Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00280/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIAN ESCALANTE, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-280 REC

(Nos. CR-F-97-5266 REC and

04-5174 REC) 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO AMEND MOTION FOR

RELIEF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, DENYING CERTAIN

CLAIMS IN PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AS

AMENDED, AND DIRECTING

UNITED STATES TO ELECT

REMEDY FOR ALLEGED FAILURE

OF DEFENSE COUNSEL TO FILE

NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN 30

DAYS

On March 13, 2006, petitioner Adrian Escalante timely filed

a motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On March 27,

2006, petitioner timely a motion to amend his Section 2255

motion.

In No. CR-F-97-5266 REC, petitioner was charged in Count 6

of the Second Superseding Indictment with conspiracy to aid and

abet the manufacture of a controlled substance. Petitioner

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pleaded guilty to Count 6. Petitioner was initially sentenced on

January 24, 2000 to 108 months in custody and 60 months of

supervised release. At this sentencing the court specifically

advised petitioner of the following terms of supervised release:

that he commit no federal, state or local crime, that he not

illegally possess any controlled substances, that he not possess

a firearm, and that the court imposed all of the special

conditions, including special condition number 4, recommended by

the Probation Office and listed on pages 18 and 19 of the

Presentence Investigation Report, a copy of which petitioner

stated to the court he had reviewed and discussed with counsel 

prior to sentencing. Upon motion filed by the United States,

petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 50 months in custody and 60

months of supervised release subject to the terms and conditions

previously imposed on January 24, 2000. On December 31, 2003, a

Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision

was filed. The Petition for Warrant asserts that petitioner’s

supervised release commenced on November 16, 2001. The Petition

for Warrant alleged the following violations of petitioner’s

conditions of supervised release and prayed for the issuance of a

warrant for petitioner’s arrest:

Charge 1: NEW LAW VIOLATIONS

A) [¶] On November 4, 2003, the defendant was

found in the possession of methamphetamine,

in violation of Arizona Revised Statute 13-

3407A1; and in violation of the general

condition ordering him not to commit another

federal, state, or local crime.

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B) [¶] On November 4, 2003, the defendant was

found in the possession of drug

paraphernalia, in violation of Arizona

Revised Statute 13-3415A; and in violation of

the general condition ordering him not to

commit another federal, state, or local

crime.

C) [¶] On November 4, 2003, the defendant was

found in possession of a firearm, in

violation of Arizona Revised Statute 13-

3102A8; and in violation of the general

condition ordering him not to commit another

federal, state, or local crime.

Charge 2: RE-ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES

WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

GENERAL

On or before November 4, 2003, the defendant

unlawfully re-entered the United States in

violation of 8 USC 1326; and in violation of

the general condition requiring that he obey

all laws as well as special condition number

4, to wit: he shall not re-enter the United

States without the consent of the Attorney

General of the United States.

Charge 3: FAILURE TO REPORT TO THE UNITED

STATES PROBATION OFFICE (EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA) UPON RE-ENTRY INTO THE UNITED

STATES WITHIN 72 HOURS

On or about November 4, 2003, the defendant

re-entered the United States. Upon his

return to the United States, the defendant

failed to report to the United States

Probation Office; in violation of Special

Condition No. 4.

The Petition for Warrant was not accompanied by a statement of

probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. A warrant for

petitioner’s arrest was issued on January 4, 2004. Petitioner

was arrested on May 3, 2004 in Arizona and appeared before United

States Magistrate Judge Irwin in the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona on May 4, 2004. Petitioner was

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represented by appointed counsel at that hearing, a removal

hearing was waived, and a warrant of removal to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California issued. 

Petitioner appeared in this court on May 28, 2004 before

Magistrate Judge Snyder. Petitioner was represented by Assistant 

Federal Defender Ament. Magistrate Judge Snyder read the charges

in the Petition for Warrant to petitioner on May 28, 2004. 

