Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00390/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00390-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ESCOBEDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLESSING-CO, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00390-JLT-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT WITH REDUCTION IN 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

ORDER REQUIRING SERVICE ON 

DEFENDANTS WITHIN THREE DAYS

(ECF No. 13)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Jose Escobedo’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for default 

judgment, filed on October 11, 2024. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff seeks default judgment against 

Defendants Blessing-Co, Inc., Xiaohong Chen, Han Hong Li, Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, 

LLC, and Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC. A hearing on the motion was held on November 20, 

2024. Counsel Tanya E. Moore appeared by videoconference on behalf of Plaintiff. No 

appearances were made on behalf of any Defendant via videoconference or in person, despite the 

courtroom being open to the public.

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Having considered the moving papers, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, the 

argument presented at the November 20, 2024 hearing, the nonappearance of the Defendants, and

the Court’s file, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, subject 

to a reduction in attorneys’ fees. 

II.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants Blessing-Co, Inc. 

(“Blessing-Co”); Xiaohong Chen doing business as Moy’s Restaurant (“Chen”); Han Hong Li 

doing business as Moy’s Restaurant (“Li”); Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC doing 

business as Noodle Q (“Golden Tripod Group”); and Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC doing 

business as Noodle Q (“Golden Tripod Restaurant”). (ECF No. 1.) Because no Defendant 

responded to the complaint, Plaintiff requested entry of default against each Defendant, which the 

Clerk of the Court entered on May 9, 2024. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff 

filed his motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 13.) The Court held a hearing via 

videoconference on November 20, 2024, whereby only counsel for Plaintiff appeared. (ECF No.

17.) Counsel Tanya E. Moore appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. No one appeared on behalf of 

Defendant.

B. Allegations in the Operative Complaint

The complaint asserts claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (the “ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh 

Act”), and Part 5.5 of the California Health and Safety Code §§ 19953 et seq. and/or Government 

Code § 4450 against Defendants, the purported owners/operators/leasers of restaurants Moy’s 

Restaurant and Noodle Q (the “Facilities”). (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7, 16-47.) Plaintiff alleges the 

Facilities are restaurants open to the public, intended for non-residential use, their operation 

affects commerce, and is a “public accommodation” as defined by applicable federal and state 

laws. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.)

Plaintiff alleges he suffers from rheumatoid arthritis, which impairs his ability to move his 

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joints without pain and substantially limits his ability to walk requiring a cane for mobility. (Id.

at ¶ 8.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges he has limited dexterity due to arthritis and finger 

amputation. (Id.) Plaintiff lives less than ten miles from the Facility. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff visited 

the Moy’s Restaurant on June 14, 2023, to dine; Plaintiff visited Noodle Q on June 15, 2023, to 

dine. (Id.) During the June 14, 2023 visit to Moy’s Restaurant, Plaintiff alleges he encountered 

barriers that interfered with and denied his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, 

and accommodations offered at the facility. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff identifies the following 

barriers: 

a) The entrance door at the Moy’s Facility was heavy and closed 

too quickly, making it difficult for Plaintiff to open and walk 

through. 

b) The door to the men’s restroom at the Moy’s Facility had a 

round door knob, which was difficult for Plaintiff to grasp and 

turn. 

c) The locking mechanism on the door to the toilet compartment in 

the Moy’s Facility men’s restroom required tight pinching and 

twisting of the wrist to operate, which made it difficult for 

Plaintiff to use. 

d) The toilet in the Moy’s Facility men’s restroom was too low 

and there was no rear grab bar, which made it difficult for 

Plaintiff to lower himself and stand up from the toilet. 

e) The toilet seat cover dispenser in the Moy’s Facility men’s 

restroom toilet compartment was positioned high on the wall 

behind the toilet, making it difficult for Plaintiff to reach.

f) The toilet paper dispenser in the Moy’s Facility men’s restroom 

toilet compartment was positioned too high, making it hard for 

Plaintiff to reach.

g) The faucet controls on the sink in the Moy’s Facility men’s 

restroom were round and required tight grasping and twisting of 

the wrist to operate, making them difficult for Plaintiff to use.

h) The paper towel dispenser in the Moy’s Facility men’s restroom 

was positioned too high, making it hard for Plaintiff to reach. 

i) The transaction counter at the Moy’s Facility was obstructed by 

a row of chairs that were placed in front of the entire counter, 

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and it was difficult for Plaintiff to lean over the obstructions and 

reach the counter to pay for his meal.

(Id.) During the June 15, 2023 visit to Noodle Q, Plaintiff alleges he encountered barriers that 

interfered with and denied his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and 

accommodations offered at the facility. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff identifies the following 

barriers:

j) There was a loose floor mat near Plaintiff’s table at the Noodle 

Q Facility, which caught on his chair as he pushed it back 

creating a tripping hazard when Plaintiff got up from his chair.

k) The door to the men’s restroom at the Noodle Q Facility was 

heavy and difficult for Plaintiff to open. 

l) The locking mechanism on the door to the toilet compartment in 

the Noodle Q Facility men’s restroom required tight pinching to 

operate, which made it difficult for Plaintiff to use.

m) The toilet in the Noodle Q Facility men’s restroom was 

positioned too far from the side wall, which made it difficult for 

Plaintiff to use the side grab bar when lowering himself and 

standing up from the toilet, and also made it hard for him to 

reach the toilet paper dispenser. Additionally, the toilet seat was 

not properly secured, causing Plaintiff more difficulty in using 

the toilet. 

n) The toilet seat cover dispenser in the Noodle Q Facility men’s 

restroom toilet compartment was positioned high on the wall 

behind the toilet, making it hard for Plaintiff to reach.

o) The soap dispenser and paper towel dispenser in the Noodle Q 

Facility men’s restroom were positioned too high, making them 

hard for Plaintiff to reach.

