Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04214/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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 1 When considering a Motion to Dismiss, this Court must “accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the

following facts are taken entirely from the allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Dkt. 1.) 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Orlando Medina, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-4214-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Chas Roberts Air Conditioning Inc.’s

(“Roberts”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ second cause of action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. 4.) Plaintiffs

Orlando Medina, Mahelio Rico, Joseph Muniz, and Jose Rodriguez (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) have filed a response to Roberts’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 6.) In turn, Roberts

has filed a reply in support of its motion. (Dkt. 8.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Roberts is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor

Standards Act (the “FLSA”). (Dkt. 1, ¶4.) Defendant Does 1-10 are management personnel

of Roberts who were partly responsible for Roberts’ decision to discharge Plaintiffs. (Id.,

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¶5.) Plaintiffs Medina and Rico previously filed an action alleging that Roberts has been

underpaying its current and former employees in violation of the FLSA and an Arizona state

statute (the “Class Action”). (Id., ¶6; see Rico, et al. v. Chas Roberts, et al., U.S.D.C. Ariz.

Case No. 05-1371-PHX-EHC.) 

On December 1, 2005, Defendants first learned that Medina and Rico were actively

participating in the Class Action and had allegedly discovered violations of the FLSA and

state payment laws. (Id., ¶7.) On December 2, 2005, foreman Rick Lange responded by

announcing that Plaintiffs would not be permitted to work under him. (Id.) Manager Charles

Brooks echoed Lange’s sentiments. (Id.)

Plaintiffs made up a work crew based out of Roberts’ Queen Creek yard. (Id., ¶8.)

On December 5, 2005, after Plaintiffs reported for work in Queen Creek, Defendants

reassigned them to Roberts’ Litchfield yard. Plaintiffs drove to the Litchfield yard, stopping

only once to get gas. Due to several freeway accidents, the trip took two hours. (Id., ¶9.)

When they arrived at the Litchfield yard, management advised Plaintiffs that they

would be permitted to work only if they reported working no more than eight hours and

agreed to be paid one hour for drive time each way. (Id., ¶10.) Plaintiffs objected to these

demands and reminded management they were to be paid for all time worked, including drive

time between work locations. Defendants refused to allow Plaintiffs to work and sent them

back to the Queen Creek yard, where they were sent home early. (Id., ¶11.) 

On December 6, 2005, Defendants suspended Plaintiffs on the grounds that it took

three hours for them to get from the Queen Creek yard to the Litchfield yard on December

5, 2005. (Id., ¶12.) Plaintiffs were not provided an opportunity to explain that the trip had

not in fact taken three hours or that the delay resulted from freeway accidents. (Id., ¶13.)

The State Police have confirmed that, on December 5, 2005, four accidents were reported on

the freeway Plaintiffs used to get to the Litchfield yard. (Id., ¶14.)

On December 9, 2005, Defendants discharged Plaintiffs without offering any

explanation except that their services were no longer needed. (Id., ¶15.) There was no

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shortage of work, as other persons were subsequently hired to do the work Plaintiffs could

have done. (Id., ¶16.)

Roberts claims that Plaintiffs were fired because they stole materials. (Id., ¶17.)

Plaintiffs deny stealing materials. (Id., ¶18.) Based on the timing of their discharge, the

shifting explanations for their discharge, Defendants’ failure to investigate the allegations

against them, and the falsity of such allegations, Plaintiffs claim they were discharged in

retaliation for engaging in activities protected by the FLSA and state law. (Id., ¶19.)

