Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-17790/USCOURTS-ca9-08-17790-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIO DINERO SESSOMS,  No. 08-17790

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  2:05-cv-01221-

JAM-GGH D. L. RUNNELS,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 20, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed August 16, 2012

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Mary M. Schroeder,

Betty B. Fletcher, Barry G. Silverman,

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher,

Richard A. Paez, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Sandra S. Ikuta, and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Fisher;

Dissent by Judge Murguia

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COUNSEL

Eric Weaver (argued), Albany, California, for petitionerappellant Tio Dinero Sessoms.

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General of California, Michael

P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles A.

French, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey D.

Firestone (argued), Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento,

California, for respondent-appellee D. L. Runnels. 

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, (argued), HL Rogers, Brian A. Fox, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C.; Mark E. Haddad, Douglas

A. Axel, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California; David

M. Porter, Sacramento, California, for amicus National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, with whom SCHROEDER,

WARDLAW, FISHER, PAEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit

Judges, join in full:

Tio Sessoms, a nineteen-year-old black man, sat alone in an

eight-by-ten foot interrogation room. Five days earlier, on the

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advice of his father, Sessoms had turned himself in to the

local police. Before doing so, Sessoms’s father told his son:

you must ask for a lawyer before talking to the police.

Sessoms followed his father’s advice. When the two police

officers entered the interrogation room, Sessoms sat slouched

in his chair. He looked up and they exchanged brief pleasantries. Forty seconds after the officers entered the room and

before they read Sessoms his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the following exchange occurred:

Sessoms: There wouldn’t be any possible

way that I could have a — a lawyer present while we do this?

[Detective]: Well, uh, what I’ll do is, um —

Sessoms: Yeah, that’s what my dad asked

me to ask you guys . . . uh, give

me a lawyer.1

Instead of immediately ceasing the interrogation, the officers persevered and convinced Sessoms that the only way to

tell his side of the story was to speak to them without an attorney. Eventually, Sessoms agreed to talk and made incriminating statements. 

We hold that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably

applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it

concluded that Sessoms was required under Davis v. United

States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), to unambiguously invoke

his right to counsel. We reverse the district court’s judgment

and remand with directions to grant a conditional writ of

habeas corpus.

1The transcript of the colloquy says “Give me a lawyer,” but Detective

Woods, after comparing the transcript to the videotape, testified that Sessoms said “Get me a lawyer.” We find this distinction irrelevant to our

analysis. 

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I. Facts and Procedural History 

On October 20, 1999, Sessoms and two others burglarized

Edward Sheriff’s home. During the burglary, one of Sessoms’s accomplices choked and repeatedly stabbed Sheriff. 

Sessoms then fled from California to Oklahoma. There, at

his father’s urging, Sessoms surrendered to Oklahoma police

on November 15, 1999. His father advised him to ask for a

lawyer before talking to the police. Sessoms was in custody

for four days before being interrogated. On November 19 or

20, two police officers, Detectives Woods and Keller, flew

from California to Oklahoma to question Sessoms at the

county jail where he was being held. 

The entire interrogation was videotaped. The video shows

Sessoms sitting alone, talking to himself and quietly saying,

“I’m not a criminal, but I got [inaudible]. They didn’t tell me

if I have a lawyer. I know I want to talk to a lawyer.”

2

 When

the detectives entered the room, the following exchange took

place: 

Det. Woods: . . . Tio, I’m Dick.

Sessoms: How you doing, all right. You

already know me.

Det. Woods: You say . . .

Det. Keller: Tio, Pat Keller.

Det. Woods: You say Tio or Theo?

Sessoms: It — my name is pronounced Tio

because it’s Spanish.

2Sessoms’s statements to himself were made prior to the detectives

entering the room and there is no evidence that any law enforcement officers heard these statements. 

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Det. Woods: Tio. Okay.

Det. Keller: Why don’t we swap corners here

for a minute, you guys? Go ahead

and sit here.

Sessoms: So glad you fellows had a safe

flight.

Det. Woods: Huh?

Sessoms: I’m glad you fellows had a safe

flight out here.

Det. Keller: So are we. Huh.

Det. Woods: Well, we want a safe one back

too.

Sessoms: Oh, you know [inaudible].

Det. Woods: Yeah. Uh, we both, uh — both

from, uh, Sacramento PD and, uh

—

Sessoms: There wouldn’t be any possible

way that I could have a — a lawyer present while we do this?

Det. Woods: Well, uh, what I’ll do is, um —

Sessoms: Yeah, that’s what my dad asked

me to ask you guys . . . uh, give

me a lawyer.

Woods proceeded as though Sessoms said nothing. Instead

of ending the interrogation, Woods persuaded Sessoms that

having a lawyer was a bad idea. Sessoms explained that he

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was concerned that some police officers “end up switching

your words afterwards,” to which Woods responded that he

had no intention of playing any “switch games” and would

even tape record the conversation to allay Sessoms’s fears.

