Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chad Alan Lee, ) No. CV-01-2178-PHX-EHC 

) No. CV-01-2179-PHX-EHC 

)

Petitioner, ) DEATH PENALTY CASE

)

v. )

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

) AND ORDER )

Respondents. )

)

________________________________ )

Chad Alan Lee (Petitioner) has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in

violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 59.)1

 For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

BACKGROUND

In two separate trials, Petitioner was tried for committing three murders during a crime

spree in April 1992. In the first trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in the

deaths of Linda Reynolds and David Lacey, as well as kidnapping, sexual assault, armed

robbery, and theft with respect to Reynolds and armed robbery with respect to Lacey.

Several months later, Petitioner was convicted of the murder and armed robbery of Harold

Drury. Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Ronald S. Reinstein sentenced Petitioner to

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2 This Court has independently reviewed the state court records and concludes

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s factual recitations on appeal accurately recount the

evidence adduced at each trial.

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death for each of the murders and to various terms of imprisonment for the non-capital

counts. Petitioner appealed the judgments from each trial separately. In the first of two

consecutive opinions affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, the Arizona Supreme

Court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history surrounding the Reynolds/Lacey

crimes:2

Murder of Linda Reynolds

On April 6, 1992, defendant and David Hunt called Pizza Hut from a

pay phone and placed an order to be delivered to a vacant house. When Linda

Reynolds arrived with the pizza order, defendant and Hunt confronted her with

a rifle, forced her to remove her shorts and shirt, and abducted her. Defendant

drove his Pontiac LeMans into the desert with Reynolds, and Hunt drove

Reynolds’ car to meet them.

Defendant removed the stereo from Reynolds’ car and then destroyed

the car by smashing windows and various parts with a bat, puncturing the tires,

and disabling the engine by cutting hoses and spark plug wires. Reynolds

watched as one of the two, either defendant or Hunt, shot a bullet through the

hood of her car. Defendant testified he destroyed Reynolds’ car so that she

could not escape.

Reynolds was forced to remove her pantyhose, socks, and shoes and to

walk barefoot with Hunt in the desert north of her car where he raped her.

Hunt then walked Reynolds back toward her car, where defendant forced

Reynolds to perform oral sex on him.

After finding Reynolds’ bank card in her wallet, defendant drove her

and Hunt to Reynolds’ bank to withdraw money from an automated teller

machine (ATM). Defendant gave Reynolds his flannel shirt to wear, walked

her to the ATM, and forced her to withdraw twenty dollars. Defendant and

Hunt then drove Reynolds back to the desert north of where they had

destroyed her car. Reynolds momentarily escaped, but Hunt found her and

forced her back to the car. When she returned, her face and lips were bloody.

Defendant claimed that he and Hunt argued in front of Reynolds about

whether to release her. Defendant testified that Hunt was opposed to releasing

her because she would be able to identify them. Defendant stated that as he

was escorting Reynolds away from Hunt, defendant shot her in the head as she

attempted to take the gun from him. Further, defendant testified that he ran

back to the car, got a knife, went back to Reynolds, and stabbed her twice in

the left side of her chest to stop her suffering. Defendant returned to his car

and drove away with Hunt.

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On April 7, 1992, defendant pawned Reynolds’ wedding ring, gold ring, and car stereo for a total of $170. He filled out a sales slip and used his

driver’s license as identification.

Murder of David Lacey

Shortly after midnight on April 16, 1992, nine days after the Reynolds

murder, defendant called for a cab from a pay telephone at a convenience

store. David Lacey’s cab was dispatched, and he picked up defendant. Hunt,

who had waited near the convenience store, drove defendant’s car to the

location where he and defendant intended to rob Lacey. When Lacey stopped

the cab and turned around to get paid, defendant pulled out his revolver and

demanded money. Defendant claimed that Lacey turned around and attempted

to grab the gun. Defendant then fired nine shots, four of which hit Lacey.

Defendant removed forty dollars from Lacey’s pockets and dumped his body

by the side of the road. With Hunt following, defendant drove the cab to a dirt

road where he shot the cab’s windows and tires and rifled through its contents.

Defendant’s cigarette lighter and bloody fingerprint on a receipt were later

found in the abandoned cab.

After hearing news reports that police had found distinctive shoeprints

at the Reynolds and Lacey crime scenes, defendant drove to a forest north of

Prescott and burned the shoes he had worn during both murders. At the same

time, defendant burned and buried two .22 caliber rifles including one gun he

used to shoot Reynolds. Defendant left the knife he used to stab Reynolds

stuck into a tree at the same location.

Investigation

Police began their investigation of Reynolds’ disappearance the evening

of April 6, 1992, at her last delivery site and found her body on April 7. They

obtained videotape from the ATM that depicted a Pontiac LeMans with

Reynolds sitting in the front passenger seat and also showed her at the ATM

with defendant standing next to her.

A patrol officer who responded to two Lacey crime scenes noticed that

the shoeprints found at both scenes matched a shoeprint he had seen on a flyer

containing information about the Reynolds murder. Subsequently, the Phoenix

Police Department, investigating the Reynolds murder, and the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Department, investigating the Lacey murder, began a joint

investigation because of striking similarities between the two crimes.

Pizza Hut provided police with information about past orders that

included Hawaiian pizza similar to the last order delivered by Reynolds. One

such order had been placed from the home of Hunt’s stepmother. On May 1,

1992, Hunt’s stepmother told police that Hunt and defendant had ordered

Hawaiian pizza in the past and that she had recognized defendant’s photograph

in the newspaper. She gave police Hunt’s father’s address where police found

Hunt, his father, and defendant. Defendant and Hunt agreed to provide police

a sample of their fingerprints and did so that day. A few hours later,

defendant, Hunt, and their girlfriends left town in defendant’s car.

On May 3, 1992, at 4:00 p.m., defendant, Hunt, and their girlfriends

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were stopped by police in Oak Creek Canyon in connection with an armed

robbery in Flagstaff. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and

transported to the Flagstaff Police Department. That evening defendant was

advised of his Miranda rights again and signed a waiver form.

Later that day, a palm print found on Reynolds’ car was identified as

belonging to Hunt. While attempting to alert law enforcement officers to

detain defendant’s car, police learned that it had been impounded in Flagstaff.

Detectives from the Phoenix Police Department and the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Department drove to Flagstaff to interview defendant and Hunt. On

the way, the detectives received information that the bloody fingerprint found

on the receipt in Lacey’s cab matched defendant’s print.

The detectives interviewed the girlfriends, then Hunt, and then

defendant. In defendant’s interview, which began at 2:45 a.m., May 4, after

he was again read his Miranda rights, he confessed to robbing and murdering

Reynolds and Lacey and told detectives how and where he had disposed of the

weapons. He offered to assist police officers in locating the weapons he used

to murder Reynolds.

On May 5, 1992, a Phoenix Police detective met with defendant at the

Coconino County Jail and again advised him of his Miranda rights. Defendant

agreed to talk and then accompanied the police officers, directing them to the

campsite where he had hidden a single-shot, sawed-off .22 caliber rifle and

semi-automatic .22 caliber rifle and left a knife in a nearby tree. Defendant

told officers that he used the knife to stab Reynolds and the single-action rifle

to shoot her. Defendant further confessed in detail about his involvement in

both murders to the Phoenix Police detective and later to two other officers

during transport back to Coconino County Jail.

On May 6, 1992, a Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department detective

reinterviewed defendant about the Lacey murder and robbery because the tape

recorder had not functioned properly during the prior interview. On tape,

defendant waived his Miranda rights and retold how he planned the robbery

and shot Lacey to death.

Finally, defendant testified at trial and admitted that he made the pizza

order, destroyed Reynolds’ car, shot and stabbed Reynolds, and pawned her

rings and stereo. Defendant also admitted that he called the cab and shot

Lacey in the head. Further, defendant testified at trial that all statements he

made to police officers were of his own free will, that he was advised of his

Miranda rights, and that he told officers he understood his rights.

State v. Lee (Lee I), 189 Ariz. 590, 595-97, 944 P.2d 1204, 1209-11 (1997). In its opinion

regarding the Drury crimes, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

Around 1:00 a.m. on April 27, 1992, defendant Lee entered an AM-PM

market to purchase some cigarettes. After the store clerk, Harold Drury,

opened the cash drawer, defendant displayed his revolver and shot Drury in the

shoulder, causing him to fall slightly backwards. Defendant then shot Drury

in the top of the head, the forehead, the cheek, and the neck. Drury slumped

to the floor. Defendant walked around the counter and shot Drury two more

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times in the right temple. One bullet went through Drury’s head and broke the

display case next to his body. Defendant picked up the cigarettes, took the

entire cash drawer from the register, and left the store. Scott Hunt was in

defendant’s car waiting to leave the scene.

Hunt immediately drove defendant across the street where defendant

removed the cylinder from his revolver and threw both parts into a dumpster.

