Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04872/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04872-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

For clarity because petitioner and the victim shared the same last name, this opinion will

refer to the victim as “Tina.” 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREG COOPER, JR.,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.J. MAYFI,

Respondent. _____________________________

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No. C 06-4872 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-entitled petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to

show cause why the petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s two cognizable

claims for relief. Respondent has filed an answer and memorandum in support thereof.

Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2002, petitioner was convicted by a jury in Humboldt County Superior Court for

the murder of Tina Wells Cooper1

, and with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Petitioner was sentenced to a total prison term of 127 years to life. On appeal, the

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California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and the California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal: 

Appellant's wife, Tina Wells Cooper, was shot and killed at the Crown

Pub in Eureka shortly after midnight on April 21, 2001. According to Tina’s

relatives and friends, the marriage was not happy. At the time of the murder,

Tina lived in Eureka and appellant lived in Richmond.

Tiffany Taylor, a lifelong friend of Tina’s, testified that she had

a telephone conversation with appellant about three weeks before the murder

in which appellant said he was mad at Tina and stated, “I’m going to kill that

bitch if she don’t come back.” Tiffany testified that appellant had previously

used the name Tony Moore as an alias. About three weeks before Tina’s

death, Tiffany saw Tina at the hospital, where appellant had taken her

because she had slit her wrists. 

On April 5, 2001, Tina filed for divorce and applied for a temporary

restraining order against appellant. In her affidavit in support of the

application, Tina stated that appellant had mentally and physically abused her

on February 20, and on April 3, had threatened to kill her and her son. 

Sarah Simmons was a friend of Tina’s but had had a “falling out” with

her. About three weeks before Tina’s murder, Simmons was “intimate” with

appellant. The day before the murder, Simmons told appellant in a telephone

conversation that Tina was having an affair with a man named Jack Rawson.

Appellant hung up on Simmons. After midnight on April 21, appellant called

Simmons and told her Tina was dead. 

Shayne Taylor (Tiffany’s husband) testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on

April 20, appellant called Cassidy Hess’s house and asked Shayne where

Tina was. Shayne testified that appellant said “Tina gonna make him flash or

something. He was saying that she playing with him.”

Appellant’s cellular telephone records reflect that a call was made

from his cell phone at about 3:36 p.m. on April 20, in Richmond. Calls were

made later in the afternoon from San Rafael and Novato and, at 5:45 p.m.,

from Cloverdale. Subsequent “roaming” calls were made in the Mendocino

and Eureka regions, but the records did not reflect the precise location from

which these calls were made. 

At 10:29 p.m. on April 20, appellant called June Skillman, Tina’s

material aunt, and told her to ask Tina’s mother to stop calling people saying

he was in Eureka. Appellant called again at 3:10 a.m. and Skillman told him

Tina had been shot; appellant laughed and said she “must have made

somebody very mad.” In March 2001, appellant had come to Skillman’s

house and she had seen a nine millimeter Glock pistol in the back of his

pants. 

Tina went to the Crown Pub around midnight on April 21, with

Cassidy Hess, Amber Brannon and Shayne Taylor. Shayne testified that

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while he was sitting next to Tina at the bar, someone came in and said they

had seen “Greg” drive by. Shayne went outside to spit out his cognac, of

which he had taken too big a swallow. Shayne met appellant, whom he

identified in court, three or four feet from the door. Appellant told Shayne to

bring Tina outside and Shayne heard him tell a woman at the door to tell Tina

to come outside because her cousin Tony wanted to talk to her. Tina peeked

out the door, appellant saw her, “barged through the door,” put his coat over

his head and started shooting. Shayne had previously seen appellant about

four times, most recently about a year before the shooting. 

Pauline Clark was outside the Crown Pub smoking a cigarette a few

minutes before midnight on the night of the shooting. A black man

approached, asked if she knew Tina, and asked her to tell Tina that “her

cousin was outside and he needed money to get into the party.” The man said

his name was “Tony.” As Clark was about to go back inside, the man

“bombarded his way in front of me without paying” and chased Tina to the

end of the bar, and Clark heard gunshots. Clark identified appellant in a

police photographic lineup at the beginning of May. She told the police she

had heard the shooter was married to Tina and Tina was trying to divorce

him. 

Hess and Brannon testified that shortly after they arrived at the Pub,

Tina said she saw her husband in his car outside. According to Hess, Tina

became scared and nervous and started walking toward the bouncers, with

Hess following. Hess saw appellant push past the bouncers; Tina turned and

ran toward the pool tables and appellant started shooting her. Brannon

testified that she heard noise from the crowd toward the door and saw

appellant, with a jacket or hood pulled over his head and a gun at his side,

“sliding through the crowd.” Tina looked at appellant and started running;

appellant followed and started shooting her. 

Hess testified that she knew who appellant was when he entered the

bar and shot Tina; she got a clear look at the shooter’s face and recognized it

as appellant’s. She had seen appellant briefly on two occasions some three to

five years before. She identified appellant in a police photographic lineup the

day after the shooting.

Brannon testified that she got a good, clear look at the shooter's face.

She had previously seen photographs of appellant and Tina together and

recognized appellant from those photographs; she had never met appellant in

person. She identified appellant in two photographic lineups and recognized

him as the shooter at the preliminary hearing. The detective who showed

Brannon the photographic lineup testified that although Brannon had never

met appellant, when she looked at the lineup she said, “That's Greg.”

Yvonne Webb, who had known Tina since she was a young girl,

testified that Tina came to her in the Crown Pub, looking frightened, and said

her husband was outside. They started to walk toward the front door but Tina

backed up before they got there, as though she was scared. A man entered the

Pub, moving past Webb “close enough to kiss,” and she got a clear look at his

face. She did not recognize him. Webb turned to ask Tina if this was her

husband but Tina was already moving to run, looking frightened. As the man

chased Tina, Webb recognized who he was and she and the bouncer chased

after him. He rapidly shot Tina in the back and head. Webb identified

appellant as the person who shot Tina. She had previously seen pictures of

appellant but had not met him in person. Police Officer Dunn testified that he

did not ask Webb to do a photographic lineup. Webb told Dunn that she did

not recognize the shooter and wondered who he was as he moved past her.

