Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00091/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00091-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUEVANO,

Plaintiff,

v. 

ANTHONY JENKINS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-cv-0091 TLN KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Defendants’ fully briefed motion for summary judgment based on exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is before the court. As discussed below, the undersigned recommends 

that defendants’ motion be granted. 

I. Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint

 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s original complaint, in which plaintiff alleges that on 

March 16, 2021, at Mule Creek State Prison, defendants Jenkins, Janam and Bickle used 

excessive force on plaintiff. (ECF No. 1.)1 Plaintiff also included his own declaration. (ECF No. 

1 at 8-14.) 

//// 

1

 On June 9, 2022, plaintiff consented to dismissal of defendants Griffin and Parker, who were 

dismissed on June 15, 2022. (ECF Nos. 10 & 11.) 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 1 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)). “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

 Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 2 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Walls v. Central Costa 

County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, inferences are not 

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from 

which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a 

genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 3 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). 

 By contemporaneous notice provided on August 15, 2023 (ECF No. 45-5), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 B. Objection to Hollis Declaration

Plaintiff submitted the declaration of fellow inmate Marvin Hollis, who assisted plaintiff 

in preparing his opposition. Hollis claims he has been incarcerated for almost 30 years and has 

filed hundreds of administrative grievances, concluding that plaintiff’s grievances were 

improperly rejected based on Hollis’ “experience in CDCR.” (ECF No. 53 at 54.) Defendants 

seek to strike Hollis’ declaration because Hollis fails to include any information regarding 

plaintiff’s appeals relevant to this case, plaintiff’s efforts to appeal his administrative remedies, or 

any other information that might demonstrate a disputed fact as to whether plaintiff exhausted 

administrative remedies as to the March 16, 2021 incident. (ECF No. 54 at 6.) 

 The undersigned reviewed Mr. Hollis’ declaration and agrees that he failed to provide 

pertinent facts relevant to the claims at issue here. Therefore, defendants’ request to strike the 

Hollis declaration is granted.

 C. Failure to Support Disputed Facts 

Initially, as argued by defendants, plaintiff largely failed to comply with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A), which requires that “a party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record. . . .” 

Id.; see also Local Rule 260(b). While plaintiff filed a separate document identifying which facts 

contained in defendants’ statement of undisputed facts were disputed or undisputed, plaintiff 

failed to cite to evidence supporting such identification. 

However, it is well-established that the pleadings of pro se litigants are held to “less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of 

procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 4 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

overruled on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

That said, an inmate’s choice to proceed without counsel “is less than voluntary” and is subject to 

“the handicaps . . . detention necessarily imposes upon a litigant,” such as “limited access to legal 

materials” as well as “sources of proof.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 & n.4 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Therefore, prisoners should not be held to a standard of “strict literalness” with 

respect to the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Id.

 Further, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that district courts are to “construe liberally 

motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary 

judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). The nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [his] 

favor . . . . [his] version of any disputed issue of fact is thus presumed correct.” Eastman Kodak 

Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, the court considers the record before it in its entirety despite plaintiff’s 

failure to be in strict compliance with the applicable rules. However, only those assertions which 

have evidentiary support in the record are considered. 

 D. Undisputed Facts (“UDF”)2

 1. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the CDCR.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint was signed on November 29, 2021, and was filed in this action on 

January 15, 2022, regarding alleged incidents at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). 

3. At all times relevant herein, defendants were correctional officers at MCSP.

 4. The undersigned found plaintiff’s allegations stated potentially cognizable Eighth 

Amendment claims against defendants Jenkins, Janam and Bickle based on plaintiff’s claims that 

such defendants used excessive force on plaintiff on March 16, 2021, while he was housed at 

MCSP. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff’s remaining claims and defendants were dismissed with plaintiff’s 

consent. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) 

 5. At all times relevant herein, CDCR and MCSP had an administrative grievance process 

2

 For purposes of summary judgment, the undersigned finds these facts are undisputed, unless 

otherwise indicated.

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 5 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

for inmates. Since June 2020, inmates may now submit a written grievance containing one or 

more claims, subject to the requirements in section 3482, to dispute a policy, decision, action, 

condition, or omission by CDCR or CDCR staff that causes some measurable harm to the

inmate’s “health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3481(a) (2021). 

 6. The grievance process has two levels of review. Id. The new process requires the 

inmate to submit a grievance in writing to the Institutional Office of Grievances (“OOG”) at the 

prison, re-entry facility, or fire camp where they are housed within 30-days of the grieved 

incident. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(a)(1) and (b). The inmate shall submit the grievance on 

a form 602-1, if available, or by other means provided by the institution. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3482(a)(2) and (c). If the inmate wishes to appeal the OOG decision, they may do so in writing 

to the Office of Appeals (“OOA”) within 30 days. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3485(a)-(b).

 7. The inmate must describe all information known and available regarding the claim, 

including key dates and times, names, and titles of all involved staff (or descriptions of those staff 

members), and names and titles of all witnesses to the best of the claimant’s knowledge. Inmates 

must also include any and all supporting documents available. Claims may be rejected for any of 

the reasons provided in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3487, including failure to submit the claim 

within the applicable time frames, concerns an anticipated decision, duplicative, claim concerns 

harm to someone other than the claimant, and the claim concerns the regulatory framework of the 

grievance or appeal process itself. Completion of the review process by the OOA constitutes 

exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant. A claim is not exhausted if it 

was disallowed pursuant to subsections 3482(d)(3) or 3485(d)(3) or rejected pursuant to 

subsection 3487(a). 

