Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06061/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOT ERIC PINKERTON,

Petitioner,

v.

M. YARBOROUGH, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 03-6061 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER

JUDGMENT

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Court Docs. 3, 15, 19.) 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 18, 1999, Petitioner was convicted in the Kern County Superior Court of

assault with a deadly weapon (Ca. Pen. Code § 245 (a)(1), and battery resulting in the infliction

of great bodily injury (Ca. Pen. Code § 243(d). (CT 161.) The jury further found that Petitioner

personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses (Ca. Pen. Code §

12022(b)(1)), and that he had suffered three prior serious felony convictions (Ca. Pen. Code §§

667(a)-(I), and 1170.12), and three prior prison terms (Ca. Pen. Code § 667.5(b)). (CT 161.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-three years to life in prison. 

///

///

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its August 6, 2001, opinion. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit A, attached to Answer.) Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

2

 Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On August 6, 2001, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit A, attached to Answer.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied

on October 10, 2001. (Respondent’s Exhibit B, attached to Answer.)

On October 10, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The petition was denied on July 9, 2003. (Respondent’s Exhibit C, attached to

Answer.)

On July 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kern

County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Exhibit D, attached to Answer.) The petition was denied

on August 13, 2002. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 7, 2003. 

By order of November 3, 2003, Petitioner filed an amended petition on December 5, 2003. 

Respondent filed an answer on July 8, 2004, and Petitioner filed a traverse on August 11,

2004.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On September 8, 1997, a concert was held at Stramler Park in Bakersfield,

which featured “Social Distortion,” an alternative rock group, and several other

bands. The concert started at approximately 3:00 p.m. and ended around 8:00

p.m. Shawn Cope worked at the refreshment stand and sold tickets to the

audience for beer and soft drinks. The refreshment stand continued to serve

beverages after the concert ended. Michelle Richardson and Shawn McCormick

attended the concert, and drank two beers each.

After the concert ended, several fights broke out among the crowd. One of

Richardson’s friends, Cheryl, found Richardson and McCormick, and said that

she thought she was going to get into a fight. Richardson left with Cheryl, and

they approached three or four women who appeared to be skinheads. Richardson

told the women, “[C]ome on, we’ve all had a good time here, we’ve been

drinking, just let it go.” Richardson testified that one person in the skinhead

group was named Eva, and had purplish-red hair and tattoos. Eva agreed they did

not want to fight, and the group started to break up. However, Lori Morelock

arrived at the scene and insulted Eva. Morelock, who was Cheryl’s friend, walked

over to Eva, called her a bitch, and hit her in the face.

After Morelock insulted Eva, a fight broke out among the women. 

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Richardson attempted to get away, but another woman approached and was about

to throw sand in her face. Richardson punched this woman in the face, and Cheryl

was fighting with the other women.

Shawn McCormick described the fight as a “huge brawl,” and the “type of

thing you see in a bar on TV.” McCormick saw several women yelling and hitting

each other, and Richardson and Cheryl were in the middle of the fight. Shawn

Cope thought there were 15 to 20 people involved in the fight, including

Richardson. Cope watched as some of Richardson’s friends tried to pull her

away.

Michelle Richardson finally emerged from the crowd and found Shawn

McCormick, and said they should get out of there. They decided to leave the park

and walk downtown. McCormick believed the fight had ended, although there

were still people yelling and shouting. 

As the fight ended, a man and a woman approached McCormick and

Richardson. McCormick described a man as six feet tall, with long brown hair

that was pulled back in a ponytail. He had a goatee, some tattoos, a pierced lower

lip, and wore a long, black T-shirt and knee-length jean shorts. McCormick did

not know the woman, but heard someone call her “Eva.” McCormick recognized

the woman as being involved in the fight with Richardson and Cheryl.

Stephanie Gamblin was also in the area and saw a man walking near the

scene of the fight. The man held his arm down by his leg, and held a knife which

was pointed upwards. The man was looking around to see if anyone was looking

at him. Gamblin described the man as about six feet one inch tall, with long hair

in a ponytail. His eyes looked as if he had been drinking or used a lot of drugs. 

