Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02614/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02614-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rico Jerome Campbell,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-02614-PHX-KML (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Plaintiff challenges the denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant”). Plaintiff filed 

a Complaint seeking judicial review of that denial. (Doc. 1.) Having reviewed Plaintiff’s 

Opening Brief (doc. 17), Defendant’s Response Brief (doc. 22), Plaintiff’s Reply Brief 

(doc. 25), and the Administrative Record (“AR.”) (doc. 15, 16), the Court issues the 

following Report and Recommendation in accordance with the December 28, 2023,

Order of the District Court (doc. 12), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(10), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons explained below, the Court 

finds the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and remanded for additional 

proceedings.

I. Background.

Plaintiff filed a claim for Title II disability benefits in June 2021 alleging disability 

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beginning February 20, 2019. (AR. at 15.) Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) for the 

purposes of establishing disability under Title II is December 31, 2020. (AR. at 17.)1 The 

Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claim in September 2021 and upon reconsideration in 

November 2021. (AR. at 69-72, 81-84.) Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on July 18, 2023. (AR. at 32-53.) 

On August 3, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (AR. at 12-29.) The 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the capacity to perform “medium work” as of his DLI, 

enabling him to perform his past relevant work. (AR. at 18, 21.) Plaintiff then appealed to 

the Social Security Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied the request for 

review on October 20, 2023. (AR. at 9-10.) This appeal follows.

Three issues are presented for review: (1) whether the ALJ erred by rejecting the 

medical opinions of Plaintiff’s treating dermatologist, Dr. Toni Stockton, M.D.; (2) 

whether the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating oncology 

nurse practitioner, Megan Lorenz, FNP; and (3) whether the ALJ cited clear and 

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discrediting Plaintiff’s

symptom testimony.

II. The Five-Step Disability Analysis and the Legal Standard.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ 

determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial, gainful work activity. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At 

step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not 

disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s 

1

In a Title II case, the claimant must establish his disability began on or before his date 

last insured. Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A claimant can 

qualify for SSDI only if her disability begins by her date last insured[.]”)

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impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equivalent to an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds to step four, where he

determines whether the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the 

ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can 

perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ finds the 

claimant can perform such work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the ALJ finds the 

claimant cannot perform this work, the claimant is disabled. Id.

The court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the 

determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, 

but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence 

supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports 

the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. The ALJ Cited a Clear, Convincing Reason Supported by Substantial 

Evidence for Discrediting the Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony.

Plaintiff testified that he experiences symptoms of skin deformities, tightness, and 

inflammation from a form of blood cancer that presents on the skin. (AR at 38.) He 

testified that the plaques dry out and “mushroom” and “crack open,” and that the lesions 

itch, and he scratches them. (Id. at 38–39.) He testified they are “nasty looking” and 

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“difficult to deal with.” (Id. at 38.) He added that when the plaques crack open, they 

bleed. (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff stated the plaques can appear anywhere on the body, including 

on his hands, legs, the back of his knees, and the back of his head. (Id.) He reported 

difficulty using his hands, and that tightness and inflammation interfere with his gripping, 

such as when he would try to open a jar. (Id. at 45.) He said he is always tired and feels 

weighed down, and that he has no energy. (Id. at 44.) He reported taking naps during the 

day prior to his DLI, and that he feels his fatigue is getting worse. (Id. at 44.) He stated he 

has cognitive issues, that his memory is slowly slipping, that he has difficulty 

comprehending like he once did, that he has word-finding difficulties, and that, during 

2019 and 2020, he needed help remembering doctor’s appointments. (Id. at 44–45)

In the decision, the ALJ found, “There is minimal evidence showing limitations 

before the date last insured, December 31, 2020.” (Id. at 19.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s 

diagnoses of “cutaneous T-cell lymphoma,” “eczema/dermatitis,” and “Prurigo Nodularis 

and Mycosis fungoides,” but also observed that “[r]ecords from 2021 show he was fully 

active and able to carry on all pre-disease performance without restriction.” (Id.) 

(citations omitted). In an apparent contradiction, the ALJ added Plaintiff “was 

symptomatic due to involvement of both hands [in April 2021] and his activity was 

restricted.” (Id.) The ALJ asserted Plaintiff “alleged he had boils on his hands, but there 

is nothing in the medical record discussing this symptom[,]” although there was evidence 

of “papules, plaque, and skin dermatitis.” (Id.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s itching 

improved with treatment and his fatigue improved with CPAP usage. (Id.) The ALJ 

stated there is no objective evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations. (Id.)

