Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01449/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01449-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alan Marcel Sojka II,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-1449-PHX-DGC (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

On July 16, 2013, Alan Marcel Sojka II (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). On April 15, 2014, 

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 26). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 36) on October 

15, 2014. The matter is deemed ripe for consideration.1

 

Petitioner raises six grounds and a number of sub-grounds for habeas relief in the 

Petition. The undersigned finds that the Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute 

of limitations set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014.

 

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(“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.

2

 It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Convictions and Sentences

On March 2, 2006, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the following crimes against 

his son: (i) seven counts of child abuse and (ii) first-degree murder. (Doc. 17-1 at 2-6). 

Petitioner’s son was approximately five months old at the time of death. (Id. at 18).

Petitioner is serving a life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction, which 

commences upon completion of his sentence for the child abuse convictions.3

 (Doc. 26-1 

at 12-16). 

B. Direct Appeal

After his 2006 convictions and sentencing, Petitioner timely appealed to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 17-1 at 9-62). On December 11, 2007, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, but found that the sentences for six of 

the child abuse counts were based on the existence of a prior conviction that had not been 

established. (Doc. 17-1 at 64-71). As such, the Court of Appeals vacated those sentences 

and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. (Id.).

At the May 20, 2008 resentencing proceeding, the trial court found that the State 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt Petitioner’s prior felony conviction. (Id. at 81). The 

trial court sentenced Petitioner to the same terms of imprisonment as it ordered in 2006. 

2 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas 

petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

3 The State sought the death penalty for the first-degree murder charge (Count 8). On March 7, 2006, a jury found the appropriate sentence to be life imprisonment. (Doc. 

26-3 at 320). The trial court held the sentencing proceeding on April 21, 2006. (Doc. 26- 1 at 12). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 6.5 years for child abuse on Counts 1, 2, 

and 6; 4.5 years for child abuse on Counts 4 and 5; and 2.25 years for child abuse on 

Count 7. (Id. at 14-15). Those sentences run concurrently, but consecutive to the 17 year sentence imposed for child abuse on Count 3. For Petitioner’s first-degree murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life with the possibility of parole after 

35 years. (Id. at 15). 

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(Id. at 83). On August 29, 2008, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, 

which explained that counsel found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous and 

requested that the Court of Appeals search the record for fundamental error. (Id. at 93). 

Petitioner was given leave to file a supplemental brief, but did not do so. (Id. at 98). 

On December 2, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Id. at 97-102). Petitioner did not seek further review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 30, 2008, before Petitioner’s direct appeal of the resentencing 

concluded, Petitioner’s attorney filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 

17-1 at 73-76). In its July 18, 2008 minute entry, the trial court denied Petitioner’s 

request for an extension of the deadline in which to file a PCR petition, which Petitioner 

requested on the grounds that the direct appeal had not concluded. (Id. at 78). The trial 

court was not inclined to “allow such an indefinite stay” and treated Petitioner’s motion 

as a motion to dismiss with leave to re-file upon resolution of Petitioner’s direct appeal. 

(Id.).

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”), which is filestamped January 6, 2009. (Id. at 107-09). The trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Id. at 

111-12). Petitioner’s counsel filed a PCR petition on December 4, 2009. (Id. at 127-36). 

With the trial court’s permission, Petitioner also filed a pro se PCR petition. (Id. at 142, 

Doc. 17-2 at 8-100). Both PCR petitions are collectively referred to herein as the “PCR 

Petition.” On February 10, 2012, the trial court dismissed the PCR Petition. (Doc. 17-2 at 

130-41). 

After dismissal of the PCR Petition, the trial court allowed Petitioner’s attorney to 

withdraw and set March 30, 2012 as the filing deadline for a petition for review. (Id. at 

147-48). Petitioner asked the trial court to extend the deadline in which to file a “motion 

for rehearing/reconsideration.” (Id. at 150-52). The trial court granted the request and 

extended the filing deadline for a motion for rehearing/reconsideration to June 29, 2012. 

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(Id. at 165). The trial court cautioned Petitioner that “no further continuances will be 

granted absent a substantial showing of extraordinary circumstances.” (Id.) 

