Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02152/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James E. Skinner, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-2152-PHX-SMM (LOA)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Sign

Medical Authorization. (Doc. 66) Plaintiff opposes the motion as untimely. (Doc. 68) In their

Reply, Defendants argue that the request that Plaintiff sign the medical authorization for the

“purpose of accessing his medical records from the Arizona Department of Corrections

(‘ADC’)” is not a discovery request. (Doc. 69 at 1) Rather, Defendants “are simply seeking a

signed medical authorization to obtain Plaintiff’s medical records because Plaintiff has put his

health at issue in this case.” (Id. at 1-2) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny

Defendants’ Motion to Compel.

Defendants’ efforts to characterize their request for access to Plaintiff’s medical

records as something other than a discovery request is, at best, disingenuous and, at worst, an

intentional misrepresentation to the court. As Defendants state in their motion, Plaintiff’s

Complaint alleges that he was housed in a filthy cell and that Defendants continually denied his

requests for cleaning supplies. Plaintiff further argues that the plexiglass shield covering the

front of his cell prevented air from circulating and adversely impacted the temperature in his

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cell. Plaintiff also alleges he was subjected to extreme temperatures for eight months without

being provided adequate clothing. As a result of these conditions, Plaintiff alleges he suffered

blinding headaches and nausea. (Doc. 1) Defendants contend that, when preparing Defendants’

dispositive motion, counsel for Defendants “determined it was necessary to review Plaintiff’s

medical records.” (Doc. 66 at 2) 

Accordingly, defense counsel sent Plaintiff a letter on October 6, 2010, requesting

that Plaintiff provide a medical authorization to release his ADC medical records. Counsel

indicates that Plaintiff, through his counselor CO III Brown, advised counsel he would not sign

the authorization. Defendants filed the pending motion to compel, arguing that because Plaintiff

has placed his medical condition at issue, he cannot “refuse discovery on that issue.” (Id.) In

their own motion to compel, Defendants refer to Plaintiff’s medical records, which Defendants

seek to access by way of a medical authorization executed by Plaintiff, as “discovery.” (Id. at

2) (“Plaintiff has placed his health at issue and cannot, therefore, refuse discovery on that

issue.”) (emphasis added). Defendants’ request for Plaintiff’s medical records via a medical

authorization is properly characterized as discovery. 

In an effort to avoid the discovery deadlines, Defendants’ Reply asserts that they are

not seeking discovery, but are merely seeking an order directing Plaintiff to sign a medical

authorization. (Doc. 69) As Defendants noted in their Motion to Compel, the medical records

are discovery. The fact that Plaintiff must sign a medical authorization to permit the Arizona

Department of Corrections to release those records does not change the underlying character

of the medical records themselves. Besides, Defendants have not provided the Court with any

authority, much less controlling or persuasive authority, that a plaintiff, alleging personal injury

and damages in a civil case, is required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sign a

medical authorization for the release of his medical records. For example, such records may be

obtained by a timely request for subpoena duces tecum and court order prior to the expiration

of discovery. Kent v. Cummings, 2010 WL 2643538 (D.Ariz. 2010); Clark v. Vega Wholesale,

Inc., 181 F.R.D. 470, 472 (D.Nev. 1998) (concluding that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to

sign a medical release pursuant to Rule 34, Fed.R.Civ.P., to obtain copies of her medical records

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1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) requires that, unless exempted by Rule

26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a plaintiff must disclose witnesses who

may possess discoverable information and the substance of that information, documents, and tangible

items which may be used to support the claims made, and a computation of damages. Rule

26(a)(1)(B)(iv), however, exempts a prisoner plaintiff from initial disclosures in “an action brought

without an attorney by a person in the custody of the United States, a state, or a state subdivision . . .

.” Rule 26(a)(1)(B) (iv), Fed.R.Civ.P.

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in the possession of her physician). Of course, a plaintiff may voluntarily sign a medical

authorization if he so agrees. A plaintiff , however, must produce copies of relevant medical

records in his possession pursuant to Rules 26(a)(1)(A)1

 and if requested by 34, Fed.R.Civ.P.

 As Plaintiff noted in his response, Defendants’ October 6, 2010 letter to Plaintiff

requesting that he sign the medical authorization was served several months after the June 21,

2010 discovery deadline. (Doc. 26) Likewise, the Motion to Compel was filed over a month

after the already-extended September 3, 2010 deadline for bringing discovery disputes to the

Court’s attention. (Doc. 48) Defendant’s discovery request and motion to compel are untimely.

Defendants have not even attempted to explain why their discovery request and motion to

compel are untimely or why an extension of the applicable deadlines is warranted. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) (stating that the court may, for good cause shown, extend a deadline “on

motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”).

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that the Rule 16 deadlines are “to be taken

seriously.” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994)

Additionally, Defendants have not certified “that after personal consultation and

sincere efforts to do so,” they were unable to resolve this discovery issue with Plaintiff absent

court intervention as mandated by Rule 37(d)(1)(B), Fed.R.Civ.P., and LRCiv 7.2(j). The

discovery deadline expired on June 21, 2010, doc. 26, and the discovery motion deadline was

extended to September 3, 2010. (Doc. 48) Because Defendants’ October 14, 2010 Motion is

untimely and Defendants have not conferred with Plaintiff to resolve this matter as required by

Rule 37(d)(1)(B), Fed.R.Civ.P., and LRCiv 7.2(j), the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to

Compel. The Court, however, urges that parties to mutually resolve this issue on their own as

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it may serve both sides’ interests in the long run for Plaintiff to voluntarily disclose his relevant

medical records prior to trial. Because Plaintiff has put his health at issue, Plaintiff and

Defendants will need access to Plaintiff’s medical records to pursue or defend this action. 

In view of the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel, doc. 66, is DENIED. 

Dated this 5th day of November, 2010.

 

 

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