Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10771/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10771-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10771

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00460-MCR-EMT

DAN SCHMIDT,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD RODRIGUES, et al.,

 Defendants, 

FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS, 

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(January 29, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 1 of 7
2

Daniel K. Schmidt, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. The district court 

dismissed Schmidt’s civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as 

frivolous, or in the alternative under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

1

 In his second amended 

complaint, Schmidt alleged various claims against the Florida First District Court

of Appeal (DCA), the Florida Supreme Court, and the State of Florida based on the 

First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution.

2

 

 1 The PLRA provides: 

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil 

action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

2 In addition to other forms of relief, Schmidt sought: (1) a declaratory judgment stating

that “all orders, judgments, mandates and the like” of the First DCA and the Florida Supreme 

Court are void; (2) an injunction “directing the state to conduct [a] new sentencing hearing in the 

trial court”; and (3) a declaratory judgment saying Schmidt’s constitutional rights were violated 

because: (a) he was not provided “notice and an opportunity to respond” before sanctions were 

imposed, (b) the First DCA erroneously classified his forty-six prior actions as frivolous, (c) the 

First DCA did not provide notice and an opportunity to litigate the frivolity determinations at the 

time the appellate proceeding was pending, (d) the First DCA “hid[] behind a mere denial” 

without making “findings of fact and conclusions in law,” (e) the First DCA prevented Schmidt 

from seeking “meaningful discretionary review” in the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme 

Court, and a U.S. district court, (f) the First DCA forced him “to properly exhaust all available 

state remedies to try and obtain relief that was already ordered,” and (g) the First DCA forced 

him “to serve a vacated and void sentence.” 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 2 of 7
3

Schmidt argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which he filed 

before the district court dismissed his claim. He also argues that the district court 

abused its discretion by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and his motion to make 

additional findings pursuant to Rule 52(b). Lastly, Schmidt contends that the 

district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.

I.

Schmidt first argues that the district court erred in denying him leave to file 

a third amended complaint. Under Rule 15(a), parties may amend their pleadings 

once as a matter of course, but after that, a pleading may be amended only with 

leave of the court or the opposing party’s written consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(1)–(2). Courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id.

15(a)(2). However, a court need not give an opportunity to amend “where 

amendment would be futile.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). We review for abuse of discretion a 

district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint but review de novo any legal 

conclusion as to whether the amendment would have been futile. SFM Holdings, 

Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 3 of 7
4

Because Schmidt is a pro se prisoner, his motion for leave to amend is 

deemed filed on the date he submitted it to prison authorities. United States v. 

Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012). Schmidt’s motion was filed on 

December 30, 2014, before the district court issued its judgment in his case on 

January 7, 2015. The district court therefore erred in denying Schmidt’s motion on 

the ground that “the case ha[d] been dismissed.” 

However, this error was harmless because Schmidt’s amendment would 

have been futile, so the district court was not required to give him an opportunity 

to amend his complaint a third time. See Corsello, 428 F.3d at 1014. Schmidt’s 

amendment would have been futile because his suit was properly dismissed under 

the PLRA’s three strikes provision, which bars a prisoner who has filed three or 

more complaints that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to 

state a claim from proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). After three meritless 

suits, the prisoner must pay the full filing fee when he initiates suit; his failure to 

do so warrants dismissal without prejudice. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 

1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The only exception is if the prisoner is “under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The magistrate judge took judicial notice of three civil actions previously 

filed by Schmidt while he was incarcerated that were dismissed as frivolous or 

malicious. See Schmidt v. Fauchuex, No. 5:94-cv-50258 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 1994); 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 4 of 7
5

Muder v. Wooten, No. 5:95-cv-50235 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 1995); and Schmidt v. 

Wade, No. 5:95-cv-50215 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1995). Given these three dismissals, 

Schmidt could not bring this civil action IFP unless he was “under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Neither Schmidt’s 

previous complaints nor his third amended complaint alleged any facts indicating 

that his action fit this exception. The third amendment would have been futile and 

the district court’s error in denying it was harmless.3 

II.

Schmidt also argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 59(e) 

and Rule 52(b) motions. Rule 59(e) allows the court to alter or amend a judgment 

on a party’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 52(b) permits the court to amend 

 3 Schmidt’s claims were also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid.

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 

103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983). This doctrine provides that “lower federal courts are precluded from 

exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 

1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It applies when the success of the federal claim 

would “effectively nullify the state court judgment” or the federal claim “succeeds only to the 

extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 

(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). However, the doctrine will not bar a federal 

claim that a party did not have “reasonable opportunity to raise . . . in state proceedings.” Id.

(quotation omitted). 

The Florida First DCA affirmed the denial of Schmidt’s Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850 motion and imposed sanctions in 2010. When Schmidt commenced this federal 

action on August 7, 2013, state court proceedings were final for Rooker-Feldman purposes. If 

Schmidt had succeeded in obtaining the relief he requested from the district court, which 

included voiding all judgments of the First DCA and overturning its frivolity determinations on 

his forty-six prior actions, it would have “effectively nullif[ied] the state court judgment.” Id.

(quotation omitted). In addition, Schmidt had a “reasonable opportunity” to bring his federal 

claims in the state proceedings. Id. (quotation omitted). As such, the district court’s alternative 

reason for dismissing Schmidt’s action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also rendered 

amendment futile. 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 5 of 7
6

its findings or make additional findings on a party’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). 

We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) or Rule 52(b) motion for abuse of discretion. 

Lambert v. Fulton Cty., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001); Trigo v. Fed. Deposit 

Ins. Corp., 847 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988). “The only grounds for granting 

a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” 

Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation and 

alteration omitted). “A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to re-litigate old matters, 

raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of 

judgment.” Id. (quotation and alterations omitted). 

Schmidt pointed to no new evidence requiring alteration of the judgment or 

additional findings. His complaint merely changed the defendants and then 

restated similar claims for relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Schmidt’s Rule 59(e) and Rule 52(b) motions. 

III.

Finally, Schmidt contends that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion for leave to proceed IFP. In fact, the district court granted 

Schmidt IFP status before it received the archived information establishing 

Schmidt’s PLRA strikes. Although withdrawal of IFP status was warranted, the 

district court opted not to do so because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provided an 

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 6 of 7
7

alternative ground for dismissal. Schmidt’s final claim is therefore not supported 

by the record. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 15-10771 Date Filed: 01/29/2016 Page: 7 of 7