Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00287/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

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Meehan has withdrawn his additional argument that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by

the two-year statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542. (Doc. 16.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnnie Little,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Meehan, Kinerk Schmidt & Sethi,

P.L.L.C., James H. Dyer; Ted A. Schmidt,

Defendants. 

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CV-12-287-TUC-JGZ

ORDER

This is a legal malpractice action brought by Plaintiff Johnnie Little against her former

attorneys, Michael Meehan (“Meehan”) and James H. Dyer and Ted A. Schmidt and their

law firm, Kinerk, Schmidt & Sethi, P.L.L.C. (collectively “the Kinerk Defendants”). 

Plaintiff claims that the lawyers failed timely to file a notice of claim, which resulted in the

dismissal of her lawsuit against the State of Arizona. That lawsuit alleged medical

malpractice against the State of Arizona in the medical care provided to Plaintiff’s daughter,

Shawntinice Polk, a member of the University of Arizona’s women’s basketball team.

Meehan has filed a Motion to Dismiss this case, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims against him

lack legal causation.1

 (Doc. 12.) The Kinerk Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. (Doc. 22.) For the reasons stated

herein, the Court will grant Defendant Meehan’s Motion to Dismiss, and deny the Kinerk

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

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2

 Doc. 19-2 is a copy of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision affirming the state trial

court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s medical malpractice suit. The opinion is reported at Little v. State

of Arizona, 225 Ariz. 466, 240 P.3d 861 (Ariz. App. 2010). Under Fed. R. Evid. 201, the Court

may take judicial notice of a public record without converting the motion to one for summary

judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court “must take judicial notice if a party

requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). 

Defendant has requested that the Court take judicial notice of the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision. (Doc. 12, p. 2.) Plaintiff refers extensively to the Court of Appeals’ decision in her

Complaint and attaches a copy of the decision to her Memorandum in Response to Meehan’s

Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 1 & 19-2.) Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court of Appeals decision will be referred to as “Doc.

19-2, Ct. App.”. 

3

 In a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents incorporated by reference in

the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. A document is incorporated into a complaint by reference if “the

plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s

claim.” Id. Plaintiff referred to Meehan’s letter terminating his representation in her Complaint,

and the contents of the letter are integral to her claim. Therefore, the Court finds that the letter

has been incorporated by reference in the Complaint. 

4

 “DSOF” refers to Defendants’ Statement of Facts. (Doc. 23.) “PSOF” refers to

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts. (Doc. 27.) “PCSOF” refers to

Plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Facts. (Doc. 27.) Facts taken from the parties’ Statement of

2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2005, Shawntinice Polk died from a pulmonary thromboembolism.

(Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 2.) For over a year prior to her death, Polk received primary medical

care from Dr. Porter, a doctor who worked at Campus Health Services (“CHS”) at the

University of Arizona. (Doc. 19-2, Ct. App. ¶ 2.)2

 

Shortly after Polk’s death, Plaintiff was approached by Len Johnson, a Tucson

television reporter. (Complaint ¶ 10; Doc. 19-2, Ct. App. ¶ 3.) Johnson was interested in

doing a news story on Polk’s death. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff authorized Johnson to obtain

Polk’s medical records and investigate the circumstances surrounding her daughter’s death.

(Complaint, ¶ 10; Doc. 19-2, Ct. App. ¶ 3.) Johnson, on behalf of Plaintiff, retained Meehan

to help him obtain the “appropriate medical records.” (Complaint ¶ 11.) By letter to Plaintiff

dated December 16, 2005, Meehan documented the scope of his representation.3

 The letter

states that Meehan was retained to “look into possible medical malpractice of the University

Medical Center with respect to Polk.” (PSOF ¶ 8; DSOF ¶ 8; Doc. 12-4, p. 9.)4

 

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Facts are not considered by the Court with regard to Meehan’s Motion to Dismiss. 

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Plaintiff is inconsistent in specifying when Johnson succeeded in obtaining the medical

records from CHS. In addition to the allegations in the Complaint that the records were obtained

in the Spring of 2007, Plaintiff has asserted that the CHS records were finally obtained on

February 28, 2007 (Doc. 19, p. 2, l. 13) and in March 2007 (PCSOF ¶ 5).

3

Meehan terminated his representation of Plaintiff a short time later by letter dated

March 6, 2006. (Doc. 12-4, Exh. I.) In that letter, which was sent via FedEx, Meehan alerted

Plaintiff of the notice of claim requirement. The letter reads in relevant part:

No determination on whether or not you have a valid claim has been made, nor is any opinion or advice offered in that regard.

You need to be aware of the fact that there is a “statute of

limitation” which is a type of deadline applicable to your case

after which you would be prohibited from pursuing your claim.

