Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00746/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10cv746-WQH (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND NEWSOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent. _____________________________________

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Case No. 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California.

On April 8, 2010, Petitioner Raymond Newsom, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus currently before the Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his 2006 drug

convictions. (Id. at 1-2.) On June 14, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that

the Petition is untimely and four of the claims are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No. 9-2.) On August 30,

2010, Petitioner filed a “Response to Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Based on His

Untimeliness and Procedural Default.” (Doc. No. 16.)

This Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s opposition to

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and all other documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED.

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1

The appellate opinion (Lodgment 4 at 3) indicates that Petitioner filed a supplemental brief but the actual brief has not

been lodged with this Court.

2

In determining the filing date of a petition, pro se prisoners generally are entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,”

which dictates that the statutory filing date is the date a document was presented to prison authorities for mailing to the court.

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the correct

date is unclear. Petitioner signed his Petition under penalty of perjury on November 7, 2008. (Lodgment 6 at 6.) However,

Petitioner’s proof of service states that he gave the Petition to prison officials on October 30, 2008. (Id. at 62.) The Petition cover

sheet contains two “Received” stamps-one indicating it was received on November 3, 2008 and one indicating it was received

on November 12, 2008. (Id. at 1.) It was filed on November 12, 2008. (Id.) Neither party explained the date discrepancy.

Because the submitted evidence is unclear, the Court will use October 30, 2008, the date Petitioner declares he gave the Petition

to prison authorities for mailing, as the filing date. 

2 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2006, a San Diego jury convicted Petitioner of selling, transporting, and

possessing for sale cocaine base in violation of California law. (Lodgment 1 at 112; Lodgment 4 at 1.)

Petitioner then admitted six prior drug convictions, a strike, and serving five prior prison terms. (Lodgment

1 at 85-87; Lodgment 4 at 1.) Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years in custody. (Lodgment 1 at 112;

Lodgment 4 at 2.)

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and his lawyer subsequently filed an appellate brief pursuant to

People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Lodgment 2.) The

appellate court gave Petitioner an opportunity to file a supplemental brief and he apparently did so.1

(Lodgments 3 & 4.) On August 24, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment 4.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 1 at 2; Doc. No. 9-2

at 7.) The appellate court issued a remittitur on October 26, 2007, confirming that the appellate decision

was final. (Lodgment 5.)

On October 30, 20082, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment 6.) On May 13, 2009, the Court denied the Petition. (Lodgment 7.) On August 5, 2009,

Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on January 13, 2010. (Lodgments 8 & 9.) Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on April 8,

2010. (Doc. No. 1.)

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

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3 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed because it is barred by the one-year

statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 8-12.) Alternatively, Respondent argues that the four claims

presented in the second habeas petition are procedurally barred. (Id. at 12-16.) Petitioner responds that the

petition is timely because the appellate court did not send him a copy of the decision denying his appeal so

he did not learn of the decision until October 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 16 at 2-3.) Petitioner asserts that he

immediately appealed the denial and then subsequently filed a state habeas petition raising additional issues.

(Id. at 3-5.) Accordingly, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to statutory and/or equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. (Id. at 7-15.) Petitioner also argues that his claims are not procedurally barred. (Id.)

A. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year statute

of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Section 2244(d)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in “custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” and runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Here, the parties agree that subsection A governs the start of the statutory limitations period but they

disagree as to the date “on which the judgment became final.” Respondent asserts that the judgment became

final on October 3, 2007. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 3.) In reaching this conclusion, Respondent explains that the

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appellate court issued its decision on August 24, 2007 and Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court. (Id.) Because Petitioner did not complete his direct review, Respondent states

that the statute of limitations commenced at the expiration of the forty days authorized by statute for filing

a petition for review. (Id.) Adding forty days to August 24, 2007, Respondent concludes that the limitations

period began on October 3, 2007. (Id.)

