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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3511 

WILLIAM B. SHIPLEY, NINA MARIE,

and KATHERINE WUTHRICH, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS 

and JAMES M. SCANLON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 16-cv-07424 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2020 — DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2020 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Claims of election fraud are not new 

in Illinois. Plaintiffs William B. Shipley and Katherine Wuthrich were credentialed election monitors in Chicago during 

the 2016 Illinois primary election and Plaintiff Nina Marie 

voted in the election. They allege that during the statutorily 

mandated post-election audit of electronic voting machines, 

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they witnessed rampant fraud and irregularities by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners’ (the “Board”) employees conducting the audit. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal 

court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging this post-election audit 

fraud violated their right to vote. 

The problem with Plaintiffs’ allegations, however, is that 

Illinois law expressly precludes the findings of the post-election audit from changing or altering the election results. In 

other words, no matter how improper the Board employees’ 

conduct was during the audit, it could not have affected Plaintiffs’ right to vote. For this reason, the district court dismissed 

the complaint for failure to state a claim. And for the same 

reason, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I. Background 

The Illinois Election Code, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-1 et seq., 

provides for the use of Direct Recording Electronic Voting 

Systems (DREVS), or, more simply, electronic voting, in election precincts during regular and early voting. 10 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/24C-1. The electronic voting equipment must be capable of “instantaneously recording such votes, storing such 

votes, producing a permanent paper record and tabulating such 

votes at the precinct or at one or more counting stations.” Id. 

(emphasis added). The permanent paper record is, as its name 

suggests, a paper upon which the machine prints an image of 

the votes cast on each ballot electronically recorded on that 

machine. Id. § 24C-2. The permanent paper records are then 

preserved in the same manner as paper ballots and “shall be 

available as an official record for any recount, redundant 

count, or verification or retabulation of the vote count.” Id. 

§ 24C-12. After the polls close, the DREVS equipment tabulates the total votes and produces an “In-Precinct Totals 

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Report,” or a precinct return. Id. The precinct return includes 

“the number of ballots cast and votes cast for each candidate 

and public question and shall constitute the official return of 

each precinct.” Id. § 24C-15. 

After an election, the Board randomly tests a small percentage—five percent to be exact—of the electronic voting 

equipment in service during that election. Section 24C-15 of 

the Code, which is at the heart of this appeal, provides the 

procedure for the post-election audit of the electronic voting 

equipment. 

A. The five percent audit

Section 24C-15 covers three topics, as indicated by its title: 

“Official Return of Precinct,” “Check of Totals,” and “Audit.” 

The section does not contain subdivisions, internal headings, 

or otherwise obviously subdivide the topics, but a read of the 

section quickly reveals its structure. The first paragraph deals 

with the Official Return of Precinct and the Check of Totals, 

which are irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. 

The second paragraph in section 24C-15 outlines the five 

percent audit procedure that we are concerned with here. 

“Prior to the proclamation, the election authority shall test the 

voting devices and equipment in 5% of the precincts within 

the election jurisdiction, as well as 5% of the voting devices 

used in early voting.” 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24C-15. The State 

Board of Elections, not the local election authority, randomly 

selects, based on a mathematical formula, the precincts and 

voting devices to be tested. The local election authority 

though—here, the Board—conducts the five percent audit. 

The procedure for auditing, or testing, the electronic voting equipment is simple. The Board manually counts the 

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votes marked on the permanent paper record and then compares those hand-tallied vote totals to the DREVS-generated 

results. See 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24C-15. If there is a discrepancy, “the cause shall be determined and corrected, and an 

errorless count shall be made prior to the official canvass and 

proclamation of election results.” Id. If, however, “an errorless 

count cannot be conducted” and there continues to be a difference between the hand tally of the permanent paper record 

and the electronically generated totals, the Board “shall immediately prepare and forward to the appropriate canvassing 

board a written report explaining the results of the test and 

any errors encountered and the report shall be made available 

for public inspection.” Id. Finally, section 24C-15 concludes by 

expressly providing that the “results of this post-election test 

shall be treated in the same manner and have the same effect 

as the results of the discovery procedures set forth in Section 

22-9.1 of this Code.” Id. The incorporated section 22-9.1 is discussed in greater detail below, but for now it is sufficient to 

say that the discovery procedures cannot be used to affect 

election results. 