Tyrone Griffin, who had known Tina since they were children, was at

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the Crown Pub when Tina was shot. Tina ran in, screaming “help!” Someone

was chasing her, Griffin saw “fire from a gun” and Tina fell. The assailant

ran up and fired shots from a semiautomatic pistol into the back of her head,

then “threw” the hood of his sweatshirt or jacket back on his head and ran out

of the bar. Griffin identified appellant at trial as the man who shot Tina. He

testified that appellant was right next to him when he fired the first shot and

Griffin got a clear look at his face. Griffin had met appellant five or six years

before the trial. Since then, he had seen appellant “around, like on the street”

and when appellant came by to visit Griffin's brother.

Griffin's wife, Jennifer Johnson, also identified appellant as the

shooter. Johnson had never met appellant. She was a foot and a half to two

feet from Tina, sitting at the corner of the bar, when Tina was shot; she was

about two and a half feet from appellant and could see his face clearly.

Johnson testified that appellant “ran up behind” Tina and shot her once, then

stood over her and shot her four to six more times. When shown a

photographic lineup by the police, Johnson had chosen a photograph and was

almost but not 100 percent sure.

David Scott Rogan was in the Crown Pub around 12:45 or 1:00 a.m.

on April 21 when he heard a woman scream, felt himself pushed toward the

bar and heard gunshots to his left. He looked and saw “a man with a gun up a

lady's head.” Rogan did not know the victim. He was about five feet away

from the shooter and got a clear look at the man, whom he identified in court

as appellant. He identified appellant from a police photographic lineup.

Rogan's girlfriend, Jennifer Bayless, testified that Tina, whom she

knew as an acquaintance, ran through the bar and pushed by her. Bayless

heard gunshots and saw a black man shooting a semiautomatic pistol. Bayless

was a few feet away from the man, across the corner of the bar. The man

“grabbed” Tina and “shot down into her.” Bayless was not able to positively

identify the shooter in a photographic lineup but found one photograph that

was “similar.” In court, she testified that appellant looked “similar” to the

shooter: His eyes, face and skin color were the same, but the shooter's hair

was not as full and he did not have “a lot of facial hair.” Bayless could not be

positive that appellant was the shooter. She acknowledged that at the

preliminary hearing she had said she did not have a clear recollection of the

shooter's face, she “just kn[e]w that he's a black male,” and she only saw the

shooter from the back.

Lori Liston was standing in the doorway of the Crown Pub when

someone pushed past her. She saw a black man open his coat and reach for

something black, a girl in the bar start running and the man chase her, then

heard six gunshots. Liston identified appellant at trial as the man she saw,

stating that she got a clear look at his face as he pushed past her. She had

picked his picture from two photographic lineups a few days after the

shooting.

Dave Hill, the manager at the Crown Pub, was tending bar on April

21, when a person ran in front of him and ducked down by the bar, about

three feet from where Hill was standing. Another person came running

behind the first, with a jacket pulled over his head, and started firing a gun.

The victim fell and the shooter ran; Hill chased him and caught him at the

door. The shooter pointed the gun at Hill, then turned and pointed the gun at

people who had run up behind him in the parking lot, then ran across the

street. Hill chased him for about three blocks. Hill testified that he got a clear

look at the man's face, which was about two and a half feet from Hill's when

the man pointed his gun at him, and identified him as appellant. Hill testified

that his identification of appellant was based on what he saw the night of the

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shooting, stating that after what happened to him, appellant's face “will stick

in my mind for a long time....”

After the shooting, patrons of the bar gathered in the parking lot. Many

of the witnesses testified that the crowd was kept there by the police. A few,

however, testified that they were not prevented from leaving and did so

within a few minutes of the shooting.

Webb was interviewed by a police officer inside the bar, after Tina

was taken out, and told the officer that Tina's husband, Greg Cooper, shot

her. Griffin told an officer in the parking lot that he had seen Gregory Cooper

shoot Tina. 

The witnesses' descriptions of the assailant were consistent in some

respects and differed in others. All agreed the shooter was wearing a dark

jacket or sweatshirt. Several witnesses remembered him wearing dark pants

or jeans; others did not remember his pants. Two witnesses testified the

shooter was wearing white tennis shoes; other witnesses did not remember his

shoes. Most of the witnesses testified that the shooter had no facial hair. Clark

testified that he had a mustache and small beard, although she acknowledged

having told the police at the time of the shooting that the shooter had no facial

hair. Clark also testified that the man was wearing a white tee shirt and a

baseball cap. Shayne Taylor testified that appellant was “bald-headed” and

pulled his coat over his head when he entered the bar. Brannon and Rogan

also testified that appellant had a jacket or hood pulled over his head. Two

witnesses, Webb and Bayless, testified that they saw a second person with a

gun at the Crown Pub.

Most of the witnesses had seen appellant's name and photograph in the

newspaper, on television or on posters around town after the shooting. Webb

also had “glanced” at photographs of appellant at Tina's mother's house since

the shooting. Most of the witnesses had discussed the incident with other

people or heard general talk about it. When Hess was asked whether she had

told people since the incident that appellant shot Tina, she replied,

“Everybody knows.” Johnson testified that she had neither seen the

photographs of appellant nor discussed the incident with anyone except her

husband (Griffin); and Bayless testified she had not discussed the incident

with others, including her boyfriend (Rogan). Police Officer Jeffrey Daniel

acknowledged that a lineup would be unreliable if the witnesses had

previously seen the suspect's photograph and identification in the newspaper

or on television.

Many of the witnesses had some alcohol before the shooting, but none

felt they had had enough to affect their perception and recall of the events.

Brannon had a beer earlier in the evening but was not intoxicated at the time

of the shooting. Shayne had “half a drink” of cognac and no other intoxicants.