Petitioner asserts that his federal habeas petition is timely. (Doc. No. 16.) Petitioner explains that

after his lawyer filed the Wende brief in the Court of Appeals, Petitioner filed his own supplemental brief

arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. (Id. at 2.) Even though Petitioner

filed a supplemental brief and therefore was a party to the proceedings, he was not on the service list and

did not receive a copy of the appellate court’s ruling. (Id.) Petitioner waited patiently for approximately one

year and then filed two documents seeking a ruling on his supplemental argument. (Id. at 3.) On October

1, 2008, Petitioner received a copy of the Remittitur and the appellate ruling. (Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner claims

that he tried to appeal the order affirming his conviction but “inadvertently” used the Writ of Habeas Corpus

form, rather than the Petition for Review form. (Id. at 4.) As a result, Petitioner asserts that his first habeas

petition filed in the California Supreme Court actually was a direct appeal, not a collateral challenge. (Id.

at 4-5.) Petitioner explains that after the California Supreme Court denied his first pleading, he filed his

only collateral challenge less than three months later. (Id. at 8.) After the California Supreme Court denied

this pleading on January 13, 2010, Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on April 8, 2010. Accordingly,

Petitioner argues that his federal habeas petition is timely. Alternatively, Petitioner argues, in essence, that

he is entitled to equitable tolling.

1. Commencement of the AEDPA Statute of Limitations

Subsection A provides that the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run on the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). Here, the state appellate court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal

on August 24, 2007. (Lodgment 4.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court within the authorized time period so, on October 3, 2007, forty days after the order was issued, the

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3

The Court notes that Respondent repeatedly incorrectly cites to the California Rules of Court because he uses the code

numbers that were applicable prior to 2007, rather than the current ones. (See e.g., Doc. No. 9-2 at 3.)

4

Lodgment 6 is not numbered so the Court numbered the pages sequentially from 1 to 62 and uses those numbers in this

Report and Recommendation.

5 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

appellate court’s decision became final. Cal. R. Ct. 8.3663; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Petitioner claims that his first habeas petition, filed on October 30, 2008, actually was a direct

appeal. (Doc. No. 16 at 4.) While the title of Petitioner’s brief is “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,”

Petitioner describes his pleading in section 18 of the form as a “Petition for Review From Denial of the

Fourth Appellate Court” and in the proof of service as “Petitioner for Petition For Procedure Issuse [sic]

And, Petitioner for Review of Supplemental Brief To To [sic] The California State Supreme Court.” (Id.;

Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. F; Lodgment 6.) In the body of the brief, Petitioner explains that he did not receive

notice of the appellate court’s denial until October 1, 2008 and asks the court to accept his late filing.

(Lodgment 6 at 32-33.4) The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation.

Lodgment 7.

California law requires a prisoner to file a Petition for Review within forty days after the appellate

court denies the direct appeal. Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b) & 8.500(e). Petitioner did not do so. While Petitioner

asked the California Supreme Court in his first pleading to accept the late filing, the court denied the entire

document without comment. (Lodgment 7.) Because the court denied the late filing, the pleading did not

reset the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2010)

(filing an untimely notice of appeal does not delay the commencement of the AEDPA statute of limitations).

Thus, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on October 4, 2007 and expired one year later

on October 4, 2008. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA statute of

limitations begins to run the day after the conviction becomes final). Petitioner did not file any collateral

challenges to his conviction during that time period so Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 28

U.S.C. §2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (The statute of limitations is not

tolled “from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed.”). Thus, absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely.

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5

As discussed above, the form document filed by Petitioner is entitled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Doc. No.

16-1, Exh. F; Lodgment 6) but Petitioner argues that he intended it to be a direct appeal of the appellate court’s denial of the

arguments set forth in his supplemental brief (Doc. No. 16 at 4).

