Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04550/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04550-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOURDES SANTOS-REYES,

Plaintiff,

v

ALBERTO R GONZALES, United States

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendant. /

No C 05-4550 VRW

ORDER

This case involves claims of employment discrimination

and retaliation against plaintiff’s former employer the Federal

Correctional Institute in Dublin, California (FCI-Dublin). Doc #1. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on each of the discrimination

and retaliation claims. Doc #26. 

Plaintiff in pro se alleged seven claims against her

former employer FCI-Dublin. See Doc #1. Now represented by

counsel, plaintiff focuses her efforts on only two of these claims. 

See Doc #42. While government counsel inappropriately asserted

that plaintiff “conceded all but two claims” of the seven asserted

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

in her complaint, see Def Reply Br, Doc #48 at 1, 6, where in fact

plaintiff’s counsel merely failed to argue all but two claims – a

distinction not without a difference – plaintiff’s counsel at oral

argument acknowledged that he was abandoning all but the sixth and

seventh claims of the complaint. These allege claims for hostile

work environment under the Rehabilitation Act and for disability

discrimination under Title VII. Both claims arise from the same

set of facts and therein lies plaintiff’s difficulties. Although

afforded remedies through grievance and mediation procedures,

plaintiff failed to see these through and thus her claims are

barred. 

I

Plaintiff, a female of Filipino descent, began working as

a physician’s assistant at FCI-Dublin in 1987 and continued in this

capacity until 1989. Doc #43 at 1; Doc #1 at 1-2. In April 1994,

after completing her residency, plaintiff was hired by FCI-Dublin

as a physician/medical officer. Doc #43 at 1. FCI-Dublin is a

correctional institution primarily for female prisoners that houses

approximately 1,400 inmates, around 700-800 of whom are located

within the “chronic care” unit. Doc #51 at 2. Plaintiff worked

under the supervision of Dr Tracy Thompson from April 1994 until

around October 1999. Doc #27, Ex C at 24; Doc #26 at 3. Plaintiff

received positive written job performance reviews from Thompson. 

Doc #43 at 2. In the time between Thompson’s departure and the

hiring of a new clinical director, plaintiff was supervised by Dr

Marcus Pang. Doc #27, Ex C at 25; Doc #26 at 3. No negative

performance reviews were recorded during this period either. In

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

January 2000, Dr Belen Ezaz, a female of Filipino descent, was

hired as the new clinical director and began supervising plaintiff

and Pang. Id. It is the relationship between plaintiff and Ezaz

that triggered the present suit.

Plaintiff alleges that Ezaz began harassing her and

discriminating against her almost immediately after becoming

clinical director. Doc #1 at 2. Plaintiff specifically alleges

that Ezaz gave her unwarranted negative job performance reviews

(id; Doc #42 at 2); that Ezaz assigned plaintiff a greater number

of difficult, or “chronic care,” patients than she assigned to Pang

(Doc #42 at 3); and that Ezaz yelled at plaintiff in front of other

staff and inmates regularly, but did not do the same to Pang. Doc

#42 at 2; Doc #1 at 2.

After Ezaz assumed her position as clinical director,

plaintiff took leave from work on several occasions, including from

August 30, 2000, to February 14, 2001 (Doc #43 at 2; Doc #26 at 6);

from July 10, 2001, to February 14, 2002 (Doc #43 at 3; Doc #26 at

6); and from April 8, 2003, until her termination on November 6,

2003. Doc #43 at 6; Doc #26 at 6. Plaintiff asserts that each

leave was the result of depression caused by Ezaz’s harassment and

discrimination. See Doc #43 at 2-3, 6. Plaintiff began to see Dr

Harvey Widroe in August 2000 for depression. He prescribed a

number of medications. Doc #43 at 2-3. 

On November 24, 2000, plaintiff filed a formal union

grievance concerning Ezaz’s “continuous harassment” and the

negative performance rating plaintiff received from Ezaz. See Doc

#28, Ex B. On January 31, 2001, the union invoked arbitration on

plaintiff’s behalf, Doc #27, Ex C at 56-57, and an arbitration

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

hearing was held concerning plaintiff’s grievance one year later. 

Doc #28, Ex D; Doc #42 at 3. In the arbitrator’s view, plaintiff

sought the cessation of Ezaz’s harassment and the removal of

plaintiff’s “minimal satisfactory” rating. Doc #28, Ex D at 1. 

