Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_14-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-1_14-cv-04624-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

DENISA SEMENZA OFFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04624-NJV

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 15

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Denisa Semenza Offord, seeks judicial review of an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) decision denying her application for disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. Plaintiff‟s request for review of the ALJ‟s unfavorable decision was denied 

by the Appeals Council. The decision thus is the “final decision” of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, which this court may review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Both parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Docs. 6 & 9. Plaintiff filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 15), to which Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 16). For the reasons 

stated below, the court will grant Plaintiff‟s Motion for Summary Judgment in part and remand the 

matter back to the ALJ for further proceedings.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner‟s findings “as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 

conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court has a limited scope of review and can only set 

aside a denial of benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal 

error. Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantial 

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evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 

F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). “In determining whether the Commissioner‟s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence,” a district court must review the administrative record as a 

whole, considering “both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner‟s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The 

Commissioner‟s conclusion is upheld where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

THE FIVE STEP SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY

A person filing a claim for social security disability benefits (“the claimant”) must show 

that she has the “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” which has lasted or is expected to last for twelve or 

more months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.909. The ALJ must consider all evidence in the 

claimant‟s case record to determine disability (Id. § 416.920(a)(3)), and must use a five-step 

sequential evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled (Id. § 416.920). “[T]he ALJ 

has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant‟s interests 

are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff‟s application for benefits under the required five-step 

sequential evaluation. See AR. 27-38.

At Step One, the claimant bears the burden of showing he has not been engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity” since the alleged date the claimant became disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(b). If the claimant has worked and the work is found to be substantial gainful activity, 

the claimant will be found not disabled. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. AR. 29.

At Step Two, the claimant bears the burden of showing that she has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “An impairment is 

not severe if it is merely „a slight abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no 

more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.‟” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 

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F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting S.S.R. No. 96–3(p) (1996)). The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

suffered the following severe impairments: asthma; posttraumatic stress disorder; depressive 

disorder; anxiety disorder; and shoulder problems. AR. 29.

At Step Three, the ALJ compares the claimant‟s impairments to the impairments listed in 

appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). The claimant bears 

the burden of showing her impairments meet or equal an impairment in the listing. Id. If the 

claimant is successful, a disability is presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant is 

unsuccessful, the ALJ assesses the claimant‟s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds 

to Step Four. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed 

impairments. AR. 30. Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC “to perform 

medium work” with several physical, mental, and environmental limitations. AR. 32.

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not capable of performing her past 

relevant work. AR. 36. At Step Five, and after consulting with a Vocational Expert (“VE”), the 

ALJ found that considering Plaintiff‟s RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR. 37. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date through the date of the decision. Id.

ISSUESS PRESENTED

In her Reply (Doc. 21), Plaintiff informed the court that since the filing of the Motion for 

Summary Judgment, she was granted social security benefits on a subsequent application. Rep. 

(Doc. 21) at 1. Plaintiff had alleged an onset date of August 15, 2008, in her initial application. 

However, the award on the subsequent application determined the onset date to be April 5, 2010. 

See Report (Doc. 21-1) at 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates 

to the time period after April 5, 2010 is moot. Thus, Plaintiff focused her Reply only on the 

period of time between August 15, 2008 and April 5, 2010, which is now the relevant time period.

Plaintiff presented three issues for this court‟s review of the ALJ‟s decision: (1) whether 

the ALJ properly rejected the opinion of treating psychologist Dr. Haven; (2) whether the ALJ 

erred in rejecting Plaintff‟s testimony; and (3) whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the lay 

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testimony of Gary Franklin. Pl.‟s Mot. (Doc. 15) at 5. The court will discuss these issues below. 

DISCUSSION

The Opinion of Dr. Haven

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ‟s rejection of Dr. Haven‟s opinion was error. Dr. Haven was 

Plaintiff‟s treating psychologist, who treated Plaintiff from December 3, 2012, to May 8, 2013. 

