Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08197/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08197-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment (Insurance)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EXC, Inc., a Nevada corporation, d/b/a

Express Charters and D.I.A. Express, Inc.;

Conlon Garage, Inc., a Colorado

corporation; Go Ahead Vacations, Inc., a

Massachusetts corporation; Russell J.

Conlon, and; National Interstate Insurance

Company,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Jamien Rae Jensen, individually, and as

parent and next friend of D. J. J., and as

Personal Representative of the Wrongful

Death Estate of Corey Johnson; Chavis

Johnson, individually, and as Personal

Representative of the Wrongful Death

Estate of Butch Corey Johnson; Margaret

Johnson and Frank Johnson, individually,

and as parents and next friends of H. J. and

D. J.; Francesca Johnson, individually;

Justin Johnson, individually; Raymond

Jensen, Sr., individually; Louise R. Jensen,

individually; Nicole Jensen, individually;

Ryan Jensen, individually; Justin Jensen,

individually; Katrina Jensen, individually;

Raymond Jensen, Jr., individually, and;

Murphy Jensen, individually,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

))

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. CV 10-08197-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 99)

and (2) the Jensen Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 101). The Court now

rules on the Motions. 

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The issues in this case arise out of an automobile accident that occurred on September

21, 2004 between occupants of a tour bus and occupants of a sedan. (Joint Statement of

Facts, Doc. 82 at ¶ 1). The tour bus was chartered by Plaintiff Express Charters or EXC,

Inc. (“EXC”) pursuant to a December 22, 2003 Coach Service Agreement between EXC and

Plaintiff Go Ahead Vacations, Inc. for the purpose of the operation of tours in North

America. Id. at ¶ 11. EXC, Inc. provided a tour vehicle and a qualified driver and Go Ahead

Vacations organized the tour and provided a tour director. (Id. at ¶ 12). Plaintiff National

Interstate Insurance Company provided insurance to Plaintiff EXC, Inc. (Id. at ¶ 15).

Plaintiff Conlon Garage, Inc. owned the tour bus. (Defendants’ Statement of Facts, Doc.

111-1 at ¶ 30). 

On the date of the collision, the tour bus was traveling within the boundaries of the

Navajo Nation as part of a twelve day tour beginning on September 17, 2004 and ending on

September 28, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 14). On September 20, 2011 and September 21, 2011, the tour

bus made stops on the Navajo Nation at the Monument Valley Visitors Center and the

Hampton Inn in Kayenta, Arizona, which is located on tribal trust land within the Navajo

Nation. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-29). Over the course of the tour, Plaintiffs traversed almost 200 miles

of Navajo Nation territory and stayed overnight at a Navajo Nation hotel. (Id. at ¶¶ 31 & 34).

Plaintiff Russell J. Conlon was operating the tour bus when it collided head-on with

a 1997 Pontiac sedan within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Nation on U.S. Highway

160. (Id. at ¶ 2). The sedan was driven by Butch Corey Johnson. (Id. at ¶ 5). Jamien Rae

Jensen and D. Jensen Johnson were passengers in the sedan. (Id. at ¶ 6). Butch Corey

Johnson died of his accident-related injuries and D. Jensen Johnson sustained non-lifethreatening injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8, 19). Jamien Rae Jensen was approximately one month

pregnant at the time of the collision and later miscarried as a result of the collision. (Id. at

¶¶ 17-18). The three occupants of the Sedan were all members of the Navajo Nation. (Id.

at ¶ 9). 

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

The collision occurred on part of U.S. Highway 160, which is open to the public and

maintained by the State of Arizona under a federally granted right-of-way over Navajo

Nation land. (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Facts, Doc. 100 at ¶ 1; Doc 100-1). The

portion of U.S. Highway 160 that crosses the Navajo Nation is approximately 197.4 miles.

(Doc. 82 at ¶ 21). Navajo Nation Emergency Services, the Navajo Police Department, the

Navajo Department of Criminal Investigations, and the Navajo Nation Department of Fire

& Rescue Services were present on the scene of the September 21, 2004 collision on U.S.