Because Assistant Federal Defender Ament advised Magistrate Judge

Snyder that petitioner would be represented by attorney Eric

Fogderude, the matter was continued to June 2, 2004 before

Magistrate Judge O’Neill. At that hearing, Mr. Fogderude stated

that he had just received a copy of the Petition for Warrant and

asked for a continuance in order to review the Petition for

Warrant with petitioner. The matter was continued to June 16,

2004 before Magistrate Judge Beck. At that hearing Magistrate

Judge Beck again read the charges in the Petition for Warrant to

petitioner in open court. Mr. Fogderude advised Magistrate Judge

Beck that petitioner had received a copy of the Petition for

Warrant. The matter was continued to June 30, 2004. On June 30,

2004, Mr. Fogderude obtained a continuance to July 6, 2004

because he had been informed that new charges were going to be

filed against petitioner and he believed that both matters would

be resolved at the same time. At the hearing on July 6, 2004,

the court was advised that an indictment had been filed against

petitioner in No. CR-F-04-5174 REC. Thereafter, the matter was

continued a number of times in tandem with matters proceeding in

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No. CR-F-04-5174 REC. On October 4, 2004, and pursuant to the

terms of the written Plea Agreement entered in No. CR-F-04-5174

REC, see infra, petitioner admitted to the violations in Charge 

1(B)(possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Arizona law

and the general condition of supervised release that petitioner

not commit another federal, state or local crime while under

supervision), in Charge 2 (that he unlawfully re-entered the

United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and in violation of

the general condition of supervised release that petitioner not

commit another federal, state or local crime while under

supervision and in violation of special condition of supervision 

number 4 that, if deported during the term of supervised release,

defendant shall not re-enter the United States without the

consent of the Attorney General of the United States), and in

Charge 3 (that upon his return to the United States defendant

failed to report to the United States Probation Office in

violation of special condition of supervision number 4 that upon

any re-entry into the United States the defendant shall report in

person to the United States Probation Office in the Eastern

District of California within 72 hours). On March 28, 2005, the

court revoked petitioner’s supervised release and sentenced him

to six months incarceration to be served consecutively to any

undischarged term of imprisonment. At no time did petitioner

assert that he did not have written or oral notice of the terms

and conditions of supervised release he was charged with

violating. Petitioner did not file an appeal. 

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Petitioner was represented by Eric Fogderude until August 9, 1

2004, when Mr. Richardson was substituted as counsel. 

6

In No. CR-F-04-5174 REC, petitioner was charged with being a

deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326. At all relevant times, petitioner was represented

by counsel Thomas Richardson. On October 4, 2005, petitioner 1

pleaded guilty pursuant to a written Plea Agreement. In

pertinent part, the Plea Agreement provides:

III. Agreements by Defendant.

... 

(c) The defendant shall not be permitted to

withdraw his plea should the court fail to

follow the government’s sentencing

recommendations;

(d) The defendant expressly, knowingly and

voluntarily waives his constitutional and

statutory rights to appeal, including any

rights to appeal his sentence on any ground

and any appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. §

3742. Defendant further agrees not to

contest his sentence in any post-conviction

proceeding, including, but not limited to,

any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

...

(f) The defendant agrees not to move for a

downward departure of his sentence. The

defendant understands and agrees that this

agreement by him includes, but is not limited

to, not moving for a downward departure of

his offense level, criminal history category,

or criminal history points as defined by the

United States Sentencing Guidelines.

(g) To the extent that the defendant might

have a right to have any facts that will be

used to determine his sentence charged in the

indictment and found by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt, the defendant waives that

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right and consents to have the district court

find any facts necessary for the imposition

of sentence under the applicable lesser

standard of proof determined by the

guidelines and case law prior to Blakely v.

Washington, (June 24, 2004). Defendant also

agrees to waive any constitutional challenge

to the validity of the federal sentencing

guidelines and their application to his case. 

(h) The defendant agrees that the sentence

imposed in this case will be served

consecutively to any other sentence that the

defendant may be required to serve for any

other state or federal case (excluding his

currently pending supervised release

violation in federal court in Fresno).

(i) The defendant agrees that he will admit a

violation charges 1B, 2 and 3 of his

supervised release in case CR-F-975266 REC. 

The parties are free to argue that any

sentence imposed on that case will be served

concurrently or consecutively to any sentence

imposed in the case to which this plea

agreement relates (CRF-04-5174 REC).

...

IV. Agreements by the Government.

...

