Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03810/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03810-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN MACKALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL STAFFING, 

INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-03810-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

COMPEL ARBITRATION

Re: Dkt. No. 8

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Karen Mackall brings claims individually and on behalf of a class of employees of 

HealthSource Global Staffing, Inc. (“HSGI”), alleging that HSGI failed to provide their employees 

with meal breaks, rest periods, overtimes wages, and other protections as required under California 

law. HSGI moves to compel individual arbitration, arguing Mackall is bound by the arbitration 

agreement she completed when she filled out HSGI’s online job application. HSGI also moves to 

stay Mackall’s California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claim, which is not subject to 

arbitration. In opposition to the motion to compel, Mackall argues that the arbitration agreement 

is unconscionable and not enforceable because: (i) it is procedurally unconscionable as a contract 

of adhesion and (ii) is substantively unconscionable as it does not impose a mutual obligation to 

arbitrate, does not provide for a written award, and contains a class waiver invalid under the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Mackall further alleges that her injunctive relief claim 

is not arbitrable and the agreement is not enforceable against recently added co-defendant 

HealthSource Global (“HG”). 

I conclude the class waiver is invalid under the NLRA and Morris v. Ernst & Young, __

F.3d __, 2016 WL 4433080 (9th. Cir. Aug. 22, 2016). As the parties did not contract to pursue 

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class claims in arbitration, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration 

Act. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). Accordingly, 

HSGI’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED and HSGI’s motion to stay the PAGA claim is 

rendered MOOT. 

BACKGROUND

Karen Mackall filed this class action in Alameda Superior Court on behalf of a class of all 

non-exempt employees who are currently employed or formerly employed by HealthSource 

Global Staffing, Inc. (HSGI) and Healthsource Global (HG, collectively HSGI). First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 1-7). HSGI hires registered nurses from all over the United 

States for temporary positions in hospitals during labor disputes. Declaration of Lance Fanger in 

Opposition to Motion to Remand ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 1-2). Mackall and putative class members she 

seeks to represent were employed by HSGI as non-exempt hourly registered nurses at various 

times in the County of Los Angeles during the last four years. FAC ¶ 7. She alleges causes of 

action against HSGI under (1) the California Labor Code, (2) California Business and Professions 

Code § 17200, (3) the Fair Labor Standards Act, and (4) the California PAGA. FAC ¶ 1. 

To be eligible for an assignment with HSGI, a nurse applicant creates a HSGI portal using 

a unique username and password. Declaration of Lance Fanger in Support of Motion to Compel 

Arbitration (“Fanger Decl.”) ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 8-2). The nurse will then enter his or her personal 

email address, phone number, name, licensure, certifications, skills, experience, qualifications, and 

availability. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9. When potential strike assignments arise, a nurse applicant may 

nominate himself or herself. Id. at ¶ 9. The nurse applicants will then be prompted to complete 

their profile, including human resource forms, acknowledgments confirming receipt of policies 

and procedures, receipt of health insurance information, and consent for background checks. Id. at 

¶¶ 11-13. Applicants also agree to an arbitration agreement which provides:

Arbitration Agreement – Mandatory Forum Selection

This ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (“Agreement”) is made 

between you (“Employee”) and HealthSource Global Staffing, Inc., 

a California Corporation (“HealthSource”) (together the “Parties”) 

as of the date you sign this document.

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...

2. The Parties agree that any dispute arising out of, in connection 

with, or relating to your employment agreement with HealthSource, 

your employment with HealthSource, and any and all previous 

employment relationships with HealthSource, including with respect 

to the termination of such employment or other and any dispute as to 

the validity, interpretation, construction, application or enforcement 

of any provision of the operative employment agreement, shall be 

submitted to binding arbitration before a neural arbitrator. Except as 

otherwise required under applicable law, (1) The Parties expressly 

intend and agree that class action and representative action 

procedures shall not be asserted, nor will they apply, in any 

arbitration pursuant to your employment, your employment 

agreement, or this Agreement; (2) The Parties agree that each will 

not assert class action or representative action claims against the 

other in arbitration or otherwise; and (3) each of the Parties shall 

only submit their own, individual claims in arbitration and will not 

seek to represent the interests of any other person. Discovery shall 

be conducted in accordance with the American Arbitration 

Association’s Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation 

Procedures. The arbitrator may provide a written award subject to 

judicial review. Costs unique to arbitration, such as the arbitrator’s 

fee, will be paid by HealthSource.

Fanger Decl. Ex. F.1

Mackall was employed on two separate assignments to work as a registered nurse in Los 

Angeles area hospitals. Fanger Decl. ¶ 20. Mackall went through the nomination process twice 

and signed the arbitration agreement on January 30, 2016 and March 12, 2016. Id. at ¶ 21-22. 

