Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56127/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TARA SHENEVA WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-56127

v. D.C. No.

JAVIER CAVAZOS, Acting Warden of  CV-03-02691-GW

the Central California Women’s OPINION Facility in Chowchilla, California,

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 2, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed May 23, 2011

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Stephen Reinhardt,

Circuit Judge, and Ronald M. Whyte,

Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

*The Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Kurt David Hermansen, San Diego, California, for the

petitioner-appellant.

Stephanie C. Brenan, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles,

California, for the respondent-appellee. 

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OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Consider two scenes:

Scene One

Juror #8: I just want to talk.

Juror #7: Well, what’s there to talk about? Eleven

men in here think he’s guilty. No one had

to think twice about it except you.

Juror #10: I want to ask you something: do you

believe his story?

Juror #8: I don’t know whether I believe it or not

— maybe I don’t.

Juror #7: So how come you vote not guilty?

Juror #8: Well, there were eleven votes for guilty.

It’s not easy to raise my hand and send

a boy off to die without talking about it

first. . . . We’re talking about somebody’s life here. We can’t decide in five

minutes. Supposin’ we’re wrong.

Scene Two

Juror #6: I said . . . this is a very important case

and we should be very convinced that if

the defendant is found guilty that it is

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

Foreman: We have spent some time now trying to

understand the reasonable basis for his

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doubt, and I personally did not yet

understand it . . . . I would say that twothirds of the jurors have tried to persuade

— have actively tried to persuade . . .

him that his current view is incorrect.

. . .

Juror #4: Well, I guess he believes from the evidence that he’s seen that there hasn’t

been sufficient proof. . . .

Juror #5: I think the question may have been

raised: “Do you have a political agenda?” I think [it] might have been in the

heat of the argument, because it does get

heated back and forth from a bunch of

different people. It may have been said.

. . .

Juror #9: Well, he said this is a serious thing, and

I don’t really feel that there is enough

cause for — or something to that effect.

. . . What he said was, “I wouldn’t want

to take anyone’s freedom away, unless,”

you know, “I was sure that certain things

took place.” . . . .

The first passage above is dialogue from the classic Academy Award-winning 1957 film, Twelve Angry Men, in which

Henry Fonda plays a holdout juror who, over two tense hours,

convinces his eleven peers that the defendant in a murder trial

should be acquitted. The second excerpt comes from the transcript of proceedings during the petitioner’s murder trial, in

which each juror was examined and cross-examined, seriatim

and mid-deliberation, after it was reported that one juror was

taking a different view from the others. In the end, the trial

court dismissed that juror on the ground that he was “biased”

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against the prosecution. With an alternate juror in place, the

jury returned a guilty verdict. 

Twelve Angry Men made for great drama because it violated the sanctity of the jury’s secret deliberations by allowing

the audience into the jury room. It was, of course, a work of

fiction. We are presented here with a similar intrusion into

heated deliberations involving a holdout juror, except that this

one took place in open court, and it resulted in a woman being

convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment after the holdout was dismissed. Under the precedent that existed when

petitioner’s conviction became final (and exists today as

well), the trial court’s actions violated the petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment rights, as incorporated with respect to the states

under the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore conclude that

petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution,

reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand with

instructions to grant the writ.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Offense

One afternoon in October 1993, petitioner Tara Sheneva

Williams agreed to drive around two friends, Carde Taylor

and Schantel W., to case out stores for a potential robbery

later that night. The third or fourth store they visited was a

liquor store, which Taylor and Schantel entered while Williams waited in the car. The two emerged a few seconds later,

but then Taylor went back in, pointed a gun at the proprietor

and, in the course of emptying the cash register, shot and

killed him. After being arrested in 1998 and initially denying

knowledge of the crime, Taylor and Williams both admitted

to being present and that Taylor had killed the owner. Williams told the police that, while she knew Taylor was armed,

there had never been a plan to rob the store during daylight

hours. 

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Taylor and Williams were each charged with special circumstances murder and a firearm enhancement, and they were

tried separately. After a five-day jury trial, Williams was

found guilty of murder with special circumstances as charged

and the firearm enhancement. The jury found that a handgun

was used in the commission of the crime. She was later sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.1

B. The Jury Deliberations

Williams was convicted only after the trial court dismissed

a known holdout juror and replaced him with an alternate.

This dismissal, and the events leading up to it, form the basis

of her claim for habeas relief.

Two days after the jurors began deliberations, the jury foreman delivered two notes to the trial court. The first read: 

Relative to jury instruction 17.[41].1,[2] I wish to

1Taylor was convicted as well, and sentenced to a life term without the

possibility of parole, plus five years. 

2That instruction is California’s anti-jury nullification instruction, which

states: 

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during

their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these

instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses

to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to

decide the case based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other]

improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation. 

California Jury Instructions — Criminal, CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (1998 New)

(6th ed. 1996) (brackets in original). The Supreme Court of California has

since barred the use of this instruction, “believ[ing] [it to] ha[ve] the

potential to intrude unnecessarily on the deliberative process and affect it

adversely — both with respect to the freedom of jurors to express their

differing views during deliberations, and the proper receptivity they

should accord the views of their fellow jurors.” People v. Engelman, 28

Cal. 4th 436, 440 (2002). The trial court’s use of this instruction is not at

issue here. 

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inform you that we have one juror who: 1) has

expressed an intention to disregard the law . . . and

2) has expressed concern relative to the severity of

the charge (1st degree murder). 

The second asked: 

Is it legally permissible for a juror to interpret page

32 of the jury instructions to mean that the conspiracy should involve a plan to commit a specific robbery, rather than a general plan to commit robberies

in the future? 

The trial court called the jury into the courtroom and informed

its members that the answer to the second question was “no.”

All the jurors except for the foreman were asked to leave, and

the court proceeded to question him regarding the first note.

1. Jury Foreman (Juror No. 8)

The foreman first confirmed that no juror had “expressed

any concern about punishment or the punishment that one

might expect to flow from a certain conviction,” which the

jury had been expressly instructed it could not do. When

asked what was meant by the phrase “has expressed concern

relative to the severity of the charge,” the foreman answered

that the juror in question “has probably ten or fifteen times in

our conversations so far expressed that . . . he doesn’t believe

that there’s sufficient evidence —.” At this point, the court

interrupted the foreman and informed him that he could not

speak to “how jurors view the evidence” but could only

express concern with whether there was “misconduct.” As an

example of misconduct, the court described a situation where

a juror “says something like, I can’t convict anybody of first

degree murder because of the punishment or something like

that, or I had a cousin in a similar situation, and I wouldn’t

want the person here to suffer what, you know, my cousin

went through, something like that.” The foreman then

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responded: “I think it’s halfway to that, and so I think that

one’s a little iffy, and I think your answer to the first part may

be sufficient to resolve our concern at this time.” 

Upon the People’s motion, and over Williams’s objection,

the court halted jury deliberations and questioned the foreman

again the next day. According to the foreman, on the first day

of deliberations, Juror No. 6 had brought up historical

instances “when juries have refused to follow the law,” such

as in pre-Civil War prosecutions for harboring fugitive slaves

and during the Vietnam War era for burning draft cards. The

foreman expressed his opinion that Juror No. 6 had “a belief

. . . that [there] is a civic responsibility to — there’s a name

for this — civil disobedience. There’s a responsibility to be

disobedient in that case.” However, the foreman testified that

when he had asked Juror No. 6 explicitly “if that’s what was

going on here,” the juror answered “no.” 

The foreman testified that Juror No. 6 had expressed his

view that first degree murder was a severe charge which

affected the “way he interprets the evidence and the standard

he uses for doubt.” Juror No. 6, according to the foreman, had

made a “fairly clear statement . . . that connects the severity

of the charge with — explicitly of first degree murder with his

need for a higher standard.” The foreman conceded that Juror

No. 6 had not explicitly expressed an unwillingness to follow

the law or the jury instructions on the standard of proof. He

also agreed that the juror had attempted to explain “the basis

for his reasonable doubt” to the other jurors many times and

had actively engaged in “intellectual conversation with them,

listening to their questions, trying to answer them.” 

2. Juror No. 6

The court called in Juror No. 6 for questioning. Juror No.