Highway 160 and, with the assistance of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, secured

the scene, investigated the collision, cleared the scene of the collision, issued reports and

provided governmental services. (Doc. 82 at ¶ 4). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2006, the Jensen Defendants filed negligence claims against Plaintiffs

in the Kayenta District Court. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of

jurisdiction, which the Kayenta District Court denied. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Writ of

Prohibition with the Navajo Supreme Court seeking to prevent the Kayenta District Court

from proceeding based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Navajo Supreme Court

affirmed, holding that the Kayenta District Court had jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs then filed this case seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Kayenta

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Jensen Defendants’ claims and (2) an injunction

barring the Jensen Defendants from proceeding with their claims in Kayenta District Court.

Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint without prejudice based on

Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust tribal court remedies. This Court denied Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, finding that requiring Plaintiffs to further exhaust their jurisdictional

requirement in Kayenta District Court would be futile. (Doc. 80). Plaintiffs and Defendants

now move for summary judgment on the jurisdictional issue. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews the factual findings in a tribal court’s decision regarding tribal

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

jurisdiction for clear error and reviews questions of federal law de novo. FMC v. ShoshoneBannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, a “tribal court’s

determination of its own jurisdiction is entitled to ‘some deference.’” Water Wheel Camp

Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of law, the Navajo Nation tribal court has no

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs, who are all nonmembers of the tribe, regarding the automobile

accident that occurred on a state highway running over Navajo land. Plaintiffs rely on the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)

to support their argument that the Navajo Nation lacks jurisdiction over them as a matter of

law.

In Strate, Petitioner Fredericks, who was not a member of a Tribe, but was the widow

of a deceased member of the Tribe and had five adult children who were Tribal members,

was injured in an automobile accident with Respondent Stockert when Petitioner’s vehicle

collided with a gravel truck driven by Stockert and owned by Respondent A-1 Contractors,

Stockert’s employer. Id. at 443. The accident occurred on a portion of a North Dakota state

highway running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. Id. The strip of highway

crossing the reservation was open to the public and maintained by the State of North Dakota

under a right-of-way granted by the United States to the State’s Highway Department. Id.

The right-of-way was on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated

Tribes and their members. Id. 

Applying Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Strate Court held that tribal

courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state

highways absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of

nonmembers on the highway in question. (Id. at 1408). The Court noted that the opinion did

not attempt to decide the proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a

reservation. 

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Strate Court recognized that there was no question in that case of the authority

of tribal police to patrol roads within the reservation, including rights-of-way made part of

a state highway and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the

highway for conduct violating state law. Id. at 1414 n.11. Likewise, no such question is

presented in this case.

- 5 -

Defendants argue that Strate, and the analysis from Montana applied therein, only

apply to cases where the tribe attempts to exert jurisdiction over nonmembers on alienated

non-reservation land. Defendants argue that, in this case, the Montana analysis does not

apply because the portion of U.S. Highway 160 where the accident occurred is tribal land.

The Strate Court considered a nearly identical argument regarding a right-of-way through

reservation land granted to North Dakota and found that the “right -of-way North Dakota

acquired for the State’s highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for nonmember

governance purposes to alienated, non-Indian land.” Id. at 1413. In Strate, the grant of the

right-of-way over Indian land where the accident occurred was made for the purpose of

facilitating public access to Lake Sakakawea, a federal water resource project under the

control of the Army Corps of Engineers. Id. at 1414. The Strate Court noted that nothing

in the grant expressly reserved the Tribe’s right to exercise dominion or control over the

right-of-way, and found that “[s]o long as the stretch is maintained as part of the State’s

highway, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude.” Id. at 1414.1

The grant involved in this case was made pursuant to an agreement between the State

Highway Commission, the Arizona Highway Department, and the United States of America,

acting on behalf of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. (Doc. 100-1). The Navajo Tribal Council

authorized the Chairman of the Tribe to give consent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the

right-of-way and to transfer the right-of-way to the State of Arizona. (Id.; Doc. 100 at ¶ 2).

