Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02305/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02305-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Because plaintiff’s opposition contains no substantive argument, the court will construe 1

his motion for summary judgment as an opposition to defendants’ motion.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RON KICZENSKI,

Plaintiff, CIV S-03-2305 MCE GGH PS

vs.

JOHN ASHCROFT, et al., ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

Defendants. RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action, referred to the

undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 72-302(c)(21). Hearing on defendants’ motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, filed June 29, 2005, and plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, filed July 5, 2005, was held on July 28, 2005. John Gisla appeared for 1

defendants. Plaintiff appeared in pro se. In preparing this decision, the court reviewed Hemp

Industries v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 357 F.3d 1012 (9 Cir. 2004), which had not been th

raised by the parties. Further briefing was ordered on this basis and the parties have now

complied with that directive.

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BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the complaint filed November 4, 2003. Plaintiff

alleges that federal government officials have thwarted his attempts to possess, plant, cultivate

and use hemp for various reasons, including food, cloth, paper, building materials, and above all

for use in his pain management. Although plaintiff filed an application with the Drug

Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) to grow and use hemp, he claims his application was returned

without being processed as incomplete and lacking the filing fee. Plaintiff is currently in

possession of cannabis seeds and medical cannabis. After dismissal of his claims under the Fifth,

Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth amendments to the Constitution, as well as the Commerce Clause and

an Executive Order, the only claim remaining is under the First Amendment and/or RFRA

(Religious Freedom and Restoration Act). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff’s post hearing filing of August 1, 2005, entitled

“supplemental affidavit,” is found untimely submitted. E. D. Local Rule 78-230(c). 

Furthermore, even if it were considered, it would be rejected. Plaintiff urges the court to permit

him to amend his complaint to add a claim under RLUIPA or to consider this act in deciding the

motion under submission. The Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act of 2000

(RLUIPA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, protects only institutionalized persons from a

substantial burden imposed by the government on the practice of their religion. It also prevents

the government implementing a land use regulation that burdens an individual’s exercise of

religion. Plaintiff is not confined to an institution. Nor is the Controlled Substances Act which

regulates the activity in which plaintiff seeks to engage a land use regulation. Therefore,

RLUIPA does not apply to this case. 

I. Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

The “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

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 “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 2

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee note to 1963 amendment). Summary judgment is appropriate “if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). Disputed facts must be material (affecting the outcome of the

suit under the governing law), and genuine (supported by evidence permitting a reasonable jury

to return a favorable verdict). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2510 (1986).

The moving party: 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(c)). 

The moving party without the burden of proof at trial may rely “solely on the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. (citations

omitted.) That party need only point to the absence of a genuine material factual issue, and is not

required to produce evidence negating the opponent’s claim. Id. at 323-24; Lujan v. National

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990). 

When the moving party meets its responsibility, the burden shifts to the opposing

party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. The opposing party then must submit

“significant probative evidence” on each element of his claims on which he bears the burden at

 trial. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994). Unverified denials in pleadings are 2

insufficient. Neither can conclusory statements defeat a properly supported motion. Scott v.

Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). Rather, specific facts in the form of

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 At hearing, plaintiff, ever wary, at first believed that the government’s invocation of 3

RFRA was some sort of “trick.”

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affidavits or admissible discovery material must be submitted. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 586 n.11, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 n.11. 

The opposing party need not conclusively establish any fact. To demonstrate a

genuine dispute, however, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead

a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted). In other words, the evidence

must demonstrate that a trial is required to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth. 

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

The court believes the evidence of the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

106 S. Ct. at 2513, and draws all reasonable inferences in its favor, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587,

106 S. Ct. at1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and the opposing party

must produce a factual predicate from which to draw an inference. Richards v. Nielsen Freight

Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants brief the effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 

Defendants indicated at hearing that they gave plaintiff’s pleadings a liberal reading and

addressed his claims under this act out of an abundance of caution. At hearing, plaintiff

indicated that he was not aware of RFRA, but after it had been explained to him, he wished to

proceed under both the First Amendment and RFRA. Therefore, his claim will be analyzed 3

under both standards.

A. Effect of Hemp Industries (“Hemp II”)

In Hemp Industries v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 357 F.3d 1012 (9 Cir. 2004) th

(“Hemp II”), the Ninth Circuit held that because the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)

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did not follow the correct procedures for scheduling a substance, it had no authority to regulate

drugs which were not scheduled. Id. at 1018. Specifically, the court found that the Final Rules

banning non-psychoactive hemp products which are not within the Controlled Substances Act’s

(“CSA”) definition of marijuana or which do not contain synthetic THC, could not be enforced. 

Id. In other words, the DEA only has authority to enforce rules and regulations banning

marijuana or synthetic THC. 

