Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00787/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00787-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin L Sanders,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-24-00787-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kevin L. Sanders’s appeal from the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA,” “Commissioner,” or 

“Defendant”) denial of Social Security benefits. (Doc. 13-3). The appeal is fully briefed 

(Doc. 17; Doc. 18; Doc. 19), and the Court now rules. 

I. BACKGROUN\D

A. Factual Overview

 Plaintiff was 36 years old on his alleged disability onset date, and he has a high 

school education. (Doc. 13-3 at 31). His past relevant work includes cook, painter, 

warehouse worker, and driver. (Id. at 30). Plaintiff filed his Social Security Disability 

Insurance (SSDI) benefits application on April 23, 2021, alleging disabilities beginning on 

February 1, 2021. (Doc. 17 at 1). An ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim on April 6, 2023, after 

an administrative hearing. (Doc. 13-3 at 32, 87). The SSA Appeals Council denied a 

request for review of that decision and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final 

decision on February 16, 2024. (Doc. 17 at 2).

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A. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process

To qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, a claimant must show 

that he “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the 

claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be of 

such severity that the claimant cannot do his previous work or any other substantial gainful 

work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2). The SSA has created a five-step 

sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is potentially 

dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4).

At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial 

gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that 

is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities;” and (2) “gainful,” 

i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)–(b). If the claimant is engaging 

in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i).

At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant’s impairment must “significantly limit” 

the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ 

will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or 

equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ 

must assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) before proceeding to 

Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(e). The claimant’s RFC is his ability 

perform physical and mental work activities “despite his limitations,” based on all relevant 

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evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To determine RFC, the ALJ must 

consider all the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and any 

related symptoms that “affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. §§ 

404.1545(a)(1)–(2).

At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the 

physical and mental demands of “his past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 

404.1520(e). “Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past 15 years, 

that was substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to 

perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will 

proceed to Step Five in the sequential evaluation process.

At Step Five, the final step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work,” considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(v). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. If the claimant 

cannot make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the opposite. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 

Here, at Step One, the ALJ concluded that the record established that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 1, 2021, the alleged onset date. 

(Doc. 13-3 at 23). 

At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: “right shoulder avascular necrosis and right hip arthroplasty for avascular 

necrosis.” (Id. at 24).

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have any impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment in Appendix 

1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.F. Part 404. (Id. at 26). Subsequently, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 

416.967(a), except with the following restrictions: 

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He can frequently balance and stoop and can occasionally 

kneel, crouch, and climb ramps and stairs, but can never crawl 

or climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He can occasionally 

reach overhead to the right, reach right to the front, and reach 

right laterally. The claimant can have occasional exposure to 

hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights.

[He can alternate] between sitting and standing for a few 

minutes as frequently as every half hour without loss of 

productivity. The claimant requires a handheld assistive device 

when ambulating.

(Id. at 26).

At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past 

relevant work. (Id. at 30). At Step Five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could make sufficient 

adjustments to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy given his age, 

education, work experience, and RFC. (Id. at 31). Examples of such jobs included small 

products assembler, housekeeping cleaner, and rental clerk. (Id. at 31–32). Accordingly, 

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act 

from the alleged onset date through September 26, 2023. (Id. at 32).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ 

decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. 

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Substantial” evidence involves “more 

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Court, in its review, must 

consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both the evidence that supports and evidence 

that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1009 (9th Cir. 2007)).

The ALJ—not this Court—is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving 

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conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences 

from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, when the evidence of record could result in more 

than one rational interpretation, “the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Further, this Court may 

only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination; it “may not affirm 

the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. The Court 

will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists 

if the error is “‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or if, despite 

the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned ....’” Brown-Hunter v. 

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ committed materially harmful error by rejecting 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony “in the absence of specific, clear, and convincing reasons” 

for doing so. (Doc. 17 at 9). Conversely, Defendant argues that the ALJ provided “multiple 

valid reasons, supported by substantial evidence,” for rejecting Plaintiff’s physical 

complaints. (Doc. 18 at 5). 