The purpose of the grant was to provide for the design and construction of U.S. Highway 160

by the United States and the subsequent designation and maintenance of the road, as a public

highway, by the State of Arizona. (Id. at 100-1). As in Strate, nothing the in the agreement

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

in this case expressly reserved the Tribe’s right to exercise dominion or control over the

right-of-way. 

Defendants attempt to distinguish Strate by arguing that (1) the purpose of the rightof-way in Strate was to facilitate access to a federal water resource project, while the

congressional intent for the right-of-way that became U.S. Highway 160 was to serve tribal

interests and (2) the Three Affiliates Tribe in Strate received compensation for approving the

grant of the right-of-way, while the Navajo Nation in this case expressly waived

compensation for approving the grant of the right-of-way. 

Despite these differences, in the absence of any express reservation of the Tribe’s

right to exercise dominion and control over the right-of-way, when the “stretch is maintained

as part of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner’s right to occupy and

exclude.” 520 U.S. at 440. This holding in Strate leaves room for no other conclusion than

that the stretch of U.S. Highway 160 within the Navajo reservation is equivalent, for

nonmember governance purposes to alienated, non-Indian land, and thus, the Court must

apply the Montana analysis to the jurisdictional issues in this case. Under Montana, absent

express authorization by federal statute or treaty, “Indian tribes lack civil authority over the

conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two exceptions:”

(1) when nonmembers enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members and (2)

when the activity in question directly affects the tribes political integrity, economic security,

health or welfare. 520 U.S. at 446 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-567

(1981)). 

Accordingly, the first question the Court must address is whether there is express

authorization in a federal statute or treaty giving the Tribe authority over the conduct of

nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. 

A. An Express Treaty or Statute

In Strate, neither party referred the Court to a “treaty or statute authorizing the Three

Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind Fredericks commenced

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

against A-1 Contractors and Stockert,” and thus, the Court found that, in order for the Tribal

Court to retain jurisdiction, the case needed to fall into one of the Montana exceptions. Id.

at 1414. 

The Jensen Defendants argue that the Navajo Nation continues to enjoy treaty-based

ownership rights to all the land traversed by Plaintiff in the course of their on-reservation

commercial touring activities, including U.S. Highway 160. However, in this case, as in

Strate, Defendants fail to point to a treaty or statute authorizing the Navajo Nation to

entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind that the Jensen Defendants commenced

against Plaintiffs. Accordingly, as in Strate, in order to prevail, Defendants must show that

Defendants’ tribal-court action against nonmembers qualifies under one of Montana’s two

exceptions. 

B. Montana’s First Exception

The first Montana exception covers “activities of nonmembers who enter consensual

relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts leases, or

other arrangements.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 456. 

In Strate, A-1 Contractors was engaged in subcontract work on the Fort Berthold

Reservation, and therefore had a “consensual relationship with the Tribes.” Id. at 457.

However, Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract and the “Tribes were strangers to the

accident.” Id. at 457. The Strate Court found that the tortious conduct alleged in Fredericks’

complaint did not fit within this exception, reasoning that the dispute was “distinctly nontribal in nature,” arising “between two non-Indians involved in [a] run-of-the-mill highway

accident” and thus, unlike the types of cases where Montana’s first exception had been

applied, the Fredericks-Stockert highway accident did not present a “consensual relationship

of the qualifying kind.” Id. at 457 (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiffs argue that, as in Strate, this “run-of-the mill highway accident” does not

present a consensual relationship of the qualifying kind. In response, Defendants argue that

this case is distinguishable from Strate because Plaintiffs were engaged in a planned tour of

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

the Reservation prior to the accident and Plaintiffs were required to have a permit for such

a tour. Defendants argue that, had Plaintiffs acquired a permit, as they were legally required

to do, they would have been required to consent to the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts.

