Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07793/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07793-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLON CRUMP,

 Plaintiff, In Pro Per

 v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, ANGEL LOZANO and

RAYMOND LEE

Defendants. /

No. C06-07793 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant City and County of San Francisco’s (“Defendant” or “the

City”) Motion to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action and All Other Putative Causes of Action for

Anything Other than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State Tort and Constitutional Law Claims, i.e., False

Detention, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. (Docket

No. 64.) Pro se Plaintiff Marlon Crump (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. For the following

reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2007, this Court granted in part and denied in part the City’s Motion to Dismiss

and denied the City’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). This Court 

Case 3:06-cv-07793-MJJ Document 67 Filed 09/26/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ordered Plaintiff to amend his FAC no later than August 10, 2007, in the following manner: 

(1) combine the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendant and Individual defendants into the first 

cause of action; (2) list the individual state law tort claims in separate and successive causes of

action; and (3) put forward the California Civil Code § 52.1 constitutional claims as his final cause

of action. (Docket No. 61.)

Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on August 7, 2007. (Docket No. 63.) 

In his SAC, Plaintiff asserts four numbered causes of action and two unnumbered causes of action. 

(SAC at 7-8.) In his first cause of action, Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Officers Lozano and Lee, Does 1-100 (together “the Individual Defendants”), and the

City. (SAC at 25-30.) In his second cause of action, Plaintiff asserts a claim of racial profiling

against Officers Lozano and Lee and the City under Title I of an alleged federal prohibition of racial

profiling, located specifically in Section 2 of the “End Racial Profiling Act of 2004.” (SAC at 30-

36.) In his third cause of action, Plaintiff asserts claims of assault and battery, as well as use of

firearms and excessive force, against the Individual Defendants under California Civil Code §§ 51.7

and 52.1. (SAC at 37-41.) In his fourth cause of action, Plaintiff asserts claims of false detention,

false arrest, and false imprisonment under California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1. (SAC at 41-44.) 

In the first unnumbered cause of action, Plaintiff also asserts claims of falsifying evidence and

bribing, influencing, intimidating, or threatening witnesses in violation of California Penal Code §

132. (SAC at 45-50.) In a second unnumbered cause of action, Plaintiff asserts a claim of violating

his substantive due process. (SAC at 56.)

In this Motion, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s amended second cause of action and both

unnumbered causes of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted and for violating the Court’s prior order. Defendant does

not challenge Plaintiff’s § 1983 or state law claims. In the alternative, Defendant also moves to

strike portions of the SAC that are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, unnecessary, and, in some

instances, in direct violation of the Court’s prior order.

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United States District Court

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v.

Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Cir. 1984). In pleading sufficient facts, however, a plaintiff must suggest his or her right to relief is

more than merely conceivable, but plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles

County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.

2001)). Before a district court can dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint, the court must provide the

litigant with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to amend the complaint effectively. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

 The Court notes that Plaintiff made a sincere effort to follow the Court’s instructions in

crafting his SAC. Plaintiff correctly asserts his civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as

his first cause of action. Plaintiff also correctly includes his state law claims as successive causes of

action. His third cause of action is for assault, battery, use of firearms and excessive force pursuant

to California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1. His fourth cause of action, pursuant to the same

California statute, is for false detention, false arrest, and false imprisonment. 

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 “Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law,

offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same

to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.” California Penal Code § 132.

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However, Plaintiff failed to follow the Court’s explicit instructions in two important respects. 

First, Plaintiff asserts as his second amended cause of action a claim of racial profiling against

Officers Lozano and Lee and the City under Title I of an alleged federal prohibition of racial

profiling. Second, in two unnumbered causes of action appearing later in the complaint, Plaintiff

also asserts (1) claims of falsifying evidence and bribing, influencing, intimidating, or threatening

witnesses in violation of California Penal Code § 132; and (2) a claim for violation of substantive

due process. By including these claims in his SAC, Plaintiff disregarded the Court’s explicit

instructions on how to organize his pleading. The Court could find sufficient grounds to dismiss

these additional claims for Plaintiff’s failure to follow the Court’s directions. 

However, even if the Court looked beyond Plaintiff’s failure to follow directions and

addressed the merits of the additional claims put forth in the SAC, the amended pleading remains

deficient. First, Plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory in accusing Defendant of

violating the “End Racial Profiling Act of 2004.” The Court can find no record or authority to

sustain a claim for a violation of the “End Racial Profiling Act.” The statute cited by Plaintiff has

not yet been enacted into law. As to Plaintiff’s unnumbered cause of action under California Penal

Code § 132, that statute does not provide for a private right of action.1

 Even under the appropriate

liberal construction for pro se litigants, both of these causes of action are wholly insufficient as

written to establish a cognizable legal claim.

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, however, appears to be related to his claim under §

1983. Additionally, the substantive due process claim does not appear as a separate cause of action

but rather under the heading “Theories, argument, and cases cited plaintiff, in pro per’s Amended

Complaint.” Although the pleading is not entirely clear in this regard, these statements are sufficient

under the liberal standard for pro se litigants to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Because this is Plaintiff’s second attempt and second failure to follow the Court’s directions,

the Court ORDERS Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Racial Profiling and the Unnumbered

Cause of Action for Violation of Penal Code § 132 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However,

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 Defendant characterizes the following sections of Plaintiff’s SAC as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

unnecessary, and, in some instances, in direct violation of the Court’s order”: Procedural Background (SAC at 4-7); Second

Amended Complaint To the Court (SAC at 7); Table of Contents (SAC at 7-9); Table of Authorities (SAC at 9-10); Table

of Cited Cases (SAC at 10-11); Summarization of Complaint (SAC at 11-14); Table of Exhibits A-M (SAC at 15-17);

Statement of Evidentiary Exhibits (SAC at 19-24); Second Cause of Action – Prohibition of Racial Profiling (SAC at 28-35);

Title 7 Penal Code Section 132 (SAC at 42-47); Theories, Arguments, and Cases Cited Plaintiff, in Pro Per’s Amended

Complaint (SAC at 47-52); and Substantive Due Process Claim (SAC at 52-53).

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the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to the Substantive Due Process Claim.

B. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits the Court to “[strike] from any pleading any

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(f). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with

those issues prior to trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1993) (quotations,

citation omitted). However, Rule 12(f) motions are generally disfavored. See Neilson v. Union

Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Accordingly, such motions should

be denied unless the matter has no logical connection to the controversy at issue and may prejudice

one or more of the parties to the suit. See SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 

In the absence of such prejudice, courts have denied Rule 12(f) motions “even though the offending

matter literally [was] within one or more of the categories set forth in Rule 12(f).” Charles A.

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1382 (1990) (quoted in Rawson v.

Sears Roebuck & Co., 585 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (D. Colo. 1984)). When considering a motion to

strike, the court “must view the pleading in a light most favorable to the pleading party.” In re

2TheMart.com, Inc. Securities Litig., 114 F. Supp. 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000).

Defendant moves to strike under Rule 12(f) several parts of Plaintiff’s complaint.2

 Although

Defendant City does specify portions of the complaint that are offensive, Defendant does not offer

any supporting authority or arguments beyond those that discuss the legal standard for a motion to

strike. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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