Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00128/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00128-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Marine-Exoneration from/or Limitation of Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN THE COMPLAINT OF ARDEN A. )

JOHNSON, etc., )

 ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0128-WS-B

Petitioner. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment

as to certain assertions made by claimant Dog River Marina & Boat Works, Inc. (“Dog River”). 

(Doc. 137). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective

positions, (Docs. 138-41, 144, 155, 170-71), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After

carefully considering all the foregoing materials, the Court concludes that the motion is due to be

granted in part and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND

The petitioner’s vessel was berthed at Dog River. Vessels belonging to claimants Conrad

Armbrecht, Sam Haginas and Duncan Greenwood were also berthed there. On September 6,

2003, a fire broke out on the petitioner’s vessel, damaging or destroying that vessel and those of

the claimants, as well as Dog River’s facility. The petitioner brought this action seeking

exoneration from or limitation of liability. (Doc. 1). 

The marina berth lease/storage agreement (“the Agreement”) between Dog River and the

petitioner provides in pertinent part as follows: 

Owner shall, to the extent owner may do so without violating the terms 

and conditions of Owner’s liability insurance policy, indemnify, and hold Marina

harmless against all damage caused by Owner or Vessel to Marina’s property, 

docks, pilings and bulkhead and against all claims, including cost of litigation and 

reasonable attorney’s fees by third parties arising from owner’s use of the abovedescribed slip/space. Owner shall maintain a liability insurance policy for property

damage and/or personal injury arising from the use of Vessel with minimum limits 

of $300,000.00.

(Doc. 150, Exhibit A, Exhibit 7, ¶ 7).

In response to the petition, Dog River filed a claim for indemnity based on the foregoing

Case 1:04-cv-00128-WS-B Document 192 Filed 01/17/06 Page 1 of 8
1

The petitioner describes Dog River’s invocation of paragraph 7 of the Agreement as an

assertion of affirmative defenses, (Doc. 137 at 1), but Dog River plainly relies on the provision

to support its claim for affirmative relief.

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contract language. (Doc. 68 at 1-3).1

 The petitioner argues that it would violate the terms of its

liability insurance policy for him to agree to indemnify Dog River and that, in the alternative, the

indemnity provision contains an exculpatory clause that is unenforceable pursuant to public

policy.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1333. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986))(footnote omitted).

“When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show

affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with

credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. [citation

omitted] In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its

case on which it bears the burden of proof, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving

party.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)(en

banc) (emphasis in original); accord Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.

1993).

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2

The petitioner has not provided any evidence that the policy actually contains this

language, as the copy of the policy he submitted omits the critical page. (Doc. 144, Exhibit 2). 

The Court’s resolution in text of the petitioner’s argument renders it unnecessary to decide

whether either this default, or the petitioner’s alleged failure to provide a copy of the policy to

Dog River, (Doc. 155 at 3-4), would alone be dispositive of his argument. 

3

Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V YEOCOMICO II, 329 F.3d 809, 813 (11th Cir.

2003); King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1545 n.8 (11th Cir. 1990). 

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The distribution of burdens at trial determines the parties’ burdens on motion for

summary judgment. At trial, Dog River bears the burden of showing that the indemnity

provision applies, while the petitioner bears the burden of showing that the provision is

unenforceable as against public policy. 

“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could

be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court therefore confines its consideration

to those arguments the parties have elected to assert expressly. 

A. Applicability of the Clause.

According to the petitioner, his liability policy contains the following exclusion from

coverage: “We do not provide coverage under Part B: Liability Coverage for ... [l]iability

assumed by you under any contract or agreement.” (Doc. 138 at 2, ¶ 6).2 The petitioner asserts,

without challenge by Dog River, that the indemnity provision represents a liability assumed by

the petitioner by contract or agreement. The petitioner continues that, because his policy

excludes coverage for such assumed liability, it would “violat[e] the terms and conditions of” the

policy for him to indemnify Dog River under paragraph 7 of the Agreement. (Id. at 5-6). Dog

River counters that to “violate” means to break, breach or disregard, and that the petitioner

would not breach his insurance policy by assuming a liability by contract; he would simply not

be afforded insurance coverage for such assumed liability, leaving him personally responsible

for payment. (Doc. 155 at 4). 

The determination of whether a maritime contract is ambiguous is a legal one for the

Court.3

 “Under federal maritime law, a court may not look beyond the written language of the

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4

United States ex rel. Eastern Gulf, Inc. v. Metzger Towing, Inc., 910 F.2d 775, 779 (11th

Cir. 1990).

