Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 01cv1322

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR JUAN AYALA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 01cv1322-IEG(PCL)

Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion

for Summary Adjudication on

Group 5 Claims [Doc. No. 213];

Granting Respondent’s Motion for

Summary Adjudication on Group 5

Claims [Doc. No. 210]

vs.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Warden of the

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala and Respondent Steven Ornoski have moved for summary

adjudication on Petitioner’s Group 5 claims which include Grounds 22-25 of his Third Amended

Petition. The parties have filed opposition and reply briefs. 

A hearing was held before Chief Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on June 8, 2007. Tiffany Salayer

appeared on behalf of Petitioner. Steven Oetting of the California Attorney General’s Office

appeared on behalf of Respondent. Upon consideration, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for

summary adjudication and GRANTS Respondent’s motion for summary adjudication on the

Group 5 claims.

OVERVIEW

By an amended information filed on January 20, 1987, Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala

(“Petitioner”) and his brother Ronaldo Medrano Ayala were charged with the murders of Jose Luis

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 01cv1322

Rositas, Marcos Antonio Zamora and Ernesto Dominguez Mendez. The information alleged that

the murders were committed on or about April 26, 1985, during a robbery attempt where the

brothers held four men captive in an automobile repair shop. Both men were also charged with the

attempted murder of Pedro Castillo, who was shot during the drug-related robbery attempt, but

who escaped and survived. At trial, the prosecution also presented evidence that a third man, Jose

Moreno, helped in the commission of these crimes. Castillo provided the information to police

that led to the arrests and was the key prosecutorial witness at trial. 

Petitioner was convicted on August 1, 1989, of three counts of first-degree murder in

violation of California Penal Code (“Cal. Penal Code”) § 187, one count of attempted murder in

violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 187, and one count of robbery and three counts of

attempted robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 211--each count with findings that

Petitioner used a firearm in the commission of the crimes in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12022.5. Petitioner was also found guilty of the two special circumstance allegations, multiple

murder under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3), and murder in the attempted commission of a robbery

under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(1). The jury returned a verdict of death for each of the three

murders on August 31, 1989, and the court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict on

November 30, 1989.

Petitioner filed his opening brief on automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court on

April 23, 1998, raising nineteen (19) separate issues. The California Supreme Court denied the

appeal on August 28, 2000. People v. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th 243 (2000). On November 15, 2000, the

state court denied the petition for rehearing. On March 15, 2001, Petitioner filed a Writ of

Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on May 14, 2001. On May 14,

2001, his judgment became final.

On August 9, 1999, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court,

raising three (3) grounds for relief. Petitioner was not granted an evidentiary hearing on those

claims and his petition was summarily denied on the merits on August 30, 2000. 

On July 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a request for appointment of counsel to handle his federal

habeas petition. Petitioner filed an initial petition in this Court on May 14, 2002. After later filing

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 01cv1322

a Second Amended Petition in this Court on December 13, 2002, Petitioner filed a second state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on March 17, 2003. The state petition was filed in

order to exhaust several unexhausted claims.

Petitioner filed his Third Amended Petition with this Court on December 9, 2004. On

April 11, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s Group 1 Claims (Claims 12 and 13) and granted

Respondent’s motion for summary adjudication of those claims. On October 23, 2006, the Court

denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an evidentiary hearing on the Group

Two Claims (Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9) and granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss those claims. 

On December 6, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an

evidentiary hearing on the Group Three Claims (Claims 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11) and granted

Respondent’s motion to dismiss those claims. On December 19, 2006, the Court denied

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Order on Group Two Claims (Claim 5). On March

15, 2007, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an evidentiary

hearing on the Group Four Claims (Claims 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21) and granted

Respondent’s request for summary adjudication on those claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that

the new provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

“generally apply only to cases filed after the Act [AEDPA] became effective.” In capital habeas

actions, cases are typically commenced by the filing of requests for appointment of counsel and

stays of execution of the petitioners’ death sentences. Petitioner filed his request for appointment

of counsel and stay of execution on April 27, 2001 and filed his petition with this Court on May 6,

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 01cv1322

2002. The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996, when the President signed it into law. 

See id. Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Relevant to this case are the changes AEDPA rendered to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which now reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006). 

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority, or if it applied the controlling authority to a case involving

facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless

reaches a different result. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application”

of federal law if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle ...

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.

Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).