B. Plaintiffs’ allegations 

After the March 15, 2016 primary election in Illinois, the 

Board conducted the statutorily mandated five percent audit 

from March 23, 2016, through March 29, 2016, at a storage facility in Chicago. Plaintiffs Shipley and Wuthrich were credentialed election monitors and attended one or more of these 

audits. According to Plaintiffs, they observed troublesome behavior. 

The Board performed the five percent audits by having 

one Board employee read aloud the individual votes from the 

permanent paper record while another employee would hand 

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record the votes on a tally sheet. The machine-generated final 

vote count was allegedly preprinted at the top of the tally 

sheet in bold—essentially, according to Plaintiffs, giving away 

the answers to the test. The Board employees, Plaintiffs allege, 

also used pencil to make the tally marks, permitting the employees to erase tallies at the end so that their test count would 

match the preprinted final count. Or, similarly, employees 

would add tallies at the end to make up any difference or just 

stop counting once the test count reached the “target” vote 

count. Plaintiffs also contend that Board employees actively 

attempted to obscure Plaintiffs’ view of the tally sheets. This 

improper conduct was “widespread and pervasive” throughout the observed audits. 

Troubled by their observations, Plaintiffs attended an 

April 5, 2016 Board meeting for consideration of returns and 

proclamation of the results of the primary election. They also 

submitted their concerns to the Board in writing in advance 

of the public meeting. But Plaintiffs allege that even though 

the meeting was supposed to be open for public comment, the 

Board closed public comment and did not allow Plaintiffs to 

speak. The Board certified the returns and adjourned the 

proclamation meeting in “less than two minutes.” 

C. The district court proceedings 

Plaintiffs1 filed a three-count complaint in federal court. 

Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged a violation of 

the right to vote. Count II, also brought under § 1983, alleged 

a violation of the rights of freedom of association and to petition the government. In Count III, Plaintiffs sought 

1 Rebecca A. Kerlin, Michelle Gale, and Claire Tobin were also named 

plaintiffs in the district court but withdrew from the case on appeal. 

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declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that the court 

permanently enjoin the Board from further violating the Illinois Election Code. 

The Board moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district 

court initially granted in part and denied in part the motion. 

Specifically, the court dismissed Count II but found that 

Counts I and III sufficiently stated a claim to survive dismissal. The Board moved for reconsideration, suggesting that the 

district court misapprehended its argument regarding the 

right to vote claim due to “a lack of clarity” in the Board’s initial motion to dismiss. The Board more clearly articulated its 

argument that regardless of whether the post-election audit 

was properly conducted, the audit cannot—by statute—be 

used to amend or change any vote and thus the alleged improprieties could not have affected anyone’s right to vote. 

Plaintiffs then amended their complaint in response to the 

motion to reconsider, adding some factual allegations in support of Count I and repleaded the dismissed Count II verbatim “to preserve the record for appellate purposes, if necessary.” The Board again moved to dismiss. 

Upon reconsideration, and in light of the new motion to 

dismiss, the district court agreed with the Board. “Simply put, 

the plain text of section 22-9.1 unambiguously says that the 

discovery procedure’s results, and thus the 5% test’s results, 

cannot change election results. Under Illinois law, the only outcome of an error in the 5% test count is a public[ly] available 

written report.” The court therefore dismissed Count I because “[n]o matter how flagrantly [the Board] might have 

doctored the numbers during its 5% test, that test’s results 

could not possibly have affected the election results under 

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Illinois law.” As to Count II, the district court incorporated its 

previous memorandum and opinion dismissing the count, 

which found that Plaintiffs’ allegations did not identify with 

whom Plaintiffs were prevented from associating with or any 

interference with “petitioning” the government. With the dismissal of Counts I and II, the court dismissed Count III because there was no longer a claim of a deprivation of any federal constitutional right to support federal jurisdiction. 