Woods then explained the situation: Sessoms and his two

accomplices were all being “charged with the same thing.”

Woods said he already knew “what happened” because Sessoms’s accomplices had waived their rights “and laid it out

from A to Z.” Woods reassured Sessoms that he believed that

Sessoms “did not participate in the stabbing,” but warned that

if Sessoms didn’t make a statement right then and there,

Woods wasn’t going to be able to “get his version of it”

because “most all attorneys — in fact, all attorneys — will

sometimes or usually advise you not to make a statement.” He

then said he didn’t really “need [Sessoms’s] statement to

make [the] case” anyway because he “already [had] two and

a half other complete statements,” reiterating that he already

“[knew] what happened.” 

Only then—after telling Sessoms that having a lawyer

would only hurt him, and that invoking his right to counsel

would be futile because the police already knew what

happened—did the police even read Sessoms his rights under

Miranda. Sessoms eventually said “Let’s talk,” and proceeded

to implicate himself in the crime.

Prior to trial, Sessoms moved to suppress the incriminating

statements, arguing that he had clearly invoked his right to

counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Sessoms went to

trial and was convicted of murder, robbery, and burglary, with

the special circumstance that he was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of robbery and

burglary when the murder occurred. He was sentenced to life

in prison without the possibility of parole.

Sessoms appealed to the California Court of Appeal. That

court analyzed Sessoms’s statements under the rule of Davis:

a request for counsel must be unequivocal or unambiguous.

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The state court then determined that Sessoms’s statements did

not satisfy Davis’s requirement. It found that “although [Sessoms] twice explicitly referred to an attorney, neither statement was an unequivocal or unambiguous request for

counsel.” People v. Sessoms, No. C041139, 2004 WL 49720,

at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2004). According to the state

court, Sessoms’s first statement was “legally indistinguishable” from the statements made in Davis, 512 U.S. at 455

(“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”) and People v. Crittenden,

9 Cal. 4th 83, 123-24 (“Did you say I could have a lawyer?”),

which were not unequivocal requests for an attorney. Sessoms, 2004 WL 49720, at *3. Sessoms’s second statement,

the state court continued, was also not an unequivocal request

for an attorney, but rather “[a]t best . . . a statement of his

father’s advice to him.” Id. Ultimately, the California Court

of Appeal concluded that Sessoms’s statements were equivocal and not “ ‘sufficiently clear[ ] that a reasonable police

officer in the circumstances would understand the statement

to be a request for an attorney.’ ” Id. (citing Davis, 512 U.S.

at 459). 

Sessoms then filed a federal habeas petition. The district

court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on his Miranda claim and his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. A divided three-judge panel upheld the district

court’s denial of Sessoms’s habeas petition. The panel majority recognized that “[b]ecause Sessoms’s statements were

made prior to his Miranda waiver, Davis cannot apply as

‘clearly established Federal law’ in this case.” Sessoms v.

Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2011). But the panel

majority held that it was not unreasonable for the state court

to require an unambiguous request for counsel and concluded

that Sessoms’s request was ambiguous. Id. We granted

rehearing en banc. We now conclude that the state court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly estabSESSOMS v. RUNNELS 9311

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lished federal law. We therefore reverse the district court’s

denial of habeas relief.3

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because Sessoms’s habeas petition was filed after April 24,

1996, we apply AEDPA. Under AEDPA, Sessoms is entitled

to federal habeas relief if he can show that the state court’s

adjudication of the merits of his claim was “contrary to” thenestablished Supreme Court precedent; was “an unreasonable

application of” such law; or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts” in light of the state court record.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

785 (2011). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

Supreme Court precedent if it (1) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s]

cases”; or (2) reaches a different result on a “materially indistinguishable” set of facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000). A state-court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state

court (1) “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of the . . . case”; or (2) “unreasonably extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at

407. 

This case illustrates the difficulty in defining the precise

contours of the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”

3Because we conclude that Sessoms is entitled to relief on his Miranda

claim, we need not address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

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prongs of § 2254(d)(1). Indeed, Williams itself recognized

that in many cases it will be “difficult to distinguish a decision involving an unreasonable extension of a legal principle,” warranting relief under the “unreasonable application”

clause “from a decision that arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,”

warranting relief under the “contrary to” clause. Id. at 408

(internal quotation marks omitted). Deciding whether this

case falls into the unreasonable extension of legal principle or

incorrect choice of law category involves, as the Supreme

Court in Williams described, some “problems of precision.”

Id. Regardless, “it is clear that both [standards] are met when

the state court has failed to follow the law as set forth by the

Supreme Court.” Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th

Cir. 2000). The state court decision is both contrary to and

involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent because it unreasonably extended the principle from

Davis to a new context where it should not apply and because

it analyzed Sessoms’s case using the incorrect legal framework.

