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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MILAN C. SEIBERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel, THE UNIVERSITY OF 

OKLAHOMA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER; CHARLES YORK, 

individually and in his official capacity of 

Director of-Site Support, Site Support Div., 

HSC, State of Oklahoma; TONI STARIN, 

individually and in her official capacity as 

Assistant Director of Site Support, Site 

Support Div., HSC, State of Oklahoma; THEO 

CUSTER, individually and in his official 

capacity as Mechanical Supervisor Site Support, 

Site Support Div., HSC, State of Oklahoma; 

BOB PARIS, individually and in his official 

capacity as Plumbing Foreman, Site Support 

Div., HSC, State of Oklahoma; BILL CHENOWETH, 

individually and in his official capacity as 

Engineer, Site Support Div., HSC, State of 

Oklahoma; FRANK ROSE, individually and in his 

official capacity as Director of Office of 

Personnel Services, HSC, State of Oklahoma; and 

GARY SMITH, individually and in his official 

capacity as Vice Provost for Administration and 

Finance, HSC, State of Oklahoma, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

FILED 

United St.at.es. Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 101989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-84-1475-E) 

James D. Jordan of Unruh & Jordan, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Susan Gail Seamans, Kurt F. Ockershauser, and Lawrence E. Naifeh 

of the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, and Michael 

Appellate Case: 87-1376 Document: 01019740012 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 1 
Mannes of· Manners and Burke, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

· EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

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After examining the briefs and the appellate iecord, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

Therefore, the cause is ordered submitted without oral argument. 

The principal issues in this case are whether the University 

of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center provided plaintiff with 

satisfactory procedures before terminating his employment and 

whether the termination violated plaintiff's first amendment 

rights under the United States Constitution. We conclude that the 

University's pre-termination procedures were constitutionally 

adequate and that the termination did not violate plaintiff's 

first amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Plaintiff is a journeyman plumber certified to perform 

welding on high-pressure steam lines. He worked in the 

University's plumbing department for eleven years. About six 

months before his termination, plaintiff began voicing a series of 

complaints concerning the University's policies toward 

constructing and maintaining steam pipes and boilers. Many of 

plaintiff's complaints related to his views about the safety of 

those fixtures. Plaintiff repeatedly discussed his concerns with 

his superiors. On a few occasions, his superiors accepted his 

suggestions and made appropriate corrections. In the majority of 

instances, his superiors (many of whom were trained engineers) 

disagreed with plaintiff's views and told him so. 

Plaintiff persisted in his complaints, raising the same 

concerns over and over. His relationship with his direct foreman 

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deteriorated because plaintiff often refused to accept the 

decisions of the foreman and plaintiff's other superiors. 

Plaintiff's foreman had repeated discussions with plaintiff about 

the disruptive nature of plaintiff's complaints. On December 2, 

1981, the foreman gave plaintiff an oral and written reprimand. 

As part of the reprimand, the foreman placed plaintiff on 

''probation" for six months and warned him he must accept the 

decisions of his superiors or face termination. (Dec. 2, 1981 . -

letter, R. 82 Exh. 10: March 2, 1987 Tr. at 57-58.) 

In the weeks following the reprimand, plaintiff's complaints 

continued. He complained to his state senator and the Oklahoma 

State Department of Labor. The state agency thereafter inspected 

the University's steam pipes and largely disagreed with 

plaintiff's concerns. He also expressed his views to other 

University workers, such as electricians, causing some of them to 

fear working in service tunnels near steam pipes. 

The last straw occurred on February 24, 1982 when plaintiff 

contacted a supervisor in another department about his concerns. 

Without permission from his foreman, plaintiff left his job for an 

hour and fifteen minutes in order to take the other supervisor on 

an inspection tour of the items that plaintiff insisted were wrong 

with the University's steam pipes and boilers. Those were the 

same items that plaintiff had been raising and re-raising with his 

direct superiors for months. 

