Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00239/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfonso G. Fragoso, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Riening,1

 et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-239-TUC- JMR(HCE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereinafter “Petition”) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. No. 1). Pursuant to the Rules

of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court deny in part and dismiss the remainder of the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND: STATE PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner was convicted in Pima County Superior

Court, Arizona, of aggravated driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (hereinafter

“DUI”) while his driver’s license was suspended, revoked, or restricted, a class four felony.

(See Answer, Exh. A at p.1). In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State dismissed an

aggravated assault charge and a felony fleeing allegation. (See Answer, Exh. C). Upon

_______________________

1

Respondents have pointed out that “Charles L. Ryan is the Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections. Petitioner has apparently misidentified him as Charles Riening.”

(Answer (Doc. No. 7), p.1 n.1). Because Petitioner has identified Charles Riening as the

person having custody of him, and to remain consistent with the docket, the Court has used

the caption that appears on the docket. Respondents do not argue that Petitioner’s error is

fatal to his action, and, thus, have waived any such argument. See Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d.

350 (state waived lack of jurisdiction on the custodian’s behalf where petitioner failed to

name the correct party and state did not object).

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1

The correct citation for the case title and docket number cited by Petitioner is: United

States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2005), abrogated by United States v. McCall, 439

F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

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Petitioner’s admission to having two prior felony aggravated DUI convictions, the trial court

sentenced him to the presumptive, ten-year prison term. (See Answer, Exh. A at p.1;

Answer, Exh. C). 

After appointed counsel notified the trial court that “she was unable to find any

arguably meritorious legal issues to raise in a post-conviction petition...,” Petitioner filed a

pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter “PCR Petition”) pursuant to Rule 32

of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. (Answer, Exh. A at pp. 1-2 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Answer, Exh. B). In his PCR Petition, Petitioner argued that:

1. the trial court’s application of the criminal code to enhance Petitioner’s

sentence violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution

and did not comport with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) and “United States v. Ned Walker No.

04-1815 (11th Cir. 2005)...”1

, because Petitioner’s conviction arose from a

violation of the traffic code; and

2. his trial counsel was ineffective “by not challenging or researching the

authority of law on this subject matter of authorizes [sic] sentencing Agg-DUIs

[sic] offenders in a criminal statute.” 

(Answer, Exh. B).

On April 26, 2007, the state trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition.

(Answer, Exh. C).

On July 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the trial court’s denial of

his PCR Petition. (Answer, Exh. D). Therein, Petitioner argued that his sentence was

unconstitutional and his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his sentence all in

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Petitioner’s Petition was filed stamped by the Clerk of the Court on April 24, 2009.

A petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for mailing. See

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988). The Court deems the Petition commencing

this action as filed on April 14, 2009. See id.

3

Petitioner’s claims as outlined by this Court are not Petitioner’s own words, except

where indicated by quotation. The Court has characterized Petitioner’s claims for purposes

of clarity. 

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violation of his “due process, 6th amend [sic] rights to the protection of his substantial right

to liberty interest to this traffic offense.” (Id. at p.12).

On March 10, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s request for

review but denied relief. (Answer, Exh. A). Petitioner did not seek review before the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, p. 2; Petition, p. 3).

II. PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 14, 2009.2 Therein,

Petitioner alleges two grounds as the basis for relief:

1. that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated

because the trial court failed to uphold precedent established by the United

States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; and

2. that his trial counsel was ineffective because “if Counsel was to read the law

book Counsel would have found the casing [sic] this petitioner will cite in the

petition.”

(Petition, pp. 6-7).3

 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s Petition For Writ For Habeas Corpus is timely.

(Answer, p. 4). Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and/or

without merit. Petitioner did not file a Reply to Respondents’ Answer.

III. DISCUSSION 

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents argue that habeas review of some of Petitioner’s claims is barred because

such claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

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a. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed] his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (internal quotations omitted); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing

the factual or legal bases for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that

the...[petitioner is] asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S.

at 365-366. See also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere

similarity between a claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is

insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of the

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

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Respondents argue that to satisfy the exhaustion requirement Petitioner herein must

present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, pp. 4-5) That argument is

addressed infra, at II.B.