In a motion file-stamped June 26, 2012, Petitioner requested a further time 

extension to file a motion for rehearing. (Doc. 17-2 at 168-70). When the trial court took 

no action (Id. at 172), Petitioner re-filed his request on two occasions. (Id. at 174-76; 

180-82). On August 7, 2012, the trial court issued an order explaining that it had 

“explicitly cautioned [Petitioner] ‘that no further continuances will be granted absent a 

substantial showing of extraordinary circumstances.’” (Id. at 185). The court found that 

Petitioner “failed to make the required showing of extraordinary circumstances to justify 

a further extension of time.” (Id.). Based on this finding, the court ordered that as 

Petitioner “failed to meet the extended deadline for submission of a motion for rehearing 

under Rule 32.9, that relief is no longer available to him. The Court’s February 10, 2012 

ruling dismissing [the PCR Petition] is confirmed.” In addition, the trial court ordered 

that the “Court’s Order herein shall serve as a ‘final decision’ for purposes of Rule 

32.9(c).” (Id.). As explained in more detail in Section III(A)(2) below, Petitioner failed 

to timely petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the trial court’s August 7, 

2012 order. 

D. Petition for Special Action

On May 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Special Action (Re: Denial to File 

Petition for Review when Petition was Never Untimely)” in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 17-6 at 44-81). The Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction of 

the Petition for Special Action. (Id. at 85). On May 30, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Petition 

for Review of a Special Action Decision of the Court of Appeals” in the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Id. at 88-134). Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) seeking habeas 

relief in the U.S. District Court on July 16, 2013. On October 29, 2013, the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Doc. 19-1 at 2). 

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II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

There are a number of bars that may prevent a federal court from reviewing the 

merits of claims alleged in a federal habeas petition. Respondents argue that the Petition 

is time-barred under AEDPA. Respondents also argue that the majority of Petitioner’s 

claims are procedurally barred under the exhaustion-of-state-remedies and procedural 

default doctrines. The undersigned finds that the Petition is time-barred and thus 

recommends that the Court deny and dismiss the Petition. Because the Petition is timebarred, the undersigned does not address Respondents’ alternative affirmative defenses. 

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within 

one year of the latest of: 

1. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

2. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

3. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

4. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. 

Statutory tolling is available under AEDPA, which provides that the limitations 

period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) 

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(limitations period is tolled while the state prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state 

court and state post-conviction remedies are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

Calculating the timeliness of a habeas petition can become complicated in a case 

where the statute of limitations stops and restarts on multiple occasions due to the 

application of statutory and/or equitable tolling. Below is one method for making the 

calculation: 

1. Determine the total number of days between the date the limitations period 

commenced and the date the federal habeas petition was filed. 

2. Determine the total number of days the limitations period was statutorily and/or 

equitably tolled. 

3. Finally, subtract the figure determined in step two from the figure determined in 

step one. This calculation denotes the number of days it took a petitioner to file the 

federal habeas petition, excluding tolled days. If the number is 365 days or less, then the 

petition is timely. If the number is more than 365 days, then the petition is untimely.4

4 The exception to this rule is where the statute of limitations expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C), the habeas petition would be due the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. In such situations, a habeas petition may 

be timely even though it is filed more than 365 days from the date the limitations period 

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III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. The Petition is Time-Barred by AEDPA

1. The Statute of Limitations Commenced on January 3, 2009

Petitioner’s convictions became final on January 2, 2009.5

 (Doc. 17-1 at 97-102). 

Therefore, unless statutory or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to 

file a habeas petition expired on January 3, 2010, making the Petition filed on July 16, 

2013 several years late. While Respondents concede that the limitations period was 

statutorily tolled while the PCR Petition was pending, the parties dispute the dates during

which the PCR Petition was “pending.” Petitioner also argues that the Court should find 

that the limitations period was equitably tolled. 

2. Statutory Tolling 

A statutory tolling analysis under AEDPA begins by determining whether the 

collateral review petition was “properly filed.” This is because statutory tolling does not 

apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly 

filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing 

filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing requirements in determining 

whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly filed” application that is 

eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. An untimely state 

collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that 

commenced. 

5 Pursuant to Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012), AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations commences upon the expiration of the time for seeking review in a state’s 

highest court. Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 31.19(a) provides that “[w]ithin 30 days after the filing of a decision . . . any party may file with the clerk of the Court of Appeals a petition for review by the Supreme Court.” The Arizona Court of Appeals’ affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences on December 2, 2008. Thirty days after December 2, 2008 is 

Thursday, January 1, 2009. However, because January 1 is a legal holiday, Petitioner’s deadline to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court was extended to the next day that 

is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, which was Friday, January 2, 2009. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 1.3. 

