Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00442/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00442-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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On January 28, 2005, the court issued an order deeming this case related to 1

Romero v. Runnels, CIV S-04-0459-MCE-CMK. Proceedings in the related case are currently

being held in abeyance pending exhaustion of claims in state court. The related case order does

not preclude resolution of the cases separately. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM R. FERNANDEZ, No. CIV S-04-0442-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. RUNNELS,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on March 4, 2004, respondent’s answer (Doc. 7), filed on

August 13, 2004, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 10), filed on September 9. 2004.1

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 2

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts2

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The trial testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the

judgment, established the following facts. On January 28, 1999, two men

kicked in the door of an apartment in the Southwood Estates apartment

complex in Vacaville, where Cory Bonifacio and Ann Winston lived with

their two children. Both Bonifacio and Winston and their children were

home when the two men entered. Pepper, their two-year-old Rottweiler

dog, was also in the house. One man, later identified as defendant

Romero, wore a mask and carried a gun. The other man, later identified

ad defendant Fernandez, was not wearing a mask and was carrying a lead

pipe. 

Once in the kitchen of the apartment, Fernandez told Winston to

get on the floor. Romero pointed his gun at the children and demanded

money. He said, “[I]f you don’t give me money, I will shoot your kids.”

When Bonifacio heard the noise, he came down to the kitchen. Romero

pointed the gun at him and ordered him to get on the ground. In spite of

the mask, Bonifacio immediately recognized Romero from his eyes, chin,

and voice, having seen him twice before. Winston also recognized

Romero’s voice from a prior conversation she had with him in the

neighborhood.

Once Bonifacio was on the ground in the kitchen, Fernandez hit

him with his fist, and struck the dog in the head with the pipe. At some

point, Fernandez pulled a gun out of his fanny pack and pointed it at

Bonifacio, demanding that he give him money. Bonifacio took about

$150 out of his pocket and Romero grabbed it.

Romero ran out of the door and Pepper chased after him. 

Fernandez also fled, but paused at the front door as if he were putting

something into his fanny pack. When he paused, Bonifacio tackled him. 

While Bonifacio and Fernandez fought, Pepper had Romero pinned to the

ground about 10 to 15 feet away. Romero’s mask came off in the struggle

and Fernandez [sic] clearly saw his face. Romero ran away with Pepper

chasing him and Fernandez ran after them once he got away from

Bonifacio. After defendants ran away, Winston and Bonifacio heard a

single gun shot, and later they found Pepper dead with a gunshot wound in

her chest. Winston and Bonifacio later identified Romero and Fernandez

in photographic lineups.

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Fernandez’s wife, Gloria, eventually helped the police locate

Fernandez and Romero in Colorado. Gloria testified that on January 26

she had rented Fernandez a U-Haul so he and Romero could move to

Colorado where Fernandez’s daughter, Desiree, lived. She and Fernandez

had fought over the move, and that night she was arrested for domestic

violence. When she was arraigned on January 28, Fernandez and Romero

were present in the courtroom. By the time she was released that evening,

however, Fernandez and Romero were gone and had taken all of her

furniture. Gloria reported the theft to the police.

Rosie Aguayo, who had traveled with Romero and Fernandez to

Colorado, testified that prior to leaving California, the U-Haul stopped at

the Southwood Apartment Complex and Fernandez got out to see a friend. 

After about five minutes, she heard a noise that sounded like a backfire

and then she heard a dog yelping. Shortly thereafter the U-Haul departed. 

They arrived in Colorado two days later.

Investigators arrested Fernandez and Romero in Colorado and

executed a search warrant for Desiree’s house. The search turned up

clothing that matched the descriptions of the clothing worn by the robbers

on January 28th. Desiree testified at trial that the clothes seized from her

house belonged to her. She also testified that Romero and Fernandez

arrived at her house at about 11:00 p.m. during her anniversary party. She

said her wedding anniversary is on January 28th. Gloria, however,

testified that the anniversary, as recorded in her date book, is actually on

January 30th. 

Fernandez and Romero are father and son, respectively. 

