Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01119/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

The September 6, 2005 Order denied the other claims presented

in the petition: due process and equal protection claims arising

from the admission of prior bad acts. Those rulings are

reaffirmed.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS ALLEN DARBY,

Petitioner,

v.

ANA M. RAMIREZ-PALMER, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 02-1119 CW

ORDER VACATING

PREVIOUS JUDGMENT

AND PREVIOUS

ORDER GRANTING

PETITION, AND

DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

On September 6, 2005, this Court issued an Order Granting

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (September 6, 2005 Order)

based upon the Ninth Circuit decision Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d

1010, 1011 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of petition for reh'g, 408

F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.), petition for reh'g en banc denied, 2005 WL

1906932 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2005), which applied Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) retroactively to Petitioner's

Confrontation Clause claim.1 Because the petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court in Bockting was

pending, this Court stayed Respondent's implementation of the

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2

On March 26, 2007, the same day the Court issued its Order

Providing Notice of Intent to Vacate Judgment, Petitioner filed a

Notice of Appeal. However, on March 26, 2007, Petitioner could not

appeal because the only judgment that had been entered at that time

was in his favor granting his petition.

2

September 6, 2005 Order. See September 6, 2005 Order at 28-29. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bockting and on February

28, 2007, it issued its decision, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct.

1173 (2007), in which it held that Crawford is not to be applied

retroactively, id. at 1184. 

On March 26, 2007, the Court issued an Order Providing Notice

of Intent to Vacate Judgment Regarding Confrontation Clause Claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) noting that a court may

sua sponte relieve a party from a final judgment or order, after

notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court gave notice to

the parties that it would vacate the judgment entered in favor of

Petitioner in order to re-analyze Petitioner's Confrontation Clause

claim under Whorton v. Bockting. The Court provided Petitioner one

week to file an objection to vacating the judgment. More than one

week has passed since the Court filed the March 26 Order and

Petitioner has not filed an objection.2 Therefore, under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court vacates the previous order

and judgment granting the petition, re-analyzes Petitioner's

Confrontation Clause claim without application of Crawford and

DENIES the petition and sets aside the previous judgment.

The background, statement of facts, standard of review, and

the ruling on the due process and equal protection claims in the

September 6, 2005 Order will not be repeated here.

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5 The original footnote numbering is maintained.

3

DISCUSSION

In the September 6, 2005 Order, the Court addressed

Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim based on the admission of

tapes of Ashley's audio- and video-taped interviews with Officer

Kevin Stonebarger and Karen Lofts-Jarboe. Because this claim was

denied by the state courts on the merits, the Court considers

whether the state courts' rejection of the claim was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of settled federal law prior to

Crawford. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I. Background of Confrontation Clause Claim

At trial, the court overruled Petitioner's objection to the

admission of these audio- and video-taped interviews of Ashley. On

appeal, Petitioner claimed that admission of the taped interviews

deprived him of the opportunity properly to cross-examine Ashley,

in violation of the Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth

Amendment. The state court found no merit to this claim.

The state court summarized its factual findings and legal

conclusions regarding Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim and

opportunity for cross-examination as follows:5

Defendant contends that under the circumstances of this case

admission of the taped evidence pursuant to section 1360

denied him of his rights under the Confrontation Clause and

the Fourteenth Amendment. The Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment),

provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses

against him . . . ." Defendant contends admission of Ashley's

taped out-of-court statements violated his constitutional

right to confront and cross-examine her. Our upholding

admission of the taped statements under exceptions to the

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hearsay rule is not dispositive of this issue, because the

Confrontation Clause excludes some hearsay evidence which is

otherwise admissible. (Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805,

814 [holding hearsay statements of child victim to

pediatrician improperly admitted].)

The Confrontation Clause is concerned with ensuring

reliability of evidence against a criminal defendant by

"'subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an

adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.'" (Lilly v.

Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. , [144 L.Ed.2d 117, 126, 119

S.Ct. 1887], quoting Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836,

845.) Having that purpose in mind, the United States Supreme

Court has held that generally before it can be determined that

incriminating statements which are admissible under an

exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of

the Confrontation Clause, two criteria must be met: First, the

prosecution must produce the declarant or show she is

unavailable; and second, if the declarant is unavailable, her

statement is admissible only if it bears "adequate 'indicia of

reliability.'" (Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at pp.814-

815, quoting Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66.) 

