Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01224/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01224-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ALLEN LUCAS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 15cv1224 GPC (WVG)

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A

PROTECTIVE ORDER 

vs.

RON DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin

State Prison,

Respondent.

On November 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion for a Protective Order under

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003), and a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of the Motion [“Mot. Mem.”]. (ECF Nos. 44, 44-1.) On

November 30, 2016, Respondent filed a Response in Opposition [“Opp.”], and on

December 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply. (ECF Nos. 50, 55.) On January 27, 2017,

Petitioner filed a privilege log, specifying privileged materials to be covered by the

protective order. (ECF No. 61.) The Court heard arguments from both parties on

March 10, 2017. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s motion is DENIED

without prejudice.

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Respondent has lodged the state record in this Court, which includes the pretrial, trial, state appellate and state postconviction records. (ECF Nos. 30-36.) In his

motion, Petitioner refers generally to the state court record lodged in this Court by

Respondent, and asserts that: “In order to plead his claims, Lucas has relied on

documents and exhibits in the lodgment throughout the Petition. Some of those

documents contain statements and information that are protected by the attorney client

privilege and work product doctrine.” (Mot. Mem. at 2.) Petitioner contends that 1

“[b]ecause Lucas was compelled by this action to produce documents in support of his

claims, Lucas seeks to limit the scope of the waiver of the protections afforded by the

attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Lucas now seeks a protective

order to protect these privileged materials against use in proceedings other than the

current federal habeas proceeding, such as a retrial.” (Id.) In the proposed protective

order,Petitioner seeks protection for “documents and materials, including declarations,

materials derived from the trial team, or trial counsel files that Petitioner provides to

Respondent during this habeas action or that have been previously or will be lodged

in this Court” as well as “any reference to such documents and testimony in the parties’

pleadings submitted to this Court.” (Id. at 5-6.)

Respondent opposes the motion, pointing out that “the materials Lucas seeks to

protect were produced in the course ofstate proceedings and, therefore, are not subject

to a so-called Bittaker order.” (Opp. at 2.) Respondent notes that Petitioner “isseeking

a protective order for information contained in documentslodged by Respondent,” and

that “to the extent any of those documents were disclosed by Lucas, they were

disclosed in the course of state court litigation” and thus, “the contours of any implied

waiver occasioned by the disclosure of those documents is a matter of state law.” (Id.

at 3-4.) Respondent also maintains that because the federal court’s review under 28

When citing to documents filed with the Court’s Electronic Case Filing 1

(“ECF”) system, the Court will refer to the pages assigned by that system.

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U.S.C. § 2254(d) is limited to the state record, there is no present need for Petitioner

to produce materials requiring federal court protection. (Id. at 4, citing Cullen v.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).) Respondent also notes that California law protects

materials disclosed in state court proceedings. (Id. at 4-5, citing People v. Ledesma,

39 Cal. 4th 641 (2006).) In the Reply, Petitioner argues that Respondent’s view of

Bittaker and the subsequent case law istoo narrow, his argument about section 2254(d)

and Pinholster is “misguided and irrelevant,” and asserts that a federal court may issue

a protective order regardless of the fact that the privileged materials at issue were

originally disclosed in state court proceedings. (Reply at 2-5.) Petitioner also argues

that a federal protective order is appropriate at this time because state law does not

adequately protect the privileged information. (Id. at 5; see also Mot. Mem. at 5.) 

On January 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a Privilege Log, specifying the privileged

materials he seeks to protect through the requested protective order. Each of the

documents listed in the privilege log are identified as part of the state court record

lodged in this Court by Respondent, specifically lodgment number 13, which contains

the exhibits to Petitioner’s state habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court

in Case No. S168103. (See ECF No. 61 at 2-19, citing ECF No. 36-8 through 36-30.)

II. DISCUSSION

In Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (2003) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged that “[i]t has long been the rule in the federal courtsthat, where a habeas

petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he waives the attorneyclient privilege as to all communications with his allegedly ineffective lawyer,” and

then examined and ultimately upheld a district court’s decision to issue a protective

order with respect to materials from trial counsels’ files disclosed during federal

discovery proceedings, as well as depositions of trial counsel conducted during those

proceedings. Id. at 716-17 n.1, 728. In Bittaker, “[t]he district court entered a

protective order precluding use of the privileged materials for any purpose other than

litigating the federal habeas petition, and barring the Attorney General from turning

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them over to any other persons or offices, including, in particular, law enforcement or

prosecutorial agencies.” Id. at 717.

At issue was “[t]he rule that a litigant waives the attorney-client privilege by

putting the lawyer’s performance at issue during the course of litigation,” and the

Bittaker Court noted that this long-standing rule, termed “the fairness principle,” “is

often expressed in terms of preventing a party from using the privilege as both a shield

and a sword.” Id. at 718-19. The Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the scope

of this waiver, including considerations such as the privilege itself, the right to habeas

review and to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and state prosecutorial

interests, and held that a “narrow waiver rule” was appropriate, that is, “[a] waiver that

limits the use of privileged communications to adjudicating the ineffective assistance

of counsel claims.” See id. at 720-24. 