6

There is ample evidence establishing both elements. Petitioner repeatedly states that he did not receive a copy of the

order. (Doc. No. 16 at 2-3, 8, 10, 13-14.) In support of his position, Petitioner submits two documents that he filed inquiring

about the status of his appeal. (Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. B (Notice and Request for Ruling Cal. Rules of Ct. 4.551(a)(3) dated August

12, 2008) and Exh. C (Petitioner Request This Court For A Status Report In Regards To The Above Case Number dated

September 26, 2008).) Petitioner also submitted a mail log indicating that he did not receive any mail from his attorney or the

6 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

/ / /

2. Equitable Tolling

The United States Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is

subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). While

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is

appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates two specific elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way,” Holland, 130 S. Ct.

at 2562 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The bar is set high to effectuate the

“AEDPA’s statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal

system from being forced to hear stale claims.” Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because the appellate court never notified him that his appeal had been denied and, as soon as he learned

of the denial, he prepared and filed another challenge to his sentence.5

 (Doc. No. 16 at 4.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘a prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached

a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently

in the matter.’” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). In making this assessment, courts

should consider “(1) on what date [the prisoner] actually received notice, (2) whether [the prisoner] acted

diligently to obtain notice . . .; and (3) whether the alleged delay of notice caused the untimeliness of his

filing and made a timely filing impossible.” Id. at 998 (citations omitted). 

Here, Respondent does not dispute Petitioner’s claim that Petitioner did not receive notice that his

appeal had been denied until October 1, 2008 or that the delayed notice caused the untimely filing and made

a timely filing impossible.6

 (Doc. No. 9-2 at 11.) Rather, Respondent only challenges the second element--

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court of appeals after August 24, 2007 and before October 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. D.) Finally, while the copy of the

appellate court order affirming the judgment does not indicate upon whom the order was served (Lodgment 4), the Remittitur

executed on October 25, 2007 contains an Affidavit of Transmittal indicating that it was served on Petitioner’s attorney but not

Petitioner (Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. E; Lodgment 5 (Remittitur without Affidavit of Transmittal)). Respondent did not submit any

contradictory evidence or argument. Since Petitioner did not know that his direct appeal had been decided, he could not properly

file either a petition for review or a habeas petition. 

7 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

that Petitioner did not act diligently to obtain notice because he waited more than one year before writing

the Court of Appeal inquiring about the status of his case. (Id. at 11-12.) Respondent also notes that

Petitioner failed to contact his own attorney during the time period to inquire about the appellate ruling.

(Id. at 12.) While Petitioner does not dispute that he did not inquire about the status of his appeal until

August 12, 2008, Petitioner argues this delay was reasonable because his attorney had told him that the

appellate process was “very slow” and the whole process “will take about one year.” (Doc. No. 16 at 2, 10-

11; Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. A.)

As Petitioner explains through words and supporting documents, in April 2007, his attorney advised

him that the appellate process is a lengthy process and he should be patient. (Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. A (“The

entire appeal process will take about a year, so be patient. The process can be very slow.”).) Petitioner’s

attorney then filed a Wende brief, indicating that there were no arguable issues for appeal. (Lodgment 2.)

On June 7, 2007, the appellate court notified Petitioner of his opportunity to file a supplemental brief.

(Lodgment 3.) Shortly thereafter, Petitioner’s attorney sent a letter to Petitioner. (See Doc. No. 16-1, Exh.

D (6/27/2007 letter from Kessler & Seecof, LLP).) Although the letter was not provided to this Court, the

mail log indicates that this was the last letter sent to Petitioner from his attorney. After receiving an

extension from the court, Petitioner apparently filed his supplemental brief on July 30, 2007. (See

Lodgment 4 at 3; Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. B.) On August 24, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the judgment

(Lodgment 4) but did not notify Petitioner. 

On August 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice and Request for Ruling in the appellate court seeking

a ruling on his Supplemental Brief. (Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. B.) Petitioner did not receive a response so on

September 26, 2008, he filed a second request for status report. (Id., Exh. C.) On October 1, 2008, in

response to Petitioner’s pleadings, the appellate court sent Petitioner a copy of the Remittitur and opinion.