Even when the federal court undertakes an independent review of the record in the absence

of a reasoned state court decision, the federal court must “still defer to the state court’s ultimate

decision.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If the state court decision does

not furnish any analytical foundation, the review must focus on Supreme Court cases to determine

“whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts

also look to Ninth Circuit law for persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law and to

determine whether a particular state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Petitioner does not, in any of his filings on the Group Five Claims, request an evidentiary

hearing. Respondent does contest any potential request for an evidentiary hearing, asserting that

these claims are controlled by the “unreasonable determination” standard of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). 

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 01cv1322

The standard for granting an evidentiary hearing requires Petitioner to make a showing he

is entitled to relief if the facts alleged can be proven. Petitioner has not made any attempt to show

that any of these claims rely on either a new rule of constitutional law or a factual predicate that

could not have been previously discovered through due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. 2254 (e)(2). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

TEAGUE v. LANE

The United States Supreme Court, addressing perceived inconsistencies in its prior rulings

regarding retroactive application of its decisions, held that “new” constitutional rules of criminal

procedure will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within two

narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-311 (1989). A new rule is one that “breaks

new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or one whose

“result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.” 

Id. at 301. The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1) rules placing certain kinds of private

individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to prohibit, and (2) procedures implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously

diminished. Id., at 311; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989); Graham v. Collins, 506

U.S. 461, 478 (1993). 

When the state properly argues that a “defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of

constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before considering the merits of the

claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). Under Teague, habeas relief is generally

unavailable if it is based “on a rule announced after [a petitioner’s] conviction and sentence

became final.” Id. Therefore, the court must first ascertain the date on which a petitioner’s

conviction became final. Id. The second step in a Teague analysis is to determine whether a state

court considering the contested claim would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude

that the rule petitioner seeks was required by the Constitution at the time his or her conviction

became final. Id. at 389-90. Third, if the court determines that a petitioner is seeking relief under

a new rule, the court must then decide if that rule falls under one of the two exceptions to Teague. 

Id. at 390. Even if Petitioner does not seek to apply a decision creating a new rule, “it is necessary

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 01cv1322

to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is

applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228

(1992), referencing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1990). 

In the Answer to the Third Amended Petition, Respondent asserts that this Court is barred

from deciding the merits of each of the Group Five claims due to the decision in Teague v. Lane. 

However, in the arguments on Claims 24 and 25, Respondent’s assertion of a Teague bar is limited

to a generalized contention that “Petitioner fails to show that the claim does not rest upon a new

rule barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 288.” [Answer to Third Amended Petition (“Ans.”)

at 83, 85.] In the cross-motions Respondent asserts that Claims 22 and 23 are barred under

Teague, and mounts detailed arguments in support of those contentions.

As to Claims 24 and 25 , the Ninth Circuit has articulated its view on the duties placed on

the state to properly raise and plead a claim made under Teague. That court has held:

If a state seriously wishes to press Teague upon us, at a minimum

Teague should be identified as an issue (indeed the first issue) on

appeal, the new rule of constitutional law that falls within its

proscription should be articulated, the reasons why such a rule would

not have been compelled by existing precedent should be explained

with particular reference to the appropriate universe of precedent, and

an argument should be made why the rule contended for is not within

one of Teague’s exceptions. 

Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781-782 (9th Cir. 2004).

Respondent has not met his burden of properly raising and pleading a Teague bar for

Claims 24 or 25. Thus, the court’s Teague analysis will only concern Claims 22 and 23, for which

Teague was properly pled in the cross-motions for summary adjudication.

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on August 28, 2000, and

denied rehearing on November 15, 2000. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on

May 14, 2001, at which time Petitioner’s conviction became final. 

1. Claim 22

In claim 22, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his prior

unadjudicated offenses as aggravating factors in the penalty phase proceedings. [Third Amended

Petition (“TAP”) at 61-65.] Respondent contends that the claim is “Teague-barred to the extent he

argues that a jury must find the existence of aggravating factors under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 01cv1322

584, 609 (2002).” [Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“Resp. MTD”) at 2.] Respondent also

argues Petitioner is barred by Teague from relying upon Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ___,

127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). [Resp. Reply at 4.]

