Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00763/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00763-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMAL AUSTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00763-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 8, 13, 14

Defendants County of Alameda, Glenn Tafolla, and Frank Gonzalez move to dismiss pro 

se Plaintiff Jamal Austin’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For 

the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 19, 2015. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complt.”). Plaintiff 

alleges two causes of action: 1) “Assault/Battery (Gross Negligence),” which the Court construes 

as a § 1983 excessive force claim; and 2) “Professional Medical Malpractice In RE: Injured 

Inmate Medical Care,” which the Court construes as a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim. The 

following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s allegations and taken as true for purposes of this motion 

to dismiss.

A. Excessive Force Allegations

In May 2013, Plaintiff was a prisoner “being held within the complete custody, control, 

and care of the Alameda Co. Sheriff Dept.” Complt. at 3:27-4:1. Defendants Tafolla and 

Gonzalez were “Alameda Co. Sheriff Deputies.” Id. at 5:28-6:1. After appearing pro se for a 

hearing, Plaintiff was waiting to receive copies of court documents in the “Inmate Holding Tank” 

of Wiley Manuel Courthouse in Oakland. Id. at 4:9-10, 16-17, 28. “[U]pon . . . hearing the sound 

of the buzzer, which indicates to inmates, that the cell-door of the Inmate Holding Tank is about to 

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open, . . . Plaintiff again rose to move towards the cell-door.” Id. at 4:26-5:1. “Before and 

[w]ithout asking Plaintiff any questions or making any [s]tatements, Defendant Tafolla suddenly 

yanked Plaintiff out of the Dept. 115 Inmate Holding Tank” and “violently threw Plaintiff to 

pavement in [the] Hallway Area.” Id. at 5:2-12. Defendants Tafolla and Gonzalez then “engaged 

in savage beating” that “cause[d] Plaintiff injury,” “slamming Plaintiff’s head, tasing, and so 

repetitiously punching Plaintiff until he lay soaked in a pool of his own blood.” Id. at 6:2-7, 7:3-4. 

Throughout the incident, “Plaintiff was peaceful” and “at no time posed any immediate, imminent, 

or otherwise threat to anyone.” Id. at 6:17, 26-27.

As a result of Defendants’ excessive force, Plaintiff suffered injury to “his health, strength, 

mobility, activity, and . . . his nervous system and person, all of which injuries caused, and since 

then continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, emotional, and nervous pain/suffering.” 

Id. at 9:5-10. Furthermore, “Plaintiff is informed and believes . . . that these injuries will or have 

resulted in permanent disability to him.” Id. at 9:11-14.

B. Deliberate Indifference Allegations

Santa Rita County Jail employs physicians, dentists, and other medical professionals to 

provide medical care to inmates. Id. at 9:21-23. After the excessive force incident described 

above, Plaintiff sought treatment from medical professionals at Santa Rita County Jail “for 

Plaintiff’s possible [broken jaw] and possible [broken nose] fracture.” Id. at 10:8-9 (brackets in 

original). On May 8, 2013, a medical professional took x-rays of Plaintiff, but the results of those 

x-rays were not disclosed to him. Id. at 10:10-11. On June 11, 2013, Plaintiff had a follow-up 

appointment with a dentist at Santa Rita County Jail “for a previous dental Surgery.” Id. at 10:14-

16. At that appointment, the dentist took a second set of x-rays, which “show[ed] Plaintiff’[s] 

broken jaw fracture.” Id. at 10:21-26. Although Plaintiff’s “jaw [eventually] healed, it apparently 

was not healing correctly, and later would either require Plaintiff’s jaw to be re-broken, or require 

jaw therapy.” Id. at 12:13-16. 

In April 2014, “after subpoenas of his medical records for another purpose,” Plaintiff 

discovered that Santa Rita County Jail’s medical care providers had “erroneously claimed [that] 

Plaintiff did not suffer a Broken Jaw Fracture” based on the initial set of x-rays taken in May 

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2013. Because Plaintiff’s broken jaw was not diagnosed until the follow-up dentist appointment, 

“Plaintiff went for about one month before he was placed on a special diet [and] given other 

appropriate care for a broken[ ] jaw,” and in the interim suffered pain and “the detriment of not 

even knowing his jaw had been broken.” Id. at 13:10-15. Plaintiff believes that the May 2013 xrays and medical reports were “concocted[] to hide wrongdoers from liability and being held 

responsible for breaking Plaintiff’s jaw” and bases that belief on the following:

Plaintiff ma[de] known by complaining to the Judge, Yolanda 

Northridge, and others, that following the May 07, 2013, Use of 

Force, no one told Plaintiff his jaw was broken, and how thereupon, 

J. Northridge began denying Plaintiff’s jaw being broken, and 

subsequently, J. Northridge electing to “recuse” herself after 

Plaintiff set forth a motion to ask J. Northridge to declare her ability 

to be fair/impartial. And, moreover, after the revelation, how even 

the same Dentist who diagnosed Plaintiff’s broken-jaw fracture, 

evidently started to deny Plaintiff had a broken-jaw. Moreover, and 

because, it does not appear likely to have been “accidental” that June 

11, 2013 Xrays could so positively show two sets of Plaintiff’s 

broken-jaw, but a month earlier, on May 08, 2013, in an entirely 

separate (medical) department, such clear visuals would be totally 

missed by the person responsible for performing the Xrays, and 

therefore it appears the person responsible for documenting Plaintiff 

did not have a broken jaw, presents a question of fact for a jury . . . 

to adduce evidence or some reasonable explanation other than badfaith.

