Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01189/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lori E. Kant,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 05-1189-PHX-DKD

ORDER

Plaintiff Lori E. Kant appeals the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s

decision to adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s ("ALJ") ruling denying her claim for

disability benefits. In denying Kant’s claims, the ALJ rejected her testimony and her treating

physician’s testimony, without providing clear and sufficient reasons for doing so, and in

addition, adopted the opinion of a nonexamining physician. This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and upon consideration of the cross motions for summary

judgment and the arguments of counsel at oral argument concludes that the ALJ’s reasons for

denying Kant’s claim are not supported by substantial evidence. Further, because the Court

finds that once the treating physician’s opinion is properly credited and accepted as a matter of

law, a finding of disability is shown, it concludes that a remand for further proceedings is

unnecessary. The Court finds that the record is complete and that the matter should be

remanded for payment of benefits. The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c).

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BACKGROUND

Kant was born on July 22, 1962. She filed for disability benefits in November 2002,

alleging disability as of August 2001. (Claimant’s Statement of Facts “CSOF” ¶ 1). She has

a history of Raynaud’s syndrome, fibromyalgia, lupus, irritable bowel syndrome, insomnia, and

fatigue (Tr. 388). Her previous work experience includes employment as an office manager and

sales team manager (Tr. 103-12). She has not worked since August 2001 (Tr. 39).

Treating Physicians

Kant was treated at Kaiser Permanente from February through June 2002. A

rheumatological evaluation was performed in May 2002, indicating a history of lupus, chronic

fatigue syndrome, and irritable bowel syndrome (Tr. 194-195). She complained of general body

aches, difficulty with concentration and memory, and was prescribed Robaxin and Naprosyn

(Tr. at 194). Dr. Venkat noted in May that the clinical findings were “suspicious for

fibromyalgia syndrome,” and in June found her lupus to be stable (Tr. 187, 195).

By October 2002, Kant had discontinued treatment at Kaiser, and was seen by Dr. Liao

through Cigna Healthplan; her treatment through Cigna continued through September 2003 (Tr.

206-30, 324-40). In October 2002, Dr. Liao ordered a rheumatology evaluation and requested

that she return in two weeks for a follow up (Tr. 228). In December 2002, Dr. Mallace, a

rheumatologist also through the Cigna plan, performed the suggested rheumatology evaluation,

and in noting mild depression and irritable bowel syndrome, increased her Plaquenil dosage (Tr.

220-24). Dr. Liao and Dr. Mallace continued treatment of Kant over the succeeding months,

noting “some improvement about her systemic symptoms,” but chronic joint aches and stiffness

(Tr. 216). In March and July 2003, Dr. Mallace repeatedly noted mild depression, chronic

irritable bowel syndrome, and that both lupus and fibromyalgia “seemed stable” (Tr. 206-07,

331). During her care through Cigna, Kant was prescribed Vioxx, Vicodin, Plaquenil,

Betamethasone ointment, Belladonna, ranitidine, Trazedone, and Naprosyn (Tr. 206, 222).

Dr. Nada Krnjaich assumed Kant’s care in October 2003, and referred her to

rheumatologist Dr. Shakir (Tr. 328, 356). When she first saw Dr. Shakir in October 2003, she

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was taking Vioxx, Plaquenil, Roxicet, Trazedone, and Hydrocodone; all except the

Hydrocodone he continued to prescribe, along with a daily exercise regimen (Tr. 357-58).

During Kant’s last visit to Dr. Shakir in November 2003, he again diagnosed fibromyalgia and

recommended that she “see a pain specialist for her chronic persistent pain” (Tr. 355).

Through Dr. Krnjaich’s referral, rheumatologist Dr. Nolan assumed treatment in January

2004 (Tr. 391). Dr. Nolan noted her constant pain, constipation, persistent cough, “brain fog,”

and inability to concentrate were all complaints due to her fibromyalgia (Tr. 289-90). In May

2004, Dr. Nolan completed pain and fatigue assessments at the request of Kant’s counsel; he

concluded that her pain and fatigue were at the “moderately severe” level, which “constantly”

interfered with Kant’s ability to concentrate and perform tasks in a timely manner (Tr. 392-95).

Additionally, he ascertained that she would not be able to maintain a regular work schedule (Tr.

393).

