Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08110/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08110-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Travis Donovan Hiland, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-08110-PCT-PGR 

ORDER 

 Hiland is an Arizona state prisoner who was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of 

theft, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1802, and fraud schemes, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-

2310. The state trial court imposed a sentence of nine years of imprisonment for the theft 

conviction, and a consecutive sentence of seven years of probation for the fraud schemes 

conviction. Hiland filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

by a Person in State Custody in which he challenges his conviction and sentence. The 

Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 29) 

recommending that the Petition be denied. Hiland has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 

32). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will over rule Hiland’s objections, will 

adopt in part the R&R, and will deny the Petition. 

A. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two of his Petition, Hiland argues that “he was convicted on the basis 

of a guilty plea that was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 7, 

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15-16.) Hiland does not deny that he has procedurally defaulted Ground Two because he 

failed to raise it in his PCR proceeding, but objects to the R&R’s conclusions that he has 

failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default. (Doc. 32 at 2-6.) 

 Under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), “a procedural default by state 

PCR counsel in failing to raise trial-counsel IAC is excused if there is ‘cause’ for the 

default.” Dietrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013). To demonstrate such 

“cause,” a petitioner must show, among other things, that the trial counsel IAC claim is a 

“substantial” claim. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. Hiland contends that he met this 

requirement. He contends that his trial counsel IAC claim is “substantial” because his 

trial counsel advised him to enter a guilty plea to both theft and fraud schemes even 

though a conviction and sentence on both of these offenses violates the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. (Doc. 32 at 3.) 

 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects “an individual from being subjected to the 

hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Missouri 

v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because 

Hiland was convicted of both of the offenses in a single proceeding, his “right to be free 

from multiple trials for the same offense” is not implicated. Id. Rather, at issue is the 

imposition of cumulative sentences in a single proceeding. 

 “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 

punishment than the legislature intended.” Id. at 366. Thus, “where the offenses are the 

same . . . cumulative sentences are not permitted unless elsewhere specially authorized 

by” the legislature. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980). Where the 

legislature intended “to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does 

not violate the Constitution.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). 

 The Arizona legislature has provided notice of its intent to allow multiple 

punishments for the same act. See A.R.S. § 13-116 (“An act or omission which is made 

punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under 

both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.”) Assuming that theft and 

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fraud schemes are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes,1 imposition of cumulative 

sentences in the same trial is authorized by the legislature and does not, therefore, violate 

the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, Hiland’s claim – that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because he advised Hiland to enter guilty pleas that violated Hiland’s rights 

under the Double Jeopardy Clause – is not a “substantial” claim, and Hiland has failed to 

meet his burden of demonstrating cause for his procedural default of Ground Two. 

Ground Two is therefore dismissed. 

B. Ground Five 

 In Ground Five of his Petition, Hiland contends that the trial court’s imposition of 

consecutive sentences for his convictions for theft and fraud schemes violates the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. (Doc. 1 at 19-20.) He objects to the R&R’s recommendation to 

dismiss Ground Five as unreviewable in habeas. He contends that Ground Five is 

reviewable in habeas because the state court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences 

involves “an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law.” (Doc. 32 at 13.) 

 In determining that the sentences for theft and fraud schemes could be run 

consecutively rather than concurrently under state law, the sentencing judge determined: 

 The misrepresentations of the information [for the fraud] is different than 

the theft of the items that are taken, . . . the crux of a fraud case is the 

misrepresentation. The crux of the theft case is actually the taking. . . . 

 . . . . I looked at the State versus Gordon analysis . . . [and an unpublished 

case from toward the end of 2008]. . . . [T]he theory of it is equally applicable 

here as it was in that particular case, distinguishing between the offense of 

fraudulent schemes and artifices and a theft count. And it is true that the shared 

characteristic of that is victims of the theft count may also be victims of the fraud 

count. But that case law supports consecutive sentencing. 