A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

In the Ninth Circuit, a two-step analysis is required when determining the credibility 

of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 

591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must decide if there is “objective medical evidence of 

an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Next, if there is 

such objective evidence, there is no malingering present, and the ALJ finds the claimant’s 

testimony to be unpersuasive, the ALJ must then explain his decision, including “cogent 

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reasons for the disbelief.” See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ must provide “specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony. Ferguson v. 

O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024). This is the most demanding standard in 

Social Security cases. Id. The reasons for an adverse credibility determination are 

sufficiently specific if the ALJ identifies “what testimony is not credible and what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). Such reasons are clear and convincing where the “ALJ’s rationale 

is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 

(9th Cir. 2022).

In his evaluation of the credibility of a claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ 

must rely on factors such as contradictions within the claimant’s testimony, conflicts 

between the testimony and conduct or medical evidence of record, or reasons unrelated to 

the testimony (for example, previous deceitful behavior). Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 

F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). In rejecting a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ is required to 

specify which testimony was not credible and the evidence undermining it. Treichler v. 

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The 

ALJ’s explanation for rejecting the testimony must include “specific reasons for the weight 

given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and 

be clearly articulated so the individual and subsequent reviewers can assess how the 

adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462, 49467 

(Oct. 25, 2017). A reviewing court must be able to conclude that the ALJ’s rejection of a 

claimant’s testimony was not arbitrary, and when an ALJ’s reasoning cannot “reasonably 

be discerned,” reversal of the ALJ’s decision is warranted. See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1997); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103. 

Here, in his written decision, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, 

paraphrasing as follows: 

The claimant’s medical records document the history of his 

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right shoulder avascular necrosis and right hip arthroplasty for 

avascular necrosis. Because of these impairments the claimant 

states that he experiences chronic right hip and right shoulder 

pain that movement exacerbates especially walking. He further 

explains that he has difficulty lifting the right arm or reaching 

behind him. He has also endorsed intermittent achiness of his 

hips if he stands or walks more than 8 hours (Ex. 9F/2; Hearing 

Testimony). 

Because of these impairments and their associated symptoms, 

the claimant states that he experiences difficulties in the 

following functional areas: lifting, squatting, bending, 

standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, and stair 

climbing (Ex. 5E/6; Hearing Testimony). He particularly 

testified that he can only walk about 1 block, can stand about 

1-half hour, and can sit no more than 15-20 minutes before 

needing to switch positions or stand up. He also stated that he 

must lie down for about 1.5 to 4 hours per day due to the pain 

caused by his physical conditions. Because of these 

difficulties, the claimant indicates that he has difficulties with 

dressing, bathing, hair care, shaving, feeding self, toileting, 

lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, 

kneeling, stair climbing, and using hands (5E/1-7, 11E1-6; 

Hearing Testimony). 

(Doc. 13-3 at 27). Following that summary, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms” 

and did not find that Plaintiff was malingering. (Id.) However, the ALJ also found that 

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his 

alleged] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id.) Because the ALJ did not find 

that Plaintiff was malingering, the Court must determine whether the ALJ gave specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for partly discrediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

1. Activities of Daily Living

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 

testimony because it was inconsistent with his reported activities of daily living. (Doc. 17 

at 10). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living contradicted the level of 

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impairment he claimed, explaining the following:

Generally, the claimant’s daily activities are inconsistent with 

the extent of his alleged limitations. Although [he] reports 

some difficulties with aspects of his personal hygiene, he is 

generally able to manage his personal care independently. He 

can also prepare simple[] and complex meals and perform 

multiple household chores, including doing the laundry and the 

dishes. The cla[i]mant also shops in stores, where he ambulates 

without assistance (Ex. 5E/1-7; Hearing Testimony). Overall, 

these activities suggest that the claimant’s limitations are not 

as severe as alleged and that he can perform within the 

restrictions of the residual functional capacity.

(Doc. 13-3 at 27).