5

Sander v. Alexander Richardson Investments, 334 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 2003).

6

See, e.g., Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. 385, 397 (2004). 

7

United States ex rel. Eastern Gulf v. Metzger Towing, 910 F.2d at 782 (Johnson, J.,

dissenting).

8

Atlantic Lines, Ltd. v. Narwhal, Ltd., 514 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1975). 

9

Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 889 (11th Cir. 1986).

10Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 140, 1319 (3rd ed. 1993).

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document to determine the intent of the parties unless the disputed contract provision is

ambiguous.”4

 In reviewing maritime contracts to see if their written language is ambiguous, the

Court is to “giv[e] their terms their normal and everyday meaning.”5 Standard dictionaries may

be employed for this purpose.6 Language in a maritime contract is ambiguous “if it is reasonably

susceptible to more than one interpretation.”7 If language in a maritime contract is determined to

be ambiguous under these rules, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence in isolating the

parties’ intent.8 And, at least when no such evidence is offered, “[t]he traditional rule of

construction in admiralty cases is to construe the contract language most strongly against the

drafter.”9

The ordinary meaning of “violate” is to breach, break or disregard.10 That meaning

plainly qualifies as a reasonable interpretation of the word as used in the Agreement. The

petitioner concedes that the indemnity provision did not result in a breach of his contract with his

insurer. Instead, he argues that a second reasonable interpretation of “violate” is “exclude from

coverage.” He offers no dictionary definition or other source to show that this is a common or

otherwise reasonable construction. Instead, he suggests that the purpose of the “without

violating” language in the indemnity provision was to keep the provision from being activated if

it would cause the insurer to exclude coverage for losses that would otherwise be covered. (Doc.

170 at 4-5). 

There are multiple problems with this one-sentence argument. First, the petitioner has

Case 1:04-cv-00128-WS-B Document 192 Filed 01/17/06 Page 4 of 8
11At any rate, the petitioner has proffered no evidence of the purpose of the “without

violating” language but only his unhelpful ipse dixit. 

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offered no explanation how that purpose can be gleaned from the four corners of the Agreement,

and on its own review the Court has been unable to do so. Second, to the extent the petitioner

suggests there is extrinsic evidence of that purpose, the Court cannot look to such evidence until

after determining the indemnity provision to be ambiguous from a review of the contractual

language itself.11 Third, the petitioner has provided no analysis of the policy — or even a copy

of Part B of the policy — to show that the indemnity provision, absent the “without violating”

language, would have resulted in a loss of coverage that would otherwise exist.

In summary, while Dog River’s interpretation of the indemnity provision is reasonable,

the petitioner’s is not under governing rules of construction. Accordingly, the “without

violating” qualifier of the indemnity provision is unambiguous, and it is triggered only when the

renter’s assumption of an indemnity obligation would breach his contract with his insurer. 

Because the petitioner did not breach his insurance contract by assuming this obligation, the

indemnity provision applies here.

B. Enforceability of the Clause. 

Clauses in maritime contracts that purport to exculpate one party from its own negligence

are enforceable only in limited circumstances. See generally Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.,

349 U.S. 85 (1955). The petitioner argues that the indemnity provision is unenforceable under

this theory. (Doc. 170 at 5-8). 

The threshold question is whether the indemnity provision constitutes an exculpatory

clause subject to these rules. The indemnity provision does not expressly exculpate Dog River

from its own negligence, as it requires the petitioner to indemnify Dog River for “all damage

caused by Owner or Vessel.” The petitioner, however, notes that Dog River could come aboard

the vessel, start (or do something that helps start) a fire with or without the concurrent fault of

the petitioner or vessel, and then say the vessel caused the resulting damage to the marina,

resulting in the petitioner indemnifying Dog River for its own negligence. (Doc. 170 at 7 & n.2). 

Case 1:04-cv-00128-WS-B Document 192 Filed 01/17/06 Page 5 of 8
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In such a situation — when the conduct of Dog River and the petitioner or his vessel

jointly cause damage to the marina — the Agreement does not specify how responsibility for the

damage will be allocated. There are at least four possibilities: (1) the petitioner is responsible for

all damage; (2) Dog River is responsible for all damage; (3) the responsibility of each is

proportionate to fault; and (4) the responsibility is divided pro rata. If the second possibility (or

perhaps the third) obtains, the indemnity provision is not an exculpatory clause. If the first or

fourth obtains, the indemnity provision is an exculpatory clause, because it requires the

petitioner to pay for all or part of Dog River’s negligence. 