See AR. 246-72. On February 6, 2013, Dr. Haven opined on Plaintiff‟s mental ability to perform 

work-related activities. AR. 508-10. Dr. Haven‟s assessment included several marked restrictions 

for work-related mental activities. Id. The ALJ rejected Dr. Haven‟s opinion: (1) as overly 

restrictive in light of Plaintiff‟s positive response to psychotropic medicine; (2) in light of 

Plaintiff‟s work activities after the alleged onset date; and (3) due to Plaintiff‟s predominantly 

mild GAF scores.

Dr. Haven‟s opinion is in the form of a medical source statement, which is used to 

determine a claimant‟s ability to work despite their impairments. Dr. Haven‟s medical source 

statement does not opine on Plaintiff‟s past abilities to work, nor does it state that it is relevant to 

any prior time period. In cases where courts have found a medical source statement relevant to an

earlier time period, there has been an indication in the statement that the assessment encompassed 

an earlier time period. See e.g. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (finding a medical source statement relevant because it indicated that the assessment 

encompassed the period from the date of disability onset through the date of the evaluation). No 

such statement or indication is made in Dr. Haven‟s assessment. In addition, Plaintiff does not, in 

her Reply, explain how a medical source statement from 2013 would be relevant in determining 

disability for the now relevant time period which was three to five years prior. Thus, Dr. Haven‟s 

opinion is not relevant to the time period in question. See e.g. Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 

F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “no evidence in the record from an appropriate medical 

source during the relevant time period”) (emphasis added). Even were the court to assume error 

in the ALJ‟s rejection of Dr. Haven‟s opinion, such error became moot when the new disability 

determination was made. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s request for summary judgment as to this issue is 

denied.

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Rejection of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ‟s rejection of Plaintiff‟s testimony regarding the limiting 

effects of her impairments was error. Specifically, Plaintiff attacks the ALJ‟s reliance on 

Plaintiff‟s prior work activities, and the ALJ‟s finding that Plaintiff‟s mental symptoms were 

effectively managed with counseling and medication. 

With regard to the prior work activities, the ALJ found that Plaintiff‟s prior work as an InHome Supportive Services (“IHSS”) provider for a terminally ill woman was inconsistent with 

Plaintiff‟s allegations that she could not perform basic household chores as enumerated in her 

Function Report dated April of 2012. Plaintiff argues that this was error because her testimony 

indicates that her work did not involve such chores. The court will discuss this issue below as it 

relates to the rejection of Gary Franklin‟s testimony.

As to the ALJ‟s finding that the Plaintiff‟s mental symptoms were effectively managed 

with counseling and medication, the court can find no error related to the relevant time period. In 

her Reply, Plaintiff makes much of the ALJ‟s and Defendant‟s discussions of Plaintiff‟s GAF 

scores. To be clear, the ALJ did not rely on Plaintiff‟s GAF scores in making her determination. 

Instead, what the ALJ stated in regard to the credibility determination was that Plaintiff‟s “mental 

symptoms were effectively managed with counseling and medication, which is supported by her 

low GAF scores and positive response to treatment.” AR. 34. The GAF scores, along with the 

positive response to treatment, were referenced as evidence of the effective management of 

Plaintiff‟s mental symptoms through counseling and medication. 

It is important to note that these counseling and medication records relate to later time 

periods than the now relevant time period. The ALJ specifically, discussed the lack of mental 

health treatment notes in the period between July of 2009 and September of 2011. In July 2009,

Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression and anxiety disorder. In 2011, following treatment and 

medication, Plaintiff reported that she was feeling better and reported no distress. See AR. 314-

20. Other than those treatment notes, there is a lack of mental health treatment records during the 

relevant time period. The court finds no error in the ALJ‟s reliance on the lack of treatment 

records, because “[t]he ALJ is permitted to consider lack of treatment in h[er] credibility 

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determination.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, Plaintiff fails to 

point to any other evidence during the relevant time period regarding her allegations of mental 

impairments to undermine the ALJ‟s determination. Accordingly, the Plaintiff‟s request for 

summary judgment as to the ALJ‟s credibility determination of Plaintiff‟s testimony regarding her 

mental impairments is denied.

