Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01443/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01443-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY A. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NEW UNITED MOTOR

MANUFACTURING, INC., a California

Corporation, and DOES 1 through 50,

Inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-01443 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Anthony A. Rodriguez’s motion to remand brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court finds the present motion appropriate for decision

without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing set for July 1, 2005. See Civil L.R. 7-

1(b). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers, considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Rodriguez’s motion to

remand.

BACKGROUND

Rodriguez originally filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California for

the County of Alameda on January 24, 2005, asserting causes of action for discrimination based

on physical disability, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, and

termination in violation of public policy. (See Complaint at ¶ 1.) 

Case 3:05-cv-01443-JSW Document 13 Filed 06/29/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On April 8, 2005, Defendant removed Rodriguez’s action to this Court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441 asserting the existence of a federal question. Thereafter, on April 20, 2005, Rodriguez

moved to remand.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Relevant to Removal Jurisdiction.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1995). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may

remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction ... to the district court of the United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is pending.” 

Removal from state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 is permitted in any

civil case in which the district court has original jurisdiction, provided that notice of removal is

filed within thirty days after the defendants have received summons and the complaint or have

been formally served. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 354-56

(1999); see also Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921). The removal

statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167

F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction for

the purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal and must be satisfied by a

preponderance of the evidence. See id.; see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115,

1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, Defendant asserts that removal is proper because Plaintiff’s claim is premised on a

federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This section provides that “district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

B. Plaintiff’s Termination Claim is Preempted by Section 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act.

Plaintiff’s termination in violation of public policy claim alleges that New United Motor

Manufacturing, Incorporated (“NUMMI”) terminated him in violation of public policy;

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specifically, he was discharged because he has a physical disability. (Complaint at ¶ 37.) He

contends that NUMMI constructively terminated him after he suffered an industrial injury by

not allowing him to go back to work despite doctors’ releases. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.) In order to

sustain a cause of action for termination in violation of public policy, Plaintiff must establish

that he was employed by NUMMI; he was discharged; the alleged violation of public policy was

a motivating factor for the discharge; and the discharge caused him harm. See Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 (1980). Plaintiff argues that the resolution of this

claim is not substantially dependent upon analysis of the collective bargaining agreement

(“CBA”). (Br. at 7.) Defendant counters that the element of “discharge” is in dispute, and

requires the court to interpret the CBA. (Opp. Br. at 5.)

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) establishes federal

jurisdiction for “suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.”

28 U.S.C. § 185(a). The LMRA therefore preempts any state cause of action for breach of a

collective bargaining agreement. Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1522 (9th Cir.

1995). “Even suits based on torts, rather than on breach of the collective bargaining agreement,

are governed by federal law if their evaluation is inextricably intertwined with consideration of

the terms of [a] labor contract.” Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.

1988) (internal quotations omitted). When resolution of a state-law claim is substantially

dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor

contract, that claim is preempted by federal law governing labor contracts. Allis-Chambers

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). “The key to determining the scope of preemption is

not how the complaint is cast, but whether the claims can be resolved only by referring to the

terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grotto, Inc., 830 F.2d

993, 999 (9th Cir. 1987).

For example, in Firestone v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000), the

plaintiffs’ unions and the employer agreed to a compensation arrangement, yet the method of

calculating compensation for overtime hours was disputed by the parties. The Ninth Circuit

concluded that to determine whether there were overtime violations required interpretation of

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the contractual wage rates in the collective bargaining agreement, thus the plaintiffs’ state-law

claim was preempted by the LMRA. Id. at 1067. 

Here, like the plaintiffs’ wage claim in Firestone, Rodriguez’s claim for termination in

violation of public policy requires interpretation of provisions in the CBA. The allegations

contained in the complaint which form the basis of Rodriguez’s claim are premised on his

alleged constructive termination. (Complaint at ¶ 15.) However, Defendant contends that

Plaintiff has never been terminated and is still employed at NUMMI. (Johnson Declaration at ¶ 

4.) The CBA specifically regulates the circumstances under which an employee can be

terminated and the procedures that must be adhered to when there is a medical dispute as to

whether an employee may return to work. (NUMMI Notice of Removal Action, Exh. B at 28-

29, 171-73.) Thus, the element of whether Plaintiff was actually discharged, integral to

Plaintiff’s termination in violation of public policy claim, requires an interpretation of the

contractual provisions in the CBA concerning termination and returning to active status after an

injury. Consequently, Rodriguez’s claim for termination in violation of public policy cannot be

interpreted independently of the CBA and is therefore preempted by § 301(a) of the LMRA. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s additional claims for discrimination based on physical disability,

retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation are not remanded because they share

a common nucleus of operative fact with Plaintiff’s termination in violation of public policy

claim, and the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that if the state

and federal claims are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one

judicial proceeding, it is in the federal court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the state claims).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Rodriguez’s motion to remand is DENIED. The parties’ joint

case management statement is due July 1, 2005 and the initial case management conference

shall be conducted on July 8, 2005 at 1:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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