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“time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is 

therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as untimely).

Under Ninth Circuit case law, untimely appeals of a lower state court’s decision 

regarding a collateral review petition are also not “properly filed” for statutory tolling 

purposes. This means that the time between a lower state court’s ruling on a collateral 

review petition and an appeal to a higher state court is not statutorily tolled if the appeal 

is deemed untimely. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 

F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Under Pace, if a state court denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or 

during the court’s consideration of that petition is statutorily tolled.”).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona 

postconviction rules demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the 

Notice.”). It remains “pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s 

post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes 

“[t]he time between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s 

filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under 

state law.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 191. 

i. The Statute of Limitations was Tolled from January 6, 2009 

through February 10, 2012

Here, the one-year statute of limitations began running on January 3, 2009. 

Although Petitioner filed his first notice of PCR before that date, the trial court dismissed 

the PCR notice the same day it was filed. (Doc. 17-1 at 78). Thus, the first PCR notice 

had no statutory tolling effect. On January 6, 2009, Petitioner filed a second notice of 

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PCR. 6 (Id. at 107-09). The trial court accepted the notice and the AEDPA limitations 

period was therefore suspended as of January 6, 2009. Three days, however, ran off the 

limitations “clock,” leaving Petitioner with 362 days remaining to file a federal habeas 

petition.

On February 10, 2012, the trial court denied the PCR Petition. (Id. at 130-41).

Respondents concede that the limitations period was tolled until February 10, 2012. 

Petitioner disputes Respondents’ assertion that the limitations period restarted on 

February 11, 2012. Petitioner argues that the limitations period extended much beyond 

this date. In support of this argument, Petitioner points to (i) the trial court’s August 7, 

2012 minute entry, which stated that it was a “final decision”; (ii) the trial court’s 

September 24, 2012 minute entry, which denied Petitioner’s “Motion to Set Aside Final 

Decision and to Consider/Permit Defendant’s Motion for Rehearing and Extension of 

Time for Petition for Review”; (iii) Petitioner’s attempt to file a petition for review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals; and (iv) Petitioner’s Petition for Special Action filed in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 36 at 8-10, 19, 27-28, 36-37). 

ii. Trial Court’s August 7, 2012 Minute Entry

In April 2012, Petitioner requested that the trial court extend the deadline for filing 

a motion for rehearing/reconsideration. (Doc. 17-2 at 150-52). In its May 7, 2012 

6 January 6, 2009 is the date the clerk of court filed the PCR notice. Petitioner argues that under the “prison mailbox rule,” the filing date is actually December 31, 2008 

as that is the date Petitioner allegedly delivered the PCR notice to prison authorities. (Doc. 36 at 36). While the federal “prison mailbox rule” may apply for purposes of calculating tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the PCR notice does not contain a proof of service indicating when Petitioner delivered it to prison officials for mailing. See 

Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (to meet the initial burden of 

proving a timely filing under the prison mailbox rule, an inmate must, at a minimum, provide a sworn declaration or notarized statement indicating the date the inmate gave the document to prison officials for mailing unless more probative evidence, such as the prison mail log, is available). Therefore, the undersigned has used the file-stamped date of January 6, 2009 for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations’ commencement 

date. The additional three days of tolling that using December 31, 2008 as the PCR notice’s filing date would provide Petitioner would not alter the ultimate conclusion that 

the Petition is time-barred. Section III(A)(4) explains that the Petition is over 160 days late. 

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minute entry, the trial court granted the request and extended the filing deadline to June 

29, 2012. (Doc. 17-5 at 146). On June 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Extension 

of Time and for Copies of the Record on Appeal which are Not in Defendant’s 

Possession.” (Doc. 17-2 at 168-70). Petitioner filed two similar motions for an extension 

that are file-stamped July 16, 2012 and August 1, 2012. (Id. at 174-75, 180-82). 

