Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02559/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE ELOWSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEA SENIOR LIVING, a 

Washington state corporation; 

JOHN MCNEIL; JERRY ERWIN; 

CODY ERWIN, and DOES 1-50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02559-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants Cody Erwin and Jerry Erwin (collectively “the 

Erwins”) filed a motion to dismiss (“the Erwins’ Motion to 

Dismiss”) (Doc. #11) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2). In addition, Defendants JEA Senior Living (“JEA”), 

John McNeil (“McNeil”) and the Erwins (collectively “Defendants”) 

filed a joint motion to dismiss (Doc. #12) (“Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).1 Plaintiff Leslie Elowson (“Plaintiff”) filed a single 

 

1 These motions were determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for April 22, 2015.

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opposition to both motions (Doc. #17), and Defendants filed a 

single reply (Doc. #18). 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

JEA is a Washington state corporation that operated the 

Empire Ranch Alzheimer’s Special Care Center where Plaintiff was 

employed as an administrator. McNeil and the Erwins were 

executives of JEA and direct supervisors of Plaintiff. 

Due to a variety of medical conditions and complications, 

Plaintiff was forced to take medical leave on several occasions. 

She alleges that as a result, Defendants conspired to, and did in 

fact, compel her to leave her job in violation of her 

constitutional rights. Over the relevant time period, Plaintiff 

was subjected to harassment, discrimination and retaliatory 

actions on the basis of her gender, medical conditions, and 

lawful taking of protected leave. After being forced from her 

position, she alleges Defendants made knowingly false and 

damaging statements about her to third parties, including 

defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff’s professional 

qualifications and abilities. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. #10) (“FAC”) 

contains three causes of action: (1) conspiracy to violate her 

civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“§ 1985(3)”); (2) 

intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 

(3) defamation. 

///

///

///

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II. OPINION

A. The Erwins’ Motion to Dismiss

The Erwins’ Motion to Dismiss contends the Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over Cody and Jerry Erwin. 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 

1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Personal jurisdiction in federal 

court must comport with Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, as well as with federal due process. Schwarzenegger 

v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The long-arm statute of the state in which the district court 

sits must be applied when determining whether the court has 

jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. Id. at 800 (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). The California long-arm statute is 

coextensive with federal due process. Id. at 800–01. 

The overarching framework for personal jurisdiction asks 

whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state 

such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l 

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also

Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015-16. A plaintiff need only make a 

prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to avoid the granting 

of a motion to dismiss. Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015-16; Caruth 

v. Int'l Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir.

1995). “Uncontroverted allegations in [a plaintiff's] complaint 

must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained 

in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff's] 

favor.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 

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1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, “the court need not consider merely conclusory 

claims, or legal conclusions in the complaint as establishing 

jurisdiction.” NuCal Foods, Inc. v. Quality Egg LLC, 887 F. 

Supp. 2d 977, 988 (E.D. Cal. 2012). The plaintiff “must show 

facts, which if true, would establish personal jurisdiction over 

defendants.” Id. (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner and Hausser 

GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. 

See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 

1086 (9th Cir. 2000). General jurisdiction may be established 

when a defendant's contacts with a state are “substantial” or 

“continuous and systematic” such that the defendant “can be haled 

into court in that state in any action, even if the action is 

unrelated to those contacts.” Id. “The standard for 

establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high, and requires 

that the defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximate 

physical presence.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has developed a three-prong test for 

analyzing a claim of specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct 

his activities or consummate some transaction with the 

forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which 

he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking 

the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; 

and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair 

play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 

reasonable.

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Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting 

Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The Erwins contend Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the

Court has either general or specific personal jurisdiction over 

them. In the Opposition, Plaintiff responds to Defendants’ 

arguments by citing to paragraph six of the FAC. The portion of 

that paragraph relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction 

states: 

Defendants McNEIL, J. ERWIN, and C. ERWIN had frequent, 

substantial and systematic contacts with Plaintiff, as 

ERASCC’s General Manager, both in this jurisdiction and 

in Washington state. Defendants (McNEIL in particular) 

made frequent, substantial visits to California to meet 

with Plaintiff and members of her staff, evaluate 

ERASCC’s operations, and also to oversee other 

businesses owned and/or operated by Defendants J. ERWIN 

and C. ERWIN. Defendants’ purposeful, repeated and 

substantial contacts with this jurisdiction and 

availing of the laws, regulations, and protections of 

this jurisdiction make it proper for this Court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants McNEIL, 

J. ERWIN, and C. ERWIN.

FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff contends this paragraph “sufficiently pleads 

the requisite minimum contacts for [the Erwins] such that 

specific personal jurisdiction is [] proper.” Opp. at pp. 8-9 

(emphasis added). The Court thus assumes Plaintiff is not 

arguing the Court has general jurisdiction over the Erwins even 

though the language quoted from the FAC clearly blends the 

standards for general and specific personal jurisdiction. 