Griffin had a couple of beers before the shooting but was not feeling

intoxicated. Johnson had a beer earlier in the evening and was drinking a

second at the time of the shooting. Rogan had shared a pitcher of beer with

his brother earlier in the evening and had one drink at the pub, but did not feel

his ability to perceive and recall was impaired. Hill had one or two sips of a

drink. Hess had consumed no alcohol before the shooting; she did not drink.

At the time of trial, Hess was on felony probation for “grand theft of a

personal.” Griffin acknowledged being on felony probation for burglary and

having had legal problems “around domestic violence.” Clark was in custody

at the time of trial on a theft matter and acknowledged having prior theft

convictions. About a week before Tina's death, Shayne Taylor had been

kicked out of a drug program he had been required to attend by the probation

department. Shayne knew that Tina was a cocaine dealer.

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Eureka Police Officer Tim Jones responded to the scene of the

shooting. Tyrone Griffin told Jones he was standing about two feet away

from Tina when the incident began and saw the shooter, whom he identified

as Gregory Cooper. Griffin said he had known Cooper for four or five years.

Jones located a blue 1998 Ford Expedition, license plate 4RFS480, in the

parking lot of the Canton Café at 1010 Broadway and impounded it. This

parking lot connected to another lot between the Café and the Pub.

Jason Sanders had known Tina and her mother for some eight to 10

years and had never seen appellant before the trial. At the time of the

shooting, he was in the parking lot of the Crown Pub and saw a black man in

dark clothing touching the hood of Tina's car. The man had a short afro and

“kind of funny looking” or “bugged out” eyes. The man joined the line

waiting to enter the Pub. Sanders looked away and within 15 seconds heard a

series of gunshots. After the shooting, Sanders pointed the police to a black

Ford “Excursion” parked in the lot. Sanders had seen this vehicle several

hours earlier at Tina's mother's house.

Eureka Police Officer Jeffrey Daniel was the lead investigating

detective on this case. When he arrived at the murder scene about 12:52 a.m.

on April 21, he found yellow caution tape strung from the Pub beyond the

Canton Café, with about 85 to 100 people in the parking lot area, talking to

each other, “restless” and “boisterous.” The victim had been removed from

the scene and appellant had been identified as a suspect before Daniel arrived

at the scene. Jones directed Daniel to the blue green Expedition, which was

parked backed into a stall, and Daniel noticed a telephone adaptor plugged

into the accessory outlet. The registered owners of the vehicle were appellant

and Raquel Williams, and the car was subsequently released to Williams.

After the preliminary hearing, a fight arose between spectators at the

hearing. Daniel gave his investigation file on the case to Cassidy Hess, whom

he knew to be a witness in the case, in order to free his hands to intervene in

the fight. She had his file about 20 minutes.

Appellant's cell phone records for April 21 showed a call at 10:29 a.m.

in Geyserville, then calls from successively southerly locations in

Healdsburg, Santa Rosa and, at 11:48 a.m., Richmond.

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on April 21, Detective Daniel received a

phone call at his office from appellant. The call was taped and played for the

jury. Appellant said he was at home in Richmond. When Daniel told

appellant he had been identified as a suspect in Tina's shooting, appellant said

they had him mixed up with someone else. Appellant said he was not in

Eureka and his girlfriend and cousin had used his Ford truck. He agreed to

have his girlfriend call Daniel. Daniel told appellant he was going to be

arrested and advised him to turn himself in to the local police department.

Appellant ended the call. The next day, Daniel was at Mary Skillman's house

and had her listen to the 

voicemail greeting on the cellular phone number he had been given as

appellant's. She hung up and appellant called her; Daniel spoke with him and

appellant said he was nearby.

Katie Koopman testified that she had known appellant for about five

years and had dated him in June and July 2000. When she first met him, he

went by the name “Tony Moore.” On the day of Tina's funeral in early May,

appellant called Koopman and asked her to take pictures of the funeral for

him. Appellant asked, “If I dressed up like a girl, do you think anybody

would recognize me?” Appellant said during the conversation that he did not

kill Tina.

Appellant was arrested on September 5, 2001, at an apartment

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complex in Clear Lake Oaks. Sergeant Patrick McMahon of the Lake County

Sheriff's Department testified that when he and other officers entered the

apartment, appellant identified himself as "Larry." Deputy Sheriff James

Samples, who was positioned outside the apartment, saw appellant attempt to

climb out a rear window when officers entered the front door. Samples

shouted at appellant, who went back into the apartment. Lakeport Police

Officer Norman Taylor searched the residence and found a California driver's

license with a photograph of appellant and the name "Larry DeVoux" in the

bedroom. Other indicia in the name of "Larry DeVoux" was also found in the

apartment. 

Raquel Williams, appellant's girlfriend, testified that she had been to

Eureka once before the trial, when she drove there with Michael Reese, in the

Expedition she and appellant owned, to pick up marijuana. When they arrived

at 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., she dropped Reese at the Flamingo Motel and went

out to have a drink. She saw a lot of people “hanging out” at the Crown Pub

and parked the vehicle, nose in, in a stall next to a restaurant across the street.

As she walked across the parking lot, she heard gunfire. She ran across the

street to the gas station to call Reese from a pay phone, then went to get the

car but found the police had roped off the area. In the morning, she called the

police, trying to locate her car, but no one knew where it was or how to find

it. A friend from the Bay Area drove up and gave her a ride back. When she

returned to Richmond in the early afternoon, everyone was saying that Tina

had been killed the night before. After numerous phone calls over the next

month, she finally got the car back and sold it.

Williams testified that when she spoke with Detective Daniel in April

2001, she was not honest, telling him Reese had driven the car to Eureka and

denying appellant was her boyfriend. She wanted to get her vehicle back and

to avoid further involvement in the case. She first told the true story to a

defense investigator with whom she spoke in October 2002.

Michael Reese, appellant's cousin, confirmed Williams's description of

the events. He testified that Williams was hysterical when she came back to

the motel room and that they learned of Tina's death “through the streets”

when they returned to Richmond.

