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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Srateti Court of Appe-~s 

Tenth Cb:uit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 1 b 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED 

MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

BIG HORN COAL COMPANY, 

a Wyoming corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-8067 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. C-88-0254-J) 

Earl V. Brown, Jr. of United Mineworkers of America, Washington, 

D. C. (John L. _Quinn and Robert M. WeavE!r of Longshore, Nakamura 

& Qu~~n, Birmingham, Alabama, on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Sandra R. Goldman (Jeffrey T. Johnson with her on the briefs) of 

Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and 

BRATTON, Senior District Judge.* 

PER CURIAM. 

*The Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 1 
This appeal arises from an order of the district court 

granting summary judgment for the United Mine Workers of America 

(the "Union") against Big Horn Coal Company (the "Company") and 

denying the Company's cross-motion for summary judgment. The 

disputed issue is whether the Company has an obligation to submit 

to arbitration certain grievances which arose after the expiration 

date of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The lower 

court held as a matter of law that such an obligation exists in 

this case. We find no contract between the parties upon which to 

base jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management 

Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 185(a). Accordingly, we reverse. 

In the spring of 1987, Union and Company officials began 

negotiation efforts to reach agreement on a new labor-management 

contract. These efforts extended past the June 1, 1987 expiration 

date of the parties' collective bargaining agreement but no new 

agreement was reached. On July 1, 1987, after negotiations reached 

an impasse, the Company implemented its "last and final offer," an 

offer which, from all appearances, included the grievance and 

arbitration provision of the expired contract. 1 

The employees continued thereafter to work until october 5, 

1987, when Local Union 2055, comprised of mine worker employees at 

1

on June 4, 1987, the Company sent a letter to the Union 

outlining the terms of the Company's last contract offer. This 

letter delineated the contract sections which would be changed from 

the prior agreement, and further stated, "[A]ll other provisions 

of the 1984 agreement not hereinbefore mentioned remain in effect 

under our last offer." No change in the grievance and arbitration 

provision had been discussed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 2 
Big Horn Coal Company's Sheridan, Wyoming mine, commenced a strike. 

The strike continued until on or about June 27, 1988, at which time 

the Union, on behalf of Local Union 2055 members, notified the 

Company of the employees' unconditional offer to return to work. 

The Company, however, refused to reinstate eighteen of the 

striking employees, alleging that they had been engaged in serious 

strike-related misconduct. The Union filed grievances on behalf 

of each employee. The Union and the Company processed these 

grievances through the steps of the grievance procedure without 

resolution. At the conclusion of the last meeting the Union 

demanded arbitration. The Company refused to submit to arbitration 

on the grounds that the grievances were not arbitrable. 

The Union brought this action pursuant to Section 301 of the 

Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 185, seeking an order 

to compel the Company to arbitrate the grievances of the employees 

denied reinstatement. The Union argued that the Company's 

unilateral implementation of its last offer extended the Company's 

contractual obligation to arbitrate. 

The district court, in granting the Union's summary judgment 

motion and denying the Company's motion, held that the parties 

intended to abide and be bound by the unchanged terms of the 

expired collective bargaining agreement. R. Vol. I, Tab 21, p. 7. 

The court found that the Company's extension of the final offer and 

the employees' continuation to work after the offer was implemented 

constituted objective manifestations of the parties' mutual assent 

to contract. Id. Upon review of the district court's decision, 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 3 
we utilize the same standard employed by the court below and 

examine the conclusions reached de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

In United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v. 

Gold Star Sausage Co., 897 F.2d 1022 (lOth Cir. 1990), we rejected 

the position taken by the labor union therein that federal courts 

should enforce an arbitration provision included within the terms 

of a unilaterally-implemented last offer. Id. at 1026-27. 

Employer implementation of a last and final offer is, by itself, 

insufficient to invoke jurisdiction absent some manifestation of 

acceptance of the offer sufficient to create a contract. Id. at 

1026. As we noted in Gold Star, jurisdiction under Section 30l(a) 

of the Labor-Management Relations Act arises when redress is sought 

for "'violations of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization.'" Id., citing 29 u.s.c. § 185(a)(ernphasis supplied 

in Gold Star). Thus, simply spotlighting management's exercise of 

its statutory right to implement its last and final offer does not 

establish the contractual basis necessary for jurisdiction. 

Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 

444 F. Supp. 1223, 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 590 

(7th Cir. 1980). 

The contract between the parties required for jurisdiction 

need not be a written, signed collective bargaining agreement, but 

may exist as any informal agreement between the parties significant 

to the maintenance of labor peace between them. Retail Clerks 

Int'l Ass'n, Local Unions Nos. 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 4 
369 u.s. 17, 28 (1962). It suffices that the parties' intent to 

abide by the agreed-upon provisions of any such informal agreement 

is in some manner manifest. Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Int'l Ladies 

Garment Workers Union, 835 F.2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir. 1987); see 

also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Wells Badger Industries, 

Inc., 835 F.2d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1987). 

In Gold Star, we noted that in one case an employer's 

implementation of its last offer constituted an invitation to enter 

into an interim unilateral contract, accepted by the employees' 

continued performance. 897 F.2d at 1026, citing Taft Broadcasting 

Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1971). Yet, in Gold Star we 

found no unilateral contract. The Union therein had expressly 

rejected the employer's last offer. Thus, the fact that the Gold 

Star employees continued to work after the rejection did not 

constitute the acceptance necessary to form a contract, and the 

Gold Star court was without jurisdiction to proceed under Section 

301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 897 F.2d at 1024, 1026. 

The facts of the present case likewise suggest implicit 

rejection of the employer's offer. The lower court's determination 

that a "legal relationship [was] created between the parties on 

July 1, 1987," seeR. Vol. Tab 21, p. 8, the date the last offer 

was implemented, is unsupported. Employee conduct after July 1, 

1987, did not evince an acceptance of the Company's last offer. 

To the contrary, the commencement of a seven-month strike on 

October 5, 1987, during which time the alleged misconduct occurred, 

shows continued dissatisfaction with and rejection of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 5 
employer's offer. 2 See Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron 

Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers -- Local 1603 v. 

Transue & Williams Corp., 879 F.2d 1388, 1393-94 (6th Cir. 1989) 

(labor contract found to exist because parties refused to marshal 

economic weapons such as strikes or lockouts and adhered to the 

arbitration provisions of their prior agreement during period 

without formal collective bargaining agreement). 

Accordingly, we do not agree that a contractual relationship 

was created on July 1, 1987, either by virtue of the employer's 

implementation of its last offer or by virtue of any perceived 

acceptance of that offer evidenced by employee conduct. We 

determine that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider 

whether the disputes in this case should be referred to arbitration 

and, hereby, REVERSE the decision of the district court. 

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As of the date the briefs were filed in this matter the Union 

and Company still had not agreed on a new collective bargaining 

agreement. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8067 Document: 01019311230 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 6