6 testified that no juror had indicated being motivated by the

issue of possible punishment in the case, and that no juror had

even used the word “punishment.” He denied using a higher

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burden of proof based on the severity of the first degree murder charge, and stated, “I think that the same burden of proof

should be used for any criminal offense, higher than a civil

trial, but all criminal trials should have — whether it’s first

degree murder or not should have the same burden of proof.”

He recalled the court’s instruction regarding what constituted

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and testified that he agreed

to follow it as he understood it. He expressed his understanding of the instruction as: “not proof — there’s always some

possible doubt in any human affair, but if you have a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and only on the evidence

that was presented at trial, if you have a reasonable doubt

about a defendant’s guilt, under the law, you are required to

vote not guilty.” 

The prosecutor asked, “Has anyone discussed the severity

of the charge?” Juror No. 6 responded, “No, not that I recall.”

The court then interjected, “Just to be clear, have you made

reference during deliberations to the severity of the charge?”

And Juror No. 6 replied, “No, I — Well, let me amend that.

I said I can remember saying this is a very important case and

we should be very convinced that if the defendant is found

guilty that it is beyond a reasonable doubt. Other than that, I

did not make a reference to the severity of the case — the

severity of the charge.” 

The court asked Juror No. 6 about the difference between

proving a criminal charge under the standard of “beyond a

reasonable doubt” and proving the same charge under the

standard of “very convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Juror No. 6 began to answer “No, they’re the same standards

as far as —” when the court cut him off, asking, “What does

‘very convinced’ add?” Juror No. 6 responded, “It just means

. . . it’s a good idea to pay particular attention to what evidence was presented at the trial and make sure before we

decide on a verdict, that we are convinced — if the verdict is

guilty, that we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by

the evidence that was presented at the trial.” He then stated a

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second time that “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is the

standard, and I don’t think that there is a difference between

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and very convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt. I think it’s the same thing.” 

Juror No. 6 also expressed his view that “jurors should not

use juror nullification.” He stated, “They should base their

decisions on the evidence that was presented at a particular

trial and only on that evidence.” Juror No. 6 was later asked

again whether the jurors had discussed jury nullification. He

responded that another juror had “raised the question whether

juries always convict according to the law,” and that he had

responded, “sometimes they don’t,” and had shared his

knowledge of historical cases in which the law “was not

always enforced” and “became impossible to enforce, because

juries would not convict people who were clearly in violation

of it.”

After Juror No. 6 was excused, the prosecutor asked the

court to remove him. The court stated that it was “inclined to

rule that the juror has engaged in misconduct. He’s applying

a higher burden of proof than the law requires . . . and . . . he

isn’t lying, but intentionally withheld honest information.”

The court noted that Juror No. 6 had “contradicted himself,”

because he initially answered that no juror had discussed juror

nullification or the seriousness of the charge, but later admitted that he had responded to a juror’s question about jurors

not following the law. But the court decided to first question

the other jurors about Juror No. 6, in order to develop a “fuller

record.” 

3. The Other Ten Jurors

Over the next two hours, the trial judge, prosecutor, and

defense counsel questioned each of the remaining jurors, one

by one. Six jurors (Nos. 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, and 12) stated that,

in their opinion, Juror No. 6 was not following the law. When

questioned further, however, four of those six (Nos. 5, 7, 11,

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and 12) acknowledged that Juror No. 6 had never said as

much, but two (Nos. 3 and 10) reported that Juror No. 6 had

said, “in essence,” that he would not follow the law. The other

four (Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 9) thought that Juror No. 6 was following the law, and, in the words of Juror No. 2, was “being honest.” Those jurors thought there was just a difference in

opinion over how the law applied to the facts of the case.

Juror No. 9, for example, explained that Juror No. 6 had tried

to explain his view, “but none of us really understood it the

way he did.” Only five jurors (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11) mentioned jury nullification at all, of which just one (No. 2)

thought Juror No. 6 might actually be engaging in the practice. Additionally, two jurors (Nos. 2 and 5) made comments

to the effect that Juror No. 6 disapproved of the theory of

accomplice liability. Six jurors (Nos. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11)

explained that Juror No. 6 did not believe that the evidence

was sufficient to prove guilt of murder beyond a reasonable

doubt. 

4. The Trial Court Decision

After the inquiry concluded, the court dismissed Juror No.

6 under California Penal Code section 1089, which provides

for the discharge of jurors for good cause.3 The court ruled

that its dismissal of Juror No. 6 was “not because he’s not

deliberating and not because he’s not following the law.”

3

In relevant part, the statute reads: 

If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the

case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good

cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or

her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause

appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged

and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a place

in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations

as though the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors. 

Cal. Penal Code § 1089 (emphasis added). 

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Instead, “he is dismissed without any question in my mind as

a biased juror,” because “his mind is bent . . . against the prosecution,” as evidenced by his statements concerning the government’s burden of proof, his disagreement with the felonymurder rule, and his “dishonest[y]” in recounting whether

anyone had discussed the severity of the charge or juror nullification. The court then concluded that Juror No. 6 “was lying

in court” and “has no business being a juror in this matter,”

and so dismissed him. 

C. Subsequent Proceedings

An alternate juror replaced Juror No. 6 immediately. The

following day, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Williams for first degree murder. Williams appealed, claiming

that the trial court had both abused its discretion in applying

section 1089 and violated her Sixth Amendment rights. The

California Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction on the

state-law ground, but did not address her Sixth Amendment

claim at all. The Supreme Court of California then granted

review, ordered the Court of Appeal decision vacated, and

remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its recent

decision, People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225 (Cal. 2001). 

On remand, the Court of Appeal issued a slightly modified

version of its prior opinion and again affirmed Williams’s

conviction. The Court of Appeal reiterated that the trial court

“discharg[ed] Juror No. 6 because he had shown himself to be

biased, not because he was failing to deliberate or engaging

in juror nullification.” Again, the court did not address her

Sixth Amendment challenge. The Supreme Court of California denied Williams’s second petition for review without

comment, over Justice Kennard’s dissent. Her conviction

became final on July 9, 2002, when the time to petition the

United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari expired.

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Williams then sought relief in federal court.4

 The district

court denied the petition, and Williams timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Williams filed her federal habeas petition in 2003, so it is

subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, federal courts

may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner “with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” only if that adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To determine whether we

apply “AEDPA deference” here, we must consider which

state court “decision” we review, and whether that decision

actually “adjudicated” Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim on

the merits.

A

It has long been the practice of federal habeas courts to

“look through” summary denials of claims by state appellate

courts and review instead the last reasoned state-court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991); see, e.g.,

Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004).

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), we continue to adhere to that

practice, at least with respect to cases in which state courts of

4Williams’s initial pro se petition was stayed pending exhaustion of

state post-conviction remedies. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme

Court of California denied her state habeas petitions on the ground that her

claim concerning juror discharge had already been decided on direct

appeal. 

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last resort have exercised their discretionary authority to deny

petitions for review. In Richter, the Court held that summary

denials of original petitions for habeas corpus filed in the

Supreme Court of California should “be presumed” to be “adjudicated . . . on the merits.” Id. at 784-785. The question in

Richter arose because state habeas petitions in California are

presented to the state supreme court as original petitions,

rather than as requests for review of lower-court rulings denying relief; accordingly, the Supreme Court of California must

actually adjudicate each habeas petition. Noting that “the California Supreme Court disposes of . . . more than 3,400 original habeas corpus petitioner” each year, the Richter Court

observed that “[t]he issuance of summary dispositions in

many collateral attack cases can enable a state judiciary to

concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions are most

needed.” Id. at 784. It thus determined that the summary

nature of the court’s disposition of its thousands of original

habeas petitions in no way undermines any presumption that

they are decisions on the merits. Id. at 784-785.

