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Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RUTH ANN BRYSON, individually and 

as administratrix of the estate 

of Patty Husband; GARY CHAMBERS, 

individually and as administrator 

of the estate of Patty Chambers 

and as guardian and next friend 

of Tricia Chambers; JANET ESSER, 

individually and as administratrix 

of the estate of Richard Esser 

and as guardian and next friend 

of Richard Esser, III and Shannon 

Esser; LISA HAMILTON, individually 

and as representative of the 

estate of Patricia Gabbard; KIM 

BAKER, individually and as 

representative of the estate of 

Patricia Gabbard; JUDITH MOREY, 

individually and as administratrix 

of the estate of Kenneth Morey; 

ROBERT MOREY, individually; CARLA 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

JUN 1 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

PHILLIPS, individually and as 

executrix of the estate of Leroy 

o. Phillips and as guardian and 

next friend for Craig Arthur 

Phillips and Christopher Lee 

Phillips; DOROTHY PYLE, 

individually and as executrix and 

personal representative of the 

estate of Jerry Pyle; LYNDA 

ROCKNE, individually and as 

administratrix of the estate of 

Paul Rockne and as guardian and 

next friend of Damien Rockne; GENE 

BRAY; LOIS BRAY; RON BLACKWELL; 

WILLIAM NIMMO; TRACY SANCHEZ; 

STEVEN VICK; and JUDY WALKER, 

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No. 89-6100 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. .. CITY OF EDMOND, a municipal 

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 1 
corporation; CLENT D-EDEK, ) 

individually and in his official ) .. capacity as Chief of Police. of. the ) 

City of Edmond; JOHN DOE, ) 

individually; WILLIAM SAVAGE, ) 

individually; and DALE FOWLKES, ) 

individually, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-88-678-T) 

Steven M. Angel, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Robert J. Turner and Richard J. Goralewicz, of Turner, Turner & 

Braun (Kenneth W. Turner with them on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees City of Edmond and Clent Dedek; 

Wm. Lee Borden, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (Robert E. 

Mydans, United States Attorney, and John E. Green, First Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees Dale Fowlkes and William Savage. 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN*, District Judge. 

CHRISTENSEN, District Judge. 

In this civil rights action, the plaintiffs-appellants have 

appealed from orders of the district court granting the 

defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 

claims on which relief can be granted and dismissing the action. 

•. 

* Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior United States District . Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 2 
The plaintiffs or their decedents were injured or killed on 

August 20,. 1986, when shot by".,..q,...de.ranged. fellow post off ice employee, Henry Patrick Sherrill, inside the Edmond, Oklahoma, post 

office. The Edmond city police arrived at the scene within 

minutes of the outset of the shooting but classified the massacre 

as a hostage situation and did not attempt to enter the building 

for more than an hour and a half. 

I. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Plaintiffs brought the action against the city of Edmond, its 

police chief Clent Dedek, the postmaster Dale Fowlkes, and two 

officers of the Oklahoma Air National Guard, William Savage and an 

otherwise unidentified and unserved John Doe from whom Sherrill 

allegedly obtained his weapons. The plaintiffs alleged they were 

deprived of substantive due process and associational rights in 

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The claim 

against the city, the police chief and the guardsmen was 

designated as a 42 u.s.c. § 1983 action and the claim against the 

postmaster a Bivens action. 1 In addition, a pendent wrongful 

death claim was asserted, which was dismissed by the district 

court without prejudice when the federal claims failed. 

The district court held that plaintiffs failed to state a 

section 1983 claim because no liberty interest 2 was implicated and 

1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The plaintiffs argue that their 

claim against the guardsmen was brought under Bivens as well as 

§ 1983. 

2 The plaintiffs also alleged they were deprived of property 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 3 
the plaintiffs did not allege the requisite intent or-level of 

conduct for a constitutional violation .... The plaintiffs were 

afforded opportunity to amend but elected not to do so, and all 

their claims were dismissed. 