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew or should have known of the barriers, and that they have 

the financial resources to remove them but refuse to do so. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claims the 

continued presence of the obviousness of the barriers is sufficient to establish discriminatory 

intent. (Id. ¶ 15.)

As a result of the alleged barriers, Plaintiff contends the Facilities’ goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations were unavailable to him, and he was and 

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continues to be deterred from visiting the Facility. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends he will return 

to the Facility once the barriers are moved. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, statutory 

damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at pp. 10-11.)1

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Our starting point is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored,” as 

“[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” NewGen, LLC v. 

Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55, obtaining a default 

judgment is a two-step process. Entry of default is appropriate as to any party against whom a 

judgment for affirmative relief is sought that has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided 

by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and where that fact is made to appear by affidavit or 

otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, a plaintiff can seek entry of default 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Rule 55(b)(2) provides the framework for the Court to enter a 

default judgment: 

Entering a Default Judgment.

(2) By the Court. In all other cases, the party must apply to the

court for a default judgment. A default judgment may be entered 

against a minor or incompetent person only if represented by a 

general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has 

appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is sought 

has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its 

representative must be served with written notice of the application 

at least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings 

or make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury 

trial—when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:

(A) conduct an accounting;

(B) determine the amount of damages;

(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or

(D) investigate any other matter.

1All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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Id.

The decision to grant a motion for entry of default judgment is within the discretion of the 

court. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also

TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has set 

forth the following seven factors (the “Eitel factors”) that the Court may consider in exercising its 

discretion: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s 

substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the 

action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due 

to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72.

Generally, once default has been entered, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except 

those relating to damages, will be taken as true.” Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). The amount of damages must be proven at an evidentiary hearing or through 

other means. Microsoft Corp. v. Nop, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 

Additionally, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally 

insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 

1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). The relief sought must not be different in kind or 

exceed the amount that is demanded in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

IV.

DISCUSSION

The Court begins by discussing jurisdiction and then turns to the Eitel factors to determine 

whether default judgment should be entered. 

A. Jurisdiction

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power to adjudicate is limited to 

that granted by Congress. United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions 

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’ “A case ‘arises under’ 

federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right 

under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.” Republican Party of 

Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Franchise 

Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (citations omitted)). “[T]he 

presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id. at 1089 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff brings this action alleging violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. 

Therefore, the Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the Court has 

original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA claim, it also has the discretion to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for Plaintiff’s related state law claims pursuant 

to the Unruh Act, California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq. Here, the Court recommends exercising 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under the Unruh Act.

2. Service of Process on Defendants 

Generally, the Court considers the adequacy of service of process before evaluating the 

merits of a motion for default judgment. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Singh, No. 1:13-cv1453-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 1665014, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014); Mason v. Genisco Tech. 

Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that if party “failed to serve [defendant] in the 

earlier action, the default judgment is void and has no res judicata effect in this action.”); see

Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc. (Direct Mail), 840 F.2d 685, 688 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant 

has been served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”). The Court therefore examines the propriety 

of service as to each Defendant.

a. Blessing-Co, Inc.

On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff served a copy of the summons and complaint on Blessing-Co’s 

registered agent Abdulgalil Fadhl Hussein, by substituted service on “Mike,” the purported 

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“person in charge” at “Blessing-Co, Inc.,” located at 3750 West Shields Avenue, California 

93722. (ECF No. 8.)2 The process server also mailed the papers to Blessing-Co, Inc. on April 5, 

2024, to the same address. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Blessing-Co., Inc, a California business entity, 

was served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A) and California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 415.20(a). 

Service may be completed on a corporation or LLC by delivering a copy of the summons 

and complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 

416.10(a). As to the manner in which such service may be completed, California law provides 

that: 

In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and 

complaint to the person to be served as specified in section 416.20

. . . a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons 

and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office . . . with 

the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter 

mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, 

postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy 

of the summons and complaint were left . . . .

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(a); see also Khourie, Crew & Jaeger v. Sabek, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 

3d 1009, 1013 (1990).

Although the affidavit of service contains largely boilerplate language without many 

factual details as to how the process server knew Mike was the person in charge or otherwise 

authorized to receive service of process, the Court is satisfied service was properly effected under 

California’s provisions for substitute service on a corporation pursuant to section 415.20(a) on 

Blessing-Co., Inc.

b. Xiaohong Chen, doing business as Moy’s Restaurant

Plaintiff proffers he served a copy of the summons and complaint on Xiaohong Chen on 

April 11, 2024, by personal service on Chen at 2636 East Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 

2 The Court notes the California Secretary of State’s website lists Abdulgalil Fadhl Hussein, located at 3750 W 

Shields Ave, Fresno, California 93722, as the agent authorized to accept service of process for Blessing-Co, Inc.

