Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a 

limited liability company; 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a 

national business 

association; and DOES 1-50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART NATIONSTAR’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING BANK 

OF AMERICA’S MOTION TO DISMISS; 

DENYING BANK OF AMERICA’S MOTION 

FOR AN ORDER EXPUNGING LIS 

PENDENS

Defendants Nationstar and Bank of America each moves

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for 

dismissal of claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). The FAC consists of state claims alleged under 

California Civil Code sections 2924(a), 2923.6(c), 2923.7(b)(3), 

and 2923.7(c); the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; and the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). 

Plaintiff opposes the dismissal motions. Bank of America also 

seeks an order expunging the lis pendens recorded against 

Plaintiff’s property; however, no basis for granting this relief

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has been shown, and therefore it is denied. 

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Nationstar’s dismissal motion includes a request that 

judicial notice be taken of the following documents recorded in 

the Butte County Recorder’s Office: 1) the Deed of Trust recorded 

October 30, 2007; 2) the Notice of Default and Election to Sell 

Under Deed of Trust (“Notice of Default”) recorded March 5, 2013; 

and 3) the Notice of Trustee’s Sale (“Notice of Sale”) recorded 

May 31, 2013. Plaintiff does not oppose this request. 

“As a general rule, ‘we may not consider any material 

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’ We 

may, however, . . . take judicial notice of ‘matters of public 

record.’” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998-

99 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001)). Since the 

referenced documents are matters of public record, the judicial 

notice request is granted. 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND JUDICIALLY NOTICED MATTERS

The dismissal motions concern the following allegations 

in the FAC and judicially noticed information. In 2007, Plaintiff 

refinanced the loan agreement for his residential property (“the 

property”) with Countrywide Bank, FSB. (FAC. ¶ 11, ECF No 22; 

(Nationstar’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A, ECF No. 

40-1.) In late 2008, Defendant Bank of America acquired 

Plaintiff’s loan from Countrywide. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff 

applied for a loan modification. (Id. ¶ 12.) In April 2011, Bank 

of America responded by “inform[ing] Plaintiff . . . that the 

reason he was not being modified was because he was not 

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delinquent in his mortgage payments. [Bank of America told] 

Plaintiff that . . . to obtain a modification it was absolutely 

necessary for Plaintiff to stop making payments on his loan.” 

(Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff missed three mortgage payments, 

and then submitted another loan modification application to Bank

of America. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

“[I]n November 2011, while Plaintiff was still in 

modification review, Plaintiff learned that Defendant Nationstar 

had obtained his mortgage . . . .” (Id. ¶ 14.) Shortly thereafter 

Plaintiff brought his account current. (Id.) 

“[B]eginning in January 2012 . . . Plaintiff began 

submitting his loan modification application documents to 

Nationstar through his customer service manager, Amber Orebaugh. 

In May 2012, Ms. Orebaugh confirmed receipt of all documents 

necessary for the application, and Plaintiff awaited a response.” 

(Id. ¶ 31.) 

In August 2012, Plaintiff attempted to make an online 

payment and learned that “his account had been frozen.” (Id. ¶ 

15.) Plaintiff then attempted to contact a customer service 

manager to remedy the issue, but “he was put on hold or 

transferred between lines without any assistance.” (Id.) He 

“endured [this] for weeks.” (Id.) 

“On or about September 6, 2012,” Plaintiff had a 

telephone conversation with a Nationstar representative, during 

which Plaintiff requested “to make a telephonic payment, but was 

informed that he could not do so because his account was frozen.” 

(Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was told to contact Ms. Orebaugh for 

further information yet was unable to reach her. (Id.)

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On March 5, 2013, Trustee Pite Duncan filed the Notice 

of Default concerning Plaintiff’s loan in the Butte County

Recorder’s Office. (Id. ¶ 17; RJN Ex. D, ECF No. 40-1.) On May 

31, 2013, Pite Duncan filed the Notice of Sale of Plaintiff’s 

property in the Butte County Recorder’s Office. (FAC ¶ 20; RJN 

Ex. E, ECF No. 40-1.) The Notice of Sale “indicated that 

Plaintiff’s property would be sold at auction at 3:30 p.m. on 

June 26, 2013.” (FAC ¶ 20; see RJN Ex. E.) “Plaintiff had not 

[yet] received a written determination on his loan modification 

application, despite the fact that he had been informed that his 

application was complete and in review.” (FAC ¶ 31.) 