When plaintiff returned from the unauthorized tour, his 

foreman summoned him to the foreman's office to explain his 

absence and to discuss the situation. At the meeting, plaintiff 

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was less than candid. Plaintiff stated that the other supervisor 

requested that he "go look at something," failing to disclose that 

it was plaintiff who initiated the contact and the tour. On the 

next day, February 25, 1982, after consulting with other 

supervisory personnel, the foreman and another supervisor met with 

plaintiff and gave him the opportunity to resign. Plaintiff 

refused to resign, and the foreman fired him "[b]ecause of 

insubordination." (Paris Dep. at 42-43.) 1 

Under the University's policy manuals, the ter~ination of an 

employee is not f fnal for at least ten working days after the 

employee is notified of the termination. During those ten days, 

the employee has the right to initiate a series of grievance 

procedures. Here, although plaintiff consulted and retained an 

attorney during the ten-day period and gave the attorney a copy of 

the University's policy manuals within the period, plaintiff never 

invoked the procedures. At the end of the period, the University 

sent a letter to plaintiff stating that his termination was final. 

Plaintiff then filed suit in the district court under 42 

u.s.c. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. 2 He also raised various 

1 We conclude that the Paris deposition is properly part of the 

record in this case. Plaintiff and defendants both cited the 

Paris deposition in their summary judgment submissions. (~, R. 

87 and 88.) Moreover, the district court stated in its February 

9, 1987 Order that it had "exhaustively examined the pleadings, 

interrogatories, depositions, and exhibits submitted by the 

parties." (Order at 5, emphasis added.) 

2 42 u.s.c. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of 

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 

Continued on next page 

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pendent claims under state law. He named as defendants the State 

of Oklahoma, the University, and various University supervisors 

and officials involved in the dispute. 

In a series of rulings, the district court (1) granted 

defendants judgment on the pleadings to the extent that 

plaintiff's complaint sought damages from the State, the 

University, or the individual defendants acting in their official 

capacities, holding that recovery of those damages was barred by 

the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution (April 9, 

1985 Order at 1-2); (2) awarded summary judgment to the defendants 

on plaintiff's first amendment claim and on his claim that he had 

been deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law 

(February 9, 1987 Order at 6); (3) directed a verdict in favor of 

defendants on plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of a property 

interest in continued employment without due process of law, 

holding that plaintiff waived his right to a pre-termination 

hearing (March 4, 1987 Judgment); and (4) dismissed plaintiff's 

pendent state-law claims (March 4, 1987 Judgment). 

continued from previous page 

any citizen of the United States or other 

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress. 

Section 1985 of the same 

interfere with civil rights~ 

persons who knowingly fail to 

Section 1988 provides for the 

certain civil rights cases. 

title prohibits conspiracies to 

Section 1986 imposes liability upon 

prevent violations of section 1985. 

recovery of attorneys fees in 

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·on appeal, plaintiff raises five issues: (1) whether the 

eleventh amendment barred plaintiff's damage claims against the 

State of Oklahoma, its entities, and its agents acting in their 

official capacities; (2) whether defendants violated plaintiff's 

first amendment rights; (3) whether plaintiff waived any right 

that he had· to a pre-termination hearing by failing to invoke the 

University's grievance procedures; (4) whether the district court 

erred in dismissing the pendent state-law claims; and (5) whether 

the district court erred in failing to award summary judgment to 

pl°aintiff. 

I. Immunity Under Eleventh Amendment 

Plaintiff asserts that his claims under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 

1985, 1986, and 1988 against the State, the University, and the 

individual defendants acting in their official capacities are not 

barred by the eleventh amendment. 3 We disagree. 

The Supreme Court expressly has held that the eleventh 

amendment prohibits damage suits against states under section 

1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Edelman v. 

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). We see no reason why the 

3 The eleventh amendment provides: 

The judicial power of the United States shall 

not be construed to extend to any suit in law 

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 

of the United States by Citizens of another 

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 

Foreign State. 

- The Supreme Court has interpreted the eleventh amendment to bar 

suits against a state by its own citizens as well as by citizens 

of another state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). 

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Supreme Court's reasoning and holding should not apply with equal 

force to plaintiff's civil rights claims under section 1985 

(conspiracy) and section 1986 (failure to prevent conspiracy 

violations). See,~, Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1376-

77 (11th Cir. 1982) (state board of corrections immune from damage 

suits brought under sections 1983, 1985, and 1986), cert. denied, 

464 U.S. 932 (1983).4 

Nor do we agree with plaintiff's contention that the 

University or its Board of Regents is separate from the State for 

eleventh amendment purposes. The relationship between a public 

entity and a state is determined by state law. Korgich v. Regents 

of New Mexico School of Mines, 582 F.2d 549, 551 (10th Cir. 1978); 

Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118, 1121 

(10th Cir. 1978). Under Oklahoma's constitutional and statutory 

scheme, the Board of Regents, which supervises the University and 

in whose name all suits against the University must be brought, is 

an arm of the State. Okla. Const. art. XIII, XIII-A, XIII-B; 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70 §§ 3200-3310 (1981). See Gay Activists 

Alliance v. Board of Regents, 638 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Okla. 1981) 

(''For the purpose of monetary damages, as an administrative 

agency; in essence an arm of the State, the Board [of Regents of 

4 The eleventh amendment immunity established in Quern and 

Edelman does not necessarily apply to plaintiff's claim for 

attorneys fees under section 1988. · See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 

678, 693-95 (1978) (attorneys fees properly awarded under section 

1988 against state department of correction. in civil rights suit 

seeking injunctive relief). However, for the reasons shown later 

in this opinion, the district court correctly entered judgment 

against plaintiff on his civil rights claims and, consequently, 

plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys fees under section 1988. 

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the University] enjoys ·the privilege of Eleventh Amendment •.•• 

immunity granted to the State"). 

It seems obvious that a judgment against the University or 

the individual defendants in their official capacities "must be 

paid from public funds in the state treasury," and hence "is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Quern, 440 U.S. at 337. As we 

have stated previously, "a suit in a federal court against the 

members of a state board or agency acting in their official 

capacities is a suit against the board or agency itself, and [is] 

subject to the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment." 

Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118, 1121 

(10th Cir. 1978). See also,~' Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 

471-72 (1985} ("a judgment against a public servant 'in his 

official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he 

represents"}; McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1981) 

("official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 

agent"}, quoting Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

690 n.55 (1978). 

Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, nothing 

indicates to us that Oklahoma has waived its eleventh amendment 

immunity. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (waiver of eleventh 

amendment immunity must be based upon "'the most express language 

or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave 

no room for any other reasonable construction"), quoting Murray v. 

Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). Although 

plaintiff is correct that Oklahoma has waived its sovereign 

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immunity in certain circumstances, that waiver does not, in and of 

itself, amount to a waiver of Oklahoma's eleventh amendment 

immunity. See Wallace v. State of Oklahoma, 721 F.2d 301, 305 

(10th Cir. 1983). 

Consequently, the district court properly dismissed the 

damage actions against the State, the University, and the 

individual defendants acting in their official capacities. We 

must reach the remaining issues because plaintiff has requested 

injunctive relief as well as damages, and because plaintiff has .. 

sued the individual defendants in their individual capacities as 

well as their official capacities. 

II. First Amendment Issues 

Plaintiff contends that "[c]learly ••• his employment was 

terminated because of his speech." (Pl. Br. at 22.) That 

assertion is at least partially true, but it only begins the 

inquiry. Plaintiff's brief on appeal ignores the Supreme Court's 

two-part test for evaluating the first amendment rights of public 

employees: (1) whether the plaintiff's statements can be "fairly 

characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public 

concern"; and (2) whether the "interests of the [employee], as a 

citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" outweigh 

the "interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through its 

employees." Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 146 (1983). 

See also, ~' Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165, 1166-67 (10th 

Cir. 1980) (requiring '"balancing' between the right of a public 

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employee to freely comment, believe and associate in matters of 

public interest and concern, and the competing interest of the 

State, .as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 

service it performs through its employees"). 

The district court assumed that the first part of the test 

was met: "Certainly, safety in the workplace is something which 

could rise to the level of public concern." (February 9, 1987 

Order at 4.) 

However, the district court concluded that plaintiff could 

not meet the second part of the test. We need not address the 

first part of the test because we agree with the district court's 

analysis of the second part (id. at 5-6): 

Pickering [v. Board of Education, 391 

U.S. 563, 568 (1968)] requires full 

consideration of the government's interest in 

effective and efficient fulfillment of its 

responsibilities to the public. See Connick 

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983-)-.- This 

includes the prerogative to remove employees 

when their conduct hinders efficient operation 

and interferes with mandatory close working 

relationships. Id. at 151. See Arnett v. 

Kennedy, 416 u.s~. 134, 168 (1974). 

Furthermore, the employer is not required to 

let the situation reach a point where the work 

place is disrupted and the destruction of 

working relationships is manifest. Connick, 

(461 U.S. at 152). Of course, these concerns 

must be appropriately offset by the nature of 

the employee's speech. Id. 

