Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01093/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

March 13, 1995 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-1093, Ayala v. USA 

Filed February 22, 1995 by Judge Tacha 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

The fifth line of the paragraph identifying counsel 

for the defendant/appellee has been corrected to read "with 

him on the briefs" instead of with her. 

Please make this correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

By:~~4/~~~ Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-1093 Document: 01019280728 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATSY AYALA, DONNA M. AYALA, DAISY M. AYALA, 

DION W. AYALA, by and through their mother and 

next of friend, Patsy Ayala; SYLVIA COOK, KYLE 

D. COOK, JR.; DONNA COOK, ANGELA COOK, SHERYL 

LUCERO STEINER; TRAVIS LUCERO, by and through 

his mother and next of friend, Sheryl Lucero 

Steiner; PAMELA MEAD, JESSE L. MEAD, EVAN K. 

MEAD; KRAIG N. MEAD, BRIAN T. MEAD, by and 

through their mother and next of friend, Pamela 

Mead; SHAY TAMAR TUCKER, by and through her 

mother and next friend, Joy L. Jameson; ROBERT 

JAMES TUCKER, PAUL ELLIOT TUCKER, KAREN GREENE; 

RAYMOND L. PATCH, Personal Representative of the 

Estates of Loretta M. Patch and Brenda Louise 

Patch; RODNEY ALLEN PATCH, MICHAEL KENT PATCH; 

STACEY MARIE PATCH, by and through her 

conservator and next friend, Raymond L. Patch; 

CHERYL SHARP CLEGG; WENDY I. SHARP, GLEN W. 

SHARP, AMY E. SHARP, JAMES E. SHARP, by and 

through their mother and next friend, Cheryl 

Sharp Clegg; LINDA VETTER GRANATO; JENNIFER K. 

VETTER, MICHAEL T. VETTER, by and through their 

mother and next friend, Linda Vetter Granato; 

JUDY INEZ GUTHRIE, MYRA LYNN GUTHRIE; PATRICIA 

KATHLEEN GUTHRIE, by and through her mother and 

next friend, Judy Inez Guthrie, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant - Appellee. 

FILED 

Ualted States Court of Appeab Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 2 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 82-S-1907) 

David W. Griffith, Worrell, Griffith, Durrett & Jaynes, P.C., 

Glenwood Springs, Colorado (Karen S. Renne, Denver, Colorado, with 

him on the briefs) for the Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Appellate Case: 94-1093 Document: 01019280728 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 2 
Robin D. Smith, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, Civil Division, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Frank W. Hunger, 

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Henry L. Solano, 

United States Attorney, Phyllis J. Pyles, Assistant Director, 

Torts Branch, Civil Division, with her on the briefs) for the 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, and BARRETT, Senior 

Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

This case originates from a wrongful death action brought by 

the families of fifteen miners who were killed in an underground 

mine explosion near Redstone, Colorado, on April 15, 1981. Dutch 

Creek No. 1 mine was owned and operated by Mid-Continent 

Resources, Inc. (Mid-Continent). The case has a long litigation 

history, including two previous appearances before this court.l 

Of the numerous claims originally filed in this action, only one 

remains: plaintiffs' claim, against the United States, that the 

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) gave negligent 

technical assistance to Mid-Continent. 

In our most recent decision in this case, we held that the 

technical assistance claim was not barred by the discretionary 

1 Because the factual background and procedural history of this 

case have been set out at length in other reported opinions, we 

recite only those facts necessary to our decision here. The 

previous decisions rendered in this case are, in chronological 

order: Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 521 (D. Colo. 1984) 

(Ayala I); Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 610 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo. 1985) 

(Ayala II); Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 846 (lOth Cir. 1989) 

(Ayala III), rev'g, 610 F. Supp. 86; Ayala v. United States, 771 

F. Supp. 1097 (D. Colo. 1991) (Ayala IV); Ayala v. United States, 

980 F.2d 1342 (lOth Cir. 1992) (Ayala V), rev'g, 771 F. Supp. 

1097; Ayala v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 1431 (D. Colo. 1993) 

(Ayala VI) . 

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function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) , 28 

U.S.C. § 2680(a). Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1351 

(lOth Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we remanded the case for 

determination of the remaining liability issues, including duty, 

breach, proximate cause, and damages. Id. at 1351 n.5. 

