Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06306/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FlL..L-DA l United St.Wt CcmCi rt (lf App,,a ! 

Tenth rcuJt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 2 1 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

REGINA DICKSON, individually; 

MICHAEL G. DONNELLY, II, by and 

through his guardian Regina Dickson, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

KERR-MCGEE REFINING CORPORATION, a 

Delaware corporation; GILBARCO, INC., 

a Delaware corporation; MITCHELL & 

JOHNSON OIL COMPANY, an Oklahoma 

corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 92-6306 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-1046-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedentia1- value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, · res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Michael Donnelly was seriously injured when, at the 

age of two and one-half · years, he gained access to a locked 

garage, opened a can of gasoline stored there, poured it out on 

the lawn mower, and the pilot light to a hot water heater located 

in the garage ignited the gas. Plaintiffs sued various defendants 

connected with the hot water heater and the gasoline. The 

defendants who are parties to this appeal are Kerr-McGee, the 

manufacturer of the gasoline; Mitchell & Johnson, the distributor 

of the gasoline; and Gilbarco, the manufacturer of the gasoline 

pump that was used to pump the gas into the can from which Michael 

ultimately poured the gas. Plaintiffs appeal the orders of the 

district court entering summary judgment in favor of defendants 

and denying plaintiffs' post-judgment motion for reconsideration. 

We affirm. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 

1990) . Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 2 
Plaintiffs asserted claims against Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & 

Johnson based on manufacturer's product liability and negligence. 1 

Plaintiffs contended that the gas was defective and unreasonably 

dangerous because it was not sold with sufficient warnings about 

its dangerous propensities. 

defendants were negligent 

Plaintiffs further asserted that 

in selling the gasoline without the 

proper warnings. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted these 

defendants failed to warn (1) that gas should be dispensed into 

metal, not plastic, containers; (2) that gas should be kept out of 

the reach of children; and (3) that gas should be stored outdoors, 

not indoors. 

Plaintiffs asserted similar claims against Gilbarco. 

Plaintiffs alleged that the pump Gilbarco manufactured was 

defective and unreasonably dangerous because it did not have 

warnings attached to it that warned against (1) allowing minors to 

use the pump to dispense gas and (2) dispensing gas into 

unapproved containers. Plaintiffs also alleged that Gilbarco's 

failure to warn violated accepted industry practices and thus was 

negligent. 

The undisputed evidence showed that about two weeks before 

the accident, Michael's fifteen-year-old brother Ian bought the 

gas at issue from a convenience store and pumped it into a plastic 

1 Plaintiffs also asserted claims against these defendants 

based on breach of implied warranty of fitness and 

merchantability. Although the district court entered summary 

judgment in favor of Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & Johnson on all 

plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs do not challenge the court's ruling 

on the breach of warranty claims. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 3 
one-and-one-half-gallon gas can his father had purchased for the 

purpose of carrying and storing gas for the lawn mower. Ian then 

took the can of gas home and put it in its usual place on the 

garage floor next to the lawn mower. Michael's father testified 

I that he had always stored the gas by the lawn mower in the garage 

and had always stored both items by the front garage door to keep 

it as far away from the house as possible "because the garage is 

the only storage area I have." Appellant's App., Dep. of Robert 

Donnelly, at 308-09. He further testified that to his knowledge, 

Ian never stored the gasoline anywhere other than next to the lawn 

mower. The garage was kept locked, and both Michael and his 

little sister were warned repeatedly against going into the 

garage. 

Michael's parents and Ian testified that they knew gasoline 

was dangerous and should not be handled by the younger children. 

Michael's father testified that he took what he believed to be 

adequate steps to prevent Michael from having access to the gas, 

namely, he stored it in the locked garage, screwed the lid on 

tight, and warned Michael not to go in the garage. Until the day 

of the accident, no one thought Michael could unlock the garage. 

This diversity action is governed by Oklahoma law. In 

Oklahoma, "[i]t is well established that in order to recover in a 

case of negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) a duty; ( 2) 

negligence or violation of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) 

damage or injury." Loper v. Austin, 596 P.2d 544, 546 (Okla. 

1979) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 4 
In addition, Oklahoma has adopted the doctrine of 

manufacturer's product liability set forth in the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 402A. Kirkland v. General Motors Co;r:p., S?l 

P.2d 1353, 1361-62 (Okla. 1974). To prevail on a manufacturer's 

product liability claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the 

product was the cause of the injury; (2) that the defect existed 

in the product at the time it left the hands of the particular 

defendant; and (3) that the defect in the product made the product 

unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's 

property. Id. at 1363. 

The district court entered summary judgment against 

plaintiffs and in favor of defendants Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & 

Johnson on all claims after concluding the gasoline was not 

unreasonably dangerous, these defendants had no duty to warn the 

convenience store or the ultimate consumer of the dangerous 

propensities of gas, and the failure to warn was not the proximate 

cause of Michael's injuries. We agree that plaintiffs failed to 

establish the requisite causation between Michael's injuries and 

t h~ acts or omissions of Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & Johnson under 

either a negligence or a manufacturer's liability theory. 

