Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05206/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05206-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

SANDRA HATFIELD, an individual; 

LAUREL ANTONUCCI, an individual; and 

MAUREEN PATRICIA MURPHY, an 

individual,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DaVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC.; 

and Does 1 through 50, inclusive,,

Defendants.

Case No: C 13-5206 SBA

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Dkt. 46

Plaintiffs Sandra Hatfield (“Hatfield”), Laurel Antonucci (“Antonucci”) and 

Maureen Patricia Murphy (“Murphy”) bring the instant action against their former 

employer, DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc.1(“Defendant”), alleging, inter alia, claims for 

disability discrimination, retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”). Antonucci has settled her claims with Defendant, leaving Hatfield and Murphy 

as the only remaining party-plaintiffs.

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Third 

Amended Complaint for Damages Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Dkt. 46. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and 

being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss. The Court, in its 

 

1 According to Defendant, the proper party-defendant is Renal Treatment Centers—

California, Inc., not DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc. See Cha Decl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 46-1. 

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discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant operates kidney dialysis clinics throughout the United States, including 

one located in the Bel-Aire Plaza Shopping Center in Napa, California. Third Am. Compl. 

(“TAC”). ¶ 4, 10, 12, Dkt. 40. Hatfield and Murphy were employed as nurses at the Napa 

facility. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiffs claim that while working at the clinic, “they experienced 

conditions which created an intolerable, hostile work environment because DaVita’s 

facility operations were medically dangerous and unsafe” and were “rife with racial 

discrimination . . . .” Id. ¶ 13.

On October 4, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendant in the Napa 

County Superior Court, alleging six state law causes of action for: (1) constructive 

discharge in violation of public policy (by Hatfield and Antonucci only); (2) breach of 

contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) retaliation, 

failure to prevent harassment, discrimination; (5) fraudulent inducement to accept 

employment (by Hatfield only); and (6) IIED. 

On November 8, 2013, Defendant removed the action on the basis of diversity 

jurisdiction. Def.’s Not. of Removal, Dkt. 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all 

causes of action (except the first claim for constructive discharge) for failure to state a 

claim, which the Court granted with leave to amend. Dkt. 23. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a 

First Amended Complaint on June 9, 2014, a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on July 

17, 2014, and a TAC on August 29, 2014. Dkt. 24, 31, 40.2 The TAC, which is the 

 

2

In its Order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court instructed that: “To 

avoid unnecessary motion practice, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding 

the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ amended allegations in their forthcoming First Amended 

Complaint.” Order at 16. Plaintiffs failed to comply with that Order. See Cha Decl. ¶ 2, 

Dkt. 46-1. After Plaintiffs filed their FAC, the parties met and conferred, at which time 

Defendant took the position that the amended pleadings did not rectify the deficiencies 

identified by the Court. Id. ¶ 3. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a SAC and TAC without prior 

leave of Court, in violation of Rule 15. Plaintiffs are cautioned that further transgressions 

of any applicable procedural rules may result in sanctions, up and including dismissal with 

prejudice under Rule 41(b).

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operative pleading before the Court, alleges the following five state law causes of action: 

(1) constructive discharge in violation of public policy; (2) race and disability 

discrimination3; (3) failure to accommodate in violation of the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act; (4) retaliation; (5) fraudulent inducement to accept employment; and 

(6) IIED.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the second cause of action for discrimination, 

insofar as it is based on disability discrimination as to Murphy; the fourth cause of action 

for retaliation; and the sixth cause of action for IIED. Dkt. 46. The motion has been fully 

briefed and is ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “Rule 12(b)(6) is read 

in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires not only ‘fair notice of the nature of the 

claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.’” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-

99 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting in part Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3 

(2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007)). A complaint 

must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements 

of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in 

its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 

 

3 The second cause of action consists of a claim of racial discrimination by all 

Plaintiffs and a claim for disability discrimination on behalf of Murphy only. TAC ¶¶ 25-

37. 

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and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 

2007). Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, 

unless further amendment would be futile. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 

1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any person 

because of a physical or mental disability. Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). To “prevail on a 

discriminatory discharge claim under section 12940(a), an employee bears the burden of 

showing (1) that he or she was discharged because of a disability, and (2) that he or she 

could perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation (in the 

parlance of the [ADA], that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability).” Liu v. 

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (2012) (internal quotations and 

citation omitted, emphasis added). 

The pleadings allege that Murphy “qualifies as disabled under FEHA” based on a 

concussion she suffered after a fall at work, and was terminated “in part because of 

her . . . disability.” TAC ¶¶ 13(D), 36, 37. These allegations are too conclusory to state a 

plausible claim for disability discrimination. As set forth in the Court’s prior order, a 

plaintiff presenting a claim for employment discrimination must allege facts demonstrating, 

either directly or inferentially, a nexus between the employee’s disability and the 

employer’s adverse employment action. Dkt. 23 at 7-9. Despite that guidance, Plaintiffs

allege only that Murphy has a disability and that she was terminated “in part” because of 

such disability. TAC ¶¶ 36, 37. Without facts to support the conclusion that Defendant 

terminated Murphy’s employment because of her disability, this claim must fail. See

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for disability 

discrimination as to Murphy and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

second cause of action as to said claim.

B. RETALIATION UNDER FEHA

The anti-retaliation provision of FEHA prohibits employers from taking any adverse 

employment action against an employee who “has opposed any practices forbidden under 

[§ 12940] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any 

proceeding under this part.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h). “To state a claim of retaliation 

under FEHA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he was 

subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the 

protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Rope v. Auto-Chlor Sys. of Wash., 

Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 635, 651 (2013). An employee engages in “protected activity” 

where he or she “opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be unlawfully 

discriminatory under the FEHA, [and] . . . when the employee opposes conduct that the 

employee reasonably and in good faith believes to be discriminatory, whether or not the 

challenged conduct is ultimately found to violate the FEHA.” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, 

Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1130-31 (2005).

