Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02240/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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Pursuant to the instructions of the state court, 1

plaintiff filed his case in the Superior Court in and for the

County of Los Angeles and designated Placer County as the “county

of origin”, which is controlling for removal purposes in the

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CHRISTOPHER LEESON,

CASE NO. CIV. S-05-2240 WBS PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO REMAND AND MOTION TO

STAY 

MERCK & COMPANY, INC., PFIZER,

INC., MCKESSON CORPORATION,

and DOES 1 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Christopher Leeson brought this action in the

Superior Court in and for the County of Los Angeles for damages

related to a myocardial infarction allegedly caused by the drugs

Vioxx and Celebrex. The action was removed to this court on

November 4, 2005. Plaintiff now seeks a remand to state court 1

Case 2:05-cv-02240-WBS-PAN Document 38 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 13
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state Coordination Proceeding involving Vioxx products liability

claims.

2

and attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with that motion. 

Defendants Merck and Pfizer oppose plaintiff’s motion to remand

and Merck moves the court to stay this case pending transfer to

the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Merck is a pharmaceutical company

incorporated and having its principal place of business in New

Jersey. Prior to September, 2004, Merck manufactured and

marketed Vioxx, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”)

used to treat arthritis and acute pain. However, on September

30, 2004, Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market in

light of evidence that patients taking the drug experienced

cardiovascular complications. 

Defendant Pfizer is also a pharmaceutical company,

incorporated in Delaware and having its principal place of

business in New York. Pfizer manufactures Celebrex, another

NSAID that competes with Vioxx and allegedly presents similar

risks to cardiovascular health. Celebrex, however, is still

commercially available. 

Multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) against both

companies, arising from consumption of these drugs, is currently

pending in the federal courts. On February 16, 2005, the

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) consolidated

138 federal cases involving Vioxx and transferred them to the

Eastern District of Louisiana. See MDL Panel Docket Nos. 1657

and 1699, CTO-35 and CTO-11 (Dec. 21, 2005). At last count,

Case 2:05-cv-02240-WBS-PAN Document 38 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 13
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Defendant Pfzier only filed an opposition to 2

plaintiff’s motion to remand and touched on the stay issue in

that brief. Defendant McKesson has not filed papers since the

case was removed.

3

2,680 additional Vioxx cases had been transferred there. Id. On

September 6, 2005, the JPML similarly consolidated cases against

Pfizer involving Celebrex and Bextra and transferred them to the

Northern District of California. Id. Three hundred and fortynine additional Celebrex/Bextra cases have since been added to

that proceeding. Id. In cases such as the instant action, where

the plaintiff brings claims against both companies, the JMPL has

elected to sever the claims and, with the permission of the

particular district court, assign them to their respective MDL

proceeding. Id. 

Plaintiff’s suit is, however, further complicated by

plaintiff’s inclusion of a third defendant. In addition to Merck

and Pfizer, the manufacturer defendants, plaintiff is suing the

McKesson Corporation, a California corporation allegedly serving

as the state’s primary distributor of pharmaceuticals. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Def.s’ Mot. to Stay Ex. 1 (Wolden Decl. at 7).) 

Plaintiff, also a citizen of California, contends that McKesson’s

involvement in this suit rendered Merck’s removal of this action

improper. Accordingly, he moves to remand the case to Los

Angeles Superior Court where Judge Chaney is presiding over a

Coordination Proceeding (JCCP No. 4247) for Vioxx lawsuits in

California. In response, defendant Merck moves to stay this

action in light of Conditional Transfer Order 35, which marked 2

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Plaintiff opposed transfer of this matter, as 3

conditionally ordered in MDL-1657 CTO-35 and MDL-1699 CTO-11, on

January 3, 2006. Consequently, actual transfer of this action

has been delayed and may yet be defeated. However, according to

Merck, “to date, the Panel has rejected each and every motion to

vacate a conditional transfer order that it has taken under

consideration.” (Def.’s Mot. to Stay 5 n.1.)

4

this case as potentially transferrable to the MDL proceedings.3

Merck argues that after the transfer is complete, the MDL courts

will be in the best position to provide a uniform answer to the

question presented here: whether McKesson was fraudulently

joined for the purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction.

II. Discussion

For a federal court to have jurisdiction based on

diversity, there must be complete diversity between the parties. 

Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.

