Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_19-cv-04018/USCOURTS-arwd-4_19-cv-04018-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Auto Negligence

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

SAMANTHA EDWARDS, Individually, and as 

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX of the ESTATE

of WILLIAM BOBBY WRAY EDWARDS, Deceased,

and ARLEIGH GRAYCE EDWARDS, Deceased; and as

PARENT and NEXT FRIEND for Peyton Hale, a Minor PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:19-cv-4018

ERIC JAMES CORNELL THOMAS

and MCELROY TRUCK LINES, INC. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion for Stay. (ECF 

No. 55). Plaintiff filed a response. (ECF No. 66). The Court finds the matter ripe for 

consideration. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an automobile collision that occurred on August 2, 2018. Defendant 

Eric James Cornell Thomas (“Thomas”) was driving a tractor trailer in the course and scope of his 

employment with Defendant McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. (“McElroy”) when he collided with

another vehicle. William Bobby Wray Edwards and Arleigh Grayce Edwards suffered fatal 

injuries and Peyton Hale suffered personal injuries. On February 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed this 

wrongful death and survival action, asserting separate claims of negligence against Defendants. 

McElroy has admitted vicarious liability in connection with the automobile collision.

On August 7, 2019, a criminal warrant was issued in the District Court of Howard County 

for the arrest of Thomas on two counts of negligent homicide, stemming from the August 2, 2018 

collision. On December 16, 2019, Defendants moved for a stay of discovery and of this case’s

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
2

trial setting pending the resolution of the parallel criminal charges against Thomas. On January 

31, 2020, the Court denied that motion, largely on the basis that Defendants had not carried their 

burden of demonstrating that a parallel criminal matter was pending against Thomas.

On February 7, 2020, Defendants filed the instant motion, asking the Court to reconsider 

its order denying a stay. Defendants suggest that the Court’s decision was largely based on a 

misinterpretation of Arkansas criminal law and that a stay is indeed proper. Plaintiff opposes the 

motion.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court must first determine whether to reconsider its previous order. If so, the Court 

will then conduct its reconsidered analysis.

A. Whether Reconsideration is Proper

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not account for “motions to reconsider.” The

Eighth Circuit instructs that “motions to reconsider are ‘nothing more than Rule 60(b) motions

when directed at non-final orders.’” Nelson v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 702 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Elder–Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2006)). The instant motion 

is directed at a non-final order. Thus, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion as it would a 

Rule 60(b) motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a district court to relieve a party from a 

judgment on the narrow grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; newly 

discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; voidness; 

satisfaction of judgment; or “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Relief is appropriate when circumstances are so ‘unusual or compelling’ 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
3

that extraordinary relief is warranted, or when it ‘offends justice’ to deny such relief.” Bissonette 

v. Dooley, No. CV 16-5120-JLV, 2017 WL 5499776, at *2 (D.S.D. Nov. 15, 2017).

The purpose of Rule 60(b) relief is not to give parties an opportunity to re-argue their case 

and it should not be used as a substitute for a timely appeal. Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 180 

(8th Cir. 1980); Nichols v. United States, No. 4:00cr-00022-003-WRW, 2006 WL 3420303 (E.D. 

Ark. Nov. 28, 2006). “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest 

errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 

627 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2010). Id. Rule 60(b) motions are “viewed with disfavor,” but in 

certain circumstances can “serve a useful, proper and necessary purpose in maintaining the 

integrity of the trial process.” Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 515 (8th 

Cir. 1984).

The Court’s January 31, 2020 order denied the requested stay in large part because there 

was no evidence that Thomas had been indicted and, thus, there was no evidence that a parallel 

criminal proceeding had been initiated against Thomas. Defendants suggest that this finding was 

erroneous because Thomas was charged with misdemeanor offenses, and criminal misdemeanor 

proceedings in Arkansas are generally initiated with the issuance of an arrest warrant, not an 

indictment. Thus, Defendants state that the Court mistakenly determined that criminal proceedings 

were not pending against Thomas when they, in fact, are. Defendants conclude that the Court’s 

previous analysis, when accounting for the existence of the parallel criminal case, weighs in favor 

of issuing a stay. Defendants ask the Court to revisit its prior ruling and issue a stay.