(Doc. No. 16 at 3-4; Doc. No. 16-1, Exh. D.) Petitioner filed his first pleading in the California Supreme

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Respondent argues that Petitioner’s failure to contact his lawyer negates diligence. While failure to contact counsel

may demonstrate a lack of diligence, the Court finds it does not do so in this case. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marshall, 2009 WL

1424260, *5-6 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2009)(no diligence where Petitioner had constructive statutory notice of denial and appellate

counsel had advised Petitioner of need to begin preparing habeas petition but counsel failed to notify Petitioner of denial and

Petitioner waited more than fifteen months to contact counsel or the court); Hunter v. Galaza, 2007 WL 2812176 (E.D. Cal. Sept.

26, 2007) (attorney’s negligent failure to advise prisoner of direct appeal status does not warrant equitable tolling of federal habeas

deadline). Here, Petitioner’s lawyer filed a Wende brief stating that there were no appellate issues. As a result, Petitioner became

his own appellate attorney and the court had an independent duty to directly notify Petitioner of the decision. See Cal. R. Ct.

8.264 & 8.366. As such, it was not unreasonable for Petitioner to not contact the lawyer who believed there were no appellate

8 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

Court on October 30, 2008. 

The Ninth Circuit has not defined what constitutes the requisite diligence in cases such as this one

where the prisoner does not receive notice of a final court order. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997 (remanding

for district court to determine whether prisoner acted diligently). Because the analysis is fact-specific,

courts have varied in their interpretation of what constitutes the requisite diligence. For example, the

Eleventh Circuit found an eighteen-month delay was sufficiently diligent because the clerk of court had

advised the prisoner that he would be notified as soon as the ruling was filed. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d

709 (11th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Second Circuit found a nine-month delay in requesting information

regarding a ruling was sufficiently diligent because “‘[f]rom a litigant’s perspective, it is a difficult, if not

impossible endeavor, to estimate how long a reviewing court will take to decide a particular motion.” Diaz

v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) quoting Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2002);

see also Stinson v. Cate, 2010 WL 836930, *8 (C.D. Cal. March 3, 2010) (prisoner entitled to equitable

tolling for five month delay in receiving notice of state court ruling); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F. Supp. 2d

1057, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same). On the other hand, several courts found that delays of sixteen to

twenty-one months did not establish diligence. Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278 (11th

Cir. 2002) (one letter sent after sixteen months not diligent); LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir.

2005) (insufficient diligence where prisoner waited 21 months to inquire about status of case); Popov v.

Martel, 2010 WL 2904642, *4 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (same). 

Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Petitioner’s lawyer advised Petitioner that the

appellate process would take about one year and that he should be patient. The attorney then filed a Wende

brief, indicating that he did not see any appellate issues, which required Petitioner to become his own

attorney and file his own appeal.7

 Petitioner did not receive any communication from his attorney or the

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issues to obtain advice about the appeal Petitioner was advancing, especially since the lawyer had told Petitioner to be patient

because the process takes one year. In this unusual circumstance, the Court finds the failure to contact counsel regarding the status

of the appeal did not negate the requisite diligence. The Court also notes that in this case there was no constructive notice of the

denial.

9 10cv746-WQH (BGS)

court of appeals after he filed his supplemental brief alleging an appellate issue. In accordance with his

lawyer’s letter, Petitioner waited approximately one year after filing his supplemental brief to file his first

request regarding the status of his case to the appellate court. Petitioner then filed his first pleading in the

state court within four weeks after receiving notice that his appeal had been denied. Given the unique facts

of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner acted with the required diligence. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d

918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (the grounds for equitable tolling are “highly fact dependent”). 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from October 3, 2007, the

date the appellate court’s decision became final, until October 1, 2008, the date Petitioner received notice

that the appellate court had denied his appeal. The AEDPA statute of limitations expired one year and one

day later on October 2, 2009. Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until April 8, 2010 so, again,

the federal petition is untimely unless Petition is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. 

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. There is a difference, however, between a “filed” petition and a “properly filed”

petition as required by AEDPA. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). As the Supreme Court explained,

An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and

accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. And an

application is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form

of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be

lodged, and the requisite filing fee.

Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a habeas petition that is denied by the California Supreme Court as untimely

or improperly successive is not “properly filed” for the purposes of section 2244(d)(2) and does not toll the

AEDPA limitations period. Wall v. Adkins, 2010 WL 3633001, *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010); Bonner v.

Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (a petition denied as untimely does not statutorily toll the time

limitation).

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This interpretation seems the most likely. If, on the other hand, the court construed Petitioner’s first filing as part of

the direct appeal, the denial could have been a denial on the merits or it could have been a denial of Petitioner’s request to file

a late petition for review. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, No. 09-587 (January 19, 2011) (a silent denial of a habeas

petition is presumed to be an adjudication on the merits). If it was a denial on the merits, the AEDPA statute of limitations would

have begun to run 90 days after the Court’s order dated May 13, 2009 (Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999)) and the

federal petition filed on April 8, 2010 would have been timely. However, there is no evidence to support this interpretation. If

the denial was to Petitioner’s request to file an untimely petition for review, the limitations would not be tolled or reset (Randle,

604 F.3d at 1055) and the federal petition would be untimely. Again, this interpretation is unlikely since the court did not mention

the request or untimeliness in the denial and the next pleading is denied for being untimely or successive. (Lodgments 7 & 9.)

9

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the second petition since it was denied as untimely or for being a

successive petition. See Wall, 2010 WL 3633001, *5. While there is an argument that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

since the court failed to notify him regarding the appellate denial, there is evidence that he attempted to appeal the appellate

decision, and the California Supreme Court did not clearly address the late-filing request, the Court need not resolve this issue

since the federal petition is timely without the additional tolling.

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Here, Petitioner argues that his first filing was not a habeas petition; it was part of the direct appeal.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the first filing was a habeas petition and the second filing was

an improper successive habeas petition. As discussed elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation, the

California Supreme Court did not specifically address Petitioner’s request for permission to file a late direct

appeal when it denied his first pleading. (Lodgment 7.) The California Supreme Court also did not clearly

state that the second filing was an improper successive habeas filing. (Lodgment 9.) Rather, the court

denied the first pleading without comment and the second pleading with a single citation to In Re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750. (Lodgments 7 & 9.) As a result, it is unclear how the court interpreted the pleadings

and whether or not they were timely filed. 

Assuming that the California Supreme Court construed the first filing as a habeas petition8, Petitioner

is entitled to statutory tolling from the date of filing (October 30, 2008) to the date of denial (May 13, 2009).

Under this scenario, 29 days of the limitations period expired before Petitioner filed his first pleading, so

Petitioner had 336 days left in the limitations period after the court denied his pleading. Petitioner filed his

federal habeas petition on April 10, 2010, 330 days later. Accordingly, even if Petitioner did not receive

statutory or equitable tolling for the second filing9, his federal habeas petition was timely. 

The Court therefore finds that the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on October 4, 2007,

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from October 3, 2007 to October 1, 2008, and Petitioner is entitled

to statutory tolling from October 30, 2008 to May 13, 2009. Thus, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition filed

on April 8, 2010 is timely and the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss on this

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basis be DENIED.

B. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that the claims asserted in Petitioner’s second state habeas petition should be

dismissed because they are procedurally barred. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 12-16.) Respondent states that the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s second habeas petition on the grounds that it was a successive

petition and concludes, therefore, that the four claims raised in the second state habeas petition are

procedurally barred. (Id.)

“The procedural default doctrine ‘bar[s] federal habeas [review] when a state court declines to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner has failed to meet a state procedural requirement.’”

Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The doctrine “‘is a specific application of the general adequate and

independent state grounds doctrine.’” Bean, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008

(9th Cir. 1994)). Under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, federal courts “‘will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Bean, 96 F.3d

at 1129 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729); see also Hill v. Roe, 298 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 2002);

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative defense, Respondent

must first have “adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground. .

. .” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Once the defense is placed at issue, the burden

shifts to petitioner, who must then “assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of

the state procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving procedural default, however, belongs to

the state. Id. If the state meets this burden, federal review of the claim is foreclosed unless the petitioner

can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,

or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “‘[f]or a state procedural rule to be “independent,” the state law

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10The Court notes that neither party provided the Supreme Court’s actual orders. Rather, the Court is relying on the

dockets provided by Respondent in the lodgments. 