Defendants further argue that this case is distinguishable from Strate because the accident

in this case occurred between members of the tribe and nonmembers, whereas Fredericks

may have lived on the reservation, but was not a member of the tribe. In response, Plaintiffs

argue that whether or not they were required to get a permit to tour the Navajo reservation

is irrelevant to the issue at hand, or if it is relevant, “Plaintiffs’ failure to apply for or receive

Navajo tourism permits shows their lack of consent to Navajo jurisdiction over their

activities.” (Doc. 119 at 3). 

1. The Relevancy of Tourism Permits

It is undisputed that, on September 20 and September 21, 2011, Plaintiff did not (1)

apply for a tour permit, (2) pay an annual permit fee of $3,000, (3) provide proof of liability

insurance, (4) execute a Tourist Passenger Service Agreement; or (5) follow any other

requirement of the Navajo Nation Tour and Guide Services Act (the “NNTGSA”), 5 N.N.C.

§ 2501, et. seq. or its associated regulations. (Doc. 82 at ¶ 33). 

Defendants argue that, if Plaintiffs had acquired a permit, as they were required to

under Navajo law, Plaintiffs would have been required to consent to the jurisdiction of the

Navajo Courts. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs should not benefit from their failure

to comply with Navajo law. 

The Navajo Nation Tour Guide and Services Act provides that “No person, firm,

association or corporation shall, either directly or indirectly, furnish, provide or conduct

passenger transportation for hire, for the purposes of touring, visiting, sightseeing or like

activities within the Navajo Nation, unless such person, firm, association or corporation shall

first obtain a permit from the Division of Economic Development of the Navajo Nation to

perform such activities within the Navajo Nation.” NNTGSA, 5 N.N.C. § 2501A at Doc.

104, Exhibit 1. When obtaining a permit, each Tour Company is required to execute a

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

contractual agreement, which includes the following language: “Permittee consents to the

jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation Courts relating to the activities under this Agreement on

lands within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.” Doc. 105, Exhibit 3-1. 

There is no question that the Navajo Nation has the right to regulate tourism on the

reservation. “Indian tribes possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to

exclude.” Water Wheel Camp Recreational Aria, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.

2011) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)). This includes

the “power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation.”

New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 333 (internal citations omitted); Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 810 (“a

tribe’s power to exclude exists independently of its general jurisdictional authority.”) (internal

citation omitted). “This power to exclude non-Indians from tribal land necessarily includes

the lesser authority to set conditions on their entry through regulations.” Id. at 811.

“Montana limited the tribe’s ability to exercise its power to exclude only as applied to the

regulation of non-Indians on non-Indian land, not on tribal land.” Id. at 810. 

With these principles in mind, there is no question that the Navajo Nation can place

conditions on nonmembers touring the Navajo Nation. These conditions necessarily include

requiring any tourism company to obtain a license, enter into a Passenger Service Agreement,

and to abide by the Nation’s laws regulating tourism. If nonmembers do not agree to the

conditions set by the Nation, the Nation may exclude those members. 

The Navajo Nation Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs’ touring activities within the

Navajo Nation Reservation constituted tour business activities within the meaning of the

NNTGSA. The Court finds no clear error in the tribal court’s finding that petitioners were

engaged in tour business activities within the meaning of the NNTGSA. See FMC v.

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990) (factual findings in a tribal

court’s decision regarding tribal jurisdiction is reviewed for clear error); Sanders v. Robinson,

864 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988) (The tribal court’s “interpretation of tribal law is binding”

on reviewing courts). 

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 10 -

Plaintiffs argue that their evasion of the Nation’s laws regulating tourism “shows their

lack of consent to Navajo jurisdiction over their activities.” The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs

cannot claim that, by ignoring the Nation’s laws, they have not consented to the Nation’s

jurisdiction. The Court agrees with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s holding that “no

person or entity may deny the Navajo Nation’s regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction on the

basis of a violation of [the Nation’s] laws.” See Doc. 83-1 at 13. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs were required to comply with the NNTGSA, the Court

will examine whether, if Plaintiffs had complied with the Nation’s laws, they would have been

required to “consent” to the tribal court’s jurisdiction such that this case falls within

Montana’s first exception. 

a. Whether Compliance with the Nation’s Tourism Laws

would be Consent within Montana’s First Exception.

