Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00232/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00232-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Schmidt was a City Councilman during the relevant time period. Additionally,

claims were also made against Dustin Escapule, Sr. Those claims were dismissed on May

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PAIGE A. NORBY, dba TUCSON

RANGE RIDERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

CITY OF TOMBSTONE, et al.,

Defendants. 

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 No. CIV 07-232-TUC-CKJ

 ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 190,

196, 228) and Plaintiffs’ Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider SurReply (Docs. 252 and 253). The parties presented oral argument to the Court on March 18,

2011. Additionally, Plaintiffs' Second Joint Objection to Defendants' Amended Summary

Response and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply is pending before the

Court (Doc. 258).

Factual Background

An action has been filed by David Weik (“Weik”) and Paige Norby Weik (“Weik”)

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants City of Tombstone, Marshall Merlin Jay Smith

(“Smith”), Councilwoman Stacey Korbeck-Reeder (“Korbeck-Reeder”) and Stephen Schmidt

(“Schmidt”).1

 

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21, 2008.

2

The parties dispute whether all persons expressing concerns were Tombstone

residents. The basis of some of the concerns involved a previous incident where an

individual was trampled by a trail horse owned by Blue Sky Ranches.

3

Although Weik had informed the City Council that he owned the horses, Defendants

assert that the horses were not purchased until after the permit was issued. Plaintiffs point

out that the permit allowed for Plaintiffs to conduct trail rides for up to nine riders at a time,

but did not limit Plaintiffs’ ownership or possession to nine horses. The horses were kept

within the city limits in a corral or stable area approximately a five to ten minute walk from

the store front.

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Tombstone Rangeworks General Store and Tombstone Range Riders

Plaintiffs operated Tombstone Rangeworks General Store and Tombstone Range

Riders, a trail riding business, at 116 S. Fourth Street in Tombstone, Arizona. Weik initially

obtained a business permit for the store on May 27, 2005. The store operated until August

of 2006.

On December 6, 2005, Weik expressed his desire to the Tombstone City Council

(“City Council”) to conduct horse trail rides within the City of Tombstone and suggested

staging them on Allen Street. On December 7, 2005, Weik submitted three animal use permit

applications for four horses each to conduct a trail riding business within the town limits.

On December 20, 2005, during the next City Council meeting, some people present

expressed safety concerns over allowing single horse trail rides on downtown Allen Street.2

At that meeting, the City Council members discussed with Weik other concerns including

sanitation issues, insurance, damage to roads, staging location, and other organizations using

Allen Street. Two members of the City Council voted to approve the permit applications and

two members voted against approval.

On January 5, 2006, the City Council again addressed the issue. Defendants assert

this is because Plaintiffs requested a 60 day conditional permit. Plaintiffs assert that the 60-

day permit was proposed by the City Council. The City Council voted to approve a permit

for nine horses, with a staging location of 116 S. 4th Street.3

 This conditional permit was

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Defendants assert Allen Street is the main tourist attraction in Tombstone which has

over 400,000 visitors each year. Plaintiffs assert there is nothing to support Defendants'

claim. Other groups, including the Tombstone Vigilantes, the Tombstone Office of Tourism,

Tombstone Chamber of Commerce, Tucson Tumbleweed, Tombstone Western Music

Festival, and the Tombstone Lions Club, use Allen Street for various activities, but their

activities do not involve a horse trail riding business.

5

Plaintiffs point out that, while Allen Street does not have any vehicular traffic, 4th Street

not only has vehicular traffic, but a gas meter was located in front of the Tombstone Rangeworks

General Store.

6

Plaintiffs point out that the Historic District Commission recommended to the City

Council that the placement of the covered wagon be approved.

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later extended. The expiration date of the permit was January 27, 2007. Norby’s name was

added to the permit on July 28, 2006. 

Defendants assert Plaintiffs knew the City had not permitted them to stage on Allen

Street when the permit was issued.4

 During argument, Weik acknowledged that Plaintiffs

knew they were not permitted to stage on Allen Street.

Weik requested a safer staging location from the City Council.5

 At the February 14,

2006, meeting the request died for lack of motion.

Plaintiffs requested permission from Mayor Andree DeJournett (“DeJournett”) to

place a covered wagon in front of the store at 116 S. Fourth Street in Tombstone, Arizona

– in front of the gas meter and above the ground gas line; DeJournett granted the request.

Weik went before the City Council on January 17, 2006, and was told to move the wagon

because its placement had not been approved by the City Council.6

Defendants assert that, due to safety issues regarding traffic and the gas line, Plaintiffs

began staging across the street in a parking lot area. Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs had

not received permission from the parking lot owner to do this; the owners of the parking lot

told Plaintiffs to move the horses. Plaintiffs assert that they staged some rides from a vacant

lot near the store. Plaintiffs also staged some rides from the corral.

On September 19, 2006, Weik asked the City Council if he could stage his horses on

Allen Street. Safety issues regarding traffic and a gas meter were discussed. The City

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Council denied the request.

Defendants assert that Smith discussed the proposed staging area with business

owners on Allen Street. The business owners objected to the proposed staging area. Smith

recommended against the proposed staging in a confidential memorandum to the City

Council. Smith subsequently attempted to speak with Weik about another possible staging

area; Weik refused to talk with Smith.

The renewal of Tombstone Range Rider’s Animal Use Permit was placed on the

agenda for the December 12, 2006, City Council meeting. The renewal died for lack of a

motion. DSOF, Ex. 10.

City Clerk George Burns sent a letter to Weik on December 18, 2007, informing Weik

that additional information regarding permits needed to be provided by January 5, 2007.

Weik provided some of the requested information on January 8, 2007.

On January 9, 2007, Weik went before the City Council regarding the permit renewal.

Weik claimed that the staging area was up in the air, but that he was just seeking renewal of

the permit at that time; Weik did not inform the City Council that he was willing to stage

from his corral area. The minutes indicate that the City Council and Weik discussed zoning

issues and Weik’s complaints regarding the safety of staging areas. Weik informed the City

Council that he would obtain insurance only if his permit was renewed. The City Council

requested Weik return when he had a complete package and had a place to stage the horses.

The minutes from that Council meeting state:

City Attorney Mr. Bays advised the City Council:

[I]n essence because we are still in the discussion phase, the City is only being asked

to approve a permit for being able to ride the horses within the city limits. If the

entity is violating a zoning ordinance then there are other avenues that we can get that

enforced. It is not something we have to necessarily decide tonight on whether or not

we are going to approve or disapprove the permit that he is requesting. Furthermore,

in order to disapprove the permit that is already in use right now, I realize that it is

only a one (1) year permit, but the City is going to have to have a good faith basis for

disapproving a business permit that they previously have already approved. The good

faith basis could be the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Tombstone or

tourist, but not necessarily because he is violating a zoning ordinance that can be

enforced through some other action.

DSOF, Ex. 11, p. 5. No member of the City Council moved to approve the Animal Use

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7

Plaintiffs point to the deposition of Brenda Ikirt in which she indicates that the City

Council was required to send a denial letter of application. PSSOF, Ex. 47 (Doc. 222-4), p.

139.

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Permit renewal for Tombstone Range Riders for the operation of trail rides and the request

died for lack of a motion.