On appeal, the plaintiffs insist they did state cognizable 

section 1983 and Bivens claims. Specifically they argue that a 

substantive due process claim was stated against the city and its 

police officers and a claim for deprivation of associational 

rights was stated against the postmaster and the guardsmen. 

The factual allegations concerning the conduct of the 

defendants, eliminating redundancies, are set out in the margin. 3 

interests, but they did not pursue that contention in the district 

court or on appeal. 

3 As to the city and police chief Dedek:· instructing officers 

not to extend help to the persons within the post office; 

instructing them not to enter the post office, although they were 

notified of safe access through the postal inspector's entrance 

and that Sherrill was shooting individuals; failing to instruct 

officers to extend assistance to the individuals inside; 

maintaining a S.W.A.T. team and police department which were 

inadequately trained and unable to extend assistance to 

individuals in the post office; failing to train its employees on 

how to handle such an emergency situation; failing to implement 

any procedures on how to handle such a situation; classifying this 

as a hostage situation and, as a result, failing to attempt any 

rescue of those inside for over an hour and a half during which 

time the individuals inside were continuing to suffer extreme pain 

and suffering. R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 6-7. 

As to national guardsman Savage: failing to conduct minimal 

psychiatric examination of individuals having access to deadly 

weapons and ammunition and failing to assure the mental stability 

of those to whom weapons were assigned. Id. at 12-13. (There 

were other charges directed particularly against the defendant Doe 

which are immaterial for the purposes of this appeal.) 

As to postmaster Fowlkes: with notice that the post office di~ 

not meet minimum safety requirements, failing to correct the · probiem; knowing of Sherrill's instability, failing to fulfill his 

duty by requiring evaluation and medical assistance and 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 4 
The allegations of the complaint concerning the state of mind 

or intent of all- the defendants, while engaging in.such conduct 

. employed essentially these terms: that they "acted intentionally, 

wilfully and with wanton disregard for plaintiffs' rights and/or 

th rough g r o s s neg 1 i gen c e . 11 See R . Vo 1 . I , Tab 1 , ,1 2 5 a t 6 ; ,1 31 

at 12; fl 31 at 13; fl 36 at 19. Concerning the conduct of the 

guardsmen and the postmaster particularly, the complaint added 

that by "their acts and conduct defendants intentionally, or with 

conscious disregard for plaintiffs' rights, deprived plaintiffs 

and those whom they represent [of] associational rights." Id. 

fl 33 at 14; fl 36 at 19. 

The Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, dealt 

with the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint in two 

orders. In the first, concerning the situations of the city and 

police chief Dedek {the "city defendants"), he characterized 

plaintiffs' claims as essentially premised upon an alleged failure 

to successfully rescue the victims of a third party. He 

distinguished cases of shooting by police relied _upon by 

plaintiffs such as Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Texas, 767 F.2d 

161 {5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 {1987), and 

examinations; authorizing Sherrill to be placed under increased 

pressure in hopes of forcing him to resign; and "by these acts and 

conduct" intentionally, wilfully and with wanton disregard for 

plaintiffs' rights and/or through gross negligence, violating 

plaintiffs' rights, individually and as to those they represent, 

directly and proximately causing plaintiffs' loss of association 

and companionship. "Specifically, defendant knew, or should have 

known, that by the actions set forth above, death was likely to 

occur, and the plaintiffs, and those they represent, would be 

denied the ~ompanionship and association of the.decedent." Id. at 

19-20. 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 5 
Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Ga. 1987), -and observed 

that Taylor v. Walters, 655 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Mich .. 1987), 

Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 

denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), and Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 

796 F,2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986), denying recoveries, were more 

analogous. And he determinatively applied against the city 

defendants a negligence analysis, relying upon Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and citing Watson v. City of Kansas 

City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988), Ellsworth v. City of 

Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 

(1986), and Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 

1984)~ 4 

In the second order, the district court dismissed the Bivens 

claim against postmaster Fowlkes and the section 1983 claim 

4 The district court reasoned: 

Plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the Supreme 

Court's decision in Daniels that "injuries inflicted by 

governmental negligence are not addressed by the United 

States Constitution," by alleging that the city acted 

"intentionally, wilfully, and with wanton disregard for 

plaintiffs' rights, and/or through gross negligence." 

