Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00791/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00791-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH R. HENRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-00791-LJO-SKO (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM BE DENIED

(Docs. 16, 23, and 26)

OBJECTION DEADLINE: FIFTEEN DAYS

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Kenneth Henry (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 23, 2014. This action 

for damages is proceeding against Defendants Jolley,

1 Contreras, and Ortega (“Defendants”) for 

using excessive physical force against Plaintiff in 2013, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution. 

On May 6, 2015, Defendants Contreras and Jolley filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 22, 2015, Defendants 

Contreras and Jolley filed a reply on June 2, 2015; and Defendant Ortega filed a notice of joinder 

 

1

Identified as Jolly in the complaint.

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in the motion on June 12, 2015.2 On June 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a surreply and on June 23, 

2015, Defendants Contreras and Jolley filed a motion to strike.3

Defendants Contreras and Jolley’s motion to dismiss has been submitted upon the record 

pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), and for the reasons that follow, the Court recommends the motion 

be denied.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a 

claim, and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In resolving a 12(b)(6) 

motion, a court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National 

Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 

2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. 

California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 1964-65 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. 

 

2 Defendants’ motion to strike certain new allegations in Plaintiff’s opposition, set forth with their reply, should be 

denied. Defendants’ reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is misplaced; the reply at issue is not a 

pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(f); Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Notwithstanding that deficiency, “[m]otions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” Neveu v. City of 

Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1170 (E.D.Cal. 2005). With limited exceptions not present here, a court’s review is 

limited to the four corners of the pleading, U.S. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)), and it suffices for the moving party 

to focus its argument on whether newly pled allegations entitle the non-moving party to an opportunity to amend its

pleading, Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014).

3

Parties do not have the right to file surreplies and motions are deemed submitted when the time to reply has expired. 

Local Rule 230(l). The Court generally views motions for leave to file a surreply with disfavor. Hill v. England, No. 

CVF05869 REC TAG, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 366 

F.Supp.2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005)). However, district courts have the discretion to either permit or preclude a 

surreply. See U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not 

abuse discretion in refusing to permit “inequitable surreply”); JG v. Douglas County School Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 803 

n.14 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to file surreply where it did not consider 

new evidence in reply); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (new evidence in reply may not be 

considered without giving the non-movant an opportunity to respond). In this instance, the Court declines to consider 

Plaintiff’s surreply and it recommends Defendants’ motion to strike be denied as moot. 

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U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept the well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 

Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Huynh, 465 F.3d at 996-97; Morales v. 

City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts may not supply essential 

elements not initially pled, Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014), but “[c]ourts in 

this circuit have an obligation to give a liberal construction to the filings of pro se litigants, 

especially when they are civil rights claims by inmates,” Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 

1241 (9th Cir. 2013). Pro se complaints “may only be dismissed ‘if it appears beyond doubt that 

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)). “This rule relieves pro se litigants from the strict application of 

procedural rules and demands that courts not hold missing or inaccurate legal terminology or 

muddled draftsmanship against them.” Blaisdell, 729 F.3d at 1241. 

III. Discussion

A. Introduction

Plaintiff’s complaint was screened and the Court determined it stated a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 908 (“Dismissal for failure to 

state a claim under § 1915A ‘incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to 

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).’”) (quoting Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

1121); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

screening standard is the same as Rule 12(b)(6) standard). Defendants’ acknowledgement that the 

complaint was screened is appreciated; however, they present no arguments which persuade the 

Court it erred in determining that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims were cognizable or that 

any other grounds justifying relief from the screening order exist. See Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 

F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the 

case doctrine only if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an intervening change in the 

law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially different; (4) other changed 

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circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result.”). As explained below, 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed past the pleading stage.

B. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims arise from two alleged incidents of excessive force 

against him at California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, where he was incarcerated at the 

time. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002) 

(citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986)) (quotation marks omitted). 

Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are totally without penological 

justification, Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 

2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted), and punitive treatment which amounts to gratuitous 

infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, id. at 738 

(quotation marks omitted).

What is necessary to show sufficient harm under the Eighth Amendment depends upon the 

claim at issue, with the objective component being contextual and responsive to contemporary 

standards of decency. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). For excessive force claims, the core judicial inquiry is whether the force 

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically 

to cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam) (citing 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (quotation marks omitted). Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard 

gives rise to a federal cause of action. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 

503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Necessarily excluded from constitutional recognition is 

the de minimis use of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

9-10) (quotations marks omitted). 