8. If plaintiff submitted a grievance to another institution regarding an event that occurred 

at MCSP, the institution would forward the grievance to MCSP for review. Post-June 2020 

grievances are reflected on a single print out and in a single system, regardless of the institution 

involved. All grievance coordinators have access to all new grievances and can testify as to their 

authenticity, regardless of the institution handling the grievance. 

 9. The OOA receives, reviews, and maintains all non-medical inmate grievances at the 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 6 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

final level of review. A final decision by the OOA generally exhausts an inmate grievance.

10. Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances to MCSP’s OOG and the OOA between 

March 16, 2021, when plaintiff’s allegations first giving rise to his lawsuit occurred, through 

January 18, 2022, when plaintiff filed his complaint.

 11. Plaintiff submitted four grievances during the relevant time frame that are relevant to 

the allegations in his Complaint - Grievance Log Numbers 113082, 132418, 132564, and 151569. 

The appeal of another grievance is also relevant – 127675. 

 12. In Grievance Log Number 113082, plaintiff alleged that Jenkins, Bickle, and Janam 

used unnecessary excessive force on March 16, 2021. (ECF No. 45-3 at 12.) Plaintiff dated the 

grievance April 28, 2021, and MCSP stamped it received on April 29, 2021. (Id. at 13.) The 

MCSP OOG rejected the grievance on April 29, 2021, stating that plaintiff failed to submit his 

grievance within the applicable 30-day timeframe.

3

 (ECF No. 45-4 at 14.) The MCSP OOG 

informed plaintiff that his allegation of excessive use of force was rejected but would be 

addressed outside the grievance process.4 (Id.) 

 13. Plaintiff appealed the response to 113082 for untimeliness to the OOA. In the appeal, 

plaintiff included a letter stating he was going to wait to file his grievance until the RVR was 

done but decided to just “get it done and tell [his] story.”5 (ECF No. 45-4 at 13.) The OOA 

received the appeal on May 10, 2021. The OOA denied the appeal of the rejection on July 1, 

2021, stating that the allegation of excessive force occurred on March 16, 2021, but plaintiff did 

not file his grievance until April 29, 2021, outside the 30-day time constraints as set forth in Cal. 

3

 Contrary to defendants’ SUF (ECF No. 45-2 at 4), the rejection is appended as Exhibit B to the 

Moseley Declaration, ¶ 9 (ECF No. 35-4 at 10). 

 

4

 On May 3, 2021, a memo regarding “staff complaint response - grievance log #113082, noting 

that plaintiff’s claim of excessive force was investigated outside the grievance process “due to a 

prior verbal allegation that was reviewed previously.” (ECF No. 45-3 at 17.) Because plaintiff 

verbally claimed use of excessive force, an investigation into staff misconduct took place prior to 

plaintiff filing grievance 113082. (Id. at 18.) The investigation found staff did not violate CDCR 

policy, and plaintiff was reminded that in order to exhaust administrative remedies, he must 

submit his staff misconduct grievance on 602-2 to the OOA for review. (ECF No. 45-3 at 18.) 

5

 Plaintiff does not address this letter in his opposition. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 7 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3482(b) and 3487(a)(1). (ECF No. 45-3 at 12.) The reviewing official 

added: “It’s important to note that the [OOG] investigated this claim outside the grievance 

process, which was appropriate in this case.” (Id.) 

 14. Grievance Log Number 132418 concerns a letter plaintiff sent to the Office of 

Internal Affairs (“OIA”) dated April 12, 2021, regarding the alleged March 16, 2021 incident. 

(ECF No. 45-4 at 15.) On June 14, 2021, the OIA forwarded the letter to plaintiff’s institution --

California State Prison, Solano (“SOL”) -- stating that, “based upon a review of the 

correspondence, it has been determined that the issue(s) can be addressed at the institutional 

level.” (ECF No. 45-3 at 21.) On June 25, 2021, after receiving the documentation from the 

OIA, SOL sent a “Closure of Grievance” letter to plaintiff informing him that SOL reassigned the 

grievance to MCSP for review and that MCSP would provide him with a response to his claim on 

or before August 25, 2021. (ECF No. 45-3 at 20.) SOL then forwarded the letter and 

documentation to MCSP. (Id.) 

 15. Grievance Log Number 132564 is the MCSP review of Grievance Log Number 

132418 forwarded from SOL. (ECF No. 45-3 at 28-34.) MCSP OOG received plaintiff’s 

grievance as forwarded from SOL on June 25, 2021. (Id. at 29.) On June 25, 2021, MCSP OOG 

sent plaintiff a closure of grievance letter stating that plaintiff’s grievance was not assigned for 

review or a response and it was “being rejected as a duplicate of log #113082, which has been 

addressed and disproved.” (ECF No. 45-3 at 28.) Plaintiff was further informed that if he was 

dissatisfied with the rejection of 132564, he could appeal the rejection to the OOA. (Id.) Plaintiff 

took no further action and did not appeal the rejection of 132564 to the OOA.6

 16. In Grievance Log Number 151569, dated August 12, 2021, plaintiff again appealed 

the March 16, 2021 excessive force claim. (ECF No. 45-3 at 37-38.) MCSP received this 

grievance on August 13, 2021. (Id. at 38.) On August 13, 2021, MCSP OOG sent plaintiff a 

closure of grievance letter stating that plaintiff’s grievance was not assigned for review or a 

