Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00411/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00411-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS BICEK, individually, and on 

behalf of other members of the general 

public similarly situated, and on behalf 

of aggrieved employees pursuant to 

the Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

v.

C&S WHOLESALE GROCERS, INC.,

a Vermont corporation; TRACY 

LOGISTICS, LLC, an unknown 

business entity; and DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00411-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this action, Plaintiff Dennis Bicek (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief from 

Defendants C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (“C&S”) and Tracy Logistics, LLC (“Tracy 

Logistics”) (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of California state law. On 

December 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. 

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Plaintiff alleges violations of: (1) California Labor Code § 1194 for unpaid minimum and 

overtime wages; (2) the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor 

Code §§ 2698-2699.5; and (3) violations of California’s unfair competition law, Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code §§ 17200-17207. On February 28, 2013, Defendants removed the case to 

federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Pl.’s Mot. Remand, 

Mar. 15, 2013, ECF No. 11.) Defendants filed a timely opposition. (Defs.’ Opp’n, Apr. 4, 

2013, ECF No. 13.) Then, on May 25, 2013, Defendants filed an Ex Parte Application, 

seeking to amend or supplement Defendants’ Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 24.) On 

June 10, 2013, the Court denied the ex parte application, and ordered Defendants to file 

the application as a noticed motion for the Court’s consideration. (ECF No. 29.) Thus, 

on June 27, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Amend/Supplement Notice of Removal. 

(ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion.1 (ECF No. 35.)

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Amend/Supplement Notice 

of Removal is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff brings the present action on behalf of himself and other current and 

former warehouse supervisors at Defendant C&S’s warehouses in California. 

 1 Plaintiff filed the opposition one day late and submitted a declaration stating that it was filed late 

because Plaintiff’s attorney instructed the Senior Litigation Assistant to file the opposition on “Thursday, 

July 12th.” (Decl. Jill Parker, July 12, 2013, ECF No. 35.) However, the opposition was due on Thursday, 

July 11, 2013. Due to the incorrect date contained in the instruction, the assistant filed the opposition on 

Friday, July 12th. Plaintiff made the same arguments in opposing Defendants’ ex parte motion, and thus 

Defendants had notice of Plaintiff’s substantive arguments in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the 

Court accepts Plaintiff’s Opposition, although untimely, because the late filing does not prejudice 

Defendants.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders these matters

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

3 The following recital of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Class Action 

Complaint. (Pl.’s Compl. Attached to Defs.’ RJN, ECF No. 1-1.)

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Plaintiff’s proposed class includes warehouse supervisors who worked for Defendant 

from February 3, 2007, to final judgment in this case. Defendants employed Plaintiff as 

a warehouse supervisor, which is an “exempt” salaried position, from approximately 

November 2007 to December 2011, in Sacramento County. Defendants hired Plaintiff 

and misclassified him as an “exempt” employee, and paid him on a salary basis, without 

any compensation for overtime hours worked, missed meal periods or rest breaks. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendants engaged in a uniform policy and systematic scheme of 

wage abuse against their warehouse supervisors. This alleged scheme involved 

misclassifying warehouse supervisors as “exempt” for purposes of payment of overtime 

compensation, when in fact these employees were “non-exempt” under California law. 

Plaintiff and other class members worked over eight hours per day and/or more 

than forty hours per week during the course of their employment with Defendants. 

Furthermore, although Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and putative 

class members were entitled to receive certain wages as overtime compensation, 

Plaintiff and putative class members did not receive such wages. Similarly, Plaintiff and 

putative class members did not receive all rest and meal periods that they were entitled 

to receive, nor did Plaintiff and the putative class members receive one additional hour 

of pay when a meal period was missed. Plaintiff also alleges that while Defendants 

knew or should have known that Plaintiff and putative class members were entitled to 

receive at least minimum wages as compensation, Plaintiff and putative class members 

did not receive at least minimum wages for all hours worked. 

Plaintiff and putative class members also allege that they were entitled to timely 

payment of all wages during their employment and to timely payment of wages earned 

upon termination, but did not receive timely payment of these wages either during their 

employment or upon termination. Plaintiff and putative class members likewise did not 

receive complete and accurate wage statements from Defendants, although Defendants 

knew or should have known that Plaintiff and putative class members were entitled to 

these statements. 