Reliability will be inferred if the evidence falls within a

"'firmly rooted hearsay exception.'" (Idaho v. Wright, supra, at p.815, citation omitted.) If it does not, it must be

excluded "'absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 

trustworthiness.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)

As we have seen in the case at bench the unavailability

requirement was met. Like the "residual" hearsay exception

examined in Idaho v. Wright, supra, the hearsay exception

established in section 1360 in 1995 is not one which is

"firmly rooted," so the question is whether the record

supports a finding that the requirement of "particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness" was met.

The court in Idaho v. Wright noted that out-of-court

statements made by children regarding sexual abuse "arise in a

wide variety of circumstances," and the Constitution does not

impose "a fixed set of procedural prerequisites" for admission

of hearsay statements by child victims of sexual abuse. (Idaho

v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p.818.) Rather, in testing for

the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," courts

must look to the totality of circumstances which "surround the

making of the statement and that render the declarant

particularly worthy of belief." (Id. at p.819.)

The court pointed out that in general, exceptions to the

hearsay rule may arise where the circumstances indicate that

cross-examination is unnecessary. "In other words, if the

declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding

circumstances [for example in the case of an 'excited

utterance'] that the test of cross-examination would be of

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13 The court gave this example: "Corroboration of a child's 

allegations of sexual abuse by medical evidence of abuse, 

for example, sheds no light on the reliability of the 

child's allegations regarding the identity of the abuser. 

There is a very real danger that a jury will rely on 

partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the 

trustworthiness of the entire statement." (Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 824.)

5

marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission

of the statement at trial." (Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S.

at p.820.) The court applied the same rationale to the

"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required for

admission under the Confrontation Clause. The proffered

evidence must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its

"inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence

at trial." (Id., at p.822) For that reason corroborating

evidence cannot properly be used to support a hearsay

statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."

(Id., at p.823.13) Factors which may properly be considered by

the trial court include "whether the child had a motive to

'make up a story of this nature,' and whether, given [her]

age, the statements [were] of the type 'that one would expect

a child to fabricate.' [Citation.]" (Id., at p.826.) Also,

where as here, there is no evidence of prior interrogation,

prompting or manipulation by adults, the spontaneity of the

statement may be viewed as one indicator of trustworthiness.

(Id., at pp.826-827; In re Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at

p.30; People v. Brodit, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp.1329-

1330.)

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the state's

compelling interest in "'the protection of minor victims of

sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment'. . . ."

(Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 852, citations

omitted.) To that end, the court upheld a state procedure in

which the child was permitted to testify via closed circuit

television without having to appear directly in the

defendant's presence. The court found that although the

procedure eliminated some of the subtle effects of the faceto-face element of confrontation, other elements of

confrontation were preserved - oath, cross-examination and

observation of the witness's demeanor. (Id., at p.851.)

Here, although the procedure pursuant to section 1360

eliminated oath and cross-examination, the element of

observation was preserved on videotape and the "particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness," required by the statute and

discussed above, were present. Ashley's statements were

spontaneous and consistent in their repetition. Her mental

state did not cast doubt on her reliability. She described

incidents unexpected of a child her age, and no motive for

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fabrication appeared. (§ 1360, subd. (a)(2); In re Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp.29-30; People v. Brodit, supra, 61

Cal.App.4th at p.1330.) Too, there was corroborative

evidence, not of the immaterial type disallowed by the Idaho

v. Wright court, but evidence corroborating Ashley's story

that defendant molested her. In a letter to ADreanen Darby,

defendant acknowledged he needed help and was praying to be

sent to an institution. The prior incidents with the three

girls and defendant's collection of child pornography also

qualified as "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."

We conclude that on the facts of this case, the provision of

section 1360 did not deprive defendant of his constitutional

rights under the Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth

Amendment.

People v. Darby, A082278, 20-22 (Dec. 16, 1999).

II. Applicable Federal Law

Under the Sixth Amendment, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This confrontation

right applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). A defendant's right to

cross-examine the witnesses brought against him is a fundamental

right under the Confrontation Clause. Id. Before Crawford,

Supreme Court authority held that this right may be satisfied

without face-to-face confrontation at trial where denial of the

confrontation right is "necessary to further an important public

policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise

assured." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).

Before Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the rights of the

accused under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause may

prohibit the introduction of evidence that otherwise would be

admissible under a hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.

805, 813, 814 (1990). Before Crawford, such out-of-court hearsay

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statements could be admitted without violating the Confrontation

Clause when they met the two-pronged test of unavailability and

reliability. Id. at 814-815 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,

65, 66 (1980)). A witness's unavailability would be assumed where

the trial court found the witness unavailable and defense counsel

did not object. Id. at 815-16.