Further, actions against public entities or public employees

requires [sic] that you file a claim within 180 days of the cause

of action accrues. THIS MEANS THAT IF YOU WISH TO

PRESERVE YOUR RIGHTS UNDER ARIZONA REVISED

STATUTES [sic] § 12-821.01(A), YOU MUST FILE A

CLAIM NO LATER THAN MARCH 24, 2006. You should,

therefore, immediately seek other counsel of your choice or contact Pima County Lawyer Referral Service, 623-4625, for the

name of an attorney who would be willing to represent you and

pursue your claim. 

(Id.) (emphasis in original). 

After Meehan terminated his representation, Johnson continued his attempts to obtain

Polk’s medical records from CHS and the University of Arizona. (Complaint ¶¶ 3, 18.)

Plaintiff alleges that Johnson obtained Polk’s CHS medical records in the spring of 20075

and, at the same time, asked the Kinerk Defendants to evaluate and pursue claims for medical

negligence against CHS and the State of Arizona. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 20; PCSOF ¶ 6.) Johnson

provided to the Kinerk Defendants the CHS medical records. (Complaint ¶ 23; Answer ¶

20.) On or about July 1, 2007, during the Kinerk Defendants’ representation of Plaintiff,

Johnson filed a claim with the Arizona Medical Board (“the Medical Board”), which alleged

that CHS’ Dr. Porter had failed to properly care for and treat Polk. (Complaint ¶ 24; DSOF

¶ 12; PSOF ¶ 12.)

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On September 13, 2007, Dyer, individually and on behalf of the Kinerk firm, wrote

a letter to Plaintiff stating that the firm was terminating its representation. Dyer wrote: “I

was unable to find what I believe to be adequate documentation to overcome the 180-day

claim letter requirement [A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)]. . . .” (Complaint ¶ 26; Answer ¶ 23.)

Neither Meehan nor the Kinerk Defendants filed a statutory notice of claim on behalf of

Plaintiff. (PCSOF ¶ 7.) 

On February 7, 2008, the Medical Board issued a letter of reprimand to Dr. Porter.

(Complaint ¶ 31.) The Medical Board report concluded that Dr. Porter failed to consider and

pursue a diagnosis of pulmonary embolus, to perform an adequate examination, and to

measure vital signs. (Id.)

On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff, represented by John Stompoly, filed a notice of claim

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) against the State of Arizona. (Id. ¶ 32.) On August 4,

2008, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging a medical negligence claim in the Superior Court of

Pima County. (Id.) The court dismissed Plaintiff’s case, concluding that the action was

barred by the 180-day time limit to file a notice of claim against a public entity. (Complaint

¶ 33.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Plaintiff’s cause of action

“accrued as a matter of law no later than the date the Board complaint was filed,” or July 1,

2007. (Doc. 19-2, Ct. App. ¶ 11.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Kinerk Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.

A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Material

facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue exists if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

at 248. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

See id. at 255. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents

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“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Under Arizona law, a plaintiff who wishes to file a lawsuit against a public entity or

public employee must file a notice of claim within 180 days after the cause of action accrues.

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Otherwise, the claim is barred. Id. A cause of action accrues “when

the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should

know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed

to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). Arizona courts construe the term “accrue” in

accordance with the common law discovery rule. See Little v. State of Arizona, 240 P.3d

861, 864 (Ariz. App. 2010). The common law discovery rule provides that “‘a cause of

action accrues when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury

was caused by the defendant’s negligent conduct.’” Id. (quoting Stulce v. Salt River Project

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ariz. App. 1999)). A plaintiff need

not be aware of all the facts underlying the cause of action for a claim to begin to accrue.

Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 961 (Ariz. 1998). Rather, “the plaintiff must at least possess a

minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and caused

injury.” Id. In other words, the plaintiff must be able to identify the “who” and “what”

elements in order for a cause of action to accrue. Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 996 (Ariz.

2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the plaintiff’s failure to investigate the

“who” and “what” elements is not reasonably justified. Id. “When discovery occurs and a

cause of action accrues are usually and necessarily questions of fact for the jury.” Doe, 955

P.2d at 961. 

The Kinerk Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s cause of action began to accrue no later

than March 6, 2006, when Meehan notified Plaintiff of the notice of claim requirement.

Plaintiff asserts that the earliest possible date that her cause of action began to accrue was

February 28, 2007, when she obtained medical records from CHS. The Court concludes that

the date Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued is a disputed question of fact, and therefore

summary judgment is unwarranted at this stage of the proceedings. Although Meehan

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warned Plaintiff that a notice of claim had to be filed by March 24, 2006, his letter also stated

that “[n]o determination on whether or not you have a valid claim has been made, nor is any

opinion or advice offered in that regard.” Meehan’s letter contained no information as to

who and what caused Polk’s death. At the time Meehan’s letter was sent, Plaintiff had not

obtained the medical records from CHS. Plaintiff alleges the CHS records ultimately

supported her claim against Polk’s treating physician. The parties do not specify when the

Kinerk Defendants were retained, but generally agree that it was sometime in the Spring of

2007. Thus, when Plaintiff knew or should have known the cause of Polk’s death is therefore

a disputed question of fact. 