The Supreme Court issued the decision in Ring, which announced that a jury, not a judge,

must find the existence of aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt on June

24, 2002, at which time Petitioner’s conviction had been final for over a year. Under Teague,

habeas relief may not be granted based on a rule that was announced after a petitioner’s conviction

became final. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 589. However, Petitioner asserts that “Respondent fails to

consider that the decision in Ring was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),” which was decided before Petitioner’s case was final, and which

held that any fact other than that of a prior conviction that increases the penalty beyond the

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pet. Opp.”) at 3.] The Supreme

Court has held that the application of established legal principles to a new set of facts does not

create a new rule of law. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-232 (1992). Thus, Petitioner

asserts that as Ring is merely an application of Apprendi to a new set of facts, it did not constitute

a new rule of law, and its application to his case cannot be barred under Teague. [Pet. Opp. at 3.]

However, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), the Supreme Court specifically

considered this question, and ruled that their decision in Ring v. Arizona did announce a new rule

of criminal procedure, and that the application of that rule was not retroactive to cases already

final on direct appeal. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358. The Court’s decision to classify Ring as a new

rule of criminal procedure precludes Petitioner’s argument that Ring was only an application or

extension of Apprendi to a new set of facts. 

Similarly, Petitioner is precluded from relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in

Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. 826 (2007), as that decision was rendered well after Petitioner’s

conviction was finalized. The Ninth Circuit has previously held the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), announced a new rule of criminal

procedure that did not apply retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its publication. 

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 01cv1322

See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Cunningham applied Blakely’s reasoning to the California determinate sentencing scheme. See

Cunningham, 127 S.Ct 826. Accordingly, the Cunningham decision announced a new rule of

criminal procedure, one which is not a “watershed” rule, and thus cannot be applied retroactively

to Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner is barred under Teague v. Lane from relying on the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Ring v. Arizona and Cunningham v. California. The Court will not consider

Ring or Cunningham in its evaluation of the merits of Claim 22.

2. Claim 23

In claim 23, Petitioner asserts a due process violation arising from the 13 year delay in

presenting evidence of the Maytorena stabbing at the penalty phase proceedings in his case. [TAP

at 65-68.] Respondent contends “there is no existing rule of criminal procedure foreclosing the

use of such penalty phase evidence based on delay.” [Resp. MTD at 5.] Respondent further

maintains that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971),

relied upon by Petitioner, does not apply to the “presentation of mere evidence” and thus Petitioner

is advocating a decision that would involve announcing a new rule of criminal procedure which

would be barred under Teague. [Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Resp. Opp.”) at 6-7.] Petitioner asserts that Respondent has “reduced Petitioner’s

claim to an excessive level of specificity in order to assert the Teague bar.” [Pet. Opp. at 5.] 

Petitioner maintains that “[i]t is well-established that a pre-accusation delay may give rise to a due

process claim.” [Id.] 

As the United States Supreme Court decided Marion well before the date when Petitioner’s

conviction became final and thus did not announce a new rule in issuing that decision, this Court’s

inquiry changes and “it is necessary to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a

new rule because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” 

Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (emphasis added).

In Marion, the Supreme Court considered the significance, for constitutional purposes, of a

lengthy pre-indictment delay, holding that proof of actual prejudice to the defense would make a

due process claim of this ilk determinable on the merits. Id., 404 U.S. at 326. Petitioner is

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 01cv1322

exhorting this Court to apply Marion to the prosecution’s introduction in evidence of an

unadjudicated crime during the penalty phase of his trial, claiming that “[t]he lengthy delay in the

prosecution of the assault on Maytorena caused Petitioner to suffer actual prejudice and violated

his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.” [Pet. MSA at 11.]

Petitioner argues “[d]uring the penalty phase, evidence is presented from both parties in an

adversarial setting. Each juror is instructed to disregard evidence of other crimes unless they find

defendant guilty of that crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.” If a juror is satisfied the prosecution

has met the requisite burden of proof, evidence of other crimes subjects the defendant to enhanced

punishment. Thus, by its very nature, the penalty phase involved a substantive trial on the prior

unadjudicated crime(s) and is not solely a sentencing hearing relating to the crime(s) charged.” 

[Pet. Opp. at 8.]

Notwithstanding Petitioner’s novel argument, the penalty phase of a criminal trial is not the

equivalent of a criminal prosecution for the purposes of this due process analysis. Evidence of

prior unadjudicated conduct is admitted during the penalty phase not to impose punishment for

that conduct, but to give the penalty phase jury “a true picture of the defendant’s history since

there is no temporal limitation on evidence in mitigation offered by the defendant.” People v.

