Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00247/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Gary Gene Angel,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 02-0247 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

E. Roe,

Respondent.

-oOoPetitioner is a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in

1997 in the San Joaquin County Superior Court of first degree

murder by personal use of a firearm, evading an officer in wanton

disregard for the safety of others, and possession of a firearm

by a felon. He is serving a sentence of 61 years and four months

to life for these crimes.

Petitioner claims trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to pursue diligently a written plea offer,

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1 Other claims in the petition were withdrawn in the traverse, viz.,

due process was violated because the conviction is unsupported by sufficient

evidence of premeditation and deliberation, that petitioner is entitled to a

new trial based on newly discovered evidence, that the trial court erred by

giving a “consciousness of guilt” instruction, and that due process was

violated when the California Court of Appeal denied a request by appellate

counsel to expand the scope of her appointment to include the preparation of a

habeas petition. Traverse at 19.

2

failing to successfully impeach prosecution witnesses Lenhardt

and Craig Beck regarding deals they had made with prosecutors and

other matters, and failing to object to witnesses testifying in

jail garb in a courtroom filled with uniformed officers. 

Petitioner also claims his conviction should be reversed based on

cumulative error.1

Petitioner filed the petition without counsel. After

respondent answered and petitioner filed a traverse, petitioner

substituted Frank Prantil as counsel and moved for leave to amend

and to abey the proceedings. Petitioner sought to amend his

pleading to allege prosecutorial misconduct and errors in jury

instructions. The court denied the motion.

Factual Background

The court of appeal affirmed the conviction on these facts:

Jay Beck was killed, and his brother, Craig Beck, was a

witness to the killing. To distinguish between them we

will refer to them by their first names only.

Jay died of a single gunshot wound to the head on

November 12, 1996. The witnesses to the killings, most

of whom were firmly ensconced in the drug subculture

and suffered definite credibility problems due to their

lifestyles and felony convictions, testified at trial,

giving differing versions of the events that led to

Jay’s death. The jury resolved the evidentiary

conflicts and found the defendant guilty of first

degree murder. Accordingly, our recitation of the

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3

facts presents the evidence in the light most favorable

to that outcome, except for various comments on the

conflicting evidence. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26

Cal.3d 557, 578.) Since the facts of the felony

evading are not pertinent to the issues on appeal, we

need not address them.

Prior to his death, Jay believed the defendant stole

some equipment for manufacturing methamphetamine from

him. He accused the defendant of doing so. The two

agreed to meet at a garage to settle the issue by

fighting.

The agreed upon location was a commercial garage used

by Jim Lenhardt. Jay asked Craig to come and back him

up. Both of them were unarmed. Jim Lenhardt was in

the garage with the Becks, seated at a desk at the back

of the garage. When the defendant entered the garage,

he was carrying a whiskey bottle. Standing close to

the desk at the back of the garage, Jay and the

defendant argued about the equipment that Jay believed

the defendant had stolen. Finally, the defendant said

to Jay and Craig, “One of you guys is going to get

shot.” As he reached toward his waistband, Craig

rushed him. The defendant hit Craig over the head with

the whiskey bottle. The bottle broke and fell to the

floor. 

The defendant commanded Jay to get down on the floor. 

As Jay obeyed, the defendant put a gun to his head and

executed him. After attempting to kick Craig in the

face, the defendant then ran from the garage. Craig

chased him. When Craig came out of the garage, the

defendant shot at him, forcing Craig to duck back

inside.

Most of the foregoing facts came from the testimony of

Craig and Lenhardt, who testified early in the trial. 

The relevance of this situation will become apparent

later in this opinion when we discuss the defendant’s

belated attempt to accept a plea offer from the

prosecution after it had expired with the swearing of

the jury and after Craig and Lenhardt had given this

damning testimony. Before trial, Craig had indicated

he would not testify because he was in custody and did

not want to suffer the consequences from other inmates

of testifying. Ultimately, he changed his mind and

testified. Also before trial, Lenhardt, who was also

in custody at the time of trial, saw the defendant in a

different courtroom. The defendant called Lenhardt a

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“rat.” Lendardt testified that “rat” meant “somebody

who is testifying and somebody who isn’t going to make

it out on any prison yard for any length of time that’s

for sure [sic].” Lenhardt testified despite the

defendant’s attempt to intimidate. As the defendant

concedes, “the prosecution’s case as to the murder

charged in count I rested on the testimony of Craig

Beck and Lenhardt versus that of [the defendant].”

