Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02566/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUSTAFA WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

vs.

N. GRANNIS, SILVA H GARCIA, E. A.

CONTRERAS, OFFICE OF WATCH

COMMANDER, E. MARRERO, CHIEF

MEDICAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF 

REGISTERED NURSES, P. A. CORTEZ,

ABAD AND D. SMITH,

Defendants.

 

 

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Civil No. 09cv2566-JLS (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS E.A. CONTRERAS, E.

MARRERO, P.A. CORTEZ, ABAD AND

D. SMITH’S MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO AMEND

[ECF Nos. 24 & 32] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Janis

L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On November 4, 2009, Plaintiff Mustafa Wright, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit against Correctional Officer D. Smith,

Correctional Counselors Abad and P.A. Cortez, Office of Registered Nurses, Chief Medical

Officer, Correctional Captain E. Marrero, Office of Watch Commander, Silvia H. Garcia, and

E. A. Contreras under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on January 23, 2010. ECF No. 8. Defendants E. A. Contreras, E.

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1Defendants Chief Medical Officer, Office of Registered Nurses, Silvia Garcia and Office of Watch

Commander have not been served in this matter. See ECF. Nos. 9-12 (Form US-28 5 Process Receipt and

Return, unexecuted as to Defendants Chief Medical Officer, Office of Registered Nurses, Silvia Garcia and

Office of Watch Commander). As such, the instant motion is only brought on behalf of the served

Defendants. 

-2- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

Marrero, P. A. Cortez, Abad, and D. Smith (“Defendants”)1 filed a motion to dismiss the

Complaint on April 1, 2010 for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

ECF No. 24. Plaintiff opposed the motion on April 20, 2010 [ECF No. 29] and Defendants

filed a reply on May 5, 2010 [ECF No. 30]. Plaintiff replied to Defendants’ reply on May 13,

2010 [ECF No. 34] and also filed a Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint on April

15, 2010 [ECF No. 32].

 This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.(d)(1). See ECF No. 25. The Court has

considered the FAC, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’ Reply

and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below,

this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) be GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept as true all material allegations in the FAC, and must construe the FAC and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). According to the FAC, on June 5,

2008, Defendant Smith escorted an inmate by the name of Hopkins into Plaintiff’s cell. ECF

No. 8 at 11. Plaintiff immediately expressed to Defendant Smith that he was reluctant to

be housed with Hopkins because he “did not appear to be mentally sound.” Id. Smith

responded “Oh he’s just a little crazy, but we got to house him.” Id. When Plaintiff

continued to insist that he did not want to be in a cell with Hopkins, Smith told Plaintiff “you

can handle yourself” and left. Id. Plaintiff claims that the next day he learned that Hopkins

had been moved from his previous cell because another inmate refused to be housed with

him due to Hopkins’s “crazy” behavior, habit of mumbling profanities to himself, and lack

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2In his complaint, Plaintiff states that he “was unsure it wasn’t a vivid nightmare.” ECF. No. 8 at 14.

However, Plaintiff later clearly alleges that the he was raped. Id.

-3- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

of bowel control. Id. Plaintiff states that he informed Defendant Smith that Hopkins made

threatening comments towards him, including stating, “I’m gonna get you,” and that he did

not want to be in the same cell as Hopkins. Id. at 12. After being ignored by Defendant

Smith, Plaintiff presented his concerns to Defendant Abad on June 7, 2008. Id.

Plaintiff claims that he “vehemently complained” about Hopkins to Defendant Abad

and told Defendant Abad that he “did not feel safe with Hopkins in the cell.” Id. Defendant

Abad discounted Plaintiff’s concerns and told Plaintiff that he “could go to the hole.” Id.

When Plaintiff responded that he should not be punished due to the correctional staff’s

decision to house him with a mentally unstable person, Defendant Abad ordered Plaintiff to

leave his office. Id. The next day Plaintiff returned to Defendant Abad’s office and again

asked to have Hopkins removed from his cell due to his “strange behavior.” Id. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Abad then called Defendant Cortez, informed him of the situation,

and told him that Hopkins had been “previously ordered single celled.” Id. Plaintiff was

then asked to step out of the office. When he was summoned back into the office,

Defendant Abad told Plaintiff that Hopkins had not been classified yet and that he would

take Hopkins to committee to see what they could do, but that in the mean time, Plaintiff

“was stuck with him.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff then pointed out that he should not be housed

with Hopkins if he was not classified, but Defendant Abad told him that he had to “just wait

it out.” Id. 