As indicated, the Court is not required to accept 

“conclusory claims” or “legal conclusions” in determining whether 

a plaintiff has met her burden in establishing personal 

jurisdiction. Since the portion of the FAC relied on by 

Plaintiff consists of conclusory claims and legal conclusions, 

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the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in 

establishing this Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Erwins

under the Ninth Circuit’s three-prong test. However, because the 

Court is not convinced amendment would be futile, the Erwins’ 

Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 

challenges each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. They will be 

discussed in turn. 

1. November 2012 Release

Defendants first argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are 

barred by a November 2012 release, entitled “Severance, Release 

and Confidentiality Agreement” (“the Release”), which Plaintiff 

admits was signed by her. MTD at pp. 3-4. In her Opposition, 

Plaintiff challenges the enforceability of the Release, 

contending “she was not possessed of all her faculties and was in 

an untenable situation when Defendants ordered her to sign the 

Release.” Opp. at pp. 10-11. 

The actual Release was offered by Defendants in an attached

request for judicial notice (Doc. #12-1). The Court finds that 

further factual development is necessary in order to determine 

what effect, if any, the Release has on Plaintiff’s claims. 

Therefore, Defendants’ request for judicial notice and motion to 

dismiss on this ground are denied.

2. Conspiracy

Section 1985(3) creates a civil action for damages caused by 

two or more persons who “conspire . . . for the purpose of 

depriving” the injured person of “the equal protection of the 

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laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws” and 

take or cause to be taken “any act in furtherance of the object 

of such conspiracy.” “The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: 

(1) the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the 

equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in furtherance of the 

conspiracy and (3) a resulting injury.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 

Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Scott v. Ross, 

140 F.3d 1275, 1284, rehearing den., 151 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 

1998)). “A complaint that contains vague, conclusory allegations 

of conspiracy, without any specification of the agreement forming 

the conspiracy, will not survive a motion to dismiss under § 

1985(3).” Lester v. Mineta, No. C 04-3074 SI, 2006 WL 463515, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim

because (1) she has not properly alleged such a claim; and (2) 

the claim is barred by the “intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine.” 

MTD at pp. 4-5. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s allegations are 

vague and fail to meet the requisite specificity standard. The 

FAC alleges there existed a systematic and coordinated effort by 

Defendants to force Plaintiff out of her position, including 

meetings between Defendants to form a plan for carrying out this 

common goal. FAC ¶¶ 24-35. The Court finds these factual 

allegations adequately state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 

§ 1985(3) and denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this 

ground. 

Defendants next argue the “intra-corporate conspiracy 

doctrine” bars Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim. “The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was first developed in the 

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antitrust context, and precludes a corporation from being charged 

with conspiracy to violate antitrust laws . . . .” Lester, 2006 

WL 463515, at *3. Numerous circuits have extended this doctrine 

to civil rights cases; however the Ninth Circuit has expressly 

reserved the issue. See Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 

F.2d 898, 910 (9th Cir. 1993). Similar to other district courts 

in California, this Court declines to extend the scope of the 

intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine here. See Ibarra v. City of 

Watsonville, No. 5:12-CV-02271-EJD, 2013 WL 623045, at *8 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013); Brown v. Alexander, No. 13-01451 SC, 2013 WL 6578774, 

at *14 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The motion is denied on this ground. 

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress

Under California law, a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) is comprised of the following 

elements: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's 

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

defendant's outrageous conduct.” Ferretti v. Pfizer Inc., No. 

11-CV-04486, 2012 WL 3638541, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s IIED claim on two grounds. 

They first contend that the claim is preempted by California’s 

workers’ compensation scheme. MTD at p. 6. They also argue 

Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege extreme and outrageous 

conduct or emotional distress, as required for an IIED claim. 

Id. at pp. 7-8. 

“Following the California Supreme Court's holding in Miklosy 

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[v. Regents of Univ. of California, 44 Cal. 4th 876 (2008)], 

California courts have held that California IIED claims are 

barred by [California’s Workers’ Compensation Act’s] exclusivity 

provisions, even if they are based on conduct that allegedly 

violates a fundamental public policy . . . .” Langevin v. Fed. 