Jennings, 46 Cal.3d 963, 982 (Cal. 1988). The jury is rendering a sentence based on the crimes

adjudicated during the guilt phase, and the unadjudicated crimes serve as factors in that sentencing

decision, not as separate crimes charged to which the jury will render a verdict and sentence.

The application of Marion to evidence presented in the penalty phase of a trial would

“impose[] a new obligation on the State or the Federal Government,” and does run adverse to the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Teague. Id. at 301. Granting Petitioner relief on Claim

23 would result in the creation of a new rule of criminal procedure which does not fall under either

of the exceptions to Teague, thus Claim 23 is barred. 

DISCUSSION OF MERITS OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

The Group Five claims involve allegations of trial court errors and constitutional

deficiencies in the California death penalty statute. Petitioner moves for summary adjudication on

the Group Five claims. Respondent moves for summary adjudication on all of the Group Five

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 01cv1322

claims. 

1. Claim 22

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed introduction of prior

unadjudicated offenses as factors in aggravation in the penalty phase of his trial in violation of his

right to a fair and impartial jury trial, due process, equal protection, and a reliable determination of

his death sentence. [TAP at 61-65.] 

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court considered this claim on direct appeal, concluding: 

Jury unanimity is not required to establish the truth of unadjudicated

crimes. (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1061.)

Ayala, 24 Cal. 4th at 287.

B. Discussion

As explained above, Petitioner cannot rely upon Ring v. Arizona or Cunningham v.

California with regard to his Claim 22 because of the limitations imposed by Teague. As a result,

in evaluating Petitioner’s argument, the Court will rely upon authority prior to Ring to determine

whether the California Supreme Court’s decision denying Petitioner’s claim was “contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”

The jury was instructed, with regard to its ability to consider evidence of Petitioner’s prior

unadjudicated offenses as aggravating factors, as follows, 

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that Hector Ayala

committed the following criminal acts: (A) robbery at the Picnic ‘N Chicken in

violation of Penal Code section 211 on March 28, 1975, (B) assault with a deadly

weapon on Robert Maytorena in violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(1), and

personally using a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of said crime on

August 25th, 1976, (C) murder of Jessie Apodaca in violation of Penal Code section

187, and personally using a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of said

crime in violation of Penal Code section 12022(b) on September 6th, 1982; which

involved the express or implied use of force or violence, or the threat of force or

violence. Before you may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating

circumstance in this case, you must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt

that Hector Ayala did, in fact, commit such criminal acts.

[106 RT 13375-13376 (emphasis added).] The jury was not, however, required to make special

findings with regard to the prior unadjudicated offenses, demonstrating they found Petitioner

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each of those offenses. As a result, Petitioner argues any one

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 01cv1322

juror may have considered evidence of one or both of the unadjudicated offenses as factors in

aggravation, justifying imposition of the death penalty, without any unanimity as to whether he

committed those prior offenses.

Petitioner argues the Sixth Amendment requires the jury find a special circumstance

allegation to be true. Petitioner argues the jury must also find one or more aggravating

circumstances (a) exist; (b) outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and (c) are so substantial in

comparison with the mitigation as to make death the appropriate penalty. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. 

Petitioner argues, based upon Ring, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) that the jury must unanimously make each of the § 190.3

findings. Petitioner argues the jury could not consider any of the evidence of the unadjudicated

offenses as factors in aggravation unless they first unanimously determined beyond a reasonable 

Because Petitioner cannot rely upon Ring, the question is whether the California Supreme

Court’s decision not to extend Apprendi to the facts and circumstances alleged by Petitioner in

Claim 22 was contrary to clearly established federal law. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held

that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. While the Supreme Court invalidated the New Jersey statute

at issue, it also expressly distinguished Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990), which

upheld the trial judge’s determination of the ultimate penalty of death, rather than life

imprisonment, based upon facts beyond those proven to the jury. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97. 

The issue resolved in Apprendi was whether the judge, as opposed to the jury, must find the facts

supporting imposition of the death penalty. 

