Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08164/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08164-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Grand Canyon Trust, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-8164 PCT-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff Grand Canyon Trust has filed suit against the United States Bureau of

Reclamation and the Commissioner of the Bureau (collectively, the “Bureau”). Dkt. #1.

Plaintiff has named the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) as a defendant in

a supplemental complaint. Plaintiff describes itself as an organization created to “protect and

restore the canyon country of the Colorado Plateau” including its “diversity of plants and

animals.” Dkt. #59 ¶ 8. Plaintiff claims that the Bureau’s current operation of the Glen

Canyon Dam, particularly the Dam’s non-seasonal fluctuating releases of water into the

Colorado River, jeopardizes the endangered humpback chub and its habitat and fails to

comport with statutory procedures. The Court allowed several States and other entities to

intervene in this case as defendants, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New

Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, the Southern Nevada

Water Authority, the Colorado River Energy Distributors Association, the Central Arizona

Water Conservation District, the Imperial Irrigation District, and the Metropolitan Water

District of Southern California (collectively, “Intervenors”). Dkt. #98. 

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I. Background. 

Glen Canyon Dam is located on the Colorado River in Northern Arizona. The Dam

creates Lake Powell, 186 miles long and the second largest reservoir in the United States.

Congress authorized the construction of the Dam in 1956 for the purposes of “regulating the

flow of the Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use, [and] making it

possible for the States of the Upper Basin to utilize . . . the apportionments made to and

among them.” 42 U.S.C. § 630. Generation of hydroelectric power was recognized as “an

incident of the foregoing purposes[.]” Id. 

The humpback chub is a “big-river fish” that developed in the canyons of Northern

Arizona three to five million years ago. The species exists primarily in the relatively

inaccessible canyons of the Colorado River. Six humpback chub populations have been

identified, five upstream of the Dam and one downstream. 

The humpback chub was listed as endangered under the statutory predecessor to the

Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967). In 1973, the chub

was listed as endangered under the newly-enacted ESA. 38 Fed. Reg. 106 (June 4, 1973).

In 1994, critical habitat for the chub was designated. Such habitat is essential for the

endangered species’ survival and therefore requires special management. 59 Fed. Reg.

13374 (Mar. 21, 1994).

A. Plaintiff’s Factual Assertions.

The Bureau operates the Dam using a water release system known as the “modified

low fluctuating flow” or “MLFF.” Plaintiff contends that the MLFF system impermissibly

harms the humpback chub and its habitat, while a “seasonally adjusted steady flow” or

“SASF” system would be more accommodating of the chub and more consistent with the

Bureau’s obligations under the ESA. Plaintiff also claims that the Bureau has failed to fulfill

its obligation to consult with FWS in developing the Dam’s annual operating plans and to

assess the environmental impacts of those plans.

The MLFF consists of fluctuating water releases tied to the demand for electricity

generated by the Dam. Plaintiff alleges that the Dam’s water releases vary by a factor of five

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The 1994 opinion was signed on December 21, 1994, but was not transmitted to the

Bureau until January 7, 1995. Plaintiff refers to the opinion as the 1994 opinion, while the

Bureau refers to it as the 1995 opinion. The Court will refer to it as the 1994 opinion. 

2

A “low water year” is one in which only 8.23 million acre-feet, the minimum water

required to satisfy the water supply, is released from the Dam. See Dkt. #17 at 12 n.9.

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over a 24-hour cycle, resulting in a daily vertical variation of the Colorado River by as much

as six feet. Plaintiff alleges that this release schedule adversely impacts the humpback chub

and its habitat. In particular, “[s]ediment and the movement of sand within the Colorado

River system ensure the formation of shoreline habitats the chub needs for spawning, rearing,

and feeding,” but the Dam’s operation “blocks the transportation of upstream sediments,”

disrupts traditional “river flows, shoreline habitats, and temperatures,” “reduc[es] and limit[s]

chub distribution, reproduction and population,” and “alter[s] biological and habitat

features[.]” Dkt. #17 at 6-7, 20. Plaintiff contends that the Dam’s fluctuating releases are

inconsistent with thirty years of Bureau statements acknowledging the harm such fluctuations

cause to the humpback chub and its habitat. 

A 1994 FWS biological opinion determined that the MLFF’s fluctuating flows

“jeopardize” the humpback chub and “adversely modify” its habitat.1

 Plaintiff asserts that

the Dam operation does not follow the 1994 opinion’s recommendation of seasonally

adjusted steady flows during all low water years.2

 According to Plaintiff, the

recommendation is intended to mimic natural conditions in the Colorado River and would

not jeopardize the endangered humpback chub nor adversely modify critical habitat. Plaintiff

alleges that the recommendation and its seasonally adjusted steady flow regime was to be

implemented by 1998, but never was. 

B. The 2008 Plan.

The Bureau has adopted a 2008 Experimental Plan that mandates continuation of the

MLFF system, but with a high water release in March of 2008 and steady flows in September

and October of 2008-2012. The Bureau completed an environmental assessment (“EA”) for

this plan and found that the environmental impact would be insignificant (“FONSI”). 

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FWS issued a new biological opinion on February 27, 2008. The opinion states that

it replaces the 1994 biological opinion and notes that “some combination of conditions under

MLFF has benefitted the humpback chub, and that more recent conservation actions likely

have as well[.]” Dkt. #27, Ex. 4 at 52. The opinion concludes that “implementation of the

March 2008 high flow test and the five-year implementation of MLFF with steady releases

in September and October,” as proposed in the 2008 Experimental Plan, “is not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of the humpback chub . . . and is not likely to destroy or

adversely modify designated critical habitat for the humpback chub.” Id. at 51.

C. This Suit and the Parties’ Motions.

Plaintiff filed suit on December 7, 2007, claiming that the Bureau had violated the

ESA and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Dkt. #1. Specifically, Plaintiff

asserts that the Bureau has (1) violated the ESA by jeopardizing the humpback chub,

(2) violated the ESA by destroying or adversely modifying the chub’s critical habitat,

(3) violated the ESA by “taking” the chub, (4) violated the ESA by failing to consult with

FWS on the development of annual operating plans for the Dam, and (5) violated NEPA by

failing to prepare environmental assessments or impact statements regarding the Dam’s

annual operating plan. Id. On February 15, 2008, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment

on these five claims. 

On March 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint asserting three additional

claims: (6) that the Bureau failed to provide an opportunity for public comment with respect

to the 2008 EA or FONSI, (7) that the FONSI and the 2008 biological opinion issued by

FWS are based on an inadequate assessment of the harms of the MLFF system, and (8) that

the 2008 plan does not sufficiently consider or adopt the seasonally-adjusted steady flow

scheme. Dkt. #23. These claims are not at issue in the current motions, but they will be

mentioned in this order. 