5

The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions

to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available for claims

that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

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Criminal Procedure.4 Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Thus, “[a] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court

for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the

proper forum..., (2) through the proper vehicle..., and (3) by providing the proper factual and

legal basis for the claim....” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

b. Procedural Default

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). A claim is procedurally

defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons

such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-805 (1991); Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial

reaffirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

Additionally, procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state

court and it is clear the state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for

procedural reasons. Id. Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal

habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available.5

 See Harris v. Reed,

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Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination

often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies

when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal

constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on

any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief,

with the exception of certain claims6

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile when it is timebarred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of Arizona

petition for post-conviction relief is distinct from preclusion under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

These instances of procedural default provide an independent and adequate state-law

ground for the conviction and sentence and thus prevents federal habeas corpus review.

Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal

review by allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to federal

court seeking review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-732 (1991).

(1.) Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause and

prejudice. Edwards v.Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000)(“We therefore require a prisoner

to demonstrate cause for his state-court default of any federal claim, and prejudice therefrom,

before the federal habeas court will consider the merits of that claim....The one exception to

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that rule,...is the circumstance in which the habeas petitioner can demonstrate a sufficient

probability that our failure to review his federal claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.”) (emphasis in original); Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.

2003)(“Because [petitioner] has procedurally defaulted her Confrontation Clause claim, she

‘may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual

innocence.’”) (citation omitted); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996);

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Generally,

“cause” sufficient “to excuse a default exists if the petitioner ‘can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 129

S.Ct. 1033 (2009), (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Examples of cause sufficient to

excuse a procedural default include “‘a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available to counsel,’ or that ‘some interference by officials’ made

compliance impracticable.’” Id. (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488)). Additionally, in certain

circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel may also constitute sufficient cause to

excuse a default. Id. (citing Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451; Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby

v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must

demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original). If the petitioner fails to establish

cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default, the court “need not consider whether he

suffered actual prejudice.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

134 n.43 (1982)). 

(2.) Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

A habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he can

show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). This exception

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to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can establish that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. See also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at

1028. “‘To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented at

trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

c. Conclusion

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default/bar are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default [or a fundamental miscarriage of justice]...the district

court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

2. Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

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“[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999), only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original). See also Holley v.

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-

77 (2006) (“Circuit precedent may not serve to create established federal law on an issue the

Supreme Court has not yet addressed”).

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Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary to” test and the

“unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court’s “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000)). Additionally, a state court’s

decision is “‘contrary to’ Supreme Court case law if the state court ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in’ Supreme Court cases.”7 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “Whether a

state court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a

question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state

courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)(distinguishing deference owed

under the “contrary to” test of section (d)(1) with that owed under the “unreasonable

application” test). 

Under the second test, “‘[a] state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Van

Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the “unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

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concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be

objectively unreasonable.’” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable

application of federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court

interpretations of federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929.

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978: see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 543 U.S. 1038 (2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s

findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert. 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

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Under the AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(e). The “AEDPA spells out what this presumption

means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the

first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof

that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the

clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once...” it is found that the state

court reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

proceeding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

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court.”8 Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Factual and credibility

determinations by either state trial or appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of

correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

2001). Furthermore, factual assertions made in support of properly exhausted claims in state

court cannot be altered or expanded upon without permission of the federal habeas court. See

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). Consequently, a federal habeas court

can only look to the record before the state court in determining whether a state court

decision is contrary to clearly established federal law. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652

(2004)(“[W]e have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must

be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.”)(citations omitted).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) that his trial

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counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). The Strickland test also applies to a petitioner’s challenge

of his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)). “In the context

of a guilty plea, the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged ineffective assistance

impinged on the...[petitioner ’s] ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea

of guilty." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980. 

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious...that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The relevant inquiry is

not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by defense

counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). In

considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel’s performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In the context of

a guilty plea, "'[i]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the...[petitioner] must show

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that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980 (quoting Hill,

474 U.S. at 59). See also Washington, 422 F.3d at 873 (same). Thus, under the prejudice

factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting

aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Because failure to make the required showing of either deficient

performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one

is lacking. Id. at 697-700.

