Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00450/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Prudencio Beltran-Lopez,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-16-0450-PHX-DGC (JFM)

CR-15-0482-PHX-DGC

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February 16, 2016 (Doc. 1). On June 15, 2016 Respondent filed its 

Response (Doc. 11) and a supplemental exhibit (Doc. 17) on July 5, 2016. Movant has 

not filed a reply, and the time to do so expired on August 12, 2016.

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the factual basis in his written Plea Agreement (Exhibit 15), Movant admitted 

the following:

I am not a citizen or national of the United States. I was removed 

from the United States through San Ysidro, California, on 

September 27, 2013. I was voluntarily present and found in the 

United States at or near Phoenix, Arizona, on March 11, 2015. I did 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 20
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not obtain the express consent of the United States government to 

reapply for admission to the United States prior to returning to the 

United States. 

For sentencing purposes, I admit I was convicted of Possession of 

Marijuana for Sale, a felony, on July 27, 2009, in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court. I was represented by an attorney, and I was 

sentenced to three (3) years probation and three (3) months 

imprisonment. 

For sentencing purposes, I admit I was convicted of Re-Entry after 

Deportation, a felony, on June 21, 2011, in the United States District 

Court, District of Arizona. I was represented by an attorney, and I 

was sentenced to thirty-seven (37) months imprisonment and three 

(3) years supervised release. 

I further admit that I was under a term of supervised release in No. 

CR-11-00520-001-TUC-DCB(BPV) when the present offense was 

committed.

(CR Doc. 32 at 8.) (Docket entries in the underlying criminal case, CR-15-0482-PHXDGC, are referenced herein as “CR Doc. ___”. Exhibits to the Response, Doc. 11, are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

Indeed, Movant was subjected to a Decision to Reinstate Order of Removal, 

which was issued on September 27, 2013 (Exhibit 9), and was removed on the same date 

(Exhibit 10, Executed Warrant of Removal). That removal was founded upon Movant’s 

removal order entered on May 7, 1998. (Id.) The 1998 removal was based upon 

Movant’s his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court on January 17, 1997 for 

possession of narcotic drugs. (Exhibit 5, Not. to Appear.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Movant was charged by Complaint (CR Doc. 1) on March 17, 2015 with violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), re-entry after removal. Movant subsequently waived indictment 

(CR Doc. 11), and was charged by Information (CR Doc. 12) with re-entry after removal 

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). 

Movant eventually entered into a written Plea Agreement (CR Doc. 32) 

addressing both the instant case and his violation of supervised release in CR-11-00520-

001-TUC-DCB(BPV). Movant agreed to plead guilty to the charge in exchange for 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 2 of 20
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

agreements for stipulated reductions in offense level for acceptance of responsibility, 

termination of the supervised release in the prior case, and a base offense level of 8, plus 

adjustments for the most serious prior conviction, and early disposition departures. (Id. at 

2-4.) The Plea Agreement contained the following provision:

4. WAIVER OF DEFENSES AND APPEAL RIGHTS 

The defendant waives ( 1) any and all motions, defenses, 

probable cause determinations, and objections that the defendant 

could assert to the indictment or information; and (2) any right to 

file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion 

that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or forfeiture, 

the entry of judgment against the defendant, or any aspect of the 

defendant's sentence, including the manner in which the sentence is 

determined, including but not limited to any appeals under 18 

U.S.C. § 3742 (sentencing appeals) and motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2241 and 2255 (habeas petitions), and any right to file a motion for 

modification of sentence, including under Title 18, United States 

Code, Section 3582(c). The defendant acknowledges that this 

waiver shall result in the dismissal of any appeal, collateral attack, 

or other motion the defendant might file challenging the conviction, 

order of restitution or forfeiture, or sentence in this case. This 

waiver shall not be construed to bar a claim by the defendant of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

(CR Doc. 32 at 4-5 (emphasis in original.) 

Movant entered his plea of guilty on April 28, 2015 before U.S. Magistrate Judge 

Burns. (CR Doc. 40, R.T. 4/28/15.) Judge Burns issued a Findings and 

Recommendation (CR Doc. 18) finding the plea knowingly and voluntarily entered, and 

recommending acceptance. The findings and recommendations were adopted, but 

acceptance of the pleas was deferred until sentencing. (CR Doc. 20, Min. Order 

5/28/15.) 