Defendants assert that the City Attorney has indicated that additional information

(including home addresses, proof of insurance, staging area, names and information

regarding wranglers, Weik’s driver’s license number, and $100 deposit per animal) was not

provided to the City Council. DSOF, Ex. 27. However, the minutes of the January 9, 2007,

City Council meeting indicate that City Clerk George Burns stated that “Mr. Weik has

provided the information that we requested such as driver's license, certifications, the owners

of the businesses, and will provide a copy of the certificate of insurance upon approval

because it is not refundable.” DSOF, Ex. 11, p. 2. Defendants point out that Weik never

had a valid driver’s license during this time although it is a requirement of the permit.

Weik did not return to the City Council with a proposed staging area and did not

address questions from the City Attorney regarding the permit application. 

Plaintiffs’ insurance expired on January 20, 2007. Pursuant to the City Code, the

permit was immediately deemed cancelled when the insurance expired.

Plaintiffs asserts that the City of Tombstone never sent Plaintiffs a Letter of Denial.7

The trail ride business was dissolved on January 24, 2007. No citation for any

violation of safety or city codes was ever issued to Weik, Norby, the Tombstone Range Rider

business, or the Tombstone Range Rider wranglers.

Contacts Between Smith and Weik

Reports from Kitchel and Fike

Defendants assert that, on May 16, 2006, Harvey Kitchel (“Kitchel”) contacted the

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The relationship between Weik and Norby ended at the end of May 2006.

Defendants assert that Norby had hired Kitchel to investigate Weik after she learned that he

was still married and that Norby had given money to Weik on a promise that they would be

married. Plaintiffs assert that Weik’s ex-wife did not inform Weik that there had been a

problem with the divorce proceedings and Weik did complete divorce proceedings. Plaintiffs

further assert that Norby did not give money to Weik on a promise of marriage. The parties

dispute whether Norby ever stated that she was afraid of Weik. Norby and Weik

subsequently reconciled and were married.

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Marshal’s office and Smith began conducting a fraud investigation regarding Weik.8

Although Plaintiffs point out that Smith, during his deposition, did not provide a date when

Kitchel contacted him, Smith’s incident report indicates that Kitchel contacted Smith on May

16, 2006. See DSOF, Ex. 20. 

Defendants assert that Mike Fike (“Fike”), one of Plaintiffs’ customers, stated that

Weik had threatened him on May 19, 2006. Plaintiffs point out that, in the letter Fike sent

to the Tombstone Chamber of Commerce, Fike did not state that Weik threatened him. 

Smith investigated the incident. At one point, Smith contacted Weik at the Tombstone

Range Works and General Store. According to Smith’s incident report, Weik permitted

Smith to review the rental agreement between Tucson Range Riders and Fike. Plaintiffs

assert that Smith told Weik he was going to take the Fike liability waivers and see about

getting Plaintiffs’ permit pulled. Defendants assert that, when Smith told Weik that it would

be in everyone’s best interest for Weik to return Fike’s rental fee, Weik stated that he would

talk with his attorney first and left the store. Smith took possession of the waivers;

Defendants assert this was done without objection from Norby.

Smith’s incident report indicates that Weik returned shortly and indicated that his

attorney agreed that it would probably be best to refund the money. See DSOF, Ex. 20.

Plaintiffs assert the attorney returned with Weik and the attorney spoke with Smith.

Plaintiffs assert Weik discovered that Smith had taken the waivers without authorization.

Weik’s attorney arranged for the return of the waivers from Smith. PSSOF, Ex. 76, p. 238.

During his deposition, Smith stated that he took the waivers without asking permission.

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PSSOF, Ex. 76, p. 236-37.

Smith referred the Fike matter to the prosecutor on June 6, 2006. Although Weik was

formally charged, the charges were dismissed on February 2, 2007. PSSOF, Exs. 90-91.

Hitching Rail Incident

On May 24, 2006, Weik, in western wear, was standing at the hitching rail on 4th

Street and Allen Street. Weik asserts that Smith pushed Weik against a rail and tried to pull

out Weik’s gun. Weik further asserts that, when Weik turned around, Smith said, “No one

is watching your back,” and walked away. Witness Randy Tamplin (“Tamplin”) testified at

deposition that Smith put a hand or fist on Weik’s back and grabbed Weik’s gun. PSSOF,

Ex. 83, p. 48. Mike Jones (“Jones”) testified during his deposition that Smith shoved Weik

on the shoulder and tried to pull his gun and that it did not seem like Smith was merely

horsing around; he also testified that Weik had "smirked like what a jerk. What an idiot.”

PSSOF, Ex. 81, pp. 33, 60-61. In a June 14, 2006, memorandum to the Tombstone Mayor

and City Council, Smith stated that he “did in fact walk up behind Mr. Weik and put [his]

hand on the butt of one of [Weik’s] guns and shook it. At the same time [Smith] put a finger

in the small of [Weik’s] back and said ‘who’s watching your back David?’ [Smith] made

no attempt what so ever to remove his gun nor would I have any reason to do so. [Smith’s]

conduct and comments were made entirely in jest and [Smith was] quite certain that Mr.

Weik knew that at the time.” DSOF, Ex. 22. Weik asserts that he reported this incident to

the mayor on May 24, 2006, and asserts that he reported the incident to the Arizona

Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) prior to June 5, 2006. PSSOF, Ex. 87. Defendants

assert Weik did not report the incident to DPS until June 8, 2006, after Weik learned that

Smith was investigating him. The incident was investigated by the Arizona Department of

Public Safety, which concluded that the claim was unfounded and closed its investigation.

Care of Horses

Additionally, on January 16, 2007, Weik’s horses were investigated after a citizen

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The Amended Complaint refers to the “Defendant’s papers and effects[.]” Doc. 22,

p. 13. Reading the statement in the context of the Amended Complaint, the Court accepts

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complained to the Marshal's office that the horses were not being fed and watered. The

animal control officer and the fire chief fed and watered the horses and referred the matter

to the Arizona Livestock Inspector. On January 20, 2007, Livestock Inspector Cathe Shelton

visited the horses. Plaintiffs assert that she informed Weik that there were the best kept trail

riding horses she had seen in years. Shelton issued findings to the Livestock and Agricultural

Department and closed the file.

City Council Aspirations of Weik

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Weik expressed interest in running for City

Council. PSSOF, Ex. 2 pp. 69-70. Plaintiffs assert that Dwayne Harris intended to run for

another City Council position with Weik. DeJournett stated in an affidavit that Weik told

him many times that Weik wanted to run for City Council. When asked by the Court during

argument what evidence existed that any of the Defendants knew of Weik’s aspirations,

Weik indicated that Tombstone is a small town and things get around by word of mouth.

However, no evidence is before the Court that disputes the deposition testimony of Tamplin

and Jones that they were not aware Weik was interested in running for City Council.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on May 21, 2007. The Complaint was dismissed with

leave to amend and, on March 21, 2008, an Amended Complaint was filed. The Amended

Complaint alleged claims of defamation, harassment, false light invasion of privacy,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, assault, respondeat superior, and conspiracy. The

Amended Complaint also alleged violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment,

Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The assault claim and the Fourth

Amendment claim as to Plaintiffs’ papers and effects were alleged against Smith alone.9

 The

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28 this statement to mean the Plaintiffs’ papers and effects.