The arbitrator’s award obliged the prison warden to issue an order

requiring that plaintiff be treated fairly and equitably as

provided by article 6, section b(2) of the union-prison master

agreement. Id at 2. The arbitrator also “retained [jurisdiction]

for 21 months from January 31, 2002, to hear any future complaints

if such complaints have not been resolved through informal attempts

through the local union and administration.” Id. Plaintiff

declined to assert any further complaints before the arbitrator. 

Doc #27, Ex C at 59; Doc #26 at 4.

Pursuant to the arbitrator’s order, on February 14, 2002,

then-Warden Michael Benov issued a memorandum directing the

managers under him, including Ezaz, to follow the master agreement

and treat “all employees fairly and equitably in all aspects of

personal management.” Doc #43, Ex C. 

One month later — well within the twenty-one month period

during which the arbitrator retained jurisdiction — plaintiff

“elected to file her discrimination claims through the EEO

procedures.” Doc #43 at 4; Doc #42 at 4. On April 11, 2002,

plaintiff sought EEO counseling and on May 18, 2002, plaintiff

filed an EEO complaint. Id; Doc #26 at 5; Doc #1 at 4. The EEO

counselor’s report that issued on May 5, 2002, concerned the

alleged harassment and retaliation by plaintiff’s supervisor. Doc

#28, Ex F at 2 (noting that plaintiff alleged “[c]ontinuous

discrimination and harassment since February 2000, reprisal and

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

retaliation”). 

On December 2, 2003, the EEOC ALJ dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint because she “had previously elected the remedy of the

union grievance procedure instead of the EEO process.” Doc #1 at

4; see also Doc #50, Ex A at 1. The ALJ’s decision was implemented

by the final order of the Federal Bureau of Prisons on January 13,

2004. Doc #50, Ex A at 1. The EEOC Office of Federal Operations

(OFO) subsequently vacated this final order on May 20, 2004, and

remanded the case to determine whether the master agreement

permitted allegations of discrimination to be raised. Doc #50, Ex

A at 1-3. The OFO ordered the Department of Justice (DOJ) to

dismiss plaintiff’s EEO complaint if she was able to bring her

discrimination claims via the grievance forum. Id at 2-3. On July

13, 2004, the DOJ concluded that the grievance process permitted

allegations of discrimination and, as a result, dismissed

plaintiff’s complaint. Id, Ex B at 1-2. On August 3, 2005, the

OFO denied plaintiff’s appeal concerning the dismissal of her

complaint due to untimely filing. Doc #43, Ex K; Doc #48 at 5. 

As noted above, defendant terminated plaintiff’s

employment on November 6, 2003. See Doc #29, Ex A; Doc #42 at 8. 

On December 5, 2003, three days after the ALJ dismissed her EEO

complaint, plaintiff filed an appeal of her termination with the

Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). Doc #30, Ex A; Doc #42 at 8. 

On June 17, 2004, the MSPB ALJ issued an initial decision

dismissing the appeal without prejudice to refile due to recent

events in the case. Doc #30, Ex B at 1. The MSPB ALJ provided

that the appeal would “be deemed automatically refiled” after forty

days. Id at 4-5. In plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

for summary judgment plaintiff concedes that she “did not resume

the MSPB proceedings.” Doc #42 at 10.

 

II

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist,

resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). 

Further, the dispute over a material fact must be “genuine,” that

is, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. And the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies

with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23

(1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings, 

but must produce significant probative evidence, by affidavit or as

otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v Pacific Elec

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). The evidence

presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson,

477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

//

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

III

In order to pursue her claims in federal court, plaintiff

must first exhaust administrative remedies. Sommatino v United

States, 255 F3d 704, 707 (9th Cir 2001). See also Greenlaw v

Garrett, 59 F3d 994, 997 (9th Cir 1995) (“In order to litigate a

Title VII claim in federal district court, [plaintiff] must have

exhausted her administrative remedies”). “Substantial compliance

with the presentment of discrimination complaints to an appropriate

administrative agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” 

Sommatino, 255 F3d at 708. Further, a plaintiff must pursue her

administrative remedies with diligence. See Greenlaw, 59 F3d at

997. Abandonment or failure to cooperate in the administrative

process prevents exhaustion and precludes judicial review.

Sommatino, 255 F3d at 708. The exhaustion requirement applies to

both plaintiff’s Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. 