On August 7, 2012, the trial court denied all three motions for extension, 

explaining that its May 7, 2012 order “explicitly cautioned Defendant ‘that no further 

continuances will be granted absent a substantial showing of extraordinary 

circumstances.’” (Doc. 17-5 at 151). The Court found that Petitioner “failed to make 

the required showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify a further 

extension of time.” (Id.). The trial court ordered that as Petitioner failed to meet the 

extended deadline for filing a motion for rehearing, that “relief is no longer available” to 

Petitioner and stated that its “February 10, 2012 ruling dismissing [the PCR Petition] is 

confirmed.” Lastly, the Court ordered that “the Court’s Order herein shall serve as a 

‘final decision’ for purposes of Rule 32.9(c).” (Id.). 

Petitioner argues that because the trial court stated that its August 7, 2012 ruling is 

a “final decision,” the statutory tolling period ran until at least August 7, 2012 as the 

ruling shows that the PCR Petition was still “pending.” (Doc. 36 at 8-9). Yet an 

untimely request is not “properly filed.” See Thorson, 479 F.3d at 646; Bonner, 425 F.3d 

at 1149. Petitioner failed to timely submit a motion for rehearing. Therefore, the

limitations period was not statutorily tolled between the date the trial court dismissed the 

PCR Petition (February 10, 2012) and the date the trial court ruled that Petitioner is not 

entitled to a further extension of time to file a motion for rehearing (August 7, 2012). 

Moreover, the trial court stated that its August 7, 2012 order was a final decision 

for purposes of Rule 32.9(c). (Doc. 17-5 at 151). Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant has 30 days from the date of a trial court’s 

decision regarding a PCR petition or motion for rehearing to file a petition for review in 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus, the August 7, 2012 minute entry clarified that 

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Petitioner had 30 days to file a petition for review regarding the trial court’s order that 

Petitioner is not entitled to a rehearing as Petitioner failed to meet the extended filing 

deadline. Ruling that a petitioner’s request is untimely and affirming a prior dismissal 

does not make a collateral review petition “pending” after the petition was initially 

dismissed. See Thorson, 479 F.3d at 646; Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1149. 

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that the trial court’s August 7, 

2012 minute entry did not have any statutory tolling effect on AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. 

iii. Trial Court’s September 24, 2012 Minute Entry

In September 2012, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Set Aside Final Decision and to 

Consider/Permit Defendant’s Motion for Hearing and Extension of Time for Petition for 

Review.” (Doc. 17-3 at 3-8). Petitioner also contemporaneously filed a “Motion for 

Rehearing (Reconsideration) and Motion to Exceed Page Limit of Rule 32.5 for PostConviction Relief (Oral Arguments Requested).” (Id. at 9-101, Doc. 17-4). 

On September 24, 2012, the trial court issued an order “denying [Petitioner’s] 

motion to set aside final decision,” but extended Petitioner’s time to file a petition for 

review until October 31, 2012. (Doc. 17-5 at 2). The order was amended nunc pro tunc 

“to include the denial of [Petitioner’s] Motion for Rehearing (Reconsideration) and 

Motion to Exceed Page Limit of Rule 32.5 for Post-Conviction Relief (Oral Arguments 

Requested).” (Id. at 4). Petitioner argues that the trial court’s September 24, 2012 

minute entry, as amended by its October 17, 2012 minute entry, had the effect of tolling 

the period of time after the trial court’s August 7, 2012 minute entry. Petitioner explains 

that:

Clearly, the court never striked these pleadings and never 

stated that either of them was ever untimely in both of the 

foregoing order, and in fact, the court specifically ‘reviewed’

and took them ‘in consideration’ which can be construed as 

‘pending’ AND further tolls the limitation period of AEDPA. 

. . . . Clearly, this timely tolling gives Petitioner an extra 49 

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days (Aug. 7, 2012 through to Sept. 24, 2012), 7 on top of the 

tolling from Feb. 10, 2012 through Aug. 7, 2012, due to his 

properly pending pleadings that qualify as collateral review 

pursuant to the Supreme Court in Wall v. Kholi, 131 S.Ct. 

1278, ____ (2011). 

(Doc. 36 at 19).