Exp. Corp., No. CV 14-08105 MMM FFMX, 2015 WL 1006367, at *10 

(C.D. Cal. 2015). In Miklosy, the California Supreme Court was 

faced with an IIED claim brought against the plaintiffs’ 

employer:

Plaintiffs allege defendants engaged in “outrageous 

conduct” that was intended to, and did, cause 

plaintiffs “severe emotional distress,” giving rise to 

common law causes of action for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. The alleged wrongful conduct, 

however, occurred at the worksite, in the normal course 

of the employer-employee relationship, and therefore 

workers' compensation is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy 

for any injury that may have resulted.

Miklosy, 44 Cal. 4th at 902; see also Webb v. Cnty. of Trinity, 

734 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1034-35 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 

Plaintiff argues that an employer’s unlawful discrimination 

is not a normal incident of employment, and thus her claim is not 

preempted under Miklosy. Opp. at p. 11. 

“Discrimination based on race, religion, age, or gender is 

not a normal risk inherent in employment, and therefore workers' 

compensation is not the exclusive remedy since any injury from 

such discrimination [] falls outside the scope of employment.” 

Silva v. Solano Cnty., No. 2:13-CV-02165-MCE, 2014 WL 5501225, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. 2014). However, misconduct such as demotions, 

criticism and retaliation is a part of and within the risks 

inherent in the employment relationship; thus, the exclusivity 

rule bars emotional distress claims based on such conduct. See

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id.; Miklosy, 44 Cal. 4th at 902-03; Ferretti v. Pfizer Inc., No. 

11-CV-04486, 2012 WL 3638541, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

Plaintiff’s IIED claim therefore survives but is limited to 

any injury caused by Defendant’s alleged discriminatory conduct

based on Plaintiff’s gender since the exclusivity rule is 

inapplicable under these circumstances. However, to the extent 

this IIED claim is based on various other forms of misconduct 

alleged in the FAC, such as criticism and retaliation, the motion 

is granted. 

As for Defendants’ arguments regarding the sufficiency of 

Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff has 

adequately alleged the requisite elements of an IIED claim under 

California law. FAC ¶¶ 14-16; 19-38; 47-51. The motion on this 

ground is denied. 

4. Defamation

“Under California law, a tort of defamation involves ‘(1) a 

publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, 

and that (5) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes 

special damages.’” Silva, 2014 WL 5501225, at *5 (quoting Taus 

v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 (2007)).

Defendants contend the Court should dismiss this cause of 

action because Plaintiff has failed to identify the alleged 

defamatory statements and the claim is based on opinions, not 

facts, as required for a claim of defamation. Despite 

Plaintiff’s meager opposition, the Court finds the FAC adequately 

states a cause of action for defamation. 

“While the exact words or circumstances of the slander need 

not be alleged to state a claim for defamation, the substance of 

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the defamatory statement must be alleged.” Silicon Knights, Inc. 

v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 

1997). “‘Even under liberal federal pleading standards, “general 

allegations of the defamatory statements” which do not identify 

the substance of what was said are insufficient.’” Charlson v. 

DHR Int'l Inc., No. C 14-3041 PJH, 2014 WL 4808851, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. 2014) (quoting Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 

1198, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 

The factual allegations made by the plaintiff in Scott v. 

Solano Cnty. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959 

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (“Scott”) are analogous to those in this case

and the Court’s reasoning in Scott is persuasive. In Scott, the 

plaintiff alleged that the “defendants ‘published false 

information about plaintiff's performance and falsely accused 

plaintiff of dishonesty and lack of integrity.’” Id. at 973. 

The court found it was clear that the plaintiff was complaining 

about “statements allegedly made about her performance at work 

and her character.” Id. The Scott court concluded that 

“[a]lthough terse, [the plaintiff’s] allegations [were] 

sufficient to provide defendants sufficient notice of the issues 

to enable preparation of a defense.” Id. 

As in Scott, the Court finds Plaintiff’s terse allegations 

herein of Defendants’ defamatory statements regarding her work 

performance and qualifications to be sufficient. The Court does 

not find the allegations reference merely opinions rather than 

facts, and finds Defendants’ arguments to the contrary 

unpersuasive. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

defamation claim is denied. 

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III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Erwins’ 

Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. The Court DENIES 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for 

conspiracy and defamation. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss the IIED claim to the extent it is based on gender 

discrimination, but GRANTS the motion to the extent the IIED 

claim is based on the various other forms of misconduct alleged 

in the FAC. 

Due to the suspension of Plaintiff’s counsel until June 25, 

2015 (Doc. #20), Plaintiff shall have until July 6, 2015 to file 

her amended complaint. If any amended complaint is filed, 

Defendants’ responsive pleading is due within twenty days 

thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2015

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