Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02569/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ARISTO GALLARDO, III,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE NEOTTI,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv02569 LAB (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Robert Aristo Gallardo, III, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

November 3, 2011, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1]. 

Gallardo claims that his sentence of "three potential life

sentences" violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution because it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity

of his offenses. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.)1

On January 18, 2012, Respondent George Neotti, warden of RJ

Donovan State Prison ("Donovan"), filed an "Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

1

 Because Gallardo's Petition and Neotti's Answer are not

consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to them using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system. 

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Support" [ECF No. 5] along with a Notice of Lodgment [ECF No. 6]. 

Respondent asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief because the state courts' denials of his cruel and unusual

punishment claim were neither unreasonable determinations of the

facts, nor contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, clearly

established federal law. (Answer 13-14, ECF No. 5.) Neotti

argues that Gallardo's sentence does not shock the conscience and

is not out of proportion to the gravity of the violent crimes he

committed. (Id. at 16.) Petitioner did not file a traverse.

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent's Answer, and

the lodgments. For the reasons stated below, the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] should be DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Prior Strikes

On February 15, 2002, Gallardo pleaded guilty to four counts

of first-degree robbery. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 58-

60, 80, Feb. 15, 2002.) Petitioner admitted that he "took the

personal property of the victims by force and while armed with a

handgun." (Id. at 60.) He was sentenced to six years in prison. 

(Id. at 80.) 

B. Most Recent Convictions

Gallardo's most recent convictions stem from a series of

domestic disputes occurring in June 2008 involving Angelica E.,

the mother of Petitioner's then-infant daughter. (Lodgment No.

14, People v. Gallardo, No. D058810, slip op. at 5-6 (Cal. Ct.

App. Oct. 6, 2011).) Gallardo had been in an intimate

relationship with Angelica for approximately eight months when, in

October 2007, his parole was revoked and he returned to prison. 

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(Id. at 5.) Angelica gave birth to the couple's child in February

of 2008. (Id.) Petitioner was released from prison in May of

that year; at that time, Angelica and the infant were living with

another man. (Id.) Angelica carried on an intimate relationship

with both men once Gallardo was released from prison. (Id.)

On June 8, 2008, Petitioner and Angelica got into a physical

altercation with each other at the beach. (Id.) He complained

about her relationship with the other man and accused her of not

properly caring for Gallardo's child. (Id.) Angelica responded

by slapping Petitioner in the face. (Id.) "Gallardo then slapped

her twice in the face fairly hard with an open hand, causing her

to see stars and suffer a cut and bruised lip." (Id.)

The next day, Petitioner and Angelica had another violent

exchange at the home of one of Gallardo's former girlfriends,

where he was staying at the time. (Id. at 5-6.) During the

argument, Petitioner grabbed Angelica by the hair, threw her to

the ground, slapped her head, and kicked her while she was on the

ground. (Id.) "As Angelica stood up, Gallardo grabbed a yellow

rope and wrapped it around her neck from behind, squeezing it

tight until she fell backward to the floor on top of him and

passed out." (Id. at 6.) When Angelica awoke, Petitioner choked

her again until she lost consciousness. (Id.) When she regained

consciousness and attempted to leave the home, Gallardo physically

prevented her from escaping. (Id.)

Petitioner later permitted Angelica to leave for work. (Id.) 

