Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00823/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IZABELLE J. DOUCET, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL HAIR 

INSTITUTE, LLC, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv823-LAB (KSC)

ORDER OF REMAND

Defendants removed this case from state court, citing diversity jurisdiction 

under the Class Action Fairness Act. After Plaintiffs amended their complaint, 

Defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action in favor of bilateral arbitration. 

The briefing on this motion brought to the forefront some reasons to doubt 

whether the Court had jurisdiction over this case. In particular it appeared Izabelle 

Doucet and Charlotte Dukich, the two named Plaintiffs,1 may lack standing. Where 

 

1 This order refers to Doucet and Dukich as the Plaintiffs. No class has been 

certified, so any class members are only putative plaintiffs at this point. And in 

any event, what matters for purpose of this order is whether Doucet and Dukich 

have standing, not whether someone else does.

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no named plaintiff has standing, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the 

case, and the defect cannot be cured by substitution of another plaintiff. Lierboe 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court 

therefore issued an order (Docket no. 31 (the “OSC”)) directing both parties to 

address jurisdiction. The parties have now filed their responses.

Legal Standards

The Court is obligated to confirm its jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary, 

whenever doubts arise. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 

U.S. 274, 278 (1977). In this case, as in every other case in federal court, 

jurisdiction is presumed to be lacking unless it is affirmatively shown. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). As the OSC pointed 

out, each party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, for different reasons. 

Plaintiffs must show that the Court has jurisdiction over their claims. See 

Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). This includes 

a showing of standing as to each type of industry and form of relief they seek. See 

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

Because no class has been certified, Plaintiffs must establish standing on their 

own behalf; the standing of putative class members does not come into play. 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 

(9th Cir. 1986). And Defendants, as the removing parties, bear the burden of 

showing that removal was proper, which includes establishing jurisdiction. Gaus 

v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A lack of standing cannot be cured by substituting in new class 

representatives. Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022–

23 (9th Cir. 2003). If the Court lacks jurisdiction, the case must be remanded. 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c); Polo v. Innoventions, Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 

2016). 

/ / /

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Article III standing contains three elements: an injury-in-fact, causal 

connection of the injury to the defendant’s actions, and a likelihood that the injury 

will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992). Although the standing inquiry is not the same as an inquiry 

into the merits, the two often overlap. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998); Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises, Inc., 

711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the question of jurisdiction and the 

merits of an action will be considered intertwined where a statute provides the 

basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff's 

substantive claim for relief). Where jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits, the 

Court assumes the truth of the allegations in a complaint unless controverted by 

undisputed facts in the record. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 

1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Standing, the Supreme Court has explained, is not commutative. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 352. That is, a plaintiff’s standing to bring one 

claim does not mean she has standing to bring all claims that arise from the same 

nucleus of operative fact. Id. Rather, standing must be shown as each claim, id., 

and each type of relief sought. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 

(2009). This means that injury-in-fact, causal connection, and redressability must 

be shown as to each claim and type of relief sought. The fact that plaintiffs might 

have been injured in ways not connected to their claims does not confer standing. 

Such injuries would not be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 560–61. And injuries to supposed interests that are not legally-protected do not 

amount to an injury-in fact. See id.2

 This also means that standing can only be 

 

2 The inquiry into whether a complaint states a claim is not the same as whether 

the plaintiff has standing to pursue that claim. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; Bell 

v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). At the same time, the interest a plaintiff 

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based on claims a plaintiff is actually bringing, not on claims she hypothetically

might have brought but didn’t.

Although state courts may afford plaintiffs broad standing, in federal court 

standing is limited by Article III’s requirements. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (“State courts may afford litigants standing to appear where federal 

courts would not, but whether they do so has no bearing on the parties' Article III 

standing in federal court.”); Lee v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 999–

1000, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2001). This, together with the principle that standing must 

be established on the basis of a plaintiff’s actual claims, means that while Article 

III standing can be narrower than the state law would permit, it cannot be broader. 