The claim asserted by Petitioner, that the jury must unanimously find him guilty of the

prior unadjudicated offenses before it considers any of the evidence in its penalty phase

deliberations, was not clearly established prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring. In Ring,

the Supreme Court reversed Walton and held that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury, rather

than the judge, to find the existence of aggravating factors supporting imposition of the death

penalty. The Supreme Court in Schriro acknowledged the decision in Ring “altered the range of

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 01cv1322

permissible methods for determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable by death,

requiring that a jury rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment.” Schriro,

542 U.S. at 353.

Even under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. The

Supreme Court in Ring held that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury, not the trial judge, to

make findings of the existence of aggravating factors supporting imposition of the death penalty. 

That holding has nothing to with the much more narrow claim now raised by Petitioner – whether

the constitution requires the jury to unanimously find a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of any alleged prior unadjudicated offenses before such evidence can be considered by the

jury in its penalty phase deliberations. Neither Apprendi, Ring, Cunningham nor any of the other

authorities relied upon by Petitioner require such a procedure be implemented in a death penalty

jury proceeding under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Finally, Petitioner asserts the admission of prior unadjudicated offenses evidence in the

penalty phase of a capital trial violates equal protection because the same type of evidence is

excluded in sentencing in non-capital cases. [Petitioner’s Opposition, p. 7.] Petitioner, however,

cites no authority for the proposition such evidence cannot be admitted in a noncapital case. 

Petitioner points to Cal. Penal Code §§ 1158 and 1158a which require special findings before a

sentencing enhancement can be imposed. These statutes have nothing to do with the admissibility

of prior unadjudicated offenses or the manner in which those offenses may be considered by the

jury during the penalty phase of a trial. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on claim 22.

2. Claim 23

Petitioner alleges the 13-year delay in the prosecution of the prior unadjudicated prison

stabbing of Robert Maytorena was prejudicial and therefore Petitioner was unlawfully sentenced in

violation of his right to due process and to a reliable determination of his death sentence. [TAP at

65-68.]

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court considered this claim on direct appeal, concluding:

The delay in presenting evidence of unadjudicated crimes did not amount to a stale

prosecution (People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 300) or violate any statute of

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 01cv1322

limitations (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1061). 

Ayala, 24 Cal. 4th at 290. 

B. Discussion

During the penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution presented the jury with

evidence regarding two previously unadjudicated offenses Petitioner allegedly committed while

incarcerated – the 1976 assault on inmate Robert Maytorena and the 1982 homicide of inmate

Jesse Apodaca. [96 RT 11880, 11887; 97 RT 12004 - 100 RT 12628.] The assault on Maytorena

took place on August 25, 1976. [97 RT 12016-12017.] Just prior to the commencement of the

penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial, Petitioner moved to exclude evidence of the incident. [96 RT

11878-11881.] Petitioner argued there were items of evidence which could not be located

including a tape made of Maytorena at the Kern Medical Center the day after the incident, the

photo spread shown to Maytorena, and photos showing bruises on Robert Baltierra (a fellow

inmate who testified during the penalty phase that he participated in planning the attack on

Maytorena). Petitioner also argued Maytorena said there was an “old man” on a bunk near him at

the time of the stabbing, but no one was able to identify this prisoner. Petitioner argued the

destruction of the photo spread, in particular, made it impossible to cross-examine Maytorena on

his identification of Petitioner and noted there was a confusion at the time of the incident regarding

proper identification. The trial court denied Petitioner’s request to exclude evidence of the

Mayorena incident. [96 RT 11881.]

Petitioner argues the delay in prosecution of the Robert Maytorena stabbing violated his

right to due process. Petitioner argues the statute of limitations for assault at the time of the

Maytorena incident was three years, and the use of evidence regarding the stabbing more than 10

years after the statute of limitations expired violated the policy considerations underlying statutes

of limitations. Petitioner also argues the evidence was unreliable and should not have been

admitted. 

Petitioner relies primarily upon United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). In

Marion, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial does not

apply until a putative defendant has been “accused.” 404 U.S. at 321-22. The Supreme Court

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 01cv1322

noted prejudice may occur from a long delay between crime and arrest or charge but that the

applicable statute of limitations was the primary mechanism to guard against such prejudice. Id. at

322. The Court further noted the due process clause “would require dismissal of the indictment if

it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay . . . caused substantial prejudice to appellees’

rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the

accused.” Id. at 324. As applied to this case, Petitioner argues there was no legitimate

justification for the 13-year delay in prosecuting the Maytorena stabbing and that he suffered

actual prejudice from the delay because of his inability to cross-examine Maytorena on his

identification of his assailant. Petitioner cites numerous other cases for the proposition that

evidence introduced in a sentencing proceeding must bear “some minimal indicium of reliability

beyond mere allegation.” 

