Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03649/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03649-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3649

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Charles Chambers; Ola Chambers,

Administrators of the Estate of

Sidney Chambers, deceased,

Appellants,

v.

City of Fordyce, Arkansas; Joe

Pennington, Chief of Police,

Individually, and in his official

capacity; Marvin Harrison, Officer,

Individually, and in his Official

Capacity; Jimmy Foreman, Officer,

Individually and in his Official

Capacity, originally sued as Tommy

Foreman,

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: November 12, 2007

 Filed: November 29, 2007

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Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Appellate Case: 04-3649 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/29/2007 Entry ID: 3376932
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The Honorable William R. Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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Charles and Ola Chambers, the parents of Sidney Chambers and the coadministrators of his estate, appeal the district court's1

 denial of their Motion to

Reopen Case and/or Relief for [sic] Judgment related to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

they brought against the appellees based on excessive force in the shooting death of

their son. We affirm the district court's Order denying the Motion to Reopen, and we

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction to the extent it raises issues related to the

summary judgment granted to the City of Fordyce and to Chief of Police Joe

Pennington.

Fordyce City Police Officer Jimmy Foreman approached Sidney Chambers and

another individual as they walked down a Fordyce street late one night. When Officer

Foreman asked the men their names, Sidney took off running, and Officer Foreman

pursued him on foot. The events that transpired during the chase are disputed, but it

ended when Officer Foreman shot Sidney point blank in the chest with his service

revolver. Sidney died from his wound. Fordyce City Police Officer Marvin Harrison

was the first officer on the scene following the shooting. The parties dispute whether

Sidney pulled a gun from his pants during his struggle with Officer Foreman or

whether the gun found near his body was planted there by Officer Harrison. 

Sidney's parents, as co-administrators of his estate, brought a § 1983 claim and

related pendant state law claims asserting excessive use of force against Officers

Foreman and Harrison in both their individual and official capacities. They also

brought claims for failure to train and supervise against Joe Pennington, Chief of

Police of the Fordyce City Police Department, in both his individual and official

capacities and against the City of Fordyce. The district court granted summary

judgment to the City on all claims, to Pennington, Harrison, and Foreman on the

official capacity claims, and to Pennington on his individual capacity claim in March

Appellate Case: 04-3649 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/29/2007 Entry ID: 3376932
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2002. The district court denied the Chambers' Motion for Relief from Partial

Summary Judgment on March 7, 2003. The case proceeded against Harrison and

Foreman in their individual capacities until the parties reached a settlement on those

claims in July 2004. The district court entered an Order Granting Joint Motion to

Dismiss with Prejudice as to Separate Defendants Marvin Harrison and Jimmy

Foreman on July 2, 2004. The docket sheet entry for the July 2 Order states that

"pltf's complt is dismissed; terminating case." (Dist. Ct. docket entry # 42.) The

Chambers filed a Motion to Reopen Case and/or Relief for [sic] Judgment on August

16, 2004, asserting that the official capacity claims remained pending against Officers

Harrison and Foreman. The district court denied the motion on September 23, 2004,

finding that the official capacity claims had been dismissed with the 2002 summary

judgment order. The Chambers filed a Notice of Appeal in the district court on

October 25, 2004.

After this appeal was docketed, the appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal,

arguing that the Notice of Appeal was untimely and we therefore lack jurisdiction over

the appeal. Appellees are correct that "[f]iling requirements for appeals are mandatory

and jurisdictional." Hable v. Pairolero, 915 F.2d 394, 394 (8th Cir. 1990). In fact, we

have an independent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction exists. See Bilello v.

Kum & Go, LLC., 374 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2004). The merits of the Chambers'

appeal brief address only the summary judgment order entered in favor of the City and

Chief of Police Pennington in 2002. Consequently, there are actually two issues that

potentially prevent us from exercising jurisdiction over those issues in this appeal: the

timeliness of the Notice of Appeal and the effectiveness of the Notice of Appeal to

reach the 2002 summary judgment order.

A notice of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after the judgment or order

appealed from is entered." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Because the summary

judgment order was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, the Chambers had to

await entry of final judgment before they could appeal that ruling. Greer v. St. Louis

Appellate Case: 04-3649 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/29/2007 Entry ID: 3376932
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Reg'l Med. Ctr., 258 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Review must await a final

judgment disposing of all claims and, normally, attended by the formalities specified

in Fed. R. Civ. P. 58."). 