(Doc. 16-5 at 140-141.) Thus, the sentencing judge determined that “these are not the 

same elements and that consecutive sentencing is available to the Court.” (Id. at 159.) 

 

1

 The Court disagrees with and thus does not adopt the portion of the R&R that 

analyzes whether theft and fraud schemes are the “same” offenses for double jeopardy 

purposes in relation to Ground Two. (See Doc. 29 at 23-24.) 

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 The state PCR court interpreted the sentencing judge as finding that “each of the 

Defendants knowingly obtained a benefit by misrepresenting that they had actual 

investments for the victims to invest in and that those investments would result in a 

benefit to the victims. The Defendants then received money from the victims and kept 

that money for their own gain.” (Doc. 15-3 at 10 (citing Doc. 16-5 at 140-141.) The 

PCR court thus rejected Hiland’s challenge to the consecutive sentences, finding that the 

fraud schemes and theft were separate acts, and that, accordingly, consecutive sentences 

were authorized under A.R.S. § 13-116 and State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989). 

(See Doc. 15-3 at 10.) 

 A review of the indictment, which is the basis of the convictions for theft and 

fraud schemes, indicates that this decision by the state court may be based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding.2

 However, the mere fact that a state court made an unreasonable 

determination of facts does not provide a basis for this Court to grant habeas relief. 

Rather, “it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal 

judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 

U.S. 1, 5 (2010). Thus, a state court’s unreasonable determination of facts applied to 

state law, and that may result in a violation of state law, does not provide an avenue for 

relief in habeas. Id. at 5-6; see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“‘federal 

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’” (citation omitted)). 

 Hiland contends that federal law was violated here, citing the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. However, as discussed previously in relation to Ground Two, the imposition of 

 

2

 The indictment, which is the basis for Hiland’s guilty plea, charges Hiland with 

committing a violation of the fraud schemes statute by engaging in the following 

conduct: “[P]ursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, [he] knowingly obtained a 

benefit of approximately $1,658,849.71 by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 

misrepresentations, promises or material omissions.” (Doc. 15-1 at 4.) Thus, the 

“benefit” to which Hiland pled guilty on the fraud schemes charge was the $1,658,849.71 

in funds, not the “benefit” of having the victims believe or trust in the value of the 

investments, as found by the state court. 

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sentences in the same proceeding for both theft and fraud schemes does not violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause because state law allows imposition of cumulative sentences.3

 

Further, the determination of whether consecutive cumulative sentences, as opposed to 

concurrent cumulative sentences, can be imposed is a question of state law, not federal 

law. See A.R.S. § 13-116; State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Ariz. 1989). Thus, in 

Ground Five, Hiland is actually challenging the state court’s application of what may be 

an unreasonable determination of facts to state law, and in particular to A.R.S. § 13-116 

and Gordon. This challenge is not cognizable in habeas. See Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5-6. 

Ground Five is therefore dismissed. 

C. Ground One 

 In Ground One of his petition, Hiland contends that his guilty plea was not 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Doc. 1 at 14-15.) The R&R concludes that 

Hiland’s challenge to his guilty plea lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the 

state court’s rejection of his claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. 

(Doc. 29 at 38-42.) Hiland raises a general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and 

recommendation that Ground One be dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, 

relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse in relation to this ground.” 

(Doc. 32 at 7-8.) 

 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 

objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not demonstrated that his 

guilty plea was involuntary or that there was a Due Process violation. The Court further 

finds that the record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and demonstrates that those 

allegations are not credible. The Court adopts the R&R’s findings, analysis, and 

conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 38-42.) Ground One is therefore dismissed. 

 

3

 The Court disagrees with and thus does not adopt the portion of the R&R that 

analyzes whether theft and fraud schemes are the “same” offenses for double jeopardy 

purposes in relation to Ground Five. (See Doc. 29 at 55-56.) 

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D. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four of his petition, Hiland contends that he did not receive a fair 

hearing or a fair sentence due to the bias and prejudice of the trial court judge, and that 

this violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 17-19.) 

