Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04042/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Many inmates apparently believe that they will receive an immediate payout from a fund

established in Hart v. Hill, No. CV 77-0479-PHX-EHC (MS) (D. Ariz.). No such fund exists. The

inmates in Hart asked for injunctive relief and not monetary damages. The Court at this time

expresses no opinion on whether Plaintiff’s lawsuit may result in an award of damages. 

TERMPSREF

WO BL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dusko Djukic, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-4042-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Dusko Djukic, currently confined in the Maricopa County Lower Buckeye

Jail in Phoenix, Arizona, has filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 This

action is one of more than one thousand lawsuits filed in this district since September 2004

alleging that the overcrowded conditions in the Maricopa County jail system have resulted

in a variety of constitutional violations. The Court will order that the action be served upon

Defendant Arpaio. 

A. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Filing Fee.

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of

$250.00 for this action. No initial partial filing fee will be assessed by this Order. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will direct the appropriate agency to collect

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monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust

account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court

each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff should take notice that if he is released before the filing fee is paid in full, he

must pay the remaining unpaid amount of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of his

release. If Plaintiff fails to pay the remainder of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of

his release, the action will be dismissed, unless Plaintiff shows good cause, in writing, why

he is unable to pay the remainder of the filing fee.

B. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

C. Complaint.

Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and (2) Joseph

M. Arpaio. Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by (1) overcrowding

resulting in insufficient and unsanitary sleeping areas, being forced to eat on the floor, back

pains, constant runny nose, stress, anxiety, digestive problems, insomnia, diarrhea, and

headaches, (2) an inadequate, non-nutritious, and tainted diet due to food handlers not being

screened or certified, and the serving of contaminated food, resulting in hunger, digestive

problems, and other health problems, (3) lack of contact visits, (4) improper temperatures in

the jail resulting in breathing problems, stress, anxiety, fear of other inmates, infections, and

heat rashes, (5) denial of telephone privileges due to non-service or time restrictions,

(6) unsanitary conditions due to toilets backing up, resulting in anxiety, stress, digestive

problems, insomnia, staph infection, rashes, and foot fungi, and (7) deliberate indifference

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to medical needs because (a) when he asked to lie down prior to a physical, the nurse refused,

acted unprofessional, and threatened him, and (b) the detention officers took his prescriptions

from him during a shake-down. Plaintiff seeks monetary and other relief.

D. Failure to State a Claim.

1. Hart v. Hill

Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff refers to Hart v. Hill, No. CIV 77-0479-PHXEHC (D. Ariz.), claiming that the conditions of his confinement violated an Amended

Judgment in that action. Jurisdiction to enforce the judgment is retained by the court which

entered it. Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 2004). A civil rights action

is not the proper means by which to enforce the decree. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980,

986 (11th Cir. 2003); Klein v. Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1996); DeGidio v. Pung,

920 F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir.1990); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th Cir.

1986). Standing alone, remedial orders cannot serve as a substantive basis for a § 1983 claim

for damages because such orders do not create “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws.” Green, 788 F.3d at 1123-24. Remedial decrees are the means

by which unconstitutional conditions are corrected but they do not create or enlarge

constitutional rights. Id. at 1123. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to enforce Hart v. Hill, his

claim is not properly brought in this action. 

2. Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper Defendant. In Arizona, the

responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff.

See A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(5); A.R.S. § 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply an administrative

creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties, and not a

“person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office will be dismissed from this action as an improper Defendant. 

3. Count III - Contact Visits

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional right to contact visits was violated.

Inmates do not have a right to “unfettered visitation.” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v.

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Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Denial of contact visitation does not violate an

inmate’s constitutional rights. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1113 (9th Cir. 1986).

Because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a contact visit, this claim will be

dismissed without prejudice.

4. Count V - Telephone Privileges

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his constitutional right to telephone

privileges due to non-service and time restrictions. “Pretrial detainees have a substantive due

process right against restrictions that amount to punishment. This right is violated if

restrictions are ‘imposed for the purpose of punishment.’ There is no constitutional

infringement, however, if restrictions are ‘but an incident of some other legitimate

government purpose.’ In such a circumstance, governmental restrictions are permissible.”

Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). Based on Plaintiff’s allegations,

the telephone restrictions are not a punishment, but a response to the high number of inmates

or a lack of service. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that his constitutional

rights were violated and this Count will be dismissed without prejudice.

5. Count VII - Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges that his medical needs were disregarded when (1) he

asked to lie down prior to a physical, the nurse refused, acted unprofessional, and threatened

him, and (2) the detention officers took his prescriptions from him during a shake-down. 

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

“To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious . .

. health needs, the prisoner must show that ‘the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate health.’” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)). “In order to know of the excessive

risk, it is not enough that the person merely ‘be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, [ ] he must also draw that

inference.’ If a person should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the person has

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not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

To state a valid constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered specific

injury as a result of the specific conduct of a defendant, and show an affirmative link between

the injury and the conduct of the defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). For a person to be liable in his official capacity, Plaintiff must allege that he acted

as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). A supervisor, in his individual capacity, “is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Although Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his medical needs were disregarded, he

fails to sufficiently allege that Defendant Arpaio was the individual responsible for this

alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not allege that the violation was the result of

a policy, practice, or custom enacted or enforced by Defendant Arpaio. Plaintiff further fails

to sufficiently allege that Defendant Arpaio directly violated his constitutional rights or was

even aware that his rights were being violated. Thus, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that

Defendant Arpaio was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and this Count will be

dismissed without prejudice.

E. Claims For Which An Answer Will be Required.

At this early stage, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his constitutional rights were

violated by (1) overcrowding, (2) an inadequate, non-nutritious, and tainted diet,

(3) improper temperatures in the jail, and (4) unsanitary conditions. Defendant Arpaio will

be ordered to answer these Counts.

F. Warning of Possible Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41.

Plaintiff should take notice that if he fails to timely comply with every provision of

this Order, or any order entered in this matter, this action will be dismissed pursuant to Rule

41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-

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61 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply with any order of

the Court).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. # 1) is granted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

(2) Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action.

Plaintiff is assessed no initial partial filing fee. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this Court’s Order to the appropriate government agency filed concurrently

herewith.

(3) Counts III, V, VII Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office are dismissed

without prejudice.

(4) Defendant Arpaio is ordered to answer Counts I, II, IV, and VI.

(5) The Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including the Complaint

(Doc. #1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendant Arpaio.

(6) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court within

20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or complete

service of the Summons and Complaint on the Defendant within 120 days of the filing of the

complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be

dismissed as to each Defendant not served pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(8) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal shall notify Defendant of the commencement of this

action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant shall include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers that were

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returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of summons

is not returned by a Defendant within thirty days from the date the request for waiver was

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

(b) Within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for the Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of

the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon the

Defendant. The costs of service shall be enumerated on the return of service form

(USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying

additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new

process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be

taxed against the personally served defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

shall return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendant shall answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, or other motion or

paper that does not identify the Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original document and copy, to

be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of

the pleading or document was mailed to Defendant or counsel. Any paper received by a

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District Court Judge or Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk of Court

may be disregarded by the Court.

(14) At all times during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff shall immediately advise

the Court and the United States Marshal of any change of address and its effective date.

Such notice shall be captioned “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” The notice shall

contain only information pertaining to the change of address and its effective date. Plaintiff

shall serve a copy of the notice on all opposing parties. The notice shall not include any

motions for any other relief. Failure to file a Notice of Change of Address may result in the

dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. 

(15) A clear, legible copy of every pleading or other document filed shall accompany

each original pleading or other document filed with the Clerk for use by the District Judge

or Magistrate Judge to whom the case is assigned. Failure to comply with this requirement

may result in the pleading or document being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

(16) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to Local

Rules of Civil Procedure 72.1 and 72.2 for further proceedings.

DATED this 12th day of January, 2006.

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