The district court's July 2, 2004, order dismissing the only remaining claims

against Harrison and Foreman effectively ended the case and was therefore the final

appealable order that could have started the appeal clock for all appealable orders in

the case, including the 2002 summary judgment. See Union Pac. R.R. v. United

Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1993) ("'A final decision under section 1291

generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute the judgment.'" (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,

233 (1945) (some internal marks omitted)). The Chambers did not file a notice of

appeal until October 25, 2004, well over 30 days after entry of the July 2, 2004, final

order. However, the district court did not enter judgment dismissing the case on a

separate document as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1). Thus,

judgment was not "entered for purposes of . . . Rule 4(a) . . . [until] 150 days ha[d] run

from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 79(a)," Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), and the appeal clock did not begin

to run until November 29, 2004, at the end of the 150-day period. But see Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) ("A failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document

when required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) does not affect the validity

of an appeal from that judgment or order."). The net effect of these rules is that the

Notice of Appeal filed on October 25, 2004, was actually premature, but is still timely

in relation to the July 2, 2004 final order. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss

Appeal to the extent it relies on the assertion that the Notice of Appeal was untimely.

Although the Notice of Appeal was timely to reach the final order, and thus

potentially the earlier partial summary judgment order, see Hawkins v. City of

Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 704 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a notice of appeal

designating only the final judgment was effective to also appeal an earlier summary

Appellate Case: 04-3649 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/29/2007 Entry ID: 3376932
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judgment order given the circumstances of the case), a notice of appeal still must

"designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed." Fed. R. App. P.

3(c)(1)(B). Like Rule 4, the Rule 3 requirements are jurisdictional. See Smith v.

Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) ("Although courts should construe Rule 3 liberally

when determining whether it has been complied with, noncompliance is fatal to an

appeal."); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (notice

of appeal specifically appealing a posttrial order granting judgment as a matter of law

on one claim was insufficient to also appeal an earlier grant of summary judgment on

a different claim not mentioned in the notice of appeal). 

The October 25, 2004, Notice of Appeal specifically identified "the Final

Judgment and Remedy Order entered in this action on the 23rd day of September,

2004." (Dist. Ct. docket entry # 49.) Although there is no document entitled "Final

Judgment and Remedy Order," the notice clearly refers to the district court's

September 23, 2004, order denying the Chambers' self-styled Motion to Reopen Case

and/or Relief for [sic] Judgment filed on August 16, 2004. The August 16 motion

does not specify the particular rule of federal civil procedure relied upon as the basis

for the motion. Given the timing and the substance of the motion, it most closely

resembles a Rule 60 motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. "An appeal from the

denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not raise the underlying judgment for our review

but only the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in ruling on the

Rule 60(b) motion." Noah v. Bond Cold Storage, 408 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir.2005);

see also Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978) ("[A]n

appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for

review."). Because the Notice of Appeal explicitly limits its reach to the Order

Denying the Motion to Reopen, we are limited to reviewing that order, and we lack

jurisdiction to review the district court's much earlier grant of summary judgment in

favor of the City and Chief of Police Pennington.

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On appeal, the Chambers' entire argument focuses on the summary judgment

order entered in favor of the City and Chief of Police Pennington. They do not take

issue with the district court's order denying their Motion to Reopen, which is limited

to the issue of whether the official capacity claims against Harrison and Foreman were

still pending following the settlement of the individual capacity claims. As a

procedural matter, the official capacity claims against Harrison and Foreman were

explicitly included in the earlier order granting summary judgment. (Dist. Ct. docket

entry # 2, at 6.) Further, we generally do not address issues not briefed on appeal.

See United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1524 (8th Cir. 1995) (addressing only the

issues that were properly briefed), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1149 (1996). In any event,

we find no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Motion

to Reopen. See Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 164-65, 169-70 (8th

Cir.1988) (construing postjudgment motion filed more than 10 days after entry of

judgment under Rule 60(b); standard of review). 

The appeal is dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction to the extent it seeks to

reach the 2002 summary judgment order, and the district court's order denying the

Motion to Reopen is affirmed.

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Appellate Case: 04-3649 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/29/2007 Entry ID: 3376932