Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01349/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01349-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMAZING INSURANCE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. DiMANNO and

ACCUIRE, LLC,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01349-TLN-CKD

ORDER RE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND FOR 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Amazing Insurance, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion 

for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunction Should 

Not Issue. (ECF No. 7.) Defendants Michael A. DiManno, an individual, and Accuire, LLC, a 

Florida limited liability company (collectively, “Defendants”), have not appeared. The Court 

previously dismissed the underlying Complaint (ECF No. 1) sua sponte and without prejudice, on 

the grounds that the Complaint failed to allege the components of federal subject-matter 

jurisdiction as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff filed a First Amended 

Verified Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 6), and renewed its request for a temporary restraining 

order (ECF No. 7).

///

///

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed its FAC on July 23, 2019, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 

duties, conversion, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 6

¶¶ 43–64.) The FAC also requests declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. 

(ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 36–42.) The FAC describes a business dispute over the ownership of Accuire and 

its wholly owned subsidiaries, which “are staffing companies and professional employer 

organizations.” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 7.) Accuire is allegedly a Florida company with a principal place 

of business in Folsom, California. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff claims that it purchased a seventy-five percent ownership stake in Accuire 

pursuant to a “Binding Letter of Understanding” executed in November 2016. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 8.) 

DiManno owned the remaining twenty-five percent of Accuire and served as its Chief Executive 

Officer. (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 9–10.) The FAC alleges that Accuire operated pursuant to the terms of 

an “Amended Operating Agreement,” which contemplated that corporate action could be taken 

without an in-person meeting so long as a sufficient number of Accuire’s members consented in 

writing. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 11; ECF No. 6-2 at 8.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff and its 

owner, an individual named Alex J. Campos, are “sole guarantors for several of Accuire’s 

obligations based on DiManno’s lack of creditworthiness to secure the obligations alone.” (ECF 

No. 6 ¶ 12; see also ECF No. 6-1 at 6–7 (setting forth assumption by Plaintiff of certain 

obligations of Accuire in connection with Plaintiff’s purchase of controlling membership interest 

in November 2016).)

On March 30, 2019, Plaintiff, Accuire, and DiManno executed a term sheet that 

contemplated Accuire buying out Plaintiff’s seventy-five percent interest in Accuire. (ECF No. 6 

¶ 13; ECF No. 6-5 at 3–4.) The term sheet acknowledged that as of the date of its execution, 

Plaintiff was “a 75% owner of Accuire” and DiManno was a “25% owner of Accuire before this 

transaction and shall be the 100% owner” of Accuire on the closing date. (ECF No. 6-5 at 2–3.) 

Among numerous other terms, the term sheet set forth that Accuire would pay a $350,000 down 

payment by July 1, 2019, as a condition of closing. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 13; ECF No. 6-5 at 3.) The 

FAC alleges that this down payment was never paid by Accuire or DiManno, which means that 

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the transfer of Accuire’s majority membership interest from Plaintiff to Accuire and DiManno 

never occurred. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that the failure of Accuire and DiManno to produce the anticipated 

$350,000 down payment — along with the fact that Plaintiff knew that Accuire currently had 

unpaid debts and other financial obligations totaling over a million dollars, some of which could 

subject Plaintiff and Campos to direct liability if not paid or settled — caused Plaintiff to set a 

special meeting of Accuire’s members for July 15, 2019, to address Accuire’s management and 

financial condition. (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 15–18; ECF No. 7-1 at 2–3.) DiManno knew about the 

meeting no later than July 10. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 19.) However, DiManno did not attend the July 15 

meeting, and allegedly called the police on Plaintiff’s representative — an individual named 

Vikash Jain — who had arrived at Accuire’s offices for the meeting. (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 19–24.)

