Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07427/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07427-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendant Edward Rapoza, the only party besides Pang, Jr. remaining in this case,

failed to file any opposition to Pang, Jr.’s motion. Rapoza did, however, send the Court a

letter, dated December 13, 2007, repeating his assertion of innocence and expressing his

“disgust[] with the judicial system,” where “fraud, perjury, forgery, and dishonesty are

prevalent.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD RAPOZA, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C06-7427 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT RICHARD H.S.

PANG, JR.’S RENEWED

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Richard H.S. Pang, Jr.’s renewed

motion for summary judgment, filed on December 10, 2007, and noticed for hearing on

January 14, 2008. After carefully reviewing the parties’ papers,1

 the record in this case, and

governing law, the Court concluded that oral argument was unnecessary and vacated the

hearing date on January 10, 2008. For the reasons discussed below, the Court now GRANTS

Pang, Jr.’s motion and directs the Clerk to enter judgment and close the file.

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously summarized the factual and early procedural history of this

case:

On October 6, 2002, Defendant Eddie Rapoza (“Rapoza”) was

driving a vehicle in Moss Beach, California, with his pregnant

wife, Raye Lynn Rapoza (“Raye”), and their four-year-old

daughter, Tehani, as passengers. The vehicle went over a cliff

Case 3:06-cv-07427-TEH Document 58 Filed 02/26/08 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and landed in the ocean. Raye, Tehani, and Raye’s unborn child

died as a result of the crash, but Rapoza survived.

In May 2005, Rapoza was convicted of one count of first-degree

murder and two counts of second-degree murder in San Mateo

County Superior Court. Rapoza’s appeal of his conviction was

argued and submitted to the California Court of Appeal for the

First District on June 12, 2007. . . .

This case is an interpleader action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1335,

involving disputed proceeds from Raye’s life insurance policy. 

Plaintiff CGLIC [Connecticut General Life Insurance Company],

which issued the policy, has deposited the disputed $297,417.17

into the Court registry. CGLIC named the following potential

claimants as Defendants: Rapoza; Raye’s sister, Robin PangMaganaris (“Pang-Maganaris”); Raye’s father, Richard H.S.

Pang, Jr. (“Pang, Jr.”); and Raye’s brother, Richard Pang III

(“Pang III”).

In her life insurance policy, Raye listed Rapoza and PangMaganaris as primary beneficiaries, each to receive 50% of the

proceeds, and did not list any contingent beneficiaries. CGLIC

paid Pang-Maganaris the 50% of the proceeds designated for her,

and those funds are not in dispute. However, because of

Rapoza’s conviction for killing Raye, the parties dispute who is

entitled to receive the 50% designated for Rapoza. California

Probate Code section 252 prohibits a person “who feloniously

and intentionally kills” an insured to receive any insurance

proceeds and provides that the insurance policy “becomes

payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.”

July 25, 2007 Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Def. Richard H.S. Pang, Jr.’s Mot.

for Summ. J. at 1-2.

Pang, Jr. originally moved for summary judgment on April 25, 2007, and the Court

heard oral argument on the motion on July 19, 2007. In its July 25, 2007order ruling on

Pang, Jr.’s motion, the Court dismissed CGLIC as a disinterested stakeholder and granted

CGLIC’s request for $7,235.12 in attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid out of the funds

deposited in the Court registry for this case. The Court further found that disputed material

facts prevented summary judgment against Rapoza. However, the Court determined that

Pang III and Pang-Maganaris had no valid claim to the disputed funds, leaving Pang, Jr. and

Rapoza as the only two possible claimants to the disputed insurance proceeds.