Merely alleging that standing requirements are met does not establish 

standing. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888 (refusing to find standing based on the 

“conclusory allegations of an affidavit”); Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

656 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing to find standing based on conclusory 

allegations). Similarly, the mere fact that a plaintiff has asked for relief for an 

alleged injury does not necessarily mean she has standing to seek that relief. This 

is true for both injunctive and monetary relief. See generally Lujan (holding that 

plaintiffs lacked standing to seek the injunctive relief they were asking for). See 

also Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (indirect purchasers 

 

points to as the basis for standing must be one that is protected by law. 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, (2003), overruled in part on other grounds, 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that plaintiffs lacked 

standing because their interest was premised on a mistaken interpretation of 

legal precedent that did not apply; the group's “claim of injury . . . [was], 

therefore, not to a legally cognizable right”); Arjay Assocs., Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 

894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“We hold that appellants lack standing because the 

injury they assert is to a nonexistent right.”). Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 

(explaining that some de facto injuries that are inadequate in law may be 

legislatively elevated to cognizable injuries that are sufficient to support 

standing).

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of products lacked standing to sue for damages); Chuck v. Hewlett Packard Co., 

455 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (non-participant in benefit plan lacked standing 

to seek statutory damages under ERISA).

While the Court is not examining Plaintiffs’ adequacy as class 

representatives, and does not rely on it as a basis for this order, it should be 

remembered that under either federal or state law, a named plaintiff must be a 

member of the class she purports to represent. Representatives who are not 

members of the class lack standing to bring class claims. E. Tex. Motor Freight 

Sys, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (class representative must be a 

part of the class, possess the same interest, and suffer the same injury as class 

members); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1564, 1573 

(2007). Ordinarily, this is examined in terms of a class representative’s adequacy 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. But the reason for Rule 23’s requirement is to satisfy 

standing requirements. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–49 

(2011). See also Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 131 n.12 (1977) (reasoning 

that, allowing a class action to be litigated by named plaintiffs without live claims 

would do away with Article III standing requirements).

Factual Background

The claims in this case arise from the purchase of hair products. The 

amended complaint alleges: 

when consumers respond to one of Defendants’ “riskfree” trial offers, 

Defendants require the consumer to provide his or her credit card or 

debit card billing information, purportedly to pay nominal shipping and 

handling fees (typically less than $5.00) to receive the advertised 

product. However, 30 days after the consumer receives the product, 

Defendants charge the consumer the full price of the “trial” product, 

imposing charges that often amount to $159.90 or more onto the 

consumer’s credit or debit card. Moreover, when a consumer accepts 

a “risk-free” trial offer, Defendants enroll the consumer in a negative 

option “auto shipment” plan, in which Defendants periodically ship 

additional products and charge the consumer’s credit or debit card the 

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full cost of the products, often $79.95 per month or more. To make 

matters worse, after consumers discover credit or debit card charges 

they did not authorize, and/or when consumers receive shipments they 

did not request, Defendants resist consumers’ requests to return 

product for a refund and/or cancel further shipments.

(Am. Compl., ¶ 2.) The putative class consists of:

All individuals in California who, within the statute of limitations period, 

were either (i) charged the full price for a Defendants’ Product that was 

represented as a “free” trial, a “risk-free” trial, or at a discounted price, 

and for which Defendants charged a higher price if the product was not 

returned within a limited period of time, and/or (ii) enrolled in 

Defendants’ auto shipment program.

(Id., ¶ 33.) None of the briefing identifies, even approximately, the number of class 

members or the amount they spent; the notice of removal merely says that over 

100 California residents purchased Defendants’ products during this time period, 

and that the sales of products as part of an automatic renewal program “well 

exceeds” $5 million. (Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 16, 23.)

The complaint identifies four California statutes as the basis for Plaintiffs’ 

claims: the Automatic Renewal Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ''17600, et seq.; the 

False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ''17500, et seq.; the California 

Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code ' 1750, et seq.; and the Unfair 

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ''17200, et seq.