(a) The government will recommend a two-level

reduction (if the offense level is less than

16) or a three-level reduction (if the

offense level reaches 16) in the computation

of his offense level if the defendant clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for

his conduct as defined in Section 3E1.1 of

the United States Sentencing Commission

Guidelines Manual; and

(b) The government will recommend that the

defendant receive an additional two-level

downward adjustment in offense level under

U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 for ‘early disposition’ of

his case; and

(c) The government will recommend that the

defendant be sentenced at the low end of the

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applicable sentencing guideline range ....

The Presentence Investigation Report, prepared on December

16, 2004 calculated the base offense level as 8 pursuant to USSG

§ 2L1.2. 16 levels were added pursuant to USSG §

2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) because petitioner was previously deported on

November 18, 2001, following a conviction for Conspiracy to Aid

and Abet the Manufacture of a Controlled Substance. A 3 level

reduction in the base offense level was recommended pursuant to

USSG § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility. The

resulting base offense level was 21. Petitioner’s criminal

history category was IV. Therefore, the guideline range for

imprisonment was 57 to 71 months. However, because the United

States would make a recommendation for a 2-level downward

departure pursuant to USSG § 5K3.1, the Presentence Investigation

Report recommended a downward departure to a guideline range of

46 to 57 months and recommended that petitioner be sentenced at

the low end of that guideline range. The United States did make

the recommended downward departure and petitioner was sentenced

on March 28, 2005 to 46 months in custody and 36 months of

supervised release.

Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal.

In his motion for relief under Section 2255 filed on March

13, 2006, petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel on the following grounds:

1. Whether advice on the enhancements apply

were misled by counsel.

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2. Failed to do legal research on relevant

facts of law, matters of potential relief

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 a cultural

assimilation.

3. Failed to file motions on the Programs

available such as the ‘Fast Track’ pursuant

to the ‘2003 Protect Act’ for an aliens

deportable which can bargain in plea

agreements.

4. Failure to conduct an object to

evidentiary hearing Pursuant to Booker

issues.

5. Failed to file a NOTICE OF APPEAL’S upon

defendant’s request. and, or attorney’s

motion to withdraw as counsel’s Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 ... (1967) must file

to move for leave.

6. Counsel’s failed to perform adequate

pretrial indentification of such relief

consist of ineffective assistance of counsel

[sic].

Petitioner also contends that counsel was ineffective by failing

to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea after the Supreme

Court issued its opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005).

As noted, on March 27, 2005, petitioner filed a motion to

amend the Section 2255 motion. Because the motion to amend was

filed within the one year limitation period applicable to Section

2255 motions, the court grants leave to amend.

In the amendment, petitioner claims that his term of

supervised release in No. CR-F-97-5266 should not have been

revoked because “[t]he government did not produce sufficient

evidence that he violated Standard Condition One”, because he did

not receive the conditions of supervised release in writing and

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was not given oral notice of the conditions of supervision he was

charged with violating, and because this court lacked

jurisdiction to terminate supervised release pursuant to United

States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901 (9 Cir. 2004), rehearing th

en banc denied, 408 F.3d 1227 (9 Cir. 2005). th

A. Claims Relating to No. CR-F-97-5266 REC.

As noted, petitioner did not file an appeal from the

revocation of the term of supervised release and imposition of a

six month sentence to run consecutive to any other undischarged

sentence. Petitioner makes no claim that he asked Mr. Richardson

to file an appeal in connection with this criminal action. 

Consequently, to the extent that petitioner’s claims that the

United States did not provide sufficient evidence that he

violated Standard Condition One and that he did not receive the

conditions of supervised release in writing, petitioner has

waived his right to raise these claims in a Section 2255 motion. 

See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483 (9 Cir. 1994). th

Even if not waived, petitioner’s claim that the United

States did not provide sufficient evidence that he violated

Standard Condition One is without merit. As set forth in the

Judgment in a Criminal Case filed on January 28, 2000 and in the

Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case filed on January 9, 2001, 

Standard Condition of Supervision One provides that “the

defendant shall not leave the judicial district without

permission of the court or probation officer”. The Petition for

Warrant does not charge petitioner with a violation of Standard

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The record before the court does not indicate whether the 2

Bureau of Prisons or INS (now ICE) gave petitioner a copy of the

terms and conditions of his supervised release prior to

petitioner’s deportation.

11

Condition One. 

