Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07147/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2006 Decided July 21, 2006

No. 04-7139

MARY ANN BLACKMAN, MIKEISHA BLACKMAN,

BY HER MOTHER AND FRIEND, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

No. 04-7144

DORA CHAVEZ, IN HER OWN RIGHT

AND AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF ERIK CHAVEZ,

APPELLEE

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL.

APPELLANTS

No. 04-7145

CHAWNTAVIA WATKINS, A MINOR,

BY HER LEGAL CUSTODIANS AND NEXT FRIENDS

ETHEL AND JOSEPH HARDEN, ET AL.,

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APPELLEES

v.

CLIFFORD B. JANEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

CEO/SUPERINTENDENT, D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

APPELLANTS

No. 04-7147

DE’MITRIA RICE, A MINOR,

BY HER MOTHER ALICIA RICE, NEXT FRIEND, ETC. ,

APPELLEES

v.

CLIFFORD B. JANEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

CEO/SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00330)

(No. 97cv01629)

(No. 98cv03036)

(No. 98cv03081)

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, District of

Columbia, argued the cause for the appellants. Robert J.

Spagnoletti, Attorney General and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy

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1

We review three district court orders: Blackman v. District of

Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2004), Chavez v. District of

Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004), and Watkins v. Vance,

328 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2004), in which order the district court

granted the attorney’s fees petitions in both Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-

cv-3081 and Rice v. Vance, No. 00-cv-0330. Notices of appeal were

filed in all four cases. Between the district court orders and the

notices of appeal, Clifford Janey replaced Paul Vance as

CEO/Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools and

as defendant in Watkins v. Vance (now Watkins v. Janey) and Rice v.

Vance (now Rice v. Janey). We sua sponte consolidated for briefing

and argument these appeals: Blackman v. District of Columbia, No.

04-7139, Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7144, Watkins v.

Janey, No. 04-7145, and Rice v. Janey, No. 04-7147. A reference to

“appellees” includes all of the appellees in this consolidated appeal.

A reference to “Blackman appellees” or “Chavez appellees” includes

only the individual appellees in the designated order. A reference to

“Watkins appellees” includes the individual appellees in the Watkins

Attorney General, District of Columbia, were on brief.

Donna L. Wulkan and Daniel C. Lewis argued the cause for

the appellees. Alan I. Horowitz, Steven R. Dixon, Elizabeth T.

Jester and Tilman L. Gerald were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Riders to

appropriations acts the Congress enacts for the District of

Columbia (District) limit the amount of attorney’s fees a party

may collect from the District after prevailing in a suit “under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400 et seq. The appellees1 brought suit against the District

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4

order and the Rice order. A reference to the “District” as defendant

includes superintendent Janey as defendant as well. See infra p. 4. 

2

In its entirety, section 130 provides: 

None of the funds contained in this Act may be made

available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party

who prevails in an action, including an administrative

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the IDEA’s guarantee of a

free appropriate public education. In three separate orders, the

district court awarded them attorney’s fees above the limits the

rider imposed. The District appeals all three orders. Because

the district court did not properly certify as final two of the

orders, we lack jurisdiction over those two. Regarding the third

order, we agree with the District’s argument that an action

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce IDEA rights is

a suit “under” the IDEA and thus subject to the rider.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court as to that order and

remand. 

I.

In response to “the growth in legal expenses and litigation

associated with special education in the District of Columbia

and the usurping of resources from education to pay attorney

fees,” H.R. Rep. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998), the Congress

attached a rider, section 130, to the Omnibus Consolidated and

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, limiting

the amount of fees the District could pay to prevailing parties in

IDEA cases, see Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,

§ 130, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (section 130). Specifically, section

130 prohibited any funds appropriated in the 1999

Appropriations Act from being used by the District to pay fees

to any attorney prevailing against the DCPS in an action “under

the [IDEA]” above the amount specified therein.2

 Id. The

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proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public

Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(20 U.S.C. [§§] 1400 et seq.) if-- 

(1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney

exceeds [$50]; or 

(2) the maximum amount of compensation of the

attorney exceeds [$1,300], except that compensation

and reimbursement in excess of such maximum may

be approved for extended or complex representation

in accordance with section 11-2604(c), District of

Columbia Code.

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Act, 1999 § 130. 

