Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00921/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00921-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-00921-PSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REMAND FOR FURTHER 

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For the Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

VALERIE J. MARRS-ESPINOZA,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-00921-PSG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO REMAND FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 

(Re: Docket Nos. 21, 28)

 

 Plaintiff Valerie J. Marrs-Espinoza suffers from a combination of physical and mental 

impairments, namely back pain and resulting anxiety and depression.1 After Marrs-Espinoza 

applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, the 

Commissioner of Social Security found that she had a disability beginning August 1, 1998.2

 In 

2002, the Commissioner conducted a Continuing Disability Review and found Marrs-Espinoza 

remained disabled.3

 In 2011, the Commissioner again conducted a CDR but found that Marrs-

 

1 See Docket No. 13-3 at 23; Docket No. 28 at 3. 

2 See Docket No. 16-3 at 15. 

3 See id. at 17. 

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Espinoza no longer suffered from a disability as of March 30, 2011.4 After a state agency 

disability hearing, the CDR decision was upheld. An Administrative Law Judge upheld this 

determination upon reconsideration.5 The ALJ also found that only Marrs-Espinoza’s “disorders 

of the back, s/p back fusion” were medically determinable,6

 and concluded that neither MarrsEspinoza nor her treating physician, Dr. Maureen Miner, were credible.7

 The ALJ found MarrsEspinoza’s condition had improved, though he was ambiguous as to whether she had the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work including past relevant work.8 

The Commissioner agrees with Marrs-Espinoza that the ALJ made errors in his 

determination and requests remand for further administrative proceedings.9 Where the parties 

disagree is on what happens next. The Commissioner urges that Marrs-Espinoza should be 

permitted to present additional evidence, including third-party testimony and further medical 

records, to an ALJ.10 Marrs-Espinoza argues that the court should hold that the ALJ’s record was 

 

4 See Docket No. 16-3 at 24. 

5 See id.

6 See id. at 18. 

7 See id. at 18, 21. 

8 See id.at 22. 

9 See Docket No. 28 at 4; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

10 See Docket No. 28 at 4-5 (“Upon remand, the Appeals Council will instruct the ALJ to 

reevaluate the severity of the claimant’s mental impairments pursuant to the special technique set 

forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; reevaluate the medical opinions of record and explain the weight 

given to this evidence; reevaluate the claimant’s credibility pursuant to SSR 96-7p, as well as 

third party statements pursuant to SSR 06-3p; reassess the claimant’s maximum residual 

functional capacity; and, if necessary, obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to 

clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the occupational base.”); see also Docket No. 16-

7 at 78-79. 

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incomplete, the analysis faulty in allocating weight and the findings ultimately improper, such 

that on remand the Commissioner must simply reinstate Marrs-Espinoza’s disability benefits.11 

Though there is no doubt that the ALJ significantly erred, because the record is 

incomplete the court must allow the ALJ the opportunity to evaluate Marrs-Espinoza’s disability 

in light of a complete record. The court therefore DENIES Marrs-Espinoza’s motion for 

summary judgment and for reinstatement of benefits and GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion 

to remand the case for further proceedings.12

I. 

Through its administrative law judges, the Commissioner of Social Security determines 

the continued disability status of claimants by following an eight-step evaluation process.13 

At step one, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 

activity. If so, the claimant is no longer considered to have a disability.14 If not, the ALJ 

continues to step two. 

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments which meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed 

 

11 See Docket No. 21 at 2. 

12 See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should 

remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency 

hands”); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The trier of fact and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”). 

13 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594. 

14 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1). 

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in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.15 If so, her disability status continues.16 If not, the 

ALJ moves on to step three. 

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether medical improvement has occurred.17 

Medical improvement is any decrease in medical severity of the impairment(s) as established by 

improvement in symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings.18 If medical improvement has 

occurred, the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. If not, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. 