Throughout the day on June 10, 2008, Plaintiff experienced pain around his rectum

but was unsure of the cause. Id. at 14. Plaintiff explained that he woke up later than usual,

but still felt tired and in need of a nap later in the day. Id. As Plaintiff was preparing to

take his nap, he saw Hopkins “attempting to pour some of his medication into my coffee

mug.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he then recalled the events that had taken place the night

before specifically, that he was drugged and raped by Hopkins2

. Plaintiff confronted Hopkins

who just smiled. Plaintiff then went to the nurses’ station and reported that he had been

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28 3Exhibit A, attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, contains CDC Form 128-G, a classification chrono. ECF.

No. 8-1 at 15. The form contains a single cell review and annual review of Plaintiff and discusses the alleged

rape, noting that the San Diego Sheriff’s Department investigated the allegations and did not uncover any

evidence of a rape.

-4- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

drugged and raped3. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that various members of the R.J. Donovan correctional staff,

including Defendants Cortez and Contreras, knew that Hopkins had a history of raping his

cellmates and was supposed to be housed in a single cell. Id. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Garcia, Marrero, and Office of Watch Commander had a policy whereby they

ignored the single cell status of prisoners in order to fill empty beds and ease the burdens

of overcrowding. Id. It was this policy and practice that Plaintiff believes led to his alleged

drugging and rape. Id. In addition, according to Plaintiff, between June 6th and June 10th

2008, Defendant Office of Registered Nurses permitted Hopkins to leave the medical area

of the prison without swallowing the powerful medication he was being given, which

enabled Hopkins to save enough medication to later drug and rape Plaintiff. Id. at 15. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated his constitutional rights of

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process as guaranteed by

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for the following

reasons: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference under the

Eighth Amendment; (2) there is no viable constitutional claim based upon respondeat

superior or vicarious liability against Defendants Contreras and Marrero; (3) Plaintiff’s claim

that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated is redundant and duplicative of his

claim arising under the Eighth Amendment; (4) Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity for their actions; and (5) Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to

injunctive relief. ECF No. 24 at 2. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ arguments. 

A. Legal Standard

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

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-5- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 24 at 6. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will

prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to

dismiss, a Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim that is plausible on its face.’" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). If the facts alleged in the complaint are "merely consistent with" the defendant’s

liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. This rule of liberal

construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528

F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F. 3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating

that “because Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter

the Court’s treatment of pro se filings, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” This

is particularly important where the Petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil rights

matter). When giving liberal construction to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

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-6- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

court is not permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”

Easter v. CDC, 694 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. March 9, 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a

motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268).

The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint

"unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Ramirez

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "before

dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the

deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to

amend effectively." Wayne v. Leal, 2009 WL 2406299, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting

Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).

B. Eighth Amendment - Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware of and deliberately indifferent to the

fact that his cellmate posed a real and serious threat to him. ECF No. 8 at 11-15.

Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s factual allegations

do not establish the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference. ECF No. 24-1 at 10. Specifically, Defendants argue that there is no evidence

that they knew that Plaintiff’s cellmate posed a real threat to Plaintiff. Id. at 7-8.

Additionally, Defendants note that it is unclear whether Plaintiff was actually assaulted by

his cellmate due to his description of the assault as a “nightmare” and the results of an

investigation done by the San Diego Sheriff’s Department that found “no evidence of rape.”

Id. at 9.

A prisoner may state a section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against

prison officials where the officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the threat of serious

harm or injury by another prisoner. Leach v. Drew, 2010 WL 2640335, *1 (9th Cir. June 28,

2010) (citing Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F. 2d 457, 459 (1986)); see also Robins v. Prunty, 249

F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2001). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to

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-7- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

prevent harm, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the objective requirement, the inmate

must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm. Id. Under the subjective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts which

demonstrate that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at

837. To prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence; in

fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish knowledge. Id. at 842.