At first glance, Hemp II appeared to be on point with the position taken by

plaintiff in his complaint: “[t]he hemp plant is a different strain of cannabis with a different

chemical-based makeup, and contains no viable amounts of the chemical THC that exists in

some of the other strains of cannabis, and is of no end use value in the illegal (drug) trade.” 

Compl. at 16:22-24. In his opposition to defendants’ August, 2004 motion, plaintiff also raised

the issue of the CSA’s authority to regulate his activities because they “do not fall within the

definition of this legitimate category of legislative authority.” Oppo., filed September 10, 2004,

at 2:17-21. Throughout this opposition, plaintiff emphasized that growing hemp for utilitarian

purposes was not intended to be outlawed by the government’s ban on drugs. 

Briefing submitted by the parties after hearing now clarifies that plaintiff’s

proposed activity is properly regulated by the DEA and the plants he seeks to grow are defined as

marijuana. Although Hemp II, struck down the regulation, the statute remains and defines

marijuana as:

(16) The term “marihuana” means all parts of the plant Cannabis

sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin

extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound,

manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant,

its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of

such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from

the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt,

derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except

the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized

seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.

21 U.S.C. § 802. 

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 These plaintiffs obtained the product from Canada and Europe where it was grown. Id. 4

at 1013, n.2. 

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As the government correctly points out, Hemp II is distinguishable because the

plaintiffs were manufacturers, distributors and sellers of products containing parts of the cannabis

plant which were expressly excluded from the definition of marijuana. In this case, plaintiff 4

attempts to grow the entire plant, much of which is expressly prohibited under the definition. In

fact, as the government notes, in Hemp Industries v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 333 F.3d 1082

(9 Cir. 2003) (“Hemp I”), the court stated that “the industrial hemp plant itself, which falls th

under the definition of marijuana, may not be grown in the United States. Therefore, the seeds

and oil must be imported.” Id. at 1085, n. 2. 

Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish an “industrial” or “feral” plant from the

plant defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) as marijuana, he finally concedes that he has run out of time

and money to make the alleged distinction. He has submitted a declaration by Christopher

Conrad who claims to be an expert on the subject, but the declaration does not support plaintiff’s

assertion that there are two types of plants and the one he seeks to grow is not defined as

marijuana. Rather, Conrad impliedly undercuts plaintiff’s assertion by stating that “marihuana

‘is derived from the flowering tops of the female plant of hemp grown in semi-tropical and

temperate countries.’ Hence, if hemp is harvested before such flowers develop to a usable

extent, there is no marihuana, which is consistent with the illicit trade in marijuana today; it is

concerned with the mature female flowering tops, not immature plants or industrial and personal

products derived therefrom.” Conrad Decl. at 4. Conrad insinuates that there is only one type of

hemp plant. Therefore, plaintiff’s attempted activities are distinguishable from those conducted

by the plaintiffs in Hemp II, and are clearly prohibited by the CSA.

B. First Amendment

The complaint as it pertains to the First Amendments states that “Defendant’s

actions to deny possessing, planting, and cultivating seeds into plants comes directly in conflict

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with Plaintiff’s abilities to worship and/or commune with God and does violate the First

Amendment as applied to Plaintiff.” Compl. at 18:10-14. Plaintiff cites to both the

establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. 

The First Amendment protects “legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion,”

but does not extend to conduct that a State has validly proscribed. Employment Div., Dept. of

Human Resources of State of Or. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671, 108 S. Ct. 1444, 1451 (1988)

(citations omitted). 

In this case, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails because the Federal

government has proscribed the possession of cannabis. The Controlled Substances Act has been

found constitutional and trumps California law which permits limited use of marijuana for

medicinal purposes. Gonzales v. Raich, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (June 6, 2005). The state

of California was found to have not validly permitted the use of marijuana as this controlled

substance is properly subject to federal regulation. (Id. at 2215.) Because Congress has validly

proscribed the use of cannabis, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails.

C. RFRA

Defendants’ motion requests judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff’s

attempts to grow marijuana are not based on religious beliefs but on social, political,

philosophical, economic and ideological beliefs.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the

States because Congress had exceeded its authority. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532,

117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). RFRA was found to be unconstitutional only in regard to state and local

law. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9 Cir. 1999). Although the th

Supreme Court has not ruled on its applicability to the federal government, RFRA remains valid

in this regard until the court so rules. Cutter v. Wilkinson, ___ U. S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118

n.2 (2005); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210,1218 (9 Cir. 2002). th

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RFRA requires that a law that works a substantial burden on an

individual’s ability freely to exercise his religion must be justified

by a compelling government interest and achieve that interest by

burdening as little religious freedom as possible. 

 42 U.S.C. S 2000bb 1(b); Guam, 290 F.3d at 1218.

The statute provides: 

Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of

religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the

person-- 

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. S 2000bb 1(b).