Psychological Evaluation

In addition to the above treating physicians, Kant was also referred for a psychological

evaluation in conjunction with her pending claim with the Arizona Department of Economic

Security (Tr. 239). Psychologist Dr. Huddleston conducted a full psychological evaluation in

April 2003, concluding that Kant “does not suffer from any severe or debilitating psychological

disorder” but also that “her physical problems appear real and they are somewhat exacerbated

or magnified by her somewhat intense psychological style” (Tr. 243). Regarding Kant’s

abilities to function in a work environment, Dr. Huddleston concluded that she is cognitively

capable of performing work tasks, but may experience difficulty in sustaining focus (Tr. 243).

Further, regarding normal work pressures and typical daily demands, he concluded that “Ms.

Kant would likely suffer a significant limitation.” Id.

Nonexamining State Agency Physicians

During the initial and reconsideration determinations, Dr. Haley in April 2003 and Dr.

Campbell in July 2003 completed assessment forms on behalf of the state agency (Tr. 231-38,

246-59, 260-85). Dr. Haley concluded that Kant had no manipulative, visual, or communicative

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limitations, and that the only limitation she may suffer is exposure to cold temperatures due to

the presence of Raynaud’s Syndrome (Tr. 231-35). Although she assessed mood disturbance,

she found Kant’s impairments to be not severe, and that daily living activities and concentration

were only mildly limited (Tr. 246, 256). Dr. Campbell reviewed Kant’s medical file during the

reconsideration period. He diagnosed depressed mood and pain disorder, noting that Kant

suffered to a moderate degree in social functioning and maintaining concentration, but that her

symptoms did not prevent her from performing light work (Tr. 260-85).

However, instead of discussing these physicians’ assessments, during the hearing the

ALJ relied upon the testimony of neurologist Dr. Goren. Prior to the hearing, Dr. Goren

reviewed Kant’s entire medical file and submitted a questionnaire for the ALJ (Tr. 287). Dr.

Goren has never met the claimant and testified from Cleveland. Ohio.

Administrative Hearing

At the May 27, 2004 hearing, testimony was given by Kant, Dr. Goren, and vocational

expert Linda Heiland. Claimant’s counsel established that as of that date, Kant was taking

Vioxx, morphine sulfate, Soma, Tonazapam, Zelnorn, and Plaquina, noting that the numerous

medications “in and of themselves in terms of side effects [sic]...would impact the ability to

sustain work activities” (Tr. 37-39).

Kant testified that she stopped working in August 2001, when she was let go due to

excessive absences because of her illness (Tr. 39). Her afflictions include lack of sleep for

several days at a time, pain in her right shoulder so severe that she is often unable to lift or sit,

pain throughout her body “like deep in the core bone pain and then it’s surrounded by the

muscle,” fibromyalgia “flares” which occur whenever Kant does exert, stress, and depression

(Tr. 39-43). She also has very painful irritable bowel syndrome, which keeps her awake at night

(Tr. 47). Additionally, the medications she is prescribed result in side affects including

drowsiness that restricts her to lying down for six hours in an eight-hour period.

Kant reports that she suffers depression from being isolated and unable to assist her

family in the household chores and shopping (Tr. 43-45). Her ability to drive fluctuates because

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she says she is often in a “fibro fog,” and she is unable to do laundry, vacuum, wash dishes, or

cook (Tr. 45). Since moving to Arizona in 2002, she has taken one trip to visit family in

Wisconsin, during which time the doctor increased her pain medication so that she was able to

travel (Tr. 47). She testified to the ALJ that her work history includes primarily positions as an

office manager, and she completed two years of college (Tr. 47-48).

The ALJ also questioned her about her exercise regimen, as prescribed by Dr. Nolan.

She testified that she continues physical therapy exercises from her home, as well as water

aquatics (Tr. 48-49). Her daily activities include waking up with her children, taking a hot bath

and returning to bed (Tr. 49-50). She tries to do exercise, takes hot baths four times per day,

occasionally sends e-mail, and spends most of her time lying down; “it’s the only time that I’m

comfortable” (Tr. 50).

Next, Dr. Goren testified that although all rheumatologists who examined Kant

diagnosed fibromyalgia, her orders to lay down during the day are contrary to his suggested

treatment of getting a lot of exercise (Tr. 52). Additionally, Dr. Goren disagreed with the

prescription of narcotics for fibromyalgia, and suggested that these prescriptions were

contributing to her pain and inability to concentrate (Tr. 53). Unlike all previous treating

physicians, Dr. Goren diagnosed Kant with lupus, and restricted her to light work with no high

production quotas (Tr. 54). He also admitted that although he has treated fibromyalgia patients

in the past, he was in fact a neurologist who had never met the claimant and has not treated a

patient since 1996 or 1998 (Tr. 54-55).