The undersigned does not find that the trial court’s September 24, 2012 minute 

entry, as amended, tolled the statute of limitations because it did not pertain to a 

“properly filed” PCR petition or other collateral relief. The trial court ruled in its August 

7, 2012 minute entry that relief pursuant to a motion for rehearing was no longer 

available to Petitioner. The proper recourse to address the ruling was to timely file a 

petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which Petitioner failed to do as 

discussed in the following section. Even if Petitioner was entitled to an additional 48 

days of tolling, the Petition would still be untimely by 112 days.8

iv. Untimely Petition for Review 

Petitioner received numerous extensions of time to file a petition for review of the 

trial court’s August 7, 2012 minute entry. In its November 5, 2012 order, the trial court 

extended the deadline until November 30, 2012 and warned Petitioner that no additional 

extensions of time would be granted “absent a substantial showing of extenuating 

circumstances.” (Doc. 17-5 at 156). Immediately before the November 30 deadline, 

Petitioner filed another request for an extension. (Id. at 14-17). When the court took no 

action, Petitioner re-filed his request. In February 2013, before the trial court ruled on the 

request, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 28-

128). The petition for review was 100 pages, which is five times the maximum page 

limit. The Arizona Court of Appeals struck the petition for review for exceeding the page 

limit and gave Petitioner until April 11, 2013 to file a petition for review that is in 

7 The number of days between August 7, 2012 and September 24, 2012 is 48, not 49 as Petitioner has calculated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1). 

8 Section III(A)(4) below explains that the Petition was filed 160 days late.

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compliance with the rules. (Doc. 17-6 at 4). 

Before Petitioner re-filed his petition for review, the State filed a motion in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals to preclude the petition for review, asserting that it was

untimely. (Id. at 14-16). See State v. Pope, 635 P.2d 846 (Ariz. 1981) (the Arizona 

Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over an untimely petition for review). The 

Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and indicated that the trial court may allow a 

late filing “if it finds that petitioner was not responsible for the untimely filing” after 

being presented with proper evidence. (Id. at 29). 

In March 2013, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Permit Late Filing of his Petition for 

Review.” (Id. at 32). The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion on April 15, 2013. (Id. 

at 42). 

Because the February 2013 Petition for Review was untimely and did not comply 

with the rules, it was not “properly filed” and has no tolling effect on AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. The statute of limitations therefore continued to run after the trial court 

issued its orders dated February 10, 2012, August 7, 2012, and September 24, 2012.

v. Petition for Special Action

On May 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Special Action (Re: Denial to File 

Petition for Review when Petition was Never Untimely)” in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 17-6 at 44). The Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction of the 

Petition for Special Action. (Id. at 85). On May 30, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Petition for 

Review of a Special Action Decision of the Court of Appeals” in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Id. at 88). On October 29, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. 

(Doc. 19-1 at 2).

A petition for special action has no tolling effect on AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See Hardiman v. Galaz, 58 F.App’x. 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the 

Petition for Special Action did constitute a collateral review petition, it was filed after the 

statute of limitations expired on February 6, 2013 as explained in Section III(A)(4) 

below. Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do 

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not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). For the above reasons, the undersigned 

finds that the Petition for Special Action has no statutory tolling effect on the limitations 

period in Petitioner’s case.

3. Equitable Tolling

The standard for equitable tolling of the one-year habeas limitations period is a 

very high bar, and is reserved for rare cases. Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075 

(9th Cir. 2014); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’”) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 

(7th Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, such as 

“abandonment” by the petitioner's counsel, the unavailability of a prison library, or a 

petitioner’s mental disability, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely habeas action. See Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 886–87; Sossa v. Diaz, 729 

F.3d 1225, 1236 (9th Cir. 2013). It is a petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable 

tolling is warranted.9 Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

As mentioned previously, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that: 

(i) he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and (ii) that some extraordinary 

9 Petitioner argues that under Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2566 (2010), 

there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling. (Doc. 36 at 11). Yet the 

presumption applied in Holland was not one that equitable tolling should be found in an 

individual case, but that a presumption that a given statute of limitations was subject to 

equitable tolling at all. After considering the presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court held 

that AEDPA’s statute of limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons. Holland, 130 

S.Ct. at 2550.

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circumstances stood in his or her way. A petitioner must also show that the 

“extraordinary circumstances” were the “but-for and proximate cause of his [or her] 

untimeliness.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam); see also 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Liberally construing the Petition and Reply, Petitioner primarily bases his 

equitable tolling argument on (i) the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motions for 

extension of the deadlines to file a motion for rehearing and petition for review; (ii) the 

trial court’s failure to provide Petitioner with copies of transcripts and the record; (iii) the 

trial court’s alleged recharacterization of his motion for rehearing/reconsideration; (iv) 

Petitioner’s pro se status and lack of legal knowledge; and (v) inadequate legal assistance 

in prison. In Petitioner’s words:

[The] relevant time period of events included an unusual set 

of facts which amounted to a clerk and the court’s 

continuous/ongoing miscommunication within the court in 

addressing/handling Petitioner’s several motions filed during 

this interval. This was entirely beyond Petitioner’s control. 