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Defendants also failed to keep complete and accurate payroll records. Finally, 

Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff and putative class members that the wage

denials were proper. Instead, these wage denials were improper and served the 

purpose of increasing Defendants’ profits.

These claims were brought by a different plaintiff in a prior class action, 

Tompkins v. C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., which was initially brought in state court on 

February 3, 2011.4 On March 14, 2011, the defendants in the Tompkins action removed 

the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

The defendants did not assert CAFA jurisdiction in the Tompkins case. The plaintiff then 

moved to remand the case on the grounds that the operative complaint alleged an 

amount in controversy below the $75,000 threshold. The Court granted the plaintiff’s 

motion to remand, finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the amount in 

controversy for the plaintiff’s individual claims exceeded $75,000. The defendants again 

removed the case to federal court on October 26, 2011, based on discovery conducted 

prior to that date. The Tompkins plaintiff again moved to remand, and the Court again 

granted the plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that the defendants had not met their 

burden of proving that the amount in controversy on the plaintiff’s individual claims 

exceeded $75,000.

On June 15, 2012, after the case was remanded, the Tompkins defendants 

deposed the named plaintiff in that case, David Tompkins. On September 21, 2012, the 

defendants offered Mr. Tompkins a Joint Offer to Compromise under California Civil 

Procedure Code § 998(b)(2), in the amount of $75,001. Mr. Tompkins accepted the 

Joint Offer on October 3, 2012. The instant action was filed two months later, on behalf 

of the same putative class.

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 4 All facts relating to the Tompkins action are taken from Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 14.)

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5

LEGAL BACKGROUND5

In September 2003, the California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Private 

Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”). Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698-2699.5. The 

Legislature declared that adequate financing of labor law enforcement was necessary to 

achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws. Staffing levels for labor law 

enforcement agencies had declined and were unlikely to keep pace with the future 

growth of the labor market. Therefore, it was in the public interest to allow aggrieved 

employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for violations of 

the Labor Code, with the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to 

retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.

Pursuant to PAGA, an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil action personally 

and on behalf of other current, or former, employees to recover civil penalties for 

violations of the California Labor Code. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). PAGA defines an 

“aggrieved employee” as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and 

against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” Id. § 2699(c). 

Seventy-five percent of the civil penalties recovered go to the Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency, leaving the remaining twenty-five percent for the “aggrieved 

employees.” Id. § 2699(i).

STANDARDS

A. Supplement Notice of Removal

28 U.S.C. § 1446 allows a defendant to remove an action to federal court within 

thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. 

 5 The following summary of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is taken from Arias v. Sup. 

Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980-81 (2009).

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It is well settled that the defendant's notice of removal may be amended freely prior to 

the expiration of this initial thirty-day period. Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 863 F. 

Supp. 1156, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 

864 F.2d 1162, 1159 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990)). “After the first 

thirty days, however, the cases indicate that the petition may be amended only to set out 

more specifically grounds for removal that already have been stated, albeit imperfectly, 

in the original petition; new grounds may not be added and missing allegations may not 

be furnished.” Id. at 1159 (citing 14A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 3733 (2d ed. 1985)). “The majority of courts, for example, allow defendants 

to amend ‘defective allegations of jurisdiction’ in their notice as long as the initial notice 

of removal was timely filed and sets forth the same legal grounds for removal.” Id. (citing 

Barrow Dev. Co. v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969) (permitting 

amendment of removal petition to cure inadequate allegation of the citizenship of the 

defendant corporation)). “If the removing party seeks to cure a defect in the removal 

petition after the thirty day period has elapsed . . . the court has discretion to prohibit 

such an amendment.” Hemphill v. Transfresh Corp., No. C–98–0899–VRW, 1998 WL 

320840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 1998). 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

A district court has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. A district court has 

diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

$75,000, . . . and is between citizens of different states, or citizens of a State and citizens 

or subjects of a foreign state . . . .” Id. § 1332(a)(1)-(2). 

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Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship, with each plaintiff being a 

citizen of a different state from each defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Caterpillar, 

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (stating that complete diversity of citizenship is 

required).