3

The rider to the 2002 Appropriations Act, Section 140(a) of the

District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96,

115 Stat. 923 (2001), is discussed infra p. 5–6. 

4

Hereafter, a reference to “section 130” includes the analogous

provisions in the 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 appropriations

Congress attached virtually identical riders to subsequent

appropriations acts for 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.3

See Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development,

the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 122,

119 Stat. 2396, 2519 (2005); District of Columbia

Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-335, § 327, 118 Stat.

1322, 1344 (2004); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.

L. No. 108-199, § 432, 118 Stat. 3, 141 (2004); Consolidated

Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 144, 117

Stat. 11, 131–32 (2003); District of Columbia Appropriations

Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-522, § 122, 114 Stat. 2440, 2464

(2000); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2000, Pub. L.

No. 106-113, § 129, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (1999).4

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acts.

5

We also considered the fees cap provisions in Petties v. District

of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and Kaseman v. District

of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

In Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.

2000), we first interpreted the section 130 language.5 In that

case, the District argued that section 130 prohibited the court

from awarding fees above the cap. Id. at 9. We rejected the

argument, finding that the rider only prohibited the District from

paying attorney’s fees greater than the prescribed amount but

had no effect on the district court’s authority to award higher

fees. Under our Calloway holding, if the Congress should

someday lift the fees cap provision, a prevailing party could then

seek the unpaid fees above the cap nunc pro tunc. Id. at 9–11.

Following Calloway, the Congress changed the statutory

language in the 2002 District of Columbia Appropriations Act,

section 140(a) of which provides:

Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C. 1988, 29

U.S.C. 794a, or any other law, none of the funds

appropriated under this Act, or in appropriations Acts

for subsequent fiscal years, may be made available to

pay attorneys’ fees accrued prior to the effective date

of this Act that exceeds [sic] a cap imposed on

attorneys’ fees by prior appropriations Acts that were

in effect during the fiscal year when the work was

performed, or when payment was requested for work

previously performed, in an action or proceeding

brought against the District of Columbia Public

Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (20 U.S.C. [§§] 1400 et seq.).

District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

96, § 140(a), 115 Stat. 923, 958 (2001) (Section 140(a)). 

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6

Because the appellees were either “prevailing parties” at the

administrative level or had reached private agreements with the DCPS,

they had no IDEA cause of action. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)

(limiting IDEA cause of action to “[a]ny party aggrieved . . . .”). They

therefore instituted actions against the District under section 1983

alleging a “deprivation of . . . rights . . . secured by the . . . laws,” 42

U.S.C. § 1983—to wit, the IDEA’s guarantee of the right to a free

appropriate public education (FAPE). We have not yet decided

whether a section 1983 action can be brought to enforce the FAPE

right. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), the plaintiffs

pursued a section 1983 claim, alleging that the school district had

discriminated against their child based on his handicapped condition

in violation of the equal protection clause. Their equal protection

claim was brought pursuant to section 1983 and was “virtually

identical to” one cognizable under the IDEA’s predecessor, the

Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). Id. at 1009. The United

States Supreme Court held that the EHA’s comprehensive remedies

demonstrated the Congress’s intent that a FAPE claim be pursued

solely through the EHA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could not

maintain a section 1983 action and the Court reversed the grant of

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It expressly declined,

however, to address “a situation where the EHA is not available.” 468

U.S. at 1021. In Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1271 (4th

Cir. 1987), the Fourth Circuit subsequently held that certain parties

could maintain a section 1983 action to enforce an EHA claim. There,

the plaintiffs, like the appellees here, prevailed at the administrative

level but faced a school district that refused to implement the

administrative decision. The court held that the EHA lacked an

enforcement mechanism to secure the right the plaintiffs had won at

the administrative level and thus the plaintiffs could enforce that right

The appellees instituted four separate section 1983 actions

against the District, Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 97-

cv-1629, Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036,

Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-cv-3081, and Rice v. Vance, No. 00-

cv-0330, which the district court consolidated with other

pending section 1983 class actions.6 The district court

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via section 1983. Because none of the parties addresses the issue here,

we save it for another day and assume, without deciding, that the

appellees’ section 1983 actions are cognizable.

7

The Blackman appellees are parties to Blackman v. District of

Columbia but after Blackman’s consolidation with Jones and the class

certification, they became members of the Jones subclass. See

Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 37.

consolidated two of the actions, which were class actions,

Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 97-cv-1629, and Jones v.

