Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01430/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01430-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN HOSKINGS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

PAT L. VASQUEZ, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-1430 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #5]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by guilty

plea on April 27, 1984, to second degree murder with the use of a firearm. See Petition at 2;

Petitioner’s Opposition at 1. On May 25, 1984, Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate

term of 17 years to life with possibility of parole. Id.

On November 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court.

Petitioner claims he was denied his due process and equal protection rights under the Constitution

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when the Governor reversed the Board of Prison Terms’ grant of parole without good cause and

evidentiary support. According to the petition, Petitioner fully exhausted his claim in the California

courts. On February 21, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to

dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a

formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under

Rule 4. 

B. Jurisdiction

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

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denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state court

judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the threshold

requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d

1002, 1006 (9th Cir.2004); Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F.Supp.2d 975, 978 (E.D.

Cal. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).

Petitioner contends that his federal constitutional rights were violated when the Governor

reversed the Board of Prison Terms’ grant of parole. Petitioner alleges the Governor’s May 21, 2004,

decision was made without good cause and any evidentiary support. Petitioner contends that the

language of the California parole statutes creates a presumptive entitlement to, and thus has a liberty

interest in, the setting of a parole release date. Respondent moves for summary dismissal alleging

Petitioner has no protected liberty interest in parole, thus arguing that the Court is without

jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Because Petitioner is challenging the actions of a state, the Court

will proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. In certain cases, a

state law may create a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. In examining questions of

procedural due process, federal courts employ a two-step inquiry: 1) whether there exists a liberty or

property interest which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State Colleges v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); and 2) whether the procedures

attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472,

103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), receded from and rejected on separate grounds, Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). See Kentucky Dept. of Corrections

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v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). 

Thus, the first question that must be answered is whether there exists a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause. The United States Supreme Court has expressly denied

entitlement to a protected liberty interest in parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and

Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) ("There is no

constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence."). "Nevertheless, early release statutes can create a 'liberty interest

protected by due process guarantees.'" Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1991) (per

curiam), quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987).

Moreover, "[a] state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest by establishing regulatory

measures that impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion." Bermudez, 936

F.2d at 1067, citing Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.1985).

However, no protected entitlement to release exists unless a state scheme includes a formula which

mandates release after the occurrence of specified events. Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844 (stating that the

unique "shall/unless" formula was decisive in Greenholtz). If there exists mandatory language in a

parole statute, then Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in parole release. Greenholtz, 442 U.S.

at 11-12. If, however, the state merely holds out the possibility of parole, then such a hope is not

protected by due process. Id.; Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844. Therefore, the Court must look to the

California parole statutes to determine whether the unique structure and language of those statutes

creates an entitlement to parole release or a presumption of expectation of parole release.

The relevant California statutory language is contained in Cal. Penal Code § 3041, which

states, in relevant part:

(a) One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole release date a panel of two or

more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. 

(b) The panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore,

cannot be fixed at this meeting . . . . 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (Emphasis added).

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The language in Cal. Penal Code § 3041 provides for the possibility of parole. A release date

shall be set unless the BPT determines that the prisoner should not be released. The word “shall” is

not used in an absolute or mandatory sense. Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 981. It is qualified or modified in

both subsections. Thus, parole is not automatic; it is discretionary. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, without the assistance of a definitive California Supreme Court interpretation,

found the language in § 3041 to be mandatory. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th

Cir.2002). 

In 2005, in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1087 (2005), the California Supreme Court

provided a definitive interpretation of § 3041's structure and language. In Dannenberg, the California

Supreme Court held: 1) the language in § 3041 is not mandatory; 2) there is no right to parole in

California; 3) the Board of Prison Terms has extremely broad discretion and is not required to fix a

parole date; and 4) the statutory scheme of § 3041 indicates that § 3041(b) extinguishes any

expectancy an inmate may have in parole found in § 3041(a). Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1084, 1087-

88, 1097-98; Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 981. 

This Court is therefore faced with conflicting interpretations from the Ninth Circuit and the

California Supreme Court. Normally, the Court would defer to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of

the state statute; however, circuit opinions are only persuasive authority. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069;

Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600-01. On the other hand, “[w]hen a state court has made its own definitive

determination as to the meaning of a state statute, federal courts give this finding great weight in

determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute’s reasonable

interpretation, it will be deemed conclusive.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 982, citing Gurley v. Rhoden,

421 U.S. 200, 208, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975); see also Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877

F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal courts are bound by state

court rulings on questions of state law). As noted by this Court in Sass, the general principle of

deference to state court interpretations is compelled by the Supreme Court’s clearly established

habeas corpus jurisprudence. See, e.g., Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 12, citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.

341, 345, 346 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (demonstrating deference to, and the need

for, holdings and interpretations of state supreme courts when establishing interests protected by due

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process); Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377 n.8, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (implying that a

Montana Supreme Court decision would have been instructive if there had been one on point). 

Therefore, this Court will defer to the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 3041 in

Dannenberg. The California Supreme Court answers the first question: the language of § 3041 is not

mandatory. Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1087-88. The absolute sense of the word “shall” is eviscerated

by the modifications (“shall normally set”) and qualifications (“shall . . . unless it determines”)

contained in the subsection. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (Emphasis added).

Furthermore, “the lack of mandatory language in § 3041, especially when considered in light of 1)

California’s long standing jurisprudence denying the existence of a parole right, 2) the statutory

scheme of § 3041, and 3) the broad discretion given to the BPT under the “noncapital murderers”

exception to California’s determinant sentencing law, precludes a legitimate expectation of parole

release and, thus, does not give rise to an associated liberty interest under clearly established federal

law.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 982-983, citing Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1084, 1087-88, 1097-98.

Therefore, as this Court held in Sass, “the unique structure and language of § 3041 precludes the

finding of a federal liberty interest in parole.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 983. Consequently, the state

court determination that Petitioner’s federal due process rights were not violated at his May 31,

2001, parole hearing was not contrary to or an unreasonable of clearly established federal law. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition, because California’s parole statutes do not give rise to a protected

liberty interest, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s claims. For this reason,

Respondent’s motion should be granted and the petition should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction be GRANTED and the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

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Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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