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remaining claims were alleged against all Defendants. 

Following the filing of a previous Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, summary

judgment was granted in favor of Defendants as to the state law claims and judgment on the

pleadings was granted in favor of Defendants Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt as to the First

Amendment retaliation claim, in favor of Smith as to the First Amendment association claim,

in favor of Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt as to the Fourth Amendment claim, in favor of

Smith as to the Fifth Amendment takings claim, and in favor of Smith as to the Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim. The claims that remain pending before the Court are a First

Amendment retaliation claim against Smith, a First Amendment expressive association claim

against Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt, a Fourth Amendment claim against Smith, a Fifth

Amendment takings claim against Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt, a Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process and Equal Protection claims against the City of Tombstone, Korbeck-Reeder,

and Schmidt, and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim against Smith, Korbeck-Reeder, and

Schmidt. Additionally, policy-making claims against the City of Tombstone for the pending

claims against the individuals Defendants remain pending.

On March 30, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 190,

196, 228). A Response and a Reply were filed. On December 23, 2010, this Court granted

permission for Plaintiffs to file an Amended Response. In issuing the Order, the Court made

clear that the Amended Response superseded the original response and that the original

response would not be considered in resolution of the Motion for Summary Judgment. An

Amended Response (Docs. 244, 245, 221-225) and an Amended Reply (Doc. 249) have been

filed. 

Plaintiffs have filed a controverting statement (Doc. 220).

Plaintiffs have filed an Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider SurReply (Docs. 252 and 253). A Response and a Reply have been filed. Plaintiffs also filed

a Second Joint Objection to Defendants' Amended Summary Response and Motion to Strike

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and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply (Doc. 258).

Applicable City Code Provisions

The Tombstone City Code sets out the requirements for an animal use permit. Among

other provisions, the City Code gives the City Council discretion in issuing permits and to

consider the health and welfare of citizens, number of animal drawn vehicles on the streets,

the probable effect of increased service on local traffic, the character and experience of the

applicant, etc.:

A. Animal Use Permit Required:

1. In addition to the business license required pursuant to title 4 of this code,

shall require each owner, peddler, merchant, itinerant merchant, solicitor or

proprietor, or any agent, assign, or subdivision of any kind, to obtain from the

city clerk an animal use permit, hereinafter referred to as "permit", to be used

solely for the operation of commercial enterprises or businesses using animals

or animal drawn vehicles on public streets within the limits of the city of

Tombstone. Permit holders shall not be granted a permit unless the permit

holder has acknowledged in writing that this ordinance has been read in its

entirety and that, by being granted a permit under this ordinance, the permit

holder consents to the rules, regulations, restrictions, and penalties embodied

in this ordinance and the laws of the state of Arizona and the city of

Tombstone.

2. It shall be unlawful for any person, enterprise or business, hereinafter

referred to as "person", to be licensed under title 4 of this code or permitted

under this title to operate an animal or animal drawn vehicle (also known as

a wagon) on the streets of the city of Tombstone for commercial purposes;

provided, however, the city clerk may issue licenses and permits for said

activities subject to the terms and conditions of this ordinance and such other

reasonable terms or conditions as the mayor and common council may impose.

The mayor and common council have authority to promulgate rules and

regulations relating to such licenses and permits in addition to those contained

herein.

B. Principal Also Liable: Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or entity, or any

officer or director thereof, employing any employees, shall also be liable for the

violation of any provision of this ordinance by its employee.

C. Indemnity: The holder of any permit issued under the terms of this ordinance shall

release and indemnify, defend and save harmless the city, it officers, agents and

employees from and against any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands,

judgments, costs, expenses, and all damages of any kind and nature incurred by or

insuring to any person whatsoever predicated upon injury to death or any person to

damage to property, public or private, or whatever ownership, or damage to business,

provided such injury, death, loss or damage shall arise out of or be connected directly

or indirectly with the exercise of any right or privilege granted by such a permit.

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D. Insurance Requirements:

1. No permit shall be issued or remain in effect unless the permittee, at the

permittee's expenses and without cost to the city, procures, and maintain in

force and on file with the city clerk sufficient evidence of a general liability

policy naming the city of Tombstone as an additional insured covering bodily

injury, including death, in the amount of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)

and one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) coverage for injury to or

destruction of property of others in any one accident.

2. Such insurance coverage constitutes a minimum requirement and shall in no

way be deemed to limit or lessen the ability of the permittee under the terms

of such permit. Permittee is encouraged to purchase additional coverage if at

no cost to the city.

3. An endorsement shall be included on the required policy, providing for

thirty (30) days' notice to the city of any material change or cancellation.

E. Designated Hours And Locations Of Operation:

1. The mayor and common council hereby promulgate rules and regulations

designating the hours of operation and the acceptable areas, sites and streets

in which animals and animal drawn vehicles may be ridden or operated for

commercial purposes. The mayor and common council, or its designee may

limit the number of animals and animal drawn vehicles in any area or within

the limits of the city of Tombstone if such limitations are needed for the health,

safety or welfare of the general public. Limitations shall be temporary and only

for the period determined to address an immediate issue of health, safety or

welfare. Limitations shall not be made unless reasonable and timely notice is

given to the owner or operator specifying the reason for the temporary

limitation. The term "operator" is intended to include persons driving, riding,

or controlling animals.

2. It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an animal or animal drawn

vehicle for commercial purposes at times or locations other than those

permitted and stated on the permit.

3. The city clerk is authorized to issue periodic special use permits to peddlers,

vendors and persons, waiving the normal hours and defined areas of operation

when special days or events are being celebrated.

4. The hours of operation shall be from dawn to dusk.

5. The designated route(s) and loading/unloading zone(s) shall be mapped and

filed with the office of the city clerk on the effective date of this ordinance and

printed or attached to the permit.

F. Application: An application for a permit under these provisions shall be made to

the city clerk and shall include the following information:

1. The name, address and telephone number, both business and personal of the

applicant; in the case of an S corporation or closely held corporations, limited

liability company or partnership, the names of the shareholders or owners,

partners of officers with authority to act on behalf of the corporation or

partnership. 

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2. The number of animals other than those connected to an animal drawn

vehicle to be operated; not to exceed four (4) per permit holder.

3. A specific description of the area and the streets on which the animal drawn

vehicle is to be operated; to include a description of city property and proposed

ticket booths or structures.

4. Such other information as the city clerk may require; including the name of

animal riders or animal drawn vehicle drivers, their ages and driver license

numbers. After submission of initial application, the same information must

be submitted for new drivers at the time the driver is hired. Permit holders

shall be responsible for keeping the information contained on their application

current.

G. Requirements For Issuance: A permit issued under this ordinance shall be subject

to the following requirements:

1. The permit shall be valid for a period of not more than twelve (12) months

after the date of issuance and may be revoked or suspended for cause. The

expiration date of each permit shall be shown on the permit, and each permit

shall expire at twelve o'clock (12:00) midnight on the expiration date. Any

permit holder may renew a permit by submitting the same application with any

updates or changes noted.

2. A permit issued under this ordinance is valid only for the applicant and is

not transferable.

