Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03091/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3091

ARIE S. FRIEDMAN and ILLINOIS STATE RIFLE ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, ILLINOIS,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 9073 — John W. Darrah, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 22, 2015 — DECIDED APRIL 27, 2015

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. The City of Highland Park

has an ordinance (§136.005 of the City Code) that prohibits

possession of assault weapons or large‐capacity magazines

(those that can accept more than ten rounds). The ordinance

defines an assault weapon as any semi‐automatic gun that

can accept a large‐capacity magazine and has one of five

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
2 No. 14‐3091

other features: a pistol grip without a stock (for semi‐

automatic pistols, the capacity to accept a magazine outside

the pistol grip); a folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; a

grip for the non‐trigger hand; a barrel shroud; or a muzzle

brake or compensator. Some weapons, such as AR‐15s and

AK‐47s, are prohibited by name. Arie Friedman, who lives in

Highland Park, owned a banned rifle and several large‐

capacity magazines before the ordinance took effect, and he

wants to own these items again; likewise members of the Il‐

linois State Rifle Association, some of whom live in High‐

land Park. Plaintiffs asked the district court to enjoin en‐

forcement of the ordinance, arguing that it violates the Con‐

stitution’s Second Amendment, see District of Columbia v. Hel‐

ler, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), applied to the states by the Four‐

teenth. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

Heller holds that a law banning the possession of hand‐

guns in the home (or making their use in the home infeasi‐

ble) violates the individual right to keep and bear arms se‐

cured by the Second Amendment. But the Court added that

this is not a “right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever

in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554

U.S. at 626. It cautioned against interpreting the decision to

cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions”, including the

“historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘danger‐

ous and unusual weapons’”. Id. at 623, 627. It observed that

state militias, when called to service, often had asked mem‐

bers to come armed with the sort of weapons that were “in

common use at the time”, id. at 624, and it thought these

kinds of weapons (which have changed over the years) are

protected by the Second Amendment in private hands, while

military‐grade weapons (the sort that would be in a militia’s

armory), such as machine guns, and weapons especially at‐

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3091 3

tractive to criminals, such as short‐barreled shotguns, are

not. Id. at 624–25.

Plaintiffs contend that there is no “historical tradition” of

banning possession of semi‐automatic guns and large‐

capacity magazines. Semi‐automatic rifles have been mar‐

keted for civilian use for over a hundred years; Highland

Park’s ordinance was enacted in 2013. But this argument

proves too much: its logic extends to bans on machine guns

(which can fire more than one round with a single pull of the

trigger, unlike semi‐automatic weapons that chamber a new

round automatically but require a new pull to fire). Heller

deemed a ban on private possession of machine guns to be

obviously valid. 554 U.S. at 624. But states didn’t begin to

regulate private use of machine guns until 1927. See Notes to

Uniform Machine Gun Act, Handbook of the National Confer‐

ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of

the Forty‐Second Annual Conference 427–28 (1932). The Na‐

tional Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236, regulating machine guns at

the federal level, followed in 1934.

How weapons are sorted between private and military

uses has changed over time. From the perspective of 2008,

when Heller was decided, laws dating to the 1920s may seem

to belong to a “historical tradition” of regulation. But they

were enacted more than 130 years after the states ratified the

Second Amendment. Why should regulations enacted 130

years after the Second Amendment’s adoption (and nearly 60

years after the Fourteenth’s) have more validity than those

enacted another 90 years later? Nothing in Heller suggests

that a constitutional challenge to bans on private possession

of machine guns brought during the 1930s, soon after their

enactment, should have succeeded—that the passage of time

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
4 No. 14‐3091

creates an easement across the Second Amendment. See

United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

If Highland Park’s ordinance stays on the books for a few

years, that shouldn’t make it either more or less open to chal‐

lenge under the Second Amendment.

Plaintiffs ask us to distinguish machine guns from semi‐

automatic weapons on the ground that the latter are com‐

monly owned for lawful purposes. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.

This does not track the way Heller distinguished United States

v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): The Court took from Miller the

rule that the Second Amendment does not authorize private

persons to possess weapons such as machine guns and

sawed‐off shotguns that the government would not expect

(or allow) citizens to bring with them when the militia is

called to service. During Prohibition the Thompson subma‐

chine gun (the “Tommy gun”) was all too common in Chica‐

go, but that popularity didn’t give it a constitutional immun‐

ity from the federal prohibition enacted in 1934. (The Tom‐

my gun is a machine gun, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §921(23)

and 26 U.S.C. §5845(b), and generally forbidden by 18 U.S.C.

§922(a)(4), because it fires multiple rounds with a single pull

of the trigger; like the Uzi it is called a “submachine gun” to

indicate that it is smaller and more mobile than other ma‐

chine guns. The AK‐47 and AR‐15 (M16) rifles in military use

also are submachine guns, though civilian versions are re‐

stricted to semi‐automatic fire.) Both Heller and Miller con‐

templated that the weapons properly in private hands for

militia use might change through legal regulation as well as

innovation by firearms manufacturers.