2001). Complete diversity only exists when no defendant is a

citizen of the same state as any plaintiff. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Therefore, because McKesson is,

like plaintiff, a citizen of California, complete diversity does

not exist on the face of the complaint. 

However, an exception to the requirement of complete

diversity exists where a non-diverse defendant has been

fraudulently joined. Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067. “‘Fraudulent

joinder’ is a term of art [and] it does not reflect on the

integrity of plaintiff or counsel but is merely the rubric

applied when a court finds either that no cause of action is

stated against the nondiverse defendant, or in fact no cause of

action exists.” Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 460 (E.D.

Cal. 1979) (citation omitted). “[I]f the plaintiff fails to

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5

state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the

failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state,”

then the defendant’s joinder is deemed fraudulent and is ignored

for purposes of diversity. Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067 (quoting

McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)).

A. Order of Pending Motions

As an initial matter, though, the court must determine

which motion--plaintiff’s motion to remand or Merck’s motion to

stay--to entertain first. Generally, jurisdiction is a

preliminary matter that should be resolved before all others. 

Smith v. Mail Boxes, Etc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (E.D. Cal.

2002) (“[J]urisdictional issues should be resolved before the

court determines if a stay is appropriate.”); see also Villarreal

v. Chrysler Corp., No. C-95-4414, 1996 WL 116832, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. Mar. 12, 1996) (“Judicial economy will best be served by

addressing the remand issue [before a party’s motion to stay]

because a determination on this issue will facilitate litigation

in the appropriate forum.”). However, the calculus changes

somewhat when deference to a MDL court will further “the

uniformity, consistency, and predictability in litigation that

underlies the MDL system.” Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce

Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Resolution of

a motion to remand can be left to the transferee court when “the

motion raises issues likely to arise in other actions pending in

[the consolidated action].” Id.; see also In re Vioxx Prods.

Liability Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2005)

(“[M]otions to remand . . . can be presented to and decided by

the transferee judge.”).

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As part of its attack on distributor liability under 4

California law, defendants argue that state law does not

recognize such a claim, and that, even if it does, federal

requirements that govern the content of warning labels preempt

state laws that might hold distributors liable for failure to

warn. (Def. Merck’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand 14-15.)

6

More specifically, several courts have applied the

following methodology when considering simultaneous motions to

remand and stay in the MDL context. “First, the court should

[scrutinize] the merits of the motion to remand” and consider it

in full if “this preliminary assessment suggests that removal was

improper.” Conroy, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. “Second, if the

jurisdictional issue appears factually or legally difficult, the

court should determine whether identical or similar

jurisdictional issues have been raised in other cases that have

been or may be transferred to the MDL proceeding.” Id. If the

second inquiry is answered affirmatively, the court should

consider staying the action. Id.; see also Meyers v. Bayer AG,

143 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048-49 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Quincy Cmty.

Servs. Dist. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. S-03-2582, slip op. (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 24, 2004) (quoting Meyers). 

Applying this methodology here, the court finds that a

stay is in order. First, in light of Merck’s fraudulent joinder

arguments, removal was not plainly improper. In numerous cases,

Merck has challenged plaintiff’s inclusion of McKesson, arguing

that (1) California law does not charge distributors with a duty

to warn consumers of the hazards associated with prescription

drugs and (2) plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a 4

connection between the drugs distributed by McKesson and those

consumed by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Martin v. Merck & Co., No.

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Significantly though, in the Central District, Judge 5

Walter, who has related the cases involving Merck for that

region, has held that alleging that McKesson “distributed and

sold Vioxx in and throughout California . . . which was ingested

by plaintiffs,” is sufficient. See, e.g., Aaroe v. Merck & Co.,

No. 05-5559, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005); Aaron v.

Merck & Co., No. 05-4073, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 26,

2005). (Cf. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13, 15 (“Plaintiff ingested and

consumed the prescription drugs Vioxx® and Celebrex®, as . . .

distributed, marketed, . . . [or] sold [‘in California’] or

otherwise placed in the stream of interstate commerce by . . .

Defendant McKesson Corporation . . . .”).) 

Admittedly though, Aronis was based on a skimpy form 6

complaint that differed significantly from the Master Complaint

used by plaintiff’s counsel in more recent cases like this one.

