Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01387/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01387-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAI T. VO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-01387 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

REMANDING TO AGENCY

Plaintiff Tai Thanh Vo filed a complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of the decision of the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) finding thatVo is not disabled and denying his application for Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”). Vo has filed a motion forsummary judgment and defendant has filed a cross motion

for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS

plaintiff’s motion(Docket No. 14) and DENIES defendant’s motion forthe reasons set forth below. (Docket

No. 15).

BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2001, Vo filed an application for SSI, which identified the onset date of his disabling

condition as May 1, 1998. See Court Transcript (Tr.) 50-51. In his initial SSI application, Vo alleged that

various impairments such as depression with anxiety, sleep-related problems, and dizziness, limited his ability

to work. See Tr. 64. Vo alleged that although he cared for his disabled wife and minor children, his disability

caused him to have trouble with performing these daily tasks. See Tr. 80-81.

Since 1996, Vo has submitted to severalmentaland psychologicalevaluations by a number ofmedical

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 Plaintiff alleged additional impairments, which have been documented in medical examinations and

evaluations. See Opening Statement of Helen Yoon, Tr. 115-20. He suffers from auditory hallucinations,

insomnia, hearing difficulties, blurred vision, poor memory, inability to concentrate, and other ailments. See id.

Dr. Ly Nguyen diagnosed plaintiff with Psychotic Disorder on November 14, 1996. See Tr. 131. Dr. Robert

E. Lee diagnosed plaintiff with Paranoid Schizophrenia on August 14, 2001. See Tr. 217. Howard Hansell,

M.D. diagnosed plaintiff with Anxiety Disorder on February 4, 2002. See Tr. 275-76. Huong Hoang, a

licensedclinicalsocialworker (LCSW), diagnosed plaintiff with GeneralizedAnxietyDisorderinJanuary 2002.

See Tr. 244. Plaintiff has also been treated for physical impairments including vertigo, hypertension, hearing

loss. See ALJ’s Opinion for synopsis, at Tr. 18-20.

2

 In July 2001, the Department of Social Services Disability Evaluation Division referred plaintiff to Dr.

Sanchez for a psychological evaluation. See Tr. 211-16. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess

plaintiff’s current intellectual, cognitive, psychologicaland emotionalstates, and how theymight affect his ability

to work. See Tr. 211. In addition to observing plaintiff’s behavior, Dr. Sanchez administered the following

tests with the aid of an interpreter: Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, Reyes 15 Items Memory Test III,

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, and Weschsler Memory Scale III.

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professionals.1 Of most relevance to the pending motions is the psychological evaluation performed by Ubaldo

F. Sanchez, Ph.D.2 Based on test results and behavioral observations made during the evaluation, Dr. Sanchez

diagnosed Vo with “psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified.” See Tr. 215. In light ofhis performance on

the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) test, Dr. Sanchez observed plaintiff was currently

functioning in the lower limits ofthe borderline range ofmeasured intelligence. Vo obtained a verbal IQ score

of80, a full performance IQ score of 67, and a full scale score of72 on the WAIS-III. Id. Dr. Sanchez noted

that these scores “need to be interpreted with caution giventhe culturalbias ofWAIS-III.” Id. He also opined

that although Vo was not limited in performing daily activities such as bathing, dressing, and eating, he would

have difficulty being socially appropriate, and he would have difficulty concentrating, focusing and keeping up

with the pace of a working environment given his allegation of auditory hallucinations. See id. 

In August 2001, the SocialSecurity Administration(“SSA”) denied Vo’s application for SSI. See Tr.

37-40. Vo filed a “Request for Reconsideration” in November 2001, and the SSA responded by re-reviewing

his claim in April 2002. See Tr. 41, 43. After the SSA reaffirmed its decision to deny benefits, Vo filed a

“Request forHearing by Administrative Law Judge” on April 29, 2002. See Tr. 47. Vo’s request was granted

and an ALJ held a hearing in November 2002, during which Vo represented himself with the assistance of a

Vietnamese interpreter. See Tr. 328-46. After this initial hearing, an individual who was not an attorney was

appointed to represent Vo. See Tr. 16, 29. Vo’s representative submitted an opening and closing statement

to the ALJ in which she contended that plaintiff qualified as disabled because he met Listing 12.05, Mental

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 This was the first time plaintiff claimed disability under Listing 12.05 Mental Retardation. In his

original SSI application, he alleged disability associated with depression with anxiety, sleep related problems,

and dizziness. See Tr. 64.