And relying on how common a weapon is at the time of

litigation would be circular to boot. Machine guns aren’t

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3091 5

commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they

are illegal; semi‐automatic weapons with large‐capacity

magazines are owned more commonly because, until recent‐

ly (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it would

be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon

can be banned is that there is a statute banning that it, so that

it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be the

source of its own constitutional validity.

Highland Park contends that the ordinance must be valid

because weapons with large‐capacity magazines are “dan‐

gerous and unusual” as Heller used that phrase. Yet High‐

land Park concedes uncertainty whether the banned weap‐

ons are commonly owned; if they are (or were before it en‐

acted the ordinance), then they are not unusual. The record

shows that perhaps 9% of the nation’s firearms owners have

assault weapons, but what line separates “common” from

“uncommon” ownership is something the Court did not say.

And the record does not show whether the banned weapons

are “dangerous” compared with handguns, which are re‐

sponsible for the vast majority of gun violence in the United

States: nearly as many people are killed annually with hand‐

guns in Chicago alone as have been killed in mass shootings

(where use of a banned weapon might make a difference)

nationwide in more than a decade. See Research and Devel‐

opment Division, 2011 Chicago Murder Analysis, Chicago Po‐

lice Department 23 (2012); J. Pete Blair & Katherine W.

Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States

Between 2000 and 2013, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

United States Department of Justice 9 (2014).

The large fraction of murders committed by handguns

may reflect the fact that they are much more numerous than

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
6 No. 14‐3091

assault weapons. What should matter to the “danger” ques‐

tion is how deadly a single weapon of one kind is compared

with a single weapon of a different kind. On that subject the

record provides some evidence. We know, for example, that

semi‐automatic guns with large‐capacity magazines enable

shooters to fire bullets faster than handguns equipped with

smaller magazines. We also know that assault weapons gen‐

erally are chambered for small rounds (compared with a

large‐caliber handgun or rifle), which emerge from the barrel

with less momentum and are lethal only at (relatively) short

range. This suggests that they are less dangerous per bul‐

let—but they can fire more bullets. And they are designed to

spray fire rather than to be aimed carefully. That makes them

simultaneously more dangerous to bystanders (and targets

of aspiring mass murderers) yet more useful to elderly

householders and others who are too frightened to draw a

careful bead on an intruder or physically unable to do so.

Where does the balance of danger lie?

The problems that would be created by treating such

empirical issues as for the judiciary rather than the legisla‐

ture—and the possibility that different judges might reach

dramatically different conclusions about relative risks and

their constitutional significance—illustrate why courts

should not read Heller like a statute rather than an explana‐

tion of the Court’s disposition. The language from Heller that

we have quoted is precautionary: it warns against readings

that go beyond the scope of Heller’s holding that “the Second

Amendment creates individual rights, one of which is keep‐

ing operable handguns at home for self‐defense.” Skoien, 614

F.3d at 640.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3091 7

Heller does not purport to define the full scope of the

Second Amendment. The Court has not told us what other

entitlements the Second Amendment creates or what kinds

of gun regulations legislatures may enact. Instead the Court

has alerted other judges, in Heller and again in McDonald,

that the Second Amendment “does not imperil every law

regulating firearms.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality

opinion); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. Cautionary lan‐

guage about what has been left open should not be read as if

it were part of the Constitution or answered all possible

questions. It is enough to say, as we did in Skoien, 614 F.3d at

641, that at least some categorical limits on the kinds of

weapons that can be possessed are proper, and that they

need not mirror restrictions that were on the books in 1791.

This does not imply that a law about firearms is proper if

it passes the rational‐basis test—that is, as long as it serves

some conceivable valid function. See, e.g., Vance v. Brad‐

ley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). All legislation requires a rational basis;

if the Second Amendment imposed only a rational basis re‐

quirement, it wouldn’t do anything. So far, however, the Jus‐

tices have declined to specify how much substantive review

the Second Amendment requires. Two courts of appeals

have applied a version of “intermediate scrutiny” and sus‐

tained limits on assault weapons and large‐capacity maga‐

zines. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (a law materially identical to Highland Park’s is

valid); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015) (a ban

on magazines holding more than ten rounds is valid). But

instead of trying to decide what “level” of scrutiny applies,

and how it works, inquiries that do not resolve any concrete

dispute, we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans

weapons that were common at the time of ratification or

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
8 No. 14‐3091

those that have “some reasonable relationship to the preser‐

vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” see Heller,

554 U.S. at 622–25; Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–79, and whether

law‐abiding citizens retain adequate means of self‐defense.

The features prohibited by Highland Park’s ordinance

were not common in 1791. Most guns available then could

not fire more than one shot without being reloaded; revolv‐

ers with rotating cylinders weren’t widely available until the

early 19th century. Semi‐automatic guns and large‐capacity

magazines are more recent developments. Barrel shrouds,

which make guns easier to operate even if they overheat, al‐

so are new; slow‐loading guns available in 1791 did not

overheat. And muzzle brakes, which prevent a gun’s barrel

from rising in recoil, are an early 20th century innovation.

