Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03091/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983d Civil Rights (Death)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY HAUSER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF EL CAJON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv3091 W (MDD)

ORDER DENYINGING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS [DOC. 6]

Defendants City of El Cajon and El Cajon Police Officer Samson Pak move to 

dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose. 

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 

See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Defendants’ 

motion [Doc. 6]. 

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I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs Larry and Judy Hauser are the parents and successors in interest of 

decedent, Kelsey Hauser. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 2.) Defendant City of El Cajon is the 

employer of Defendant Samson Pak and other police officers referred to herein. (Id. ¶ 6.)

On January 16, 2016, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Kelsey was a passenger in a 

stolen 2014 Toyota Yaris driven by Geoffrey Sims. (Compl. ¶ 10.) El Cajon police 

officers attempted to the stop the car, but Sims fled from the officers. (Id.) Defendant 

Officer Samson Pak engaged in a high speed pursuit of the car on both the freeway and 

surface streets. (Id.) 

When the Yaris drove into a cul-de-sac on a surface street, Officer Pak, a short 

distance ahead of several other officers, rammed the right passenger side of the car with 

his police car, at a speed of approximately 25 miles per hour. (Compl. ¶ 11.) As he did 

so, Officer Pak saw Sims in the driver’s seat, Kelsey in the passenger seat, two males in 

the back seat, and a dog in between Sims and Kelsey. (Id.) 

After hitting the Yaris with the front of his vehicle, Officer Pak got out of his 

vehicle with his gun drawn. (Compl. ¶ 12.) The Yaris slowly backed up, and Officer Pak 

“moved from behind the car to a position in front of the car, then immediately to a 

position approximately 15 feet off the passenger side of the car.” (Id.) As the car moved 

backward then forward at a very slow rate of speed, Officer Pak fired several shots “into 

the Yaris at the passenger.” (Id.) Kelsey was hit twice, in the jaw and chest. (Id.) She 

was conscious and in severe pain until paramedics arrived, but died following several 

emergency medical procedures. (Id. ¶ 13.) The Complaint alleges and Defendants’ 

motion concurs that at no point did Kelsey do anything that posed a threat to Officer Pak. 

 

1 Throughout this order, parties and witnesses will be referred to by their last name. However, to avoid 

any confusion, where multiple parties or witnesses share the same last name, they will be referred to by 

their first name.

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(Id. ¶ 12; P&A [Doc. 6-1] 10:16–17.) A gunshot also hit and killed the dog in the front 

seat. (Compl. ¶ 12.) No shots hit the driver. (Id.)

On November 27, 2016, Kelsey’s parents filed two claims against Officer Pak 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a 4th Amendment excessive force claim on Kelsey’s behalf, and 

a 14th Amendment loss of familial relationship claim brought on their own behalf.

(Compl. ¶¶ 14–21.) Defendants now seek to dismiss these two causes of action, arguing 

the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 4th or 14th Amendment claim, 

and that Officer Pak is entitled to qualified immunity. (P&A 14:22–15:3.) Plaintiffs 

oppose the motion. (See Opp’n [Doc. 7].)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either 

for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In ruling on the 

motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the 

complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 

487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has 

interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 

(2007). The allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

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Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, but a court is not required 

to accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable 

inferences. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION 

A. The Complaint’s factual allegations support a 4th Amendment 

violation claim.

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the 

contention that Officer Pak’s shooting and killing of Kelsey constituted an excessive and 

unreasonable use of force and thus an unlawful seizure, in violation of the 4th 

Amendment. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Defendants argue the claim should be dismissed because

Plaintiffs fail to establish Kelsey “was seized under the 4th Amendment because no facts 

establish Pak specifically intended to restrict [Kelsey’s] freedom of movement through 

the use of force.” (P&A 1:17–20.)