Business search results for Blessing-Co, Inc. (Entity No. 4844279), https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business 

(last visited November 15, 2024); see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (courts may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not 

subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Daniels–Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010).

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93726. (ECF No. 5.) The service affidavit indicates that the person served identified as 

Xiaohong Chen, a person doing business as Moy’s Restaurant. (Id.) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(A), service may be completed by 

“delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally.” Here, 

service affidavit indicates that Chen was served personally at their place of business. (Id.) 

Therefore, the Court finds that service was properly effectuated on Chen. 

c. Han Hong Li, doing business as Moy’s Restaurant

Plaintiff proffers he served a copy of the summons and complaint on Han Hong Li on 

April 11, 2024, by personal service on Li at 2636 East Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 93726. 

(ECF No. 4.) The service affidavit indicates that the person served identified as Han Hong Li, a 

person doing business as Moy’s Restaurant. (Id.) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(A), service may be completed by 

“delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally.” Here, 

service affidavit indicates that Li was served personally at their place of business. (Id.) 

Therefore, the Court finds that service was properly effectuated on Li. 

d. Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC, doing business as Noodle Q

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff served a copy of the summons and complaint on Golden 

Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC’s registered agent Cynthia Thacker, by substituted service on 

Hector Maldonado, CFO and person authorized to accept on behalf of Cynthia Thacker at 2648 

East Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 93726. (ECF No. 7.)3 The process server also mailed the 

papers to Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC on April 5, 2024, to the same address. (Id.) 

Plaintiff proffers Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC, a California business entity, was served 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A) and California Code of Civil Procedure § 

415.20(a). 

As discussed above, service may be completed on a corporation or LLC by delivering a 

3 The Court notes the California Secretary of State’s website lists Cynthia Thacker, located at 2648 E Ashland 

Avenue, Fresno, California 93726, as the agent authorized to accept service of process for Golden Tripod Restaurant 

Group, LLC. Business search results for Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC (Entity No. 201804610009), 

https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business (last visited November 15, 2024); see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Daniels–

Hall, 629 F.3d at 998-99.

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copy of the summons and complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process. Cal. 

Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10(a); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(a); see also Khourie, Crew & Jaeger, 

220 Cal. App. 3d at 1013. Although the affidavit of service contains largely boilerplate language 

without many factual details as to how the process server knew Hector Maldonado was the CFO 

or was otherwise authorized to receive service of process, the Court is satisfied service was 

properly effected under California’s provisions for substitute service on a corporation pursuant to 

section 415.20(a) on Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10(b).

e. Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC, doing business as Noodle Q

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff served a copy of the summons and complaint on Golden 

Tripod Restaurant, LLC’s registered agent Cynthia Thacker, by substituted service on Hector 

Maldonado, CFO and person authorized to accept on behalf of Cynthia Thacker at 2648 East 

Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 93726. (ECF No. 6.)4 The process server also mailed the 

papers to Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC on April 5, 2024, to the same address. (Id.) Plaintiff 

proffers Golden Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC, a California business entity, was served pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A) and California Code of Civil Procedure § 

415.20(a). 

As discussed above, service may be completed on a corporation or LLC by delivering a 

copy of the summons and complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process. Cal. 

Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10(a); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(a); see also Khourie, Crew & Jaeger, 

220 Cal. App. 3d at 1013. Although the affidavit of service contains largely boilerplate language 

without many factual details as to how the process server knew Hector Maldonado was the CFO 

or was otherwise authorized to receive service of process, the Court is satisfied service was 

properly effected under California’s provisions for substitute service on a corporation pursuant to 

section 415.20(a) on Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10(b).

In sum, the Court finds service was properly effectuated on all defendants. Accordingly, 

4 The Court notes the California Secretary of State’s website lists Cynthia Thacker, located at 2648 E Ashland 

Avenue, Fresno, California 93726, as the agent authorized to accept service of process for Golden Tripod Restaurant, 

LLC. Business search results for Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC (Entity No. 202253916878), 

https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business (last visited November 15, 2024); see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Daniels–

Hall, 629 F.3d at 998-99.

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the Court shall proceed to consideration of whether the Eitel factors would weigh in favor of 

granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

B. Evaluation of the Eitel Factors in Favor of Default Judgment

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that consideration of the Eitel factors 

weighs for granting default judgment.

1. Possibility of Prejudice Toward Plaintiff 

Generally, where default has been entered against a defendant, a plaintiff has no other 

means by which to recover against that defendant. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177;

Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Allstate Beauty Prods., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff would be prejudiced if default judgment were not granted because 

Plaintiff does not have any other way to recover against Defendants. See Vogel v. Rite Aid 

Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2014). This factor weighs in favor of default 

judgment against Defendants.

2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The second and third Eitel factors, taken together, “require that a plaintiff state a claim on 

which the [plaintiff] may recover.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (brackets in original). 

The complaint asserts claims under the ADA, the Unruh Act, and Health and Safety Code. 