He wore longer shorts and a dark T-shirt. Gamblin was unable to identify anyone

as the man who was carrying the knife.

Shawn McCormick testified that the woman pointed to Richardson, and

the man asked the woman, “[I]s that the bitch?” The woman nodded and replied,

“[Y]es, that’s her.” Shawn McCormick told them that everything was okay and

the fight was over. Shawn McCormick turned toward Richardson and saw the

man put his arm around her.

Shawn Cope also saw the man place his arm around Richardson. Cope

thought the man was trying to console her, but he did not recognize the man as

one of their friends. The man had long hair and wore shorts and a dark T-shirt. 

He was thin, with facial hair and a tattoo, and was about six feet two inches tall. 

Cope suddenly realized the man was holding a metal object, and watched as the

man stabbed Richardson in the back.

As Richardson was speaking with McCormick, she felt someone bump

her, as if she was kicked in the lower back. Richardson turned and looked at a

man who was standing behind her, and she told McCormick the man had just

kicked her. Richardson testified the man had long hair in a ponytail, and wore a

dark T-shirt and long jean shorts. The man looked at Richardson, and put

something in his pocket as he walked away. Richardson realized she had a sharp

pain in her back, and felt something going down her back and leg. She put her

hand behind her back, and it was covered with blood. Richardson realized she

was bleeding heavily and she fell down.

The man and woman walked away after the stabbing. McCormick

screamed for help and tried to grab the man, but he ran away and she was unable

to stop him. Cope also chased the man but he was unable to catch the suspect.

At approximately 10:00 p.m., Bakersfield Police Officer Kelly Caldwell

responded to Stramler Park on the dispatch about a large fight at the concert. She

found Michelle Richardson lying on the grass with her back and clothing saturated

with blood. The paramedics treated Richardson at the scene, and she was

transported to the hospital. Richardson suffered a puncture wound along the right

side of her spine, in the lower back area. The stab wound penetrated the muscle

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 According to the probation report, [Petitioner] was arrested in September 1999, nearly two years after the

assault. 

4

of her lower back, but did not rupture the bowel area.

Officer Caldwell interviewed Shawn Cope and Shawn McCormick at the

scene. McCormick described the suspect as six feet tall, with long brown hair in a

ponytail, a goatee, a pierced lower lip, and wearing a black T-shirt. McCormick

also described Eva, the woman with red hair who was involved in the fight with

Richardson. Shawn Cope described the suspect as six feet two, thin build, dark

hair in a long ponytail, and wearing jean shorts and a dark T-shirt.

A large group of Michelle Richardson’s friends went to the hospital and

waited for her to be treated in the emergency room. Shawn McCormick had

spoken to the organizers of the concert, and learned the suspects name might be

Scot Pinkerton. When Officer Caldwell arrived at the hospital, McCormick said

that she had additional information and Scot Pinkerton might be the suspect. 

Officer Caldwell spoke with the other individuals at the hospital, and one person

said that Scot Pinkerton might work at Naked Al’s Tattoo Parlor.

Officer Caldwell requested the sheriff’s department to prepare a six-person

photographic lineup, which included a picture of [Petitioner]. Officer Caldwell

separately showed the photographic lineup to Shawn McCormick and Michelle

Richardson. Both McCormick and Richardson immediately identified [Petitioner]

as the person who stabbed Richardson. Shawn McCormick testified it was ‘[n]ot

hard” to identify [Petitioner], and she was positive that he was the man who

stabbed Richardson. McCormick did not speak with Richardson between the time

of the stabbing and her observation of the photographic lineup.

Officer Caldwell also showed the photographic lineup to Shawn Cope. 

Cope selected [Petitioner’s] photograph and identified him as the suspect who

stabbed Richardson.