Relying on 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), Plaintiffs’ first count alleges that Defendants

breached the FLSA by discharging them in retaliation for complaining to both the court and

Defendants that they were violating the FLSA. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶21-25, Count I). In Count two,

Plaintiffs Medina and Rico allege that Defendants breached Arizona’s Employment

Protection Act (the “EPA”), Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii), by discharging them in

retaliation for filing the Class Action and responding to discovery requests that Defendants

were violating Arizona payment laws. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a

dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). A complaint may

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to

relief.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). If as a matter of law it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, under Rule

12(b)(6) a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish

legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. On

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must presume all factual allegations

of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party. Usher, 828 F.2d at 561. A court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the

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 2 A.R.S. 23-353 provides that an employee “shall be paid wages due him within

three working days or the end of the next regular pay period, whichever is sooner,” when

he is discharged from the service of an employer, and shall be paid in the usual manner

all wages due him no later than the regular payday for the pay period during which the

termination occurred, when he quits the service of an employer. A.R.S. 23-353(A)-(B).

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form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged. McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs Rico and Medina Have Alleged A Valid Claim Under Arizona’s EPA

Relying on Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2003), Roberts argues that Medina’s and Rico’s second cause of action is not cognizable

under Arizona’s EPA because A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) “does not give rise to a retaliation

claim premised upon an employee’s reporting of a violation of a federal statute,” such as the

FLSA. (Dkt. 8 at 1.) Plaintiffs Medina and Rico do not dispute the holding of Galati, but

contend count two is distinguishable because it is premised upon their reporting a violation

of A.R.S. §23-353,2

 i.e., that Roberts failed to pay current and former employees for all hours

worked. (Dkt. 6 at 3.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs Medina and Rico.

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii), an employee has a wrongful termination claim

against the employer if the employer terminates the employment relationship of an employee

in retaliation for:

The disclosure by the employee . . . that [he] has information or

a reasonable belief that the employer . . . has violated . . . the

statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of

the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a

managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to

investigate the information provided by the employee and to

take action to prevent further violations of the . . . statutes of this

state . . . . 

A.R.S.§ 23-1501(3)(c)(ii). In their Class Action complaint, Plaintiffs Medina and Rico

alleged that “former Roberts’ field employees” were paid for fewer hours than they actually

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worked, and thus were not paid in full when they left their jobs, a violation of A.R.S. §23-

353. See Rico, et al. v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., CV 05-1371-PHX-EHC, Dkt.

1, Ex. A at ¶¶1,7,20,22,26; at page 6, ¶E. Roberts’ reliance on Taylor v. Graham County

Chamber of Commerce, 33 P.3d 518, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (dkt. 8 at 2), is inapposite.

Taylor only addresses claims under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b); it does not refer to claims

brought under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Medina and Rico have

stated a cognizable state law retaliation claim stemming from the filing of their Class Action

complaint that Roberts violated an Arizona wage statute, A.R.S. §23-353.

II. The FLSA Does Not Preempt Plaintiffs’ State Law Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Roberts argues that, even if cognizable, Medina’s and Rico’s state law claim for

retaliatory discharge is preempted because the FLSA provides an adequate statutory remedy,

and thus imposition of Arizona’s state law remedy would frustrate the purpose of the FLSA.

(Dkt. 4 at 6-10.) Rico and Medina argue that the FLSA contains no express preemption

language, that the Ninth Circuit has held “the FLSA’s savings clause is proof that Congress

did not intend to occupy the field,” and that remedies for state law retaliatory discharge

claims do not conflict with the FLSA because compliance with both state laws and the FLSA

is not impossible. (Dkt. 6 at 1-2,6.) 

Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the

Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. However, consideration of issues arising under

the Supremacy Clause “‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the

states [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest

purpose of Congress.’” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citation

omitted). Moreover, States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the

employment relationship to protect resident workers. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356

(1976). Thus, in addressing the preemption question, this Court “‘start[s] with the

assumption that the historic powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal

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legislation] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Moreover, “because the States are independent sovereigns

in our federal system,” it is “presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law

causes of action.” See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).

