Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01529/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01529-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

JEANETTE K. LANSBURG and ) 

LARRY J. ENCINAS, )

) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE )

CORPORATION, et al., ) 

) No. 2:11-cv-1529-HRH

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.1 This motion is

opposed.2 Oral argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary. 

Background

Plaintiffs are Jeanette K. Lansburg and Larry J. Encinas. Defendants are Federal

Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc.

(“Saxon”). 

1Docket No. 91. 

2Docket No. 98. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 1 of 17
Plaintiffs allege that in February 2007, they “entered in to a mortgage/deed of

trust/securitydeed/note with Taylor Bean & Whitaker for real propertylocated at 14394West

Shaw Butte Drive, Surprise, Arizona 85379....”3 Plaintiffs allege that on March 1, 2008, they

“entered in to [a] loan modification ... with .... Taylor Bean & Whitaker.”4

Plaintiffs allege that “[s]everal months after the March 2008 loan modification,” they

“again began experiencing monetary difficulties” and they “were unable to pay the loan

modification payments under the terms of the” March 2008 loan modification.5 Plaintiffs

allege that due to the financial difficulties they were having they “became certified foster

parents” and received in excess of $5,000 per month for being foster parents.6

Plaintiffs allege they “were advised they were in default under the promissory note

and Deed of Trust” and that Taylor, Bean & Whitaker sent a notice concerning the breach

to” them.

7 Thus, in March 2009, plaintiffs allege that they “sought a second loan modification”8

and that on May 11, 2009, they “sent in a formal loan modification package in

3Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 2, ¶ 5, Docket No. 86. 

4

Id. at 3, ¶ 9. 

5

Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. 

6

Id. at 4, ¶¶ 21 & 23. 

7

Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. 

8

Id. at ¶ 17. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 2 of 17
accordance with the newly issued rules and regulations under the HAMP program.”9

Plaintiffs allege that in June 2009, they “executed the Home Affordable Modification Trial

Period Plan (‘TPP’) with the Defendants and sent in the first monthly payment of

$1739.70.”10 Plaintiffs allege that they mailed the TPP agreement to “Taylor Bean &

Whitaker....”11 

Plaintiffs allege that they “made all [the] required monthly payments under the terms

of the TPP.”12 They also allege that they “provided every financial document requested by

the Defendants during the term of the TPP” agreement.13 

Plaintiffs allege that they “were aware Saxon was the new servicer of the mortgage

starting after the third TPP payment was made in August 2009.”14 

Plaintiffs allege that “Taylor Bean & Whitaker, as well as Saxon [M]ortgage failed

to comply with their requirements under the HAMP regulations and guidelines, Arizona law

and the TPP and failed to provide a signed copy of the TPP despite receiving all the

9

Id. at ¶ 26. 

10Id. at 5, ¶ 27. 

11Id. at ¶ 29. 

12Id. at 6, ¶ 34. 

13Id. at 8, ¶ 53. 

14Id. at 6, ¶ 37. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 3 of 17
payments required under the TPP to be made by the Plaintiffs.”15 Plaintiffs allege that

despite this non-compliance, “Taylor, Bean & Whitaker and Saxon continued to accept

payments under the TPP, [and] continued to instruct the Plaintiffs to make payments under

the TPP even after the 3 month trial period ended....”16

Plaintiffs allege that their home was sold at a trustee sale conducted by Saxon on June

14, 2010.17 The home sold for $240,000.18 At the time of the sale, the amount of the unpaid

debt on the underlying loan was $482,178.96.19 Plaintiffs allege that they did not learn of the

sale until after it had been conducted.20 

Although the property had already been sold, plaintiffs allege that in September 2010,

they were “advised in writing ... that they were denied for a loan modification based upon

failure to make TPP payments” and that their home would be foreclosed on in thirty days.21

Plaintiffs allege that 

[a]s a result of the [D]efendants[’] conduct, [they] lost their

home, lost their monthly income as foster parents, lost the

15Id. at 5, ¶ 32. 

16Id. at ¶ 33. 

17Id. at 6, ¶¶ 36 & 40. 