Plaintiff’s motion, however, only requests default judgment with respect to the ADA and the 

Unruh Act claims. 

a. Americans with Disabilities Act

Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 

basis of disability” in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “Discrimination” 

is defined as a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, 

when modification is necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 

or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless modifications would fundamentally 

alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 

Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 

“To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is 

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disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 

operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 

F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Facilities include “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, 

complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking 

lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, 

or equipment is located.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of 

discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also 

prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural 

barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 

Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Parr v. L & L 

Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000)); see also Wyatt v. Ralphs Grocery 

Co., 65 F. App’x 589, 590 (9th Cir. 2003). 

i. Whether Plaintiff is Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA

Plaintiff must allege that he is disabled under the ADA. Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. The 

ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 

major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Major life activities include walking, standing, 

and hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). An individual who is substantially limited in his ability to 

walk is disabled under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

Plaintiff alleges that he is substantially limited in his ability to walk and uses a cane for 

mobility. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 8.) Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded this element of his ADA 

claim.

ii. Whether Defendants Own, Lease, or Operate a Place of Public Accommodation

Plaintiff must allege each Defendant “owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. The Court finds the 

Facilities are places of public accommodation. This is supported by Plaintiff’s allegations (ECF 

No. 1, ¶¶ 9) and the ADA, which provides that a “restaurant” is considered a public 

accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B). 

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Plaintiff’s complaint generally states that each of the Defendants “own, operate, and/or 

lease the real property consisting of the real property and common areas of the Facilities as well 

as the physical structures thereon (including the buildings in which each of the individual Tenant 

Defendants’ Facilities is located), and consists of a person (or persons), firm, or corporation.” 

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff explains that Defendant Blessing-Co is the landlord for both Moy’s 

Restaurant and Noodle Q. (Id., ¶ 2, 7.) In turn, Defendants Chen and Li do business as Moy’s 

Restaurant, and Defendants Golden Group and Golden Tripod Restaurant do business as Noodle 

Q. (Id.) 

In support that Blessing-Co is the relevant landlord, Plaintiff proffers the Grant Deed 

evidencing that Blessing-Co. owns the real property (Parcel ID 436-041-02S) on which the 

Facilities are located. (ECF No. 16, ¶ 16; ECF No. 16-1, pp. 20-22.) Further, Plaintiff produced 

a the most recently filed Statement of Information filed by Blessing Co., Inc. from the California 

Secretary of State’s Business Search database, indicating Blessing-Co, Inc. owns the shopping 

center at 3750 W Shields Ave, Fresno, California 93722. (ECF No. 16, ¶ 17; ECF No. 16-1, pp. 

24-26.) 

Regarding Chen and Li as owners and operators of Moy’s Restaurant, Plaintiff has 

included public records, including an assessor’s record for business property tax, a fictitious 

business name record, and a license from the California Alcoholic Beverage Control. (ECF No. 

16, ¶ 18.) The Court finds that these records collectively and individually indicate that Xiaohong 

Chen and Han Li conduct their business of Moy’s Restaurant at 2636 East Ashlan Avenue, 

Fresno, California 93726. (ECF No. 16-1, pp. 27-30.) 

Regarding Golden Tripod Group and Golden Tripod Restaurant as owners and operators 

of Noodle Q, Plaintiff has included public records, including a Sales and Use Tax for Noodle Q, a 

Statement of Information filed by Golden Tripod Group and/or Golden Tripod Restaurant from 

the California Secretary of State’s Business Search database. (ECF No. 16-1, pp. 32-36.) The 

Court finds that these records collectively and individually indicate that Golden Tripod Group 

and/or Golden Tripod Restaurant own and operate Noodle Q located at 2648 East Ashlan Avenue, 

Fresno, California 93726. (Id.) 

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In consideration of the supporting declaration of counsel and supporting property records, 

the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Blessing-Co is the landlord for the 

businesses of Moy’s Restaurant and Noodle Q. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

sufficiently alleged that Defendants Chen and Li own and operate Moy’s Restaurant, and 

Defendants Golden Tripod Group and/or Golden Tripod Restaurant own and operate Noodle Q.

iii. Plaintiff Was Denied Public Accommodations Due to an Architectural Barrier

(1) Whether Denial of Access Was Due to Disability 

Plaintiff must allege and prove that he was denied public accommodations by a defendant 

because of his disability. Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he visited Moy’s 

Restaurant on June 14, 2023, and the entrance door was heavy and closed too quickly; the door to 

the men’s restroom had a round door knob that was hard to grasp; the locking mechanism on the 

door to the toilet required tight pinching; the toilet seat was too low; the toilet seat cover, toilet 

paper, and paper towel dispensers were too high; the faucet controls on the sink were round and 

required tight grasping and twisting; and the transaction counter was obstructed by chairs placed 

in front of it. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 10(a)-(i).) 

On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff alleges he visited Noodle Q and there was a loose floor mat 

near Plaintiff’s table that caught on his chair; the door to the men’s restroom was heavy and 

difficult to open for Plaintiff; the locking mechanism on the door to the toilet require tight 

pinching to operate; the toilet was positioned too far from the side wall, making it hard to use the 

grab bar and reach for the toilet paper dispenser; and the toilet seat cover, paper towel, and soap 

dispensers were positioned too high. (Id. at ¶ 10(j)-(o).) 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately established he was denied access to the 

Facilities due to his disability.

(2) Architectural Barrier

Congress entrusted the Attorney General with promulgating the implementing regulations 

for Title III. Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 12186(b)). Congress provided that these implementing regulations must be consistent 

with the minimum guidelines issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance 

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Board, which issued its final ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities 

(“ADAAG”) in 1991. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c); 36 C.F.R. Pt. 1191, App. A). The 

Attorney General adopted the ADAAG as the “Standards for Accessible Design,” which lay out 

the technical structural requirements of places of public accommodation and are applicable during 

the design, construction, and alteration of such facilities. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A).