B. Procedural History

The state court recited the following procedural history through direct appeal:

Defendants Romero and Fernandes were charged by an amended

information with first degree residential burglary in count one . . .; first

degree residential robbery in counts two and three . . .; assault with a

semiautomatic firearm in counts four, five, six, and seven . . .; and cruelty

to an animal in count eight . . . . The amended information also alleged

that both defendants used a firearm in the commission of the offenses . . .;

that a principal in each of the above offenses was armed with a firearm. . .;

and that Romero personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the

commission of the robbery. . . . On June 16, 2000, a jury found

defendants guilty as charged. The jury found true all the firearm

enhancement allegations against Romero, but found true only those

enhancement allegations against Fernandez that did not require him to

have been personally armed with a firearm. Defendants each filed a

motion for a new trial that was denied.

Romero was sentenced to a total of 38 years in prison. The trial

court sentenced him to the midterm of four years for first degree robbery,

the midterm of two years for each of the four counts for assault with a

semiautomatic firearm, and the midterm of eight months for cruelty to an

animal. He was sentenced to an additional 25 years, 4 months for the

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4

firearm enhancements. Sentencing on all other counts and enhancement

allegations was stayed . . . .

Fernandez was sentenced to a total prison term of 18 years. The

trial court sentenced him to the midterm of one year four months for first

degree robbery, the upper term of nine years for one count of assault with

a semiautomatic firearm, the midterm of two years for each of the

remaining three counts of assault . . ., and the midterm of eight months for

cruelty to an animal. He was sentenced to an additional one year for the

firearm enhancements. Sentencing on all other counts and enhancement

allegations was stayed . . . .

On direct appeal, petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed in an unpublished reasoned

decision issued on November 18, 2002. Petitioner’s request for direct review by the California

Supreme Court was denied on February 11, 2003, without comment or citation. Petitioner did

not seek post-conviction relief in the state courts. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. For instance, when the state court reaches a

decision on the merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas

court independently reviews the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Similarly, when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim,

because it was not raised in state court or because the court denied it on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de

novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not

apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach petitioner’s claim under its

“relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that,

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where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on perjury claim, AEDPA did not

apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the evidentiary hearing in federal

court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing petition de novo where state

court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the claim alleged by petitioner).

 When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, “concerns about comity and

federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Lockhart v.

Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

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Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

A state court decision is reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot be found

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. As

with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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7

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the trial court erred by denying his

motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; (2) the trial court erred in limiting CALJIC

Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 to circumstantial evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury

pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.27. Respondent concedes these claims are exhausted. 

A. Juror Misconduct Claim

Petitioner contends that the juror who eventually served as the foreperson

concealed during voir dire that her father-in-law had been the police chief of Fairfield, and that

she had been friends with an elderly woman who had been murdered in a home invasion robbery. 

This information was presented to the trial court in the form of a declaration from petitioner’s

attorney filed in support of petitioner’s motion for a new trial. 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.1990). If even a

single juror is “unduly biased or prejudiced” the defendant has been denied his right to an

impartial jury. See Tinsley,895 F.2d at 523-24. To establish misconduct in the context of

failing to answer voir dire questions, petitioner must demonstrate that the juror failed to answer

honestly, and that a correct response would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause. 

See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); Tinsley, 895 F.2d

at 524. While the motives for concealing information may vary, only those reasons that affect a

juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of the trial. See id. Forgetfulness does

not indicate lack of impartiality. See United States v. Edmond, 43 F.3d 472, 473-73 (9th Cir.

1994). 

However, not every incident of juror misconduct or bias requires a new trial. See

United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974). “The test is whether or not the

misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.” Id. 

On collateral review, if misconduct occurred, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “‘had

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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993)); see also Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 699 (1990).

In addressing this claim, the state court stated:

Prejudicial jury misconduct constitutes grounds for a new trial. 

