Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01014/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

Winiteb ~tates QCourt of ~ppeals 

for tbe jf eberal QCircuit 

LIGHTING BALLAST CONTROL LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA 

CORPORATION, 

Defendant, 

AND 

UNIVERSAL LIGHTING TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

2012-1014 

Appeal from the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Texas in case no. 09-CV-0029, 

Judge Reed O'Connor. 

Decided: January 2, 2013 

JONATHAN T. SUDER, Friedman, Suder & Cooke, of 

Fort Worth, Texas, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him 

on the brief was ROBERT P. GREENSPOON, Flachsbart & 

Greenspoon, LLC, of Chicago, Illinois. 

Case: 12-1014 Document: 51-3 Page: 1 Filed: 01/02/2013
2 LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 

STEVEN J. ROUTH, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. With 

him on the brief were STEN A. JENSON, JOHN R lNGE, T. 

VANN PEARCE, JR., and DIANAM. SZEGO. 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, O'MALLEY and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges. 

REYNA, Circuit Judge 

Lighting Ballast Control LLC ("Lighting Ballast") 

sued Universal Lighting Technologies, Inc. ("ULT") for 

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,436,529 (the '529 Patent). The patented technology relates to control and 

protection circuits for electronic lighting ballasts commonly used in fluorescent lighting. The district court 

construed the term "voltage source means" as a meansplus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. S 112, ,! 6. 

Lighting Ballast Control, LLC u. Philips Elecs. N. Am .. 

Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127409. '~'26-41 (N.D. Tex. 

Dec. 2, 2010). Following a jm·y verdict in favor of Lighting Balla::;t, the district court entered final judgment of 

infringement and validity with respect to independent 

claim 1 and its dependent claims 2 and 5. 

Because we find that the term "voltage source means" 

in the claims of the '529 Patent is a means-plus-function 

limitation under § 112, ,I 6, and because we find in the 

specification no corresponding structure, we hold the 

claims invalid for indefiniteness and reverse the judgment 

of the disb·ict court. 

I. PATENTED TECHNOLOGY 

High levels of electric current are required to start a 

fluorescent lamp. As a result, a fluorescent lamp fixture 

typically includes an electronic ballast to regulate current 

flow. The electronic ballast helps maintain a current level 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 3 

high enough to start the lamp while simultaneously 

preventing current from reaching destructive levels. 

When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a 

filament is broken, current provided by the ballast suddenly ceases to flow though the lamp and dissipates back 

into the ballast circuitry. The dissipating current can 

destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard for 

someone servicing the lamp. 

The '529 Patent discloses an electronic ballast with a 

number of improvements over the prior art, including an 

ability to shield itself from destructive levels of current 

when a lamp is removed or becomes defective. '529 Patent col. 2 ll. 39-4 7. Claim 1 recites, 

An energy conversion device employing an oscillating resonant converter producing oscillations, having DC input terminals producing a 

control signal and adapted to power at least one 

gas discharge lamp having heatable filaments, the 

device comprising: 

voltage source means providing a constant 

or variable magnitude DC voltage between the 

DC input terminals; 

output terminals connected to the filaments of the gas discharge lamp; 

control means capable of receiving control 

signals from the DC input terminals and from 

the resonant converter, and operable to effectively initiate the oscillations, and to effectively stop the oscillations of the converter; 

and direct current blocking means coupled to 

the output terminals and operable to stop flow 

of the control signal from the DC input terminals, whenever at least one gas discharge 

lamp is removed from the output terminals or 

is defective. 

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4 LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTIWN 

Id. col. 11 11. 49-68 (emphasis added). The "control 

mea11s" a11d the "direct Ctlrrent blocl(ing 1neans" correspond generally to circuits designed to prevent current 

from dissipating into the ballast circuitry when a lamp is 

removed or defective. See, e.g., id. col. 7 l. 45 to col. 8 l. 

45. These two elements appear to be central features of 

the invention. See Joint App. 814 7 (applicant describing 

the "particular arrangement of control means and direct 

current blocking means" as a key feature in a Response to 

the PTO). The "voltage source means" provides the device 

with useable DC voltage. See id. 

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

On motion for summary judgment, ULT argued that 

"voltage source means" is a means-plus-function limitation and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 

112, ,! 2, because the specification fails to disclose any 

structure capable of providing DC voltage to the device. 

The district court initially agreed with ULT's assertion 

and found the asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness. 

Lighting Ballast Control, LLC u. Philips Elecs. North Am. 

Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85570. *29-31 (N.D. Tex. 

Aug. 19, 2010). 