On remand, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had not 

proved the necessary elements of their negligence claim and 

entered judgment for defendant. Ayala v. United States, 846 F. 

Supp. 1431, 1443 (D. Colo. 1993). Specifically, the district 

court found (1) that MSHA owed no duty of care to plaintiffs; (2) 

that even if MSHA owed plaintiffs a duty, MSHA had not breached 

that duty; and (3) that even if MSHA owed a duty and had breached 

it, the breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' 

injuries. Id. at 1437-43. 

In this appeal, plaintiffs claim that the district court 

erred by (1) making factual findings inconsistent with findings 

made in an earlier decision, and (2) concluding that plaintiffs 

had not proved the elements of a negligence claim. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Factual Background 

Mid-Continent used a self-propelled continuous miner in Dutch 

Creek No. 1 to cut into a seam of coal. As the mechanical 

continuous miner moved forward, it occasionally encountered large 

pockets of highly explosive methane gas. On such occasions, the 

area of the tunnel surrounding the continuous miner filled with 

methane gas. MSHA regulations require that all electrical 

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equipment automatically deenergize when the methane content in an 

underground tunnel reaches a level of two percent or greater. 30 

C.F.R. § 27.22. Automatic deenergization prevents the electrical 

equipment from sparking, which could ignite the gas and result in 

an explosion. According to MSHA regulations, only the main power 

circuit and the methane monitor circuit should remain energized 

when the methane monitor triggers deenergization. 

In June 1978, Mid-Continent ordered add-on lighting packages 

for installation on their continuous miners. Mid-Continent was 

installing these add-on lighting packages to comply with new MSHA 

illumination standards. Installation of the lights was a field 

modification of underground mining equipment. MSHA inspectors 

must approve and inspect a field modification prior to a mine 

operator's use of the modified equipment. See 30 C.F.R. § 26.19. 

As a result, MSHA mine inspector Jack Marshall visited Dutch Creek 

No. 1 on June 9, 1978 to assist Mid-Continent engineer Brad 

Bourquin in revising Mid-Continent's application for approval of 

the field modification. After assisting Bourquin with the add-on 

light installation, Marshall prepared to leave the mine. As 

Marshall was leaving, Bourquin asked him where to connect the addon lights to the power supply. Marshall indicated that the 

connection should be made below the main circuit breaker. After 

Marshall left, Bourquin drew a wiring diagram showing the power 

connection directly below the main circuit breaker but above the 

methane monitor. Mid-Continent installed the lights according to 

Bourquin's diagram. Consequently, the add-on lights were not 

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automatically deenergized by the methane monitor when the methane 

concentration exceeded two percent. 

Mid-Continent made no additional modifications to the lights 

until nine days before the explosion. At that time, a new cover 

plate was installed with a light switch allowing the lights to be 

turned on and off manually. The cover plate was installed with a 

wire pinched in the flange of the cover plate, leaving an opening 

in excess of 0.015 inch. MSHA regulations limit the acceptable 

size of such an opening to 0.004 inch. 

MSHA's post-explosion investigators concluded that one of the 

miners had manually switched off the light on the continuous miner 

after the methane monitor had deenergized the other electrical 

equipment in the tunnel. Use of the switch caused an intense arc 

inside the explosion-proof compartment, which ignited the methane 

that had entered the compartment. The fire in the compartment 

escaped through the opening in the flange of the cover plate and 

ignited the methane in the mine, thereby causing the explosion. 

According to plaintiffs, if the lights had been automatically 

deenergized by the methane monitor, the manual light switch would 

not have been used. The lights did not deenergize because they 

were wired to the power source above the methane monitor, which, 

plaintiffs allege, was a direct result of Marshall's response to 

Bourquin's question. 

Inconsistent Factual Findings 

Plaintiffs first contend that the district court abused its 

discretion by making factual findings in Ayala VI inconsistent 

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with its findings in Ayala IV. Plaintiffs apparently believe that 

the law of the case doctrine precludes revision of the district 

court's findings on remand. We disagree. 

The law of the case doctrine applies only to rules of law 

decided in the same case. Mason v. Texaco. Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 

1553 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1941 (1992). 

Plaintiffs admit that the doctrine does not prohibit 

reconsideration of the district court's prior factual findings. 