Pre-Crawford, an out-of-court statement was admissible only if

it bore adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. at 814-15. PreCrawford, the Confrontation Clause required the exclusion of all

out-of-court statements, unless the circumstances provided an

affirmative showing of the statement's reliability. Id. at 821. 

Pre-Crawford, reliability could be inferred where the evidence fell

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 814-15; see,

e.g., People of the Territory of Guam v. Cepeda, 69 F.3d 369, 373

(9th Cir. 1995). If the evidence did not fall within a firmly

rooted hearsay exception, it could be admitted if it was supported

by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 

Wright, 497 U.S. at 816. 

Before Crawford, trustworthiness was shown from "the totality

of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement and

render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." Id. at 820.

Prior to Crawford, corroborating evidence could not be used to

demonstrate the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement. Id. at

822. "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay

evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of

reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by

reference to other evidence at trial." Id.

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Prior to Crawford, in order to obtain habeas relief on the

basis of an evidentiary error, a petitioner had to show that the

error was one of constitutional dimension and that it was not

harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). The

Petitioner had to demonstrate that the error had "'a substantial

and injurious effect' on the verdict.'" Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d

758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). If

a court determined that the cumulative effect of various trial

errors, including admission of evidence, “so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process,” the substantial and injurious effect standard was

necessarily satisfied and the conviction would have to be reversed. 

Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

III. Analysis of Claim Based on Admission of Taped Statements

Petitioner's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation was violated when he was denied the opportunity to

cross-examine Ashley, whose out-of-court testimony was admitted

through taped statements, is unavailing under pre-Crawford federal

law.

The primary federal law utilized in the state court's

evaluation of Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim was Idaho v.

Wright. In Wright, the Court found that the admission of hearsay

statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse to an examining

pediatrician was improper. Id. at 808. The Court followed the

"general approach" to admitting hearsay statements in accordance

with the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause: First,

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demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant; second, if the

declarant is unavailable, demonstrating the statement "bears

adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" Id. at 814-15 (quoting Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)). The state court's reliance on

Idaho v. Wright was correct because that was the leading Supreme

Court case addressing Confrontation Clause claims prior to

Crawford. The Court now considers whether the state court's

rejection of Petitioner's claim was an unreasonable application of

Idaho v. Wright.

In Wright, the Court was not called upon to determine whether

the child victim was "unavailable," because both parties agreed the

child was unavailable and the reviewing court did not take issue

with this conclusion. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816. Similarly,

Ashley's unavailability was never challenged, so this Court may

assume she was unavailable. (See Darby, A082278 at 20.)

In determining whether the child's statement to her physician

was reliable, the Wright Court first ruled that the residual

hearsay exception in question was not a "firmly rooted hearsay

exception," so that the statements were presumptively unreliable

and inadmissible. Wright at 818 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.

530, 543 (1986)). The Court then looked for indicators of

trustworthiness to overcome the presumption against admission. Id.

In the course of this analysis, the Court declined to establish

prerequisites for the admission of out-of-court statements made by

children about sexual abuse. Id. Instead, it looked to "the

relevant circumstances includ[ing] only those that surround the

making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly

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14The state court identifies Petitioner's wife as ADreanan

Darby and the clerk's transcript identifies her as Adrianna Darby.

See CT at 223. The Court uses the spelling in the clerk's

transcript.

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worthy of belief." Id. at 819. Persuasive indicators included

spontaneity, consistent repetition, the mental state of the

declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age,

and lack of motive to fabricate. Id. at 821-22 (internal citations

omitted).

In the present case, the taped evidence at issue was admitted

under California Evidence Code § 1360 ("Statement describing child

abuse or neglect made by child under age of 12"). The state court

correctly followed the analytic procedure established in Wright. 

Because the court concluded that § 1360 was not a firmly rooted

hearsay exception, it analyzed the taped testimony for particular

guarantees of trustworthiness. It found that such guarantees of

trustworthiness were present in that Ashley's statements were

spontaneous and consistent in their repetition, her mental state

did not cast doubt on her reliability, she described incidents

unexpected for a child of her age, she had no motive for

fabrication and there was a lack of evidence of prior interrogation

or manipulation by adults. These factors were adequate to support

the reasonableness of the court's ruling.

The state court also supported its finding of trustworthiness

with the letter written by Petitioner to his then-spouse, Adrianna

Darby14, in which he "acknowledged he needed help and was praying to

be sent to an institution," as well as prior uncharged incidents,

and Petitioner's collection of child pornography. (Id. at 22.) 

