Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01273/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01273-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY WAYNE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendant(s). 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 10-01273 JW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has filed a

pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials. 

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Docket No. 2), will be addressed in

a separate order. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint "is

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd 2

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or

"seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. §

1915A(b).Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials are violating his right to equal protection

by refusing to provide him with a free education as provided to other similarly

situated inmates. (Compl. 3.) Plaintiff claims that they are discriminating against

him on the basis of his financial status as an indigent inmate and based on his race as

an African American. (Id.) Specifically, plaintiff claims that he is being forced to

pay for college textbooks and supplies that are being provided for free to inmates

who read below a ninth grade reading level. (Id., Attach. at 1.) 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that

no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); Thornton v. City of St.

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (evidence of different treatment of

unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim). 

Where prisoners are not involved, the Supreme Court has articulated three

distinct standards applicable to equal protection analysis: strict scrutiny, heightened

scrutiny and rational basis review. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. The

standard to be invoked depends on the nature of the class involved or the interest

affected. The most lenient standard, rational basis review, requires only that a

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

A violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination is

never de minimis. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712 (9th Cir.

1997).

2

The legitimate penological interest may not be presumed. “To satisfy

Turner, the [defendant] must, at the very least, adduce some penological reason for

its policy at the relevant stage of the judicial proceedings. ‘[C]onsiderations

advanced to support a restrictive policy [must] be . . . sufficiently articulated to

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd 3

rational basis exist for the classifications drawn and that the practice in question be

adopted in pursuit of legitimate government purposes. See, e.g., San Antonio Sch.

Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to education). At the other extreme, the

strict scrutiny standard requires a close connection between the legislation or

practice under examination and a compelling state interest. This is the appropriate

test when fundamental rights are at stake or a suspect classification is involved. See,

e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose an abortion); Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1

(1967) (right to marry); see also Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (Equal

Protection Clause strives “to do away with all governmentally imposed

discrimination based on race”).1

 Finally, in between these two positions lies an

intermediate standard of review, heightened scrutiny: there must be a substantial

relationship to an important, although not compelling, state interest. This standard

has been applied to gender-based classifications. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb,

430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

Strict scrutiny is inappropriate to test the infringement of prisoners’

constitutional rights except the right to racial equality. Johnson v. California, 543

U.S. 499, 530-31 (2005) (holding that Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), does not

apply to racial classifications in prison). In Turner, the Court reiterated the need for

judicial deference to the problems of prison administration, holding that when a

prison regulation [or practice] impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89.2

 The Court set out four factors to be considered:

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

permit . . . meaningful review.’ Thus, at a minimum, the reasons must be urged in

the district court.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Walker v Sumner, 917 F2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd 4

(1) Whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison

regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify

it. A regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection

between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render

the policy arbitrary or irrational, and the government objective must be

a legitimate and neutral one. 

(2) Whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that

remains open. If so, courts should be particularly conscious of the

measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials.

(3) What impact the accommodation of the asserted right will have

on guards, other inmates and the allocation of prison resources

generally. If the accommodation will have a significant ripple effect

the courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion

of correctional officials.

(4) If there is an absence of ready alternatives, this is evidence of

the reasonableness of a prison regulation. 

See id. at 89-91.

The only proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation

or practice claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether

the regulation or practice is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Id. at 89. This is true even when the constitutional right claimed to have been

infringed is fundamental or a suspect class is involved, and the state under other

circumstances would be required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-25 (1990) (standard of review adopted in

Turner applies in all circumstances in which needs of prison administration

implicate constitutional rights). 

According to the second level’s decision which was reviewed at the

Director’s Level, college tuition was waived for inmate/students through Coastline

Community College. (Compl., Ex. 1.) Students were still responsible for paying the

cost of their own textbooks and supplies. (Id.) Plaintiff was advised of the relevant

California Department of Corrections Operations Manual Section 101010.3, which

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd 5

states in part, “‘Academic classes shall be offered to inmates from literacy through

high school... College classes may be offered based upon available funding.’” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was informed that funding was not available, and that SVSP was not

required to provide free college courses to inmates, indigent or not. (Id.) The

decision stated that SVSP was required “to provide programs that are designed to

ensure that upon parole inmates are able to achieve a ninth grade reading level.” 

(Id.) The Decision’s Level Appeal Decision affirmed the denial, finding that

plaintiff had failed to present compelling evidence and convincing argument to

warrant modification of the decision. (Id.) The decision noted that the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) did not have the funding to

provide plaintiff “moneyies [sic] to purchase college text books.” (Id.) 

First of all, plaintiff’s assertion that he is being discriminated against based

on his race without any factual support is conclusory. This Court is not persuaded

by plaintiff’s reasoning that since Caucasian inmates are the overwhelming majority

of non-indigent inmates and can quite easily pay for an education that should be

provided for free to all inmates, that therefore the regulation is racially biased. 

When challenging his treatment with regard to other prisoners, courts have held that

in order to present an equal protection claim a prisoner must allege that his treatment

is invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates. More v. Farrier, 

984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1993) (absent evidence of invidious discrimination,

federal courts should defer to judgment of prison officials); Timm v. Gunter, 917

F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). Here, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient

to show invidious discrimination on the part of prison officials in the racially neutral

regulations regarding college education. Plaintiff cannot show that prison officials

are responsible for the alleged financial disparity between Caucasians and African

Americans in prison. 

Absent racial discrimination, consideration of the Turner factors are

appropriate in determining whether the prison regulation regarding education is

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 A court need not determine the scope of a prisoner’s constitutional rights

before applying the Turner test: if a challenged regulation is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests, it must be sustained regardless of whether or to

what extent it infringes a constitutional right. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U. S. 126,

131-32 (2003) (holding that it need not consider the scope of prisoners’ First

Amendment right to intimate association because challenged regulation bears a

rational relation to legitimate penological interests). 

Order of Dismissal

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\CR.10\Johnson01273_dismissal.wpd

valid because it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. at 89.3 According to the appeal decision discussed above, the

CDCR did not have funding to enable plaintiff, or other indigent inmates, to pay for

college textbooks. See supra at 5. The Court finds this constitutes a “commonsense connection between a legitimate objective and a prison regulation,” i.e., the

prison regulation limiting the availability of college classes and the requirement that

inmates pay for their own textbooks and supplies is rationally related to the

legitimate penological interest in managing prison resources. Frost v. Symington,

197 F.3d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1999). There is little doubt that the impact of covering

the cost of textbooks and supplies for all inmates who wished to pursue a college

education would strongly impact the allocation of prison resources. Furthermore,

the regulation does not prevent plaintiff from obtaining money on his own to cover

the cost of textbooks and supplies or prohibit plaintiff from pursuing a college

education through other less costly means. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim that

SVSP’s regulations regarding education violates his right to equal protection is

DISMISSED because the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

DATED:_____________________ 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

July 6, 2010 

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 6 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY W JOHNSON JR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants. /

Case Number: CV10-01273 JW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the

attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s)

hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into

an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Anthony Wayne Johnson F-58411

Salinas Valley State Prison

P. O. Box 1030

Soledad, Ca 93960

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

7/6/2010 7/6/2010 /s/

Case 5:10-cv-01273-JW Document 4 Filed 07/06/10 Page 7 of 7