Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05531/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05531-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

WARDEN, CALIFORNIA STATE )

PRISON AT CORCORAN, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

)

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 04-5531 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 6, 1992, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of seventeen years to life in

prison, based on his conviction of one count of murder in the second degree. Approximately

ten years later, Petitioner attended his initial parole consideration before the Board of Prison

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Terms (“the Board”). The Board concluded that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and

denied parole for five years. Following the Board’s finding of unsuitability, Petitioner’s

administrative appeal challenging the Board’s decision was denied on the merits on April 8,

2003. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the decision of the

Board with the Superior Court for the County of Kern, which transferred the petition to the

Superior Court for the County of Stanislaus. The court denied the petition on June 16, 2003. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition on July 10, 2003 and

February 18, 2004, respectively.

Petitioner filed the present petition on March 11, 2004. Respondent admits that

Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies with respect to the claims raised in this

petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d th

751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by th

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after

statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus,

it is governed by its provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a

state court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court

conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he

meets the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment.

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004); Sass v. California Board of Prison th

Terms, 376 F.Supp.2d 975 (E.D. Cal.2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (This court may

entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).

 Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 71, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established

Federal law," this court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme

Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams,

592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state

court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see

also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

[the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme

Court law is binding on the states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive

authority in determining whether a state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9 Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, th

600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The

state court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by

a state's interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he was denied clearly established pre-hearing due process

rights and equal protection because he was not provided “the guaranteed pre-Board of Prison

Terms . . . due process protection.” He also contends that he was afforded ineffective

assistance of counsel in regard to his hearing before the Board. Petitioner further contends

that he was denied a lawful and impartial hearing panel. He furthermore contends that his

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

rights to due process and equal protection were violated “by the BPT and CDC’s system of

enforcement concerning hearing related rights. Finally, Petitioner contends that CDC 115's

were used in his hearing before the Board in violation of due process based on lack of prior

fair notice.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. In

certain cases, a state law may create a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. In

examining questions of procedural due process, federal courts employ a two-step inquiry: 1)

whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State,

Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d

548 (1972); and 2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were

constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d

675 (1983), receded from and rejected on separate grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). See Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). 

Thus, the first question that must be answered is whether there exists a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause. The relevant California statutory language is contained

in Penal Code Section 3041, which states, in relevant part:

(a) One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole release date a panel of two

or more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again meet with the inmate

and shall normally set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. 

(b) The panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing

and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual,

and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting . . . . 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (Emphasis added). The Court of Appeal

for the Ninth Circuit has held that California inmates do have a liberty interest in a parole

date. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9 Cir. 2006). Therefore, th

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

this court must next analyze whether the deprivation of that interest in this case violated

Petitioner’s right to due process. See Ky. Dep’t Corr., 490 U.S. at 45, 460 (1989). The

standard used in such an analysis is the “some evidence” standard enunciated in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d

1389, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987)(holding that the same process is due in the parole recision setting th

that the Supreme Court outlined for the prison disciplinary setting in Hill). To determine

whether the some evidence standard is met does not require examination of the entire record,

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. 

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill at 455-56. 

The Board of Prison Terms decision provides in part as follows:

[T]he Panel has reviewed all information received from the public and relied

on the following circumstances in concluding that you are not suitable for parole and 

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public safety if

released from prison. The offense was carried out in an especially cruel a manner. 

The offense was carried out in an exceptionally cruel and callous, violent, brutal and

cold-blooded manner. Victim was mutilated during the offense, stabbed 17 - - or

excuse me - - 13 times. The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human life. The motive for the crime was

extremely inexplicable in relation to the offense.

 

In making its judgment based on the nature of the conviction offense, the Board cannot be

found to have acted arbitrarily. The nature of the offense amounts to some evidence to

support the Board’s determination. Because of the existence of this evidence, Petitioner’s

due process claims fail.

Petitioner also raises equal protection claims in connection with his denial of parole.

The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause means “that no State shall deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Texas

v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985); Clark v.

California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). The first step in any equal protection

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

analysis is to identify petitioner’s classification or group. Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68

F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner must show that the law has been applied in a

discriminatory manner on him or imposes different burdens on different groups. Id.; Christy

v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988). The second step requires the Court to

determine the level of scrutiny with which the Court should review the statute. Freeman, 68

F.3d at 1187. Discrimination on the basis of race or national origin and discrimination that

affects fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108

S.Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988).

In this case, Petitioner has not identified his classification or group and has also not

explained how the law was applied to him in a discriminatory manner or how it imposes

different burdens on different groups. See, Freeman. Therefore, Petitioner’s equal

protection claims must fail.

Further, Petitioner raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to his

hearing before the Board. Ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, which exists “in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). A

claim for ineffective assistance must meet the two-part test advanced by the Strickland court.

First, petitioner must show that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,

[petitioner] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In

light of the above finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding,

the court concludes that Petitioner cannot show that any deficiency in counsel’s performance

prejudiced the outcome of the hearing. Accordingly, this claim presents no basis for habeas

corpus relief.

Finally, Petitioner contends that he was denied an impartial hearing panel when he

appeared before the Board. Petitioner complains that the panel consisted of only two

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

members, rather than three, which he argues was required under the then-existing version of

Penal Code Section 5076.1. Petitioner does not deny, however, that under Section

5076.1(c), no action could be taken by the Board unless a majority of the panel vote to grant

parole. Here, two panel members voted to deny parole to Petitioner. Thus, he is unable to

show prejudice. 

In light of the above, the state court decisions upholding the Board’s decision to deny

parole to Petitioner were neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable

interpretation of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, this petition presents no basis for habeas

corpus relief.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by

mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05531-LJO -WMW Document 27 Filed 01/19/07 Page 8 of 8