Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00472/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on March 10, 2015.

1

 A preliminary review of the petition, 

 

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed 

filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court 

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s 

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might 

be adverse to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit 

has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

RICHARD ANDREW GREEN, JR.,

 Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00472-JLT

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE PETITION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION 

OF THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS AND FOR LACK OF 

EXHAUSTION

ORDER DIRECTING THAT RESPONSE BE 

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

ORDER REQUIRING PETITIONER TO FILE 

MOTION TO AMEND CAPTION TO REFLECT 

CORRECT RESPONDENT

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

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however, reveals that the petition may be untimely and unexhausted and should therefore be 

dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate 

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this 

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in 

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

The instant petition was filed on March 10, 2015, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the 

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) 

 

Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The date the petition is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison 

authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, 

for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the 

petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing 

date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. 

Petitioner signed the instant petition on March 10, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 8). 

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reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. Here, Petitioner alleges that he was convicted after a guilty plea entered on 

September 29, 2010. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Although Petitioner indicates he did not appeal his guilty plea of 

September 29, 2010, the Court’s review of the California court system’s database shows that Petitioner 

did file a notice of appeal in the Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”) on December 8, 2010, but that 

the appellate court dismissed the appeal as abandoned on March 9, 2011. 2 It appears that Petitioner 

did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court from this dismissal by the 5th DCA. 

According to the California Rules of Court, a decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final thirty 

days after filing of the opinion or dismissal, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.264(b)(1), and an appeal must 

 

2

The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial 

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. 

Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 

1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court 

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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be taken to the California Supreme Court within ten days of finality. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 

8.500(e)(1). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction would become final forty days after the Court of Appeal’s 

decision was filed, or on April 18, 2011. Petitioner would then have one year from the following day, 

April 19, 2011, or until April 18, 2012, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on March 10, 2015, almost three years after the 

date the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or 

equitable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California 

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay 

in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized 

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and 

the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no 

state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the 

period between finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the 

limitation period is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. 

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Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling where the limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the 

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. 

White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling 

when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 

1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner alleges he filed a single state habeas petition in the Superior Court of Mariposa 

County that was denied on February 5, 2013. (Doc. 1, p. 12). The petition does not indicate on what 

date that habeas petition was filed, and thus, the Court is unable to determine at this juncture precisely 

how much tolling to which Petitioner might be entitled during the pendency of this state petition. 

However, the Court notes that, in order for the instant petition to be timely, Petitioner would have had 

to file that state petition prior to April 18, 2012, the date the one-year period expired, in order to avoid 

being time-barred. Additionally, the Court notes that, even if that were the case, the state petition was 

denied on February 5, 2013 and, hence, the one-year period would have resumed on February 6, 2013. 

Again, the instant petition was not filed until over two years after that denial. Thus, it is difficult for 

this Court to see how the instant petition can possibly be timely. 

Indeed, the more likely scenario is that the one-year period expired prior to the date when 

Petitioner filed his state habeas case in the Superior Court. Under those circumstances, he is not 

entitled to any statutory tolling because a petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations 

period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 

(11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not 

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); 

Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state 

habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). Hence, unless Petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling, the petition appears to be untimely and should be dismissed.

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D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period 

is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 

2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a 

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 

(2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation 

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 

1107. Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on the 

record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. 

In sum, under any scenario, the petition appears to be untimely by several years. Unless 

Petitioner can present evidence in his response to this Order to Show Cause that accounts for the 

substantial delay in filing and makes the petition timely under the AEDPA, this Court must 

recommend that the petition be dismissed. 

E. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial 

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full 

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the 

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to the highest state court as required by 

the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a 

mixed petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to 

petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner does not allege that he has ever presented any of his habeas claims to the 

California Supreme Court. Further, the Court has reviewed the state court database and determined 

that no one with Petitioner’s name has filed a case in the state high court.

From the foregoing, it appears that Petitioner has not presented any of his claims to the 

California Supreme Court as required by the exhaustion doctrine. Because Petitioner has not 

presented his claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the 

petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition that 

is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. However, it 

is possible that Petitioner has exhausted his claims and simply failed to provide the Court with the 

documents and information that would establish such exhaustion. Accordingly, Petitioner will be 

permitted thirty days within which to respond to this Order To Show Cause by filing a response 

containing evidence that the claims herein are indeed exhausted.

F. Proper Respondent.

A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state officer 

having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2 (a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 

Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California Supreme 

Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having custody of an incarcerated 

petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the petitioner is incarcerated because the warden has 

"day-to-day control over" the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 

1992); see also, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the 

chief officer in charge of state penal institutions is also appropriate. Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 

F.3d at 360. Where a petitioner is on probation or parole, the proper respondent is his probation or 

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parole officer and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency or state correctional agency. 

Id. 

Here, Petitioner has named as Respondent “Department of Corrections.” However, 

“Department of Corrections” is not the warden or chief officer of the institution where Petitioner is 

confined and, thus, does not have day-to-day control over Petitioner. Petitioner is presently confined 

at the High Desert State Prison, Susanville, California. The current director or warden of that facility 

is Suzanne M. Peery. This is the person Petitioner should name as Respondent.

Petitioner’s failure to name a proper respondent requires dismissal of his habeas petition for 

lack of jurisdiction. Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360; Olson v. California Adult Auth., 423 F.2d 1326, 1326 

(9th Cir. 1970); see also, Billiteri v. United States Bd. Of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 948 (2nd Cir. 1976). 

However, the Court will give Petitioner the opportunity to cure this defect by amending the 

petition to name a proper respondent, such as the warden of his facility. See West v. Louisiana, 

478 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir.1973), vacated in part on other grounds, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1975) 

(en banc) (allowing petitioner to amend petition to name proper respondent); Ashley v. State of 

Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). 

In the interests of judicial economy, Petitioner need not file an amended petition. Instead, 

Petitioner can satisfy this deficiency in his petition by filing a motion entitled "Motion to Amend 

the Petition to Name a Proper Respondent" wherein Petitioner may name the proper 

respondent in this action.

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within 30 days of the date of service of 

this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year statute of 

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and for lack of exhaustion. 

2. Petitioner is further ORDERED to file a motion to amend the caption to reflect the 

proper respondent within thirty days of the date of service of this Order to Show Cause.

///

///

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Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a 

recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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