Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01553/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01553-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the

Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LOUIS BAKER, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CITY OF TEMPE, ARIZONA, a body

politic; CHUCK SCHOVILLE;

BRANDON BANKS; JASON WOLFE;

JANE DOES and JOHN DOES I-X;

ENTITIES, CORPORATIONS,

PARTNERSHIPS, A-Z, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-1553-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court are two motions for summary judgment: one by Defendant

Chuck Schoville (“Officer Schoville”); another by Defendants City of Tempe (“Tempe”),

Brandon Banks (“Officer Banks”), and Jason Wolfe (“Wolfe”). (Dkt. ## 52, 55.) For the

reasons below, the Court will grant the motions with respect to the § 1983 claims and dismiss

the state law claims without prejudice.1

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Defendants allege the camera was turned off on two occasions—(1) when the

dispatcher informed Officer Schoville that Baker’s license was suspended and (2) when

Baker and Tarvin allegedly told Officer Schoville that they enjoyed rapping—but Baker

disputes that assertion. 

- 2 -

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2006, Louis Baker (“Baker”) and Robert Tarvin (“Tarvin”), both

African-Americans, were in a motor vehicle in Tempe. (Dkt. # 9 at 3.) Meanwhile, Officer

Schoville, Officer Banks, and Wolf (collectively, the “individual defendants”) were riding

together in a Tempe Police Department patrol car. (Dkt. # 55 at 2.) At the time, Officer

Schoville and Officer Banks were Tempe Police officers, while Wolf was Tempe’s Media

Services Producer. (Dkt. # 9 at 2.) Officer Schoville was also host of “StreetBeat,” a cable

television program about law enforcement, aired jointly by the Tempe Police Department and

the Tempe Media Services Division. (Dkt. # 56 at 2.). Officer Banks also served as

StreetBeat’s producer, while Wolf directed, filmed, and edited StreetBeat segments. (Id.) 

The individual defendants observed Baker throw trash out of his car window. (Id.)

Officer Schoville therefore initiated a traffic stop, which Wolf filmed.2

 (Id.) The encounter

proceeded as follows. 

Officer Schoville ordered Baker and Tarvin out of the vehicle to investigate the

criminal offense of littering. (Dkt. ## 9 at 3, 56 at 2.) Officer Schoville then asked Tarvin

to retrieve the trash, and Tarvin complied. (Dkt. # 56 at 3.) Next, Officer Schoville asked

Baker for a driver’s license; however, Baker produced only a state-issued identification card

and did not mention his license was suspended. (Dkt. # 9 at 4; 56 at 3.) Thus, Officer

Schoville contacted a radio dispatcher to do a driver’s license and warrant check. (Dkt. # 56

at 3.) 

While Officer Schoville talked to the dispatcher, Baker began a conversation with

Officer Schoville about a football video game. (Id.) During this time, Tarvin returned with

the trash, and Officer Schoville asked Tarvin if he knew how much he had saved Baker in

ticket costs, to which Tarvin responded “about five hundred.” (Id. at 4.) 

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Defendants contend Baker and Tarvin told Officer Schoville that they liked to rap

“just for fun.” Baker, however, contends he “did not rehearse or suggest the idea of

performing a rap number for the police and Wolf in front of the camera.” (Dkt. # 68 at 4.)

4

 With the video beginning mid-sentence, Officer Schoville stated, “good for driving

on a suspended license, no ah littering ticket if you just do a little rap about, what do you

want to rap about, littering?” (Dkt. # 56 Ex. E at 8).

- 3 -

Officer Schoville then learned the records check revealed Baker’s license was

suspended, and Officer Schoville noted Baker could not drive away without a license. (Id.

at 4.) 

The conversation again returned to football and eventually turned to rap. (Id. at 5.)

The parties dispute how the conversation turned to rap,3

 but at some point Officer Schoville

told Baker he could avoid a ticket if he and Tarvin performed a rap on camera.4

 (Id. at 5–6.)

Baker responded, “Yeah, I’ll rap about littering.” (Id. Ex. E at 8.) Baker and Tarvin rapped:

The dangers of littering you will get a ticket, if you aint with it. You better be

experience because . . . Yo I just got pulled over cuz I threw my trash out the window

when they rolled over the guy behind me pulled me over, when I’m down here in

Maricopa. (Id. at 9.)

Baker and Tarvin laughed after completing the rap. (Id. at 8) 

Next, Officer Schoville brought up football again, commenting that it would be the

“Raiders in the Super Bowl this year,” to which Baker responded, “Oh, you’re right.” (Dkt.