At step four, the ALJ must determine whether medical improvement is related to the 

ability to work.19 Medical improvement is related to the ability to work if it results in an increase 

in the claimant’s RFC to perform basic work activities.20 If medical improvement is not related 

to the claimant’s ability to do work, the ALJ moves on to step five. If the medical improvement 

is related to the claimant’s ability to do work, the ALJ proceeds to the sixth step. 

At step five, the ALJ must determine if an exception applies to step three’s “no medical 

improvement” or step four’s “medical improvement not related to the claimant’s ability to 

work.”21 If none apply, the claimant’s disability continues. If an exception applies under 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1594(e), the claimant’s disability ends—and these exceptions may be considered at 

 

15 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. 

16 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(2). 

17 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(3). 

18 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1). 

19 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(4). 

20 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(3). 

21 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(5). 

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any point in the process. If an exception applies under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d), the analysis 

proceeds to step six. 

At step six, the ALJ must determine whether all of the claimant’s current impairments in 

combination are severe.22 If all current impairments in combination do not significantly limit the 

claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, the claimant’s disability ends. If the current 

impairments do significantly limit the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, the ALJ 

continues to step seven. 

At step seven, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC based on the current impairments 

and determine if she can perform past relevant work.23 If the claimant has the capacity to 

perform past relevant work, her disability has ended. If not, the ALJ continues to step eight. 

At step eight, the ALJ must determine whether other work exists that the claimant can 

perform, given her RFC assessment and considering her age, education and past work 

experience.24 If the claimant can perform other work, she is no longer disabled. If the claimant 

cannot perform other work, her disability continues. 

When, as here, a recipient of disability benefits challenges the cessation of benefits, the 

central issue is whether the recipient’s medical impairments have improved to the point where 

 

22 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(6), 404.1521. 

23 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(7), 404.1560. 

24 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(8); but see an exception at § 404.1594(f)(9) (“We may proceed to 

the final step, described in paragraph (f)(8) of this section, if the evidence in your file about your 

past relevant work is not sufficient for us to make a finding under paragraph (f)(7) of this section 

about whether you can perform your past relevant work. If we find that you can adjust to other 

work based solely on your age, education, and residual functional capacity, we will find that you 

are no longer disabled, and we will not make a finding about whether you can do your past 

relevant work under paragraph (f)(7) of this section. If we find that you may be unable to adjust 

to other work or if § 404.1562 may apply, we will assess your claim under paragraph (f)(7) of 

this section and make a finding about whether you can perform your past relevant work.”). 

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she is able to perform substantial gainful activity.25 Whether an individual’s entitlement to 

benefits continues depends on a two-part evaluation process: (1) whether “there has been any 

medical improvement in [the individual’s] impairment(s)”26 and, if so, (2) “whether this medical 

improvement is related to [the individual’s] ability to work.”27 Under the first prong, the 

implementing regulations define “medical improvement” as “any decrease in the medical severity 

of [the individual’s] impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent favorable 

medical decision that [the individual was] disabled or continued to be disabled.”28 “A 

determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on changes 

(improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with [the 

individual’s] impairment(s). . . . If there has been a decrease in the severity of the impairments 

since the favorable decision, the medical improvement is related to the individual’s ability to 

work only if there has been a corresponding ‘increase in [the claimant’s] functional capacity to 

do basic work activities.’”29 

The second part of the cessation analysis focuses on whether the individual has the ability 

to engage in substantial gainful activity.30 The implementing regulations for this part of the 

evaluation incorporate many of the standards set forth in the regulations that govern initial 

 

25 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1); Kennedy v. Astrue, 247 F. App’x 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2007). 

26 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b). 

27 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b). 

28 Kennedy, 247 F. App’x at 764–65 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)). 

29 Kennedy, 247 F. App’x at 765 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(3), 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1594(b)(1)(i)); see also Nierzwick v. Commissioner of Social Security, 7 F. App’x 358, 361 

(6th Cir. 2001). 