With regard to petitioner’s claim that he did not receive a

written copy of the terms and conditions of his supervised

release and did not receive oral notice of the conditions of

supervision, the standard practice of the Probation Office is to

give a defendant a copy of the terms and conditions of

supervision when the term of supervised release actually

commences. Here, however, petitioner was not actively supervised

by the Probation Office because he was deported on November 28,

2001 following the completion of the term of incarceration

imposed in No. CR-F-97-5266 REC. Therefore, the Probation Office

did not provide a written copy of the terms and conditions of

supervision to petitioner. However, as noted supra, at 2

petitioner’s initial sentencing in No. CR-F-97-5266 REC on

January 24, 2000, the court specifically advised petitioner of

the following terms of supervised release: that he commit no

federal, state or local crime, that he not illegally possess any

controlled substances, that he not possess a firearm, and that

the court imposed all of the special conditions, including

special condition number 4, recommended by the Probation Office

and listed on pages 18 and 19 of the Presentence Investigation

Report, a copy of which petitioner stated he had reviewed and

discussed with counsel prior to sentencing. 

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In arguing that he is entitled to relief with respect to

this claim, petitioner relies on United States v. OrtunoHigareda, 421 F.3d 917 (9 Cir. 2003). th

In Ortuno-Higareda, the defendant appealed to the Ninth

Circuit from the district court’s judgment revoking his term of

supervised release and sentencing him to imprisonment. In

pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether supervised

release was properly revoked when the government did not prove

that Ortuno has received notice of the supervised release

condition that he was charged with violating. The United States

conceded that Ortuno was not given written notice of his

supervised release conditions. 421 F.3d at 922. The Ninth

Circuit further held:

... Ortuno was orally advised that he was

subject to Special Condition One, which

provided that he ‘shall not re-enter the

United States without legal authorization.’ 

However, the Revocation Petition did not

charge him with a violation of that

condition. Instead, it charged him with

violating Standard Condition One, which

provided that Ortuno ‘shall not commit

another federal, state or local crime during

the term of supervision.’ Ortuno was not

informed at the hearing that he was subject

to this latter condition. Because the

government did not prove that Ortuno received

any notice, written or oral, that he would be

subject to Standard Condition One, a

violation of that condition could not serve

as the basis for revocation of his supervised

release.

It is insufficient that Ortuno was verbally

advised that he would violate a condition of

his supervised release if he illegally reentered the United States. As we stated in

Ortega-Brito, the lack of written notice may

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be excused if a defendant received actual

notice of a condition and ‘the revocation of

his release [is] based upon a violation of

such condition [].’ Id. (emphasis added);

see also id. (stating that ‘we must determine

whether [the defendant] received actual

notice of the conditions, the violations of

which formed the basis for the revocation of

his supervised release’ (emphasis added)). 

In disregarding noncompliance with the

statutory mandate, we did not go so far as to

hold that actual notice of one condition may

support revocation based on a violation of a

different condition. We now hold that the

failure to provide the statutorily required

written notice will be tolerated only when

the government proves that the defendant

received actual notice of the very condition

that he is charged with violating ... Since

the Revocation Petition did not charge Ortuno

with a violation of Special Condition One,

his receipt of notice of that condition is

irrelevant. Rather, the failure to give

Ortuno notice of Standard Condition One is

dispositive, and the court abused its

discretion in revoking his supervised

release.

421 F.3d at 923-924.

Here, the circumstances of petitioner’s revocation of

supervised release are not similar to those in Ortuna-Higareda. 

As noted, petitioner was advised by the court at sentencing of

the condition of supervised release that petitioner not commit

another federal, state or local crime. Two of the charges which

petitioner admitted, i.e., Charge 1(B) and Charge 2 stated that

the violations were of the condition that petitioner not commit

another federal, state or local crime. That Charge 2 also

asserted that the violation also was of special condition number

4 does not negate that petitioner was made aware of one of the

conditions that he violated. While it is true that Charge 3,

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which petitioner also admitted, refers only to the violation of

special condition number 4, petitioner admitted at sentencing on

January 24, 2000 that he had read the Presentence Investigation

Report to which the special conditions of supervision were

attached. Therefore, petitioner’s claim that revocation of

supervised release was an abuse of discretion pursuant to OrtunaHigareda is without merit because the record establishes that

petitioner had actual notice of the conditions of supervision

even though he may not have received a written copy of those

conditions.

