Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03064/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES FREDDIE CAVITT, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-3064 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES;

GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO STAY PETITION;

INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK

(Docket Nos. 5, 6)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the writ

of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition for

failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner filed opposition to the motion to dismiss or in

the alternative, a motion to hold the petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of state

remedies. Although directed to do so, Respondent did not file a reply brief. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

However, the Court also will GRANT Petitioner’s motion to stay the petition while

Petitioner exhausts his additional claim before the state supreme court. 

*Original filed 3/28/07

Case 5:05-cv-03064-JF Document 7 Filed 03/28/07 Page 1 of 9
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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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BACKGROUND

A San Mateo Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder (Cal.

Penal Code § 187), first degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 212,5(a)), first degree

burglary (Cal. Penal Code §§459, 460(a)), conspiracy (Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(1)), and

grand theft of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 487). The jury found that the murder was

committed during a robbery and a burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(I),

(a)(17)(vii)) and that petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury during the

commission of the murder, robbery and burglary (Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 1203.075(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), 12022.7). On January 15, 1998, Petitioner was

sentenced to twenty-five years-to-life in state prison. On direct appeal, the state appellate

court affirmed the judgment on February 5, 2002. The state supreme court granted a

petition for review and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in a written opinion on July 21,

2004. See People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187 (2004). Petitioner filed the instant federal

habeas petition on July 28, 2005. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Respondent moves to dismiss the instant petition because Petitioner has failed to

exhaust state remedies as to all of his claims. Specifically, Respondent contends that

Petitioner did not exhaust claim three in the instant petition. Petitioner opposes the

motion, and in the alternative asks the Court to hold the instant petition in abeyance in

order for Petitioner to exhaust his state remedies. 

Prisoners in state custody seeking to challenge collaterally in federal habeas 

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust

state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by

presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of

each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c);

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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(1981); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal district court

must dismiss a federal habeas petition even if it contains only a single claim as to which

state remedies have not been exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c). Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. at 522. Federal courts have a duty to construe pro se petitions for writs of

habeas corpus liberally. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). The

exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine reflects a policy of federal-state comity to give the

state “the initial ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’

federal rights.’” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations omitted). The

exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the federal claim (1) has been “fairly

presented” to the state courts, see id.; Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996); or

(2) no state remedy remains available, see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 It is not sufficient to raise only the facts supporting the claim; rather, “the

constitutional claim . . . inherent in those facts” must be brought to the attention of the

state court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277. State courts must be alerted to the fact that prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution in order to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); see, e.g., Dye v. Hofbauer, 126 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2005) (federal due

process claim based on prosecutorial misconduct was fairly presented where the text of

the brief cited the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and federal cases concerning alleged

violation of federal due process rights in the context of prosecutorial misconduct – the

“brief was clear that the prosecutorial misconduct claim was based, at least in part, on a

federal right”);. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (characterizing Picard

as requiring “reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee” in state court;

presentation of facts underlying claim not sufficient); Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d

1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (general reference to federal Constitution “as a whole, without

specifying an applicable provision, or an underlying federal legal theory, does not suffice

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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to exhaust the federal claim.”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1001, 1002 (9th Cir.

2005)(requiring reference to “specific provision of the U.S. Constitution;” statement that

appellant was “denied a fair trial in violation of the United States and the Arizona

Constitutions” insufficient; “drive-by citation” of “Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights” in conclusion of appellate brief, divorced from any articulated federal

legal theory, insufficient).

A claim is “fairly presented” only if the petitioner either referenced specific

provisions of the federal constitution or federal statutes, or cited to federal or state case

law analyzing the federal issue. Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1158 (holding that a federal claim

can be fairly presented by citation to state cases analyzing the federal issue). Ordinarily a

state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond

a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of a

federal claim in order to find material that does so. Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347,

1350-51 (2004) (where state petitioner did not claim specifically in brief presented to

state supreme court that appellate counsel’s performance violated federal law, claim was

not fairly presented even though that court had the opportunity to read lower court

opinions which could have shown the claim was cast in federal terms); Castillo, 399 F.3d

at 1000 (characterizing Baldwin as requiring that petitioner present his federal

constitutional issue within the “four corners of his appellate briefing.”) 

Here, Respondent asserts that Petitioner did not fairly present claim three, in which

he asserts that the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the elements of felony

murder were unconstitutionally vague, set forth in the instant petition in his petition for

review. In his opposition, Petitioner claims that his third claim is “an aspect or extension

of his first two claims” and thus it is exhausted. Petitioner maintains that the California

Supreme Court granted his petition for review to decide whether the jury was given

erroneous instructions on the elements of accomplice liability for felony murder and

whether the evidence Petitioner sought to present could have negated those elements. 

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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Petitioner contends that neither issue could be addressed without identifying the elements

for accomplice felony murder in California. Petitioner therefore submits that “the state

supreme court’s conclusion that the instructions to [Petitioner’s] jury effectively

conveyed the requirement of a ‘logical nexus’ means his challenge to the constitutional

validity of those instructions the second claim in his petition to this Court) necessarily

includes the third claim.” See Pet.’s Mot. at 5. 