To evaluate a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). “First, the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Id. Next, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must cite 

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“specific, clear, and convincing reasons,” supported by substantial evidence, to discredit 

the testimony. Id. at 1014–15. “[A]n ALJ is responsible for determining the credibility of 

a claimant, [but] an ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony without giving clear and 

convincing reasons.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (superseded on 

other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 

(9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to 

be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Id. While the 

ALJ need not engage in “extensive” analysis, he should, at the very least, “provide some 

reasoning in order for [a reviewing court] to meaningfully determine whether [his]

conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 

487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, even if the ALJ explains his decision “with less than 

ideal clarity, a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account if [his] path 

may reasonably be discerned.” Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 

461, 497 (2004) (cleaned up); see Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (applying this rule to 

the Social Security context). Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment 

of a claimant’s subjective complaints, a reviewing court will “not engage in secondguessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court finds the 

ALJ cited a clear, convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

To begin, the ALJ identified records from 2021 indicating that Plaintiff was “fully 

active and able to carry on all pre-disease performance without restriction[.]” (AR. at 19.) 

The ALJ’s only citation in support is Plaintiff’s hematology and oncology visit from July 

2021, which indicates, “ECOG 0: Fully active, able to carry on all pre-disease 

performance without restriction.” (AR. at 470.)2 The treating doctor later notes in the 

record of that visit, “[T]he patient is symptomatic due to involvement of both hands and 

his activity is restricted[.]” (Id.) This internal inconsistency is repeated throughout 

2 The ECOG performance scale—ranging from 0, or no limitation, to 5, maximum 

limitation—“describes a patient’s level of functioning in terms of their ability to care for 

themself, daily activity, and physical ability (walking, working, etc.).” E.g., Northrup v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 23-01250 PHX SMB (CDB), 2024 WL 2702545, at 

*17 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-23-01250-

PHX-SMB, 2024 WL 2699977 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2024).

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Plaintiff’s hematology and oncology records. (AR. at 473, 478-49, 481-82, 484-85.)

Accordingly, the ALJ’s rationale appears to be in the manner of “cherry-picking” 

evidence unfavorable to the claimant from the record, which is prohibited. See Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, this reason is insufficient.

Regarding Plaintiff’s perfect score on a mental status examination in May 2023, 

the lack of objective medical evidence is insufficient alone to reject Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony. See Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ[ ]may not 

discredit the claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the objective evidence fails 

to fully corroborate the degree of pain alleged.”) (citations omitted). As such, this reason 

is also insufficient.

Importantly, however, the ALJ also cited evidence from January 2021 indicating 

Plaintiff’s fatigue was improved after restarting use of a CPAP machine. (AR. at 19, 

citing AR. at 349.) The record stated the claimant was “feeling better since restarting” his 

CPAP. (AR. at 349.) With respect to improvement, the ALJ is required to consider the 

“broader context” of a claimant’s impairment. Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2016). If the ALJ was to cite evidence of improvement, it “must in fact constitute 

examples of a broader development to satisfy the applicable ‘clear and convincing’ 

standard.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018. The record both before and after the DLI shows 

Plaintiff reported and was assessed with fatigue. (E.g., AR. at 355, 358, 477, 479, 517, 

519, 556, 562, 568, 657.) But many of these visits reflect improvement in Plaintiff’s 

fatigue, or only moderate or sporadic fatigue, contrary to the more severe fatigue Plaintiff 

described. (Id. at 335, 477, 556, 562, 568, 573, 580, 701.)3 Consequently, the Court finds 

this constitutes a clear, convincing reason supported by substantial evidence sufficient to 

discredit Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinion Evidence.

Regulations effective March 27, 2017, provide that the ALJ “will not defer or give 

any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . 

3 Plaintiff described more severe fatigue at his hearing. (Id. at 44.)

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. . including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). 