1. Objective Requirement

Plaintiff has pled facts that satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment

claim. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was drugged and raped in his cell by his

cellmate, who should have been single celled. ECF No. 8 at 14. These facts sufficiently

allege that Plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Becker v. Cowan, 2008 WL 802933, *11 (S.D.

Cal. 2008) (finding that “a substantial risk of being physically attacked, beaten, or raped is

sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim”) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832).

2. Subjective Requirement

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that each

Defendant was put on “notice that plaintiff suffered a serious risk of harm due to his cell

assignment.” ECF No. 24-1 at 8; ECF No. 30 at 4. Rather, Defendants argue that, at most,

Plaintiff’s alleged facts merely establish a “generalized or theoretical risk of harm from his

cell mate” and a theoretical risk is insufficient to state a claim. Id.

a. Defendant Smith

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith knew that Hopkins posed a serious threat

to his safety because: (1) Hopkins recently was moved out of another cell in housing unit

13 “on Defendant Smith’s watch” because Hopkins was “acting crazy," mumbling profanities

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-8- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

to himself, and did not have control of his bowels; and (2) Plaintiff told Smith that Hopkins

had made threatening statements to Plaintiff. ECF No. 8 at 11. 

While the Court must interpret Plaintiff’s alleged facts, and circumstantial evidence,

liberally and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the FAC fails to allege that Defendant

Smith was aware of, and indifferent to, the risk of harm facing Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s initial

allegations are too conclusory to establish the requisite knowledge. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1949 (“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation is

required to state a claim for a constitutional violation”). Plaintiff alleges that Hopkins was

moved out of another cell during Smith’s watch. ECF No. 8 at 11. From this allegation, the

Court can infer that Smith knew that Hopkins had been moved out of a prior cell. Wallis v.

Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995) (circumstantial evidence is permissible).

However, the complaint does not contain any allegations that Hopkins was moved because

he was a danger to his cellmate or that Smith knew about such facts. 

The remaining allegations, Plaintiff’s statements to Defendant Smith, are too vague

to support the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff states that he spoke with Defendant

Smith several times and told him that Hopkins “did not appear to be mentally sound,” “didn’t

look stable,” and made strange comments, including stating “I’m gonna get you.” ECF No.

8 at 11-12. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Smith responded with comments like "Oh

he's just a little crazy, but we got to house him" and "you can handle yourself." Id. at 12.

While these statements indicate Plaintiff’s preference not to be housed with Hopkins and his

concern that Hopkins has mental issues, they do not indicate that Plaintiff told Smith that

he believed Hopkins presented a real danger to his safety, nor do they indicate that Smith

believed that Hopkins presented a real danger to Plaintiff. 

Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s

allegations and the circumstantial evidence indicate that Defendant Smith knew that Plaintiff

was being celled with an inmate who had ben moved out of another cell after exhibiting odd,

but non-aggressive, behavior, that the cellmate had some mental issues, and that the

inmate told Plaintiff that he was “gonna get” him. Based on these allegations, the Court

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4Plaintiff does make this claim in his opposition [ECF No. 29 at 9], but when considering a motion

to dismiss, the Court "may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a

memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss." See Schneider v. California Dep't of Corrs.,

151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original).

-9- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

cannot find that Defendant Smith was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to

Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Smith knew that Hopkins was

supposed to be single celled or that he was unclassified and should not have been housed

with other inmates4. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff also fails to allege that Defendant Smith had any

knowledge that Hopkins had raped or been violent towards his previous cellmates. Id. That

Defendant Smith knew that Plaintiff did not want to be celled with Hopkins and that Hopkins

behaved strangely is not sufficient to allege that Defendant Smith was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s substantial risk of serious harm. 