“On or about May 8, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter 

from Nationstar which indicated his Single Point of Contact

[“SPOC”] had changed . . . .” (FAC ¶ 18.) Two days later, 

Plaintiff received a letter informing him that Nationstar had 

assigned him a different single point of contact. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

“Then, on or about June 10, 2013,” Plaintiff again received a 

letter from Nationstar informing him that Plaintiff’s single 

point of contact had changed. (Id. ¶ 21.) Each single point of 

contact “refused to answer Plaintiff’s telephone calls . . . and 

did not communicate with Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 30.)

III. DISMISSAL MOTION

a. Legal Standard

Decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion requires 

determination of “whether the complaint’s factual allegations, 

together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim 

for relief.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 

Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft 

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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)).

When determining the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6), “[w]e accept factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this 

tenet does not apply to “legal conclusions . . . cast in the form 

of factual allegations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).)

b. Section 2923.7(c) 

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 

2923.7(c) claim, in which Plaintiff alleges Nationstar changed

his SPOCs. Nationstar contends this section does not preclude 

changings SPOCs, and therefore Plaintiff does not allege a viable

2923.7(c) claim.

Section 2923.7(a) prescribes: “Upon request from a 

borrower who requests a foreclosure prevention alternative, the 

mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a [SPOC] and provide 

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to the borrower one or more direct means of communication with 

the [SPOC].” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(a). Section 2923.7(c) 

prescribes, in part: “The [SPOC] shall remain assigned to the 

borrower’s account until the mortgage servicer determines that 

all loss mitigation options . . . have been exhausted . . . .” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(c). Furthermore, section 2923.7(e) 

prescribes, in part: “‘[S]ingle point of contact’ means an 

individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and 

authority to perform the responsibilities [of a SPOC].” 

Since Plaintiff’s allegations do not indicate that 

Nationstar failed to provide Plaintiff with a SPOC, this claim is 

dismissed.

c. Sections 2923.6(c) and 2923.7(b)(3)

i. Whether Plaintiff Must Allege A Trustee’s Deed of 

Sale Has Recorded

Nationstar argues Plaintiff’s 2923.6(c) and 

2923.7(b)(3) claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff seeks 

damages in these claims that may not be sought until after a 

trustee’s deed upon sale is recorded as required by California 

Civil Code sections 2924.12(b)-(c). Those sections state, in 

pertinent part:

After a trustee's deed upon sale has been 

recorded, a mortgage servicer . . . shall be 

liable to a borrower for actual economic 

damages . . . , resulting from a material 

violation of Section . . . 2923.6, [and] 

2923.7 . . . where the violation was not 

corrected and remedied prior to the 

recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale . 

. . . 

A mortgage servicer . . . shall not be liable 

for any violation that it has corrected and 

remedied prior to the recordation of a 

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trustee's deed upon sale . . . . 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(b)-(c).

Since Plaintiff has not alleged a trustee’s deed upon 

sale has recorded, the damages portions of these claims are

dismissed. See Vasquez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 13-CV-02902-JST, 

2013 WL 6001924, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013) (stating, “if no 

trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, Plaintiff's claims . 

. . for actual damages . . . are unavailable until such time as 

the deed upon sale has been recorded.”) 

ii. Whether the Home Owners’ Loan Act Preempts 

Plaintiff’s Section 2923.6(c) and 2923.7(b)(3) 

Equity Claims

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 2923.6(c) and 

2923.7(b)(3) equity claims, arguing these claims are preempted by 

the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”), and that the HOLA preemption

applies to federal savings banks. Nationstar concedes that it is 

not a federal savings bank, but argues it stepped into the shoes 

of Plaintiff’s original lender, which was a federal savings bank, 

and that certain provisions of the Deed of Trust indicate that 

Plaintiff “agreed to be bound by HOLA.” (Nationstar’s Mot. 5:15-

16, ECF No. 27.) However, the referenced provisions do not 

support Nationstar’s assertion that the HOLA preemption applies 

to it; therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

d. Section 2924(a) 

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s section

2924(a) claim, in which Plaintiff alleges Nationstar violated 

sections 2924(a)(2)-(3) by failing to wait three months after

recordation of the Notice of Default before recording the Notice 

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of Sale. Nationstar contends section 2924(a)(4) authorized it to 

record this Notice of Sale prior to the lapse of the referenced

statutory three-month period. 