Finally, Ms. Heiland testified as a vocational expert, describing Kant’s work history as

primarily in office management or retail managing positions (Tr. 56). These positions range in

skill level from sedentary skilled to medium skilled. At this point, the ALJ posed various

hypotheticals, and Heiland responded as follows: (1) assuming an individual with the

limitations posited by Dr. Goren, she would not be able to perform her past work, but there

would be light, unskilled jobs available, such as information clerk or parking lot attendant; (2)

assuming an individual with the restrictions assessed by the DDS forms, she would be able to

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perform her past sedentary work as an office manager, or as an information clerk; (3) assuming

an individual missing four or more days of work per month and who could not complete

assigned tasks in an eight-hour day, as found by Dr. Nolan, such an individual would not be able

to perform Kant’s past relevant work nor any other work without special accommodations (Tr.

57-60). In response to counsel’s additional hypotheticals, Heiland responded as follows: (1)

assuming the limitations established by claimant’s testimony, particularly the pain level and the

need to lie down during the day, there would be no work that the individual could do; (2)

assuming an individual with the level of pain and fatigue established by claimant that seriously

affects the individual’s ability to function, concentrate, or complete tasks in a timely manner,

there would be no work that the individual could do; (3) assuming an individual established by

claimant's testimony, who was seriously limited in dealing with co-workers, maintaining

attention and concentration, and had poor to no ability to deal with the public and work stresses

and reliability, there would be no work that the individual could do (Tr. 60-62).

Finally, the ALJ asked the vocational expert about transferable skills of the hypotheticals

he originally posed to her; she responded as follows: (1) there are no skills that would transfer

to the hypothetical jobs posed by the vocational expert in regards to Dr. Goren’s assessed

limitations; (2) regarding the second hypothetical with the limitations posited by the DDS

forms, there would be transferable skills, to a job such as clerical supervisor (Tr. 62-63).

ALJ Decision

The ALJ found that Kant suffered from severe impairments: fibromyalgia, chronic

fatigue syndrome, history of irritable bowel syndrome, affective disorder, and a history of lupus

(Tr. 22). However, he concluded that these impairments “do not meet or medically equal one

of the listed impairments” as required in the Regulations (Tr. 22).

The ALJ also noted that he found Kant’s allegations regarding her limitations “not totally

credible” (Id.). In doing so, the ALJ cited fragments of her testimony and written

questionnaires, rather than her testimony as a whole (Tr. 19). The ALJ found that while her

residual functional capacity rendered her unable to perform her past relevant work, she

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maintains the capacity to perform a significant range of light work and that there are a

significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform (Id.).

The ALJ relied exclusively on nonexamining physician Dr. Goren, in concluding that her

residual functional capacity included a range of light work (Tr. 20). Because Dr. Nolan had

treated Kant for only seven months, did not indicate that her symptoms would likely last for

twelve continuous months or longer, and because his conclusions were “neither supported by

the overall medical record nor the doctor’s own progress notes,” the ALJ gave his opinions

“little weight” (Tr. 19). In doing so, the ALJ failed to cite any such examples in the record.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by substantial evidence

and are free from reversible error. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990).

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less that a preponderance; it is “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In determining whether substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision, the court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater,

157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, ambiguity,

and determining credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). If there is sufficient evidence to

support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Young

v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Thus, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision where the evidence considered in its

entirety substantially supports it and the decision is free from reversible error. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court must do more than

merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1987).

However, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s

decision must be upheld. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.

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DISCUSSION

I. ALJ’s Rejection of Treating Physician.

Kant first contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of the examining

physician, Dr. Nolan. The ALJ set forth three reasons for discrediting his testimony. First, the

ALJ reasoned that Dr. Nolan had only treated Ms. Kant since January 2004, less than six

months from the hearing before the ALJ. Second, the ALJ noted that Dr. Nolan “did not

indicate that the claimant’s symptoms would likely last for twelve continuous months or longer”

(Tr. 19). Finally, the ALJ determined that Dr. Nolan’s “medical conclusions are neither

supported by the overall medical record nor the doctor’s own progress notes” (Id.).