On March 17, 2008, the Bureau filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, crossmotion for summary judgment, and moved to stay briefing on claims 1-3. Dkt. ##24-25. The

Bureau’s motion asks the Court to dismiss or grant summary judgment on the five original

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causes of action. Id. The Court denied the motion to stay and required the Bureau to brief

claims 1-3. Dkt. #58. The Intervenors joined the Bureau’s cross-motion and memoranda.

Dkt. ##76, 80. The Court held oral argument on August 29, 2008. Dkt. #116. Supplemental

briefs were filed at the Court’s request. Dkt. ##117-22.

II. Are Claims 1, 2, and 3 Moot?

The ESA requires each federal agency to “insure that any action authorized, funded,

or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification

of habitat of such species[.]” ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Claims 1 and 2 allege

that the Bureau has violated this provision by jeopardizing the humpback chub and adversely

modifying its habitat. The ESA also makes it unlawful for any person to “take” any

endangered species “within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States[.]”

ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm,

pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such

conduct.” ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Claim 3 alleges that the Bureau’s actions

have resulted in an unauthorized “take” of the humpback chub. The parties do not dispute

that the humpback chub and its habitat fall within these protections, nor that the Bureau is

subject to the ESA.

The Bureau argues that claims 1, 2, and 3 are premised exclusively on the continuing

validity of the 1994 biological opinion, that this opinion was replaced by the 2008 biological

opinion, and that the claims therefore are moot. Plaintiff’s original complaint did seem to

predicate claims 1 through 3 on the Bureau’s violation of the 1994 opinion. Claim 1, for

example, alleged that “by failing to comply with the 1994 Biological Opinion and operating

Glen Canyon Dam under a [MLFF] regime, [the Bureau] is violating its mandatory ESA

section 7 duty to avoid jeopardy.” Dkt. #1 ¶ 52. Claims 2 and 3 contained similar language.

Id. ¶¶ 56, 60. 

Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint on April 10, 2008. Dkt. #59. The Bureau

stipulated to this filing. Dkt. #47. The supplemental complaint modified claims 1, 2, and 3

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to make them less dependent on the 1994 opinion. Although each claim continues to refer

to the opinion, the alleged wrongdoing is violation of the ESA. Claim 1 asserts, for example,

that “[o]perating Glen Canyon Dam under a [MLFF] regime violates [the] ESA section

7(a)(2) prohibition against jeopardizing a listed species,” that the Bureau “has and is

operating Glen Canyon Dam under a [MLFF] regime,” and that the Bureau therefore “is

violating its mandatory ESA section 7 duty to avoid jeopardy.” Dkt. #59, ¶¶ 58-60. Claim

2 contains virtually the same language, but asserts that the Bureau’s operation violates the

ESA “duty to avoid actions that destroy or adversely modify critical habitat.” Id. ¶ 64.

Claim 3 asserts that the Bureau “has unlawfully withheld compliance with section

9(a)(1)(B)’s ‘take’ prohibition[.]” Id. ¶ 68. Although this claim asserts that the Bureau failed

to comply with the 1994 opinion’s recommendation, the wrong alleged is violation of the

ESA, not violation of the 1994 opinion. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. 

The Court finds that the supplemental complaint clearly alleges violations of the ESA.

This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that claims 1, 2, and 3 are asserted only against the

Bureau, the entity charged with operating the Dam. They are not asserted against FWS, the

entity that wrote the 1994 opinion.

The Bureau bases its mootness argument on American Rivers v. National Marine

Fisheries Service, 126 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs in that case alleged that a

1994-1998 biological opinion concerning the operation of dams on the Columbia River

violated section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Id. at 1122. The claim became moot when the National

Marine Fisheries Service issued a 1995 biological opinion that superceded the 1994-1998

opinion. Id. at 1123-24. The Bureau argues that Plaintiff’s claims 1, 2, and 3 are similarly

rendered moot by the 2008 opinion’s replacement of the 1994 opinion.

The action at issue in American Rivers, however, was a challenge to the validity of

the 1994-1998 biological opinion. The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the case

constituted “an attack on the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion” and a “challenge to the 1994-

1998 Biological Opinion.” Id. at 1124. Although the plaintiffs also were attacking the

manner in which the defendants were transporting salmon to comply with the ESA, the

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challenge was based on the invalidity of the 1994-1998 opinion on which the defendants

were relying. Id. at 1123-24. When the challenged biological opinion was superceded by

a new opinion, the challenge to the old opinion became moot. See also Idaho Dep’t of Fish

& Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1995) (challenge

to validity of 1993 biological opinion rendered moot by issuance of superceding opinion).

This case is different. Claims 1, 2, and 3 assert that the Bureau’s operation of Glen

Canyon Dam under an MLFF regime violates the ESA. Plaintiff does not assert that

Defendants are wrongfully relying on an invalid 1994 opinion, but that the 1994 opinion and

other documents support its claim that operation of the Dam violates the ESA. Such a

challenge is not rendered moot by issuance of the 2008 opinion, even if it does replace the

1994 opinion. The Bureau continues to operate the Dam under the MLFF regime and the

legality of that operation under the ESA remains a live issue. The Court will therefore deny

the Bureau’s motion to dismiss claims 1, 2, and 3 as moot. 

III. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Notice on Claims 1, 2, and 3.

The Bureau argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims 1, 2,

and 3 because Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice 60 days before filing suit.

Specifically, the Bureau asserts that Plaintiff’s notice of claim was based on violations of the

1994 opinion and did not include the claims now asserted in the supplemental complaint and

described in response to the motion to dismiss. 

No lawsuit may be commenced under the citizen suit provision of the ESA “prior to

60 days after written notice of the violation has been given . . . to any alleged violator of any

such provision or regulation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(I). This notice requirement is

jurisdictional. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 520

(9th Cir. 1998); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1988). Failure

to comply with the notice requirement acts as an absolute bar to bringing suit under the ESA.

Sw. Ctr., 143 F.2d at 520. 

“‘The purpose of the 60-day notice provision is to put the agencies on notice of a

perceived violation of the statute and an intent to sue. When given notice, the agencies have

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an opportunity to review their actions and take corrective measures if warranted. The

provision therefore provides an opportunity for settlement or other resolution of a dispute

without litigation.’” Id. (quoting Forest Conservation v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (D.

Idaho 1993), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1984)). “At a minimum, [Plaintiff] was obligated

to provide sufficient information of a violation so that the [Bureau] could identify and

attempt to abate the violation.” Id. at 522. 

Plaintiff’s letter of September 12, 2007, satisfies the notice requirement. The letter

does assert that the Dam is being operated contrary to the 1994 opinion, but it is a violation

of the ESA that is the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint. The letter specifically states that

“by operating Glen Canyon Dam in low water years under MLFF, the Bureau is jeopardizing

the humpback chub . . . and adversely modifying critical habitat in violation of the ESA.”