The Court concludes that the phrase “Owner shall ... indemnify ... Marina ... against all

damage caused by Owner or Vessel” can reasonably be construed to mean that the petitioner

must indemnify Dog River for all damage to the marina resulting from the concurrent fault of

Dog River and the petitioner or his vessel. The Court reaches this conclusion because, when

either of two causes of damage is alone sufficient to have caused the damage, then each cause

can reasonably be said to have caused all the damage. Likewise, when neither of two causes

would alone be sufficient to have caused the damage, but both were necessary to cause the

damage, each can reasonably be said to have caused all the damage. There appears to be nothing

within the Agreement to negate this as a reasonable interpretation of the quoted language.

It would also be reasonable to construe the quoted language as denoting that the damages

for which the petitioner must indemnify Dog River are limited to those caused exclusively by the

petitioner or his vessel. Because there are two reasonable constructions of the indemnity

provision, it is ambiguous. In the absence of any evidence or argument from the parties as to

how to resolve the ambiguity, the Court proceeds to the principle that an ambiguous provision in

a maritime contract is to be construed against the drafter. Accordingly, the Court adopts the

petitioner’s favored interpretation and concludes that the indemnity provision requires the

petitioner to indemnify Dog River for its own negligence. It is therefore an exculpatory clause

subject to Bisso and its progeny.

 The petitioner requests the Court to employ the test for enforceability of such clauses

articulated in Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V YEOCOMICO II, 329 F.3d 809 (11th Cir.

2003), and other cases. (Doc. 170 at 5-6). This test consists of three components:

First, the ... clause must clearly and unequivocally indicate the parties’ intention. 

Case 1:04-cv-00128-WS-B Document 192 Filed 01/17/06 Page 6 of 8
12It is quite possible that the same result could have been reached more directly under the

maritime rule that “[a] contract of indemnity ... should not be read to impose liability for those

losses or liabilities which are neither expressly within its terms nor of such a character that it

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Second, the limitation must not absolve the [party] of all liability and must still 

provide a deterrent to negligence. ... Third, the parties to the contract must have 

equal bargaining power. 

Id. at 813.

The indemnity provision does not “clearly and unambiguously indicate the parties’

intention” that the petitioner indemnify Dog River if the two combine to cause damage to the

marina. As set forth above, the provision does not expressly provide for exculpation, and the

meaning of the term “all damage caused by Owner or Vessel” is ambiguous. The Court has

adopted the construction that the provision requires the petitioner to indemnify Dog River for its

own negligence, not because the requirement is unambiguous, but because legal rules of

construction require it to resolve ambiguity in this manner.

Because the indemnity provision does not clearly and unambiguously indicate the

parties’ intention that the petitioner indemnify Dog River for its own negligence, it is

unenforceable to that extent.

Dog River does not seek to justify the exculpatory aspects of the indemnity provision,

either by denying the existence of such aspects or by attempting to fit them within Merrill

Stevens. Instead, Dog River suggests that the Court should not apply Merrill Stevens or any

similarly restrictive test to an exculpatory clause that appears, as this one does, in a slip

agreement. (Doc. 175 at 7-10). Dog River bases this argument on Sander v. Alexander

Richardson Investments, 334 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2003). Sander, however, rejected only the

second requirement of Merrill Stevens — that the clause not absolve a party of all liability. Id. at

717-21. Sander left intact the requirement that an exculpatory clause be clearly and

unequivocally expressed, finding this element “universally agreed” upon. Id. at 715. 

The petitioner assumes that, because the indemnity provision is exculpatory in some

applications, it is never enforceable, even if the petitioner or his vessel is wholly at fault and Dog

River is not at all at fault. Absent authority or compelling argument in support of this position,

which the petitioner does not provide, the Court declines to adopt it.12

Case 1:04-cv-00128-WS-B Document 192 Filed 01/17/06 Page 7 of 8
can be reasonably inferred that the parties intended to include them within the indemnity

coverage.” Corbitt v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1981)(emphasis

added)(providing as an example agreements to indemnify against another’s negligence). Under

that rule, the Court might have been able to conclude that the indemnity provision does not reach

damage caused by Dog River’s negligence to begin with, rather than concluding that it does

reach such damage but is to that extent unenforceable. Because neither party urged application

of this principle, the Court does not rest its decision upon it. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment is

granted to the extent that Dog River is precluded from relying on the indemnity provision to

obtain indemnity for damages caused by its own negligence or other culpable fault. In all other

respects the motion is denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of January, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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