Nonetheless, Marion does not clearly establish a right to have evidence of unadjudicated

prior offenses excluded from the penalty phase of a trial even where the statute of limitations has

expired on such offense. In McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1366, as amended and

superseded in part, 116 F.3d 364, vacated on other grounds in part by 130 F.3d 833, 385 (9th Cir.

1997)(en banc), the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction finding the admission of previously

unadjudicated prior offenses did not in that case violate due process. In rejecting McDowell’s due

process argument, the Ninth Circuit noted “[a] sentencer may rely on criminal conduct not

resulting in a conviction if the evidence has ‘some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere

allegation.’” 107 F.3d at 1366 (citing United States v. Ibarra, 737 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The rule proposed by Petitioner, barring admission of unadjudicated prior offense evidence where

the statute of limitations on that underlying crime has expired, would be a new rule of criminal

procedure. The Court is barred by Teague from granting relief on the ground asserted.

The evidence of the Maytorena incident introduced during the penalty phase of Petitioner’s

trial bore at least the “minimal indicium of reliability” required to satisfy due process. Maytorena,

the victim of the assault, was present in court to testify along with Ronald Baltierra who

participated in the assault upon Maytorena. On cross-examination the defense was able to

question both Baltierra and Maytorena, challenging their recollection and motive for identifying

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 01cv1322

Petitioner as the assailant so many years later. Finally, as Respondent points out, the Maytorena

incident was not the only aggravating factor alleged in the penalty phase. In light of all the other

evidence presented during the penalty phase it cannot be said the introduction of the unadjudicated

prior offense regarding Maytorena had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 407 U.S. at 619, 631.

3. Claim 24

Petitioner alleges that “California’s capital scheme, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 190.1 et seq. (“the

1978 Statute”) fails to genuinely narrow the number of death-eligible offenses” in violation of his

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a reliable determination of his death

sentence. [TAP at 68-69.]

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court considered this claim on direct appeal, concluding:

And the combination of numerous available special circumstances and

the prosecution’s charging discretion does not render the death penalty

law invalid. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 478, 48

Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) 

Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 290.

B. Discussion

Since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the United States Supreme Court has

required states to limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be applied, and has

held that in order to survive constitutional scrutiny, a death penalty statute must “genuinely narrow

the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a

more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 (1983). The Ninth Circuit has held that the “special circumstances”

section of California’s death penalty statute, Cal. Penal Code § 190.2, satisfies these constitutional

requirements. Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270

F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A reasonable jurist could not debate, therefore, that the 1978

California statute, which narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants at both the guilt and

penalty phases, was constitutional.”) 

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 - 01cv1322

California’s eligibility factors, the special circumstances enumerated in Cal. Penal Code

section 190.2, are designed to satisfy the narrowing requirement of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238 (1972) (per curiam). Petitioner notes there are currently 32 special circumstances contained in

Cal. Penal Code section 190.2, largely due to the expansion of the felony murder special

circumstance, with each tenet (i.e., robbery-murder, burglary-murder) considered a separate

special circumstance, while at the time of his conviction, there were 26 special circumstances. 

[Pet. Opp. at 15.] Petitioner asserts these special circumstances “potentially sweep[] the great

majority of murderers into its grasp” and thus fails to perform the narrowing function required by

federal law. [Pet. MSA at 15.] Petitioner argues the actual narrowing effect of the California

statute can be assessed by determining the percentage of persons convicted of statutorily deatheligible murders who were actually sentenced to death, and attaches the declaration of Professor

Steven F. Schatz, signed on June 23, 1999, and originally presented to the California Supreme

Court during Petitioner’s state habeas appeal, to illustrate this argument. [Id. at 13.]

Professor Schatz conducted a study with Nina Rivkind on California cases involving

murder convictions to attempt to determine “(1) the degree to which the special circumstances

listed in California Penal Code § 190.2 limit death-eligibility for persons convicted of first degree

murder and (2) to determine what percentage of persons convicted of first degree murder who are

statutorily death-eligible are sentenced to death, i.e., California’s death sentence ratio.” [Ex. 1 at

1-2.] After analyzing three groups of murder conviction cases from the appellate and trial courts

between 1987-1992, Professor Schatz states that in 1985, 83% of first degree murders were

classifiable as special circumstance murders under the 1978 statute, while 9.6% of those convicted

of first degree murder were actually sentenced to death, thus the death sentence ratio was 11.6%.