In its prior order, the Court explained the factual allegations necessary to state a 

“plausible” claim for retaliation under FEHA:

In sum, the allegations in support of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

fail to provide Defendant with fair notice of the factual basis 

therefor. To the extent that Plaintiffs intend to pursue a claim 

of retaliation, it is incumbent upon them to allege facts that 

specify the nature of the complaint or complaints made to 

Defendant by each Plaintiff, the adverse employment action 

resulting from making such complaint, and facts from which 

it may be plausibly inferred that the adverse employment 

action is linked to those complaints. Given the absence of such 

allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for 

retaliation is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Dkt. 23 at 12 (emphasis added). 

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Plaintiffs now allege that Defendant retaliated against them for complaining about 

medically unacceptable practices, the mistreatment of Caucasians by Filipino employees, 

and various “intolerable” working conditions. TAC ¶¶ 13(A), (B), (C), 53. As before, 

however, the TAC fails to specify which Plaintiff made each complaint or when it was 

allegedly made. Instead, Plaintiffs merely claim that on “numerous occasions” they made 

complaints to unidentified “supervisors and other persons of authority.” Id. ¶ 53. Also 

absent are any factual allegations from which it can be inferred that a causal link exists 

between Plaintiffs’ alleged protected activity and any adverse employment action. See

Rope, 220 Cal. App. 4th at 651. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for retaliation 

and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action.

C. IIED

A claim for IIED requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 

distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and 

proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” 

Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982). The conduct must be “so 

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Potter 

v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ IIED claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to 

specify the conduct alleged to be extreme and outrageous, or otherwise allege facts 

establishing that such conduct was directed at them in particular. Dkt. 23 at 14-15. In their 

TAC, Plaintiffs now aver that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by 

failing to adequately address their complaints regarding patient care, mistreatment by 

Filipino employees, and “generally intolerable conditions.” TAC ¶¶ 73 (citing TAC 

¶ 13(A)-(C)). These allegations are insufficient to show extreme and outrageous conduct. 

See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 210 (1982) (dismissing IIED claim 

where Plaintiff had “not alleged that the officers acted (or failed to act) as they did for the 

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purpose of causing emotional injury” and where “the officers’ conduct did not rise to the 

level of outrageous conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 

civilized community”) (internal citation omitted).

Even if Plaintiffs had alleged outrageous conduct, insufficient facts are alleged 

demonstrating that such conduct was intentionally directed at them, or that they suffered 

severe emotional distress as a result. To sustain an IIED claim, the defendant “must have 

engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury 

will result.’” Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. 

City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1991)). Here, Plaintiffs merely allege that 

Defendant “knew [of] the conditions experienced by Plaintiffs and nonetheless, took 

virtually no effective action to remedy the conditions.” TAC ¶ 74. Without more, these 

conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible claim for IIED. See Davidson, 32 Cal.3d at

210 (1982) (“[t]he tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conduct—conduct intended 

to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.”). 

Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that they suffered severe or 

extreme emotional distress. In an entirely vague manner, Plaintiffs allege that they suffered 

“depression, fear and anxiety about their jobs and lives.” TAC ¶ 78. The California 

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have held that these types of amorphous claims of 

emotional distress are insufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered severe 

emotional distress. See Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051 (2009) (“[P]laintiff’s 

assertions that she has suffered discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and 

agitation as the result of defendant’s comments to her . . . do not comprise ‘emotional 

distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in 

civilized society should be expected to endure it.’”) (citation omitted); Lawler v. Montblanc 

N.A., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s “anxiety, 

sleeplessness, upset stomach, and . . . muscle twitches” did not rise to the level of severe 

emotional distress); see also Hamilton v. Prudential Fin., No. 2:07-cv-00944-MCE-DAD, 

2007 WL 2827792, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007) (finding allegations that the plaintiff 

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suffered from “’depression,’ ‘frustration,’ ‘nervousness and anxiety,’” were “conclusory 

statements [that] lack the necessary specific facts to show their nature or extent” to support 

a cause of action for IIED). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for IIED and 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action.

D. LEAVE TO AMEND

“Although leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss 

without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading 

deficiencies and amendment would be futile.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 

Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Leave to amend also need not be granted where 

the plaintiff has been afforded prior opportunities to amend. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. 

Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Court, in its discretion, finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. In its 

prior order adjudicating Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court identified the flaws in the 

original Complaint and type of factual allegations necessary to rectify those deficiencies. 

In addition, prior to filing the TAC, Plaintiffs were informed by Defendant of the reasons it 

believed that their three amended complaints failed to adequately state claims for disability 

discrimination (as to Murphy), retaliation and IIED. Cha Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, Dkt. 46-1. Despite 

that guidance, Plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to the aforementioned claims remain 

conclusory. In addition, Plaintiffs’ opposition presents no new potential factual allegations 

in response to Defendant’s motion, and merely takes the position that the TAC, as alleged, 

is sufficient. Given the record presented, the Court is therefore persuaded that granting 

further leave to amend would be futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 991 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 

amend where plaintiff “did not propose any new facts or legal theories for an amended 

complaint and therefore gave the Court no basis to allow an amendment.”). 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion to dismiss certain of the 

claims of the TAC is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for disability 

discrimination as to Murphy, fourth cause of action for retaliation, and sixth cause of action 

for IIED are DISMISSED without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/7/15 ______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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