Christin Kukar testified that appellant and his girlfriend, Altha Sims,

were at her house in Clear Lake Oaks on the evening of Friday, April 20,

2001; Sims was Kukar's boyfriend's sister. Kukar remembered the date of the

visit because her friend's birthday was April 19. The friend, Lacey Proctor,

was 20 years old. Kukar acknowledged on cross-examination that it could

have been Saturday, April 21, rather than Friday, April 20, when appellant

came to her house. She also acknowledged that she knew of appellant's arrest

in September 2001, but did not tell anyone about appellant being at her house

on April 20 until she was contacted by the defense investigator in September 

2002.

Forensic psychologist Robert Shomer testified as an expert in the areas

of memory, perception and eyewitness observation. He testified that a person's

memory combines direct perceptions, input from other people and

assumptions; people are unable to fully distinguish one of these sources from

another, especially in dangerous, stressful situations. Observations made in

unexpected, highly stressful situations are less accurate, because the observer

is more focused on self protection than on making careful observations.

Shomer testified that a person's confidence in the accuracy of his or her

eyewitness perception is not related to its actual accuracy. With the passage of

time, people become more confident in their memory of an event while in fact

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the accuracy of the memory decreases; once a person comes to believe he or

she saw an event in a particular way, the person becomes invested in that

scenario and believes it even more strongly, especially where there is a

personal connection to the victim. Where a weapon is involved, people focus

more on the weapon than on the person wielding it. Seeing a photograph of a

person assumed to be associated with the event can influence the witness's

subsequent identification in a lineup.

Shomer was given the hypothetical situation of a person shot and killed

in a crowded bar, late at night, with the patrons then kept in the parking lot

together. He testified that observations in such a situation were “notoriously

unreliable and ... full of vividness without a lot of accuracy,” as witnesses

reacting to the shock would not make detailed observations of the assailant's

features but rather would form general impressions to which they would then

commit themselves. Everyone would want to know what had happened, and

remarks by anyone in the group could influence others. Portrayal of an

individual's photograph in the media and on handbills in the area would

further “corrupt” the process of identification and prior knowledge by

witnesses of marital discord between the victim and her husband would

strongly dispose the witnesses to believe the husband was the assailant.

Shomer testified that with all these factors at play, a conclusion based on

assumption rather than actual perception at the time of the shooting would be

“irresistible.” The situation would be “fertile” ground for “hysterical

contagion,” in which people's impressions of what actually happened are

influenced by others' impressions, “homogeniz[ing]” into a “third version” of

the facts.

The district attorney's investigator testified that he searched Department

of Motor Vehicles records for a 20-year-old female named Lacy Proctor. He

found two individuals meeting this description, one of whom lived in Clear

Lake Oaks. Her birth date was April 13, 1982.

Detective Daniel testified that when he spoke with appellant on April

21 and 22, appellant did not mention Kukar or Clear Lake Oaks

People v. Cooper, No. A102048, Slip Op. at 2-12 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2005) 

(hereinafter “Slip Op.”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. E) (footnotes omitted). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), whereby a district court may grant relief on the basis

of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court only if the state court's

adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(d). 

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant a

writ if the state court’s conclusion is “opposite to that reached by this Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). 

An ‘unreasonable application’ occurs when the state court identifies “the correct governing

legal principle” from the appropriate Supreme Court decision but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 412-13. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively

unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

In any event, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is

structural error or had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-6 (2001) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). When highest state court to rule on petitioner’s

claims provides no reasoned opinion, the court looks to the last court to issue a reasoned

opinion, which in this instance is the Court of Appeal. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

801-6 (1991).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

The instant federal habeas corpus petition presents two cognizable claims. First,

petitioner claims the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to

attorney-client privilege when material was seized from his jail cell prior to trial, which

allegedly resulted in the prosecution obtaining his trial strategy. Petitioner also claims the

trial court erred in requiring him to prove he was prejudiced by the violation. Secondly,

petitioner claims the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by the

trial court’s admission of Tina’s declaration in support of her application for a temporary

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restraining order.

1. Interference with Attorney-Client Relationship

Petitioner claims his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial

court denied petitioner’s motions to dismiss and to exclude the testimony of sheriff’s

deputy, Jeffrey Daniel, based on Daniel’s seizure of privileged documents from petitioner’s

jail cell prior to trial. 

The Court of Appeal described the facts underlying petitioner’s first claim as

follows: 

On January 17, 2002, a search warrant was served on appellant and the

written material in his jail cell was seized. The following day, appellant filed

a motion for return of the material, which appellant stated included privileged

attorney-client communications, attorney work product and other privileged

and confidential material. Appellant requested an immediate hearing, an order

directing return to the court of all the seized material, unread, and all copies

made of the material, and an in camera hearing for review of the documents.

At a hearing on January 18, the prosecutor did not object to the

requested orders for return of property and setting of an in camera hearing.

The court ordered return of the property and set an in camera hearing for

January 22, at which the court reviewed the seized items with appellant and

his counsel. On May 15, the court filed its order finding that certain of the

items (court exh. Nos. J2, J4, J5-6, J6 and J7) were protected by attorneyclient privilege and the attorney work product rule. The court ordered that

copies of these documents be provided to the defense and the originals

remain under seal in the court's file. The remaining documents to which

appellant's motion was directed (court exh. Nos. J1 and J3) were ordered

returned to the police department and/or prosecutor's office.

On June 20, appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that

law enforcement improperly obtained confidential attorney-client

communications in violation of his constitutional rights to counsel, to due

process and against self incrimination under the United States and California

constitutions. Appellant stated that the papers seized from his cell contained

his remarks and thoughts about his defense strategy and that he was now

afraid to make any notations on documents to assist his attorney, did not trust

the confidentiality of his correspondence with his attorney, and was afraid to

communicate with his attorney about the facts of the case or defense strategy.

The prosecutor filed a declaration stating that he had not seen the

material seized from appellant's cell; that he discussed the search with the

detective who conducted it and was assured it was conducted “in a fashion

which respected attorney-client privilege,” and that the prosecution had

“gained absolutely nothing as a consequence of the search of which the

defendant complains.”