On December 10, 2007, Pang, Jr. filed a renewed motion for summary judgment

based on a change in factual circumstances. Since the time of the Court’s denial of

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Pang, Jr.’s first motion for summary judgment, the California Court of Appeal, First

Appellate District, Division 4, affirmed Rapoza’s conviction on August 10, 2007. Ching

Decl. Ex. 1. The Court of Appeal denied Rapoza’s petition for rehearing on September 5,

2007, id. Ex. 2, and the California Supreme Court denied Rapoza’s petition for review on

November 14, 2007, id. Ex. 3. On December 5, 2007, the Court of Appeal issued a remittitur

certifying that the court’s August 10, 2007 opinion “has now become final.” Id. Ex. 4.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party. Id. at 322-23. However, on an issue for which its opponent will have

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out to the

District Court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

As this Court explained in its ruling on Pang, Jr.’s first motion for summary judgment:

California Probate Code section 252 prohibits a person “who

feloniously and intentionally kills” an insured to receive any

insurance proceeds and provides that the insurance policy

“becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the

decedent.” Under California Probate Code section 254(a), a

“final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing

is conclusive” in establishing a person’s ineligibility under

section 252. Where there has been no such final judgment of

conviction, “the court may determine by a preponderance of

evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional. . . . 

The burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish that the

killing was felonious and intentional. . . .” Cal. Prob. Code

§ 254(b).

July 25, 2007 Order at 4-5. At the time of the Court’s ruling on Pang, Jr.’s original motion

for summary judgment, Rapoza’s criminal conviction for Raye’s murder was pending on

appeal. Consequently, the Court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard and found

that Pang, Jr. had failed to demonstrate a lack of material disputed facts under that standard. 

The Court therefore denied Pang, Jr.’s motion for summary judgment against Rapoza.

However, Rapoza’s criminal conviction is now no longer on appeal. The California

Court of Appeal affirmed Rapoza’s conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied

review. Rapoza’s time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court has also now expired. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (where, as here, review is sought of a

lower state court judgment subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort, a

petition for a writ of certiorari is timely when filed within 90 days after entry of the order

denying discretionary review). Thus, despite Rapoza’s continued assertions of innocence,

his conviction is now final. Compare In re Peterson, 156 Cal. App. 4th 676, 684-86 (2007)

(holding that the term “final judgment of conviction” in California Probate Code section

254(a) does not include a conviction pending on appeal).

Under the clear language of California Probate Code section 254(a), the final

judgment of Rapoza’s conviction is “conclusive,” and no further inquiry as to whether

Rapoza committed a “felonious and intentional killing” under the preponderance of the

evidence standard is necessary. Cal. Prob. Code § 254. Pursuant to California Probate Code

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section 252, Raye’s life insurance policy thus “becomes payable as though the killer

[Rapoza] had predeceased the decedent [Raye].”

As this Court explained in its ruling on Pang, Jr.’s original motion for summary

judgment:

Raye’s insurance policy provides that “[a]ny amount of an

Insured’s Death Benefit for which there is no designated or

surviving beneficiary will be paid to the Owner or to the

executors or administrators of the Owner’s estate.” Ex. 6 to

Ching Decl. at CG 050. Under this clause, if Rapoza is deemed

to have predeceased Raye, as would be required if California

Probate Code section 252 applies, then the 50% designated for

his benefit in the policy would be paid to Raye’s estate. It is

undisputed that Raye died intestate and that she has no surviving

children. Thus, under California Probate Code section 6402(b),

the insurance proceeds designated for Rapoza would pass to

Pang, Jr., Raye’s only surviving parent. 

July 25, 2007 Order at 6. Because California Probate Code section 252 now indisputably

applies to this case, summary judgment in favor of Pang, Jr. is proper.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Richard H.S.

Pang, Jr.’s renewed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall disburse

the remaining funds in the Court registry for this case, including any accrued interest, to

Pang, Jr. In addition, the Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

Before Pang, Jr. can receive his disbursement, his counsel must send a fax to the

Court’s finance department, at (415) 522-4103, that includes Pang, Jr.’s taxpayer

identification or Social Security number, as well as the address to which the disbursement

should be sent. The fax shall reference this case by both case name and case number.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 02/26/08 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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