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 The five steps are: (1) Is claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two; (2) Is claimant's impairment severe? If so, proceed to

step three. If not, claimant is not disabled. (3) Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific

impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1? If so, claimant is disabled and the inquiry ends.

If not, proceed to step four; (4) Is claimant able to do any work that he has done in the past? If so, claimant

is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five; (5) Is claimant able to do any other work? If so, then claimant is

not disabled. If not, then claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Bustamante

v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Retardation. See Tr. 115-26.3

In a decision dated April 11, 2003, the ALJ concluded thatVo was not eligible for SSI payments. See

Tr. 16-22. The ALJ performed the requisite five-step evaluation pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920,4 and

concluded in step one thatVo has not engaged in substantialgainfulactivity since the alleged onset ofdisability,

and in step two that Vo has an impairment or combination of impairments considered “severe” based on the

requirements contained in § 416.920(b). Id. at 21. However, the ALJ determined in step three that Vo’s

impairment did not “meet or equal” Listing 12.05. In so concluding, the ALJ rejected Vo’s full performance

IQ score of 67, which falls within the range of IQ scores to establish mental retardation under Listing 12.05.

The ALJ then evaluated plaintiff’s impairments under step four and found that plaintiff was not prevented from

performing past relevant work and thus, was not disabled. See Tr. 18. 

In February 2004, plaintiff’s “Request for Review ofHearing Decision/Order”was denied by the SSA

Appeals Council. See Tr. 5-7, 10. After exhausting all administrative remedies, Vo filed an action in this Court

in April 2004. 

Now before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions forsummary judgment. Vo argues that the ALJ

erroneously determined he did not meet step three of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, and that his rejection ofVo’s full

performance IQ score is not supported by substantialevidence. Defendant contends that the ALJ’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is free from legal error. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The district court’s review of an appealfromthe SSA is limited to the Social Security Commissioner’s

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final decision, as reflected in the transcript lodged by the Commissioner pursuant to the standing procedural

order. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may disturb the Commissioner’s decision “only if it is based

on legalerror or ifthe factfindings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d

1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The proper inquiry is to consider whether the record, read as a whole,

yieldssuch evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ. See id.;

see also Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Even ifthe factualfindings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider whether the

Commissioner based his decision on improper legal standards. A decision must be set aside if it was based

on legalerror. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). However, a decision of the ALJ

will not be reversed for errors that are harmless. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)).

DISCUSSION

The parties’ motions for summary judgment primarily focus on whether the ALJ erred when he

determined, in step three of the analysis, that none of Vo’s impairments, alone or in combination, met or

equaled a listed impairment as set forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P. Regulation No. 4. Before the ALJ, Vo

contended that he met or equaled the conditions for mental retardation, as defined in Listing 12.05C or D of

20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1. The pertinent provisions of Listing 12.05 define mental retardation as:

[S]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning

initially manifested during the developmental period . . . before age 22 . . . C. A valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing an additionaland significant work-related limitationor function; or D. A valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70, resulting in at least two of the following: (1)

Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or (2) Marked difficulties in maintaining social

functioning; or (3) Marked difficultiesin maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4)

Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05C-D. 

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 Presumably because he concluded Vo was not mentally retarded, the ALJ did not address whether

any mental retardation manifested itself prior to age 22. Defendant’s contentions in this regard are discussed

infra. Although the ALJ did address, in step three, whether Vo had a “physical or other mental impairment

imposing an additional and significant work-related limitationor function,”20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.

1, § 12.05C-D, the Ninth Circuit has held that a finding of severe impairment in step two automatically

establishes that a claimant has a “physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant

work-related limitation or function.” See Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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1. The ALJ’s Rejection of Vo’s Full Performance IQ Score

The ALJ concluded that Vo did not meet or equal Listing 12.05 based on his rejection of Vo’s full

performance IQ score.5 The ALJ’s decision stated, 

OnMarch14, 2003, HelenYoon, claimant’srepresentative submitted a closingstatement brief

arguing that a Full Performance IQ of67 allowsthe claimant to meet 12.05C and 12.05D (Ex.

11E). However, the psychological consultive examiner shows other IQs are a good deal

higher and indicated that all scores must be viewed with caution since claimant’s cultural

background varies fromthe population the WAIS-III was normed on (Ex. 5f/5). Therefore,

the Undersigned rejects the IQ score of 67. 

