Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01834/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01834-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR FERNANDO 

GUTIERREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

HEIDI LACKNER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01834 DAD MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Heidi Lackner, warden of Sierra 

Conservation Center in Jamestown, California, is hereby substituted as the proper 

named respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Respondent is represented by Daniel B. Bernstein of the office of the Attorney General.

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his 

conviction by jury trial on June 30, 2010, of attempted murder, first degree burglary, 

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possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving stolen property, and various enhancements. 

(Clerk's Tr. at 359-60.) On May 20, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate 

term of twenty-six (26) years and eight months in prison, and an additional indeterminate 

term of twenty-five (25) years to life. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which, but for staying the sentence on the burglary conviction and fixing clerical 

errors, affirmed the judgment on January 8, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Petitioner sought

review from the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The California Supreme 

Court denied review on April 17, 2013. (Id.)

Petitioner proceeded to file collateral challenges to his conviction in state court in 

the form of petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a petition with the Kern 

County Superior Court. The court denied the petition in a reasoned opinion on July 14, 

2014. (Lodged Docs. 7-8.) He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth 

District Court of Appeal. The court denied the petition in a summary decision on August 

7, 2014. (Lodged Docs. 9-10.) Finally, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with the California Supreme Court. The court denied the petition in a summary decision 

on November 12, 2014. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.)

On November 21, 2014 Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. (Pet., 

ECF No. 1.) Petitioner presented two claims for relief in the petition, however the second 

claim included several different theories. Petitioner asserted: (1) that he was denied the 

right to present a complete defense based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury 

on self-defense with regard to the criminal charge of possession of a firearm by a felon 

and; (2) that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by (a) failing to refute the 

gunshot residue evidence, (b) failing to obtain phone records, and (c) failing to present a 

ballistics expert. (Id.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on January 30, 2015. (ECF No. 11.)

Petitioner filed a reply on February 23, 2015. (ECF No. 13.) The matter stands ready for 

adjudication.

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II. Statement of the Facts1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

On October 29, 2009, police received a report of a shooting at 2210 

San Felice Way in Delano, the home of Brenda Cadiz and her husband 

Melecio Cadiz. Brenda's brother, Joejo Raquinio, lived with her. Officers 

found Brenda lying in a neighboring driveway with one gunshot wound to 

the head and three to the left arm. She and Raquinio told the officers that 

a man had come to the house saying he was seeking a job with Melecio. 

When he was told there were no jobs, he forced his way into the house, 

produced a gun, and shot Brenda repeatedly. Raquinio and the man 

struggled; the man hit Raquinio in the head with the gun, and Raquinio hit 

the man over the head with a vase. The man fled on foot. He had once 

worked for the family. Raquinio and Brenda knew him as Fernando.

Following a trail of drops of blood, the officers tracked Gutierrez to 

2222 Ruffion Court, a block away, where they found him hiding in a shed, 

bleeding, in the back yard. With him in the shed were some pieces of 

jewelry and a glass smoking pipe. Brenda and her daughter, Kaelah 

Cadiz, identified Gutierrez as the man who had been at the house.

The officers took a set of car keys from Gutierrez. They found his 

car, which was parked a short distance from Brenda's house, and 

searched it pursuant to a warrant. Inside was a gym bag containing 100 to 

150 pieces of jewelry and some baseball memorabilia. Some of the 

jewelry and the baseball memorabilia had been reported stolen from a 

home in Visalia. On the roof of the house at 2214 Ruffion Court, two 

houses south of the shed where Gutierrez was hiding, the officers found a 

.32-caliber revolver with four spent shell casings in the cylinder.

The district attorney filed an information charging Gutierrez with six 

counts: (1) attempted murder of Brenda (§§ 187, 664); (2) assault of 

Brenda with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); (3) first degree burglary (§ 

460, subd. (a)); (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 

12021, subd. (a)(1));[fn2] (5) receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); 

and (6) assault of Raquinio with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). For 

sentence-enhancement purposes, the information alleged that Gutierrez 

used a firearm in committing the offenses in counts 1, 2 and 6. (§§ 

12022.5, subd. (a)(1); 12022.53, subd. (d).) The information also alleged 

that Gutierrez had one prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three 

Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) and four prior 

convictions resulting in prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

FN2: This statute now appears at section 29800, subdivision (a).

Gutierrez testified at trial, contradicting the account given by the 

victims. In his version, he was a methamphetamine dealer and Melecio 

Cadiz was his supplier. In the past, Melecio had accepted payment for 

methamphetamine in the form of jewelry and electronic devices. 

