Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00641/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00641-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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RP

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Laura Ann Rogers, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-641-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

On March 27, 2007, Plaintiff Laura Ann Rogers, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Perryville, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint (Doc. #1) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not pay the $350.00 civil action filing fee but filed an uncertified

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

By Order filed April 9, 2007 (Doc. #3), the Court denied Plaintiff's Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis without prejudice and gave Plaintiff 30 days from the filing date

of the Order to either pay the $350.00 filing fee or file a completed Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis and a six-month trust account statement.

On April 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed a "Motion requesting copy of Original Complaint"

(Doc. #4) and on April 26, 2007, she filed her Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis

and six-month statement (Doc. #5). By Order filed November 15, 2007 (Doc. #8), the Court

granted the "Motion requesting copy of Original Complaint" (Doc. #4), granted the

Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #5), and dismissed the Complaint (Doc.

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#1) with leave to amend. Plaintiff was given 30 days from the filing date of the Order to file

a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined in the Court's Order. On

December 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a “First Amended Complaint” (Doc. #10) (Amended

Complaint). 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints and amended complaints brought by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). If the Court determines that

a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an

opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend.

II. Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges four counts in her Amended Complaint. In Count I she claims that

her Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Joseph Arpaio’s new policy

limiting incoming inmate mail to postcards. 

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendants Rylel and Burtcher when they threw away “very important documents (Inmate

Letters & Grievances)” that had been taken to them for processing. Defendant also claims

that Defendant Cesolini was aware of this problem but did not do enough to stop and take

control of the situation.

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that she sustained a broken rib while being arrested on

October 6, 2006, and that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant

Maricopa County Estrella Jail Medical when she was sent to the Estrella Jail on October 7,

2006 and did not receive any treatment for her broken rib until October 21, 2006. 

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In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendant Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail when, from October 7, 2006 until July 4,

2007, she was not “treated completely for Advanced Stages of degenerative Joint Disease”

in her knees and back. 

Defendants named in the Amended Complaint are: (1) Joseph Arpaio, Maricopa

County Sheriff; (2) Cesolini, Captain, Estrella Jail; (3) Rylel, Detention Officer, Estrella Jail;

(4) Burtcher, Detention Officer, Estrella Jail; and (5) Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

III. Improper Defendant

Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail is not a proper Defendant. Although Arizona

places responsibility for operating county jails by law upon the county sheriff, the county is

responsible for the provision of medical care to inmates, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-251(8),

11-291(A). Defendant Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail is an administrative creation

of Maricopa County and is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Therefore,

Defendant Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail is not a proper Defendant and is subject

to dismissal from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that her Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendant Joseph Arpaio’s new policy limiting incoming inmate mail to postcards. Plaintiff

further claims that Defendant Cesolini has “implicated” this policy in the Estrella Jail, and

that by refusing to allow inmates “all” mail, Defendants Arpaio and Cesolini have violated

the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee inmates the

right to receive “all” mail. Accordingly, Count I will be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

Moreover, although prisoners generally have “a First Amendment right to send and

receive mail,”Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)), prison officials may adopt a regulation

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that impinges upon that constitutional right if “the regulation . . . is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). “[T]he

prevention of criminal activity and the maintenance of prison security are legitimate

penological interests which justify the regulation of both incoming and outgoing prisoner

mail.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). 

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendants Rylel and Burtcher when they threw away “very important documents (Inmate

Letters & Grievances)” that had been taken to them for processing. Plaintiff also claims that

Defendant Cesolini was aware of this problem but did not do enough to stop and take control

of the situation. Plaintiff contends that by throwing these documents away, her right to

personal safety was jeopardized. 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979). Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Ivey,

673 F.2d at 268.

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count II are vague and conclusory because she does not

specify whose documents were thrown away, explain how the loss of these documents

threatened her safety, or explain how the loss of the documents violates the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, Count II will

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that she sustained a broken rib while being arrested on

October 6, 2006, and that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant

Maricopa County Estrella Jail Medical when she was sent to the Estrella Jail on October 7,

2006 and did not receive any treatment for her broken rib until October 21, 2006.

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 In dismissing the original Complaint with leave to amend, the Court gave Plaintiff

very specific instructions on how to correct the deficiencies in the Complaint.

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Because Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail is being dismissed as an improper

Defendant, and because Plaintiff’s claims in Count III are only made against Defendant

Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail, Count III will be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

D. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that her Eight Amendment rights were violated by

Defendant Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail when, from October 7, 2006 until July 4,

2007, she was not “treated completely for Advanced Stages of degenerative Joint Disease”

in her knees and back. Again, because Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail is being

dismissed as an improper Defendant, and because Plaintiff’s claims in Count IV are only

made against Defendant Maricopa County Medical Estrella Jail, Count IV will also be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

V. Dismissal of Complaint Without Leave to Amend

Because no claims now remain, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In deciding whether or not Plaintiff

should be given leave to amend again, the Court notes that leave to amend need not be given

if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend her complaint.

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure

to cure deficiencies by previous amendments is one of the factors to be considered in

deciding whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend her original Complaint to cure the

deficiencies and appears unable to do so.1

 Further opportunities would be futile. Therefore,

the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss the Amended Complaint without leave to amend, and

will dismiss this action. 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The First Amended Complaint (Doc. #10) and this action are dismissed for

failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 

(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the

dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 31st day of March, 2008.

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