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's

claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Smith be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing

complaint but granting plaintiffs leave to amend in accordance with new pleading

standards); see also Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (court must grant a pro se plaintiff leave to

amend his complaint "unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts") (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

b. Defendants Abad and Cortez

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Abad knew that Plaintiff was facing a substantial

risk of serious harm from Hopkins because Plaintiff specifically told Defendant Abad that he

did not feel safe being celled with Hopkins and that Hopkins was behaving strangely. ECF

No. 8 at 12. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Abad and Cortez knew that Hopkins

was supposed be single celled because he heard Defendant Abad tell that fact to Defendant

Cortez. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that immediately after making that statement, Defendants

Abad and Cortez had a private conversation and then Defendant Abad told Plaintiff that

Hopkins was not yet classified, that Abad would see what he could do, that Plaintiff was

“stuck” with Hopkins, and that Plaintiff would have to “wait it out.” Id. at 12-13. Finally,

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5Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Cortez knew that Hopkins had a history of raping his cellmates

and therefore should be single-celled further supports Plaintiff’s claim. However, the Court cannot consider

it because it is plead in a conclusory manner. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff does not state any facts

supporting his bald accusation that Defendant Cortez “knew” this fact.

-10- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cortez knew that Hopkins had a history of raping his

cellmates and was supposed to be single-celled. Id. at 14.

Interpreting the facts and circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Abad and Cortez knew that Hopkins was supposed

to be single-celled because he heard them discuss it. Plaintiff also alleges that they had a

private discussion and then Defendant Abad told Plaintiff that he would have to “wait it out.”

From these factual allegations, the Court can infer that Defendants Abad and Cortez knew

that Plaintiff was facing a substantial risk of serious harm from Hopkins and that they chose

to ignore the risk.5 See Bowman v. Washington, 2010 WL 597466, *1-2 (W.D.Wash. Feb.

16, 2010) (finding that Plaintiff pled a prima facie case of deliberate indifference to

withstand defendant's motion to dismiss where Plaintiff alleged that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to his safety when they housed him with a violent inmate who threw

an object at him and as a result permanently injured him); see also Berg, 794 F.2d 457

(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and finding prima facie case of

deliberate indifference where inmate told prison official his life was in danger if he went to

his work assignment, but the official ignored his complaint and sent him to work, where he

was beaten and raped by his cell partner). As such, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

state a claim for deliberate indifference.

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's

claim of deliberate indifference against Defendants Abad and Cortez be DENIED.

c. Defendants Contreras and Marrero

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Contreras and Marrero personally

participated in the deliberate indifference constitutional violation. ECF No. 8 at 11-14.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Contreras and Marrero implemented practices and

polices and provided training, guidance and supervision to other Defendants that allowed

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-11- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

the rape to be committed. Id. Defendants respond that the claims against Defendants

Contreras and Marrero should be dismissed “for lack of personal involvement and/or

causation.” ECF Nos. 24-1 at 10-12; 30 at 5-6.

There generally is no liability under section 1983 based on respondeat superior or

another theory of vicarious liability; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant

personally participated in the alleged denial of rights. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (citing

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978)); see also

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). However, a “supervisor can be held

liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of

subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a complaint

is made; or 3) conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 961 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000)). If, however, there is no

affirmative link between the defendant's conduct and the alleged injury, the defendant will

not be not liable for any deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). 

Additionally, a “plaintiff may hold a supervisory defendant liable based on an

unconstitutional policy if he alleges facts indicating that the defendant implemented a policy

so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving

force of the constitutional violation.” Lee v. Alameida, 2010 WL 2629800, *2 (E.D. Cal.

2010) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Official policy often

refers to formal rules or understandings-often but not always committed to writing-that are

intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar

circumstances consistently over time.” Id. at *3 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti, 475

U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Contreras was the Associate Warden at R.J.

Donovan Correctional Facility and, as such, responsible for the policies and practices

implemented for inmates who were high security risks. ECF No. 8 at 7. Plaintiff also alleges

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6Plaintiff alternatively states that Defendant Marrero was responsible for executing policies (ECF No.