Petitioner also asserts “that if the court orally pronounced

its decision regarding the imposition of 6 consecutive months,

the petitioner would have a chance to argue or request the court

to run these six months concurrent.” Although this assertion is

not very clear, it appears that petitioner may be contending that

he was denied his right of allocution during the proceedings at

which supervised release was revoked. Here, the court conducted

a single hearing on March 28, 2005 to impose sentence on both the

illegal reentry offense and the supervised release violations. 

At sentencing, Mr. Richardson addressed both matters and

specifically requested that the sentence for the violations of

supervised release run concurrent. Thereafter, petitioner was

asked by the court whether he had anything to say in his own

behalf and petitioner responded “No. Nothing.” The court then

sentenced petitioner for the illegal reentry offense and then

revoked supervised release and sentenced petitioner to six months

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consecutive. Therefore, the record establishes that petitioner

was not denied his right of allocution, that Mr. Richardson

requested that sentence on the violations of supervised release

run concurrent, and that petitioner, when asked to speak, had

nothing to say.

Petitioner’s claim that this court lacked jurisdiction to

revoke his term of supervised release is a claim that cannot be

waived by the failure to appeal. Nonetheless, this claim is

without merit. Petitioner’s reliance on United States v. VargasAmaya, supra, is misplaced. Here, the record establishes that

the warrant for petitioner’s arrest pursuant to the Petition for

Warrant was executed before the expiration of petitioner’s

supervised release term. As held in United States v. OrtunoHigareda, supra, 421 F.3d at 922:

[B]ecause Ortuno’s revocation proceedings

were completed before the conclusion of his

supervised release term, section 3583(e)(3)

rather than section 3583(i) provided the

revocation authority. Therefore, that Ortuno

was arrested pursuant to a warrant which was

not supported by oath or affirmation did not

deprive the district court of jurisdiction to

revoke his supervised release.

B. Claims Relating to No. CR-F-04-5174.

1. Effect of Waiver in Plea Agreement.

To the extent that petitioner claims he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel with regard to sentencing issues,

petitioner’s claims are barred by the waiver of his right to

bring a Section 2255 motion set forth in the Plea Agreement. 

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a Section

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2255 motion challenging the length of his sentence. United

States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9 Cir. 1994); United States th

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub th

nom. Abarca-Espinoza v. United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel that challenges the voluntariness of the

waiver does not preclude jurisdiction over a habeas action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Washington v. Lambert, 422 F.3d

864 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Here, petitioner does not claim that he did not knowingly

and voluntarily enter into the Plea Agreement or claim

ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the

provision for the waiver in the Plea Agreement. Therefore, to

the extent that petitioner claims that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel at sentencing, his claims are

barred. 

2. Sentencing Claims.

Furthermore, even if petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing at not barred by the

provision in the Plea Agreement, petitioner has not demonstrated

ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to those claims. 

 Claims asserting the ineffective assistance of counsel are

analyzed under the two-prong test announced in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As explained in United States

v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996):

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According to Strickland, there are two

components to an effectiveness inquiry, and

the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing both ... First, the

representation must fall ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness.’ ... Courts

scrutinizing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s conduct must examine counsel’s

‘overall performance,’ both before and at

trial, and must be highly deferential to the

attorney’s judgments ... In fact, there

exists a ‘strong presumption that counsel

“rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.”’ ... In

short, defendant must surmount the

presumption that, ‘under the circumstances,

the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.”’ ... Thus, the proper

inquiry is ‘whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’ ....

If the petitioner satisfies the first prong,

he must then establish that there is ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different ....’

Under these standards, petitioner’s claim that counsel was

ineffective because he “[f]ailed to file motions on the Programs

available such as the ‘Fast Track’ pursuant to the ‘2003 Protect

Act’ for an aliens deportable which can bargain in plea

agreements [sic]”, is without merit. Pursuant to the Plea

Agreement, the Government did recommend at sentencing that

petitioner receive an additional two-level downward adjustment in

his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 for early disposition of

his case. § 5K3.1 provides:

Upon motion of the Government, the court may

depart downward not more than 4 levels

pursuant to an early disposition program

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authorized by the Attorney General of the

United States and the United States Attorney

for the district in which the court resides.