Defendants are correct that, in Arkansas, criminal proceedings for felony offenses must be

initiated with a charging instrument. Watson v. State, 358 Ark. 212, 222, 188 S.W.3d 921, 927 

(2004). In contrast, criminal proceedings for misdemeanor offenses can be initiated with the 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
4

issuance of an affidavit for an arrest warrant. Id. Thus, the Court agrees that if Thomas faces 

misdemeanor charges, criminal proceedings were initiated against him on August 7, 2019, the day 

the arrest warrant was issued. 

The Arkansas negligent homicide statute contemplates two types of the offense: one a 

felony and the other a misdemeanor. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105(a)(2) (“A person who 

violates subdivision (a)(1) of this section upon conviction is guilty of a Class B felony.”), with 

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105(b)(2) (“A person who violates subdivision (b)(1) of this section upon 

conviction is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.”). The Court previously ruled as it did because it 

lacked information to determine whether Thomas was accused of felony or misdemeanor negligent 

homicide. In support of their motion to stay, Defendants offered the arrest warrant for Thomas 

and the probable cause affidavit. (ECF Nos. 24-1, 24-2). The arrest warrant indicates that Thomas 

was wanted for “Negligent Homicide,” and the probable cause affidavit indicates that he was 

wanted for two counts of negligent homicide, in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105.

Although it was clear Thomas was wanted for negligent homicide, the Court could not

determine whether he was wanted for the felony or misdemeanor version of the offense.

1

 Thus, 

the Court could not tell whether criminal proceedings had been initiated against Thomas by the 

issuance of the arrest warrant. The movant for a stay must show that a stay is proper and in 

recognition of that, the Court was unwilling to draw the inference in Defendants’ favor that 

Thomas faces misdemeanor charges rather than felony ones.

Defendants now clarify that Thomas faces misdemeanor charges. Plaintiff’s response does 

not dispute that assertion. Defendants also provide the Court with additional evidence showing 

that criminal proceedings are indeed underway against Thomas, including a copy of the docket 

1 Defendants’ brief made mention of ongoing criminal proceedings but there was no verifying evidence of this in the 

record at that time.

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
5

sheet from his criminal case and correspondence from his criminal lawyer to the state court, 

entering not-guilty pleas on his behalf and requesting a trial setting. (ECF Nos. 55-1, 55-3). 

Plaintiff does not argue that the Court should decline to reconsider its prior order based on this 

evidence and instead focuses her efforts on why, upon reconsideration, the Court should maintain 

its previous ruling denying a stay. 

Ultimately, the Court agrees that its prior order denying a stay was based on a mistake of 

fact: that Thomas is not presently facing a criminal proceeding. It is now clear that Thomas faces 

a parallel criminal proceeding that was initiated on August 2, 2019, when the arrest warrant was 

issued. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to reconsider serves a valid purpose: the correction of a 

manifest error of fact. Arnold, 627 F.3d at 721. In the absence of any argument otherwise, the 

Court will reconsider its prior order, as doing so will “serve a useful, proper and necessary purpose 

in maintaining the integrity of the trial process.” Rosebud, 733 F.2d at 515.

B. Stay of Discovery Pending Resolution of Parallel Criminal Matter

The Court will now revisit its prior analysis regarding whether to stay discovery in this 

case pending the resolution of the parallel criminal proceeding against Thomas. As before, the

Court applies the test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 

F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1995).

2

 That test involves consideration of the following five factors:

(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or 

any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) 

the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on 

defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the 

efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil 

litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal 

litigation.

2 The Court’s prior order detailed the requisite showing that must be made to obtain a civil stay pending the resolution 

of a parallel criminal matter, as well as the reasons why the Court utilized the Keating factors. 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
6

Id. at 325. The Court will address each factor in turn.3

1. Plaintiff’s Interest

This factor concerns “the interest of the plaintiff[] in proceeding expeditiously with this 

litigation or any particular aspect of it . . . and the potential prejudice to plaintiff[] of a delay.” 