When a party brings a case in state court in “which the district courts of the United 

States have original jurisdiction,” the defendant may remove it to the federal court 

“embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The party 

invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 

Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Williams v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 1986)). A motion to remand is the 

proper procedure for challenging removal. “The party invoking the removal statute bears 

the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge, 861 F.2d at 1393 (internal 

citations omitted). Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 

jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations 

omitted). “[I]f there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” the court 

must grant the motion for remand. Id. Additionally, “[i]f at any time before final judgment 

it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 

remanded” to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

ANALYSIS

A. Supplement Notice of Removal

Defendants seek to amend or supplement their Notice of Removal to include new 

allegations and evidentiary support recently obtained through Defendants’ deposition of 

Plaintiff Dennis Bicek. Plaintiff’s deposition was taken on May 13 and 14, 2013, after the 

Court submitted Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on the briefs. 

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Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes that the amount in 

controversy is met, and the Notice of Removal should be amended or supplemented to 

include this additional summary judgment-type evidence. 

As set forth above, “[t]he majority of courts . . . allow defendants to amend 

‘defective allegations of jurisdiction’ in their notice as long as the initial notice of removal 

was timely filed and sets forth the same legal grounds for removal.” Smiley, 

863 F. Supp. at 1159 (citing Barrow, 418 F.2d at 318 (permitting amendment of removal 

petition to cure inadequate allegation of the citizenship of the defendant corporation)). 

However, when defendants attempt to assert totally new grounds for removal or “to 

create jurisdiction where none existed,” courts uniformly deny leave to amend. Rockwell 

Int’l Credit Corp. v. U.S. Aircraft Ins. Grp., 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled 

on another ground by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991). Indeed, courts 

frequently repeat the Ninth Circuit’s language from Barrow that “the removal petition 

cannot be . . . amended to add allegations of substance but solely to clarify ‘defective’ 

allegations of jurisdiction previously made.” 418 F.2d at 317; see also Emeryville Redev.

Agency v. Clear Channel Outdoor, No. C 06-01279 WHA, 2006 WL 1390561, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. May 22, 2006) (discussing “allegations of substance” rule); Hemphill, 1998 WL 

320840 at *4 (citing Barrow, 418 F.2d at 317); Nat’l Audobon Soc. v. Dep’t of Water & 

Power of City of L.A., 496 F. Supp. 499, 503 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (same). In Barrow, the 

defendant’s removal notice alleged “simply that plaintiff was a citizen of Alaska and 

defendant of New York,” rather than “disclos[ing] both the state of incorporation and the 

location of the corporation’s principal place of business.” 418 F.2d at 318. The Ninth 

Circuit followed other circuit courts in holding that these “allegations [were] defective in 

form but not so lacking in substance as to prevent their amendment.” Id. (citing 

Hendrix v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 390 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1968)). 

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Furthermore, when a defendant must show that the amount in controversy 

exceeds the statutory amount, the defendant “may rely upon affidavits and declarations 

to make that showing; the law in the Ninth Circuit expressly contemplates the district 

court's consideration of some evidentiary record.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 

627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 

1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (court may consider “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 

the amount in controversy at the time of removal”). While “[i]t is best to make this 

showing in the notice of removal itself, . . . a party can supplement its showing in an 

opposition to a motion to remand.” Waller v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 11CV0454-LAB RBB, 

2011 WL 8601207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2011) (citing Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 

281 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In Cohn v. Petsmart, the Ninth Circuit noted that “Petsmart's notice of removal 

was deficient because it only summarily alleged that the amount in controversy 

exceeded $75,000, without alleging any underlying facts to support this assertion.” 

281 F.3d at 843 (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567). However, Petsmart’s opposition to the 

plaintiff’s motion to remand provided further factual basis for the amount in controversy

alleged in the notice of removal, explaining that the $75,000 amount was based on the 

plaintiff’s settlement demand. The Ninth Circuit found that “the district court did not err in 

construing Petsmart's opposition as an amendment to its notice of removal.” Id. (citing 

Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 n.3 (1969) (“It is proper to treat the removal 

petition as if it had been amended to include the relevant information contained in the 

later-filed affidavits”); 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be 

amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”)). 