District of Columbia, No. 97-cv-2402, to form one class with

two subclasses, only one of which, the Jones subclass, is

applicable here:

[A]ll children, now and in the future, who are entitled

to have DCPS provide them with a free appropriate

public education [FAPE] and who have been denied

same because DCPS either (a) has failed to fully and

timely implement the determinations of hearing

officers, or (b) failed to fully and timely implement

agreements concerning a child’s identification,

evaluation, educational placement, or provision of

FAPE that DCPS has negotiated with the child’s parent

or educational advocate.

Blackman v. District of Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39

(D.D.C. 2004) (second alteration in original). The court

consolidated Chavez with Blackman and Jones on March 19,

1999, see Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036

(D.D.C. March 19, 1999); Watkins on February 17, 1999, see

Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-cv-3081 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1999); and

Rice on February 29, 2000, see Rice v. Vance, No. 00-cv-330

(Feb. 29, 2000).7

 All appellees are members of the Jones

subclass. 

On June 3, 1998, the district court granted partial summary

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judgment to the appellees on the liability issue. The court

nonetheless declined to grant class-wide preliminary injunctive

relief, believing that where “irreparable injury was threatened

absent some action by the District, the District would not ignore

its obligation to take such action [to remedy violations] even

absent resolution of the claims of the class as a whole.”

Blackman v. District of Columbia, 185 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.D.C.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). By 2000, however,

the district court was dissatisfied with the District’s lack of

response and therefore appointed a special master to assist it in

handling individual preliminary injunction motions. 

The appellees then moved for attorney’s fees under section

1988(b). Section 1988(b) provides that “the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a section 1983 action. 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b). Before moving for attorney’s fees, the Chavez

and Watkins appellees had sought and obtained preliminary

injunctive relief. The district court awarded fees to the Chavez

and Watkins appellees based on the relief they obtained. See

Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036 (D.D.C. March

31, 2000). The Blackman appellees, by contrast, did not obtain

preliminary injunctive relief but instead had earlier reached

private agreements with the DCPS, which the DCPS then failed

to honor. After the district court appointed the special master,

the Blackman appellees sought a preliminary injunction to

require the DCPS to comply with the respective agreements.

Before the special master acted, the Blackman appellees reached

new agreements with the DCPS, whereby the latter agreed to

implement the original agreements. The special master

therefore recommended to the court that their motions for

preliminary injunctions be denied and the district court agreed.

See Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 40. The Blackman appellees

then sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The

District argued that the Blackman appellees were not “prevailing

parties” within the meaning of section 1988(b) because they had

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neither obtained a favorable ruling at the administrative level

nor obtained injunctive relief from the district court, citing the

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home,

Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human

Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). The district court disagreed,

concluding that the Blackman appellees “sought and achieved a

remedy for defendants’ ongoing violations of the IDEA. Such

an effort to secure a remedy through Court-established

procedures is—and must be—inextricably intertwined with the

Court’s conclusion that the violation existed in the first

instance.” Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45. 

The District argued in all four actions (Chavez, Watkins,

Rice and Blackman) that section 130 (or section 140(a)) capped

the attorney’s fees the District could pay them but the district

court rejected its argument. With regard to section 130, the

court held that the language “under the [IDEA]” did not apply

to the appellees’ suits which were brought under section 1983,

not the IDEA. The district court similarly interpreted section

140(a), finding that “[b]y its plain meaning, the restrictions of

Section 140(a) (2002) apply only to cases brought under the

IDEA itself. To interpret this provision to preclude awards in

connection with substantive Section 1983 claims would render

the language in the final portion of the sentence incomplete

because there is no reference to actions brought under Section

1983.” Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 35; see Blackman, 328 F.

Supp. 2d at 43 n.3; Chavez, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 22. The court

also rejected the District’s argument that the court’s

interpretation would render section 140(a)’s opening

proviso—“Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C. 1988, 29

U.S.C. 794a, or any other law” (emphasis added)—superfluous.

See Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 43 n.3; Chavez, 328 F. Supp.

2d at 23; Watkins, 328 F. Supp.2d at 34–36. The court gave two

reasons for its construction. First, “the provision still prevents

parties from using other statutes, including Section 1988, to

collect the IDEA attorneys’ fees awarded for counsel’s preUSCA Case #04-7147 Document #981590 Filed: 07/21/2006 Page 10 of 19
11

8

To repeat, all appellees include the Blackman appellees, the

Watkins appellees (including the Rice appellees) and the Chavez

appellees. See supra note 1. 

