Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02066/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mario Alvarado,

Plaintiff,

v.

United States of America; U.S. Border Patrol

Agent M. Jarmon N235, in his individual and

official capacity; U.S. Border Patrol Agent R.

Husted N422, in his individual and official

capacity; and U.S. Border Patrol Agent A. Rowe

N538, in his individual and official capacity, 

Defendants. ______________________________________

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CV 14-2066-TUC-LAB

ORDER

 Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P

12(b)(5), filed on January 12, 2015, for failure to properly serve the United States. (Doc. 14)

In the alternative, the defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14) 

The plaintiff in this action, Mario Alvarado, claims his civil rights were violated when

he was stopped and detained at a U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint on Interstate 19. He alleges

was detained for eight hours even though no drugs were ever found in his vehicle.

 In the pending motion, the defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed because

the plaintiff failed to properly serve the United States. They further argue the complaint fails

to state a proper Bivins claim or a proper claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Magistrate Judge Bowman presides over this action having received the written consent

of all parties. (Doc. 24)

The motion to dismiss will be granted in part. Alvarado failed to properly serve the

United States, but the court will extend the time for service in the interests of justice. Upon

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construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court concludes that

Counts 1, 2, and 4 state proper claims. Count 3, however, fails to state a cognizable claim under

the Federal Tort Claims Act. 

Background

In his complaint, Alvarado describes several run-ins he has had with U.S. law

enforcement. (Doc. 1) The first occurred on July 2, 2012, when he entered the country from

Mexico. Id. While driving north on Interstate 19, Alvarado was stopped and detained at a U.S.

Border Patrol checkpoint. Id. A drug-detection dog “allegedly alerted to the presence of illegal

substances,” and the defendant agents, Jarmon, Husted, and Rowe, sent him to the secondary

inspection station. Id. They did not find any drugs, but they held him for eight hours before

releasing him. Id. At one point, the agents summoned an Arizona Department of Public Safety

officer to the scene. Id. That officer cited Alvarado with providing false information to law

enforcement and possession of an open container within the passenger compartment of a motor

vehicle on a public highway. Id. 

Alvarado again entered the United States from Mexico on August 20, 2012. Id. He was

again detained at the Border Patrol checkpoint for an extended period of time “when the Border

Patrol dog allegedly alerted to the presence of illegal substances.” Id. Alvarado does not

identify the agents that detained him. Id. 

On August 30, 2012, a Border Patrol internal affairs investigator went to Alvarado’s

home hoping to speak with him. Id. Alvarado was not home at the time, but his wife later

called the Border Patrol and spoke with an Agent Serrano. Id. The agent said he was

investigating a matter concerning Border Patrol agents and Alvarado. Id. Serrano, however,

would not discuss the matter with anyone but Alvarado, and Alvarado was not willing to speak

with him. Id. 

One month later on September 23, 2012, Alvarado was detained at the Port of Entry for

one hour. Id. He was arrested and handcuffed because a computer code indicated he was armed

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and dangerous. Id. When the computer was checked again, a different code appeared, and

Alvarado was released. Id. Alvarado does not identify the agents involved. Id. 

On November 2, 2012, Alvarado was again stopped and detained at the Border Patrol

checkpoint on Interstate 19. Id. Alvarado alleges he was assaulted by Border Patrol agents and

suffered a broken toe. Id. He was transported to a hospital in Nogales, Arizona. Id. He was

later taken to the Border Patrol station and released. Id. Alvarado does not identify the agents

involved. Id. 

On May 1, 2014, Alvarado filed a complaint in this court claiming the defendants’

actions violated his civil rights. Counts 1 and 2 are brought pursuant to Bivins v. Six Unknown

Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971). Counts 2 and 3 are brought

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.

In Count 1, Alvarado claims the individual defendants violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. Id. In Count 2, he claims the individual defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive

him of his civil rights. Id. In Count 3, he claims the individual defendants assaulted him. In

Count 4, he claims the individual defendants falsely imprisoned him. Id.

On January 12, 2015, the defendants brought the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(5). (Doc. 14) They argue Alvarado failed to properly serve the United

States. In the alternative, the defendants argue the case should be dismissed pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14) 

Discussion: Service

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argue Alvarado failed to properly serve the

United States pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(1)(A) and dismissal is appropriate pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5).