Sometimes Brenda chose the pieces.

 

1

The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its January 8, 2013 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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Gutierrez came to the Cadizes' house on October 29, 2009, to 

show Brenda jewelry. They sat in her car and smoked some 

methamphetamine, and then went in the house to look at the jewelry. 

Gutierrez set out some pieces on a coffee table in the living room while 

Brenda talked on the phone in the kitchen. Raquinio came into the living 

room and looked at the jewelry. He offered Gutierrez $250 for some rings, 

including a Kansas City Royals American League Championship ring, but 

Gutierrez wanted $500. Raquinio became angry and pulled out a pistol.

Gutierrez gathered up the jewelry and tried to leave, but Brenda 

shut the door as Raquinio hit Gutierrez on the head with a vase. Gutierrez 

fell and Raquinio pointed the gun at him. Gutierrez tried to take the gun 

from Raquinio and, as they struggled, the gun went off twice and Brenda 

was shot. Then Gutierrez passed out. When he regained consciousness, 

Brenda and Raquinio had left the room.

Gutierrez tried to flee through the back door but encountered 

Raquinio, who still had the gun, in the laundry room. Gutierrez tried to take 

the gun again, succeeding this time. The gun went off two more times as 

the two men fought. Raquinio continued to struggle, so Gutierrez hit him 

on the head with the gun in self-defense. Gutierrez then fled the house. 

He threw the gun away because he feared the police would shoot him if 

they saw him with it. In the street, people looked at him in a way he felt 

was accusatory. He hid in the shed because he was afraid. Then he lost 

consciousness again. He was in possession of the property stolen from 

Visalia because someone gave it to him to pay for methamphetamine.

The jury rejected Gutierrez's story and found him guilty of counts 1, 

3, 4, 5, and 6. Following the court's instructions, it returned no verdict on 

count 2 because it was a lesser offense included in count 1. The jury also 

found true the firearm allegations for counts 1 and 6. The court found true 

two of the prior-prison-term allegations and the prior-strike allegation.

People v. Gutierrez, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 114, 2-9 (Cal. App. Jan. 8, 2013).

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which 

is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, 

this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

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B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

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2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

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‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

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Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

IV. Review of Petition

A. Claim 1 – Failure to Instruct on Self-Defense

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his right to present a defense by failing 

to instruct the jury regarding self-defense with respect to the charge of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-6.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05, 111 S. Ct. 

2590, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 & n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" 

presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms 

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining 

whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

I. Self-defense instruction for being a felon in possession of a 

firearm

Gutierrez argues that for count 4, possessing a firearm while a 

felon, the court was obligated to instruct the jury sua sponte on temporary 

possession for purposes of self-defense. The People argue that the 

instruction need not have been given because there was no substantial 

evidence to support it. The People also argue that any error was 

harmless.

We need not decide whether it was error not to give the instruction. 

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Erroneous failure to give a jury instruction warrants reversal only if the 

failure is prejudicial. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178.) 

This general rule applies to an erroneous failure to instruct on an 

affirmative defense. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23.) The 

California Supreme Court has applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

standard of harmless error review to this type of error (ibid.), but has 

suggested that the less-stringent reasonable-probability test might be 

appropriate instead (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984).[fn4] For 

two reasons, we agree with the People that any error in failing to give a 

self-defense instruction for count 4 was harmless under any standard.

FN4: Gutierrez cites a California Center for Judicial Education and 

Research publication for the proposition that a court's erroneous refusal to 

give a self-defense instruction is reversible per se. The publication relies 

on People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478, which stated that 

this type of error is not subject to harmless-error review unless the factual 

question posed by the omitted instruction was resolved against the 

defendant under another instruction. Gutierrez cites no authority for the 

view that the mere erroneous omission of a self-defense instruction is 

reversible per se. In the absence of any authority, we will not accept that 

view, as it is inconsistent with the California Supreme Court's general 

stance on harmless error, i.e., that trial court error is reversible only when 

it results in a miscarriage of justice.

First, the jury found Gutierrez guilty of the attempted murder of 

Brenda. This means the jury believed Gutierrez shot Brenda with malice 

aforethought. To be not guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm 

under a theory of self-defense, a felon must be in "temporary possession 

of [the] weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity ... 

to use it in self-defense continues ...." (People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 

12, 24.) If the period during which Gutierrez possessed the gun included 

the time when he tried to murder Brenda with it, then it is exceedingly 

unlikely that the period was limited to a time when he needed the gun for 

self-defense. Since the jury believed Gutierrez committed attempted 

murder with the gun, there is virtually no chance that, if instructed on the 

issue, it would have found that the prosecution failed to prove he 

possessed it for a longer time than he needed it for self-defense, 

assuming it would have found he ever needed it for self-defense at all.