Some of the weapons prohibited by the ordinance are

commonly used for military and police functions; they there‐

fore bear a relation to the preservation and effectiveness of

state militias. But states, which are in charge of militias,

should be allowed to decide when civilians can possess mili‐

tary‐grade firearms, so as to have them available when the

militia is called to duty. (Recall that this is how Heller under‐

stood Miller.) And since plaintiffs do not distinguish be‐

tween states and other units of local government—according

to them, an identical ban enacted by the State of Illinois

would also run afoul of the Second Amendment—we need

not decide whether only states, which traditionally regulate

militias, have the power to determine what kinds of weap‐

ons citizens should have available. (Such an argument might

anyway have been foreclosed by Illinois’ recognition that lo‐

cal assault‐weapon bans enacted before July 19, 2013, are val‐

id; see 430 ILCS 65/13.1(c).)

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3091 9

Since the banned weapons can be used for self‐defense,

we must consider whether the ordinance leaves residents of

Highland Park ample means to exercise the “inherent right

of self‐defense” that the Second Amendment protects. Heller,

554 U.S. at 628. Heller held that the availability of long guns

does not save a ban on handgun ownership. The Justices

took note of some of the reasons, including ease of accessibil‐

ity and use, that citizens might prefer handguns to long guns

for self‐defense. But Heller did not foreclose the possibility

that allowing the use of most long guns plus pistols and re‐

volvers, as Highland Park’s ordinance does, gives house‐

holders adequate means of defense.

Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance substantially restricts

their options for armed self‐defense. But that contention is

undermined by their argument, in the same breath, that the

ordinance serves no purpose, because (they say) criminals

will just substitute permitted firearms functionally identical

to the banned guns. If criminals can find substitutes for

banned assault weapons, then so can law‐abiding home‐

owners. Unlike the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns,

Highland Park’s ordinance leaves residents with many self‐

defense options.

True enough, assault weapons can be beneficial for self‐

defense because they are lighter than many rifles and less

dangerous per shot than large‐caliber pistols or revolvers.

Householders too frightened or infirm to aim carefully may

be able to wield them more effectively than the pistols James

Bond preferred. But assault weapons with large‐capacity

magazines can fire more shots, faster, and thus can be more

dangerous in aggregate. Why else are they the weapons of

choice in mass shootings? A ban on assault weapons and

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
10 No. 14‐3091

large‐capacity magazines might not prevent shootings in

Highland Park (where they are already rare), but it may re‐

duce the carnage if a mass shooting occurs.

That laws similar to Highland Park’s reduce the share of

gun crimes involving assault weapons is established by data.

See Christopher S. Koper, Daniel J. Woods & Jeffery A. Roth,

An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Im‐

pacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994‐2003, Report to

the National Institute of Justice, United States Department of

Justice 39–60 (June 2004). There is also some evidence link‐

ing the availability of assault weapons to gun‐related homi‐

cides. See Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube & Omar García‐

Ponce, Cross‐Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in

Mexico, 107 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 397 (2013) (finding that Mexi‐

can municipalities bordering American states without as‐

sault weapons bans experienced more gun‐related homi‐

cides than those bordering California, which had a ban).

Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the ordinance will

have no effect on gun violence because the sort of firearms

banned in Highland Park are available elsewhere in Illinois

and in adjacent states. But data show that most criminals

commit crimes close to home. See Elizabeth Groff & Tom

McEwen, Exploring the Spatial Configuration of Places Related to

Homicide Events, Report to the National Institute of Justice,

United States Department of Justice 5–10, 48–56 (March

2006) (homicide); Christophe Vandeviver, Stijn Van Daele &

Tom Vander Beken, What Makes Long Crime Trips Worth Un‐

dertaking? Balancing Costs and Benefits in Burglars’ Journey to

Crime, 55 Brit. J. Criminology 399, 401, 406–07 (2015) (burgla‐

ry). Local crimes are most likely to be committed by local

residents, who are less likely to have access to firearms

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14‐3091 11

banned by a local ordinance. A ban on assault weapons

won’t eliminate gun violence in Highland Park, but it may

reduce the overall dangerousness of crime that does occur.

Plaintiffs’ argument proves far too much: it would imply

that no jurisdiction other than the United States as a whole

can regulate firearms. But that’s not what Heller concluded,

and not what we have held for local bans on other substanc‐

es. See National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124

(7th Cir. 1995) (spray paint).

If it has no other effect, Highland Park’s ordinance may

increase the public’s sense of safety. Mass shootings are rare,

but they are highly salient, and people tend to overestimate

the likelihood of salient events. See George F. Loewenstein,

Christopher K. Hsee, Elke U. Weber & Ned Welch, Risk as

Feelings, 127 Psychological Bulletin 267, 275–76 (2001); Eric J.

Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard

Kunreuther, Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance

Decisions, 7 J. Risk & Uncertainty 35 (1993). If a ban on semi‐

automatic guns and large‐capacity magazines reduces the

perceived risk from a mass shooting, and makes the public

feel safer as a result, that’s a substantial benefit. Cf. Frank v.

Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2014).

McDonald holds that the Second Amendment creates in‐

dividual rights that can be asserted against state and local

governments. But neither it nor Heller attempts to define the

entire scope of the Second Amendment—to take all ques‐

tions about which weapons are appropriate for self‐defense

out of the people’s hands. Heller and McDonald set limits on

the regulation of firearms; but within those limits, they leave

matters open. The best way to evaluate the relation among

assault weapons, crime, and self‐defense is through the po‐

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
12 No. 14‐3091

litical process and scholarly debate, not by parsing ambigu‐

ous passages in the Supreme Court’s opinions. The central

role of representative democracy is no less part of the Con‐

stitution than is the Second Amendment: when there is no

definitive constitutional rule, matters are left to the legisla‐

tive process. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407

(1819).

Another constitutional principle is relevant: the Constitu‐

tion establishes a federal republic where local differences are

cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a

search for national uniformity. McDonald circumscribes the

scope of permissible experimentation by state and local gov‐

ernments, but it does not foreclose all possibility of experi‐

mentation. Within the limits established by the Justices in

Heller and McDonald, federalism and diversity still have a

claim. Whether those limits should be extended is in the end

a question for the Justices. Given our understanding of exist‐

ing limits, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 13

MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

By prohibiting a class of weapons commonly used

throughout the country, Highland Park’s ordinance infringes

upon the rights of its citizens to keep weapons in their homes

for the purpose of defending themselves, their families, and

their property. Both the ordinance and this court’s opinion

upholding it are directly at odds with the central holdings of

Heller and McDonald: that the Second Amendment protects a

personal right to keep arms for lawful purposes, most notably

for self-defense within the home. District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.

767, 780 (2010). For the following reasons, I respectfully

dissent. 

Unlike public life where the cities and states have broad

authority to regulate,the ultimate decision for what constitutes

the most effective means of defending one’s home, family, and

property resides in individual citizens and not in the government. The Heller and McDonald opinions could not be clearer

on this matter. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780.

The extent of danger—real orimagined—that a citizen faces at

home is a matter only that person can assess in full. 

To be sure, assault rifles and large capacity magazines are

dangerous. But their ability to project large amounts of force

accurately is exactly why they are an attractive means of selfdefense. While most persons do not require extraordinary

means to defend their homes, the fact remains that some do.

Ultimately, it is up to the lawful gun owner and not the

government to decide these matters. To limit self-defense to

only those methods acceptable to the government is to effect an

enormous transfer of authority fromthe citizens of this country

to the government—a result directly contrary to our constituCase: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
14 No. 14-3091

tion and to our political tradition. The rights contained in the

Second Amendment are “fundamental” and “necessary to our

system of ordered liberty.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778. The

government recognizes these rights; it does not confer them.

Fundamentally, I disagree with the court’s reading of

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), as it pertains to the

nature of the rights recognized by the Second Amendment.

Long ago, in Miller, the Supreme Court expressly tied Second

Amendment rights to one’s association with a state militia. In

Heller, the District of Columbia relied on this holding from

Miller as justification for an ordinance restricting the rights of

its citizens to keep and use handguns. 554 U.S. at 577, 587. The

Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 622. Indeed, the central

holding of Heller is that citizens have an individual right to

keep and bear firearms that does not depend upon any

association with a militia. In so holding, Heller effectively laid

to rest the notion of collective Second Amendment rights, and

then McDonald placed a wreath on its grave. 

Here, the court comes not to bury Miller but to exhume it.

To that end, it surveys the landscape of firearm regulations as

if Miller were still the controlling authority and Heller were a

mere gloss on it. The court’s reading culminates in a novel test:

whether the weapons in question were “common at the time of

ratification” or have “some reasonable relationship to the

preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” and

“whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of selfdefense.” Ante at 7–8. 

The problem is Heller expressly disclaimed two of the three

aspects of this test; and it did so not as a matter of simple

housekeeping, but as an immediate consequence of its central

holding. It held as “bordering on the frivolous” arguments that

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 15

recognized a right to bear only those arms in existence at the

time of ratification. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“Some have made

the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms

in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second

Amendment.”). Likewise, it expressly overruled any reading

of the Second Amendment that conditioned the rights to keep

and bear arms on one’s association with a militia. Id. at 612. (“It

is not possible to read this as discussing anything otherthan an

individual right unconnected to militia service.”). For this

reason, there is no way to square this court’s holding with the

clear precedents of Heller and McDonald.

Heller and McDonald

We turn to the controlling precedents. Although the Heller

decision is of recent vintage, the rights recognized by it—for

individual citizens to keep and bear arms lawfully—are not.