However, the specific conduct which the plaintiffs cite 

as the premise for the defendants' liability consists of 

their alleged negligent actions or their failure 

(through their employees) to attempt or to effectuate a 

rescue effort from a dangerous situa.tion which they 

neither created nor exacerbated. If defendants here had 

failed to act they could not have been held liable for a 

constitutional violation. Thus, their alleged negligent 

or ineffective efforts under these circumstances cannot 

form the basis for a§ 1983 claim, as a matter of law 

under the foregoing authorities. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 36 at 6-7. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 6 
against the guardsman Savage, relying upon Trujillo v. Board of 

County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d ll86 (10th Cir. 1985). 5 

Because of the dismissal of the federal law claims and the 

election of plaintiffs not to amend within the time allowed, the 

court concluded that it should not exercise pendent jurisdiction 

over the state law claims, and they were dismissed without 

prejudice. Final judgment was entered February 16, 1989, and 

plaintiffs timely appealed. 

5 

II. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

The issues of this appeal as framed in plaintiffs' brief are: 

The district court wrote: 

The plaintiffs' complaint fails to plead an intent on 

the part of defendant Fowlkes to deprive them of their 

protected relationships with their decedents. 

Plaintiffs do allege that defendant Fowlkes 

"intentionally, or with conscious disregard for 

Plaintiff's rights deprived Plaintiffs .... of the 

associational rights." However, this allegation is 

insufficient under Trujillo. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 37 at 2. 

The district court noted that the claim in Trujillo was 

asserted under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, rather than Bivens, but that this 

distinction is immaterial, citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 

21 n.6 (1980). Finally, the district court stated: 

Defendant William Savage also has filed a motion to 

dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a more 

definite statement. The plaintiffs have asserted a 

§ 1983 claim against defendant Savage. For the reasons 

previously stated by the court in support of his 

decision to grant the motion to dismiss filed by 

defendant Fowlkes, the court concludes that the 

plaintiffs have failed to state a§ 1983 claim against 

defendant Savage. 

Id. at 2-3. 

- 7 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 7 
1. [Have plaintiffs] stated a cause of action 

against the City of Edmond, and its police officers, 

unde.r the 14th Amendment to the. Cons ti tut ion of the 

United States arising from their actions which 

contributed to the death and injury of plaintiffs during 

the 1986 Edmond Post Office massacre? 

2. [Have plaintiffs] stated a cause of action 

against various federal officers under the 5th Amendment 

to the Constitution of the United States arising from 

their actions which contributed to the death and injury 

of plaintiffs during the 1986 Edmond Post Office 

massacre? 

Within these broad issues, particular questions are whether 

the charged conduct of the defendants was actionable as a 

violation of any constitutional duty owed to plaintiffs or their 

decedents either by reason of its intrinsic nature or the state of 

mind motivating it; for the purpose of this determination, the 

extent, if any, which conclusory allegations of the complaint 

characterizing the defendants·' state of mind may prevail over the 

situation clearly appearing from specific allegations; and whether 

the situation at the post office when the shooting occurred gave 

rise at all to, or rendered causally relevant, the constitutional 

duties upon which plaintiffs premise their case. 

III. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Reviewing de novo the sufficiency of the complaint, we must 

accept its well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them in 

the light most favorable to the pleader. Zinerrnon v. Burch, 110 

S.Ct. 975, 979 (1990); National Commodity & Barter Ass'n. v. 

Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989). Dismissal was proper 

only if it appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can 

prove within such allegations no set of facts in support of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 8 
claim which would entitle him to relief. Shaw v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 

96 5, 968 ( 1.0 th Cir p 1987) • While. ,reasonable .inferences drawable 

therefrom must be accepted, mere conclusions characterizing 

pleaded facts are not, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 

Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54, 57 (1938), nor are "unwarranted 

inferences drawn from the facts or footless conclusions of law 

predicated upon them." Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 57 (10th 

Cir. 1957). 