Respondent filed a Sentencing Memorandum (CR Doc. 26), recommending a high 

sentencing range sentence of 46 months based on Petitioner’s criminal history and 

continuing conduct. The Presentence Investigation Report and Recommendation (CR 

Doc. 28) recommended a sentence of 41 months. Movant filed a Sentencing 

Memorandum (CR Doc. 29) concurring in that recommendation.

Movant appeared for sentencing on August 10, 2015, and was sentenced to 41 

months, based on a departure under the early disposition program. (CR Doc. 31, 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 3 of 20
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Judgment; CR Doc. 33, Statement of Reasons; CR Doc. 41, R.T. 8/10/15 at 9-10.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant did not file a direct appeal. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 2.) 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion to Vacate - Movant commenced the current case by filing his Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February 16, 

2016 (Doc. 1). Movant’s Motion asserted the following three grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he argues that his indictment should be dismissed 

because the removal orders that formed the basis for his illegal 

reentry conviction were invalid. In Ground Two, Movant claims 

there was insufficient evidence to support the prior convictions used 

to calculate his sentence. In Ground Three, Movant argues that he 

received ineffective assistance from counsel because his attorney 

failed to attack the underlying removal orders and sentencing 

guidelines calculation, as discussed in Grounds One and Two.

(Order 3/1/16, Doc. 3 at 1-2.)

On screening, the Court dismissed Ground One and Two as unrelated to the 

voluntariness of Movant’s guilty plea and waivers of review, and ordered a response to

Ground Three. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Waiver of Privilege – On April 12, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion for Order 

Requiring Defendant to Execute Limited Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver (Doc. 4). 

That motion was granted and Movant was directed to either withdraw his claims of 

ineffective assistance or file a waiver. (Order 5/10/16, Doc. 7.) Movant complied by 

providing his Waiver, which was filed by Respondents on May 13, 2016 (Doc. 8) and 

Movant on May 19, 2016 (Doc. 10). Respondents report that trial counsel nonetheless 

has refused to make any disclosures. (Response, Doc. 11 at 7, n. 4.) Neither party has 

since requested such an order.

Response - On June 15, 2016, Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 11). 

Respondent argues that Movant has waived his right to bring the instant Motion to 

Vacate (id. at 8-9), and his claims of ineffective assistance are without merit (id. at 10-

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 4 of 20
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12) because there was an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea (id. at 12-14) and his 

offense level was properly calculated (id. at 14-20).

Respondent sought to file a recording of an immigration hearing as an exhibit to 

its Response. (Motion, Doc. 14.) The motion was denied, and Respondents were 

directed to file a transcript instead. (Order 6/16/16, Doc. 15.) On July 5, 2016, 

Respondent filed the transcript (Doc. 17). 

Reply – The Court’s scheduling order required any reply to be filed within 35 

days of the filing of a response to the Motion to Vacate. (Order 4/27/16, Doc. 6 at 2.) 

The Order directing filing of the transcript provided that the time for a reply was 

extended to run from service of the transcript. (Order 6/16/16, Doc. 15.) The transcript 

(Doc. 17) was served on July 5, 2016. Accordingly, a reply was due on or before August 

12, 2016. To date, Movant has not replied.

“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an 

order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as 

true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2248.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. WAIVER

1. Applicable Law

a. Implicit Waivers

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact 

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 

of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty 

plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

/ /

/ /

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 5 of 20
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

b. Explicit Waivers

Beyond the waivers implicit in a guilty plea, the Ninth Circuit regularly enforces 

"knowing and voluntary" waivers of appellate rights in criminal cases, provided that the 

waivers are part of negotiated guilty pleas, see United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 

(9th Cir.1994), and do not violate public policy, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 

840, 843 (9th Cir.1996) (cataloguing public policy exceptions). Similarly, the right to 

collateral review may be waived. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 

(9th Cir.1993). Such waivers usefully preserve the finality of judgments and sentences 

imposed pursuant to valid plea agreements. See Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 843.