6

 In his response to defendants’ SUF, plaintiff contends Fact No. 15 is disputed, but he fails to 

explain how or why. The undersigned has reviewed the documents and edited UDF No. 15 in a 

minor way to comport with the documentary evidence as cited. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 8 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

response and it was being rejected because (1) plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable time 

constraints; plaintiff needed to submit the grievance by April 15, 2021; (2) the claim was 

“substantially duplicative of a prior claim already submitted by you that is in process or has been 

answered”; and plaintiff’s “allegation of excessive force on RVR #7070770 is rejected as a 

duplicate of log #113082, which has been addressed.” (ECF No. 45-3 at 39.) Plaintiff was 

further informed that if he was dissatisfied with the response he could appeal the rejection 

decision to the CDCR’s OOA. (Id.) 

 17. Plaintiff appealed the rejection of Grievance Log No. 151569 to the OOA, which was 

received on August 30, 2021. (ECF Nos. 45-3 at 36; 45-4 at 20.) Because the OOA’s time to 

respond expired before it was able to render a decision, the OOA sent plaintiff a letter on October 

30, 2021, stating that the time to respond had expired and that plaintiff would not be receiving 

any further response. (Id.) This meant that the lower level MCSP OOG rejection of the original 

grievance was not overturned and instead adopted by the OOA.7 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§§ 3482(b), 3487(a)(1), and 3487(a)(3). 

 18. In Grievance Log No. 127675, signed June 12, 2021, plaintiff alleged Officer Jenkins 

winked at him twice on June 11, 2021. (ECF No. 45-4 at 44.) Plaintiff alleged that he didn’t 

know if this meant that Jenkins wanted to hurt plaintiff. Plaintiff requested that Jenkins not be 

permitted to work on the same yard as plaintiff due to a previous incident. (Id.) OOG received 

the appeal on June 14, 2021. (ECF No. 45-4 at 48.) On July 22, 2021, the grievance was 

disproved. (Id. at 49.) When plaintiff appealed this grievance to the OOA, he added new claims 

regarding the alleged March 16, 2021 incident. (ECF No. 45-4 at 42.) Appeal Log No. 127675 

was received by the OOA on August 30, 2021, and was rejected on September 24, 2021, because 

plaintiff failed to timely appeal to the OOA. Plaintiff received the institution’s decision letter on 

July 23, 2021, but waited until August 26, 2021, as indicated on the envelope as the date plaintiff 

provided to prison officials for mailing, to appeal to the OOA. In order to comply with the 

7

 In his response to defendants’ SUF, plaintiff contends Fact Nos. 16 & 17 are disputed, but he 

fails to explain how or why. The undersigned has reviewed the documents and edited UDF Nos. 

16 and 17 in minor ways to comport with the documentary evidence as cited. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 9 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

applicable 30-day time constraints, plaintiff should have submitted his claim on or before August 

22, 2021. 

 19. Plaintiff also submitted various unrelated grievances and appeals during the relevant 

time frame. (ECF No. 45-4 at 6-7.) 

 20. Aside from the appeals and grievances provided, plaintiff did not submit any other 

appeals or grievances, related or unrelated to the allegations in his Complaint, during the relevant 

time frame. (ECF Nos. 45-3, 45-4.)8

 E. Legal Standards for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must file a grievance alerting prison 

officials to the claims the plaintiff included in the complaint with the level of detail required by 

the grievance system itself. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007); Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-

25 (the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give officials the “time and opportunity to 

address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case”). All claims alleged 

by an inmate in a federal lawsuit against prison officials must be exhausted before the inmate files 

the lawsuit; unexhausted claims must be dismissed without prejudice. Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 736, 741 (2001); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit and plaintiff may not exhaust while suit is pending). 

A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate appeal at the appropriate level and 

8

 Plaintiff disputes this fact but points to no other grievance or appeal. Plaintiff only provided 

appeals numbered 151569 and 113082 (ECF No. 53 at 39, 43), both of which were also provided 

by defendants (ECF No. 45-4 at 10-39). 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 10 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

proceed to the highest level of review available to him. Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Burden Re Exhaustion 

A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust an available 

administrative process. Fordley v. Lizarraga, 18 F. 4th 344, 350-51 (9th Cir. 2021). If a 

defendant meets its initial burden to show failure to exhaust an available administrative process, 

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the process was not available to him. Id. at 351. But 

the “ultimate burden of proving that the inmate has not exhausted his claims remains with the 

defendants.” Id. (citing Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016).) 

Administrative Remedy Unavailable

An administrative remedy is not available (and thus exhaustion is not required) where: 

(1) the administrative process is a dead end because prison officials are consistently unable or 

unwilling to provide any relief via that process; (2) the process is so opaque that no ordinary 

prisoner could navigate it; and (3) officials thwart the prisoner’s attempts to use the process 

“through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 

(2016). The Ninth Circuit has held that a prison’s complete failure to process a grievance renders 

the administrative process unavailable. Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2017). 

The failure to timely process a grievance may render the process unavailable depending on the 

circumstances. Fordley, 18 F.4th at 350, 354-55. 