See United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue 

that a district court "abuses its discretion when, while 

pretending to interpret its original findings, it issues new 

findings that are not consistent with the original findings." But 

plaintiffs cite no authority for this argument. Thus, we review 

the district court's factual findings in Ayala VI only for clear 

error. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891, 

897 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992). After 

reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court's 

factual findings are not clearly erroneous. 

Duty of Care 

Plaintiffs' claim is predicated on the United States' waiver 

of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. Pursuant to the FTCA, the 

United States is liable in tort claims "in the same manner and to 

the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 

28 U.S.C. § 2674, "in accordance with the law of the place where 

the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See Franklin 

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v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1993). Even if 

specific behavior is statutorily required of a federal employee, 

the government is not liable under the FTCA unless state law 

recognizes a comparable liability for private persons. Zabala 

Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1149 (1st Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). We therefore look to the law 

of the state in which the alleged tortious activity occurred to 

resolve questions of liability under the FTCA. Franklin, 992 F.2d 

at 1495. We review the district court's determinations of state 

law de novo. Id. 

According to Colorado law, the elements of a negligence claim 

are that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the 

defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately 

caused the plaintiff's injury. Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 

356 (Colo. 1992). The threshold question in any negligence action 

is therefore "whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect 

the plaintiff against injury." Cannes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., 

Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Colo. 1992). Whether such a duty 

exists is a question of law to be determined by the court. Id. 

The source of a legal duty may be either a legislative 

enactment or the common law. Board of County Comm'rs v. Moreland, 

764 P.2d 812, 816 (Colo. 1988). In this case, plaintiffs cite no 

Colorado statute imposing a duty of care upon a party giving 

technical assistance to another, so we must examine Colorado 

common law to determine whether MSHA owed a duty to plaintiffs 

under these circumstances. 

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Plaintiffs advance two arguments to support their contention 

that Colorado law imposes a duty of care on MSHA when it provides 

technical assistance to mine operators. Plaintiffs first contend 

that MSHA owed them a duty of care because it created an 

unreasonable risk of harm. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that 

under the good samaritan doctrine MSHA assumed a duty of care when 

it provided technical assistance to Mid-Continent. We address 

plaintiffs' arguments in order. 

Although no Colorado court has imposed a duty of care on a 

provider of technical assistance, plaintiffs argue that general 

tort principles require us to conclude that MSHA owed a legal duty 

to plaintiffs. "A court's conclusion that a duty does or does not 

exist is 'an expression of the sum total of those considerations 

of policy which lead the law to say the plaintiff is [or is not] 

entitled to protection.'" University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 

P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & 

Keeton on the Law of Torts§ 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984)). The 

factors that a court must consider when determining whether a duty 

exists include "the risk involved, the foreseeability and 

likelihood of injury as weighed against the social utility of the 

actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against 

injury or harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon 

the actor." Id. (quoting Smith v. City & County of Denver, 726 

P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986)); accord Connes, 831 P.2d at 1320; 

Casebolt, 829 P.2d at 356; Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 

46 (Colo. 1987). This list is not exhaustive; courts should also 

take into account "other factors that may become relevant based 

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upon the competing individual, public and social interests 

implicated in the facts of each case." University of Denver, 744 

P.2d at 57. Moreover, "[n]o one factor is controlling, and the 

question of whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case 

is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards 

whether reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that 

it exists." Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 46. 

These factors lead us to conclude that MSHA owes no duty of 

care to mine operators in its provision of technical assistance. 

We recognize that the potential damage involved here is great: 

The risk of death and serious injury in the event of a methane 

explosion is quite high. We also recognize that Dutch Creek No. 1 

presented a particularly high risk for such an explosion. That 

MSHA's technical assistance to Mid-Continent would lead to a 

methane explosion, however, was largely unforeseeable. Marshall, 

the MSHA mine inspector, could not have foreseen that Bourquin 

would prepare a separate wiring diagram without submitting that 

diagram to MSHA with Mid-Continent's revised application. And 

even if it was foreseeable that Marshall's technical advice would 

result in Bourquin's incorrect diagram, the subsequent chain of 

events was not foreseeable. Marshall could not have foreseen that 

Mid-Continent would later install a manual on-off switch and that, 

when installing the switch, an opening would be left to the 

explosion-proof compartment large enough to allow the migration of 

methane gas. Thus, the actual events that led to the explosion 

were not foreseeable at the time Marshall answered Bourquin's 

question. Moreover, any foreseeability of risk in this case is 

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substantially outweighed by the social utility of the actor's 

conduct; MSHA's technical assistance to mine operators in 

complying with safety regulations is of great value to both mine 

operators and miners. 

