Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01913/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01913-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patrice Jerome, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Midway Holding, Inc. et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 03-1913-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc.

79), to which Plaintiff has filed a Response. Defendants also have filed a Motion for Leave

to File a Reply in Further Support of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 87).

Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Reply is fully briefed. The Court has considered all

relevant documents issues the following Order. 

BACKGROUND

Defendants move the Court to reconsider its Summary Judgment Order specifically

concerning two aspects of its ruling on Plaintiff’s claims for sexual harassment and sex

discrimination. First, Defendants argue that the Court did not address Defendants’

affirmative defense under Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Second, Defendants argue that

it appears that the Court did not consider the fact that Plaintiff’s former supervisor Jack

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

Colson, who made the decision to terminate Plaintiff, did not personally make, nor was he

aware of, disparaging sexist remarks made to or about Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants

argue, no discriminatory animus can be attributed to Mr. Colson. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) shall be filed no

later than ten days after entry of the judgment. A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted (1) to

correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) the moving party

presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) as necessary to prevent

manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening change in controlling law. Turner v.

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). "A Rule

59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when

they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342

F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

Initially, the Court considers Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Further

Support of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. In the interest of full consideration of the

issues, the Court hereby grants Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Reply. 

I. FARAGHER / ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF’S SEXUAL

HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants argue that the Court did not address Defendants’ affirmative defense under

Faragher and Ellerth. Faragher, 529 U.S. at 807, provides for a complete affirmative defense

to harassment claims involving alleged harassment not involving a tangible employment

action against an employee where: “(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent

and correct promptly any harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably

failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the

employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Defendants argue that they can not be liable for the

disparaging sexual harassment Plaintiff experienced while under their employ because they

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

can only be liable for alleged harassment if Plaintiff complained of harassment and

Defendants failed to take remedial action. Id., at 789. In Faragher the Supreme Court found

that the employer was vicariously liable for its employees harassing behavior because of the

employer’s failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent harassing behavior. Id. at 778.

Though Defendants correctly cite the two prongs of a sexual harassment affirmative

defense as provided by the Supreme Court in Faragher, Defendants neglect to provide the

Faragher holding in its entirety. Faragher further states that “[w]hen no tangible employment

action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or

damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c).”

Id. at 807. “A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different

responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. . . . A tangible

employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62.

Here, Defendants assert that no tangible employment action occurred. Though

Plaintiff was terminated from her position at Midway, she was terminated by Mr. Colson,

who did not personally make, nor was he aware of, disparaging sexist remarks made to or

about Plaintiff. Thus, Defendants may benefit from the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense,

if they can prove both by a preponderance of the evidence that “(a) [Defendants] exercised

reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior, and (b) [Plaintiff]

employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise” by a preponderance of the evidence.

Id. at 807. 

Defendants must meet both prongs of the test to establish the Faragher/Ellerth

affirmative defense. Though Plaintiff may not have taken full advantage of the policies and

procedures Defendants assert were in place to address workplace harassment, Defendants

have the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they exercised reasonable

care to prevent and promptly correct harassing behavior. Defendants assert that they had

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 By Defendants’ own account, Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim is based on

disputed allegations of inappropriate sexist name-calling.

- 4 -

“written policies and procedures to prevent and promptly remedy any alleged harassment”

as well as a “1-800 Employee Hotline,” and that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take

advantage of these policies and procedures. Despite Defendants’ assertions of policies and

procedures to prevent workplace harassment, there exists tremendous evidence of

disparaging comments in the workplace. Thus, in light of the evidence of allegedly harassing

comments and pointedly vulgar name-calling in the workplace, the Court is not convinced

by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants policies, procedures, and “1-800

Employee Hotline" were put into everyday practice with reasonable care to prevent and

correct harassing behavior nor that the policies and procedures were established in good

faith. Thus, as the Supreme Court found in Faragher, the Court finds that Defendants have

not met their burden that they exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any

harassing behavior. The Court, again, finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists with

regard to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment cause of action.1

 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion

for Partial Reconsideration based on a Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is denied. 

II. RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF’S SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION CAUSE

OF ACTION

Next, Defendants argue that it appears that the Court did not consider the fact

Plaintiff’s former supervisor Jack Colson, who made the decision to terminate Plaintiff, did

not personally make, nor was he aware of, disparaging sexist remarks made about Plaintiff.

therefore, Defendants argue, no discriminatory animus can be attributed to Mr. Colson. 

To establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination Plaintiff must show the

following: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she

was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) that Plaintiff's employer treated

Plaintiff differently than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

protected class as Plaintiff. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Ninth

Circuit "has explained that under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 'the requisite degree

of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is

minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.'" Id.

(quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production

shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

the plaintiff's employment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendants do so,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful

discrimination by "'either directly persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Texas Dept. of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).

However, the plaintiff's evidence must be both specific and substantial to overcome the

legitimate reasons put forth by the defendant. E.g., Bergene v. Salt River Project

Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.2001); Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221;

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996).

If the plaintiff demonstrates pretext, then the burden-shifting framework disappears,

and the only remaining issue is "'discrimination vel non.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). While the burden of production may shift, the "ultimate burden

of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dept. of Cmty Affairs, 450 U.S. at

253.

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Defendants assert that the Plaintiff’s

sexual discrimination cause of action is based on two inappropriate sexist name-calling

remarks by her former co-workers, Mike Moss and Patrick Beaman. The Court notes that

this statement is not entirely true because it appears from the facts submitted that Mr.

Beaman was not merely a co-worker but, rather, he was Plaintiff’s supervisor at the time he

made the sexist comment toward Plaintiff. At any rate, the Court finds that Plaintiff presented

a prima facie case that belongs to a protected class, that she was qualified for her position,

that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and that Plaintiff's employer treated

Plaintiff differently than similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same

protected class as Plaintiff. 

Next the burden of production shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff's employment. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 802. Defendants provide evidence to argue that Plaintiff was terminated due to

poor job performance. 

Finally, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants’ articulated reason is a pretext for

unlawful discrimination. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that

Defendants’ reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment was a pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Defendants cite Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.

2005), DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 879 F.2d 459, 467-68 (9th Cir.

1989), and Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2005), to argue

that Plaintiff’s Motion for sexual discrimination should be dismissed due to lack of evidence

that the person who decided to terminate Plaintiff – Mr. Colson – knew of or was influenced

by discriminatory remarks made to and about Plaintiff. 

However, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Beaman remained Plaintiff’s supervisor even

after he made a disparaging sexist comment about Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Beaman

directed Plaintiff’s day to day activities. So, even if Mr. Colson made the final decision to

terminate Plaintiff. A plaintiff can prove pretext either "(1) indirectly, by showing that the

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

employer's proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence' because it is internally

inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful

discrimination more likely motivated the employer." Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 1998). If Mr. Beaman continued on as Plaintiff’s supervisor until the

time Plaintiff was terminated, Mr. Colson’s impressions of Plaintiff’s alleged poor job

performance could have been influenced by Mr. Beaman. Moreover, Plaintiff had no history

of being reprimanded by Midway before she complained about Mr. Beaman’s inappropriate

treatment. Thus, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to

Plaintiff’s sexual discrimination cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for

Partial Reconsideration of this claim is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for leave to File a Reply in Further Support

of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 87) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration

(Doc. 79) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter for Status Hearing on September 10,

2007 at 3:45 p.m.

 DATED this 3rd day of August, 2007.

Case 2:03-cv-01913-MHM Document 91 Filed 08/07/07 Page 7 of 7