Although Petitioner exercised his rights diligently, the court’s 

miscommunication within itself created several misleading 

minute entries sent to Petitioner making it impossible for him 

to reasonably timely file within the extensions in an 

extraordinary way based on the fact that Petitioner had to 

constantly file numerous motions to clarify extensions timely 

filed and rulings therefrom. That, in effect, took away critical 

preparation and Petitioner’s full undivided attention to the 

Motion for Rehearing. All of these circumstances became a 

severe obstacle that of which, but for, Petitioner would have 

timely filed the Rehearing motion exceptionally sooner before 

6/29/2012. Further, the court never honored Petitioner’s 

request for the transcripts or portions of the record, thus 

compounding the extraordinary circumstance and its legal 

significance of possible impediment and equitable tolling 

grounds.

(Doc. 36 at 12).

. . . .

Petitioner’s motions to the relevant issues for 

Rehearing/Reconsideration were clearly denied and/or 

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recharacterized in an arbitrary decision when in fact 

Petitioner made good faith allegations warranting further 

evidentiary/record development. The court’s recharacterizing 

and denials was an abuse of discretion under the 

circumstances, which now would, if true, entitled Petitioner to 

statutory tolling of AEDPA and/or equitable tolling in 

accordance with Whalen/Hunt, supra, with a hearing to 

ensure development of an adequate factual record.

(Id. at 13). 

. . . .

Had the state courts’ [sic] not unreasonably dismissed the 

petition for review or unreasonably denied the extensions at 

the eleventh or past the twelvth [sic] hour and/or that the 

factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing 

evidence, Petitioner would have invoked one complete round 

of the state’s appellate review process and tolled AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations for nearly an additional 12 months. 

(Id. at 24).

. . . .

In the last 8-10 years, this Petitioner who never graduated 

high school and followed into the family “trade” of floor 

covering involving at times dangerous exposure and contact 

with toxic chemicals and materials potentially causing 

harmful effects on his brain (cf. Caro v. Caderon, 165 F.3d 

1223, 1226 (1999)), has struggled with trying to 

comprehend/learn this new and foreign-like language called 

law, its legal development and its relentless plethora of legal 

standards.

(Id. at 32).

. . . .

The paralegal refused to help Petitioner in all his requests 

. . . . Without any access to research case law decisions based 

on the complexity of materials interpreting AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations § 2244, equitable tolling can be justified. See 

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) 

. . . . The state’s attorneys (opposing party) have access to a 

vast resource of law library, internet, Lexis Nexis, 

shepardizing, etc. Clearly, Petitioner is undermined and out-

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gunned to a severe disadvantage who has no such arsenal to 

combat with a zealous adversary challenge.

(Id. at 34). 

Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify 

equitable tolling or demonstrated that an external impediment hindered the diligent 

pursuit of his rights. Although Petitioner argues the trial court impeded his ability to 

timely file a motion for rehearing, the record is clear. In April 2012, Petitioner requested 

that the trial court extend the deadline to file a motion for rehearing. (Doc. 17-2 at 150-

52). On May 7, 2012, the trial court granted his request and set a deadline of June 29, 

2012. (Doc. 17-5 at 146). The trial court explicitly stated that no further extension 

would be granted absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. (Id.). While 

Petitioner disputes the trial court’s finding that Petitioner was not entitled to a further 

extension, “[f]ederal habeas courts lack jurisdiction to review state court applications of

state procedural rules.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas 

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”); Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state law unless 

they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

Likewise, Petitioner failed to meet the extended deadline in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals for review of the trial court’s August 7, 2012 ruling that Petitioner was not 

entitled to a rehearing. Although Petitioner disputes the trial court’s denial of a further 

extension, the dispute is not reviewable in the federal habeas proceeding. See Poland, 

169 F.3d at 584; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

To support his argument that the trial court’s alleged “recharacterization” of 

Petitioner’s motion warrants equitable tolling, Petitioner cites to Castro v. United States, 

540 U.S. 375 (2003). Castro has no application to this case. In Castro, the U.S. Supreme 

Court held that a federal district court must (i) notify a pro se litigant that it intends to 

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recharacterize a pleading as a request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and (ii) 

warn the litigant that the recharacterization means that any subsequent Section 2255 

motion will be subject to the restrictions on “second or successive” motions.10 Id. at 383. 