The Commentary explains that § 5K1.3 “implements the directive to

the Commission in section 401(m)(2)(B) of the Prosecutorial

Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children

Today Act of 2003 (the ‘PROTECT Act’, Public Law 108-21).” When

fast-track programs have been authorized by the Attorney General

and implemented, the defendant must “‘agree to the factual basis

[of the criminal charge] and waive the rights to file pretrial

motions, to appeal and to seek collateral relief (except for

ineffective assistance of counsel).’” See United States v.

Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22, 26 (1 Cir. 2005), cert. denied, st

___ U.S. ___, 2006 WL 236308 (2006).

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel because counsel failed to research and

argue at sentencing that petitioner was entitled to a downward

departure because of cultural assimilation pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

5K2.0 also fails. Such an argument at sentencing would have been

a breach of the terms of the Plea Agreement, thereby raising the

possibility that the United States would seek to vacate the Plea

Agreement.

Furthermore, petitioner’s apparent claim that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel because counsel’s advice that

the enhancement set forth in USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) was

erroneous is also without merit. It is apparent from

petitioner’s motion that this claim of ineffective assistance of

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Weiland also negates petitioner’s claim that his term of 3

imprisonment violates due process because it exceeds the two year

statutory maximum set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 

As noted, petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to conduct an

evidentiary hearing pursuant to Booker and because of counsel’s

failure to perform adequate pretrial identification “of such

relief”. It is unclear what point petitioner is attempting to

make. However, as noted infra, Mr. Richardson did request a

continuance of sentencing in order to consider Booker.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record before the court that

indicates any questions concerning petitioner’s identification.

Therefore, the court concludes that petitioner has not established

entitlement to relief under Section 2255 with respect to these

claims.

19

counsel is based on the assertion that United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005), renders that enhancement unconstitutional. 

However, in Booker, the Supreme Court held:

[W]e reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any

fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the

maximum authorized by the facts established

by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt.

543 U.S. at 244. The Ninth Circuit has further held that

“[a]lthough recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has perhaps called

into question the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres, we

are bound to follow a controlling Supreme Court precedent until

it is explicitly overruled by that Court.” United States v.

Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1080 n. 16 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Consequently, any claim that counsel was ineffective at

sentencing because of a failure to argue against the application

of USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) is foreclosed by these cases.3

3. Failure to Move to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

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Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel when counsel failed to move to withdraw his

guilty plea after the Supreme Court issued its decision in United

States v. Booker, supra, on January 12, 2005.

In order to withdraw a guilty plea prior to the imposition

of sentence, a defendant must “show a fair and just reason for

requesting the withdrawal.” Rule 11(d)(2)(B), Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. This standard is applied liberally and a

fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea includes

intervening circumstances or any other reason for withdrawing the

plea that did not exist when the defendant entered his guilty

plea. See United States v. Ortega-Ascano, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Here, Mr. Richardson sought and obtained a continuance of

sentencing because of the issuance of Booker between the time the

plea was entered and the date set for sentencing. Therefore, it

is apparent that Mr. Richardson was aware of Booker and the 

potential impact on petitioner. However, a motion to withdraw

the guilty plea because of Booker would not have benefitted

petitioner. 

In Booker, the Supreme Court struck down the Sentencing

Guidelines to the extent that the Sentencing Reform Act mandated

the imposition of sentences predicated on facts not found by the

jury or admitted by the defendant, an outcome following from the

conclusion that the Sixth Amendment precludes a judge from

enhancing a sentence based on extra-verdict findings (other than

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the fact of prior conviction) in a mandatory sentencing regime. 

543 U.S. at 244. The Supreme Court remedied the Sixth Amendment

infirmity in the Sentencing Guidelines by making the Guidelines

effectively advisory. The remedial portion of Booker agreed that

“without this provision - namely the provision that makes ‘the

relevant sentencing rules mandatory and imposes binding

requirements on all sentencing judges’ - the statute falls

outside the scope’ of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial

requirement. 543 U.S. at 259. Rather than engraft a jury trial

requirement onto the mandatory sentencing guideline system,

Booker severed from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 “the

provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence

within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of

circumstances that justify a departure) and the provision that

sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo

review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range.’ Id. 

