Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-01898/USCOURTS-ca3-09-01898-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-1898

 

ERIC LEKICH, 

 Appellant

v.

COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI,* in his official capacity as Chairman of

Municipal Police Officers Educational Training Commission (MPOETC); 

DOYLESTOWN BOROUGH

*(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c))

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-08-cv-01048

District Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 14, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY, and SMITH Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 15, 2010)

 

OPINION

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Eric Lekich appeals from the judgment of the United States District

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 MPOETC, incorrectly named by Plaintiff, and thus in the caption, as the Municipal 1

Officers’ Educational Training Commission, is an arm of the Pennsylvania State Police and is

responsible for setting the minimum standards required of applicants to be police officers within

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and certifying that an applicant has met them. 53 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 2164(8), (12). It acts on an application for certification only by direction of a police

department that has extended an offer of employment to the applicant. 37 Pa. Code § 203.15(c).

2

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entering summary judgment in favor

of Defendants and against him on his claims of disability discrimination and

retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. We will affirm.

I.

Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, we presume familiarity

with the facts and recite them only briefly. Eric Lekich is a 2006 graduate of the

Municipal Police Officers’ Training Program of Montgomery County Community

College. After graduation he interviewed with the Chief of Police of Doylestown

Borough and received a conditional offer for a part-time police officer position. 

The Chief told Lekich that he had to return a physical evaluation form to the

Police Department after having it filled out by two physicians, with whom

appointments had already been made. The Chief also notified the Municipal

Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission (“MPOETC”) that he had

given Lekich an offer of employment conditioned on his passing the required tests. 

MPOETC then scheduled a written examination for Lekich.1

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
3

Lekich went to his physical examinations. The doctor performing the vision

test indicated on the evaluation form that Lekich lacked normal color perception. 

Lekich returned the evaluation form to the Doylestown Police Department as he

was instructed. A few days later he received a call from the Chief of Police that

his conditional job offer was being withdrawn because of the vision test result. 

Because the conditional offer was withdrawn, the Doylestown Police Department

never forwarded a packet on Lekich to MPOETC for processing.

Lekich then contacted MPOETC to inquire about retaking the vision test but

was told he had no recourse. He nevertheless saw another doctor to retake the test. 

This doctor confirmed that Lekich had a color perception problem, but also stated

it was minor and, in his opinion, would not interfere with Lekich’s working as a

police officer.

Lekich then retained counsel and, through him, sought to have MPOETC

either waive the vision requirement or consider the newer vision exam. MPOETC

informed counsel that it was authorized only to process applications from police

departments. Thus, it could do nothing for Lekich without his having an offer of

employment and an application packet sent to MPOETC on his behalf. Lekich

sent further information to MPOETC, but it took no further action.

Lekich filed this action seeking legal and equitable relief for Defendants’

alleged discrimination and retaliation against him. His Amended Complaint, after

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 By operation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c), Colonel Frank Pawlowski 2

has been automatically substituted for Colonel Jeffrey B. Miller because he succeeded him to the

position of Chairman of MPOETC.

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stipulating to the dismissal of two counts only as to one of the Defendants,

asserted claims as follows: Count I asserted a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), against Colonel Jeffrey B.

Miller, in his official capacity as Chairman of MPOETC; Count II asserted a claim

under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. (“RA”), against Colonel

Miller in his official capacity and against Doylestown Borough; Count III asserted

an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colonel Miller in his

official capacity and against Doylestown Borough; and Count IV asserted a claim

under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951, et seq.

(“PHRA”), against Colonel Miller in his official capacity.

Cross motions for summary judgment followed, and the District Court

granted both Defendants’ motions and denied Lekich’s motion on all Counts. 

Lekich now appeals. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, and we have jurisdiction under § 1291.

Lekich’s brief on appeal is silent as to his § 1983 claim, and as to all claims

against Doylestown Borough. Thus, we consider only the ADA, RA, and PHRA

claims, and then only as to Defendant Miller.2

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
5

II.

We “exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment and apply the same standard that the District Court should have

applied.” Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146

(3d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences

from the evidence must be drawn in his favor. Conopco, Inc. v. United States, 572

F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2009).

III.

Defendant Miller (now Defendant Pawlowski) is sued only in his official

capacity as Chairman of MPOETC. “Official-capacity suits are an alternative way

to plead actions against entities for which an officer is an agent.” Koslow v.

Commonwealth of Pa., 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, we will refer to

the Chairman of MPOETC simply as “MPOETC.”

The ADA prohibits any “covered entity” from discriminating against

individuals on the basis of a disability in making employment decisions. 42

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 Because the acts Lekich complains of took place prior to January 1, 2009, MPOETC 3

argues that the Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) is not

applicable. Lekich neither cites the amended law in his initial Brief nor has filed a Reply Brief

arguing that the ADAAA does apply, despite its effect on the “disability” and “regarded as”

provisions of the ADA. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 188 n.17 (3d

Cir. 2009). Though we have not decided whether the ADAAA is retroactive, id., our disposition

of this case would not be affected by the answer to this question.

6

U.S.C. §§ 12112(a). “The term ‘covered entity’ means an employer, employment

3

agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” Id. §

12111(2). MPOETC is not any of these things in this context. It is merely a

governmental body that certifies that an applicant has or has not met certain

preordained guidelines when a police department—an employer—directs it to

process an application. 37 Pa. Code § 203.15(c); see also 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

2164. Thus, MPOETC did not violate the non-discrimination in employment

provisions of the ADA because it is not subject to them.

In addition, and only assuming MPOETC is covered by the nondiscrimination in employment provisions of the ADA, we conclude that Lekich’s

claims lack merit. A prima facie case of discrimination requires, inter alia, that an

adverse employment action be taken against the complainant. Shaner v. Synthes,

204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). None was taken here by MPOETC because

Lekich’s offer of employment was withdrawn. Thus, MPOETC had nothing on

which to act. We agree with the District Court that Lekich’s ADA discrimination

claim fails “because MPOETC was never in a position to make a certification

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 Lekich testified in his deposition that he understood he needed a job offer for MPOETC 4

to certify him. Thus, he would have understood that its refusal to certify him was connected to

his lack of an offer of employment.

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decision regarding [him].”

4

As the District Court recognized, Lekich’s retaliation claim “simply

reframe[s] the allegations underlying his claims of unlawful discrimination.”

Assuming Lekich can establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the

ADA by MPOETC’s refusal to provide him with a reasonable accommodation

after he requested it, MPOETC bears the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500. MPOETC argues

that its reason for refusing to waive the vision requirement or accept the second

opinion on Lekich’s vision—what Lekich argues would be reasonable

accommodations—was that it can only act on an application packet sent to it by a

police department that has extended an offer of employment. 37 Pa. Code §

203.15(c). Without this, it had nothing to act on, whether granting or denying the

request for an accommodation. Lekich has failed to demonstrate that this reason is

pretext, and his claim thus fails.

This reasoning yields the same result for Lekich’s RA and PHRA claims. 

29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (declaring that the same standards apply to an RA claim as an

ADA claim); Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 433 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009)

(noting that the same analysis controls an ADA claim as a PHRA claim)

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
8

(quotation omitted).

IV.

We conclude that Lekich has failed to point to a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether MPOETC violated the ADA, RA, or PHRA. Thus, we will

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Case: 09-1898 Document: 00319984822 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/15/2010