Young v. W. Memphis Police Dep’t, No. 3:11-cv-0161-BRW, 2011 WL 6033060, at *1 (E.D. Ark. 

Dec. 5, 2011). 

Plaintiff has “a legitimate interest in the expeditious resolution of [her] case.” Ruszczyk as 

Tr. for Ruszczyk v. Noor, 349 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (D. Minn. 2018). The Court previously 

indicated that Plaintiff stood to suffer undue prejudice from a stay because of the uncertainty of 

when, if ever, an indictment might issue against Thomas. That concern has now been alleviated. 

However, Plaintiff would nonetheless suffer prejudice from a stay of discovery in this case 

pending the resolution of the criminal proceeding against Thomas. Defendants suggest that the 

stay will not be overly long, pointing out that Thomas has requested a trial in the criminal case, 

which will hopefully occur in the coming months. Even if so, this assumes that Thomas’s criminal 

case will end when the charges against him are dismissed, he is found not guilty, or he is sentenced 

following a guilty plea or a guilty verdict. That assumption does not account for the possibility of 

“mistrials or hung juries, as well as direct appeal and possible postconviction petitions.” Id. 

Granted, any such delays are speculative at this point, but nonetheless, the “uncertain timeline of 

the requested stay hinders Plaintiff’s interest in moving this lawsuit forward.” Id.

On the other hand, a stay of discovery in this case would also work in Plaintiff’s favor in 

certain ways. “[T]he resolution of the [c]riminal [c]ase may reduce the scope of discovery in the 

3 The parties have incorporated by reference their arguments made in the briefing of the underlying motion to stay. 

Although those arguments will not be recounted in the following discussion, the Court has reviewed and taken them 

into consideration.

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
7

civil case and the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution can later be used in the civil 

action.” Id. Given the factual overlap between this case and the criminal case, the Court is 

unconcerned that evidence will be lost or made unavailable if discovery in this case is stayed. Plus, 

allowing the criminal case to proceed first would also give Plaintiff the benefit of the transcripts 

and rulings in the criminal action. Id. at 764. 

Moreover, any burden a stay might impose on Plaintiff can be tempered by requiring the 

parties to keep the Court informed periodically as to the state criminal proceeding. This would 

also give the parties an opportunity to address the propriety of continuing the stay if the criminal 

matter is not resolved after the impending trial. Id. at 767. Accordingly, the Court finds that this 

factor weighs against a stay, but only slightly.

2. Burden on Defendants

Next, the Court must consider “the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings 

may impose on defendants.” Young, 2011 WL 6033060, at *1.

The Fifth Amendment ordinarily does not mandate a stay of civil proceedings when related 

criminal proceedings are pending. Koester v. Am. Republic Invs., Inc., 11 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 

1993). However, courts may choose to stay a civil proceeding “pending the completion of parallel 

criminal prosecutions when the interests of justice seem[] to require such action.” United States 

v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970). “[T]he strongest case for granting a stay is where a party 

under criminal indictment is required to defend a civil proceeding involving the same matter. 

Under such circumstances, denying a stay might undermine a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination.” Kozlov v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. 4:10-cv03211, 2011 WL 3320972, at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 2, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(internal citation omitted). 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
8

As stated above, the Court finds that Thomas is currently facing parallel civil and criminal 

proceedings such “that he cannot protect himself at the civil trial by selectively invoking his Fifth 

Amendment privilege, or that the two trials will so overlap that effective defense of both is 

impossible.” Koester, 11 F.3d at 823. Indeed, Thomas faces serious charges of negligent homicide 

for the same conduct encompassed in claim one of Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff is correct that 

there is no constitutional right that would protect Thomas from being forced to choose between 

fully participating in civil discovery and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. As noted above, 

however, the Court may nonetheless choose to stay civil discovery pending completion of the 

parallel criminal case if the interests of justice so require. 

