Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02362/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02362-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KEITH R. STOKES, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-02362 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

MRS. DAIELL, )

) 

 Respondent. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On or about December 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition on April

30, 2009. See Docket No. 5. Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on

October 1, 2009. Respondents contend the action for habeas

relief may be denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to

file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Petitioner filed a two-page pleading on October 8, 2009, which

is titled as an amended petition but which provides an argument

in reply to the response to his petition. See Docket No. 13.

I Procedural History

In April of 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty of one

count of second-degree murder, two counts of attempted

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first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, the

result of events occurring in 1999. Petitioner was sentenced to

aggravated terms of, respectively, twenty years, fifteen years,

and twelve years imprisonment, on the first three counts.

Petitioner was sentenced to a presumptive term of seven and

one-half years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

aggravated assault. The state trial court ordered the sentences

be served consecutively. See Answer, Exh. A (Arizona v. Stokes,

No. 1 CA–CR 03–0397 (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004)). The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

in a decision issued on February 24, 2004. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed a timely state action seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on March 17, 2004. Id., Exh. C. The state trial

court dismissed the petition on March 1, 2005. Id., Exh. D.

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of that decision on

August 14, 2006. Id., Exh. E. On January 22, 2008, Petitioner

filed a “Supplemental to My Petition for Review” in the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id., Exh. F. 

On April 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition seeking

a writ of coram nobis. Id., Exh. G. The state trial court

treated this writ as a second petition for post-conviction

relief. In a decision issued June 3, 2008, the state trial

court found all the claims stated were precluded, and dismissed

the petition. Id., Exh. H. 

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In his amended habeas petition Petitioner contends he

is entitled to federal habeas relief because, he asserts,

perjured testimony was presented to the grand jury in violation

of his right to due process of law. Petitioner further contends

his conviction for murder violates his right to due process

because the victim’s death, ten months after he was shot by

Petitioner, was not the result of Petitioner’s actions.

Petitioner also maintains his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated because he was charged with attempted first degree

murder and convicted of second degree murder. Additionally,

Petitioner contends his sentence violates the separation of

powers doctrine because the trial court’s application of

Arizona’s sentencing statutes was “manifest injustice.”

Petitioner also alleges his trial counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on prisoners

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions.

See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002).

The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of

the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2009). See also Artuz v.

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Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

397 (2008). 

Petitioner’s conviction became “final” at the

conclusion of his direct appeal proceedings, at which time

Petitioner had a properly-filed petition for post-conviction

relief pending in the state trial court. The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied review of the decision dismissing Petitioner’s

first action for post-conviction relief on August 14, 2006.

Answer, Exh. E. Petitioner had thirty days to appeal that

decision to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

(2009). Therefore, the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s

federal habeas action began to run on September 15, 2006, and

expired on or about September 16, 2007. See Tillema v. Long,

253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Compare Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d

1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007); Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 855

(8th Cir. 2008).

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action until

April 30, 2009, approximately nineteen months after the statute

of limitations expired. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated

that the Court should still determine whether a section 2254

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations must establish two

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elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In response to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

filed an “Amended” section 2254 petition which is two pages.

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The second page states:

Petitioner was tried, convicted and

sentence[d] in violation of Arizona

legislative statues (sic) 13-110 (13-111) 13-

1150 CB) and 13-116. Prosecution created his

own interpretation of charges before trial

court, and persuaded courts to apply its

interpretation beyond legislative intent as

afermented (aforementioned?) statues (sic)

plainly state manifest injust has occured in

this cause (sic).

Docket No. 13.

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he has

not presented evidence of due diligence or a factor outside the

defense which resulted in his failure to timely file his habeas

action. Even if the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard for excusing procedural default of habeas claims were

applicable as a reason for tolling the statute of limitations,

Petitioner has not established that the failure to consider his

habeas claims on their merits would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Cf. Hayman v. Pennsylvania, 624 F.

Supp. 2d 378, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing case law on when

equitable tolling is warranted).

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Stokes’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 29th day of October, 2009.

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