After the meeting adjourned without any action being taken, Plaintiff exercised its rights 

under the amended operating agreement to take corporate action by executing a “Written Consent 

of Members Holding Majority Units.” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff, through Campos as its 

President, executed the written consent on July 15. (ECF No. 6-11 at 5.) This written consent 

purported to terminate DiManno’s employment as Accuire’s Chief Executive Officer and to 

appoint a new Board of Directors consisting of Campos, Jain, and DiManno. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 27.) 

The written consent also purported to give Jain authority to (i) negotiate with some of Accuire’s

creditors regarding outstanding notes owed to them by Accuire; (ii) engage a consultant to 

“reduce unnecessary expenses;” (iii) notify Accuire’s vendors, its bank, its labor union, its 

landlord, and an insurance company of Accuire’s new management structure; (iv) require two 

signatures on any company check and for all outgoing wires and financial transfers; and (v) take 

over Accuire’s e-mail system. (ECF No. 6-11 at 3.) The written consent also contemplated that 

Accuire’s new management would (i) hire an audit firm to undertake a forensic accounting, 

(ii) seek additional capital, or (iii) seek to sell Accuire. (ECF No. 6-11 at 3.)

By way of the pending motion, Plaintiff seeks an order to (i) restrain and enjoin 

Defendants “from continuing to exercise control over Accuire, LLC, its employees and 

subsidiaries,” and (ii) force Defendants to comply with the July 15 written consent. (ECF No. 7 

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at 2.) Plaintiff’s primary argument is that allowing DiManno to continue exercising control over 

Accuire will result in significant damage to its business reputation, credit profile, and goodwill. 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 8–9.) Plaintiff’s evidence of this impending reputational harm includes the 

averment in an affidavit submitted by Campos that Accuire currently owes $700,000 to Vensure 

Employer Services, $120,000 to the State of California, and $440,000 to various former members 

of Accuire. (ECF No. 6-6 ¶ 6.) It also includes a declaration submitted by a former Accuire 

president named Ronald Wolcott, stating that DiManno issued a million-dollar line of credit to a 

client that had not been recovered as of April 2018. (ECF No. 6-7 ¶ 4.) And it includes the 

allegation that even while Accuire was drawing down millions of dollars on a credit line, it “has 

failed to fulfill its obligations under its line of credit with Sterling National Bank, which failure 

puts Accuire at risk of default and accordingly puts both Amazing and Mr. Campos at risk of 

being liable for the debt.” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 17; see also ECF No. 6-6 ¶ 7 (averring that the balance 

on this line of credit is currently unknown to Plaintiff).)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A. Temporary Restraining Orders Generally

A district court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse 

party if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary 

remedy, the underlying purpose of which is “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable 

harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 

(1974). In this context, the status quo “refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a 

lawsuit, but instead to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’” 

GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tanner Motor 

Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)).

“[T]he legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are ‘substantially 

identical.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir.) (quoting Stuhlbarg Int’l 

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Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)), 

reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 448 

(2017). Hence, a temporary restraining order “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 

the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). A plaintiff seeking 

a temporary restraining order must therefore make a clear showing “[1] that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Id. at 20.

Alternatively, a district court may weigh a plaintiff’s showing on the four Winter elements 

using a sliding scale. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Pursuant to this alternative approach, a plaintiff may obtain preliminary relief where it 

demonstrates “serious questions going to the merits” of its underlying claims as well as “a 

balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff . . . , so long as the plaintiff also shows 

that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id.

B. Irreparable Harm

Regardless of the analytical method used by a district court, a plaintiff must “make a 

showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary 

restraining order. Id. Generally, for the component of the Winter test that requires a plaintiff “to 

demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of” a temporary restraining order, 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, “economic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, 

because such injury can be remedied by a damage award,” Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television 

& Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991).

Even though economic injury is not enough to show irreparable harm in the context of a 

request for preliminary relief, “loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill 

could constitute irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 

1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). But a plaintiff who attempts to establish irreparable harm via loss of 

business reputation and goodwill must proffer evidence of that loss — a district court may not 

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base a finding of reputational harm on “platitudes rather than evidence.” Id. Furthermore, the 

irreparable harm alleged by a plaintiff must also be imminent. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 

v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate 

“immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief”).