Viewing the complaint accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in granting defendants' motions and in 

dismissing the action. 

IV. 

DISCUSSION 

A. 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), in a prison 

situation, firmly establishes the rule with its constitutional and 

decisional rationale that negligent conduct does not implicate the 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to afford section 

1983 relief. 

As has been seen, the district court employed a negligence 

analysis in light of Daniels to support the dismissal of 

plaintiffs' action against the city defendants, and we do not 

disagree with the result. The premises for this analysis 

sufficiently appear from Judge Thompson's orders, except for the 

language in the complaint purporting to charge, beyond mere 

negligence, gross negligence and wanton and intentional conduct on 

- 9 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 9 
the part of the defendants. As to this problem, a further 

.. analysis . seems called for. 

B. 

The formulation in a pleading of ~intentionally, wilfully, 

and with wanton disregard for plaintiffs' rights, and/or through 

gross negligence," might be thought to say effectively ·no more 

than that the acts were performed with gross negligence, were it 

not for the rules of civil procedure concerning alternative 

pleadings. 6 It might be logical to consider "gross negligence" as 

conceptually nearer "negligence" than "wantonness" or "intentional 

conduct" on the Daniels spectrum7 if nice distinctions were to be 

drawn on this point. But it is now unnecessary for us to resolve 

this still open question. 8 Even if gross negligence were deemed 

6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) provides that "[w]hen two or more 

statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 

independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 

insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 

alternative statements." 

7 

[Despite possibly fine distinctions otherwise] the 

difference between one end of the spectrum--negligence--

and the other--intent--is abundantly clear. 

474 U.S. at 335. 

8 Various related questions have been discussed by the Supreme 

Court or this court, focusing on the Fourth, Eighth or Fourteenth 

Amendments, or a combination, in relation to essential states of 

mind, but all agree that the Supreme Court has left open whether 

gross negligence should be considered a species of negligence in 

application of Daniels. ~, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 109 s.ct. 1197, 1204 n.8 (1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago County 

Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1002 (1989); 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317 (1986); Berry v. City of 

Muskogee, Okl., F.2d , Nos. 86-1934 & 86-2003, slip op. 

at 11-12 n.9 (10th Cir., Ap'r"-:-10, 1990); Archuleta v. Mcshan, 89-'7 

F.2d 495, 499 n.8 (10th Cir. 1990); Harris ex rel. Harris v. 

Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988). Two dissenting 

opinions present opposite views of what the answer should be. See 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 10 
to have the same consequences under the doctrine of Da-niels as 

ordinary .negligence, there would remain .in the.complaint other 

characterizations far advanced on the spectrum in the direction of 

liability. 

It appears that counsel for plaintiffs designed the 

allegations in question to fully bridge a possible gap between the 

pleaded case and any required degree of culpability on the part of 

the defendants to establish a federal claim--in unwitting 

fulfillment of predictions of artful pleading in Daniels. 9 But 

the petitioner's suggestion noted there that he might have alleged 

the pillow in question was left on the stairs with the intention 

City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 107 s.ct. 1114, 

1116 (1987) (Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, 

Justice White and Justice Powell, dissenting); Berry, supra at 6 

(Judge McKay dissenting). See also Beck v. Calvillo, 67l F. Supp. 

1555, 1560 (D. Kan. 1987). - --

9 The court wrote in Daniels: 

Petitioner also suggests that artful litigants, 

undeterred by a requirement that they plead more than 

mere negligence, will often be able to allege sufficient 

facts to support a claim of intentional deprivation. In 

the instant case, for example, petitioner notes that he 

could have alleged that the pillow was left on the 

stairs with the intention of harming him. This 

invitation to ''artful" pleading, petitioner contends, 

would engender sticky (and needless) disputes over what 

is fairly pleaded. What's more, requiring complainants 

to allege something more than negligence would raise 

serious questions about what "more" than negligence--

intent, recklessness, or "gross negligence"--is 

required, and indeed about what these elusive terms 

mean •... But even if accurate, petitioner's 

observations do not carry the day. In the first place, 

many branches of the law abound in nice distinctions 

that may be troublesome but have been thought 

nonetheless necessary. 

