Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01025/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Larry C. Nolte, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, 

Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration

Defendant. 

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CV-07-1025-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Larry Nolte filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to seek judicial review

of Defendant’s denial of his request for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title

XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. #1 (Compl.).) This appeal is now before the Court on

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (Doc. ## 15 (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

“MSJ”), 21 (Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. “X-MSJ”).) After considering the parties’

arguments and the evidence in the record, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in part and deny in part, and grant Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment in part and deny in part.. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income

benefits, alleging a disability onset date of December 31, 2003. (Record Transcript “Tr.” 49-

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51.) Plaintiff asserts that he is disabled due to, inter alia, fibromyalgia, headaches, fatigue,

and depression. (Id. at 43.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s

application and request for reconsideration. (Id. at 208-11, 222-25.) Plaintiff timely

requested and received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael Cianci.

(Id. at 37, 233-57.)

On September 15, 2006, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits, finding that,

despite Plaintiff’s restrictions, he still retained the residual functional capacity to engage in

substantially gainful activity. (Id. at 15-21.) On April 11, 2007, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the decision of the ALJ as the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Id. at 6-9.) Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 22, 2007 pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. # 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will not set aside the Commissioner’s decision unless: (1) the findings of

fact are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or (2) the decision is based on

a legal error. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). “Substantial

evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the court must consider the record as a whole and review evidence both supporting

and detracting from the decision. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The

ALJ’s role is to make credibility determinations and to resolve conflicts in medical

testimony. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. If the evidence is susceptible to more than one

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, then the court will uphold

the decision. Id. at 1040. However, if the ALJ applied improper legal standards, the court

must set aside a decision even if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Ceguerra v.

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Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 993 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1991).

The claimant bears the initial burden to prove that he qualifies for disability benefits

under the Social Security Act. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040. A claimant is disabled if he is

“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ must perform a five-step analysis to

determine whether a claimant is disabled. The questions are posed sequentially until a

finding of disability is affirmatively rejected or established. An applicant establishes a prima

facie case of disability if he proves the first four of the following five steps: (1) applicant is

not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) applicant has a “medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments”; (3) applicant’s impairment equals one of a

number of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledged as so severe as to

preclude the applicant from engaging in substantial gainful activity; (4) if the applicant’s

impairment does not equal one of the “listed impairments,” applicant is incapable of

performing his or her past relevant work; and (5) applicant is unable to perform other work

in the national economy considering his or her age, education, and work experience. See

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). In

analyzing step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. “The Commissioner can meet

this burden through the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical

Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999)); see

also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). “If the Commissioner meets his burden, the claimant has failed

to establish disability.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955.

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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Disability Claim

Plaintiff claims that he has been unable to work since December 31, 2003. (Tr. 49.)

He alleges that he is disabled due to fibromyalgia, depression, irritable bowel syndrome,

migraine headaches, fatigue, insomnia, anxiety, stress, memory loss, and concentration

problems. (Id. at 43.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Background

Plaintiff was born on February 12, 1973, and stands at 6 feet, 4 inches tall. (Id. at 54,

137.) Presently, he lives with his wife and two teenage children. (Id. at 243.) He has a high

school education and a certificate in auto body repair work. (Id. at 111-12.) From 1991 to

2003, Plaintiff worked full time running his own auto body shop. (Id. at 108-09, 239.)

Plaintiff alleges that he sold the business in 2003 when he became sick. (MSJ at 10.)

On August 9, 2006, Plaintiff testified to the ALJ regarding his allegedly disabling

conditions. (Tr. 233-56.) Plaintiff stated that as a result of these ailments he is unable to

work due to excessive fatigue and pain. (Id. at 239-40.) Plaintiff further testified that he

cannot stand much longer than 20-30 minutes at a time, walk longer than 15 minutes, or sit

for more than 25 minutes without standing up or lying down. (Id. at 241.) Additionally, he

indicated that he may be able to lift 20 pounds at the most, but he would be unable to carry

this weight across the kitchen. (Id. at 241-42.) Plaintiff also visits his mother, occasionally

shops with his wife, fixes simple meals, performs some light household chores. (Id. at 242-

45.) He has also traveled outside Arizona twice since 2003, once to California and once to

New Jersey. (Id. at 250.) Plaintiff attempts to use a treadmill everyday, though the duration

and intensity of this activity is unclear. (Id. at 251.) 