Plaintiff also alleges in the FAC that Nationstar

violated section 2923.6(c) by recording this Notice of Sale while

Plaintiff’s loan modification application was pending. Since this

2923.6(c) claim has survived dismissal, Nationstar has not shown 

that it was authorized to record this Notice of Sale.

Accordingly, this portion of the motion is denied.

e. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

i. Bank of America

Bank of America seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, arguing it should 

be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that 

Bank of America caused him to suffer harm. Causation of harm is 

an element of this claim. Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transp., 879 

F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Rosenfeld v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (N.D. Cal. 

2010)). 

Plaintiff alleges in the FAC: “BANK OF AMERICA breached 

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and interfered with 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform under the contract by inducing 

Plaintiff to stop making payments on his mortgage loan.” (FAC ¶ 

37.) Plaintiff further alleges: “As a result of Defendants’ 

conduct, Plaintiff’s credit has been detrimentally impacted, and 

Plaintiff now risks the loss of his home through foreclosure.” 

(Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff also alleges that after his loan was 

transferred from Bank of America to Nationstar, Plaintiff 

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“br[ought] his account current.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Since Plaintiff 

alleges he brought his account current after Bank of America 

induced him to stop making payments, his conclusory allegations

that Bank of America harmed his credit and caused the 

commencement of foreclosure proceedings against his property, are 

insufficient to allege a plausible claim. Therefore, this portion 

of the dismissal motion is granted. 

ii. Nationstar

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, arguing in essence 

that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Nationstar 

prevented Plaintiff from making loan payments. However, Plaintiff 

alleges in this claim that he attempted to make payments online 

and via telephone, yet was unable to do so because his account 

was “blocked.” (FAC ¶¶ 15-16.) “The covenant of good faith is 

read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or 

promises of the contract.” Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, 

Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1393 (1990). “If the cooperation of 

the other party is necessary for successful performance of an 

obligation, a promise to give that cooperation, and not to do 

anything which prevents realization of the fruits of performance, 

will often be implied.” Ninety Nine Investments, Ltd. v. Overseas 

Courier Serv. (Singapore) Private, Ltd., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1118, 

1131 (2003) (emphasis in original)(quoting 1 Witkin, Summary of 

Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 743, p. 674.); see

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) cmt d. (stating

that “interference with or failure to cooperate in the other 

party’s performance” has “been recognized in judicial decisions” 

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as a violation of “the obligation of good faith.”) Since the 

essence of Plaintiff’s allegations in this claim is that 

Nationstar prevented him from successfully performing his 

contractual obligation to submit monthly loan payments, this 

portion of Nationstar’s motion is denied. 

f. UCL 

i. Bank of America 

Bank of America seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL

claim alleged against it, arguing Plaintiff lacks statutory 

standing since he fails to adequately allege that Bank of America 

caused him to suffer an economic injury. Plaintiff alleges in 

this claim that Bank of America’s breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing constitutes an “unlawful . . .

business act or practice” proscribed by the UCL. Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200.

To have standing to state a UCL claim, a plaintiff 

must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property

sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, 

and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., 

caused by, the unfair business practice . . . that is the 

gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 

4th 310, 322 (2011).

Since Plaintiff’s UCL claim is premised on his implied 

covenant claim, in which he fails to plausibly allege damages,

the FAC lacks a factual allegation that supports drawing a 

reasonable inference that Plaintiff has suffered an economic 

injury caused by Bank of America. Therefore this portion of the 

dismissal motion is granted.

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ii. Nationstar 

A. Standing 

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL claims,

which are predicated on Nationstar’s alleged violations of 

sections 2924(a), 2923.6(c), 2923.7(b)(3), 2923.7(c), and the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nationstar

argues Plaintiff lacks UCL standing since Plaintiff has not 

plausibly alleged Nationstar caused him to suffer an economic 

injury. 

Plaintiff’s 2923.7(b)(3) & (c) claims are composed of

conclusory allegations that “Defendant’s conduct has caused 

Plaintiff actual damages, including but not limited to the 

imminent loss of his property to foreclosure and destruction of 

his credit.” (FAC ¶ 32; see also id. ¶¶ 29, 30.) These conclusory 

allegations do not plausibly show that Nationstar caused 

Plaintiff to suffer an economic injury, and therefore Plaintiff 

has not shown that he has standing to bring UCL claims against 

Nationstar predicated on violations of sections 2923.7(b)(3) & 

(c).