3. In addition to the permit holder's name and such other information required

by the city clerk, the permit shall contain the following:

a. The period of time for which the permit is issued;

b. A statement that the permit issued is not transferable. In the case of

a corporation, limited liability company or partnership, it shall be

unlawful for the permit holder to transfer the permit to any person,

shareholder, partner, owner or other entity not listed on the original

application.

c. The locations and hours of the operation; and

d. A statement that the permit is subject to the provisions of this

ordinance.

4. The permit holder shall designate by signing the permit that:

a. The permit holder is authorized to sign the permit;

b. The information contained in the application and permit are true and

accurate to the best of the undersign's knowledge and belief;

c. This chapter has been read and understood in its entirety and that the

permit holder consents and binds those operating under this permit to

the rules, regulations, restrictions and penalties described herein.

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H. Standards Of Issuance And Renewal:

1. If the city clerk finds upon application for a new permit that existing

commercial animal drawn transportation for hire is adequate to meet the public

convenience the permit application shall be taken by the city clerk to the

mayor and common council for a final determination.

2. If the mayor and common council find that the particular commercial

transportation for hire in the city will not place an undue burden on the health,

safety, or welfare of its citizens and that additional commercial transportation

will serve the public convenience and necessity and the applicant can satisfy

the legal and financial obligations or responsibilities of this ordinance, and is

willing and able to perform such public transportation and to conform to the

provisions of this ordinance, then the city clerk shall be instructed to issue a

permit to the applicant in accordance with the regulations and limitations

stated in subsection I of this section.

3. The mayor and common council shall take into consideration the number of

animal drawn vehicles already in operation, whether existing transportation is

adequate to meet the public convenience, the probable effect of increased

service on local traffic conditions, the character, experience and financial

responsibility of the applicant, the number, kind and type of equipment being

used in the enterprise.

4. No permit shall be issued by the city unless the applicant has certified in

writing to the city clerk that each owner/operator has demonstrated his or her

knowledge of horses or other such hoofed animals, animal drawn vehicles, and

the handling of the combination of the animals and animal drawn vehicles.

I. Restrictions: A person or firm to whom a permit has been issued hereunder is

subject to the following restrictions:

1. The rider or operator of an animal or animal drawn vehicle must be least

eighteen (18) years of age and have a valid Arizona driver's license in order to

ensure competency levels and knowledge of applicable transportation codes

of the state of Arizona and must comply with the same when subject to this

chapter.

2. No permit holder shall be allowed to operate more than four (4) animal

drawn vehicles.

3. No person shall be allowed to have an interest in more than four (4) permits

under this ordinance.

4. Permittee shall maintain premises and equipment in a clean and safe

condition, and adhere to state laws and local regulations pertaining to the

proper and humane treatment of animals. Maltreatment to, or neglect of the

animals could result in civil or criminal penalties for offending parties.

5. Permittee shall immediately notify the city clerk of any change of address

or substantial change in equipment or circumstances.

J. Fees: The fees for permits under this section, which apply to commercial use of

animals and animal drawn vehicles, may be prorated if issued for less than one year

shall be as follows:

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1. Nonrefundable annual application fee: One hundred fifty dollars ($150.00);

2. Annual permit fee for loading area in the Tombstone historic district: Three

hundred twenty dollars ($320.00) per vehicle or one hundred dollars ($100.00)

per animal if no vehicle is involved; and

3. Special use permits for animals and animal drawn vehicles shall not exceed

twenty dollars ($20.00) per vehicle or per animal without a vehicle, for each

event. A special use permit shall be valid for a twenty four (24) hour period

after its effective date or until the conclusion of the event for which the permit

is issued, whichever comes first.

* * * * * *

L. Stopping And Loading Of Passengers: The mayor and common council shall

establish, fund the construction of, and clearly designate stop and loading zones for

animals and animal drawn vehicles. Only designated stop and loading zones will be

used by the rider or operator for loading or unloading riders or passengers. No

unauthorized zones will be permitted or condoned, except when emergencies arise or

when the public safety, health and welfare are paramount considerations or when

designated by a police officer.

* * * * * 

Q. Waste Control: Efficient provisions should be made for the immediate and prompt

removal of material deposited by animals. Failure to comply with this provision could

result in suspension and/or revocation of the permit.

* * * * * 

T. Operation/Contract Agreement: The mayor and common council are hereby

authorized to place additional definitive restrictions on the permittee by a means of

a written operation/contract agreement. The general types of considerations to be

included in the said agreement are: route determination, roadway maintenance,

loading and unloading sites; hours of operation; animal welfare, treatment and care;

appearance and condition of a vehicle; vehicle modifications; expiration and

amendment clauses; and authorized seating capacity per vehicle.

* * * * *

V. Suspension Or Revocation:

1. The violation of Arizona traffic regulations criminal code or city ordinances

could result in suspension of operations up to thirty (30) days or permanent

revocation by the mayor and common council.

2. A permit shall be immediately revoked if the permit holder or agents are

found guilty of operating an animal or animal drawn vehicle under the

influence of alcohol or an illegal drug. Operating a vehicle in a reckless

manner could also be grounds for suspending or revoking a permit.

3. A permit shall be immediately revoked upon the cancellation of insurance

as required by this ordinance.

4. The city clerk shall have the authority to suspend under this ordinance and

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10The Court declines to address Plaintiffs’ objections regarding their opportunity to

respond based on “disclosure date” and mailing. Exhibit A is, in essence, a legal authority

rather than “evidence.” See generally, Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long

Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1026 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (taking judicial notice of municipal

ordinances).

11Plaintiffs’ motion expresses concern that the Code presented to the Court includes

revisions made after the filing of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The Court notes that this action was

filed on May 21, 2007, after the latest revisions. Further, as discussed infra, the Court

accepts that the portion specifically pointed out by Plaintiffs as having been modified in

2006, City Code § 1-6-10, was not in effect until November 21, 2006. 

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recommend revocations to the mayor and common council. The office of city

clerk and the office of city marshal are authorized to take any steps reasonably

necessary to enforce this chapter. 

* * * * * 

City Code 8-5-2.

Plaintiffs’ Joint Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply

Plaintiffs request the Court strike Defendants’ Amended Reply and/or its Exhibit A.

Defendants’ Exhibit A is a copy of portions of the Tombstone City Code. The Court finds

this document is not evidence and it is not appropriate to strike a copy of the applicable

code.10 Further, the Court notes that the source of the document, Sterling Codifiers, is a

source used by the Court and the website, http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/

index.php?book_id=541, indicates that the last update was based on May 8, 2007,

modifications.11 

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to reconsider its previous Order denying Plaintiffs

permission to file a sur-reply regarding the summary judgment documents. Plaintiffs assert

that they believe that the Court’s Order was the result of Plaintiffs’ failure to abide by the

Court’s cut-off date for disclosure of discovery. In issuing its Order, the Court stated:

Additionally, the original Response having been superseded by the Amended

Response, Defendants’ Reply is null. Defendants will be given an opportunity to file

a new Reply. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ request to file a sur-reply is null; the Court will

deny the request. 

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December 23, 2010, Order, p. 3. Because Defendants’ original Reply was null, there was no

document that warranted a sur-reply at that time. The Court will consider Plaintiffs’ current

request in light of the Amended Response and Amended Reply that have subsequently been

filed.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants make an argument based on new evidence in their

Reply. See e.g. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied 522 U.S.