This court has exhaustively examined the 

pleadings, interrogatories, depositions, and 

exhibits submitted by the parties in this case 

and has determined that the government's 

interest in maintaining a functioning work 

place outweighs plaintiff's expression about 

how jobs should have been done and what 

materials should have been used. Assuming 

plaintiff initially had a right to voice his 

opinions and concerns, it is undisputed that 

his supervisors lookeo into the complaints 

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made to them and determined there were no 

safety problems. Paris [plaintiff's direct 

foreman] and two other supervisors, both 

engineers, spoke with plaintiff about his 

concerns. Unsatisfied with their explanation, 

he contacted the State Department of Labor who 

made an inspection of the HSC. The Department 

cited violations the HSC was obligated to 

correct. With one exception, however, these 

were not in the nature of plaintiff's 

complaints. 

Nonetheless, even after this inspection, 

plaintiff continued to disagree about 

conditions and expressed this to other 

workers. His conduct created severe friction 

between himself and his foreman and caused 

disruption in other departments as well. ln 

fact, his foreman received a number of 

complaints from supervisors that the workers 

in their departments thought their workplace 

was unsafe because of plaintiff's talk. 

Our review of the extensive record convinces us that the 

University's interest in promoting the efficiency of its public 

services outweighed plaintiff's interest in repeating his 

disruptive safety complaints after the complaints had been 

investigated and settled. Accordingly, the district court 

correctly awarded summary judgment to defendants on this issue. 

See generally Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). 

III. Pre-termination Hearing Requirement 

Plaintiff asserts that he was entitled to a pre-termination 

hearing under the due process clause because he had a property 

interest in continued employment by the University. In response, 

defendants contend that plaintiff had no property interest in 

continued employment and that even if he did, he waived his right 

to a pre-termination hearing. The district court decided to hold 

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a bifurcated trial on those two issues in reverse order. The 

first portion of the trial was dedicated to the question of 

whether plaintiff waived any right that he might have had to a 

pre-termination hearing. If plaintiff were successful at the 

first portion of the trial, then the second portion was to concern 

whether plaintiff had a property interest entitling him to.a pretermination hearing. 

At the conclusion of the first portion of the trial, the 

district court held that plaintiff, by refusing to initiate the 

grievance procedures outlined in the University's policy manuals, 

waived any right to a pre-termination hearing. Consequently, the 

district court directed the jury to enter a verdict in favor of 

defendants.5 

We do not agree with the district court that plaintiff waived 

his right to a pre-termination hearing by refusing to initiate the 

University's grievance procedures because, in our opinion, the 

grievance rules effectively were post-termination procedures. 

However, we are persuaded that the judgment for defendants on 

plaintiff's due process claim should be sustained on the 

alternative ground that the undisputed evidence in the record 

establishes that plaintiff in fact was accorded all of the pretermination hearing opportunities required by the Constitution. 

5 Because of our disposition of this issue based upon the 

adequacy of the University's pre-termination procedures, we need 

not address whether plaintiff in fact had a property interest in 

continued employment deserving due process protection. Defendants 

point out that nothing in Oklahoma's statutes or in the 

University's policy manuals establishes that plaintiff was 

anything other than an employee terminable at will. Although 

defendants' arguments· are facially compelling, the district court 

did not need to, resolve the issue, and we need. not do so either. 

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An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a district court on 

any grounds that find support in the record, provided the 

litigants have had a fair opportunity to develop the record. See, 

~' Blum v. Bacon, 457 u~s. 132, 137 n.5 (1982) ("It is well 

accepted ••• that without filing a cross-appeal or cross 

petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the 

record in support of the judgment below"); Colorado Flying 

Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 880 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (i986). 

It is settled that the "'root requirement' of the Due Process 

Clause [is] 'that an individual be given an opportunity for a 

hearing before he is deprived of any significant property 

interest.'" Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 

532, 542 (1985) (emphasis in original), quoting Boddie v. 

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). The Supreme Court in 

Loudermill held that "[t]his principle requires 'some kind of a 

hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a 

constitutionally protected property interest in his employment." 

470 U.S. at 542. A pre-termination hearing is necessary in order 

to balance the competing interests at stake: the "private interest 

in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the 

expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance 

of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous 

termination." Id. at 542-43. 

The Supreme Court in Loudermill held that a security guard 

employed by a school district should have been given some 

opportunity to explain an apparent misstatement found in his job 

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application before being fired. The Court stated that the 

"pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary, need not be 

elaborate." Id. at 545. Indeed, "[t]he formality and procedural 

requisites £or the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance 

of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent 

proceedings." Id. 