However, the remainder of this portion of the motion is 

denied since Plaintiff plausibly alleges that he suffered an 

economic injury in his implied covenant of good fair dealing 

claim, and in his claims alleged under sections 2923.6(c) and

2924(a). In each of these claims, Plaintiff in essence alleges 

Nationstar caused him economic harm by unlawfully commencing 

foreclosure proceedings. Since commencement of foreclosure 

proceedings constitutes an economic injury within the meaning of 

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the UCL, Nationstar has not shown this portion of its motion

should be granted. See Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 

Cal. App. 4th 497, 522 (2013) (finding initiation of foreclosure 

proceedings constitutes loss of property under UCL); Griley v. 

Nat'l City Mortgage, CIV. 2:10–1204 WBS, 2011 WL 219574, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (same).

B. Unlawful Business Acts or Practices

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

that is premised on an unlawful business act or practice and is 

predicated on Nationstar’s alleged breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing. Nationstar contends this claim is 

a breach of contract claim that cannot, by itself, form the basis 

of a UCL unlawfulness claim. 

“It is well established a breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith is a breach of the contract.” Carson v. 

Mercury Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 4th 409, 429 (2012). Allegations 

of a breach of contract “alone do not amount to a violation of 

the ‘unlawful’ prong of [the UCL]” unless the plaintiff also 

alleges in a contract claim “that [Defendant] engaged in a 

business practice ‘forbidden by law . . . .’” Shroyer v. New 

Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 

838–39 (1994)). Since Plaintiff has not alleged that Nationstar 

engaged in a business practice forbidden by law, this portion of 

Nationstar’s dismissal motion is granted. Id.

Nationstar further seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL 

claim in which Plaintiff alleges that Nationstar committed an 

unlawful business act or practice by violating sections 2924(a) 

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and 2923.6(c). Nationstar argues in essence that Plaintiff fails

to adequately allege that Nationstar violated these statutes. The 

unlawfulness portion of the UCL “borrows violations of other laws 

and treats them as unlawful [acts or] practices that the unfair 

competition law makes independently actionable.” Cel–Tech 

Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 

180 (1999). Since Plaintiff’s section 2924(a) claim and section

2923.6(c) equity claim survive the dismissal motion, this portion 

of the motion is denied. 

C. Unfair Business Acts or Practices 

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL claim in 

which Plaintiff alleges an unfair business act or practice

predicated on Nationstar’s alleged refusal to accept from 

Plaintiff online and telephonic loan payments. Nationstar argues 

this unfairness claim fails because it is “not tied to any 

legislatively declared policy.” (Nationstar’s Mot. 12:16-17.)

However, Nationstar has not shown this unfairness claim 

must be tied to a legislatively declared policy. Therefore, this 

portion of the motion is denied. See Lozano v. AT & T Wireless 

Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 2007) (indicating that 

two non-mutually exclusive approaches are considered when 

deciding a motion challenging a UCL unfairness claim – that the 

unfairness be tied to a legislatively declared policy or a 

balancing approach.) 

Nationstar further seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL 

unfairness claim which is predicated on Nationstar’s alleged 

violations of California foreclosure statutes. Nationstar

contends in essence that this claim is not tethered to a 

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legislatively declared policy since Plaintiff’s statutory claims 

challenging the foreclosure process “fail as a matter of law.” 

(Nationstar’s Mot. 12:14-15.) However, since Plaintiff’s section 

2924(a) claim and section 2923.6(c) equity claim survives

Nationstar’s motion, Nationstar has not shown that this UCL 

unfairness claim is not plausibly pled. See Rubio v. Capital One 

Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding Plaintiff 

“stated a claim” for unfairness under UCL “by successfully 

alleging a TILA violation.”) Therefore, this portion of 

Nationstar’s dismissal motion is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Nationstar’s dismissal motion 

is granted in part and denied in part, and Bank of America’s 

dismissal motion is granted. Further, Bank of America’s motion 

for an order expunging the lis pendens recorded against the 

property is denied. Lastly, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) 

days from the date on which this order is filed to file an 

amended complaint addressing deficiencies in any dismissed claim.

Dated: June 26, 2014

 

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