808 (1997) (party may not file “new” evidence with reply and then deprive opposing party

opportunity to respond). However, the “new evidence” complained of by Plaintiffs is a copy

of portions of the City Code. There has been no showing by Plaintiffs that they did not have

access to this legal authority when preparing their Amended Response.12 The Court finds

Plaintiffs have not shown any basis to either strike the reply or permit a sur-reply. See

generally Macquarie Group Ltd. v. Pacific Corporate Group, LLC, No. 08 CV 2113-IEGWMC, 2009 WL 539928, at *3 (S.D.Cal.2009), citing 5C Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2004) (“Motions to strike are a drastic remedy and

generally disfavored.”); L.R.Civ. 7.2 (providing for motion, response, and reply); Silvas v.

GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 457234 (D.Ariz. 2009).

Plaintiffs’ Second Joint Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply

Plaintiffs assert the Court did not give Plaintiffs an opportunity to argue the original

Joint Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply during oral

argument. However, the Court informed Weik, who was presenting argument for Plaintiffs

that she would ask him some questions and then allow him to make any additional comments.

After the defense made rebuttal argument, the Court permitted Weik to make additional

comments. That the Court did not specifically invite comments regarding the Plaintiffs’ Joint

Objection and Motion to Strike and Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply did not prevent

Plaintiffs from raising issues they thought appropriate. 

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13Dredge Corp. and Biotics Research Corp. discuss the requirement of oral argument as

to a motion for summary judgment.

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Additionally, Plaintiffs have submitted a portion of the former City Code that differs

from Defendants' Exhibit A in that the City Code appears to have been modified on

November 21, 2006, to specify when the City Council meetings would be held. For purposes

of this Order, the Court will accept that City Code § 1-6-10, which addresses when City

Council meetings are to be held, was not in effect until November 21, 2006. 

Lastly, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs’ Joint Objection and Motion to Strike and

Motion to Reconsider Sur-Reply did not include "'Oral Argument Requested' immediately

below the title of such motion[.]" L.R.Civ. 7.2(f). Not only does a party waive any right to

oral argument by failing to request it, see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th

Cir. 1964), but the decision whether to grant oral argument is discretionary. Biotics Research

Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1983).13 Although this Court initially

scheduled oral argument on this motion because of its interrelationship with the Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court does not find that scheduling this matter for further oral

argument would assist the Court. The Court will deny the motion.

Plaintiffs' Controverting Statement of Facts

A motion for summary judgment is to set forth the specific facts (with reference to a

specific admissible portion of the record where the fact may be found) on which a party relies

separately from the memorandum of law. L.R.Civ. 56.1. Furthermore, the specific facts are

to be set forth in serial fashion and not in narrative form. Id. 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Controverting Statement of Facts and has sought

to identify material factual disputes in the Court’s factual summary. The Court will not

specifically address each dispute, but will only consider admissible evidence that is supported

by specific facts that may show a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 

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Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted if the movant shows “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party has the initial responsibility

of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond

the pleadings" and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [material] issue

for trial." Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, internal quotes omitted. The nonmoving

party must demonstrate a dispute “over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law” to preclude entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Further, the disputed facts

must be material. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. In opposing summary judgment, a

plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the allegations of his complaint, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), or upon

conclusory allegations in affidavits. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th

Cir. 1992). Further, "a party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by

making assertions in its legal memoranda." S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense

(Varig Airlines) v. Walter Kiddle & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).

The dispute over material facts must be genuine. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106

S.Ct. at 2510. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. A party opposing a

properly supported summary judgment motion must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial. Id. Mere allegation and speculation are not sufficient to create a

factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam). “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

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14To the extent that Defendants argue that, while the City Code specifically gives

authority to the Marshal to enforce the animal use permit, inspect the horses, investigate

complaints, etc., it is the City Council that has authority to issue permits and licenses, see

Minnesota Brd. For Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285, 104 S. Ct. 1058,

1067 (1984) (the denial of permits and licenses is insufficient to state a retaliation claim), that

argument does not address whether Smith’s investigation of Weik caused Plaintiffs to suffer

an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that

activity. 

15Defendants acknowledge that Weik asserts the retaliation was based on his

complaint of the May 24, 2006, incident. However, Plaintiffs argue that the retaliation is for

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However, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 255. Further, in seeking to establish the existence of a

factual dispute, the non-moving party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively

in his favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or

judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809

F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

Additionally, the Court is only to consider admissible evidence. Moran v. Selig, 447

F.3d 748, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2006) (pleading and opposition must be verified to constitute

opposing affidavits); FDIC v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1991)

(declarations and other evidence that would not be admissible may be stricken).

First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Smith14

In a non-employment context, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires that a

plaintiff has engaged in constitutionally protected activity, a defendant’s conduct caused the

plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

to engage in that activity, and defendant’s conduct must have been substantially motivated

against the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. See e.g. Worrell v.

Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Defendants asserts that Plaintiffs have not identified any constitutionally protected

activity that Plaintiffs were engaged in.15 Plaintiffs assert that the constitutionally protected

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petitioning the City Council and considering running for a City Council seat.

16Although Plaintiffs assert that Norby never indicated that she was afraid of Weik,

this dispute is not material because evidence in the record establishes that Smith had

information from Kitchel of possible fraud. Even if Kitchel’s information was false, there

is no evidence in the record to establish that Smith should have known of the falsity. Smith

was entitled to rely on the information from Kitchel in pursuing the investigation. 

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activity at issue in this case is that Plaintiffs were petitioning the government (i.e., seeking

a permit) and Weik was contemplating running for city council. While the First Amendment

“does not guarantee a favorable response, or indeed any response, from [government]

officials,” Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F.Supp.2d 807, 811 (N.D.Ind. 2003), the right to redress

is constitutionally protected activity.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs have not shown that any injury suffered by Weik

would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity and has

not identified any way in which Smith allegedly retaliated against Weik because of his

speech or activity. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 1703-04

(2006) (discussing “but for” causation standard in retaliation claims); Beck v. City of Upland,

527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2008). 

To any extent that the claimed retaliation is for reporting Smith for the May 24,

2006,incident, the Court notes that Defendants assert that Smith began investigating Weik

based on Norby’s allegations of fraud and the Fike incident before the May 24, 2006,

incident.16 Further, Defendants assert that the Fike incident was referred to the prosecutor

before Weik had made any complaint about the incident. Defendants argue that Smith’s

action in investigating Weik could not have been in retaliation when the investigation

occurred before Weik made a complaint. Plaintiffs, however, assert that Weik immediately

reported the incident. Whether Weik immediately reported the incident or not is not a

material dispute. Smith began investigating after the May 16, 2006, information from

Kitchel and the May 19, 2006, information from Fike. 

Defendants also argue that the probable cause that came from Norby and Fike defeats

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if not totally bars any retaliation claim. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66, Beck, 527 F.3d at 864.