In the Ninth Circuit, a claimant’s engagement in daily activities is a valid factor for 

an ALJ to consider in assessing his credibility. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Though it is not required that a claimant “vegetate in a dark room” to be eligible 

for benefits, Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted), the

claimant’s daily activities “may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the 

extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment,” even when those 

activities suggest some difficulty functioning. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d F.3d 1104, 1113 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Hence, the Court finds that although Plaintiff stated that he had difficulty functioning, the 

ALJ properly discounted his credibility to the extent that his daily activities were 

inconsistent with an inability to work in any capacity. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 

1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the claimant’s ability to “take care of [his] personal 

needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework and shop for some groceries ... may be seen 

as inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity.”

(citations omitted)).

Plaintiff contends that, ultimately, the ALJ did not find that a substantial part of a 

typical day was spent engaged in activities inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. 

(Doc. 17 at 10). Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ’s “simple list of activities, without any 

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information as to the demands, frequency, or duration of those activities, does not show 

any contradiction with [Plaintiff’s] reported symptoms.” (Id. at 11). The Court 

acknowledges that the length of time or frequency with which Plaintiff performed his daily 

activities may be unclear from the evidence. Regardless, the Court declines to second-guess 

the ALJ’s reasonable determination to the contrary, despite the possibility that the evidence 

could result in inferences more favorable to Plaintiff. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d

853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even when the record was ambiguous about the 

frequency and duration of Plaintiff’s engagement in daily activities, if the ALJ’s 

interpretation was reasonable, the court would not second-guess it). 

Here, the ALJ reached a reasonable determination based on substantial evidence 

that Plaintiff’s daily activities were incompatible with the severity of his alleged symptoms, 

i.e., the extent of his alleged impairment-induced limitations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s daily 

activities are a clear and convincing reason to discount his symptom testimony. See 

Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1165 (“Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible with the 

severity of symptoms alleged can support an adverse credibility determination.”). 

2. Medical Evidence

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 

symptom testimony, reasoning that it conflicted with the medical evidence of record. (Doc. 

17 at 11–15). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a 

sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). A claimant need not produce 

evidence to demonstrate his symptom severity. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 

(9th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, when the evidence produced contradicts Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony, the ALJ can use it as a sufficient reason to reject the testimony. See, e.g.,

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1661; Alto v. Saul, 818 Fed. App’x. 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2020); 

Everson v. Colvin, 577 Fed. App’x. 743, 744 (9th Cir. 2014).

Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred when he “failed to connect anything 

specific in the records summarized while determining the RFC to any specific 

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inconsistency in [Plaintiff’s] symptom testimony.” (Doc. 17 at 13). However, the Court 

disagrees. Plaintiff’s symptom testimony includes limitations resulting from his 

impairments, including “difficulties with dressing, bathing, hair care, shaving, feeding self, 

toileting, lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, stair 

climbing, and using hands.” (Doc. 13-3 at 27). The ALJ directly addressed this part of 

Plaintiff’s testimony by stating, “the claimant’s statements regarding the limiting effect of 

his impairments are not consistent with the restrictions established in his treatment notes.” 

(Id.) (emphasis added). The ALJ then provided several examples of normal or improved 

findings following Plaintiff’s hip surgery, e.g., “[by November 18, 2021] claimant’s 

condition improved such that the diagnostic findings related to his right hip were 

unremarkable”; “[in] December 2022 the claimant’s treatment notes ... indicate that he had 

no pain concerns or complaint and was very happy with his range of motion”; and “his July 

5, 2022, medical examination noted that the claimant’s range of motion was painless.” (Id. 

at 27). This evidence contradicts Plaintiff’s reports of difficulty “with lifting, squatting, 

bending, standing,... walking, sitting, kneeling, [and] stair climbing.” (Id.) 

Similarly, the ALJ cited examples of medical evidence demonstrating normal to 

mild findings regarding Plaintiff’s right shoulder and arm prior to his August 2, 2022, right 

shoulder surgery, e.g., “[Plaintiff] still demonstrated active range of motion across his 

[elbow], wrist, and hand, as well as intact sensation through his arm, forearm, wrist, and 

hand (Ex. 3F/9; 4F 7; 13F/5)”; and “just as with the previous physical examinations, 

[Plaintiff’s] elbows, wrists, fingers, and thumbs demonstrated functional range of motion 

(Ex. 9F/3).” (Id. at 28). The ALJ also highlighted post-surgery evidence, i.e., “[a] physical 

therapy note from November 2, 2022, not[ed] that the claimant had only minor range of 

motion limitations.” (Id.) These examples of evidence conflict with Plaintiff’s reported 

difficulties “with dressing, bathing, hair care, shaving, feeding self,... reaching,... and 

using hands.” (Doc. 17 at 27). 