7

S-05-750, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2005). Yet only a handful

of judges have found that California law does not clearly exempt

distributors from strict liability for failure to warn. See,

e.g., Black v. Merck & Co., No. 03-8730, slip op. (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 3, 2004) (holding that Merck failed “to show ‘absolutely no

possibility’ that Plaintiffs could prevail on their strict

liability claim against McKesson”); Martin, No. S-05-750. 

Additionally, only Judge Karlton has held that evidence

that a plaintiff purchased his drugs from an outlet (e.g.,

Safeway) whose primary supplier was McKesson demonstrates a

sufficient connection between the plaintiff and the distributor.5

Martin, No. S-05-750. In contrast, the undersigned has denied a

similar motion to remand when the plaintiff failed to allege

“that McKesson . . . handled the specific pills that were

allegedly the cause of her injuries.” Aronis v. Merck & Co., No.

S-05-0486, slip op. (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2005). The preliminary 6

assessment is supposed to be a limited inquiry, undertaken only

if removal was clearly improper. With just a few examples of how

to handle this issue and outcomes on both sides, Merck’s

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The glaring exception to this practice has been the 7

Central District of California, where the court has routinely

remanded cases involving Vioxx and McKesson. Defendants

explained at oral argument that the Central District, following

an approach adopted in cases before the MDL panels were created,

has remanded approximately 12 cases involving McKesson. See,

e.g., Black, No. 03-8730, slip op. As discussed in more detail

above, this approach differs from that in the Northern and

Southern Districts, where at least twice as many cases have been

stayed.

8

fraudulent joinder arguments are not clearly baseless. 

Second and perhaps more importantly, in the majority of

cases submitted for this court’s consideration, cases that have

already been transferred to the MDL court or are awaiting

transfer, courts have either (1) issued a stay and left the

motion to remand for the MDL court to decide or (2) avoided the

issue all together because the case was transferred before such

motions were heard or even filed. In October, 2005, Judge Patel 7

of the Northern District of California noted that “there are

presently more than 25 California cases that involve precisely

the same fraudulent joinder of the McKesson defendants already

pending before the MDL judge.” Johnson v. Merck & Co., No. 05-

02881, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (granting

defendant’s motion to stay); see also In re Vioxx Prod. Liability

Cases, No. 05-0943, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2005)

(staying 18 consolidated cases and denying without prejudice

plaintiff’s motion to remand; these cases were transferred to the

MDL court in late 2005); Love v. Merck & Co., No. 05-2140 (E.D.

Cal. filed Oct. 24, 2005) (naming McKesson as a defendant; case

transferred before a motion to remand was filed); Lagden v. Merck

& Co., No. 05-0656 (E.D. Cal. filed Apr. 4, 2005) (same). 

Consequently, “identical or similar jurisdictional issues have

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Although the various outstanding motions to remand in 8

cases transferred to the MDL court all rest on the particular law

of the state and circuit where the case originated, Judge Fallon,

who is presiding over the Vioxx MDL, has already taken steps to

group like cases. (Def.’s Reply to Mot. to Stay (Kim Decl. Ex. I

(Hr’g Tr. 21, June 23, 2005)).) It is therefore safe to assume

that the McKesson cases will all be considered at once and under

applicable California and Ninth Circuit law.

9

been raised in other cases that have been or may be transferred

to the MDL proceeding.” Conroy, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 8

The MDL court will therefore necessarily need to rule

on the alleged fraudulent joinder of McKesson. The Conroy

methodology suggests, then, that the court should first consider

Merck’s motion to stay.

B. Merck’s Motion to Stay

The power to issue a stay, as the Supreme Court has

noted, “is incidental to the power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy

of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Primarily, the

court is concerned with balancing competing interests and thus

should consider: “(1) potential prejudice to the non-moving

party; (2) hardship and inequity to the moving party if the

action is not stayed; and (3) the judicial resources that would

be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation if the cases are in

fact consolidated.” Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp.

1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55;

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). 

Here, plaintiff argues that it will suffer prejudice as

a result of a stay because (1) it will be forced to litigate the

remand motion in a “foreign forum . . . before a judge who might

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Judge Chaney intended to make a more definite ruling 9

regarding the relationship between claims against Merck and

Pfizer on November 19, 2005. This proceeding was, however,

continued by the court. See http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/

civilCaseSummary/index.asp?CaseType=Civil (search term: “JCCP

4247”).