“Whether a facility is ‘readily accessible’ is defined, in part, by the ADA Accessibility 

Guidelines.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff proffers that because no discovery has occurred, he does not know if the Facility 

was constructed or had any alteration done after March 15, 2012, and therefore will apply the 

1991 ADAAG standards to determine whether a barrier existed at the time of his visit to the 

Facility. (ECF No. 13-1, p. 4-5.) However, Plaintiff submits—and the Court agrees—that the 

2010 Standards now in effect will govern any injunction which issues, since the remedial work 

will be undertaken after March 15, 2012. (Id. at p. 5.)

As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that it was difficult for him to navigate the space in the 

Facilities, including the bathrooms. Thus, it appears Moy’s Restaurant failed to provide a door 

with the appropriate sweep period; handles or other operating devices on accessible doors, 

including toilet stall doors, that are easy to grasp and do not require tight pinching or twisting; a 

toilet at the appropriate height with correctly positioned side and rear grab bars; controls, 

dispensers, and receptacles, including toilet paper dispenses, within specified reach ranges; 

acceptable control mechanisms for faucet controls; an accessible sales and service counter, in 

violation of 1991 ADAAG §§ 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.13.10, 4.13.9, 4.16.3, 4.16.6, 4.17.5, 4.17.6, 4.27.3, 

4.27.4, and 7.2. (Id. at pp. 5-7.) 

In addition, it appears that Noodle Q failed to provide secured carpet or carpet tile; a 

men’s room door with the appropriate weight and sweep period; handles or other operating 

devices on all accessible doors, including toilet stall doors, that are easy to grasp and do not 

require tight pinching or twisting; a toilet the appropriate distance from the wall and toilet paper 

dispenser; controls, dispensers, and receptacles within appropriate reach ranges, as well as height 

ranges, in violation of 1991 ADAAG §§ 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.5.3, 4.13.9, 4.13.10, 4.13.11, 4.17.3, 

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4.17.5, and 4.27.3. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) 

The Court notes that even on default judgment in ADA cases, plaintiffs often present the 

results of an investigation by an independent consultant, such as a construction expert that takes 

measurements, or at least a more detailed declaration of the plaintiff in support of the claim that 

there is an architectural barrier. Such details do not appear in this instant motion. Nonetheless, 

taking the allegations as true for purposes of default judgment as presented by Plaintiff in his 

complaint, and based on the applicable laws and regulations, the Court finds Plaintiff has 

sufficiently alleged and demonstrated the presence of architectural barriers at the Facility which 

violate the ADA.

(3) Whether Removal of the Barrier Is Readily Achievable

Removal of an architectural barrier is “readily achievable” if it is “easily accomplishable 

and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C § 12181(9). Factors to 

be considered in determining whether such removal is readily achievable include: 

(A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter; (B) 

the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in 

the action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the 

effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such 

action upon the operation of the facility; (C) the overall financial 

resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a 

covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 

number, type, and location of its facilities; and (D) the type of 

operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 

composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such 

entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal 

relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered 

entity.

Id. Federal regulations provide examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers, 

including: rearranging tables, chairs and other furniture, installing grab bars in toilet stalls, 

installing a raised toilet seat, repositioning papers towel dispensers in bathrooms, removing high 

pile, low density carpeting. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b).

“All the plaintiff must do at the pleadings stage to proceed under § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) is 

plausibly allege that the barrier’s removal is readily achievable.” Whitaker v. Sheikh, No. 21-cv0493-KJM-KJN, 2022 WL 1262023, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2022). If the defendant fails to 

plead an applicable affirmative defense, “the plaintiff is effectively entitled to judgment on the 

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pleadings as to that claim—assuming he pleads the preceding elements of a qualifying disability, 

a covered public accommodation, and an architectural barrier encountered.” Id.; cf. Lopez v. 

Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants can easily remove the architectural barriers at the 

Facilities without much difficulty or expense, that the cost of removing the architectural barriers 

does not exceed the benefits under the particular circumstances, and that Defendants violated the 

ADA by failing to remove those barriers, when it was readily achievable to do so.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 

21.) In the motion, Plaintiff maintains Defendants can easily remove the barriers without much 

difficulty or expense. (ECF No. 13-1, p. 8.) 

For purposes of default judgment, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that 

removal of the architectural barriers he encountered is readily achievable. Federal regulations 

provide a non-exclusive list of steps to remove barriers, including rearranging tables, chairs, and 

other furniture; installing accessible door hardware; installing grab bars in toilet stalls; 

rearranging toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space; installing a raised toilet seat; 

repositioning the paper towel dispenser in the bathroom; and removing high pile, low density 

carpeting. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.304(b)(4), (11), (12), (13), (15), (17), (20). Courts have also observed 

that such listed items are “examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers” and found

similar allegations to those alleged here sufficient at the default judgment stage. See Johnson v. 

Garlic Farm Truck Ctr. LLC, No. 20-cv-03871-BLF, 2021 WL 2457154, at *5-*6 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 

16, 2021). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has met his burden to plausibly show that a 

proposal for removing certain identified barriers is readily achievable.