[Id. at 18.] Petitioner argues that the decision in Furman was based, in part, on the Supreme

Court’s observation that “[a]lthough accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is thought that from

15% to 20% of those convicted of murder are sentenced to death in States where it is authorized.” 

Furman, 408 U.S. at 387 n.11 (dissenting opinion of Burger, C.J.). Professor Schatz concludes:

A statutory scheme in which 83% of first degree murderers are death-eligible does not

“genuinely narrow” (see Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S.Ct. 923), and, if only 11.6% of those statutorily death-eligible are

sentenced to death, the scheme is more arbitrary than those in existence at the time of

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 01cv1322

Furman, and is therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Id.]

Petitioner adds that in his case, pursuant to a prior California Supreme Court decision, the

robbery felony murder special circumstance required a finding of intent to kill. Carlos v. Superior

Court, 35 Cal.3d 131 (1983), overruled by People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.3d 1104 (1987). Under this

interpretation of the 1978 statute, 77.5% of convicted first degree murderers in 1985 would have

been death eligible, and the resultant death sentence ratio would have been 12.4%. [Pet. at 71.] 

Petitioner argues that this figure is still below the 15-20% ratio the Supreme Court had estimated

when deciding Furman, and thus in violation of the Constitution. [Id.]

Respondent notes the Ninth Circuit has recently rejected a overbreadth challenge to a

specific special circumstance, lying in wait. [Resp. Opp. at 11.]; Morales v. Woodford, 336 F.3d

1136, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended 388 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2004). Respondent goes on to

cite Morales in support of the assertion that Petitioner fails to show that California’s death penalty

statute was unconstitutional in its application to his case, and thus may not challenge the statute’s

validity. [Resp. MTD at 13.] Respondent concludes that Petitioner’s claim fails as “one to whom

application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the grounds that

impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its

application might be unconstitutional.” Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 1999),

quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has previously allowed claims identical to the one Petitioner

raises in the instant case, stating that “a challenge under Furman is a challenge to the capital

sentencing regime as a whole, not its application to a particular defendant.” United States v.

Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1444 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Petitioner is not foreclosed from a

resolution of claim 24 on the merits despite the his failure to prove the unconstitutional application

of the death penalty statute to his particular case.

In 1976, the Supreme Court reviewed numerous state death penalty statutes enacted in the

wake of Furman, and upheld three state death penalty statutes, finding that they sufficiently

narrowed the class of defenders eligible for the death penalty through either aggravating factors or

by the definition of capital offenses, properly considered mitigation, and guided the discretion of

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 - 01cv1322

the sentencing authority. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242

(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Supreme Court, at the same time, invalidated

two state statutes where defined capital offenses carried a mandatory imposition of death. 

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 

In California, imposing the death penalty on a criminal defendant requires a determination

of death eligibility and then an additional death qualification judgment performed by the

factfinder. First, for a defendant to be death-eligible, he or she must be convicted of a crime,

homicide, for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. Tuilaepa v. California, 512

U.S. 967, 972 (1994). Then, the jury must not only convict the defendant of the charged murder,

but also must additionally find at least one of the special circumstances enumerated in California

Penal Code § 190.2 to be true. Id. If the jury finds at least one charged special circumstance true,

the trial proceeds to a penalty phase where the jury must take a separate list of sentencing factors

into consideration under California Penal Code § 190.3, making an individualized determination of

punishment based on considerations which include the circumstances of the crime as well as

defendant’s history and character. Id. at 972-73. Thus, the 1978 California statute is comparable

in structure, scope, and effect to those upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme

Court. 

Petitioner also argues that the intent of the 1978 death penalty statute, enacted by initiative,

was to expand the 1977 statute in order to make more murders eligible for the death penalty. 

Petitioner quotes excerpts from a voter’s pamphlet distributed in support of this measure, which

assert, “[a]nd, if you were to be killed on your way home tonight simply because the murderer was

high on dope and wanted a thrill, the criminal would not receive the death penalty. Why? 

Because the legislature’s weak death penalty law does not apply to every murder. Proposition 7

would.” [Pet. MSA at 14.]