As a result, evidence of reputational damage or harm to business goodwill sufficient to 

merit entry of preliminary relief typically incorporates information provided by, or from the 

perspective of, market-based sources external to the plaintiff itself. See, e.g., Disney Enters., Inc. 

v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 865 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding likelihood of harm to business 

goodwill was supported by declaration that incorporated statements from plaintiff’s customers 

raising concerns about general behavior of competitor companies like defendant’s); Titaness 

Light Shop, LLC v. Sunlight Supply, Inc., 585 F. App’x 390, 391 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 

insufficient showing of reputational harm alleged to result from non-movant’s website’s 

association with marijuana, where evidence failed to establish that movant’s customers were

aware of non-movant’s website or its association with marijuana); DFO, LLC v. Denny Bar Co., 

LLC, No. 2:18-cv-02226-JAM-KJN, 2018 WL 5880813, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018) (holding 

that declaration submitted by plaintiff’s employee was insufficient to establish likelihood of harm 

to business goodwill because it was based only on the declarant’s opinion and experience 

regarding the relevant market, and therefore “fail[ed] to present any concrete evidence that a loss 

of control of [plaintiff’s] business reputation has occurred or is likely to occur at all”).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Irreparable Harm in Absence of Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff argues that it will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not issue a temporary 

restraining order because allowing DiManno to continue mismanaging Accuire’s assets, debts, 

and obligations will damage Plaintiff’s “credit worthiness, business reputation, and goodwill.” 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 8.) Plaintiff also argues that “damage to its reputation and credit worthiness” 

will result if “Defendants are allowed to continue to neglect their debts, which subjects Accuire to 

litigation in which Amazing would ultimately be responsible for 75% of any judgment and/or

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certain debts.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 8.)1 The Court finds that this argument is insufficient to 

constitute “a clear showing” that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of” the requested 

temporary restraining order. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. This is because Plaintiff’s evidence of harm 

to its creditworthiness, reputation, and business goodwill is either too speculative or fails to 

demonstrate imminence. See Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250; Caribbean Marine Servs., 844 F.2d at

674.

i. Sterling National Bank Credit Line

For instance, there is ample evidence in the record pointing to Accuire’s corporate 

borrowing on a line of credit provided by Sterling National Bank. (See ECF No. 6 ¶ 17; ECF No. 

6-6 ¶ 7.) But Plaintiff submitted no evidence from representatives at Sterling National Bank, or 

from other external sources, that speak to the bank’s concern about Accuire repaying its credit 

line, see DFO, 2018 WL 5880813, at *2 (holding that statement from declarant associated with 

plaintiff’s company was insufficient to establish likelihood of harm to business goodwill, because 

declaration was based only on the declarant’s opinion and experience regarding the relevant 

market), or that describe any actual impending calls on Plaintiff’s guarantee of Accuire’s debts,

(see ECF No. 7-1 at 8 (referring to potential damage to Plaintiff and Campos “caused by having 

their personal guarantee called due”)).

Nor is there any evidence from, for example, Accuire’s customers or vendors or from 

third-party business analysts, demonstrating external awareness of Accuire’s credit issues that 

might lead to negative market conclusions about its creditworthiness. See Disney Enters., 869 

F.3d at 865 (finding likelihood of harm to business goodwill was supported by declaration that 

incorporated statements from plaintiff’s customers); Titaness Light Shop, 585 F. App’x at 391

(noting lack of evidence proffered to establish that movant’s customers were aware of 

relationship between movant’s and non-movant’s respective websites). Additionally, the Campos 

affidavit states quite plainly that Plaintiff, through no fault of its own, does not actually know the 

 

1 By characterizing irreparable harm in this manner, Plaintiff implicitly and correctly recognizes that its 

claims for money damages cannot support issuance of a temporary restraining order. Rent-A-Ctr., 944 F.2d at 603 

(stating the rule that “economic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because such injury can 

be remedied by a damage award”).