Respondent has submitted a copy of Petitioner’s petition for review filed in the

state supreme court. See Resp. Mot., Exh. A. In the petition for review, Petitioner 

presented the following claim: the exclusion of evidence and omission of instructions on

essential elements of the felony murder rule denied Cavitt his rights to present a defense

and have the jury determine every element of the murder charge citing to the Fifth, Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and California

Constitution Article I, §§ 7, 15, 16. Resp. Mot., Exh. A at 19. 

The state supreme court granted petitioner’s and his co-defendant’s petitions for

review, to consider the following issues: (1) Does first degree felony murder liability

attach to the nonkiller accomplice liability only when the killing is committed “in

furtherance of the common design” of the felony, or instead, when the accomplice is

“jointly engaged” in the felony, a question left open in People v. Pulido, 15 Cal.4th 713

(1997); (2) Whether the enumerated felony continues as to every accomplice when some,

but not all, reach a place of temporary safety; and (3) whether the trial court prejudicially

erred in precluding defendants from presenting evidence establishing a cohort harbored

independent animus for purposes of first-degree felony murder. See Resp. Mot., Exh B.,

(Petitioner’s Opening Brief, People v. Freddie Cavitt, California Supreme Court S105058,

docketed November 27, 2002) at 1; People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187 (2004). 

The Court concludes that claim three is not exhausted. In his petition for review,

Petitioner did not assert that the state supreme court’s determination of the elements of

felony murder are unconstitutionally vague. The court thus was not alerted to the fact that

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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petitioner sought to challenge the elements of California’s felony murder rule on

vagueness grounds. As set forth above, it is not sufficient to raise only the facts

supporting the claim; rather, “the constitutional claim . . . inherent in those facts” must be

brought to the attention of the state court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 277. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state

remedies is GRANTED. 

B. Motion to Hold Petition in Abeyance 

District courts have the authority to issue stays and AEDPA does not deprive them

of that authority. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). The district court’s

discretion to stay a mixed petition is circumscribed by AEDPA’s stated purposes of

reducing delay in the execution of criminal sentences and encouraging petitioners to seek

relief in the state courts before filing their claims in federal court. Id. Because the use of

a stay and abeyance procedure has the potential to undermine these dual purposes of

AEDPA, its use is appropriate only where the district court has first determined that there

was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims in state court and that the

claims are potentially meritorious. Id. Moreover, when granting a stay, the district court

must effectuate the timeliness concerns in AEDPA by placing “reasonable limits on a

petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Id. at 278. Prisoners who may run the risk of

having the federal statute of limitations expire while they are exhausting their state

remedies may avoid this predicament “by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and

asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state

remedies are exhausted.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). 

Therefore, a petitioner can ask the district court to stay an unexhausted petition while he

exhausts his unexhausted claims in state court. A petitioner need not delete his

unexhausted claims asking the district court to issue a stay. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d

654, 659-61 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78). 

Here, Petitioner’s claim is cognizable under § 2254 and is not “plainly meritless.” 

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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Petitioner appears to show good cause for his failure to exhaust the claim in state court in

that he believed his claim was incorporated in the exhausted claims raised in his petition

for review. Petitioner does not appear to be intentionally delaying this action.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant petition to allow him to exhaust his

additional claim (docket no. 6) is GRANTED. This action is hereby STAYED until thirty

days after the California Supreme Court’s final decision on petitioner’s additional claim

as set forth below.

CONCLUSION

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition (docket no. 5) is

GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant petition (docket no. 6) is 

GRANTED, and the above-titled action is hereby STAYED until thirty days after the

California Supreme Court’s final decision on Petitioner’s additional claim.

3. If Petitioner wishes to have this Court consider his unexhausted claim 

he must properly present this claim to the California Supreme Court within thirty days of

the date this order is filed. 

4. Once the California Supreme Court has issued a decision on Petitioner’s 

additional claim, and if he has not obtained relief in state court, Petitioner shall promptly

notify the Court and Respondent within thirty days of the California Supreme Court’s

decision. Thereafter, the Court will order supplemental briefing on the exhausted claim. 

Petitioner need not file an amended petition, as the Court has stayed the original “mixed”

petition containing all of his claims, including his exhausted claim. 

5. The Clerk shall ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE the file pending the stay 

of this action. This has no legal effect; it is purely a statistical procedure. When

Petitioner informs the Court that exhaustion has been completed the case will be

administratively re-opened. 

Case 5:05-cv-03064-JF Document 7 Filed 03/28/07 Page 7 of 9
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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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6. It is Petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner is 

reminded that all communications with the Court must be served on Respondent by

mailing a true copy of the document to Respondent’s counsel. Petitioner must keep the

Court and all parties informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper

captioned “Notice of Change of Address.” He must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ JEREMY FOGEL

 United States District Judge

3/28/07

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies; Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay Petition; Instructions to Clerk

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

James Freddie Cavitt

K-81900

Correctional Medical Facility

P.O. Box 2000

Vacaville, CA 95696 

Juliet B. Hayley

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

 

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