Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00072/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00072-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE F. CARDINAL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv72-MMA(BLM)

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 9

[Doc. No. 127]

vs.

GREGORY BUCHNOFF, et al.,

Defendants.

The trial of the above-captioned matter is set to begin on April 13, 2010. On March 19,

2010, the Court presided over a hearing on Defendants Gregory Buchnoff, et al.’s motions in limine. 

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, Defendants move the Court for an

order precluding Plaintiffs from introducing or attempting to introduce evidence of decedent Kyle

Cardinal’s pain and suffering arising out of the January 17, 2005 incident at issue in this case,

arguing that Floyd Cardinal, as the representative of Kyle’s estate, may not recover such damages.

After considering the oral arguments of counsel, the Court took this motion under submission for

further review. During the hearing, the majority of the discussion focused on whether Kyle’s estate

may recover pain and suffering damages under applicable California law. 

 Plaintiffs concede that Kyle’s estate may not recover pain and suffering damages for his

state law claims pursuant to section 337.34, otherwise referred to as California’s “survivorship”

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 California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 provides:

In an action or proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on the

decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the

decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary

damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do

not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement.

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statute.1 The current dispute involves whether the estate may recover these damages if Kyle’s

federal civil rights claim succeeds at trial. 

The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose behind the Federal Civil Rights Act is to: (1)

prevent official illegality, See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978), and (2)

“compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). Section 1983 does not specify the survivability of actions

brought pursuant thereto; it does not identify the injured parties when a victim is killed; nor does it

provide a measure of available damages. As such, federal courts must look to state law to address

these issues, unless the applicable state law is found to be inconsistent with federal law. County of

Los Angeles, v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 292, 297 (1999), citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 255. Thus, the

issue is whether application of California’s survivorship statute barring Kyle’s estate from

recovering pain and suffering damages is inconsistent with Section 1983. The Ninth Circuit has not

decided this issue and no clear consensus has arisen out of the trial courts. 

Several district courts in California have held that section 377.34 does not limit damages in

federal civil rights actions. In Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.Supp. 1154 (N.D.Cal. 1981), the Northern

District held that application of California’s survivorship statute to preclude all recovery for pain

and suffering would be inconsistent with federal civil rights laws. The Central District reached a

similar holding in Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F.Supp. 230, 232 (C.D.Cal.1997). These courts simply

noted that had the decedents survived, they could have recovered pain and suffering. Garcia, 961

F.Supp. at 232; Guyton, 532 F.Supp. at 1166. On the other hand, the Eastern District of California

has concluded that section 377.34 is not inconsistent with Section 1983. Venerable v. City of

Sacramento, 185 F.Supp.2d 1128 (E.D.Cal. 2002). In Provencio v. Vazquez, 2008 WL 3982063

(E.D.Cal.. 2008), the court addressed the issue, stating in pertinent part:

The deterrent purpose of Section 1983 is satisfied by the fact that section

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377.34 allows the estate to recover the punitive damages the decedent would

have been entitled to recover had he survived. Unfortunately, once deceased

a decedent cannot in any practical way be compensated for his injuries or pain

and suffering, or be made whole. However, the statutory scheme for survivors

in California still provides compensatory damages for the remaining injured

parties, i.e. the survivors. California law provides for not only recovery by the

representative of the estate but also for a wrongful death action by the

decedent’s heirs. Thus, this court finds that the estate’s claims for pain and

suffering damages and hedonic damages are precluded by section 377.34.

Id. at *12 (citations omitted). The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Provencio. Pain and

suffering is something uniquely experienced by the injured person. If the injured person dies, it

makes sense for the law to permit his or her estate to recoup monies spent paying medical bills or

monies lost due to the decedent’s inability to earn an income prior to his or her death; absent injury,

these are assets that would otherwise be part of the estate and distributable upon death. 

Compensating an estate for pain and suffering, on the other hand, is not intuitive. The representative

of the estate may be someone close to the decedent who observed their loved one’s pain and

suffering prior to death, but other causes of action allow for that person to be compensated for their

own emotional distress, if they in fact experienced any. 

The Southern District of California recently weighed in on this topic. In Hirschfield v. San

Diego Unified Port Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94232 (S.D. Cal. 2009), the court concluded that

because the decedent died almost immediately as a direct result of the alleged constitutional

violation, the estate should be permitted to recover pain and suffering damages. The court reasoned

that the recoverable compensatory damages would be “minimal to non-existent” since death was

immediate and, as such, the estate would be entitled to very little relief if it ultimately prevailed on

the decedent’s civil rights claim. Id. This case is distinguishable from Hirschfield in an important

respect. Denial of recovery for pain and suffering would have left the estate in that case with no

recompense. Without proof of any compensatory damages, the estate likewise would not have been

able to recover punitive damages. Thus, application of California’s survival statute would have left

the estate with no remedy, and the purpose and intent of Section 1983 would have been eviscerated. 

It was this result that the Hirschfield court noted as its basis for permitting the decedent’s estate to

seek pain and suffering damages. 

The Court’s survey of cases has revealed that whether the intent of the federal civil rights

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statutes is served depends as much on a particular philosophical perspective as it does on the specific

facts of the case, if not more so. The statutory scheme in California provides for recovery of certain

types of damages by Kyle’s estate. The Court finds that Kyle’s surviving claims for pain and

suffering damages are precluded by section 377.34, however the result is not inconsistent with the

intent of Section 1983 under the facts of this case. If a jury finds that Kyle’s civil rights were

violated, the deterrent and rehabilitative goals of Section 1983 may be met by an award benefitting

his estate for compensatory and potentially punitive damages. His estate is not without available

remedies. 

The evidentiary question of whether evidence of Kyle’s pain and suffering should be

completely excluded from trial is a distinct issue. With respect to this request, the Court denies the

motion without prejudice. Defendants cite no law to support their assertion that Plaintiffs should not

be permitted to present any evidence of Kyle’s pain and suffering simply because his estate may not

recover such damages. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 5, 2010

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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