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) governs the

interplay between collective bargaining agreements in federal

employment and statutory employment procedures. 5 USC § 7101 et

seq. Under the CSRA, a federal employee who believes she has been

discriminated against and whose collective bargaining agreement

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

provides for a negotiated grievance procedure addressing

discrimination claims “may raise the matter under a statutory

procedure or negotiated grievance procedure, but not both.” See 29

CFR § 1614.301(a); See also Saul v United States, 928 F2d 829, 835

(9th Cir 1991) (“Congress took pains to define the

interrelationships between the CSRA’s appeal mechanisms * * * [for

the] purposes of avoiding duplication and fragmentation of

remedies.”). Moreover, an employee’s decision to file a written

grievance before lodging an EEO complaint is irrevocable. See 5

USC § 7121(d); Vinieratos v United States Dept of the Air Force,

939 F2d 762, 768 (9th Cir 1991). Accordingly, judicial review is

available to a federal employee alleging discrimination only after

she has fully exhausted her administrative remedies in dealing with

her grievance. See Johnson v Peterson, 996 F2d 397, 401 (DC Cir

1993): 

[S]ection 7121(d) requires a federal employee with a

pure discrimination complaint to choose between the

statutory and the negotiated grievance procedures. 

The employee who chooses the negotiated procedure

may appeal the abitrator’s decision to the EEOC. 

Only after the EEOC has rendered a decision or

failed to do so within 180 days may the employee use

section 2000e-16(c) and initiate suit in district

court. After the arbitrator ruled against them,

[plaintiffs] attempted to bring suit in district

court without first appealing to the EEOC. They

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and,

as a consequence, their lawsuit was properly

dismissed by the district court. 

This exhaustion requirement creates a predicament for an

employee who, such as plaintiff here, invokes the grievance

procedure but then becomes dissatisfied with the proceedings. 

Plaintiff dealt with this situation by raising a new legal theory

and trying her hand before a different tribunal — the EEOC. 

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Instead of asserting the claims brought before the grievance forum

pertaining to article 6, section b(2), which requires the prison to

treat its employees fairly and equitably, plaintiff’s EEO complaint

alleged that Ezaz’s conduct amounted to discrimination.

The CSRA does not countenance the dividing of proceedings

according to legal theory. When an employee elects the grievance

process, and the process allows for allegations of discrimination,

the employee “may not thereafter file [an EEO] complaint on the

same matter * * * irrespective of whether the grievance has raised

an allegation of discrimination within the negotiated grievance

procedure.” 29 CFR § 1614.301(a). See also Macy v Dalton, 853 F

Supp 350, 354 (ED Cal 1994). In determining what constitutes the

“same matter,” courts look to the facts underlying the claims, not

the legal theories asserted. See Macy, 853 F Supp at 354 (“matter”

refers to the underlying government employment action); Bonner v

Merit System Protection Board, 781 F2d 202, 204-05 (Fed Cir 1986)

(same). Hence, the fact that plaintiff’s claims in the grievance

forum focused on article 6, section b(2), rather than article 6,

section b(3)’s prohibition on discrimination, affords plaintiff no

end run around the exhaustion requirement as the new claims spring

from the “same matter.” Doc #42 at 4. 

The court in Rosell v Wood, 357 F Supp 2d 123 (DDC 2004),

rebuffed a plaintiff’s similar efforts to proceed in two forums. 

In Rosell, the plaintiff, an auditor for the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC), lodged a written grievance alleging

that his negative performance reviews were in retaliation for an

“ongoing appeal in a lawsuit regarding his overtime pay * * *

against FERC.” Id at 27. Then, plaintiff attempted to file an EEO

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

complaint, which FERC’s EEO manager denied due to plaintiff’s

pending grievance. The court affirmed the EEO manager’s decision

and rejected plaintiff’s contention that he was “entitled to bring

separate grievance and EEO complaint actions * * * because his

grievance only alleged retaliation, and not age or disability

discrimination.” Id at 130. The court reasoned as follows:

A side-by-side comparison of [plaintiff’s]

grievance and complaint show nearly identical

language to describe [plaintiff’s] alleged

injuries. Moreover, any person investigating his

discrimination and retaliation claims would have to

evaluate the same set of underlying employment

actions. Although [plaintiff’s] grievance and

complaint present different legal theories, they

are rooted in the same factual nucleus, and

therefore, concern the same matter. 