While the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Hartman as applicable in only those retaliation cases

where a criminal prosecution results, see Skoog v. County of Clakamas, 469 F.3d 1221,

1234-35 (9th Cir.2006) (holding no requirement to plead and prove absence of probable

cause in an “ordinary retaliation claim” and explaining that proof of an absence of probable

cause is necessary in retaliatory prosecution cases due to the complexity of causation in such

cases), in this case, the prosecutor in this case did initiate charges. Although the charges

were ultimately dismissed, for purposes of consideration whether summary judgment is

appropriate, the Court finds the initiation of those charges requires summary judgment unless

the evidence establishes a lack of probable cause. Plaintiffs have not shown a lack of

probable cause and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

Further, Plaintiffs have failed to link Smith's investigation to any speech or activity

of Plaintiffs other than the Norby and Fike incidents. For example, no evidence has been

presented that Smith knew Weik was running for office. Further, the initial approval of the

animal use permits had occurred months earlier. The Court finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact that Smith was substantially motivated against Plaintiffs' exercise of

constitutionally protected conduct.

First Amendment Expressive Association Claim Against Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt

A plaintiff alleging a violation of the right to expressive association may support his

or her claim by demonstrating, inter alia, some form of government action to impose

penalties for the expression of political views. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.

609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (infringement may be “justified by

regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,

that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational

freedoms”).

In determining whether a group is protected by the First Amendments’ expressive

associational right, the Court must determine if the group engages in “expressive association”

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otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,

648, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Weik

intended to run for the City Council and associated with then-mayor Andre DeJournett and

Dwayne Harris. While the right to associate for the advancement of common political goals

is protected by the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments, Timmon v. Twin Cities

Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997), there is no

evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendants knew Weik was

considering running for a position on the City Council. 

Moreover, in addressing this claim, Plaintiffs assert that Schmidt, Korbeck-Reeder and

Smith were angered by Notices of Claim made by Plaintiffs – Plaintiffs assert that

Defendants retaliated against them by refusing to renew the permits. However, because the

denial of the requested permits and licenses is insufficient to state a claim, see Minnesota

Brd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285, 104 S.Ct. 1058, 1067, 79 L.Ed.2d

299 (1984) (noting that “[n]othing in the First Amendment or in this Court’s case law

interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate and petition require government

policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public issues”), the

Court previously determined that Plaintiffs had failed to state a First Amendment retaliation

claim against Schmidt and Korbeck-Reeder. 

Additionally, the City Code, as to the Animal Use Permit requirements, does not “aim

at the suppression of speech, does not distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity

on the basis of viewpoint, and does not license enforcement authorities to administer the

statute on the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,

468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3253, 82 L.Ed.2d (1984) [Citations omitted.] Further,

the City Code does not grant the City Council “unfettered discretion” in determining whether

a permit should be granted. See Seattle Affiliate of the October 22nd Coalition v. City of

Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2008). Rather, the City Code sets forth the requirements

and sets forth the considerations to be made in determining whether a permit should be

granted. The City Code is content neutral.

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17The Court notes that Plaintiffs have not pointed to any authority that Smith did not

have the authority to act as a peace officer; i.e., any authority that states that Smith was

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The Ninth Circuit has stated:

Outside the school speech context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a law

restricting speech on a viewpoint- and content-neutral basis is constitutional as long

as it withstands intermediate scrutiny – i.e., if: (1) “it furthers an important or

substantial government interest”; (2) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression”; and (3) “the incidental restriction on alleged First

Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that

interest.” [Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 661-62, 114

S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).] The same is true of a regulation that has an

incidental effect on expressive conduct. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,

376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

Jacobs v. Clark County School Dist., 526 F.3d 419 434 (9th Cir. 2008), footnote omitted.

To the extent that Plaintiffs are arguing that the City Code, as applied, has an incidental

effect on their expressive conduct, the consideration of safety concerns (including the staging

of the horses), a driver’s license requirement, and an insurance requirement further a

substantial government interest in the safety of persons. Indeed, even the driver’s license

requirement is “to ensure competency levels and knowledge of applicable transportation

codes of the state of Arizona[.]” City Code 8-5-2(I)(1). This governmental interest is

unrelated to the suppression of free expression and is no greater than is needed to further the

governmental interest. There is no genuine issue of material fact presented to the Court that

the lack of renewal of the permit, with an invitation to Plaintiffs to return with additional

information, unjustifiably infringed on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment expressive association

rights. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against Smith – May 19, 2006

Defendants assert that, in taking and then returning the waivers, Smith did not violate

the Fourth Amendment. Defendants assert that Smith had the authority under the City Code

to investigate the Fike incident and took the waivers without objection. Plaintiffs argue that

Smith was not a certified police officer, was impersonating a police officer, and committed

larceny by taking the waivers from the store.17 However, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Smith

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required to be certified under the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (“AZ

POST”) – rather, the documentation provided by Plaintiffs indicates that a grace period for

compliance is provided for and a waiver of academy attendance can be requested. Although

Plaintiffs point to A.R.S. § 41-1822 for the assertion that the AZ POST is authorized to

establish minimum qualifications, this provision does not address deficiencies, grace periods,

academy waiver, or the authority of a person appointed by the governing authority (i.e., the

City Council) in such a situation. It is not disputed that the City Council appointed Smith as

the Tombstone Marshal. Further, the documentation establishes that Smith was taking steps

to be AZ POST certified. Although Plaintiffs have also provided documentation that Smith

was advised by the AZ POST that he did not have peace officer authority, they have not

provided any basis to conclude that Smith could not perform some functions in his appointed

position. See Tombstone Code § 1-14-4. Additionally, Plaintiffs have provided a letter from

Curt Milam with AZ POST indicating that Smith was not a Certified Arizona Peace Officer.

Milam also indicates that he told Smith he could not present himself with a badge and a gun.

PSSOF, Ex. 87. During his deposition, Smith acknowledged that he was not AZ POST

certified between March 2006 and November 15, 2006.

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was hired as, and acting as, the Tombstone Marshal. See Tombstone Code § 1-14-2. As

such, Smith was acting under color of law, i.e., under pretense of law, which occurs when

an officer’s action are in some way related to the performance of his official duties. Huffman

v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir.1998), quotation marks and citations

omitted; see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495

(1945) (“It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ of law.”).

To the extent that Defendants argue that Smith took the waivers without objection,

Smith testified during his deposition:

A: . . . The waivers that I saw in the store I took, made copies of them, returned

them and then submitted the waivers I had with my report to the prosecutor.

Q: How did you get those waivers?

A: I took them.

Q: You took them?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Without permission?

A: I didn’t ask permission.

Q: Did you ask David for those waivers?

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18Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known." Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.

1997), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396

(1982). Any genuine issues of material fact concerning the underlying facts of what the

officer knew or what the officer did are questions of fact for the jury. Acosta v. City and

County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Sinaloa Lake Owners

Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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A: No, I took the waivers. I said, “I’m taking these for evidence and I’m going

to make copies and bring them back”.

Q: Didn’t David refuse you those waivers?

A: I got the waivers, so obviously he did not refuse – 

Q: I’m going to object, non-responsive. Did you ask David for the waivers?

A: No, I took the waivers.

PSSOF, Ex. 76, p. 236-37.