18Trustee’s Deed upon Sale at 1, Exhibit D, Defendants[’] ... Request for Judicial

Notice, Docket No. 78. 

19Id.

20Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 6, ¶ 36, Docket No. 86. 

21Id. at ¶ 39. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 4 of 17
monthly TPP payments paid and were forced to incur debts in

being forcibly removed from their home by the constable,

including incurring attorney fees and costs in defending against

a forcible detainer, moving costs and expenses in setting up

temporary housing for themselves.[22]

Plaintiffs also allege that “as a further consequence of the Defendants[’] breach of the TPP

and its requirements, ... Lansburg suffered numerousmedical bills fromstress directlyrelated

to the Defendants[’] failure to comply with the TPP” agreement.23 

Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants and MTC Financial, Inc. on July

6, 2011 in state court and it was subsequently removed to this court. In their original

complaint, plaintiffs asserted five claims: 1) a claim for declaratory relief, 2) a conversion

of real property/slander of title claim, 3) a breach of fiduciary duty claim, 4) a breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, and 5) a material misrepresentation

claim. MTC was dismissed as a party on September 15, 2011.24 On January 5, 2012,

defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.25 Plaintiffs’ “request

for a declaration that Defendants are not legally entitled to enforce the underlying Deed of

Trust or promissorynote under their former terms due to the modifications that occurred” and

their claim“for violation ofthe covenant of good faith and fair dealing” survived defendants’

22Id. at 8, ¶ 54. 

23Id. at ¶ 55. 

24Docket No. 10. 

25Docket No. 22. 

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motion to dismiss.26 On October 31, 2012, defendants moved for summary judgment on

these remaining claims.

27 On March 7, 2013, the court granted defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.28

Plaintiffs appealed and the Ninth Circuit vacated this court’s judgment based on

Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013). In Corvello, the Ninth

Circuit “held that ‘... a TPP Agreement offered pursuant to HAMP is a contract, and a party

to that contract may sue for breach if the lender violates a term contained within the four

corners of the TPP.’” Meixner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 101 F. Supp. 3d 938, 947 (E.D.

Cal. 2015) (quoting Lazo v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:13–CV–2015 AWI JLT, 2015

WL 590663, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015)). Under Corvello, a borrower has a valid claim

for breach of the TPP agreement if the borrower has “fulfilled all of [his] obligations under

the TPP, and the loan servicer has failed to offer a permanent modification[.]” Corvello, 728

F.3d at 884. 

The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to this court.29 Upon remand, plaintiffs were

given leave to amend their original complaint.30

 

26Id. at 16. 

27Docket No. 37. 

28Docket No. 55. 

29Docket No. 61. 

30Docket No. 65. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 6 of 17
On March 15, 2016, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in which they asserted

five claims: 1) a claim for declaratory relief, 2) a claim for wrongful disclosure, 3) a claim

for breach of contract, 4) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, and 5) a claim for negligence.31 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint.32 On June 8, 2016, the court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

First Amended Complaint.33 Plaintiffs were, however, given leave to amend as to their

breach of contract claim and their breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing claim.

34 In giving plaintiffs leave to amend their breach of contract claim, the court

reminded plaintiffs that “in addition to clearly alleging that they had a TPP agreement with

defendants, that they satisfied their obligations under the TPP agreement, and how

defendants breached the agreement, plaintiffsmust specificallyallege what damages theyare

asserting flow from the alleged breach of contract.”35 In giving plaintiffs leave to amend

their breach of the implied covenant claim, the court “again reminded” plaintiffs “that they

must allege specific damages flowing from the alleged breach of the implied covenant. It is

not sufficient to merely allege that they have been damaged as a result of defendants’

31Docket No. 74. 

32Docket No. 77. 

33Docket No. 82. 

34Id. at 20. 

