Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_17-cv-06479/USCOURTS-cand-1_17-cv-06479-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JOSEPH GERARD LUTHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-06479-RMI 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 26

Plaintiff filed an application for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $7,154.00

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Mot. (dkt. 26). 

Defendant’s opposition, if any, was due on July 8, 2019. Defendant did not file, timely or 

otherwise, an opposition. 

BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2019, the court issued an opinion and judgment granting Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment and denying Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. See

Order (dkt. 23). The court found that the ALJ erred at Step Two of the disability determination 

process related to Plaintiff’s anxiety and panic attacks. Id. at 6-7. The court found that the ALJ’s 

analysis related to these two claims of medically severe impairments was insufficient. Id. The 

court also noted that while Defendant conceded in its briefing that “the ALJ technically erred,” 

Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to show that the error was not harmless. Id. 

In determining that this matter should be remanded for the errors committed at Step Two, 

the court rejected Defendant’s harmless error argument based on the Circuit’s instruction that an 

ALJ’s failure to follow the procedure set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a is not harmless in cases 

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that involve a ‘colorable’ claim of mental impairment. See Keyser v. Comm’r SSA, 648 F.3d 721, 

725 (9th Cir. 2011). A claim is ‘colorable’ if it is not “wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or 

frivolous.” Boettcher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1985).

Based on the uncontroverted evidence in support of Plaintiff’s claim that he suffered from anxiety 

and panic attacks, which included: (1) narrative statements by his wife and himself on SSAprovided function report forms; (2) Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing; (3) extensive medical 

records from his treating physician consistently indicating an assessment for an anxiety disorder; 

and (4) a substantiating observation by a state agency reviewing consultant, noting that Plaintiff 

received a “diagnosis of Anxiety/Panic at all visits” between June of 2005 and July of 2011, the 

court found that Plaintiff presented more than a ‘colorable’ claim of mental impairment and 

remanded the case.

LEGAL STANDARD

 The purpose of the EAJA statute is to “eliminate financial disincentives for those who 

would defend against unjustified government action and thereby to deter the unreasonable exercise 

of government authority.” Guitierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cit. 2001) (quoting 

Ardestani v. INS, 502 US 129, 138 (1991)). To prevail in a motion for EAJA fees, the plaintiff 

must be a prevailing party and the government’s position must be without substantial justification. 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 (1983).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff as Prevailing Party

An applicant for Social Security benefits who receives a remand under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. §405(g) is a “prevailing party” and eligible for fees and costs under the EAJA. Shalala v. 

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party within the meaning of 

the law. Because Plaintiff's net worth was less than $2,000,000 when the civil action was filed, he 

is an eligible party under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).1

//

 

1 The court granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis on November 27, 2017. See Order

(dkt. 7).

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Position of the United States Was Not Substantially Justified

Because Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this case, the EAJA mandates an award of 

attorney fees “unless the court finds the position of the United States was substantially justified or 

that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A); Thomas v. Peterson, 

841 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1998). The Commissioner in this case bears the burden of establishing 

that his position was “substantially justified.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. To meet this standard, 

the government must show that its position was “justified in substance or in the main – that is, 

justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 

565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Put differently, the government’s position must 

have a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870

(9th Cir. 2013). Under the EAJA, both the “government’s litigation position and the underlying 

agency action giving rise to the civil action” must be substantially justified to avoid an award of 

fees. Id. Thus, “[t]he government’s position must be substantially justified at each stage of the 

proceedings.” Id. at 872 (quoting Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In this circuit, “a holding that the agency’s decision was unsupported by 

substantial evidence is a strong indication that the position of the United States was not 

substantially justified.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 872 (internal quotations and modifications omitted);

see also Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t will be only a decidedly 

unusual case in which there is substantial justification under the EAJA even though the agency’s 

decision was reversed as lacking in reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record.”).

As discussed above, the court found that the ALJ’s error at Step Two was not harmless 

because Plaintiff had presented at least a ‘colorable’ claim of mental impairment and remand was 

required. See Keyser, 648 F.3d at 725; see also Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 722. While Defendant 

conceded the ALJ’s error, Defendant’s argument that the error was harmless was not substantially 

justified in light of Plaintiff’s presentment of, at the very least, a colorable mental impairment 

claim. Moreover, as stated above, it is Defendant’s burden to establish that his position was 

substantially justified, and Defendant has failed to attempt to meet his burden when he failed to 

timely file an opposition. 

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Plaintiff’s Fee Request is Not Excessive

Plaintiff contends that the number of hours claimed by counsel for compensation are 

reasonable and necessary under the circumstances of this case. Under the EAJA, Plaintiff is 

entitled to “reasonable” fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Determining whether the expenditure of 

time litigating a Social Security case was reasonable “will always depend on case-specific factors 

including, among others, the complexity of the legal issues, the procedural history, the size of the 

record, and when counsel was retained;” courts cannot apply de facto caps limiting the hours 

attorneys can reasonably expend. Costa v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 690

F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s attorney did not represent Plaintiff at the administrative hearing. Thus, he first 

became familiar with the record while preparing to file Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Additionally, he reviewed and responded to the arguments made in Defendant’s Cross Motion for 

Summary Judgement. The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s attorney’s briefing and finds that the 

hours expended by Plaintiff’s attorney in litigating this action were a reasonable expenditure of 

time in light of the circumstances of the case.

Generally, fees under the EAJA are not to exceed $125 per hour, “unless the court 

determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability 

of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(2)(A). It is undisputed that the EAJA statutory maximum hourly rate in the Ninth Circuit, 

adjusted for increases in the cost of living, was $196.79 for 2017, and $200.78 in the first half of 

2018.2 Plaintiff’s attorney provided a Declaration explaining that his hourly rate was $196.00, and 

that he spent at least 36.5 hours litigating this case, comprised of 2.5 hours in 2017 ($490.00), 27.3

hours in 2018 ($5,350.80), and 6.7 hours in 2019 ($1,313.20). See (dkt. 26-1). Plaintiff’s attorney 

also seeks $310.00 in costs to recoup his pro hac vice admission fees.3Id.

 

2

See table set forth at: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039; citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

3

“[P]ro hac vice fees, charged by the Clerk of the Court, can be considered ‘Fees of the clerk’ under 28 

U.S.C. § 1920(1).” Dubord v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-CV-1402-DMC, 2019 WL 1060048, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019

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Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff meets the statutory requirements for 

an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,154.00 under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), plus 

an award for costs in the amount of $310.00, totaling $7,464.00.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees under the EAJA in that amount is 

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2019

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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