In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, courts may evaluate 

the extent of the prisoner’s injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, 

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and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the 

Eighth Amendment inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic 

use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. 

at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is the 

use of force rather than the resulting injury which ultimately counts. Id. at 37-8. 

C. Claim Against Defendant Jolley

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on June 21, 2013, Defendant Jolley kept staring at 

him during an escort to the medical clinic. After they arrived at the clinic and Plaintiff was seated 

in a chair, he asked Defendant Jolley if there was a problem. Defendant Jolley pulled Plaintiff up 

from his chair, escorted him to the medical clinic podium, and “violently bashed” his head into the 

podium, causing him to need codeine for ten days for pain management. (Doc. 1, Comp., p. 6.) 

Plaintiff is entitled to have his factual allegations taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to him, and he is entitled to be afforded the benefit of any doubt. Nordstrom, 762 

F.3d at 908; Blaisdell, 729 F.3d at 1241. Moreover, Plaintiff is required only to allege a short and 

plain statement of his claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) Johnson v. City of Shelby, __ U.S. __, __, 135 

S.Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam), and at the pleading stage, Plaintiff need only present facts 

supporting a claim that physical force was used “‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,’”

Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6). 

Although Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations are brief and some of the allegations in the 

complaint recite words taken from the legal standard applicable to Eighth Amendment excessive 

force claims, his complaint amounts to more than mere conclusory allegations which reiterate the 

legal standard. Accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construing them in the light 

most favorable to him, he has shown a use of force that was totally unprovoked and not 

undertaken in any good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Moreover, although Plaintiff 

does not describe his injury, it is inferable from his allegations that he sustained an injury to his 

head and he alleges that he needed codeine for ten days, which supports the inference that he

sustained an injury meriting medical treatment in the form of prescription-strength pain 

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medication. The gratuitous use of force by a correctional officer in the absence of any need to use 

force supports a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment and Defendants’ arguments to the 

contrary are rejected.

4

 Furthermore, the Court declines to find that as a matter of law, bashing an 

inmate’s head into a podium for no reason at all constitutes a de minimis use of force. Wilkins, 

559 U.S. at 37-38. 

Regarding several of Defendants’ specific arguments, Plaintiff is not required to offer an 

explanation for Defendant Jolley’s motivation; Plaintiff is not required to provide further detail 

regarding the severity of his injury, as he is not required to show significant injury to maintain a 

claim; and Plaintiff’s allegations are not implausible as a matter of law.5 Id. at 37-40. Plaintiff 

has described an unjustified use of physical force that injured him, and although Plaintiff would be

entitled to the benefit of any doubt with respect to any necessary factual construction, his 

complaint is notably devoid of any facts supporting an inference that the use of force might have 

 

4 Defendants cited three district court cases in support of their motion. All three cases are distinguishable, however. 

One case involved grabbing an inmate’s wheelchair and spinning him around, causing injury. Armstrong v. Hedgpeth, 

No. 1:11-cv-00761-LJO-GSA-PC, 2013 WL 595125, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 15, 2013). Such an act may or may not 

suffice to support a claim, depending on additional facts might be pled. In that case, the court stated that the plaintiff 

“must allege facts showing that under the circumstances, there was no need for the defendant to use the amount of 

force described.” Armstrong, 2013 WL 595125, at *6. The Court may take judicial notice of its own records, United 

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980), and following amendment, the court in the Armstrong case 

determined on June 4, 2014, that the use of force at issue was de minimis. In this case, Plaintiff’s head was bashed 

into a podium in the absence of any need for force, an act which is not equivalent to spinning a wheelchair around and 

which the Court declines to find is de minimis.

In Miller v. Brown, the court was unable to determine whether pulling an inmate’s handcuffs and using 

pepper spray was force employed in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or was instead malicious and 

sadistic for the purpose of causing harm. Miller v. Brown, No. 1:12-cv-01589-LJO-BA[M] (PC), 2014 WL 496919, at 

*7 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 6, 2014). In this case, although the facts are minimal, Plaintiff provided enough context to show 

that the uses of force were not employed to maintain order or restore discipline and were instead totally unprovoked 

and unjustified. 

Finally, in Kabil v. Youngblood, the plaintiff alleged only that his stool was kicked away and he was locked 

down unreasonably. Kabil v. Youngblood, No. 1:08-cv-00281-SMS PC, 2009 WL 2475006, at *4, 14 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 

11, 2009). Kicking a stool away is not equivalent to bashing a head into a podium or hitting an inmate with batons, 

and the complaint in that case was so lacking that the court found it “baffling” to the reader. Kabil, 2009 WL 

2475006, at *1. No such deficiency exists here.