On motion for reconsideration, the district court reversed its indefiniteness decision because its initial construction of "voltage source means" "exalted form over 

substance and disregarded the knowledge of a person of 

ordinary skill in the art." Lighting Ballast Control, LLC 

u. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

127409, at *38 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2010). The court cited 

testimony from an expert for Lighting Ballast. Dr. Roberts, and the inventor, Andrew Bobel, both of whom 

testified that one of skill in the art would understand the 

claimed '·voltage source means" to correspond to a rectifier 

(which converts AC to DC) or other structm·e capable of 

supplying useable voltage to the device. The district court 

thus found that means-plus-function claiming did not 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 5 

apply and construed the limitation according to its "ordinary meaning in the art." The court found that, according 

to the limitation's ordinary meaning, the claimed ''voltage 

source means" corresponds to a class of structures: a 

rectifier for common applications in which the claimed 

device is used with an AC power line; and a battery or the 

like for less commonly used applications in which a DC 

power line is used. 

ULT again moved for summary judgment, renewing 

its argument that the term "voltage source means" invokes means-plus-function claiming and is indefinite. 

The district court responded that it had "twice addressed 

this limitation" and declined "to address the same issue a 

third time." Joint App. 62. At the close of evidence, ULT 

moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") under 

FRCP 50(a), but did not continue to dispute the court's 

construction of "voltage source means." The court denied 

ULT's JMOL motion. The district court stated in its jury 

charge that the term "voltage source means" refers to "a 

rectifier." ULT did not object to this aspect of the jury 

charge. After the jury found claim 1 and its dependent 

claims 2 and 5 valid and infringed. ULT renewed its 

JMOL motion under FRCP 50(b) but did not press its 

argument regarding the court's construction of "voltage 

source means." The district court denied ULT's JMOL 

motion and entered final judgment in favor of Lighting 

Ballast. 

ULT appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l). 

Ill. WAIVEH 

We first address whether ULT waived the right to 

dispute the district court's construction of the term "voltage source means." Lighting Ballast argues that ULT 

waived its argument by failing to raise the argument in a 

JMOL motion during trial or in a renewed JMOL motion 

after the jury verdict, and by failing to object to the jury 

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6 LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 

instructions regarding the "voltage source means" limitation. 

To determine whether a party waived a defense, we 

look to law of the applicable regional circuit, which in this 

case is the Fifth Circuit. See Ultra-Precision Mfg. v. Ford 

Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In the 

Fifth Circuit, "[i]t is a well-settled rule of law that an 

appeal from a final judgment raises all antecedent issues 

previously decided." Exxon Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1997). 

"[O]nce a final judgment is entered, all earlier non-final 

orders affecting that judgment may properly be appealed." 

Id. Thus, "a party may obtain review of prejudicial adverse interlocutory rulings upon his appeal from adverse 

final judgment, at which time the interlocutory rulings 

(nonreviewable until then) are regarded as merged into 

the final judgment terminating the action." Dickinson v. 

Auto Center Mfg. Co., 733 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1983). 

This is not a situation where a party has failed to 

raise an issue before the trial court that it seeks to have 

us review on appeal. ULT twice moved for summary 

judgment and argued its proposed construction of "voltage 

source means." In response to ULT's second motion for 

summary judgment, the district court denied the motion 

and ruled that it would not "address the issue a third 

time," at which point the dispute surrounding the "voltage 

source means" became fully litigated. The district court's 

final claim construction and indefiniteness ruling concerned only questions of law. See Biomedino, LLC v. 

Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(noting that an indefiniteness determination, like claim 

construction, is a question of law). Thus, the district 

court's interlocutory ruling regarding the "voltage source 

means" merged into the final judgment terminating the 

action. See Dichinson, 733 F.2d at 1102. 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 7 

Once ULT's position regarding the "voltage source 

means" was made clear to the district court, ULT was not 

required to renew its arguments during jury instructions. 

See 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 

521 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("When the claim 

construction is resolved pre-trial, and the patentee presented the same position in the [pre-trial] proceeding as is 

now pressed, a further objection to the district court's pretrial ruling may indeed have been not only futile but 

unnecessary."). As a result, we find that ULT preserved 

its claim construction and indefiniteness argument with 

respect to "voltage source 1neans" a11d that tl1e isslte is 

properly raised on appeal. 

IV. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMING 

Means-plus-function limitations are governed by 35 

U.S.C. § 112, ,1 6, which allows a patentee to express a 

claimed element as a "means or step for performing a 

specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof." Such an element "shall 

be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 

thereof." § 112, ,1 6. The statute thus establishes a quid 

pro quo whereby a patentee may conveniently claim an 

element using a generic "means" for performing a function, provided the patentee's specification discloses structure capable of performing that function. Atmel Corp. v. 

Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

1999). Whether a claim limitation invokes means-plusfunction claiming under § 112, ,1 6, is a matter of claim 

construction and therefore a question of law that we 

review without deference. See Cybor Corp. v. F'AS Techs., 

Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (Feel. Cir. 1998) (en bane). 