In the Fourth Amendment context, the Ninth Circuit has stated that consent may not

be shown by a failure to object. See Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th

Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1990). Although

consent to a warrantless search or seizure can be inferred from nonverbal actions, it “must

be ‘unequivocal and specific’ and ‘freely and intelligently given.’” United States v. Basher,

629 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324,

1328 (9th Cir.1997). The dispute about whether consent was given for the seizure constitutes

a dispute of material fact. See e.g. Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 1996).

“Because the conduct alleged by plaintiffs would be clearly unlawful and because a material

dispute of fact exists, [. . . Smith] is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity[.]” Id.

18

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that, while “some governmental intrusions

may be so minor as not to violate the Fourth Amendment at all, . . . it has never held that

actions that do violate the Fourth Amendment may result in such little harm that § 1983 is

not an available remedy.” Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir.

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19In the context of suppression of evidence during a criminal proceeding, the Ninth

Circuit considered whether the defendant had been inconvenienced or whether his plans had

been interfered with. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984). During his

deposition, Weik testified that Smith contacted him around 11:00 or 11:30 and that they met

at the store to talk about the Fike incident. PSSOF, p, 149. Weik further testified that his

attorney had arranged for Weik to retrieve the waivers from the Marshal’s office at 3:00.

PSSOF, p. 154. In other words, Smith interfered with Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights,

by the seizure of the waivers, for no more than four hours. However, Weik was

inconvenienced in that he personally and through his attorney had to take actions to retrieve

the waivers. Moreover, accepting all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties, Smith acted after being denied permission to take the waivers.

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2003), overruled on other grounds.19 This Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of Plaintiffs

against Smith may proceed.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against Smith – May 24, 2006

Defendants also assert the May 24, 2006, incident does not constitute a Fourth

Amendment violation. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). The

Supreme Court has stated that “[a] ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections

occurs only when government actors have, by means of physical force or show of authority,

in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10,

109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), alterations and quotations omitted. A seizure takes

place when, “taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the

police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty

to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’” Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,

629, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003), quotation omitted.

The parties dispute what occurred during this incident. Accepting all reasonable

inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the non-moving parties, Smith restrained the liberty of Weik

by pushing him against a rail and trying to remove his gun. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has

stated that “[g]ratuitous and completely unnecessary acts of violence by the police during a

seizure violate the Fourth Amendment.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir.

2001), citing McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir.1988). “Because the

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conduct alleged by plaintiffs would be clearly unlawful and because a material dispute of fact

exists, [. . . Smith] is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity[.]”

Marks, 102 F.3d 1012 at 1032. This Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of Weik against

Smith may proceed.

Fifth Amendment Takings Claim Against Korbeck-Reeder and Schmidt

A Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim is considered non-categorical when the

alleged taking “is the consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts only

some of the uses that would otherwise be available to the property owner, but leaves the

owner with substantial viable economic use.” Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d

155, 1362 (Fed.Cir. 2011), citation omitted. The determination of whether an actionable

non-categorical taking has occurred requires a fact-based inquiry into (1) the character of the

governmental action; (2) the economic impact of the action on the plaintiff; and (3) the

effects of the governmental action on the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the

plaintiff. See, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2081, 161

L.Ed.2d 876 (2005); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct.

2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); American Pelagic Fishing Co., LP v. United States, 379

F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2004).

As argued by Defendants, Plaintiffs have not shown that they were entitled to or had

a protectable property interest in the permits. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,

494, 93 S. Ct. 801 (1973) (property right must have indicia of rights such as transferability

and excludability). The requested permits were within the discretion of the City Council,

were limited in duration, were not transferrable, and did not permit Plaintiffs to exclude

anyone.

Moreover, where a government decision diminishes the value of private property, the

act does not constitute a taking requiring compensation if, despite the regulation, a reasonable

use of the regulated property still exists. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th

Cir.2002). Indeed, “[a] requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a

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certain use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense: after all, the

very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the

landowner free to use the property as desired.” United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127, 106 S.Ct. 455, 459, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985). It is only when the

effect of a permit denial is to prevent “economically viable” use of the property in question

can it be said that a taking has occurred. Id. While the “economic impact of the action on

[Plaintiffs’ interest in the horses and the rental interest in the stable] is presumably

substantial,” it potentially could have been “temporary” if Plaintiffs had sought to address

the concerns of the City Council. Carr HUML Investors, LLC v. Arizona, CV 05-2233 PHX

MEA, CV 05-2470 PHX MEA, CV 06-2636 PHX MEA, 2007 WL 4403981 *17 (D.Ariz.

2007).

Defendants point out that the original permits were to stage the horses on 4th Street

and Plaintiffs were not complying with those permits. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute that

the City Council was informed that the staging area issue was unresolved. In other words,

the requested permits did not resolve the staging area issue and it appears that Plaintiffs were

seeking to obtain permits for which Plaintiffs did not intend to comply. The governmental

action in not voting on the requested permits (which, as a practical matter, constitutes a

denial of the permits) was within the City Council’s discretion to issue permits, limit permits,

and place restrictions on permits. See Erdelyi v. O'Brien, 680 F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1982),

citation omitted ("Whether the statute creates a property interest in concealed weapons

licenses depends ‘largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language

that restricts the discretion of the (issuing authority) to deny licenses to applicants who claim

to meet the minimum eligibility requirements.'"). Not only did Plaintiffs still have an

economically viable use of the property, but Plaintiffs have not shown that they could not

have addressed the concerns of the City Council and again request a permit. Summary

judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

The Court also agrees with Defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity on

this claim. Taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the facts do not show that

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Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121

S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1183

(9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the defense of qualified immunity allows for errors in judgment

and protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law . . . [I]f

officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue [whether or not a specific

action was constitutional], immunity should be recognized." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Qualified immunity balances the

interests of “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when

they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808,

815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.

1998). In this case, the staging area issue was not resolved, the City Council was aware of

safety concerns, the City Code granted the City Council discretion in granting permits, and

the City Council’s action did not prohibit Plaintiffs from returning to seek a permit. The

Court finds that city councilpersons of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the

conduct was constitutional. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim and,

therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is appropriate.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim against the City of Tombstone, Korbeck-Reeder,

and Schmidt

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights are those not otherwise

constitutionally protected but which are deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradition

and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty or justice would

exist if it were sacrificed. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138

L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). Plaintiffs have asserted that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’

substantive due process rights by deliberately abusing their power without any reasonable

justification in aid of any government interest or objective and only to oppress in a way that

shocks the conscience. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132

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L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Board of Regents of State

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 

“A protected property interest is present where an individual has a reasonable

expectation of entitlement deriving from ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an

independent source such as state law.’” Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of

Phoenix, Arizona, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). “A reasonable expectation of

entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the

entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Association of Orange Co. Deputy Sheriffs v.

Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983). Where, as here, the City Council has the discretion

to grant or deny a permit, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show an entitlement.

Lindsay v. City of Philadelphia, 844 F.Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Indeed, Defendants point

out that there is no basis in the City Code for this claimed entitlement especially when

Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for the permit.

Furthermore, Defendants argue that substantive due process claims must be grounded

in fundamental rights. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). In other words,

Defendants point out that, in order to qualify for “substantive due process” protection, an

alleged “property interest” must consist of something more than an abstract need, desire or

expectation of the interest. Because of the discretionary nature of the City Council’s action,

Defendants assert Plaintiffs cannot show a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the property

interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Lindsay v. City of

Philadelphia, 844 F.Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Further, Defendants assert Plaintiffs do not

have a protected interest unless and until they can demonstrate that their renewal permit fully

complied with the City requirements and the City Council had no discretion in denying it.