The claims do not allege any defect in the products, or that the products did 

not live up to their claims. Instead, the claims depend solely on the price charged 

for the products, and customers’ enrollment in the auto shipment program. Nor do 

the claims arise from any other behavior by Defendants, such as fraudulently 

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inducing customers to hand over credit card information that was then misused, or 

causing irritation and inconvenience.

3

There are two important standing problems. First, except possibly for the 

nominal shipping fees (which were disclosed), the named Plaintiffs have not lost 

any money or property. A declaration by Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that 

Doucet’s charges (except for the shipping fees) were refunded, and that Dukich’s 

credit card was never charged.4 If neither of them suffered any cognizable harm, 

they have no standing to seek any relief either on their own behalf or on behalf of 

a class. 

Second, Plaintiffs on behalf of the people of California are seeking equitable 

relief that it does not appear would provide any redress to either Doucet or Dukich.

Additionally, because the two named Plaintiffs they were never charged for 

products, they are not members of the class they purport to represent. The Court 

does not rely on this here, partly because the issue was not briefed, and partly 

because it concerns only Plaintiffs’ standing to represent the class, not standing to 

bring their own claims.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

3 Two of the statutes Plaintiffs are suing under would not support such claims. 

See Warner v. Tinder, Inc. 105 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093–94 (C.D. Cal., 2015) 

(citing cases for the proposition that standing to sue under California’s False 

Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law is limited to plaintiffs who have had 

money or property taken from them). And in any event, the complaint does not 

allege any basis for compensatory damages for either Plaintiff.

4 The briefing is ambiguous about whether Dukich was ever charged the shipping 

fee. Because both parties are obligated to show jurisdiction, and neither one has 

clearly said Dukich was charged for shipping, the Court will assume she was 

never charged. But even if she were charged for shipping, the analysis would be 

the same for her as for Doucet. 

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Discussion

Defendants’ Position

Defendants’ response argues that while Plaintiffs5 lack “statutory standing,” 

they nevertheless have Article III standing. Statutory standing, as Defendants use

the term, refers to class members’ being among the parties protected by 

California’s Unfair Competition Law under which they seek redress. See Van 

Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). The 

response suggests, however, that Plaintiffs have Article III standing, because they 

were injured in other ways, and because they are asking for restitution. This is 

unpersuasive, however. 

Defendants argue that Doucet’s payment of initial shipping charges amounts 

to an injury-in-fact, while at the same time arguing that shipping charges are not 

part of Plaintiffs’ claims. The class claims are not based on the initial, disclosed 

shipping charges. Rather, the class consists of people who were allegedly 

overcharged for products and/or who were enrolled in an auto shipment program. 

(Am. Compl., & 33.) The complaint repeatedly alleges that shipping fees are 

disclosed, and that consumers knew about them and agreed to them before 

ordering. (Id., && 2, 17, 19, 21, 25, 27, 29.) 

If Defendants had then done what Plaintiffs claim they promised to do, 

Plaintiffs would have no claim either for shipping charges or for anything else. 

Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants delivered a different deal, one they had 

not agreed to. Specifically, they allege that Defendants then enrolled customers 

in automatic renewal programs they had not been told about or consented to, 

charged their credit and debit cards for the products sent as a result of those 

programs, and did not tell customers how to cancel the automatic renewal. (Id., 

 

5 Defendants’ brief argues that either the named Plaintiffs or the putative class 

members may satisfy standing requirements, and treats them interchangeably.

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&49.) Plaintiffs argue that under California law the products they were sent should 

be considered gifts, and that they should have no obligation to pay for them. (Id., 

& 48.) Plaintiffs bring claims under several different statutes, but under all 

theories, the underlying injury consists of being charged for products customers 

did not agree to buy. Other than this, the complaint does not identify any basis for 

either restitution or a damages award.

