Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02986/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02986-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JANIS TRULSSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:11-CV-02986 KJM DAD 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees. (ECF 

No. 148.) Defendant opposes the motion. (ECF No. 166.) The court held a hearing on the matter 

on September 26, 2014, at which Jill Telfer appeared for plaintiff and Velma Lim appeared for 

defendant. As explained below, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion. 

I. BRIEF BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination case on November 9, 2011. (ECF 

No. 1.) Through various pre-trial motions and rulings, the action was eventually narrowed so that 

the case proceeded to trial on the following claims only: (1) gender discrimination in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) gender discrimination in violation of California’s 

Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) retaliation in violation of the FEHA; and 

(4) failure to prevent retaliation and discrimination in violation of the FEHA. (ECF No. 82.) 

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The jury trial commenced on March 10, 2014. (ECF No. 109.) The jury was 

instructed and began its deliberations on March 28, 2014. (ECF No. 127.) On March 31, 2014, 

the jury returned its verdict in favor of plaintiff, finding (1) defendant had retaliated against 

plaintiff for complaining about gender discrimination and (2) defendant had failed to take all 

reasonable steps to prevent retaliation. (ECF No. 145 at 6–8.) The jury awarded plaintiff 

damages in the amount of $2,059,708. (Id. at 10.) The jury found plaintiff did not prove by the 

preponderance of the evidence that defendant discriminated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s 

gender. (Id. at 2–5.) In conformance with the jury verdict, the court entered a judgment in 

plaintiff’s favor. (ECF No. 147.) 

Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 148). Defendant opposes the 

motion (ECF No. 166), and plaintiff has replied (ECF No. 178.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

If a case is governed by state substantive law, then the state law also governs the 

determination of whether attorney’s fees should be awarded. Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 

738 F.3d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 2013). California follows the “American rule” as opposed to the 

“English rule” regarding recovery of fees: Each party to a lawsuit is generally responsible for his 

or her fees. Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal. 4th 512, 516 (2009). However, the “American rule” has 

two exceptions in California: (1) parties may contractually agree on the mode of attorney 

compensation and (2) attorney’s fees may be provided for by statute. Id. The FEHA represents 

one such statutory exception to the “American rule.” Specifically, section 12965(b) of the FEHA 

provides the court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the 

prevailing party. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965. “This statute has been interpreted to mean that in a 

FEHA action a trial court should ordinarily award attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff unless 

special circumstances would render a fee award unjust.” Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 

4th 970, 976 (2010). Attorney’s fee awards in FEHA actions “are intended to provide fair 

compensation to the attorneys involved in the litigation at hand and encourage [] litigation of 

claims that in the public interest merit litigation.” Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks omitted, 

alteration in original). 

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California courts award attorney’s fees under the FEHA by using “the lodestar 

adjustment method . . . .” Id. at 985. Applying this method, a court must first determine a 

lodestar amount by multiplying a reasonable hourly fee by a reasonable number of hours 

expended by the attorney. Id. Then, a court has discretion to increase or decrease that resulting 

amount by the application of a “multiplier” after considering numerous relevant factors. Id. 

Ultimately, “when using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees under the FEHA, the . . . 

goal is to determine a ‘reasonable’ attorney fee, and not to encourage unnecessary litigation of 

claims that serve no public purpose either because they have no broad public impact or because 

they are factually or legally weak.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, a court must consider “the extent of a plaintiff’s success” as a “crucial 

factor” in “determining a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney fee . . . .” Id. at 989. “Under both 

California and federal law, a fee award must be adjusted to reflect limited success.” Muniz, 

738 F.3d at 224. “California courts . . . in cases of limited success have adopted the approach set 

forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).” Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of 

Forestry & Fire Prot., 190 Cal. App. 4th 217, 238 (2010). That approach “has two components: 

first, the court must deduct from the lodestar hours spent exclusively on unrelated unsuccessful 

claims; and second, the court must evaluate the remaining hours to determine if they were 

reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained.” Muniz, 738 F.3d at 224 (citing Hensley, 46 

U.S. at 434). “Hensley cautions that, before hours may be deducted . . . for unsuccessful claims, 

the claims must be suitable for entirely separate lawsuits,” meaning the claims “must be distinct 

in both fact and law.” Muniz, 738 F.3d at 224. “To deduct time, the court must find that the time 

deducted did not aid in proving the successful claims.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of $447,791.25, enhanced 

by a 1.5 multiplier, or, in the alternative, $298,527.50, the mere lodestar. (ECF No. 148 at 1.) 