Further, it is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of

counsel] which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a

petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of

counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment”);

Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner

failed “to indicate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure...” to conduct crossexamination on a specific issue); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.

1987)(defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel for failure to call out-of-state

witnesses absent indication of what witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony

would have changed the outcome of proceeding.); Cranford v. Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 453, 457

(D.Nev. 1987)(“Aside from the bald allegation that his attorney should have raised this claim

but did not, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his attorney’s performance fell

below the reasonable level of professional competence required by Strickland.”). 

It is well-established that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make fundamental

decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his or her own

behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)(Burger, C.J.

concurring). However: 

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests,...that the indigent defendant has

a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points

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requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,

decides not to present those points.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699 (2002).

In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that

the state court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable

application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); West v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4240859,

*7 (D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

B. Respondents’ exhaustion argument based upon Petitioner’s failure to seek

review by the Arizona Supreme Court 

Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s claims are not exhausted because Petitioner

failed to present the issues raised in his PCR proceeding to the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Answer, pp. 4-5). According to Respondents, under Baldwin, 541 U.S. 27, Petitioner was

required to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court before presenting his claim to this

Court. Because Petitioner did not seek such review, Respondents contend that Petitioner has

failed to properly exhaust his claim for relief. (Id.). This Court disagrees.

In Baldwin, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision from the Ninth Circuit to

address the question of what constitutes notice of the federal nature of a claim sufficient to

satisfy the fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In setting out the

groundwork for its decision, the Baldwin Court stated that "[t]o provide the State with the

necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state

court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting

that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (citations omitted).

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9

Under Swoopes, Petitioner herein need only seek review from the Arizona Court of

Appeals and not the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d 1008.

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Respondents rely on the Baldwin Court's general statements of the law of exhaustion to

support their assertion that Swoopes, at least insofar as it addresses whether habeas

petitioners must seek review in the highest state court, is no longer valid.9

 However, an

examination of the rationale employed in the Swoopes decision readily distinguishes that

case from the general statements of law referred to by Respondents. 

Swoopes, which examines the habeas exhaustion requirement specifically with regard

to Arizona's discretionary review system, was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for

consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in the O'Sullivan case. Swoopes, 196

F.3d 1008. In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, like the Baldwin Court, began its analysis by

reiterating the general rule stated in O'Sullivan that, "in order to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for discretionary review in a

state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary appellate review." Swoopes, 196

F.3d at 1009 (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847). The Swoopes court recognized, however,

that the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged an exception to the exhaustion

requirement..." by making it clear that "'the creation of a discretionary review system does

not, without more, make review' in a state supreme court 'unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1009 (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847) (emphasis added in Swoopes). The Ninth

Circuit proceeded to consider Arizona's discretionary review system and found that Arizona

case law made it clear that "in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, review

need not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies."

Swoopes, 196 F.3d. at 1010. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that "post-conviction

review before the Arizona Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within the meaning

of O'Sullivan." Id. (footnote omitted). There is nothing in Baldwin that suggests, implicitly

or explicitly, that this analysis is flawed or that the Swoopes holding has been overruled. 

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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit continues to cite Swoopes for the very proposition

Respondents contest. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[i]n

cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims of Arizona state prisoners are

exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on

them.'" (quoting Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010)). Therefore, Respondents do not prevail with

this line of argument. 

All other exhaustion arguments raised by Respondents are claim-specific and are

addressed in the section discussing the specific claim. 

C. Ground I: Trial court’s failure to follow U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent

Respondents advance several arguments to support their position that Petitioner’s

Ground I is barred from federal habeas review. Each argument is discussed below.

1. Sufficiency of factual basis for Ground I

First, Respondents correctly point out that Petitioner did not assert any specific factual

basis for Ground I other than that the state court failed to follow precedent established by the

U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, thereby violating his due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner’s federal habeas petition makes no reference to the

specific cases or holdings that were not followed. According to Respondents, “‘the

exhaustion requirement is not met where the petitioner presents different facts at the federal

level to support the same legal theory that was not presented to the state courts.’” (Answer,

p.6 (quoting Nardi v. Schriro, 2008 WL 4446963, at *43 (D. Ariz. 2008)). Nonetheless, the