Defendants point out that Plaintiffs’ request for restitution of all amounts they 

paid which, Defendants speculate, might include shipping fees. Because Plaintiffs’ 

response addresses what they meant to say, this will be discussed in detail in 

connection with their response. But as noted infra, the fact that Doucet was 

charged a shipping fee does not give rise to jurisdiction.

In addition, what Defendants label “statutory standing” is California’s 

“economic injury” requirement. Under California law, only plaintiffs who have 

suffered economic injuries can bring claims under the Unfair Competition Law. Id. 

(citing Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310 (2011)).6 Even assuming 

there a meaningful distinction between Article III standing and “statutory standing” 

could be made in another case, there is no difference here, because the only 

injuries Plaintiffs have identified are economic. If Plaintiffs did not suffer any 

economic harm, there is no basis for Article III standing either. See Van Patten, 

847 F.3d at 1049 (affirming trial court’s dismissal of Unfair Competition Law claims 

on the basis of lack of economic injury). The fact that other people may have 

suffered economic harm or might suffer economic harm in the future cannot give 

 

6 The parties’ briefing treats standing requirements as the same for claims 

brought under all four statutes Plaintiffs’ claims are based on. Any argument that

standing requirements are different for Plaintiffs’ different claims, or that standing 

is easier to establish under one of the other statutes, is waived. For purposes of 

this order, the Court will treat all four statutes’ standing requirements as the 

same.

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either Doucet or Dukich standing under Article III. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (discussing requirement that injury-in-fact must be 

particularized, i.e., that it affect the plaintiff in a person and individual way).

Defendants, citing Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 

S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014), suggest that they have no burden to establish the propriety 

of removal. In fact, Dart Cherokee’s holding is not as broad as Defendants argue. 

Dart Cherokee, which focused on the amount in controversy in diversity cases, 

made clear “no antiremoval presumption invokes cases invoking CAFA,” but went 

on to say that a defendant must establish jurisdiction whenever the plaintiff 

contested it or the court questioned it. Id. See Scott v. Cricket Commc’ns, LLC, 

865 F.3d 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that a defendant bears the burden of 

alleging that CAFA jurisdiction exists, and if jurisdiction is challenged, bears the 

burden of demonstrating that removal jurisdiction is proper); In re Anthem, Inc., 

129 F. Supp.3d 887, 892–93 (N.D. Cal., 2015) (citing Dart Cherokee, 135 S.Ct. 

547 at 554) (“There is no presumption against removal jurisdiction in CAFA cases 

. . . . The defendant, however, still bears the burden of establishing removal 

jurisdiction.”)

In short, Defendants’ response fails to meet their burden of establishing 

removal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs’ Response

Plaintiffs agree that the purchase price was fully refunded, but argue that 

merely buying products is enough to establish standing to pursue an Unfair 

Competition Law claim. Their brief did not separately address standing as to their 

other claims, but merely argued that because they had standing to bring that claim, 

a fortiori they had standing to bring their other claims. Their brief treats “statutory 

standing” as sufficient to establish Article III standing.

In support of this, they cite Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1107 

(9thCir. 2013), Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015); and 

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Polo, 833 F.3d at 1198. They also cite California state cases, but those do not 

concern standing in federal court. Hinojos and Reid, however address cases 

where the plaintiffs paid money for products, and could point to that as an 

economic injury. Neither Dukich nor Doucet, in the end, paid anything for any

products. And Polo does not help Plaintiffs; there, the Ninth Circuit held only that 

the plaintiff, whose purchase price had been fully refunded, might still have 

standing under state law. Where a plaintiff has actually received all of the relief he 

or she could receive on the claim through further litigation, the court lacks 

jurisdiction over that claim.7

 Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1144–45 

(9th Cir. 2016) (citing Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S.Ct. 663 (2016)) (“[A]

lawsuit—or an individual claim—becomes moot when a plaintiff actually receives 

all of the relief he or she could receive on the claim through further litigation.”) This 

includes claims for which a plaintiff has received a full refund. Luman v. Theisman, 