Counsel argues she reasonably expended 664 hours in litigating the instant case and seeks to 

recover for all those hours. (ECF No. 148 at 6.) She avers that even though plaintiff did not 

prevail on all of her claims, because all four of her claims stemmed from the same common facts, 

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plaintiff’s award should not be apportioned between the claims on which she prevailed and the 

claims on which she did not. (Id. at 7–8.) Plaintiff claims the lodestar amount should be 

enhanced by a 1.5 multiplier because counsel accepted the case on a contingency fee basis; was 

precluded from undertaking other representation; demonstrated a high level of skill in prevailing 

in the lawsuit; and obtained a large damages award. (Id. at 9–14.) 

 Defendant’s response is two-fold: First, defendant argues the award of attorney’s 

fees should reflect plaintiff’s limited success (ECF No. 166 at 1–4), and second, the fees should 

not be enhanced by a multiplier because the relevant factors weigh against enhancement (id. at 

4-5). Defendant concludes plaintiff should be awarded fees in an amount not greater “than 

$99,519.17, representing one third of her requested lodestar.” (Id. at 5.) 

A. Lodestar 

1. Number of Hours 

Defendant does not argue that specific time entries should be stricken. Rather, 

defendant argues the 664 hours plaintiff’s counsel expended on litigating this case should be 

reduced to reflect plaintiff’s limited success in prevailing on the retaliation and failure to prevent 

retaliation claims under the FEHA and losing on her gender discrimination claims under the 

FEHA and Title VII. (ECF No. 166 at 1–4.) Defendant argues “plaintiff’s retaliation claim was 

only a minor focus of th[e] case.” (Id. at 3.) “The facts required to establish these two allegations 

of retaliation were limited to plaintiff’s belief regarding Mary Aguirre, the fact that she filed a 

Rule 20 Complaint, and facts establishing DA Willett’s knowledge (actually, his lack of 

knowledge) of those complaints and how the complaints impacted [Willett’s] decisions.” (Id.) 

Defendant concludes, “[a] two-thirds reduction to plaintiff’s fees would adequately represent the 

amount of time spent on the unsuccessful discrimination claim[] [because] [a]pproximately twothirds of the trial was spent on evidence relating to discrimination rather than retaliation.” (Id. at 

4.) 

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In adjusting a lodestar amount “to account for time spent exclusively on an 

unsuccessful claim,” Muniz, 738 F.3d at 223, the court first determines whether the successful 

claims are related to the unsuccessful claims. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 190 Cal. App. 4th at 239. 

“There is no certain method for determining when claims are related or unrelated.” Id. But if the 

claims are based on different legal theories and facts, they may be deemed as unrelated. Id. In 

contrast, related claims “will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal 

theories.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A successful claim is unrelated to an 

unsuccessful claim “when the relief sought on the unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a 

course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave rise to the 

injury on which the relief granted is premised.” Id. 

If the claims are related, a court proceeds to the second step and considers whether 

a prevailing plaintiff’s level of success “makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis 

for making a fee award.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this analysis, a court 

“will evaluate the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours 

reasonably expended on litigation.” Id. “Full compensation may be appropriate where [a] 

plaintiff has obtained excellent results, but may be excessive if a plaintiff has achieved only 

partial or limited success.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

a. Relatedness of Claims 

Here, the court finds plaintiff’s claims were closely related. As to plaintiff’s Title 

VII and FEHA claims, the jury found plaintiff did not prove that defendant discriminated against 

her based on her gender in laying her off and not promoting her to Chief Investigator. (ECF 

No. 145 at 2–3.) Nevertheless, the jury found in favor of plaintiff on her retaliation and failure to 

prevent retaliation FEHA claims, based on plaintiff’s having made a complaint of gender 

discrimination. (Id. at 6–8.) While plaintiff prevailed on two of her four claims only, she 

obtained the relief she sought: The jury awarded plaintiff damages for past lost earnings and 

benefits in the amount of $73,625, for future lost earnings and benefits in the amount of 

$439,757, and for pain and suffering in the amount of $1,546,326. (Id. at 10.) Those damages 

represent the exact relief plaintiff argued for during her closing argument: 

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So what you need to look at in damages, and you’ll see this in the 

instruction, is the economic loss to Ms. Trulsson and the 

noneconomic loss. Now, you heard from Dr. Mahla what the 

financial loss was. And so the $73,625 is the past wage loss, and 

then the future wage loss is the $439,757. 