In sum, Plaintiff has plausible alleged a prima facie claim for discrimination under Title 

III against the Defendant owner and operator of the Facilities. Plaintiff is thereby entitled to 

injunctive relief for the violations of the ADA as asserted.

b. California’s Unruh Act

Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for violations of the Unruh Act. Pursuant to the 

Unruh Act, all persons are “entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 

privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal Civ. Code 

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§ 51(b). Additionally, no business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate 

against any person in this state on account of disability. Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5. Unlike the ADA, 

the Unruh Act permits the recovery of monetary damages, in the form of actual and treble 

damages, at a statutory minimum of at least $4,000.00 per violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); 

Molski, 481 F.3d at 731; Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. After passage of the ADA in 1990, the 

Unruh Act was amended to provide that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the 

Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d). Thus, the Unruh Act incorporates an individual’s rights 

under the ADA by reference, such that a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Here, Plaintiff argues Defendants denied him full and equal accommodations, advantages, 

facilities, privileges, and services in a business establishment based on his disability. (ECF No. 1, 

¶¶ 35-42.) Because the complaint properly alleges a prima facie claim under the ADA against the 

both the owner and operator of the Facilities, the Court finds Plaintiff has also adequately alleged 

facts establishing the necessary elements for an Unruh Act claim.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of

default judgment as asserted against Defendant Blessing-Co, as landlord of the facilities, 

Defendants Chen and Li as owners and operators of Moy’s Restaurant, and Defendants Golden 

Tripod Group and Golden Tripod Restaurant as owners and operators of Noddle Q.

3. The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

The sum of money at stake in this action weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F Supp. 2d at 1176; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 

219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Default judgment is disfavored where large amounts of 

money are involved, or the award would be unreasonable in light of the defendant’s actions. G & 

G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Nguyen, No. 3:11-cv-06340-JW, 2012 WL 2339699, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. May 30, 2012); PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Here, in addition to injunctive relief, 

Plaintiff is seeking statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.00, attorneys’ fees in the amount of 

$2,925.50, and costs of $871.44, for a total award of $11,796.94. (ECF No. 13-1 at 9-12.) This is 

not an excessive amount of money, nor does it seem unreasonable considering the allegations 

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contained in the complaint. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citing Moore v. Cisneros, No. 

1:12-cv-00188 LJO SKO, 2012 WL 6523017, *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012); Johnson v. Huynh, 

No. CIV S-08-1189 JAM DAD, 2009 WL 2777021, *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009). Accordingly, 

this factor does not weigh against default judgment.

4. The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The next Eitel factor considers the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts. As 

discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged disability discrimination under the ADA and 

the Unruh Act by demonstrating his encountering of architectural barriers at the Facilities. The 

Court finds this factor weighs in favor of entering default judgment as there is no possibility of 

dispute regarding the material facts due to the factual allegations in the complaint being taken as 

true upon Defendants’ default. See Garamendi, 683 F.3d at 1080; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1177. Accordingly, the Court finds this Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting default 

judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants.

5. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility that Defendants’ default resulted from 

excusable neglect. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Courts have found that where a 

defendant was “properly served with the complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the 

paper in support of the [default judgment] motion,” there is no evidence of excusable neglect.

Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment because

Defendants have failed to file a responsive pleading or otherwise appear in this action, including 

attending the hearing on the motion for default judgment. See id.

6. Policy Favoring a Decision on the Merits

Generally, default judgments are disfavored, and a case should be decided on the merits 

whenever possible. See Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985). 

However, the policy favoring decisions on the merits does not weigh against entering default 

judgment where, as here, Defendants’ failure to appear has made a decision on the merits 

impossible at this juncture. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. 

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Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010). Given the prejudice to 

Plaintiff if default judgment is not granted, and the merits of the allegations contained in the 

complaint, granting default judgment in this case would not violate the general policy under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1177. Accordingly, the Court finds the policy favoring decisions on the merit does 

not weigh against entering default judgment against Defendants under these circumstances. 

In sum, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment 

and will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be granted. The Court now turns 

to the types of relief requested by Plaintiff.

C. Requested Relief

In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the amount of 

$8,000.00, attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,925.50, and costs of $871.44, for a total award of 

$11,796.94. (ECF No. 13-1 at 9-11.) While the Court will recommend granting Plaintiff’s 

injunction in full, the award of attorneys’ fees should be reduced for the reasons discussed below. 

1. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks an injunction compelling Defendant to comply with the ADA by removing 

the itemized barriers that Plaintiff personally encountered. (ECF No. 1, pp. 10-11; ECF No. 13-1, 

p. 9.) The ADA provides that “injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make 

such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent 

required” by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). A court may grant injunctive relief for 

violations of the Unruh Act under § 52.1(h). Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015; Cal. Civ. Code § 

52.1. “Injunctive relief may be granted ‘when architectural barriers at defendant’s establishment 

violate the ADA.’” Johnson v. Pizano, No. 2:17-cv-1655 TLN DB, 2019 WL 2499188, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. June 17, 2019) (quoting Vogel, 992 F.Supp.2d at 1015). 

Pursuant to federal and California law, Plaintiff is entitled to the removal of those 

architectural barriers which he encountered on his visit to the Facilities that violated the ADA. 