474 U.S. at 334. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 11 
of harming him [as farfetched as that may have been] i-s unmatched 

in either specificity or ef feet by the c.onclusions of the 

complaint here which cannot be construed to charge that defendants 

had intent or wilfulness to kill or otherwise harm plaintiffs or 

their decedents, nor a state of mind of wanton, reckless, or 

grossly negligent indifference whether or not they were killed or 

wounded. 

Perhaps the conclusory, almost euphemistic, phrasing in the 

complaint can be better understood from the explanation in 

appellants' brief at 3 that the reason they did not amend pursuant 

to leave granted was because in view of Rule 1110 they "could 

plead no additional facts." Surely, if the allegations of 

defendants' intent, beyond mere negligence, were other than goodfaith argument of a legal nature as authorized by the rule, at 

least some supporting facts would appear. 

Be this as it may, the conclusory language referred to is so 

at variance with the specifically pleaded facts as to constitute 

no more than unwarranted inferences drawn from those facts or 

footless conclusion of law predicated upon them. Ryan, 245 F.2d 

at 57. The necessity of drawing distinctions as recognized in 

Daniels applies with compelling force here. 

10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in part: 

The signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading] 

constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer 

has read the pleading ... ; that to the best of the 

signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 

warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 

the ext~nsion, modification, or reversal of existing 

law. 

- 12 -

Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 12 
The city defendants played no part in creating the danger to 

the victims, nor .did they do anything to_render them more 

vulnerable to those dangers. It is not alleged in the complaint, 

although appellants' counsel orally argued, that other people were 

prevented from entering the building who could have aided the 

victims of the massacre. 11 It is obvious, however, that believing 

there was a hostage situation inside, had the police permitted 

others to rush into the midst of the audible gunfire, there might 

have been some basis for charging recklessness or indifference 

towards the public and possibly toward those inside. Cf. Whitley 

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 

We conclude, as did the district court, that if any 

culpability were factually alleged it would have been no more than 

ordinary negligence. 

c. 

There is an additional reason to sustain the judgment of the 

district court. 

One of the assumptions underlying plaintiffs' case has been 

that the situation at the Edmond Post Office was analogous to a 

prison setting, or involved other special circumstances giving 

rise to a duty of affirmative action on the part of the city 

defendants. See~' Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and Harris ex rel. Harris 

v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1988) (prison situations); 

11 The complaint states that a number of the victims "were 

injured after the time in which the police could have, and should 

have, acted in order to protect those inside" and that they "were 

allowed to die without being extended adequate medical care for 

over an hour and a half." R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 7. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 13 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (mental patients 

.. involun.tar ily ... commi t ted to. a state. hospital); .. Reve.re v .. Mass. Gen. 

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (suspects in police custody). 

After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims 

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 

(1989), was decided, further interpreting the requirements of 

substantive due process and setting limits on special 

circumstances outside the prison setting giving rise to an 

affirmative duty to act. 

In DeShaney, a young boy suffered permanent brain damage 

after repeated beatings by his father. The boy's mother brought a 

civil rights action against social workers and others who had 

received complaints of abuse, alleging their failure to remove him 

from his father's custody was a deprivation of his liberty in 

violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Supreme Court held that although the defendants may have 

breached duties under state tort law, the state had no 

constitutional duty to protect the boy from his father, 

explaining, 

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause 

itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, 

and property of its citizens against invasion by private 

actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the 

State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain 

minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the 

State ftself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or 

property without "due process of law," but its language 

cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative 

obligation on the State to ensure that those interests 

do not come to harm through other means .... Its 

purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to 

ensure that the State protected them from each other. 

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(A] State's failure to protect an individual against 

private violence simply does not constitute a violation 

of the Due Process.Clause. 

109 s.ct. at 1003-04. 

The Court said affirmative duties of care and protection 

arise under the Constitution only "with respect to particular 

individuals" and "in certain limited circumstances." Id. at 1004-

05. These affirmative duties arise "not from the State's 

knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions 

of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has 

imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." Id. at 1006. 

