Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_06-cv-00063/USCOURTS-ared-3_06-cv-00063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

TWO TENNESSEE, LLC, and PLAINTIFFS

RAZORBACK CONCRETE COMPANY

v. No. 3:06CV00063 JLH

CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS;

MARTIN GIPSON, CHARLIE HIGHT, GARY

BERRY, and NEIL BRYANT, in Their Official

Capacities and as Members of the City Council of

North Little Rock, Arkansas, and Individually DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment in which they ask for summary

judgment on all of plaintiffs’ claims or, in the alternative, for determination that the individual

defendants are immune from suit. In denying a motion to dismiss on the immunity issue, this Court

previously explained:

Legislative Immunity

The defendants contend that the individual defendants, Gipson, Hight, Berry,

and Bryant, are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions because they acted in

a legislative function. It is well settled that “[a]bsolute legislative immunity protects

legislators from suit for actions taken in furtherance of legitimate legislative activity.”

Hinshaw v. Smith, 436 F.3d 997, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006). Razorback Concrete and Two

Tennessee recognize this general principle but argue that the city council members’

acts were ministerial or executive in nature, not legislative.

According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the

nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.”

Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S. Ct. 966, 973, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998).

In Bogan, the plaintiff sued city officials for voting to eliminate the city department

in which she worked, alleging that their action was motivated by racial animus and

in retaliation against the exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. at 47, 118 S. Ct. at

969. The Court of Appeals, emphasizing the fact that the defendants had relied on

matters relating to the plaintiff and devised an ordinance that targeted her and treated

her differently from other employees, held that such action is not legislative. ScottHarris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427, 441 (1st Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 44,

118 S. Ct. 966. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals had

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erroneously relied upon subjective intent rather than the nature of the act. Bogan,

523 U.S. at 54, 118 S. Ct. at 972-73. In determining the nature of the act, the

Supreme Court primarily directed its attention to the form of the act. The court held

that, in form, the nature of an act of voting for or against a city ordinance was

“quintessentially legislative.” Id. at 55, 118 S. Ct. at 973. The court declined to

decide whether form alone could determine the nature of an act because the act in

that case was substantively legislative as well. Id. at 55-56, 118 S. Ct. at 973. Cf.

Hinshaw, 436 F.3d at 1008 (introducing a bill is “quintessentially legislative”);

Alcierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 1994) (down-zoning a single parcel

may be legislative if the council is acting in a policy-making manner); O’Brien v.

City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 1989) (voting at a special

meeting not to appropriate funds to defend an alderman was executive, not

legislative); Thornbury Noble, Ltd. v. Thornbury Township, No. CIV. A. 99-6460,

2002 WL 442827, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 2002) (rejecting a rezoning request

was neither procedurally nor substantively legislative).

In Bogan, the Supreme Court decided whether the action was legislative or

executive in nature after trial, so the Court had a full record upon which to base that

determination. Here, the Court has only a few allegations in a sparsely pled

complaint. The complaint says nothing other than that the defendants refused to

correct the error on the zoning map and did so for bad motives (which are irrelevant

to the immunity issue). The complaint is insufficient to inform the Court of whether

the form or the substance of the action (or inaction) by the defendants was legislative.

Was an ordinance presented? If so, were the formalities for presenting an ordinance

observed? Was there a formal vote? Did the events occur at a regular meeting of the

city council? Was the city council acting on an administrative recommendation by

the planning commission, on an appeal from a decision of the commission, or in

some other context? The complaint fails to answer these questions and others that

are relevant to the issue of legislative immunity. Thus, the Court has no information

as to whether the requirements for adopting ordinances were followed, so the Court

cannot ascertain whether the action was legislative in form; nor does the Court have

information to ascertain whether the substance of the action (or inaction) was

administrative rather than legislative.

The Court is mindful that the immunity at issue is immunity from suit, not

merely immunity from damages, and that the issue should be decided as early as

possible. Cf. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.

Ed. 2d 272 (2001). Nevertheless, the information before the Court is insufficient to

show whether the action (or inaction) was legislative or administrative in nature.

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the individual defendants because they have

legislative immunity is denied without prejudice to the right of these defendants to

renew the motion by way of a motion for summary judgment or at trial.

The motion for summary judgment is supported with certified copies of the records from the

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planning commission and the city council. Those records show that the form and substance of the

action by the defendants was legislative in nature. An ordinance was presented to amend the city’s

comprehensive zoning ordinance, which mistakenly zoned the property in question as R-4 rather than

I-2. The minutes of the city council meeting of November 14, 2005, show that the planning

commission recommended that concrete manufacturing be allowed in I-3 zones and as a conditional

use in I-2 zones. The city council conducted a formal vote at a regular meeting. The minutes reflect

that there were issues regarding the effect that the plaintiffs’ proposed concrete plant would have on

the surrounding area. The issue before the city council was larger than merely correcting a

scrivener’s error; it was a policy issue regarding land use planning for an area of the city. Hence, the

formalities for adopting or rejecting an ordinance were preserved, and the city council acted in a

policy-making manner. Therefore, the members of the city council are absolutely immune from suit.

Although the motion for summary judgment is supported by certified copies of the records

from the planning commission and the city council, it is not supported by affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, or any other form of sworn testimony that would meet the defendants’

burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiffs’ claims that the city

violated their substantive due process rights or their right to equal protection of the laws. Therefore,

summary judgment is denied as to those claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 478 U.S. 317, 323, 106

S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Although, as Celotex states, a motion for summary

judgment need not always be supported by affidavits or other forms of sworn testimony, it is still the

moving party’s burden in the first instance to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

The city has not met that burden.

The amended complaint also attempts to allege a claim for tortious interference with a

contract or business expectancy. See para. 25. Other than to say, mistakenly, that the amended

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complaint fails to allege a state-law claim by name, the defendants’ brief does not address that claim,

so neither will this Opinion and Order.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment on behalf of Martin Gipson, Charlie Hight, Gary Berry,

and Neil Bryant is GRANTED because those individual defendants are absolutely immune from suit.

The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to claims against the City of North Little Rock

because the City has failed to support its motion for summary judgment in such a manner as to show

that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the claims against it. Document #23.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2006.

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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