“When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury misconduct, a court must

undertake a three-step inquiry. The court must first determine whether the

affidavits supporting the motion are admissible under [California]

Evidence Code section 1150(a). If the evidence is admissible, the court

must then consider whether the facts establish misconduct. Finally,

assuming misconduct, the court must determine whether the misconduct

was prejudicial.” (citations omitted). “Intentional concealment of

relevant facts or the giving of false answers by a juror during the voir dire

examination constitutes misconduct, and the occurrence of such

misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.” (citation

omitted). To determine whether the concealment gives rise to a

presumption of prejudice, the trial court must “determine whether the

question propounded to the juror was (1) relevant to the voir dire

examination; (2) whether it was unambiguous; and (3) whether the juror

had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited.”

(citation omitted). “The presumption of prejudice created by the

misconduct may be rebutted by ‘“. . . an affirmative evidentiary showing

that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court’s examination of the

entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of

actual harm to the complaining party resulting from the misconduct.”’”

(citations omitted). 

* * *

Initially, it is necessary to comment on the strength of defendant’s

showing. The People do not directly challenge the admissibility of

counsel’s declaration, presumably recognizing that the prosecution’s

failure to object to the competency of counsel’s declaration in the trial

court waived any challenge to its admissibility on appeal. (citation

omitted). They do, however, fault defendants for not submitting a

declaration from Juror No. 9, and point out that in the absence of such a

declaration, we are not required to assume the truth of counsel’s

statements. Regardless of the prosecutor’s failure to object to the

declaration, the trial court had an independent obligation to carefully

“examine the proffered basis for the new trial motion and determine

whether credible and admissible evidence substantiates the underlying

allegations.” (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court could consider the

absence of any foundation when evaluating the credibility of the

declaration. The declaration fails to identify how counsel came to know

the information he relates, leaving the trial court to resolve the motion

based only upon unexplained allegations of defense counsel concerning

matters about which he undoubtedly had no direct knowledge.

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Question number 11 on the juror questionnaire asked whether “a

close friend or relative had been a victim of a crime?” Defendants submit

that in response to this question Juror No. 9 intentionally concealed that

she was a friend of Dorothy Stone, an 85-year-old neighbor who lived

across the street from her father-in-law and who had been killed during a

brutal home invasion robbery. The People argue that the allegedly

concealed information was not responsive to the question asked during

voir dire and that counsel’s declaration does not establish that Juror No. 9

had knowledge of the allegedly concealed facts. Unfortunately, the

People attempt to discredit defendants’ showing by arguing that the

concealed information was not responsive to a question that asked about a

“friend/or relative being involved in a criminal case.” Clearly, however,

the People focus on the wrong question, and as a result never respond to

defendants’ actual argument that Juror No. 9 denied knowing the victim of

a crime, a separate and distinct voir dire question. Nonetheless, it is not at

all clear that the allegedly concealed friendship was responsive to question

number 11. The term “close friend” has no precise meaning, and the

neighbor of one’s father-in-law is not necessarily a close friend. If the

attorney’s declaration was correct that Juror No. 9 invited Ms. Stone to her

wedding, this would provide some evidence of their relationship, but it

would hardly be conclusive of a “close” friendship. Likewise, because the

declaration does not indicate when Juror No. 9 was married or when the

crime occurred, it is impossible to evaluate the depth of that relationship

or the likelihood that the two remained in close contact prior to Ms.

Stone’s murder. Finally, while one might infer that Juror No. 9 had

knowledge of the crime because the declaration recites it was widely

publicized, that too is hardly conclusive. Because the declaration does not

provide the source of the declarant’s assertion that Juror No. 9 knew of the

crime, the trial court was unable to weight the reliability of that assertion. 

Accordingly, in light of the questionable value of the declaration before

the court, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that there was

insufficient evidence to justify a finding of misconduct.

Defendants’ second contention suffers from similar defects. Juror

No. 9 was asked whether “a friend or relative . . . is employed in the law

enforcement capacity?” She responded that her sister is in the border

patrol and a family friend is in the Vacaville Police Department. 

Defendants assert that this answer improperly concealed her father-inlaw’s prior employment with the Fairfield Police Department,

demonstrating a bias in favor of law enforcement. The question, however,

was asked in the present tense, so that the juror’s failure to mention her

father-in-law’s former position as police chief did not render her answer

literally wrong or incomplete. Even if this information should have been

revealed, the juror’s failure to mention it cannot realistically be regarded

as indicative of bias in light of her disclosure of two other relationships

with currently active law enforcement personnel and the additional

disclosure that she had dinner the night before with a member of the

Vacaville Police Department, the agency that investigated the crime being

tried. Additionally, Juror No. 9 was asked and confirmed that she would

not give greater weight to the testimony of police officers. 