Heller certainly did not create them in 2008, nor did the Second

Amendment in 1791. These rights are “fundamental” and

“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768. They are natural rights that pre-existed the

Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (quoting United

States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) that the right to

carry weapons is not “dependent upon [the Second Amendment] for its existence.”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684,

700 (7th Cir. 2011). This understanding persisted and was

shared by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who

counted these among the “fundamental rights necessary to our

system of ordered liberty.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778. These

rights exist not merely in the abstract, but are exercised on a

daily basis; indeed, a detailed list of the various ways in which

Americans use weapons lawfully would be prohibitively long.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
16 No. 14-3091

Which brings us to Friedman, our plaintiff. He is a resident

of Highland Park who owns an AR rifle and large capacity

magazines of the types prohibited by the ordinance. Friedman

contends—and the city does not contest—that he keeps the

weapons in his home for the defense of his family. Prior to the

passage of the ordinance, he used these weapons lawfully.

Now, under the terms of the ordinance, Friedman has ninety

days to remove the weapons beyond Highland Park’s city

limits or to surrender them to the Chief of Police. §136.005

(D)(1), (3). Should he fail to do so, he faces a misdemeanor

conviction punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of

between $500 and $1,000. Id. at § (F).

The Framework

In Ezell, we stated that a court must first identify whether

the regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second

Amendment. 651 F.3d at 701. However, where, as here, the

activity is directly tied to specific classes of weapons, we are

faced with an additional threshold matter: whether the classes

of weapons regulated are commonly used by law-abiding

citizens. If the weapons in question (assault rifles and highcapacity magazines) are not commonly used by law-abiding

citizens, then our inquiry ends as there is no Second Amendment protection and the regulation is presumed to be lawful.1

This question is best viewed as a separate, threshold matter than as an

1

aspect of the regulated activity. An example bears this out: because hand

grenades have never been commonly used by law-abiding citizens for

lawful purposes, it matters not whether the regulation is an ordinance

prohibiting ownership of such weapons, a licensing scheme impeding

access to them, or a regulation setting conditions on their manufacture or

sale: the Second Amendment does not apply to such inquiry because the

type of weapon is not covered by it. 

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 17

If the weapons are covered by the Second Amendment, we

then examine whether the asserted right (i.e., the activity

affected by the regulation) is likewise covered. To do this, we

examine how the asserted right was publicly understood when

the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (or Second Amendment in the case of federal regulation) to discern whether the

right (or some analogue) has been exercised historically. Id. at

702. This answer requires a textual and historical inquiry into

the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Id. (citing

Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35). Significantly, the plaintiff need not

demonstrate the absence of regulation in order to prevail; the

burden rests squarely on the government to establish that the

activity has been subject to some measure of regulation. Id. 

Finally, if we conclude that the weapons and asserted right

at issue are covered by the Second Amendment, then we must

assign a level of scrutiny appropriate to the right regulated and

determine whether the regulation survives such scrutiny. Ezell,

651 F.3d at 702–03. Conversely, if the activity falls outside of

the scope of the Second Amendment as understood at the

relevant historical moment (1868 with the passage of the

Fourteenth Amendment),the regulatedactivity is categorically

unprotected and our inquiry ends. Id. at 703.

In summary, this framework involves up to three separate

steps for a reviewing court. A shorthand of it runs as follows:

1. determine whether the weapon is commonly used by

law-abiding citizens; 

2. review the original public meaning of the asserted right

(i.e. the regulated activity); and, if both the weapon and

asserted right are covered; 

3. assign and apply a standard of scrutiny.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
18 No. 14-3091

Having established the appropriate framework, it is time to

examine Highland Park’s ordinance in light of the Second

Amendment.

Common Use

The regulated weapons: In Miller, the Supreme Court

upheld a prohibition against short-barreled shotguns because

the Second Amendment did not protect those weapons that

were not typically possessed as ordinary military equipment

for use in a state militia. 307 U.S. at 178. The “common use”

test is the offspring of this decision and asks whether a

particular weapon is commonly used by law-abiding citizens

for lawful purposes. Heller jettisoned Miller’s requirement of 2

a nexus between the weapon and military equipment, but

otherwise adopted the test with a focus on whether the

weapon in question has obtained common use by law abiding

citizens. Heller, 554 U.S. 623, 627.

Here, the evidentiary record is unequivocal: a statistically

significant amount of gun owners such as Friedman use semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity magazines for lawful

purposes. This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that these 3

It is of no significance that other courts have worded this inquiry

2

differently, asking whether the regulated weapons are “dangerous and

unusual.” All weapons are presumably dangerous. To say that a weapon is

unusual is to say that it is not commonly used for lawful purposes. 