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grounds for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law.’” Bennett, 322 F3d at 581 (quoting

LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704 citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). “‘A state law ground

is so interwoven if “the state has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on

federal law [such as] the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.”’” Id.

(quoting Park, 202 F.3d at 1152 and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)).

For a state procedural rule to be adequate, “the state law ground for decision must be

well-established and consistently applied.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583 (citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d

573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999)); Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, the state

procedural rule must be “clear . . . and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s purported default.”

Bean, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Wells, 28 F.3d at 1010); see also Fields, 125 F.3d at 760, 762 (quoting Ford

v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) (stating that the state procedural rule must be firmly established, regularly

followed, and consistently applied to be adequate)). 

 In this case, Petitioner arguably filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgments 6 & 8.) Petitioner did not file any habeas corpus petitions in the lower courts.

In the first petition, Petitioner raised the same challenges he raised in his supplemental filing in the appellate

court: sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Lodgment 6.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation. (Lodgment

7; Doc. No. 9-2 at 7.10) In the second habeas petition, Petitioner raised the following claims: denial of his

Confrontation Rights, denial of his right to a fair trial, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel. (Lodgment 8.) The California Supreme Court denied the second petition without comment but

with the following citation: “(See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750.).” (Lodgment 9.) 

Respondent asserts that the In re Clark citation establishes that the court denied the second petition

because it was a successive petition. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 9.) However, that conclusion is not necessarily

correct. Courts cite In re Clark for several propositions, including those prohibiting untimely or successive

petitions. Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1206 (In re Clark dictates that a “habeas petition is untimely if it is filed

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after an unjustified, substantial delay.”); Scott v. Garcia, 2010 WL 917430, *9 (C.D. Cal. March 6, 2010)

(“In re Clark sets forth the California rule barring successive presentation of previously denied claims and

untimely petitions.”); Ratliff v. Hedgepeth, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (a citation to In

re Clark may indicate that a petition is untimely or that it is successive or that issues resolved on appeal will

not be reconsidered on habeas corpus or that issues that could have been raised on direct appeal cannot be

raised in a habeas petition). 

Here, the California Supreme Court does not state which procedural rule or rules it is relying on to

deny Petitioner’s petition and there are no clues to guide this Court in its review. (Lodgment 9.) For

example, the court’s denial citation does not include a pinpoint cite to the specific page or language it is

relying upon. See Ratliff, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (Respondent has not satisfied burden of proving petition

was denied for untimeliness where California Supreme Court cited to In re Clark without any page cite or

specific language); Fernandez v. Gonzalez, 2009 WL 6543660, *15 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (failure to

provide “jump cite” for In re Clark, a 49 page opinion that stands for a number of propositions, makes the

citation ambiguous and prevents it from precluding federal collateral review). In addition, there is no lower

court opinion so the Court cannot “look through” the silent denial to the lower court opinion for guidance

on the court’s reasoning. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Thomas v. Uribe, 2010 WL

3583365, *3 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (court looked through California Supreme Court’s silent denial

to procedural default reasoning expressed by lower court). Finally, Petitioner’s petition is subject to attack

under both doctrines since it was filed more than eighteen months after the direct appeal was final and after

a previous habeas filing. And, in fact, Respondent argues that the petition is both successive and untimely.

(Doc. No. 9-2 at 12-16 (lengthy argument that petition is successive and additional statement on page 16

that “the Clark citation also means the petition is untimely”).) Because the order is ambiguous, it cannot

preclude federal collateral review unless Respondent pleads and proves that both the timeliness and

successive bars are adequate and independent. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (procedural default

can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests

on a state procedural bar”); Fernandez, 2009 WL 6543660, *15 (ambiguity in denial order prevents order

from precluding federal collateral attack); Williams v. Walker, 2009 WL 4040091, *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18,

2009) (citing Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2000)) (ambiguous order requires

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11The Court acknowledges that the timeliness bar has been independent of federal law since 1998. Townsend, 562 F.3d

at 1206-07. With regards to the first two steps of the adequacy review, the Court finds that Respondent did not plead adequacy.

