Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00586/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00586-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABEL P. REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

FLORES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00586-DAD-JLT (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER 

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY 

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY 

ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS 

(Doc. 1)

30-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff’s claims he suffered inadequate medical care following prostate surgery. As 

discussed below, Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against two of the named defendants 

upon which he may elect to proceed, or he may attempt to cure the deficiencies in his pleading by 

filing a first amended complaint.

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

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per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred at California State Prison in Corcoran (CSP-Cor), 

where he is currently housed. CDCR Director Matthew Cate, Receiver J. Clark Kelso, Warden 

Dave Davey, Chief Medical Officer O. Beregovskaya, Supervising Registered Nurse Marquez,

Registered Nurse John Doe, Licensed Vocational Nurse M. Flores, and Correctional Officer J. 

Huewe are named as Defendants from whom Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff had surgery for an enlarged prostate. He was discharged 

from the hospital to CSP-Cor on January 23, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that he was not given the 

prescribed post-operative medications and, when he began experiencing pain and bleeding, he 

was denied care and treatment. The details of Plaintiff's allegations against each Defendant are 

discussed where applicable below.

Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against LVN Flores and John Doe RN for 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and may be able to amend to correct the 

deficiencies in his pleading so as to make additional claims cognizable. Thus, he is being given 

the applicable standards based on his stated claims and leave to file a first amended complaint, or 

he may notify the Court that he desires to proceed on the claim found cognizable in this order. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as 

possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were violated by each 

Defendant and its factual basis. Where the allegations against two or more Defendants are 

factually intertwined, Plaintiff need not repeat the factual allegations separately against each 

Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff should present his factual allegations and identify whichever 

Defendants he feels are thereby implicated.

2. Receiver J. Clark Kelso

As a federal receiver, Kelso is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Quasi-judicial 

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immunity1is derived from the long-recognized common law doctrine of judicial immunity. In re 

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.2002). Partly to promote the use of the appellate process, 

acts performed by judges that relate to the judicial process are immune from attack. Id. Quasijudicial immunity is immunity that extends to nonjudicial officers for “claims relating to the 

exercise of judicial functions .” Id., quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991). In other 

words, quasi-judicial immunity protects nonjudicial officers because their decisions are the 

functional equivalent of a judge and involve considerable exercise of discretion. Antoine v. Byers 

& Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 436, 113 S.Ct. 2167 (1993).

To this end, Kelso was appointed to be the receiver for CDCR's health care system. See 

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, et al., C01-1351-TEH (N.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2008) (class action 

constitutional challenge to the adequacy of medical care provided throughout the California state 

prison system). Upon Kelso’s appointment as receiver in 2008, the district court stated that “[t]he 

Receivership must continue to maintain its independence as an arm of the federal courts 

established to take over state operations . . . .” Id. at 5. The district court ordered that “[a]ll 

powers, privileges, and responsibilities of the Receiver, as set forth in the Court’s February 14, 

2006 Order Appointing Receiver, shall continue in full effect, except as modified by subsequent 

orders....” Id. In the February 14, 2006 Order Appointing Receiver, the district court ordered that 

[t]he Receiver and his staff shall have the status of officers and agents of this 

Court, and as such shall be vested with the same immunities as vest with this 

Court.

Id. at 6. Those judicial immunities extend to immunity from suit. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 

547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the 

immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction 

. . . .”); see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 4276554 (E.D.Cal. Nov.29, 2007) 

(holding that a receiver who was “imbued with the power and authority to act in the name of the 

 

1 This doctrine is also referred to as “derivative judicial immunity.” See New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 

F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit noted that other circuits “have held uniformly that state courtappointed receivers are entitled to absolute immunity” on the premise that “receivers are court officers who share the 

immunity awarded to judges.” Id., quoting Kermit Const. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 

Cir.1976).

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Court as the Court's officer” had judicial immunity). “[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by 

allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without 

engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). The two 

primary exceptions to the absolute judicial immunity are where the judge's action is “not taken in 

the judge's judicial capacity” and “though judicial in nature, is taken in the complete absence of 

all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11-12.

Plaintiff’s allegations solely attack Kelso’s status as federal receiver and there is no 

allegation to support or otherwise even imply that Kelso acted “in the complete absence of all 

jurisdiction.” Accordingly, Kelso is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and this suit may not be 

maintained against him.

3. Exhibits

Plaintiff=s Complaint refers to a number of exhibits which he referenced in compliance 

with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). (See e.g. Doc. 1, 16:10, 16:23-25, 17:5-6) However, no such 

exhibits were attached and filed with the Complaint. In any event, the submission of evidence is 

premature as Plaintiff is only required to state a prima facie claim for relief. For screening 

purposes, the Court must assume that Plaintiff=s factual allegations are true. Thus, it is 

unnecessary for a plaintiff to submit exhibits in support of the allegations in a complaint. If 

Plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, he would do well to simply state the facts 

upon which he alleges a Defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from 

submitting or referring to any exhibits. 

4. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act requires an actual connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 

Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional 

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s 

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 

deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

As will be discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff’s allegations do not sufficiently link 

Director Cate, Warden Davey, CMO Beregovskaya, and SRN Marquez to his factual allegations 

Plaintiff must clearly identify which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of 

his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each Defendant on 

notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2004). Further, there are a number of prison personnel whom Plaintiff identifies in his 

allegations, but did not name as Defendants in this action. If Plaintiff desires to proceed on any 

claims against such prison staff, he must name them as Defendants. 

D. Claims for Relief

1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘ “significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” ’ ” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

“Indications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include the existence of an injury 

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the 

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presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic or substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). For screening 

purposes, Plaintiff's post-operative condition and complications are accepted as a serious medical 

need. 

Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and 

“requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’ ” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). “Deliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). “Under this 

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have 

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no 

matter how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122. More generally, deliberate indifference Amay appear when prison officials deny, 

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which 

prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] 

prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 

(A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in >substantial= harm to the prisoner is not 

necessary.@). 

Plaintiff alleges that, following surgery, he was discharged to the ACH at CSP-Cor on 

January 23, 2014 with a prescription for medications and directions from the surgeon for Plaintiff 

to report to a physician or an Emergency Room if his symptoms returned or worsened. (Doc. 1, 

p. 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that, he told R.N. B. Marean in the ACH that he needed his post-op 

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medications and she told him that he would receive them “on the yard.” (Id.) Plaintiff never 

received them. (Id.) 

Plaintiff next alleges that, on January 26, 2014, at approximately 7:00 a.m., he was pushed 

in a wheelchair to the clinic to pick up his morning medications at which time he informed LVN 

Flores that he was in severe pain in his bladder and kidneys and that he was leaking blood from 

his penis. (Id., p. 18.) LVN Flores responded that it was not a medical emergency, that the red 

on his boxers was not blood but Kool-Aid, and told him to submit a health care services request 

form to be seen. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was wheeled back to his building where he and the person pushing him in the 

wheelchair informed C/O Huewe and the control booth officer that he was in pain and that 

medical staff were not responsive, to which the control booth officer indicated that he would let 

Plaintiff go back to medical at noon. (Id.) Around 11:30 a.m., the assistant wheeled Plaintiff 

back to the clinic where he was again seen by LVN Flores and told her of his continuing pain as 

well as that he was unable to urinate, had thick blood clots come out of his penis, and that he had 

just had surgery and needed medical attention. (Id., p. 19.) LVN Flores ignored Plaintiff. (Id.) 

LVN Hamilton was also present for this exchange but did nothing. (Id.) 

When Plaintiff and the assistant pushing his wheelchair arrived back at Plaintiff’s building 

they again relayed what happened to the control booth officer and C/O Huewe who asked if 

Plaintiff wanted them to hit the alarm to which Plaintiff responded in the affirmative. (Id.) LVNs 

Hamilton and Flores responded to the alarm and LVN Flores again stated that it was Kool-Aid, 

not blood on Plaintiff’s boxers and told custody staff that Plaintiff could go back to his cell and 

wait to see the nurse the next day. (Id., pp. 19-20.) C/O Huewe escorted Plaintiff back to his cell 

and Plaintiff told him that he was in severe pain, dripping blood clots from his penis, and was 

unable to urinate, but C/O Huewe responded that medical had already seen Plaintiff, so there was 

nothing more he could do. (Id., p. 20.) 

On third watch, Plaintiff reported his problems to other floor staff officers (not named as 

defendants) who let him call his mother, who thereafter called the hospital where Plaintiff’s 

surgery was performed. (Id., p. 21.) At approximately 3:45 p.m., Plaintiff was seen at the clinic 

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by John Doe RN, whom Plaintiff told of his surgery, severe pain, and that Plaintiff had used a 

catheter trying to release his urine, but only blood clots came out. (Id.) John Doe RN looked and 

told Plaintiff he did not see any blood on his penis and told Plaintiff to see a nurse the next day. 

(Id.) When Plaintiff protested and asked John Doe RN “Why not do something now?” John Doe 

RN simply responded “I’m done.” (Id.) When he returned to his cell, Plaintiff again called his 

mother and eventually a nurse from the hospital called CSP-Cor and told medical staff that 

Plaintiff was having a medical emergency which resulted in his return to the hospital at 

approximately 10:00 that evening. (Id., pp. 21-22.) 