8 at 6) and for implementing policies (id. at 14) and Defendant Contreras was responsible for implementing

policies (id. at 7) but did not implement the policy at issue in this case (id. at 14). As such, the FAC does not

clearly allege which defendant is responsible for which conduct. Moreover, a supervisory defendant cannot

be held responsible merely for executing a policy. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1449

(9th Cir. 1991) (opining that just because and individual defendant “was familiar with the policies and

procedures, and implemented them as required by his supervisor, does not afford a basis for holding him

liable as a policymaker under § 1983").

-12- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

that Defendant Contreras was responsible for the training, guidance, supervision and control

of subordinates such as Defendants Marrero, Smith and Abad. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Contreras knew that Hopkins had a history of raping his cellmates and was

supposed to have single-cell status. Id. at 14. While Plaintiff argues in his pleadings that

Defendant Contreras “created and implemented the policies and practices” to ignore the

single-cell designations in order to ease overcrowding, the FAC contains no such allegation.

Plaintiff further alleges that as a Correctional Captain at R.J. Donovan Correctional

Facility, Defendant Marrero was responsible for: (1) executing “the policies and practices of

general population and ad/seg release detainments for committee referrals and program

recommendations;” (2) the “critical safety security and treatment of all Facility 3 placement

inmates;” and (3) “the immediate resolve of custody issues of housing security and safety

of all Facility 3 inmates.” ECF No. 8 at 6. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Marrero is

responsible for the “training, guidance, supervision and control of all subordinate

Correctional Counselors, [and] Correctional Officers.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Marrero worked with other defendants to implement a policy “to ignore such critical case

factors as single cell S Suffix to fill up any empty bed so as to reduce the over crowding.”

Id. at 14. Plaintiff alleges that this policy “lead directly” to his being drugged and raped.

Id. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory and incomplete allegations do not state a claim against

Defendants Contreras and Marrero. Plaintiff does not allege that either defendant personally

participated in the alleged denial of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also does not clearly

identify which defendant or defendants created and implemented the policies at issue in this

case,6 nor does Plaintiff clearly identify the specific policy at issue in this case (e.g., a policy

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to double-cell inmates who have single-cell designations or a policy to double-cell inmates

who have not yet been designated). Also, if Plaintiff is alleging conduct other than a

significantly deficient policy that warrants supervisory liability, he fails to adequately identify

and allege the misconduct. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and vague. If

Plaintiff wants to re-allege constitutional violations against these defendants, Plaintiff should

bear in mind that defendants can only be liable for their own misconduct. See Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. at 1948. Plaintiff must plead facts alleging that Defendants Contreras and Marrero

violated the constitution through their own individual actions. Id. Plaintiff will not satisfy

the pleading requirements of Iqbal merely by alleging that one of the Defendants was the

"architect" of an unconstitutional policy which the other Defendant executed. Id. at 1951

(stating that Plaintiff's allegations that Ashcroft was the "principle architect" of an invidious

policy that Mueller adopted and executed were "bare assertions" that were "conclusory and

not entitled to be assumed true") (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55). Plaintiff must

clearly state the facts, not merely conclusions, supporting his allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

at 1949 (While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.).

This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendants Contreras and Marrero be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process

Plaintiff asserts that the conduct of Defendants Cortez, Marrero, and Contreras also

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to “procedural protection”. ECF No. 8. at 12. In

response, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims should be

dismissed because any protection afforded prisoners by the Fourteenth Amendment “is, at

best, redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.” ECF No. 24-1 at 14. 

The exact nature of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment allegations is not clear from

the complaint. If Plaintiff is alleging that his substantive due process rights were violated,

he has failed to state such a claim. “While the Eighth Amendment governs claims brought

by convicted prisoners, the Due Process Clause governs failure-to-protect claims filed by

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pretrial detainees and civilly-committed individuals.” See Becker, 2008 WL 802933 at *8

(citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) and Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d

918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner at the time of the

allegedly unconstitutional actions, his claims arise solely under the Eighth Amendment. See

Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843

(1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)) (finding that “if a

constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or

Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that

specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process"). 

If Plaintiff is alleging that his procedural due process rights were violated, he also

has failed to state such a claim. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law. See U.S. Const. XIV, § 1; see also Becker, 2008 WL 802933 at *9 (citing Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). A person asserting a violation of the right to due

process must first allege facts showing that they were deprived of an interest cognizable

under the Due Process Clause or state law. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). Liberty

interests in the prison context are generally limited to freedom from restraints that "impose

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Even severe hardship does not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation unless it is both atypical and significant. Id.