A 4th Amendment seizure occurs when an officer intentionally restricts another’s 

freedom of movement. Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). The detention 

must be intentional because the 4th Amendment protects against misuse of power, “not 

the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct.” Id. In effecting a 

seizure, an officer's use of deadly force is reasonable only if “the officer has probable 

cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 

officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 

The central issue Defendants raise is whether the Complaint adequately asserts that 

Officer Pak intentionally shot Kelsey. The Complaint alleges that Officer Pak “fired 

several shots into the Yaris, at the passenger, at least two of which struck the passenger, 

Kelsey Hauser.” (Compl. ¶ 12, emphasis added.) Defendants argue this allegation

establishes no more than a possibility that Officer Pak intentionally shot Hauser and that 

a more concrete statement of intent such as Officer Pak “intended to shoot Hauser” or 

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“intentionally shot Hauser” is required. (Reply [Doc. 8], 4:14–16.) Although 

Defendants’ proposed allegation is a clearer indication of Officer Pak’s intention when 

firing his weapon, the Court disagrees that the Complaint’s allegation is not sufficient. 

As set forth above, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all material 

allegations of fact as true, and construe the Complaint in a light most favorable to

Plaintiffs. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1249. Under this standard, the inclusion of “at” provides 

an adequate inference of Officer Pak’s intent to shoot Kelsey. In short, it is reasonable to 

infer that when you shoot a gun “at” someone, you intended to shoot that person. 

Moreover, adding plausibility to Plaintiffs’ assertion is the fact that Officer Pak 

shot at Kelsey from only 15 feet away, while on her side of the car, hitting her twice, and 

not hitting the driver. Defendants respond by highlighting that because Kelsey was not 

driving and had done nothing threatening there would have been no reason for Officer 

Pak to intentionally shoot Kelsey. (P&A 10:16–17.) But such an argument begs the 

question Plaintiffs raise in this lawsuit: why the officer fired three shots into the 

passenger side of the car while standing only 15 feet away. For these reasons, the Court 

finds the Complaint’s allegations are sufficient to support a 4th Amendment violation.

B. The Complaint’s factual allegations support a 14th Amendment 

violation claim.

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the 

contention that Offer Pak’s acts deprived Plaintiffs’ “of their constitutionally protected 

due process right to the love, support, affection and companionship of their daughter, in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” (Compl. ¶ 20.) Defendants raise two 

grounds for dismissal. First, Defendants contend the lack of a 4th Amendment claim 

prevents Plaintiffs from raising a 14th Amendment claim. (P&A 11:10–12.) Second,

Defendants argue the Complaint contains no facts “establishing Pak’s use of force was 

‘consence-shocking’ [sic] in that it was unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement 

objective and employed solely for the purpose of punishing [Kelsey].” (P&A 1:20–23.)

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The standard of culpability for a due process right to familial association claim is 

whether the officer’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 

1137 (9th Cir. 2008). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, it must be demonstrated that the officer acted with a purpose to harm for reasons 

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Id. Whether a jury could infer that 

an officer was acting for purposes other than legitimate law enforcement is determined by 

looking at the totality of the circumstances. City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 

850 (1998).

Defendants preliminarily argue that “the absence of an actionable 4th Amendment 

excessive force claim precludes [Plaintiffs’] 14th Amendment loss of familial association 

claim.” (P&A 11:10–12.) This argument fails, as this Court has found the allegations are 

sufficient to support a 4th Amendment violation claim. 

Defendants next argue that there are no allegations establishing Officer Pak 

deliberately shot Kelsey with a purpose unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement 

objective. (P&A 11:25–26.) The central problem with Defendants’ argument is that

based on the Complaint’s allegations, there would have been no reason for Officer Pak to 

target Kelsey. In fact, Defendants conceded this point and highlighted that Kelsey “was 

not driving but just was sitting in the car while it was moving, and she did nothing 

threatening and never tried to flee.” (P&A 10:16–19.) Given that at this stage in the 

litigation all facts pled must be accepted as true, the Court finds that because there was no 

legitimate law enforcement objective for Officer Pak to intentionally shoot Kelsey, it is 

reasonable to infer “the officer acted with a purpose to harm for reasons unrelated to 

legitimate law enforcement objectives” and thus his conduct was “conscience-shocking.”

Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137.

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C. Defendant Pak is not entitled to Qualified Immunity

Defendants next argue that if the Court finds viable 4th or 14th Amendment claims 

are alleged, Officer Pak is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. (P&A 12:8–13.) 

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for monetary 

damages unless the plaintiff establishes that (1) the conduct violated a constitutional 

right, and (2) the right was “clearly established” when the misconduct occurred. Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236–42 (2009) (modifying the two-step inquiry in 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), to allow courts discretion in deciding which prong 

to address first depending on the facts of the particular case). “Clearly established” 

means “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 

would understand what he is doing violates that right” with careful consideration to the 

facts of the particular case. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In 

determining whether a right is clearly established, courts “may look at unpublished 

decisions and the law of other circuits, in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent.” Prison 

Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 2005); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 

965, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (looking to “decisions of our sister Circuits, district courts, and 

state courts” in evaluating if law was clearly established).

Defendants argue that Officer Pak is entitled to qualified immunity because

“[w]hether passengers can bring Fourth Amendment excessive force claims under any 

factual scenario is uncertain” and therefore Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the “clearly 

established” prong. (P&A 12:8–10.)2 But similar to Plaintiffs’ claim here, in Tubar v. 

Clift, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2006), the district court denied an officer’s 

motion for qualified immunity, and allowed a passenger shot by the officer to pursue his

Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 1253. The decision was then affirmed by the Ninth 

 

2 Specifically, Defendants contend that because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter, then it is 

not “clearly established law.” (P&A 12:n.3.) This argument is contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent 

holding that unpublished decisions and the law of other circuits may be used to determine whether a 

right is clearly established. Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 702; Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 970.

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Circuit. See Tubar v. Clift, 286 Fed.Appx. 348 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendants’ argument is 

therefore meritless.

Apparently recognizing that Tubar contradicts their argument, Defendants attempt 

to distinguish the case on the basis that, unlike Kelsey, the passenger in Tubar was a 

suspect who the officer intended to seize when he shot into the car. (P&A 13 n.4.) 

Again, their argument lacks merit. 

Similar to Officer Pak, the officer defendant in Tubar contended that because he 

intended to shoot the driver, the passenger was not seized and could not maintain his

Fourth Amendment claim. Tubar 453 F.Supp. 2d at 1255. In support of this argument, 

the officer relied on cases involving innocent or undetected bystanders or hostages who 

were accidently shot by officers. The district court rejected the argument because the 

passenger and driver were both suspects, who the officer “intended to stop and seize....” 

Id. In other words, the passenger’s status as a suspect was important to establish the

officer’s intent to seize him when he fired his weapon.

In contrast, here, the Complaint alleges that Officer Pak specifically shot “at” 

Kelsey, while standing only 15 feet from her side of the car. These facts are sufficient to 

create a reasonable inference that he intended to shoot Kelsey, and thus seized her. 

Whether Kelsey was a suspect at the time is, therefore, immaterial at this stage in the 

litigation. More importantly, because Tubar was decided ten years before Officer Pak 

shot Kelsey, the Court finds the law was clearly established at the time of the incident 

and accordingly Officer Pak is not entitled to qualified immunity.3

 

3

 The Supreme Court has noted that particularized case law is only necessary in not-so-obvious 

cases. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). Notwithstanding that Tubar is directly on point, 

the Court also feels this is an “obvious” case involving 4th and 14th Amendment violations. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Pak intentionally shot Kelsey, while Defendants have 

acknowledged Kelsey was neither driving nor doing anything threatening. Under these circumstances, 

Officer Pak’s conduct was contrary to Garner’s holding that deadly force may not be used to affect a 

seizure unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of 

death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Id. 471 U.S. at 1.

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion [Doc. 6].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2017

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