Insofar as the evidentiary record addresses the matter, it supports the 3

proposition that AR-rifles are commonly used by law-abiding citizens. Out

of 57 million firearm owners in the United States, it is estimated that 5

million own AR-type rifles. (A. 66). Firearm industry analysts estimate that

5,128,000 AR-type rifles were produced in the United States for domestic

sale, while an additional 3,415,000 were imported. (A. 65; 73). Between 2008

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 19

weapons are commonly used and are not unusual. In other

words, they are covered by the Second Amendment. Whether

or how people might use these weapons for illegal purposes

provides a basis for a state to regulate them, but it has no

bearing on whether the Second Amendment covers them.

Unfortunately, the court effectively inverts this equation and

considers first the potential illegal uses (here: catastrophic

public shootings) and then doubles back to determine whether

attendant lawful use by ordinary citizens might be sufficient to

warrant some type of Second Amendment protection.

An example: At oral argument, there was much discussion

about various longstanding regulations prohibiting such

weapons as machine guns. The crux of this discussion was

whether machine guns would have satisfied the common use

test during the 1930s when they were the weapon of choice

among gangsters in Chicago. But this misses the point: it

matters not whether fifty or five thousand mob enforcers used

a particular weapon, the question is whether a critical mass of

law-abiding citizens did. In the case of machine guns, nobody

has argued, before or since, that ordinary citizens used these

weapons for lawful purposes, and so they have been rightly

deemed not to fall within the ambit of the Second Amendment.

Had there been even a small amount of citizens who used them

for lawful purposes, then the Second Amendment might have

covered them. The fact that gangsters used them to terrorize

people might have served as ample justification to regulate

and 2012, approximately 11.4% of firearms manufactured in the United

States were AR-type rifles. A survey of randomly selected United States

residents demonstrated that an estimated 11,976,702 million persons

participated in target shooting with an AR-type rifle in 2012. (A. 68; 102).

The evidentiary record contains no entries disputing these estimates. 

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
20 No. 14-3091

them (or even prohibit them outright), but it has no bearing on

whether they are covered under the Second Amendment.4

The court also objected because the common-use test is a

circular one. Perhaps so, but the law is full of such tests, and 5

this one is no more circular than the “reasonable expectation of

privacy” or the “reasonable juror.” The fact that a statistically

significant number of Americans use AR-type rifles and largesize magazines demonstrates ipso facto that they are used for

lawful purposes. Our inquiry should have ended here: the

Second Amendment covers these weapons.

 Weapons can be commonly used by both criminals and law-abiding

4

citizens. For example, the court correctly notes that handguns have long

been the preferred weapon for criminals and are “responsible for the vast

majority of gun violence in the United States ... .” Ante at 5. This, of course,

is the same type of weapon that McDonald recognized as covered under the

Second Amendment because it was (and still is) “the most preferred firearm

in the nation.” 561 U.S. 767. In evaluating common use, McDonald

considered as relevant only use by law-abiding citizens. 

Circularity results from the obvious fact that common use is aided

5

when a weapon is legal and precluded when it is not. The argument goes

that authorities are free to regulate irrespective of the Second Amendment

until a weapon obtains a certain quotient of use by law-abiding citizens.

After that, they are too late as Second Amendment protections obtain.

Under this view, common use is the effect of law rather than the cause. But

this scenario overstates the evolution of technology among weapons.

Overwhelmingly, newly developed weapons are merely updated versions

of weapons already in the marketplace. It is rare to have a weapon come to

market in such form that it has no precursors subject to regulation. Weapon

manufacturers are unlikely to expend funds to develop and bring to market

variations on classes of weapons that are currently prohibited. 

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 21

Original Meaning of Asserted Rights

We follow Heller’s example examining the original meaning

of the right asserted. 554 U.S. at 576. Heller examined the right

to keep arms as it was understood in 1791 when the Second

Amendment was ratified. Significantly, Heller expressly

rejected the view that the Second Amendment contained a

unitary right and instead noted that lawmakers of the founding

period routinely grouped multiple, related, rights under a

singular right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591. Because the rights in the

Second Amendment are many and varied, a court must

identify the specific right implicated by a regulation.

To examine the scope of the right, we must first identify the

regulated activity. Here, the relevant section of the ordinance

provides that: “No person shall manufacture, sell, offer or

display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire or

possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine.” §

136.005(B). Plaintiffsdo not challenge the provisions associated

with the manufacture or sale of such weapons in Highland

Park and so we need not address the scope of those rights.

Instead, we isolate our attention on the language in the statute

that forbids a citizen from acquiring or possessing any assault

weapon or large-capacity magazine. 

The Right to Keep Arms v. The Right to Bear Arms

Heller defined the term “to keep arms” to mean to “have

weapons,” and “to bear arms” as to “carr[y]” weapons. 554

U.S. at 582; 589. Though similar, these activities are not

identical; for instance, an ordinance that prohibits the carriage

or use of weapons but not outright possession would not

implicate the right to keep arms, but only the right to bear

them in certain locations. HighlandPark’sordinance implicates

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
22 No. 14-3091

bothrights. Leaving aside the other prohibitions, the ordinance

prohibits the “acqui[sition] or possess[ion of] any assault

weapon or large capacity magazine.” §136.005 (B). Notably

absent from this provision is any qualifying language: allforms

of possession are summarily prohibited. Other laws notwithstanding, the ordinance makes no distinction between storing

large-capacity magazines in a locked safe at home and carrying

a loaded assault rifle while walking down Main Street. Both

constitute “possession” and are prohibited outright. 