Section 140 (2002) efforts by courts under Calloway but that

remain unpaid because of the statutory cap.” Watkins, 328 F.

Supp. 2d at 35. And second, it “prevents plaintiffs from filing

a separate Section 1983 action seeking payment for such past

attorneys’ fees awarded under the IDEA in the event the

statutory cap is ever dissolved.” Id.

The District appeals all three orders, arguing that section

130 and section 140(a) limit the amount of attorney’s fees the

appellees can recover because a section 1983 action to enforce

the FAPE right provided by the IDEA amounts to an action

“under the [IDEA].” It appeals the Blackman order on the

additional ground that the Blackman appellees are not

“prevailing parties.” 

II. 

In this consolidated appeal, the District raises three “merits”

issues: (1) whether section 130 limits the attorney’s fees the

District may pay to all appellees;8

 (2) whether section 140(a)

limits the attorney’s fees the District may pay to all of the

appellees; and (3) whether the Blackman appellees are

“prevailing part[ies]” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b). Our review of these issues of statutory construction is

de novo. See, e.g., Calloway, 216 F.3d at 5 (citing United States

v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

A.

Although neither side contests our jurisdiction, “it is well

established that a court of appeals must first satisfy itself of its

own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary, before proceeding to

the merits.” Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v.

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9

Chavez involved only one plaintiff—Dora Chavez, in her own

right and as parent and next friend of Erik Chavez. See Chavez, No.

98-cv-3036 docket report. Rice involved two plaintiffs—De’Mitria

Rice by her parent and next friend Alicia Rice and Alicia Rice in her

own right. Rice, No. 00-cv-330 docket report. The Watkins order

resolved the only remaining issues in that action. See Watkins, 328 F.

Supp. 2d at 30 n.1. The orders in these cases thus could be considered

final orders if they had retained their separate identities after their

consolidation with Blackman and Jones. To determine whether

consolidated cases retain their separate identity or become one case for

the purpose of appellate jurisdiction, we “focus on the reasons for the

consolidation.” United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA

Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2003). That is, “when

a district court consolidates cases and treats them as such ‘for all

purposes,’ an order deciding fewer than all the claims of all the parties

cannot be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification.” Id. (quoting

Phillips v. Heine, 984 F.2d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal

Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1990),

aff’d, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). Our jurisdiction, if it exists, arises

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which “generally extends only to final

district court orders,” Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning &

Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing DSMC

Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2003))

(emphasis added); that is, orders that dispose of an entire case

both as to parties and issues. See Haynesworth v. Miller, 820

F.2d 1245, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, if the case

involves “more than one claim for relief” or “multiple parties,”

the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to

one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties”; the

court may do so, however, “only upon an express determination

that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express

direction for the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

All three orders—Chavez, Watkins, and Blackman—are

nonfinal because they do not dispose of all of the claims of all

of the parties in the consolidated class action.9

 Our jurisdiction,

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quotation marks omitted)). After consolidating the actions here, the

district court “treat[ed] them as such for all purposes,” id. (internal

quotations marks omitted), including through the remedy phase, see

Blackman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 679906 (D.D.C. March

17, 2006). Accordingly, they “cannot be appealed without a Rule

54(b) certification.” Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d at

216. The Blackman order is nonfinal for a different reason—it

resolved the claims of only three—Diane Blackwell, Dionne Timmons

and Victoria Harris—of more than 150 plaintiffs and therefore did not

dispose of all claims for all parties.

accordingly, turns on whether the district court properly certified

these orders for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b). We review each order to assure that the district court

made (1) “an express determination that there is no just reason

for delay” and (2) “an express direction for the entry of

judgment.” Id. (emphasis added). The Blackman order states

only “MINUTE ORDER granting defendants’ renewed motion

for expedited certification of order under Federal Rule 54(b).”

Blackman, No. 97-cv-1692, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2005).

The Watkins order provides that “this Order constitutes a final

appealable Order.” Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 35. We believe

that both the Blackman and Watkins orders are facially deficient.

In Building Industry Association of Superior California v.

Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we held that the

“express direction and determination is a bright-line

requirement” that prohibits us from “imply[ing] a Rule 54(b)

determination.” The mandate of Rule 54(b) is plain and without

exception. Cf. Everett v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 132 F.3d

770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[A]bsent an express direction for

entry of judgment, an order that disposes of less than all the

claims—no matter with what firmness and apparent finality—is

not appealable . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). While the

Blackman and Watkins orders can be construed to contain an

“express direction,” see Blackman, No. 97-cv-1692, at 1 (D.D.C.