C. Record Evidence

1. Physical and Mental Impairments

In 2003, Plaintiff began to be treated for severe pain by his treating physician, Dr.

Pena. (Id. at 166.) In November of that year, Dr. Pena concluded that Plaintiff was unable

to work due to fibromyaliga and depression. (Id. at 168.) In March of 2004, Plaintiff was

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1

While Plaintiff alleges that his depression should be considered in the evaluation of

his disability (Pl.’s Statement of Facts p. 3), Plaintiff did not provide the requested

information to the government’s reviewing psychologist. (Tr. 169-82.) Since the evidence

presented indicates that Plaintiff’s treatment appears to have resolved his depression, and

because Plaintiff did not provide the requested information to the SSA, the ALJ properly

determined in Step 2 of his analysis that Plaintiff’s depression was not to be taken into

account in the disability evaluation. (Id. at 16.)

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treated in the emergency room of the Mayo Clinic for body aches and pains. (Id. at 141.)

He received multiple medical tests, all of which came back normal. (Id.) His discharge

diagnosis was “myalgias of undetermined etiology.” (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff

established care at the Mayo Clinic. (Id. at 136-38.) His pain was treated with Duragesic

patches; however, he experienced adverse side effects to them. (Id. at 129, 138.) 

In early 2004, Plaintiff was also treated for insomnia, weight loss, depression, and

headaches. (Id. at 124-26.) He was prescribed Lexapro for his depression and Trazadone

and Flexeril for his insomnia. (Id.) On April 20, 2004, Plaintiff was referred to a

rheumatologist specializing in fibromyaliga. (Id. at 158-60.) The treating rheumatologist

adjusted his medications and recommended physical therapy. (Id.) The reports were sent

to Dr. Pena, and it appears that Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Pena rather than the

rheumatologist. The Mayo Clinic noted that Plaintiff appeared to be gaining his weight back,

and the antidepressants seemed to be effective.1

 (Id. at 120-22.) 

In January of 2005, Dr. Pena assessed Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related physical

activities. (Id. at 183-84.) He concluded that Plaintiff is able to sit, stand, or walk for less

than an hour each in an eight hour work day. (Id. at 183.) He also claimed that Plaintiff

could not lift or carry more than 10 pounds, and that Plaintiff could not repetitively use is left

foot or left hand at all. (Id.) Dr. Pena also stated that Plaintiff could not ever bend, crawl,

climb, reach, stoop, balance, crouch, or kneel in a work setting. (Id.) 

2. Vocational Expert

The Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified regarding past work history and potential for

future employment. (Id. at 253-56.) The ALJ first presented the VE with a hypothetical

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2

According to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), if a claimant does not have “any impairment

or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to

do basic work activities, [the SSA] will find that [he] do[es] not have a severe impairment

and [is], therefore, not disabled.”

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person with the same age, work experience, and educational background as the claimant,

with the ability to do work of light exertional level with occasional bending, crouching,

crawling, kneeling, and climbing. (Id. at 253.) The VE stated that this person would be

precluded from performing Plaintiff’s past work history, but that this person would be able

to get a job as a shop estimator or a parking lot attendant. (Id. at 253-54.)

The VE classified the shop estimator job as light and semi-skilled employment. (Id.

at 253.) He estimated that there were 200,000 such jobs nationally and 1,800 in Maricopa

County. The VE classified a parking lot attendant as a light, sedentary, and unskilled type

of employment. (Id. at 254.) The VE stated that there are 500 of these positions in Maricopa

County, and 31,000 nationwide. (Id.)

The ALJ’s second hypothetical presented the same person who would miss four or

more days at work per month and not complete assigned tasks in an eight-hour day due to

fatigue, pain, or other factors four or more days per month. (Id. at 254.) The VE opined that

this person would be unable to work without special accommodation. (Id.) Upon

examination by Plaintiff’s attorney, the VE stated that, if Plaintiff’s testimony were true,

Plaintiff would not be able to perform any job. (Id.) The VE also confirmed that someone

with the limitations presented in Dr. Pena’s assessment of Plaintiff would similarly not be

able to perform work. (Id. at 255.)