Court is mindful that “‘[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Here, Petitioner does not cite different

facts than those relied upon in state court. While the Court does not condone Petitioner’s

failure to cite specific facts to support his claim, on the instant record, the Court can discern

and presume that Petitioner is alluding to his argument presented in his PCR Petition and to

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10Respondents are correct that Petitioner’s argument that his sentence also violated

Ninth Circuit precedent is not a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Although the

Court may look to circuit law as persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether

a state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, Petitioner is entitled to relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth in “the

holdings ...(as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision.’” Clark, 331 3d. at 1069 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). See also 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(1); Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (although the state court’s ruling

would warrant issuance of the writ under Ninth Circuit precedent, writ was denied because

of the lack of Supreme Court precedent on the issue).

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the Arizona Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by subjecting him to an enhanced

sentence under Arizona’s criminal code and, thus his sentence does not comport with the

Leocal decision. On the instant record, the deficiencies in Petitioner’s factual basis of Ground

I are not fatal to his claim.

2. Applicability of Leocal decision

Respondents also argue that Petitioner fails to properly state an adequate federal-law

basis for his claim that his sentence does not comport with the Leocal decision.10 Petitioner

was convicted of aggravated DUI while his driver’s license was suspended, revoked, or

restricted in violation of A.R.S. §28-1383, a class four felony. Petitioner also admitted that

he had two prior felony convictions. He was sentenced in accordance with A.R.S. §13-604

which provides an enhanced sentencing scheme for “dangerous and repetitive offenders.”

Specifically, A.R.S. §13-604 provides for an enhanced sentence if the defendant commits a

class 4 felony with “two or more historical prior felony convictions.” A.R.S. §13-604(C).

See also Miller v. Schriro, CV 07-1848-PHX-PGR(GEE), 2008 WL 1836741, *4 (D. Ariz.

Apr. 23, 2008), adopted, 2008 WL 2113403 (D.Ariz. May 16, 2008), certificate of

appealability denied, No. 08-16520, slip op., (9th Cir. June 23, 2009). Petitioner’s argument

is that the sentencing enhancements under Arizona’s criminal code, such as A.R.S. 13-604,

do not apply to traffic offenses proscribed by the Arizona traffic code, Title 28.

Respondents argue that Petitioner “failed to properly state an adequate federal law

basis for...” his Ground I claim invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Leocal.

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(Answer, p.7). To support this argument, Respondents assert that because Petitioner was

convicted of state law violations, Leocal, which considered whether federal deportation

statutes applied to a lawful permanent resident convicted of state felony DUI offenses, does

not apply to Petitioner’s case. 

Under section 2254, the Court “shall entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (emphasis added). Generally, federal habeas relief is appropriate, inter

alia, where the state court’s adjudication of a petitioner’s claim “resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Because Petitioner argued to the state court that his sentence violated clearly-established

Supreme Court case law under Leocal, he has raised a federal-law basis for his claim. 

The next question, then, is whether that claim is adequate to merit relief. Respondents

argue that Leocal is inapplicable to Petitioner. The Arizona Court of Appeals did not

specifically address Petitioner’s claim based on Leocal. Instead, the court first noted that

Petitioner’s guilty plea resulted in waiver of the sentencing issue. (Answer, Exh. A at p.1).

In an alternative ruling, the court upheld the sentence under state law. (Id. at pp.1-2). The

U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state courts are not required to cite U.S. Supreme Court

cases nor are they required to have an “awareness of our cases so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8

(emphasis in original).

The issue before the Supreme Court in Leocal was whether a lawful permanent

resident who pleaded guilty in Florida state court to two counts of DUI and causing serious

bodily injury in an accident in violation of Florida law had committed a “crime of violence”

as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16, thereby constituting an “aggravated felony” under the

Immigration and Nationality Act and subjecting the defendant to deportation. Leocal, 543

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U.S. 1. After analyzing the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§16(a), 16(b), the Court held that the

offense of DUI is not a “crime of violence” as defined in that statute. Id.

Petitioner argues that under Leocal he cannot be sentenced for “dangerous and

repetitive” criminal offenses, when he stands convicted under the state traffic code and, thus,

his sentence violates clearly established federal law.