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s expressed religious doctrine is based on beliefs

that are philosophical, political, economic, social and secular, and are not based on religion. 

Defendants cite to United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10 Cir. 1996), where the court th

ruled that “marijuana’s medical, therapeutic, and social effects are secular, not religious...” 

In support, defendants have cited to various portions of the complaint. 

Throughout the complaint, plaintiff’s briefing, and his argument at hearing,

plaintiff’s description of his growing hemp/cannabis indicates that it is a way of life for him

rather than a religion. Although plaintiff does link “tending his garden” with feeling close to

God, he does not specifically link or require growing hemp to commune with God. (Compl. at

7:15.) 

Tending our family garden as a boy just reinforced what I was

being taught in Catholic School about God, Nature, and our

dependency on such. But, for me, tending the garden became

much more, it somehow brought me closer to God. It was as if to

tend our garden was my most direct connection with God, outside

of my own heart. It gave me a feeling of communing with God in a

way that simply was not there in my church. Even tending Mass as

an Alter Boy did not satisfy my need to link with God, but my

garden did.

(Compl. at 5:1-6.) 

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Plaintiff admits that his efforts to introduce hemp and its byproducts were for

reasons other than worship of his religion:

In the mid 1990's I was directly involved in helping to organize

efforts to introduce and implement and [sic] economic

development plan, based on producing hemp, to the Oglala Lakota

Sioux tribe at Pine Ridge in South Dakota. ... If it had succeeded it

would have gone far to bring food, jobs, housing and selfsustainability to a place that was then and is still one of the most

impoverished areas within U.S. continental borders. 

(Id. at 7:21-8:1.)

Plaintiff also refers to his efforts to aid American farmers who were in desperate

need of economic aid by teaching them to grow hemp, and concedes it was an “economic effort.” 

(Id. at 8:4-9.) Plaintiff additionally invokes hemp in the name of better clothing and household

use, better quality of life, and pursuit of survival for man in general and him and his family in

particular. (Id. at 15:25, 15:14, 15:9, 26:24, 27:3.) 

In his opposition, plaintiff reaffirms that his use of the cannabis/hemp plant

represents a way of life rather than a religion. He states that no other plant can meet all the basic

necessities of life, that it is central to our survival, and that it is necessary in order for him to live

in the most healthy and harmonious possible way. (Oppo. at 6:5-7, 6:13-14, 7:16-18.) Upon

questioning by the court at hearing, plaintiff further confirmed that his religion is his way of

living:

[THE COURT:] It’s when we get into RIFRA [sic] that I start

getting into the problems. But here’s the rub there. Your religion,

of which I take no issue with, is basically everything I do in life is

religious. When I get up in the morning in [sic] eat, that’s religion. 

When I’m here in this courtroom, it’s religion, and you’re shaking

your head in affirmation.

MR. KICZENSKI: Absolutely.

(Tr. at 6:4-10.) Other statements by plaintiff at hearing confirm his stance. See Tr. at 7:21-8:3

(“a common reality of access to nature that is about our very existence”); 9:16-21 (“it’s my 

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 On another note, even if a “commune with God through nature” philosophy could be 5

considered a religion, plaintiff’s religion would not be substantially burdened by not permitting

him to grow hemp. This is clear from the fact that it is growing anything, not specifically hemp,

which spiritually fulfills plaintiff. Therefore, the case of Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita etc.,

__U.S.__, __S. Ct. __, 2006 WL 38637 (February 21, 2006), finding that the government would

have to prove a compelling interest in order to preclude a religious sect from utilizing a

hallucinogenic tea in its services) is not applicable here. In Gonzalez, there was no doubt that the

sect at issue was a religion, and that preclusion of use of the tea would substantially burden the

religion. 

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responsibility to be as healthy as I can”); 12:24-25 (“I need every single plant that’s at my

disposal that helps me live.”) 

At one point the court stated,

But from your paper, growing brussel sprouts is every bit as

important as hemp, or broccoli is every bit as important as hemp,

and you’re again nodding in affirmation, and so therefore I can’t

find that marijuana is absolutely a tenant, or essential if you will, or

a very important part, if I could bring it down a little bit, to the

practice of your philosophy/religion.

(Id. at 12.) 

All of these statements and affirmations indicate that plaintiff’s beliefs are secular,

economic, social, and philosophical, but that they are not religious. As the court in Meyers

found, an individual’s belief in a “Church of Marijuana” does not make it a religion. Id. at 1498.

Plaintiff has not shown that his beliefs are religious in nature.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

filed July 5, 2005, is construed as an opposition to defendants’ motion.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants’

motion for summary judgment be granted and judgment entered for defendants.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 2/24/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

______________________

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH/076

Kiczenski2305.sj.wpd

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