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Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

JONATHAN DARYL PEACOCK, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:14cv1207-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Jonathan Daryl Peacock (“Plaintiff”) filed applications for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq, 

and for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et 

seq., on August 24, 2012. His applications were denied at the initial administrative level. 

Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled 

from the alleged onset date of August 14, 2012, through the date of the decision. Plaintiff 

appealed to the Appeals Council, which rejected his request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

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129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is 

unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie

case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One 

through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then 

show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can 

perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is 

still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. 

at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

 

3

 McDaniel is a supplemental security income (SSI) case. The same sequence applies to disability 

insurance benefits. Supplemental security income cases arising under Title XVI of the Social Security 

Act are appropriately cited as authority in Title II cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412 

(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 876 n.* (11th Cir. 2012) (“The 

definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has a disability is the same for 

claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income.”). 

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claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

 

4

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was thirty-five years old on the alleged disability onset date, and had 

completed high school and a two-year degree program at a technical college. Tr. 29, 39-

40. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ 

found at Step One that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

August 14, 2012, the alleged onset date[.]” Tr. 23. At Step Two, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: “major depressive disorder, 

panic disorder, personality disorder, NOS, [and] Tourette’s syndrome[.]” Tr. 23. At Step 

Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments[.]” Tr. 24. Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range 

of work at all exertional levels except that the claimant has the following 

nonexertional limitations: limited to simple routine tasks of unskilled work 

involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple work related 

decisions with few work place changes and changes should be gradual. 

Claimant can interact with coworkers and supervision on a basic level but 

needs a well-spaced work environment to reduce the amount of interaction. 

He can have infrequent casual contact with public. Claimant cannot have 

any production pace work or work that requires rapid changes or multiple 

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demands. Supervision should be non-confrontable; and claimant should not 

operate motorized equipment. 

Tr. 25. Having consulted with a VE at the hearing, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that 

Plaintiff is “unable to perform any past relevant work[.]” Tr. 29. Finally, at Step Five, 

and based upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering the 

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Tr. 29. The ALJ identified several representative occupations, including, at 

the medium unskilled exertional level, “Hospital cleaner” and “Laundry worker,” and, at 

the light unskilled exertional level, “Car checker.” Tr. 30. Accordingly, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . from August 14, 2012, 

through the date of this decision[.]” Tr. 30. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

 Plaintiff presents one issue for the court to consider in its review of the 

Commissioner’s decision, arguing that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed 

because the ALJ “failed to provide adequate weight to the opinions of Mr. Peacock’s 

treating physician, Dr. Lopez.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 7. 

V. DISCUSSION 

 On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Lopez, completed a 

psychological impairment questionnaire in which Dr. Lopez rated the degree of 

Plaintiff’s impairments in a number of functional areas. See Tr. 295-97. Dr. Lopez 

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declined the form’s invitation to provide comments regarding his impairment ratings (Tr. 

297) and, apart from Dr. Lopez’s treatment notes, the record does not appear to contain 

the “narrative report” which the questionnaire contemplates should be provided in 

addition to the questionnaire. See Tr. 295. In completing the questionnaire, Dr. Lopez 

indicated his opinion that Plaintiff suffers “marked” limitations, defined as “[a]n 

impairment which seriously affects ability to function,” in a number of functional areas 

including the following: “ability to interact appropriately with the general public”; 

“degree of constriction of interests of the claimant”; “degree of restriction of the 

claimant’s daily activities, e.g., ability to attend meetings (church, school, lodge, etc.), 

work around the house socialize with friends and neighbors, etc.”; “ability to understand, 

remember, and carry out complex instructions”; “ability to maintain attention and 

concentration for extended periods”; “ability to perform activities within a schedule, 

maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances”; “ability to 

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically 

based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of 

length and rest periods”; “ability to respond appropriately to supervision”; “ability to 

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting”; “ability to respond to customary 

work pressures”; and “ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate 

precautions.” Tr. 295-97. 

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 In his opinion, the ALJ surveyed the available treatment records from Dr. Lopez 

and SpectraCare, and summarized Dr. Lopez’s opinion that “claimant essentially had 

marked deficiencies and restrictions in the majority of the categories listed” on the 

questionnaire provided to him. Tr. 27. Based upon his review of Dr. Lopez’s treatment 

notes and the other evidence in the record, the ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Lopez’s 

opinion. Tr. 28. The ALJ found that Dr. Lopez’s responses on the questionnaire are 

largely “inconsistent with the physician’s treatment and therapy notes . . . , which indicate 

the claimant essentially with normal affect, appropriate mood, and no side effect of 

medications.” Id. Furthermore, the ALJ found notable that an “assessment” completed 

on March 18, 2013, less than a month before Dr. Lopez completed the questionnaire, 