35Id. at 13. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 7 of 17
actions.”36 The court also reminded plaintiffs that “tort damages are only available for a

breach of the implied covenant claim if there is a ‘special relationship’ between the parties”

and advised plaintiffs that it “doubt[ed] that ... the HAMP regulations impose a fiduciaryduty

on a loan servicer.”37

On July 22, 2016, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in which they

assert a breach of contract claim and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing claim. Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached the TPP agreement “by failing to

comply with their duties which included either offering a loan modification on the 91st day

after the TPP was executed or denying such modification.”38 Plaintiffs allege that defendants

breached the implied covenant by not sending them a signed copy of the TPP agreement, by

requiring them to continue making monthly payments after the TPP agreement had expired,

and by foreclosing on the property prior to giving written notice.39

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 

Discussion

“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a ‘plaintiff must allege enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Turner v. City and County of San

36Id. at 16. 

37Id.

38Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 10, ¶ 67, Docket No. 86. 

39Id. at 11, ¶¶ 73-75. 

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Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546

F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008)). “In assessing whether a party has stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted, a court must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; but ‘conclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid aRule 12(b)(6) dismissal.’” Id. (quoting

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009)). “‘A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “This standard ‘asks for more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully,’ but it ‘is not akin to a probability requirement.’” Id.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible breach of contract

claim. “In an action on a contract plaintiff has the burden of proof to show, 1) a contract, 2)

a breach, and 3) damages.” Thunderbird Metallurgical, Inc. v. Ariz. Testing Laboratories,

423 P.2d 124, 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 

Defendants first argue that plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the existence of

a contract between them and defendants. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is based on a

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 9 of 17
breach of the TPP agreement. Thus, in order to state a plausible breach of contract claim,

plaintiffs must allege that they entered into a TPP agreement with defendants. Defendants

acknowledge that plaintiffs have made an allegation that they entered into a TPP agreement

with “[d]efendants.”40 But, defendants contend that the TPP agreementwas actuallybetween

plaintiffs and Taylor Bean. In support of this contention, defendants cite to a document

attached to their request for judicial notice filed in connection with their motion for summary

judgment. This document is entitled “Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan” and

it was signed by plaintiffs.41 But, the document was not signed byTaylor Bean or Sparta (the

loan servicer prior to Saxon); so this document does not suggest, as defendants contend, that

the TPP agreement was between plaintiffs and Taylor Bean. 

In their Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffsmake a conclusoryallegation that they

entered into a TPP agreement with “defendants”42 and the supporting factual allegations 

indicate that they sent the TPP agreement to Taylor Bean and that by the time Saxon became

the servicer, the trial plan period had already expired. This would seem to suggest that

defendants were not parties to the TPP agreement, which would mean that plaintiffs have not

stated a plausible breach of contract claim. However, there is authority that stands for the

proposition that “the HAMP guidelines do not allow for a loan servicer ... to negate a loan

40Id. at 5, ¶ 27. 

41Exhibit C, Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice [etc.], Docket No. 36. 

42Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 5, ¶ 27, Docket No. 86. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 10 of 17
modification contract by transferring the loan to a third party....” Romero v. Nationstar

Mortg. LLC, Case No. 14–cv–02954–TLN–DAD, 2015 WL 4393969, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July

15, 2015).

In Romero, the plaintiff started a Trial Plan Period with BAC and made the three

required payments. Id. at *1. The plaintiff alleged that BAC then failed to provide a loan

modification agreement. Id. The plaintiff filed bankruptcy but continued to attempt to

finalize the loan modification but BAC said it could not finalize the agreement while the

plaintiff was in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. After his bankruptcy discharge, the plaintiff

resumed his attempts to finalize the loan modification, but by that time his loan had been

transferred to a new loan servicer, defendant Nationstar. Id. The plaintiff brought a breach

of contract claim against Nationstar, alleging that Nationstar had “breached a contract by

failing to offer a loan modification after completion of the TPP[.]” Id. at *3. Nationstar

moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Id. at *2. Nationstar argued that

the breach of contract claim failed because “the TPP terminated by its own terms before the

loan assignment to [Nationstar] occurred [and] [Nationstar] cannot be liable for the breach

of contract claim because [it was] not a party to the TPP[.]” Id. at *3. The court rejected this

argument explaining that 

[l]iability is also imposed by the terms of participation in

HAMP. Loan servicers, such as [Nationstar] and BAC, are

required to sign a Servicer Participation Agreement (“SPA”),

which addresses this issue. The “Servicer Handbook” states that

if loans eligible to participate in the HAMP program (“eligible

loans”) are transferred, the transferee servicer assumes the

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obligations of the transferor under their own SPA. If the