30 See Kennedy, 247 F. App’x at 765. 

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disability determinations.31 But in the cessation analysis, “the ultimate burden of proof lies with 

the Commissioner in termination proceedings.”32 An increase in the claimant’s functional 

capacity leads to a cessation of benefits only if, as a result of any increase, the claimant can 

perform past work or other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.33

Marrs-Espinoza received Title II disability benefits as of an onset of August 1, 1998. A 

favorable continuing disability review occurred on March 5, 2002 which now constitutes the 

“comparison point decision.”34 The Commissioner determined Marrs-Espinoza no longer 

qualifies for disability benefits as of March 30, 2011.35 A state agency disability hearing officer 

upheld this determination upon reconsideration. After a video hearing, an ALJ affirmed.36

Marrs-Espinoza now requests that this court remand to reinstate benefits,37 and the 

Commissioner requests that this court remand for further proceedings.38 

 

31 See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(5) and (f) (7)). 

32 Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(5) and (f)(7); Griego v. Sullivan, 940 F.2d 942, 944 (5th 

Cir. 1991)). 

33 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(7), (8); but see Docket No. 16-3 at 17 (According to the ALJ’s 

opinion, “Although the claimant generally continues to have the burden of proving disability at 

this step, a limited burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Social Security 

Administration. In order to support a finding that an individual is not disabled at this step, the 

Commissioner is responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can do, given the residual 

functional capacity, age, education and work experience.”). 

34 See Docket No. 21 at 1, n.1. 

35 See Docket No. 16-3 at 16. 

36 See id. 

37 See Docket No. 21 at 2. 

38 See Docket No. 28 at 4; pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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II. 

The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties further consented to the 

jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a).39 The court finds this motion suitable for disposition on the papers in light of this court’s 

local rules and procedural order.40 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits. The court may set aside the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are 

based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.41

“Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance”42 and is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.”43 In determining whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s subsidiary factual 

determinations, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must 

nonetheless weigh both evidence supporting and detracting from the ALJ’s conclusion.44 

 

39 See Docket Nos. 7, 9. 

40 See Docket No. 4; Civil L.R. 7–1(b) (“In the Judge’s discretion, or upon request by counsel 

and with the Judge’s approval, a motion may be determined without oral argument or by 

telephone conference call.”); Civil L.R. 16-5. 

41 See Bray v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009); Aukland v. 

Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

42 Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222. 

43 Id. 

44 See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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Reasoning the ALJ did not assert cannot be relied upon to affirm his/her findings45—“only . . . 

the grounds articulated by the agency” may be considered.46 

Usually, “[i]f additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative 

proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.”47 The Ninth Circuit has devised a threepart credit-as-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to 

an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits: (1) the record has been fully developed 

and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical 

opinion and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.48 Because the record has not been fully 

developed here, the court may not remand for reinstatement of benefits. 

III. 

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1598, the ALJ conducted the eight-step evaluation process 

for determining whether an individual should maintain disability status.49 At step one, the ALJ 

found Marrs-Espinoza has not engaged in substantial gainful activity.50 At step two, the ALJ 

found Marrs-Espinoza does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets 

 

45 See Bray, 554 F.3d at 26; Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

46 Cequerra v. Sec’y, 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991); accord Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 

641 (9th Cir. 1995). 

47 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 

631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

48 See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020-21; Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1202; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 

1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007); Benecke v. 

Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. 

49 See Docket No. 16-3 at 16. 

50 See id. at 18. 

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or equals a listing.51 At step three, the ALJ found medical improvement has occurred as of 

March 30, 2011.52 Though the ALJ’s finding of “disorders of the back, s/p back fusion” was the 

same medically determinable impairment found at CPD, the ALJ found the severity had 

decreased based on: a change in range of movement,53 “minimal treatment,” and the ALJ’s 

finding that Marrs-Espinoza had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(h).54

At step four, the ALJ found Marrs-Espinoza’s medical improvement was related to her 

ability to do work because it resulted in a less restrictive RFC.55 Thus the ALJ did not make a 

determination at step five, but instead moved on to step six. At step six, the ALJ found that as of 