The purpose of the pre-termination hearing is to be an 

"initial check against mistaken decisions -- essentially, a 

determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the charges against the employee are true and support the 

proposed action." Id. at 545-46. In an employment context, the 

"essential requirements of due process • • • are notice and an 

opportunity to respond. • To require more than this prior to 

termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the 

government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory 

employee." Id. at 546. 

Here, the district court essentially held that the 

University's elaborate grievance procedures were ~-termination 

procedures which plaintiff knowingly waived. The district court 

apparently focused on the fact that under the University's 

procedures, a termination is not "final" until ten working days 

after the University gives the employee what the University calls 

a ''notice of termination." The University's rules provide that 

the employee can begin the grievance procedures at any time during 

the ten-day period. The rules further provide that if the 

employee initiates· the procedures, then the termination is 

suspended temporarily and "no termination papers will be processed 

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••• until the grievance has been resolved." (Staff Handbook at 

14 (R. 82 Exh. 9); March 2, 1987 Tr. at 44, 56.) 

Although a termination technically is not final for ten days, 

in our view the University's policies demonstrate that as a 

practical matter, termination occurs as soon as the employee is 

given "notice of termination." During the ten-day period and 

during the pendency of the grievance procedure (assuming that the 

employee invokes the procedures), the employee is not allowed to 

work. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 53.) More to the point, the employee 

receives no pay during that time. (Staff Handbook at 14 (R. 82 

Exh. 9).) In addition, if the employee's grievance is not 

successful and the termination ultimately is upheld, then the 

effective date of the termination relates back to the date of the 

initial notice. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 49.) 

Indeed, the University's conduct in this case indicates that 

plaintiff's termination effectively occurred on the date of his 

final meeting with his supervisors and not ten days later. 

Although the University's witnesses testified that plaintiff's 

foreman gave plaintiff a "notice of termination" at their final 

meeting, the foreman's statement to the plaintiff at the time was 

more direct: "[A)s of now, you are terminated." (Id. at 38.) 6 

6 The district court recognized the importance of whether 

plaintiff was terminated at the time of his final meeting with the 

foreman or ten working days later: "Well, sure it's ••• 

terminology, but there's a vast difference between you're 

terminated or I'm going to recommend that you be terminated." 

(March 2, 1987 Tr. at 38.) The foreman's own interpretation of 

what happened was that he fired plaintiff at the time of the final 

meeting (id. at 30): 

Q. Okay. So you're saying, he was 

Continued on next page • 

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Therefore, we cionclude that the University's gri~vance 

mechanism, at least in the context of the facts of this case, was 

effectively a post-termination procedure. Thus, contrary to the 

district court's reasoning, the fact that plaintiff knowingly 

waived his grievance rights is not relevant to the issue of 

whether plaintiff received.proper pre-termination procedures. 

Notwithstanding that conclusion, we find more than sufficient 

evidence in the record to establish that the pre-termination 

procedures which the University accorded plaintiff fully satisfied 

plaintiff's constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to 

be heard before discharge. The Constitution does not require an 

elaborate or formal pre-termination hearing. All that is required 

is an "initial check" against mistaken decisions. The employee 

needs only "notice and an opportunity to respond" to the basis of 

the firing. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46. 

Here, there was an extensive history of warnings, including 

probation, whereby the University notified plaintiff that his 

conduct constituted insubordination and jeopardized his continued 

employment. The University gave plaintiff numerous opportunities, 

including face-to-face meetings, to justify and explain his 

position, but he continued to persist in his disruptive attitude 

and conduct. There is no dispute that plaintiff's supervisors 

ultimately fired plaintiff because, in their opinion, he was 

guilty of insubordination. (Paris Dep. at 42.) Plaintiff 

• continued from previous ppge 

either going to quit or he was going to be 

fired right there; is that correct? 

A. Yes. 

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disagrees that he was, in fact, guilty of insubordination, given 

the alleged legitimacy of his safety concerns. But plaintiff does 

not dispute that he was warned that further conduct of the type 

which his supervisors deemed to be insubordination could lead to 

his discharge. 

We conclude that plaintiff's supervisors gave plaintiff 

sufficient warnings and ample opportunities to "present his side 

of the story." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. 