(Trial Transcript at 1579:16–21.) 

. . . 

So the damages. The past wage and benefit loss is $73,625. The 

future wage and benefit loss is $439,757. And then the mental 

suffering and emotional distress is significant. 

(Id. at 1580:17–20.) 

Because “success counts and is to be judged . . . by the relief given or the right 

established[,]” and because plaintiff “ultimately obtained” “all the relief sought[,]” plaintiff’s 

failure to prevail on her gender discrimination claims “was ultimately unnecessary to” plaintiff’s 

success. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 190 Cal. App. 4th at 240–41 (internal quotation marks omitted 

and alteration in original). 

Plaintiff’s evidence concerning defendant’s alleged discriminatory treatment of 

other female employees also was relevant to showing that plaintiff complained about gender 

discrimination in the office in good faith. See Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 36 Cal. 4th 446, 474 

(2005) (“An employee is protected against retaliation if the employee reasonably and in good 

faith believed that what he or she was opposing constituted unlawful employer conduct . . . .”). 

At hearing, defendant’s counsel conceded that certain underlying facts solicited during trial were 

applicable to all of plaintiff’s claims. That evidence also supported her theory of the case that she 

was laid off and not promoted because of her complaints about discriminatory treatment of other 

female employees. See Muniz, 738 F.3d at 224 (“To deduct time, the court must find that the 

time deducted did not aid in proving the successful claims.”). 

Finally, defendant’s argument that “[t]he burden of proving a good faith belief is 

not the same as establishing that discrimination actually occurred . . .” (ECF No. 166 at 3) is 

unpersuasive; it was reasonable for plaintiff to introduce the strongest evidence in an attempt to 

prove all of the case. 

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Because “plaintiff’s claims for relief . . . involved a common core of facts or were 

based on related legal theories[,] [m]uch of counsel’s time [was] devoted generally to the 

litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The court exercises its discretion in declining to make an equitable 

judgment. 

b. Reasonableness of Hours Relative to Success 

The court proceeds to the second step and asks whether plaintiff’s counsel 

reasonably expended 664 hours. This step “asks whether the hours allowed were reasonably 

necessary to achieve the result reached.” Muniz, 738 F.3d at 225. “If the plaintiff obtained 

excellent results, full compensation may be appropriate.” Harman v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 4th 407, 417 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this step, 

“[t]he trial court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in 

relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. The court may appropriately reduce 

the lodestar calculation if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of 

the litigation as a whole. . . .[T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Id. at 

418 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As noted, the jury awarded plaintiff the amount of damages she sought to recover. 

The jury also awarded over $1 million in pain and suffering damages. Plaintiff’s recovery is selfevidently an excellent one. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should 

recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation . . . . the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to 

prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Having reviewed 

the billing records plaintiff submitted, the court cannot say there are “specific hours that should 

be eliminated . . . .” Harman, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 418. 

The number of hours to use in the lodestar calculation here is 664. 

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

In calculating the lodestar amount, the California Supreme Court has “expressly 

approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 

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1132. The relevant community is the forum in which the court is located. Camacho v. 

Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The burden is on the movant to present 

evidence in support of the hours worked and the hourly rates. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Plaintiff’s requested lodestar amount is based on plaintiff’s counsel’s working at 

an hourly billing rate of $425 for work done in 2011 (10.9 hours) and $450 per hour for work 

done since 2012 (638.1+15=653.1 hours). (Telfer Decl. ¶ 42, ECF 148-1.) The total lodestar 

amount plaintiff seeks equals $298,527.50 for 664 hours of work. (Id.) She correctly identifies 

the Sacramento area as the relevant forum community. (ECF No. 148 at 8–9.) Plaintiff’s 

evidence in support of the requested hourly rate of $450 consists of declarations from Chris 

Whelan, Lawrence Bohm, and Mark Velez, all Sacramento area attorneys practicing in 

employment litigation. (See generally Whelan Decl., ECF No. 148-2; Bohm Decl., ECF No. 148-

3; Velez Decl., ECF No. 148-4.) At hearing, defendant confirmed it did not challenge plaintiff’s 

requested hourly rate. 