Dkt. #101-2 at 2. The letter further asserts that “[b]y operating Glen Canyon Dam during

low water years under the MLFF program, the Bureau has unlawfully taken the endangered

chub . . . in violation of ESA section 9(a)(1).” Id. at 4. 

The Court concludes that the letter provided sufficient information for the Bureau to

identify and attempt to abate the alleged ESA violation caused by the MLFF regime. The

Court will not dismiss claims 1, 2, and 3 for lack of notice.

IV. The Standard of Review and Merits of Claims 1, 2, and 3.

A. APA Review.

The Bureau contends that the Court’s review of claims 1, 2, and 3 is limited to the

“arbitrary and capricious” standard established by the APA and must be confined to the

administrative record already lodged with the Court. Plaintiff concedes that the standard of

review is “arbitrary and capricious,” but contends that the scope of review is not limited to

the administrative record. The parties also appear to disagree on the scope of the

administrative record, although they have not addressed this question directly.

1. Standard of Review.

The ESA does not contain a standard of review. The Court therefore must evaluate

the defendants’ administrative decisions using the APA standard. See Or. Natural Res.

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Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (“As the ESA does not itself specify

a standard of review of its implementation, we apply the general standard of review of

agency action established by the [APA].”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 934 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When reviewing administrative

decisions involving the ESA, we are guided by section 706 of the Administrative Procedure

Act.”). The Court may set aside an agency’s decision under the APA only if the decision is

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries

Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001). “This standard of review is highly deferential,

presuming the agency action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis

exists for its decision.” Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d

1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotes and citation omitted). 

2. Scope of Review.

Review under the APA usually is restricted to the administrative record. See, e.g.,

Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1243 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[t]he reviewing court may not substitute reasons for agency action that are not in the

record”); 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (“the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited

by a party”). The Court may consider materials outside of the administrative record “(1) if

necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has

explained its decision, (2) when the agency has relied on documents not in the record, . . .

(3) when supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject

matter, [or] . . . (4) when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.” Ctr. for Biological

Diversity, 450 F.3d at 943. 

Plaintiff cites Washington Toxics Coalition v. Environmental Protection Agency, 413

F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that any claim brought under the ESA

citizen suit provision is not subject to this APA record review limitation. But such a rule

would be contrary to the majority of Ninth Circuit cases which hold that ESA claims are

subject to APA review. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d at 1035-36; Ctr. for

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Biological Diversity, 450 F.3d at 943; Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t

of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004); Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren,

336 F.3d 944, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2003); Ariz. Cattle, 273 F.3d at 1236; Pyramid Lake Paiute

Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990); see also S.

Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CIV S-06-2845 LKK JFM,

2008 WL 3932358, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S.

Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 2, 2006). 

Although it is true that Washington Toxics suggests that ESA claims are not limited

to the agency record, the case devoted all of one paragraph to the subject of APA review and

failed to cite any of the numerous Ninth Circuit cases holding that APA review applies in

ESA cases. 413 F.3d at 1034. This Court is not charged with deciding whether a decision

of the Ninth Circuit is incorrect, but it appears that Washington Toxics does not represent the

majority view in this circuit and that it and the few cases that have followed it are best

understood as agency inaction cases. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, Nos.

CV-05-297-E-BKW, CV-060275-E-BLW, 2007 WL 1667618, at *19-20 (D. Idaho June 8,

2007) (stating that court is not bound by the APA record review limitation in an ESA citizen

suit challenging an agency’s failure to consult, although the court ultimately relied solely

upon material within administrative record); Defenders of Wildlife v. Martin, 454 F. Supp.

2d 1085, 1094 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (relying on extra-record material to grant an injunction

until agency remedied its failure to consult); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Norton, No. C05-

1835L, 2006 WL 1518895, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2006) (finding that a court has

discretion in choosing whether or not to apply the APA standards and ultimately choosing

to apply APA record review limitation). 

Claims 1, 2, and 3 involve the Bureau's actions in operating Glen Canyon Dam, not

agency inaction. The Court therefore will apply the Ninth Circuit’s traditional view and limit

its consideration of claims 1, 2, and 3 to the administrative record. As the Ninth Circuit

reiterated in 2006, “[w]hen reviewing an agency decision, ‘the focal point for judicial review

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should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially

in the reviewing court.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 450 F.3d at 943 (citing Camp v. Pitts,

411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)). 

B. Merits of Claims 1, 2, and 3.

Plaintiff asks the Court to hold that the Bureau has violated the ESA by jeopardizing,

destroying habitat for, and taking the humpback chub. Plaintiff supports this argument

primarily with the 1994 opinion, noting that the opinion found that operation of the Dam

under an MLFF regime would jeopardize the chub and destroy or adversely modify its

habitat. Plaintiff cites numerous other documents in support of its contention that MLFF

operations violate the ESA, including a 1978 biological opinion, 1990 recovery plan, the

Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, a 1999 insufficiency letter, a 2002 insufficiency letter,

a 2005 SCORE report, a 2007 biological opinion, and a 2008 USGS study, among others.

Plaintiff further claims that the 2008 biological opinion is procedurally and substantively

flawed and cannot be relied upon for a finding of compliance with the ESA.

The Bureau disputes these factual assertions and claims that Plaintiff is relying on

outdated scientific information contained in the 1994 opinion. The Bureau cites the 2008

biological opinion and its finding that jeopardy, habitat destruction, and taking are not likely

under current Dam operations. The Bureau notes that it conducted a series of flow tests in

1996, 1997, and 2000 and has eliminated non-native fish that prey on the humpback chub.

The Bureau asserts that the population decline of the humpback chub has decreased and the

population of adult fish has increased since 2001. The Bureau cites numerous documents in

the administrative record showing, it claims, that FWS has never found the Bureau to be in

violation of the 1994 opinion or the ESA.

The most pivotal document from the Bureau’s perspective is the 2008 biological

opinion. The most pivotal document from Plaintiff’s perspective is the 1994 opinion that

purportedly was superceded by the 2008 opinion. Thus, the validity of the 2008 opinion is

central to the Court’s resolution of the parties’ dispute on claims 1, 2, and 3. Because

Plaintiff’s claim 7 asserts that the 2008 opinion is invalid and should be disregarded, the

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The Bureau contends that the Court cannot fashion a remedy to address the violations

in claims 1, 2, and 3 because they concern wholly past events. See Gwaltney of Smithfield

v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57-60 (1987). As concluded above, however,

Plaintiff challenges the ongoing operation of the Dam, not merely past operations. The

Bureau further contends that the only remedy available for ongoing violations would be to

order the resumption of consultation between the Bureau and FWS, a process only recently

concluded. As Plaintiff has not moved for summary judgment on the question of remedies

and the parties generally have not addressed that issue, the Court will not rule on it now.

