Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01339/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01339-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth W. Reed,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Karen Barcklay, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV 11-1339-PHX-JAT (BSB)

ORDER

Plaintiff Kenneth W. Reed brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles Ryan and ADC

physician Dr. Karen Beth Barcklay (Doc. 22). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s combined

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and

Request for Emergency Hearing (Doc. 58), which Defendants oppose (Doc. 112).

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement at the Arizona State Prison Complex

in Florence, Arizona (Doc. 22 at 1). In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Barcklay was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment

when she refused to provide his regularly prescribed medication to treat migraine headaches

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Additional citation refers to the document and page number in the Court’s Case

Management/Electronic Case Filing system.

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(id. at 4-6 (Doc. 22 at 12-14)1). 

In Count II, Plaintiff alleged a second deliberate-indifference claim against Barcklay

and a retaliation claim against Barcklay and Ryan (id. at 7-10 (Doc. 22 at 15-18)). Plaintiff

claimed that after he filed a grievance against Barcklay about his migraine headache

medication, she failed to refill his blood pressure medications for five months. He further

alleged that after initiating this lawsuit, he sought renewal of a Special Needs Order (SNO)

authorizing that Plaintiff be assigned a lower bunk and no work duty unless it was cleared

by medical, but Barcklay prevented renewal. Plaintiff also alleged that Ryan embraced a

policy that allowed subordinates to use various means to hinder or prevent inmates from

filing grievances and that he encouraged or permitted ADC employees to retaliate against

inmates who file grievances (id.).

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A. Plaintiff’s Contentions

On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed his pending motion (Doc. 58). He seeks an order

enjoining Defendants or their agents from assigning him to a top bunk or giving him a work

assignment that is beyond his abilities and likely to cause him injury (id.). In support of his

motion, Plaintiff submits his affidavit, in which he attests that he suffers from welldocumented knee and shoulder injuries, degenerative joint disease, and migraine headaches

(Doc. 59, Pl. Aff. ¶¶ 3-7). Plaintiff avers that in May or June 2010, when he was diagnosed

with hypertension, Dr. Milazzo advised him to limit his activities due to the dizziness caused

by his hypertension medication and to avoid prolonged exposure to sunlight (id. ¶¶ 10-12).

Plaintiff states that Dr. Milazzo also issued the SNO prohibiting assignment to a top bunk

and any work duty not first cleared by a medical provider (id. ¶ 13).

Plaintiff avers that in July 2011, he submitted an Health Needs Request to renew the

SNO (id. ¶ 16). According to Plaintiff, instead of examining Plaintiff to assess his need for

an SNO, Barcklay enlisted another nurse to fabricate an excuse to deny his SNO renewal

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Defendants respond to and dispute numerous statements made in Plaintiff’s affidavit;

many of these disputes relate to the grievance process and whether Plaintiff properly

exhausted administrative remedies (Doc. 112 at 2-6). 

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request (id.). 

Plaintiff states that in early April 2012, Barcklay approved Plaintiff for work on a

hard-labor work crew and he was assigned as a groundskeeper (id. ¶¶ 22-23). Plaintiff avers

that he was ultimately placed “on report” for refusal to perform work, and he was then placed

in disciplinary confinement (id. ¶¶ 29-30).

Attached to Plaintiff’s affidavit are copies of his prescriptions, his SNO that expired

on June 29, 2011, the SNO denial from the nurse, grievance documents, and documentation

of Plaintiff’s April 2012 job assignment (id., Exs. 1-8).

B. Defendants’ Response

The Court considers only the portion of Defendants’ response that is relevant to the

pending preliminary-injunction request (see Doc. 112).2

Defendants contend that Dr. Milazzo’s SNO did not include a directive that Plaintiff

could not work (id. at 2-3). Nonetheless, they submit that Plaintiff’s motion for an injunction

is moot, and they proffer evidence that on April 26, 2012, Dr. Barcklay issued a one-year,

non-duty and lower-bunk SNO (id. at 5, 10, Ex. A (Doc. 112-1 at 6)). 