Tr. 20. Thus, the ALJ provided two reasons for rejecting Vo’s full performance IQ of 67: (1) because his

other IQ scores “are a good deal higher”; and (2) because Dr. Sanchez “indicated that all scores must be

viewed with cautionsince claimant’s culturalbackground variesfromthe population the WAIS-III was normed

on.” Id.

Vo contends that the ALJ’s rejection of his full performance IQ of 67 violates the regulations, which

provide that “where more than one IQ is customarily derived from the test administered, e.g., where verbal,

performance, and full scale IQs are provided in the Wechsler series, we use the lowest of these in

conjunction with 12.05.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1, §12.00D(6)(c) (emphasis added); see

also Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). The Court agrees that to the extent the ALJ

rejected Vo’s full performance IQ score simply on the basis that Vo’s other IQ scores were higher, the ALJ

committed legal error. Id. 

An ALJ may reject an IQ score ifthe ALJ finds the score is invalid or inconsistent with the record. See

Markle, 324 F.3d at187. Section 12.00D(6) of the regulations, which contains guidelines for using intelligence

tests as evidence ofmentalretardation, directs the ALJ to “comment on whether the IQ scores are considered

valid and consistent with the developmentalhistory and degree of functional limitation” of the claimant. See 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00D(6)(a). Defendant contends that the ALJ’s rejection ofVo’s full

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performance score is supported because Dr. Sanchez stated that Vo’s “scores must be viewed with caution.”

Defendant argues that the ALJ logically inferred fromDr. Sanchez’s statement that all ofVo’s scores, including

the full performance IQ score, should be higher than they actually were due to cultural bias, and thus is was

proper for the ALJ to reject Vo’s full performance IQ score.

Defendant’s contentions lack merit. Dr. Sanchez’s statement that “all scores must be viewed with

caution” is not tantamount to stating that the IQ scores are invalid. If the scores were invalid, presumably Dr.

Sanchez would have said that they were invalid. Moreover, while it may be the case that Dr. Sanchez was in

fact suggesting that all ofVo’s IQ scores were artificially deflated due to culturalbias, it is equally possible that

Dr. Sanchezmeantsomething different by this statement. While Dr. Sanchez’s statement is ambiguous, it does

not provide a basis for rejecting Vo’s full performance IQ score. “An ALJ cannot reject IQ scores based on

. . . speculative inferences drawn fromthe record.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2000); see

also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, when presented with an ambiguity

in the record, particularly one that goes to the heart of a claimant’s case, an ALJ has a duty to “conduct an

appropriate inquiry” to resolve the ambiguity. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.

2001) (internal citations omitted). Here, the ALJ could have requested further clarification from Dr. Sanchez

or another psychiatric expert, and/or he could have requested that Vo take a different IQ test lesssusceptible

to cultural bias, such as those listed in 20 C.F.R. § 12.00(D)(6)(d). 

Alternatively, the ALJ could have rejected Vo’s full performance IQ score if he found that it was

inconsistent with Vo’s level of adaptive functioning and how he performed activities of daily living and social

functioning. See 20 C.F.R. § 12.00(D)(6)(e). Defendant argues that although the ALJ did not explicitly reject

Vo’s full performance IQ score on this basis, “the inconsistency is evident from the ALJ’s thorough discussion

of plaintiff’s daily activities.” Def’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4:25-26. 

As an initial matter, the Court finds it would be improper to uphold the ALJ’s rejection of Vo’s full

performance IQ score on the basis of a reason that is only arguably implicit in the ALJ’s decision. Cf.

Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “we are wary of speculating about

the basis of the ALJ’s conclusion – especially when his opinion indicates that the conclusion may have been

based exclusively upon an improper reason.”). Here, the ALJ gave two invalid reasons for rejecting Vo’s full

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performance IQ, and he does not state anywhere in the decision that his rejection of the IQ score is based on

Vo’s ability to perform daily activities. 

However, even if the Court considered the ALJ’s discussion of Vo’s daily activities as a basis for

rejecting Vo’s full performance IQ score, the Court concludes that the record does not support such a

conclusion. The Court finds Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2003), and Brown v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 948 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1991), instructive. In Markle, the ALJ had rejected

a claimant’sIQ score on the ground that the claimant could, inter alia, pay his own bills, add and subtract, use

an ATM machine, take care of all of his own personalneeds, and identify and administer his own medication.

See Markle, 324 F.3d at 184-86. The ALJ also found it significant that the plaintiff had obtained a general

equivalency diploma, and that he was able to performa wide range ofsimple, routine and repetitive light work.