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Court concludes that it should address claim 7 before deciding claims 1, 2, and 3. The Court

will defer ruling on these claims until after the parties have briefed claims 6, 7, and 8.3

V. Claim 4.

Plaintiff claims that the Bureau has violated the ESA by failing to consult with FWS

each time the Bureau has prepared an annual operating plan (“AOP”) for the Dam. For the

reasons stated below, the Court will enter summary judgment in the Bureau’s favor on this

claim.

A. ESA Consultation Requirements.

The ESA establishes a three-step process. First, an agency proposing to take an

“agency action” must inquire of the Secretary of the Interior whether any threatened or

endangered species may be present in the area of the proposed action. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(c)(1). Second, if the answer is yes, the acting agency must prepare a “biological

assessment” to determine whether such species “is likely to be affected” by the proposed

agency action. Id. Third, if the acting agency determines in the biological assessment that

its proposed action may affect a threatened or endangered species, the acting agency must

engage in formal consultations with the agency designated to protect the species, in this case

the FWS. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). 

Formal consultation is initiated by a written request. The acting agency must provide

FWS with the best scientific and commercial data available. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c). The

FWS then issues a “biological opinion” stating its view on whether the proposed agency

action will affect the endangered species or its habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the

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4

The parties each cite a variety of Ninth Circuit cases to support their position, but

neither side provides a broad review of relevant case law or principles. The Court finds the

parties citations largely unhelpful in deciding this important question. Several of the cited

cases do not include any decision on the meaning of agency action for purposes of ESA

section 7, but include only a factual description of events or decisions that are not at issue in

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opinion concludes that the agency action is likely to jeopardize the protected species, FWS

may recommend “reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action.” Id. 

If the biological assessment of the acting agency concludes that the agency action is

“not likely to adversely affect” an endangered or threatened species, the acting agency may

seek informal consultation with FWS. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). FWS may issue a written

concurrence in the determination or may suggest modifications that the acting agency could

take to avoid the likelihood of harm to the endangered species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(b). If

FWS does not agree that the agency action is not likely to adversely affect the protected

species, formal consultation must occur. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. Thus, “[f]ormal consultation

is excused only where (1) an agency determines that its action is unlikely to adversely affect

the proposed species or habitat, and (2) [FWS] concurs with that determination.” Natural

Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999) (“NRDC”) (emphasis in

original). 

The Court’s review of this claim is governed by the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706. The

Bureau’s decision not to consult with respect to AOPs may be set aside only if it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or if it is found

to be “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D); NRDC,

146 F.3d at 1125, 1127; see also Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries

Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. “Agency Action.”

Plaintiff argues that the AOP prepared by the Bureau each year constitutes agency

action and triggers the obligation to consult. The Bureau disagrees, arguing that the AOP

constitutes nothing more than a report to Congress and relevant Governors on past and

projected Dam operations.4

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the cases. See, e.g., Dkt. #17 at 28 (citing Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v.

Gutierrez, No. 1:06-CV-00245 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 1752289 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2007);

Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D. Or.

1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995)); Dkt. #91 (citing Forest Guardians

v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 2006)). And some of the cited cases concern the

“final agency action” rule under the APA, not the “agency action” requirement under the

ESA. See, e.g., Dkt. #91 (citing Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U. S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d

977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006)).

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The Ninth Circuit has issued a number of decisions on the agency action requirement.

Some note that agency action is to be interpreted broadly to encompass any ongoing

government conduct that has long-lasting effects. See Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30

F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1994); see also NRDC, 146 F.3d at 1125; Lane County

Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992). These cases rely on TVA v.

Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), a case in which the Supreme Court, while addressing substantive

rather than procedural provision of ESA section 7, noted the broad language of the statute

and observed that it admits of no exceptions. See Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1054; NRDC, 146

F.3d at 1125; Lane County, 958 F.2d at 294. 

Recently, the Supreme Court revisited section 7 and declined to adopt a broad reading

that would encompass virtually all actions by government agencies. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home

Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2531-37 (2007). The Court found that the

broad language of TVA, which was decided before the issuance of regulations construing the

ESA (discussed below), was not controlling. Id. at 2536-37. Some Ninth Circuit cases have

also held that the agency action definition is not unlimited in breadth. See Sierra Club v.

Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Envt’l Protection Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber

Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) (“EPIC”). 

The Court’s task, then, is to determine the limits of agency action and apply them to

this case. Several principles are relevant.

First and most obviously, agency action requires some “affirmative action” on the part

of the agency. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 967 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d on

other grounds, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S.Ct. 2518. The ESA defines agency

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action to include actions “authorized, funded, or carried out by [an] agency[.]” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(2). Implementing regulations provide several examples of affirmative action:

“(a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of

regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits,

or grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water,

or air.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 

 Second, agency action must be discretionary. Implementing regulations state that

ESA consulting obligations “apply to all actions in which there is discretionary federal

involvement or control.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added); see 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. The

Supreme Court found this regulatory gloss on the statute to be reasonable and entitled to

deference. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2534. This gloss limits the meaning

of agency action because “not every action authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal

agency is a product of that agency’s exercise of discretion.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has also

recognized this discretion requirement, noting that “[i]f no discretion to act is retained, the

consultation would be a meaningless exercise.” Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974. Thus,

“‘where there is no agency discretion to act, the ESA does not apply.’” Id. (quoting NRDC,

146 F.3d at 1125-26). 

Third, not just any discretion will do. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that agency

action occurs only when the discretion retained by the agency would enable the agency to

take steps that benefit the protected species. This limitation has been recognized in numerous

cases. See Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1509 (agency action does not occur if the agency “does

not possess the ability to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the protected

species”); EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1080 (“Under Sierra Club to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, [the plaintiff] must allege facts to show that the [agency] retained sufficient

discretionary involvement or control . . . to implement measures that inure to the benefit of

the [protected species]”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at

974 (“this court has held that the discretionary control retained by the federal agency must

have the ability to inure to the benefit of the protected species”); Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at

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5

The parties’ memoranda fail to address this discretion requirement. As the citations

in the text make clear, however, the requirement is well established in Ninth Circuit law and

must be applied by this Court.

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1033 (“The ESA consultation requirement applies only if the agency has the discretionary

control to inure to the benefit of a protected species.” (quotation omitted)). Even the

retention of other kinds of discretion will not satisfy the agency action definition. The

discretion must enable the agency to take actions that would benefit the protected species.

See Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1508-09 (BLM’s discretion to alter rights-of-way on other

grounds did not satisfy agency action requirement when BLM had not retained discretion to

alter rights-of-way to benefit spotted owl); EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1082-83 (retention of “some”

agency discretion not sufficient to trigger consultation requirement; discretion must allow

agency to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the endangered species).5

C. Are AOPs Agency Actions?

Plaintiff argues that the Bureau makes monthly flow decisions in each year’s AOP,

that these decisions adopt the MLFF approach to operating the Dam, and that MLFF is the

primary source of jeopardy to the humpback chub and its habitat. Plaintiff argues that the

Bureau could decide in the AOPs to adopt SASF, a regime that more closely tracks the

natural hydrograph. The Bureau’s decision on this issue each year, Plaintiff contends,

constitutes agency action that should be taken only in consultation with FWS. 

The Bureau argues that the decision to adopt the MLFF regime is not made in the

annual AOPs, but was instead made in 1996 following a full environmental impact study and

consultation with FWS. The Bureau also contends that the AOPs make projections, not

decisions, regarding monthly flows, and that these projections are routinely modified as

actual water conditions become known throughout the course of the year.

To decide which party is correct, the Court will review the history of Dam operation

decisions and the nature of the AOPs. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed during oral argument that

only the 2008 AOP is at issue in this case. 

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An “acre foot” of water is the amount of water needed to cover one acre of land to

a depth of one foot. It amounts to 43,560 cubic feet of water, or about 325,851 gallons.

A million acre feet or “maf” is one million times this amount.

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1. Dam Operation Decisions.

Glen Canyon Dam was authorized in 1954 and completed in 1963. In 1968, Congress

passed the Colorado River Basin Project Act (“1968 Act”). See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.

The 1968 Act required the Secretary of the Interior to adopt criteria for the long-range

operation of reservoirs on the Colorado River, including Glen Canyon Dam. 43 U.S.C.

§ 1552(b). In addition, the 1968 Act required the Bureau to “transmit to the Congress and

to the Governors of the Colorado River Basin States a report describing the actual operation

under the adopted criteria for the preceding compact water year and the projected operation

for the current year.” 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b). Long Range Operating Criteria (“LROC”) were

adopted by the Secretary of the Interior on June 4, 1970. See 35 Fed. Reg. 8951-02 (June 10,

1970). The LROC have remained largely unchanged. See 70 Fed. Reg. 15873, 15874

(Mar. 29, 2005). They establish a minimum annual water release from Lake Powell of 8.23

million acre feet, and specify conditions under which greater releases may be made to

equalize water storage between Lake Powell and Lake Mead. Id. at 15875.6

In 1992, Congress enacted the Grand Canyon Protection Act ( “1992 Act”). See Pub.

L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, §§ 1801-1809. The 1992 Act required the Bureau to

complete a Dam environmental impact statement (“EIS”) that was then underway. Id.

§ 1804(a). Congress also required the Bureau, upon completion of the EIS, to adopt

Operating Criteria for the Dam. Id. § 1804(c). The 1992 Act required the Bureau to

“transmit to the Congress and to the Governors of the Colorado River Basin states a report

. . . on the preceding year and the projected year operations undertaken pursuant to this Act.”

Id. 

Consistent with these requirements, a final environmental impact statement for Glen

Canyon Dam operations was completed on March 21, 1995 (the “FEIS”). The FEIS

considered several alternative approaches to operating the Dam. These alternatives “were

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formulated through a systematic process using public input, technical information,

interdisciplinary discussions, and professional judgement.” Dkt. #122-2 at 3. The FEIS team

developed 10 preliminary water-release alternatives and divided them into three general

categories – fluctuating flows, steady flows, and flows mimicking pre-dam conditions. The

preliminary alternatives were published in 1991 and a series of public meetings was held to

discuss them. Following the meetings, the FEIS team formulated nine water-release

alternatives for detailed study. These included (1) no action (i.e., no change in Dam

operations), (2) maximum power plant capacity, (3) high fluctuating flow, (4) moderate

fluctuating flow, (5) modified low fluctuating flow (MLFF), (6) interim low fluctuating flow,

(7) existing monthly volume steady flow, (8) seasonally adjusted stead flow (SASF), and

(9) year-round steady flow. 

To understand the MLFF approach that ultimately was adopted by the Bureau, and the

SASF alternative favored by Plaintiff, one must first understand how the Dam was operated

before the FEIS. Existing Dam operations were considered by the FEIS in the No Action

Alternative – the alternative that would have made no change to operations. The objective

of the existing operations was to generate as much electricity as possible given the needs of

the power system. Id. at 7. Under this approach, “[f]luctuating releases occur . . . to follow

power system load changes, to produce peaking power, to regulate the power system, or to

respond to power system emergencies.” Id.

Monthly release volumes under the No Action Alternative were described in the FEIS

as follows:

[T]he volume of water released from Lake Powell each month depends

on forecasted inflow, existing storage levels, monthly storage targets, and

annual release requirements. Demands for electrical energy, fish and wildlife

needs, and recreation needs also are considered and accommodated as long as

the risk of spilling and storage equalization between Lakes Powell and Mead

are not affected.

Power demand is highest during winter and summer months, and

recreation needs are highest during the summer. Therefore, the higher volume

releases are scheduled during these months whenever possible to benefit these

uses.

Id. A chart following this explanation provided a graphic illustration of the monthly releases

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during the low water year of 1989. The chart shows higher releases in the winter and

summer and lower releases in the spring and fall.

The FEIS described the MLFF approach in these words:

The Modified Low Fluctuating Flow Alternative was developed to

reduce daily flow fluctuations well below no action levels and to provide

special high steady releases of short duration, with the goal of protecting or

enhancing downstream resources while allowing limited flexibility for power

operations. This alternative would have the same annual and essentially the

same monthly operating plan as described under the No Action Alternative but

would restrict daily and hourly operations more than any of the previously

described fluctuating flow alternatives.

Id. at 16 (emphasis added). The MLFF alternative thus included the same monthly pattern

of water releases as the existing Dam operation – higher releases in the peak power-demand

months of the winter and summer, and lower releases in the spring and fall. This

characteristic of MLFF was illustrated in the FEIS projections of median monthly releases

– .586 maf in the fall, .899 maf in the winter, .587 maf in the spring, and 1.045 maf in the

summer. Id. at 46. The key difference between the No Action alternative and the MLFF was

that the MLFF significantly reduced the daily fluctuations in water releases from the Dam.

The MLFF also included habitat maintenance flows intended “to re-form backwaters and

maintain sandbars, which are important for camping beaches and wildlife habitat.” Id. 

 The SASF alternative was quite different. It did not consider the need for power

production, but instead “was developed to enhance the aquatic ecosystem by releasing water

at a constant rate within defined seasons and by using habitat maintenance flows. Seasonal

variations in minimum flows and habitat maintenance flows were designed with the goal of

protecting and enhancing native fish.” Id. Water releases under the SASF alternative would

be steady throughout any given month, but total monthly releases would be higher in the

spring and lower in the summer and fall to more closely track the natural hydrograph. As the

FEIS explained, “[t]his alternative would provide steady flows on a 1- to 3-month basis,

providing seasonal variations throughout the year to meet downstream resource needs. The

highest releases would occur in May and June, with relatively low releases from August

through December.” Id. at 21. These characteristics of the SASF were illustrated in the FEIS

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projections of median monthly releases – .492 maf in the fall, .688 maf in the winter, 1.106

maf in the spring, and .768 maf in the summer. Id. at 47.