Hunt then drove for several miles, and defendant attempted to throw the cash

drawer into a creek bed. The drawer, however, smashed into a concrete

abutment on the overpass, prompting defendant and Hunt to go back, pick up

the drawer, and throw it into the creek bed.

Shortly after the murder, customers found Drury behind the counter and

called the police. Upon entering the store, the police saw the cash register

open and the cash drawer missing. The register tape showed an incomplete

transaction for cigarettes.

During three separate interviews, defendant confessed to robbing the

AM-PM market and shooting Drury: May 4, 1992, at 2:45 a.m. at the

Coconino County Jail where defendant was in custody for other crimes; May

5, 1992, when defendant showed police where he had disposed of the

Reynolds (Lee I) murder weapons; and May 6, 1992, at the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office in Phoenix where the interview was recorded.

During the first interview, defendant described to detectives where the

drawer first landed and where he eventually threw it into the creek bed. On

their return to Phoenix, the detectives located the pieces of the cash drawer and

the drawer itself in the weeds under the bridge that defendant identified. They

photographed each scene and preserved the evidence.

State v. Lee (Lee II), 189 Ariz. 608, 612, 944 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). 

In March 2000, following an unsuccessful petition for certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court, Lee v. Arizona, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998), Petitioner filed a consolidated petition

for post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, challenging his convictions and sentences in all three murders and raising

numerous claims for relief. (See Dkt. 68, Ex. F.) The trial court denied PCR relief on

December 29, 2000, and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for review.

(Id., Exs. G, H, I.)

In November 2001, Petitioner filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief in this Court,

which consolidated the petitions pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Dkt. 3.) In March 2003, Petitioner filed a consolidated amended petition raising

twenty-five grounds for relief and, in a series of motions, sought evidentiary development

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of Claims 1-6, 8, 10, and 22-25. (Dkts. 59, 60, 89, 101.) In resolving the motions, the Court

determined that Claims 1 and 22 failed to state cognizable grounds for relief; Claims 2, 4, 5,

6, and 25 were procedurally barred; Claims 3, 4, and 24 failed on the merits; and Claim 23

was premature. (Dkts. 94, 106, 125.) 

This order addresses Petitioner’s remaining claims, Claims 7-21, including

Respondents’ assertions that a number of these claims are procedurally barred from federal

habeas review.

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a writ

of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has exhausted all

available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To exhaust state remedies, a

petitioner must “fairly present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims

to the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 848 (1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971). If a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the

state court, it may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal

claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief proceedings.

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides

that a petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal

or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule

32.2(a) may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d)

through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a

prior petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b),

32.4(a).

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A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present

it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims

in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Id. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the

district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available

state remedy). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is

“technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see

also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were

not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Ordinarily “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule.” Id. at 753. Objective factors which constitute cause include interference

by officials which makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule impracticable, a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, and

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986).

There are two types of claims recognized under the fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception to procedural default: (1) that a petitioner is “innocent of the death sentence,” –

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in other words, that the death sentence was erroneously imposed; and (2) that a petitioner is

innocent of the capital crime. In the first instance, the petitioner must show by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the existence of any aggravating circumstance or some other condition of eligibility

for the death sentence under the applicable state law. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336,

345 (1992). In the second instance, the petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

LEGAL STANDARD FOR RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving

a party’s claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or

other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-

04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

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became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649 (2006): Clark

v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the

Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle

advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529

U.S. at 381. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court

precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established and whether

a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254 (d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974.

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. In order for a federal court to find a state

court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the

petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous,

but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)

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(per curiam).

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddux, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).

In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are

presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1): Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

However, it is only the state court’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject

to § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42 (“The clear and

convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to

state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those

circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state

court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal

court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167

(citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state

court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo

because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to

accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

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PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Claim 7 - Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by the

cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s deficient performance, or in the

alternative, by the cumulative effect of the inadequate assistance he

received from all of his state-appointed attorneys.

Respondents contend that Petitioner never presented a “cumulative” claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in state court and that any habeas claim predicated

on this notion is procedurally barred. (Dkt. 68 at 36.) The Court agrees. Petitioner

neglected to raise Claim 7 in state court. If he were to return to state court now, the claim

would be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to Arizona’s rule

of preclusion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Claim 7 is “technically”

exhausted but procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer has an available state

remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1.

Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that he never raised Claim 7 in state court, but

asserts he is excused from doing so because the claim includes an allegation of PCR

counsel’s ineffectiveness and “the Arizona Supreme Court has previously rejected the

argument that a capital defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of post-conviction

counsel.” (Dkt. 82 at 53.) Therefore, Petitioner asserts, it is futile to attempt to exhaust this

claim in state court. (Id.) The Court disagrees.

In Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit recognized an

exception to the exhaustion requirement if exhaustion in state court would be futile.

Subsequently, in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982), the Supreme Court criticized the

futility doctrine, ruling that it does not excuse the failure to exhaust a habeas claim in state

court proceedings. The Court stated: 

If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor

in the federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he

thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has

previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that

the contention is valid.

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3 Moreover, as fully explained by the Court in its February 2005 order with

regard to Claim 1 (alleging IAC of PCR counsel), that aspect of Claim 7 alleging

ineffectiveness by PCR counsel fails to state a cognizable ground for federal habeas relief.

(See dkt. 94 at 6-8.) 

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Id. Following Engle, the Ninth Circuit rejected the futility doctrine and held that the

apparent futility of presenting habeas claims to state courts does not constitute cause to

overcome a procedural default. See Roberts v. Arave, 847 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1988).

Therefore, the Court finds that futility does not constitute cause to excuse the default of

Claim 7. Petitioner does not argue that the failure to consider Claim 7 on the merits may

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court finds that Claim 7 is

procedurally barred.3

Claim 8 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it erroneously refused to suppress the statements he involuntarily made

to police.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s failure to suppress his statements to the police

violated his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 59 at 114.) Specifically, he asserts that his statements

were not voluntary and that his waiver of his constitutional rights was neither knowing nor

intelligent. (Id. at 112.)

Background

Petitioner was arrested in Oak Creek Canyon near Sedona, Arizona on the afternoon

of May 3, 1992, after a police officer observed the car he was driving and believed it matched

the description of a car used by persons involved in an armed robbery earlier that day in a

store parking lot in Flagstaff. Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 596, 944 P.2d at 1210. Petitioner was

taken to the Flagstaff police department where he was eventually interrogated by two

officers: Lee Luginbuhl with the Maricopa Country Sheriff’s Office, who was investigating

the murder of David Lacey, and Mike Chambers of the Phoenix Police Department, who was

investigating the murder of Linda Reynolds. During this interrogation, Petitioner confessed

to robbing and killing Lacey, Reynolds, and Drury. (RT 3/16/94 at 147-80; RT 3/17/94 at

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4 “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts in both the Reynolds/Lacey and Drury

trials. As is customary in this District, the Arizona Supreme Court provided the original

transcripts to this Court for use in these proceedings. (See Dkt. 18.)

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67-98; see also RT 8/25/94 at 11-23, 58-68.)4 In the days that followed, Petitioner made

similar statements to other officers. (RT 3/15/94 at 164-80; RT 8/21/94 at 8-12; 18-23; 32-

36; RT 112-13.)

Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to suppress his statements. At a hearing on the motion,

several law enforcement officers testified to the sequence of events following Petitioner’s

arrest. The arresting officer stated that he read Petitioner his Miranda rights from a card at

the time of his arrest. (RT 1/28/94 at 31.) After being taken to the Flagstaff police station,

Detective Mike Cicchinelli read Petitioner his Miranda rights and questioned him about an

armed robbery. (Id. at 11-12.) Petitioner indicated he understood his rights, agreed to waive

them, and signed a card to this effect. (Id. at 12.) The detective testified that he did not

promise, threaten, or coerce Petitioner to waive his rights. (Id.)

After learning that Petitioner was in custody, Detectives Luginbuhl and Chambers

drove to Flagstaff, arriving at the station at about 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. (Id. at 50, 80.) After

talking to the others who were arrested with Petitioner, including David Hunt, they

commenced an interrogation with Petitioner at about 2:45 a.m. on the morning of May 4. (Id.

at 50-51.) The interrogation lasted a little over an hour, concluding just before 4:00 a.m. (Id.

at 55.) The officers attempted to tape record the interview, but the recorder malfunctioned.

(Id. at 53-54, 90-91.) 

When Detective Chambers and Luginbuhl first entered the interview room, Petitioner

was seated at a table, had his head down, and appeared to be sleeping. (Id. at 87.) Petitioner

was Mirandized prior to questioning, stated he understood his rights, and agreed to talk. (Id.

at 52-53, 89-90.) Petitioner was allowed to go to the restroom just before questioning started

and was given water to drink. According to the detectives, Petitioner never indicated that he

did not wish to answer questions, was alert, spoke coherently, and did not seem to be under

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the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Id. at 54, 91-92.) They further stated that they made no

promises and did not threaten or coerce Petitioner. (Id. at 55; 92-93.)