Because treating physicians are “employed to cure” and thus have a better chance to

observe the patient, their opinions generally carry more weight than those of non-examining

physicians. Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1989); Holohan v. Massanari,

246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). An examining physician’s

opinion, even if contradicted, may only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are

supported by the record. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ

provides “specific and legitimate reasons” by setting forth a detailed summary of the facts and

conflicting evidence, and offering “his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than

the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

The ALJ’s discount of Dr. Nolan’s opinion was in error. Although Dr. Nolan treated

Kant for a short time, so long as the treating physician has seen the patient long enough to

obtain a “longitudinal picture of the patient’s impairments,” the source’s opinion will be given

more weight than a nontreating source. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i); Holohan

v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001). A treating physician has a continuing

relationship with his patients, which makes him especially qualified to evaluate reports from

previous doctors and form an overall conclusion as to a claimant’s functional capacities and

limitations. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 833. The ALJ rejected Dr. Nolan’s opinion even

though he was her current treating physician, as referred by her previous physician, Dr. Krnjaich

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(Tr. 391). Because Dr. Nolan was in fact able to assess Kant’s overall condition and

impairments, this relatively short length of treatment should not discount his findings. See

generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Lester, 81 F.3d at 833.

Next, the ALJ argues that Dr. Nolan did not indicate Kant’s symptoms “would likely last

for twelve continuous months or longer” (Tr. 19). The standard definition of disability used in

the five-step sequential process by the Social Security Administration requires “the inability to

do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment...which has lasted OR can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). Here,

the ALJ’s decision states that Kant, “since at least 2002 . . . has had fibromyalgia” (Tr. 17).

Because all parties agree that Kant has suffered from these impairments since at least 2002, this

twelve-month threshold is ostensibly met. Further, because there is no known cure to Kant’s

impairments, while her symptoms may wax and wane, occasional symptom-free periods are not

inconsistent with finding that claimant suffers disability. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833

(9th Cir. 1995) (although claimant experienced some relief from his back pain, “in evaluating

whether the claimant satisfies the disability criteria, the Commissioner must evaluate the

claimant’s ability to work on a sustained basis”); see Leidler v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 291, 293 n.

3 (5th Cir. 1989).

Finally, the ALJ asserts that Dr. Nolan’s medical conclusions are “neither supported by

the overall record nor the doctor’s own progress notes” (Tr. 19). In reviewing the medical

record, fibromyalgia was diagnosed by all four physicians who treated Kant prior to Dr. Nolan

(Dr. Venkat, first suspicious as of 4/29/02; Dr. Liao, 11/02; Dr. Mallace, first suspicious on

3/14/03; Dr. Shakir, confirmed diagnosis on 10/16/03; Dr. Nolan, “patient clearly has

fibromyalgia” on 1/20/04) (Tr. 187, 227, 206-07, 354, 357, 389). All five treating physicians

diagnosed Kant with lupus, irritable bowel syndrome, and mild depression, among other aches,

arthralgias, and fatigue, during their treatment period. Further, Dr. Nolan’s progress notes and

clinical findings are consistent with his overall assessment and Kant’s previous treating

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physicians (Tr. 387-89). Upon assessment, Dr. Nolan concluded that because of her

fibromyalgia and other complaints attributable to it, she would not be able to sustain work on

a regular and continuing basis (Tr. 393). Because the ALJ did not give specific examples of

inconsistencies in Dr. Nolan’s conclusions or opinions, nor did the ALJ provide legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record, his rejection of Dr. Nolan's opinion was

in error, and Dr. Nolan's assessment should be given controlling weight and accepted as a matter

of law. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998), Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

834 (9th Cir. 1995).

II. ALJ Based Residual Functional Capacity on Opinion of Non-treating Physician.

Kant next contends that the ALJ erred in granting substantial weight to the opinions of

non-examining medical expert, Dr. Herschel Goren. In general, opinions of physicians who do

not have a treatment relationship with a claimant are weighed by stricter standards, based “to

a greater degree on medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations for the opinions,” than

are required of treating physicians. SSR 96-6p (1996); see generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, §

416.927 (2005). Further, more weight is given to the opinions of a specialist regarding medical

issues related to their specialty than to the opinions of a source who is not a specialist. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2005). The opinion of a non-examining physician is not a specific and

legitimate reason for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion, and “without a personal medical

evaluation, it is almost impossible to assess the residual functional capacity of any individual.”

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1993).