A state court’s decision to deny discretionary review is

entirely different. On direct appeal of a decision by a state

court of appeal in a non-capital case, the Supreme Court of

California has the authority to choose whether or not to grant

review. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500. As when the United States

Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari, the California

high court’s decision to deny a petition for review is not a

decision on the merits, but rather means no more than that the

court has decided not to consider the case on the merits. See,

e.g., Campers v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 836 P.2d 888,

894 n.8 (Cal. 1992) (“[W]e reiterate the well-established rule

in this state that a denial of a petition for review is not an

expression of opinion of the Supreme Court on the merits of

the case.”); see also People v. Davis, 81 P. 718 (Cal. 1905)

(“The significance of such refusal [by the Supreme Court to

accept a case for review] is no greater than this — that this

court does not consider that the interests of justice, or the purposes for which the power [to transfer cases for review] was

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given, require its exercise in the particular case.”). That is,

under California law, the state supreme court’s discretionary

denial of a petition for review is decidedly not a decision on

the merits. Cf. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785. Accordingly, in this

case, the Supreme Court of California’s denial of Williams’s

second petition for review — seeking review of the California

Court of Appeal opinion issued on remand from the Supreme

Court of California — was not a decision on the merits. We

therefore continue to “look through” the state supreme court’s

denial of discretionary review to the last reasoned state court

decision, which here is the second California Court of Appeal

opinion on Williams’s direct appeal.

B

We must next consider whether the Court of Appeal adjudicated Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim on the merits. We

conclude that it did not.

Most of the time, any claim a federal habeas court is able

to consider on the merits will first have been “adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings,” and thus the strictures

of § 2254(d) apply. That is so because the most common reason a claim would not have been adjudicated on the merits —

it was never raised in state court — is itself a bar to federal

habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring

exhaustion). Occasionally, however, a federal habeas petitioner brings a claim that was raised in state court but was not

decided on its merits — because, for example, the claim was

dismissed on a procedural ground that itself is inadequate to

bar federal review, there was no need to address the claim in

light of a precursor holding, or, as here, the court simply

failed to decide the claim without explanation.5 In such cases,

5That no decision on the merits was issued is, of course, no indication

itself of a failure to exhaust; “[i]t is too obvious to merit extended discussion that whether the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) has

been satisfied cannot turn upon whether a state appellate court chooses to

ignore in its opinion a federal constitutional claim squarely raised in petitioner’s brief in the state court.” Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333

(1978) (per curiam). 

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when it is clear that the “[state] courts did not reach the merits

of [the petitioner’s constitutional] claim, federal habeas

review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies

under AEDPA to ‘any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings’ ”; “[i]nstead, the claim is

reviewed de novo.” Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1784

(2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).6

6

See also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (because state

court never reached “prejudice” prong of ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, that issue was reviewed de novo); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,

534 (2005) (same); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-1057 (9th Cir.

2003) (state court dismissed state habeas petition for failing to state a

claim under Oregon habeas law, so “AEDPA’s deferential standard . . .

does not apply in this case because the state court did not reach the merits

of Nulph’s due process claim”); Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 968

(8th Cir. 2003) (de novo review because claim was not decided on the

merits by the state court, which had dismissed the claim as having been

previously litigated); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1165, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2002) (state court declined to adjudicate claim on state postconviction review under its “relitigation rule,” although the issue had not

actually been raised on direct review, so federal habeas court reviewed

claim de novo); Norde v. Keane, 294 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Here,

the Appellate Division’s opinion on direct review addressed only Norde’s

arguments that the evidence relating to the physical injury was insufficient, that the prosecutor was improperly allowed to make prejudicial

remarks during summation, and that the prosecutor’s inquiry into Norde’s

prior convictions was prejudicial. The court did not mention Norde’s Sixth

Amendment claims, and the opinion does not contain any language, general or specific, indicating that those claims were considered and denied

on the merits. . . . Because the Appellate Division never indicated in any

way that it had considered Norde’s Sixth Amendment claims, we find that

those claims were not adjudicated on the merits, and therefore that the

AEDPA’s new, more deferential standard of review does not apply.”

(internal citation omitted)); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir.

2001) (de novo review after state supreme court had wrongly “recharacterized” petitioner’s constructive-denial-of-counsel claim as an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, and as a result “failed to adjudicate [the]

denial of counsel claim on the merits”); Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249,

262-263 (4th Cir. 1999) (de novo review when state supreme court “failed

to address” a properly raised claim); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295,

300-302 (5th Cir. 1999) (de novo review when state court had dismissed

claim on procedural grounds, not merits, and state then failed to assert the

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De novo review in these infrequent circumstances is consistent with “the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction,”

which is “designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787. When those “principal

forum[s]” are provided the opportunity to adjudicate constitutional challenges but fail to do so, whether intentionally or

inadvertently, the only remaining forum — the federal courts

— must do so in the first instance. Habeas review under such

circumstances neither “frustrates . . . [the States’] good-faith

attempts to honor constitutional rights” — for the State has

made no attempt to do so — nor “disturbs the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation” — since an

issue in the litigation was left unconcluded. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

This is one of those rare cases in which a claim was properly raised and yet was not decided by the state court.7

 Before

procedural default in federal habeas litigation); Moore v. Parke, 148 F.3d

705, 708-710 (7th Cir. 1998) (de novo review when state decision was

based on procedural error that was not an “adequate” state ground for the

decision). 

7Counsel for the State acknowledged at oral argument that nothing in

the Court of Appeal decision suggests that the court considered the Sixth

Amendment argument. Audio recording of oral argument at 27:21 to

29:30: 

Reinhardt, J: Where in its decision did the Court of Appeal decide the

question of whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation? 

Deputy A.G.: What we’re looking at is they were applying what was

California law. The 1089, I believe, of the Penal Code,

and saying that California state court properly applied

that. I think that, specifically they didn’t get into a Sixth

Amendment question, but if you look at, for our purposes,

what we have are really no U.S. Supreme Court authority

that would govern this particular type of situation . . . . 

Kozinski, C.J.: That was a very long answer. . . . It wasn’t a good

answer; it was just a long answer. I take it the answer is

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the Court of Appeal, Williams made two arguments relevant

to the issue now before us. First, citing numerous state court

decisions construing section 1089, she argued that the trial

court abused the discretion accorded to it by that statute to

dismiss jurors for cause. Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 7-8. Second,

she presented her constitutional claim by arguing that the “remov[al] and replace[ment]” of a holdout juror from “a jury

which had previously been deadlocked” violated her rights

under the Sixth Amendment. Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 9; see

also id. at 41-42.8

“no” to Judge Reinhardt’s question. The Court of Appeal

did not discuss the Sixth Amendment. . . . Is there anything more than “no” by way of an answer to the question Judge Reinhardt asked? 

Deputy A.G.: “No” would answer it. 

Kozinski, C.J.: It is not discussed. The Court of Appeal does not discuss

the Sixth Amendment. 

Deputy A.G.: The Court of Appeal does not discuss the Sixth Amendment. Correct. 

8

 Specifically, Williams relied upon Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422

(9th Cir. 1997), which recognized that the “Sixth Amendment right to a

jury trial” could be offended by “the dismissal and replacement of . . .

jurors” under section 1089 in some circumstances, although there was no

violation on the facts of that case. Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 41-42 (citing id.

at 1426). The substance of Williams’s federal claim was just that: Because

“Juror No. 6 was a holdout juror for acquittal” who “questioned the sufficiency of the People’s evidence to prove appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court “denied [Williams] her Sixth Amendment right”

by dismissing him. Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 41. Moreover, citing federal

cases, Williams argued that in this case the “questioning [of all jurors] was

a severe intrusion onto the secrecy of the jury’s deliberations to the extent

it elicited their subjective thought processes during those deliberations,”

which violates an “essential” constitutional feature of the “proper functioning of juries.” Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 14-15 & n.12. Williams also

asserted that Juror No. 6’s discharge violated her right to a unanimous jury

verdict. Pet’r Cal. Ct. App. Br. 9; see also id. at 41-42. Although there is

no federal right to jury unanimity in state court, see Apocada v. Oregon,

406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972), California does provide such a right, see People

v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 350 n.10 (1975), and Williams’s argument was

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The Court of Appeal proceeded to adjudicate only her section 1089 claim, but not her constitutional claim. It held that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 1089,

because sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding

that Juror No. 6 met the definition of “actual bias” under the

statute. It did not consider, however, whether the removal of

the known holdout juror violated the Sixth Amendment.9

To be sure, a state court may adjudicate the merits of a constitutional claim without citing federal precedent, and such a

decision would be entitled to AEDPA deference. See, e.g.,

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). And under

Richter, even “when a state court’s order is unaccompanied

by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied,”

we must “presume[ ] that the state court adjudicated the claim

on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law

procedural principles to the contrary.” 131 S. Ct. at 784-785.