 F. Discussion

 1. Did plaintiff exhaust? 

 Defendants provided evidence that none of the five grievances submitted during the 

applicable time frame were addressed at the final level of review on the merits of plaintiff’s 

claims. Rather, each grievance was rejected based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with CDCR 

appeal procedures. Thus, the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate remedies were unavailable. 

 2. Were remedies available?

 In his opposition, plaintiff relies on grievance log numbers 113082 and 151569. The 

undersigned first addresses plaintiff’s arguments in support of his claims that he should be 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 11 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

excused from exhaustion, that administrative remedies were not available, or that his time to file a 

grievance was extended, and then addresses the relevant grievances individually. 

 Defendants’ Actions Excuse Plaintiff from Exhaustion 

 First, plaintiff contends that after the excessive force incident, which caused him multiple 

physical and psychological injuries, defendants intimidated and threatened plaintiff that if he 

complained about what they did, further harm would come to plaintiff and that his time would be 

difficult as long as he was housed at MCSP. (ECF No. 53 at 3.) This caused plaintiff to be 

scared for his life and kept him from initially filing his appeal. In his declaration submitted with 

his complaint, plaintiff declared that he “took a long time to file the 602 because [he] was afraid 

the officers who assaulted [him] would retaliate against [plaintiff] if [he] filed a 602.” (ECF No. 

1 at 13.) He declared that defendant Jenkins continued to harass plaintiff; in late June of 2021, 

Jenkins passed by plaintiff’s cell and winked at plaintiff as they made eye contact through the cell 

window. (Id.) Plaintiff believed the wink was a form of intimidation and an acknowledgment 

that Jenkins assaulted plaintiff. (Id.) 

 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s unsupported allegations are contradicted by plaintiff’s 

own letter to the OOA explaining that the grievance was untimely because he was going to wait 

to file his grievance until the RVR was done, but just decided to “get it done and tell [his] story.” 

(UDF 13.) Defendants contend that plaintiff “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to 

survive summary judgment by contradicting his earlier version of the facts.” (ECF No. 45-1 at 

11) (quoting Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001).) Because 

plaintiff failed to provide additional evidence to support his claims of intimidation, defendants 

maintain that plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and intimidation are unavailing. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the threat of retaliation for reporting an incident may 

excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 

987 (9th Cir. 2015). Under McBride, two conditions must be met: (1) the inmate actually 

believed he would suffer retaliation for filing a grievance about the issue in question, and (2) his 

belief was objectively reasonable. 807 F.3d at 987, 988. 

Here, plaintiff’s allegations are not supported with specific facts as to a particular 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 12 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

defendant’s actions taken prior to plaintiff filing grievance 113082. Unlike the inmate in 

McBride who identified a particular verbal threat, plaintiff’s claims are unsupported, referring 

generally to retaliation, intimidation, and harassment, but without any specific facts to support 

such conclusory assertions. See Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587 (“the nonmoving party must 

come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”) Moreover, 

plaintiff utterly fails to address his own letter to OOA claiming he did not file his appeal earlier 

for an entirely different reason. (UDF 13.) 

But even assuming plaintiff was reasonably frightened of defendants following the use of 

force on March 16, 2021, and was scared they would retaliate, plaintiff fails to meet the objective 

prong of McBride. The only specific factual allegation plaintiff includes is that defendant Jenkins 

winked at plaintiff. Although plaintiff declares this took place in late June of 2021, his grievance 

concerning the wink states that it occurred on June 11, 2021 (UDF 18). In any event, both dates 

were over 86 days after the March 16, 2021 incident. Thus, the timing alone fails to meet the 

objective prong. But the mere fact that defendant Jenkins winked at plaintiff also fails to 

demonstrate an objective threat of retaliation if an inmate used the grievance process. There must 

be some basis to support a finding that a reasonable prisoner of ordinary firmness would 

understand that defendant Jenkins’ action, taken almost three months after the incident at issue, 

threatened retaliation if the prisoner chose to use the prison’s grievance process. See McBride

807 F.3d at 988. Plaintiff does not provide such basis, and the undersigned finds no such basis in 

the record. 

The undersigned finds that plaintiff should not be excused from the exhaustion 

requirement based on such unsupported allegations of retaliation and unspecified threats.

 Second, plaintiff also declares he suffers from brain fog resulting from the incident, has 

been unable to think right, has a lot of headaches, and “had a hard time writing the 602.” (ECF 

No. 1 1t 13.) 

“A number of courts, including courts within the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that an 

administrative remedy can be ‘effectively unavailable’ when: “(1) an inmate’s untimely filling of 

a grievance is because of a physical injury, and (2) the grievance system rejects the inmate’s 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 13 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

subsequent attempt to exhaust his remedies based on the untimely filing of the grievance.” Baker 

v. Villalobos, 2021 WL 6804237, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (collecting cases), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 326132 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL 5608985 

(9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2023). If the court finds that the injury or illness constitutes a defense to 

nonexhaustion, the inmate is required to timely file a grievance once he is no longer inhibited by 

such injury or illness, and to have such remedies denied before courts will find the remedies were 

unavailable. Baker, 2021 WL 6804237, at *7 (citations omitted). 