The Weight of Gary Franklin’s Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to present legitimate reasons for assigning little or no 

weight to the testimony of lay witness Gary Franklin. In her decision, the ALJ found the 

“allegations made by Mr. Franklin to be unpersuasive.” AR. 35. The ALJ made that 

determination after finding that: (1) lay witnesses are not considered medical or vocational 

experts and (2) Mr. Franklin‟s statements appear “to be mere extensions of the claimant‟s own 

allegations (Hearing Testimony),” and a “[r]ephrasing or reassertion of the Claimant‟s own 

allegations, in a different format, is not a basis for a finding of disability.” AR. 35. The ALJ then 

stated that for the same reasons that she found Plaintiff‟s allegations inconsistent with the record, 

so too were Mr. Franklin‟s allegations unpersuasive. Id.

First, Plaintiff correctly points out that the first finding is self-evident and that Mr. 

Franklin‟s testimony was not offered as medical opinion. Rather, Mr. Franklin testified about 

Plaintiff‟s activities of daily living. Second, Plaintiff correctly points out that Mr. Franklin‟s 

testimony could hardly be a rephrasing of, or an extension of, Plaintiff‟s hearing testimony when 

Mr. Franklin‟s statement was made more than a year and five months prior to Plaintiff‟s hearing 

testimony.1

As to the ALJ‟s rejection of Mr. Franklin‟s allegations for “the same reasons” the ALJ 

found Plaintiff‟s allegations of disability inconsistent with the record, the court finds error. Mr. 

Franklin‟s testimony was in the form of a “function report” which only concerned Plaintiff‟s 

activities of daily living. AR. 262-69. Thus, when the ALJ found Mr. Franklin‟s testimony 

inconsistent with the record for “the same reasons” the ALJ found Plaintiff‟s testimony incredible,

 

1

 Mr. Franklin‟s statements were made April 8, 2012, and the hearing was held September 12, 

2013. 

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the ALJ must have been referring to Plaintiff‟s allegations regarding her activities of daily living 

as set forth in her function report of April, 2012. As stated above, the ALJ found those statements 

inconsistent because of Plaintiff‟s work as an IHSS provider. While that work was done outside 

of the relevant time period, Mr. Franklin‟s testimony included the relevant time period. See AR. 

262-69 (stating that Mr. Franklin had known Plaintiff for 5 years and that the allegations apply to 

the entirety of their relationship.). Because the ALJ‟s rejection of Mr. Franklin‟s testimony was 

based on the ALJ‟s rejection of Plaintiff‟s testimony, the court must now look to the rejection of 

Plaintiff‟s testimony.

The court finds that the rejection of Plaintiff‟s testimony regarding her ability to perform 

basic work functions was error. The ALJ‟s finding that Plaintiff worked as an IHSS provider for 

an elderly terminally ill woman is based on Plaintiff‟s medical records, not on employment 

records, or on a statement regarding employment activities, or even on an evaluation of the 

position as it relates to work activities. Specifically, the ALJ cites to Plaintiff‟s June 1, 2011 visit 

to the Humboldt Open Door Clinic, wherein the healthcare provider noted that Plaintiff 

complained of “[i[ncreased anxiety caring to BF‟s elderly mother.” AR. 329. That report also 

notes that Plaintiff was currently living in the elderly woman‟s garage. Id. The ALJ also cites to 

Exhibit 2F p.32. This page has no information related to Plaintiff‟s employment as an IHSS 

worker. In fact, the next page includes a note that Plaintiff was “trying to apply for jobs,” which 

would undermined the notion that the IHSS work at that time was employment. In November 

2011, Plaintiff reported that she was working as a caregiver and that she was depending on her 

partner for financial needs. Exhibit 2F p.36-40. Next, the ALJ cites to Plaintiff‟s records from the 

North County Clinic. Here again, these medical treatment notes do not describe the work 

activities involved in Plaintiff‟s self-reports of work as an IHSS provider. For example, on May 8, 