Our first step in analyzing a means-plus-function 

limitation is to determine whether § 112, ,I 6, applies. 

Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 

1361 (Feel. Cir. 2000). We start by considering whether 

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8 LIGHTIJ\G BALLAST v. l'HILll-'S ELECTRON 

the limitation includes the word "means," "as the terms 

'means' and 'means for' have become closely associated 

with means-plus-function claiming." lnG·cntio AG u. 

Thyssenhmpp Eleuator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3cl 1350, 1356 

(Feel. Cir. 2011). The word "means" triggers a presumption that '·the inventor used this terrn advisedly to invoke 

[means-plus-function claiming]." Yorh Prods., Inc. u. 

Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Feel. Cir. 1996) 

(citation omitted). 

The presumption triggered by use of the word 

"means" may be rebutted if the claim itself recites sufficient structure for performing the function. See Cole u. 

Kim.berly-Clarh Corp., 102 F.:3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

In Cole, for example, we construed a claim directed to 

removable tl·aining pants for toddlers. 102 F.3d at 529. 

The claim recited a "perforation means extending from 

the leg band means to the waist band means through the 

outer impermeable layer means for tearing the outer 

imrwnneable layer means £'01· 1·emoving the tn1ining brief 

in case of an accident by the user." ld. at 530. We held 

that the term "perforation means" did not invoke meansplus-function claiming because the cbim clcscrilwd not 

only the structurv for performing the tearing function 

("perforation") but also the structure's location (extending 

from the leg band to the waist band) and extent (extending through the outer impermeable layer). lcl. at 531. 

"An element with such a detailed recitation of its structure. as opposed to its function, cannot meet the requirements of l§ 112, ,I 6] ." !d. 

By contrast. when a term only indicates vvhat the recited means ''does, not what it is structumlly,'' the claim is 

properly construed under § 112, ,[ 6. Laitram Corp. u. 

Rexnorcl, Inc., 939 F.2d 15:3:3, 153(i (Feel. Cir. 1991). For 

example, in Biomeclino, we construed the phrase "control 

means for automatically operating said valving." 490 

F.3cl at 949. We held that the term "control" failed to 

convey sufficient structure to rebut the presumption that 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 9 

means-plus-function claiming applied because "'control' is 

simply an adjective describing 'means': it is not a structure or material capable of performing the identified 

function." Id. at 950. 

Here, because claim 1 of the '529 Patent recites a 

"voltage source nwans," we start from the presumption 

that means-plus-function claiming under § 112, ,I 6, 

applies. The claim goes on to recite the corresponding 

function: "providing a constant or variable magnitude DC 

voltage between the DC input terminals." The term 

"voltage source" implies that voltage is provided, but the 

claim only sets out an indication of what the element 

"does, not what it is structurally." Laitrmn, 939 F.2d at 

1536. The recited function implies no more structure 

than the term "voltage source" itself. While "DC input 

terminals" is a structural term, the input terminals 

receive rather than provide DC voltage. Thus, the claim 

does not contain structural language that is sufficient to 

remove "voltage source means" from the reach of§ 112, ,I 

6. 

In some circumstances, expert testimony may be probative of whether a claim term itself corresponds to 

sufficiently definite structure. In Rembrandt Data Techs., 

LP v. AOL, for example, we relied on expert testimony to 

confirm that the terms "fractional rate encoding" and 

"trellis rate encoding" were commonly used in publications to identify defined algorithms (i.e., structure) known 

in the art. 641 F.3d 1331, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 200 1). 

Because the terms were "self-descriptive," we held that 

the terms "fractional rate encoding means" and "trellis 

encoding means" were not governed by § 112, ,I G, notwithstanding the word "means." Id. at 1340-41. 

Lighting Ballast relies on expert testimony to support 

its argument that ''voltage source means" implies structure and, as a result, means-plus-function claiming does 

not apply. Dr. Roberts, Lighting Ballast's expert, testified 

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10 LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 

that "[t]he 'voltage source' limitation connotes, or suggests, to me, and would connote to anyone skilled in the 

art, the structure of a rectifier ... " because "the only way 

for a [l]ighting [b]allast to convert AC (from a 'power line 

source' such as a wall outlet or other similar AC power 

source in a home or office) into DC (for use at the 'DC 

supply voltage') is through a rectifier." Joint App. 21. Dr. 

Roberts also stated that a battery could be used as the 

"voltage source means" if a DC power source was used. 

Id. at 21-22. 

Lighting Ballast's expert testimony suggests that 

some structure for performing the recited function is 

implied, but it does not cure the absence of structural 

language in the claim itself. Nor does the testimony 

establish that the term "voltage source" was used synonymously with a defined class of structures at the time 

the invention was made, unlike the testimony in Rembrandt. See id. at 1341. In fact, Lighting Ballast's record 

testimony suggests a lack of a defined class of structures. 