Here, on the date of the incident, plaintiff was taken to an outside hospital but returned to 

his cell early the next morning. (ECF No. 54-1 at 4.) Plaintiff provided no medical evidence 

demonstrating his inability to write a grievance; indeed, he claims he had a hard time writing it, 

but does not state he was unable to do so. Further, as argued by defendants, plaintiff’s letter to 

the OOA states plaintiff intentionally waited to file a grievance. The instant record does not 

support an extension of the filing deadline based on plaintiff’s alleged physical injuries. 

Third, plaintiff claims that he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies in good 

faith and was improperly blocked by defendants’ failure to have the rights and responsibility 

statement available. (ECF No. 53 at 8) (citing Cal. Penal Code section 148.6(a)(1)&(2); see also

Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants contend such argument is 

unavailing because plaintiff’s grievances were not rejected for lack of such document. 

Defendants are correct that none of the submitted grievances were rejected based on 

plaintiff’s failure to provide the rights and responsibility statement. But to the extent plaintiff 

contends he was unable to file a grievance based on not having such a form, plaintiff provides no 

specific facts to support his conclusory statement, for example, when did he seek to file such 

grievance and who specifically failed to provide such statement. Such vague and conclusory 

claim is insufficient. In addition, plaintiff does not explain his citation to Chaker. In Chaker, the 

Ninth Circuit held that a California statute unconstitutionally restricted certain viewpoints by 

making it a misdemeanor to file false complaint reports with the police department. 428 F.3d 

1215. Plaintiff fails to show how Chaker is relevant to plaintiff’s claim concerning administrative 

exhaustion to bring claims in federal court. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 14 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15

New Rules Rendered Remedies Unavailable

Plaintiff argues that the new rules were not included in Title 15 until after the update 

through July 1, 2021, which kept inmates unaware of such new rules. (ECF No. 53 at 4.) 

Further, plaintiff contends that the appeals process is difficult to understand and navigate until set 

forth in Title 15, and such new rules effective 2020 were not printed in Title 15 until well after 

the date of the instant incident. Plaintiff contends that he was not aware of such new rules until 

2023 when such rules were printed in the new blue book (CDCR) Title 15. (ECF No. 53 at 4.) 

Plaintiff was also not aware of the critical 30-day time limit to file an appeal to the next level. 

Defendants counter that the new rules are immaterial because the prior years’ regulations 

set forth the same time limits for submitting an inmate grievance. (ECF No. 54 at 3, citing see

e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3084.6(c)(4), 3084.8(b) (2019) (likewise setting 30-day

deadline).) In addition, plaintiff was well aware of the inmate grievance process, previously 

submitting multiple inmate grievances (UDF 19).

 The undersigned is persuaded that the amendment of the rules did not have an impact on 

whether or not plaintiff timely filed a grievance because the filing deadlines did not change.9 

Compare Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(g), 3084.6 (c)(4), 3084.8(b) (2020) to Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3482(b), 3485(b), and 3487(a)(1)(2021). Moreover, as noted above, plaintiff’s 

letter to the OOA demonstrates an entirely different reason for plaintiff failing to timely file 

grievance 113082, and plaintiff failed to rebut such evidence. 

Further, the undersigned agrees that plaintiff’s claim that the appeals process was too hard 

to navigate is conclusory and not supported by specific facts or evidence sufficient to meet the 

requirements of Ross, 578 U.S. at 644 (“an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those 

grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained 

of.’”) Here, plaintiff provides no facts or evidence showing that the grievance procedure was so 

difficult it was not “capable of use” or operated as a simple dead end, or that prison staff 

9

 The 2021 regulations took effect on June 10, 2021, after the March 16, 2021 incident, and after 

plaintiff submitted grievance 113082 on April 29, 2021. (UDF 12.) However, plaintiff submitted 

grievance 151569 on August 13, 2021, after the 2021 regulations were implemented. (UDF 16.) 

Thus, both sets of regulations are discussed herein. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 15 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

16

prevented plaintiff from using the procedures. Plaintiff’s conclusory arguments fail to 

demonstrate the grievance process was not available. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (prisoner must “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 

unavailable to him.”) 

Similarly unavailing is plaintiff’s claim that the appeals process generally is inadequate 

because it leads nowhere. (ECF No. 53 at 6.) As the Supreme Court confirmed in 2016, the high 

court has rejected every attempt to deviate from the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Ross, 578 

U.S. at 639-40 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 731 (even where the prison cannot provide the relief 

sought, i.e., money damages, prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to 

bringing suit in federal court); Porter, 534 U.S. at 520 (rejecting proposal to exclude excessive 

force claims from exhaustion requirement). Plaintiff’s subjective belief that the appeals process 

was futile is not an exception to the exhaustion process. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 & n.6 (Even 

when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, 

exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit.); Melendez v. Diaz, 2023 WL 3063291, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 24, 2023) (“Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, it is immaterial whether the parties agree that 

the administrative process could provide a form of relief -- Congress deliberately amended the 

PLRA to prevent prisoners from bypassing the administrative process with limited prayers for 

relief.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Melendez v. Ndoh, 2023 WL 5723825 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2023). Rather, as set forth above, proper exhaustion is mandatory. 