10

be less sympathetic to the plaintiff’s cause” and (2) its case

may be needlessly “carved . . . in half” and shipped off to

separate MDL proceedings for the purpose of determining that

federal courts never had jurisdiction in the first place. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Stay 3, 13.) Plaintiff’s first argument

is without merit, as plaintiffs from up to 49 states in every MDL

case are routinely forced to litigate pretrial motions in a

foreign forum. His second argument is likewise flawed because it

is based on his erroneous assumption that the Los Angeles

Coordination Proceeding for Vioxx will allow him to pursue his

claims against all defendants in a single litigation, at least

until separate trials for the Vioxx and Celebrex/Bextra claims

begin. Judge Chaney, who is presiding over JCCP 4247, determined

at a status conference on October 14, 2005 that the claims

against Merck and Pfizer will, as in the federal litigation, be

severed in the state litigation. (Def. Pfizer’s Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. to Remand Exs. G-H (Notice of Ruling Re: Oct. 14, 2005

Status Conference).) Therefore, plaintiff’s ability to pursue

his claims against all defendants in a single proceeding exists,

at best, only temporarily.9

On the other hand, Merck stands to suffer some hardship

and inequity if the court instead addresses plaintiff’s motion to

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The court’s analysis of the motion to stay, like the 10

parties’ briefs, largely focuses on Merck’s arguments. Perhaps

because the Pfizer MDL is located in plaintiff’s home state of

California, plaintiff has not contested, and does not plan to

challenge, Pfizer’s removal of cases that do not involve Merck. 

(Def. Pfizer’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand Ex. D. (Letter from

Clifford Carter to Peter Schnaitman).) Consequently, although 

five to six cases involving McKesson are part of MDL-1699

(according to Pfizer), it is unlikely that Judge Breyer (who is

presiding over the Celebrex/Bextra MDL) will have to consider the

fraudulent joinder issue since the plaintiffs do not plan to move

to remand those cases. Nevertheless, should plaintiffs change

their approach or tactics, Pfizer would face the same hardships

that Merck will inevitably face.

11

remand. If this court considers and denies plaintiff’s motion 10

to remand, plaintiff will have a second bite at the apple before

the MDL court, which, as explained, will necessarily address the

fraudulent joinder of McKesson in the several cases already

transferred from California district courts. “Although

transferee judges should generally respect any orders of a

transferor judge,” experience teaches that this is not always the

case. Rivers, 980 F. Supp. at 1361 (citing examples where MDL

courts have vacated or modified previous rulings). Merck should

not have to defend against the same motion repeatedly brought by

the same plaintiff. Alternatively, if this court determines that

McKesson was not fraudulently joined and the MDL court holds

otherwise, Merck will be stuck with a decision that is contrary

to the decision applicable in a majority of the other similar

cases against it because an order to remand is not appealable. 

Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th

Cir. 1987) (“Remand orders . . . are immune from appellate review

. . . even if the district court’s jurisdictional decision was

erroneous.”). Therefore the legitimate prejudice considerations

here seem to favor staying this action.

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Although Judge Breyer does not face the same volume of 11

cases presenting a fraudulent joinder question as Judge Fallon, a

stay of plaintiff’s claims against Pfizer, as well as his claims

against Merck, is still likewise in the interests of judicial

economy. As observed in note 10, in a handful of the Pfizer

cases before Judge Breyer, the plaintiffs could challenge federal

jurisdiction, but have declined to do so. In the event that

plaintiffs change their approach to the Celebrex litigation,

another California district court would be just as well equipped

as this court to address the fraudulent joinder question. 

Moreover, Judge Breyer, unlike the undersigned, could resolve

this issue in several cases at once.

12

Moreover, the third factor, which discourages

duplicative litigation, obviously favors a stay in this instance. 

Dozens of cases with outstanding motions to remand, which

specifically contend that McKesson has not been fraudulently

joined, are before the Vioxx MDL judge and thus will be disposed

of uniformly. It follows then that, in the interest of judicial

economy and to further the consistency that MDL proceedings aim

to provide, this court should stay proceedings in this matter

until a definitive transfer order issues.11

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendant Merck’s motion to stay be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) plaintiff’s motion to remand be, and the same 

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An order directing “payment of just costs and any 12

actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of

the removal” is only warranted when the motion to remand is

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

13

hereby is, DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

(3) plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.12

DATED: January 25, 2006

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