Therefore, we need not address the other grounds on 

judgment in favor 

which the 

district court entered summary of these 

defendants. 

Plaintiffs concede that defendants' failure to warn Ian or 

his father to dispense gasoline into only a metal, and not a 

plastic, container did not cause Michael's injuries. Plaintiffs 

argue, however, that the plastic nature of the gas can enhanced 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 5 
Michael's injuries. They base their argument on an affidavit of 

an expert fire investigator, who opined that had the container 

been metal, the fire from the spilled gas would not have been as 

great because the container would not have melted and exposed the 

rest of the gasoline to the fire. 

While plastic containers may have the propensity to melt and 

expose their contents to the fire, there is no evidence in the 

record to suggest this is what happened here. Michael may have 

poured all the gasoline out of the container from the outset, 

leaving no remaining gasoline to be exposed to the flame once the 

container melted. An affidavit of an expert witness that is not 

supported by specific facts cannot be used to create a genuine 

issue of material fact and defeat summary judgment. See Evers v. 

General Motors Co:r;:p., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985); 

Rohrbaugh ex rel. Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., ~nc., 719 F. Supp. 

470, 474 (N.D.W.Va. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 

Defendants' failure to warn Ian or his father to keep 

gasoline out of the reach of children was not a cause of Michael's 

injuries, either. Both Ian and his father testified that they 

knew gasoline was dangerous and should be kept away from Michael 

and that they took precautions to keep Michael away from the 

gasoline. An additional warning from defendants to keep the 

gasoline away from children would not have prevented the accident 

and Michael's ensuing injuries. 

Finally, defendants' failure to warn Ian or his father to 

store the gasoline outdoors was not a cause of Michael's injuries. 

Michael's injuries arose from his pouring the gasoline out in the 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 6 
) 

garage, not from the gasoline having been stored in the garage. 

As the district court noted, regardless of whether the gasoline 

were stored indoors or out, Michael still could have taken it into 

the garage and poured it out on the lawn mower. 

In sum, even if defendants breached a duty to warn Ian or his 

father of the precautions discussed above or if the gas were 

defective because it was sold without these warnings, the lack of 

warnings did not cause Michael's injuries. "[M]anufacturers and 

suppliers of defective products [are not] absolute insurers of all 

users and consumers whom they serve. . [C]ausation of the 

injury by the defective product beyond a mere possibility must be 

shown." Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1366. The district court properly 

entered summary judgment in favor of Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & 

Johnson on plaintiff's claims for negligence and manufacturer's 

product liability. 

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of 

Gilbarco on plaintiffs' 

after concluding that 

manufacturer's product 

no duty 

liability claim 

Gilbarco had to 

permitting minors to dispense gasoline or permitting 

be dispensed into unapproved containers, because 

warn against 

gasoline to 

neither the 

gasoline nor the container was Gilbarco's product. The court 

entered summary judgment in favor of Gilbarco on plaintiffs' 

negligence claim after concluding that even if Gilbarco had a duty 

to provide the warnings, its failure to do so was not a proximate 

cause of Michael's injuries. 

An essential element of any manufacturer's product liability 

claim is that the plaintiff was injured by a defect in the 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 7 
manufacturer's product. See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363. 

Gilbarco's product--the pump--was not responsible for Michael's 

injuries. Michael was not injured while he or someone else was 

pumping gasoline, and plaintiffs point to no evidence to suggest 

that how the gasoline was pumped into the can affected subsequent 

events in any manner. Plaintiffs' negligence claim against 

Gilbarco suffers from the same defect as their negligence claims 

against Kerr-McGee and Mitchell & Johnson: the failure to warn 

Ian or his father about the dangerous propensities of gasoline was 

not the cause of Michael's injuries. 

Because plaintiffs failed to establish a material issue of 

fact as to causation, we conclude the district court properly 

entered summary judgment in favor of Kerr-McGee, Mitchell & 

Johnson, and Gilbarco on plaintiffs' claims for manufacturer's 

product liability and negligence. 

Following the entry of summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a 

"Motion for New Trial; Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration; 

and Motion to Vacate Prior Order and Set Aside Judgment." We 

review the district court's denial of this motion under an abuse 

of discretion standard. See Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 

1507, 1519 (10th Cir. 1990). Based upon our review of the record, 

the briefs, arid the pertinent law, as well as our earlier 

conclusion that the district court properly entered summary 

judgment against plaintiffs because they failed to present a 

material issue of fact on causation, we conclude the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' 

post-judgment motion. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6306 Document: 010110115169 Date Filed: 05/21/1993 Page: 8 
' 

Plaintiffs' motion to file a brief in reply to the answer 

brief of Gilbarco is GRANTED, and the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

G. Thomas Van Bebber 

District Judge 

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