B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Meehan.

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if the facts alleged do not state a claim

that is plausible on its face, Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009),

or if a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). When assessing the

sufficiency of the complaint, all factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500,

1504 (9th Cir.1994). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party.

Jacobsen v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir.1997). 

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that Meehan committed legal

malpractice. As in any tort action, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must demonstrate

four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Phillips v.

Clancy, 733 P.2d 300, 303 (Ariz. App. 1986). In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff also

must prove that but for the attorney’s negligence, he would have been successful in the

prosecution or defense of the original suit. Id.; Molever v. Roush, 732 P.2d 1105, 1112 (Ariz.

App. 1986). “Negligence-based malpractice liability inures only if, in addition to

establishing duty and breach of the duty by failing to assert a viable claim, the plaintiff-client

demonstrates that the defendant-attorney’s omission caused her to sustain economic

damages.” Cecala v. Newman, 532 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1170 (D. Ariz. 2007) (emphasis in

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 This is not to say that, at the time Plaintiff received Meehan’s termination letter, she

possessed, as a matter of law, sufficient information to start the clock on her statute of limitations

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). For the reasons stated in section A, a material issue of fact

exists as to when Plaintiff should have filed her notice of claim. However, with respect to

Meehan’s conduct and his ability to reasonably foresee a harm to Plaintiff caused by an untimely

notice of claim, the Court concludes that Meehan fulfilled his duties to Plaintiff by advising her

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original) (citing Reed v. Mitchell & Timbanard, P.C., 903 P.2d 621, 626 (Ariz. App. 1995)).

The question of causation is normally for the jury to determine, however, “when the

consequences of an attorney’s alleged negligence bear upon a legal ruling by the court, the

causation question is in all circumstances one of law.” Molever, 732 P.2d at 1112. 

Plaintiff alleges that Meehan’s conduct caused Plaintiff to file an untimely medical

negligence claim against the State of Arizona. However, Plaintiff’s own conduct following

Meehan’s representation constitutes an intervening cause that breaks any causal link between

Meehan’s alleged omissions and Plaintiff’s injury. A plaintiff proves proximate cause by

demonstrating a natural and continuous sequence of events stemming from the defendant's

act or omission, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, that produces an injury, in

whole or in part, and without which the injury would not have occurred. Barrett v. Harris.

86 P.3d 954, 958 (Ariz. App. 2004) (citations omitted). An intervening cause is an

independent cause that occurs between the original act or omission and the final harm and

is necessary in bringing about that harm. Id. An intervening cause becomes a superseding

cause, thereby relieving the defendant of liability for the original negligent conduct, “when

[the] intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described, with the benefit of

hindsight, as extraordinary.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In her Complaint, Plaintiff admits that although Meehan advised her that she should

file her notice of claim by March 24, 2006, Plaintiff nevertheless continued her attempts to

obtain medical records and deferred filing a notice of claim. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) When

Plaintiff obtained the CHS records in the spring of 2007, she retained new counsel and filed

a complaint with the Medical Board, but still elected not to file a notice of claim against the

State. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) Thus, Plaintiff repeatedly and independently decided not to file a

notice of claim despite Meehan’s advice to do so by March 24, 2006.6

 Meehan could not

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of the earliest possible date that the statute of limitations could expire.

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have foreseen that Plaintiff would choose not to follow his advice and instead continue

searching for medical records on her own. Plaintiff’s conduct was extraordinary considering

that Meehan’s March 6, 2006 letter advised her that a notice of claim “MUST” be filed by

March 24, 2006 in order to preserve Plaintiff’s rights under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Given

Plaintiff’s independent conduct, Meehan’s advice that Plaintiff file a notice of claim within

earliest possible time period could not have caused the dismissal of her lawsuit for failure to

timely file a notice of claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence

against Meehan.

C. Leave to amend

Rule 15(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that leave to amend a complaint should be

“freely given when justice so requires.” Where a complaint has been dismissed at the

pleading stage, dismissal generally should be with leave to amend unless it is clear the

complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2005). Where amendment would be futile, the court may refuse to grant leave to amend.

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Given the admissions in Plaintiff’s

Complaint that she independently elected not to file a notice of claim following termination

of Meehan’s representation, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim against Meehan cannot

be cured by further amendment. Leave to amend would be futile, and thus, Meehan’s

dismissal from this action is with prejudice. 

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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants Kinerk, Schmidt & Sethi, P.L.L.C., James H. Dyer and Ted A.

Schmidt’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) is DENIED without prejudice. 

2. Defendant Meehan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. 

3. Defendant Michael Meehan is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of

the Court shall terminate Defendant Michael Meehan from this case.

Dated this 29th day of March, 2013. 

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