Id. at 185-86. The Third Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s rejection of the IQ score was not supported by

substantialevidence, noting that there was no expert opinionof a psychologist or a medicalperson to contradict

the IQ findings. Id. at 187. The court also held that the various activities in which the plaintiff was able to

engage are not inconsistent with qualifying mental retardation. Id. The court reversed and remanded for the

SSA to determine whether the claimant’s mental retardation had manifested before age 22. Id. at 189.

Similarly, in Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the ALJ rejected a claimant’s full

scale IQ score of 68 on the ground that the claimant had a driver’s license, visited friends, possessed limited

literacy and a sixth grade education, was able to make change, used public transit, did his own laundry and

cleaned his room. See Brown, 948 F.2d at 270. The ALJ noted that when the plaintiff worked as a truck

driver, he read a road atlas and recorded mileage, the hours he worked, and the places he drove. Id. The

Sixth Circuit reversed, holding these facts were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of68. Id. The court noted that

the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders stated that persons with mild mental retardation

achieve social and vocational skills adequate for self-support, and that most individuals are able to live

successfully in the community. Id. at 270. The court also noted that if the ALJ had any doubts about the

validity of the plaintiff’s IQ score, he could have administered a second IQ test, which he did not. Id. The

court remanded to the SSA to determine whether the plaintiff’s mental retardation manifested before age 22.

Id. at 271. 

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 The ALJ noted these facts, but did not explicitly adopt them. Indeed, even though defendant argues

that the ALJ implicitly rejected Vo’s full performance IQ score due to Vo’s ability to performactivities ofdaily

living, the fact that the ALJ did not make explicit factual findings to support such a conclusion further

complicates the Court’s consideration of defendant’s argument.

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Here, the ALJ noted that Vo takes care ofhis disabled wife and their two small children, takes public

transportation, does household chores such as cooking and laundry, and is responsible for paying the family’s

bills. Tr. 18-19.6 The ALJ adopted the assessment of the State Agency physicians that Vo could perform

simple routine tasks with limited public interactions. Although the ALJ stated that Vo had a 12th grade

education, Tr. 17, Vo’s closing statement submitted to the ALJ states that he has a 10th grade education from

Vietnam. Tr. 122. The ALJ also noted that Vo’s past work included employment as a handpresser and as an

in-home care provider. Tr. 17. Vo’s closing statement states thatVo worked as a handpresser for less than

six months in 1999. Tr. 125. 

Applying the analysis of Markle and Brown to the instant case, the Court concludes that even ifALJ

implicitly rejected Vo’s full performance IQ score as being inconsistent with his ability to perform activities of

daily living, sucha conclusion is notsupported by substantialevidence. As in Markle and Brown, the fact that

Vo performs basic household chores and takes public transportation is notinconsistentwith mentalretardation.

His ability to take care of himself, his children and his wife, although certainly physically and emotionally

demanding, is no indicationofthe intellectualdemands ofthose activities and is also not inconsistent with being

mentally retarded. The ALJ made no assessment regarding the time it took the plaintiff to complete the daily

tasks mentioned nor did the ALJ consider the ease or difficulty with which plaintiff performed them.

Accordingly, the Court remands to the agency forfurther proceedings to determine whether Vo meets

listing 20 C.F.R. § 12.05. On remand, the agency may, inter alia, request further clarification regarding the

interpretation of Vo’s IQ scores or require Vo to take a different IQ test, such as one of the tests listed in 20

C.F.R. § 12.00(D)(6)(d).

2. Manifestation of Sub-Average Mental Functioning Before Age 22

Defendant also contends that the Court should uphold the ALJ’s decision on the separate and

independent basis thatVo failed to meet the first prong of Listing 12.05, which requires a showing that his subCase 3:04-cv-01387-SI Document 20 Filed 01/03/06 Page 8 of 9
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average mental functioning manifested itself before age 22. However, because the ALJ did not find that Vo

had a sufficiently low IQ to qualify for a § 12.05 listed impairment, he did not inquire into whether Vo’s mental

retardation was initially manifested during his developmental period. The Court remands to the agency for it

to determine this issue in the first instance. See Markle, 324 F.3d at 189; Brown, 948 F.2d at 271. The Court

notes that the ALJ may well believe on remand that he should develop the record further – as is his duty – and

inquire further into the nature of Vo’s education and experience in Vietnam, or obtain an expert opinion as to

the likely onset of the retardation. See generally Markle, 324 F.3d at 188-89.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES

defendant’s cross-motion forsummary judgment, and REMANDS the case forfurther proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2006

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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