Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05267/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05267-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2005 Decided June 3, 2005

No. 04-5267

ALFRIEDA S. CONNOR SCOTT, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE ESTATE OF HAROLD CONNOR,

APPELLANT

v.

MICHAEL JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv01560)

Charles W. Day, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Joseph D. Gebhardt.

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Special

Counsel.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and TATEL and GARLAND,

Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, federal employees dissatisfied with the

administrative resolution of their discrimination complaints may

file suit in federal court. In this case, we must decide whether

an employee who secures a final administrative disposition

finding discrimination but who is dissatisfied with the remedy

may challenge only the remedy in the federal court action.

Answering no, the district court held that the employee must

first prove liability, and we agree. 

I. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., provides that before filing suit, an

individual alleging that a federal agency engaged in employment

discrimination must seek administrative adjudication of the

claim. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Under EEOC

regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VII, the employee (or

job applicant) files a complaint with the employing agency. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.106(a). The employing agency then conducts an

investigation and, if the employee so requests, refers the matter

to an EEOC Administrative Judge (“AJ”) for a hearing. Id. §§

1614.106(e)(2), 1614.108-09. After the employing agency

investigates or, if the employee requested a hearing, after the AJ

issues a decision, the employing agency must “take final

action.” Id. § 1614.110. If the employee never requested a

hearing, the employing agency’s final action must “consist of

findings . . . on the merits of each issue . . . and, when

discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and relief.” Id. §

1614.110(b). In cases where the employee requested a hearing,

the employing agency’s “final order shall notify the complainant

whether or not the agency will fully implement the [AJ’s]

decision.” Id. § 1614.110(a). Complainants dissatisfied with an

employing agency’s final action, whether or not issued after an

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AJ decision, have two options: they may either file suit or

appeal to the EEOC. See id. § 1614.110. If a complainant takes

the latter course, EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”)

reviews the record, supplements it if necessary, and then issues

a written decision. Id. § 1614.404-05. Like the employing

agency’s final action, the OFO’s decision amounts to a final

disposition, triggering the right to sue. Id. § 1614.405(b).

This case began in 1997 when Harold Connor and several

other African-American employees of the Department of

Agriculture (“DOA”) filed a complaint alleging (among other

things) denial of promotions on account of race. DOA referred

the complaint to an AJ who found two claims meritorious:

Connor’s and that of another employee, Dr. Clifford Herron.

After holding a hearing on remedy, the AJ awarded Connor and

Herron GS-15 positions, back pay, attorneys’ fees, and $10,000

each in compensatory damages. In separate final agency

actions—one each for Connor and Herron—DOA accepted the

findings of discrimination, as well as the remedies the AJ had

awarded. 

Following additional administrative proceedings not

relevant to the issue now before us, Herron filed suit in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia challenging only the

sufficiency of his $10,000 compensatory award. Although

Connor is now deceased, Alfrieda Connor Scott, his former wife

and the personal representative of his estate, filed a similar suit.

Addressing Herron’s suit first, the district court held that when

a final administrative disposition finds discrimination and orders

a remedy, the employee may not file suit challenging only the

remedial award. Herron v. Veneman, 305 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74-79

(D.D.C. 2004). Instead, an employee seeking a greater award

must start from scratch, i.e., the employee must file a Title VII

suit and prove liability along with entitlement to relief. Id.

Given that Herron requested trial on damages only, the court

concluded he failed to state a claim. Id. at 74, 79. Later,

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observing that Scott’s claim raised “the same legal issues” as

Herron’s, the district court dismissed it “for the reasons stated

in the court’s . . . order in Herron v. Veneman.” Scott v.

Veneman, No. 03-1560 (D.D.C. June 18, 2004). 

Scott now appeals. Because the only issue she presents is

legal, our review is de novo. Second Amendment Found. v.U.S.

Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

II. 

As the district court explained, two types of civil actions

may arise from Title VII’s federal-sector administrative process.

See Herron, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75. First, complainants who

prevail in the administrative process but who—for whatever

reason—fail to receive their promised remedy, may sue to

enforce the final administrative disposition. See, e.g., Wilson v.