In Strate, there was no question A-1 Contractors had a consensual relationship with the

Tribes based on the subcontract work it was engaged in on the Fort Berthold Reservation and

therefore had a “consensual relationship with the Tribes.” Id. at 457. Nonetheless, the Strate

Court found that the relevant issue was whether consent could be implied on behalf of the

nonmember based on the nature of that consensual relationship. In this case, “Navajo Nation

Law provides for the regulation of tour operations within the jurisdictional limits of the

Navajo Nation” and, if Plaintiffs had followed the laws regulating tourism activities, they

would have been required to sign a contract with the Navajo Nation that stated “Permittee

consents to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation Courts relating to the activities under this

Agreement on lands within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.” See Doc. 104, Exhibit 2;

Doc. 105, Exhibit 3. 

Accordingly, the Court must determine whether a consensual relationship of the

qualifying kind would have arisen between Plaintiffs and the Navajo Nation if they had

entered into this contract, as was required by Navajo Nation law. 

If the accident had occurred within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, Plaintiffs

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 11 -

would have consented to tribal court jurisdiction. However, as discussed above, “[s]o long

as the stretch is maintained as part of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a

landowners’s right to occupy and exclude.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 456. Accordingly, the

language in the Agreement relating to “lands within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation,”

cannot encompass the stretch of land maintained as part of the State’s highway because the

Nation’s right to occupy and exclude does not extend to that stretch of land. Accordingly,

even if Plaintiffs had followed the Nation’s laws and entered into the Agreement regulating

touring services, the contents of that Agreement do not give rise to an implication of consent

by Plaintiffs to the tribal court exercising jurisdiction over them for the automobile accident

that occurred on the State’s Highway. Therefore, the highway accident at issue in this case

does not fall within a consensual relationship as required by Montana’s first exception. 

C. Montana’s Second Exception

Montana’s second exception applies if the conduct at issue “threatens or has some

direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the

tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. In analyzing Montana’s second exception, the Strate Court

reasoned that:

Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public

highway running through a reservation endanger all in the

vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But

if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the exception

would severely shrink the rule. 

Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58. Plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable from Strate

because “commercial touring on the Navajo Reservation unconstrained by tribal regulatory

authority ‘menaces’ the political integrity and the health and welfare of the tribe, and

comprises a serous ‘intrusion on tribal relations [and] self-government.” (Doc. 101 at 17

(internal citation omitted)). While the Court has recognized that the Navajo Nation’s power

to exclude certainly gives the Nation the ability to regulate touring activity within the

Reservation and protect tribal self-governance through those means, the Court is unable to

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 12 -

ascertain a difference between an individual (or a subcontractor) driving carelessly on a public

highway running through a reservation and a touring company driving carelessly on a public

highway running through a reservation. There is no question that, no matter who is driving,

such activity “endanger[s] all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize[s] the safety of tribal

members.” 520 U.S. at 458. However, the Court is bound by the Strate Court’s finding that

“if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the

rule.” 520 U.S. at 458. Accordingly, this case does not fall within Montana’s second

exception.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Navajo Nation tribal court does not

have jurisdiction over nonmember Plaintiffs relating to the highway accident that occurred

on September 21, 2004. 

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Stipulations regarding Documents for Purposes of

Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 81) are granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

99) is granted. 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter a declaratory judgment that the Kayenta District

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Jensen Defendants’ claims relating to the September 21,

2004 state highway accident. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Jensen Defendants are permanently enjoined

from proceeding with the claims relating to the September 21, 2004 state highway accident

in Kayenta District Court.

////

///

//

/

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 13 -

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Jensen Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 101) is denied.

The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 

DATED this 9th day of August, 2012.

Case 3:10-cv-08197-JAT Document 129 Filed 08/09/12 Page 13 of 13