The court finds plaintiff’s requested rates reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel graduated 

from law school in 1989 and has been a California Bar member since then. (ECF No. 148-1 

¶ 23.) She has represented plaintiffs in employment cases since 1992 and has also been actively 

involved with various professional legal associations. (Id. ¶¶ 24–30.) Whelan graduated from 

law school in 1977 and has practiced employment law since 1980. (ECF No. 148-2 ¶ 3.) He 

provides examples of Sacramento area state court cases approving his hourly rate up to $650. (Id.

¶¶ 5–10.) He believes “the hourly rate appropriate” for plaintiff’s counsel is between $500 and 

$550. (Id. ¶ 15.) Bohm, who graduated from law school in 2000 and primarily practices 

employment law, supports plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates based on his knowledge of the hourly 

rates charged by other employment lawyers in the Sacramento area. (ECF No. 148-3, ¶¶ 3-6, 

8-12.) Finally, Velez is a 1992 law school graduate who began practicing employment law in 

1998. (ECF No. 148-4 ¶¶ 2, 4.) He also, based on his knowledge of attorney fee rates prevalent 

in the Sacramento area, supports Telfer’s $450 hourly rate. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Other courts’ decisions are consistent with finding the hourly rates of plaintiff’s 

counsel reasonable in the prevailing community. See Pehle v. Dufour, No. 06-1889, 2014 WL 

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546115, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) ($350 reasonable hourly rate for labor attorney practicing 

since 1989); Knox v. Chiang, No. 05-02198, 2013 WL 2434606, at *7–9 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) 

($450 reasonable hourly rate for attorneys with extensive trial and appellate experience in labor 

and constitutional law); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 460 (E.D. Cal. 

2013) ($400 prevailing hourly rate for counsel in wage-and-hour class action). See also

McCarthy v. Reynolds, No. 09–2495, 2011 WL 4344147, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) ($285 

reasonable hourly rate for counsel in employment action pursuant to Title VII and FEHA); Cosby 

v. Autozone, Inc., No. 08-505, 2010 WL 5232992, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010) ($375 

reasonable hourly rate for counsel who assisted trial counsel in FEHA litigation). 

B. Enhancement of Lodestar 

Plaintiff argues her requested lodestar amount should be enhanced by a 1.5 

multiplier because (a) her counsel obtained excellent results; (b) her counsel was precluded from 

other employment; and (c) the lawsuit served the public interest. (ECF No. 148 at 10.) 

Defendant disagrees, saying: the results obtained were not excellent because plaintiff prevailed 

only on two of her four claims; plaintiff was able to work on other cases; and “plaintiff did not 

succeed on her [gender discrimination] claim[,] which arguably had the most significant public 

interest.” (ECF No. 166 at 4–5.) 

“[T]he party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof.” Ketchum, 

24 Cal. 4th at 1138. “[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic 

lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion 

to do so in the appropriate case[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). “In each case, the trial court should 

consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of 

nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount 

regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market 

compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors . . . .” Id. The court 

“should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the 

lodestar.” Id. 

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For example, 

the factor of extraordinary skill, in particular, appears susceptible to 

improper double counting; for the most part, the difficulty of a legal 

question and the quality of representation are already encompassed 

in the lodestar. A more difficult legal question typically requires 

more attorney hours, and a more skillful and experienced attorney 

will command a higher hourly rate. 

Id. at 1138–39. In fact, “the reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product 

of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be 

obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.” Id. at 

1139 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations in original). 

Some of the factors courts may utilize in deciding whether to enhance the lodestar 

amount include, but are not limited to: “(1) the results obtained by plaintiff’s counsel; (2) the 

skill and quality of representation; (3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (4) the 

extent to which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (5) the contingent 

nature of the case.” Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1134–35 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 

(citing California and Ninth Circuit cases). 

 The court declines to consider basing a multiplier on skill. While the court 

recognizes the high quality of representation of plaintiff’s counsel, the court cannot say “the 

quality of representation far exceed[ed] the quality of representation that would have been 

provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the 

lodestar calculation.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1139. The court also does not consider the 

difficulty of the questions involved. The lodestar amount itself accounts for this factor and, 

therefore, an enhancement based on this factor is inappropriate. See Kranson v. Fed. Express 

Corp., No. 11-05826, 2013 WL 6503308, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013). The court does 

address the results obtained, preclusion of other employment and contingent risk, and finds the 

circumstances of the case warrant an enhancement. 

