Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02731/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02731-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Ruiz Rogel, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-02731 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December

27, 2012. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on May 28, 2013.

Petitioner’s reply to the response to the petition was due June

26, 2013. 

 I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned March

29, 2001, charged Petitioner with three felonies involving the

death of his toddler son: (1) first-degree murder, or, in the

alternative, second-degree murder (a Class 1 felony and

dangerous crime against children); (2) child abuse (a Class 2

felony and dangerous crime against children); and (3) child

abuse (a Class 4 felony). See Answer, Exh. A & Exh. F at

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171–73.

 Petitioner’s jury trial began on April 3, 2002. Id.,

Exh. F at 161–62; Exh. G at 4. One of the allegations (Count

III) was that Petitioner committed child abuse by biting his

son. On April 11, 2002, the jury acquitted Petitioner of the

bite-mark-based child abuse charge, but convicted him of

second-degree murder and child abuse. Id., Exh. T; Exh. U at

3–6; Exh. V at 2.

On June 27, 2002, the trial court held a sentencing

hearing. Id., Exhs. BB–CC. Citing Petitioner’s “prior record

for assaultive behavior”, the state trial court sentenced him to

the maximum aggravated term of 27 years imprisonment for

second-degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent

term of 24 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on the

charge of child abuse as a dangerous crime against children.

Id., Exh. BB at 28–30; Exh. CC at 2–3.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences, in which he raised three claims: (1)

violation of the right to due process of law because the trial

court admitted allegedly inflammatory photographs; (2) violation

of the right to a jury trial based on an allegedly defective

jury instruction on reasonable doubt; and (3) that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on

lost evidence (a “Willits” instruction). Id., Exh. FF. In a

memorandum decision issued February 3, 2004, the Arizona Court

of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. Id., Exh.

JJ. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the

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Arizona Supreme Court. 

On March 26, 2004, and again on May 3, 2004, Petitioner

initiated an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to

Rule 32, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. HH at 4,

Exh. II, Exh. KK. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent

him; counsel averred to the state trial court that she was

unable to find a tenable issue on which to challenge

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Although the trial

court allowed Petitioner additional time to file a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief he failed to do so and, on

September 1, 2004, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule

32 proceeding. Id., Exh. PP. 

In August or September of 2004, Petitioner filed a

“Motion for Newly-Discovered Evidence under Rule 32.1(E)” in the

Arizona state trial court. Petitioner attached an affidavit to

the motion, purporting to contain a signed confession by an

individual alleging they had killed Petitioner’s son. Id., Exh.

QQ. The state trial court construed the motion to be a petition

for post-conviction relief and ordered the state to file a

response to the motion. 

On March 14, 2007, after briefing was completed, the

trial court agreed with the state that “the authenticity of the

purported affidavit attached to the Defendant’s petition is

certainly questioned”. Id., Exh. UU. The state trial court,

however, dismissed the proceeding on the alternative ground

that, 

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aside from whether the Defendant’s affidavit

is authentic, the Defendant has not

demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence

that the ‘facts’ underlying his claim of

newly discovered evidence would be sufficient

to establish that no reasonable fact-finder

would have found the Defendant guilty of the

crimes for which he has been convicted beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Id., Exh. UU.

On May 11, 2007, Petitioner filed what was construed as

a petition for review of this decision in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Id., Exh. VV. On May 29, 2007, the Arizona Court of

Appeals dismissed the petition for review as untimely, pursuant

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c). Id., Exh. WW.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id., Exhs. OOO–PPP.

On November 2, 2007, Petitioner filed another petition

for post-conviction relief in the state trial court. Id., Exh.

XX. Petitioner argued that the trial court sentenced him in a

sentencing range not authorized by state statutes. Petitioner

also alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

with regard to his sentencing. Id., Exh. XX at 7. On January

11, 2008, the trial court dismissed the proceeding because the

petition was untimely and because Arizona law precluded both

claims as waived. Id., Exh. YY. On December 9, 2008, the

Arizona Court of Appeals summarily dismissed a petition for

review of the trial court’s denial of relief. Id., Exhs.