/ / /

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In particular, consistent with the applicable federal law, the state court stated that, 3

if there was misconduct, “the court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial.” 

The court notes that respondent appears to analyze the state court’s decision under

the “contrary to” standard. Specifically, respondent states: “The California Court of Appeal’s

rejection of petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct was not contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court authority.”

10

Because the state court concluded that there was an insufficient evidentiary showing to establish

misconduct, it did not reach the question of whether petitioner was prejudiced. Based on the

state court’s recitation of the applicable law, the court concludes that it applied the correct

federal legal rules and, therefore, will review under the more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard.3

In his pro se petition, petitioner asserts that the state court’s analysis is flawed

because it did not take into account other questions asked of other jurors, which all jurors had

been instructed to answer if applicable. Petitioner states:

During voire dire, court and counsel repeatly explained that the

types of questions asked of one member of the venire pertained to all

members of the venire, both those in the jury box and those in the

courtroom who may be called. [sic].

Petitioner concludes that, because other questions asked during voir dire sought responses

concerning any encounters with law enforcement, positive or negative, and past relationships

with law enforcement, Juror No. 9 necessarily concealed information by not disclosing her

knowledge of Ms. Stone’s murder and her father-in-law’s past employment as police chief. In

this regard, respondent notes that, when Juror No. 9 was called to the jury box for voir dire, she

was asked by the court whether she heard the questions asked of prior prospective jurors, to

which Juror No. 9 responded that she had. When asked whether she wished to respond to any of

those questions, Juror No. 9 said “No.” 

Assuming that petitioner is correct and Juror No. 9 should have disclosed her

knowledge of Ms. Stone’s murder and her father-in-law’s past employment because other

questions asked before Juror No. 9 entered the jury box sought such information, there is no

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evidence that Juror No. 9 failed to disclose the information for any reason which would reflect

negatively on her ability to be impartial. For example, there is no evidence that Juror No. 9

intentionally concealed the information in order to get on the jury and then vote for conviction. 

Moreover, even though Juror No. 9 had current relationships with law enforcement personnel,

she nonetheless assured the trial court that she could be fair and impartial and that she would not

automatically give more weight to the testimony of a police officer. Therefore, disclosure of

information concerning Ms. Stone’s murder and her father-in-law’s prior employment would not

have provided cause for a challenge to Juror No. 9. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the state court’s conclusion that no

misconduct had been established is neither an unreasonable application of federal law nor

contrary to federal law. Under either standard of review, petitioner’s claim should be denied. 

B. Jury Instruction Claims

Petitioner challenges the trial court’s instructions pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.01,

2.02, and 2.27. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

a transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright,

786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury

instructions does not generally give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768

F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

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Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury

instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

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from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).

1. CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02

The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01 as follows:

[A] finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on

circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only, one,

consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but,

two, cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. Further,

each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary

to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may

be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or

circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, if the circumstantial evidence as to any particular count

permits two reasonable interpretations one that point to the defendant’s

guilt and the other to his innocence, you must adopt that interpretation that

points to the defendant’s innocence and reject that interpretation which

points to his guilt.

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to

you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you

must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable. 

The court also instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.02:

The specific intent with which an act is done may be shown by the

circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. However you may

not find the defendants guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 1, 2, and 3

unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory

the defendant had the required specific intent, but cannot be reconciled

with any other rational conclusion.

Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent permits two

reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence of the

specific intent and the other to its absence, you must adopt that

interpretation which points to its absence.

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to

specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation

to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and

reject the unreasonable. 

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In addressing petitioner’s claim concerning these jury instructions, the state court stated:

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in limiting to

circumstantial evidence the principle that if evidence is susceptible to two

reasonable interpretations, then the jury must reject the interpretation that

points to defendants’ guilt. Defendants argue that this general principle is

applicable to direct evidence as well as circumstantial evidence and that

CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 improperly limit its application to

circumstantial evidence only. Defendants’ argument lacks merit. 

First, CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 apply only to circumstantial

evidence and, in fact, should not be given where the prosecution relies

primarily on direct evidence of a defendant’s guilt. (citation omitted). 

Moreover, an additional instruction applying the principle contained in

CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 to direct evidence would make no sense.

Direct evidence “means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an

inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, conclusively

establishes that fact.” (citation omitted). There is no room for inference

or interpretation of direct evidence warranting an instruction that the

defendant should be given the benefit of any reasonable interpretation that

points to his or her innocence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

this regard. 

The state court did not directly address whether CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 reduce the

prosecution’s burden of proof. While it indirectly did so by holding these instructions would not

make any logical sense in the context of direct evidence, the state court did not explicitly address

the issue. Therefore, this court will review de novo.

First, as the state court observes, there is no logical room for the concept

embodied in CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 in the context of direct evidence because such evidence

is not susceptible to inference or differing interpretations. It is what it is – evidence directly

establishing a fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that limiting the concept to circumstantial

evidence – where is makes sense logically – reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof on any

essential element of a charged offense. Second, other instructions given at the trial make clear

that the jury understood its obligation to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the

prosecution carried the burden of proof. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury as

follows:

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until

the contrary is proved. And in case of a reasonable doubt whether his

guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This

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presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.

For these reasons, the court concludes that there was no constitutional error with

respect to the trial court’s instructions pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.01 or 2.01.

2. CALJIC No. 2.27

In addressing petitioner’s claim as to this instruction, the state court stated:

CALJIC No. 2.27 reads as follows: “You should give the

[uncorroborated] testimony of a single witness whatever weight you think

it deserves. Testimony by one witness which you believe concerning any

fact [whose testimony about that fact does not require corroboration] is

sufficient for the proof of that fact. You should carefully review all the

evidence upon which the proof of that fact depends.” The court instructed

the jury with CALJIC No. 2.27 in full. The Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.27

provides that the bracketed phrases should be used when “corroboration of

witness’s testimony is required, such as in [perjury cases]. . . . None of

the charged crimes or defendants in this case required corroboration, but

the trial court nonetheless included the bracketed phrases in the

instruction.

Defendants content that the trial court erred because the references

to corroboration in the instruction misled the jury to believe that “they

should ‘carefully review’ the testimony of a single witness and could find

it insufficient if ‘uncorroborated.’” Defendants assert that this error was

prejudicial because only one witness testified that defendants were in

Colorado on January 28, 1999, the day that the crimes were committed in

California. 

Arguably, the trial court should have eliminated the bracketed

language from this instruction. There is, however, no indication in the

record that the jury had any questions regarding whether the testimony of

any witness in this case required corroboration. Absent a requirement for

corroboration, the instruction merely tells the jury that a single witness’s

testimony is sufficient if believed, and that they should consider the

evidence in support of that testimony carefully. The possibility that the

jury was confused by this instruction is remote, and it is even less likely

that any prejudice arose from the potential confusion. Desiree’s testimony

that defendants arrived in Colorado on her anniversary conflicted with

Gloria’s testimony that defendants were in California on the morning of

the 28th and is inconsistent with the victims’ identification of Fernandez

and Romero as the two men who broke into their home. Thus, it is likely

that the jury rejected Desiree’s testimony, not because it was

uncorroborated, but because it was in conflict with the credible testimony

of three other witnesses. Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable that

the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendants had the

bracketed portions of the instruction been deleted. 

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While the state court concluded that the jury was probably not confused by CALJIC No. 2.27, as

given, it did not specifically address whether the instruction reduced the prosecution’s burden on

an essential element. Therefore, as with CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02, this court reviews de novo.

The state court is correct. There was no testimony in this case which required

corroboration. Therefore, there could have been no reasonable chance of jury confusion. 

Further, there is nothing in the instruction which could arguably reduce the prosecution’s burden

on an essential element. For these reasons, the court concludes that petitioner’s claim lacks

merit. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and

close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 19, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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