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s alleged disability according to the five-step evaluation

process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. (Id. at 15-21.) The ALJ first determined that

Plaintiff has not been gainfully employed since the alleged onset date. (Id. at 15.) Next, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and sleeping disorder were “severe” within the

meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).2

 (Id. at 16.) However, the ALJ concluded that

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Plaintiff’s impairments failed to meet the criteria of the third step. (Id.) This step requires

a claimant’s impairment(s) to “meet[] or equal[] one of [the SSA’s] listings in appendix 1 to

subpart P of part 404 of this chapter and meet[] the duration requirement . . . .” 20 C.F R. §

416.920(a)(4)(iii). Specifically, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment

or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment.” (Id.)

Finally, the ALJ examined whether Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work or other work in the economy. (Id. at 19-20.) The

RFC is defined as “the most [Plaintiff] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.945. Before determining the RFC, the ALJ first dismissed Plaintiff’s testimony and the

opinion of the treating physician, finding that they lacked credibility and were inconsistent

with the record. (Id. at 17-19.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of

lifting/carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, that he could sit for 6

hours out of an 8 hour work day, and that he could stand/walk for a total of 6 hours in an 8

hour day. (Id. at 20.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff could engage in only occasional climbing,

bending, crouching, crawling, and kneeling. (Id.)

Based on the RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff

is incapable of performing his past work, he is capable of performing work as a parking lot

attendant. (Id. at 21.) The number of such positions available in Maricopa County is

significant. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ held that Plaintiff was not eligible for payments

under sections 1602 and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Id.) 

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and

is founded on multiple errors of law. (MSJ at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ

committed reversible error by: (1) improperly rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

physician; (2) improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony; and (3) failing to

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3

Plaintiff also asserts in his Statement of Facts that “the ALJ’s assessed residual

functional capacity is not supported by any substantial evidence.” (Pl.’s Statement of Facts

at 2). However, this assertion was not raised in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Because Plaintiff failed to properly raise and brief this issue in its motion, the Court will not

address it on this appeal. See Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring district court to resolve issues outside of the motions would

be unfair to other litigants who would otherwise have that judicial time, and would be unfair

to the opposing party who does not have a fair opportunity to address the matter, and

therefore the court should not become a lawyer for the parties involved).

4

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ has put Plaintiff in a “Catch-22” regarding Plaintiff’s

treadmill usage: if he uses the treadmill he is physically active and therefore not disabled, but

if he does not use the treadmill then he is not compliant with the medical recommendations

for physical activity and this decreases his credibility. However, this is not a true “Catch22.” A Catch-22 is a false dilemma in which no real choice exists. Here, while Plaintiff may

not have a choice as to his diagnosis, this choice was never his to make. The determination

of Plaintiff’s abilities is made by medical professionals, and it is here that the choice exists.

It is they, and not Plaintiff, who determine if Plaintiff’s restrictions make him unable to

engage in physical exercise. If they reach the conclusion that Plaintiff is unable to exercise,

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consider the statements of Plaintiff’s wife.3

 Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

A. Treating Physician Opinion

The ALJ rejected the evaluation of Plaintiff’s treating physician despite the fact that

it was not technically contradicted by any other medical opinion. “Where a treating

physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for clear

and convincing reasons.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956-57. Thus, the ALJ was required to

articulate clear and convincing reasons for his decision to reject Dr. Pena’s evaluation.

Dr. Pena stated in his opinion that Plaintiff cannot use his left foot repetitively, reach,

crouch, or kneel “at all.” He also claims that Plaintiff cannot sit, stand, or walk for more than

an hour, and that Plaintiff cannot lift more than 10 pounds. In contrast, Plaintiff admits that

he attempts to use a treadmill every day, and that he is able to lift 20 pounds. Plaintiff also

admits that he has traveled across the country and to California since the alleged onset of his

disability. While these admissions are perhaps not inconsistent with only occasionally using

a foot repetitively, reaching, crouching, or kneeling, it is difficult to believe that Plaintiff can

use a treadmill4

 yet be unable to repetitively use his left foot “at all.” Further, it seems highly

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then they can easily make the recommendation that he not exercise. However, if Plaintiff’s

doctors do decide that he has the ability to exercise, then they can recommend that he do so.