When she arrived at work, Angelica informed her supervisor that

Gallardo tried to strangle her. (Id.) The police were called and

Petitioner was arrested. (Id.) While in custody, Gallardo

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escaped from a police officer's patrol vehicle, but was found

several days later hiding out at a friend's home. (Id.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2009, in the Superior Court of California, County

of San Diego, a jury convicted Gallardo of (1) assault with a

deadly weapon or force likely to cause great bodily injury (count

two); (2) two counts of corporal injury to the mother of his child

(counts four and six); (3) false imprisonment (count five); and

(4) escape from arrest (count seven). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's

Tr. vol. 1, 226, 228-31, June 5, 2009.) The jury found that

Petitioner used a deadly weapon (a rope) in the commission of the

assault and the corporal injury to the mother of his child. (Id.

at 226, 228.) The trial court also determined that Gallardo had

previously been convicted of four serious or violent felonies

within the meaning of California Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and

1170.12, one serious felony prior within the meaning of California

Penal Code § 667(a)(1), and one felony for which he served a

separate prison term within the meaning of California Penal Code §

667.5(b). (Lodgment No. 3, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 10, 1119-21, June 5,

2009.)

The trial court granted Petitioner's request to strike all

prior convictions as to one of the corporal injury counts (count

six). (Id. vol. 11, 1144-45, July 8, 2009.) The court declined,

however, to strike any prior convictions as to the other counts

(counts two, four, and five). (Id. at 1143-44.) Gallardo was

sentenced to twenty-five years to life plus seven years in state

prison. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 141, July 8, 2009.) 

This sentence was comprised of (1) twenty-five years to life for

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one of the corporal injury convictions (count four), pursuant to

California's three-strikes law; (2) one year for the weapon use

enhancement as to that count; (3) one year for the other corporal

injury conviction; and (4) five years for the prior serious felony

enhancement. (Id. at 140, 142; Lodgment No. 3, Rep.'s Tr. vol.

11, 1145-46.) Sentencing was stayed as to the assault conviction,

the false imprisonment conviction, and the prior prison term

enhancement. (Id.)2

Gallardo appealed the convictions on November 19, 2009,

arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it

refused to strike all but one of his prior strikes; and (2)

Petitioner's three indeterminate sentences of twenty-five years to

life constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the

"sentences" are disproportionate to his offenses. (Lodgment No.

4, Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, 22, People v. Gallardo, No.

D055505 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2010).) On appeal, the People

requested a limited remand for the trial court to select and

impose a "full strength sentence" for count six and to correct

various sentencing errors in the judgment and abstract of

judgment. (Lodgment No. 5, Respondent's Brief at 36, People v.

Gallardo, No. D055505 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2010).)

On August 23, 2010, Division One of the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, held that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in declining to strike all but one of

Gallardo's prior convictions. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

2

 There is a discrepancy between the Clerk's Transcript and

the Reporter's Transcript regarding staying the prior prison term

enhancement, which was addressed on remand. (See Lodgment No. 11,

Rep.'s Tr. vol. 1, 12-14, Dec. 13, 2010.) 

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Gallardo, No. D055505, slip op. at 9, 12 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23,

2010).) The court also determined that Petitioner's sentence was

not cruel or unusual. (Id. at 12-13, 18.) The court of appeal 

concluded, however, that the trial court imposed an unauthorized

sentence when it failed to select and impose a full strength

sentence as to count six. (Id. at 18-21.) The court noted that

additional errors were made as to the judgment and abstract of

judgment. (Id. 21-23.) The case was remanded to the superior

court for resentencing and to correct the errors. (Id. at 23.)

Gallardo petitioned the California Supreme Court for review

on September 30, 2010. (Lodgment No. 8, Petition for Review,

People v. Gallardo, No. SD2009702703 (Cal. Nov. 10, 2010).) On

November 10, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition without opinion. (Lodgment No. 9, People v. Gallardo,

No. S186853, order at 1 (Cal. Nov. 10, 2010).)

Pursuant to the remand, a new sentencing hearing was

conducted on December 13, 2010. (Lodgment No. 11, Rep.'s Tr. vol.

1, 1.) Again, the court struck Petitioner's prior strikes as to

count six. (Id. at 12.) The court also denied Gallardo's renewed

request to strike the prior strikes as to the other counts. (Id.)