The judge who had conducted the in camera review recused himself

and after a hearing on July 8, the new judge denied appellant's motion. The

court found that the search warrant was executed as part of an investigation of

threats appellant allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses; that the

court had examined the seized documents and those that came within

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attorney-client privilege and ordered certain of them sealed; and that the

prosecutor had indicated by declaration that he had not seen these documents.

The court concluded that appellant had not demonstrated the prejudice

requisite to justify dismissal of the charges and therefore denied the motion to

dismiss.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to exclude the testimony of Detective

Daniel, arguing this was the only meaningful remedy for the violation of the

attorney-client relationship because the knowledge gained from the material

continued to “reside” in Daniel's brain. The prosecutor asked the court to

review the materials to assess what Daniel might know that could justify the

remedy sought by the defense. Defense counsel stated the court could not do

this because the documents had been sealed. The court acknowledged that the

situation presented the defense with a “Catch-22” because it could not

demonstrate prejudice without revealing the documents to the prosecution.

The court noted that appellant had already been afforded the remedy of in

camera review and sealing of the privileged documents and held that

exclusion of Daniel's testimony was not warranted “[a]t least at this point

without any further showing of substantial prejudice or substantial threat of

prejudice.”

(Slip Op. at 13-14.)

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,” U.S. Const.

amend. VI, and such right can be meaningfully implemented only if a criminal defendant

knows that his communications with his attorney are private and that his lawful

preparations for trial are secure against intrusion by the government, his adversary in the

criminal proceeding. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 553 n.4 (1997). However,

"[i]mproper interference by the government with the confidential relationship between a

criminal defendant and his counsel violates the Sixth Amendment only if such

interference substantially prejudices the defendant. Substantial prejudice results from the

introduction of evidence gained through the interference against the defendant at trial,

from the prosecution's use of confidential information pertaining to defense plans and

strategy, and from other actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at

trial." United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations

and citation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit described in Danielson the necessary showing of prejudice and

the burden of proof in a case in which the interference has resulted in the prosecution

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learning a defendant's trial strategy. First, the defendant must make a prima facie

showing of prejudice. Id. at 1071. It is not enough that the government informant was

involuntarily present and passively received privileged information. Id. Rather, "the

government informant must have acted affirmatively to intrude into the attorney-client

relationship and thereby to obtain the privileged information." Id. at 1073-74 (defendant

satisfied his burden under first step by showing that the government deliberately sent

informant to obtain information from defendant, that the informant affirmatively inquired

to obtain privileged trial strategy information from defendant, the privileged information

was told to and memorialized by members of the prosecution team, and the lead

prosecutor kept much or all of this information in his private office).

Second, once the prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the

government to show that there has been no prejudice to the defendant as a result of these

communications. Id. at 1074. The mere assertion by the government of the integrity and

good faith of the prosecuting authorities is not enough to meet the burden. Id. at 1072. 

Rather, the government must present evidence and show by a preponderance of that

evidence that all of the evidence it proposes to use and all of its pre-trial and trial

strategies were derived from legitimate independent sources. Id. at 1071, 1074. Absent

such a showing by the government, the defendant has suffered the prejudice necessary for

a Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 1073 (prosecutor did not go far enough in efforts to

insulate himself and members of his prosecution team from privileged trial strategy where

informant continued to elicit and report information about trial strategy and prosecutor

did not repeat his earlier instruction to the informant to stop making such inquiries).

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s

motions to dismiss and to exclude Daniel’s testimony. The Court of Appeal determined

petitioner had suffered no prejudice based on the following reasoning: 

Appellant argues, based on U.S. v. Danielson (9th Cir.2003) 325 F.3d

1054 (Danielson), that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the burden

to demonstrate prejudice from the seizure of materials. In Danielson, the

police and prosecution encouraged a paid informant to report on and record

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conversations with the defendant, including privileged information about trial

strategy. Danielson held that because the government's interference with the

defendant's attorney-client relationship was “neither accidental nor

unavoidable, but was rather the result of deliberate and affirmative acts ..., if

there was prejudice there was a violation of the Sixth Amendment under

Weatherford v. Bursey, [supra,] 429 U.S. 545.” (Danielson, at p. 1059.)

Danielson noted that the problem was greater than if the government

had deliberately elicited incriminating statements from an indicted defendant

in the absence of counsel, in which case the statements would be excluded

from the prosecution's case in chief: “The problem in this case ... is not that

the government obtained incriminating statements or other specific evidence,

but rather that it obtained information about Danielson's trial strategy.”

(Danielson, supra, 325 F.3d at p. 1067.) Where the prosecution has

impermissibly obtained “a particular piece” of incriminating evidence, the

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. (Id. at p. 1070.)

Danielson explained, however, that “where wrongful intrusion results in the

prosecution obtaining the defendant's trial strategy, the question of prejudice

is more subtle. In such cases, it will often be unclear whether, and how, the

prosecution's improperly obtained information about the defendant's trail

strategy may have been used, and whether there was prejudice. More

important, in such cases the government and the defendant will have unequal

access to knowledge. The prosecution team knows what it did and why. The

defendant can only guess.” (Ibid.)

Danielson adopted a two-step test for prejudice developed in Kastigar

v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, in the context of Fifth Amendment

violations. “First, the defendant must make a ‘prima facie showing of

prejudice,’ “including that the government “acted affirmatively to intrude into

the attorney-client relationship.” (Danielson, supra, 325 F.3d at p. 1071.) If

that showing is made, the burden shifts to the government to prove the

defendant has not been prejudiced. In this regard, “the mere assertion by the

government of ‘the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities' is

not enough. [Citation.] Rather, the government must present evidence, and

must show by a preponderance of that evidence, that ‘all of the evidence it

proposes to use,’ and all of its trial strategy, were ‘derived from legitimate

independent sources.’ [Citation.]” (Danielson, at p. 1072, quoting Kastigar v.

United States, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 460.)... 