Pena, 79 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing dismissal of

action contending that employing agency used improper

performance rating in calculating back pay owed pursuant to

EEOC finding of discrimination); Houseton v. Nimmo, 670 F.2d

1375 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming decision requiring employing

agency to provide job training awarded in 16-month-old

administrative disposition). In such enforcement actions, the

court reviews neither the discrimination finding nor the remedy

imposed, examining instead only whether the employing agency

has complied with the administrative disposition. See Moore v.

Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1986). Second, a

complainant “aggrieved by the final disposition of his

complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint,

may file a civil action” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c). In a Title VII suit brought after a final administrative

disposition finding no discrimination, the district court considers

the discrimination claim de novo. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425

U.S. 840 (1976). 

Challenging only the compensatory damages award, Scott

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seeks neither to enforce an administrative disposition nor to

retry an unsuccessful discrimination claim. Her suit therefore

raises this question: May a court review a final administrative

disposition’s remedial award without reviewing the disposition’s

underlying finding of liability? According to Title VII’s plain

language, the answer is no. 

Because Scott takes issue with a final administrative

disposition—though just a portion of it—her claim arises under

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), the provision authorizing a cause of

action for a party “aggrieved by [a] final disposition.” Section

2000e-16(c) provides that such “an employee or applicant for

employment . . . may file a civil action as provided in section

2000e-5,” which contains provisions governing actions against

private employers, states, and units of local government.

Section 2000e-16(d) further specifies that “[t]he provisions of

section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall

govern” Title VII suits against federal agencies. (The Supreme

Court has explained that “[t]he most natural reading of the

phrase ‘as applicable’ in [section 2000e-16(d)] is that it merely

reflects the inapplicability of provisions in [section 2000e-5(f)

through (k)] detailing the enforcement responsibilities of the

EEOC and the Attorney General.” Chandler, 425 U.S. at 848.)

Critical to the question before us, section 2000e-5(g), one

of the provisions applied to federal sector suits by sections

2000e-16(c) and (d), states: “[i]f the court finds that the

respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally

engaging in an unlawful employment practice,” it may order

various specified remedies, id. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis

added). Thus, in a federal-sector Title VII case, any remedial

order must rest on judicial findings of liability, and nothing in

the statute’s language suggests that such findings are

unnecessary in cases where a final administrative disposition has

already found discrimination and awarded relief. This rule,

moreover, applies to Scott’s claim even though section 2000eUSCA Case #04-5267 Document #897990 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 5 of 9
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5(g) says nothing about compensatory damages, for the statute

authorizing such damages indicates that section 2000e-5(g)’s

requirement of a judicial finding of liability applies to them as

well. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (making compensatory

damages available “in addition to” remedies mentioned in

section 2000e-5(g)).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chandler v. Roudebush,

425 U.S. 840, reinforces this conclusion. Explaining that federal

courts should not defer to final administrative determinations

finding no discrimination, the Court observed that pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c), “[p]rior administrative

findings made with respect to an employment discrimination

claim may, of course, be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector

trial de novo.” 425 U.S. at 863 n.39. Notice that the Court drew

no distinction between discrimination claims resolved in favor

of the complainant and those resolved against the complainant.

In all cases, administrative findings may “be admitted as

evidence.” Were an administrative finding of liability

conclusive, it would, as the district court pointed out, be

“unnecessary, and indeed strange,” Herron, 305 F. Supp. 2d at

77, for the Supreme Court to have stated that “findings with

respect to” the claim could “be admitted as evidence.”

Chandler is helpful in another respect. The Court explained

that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.

No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, which extended Title VII to federal

employees, sought “to accord [them] the same right to a trial de

novo as is enjoyed by private-sector employees.” 425 U.S. at

848. Requiring federal-sector plaintiffs to prove liability puts

them in approximately the same position as private-sector

plaintiffs who, unable to obtain legally-binding EEOC findings,

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, must litigate both liability and remedy.