Defendants also address the factors to be considered with respect to a motion for a

preliminary injunction (id. at 7-10). First, they argue that Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood

of success on the merits because he cannot show that either Defendant played an affirmative

role in the alleged deprivation or that either Defendant acted improperly (id. at 6-7, 9). Next,

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot show irreparable harm because he is already approved

for a bottom bunk and non-work status (id. at 9). Defendants maintain that the balance of

hardships weigh in their favor because an order from the Court would improperly intrude on

matters of prison administration absent a constitutional violation and encourage inmates to

challenge prison policies at any time (id. at 9-10). Finally, they submit that the public

interest will not be served by an order from the Court given that there is no interest in

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“unwarranted, judicially-sanctioned privileges” absent a constitutional violation (id. at 10).

For these reasons, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s motion be denied (id. at 10-11).

C. Plaintiff’s Reply

Like Defendants’ response, Plaintiff’s reply will be considered only to the extent that

it is relevant to his original preliminary-injunction request (see Doc. 141). In support of his

reply, Plaintiff submits his supplemental affidavit (Doc. 142).

Plaintiff maintains that both Barcklay and Ryan were directly involved in the alleged

constitutional violation because they were aware of the violation and failed to act properly;

namely, Barcklay failed to renew his SNO and cleared him for hard labor, and Ryan failed

to remedy the situation when he did not address Plaintiff’s final-level appeal (id. at 5-6).

Plaintiff acknowledges that Barcklay wrote an SNO on April 26, 2012, which

provides that he is on non-duty/no work status and he is to have a lower bunk assignment (id.

at 6; Doc. 142, Pl. Supp. Aff. ¶ 41). But Plaintiff submits that this SNO is a sham (Doc. 141

at 7). He states that Ryan refused to provide a copy of the SNO to Plaintiff, and that, despite

its issuance and “apparent inclusion” in Plaintiff’s medical record, no one other than the

parties in this case know of its existence (id.). He states that, although he “might go so far

as to concede that his [motion] could be considered as having been rendered moot by a

diminished threat of imminent physical injury,” there remains a viable controversy that must

be heard on the merits and he therefore renews his request for an injunction (id.). 

III. Governing Standard

The standard for issuing a TRO is identical to the standard for a preliminary

injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales, Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839

n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, when the opposing party receives notice of a motion for a

TRO, it is appropriate to treat the motion as one for a preliminary injunction. See 11A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951 (2d ed.

2007).

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that may be granted only where

the movant shows that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

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irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046,

1052 (9th Cir. 2009). The movant has the burden of proof on each element of the test. Envtl.

Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000).

Under the “serious questions” version of the sliding-scale test, a preliminary

injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that “serious questions going to the

merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Alliance

for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lands

Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). This approach requires

that the elements of the preliminary injunction test be balanced, so that a stronger showing

of one element may offset a weaker showing of another. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies,

632 at 1135. Regardless of which test is applied, there is a heightened burden where a

plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the

facts and law clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d

1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner

litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that any

injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct the

harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 987, 999

(9th Cir. 2000).

In attempting to establish either eligibility for an injunction or that a party is not

entitled to injunctive relief, the parties may rely on developments that postdate the pleadings

and pretrial motions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994).

IV. Analysis

Defendants present evidence that since filing his motion, Plaintiff has been issued an

SNO that gives him no-work status and assigns him to a bottom bunk (Doc. 112, Ex. A (Doc.

112-1 at 6)). Although Plaintiff states that Ryan did not previously provide a copy of this

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SNO to him, Plaintiff submits a copy of the SNO with his reply, thereby demonstrating that

he now retains a copy of it (Doc. 142, Ex. 11 (Doc. 142 at 17)). 

Further, there are no allegations or evidence that Plaintiff is currently being assigned

work duties or placed in a top bunk contrary to the SNO directives. Plaintiff suggests that

the prison may not honor the SNO in the future, but “[s]peculative injury does not constitute

irreparable injury.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th

Cir. 1988); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (preliminary injunction will not issue “simply to

prevent the possibility of some remote future injury”) (quotation omitted). To warrant a

preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible

threat of immediate and irreparable harm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Plaintiff fails to make this

showing.

Because the record shows that Plaintiff has received the relief sought in his motion,

and he fails to show that he is currently likely to suffer an irreparable injury, his motion for

a preliminary injunction and request for a hearing on the matter will be denied. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 846.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that there remains a viable controversy, the Court notes

that this Order addresses only the pending motion for an injunction; it does dismiss the case

or render a decision on the merits of his underlying claim.

IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to

Plaintiff’s combined Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, and Request for Emergency Hearing (Doc. 58), and the Motion is denied.

DATED this 24th day of October, 2012.

 

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