Id at 130-31. 

Here, as in Rosell, plaintiff’s grievance and complaint

rest on different legal theories but are rooted in the same factual

nucleus and therefore concern the same matter. The factual

allegations plaintiff relied on in her EEO complaint are virtually

identical to the allegations in the arbitration forum. The

arbitrator’s award of February 5, 2002, makes plain that plaintiff

sought relief from Ezaz’s harassing behavior and her negative job

performance evaluation. See Doc #28, Ex D. These events likewise

underlie plaintiff’s EEO complaint, albeit under the alternative

legal theory of discrimination. See Doc #28, Ex E. Advancing

claims over the same matter in two separate forums is precisely the

type of fragmentation that Congress aimed to prohibit when enacting

the CSRA. 

The EEO ALJ’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint was

proper; plaintiff should have exhausted her claims through the

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

grievance procedure. Because plaintiff never properly exhausted

her claims, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear

the case. See Vinieratos, 939 F2d at 768-69.

B

The same legal analysis with regard to plaintiff’s EEO

complaint applies with equal force to plaintiff’s MSPB appeal of

her termination. Plaintiff’s termination letter of November 6,

2003, see Doc #29, Ex A, informed plaintiff of her right to appeal

her termination by filing a grievance pursuant to the master

agreement, filing an appeal with the MSPB or by filing a formal EEO

complaint. Id at 2. The letter stated in pertinent part:

If you appeal this decision, you must elect to do

so under only one procedure. You are considered to

have made an election when you timely file, in

writing, a grievance under the negotiated grievance

procedure, an appeal with the MSPB, or a formal

complaint with EEO. Please ensure you elect under

which procedure you wish to proceed because, if you

file under more than one procedure, the procedure

under which you timely file first shall be

considered to be your elected procedure.

Id (emphasis in original). 

After filing an appeal of her termination with the MSPB

on December 5, 2003, plaintiff abandoned the MSPB proceedings. 

According to plaintiff, she “did not resume the MSPB proceedings *

* * [and] elected to continue with her EEO complaint for

discrimination which she had commenced earlier on May 18, 2002.” 

Doc #42 at 10. But for plaintiff to rely on the “earlier” EEO

complaint is disingenuous: plaintiff filed her MSPB appeal three

days after the EEO ALJ dismissed her EEO complaint for failure to

exhaust the union-prison grievance procedure. Plaintiff cannot

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

abandon the MSPB proceedings on account of an earlier invalid EEO

complaint; she elected the MSPB procedures first and did not

exhaust them.

In any event, even if plaintiff selected the EEO process

first, plaintiff’s subsequent invocation of the MSPB procedures

nonetheless triggers an exhaustion requirement. Once the MSPB

determined it had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal, plaintiff

was obligated to continue down the MSPB track and pursue her

discrimination claims before the MSPB. See McAdams v Reno, 64 F3d

1137, 1142 (8th Cir 1995) (noting that filing of MSPB appeal after

filing EEO complaint transformed plaintiff’s case into an MSPB

mixed case appeal and that plaintiff “was required to exhaust her

claims in that forum before filing a civil action”). See also

German v Pena, 88 F Supp 2d 222, 225 (SDNY 2000). As such,

plaintiff’s abandonment of the MSPB appeal constitutes a failure to

exhaust her administrative remedies. See Greenlaw, 59 F3d at 997

(“A plaintiff may not cut short the administrative process prior to

its final disposition, for upon abandonment a claimant fails to

exhaust administrative relief and may not thereafter seek redress

from the courts”). Consequently, plaintiff’s actions have rendered

this court without subject matter jurisdiction concerning her

claims derived from the termination. Id. 

In the final analysis, plaintiff pursued her claims in

three different forums, contravening the CSRA and its aim to avoid

the fragmentation of proceedings. These efforts to take three

bites at the proverbial apple preclude the court from having

subject matter jurisdiction, as plaintiff exhausted neither her EEO

complaint nor her MSPB appeal. The court’s remark in Vinieratos is

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

apropos, “[i]t is not the role of the federal judiciary to

straighten out a mess that is the complainant’s own doing.” 939

F2d at 773. Accordingly, the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims and the court GRANTS

defendant’s motion.

IV

In sum, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. In addition, plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED as

moot. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and TERMINATE all

motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04550-VRW Document 54 Filed 04/02/07 Page 13 of 13