Here, however, the Court of Appeal’s decision was not “unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has

been denied,” id. at 784; rather the court provided a lengthy,

reasoned explanation for its denial of Williams’s appeal, but

none of those reasons addressed her Sixth Amendment claim

in any fashion, even indirectly.10

that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a juror whose vote is essential

to the verdict to be removed because he is known to be in favor of the

defendant, whatever the vote required to convict. In California, which

requires jury unanimity, the removal of even a lone holdout juror violates

that right to a fair trial by jury. 

9

In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 1089,

the court did quote a California Supreme Court case’s discussion of the

federal constitutional principle of impartiality. The section 1089 issue was

distinct from Williams’s constitutional claim: that the removal of Juror

No. 6 violated her right to a fair trial by jury. 

10In contrast, in Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

banc), a plurality of the en banc court determined that the California Court

of Appeal had “discuss[ed] and quote[d] from the section of [the petitioner’s] brief in which he raised” his federal constitutional claim and had

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It is obvious, not “theoretical” or “speculat[ive],” that Williams’s constitutional claim was not adjudicated at all, and so

the Richter presumption is overcome. Id. at 785. Specifically,

the portion of the court’s opinion concerning the discharge of

Juror No. 6 reveals that the court upheld his dismissal on the

sole basis that the trial court had not abused its discretion in

applying section 1089. That the court engaged in an extended

discussion of Williams’s statutory claim, but made no mention whatsoever of her more fundamental constitutional claim,

is a compelling “indication” that the court either overlooked

or disregarded her Sixth Amendment claim entirely, rather

than that it adjudicated the claim but offered no explanation

at all for its decision. Cf. id. at 785. Put differently, when a

court simply says “claims denied,” and nothing more, we presume the denial is on the merits and as to all claims, see id.

at 784-785, but when a court devotes many pages to explaining its reason for denying one claim, and then says absolutely

nothing that even acknowledges the existence of a second

claim, “there is reason to think” that it “is more likely” that

the court simply neglected the issue and failed to adjudicate

the claim.11

cited a state case that discussed the federal constitutional right. It therefore

stated that the state court had adjudicated the petitioner’s constitutional

claim on the merits, even though it “addressed [the] argument only

obliquely.” Id. at 990 n.6 (plurality opinion). Unlike in Murdoch, here the

state court did not address Williams’s claim, obliquely or otherwise, and

there is not a scintilla of evidence that the Court of Appeal decided the

constitutional claim, in addition to a separate claim that it discussed at

length. The Murdoch court found an “indication” that the state court had

adjudicated the constitutional claim on the merits; here, the total disparity

between the court’s treatment in the opinion of Williams’s statutory claim

(reasoned in detail) and her constitutional claim (not mentioned at all) provides a strong “indication” that the claim was never adjudicated on the

merits. 

11Our “reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely” comes in part from common sense and our own experience as sometimes-fallible judges. Id. When we write thorough 29-page

decisions as the state court did here, yet completely fail to address a partic6718 WILLIAMS v. CAVAZOS

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Even then, the Court of Appeal’s decision might be entitled

to deference if adjudicating the section 1089 claim necessarily

entailed adjudicating the Sixth Amendment claim. That would

be the case if, for example, California had ever defined the

limit of “discretion” to discharge a juror to be at, or short of,

the Sixth Amendment boundary. Were that so, a Court of

Appeal finding that the trial court had not abused its discretion under section 1089 might implicitly be a determination

that the Sixth Amendment had not been violated, and we

might be required to consider that Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim had been adjudicated on the merits. Cf. Baker v.

Blaine, 221 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The state court

decisions to which the district court gave deference either

cited directly to opinions of the Supreme Court of the United

States or to cases which themselves rested on Supreme Court

precedent, and the state court holdings were consistent with

the reasoning of the cited cases,” so AEDPA deference should

apply).

California does not appear to have considered, however,

how the federal constitution constrains a trial court’s discretion to discharge a juror from deliberations, so the Baker

approach to recognizing indirect state determinations of federal constitutional claims does not apply.12 Cleveland was not

ular issue, even in an oblique, tangential, or summary manner, it is most

often because we so focused on the remainder of the opinion that we overlooked the issue we did not mention directly or indirectly. Just as we occasionally make mistakes and overlook an argument raised on appeal, so too

do our state-court peers. It is most unlikely that the state court methodically analyzed each issue presented on appeal except one, a substantial

claim of the violation of a federal constitutional right, which it chose to

deny on the merits without saying a word. 

12By contrast, California has considered constitutional limitations in

restricting a trial court’s discretion to instruct a jury once an alternate juror

has been added to the group. Citing constitutional concerns, People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976), held that a trial court must direct the jury

to disregard past deliberations and begin anew when an alternate juror

joins. Id. at 745-747. 

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a constitutional decision; rather, the California Supreme Court

defined the limits of a trial court’s discretion to conduct evidentiary hearings into juror misconduct, and to dismiss jurors

for good cause under section 1089, based on various “policy

considerations” and its precedent interpreting section 1089.13

21 P.3d at 1231. In so doing, the court expressly rejected the

juror-discharge standard adopted by the Second, Ninth, and

D.C. Circuits. See 21 P.3d at 1236-1237 (declining to adopt,

among others, United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th

Cir. 1999), in favor of a more permissive standard). So it is

entirely possible that a juror discharge under section 1089 that

is permissible under Cleveland could nonetheless violate the

Sixth Amendment. Indeed, Justice Werdegar wrote separately

in Cleveland to raise the concern that a trial court might not

abuse its discretion but nonetheless “trench upon a defendant’s right to trial by jury” — a concern that the majority did

not meet with any response. Cleveland, 21 P.3d at 1239

(Werdegar, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion under section 1089 thus did not

resolve Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim, even indirectly.

Instead, we are presented with a case more like the one

considered by the Third Circuit in Hameen v. Delaware, 212

F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000). The petitioner in that case alleged

that the “double counting” of an aggravating circumstance in

the penalty phase of his capital murder trial resulted in an

Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 246-247. In its opinion,

the Delaware Supreme Court decided that the challenged

aggravating factor did not constitute impermissible doublecounting under Delaware’s death penalty statute, but it did not

13In this respect, Cleveland was a California equivalent of Brasfield v.

United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926) or Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S.

445 (1965) (per curiam), cases in which the Supreme Court set limits on

district courts’ interference with jury deliberations pursuant to its supervisory power, rather than the Constitution. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484

U.S. 231, 239-240 & n.2 (1988). 

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decide his Eighth Amendment claim, apparently believing its

death penalty statute to be facially constitutional. Ferguson v.

State, 642 A.2d 772, 781-783 (Del. 1994); see Hameen, 212

F.3d at 247. Reviewing that decision, the Third Circuit determined that the Delaware Supreme Court “did not pass on Ferguson’s Eighth Amendment constitutional duplicative

aggravating circumstances argument, even though it had the

opportunity to do so.” Hameen, 212 F.3d at 248. Accordingly,

with no state decision on the merits to which to apply AEDPA

deference, it reviewed de novo. Id. Other courts have faced

similar situations. See, e.g., Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177,

1182 (6th Cir. 2006); Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376,

382-383 (7th Cir. 2005); Norde, 294 F.3d at 410; Weeks, 176

F.3d at 262-263. 

As in Hameen, the Court of Appeal here conducted a

purely statutory analysis of whether the trial court had properly exercised its discretion under section 1089, a statute that

was known to be facially constitutional. See Miller v. Stagner,

757 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 768 F.2d

1090 (9th Cir. 1985). But a determination that the trial court

did not apply section 1089 erroneously as a matter of state

law did not resolve Williams’s federal claim: that section

1089 as applied in her case violated the Sixth Amendment, a

claim that the State acknowledges the Court of Appeal did not

decide. See supra at 6715-16 n.7. Absent a state court adjudication of that claim on the merits, we must review the claim

de novo here.

C

One other potential bar to considering Williams’s Sixth

Amendment claim merits only brief discussion. The preAEDPA standards that govern this case include the Supreme

Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),

which limits the constitutional claims that may be presented

to a federal court sitting in habeas to exclude those “new rule-

[s]” that were announced after the defendant’s conviction

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became final, with certain exceptions. Id. at 301 (plurality

opinion). Because “the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct,” the Supreme Court has directed that “in addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court

considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold

Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the

state.” Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam).

A Teague claim may be waived by the State, however, and so

we need not consider Teague where, as here, the state does

not raise it. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).

We note, in any event, that Williams does not seek retroactive

application of a “new rule” of constitutional law, but rather

relies upon cases that were decided years before her conviction became final in 2002, namely United States v. Symington,

195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Brown,

823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987).14 Thus, even if a Teague issue

were properly raised, it would not affect our review.

14Because AEDPA’s deferential standard of review does not apply, Williams is not limited to presenting violations of federal law that was

“clearly established . . . as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” at the time her conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Rather, under Teague she may also rely upon law that had been established by the federal courts of appeals when her conviction became final.

See Bell v. Hill, 190 F.3d 1089, 1091-1092 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no

Teague problem “despite the fact that Bell bases his Sixth Amendment

claim specifically on Ninth Circuit precedent rather than Supreme Court

precedent”); see also Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., for the Court) (“With one caveat, whatever would qualify

as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute ‘clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States’ under § 2254(d)(1). The one caveat, as the statutory language makes clear, is that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to this Court’s jurisprudence.”) (citations omitted); id. at

381 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (“[Section

2254(d)(1)] extends the principle of Teague by limiting the source of doctrine on which a federal court may rely in addressing the application for

a writ.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, where Teague is

not raised the courts are free simply to apply the Constitution de novo. 

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III. THE MERITS

We turn, at last, to the merits of Williams’s claim. Williams

argues that the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right

to a fair trial by dismissing a juror who was known to be the

lone holdout for acquittal. Reviewing her claim de novo, we

agree, for two reasons: (1) there was a reasonable possibility

that the request for the juror’s discharge stemmed from his

views of the merits of the case, and (2) the grounds on which

the court relied did not amount to “good cause” to remove a

known holdout juror, and thus violated the Sixth Amendment.

Accordingly, we reverse.

A

As a general matter, the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the mid-deliberation dismissal of jurors who are unable

to serve or who engage in misconduct. In Miller, for example,

we found no constitutional violation in the dismissal of two

jurors after deliberations had begun: one of whom was sick

with the flu, and another who had been intoxicated the previous morning and had fallen asleep during the rereading of testimony. 757 F.2d at 995. To the contrary, we held that the

“California substitution procedure followed by the trial court”

— Penal Code section 1089 — was constitutional because it

“preserved the ‘essential feature’ of the jury required by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. (quoting Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)). It appears that every court

to have considered the question agrees that some middeliberation substitutions are permissible under the federal Constitution.15

15See, e.g., Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1577 (3d Cir. 1995) (juror

illness); Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1483-1484 (11th Cir. 1986) (en

banc) (emotional distress and physical illness); United States v. Hillard,

701 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1983) (illness); United States v. Phillips, 664

F.2d 971, 992-993 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (heart attack); Henderson v.

Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 178-179 (7th Cir. 1980) (heart attack); see also ComWILLIAMS v. CAVAZOS 6723

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[1] It is just as clear, however, that the Sixth Amendment

does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of

his views of the merits of the case. In Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145 (1968), which incorporated the Sixth Amendment with respect to the states, the Supreme Court explained,

Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect

against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to

the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary

but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary

action. Providing an accused with the right to be

tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable

safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric

judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense

monwealth v. Carnes, 933 N.E.2d 598, 614-615 (Mass. 2010) (upon discovering juror’s material misrepresentations on juror questionnaire). Such

unanimity is perhaps surprising given that this rule is in derogation of the

jury practice at common law, which was “to discharge the entire panel and

begin de novo by forming a new jury” when “a juror has become incapacitated by illness or death after the jury is impaneled and sworn in chief.”

People v. Peete, 202 P. 51, 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921); see also West v. State,

28 So. 430, 431 (Fla. 1900); State v. Hasledahl, 52 N.W. 315, 316 (N.D.

1892).

Some states, however, prohibit juror substitutions after the case has

been submitted to the jury under state law. See, e.g., Claudio v. State, 585

A.2d 1278, 1301 (Del. 1991) (state constitution); Crossland v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Ky. 2009) (by rule); Hayes v. State, 735

A.2d 1109, 1120 (Md. 1999) (by rule); State v. Dushame, 616 A.2d 469,

472 (N.H. 1992) (by statute); State v. Sanchez, 6 P.3d 486, 494 (N.M.

2000) (by rule); People v. Ortiz, 705 N.E.2d 1199, 1199 (N.Y. 1998) (by

rule, forbidding substitutions except upon the defendant’s in-court, written

consent); State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1991) (state constitution). California, of course, is not among them. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 1089. 

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judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps

less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was

to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in

the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power

—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life

and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group

of judges.

Id. at 156 (emphasis added). 

The Court later elaborated, “the essential feature of a jury

obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his

accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,

and in the community participation and shared responsibility

that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added). The jury

is the only actor permitted to determine guilt — not the judge.

It is well-established, of course, that “a judge may not direct

a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence” in

a criminal case. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joinders of Am.

v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947). It would similarly

vitiate the “essential” role of a jury to act as a “safeguard”

against both the power of the state and the court for a judge

to selectively dismiss jurors based on the views of the merits

of the case they express during deliberations. Such dismissals

are thus prohibited as well, because a court cannot “do indirectly that which it has no power to do directly.” Sparf v.

United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895). 

[2] Indeed, no one, including the judge, is even supposed

to be aware of the views of individual jurors during deliberations, because a jury’s independence is best guaranteed by

secret deliberations, such that jurors may “return a verdict

freely according to their conscience” and their “conduct in the

jury room [may be] untrammeled by the fear of embarrassing

publicity.” Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933). As

Justice Cardozo wrote, “Freedom of debate might be stifled

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and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to

feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.” Id. at 13. To be sure, maintaining the

secrecy of deliberations might limit a court’s ability to investigate alleged misconduct. Nevertheless, as the Second Circuit

has explained, 

Where the duty and authority to prevent defiant disregard of the law or evidence comes into conflict

with the principle of secret jury deliberations, we are

compelled to err in favor of the lesser of two evils

— protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations at the

expense of possibly allowing irresponsible juror

activity. Achieving a more perfect system for monitoring the conduct of jurors in the intense environment of a jury deliberation room entails an

unacceptable breach of the secrecy that is essential

to the work of juries in the American system of justice. To open the door to the deliberation room any

more widely and provide opportunities for broadranging judicial inquisitions into the thought processes of jurors would, in our view, destroy the jury

system itself. 

United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, in deciding whether to discharge a juror middeliberation, the critical Sixth Amendment questions are

whether, after an appropriately limited inquiry, it can be said

that there is no reasonable possibility that the juror’s discharge stems from his views of the merits, and whether the

grounds on which the trial court relied are valid and constitutional. If the answer to either question is no, the removal of

the juror violates the Sixth Amendment. We will discuss the

two questions separately.

B

In cases such as Miller involving juror illness or intoxication, it is obvious that the basis for discharge is independent

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of the juror’s views of the merits. Indeed, in Miller, the views

of the dismissed jurors were not even known. 757 F.2d at 995.