See Aegis of Arizona, L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557, 570, 81 P.3d 1016, 1029

(App. 2003) (“Courts repeatedly have held that a complaining landowner’s substantive due

process and equal protection rights are not violated even when a municipality acts in

violation of state or local law, in bad faith, and/or beyond its jurisdiction.”); Bartolomeo v.

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Town of Paradise Valley, 129 Ariz. 409, 415, 631 P.2d 564, 570 (App. 1981) (since the

record involving application for special use permit showed reasonable concerns, town

council’s denial of permit application was not arbitrary or unreasonable).

Recently, the Ninth Circuit declined to find a legitimate entitlement where the

governing body was not limited in its discretion to grant or deny a permit. Gerhart v. Lack

County, Mont., — F.3d — , 2011 WL 923381 (9th Cir. 2011). In this case, the City Code

set forth prerequisites for a permit and provided factors to consider in determining whether

a permit should be granted or denied; however, within those parameters, it was within the

discretion of the City Council whether or not to renew the permit.

However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that property interests may

extend to benefits that have already been acquired. The Court has held that “once licenses

are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.

Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests

of the licensees.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971).

“‘[A] regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary

or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.’” Id., quoting Lingle v. Chevron

U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542, 125 S.Ct . 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). 

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the City Council did not require strict

adherence to the permit prerequisites on January 5, 2006, when their permits were initially

approved. Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute (although they attempt to excuse) that they had

not met all of the requirements (e.g., no insurance (Plaintiffs assert they would have renewed

policy if permit had been renewed); lack of Weik’s license on file (Plaintiffs had provided

Norby’s license) for a renewal. However, new requirements, not inconsistent with the terms

of an ordinance, may be required for a renewal. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 171.

Here, the City Council did not mandate new requirements, but simply enforced “old”

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20 In relying on Rivera v. City of Phoenix, 186 Ariz. 600, 925 P.2d 741 (App. 1996),

for the assertion that they have a vested property right because they have incurred expenses

in reliance on the issuance of the original permit, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that the

Rivera court ruling was premised on a legitimately issued permit – it was only because of the

discretion of the City Council that certain prerequisites were not originally required.

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requirements.20 Moreover, Defendants have argued, and City Council meeting minutes

confirm, that the City Council was concerned with safety issues. Indeed, the Court notes that

the City Council meeting minutes indicate that safety issues were an ongoing concern since

the issuance of the original permits. The Court finds that there is not a material factual issue

in dispute – the City Council acted within its discretion. Summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on this claim is appropriate.

Moreover, the Court finds that city councilpersons of reasonable competence could

disagree on whether the conduct was constitutional. Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is

appropriate.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim Against the City of Tombstone, KorbeckReeder, and Schmidt

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.

432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “‘To state a claim . . . for a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause . . . a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’”

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, “[i]n order to claim a violation of equal protection in a class of one case,

the plaintiff must establish that the [defendant] intentionally, and without rational basis,

treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated.” N. Pacifica LLC v. City of

Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473

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21The Court notes that although Plaintiffs argue that their horses did not present a

safety issue, they have stated that there were safety concerns regarding the staging of the

horses.

22Plaintiffs have presented evidence of other businesses that have been granted permits

(e.g., Old Tombstone Stables) and others that have not been granted permits (e.g., Horst

T.R.O.T. Stables, LLC); however, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that a trail ride

business has been granted a permit and/or was subject to a different standard.

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U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Defendants assert that a “rational-basis review in an equal protection

analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness or logic of a governmental

activity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Indeed, Defendants asserts that the

actions or inactions of the City Council and its members cannot be challenged, “if there is

any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for their

conduct. Fed. Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313

(1993); see also, Gerhart, 2011 WL 923381 * 7 (issue is whether there is a rational basis for

treating plaintiff differently, not whether there is a rational basis for denying permit).

Defendants assert that the facts present a rational basis for the City Council’s conduct

– the City Council had a good faith basis not to make a decision until Plaintiffs had a staging

area and had complied with all permit requirements. Moreover, the evidence presented by

both Plaintiffs and Defendants establish that all parties were concerned about safety issues.21

Further, the Court considers that Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that they were

treated differently than any other business seeking to conduct trail rides.22 See e.g., Gerhart,

2011 WL 923381 * 7 (“[plaintiff] presented considerable evidence that he ws treated

differently than other similarly situated property owners throughout the permit application

process”).

Further, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence, as opposed to speculation, that

the reasons offered by Defendants are pretextual. See Squaw Valley Development Co. v.

Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (need to show disparate treatment, defendant’s action

were arbitrary or irrational and not supported by a rational basis, and proffered reason was

a pretext), overruled on other grounds. 

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Moreover, the Court finds that city councilpersons of reasonable competence could

disagree on whether the conduct was constitutional. Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is

appropriate.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy Claim Against Smith, Korbeck-Reeder, and Schmidt

To establish a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show “'an

agreement' or 'meeting of the minds' to violate constitutional rights. The defendants must

have, 'by some concerted action, intend[ed] to accomplish some unlawful objective for the

purpose of harming another which results in damage." Mendocino Environmental Center v.

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999), citations omitted. Furthermore, a

plaintiff must establish that there was an actual deprivation of his constitutional rights as a

result of the conspiracy. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006), citing

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Smith told Weik that failure to comply with

his demands would result in Plaintiffs permits being “pulled” and that Smith subsequently

recommended to the mayor and council that Plaintiffs be denied continuing operations within

the city limits. The City Council subsequently failed to approve the permit renewal.

Plaintiffs argue that the dated history of the chain of events clearly establishes the meeting

of minds of Korbeck-Reeder, Schmidt and Smith; however, the evidence merely presents

speculation. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of a meeting of minds to violate the

constitutional rights of Plaintiffs. The Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact

in dispute and summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Defendants assert that this is a frivolous lawsuit, they are entitled to summary

judgment and are entitled to fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Karam v. City of

Burbank, 340 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2003). Because issues remain pending, an award of

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23The Court notes that Defendants did not move for summary judgment as to the City of

Tombstone. See December 1, 2008 Order (finding Plaintiffs had stated claims against City of

Tombstone where claims were adequately stated against individual defendants). Although

Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a policy or custom of the City of Tombstone as to the

Marshal's authority or the Fourth Amendment claims, because Defendants did not raise this issue

in their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs had no reason to present such evidence and

summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims against the City of Tombstone is not

appropriate.

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attorney’s fees and costs is not appropriate at this time.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 190, 196, 228) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

2. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs is awarded

on the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and conspiracy claims.

The Fourth Amendment claims being the only remaining claims, Korbeck-Reeder and

Schmidt are DISMISSED from this action.23

3. Plaintiffs’ Objections and Motions to Strike and Motions to Reconsider SurReply. (Docs. 252, 253, and 258) is DENIED.

4. The parties shall submit their Proposed Joint Pretrial Order on or before May

2, 2011. See generally May 23, 2008, Order.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2011.

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