In this case, although Dr. Goren had never met or examined the claimant, and despite his

specialty in neurology rather than rheumatology, the ALJ gave substantial weight to his medical

opinions (Tr. 20). Dr. Goren testified at the hearing, finding that because of Kant's restrictions

due to lupus, she would be able to perform the exertional demands of light work, limited to low

stress and minimal interaction with the public and co-workers (Tr. 54). However, during his

testimony, Dr. Goren provided very limited medical explanations for concluding that despite

his admission that “she’s been examined by numerous rheumatologists. All of them think that

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she has fibromyalgia,” he instead concludes that she has lupus (Tr. 52, 54). Further, the medical

questionnaire he submitted prior to the hearing is completely devoid of any analysis,

explanation, or conclusions about her impairments (Tr. 287). Because the ALJ accepted this

analysis and opinions during oral testimony, despite his specialty in a field other than

rheumatology, and with a lack of medical explanations or detail, the ALJ erred in giving

substantial weight to these opinions.

III. Evaluation of Kant’s Residual Functional Capacity.

Next, claimant contends that the ALJ erred in determining her residual functional

capacity on a hypothetical question to the vocational expert and not a function-by-function

assessment as required by the SSA. The process for assessing a claimant’s RFC includes first

identifying the claimant’s limitations and restrictions to “assess his or her work-related abilities

on a function-by-function basis,” particularly their physical, mental, and other abilities affected

by impairments. SSR 96-8p (1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. Only after this function-by-function

analysis may the RFC be expressed in terms of exertion. Id. Further, if a hypothetical posed

to the vocational expert is inaccurate, their testimony cannot be used by the Commissioner.

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995).

Upon granting substantial weight to Dr. Goren’s opinions, the ALJ proceeds by assessing

Kant with the RFC of light work with low stress. This finding is a precise recitation of the nonexamining physician, and does not take into account her physical, mental, and other abilities

affected by her limitations, as required. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. These regulations outline the

assessments an ALJ must make regarding a claimant’s residual mental abilities, noting, “a

limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding,

remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting, may reduce your ability to do past work and

other work.” To this effect, the ALJ again restates Dr. Goren’s conclusions without explanation

or elaboration. Further, RFC is the ability to do sustained work on a regular and continuing

basis, which Dr. Nolan concluded she would not be able to do. See SSR 96-8p (1996) (emphasis

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in original). Due to the incorrect application of claimant’s RFC, the hypothetical posed to the

vocational expert was inaccurate and not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Thus

the ALJ erred in ignoring the limitations observed by the examining physician and instead bases

its opinion exclusively on a non-examining physician’s assessment of claimant’s RFC, and

posing an inaccurate hypothetical to the vocational expert.

IV. ALJ’s Rejection of Kant’s Testimony.

Finally, claimant attests that the ALJ erred by discounting her testimony without

providing clear and convincing reasons for doing so. The ALJ determined that “although the

record supports the existence of the claimant’s joint pain,” objective medical evidence does not

support the severity of claimant’s joint pain and mental health problems, and that her “daily

living activities simply are not consistent with her allegation of disability” (Tr. 19). Kant argues

that unless there is affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must identify what testimony

lacks credibility and provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. General findings that

the claimant lacks credibility are insufficient; “rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is

not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).

The initial burden is on the claimant to produce medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, and once established, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony

as to severity merely because they are uncorroborated by objective medical evidence. Reddick

v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc). Here, the daily activities that the ALJ maintains are “inconsistent with her

allegation of disability” include her ability to drive, run errands, use the computer, shop, do

home exercising, physically move from California to Arizona in July 2002, and travel once to

Wisconsin in 2003 (Tr. 19). Because the claimant produced evidence of an underlying

impairment, the ALJ erred by discounting the severity of her limitations without specific, cogent

reasons.

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Kant’s testimony indicates lack of sleep, extreme pain in her shoulder (“it’s always

there”), hands, knees, lower back, elbows, wrists, all of which “spikes when you do things,”

drowsiness, depression, and “it’s been four years now and there’s been no remission” (Tr. 40-

44). According to her Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire, which the ALJ uses to discredit

her testimony, it is clear the administrator used only selected portions of Kant’s responses. For

example, in response to claimant’s ability to go shopping, she responded: “Rarely—as my

youngest daughter’s birthday is almost here, I have 1 present but—my other children will be

doing the shopping because I can’t” (Tr. 136); “I can only shop for a few things . . . I can really

only do short runs” (Tr. 140). As to her hobbies, Kant responded: “Most of my pastimes I have

given up for now—reading, hiking, computer, letter writing . . . My physical exercise now

consists of doing stretching exercises, simple neck rolls, arm stretches, and for my back . . . I

try to do aquatic exercises—a few times a week.” In context with her overall testimony, such

responses do not indicate an inconsistency with her allegation of disability.