Under Rule 12(b)(5), if service of process was insufficient, the court has broad discretion

to dismiss an action or retain jurisdiction and extend the time for service. Ross v. Snohomish

County, 2014 WL 371652, 2 (W.D.Wash. 2014). Under Rule 4(m), the court must extend the

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time for service if the defendant can show good cause for the failure to serve and may extend

the time even without such a showing. See Cook v. U.S., 2009 WL 2503644 (D. Idaho. 2009).

In this case, the defendants argue Alvarado failed to properly serve the United States

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(1)(A). Specifically, they maintain Alvarado failed to “deliver[]

or send[] a copy of the complaint and summons to the United States Attorney for the District

of Arizona,” which is the first part of the two-part service rule applicable to the United States.

(Doc. 14, p. 4) It appears Alvarado did comply with the second part of the two-part service rule

by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the Attorney General, pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P.4(i)(1)(B). (Doc. 5, p. 1) The United States obviously has the complaint in hand.

In his response, Alvarado states that he thought he complied with Rule 4(i)(1)(A), but

if he did not “it was a mere oversight.” (Doc. 19, p. 2) He concedes there was “some confusion

in Plaintiff’s counsel’s office.” Id. He has provided no proof of service in accordance with the

Rules.

The court finds Alvarez failed to comply with Rule 4(i)(1)(A). The court further finds

that the cause of this failure was attorney error which does not constitute good cause. Ross v.

Snohomish County, 2014 WL 371652, 2 (W.D.Wash. 2014). 

Nevertheless, the court concludes that dismissal is not appropriate. See Umbenhauer v.

Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“[D]ismissal of a complaint is inappropriate when there

exists a reasonable prospect that service may yet be obtained.”). The United States received

actual notice of the lawsuit and has suffered no prejudice from the delay. In addition, it appears

that the statue of limitations on Alvarado’s claims might have already run. See Cholla Ready

Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). The court will, in the exercise of

discretion, extend the time for completing service. See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041

(9th Cir. 2007) (“District courts have broad discretion to extend time for service under Rule

4(m).”). 

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The defendants argue in the alternative that the complaint fails to state cognizable claims

under either Bivins or the Federal Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, they argue the complaint

should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).

Discussion: Bivins

In Count 1 of the complaint, Alvarado claims the individual defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1) In Count 2, he claims the individual defendants engaged

in a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. Id. Counts 1 and 2 are brought pursuant to

Bivins v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971). Id. The

defendants argue Alvarado has failed to present a proper Bivins claim and dismissal is

appropriate pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14)

 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claim.” Cook v. Brewer, 637

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). The claim must allege a legally cognizable theory of relief and

include factual allegations sufficient to support that theory. Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Angioli,

654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“All allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754 -755 (9th Cir. 1994). “However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast

in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged.” Id.

To survive the motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (internal punctuation omitted). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that

a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 1965 (internal punctuation omitted). 

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 The defendants argue first that Counts 1 and 2 fail to state proper Bivins claims because

a Bivins claim must be brought against the agents in their individual capacities, but the

complaint effectively sues them only in their official capacities. (Doc. 14) The defendants base

this argument on a paragraph in the complaint in which Alvarado states the agents harmed him

“while acting in their capacity as law enforcement officers and governmental agents of the

United States of America.” (Doc. 14, p. 7) (citing (Doc. 1, ¶ 1)) This paragraph, they argue,

indicates that Counts 1 and 2 are brought against the agents in their official capacities. (Doc.

14) 

The defendants are correct when they state that a Bivins claim must be brought against

the agents in their individual capacities. Nurse v. U.S., 226 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). The

court, however, disagrees with their reading of the complaint.

Alvarado states in the caption of the complaint that the agents are being sued in their

“individual and official” capacities. (Doc. 1, p. 1) This reference to the agents’ “individual”

capacities must relate to Counts 1 and 2 because it has no application to Counts 3 and 4, which

are brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The complaint further states that the

agents “personally participated in the constitutional deprivations.” (Doc. 1, p. 2) Finally, the

court notes that Counts 1 and 2 allege that the agents intentionally engaged in unconstitutional

activities, which would be contrary to their officially sanctioned duties. Construing the

complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court concludes that the agents are

being sued in their individual capacities in Counts 1 and 2. See, e.g., Nurse v. U.S., 226 F.3d

996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s Bivins claims

where the complaint “purports to sue the individual defendants in both their individual and

official capacities.”).