Other cases have presented more uncertain circumstances. In

Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), a habeas

petitioner claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights

when a known holdout juror was dismissed for good cause

under section 1089. At an in camera hearing, the juror, a

twenty-year-old woman, “told the judge that she was distressed and that she did not want the responsibility of deciding

whether Perez was guilty,” and requested to be dismissed. Id.

at 1424. Over the prosecution’s objection, the court denied the

request and encouraged her to continue deliberating. Shortly

after deliberations resumed, the foreperson reported “difficulties in the jury room,” and the court suspended deliberations

again. Id. The juror said she was not “emotionally able to continue deliberations,” id. at 1428, and the jury foreperson confirmed that “it started to be a very emotional thing with the

jurors where basically no one could try to make an intelligent

decision when you’re dealing with somebody that’s basically

in pieces,” id. at 1425. The next morning, the court dismissed

the juror on the basis that “she is just emotionally out of control.” Id. Deferring to the “trial court’s findings regarding

juror fitness,” we found no Sixth Amendment violation in the

replacement of that juror after her repeated requests to be dismissed. Id. at 1426. Because “the record shows that the [trial]

court was forced to act, not because of [the juror]’s status as

a holdout juror, but because of [her] emotional inability to

continue performing the essential function of a juror — deliberation,” we accepted the state court’s decision. Id. at 1427

(emphasis added); accord id. at 1428 (“[B]ecause there is no

evidence to suggest that the trial court’s decision was motivated by [the juror]’s views on the merits of the government’s

case, we affirm the . . . denial of habeas relief.” (emphasis

added)). 

In United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

by contrast, the D.C. Circuit held unconstitutional the dismissal of a juror who requested to be discharged after five

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weeks of deliberations. The juror told the court that “the problem” he had was “the way the R.I.C.O. conspiracy act reads.

. . . If I had known at the beginning of this trial what the act

said, I would have not said I could be impartial.” Id. at 594.

He acknowledged that he “disagree[d] with the law,” but did

not say he would refuse to follow it. Rather, he stated, “If the

evidence was presented in a fashion in which the law is written, then, maybe, I would be able to discharge my duties.” Id.

Reviewing this episode, the D.C. Circuit held that “a court

may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the request for

discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.” Id. at 596. “A discharge of this kind,” the court explained, “would enable the

government to obtain a conviction even though a member of

the jury that began deliberations thought that the government

had failed to prove its case. Such a result is unacceptable

under the Constitution.” Id. Recognizing that “the reasons

underlying a request for a dismissal will often be unclear,”

and that “a court may not delve deeply into a juror’s motivations because it may not intrude on the secrecy of the jury’s

deliberations,” the court held that “if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from

the juror’s view of the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, the court must deny the request.” Id. Because there

was a “substantial possibility that [the juror] requested to be

discharged because he believed that the evidence offered at

trial was inadequate to support a conviction,” the court determined that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights had been

violated. Id.

We adopted Brown in 1999, in a case involving the prosecution of Arizona Governor Fife Symington III. During deliberations, the jury sent the court two notes requesting

guidance, because “[o]ne juror has stated their [sic] final opinion prior to review of all counts,” and the jury felt “that the

juror in question cannot properly participate in the discussion

with us” because she was unable to maintain focus on the topics of discussion and she refused to discuss her views with the

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other jurors. Symington, 195 F.3d at 1083. While being questioned individually, each juror confirmed the concerns raised

in the notes, although “some jurors indicated that their frustration with [the juror] may have derived more from their disagreement with her on the merits of the case, or at least from

their dissatisfaction with her defense of her views.” Id. at

1084. The juror testified that she simply disagreed with the

majority and she was willing to discuss the case with the other

jurors, but that she had “bec[o]me intimidated” by the

demands of the other jurors to justify her views. Id. The court

dismissed the juror, on the ground that she was “either unwilling or unable to deliberate with her colleagues.” Id.

[3] On appeal, we determined that “[w]hile there may have

been some reason to doubt [the juror]’s abilities as a juror,

there was also considerable evidence to suggest that the other

jurors’ frustrations with her derived primarily from the fact

that she held a position opposite to theirs on the merits of the

case.” Id. at 1088. We therefore reversed, reasoning that “if

the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that

the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s

views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the

juror.” Id. at 1087 (emphasis omitted). We reached that conclusion because to allow dismissal under the circumstances

presented would permit a court “[t]o remove a juror because

he is unpersuaded by the Government’s case,” which would

violate a defendant’s rights.16 Id. at 1085 (internal quotation

16A later AEDPA case, Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004),

which was decided long after Williams’s conviction became final, characterized Symington as a decision under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

23(b), not the Sixth Amendment. Although we would not have reached the

same conclusion as the Brewer court — Symington plainly adjudicated a

Sixth Amendment challenge, see 195 F.3d at 1085 & n.2 — we are now

bound by and therefore accept its description of Symington. Because we

review the Sixth Amendment question presented here de novo, we may

nevertheless treat Symington as instructive on the question of when it is

constitutionally permissible to dismiss a juror mid-deliberations for reasons that could be merits-related. Brewer did not actually decide what the

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marks omitted). We also acknowledged that a detailed inquiry

into the jurors’ thinking and motivations would “compromise

the secrecy of jury deliberations” and “jeopardize the integrity

of the deliberative process.” Id. at 1086. We thus recognized

that while a trial court’s inability to resolve any ambiguity

concerning alleged misconduct would result in the juror

remaining empaneled, to do otherwise would, in the words of

the Second Circuit, “destroy the jury system itself.” Thomas,

116 F.3d at 623. 

[4] Following Brown’s holding and Symington’s reasoning,

we hold that the discharge of Juror No. 6 violated Williams’s

Sixth Amendment rights.17 Even if we presume all the facts

found by the state court to be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),

Sixth Amendment does require in cases of mid-deliberation juror discharge, since that case did not concern juror discharge, so the question

remains open for us to answer even if Symington did not already answer

it. See 378 F.3d at 955-956. Given that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in

Brown, upon which Symington relied and we rely, was indisputably a constitutional decision, we see no reason why the Sixth Amendment standard

should be any different from the one announced in Symington for Rule 23.

We therefore hold that, to comply with the Sixth Amendment, “if the

record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for

a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case,

the court must not dismiss the juror.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087

(emphasis omitted). 

17The Sixth Amendment protection required by Brown and foreshadowed by Symington is against improper interference with jury deliberations. Freedom to deliberate without coercion is a necessary component of

“the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,” which is “the essential feature of

a jury.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. This component of the Sixth Amendment is thus incorporated with respect to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Weaver v. Thompson, 197

F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1999), for example, we held that improper coercion had

broken a jury deadlock to produce the ten-to-two vote needed to convict

under Oregon law, and granted habeas as a result. Similarly, the deadlockbreaking dismissal of a holdout juror on an improper basis is an unconstitutional form of interference with deliberations. 

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we conclude that the record discloses a “reasonable possibility

that the impetus for [Juror No. 6’s] dismissal stems from the

juror’s views on the merits of the case.” 195 F.3d at 1087. At

least seven jurors expressed the view that Juror No. 6 did not

believe that the evidence was sufficient to prove guilt of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby making a total of twothirds of the panel. The jury foreman testified that Juror No.

6 “has probably ten or fifteen times in our conversation so far

expressed that . . . he doesn’t believe that there’s sufficient

evidence.” Juror No. 2 said, “He didn’t believe that whatever

was in evidence was enough evidence for him.” Juror No. 3

affirmed that Juror No. 6 “didn’t believe that the evidence that

was shown in trial was sufficient to prove the severe charge

of murder.” Juror No. 4 said, “Well, I guess he believes from

the evidence that he’s seen that there hasn’t been sufficient

proof.” Juror No. 9 stated, “he didn’t feel that there was

enough proof of it [first degree murder].” Juror No. 10 said,

“He didn’t believe the evidence showed first degree murder

should be the charge.” And Juror No. 11 testified, “he said it

[the evidence] wasn’t proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The

juror’s views regarding the insufficiency of the evidence were

thus made known to the prosecution as the result of a rigorous

inquiry into the thought process and reasoning of Juror No. 6.

Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal, however, even

mentioned this clear evidence regarding the juror’s views as

to the merits, or acknowledged the strong possibility that

Juror No. 6 was a holdout juror for legitimate reasons.