Additionally, the fact that claimant made one move from California in July of 2002, and

traveled one time to Wisconsin in 2003, hardly qualifies as “daily activities” inconsistent with

her claim of disability. Disability claimants “should not be penalized for attempting to lead

normal lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir.

1998). It is well established that a claimant who does engage in numerous daily activities

involving skills transferable to a work environment could reasonably be discredited by an

adjudicator. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, the SSA “does not require that claimants be utterly

incapacitated to be eligible for benefits.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).

Kant’s intermittent ability to perform occasional tasks that could be transmitted to the

workplace1

 is not the same as being able to engage in ‘substantial gainful activity’. Kornock

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v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980). Based on the overall record, the ALJ erroneously

discounted Kant’s testimony, and in failing to articulate specific reasons for finding claimant

to be lacking in credibility, this testimony is to be accepted as true. Hammock v. Bowen, 879

F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987)).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision that Kant’s residual functional capacity leaves her capable of

performing many jobs readily available in the national economy is not supported by the

substantial evidence in the record. Examining physician Dr. Nolan found that Kant suffered

from significant exertional limitations and constant interference on concentration, memory, and

attentiveness due to fatigue. The ALJ’s finding of non-disabled was premised on a nonexamining physician’s belief that Kant's various medical prescriptions were contributing to her

limitations, and that she was not getting enough exercise as part of her treatment. Nonexamining physician Dr. Goren did not elaborate, either on his medical questionnaire or while

giving testimony at the hearing, by explaining these conclusions, nor did the ALJ provide clear

and convincing reasons for dismissing Dr. Nolan’s conclusion and instead granting substantial

weight to Dr. Goren’s testimony, and thus, was in error. Accordingly, the ALJ also erred in

basing its decision of residual functional capacity on a hypothetical question to the vocational

expert based on Dr. Goren’s conclusion that Kant would be restricted to light work with low

stress. Because the vocational expert’s opinion was based on assumptions not supported by

substantial evidence in the record, it has no valuable significance. Finally, the ALJ erred in

extracting limited excerpts from Kant’s Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire rather than

considering all of her written answers and oral testimony in full context. The examining

physician’s findings provided objective medical evidence of the physical and mental

impairments that Kant testified to suffering, which fulfills her initial burden of demonstrating

an underlying impairment. Thus the ALJ erroneously discounted the testimony of Kant.

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REMAND

The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or simply to award

benefits is within the discretion of this Court. Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir.

1989). A remand for further proceedings is unnecessary if the record is fully developed and it

is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits. Holohan v.

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001). This rule recognizes the importance of

expediting disability claims. Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994).

When the ALJ does not provide adequate reasons for rejecting an examining physician’s

opinion, that opinion is credited “as a matter of law.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the ALJ did

not provide any reasons for rejecting the opinions of the examining physician, Dr. Nolan. Thus

his opinion that Kant’s impairments would decrease her ability to deal with work stresses,

maintain concentration and attention, and demonstrate reliability, and would require her to lie

down during the day and take frequent naps, is accepted as a matter of law.

Similarly, where the ALJ fails to properly refute a claimant’s testimony regarding her

symptoms, that testimony is accepted as true as a matter of law. Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d

759, 761 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons for

discrediting her testimony because of the faulty rejection of the examining physician's opinion

and inadequate analysis of her testimony and written descriptions of her limitations. Thus this

Court accepts Kant’s testimony as true as a matter of law.

Because Kant established her disability and proved that she could not return to past

gainful activity in step four of the sequential evaluation process, the burden shifted to the ALJ

to show that Kant is able to perform other work available in the national economy. The ALJ

did not meet this burden because he erroneously used the non-examining physician’s residual

functional capacity assessment in obtaining the opinion of the vocational expert. In using the

conclusions set forth by the examining physician and the claimant’s testimony, the vocational

expert agreed “there would be no work that she could do” (Tr 60). Thus, at step five of the

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evaluation, Kant would have been found disabled. When properly considered, the evidence

indicates that a determination of not disabled would not be supported by substantial evidence.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Lori E. Kant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc #7) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 13) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be REMANDED for an AWARD OF

BENEFITS.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2006.

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