Once the arbitration agreement was digitally signed, neither Mackall nor HSGI could alter the 

agreement. Id. at ¶ 23.

On July 14, 2016, HSGI moved to compel arbitration of Mackall’s individual claims and 

stay Mackall’s PAGA claim. Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Mot.”) at 1 (Dkt. No. 8). I heard 

argument on October 26, 2016.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the motion to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. 

§§ 1 et seq. Under the FAA, a district court determines (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate 

 

1

The arbitration agreement is presented as a “standalone screen” titled “Arbitration Agreement.” 

Id. ¶ 13. To “electronically sign” the Agreement, the applicant must check the check box 

acknowledging “I have read, understand and accept the terms of the Arbitration Agreement 

document” and click the “Accept” button. Id.

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exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Lifescan, Inc. v. 

Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). “To evaluate the validity of 

an arbitration agreement, federal courts should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 

formation of contracts.” Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the court is satisfied “that the making of the 

arbitration agreement or the failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall 

make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. “Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 

resolved in favor of arbitration.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999).

II. MOTION TO STAY

“Under § 3 of the FAA, if any suit or proceeding is brought in a court of the Unites States 

upon any issue that is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, the court “shall...stay the 

trial of the action.” 9 U.S.C. § 3; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 (2011). 

Where plaintiffs assert both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, district courts have “discretion 

whether to proceed with the nonarbitrable claims before or after the arbitration and [have] ... 

authority to stay proceedings in the interest of saving time and effort for itself and litigants.” 

Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 851, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 

593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979). A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury 

might otherwise result[, but] is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its 

issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 

433-34 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO COMPEL

A. Class Waiver

Mackall asserts that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement is unenforceable 

because (i) it is procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion in a take it or leave it 

employment application and (ii) it is substantively unconscionable because it is non-mutual, it 

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fails to require the arbitrator to issue a written opinion, and it fails to provide a right to a collective 

action. I agree that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and 

substantively unconscionable because its contains a class action waiver that is unenforceable under 

the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Morris v. 

Ernst & Young, --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 4433080 (9th. Cir. Aug. 22, 2016). Mot. 15; Dkt. No. 24. 

In Morris, Ernst & Young moved to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards 

Act misclassification and wage and hour claims. Morris, 2016 WL 4433080, at *1. The plaintiffs 

signed agreements as a condition of employment that required employees to “(1) pursue legal 

claims against [defendant] exclusively through arbitration and (2) arbitrate only as individuals and 

in ‘separate proceedings.’” Id. In opposition to the motion to compel, plaintiffs alleged the 

arbitration agreement’s class waiver provision violated Section 7 of the NLRA, which grants the 

employees to right to “self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 

collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 

157. 

The Morris court held that “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to 

achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ under §7 of the 

[NLRA].” 2016 WL 4433080, at *3-4 (internal quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit concluded 

that Ernst & Young interfered with its employees’ substantive right to concerted activity under the 

NLRA by requiring employees, as a condition of employment, “to pursue work-related claims 

individually.” Id. at *5. 

Here, Mackall was similarly required to agree to the arbitration agreement in order to work 

for HSGI. Declaration of Karen Mackall in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' 

Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Mackall Decl.”) ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 14-2). While completion of human 

resources forms, including the arbitration agreement, is not required in order to be considered for a 

nursing assignment, nurses either complete it online prior to or during the in-person application 

process. Fanger Decl. ¶ 14. Once a nurse is selected for an assignment, the nurse travels to the 

assignment location and fills out the remaining pre-hire paperwork in person. Id. at ¶ 17. While 

applicants have many opportunities to complete the required forms, the nurse applicant must 

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consent to the arbitration agreement as a step in that application process. As the arbitration 

agreement did not provide any opportunity for a prospective employee to opt-out of the agreement 

and was a condition of their employment, the Morris analysis applies to this case. 

HSGI argues that an arbitration agreement that is a prerequisite to employment is not 

automatically rendered unconscionable under California law. Reply 3. That may be so. 

However, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Morris, an arbitration agreement is invalid 

under § 7 of the NLRA if employees cannot opt-out of it and it waives all ability to pursue 

employment-related claims collectively.