The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice because 

Plaintiffs did not request leave to replead and, in any event, 

any attempt to replead would be futile.2 

II. Discussion 

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim de novo. Chicago Studio Rental, Inc. 

v. Illinois Dep’t of Commerce, 940 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 2019). 

We accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id. To survive a motion to 

dismiss, the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Plaintiffs allege the deprivation of three constitutional 

rights: the right to vote, freedom of association, and the right 

to petition the government.3 The focus of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, 

2 Plaintiffs do not challenge that the dismissal was with prejudice or 

argue that they should be given another opportunity to replead. 

3 Plaintiffs’ opening brief makes a cursory, two-sentence reference to 

an equal protection claim. To the extent Plaintiffs assert an equal 

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and their briefing, is the right to vote claim, but we will address each constitutional claim in turn, along with the equitable relief claim. 

A. Right to vote 

It is undeniable that the right to vote is a fundamental 

right guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). The right to vote is not just the 

right to put a ballot in a box but also the right to have one’s 

vote counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915). 

“The right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box 

stuffing.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (internal 

citations omitted). Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for a violation of the right to vote, though, because the five percent audit 

cannot alter or discard any vote cast. The Illinois Election 

Code compels this conclusion. 

Because we are interpreting an Illinois statute, we apply 

Illinois’s principles of statutory construction. See Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 772 F.3d 437, 440–41 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(“When interpreting a state statute, we apply the same principles of statutory construction that a state court would apply.”). In Illinois, the “primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 

939 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ill. 2010). “The plain language of a statute 

is the most reliable indication of legislative intent.” Id. 

“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied 

protection claim on appeal, they have waived the right to argue that claim 

because they failed to present it to the district court. See Hale v. Victor Chu, 

614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010). 

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No. 17-3511 9

as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation.” 

DeLuna v. Burciaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Ill. 2006). The analysis 

here starts and stops with the plain language of section 24C15 and, as incorporated therein, section 22-9.1. 

Section 24C-15 provides that if, during the five percent audit of the electronic voting equipment, 

an errorless count cannot be conducted and 

there continues to be difference in vote results 

between the certificate of results produced by 

the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System 

and the count of the permanent paper records 

or if an error was detected and corrected, the 

election authority shall immediately prepare 

and forward to the appropriate canvassing 

board a written report explaining the results of 

the test and any errors encountered and the report shall be made available for public inspection. 

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24C-15. In simpler terms, the statute expressly contemplates the possibility of discrepancy in the final test count and offers only one option: a written report. 

Nothing in section 24C-15 permits the Board to use the results 

of the five percent audit to in any way change, correct, or even 

question the official precinct returns, the certificate of results, 

or the proclamation of election results. 

If this plain reading of section 24C-15 was not clear 

enough on its face, the provision concludes by stating that the 

“results of this post-election test shall be treated in the same 

manner and have the same effect as the results of the 

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discovery procedures set forth in Section 22-9.1 of this Code.” 

Id. So we turn to section 22-9.1. 

Section 22-9.1 governs the ability of a candidate to petition 

for discovery within five days after the last day for proclamation of the results of an election. A petition for discovery includes a request to test a portion of the automatic tabulating 

equipment. But, critical to the effect of the five percent audit, 

the 

results of the examination and count shall not 

be certified, used to amend or change the abstracts of the votes previously completed, used 

to deny the successful candidate for the same office his certificate of nomination or election, nor 

used to change the previously declared result of 

the vote on a question of public policy. 

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/22-9.1. The incorporation by reference of 

section 22-9.1 forecloses any argument that Plaintiffs may 

have had that section 24C-15 leaves open the possibility to 

challenge the official election results. Taken together, section 

22-9.1 reaffirms the conclusion that section 24C-15’s five percent audit procedure cannot affect votes. 