Id. at 13:25-14:24.

C. Procedural Background

Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on March 20, 2015. Dkt. No. 8 (“Mot.”). 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a document titled “Advance Request for Leave to Amend 

Complaint/Other Relief,” Dkt. No. 13, which the Court construes as a motion for leave to file an 

amended complaint, and a motion to appoint counsel, Dkt. No. 14. Both of Plaintiff’s motions are 

also pending before the Court. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard 

requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must provide 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a 

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and construes all factual inferences in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th 

Cir. 2008). But the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Excessive Force Claim

“[T]he Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations for considering 

claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court recently clarified that a pretrial detainee “must show 

only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable” in 

order to state a claim for excessive force under § 1983. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __ S. Ct. __,

2015 WL 2473447, at *5 (June 22, 2015).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is unsupported by sufficient facts 

and fails to state a claim because 1) “claims asserted directly under the Fourth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments are untenable” and 2) as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff may not assert a 

§ 1983 claim on the basis of Eighth Amendment violations. Because the Court construes 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action as a § 1983 claim, Defendants’ first argument is moot. And while 

the Court agrees that the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not support a § 1983 claim based on 

violations of the Eighth Amendment, Defendants do not make any argument to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim based on Fourth Amendment violations. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

allegations that Defendants Tafolla and Martinez, without any justification or reason, “violently 

threw” Plaintiff to the ground and “engaged in savage beating” that left Plaintiff lying “soaked in a 

pool of his own blood” are sufficient to state a § 1983 claim because they describe objectively 

unreasonable uses of force. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s first cause 

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of action. 

C. Deliberate Indifference Claim

A pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical need derives from the 

substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 

F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003). “Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious 

medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). But “a person is liable for denying a prisoner needed 

medical care only if the person knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and 

safety.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “it is not enough that 

the person merely be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists”—rather, the individual “must also draw that inference.” Id. at 1188. 

“If a person should have been aware of the risk, but was not,” then there is no basis for a deliberate 

indifference claim, “no matter how severe the risk.” Id.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for 

deliberate indifference to medical need. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants disregarded a 

substantial risk that Plaintiff’s jaw was broken following the initial set of x-rays in May 2013. 

Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that the broken jaw was not diagnosed until the second set of xrays were taken in June 2013. Following that diagnosis, Plaintiff was promptly placed on a 

special diet and given other appropriate medical care. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action.

D. Monell Claims

Section 1983 suits against local governments alleging constitutional rights violations by 

government officials cannot rely solely on respondeat superior liability. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 

486 F.3d at 581; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, 

plaintiffs must establish that “the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice 

that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” Whitaker, 486 F.3d 

at 581 (citations omitted). In order to state a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff 

must therefore plead four elements: 1) the plaintiff possesses a constitutional right of which he or 

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she was deprived; 2) the municipality had a policy, custom, or practice; 3) the policy, custom, or 

practice amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and 4) the policy, 

custom, or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. 

Dist. #40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

challenge, Monell claims “must not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must 

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012).

Plaintiff appears to assert both excessive force and deliberate indifference claims against 

Defendant County of Alameda. However, Plaintiff does not plead specific facts that support the 

existence of a custom, policy, or practice of Defendant County of Alameda that exhibits deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed 

to state § 1983 Monell claims against Defendant County of Alameda and accordingly grants 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss such claims.1

E. State Law Claims

Defendants also move to dismiss any state law claims asserted by Plaintiff. Because the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not asserted any claims under state law, the Court denies Defendants’ 

motion as to any such claims as moot.2

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint as to the second cause of action for deliberate indifference 

to medical need and the Monell claims. The Court otherwise DENIES Defendants’ motion. In 

light of the resolution of Defendants’ motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file an amended complaint as moot. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days of 

 

1 Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant County of Alameda, the 

Court does not address Defendants’ argument regarding punitive damages. However, in the event 

that Plaintiff attempts to amend his Monell claims, the Court cautions Plaintiff that punitive 

damages are not recoverable under § 1983 against municipalities as a matter of law. See City of 

Newport v. Facts Concert, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).

2 As a result, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is also denied as moot. See Dkt. No. 8-1.

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the date of this Order.

The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel as premature. The Court 

strongly encourages Plaintiff to schedule an appointment with the pro se Legal Help Center, either 

by calling 415-782-8982 or by signing up in the appointment book located on the table outside the 

door of the Legal Help Center at the United States Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th 

Floor, Room 2796, in San Francisco, California. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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