Nonetheless, Petitioner stated that the timeliness bar has not been consistently applied. (Doc. No. 16 at 6, 11.) Because the Ninth

Circuit previously has held the timeliness bar to be inadequate, this challenge satisfies Petitioner’s burden. King, 464 F.3d at 967;

Ross, 669 F. Supp. 2d. at 1141. Under Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86, the burden returns to Respondent. Respondent did not file

a reply brief or any other evidence purporting to establish adequacy. As such, Respondent has not satisfied its burden.

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Respondent to plead and prove independency and adequacy of all suggested bars). 

Respondent has not satisfied his burden. Because he has not yet answered, Respondent has not plead

the independency and adequacy of either doctrine in his answer. In his motion to dismiss, Respondent

asserts that “there is a procedural default of the claims raised in the second state habeas petition” and

provides basic procedural default law. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 12, 12-15.) Respondent then states that the “petition

was denied as successive” and explains the In re Clark decision. (Id. at 15.) Without citing any federal law,

Respondent states that the successive bar is independent of federal law. (Id. at 16.) This statement is

followed by the only reference to the In re Clark untimeliness bar: “Cf. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582-83

(untimeliness rule independent of federal law).” (Doc. No. 9-2 at 16.) Respondent does not address the

adequacy of either doctrine.

Even if Respondent had plead independence and adequacy of the Clark untimeliness bar, it would

have been to no avail because courts repeatedly have held that the Clark untimeliness bar is inadequate.

Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1208 (“Because the [Respondent] offers no evidence that California operated under

clear standards for determining what constituted ‘substantial delay’ in [2007], [he] failed to meet [his]

burden of proving that California’s timeliness bar was sufficiently clear and certain to be an adequate state

bar.”); King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 965-68 (9th Cir. 2006); Ross v. Felker, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1135,

(C.D. Cal. 2009); Dean v. Grounds, 2010 WL 4687815 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2010); Martin v. Walker, 357

Fed.Appx. 793 (9th Cir. 2009). Respondent made no effort to prove that the timeliness bar was “sufficiently

clear and certain” and the case law reflects a consistent determination that such proof is unavailable at this

time. Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent has not carried his burden of proving the adequacy of

the timeliness bar.11

 With regard to Respondent’s assertion of the successive bar, Petitioner argues that the In re Clark

cite is ambiguous and that neither the timeliness nor successiveness procedural bars are independent and

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adequate. (Doc. No. 16 at 6-7, 11-15.) However, Petitioner did not provide any evidence supporting his

assertion. Respondent did not file a reply or any additional evidence or legal authority establishing that the

successive bar is legally adequate.

As with the Clark untimeliness bar, the Court acknowledges that the Clark successive petition default

bar has been independent of federal law since 1998. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582-83. However, the Ninth

Circuit has not explicitly addressed the adequacy of the bar and district courts have differed on that

conclusion. In this case, it is unclear whether either party has satisfied his shifting burden as described in

Bennett. First, while Respondent asserted the procedural bar, he did not address whether the procedural bar

for successive petitions was “clear and well-established” and “consistently applied” in 2008 when the

alleged default occurred. Assuming Respondent did satisfy his initial burden, Petitioner fails to assert

“specific factual allegations” demonstrating the inconsistent application of the rule. However, since there

are courts who have found the successive bar prohibition to be inadequate, Petitioner’s stated challenge may

be sufficient. See King 464 F.3d at 967 (simply contesting the adequacy of a bar is sufficient where the

Ninth Circuit previously has found the procedural rule to be too ambiguous to bar federal review); Ross,

669 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (same). Assuming Petitioner did satisfy his burden, Respondent has not made any

effort to prove the adequacy of the bar. The Court need not resolve these issues in this case since, as

discussed above, the California Supreme Court’s ruling was ambiguous and Respondent has not proved the

adequacy of the Clark timeliness bar.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss based on a

procedural bar be DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 15, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties within 10 days of being served with objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: January 31, 2011

 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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