Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00853/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00853-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Charles Scott Taylor, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan; et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00853-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Charles Scott Taylor’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended that the Court deny the Petition 

with prejudice. (Doc. 17.) Taylor filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 22.) Because 

objections have been filed, the Court will review the Petition de novo. See United States 

v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For the following 

reasons, the Court accepts the R&R and denies the Petition. 

BACKGROUND 

 Taylor was convicted by a jury in Pinal County Superior Court, case #CR2007-

01800, of one count of sexual conduct with a minor under 15 years of age, one count of 

sexual abuse of a minor under 15 years of age, one count of molestation of a minor under 

15 years of age, and, in a related matter that was consolidated with these charges, two 

counts of witness tampering. (Doc. 12, Exs. B, M.) Twelve days before Taylor’s trial, the 

trial court held a hearing on his motion to change defense counsel. (Doc. 12, Ex. A.) This 

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motion was denied at the conclusion of the hearing. (Id.) On June 2, 2008, he was 

sentenced to a combination of aggravated and presumptive, concurrent and consecutive 

terms of imprisonment totaling 52 years. (Id., Ex. M.) 

 Petitioner appealed the judgment. He argued that the trial court improperly denied 

his motion to preclude expert testimony about the behavior of child victims of sexual 

assault and that his sentences were improperly enhanced. (Doc. 12, Ex. B.) On October 

14, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id., Ex. 

D.) Taylor did not seek review of this decision in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 Petitioner timely initiated an action for state post-conviction relief under Rule 32 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. He was appointed counsel to represent him 

in that action and that counsel notified the state court that they could find no legitimate 

claims to raise on Taylor’s behalf. (Doc. 12, Ex. E.) Taylor filed a pro se brief in his Rule 

32 action. (Id., Ex. F.) He asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

change counsel and that his appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel did not 

raise this issue in his direct appeal. (Id., Exs. F, G.) On July 7, 2011, the trial court denied 

Taylor relief in his Rule 32 petition, finding no error in the court’s denial of Taylor’s 

motion or in appellate counsel’s failure to raise that issue on direct appeal. (Id., Ex. G.) 

 Petitioner then initiated a second Rule 32 action, asserting that the sentencing 

judge erred in imposing a consecutive sentence. (Id., Ex. H.) On August 19, 2011, the 

trial court dismissed this action pursuant to Rule 32 because Taylor could have but did 

not raise this issue on direct appeal. (Id., Ex. I.) Further, the trial court found that the 

claim also failed on its merits. (Id.) 

 In separate petitions for review filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals and 

consolidated by that court, Taylor challenged the imposition of consecutive sentences and 

alleged that he was denied the right to effective assistance of appellate and postconviction counsel. (Id., Exs. J, K.) On January 12, 2012, in a memorandum decision, the 

appellate court granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 1 at 28.) The court rejected his 

claims regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences and ineffective appellate 

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counsel, and found he had failed to properly present his claim regarding ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Id.) Taylor sought review of this decision by the 

Arizona Supreme Court, and that review was denied. (Id. at 27.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 26, 2013. 

(Doc. 1.) In his Petition, Taylor cites three grounds for relief: (1) that the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to substitute counsel violated his federal constitutional rights; (2) 

that his appellate counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective; and (3) that 

the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violated his federal constitutional 

rights. 

 Magistrate Judge Aspey issued a R&R on November 14, 2013, in which he 

recommended denial of the Petition with prejudice. (Doc. 17.) Petitioner filed objections 

to the R&R on January 17, 2014 (Doc. 22), and the Court will now review the Petition de 

novo. 

DISCUSSION 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)(2006). Review 

of Petitions for Habeas Corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Id.; U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. 

I. Claim One: Denial of Motion to Substitute Counsel 

Taylor first alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to substitute 

counsel prior to trial. Respondents contend that Taylor failed to properly exhaust this 

claim in his direct appeal because he referenced the substance of the claim as part of a 

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. However, assuming without deciding 

that Petitioner technically properly exhausted this claim, the claim fails on its merits. 

When a defendant has indicated dissatisfaction with his counsel, a trial court must 

generally conduct a thorough inquiry into whether the situation is depriving the defendant 

of an adequate defense. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2000). To 

determine whether the trial court judge erred in denying Taylor’s motion, this Court may 

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consider the extent of the alleged conflict, whether the trial judge appropriately inquired 

into the extent of that conflict, and the timeliness of the motion to change counsel. See, 

e.g., Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court has 

reviewed the transcript from the trial court’s hearing on Taylor’s motion and finds that 

the trial judge made an appropriate inquiry into the alleged conflict. Thus, the Court finds 

that the denial of Taylor’s motion did not violate his right to a fair trial or to due process 

of law. This portion of the R&R is accepted. 

II. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Taylor next alleges that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel because his appellate counsel failed to argue that the trial court 

erred by denying his motion to substitute counsel. Petitioner properly exhausted this 

claim in state court. To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Taylor must 

demonstrate both that his counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of 

reasonableness and that this resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). To show prejudice, Taylor must show that there is a reasonable 

probability, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. 

 Here, the state court concluded that Taylor had not been denied effective 

assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to challenge the denial of Taylor’s motion 

as this did not constitute deficient performance and was not prejudicial. In his Petition, 

Taylor argues that the trial judge’s failure to conduct a thorough inquiry in his 

consideration of Taylor’s motion to substitute counsel was a constitutional violation, and 

thus his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise that violation. (Doc. 1 at 20–

21.) However, as stated above, the motion hearing transcript indicates that the trial judge 

did undertake the necessary inquiry regarding the motion. Thus, Taylor’s appellate 

counsel did not err in failing to challenge that inquiry. This alleged failure does not 

constitute inadequate performance and Taylor has not established that there is any 

probability that exclusion of the challenge amounted to prejudice. This portion of the 

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R&R is accepted. 

III. Claim Three: Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 

Finally, Taylor claims that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences 

because this violated his right to due process and subjected him to double jeopardy. 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation and 

application of state law, including a state’s statutes regarding sentencing. See Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“We may not second-guess the [state court’s] construction of its own state law 

unless ‘it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of 

a federal issue.’”). In his Objections to the R&R, Taylor states that the state’s 

interpretation of their sentencing law is indeed “an obvious subterfuge to evade 

consideration to a federal issue,” but he has provided no basis for this contention. As 

Taylor asserts that his sentences violated his right to due process because they were 

improperly imposed as consecutive sentences under Arizona law, he has not stated a 

cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 

2002) (stating that Petitioner’s argument that “the trial court improperly imposed 

consecutive sentences in violation of Arizona law” is “not cognizable in federal habeas 

proceedings”). This portion of the R&R is also accepted. 

CONCLUSION

 Petitioner’s Claims One and Two fail on their merits and his Claim Three is not a 

cognizable basis for federal habeas relief. Thus, the Court denies his petition. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Aspey’s Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 17) is ACCEPTED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Charles Scott Taylor’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines 

to issue a Certificate of Appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the 

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Court’s procedural ruling debatable, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), 

and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 Dated this 1st day of May, 2014. 

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