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Jan. 25, 2005) (“ORDER granting defendants’ renewed

motion . . . under Federal Rule 54(b)); Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d

at 36 (“[T]his Order constitutes a final appealable Order.”),

neither contains an “express determination that there is no just

reason for delay” and under our precedent we cannot imply one.

See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Super. Cal., 161 F.3d at 743–44; see

also Granack v. Continental Cas. Co., 977 F.2d 1143, 1144-45

(7th Cir. 1992) (order described as “Final Appealable Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)” insufficient);

Auriemma v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1990)

(order purporting to be “final and appealable” insufficient). 

Despite the clarity of Rule 54(b) and our precedent, at oral

argument the parties argued that so long as it is apparent or

discernible from the record that “there is no just reason for

delay,” the Building Industry holding does not require that the

order contain an “express determination.” Not so. We held in

Building Industry that the district court need not express its

reasoning behind an “express declaration” so long as the

reasoning is apparent or discernible from the record. Bldg.

Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal., 161 F.3d at 744 (“Where the

district court’s reasoning is apparent to us, or discernible from

other parts of the record, we would perhaps find literal

compliance with the Rule quite sufficient.” (emphasis added)).

On the other hand, even if the record indicates no just reason for

delay, an order is not final under Rule 54(b) unless it contains

the “express determination” thereof. See Granack, 977 F.2d at

1145 (“A court’s intention to enter an express determination [ ]

is irrelevant absent an express determination.” (internal

quotation omitted)). Neither the Blackman order nor the

Watkins order meets Rule 54(b)’s “bright-line requirement” and

we are therefore without jurisdiction to review them. 

In contrast, the Chavez order provides in part: “Order

finally deciding the attorney’s fees claims by these plaintiffs;

and there being no just reason for delaying an appeal, it is . . .

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10Section 140(a) applies not only to funds appropriated in the 2002

Appropriations Act but also to “appropriations Acts for subsequent

fiscal years.” For this reason, we need not reach the District’s section

130 argument. 

ORDERED, that the Order constitutes a final, appealable

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).” Chavez v. District of

Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2004) (emphasis

added). It therefore contains the requisite “express direction”

and “express determination.” Moreover, we can discern the

court’s rationale for its “express determination” from the record.

See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Expedited Certification of

Order under Federal Rule 54(b); see also Chavez, 328 F. Supp.

2d. 21. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the Chavez

appeal. 

B.

The sole merits issue before us, then, is whether section

140(a) limits the amount of attorney’s fees the District can pay

to the Chavez appellees.10 This issue is one of statutory

construction and, as noted, our review is de novo. We start with

the plain meaning of the text, looking to the “ ‘language itself,

the specific context in which that language is used, and the

broader context of the statute as a whole.’ ” United States v.

Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). If the

language has a “ ‘plain and unambiguous meaning,’ our inquiry

ends so long as the resulting ‘statutory scheme is coherent and

consistent.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347,

352 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340

(internal quotations omitted))). We agree with the District that

the plain meaning of the phrase “an action or proceeding . . .

under the [IDEA],” in the context of section 140(a) as a whole,

includes not only an action alleging the IDEA as its statutory

basis but also a section 1983 action brought to enforce the FAPE

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right granted by the IDEA. 

As the Supreme Court has noted, the word “under” has

many dictionary definitions and we draw its meaning from the

context of the statute before us. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,

135 (1991). Both the High Court and this court have interpreted

a provision analogous to the one before us. In Ardestani, the

Court interpreted the attorney’s fees provision of the Equal

Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA requires a court to

award fees to a party prevailing in “an adjudication under

section 554” of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)(i).

The Court decided that “the most natural reading of the EAJA’s

applicability to adjudications ‘under section 554’ is that those

proceedings must be ‘subject to’ or ‘governed by’ § 554.”

Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135. The Court also approvingly cited

this court’s decision interpreting the same phrase. Id. Our

decision in St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446

(D.C. Cir. 1989), held that the term “under,” as used in the

EAJA’s attorney’s fees provision, “means ‘subject [or pursuant]

to’ or ‘by reason of the authority of.’ ” Id. at 450 (alteration in

original); see also D.C. Hosp. Ass’n. v. District of Columbia,

224 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“ ‘Under’ is defined as

‘required by[,] in accordance with[, or] bound by.’ ” (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2487 (1981)

(alteration in original)). 