Although the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory,

the Act nonetheless requires judges to take

account of the Guidelines together with other

sentencing goals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(Supp. 2004). The Act nonetheless requires

judges to consider the Guidelines ‘sentencing

range established for ... the applicable

category of defendant,’ § 3553(a)(4), the

pertinent Sentencing Commission policy

statements, the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities, and the need to

provide restitution to victims, §§

3553(a)(1), (3), (5)-(7) (main ed. and

Supp.2004). And the Act nonetheless requires

judges to impose sentences that reflect the

seriousness of the offenses, promote respect

for the law, provide just punishment, afford

adequate deterrence, protect the public, and

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effectively provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training and

medical care. § 3553(a)(2) (main ed. and

Supp.2004) ....

Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-260. 

Here, a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, if granted,

would have lost petitioner the reduction in his sentence because

of the reduction in his sentence because of acceptance of

responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1(a) and (b) and the reduction in

his sentence because of the “fast track” program under USSG §

5K3.1 and. As noted, the guideline range prior to the reduction

under USSG § 5K3.1 was 57 to 71 months. If petitioner lost the

benefit of the 3 level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, the guideline range would have increased to 77 to

96 months and, again, petitioner would have lost the “fast track”

reduction. As noted supra, petitioner’s contention that the

decision in Booker undermines Almendarez-Torres is without merit. 

Consequently, there would have been no benefit to petitioner by

withdrawing the plea on this ground. As further noted,

petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to

argue for downward departure because of cultural assimilation. 

Withdrawal of the guilty plea would have freed Mr. Richardson to

argue for such a downward departure upon petitioner’s conviction

following jury trial. However, there is no guarantee that a

downward departure based on cultural assimilation would be

granted by the sentencing court following trial. When compared

with the sentencing benefits obtained for petitioner in the plea

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agreement, petitioner has not demonstrated that Mr. Richardson’s

failure to move to withdraw the guilty plea was outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance under the

circumstances of this case or that petitioner was prejudiced by

this failure. 

4. Alleged Failure to File Notice of Appeal.

The court addresses petitioner’s claim that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a

notice of appeal after petitioner requested that he do so.

In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the Supreme

Court addressed the showings required for a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to file a

notice of appeal. The Supreme Court noted that it has “long held

that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the

defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is

professionally unreasonable.” Id. at 477. In United States v.

Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit th

held:

If a defendant, even one who has expressly

waived his right to appeal, files a habeas

petition after sentencing and judgment

claiming that he ordered his attorney to

appeal and his attorney refused to do so, two

things can happen. The district court can

hold an evidentiary hearing to decide whether

petitioner’s allegation is true, and if it

is, vacated and reenter the judgment,

allowing the appeal to proceed. Or, if the

state does not object, the district court can

vacate and reenter the judgment without a

hearing and allow the appeal to proceed,

assuming without deciding that the

petitioner’s claim is true. The case at bar

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In the event the United States demands an evidentiary hearing 4

on this issue, the court will appoint counsel to represent

petitioner at such a hearing and order that the action be

transferred pursuant to random selection to another district court

judge for the purpose of conducting the evidentiary hearing and

determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to relief with

regard to this claim. 

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is a particularly plain instance of where

‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ is a term

of art that does not mean incompetence of

counsel. It may be very foolish to risk

losing a seven-year plea bargain on an appeal

almost sure to go nowhere, in a major heroin

case. Nevertheless the client has the

constitutional right, under Flores-Ortega and

Peguero, to bet on the possibility of winning

the appeal and then winning an acquittal ....

409 F.3d at 1198-1199.

Consequently, the court gives the United States the option

of demanding an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of

petitioner’s claim that Mr. Richardson failed to file a notice of

appeal in No. CR-F-04-5174 REC after being directed to so by

petitioner or of conceding the truth of petitioner’s claim and

allowing the vacation and reentry of judgment so that petitioner

can file the notice of appeal. 

4

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner’s motion to amend motion for relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is granted.

1. Petitioner’s motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 as amended is denied in part as set forth herein.

2. The United States is ordered to advise the court by

written pleading within 30 days of the filing date of this Order

whether the United States demands an evidentiary hearing

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regarding petitioner’s claim that Mr. Richardson failed to file a

notice of appeal after being directed to do so by petitioner or

whether the United States concedes the truth of petitioner’s

claim. All further proceedings shall be by order of this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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