A federal district court must also give the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend 

the motion so that it contains all the Section 2255 claims the litigant desires to pursue. 

Id. Even if the trial court did “recharacterize” Petitioner’s motion, Petitioner does not 

establish that it was an extraordinary circumstance that was the proximate cause of 

Petitioner’s untimeliness. 

The trial court’s inaction on Petitioner’s request for transcripts does not constitute 

grounds for equitable tolling. The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants have 

no constitutional right to free transcripts on collateral review. See United States v. 

MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1976). Rule 32.4(d) of the Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure provides that “[i]f the trial court proceedings have not been previously 

transcribed” a defendant may file a request for their preparation. The trial court then 

reviews the request and orders “only those transcripts prepared that it deems necessary to 

resolve the issues to be raised in the petition.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(d). The trial and 

sentencing transcripts in Petitioner's case were prepared on direct appeal, as evidenced by 

the opening brief filed by Petitioner’s appellate counsel. (Doc. 17-1 at 9-62).

Finally, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, and alleged 

ignorance of the law alone do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(“[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary 

circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 

10 A petitioner who seeks to file a “second or successive” Section 2255 motion must first obtain from the appropriate federal court of appeals an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals reviews the application and determines whether the petitioner has 

made a prima facie showing that the application meets the statutory exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

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(2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance 

as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for 

promptness.”).

As Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances 

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal petition, it is not necessary to address 

the diligence element of his equitable tolling claim. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1153 (“We 

need not address the diligence element [of petitioner’s equitable tolling claim] because 

we conclude that no extraordinary circumstance stood in [the petitioner’s] way.”). For 

the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled equitable tolling. 

4. The Statute of Limitations Expired on February 6, 2013, Meaning 

the Petition is 160 Days Late

In calculating the timeliness of a petition, the undersigned has used the 

methodology explained in Section II above. The period between the date the limitations 

period commenced and the date Petitioner filed the Petition is 1,655 days (January 3, 

2009 through July 16, 2013). The total number of days AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

was tolled is 1,130 (from January 6, 2009 through February 10, 2012). The difference 

between those two figures is 525 days, which denotes that it took Petitioner 525 days to 

file the Petition. This is 160 days over the 365 day statute of limitation period. In other

words, the statute of limitations expired on February 6, 2013 (calculated by subtracting 

160 days from the Petition’s July 16, 2013 filing date).11 The Petition is therefore 

untimely. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny and dismiss the 

Petition.

B. The Petition’s Untimeliness is Not Excused by the Actual Innocence 

Gateway/Miscarriage of Justice Exception 

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

11 Alternatively, the Court may calculate the February 6, 2013 statute of limitations expiration date by adding 362 days to February 10, 2012, the end of the 

statutory tolling period. As explained in Section III(A)(2)(i), the limitations period ran three days before tolling commenced on January 6, 2009.

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announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway” 

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.” 

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th 

Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “‘must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.’” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

Here, Petitioner does not explicitly argue that the miscarriage of justice exception 

should be applied if the Court finds that the Petition is time-barred. Even if the Petition 

and Reply are liberally construed to include such a claim,12 Petitioner does not proffer 

any new evidence to support actual innocence. For example, while Petitioner asserts that 

he “insisted and directed trial counsel to investigate, interview and secure [Petitioner’s] 

12 For instance, in his Reply (Doc. 36), Petitioner states that the record “shows a progressive pattern and diligence as shown in his filings of motions that, in most circumstances, only an innocent prisoner (such as Petitioner) who knows beyond a doubt he was wrongfully convicted would pursue.” (Doc. 36 at 32).

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defense from . . . important critical witnesses” (Doc. 1 at 10), Petitioner merely presents 

self-serving and speculative statements about the testimony such witnesses would have 

offered. (Id. at 10-13). This is insufficient to establish a Schlup gateway claim. See 

Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (“we have denied access to the 

Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of innocence was merely cumulative or 

speculative or was insufficient to overcome otherwise convincing proof of guilt”). The 

undersigned does not find that the record and pleadings in this case contain “evidence of 

innocence so strong that [the Court] cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” 

McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the 

Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of the Petition.

