Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15940/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15940-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DERRICK LAKEY,  No. 09-15940

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  2:05-cv-01864-

JAM-GGH RODERICK HICKMAN,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 15, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed January 5, 2011

Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Sidney R. Thomas,

Circuit Judges, and Richard Mills, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Wallace

*The Honorable Richard Mills, Senior United States District Judge for

the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Mark David Greenberg, Oakland, California, for petitionerappellant Derrick Lakey.

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Justin Riley (argued), Edmund G. Brown, Michael P. Farrell

and Brian G. Smiley, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for respondent-appellee Roderick Hickman.

OPINION

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Derrick Lakey, a California state prisoner, appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2253, and we dismiss the appeal because Lakey’s

habeas petition is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)

(1996).

I.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA) allows state prisoners only one year from the

completion of the direct review process in state court to apply

in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The limitations period, however, is subject to

both statutory tolling during the pendency of a properly filed

state application for post-conviction relief, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010), and to equitable tolling

when a state prisoner pursues his federal rights diligently, but

is prevented from filing a timely petition by some extraordinary circumstance, id. at 2562. Although Lakey filed his federal petition nearly three years after the state court direct

review process ended, he contends that his petition qualifies

for both statutory and equitable tolling.

Following a 1996 jury trial in state court, Lakey was convicted on one count of first-degree murder and two counts of

attempted murder for his participation in a drive-by shooting

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in Stockton, California. After an unsuccessful direct appeal,

Lakey’s convictions became final for purposes of AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations on October 30, 2002. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Over the next three years, Lakey initiated a series of unsuccessful state-court applications for post-conviction relief,

including two rounds of state habeas petitions. Lakey began

his first round of state petitions in California superior court on

April 5, 2003. After that court denied relief, Lakey slowly

worked his way to the Supreme Court of California, which

rejected his first round of claims without comment on August

25, 2004. Thirty days later, on September 24, 2004, Lakey

initiated a second round of state habeas proceedings. The state

trial court rejected this second set of claims on November 5,

2004, and the state court of appeal summarily denied relief on

December 22, 2004. Nearly one year later, on December 15,

2005, the Supreme Court of California denied Lakey’s final

petition for post-conviction review as untimely.

Lakey filed his federal petition in the Eastern District of

California on September 15, 2005, which was 267 days after

the state court of appeal summarily denied Lakey’s second

round of post-conviction relief and 90 days before the state

supreme court rejected those claims on timeliness grounds.

According to Lakey and the State, at least 352 days of

AEDPA’s 365-day limitations period had expired by the time

Lakey filed his federal petition. One hundred fifty-seven days

ran from the finalization of Lakey’s direct appeal on October

30, 2002, and the filing of his initial state petition on April 5,

2003. The parties agree that another 165 days expired as a

result of two lengthy filing delays that occurred during

Lakey’s first round of state habeas proceedings: an 84-day

gap following the state trial court’s denial of relief and an 81-

day delay in seeking review from the state supreme court after

Lakey’s claims were denied by the court of appeal. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing

to toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations when interval between

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California prisoner’s state court filings is “substantially longer

than” the 30 to 60 days typically afforded in other states). But

we need address the issue of whether Lakey’s unexplained 81

and 84-day delays substantially exceed the 30 to 60-day limits

because in his brief and at oral argument, Lakey explicitly

conceded that interval tolling is unavailable for the time that

passed during his relatively lengthy filing delays. Finally, an

additional 30 days expired after the completion of Lakey’s

first round of state petitions on August 25, 2004, and the

beginning of his second round on September 24, 2004. See

Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)

(AEDPA’s limitations period is not tolled during interval

between California petitioner’s first and second round of state

petitions).

Although both parities agree that at least 352 days had

expired by the time Lakey filed his federal petition, they dispute whether any additional time had lapsed. Lakey contends

that the remaining time is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling. According to the State, however, an additional 267

days of the limitations period expired between December 22,

2004, when the California Court of Appeal summarily denied

Lakey’s second round of state proceedings, and September

15, 2005, when Lakey filed his federal petition. The State

maintains that tolling is unavailable during this time because

Lakey’s subsequent petition for review to the Supreme Court

of California was ultimately denied as untimely under state

law. Therefore, the dispute in this case focuses on whether

Lakey is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for the 267

days that his final petition was pending before the Supreme

Court of California.

In the federal district court, a magistrate judge recommended that Lakey’s federal habeas petition be dismissed as

time-barred under section 2244(d)’s statute of limitations. The

district court, however, rejected this recommendation, concluding that Lakey’s petition was timely because he “was

entitled to AEDPA tolling for the 267 days his [final state]

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petition was pending” before the Supreme Court of California. The district court then rejected Lakey’s federal claims on

the merits.

In the instant appeal, Lakey challenges the district court’s

denial of habeas relief, contending that he was convicted of

first-degree murder in violation of his due process rights.

Nevertheless, we need not reach the merits of Lakey’s due

process claims if the district court was incorrect when it determined Lakey filed his federal petition within AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Upon de novo examination of the district

court’s tolling decision, see Espinoza-Matthews v. California,

432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), we must determine

whether Lakey is entitled to tolling during the pendency of his

untimely petition for review to the Supreme Court of California. Unless statutory or equitable tolling are available for the

267 days at issue, Lakey’s federal petition will be time-barred

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

II.

[1] We first address Lakey’s request for statutory tolling.

