Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02854/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02854-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD STEVEN DAVIS,

Inmate Booking No. 13711805 Civil

No. 

13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHO ARE

IMMUNE AND FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

WILLIAM J. McGRATH; Superior Court

Judge; STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

Defendants.

Edward Steven Davis (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the George Bailey Detention

Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 6.)

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 1 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 6] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Watch Commander to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this

case, collect and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

/ / /

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 2 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

First, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on rulings made by San

Diego Superior Court Judge WilliamJ. McGrath, this Defendant is absolutely immune. “Judges

and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts

performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Therefore, as a Superior Court Judge for the State of California, this Defendant has absolute

immunity from civil proceedings relating to these actions, which were performed within their

judicial discretion. 

Second, to the extent that he is challenging the rulings made by Superior Court Judge

McGrath in his criminal proceedings, he cannot state a viable § 1983 claim. The RookerFeldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in

substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court,

based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal

rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512

U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 868 (1999); see District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 416 (1923). 

Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States Supreme

Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The

Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint raises federal constitutional

issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d

609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the bar applies if the challenge to the state court

decision is brought as a § 1983 civil rights action alleging violations of due process and equal

protection. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God

v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims presented to the

district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision in a judicial

proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal claimis inextricablyintertwined with

the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 3 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25

(1987)(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 891-92.

Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders made by

a San Diego Superior Court Judge, his claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court

proceedings, and are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Plaintiff’s claims for money damages also appear to challenge the validity of his criminal

conviction. It is not clear whether Plaintiff has been convicted of a crime or he is currently

awaiting trial on criminal charges. If Plaintiff has been convicted of a crime, in order to recover

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, Plaintiff must show that his criminal

conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994);

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully

exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512

U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of

a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages challenging the

legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable. Id. at 487;

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidityof anyoutstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,

the action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 4 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds

in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal conviction.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Accordingly, because Plaintiff seeks damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional criminal conviction and because he has not alleged that his conviction has

already been invalidated, a claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-

90.

If Plaintiff is currently in the process of facing criminal charges and requests that this

Court intervene in the state court’s decisions, the Court declines to do so. A federal court cannot

interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive relief absent a showing

of the state’s bad faith or harassment, or a showing that the statute challenged is “flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46,

53-54 (1971). 

Younger abstention is appropriate if four criteria are met: (1) state judicial proceedings

are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state

proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal questions; and (4) the federal court

action would “enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere

with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber

of Commerce PAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, based on

Plaintiff’s allegations that he may have ongoing criminal proceedings in state court and requests

this Court’s intervention, abstention pursuant to the Younger doctrine is warranted. 

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for seeking monetary

damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 6) is

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 5 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

GRANTED. 

2. The Watch Commander for the George Bailey Detention Facility, or his designee,

shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this

case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent

(20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Watch

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, San Diego, California 92158.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary damages against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

5. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed

in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, this action

shall remain dismissed without further Order by the Court.

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a Court approved § 1983

civil rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 21, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

I:\Everyone\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\13cv2854-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 6 13cv2854 LAB (WVG)

Case 3:13-cv-02854-LAB-WVG Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 6 of 6