Although the trial court did not follow this procedure here, we find no

prejudice. The documents seized from appellant's cell were sealed and copies

returned to the defense; the prosecution had very limited, if any, access to

them and the defense was not deprived of them. None of the material was

directly presented at trial. Appellant's claim of prejudice is that access to the

privileged material might have given the prosecution an advantage by

allowing Daniel to shade his testimony in light of his knowledge of

appellant's defense strategy. Daniel's testimony, however, did not address

matters which could have been affected by appellant's trial strategy. Daniel's

testimony covered his investigation of appellant's vehicle, his presentation of

photographic lineups to witnesses, and the telephone call he received from

appellant. Appellant's defense at trial, that his vehicle was in Eureka because

Williams and Reese had driven it there, was identical to the explanation he

gave Daniel in the recorded telephone conversation on April 21, 2001. The

only aspect of appellant's defense not addressed in the telephone conversation

with Daniel was Kukar's testimony that she remembered appellant being at

her house on April 20, by reference to the date of a friend's birthday. The

prosecution apparently did not have advance notice of this alibi witness, as it

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worked “overnight” after her testimony to find evidence that the friend's

birthday was in fact on a different date.

Perhaps more importantly, the evidence against appellant was

overwhelming. Multiple eyewitnesses to the shooting identified appellant as

the perpetrator. Appellant stresses on appeal various factors that might

undermine the reliability of these identifications: That most of the witnesses

had not met appellant or had last seen him years before the incident; that

witnesses in the bar might have consumed more alcohol than they admitted;

that witnesses knew each other, discussed the events and influenced each

others' memories of what occurred; that witnesses' perceptions were

influenced by their post-event exposure to media treating appellant as the

suspect; and that Tina's friends and family were predisposed to believe

appellant was the murderer. These factors, however, were presented at trial

and strenuously argued by the defense, but apparently rejected by the jury.

Appellant's alibi defense was undermined by the facts that Kukar was

not certain whether appellant was at her house on Friday, April 20, or

Saturday, April 21; that the friend's birthday by which Kukar claimed to

know which weekend appellant was at her house was in fact a week earlier;

and that Kukar did not come forward with the alibi until she was contacted by

the defense a month before trial. Appellant's explanation that his vehicle was

in Eureka on the night of the murder, parked by the Crown Pub, because

Williams had driven it there was weakened by her testimony that she parked

the car "nose in" when in fact it was found backed into the stall, and by her

acknowledgment that she initially lied to the police when questioned about

the events. Contrary to appellant's assertion that he was not in Eureka at the

time of the murder, appellant's cellular telephone records indicated he

traveled to Eureka on April 20, 2001, and returned to Richmond the next day.

Appellant had moved to a different county and was using a different name

when he was arrested in September 2001.

(Slip Op. at 19-22.) The Court of Appeal concluded “there [was] virtually no possibility

a different verdict would have been reached even if Daniel’s testimony had been

excluded.” (Id. at 22.) 

As an initial matter, petitioner argues that the trial court improperly placed the

burden on him to prove prejudice from the seizure of his materials rather than requiring

the prosecution to prove that it did not gain an advantage from the seizure. However, as

explained in Danielson, in order to shift the burden to the government to prove they did

not use privileged information the defendant must first establish a prima facie showing of

prejudice, and such burden is not satisfied merely because the government informant was

involuntarily present at a meeting and passively received privileged information about

trial strategy. Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1071. Rather, "the government informant must

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have acted affirmatively to intrude into the attorney-client relationship and thereby to

obtain the privileged information." Id. at 1073-74.

Petitioner, here, has not pointed to any evidence that law enforcement

“deliberately” or “affirmatively” intruded into the attorney-client relationship for the

purpose of obtaining the defense trial strategy. Detective Daniel served a valid search

warrant on petitioner for the sole purpose of an investigation of threats to potential

witnesses, not to interfere with petitioner’s relationship with his defense counsel. (Slip

Op. at 13-14.) Daniel was not looking for evidence or trial strategy regarding the pending

murder charge on the behalf of the prosecution. (Id.) In addition, the prosecutor filed a

declaration stating that he had not seen the material seized from petitioner’s cell, and that

Daniel, the detective who conducted the search, assured the prosecutor that the search

was conducted “in a fashion which respected attorney-client privilege.” (Id. at 14.) 

Therefore, under the governing federal law set forth in Danielson, the state courts

properly found that the petitioner had the burden to show prejudice, and that such burden

did not shift to the prosecution.

Secondly, petitioner contends the record contains sufficient evidence of prejudice

that the trial court’s failure to either dismiss or exclude Daniel’s testimony violated

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of this

claim was not “contrary to” federal law within the meaning of AEDPA because, as

described above, it applied the correct federal standard from Danielson and it did not

decide this case differently from the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). 

The California Court of Appeal’s decision, was furthermore a “reasonable

application” of federal law within the meaning of AEDPA. The trial court’s unrebutted

factual findings, which this Court must presume are correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),

establish that the prosecutor had not seen the material seized from petitioner’s cell, and

that the prosecution had gained absolutely nothing as a consequence of the search of

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which the defendant complains. Petitioner argues Daniel could have formulated in

advance answers to anticipated questions and shaded his testimony to meet expected

defenses because Daniel had advance notice of petitioner’s defense strategy. Petitioner,

however, did not want the court to engage in an in camera review of the documents,

which had been previously been sealed, to determine what kind of information Daniel

was privy to prior to trial. (Slip Op. at 14.) Nonetheless, Daniel’s testimony did not

address matters which could have been affected by knowledge of petitioner’s trial

strategy, and only covered Daniel’s investigation of appellant’s vehicle, his presentation

of photographic lineups to witnesses, and the telephone call he received from petitioner. 

(Id. at 21.) Additionally, petitioner had already told Daniel of the alibi petitioner related

at trial – that his girlfriend and cousin were driving his truck on the day of the murder –

when he spoke to Daniel on the phone on April 21, 2001. (Id.) As the Court of the

Appeal pointed out, had the prosecution gained improper information about petitioner’s

alibi defense during the search of the cell, the prosecution would have been better

prepared to meet the testimony of petitioner’s witness, Christin Kukar, when she took the

stand. (Id.) Under these circumstances, the California Court of Appeal could reasonably

conclude that the seized materials did not sufficiently prejudice petitioner so as to violate

his Sixth Amendment rights. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. at 556-58 (holding

without a presence of tainted evidence, communication of defense strategy to the

prosecution, and a purposeful intrusion by the agent, there was no violation of the Sixth

Amendment). 