The consequences of imposing a duty on MSHA -- which would 

place the burden of guarding against injury on the agency also 

counsel against imposition of a duty here. Congress enacted the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 to improve the "working 

conditions and practices in the Nation's ... mines in order to 

prevent death and serious physical harm ... in such mines." 30 

U.S.C. § 801(c). MSHA was created to carry out the provisions of 

the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 557a. MSHA's statutory duties include 

"provid[ing] technical assistance to operators [to] 

improv[e] the ... safety conditions ... in. mines." 30 

U.S.C. § 952(b). But mine operators retain the primary 

responsibility for safety in their mines. Id. § 801(e). Imposing 

a duty of care on MSHA when it provides technical assistance 

would, in effect, shift the responsibility for safety away from 

operators and onto MSHA. Despite plaintiffs' argument to the 

contrary, we do not think that MSHA substitutes itself for the 

mine operator when it provides technical assistance to operators. 

See Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 903 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(stating that holding the government liable for undertaking to 

fulfill a duty owed by an operator to its miners would require the 

court "to ignore [the] plain language" of 30 U.S.C. § 801). 

Congress's clear intention that operators remain primarily 

responsible for mine safety is a particularly important 

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consideration under Colorado law. In the absence of clear 

legislative intent to create a civil remedy, the Colorado Supreme 

Court has been unwilling to impose civil liability on actors whose 

obligations are imposed by statute. See Moreland, 764 P.2d at 817 

(even if building code imposed an obligation on county to require 

compliance with the code, plaintiff had no civil remedy for 

damages resulting from the breach of such obligation); Quintana v. 

Indus. Comm'n, 495 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Colo. 1972) (refusing to infer 

legislative intent to create a civil remedy from the enactment of 

a statute creating an industrial commission); cf. State v. 

Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 228 (Colo. 1992) (legislative scheme 

expressed an intent to create a private tort remedy for highway 

motorists injured due to the failure of the Division of Highways 

to maintain a fence adjacent to the highway) .2 For all of these 

reasons, we conclude that Colorado would not impose a duty of care 

upon MSHA in its provision of technical assistance to mine 

operators. 

Plaintiffs next argue that the good samaritan (or assumed 

duty) doctrine dictates that MSHA owed a legal duty when it 

rendered technical assistance to Mid-Continent. Under the assumed 

duty doctrine, "a party may assume duties of care by voluntarily 

undertaking to render a service." Jefferson County Sch. Dist.· R-1 

v. Justus, 725 P.2d 767, 770 (Colo. 1986). The Supreme Court of 

2 We recognize that the FTCA imposes liability "to the same 

extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 

U.S.C. § 2674, and that these Colorado cases concern governmental, 

not private, actors. We nevertheless find these cases persuasive 

because they concern the duty of parties acting pursuant to a 

legislatively imposed obligation. 

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Colorado originally adopted this doctrine in Lester v. Marshall, 

352 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1960). More recently, the court 

reaffirmed the doctrine in Justus, restating the doctrine in 

language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 

render services to another which he should recognize as 

necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, 

is subject to liability to the other for physical harm 

resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 

perform his undertaking, if 

(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk 

of such harm, or 

(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 

upon the undertaking. 

Justus, 725 P.2d at 770 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 

323 (1965)). The Justus court further stated that a determination 

that a defendant assumed a duty to a plaintiff is 

predicated on two factual findings. A plaintiff must first 

show that the defendant, either through its affirmative acts 

or through a promise to act, undertook to render a service 

that was reasonably calculated to prevent the type of harm 

that befell the plaintiff .... Second, a plaintiff must 

also show either that he relied on the defendant to perform 

the service or that defendant's undertaking increased 

plaintiff's risk. 

Justus, 725 P.2d at 771 (footnote omitted). Under Colorado law, a 

party who has undertaken a duty pursuant to the good samaritan 

doctrine may also be liable to third persons who rely on the 

undertaking. DeCaire v. Public Serv. Co., 479 P.2d 964, 967 

(Colo. 1971) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A). 