In upholding the district court’s decision to issue a protective order, the Ninth

Circuitspecifically held that “district courts have the obligation, whenever they permit

discovery of attorney-client materials as relevant to the defense of ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in habeas cases, to ensure that the party given such access

does not disclose these materials, except to the extent necessary in the habeas

proceeding, i.e., to ensure that such a party’s actions do not result in a rupture of the

privilege.” Id. at 727-28.

Petitioner acknowledges that “Bittaker dealt with a protective order in the case

of court-compelled discovery,” but argues that “its reasoning applies to all stages of

habeas litigation, including the filing of a petition, because the same concerns noted

by the Bittaker court [as being] present during discovery are also present during the

initial filing stage.” (Mot. Mem. at 3.) This argument relies on an overly-expansive

view of Bittaker, because, as Petitioner acknowledges, Bittaker’s holding was

specifically aimed at providing protection for privileged materials produced during

federal discovery proceedings. In Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir.

2012), while the Ninth Circuit generally stated that “the language in Bittaker supports

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the conclusion that its holding extends to the entire habeas litigation, not to pretrial

discovery only,” the panel majority held that federal protection was available for

privileged materials disclosed in federal court during both discovery and evidentiary

hearing proceedings, but rejected the suggestion that a protective order was required

upon the filing of a habeas petition in federal court. Id. at 820; see id. at 819 n.4

(“Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, we do not hold that a district court must issue a

protective order the moment a habeas petitioner asserts an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. It must, however, do so prior to authorizing discovery on such a

claim.”), citing Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 728.

Again, a review of the privilege log confirms that Petitioner cites only to

documents lodged in this Court by Respondent, all of which were originally disclosed

during state court proceedings, and none of which, as counsel for Petitioner

acknowledged at oral argument, were filed under seal in state court. As Bittaker’s

holding specifically addressed a federal court’s duty to protect otherwise privileged

materials disclosed during federal proceedings, which is not the case here, and the

Ninth Circuit has since explicitly declined to set forth a requirement that a protective

order issue upon the filing of a federal habeas petition raising claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, this Court remains unpersuaded that Bittaker orsubsequent case

law compels a protective order under the present circumstances.

Examining Petitioner’s motion in light of the habeas statute and clearly

established law similarly supports the conclusion that a protective order is neither

compelled nor appropriate at this time. Under AEDPA, a state prisoner is not entitled

to federal habeasrelief unlessthe state court ruling: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, orinvolved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “(2) resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98

(2011), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). In Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that

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for claims previously decided on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas court’s

“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claimon the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. The Pinholster Court

also stated that “[a]lthough state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in

federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage themfrom

doing so.” Id. at 186. Section 2254(d)(2), as noted above, explicitly limits a reviewing

court to the “evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2).

While Petitioner correctly notes that he must plead facts sufficient to state a

claimfor relief in order to satisfy federal habeas pleading requirements(see Rules 2(c),

4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254), Bittaker specifically dealt with protecting a federal

petitioner’s disclosure of privileged information in federal court. That is simply not

the situation presented here. In this case, while Petitioner has cited to, and relied upon,

privileged materials produced in state court to plead his federal habeas claims, the

materials Petitioner seeks to protect were not newly disclosed during federal court

proceedings.

Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that any perceived

inadequacies in available state court protections should somehow compel the federal

court to issue a protective order. First, as Petitioner recognizes, California law

provides protection for privileged materials disclosed in the course of state habeas

proceedings. See Ledesma, 39 Cal. 4th at 695 (“[W]e conclude the attorney-client

privilege continues to apply for purposes of retrial after otherwise privileged matters

have been disclosed in connection with habeas corpus proceedings, under [California]

Evidence Code section 958.”) Moreover, regardless of the sufficiency or insufficiency

of state law in this respect, the Bittaker decision clearly reflects the Ninth Circuit’s

reasoning that the federal protective order in that case was required because “it is the

federal courts that are inducing petitioner to waive his privilege, so the federal courts

must be able to guarantee the integrity of the bargain if petitioner chooses to waive his

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privilege so he can litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Bittaker, 331

F.3d at 726. Here, Petitioner cites solely to materials disclosed and turned over to

Respondent during the state court proceedings, and the scope of anywaiver orresulting

need for protection is thus a matter to be decided by that same court. 

Ultimately, it is clear that Bittaker does not compel the protective order

Petitioner seeks, as Petitioner has not produced new materials in federal court as the

result of federally-compelled disclosure. That Petitioner points to other district courts

that have granted such orders upon the filing of a federal petition does not persuade the

Court that this is an appropriate course of action here. (See Mot. Mem. at 5; Reply at

4.) Given that Bittaker is specifically aimed at ensuring federal protection for

privileged materials disclosed in the course of federal proceedings and Petitioner fails

to identify any materials not previously produced in state court that he was compelled

to now disclose for purposes of this federal action, Petitioner’s motion is DENIED.

In the motion, Petitioner states that “Lucas reserves the right to seek protection

of privileged materials to be disclosed at a future evidentiary hearing or in future

discovery related to these federal habeas proceedings.” (Mot. Mem. at 6, fn. 2.) As

such, the denialshall be without prejudice to refiling the motion in the event of federal

discovery, evidentiary hearing, or similar proceedings in this Court which compel

Petitioner to produce or disclose previously undisclosed privileged materials.

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s motion for a Bittaker protective

order (ECF No. 44), is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 15, 2017

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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