During the course of questioning by Detectives Chambers and Luginbuhl, Petitioner

indicated he left the murder weapons at a remote location near Prescott. (RT 3/16/94 at 178-

79.) The next day, following up on these statements, Phoenix Police Detective Charles

Gregory interviewed Petitioner. Gregory read Petitioner his Miranda rights, and Petitioner

stated he understood his rights and agreed to talk. (RT 1/28/94 at 116-17.) Petitioner then

told Gregory the general location near Prescott where he left the weapons and subsequently

led officers to a campsite where the weapons were found. (Id. at 118-20.) According to

Gregory, Petitioner did not appear tired or fatigued, spoke coherently, and seemed to

understand everything. Gregory also testified that he made no promises and did not coerce

Petitioner into answering questions. (Id. at 122-23.)

While en route back to Flagstaff with Detectives Terry Kenney and Raoul Osegueda,

Petitioner asked to talk “off the record.” (Id. at 146.) When told that was not possible,

Petitioner nevertheless related to them his involvement in the three murders. (Id. at 147,

155.) According to the detectives, Petitioner told this story voluntarily, without prompting,

and without any promises, threats, or use of coercion. (Id. at 146-48, 155-57.) 

On the afternoon of May 6, 1992, Detective Luginbuhl recorded an interview with

Petitioner regarding the Lacey murder. Prior to questioning, Petitioner was Mirandized,

stated he understood his rights, and agreed to be interviewed. (Id. at 59.) Petitioner’s speech

was coherent. (Id. at 60.) Luginbuhl testified that he made no promises to Petitioner and

used no coercion to get him to speak. (Id.) During this interview, Petitioner repeated his

involvement in the murders. (RT 8/25/94 at 20-23.)

Petitioner also testified at the suppression hearing. On direct examination, he stated

he was a poor student and had a grade point average of 1.2, ranking him 462 out of a class

of 543. (RT 1/31/94 at 5-6.) He thinks he was Mirandized when initially arrested, but could

not remember if he was Mirandized after being brought to the Flagstaff police department;

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he conceded signing a waiver. (Id. at 7, 10.) Petitioner was tired when he was brought to

the station, dozed while waiting in an interrogation room, and was dozing with his head on

the table when Detective Chambers entered the room. (Id. at 15.) He described himself as

“walking into walls” at the time the interview began and only a “little bit” alert. (Id. at 17.)

Petitioner did not remember being Mirandized prior to the interview with Chambers and

Luginbuhl, did not understand that he did not have to speak with them, and claimed he would

not have agreed to talk if he had fully understood his rights. (Id. at 19-22.)

Petitioner thought he told Chambers and Luginbuhl he would show them the

campground near Prescott where the weapons and other evidence were left. (See RT 1/31/94

at 21-22.) He admitted talking about his involvement in the murders to police officers during

the trip to and from the campground but said he made those statements because he “didn’t

think it mattered” in light of the fact that he had already confessed to Chambers and

Luginbuhl. (Id. at 22-23.) If he had not already made those incriminating statements,

Petitioner stated he never would have lead officers to the murder weapons or made further

incriminating statements. (Id. at 24.)

On cross-examination, Petitioner could not remember but indicated it was possible he

was advised of his rights upon his initial arrest, as well as after he was brought to the police

station and questioned by Detective Cicchinelli about an armed robbery, and again at the

beginning of his interrogation by Chambers and Luginbuhl. (Id. at 26-67.) He further

testified that none of the detectives made any promises or threats, or used coercion to get him

to talk. He did not remember asking for an attorney during questioning. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s psychological expert, Mickey McMahon, Ph.D., also testified at the

suppression hearing. He opined that Petitioner suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder

(ADD) and consequently might have had difficulty processing the meaning of his Miranda

rights. (RT 1/28/94 at 164-186.) Dr. McMahon also opined that Petitioner displayed a

submissive personality. As a result, Petitioner was prone to be submissive to authority and

likely to relinquish his right to silence out of a desire to please authority figures such as

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5 “ME doc.” refers to one volume of enumerated minute entries from the Drury

record on appeal filed with the Arizona Supreme Court in Case No. CR-94-0367-AP. (See

dkt. 18.)

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police officers. (Id. at 168-71.) Under cross-examination, Dr. McMahon stated that someone

who suffers from ADD and a submissive personality was capable of understanding their

rights and could also have committed a crime and confessed to that crime because they were

guilty. (Id. at 211-16.) The State’s rebuttal expert, clinical psychologist Jeffrey Harrison,

testified that Petitioner might suffer from a mild learning disability but opined that this would

not have impaired his ability to understand his Miranda rights. (RT 2/10/94 at 6, 8-9.)

In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that Petitioner had been

advised of his rights on at least five occasions and that a preponderance of the evidence

established Petitioner was properly advised and understood his rights. (ME doc. 82.)5

 The

court concluded that Petitioner’s statements were not the result of promises, force, threats,

or coercion, but were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Id.) 

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling:

Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring

his physical and mental condition at the time of the May 4, 1992 interrogation

in Flagstaff. Defendant claims that at the 2:45 a.m. interview he was

exhausted and disoriented because of the time of night, because police had

disturbed his sleep by checking on him, and because he had not slept well

while camping the previous two nights. He further claims that his will was

overborne by the interrogating officers because he has attention deficit

disorder and quickly succumbs to authority figures, a tendency he argues had

been substantiated by psychological testing.

To determine the voluntariness of a statement, the appropriate inquiry

is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the statement was the

product of coercive police tactics. State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 445-46, 759

P.2d 579, 591-92 (1988) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107

S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “The trial court’s determination that

a confession was voluntary will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error.”

Id. at 444, 759 P.2d at 590.

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing and found that

defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights on at least five separate

occasions by different police officers, that he understood his rights on each of

those occasions, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived

those rights. The trial court also found that his statements were knowingly and

voluntarily made and were not given as a result of police misconduct. These

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6 Petitioner also raised this issue in the Drury appeal. The Arizona Supreme

Court rejected this claim in summary fashion, noting it had discussed and rejected the claim

in Lee I. See Lee II, 189 Ariz. at 613, 944 P.2d at 1227.

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findings are not only supported by testimony of police officers, but also by

defendant’s testimony at trial that all statements he made to police officers

were of his own free will, that he was advised of his Miranda rights, and that

he told officers he understood his rights. The record does not suggest that

police tactics were coercive. We find no clear error in the trial court’s denial

of defendant’s motion to suppress his statements.

Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 600-01, 944 P.2d at 1214-15.6

Analysis

In evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, “the test is whether, considering the

totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or

psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.”

Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373

U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)). Coercive police activity, including lengthy questioning,

deprivation of food or sleep, physical threats of harm, and psychological persuasive, is a

necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is not voluntary. Colorado v. Connelly,

479 U.S. 157, 167, (1986). Personal characteristics of the defendant are constitutionally

irrelevant absent proof of coercion. Derrick, 924 F.2d at 818.

The waiver of a defendant’s right to silence must also be knowing and voluntary; that

is, the defendant understood the right to remain silent and that relinquishment of that right

meant anything he said could be used as evidence against him. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.

564, 574 (1987). A defendant need not know and understand every possible consequence

of a waiver of his rights. Id. Miranda warnings ensure a defendant understands these rights

by informing him that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only

with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time. Id.

Although the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact,

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1985), subject to review under the standards set forth

in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), any subsidiary factual findings made by the state court are entitled

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to a “presumption of correctness” under § 2254(e)(1). These include findings concerning the

tactics used by the police and other circumstances of the interrogation. Miller, 474 U.S. at

112, 117. With respect to such findings, Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 626 (9th Cir. 1997).

In this case, undisputed evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that

Petitioner was informed of his Miranda rights on five separate occasions in the days

following his arrest on May 3, 1992, including prior to the commencement of the

interrogation by Detectives Luginbuhl and Chambers in the early morning hours of May 4,

when he made his initial confession to the murders of Reynolds, Lacey, and Drury. During

that interview (and on the other occasions when he admitted guilt), Petitioner indicated he

understood those rights and that he agreed to waive them and talk to the officers. Regarding

his statements to Officers Kenney and Osegueda while being transported from the Prescott

campground where the weapons were found, testimony indicated he made spontaneous

inculpatory statements without being questioned or prompted. 

Petitioner argues that his statements and waiver of rights were not voluntary because

he was “sleep-deprived and emotionally exhausted when the police began questioning him.”

(Dkt. 59 at 112.) Although Petitioner’s interview on May 4 did not commence until around

2:45 a.m., the evidence shows Petitioner was alone for hours prior to commencement of the

interview and that he was not hindered from sleeping and did in fact sleep during this period.