Under the AEDPA, “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

. . . is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). When

“the state court reject[s]” a petition for post-conviction relief

“as untimely, it [is] not ‘properly filed’ ” and does not toll the

limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417

(2005). This is so because state “time limits, no matter their

form, are ‘filing’ conditions” that “go to the very initiation of

a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition.” Allen

v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-6 (2007) (internal quotation omitted)

(untimely state petition does not toll section 2244(d)(1) even

if state time limit contains element of “discretion” or operates

as an “affirmative defense”). Based on these principles, we

have consistently held that statutory tolling “is unavailable

where a state habeas petition is deemed untimely under CaliLAKEY v. HICKMAN 409

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fornia’s timeliness standards.” White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882,

884 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,

1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

[2] Statutory tolling is unavailable for the 267 days at issue

here because Lakey’s final state habeas petition was deemed

untimely under California law. In denying Lakey’s final petition for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court of California cited its decision of In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993),

which “dealt specifically with the bar of ‘untimeliness.’ ”

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000).

Because Lakey’s untimely petition must be treated as improperly filed, or as though it never existed, for purposes of section 2244(d), the pendency of that petition did not toll the

limitations period. See White, 601 F.3d at 884; Bonner, 425

F.3d at 1149. 

[3] We disagree with Lakey’s contention that White and

Bonner are inconsistent with our recent decision in Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ramirez, we held

that a California petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling

during the pendency of a state coram nobis petition that was

later denied on the merits due to the petitioner’s failure to

“demonstrate that he . . . proceeded with due diligence,”

which is a necessary condition for obtaining coram nobis

relief under California law. Id. at 999. According to Lakey, he

is likewise entitled to tolling for the 267 days at issue here

because California’s timeliness rule for state habeas filings

frequently requires consideration of a petitioner’s diligence.

See, e.g., People v. Kim, 202 P.3d 436, 449 (Cal. 2009). Nevertheless, unlike in Ramirez, Lakey’s petition for collateral

review was not denied as without merit or for failure to satisfy

a “ ‘condition for obtaining relief,’ ” but rather because Lakey

failed to comply with California’s timeliness rule for state

habeas petitions. As the Supreme Court explained in Pace,

“[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state law,

‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of” statutory tolling. 544 U.S. at 414 (second alteration in original), quoting

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Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 236 (2002). The Court even

used California’s timeliness rule as an example of a “filing

condition” that must be satisfied for a state application for

post-conviction relief to be “properly filed” within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2). Id. at 413-14, citing Carey, 536

U.S. at 226. 

Thus, statutory tolling is unavailable for the 267 days that

Lakey’s untimely state petition was pending before the

Supreme Court of California. Only equitable tolling can keep

Lakey’s federal petition from being time-barred by 254 days.

III.

[4] We next turn to Lakey’s request for equitable tolling.

We recognize that “a ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 130 S. Ct.

at 2562, quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness . . . and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997 (internal quotations, citations, and

alteration omitted). The high threshold of extraordinary circumstances is necessary “lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). 

[5] In the appeal before us, both parties agree that 352 of

days of the limitations period had expired as of December 22,

2004, when the California Court of Appeal summarily denied

Lakey’s second round of state post-conviction proceedings.

On April 27, 2005, 126 days later, the Supreme Court issued

its decision in Pace, which rendered Lakey’s federal petition

time-barred because his then-pending state habeas application

was deemed “untimely” and “improperly filed.” See Pace,

544 U.S. at 413-14. Prior to Pace, however, our precedent, as

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established in Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 727-28

(9th Cir. 2001), provided “that an untimely . . . State postconviction petition was ‘properly filed’ for purposes of [section]

2244(d) and tolled the statute of limitations while the petition

was pending in the state courts.” Townsend v. Knowles, 562

F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted),

quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.

2008). Based on Townsend and Harris, Lakey asserts that he

is entitled to equitable tolling for the 267 days at issue

because, from the moment Pace was decided, it became “impossible for [him] to file a timely petition.” See Harris, 515

F.3d at 1056.

[6] However, in Townsend and Harris, equitable tolling

was appropriate because the petitioners made a showing that

they actually relied on a correct interpretation of the Dictado

rule in delaying their federal petitions. See Townsend, 562

F.3d at 1206; Harris, 515 F.3d at 1053-54. Lakey does not set

forth any facts suggesting similar reliance on our prior precedent. Instead, the notion that Lakey relied on Dictado is belied

by the fact that he waited an additional 141 days after Pace

was decided to file his federal petition. The petitioners in

Townsend and Harris, on the other hand, filed their federal

petitions either before or immediately after Pace went into

effect. Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1206 (petitioner filed his federal petition before Court’s decision in Pace); Harris, 515

F.3d at 1054 (federal petition filed just fourteen days after

Pace). Lakey’s 141-day delay in bringing his federal petition

indicates that he did not diligently pursue his rights. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562.

[7] Moreover, even if we were to conclude that equitable

tolling was appropriate for the time period that the Dictado

rule was still in effect, the statute of limitations would only be

tolled until the Court issued its decision in Pace. Once Pace

was decided, Lakey had notice that Dictado had been overruled and that tolling would be unavailable if his state petition

was denied as untimely. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-414 & n.3.

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Pace also explicitly advised state prisoners, such as Lakey, to

file a protective federal petition to avoid a possible timeliness

bar. Id. at 416. Despite this warning, Lakey waited nearly five

months before filing his federal claims. Thus, even giving

Lakey the benefit of equitable tolling for the time period prior

to the Court’s decision in Pace, Lakey’s subsequent 141-day

delay rendered his federal petition untimely by at least 128

days.

IV.

[8] For these reasons, we hold that Lakey is not entitled to

statutory and equitable tolling. We therefore dismiss his

appeal from the denial of habeas relief and instruct the district

court to enter an order dismissing Lakey’s federal petition as

time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s statute of limitations.

DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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