Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04842/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04842-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Calvin James,

Petitioner,

v. 

Bureau of Prisons, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-04842-PHX-SRB (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Calvin James has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner is currently serving a term of 210 months of imprisonment after his 

conviction on one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Petitioner 

seeks an early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), a provision allowing the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons (BOP) to grant up to one year’s worth of sentence credit to inmates who 

successfully complete the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). 

Because Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses review of a decision to deny a sentence 

reduction to a specific inmate who completes the RDAP, the Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. Further, because Petitioner’s current conviction is for 

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a crime of violence as recognized by BOP regulations and Ninth Circuit caselaw, he is 

categorically ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), even if the 

Court retained subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the 

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

II. Background.

a. Facts and Proceedings.

On June 6, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 210 months of imprisonment 

for one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). (Doc. 13-3, Attachment 

3, at 2.) Petitioner’s projected release date is January 20, 2022. (Doc. 13-3, Attachment 1, 

at 1.) Petitioner is currently incarcerated at FCI Phoenix. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. A, at 1.) On 

January 30, 2019, Petitioner entered the RDAP at FCI Phoenix, and currently remains in 

the program. (Doc. 13-3, Attachment 7, at 1.)

b. Administrative Appeals. 

On October 18, 2018, BOP personnel completed an offense review for Petitioner, 

concluding that he was ineligible to receive early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) due to 

his current offense conviction for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). (Doc 

13-2, Ex. A, at 6.) On November 28, 2018, Petitioner filed an Informal Resolution (BP-8) 

form with FCI Phoenix requesting reconsideration of his ineligibility for early release. 

(Doc. 1 at 28.) On December 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a Request for Administrative 

Remedy with BOP, arguing that BOP failed to “properly assess and screen [a] documented 

request” by Petitioner to enter the RDAP as early as 2008. Id. at 25. On January 10, 2019, 

BOP partially granted Petitioner’s Request for Administrative Remedy and re-assessed his 

eligibility for early release, but still determined Petitioner was ineligible for early release. 

Id. at 23. On April 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal, 

asserting that, as he requested consideration for the RDAP as early as 2008, the Ninth 

Circuit’s decisions in Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2009) and Arrington v. 

Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) bar the BOP from denying him early release upon 

successful completion of the RDAP. (Doc. 1 at 13-15.) On June 27, 2019, BOP denied 

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Petitioner’s appeal, stating that Petitioner’s conviction for bank robbery rendered him 

ineligible for early release under BOP Program Statements 5331.02, Early Release 

Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), and 5162.05, Categorization of Offenses. (Doc. 1 

at 12.)

III. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with 

this Court on July 26, 2019. Petitioner argues that the BOP erroneously denied him 

eligibility for early release, as he was “grandfathered in” to the one-year sentence credit 

under the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Arrington and Crickon. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner 

argues that the Ninth Circuit invalidated BOP’s pre-2009 regulations concerning eligibility 

for the early release credit in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), and since he was incarcerated in a facility 

within the Ninth Circuit when the pre-2009 regulations were in effect, he is entitled to a 

sentence reduction of one year. Id. at 5. He concludes that the BOP violated the Ex Post 

Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 

Constitution by denying him a reduction in sentence. Id. at 4.

IV. Discussion.

a. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody “under or by color of 

the authority of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1). Authority to manage federal 

correctional institutions and those in the custody of the United States after conviction is 

delegated by Congress to the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(1). The authority 

delegated to the BOP includes discretion to carry out substance abuse treatment programs. 

18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1). Congress also exempted “any determination, decision, or order” 

issued by the BOP under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 from the Administrative 

Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3625. The Ninth Circuit concluded 

that, given the unambiguous nature of 18 U.S.C. § 3625, a district court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the denial of a sentence reduction despite completion of the RDAP. 

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See Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011).1 There, the Ninth Circuit held that 

“any substantive decision by the BOP to admit a particular prisoner into RDAP, or to grant 

or deny a sentence reduction for completion of the program, is not reviewable by the district 

court.” Id. at 1227. Petitioner seeks an order for the BOP to “[g]rant James request for 

3621(e) Early Release at the completion of RDAP.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) This Petition, if granted, 

would order a sentence reduction for a particular prisoner’s completion of the RDAP, in 

clear contravention of Reeb. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider the Petition.

b. Eligibility for Early Release.