[5] As in Brown, “[g]iven the [reasonable] possibility” that

the request to discharge the juror “stemmed from his belief

that the evidence was inadequate to support a conviction, we

must find that his dismissal violated” the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right. 823 F.2d at 597. A comparison to the facts

of Symington makes this violation all the more clear. In

Symington, the evidence of juror misconduct was far greater

than it was in the case before us, but even then we held that

the juror’s dismissal was improper given the “considerable

evidence to suggest that the other jurors’ frustrations with her

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derived primarily from the fact that she held a position opposite to theirs on the merits of the case.” Symington, 195 F.3d

at 1088. The other jurors in that case were unanimous in their

view that the discharged juror, a woman in her mid-70s, was

both unable to participate in deliberations and unwilling to

discuss her views. Id. at 1083. Here, the other jurors’ views

as to Juror No. 6’s willingness to follow the law were mixed

and the trial court ultimately did not find that he was unwilling to do so when deciding to discharge the juror; also, most

of the jurors recalled Juror No. 6’s many attempts to explain

his views during deliberations, and none of the jurors

expressed the view that Juror No. 6 was biased. There was,

however, considerable frustration on the part of those other

jurors that Juror No. 6 did not agree with them on the sufficiency of the evidence. 

[6] As in Symington, notwithstanding the cause that the

trial court believed it possessed to discharge the juror whom

it knew to be the one vote for acquittal, it was not justified in

acting upon that cause because there was a “reasonable possibility” that the request for removal was directly connected to

the juror’s views on the merits. Following Brown and Symington, we could reverse on this basis alone.

C

Although the reason offered above is sufficient to require

granting the writ on the ground that Juror No. 6’s discharge

violated the Sixth Amendment, the trial court’s lack of “good

cause” for removing the known holdout juror provides an

independent reason for reaching the same conclusion. See

Perez, 119 F.3d at 1426. We therefore hold that, in addition

to the Symington violation, the trial court’s dismissal of Juror

No. 6 was unconstitutional on its own terms.

[7] Although refusing to follow the law or refusing to

deliberate would be “good cause” for discharging a juror, the

trial court expressly disclaimed any finding that Juror No. 6

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was guilty of either, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that determination.18 The only good cause relied upon for dismissal of

Juror No. 6 was “actual bias.” The court did not find, however, that Juror No. 6 was “biased” in any traditional sense of

the term, as would have been the case if, for example, he had

stated that he could not be impartial or had accepted a bribe

related to the case. Nor did it find that he had “implied bias,”

such as might have resulted from Juror No. 6 having a connection to one of the parties, or being related to someone who

had either committed or been a victim of some similar crime.

Cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (discussing possible instances of implied bias);

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)

(holding that a juror who was a victim of multiple crimes and

whose husband had been a cellmate of the defendant should

have been dismissed as biased).

Rather, the court found that the juror was “biased” for five

overlapping reasons: (1) “the fact that he added his own

words to the court’s instructions as to what the law is,” which

“indicates where his mind is bent towards and that is biased

against the prosecution in the matter”; (2) “his repeating of

the severity of the charge in conjunction with his bringing up

the subject of juror nullification,” which “establishes his state

of mind that he’s bent in that regard, that he’s concerned

about the severity of the charge, which means the severity of

the punishment”; (3) when the judge “asked him what burden

of proof he was relying on, he said it was a [sic] very, very

18Specifically, the trial court said, “I’m going to dismiss the juror, but

not because he’s not deliberating and not because he’s not following the

law. . . . [I]t’s fairly debatable whether he was deliberating or not, so I’m

not taking that into account. That is not a basis for dismissal. Not following the law is not a basis for his dismissal either, since there was a request

by him to have the law clarified. It was clarified for him.” Rejecting Williams’s argument that the standard for good-cause dismissals set forth in

Cleveland had been violated, the Court of Appeal explained that Juror No.

6 was discharged “because he had shown himself to be biased, not because

he was failing to deliberate or engaging in juror nullification.” 

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convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,” which the judge

believed to mean “higher than beyond a reasonable doubt

because the charge is murder”; (4) the fact that “[h]e also disagrees with the felony murder rule”; and (5) the fact that

“[h]e’s dishonest to me in stating that no juror including himself had discussed the severity of the charge, had not discussed juror nullification.” 

Whether that determination amounted to “bias” under the

California standard for “actual bias” is neither a question that

is before us nor a ground for federal habeas relief. What we

must decide instead is whether the bases for discharge relied

upon by the trial judge constitute, under the circumstances of

this case, “good cause” for removing a known holdout juror.

We conclude that they do not, for several reasons. Absent

good cause, removal of the juror violated the Sixth Amendment.

1

[8] We begin with the trial court’s determination that Juror

No. 6 disagreed with the felony murder rule. Such “disagreement” with the type of crime charged is not the type of bias

that can justify removing a juror for good cause middeliberations. There is no requirement that jurors agree with

the law that they are asked to apply, so long as they agree to

apply it impartially — which Juror No. 6 did here, according

to the trial court. “The defendant’s entitlement to jurors

impartial on the question of whether he committed the crimes

charged is entirely distinct from the question of whether the

crime itself is one which arouses their moral passions”; a juror

need not be “impartial to the underlying crime itself.” United

States v. Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1993).

Indeed, even in the capital-punishment context, in which

jurors must be specifically qualified for their task, impartiality

requires only that “jurors . . . follow the court’s instructions

and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the

death penalty”; as a result, dismissing jurors who merely har6734 WILLIAMS v. CAVAZOS

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bor doubts about the death penalty is unconstitutional. Adams

v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 50 (1980). 

We therefore hold that any disagreement with the law

expressed by Juror No. 6, even if it constituted “bias” under

California law, was not “good cause” for removing a deliberating juror, absent a finding that he was unwilling to follow

the law due to his concerns about it. Indeed, it would be

anomalous, as well as contrary to law, to hold that a juror was

“biased” by his general feelings about a law if, as the trial

court found here, he was neither unwilling nor unable to follow the law as required.

2

[9] Next, certain of the other trial court findings related to

Juror No. 6’s “concern” with the “severity of the charge,”

which the trial court erroneously took to mean that the juror

was applying a higher-than-allowed burden of proof. But misstating the law during a mid-deliberation voir dire that should

never have taken place cannot provide good cause to dismiss

a juror, and the record does not support the finding that Juror

No. 6 misstated the law in any event.

Juror No. 6 testified, when questioned by the court, “I can

remember saying [during the jury deliberations] this is a very

important case and we should be very convinced that if the

defendant is found guilty that it is beyond a reasonable

doubt.” That sentiment is not “good cause” for the dismissal

of a deliberating juror. First, the juror’s statement should

never have left the jury room. The court subjected Juror No.

6 to an improper and “broad-ranging judicial inquisition[ ]

into [his] thought processes.” Thomas, 116 F.3d at 623. The

court asked, for example, “In your own personal mind, do you

believe you are using a burden of proof that is based on a

charge of first degree murder that is higher than one that

would be used for some charge that is less serious than first

degree murder?” and then presented Juror No. 6 with a string

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of questions concerning jury deliberations in other, hypothetical prosecutions for other crimes. (Emphasis added). This pervasive inquiry violated the “imperative[ ] of preserving jury

secrecy.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087.

Second, the court clearly misstated what Juror No. 6 had

testified to during the court’s inquiry. The juror did not say

“very, very convinced beyond a reasonable doubt” ”when [the

court] asked him what burden of proof he was relying on.”

His words were actually: “[W]e should be very convinced that

if the defendant is found guilty that it is beyond a reasonable

doubt.” That is, as Juror No. 6 explained when pressed by the

court, “very convinced” as used in his sentence — detached

from the actual standard “beyond a reasonable doubt” — simply “means it’s a good . . . idea to pay particular attention to

what evidence was presented at the trial and make sure before

we decide on a verdict, that . . . if the verdict is guilty, that

we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence

that was presented at the trial.” The trial court’s misstatement

of the record made its conclusion unreasonable; Juror No. 6

did not “add[ ] his own words” to create a higher burden of

proof when he answered the court’s question. See Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the

more stringent AEDPA standard and explaining that “[a state

court’s] misapprehension [of the record] can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual

finding unreasonable”).

Third, the court was wrong to derive meaning from the precise words used by the juror to define the government’s burden of proof. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt “standard is an

ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system,”

but “it defies easy explication.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S.

1, 5 (1994). In the context of evaluating jury instructions, the

Court has emphasized that “[a]ttempts to explain the term

‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any

clearer to the minds of the jury,” Holland v. United States,

348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted),

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and that “[t]he rule may be, and often is, rendered obscure by

attempts at definition, which serve to create doubts instead of

removing them,” Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-441 (1887).