ZZ–AAA.

More than one year later, on May 27, 2010, Petitioner

filed another notice of post-conviction relief in the state

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trial court. Petitioner alleged he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel and that his Miranda rights were

violated. Id., Exh. DDD. On July 9, 2010, the state trial

court dismissed the proceeding as untimely. Id., Exh. EEE. 

On January 17, 2011, Petitioner initiated another state

action for post-conviction relief, this time arguing that the

trial court’s imposition of an aggravated sentence violated his

rights under Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. FFF. On February

11, 2011, the state trial court concluded that Blakely did not

apply retroactively to Petitioner’s case and dismissed the

proceeding. Id., Exh. GGG. On December 13, 2012, the Arizona

Court of Appeals summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for

review of the trial court’s decision. Id., Exhs. JJJ & Exh.

NNN. 

On December 27, 2012, Petitioner filed the pending

federal habeas petition. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to

relief because: 

1. He was denied his right to a jury trial on the

factors used to support his aggravated sentences.

2. He was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner contends his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel failed to raise a claim of

insufficient evidence and the impositions of unlawful sentences.

3. He was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner contends his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel failed to assert Petitioners “right”

to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense.

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Respondents contend the petition is not timely and must

be dismissed.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled

to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of

a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515

F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner’s state court conviction became final on

March 5, 2004, when the time expired to seek review of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Petitioner’s direct appeal

affirming the convictions. According, the statute of

limitations began to run on March 6, 2004, and expired on March

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5, 2005, unless tolled by a properly filed application for state

post-conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Danforth

v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008);

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The statute of limitations ran from March 6, 2004,

until March 26, 2004, when Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure. The statute of limitations was then

tolled until October 1, 2004, when the time expired to seek

review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

petition would have begun to run on October 2, 2004, and expired

on or about, at the latest, October 1, 2005, absent tolling

based on a properly filed state action for post-conviction

relief.

The statute of limitations was tolled on or about

September 6, 2004, when Petitioner filed an action that the

state trial court construed as one seeking state post-conviction

relief. That matter arguably tolled the statute of limitations

until June 29, 2007, when the time expired for seeking review of

the trial and appellate courts’ denial of relief in that matter.

The statute of limitations would have begun to run on June 30,

2007, and expired on June 29, 2008.

The statute of imitations would definitely have run for

four months, until November 2, 2007, when Petitioner filed

another petition for post-conviction relief in the state trial

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court–if this were a “properly filed” action, it would have

again tolled the statute of limitations. However, this action

was not a “properly-filed” state action for post-conviction

relief; the trial court dismissed the proceeding because the

petition was untimely and Arizona law precluded the claims. See

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812

(2005); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5–7, 128 S. Ct. 2 (2007)

(holding that the Pace rule applies even where there are

exceptions to the state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming

that a state court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is “the

end of the matter”); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th

Cir. 2009) (rejecting contention that state must prove that

rules concerning time bars are “firmly established and regularly

followed before noncompliance will render a petition improperly

filed for AEDPA tolling”).

Additionally, even allowing that any state court

actions filed prior to December 9, 2008, tolled the statute of

limitations, from at least December 9, 2008, when the Arizona

Court of Appeals summarily dismissed Petitioner’s latest

petition for review of a trial court decision denying postconviction relief, until May 27, 2010, a period of more than a

year, Petitioner had no action pending in the state courts which

would have tolled the statute of limitations on his federal

habeas action. Any action filed after the statute of

limitations expired could not and did not re-start the statute

of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See,

e.g., Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814-15. See also Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012); Porter v.

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland

the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for determining

extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a flexible,

“case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other

similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011;

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Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable

tolling is also available if the petitioner establishes their

actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v.

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not filed a reply to the answer to his

petition alleging any basis for equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

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constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner has failed to make such a showing.

II Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final, absent

tolling of the statute of limitations during the times

Petitioner had a properly filed state action for post-conviction

relief pending in the state courts. Petitioner has not

established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Rogel’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 8th day of July, 2013.

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