III. Discussion

We begin by identifying the Supreme Court’s applicable

legal principles. The landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona

established certain safeguards that must be afforded to a suspect in custody, including the right to have counsel present

during a custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The

Supreme Court has refined its analysis of the Miranda right

to counsel in a series of cases including, as relevant here,

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and United States

v. Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).

A.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court established rules the police

must follow to ensure certain “basic” and “precious” rights

“enshrined in our Constitution.” 384 U.S. at 442. These rights

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include the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “No person . . .

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. One of the Miranda

Court’s primary concerns was the temptation for law enforcement, operating with little or no supervision of their investigative actions, to overbear a defendant in an isolated

interrogation setting. 384 U.S. at 461. The Fifth Amendment

privilege, explained the Court, “protect[s] persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate

themselves.” Id. at 467. 

Miranda recognized that overzealous police practices during a custodial interrogation create the potential for compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 455-58.

Indeed, some of the tactics of which Miranda warns were

employed by the interrogators in this case. After Sessoms

asked for an attorney, Woods persisted in his questioning. He

told Sessoms he already knew what happened, and that Sessoms’s accomplices had already confessed and laid it out

from A to Z, thereby “display[ing] an air of confidence in

[Sessoms’s] guilt” and appearing only to be “interest[ed] in

confirming certain details.” Id. at 450. Woods offered Sessoms a “legal excuse[ ]” and assured him that he knew Sessoms did not participate in the stabbing. See id. at 451-52. But

then Woods immediately reversed course, telling Sessoms

that he didn’t really need his statement to make the case anyway, because Sessoms’s accomplices had already talked,

thereby placing Sessoms “in a psychological state where his

story [was] but an elaboration of what the police purport[ed]

to know already—that he [was] guilty.” Id. at 450. Eventually, the officers, much like Miranda warns, overwhelmed

Sessoms and persuaded him “out of exercising his constitutional rights.” Id. at 455.

[1] In order to assure that the use of such psychological

tactics to exploit a suspect’s vulnerabilities did not run afoul

of the Fifth Amendment, Miranda set forth clear mandates:

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“[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he

has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make

may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right

to the presence of an attorney.” Id. at 444. If a suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he

wishes to consult with an attorney,” all questioning must cease.4

Id. at 444-45. These protective devices are necessary to dispel

the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogations and “to

insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not

become but a form of words in the hands of government officials.” Id. at 444 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Fifteen years later, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme

Court reaffirmed the view that the “assertion of the right to

counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the

accused, ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is

present.’ ” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384

U.S. at 474). In Edwards, the suspect was arrested and taken

to the police station. Id. at 478. He requested counsel, at

which point all questioning ceased. Id. at 479. The next day,

the police visited Edwards in jail, but he told the jail guard

that he did not want to talk to anyone. Id. The guard told

Edwards that “he had to” talk to the police, and Edwards

eventually confessed. Id. The Supreme Court held that

Edwards’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated and “reconfirm[ed]” that a suspect, “having expressed his desire to deal

with the police only through counsel,”

5

 must not be “subject

4The dissent cites this same passage, but then curiously, states that

Miranda says nothing about what the police must do when a suspect’s

invocation is ambiguous. But Miranda explicitly addresses this issue—a

suspect can request an attorney “in any manner.” 384 U.S. at 444-45

(emphasis added). 

5The dissent correctly states that under AEDPA, the holdings and not

the dicta constitutes clearly established federal law. Dissent at 9324. But

then the dissent goes on to rely on dicta from Edwards to support its conclusion that even Edwards requires a suspect to “clearly” assert his rights

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to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has

been made available to him.” Id. at 484-85. The purpose of

the Edwards rule is “to prevent police from badgering a

defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda

rights,” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990), and

to ensure that police “will not take advantage of the mounting

coercive pressures of prolonged police custody,” Maryland v.

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). 

The Supreme Court revisited the scope of Miranda and

Edwards in Davis v. United States. There, the Court confronted a scenario where Davis had executed a written waiver

of his rights and expressly agreed to speak to the police. 512

U.S. at 454-55. Only after being questioned for ninety minutes did Davis utter the words “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 455. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court again

reaffirmed the fundamental principle that “if a suspect

requests counsel at any time during [a custodial] interview, he

is not [to be] subject to further questioning until a lawyer has

been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” Id. at 458 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85). 

[2] The Court went on to clarify, however, that “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or

equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be

invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require

to counsel. Dissent at 9327. Just as with the holding in Davis, see infra n.

5 and accompanying text, what is the holding in Edwards is unmistakable:

“We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his

desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to

him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484. The

Edwards’s Court reference to the requirement that a suspect’s invocation

be “clear” is dicta and cannot be relied upon. 