The differences between the MLFF and SASF are significant. Although they would

fluctuate through the day, total monthly flows under the MLFF would be low in the spring

and high in the late summer to correspond to electricity demand, while monthly flows under

the SASF would be the opposite – high in the spring and low in the late summer to

approximate the natural flows. These differences are illustrated in a chart attached to the

FEIS. April water releases under MLFF are projected to total .512 maf, while April releases

under SASF would be .723 maf. Dkt. #27-6 at 26. May would be .504 maf for MLFF and

1.073 maf for SASF. August would be .848 maf under MLFF and .474 maf under SASF.

Id. The point is simply this: MLFF and SASF produce very different monthly flows, and

these differences were fully understood and considered by the Bureau in the FEIS.

The FEIS found MLFF to be the preferred alternative. The Secretary of the Interior

accepted this recommendation and selected MLFF as the operating system for the Dam in

a Record of Decision signed on October 8, 1996 (“1996 ROD”). As the ROD announced:

“The Secretary’s decision is to implement the Modified Low Fluctuating Flow Alternative

(the preferred alternative) as described in the final EIS on the Operation of Glen Canyon

Dam with a minor change in the timing of beach/habitat building flows.[.]” Dkt. #27, Ex.

3 at G-3. 

The Bureau then established Operating Criteria for the Dam as required by Congress

in the 1992 Act. Notice of the new criteria was published in the Federal Register. See 62

Fed. Reg. 9447 (Mar. 3, 1997). The notice stated that the Operating Criteria would “control

the operation of Glen Canyon Dam[.]” Id. The notice described the “Specific Operational

Constraints” for the Dam as follows: “The plan of operations will follow the description of

the preferred alternative (Modified Low Fluctuating Flow) in the Operation of Glen Canyon

Dam Final Environmental Impact Statement and its Record of Decision.” Id. § 3. 

The salient points from this history can be summarized as follows: The Bureau

formally established Operating Criteria for Glen Canyon Dam under the direction of

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Congress. The Operating Criteria adopt a MLFF flow regime that includes fluctuating flows

to meet power demands within established limits. Although precise monthly flow volumes

are not set in the Operating Criteria – they could not be set given the uncertainties of yearly

precipitation and power demands – the MLFF presumes higher flows in the winter and

summer months and lower flows in the spring and fall months, a very different pattern than

the SASF that was considered and rejected in the FEIS. The Operating Criteria are based on

the ROD signed by the Secretary of the Interior, have been published in the Federal Register,

and, in the words of the Bureau, “control the operation” of the Dam. 62 Fed. Reg. 9448

(Mar. 3, 1997). Against this backdrop, the Court will consider the nature of the 2008 AOP.

2. The 2008 AOP.

The AOP concerns more than Glen Canyon Dam. It addresses the operations of

several reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin including Fontenelle, Flaming Gorge, Blue

Mesa, Morrow Point, Crystal and Navajo, Lake Mead, and Lake Powell. Releases from these

reservoirs are described for the year 2007. 

The 2008 AOP then sets forth projected releases from these reservoirs for the water

year 2008, which extends from October 2007 through September 2008. The AOP makes

clear that the projections are just that – projections – and that they are based on forecasted

in-flows and the criteria established in the 1996 ROD and the Operating Criteria. The

Bureau’s use of projections comports with the 1968 Act and the 1992 Act, both of which

require the Bureau to prepare annual reports that include “projected” operations for the next

water year. See 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b); Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1804(c). The AOP makes clear

that actual releases from the Dam will be governed by the MLFF flow regime adopted in the

ROD and the Operating Criteria: “Daily and hourly releases in 2008 will be made according

to the parameters of the ROD for Glen Canyon Dam . . . and the Glen Canyon Dam

Operating Criteria[.]” Dkt.#27, Ex. 2 at 18. 

Table 6 of the 2008 AOP sets forth projected monthly releases under the most

probable inflow conditions. The releases track the MLFF pattern considered in the FEIS,

with the highest months being in the winter and summer and the lowest in the spring and fall.

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Projected releases vary from .600 maf in October of 2007 to .900 maf in August of 2008.

Alternative projected releases are shown if the Bureau decides to undertake a high flow

experiment in February and March. The AOP explains the tentative nature of these numbers:

“Since the hydrologic conditions of the Colorado River Basin can never be completely

known in advance, the AOP addresses the operations resulting from three different

hydrologic scenarios: the probable maximum, most probable, and probable minimum

reservoir inflow conditions. River operations under the plan are modified during the year

as runoff predictions are adjusted to reflect existing snow pack, basin storage, and flow

conditions.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This need to modify release amounts as the year

progresses was recognized by the Bureau in the FEIS: “Each month during the inflow

forecast season (January to July), the volume of water to be released is recomputed based on

updated streamflow forecast information.” Dkt. #122-2 at 7. 

D. Conclusion – the AOP Is Not an Agency Action.

Plaintiff asserts that the AOP is the place where monthly flow decisions are made.

This is not correct. The AOP makes projections, fully contemplating that actual releases

from the Dam will differ from projections and will be computed only as the water year

progresses. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff contends that it is the actual releases from the Dam

that constitute agency action, those releases are not determined in the 2008 AOP. The AOP

is an educated guess of what the releases will be when conditions are known.

Plaintiff cites statements in various documents which suggest that annual water release

decisions are made in the AOP. The Court does not find these statements convincing

because the 2008 AOP clearly makes projections. Actual release decisions are made during

the course of the year. And in any event, it is not the real-time release decisions about which

Plaintiff complains. Those decisions are made daily as conditions change, and yet Plaintiff

has not suggested that every daily decision to increase or decrease flow from the Dam

requires consultation with FWS. Plaintiff’s true complaint is with the Bureau’s use of the

MLFF system, a decision made in the ROD and Operating Criteria, not in the AOP.