647 Fed. Appx. at 806–07 (citing Davis v. Fed’l Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 

 

7 Chen addresses mootness, rather than standing, but the two doctrines are 

closely related. For purposes of this case, the difference between mootness and 

lack of standing turns only on when the plaintiff obtains all the relief she could 

obtain in the lawsuit. Standing is measured as of the commencement of the suit, 

while mootness can arise during the suit. See Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 

F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 15, 2001); Native Vill. of 

Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994). For example, if full 

payment is offered and accepted during the pendency of the suit, the claim 

becomes moot. See Chen, 819 F.3d at 1144. Assuming Doucet was given a 

refund before this action was filed, standing rather than mootness it he 

appropriate inquiry. See Luman v. Theismann, 647 Fed. Appx. 804, 806–07 (9th

Cir. 2016) (where plaintiff had received a full refund before filing suit, claim 

should have been dismissed for lack of standing, rather than as moot). But both 

are jurisdictional, and either mootness or a lack of standing would require 

dismissal or remand of the moot claim. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 

Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71–72 (2013); Luman at 806 (affirming dismissal for lack 

of jurisdiction, even though district court erroneously did so on the basis of 

mootness rather than lack of standing).

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732–33 (2008)) (holding that because the plaintiff had received a monetary refund, 

he no longer met the injury-in-fact requirement at the time he filed his complaint). 

See also Berry v. Webloyalty.com, Inc., 517 Fed. Appx. 581, 581 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(holding that because the plaintiff had been fully compensated for charges against 

his debit card, he lacked Article III standing).

As to her claim for reimbursement, Dukich was never charged, and lacks 

standing to pursue that claim. Charges to Doucet’s card for the products were fully 

refunded, and she too therefore lacks standing to seek reimbursement of those 

charges.

The only charge that was not refunded was $3.95 to Doucet’s card for 

shipping charges. On this basis, Plaintiffs argue they have standing to bring their 

own claims as well as to represent the class. They point out that the amended 

complaint seeks refunds of “all monies” they and the putative class paid to 

Defendants. But, as noted, merely asking for relief does not confer standing. 

Furthermore, although the Court normally defers to a Plaintiff regarding the 

meaning of her complaint, reading it in the way Doucet urges is unreasonable, 

because a plaintiffs is only entitled to reimbursement of money she lost, not all 

money she spent.

Plaintiffs agree they intentionally ordered the samples, knowing they would 

have to pay the shipping fees, and that they received the samples they expected 

to. Had Defendants stopped there, it is uncontested Plaintiffs would not have been 

injured and would have no claim. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants went 

on to do other things that they had not consented to, namely, signed them up for 

an auto ship program, sent them products they had not ordered, and attempted to 

charge them for those products. Plaintiffs’ supposed injury arises from those later 

actions. But Plaintiffs did not lose money or property as a result of those additional 

actions, and have not identified any other injury. From a financial or material 

perspective, which is what counts here, they got the benefit of their bargain. As 

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such, they are in the same position as a customer would be who had ordered and 

received samples as promised but was not signed up for an auto shipment

program or sent unsolicited products. Such a customer would have suffered no

cognizable injury, and would lack standing.

Plaintiffs cite Kwikset, Hinojos, Reid, and Polo as holding that buying a 

product one would not have bought or would not have paid as much for, but for a 

seller’s misconduct, is an actionable injury. But those cases are of no help to them, 

for several reasons. First, those cases deal with customers who bought and paid 

for products, not customers who were sent products they did not have to pay for. 

Second, the customers suffered damage as the result of allegedly unlawful 

methods, acts, or practices. See Cal. Civ. Code '1780(a) (authorizing an action 

by any consumer who suffers damage “as a result of” the use of an unlawful 

method, act, or practice). Here, the only damage Doucet points to — being 

charged a shipping fee — was not suffered as the result of any allegedly unlawful 

method, act, or practice. A number of decisions by California courts explain why 

these facts, which were present in Kwikset, Hinojos, Reid, and Polo but which are 

absent here, are crucial.