Instead, the ALJ must determine the persuasiveness of an opinion and articulate his 

analysis using two primary factors: supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R § 

404.1520c(b)(2). The degree of supportability is based on the extent to which a medical 

source presents “relevant[ ]objective medical evidence and supporting explanations” to 

justify a conclusion. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(c)(1). For the consistency factor, “[t]he more 

consistent a medical opinion . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and 

nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 

20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(c)(2). While the ALJ must still consider other factors relevant to 

the persuasiveness of the opinion, the ALJ generally need not articulate how they were 

considered, outside of limited circumstances. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(b)(3), (c)(3)–(5). 

“[A]n ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must 

simply be supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th 

Cir. 2022).

1. The ALJ’s Decision to Discredit Dr. Stockton’s Assessment Was 

Supported by Substantial Evidence. 

Dr. Stockton, Plaintiff’s treating dermatologist, assessed Plaintiff’s limitations due 

to severe fatigue several times in the record. (AR. at 653-54, 679-80, 699-700.) She 

concluded, for instance, that Plaintiff “fatigued very easily due to disease [and] 

medication,” that his fatigue occurred daily for two or more hours a day, that his fatigue 

was “severe,” and that his limitations existed as of February 20, 2019. (AR. at 653-54.)

Addressing Dr. Stockton’s opinions, the ALJ found, “There is no support in the 

medical record from this doctor for this doctor’s opinions that the claimant’s fatigue is 

severely disabling.” (AR. at 20.) The ALJ discussed, for instance, medical records in 

January 2021 showing improvement to Plaintiff’s fatigue and conflicting notes from 

another doctor of “only moderate fatigue and no other major side effects.” (AR. at 20.)

The Court finds the ALJ addressed the regulatory factors and that his decision to 

discredit Dr. Stockton’s medical opinion is supported by substantial evidence. There is 

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sufficient evidence to belie Dr. Stockton’s conclusion Plaintiff’s fatigue was severe. (AR. 

at 20, 654.) Contrary to Dr. Stockton’s opinions, Plaintiff’s medical records reflect his 

fatigue was often described as moderate. (E.g., AR. at 477, 556, 562, 568, 657.) 

Consequently, because the ALJ cited reasons supported by substantial evidence for 

discrediting this opinion, the ALJ did not err in finding Dr. Stockton’s opinion 

unpersuasive.

2. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Explain how He Considered the 

Supportability and Consistency Factors When Rejecting FNP Lorenz’s 

Opinions. 

FNP Lorenz assessed that Plaintiff had “pain [and] limited joint mobility,” could 

sit for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday and stand and walk for less than two 

hours in an eight-hour workday, would need to miss more than six days of work per 

month, and would be off-task greater than 21% of an eight-hour work day. (AR. at 655.)4

FNP Lorenz stated Plaintiff’s pain and fatigue were “severe” and in existence on or 

before December 31, 2020. (AR. at 656.)

The ALJ concluded that FNP Lorenz’s opinions were unpersuasive because they 

were “given after [t]he expiration of the DLI,” and because FNP Lorenz “just gives a 

conclusory opinion that the claimant is disabled and does not cite anything in her 

experience or in the medical record to support [the] opinion.” (AR. at 21.) 

An ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or 

inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. Woods, 

32 F. 4th at 792. The agency must “articulate . . . how persuasive” it finds “all of the 

medical opinions” from each doctor or other source and “explain how [it] considered the 

supportability and consistency factors” in reaching these findings. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c(b)(2). 

Here, the ALJ did not adequately explain how he considered the supportability and 

4 While Dr. Stockton’s assessments focus on Plaintiff’s fatigue (AR. at 653-54, 679-80, 

699-700), the basis of FNP Lorenz’s assessment is Plaintiff’s pain and limited joint 

mobility (AR. at 655-56).

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consistency factors when finding that FNP Lorenz’s opinions were unpersuasive. To 

begin, the fact that a medical opinion post-dates the claimant’s date last insured is not, 

alone, a sufficient reason to reject it. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 

1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his court has specifically held that medical evaluations 

made after the expiration of a claimant’s insured status are relevant to an evaluation of 

the preexpiration condition.”). The ALJ cannot simply disregard an opinion that postdates the claimant’s DLI.