2013, the healthcare provider noted that Plaintiff was caring for an elderly woman, but the only 

duty described was Plaintiff stating that she was attempting to prevent the elderly woman from 

falling. AR. 514. Those same treatment notes discuss Plaintiff‟s difficulties with self-care, 

including poor eating habits. See e.g. AR. 521. None of these treatment notes sufficiently 

describe Plaintiff‟s work activities in her capacity as a care-giver sufficient enough to be used as a 

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basis to undermine Plaintiff‟s testimony in the function report. When asked to summarize 

Plaintiff‟s past relevant work, the VE only listed Plaintiff‟s previous work as a cashier. Thus, VE 

apparently did not find sufficient work activities associated with this position to include it in his 

opinion. 

Further, at the hearing, the ALJ questioned Plaintiff as to her duties in regard to the elderly 

woman. Plaintiff testified that she had no role in taking care of the woman other than being “just 

there,” and that when the woman‟s son made the woman dinner or lunch and he was not available, 

Plaintiff might have had to “hand her her [sic] plate.” AR. 63. In addition, Plaintiff stated that she 

might have to sit “in with [the elderly woman] while she is sleeping and stuff,” and that Plaintiff

did not cook, clean, do laundry, dishes or go grocery shopping. AR. 63-64. Considering the 

evidence of record the court finds that the ALJ‟s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff‟s allegations 

regarding her ability to do daily chores are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, 

because the court finds error in the ALJ‟s rejection of Plaintiff‟s testimony regarding her activities 

of daily living, the court finds that the rejection of Mr. Franklin‟s testimony is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The Commissioner urges the court to affirm the ALJ‟s decision despite any error in the 

rejection of Mr. Franklin‟s testimony, as “any oversight in the ALJ‟s treatment of third-party 

testimony, would not have affected the ALJ‟s determination.” Def.‟s Br. (Doc. 16) at 10. The 

Commissioner offers that “the lack of corroborating medical evidence alone would have been 

sufficient to discredit Mr. Franklin‟s statements.” Id. (citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 

1218 (9th Cir. 2005)). However, the Bayliss decision applies where the third party‟s statements 

are inconsistent with the record. Here, there is no inconsistency with the evidence of record 

regarding Plaintiff‟s activities of daily living. While the ALJ rejected Plaintiff‟s complaints of 

mental impairments based on the lack of treatment notes, as to the activities of daily living, the 

ALJ specifically pointed to the employment as an IHSS worker. The court cannot apply a “lackof-treatment records” rationale to the rejection of Plaintiff‟s ability to perform household chores, 

especially where there is corroborating testimony of record.

Moreover, because of the way in which the ALJ rejected Mr. Franklin‟s testimony in this 

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case, there are two errors: the ALJ‟s rejection of Plaintiff‟s allegations and the rejection of Mr. 

Franklin‟s. Plaintiff stated in her function report that her limitations had been in place since the 

beginning of her illness, which the court takes to mean since the alleged onset date. Thus, the 

allegations in her function report as to the relevant time period have not been addressed as well. 

More importantly, as evident from the discussion above, and as acknowledged by the ALJ, 

there is scant evidence in this case concerning the relevant time period. Plaintiff and Mr. 

Franklin‟s testimony are almost the only pictures of Plaintiff‟s abilities to perform basic activities 

of daily living during the relevant time period. Therefore, proper consideration of those 

statements is important. It is possible that the ALJ could still reject the testimony, but it is not for 

this court to divine the possible reasons, which might require the consult of a VE or medical 

expert. It is just as possible for the ALJ to accept the testimony and that acceptance may have 

implications regarding Plaintiff‟s ability to work during the relevant time period. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that the Motion for 

Summary Judgment is Granted in part and Denied in part. The court hereby REMANDS this 

matter for the ALJ to reconsider the testimony of Plaintiff and Gary Franklin with regard to 

Plaintiff‟s ability to perform basic activities of daily living during the relevant time period.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2016

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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