The Court recognizes that the ALJ perhaps could have connected the 

aforementioned evidence to specific limitations in Plaintiff’s testimony in greater detail. 

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However, the Court finds it was able to reasonably discern which of Plaintiff’s testimony 

the ALJ considered to be inconsistent with the evidence the ALJ highlighted. Therefore, 

the Court concludes the ALJ did not err in this regard, for even if an ALJ’s decision is 

made “with less than ideal clarity, a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that 

account if his path may reasonably be discerned.” Alaska Dept. of Env’t. Conservation v. 

E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004); see Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (applying this 

standard to Social Security).

Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony 

because “the ALJ cherry-picked isolated notes of improvement and failed to cite evidence 

that any improvement was sustained.” (Doc. 17 at 12). In support of this assertion, Plaintiff 

points to several items of evidence in the record demonstrating that following his June 2021 

right hip and August 2022 right shoulder surgery recovery periods, Plaintiff’s “pain in both 

joints continued.” Id. at 11–12. In contrast, the ALJ reported multiple examples of reported 

improvement in Plaintiff’s hip and shoulder symptoms following these procedures. Supra

Subsection III.A.2. However, as previously discussed, the ALJ—not this Court—is 

responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony and drawing logical inferences 

from the medical record. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. As such, the Court declines 

Plaintiff’s request to second guess the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence, even 

if such interpretation could give rise to inferences more favorable to Plaintiff. See Rollins, 

261 F.3d at 857 (holding that, even when the medical record was equivocal, the court would 

not second-guess the ALJ’s interpretation so long as it was reasonable).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s documented improvement following surgery constitutes a 

specific, clear, and convincing reason supported by substantial evidence to discredit 

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony regarding the extent of his alleged limitations. 

See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence of effective treatment is sufficient to 

discount Plaintiff’s testimony regarding symptom severity)); see also Singh v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-19-02315-PHX-MTM, 2020 WL 5757620, *2–3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 

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28, 2020) (affirming the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff’s testimony, in part, because 

Plaintiff’s conditions improved with treatment).

Additionally, Plaintiff also claims that “the ALJ erred by failing to adequately 

consider the progression of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms over time” in his decision regarding 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 17 at 15). However, the ALJ did discuss the 

progression of plaintiff’s reported pain and range of motion symptoms in a chronological 

fashion—starting as early as April 2021 for his hip-related symptoms, and as early as 

February 2021 for his shoulder and arm-related symptoms—up to and following his two 

surgical procedures. (Doc. 13-3 at 27–29). Regardless, to the extent that the ALJ may have 

erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony by not fully appreciating the 

progression of his symptoms over time, the error is harmless given the Court’s findings in 

the previous subsection. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162–63 (indicating that an ALJ’s 

error is harmless provided his “remaining reasoning and ultimate credibility determination 

were adequately supported by substantial evidence in the record.”). 

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony by pointing to specific 

evidence throughout the record that contradicted Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. Thus, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ 

committed no harmful legal error.

B. Further Proceedings

Finally, Plaintiff requests remand for a calculation of benefits pursuant to the creditas-true rule, or in the alternative, further administrative proceedings. (Doc. 17 at 16–17). 

However, because the Court is upholding the ALJ’s decision, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 

request for remand without considering the credit-as-true doctrine. See Leon v. Berryhill, 

880 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017), as amended (Jan. 25, 2018) (stating a direct award of 

benefits is only appropriate “when the record clearly contradicted an ALJ’s conclusory 

findings and no substantial evidence within the record supported the reasons provided by 

the ALJ for denial of benefits”).

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED and the Clerk of the Court 

shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 17th day of December, 2024.

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