While a rectifier and a battery may be examples of structures that commonly perform the recited function, there 

are many other ways to provide DC voltage, including 

"generators" and "solar voltaic cells," as Lighting Ballast's 

expert admitted. Joint App. 1623. 

Lighting Ballast points to case law in which this 

Court declined to apply means-plus-function claiming in 

view of expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence 

showing that certain claimed elements implied sufficient 

structure. In those cases, however, we started from the 

presumption that means-plus-function claiming did not 

apply because the claim limitations at issue did not 

include the word "means." See MIT u. Abacus Software, 

462 F.3cl 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The phrase 'colorant selection mechanism' is presumptively not subjecL to 

112 ,I G because it does not contain the term 'means."'); 

Lighting World, Inc. u. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 

1354, 1359 (Feel. Cir. 2004) ("Because the 'connector 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTRON 11 

assembly' limitation does not contain the term 'means,' we 

begin with the presumption that section 112 ,I 6 does not 

apply to that limitation."); Apex Inc. u. Raritan Computer, 

Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("As an initial 

matter, none of the claim limitations asserted by Raritan 

to be means-plus-function limitations contains the term 

'means,' which, as noted, is central to the analysis."); 

Greenberg u. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 

1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term "detent 

mechanism"; "means" did not appear in the claim.). In 

this case, we start with the presumption that means-plusfunction claiming does apply because the claim limitation 

includes the word "means." ULT failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome that presumption. 

V. INDEFINITENESS 

Once a court determines that a claim limitation invoked means-plus-function claiming under § 112, ~ 6, 

construction of the limitation involves two steps. First, 

the court must identify the claimed function. Applied 

Med. Res. Corp. u. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324. 

1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Second, the court must identify the 

structure described in the specification that performs the 

claimed function. Id. Here, the parties do not dispute the 

district court's construction of the claimed function. The 

sole issue on appeal is whether the specification identifies 

sufficient structure to support the claimed function. We 

review a district court's identification of the structure 

corresponding to a means-plus-function limitation without 

deference. JVW Enters., Inc. u. Interact Accessories, Inc., 

424 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

A patentee may use a generic "means" expression to 

describe a claim element, but "the applicant must indicate 

in the specification what structure constitutes the 

means." Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 948. A patent must 

point out and distinctly claim the invention. in re 

Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 

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12 LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTHON 

bane). Failure to disclose adequate structure to support a 

generic "means" expression amounts to impermissible 

functional claiming. Med. Instrwnentation & Diagnostics 

Corp. u. Elekta AB, 344 F.3cl 1205, 1211 (Feel. Cir. 2003). 

If the patentee fails to disclose adequate structm·c, the 

claim is invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ,I 2. 

See In re Donaldson, 16 F.3cl at 1195. 

We hold that the '529 Patent fails to disclose structure 

capable of "providing a constant or variable magnitude 

DC voltage between the DC input terminals." The specification does not refer to a rectifier or any other structure 

capable of converting AC supply voltage into useable DC 

voltage. Nor does the specification disclose structure 

capable of supplying useable DC voltage directly from a 

DC supply voltago. Rather, the '529 Patent mentions 

drawing power from a power line source and DC supply 

voltages without specifying a capable structure or class of 

structures. See, e.g., '529 Patent col. 1 l. 56, col. 2 l. 8, col. 

3 11. 6-7. 

As already noted, Lighting Ballast relies on expert 

testimony to support its contention that one skilled in the 

art would readily ascertain structures capable of performing the recited function. But ''testimony of one of ordinary 

skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of structure from the specification." Default Proof Credit Curd 

Sys., Inc. u. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.:3d 1291, 1302 

(Fed. Cir. 2005). Lighting Ballast's testimony merely 

demonstrates that several different structures could 

perform the recited function, namely, a rectifier, battery, 

solar celL or generator. The possibility that an ordinarily 

skilled a1tisan could find a structure that would work 

does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of meansplus-function claiming under § 112. Er,s;o Licensing, LLC 

u. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (Feel. Cir. 

2012); see also Blachboard, Inc. u. Desire2LI'arn Inc., 574 

F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("That ordinary skilled 

artisans could carry out tbc recited function in a variety 

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LIGHTING BALLAST v. PHILIPS ELECTFtON 1:3 

of ways is precisely why claims written in 'mean-plusfunction' form must disclose the particular structure that 

is used to perform the recited function."). 

Because we hold that the term "voltage source means" 

in claim 1 of the '529 Patent invokes means-plus-function 

claiming under § 112, ,I 6, and because we find in the 

specification no corresponding structure, we find the 

asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness under § 112, ,I 2. 

We need not address the other issues raised by ULT. The 

judgment below is 

REVERSED 

COSTS 

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

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