Back to the facts of defendant’s crimes: A security

guard working close by heard a gunshot and saw the

defendant fleeing the premises with a gun in his hand. 

He also saw Craig come out of the garage, bloodied and

yelling, “You shot my brother.” A police officer, who

had previously conducted surveillance on the garage and

was less than two blocks away, heard a shot. He

arrived on the scene within minutes after the incident. 

He found Jay dead of a gunshot wound and Craig,

bleeding and distraught, saying that the defendant had

shot Jay. 

Investigating officers found a broken whiskey bottle

and a spent casing in the garage. They also found a

spent casing in the driveway, where Craig described the

defendant as standing when he fired the second shot. A

gunshot residue test on Craig revealed no reside on his

hands.

The gunshot that killed Jay entered his left temple,

went through his brain, fractured his skull, and exited

above his right ear. Soot, tearing, and bruising in

the wound indicated that the gun had been held against

Jay’s head when the shot was fired.

The focus of the defendant’s case was that Craig Beck

fired the shot that killed his brother.

The defendant heard from others that Jay had threatened

to kill him; however, he laughed off these threats and

said, “I wouldn’t let him kill me if there was 10 of

him.” The defendant presented witnesses who testified

Craig either had or may have had a gun on the day of

Jay’s death. The defendant also presented witnesses

who said that Jay called for Craig to go over to the

garage that evening so Craig could “watch his back.”

The defendant testified he went to the garage that

evening but that he did not have a gun. He saw a gun

on the desk where Lenhardt was sitting. Jay confronted

the defendant about the property Jay believed the

defendant had stolen and then swung at the defendant. 

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1 A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it

fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the

controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable

from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A decision involves an

unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle but applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case in a manner that is “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). “Clearly established federal law” is defined

as the holdings of the United States Supreme Court existing when the state

court issued its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Where the state court

summarily denies the petition without comment, the district court will look to

the last reasoned state decision on the issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797 (1991). If none exists, the district court must independently review the

record to determine whether the state ruling was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Delgado v.

5

Craig came at him with a gun, so the defendant hit

Craig in the head with the whiskey bottle he had

carried into the garage. The defendant heard two

shots, then ran from the garage. Craig followed the

defendant out of the garage and pointed the gun at the

defendant. As he fled, the defendant heard another

shot. 

Answer, Ex. B (Ex. B) at 2-5.

Governing Law

Principles of comity and federalism counsel against a

federal court’s substituting its judgment for that of the state

courts, a deference proscribed in the federal habeas statute as

amended by the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA). Taylor v. Maddox, 355 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).

Some of petitioner’s claims challenge legal determinations

by the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This court cannot

grant habeas relief unless the state court’s determination of

petitioner’s claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application

of federal law as clearly established by the United States

Supreme Court.1 Id.

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26 Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000).

6

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in

plea negotiations challenge factual determinations by the state

court.

When it comes to state-court factual findings, AEDPA

has two separate provisions. First, section 2254(d)(2)

authorizes federal courts to grant habeas relief in

cases where the state-court decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding. 

Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not

second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process

unless, after review of the state-court record, it

determines that the state court was not merely wrong,

but actually unreasonable. Second, section 2254(e)(1)

provides that a determination of a factual issue made

by a [s]tate court shall be presumed to be correct, and

that this presumption of correctness may be rebutted

only by clear and convincing evidence.

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The first provision applies to situations where a

petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely

on the state record. Before concluding a state-court finding is

unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, a

federal court must “be convinced that an appellate panel,

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. Similarly, before concluding the

state-court fact finding process is non-existent, or defective in

some material way, the federal court “must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact finding

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7

process was adequate.” Id. 

