Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01139/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01139-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID W. WILSON, No. CIV S-06-1139-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

W.C. NESBETH, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc.

10), filed on June 27, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the court’s docket to reflect that these 1

individuals are the only named defendants. Specifically, any individuals listed on the docket but

not listed above should be terminated as defendants, and any individuals listed above but not

listed on the docket should be added as defendants. 

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are

satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which

support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it

is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are

vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names the following 12 individuals as defendants: Nesbeth, Tilton,

Schwartz, Veal, Cullen, O’Ran, Hudnall, Cruz, Shankland, Piazza, Masuret, and Ryan. Plaintiff 1

alleges that defendants Tilton, Schwartz, Veal, Cullen, O’Ran, Hudnall, Cruz, and Shankland

hold supervisory positions. Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under § 1983 and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

Plaintiff provides the following “summary” of his claims:

. . . This is a complaint declaratory and injunctive relief and

damages under 1983, with acts violating Title II Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) against state entity, California Medical Facility

(CMF) – Vacaville, part of California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR), in which “discrimination and unequal treatment”

for “siege & terrorism” of Unit M-3 Enhanced Out Patients (EOP’s) was

allowed against Plaintiff WILSON and all EOP’s by Correctional Officer

(C/O) W.C. NESBETH by denying program cell unlocks of doors by

intentionally walking by cells, then claim Inmate’s were not ready to make

miss or be late to Breakfast/Lunch, or confine to quarters without

supervisor’s or any Psy. staff approval, C/O NESBETH walks by cells to

deny or make late to yard, medication, church, medical or other priority

pass duckets, to see EOP’s clinicians, which when brought up at

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community meetings inmate’s cells searched, or personal property taken

in retaliation. Which after Plaintiff WILSON filed civil “discrimination”

suit of denial of school, education, dayroom access among several issued,

Plaintiff included C/O NESBETH’s actions and his supervisor’s failing to

act, intercede on behalf of M-3 EOP’s in Amended Complaint. Plaintiff

then contacted Government agencies and organizations to assist with civil

suit and C/O NESBETH’s caprice denying dayroom, showers, library

access. Plaintiff approached custody staff who turned a blind eye, then

gathered signatures on Affidavit to remove C/O NESBETH and attached

staff complaint and filed Restraining Order in discrimination case,

Plaintiff’s appeal on NESBETH was screened out twice by Appeals

Coordinator, Plaintiff sent to Warden, contacted more Government

officials, and appeal is sent to counselor “No” response who brings to

Plaintiff WILSON who ask for response, and counselor gives copy to C/O

NESBETH who use’s to harass EOP’s on Affidavit, and counselor brings

back to plaintiff who sends to Director for relief, to which C/O NESBETH

takes Plaintiff’s personal property and property card, and gives back part

and other items given back in appeal resolvement. C/O NESBETH

concocts “false disciplinary in retaliation” of Plaintiff claiming altering

shorts. Another Inmate keep requesting HELP with C/O NESBETH

harassing him and after C/O NESBETH places a knife in inmates cell,

Plaintiff writes group complaint for inmate and help gather signatures. 

C/O NESBETH concocts Plaintiff inciting to place in segregation,

Plaintiff gives Caption list of witnesses which committee claims none

denying Fourteenth Amendment due process, Plaintiff is released from

segregation and files appeal for property taken by C/O NESBETH, and

appeal filed in “False disciplinary” which both appeals are denied at

Review CMF, Plaintiff sends for Director’s Review which are sent back to

procedurally bar, which Plaintiff sends back until Director’s Review

given. Plaintiff having contacted Newspaper, more Gov’t officials, and

received other Inmate’s complaint’s against C/O NESBETH, which this

discrimination to deny programs, activities, services, was not done to

Non-EOP Inmate’s who did not face intentional, willfull, malicious,

reckless disregard as Plaintiff WILSON who is EOP with PTS (disorder)

diagnosed schizophrenia meeting Title II ADA requirements as others

similarly situated, mental impairment Title 15 section 3004(c) Rights and

respects of others; Title 42 U.S.C. § 2131 and 504 of Rehabilitation Act,

which C/O NESBETH violates with retaliation to appeals Title 15 section

3084(d); 28 C.F.R. § 35.134; First Amendment and Eighth Amendment

without Due Process Fourteenth Amendment United States Constitution. 

II. DISCUSSION

Based on the foregoing, and the additional factual allegations set forth in the

second amended complaint, it appears that plaintiff is attempting to state claims based on the

following theories: (1) denial of equal protection; (2) retaliation; and (3) possibly denial of

medical care for his mental disorder. In addition, plaintiff has named a number of defendants

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alleging liability based on their supervisory roles. The court finds that the complaint does not

currently state any clear claims for relief, but that the defects could be cured through

amendment. Therefore, the court will set forth the legal principles which apply to the theories

identified herein and will give plaintiff an opportunity to further amend the complaint. 

A. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or had

actual knowledge of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant

holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. 

See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Equal Protection

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 

See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio,

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants

acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which

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included plaintiff, and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims

may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740

(9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

C. Retaliation

Prisoners retain a First Amendment right to petition the government through the

prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In order to

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must allege that he was

retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory action was not

related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional security. See Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting this standard, the

prisoner must allege a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the exercise of a

constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also allege that his

constitutional right was actually chilled by the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must allege the following

in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse action against the

inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in protected conduct; (3)

the adverse action actually chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the adverse

action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

568 (9th Cir. 2005). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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D. Medical Care

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner are confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or

omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the

Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the

condition is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s

daily activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 15-220. An amended complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

/ / /

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 11-110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to

comply with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule

41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed on June 27, 2007, is dismissed

with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: August 15, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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