In a similar case, the District Court for the District of Arizona has adopted the

reasoning that Leocal cannot be extended in the manner urged by Petitioner:

The Court's holding in Leocal is a specific analysis of a particular federal

statute. In that case, the Supreme Court held a DUI is not a “crime of violence”

as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. The Court's holding cannot be

extended to mean a DUI is not a “dangerous offense” for the purpose of A.R.S.

§ 13-604. The term “dangerous offense” as it is used in the Arizona Revised

Statutes is not defined with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16 or any other federal

statute. Leocal does not apply here.

Miller, CV 07-1848-PHX-PGR(GEE), 2008 WL 1836741, *4, adopted, 2008 WL 2113403

(D.Ariz. May 16, 2008), certificate of appealability denied, No. 08-16520, slip op., (9th Cir.

June 23, 2009). For these same reasons, Leocal is inapplicable to Petitioner’s claims of error

under Arizona’s sentencing scheme. See Miller, 2008 WL 18736741, *3 (“Leocal does not

apply to...[Arizona’s] sentencing scheme.”). Because Petitioner’s sentence does not violate

clearly established federal law pursuant to Leocal, the state court’s decision affirming

Petitioner’s sentence was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Nor did the state

court’s proceeding result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the evidence presented.

3. Failure to exhaust due process claim

To the extent that Petitioner argues that his sentence violated due process,

Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to fairly present his due process claim to the state

court. In his PCR Petition, Petitioner argued that use of Arizona’s criminal code at

sentencing violated due process “there by [sic] violating the 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14 Amendment

[sic] to [the] United States Const....and by evading the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Leocal v. As[h]croft....” (Answer, Exh. B at p. 3). However, Petitioner’s petition

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11In his petition for review when arguing he was pressured into taking the plea,

Petitioner cited Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (examining the voluntariness

of a guilty plea under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) (Answer, Exh.

D at p. 4) (Petitioner incorrectly cited the case as “379 U.S. 742...”). Petitioner argued that

the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Leocal overruled State of Arizona v. Campa, 168 Ariz.

407, 814 P.2d 748 (1991) wherein the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed Arizona state law

and held that enhancement provisions of criminal sentencing statutes applied to traffic

offenses such as felony DUI and did not result in double punishment. (Answer, Exh. D at

p.5). When arguing that Leocal invalidated the enhancement applied to him, Petitioner cited

United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that felony DUI conviction did

not constitute a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), abrogated by

United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. RiveraSanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that conviction for marijuana offense under

California law did not qualify on its face as an “aggravated felony” under federal Sentencing

Guidelines), superseded by U.S.S.G. §2L1.2 as recognized in United States v. NarvaezGomez, 489 F.3d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 2007). (Answer, Exh. D at p. 6; see also Id. at pp.7, 9-

10). Petitioner cited Warfield v. Gardner, 346 F.Supp. 2d 1033, 1038 (D.Ariz. 2004)

(recognizing that “Arizona’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction coextensive

with the limits of federal due process”) for the premise that “[o]rganizational structure was

designed to maintain preogative [sic] of it’s [sic] context,...for this petitioner to be convicted

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for appellate court review makes no specific reference to the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause of the United States Constitution. (See Answer, Exh. D). A “[p]etitioner’s

mere mention of the federal Constitution as a whole, without specifying an applicable

provision, or an underlying federal legal theory, does not suffice to exhaust the federal

claim....Nor is a federal claim exhausted by a petitioner’s mention, in passing, of a broad

constitutional concept, such as due process. ” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021

(9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). See also Baldwin, 541 U.S. 27 (holding that, ordinarily,

for a petitioner to “fairly present” federal claims to a state court, the federal issues must be

clearly identified in the state court brief).