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the cessation of questioning.” Id. at 459. “Rather, the suspect

must unambiguously request counsel.” Id.6

The Court explained the reasoning behind this requirement

as follows: 

A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his

right to counsel after having that right explained to

him has indicated his willingness to deal with the

police unassisted. Although Edwards provides an

additional protection—if a suspect subsequently

requests an attorney, questioning must cease—it is

one that must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect. 

Id. at 460-61. The Court ultimately concluded that the statement “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel. Id. at 462. 

[3] But Davis clearly limits its holding to statements made

after a suspect has waived his Miranda rights: “We therefore

hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the

Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”7

Id. at 461 (emphasis added); see also United States v.

Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Davis

addressed what the suspect must do to restore his Miranda

rights after having already knowingly and voluntarily waived

6The dissent accuses us of misinterpreting Davis by “selectively lift[-

ing]” language to support the majority’s view. In light of the facts of the

case (after being Mirandized and talking to the police for more than an

hour, Davis made an unambiguous invocation) and Davis’s crystal clear

holding (requiring an unambiguous invocation “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights,”), the only logical interpretation of

the passage quoted by the dissent is that an unambiguous statement is

required after waiver. 

7We rely on the Supreme Court’s holdings and we cannot imagine a

more clear holding than the one made here. 

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them.”); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure

§ 6.9(g), n. 185 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012) (“Davis is . . .

limited [to the post-waiver context].” (internal citations omitted)). When there has not been a knowing and voluntary

waiver, “[i]nvocation of the Miranda right to counsel

‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably

be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance

of an attorney,’ ” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil v.

Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)), but the assertion need

not be “unambiguous or unequivocal,” id. at 462. Thus, where

the suspect has not waived his rights, Davis’s rule is inapplicable. We therefore agree with Sessoms that the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably extended Davis to requests for

counsel that, like his, were made before a valid waiver of

Miranda rights. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

The state argues, however, that the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins suggests that Davis applies

to all requests for counsel, whether pre- or post-waiver. 130

S. Ct. 2250 (2010). After being informed of his Miranda

rights, the suspect in Berghuis refused to sign a waiver form

and simply remained silent through almost three hours of

interrogation before making an incriminating statement. See

id. at 2255-27. The Supreme Court concluded that the suspect

never invoked his right to silence. Id. at 2260. Relying on

Davis, the Court held that an invocation of the right to remain

silent, like the right to counsel, must be unambiguous. Id. In

reaching that decision, the Court provided this description of

its holding in Davis:

In the context of invoking the Miranda right to counsel, the Court in Davis v. United States held that a

suspect must do so “unambiguously.” If an accused

makes a statement concerning the right to counsel

“that is ambiguous or equivocal” or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify whether the

accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights.

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Id. at 2259-60 (internal citations omitted). As the state points

out, this description of Davis draws no distinction between

ambiguous statements made before or after Miranda rights

were waived. 

Nonetheless, a critical factual distinction between Sessoms’s statements and those evaluated by the Court in both

Davis and Berghuis remains: Sessoms made his statements

before he was informed of his rights under Miranda. The

Miranda Court held that the coercive atmosphere of interrogation makes it essential for a suspect to be “given a full and

effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process.” 384 U.S. at 445. As the Court stressed, when

“the police [have] not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege . . . at the outset of the interrogation,” the suspect’s “abdication of [that] constitutional privilege—the

choice on his part to speak to the police—[is] not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of

his rights.” Id. at 465 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.

478 (1964)). 

Both Davis and Berghuis recognize that the suspect must

be given Miranda warnings before any interrogation. In Berghuis, the Court wrote that it need not “add marginally” to

Miranda’s prophylactic protections by “[t]reating an ambiguous . . . statement as an invocation of Miranda rights,”

because “full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and

request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion

is inherent in the interrogation process.” 130 S. Ct. at 2260.

Similarly, in Davis, the court emphasized that the “primary

protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation

is the Miranda warnings themselves” and that, “after having

[those] right[s] explained to him,” a suspect must invoke his

rights “affirmatively.” 512 U.S. at 460-61 (emphasis added).

[4] In light of these instructions from the Supreme Court,

it is clear that Berghuis does not alter Davis’s requirement

that an unambiguous invocation can apply only after a suspect

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has been informed of his Miranda rights. Not only are the

Supreme Court cases on this point pellucid, their rationale

makes eminent sense. A person not aware of his rights cannot

be expected to clearly invoke them. Once, however, a suspect

has been read his Miranda rights, it is reasonable to ascribe

to him knowledge of those rights. If at some later point during

the custodial interrogation he decides that he wants an attorney, he should be held to a higher standard of clarity to

invoke that right. That is precisely what Davis concluded.