However, to be enforceable, such waivers (like the plea itself) must be made 

“knowingly and voluntarily.” Michlin, 34 F.3d a 898. 

Similarly, the defendant's rights to challenge any sentencing errors may be 

explicitly waived. See e.g. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991). 

Further, where a waiver specifically includes the waiver of the right to attack a sentence, 

then it also waives “the right to argue ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.” 

U.S. v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Movant’s waiver extended to 

sentencing issues. However, it expressly excluded claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

Granted, there are some flavors of errors at sentencing that are not waivable. See 

e.g. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991) (sentence violates the 

terms of the plea agreement); United States v. Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 203 n. 6 (9th 

Cir.1995) ("sentencing error could be entirely unforeseeable and therefore not barred"); 

United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir.1994) (sentencing disparity among codefendants based entirely on race); United States v. Marin, 961 F .2d 493, 496 (4th 

Cir.1992) (sentence in excess of maximum statutory penalty or based on a 

constitutionally impermissible factor such as race). 

/ /

/ /

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 6 of 20
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

c. Knowing and Voluntary 

The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here, as here, a defendant is represented 

by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . [A] defendant who pleads 

guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 

[ineffective].’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 

267) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Application to Movant

In light of Movant’s waiver by his plea and in his guilty plea, the Court dismissed 

all but Ground Three of the Motion to Vacate, which is founded upon Movant’s 

assertions of ineffective assistance. (Order 3/1/16, Doc. 3.) 

For the reasons discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that Movant’s 

claims of ineffective assistance are without merit, and do not establish that Movant’s 

plea or waiver were unknowing or involuntary. Accordingly, Movant has effectively 

waived any claims arising under the waiver implicit in his guilty plea, and any claims 

explicitly waived in his Plea Agreement including his right to bring the instant action. 

Because the Plea Agreement excludes from Movant’s explicit waiver any claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, it does not bar Movant’s claims in Grounds Three.

However, Movant’s claims of ineffective assistance in Ground Three remain 

subject to the implicit waivers resulting from his guilty plea. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57; 

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Because the undersigned concludes hereinafter that the claims 

are without merit, they do not render the plea invalid and thus, at least with regard to the 

failure to challenge the removal order, do not avoid the implicit waiver. 

/ /

/ /

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 7 of 20
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Movant asserts in Ground Three that trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to 

attack the underlying removal order and the imposition of a 16-level drug trafficking 

enhancement under §2Ll.2.” (Motion, Doc. 1 at 11.) Respondent argues neither 

assertion has merit.

1. Applicable Law

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Movant must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also United States v. 

Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); and United States v. 

Solomon, 795 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

In evaluating claims of defective performance, the court must focus on whether 

the attorney's advice was appropriate under the circumstances existing at the time of the 

guilty plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. It is clear that the failure to take futile 

action can never be deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th 

Cir.1996). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Moreover, “[t]he law does not require counsel to raise every available 

nonfrivolous defense. Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and 

beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for 

recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations omitted). The court need not determine the actual 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 8 of 20
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range of reasonable 

representation, Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-457 (9th Cir. 1991), but “may 

not indulge ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel's decisionmaking that contradicts the 

available evidence of counsel's actions,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. For example, "[a]

defendant suffers prejudice when counsel's ineffective performance leads to an increased 

sentence for the defendant." Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-05 (2001)).

In evaluating claims of prejudice in the context of finding a plea invalid, the 

defendant must prove he was prejudiced from counsel's ineffectiveness by demonstrating 

a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58-59; 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The defendant must show "that but for counsel’s errors, he would either have gone to 

trial or received a better plea bargain." U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 

2004).

2. Validity of Underlying Removal Order

Movant argues that there were irregularities in his 1998 removal order which 

rendered it invalid, and thus counsel’s advice to plead guilty was deficient. (Motion, 

Doc. 1 at 4.) 

Because this claim would have arisen prior to Movant’s guilty plea, it would be 

barred by the implicit waiver under Tollett, unless shown to have rendered Movant’s plea 

unknowing or involuntary. 