# 56 at 6.) Officer Schoville then responded, “Yeah, you know I’m right. You know why

you say I’m right? Cuz I got a gun and a badge. I’m always right.” (Id. Ex. E at 9.) The

conversation ended without Officer Schoville issuing any citations.

The videotaped encounter was edited to a ninety-second version, which was broadcast

at least twenty times in Tempe on StreetBeat and posted on the internet. (Dkt. # 9 at 6.)

Baker brought this action against Officer Schoville, Officer Banks, and Wolfe individually

and against Tempe. (Dkt. # 9.) Baker alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both

the individual Defendants and Tempe, and Baker also alleged various state law claims

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, Defamation). 

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Substantive

law determines which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger v. Nev.

Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the dispute must be

genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). However, the moving party need not disprove matters on which the

opponent has the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 323. Then, the burden is on the nonmoving

party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 322–23. The nonmoving party “may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

II. Analysis

A. Baker Has Not Shown the Individual Defendants Violated His Constitutional

Rights.

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is a vehicle whereby

plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials. “To state a claim for relief in an

action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must [allege] that they were deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50

(1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There appears to be no dispute that the individual defendants

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Driving without insurance is not a criminal offense, but law enforcement officers

may issue civil citations. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-4135.

- 5 -

acted under color of state law. However, to prevail on summary judgment motions, Baker

must nonetheless identify the constitutional right or rights of which Defendants deprived him.

He has failed to do this with any particularity in his Responses.

Although Baker’s responses generally state that he was “subjected to abusive and

improper police conduct on account of [his] race,” his complaint does not allege an equal

protection violation, nor, in his response does he raise any facts, or cite to any case law, that

raises an issue about whether the Defendants violated the Baker’s right to equal protection.

By failing to make any such argument in his responses, he has waived it. See LRCiv. 7.2(b),

(c), (I); Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that a party’s argument was waived because “[i]nstead of making legal arguments,”

the party simply made a “bold assertion”).

The gist of the argument Baker does make, however, is that his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated because he was unreasonably seized. Baker concedes he littered and

thus Officer Schoville had probable cause to stop and arrest or cite him for the misdemeanor

of littering. Further, upon stopping him, the individual Defendants also discovered that

Baker was driving on a suspended license, and that he was driving without mandatory

insurance. This further gave the Officer Schoville probable cause to arrest or cite the

Plaintiff.5

 Despite the existence of this probable cause, however, Plaintiff argues the

individual Defendants’ stop or “seizure” of him was unreasonable because their purpose in

stopping him was not to cite him, but to obtain television footage for “StreetBeat”– the cable

television program in which each of the Defendants was involved. This motivation for

seizing him, Baker argues, violated his Fourth Amendment rights, despite the fact that the

individual Defendants had probable cause for doing so. He further alleges that the

Defendants’ manipulation of him into providing what they hoped would be entertaining

footage for their television program turned out to be racially insensitive and personally

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

demeaning.

The Court need not decide at this juncture whether the facts, as demonstrated, may

raise issues as to whether Baker has a right to recover under state law. It is sufficient to note

that Plaintiff has raised no claims of constitutional dimension. The case authority

demonstrates that once Officer Schoville had a reasonable basis to stop Baker for the crimes

of littering and driving without a license, he did not violate Baker’s constitutional rights by

doing so even if he had an ulterior motive for the stop. An officer’s “state of mind . . . is

irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. . . . That is to say, [his or her] subjective reason

for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide

probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). “[T]he fact that the

officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide

the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as

the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 813 (1996) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). At a minimum,

Officer Schoville had a legal justification for stopping Baker for the time it took to detain

him, run a search on his driver’s license, determine whether he would issue him any citations,

and issue the citations or make the arrest if he so chose. 

Baker provides no legal authority and makes no argument that the individual

Defendants violated Baker’s constitutional rights when Officer Schoville conditioned his

decision to let Baker go without arrest on Baker’s willingness to perform an anti-littering rap

for StreetBeat. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that such a condition amounts to a § 1983

violation. Further, as stated above, Baker concedes that Officer Schoville had probable cause

to arrest or cite him for multiple misdemeanor violations. If, under such circumstances,

Baker agreed to perform the rap for the StreetBeat program to avoid such citations, the

individual Defendants did not violate Baker’s constitutional rights by filming the

performance when the violation and the performance occurred in a public place. There are

no facts to suggest that, other than directing that the rap be about not littering, Schoville

required that the rap contain any particular content or be performed in any particular fashion.