Thus, if a suspect invokes his rights before the Miranda warnings are given, the invocation must be analyzed under the rule

of Miranda and Edwards, not that of Davis. We therefore

conclude that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably

extended Davis’s clear invocation rule to a situation where it

does not apply. Sessoms requested an attorney before receiving a clear and complete statement of his rights and, therefore,

knowledge of his rights cannot be ascribed to him. In this circumstance, the clear invocation rule simply should not have

been applied. 

[5] Because the California Court of Appeal unreasonably

applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent,

AEDPA’s restrictions do not apply. Panetti v. Quarterman,

551 U.S. 930 (2007) (stating that when “the requirement set

forth in § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied[, a] federal court must then

resolve the [constitutional] claim without the deference

AEDPA otherwise requires”); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724,

736-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“where the analysis on federal habeas . . . results in the conclusion that § 2254(d)(1) is

satisfied, then federal habeas courts must review the substantive constitutionality of the state custody de novo”). Therefore, using the correct legal framework we consider de novo

whether Sessoms invoked his right to counsel. Under

Miranda and Edwards, Sessoms could “indicate[ ] in any

manner and at any stage of the process that he wishe[d] to

consult with an attorney,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, so

long as he “expressed his desire to deal with the police only

through counsel,” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484; see also McNeil,

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501 U.S. at 178 (“It requires, at a minimum, some statement

that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a

desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.”). Sessoms’s statements easily meet this standard.

B.

Police officers spend their days interacting with ordinary

people in our cities and neighborhoods and are surely well

acquainted with how ordinary people speak. Recognizing this,

the Supreme Court has directed that a defendant’s words

should be “understood as ordinary people would understand

them.” Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987).

[6] Here, any reasonable police officer (as indeed did these

officers) would understand that Sessoms expressed his desire

to have a lawyer present at his interrogation. Forty seconds

into the conversation, before any meaningful exchange took

place, Sessoms requested counsel twice in rapid succession.

First, Sessoms said “There wouldn’t be any possible way that

I could have a — a lawyer present while we do this?”

Although it was couched in a polite and diffident manner, the

meaning of Sessoms’s request was clear: he wanted a lawyer

then and there. 

If there were any doubt (which there should not have been),

Sessoms immediately made a second statement: “Yeah, that’s

what my dad asked me to ask you guys . . . uh, give me a lawyer.” Simply put, the words “give me a lawyer” mean just

that: “give me a lawyer.” 

Each of Sessoms’s statements, taken on its own, clearly

expresses his desire for an attorney. But when the two statements are taken together, that conclusion is indisputable.8

8Both the state court and the dissent analyze Sessoms’s statements in

isolation but do not consider the meaning of the two statements together.

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Of course, the best test of how a reasonable police officer

would understand Sessoms’s request is how the actual police

officer in this case responded. That reaction is telling. Detective Woods’s response to Sessoms’s statements—informing

Sessoms that a lawyer would only prevent him from giving

his side of the story and that, in any event, invocation was

futile because the police already knew what happened—

shows that he knew Sessoms was requesting a lawyer, and he

wanted to do his best to talk Sessoms out of it. This desire is

understandable. Detective Woods had flown halfway across

the country to speak to Sessoms about a murder case, and it

was surely frustrating when Sessoms requested a lawyer only

forty seconds into the interrogation. But the “rigid prophylactic rule of Edwards” requires the police to cease questioning

immediately when a suspect requests counsel and forbids any

attempt to badger a suspect into waiving his previously

asserted rights. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (internal quotation

marks omitted); Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision could only be

defended by “disregard[ing] . . . the ordinary meaning” of

Sessoms’s statements. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530. This is forbidden by clearly established federal law. All that is required is

some expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney

and Sessoms made his wishes sufficiently clear.

IV. CONCLUSION

Davis’s requirement that a request for counsel be unambiguous does not apply to this case. The state court acted unreasonably by requiring Sessoms to unequivocally or

unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Under Miranda

and Edwards, Sessoms invoked his right to counsel. Law

enforcement—those responsible for enforcing the rule of law

—may not disregard the constitutional safeguards imposed by

Miranda, which ensure the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. 

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[7] Upon hearing Sessoms’s request for an attorney, Detectives Woods and Keller were required to immediately terminate all questioning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. They

failed to do so. Therefore, Sessoms’s incriminating statements

were obtained in violation of Miranda and their admission at

Sessoms’s trial violated his clearly established rights under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Edwards, 451 U.S.

at 486-87. 

[8] We reverse the district court’s denial of habeas relief

and remand with instructions to grant a conditional writ of

habeas corpus with directions that the state retry Sessoms

within a reasonable period, or release him. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, with whom B. FLETCHER,

WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, join, concurring:

I fully concur in the majority opinion. I also conclude, contrary to the dissent, that even if it were reasonable to apply the

more stringent standard of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452 (1994), the California Court of Appeal unreasonably

applied that standard. For the reasons stated in the majority

opinion, the only reasonable conclusion was that Sessoms’

statements, taken together, unambiguously conveyed his

desire to have counsel present.