Respondent casts Movant’s argument in terms of the absence of a factual basis for 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 9 of 20
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the plea and argues that the validity of the underlying removal order is not an element of 

the offense, that the fact of removal is all that is necessary and such fact was admitted by 

Movant. Respondent cites U.S. v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 857 (9

th Cir. 2014), and points 

out that Movant does not contend that he was not removed, but rather admitted at the 

change of plea that he had been removed. (Response, Doc. 11 at 12.) 

Indeed, in Lopez the Ninth Circuit held that “8 U.S.C. § 1326 does not require the 

government to prove that an order of removal or deportation was issued where the alien 

has been deported or removed.” 762 F.3d at 857. The court explained that language in 

§ 1326(a)(1) referring to the existence of an order of removal only applied where an 

alien had “departed,” and did not apply where he had been removed. “”[I]f actual 

physical removal or deportation is proven, a valid order of removal or deportation may 

be presumed.” Id. at 858. 

That does not mean, however, that the validity of the prior removal order is 

irrelevant to a subsequent conviction for re-entry. Rather, the statute explicitly provides 

for collateral attacks on the validity of the prior order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1326(d). “A defendant charged with illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 has a 

due process right to bring a collateral attack challenging the validity of his underlying 

deportation order because it serves as a predicate element of his conviction.” United 

States v. Melendez–Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted). See also United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2014)

(decided June 17, 2014, after the April 2, 2014 decision in Lopez) (quoting MelendezCastro). “Where a prior removal order is premised on the commission of an aggravated 

felony, a defendant who shows that the crime of which he was previously convicted was 

not, in fact, an aggravated felony, has established both that his due process rights were 

violated and that he suffered prejudice as a result.” United States v. Martinez, 786 F.3d 

1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here, Movant’s argument is not that there was no factual basis of a removal order, 

but that the removal order was invalid. Where a defense to a conviction exists, and 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 10 of 20
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counsel fails to adequately investigate or advise his client on the defense prior to 

advising the defendant to plead guilty, there may be ineffective assistance of counsel 

rendering the plea (and the associated waivers) invalid. See United States v. Baramdyka, 

95 F.3d 840, 845 et seq.(9th Cir. 1996) (considering effect of failure to advise on 

potential defense).

Movant founds his challenge to the 1998 removal order on an argument (more 

fully developed in the dismissed Ground One of the Motion) that his conviction in 

Maricopa County Superior Court on January 17, 1997 for possession of narcotic drugs 

did not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Movant argues 

that the statutes under which he was convicted do not qualify categorically as an 

aggravated felony, nor did it qualify under the modified categorical approach.1

Respondent argues in a footnote that rather than Movant being deported based on 

an aggravated felony, that “based on the documentation,” Movant’s 1998 removal was 

“based on his prior conviction of possession of narcotic drugs.” (Response, Doc. 11 at 3, 

n.3.) Indeed, in finding Movant removable, the immigration judge made no reference to 

“aggravated felony.” Instead, the judge simply referenced Movant’s conviction for 

possession of a narcotic. (See Exhibit 7, Removal Order 5/7/98; Exhibit 18, R.T. 5/7/98 

at 7-8.) The judge announced his decision: “So you are deportable solely because of 

the drug conviction, Mr. Lopez.” (Exhibit 18, R.T. 5/7/98 at 7.) The judge dictated on 

 

1

In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (June 26, 2015), the Supreme Court 

concluded that a categorical approach to enforcing a generic “residual clause” under the 

Armed Career Criminal Act rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague and thus 

unenforceable. The analysis in Johnson was subsequently applied to invalidate the use of 

the crime of violence standard for finding an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(43)(F). Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 

15-1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016). It has also been applied to the 

Sentencing Guidelines' definition of a crime of violence. See United States v. Rios, 2:13-

CR-02059-RHW, 2016 WL 4472996 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2016) (detailing other 

district court decisions at note 3). However, Movant does not contend that Johnson’s 

instruction on determining whether an offense is a “crime of violence” applies to his 

drug offense. The Ninth Circuit has continued after Johnson to apply the 

categorical/modified-categorical approach to determining whether a conviction qualifies 

as a drug trafficking offense under the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. 