DeShaney involved private violence by a private actor; the 

Court emphasized that the victim was in the custody and control of 

his own father. While the state may have been aware of the 

dangers the DeShaney child faced, "it played no part in their 

creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable 

to them. it placed him in no worse position than that in 

which he would have been had it not acted at all." Id. 

In the case before us, limitations on the victims' liberty 

were imposed by their assailant, Sherrill, not by the police. The 

fact that the police surrounded the post office when summoned to 

the scene did not create a special situation in which affirmative 

duties of protection arose. A contrary rule would impose 

constitutional duties on the police whenever they respond to 

reports of violence and assemble at the scene, not just in 

"certain limited circumstances" and "with respect to particular 

individuals" as taught by DeShaney. Id. at 1004-05. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 15 
For this additional reason, we hold that the resu~t reached 

by the district court was cor.rect irresi.ective of the question of 

state of mind, for as observed in DeShaney, "Because we conclude 

that the Due Process Clause did not require the State to protect 

Joshua from his father, we need not address respondents' 

alternative argument that the individual state actors lacked the 

requisite state of mind 'to make out a due process violation.'" 

Id. at 1007 n.10. We have chosen to address the latter reason, 

however, because it properly was the basis of the ruling below in 

light of then existing authority, and the situational factors 

which were persuasive that the quality of defendants' conduct 

involved no more than negligence, if that, under Daniels, 

coalesced under DeShaney to render defendants' states of mind 

immaterial. 

D. 

Little need be added concerning the claimed failures of the 

postmaster and the guardsmen to train, supervise, examine or 

afford medical care to Sherrill in deprivation of plaintiffs' 

associational right. We agree with the district court that the 

complaint fails to allege a violation of that right. 

The right to intimate or familial association as a 

constitutionally-protected liberty interest was recognized in 

Trujillo v. Board of County Cornm'rs., 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 

1985), supra. But to state a claim under section 1983 based on a 

deprivation of this right, "an allegation of intent to interfere 

with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of 

intimate association is required." Id. at 1190. The same 

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Appellate Case: 89-6100 Document: 01019867216 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 16 
requirement would apply in stating a Bivens claim for ·aeprivation 

of the.right .. of intimate or familial association. See Carlson v. 

Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 n.6 (1980). We said "this intent may not 

be transferred" because an unconstitutional deprivation of the 

freedom of intimate association occurs "only if the [defendant's] 

conduct was directed at that right." Id. 

Assuming without deciding that a direct causal link between 

the alleged failures of the defendants and the deaths of the 

victims was sufficiently pleaded, cf. City of Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 

1203, the same cannot be said of any specific intent to interfere 

with the particular relationship in question. 

To allege that "[b]y [specified] acts and conduct . 

defendant intentionally, or with conscious disregard for 

plainti~f's rights" deprived them of associational rights, with 

the qualification immediately following that "[s]pecifically, 

Defendant knew, or should have known that by the actions set forth 

above, death was likely to occur, and the plaintiffs, and those 

they represent, would be denied the companionship and association 

of the decedent," does not meet the Trujillo requirement. See 

also Archuleta, 897 F.2d at 499-500. 

Again, we are confronted with unwarranted conclusions of the 

nature already held to be insufficient as factual allegations with 

respect to the claims against the city defendants, this time by 

specific qualifications aimed wide of the target marked by 

Trujillo. Nowhere in the complaint is there an allegation that 

any claimed a~ts or omissions, however intentional, occurred with 

the specific intent on the part of the defendants to depriv~ the 

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I 

\ 

plaintiffs of their rights of association with the victims. 

v. 

CONCLUSION 

The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted either under section 1983 or Bivens. The failure of the 

plaintiffs' federal claims at the Rule 12 motion stage, plaintiffs 

having elected not to amend, warranted dismissal of the state 

claim, as to the merits of which we of course express no opinion. 

Accordingly, the court's orders dismissing the complaint and the 

action are AFFIRMED. 

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