In Justus, a six-year-old student sued a school district for 

damages stemming from injuries he sustained when he was struck by 

an automobile while riding his bicycle home from school. Justus, 

725 P.2d at 768. The school district maintained that it had no 

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duty to protect students from harm off school premises. Id. at 

769. The plaintiff's school had prepared and distributed a 

handbook of school rules and regulations, which included a rule 

prohibiting children of plaintiff's grade from riding a bicycle to 

or from school. The school also placed teachers in front of the 

school at the end of each school day to enforce the travel rules 

promulgated in the handbook. Under these circumstances, the court 

held that the school district may have assumed a duty to enforce a 

rule which would have prevented plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 772. 

The case at bar is distinguishable from Justus. In Justus, 

the question was whether the school district voluntarily assumed 

duties over and above those required by law. 725 P.2d at 771. 

Here, in contrast, MSHA was compelled by statute to fulfill the 

obligation at issue. The Supreme Court of Colorado has explicitly 

noted in a decision subsequent to Justus that "action taken to 

comply with legislative requirements can[not] properly be 

characterized as voluntarily assumed." Moreland, 764 P.2d at 821 

n.14. Thus, assumption of duty analysis is inappropriate for 

actions taken pursuant to a legislative mandate. 

MSHA is required to provide technical assistance to mine 

operators "to the greatest extent possible." 30 U.S.C. § 952(b). 

Marshall's assistance to Mid-Continent was therefore "action taken 

to comply with [a] legislative requirement[] ."3 See Moreland, 764 

3 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that this court has already 

decided this issue. See Ayala V, 980 F.2d at 1349. We 

specifically stated in that opinion that our analysis and holding 

were limited to whether Marshall's actions were shielded by the 

discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Id. at 1351 n.5. 

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P.2d at 821 n.14. In our view, Colorado would not apply the good 

samaritan doctrine to MSHA's conduct in this case.4 

Moreover, even if Colorado applied the assumed duty doctrine 

to legislatively mandated conduct, at least one of the two factual 

predicates required by the doctrine are not present here. The 

.district court made no finding with respect to the first factual 

predicate -- whether MSHA affirmatively undertook to render a 

service to plaintiffs -- so we will assume the finding was made 

favorably to plaintiffs. But the second finding -- reliance --

was expressly found in defendant's favor: "[I]t was unreasonable 

for Borquin [sic] to rely on Marshall's single instruction." 

Ayala VI, 846 F. Supp. at 1440. 

We review a factual finding by the district court under the 

clearly erroneous standard. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 932 F.2d 

at 897. Our review of the record reveals that, when he provided 

the technical assistance at issue, Marshall was assisting Bourquin 

in revising Mid-Continent's application for field modification of 

equipment. Bourquin knew that Marshall was not empowered to 

4 Our conclusion is further supported by a subsequently enacted 

Colorado statute that limits the assumed duty doctrine: 

[A] person shall not be deemed to have assumed a duty of care 

where none otherwise existed when he performs a service or an 

act of assistance, without compensation or expectation of 

compensation, for the benefit of another person, or adopts or 

enforces a policy or a regulation to protect another person's 

health or safety .... Such performance of a service or .. 

. adoption or enforcement of a policy or regulation for the 

protection of another person's health or safety shall not 

create any duty of care with respect to a third person. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-116(2) (a) (Supp. 1994). Although this 

statute does not control this case, it is a persuasive reflection 

of the evolution of Colorado law. 

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• 

• approve the application and that the revised application had to be 

submitted to MSHA's district office for approval. Bourquin 

nonetheless prepared a separate wiring diagram without including 

it with the revised application. In light of these circumstances, 

the district court's finding that it was unreasonable for Bourquin 

to rely on Marshall's comment is not clearly erroneous. See 

Myers, 17 F.3d at 904 (holding that "the good samaritan doctrine 

will only apply against the government in the presence of 

reasonable, justifiable reliance") .5 

Conclusion 

We find that, under Colorado law, MSHA owed no duty of care 

to plaintiffs. Consequently, it is unnecessary to examine 

plaintiffs' claims relating to breach and proximate cause. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

5 Plaintiffs do not argue that MSHA's action increased the risk 

to the miners. Such an argument would be futile here because 

plaintiffs could not show that Marshall's comment increased the 

risk of injury to the miners over what it would have been had 

Marshall done nothing at all. See Myers, 17 F.3d at 903. 

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