5 Defendants’ argument that “[i]t is simply not plausible that a correctional officer would decide to bash an inmate’s 

head into a podium for no reason at all” must be rejected. (Doc. 16-1, Motion, 6:27-7:1.) The credibility of Plaintiff’s 

version of events is not subject to resolution at the pleading stage, and the allegation that a guard used physical force 

to harm an inmate in the absence of any justification is not facially implausible. See Blantz v. California Dep’t of 

Corrs. & Rehab., 727 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2013) (facially implausible allegations need not be accepted as true); 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38 (guard allegedly punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed inmate without any 

provocation after inmate asked for grievance form); Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (officer allegedly slammed inmate’s face into wall without warning and kicked inmate in the genitals and 

back, all without any provocation). 

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been employed in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. 

D. Claim Against Defendants Contreras and Ortega

Next, Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2013, Defendant Ortega was escorting him back to 

his building when Defendant Contreras walked up and began violently assaulting Plaintiff.6 

(Comp., 7:10.) Plaintiff alleges the incident was staged by Defendants Ortega and Contreras, and 

he sustained permanent injuries to his lower leg, right shoulder, and head. 

Despite their brevity, Plaintiff’s allegations also suffice to state a claim for relief against 

Defendants Contreras and Ortega. Plaintiff’s exhibits demonstrate that the force at issue involved 

baton strikes against him; and he alleges that he did nothing wrong to justify the use of any force 

against him and that he sustained permanent injuries to his lower leg, top right shoulder, and head. 

Where the use of batons against an inmate was allegedly unprovoked, there is no inference to be 

drawn that the force was used in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. To the 

contrary, the inference compelled by the facts is that the force was used to cause harm, and the 

facts do not lend themselves to a finding that the force used was de minimis as a matter of law. An

inmate who alleges that two guards hit him with their batons and injured him, in the absence of 

any provocation or justification, states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. While Plaintiff may 

not ultimately prevail on his claim, he is entitled to proceed beyond the pleading stage; the Court 

cannot find that his allegations “are too speculative to warrant further factual development.” 

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1283 

(2014).

Finally, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s version of events is contradicted by his 

exhibits is rejected. Courts are not “required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits 

attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are 

 

6

Plaintiff’s exhibits show he was charged in prison disciplinary proceedings with resisting a peace officer, and the 

incident involved the use of a baton and hands. The outcome is unclear from the complaint, but if Plaintiff was found 

guilty and the length of his sentence was affected, his claim against Defendants Contreras and Ortega may be barred. 

See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-2, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred 

(absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 

prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would 

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) 

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merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall, 

629 F.3d 992 at 998. However, the purportedly contradictory facts contained in Plaintiff’s 

exhibits are Defendants’ own reports of events, which are appended to Plaintiff’s rules violation 

report. Those “facts” cannot provide a basis for disregarding Plaintiff’s allegations because they 

are contested as opposed to “established.”

7

 Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 

823 F.Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.Cal. 1993). Although brief, Plaintiff’s allegations are neither fatally 

conclusory nor mere legal conclusions and therefore, any factual disputes must be resolved in 

Plaintiff’s favor at this stage in the proceedings.

IV. Recommendation

In conclusion, the allegation that a correctional officer, totally unprovoked and absent any 

justification, bashed a prisoner’s head into a podium and caused an injury requiring prescription 

pain medication for ten days supports a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. 

Likewise, the allegation that two correctional officers, totally unprovoked and absent justification, 

hit a prisoner with their batons, causing injury to his leg, shoulder, and head supports a plausible 

claim. Although brief, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are neither conclusory nor vague and they are 

not limited to a recitation of the applicable legal standard. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 

Cir. 2011). As a result, the allegations must be taken as true and to the extent Plaintiff’s version 

lacks credibility and/or there exist factual disputes between the parties over what occurred, those 

determinations may not be made at the pleading stage. See e.g., OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 

F.3d 1053, 1078 (9th Cir. 2912); Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216-17. 

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendants’ motion to strike new allegations in Plaintiff’s opposition be DENIED;

2. Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s surreply be DENIED as moot; and

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed on May 6, 2015, be 

DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

 

7 Comp., Exs. 9-11.

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fifteen (15) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

file written objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Responses, if any, are due 

within ten (10) days from the date the objections are filed. Local Rule 304(d). The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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