Moreover, habeas relief could only be granted if the admission of Daniel’s

testimony resulted in actual prejudice, i.e. if such admission had a substantial and

injurious effect upon the verdict. See Brecht v. Abrhamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

Here, the evidence against petitioner was so overwhelming that any error in failing to

exclude Daniel’s testimony was harmless. Numerous witnesses positively identified

petitioner as the shooter, his cell phone records demonstrate that he was headed toward

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Eureka on the afternoon of the murder, and his truck was left at the scene of the shooting. 

(Id. at 2-9.) Petitioner’s explanation that his vehicle was in Eureka on the night of the

murder, parked by the Crown Pub, because Williams had driven it there was weakened by

her testimony that she parked the car "nose in" when in fact it was found backed into the

stall, and by her acknowledgment that she initially lied to the police when questioned

about the events. (Id. at 10-11.) Petitioner also moved to a different county under a

different name, and attempted to climb out of a rear window when officers came to arrest

him. (Id. at 10.)

In light of the foregoing, the California Court of Appeal’s finding that petitioner

had not been prejudiced by the document seizure from his jail cell was not an

unreasonable application of, or contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, the

evidence against petitioner was such that any error in failing to exclude Daniel’s

testimony was harmless. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. 

2. Confrontation Clause

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause by admitting Tina’s declaration in support of her application for a 

temporary restraining order against petitioner. 

The California Court of Appeal made the following factual findings underlying

this claim: 

The application was filed on April 5, 2001. Tina's declaration stated

that on February 20, appellant “came together to talk,” but “[h]e instead made

the situation unhealthy by physical and mental abuse.” She further stated that

on April 3, 2001, appellant threatened to kill her, her son, and any other

person around her. She stated that she was so convinced he would follow

through on the threats that she cut her own wrist to scare him, and that she did

not feel she or her child were safe.

At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Skillman (Tina's maternal

aunt) testified that Tina told her she had filed for divorce and applied for a

restraining order because appellant kept threatening to kill her. On March 4,

the day before Tina's birthday, Tina came to Skillman's house, crying, after

visiting appellant. Tina said her marriage was over and insisted she had to

“get out of here” before appellant came. On April 1, Skillman asked Tina in a

phone conversation whether she was going to come over and Tina said she

was not, because appellant was mad at her and “[h]e kn[e]w where all my

family stay.”

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Tiffany Taylor testified that Tina told her about an argument during

which appellant held a gun to Tina's eye. Tiffany then got a call from

appellant asking how to get to the hospital because Tina had “cut herself.”

Tiffany received a note from Tina at the end of March or beginning of April

in which Tina indicated she expected that appellant would kill her or she

would kill herself. Debra Bryant (Tina's mother) testified that appellant and

Tina “always argued” and appellant “always threatened, threatened to kill

her, me and the family.”

Tina's grandmother, Mary Kennerson, testified that the night Tina

was killed she came to Kennerson's house and told Kennerson to get police

protection. Tina said appellant had threatened to kill her and she was afraid.

Tina had told Kennerson three or four weeks earlier that she was afraid of

appellant.

The trial court found the requirements of Evidence Code section

1370, subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(5) were met: The declaration

described “the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant,” the

declarant was deceased, and the statement was made “at or near the time of

the infliction or threat of physical injury.” With respect to subdivision (a)(4),

the court stated that the fact the declaration was made under penalty of

perjury and filed with the court “in and of itself, might indicate

trustworthiness.” The court acknowledged that the declaration was made “in

contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was

interested” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)), but stated, “That's only one factor as to its

trustworthiness.” The court found the declaration was corroborated by the

testimony at the section 402 hearing (§ 1370, subd. (b)(3)) and that the only

motive for requesting the restraining order was protection. The court noted

that there were no minor children, so nothing was to be gained in terms of a

custody battle by making a false allegation, and that there were no assets or

debts subject to disposition by the court in the dissolution proceeding.

After appellant's opening brief on this appeal was filed, the United

States Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts in Crawford v. Washington

(2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 U.S. 1354](Crawford ). Crawford held that a

testimonial statement by a declarant not present at trial could be admitted

only if the declarant was unavailable and the defendant had had a prior

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (Crawford, at 68-69.) “Where

testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient

to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually

prescribes: confrontation.” (Ibid.) The Court held that “testimonial”

statements include, at a minimum, “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,

before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and ... police interrogations.” (Id. at

p. 68.)

Respondent concedes that Tina's declaration, made under penalty of

perjury in order to initiate a judicial proceeding, was testimonial. 

(Slip Op. at 22-23.) 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases

the accused has the right to “be confronted with witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 

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2

Cross-examination includes the right to show the witness's possible bias or self interest

in testifying. See Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980); Skinner v. Cardwell,

564 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).

G:\PRO-SE\MJJ\HC.06\cooper.dny.wpd 19

The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence,

but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 61 (2004). It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be

assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Id.; see

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (a primary interest secured by the

Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination). The Clause thus reflects a

judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence, but about how reliability

can best be determined. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see, e.g., United States v. Medjuck,

156 F.3d 916, 919 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (Confrontation Clause serves purposes of ensuring

that witnesses will testify under oath, forcing witnesses to undergo cross-examination,

and permitting the jury to observe the demeanor of witnesses.); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d

1544, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992) (the right to confrontation includes the right to cross examine

adverse witnesses and to present relevant evidence).2

The Confrontation Clause applies to all "testimonial" statements. See Crawford,

541 U.S. at 50-51. "Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made

for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id. at 51 (citations and quotation

marks omitted); see id. ("An accuser who makes a formal statement to government

officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an

acquaintance does not."). 