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit stated that Cohn distinguished Gaus and stands 

for the proposition “that a district court may consider later-provided evidence as 

amending a defendant’s notice of removal.” 

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Gen. Dentistry For Kids, LLC v. Kool Smiles, P.C., 379 F. App’x 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2010); 

see also Morella v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 2:12-CV-00672 RSL, 2012 WL 2903084, at *1

(W.D. Wash. July 16, 2012) (citing Cohn, 281 F.3d 837) (“[T]he post-removal submission 

of supporting evidence can be treated as amending the notice of removal.”).

Here, Defendants have not changed their grounds for removal from those 

originally asserted in the notice of removal—Defendants originally asserted CAFA and 

diversity jurisdiction and still assert only those grounds. Cf. Rockwell Int’l Credit Corp., 

823 F.2d at 304. Defendants merely seek to supplement their original Notice of 

Removal with facts that support these bases for jurisdiction. Furthermore, Defendants’ 

Notice of Removal is not so lacking in substance that it could not be amended or 

supplemented with the information contained in Plaintiff’s deposition. While it is true that 

Defendants seek to amend their notice of removal not through evidence submitted in 

opposition to a motion to remand, but through a separate noticed motion, the Court will 

not “exalt form over substance and legal flaw-picking over the orderly disposition of 

cases properly committed to federal courts.” See Piazza v. EMPI, Inc., 1:07-CV-00954-

OWW-GSA, 2008 WL 590494, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (quoting Barrow, 418 F.2d 

at 318). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Amend/Supplement Notice of Removal is 

GRANTED, and Defendants’ Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1) is amended to include the 

portions of Plaintiff Dennis Bicek’s deposition testimony, as submitted by Defendants 

(ECF No. 33-2).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) gives federal district courts 

original jurisdiction in any civil action where: (1) “the matter in controversy exceeds the 

sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” (2) the action is pled as a 

class action involving more than 100 putative class members, and (3) “any member of a 

class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). CAFA also provides that “the claims of the individual class 

members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds 

the sum or value of $5,000,000.” Id. § 1332(d)(6). Because CAFA allows for federal 

jurisdiction where only minimal, rather than complete, diversity exists, “[§] 1332(d) thus 

abandons the complete diversity rule of covered class actions.” Abrego Abrego v. Dow 

Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has explained that 

CAFA did not disturb the traditional allocation of the burden of establishing removal 

jurisdiction, holding “that under CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction 

remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 685.

The Jurisdiction and Venue allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint state: “The amount 

in controversy for the class representative, including claims for compensatory damages, 

interest, and pro rata share of attorneys’ fees, is less than $75,000.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) 

The Jurisdiction and Venue allegations also state that “[t]he total amount in controversy 

as a result of this lawsuit inclusive of attorneys’ fees is less than $5,000,000.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief again states: 

For each cause of action, the total amount of damages, 

penalties, interest, and pro rata share of attorneys [sic] fees 

including monetary value of ‘further relief as the Court may 

deem equitable and proper’ for the class representative is 

less than $75,000, and the total amount of damages, 

penalties, interest, attorneys [sic] fees and any monetary 

value of ‘further relief as the Court may deem equitable and 

proper’ from this action is less than $5,000,000.

(ECF No. 1-1 at 27.)

1. Defendants’ Burden

Plaintiff contends that the Court lacks CAFA jurisdiction because Plaintiff has pled 

an amount in controversy less than CAFA’s $5 million threshold for jurisdiction, and 

Defendant has failed to prove with legal certainty that CAFA’s jurisdictional amount is 

met.

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Lowdermilk v. United States Bank National Association provides that “where the plaintiff 

has pled an amount in controversy less than $5,000,000, the party seeking removal 

must prove with legal certainty that CAFA’s jurisdiction amount is met.” 479 F.3d 994, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must plead the amount in “good faith” for the legal 

certainty standard to apply. Id. However, “[w]here the complaint does not specify the 

amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” Abrego 

Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683. That is, a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate 

standard “where it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint 

whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled.” Guglielmino v. McKee Foods 

Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendants counter that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies. 