Rosales-Aguilar, 818 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 11 of 20
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the record the following as his order: 

At this proceeding pro se, he has admitted the five factual 

allegations. Based upon those admissions, the Court has sustained 

the charge of conviction of a law-related controlled substance. The 

Court has not sustained the other charge of entry without inspection 

since there is no factual allegation to support that particular charge.

(Id. at 8.) In addition, the Notice to Appear made clear that the ground for removability 

was based upon “Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act...as 

you are an alien who has been convicted of...law...relating to a controlled substance.” 

(Exhibit 5.) That provision, found at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), provides:

(i) In General

Except as provided in clause (ii),2any alien convicted of, or who 

admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which 

constitute the essential elements of--

* * *

(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any 

law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign 

country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 

section 802 of Title 21),

is inadmissible.

Thus, Movant’s 1998 removal was not based upon some determination that he had been 

convicted of an “aggravated felony,” but simply upon his conviction for a controlled 

substance violation. Movant proffers nothing to suggest why his conviction did not 

qualify under this provision.

Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) requires, before asserting a collateral challenge to a 

prior removal, a predicate showing that administrative remedies challenging the removal 

were exhausted, the proceedings improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for 

judicial review, and the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Movant proffers 

nothing to meet these requirements. At a minimum, it appears that Movant did not seek 

administrative review of his 1998 removal order in the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

(See Exhibit 8, 1998 Warrant of Removal (based on “final order by...an immigration 

judge.”)

 

2

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(a)(ii) relates to misdemeanor convictions of minors. Movant 

appears to have been an adult at the time of his offense underlying the conviction in 

1997, and was sentenced to 2.5 years, a felony.

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 12 of 20
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, any challenge to the validity of Movant’s 1998 removal order (or his 

2013 reinstatement of removal) would have been futile, and cannot establish ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.

Finally, Movant fails to allege that had trial counsel properly advised him about a 

defense based upon the validity of his prior removal, that Movant would have rejected 

the plea and proceeded to trial. In light of the lack of merit to such claim, and the 

substantial benefits to Movant under the Plea Agreement (i.e. termination of supervised 

release proceedings, downward departures, and variances), the undersigned finds no 

basis to conclude that Movant would have done so.

Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance would not render Movant’s plea (or 

waiver) unknowing or involuntary, and would thus be barred by Movant’s guilty plea.

3. Enhancement for Drug Trafficking Offense

Movant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the 

imposition of a 16-level drug trafficking enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. (Motion, 

Doc. 1 at 11.) Movant argues in his dismissed Ground Two that a conviction under Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3405 and -3407 does not categorically qualify as drug trafficking 

offense because the statutes extend to simple possession, personal use, and 

transportation. He further argues that no authorized evidence was introduced to support 

a determination that Movant’s offense was for a qualifying crime, e.g. the charging 

document, plea agreement, etc. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 7-10.) 

Because this claim arose after Movant’s guilty plea, it would not be subject to the 

implicit bar resulting from Movant’s guilty plea. However, that also means it could not 

render Movant’s previously entered plea unknowing or involuntary, and thus would not 

avoid the effect of his implicit waiver of Movant’s other claim of ineffective assistance.

Respondent argues that Movant admitted, and the authorized records plainly 

show, that his 2009 conviction (in Maricopa County Case CR2001-007944) was for drug

trafficking, which authorized the 12 level enhancement.

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 13 of 20
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for (dependent 

upon the sentence imposed on the prior) an 8 or 12 level increase if a deportation was 

“after...a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense.”3 (Emphasis added.) 

The Application Note to the Guideline provides the following definition:

(iv) “Drug trafficking offense” means an offense under federal, 

state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, 

distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance 

(or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled 

substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, 

import, export, distribute, or dispense.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(iv).

It appears to the Court that Movant’s theory in Ground Two and the related 

portion of Ground Three may be focused on his possession-only conviction in 1997, and 

concludes it resulted in a 16 level enhancement. However, the Presentence Investigation 

Report shows that the enhancement resulted from a 2009 conviction, and resulted in a 12 

level increase. (CR Doc. 28 at 5.) Because § 2L1.2(b)(1) only requires that the 

deportation be “after” the qualifying conviction, not the cause of the deportation, the 

court could rely upon any qualifying conviction occurring prior to Movant’s 2013 

removal, not just the conviction which resulted in the original removal order. 