Here, Plaintiff has not, and cannot allege facts supporting the existence of any

protected liberty interest. If Plaintiff is arguing that he had a right to be single celled while

Hopkins’s classification status was being determined, there is no such liberty interest. See

White v. Carasco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9785, *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2010) (stating that

“double celling is not a condition that materially differs from conditions faced by inmates in

purely discretionary segregation or general population”); see also Wiseman v. Hernandez,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125386, *48 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (finding that Plaintiff failed to

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allege atypical and significant hardship and that “there is not liberty interest in having single

cell status”); and Williams v. State of California, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22602, *7 (E.D. Cal.

Mar. 6, 2008) (stating that “generally, prison classifications do not give rise to a federal

liberty interest”) (citing Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Similarly, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in selecting his cellmate. See

Bjorlin v. Hubbard, 2010 WL 457685, *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2010) (stating “nor even if

Plaintiff has been placed with a cellmate not of his own choosing would his right to due

process be implicated”); see also Allen v. Figueroa, 56 F.3d. 70, *7 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding

that Plaintiff did not have an Eighth Amendment or due process right to be allowed to

choose his cellmate for compatibility); and Perez v. Sisto, 2007 WL 1081927, *5 (E.D. Cal.

April 6, 2007) ( stating that “in general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions

do not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and

property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”) (citing Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1992)).

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is properly considered under the Eighth

Amendment and Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that demonstrate the deprivation of a

liberty interest in support of a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. This

Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Defendants Cortez, Marrero, and Contreras be GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (court may dismiss without

leave to amend if the pleading cannot be cured by the addition of other facts).

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that “no federal constitutional rights were violated by

Defendants” and that even if the Court finds that Plaintiff’s rights were violated, Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed that their actions were

lawful and “would not have been on notice that their conduct was unlawful.” ECF No. 24-1

at 12-13. Plaintiff responds that Defendants Marrero, Contreras and Cortez are not entitled

to qualified immunity because they implemented an unreasonable policy requiring their

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subordinates to house inmates without considering critical case factors. ECF No. 29 at 15.

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions

from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). "Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand

trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)

(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), abrogated on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). This privilege is "an immunity from suit rather

than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case

is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 200-01 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).

Thus, the Supreme Court "repeatedly [has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity

questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Id. at 201 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant,

502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). 

In Saucier, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry for determining

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16; Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201. First, the court was directed to consider whether, "[t]aken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional right would

have been violated were the allegations established, the Saucier Court instructed lower

courts to next examine whether the right was clearly established such that "it would be clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at

201-02. If an officer makes a reasonable mistake as to what the law requires - i.e. the right

is not clearly established - the officer is entitled to immunity. Id. at 202-03. The Supreme

Court subsequently determined that "while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often

appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory." Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.

Instead, lower courts may "exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id.

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-17- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

1. Defendants Smith, Contreras, and Marrero

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint which could "make out a

violation of a constitutional right" by Defendants Smith, Contreras, and Marrero. Pearson,

129 S.Ct. at 815-16. As set forth above, the Court has recommended that the Eighth

Amendment claims asserted against Defendants Smith, Contreras, and Marrero be dismissed

with leave to amend. See, supra at 9 and 13. Because there are no viable claims alleged

against Defendants Smith, Contreras, and Marrero, the Court is unable to evaluate whether

they are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged conduct. Unless and until Plaintiff

alleges a constitutional violation, there can be no determination regarding the applicability

of qualified immunity. As stated by the Supreme Court, "if no constitutional right would

have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Robinson, 278

F.3d at 1013; and Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kwai Fun

Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004)) (recognizing that “a motion to

dismiss on qualified immunity grounds puts the court in the difficult position of deciding

‘far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-existent factual record’ and that while

‘government officials have the right ... to raise ... qualified immunity defense on a motion

to dismiss, the exercise of that authority is not a wise choice in every case’”).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Smith, Contreras, and Marrero on qualified immunity

grounds be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Defendants Abad and Cortez

Plaintiff has alleged facts in his FAC which could "make out a violation of a

constitutional right" by Defendants Abad and Cortez. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815-16.