The appellees maintain that the district court correctly

determined that section 140(a)’s applicability to actions “under

the [IDEA]” means that attorney’s fees are subject to the cap

only if the IDEA is the explicit statutory basis of the plaintiff’s

cause of action. Appellees’ Br. 32–33 (“Even with the addition

of the ‘notwithstanding’ clause to Section 140, Section 140 does

not cap the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees any more than Section 130

caps those fees: both sections cap attorneys’ fees only in actions

‘brought under’ the IDEA. Section 140(a) means that when

claims are ‘brought under’ the IDEA, the District is not

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authorized to pay attorneys’ fees above the fee caps,

‘notwithstanding’ other statutes that authorize awards and

payments of attorneys’ fees.”). We agree that such an action is

plainly brought “under the [IDEA].” But we do not agree that

the plain meaning of “under” precludes the applicability of

section 140(a) to an action using section 1983 to enforce the

IDEA’s FAPE right. Section 1983 is not the source of

substantive rights but rather “a method for vindicating federal

rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

144 n.3 (1979). The Chavez appellees’ section 1983 action

sought to vindicate rights conferred by the IDEA. Their action

is “governed by” and “subject to” the IDEA because, in the

absence of the IDEA, the appellees would have no federal right

to vindicate. At the very least, as we articulated in St. Louis

Fuel & Supply Co., their action was brought “pursuant to” or

“by reason of the authority of” the IDEA. 890 F.2d at 450.

Moreover, any ambiguity in the phrase “under the [IDEA]”

is resolved by the opening proviso of section 140(a). Section

140(a) begins, “Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415 [the IDEA

attorney’s fees provision], 42 U.S.C. 1988 [the section 1983

attorney’s fees provision], 29 U.S.C. 794a [the Rehabilitation

Act attorney’s fees provision], or any other law” (emphasis

added). By expressly referencing the attorney’s fees provisions

not only of the IDEA but also of section 1983 and of the

Rehabilitation Act, the Congress intended the cap to apply to

attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the IDEA’s

guarantee—namely, the guarantee of a free appropriate public

education—irrespective of the statutory basis alleged in the

complaint. Were we to read the “under the [IDEA]” language

as applying only to an action labeled an IDEA action, see 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), the proviso would be nullified contrary to

the canon of construction that “[a] statute should be construed

so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be

inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Hibbs v.

Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes

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and Statutory Construction § 46.06, pp. 181–86 (rev. 6th ed.

2000) (alteration added)). 

In an unconvincing attempt to save their interpretation of

the statute—that the cap applies only to an IDEA action

denominated as such—the Chavez appellees urge two alternative

constructions of the beginning proviso. First, they contend that

the proviso responds to our holding in Calloway that section 130

does not limit the amount of attorney’s fees the court may award

but only the District’s authority to pay them in an amount above

the cap. Appellees’ Br. 31. But the proviso in no way affects

the Calloway holding. Rather, the Congress dealt with that issue

by making section 140(a)’s cap permanent. Section 140(a)

prevents funds appropriated in the 2002 Appropriations Act “or

in appropriations Acts for subsequent fiscal years” from being

used to pay fees above the cap. If the proviso meant what the

appellees claim, there would have been no need to make section

140(a)’s limitation applicable to “appropriations Acts for

subsequent fiscal years.”

The Chavez appellees also argue that the proviso was

intended to prevent the District from paying unpaid fees if the

Congress in the future were to eliminate the cap and those

plaintiffs with unpaid fees capped in earlier years were to bring

a section 1983 action to collect the unpaid amount. Appellees’

Br. 32. This construction is also unavailing. The appellees’

argument does not give meaning to the entire proviso. It utterly

fails to address the language referring to the Rehabilitation Act’s

attorney’s fees provision and to “any other law.” The appellees

do not argue—nor could they—that the Rehabilitation Act

attorney’s fees provision would allow them to collect attorney’s

fees if the Congress were to lift the cap. Rather, the cap applies

to a section 1983 action, a Rehabilitation Act action or any other

action to enforce the right to a free appropriate public education

“under the [IDEA].”

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeals in

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Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7139, Watkins v.

Janey, No. 04-7145, and Rice v. Janey, No. 04-7147. The order

of the district court in Chavez v. District of Columbia, 328 F.

Supp. 2d 21, is vacated and remanded to the district court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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