transferee servicer has not signed an SPA, then section 8(A) of

the template SPA states that an “Assignment and Assumption

Agreement” (“Assignment”) must be completed when transferring loans, and that the Assignment must list all the eligible

loans being transferred. The Assignment itself, Exhibit D to the

SPA, states that “Assignor has agreed to assign to Assignee all

of its rights and obligations under the [Servicer Participation

Agreement]” for all eligible loans (emphasis added). Finally,

section (C)(3) of the SPA states that the servicer may not

transfer or assign any “mortgage loans or servicing rights” in a

way that circumvents, either directly or indirectly, the servicer’s

obligations under the SPA.

Thus, whether or not [Nationwide] signed an SPA, [it]

assumed the obligations of BAC when [it was] assigned Plaintiff’s loan. If [Nationstar] is a participating servicer, then [it is]

obligated under [its] own SPA. If [it is] not a participating

servicer, then the Assignment and Assumption Agreement

expressly transfers the obligations of the assignor. Simply

stated, the HAMP guidelines do not allow for a loan servicer

(i.e., BAC) to negate a loan modification contract by transferring the loan to a third party (i.e., Defendant).

Id. at *5. 

The same may be true here. The fact that Saxon was not the original loan servicer

when plaintiffs entered into the TPP agreement does not necessarily mean that Saxon (and

Freddie Mac)43 might not be liable for the alleged breach of the TPP agreement. It is at least

plausible that Saxon assumed the obligations of Taylor Bean (or Sparta) when plaintiffs’ loan

was transferred.

43Contrary to defendants’ contention, it is at least plausible that Saxon was the agent

of Freddie Mac. 

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Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ breach of contract claimfails because plaintiffs

have not adequately alleged contract damages. “[D]amages for breach of contract are those

damages which arise naturally from the breach itself or which may reasonably be supposed

to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered the contract.”

All American School Supply Co. v. Slavens, 609 P.2d 46, 48 (Ariz. 1980). 

Plaintiffs’ damages allegations are in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Second Amended

Complaint. In paragraph 54, plaintiffs allege that 

[a]s a result of the Defendants[’] conduct, [they] lost their home,

lost their monthlyincome as foster parents, lost the monthlyTPP

payments paid and were forced to incur debts in being forcibly

removed from their home by the constable, including incurring

attorney fees and costs in defending against a forcible detainer,

moving costs and expenses in setting up temporary housing for

themselves.[44]

In paragraph 55, plaintiffs allege that “Lansburg suffered numerous medical bills from stress

directly related to the Defendants[’] failure to comply with the TPP” agreement.45 

It is at least plausible that some ofthese alleged damages were reasonablyforeseeable. 

For example, it may have been reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would incur costs in

connection with being evicted from their home.

In sum, as to plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, it is plausible that defendants may

be liable for the alleged breach of the TPP agreement. Plaintiffs have also alleged some

44Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 8, ¶ 54, Docket No. 86. 

45Id. at ¶ 55. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01529-HRH Document 100 Filed 10/12/16 Page 13 of 17
damages in connection with the alleged breach of the TPP agreement that may have been

reasonably foreseeable. Thus, plaintiffs have stated a plausible breach of contract claim. 

Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ breach ofthe implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing claim is not plausible. “[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing is legally

implied in every contract.” Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Calif., 813 P.2d 710, 720

(Ariz. 1991). “[T]he covenant forbids a party to a contract from doing anything denying the

right of the other to receive the benefits that flow from the contract.” Id. “[T]he remedy for

breach of this implied covenant is ordinarily by action on the contract, but in certain

circumstances, the breach of the implied covenant may provide the basis for imposing tort

damages.” Id. Tort damages are available for “contracts in which there is a special

relationship between the parties arising from elements of public interest, adhesion, and

fiduciary responsibility.” Id.