 Time to Submit Grievance Extended 

First, plaintiff argues that based on new rules there is no time limit on submitting a staff 

complaint, so it appears prison staff improperly rejected plaintiff’s grievances. (ECF No. 53 at 5) 

(citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3484 and 3485(b).) He states the new rules are unclear, but 

plaintiff contends that § 3482(b) indicates the deadline to submit a claim shall be extended for the 

period of time a claimant is in the care of an outside hospital or temporarily housed in a medical 

or mental health crisis bed. (ECF No. 53 at 5.) Plaintiff claims he needs discovery in order to 

support his opposition and asks the court to act under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 16 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Procedure. (ECF No. 53 at 5.) Defendants counter that plaintiff is wrong on both counts; the new 

regulations extend the time limits and toll the time when an inmate is incapacitated. The code 

sections cited by plaintiff were implemented after the March 26, 2021 incident and after he filed 

the instant complaint. (ECF No. 54 at 4 citing UDF 2.) In addition, defendants point out that 

plaintiff provided no evidence that he was out to a hospital or on mental health crisis bed between 

March 16, 2021, and when he submitted grievance 113082 on April 29, 2021, and defendants

submit evidence to demonstrate that he was not. (ECF No. 54.) 

As argued by defendants, §§ 3484 and 3485 did not become effective until January 5, 

2022, well after the March 16, 2021 incident, and therefore such new regulations do not apply. 

Because such sections do not apply, no discovery is required to determine whether plaintiff was 

entitled to an extension of the filing deadline under either section. Further, defendants provided a 

copy of plaintiff’s movement history which confirms that after the March 16, 2021 incident, 

plaintiff was transported to an outside hospital at 9:29 p.m. and returned at 1:08 a.m. on March 

17, 2021, and that plaintiff had no other hospital or mental health crisis bed transfers between 

March 16, 2021, and April 29, 2021. (ECF No. 54-1 at 2, 4.) Thus, even if the new regulations 

were in effect, plaintiff would not be entitled to an extension of the thirty-day deadline based on 

such hospital visit.

Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on such new regulations is unavailing, and his request for 

discovery is denied.

Second, plaintiff also argues that none of plaintiff’s allegations of staff misconduct were 

submitted to internal affairs as required by CCR § 3484(d). (ECF No. 53 at 7.) However, even if 

plaintiff’s argument was relevant to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, § 3484(d) 

was also not implemented until January 5, 2022. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. 

Third, plaintiff argues that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3391(d), 

inmates have a right to file a complaint against a peace officer and have it investigated, and under 

§ 3391(b), citizens have one year to file such a complaint, but the rule is not clear how long an 

inmate has to file such a complaint. (ECF No. 53 at 8.)

To the extent plaintiff argues that § 3391 extended the deadline to file his grievance, 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 17 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18

plaintiff is mistaken. Before it was amended,10 section 3391 discussed citizen’s complaints and 

allowed twelve months for an allegation of misconduct to be made. Kirkpatrick v. Giron, 2010 

WL 2573208 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3391(b) (2010). 

However, § 3391 explicitly stated that the process for filing citizen’s complaints is for use by 

non-inmates. Dicey v. Hanks, 2016 WL 792784, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) (citing Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3391(b), (c) (2010), subsequently aff'd, 713 F. App’x 572 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Because plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of the incident, § 3391 does not apply to plaintiff or 

his appeal. Rather, plaintiff was required to submit his grievance within thirty days. Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(g), 3084.6 (c)(4), 3084.8(b) (2020). 

Grievance No. 151569 

 As to grievance 151569, plaintiff contends that when he received his final copy of RVR 

No. 7070770, signed July 26, 2021, plaintiff had 30 days to file a grievance. (ECF No. 53 at 9.) 

Plaintiff claims he filed a timely grievance raising the excessive force incident and asked that the 

RVR be dismissed, and good time credits be reinstated. (Id.) (citing Ex. C (grievance 151569).) 

Grievance 151569 was received by the OOG on August 13, 2021. (Id.) But despite such timely 

submission and rules that allow multiple issues in a single grievance, he argues that the grievance 

was improperly rejected on August 13, 2021, and the grievance was closed. In addition, the OOG

told plaintiff that his allegations of excessive force were rejected as a duplicate of Log No. 

113082. But plaintiff contends that a grievance can only be a duplicate grievance if the prior 

grievance was addressed, not rejected. (ECF No. 53 at 10) (citing CCR §§ 3487(a)(3) & (2).) 

Thus, he argues an adequate remedy did not remain available, even though he put prison officials 

on notice of his claim. (ECF No. 53 at 10) (citing Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 831, 824 (9th Cir. 

2010)). 

Defendants counter that the pendency of the related RVR is immaterial to whether 

10 Section 3391 was amended on September 29, 2022, is now titled “Employee and Appointee 

Conduct,” and no longer contains subsections (c) or (d). Id. In any event, § 3391 does not apply 

because plaintiff must comply with the regulations governing proper administrative exhaustion by 

a state prisoner. “Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required 

by the PLRA to “‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 18 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

19

plaintiff properly exhausted his excessive force claims. Because plaintiff was involved in the 

March 16, 2021 incident, he was aware of the alleged excessive force on that date, and therefore 

plaintiff was required to file his appeal concerning the use of force within thirty days from the use 

of force incident. Defendants argue that a grievance in which plaintiff challenged the RVR would 

not have exhausted the underlying Eighth Amendment claims, even if plaintiff included them in 

his grievance. (ECF No. 54 at 3-4) (citing district court cases).