The R&R concludes that Hiland’s claim that the trial judge was biased and prejudiced 

lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 42-46.) Hiland raises a 

general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Four be 

dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he 

“set forth in his Traverse in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 8-9.) 

 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 

objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not demonstrated that the state 

court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, or 

that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

The Court adopts the R&R’s findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 

29 at 42-46.) Ground Four is therefore dismissed. 

E. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three of his petition, Hiland contends that he did not receive fair 

hearings and a fair sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct, and that this violated his 

rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) The R&R 

concludes that Hiland did not establish a due process violation based on the alleged 

instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and that the prosecutorial misconduct claim lacks 

merit because Hiland cannot show that the state court’s rejection of his claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct, individually or cumulatively, was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 46-52.) Hiland raises a general objection to the 

R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Three be dismissed, but does not 

raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse 

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in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 9-11.) 

 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 

objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not established a due process 

violation based on the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and that the 

prosecutorial misconduct claim lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the state 

court’s rejection of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, individually or cumulatively, 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, established federal law. The Court adopts the R&R’s 

findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 46-61.) Ground Three is 

therefore dismissed. 

F. Ground Six 

 In Ground Six of his petition, Hiland contends that the trail court improperly 

considered aggravating and mitigating factors and thereby violated the protections 

provided by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 20-21.) The R&R 

concludes that the sentencing court considered Hiland’s role in the offenses and his 

argument that the money that he did receive was only a salary and did not constitute a 

pecuniary gain; that the record did not support Hiland’s contention that the imposition of 

the sentences violated his due process rights; and that Hiland had not demonstrated that 

the state court’s rejection of his sentencing claims was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 57-59.) Hiland raises a general objection to 

the R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Six be dismissed, but does not 

raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse 

in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 14.) 

 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 

objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not established a due process 

violation based on the imposition of the sentences; that the record reflects that the 

sentencing court considered Hiland’s role in the offenses and his argument that the 

money that he did receive was only a salary and did not constitute a pecuniary gain; and 

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that Hiland did not demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his sentencing claims 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The Court adopts the R&R’s 

findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 57-61.) Ground Six is 

therefore dismissed. 

G. Request for Evidentiary Hearing 

 In his petition, Hiland requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 13.) The R&R 

recommends denying an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 29 at 59-60.) Hiland objects to the 

recommendation, contending that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he has 

presented “meritorious claims” and exercised reasonable diligence in developing a factual 

record in state court. (Doc. 32 at 14-15.) 

 “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider 

whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual 

allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “Because the deferential 

standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court 

must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is 

appropriate.” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, “if the record refutes the applicant’s 

factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to 

hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id.

 Here, the record precludes habeas relief on Grounds Two and Five, for the reasons 

discussed above. As to Ground One, challenging the voluntariness of Hiland’s guilty 

plea, the record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and demonstrates that those 

allegations are not credible. (See Doc. 20 at 38-42.) Further, the Court finds that Hiland 

has not made a colorable claim and that his factual allegations are refuted by the record as 

to Ground Four, claiming that the trial court judge was biased and prejudiced; Ground 

Three, claiming prosecutorial misconduct; and Ground Six, claiming the trial court 

improperly considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (See Doc. 29 at 42-52, 57-59.) 

Accordingly, Hiland is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 

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474. 

Conclusion

 The Court will deny Hiland’s petition because the claims in his petition either lack 

merit or are procedurally defaulted and barred from review and are therefore dismissed. 

Further, because the record precludes habeas relief as to Grounds Two and Five; and the 

record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and/or Hiland has not made a colorable claim 

as to Grounds One, Three, Four, and Six, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 

29) is accepted and adopted to the extent set forth herein. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED and that this action 

is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall be issued 

and that the petitioner is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis because dismissal is 

justified by a plain procedural bar, and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable; or the petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right in that he has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find 

the Court’s assessment of his constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. 

 Dated this 28th day of June, 2015. 

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