March 30, 2011, Marrs-Espinoza’s impairment was severe and caused more than minimal 

limitation in her ability to perform work activities.56 At step seven, the ALJ stated both “the 

claimant is able to perform past relevant work” as well as “claimant was not able to perform past 

relevant work as of March 30, 2011.”57 The ALJ moved on to step eight and relied on the 

medical vocational grid rules 202-13-15 to determine that Marrs-Espinoza can perform other 

work, thus affirming the termination of her benefits.58

 

51 See id. at 19. 

52 See id. 

53 The ALJ did not explain how the change in range of movement was an improvement. 

54 See Docket No. 21 at 4-5; Docket No. 16-3 at 19-20. 

55 See Docket No. 16-3 at 21. 

56 See id. at 22. 

57 See Docket No. 16-3 at 22, 23. 

58 See id. at 23-24. 

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IV.

Having reviewed the ALJ’s reasoning, considering adverse as well as reinforcing 

evidence, the court finds substantial evidence and proper application of law do not support the 

ALJ’s decision. Because additional proceedings may remedy defects in the original 

administrative proceedings, the case is remanded for further fact finding consistent with the 

following.59

First, the ALJ erred in developing the record. Consultative examiner Dr. Dale Van Kirk 

received no medical records for review, and non-examining agency physician Dr. B. Morgan at 

least failed to review treating physician Miner’s April 18, 2012 statement.60 At the hearing, 

Marrs-Espinoza never signed an I-2-6-98 waiver of representation form, and thus her waiver 

failed to meet the Higbee requirements.61 The ALJ did not discuss the CPD, the Commissioner’s 

initial findings that Marrs-Espinoza’s condition had improved or the light work he thought she 

could perform. Further, either the record is incomplete, or Marrs-Espinoza never received notice 

of the reconsideration hearing which she failed to attend.62 The Commissioner’s SSA-3441 form 

also was incomplete in the record.63 Finally, the ALJ should not have refused Marrs-Espinoza’s 

husband’s testimony at the hearing.64 On remand, the ALJ must ensure that the record is fully 

developed. 

 

59 Cf. Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1992). 

60 See Docket No. 16-7 at 8. 

61 See Higbee, 975 F.2d at 561-62; see also Docket No. 16-7 at 78-79. 

62 See Docket No. 16-1:1. 

63 See Docket No. 21 at 15; Docket No. 21-1. 

64 See Docket No. 16-3 at 81. 

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Second, the ALJ erred in weight allocation. An ALJ must accord some weight to a 

treating physician’s opinion.65 If the ALJ rejects the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must 

also provide specific and legitimate reasons for doing so.66 Finding Miner’s report does not 

reflect objective findings,67 the ALJ gave Miner’s opinion no weight, instead relying on 

ambiguous “agency assessments—to the extent they reflect light exertional activity.”68 However, 

Marrs-Espinoza highlights Miner’s uncontroverted objective findings: 

 Miner diagnosed Marrs-Espinoza with myofascial pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, 

gastroresophageal reflux disease, opiate dependence, chronic pain syndrome, 

lumbar discogenic disease with tear, herniated nucleus polposis, radiculopathy, 

failed back syndrome, a history of lumbar fusion and pain with psychological 

features secondary to a medical condition.69

 Miner found Marrs-Espinoza has medically deteriorated since her date of 

maximum medical improvement with ongoing need for treatment as well as new 

treatment from current clinicians.70

 

65 See SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *4 (July 2, 1996) (“Treating source medical opinions are 

still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 

404.1527 and 416.927.”). 

66 See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (“Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another 

doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

67 See Docket No. 16-3 at 21-22; See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings . . . does not 

achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective factors are 

listed seriatim.”). 

