Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03657/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03657-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 8:1105(a) Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Detainee

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

XIAO FEI ZHENG, a.k.a. EDDY ZHENG,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, in his official

capacity as SECRETARY OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, ALBERTO GONZALES, in his

official capacity as ATTORNEY

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

NANCY ALCANTAR, in her official

capacity as FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,

San Francisco, California, U.S.

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT, and MARK CHANDLES, in

his capacity as CORRECTIONAL

CAPTAIN, Yuba county, California, 

Respondents. 

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No. C-05-3657 SC

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Xiao Fei Zheng, a.k.a. Eddy Zheng ("Petitioner"), has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus ("Petition") under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, challenging his detention under § 236(c) of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)

("Section 1226(c)"), which mandates the detention of certain

criminal aliens until the completion of removal proceedings. The

Attorney General has filed a return in opposition to the petition

("Ret."). Petitioner has filed a traverse in support of his
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The sentences on the other counts were stayed. Pet. at 4.

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petition.

The Court, having reviewed the parties' submissions on this

matter, DENIES the Petition. 

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United

States as a lawful permanent resident in November 1982 when he was

thirteen. Petitioner's Points and Authorities in Support of the

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3 ("Pet."). On November

10, 1986, in California state court, Petitioner pled guilty to

eighteen criminal charges, sustaining an aggravated felony

conviction. Id. at 4. He was sentenced to life with the

possibility of parole for kidnapping to commit robbery and eight

years for robbery of an inhabited dwelling.1 Id. Petitioner was

released on parole on March 4, 2005, after having served nineteen

years in California State custody. Id. 

The DHS, as mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), took Petitioner,

a criminal alien, into custody on March 10, 2005. Id. at 5. The

following day, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

of the DHS issued to Petitioner a Notice to Appear, charging him

with being deportable for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)

(A)(iii) because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. 

Id. 

At the immigration hearing, Petitioner moved for a change in

his custody status, requesting release on bond and contending that

retroactive application of Section 1226(c), which Congress enacted
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For the Northern District of California

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ten years after his conviction, was impermissible. Pet. at 5. 

The Immigration Court denied Petitioner's request, declaring that

Petitioner, having been convicted of an aggravated felony, fell

under the authority of Section 1226(c). Id. The Board of

Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Court's order without

opinion. Id. 

Petitioner's wife, Susan Smith ("Smith"), in July 2005, filed

with the DHS a Petition for an Alien Relative, seeking a visa on

her spouse's behalf. Id. At the hearing, the Immigration Judge

stated that it would take 18-20 months to adjudicate Smith's

petition. Id. The Immigration Court has put over Petitioner's

removal proceedings until it has ruled on Smith's petition. Id. 

Petitioner remains in custody with the DHS. Id. at 6. 

In 1986, when Petitioner was convicted, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)

(1986) - hereinafter "Section 1252(a)" - allowed the Attorney

General, in his discretion, to arrest and take into custody any

alien pending a determination of deportability. After taking

custody of such a person, the Attorney General could have, in his

discretion and pending determination of deportability, either

continued to retain the person in custody, released the person on

bond and under certain conditions, or released the person on

conditional parole. Id. Any release could be revoked at any

time. Id. 

In 1996, Congress amended this and other immigration

statutes, replacing Section 1252(a) with 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 

Currently, the Attorney General has discretion under Section

1226(a) whether to arrest an alien. In contrast, Section 1226(c),
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For the Northern District of California

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which applies to criminal aliens, removes this discretion. The

statute mandates that the Attorney General must take into custody

certain criminal aliens, such as Petitioner. Id. Section 1226(c)

does not allow the Attorney General to release these aliens on

bond or conditional parole. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two contentions. First, he contends that

the application of Section 1226(c) to his case is impermissibly

retroactive. Pet. at 5. Second, in the alternative, he contends

that mandatory detention for an unreasonable time violates his

right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. 

As stated above, after Petitioner's 2005 release from

California state prison, the DHS took Petitioner into custody 

pursuant to Section 1226(c), which mandates the detention of

individuals such as Petitioner. Petitioner now claims that it

would be impermissible to apply Section 1226(c) to his case, under

the presumption of retroactivity. 

The Court finds that it would be a waste of judicial time and

resources to grant the Petition and force Petitioner's custodians

to exercise their discretion under the law as it stood at the time

of Petitioner's convictions. If the Petition were granted,

Petitioner's custodians would find their discretion fettered by

Section 1226(c) which mandates they retain individuals such as

Petitioner. 

The Court is fully cognizant of the procedural steps one must

take in testing the applicability of retrospective application of

the instant statute. However, in the adjudication of the issues
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For the Northern District of California

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2

 Congress allowed the Attorney General to delay enforcement

of § 1226(c) for up to two years if he thought that "there is

insufficient detention space and Immigration and Naturalization

Service personnel available to carry out section 236(c)." Pub.L.

104-108, Div. C, Title III, § 303(b), September 30, 1996, 110 Stat.

3009-586, section 2. After this period of delay, "the provisions

of such section 236(c)...shall apply to individuals released after

such periods." Id. At the latest, the statute would apply to

aliens released during or after 1998. Because Petitioner was

released in 2005, the statute applies to him. 

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of this case, it appears that the reasonable and logical approach

would be to be to broadly construe the statute's applicability in

order to prevent a waste of judicial time and resources. 

Congress's language is bell-clear, broad, and unambiguous: the

statute applies to "any alien" released after the statute's

effective date.2

The Court will not consider Petitioner's due process

contentions, primarily because the length of his detention was

extended because his spouse filed a petition on his behalf. One

cannot justifiably oppose a detention whose extension was caused

by a delay of one's making. The solution is clear: if Smith

withdraws her petition, Petitioner's removal hearing will occur

earlier. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the

Petition. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2005

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE