Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05274/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05274-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2012 Decided January 4, 2013

No. 11-5274

IN RE: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 4

DEADLINE LITIGATION - MDL NO. 2165,

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS AND CENTER

 FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

APPELLEES

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL,

APPELLANT

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR AND UNITED STATES 

FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-mc-00377)

Douglas S. Burdin argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Anna M. Seidman.

Nicholas A. DiMascio, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on the

brief was Joan M. Pepin, Attorney. Ellen J. Durkee and

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Sambhav N. Sankar, Attorneys, entered appearances. R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

James Jay Tutchton and Amy Atwood were on the brief for

appellees Center for Biological Diversity, et al. Melissa A.

Hailey entered an appearance.

Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Center for Biological Diversity

and the WildEarth Guardians sued to compel the Secretary of

the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (together, the

“Service”) to comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered

Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3), for determining whether

to list species as endangered or threatened. As the cases neared

settlement, the Safari Club International (“Safari Club”) moved

to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in

order to oppose the settlements which would include three

species that its members hunt. The district court denied

intervention and approved the settlement agreements. On

appeal, the Safari Club contends it qualified for intervention as

of right, as well as permissively. We affirm.

I. 

The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was enacted, in part,

“to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which

endangered species and threatened species depend may be

conserved, [and] a program for the conservation of such

endangered species and threatened species.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1531(b). Species receive protection pursuant to a listing

process commenced either by the Service, acting on behalf of

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the Secretary of Interior, or by petition of an interested party. 

Id. § 1533(a), (b)(3)(A). If the Service determines that listing

a species is warranted, it must proceed by rulemaking. Id. 

§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii), (b)(5)-(6). The Service must make the

decision to formally list a species “solely on the basis of the best

scientific and commercial data available,” and upon

consideration of any of five factors. Id. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 

The ESA’s protections apply only after a species is formally

listed. Id. § 1538(a). Those protections make it unlawful to

“take” any listed species, id. § 1538(a)(1)(B), which includes

hunting, id. § 1532(19). Neither the ESA nor the implementing

regulations prohibit hunting of species prior to formal listing,

including those determined to be warranted-but-precluded

candidates for listing.

The ESA also establishes timetables for the Service to act

on petitions. First, “[t]o the maximum extent practicable, within

90 days after receiving” a petition, the Service “shall make a

finding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific

or commercial information indicating that the petitioned action

may be warranted.” Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (the “90-day finding”). 

Second, “[w]ithin 12 months after receiving a petition . . .

indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted, the

[Service] shall make one of the following findings”: (1) the

petitioned action is not warranted, (2) the petitioned action is

warranted, or (3) the petitioned action is warranted but “the

immediate proposal and timely promulgation of a final

regulation implementing the petitioned action . . . is precluded

by pending proposals to determine whether any species is an

endangered species or a threatened species” and “expeditious

progress is being made to add qualified species to either of the

lists.” Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B). Third, the Service must annually

review its warranted-but-precluded findings as if they were

resubmitted petitions. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i), (b)(3)(B)(iii). 

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The Service annually publishes a Candidate Notice of

Review (“CNOR”), which includes findings on species for

which the Service has determined listing is warranted but

precluded. This notice responds to petitions to list species as

well as the Service’s own identification of species suitable for

listing. See, e.g., 2011 CNOR, 76 Fed. Reg. 66370 (Oct. 26,

2011); 2010 CNOR, 75 Fed. Reg. 69222 (Nov. 10, 2010). As

explained in the 2010 CNOR, “[a] candidate species is one for

which [the Service has] on file sufficient information on

biological vulnerability and threats to support a proposal to list

as endangered or threatened, but for which preparation and

publication of a proposal is precluded by higher priority listing

actions.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 69222. Over the years, the number of

warranted-but-precluded findings has outpaced the number of

listings, creating a backlog of candidate species – 251 species as

of the end of 2010. See id. at 69222-24, 69229-31. At the end

of the end of 2007, the average delay in candidate species

listings was 10.6 years. 

In June 2010, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

consolidated a dozen lawsuits filed by the Guardians and the

Center against the Service, and transferred the cases to the

district court in the District of Columbia. Within a year, two 

settlement agreements emerged:

P On May 10, 2011, the Guardians and the Service

reached an agreement, and the Guardians moved for approval of

a consent decree. Under the agreement, the Service committed

to adhere to its fiscal year 2011 and 2012 work plans, submit

either a proposed rule or a not-warranted finding for the 251

species on the 2010 CNOR by September 2016, in accordance

with certain benchmarks, and meet specific deadlines for

findings on several candidate species. In return, the Guardians

agreed to dismiss their claims in the multidistrict litigation as

well as several other cases, not to file any lawsuit to compel

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compliance with the statutory deadlines or challenge any

warranted-but-precluded finding before March 31, 2017, and not

to submit more than 10 new petitions annually until September

30, 2016. 

P On June 16, 2011, the Center and Service reached a

tentative agreement. Under the agreement, the Service

committed to make certain 90-day and 12-month findings by the

end of fiscal year 2011 or 2012 and to submit either proposed

rules or not-warranted findings for certain candidate species by

specific deadlines, while reserving discretion asto the substance

of those decisions. The Center agreed to dismiss its claims in

the consolidated cases and several other lawsuits, and to the

extension of most deadlines set in the agreement if the Center

exceeded specified limitations on its ability to sue the Service. 

The agreement was filed in the district court on July 12, 2011.

The Safari Club moved to intervene, pursuant to Rule 24, on

June 27, 2011, in order “to oppose and defeat the settlement[s].” 

Safari Mot. to Intervene at 19. The three species of concern to

the Safari Club appear on the 2010 CNOR list: the New

England cottontail, the greater sage grouse, and the lesser

prairie-chicken.1 Under the Guardians’ agreement, the Service

must list the candidates on the 2010 CNOR as endangered or

threatened or find their listing not warranted by September 30,

2016. Both settlements call for the Service to act on the

1

 Attached to the motion to intervene were declarations of four

members of the Safari Club attesting that they hunted (1) greater sage

grouse for at least the last five years and had plans to hunt them again,

see Decl. of Rew Goodenow, June 15, 2011; Decl. of Philip Spulnik,

June 15, 2011; (2) New England cottontails for many years and had

plans to continue to do so, see Decl. of Charles Souza, June 19, 2011;

and (3) the lesser prairie-chicken for years and intended to do so again,

see Decl. of Robert Robel, June 21, 2011. 

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petitionsfor the greatersage grouse and New England cottontail

by the end of fiscal year 2015; and for the lesser prairie-chicken,

by November 29, 2012. 

The district court denied intervention, finding the Safari

Club lacked standing to intervene as of right and that permissive

intervention at this late date would cause undue delay and

prejudice the parties, and approved the settlement agreements. 

In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 277

F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Section 4 Deadline Litig.”). The

Safari Club appeals. This court has jurisdiction over the appeal

of the denial of intervention as of right, see Alt. Research &

Dev. Found. v. Veneman, 262 F.3d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2001),

and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction in some instances

over the appeal of a denial of permissive intervention, see In re

Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir.

2000). Our review of the district’s court’s determination on

standing is de novo. See, e.g., LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777,

785 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of

Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

II.

Rule 24(a) provides, in relevant part:

On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to

intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction that is the subject of the action,

and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability

to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately

represent that interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322

F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala,

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140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This court has held that

a movant seeking to intervene as of right must additionally

demonstrate Article III standing. See United States v. Philip

Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Fund

for Animals, 322 F.3d at 731–32; Military Toxics Project v.

EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mova Pharm., 140

F.3d at 1074; Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d

1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “[T]he underlying rationale for

this requirement is clear: because a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to

participate on an equal footing with the original parties to the

suit, he mustsatisfy the standing requirementsimposed on those

parties.” City of Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). 

To demonstrate its standing, the Safari Club invokes the

procedural rights doctrine, contending that the settlement

agreements “establish an illegal procedure — the elimination of

the Service’s statutory authority to find that a proposal to list a

species is warranted but precluded by higher priorities.”

Appellant’s Br. 28. It maintains that it has shown standing

because “this illegal procedure is likely to lead to the listing of

three game species,” which “would end the hunting and

sustainable use conservation of these species by Safari Club and

its members.” Id. Put otherwise, the Safari Club asserts an

interest in hunting the three species during the Service’s delays

in listing those candidate species. 

The Supreme Court has afforded special treatment to

procedural injuries under Article III, noting that “[t]here is much

truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special: The

person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his

concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the

normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). The

doctrine “loosen[s] the strictures” of the standing inquiry, 

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Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009), by

relaxing the immediacy and redressability requirements, Lujan,

504 U.S. at 572 n.7. An individual can enforce his procedural

rights “so long as the procedures in question are designed to

protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the

ultimate basis of his standing.” Id. at 573 n.8. As explained by

this court, the doctrine “relieves the plaintiff of the need to

demonstrate that (1) the agency action would have been

different but for the procedural violation, and (2) . . . courtordered compliance with the procedure would alter the final

result.” Nat’l Parks Conserv. Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 5

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). It has treated “[t]he

hypothetical in footnote 7 of Lujan [as] represent[ing] the

archetypal procedural injury: an agency’s failure to prepare a

statutorily required environmental statement before taking

action with potential adverse consequences to the environment.” 

Nat’l Parks Conserv. Ass’n, 414 F.3d at 5. In that hypothetical,

“one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a

federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing

agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement,

even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the

statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and

even though the dam will not be completed for many years.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 

The Safari Club has neither identified a statutory procedure

that the settlement agreementsrequire the Service to violate, nor

shown that the warranted-but-precluded finding is designed to

protect its interest in delaying formal listing. First, it has not

shown that the agreements cause the Service to violate any ESAmandated procedure. Rather, as the Service puts it, the

agreements are “an exercise — not an abdication — of the

Service’s authority under the ESA.” Fed. Appellees’ Br. 13. 

The Service has set a schedule for addressing all candidate

species on the 2010 CNOR and therefore, by the dates set in the

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agreements, will not continue to find listing those species to be

precluded. See id. The Safari Club’s position presumes that

before the Service can propose to list a species, the ESA requires

it first to decide whether listing is precluded. The ESA includes

no such procedure. Although the Service must make one of

three findings — that listing a species is not warranted, is

warranted, or is warranted but precluded — within twelve

months after receiving a petition for listing, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(3)(B), the ESA does not require the Service to find

that listing a species is precluded under any specific

circumstances. Instead, the ESA instructs the Service to make

one of the three findings, of which warranted-but-precluded is

one. Additionally, the Service may propose to list any qualified

species on its own initiative, and the ESA does not condition

that authority on findings concerning preclusion. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(a).

Furthermore, Congress has authorized judicial review of

only not-warranted and warranted-but-precluded findings, but

not warranted findings. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii). Its

failure to provide for such review indicates it is foreclosed. See

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). 

Instead, a person aggrieved by a warranted finding may

challenge the Service’s final rule listing the species. See, e.g.,

Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

Thus, as the Safari Club as much as admits, see Appellant’s Br.

29, 42; Oral Arg. Tape. 8:04-37, when the Service proposes to

formally list a species that is on the 2010 CNOR, the ESA

provides no means for the Safari Club to assert that formal

listing of the species is precluded. Congress’ failure to provide

the Safari Club with a means to require continued warrantedbut-precluded findings reinforces the conclusion that the ESA

contains no such procedural right. 

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Second, the Safari Club has failed to demonstrate that the

warranted-but-precluded procedure is “designed to protect some

threatened concrete interest of [its] that is the ultimate basis of

[its claim of] standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8. In Center

for Law & Education v. Dep’t of Education, 396 F.3d 1152,

1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005), several advocacy organizations and a

parent sued the Department of Education challenging the

composition of a rulemaking committee required by the No

Child Left Behind Act. The court held that the organizations

lacked standing because the procedures for the rulemaking

process were not designed to protect their interests. Id. at 1157. 

As to the individual plaintiff, the court questioned whether the

procedures were “‘designed to protect’ the interests of parents

and students,’” id., noting that Congress’ concern was that the

process “‘be conducted in a timely manner’” and “did not

endorse ‘protective’ litigation regarding the formation of the

committee amidst the time-limited rulemaking process,” id. So

too here. 

The Safari Club seeks to delay listing of three species that

its members hunt while the structure of the ESA’s listing

procedures indicates that Congress did not endorse suits to

forestall listing decisions. As the Service points out, this is

apparentfromboth the judicialreview provision, which does not

authorize review of warranted findings, and the warranted-butprecluded provision, which requires the Service to find that the

Service is making “expeditious progress . . . to add qualified

species” to the lists of endangered and threatened species. 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii)(II). Other circuits have observed

that Congress’ purpose in enacting the ESA provisions setting

the timetables for the Service, of which the warranted-butprecluded provision is a part, was “to facilitate the addition of

endangered species to the endangered species list.” Idaho Farm

Bureau Fed’n v. Babbit, 58 F.3d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Ninth Circuit referenced the legislative history indicating

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concern about “‘the decline in the pace of listing species . . . in

recent years,’” id. at 1400 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-567

(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2809), and noted

that in the 1982 amendments Congress sought “‘to expedite the

decisionmaking process and to ensure prompt action in

determining the status of the many species which may require

the protections of the Act.’” Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 

97-835 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2860). 

Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that in the 1982

procedures Congress sought “to force the Service to act more

quickly on petitions to list.” Biodiversity Legal Found. v.

Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998), (citing H.R.

CONF.REP.NO. 97-835 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2860, 2861-62).

It is true that Congress also included “relief valves for the

benefit of the Service given its limited resources.” Fed. 

Appellees’ Br. 19. These include the provisions for the Service

to make a 90 day finding “to the maximum extent practicable”

and temporarily excusing the failure to publish a proposed

listing rule in the Federal Register if “precluded by pending

proposals.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B)(iii)(I). But

there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended these

provisions “to allow the Se[rvice] to delay commencing the

rulemaking process for any reason other than the existence of

pending or imminent proposals to list species subject to a greater

degree of threat [that] would make allocation of resources to

such a petition unwise.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-835 (1982),

reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2862. Regardless of

whether the Safari Club defines its interest as hunting or

“sustainable use conservation,” Appellant’s Br. 30, Congress did

not design the procedures the Safari Club invokes to protect its

interest in delaying formal listing decisions. Instead, those

procedures were designed to expedite the listing process

consistent with the Service’s available resources. Although the

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“designed to protect” inquiry, similar to the zone of interest test,

see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peña, 17 F.3d 1478, 1483–84

(D.C. Cir. 1994), may not be especially demanding, see, e.g.,

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2005), it cannot

plausibly be stretched to encompass situations where an

individual interest is contrary to the statutory purpose.

To the extent the Safari Club separately claims that it is

injured by denial of a right to comment, see Appellant’s Reply

Br. 5, 8–10, neither the ESA nor the implementing regulations

require the Service to invite comment when the it makes a

warranted-but-precluded finding. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(3)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 424.15. The ESA merely requires

the Service to publish its warranted-but-precluded findings in

the Federal Register. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii). And the

regulations do not require the Service to publish the CNORs on

which the Safari Club appears to claim a right to comment and,

indeed, provide that “none of the substantive or procedural

provisions of the ESA apply to a species that is designated as a

candidate for listing.” 15 C.F.R. § 424.15.

Because the Safari Club has failed to identify a violation of

a procedural right afforded by the ESA that is designed to

protect its interests, see Center for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at

1157, the district court did not err in ruling that the Safari Club

lacked standing and therefore was ineligible to intervene as of

right, see Section 4 Deadline Litig., 277 F.R.D. at 7.

III.

Alternatively, the Safari Club contends that the district court

abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention because

the claims the Safari Club seeks to raise — the reasonableness,

legality, fairness, and public interest of the proposed settlement

agreement — share common questions of law and fact with the

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district court’s consideration of whether to approve the

settlement agreements. See Appellant’s Br. 44 (citing Citizens

for a Better Env’t. v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1128 (D.C. Cir.

1983)).

Rule 24(b) provides, in relevant part:

On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to

intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares

with the main action a common question of law or fact.

Id. Subsection (b)(3) provides that “[i]n exercising its

discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original

parties’ rights.”

The denial of a Rule 24(b) motion is not usually appealable

in itself, although the court may exercise its pendent appellate

jurisdiction to reach questions that are “‘inextricably intertwined

with ones of which we have direct jurisdiction.’” In re

Vitamins, 215 F. 3d at 31 (quoting Twelve John Does v. District

of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Here, as in

In re Vitamins, the basis for the Safari’s Club’s motion for

permissive intervention is the same as that for intervention as of

right. To that extent the questions are “inextricably

intertwined.” See id. 

It remains, however, an open question in this circuit

whether Article III standing is required for permissive

intervention. See id. at 31–32 (comparing EEOC v. National

Children’s Center, 146 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(stating a would-be intervenor needed “an independent ground

for subject matter jurisdiction”), and Diamond v. Charles, 476

U.S. 54, 76 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing that

“[t]he words ‘claim’ or ‘defense’ manifestly refer to the kinds of

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claims or defenses that can be raised in courts of law as part of

an actual or impending lawsuit”), with National Children’s

Center, 146 F.3d at 1045–46 (noting that this circuit avoids strict

readings of the phrase “claim or defense,” allowing intervention

“even in ‘situations where the existence of any nominate ‘claim’

or ‘defense’ is difficult to find.’” (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385

F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1967)))). The uncertainty about

whether standing is required for permissive intervention remains

today. The Safari Club’s brief cites only National Children’s

Center, 146 F.3d at 1044, which did not address standing but 

rather relied on a narrow exception, inapplicable here, to the

subject matter jurisdiction requirement, see id. at 1046. Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94

(1998), precludes a court from reaching the merits issues in the

absence of jurisdiction. If standing is required, then the Safari

Club could not succeed on this theory, for the reasons discussed

in Part II. If it is not, then the Safari Club would need to show

that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that

allowing the Safari Club to intervene this late in the settlement

process would cause undue delay and prejudice by forcing the

Service to continue to litigate instead of working to meet the

agreed upon schedule in the settlement agreements, thereby

consuming scarce resources and jeopardizing the settlements. 

Section 4 Deadline Litig., 277 F.R.D. at 8–9. This court has

long acknowledged the “wide latitude afforded” to district courts

under Rule 24(b). National Children’s Center, 146 F.3d at 1046

(internal citations omitted). “In view of this unresolved standing

issue, however, we think it inappropriate to exercise our pendant

jurisdiction.” In re Vitamins, 215 F. 3d at 32.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court

without reaching the Safari Club’s objections to the settlement

agreements. 

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