Movant was convicted in the 2009 conviction of, inter alia, violating “A.R.S. § 

13-3401, 13-3405, 13-3418, 13-610, 13-701, 13-702, 13-702.01, and 13-801.” (Exhibit 

14, Sentence 7/14/09.) 

In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as drug trafficking offense 

under § 2L1.2, the court must apply the categorical and modified categorical approaches 

described in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to determine whether a 

defendant's prior conviction satisfies U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). See United States v. Leal-

 

3

The 12 level increase applies if the drug trafficking offense resulted in a sentence 

imposed of “13 months or less,” and the 8 level increase applies if no criminal history 

points apply to the conviction. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). A 16 level enhancement only 

applies if the sentence on the prior “exceeded 13 months. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 

Movant’s 2009 conviction resulted in a 3 month sentence, making the 12 level increase 

applicable.

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 14 of 20
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Taylor to impose 16 level increase 

for drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)). The court begins by 

applying the categorical approach, looking only to the fact of conviction and the 

statutory definition of the prior offense. Id. at 1163-64.4

As argued by Movant, and recognized in the Presentence Investigation Report, the 

statutes under which Movant was convicted in 2009 are overly broad, because they 

include simple possession, without any required intent for distribution, etc. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-3405(A)(1) (person may not knowingly “[p]ossess or use marijuana”). 

(See CR Doc. 28, PSIR at 5, ¶ 10.) 

However, the inquiry does not end there.

If the statutory definition of the prior offense criminalizes conduct 

that would not constitute a “drug trafficking offense,” then the 

statute is not a categorical fit, and we must consider whether the 

prior conviction may still be used for a sentencing enhancement 

using the modified categorical approach. We may not use the 

conviction for a sentencing enhancement unless “the record includes 

documentation or judicially noticeable facts that clearly establish 

that the conviction is a predicate for enhancement purposes.” 

Finally, if both the statute and the documents containing judicially 

noticeable facts would allow the defendant to be convicted of an 

offense that would not be a “drug trafficking offense,” then the 

sentencing enhancement may not be applied. 

Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d at 1163 (citations omitted). “Our inquiry is limited to “the charging 

document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and 

defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to 

some comparable judicial record of this information.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Shepard v. 

United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 

Here, the judicially noticeable facts clearly establish that Movant’s 2009 

conviction was for a “drug trafficking offense.” That conviction was on Count 2 of the 

 

4

In Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2013) the Court clarified that the 

modified-categorical approach could only be turned to if the statute were “divisible.” 

“The critical distinction is that while indivisible statutes may contain multiple, 

alternative means of committing the crime, only divisible statutes contain multiple, 

alternative elements of functionally separate crimes.” Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 

1084–85 (9th Cir. 2014). Movant concedes that § 13-3405 is divisible. (Motion, Doc. 1 

at 9 (“Arizona’s statues are divisible”).

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 15 of 20
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Indictment. (Exhibit 14, Sentence 7/14/09.) The charge on Count 2 alleged Movant 

“possessed for sale an amount of marijuana having a weight of four pounds or more, in 

violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-3401, 13-3405, 13-3418, 13-701, 13-702, 13-702.01, and 13-

801.” (Exhibit 11 at 2.) That was the Count to which he agreed to plead. (Exhibit 12, 

Plea Agreement at 1.) At the plea hearing, the Court clarified:

THE COURT: In CR2001-007944 I have a plea agreement 

that indicates you wish to plead guilty to Count II, possession of 

marijuana for sale, a Class 2 felony, and Count IV, unlawful flight 

from law enforcement vehicle, a Class 5 felony; both nondangerous, non-repetitive offenses. Is that what you wish to do in 

the 2001 matter, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Exhibit 13, R.T. 6/13/09 at 6-7.) Defendant entered a plea of guilty to that charge.