“showed claimant with euthymic mood.” Id.; see Tr. 309. The ALJ further noted that 

SpectraCare’s treatment and therapy notes regarding Plaintiff generally demonstrate 

Plaintiff as reporting a euthymic mood “until they show problems after July 2013, when 

the claimant indicated he had filed for disability benefits, and was agitated over how long 

the process was taking.” Tr. 28. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving “little weight” to Dr. Lopez’s opinion 

because Dr. Lopez’s treatment notes actually support Dr. Lopez’s opinions, and because 

Dr. Lopez’s opinion is supported by the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Jordan, 

as well as the testimony of Plaintiff at the hearing. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 9-11. In Lacina 

v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 606 F. App’x 520, 526 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal 

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quotations and citations omitted), the Eleventh Circuit explained the deference Social 

Security regulations ordinarily accord treating source opinion like that of a treating 

physician: 

[T]he opinion of a treating source (i.e., a medical professional who is able 

to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical 

impairment(s)) is usually entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a 

medical professional who sees the claimant only once or for a brief period 

of time. An ALJ will also consider: the length, frequency, and nature of the 

provider-patient relationship, the extent to which a provider or other source 

presents relevant medical evidence to support his opinion, and the 

consistency of an opinion with the record as a whole. 

Where medical source opinion is credited as a treating source opinion, it is ordinarily 

entitled to deference. “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of 

treating physicians substantial or considerable weight.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

Good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) 

treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the 

doctor’s own medical records. With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a 

treating physician’s opinion, but he must clearly articulate [the] reasons for 

doing so. 

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

 As an initial matter, it is apparent that, while the ALJ ultimately gave Dr. Lopez’s 

opinion “little weight,” the RFC articulated by the ALJ includes several non-exertional 

limitations which, even if not as serious as Dr. Lopez might opine them to be, indicates 

that the ALJ at least agreed that Plaintiff has limitations in his mental functioning in 

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several of the areas identified by Dr. Lopez. For example, Dr. Lopez opined that Plaintiff 

has “marked” impairment in his “ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex 

instructions” and “ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.” Tr. 

296. The ALJ’s RFC similarly instructs that Plaintiff must be “limited to simple routine 

tasks of unskilled work involving no more than simple, short, instructions and simple 

work related decisions with few work place changes and changes should be gradual[,]” 

and that Plaintiff “cannot have any production pace work or work that requires rapid 

changes or multiple demands.” Tr. 25. Dr. Lopez opined that Plaintiff has a “marked” 

impairment in his “ability to respond appropriately to supervision.” Tr. 296. The ALJ 

likewise found that Plaintiff “can interact with coworkers and supervision on a basic level 

but needs a well-spaced work environment to reduce the amount of interaction[,]” and 

that “[s]upervision should be non-confrontable.” Tr. 25-26. Dr. Lopez opined that 

Plaintiff has “marked” impairment in his “ability to interact appropriately with the 

general public.” Tr. 295. The ALJ found Plaintiff can have only “infrequent casual 

contact with public.” Tr. 25. Thus, it is apparent that the ALJ recognized several of the 

functional limitations observed by Dr. Lopez and accounted for those limitations in the 

RFC. As such, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Lopez’s opinion is better described as a slight 

difference of opinion about the degree to which Plaintiff is functionally limited by his 

acknowledged mental impairments, not a wholesale rejection of Dr. Lopez’s opinion. 

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 In any event, to the extent the ALJ indeed failed to provide controlling weight to 

Dr. Lopez’s opinion as argued by Plaintiff, the ALJ had good cause to disregard Dr. 

Lopez’s opinion and the ALJ adequately articulated those reasons in his opinion. First 

and foremost, the ALJ found that Dr. Lopez’s opinion “is inconsistent with the 

physician’s treatment and therapy notes . . . , which indicate the claimant essentially with 

normal affect, appropriate mood, and no side effect of medications.” Tr. 28. Indeed, 

essentially all of Dr. Lopez’s treatment notes in the record characterize Plaintiff as having 

appropriate appearance, affect, behavior, and thought processes, as well as euthymic 

mood. See Tr. 272 (Dec. 3, 2012); 309-10 (March 8, 2013); 307-08 (July 24, 2013); and 

305 (Oct. 9, 2013). 

 Plaintiff points to no treatment notes in the record specifically authored by Dr. 

Lopez which lend support to the opinion Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to fully credit. 

Rather, Plaintiff points to a handful of records reflecting Plaintiff’s participation in 

therapy sessions which were not produced by Dr. Lopez. See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 9-10. 