Analysis

Petitioner’s claims all allege ineffective assistance of

counsel. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a

petitioner must first show that, considering all the

circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The court must determine whether the acts

or omissions identified by the petitioner were outside the wide

range of professional, competent assistance. Id. at 690. If so,

the court must then examine whether those errors prejudiced the

petitioner. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see

also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d

972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). The prejudice analysis focuses on

“whether counsel’s deficient performance render[ed] the result of

the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

A. Ineffective Assistance in Plea Negotiations

In an information filed January 28, 1997, petitioner was

charged with first degree murder by use of a firearm, attempted

murder, evading an officer in wanton disregard for the safety of

others and possession of a firearm by a felon. The information

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alleged petitioner used a firearm during the commission of the

murder and had suffered one prior “strike” and served three prior

prison terms. (CT 2, 4-5.) February 5, 1997, petitioner pleaded

not guilty and denied alleged sentence enhancements. (CT 170.) 

May 27, 1997, defense counsel Hirschfield requested the

prosecutor provide a written plea offer. (RT 466, 473-74, 1091,

1096, 1120.) The prosecutor prepared a written proposal that

petitioner serve 23 years and four months’ imprisonment for

voluntary manslaughter, use of a firearm, and felony evasion of

an officer and left it at the district attorney’s office for

counsel to pick up. (Pet’n Ex. 1 at 1-2, CT Supp. 4, RT 473,

1092.) The offer stated it would remain open until the jury was

sworn. (Pet’n Ex. 1 at 1-2.) Hirschfield did not pick up the

written offer. (RT 1103, 1106.) At the end of the day May 28

the jury was sworn. (CT 196, RT 1092, 1094-95, 1102, 1105.) May

29 and 30 the prosecutor called witnesses including Craig Beck

and Lenhardt. 

On the afternoon of June 2, 1997, (Memorial Day holiday)

Hirschfield’s secretary picked up the written offer from the

district attorney’s office. (RT 464, 1103.) Lenhardt and

several other prosecution witnesses testified June 3. At the end

of court that day, in petitioner’s presence, Hirschfield raised

the issue of the written offer. Hirschfield told the trial court

he had received it the previous day, had notified petitioner

about its contents but not been able to discuss it with him, and

could not respond “one way or the other” whether petitioner

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wanted to accept the offer. (RT 464-69.) 

The morning of June 4, 1997, Hirschfield informed the court

petitioner wished to accept the offer so long as it included the

dismissal of another pending case. (RT 471.) The prosecutor

stated there was nothing to accept because the offer had expired.

(RT 473-74.) Trial resumed and petitioner was convicted June 16,

1997, of all counts except attempted murder. (CT 399-400.) The

next day the trial court found petitioner had one prior serious

felony conviction and had served two prior prison terms. (CT

422; RT 1071-73.) 

June 26, 1997, Hirschfield moved the court to appoint

conflict counsel to investigate whether he was ineffective with

respect to the plea bargain offer. (RT 1077-79.) The court

granted the motion and appointed conflict counsel Paniero. Id. 

July 24, 1997, petitioner moved for enforcement of the

written plea bargain based on ineffective assistance for failing

to “communicate a plea bargain,” citing United States v.

Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994). (CT Supp. 1-4.) 

August 4, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. 

(RT 1087-1137.) The prosecutor testified Hirschfield had “pushed

for a written offer” May 27, 1997, and thus she prepared one. 

(RT 1091-92.) Terms similar or identical to those in the written

offer previously had been communicated orally to Hirschfield and

rejected. (RT 1091, 1095-96.) She and Hirschfield did not

discuss the offer again before the jury was sworn. (RT 1092-93.) 

Hirschfield testified the prosecutor orally had offered to

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resolve the case along terms similar or identical to those in the

written offer. (RT 1098-99.) Hirschfield had conveyed the oral

offer to petitioner; petitioner was willing to accept it but

Hirschfield advised him not to. (RT 1099-1101; RT 1111.)