The Ninth Circuit has “held that citation to either a federal or state case involving the

legal standard for a federal constitutional violation is sufficient to establish exhaustion,”

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999. However, the cases cited in Petitioner’s petition for appellate court

review “bear[] no relation to Petitioner’s argument that his...” federal due process rights were

violated due to the trial court’s application of Arizona’s enhanced sentencing scheme.11

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of a traffic offense. (Answer, Exh. D at pp. 6-7). To support the premise that “[s]tatutory

construction is alholsitc [sic] endeavor, and at a minimum must account for the statutes ‘Full

Text’, language as well as punctuations [sic], structure and most important its ‘Subject

Matter’”, Petitioner cited United Savings Ass’n. Of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest

Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1998) (construing the Bankruptcy Code); Lambright v. Lewis,

932 F.Supp. 1547 (holding that numerous claims were procedurally barred from federal

habeas review and denying on the merits petitioner’s claims regarding: use of dual juries; use

of inculpatory statements; form of verdict; use of mitigating and aggravating factors in

imposing the death penalty; finding of aggravating factors under A.R.S. §13-702; finding of

intent to kill; use of victim statements; use of presentence report; determination of

aggravating factors by the trial court instead of a jury; specific arguments directed at use of

A.R.S. §13-703 in death penalty cases; and the constitutionality of the use of lethal injection),

affirmed in part and remanded to panel, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999), and affirmed in part

and reversed in part, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). (Answer, Exh. D at pp. 8-9) (emphasis

in original). For the premise that “[i]t is the policy of law to encourage eretainly [sic] in the

sentencing process, Petitioner cited State of Arizona v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 683 P.2d 744

(App. 1983) (holding that as a matter of state law, the trial court erred in imposing a

mandatory consecutive sentence pursuant to A.R.S. §13-2503 following the defendant’s

guilty plea to a crime of escape in the second degree), decision adopted and approved, 140

Ariz. 544, 683 P.2d 743 (1984) (en banc). (Answer, Exh. D at p.9). Petitioner also pointed

out the Supreme Court’s instruction that a court construing a statute must “not be guided by

a single sentence or member of a sentence or paragraph but look at the provision as the

‘Whole Law’, and to it’s [sic] object and policy” citing United States National Bank of

Oregon v. Independent Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993) (considering application

of the Federal Reserve Act to national banking associations); United States v. Boisdore’s

Heirs, 49 U.S. 113 (1850) (considering a law regarding claims to lands in Missouri and

Arkansas). (Answer, Exh. D at p.10).

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Fields, 401 F.3d at 1022. “Citation of irrelevant federal cases does not provide a state court

with a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [the

petitioner’s]...constitutional claim.” Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000 (internal quotation marks

omitted). On the instant record, Petitioner failed to fairly present a federal due process claim

to the state court and the claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Further, Respondents are correct that Petitioner’s return to state court to raise such a

claim would be futile because the claim is precluded as waived under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3) since it was not presented in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. Further, presentation of

such claim in a second post-conviction relief proceeding would be untimely under

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12Because this claim is procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver such that

the claims are precluded pursuant to Cassett. Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of

Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petition did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Moreno, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (timeliness

provision of Rule 32.4(a) became effective September 20, 1992); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz.

432, 897 P.2d 734 (App.1995) (Rule 32.4(a) was amended “to address potential abuse by

defendants caused by the old rule's unlimited filing periods”); see also Wagner v. Stewart,

2008 WL 169639, *9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a state post-conviction action is futile when

it is time-barred). Nor does the claim qualify for any of the timeliness exceptions. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional petition would be subject to summary

dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State

v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135,

962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). Under such

circumstances, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted.12 Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where petitioner has not

raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has expired).

The instant record does not support a finding of cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default. Nor has Petitioner presented

any evidence or argument that would support a finding of a constitutional violation that has

probably resulted in the conviction of someone who was actually innocent of the offenses at

issue. See Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 Id. (petitioner failed to present any evidence that would

sustain application of the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” to the procedural

default rule).

4. Independent and adequate state grounds

 Respondents further argue that any federal claim raised by Petitioner regarding his

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sentence is procedurally barred because the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on state

procedural law in holding that Petitioner waived his sentencing claim. (Answer, p.8). The

Arizona Court of Appeals stated that: 

Entry of a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects, such as the claim

Fragoso asserted in his pro se petition. See State v. Quick, 177 Ariz. 314, 316,

868 P.2d 327, 329 (App. 1993). But even assuming arguendo Fragoso’s claim

could be construed as jurisdictional in nature or that it was not otherwise

waived, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief because the

claim lacks merit.

(Answer, Exh. A at p.2). A federal habeas court will not review a question of federal law

when that question has been resolved by the state court “on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman, 501

U.S. at 729. The state law ground may be substantive or procedural. Id. at 729-730. To be

independent, “the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law.”