Interpreting the facts in the light most sympathetic to Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Abad knew that he was facing a substantial risk of serious harm from Hopkins

because he specifically told Defendant Abad that he did not feel safe being celled with

Hopkins and that Hopkins was behaving strangely. ECF No. 8 at 12. Plaintiff further alleges

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28 7see also Bowman, 2010 WL 597466 at *2 (stating that “while qualified immunity is generally decided

on objective facts, when motivation or intent is a component of the alleged violation the plaintiff must be

-18- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

that Defendants Abad and Cortez knew that Hopkins was supposed be single celled because

he heard Defendant Abad tell that fact to Defendant Cortez. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that

immediately after making that statement, Defendants Abad and Cortez had a private

conversation and then Defendant Abad told Plaintiff that Hopkins was not yet classified, that

Abad would see what he could do, that Plaintiff was “stuck” with Hopkins, and that Plaintiff

would have to “wait it out.” Id. at 12-13. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cortez

knew that Hopkins had a history of raping his cellmates and was supposed to be singlecelled. Id. at 14. As discussed above (supra at 9-10), when the facts are construed in this

manner, they allege that Defendants Abad and Cortez violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights

under the Eighth Amendment. See Bowman, 2010 WL 597466 at *1-2 (finding that Plaintiff

pled a prima facie case of an Eighth Amendment violation where Plaintiff alleged that prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they housed him with a violent

inmate who injured him).

Given that Plaintiff has satisfied the threshold requirement of a constitutional

violation, the Court must next consider whether Plaintiff's right was clearly established at the

time Defendants violated that right, and if the Defendants would know their actions violated

clearly established law. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. 808. At the time of Plaintiff's rights violations,

it was clearly established that prisoners have a right to protection and that "prison officials

have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse." Hoptowit

v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.1982) abrogated in part on other grounds by

Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 ("prison officials have a duty ... to

protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners"). 

"The analytical problem facing the court is that there is a subjective element to an

Eighth Amendment violation. When the underlying alleged constitutional violation contains

an intent element, the normal qualified immunity analysis is difficult to apply." Marks v.

Gephardt, 2008 WL 618632, *6 (W.D.Wash., March 3, 2008).7 An Eighth Amendment failure

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given the opportunity to submit proof regarding intent,” and finding that since the intent of a defendant is

an element of an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff should be given the opportunity to conduct limited

discovery. Also finding that the qualified immunity issue could not be decided at the motion to dismiss stage

of the proceedings) (citing Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir.1988)); and Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that “Eighth Amendment claims depend

in part on a subjective test that does not fit easily with the qualified immunity inquiry”); but see Buckheit v.

Dennis, 2010 WL 1998767, *12 (N.D.Cal. May 18, 2010) (concluding that the allegations of discriminatory

intent at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceeding were sufficient to defeat a defense of qualified

immunity, where plaintiff alleged that defendants harbored ill intent and intentionally discriminated against

him by arresting him on account of his gender).

-19- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

to prevent harm violation contains a deliberate indifference component. Id. Thus, the state

of mind or subjective intent of Defendants Abad and Cortez is an element of the violation.

Whether the Defendants actions were constitutional and whether they are entitled to

qualified immunity turns in part on their subjective mental states in this situation. As in

Marks, at the motion to dismiss stage, the court has no record of the Defendants thought

processes or statements from them to consider. Therefore, whether Defendants Abad and

Cortez are entitled to qualified immunity requires the court to consider a greater record than

is now before it. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Abad and Cortez on qualified immunity grounds be

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

F. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief that would require Defendants to “provide single

cell status to the Plaintiff during these proceedings as the practice of housing classified

inmates and nonclassified inmates continues to date also that the Plaintiff not suffer any

adverse actions from R.J. Donovan Correctional Staff as a result of this suit.” ECF No. 8 at

19. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because his request is

unnecessary since the United States and California constitutions protect him from retaliation,

and he has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury. ECF No. 24-1 at 14.