Petitioner was willing to plead to manslaughter and a “strike”

and accept a sentence of over 20 years. (RT 112-16.) After

picking up the written offer June 2, Hirschfield told petitioner

about it before court the morning of June 3 and petitioner said

he wanted to accept it. (RT 1104.) Petitioner’s testimony was

consistent with Hirschfield’s. (RT 1124-28.) 

Panerio argued Hirschfield provided ineffective assistance

because he knew his client wanted to accept the deal but did not

convey that to the prosecutor. (RT 131-32.) The prosecution

argued Hirschfield did not know of the written offer and showed

negligence, at most, in failing to pick it up. (RT 1134-36.)

The court refused to enforce the written offer, stating:

I’ll deny [the motion] at this point. I can’t see that

Mr. Hirschfield did not convey all proper offers made,

preliminary negotiations, which took place prior to the

actual offer in writing on the 28th – were all conveyed

. . . I don’t see there was any ineffective assistance

of counsel. At this time, the crucial thing is whether

he should have picked up the mail when actually the

offer was on the table when actually reduced to writing

by [the prosecutor]. I keep banging my head against –

I don’t know how an attorney who didn’t know about an

offer at the DA’s office – that it was there – how it’s

below the standard of competency and did not pick it

up. That is basically what I would have to find. I

would have to find – to find that Mr. Hirschfield at

this time to be ineffective in assisting Mr. Angel. 

It’s too bad if the offer actually would have been

accepted that it wasn’t conveyed and Mr. Angel was

aware of it. At this point, you’ve got an appellate

issue. I may be wrong on the issue, Mr. Angel, but it

seems to me that he did what he had to do under the

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circumstances.

(RT 1136-37.) 

Petitioner appealed, claiming counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to act on his client’s desire to accept the

offered plea bargain. (Ex. A, Appt’s Opening Brief 31-56.) 

The court of appeal rejected petitioner’s argument, stating

whether Hirschfield erred in failing to pick up the written offer

was irrelevant because it was “essentially the same” as the prior

oral offer. Ex. B at 12. The court continued:

[T]he trial court did not err in finding defense

counsel was not ineffective, despite the testimony to

the effect that the defendant wanted to accept the plea

offer but counsel did not convey that desire to the

prosecution.

* * *

While the trial court made explicit findings regarding

the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it

relates to picking up the written offer from the box at

the district attorney’s office, those explicit findings

are not inconsistent with implicit findings that

counsel, contrary to some of the testimony during the

hearing, dutifully conveyed the oral plea offer to the

defendant and that the defendant rejected those offers. 

In light of the standard of review, we must infer the

trial court made these findings. The circumstances

support such an inference regarding the trial court’s

credibility determinations: the prosecution’s offer was

conveyed to the defendant; the defendant indicated a

desire to accept the plea only after the first two

witnesses provided unexpectedly damning evidence . . .

. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err

in denying the defendant’s motion to enforce the plea

offer based on ineffective assistance of counsel

because, according to proper inferences credited to the

trial court’s ruling, attorney Hirschfield did not fail

to accept a plea offer the defendant wanted. 

Ex. B at 13, 17.

The California Supreme Court denied review of this ruling

without comment. 

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2 A fair trial after plea negotiations end does not remedy a violation

of these rights. See Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466; Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d

1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). If a habeas petitioner prevails on a claim of

ineffective assistance in the plea process, appropriate remedies include

requiring the government to reinstate its plea offer. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458;

Nunes, 350 F.3d 1045; Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2005). 

12

“A criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to make

certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether

to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf,

or taken an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). A

criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel

during all critical stages of the criminal process, including

plea negotiations. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985);

United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2003).2 

Petitioner and Hirschfield testified during the evidentiary

hearing petitioner told his lawyer to accept the prior oral offer

but he refused. They also testified petitioner instructed

Hirschfield the morning of June 3, before court commenced, to

accept the written offer. This testimony is controverted by the

statements and silence of petitioner and his lawyer during trial. 