Of course, our inquiry centers on the understanding of the

right to keep arms in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment

became law. Fortunately, we need not engage in original

historical analysis because the Supreme Court in McDonald has

done so on this exact question—albeit in the context of an

ordinance restricting the right to keep handguns in the home.

McDonald concluded that the right to keep a weapon in one’s

home for the purposes of self-defense is the broadest right

under the Second Amendment. It noted: 

Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal

systems from ancient times to the present day, and in

Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central

component’ of the Second Amendment right. ... Explaining that ‘the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute’ in the home ... we found that this

right applies to handguns because they are ‘the most

preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for the

protection of one’s home and family ... . Thus, we

concluded, citizens must be permitted to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense. 

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–68 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 630)

(emphasis in original). 

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 23

Rather than merely regulate how weapons are to be stored

at home, Highland Park’s ordinance goes further than the one

that the Court found unconstitutional in Heller: it prohibits any

form of possession of these weapons. It is immaterial to this

inquiry that the regulations targeted different classes of

weapons (handguns versus assault rifles and large-capacity

magazines) because the issue at this step involves the scope of

the protected activity—the right to keep arms for selfdefense—not the class of weapons involved with such activity;

that inquiry is relevant at the final step in examining the

purpose for the regulation. 

If the right to keep arms in the home for the purpose of selfdefense obtains the broadest protections under the Second

Amendment, it follows by implication that regulations affecting the rights to carry (bear) arms outside of the home are

given greater deference. Indeed, the vast majority of the

longstanding regulations deemed “presumptively lawful” by

Heller and McDonald are regulations against the use and

carriage of weapons. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; Heller

v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(“Heller II”); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.

2009). Traditionally, these regulations limited the carriage of

weapons in sensitive locations such as courthouses or banned

dueling or carrying concealed weapons such as pocket pistols

or bowie knives. See Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right

to Bear Arms, 89 Ind. L. J. 1587, 1601 (2014). In contrast, those

regulations prohibiting ownership of weapons outright

focused on the status of the regulated party as a felon or a

person ill-suited for gun ownership due to mental infirmities.

Id. In short, outside ofweapons deemed dangerous or unusual,

there is no historical tradition supporting wholesale prohibitions of entire classes of weapons.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
24 No. 14-3091

Standards of Scrutiny

Insofar asHighland Park’s ordinance implicatesFriedman’s

right to keep assault rifles and large-capacity magazines in his

home for the purposes of self-defense, it implicates a fundamental right and is subject to strict scrutiny. See Clark v. Jeter,

486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“classifications affecting fundamental

rights are given the most exacting scrutiny”) (citation omitted).

Of course,other courts have applied lower standards of review

even in cases where they recognized that the regulation

impinged upon a fundamental right underthe Second Amendment. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256. 

The distinction here is a matter of kind and not degree;

rather than limiting the terms under which a fundamentalright

might be exercised, Highland Park’s ordinance serves as a total

prohibition of a class of weapons that Friedman used to defend

his home and family. The right to self-defense is largely

meaningless if it does not include the right to choose the most

effective means of defending oneself. For this reason, Heller

struck down a District of Columbia ordinance requiring that

firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all

times because the ordinance “makes it impossible for citizens

to use [the regulated weapons] for the core lawful purpose of

self-defense ... .” Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. Because Highland

Park’s ordinance cuts right to the heart of the Second Amendment, it deserves the highest level of scrutiny. 

Under strict scrutiny, Highland Park must prove that its

law furthers a compelling government interest and must

employ the least restrictive means to achieve that end. United

States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813

(2000). Accordingly, Highland Park claims that the law

furthers the compelling interest of preventing public shootings

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 25

such as those witnessed at the movie theater in Aurora,

Colorado and at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut. No problem so far: public safety is an obvious compelling

interest in this case. That the regulated weapons are capable of

inflicting substantial force is no doubt relevant in forming a

basis for the City to regulate their use within its public spaces. 

The difficulties arise in the next prong; rather than being

the least restrictive means to address these particular public

safety issues, Highland Park’s ordinance serves as the bluntest

of instruments, banning a class of weapons outright, and

restricting the rights of its citizens to select the means by which

they defend their homes and families. Here, one need not parse

out the various alternatives that Highland Park could have

chosen to achieve these ends; any alternative would have been

less restrictive. This can only yield one conclusion: the provisions in Highland Park’s ordinance prohibiting its citizens

from acquiring or possessing assault rifles or large-capacity

magazines are unconstitutionalinsofar as they prohibit citizens

from lawfully keeping such weapons in their homes. 

