Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05259/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05259-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO KUBA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 1-A AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, an

agency of the California Department of Food

and Agriculture’s Division of Fairs and

Expositions; DALY CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, a governmental agency; and

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05259 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this action, plaintiff Alfredo Kuba alleges that defendants 1-A Agricultural

Association and Daly City Police Department violated his civil rights. Daly City Police

Department now moves for a more definite statement pursuant to FRCP 12(e) and to strike

portions of plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(f). This order finds that plaintiff’s

complaint is sufficiently detailed under FRCP 8, such that no more definite statement is

required. This order also finds that striking all references in the complaint to punitive damages

is not warranted. The police department’s motions, therefore, are DENIED. 

Case 3:05-cv-05259-WHA Document 24 Filed 02/23/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

According to plaintiff, 1-A Agricultural owns and operates the Cow Palace in San

Mateo, which holds public events including rodeos and circuses (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9). The Daly

City Police Department provides security for the Cow Palace (id. at ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that

he was denied access to the parking lot at the Cow Palace based on messages displayed on his

vehicle (ibid.). The Daly City Police purportedly “threatened and intimidated Plaintiff with

arrest” if he remained in or near the parking lot (ibid.). 

Plaintiff has previously challenged similar conduct, ultimately prevailing at the Ninth

Circuit. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court initially

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in that action. The Ninth Circuit reversed

finding “[t]he First Amendment Expression Policy enforced by the Association at the Cow

Palace during the rodeo and the circus is unconstitutional on its face.” Id. at 863.

In this action, plaintiff again identifies several occasions in which he “attempted to

exercise his free speech rights by parking his vehicle in the Cow Palace parking facility with

messages on his vehicle regarding animal cruelty” (Compl. ¶¶ 12–17). On these occasions,

plaintiff purportedly was threatened with arrest and told that the messages on his vehicle were

“contrary to the venues and policies” (ibid.). 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains five claims for relief: (1) violation of his exercise of free

speech protected by the First Amendment of the United State Constitution brought pursuant to

42 U.S.C. 1983, (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United State Constitution brought pursuant to Section 1983, (3) violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause brought pursuant to Section 1983, (4) violation of Article 1,

Sections 2(a) and 3(a) of the California Constitution brought pursuant to Section 1983, and (5)

violation of Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution.

ANALYSIS

1. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT.

Under FRCP 12(e), “[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so

vague or ambiguous that party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading the

Case 3:05-cv-05259-WHA Document 24 Filed 02/23/06 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” This

rule must be read in light of FRCP 8, which merely requires that a complaint contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the

court’s jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to

support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

In light of the limited pleading requirements under the Federal Rules, it has been noted that

“[m]otions for a more definite statement are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely granted.” 

Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

This order finds no reason to depart from that general rule here. Contrary to the police

department’s assertions, plaintiff has identified several dates on which he was allegedly

threatened for his conduct in the Cow Palace parking lot. While no individual officers are

identified in the complaint, it is not clear that plaintiff would be able to provide that information

prior to discovery. Plaintiff is not required to do so at this stage in the litigation. 

Moreover, plaintiff’s complaint indicates the statutory and constitutional provisions at

issue as well as the grounds for jurisdiction in this Court. This information is sufficient for the

police department to determine whether to assert a qualified immunity defense. Such a defense

simply depends on whether or not the “facts establish that the official’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Dias v. Elique, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 267154, at *5 (9th Cir. Feb. 6,

2006) (citations omitted). 

The adequacy of plaintiff’s complaint is buttressed by the fact that similar claims were

litigated previously, as noted above. Under such circumstances, this order finds that it is not

unreasonable to expect the police department to respond to the complaint.

Of course, with respect to the “Doe” defendants, plaintiff is under a separate obligation

to identify any such defendants by name, including any officers plaintiff intends to include in

this action. Plaintiff must so identify these defendants and serve them with process within a

reasonable time. Nevertheless, this is a separate problem from that raised by the police

department’s motion for a more definite statement.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2. MOTION TO STRIKE.

Pursuant to a motion under FRCP 12(f), “the court may order stricken from any pleading

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

FRCP 12(f) is a vehicle by which to “avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise

from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v.

A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). As with motions under FRCP 12(e),

however, motions to strike are viewed negatively because of the limited import of the pleadings

under the Federal Rules. Accordingly, “motions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear

that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the

litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

(citations omitted).

Here, the police department seeks to strike references to punitive damages plaintiff’s

complaint. The police department relies on City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247 (1981), for the proposition that punitive damages cannot be awarded against municipalities

under Section 1983. Indeed, the City of Newport opinion held that “[a] municipality . . . can

have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive

purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself.” Id. at 267

(emphasis in original).

Plaintiff counters that this rule is not absolute. This order agrees. Our circuit recently

made this point clear: “Although municipal defendants are immune from liability for punitive

damages under § 1983, municipalities may pay punitive damages in some circumstances.” Bell

v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 868 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). One such

circumstance mentioned by the Bell court is provided by California Government Code § 825(b). 

According to the Bell court, that provision authorizes “a public entity to pay a punitive damages

award against an employee if the employee acted in good faith and within the scope of his or

her public employment.” The police department does not offer any convincing arguments why

that section of the California Government Code could not come into play here. While the police

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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department ultimately may prevail on this matter, striking all references to punitive damages is

inappropriate at this point in the litigation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Daly City Police Department’s motions are DENIED. Finding

further argument unnecessary, hearing on these motions is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05259-WHA Document 24 Filed 02/23/06 Page 5 of 5