Despite this spirited argument, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme

Court was objectively unreasonable in rejecting this claim on appeal. The United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Furman was not based solely on any statistical determination, and Petitioner’s

argument is centered on his comparison of pre- and post-Furman death penalty ratios. The

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 - 01cv1322

plurality opinion placed an emphasis on the failure of then- existing death penalty statutes to

provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many

cases in which it is not.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).

The United States Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of two state

statutes on the grounds that both statutes satisfy the requirements set forth in Furman. See Gregg,

428 U.S. at 198; Profitt, 428 U.S. at 253. Further, the Court notes that both the Florida and

Georgia statutes are substantially similar in scope and effect to that of California. In addition, the

Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the 1978 California statute. See Karis,

283 F.3d at 1141; Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 924. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to present this

Court with persuasive grounds for reversing the judgment of the state court.

In addition to his central contention, Petitioner includes an argument that the “felony

murder” special circumstance is particularly broad and is applicable to all first degree murders,

and thus his special circumstance finding of robbery-murder is constitutionally “problematic.” 

[Pet. Opp. at 13.] However, the claim he raised in the petition before the Court is to the 1978

statute as a whole, and not to the alleged infirmity of any particular special circumstance. Further,

in his case, there was also a finding of the special circumstance of multiple murder, and he does

not challenge the validity of that special circumstance finding. A true finding on one special

circumstance is sufficient to sustain death eligibility. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2; Tuilaepa, 512

U.S. at 972.

The 1978 death penalty statute, Cal. Penal Code § 190.2, performs a genuine narrowing

function and thus fulfills the constitutional requirement imposed by Furman to distinguish between

those murderers who are and are not eligible for the death penalty. Petitioner fails to establish that

California’s 1978 death penalty statute violates the federal Constitution. This Court cannot say the

state court’s denial of Claim 24 was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, or that it was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner does not merit relief on this claim.

4. Claim 25

Petitioner alleges “California’s 1978 death penalty statute gives prosecutors unbounded

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 - 01cv1322

discretion to seek the death penalty” in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to due process and a reliable determination of his death sentence. [TAP at 71.]

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court considered this claim alongside Claim 24 on direct appeal,

concluding:

The argument that each California county improperly applies its own

standards to death penalty prosecutions is without merit. (People v.

Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 702 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213];

see also People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 479.) And the

combination of numerous available special circumstances and the

prosecution’s charging discretion does not render the death penalty law

invalid. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 478, 48

Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) 

Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 290.

B. Discussion

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prosecutorial discretion to select

among eligible cases those in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of

itself offend principles of equal protection, due process, or constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254

(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-200 (1976). This argument has also been rejected by

the Ninth Circuit. Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987). The California

Supreme Court has applied the federal precedent to numerous capital cases in this state. See

People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th 543, 600 (Cal. 1999); People v. Keenan, 46 Cal.3d 478, 567 (Cal.

1988); People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 153, 278 (Cal. 1997).

Petitioner alleges that since the California death penalty statute fails to properly narrow the

number of death eligible offenses, the narrowing “function is essentially performed by the

prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in a particular case.” [Pet. MSA at 17.] In Claim

24, discussed above, the Court rejected Petitioner’s claim that the California death penalty statute

fails to perform the constitutionally required narrowing function, thus negating the predicate on

which Petitioner’s claim is based.

The Court finds no case in which the United States Supreme Court has held

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 - 01cv1322

unconstitutional a selection process where a prosecutor make the decision to seek the death

penalty within the bounds of state law. The Supreme Court has opined that “[a]bsent facts to the

contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by

factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death

penalty if it convicts.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).

Petitioner makes no specific allegations on how the prosecutor’s decision to charge a

capital crime was arbitrary and capricious in the instant case, and the record supports the

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. Without “exceptionally clear proof,” this Court

cannot infer that the prosecutor abused their discretion in pursuing the death penalty in Petitioner’s

case. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987). Petitioner has offered no such proof.

This Court cannot say the state court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner does not merit

relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on

Petitioner’s Group 5 Claims (Claims 22-25) [Doc. Nos 210 and 211] is GRANTED. Petitioner’s

cross-motion for summary judgment on those claims [Doc. No. 213] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 9, 2007

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Case 3:01-cv-01322-IEG-PCL Document 224 Filed 07/09/07 Page 21 of 21