Second, the jury found Gutierrez guilty of assaulting Raquinio with 

the gun. Again, it is extremely difficult to see how he could have 

committed this offense if he was in possession of the gun only for as long 

as he needed it for self-defense.

In sum, it is obvious that the jury accepted the prosecution's 

account in which Gutierrez was the aggressor and rejected the defense 

account in which Raquinio and Brenda were the aggressors. In light of 

this, we are confident, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the court had 

given the instruction at issue, the jury would still have found Gutierrez 

guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

People v. Gutierrez, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 114 at 9-12.

3. Analysis

To the extent Petitioner alleges the instructional claim violated state law, his claim 

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is not cognizable in this proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that a challenge to a 

jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim cognizable in 

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. A claim that 

an instruction was deficient in comparison to a state model or that a trial judge incorrectly 

interpreted or applied state law governing jury instructions does not entitle one to relief 

under § 2254, which requires violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner raises 

state law claims, his claims should be dismissed.

The only basis for federal collateral relief for instructional error is that an infirm 

instruction or the lack of instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72; Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973); see Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974) (it must be 

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even "universally 

condemned," but that it violated some right guaranteed to the defendant by the 

Fourteenth Amendment). The Court in Estelle emphasized that the Court had very 

narrowly defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness, and that 

beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process 

Clause has limited operation. 502 U.S. at 72-73.

However, when habeas is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a failure to instruct on 

the defense theory of the case constitutes error if the theory is legally sound and 

evidence in the case makes it applicable. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 

2006); see Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 

(1988) (reversing a conviction and holding that even if a defendant denies one or more 

elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, and the 

defendant requests such an instruction).

Petitioner contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury with regard 

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to self-defense as to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Petitioner argues

that the state court’s determination was unreasonable. The state court concluded that it 

was unlikely that the jury would find that Petitioner possessed the firearm in self-defense 

when it found that he used the same firearm to attempt to murder Brenda Cadiz and to 

assault Raquinio. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that it would not be conflicting for 

the jury to find that he committed attempted murder and assault with the firearm, but was 

not guilty of possessing due to self-defense. 

The state Court has the better argument. Having found that Petitioner committed 

attempted murder and assault with the firearm, it is unlikely that the jury would have 

found Petitioner not guilty of possessing the firearm based on self-defense. Petitioner 

presents no coherent theory as to why a jury would determine that he was not guilty of 

possessing the gun based on self-defense when they did not believe that he acted in

self-defense with regard to the attempted murder and assault when using the same 

firearm. The jury was instructed on self-defense as to the attempted murder and assault 

charges, and nonetheless found Petitioner guilty of those charges. (See Rep. Tr. Vol. IV 

at 648, 654.) While Petitioner testified that he acted in self-defense, Brenda Cadiz 

testified at trial that Petitioner pulled the gun from his pocket and shot her without 

provocation. (Rep. Tr. Vol. II, at 265-267.) Raquinio also testified that after running out of 

bullets, Petitioner hit him in the head with the butt of the gun. (Rep. Tr. Vol. II at 123-24.) 

Based on the corroborating evidence of the two victims, it was unlikely that a jury would 

believe that Petitioner acted in self-defense while possessing the firearm. The failure to 

provide the self-defense instruction, even though applicable to Petitioner’s defense, was 

harmless. Petitioner has failed to show that the instructional error had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. at. 637.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's claim concerning 

the failure of the state court to instruct on self-defense with respect to the felon in 

possession of a firearm charge.

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B. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner, in his second claim, contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing 

to present certain arguments and experts to show that Petitioner acted in self-defense.

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of a petition with the Kern County Superior 

Court. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Superior Court and 

summarily denied in subsequent petitions by the Court of Appeal and the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 7-12.) Because the California Supreme Court and 

Court of Appeal opinions are summary in nature, this Court "looks through" those

decision and presumes they adopted the reasoning of the Superior Court, the last state 

court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

With regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Superior Court held

in its opinion:

To prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner 

must demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below professional norms 

causing prejudice, which in its absence would create a probability of a 

change in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 

694.