Defendants state that, on advice of his criminal counsel, Thomas will invoke his Fifth 

Amendment privilege if he is required to participate in further discovery in this case. Plaintiff will

likely attempt to use Thomas’s privilege invocation against him at trial. S.E.C. v. Brown, 658 F.3d 

858, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The Fifth Amendment permits an adverse inference when the privilege 

against self-incrimination is claimed by a party in a civil case.”). “Although this is permitted by 

the law, ‘the question of whether it is fair does not yield the same answer in every case.’” Ruszczyk, 

349 F. Supp. 3d at 762 (quoting Chagolla v. City of Chicago, 529 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (N.D. Ill. 

2008)).

In this case, absent a stay, Thomas would face the choice of fully participating in civil 

discovery and potentially incriminating himself in the criminal case or invoking his Fifth 

Amendment privilege and allowing a civil jury to possibly draw negative inferences against him. 

If discovery is not deferred, it might undermine Thomas’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, expand rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Arkansas’s applicable rules 

of criminal procedure, expose the basis of the defense to the prosecution in advance of the criminal 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
9

trial, or otherwise prejudice the case. Thus, the circumstances of this case call for a stay of 

discovery as it relates to Thomas, which would enable him to eventually defend this case without 

fear of subsequent prosecution. However, the analysis does not end there. 

Defendants also ask for discovery to be stayed as to McElroy because it has admitted 

vicarious liability and contends that its defenses rest almost entirely on the testimony of Thomas. 

Without Thomas, Defendants contend that McElroy will be hamstrung in its ability to participate 

in discovery and defend itself. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that McElroy’s defenses on the 

negligence claim against Thomas rest largely on Thomas’s testimony. However, Plaintiffs argue 

that they should be allowed to conduct discovery with McElroy as to the negligence claim asserted 

against McElroy. Plaintiffs contend that that claim has nothing to do with the criminal case against 

Thomas and that the direct liability claim against McElroy has no bearing on what Thomas did or 

did not do.

The Court agrees with Defendants that, as it relates to Plaintiff’s negligence claim against 

Thomas, McElroy’s defenses largely rest on Thomas’s testimony. If Thomas invokes his Fifth 

Amendment privilege, McElroy cannot access the information known to Thomas. Moreover, 

McElroy has no control over Thomas’s Fifth Amendment invocations, which burdens McElroy’s 

ability to engage in discovery and defend itself. Id. 

Moreover, if McElroy participates in other liability discovery during the stay, that 

discovery “may well need to be re-spun following the outcome of [Thomas’s] criminal trial to 

gather information inaccessible via Fifth Amendment invocations and to explore anew previous 

discovery in light of the criminal case’s outcome.” Id. at 765. Thus, the circumstances of this case 

call for a stay of all liability discovery as to McElroy, as well.

Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of a stay.

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
10

3. The Court’s Interest

The Court must also consider “the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, 

and the efficient use of judicial resources.” Young, No. 3:11-cv-0161 BRW, 2011 WL 6033060, 

at *1. 

The Court recognizes its “responsibility to keep its calendar moving to provide litigants 

expeditious determination of their cases.” White v. Mapco Gas Prod., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 498, 502 

(E.D. Ark. 1987). Indeed, courts have “a strong interest in keeping litigation moving to conclusion 

without unnecessary delay.” Ruszczyk, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 763 (emphasis in original). On the 

other hand, stays of civil proceedings pending the resolution of a parallel criminal case can 

“promote efficiency and avoid duplication as this Court and the parties would have the benefit of 

the transcripts and rulings in the criminal action.” Id. Moreover, “the resolution of the criminal 

case might reduce the scope of discovery in th[is] civil case or otherwise simplify the issues.” Id. 

