Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01748/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mance Day, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gerald T. Gavin, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-1748-PHX-SMM (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Mance Day, confined in the Maricopa County Fourth Avenue Jail, has filed

a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis. The Court will dismiss the action.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee.

Effective April 9, 2006, the filing fee for a civil rights action increased to $350.00. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914, amended by, Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat.

4 (Feb. 8, 2006). Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, is not subject to the increased fee. Under

the “prison mailbox rule,” a complaint is deemed “filed” when handed by the prisoner to a

prison official for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988); Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). Although his Complaint was received by

the Court after the effective date of the fee increase, the Complaint appears to have been

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“filed” prior to the effective date under the “prison mailbox rule.” Accordingly, Plaintiff is

obligated to pay only the $250.00 filing fee.

An initial partial filing fee of $20.10 will be assessed by this Order. 28 U.S.C.§

1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will direct the appropriate agency to collect

monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust

account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court

each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff should take notice that if he is released before the filing fee is paid in full, he

must pay the remaining unpaid amount of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of his

release. If Plaintiff fails to pay the remainder of the filing fee within 120 days of the date of

his release, the action will be dismissed, unless Plaintiff shows good cause, in writing, why

he is unable to pay the remainder of the filing fee.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). The Court is required to grant leave to amend “if a complaint can possibly be

saved” but not if a complaint “lacks merit entirely.” Id. at 1129. The Court therefore should

grant leave to amend if the pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts or if it

appears at all possible that the defect can be corrected. Id. at 1130. Plaintiff’s Complaint

will be dismissed without leave to amend because the defects cannot be corrected. 

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III. Complaint

Plaintiff names the following Defendants: (1) Gerald T. Gavin, court-appointed

defense counsel; (2) Thomas O’Toole, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court; and (3)

Michael Denny, Prosecutor, Maricopa County. 

The Complaint contains two counts. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gavin

violated his rights by postponing his case and representing him after Plaintiff no longer

wanted his representation; that Defendant Denny engaged in scare tactics; and that all three

Defendants ignored his rights. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gavin violated

Plaintiff’s rights by requesting a continuance and that Defendant Judge O’Toole violated

Plaintiff’s rights by granting the continuance.

For relief, Plaintiff requests that he be exonerated of the crimes he is alleged to have

committed and also requests damages.

IV. Dismissed Defendants

A. Gerald T. Gavin – Defense Counsel

A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the defendant

has acted under the color of state law. An attorney representing a criminal defendant, even

a public defender or court-appointed counsel, does not act under color of state law. See Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-19, 325 (1981). Defendant Gavin will be dismissed

because he was not acting under color of state law. 

B. Thomas O’Toole – Judge Maricopa County Superior Court

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts

except when they are taken “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). An

act is “judicial” when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt

with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard,

913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe these factors “generously in

favor of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.” Ashelman, 793

F.2d at 1076.

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This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and

corruptly, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), or of making grave errors of law or

procedure. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Ammons

v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1446-48 (5th Cir. 1983)(a judge is entitled to immunity from a

claim that he verbally abused and humiliated a plaintiff); Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577-

78 (9th Cir. 1989). A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was

in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject

to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S.

at 356-57. As long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's

subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078.

The conduct of Defendant Judge O’Toole, as alleged by Plaintiff in these Counts, was

judicial in nature. Consequently, the Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil

action for damages.

C. Michael Denny – Prosecutor

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in 

“initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” insofar as that conduct is

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430,

(1976)); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 430-431 (1976)) (a prosecutor’s participation in a probable cause hearing was protected

by absolute immunity); Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076. 

Assistant Prosecutor Denny’s participation as a prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal trial

is entitled to absolute immunity, and he will be dismissed.

IV. Failure to State a Claim – Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey

Not only can Plaintiff not bring his § 1983 claims against the named Defendants, in

fact, his claims are barred. To state a § 1983 claim challenging the validity of confinement,

a plaintiff must show that his conviction has been favorably terminated. 

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[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by action whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus . . . .

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Without such a showing of a “favorable

termination,” the person’s cause of action under § 1983 has not yet accrued. Id. at 489.

Thus, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show that

the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. at 487.

Here, although it does not appear that Plaintiff has been convicted, the relief he seeks

– exoneration of all criminal charges – is barred by Heck v. Humphrey because he alleges

an unconstitutional imprisonment but the charges against him have not been favorably

terminated.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, filed with the Complaint,

is granted. 

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $250.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $20.10.

(3) The Complaint ( Doc. # 1) and this action are dismissed for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment

accordingly. 

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(4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2006.

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