The court concludes that the phrase “while acting in their capacity as law enforcement

officers and governmental agents of the United States of America” was inserted in the complaint

to bolster Counts 3 and 4. See (Doc. 1, ¶ 1) These counts allege jurisdiction pursuant to the

Federal Tort Claims Act, which “provides a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the

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United States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their

employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000).

The defendants further argue Counts 1 and 2 should be dismissed because the agents are

entitled to qualified immunity. 

“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when [he] makes a decision that, even

if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances [he]

confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599 (2004). An officer

is not entitled to qualified immunity if (1) “taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”

and (2) “the right violated was clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Davis v. City of Las

Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation omitted). The court concludes

that the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, alleges a claim for

which the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Alvarado alleges he was seized at the checkpoint when the dog alerted to the presence

of drugs. The vehicle was searched and no drugs were found. Nevertheless, Alvarado was

detained for eight hours. The complaint alleges that there came a time, after the fruitless search

for drugs, when it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that there were no drugs in the

vehicle and probable cause to hold Alvarado no longer existed. At this point, however, the

defendants continued to hold Alvarado. It is clearly established that a person “may not be

arrested, or must be released from arrest, if previously established probable cause has

dissipated.” U.S. v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).

The complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, alleges a claim for

which the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

The defendants further argue Count 1 fails to specify what each individual defendant did,

or failed to do. (Doc. 14) They further argue the complaint fails to specify how the individual

defendants violated Alvarado’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id.

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The court finds that Count 1, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,

sufficiently informs the defendants of what they did or did not do to violate his civil rights. On

July 2, 2012, they held Alvarado and his vehicle after probable cause had dissipated in violation

of his Fourth Amendment rights. The court agrees with the defendants that the allegations in

the complaint do not support an inference that the individual defendants violated his Fourth

Amendment rights on any other date.

The court further finds that Count 2, sufficiently states a claim that the individual

defendants conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by holding him and his vehicle

after probable cause had dissipated on July 2, 2012. The court agrees with the defendants that

the allegations in the complaint do not support Alvarado’s implication that this conspiracy

extended beyond that date.

Discussion: Federal Tort Claims Act

The defendants further argue Counts 3 and 4 fail to state proper claims under the Federal

Tort Claims Act. (Doc. 14) Accordingly, they move that the court dismiss those counts

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Id.

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

Fed.R.Civ.P. When analyzing a facial challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, the court accepts

as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences

in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). Because federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the

burden of proof. Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, Alvarado claims this court has jurisdiction over Claims 3 and 4

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Doc. 1)

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, et seq., “provides a

limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for torts committed by federal

employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996,

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1000 (9th Cir. 2000). The government accepts liability “under circumstances where the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the

place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 

In Count 3, Alvarado claims the individual defendants assaulted him. (Doc. 1) The

defendants argue the complaint fails to state facts to support this count. (Doc. 14) They are

correct. In the body of the complaint, Alvarado describes a single assault when he suffered a

broken toe on November 2, 2012. He does not, however, allege any facts from which it could

be inferred that the individual defendants were the ones who assaulted him. Count 3 does not

state a claim under the FTCA.

 In Count 4, Alvarado claims the individual defendants falsely imprisoned him. (Doc.

1) The defendants argue the complaint fails to state facts in support of this count. (Doc. 14)

The court does not agree.

False imprisonment is “the detention of a person without his consent and without lawful

authority.” Cullison v. City of Peoria, 120 Ariz. 165, 169, 584 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1978). Here,

Count 4 alleges the individual defendants detained Alvarado on July 2, 2012 after probable

cause had dissipated. The allegations in the complaint support a claim for false imprisonment.

The court agrees with the defendants that the allegations in the complaint do not support

Alvarado’s implication that the individual defendants falsely imprisoned him on any other date.

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on January 12, 2015, is

granted in part. (Doc. 14) 

The deadline for service is extended to April 13, 2015.

Count 3 of the complaint is dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1).

DATED this 19th day of March, 2015.

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