Not all testimonial statements are inadmissible at trial. The Crawford court

explained, “the rule of forfeiture by wrong (which we accept) extinguished confrontation

claims on essentially equitable grounds . . . . See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,

158-59 (1879).” 541 U.S. at 62; see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280

(2006). In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court explained: “The Constitution

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gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses

against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot

complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept

away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate

consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted

with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot

insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is

supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights

have been violated.” 98 U.S. at 158. 

Confrontation Clause claims are also subject to harmless error analysis. United

States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004) (post-Crawford case). For purposes

of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation

Clause is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the

jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637). 

The California Court of Appeal found any Confrontation Clause violation to be

harmless. The Court of Appeal determined as follows: 

Even assuming the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing did not apply

here and Tina’s declaration was inadmissible under Crawford, error in

admitting it would be subject to harmless error analysis. (See Arizona v.

Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 307 [confrontation clause violation among

errors subject to harmless error analysis] (citation omitted). We find any error

in this case harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. As described

above, multiple eye-witnesses positively identified appellant as Tina's

murderer. Two witnesses testified that Tina told them she saw appellant

outside the Crown Pub just before the shooting. Appellant's car was found in

the parking lot by the bar and his cell phone records demonstrated he was

driving toward Eureka on April 20, and returned to Richmond on April 21.

Several witnesses testified that appellant and Tina's marriage was unhappy;

Tiffany Taylor testified that she heard appellant say in a telephone

conversation about three weeks before Tina was killed that he was going to

kill her if she did not come back, and Simmons testified that she told

appellant on the afternoon before Tina was murdered that Tina was involved

with another man. On these facts, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that

appellant would have been convicted of this offense even if Tina's declaration

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had not been admitted into evidence.

(Slip Op. at 27-28.)

Where, as here, the state court disposed of petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim

as harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), a federal court must,

for purposes of applying the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), determine

whether the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable. See

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). If the federal court determines

that the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable, and thus an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the federal court then

proceeds to the Brecht analysis. Id. at 877. Accordingly, this Court now turns to the

issue of whether the Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was objectively

reasonable. 

Petitioner argues the admission of the declaration was highly inflammatory

because such evidence was featured prominently in the prosecution’s case to the jury. 

(RT 199, 1518-21, 1622-23.) Tina’s declaration was admitted immediately following

opening arguments and was the first piece of evidence received by the jury. (RT 199.) 

The prosecutor began his closing argument by reading the text of the declaration to the

jury, and gave the following interpretation of the declaration: “Please, courthouse people,

help me. Please issue a restraining order that requires him to stay away from me . . .

Please do that immediately. He’s got a nine millimeter. Issue a restraining order. Take his

guns. I don’t feel safe. He’s threatened to kill me. And I think he will.” (RT 1518-19.) 

The prosecutor went on to explain how the declaration showed that petitioner had the

motive to kill Tina. (RT 1520-21.) The prosecutor closed by reminding the jury that Tina

had come to the court seeking help, worried that her husband would kill her, and said, “it

turns out she was right.” (RT 1622.) During deliberations, the jury asked to see Tina’s

declaration. (RT 1640-41.) The judge instructed the jury they already had a copy of all

the restraining order materials as People’s Exhibit 19. (Id.) Therefore, petitioner

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contends Tina’s declaration was so potent that its admission was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt under Chapman.

Petitioner fails to note the jury simultaneously requested other parts of the record,

such as the transcript of the Cooper/Daniel phone interview when they asked to see Tina’s

declaration. (Id.) Moreover, Tina’s declaration was duplicative of substantial other

evidence showing that petitioner had threatened to kill her. Several eye-witnesses

testified that petitioner and Tina's marriage was unhappy. (Slip Op. at 2.) Tiffany Taylor

testified that she heard petitioner say in a telephone conversation about three weeks

before Tina was killed that he was going to kill Tina if she did not come back. (Id.) 

Sarah Simmons, Tina’s former friend and an “intimate” friend of petitioner shortly before

Tina’s death, testified that she told petitioner on the afternoon before Tina was murdered

that Tina was involved with another man, and that petitioner immediately hung up the

phone after Simmons relayed this information. (Id.) 

In addition, the other evidence in the case against the petitioner was so

overwhelming that there was virtually no possibility a different verdict would have been

reached even if Daniel’s testimony had been excluded. As described previously, multiple

eye-witnesses positively identified petitioner as Tina's murderer. (Slip Op. at 3-7.) Two

witnesses testified that Tina told them she saw petitioner outside the Crown Pub just

before the shooting. (Id. at 3-4). Another witness, Pauline Clarke, testified that a black

man approached her outside the Pub, asked her if she knew Tina, and asked her to tell

Tina that “her cousin was outside and he needed money to get into the party.” (Id. at 4.) 

She testified that the man said his name was Tony. (Id.) Tiffany Taylor testified that

petitioner had previously used the name “Tony Moore” as an alias. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner's

car was found in the parking lot by the bar and his cell phone records demonstrated he

was driving toward Eureka on April 20, and returned to Richmond on April 21. (Id. at 9.) 

Petitioner’s alibi defense was also undermined by the fact that Christin Kukar was not

certain whether petitioner was at her house on Friday, April 20, or Saturday, April 21;

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that the friend’s birthday by which Kukar claimed to know which weekend petitioner was

at her house was in fact a week earlier; and that Kukar did not come forward with the

alibi until she was contacted by the defense a month before trial. (Id. at 11-12.) On

April 20, at 10:20 p.m., shortly before Tina’s murder, petitioner called June Skillman,

Tina’s material aunt, and told her to ask Tina’s mother to stop calling people saying he

was in Eureka. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner called again at 3:10 a.m. and Skillman told him Tina

had been shot; petitioner laughed and said she “must have made somebody very mad.” 

(Id.) Lastly, petitioner moved to a different county under a different name, and

attempted to escape when he was arrested in September 2001. (Id. at 10.)

In light of this overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt, it is clear beyond a

reasonable doubt that appellant would have been convicted of this offense even if Tina's

declaration had not been admitted into evidence. Consequently, the California Court of

Appeal’s harmless error analysis was objectively reasonable under the Chapman standard. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/3/2008

____________________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge 

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