Regarding the ALJ’s summary assertion that FNP Lorenz provided a “conclusory 

opinion” without citation to the record, an assessment of the supportability of a provider’s 

opinion must include some consideration of that provider’s own medical records. Bogner 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-01908-PHX-DMF, 2023 WL 4734120, at *4 

(D. Ariz. July 25, 2023) (noting the ALJ did not adequately address supportability 

because “the ALJ failed to discuss how Dr. Aubrey and NP Kazaka’s treatment notes 

supported or did not support each provider’s opinion.”); Lisa R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 3:22-CV-5296-DWC, 2023 WL 1277694, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2023). FNP 

Lorenz noted, for instance, that her conclusions and assigned limitations resulted from 

“objective, clinical, or diagnostic findings which have been documented either by [her], 

or elsewhere in the patient’s medical records[.]” (AR. at 656.) She also indicated she had 

“considered and/or reviewed [her] treatment notes, records from other providers, 

radiographic reports, laboratory reports, [and the] patient’s response to treatment[.]” (AR. 

at 656.) FNP Lorenz treated Plaintiff for years at Ironwood Cancer and Research Centers.

(AR. at 466-88, 556-84, 608-28, 657-78, 701-10.) When addressing supportability, it was 

incumbent upon the ALJ to explain why FNP Lorenz’s treatment notes do not support her 

findings.

Moreover, the ALJ apparently failed to discuss the consistency of FNP Lorenz’s 

opinion with the other evidence of record. Under clear regulatory language, the ALJ is 

required to “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency factors for a 

medical source’s medical opinions[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); Woods, 32 F.4th at 

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792 (“The agency must articulate how persuasive it finds all of the medical opinions from 

each doctor or other source, and explain how it considered the supportability and 

consistency factors in reaching these findings.”) (cleaned up); e.g., Arroyo v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-00360-DMC, 2023 WL 3853485, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2023)

(collecting cases finding the ALJ erred by conflating the two factors and by failing to 

properly address the factors). Consequently, the ALJ erred by failing to adequately 

address the regulatory factors and by summarily concluding FNP Lorenz’s opinions were

unpersuasive. 

IV. Remedy.

“The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to

award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1232 (9th Cir. 1987). “When the ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court 

ordinarily must remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award 

of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 104, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (amended January 25, 

2018). An “automatic award of benefits in a disability benefits case is a rare and 

prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule.” Id. at 1044. 

“Usually, if additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative 

proceeding, a social security case should be remanded [for further proceedings].” 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 

1981)); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that 

the court was not required to enter award of benefits where the findings were insufficient 

as to whether testimony should be credited as true, and remanding for reconsideration of 

credibility). Moreover, when “an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and 

ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.” Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014); Lambert, 980 F.3d at 

1277-78 (remanded because the ALJ erred in failing to provide sufficient reasons for 

rejecting claimant’s testimony and the error was not harmless). It is proper to remand for 

an award of benefits when: “(1) the record has been fully developed and further 

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administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 

medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the 

ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 

1020. Even if all three prongs of the test are met, however, the court may remand for 

further proceedings when an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 

that a claimant is, in fact, disabled. Garrison, 7596 F.3d at 1021.

Here, further development of the record is necessary. First, additional

administrative proceedings would provide Plaintiff the opportunity to clarify what is

described in his Opening Brief to this Court as “repeated notation[s]” in the medical 

records that create contradictions regarding Plaintiff’s activity level during the relevant 

period. (Pl. Br. at 19.) While, on the one hand, the medical providers report that Plaintiff 

was “fully active and able to carry on all pre-disease performance without restriction,” his

providers report in the same records that “although disease burden is fairly low, the 

patient is symptomatic . . . and his activity is restricted.” (AR. at 322, 325, 467, 470, 

473.) Additional evidence could shed light on these discrepancies.

Additionally, even though FNP Lorenz indicates in her “Medical Assessment of 

Ability to Do Work-Related Physical Activities” that Plaintiff’s pain is severe, Plaintiff’s 

medical records sometimes reflect either no pain or mild pain. (AR. at 321, 324, 327, 

556, 560, 580, 608.) Similarly, some medical records indicate simply “no action needed” 

regarding Plaintiff’s reported pain, and the records that follow indicate “continue current 

pain regimen.” (AR. at 580, 603.) Plaintiff’s reports of no pain or mild pain create doubt 

regarding his disability. It is recommended that the Court remand for further proceedings.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 3rd day of January, 2025.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:23-cv-02614-KML Document 27 Filed 01/06/25 Page 12 of 12