Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04232/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04232-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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1

 Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied because Defendants have thoroughly

discussed the law and evidence and will not suffer unfair prejudice in the absence of oral

argument. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200-01 (9th.

Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Will G. Russell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Chandler, an Arizona municipal

corporation, and Dale Walters, a married

man,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-4232 PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff, a Native American, brought this action against Defendants the City of

Chandler (Plaintiff’s former employer) and Dale Walters (his former supervisor) for racial

harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; and conspiracy to interfere

with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Dkt. #1. Defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment and, when Plaintiff did not respond, a motion for summary disposition.

Dkt. ## 62, 64. Plaintiff has not responded to either motion. The Court will grant

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny as moot Defendants’ motion for

summary disposition.1

Case 2:05-cv-04232-DGC Document 65 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 6
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I. Relationship Between Local Rule 7.2(i) and Federal Rule 56.

Under this Court’s Local Rules, the Court may deem a party’s failure to respond to

a motion as a consent to the granting of the motion: 

If a motion [or opposition] does not conform in all substantial respects with the

requirements of this Rule, or if the unrepresented party or counsel does not

serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance

may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the motion and the Court may

dispose of the motion summarily.

LRCiv 7.2(i). 

The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that “a nonmoving party’s failure to comply with

local rules does not excuse the moving party’s affirmative duty under Rule 56 [of the Federal

Rules] to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Martinez v. Stanford,

323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see also Henry v. Gill, 983

F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A local rule that requires the entry of summary judgment

simply because no papers opposing the motion are filed or served, and without regard to

whether genuine issues of material fact exist, would be inconsistent with Rule 56[.]”);

Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1995) (“a motion for summary judgment

cannot be granted simply because the opposing party violated a local rule.”) (citing Henry).

The Court therefore must determine whether summary judgment is appropriate even though

Plaintiff has not submitted a response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If the adverse party does

not so respond [to a motion for summary judgment], summary judgment, if appropriate, shall

be entered against the adverse party.”) (emphasis added).

II. Discussion.

A. Title VII.

1. Hostile Work Environment. 

“To prevail on a hostile workplace claim premised on . . . race . . . , a plaintiff must

show: (1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial . . . nature; (2) that

the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that a “racially hostile environment existed . . . which

included (among other things) racist jokes and derogatory comments from his direct

supervisor and others.” Dkt. #1 ¶ 11. Plaintiff further claims that he was “subjected to a

racially hostile . . . work environment at all times material to this Complaint.” Id. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiff resigned from the City of Chandler’s employment in June 2004. Id. ¶ 20.

There is no evidence, however, that any jokes or comments related to Plaintiff’s race

occurred after July 2002. In deposition testimony, Plaintiff acknowledged that the last

negative reference to his race took place “back around July 2002”; Plaintiff was unable to

identify comments made thereafter. Dkt. #63, Ex.2(C) 372:21-374:11. Thus, there is no

evidence that a hostile work environment existed after July 2002. See Hardage v. CBS

Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a hostile work

environment ceased when the last inappropriate sexual comments or advances were made).

Title VII required Plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within

300 days of the discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The hostile work

environment ended in July 2002. Plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC until

seventeen months later, on December 16, 2003. Dkt. #63 Ex. 1(E). Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim is therefore time barred. 

2. Constructive Discharge.

“[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result

of discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to

overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain

on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.” Brooks v. City of San

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has stated that this is a particularly demanding standard. See Poland v.

Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We set the bar high for a claim of

constructive discharge because federal antidiscrimination policies are better served when the

employee and employer attack discrimination within their existing employment relationship,

rather than when the employee walks away and then later litigates whether his employment

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situation was intolerable.”).

As noted above, racial comments ceased in approximately July 2002, almost two years

before Plaintiff resigned. Between July 2002 and the date of resignation, Plaintiff’s

relationship with the City of Chandler was problematic. Plaintiff was reassigned to another

position, received a letter of admonishment, and was placed on probation. Dkt. #63 ¶¶ 11,

21, 29. The record does not suggest that these actions occurred because of Plaintiff’s race.

See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930 (noting that constructive discharge must occur “as a result of

discrimination”). In fact, Defendants have presented undisputed evidence that the reasons

for the actions were not related to race. Dkt. #63 ¶¶ 11, 21, 26. The Court finds no evidence

from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was compelled to resign by racial

discrimination. 

3. Retaliation.

“To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, [Plaintiff] must show that (1) he

engaged in a protected activity. . . ; (2) [Defendant-employer] subjected him to an adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the

adverse action.” Hardage, 427 F.3d at 1188. “If a plaintiff has asserted a prima facie

retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the

plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for

a discriminatory motive.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted).

Plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against for complaining of discrimination. Dkt.

#1 ¶ 18. The record does not indicate, however, that any adverse employment actions

following his complaints were motivated by racial animus directed towards Plaintiff.

Defendant has proffered evidence that adverse employment actions were performance-based.

See e.g. Dkt. #63 ¶ 26. Plaintiff has offered no evidence of pretext.

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint may be construed as a claim of disparate treatment

under Title VII, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that similarly situated non-Native

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Americans were treated more favorably, or that Defendants’ non-discriminatory reasons for

the adverse actions were pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). The Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants on all claims arising under

Title VII. 

B. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983.

In light of the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s contentions that Defendants violated Title

VII, Plaintiff’s claims of a deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 also

cannot survive summary judgment. See Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265

F.3d 741, 754-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for defendants upon an

application of the Title VII burden-shifting framework to a § 1983 claim); Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Fonseca v. Sysco

Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Analysis of an

employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those

applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”) (citing Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339

F.3d 792, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Moreover, with respect to Defendant City of Chandler, “a municipality can be found

liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at

issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 1203 (1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (emphasis in original)). “[I]t is not enough for

a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The

plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the

‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original). Here, there is no evidence that

Defendant City of Chandler itself was the moving force behind the alleged adverse

employment actions. As a result, municipal liability is not warranted.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Plaintiff contends that the City of Chandler “conspir[ed] to misrepresent the duration

and scope of the [discrimination] and cover[ed] up the malfeasance of plaintiff’s direct

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supervisor.” Dkt. #1 ¶ 17. The complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which prohibits two

or more persons from conspiring to deprive another of a protected right. See Sever v. Alaska

Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). A violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 must be

predicated on the deprivation of a constitutional right. Plaintiff has presented no evidence

of such a deprivation. Moreover, the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is fatal to

his § 1985 claim. See, e.g., Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1168 (9th Cir.

1989) (“[T]he absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985

conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations.”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).

As a result, the Court will grant summary judgment on this claim. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #62) is granted.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary disposition (Dkt. #64) is denied as moot.

3. The clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 2nd day of November, 2007.

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