Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03491/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03491-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KIMONI THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

MACCOMBER,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-03491-WHO (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Dkt. No. 10

INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Kimoni Thomas seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions. 

But he filed his petition more than two and a half years too late. He is not entitled to 

tolling or an equitable exception. Because his petition was untimely, respondent’s motion 

to dismiss (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement, Thomas pleaded no contest in Contra Costa 

Superior Court to assault with a firearm, attempted second degree robbery, and various 

enhancements. (Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 2.) On October 21, 2011, he was sentenced 

to sixteen years in state prison. (Id.) He did not appeal. (Id.) His conviction became final 

sixty days later, on December 20, 2011. See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a). 

In 2013 and 2014, Thomas filed petitions in state court for collateral relief, all of 

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which were denied. He then filed this federal habeas petition on July 8, 2015.1 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which 

applies to every federal habeas petition filed on or after April 24, 1996, contains a statute 

of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Federal habeas petitions must be filed 

within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the 

conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment 

to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action 

prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could not

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See id. § 2244(d)(1). 

“[W]hen a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme 

Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day 

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

II. Timeliness of the Petition 

 Because Thomas’s conviction became final on December 20, 2011, he then had one 

year, until December 21, 2012, to file a timely federal habeas petition.2

 Thomas’s petition 

was not filed until July 8, 2015, more than two and a half years after the deadline. Unless 

 

1 Thomas is entitled to this filing date, rather than the July 29, 2015 date listed in the 

docket. The Court assumes that he put the petition in the prison mail the day he signed it 

(July 8, 2015) and will use that as the filing date under the prisoner mailbox rule. See

generally Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

2 Thomas is not entitled to the additional 90 days granted by Bowen. Bowen extends the 

federal filing deadline to allow time for a defendant to file a petition in the United States 

Supreme Court after the state supreme court has denied his petition for direct review. 

Because Thomas never sought direct review in the California Supreme Court, there was no 

state supreme court decision he could ask the United States Supreme Court to review. 

Bowen is therefore inapplicable. This is of no moment in this case as Thomas’s petition 

would be untimely even if he were entitled to the additional Bowen days. 

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statutory or equitable tolling, or an equitable exception, exists, the petition is barred by 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and must be dismissed. 

1. Statutory Tolling 

Thomas did not seek a direct appeal. It was not until 2013, after the December 

2012 federal habeas filing deadline had passed, that he first sought state collateral review. 

Those facts preclude application of statutory tolling. 

For purposes of statutory tolling, the time during which a properly filed application 

for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the oneyear limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, a state habeas petition filed 

after AEDPA’s statute of limitations has ended cannot toll the limitations period, so none 

of the petitions Thomas filed after December 21, 2012 (his federal filing deadline) serve to 

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive” the limitation period once it has run (i.e., restart the 

clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. “Once the 

limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of 

limitations.” Rashid v. Khulmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

Despite this clear application of the law, Thomas contends that his federal petition 

is nonetheless timely because the state courts did not reject his state petitions as untimely. 

(Opp’n. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp.”) at 2-3.) His argument lacks merit. Even if his state 

petitions were timely under state law, they were filed outside the federal filing deadline 

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Statutory tolling does not apply. 

2. Equitable Tolling 

 A federal habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if he can show “‘(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 

(2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is not granted as a matter of course. In 

fact, it is “unavailable in most cases.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 

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2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). “[T]he threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions 

swallow the rule.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Thomas has not contended that he is entitled that equitable tolling, and the record 

does not indicate the existence of any facts that would support it. 

3. Equitable Exception: Actual Innocence

Thomas contends that he is entitled to an equitable exception3because he is 

innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. In support of this contention, he 

presents an ankle bracelet monitoring log. (Opp., Ex. A at 3.) He asserts that the log 

shows he was at home at 5am on September 17, 2010 “when the victim says he saw 

suspect.” (Id.) It is undisputed, however, that the crime occurred twenty-four hours later, 

at 5am on September 18, 2010.4

 (Id., Ex. B at 2 (State Court Order Denying Petition).) 

The Court infers that, according to Thomas, the evidence purports to show that the victim 

was not a reliable or credible witness. That is, if the witness was incorrect about seeing 

Thomas on September 17th, the victim was not reliable or credible regarding the events of 

the crime itself, which occurred the next day. Thomas alleges that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to make use of this evidence prior to his conviction. (Pet. 

at 13-14.) 

It is true that “a credible showing of ‘actual innocence’ under Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298 (1995) excuses the statute of limitations period established by [AEDPA].” Lee v. 

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Schlup requires a petitioner “to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence -- whether it be 

 

3 An equitable exception is distinct from the doctrine of equitable tolling. “[T]he phrase 

‘equitable tolling’ is used in describing the use of equitable power to allow the untimely 

filing of a habeas petition in an actual innocence case. The more accurate characterization 

is ‘equitable exception,’ because equitable tolling involves different theoretical 

underpinnings.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 932 n.5. 

4 This evidence does not create a later filing date under section 2244(d)(1). Thomas knew 

of the factual predicate of this claim (that he was at home on September 17, 2010 and was 

wearing an ankle monitor) well before trial. 

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exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence -- that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. Then a petitioner must show that in 

light of new evidence it is more likely than not that “no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, or that “every juror would have voted to acquit 

him,” Lee, 653 F.3d at 946 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327) (Kozinski, J. concurring). A 

gateway showing of actual innocence may be established despite the fact that the 

petitioner, as is the case here, entered a guilty plea. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 

614, 624 (1998); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). 

It is also insufficient to show actual innocence. To qualify under Schlup, innocence 

claims must be tied to an error in the underlying criminal proceedings. “Claims of actual 

innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for 

federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the 

underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 

“[S]uch evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the 

existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is 

not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 

(1963). 

The equitable exception is not applicable here. First, assuming without deciding 

that Thomas’s evidence proves he was at his house at 5am on September 17, 2010, it does 

not show on its own or in light of the complete record that he is innocent of a crime that 

was committed twenty-four hours later. The victim’s one (possibly) incorrect statement is 

not sufficient to undermine his reliability or credibility such that it is more likely than not 

that “no reasonable juror would have convicted” Thomas. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Second, the activity log does not show what Thomas purports. It shows that on 

September 17, 2010, the ankle bracelet was charging for nine seconds starting at 2:43am. 

(Opp., Ex. A at 2.) No further activity is shown until 10:23am. (Id.) There is no activity 

registered at or near 5am, the time Thomas asserts is crucial. 

Because Thomas has not shown evidence to support his claim of actual innocence, 

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the Court need not analyze whether he has linked such evidence to his counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness. Thomas has not shown that he is entitled to an equitable exception to 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

CONCLUSION 

 Because Thomas’s petition was not filed until well past the deadline, and neither 

statutory nor equitable tolling, nor an equitable exception, exists, the petition is barred by 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and must be dismissed. Respondent’s motion to dismiss 

the petition as untimely (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Thomas has not shown “that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent, terminate Docket No. 10, 

and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 22, 2016

_________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge

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