Therefore, an injunction should issue requiring Defendant to remove barriers that are in violation 

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of the ADA and the ADAAG.

2. Statutory Damages

Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.00 as authorized by the 

California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Unruh Act provides for minimum statutory damages of 

$4,000.00 for each violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Under the Unruh Act, statutory damages 

may be recovered if a violation of one or more construction-related accessibility standards denied 

the plaintiff full and equal access to the place of public accommodation on a particular occasion. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(a). A plaintiff is denied full and equal access only when they personally 

encountered the violation on a specific occasion. Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b). A litigant need not 

prove any actual damages to recover statutory damages of $4,000.00 for each violation. Molski, 

481 F.3d at 731. 

Because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged violation of the ADA which established a violation 

of the Unruh Act, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of 

$8,000.00. 

3. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees in the amount of $2,925.50, and costs in the 

amount of $871.44. (ECF No. 34-1 at 6–8.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the party that 

prevails on a claim brought under the ADA may recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including 

litigation expenses,” at the discretion of the Court. “[U]nder federal fee shifting statutes the 

lodestar approach is the guiding light in determining a reasonable fee.” Antoninetti v. Chipotle 

Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). The Ninth Circuit has 

explained the lodestar approach as follows:

The lodestar/multiplier approach has two parts. First a court 

determines the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 

The party seeking an award of fees must submit evidence 

supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed. A district court 

should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not 

reasonably expended because they are excessive, redundant, or 

otherwise unnecessary. Second, a court may adjust the lodestar 

upward or downward using a multiplier based on factors not 

subsumed in the initial calculation of the lodestar. The lodestar 

amount is presumptively the reasonable fee amount, and thus a 

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multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or 

downward only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by both 

specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower 

courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably 

high. 

Van Gerwin v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041,1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). 

Under the lodestar method, a district court will first determine the appropriate hourly rate 

for the work performed, and that amount is then multiplied by the number of hours properly 

expended in performing the work. Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1176. The district court has the 

discretion to make adjustments to the number of hours claimed or to the lodestar but is required to 

provide a clear but concise reason for the fee award. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 

(9th Cir. 1992). The lodestar amount is to be determined based upon the prevailing market rate in 

the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). 

a. Reasonable hourly rate

Counsel Tanya Moore (“Moore”) has been in practice for over twenty years, with over ten 

years spent almost exclusively in disability access litigation, and her current billing rate is 

$650.00. (ECF No. 16, ¶¶ 4, 6.) However, Moore is only seeking an hourly rate of $300.00 for 

her work on this matter. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Moore is also seeking an hourly rate of $115.00 for the 

work of paralegals Whitney Law (“Law”), despite normally billing at a higher rate in the 

Northern District of California, where the firm is located. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

The lodestar amount is to be determined based upon the prevailing market rate in the 

relevant community, Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 (1984), which in this matter is the Fresno Division of 

the Eastern District of California. “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, 

the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s 

own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 

465 U.S. at 895 n.11. 

This Court has previously found $300.00 per hour to be a reasonable rate for Moore. See, 

e.g., Gilbert v. HBA Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:2-cv-01358-JLT-SAB, 2022 WL 2663761, at *17 

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(E.D. Cal. July 11, 2022). Further, in the context of cases alleging violations of the ADA, courts 

in this district have awarded fees ranging from $250.00 to $325.00 per hour within recent years. 

See, e.g., Cervantes v. Vargas, No. 1:17-cv-00923-LJO-SKO, 2018 WL 2455615, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

June 1, 2018) (awarding $275.00 per hour to attorney with nine years of experience and 

representation in 275 ADA actions); Block v. Christian, No. 1:16-cv00650-LJO-SKO, 2017 WL 

5248402, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding $325.00 per hour to be a reasonable hourly rate 

for an attorney with twenty-four years of experience in general litigation and twelve years 

working on ADA cases). Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff receive the 

requested $300.00 per hour for the services of Moore. 

The Court also recommends that Plaintiff receive the requested $115.00 per hour for the 

services of Law. The Court has previously found the rate to be reasonable. See, e.g., Gilbert, 

2022 WL 2663761, at *17; see also Durham v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00596-JLT, 2020 WL 

243115, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020) (“Generally, paralegal rates within the Fresno Division of 

the Eastern District range between $75 to approximately $150.00.”). 

b. Reasonable number of hours

Moore billed 4.5 hours on this matter; Law billed a total of 13.7 hours. (ECF No. 13-1, p. 

11-12; ECF No. 16, ¶¶ 10-11.) The Court has previously observed that “[b]ased upon the Court’s 

familiarity with the actions filed by Ms. Moore’s firm in this court, the Court is aware that 

[Moore uses a] form complaint [that] is substantially similar to dozens of other actions filed in 

this district,” and previously found “time billed [to be] excessive and duplicative.” Lakhani, 2017 

WL 1831942, at *7. 