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outstanding balance on its line of credit, much less when that balance might be called due by 

Sterling National Bank. (ECF No. 6-6 ¶ 7.) It would therefore be speculative to hold that 

evidence of credit line draws — even evidence of substantial draws effectuated quite recently (see 

ECF No. 6 ¶ 17) — necessarily suggests that Accuire’s business reputation will suffer in the 

absence of a temporary restraining order, see Caribbean Marine Servs., 844 F.2d at 674

(requiring “immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief”).

ii. Debts Owed by Accuire to Third Parties

Much the same is true of the money Accuire apparently owes to Vensure Employer 

Services, the State of California, and various former members of Accuire. (See ECF No. 6-6 ¶ 6.)

There is nothing definitive in the record establishing that these debts are overdue, much 

less evidence that Plaintiff or Campos are at imminent risk of having their personal guarantee 

called to satisfy Accuire’s outstanding obligations. (See ECF No. 7-1 at 8); Caribbean Marine 

Servs., 844 F.2d at 674 (requiring “immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary 

injunctive relief”). And simply carrying debt on its books does not in and of itself demonstrate 

that Accuire is otherwise in imminent danger of reputational harm, for Plaintiff supplies no 

evidence that any of the three creditors referenced in its moving papers harbors commercial ill 

will toward Accuire because of its debts. See Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 865 (finding likelihood 

of harm to business goodwill was supported by declaration that incorporated statements from 

plaintiff’s customers). Nor does Plaintiff provide evidence that uninvolved third parties are aware

of — much less that they hold a negative opinion of Accuire’s credit worthiness as a result of —

its debts. See DFO, 2018 WL 5880813, at *2 (holding that declaration was insufficient to 

establish likelihood of harm to business goodwill because it was based only on the declarant’s

opinion and experience regarding the relevant market).

iii. Credit Line Extended to Customer

Finally, with respect to the million-dollar credit line Accuire apparently issued to one of 

its customers, “the majority of which remains unpaid” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 16), there is once again 

nothing to tie this allegation to any imminent harm to Accuire’s business goodwill or reputation, 

see Caribbean Marine Servs., 844 F.2d at 674 (requiring “immediate threatened injury as a 

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prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief”). Indeed, there is at least a colorable argument to be 

made that Accuire’s lenient approach to the credit line it issued could actually improve, rather 

than harm, its business reputation and goodwill with this particular Accuire customer. See WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Essentially, the goodwill of 

a business is its value as a going concern and is made up of many factors, such as location, 

patronage of customers, relations with suppliers, experience of employees, effectiveness of 

management, and many other factors.”). It would therefore be speculative to hold that evidence 

of a credit line Plaintiff extended to a customer makes it likely that Accuire’s business reputation 

will suffer as a result. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding that a plaintiff moving for preliminary 

relief must show that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of” the requested order).

iv. Conclusion

In short, while Plaintiff has proffered evidence that Accuire is currently extending credit 

to and receiving credit from a number of sources (see ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 16–17), it has not provided 

evidence sufficient for the Court to find that irreparable injury in the form of harm to Accuire’s 

business relationships, creditworthiness, or goodwill “is likely in the absence of” a temporary 

restraining order, Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

B. Remaining Factors

A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test to be eligible for 

the extraordinary remedy of a temporary restraining order. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 

1135. Since the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not made the required showing of imminent 

and irreparable harm to its business relationships, creditworthiness, or goodwill in the absence of 

a temporary restraining order, the Court declines to address the remaining Winter factors. See 

MD Helicopters, Inc. v. Aerometals, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02249-TLN-AC, 2018 WL 489102, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018) (“The Court finds Plaintiff fails to make a showing on irreparable harm 

and, therefore, declines to address the remaining factors.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s renewed request for a temporary restraining 

order is DENIED. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff may notice a motion for a preliminary injunction at its 

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convenience in accordance with the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of California. See L.R. 231(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2019

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