Defendants are correct. While prisoners are now permitted to raise multiple issues in one 

grievance, each issue must be timely raised. Plaintiff’s grievance 151569 was properly rejected 

as untimely because plaintiff’s excessive force claims should have been brought on or before 

April 15, 2021, and as duplicative of his prior grievance 113082. (UDF 16.) “The cancellation or 

rejection of an appeal at any level does not exhaust the administrative appeal process.” Applegate 

v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2020 WL 13444200, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2020); Harris 

v. Macomber, 2022 WL 4111067, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2022) (a cancelled grievance does not 

exhaust administrative remedies), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4707087 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 30, 2022). A claim is not exhausted if it was disallowed pursuant to subsections 

3482(d)(3) or 3485(d)(3) or rejected pursuant to subsection 3487(a). (Id.) 

In addition, although plaintiff sought different relief, the detailed facts set forth in 

grievance 151569 were wholly focused on the excessive force issue and included no specific 

factual challenges to the RVR or to the hearing on the RVR. Thus, the alternative finding that 

grievance 151569 was “substantially duplicative” of plaintiff’s prior grievance 113082 was 

proper. (UDF 16.) Departmental appeals coordinators may reject a prisoner’s administrative 

appeal for any reason set forth in § 3487, including failure to submit the claim within the 

applicable time frames or because the claim is duplicative. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3487. 

A claim is not exhausted if it was disallowed under section 3487(a). 

 Further, when plaintiff appealed the rejection of grievance 151569, the OOA’s time to 

respond expired before a decision could be issued, essentially adopting the lower finding that 

plaintiff’s grievance was untimely and duplicative. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3482(b), 

3487(a)(1), and 3487(a)(3). Because the initial appeal was properly rejected, grievance 151569 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 19 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

20

did not exhaust administrative remedies as to plaintiff’s excessive force claims.

Finally, plaintiff argues that his grievance was proper because a duplicate of a rejected 

grievance cannot be rejected as duplicative, citing § 3487(a)(3) and (2). But plaintiff misreads 

§ 3487. (ECF No. 54 at 6.) Subsection (a)(3) provides an exception only “when the prior claim 

was rejected pursuant to subsection 3487(a)(2).” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3487(a)(3). 

Subsection (a)(2) addresses grievances rejected because “the claim concerns an anticipated 

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the Department or departmental staff.” Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3487(a)(2). Plaintiff’s grievance 151569 was not rejected based on any 

exception set forth in § 3487(a)(2). (UDF 16.) Thus, plaintiff’s argument fails. 

 Grievance 132564 (and Grievance 132418) 

 Similarly, as argued by defendants, plaintiff also misreads § 3487 in connection with 

grievance 132564. (ECF No. 54 at 6.) As discussed, subsection (a)(3) provides a narrow 

exception not applicable here because plaintiff’s grievance 132564 was not rejected based on any 

exception identified in subsection 3487(a)(2). Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3487(a)(3), (a)(2); UDF 

15. 

 Grievance 132564 was filed as a result of SOL forwarding grievance 132418 to MCSP 

and concerned plaintiff’s letter to the OIA about the March 16, 2021 incident. (UDF 14, 15.) 

Ultimately, grievance 132564 was rejected as duplicative of grievance 113082, and plaintiff did 

not appeal such rejection, despite being advised of his ability to do so. Because grievance 132564 

was properly rejected, neither grievance 132564 nor grievance 132418 can serve to exhaust 

plaintiff’s administrative remedies. 

 Grievance 113082 

Plaintiff points out that grievance Log No. 113082 was assigned as a use of force 

grievance appeal and prison staff responded. (ECF No. 53 at 10.) Because No. 113082 was 

denied and not rejected by the OOA, plaintiff argues that defendants forfeit their claims of 

nonexhaustion because prison officials ignored the timeliness issue and rendered a decision on the 

substance of plaintiff’s claim. (ECF No. 53 at 11) (citing see Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 659 

(9th Cir. 2016).) Plaintiff contends that he made a good faith effort to exhaust his administrative 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 20 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

21

remedies, and that defendants are attempting to use the appeals process to avoid civil liability. 

Defendants counter that the OOG informed plaintiff that if he was dissatisfied with the 

response, he could appeal the rejection decision to the OOA, and the OOA denied plaintiff’s 

appeal of the rejection stating that plaintiff did not timely file his grievance and therefore it was 

properly rejected. (ECF No. 54 at 5.) Because the OOA confirmed that grievance 113082 was 

properly rejected, such decision does not exhaust plaintiff’s claims. 

By the time plaintiff submitted his appeal regarding the March 16, 2021 incident, the 

thirty-day time limit for submitting a grievance had expired. (UDF 12.) See Soto v. Warden of 

Salinas Valley State Prison, 2016 WL 3661384, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (plaintiff’s 

grievance regarding excessive force was untimely because he was not required to wait for 

conclusion of disciplinary process to challenge use of excessive force during underlying incident). 

Pursuant to the regulations, if plaintiff wanted to grieve the alleged use of excessive force by 

defendants, he was required to submit a grievance containing those allegations within thirty days 

of the incident date -- by April 15, 2021. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). Instead, plaintiff 

signed the grievance on April 28, 2021, and it was received by the OOG on April 29, 2021, 

beyond the thirty-day deadline. (UDF 12.) Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the OOA denied 

plaintiff’s appeal of the OOG’s rejection explaining that the grievance was properly rejected 

because it was untimely. A rejected claim is not exhausted. Applegate, 2020 WL 13444200, at 

*3; Harris, 2022 WL 4111067, at *7. 