Assuming arguendo2that Petitioner raised a reviewable claim, Petitioner is 

nevertheless not entitled to the relief he seeks. A prisoner convicted of a violent offense is 

ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). See also Lopez v. 

Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238 (2001) (“[18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)] categorically denies early 

release eligibility to inmates convicted of violent offenses.”). BOP regulations prohibit 

early release for inmates with a current felony conviction for “an offense that has as an 

element, the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(i). A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is 

considered a violent offense requiring the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical 

force. United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784-86 (9th Cir. 2018); Furguiel v. Benov, 

155 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).

1 See also Schulze v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2019 WL 7038254, at *2 (D. Haw. Dec. 20, 

2019) (“federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BOP’s . . . determinations made 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621.”) (citing Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227-28); Cislo v. Salazar, 2019 

WL 3416685, at *1 (D. Or. June 10, 2019) (“[t]his Court lacks jurisdiction to revisit 

individualized RDAP determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621.”) (citing Reeb, 

636 F.3d at 1227-28), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3414387 (D. Or. 

July 26, 2019); Johnson v. Lemaster, 2019 WL 3035121, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2019) 

(same), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3841792 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 

2019).

2 A claim that the Bureau of Prisons exceeded its statutory authority is reviewable. See

Close v. Thomas, 653 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (Petitions that “allege that the BOP 

action is contrary to . . . its statutory authority” are “within [our] jurisdiction.”) (quotations 

and citation omitted); Abbott v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 771 F.3d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 

2014) (reversing decision based on lack of jurisdiction when petitioner made “a categorical 

challenge to the BOP’s interpretation of its own regulation, which is not foreclosed from 

review.”).

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Neither Crickon nor Arrington support Petitioner’s position. The Ninth Circuit in 

Arrington rejected only the BOP’s decision “to categorically exclude prisoners convicted 

of offenses involving the carrying, possession, or use of firearms from eligibility for a 

sentence reduction under 3621(e).” Id. at 1114. Petitioner was not convicted of any of those 

offenses. Crickon is also distinguishable. In that case, the Ninth Circuit faulted the BOP 

for providing “no explanation for its decision to look to prior convictions as the appropriate 

basis to determine categorical exclusions.” Id. at 984 (emphasis added). That is not the 

same as denying early release to an inmate who successfully completed the RDAP while 

currently serving a sentence for committing a crime of violence. Here, Petitioner is serving 

a sentence for bank robbery, which, as explained above, is considered a “crime of violence” 

under BOP regulations and Ninth Circuit caselaw. See Watson, 881 F.3d at 786 (affirming 

that bank robbery is a crime of violence) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 203 (2018). Therefore, 

Crickon would not have prevented the BOP from determining Petitioner was ineligible for 

early release under section 3621(e), even assuming as true Petitioner’s argument that he 

did express interest in participation in the RDAP prior to the BOP’s adoption of the current 

version of 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5).

Petitioner’s remaining arguments that the BOP’s re-review of his Administrative 

Remedy violated his due process and equal protection rights are also unavailing. As the 

Ninth Circuit has explained, a violation of the right to due process under the Fifth 

Amendment requires that the petitioner have a “protected liberty interest” in RDAP 

participation or early release, which Petitioner does not possess. Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 

F.3d 983, 986 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a claim that existence of a drug treatment 

program “creates a due process liberty interest in the one-year sentence reduction”). See 

also Reeb at 1229 n.4 (finding petitioner “cannot prevail on his due process claim because 

inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in either RDAP participation or in the 

associated discretionary early release benefit.”). A violation of a petitioner’s right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a petitioner provide evidence 

that similarly situated individuals have been treated differently in the BOP’s administration 

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of the RDAP or the early release provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which Petitioner 

has not provided. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, the 

Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution does not bar the BOP from refusing to grant a 

sentence reduction, as declining to exercise a discretionary right to reduce Petitioner’s 

sentence does not result in “a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment 

attached to the covered crimes.” California Dep’t. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 

509 (1995).

V. Conclusion.

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims, and that in the alternative, Petitioner is not 

entitled to the relief he seeks. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

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Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

The Court need not address whether a Certificate of Appealability should issue. See 

Forde v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 114 F.3d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1997).

Dated this 13th day of February, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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