Warner discusses an analogous situation, and explains why not every 

customer has standing to sue under these statutes, even if they spent money. In 

that case, Tinder allegedly promised a free dating phone app, but then delivered 

an app that was less than promised, and would only provide the promised features

if users paid for them. Later, after the plaintiff had agreed to pay $2.99 per month 

for additional features, Tinder allegedly offered him an upgrade to a premium 

service for $19.99 per month, which he accepted. The court held that the plaintiff 

lacked standing to make a claim for Tinder’s failure to provide a free app, because 

he had not lost any money or property. And even assuming Tinder’s undisclosed 

intention to raise its price unilaterally was fraudulent and led the plaintiff to agree 

/ / /

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to pay $2.99 per month when he otherwise would not have, he did not suffer a 

cognizable injury. 

Hall v. Time, 158 Cal. App. 4th 847 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2008), on which Warner

relies, is even more closely analogous. In that case, the defendant allegedly lured 

in customers to purchase books by offering a free preview period, which it had no 

intention of honoring. After customers received the books, the defendant allegedly 

then sent them an invoice demanding payment. The plaintiff in that case paid for 

the book. But he did not allege he did not want the book, that the book was 

unsatisfactory, or that it was worth less than he paid. Id. at 855. In other words, 

he wanted the book that he ordered and paid for. The court held that he had not 

suffered an injury in fact, and lacked standing. Id. Although the plaintiff had 

“expended” money, he had not “lost” money. Id. at 855. Doucet’s situation is the 

same: She wanted the sample product that she ordered, and for which she paid 

the shipping fee, and she received it. 

Plaintiffs also that that being misled into doing business with Defendants 

amounts to an injury. They represent that they would never have done business 

with Defendants and handed over their credit card information to them had they 

known what Defendants’ practices were. While paying the shipping fee made 

Doucet Defendants’ customer, merely being a paying customer or doing business 

with a company that makes misrepresentations does not confer standing. 

In Medina v. Safe-Guard Prods., 164 Cal. App. 4th 105 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 

2008), the plaintiff bought insurance coverage from a company not licensed to sell 

insurance in California. The contract was fully enforceable and the plaintiff had not 

suffered any uncovered losses, but argued he had standing because he had spent 

money on the coverage. Id. at 114. The court rejected that argument, and 

determined that he lacked standing. The insurance company’s unlicensed status 

did not cause him any monetary loss. Id. at 115 (“He hasn’t suffered any loss 

because of Safe-Guard’s unlicensed status.”) And because the company’s 

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unlicensed status did not cause him to pay for his coverage and therefore did not 

cause his injury, it did not satisfy the requirement. Id. (“Here, this is no allegation 

that . . . Safe-Guard’s unlicensed status caused him to part with the money he paid 

for the [coverage].”) 

Doucet’s argument suffers from the same flaw as the plaintiff’s in Medina. 

Although she paid for shipping, Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations did not 

cause her to do so, nor did they cause her to lose money. Although Medina frames 

its analysis in terms of injury, causation, and reliance requirements, it makes clear 

that these are required for standing; if they are not satisfied, a plaintiff lacks 

standing. Id. at 108 n.2.

Plaintiffs are also seeking injunctive relief in the form of an order intended

to prevent Defendants from taking advantage of other California consumers. (See

Am. Compl., & 51.) Plaintiffs do not intend to order anything else from Defendants, 

and they implicitly concede that the injunction would only be of use to other people; 

it would not provide them with any relief or benefit them in any way. Plaintiffs’ 

response concedes that decisional law is divided about whether a plaintiff seeking 

an injunction under these circumstances has standing in federal court, and whether 

federal courts have jurisdiction. They cite several unpublished district court 

decisions from this circuit that have found jurisdiction. The case they chiefly rely 

on, Chester v. TJX Cos., 2016 WL 4414768 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 18, 2016), relied on 

several other district court decisions,8 as well as California court decisions 

regarding the importance of injunctive relief. That case dealt with a situation where 

plaintiffs sought to enjoin false advertising that there was no likelihood they would 

 

8 These included Koehler v. Litehouse, INc., 2012 WL 6217635 at *6 (N.D. Cal., 

Dec. 13, 2012) and Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc. 2014 Wl 46822 at *10 (N.D. 