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir.2001). “To be deemed adequate, the state

law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.” Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir.2003); see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577

(9th Cir.1999)(“A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review

if it was ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state

court.”)(quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). Moreover, “a federal

claimant's procedural default precludes federal habeas review ... only if the last state court

rendering a judgment in the case rests its judgment on the procedural default.” Harris, 489

U.S. at 262. Finally, “a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an

alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent state ground

doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the

state court's judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law.” Id. at 264 n.10

(emphasis in original).

When a defendant enters a guilty plea in Arizona, he waives all non-jurisdictional

defects including ineffective assistance of counsel except those claims of ineffective

assistance that relate to the voluntariness of the plea. See State v. Lerner, 113 Ariz. 284, 551

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P.2d 553 (1976) (a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects

in the proceeding); State v. Reed, 121 Ariz. 547, 592 P.2d 381 (App. 1979) (“It is well

established in Arizona that an appellant waives any challenges to non-jurisdictional defects

in the trial court proceedings when he enters a valid guilty plea.”); State v. Quick, 177 Ariz.

314, 316, 868 P.2d 327, 329 (App. 1993) (entry of guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional

defects, including ineffective assistance of counsel other than ineffectiveness in connection

with matters directly relating to the plea). Because the Arizona appellate court relied on this

independent and adequate state law ground in denying Petitioner’s request for relief, any

federal claim raised by Petitioner is procedurally barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30;

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1025. Moreover, for the same reasons as discussed supra, at III.C.3,

Petitioner has failed to excuse the procedural default by demonstrating cause and prejudice

or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Nor

has he argued that the alleged constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of someone who was actually innocent. Petitioner’s Ground I is barred from federal habeas

review under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine.

 5. Recommendation: Ground I

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss and deny

Petitioner’s Ground I. Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court dismiss Petitioner’s Ground I as procedurally barred from federal review by the

independent and adequate state law doctrine. 

D. Ground II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective because “if Counsel was to read the

law book Counsel would have found the casing [sic] this petitioner will cite in the petition.”

(Petition, p. 7). 

Before addressing Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Arizona

Court of Appeals pointed out that the Arizona Supreme Court had “previously addressed and

rejected the very argument Fragoso has raised here: whether driving offenses that are felonies

under Title 28 are exempt from the sentence enhancement provisions of Title 13” and has

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13The court also quoted the following from the Campa decision:

The general sentencing provisions of the criminal code, therefore, apply to all

crimes, whether defined in Title 13 or elsewhere. Likewise, §13-604 applies

to all felonies, whether defined in Title 13 or elsewhere. The language of the

statues evinces a legislative intent that all felonies are subject to the

enhancement provisions of §13-604. 

(Answer, Exh. A at p.3 (quoting Campa, 168 Ariz. at 410, 814 P.2d at 751)(emphasis in

original)).

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concluded they are not.13 (Answer, Exh. A at p.2 (citing State v. Campa, 168 Ariz. 407, 410,

814 P.2d 748, 751 (1998)). 

Because Petitioner’s underlying claim of improper sentencing enhancement was

without merit, the Arizona court rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to challenge the imposition of the enhanced sentence. (Id. at p.3). 

It is well settled that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be based on

an attorney’s failure to raise a groundless objection. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375;

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 400 (9th Cir. 2001). In light of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision in Campa and the fact, as discussed supra, at III.C.2., that, the United

States Supreme Court decision in Leocal is inapplicable to Petitioner’s case, counsel’s

alleged failure to object to the enhanced sentence was reasonable. The state court ruling on

this issue was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding

result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence

presented. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground II.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or

without merit. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny in

part and dismiss the remainder of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No.

1) as set forth below:

(1) The following claims should be denied on the merits:

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(a) Ground I claim based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004);

(b) Ground II claim of ineffective assistance of counsel;

(2) The following claim should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted:

(a) Ground I claim of due process violation; and

(3) Alternatively, Petitioner’s entire Ground I is also subject to dismissal as

procedurally barred under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 09-239-TUC-JMR.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900

(2003).

DATED this 14th day of April, 2010.

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