Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00586/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00586-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL MICHAEL TEAHAN,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07CV586 WQH (NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

vs. RECOMMENDATION

V.M. ALMAGER, Warden,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Nita L.

Stormes, filed August 29, 2007, recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. # 11).

BACKGROUND

On May 15, 1995, a jury in California State Superior Court convicted Petitioner Paul Michael

Teahan of five counts of attempted second degree murder and four counts of assault with a firearm.

Respondent’s Lodgment # 2 at 692. The conviction stemmed from a shooting which took place on

April 23, 1994, at Montgomery Waller Community Park in San Diego, California. Respondent’s

Supplemental Lodgment # 2 at 56. Following the conviction, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to

an aggregate term of forty-two years in prison. Respondent’s Suppl. Lodg. # 2.

Petitioner appealed the jury verdict to the California Court of Appeal on the grounds that there

was insufficient evidence and the trial judge improperly instructed the jury. Respondent’s Lodg. #

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1. On October 23, 1996, the California Court of Appeal denied the appeal. Respondent’s Lodg. # 1.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, and on January

15, 1997, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition. Respondent’s Lodg. # 3.

On September 23, 2004, and more than seven and a half years after the California Supreme

Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California State Superior Court. Respondent’s Lodg. # 4. Petitioner contended therein that the

trial court erroneously admitted an in-court identification which was tainted by a previously

impermissibly suggestive pretrial photo-lineup. On December 10, 2004, the Court denied the Habeas

Petition on the grounds that Petitioner failed to raise the photo-lineup issue on direct appeal.

Respondent’s Lodg. # 5. 

On January 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Court of Appeal, raising again the issue of the alleged impermissibly suggestive pretrial photo-lineup.

On February 24, 2005, the California Court of Appeal denied the Petition on the grounds that (1)

Petitioner failed to raise the issue on direct appeal, (2) the Petition was untimely, and (3) Petitioner

did not carry his burden of establishing that the pretrial photo-lineup was unduly suggestive.

Respondent’s Lodg. # 7.

On June 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Supreme Court. On January 17, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition.

Respondent’s Lodg. # 9.

On February 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California State Superior Court on the grounds that his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial under to Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). On April 19, 2007, the Court

denied the Petition. Respondent’s Lodg. # 11.

On March 29, 2007, Petitioner filed the presently pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

(Doc. # 1). The Petition alleges that (1) Petitioner’s counsel on appeal was constitutionally

ineffective, (2) Petitioner was falsely identified during his jury trial because of an impermissibly

suggestive pretrial photo-lineup, and (3) Petitioner’s sentence violated his right to jury trial. On May

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23, 2007, Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that it was barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. #

7). On June 26, 2007, Petitioner opposed the motion on the grounds that he was factually innocent

of the crimes underlying his conviction, and that time-barring his Petition would be a miscarriage of

justice. (Docs. # 8-9). In support of his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner lodged exhibits

with the Court, including statements made by four alibi witnesses which were never presented at

Petitioner’s jury trial. Petitioner’s Lodgment in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss # 5

(Doc. # 9). The alibi witnesses statements tend to show that Petitioner met with friends at

approximately 5:45 P.M. on April 23, 1994 (the night of the shooting), and that Petitioner was not

nervous during the evening. Petitioner’s Lodg. in Opp. to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss # 5 (Doc.

# 9). 

On August 29, 2007, Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s Petition. (Doc. # 11).

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s Petition was time-barred because it was filed after

the running of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge further concluded

that neither statutory nor equitable tolling applied under the facts alleged in the Petition and in

Petitioner’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 11 at 6-9); see also (Docs. # 1, 8-9). The

Magistrate Judge concluded that statutory tolling did not apply because the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations had already run by the time Petitioner filed a Habeas Petition in the California State

Superior Court. The Magistrate Judge concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because

Petitioner did not submit “new reliable evidence” which made it more probable than not that no

reasonable jury seeing the evidence would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Doc. # 11 at 9).

On September 24, 2007, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc.

# 12). In the objections, Petitioner contends that the Magistrate Judge improperly ignored the newly

submitted statements of the alibi witnesses. Petitioner contends that the alibi witness statements were

not presented at trial, and that the statements are properly considered by the District Court in

examining his claim of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316-24 (1995), and

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Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2003).

On November 28, 2007, this Court Ordered Respondent to respond to Petitioner’s objections

to the Report and Recommendation, and in particular, to “Petitioner’s legal and factual claims with

respect to actual innocence.” (Doc. # 13). On December 20, 2007, Respondent filed a reply to

Petitioner’s objections. (Doc. # 14).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . .

. to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); see also United States v. Remsing,

874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989).

When no objections are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate

judge’s factual findings and decide the motion on the applicable law. Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp.

2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206

(9th Cir. 1989)). Where a party files written objections to the Report and Recommendation, “the

district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record.”

Hunt v. Pliler, 384 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)); see also Morrison

v. Cook, Civil No. 97-57-ST, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14233, at *1-2 (D. Ore. April 27, 1999).