First, plaintiff's foreman repeatedly told plaintiff that he 

was disrupting the department and that he could not keep rehashing 

his same complaints after his superiors had made final decisions. 

(~, Paris Dep. at 45-46.) During those discussions, plaintiff 

was given the opportunity to explain his position. 

Second, in late 1981, another of plaintiff's supervisors met 

with plaintiff's wife, who also worked for the University. The 

supervisor told her about plaintiff's unacceptable behavior and 

sought her help in convincing plaintiff to cooperate with his 

supervisors. The supervisor told her that "if Mr. Seibert could 

not accept the opinion of two registered professional engineers he 

should not be· working at the Health Sciences Center, especially if 

he had no facts to show ~he engineers were wrong." (Starin 

Interrogatories at 4, R. 82 Exh. 8; March 2, 1987 Tr. (first 

session) at 21-22.) On the next day, plaintiff's wife told the 

supervisor that she had talked with plaintiff and that he told her 

that he would see if he could "work things out" with his foreman. 

Plaintiff's wife also told the supervisor that, according to 

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plafntiff, if the situation was not r~solved, plaintiff "would not 

quit, but would have to be fired." (Starin Interrogatories at 5.) 

Third, on December 2, 1981, less than three months before the 

termination, plaintiff's foreman held a formal meeting with 

plaintiff to discuss the problems created by his persistent 

complaints~ The foreman gave plaintiff an oral reprimand, telling 

him that he was "on probation" for six months and that unless his 

disruptive actions ceased, he would be subject to termination. 

(March 2, 1987 Tr. at 21-22, 25-26.) Plaintiff again was given 

the opportunity to explain his position at that time. 

Fourth, on the same day that he gave plaintiff the oral 

reprimand, plaintiff's foreman gave plaintiff a written reprimand 

conveying the same message. The written reprimand was entitled 

"Disciplinary Action" and stated that "[c]ontinuation of past 

attitudes, lack of communication or arguments when the job is 

assigned, will result in immediate termination." (Dec. 2, 1981 

letter, R. 82 Exh. 10; March 2, 1987 Tr. at 57-58.) The written 

reprimand further stated that if plaintiff's conduct improved over 

the six-month probation period, then the reprimand would "be 

removed from [plaintiff's] personnel file and destroyed." 

Plaintiff signed a copy of the ·reprimand, indicating that he had 

"read the above."7 

Fifth, on the day that the foreman discovered plaintiff's 

absence from work (when plaintiff was away conducting an 

inspection tour of his various concerns with a supervisor from 

7 Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge his probation and 

the reprimand by filing a grievance under the University's 

procedures. He did not do so. 

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another department), the foreman held another meeting with 

plaintiff. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 22-23.) Plaintiff was given the 

opportunity to explain where he had been and why. 

Sixth, on the next day, the foreman and another supervisor 

held what was to become the final meeting with plaintiff. 

Although the foreman testified that he did not "invite" plaintiff 

to explain his position again, the foreman purportedly had an 

"open mind" and "would have discussed it.with him, but he didn't 

so choose." (Id. at 33.) After plaintiff rejected the foreman's 

suggestion that he resign, the foreman told him that he was 

terminated. The other supervisor present at the meeting then 

handed plaintiff a copy of the University's grievance procedures. 

We believe that the totality of the procedures and 

opportunities which the University afforded plaintiff were 

sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. Plaintiff was 

not fired out of the blue. Plaintiff was not fired for reasons 

that he did not know. Plaintiff was not fired without being given 

the ''opportunity to present his side of the story." Loudermill, 

470 U.S. at 542. The University's procedures equaled or exceeded 

those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 

55, 65 (1979). The Court in Barry held that no due process 

violation had occurred where a horse trainer whose license was 

suspended for allegedly drugging a horse "was given more than one 

opportunity to present his side of the story'' before the 

suspension. Id. at 65. 

·Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff 

had a property interest in continued employment at the University, 

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plaintiff had available all of the pre-termination due process 

protections that the Constitution requires. 

IV. Remaining Issues 

Having concluded that the district court properly dismissed 

all of plaintiff's federal claims, we hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's pendent 

state law claims as well. See, ~' Key Financial Planning Corp. 

v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643-44 (10th Cir. 1987}; 

Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1984} 

(pendent state claims properly dismissed after trial began). 

Because the evidence was sufficient to support a judgment in favor 

of defendants, the district court properly denied plaintiff's 

competing motion for summary judgment. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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