At oral argument, HSGI contended that the impact of Morris is limited to employment 

agreements that require “separate proceedings.” It asserted that because there is no “separate 

proceedings” language in HSGI’s agreement and Mackall and Lacombe could theoretically pursue 

their individual arbitration claims together in one proceeding, the HSGI agreement does not 

prohibit all concerted activity in violation of the NLRA. That analysis ignores that both the 

majority and dissent in Morris refer to the “separate proceedings” clause at issue as a class action 

waiver, which is what is at issue here. Morris v. Ernst & Young, 2016 WL 4433080, at *2 fn.1 & 

*4 fn.3; see also id. at *11, 12 (dissent). The majority affirmed the NLRB’s determination that 

any agreement that precludes employees from filing “joint, class, or collective claims” violates the 

NLRA. Id. at *2, *5.2 And even if Morris could be so limited, and I am not finding it can, the

HSGI agreement requires that parties to the agreement “shall submit their own, individual claims 

in arbitration, and will not seek to represent the interest of any other person.” That provision 

arguably requires separate initiation of arbitration proceedings and does not expressly permit 

employees to join together to arbitrate their individual claims. Fanger Decl. Ex. F. HSGI’s 

argument that its agreement preserves a limited right to concerted action is without support. 

Mackall was required to complete the arbitration provision as a condition of her 

 

2

 As the Morris court noted, § 7 of the NRLA protects concerted action for the purpose of 

“collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id. at *3 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). By 

the nature of the rules and statutes creating them, class and collective actions are appropriate only 

where they serve the “mutual aid” of the other class members. See Fed. Rule C. Proc. 23(a) & 

(b)(3); 29 U.S.C § 216(b) (allowing employees to initiate a collective action on behalf of 

“similarly situated” employees).

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employment. HSGI’s class waiver violates § 7 of the NLRA by interfering with her right to 

“engage in... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 

protection.” See 29 U.S.C. § 157. HSGI’s class waiver is unenforceable under Morris.

B. Severability and Enforcement of Class Arbitration

The next issue to consider is whether the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable, or 

whether the unlawful class waiver can be severed from the rest of the agreement. Under Morris, a 

district court must determine whether to sever an invalid class waiver prior to enforcing an 

arbitration agreement. 2016 WL 4433080, at *11. “It is well established that a federal court has a 

duty to determine whether a contract violates the law before enforcing it.” Id. (remanding to the 

district court “to determine whether the ‘separate proceedings’ clause is severable from the 

contract”). However, even if the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement Mackall signed 

is severable (and the agreement could be enforced against Mackall because it is not otherwise 

substantively unconscionable), 3another problem arises. 

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l. Corp., a 

court cannot compel arbitration of class claims where the parties did not contract to submit to 

class-wide arbitration. 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). “[A] party may not be compelled under the 

FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 

agreed to do so.” Id. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court considered whether there was a contractual basis 

to compel arbitration of class claims where the arbitration agreement was silent on class and 

collective actions. Id. at 685. The Court determined that where the agreement was silent and the 

parties stipulated they had “no agreement” on the issue, an arbitrator could not conclude that the 

parties had “agreed to authorize class arbitration” and compel arbitration of class claims. Id. at 

687. 

Here, there is no contractual basis to conclude that HSGI and its employees “agreed to 

authorize class arbitration” because the arbitration agreement specifically waived that right. 

 

3 Mackall argues that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because it is not 

mutual. I disagree. See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237, 1249 (2016). Mackall also 

argues that the agreement is unconscionable under Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 

Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 107 (2000) because it only permits but does not require the arbitrator to issue 

a written decision. However, the agreement could be conformed to require a written decision.

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Unlike in Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitration agreement is not silent on class claims and instead 

explicitly aims to prevent them. Although I have concluded that this provision is unenforceable 

under Morris, the waiver provision unambiguously precludes a finding that the parties intended to 

agree to arbitration of class claims. The express language of the agreement indicates that they 

intended the opposite. Because the parties did not agree to arbitrate class claims, they “cannot be 

compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration.” Id. at 684.

Because the parties cannot be compelled to submit to class arbitration (if the class waiver 

is severed) and because enforcing HSGI’s arbitration agreement with the class wavier runs afoul 

of Morris, the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Therefore, HSGI’s motion to compel 

arbitration is DENIED.4 

II. MOTION TO STAY PAGA CLAIM

As I cannot compel arbitration of Mackall’s class claims as discussed above, HSGI’S 

motion to stay the PAGA claim is rendered MOOT. 

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the NLRA and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Morris, the class waiver in 

HSGI’s arbitration agreement is unenforceable. As I cannot compel class-wide arbitration when 

the parties have not contracted to or shown an agreement to do so, Mackall’s class claims may not 

proceed in arbitration, and the arbitration agreement itself is unenforceable. HSGI’s motion to 

compel arbitration is DENIED and its motion to stay the PAGA claim is DENIED as MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

 

4

I need not reach plaintiffs’ other arguments opposing arbitration, including that plaintiffs did not 

sign the arbitration agreements with the other “defendant” HG. However, I note that admissible 

evidence shows that HG is not a separate entity from HSGI, but simply an “otherwise known as” 

name used on paychecks. Fanger Reply Decl. (Dkt. No. 17-1) ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiffs’ objections to this 

evidence in the Fanger Reply Declaration are OVERRULED. Dkt. No. 19.

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