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI, Chief

Judge, and SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and IKUTA, Circuit

Judges, join, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority invalidates a conviction

on the ground that the state court reached a decision that was

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contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. According to the majority, the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Davis v. United States,

512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), to the pre-waiver context. But the

majority eschews the high level of deference we owe a state

court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal habeas court may

not grant relief unless no reasonable jurist could agree with

the state court’s determination. See Harrington v. Richter, 131

S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). On the record before us, a reasonable

jurist could conclude not only that the Davis standard applies

to pre-Miranda statements, but also that Sessoms’s request

was ambiguous and equivocal. I would, therefore, affirm the

district court’s judgment denying relief.

I

Before the police read him his Miranda rights, Sessoms

said, “There wouldn’t be any possible way that I could have

a — a lawyer present while we do this? . . . Yeah, that’s what

my dad told me to ask you guys . . . uh, give me a lawyer.”

The majority holds the state court reached a decision that was

contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law in concluding that if Sessoms wanted the

officers to stop the interrogation, he had to make a clear

request for counsel as required by Davis. Under AEDPA, Sessoms is only entitled to relief if the state court unreasonably

applied “clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). “Clearly established Federal law” refers to the

holdings, not the dicta, of the Supreme Court as of the time

of the relevant state court’s decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 71 (2003). The Supreme Court has never held that an

ambiguous request for counsel was enough to stop an interrogation. When the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider

the issue, it has either expressly declined to reach it, Smith v.

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), or held that only an unambiguous

invocation requires police to terminate the interrogation.

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Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-61; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct.

2250, 2260 (2010). 

In Smith, the Supreme Court did not address the consequences of an ambiguous inquiry about counsel, because the

invocation in that case was clear. 469 U.S. at 99-100 (“We do

not decide the circumstances in which an accused’s request

for counsel may be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal

. . . .”). The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the conflict

in the lower courts on this point. Thus, Smith confirmed that

the consequences of an ambiguous request for counsel was an

unsettled question in Miranda’s wake, and that there was no

established law on point. 

When the Supreme Court did reach the question in Davis,

it held that “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that

is ambiguous or equivocal . . . our precedents do not require

the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis

added). In expounding this rule, the Court in Davis reasoned

that “when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably

do not know whether the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule

requiring the immediate cessation of questioning ‘would

transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational

obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.’ ” Id. at

460 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).

In applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the Davis

court held that “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the

Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461. While the Court noted that this rule

(requiring a suspect to clearly request an attorney) applied to

situations where the suspect had waived Miranda rights, the

Court did not specifically address whether or not the rule’s

applicability was confined to that period. Thus, it was not

contrary to established law or unreasonable for the California

Court of Appeal to apply the Davis rule to Sessoms’s case. 

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In fact, the Supreme Court has recently confirmed that

Davis’s reasoning applies equally in the pre-waiver context.

Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; see also United States v. Plugh,

648 F.3d 118, 124-25 (2d. Cir. 2011) (applying Davis to the

pre-waiver context in light of Berghuis); United States v. Doe,

170 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Davis where

defendant asked about an attorney “before being read his

Miranda rights, before being interrogated and even before

biographical questioning”). The Berghuis Court, without qualification, held: “If an accused makes a statement concerning

the right to counsel ‘that is ambiguous or equivocal’ or makes

no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to

invoke his or her Miranda rights.” 130 S. Ct. at 2259-60

(quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62). The Court reiterated the

practical considerations underlying the rule:

There is good reason to require an accused who

wants to invoke his or her [Miranda rights] to do so

unambiguously. A requirement of an unambiguous

invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective

inquiry that avoid[s] difficulties of proof and . . .

provide[s] guidance to officers on how to proceed in

the face of ambiguity. If an ambiguous act, omission,

or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult

decisions about an accused’s unclear intent and face

the consequence of suppression if they guess wrong.

Suppression of a voluntary confession in these circumstances would place a significant burden on

society’s interest in prosecuting criminal activity.

Id. at 2260 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although Berghuis had not been decided at the time the state

court ruled on Sessoms’s claims, the holding confirms that it

was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to

apply Davis in this case.

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The majority relies upon excerpted sentences from

Miranda-related precedent to suggest there is a Supreme

Court rule that says: Any statement by a suspect that could be

interpreted as a request for a lawyer is an invocation of the

right to counsel. The majority then suggests that the rulings

in Davis and Berghuis carved out narrow exceptions to this

“rule.” But the Supreme Court has never held that an ambiguous statement or question regarding counsel is enough to stop

an interrogation. While Miranda established that a suspect

could stop the questioning by “indicat[ing] in any manner and

at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an

attorney before speaking,” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

444-45 (1966), the decision did not address what the police

were supposed to do when the suspect’s “indication” was

ambiguous. 