Similarly, the trial court’s Socratic questioning of the juror

regarding his understanding of the standard was unlikely to

produce a clear and perfect response or reflect a precise unanimous understanding of the meaning of the words. Juror No.

6’s statement was fully consistent with the jury instructions he

had received. Moreover, despite the inquisition as to what

standard the juror would actually apply, neither the trial court

nor the Court of Appeal concluded that Juror No. 6 would not

follow the law. In short, any purported deviation in Juror No.

6’s understanding of those instructions did not give rise to

good cause sufficient to justify removing a holdout juror.

Finally, it is hardly “bias” to acknowledge the relative “importan[ce]” of a murder trial and to “pay particular attention”

to whether the evidence satisfies the required burden of proof.

Rather, it is a realistic description of what all dedicated citizens who perform the public duty of serving on juries do:

deliberate more intensively and consider the facts and law

more thoroughly in the most serious of cases. Indeed, in

Adams the Supreme Court expressly disapproved a voir dire

inquiry that “exclude[d] jurors who stated that they would be

‘affected’ by the possibility of the death penalty, but who

apparently meant only that the potentially lethal consequences

of their decision would invest their deliberations with greater

seriousness and gravity or would involve them emotionally.”

448 U.S. at 49. So long as the jury actually applies the requisite burden of proof — which is the same for all crimes — in

the end, it has acted appropriately, even if it undertook its task

more deliberately and devoted more time to its deliberations

before reaching its decision.

What resulted from the court’s intrusive inquiry into the

juror’s reasoning was a suggestion that Juror No. 6 was paying “particular attention to what evidence was presented at the

trial,” was taking more time than others, and was not yet sure

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whether the government had satisfied its burden of proof.

That he was not convinced was not something that showed his

bias, but rather a reflection of his current thinking regarding

the issues in the case, a thought process to which the trial

court should not even have been exposed.

3

[10] The remainder of the court’s second determination —

that Juror No. 6 was concerned with the severity of the punishment, as opposed to the seriousness of the offense charged

— was contrary to the record and thus failed to amount to

good cause for his dismissal. California courts, like the federal courts, prohibit juries from “discuss[ing] or consider[ing]

the subject of penalty or punishment” in cases in which they

have no sentencing responsibility, because the penalty that

might result from a guilty verdict does not bear on the factual

question of the defendant’s guilt. CALJIC 17.42; see Shannon

v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994). A juror’s disregard for such an instruction may in some instances provide

good cause to discharge him. But it is plain from the record

that Juror No. 6 did not disregard the instruction here, and

thus no good cause for his removal existed. Cf. Taylor, 366

F.3d at 1001. 

According to the jury foreman, when he prepared his note

to the trial court to report a juror who had “expressed concern

relative to the severity of the charge,” he originally wrote “severity of the punishment.” He then erased “punishment” and

replaced it with “charge,” when “there seemed to be a consensus that that word [“punishment”] should be removed.”

Although the foreman “believe[d] that punishment is part of

the issue in this other juror’s mind,” he did not say that Juror

No. 6 had ever mentioned “punishment” and did not otherwise provide a basis for his belief. Indeed, only one juror,

Juror No. 5, was even “pretty sure” he recalled the word “penalty” ever being used. When asked directly, none of the other

jurors remembered the question of punishment or penalty

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being raised. To the contrary, a number of them expressly

denied that it had, distinguishing between the “charge” and

the “penalty” or the “consequences,” and explained that only

the former had been mentioned. 

Faced with this clear “consensus” among the jury and near

unanimity, there could not have been good cause to dismiss

Juror No. 6 for being “concerned about the severity of the

charge, which means the severity of the punishment,” because

“they really are interchangeable.” Rather, it is clear that the

jurors understood the two to be distinct. As noted above, for

a juror to say to his peers during deliberations that the case

before them is an important one, involving serious charges,

and that they should apply the beyond a reasonable doubt

standard most carefully and deliberately, is not good cause for

removal by any means.

4

[11] Finally, the trial court’s determination that Juror No.

6 was “lying in court” about what had been discussed during

deliberations is directly contradicted by the record. The transcript of Juror No. 6’s testimony reveals that he never

“stat[ed] that no juror including himself had discussed the

severity of the charge,” as the trial court found. (Emphasis

added). To the contrary, when the trial judge recognized the

ambiguity of the prosecutor’s question, “Has anyone discussed the severity of the charge?” to which Juror No. 6

responded, “No, not that I recall,” he then asked, “Just to be

clear, have you made reference during deliberations to the

severity of the charge?” (Emphasis added). Juror No. 6 then

answered that, yes, he had talked about the importance of the

case. Similarly, Juror No. 6 never “stat[ed] that no juror

including himself had discussed . . . juror nullification.”

Again to the contrary, when asked by the prosecutor whether

there was “any discussion about what the judge described as

jury nullification,” Juror No. 6 responded, “Yes, someone . . .

raised the question whether juries always convict according to

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the law, and I can remember I said sometimes they don’t,”

and he then mentioned the historical examples of which he

was aware. (Emphasis added).

The court’s determination is contradicted not only by the

record, but also by the court’s earlier finding made immediately after Juror No. 6 testified. At that time, the court

acknowledged that “actually, he sort of admitted that he had

discussed [the severity of the charge],” and then concluded,

“he isn’t lying, but intentionally withheld honest information.” (Emphasis added). Nothing in the record, however,

indicated that Juror No. 6 had withheld anything, and the

court offered no indication of what it thought the juror might

have withheld. 

We therefore conclude that the court’s finding that Juror

No. 6 was lying when he responded to the judicial inquiry in

court was manifestly erroneous as well, and thus cannot provide good cause for his removal. In so holding, we recognize

that credibility determinations fall largely within the purview

of the factfinder and can rarely be reversed on direct appellate

review, let alone on habeas. Nevertheless, this is not a case in

which a credibility determination was based on intangible factors, such as demeanor, or on statements that are not inherently believable, or that conflict with other evidence. Rather,

the trial court relied solely upon its recollection of statements

made in court by the juror, which statements the juror in fact

never made, as the transcript reveals. As “the state courts

plainly . . . misstate[d] the record in making their findings,”

Williams is able to overcome the presumption of correctness

bestowed upon them. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001.

D

[12] For the reasons stated above, none of the elements of

the trial court’s determinations, individually or collectively,

regarding Juror No. 6 serve to establish the “good cause”

required by the Sixth Amendment to remove a deliberating

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juror, particularly one who was neither refusing to follow the

law nor unwilling to deliberate. This is a separate reason,

independent of the Symington violation, to hold that the dismissal of a known holdout juror was unconstitutional. What

we are left with, then, are the conclusions (1) that at least a

reasonable possibility existed that Juror No. 6’s discharge

stemmed from his disagreement with his peers over their

views of the merits of the case, and (2) that there was no good

cause to justify the juror’s discharge. 

Either conclusion standing alone would warrant reversal.

Together, the constitutional violation is well beyond doubt. At

most, the trial court inartfully identified some inchoate unease

it felt about the juror, who was the only one not yet ready to

vote to convict. Such unease, however, did not allow the court

to discharge Juror No. 6, especially in light of the earlier disclosure of his views of the sufficiency of the evidence. The

trial court’s action deprived Williams of her constitutional

right to a fair trial by jury.

IV. CONCLUSION

A hung jury is never a desirable outcome in a criminal trial.

When a mistrial results, the interest shared by the State, the

defendant, the court, and the public in the efficient administration of justice is diminished. The sacrifice of efficiency for

the preservation of liberty is central, however, to the safeguards the Constitution affords criminal defendants. If “[m]en

must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,” it is even more true that the government, including the

courts, may not cut corners when dealing with man’s freedom. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S.

141, 143 (1920). Unfortunately, the trial court cut some corners here. In view of the reasonable possibility that Juror No.

6’s discharge was directly or indirectly the result of his position on the merits of the case, and in view of the lack of good

cause to justify his dismissal, we hold that the removal of

Juror No. 6 deprived Williams of her right to a fair trial by

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jury. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court

and remand with instructions to grant the writ.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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