Defendants argue that to the extent that plaintiffs are asserting a tortious breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim that claim must fail because there is

no special relationship here. Defendants argue that there is no special relationship between

a borrower and a lender. See McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), a Subsidiary of Citicorp, 829

P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there was no special relationship

between the parties based on McAlister receiving a $500,000 credit line from Citibank); see

also, Urias v. PCS Health Systems, Inc., 118 P.3d 29, 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (observing

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that “[a] commercial contract creates a fiduciary relationship only when one party agrees to

serve in a fiduciary capacity”).

Plaintiffs argue that it is plausible that there was a special relationship between them

and defendants, and they cite to a recent Montana case as persuasive authority in support of

this argument. In Morrow v. Bank of America, N.A., 324 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Mont. 2014), the

Morrows attempted “to secure a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of

America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).” The

Morrows alleged that they were orally told that they had been approved for a TPP, that they

made the required TPP payments, but that theywere later advised in writing that their request

for a loan modification had been denied. Id. at 1173-1175. The Morrows brought suit

against Bank of America, asserting a number of claims, including a tortious breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. Id. at 1175. The trial court dismissed that

claim on motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Bank of America owed no duty

to the Morrows. Id. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bank of

America owed a fiduciary duty to the Morrows. Id. at 1177-78. Under Montana law, “[a]

bank owes a fiduciary duty only when it gives advice ‘other than that common in the usual

arms-length debtor/creditor relationship.’” Id. at 1177 (quoting Coles Dep’t Store v. First

Bank, N.A., 783 P.2d 932, 934 (Mont. 1989)). The court found that the Morrows had

“alleged facts which, if proven, would establish that Bank of America owed them a fiduciary

duty[,]” in particular the fact that “Bank of America advised them it would be in their best

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interests to deliberately miss a payment and default on their loan.” Id. at 1177-78. The court

explained that in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, 

[s]ome courts have held that a mortgage servicer actively

engaging with a borrower, particularly in the modification

context, stands in a different relation to the borrower than does

a traditional “silent lender.” Those courts have found, as we do

today, that special circumstances, if proven, could support a

fiduciary duty where Defendant went beyond its conventional

role as a loan servicer by soliciting Plaintiffs to apply for a loan

modification and by engaging with them for several months[.] 

Id. at 1178 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged that Saxon continued to actively engage with

them for several months and continued to instruct themto make their monthly payments even

though the 3-month trial plan period had expired. Plaintiffs insist that the parties’

interactions went well beyond that of a borrower and “silent lender.” Thus, plaintiffs argue

that it is plausible that defendants had a special relationship with them.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ reliance on Morrow is misplaced because there are

no allegations in this case that defendants advised plaintiffs to default on their loan or to

make reduced payments on their loan. But, Morrow cannot be read that narrowly. Morrow

stands for the proposition that if the loan servicer goes beyond the ordinary role of a lender

and actively engages with the borrower and advises the borrower as to what to do, then the

loan servicer may have a fiduciary duty to the borrower. That said, Morrow is based on

Montana law, not Arizona law, which governs plaintiffs’ breach of the implied covenant

claim.

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Only once has an Arizona court held that a fiduciary relationship

existed between a bank and its customer. In Stewart, the

supreme court concluded that a fiduciary duty was owed by a

bank to its customer because (1) the bank acted as the customer’s financial advisor for many (twenty-three) years, and (2)

the customer relied upon the bank’s financial advice.

Wilson v. PNC Mortg., Case No. 1 CA–CV 14–0024, 2015 WL 448601, at *9 (Ariz. Ct.

App. Feb. 3, 2015) (citation omitted). While plaintiffs may have relied on Saxon’s advice,

they have not alleged, nor can they allege, that they had a long-standing relationship with

Saxon. Thus, plaintiffs have not, and cannot, state a plausible tortious breach of the implied

covenant claim under Arizona law.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss46 is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is

granted as to plaintiffs’ tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

claim but is otherwise denied. Plaintiffs are not given leave to amend as to their tortious

breach of the implied covenant claim as amendment would be futile. See Carrico v. City &

Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (court may dismiss a complaint

without leave to amend “if amendment would be futile.”). 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 12th day of October, 2016. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

46Docket No. 91. 

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