68 See Docket No. 16-3 at 21. 

69 See Docket No. 16-9 at 70. 

70 See id. 

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 Miner explained that Marrs-Espinoza’s disability led to frequent missed work 

days, rendering her uncompetitive and “totally disabled from this perspective.”71 

 The ALJ also found “the objective findings included ‘[metacarpophalangeal]’ pain 

with range of motion.”72

 The ALJ did not address Miner’s medication regiment of Trazadone and Effexor 

or Cymbalta for Marrs-Espinoza’s resulting depression and anxiety. 

Marrs-Espinoza argues that under SSR 96-2p, the ALJ’s errors of failing to weigh or 

consider objective findings require crediting Miner’s opinions as true.73 The Commissioner does 

not counter Marrs-Espinoza in its brief, other than to generally request further proceedings. 

The ALJ also failed to weigh the opinions of consultative psychologist examiner Dr. 

Pauline Bonilla and non-examining psychologist Dr. Heather Barrons or consider their impact on 

her disability status when he found Marrs-Espinoza’s mental impairment as “non-severe.” 

Marrs-Espinoza’s mental issues were treated during her CPD, and she alleged mental impairment 

in this proceeding.74 Upon rehearing, the ALJ must properly weigh the physician’s opinions and 

consider Marrs-Espinoza’s mental impairment. 

Third, the ALJ erred in his analysis at step two, three, seven and eight. 

At step two, the ALJ must consider the extent to which a mental impairment interferes 

with an “ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis” 

including “such factors as the quality and level of [ ] overall functional performance, any 

 

71 See id. at 70. 

72 Docket No. 16-3 at 20, Docket No. 16-8 at 24; (citing Exh. 3F at 8). 

73 See Docket No. 21 at 13. 

74 See Docket No. 16-7 at 71; Docket No. 16-8 at 4-9, 34-44, 75; Docket No. 16-3 at 75. 

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episodic limitations [and] the amount of supervision or assistance [ ] require[d].”75 The ALJ 

must consider activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and 

episodes of decomposition, and categorize the claimant’s limitations as none, mild, moderate, 

marked or extreme.76 Section 404.1520a (e)(2) mandates that the ALJ’s decision show “the 

significant history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations 

that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). 

The decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the 

functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section.”77

Marrs-Espinoza claims mental impairment due to long-term use of medications, which 

she says affects her memory, concentration, stress and anxiety.78 Bonilla only partially analyzed 

Marrs-Espinoza’s mental impairment,79 and the ALJ did not go through the required steps in 

considering Marrs-Espinoza’s metal impairment claims.80 

 Also at step two, after finding Marrs-Espinoza was not gainfully employed, the ALJ did 

not determined whether Marrs-Espinoza had an impairment or combination of impairments 

which meets or equals a listing.81 Consideration of Miner’s findings might have led the ALJ to 

determine the aggregate of Marrs-Espinoza’s impairments were equivalent to listing 12.04 

affective disorders. However, the ALJ did little more than mention Miner’s diagnoses. 

 

75 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1520a (c)(2). 

76 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3), (4). 

77 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (e)(2). 

78 See Docket No. 16-8 at 75. 

79 See id. at 7-8. 

80 See id at 75. 

81 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(2). 

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 Further, in his analysis of Marrs-Espinoza’s subjective pain, the ALJ failed to apply the 

Cotton two-step test. 82 If (1) the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an impairment 

or combination of impairments which (2) could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other 

symptoms, and there is no testimony showing malingering, then the ALJ must either accept the 

claimant’s testimony on the severity of her symptoms or provide specific findings or state clear 

and convincing reasons to reject it.83 The claimant need only show that his or her impairment 

could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.84 The ALJ then must consider all of 

the factors enumerated in SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii).85 

The ALJ did not do so—such as failing to account for Marrs-Espinoza’s experience of 

side effects from long-term medication use. He found her testimony of the intensity, persistence 

and limiting effects of her medically determinable impairments (back pain) incredible “on the 

 

82 See Batson v. Commissioner, Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Smolen, 80 

F.3d at 1281). 

