Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-00419/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-00419-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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ORDER (No. 3:11-cv-00419-LB) 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

JOSE ANTONIO JARA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:11-cv-00419-LB 

ORDER DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER 

[Re: ECF No. 108] 

This case involves the plaintiff Jose Jara’s assertion of federal and state claims against Aurora 

Loan Services, LLC and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. in connection with the 

foreclosure of his property located at 330 Arbor Drive, South San Francisco, California. (Fourth 

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 72, ¶ 1). The court dismissed the Mr. Jara’s Fourth Amended 

Complaint with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of the defendants and against Mr. Jara in 

March 2012. (3/30/12 Order, ECF No. 87; 3/30/12 Judgment, ECF No. 88.) Mr. Jara appealed the 

court’s final judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has yet 

to rule. (Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 91; see Motion, ECF No. 108 at 3.) 

On September 8, 2015, Mr. Jara filed in this court an “emergency motion under [Ninth] Circuit 

Rule 27-3” (Emergency and Urgent Motions), which asks the court to issue a temporary 

restraining order enjoining the defendants from conducting a foreclosure sale that currently is set 

for September 12, 2015. (Motion, ECF No. 108.) 

Case 3:11-cv-00419-LB Document 109 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 2
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ORDER (No. 3:11-cv-00419-LB) 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

“Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters 

being appealed.” Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. S.W. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per 

curiam); McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley Typographical Union No. 46, 686 F.2d 731, 

734 (9th Cir .1982)). “This rule is judge-made; its purpose is to promote judicial economy and 

avoid the confusion that would ensue from having the same issues before two courts 

simultaneously.” Id. (citing Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir.1983); 

20 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 303.32[1] (3d ed. 2000)).1

Mr. Jara appealed the court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissing 

his Fourth Amended Complaint. His motion for a temporary restraining order asks the court to 

enjoin the defendants because the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on this appeal. This court, 

however, is divested of jurisdiction over that matter. Jurisdiction instead lies with the Ninth 

Circuit. In addition, the court notes that Mr. Jara also filed in his appellate matter a motion asking 

the Ninth Circuit to enjoin the defendants for the very same reason he asserts here. A ruling on a 

motion by this court, when the same motion is pending before the Ninth Circuit, would not 

promote judicial economy and would create unnecessary confusion. Accordingly, the court denies 

Mr. Jara’s motion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 9, 2015 

______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

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 There is an exception that does not apply here. “The district court retains jurisdiction during the 

pendency of an appeal to act to preserve the status quo.” Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 

S.W. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). “This exception to the jurisdictional 

transfer principle has been codified in Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .” Id.

Rule 62(c) provides that “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final 

judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or 

grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Here, 

Mr. Jara’s appeal is from the court’s dismissal of his Fourth Amended Complaint, not from an 

interlocutory order or judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction. 

Case 3:11-cv-00419-LB Document 109 Filed 09/09/15 Page 2 of 2