Petitioner cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for 

the following reasons. First, the jury rejected petitioner’s claim of selfdefense. The facts clearly show that petitioner was the aggressor, and his 

use of methamphetamine does not absolve him of the attempted murder 

of Brenda Cadiz or assault with a firearm on Raquinio.

Petitioner’s injuries resulted from Raquinio defending himself as 

well as Brenda Cadiz. Petitioner continued shooting despite Raquinio 

retreating to the laundry room. Petitioner’s anger about his inability to 

speak with Melecio Cadiz was most likely fueled by being under the 

influence of methamphetamine. This explains his forcibly reopening the 

door prior to shooting at Cadiz and Raquinio.

The appellate court rejected petitioner’s argument of erroneous jury 

instructions over self-defense, and consequently agreed with the jury that 

petitioner’s version of events lacked credibility. The only tactic was to 

portray Ms. Cadiz’ shooting as accidental; as a product of a struggle 

between Raquinio and himself. Petitioner could not overcome the 

evidence that he used a firearm; that the shell casings found near the

house matched the firearm; that the trail of blood matched his where he 

was found near the shed; that Brenda Cadiz, despite her wounds, was 

able to summon help and gave a consistent rendering of events to police 

officers; and that the shoe prints matched those of petitioner’s within the 

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premises.

Second, the decision to call witnesses is a tactical one by counsel, 

which the court will not second guess. People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 

441, 458. Generally, failure to investigate meritorious defenses or call 

favorable witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. People 

v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 289, In re Alcox (2006) 137 Cal. App. 

4th 655, 666, 657.

The court discussed why a claim of self-defense is unavailing 

above. Counsel consequently need not investigate non-meritorious 

defense. People v. Geddes (1991) 1 Cal. App. 4th 448, 454. Petitioner 

contends that he wanted counsel to call experts who petitioner claims 

would testify that the ballistics tests were inconclusive that petitioner shot 

the gun. Petitioner fails to provide any declarations by experts which

would vouch for petitioner’s theory of events. Petitioner cannot have it 

both ways.

He cannot claim self-defense and then say in the same vein that it 

was not he who fired the shots at Cadiz and Raquinio. The lack of expert 

witness’ declarations renders petitioner’s argument conclusory. People v. 

Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.

Petitioner is entitled to adequate not perfect counsel. People v. 

Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, People v. Smith (1992) 6 Cal.4th 684, 

696.

The facts and the law do not favor petitioner, and his claim of selfdefense is fanciful at best, a claim which the jury rightly rejected. Counsel 

did his best under extremely difficult circumstances.

Since the court finds no ineffective assistance of counsel, it 

declines to issue an order to show cause. Petitioner’s motion for 

appointment of counsel is denied. People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 

1179, 1258, 1291. Petitioner fails to satisfy his burden to show prima facie 

case for habeas corpus relief. People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 

737.

On the basis of the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

is accordingly

denied.

(Lodged Doc. 8.)

2. Legal Standard

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established 

for the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider two factors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Lowry 

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v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel's alleged acts 

or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering 

the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court 

indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also, Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were “so serious

as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The 

Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable 

because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348; United 

States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any 

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are 

certain instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has 

been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has 

interfered with counsel's assistance. Id. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 

659, and n. 25 (1984).

As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Harrington v. Richter, meeting the standard 

for ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas is extremely difficult:

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The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking 

whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard. 

Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different than if, for 

example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review 

of a criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under AEDPA, 

though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, supra, at 

410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389. A state court must be granted a 

deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves 

review under the Strickland standard itself.

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the 

correctness of the state court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). And as this 

Court has explained, "[E]valuating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general 

the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations." Ibid. "[I]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L. Ed. 

2d 251, 261 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86.

"It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 786. "As amended by AEDPA, § 

2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims 

already rejected in state proceedings." Id. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus 

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

Accordingly, even if Petitioner presents a strong case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, this Court may only grant relief if no fairminded jurist could agree on the 

correctness of the state court decision.

3. Analysis 

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective by failing (1) to present a gunshot 

residue report, (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain phone records to show 

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that Petitioner had an ongoing illicit business relationship with Brenda Cadiz, and (3) for 

failing to present a ballistics experts 

a. Gunshot Residue Report

Petitioner was tested for gunshot residue. The report indicated that the presence 

of three metal particles – lead, barium and antimony -- was indicative of gunshot residue. 