Plaintiff may disagree with this diagnosis; however, the fact that Plaintiff’s doctors made this

recommendation is valid evidence of their evaluation of his abilities. Therefore the ALJ can

properly consider this evidence in his determination. If Plaintiff does not comply with the

doctors’ recommendations, the ALJ can then determine as the finder of fact if this is due to

lack of ability or lack of effort when considering the record as a whole (including the

doctors’ determinations of his abilities).

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unlikely that one could travel by plane and never need to bend or reach at any point during

the journey (unless the person is wheelchair bound, which Plaintiff is not). It seems even

more unlikely that someone who stands at 6 feet, 4 inches tall would never have such a need.

These are clear, convincing, and specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Pena’s evaluation as to the

extent of Plaintiff’s restrictions.

B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Similarly, Plaintiff claims that his pain prevents him from walking longer than 15

minutes, standing longer than 20-30 minutes, and sitting longer than 25 minutes. (Tr. 241.)

In deciding whether to accept subjective complaints, the ALJ must perform the analysis

adopted in Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), as a threshold matter. Smolen,

80 F.3d at 1281. If the claimant produces evidence to satisfy the Cotton test, the ALJ can

reject the claimant’s testimony on severity of symptoms only by giving “specific, clear and

convincing reasons for doing so.” Id.

Even assuming that Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the Cotton test,

the ALJ still provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the testimony.

It would seem nearly impossible for someone to travel across the country, yet not be able to

sit for longer than 25 minutes. Although there is no evidence as to the duration or intensity

of Plaintiff’s treadmill endeavors, the ALJ would not be unreasonable in assuming that

attempted daily usage was inconsistent with only being able to walk for 15 minutes. These

inconsistencies demonstrate that, at the very least, Plaintiff’s testimony exaggerated his

symptoms. Therefore there are specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony.

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C. Third Party Statements

The ALJ failed to address the statements produced by Plaintiff’s wife in his opinion.

“[W]here the ALJ’s error lies in a failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony

favorable to the claimant, a reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can

confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have

reached a different disability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin, 454 F.3d

1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). This quote from the majority opinion is best interpreted when

contrasted with the dissent’s opinion that the omission should be harmless error when “all

the evidence as a whole overwhelmingly supports denial of [the] application.” Id. at 1057.

Here, Plaintiff’s wife testified that Plaintiff will sometimes try to perform small

household chores, but when he does he usually hurts too badly the next day to the point

“where he can’t do anything.” (Tr. 61.) She also claims that he only sleeps 1-3 hours per

night, and that he is unable to pursue his former hobbies and interests. (Id. at 62, 65.) Since

a reasonable ALJ upon crediting this testimony could have arrived at a different disability

determination than what was arrived at by the ALJ here, the failure to address this testimony

is reversible error.

D. Remand

According to the Ninth Circuit, evidence should be credited and an action remanded

for the immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied: (1) the

ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence; (2) there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made;

and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled were such evidence credited. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292).

Here, it is not clear that the ALJ would be absolutely required to find the claimant

disabled were the testimony of Plaintiff’s wife credited. While Plaintiff would theoretically

not be able to perform tasks or chores requiring manual labor because he would be too sore

to function the next day, this does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of Plaintiff

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performing a largely sedentary job. Further, despite Plaintiff’s lack of sleep, it could still be

possible for him to function with naps after work and appropriate breaks during the day.

While such a finding may be unlikely, the Court cannot say that the alternative finding would

be required as a matter of law. Therefore this case is remanded to the ALJ for further

development of the record.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ did commit legal error in failing to consider the lay

testimony of Plaintiff’s wife. Because a reasonable ALJ could (but would not be required

to) find Plaintiff disabled on the basis of this testimony, this case is remanded for further

development of the record.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Summary Judgment (Doc.

#15) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED

regarding Plaintiff’s request to remand.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. #21) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s

Cross-Motion is GRANTED regarding Defendant’s request to deny an immediate award of

benefits.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2008.

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