Nothing in the record contradicts the officers’ testimony that Petitioner was alert, coherent,

and not under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Nor is there any allegation that Petitioner

was threatened, coerced, or given promises in exchange for his waiver of rights. 

Petitioner also argues that he was “vulnerable to the officers’ interrogation tactics”

because of neurological impairments related to fetal alcohol exposure. (Dkt. 59 at 112.) As

discussed by the Court in its March 24, 2006 order, Petitioner is not entitled to expand the

record with new evidence pertaining to his alleged in utero alcohol exposure because

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Petitioner had an opportunity during the state court pretrial suppression hearing to fully

develop any facts relevant to his voluntariness claim. (Dkt. 106 at 5.) Although he did

present evidence from an expert that he suffered from a low mental capacity and ADD, he

did not make any assertions of neurological impairment resulting from fetal alcohol

exposure. Because Petitioner did not act with diligence to develop this aspect of Claim 8 and

does not assert that he can satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B), this

Court may not consider Petitioner’s new allegations of neurological impairment in

determining whether his waiver of rights was voluntary.

The Court concludes, based on its review of the record, that the Arizona Supreme

Court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s statements were voluntary was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This conclusion is further

supported by Petitioner’s own testimony at trial, wherein he explicitly stated he encountered

no coercion from the officers during any of his interrogations:

Q. You are not afraid of Detective Chambers?

A. No.

Q. You are not afraid of Detective Luginbuhl?

A. No.

Q. And neither Detective Luginbuhl or Detective Chambers ever made any

threats toward you, did they?

A. No.

Q. They never coerced you in any way to make any statements, did they?

A. I don’t know. I really don’t know exactly about coerce or anything like

that.

Q. Coercion? They didn’t force you to say what you said to them, did

they?

A. No.

Q. You said what you said to them of your own freewill, didn’t you?

A. Yes.

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Q. As a matter of fact all the detectives that you spoke to in this case,

Luginbuhl, Chambers, Gregory, Osegueda, Kenny Martinez, you told

them everything of your own free will?

A. Yes.

(RT 3/21/94 at 144-45.)

Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that Petitioner’s waiver of his

constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The evidence indicated Petitioner was

informed of his Miranda rights on five separate occasions, which Petitioner does not dispute.

Although Petitioner asserted during his testimony at the suppression hearing and again at trial

that he did not understand these rights, he acknowledged telling officers he understood these

rights when questioned. (See RT 3/21/94 at 146.) In addition, during the suppression

hearing, Petitioner’s own expert witness stated that Petitioner had an IQ of 100 and that, even

though he suffered from ADD, was capable of understanding his rights. Likewise, although

the State’s rebuttal expert described Petitioner as possibly mildly learning impaired, he also

opined that this impairment would not have prevented Petitioner from understanding his

Miranda rights.

Claim 9 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it erroneously refused to sever the Reynolds and Lacey counts.

Prior to his first trial, Petitioner moved to sever the Reynolds and Lacey counts. The

trial court denied the motion, concluding that the counts were properly joined for trial: 

The Court Finds that the offenses charged in the Reynolds and Lacey

deaths are of the same or a similar character and also that they are alleged to

have been part of a common scheme or plan. There are many similarities in

the alleged offenses which involve two separate victims, and the allegations

clearly involve a plan to rob individuals who have ready cash available in

order to obtain money.

(ME doc. 125.)

On appeal, citing state law, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s

rationale that joinder of the Reynolds/Lacey counts in one trial was appropriate because they

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arose from a common plan or scheme, concluding “that the counts were not properly joined

under Rule 13.3(a)(3) and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s

severance motion.” See Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 599, 944 P.2d at 1213. However, the court

further noted:

The trial court’s error will not justify reversal if the evidence of other

crimes would have been admissible at separate trials under Rule 404(b).

Admission of evidence of prior bad acts is controlled by four protective

provisions: (1) the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose under Rule

404(b); (2) the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) the trial court

may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) the court must give an

appropriate limiting instruction if requested under Rule 105.

Id. (citations omitted). The court then analyzed each of these factors and concluded that “if

the trial court had severed the Reynolds and Lacey counts, evidence of each would have been

mutually admissible. The trial court’s error in finding a common scheme or plan as a basis

for denying defendant’s severance motion was thus harmless and does not justify reversal.”

Id. at 600, 944 P.2d at 1214.

Analysis

Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. United States v. Lane,

474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). Misjoinder rises to the level of a constitutional violation only

if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair

trial. Id.; see also Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002); Sandoval v.

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2000). Prejudice exists if the impermissible joinder

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Bean

v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1086 (citing Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

Petitioner asserts that “the cross-contamination caused by the prosecution’s

simultaneous presentation of evidence of both the Reynolds and Lacey crimes rendered [his]

trial and sentencing fundamentally unfair. The particularly troubling facts of the Reynolds

murder prevented the jury from an impartial consideration of the evidence against [Petitioner]

on the Lacey counts.” (Dkt. 59 at 115.) Petitioner also contends that failing to sever the

Reynolds and Lacey counts “prevented him from testifying about the Reynolds counts while

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exercising his constitutional right against self-incrimination on the Lacey counts,” thereby

forcing him to forego his right against self-incrimination on the Lacey counts. (Dkt. 82 at

57.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court’s harmlessness determination was based on its

conclusion that under Arizona law all of the evidence presented at the joint trial would have

been cross-admissible in separate trials. It is not the province of this court to sit in review

of that determination. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Moreover, the

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt for both the Reynolds and Lacey murders was overwhelming.

Petitioner has failed to establish that the failure to sever the Reynolds and Lacey counts had

a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdicts. Consequently, the failure to sever

did not render Petitioner’s ensuing joint trial fundamentally unfair and did not violate his

right to due process. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; see also Lane, 474 U.S. at 446 n.8.

Claim 10 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when,

in Lee II, it required that he be shackled.

On the morning of the first day of jury selection in the Drury trial, Petitioner, while

in a holding cell, assaulted a deputy and attempted to escape. (RT 8/23/94 at 19-26.)

Consequently, he was brought into the courtroom that day in both leg and wrist restraints.

(Id. at 21.) In argument to the court, Petitioner’s counsel moved to have the restraints on

Petitioner’s hands removed so he could take notes and aid in his defense and also argued that

such restraints would likely be apparent to the jury. (Id. at 22.) Counsel also requested that,

should the Court continue to restrict Petitioner’s legs, simple restraints instead of a “hobble”

be used because “they are less visibly noticeable than the traditional hobble sometimes used.”

(Id. at 25.) A deputy told the judge that he could not insure the safety of everyone in the

courtroom and that “this gentleman has nothing to lose and as long as he has his hands free,

he is going to be a hazard to anybody in this courtroom.” (Id. at 24.) The prosecutor also

relayed that Petitioner previously had been caught with a shank hidden in his shower slippers

at the jail. (Id.) When the trial court questioned Petitioner concerning his future behavior

in court, Petitioner stated, “Behave myself, I guess.” (Id. at 21.) In a minute entry issued

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later that day, the trial court directed that Petitioner be restrained by a leg brace in lieu of a

hobble and that he be allowed one free hand and a pencil to assist counsel during trial. (ME

doc. 147 at 6.)

Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal. In upholding the trial court’s decision to

restrain Petitioner during trial, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by shackling him during trial

because he took copious notes during Lee I and shackling his hands affected

his ability to participate in the Drury trial. Complying with defendant’s

request, the court ordered that he be restrained with a leg brace in lieu of a

hobble and that he be allowed one free hand to use a short pencil for assisting

counsel during trial.

“Whether a defendant will be shackled is within the sound discretion

of the trial court.” State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 532, 703 P.2d 464, 476

(1985). Courtroom security is within the discretion of the trial court” ‘absent

incontrovertible evidence’” of harm to the defendant. State v. McKinney, 185

Ariz. 567, 576, 917 P.2d 1214, 1223, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S.Ct.

310, 136 L.Ed.2d 226 (1996) (quoting State v. Boag, 104 Ariz. 362, 366, 453

P.2d 508, 512 (1969)). When the trial court’s decision to restrain a defendant

is supported by the record, this court will uphold the decision, even when the

jury sees the restraints. Id. The trial court may consider past felony

convictions for crimes of violence as well as prior escapes in deciding whether

to shackle a defendant. Bracy at 532, 703 P.2d at 476.

Here, the defendant had prior convictions for three armed robberies and

two first degree murders. Further, the record shows that defendant received

a head injury as a result of tackling a deputy and attempting to escape from a

holding cell before coming to court for the first day of trial and jury selection.

The record clearly supports the trial court’s decision to restrain defendant, and

we find no abuse of discretion.

Lee II, 189 Ariz. at 617, 944 P.2d at 1231.

Analysis

The Due Process Clause forbids the routine use of physical restraints visible to the

jury. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005). The use of restraints requires a

determination by the trial court that the restraints are justified by a specific state interest

particular to a defendant’s trial. Id. at 629; see Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002) (criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be free of shackles in the presence

of the jury absent an essential interest that justifies the physical restraints); Rhoden v.

Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). This is because a “jury’s observation

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of a defendant in custody may under certain circumstances ‘create the impression in the

minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy’ which can unfairly

prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial notwithstanding the validity of his custody status.”

United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn,

475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986)).

To obtain habeas relief, a court must find that the defendant was physically restrained

in the presence of the jury, that the shackling was seen by the jury, and that the physical

restraint was not justified by state interests. Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132. A jury’s “brief or

inadvertent glimpse” of a shackled defendant is not inherently or presumptively prejudicial.

Id. at 1133; see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim of

unconstitutional shackling subject to harmless-error analysis); United States v. Olano, 62

F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1995). An unjustified decision to restrain a defendant at trial

requires reversal only if the shackles or handcuffs had “a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir.

1992), amended by 997 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623)).

Petitioner summarily asserts that his “restraints were visible to the jury.” (Dkt. 59 at

117.) However, there is nothing in the record to support this assertion, and Petitioner has not

proffered any evidence to substantiate this claim.7

 Petitioner has not cited, and this Court

is not aware, of any controlling Supreme Court law indicating that a defendant’s

constitutional rights are violated by shackling that is not visible to a jury. 

Even assuming members of the jury were aware that Petitioner was restrained,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that

the shackling was justified was not based on an unreasonable application of the facts. The

trial court identified serious safety concerns created by Petitioner’s holding cell assault on

a deputy on the first day of trial. In addition, Petitioner previously had been caught with a

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shank while in jail. The courtroom deputy stated that he could not insure the safety of those

in the courtroom if Petitioner’s hands were not restrained, and when the trial court questioned

Petitioner concerning his prospective courtroom behavior, he answered equivocally. (RT

8/23/94 at 24, 21.) Under these circumstances, and in light of the trial court’s attempt to

balance the safety concerns at issue with the prejudicial effect of restraints on Petitioner by

ordering that less apparent leg restraints be used and that one of Petitioner’s hands be free

to take notes during the proceedings, the Court concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

determination that Petitioner’s restraint during the Drury trial was appropriate was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court law. See Deck, 544

U.S. at 629; see also Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49, 51 (9th Cir. 1994) (shackling of

defendant during trial did not violate due process where defendant had displayed a propensity

for violence and trial court determined he might try to escape).

Claim 11 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it death qualified the venire.

Petitioner next contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial

court “death qualified” the venire. (Dkt. 59 at 118.) He contends his right to a fair and

impartial jury was denied because the death qualification improperly excluded jurors for

cause. He argues that jurors did not at the time of trial play a role in sentencing and that the

“trial court did nothing to clarify that the members of the venire who were automatically

excluded because of their anti-death penalty views would have been unable to be fair and

impartial in determining guilt.” (Id. at 120.) 

As a threshold matter, Respondents contend that although Petitioner presented this

claim in his appeal in Lee II (Drury proceeding), he did not raise such a claim with respect

to Lee I (Reynolds and Lacey proceeding). Upon review, the Court agrees that this claim has

been properly exhausted with respect to the Drury proceeding only. 

Background

The jury questionnaire used in the Drury trial informed jurors that although they did

not have a role in passing sentence, Petitioner could be sentenced to death if convicted of

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8 “ROA doc.” refers to four volumes of sequentially-numbered documents in the

Drury record on appeal filed with the Arizona Supreme Court in Case No. CR-94-0367-AP.

(See Dkt. 18.) 

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first degree murder. (ROA doc. 162 at 2-3.)8 The questionnaire then asked potential jurors

if they had conscientious or religious beliefs or feelings about the death penalty that would

affect their ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors. (Id. at 3.) The questionnaire further

asked if those feelings or beliefs were so strong “that you could not return a verdict of guilty

of Murder in the 1st Degree even if you felt the State proved the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt?” (Id.) Three potential jurors indicated in the questionnaire that they

opposed the death penalty and that this opposition would render them unable to return a

guilty verdict with regard to the first degree murder charge. After further questioning in

court re-affirmed these views, the trial court dismissed the jurors for cause. (RT 8/23/94 at

37-42, 43-47, 57-60.)

Petitioner challenged these strikes on direct appeal. In upholding the trial court’s

ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by death qualifying members

of the venire and dismissing potential jurors who indicated they were opposed

to the death penalty. This court rejected that argument in State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 546, 892 P.2d 1319, 1335 (1995) (no violation of Sixth

Amendment right to fair and impartial jury where prospective jurors were

questioned regarding their views on death penalty and two were excused after

they said they could not convict at all, knowing the judge might order death

sentence), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1054, 116 S.Ct. 725, 133 L.Ed.2d 677 (1996).

Lee II, 189 Ariz. at 617, 944 P.2d at 1231. 

Analysis

Clearly established federal law holds that the death-qualification process in a capital

case does not violate a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. See Lockhart v. McCree,

476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Adams v. Texas,

448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); see also Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (death

qualification of Arizona jurors not inappropriate). As a result, the mere fact the trial court

death-qualified the venire does not establish a federal constitutional violation.

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Petitioner argues that Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), places an obligation

upon the trial judge in questioning jurors on this question to determine, despite their initial

indications, if they could still be fair and impartial. (Dkt. 59 at 119.) He argues that under

Gray, “[a] potential juror may only be excluded if he or she is ‘irrevocably committed’ to

voting against the death penalty prior to trial, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the

case.” (Id.) 

The Court has reviewed the trial court’s questioning of the three potential jurors at

issue. In each case, the court did follow up on their questionnaire responses and attempted

to determine if these jurors could render a fair and impartial verdict despite their opposition

to the death penalty. In each instance, the juror indicated that he or she still could not act

fairly and impartially. (RT 8/23/94 at 40-42, 45-47, 57-60.) Thus, the trial court satisfied

the test urged by Petitioner. 

Petitioner also argues that death-qualification was inappropriate because at the time

of these proceedings the judge and not the jury passed sentence. Thus, the jurors would

never be called upon to decide if he should be sentenced to death. Petitioner cites no

Supreme Court authority indicating that this fact renders death-qualification unconstitutional

nor is the Court aware of any authority for this proposition. As a result, this argument cannot

form a basis for federal habeas relief. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; Musladin, 549 U.S. at

76. Moreover, each of these jurors indicated that the mere possibility that a death sentence

might be imposed by the judge would render them unable to fairly consider the evidence and

render a guilty verdict if the evidence so warranted. (RT 8/23/94 at 40-42, 45, 58-59.) For

all of these reasons, the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court that the strikes for cause were

proper was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court

law.

Claim 12 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it instructed the jury on the definition of premeditation.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding premeditation

violated his federal right to due process. (Dkt. 59 at 120.) He concedes this claim was never

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presented in state court and requests permission to hold these proceedings in abeyance while

he returns to state court to exhaust it. (Id.; Dkt. 82 at 65.) Petitioner argues he has an

available remedy under Arizona’s Rule 32 to file an untimely successive PCR petition

because the claim is based on a change in the law. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(g). The Court

disagrees and notes that during the pendency of these proceedings Petitioner did return to

state court to file a successive petition. He did not include Claim 12 in that petition, which

was summarily dismissed by the state court. (See Dkt. 125.) Regardless, the Court finds that

Claim 12 is plainly meritless. 

An allegedly improper jury instruction will merit habeas relief only if “the instruction

by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; see Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 1993). The

instruction “‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

141, 147 (1973)). It is not sufficient for a petitioner to show that the instruction is erroneous;

instead, he must establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the

instruction in a manner that violated a constitutional right. Id.; Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). “The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous

instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional

validity of a state court’s judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish

plain error on direct appeal.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Petitioner

cannot make this showing.

At trial, the court provided the following instruction with respect to premeditation:

Premeditation means the defendant’s intention or knowledge existed

before the killing, long enough to permit reflection. However, the reflection

differs from intent or knowledge that conduct will cause death. It may be as

instantaneous as successive thoughts in the mind and it may be proven by

circumstantial evidence.

It is this period of reflection, regardless of its length, which

distinguishes first degree murder from intentional or knowing second degree

murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant sudden

quarrel or heat of passion.

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9 In 1998, A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) was amended to include the clause, “Proof of

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(RT 3/23/94 at 81 (emphasis added); see also RT 8/29/94 at 57-58.) This instruction, with

its statement that premeditation requires a “period of reflection,” accurately described state

law regarding premeditation. At the time of Petitioner’s trial, A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) defined

premeditation as follows:

“Premeditation” means that the defendant acts with either the intention or the

knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or

knowledge precedes the killing by a length of time to permit reflection. An act

is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or

heat of passion.9

A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) (1997). Arizona courts had further explained: “The necessary

premeditation, however, may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind, and

may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Kreps, 146 Ariz. 446,

449, 706 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1985); see State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 289, 908 P.2d 1062,

1074 (1996); State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258, 262, 762 P.2d 545, 549 (1988); State v. Sellers,

106 Ariz. 315, 316, 475 P.2d 722, 724 (1970).

As Petitioner notes, the Arizona Supreme Court has since “discouraged” use of the

phrase “instantaneous as successive thoughts in the mind” in jury instructions. State v.

Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479, 65 P.3d 420, 428 (2003). The Thompson court, resolving

conflicting decisions of the Arizona Court of Appeals, held that the statutory definition of

premeditation requires actual reflection and not the mere passage of time. Id. at 478, 65 P.3d

at 427. However, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Arizona Supreme Court did not find

the phrase, “instantaneous as successive thoughts in the mind,” to be constitutionally

impermissible. Id. at 479, 65 P.3d at 428.

Moreover, review of the instruction given at Petitioner’s trials does not support

Petitioner’s claims of a constitutional violation. The instruction does not permit a finding

of premeditation based solely on the passage of time. First, it explicitly distinguishes intent

as existing before, and as something distinct from, reflection. Second, the exclusion of acts

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10 In the Reynolds/Lacey trial, the court gave the following felony murder

instruction:

The crime of first degree murder, felony murder, requires proof of the

following two things:

First, that the defendant, acting either alone or with another person,

committed or attempted to commit, in the case regarding Linda Reynolds,

sexual assault, kidnapping or armed robbery, or in the case regarding David

Lacey, armed robbery.

And second, in the course of and in furtherance of this crime or

immediate flight from this crime, the defendant or another person caused the

death of any person.

(RT 3/23/94 at 81-82.) The court gave essentially the same instruction in the Drury trial.

(RT 8/29/94 at 58.)

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that are “the instant sudden quarrel or heat of passion” from the definition of premeditation

clarifies that impulsive acts do not satisfy the premeditation requirement. Third, nothing in

the prosecutor’s closing argument or the court’s instructions inaccurately suggested that the

State needed only to prove the time element of reflection in lieu of actual reflection. 

Moreover, review in the context of the entire trial reinforces the view that Petitioner’s

due process rights were not violated. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (instructions “may not be

considered in artificial isolation” but in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

entire trial record). Here, separate from premeditated murder, Petitioner was also convicted

of felony murder with respect to each of the three killings. (RT 3/24/94 at 2; RT 8/29/94 at

69.) Premeditation is not a factor relevant to felony murder.10 As a result, any error

regarding the premeditation instruction did not so infect the trials with error that it rendered

his convictions a violation of due process. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

with respect to this claim. 

Claim 13 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it instructed the jury that it could consider the lesser included offenses of

second-degree murder and reckless manslaughter only if it first

unanimously found Petitioner not guilty of the greater offense of firstCase 2:01-cv-02179-EHC Document 7 Filed 01/06/09 Page 30 of 45
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degree murder.

Petitioner argues that in both the Reynolds/Lacey and Drury trials, the court’s

instructions requiring the jury to first acquit him of first degree murder before it was

permitted to consider lesser-included offenses violated his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 59 at

121; RT 3/23/94 at 80; RT 8/29/94 at 57.) Petitioner concedes that at the time the instruction

was given it was approved by the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to State v. Wussler, 139

Ariz. 428, 679 P.2d 74 (1984). In 1996, however, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a

“reasonable efforts” instruction in lieu of Wussler’s “acquittal first” requirement. See State

v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 438, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (1996). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner asserted that the Wussler instruction given at both trials

violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed:

Defendant asks this court to reconsider the instruction approved in State

v. Wussler requiring juries to agree that a defendant was not guilty of the

greater charge before considering the lesser included charge. Recently, in

LeBlanc, this court overruled Wussler:

It now appears that requiring a jury to do no more than

use reasonable efforts to reach a verdict on the charged offense

is the better practice and more fully serves the interest of justice

and the parties. . . .

Our decision in LeBlanc, however, having been filed subsequent to the crimes

charged here, does not apply to this case:

Although today’s decision directs trial courts to abandon

the Wussler rule in favor of a “reasonable efforts” instruction,

we remain persuaded that the acquittal-first requirement does

not violate the United States or Arizona Constitutions.

Moreover, the giving of a Wussler-type instruction does not rise

to the level of fundamental error.

Finally, because the change we make today is procedural

in nature, adopted for purposes of judicial administration, its

application is prospective only.

Courts commenced using a “reasonable efforts” instruction no later than

January 1, 1997.

Because this case was tried in 1994, we find that the trial court did not

err by giving an “acquittal-first” jury instruction regarding lesser-included

offenses consistent with Wussler.

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11 The Arizona Supreme Court summarily rejected this claim in the Drury appeal,

citing its determination in Lee I. See Lee II, 189 Ariz. at 613, 944 P.2d at 1227.

12 In fact, as noted by the Arizona Supreme Court, in United States v. Tsanas, 572

F.2d 340, 346 (2nd Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Wussler-type

instruction was not wrong as a matter of law. In addition, in United States. v. Jackson, 726

F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit cited Tsanas and held that, it was lawful

to give a Wussler instruction if the defendant stated no choice, but that it would be error to

reject a different instruction if timely offered. See id. In this case, Petitioner’s counsel

specifically agreed to a Wussler instruction while settling instructions. (See RT 3/23/94 at

5.) Subsequently, after the jury was instructed and in deliberation, counsel voiced objections

to the instruction but the court overruled him. (See id. at 96-97.) This objection was not

timely and, thus, the giving of the Wussler instruction was not contrary to the holding in

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Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 602, 944 P.2d at 1216 (citations omitted).11

Habeas relief cannot be granted if the United States Supreme Court has not “broken

sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower

federal courts have decided the issue. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 381; Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76. Petitioner has cited no case law to support his position that the

trial court’s “acquittal-first” instructions violated his federal constitutional rights, and this

Court has found none.12 As a result, this argument cannot support a claim for federal habeas

relief. 

Claim 14 - The trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when

it considered victim impact evidence in sentencing.

During sentencing following the Reynolds/Lacey trial, family members of the victims

were allowed to offer their opinions about the appropriate sentences Petitioner should

receive. Petitioner asserts this type of testimony was improper and violated his federal

constitutional rights, including his right to a fair trial. (Dkt. 59 at 123-24.) The only specific

instance of impropriety cited by Petitioner concerns testimony from Linda Reynolds’s

mother, Eleanor Barton, who stated he “deserves the death penalty” and urged the judge to

“give him the death penalty.” (RT 6/7/94 at 90, 91.)

In its special verdict, the sentencing court explained its basis for sentencing Petitioner

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Ariz. at 606, 944 P.2d at 1220.

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to death for both the Reynolds and Lacey murders. Specifically, the court determined that

the evidence established a finding of several aggravating factors common to both murders,

including: (1) having been convicted of another offense for which life imprisonment or death

is possible; (2) having been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of

violence to another person; and (3) committing the offense as consideration for the receipt

or in expectation of the receipt of anything of value. (RT 6/23/94 at 20-23.) In addition, the

court found that Linda Reynolds’ murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or

depraved manner. (Id. at 23-26.) Regarding David Lacey’s murder, the Court determined

that, although the murder could not be deemed cruel, it was depraved.13 (Id. at 26.)

The court weighed the aggravating circumstances against the evidence of mitigation.

The court determined that the statutory factor concerning Petitioner’s age (19 at the time of

the crime) was satisfied. (Id. at 28.) The Court then considered non-statutory mitigation,

including his lack of a significant prior criminal history, his deprived childhood, his postarrest conduct, including his cooperation with law enforcement, and “various other factors

and circumstances raised by defendant in the memorandum and via testimony and exhibits

in the aggravation mitigation hearing.” (Id. at 30.) The court then weighed all of the

mitigating evidence and determined it was “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the

aggravating circumstances proved by the state.” (Id. at 32-33.)

On appeal, Petitioner raised a claim alleging that the sentencing court improperly

considered victim impact evidence. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument in

cursory fashion citing a state case. See Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 607, 944 P.2d at 1221. The court

cited no federal case law. This court will nevertheless uphold that determination unless it is

contrary to controlling Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the

introduction of a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital case

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violated the Eighth Amendment. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 830 (1991), the

Supreme Court revisited Booth and overruled it in part, holding that the Eighth Amendment

does not erect a per se barrier to admission of victim impact evidence but left intact Booth’s

prohibition on the admissibility of characterizations and opinions from the victim’s family

about the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Id. at 830 n.2.

Under Arizona law at the time of trial, the trial judge, rather than a jury, determined

the penalty in a capital case. A.R.S. § 13-703. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained,

judges are presumed to know and apply the law. State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 66, 906

P.2d 579, 599 (1995); see Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, “in

the absence of any evidence to the contrary, [the Court] must assume that the trial judge

properly applied the law and considered only the evidence he knew to be admissible.”

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997).