A stay here would conserve scarce judicial resources. Given the substantial overlap 

between Thomas’s prosecution and the civil claims, the discovery produced in the criminal

proceeding will likely be relevant to and discoverable in this case. The outcome of the prosecution 

might also narrow the issues and simplify the parties’ positions in this matter. A stay would also 

avoid the possibility that limited liability discovery conducted during the stay would have to be 

redone after Thomas’s criminal trial. “Moreover, to reduce further the burden of a stay a court can 

require the parties to advise the Court on any development in the criminal case.” Id. at 764 (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in 

favor of a stay.

4. Interest of Non-Parties

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
11

Now the Court must consider “the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation.” 

See Young, 2011 WL 6033060, at *1. 

This factor bears little weight in the analysis. Non-party family members of those killed 

and injured in the car wreck have an interest in the conclusion of this case. Conversely, Thomas’s 

family has an interest in seeing his criminal case proceed. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

5. Public Interest

Finally, the Court must consider “the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal 

litigation.” Id. at *1. 

Even though this case is not a class action touching the public at large, the Court finds the 

public has an interest in the conclusion of this case. If Plaintiff is successful, this case could deter 

similar, future behavior. However, the Court finds that the public has a stronger interest in the 

criminal prosecution of individuals charged with negligent homicide, and thus the public has a 

stronger interest in the conclusion of the criminal case. The Court finds that the public’s interest 

in the resolution of the criminal case outweighs the public’s interest in the resolution of this case. 

See Combs v. Nelson, No. 4:09-cv-0329-SWW, 2009 WL 2044413, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 10, 2009) 

(“If delay of the noncriminal proceeding would not seriously injure the public interest, a court may 

be justified in deferring it.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of a 

stay.

6. Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds that the Keating factors, viewed in the totality, favor the issuance 

of a stay of liability discovery pending the resolution of Thomas’s criminal prosecution. Discovery 

should be stayed as it relates to issues of liability.

The Court notes that Plaintiff alternatively asks that the Court allow discovery to proceed 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
12

on damages. Defendant’s brief of the underlying motion to stay concedes that this might be a 

workable solution. The Court agrees that allowing damages-related discovery to proceed during 

the stay of liability discovery would allow Plaintiff to move her case forward. The Court will 

allow the parties to conduct discovery on damages during the stay.

Finally, the Court notes that Defendants’ underlying motion to stay also asks for the trial 

setting in this case to be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal case. However, since that 

time, the Court lifted the trial setting and vacated all pretrial deadlines. A new Final Scheduling 

Order has not been issued with new dates. In light of this order, setting a new trial date and 

attendant pretrial deadlines might repeatedly prove unworkable if the criminal case has not yet 

concluded by the new deadlines, leaving the parties unable to conduct liability discovery in this 

case. Thus, the Court finds that judicial resources will be best served by staying the trial of this 

matter. Ruszczyk, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 767 (D. Minn. 2018) (staying case pending resolution of 

parallel criminal matter). The parties shall move to lift this general stay once the criminal trial is 

resolved via dismissal, a not guilty verdict, or sentencing following a guilty plea or guilty verdict.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-discussed reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider 

Denial of Motion for Stay (ECF No. 55) should be and hereby is GRANTED. 

The Court hereby enters a limited STAY of discovery in this case pending the ultimate 

resolution of the state court proceeding, Case Number CR-19-1137, against Thomas. The parties 

shall not conduct liability discovery during the duration of this stay. The parties may, however, 

conduct discovery on damages during the stay.

The trial of this matter will also be stayed until Thomas’s criminal trial is resolved via 

dismissal, a not guilty verdict, or sentencing following a guilty plea or guilty verdict. The parties 

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
13

are ORDERED to move for entry of a new Final Scheduling Order within ten days of any of those 

occurrences.

Furthermore, Defendants are ORDERED to file a status update with the Court every sixty 

days following the entry of this order and within ten days after the entry of a plea or return 

of a verdict in Thomas’s criminal case. Each update should inform the Court of the status of the 

criminal case, including relevant developments since the previous update and any upcoming 

deadlines.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey 

Susan O. Hickey

Chief United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-04018-SOH Document 72 Filed 02/24/20 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>