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Baker further seems to argue, however, that even if the initial stop was appropriate,

once Officer Schoville asked Plaintiff to perform the anti-littering rap as a condition of not

receiving any citations, there was no further justification for detaining him. Again, Baker

offers no authority to support this proposition. As the Court understands his argument, Baker

contends the stop became unreasonable for the duration of time, apparently less than two

minutes, that it took the individual Defendants to film Baker and Tarvin performing the rap.

As an initial matter, it is not clear here how the anti-littering rap that Schoville asked Baker

to perform as a condition of not being cited for littering is unrelated to the original purpose

of the stop. 

Moreover, it is not clear how Officer Schoville could, consistent with § 1983,

condition Plaintiff’s release on his agreement to perform an anti-littering rap for his program,

and yet violate § 1983 by filming the bargained-for performance. Even assuming that

Plaintiff is making an alternative argument that the individual Defendants at some point

exhausted the basis that initially justified their stop, it still does not violate § 1983 for the

officers to ask questions unrelated to the original purpose of the stop so long as they do not

overly-prolong the stop. United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding officers acted constitutionally by extending the length of a traffic stop by several

minutes to ask about drugs and to ask for consent to search the defendant’s vehicle); United

States v. Mendez, 426 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding officers may ask questions

in the course of a traffic stop). Baker does not suggest that it is unconstitutional for Schoville

to request someone to perform a rap for his program, nor does he provide any authority to

suggest that it was unconstitutional for Schoville to condition his release of Baker on Baker’s

willingness to perform for his public access program. Thus, Baker states no § 1983 claim

against the Defendants.

Baker contends that Wolf and Officer Banks are liable for failing to intervene to stop

Officer Schoville from violating Baker’s rights. An officer has an affirmative duty to

intercede to prevent constitutional violations by fellow officers if reasonable officers would

have known the conduct was unconstitutional. See Motley v. Parks, 383 F.3d 1058, 1071

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 A municipality is also liable if it inflicts a constitutional injury through its policy,

custom, or practice, such as by directly violating someone’s rights or by instructing someone

else to do so. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185 (citing Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). The plaintiff must show “the municipality acted with ‘the

state of mind required to prove the underlying violation,’ just as a plaintiff does when he or

she alleges that a natural person has violated his federal rights” under § 1983. Id. at 1187

(quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405). In this case, Baker does not allege Tempe directly

violated his constitutional rights or that Tempe instructed any of the individual Defendants

to do so.

- 8 -

(9th Cir. 2004). Because Baker has not shown Officer Schoville’s actions were

unconstitutional, however, Wolf and Officer Banks’s failure to intervene likewise is not

constitutional. 

B. Baker Has Not Established Municipal Section 1983 Liability Against Tempe.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if “the municipality itself causes the

constitutional violation at issue,” and not under respondeat superior. City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 694-95 (1978)); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). 

There are two routes to municipal liability under § 1983. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185.

Only one, the Canton route, is applicable here.6

 Even if a municipality did not directly

violate someone’s rights or instruct an employee to do so, a municipality still is liable if (1)

a municipal employee violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (2) the municipality has

“customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference,” and (3) “these policies were the

moving force behind the employee’s violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, in the

sense that the [municipality] could have prevented the violation with an appropriate policy.”

Id. at 1193–94.

As discussed earlier, the individual Defendants did not violate Baker’s constitutional

rights. Therefore, the municipality cannot be held liable for a violation of Baker’s

constitutional rights.

C. The Remaining State Claims Are Dismissed Without Prejudice.

Because the Court concludes no federal claims survive summary judgment, the Court

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

dismisses the state claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Invasion of

Privacy, and Defamation. When a district court “dismisses [federal claims] leaving only state

claims for resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss

them without prejudice.” Les Shockley Racing, Inc. V. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504,

509 (9th Cir. 1989). Only in the “unusual case” should federal courts retain jurisdiction over

the state law claims. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.

1994). Baker does not allege any reason this case is uniquely appropriate for federal

jurisdiction, and thus dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Baker’s § 1983 claims fail against both the individual Defendants and Tempe, and the

Court dismisses without prejudice Baker’s claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Defamation.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that both Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. ##

52, 55) are GRANTED IN PART, with respect to all claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims for Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Defamation are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to TERMINATE this

matter.

DATED this 21st day of September, 2009.

Case 2:07-cv-01553-GMS Document 77 Filed 09/21/09 Page 9 of 9