Plaintiffs devote most of their time to arguing that the district court ignored their allegations and demanded a higher 

degree of factual pleading than the federal rules require. 

Plaintiffs miss the forest for the trees. The issue is not one of 

facts, but one of law. No matter how factually detailed, egregious, or willful the misconduct alleged, the five percent audit 

cannot affect the election results under Illinois law. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim that the Board deprived them of their right to vote. 

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We note, parenthetically, that this does not mean that all 

allegations of misconduct during a five percent audit are 

without recourse entirely. Indeed, such allegations may state 

a claim for violation of the Illinois Election Code. But that is a 

state law claim for a violation of state law, not a federal claim 

for a violation of constitutional rights. “A violation of state 

law does not state a claim under § 1983,” and, more specifically, “a deliberate violation of state election laws by state 

election officials does not transgress against the Constitution.” Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of Chicago, 

814 F.2d 332, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 

321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944)); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 

(7th Cir. 1975) (“It is not every election irregularity, however, 

which will give rise to a constitutional claim and an action 

under section 1983. Mere violation of a state statute by an election official, for example, will not.”). Plaintiffs may have other 

avenues available to raise their complaints, but federal court 

is not one of them. 

B. Waiver of remaining constitutional claims 

Plaintiffs also claim that the Board violated their constitutional rights to freely associate and to petition the government. But on appeal, Plaintiffs offer only a few cursory sentences in support of their freedom of association and right to 

petition the government claims, buried in the middle of other 

arguments, and without any adequate explanation at all that 

would aid our review. “We will not fill this void by crafting 

arguments and performing the necessary legal research.” 

Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir. 

2010); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring appellant’s argument to contain “appellant’s contentions and the 

reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of 

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the record on which the appellant relies”). Arguments that are 

underdeveloped, cursory, and lack supporting authority are 

waived. Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 926 F.3d 409, 419 n.2 

(7th Cir. 2019) (“As briefed, the argument is terse, free of legal 

citation, and vague. It is therefore waived.”); Crespo v. Colvin, 

824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Moreover, perfunctory and 

undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those 

arguments raise constitutional issues).” (quotations omitted)). 

Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal are woefully undeveloped 

and therefore waived. 

Even if we were to forgive the waiver, Plaintiffs fare no 

better on the merits. Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible 

claim that the Board violated their right to freely associate or 

their right to petition the government. We briefly address 

each constitutional claim. 

1. Freedom of association 

The Constitution protects two forms of free association. 

“The first, freedom of expressive association, arises from the 

First Amendment and ensures the right to associate for the 

purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First 

Amendment.” Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 

617–18 (1984)). “The second, freedom of intimate association, 

protects the right ‘to enter into and maintain certain intimate 

human relationships.’” Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617). 

We assume that Plaintiffs assert the first variety. The freedom 

of expressive association accords “protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals” to help “in preserving political 

and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression 

from suppression by the majority.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 

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Certainly, Plaintiffs allege a collective effort to monitor elections on behalf of their shared goal to promote election integrity. But Plaintiffs do not allege how they were prevented 

from associating or with whom they were prevented from associating. Without more, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 

that the Board violated their right to freedom of association. 

2. Right to petition the government 

“The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is found in the First Amendment to the Constitution.” 

Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1006 (7th Cir. 2000). 

“The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, 

hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected 

representatives ....” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 

379, 388 (2011). Although “various levels of public participation in various kinds of policy decisions may be” sensible, the 

Supreme Court “has never held, and nothing in the Constitution suggests it should hold, that government must provide 

for such participation.” Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. 

Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). “[T]he rights to speak, associate, and petition [do not] require government policymakers to 

listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public 

issues.” Id. “So while the government may not interfere with 

the right to petition, it need not grant the petition, no matter 

how meritorious it is.” Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1007 (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ primary, if not only, allegation regarding the 

right to petition the government is that they were prevented 

from publicly commenting at the April 5, 2016 proclamation 

meeting before the Board certified the precinct returns. But 

elsewhere in the amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that 

they voiced their objections to the Board shortly after the five 

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percent audit and before the meeting, and also that they submitted their observations in writing in advance of the public 

meeting. “A petition conveys the special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action 

by the government to address those concerns.” Borough of 

Duryea, 564 U.S. at 388–89. Thus, Plaintiffs’ own allegations 

doom their claim. Plaintiffs were in fact able to petition the 

Board for redress of their grievances. That the Board did not 

take any action, or at least to the satisfaction of Plaintiffs, is of 

no moment. It seems, as best we can discern, that Plaintiffs’ 

only complaint is that they were not able to petition the Board 

at their desired time and place, not that they were prohibited 

from petitioning the government. And without any help from 

Plaintiffs on this score, we decline to read any further into 

their claim. 

C. Equitable relief 

Finally, Plaintiffs sought a declaration regarding the parties’ legal rights and liabilities with respect to the Board’s alleged noncompliance with section 24C-15 and a permanent 

injunction enjoining the Board from further violating the Illinois Election Code. The district court found that having dismissed the constitutional claims, no “federal case or controversy” remained to support jurisdiction and dismissed the declaratory judgment count. Plaintiffs now argue on appeal, for 

the first time, that state law remedies are inadequate to address “the violations to federal and constitutional rights” alleged in this lawsuit. The argument was not presented to the 

district court and is therefore waived. Owens v. Auxilium 

Pharm., Inc., 895 F.3d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 2018). Notwithstanding 

the issue of waiver, Plaintiffs’ argument fails. 

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The Declaratory Judgment Act permits a federal court to 

award a declaratory judgment only in “a case of actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). This is the same case-or-controversy limitation placed on federal jurisdiction under Article III. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 

(2007). Federal courts have “no supervisory powers and no 

authority to instruct the Board how to follow state law.” 

Kasper, 814 F.2d at 342. 

And with respect to the prospective injunctive relief Plaintiffs’ seek, the future harm “must be both real and immediate, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quotations omitted). “For purposes of 

standing to seek injunctive relief against future harm, courts 

generally assume that litigants ‘will conduct their activities 

within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction.’” 

Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)). Without the 

dismissed constitutional claims, Plaintiffs “have alleged nothing more than garden variety election irregularities that could 

have been adequately dealt with through the procedures set 

forth in [Illinois] law.” Bodine v. Elkhart Cty. Election Bd., 

788 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1986). 

D. Motion to strike 

There is one other matter we must address: the Board’s 

pending motion to strike Plaintiffs’ appellate reply brief. 

Plaintiffs asked this court for leave to amend their filed reply 

brief and indicated that Plaintiffs wished to “add newly 

found case law and any associated analysis to their reply 

brief.” We denied the motion and in unequivocal terms “decline[d] to permit the appellants to make substantive changes 

to their reply brief at this late stage.” Plaintiffs were, however, 

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permitted to correct the procedural deficiencies in their reply 

brief that the clerk previously identified. Plaintiffs willfully 

disregarded our order and went ahead and resubmitted their 

reply brief with numerous substantive changes, without any 

signal they did so. This prompted the instant motion to strike 

and we took the motion with the case. 

Given our preceding discussion and our holding, we deny 

the Board’s motion as moot. In doing so, we do not countenance Plaintiffs’ behavior. “A party must file one brief with 

the court, and to alter one version without informing the court 

is unethical.” Khan v. Midwestern Univ., 879 F.3d 838, 846 (7th 

Cir. 2018). We remind counsel, though we should not have to, 

that they must comply with the court’s orders. 

III. Conclusion 

Section 24C-15, and section 22-9.1 by incorporation, of the 

Illinois Election Code precludes the post-election audit of five 

percent of the electronic voting equipment from affecting any 

vote cast or the ultimate election results, and thus Plaintiffs 

cannot state a right to vote claim. Plaintiffs simply do not 

plead a plausible claim that the Board violated their right to 

freely associate or right to petition the government. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ second 

amended complaint with prejudice. 

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