Officer Caldwell was unable to find [Petitioner] either at his residence or

at Naked Al’s, and no one was able to inform Officer Caldwell about

[Petitioner’s] whereabouts. [Petitioner] was subsequently located and arrested for

the assault on Michelle Richardson.2 

At trial, Shawn McCormick identified [Petitioner] as the man with the

ponytail who stabbed Michelle. Michelle Richardson also identified [Petitioner]

as the man who stabbed her. Richardson testified she got a good look at the man

when she turned around and they looked at each other. Shawn Cope confirmed

the accuracy of his earlier identification from the photographic lineup, but he was

unable to identify [Petitioner] at trial as the suspect.

[Petitioner] did not testify at trial, but relied on an alibi defense. Anthony

Gardea worked at the park on the night of the concert, and testified that he saw

[Petitioner] trying to break up a fight between two girls around 8:00 p.m. A

security guard started to beat [Petitioner], and Gardea intervened and escorted

[Petitioner] from the park. Gardea testified [Petitioner] drove away in his truck. 

Gardea testified [Petitioner] wore a white T-shirt and shorts, and his hair was

shoulder-length but not in a ponytail.

Patricia Parada testified that she arrived at Naked Al’s Tattoo Parlor at

approximately 8:45 p.m. that night, and [Petitioner] was already there. [Petitioner]

spent two hours placing a tattoo on her ankle. Parada left the store around 10:45

p.m., and [Petitioner] was still there. [Petitioner] was wearing shorts and a white

T-shirt.

James Kulstad was [Petitioner’s] apprentice at the tattoo parlor, and

worked at the store on the evening of the concert. Kulstad testified [Petitioner]

worked on Parada’s tattoo that evening, and Eva arrived at the store around 10:15

p.m. Eva was covered in blood, and said she had been in a fight. [Petitioner] and

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Eva left the store around 10:45 p.m.

Both Parada and Kulstad testified that [Petitioner] did not return to the

tattoo parlor after that night. Kulstad finally saw him about six months later. 

Jeremy Suniga also testified that he never saw [Petitioner] at the tattoo parlor after

the night of the concert.

Eva Joezos was [Petitioner’s] girlfriend and the mother of his child. She

was the woman with red hair who was involved in the fight. Eva testified that she

was at the concert with [Petitioner] around 6:00 p.m. Eva was jumped by an

unknown girl, and [Petitioner] broke up the fight. The security guards escorted

[Petitioner] from the park.

Eva testified that she was involved in another fight after the concert. A

woman asked if Eva had jumped her friend, and whether she was [Petitioner’s]

girlfriend. Another woman said they should not fight because they had a good

time at the concert. Eva asked one of the women whether she was too old to be

fighting, and the woman hit her in the face. Eva testified the fight involved eight

people and lasted two or three minutes. Eva suffered cuts to the head, a bloody

nose, and bruises on her body.

After the fight, Eva went to the tattoo parlor and found [Petitioner] there

around 10:15 p.m. She told [Petitioner] about the fight. [Petitioner] used his Tshirt to wipe the blood from Eva’s face, and they left the store around 10:45 p.m.

Eva testified that she moved to Oregon shortly after the concert, and

[Petitioner] joined her there. They stayed for several months.

[Petitioner] was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and battery,

and received a third strike sentence. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit A, attached to Answer, at 3-8.)

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Juror Misconduct

Petitioner contends that Juror 3 committed misconduct because she lied regarding her

relationship with Petitioner’s aunt, Mary Durrett. (Amd. Pet. at 5.) 

"In all criminal prosecutions," state and federal, "the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .

trial . . . by an impartial jury," U.S. Const., Amends. 6 and 14; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145 (1968). In reviewing a claim of juror misconduct, "[t]he test is whether or not the

misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial." United

States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835. Although it is

generally preferred that a trial court hold an evidentiary hearing when allegations of juror

misconduct arise, it is not always required, particularly when the court knows the exact scope and

nature of the misconduct. See United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir.1983); United

States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.1977); see also United States v. McVeigh, 153

F.3d 1166, 1187 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1148 (1999). The Court is mindful of

the fact that “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might

theoretically affect their vote." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983), quoting Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 

In order to obtain a new trial on this claim, Petitioner “must first demonstrate that a juror

failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct

response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for

concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can

truly be said to affect the fairness of the trial.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,

464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 

As stated by the Kern County Superior Court, assuming without deciding that juror

misconduct even occurred in this case, it was not of the kind that necessarily showed the juror in

question was biased. Here, Petitioner complains that Juror 3 claimed not to know Durrett well,

when in fact the juror regularly socialized with Durrett at prayer meetings, brunches and other

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

activities. In support of this contention, Petitioner submits notes from a post-trial interview with

Juror 3, as well as a declaration from Durrett. In Durrett’s declaration she indicates that she met

Juror 3 when Juror 3 joined Durrett’s Sunday School class at Valley Baptist Church in 1994. 