83 See id. 

84 See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. This approach “reflects the highly subjective and idiosyncratic 

nature of pain and other such symptoms” and the fact that the amount of pain caused by a 

physical impairment can vary greatly from claimant to claimant. Id. (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an 

underlying medical impairment, “‘an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints 

based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of 

pain.’” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004), (quoting Rollins v. Massanari, 261 

F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

85 These factors are: 

1. The individual’s daily activities; 

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain or other 

symptoms; 

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual 

takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 

5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for relief 

of pain or other symptoms; 

6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve pain or 

other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every 

hour, or sleeping on a board); and 

7. Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions 

due to pain or other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). 

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issue of the degree to which pain interferes with her work activities.”86 This finding primarily 

was due to sporadic treatment or missed appointments and the elderly care Marrs-Espinoza 

performed ten hours weekly.87 In determining credibility, an ALJ may normally rely upon a 

claimant’s noncompliance with treatment to provide clear and convincing evidence for an 

adverse credibility finding.88 Here, however, the ALJ failed specifically to “identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints”89—especially 

when compliance relies on memory which Marrs-Espinoza claims to have lost. The ALJ’s 

reasons for rejecting Marrs-Espinoza’s credibility do not appear to be based on substantial 

evidence, and the ALJ has not provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” as required.90 

Upon remand, the ALJ must provide the significant history, including examination and 

laboratory findings, and the functional limitations considered in reaching a conclusion about the 

severity of mental impairment or impairments under Section 404.152a. The ALJ must follow the 

necessary steps in analyzing the diagnoses of Miner and the subjective pain and credibility of 

Marrs-Espinoza. 

 At step three, “medical improvement” is defined as “any decrease in the medical severity 

of [the individual’s] impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent favorable 

medical decision that [the individual was] disabled or continued to be disabled.”91 “A 

 

86 See Docket No. 16-3 at 21. 

87 See id.; but see Docket No. 16-7 at 69 (“Don’t like to get too many shots. (Not good for you)”); 

see also id. at 78-79 (explaining why Marrs-Espinoza missed appointments—such as having no 

one to driver her—the purpose her appointments, and her concern with overmedicating). 

88 See Orn, 495 F.3d at 638. 

89 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (citations omitted). 

90 See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 

91 Kennedy, 247 Fed. Appx. at 764-65 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)). 

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determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on changes 

(improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with [the 

individual’s] impairment(s)” of the CDP.92 The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing 

that a claimant has experienced medical improvement that would allow her to engage in 

substantial gainful activity.93 

Here, the ALJ did not discuss Marrs-Espinoza’s depression and affective mental disorders 

at the time of the CPD,94 and nor did he compare Van Kirk’s findings to symptoms at the time of 

the CPD.95 As a result, there is no indication of improvement or reasonably objective finding 

that, for example, Marrs-Espinoza’s range of motion improved. The ALJ found MarrsEspinoza’s movements were pain-free, when indeed Van Kirk noted “[t]he low back pain 

radiates down both legs. Coughing or sneezing does increase the pain. Also, the pain increases 

if she has to lift heavy objects, bend, twist, stoop, crouch, climb, kneel, push, crawl, or pull. She 

can stand and walk for about one hour. Sitting is limited to about one hour.”96 “She has a 14 

centimeter longitudinal scar over the mid to lower lumbar spine area. This is where her main 

pain is. She also has a 12 centimeter longitudinal scar over the lower abdomen from her anterior 

interbody fusion. The pain in the lower back does radiate into the waist area posteriorly.”97 

Further, Marrs-Espinoza’s pain medications have objectively increased, and Marrs-Espinoza’s 

 

92 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1)(i). 

93 See Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983). 

94 See Docket No. 16-9 at 21 (showing that at the time of the CPD Marrs-Espinoza was taking 

Darvocet, Elavil, and Welbutrin). 

95 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1)(i). 