In the Ninth Circuit, preemption analysis is based “on the Supreme Court’s three

categories: (1) express preemption – ‘where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which

its enactments preempt state law’; (2) field preemption – ‘where state law attempts to

regulate conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to occupy’; and

(3) conflict preemption – ‘where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal

requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution

of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Williamson v. General Dynamics Corp.,

208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

In the present case, both parties agree that no statutory language expressly preempts

Rico’s and Medina’s state law retaliatory discharge claim. In addition, Roberts concedes that

the FLSA does not preempt the entire field. (Dkt. 4 at 9.) The Court agrees. See

Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151 (“the FLSA’s ‘savings clause’ is evidence that Congress did

not intend to preempt the entire field”). Given that Roberts does not argue express or field

preemption, the only way Plaintiffs’ second claim can be found preempted is by conflict

preemption. Id.

Roberts does not argue conflict preemption, but instead claims that the FLSA provides

plaintiffs an adequate statutory remedy, and thus Rico’s and Medina’s state retaliatory

discharge claim is barred. (Dkt. 4 at 6-7.) Plaintiffs Medina and Rico respond that the FLSA

does not preempt a state law claim for retaliatory discharge based on public policy when the

basis for such claim is the employee’s report of a state law violation. (Dkt. 6 at 4-8.)

Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed this issue, the Court finds

that the FLSA does not preempt Rico’s and Medina’s state law retaliatory discharge claim.

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First, in support of its argument that the FLSA provides the Plaintiffs with an adequate

statutory remedy and thus their state law retaliatory discharge claim is preempted, Roberts

relies on Prewitt v. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 560 (W.D. Mo. 1990), Tate v.

Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 1983 WL 549 (E.D. Wis. 1983), and Gusdonovich v.

Business Information Co., 705 F.Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1985). (Dkt. 4 at 6-8.) In all three

cases, however, the plaintiffs alleged that their state law claims for wrongful discharge were

based on violations of public policy “underlying the FLSA.” See Prewitt, 747 F.Supp. at

565; Tate, 1983 WL 549, at *4; Gusdonovich, 705 F.Supp. at 263. As a result, these three

courts agreed that the statutory remedy contemplated by the FLSA completely replaced the

common law remedy because the FLSA contained its own exhaustive enforcement remedies

for a violation of the FLSA. See Prewitt, 747 F.Supp. at 565; Tate, 1983 WL 549, at *4;

Gusdonovich, 705 F.Supp. at 266.

Prewitt, Tate, and Gusdonovich are distinguishable from the instant case, because the

plaintiffs at issue there based wrongful discharge claims on the policy underlying the FLSA.

Here, by contrast, Rico and Medina base their state retaliatory discharge claim on the public

policy underlying Arizona’s wage law that requires employers to properly count the number

of hours employees work and pay them the resulting sum by the time of their last regular

paycheck. See A.R.S. §23-353. Thus, unlike the cases cited by Roberts, no aspect of Rico’s

and Medina’s claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy relies on the FLSA.

Moreover, Roberts’ argument that Medina’s and Rico’s retaliatory discharge claim is limited

to the exclusive remedy provided by the FLSA asserts “field preemption,” and conflicts with

Williamson’s holding (and its concession) that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire

field (see dkt. 4 at 9). See Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151 (under “field preemption,” the

common law claim is preempted because the statute provides exclusive remedies). 

Second, in support of its argument that the imposition of a state law remedy would

frustrate the purpose of the FLSA, Roberts relies on Spieth v. Adasen Distributing, Inc., 1989

WL 61187 (D. Ariz. 1989). (Dkt. 4 at 8-10.) In Spieth, the Court held that “the FLSA

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preempts any recovery for a claim of wrongful discharge as the FLSA remedies are allencompassing.” (Id. at *2.) In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Williamson, however,

Spieth is no longer good law on this particular point. In Williamson, the Ninth Circuit held

that the FLSA did not preempt fraud claims related to dissuading participation in an FLSA

complaint. In permitting the plaintiff’s fraud claims to go forward, the Williamson Court

rejected the district court’s conclusion that the “FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims that

duplicate or are the equivalent of rights protected by the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at

1154; see also Barnett v. Washington Mutual Bank, 2004 WL 2011462, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2004)

(“the assumption that the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims duplicated by or

equivalent of rights covered by the FLSA is incorrect”).