Petitioner was found to test positive to all three metal particles on his left hand. The 

testing on his right hand indicated some, but not all, of the metal particles. Accordingly, 

the report found that Petitioner had gunshot residue on his left hand, but was 

inconclusive with regard to Petitioner’s right hand. (Pet. at 46-47.) Petitioner contends 

that defense counsel should have presented the report as it would show that Petitioner 

was not the one that shot the gun because he was right-handed and the test only 

indicated gunshot residue on Petitioner’s left hand.

Petitioner believes that the gunshot residue would have aided his defense by 

showing that there was not gunshot residue on the hand that he most likely would have 

used to shoot the gun. However, it was reasonable for defense counsel not to use the 

report. First, the report was inconclusive as to whether there was gunshot residue on 

Petitioner’s right hand, and did not rule out the possibility that Petitioner shot the gun. 

Further, and more damaging to Petitioner, was the fact that the report would have 

indicated that there was gunshot residue on his person, and therefore would provide 

support that the gun was close to or in his hands at the time of the shooting. This 

evidence could have corroborated his testimony that there was a struggle over the gun 

when it discharged, but it also could support the prosecution’s theory that Petitioner 

alone shot at Cadiz. 

The state court was not unreasonable in denying the claim. After describing the 

strong evidence based on the testimony of the victims and the physical evidence found 

at the scene, the state court found that Petitioner’s claim of self-defense was “fanciful at 

best.” The state court held that the evidence Petitioner desired to call would not have 

provided additional support to his theory of events. The state court’s decision was 

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reasonable. Petitioner’s arguments are conclusory and his defense, in light of the 

evidence presented is not credible. 

Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness, or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. The jury was 

presented with evidence and argument of the alibi, but in finding Petitioner guilty, must 

not have found the alibi defense credible. 

The arguments or theories that could have supported the state court's decision

rejecting Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are not "so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

b. Failure to Subpoena Phone Records

Petitioner next asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena phone 

records from Brenda Cadiz to show that they had previously spoken. Petitioner asserts 

that this would have corroborated his defense that he had a standing business 

relationship with Cadiz in which he would sell her stolen goods, and that the shooting 

occurred when Raquinio pulled the gun on Petitioner in an attempt to steal his stolen 

goods. 

The phone records, assuming they indicated that Petitioner and Cadiz had 

phoned each other, would support Petitioner’s claim that Cadiz and Petitioner had some 

prior dealings. However, records from trial already indicated that Petitioner was known 

by the victims. Raquinio testified that he had previously seen Petitioner when he had 

done some repair work on another house owned by the Cadiz family. (Rep. Tr. Vol. II at 

116-17.) Even if there were prior phone conversations between Petitioner and Cadiz, the 

phone record would not indicate what was said. The evidence would not counteract the 

testimony of both Cadiz and Raquinio who testified to a version of the shooting in which 

Petitioner possessed the gun and was the aggressor. Despite lacking the phone records, 

Petitioner was able to testify to his version of events at trial. In determining that Petitioner 

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was not prejudiced by the failure to present evidence, the state court found that 

Petitioner’s self-defense theory was “fanciful,” and rightfully rejected by the jury. (Lodged 

Doc. 8.) Upon review, this Court also finds that the phone records only tangentially 

supported Plaintiff’s version of the shooting, and counsel was reasonable in not 

presenting them at trial. Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to 

present phone records and the state court's decision rejecting Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was not “lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief.

c. Ballistics Expert

Petitioner claims that had counsel retained and presented a ballistics expert, it 

would have corroborated his self-defense theory or shown that the gun was not the one 

used to shoot Cadiz. It is possible that had counsel hired a ballistics expert, it could have 

confirmed Petitioner’s version of events. However, it could have done the opposite, and 

provided further evidence that Petitioner was the shooter and that the gun was the one 

used in the shooting. In light of the testimony of the victims, and the physical evidence 

including the fact that Petitioner was likely in possession of the gun after the shooting 

and attempted to dispose of the gun on the roof of a nearby house, it was reasonable for 

counsel to believe that Petitioner’s version of events did not likely occur. There was no 

plausible scenario presented that did not involve Petitioner or the gun found near 

Petitioner. Moreover, it was implausible that the jury would believe that Cadiz was 

accidentally shot while Petitioner and Raquinio struggled for the gun. Based on the 

evidence presented, and the failure of Petitioner to provide a credible version of events 

that would require a ballistics expert, counsel was reasonable in not to attempting to 

obtain a ballistics expert for trial. 

The state court correctly found that Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s 

conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that he was prejudiced by 

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counsel’s conduct. The state court's decision rejecting Petitioner’s claim was reasonable.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief with regard to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

V. Recommendation 

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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