Cal., Jan. 6, 2014). Plaintiffs also cite Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 2012 WL 

5458396, *9–12 (N.D. Cal., June 14, 2012). 

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be deceived by (or otherwise injured by) in the future. The court found, principally 

on the basis of public policy arguments, that the plaintiffs had standing. If plaintiffs 

lacked standing, the court reasoned, California’s consumer protection laws would 

be “eviscerated” and no court could hear federal claims. Id. at *8. Plaintiffs 

acknowledge that this Court and other courts have disagreed. See In re 5-hour 

ENERGY Marketing & Sales Practices Litig., 2014 WL 5311272, *10–11 (C.D. 

Cal., Sept. 4, 2014) (describing the three principal lines of cases on this issue).

With respect to the other courts involved, the Court is convinced that that 

analysis is wrong, and in fact that Lujan and other binding precedent forbids the 

Court from following it. The Constitution, including Article III, is the supreme law of 

the land, and California’s own laws and public policies cannot override it.

First, California courts are not bound by Article III’s limitations on federal 

courts, and are fully able to entertain those claims. See Mason v. Nature’s 

Innovation, Inc., 2013 WL 1969957, *5 (S.D. Cal., May 13, 2013) (“[P]laintiffs who 

have no intention of again purchasing a product that is the focus of false advertising 

claims are not precluded from seeking an injunctive remedy because they can sue

in state court.”) 

Moreover, some plaintiffs can still have standing, even if these Plaintiffs do 

not. For example, a plaintiff with representational standing might bring those claims 

on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc. v. 

Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1988) (trade association has standing 

to seek an injunction against false advertising on behalf of its members). The state 

attorney general can sue enforce the law. See, e.g., People v. Custom Craft 

Carpets, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 676 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984). And some plaintiffs 

can show a reasonable likelihood of harm unless unfair competition or false 

advertising are enjoined. Common examples are competitors who are put at an 

unfair disadvantage, see, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. HVFG LLC, 939 F. Supp. 

2d 992, 998–99 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (plaintiffs had standing to seek an injunction 

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forbidding their competitor from misleadingly labelling its competing product), or 

customers who plan to buy the products anyway, and seek truthful information 

about them. See, e.g., Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 533 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (plaintiffs who intended to buy defendants’ beverages in the future 

had standing to seek an injunction requiring that the containers be properly 

labeled).

But even if it were true that fidelity to binding precedent meant nobody would 

have standing, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected that as a reason to find 

standing:

The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one 

would have standing, is not a reason to find standing. This view would 

convert standing into a requirement that must be observed only when 

satisfied.

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also

5-hour ENERGY, 2014 WL 5311272 at *11 (“The federal courts are not 

empowered to set aside the standing requirements of Article III in the name of 

public policy, even when that policy is laudable.”)

Because Plaintiffs concededly will not be injured in the future by the actions 

they ask the Court to enjoin, and because an injunction would provide them with 

no redress, they lack standing. See id. 

Although Plaintiffs requested other kinds of relief, such as declaratory relief, 

they did not address those in their response, and in any event the analysis appears 

to be the same.

Conclusion and Order

The Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing, and that it therefore lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiffs have requested that should the Court 

find they lack standing, they be allowed to pursue their claims in state court. Unless 

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it is completely clear the state court would also dismiss the claims, remand rather 

than dismissal is appropriate. Polo, 833 F.3d at 1198.

This action in its entirety is therefore REMANDED to the Superior Court of 

California for the County of San Diego.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2017

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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