In a recent decision examining the issue presented here, the

Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion we do: that Title VII

does not permit courts to review administrative dispositions’

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remedial awards without first determining whether

discrimination occurred. Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229

(10th Cir. 2003). True, as Scott points out, the Fourth and Ninth

Circuits have arrived at the opposite conclusion, but we think

the decisions of those circuits are flawed. 

In Pecker v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1986), the

Fourth Circuit, without “distinguish[ing] between an action for

enforcement of a final” disposition and a suit challenging such

a disposition, Timmons, 314 F.3d at 1236, stated that

“defendants are bound by” EEOC “findings of discrimination

and retaliation,” 801 F.2d at 711 n.3. But Pecker failed to

consider Title VII’s plain language and relied on two decisions

that provide no support for its broad conclusion: Houseton v.

Nimmo, 670 F.2d 1375, an enforcement action, and Moore v.

Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, which not only distinguished between

enforcement actions and challenges to administrative

dispositions, but also, when explaining that courts must enforce

EEOC decisions, made clear that it referred only to the former

type of case. Later, in Morris v. Rice, 985 F.2d 143, 145-46 (4th

Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit held explicitly that a “plaintiff

may limit and tailor his request for de novo review . . . without

exposing himself to a de novo review of a finding of

discrimination.” Yet in Morris the court relied primarily on its

earlier decision in Pecker. Id. For additional support, it cited

only Moore and a Sixth Circuit decision, Haskins v. Department

of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1987), where the court had

no need to decide whether a plaintiff can seek limited de novo

review because the defendant there had conceded liability. 

The Ninth Circuit decision, Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244

(9th Cir. 1995), suffers from precisely the same defects. Like

Pecker and Morris, it fails to examine Title VII’s text, relying

instead on Houseton, Morris, Haskins, and language in Moore

referring only to enforcement actions. Id. at 1247. 

Scott insists that requiring relitigation of liability runs

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counter to Title VII’s policy of encouraging resolution of

discrimination complaints at the administrative level. See West

v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1999) (discussing this policy).

Requiring plaintiffs who challenge a remedial award to

“relitigate [a final disposition’s] finding of discrimination . . .

would ill serve” this policy, Scott contends, because the

requirement “would encourage employees to go directly to court

at the first opportunity, instead of running the risk of erroneous,

unreasonably low damages . . . based on findings of

discrimination that would not be enforceable in federal court.”

Appellant’s Br. at 18-19. According to Scott, such a

requirement would also “encourage disingenuous behavior on

the part of federal agencies.” Id. at 20. Agencies could “speak

out of both sides of their mouth by accepting liability in the

administrative process only to attempt to deny it in the U.S.

District Court.” Id. 

We think these policy arguments fail to overcome Title

VII’s language. As to Scott’s first point, Title VII requires

exhaustion of most administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c). Complainants must pursue these remedies until the

employing agency enters its final action, or for 180 days if the

employing agency fails to act before then. Id. It may be true, as

Scott’s counsel asserted at oral argument, that agencies often fail

to take final action within 180 days, and that employees may

have some incentive to sue when the right to do so accrues. Yet

employees also have incentives not to do so: the administrative

process could produce a final disposition acceptable to the

employee, or if not, it could yield valuable evidence the

employee could use in a later lawsuit. Given this, and given

Title VII’s exhaustion requirement, we think the effect of

prohibiting remedies-only suits on an employee’s incentive to

pursue the administrative process is far from clear—and

certainly not clear enough to justify ignoring Title VII’s plain

language. 

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As to Scott’s second point, we see nothing disingenuous

about an employing agency adopting an AJ’s liability finding

and then disputing liability in court, given that the decision to

adopt the finding may well rest in part on the size of the

remedial award. In this case, for example, DOA may have

accepted the liability finding because it thought the remedy,

including the $10,000 compensatory award, was reasonable, or

at least not worth contesting. Now faced with the prospect of a

larger award, DOA might quite legitimately wish to contest

liability. 

III.

Under Title VII, federal employees who secure a final

administrative disposition finding discrimination and ordering

relief have a choice: they may either accept the disposition and

its award, or file a civil action, trying de novo both liability and

remedy. They may not, however, seek de novo review of just

the remedial award, as Scott tries to do here. We affirm the

judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

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