Similarly, Edwards v. Arizona, which held that a suspect

cannot be subjected to further questioning once he has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” says nothing about what constitutes a sufficient

expression of that desire. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). Rather,

Edwards said that authorities may not continue to interrogate

a suspect who “has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Id.

at 485 (emphasis added). This language suggests that an

unambiguous statement is required. See Davis, 512 U.S. at

460 (citing to this portion of Edwards to support point that

assertion must be clear and unambiguous). Edwards, of

course, does not provide much guidance on the issue of

ambiguity, because the suspect in that case plainly stated, “I

want an attorney before making a deal.” Id. at 479. 

When the Supreme Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin said that

an invocation of the right to counsel “requires, at a minimum,

some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an

expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police,” 501 U.S. 171,

178 (1991), it was explaining why requesting legal representation for a bail hearing would not preclude a subsequent

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police interrogation. McNeil did not set out the standard for

assessing a suspect’s ambiguous inquiry about counsel at the

start of a custodial interrogation, as the majority implies. 

The majority also suggests that its reliance on McNeil is

supported by Davis, stating:

When there has not been a knowing and voluntary

waiver, “[i]nvocation of the Miranda right to counsel

‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can

reasonably be construed to be an expression of a

desire for the assistance of an attorney,’ ” Davis, 512

U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.

171, 178 (1991)), but the assertion need not be “unambiguous or unequivocal,” id. at 462.

Maj. Op. at 9318. In addition to misconstruing McNeil, this

passage turns Davis on its head. Nowhere in Davis is there

any statement suggesting that “the assertion need not be

‘unambiguous or unequivocal.’ ” Indeed, this is made clear by

the very next line in Davis:

Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires,

at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably

be construed to be an expression of a desire for the

assistance of an attorney.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501

U.S., at 178. But if a suspect makes a reference to an

attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a

reasonable officer in light of the circumstances

would have understood only that the suspect might

be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do

not require the cessation of questioning. 

Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added). The problem with

the majority’s analysis becomes even more apparent looking

at the entire sentence from which it selectively lifts “unambiguous or unequivocal”: “If the suspect’s statement is not an

unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers

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have no obligation to stop questioning him.” Id. at 461-62.

This sentence in no way supports the majority’s statement that

“the assertion need not be ‘unambiguous or unequivocal.’ ”

The Supreme Court has never held, in Davis or in any case,

that an ambiguous or equivocal statement regarding an attorney is sufficient to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel.

The majority criticizes the state court for applying Davis in

this case because Sessoms had not been read his Miranda

rights before he referenced a lawyer. Cf. United States v. Doe,

170 F.3d at 1166 (holding that “a statement concerning an

attorney made before interrogation begins is far less likely to

be a request for attorney assistance during interrogation than

a similar statement made during custodial interrogation”). The

majority points to the emphasis in Davis and Berghuis on the

protection provided by the Miranda warnings, as grounds for

requiring a lower standard of clarity in the pre-Miranda context. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-61; Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260;

but see United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d at 1166. But here, after

Sessoms referenced a lawyer, the detective read Sessoms his

Miranda rights. Thus, Sessoms was Mirandized after he asked

about a lawyer, and, as such, was expressly advised of his

right to counsel. It was only after that advisement and Sessoms’s waiver that the police questioned him. 

The majority asserts that the waiver only occurred because

the seasoned detective, aware that Sessoms might want a lawyer, used the brief time before he read Sessoms his Miranda

rights to pressure him into waiving them. Sessoms, however,

does not claim he was improperly coaxed into waiving his

Miranda rights; instead, he claims that he invoked his right to

counsel. And because the policy considerations emphasized

by the Supreme Court in Davis and Berghuis apply equally

before and after the Miranda rights have been read, it was not

unreasonable for the state court to require an unambiguous

request for counsel in this case. 

Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court has never

held that a different standard applies prior to the reading of

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the Miranda rights. “ ‘[I]t is not an unreasonable application

of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline

to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court.’ ” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)). 

In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that the California Court of Appeal reached a decision that was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law in ruling that only an unambiguous invocation of the right

to counsel would have required the detectives to stop Sessoms’s interrogation. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120,

126 (2008) (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the

question presented, let alone one in [petitioner’s] favor, it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly

established Federal law.” (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)

(“Given the lack of holdings from this Court . . . it cannot be

said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.”) (alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666-67

(2004) (holding that court was nowhere close to the mark in

ruling that the state court had unreasonably applied established federal law by failing to consider a suspect’s age when

determining custodial status, where “[the Supreme Court’s]

opinions applying the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect’s age, much less mandated its consideration”); DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir.

2009) (“We . . . could not conclude that application of the

Davis rule to an invocation of the right to remain silent is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent where the Supreme Court has neither squarely

addressed when an ambiguous statement amounts to an invocation of the right to remain silent nor refused to extend the

Davis rule to an invocation of the right to remain silent.”