Defendants rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Standard Fire Insurance 

Company v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013), to support their argument 

that they cannot be required to show that the jurisdiction amount of $5 million is met to a 

legal certainty. Defendants contend that after Knowles, Lowdermilk is no longer good 

law. However, the Court must “follow Lowdermilk unless Knowles undercuts the theory 

or reasoning of Lowdermilk ‘in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.’” 

Deaver v. BBVA Compass Consulting & Benefits, Inc., No. 12-cv-222 JSC, 2013 WL 

2156280, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 

(9th Cir. 2003)).

In Knowles, the Court addressed the question of whether “a class-action plaintiff 

who stipulates, prior to certification of the class, that he, and the class he seeks to 

represent, will not seek damages that exceed $5 million in total.” 133 S. Ct. 1347. The 

Court found that such a stipulation does not “remove the case from CAFA's scope[.]” Id. 

Specifically, the Court held that because a “precertification stipulation does not bind 

anyone but [the named Plaintiff], [Plaintiff] has not reduced the value of the putative 

class members’ claims.” Id. at 1349. 

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Thus, such a stipulation does not operate to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA. 

Moreover, Knowles concerned the situation where the amount in controversy would 

“exceed[ ] $5 million but for the stipulation of the putative class representative.” Id. at 

1348 (emphasis in original). On the basis of the defendant’s evidence, “the District Court 

[in Knowles] found that the ‘sum or value’ of the ‘amount in controversy’ would, in the 

absence of the stipulation, have fallen just above the $5 million threshold.” Id. Thus, 

Knowles addresses the narrow situation in which: 1) removal pursuant to CAFA would 

have been proper but for the named plaintiff’s stipulation to an amount below the 

$5 million threshold; and 2) the named plaintiff’s stipulation could not validly bind the 

as-yet absent class members.

By contrast, Lowdermilk did not involve a stipulation. Lowdermilk concerned the 

burden of proof to be applied to a trial court’s determination of whether the claims pled 

exceed the $5 million threshold. Lowdermilk relied, in part, on the rule that the putative 

class representative is the “master of her complaint” and thus “may sue for less than the 

amount she may be entitled to if she wishes to avoid federal jurisdiction and remain in 

state court.” 479 F.3d at 999. Rather than contradict this reasoning, the Court in 

Knowles expressly affirms that the Plaintiff is the master of her complaint, and as such 

may avoid removal to federal court. Id. (“[F]ederal courts permit individual plaintiffs, who 

are the masters of their complaints, to avoid removal to federal court, and to obtain a 

remand to state court, by stipulating to amounts at issue that fall below the federal 

jurisdictional requirement.”) Knowles simply does not address the situation at issue in 

Lowdermilk, in which a putative class plaintiff, as master of his complaint, merely 

alleges—rather than stipulates to—an amount in controversy below the $5 million 

threshold. 

In sum, Knowles does not forbid a plaintiff from intentionally alleging that the

claims brought are under the $5 million threshold to avoid federal jurisdiction. Thus,

Knowles is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Lowdermilk, and this Court is therefore bound 

by Lowdermilk. 

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See Deaver, 2013 WL 2156280 at *5 (finding that Lowdermilk is good law after 

Knowles); Bell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 12-cv-2499, 2013 WL 1791920, at *4 n.1 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2013) (noting that the narrow issue decided in Knowles does not 

affect the legal certainty analysis). Because Plaintiff has specifically alleged that the 

total amount in controversy is less than $5 million (see supra (quoting ECF No. 1-1 at 5, 

27)), Defendants have the burden of establishing the amount in controversy to a legal 

certainty. See Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999. 

2. Amount in Controversy Calculations

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that class members “were not paid overtime 

compensation for the hours they worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day and/or forty 

(40) hours in a week.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 17.) Defendants assert that the amount in 

controversy for Plaintiff’s overtime claims is $5,522.148.72. (ECF No. 33-1 at 16.) 