Petitioner, no novice to criminal proceedings, sat silently

through trial proceedings May 28, 29 and 30 and June 3, clearly

acquiescing in Hirschfield’s decision to try the case rather than

accept the offered disposition and plead guilty. Hirschfield

then stated at the end of the day June 3, in petitioner’s

presence, that the defense needed more time to consider whether

it found the written offer palatable. Petitioner did not

contradict him. Petitioner never informed the court Hirschfield

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was refusing petitioner’s instructions to accept the offer. This

evidence supports the conclusion petitioner never decided to

accept the offer until after the close of court June 3.

The state court concluded after adequate fact-finding

process that petitioner never expressed a desire to accept the

offer, to either the court or his lawyer, before court closed

June 3. This finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness

and is reasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. Even if this court reached a contrary

conclusion based on its own determination of the facts (which it

does not), it would be required to defer to the state court under

governing habeas standards.

Therefore, petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance in

connection with plea negotiations fails. 

B. Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance

Petitioner claims trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing successfully to impeach prosecution

witnesses Lenhardt and Craig Beck and to obtain evidence, through

discovery, of “deals” between prosecutors and witnesses. 

Regardless of the adequacy of Hirschfield’s efforts, these claims

fail because petitioner cannot establish prejudice. There was

ample evidence to convict him even without the testimony of

Lenhardt and Craig Beck. Petitioner pursued a defense of

innocence, testifying that he was unarmed and Craig Beck shot at

petitioner and accidentally killed Beck’s own brother. This

defense is unbelievable in light of the evidence. Petitioner and

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Jay were involved in a dispute and met to fight; petitioner told

others he would defend any attack by Jay; Craig Beck chased

petitioner out of the garage screaming “you killed my brother”;

the shooting was a contact injury inconsistent with an accident

by Craig Beck; there was no gun residue on Craig Beck’s hands;

petitioner fled and led officers on a high-speed chase going 100

miles per hour the wrong way on Highway 99. The testimony of

Lenhardt and Beck was entirely unnecessary to establish

petitioner’s guilt; thus, any omission by counsel in impeaching

these witnesses was non-prejudicial.

Petitioner further claims counsel was ineffective in failing

to object to witnesses appearing in jail garb wearing shackles,

and in failing to object to the presence of numerous uniformed

officers during trial. Here again the prejudice prong of

Strickland is not met. All incarcerated witnesses, whether

testifying for the prosecution or defense, were shackled and

wearing jail attire. See Pet’n 5(8)-(9) (acknowledging it was

“the same for all incarcerated witnesses”). It was clear from

testimony that witnesses were “firmly ensconced in the drug

subculture and suffered definite credibility problems due to

their lifestyles and felony convictions. . . .” Answer, Ex. B at

2. For example, Lenhardt admitted to injecting methamphetamine

with either Jay or Craig Beck on the night of the murder (RT 325-

26, 356), and the dispute between petitioner and the Becks was

over the theft of methamphetamine laboratory equipment. (RT 155-

56, 315, 382.) The jury was aware from uncontroverted testimony

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that petitioner was a flight risk and had tried to elude capture

by driving 100 miles per hour the wrong way on Highway 99. (RT

533-34.) The jury was aware from the substantive testimony that

ample law enforcement presence was appropriate. See Zeitvogel v.

Delo, 84 F.3d 276, 283 (8th Cir. 1996). It is not reasonably

likely the jury was so swayed by the security environment it

disregarded its duty to assess evidence on the issue of whether

petitioner shot Jay Beck. The jury’s ability to refrain from

prejudicial assumptions was demonstrated by the fact it acquitted

petitioner of the charge of attempting to murder Craig Beck. 

Petitioner’s claims regarding courtroom security fail.

Petitioner’s claim of cumulative error fails where his other

claims establish no constitutional violation. 

Accordingly, the court recommends the petition be denied. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 11 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 30, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

Case 2:02-cv-00247-FCD-PAN Document 23 Filed 08/31/05 Page 15 of 15