Durrett states that a small group would go to lunch together after church, and Juror 3 started

going to lunch with them as well. Durrett further indicated that many of the class participants

would request prayer for different family members and friends. Durrett declares that Juror 3

requested prayer for her estranged husband who had become obsessed with pornography. Durrett

further indicates that she several times requested prayer for petitioner. (Amd. Pet. at 7,

Declaration of Mary Durrett.)

Durrett further declared that she discussed her nephew “Scot” with Juror 3, and Durrett

informed Juror 3 that he had been in trouble several times. Id. Durrett stated:

I believe that Jenny Towers (Juror 3) had at least some idea of who Scot was and

had information about his current charges based upon my prayer requests and

detailed discussions at lunch on several occasions after church at the time she was

seated on the jury. 

Id. Durrett provides her opinion by stating:

I believe that Juror No. 4 [sic], was so disillusioned with her husband over his

obsessions with pornography and the subsequent ending of her lengthy marriage

that she was down on anyone that she perceived as having done anything wrong,

and that she specifically wanted to sit on this jury for that reason.

Id. 

Nothing in the record suggests any prejudice to Petitioner by the maintenance of Juror #3

on the jury, notwithstanding her relationship with Petitioner’s aunt. Juror 3 voluntarily, on her

own initiative, disclosed that she knew Petitioner’s aunt and regularly attended Sunday School

class with her. She assured the judge that this association would not influence her decision in

Petitioner’s case and there is no evidence that she did not, in fact, function as a fair and impartial

juror. Further, there is no evidence that Juror 3 deliberately concealed or attempted to deceive

the court as to her association with Petitioner’s aunt. As Respondent submits, the record

demonstrates that Juror 3 was forthright about the fact that she had seen Durrett on a regular

basis. Juror 3's disclosure therefore did not create an impression that she was only remotely

familiar with Durrett, but rather that she was quite familiar with Durrett and had often regularly

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

seen Durrett at church. The trial judge promptly inquired, after disclosure of the association,

whether Juror 3 could still be impartial, and Juror 3 replied that it would not influence her. (RT

251.) 

Petitioner’s claim based on Durrett’s contention in her declaration that Juror 3 was so

disillusioned with her husband that she specifically wanted to sit on Petitioner’ s jury so she

could convict Petitioner is pure speculation and unsupported by the record. Conclusory

allegations do not warrant habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir.1995)

(holding that conclusory allegations made with no reference to the record or any document do not

merit habeas relief). 

In sum, Juror 3 provided responsive and direct answers to the questions posed to her, she

was more than forthcoming with the information, there is no evidence that she intentionally or

unintentionally concealed the information, and there is no evidence that she harbored bias or

impermissible prejudice during the deliberation process. The state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into whether

one of the jurors was improperly in possession of outside information concerning the facts of the

case. (Amd. Pet. at 5.)

In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the court

must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064

(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that

counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that

he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not

the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994).

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9th Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000). 

In the midst of Petitioner’s trial, Juror 3 informed the court that she recognized a woman

that was sitting in the audience next to Petitioner’s mother. The following proceedings then

ensued:

THE COURT: The record will reflect that all of the jurors have stepped

out, except juror number 3.

And Juror Number 3, I think you indicated to the bailiff, who indicated to

me, that, while you folks were outside during my discussion with counsel about a

question and an objection, you indicated to the bailiff that you believe you

recognize the lady in the audience, who is seated next to a lady that has been sort

of identified as [Petitioner’s] mother, am I correct?