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This type of corroborating evidence does not support a finding of

trustworthiness under Wright. However, the state court had no need

to use this corroborating evidence to support its conclusion that

Ashley's statements were reliable. The state court did not err in

mentioning the additional corroborating evidence because it had

sufficient proper indicators of reliability and trustworthiness to

support its conclusion.

Accordingly, the state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim

was not contrary to clearly established pre-Crawford Supreme Court

precedent and was not an unreasonable application of pre-Crawford

federal law as explicated by the Supreme Court. This claim for

habeas corpus relief is DENIED.

IV. Analysis of Unexhausted Claim Based on Admission of ThirdParty Hearsay Testimony

Petitioner also alleged a Confrontation Clause claim arising

from the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony

of a third party. This claim was not exhausted in state court and

was not addressed in the September 6, 2005 Order.

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where

there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a

case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether

the state court's decision was objectively reasonable. Plascencia

v. Alameda, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006); Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288

F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). When confronted with such a

decision, a federal court should conduct “an independent review of

the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an

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15Respondent assumes that Petitioner referred to the testimony

of Nancy Y and Karen Lofts-Jarboe, the psychologist who interviewed

Ashley. However, Ms. Lofts-Jarboe's interview with Ashley was

videotaped and the tape was played for the jury. See RT at 751,

12

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Plascencia, 467 at 1198; Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d

at 982. The federal court need not otherwise defer to the state

court decision under AEDPA: "A state court's decision on the

merits concerning a question of law is, and should be, afforded

respect. If there is no such decision on the merits, however,

there is nothing to which to defer." Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089. 

Even if there is no state court decision, a habeas court must

"still focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding whether

the state court's resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." 

Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court may deny a petition on the merits even if it is

unexhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because there is no reasoned

state court decision to which to defer, the Court reviews the

record to determine if the state court decision was reasonable. 

The Court concludes that the Confrontation Clause claim based on

third party testimony should be denied on the merits, even though

it is unexhausted. 

Petitioner claimed that his right to confrontation under the

Sixth Amendment was violated by the "admission of the child

victim's out of court statements through third persons." (Petition

at 5.) The third parties are never identified specifically in the

petition.15 

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767. Therefore, the claim regarding Lofts-Jarboe was analyzed

above in Section II, on the admission of audio and video-taped

statements.

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Respondent argues that because Petitioner's claim of error in

the admission of these out-of-court statements arises under state

law, specifically the state evidence code, it is unreviewable by a

federal habeas court. 

Respondent is correct that it is not the province of this

Court to review state court determinations of state law questions. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). A person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court can obtain a federal writ

of habeas corpus only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). State law violations, such as

violations of the California Evidence Code, do not generally

provide grounds for habeas relief. Estelle at 67-68. However, a

state court's evidentiary ruling becomes subject to federal habeas

review when the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing

upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by

depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed

by due process. See id. at 68 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). Petitioner

claims that the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence under state

law violated his federal constitutional right to confrontation. 

Therefore, the Court applies the pre-Crawford Idaho v. Wright

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Confrontation Clause analysis to the trial court's admission of

Nancy Y.'s hearsay statements.

As discussed above, prior to Crawford, out-of-court hearsay

statements could be admitted if the witness was unavailable and the

statement was reliable. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814-15. A statement

was reliable when it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception

or contained sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 816.

Again, because the trial court determined the witness was

unavailable, the defense did not object and the reviewing court

raised no concerns, this Court may assume without deciding that

Ashley was an unavailable witness. See id. at 815-816. 

The California court of appeal found the hearsay statements

made by Ashley's grandmother were properly admitted as spontaneous

statements. (Darby, A082278 at 10.) The "spontaneous declaration"

exception is a firmly rooted exception for the purpose of preCrawford Confrontation Clause analysis. White v. Illinois, 502

U.S. 346, 356 n.8 (1992) (finding the exception for "spontaneous

declarations" to be a firmly rooted hearsay exception because it is

at least two centuries old). Therefore, the statements were

sufficiently reliable under Idaho v. Wright.

The state court's admission of these hearsay statements did

not deprive Petitioner of his federal constitutional rights under

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This claim for

habeas corpus relief is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the September 6, 2005 Order and the

September 6, 2005 Judgment are vacated, the petition for writ of

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habeas corpus is DENIED, and a new judgment in favor of Respondent

will be entered. Both parties shall bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/8/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARBY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RAMIREZ-PALMER,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV02-01119 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on May 8, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Christina Vom Saal

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Thomas A. Darby K-74687

9438 Rio Vista Rd.

Forestville, CA 95436

Dated: May 8, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:02-cv-01119-CW Document 43 Filed 05/08/07 Page 16 of 16