Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00045/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00045-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROCKY CURTIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. KUSHNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00045-OWW-NEW (DLB) PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING THIS ACTION PROCEED

AGAINST DEFENDANT DOE FOR

VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH

AMENDMENT, AND RECOMMENDING

DISMISSAL OF OTHER CLAIMS AND

DEFENDANTS

(Docs. 1 and 10)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Rocky Curtis (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

January 13, 2006. On July 23, 2007, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint and issued an order

finding that plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for relief against defendant Doe 1 for

acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, but does not state any other claims for relief. Plaintiff was ordered to either file an

amended complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed only on the claim found to

be cognizable by the court. 

On August 20, 2007, plaintiff notified the court that he does not wish to amend and is

agreeable to proceeding with his Eighth Amendment claim only. Based on plaintiff ’s notice,

this Findings and Recommendations now issues.

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B. Screening Standard

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may

dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff

will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

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C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison, where the events at issue in

this action allegedly occurred. Plaintiff seeks money damages against defendants Kushner,

Smith, Bresler, Culton, Hodges-Wilkin, and John Does 1 and 2 for allegedly violating his rights

under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the failure to provide him with

timely, adequate medical care for his broken finger. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or

link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite

causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in

the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting

Johnson at 743-44). 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

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the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison

official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians

provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on

other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to

further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff alleges that on May 13, 2004, he broke one finger and injured two others while

playing softball. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the Coalinga Regional Medical Center,

where he was told he needed to see a specialist. Plaintiff was seen by a specialist on May 27,

2004, who ordered urgent surgery. Surgery was done on July 22, 2004. On October 15, 2004,

plaintiff’s splint case, steel pins, and stitches were removed. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Nochols

stated they should have been removed six weeks earlier, and as a result, plaintiff’s ability to

move his fingers normally would likely be permanent. 

Plaintiff alleges that on October 20, 2004, physical therapy was ordered. On October 26,

2004, plaintiff was seen by a therapist, who attempted to straighten his finger by pulling on it,

which caused excruciating pain. Plaintiff alleges the therapist said if he had been on the streets, a

shot for pain would have been used, but since plaintiff was in prison, he would have to deal with

it.

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kushner, a defendant, prescribed Ecotrin, which amounted to

nothing more than aspirin.

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Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive any care between the one unsuccessful physical

therapy session and the amputation of his finger on October 3, 2005, and that the amputation of

his finger could have been avoided if it had not been for the delay in treatment. Plaintiff also

alleges that Drs. Kushner and Smith, in responding to his inmate appeal, were misleading and

dishonest, and Dr. Culton stated the treatment plaintiff received was timely, which plaintiff

disputes.

Defendants Kushner, Smith, Bresler, Culton, and Hodges-Wilkin were involved in

responding to plaintiff’s inmate appeal grieving the claims at issue in this action. (Doc. 1,

Comp., pgs. 11-19.) To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by

the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

2006). The existence of an administrative remedy process does not create any substantive rights

and cannot support a claim for relief for violation of a constitutional right. Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Massey

v. Helman, 259 F.2d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). There are no allegations that defendants Kushner,

Smith, Bresler, Culton, and Hodges-Wilkin were responsible for the alleged deliberate

indifference to plaintiff ’s medical needs, and their involvement in addressing plaintiff’s inmate

appeal provides no basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983.

Defendant Kushner also allegedly prescribed Ecotrin, a medication plaintiff found to be

lacking. “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337,

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff’s disagreement with the choice of

medication prescribed does not support a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant

Kusher.

With respect to the physical therapist Doe 1, plaintiff ’s allegation that the therapist

conducted a procedure for which plaintiff would have been prescribed pain medication had he

not been incarcerated and which caused plaintiff excruciating pain is sufficient to support a claim 

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 On August 29, 2007, plaintiff provided a medical record with defendant Doe’s signature on it. Once this 1

Findings and Recommendations has been addressed by Judge Wanger and referred back to the undersigned to

initiate service of process, an order directing the Marshal to attempt service on defendant Doe using the medical

record will be issued.

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for relief under section 1983. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Erickson v. Pardus 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007). 

With respect to the second Doe physical therapist, plaintiff alleges that the amputation

had been put into motion and the therapist said why bother with therapy if they are going to cut

your finger off. This statement does not support a claim under section 1983 that the therapist

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant Doe 2.

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for relief against defendant Doe 1 for

acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted against any other defendant. Plaintiff was provided with the option of filing an amended

complaint or proceeding with the Eighth Amendment claim found to be cognizable by the court. 

Plaintiff opted to proceed on his cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, based on 1

the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s complaint, filed January 13, 2006, against

defendant Doe 1 on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim;

2. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Kushner, Smith, Bresler,

Culton, Hodges-Wilkin, and John Doe 2 be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; and

3. Defendants Kushner, Smith, Bresler, Culton, Hodges-Wilkin, and John Doe 2 be

dismissed from this action based on plaintiff’s failure to state any claims upon

which relief may be granted against them. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

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thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file

written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 5, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

9b0h UNI ie TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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