Other than the statement of Eleanor Barton at the sentencing hearing, Petitioner

presents no evidence indicating the sentencing court was swayed by anything other than the

appropriate criteria required in passing a death sentence. In fact, a review of the special

verdict rendered at sentencing supports the conclusion that the state court’s sentence of death

for the Reynolds/Lacey murders was based solely on its findings that certain statutory

aggravating factors had been established based on the evidence presented and that the

mitigation evidence offered by Petitioner did not warrant a lesser sentence. (See RT 6/23/94

at 20-33.) Nothing in the court’s rationale indicated it was swayed at sentencing by Ms.

Barton’s statements urging that Petitioner be put to death. In the absence of any clear

indication that the court improperly considered those statements, this Court assumes the

sentencing court followed the Arizona guidelines in passing sentence. See Gretzler, 112 F.3d

at 1009.

Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court on appeal reweighed the aggravating and

mitigating evidence and independently determined that the death sentences given for both

the Reynolds and Lacey murders were appropriate. See Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 603-07, 944 P.2d

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at 1217-21. In so doing, that court likewise predicated its determination solely on its

conclusion that certain aggravating circumstances had been established and that the

mitigation presented was not “sufficiently substantial, taken either separately or

cumulatively, to call for leniency.” Id. at 607; 944 P.2d at 1221.

Because there is no evidence that the state courts misapplied the law and improperly

considered the wishes of family members when it imposed the death sentences, Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief with respect to this claim.

Claim 15 - The statutory provisions governing Arizona’s capital

punishment scheme are unconstitutional because they merely require the

State to prove the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, rather than

the appropriateness of the death penalty in the defendant’s particular

case.

Petitioner argues that the death penalty scheme in Arizona is unconstitutional.

Specifically, he contends a state sentencing court must do more than simply determine that

a defendant is death eligible; rather, it must determine that such a sentence is appropriate.

He asserts the sentencing court did not do this and that this violates his federal constitutional

rights. (Dkt. 59 at 124.) Petitioner advanced this claim only with respect to proceedings in

the Reynolds/Lacey murders. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily rejected this claim on

direct appeal, citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part on other

grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 607, 944 P.2d at 1221.

Petitioner acknowledges that Walton upheld Arizona’s death penalty statute and procedures

but argues it was wrongly decided and should be overruled. It is not within the province of

this Court to do so.

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held

the death penalty statutes of Georgia and Texas to be unconstitutional because they allowed

arbitrary and unguided imposition of capital punishment. Furman caused many states to

enact new capital statutes. A number of these statutes survived the Court’s further scrutiny

in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Observing that the death penalty is “unique in

its severity and irrevocability,” id. at 187, the Gregg Court concluded that a death sentence

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may not be imposed unless the sentencing authority focuses attention “on the particularized

nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.” Id. at

206. In imposing the death sentence, the sentencer must find the presence of at least one

aggravating factor and then weigh that factor against the evidence of mitigating factors. Id.

The Court refined these general requirements in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983),

holding that a constitutionally valid capital sentencing scheme must “genuinely narrow the

class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of

a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” A

death penalty scheme must provide an “objective, evenhanded and substantively rational

way” for determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S.

at 879.

In addition to the requirements of determining eligibility for the death penalty, the

Court has imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision, “where the sentencer

determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that

sentence.” Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). “What is important at the

selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the

individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant, 462 U.S. at 879. Accordingly, a

statute that “provides for categorical narrowing at the definition stage, and for individualized

determination and appellate review at the selection stage” will ordinarily satisfy Eighth

Amendment and Due Process concerns, id., so long as the state ensures “that the process is

neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice.” Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973.

Defining specific “aggravating circumstances” is the accepted “means of genuinely

narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the [sentencing

authority’s] discretion.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). Each defined

circumstance must meet two requirements. First, “the [aggravating] circumstance may not

apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of

defendants convicted of a murder.” Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.

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463, 474 (1993). Second, “the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally

vague.” Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972; see Arave, 507 U.S. at 473; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.

420, 428 (1980).

Arizona’s death penalty scheme allows only certain, statutorily defined, aggravating

circumstances to be considered in determining eligibility for the death penalty. A.R.S. § 13-

703(F). “The presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class

of death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment does not require that these

aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by [the sentencer].” Blystone v.

Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990). Not only does Arizona’s sentencing scheme

generally narrow the class of death-eligible persons, the aggravating factors delineated in

§ 13-703(F) do so specifically. Rulings of the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth

Circuit have upheld Arizona’s death penalty statute against challenges that particular

aggravating factors, including § 13-703 (F)(5) (pecuniary gain) and (F)(6) (heinous, cruel and

depraved), do not adequately narrow the sentencer’s discretion. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 774-77 (1990); Walton, 497 U.S. at 649-56; Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329,

335 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the argument that Arizona’s

death penalty statute is unconstitutional because “it does not properly narrow the class of

death penalty recipients.” Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Regarding the Reynolds/Lacey convictions, the court found multiple aggravating

circumstances to be proven and imposed the death sentence with respect to each murder.

(See RT 6/23/94 at 20-27.) In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court independently reviewed

these findings, and in one instance (whether Lacey’s murder was especially depraved

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6)) reversed the finding of an aggravating factor but

otherwise affirmed the sentencing court. See Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 603-07, 944 P.2d at 1217-21.

Petitioner does not challenge the correctness of these findings; he simply asserts that

Arizona’s statutory scheme is unconstitutional. However, he acknowledges that the U.S.

Supreme Court determined that the Arizona statutory scheme was constitutional in Walton.

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In particular, the Walton Court held that, because the Arizona statutory scheme does not

restrict the type of mitigation which may be offered by a defendant, it does not create an

unconstitutional presumption that death is the proper sentence. See 497 U.S. at 651-52.

 In addition, Petitioner’s assertion that the trial court passed the sentences of death

without specifically determining, under the law and the facts that the death sentences were

appropriate, is factually erroneous. The sentencing court passed sentence after recounting

that numerous statutory aggravating factors had been established by the evidence. The court

then recounted in detail the statutory and nonstatutory mitigation presented by Petitioner,

weighed that against the proven aggravating factors, and determined that a lesser sentence

was not appropriate. (See RT 6/23/94 at 20-34.) Only after making these findings did the

court sentence Petitioner to death. As noted, the Arizona Supreme Court likewise conducted

an independent review of this evidence and upheld the death sentences. See Lee I, 189 Ariz.

at 603-07, 944 P.2d at 1217-21. For all of these reasons, the Arizona Supreme Court’s

rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 

Claim 16 - The death penalty statute under which Petitioner was

sentenced to death was unconstitutional because: (1) it allowed the

imposition of a death sentence by the trial judge, rather than requiring a

jury to conclude that the state had established by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt all facts essential to the imposition of the death penalty;

and (2) it failed to require that Petitioner receive notice by indictment of

all aggravating factors and all facts necessary to make him eligible for the

death penalty.

In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held that aggravating

factors that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be found by a jury, not a

judge, as previously approved in Walton v. Arizona. However, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348 (2004), the Court held that Ring does not apply retroactively to cases, such as

Petitioner’s, that were already final on direct review at the time Ring was decided.

Therefore, as a matter of law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that the lack of

jury findings as to aggravating factors violated his constitutional rights. 

Petitioner also contends his constitutional rights were violated because the State failed

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to provide notice in the indictment of all aggravating factors and facts necessary to make him

eligible for the death penalty. Although the Due Process Clause guarantees defendants a fair

trial, it does not require the states to observe the Fifth Amendment’s provision for

presentment or indictment by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884);

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972). Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court

has expressly rejected the argument that Ring requires that aggravating factors be alleged in

an indictment and supported by probable cause. McKaney v. Foreman, 209 Ariz. 268, 270,

100 P.3d 18, 20 (2004). Petitioner has presented no authority to the contrary. This claim is

without merit.

Claim 17 - Arizona’s statutory scheme for the imposition of the death

penalty is unconstitutional because the prosecutor’s discretion to seek the

death penalty is limitless, standardless and arbitrary.

Citing Furman, Petitioner asserts:

The Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer be able to meaningfully

distinguish between those few cases where the death penalty is imposed and

the many in which it is not. In Arizona, however, there is simply no way to

distinguish capital cases from non-capital cases. This is because, in each case,

the prosecutor makes a standardless and arbitrary decision as to whether to

seek the death penalty.

(Dkt. 59 at 126-27.) Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal. The Arizona Supreme

Court denied all claims challenging the constitutionality of Arizona capital sentencing

scheme by citing Walton. Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 607, 944 P.2d at 1221. 

Petitioner’s citation to Furman is unpersuasive. As already recounted in addressing

Claim 15, Furman and its progeny stand for the proposition that the statutory scheme for

imposing a death sentence may not be unguided and arbitrary. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206;

Zant, 462 U.S. at 477, 479. As long as the system provides safeguards to ensure this, it

passes constitutional muster. As discussed in addressing Claim 15, the Arizona statutory

scheme meets this test. Petitioner cites no authority to support his contention that a statutory

scheme is unconstitutional simply because it does not have specified curbs on the discretion

of a prosecutor in deciding whether to seek a death sentence, particularly in light of the

requirements placed upon the sentencer in determining whether to impose a death sentence.

