth, after discovering five “blocked” communications from

the court, he did not make an effort to obtain those

communications through PACER,7 with which his firm is registered,

because he did not know his password. 

None of these above explanations justify Callaham’s conduct. 

Rather, they simply raise more questions about his understanding

of his obligations to his clients and the court.

Finally, Callaham revealed at the conclusion of oral

argument, that he did not respond to the court’s June 1 order

because he believed, “at worst,” the grant of defendant’s summary

judgment motion would result in only “a limitation of his

clients’ damages,” not a complete dismissal of the case. Leaving

aside this apparent lack of concern for his clients’ interests,

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Callaham’s thinking was dangerously off track. Defendant’s

motion sought summary judgement and dismissal of the case. 

Defendant’s motion requested that: “For the foregoing reasons,

the Court should order that plaintiffs can recover no damages and

dismiss the complaint . . . .” (Mem. of P. & A., filed March 29,

2005, at 19.) Callaham’s calculated and losing gamble hardly

meets the Rule 60(b) standard. 

In short, plaintiffs, through their counsel’s own admissions

and proffered excuses, fail to establish “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise or excusable neglect” or otherwise “extraordinary

circumstances” required to grant the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b). While the result is harsh, where there is such obvious

and complete disregard of the court’s orders and the Local Rules,

the court reluctantly finds it has no choice but to deny the

motion. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration/relief from judgment

is DENIED. The judgment entered on June 9, 2005 in favor of

defendant is hereby affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: August 17, 2005

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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