96 Docket No. 16-8 at 13. 

97 Id. at 14. 

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testimonials of pain are nearly constant.98 The ALJ did not meet his burden of establishing 

Marrs-Espinoza experienced a medical improvement that would allow her to engage in 

substantial gainful activity.99 The ALJ must correct these errors on remand.

At step seven, “a failure to first make a function-by-function assessment of the 

individual’s limitations or restrictions could result in the adjudicator overlooking some of an 

individual’s limitations or restrictions,” which “could lead to an incorrect use of an exertional 

category to find that the individual is able to do past relevant work” and “an erroneous finding 

that the individual is not disabled.”100 Here, the ALJ did not call a vocational expert, did not 

detail the past relevant work Marrs-Espinoza engaged in and did not perform a function-byfunction assessment of Marrs-Espinoza’s past relevant work. The ALJ instead gave an 

ambiguous finding and nonetheless moved on to step eight. On remand, the ALJ must make a 

clear function-by-function assessment and determination. 

At step eight, despite Van Kirk’s finding that Marrs-Espinoza had non-exertional 

limitations of bending, stooping, crouching, climbing, kneeling, balancing, crawling, pushing or 

pulling due to radiating pain, the ALJ relied on grid rules 202.13-202.15 to find jobs MarrsEspinoza could do. An ALJ may only substitute the grids for vocational expert testimony when 

they “completely and accurately represent a claimant’s limitations.”101 Because “the grids are 

 

98 See Docket No. 21 at 22. 

99 See Murray, 722 F.2d at 500. 

100 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; SR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4-6; (including analysis 

of physical abilities such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling or other 

physical functions; mental abilities such as understanding, remembering, carrying out 

instructions and responding appropriately to supervision; and other abilities that may be affected 

by impairments, such as seeing, hearing and the ability to tolerate environmental factors). 

101 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] claimant must be able to perform 

the full range of jobs in a given [exertional] category” for the grids to apply); see also Holohan v. 

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001).; Burkhart v Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th 

Cir. 1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 200(e). 

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predicated on a claimant suffering from an impairment which manifests itself by limitations in 

meeting the strength requirements of jobs (‘exertional limitations’), they may not be fully 

applicable” to a claimant’s non-exertional limitations.102 But the mere allegation of a nonexertional limitation does not preclude the use of the grids—for the grids to be inadequate, the 

non-exertional limitation must be “‘sufficiently severe so as to significantly limit the range of 

work permitted by the claimant’s exertional limitations.’”103 When “a claimant’s [nonexertional] limitations are in themselves enough to limit his range of work, the grids do not 

apply, and the testimony of a vocational expert is required to identify specific jobs within the 

claimant’s abilities.”104

Here, the ALJ made no determination that the additional non-exertional limitations 

described by Van Kirk did not erode the occupational base.105 The ALJ’s RFC determination 

that Marrs-Espinoza could do light work is not based on substantial evidence because he did not 

consider Miner’s findings of Marrs-Espinoza’s limitations, determine at step two whether MarrsEspinoza qualifies under a listing and determine at step three whether her impairments improved 

medically. Further, the ALJ did not send Marrs-Espinoza for another consultative psychological 

exam, such as Wechsler and Trails testing, to determine the level of her memory and 

concentration limitations not addressed by the consultative psychological examiner. The 

testimony of a vocational expert is required where non-exertional limitations significantly limit 

 

102 Lounsberry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006). 

103 Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075-6 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340) 

(holding the use of grids was appropriate where the ALJ made an adequately-supported factual 

determination that claimant Hoopai’s depression was not a sufficiently severe non-exertional 

limitation); see also Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

104 Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663–64 (9th Cir. 1988). 

105 See Docket No. 16-3 at 18. 

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the range of work a claimant can perform.106 These were additional errors the ALJ must correct 

in further proceedings on remand. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 17, 2015 

 _________________________________ 

PAUL S. GREWAL 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

106 See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1102; accord Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

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