The Court also concludes that the Bureau does not exercise discretion in the AOP that

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That Plaintiff seeks abandonment of MLFF and adoption of SASF through the AOP

is clear from Plaintiff’s briefs. See, e.g., Dkt. #17 at 30 (the MLFF “flow patterns bear little

resemblance to historic seasonal flows and the natural hydrograph . . . ; natural seasonal

flows are characterized by large floods in the spring and low flows in the late summer and

fall”); Dkt. #91 at 36 (the MLFF “‘annual pattern of monthly volumes released from the dam

(with peak daily flows at their highest during the summer sediment input months of July and

August) is the greatest factor preventing accumulation of new sand inputs from

tributaries[.]’”) (quoting Ex. 22, 2007 USGS report) (emphasis added by Plaintiff); id. at 37

(“[l]ower flows in July and August, in contrast, allow sediment to settle and create sandbars

and backwater habitats for the humpback chub”); id. (“low flows in July and August that

mimic the natural hydrograph are even more important than usual this year because they

would allow the sediment washed down the river by the March high flows to settle and form

backwater habitats”); id. (“[a] seasonally adjusted flow scenario would accomplish this as

would the proposed maintenance flows described in the 1995 EIS”); Dkt. #121 at 2 (“the

monthly pattern necessary to implement a Seasonally-Adjusted Steady Flow (SASF) regime

– one adhering to the river’s natural seasonal hydrograph – would be within the range of

monthly volumes permitted under the 1996 ROD”). 

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could inure to the benefit of the humpback chub. The benefit Plaintiff has identified – the

change Plaintiff seeks in the AOP – is adoption of the SASF system. But the Bureau does

not have discretion to adopt SASF in the AOP. The Secretary of the Interior decided to adopt

the MLFF system (and not to adopt the SASF system) in the 1996 ROD. The MLFF was

also chosen as the controlling method of dam operations in the Operating Criteria that

Congress required to be established. Plaintiff has cited no authority to show that the Bureau

has discretion to countermand a decision of the Secretary of the Interior through an AOP that

projects water release levels for the coming year.7

The Ninth Circuit has stated that agency action exists “when the agency engages in

an affirmative action that is both within its decisionmaking authority and unconstrained by

earlier agency commitments.” Defenders of Wildlife, 429 F.3d at 967 (emphasis added). The

Ninth Circuit has further explained that “section 7(a)(2) [is] inapplicable where the

challenged action was legally foreordained by an earlier decision, such as where the agency

lacked the ability to amend an already-issued permit ‘to address the needs of endangered or

threatened species.’” Id. at 968 (quoting EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1082) (emphasis added). The

Secretary’s selection of MLFF in the ROD and the issuance of the Operating Criteria

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To the extent the Bureau has recently modified its release practices by adopting

certain experimental steady flows, those decisions were made outside of the AOP process

and in consultation with FWS. Although Plaintiff contends that the consultation resulting

in the 2008 biological opinion was legally flawed, the important point is that the decision to

modify the flow regime was not made in the AOP, but in a separate deliberation. 

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constrain the discretion of the Bureau and foreordain the use of MLFF in the AOP.8

The Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Sierra Club and EPIC are examples of where an

agency’s prior actions eliminated its discretion to take actions that would inure to the benefit

of the protected species. In Sierra Club, BLM entered into agreements that allowed roads

to be built in certain rights-of-way unless BLM objected on one of three specified grounds.

Because protection of the spotted owl was not one of these grounds, the Ninth Circuit held

that BLM did not retain discretion to take actions that would inure to the benefit of the

spotted owl and that the consultation obligation under the ESA therefore did not arise. 65

F.3d at 1507-09. In EPIC, the Ninth Circuit held that FWS did not retain discretion to

protect two species when it issued an incidental take permit with respect to another species,

and that FWS therefore was not obligated to reopen consultations under the ESA. 255 F.3d

at 1079-82. Although subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have noted that the agency actions

in these cases were completed and not ongoing, Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 977, the Court

does not find that this fact distinguishes them from this case. The Bureau made the MLFF

decision in 1996 and 1997 after a formal FEIS process. The decision is not made annually

in the AOPs. The Bureau therefore lacks discretion to adopt the SASF system in the AOPs

just as BLM and FWS lacked discretion as a result of their previous decisions.

In summary, the Court concludes that the 2008 AOP does not constitute the kind of

affirmative agency action contemplated by the language of the statute or the implementing

regulations. Nor does it constitute an exercise by the Bureau of discretion that could inure

to the benefit of the humpback chub. Plaintiff’s complaint is with the adoption of MLFF in

the ROD and the Operating Criteria. Plaintiff cannot redress this concern by asserting that

the Bureau should consult with FWS before making projections in the AOP each year. The

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Bureau’s decision not to consult with FWS in preparation of the 2008 AOP was not arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, nor was it

without observance of procedures required by law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D). Summary

judgment on this claim will be granted in favor of Defendants. 

VI. Claim 5.

NEPA directs federal agencies to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement

in connection with every “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). An agency may prepare an “environmental

assessment” (“EA”) to determine whether the environmental impact of the proposed action

is sufficiently significant to warrant an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. If the EA indicates that

the agency’s action “may have a significant effect upon the . . . environment, an [EIS] must

be prepared.” Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted). “If the proposed action is found to have no significant effect, the agency must issue

a finding to that effect . . . , accompanied by a convincing statement of reasons to explain

why a project’s impacts are insignificant.” Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted). 

The Bureau prepared an EIS before the 1996 ROD, but does not prepare one when

issuing an AOP each year. Plaintiff contends that the Bureau’s failure to do so violates

§ 4332(c). 

Major federal actions are defined to “includ[e] actions with effects that may be major

and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.” 40 C.F.R. §

1508.18. Major federal actions generally fall within one of the following categories: official

policy, formal plans, formal programs, or specific projects. Id. at § 1508.18(b). Plaintiff

argues that the AOP contains a determination of monthly water flows and therefore is a major

federal action. 

While “an EIS need not discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation

of a facility,” Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir.1980),

“major Federal actions’ include the expansion or revision of ongoing programs,” Andrus v.

Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 363 n.21 (1979) (internal quotes and alteration omitted). The

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Bureau argues that the AOP’s projection of releases is merely an ongoing operation.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a major federal action for purposes of NEPA is similar

to an agency action under the ESA, but that the major federal action requirement is more

demanding. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, if

the AOP is not an agency action under the ESA, as shown above, a fortiori it is not a major

federal action. Case law confirms this conclusion.

In Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232 (9th Cir.

1990), the Ninth Circuit held that the Bureau’s decisions to reduce releases from the

Palisades Dam into the South Fork of the Snake River did not constitute a major federal

action under NEPA. The Court held that such decisions, even when they significantly

lowered water levels to the likely detriment of trout in the river, “were no more than the

routine managerial actions regularly carried on from the outset [of the dam’s operation]

without change.” Id. at 235. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants were “simply

operating the facility in the manner intended. In short, they are doing nothing new, nor more

extensive, nor other than that contemplated when the project was first operational.” Id.

Similarly, in County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F.Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal.1977), the

district court ruled that lowering the level of a reservoir during the drought year of 1977,

although an action that would potentially damage fish in the reservoir, was not a major

federal action. The Court noted that:

The Bureau has neither enlarged its capacity to divert water from the Trinity

River nor revised its procedures or standards for releases into the Trinity River

and the drawdown of reservoirs. It is simply operating the Division within the

range originally available pursuant to the authorizing statute, in response to

changing environmental conditions.