C. Petitioner’s Additional Requests

1. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

The Ninth Circuit has held that a habeas petitioner “should receive an evidentiary

hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to

equitable tolling.’” Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921

(9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). In his Reply, Petitioner cites to Roy and asserts 

that “[b]ecause Petitioner has made good faith allegations that would, if true, entitle him 

to equitable tolling, he should receive an evidentiary hearing.” 

In Roy, the Ninth Circuit held that an evidentiary hearing was warranted regarding 

two habeas petitioners’ equitable tolling claims as the petitioners (i) sufficiently 

presented allegations indicating diligence and (ii) alleged that they were unaware of 

AEDPA due to a deficient/non-existent law library. Id. at 974-75. Here, Petitioner does 

not allege that he did not have access to AEDPA or any materials interpreting AEDPA. 

In fact, Petitioner’s April 22, 2013 letter to the District Court’s Clerk of Court shows that 

Petitioner was aware of AEDPA. (Doc. 36-1 at 42-43). In the letter, Petitioner states “I 

believe I have been diligent for equitable tolling purposes as stated in Holland v. Florida, 

130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563-65 (2010). Currently, I’m unaware of how many days I have left in 

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my ‘one year’ to file a habeas corpus petition in Federal Court.” (Id. at 42). Petitioner’s 

miscalculation of when the limitations period expired does not constitute an 

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. See Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 

1154 (a habeas petitioner’s incorrect calculation of the limitations period does not 

warrant equitable tolling); see also Alexander v. Schiro, 312 F. App’x. 972, 976 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“Ultimately [the petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and 

miscalculated the limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary 

circumstance’ warranting equitable tolling.”). 

For the reasons discussed in Section (III)(A)(3), the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would warrant equitable tolling. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for

an evidentiary hearing regarding his equitable tolling claim.

2. Petitioner’s Request to “Renew” Certain Motions/Pleadings

In his Reply (Doc. 36 at 48), Petitioner seeks a “renewal” of the following 

motions/pleadings previously filed and considered by the Court: 

1. “Motion for Appointment of Counsel with Attachments in 

Support for Record” (Doc. 8); 

2. “Motion for Investigative Services and to Conduct 

Discovery” (Doc. 14); 

3. “Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Objection to Motion 

for Investigative Services and to Conduct Discovery” 

(Doc. 16); 

4. “Motion to Obtain Copies of Pertinent 

Documents/Portions of the Record without Cost” (Doc. 

18); and 

5. “Amendment in Addition to Motion to Obtain Copies of 

Pertinent Documents/Portions of the Record without Cost 

(Supplement)” (Doc. 20).

Regarding Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, there is no

constitutional right to counsel in a habeas proceeding. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 

429 (9th Cir. 1993). “Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not 

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entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances indicate that appointed counsel is 

necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). However, pursuant to Rule 8(c) of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, “[i]f an

evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a

petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” Even 

if an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, a district court has discretion to appoint counsel 

for a habeas petitioner when “the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3006A(a)(2)(B). 

The undersigned does not find that the interests of justice require the appointment 

of counsel in this untimely case. Petitioner has failed to show that the complexities of the 

case are such that denial of appointed counsel would amount to a denial of due process. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s filings with the Court indicate that Petitioner understands the 

issues and is capable of presenting his arguments to the Court. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 

F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of the appointment of counsel where a 

petitioner’s pleadings demonstrated a good understanding of the issues and an ability to 

present contentions “forcefully and coherently”). In addition, the record is adequately 

developed and the undersigned does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. 

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request 

to “renew” his Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 8).

Petitioner states that his request to “renew” the motions/pleadings relating to 

discovery are “essential for Petitioner to develop fully his [ineffective assistance of 

counsel] claim.” (Doc. 36 at 49). As the undersigned recommends that the Petition be 

dismissed with prejudice because it is time-barred, and Petitioner’s request for discovery 

does not relate to the timeliness of the Petition, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny Petitioner’s request to “renew” the motions/pleadings filed as Docs. 14, 16, 

18, and 20. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss with prejudice the Petition on the basis that it is time-barred. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 25th day of August, 2015. 

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