These allegations state cognizable claims against LVN Flores and John Doe RN for 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. However, this does not state a 

cognizable claim against C/O Huewe as non-medical defendants cannot Abe considered 

deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints 

of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor@ and if Aa prisoner is under the 

care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing 

that the prisoner is in capable hands.@ Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.2005), citing 

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004). Further, Plaintiff fails to state any allegations 

to show what more, besides sounding the alarm which was done, C/O Huewe could have done to 

obtain medical care for Plaintiff when the nursing staff declined treatment. 

2. Plata Settlement

Plaintiff complains that Defendants fail to comply with the APlata Plan.@

2

 Individual suits 

for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be 

brought where there is a pending class action suit involving the same subject matter. McNeil v. 

Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir.1991); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th 

Cir.1988) (en banc). AIndividual members of the class and other prisoners may assert any 

equitable or declaratory claims they have, but they must do so by urging further actions through 

the class representative and attorney, including contempt proceedings, or by intervention in the 

 

2

The Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to the rulings under Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 01-1351 

TEH, a class action concerning medical care in California=s prisons.

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class action.@ Id. Any asserted requests for injunctive relief are therefore dismissed. If Plaintiff 

wants to complain about a perceived failure to comply with the order in Plata, he may contact the 

plaintiff=s class counsel in Plata.

3

3. California Tort Claims Act

Under the California Tort Claims Act, set forth in California Government Code sections 

810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a public employee or 

entity unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California Victim Compensation and 

Government Claims Board, and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. 

“The Tort Claims Act requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented 

to and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776, 

(1995). The purpose of this requirement is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to 

enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974) (citations omitted). 

Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” constitutes an element of a cause of action 

for damages against a public entity or official. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 

1244 (2004). Thus, in the state courts, “failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing 

compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a 

demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” Id. at 1239, (fn.omitted).

To be timely, a claim must be presented to the VCGCB “not later than six months after 

the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Govt.Code § 911.2. Thereafter, Aany suit brought against 

a public entity@ must be commenced no more than six months after the public entity rejects the 

claim. Cal. Gov. Code, ' 945.6, subd. (a)(1). 

Federal courts must require compliance with the CTCA for pendant state law claims that 

seek damages against state employees or entities. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th 

Cir.1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th 

Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may 

 

3

Counsel for the plaintiff class in Plata is Donald H. Specter at the Prison Law Office, General Delivery, 

San Quentin, CA 94964.

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proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in compliance with the applicable 

requirements. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 

Cir.1988); Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D.Cal.2008). Plaintiff fails 

to state any allegations to show compliance with the CTCA upon which to be allowed to pursue 

his claims under California law in this action. 

4. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges that, based on their supervisory positions, Director Cate, Warden Davey, 

CMO Beregovskaya, and SRN Marquez are responsible for budgetary constraints and the 

implementation of policies/practices/customs that result in deliberate indifference toward the 

serious medical needs of prisoners.

4

 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

 

4

Plaintiff also alleges these Defendants failed to implement the Plata Settlement, but this is not cognizable for the 

reasons previously stated. 

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her own misconduct. Id. 

Bare, conclusory assertions, such as Plaintiff makes here “. . . amount to nothing more 

than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” which “are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ 

Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 

ASuch allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

Thus, Plaintiff=s allegations against Director Cate, Warden Davey, CMO Beregovskaya, 

and SRN Marquez related to the Plata Settlement do not state a cognizable claim. Likewise, he 

has failed to state a claim that these supervisory personnel are liable merely because their 

subordinates violated Plaintiff's rights. 

E. Conclusion

Plaintiff is given the choice to either file a first amended complaint or to proceed on the 

claims found cognizable in this order against Defendants LVN Flores and John Doe RN5for 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff must either notify the Court of his decision to proceed on these cognizable claims, or file 

a first amended complaint within 30 days of the service of this order. 

If Plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 

1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

 

5

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include no provision Apermitting the use of fictitious defendants.@ McMillan 

v. Department of Interior, 907 F.Supp. 322, 328 D.Nev. 1995), aff=d, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 

U.S. 1132 (1997). See also Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1970). AAs a 

general rule, the use of >John Doe= to identify a defendant is not favored.@ Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 

(9th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, a plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to identify the unknown defendants through 

discovery, unless it is clear that discovery will not reveal their identities or the complaint must be dismissed for other 

reasons. Id. Plaintiff must, at some point, identify John Doe RN by name in order to proceed on claims against him.

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(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the 

deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his

first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot"

complaints).

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

b. notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended 

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the Court 

as viable/cognizable in this order.

///

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///

///

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If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, it will be recommended that he be allowed to 

proceed only on the claims found cognizable herein and that all other claims and 

Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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