Insofar as Highland Park’s ordinance implicates the right

to carry or use these weapons outside of one’s property, it is

subject to intermediate scrutiny. To satisfy this standard,

Highland Park must show that the restrictions are “substantially related to an important government objective.” Clark, 486

U.S. at 461. As noted earlier, restricting the use and carriage of

assault rifles and large-capacity magazines in Highland Park

is related to an important government objective—protecting

the safety of its citizens. Unlike strict scrutiny analysis,

intermediate scrutiny does not require that the ordinance be

the least restrictive means, but that it serve an important

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
26 No. 14-3091

government interest in a way that is substantially related to

that interest. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 

As other courts have noted, restrictions against assault

weapons and large capacity magazines can survive intermediate scrutiny. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1244. Here, Highland Park

has a legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens in

schools and other public places. For this reason, there is no

problem concluding that the ordinance, insofar as it regulates

the possession and use of the weapons in public places, coheres

with the Second Amendment.

Several other matters require attention as well.

The rights in the Second Amendment: The court treats these

rights as unitary and undifferentiated. In so doing, it makes no

distinction between the right to keep arms to defend one’s

home and the right to use those arms in a constitutionally

permissible manner. But the Supreme Court has established

clear parameters: the right to keep arms in the home for selfdefense obtains the broadest protection, McDonald, 561 U.S. at

767 (noting that the “need for defense of self, family, and

property is most acute in the home ... ), while other rights

under the Second Amendment are “not unlimited” but are

subject to appropriate regulation. Here, the court makes no

attempt to parse out the various activities prohibited by

Highland Park’s ordinance; instead it treats as identical

activities as diverse as keeping weapons in the home and

manufacturing them for sale. Heller requires courts to identify

the specific activity regulated; the court here failed to do this.

The effect of longstanding regulations: It is important to note

that Heller, for good reasons, did not seek to dismantle in

whole the nexus of existing firearms regulations. Instead, it

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 27

sought to recast the focus of courts away from policy considerations and towards the original meaning of the Second

Amendment. In so doing, it left intact existing regulations and

stated that longstanding ones are accorded a presumption of

constitutionality. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 

But a presumption is a very different thing from an

assertion: we presume that laws are constitutional until and

unless the regulation is challenged and a competent court

informs us otherwise. In other words, it is a very different

thing to presume a statute to be constitutional than to positively assert that it is. Here the court outlines various longstanding regulations and then proceeds to use them as a

navigational chart to determine the confines of permissible

firearm regulation. All of this culminates in a syllogism that

runs, roughly speaking, as follows: machine guns have been

illegal under law; assault weapons are similar to machine guns;

therefore, assault rifles may be prohibited under law. Nothing

in Heller or McDonald supports this as an appropriate framework. 

The evidentiary record: The court ignores the central piece of

evidence in this case: that millions of Americans own and use

AR-type rifles lawfully. (A.65–73). Instead, it adopts—as the

final word on the matter and with no discussion—Highland

Park’s position that the evidence is inconclusive on this

question; and it does this notwithstanding the fact that all of

the relevant evidence supportsdefendant’s contentionthat ARtype rifles are commonly used throughout this nation. Additionally, it posits as self-evident a comparison between

semiautomatic weapons and machine guns despite the fact that

the existing science is, at best, contested on this. More signifiCase: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
28 No. 14-3091

cantly, the only relevant evidence in record disputes this

contention.6

The post-Heller framework: The court wholly disregards the

(albeit still nascent) post-Heller framework established in this

and our sister courts in favor of its own, unique path. In so

doing, it offers a methodology in direct conflict to that offered

by this circuit in previous cases, see, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d 684, and

out of step with other circuits, United States v. Marzzarella, 614

F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244. 

Judicial findings: Finally, the court justifies the ordinance as

valid because it “may increase the public’s sense of safety.”

Perhaps so, but there is no evidentiary basis for this finding.

The court is not empowered to uphold a regulation as constitutional based solely on its ability to divine public sentiment

about the matter.

As noted earlier, the post-Heller framework is very much a

work in progress and will continue to be refined in subsequent

litigation. Neither Heller nor McDonald purported to resolve

every matterinvolving the regulation of weapons; but they are

clear about one thing: the right to keep arms in the home for

self-defense is central to the Second Amendment and is not

conditioned on any association with a militia. Instead of

following this clear principle, the court engages in a gerrymandered reading of those cases to hold directly contrary to their

Plaintiffs submitted a video demonstration highlighting some of the 6

differences between semiautomatic, AR-type rifles and automatic rifles. (A.

63). Automatic weapons are selective-fire weapons where a single pull of

the trigger will fire continuously until all ammunition is exhausted. (A. 21)

In contrast, a semiautomatic weapon only allows for one round per pull. (A.

19). 

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29
No. 14-3091 29

precedents. In so doing, it upholds an ordinance that violates

the Second Amendment rights of its citizens to keep arms in

their homes for the purpose of defending themselves, their

families, and their property. 

I respectfully dissent.

Case: 14-3091 Document: 44 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 29