THE COURT: And in the 2001 matter, with respect to the 

charge of Count I, possession of marijuana for sale, a Class 2 

felony, non-dangerous, non-repetitive, how do you plead, guilty or 

not guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

(Id. at 14-15.) Movant’s counsel offered the following factual basis for the charges:

MR. SLACK-MENDEZ: With reference to the 2001 case,

Your Honor, if the State were to proceed to trial the State would be 

able to prove that on or about October 17th, 2000, Mr. Castro-Lopez 

was stopped in Glendale, Arizona, Maricopa County, and at that 

point he -- once he was stopped and knew he was stopped by law 

enforcement officers, that he intended to flee the scene and he was 

thereafter stopped and there was a useable amount of marijuana in 

his possession. I believe that was approximately 37 pounds of 

marijuana. And that marijuana was possessed with the intention of 

sale.

(Id. at 15-16.)5 Movant acknowledged those facts.

THE COURT: Okay. And, sir, with respect to the 2001 

matter, both with respect to the possession of marijuana for sale and 

the unlawful flight, is what your Counsel says correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Id. at 16.) 

Each of those records makes plain that the crime for which Movant was convicted 

was not a simple possession, but possession for sale of marijuana. Thus, as recognized 

 

5

Juan Castro-Lopez, the name used by Movant in his 2009 conviction, is one of 

Movant’s many aliases. (See CR Doc. 28, PSIR at 2.)

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 16 of 20
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in the Presentence Investigation Report, Movant’s 2009 conviction qualified under the 

modified categorical approach as a drug trafficking offense. (See CR Doc. 28, PSIR at 5, 

¶ 10.) 

Indeed, Movant proffers no argument which would exclude his 2009 conviction 

from being classified as a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. In particular, 

he makes no assertion that the elements of an Arizona possession for sale offense do not 

establish a drug trafficking offense. Rather, he simply complains that the Government 

failed to present evidence beyond the Presentence Investigation Report to support the 

contention that he was convicted of possession for sale. “The government did not 

produce the information or other Shepard-approved documentation and thus failed to 

establish a factual basis for the drug trafficking enhancement.” (Motion, Doc. 1 at 9

(emphasis in original).)

But Movant fails to offer anything to suggest that had counsel objected to the 

PSIR’s determination, that the Government would not have simply produced the 

documentation provided in this proceeding, which is sufficient to support a finding under 

the modified-categorical approach. Counsel is not required to raise every conceivable 

objection, and where one is easily refutable, counsel could make a reasonable tactical 

decision (particularly in light of Petitioner’s admission to having been convicted of 

possession for sale, and the favorable recommendations under the presentence report in 

this case) to forego the objection. The Sixth Amendment does not require defense 

counsel to make futile and/or unwarranted objections and motions. See, e.g., Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (omitted action or claim must be shown to be 

meritorious to support ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 

1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996) (“the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance”); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (the “[f]ailure to 

raise a meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance”).

Accordingly, this portion of Movant’s Ground Three is without merit.

/ /

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 17 of 20
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. SUMMARY

Movant implicitly waived any pre-plea errors by entering his guilty plea. 

Moreover, Movant explicitly waived his right to raise any other claims in a Motion to 

Vacate by the explicit terms of his Plea Agreement, with the exception of his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The undersigned has concluded that Movant’s claims 

of ineffective assistance are without merit, and thus would not render his plea or waiver 

invalid. Moreover, at least Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance relating to counsel’s 

performance at sentencing would not have affected his pre-existing decision to plead 

guilty. Thus, the Court has already dismissed Grounds One and Two of the Motion to 

Vacate. And, dismissal of Movant’s claim of pre-plea ineffective assistance regarding 

the removal order should be dismissed.

Further, because both of Movant’s claims of ineffective assistance in Ground 

Three are without merit, Ground Three of his Motion to Vacate must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 

challenges Movant’s federal criminal judgment or sentence. The recommendations if 

accepted will result in Movant’s Motion being resolved adversely to Movant. 

Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 18 of 20
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed February 16, 2016 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 19 of 20
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 24, 2016

16-0450r RR 16 10 17 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:16-cv-00450-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/24/16 Page 20 of 20