Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00647/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00647-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Glen Gardner,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 03-0647 LKK PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

D. L. Runnels, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action against prison officials. 

Plaintiff alleges High Desert State Prison (HDSP) was on

“lockdown” status from December 12, 2000, to February 13, 2001;

February 17, 2001 to April 16, 2001; May 11, 2001 to October 2,

2001; December 11, 2001, to January 2, 2002; and February 15,

2002, to September 22, 2002. Plaintiff claims during each of

these periods he received no opportunity to exercise outdoors,

with a sole exception on April 19, 2002, when he was placed

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outside while maintenance work was done on his cell door. During

lockdown plaintiff was allowed out of his cell for only tenminute showers and to visit the law library or infirmary. He was

required to wear mechanical restraints when outside his cell. 

Plaintiff claims the lack of outdoor exercise violated the Eighth

Amendment and seeks damages.

Defendants move for summary judgment and plaintiff opposes.

Standards on Summary Judgment

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

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reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

Application

The following facts are not disputed. 

Plaintiff, a white inmate in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections, was housed in Facility B at HDSP

beginning December 12, 2000. Significant incidents of prison

unrest, viz., riots between rival racial groups or serious

violence by inmates against staff, occurred in Facility B

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November 22, 1999, February 17, 2001, May 11, 2001, June 10,

2001, February 15, 2002, and April 10, 2002. Numerous minor

disturbances leading to lockdowns also occurred during this

period. 

During the 13 months before plaintiff arrived in Facility B

in December 2000, 21 minor incidents and one major incident

occurred, resulting in lockdowns of part or all of the facility. 

From November 29, 1999, to January 6, 2000, and from February 17,

2001, to April 2, 2001, the entire institution operated under a

state of emergency. Between December 12, 2000, and April 10,

2002, there were five major incidents and six minor incidents in

Facility B. Plaintiff was granted “normal programming”

(including outdoor exercise) only about 25% of the time during

this period. From February 15, 2002, to September 22, 2002,

plaintiff received no outdoor exercise. In June 2002, Facility B

management commenced a “stepped” unlock process and in the course

of this process plaintiff was released from lockdown September

22, 2002, and his outdoor exercise privileges were restored.

The governing precedent is Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th

Cir. 1995). The court in Allen stated at page 1083-84:

An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has

deprived inmates of humane conditions of confinement

must meet two requirements, one objective and one

subjective. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, , 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1977 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under the

objective requirement, the prison officials’ acts or

omissions must deprive an inmate of “the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392,

2399-2400, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). The subjective

requirement, relating to the defendant’s state of mind,

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requires deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

 , 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

In Allen, plaintiff alleged prison officials violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by permitting him to exercise outdoors

only once each week over a six-week period. The district court

granted summary judgment for defendants. The Ninth Circuit

reversed, holding that defendants were entitled to summary

judgment on neither the objective nor subjective elements of the

Eighth Amendment claim. Allen, 48 F.3d at 1084-85. Whether

asserted logistical problems in providing adequate outdoor

exercise barred plaintiff from establishing defendants were

“deliberately indifferent” was a question of fact for the jury. 

Id.

Allen is directly on point and precludes granting

defendants’ motion. Plaintiff went without outdoor exercise for

four periods exceeding six weeks. In 2002, he was permitted to

exercise outside only once during a period exceeding seven

months. See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000)

(summary judgment for defendants reversed where plaintiff

received no outdoor exercise for six and one half weeks and

defendants’ assertion they acted for plaintiff’s own protection

was insufficient to explain why they could not accommodate

plaintiff’s need for outdoor exercise in some manner); Keenan v.

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083 (1995) (summary judgment for defendants

reversed where plaintiff received no outdoor exercise for six

months).

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The decision in LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir.

1993) is inapposite. In LeMaire, the court of appeals reversed

an injunction for plaintiff, who had been deprived of outside

exercise for most of a five-year period of incarceration for

disciplinary and safety reasons. 12 F.3d at 1457-58. In finding

plaintiff’s claim failed under Eighth Amendment standards, the

court emphasized that the deprivation was “directly linked to

[plaintiff’s] own misconduct” and the “physical threat he poses

to staff and other inmates.” 12 F.3d at 1458. Here, there is

nothing to suggest plaintiff was disciplined for his own

misconduct or that particularized safety concerns warranted

withholding outdoor exercise to him. 

Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980) also is

distinguishable. In Hayward, plaintiffs challenged conditions

imposed during a lockdown after declaration of a “state of

emergency” at San Quentin State Prison. The district court

denied declaratory relief and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In

Hayward, the plaintiffs were allowed outdoor exercise for one

hour per day, five days per week, within one month after the

lockdown was imposed. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendants’

December 17, 2004, motion for summary judgment be denied and the

case be remanded for pretrial conference and trial.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

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filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: June 29, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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