THE JUROR: Correct.

THE COURT: And where is it that you recognize that lady from?

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

THE JUROR: From church.

THE COURT: Okay.

And how often do you get together in any sort of gathering, where you and

she are both present?

THE JUROR: At a Sunday School class, which would be fairly regularly

every Sunday morning, until recently.

I moved to a different Sunday School class.

THE COURT: Okay.

Does it make you feel terribly uncomfortable, knowing that this person,

who attends the same church, and has been in the same Sunday School class, up

until recently, is a person whose [sic] acquainted with the [Petitioner’s] mother?

THE JUROR: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

You are not going to allow that to influence your decision in this case, are

you?

THE JUROR: No, sir.

THE COURT: You are a person of integrity?

THE JUROR: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That’s why you shared that with us in the first place.

THE JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: Even though I forgot to tell you that you were supposed to

do that, so, am I correct?

THE JUROR: Right.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Lukehart, any questions of Juror Number 3 in this regard?

MR. LUKEHART: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Woodruff?

MR. WOODRUFF: None, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Juror Number 3, could I ask you to step outside for just a minute, while I

talk with you about counsel, I’m sorry, talk with counsel about you? I said that

wrong.

THE JUROR: Okay.

(Juror leaves the courtroom.) 

THE COURT: The record will reflect that she has stepped out.

And, counsel, that’s exactly the way it did go down, and that includes the

fact that, ordinarily, I do ask these people to let me know, and I did not in this

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this Court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the Kern County Superior Court, the last state court

to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115

L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower

court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.

7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's

rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

12

case.

Mr. Lukehart, is this of any concern for you?

MR. LUKEHART: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Woodruff, for you?

MR. WOODRUFF: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let’s bring the entire jury back in, please, unless

Mr. Lukehart, you have an 1118.1, that you wish to just place on the record?

(RT 250-253.)

Juror 3 informed the court that she recognized the woman sitting next to Petitioner’s

mother in the audience. The juror advised the court that she had regularly attended Sunday

School every Sunday with the woman until just recently, when the juror had changed to a

different Sunday School class. The juror indicated that she would not be uncomfortable serving

on the jury knowing that this individual, who was Petitioner’s aunt, attended her same church and

had regularly been in the same Sunday School class. Juror 3 assured the court that the

association would not influence her decision in the case. Based on the trial judge’s immediately

questioning and the juror’s remarks, it was reasonable for counsel to not further question this

juror. As there was no indication that this juror would allow the association to Petitioner’s aunt

influence her decision in the case and she would and could remain impartial notwithstanding this

relationship. (RT 250-252.) Although Petitioner submits a declaration from his aunt, Ms. Mary

Durrett who declares that the relationship was more intimate than described by the juror, even

assuming this to be true, Petitioner has not established any resulting prejudice by this alleged

association between the two, and counsel therefore was not ineffective for failing to further

question the juror. 

As stated by the Kern County Superior Court3 in rejecting Petitioner’s claim raised in the

state habeas corpus petition:

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Petitioner’s contention fails. He does not show he was prejudiced by his

trial counsel’s allegedly deficient representation. As explained above, assuming

without deciding that juror misconduct even occurred in this case, it was not of

the kind that necessarily showed the juror in question was biased. Consequently,

a claim that Petitioner’s attorney did not investigate the juror to discover her true

relationship with Petitioner’s aunt is insufficient. Something more is needed. 

Some showing, setting forth facts with particularity, is required to explain how or

why #3's explanation of her relationship with Petitioner’ aunt was indicative of

bias on her part. Petitioner makes no such showing. Also, Petitioner’s failure to

show he was biased by his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient misrepresentation

and his failure to show that if juror #3 committed misconduct he was not

prejudiced by it also decides his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

If the claims appellate counsel failed to raise are shown to have no merit, then

counsel’s representation could not have been deficient for not raising them.

(Respondent’s Exhibit D, Opinion, at 3.) 

The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

habeas corpus must be denied. 

 ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06061-DLB Document 25 Filed 06/13/05 Page 13 of 13