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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II

Having determined that it was not unreasonable to apply

Davis in this case, I also consider whether the state court was

objectively unreasonable in concluding that Sessoms’s statement was not an unambiguous request for counsel. Even if I

would have decided differently had I been on the California

Court of Appeal, the law is clear that “a federal habeas court

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied

[the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-

25 (2002). Our review is constrained, sometimes painfully so,

by AEDPA, which “preserves authority to issue the writ in

cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could

disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the

Supreme] Court’s precedents. It goes no farther.” Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 786. 

Davis provides: “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an

attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable

officer in light of the circumstances would have understood

only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,

our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.”

512 U.S. at 459. In this case, Sessoms first asked, “There

wouldn’t be any possible way that I could have a, a lawyer

present while we do this?” The California Court of Appeal

concluded that a reasonable police officer could have interpreted Sessoms’s first question as asking only whether he was

allowed to have a lawyer present, rather than actually requesting a lawyer. When reviewing a habeas petition from a state

court, this Court “must determine what arguments or theories

supported, or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible fairminded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the

Supreme Court].” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

The state court decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of Davis. Sessoms’s question, punctuated

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with hesitation, conditions, and phrased in the negative, is

subject to different interpretations and comparable to statements that this Court and other courts have found ambiguous.

Compare Davis, 512 U.S. at 455 (“Maybe I should talk to a

lawyer.”); United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“[B]ut, excuse me, if I am right, I can have a lawyer present through all this, right?”); Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003) (“I think I would like to talk

to a lawyer.”), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538

U.S. 63; United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d at 1166 (“What time

will I see a lawyer?”); Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63-65

(2d Cir. 1996) (“I think I want a lawyer.”); Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1218-21 (7th Cir. 1994) (“I can’t afford

a lawyer but is there any way I can get one?”); with Anderson

v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“I

plead the fifth.”); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479 (“I want an attorney before making this deal.”). 

Sessoms also followed up his question with this statement:

“That’s what my dad told me to ask you guys. . . uh, give me

a lawyer.” It is unclear from this statement if Sessoms is

merely expressing his father’s opinion or if he is agreeing

with his father and he himself wants an attorney. Either interpretation is plausible. A reasonable jurist could conclude that

telling a detective “My dad told me to ask for a lawyer” is different than saying “I want an attorney.” Because it cannot be

said that no reasonable jurist would find either of Sessoms’s

statements, viewed individually or together, to be ambiguous

and equivocal, relief is barred by AEDPA. 

The majority points to the detective’s reaction to Sessoms’s

question as evidence that the detective believed Sessoms

invoked his right to counsel. The officer stammered and, the

majority claims, proceeded to persuade Sessoms to waive his

right to counsel. The detective’s reaction, however, could easily have been that of an officer faced with a suspect who only

might have invoked his right to counsel and relayed his

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father’s advice at the start of an interrogation. The detective’s

answer supports this theory:

Uh, I want to back up to your question you asked

about an attorney. Um, first, before you ask questions, uh, I’m going to tell you why we’re here, just

lay it out and be up front. And then — then I’m

going to advise you of your rights. And then it’s up

— for you to decide if you want the attorney or not.

The majority believes the officers should have answered Sessoms’s question by simply saying “yes” and terminating the

interrogation. The majority claims that in the brief exchange

before Sessoms was read his Miranda rights, the detective

manipulated Sessoms into waiving his right to counsel. Again,

however, Sessoms is not claiming that he was pressured into

an involuntary waiver, but only that he asked for counsel,

which should have terminated the interrogation. “[T]he likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not

the test for applicability of Edwards.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at

178. Unless Sessoms clearly invoked his right to counsel, the

police officers were not required to take any particular course

of action in response to his statements or questions. See

Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. As such, the majority’s focus on the

detective’s reaction at that stage is misplaced.

I acknowledge that this reasoning results in a harsh outcome for a nineteen-year-old who turned himself in, expressly

told the officers that his father wanted him to have a lawyer,

and may have been trying to be respectful when asking for

counsel. However, when it set out the rule in Davis, the

Supreme Court understood and accepted that a strict rule

would disadvantage certain individuals who wanted counsel:

We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the

right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects

who — because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons — will not

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clearly articulate their right to counsel although they

actually want to have a lawyer present.

Davis, 512 at 460-61. The law is clear.

Could the police officers have assumed that Sessoms was

in fact asking for a lawyer? Yes. Was it objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to hold that a police

officer could have interpreted Sessoms’s statement as a possible request for a lawyer rather than an actual request for a

lawyer, which would not require the officer to stop the interrogation? I cannot say that it was. Because this Court is constrained by the deference mandated by AEDPA, even when

faced with a close case where it may have ruled differently

than the state court, I respectfully dissent. 

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