1. Results Obtained 

The court finds this factor weighs in favor of an enhancement. While plaintiff did 

not prevail on all four of her claims, she did obtain the precise relief she sought, as explained 

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above. See also Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1419, (1991), disapproved 

of on other grounds by Olson v. Auto. Club of S. California, 42 Cal. 4th 1142 (2008) (“The 

plaintiffs’ lack of success on four causes of action but achievement of a monetary recovery which 

expert witnesses characterized as excellent supported the judge’s decision to apply a multiplier of 

1.5 instead of 2.0.”). 

In addition, the declarations submitted by attorneys Whelan, Velez and Bohm 

further support the excellent result obtained by plaintiff’s counsel. See ECF Nos. 148-2, 148-3, 

148-4. See also Leuzinger v. Cnty. of Lake, No. 06-00398, 2009 WL 839056, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 30, 2009) (“[Plaintiff] proffered declarations from two attorneys with extensive employment 

law litigation experience, one of whom also reviewed verdict databases, and each of which 

declares that the $1.67 million verdict in this matter was an exceptional result.”). This factor 

supports a multiplier. 

2. Preclusion of Other Employment 

Plaintiff claims the instant case “has had a profound impact on the firm’s finances, 

and the firm’s ability to take, and work on other cases that could have provided a more certain 

and reliable stream of income.” (ECF No. 148 at 13.) Defendant responds “plaintiff has failed to 

identify with any specificity any cases that she was unable to take or work on as a result of this 

case.” (ECF No. 166 at 4.) 

The court finds this factor is neutral. While the court is mindful of the potential 

difficulties that a solo practitioner may face in undertaking a complex employment case, the hours 

plaintiff’s counsel spent on this case will be compensated under the lodestar calculation. Plaintiff 

has not met her burden in providing any specific cases that were rejected or prospective clients 

that were turned away. See Jadwin, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (holding the same under similar 

circumstances); see also Hamed v. Macy’s W. Stores, Inc., No. 10-2790, 2011 WL 5183856, at 

*11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Ordinary preclusion from performing other work while engrossed 

in a pending action is a part of every case, and a party’s counsel are not entitled to a multiplier 

merely because they were busy during trial.”). 

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3. Contingent Risk 

Plaintiff argues her counsel accepted the instant case on a contingency fee basis, 

without receiving any reimbursement for her out-of-pocket expenses, which was particularly 

risky for a solo practitioner. (ECF No. 148 at 11.) Defendant responds because the purpose of a 

contingency fee agreement is to attract lawyers to accept cases that would be in the interest of the 

public, this factor weighs against an enhancement as “plaintiff did not succeed on her claim 

which arguably had the most significant public interest.” (ECF No. 166 at 4.) 

The California Supreme Court has observed: 

The economic rationale for fee enhancement in contingency cases 

has been explained as follows: A contingent fee must be higher than 

a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The 

contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal 

services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit 

interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the 

loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) 

is much higher than that of conventional loans. 

A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides 

legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he 

is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, 

competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases. 

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132–33 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff’s counsel attests that she “cannot afford to represent an individual 

employee on a contingency basis if at the end of the representation, all [she is] to receive is [her] 

hourly rate for [her] services.” (Telfer Decl. ¶ 33, ECF No. 148-1.) She further states she 

“received no fees whatsoever” during her representation leading to trial. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff 

“paid a total of approximately $3,100 . . . beginning in mid-2011” when plaintiff’s counsel was 

retained; these funds went toward costs. (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel has been working on this case 

since 2011, a significant amount of time for a solo practitioner to go unpaid. Defendant’s 

argument that the case’s outcome vindicated only plaintiff’s own rights is unpersuasive; the 

outcome serves the public interest by effectuating the FEHA’s purposes and making employers, 

including defendant County, more mindful of their compliance with the law on gender 

discrimination. The court finds this factor weighs in favor of awarding an enhancement. See

Leuzinger, 2009 WL 839056, at *10 (“An enhancement is not a windfall, but earned 

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compensation in the form of a premium reflecting the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of 

attorney fees.”). 

 Balancing the factors above, the court finds a multiplier of 1.5 is appropriate in 

this case. Accordingly, the court awards plaintiff’s counsel total fees as follows: 

TOTAL LODESTAR $298,527.50

MULTIPLIER 1.5

TOTAL $447,791.25

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion and AWARDS 

plaintiff $447,791.25 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff’s bill of costs (ECF No. 149) will be addressed 

in a separate order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 27, 2014. 

Case 2:11-cv-02986-KJM-DAD Document 190 Filed 10/28/14 Page 13 of 13