Defendants reach that figure by calculating that there were “more than 8,481 workweeks 

worked by the 101 putative class members during the putative class period” and 

assuming that “Plaintiff and the putative class members worked more than 10 hours of 

overtime per week.” Defendants then multiplied the number of workweeks in question 

(8,481) by the average hourly rate of pay for warehouse supervisors during the claims 

period ($27.13) by the amount of overtime worked per work week (16 hours) by wages at 

a rate of time and a half owed for overtime (1.5), to arrive at $5,522,148.72 as the 

amount in controversy for this claim. (ECF No. 33-1 at 15-16.)

Defendants rely on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which he testified that in 

2007, he worked “twelve to thirteen hours a day,” and in 2008, he worked “probably . . . 

fourteen hours a day.” (ECF No. 33-2 at 12, 10.) Plaintiff estimated that in 2009 he 

worked “the same amount of hours [as in 2008], twelve to fourteen hours a day,” and 

testified that the amount increased to “up to fifteen to eighteen hours a day” in 2010 and 

2011.

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(Id. at 11.) Each of these shifts, from 2007 to 2011, was four days per week. (ECF 

No. 33-2 at 10.) 

Plaintiff also testified that the other supervisors on his shift worked the same 

hours as Plaintiff when he worked twelve to thirteen hours per day in 2007, fourteen 

hours per day in 2008, twelve to fourteen hours per day in 2009, and when he worked 

fifteen to eighteen hours per day in 2010 and 2011. (ECF No. 33-2 at 11-12.) However, 

Plaintiff testified that he didn’t know what hours supervisors on other shifts worked in 

2007. (Id. at 11-12.) When asked if he knew whether other supervisors were working 

eleven, twelve, thirteen, or fourteen hours in 2008, Plaintiff answered “I couldn’t answer 

for them. I don’t know what their start time was.” (Id. at 13.) But when asked whether 

“other supervisors on different shifts [were] working the same hours” that Plaintiff worked 

in 2009, Plaintiff responded, “I would say yeah, pretty close to the same amount of hours 

that we were working. Because we couldn’t start working until their shift or their product 

was off the dock. So if they were running into our start time, then I know that they were 

ten-plus hours.” (Id.) Plaintiff also testified that in 2010, the other supervisors on 

different shifts were working approximately the same number of hours that Plaintiff 

was—between fifteen and eighteen hours per day. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that in 

2011, the other supervisors on different shifts “were working fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, up 

to eighteen hours a day.” (Id.) 

The legal certainty standard does not require an individualized damages analysis 

with respect to each class member. All that the legal certainty standard requires is the 

production of “concrete evidence” from which a court can estimate the amount in 

controversy. See Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1001 (discussing defendant’s failure to 

provide concrete evidence which would permit the court to “estimate with any certainty 

the actual amount in controversy.”)

In this case, Defendants provide concrete evidence that allows the Court to 

estimate with some certainty the actual amount in controversy. See Lowdermilk, 

479 F.3d at 1001. 

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Although there is no evidence as to the hours worked by employees at other facilities 

where Plaintiff did not work, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony provides concrete evidence 

as to the hours worked by the other supervisors on his shifts for the years 2007 through 

2011. Furthermore, although Plaintiff’s testimony does not provide evidence about the 

hours worked by supervisors on different shifts for the years 2007 and 2008, Plaintiff’s 

testimony states that in the years 2009 through 2011, supervisors on other shifts worked

hours similar to those that Plaintiff worked—i.e., sometimes “fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, up 

to eighteen hours a day.” (See ECF No. 33-2 at 12-13.) Defendants also provide the 

declaration of Christopher Clark, a Regional Director of Field Human Resources for 

Defendant C&S. (ECF No. 33-2 at 24.) Clark states that he is assigned to the West 

Coast region, which includes Tracy Logistics LLC, Sacramento Logistics LLC, and 

Fresno Logistics LLC (the California subsidiaries of C&S). (Id.) Clark’s declaration 

states that from February 3, 2007, to February 1, 2013, Tracy Logistics LLC, 

Sacramento Logistics LLC, and Fresno Logistics LLC employed at least 101 individuals, 

in the salaried position of warehouse supervisor at the California facilities. (Id.) During 

this time, the warehouse supervisors at the California facilities worked a total of “at least 

8,481 workweeks.” (Id. at 24.) Clark further states that during the period of February 3, 

2007, to February 1, 2013, the average salary of warehouse supervisors was 

approximately $56,432.98 per year, with an hourly rate of approximately $27.13 per 

hour. (Id. at 25.)