Id. at 1388-89. The Ninth Circuit quoted this language and adopted this rationale in Upper

Snake River. 921 F.2d at 235.

As noted above, the 1996 ROD and Operating Criteria – issued only after full NEPA

review – adopted the MLFF as the controlling program for Glen Canyon Dam. The AOP

projects monthly releases under the MLFF system on the basis of anticipated inflows to Lake

Powell. Like the dam releases in Upper Snake River and County of Trinity, the AOP’s

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9

Plaintiff argues that more than environmental conditions are considered in the AOP

monthly flow projections. Although this surely is true, it does not distinguish this case from

Upper Snake River. Like Glen Canyon Dam, the Palisades Dam was constructed pursuant

to an act of Congress and was part of a much larger project, the purposes of which were to

“control and conserve the waters of the River for fish and wildlife, recreation, irrigation,

flood control, and power generation.” 921 F.2d at 233. The Bureau was thus faced with

many considerations when making release decisions for the Palisades Dam, just as it is with

Glen Canyon Dam, and yet the Ninth Circuit held that those operational decisions were not

major federal actions under NEPA.

10If anything, this would appear to be a stronger case for the Court’s conclusion. The

dam operations in Upper Snake River and County of Trinity had not undergone prior NEPA

review. In this case, as Plaintiff concedes, the Bureau “did undergo NEPA review for Glen

Canyon Dam operations, initially of its own volition and later because Congress directed a

NEPA review through the Grand Canyon Protection Act.” Dkt. #91 at 43. Thus, the ROD

and Operating Criteria with which the AOP must comply have themselves been subjected to

NEPA review, rendering even more comfortable the conclusion that the AOP does not itself

constitute a new major federal action.

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projections constitute operations within the planned limits of the project and in response to

changing environmental conditions. They are not, therefore, major federal actions within the

meaning of NEPA.9

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Upper Snake River on the ground that Palisades Dam

was built before the enactment of NEPA. But this was not the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s

decision. The question addressed by the Ninth Circuit was whether the Bureau’s post-NEPA

operations of the dam included “changes [in dam operations] which themselves amount to

‘major Federal actions.’” 921 F.2d at 234 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals held that

reducing releases from the dam in response to drought conditions did not constitute major

federal action. Likewise, Glen Canyon Dam releases made in response to environmental

conditions do not constitute major federal action.10

Plaintiff argues that the Bureau’s use of the NEPA process in connection with 1996

beach building experimental releases, a 2002 removal of non-native fish, and adoption of a

2008 Experimental Plan shows that NEPA review should also be completed for each AOP.

But none of these actions were AOPs. More importantly, the question the Court must answer

is whether AOP is a major federal action under the law, not under prior Bureau practices.

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Under the authority of Upper Snake River and County of Trinity, it is not.

Plaintiff further contends that the AOP is a major federal action because it is mandated

by Congress and therefore “not simply part of the routine Glen Canyon Dam operations[.]”

Dkt. #91 at 43. But the fact that the AOP is regularized by Congress does not mean that it

is not part of routine dam operations. Moreover, the 1992 Act that required the AOP also

required completion of an EIS for the overall dam operations. Pub. L. No. 102-575,

§ 1804(a). Congress did not similarly require completion of an EIS for each AOP. 

The Court will enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Claim 5. Given

this decision, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments regarding exhaustion and

the infeasibility of NEPA compliance for AOPs.

VII. Further Proceedings.

As made clear at the oral argument and in supplemental briefing, Plaintiff and

Defendants agree that the merits of this case may be decided by summary judgment. Having

concluded that this case is subject to APA review on the administrative record, the Court

agrees. The issue to be decided – whether the agencies have acted arbitrarily or capriciously

or in violation of law – is a question of law suitable for resolution by summary judgment.

See Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1985); Dredge Corp. v.

Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964). The Court therefore will establish a briefing

schedule. Although Plaintiff initially urged the Court to postpone the briefing of remedies

until the merits have been resolved, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s proposed remedies

should be addressed with the merits of claims 6, 7, and 8.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #15) is denied with respect to

claims 4 and 5 of Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint. The motion with respect to claims 1,

2, and 3 will be decided after briefing is completed on claims 6, 7, and 8.

2. The Bureau’s motion to dismiss and alternative cross-motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. #25) is granted with respect to claims 4 and 5 of the supplemental complaint

and denied – to the extent it seeks dismissal – with respect to claims 1, 2, and 3. The crossCase 3:07-cv-08164-DGC Document 123 Filed 09/26/08 Page 28 of 30
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motion for summary judgment with respect to claims 1, 2, and 3 will be decided after briefing

is completed on claims 6, 7, and 8.

3. Additional motions and briefing shall be submitted as follows:

a. Plaintiff shall file its motion for summary judgment with respect to

claims 6, 7, and 8, and with respect to remedies, by November 14, 2008.

b. The Bureau and FWS shall file their consolidated opposition brief and

cross-motion for summary judgment, or judgment on the pleadings, by December 19, 2008.

c. Intervernors shall file response briefs or joinders to the motion filed by

the Bureau and FWS by January 9, 2009.

d. Plaintiff shall file its reply brief by January 30, 2009.

e. The Bureau, FWS, and Intervenors shall file their reply briefs by

February 20, 2009.

f. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ opening and opposition briefs, including the

briefing of remedies, shall not exceed 40 pages (and shall be considerably shorter if

possible). Reply briefs shall not exceed 20 pages (and shall be considerably shorter if

possible). Any briefs filed by Intervenors shall comply with the Court’s Local Rules.

g. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties (Dkt. #115), the administrative

record for claim 8 shall be comprised of the documents previously filed by the Bureau and

Defendants shall not file any additional administrative record documents with respect to

claim 8.

h. The Court concludes that additional briefing should occur with respect

to claims 1, 2, and 3. Plaintiff and Defendants shall file memoranda, not to exceed 20 pages

in length, on or before February 20, 2009, addressing the merits of claims 1, 2, and 3 under

the APA standard of review. Specifically, on what basis should the Court conclude or not

conclude that the Bureau’s operation of the Dam is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “without observance of procedure

required by law”? 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D). Documents cited in the memoranda shall be

limited to the administrative record or shall be submitted under an explained exception to the

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administrative record requirement. If the parties cite to a document already submitted to the

Court as an exhibit to the current briefing, they should provide a docket number and exhibit

number citation (i.e., Dkt. #27, Ex. 2). If the parties cite to additional documents not

submitted to the Court as exhibits to the current briefing, they should provide the Court with

copies of those documents appropriately marked as exhibits to their memoranda.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2008.

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