The Eleventh Amendment does permit "suits for prospective injunctive relief

against state officials acting in violation of federal law." Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540

U.S. 431, 437 (2004). However, injunctive relief is available if there is a "real or immediate

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8The PLRA provides, in relevant part: Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison

conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular

plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that

such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give

substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused

by the relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 

-20- 09cv2566-JLS (BLM) 

threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

111 (1983). Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate only when "irreparable injury" is

threatened. Id. To establish irreparable injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate a "real or

immediate threat that the[y] will be wronged again-a 'likelihood of substantial and

immediate irreparable injury." Id. "A state law enforcement agency may be enjoined from

committing constitutional violations where there is proof that officers within the agency have

engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct." Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1129

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th

Cir.1992)); see also Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Injunctive relief

is appropriate in cases involving challenges to government policies resulting in a pattern of

constitutional violations").

The standard for injunctive relief must be considered in conjunction with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Under the PLRA, the court must find that the prospective

relief is "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right," before granting injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1); see also Gomez,

255 F.3d at 1128-9. Additionally, the court must give "substantial weight to any adverse

impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief."

Id.; see also Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)) (holding that Congress explicitly prescribed section 3626's reach to include

pending cases).8

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that the officers have threatened to retaliate against

him or commented in any way on Plaintiff's filing of the instant lawsuit. Therefore, the Court

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finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated no real or immediate threat of retaliation, adverse

actions or irreparable injury. Moreover, applicable law already prohibits Defendants from

retaliating against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right to court access. See

Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (confirming that individuals have

clearly established right to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment right of

access to the courts).

With respect to Plaintiff’s request for single cell status, Plaintiff's request is too

broad and not narrowly drawn. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood

of irreparable injury required for injunctive relief. In fact, since the alleged rape, Plaintiff

has roomed with two different unclassified inmates and does not allege that he has been

injured or threatened as a result of not being single celled. ECF. No. 29 at 18.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief

be DENIED.

G. Motion to Amend Complaint

Plaintiff submitted a “Motion to Amend First Amended Complaint” filed nunc pro

tunc on May 10, 2010. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to name

individual defendants within Defendants Office of Watch Commander and Office of

Registered Nurses, and to name the individual who was the Defendant Chief Medical Officer.

Id. at 1-2. Additionally, Plaintiff wants to serve Defendant Silvia H. Garcia once he is able

to locate her since she is no longer working at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. Id. at 2-3.

As of the date of the Motion, Plaintiff had only obtained the name of the Chief Medical

Officer and was relying on the internet research of his family to locate Defendant Silvia

Garcia. Id.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that "a party may amend the party's pleading only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires." The propriety of granting a motion for leave to amend is

generally determined by analysis of several factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3)

futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. Hurn v. Retirement Fund

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Trust of Plumbing, Heating and Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 648 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981).

Defendants do not argue that amendment would result in prejudice or undue delay, or that

Plaintiff's request for leave to amend is futile or the result of bad faith. 

Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend First

Amended Complaint" be GRANTED. However, given the Court’s recommendations in the

instant Report & Recommendation, amendment is premature at this time. Following District

Judge Sammartino’s ruling on this Report & Recommendation, and assuming Plaintiff is

granted leave to amend, Plaintiff will be free to add additional defendants when he files his

Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies discussed in this Report &

Recommendation. If Plaintiff files a Second Amended Complaint, the Second Amended

Complaint should incorporate the changes discussed in the Motion to Amend First Amended

Complaint.

H. Summary of Recommendations

To summarize the foregoing, the Court recommends that:

# Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim

against Defendant Smith be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

# Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants Abad and Cortez be DENIED; 

# Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants Marrero and Contreras be GRANTED WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND;

# Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Defendants Cortez, Marrero, and Contreras be GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;

# Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants on

qualified immunity grounds be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

# Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief be DENIED; and

# Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint be GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2)

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; and (3)

GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend First Amended Complaint.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than November 30, 2010. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than December 21, 2010. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: November 9, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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