In Reyes, relied upon by plaintiff, the California prisoner had timely filed a grievance that 

was addressed on the merits at every administrative review level. Reyes, 810 F.3d at 657-59. 

While Reyes failed to name all staff members involved in his case, as required by 15 Cal. Code 

Regs. § 3084.2(a)(3), the court still found he exhausted his claim of deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs because prison officials knew who was on the pain management committee 

yet failed to address the prisoner’s failure to name those involved and still addressed the merits. 

Reyes, 810 F.3d at 656-57. Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on Reyes is unavailing because both the 

OOG and the OOA decisions on grievance 113082 do not discuss the merits of plaintiff’s 

grievance. (ECF No. 45-4 at 10, 14.) The OOA did note that the OOG investigated the claim 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 21 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

22

outside the grievance process, but no detailed facts of plaintiff’s claims are set forth or analyzed 

in the OOA’s decision. (ECF No. 45-4 at 10.) Rather, the OOA expressly found that the 

rejection of the claim as untimely was proper. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff contends grievance Log No. 113082 was assigned as a use of force grievance 

appeal and prison staff responded, thus exhausting his claims. However, the May 3, 2021 

memorandum confirms that grievance 113082 was not assigned as a use of force grievance 

appeal. (ECF No. 45-3 at 18.) Rather, the investigation was triggered by plaintiff’s verbal 

complaints and was completed on April 15, 2021, outside the grievance process by the 

Institutional Executive Review Committee (“IERC”) before plaintiff signed grievance 113082 on 

April 28, 2021. (ECF No. 45-3 at 18.) 

 To the extent plaintiff argues that prison officials were alerted to the nature of plaintiff’s 

excessive force claims because an investigation was prompted by plaintiff’s verbal complaints 

following the incident, the undersigned is not persuaded. “Efforts outside the prison grievance 

procedure do not demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (PLRA).” Smith v. Gonzales, 2019 WL 6050964 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2019), report 

and recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2021 WL 4065479 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021). To 

properly exhaust available administrative remedies under the PLRA before filing an action in 

federal court, a prisoner is required to comply with the prison’s grievance procedures. Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006). At the time relevant here, CDCR’s grievance process 

required that all administrative grievances be written and submitted on CDCR Form 602. Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(1). Thus, plaintiff’s verbal notice was not adequate. While such

verbal notice triggered an investigation outside the grievance process by the IERC, outside review 

of a use of force incident by the IERC as a review of an inmate complaint under the use of force 

regulations does not exhaust the inmate’s administrative remedies for claims arising from the use 

of force. See Baker, 2021 WL 6804237 at *6 (prisoner unable to rely on outside review of use of 

force incident by the IERC because such review does not exhaust the prisoner’s administrative 

remedies for claims arising from the use of force); Adams v. Garcia, 2019 WL 1441679 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (rejecting prisoner’s argument that use of force review by the IERC 

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 22 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

23

exhausted prisoner’s administrative remedies, comparing §§ 3084.7(d)(3), 3084.1(b) 

(administrative grievance procedures) to §3268.1(e) reporting and investigating the use of force 

for institution or facility staff.) 

 While such processes are different, and plaintiff is required to comply with the prison’s 

administrative grievance procedures, the May 3, 2021 memorandum informed plaintiff that he 

could appeal the staff misconduct grievance on a 602-2 to the Office of Appeals for review. 

(ECF No. 45-3 at 18.) And plaintiff did pursue grievance 113082 to the OOA. But because the 

IERC investigation was completed before grievance 113082 was received by the OOG, such 

grievance 113082 could not have appealed the IERC decision. If plaintiff wanted to appeal the 

result of the IERC investigation, he was required to file an appeal of that decision with the OOA 

as directed. Plaintiff points to no such appeal, and the appeals discussed herein did not challenge 

the April 15, 2021 IERC decision. 

 Grievance 127675 

In this last grievance, plaintiff claimed that defendant Jenkins winked at plaintiff on June 

11, 2021. (UDF 18.) But since such allegation occurred after the March 16, 2021 incident, 

grievance 127675 cannot serve to exhaust plaintiff’s excessive force claims herein. Plaintiff 

appealed the disproval of such grievance and added facts concerning the March 16, 2021 incident. 

But it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to submit the appeal within thirty days. (UDF 18.) Thus, 

such appeal was properly rejected. In any event, to the extent plaintiff attempted to exhaust his 

excessive force claims through his appeal of such grievance, such efforts failed because they were 

untimely, and because the initial grievance did not contain any facts concerning the March 16, 

2021 use of force, such grievance could not have exhausted the instant excessive force claims. 

 Accordingly, grievance 113082 could not have exhausted plaintiff’s claims because it was 

properly denied as untimely. 

G. Conclusion 

 For all of the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be 

granted. 

////

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 23 of 24
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

24

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

 1. Defendants’ request to strike the declaration of inmate Marvin Hollis (ECF No. 54 at 

6) is granted; 

 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the Hollis declaration (ECF No. 53 at 52-

55); and 

 3. Plaintiff’s request for discovery (ECF No. 53 at 5) is denied. 

Further IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 45) be granted; 

 2. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: January 30, 2024 

 

/luev0091.msj.fte

Case 2:22-cv-00091-TLN-KJN Document 55 Filed 01/30/24 Page 24 of 24