For example, Plaintiff points to a January 3, 2013, “Progress Note” from Plaintiff’s group 

therapy session in which Plaintiff “expressed lots of anxiety” during group therapy over 

his “home situation and recent deaths in his family[,]” for which he received “support and 

encouragement” from the group therapist. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 9 (citing Tr. 276-77). 

Plaintiff does not explain how this singular complaint of anxiety related to his home 

environment and recent deaths in his family lends support to Dr. Lopez’s opinions about 

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Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Indeed, a subsequent group therapy note reflects 

Plaintiff’s report that “he and his mother have recently moved to a different residence and 

it will be a more peaceful environment[.]” Tr. 319. See also Tr. 324 (March 4, 2013, 

group therapy note stating Plaintiff “and his mother have relocated and the home 

environment has much improved and lowered his anxiety level.”). 

 Plaintiff also points to several additional group therapy session notes which 

“reflect Mr. Peacock has poor sleep/insomnia, dysphoric mood, is easily distracted, 

depressed and anxious, impaired recent memory, he finds himself flinching when people 

raise their voices or hands, and having limited insight and judgment.” Pl.’s Br. (doc. 12) 

at 9. Plaintiff argues these “findings are inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. 

Lopez’s treatment notes are inconsistent with his psychological assessment. Instead, 

these findings actually support Dr. Lopez’s assessment of moderate and marked 

limitations in Mr. Peacock’s psychological functioning.” Id. at 9-10. Notably, apart from 

the clinical intake assessment (Tr. 283-88) cited by Plaintiff, all of the records cited by 

Plaintiff as substantiating Dr. Lopez’s April 25, 2013, opinion are dated after April 25, 

2013. See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 9 (citing Tr. 331, 333, 337, 340, 343, and 352). It is 

unclear how notes from group therapy sessions which occurred after Dr. Lopez’s opinion 

was rendered can establish that the opinion is consistent with the physician’s treatment 

notes. Nevertheless, given that none of these group therapy session notes are attributed to 

Dr. Lopez, it unclear to what extent the notes could constitute Dr. Lopez’s own 

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“findings.” Certainly, such supposed “findings” are not reflected in the very few 

treatment notes actually authored by Dr. Lopez in the record. See Tr. 272, 309-10, 307-

08, and 305. 

 Furthermore, as the ALJ observed, the group therapy notes included in the record 

forcefully indicate that the greatest source of anxiety and depression for Plaintiff, 

especially after his anxiety was improved by relocating with his mother, was his financial 

situation and the perceived slow progress of his application for disability benefits. See

Tr. 333 (May 20, 2013); 337 (June 17, 2013); 340 (July 15, 2013); 335 (Aug. 3, 2013); 

347 (Aug. 19, 2013); 348 (Sept. 16, 2013); 352 (Oct. 21, 2013); and 358 (Nov. 18, 2013). 

Plaintiff provides no explanation as to how his anxiety over his financial situation and the 

progress of his disability application somehow supports Dr. Lopez’s prior opinion about 

his several purported “marked” limitations in psychological functioning. In short, then, 

the ALJ’s decision that Dr. Lopez’s opinion is inconsistent with his “treatment and 

therapy notes” is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Lopez’s opinion because 

such opinion is “bolstered by the opinion of consultative psychological examiner Dr. 

Randy Jordan.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 10. However, the ALJ also gave Dr. Jordan’s 

opinion “little weight” because “certain aspects of the psychological consultative 

examination, such as the GAF of 40, [are] not supported by or consistent with the 

examination findings.” Tr. 28. Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s given reasons for 

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his decision to afford Dr. Jordan’s opinion “little weight.” Thus, it is of no moment that 

Plaintiff perceives some parts of Dr. Jordan’s opinion as corroborating that of Dr. Lopez, 

where the ALJ rejected both opinions and provided “good cause,” supported by 

substantial evidence, for his decision to reject such opinions. 

 Plaintiff’s final contention is that the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Lopez’s 

opinion because such opinion “is bolstered even further[] by Mr. Peacock’s own sworn 

testimony.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 11. However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony about his mental limitations is not “fully credible” due, in part, to 

Plaintiff’s history of conservative treatment for his mental impairments, favorable 

response to outpatient mental health treatment, and the nature of his reported activities of 

daily living. Tr. 27-28. Plaintiff has not separately challenged the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. Thus, it is of no moment that Plaintiff believes some aspects of his 

subjective testimony corroborate Dr. Lopez’s opinion. The ALJ articulated good cause, 

supported by substantial evidence, for his decision to discount Dr. Lopez’s opinion, and 

Plaintiff’s own “not fully credible” testimony cannot serve as a basis for a finding that the 

ALJ erred in his treatment of Dr. Lopez’s opinion. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

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Done this 25th day of November, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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