DISCUSSION

The Report and Recommendation recommends dismissing Petitioner’s Petition on the grounds

that the Petition is time-barred by the AEDPA. (Doc. # 11). The Report and Recommendation found

that the Petitioner filed the Petition outside of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and that

Petitioner was not entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling. (Doc. # 11 at 8-9). In his objections

to the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner concedes that he filed his Petition outside of the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. # 12 at 2). However, Petitioner challenges the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling pursuant to the

miscarriage of justice exception to procedural time-bars. (Doc. # 12). Specifically, Petitioner

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1

 This exception to a procedural time-bar, known as the “fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception,” “seeks to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce

judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case.” Id. at

324. The exception is often referred to as a “gateway,” whereby petitioners can file habeas petitions

which are otherwise time-barred. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

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contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because

(1) there were constitutional errors at trial, and (2) Petitioner has presented new evidence of actual

innocence which, had it been presented at trial, makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. # 12); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. 298

(1995).

Where a petitioner’s habeas petition is procedurally time-barred by the AEDPA, a petitioner

may nevertheless have his petition heard on the merits where the petitioner alleges constitutional

errors at trial and “presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the

outcome of the trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 (1995).1 In order for the claim of actual innocence to

be credible, a petitioner must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence–that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. Thereafter, “[t]he habeas court must

make its determination concerning the petitioner’s innocence ‘in light of all the evidence, including

that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence

tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after trial.’” Id. at

328 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court must determine whether “it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner] in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327.

If the habeas court determines that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence, the court must proceed to the merits of the

petition. Id.

I. Whether the Four Alibi Witness Statements Submitted by Petitioner Satisfy Schlup’s “New

Reliable Evidence” Requirement?

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner contended that he is actually innocent of

the charges upon which he was convicted, and supported his contention by submitting four alibi

witness statements which were not presented during his jury trial. (Docs. # 8-9). In the Report and

Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge ignored the alibi witness statements on the grounds that the

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statements did not constitute “new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial” under Schlup.

(Doc. # 11 at 9). Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the alibi witness statements did

not satisfy Schlup’s “new reliable evidence” requirement because Petitioner’s “trial counsel knew

about these alibi witnesses and was able to interview four of them prior to trial . . . .” (Doc. # 11 at

9).

In his objections to the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner contends that the Magistrate

Judge improperly concluded that the four alibi witness statements were not “new reliable evidence”

under Schlup. (Doc. # 12). Petitioner contends that Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962-63 (9th Cir.

2003), establishes that Schlup’s “new reliable evidence” threshold requires only “newly presented

evidence,” i.e.–evidence which was not presented at trial–as opposed to “newly discovered” evidence

as required by the Magistrate Judge.

After reviewing the case law, particularly Griffin, this Court concludes that the Magistrate

Judge improperly ignored the four alibi witness statements submitted by Petitioner in support of his

claim of actual innocence and miscarriage of justice. As correctly noted by Petitioner, the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Schlup’s “new reliable evidence” requirement as

requiring only “newly presented evidence”–in other words, evidence which was not presented at trial.

Griffin, 350 F.3d at 962-63; see also United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 191 fn. 8 (3d Cir. 2005);

Lindley v. Schriro, No. 06-0528-PHX-DGC2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59022, *14 fn. 1 (D. Ariz. Aug.

10, 2007). The Court finds that the four alibi witness statements submitted by Petitioner were not

presented at Petitioner’s trial and qualify as “new reliable evidence” for the purposes of Schlup’s

actual innocence inquiry. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-327. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion to the

contrary is hereby rejected and the Court does not adopt section (c) of the Report and

Recommendation, entitled “Equitable Tolling.” See (Doc. # 11 at 7-9).

II. Whether the Four Alibi Witness Statements Presented By Petitioner, In Conjunction With

The Other Evidence Presented At Trial, Satisfy Schlup’s “Actual Innocence” Exception to A

Procedural Time-Bar?

Petitioner concedes that he filed his Petition outside of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations. (Docs. # 8, 12). However, in light of Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence and this

Court’s conclusion that Petitioner has submitted “new reliable evidence” of actual innocence, the

question remains whether, in light of the new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable

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juror would have convicted” Petitioner. Griffin, 350 F.3d at 963 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).

There was substantial evidence of Petitioner’s guilt presented at trial. One of the victims,

Chris Alvarez, identified Petitioner before and during trial as the shooter, and other witnesses

tentatively identified Petitioner as the shooter. Respondent’s Supp. Lodg. # 2, Vol. 4 at 279-282;

Respondent’s Supp. Lodg. # 2, Vol. 5 at 359-363. In addition, shotgun shells found in Petitioner’s

bedroom matched shotgun shell-casings found at the scene, and it was undisputed that the shooter used

a shotgun in the attack. Respondent’s Supp. Lodg. # 2, Vol. 3 at 32-37; Respondent’s Supp. Lodg. #

2, Vol. 5 at 408-412. Finally, there was evidence that (1) the shooter was a member of the Del Sol

street gant, (2)Petitioner was a member of the Del Sol street gang, and (3) the location of the shooting,

Montgomery Waller Community Park, is located within the Del Sol street gang’s territory.

Respondent’s Supp. Lodg. # 2, Vol. 5 at 386-387, 392.

The Court has considered the alibi witness statements submitted by Petitioner, the other

evidence submitted at trial, and the entirety of the record before the Court. After a thorough review

of this material, the Court cannot conclude that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted [the petitioner] in light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to the actual innocence and

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the AEDPA’s procedural time-bar as articulated in

Schlup.

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 7) the Petition for failure to timely file within the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is GRANTED. In addition, the Report and Recommendation

is ADOPTED in its entirety, EXCEPT for section (c), entitled “Equitable Tolling,” which appears on

pages seven through nine. See (Doc. # 11 at 7-9).

The Clerk of the Court is Ordered to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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