Turning to the specific time entries, the Court finds the following billing entries to be 

clerical in nature, and therefore will reduce the fee awards for those entries accordingly: (1) 

Law’s April 3, 2024 entry from 0.3 hours to 0 hours to review court documents and calendar; (2) 

Law April 3, 2024, entry from 0.8 hours to 0 hours to “[s]end documents out for service on five 

defendants;”5(3) Law’s April 12, 2024 and April 15, 2024 entries from 0.4 hours to 0 hours for 

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In addition to appearing to be primarily clerical, the Court notes that there are three affidavits on the docket 

reflecting that process server Joshua Masterson mailed service documents to Defendants Blessing-Co, Golden Tripod

Group, and Golden Tripod Restaurant. (ECF Nos. 6-8.) Further, personal service was effectuated on Defendants 

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filing and calendaring proofs of service; and (4) Law’s September 16, 2024 entry from 0.2 hours 

to 0 hours to review the Court’s standing order. See Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 

288 n.10 (1989) (“purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, 

regardless of who performs them”); see also Block v. Narwal, Case No. 1:22-cv-00597-ADAEPG, 2022 WL 17455502, at *11 (E.D. Cal. December 6, 2022) (awarding no fee for Medrano’s 

boilerplate entry wherein he spent “.3 hours ‘Review[ing] order setting scheduling conference to 

calendar hearing date, set deadline to complete Rule 26 call, and deadline to file joint scheduling 

report’” due to its clerical nature.). Because the Court finds the above-mentioned entries consist 

of purely clerical work or secretarial tasks, the Court recommends the above reductions.

Further, it is unreasonable for Moore to bill for preparation of CCDA reports, as previous 

courts have found that such a task is purely clerical and one a non-attorney could perform at a 

much lower cost. See, e.g., Block v. Alzamzami, Case No. 1:23-cv-00061-JLT-SKO, 2024 WL 

664463 (E.D. Cal. February 16, 2024). As such, the Court recommends no fee be awarded for

Moore’s April 10, 2024 entry related to preparation of CCDA reports. 

The Court finds the remaining billing entries to have been reasonably expended by 

Plaintiff’s representation. Totaling the above reductions, the Court finds that a reduction of 0.5

hours is reasonable for Moore and a reduction of 1.7 hours is reasonable for Law. The Court 

additionally recommends allocating 0.1 hours for the time Moore expended preparing for and 

attending the November 20, 2024 hearing, which lasted for less than five minutes. 

c. Total Reasonable Attorneys’ Fee Award and Costs

The Court finds that counsel Tanya Moore reasonably expended 4.1 hours in this litigation

at a reasonable rate of $300 per hour, for a total of $1,230.00, and senior paralegal Whitney Law 

reasonably expended 12 hours at a reasonable rate of $115 per hour, for a total of $1,380. The 

Court therefore will recommend awarding Plaintiff $2,610.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

d. Costs

The ADA authorizes the award of costs for an action. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see 28 U.S.C. 

Chen and Li (ECF Nos. 4-5), negating any need for mailing. Therefore, the Court finds this entry to also be 

duplicitous.

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§ 1920. Plaintiff seeks costs of $405.00 for filing fees; $425.00 for service expense on 

Defendants; and $41.44 in postage (ECF No. 16, ¶¶ 12-14, Exs. B, C.) The Court finds such

costs have been reasonably expended in association with this litigation.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment, and the entry of default 

judgment is within the discretion of the Court. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th 

Cir. 1980). 

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 34) be GRANTED: 

2. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.00;

3. Plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,610.00;

4. Plaintiff be awarded costs in the amount of $871.44; and

5. Plaintiff be GRANTED an injunction requiring Defendants Blessing-Co, Chen, and Li, 

within six (6) months of entry of the order, to provide disability access by making the 

following modifications to the property known as known as Moy’s Restaurant, located 

at 2636 East Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 93726, such that each item is brought 

into compliance with the accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act and California Code of Regulations, Title 24, by:

a. Providing a properly configured entrance door, including sweep time;

b. Providing a door to the men’s restroom with a properly configured door knob;

c. Providing a properly configured locking mechanism on the door to the toilet 

compartment;

d. Providing a properly configured toilet in the men’s restroom toilet compartment;

e. Providing a properly placed toilet seat cover dispenser in the men’s restroom 

toilet compartment;

f. Providing a properly placed toilet paper dispenser in the men’s restroom toilet 

compartment; 

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g. Providing properly configured faucet controls on the sink in the men’s restroom;

h. Providing a properly placed paper towel dispenser in the men’s restroom; and

i. Providing a properly configured transaction counter that is unobstructed.

6. Plaintiff be GRANTED an injunction requiring Defendants Blessing-Co, Inc., Golden 

Tripod Restaurant Group, LLC, and Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC, within six (6) 

months of entry of the order, to provide disability access by making the following 

modifications to the property known as known as Noodle Q, located at 2648 East 

Ashlan Avenue, Fresno, California 93726, such that each item is brought into 

compliance with the accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

and California Code of Regulations, Title 24, by:

a. Providing properly secured floor mats in the facility;

b. Providing a door to the men’s restroom that is properly configured as to weight 

and sweep time;

c. Providing a properly configured locking mechanism on the toilet compartment 

in the men’s restroom;

d. Providing a properly placed toilet within the toilet compartment in the men’s 

restroom;

e. Providing a properly placed toilet seat cover dispenser in the toilet compartment 

in the men’s restroom; and

f. Providing a properly placed soap and paper towel dispenser in the men’s 

restroom.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen 

(14) days of service of these recommendations, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

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time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Further, Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to serve a copy of these findings and 

recommendations on Defendants within three (3) days of entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2024 

STANLEY A. BOONE

United States Magistrate Judge

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