Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02106/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02106-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441fr Removal- Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NIMAL SUSANTHA DIUNUGALA,

an individual, on behalf of himself and

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2106-WQHNLS

ORDER

vs.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.;

THE BANK OF NEW YORK

MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A;

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE

SERVICING, INC.; POWER

DEFAULT SERVICES, INC.; and

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order, filed Plaintiff Nimal Susantha Diunugala. (ECF No. 39).

I. Background

On January 3, 2014, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed an “Ex Parte

Application for a Stay of the Lock Out (Stay of Execution) and to Recall/Quash the

Writ and/or Immediately Remand to the State Court.” (ECF No. 35).

On January 6, 2014, the Court issued an Order denying this motion. (ECF No.

37). The Court stated: “Diunugala fails to cite legal authority indicating that a federal

court may stay execution of orders issued by a state court in these circumstances. 

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Diunugala fails to cite legal authority indicating that a remand of this action is

appropriate. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Application is denied.” Id. at 2.

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Ex Parte Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order. (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff “seeks a TRO to preliminary enjoin

Defendants ... and any other persons or entities acting on their behalf, including the San

Diego County Sheriff, from proceeding with enforcement of the writ of possession for

the real property located at 975 Merced River Road, Chula Vista, California, and from

any sale or other encumbrance of the property for the pendency of the action.” Id. at

2. Plaintiff states: “Good cause exists for this request on the grounds the US District

court has the inherent power to preserve its own authority to adjudicate the case. The

federal action affects the issue of title. Yet a lock out order has been issued [by a state

court in an unlawful detainer action] for January 7, 2014.” Id.

II. Standard of Review

When the nonmovant has received notice, the standard for issuing a temporary

restraining order is the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Brown

Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw.

2002); Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320,

1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic

remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries

the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation

omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction

is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

The sole remaining cause of action in the First Amended Complaint—which is

the operative pleading—is the Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of the Truth

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in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). See October 3, 2013 Order Granting in Part and

Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29. The only remedy

Plaintiff seeks in the third cause of action is actual and statutory damages. See

Complaint ¶ 81, ECF No. 19. Injunctive relief is not available as a remedy for a Truth

in Lending Act violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

that, if he were to succeed on the merits of his sole remaining claim, injunctive relief

would be available to him.

Even if injunctive relief were available to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to submit

evidence demonstrating that it is likely Plaintiff will prevail on his Truth in Lending Act

cause of action. Although the Court has found that the unverified First Amended

Complaint adequately alleges a claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act, “[a]

motion for preliminary injunction must be supported by evidence that goes beyond the

unverified allegations of the pleadings.” Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Castle, No. C11-896-

SI, 2011 WL 5882878, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (quotation omitted). The Court

finds that Plaintiff has failed to “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits.” 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ex Parte Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order is DENIED. (ECF No. 39).

DATED: January 6, 2014

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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