Thus, the concrete evidence from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony—and specifically 

Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the hours worked by him and other supervisors on his 

shift—allows the Court to estimate that each class member worked, at a minimum,

twelve hours per day. (See ECF No. 33-2 at 11-13 (testifying that Plaintiff and 

supervisors on his shift worked twelve to thirteen hours per day in 2007, fourteen hours 

per day in 2008, twelve to fourteen hours per day in 2009, and fifteen to eighteen hours 

per day in 2010 and 2011).) 

///

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Combined with the concrete evidence from Clark’s declaration, the Court makes the 

following calculations: (8,481 workweeks in the alleged claims period) x (4 hours 

overtime per day when estimating that class members worked at least 12 hours per day) 

x (4 days per workweek) x ($27.13 average hourly rate of pay for warehouse 

supervisors) x (1.5 overtime rate) = $5,522.148.72 in controversy for unpaid overtime for 

all putative class members.

Accordingly, Defendants have shown to a legal certainty that CAFA’s requisite

amount in controversy ($5,000,000) is met by Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime alone.

3. Diversity of Citizenship

CAFA’s third requirement is that “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of 

a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). A corporation’s citizenship 

is determined by the corporation’s principal place of business and place of incorporation. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Tosco Corp. v. Communities For a Better Env., 236 F.3d 495, 

499 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendant C&S alleges that it is incorporated in Vermont with its 

principal place of business in New Hampshire. Thus, Defendant C&S is a citizen of both 

Vermont and New Hamphsire. 

Defendant Tracy Logistics alleges that it is a citizen of Delaware, where it is

incorporated, and New Hampshire, where it has its principal place of business. 

However, Tracy Logistics is a limited liability corporation (“LLC”). According to the Ninth 

Circuit, “LLCs resemble both partnerships and corporations. Notwithstanding LLCs' 

corporate traits, however, every circuit that has addressed the question treats them like 

partnerships for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties 

Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). “This treatment accords with the 

Supreme Court's consistent refusal to extend the corporate citizenship rule to noncorporate entities, including those that share some of the characteristics of corporations.”

///

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Id. (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990) (treating a limited 

partnership as having the citizenship of all its members); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. 

Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456-57 (1900) (refusing to extend the corporate citizenship rule to 

a “limited partnership association” although it possessed “some of the characteristics of 

a corporation”)). “This treatment is also consistent with the common law presumption 

that unincorporated associations are not legal entities independent of their members.” 

Id. (citing Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133 n.2 (9th Cir.

2002)). Thus, “like a partnership, an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its 

owners/members are citizens.” Id. Defendant Tracy Logistics includes absolutely no 

allegations regarding the citizenship of its owners or members.6 Thus, the Court is 

unable to determine whether Defendant Tracy Logistics is diverse from Plaintiff.

Accordingly, only the citizenship of one Defendant can be determined from 

Defendants’ allegations. However, unlike diversity jurisdiction, CAFA requires only that 

one defendant be diverse from one member of the class of plaintiffs. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d). Thus, although the Court cannot determine Defendant Tracy Logistics’ 

citizenship, the allegations contained in the Notice of Removal make clear that 

Defendant C&S, as a citizen of New Hampshire and Vermont, is diverse from Plaintiff, 

who is a citizen of California. Accordingly, CAFA’s diversity of citizenship requirement is 

satisfied. 

Because Defendants have shown that CAFA’s amount in controversy has been 

met to a legal certainty, and because CAFA’s minimal diversity of citizenship 

requirement is met, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise subject matter jurisdiction 

over this case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.

7

 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 

is therefore DENIED.

 6 Although Plaintiffs argue that Defendants fail to produce any evidence of their citizenship, 

(ECF No. 11 at 12), “at this stage of the case, . . . [D]efendants [are] merely required to allege (not to 

prove) diversity,” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 

7 Given that the Court finds that CAFA jurisdiction exists, the Court declines to assess whether it 

may exercise diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Amend/Supplement 

Notice of Removal is GRANTED (ECF No. 33) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is 

DENIED (ECF No. 11). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2013

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