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14 Petitioner was also convicted of the predicate felonies of kidnapping, sexual

assault, and theft with respect to Linda Reynolds. (RT 3/24/94 at 2-4.)

15 Petitioner did not raise this claim in his appeal from the Reynolds/Lacey

murders but did include it in his consolidated PCR petition. (Dkt. 68, Ex. F at 9.) The trial

court denied the claim, finding it precluded because it had been raised on direct appeal. (Dkt.

68, Ex. G at 3.) Both parties acknowledge that the trial court mistakenly determined that this

claim was raised and denied on appeal in Lee I when in fact it had not been. Irrespective of

any question of procedural default in Lee I, the claim was exhausted in Lee II and will be

addressed on the merits.

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As a result, this claim cannot form a basis for federal habeas relief. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 381; Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76. The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court denying this

claim was neither contrary to, or an unreasonable determination of controlling Supreme

Court law.

Claim 18 - The pecuniary gain aggravating factor is unconstitutional

because it fails to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death

penalty.

Petitioner notes he was unanimously convicted of felony murder for each of the three

murders and that the underlying felony common to each murder was armed robbery.14 He

contends that armed robbery necessarily entails a motive of pecuniary gain and that “using

pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor in a case in which the underlying felony is armed

robbery merely replicates an element of the underlying offense.” (Dkt. 59 at 127.) As a

result, he argues that the pecuniary gain aggravating factor “fails to narrow the class because,

by definition, all felony-murder defendants whose crimes are predicated on a theft-related

felony automatically become death eligible.” (Id. at 127-28.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his appeal of the Drury conviction in Lee II.15 (Dkt. 68,

Ex. D at 54-55.) In rejecting it, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

The legislature may establish a sentencing scheme in which an element of a

crime could also be used for enhancement and aggravation purposes. Further,

this court has stated that pecuniary gain is not synonymous with robbery. In

Carriger, this court explained, “To prove robbery, the state must show a taking

of property from the victim; to prove pecuniary gain, the state must show the

actor’s motivation was the expectation of pecuniary gain.” This court has

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rejected the argument that finding pecuniary gain as an aggravating

circumstance is unconstitutional where it repeats an element of first degree

felony murder based on an underlying armed robbery. 

Lee II, 189 Ariz. at 620, 944 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted). As set forth in the Court’s discussion of Claim 15, the Ninth Circuit has specifically

upheld the pecuniary gain aggravating factor (A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5)) against constitutional

challenges that it does not adequately narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death

penalty. See Woratzeck, 97 F.3d at 334-35 (applying the principles enunciated in Lowenfield,

481 U.S. at 244, and specifically rejecting the notion that the (F)(5) pecuniary gain

aggravating factor is automatically applicable to someone convicted of robbery felony

murder). For that reason, the determination of the Arizona Supreme Court on this issue was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling Supreme Court law.

Claim 19 - Arizona’s statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty is

unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently channel the sentencer’s

discretion.

Petitioner argues that the Arizona death penalty scheme doesn’t sufficiently “channel”

the sentencer’s discretion. He further argues:

Arizona’s aggravating circumstances are also exceptionally broad. Any

murder that has no apparent motive, or that is motivated by a desire to

eliminate a witness, or that is motivated by hatred or revenge (and is therefore

“relished”) is a death penalty crime. Any murder in which the killer uses

excessive force, or in which he uses sufficient force, is a death penalty crime.

Any murder in which the victim experiences fear or uncertainty as to his fate,

or in which he is conscious and able to feel pain during the killing, is “cruel”

and therefore a death penalty crime.

(Dkt. 59 at 130-31.) Respondents contend this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was

not raised on appeal but only during PCR proceedings. The Court disagrees. Review of the

appellate brief filed in Lee I, reveals that Petitioner advanced a claim challenging the

constitutionality of Arizona’s death penalty statutory scheme predicated on the notion that

“it lacks ascertainable guidelines for the sentencer to follow in weighing aggravating and

mitigating factors in violation of the U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.” (Dkt. 68, Ex. C at 62.)

 The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the claim. Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 607, 944 P.2d

at 1221. 

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16 Respondents concede that this claim was raised on appeal in Lee I, but argue

that it was not raised in Lee II. As a result, they contend the claim was not exhausted and is

procedurally defaulted with respect to Drury. In light of the fact this claim was raised in Lee

I as part of a series of challenges to the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty

statutory scheme, the Court will address it on the merits. 

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This claim is another variation of a series of claims raised by Petitioner challenging

the constitutionality of Arizona’s statutory death sentencing scheme. In fact, this claim

presents essentially the same question raised in Claim 15. As stated in addressing Claim 15,

Arizona’s death penalty scheme allows only certain, statutorily-defined aggravating

circumstances to be considered in determining eligibility for the death penalty. This scheme

has been found constitutionally sufficient. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774-77; Walton, 497 U.S.

at 649-56; Woratzeck, 97 F.3d at 334-35; Smith, 140 F.3d at 1272. Again, Petitioner does

not challenge any of the particular findings made by the sentencing court. He simply argues

that the Arizona statutory scheme is unconstitutional. This claim is without merit. The

determination of the Arizona Supreme Court rejecting this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, controlling Supreme Court law. 

Claim 20 - Petitioner was unconstitutionally denied the right to voir dire

the trial judge. 

Petitioner contends his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied the

opportunity to voir dire the trial judge “regarding his attitudes about capital punishment to

assure that a capital defendant will not be placed in the constitutionally untenable position

of being before a sentencer who believes that the death penalty is the most appropriate

punishment for first degree murder.” (Dkt. 59 at 134.) Petitioner raised this claim in one of

his appeals, and it was summarily denied.16 Lee I, 189 Ariz. at 607, 944 P.2d at 1221. 

The federal constitution requires only that a defendant receive a fair trial before a fair

and impartial judge with no bias or interest in the outcome. Bracey v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 904-05 (1997). Petitioner makes no allegation of bias or interest on behalf of the judge

who presided at his trial or sentencing. Petitioner cites no authority, let alone Supreme

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Court authority, to support his assertion that the federal constitution affords him the right to

voir dire the sentencing judge to determine his views on the death penalty. As a result, this

claim cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381;

Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76. The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court denying this claim

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court law.

Claim 21 - Petitioner’s death sentences are unconstitutional because he

was denied the procedural safeguard of a proportionality review of his

sentences.

Respondents contend this claim was not properly exhausted in state court and is

procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 59 at 78.) In fact, Petitioner did present this claim in state

court in his PCR petition, but the claim was found to be precluded by the court pursuant to

Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it could have been

presented on direct appeal but was not. (Dkt. 68, Ex. G at 4-5.) Irrespective of any issue of

exhaustion or procedural default, the Court concludes this claim is without merit and will

deny relief on that basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The Arizona Supreme Court

abandoned proportionality review prior to Petitioner’s appeal, State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz.

399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992), and the U. S. Supreme Court has held that there is no federal

constitutional right to proportionality review of a death sentence, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481

U.S. 279, 306 (1987) (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984)). Thus, any failure

by the Arizona Supreme Court to conduct such a review cannot form a basis for federal

habeas relief. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

In the event Petitioner appeals from this Court’s judgment, and in the interests of

conserving scarce resources that otherwise might be consumed drafting an application for a

certificate of appealability to this Court, the Court on its own initiative has evaluated the

claims within the Amended Petition for suitability for the issuance of a certificate of

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d at 864-65.

Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when an appeal

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is taken by a petitioner, the district judge who rendered the judgment “shall” either issue a

certificate of appealability (COA) or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” With respect to claims rejected

on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n. 4 (1983)). For

procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate (1) whether the

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) whether the court’s

procedural ruling was correct. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of Claims 4 and 8.

The Court therefore grants a certificate of appealability as to these claims. For the reasons

stated in this order, as well as the Court’s orders of February 4, 2005 (Dkt. 94), March 24,

2006 (Dkt. 106), and November 28, 2006 (Dkt. 125), the Court declines to issue a certificate

of appealability for Petitioner’s remaining claims and procedural issues.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. The Court

further finds that evidentiary development is neither warranted nor required.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Dkt. 59) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered on November 9,

2001 (Dkt. 4) is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting a Certificate of Appealability as to the

following issues:

Whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial court

failed to remove for a cause a juror who did not understand English (Claim 4);

and 

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Whether Petitioner was denied due process of law when the trial judge failed

to suppress inculpatory statements made to police (Claim 8).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court send a courtesy copy of this

Order to Rachelle M. Resnick, Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington,

Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3329.

DATED this 6th day of January, 2009.

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