Spieth is also distinguishable because, in support of its conclusion that “the FLSA

preempts any recovery for a claim of wrongful discharge” (id.), Spieth relied on two district

court cases, Wanderlingh v. May Dept. Stores Co., 1984 WL 3293 (D. Colo. 1984), and Tate,

1983 WL 549, neither of which comports with Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. In both

Wanderlingh and Tate, the courts held that the FLSA provided the exclusive remedy for the

plaintiffs’ state law claims of wrongful discharge because the violation underlying each claim

was also covered by the FLSA. Here, as stated above, Rico and Medina base their state

retaliatory discharge claim on the public policy underlying Arizona’s law, which requires

employers to properly count the number of hours employees work and pay them the resulting

sum by the time of their last regular paycheck. See A.R.S. §23-353. 

Roberts also contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Williamson implicitly

recognizes that the FLSA savings clause does not permit a wrongful discharge claim based

on state law. (Dkt. 4 at 11.) According to Roberts, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Williamson “effectively embraced” Spieth’s interpretation of the FLSA savings clause

because “the plaintiffs’ state law [fraud] claims were not preempted based on the fact that the

employer’s alleged conduct ‘would not be actionable under the [FLSA’s] anti-retaliation

provision.” (Id.) Roberts’ interpretation of Williamson, however, is incorrect. As

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previously discussed, the Ninth Circuit clearly rejected the district court’s assumption that

the “FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims that duplicate or are the equivalent of rights

protected by the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154; see also Barnett, 2004 WL at *6

(“the assumption that the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims duplicated by or

equivalent of rights covered by the FLSA is incorrect”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit

specifically found in Williamson that “the principal purpose of the FLSA is to protect all

covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” 208 F.3d at 1150

(quotation and citations omitted). If the goal of the FLSA is generally to protect workers and

their right to minimum wages and overtime, no threat to the accomplishment of that goal is

posed by Medina’s and Rico’s state law claim for retaliatory discharge based on Arizona’s

requirement that an employer properly count the number of hours employees work and pay

them the resulting sum by the time of their last regular paycheck. 

For the reasons set forth above, Roberts has failed to demonstrate that it would be

impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, nor has it

shown that Arizona law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the congressional

objectives of the FLSA. Thus, Roberts has not satisfied its burden of proving that Rico’s and

Medina’s state law claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy is preempted

by the FLSA.

III. Doe Defendants Are Permitted in Federal Court

Roberts argues that the naming of fictitious “Does 1 through 20” in Plaintiff’s

Complaint “is contrary to longstanding practice in this district and elsewhere in the Ninth

Circuit.” (Dkt. 4 at 12-13.) Controlling authority suggests otherwise.

The Ninth Circuit has rejected naming “Doe” defendants in diversity actions, on the

grounds that complete diversity cannot exist if the identity and citizenship of some

defendants (i.e., the “Does”) are unknown. See Fifty Associates v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.

of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1970). The use of “Does” in federal question

cases, however, is permissible if the complaint alleges why the defendant’s real name was

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not then known or ascertainable. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971); Merritt v. Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768

(9th Cir. 1989). Where “Doe” allegations are permissible, the form and content should be

patterned after state law. See Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-83 (9th Cir.

1980). Pursuant to Rule 10(f) of 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen the name of

the defendant is unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant may be designated in the pleadings

or proceeding by any name. When the defendant’s true name is discovered, the pleading or

proceeding may be amended accordingly.”

The present case is a federal question proceeding. Here, Plaintiffs contend “[n]one

of the managers who communicated to Plaintiffs about their firings discussed who made the

firing decision,” and “[t]hus it was not feasible to include in the complaint the names of the

individual defendants and they were named as Does instead.” (Dkt. 6 at 9.) Applying Rule

10(f), the Court finds that the Does may remain as named defendants until Plaintiffs discover

their true names. See 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, 10(f). 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING Defendant Chas Roberts Air Conditioning,

Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 4.)

DATED this 24th day of July, 2006.

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