Petitioner was resentenced to twenty-five years to life plus nine

years, with the possibility of parole. (See Lodgment No. 10,

Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 1-3, Dec. 13, 2010.) This sentence consisted

of (1) twenty-five years to life for one of the corporal injury

counts (count four); (2) a one-year weapon use enhancement as to

that count; (3) three years for the other corporal injury count

(count six); and (4) five years for a prior conviction

enhancement. (Id. at 1, 3.) Sentencing was stayed as to the

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assault and false imprisonment convictions (counts two and five). 

(Id. at 1.) Gallardo's sentence consisted of an indeterminate

term of thirty-one years to life plus a "full strength consecutive

determinate term of three years." (See Lodgment No. 14, People v.

Gallardo, No. D058810, slip op. at 3.)

On April 8, 2011, Gallardo appealed and raised the same two

claims contained in his prior appeal; on October 6, 2011, Division

One of California's Fourth Appellate District affirmed the

judgment. (Lodgment No. 12, Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, 7,

People v. Gallardo, No. D058810 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2011);

Lodgment No. 14, People v. Gallardo, No. D058810, slip op. at 1,

16.) Petitioner filed another petition for review in the

California Supreme Court; it was denied without opinion on

December 21, 2011. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review, People

v. Gallardo, No. SD2011700636 (Cal. Dec. 21, 2011); Lodgment No.

16, People v. Gallardo, No. S197900, order at 1 (Cal. Dec. 21,

2011).)

Gallardo then submitted a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

to this Court on November 3, 2011 [ECF No. 1]. Neotti filed an

Answer on January 18, 2012 [ECF No. 5]. Petitioner did not file a

traverse. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347

(1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because Gallardo's Petition was filed on November 3, 2011, AEDPA

applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained "in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. 

Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

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(9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.

1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to level of a constitutional

violation).

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court

to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law." Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other

words, a federal court is not required to review the state court

decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed

directly to the reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty" in § 2254(d)(1) is "the reference to 'Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

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"explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore, 108 F.3d at

264. "[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id. (citing

Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin

v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Gallardo's Sentence Is Grossly Disproportionate

The sole issue presented in the Petition is whether

Gallardo's sentence of "three potential life sentences" violates 

the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See Pet.

6, ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that his sentence

is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offenses. (Id.) 

Gallardo contends that he has no serious criminal record. 

(Id.) He asserts that he was previously convicted of one serious

felony, robbery, which involved four separate victims. (Id.) 

According to Petitioner, these convictions were treated as a

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"single incident" and no one was injured. (Id.) Gallardo states

that none of his prior convictions are for the same offenses that

are the subject of this proceeding. (Id.)

Petitioner represents that his sentence is more severe than

what "most people" receive for second-degree murder. (Id.) He

also maintains that typically the longest sentence imposed on

others for the same offense is four years. (Id.) Yet, Petitioner

urges that his punishment is five times longer than it would be if

he had no record. (Id.)

Nonetheless, Respondent argues that the state courts'

rejections of Gallardo's cruel and unusual punishment claim were

not based on unreasonable determinations of the facts, nor were

they contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Answer 13-14, 17, ECF No. 5.) In

light of the relevant Supreme Court case law, Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S. 263 (1980), and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003),

Neotti contends that Gallardo's sentence is not disproportionate

to the violent crimes he committed against Angelica. (Id. at 16.) 

Further, Respondent notes that Petitioner's sentence includes the

possibility of parole. (Id. at 15.)

The Eighth Amendment mandates that "[e]xcessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. "The

final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also

sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed." 

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). The Eighth Amendment

contains a "narrow" proportionality principle which forbids only

"extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the

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crime"; it does not require "strict proportionality between crime

and sentence." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct.

2011, 2021 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001

(1991)).

"[O]ne governing legal principle emerges as 'clearly

established' under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality

principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years." 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. The "'precise contours' of [the gross

disproportionality principle] 'are unclear[]'" and are "applicable

only in the 'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case." Id. at 72–73

(quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in

part and concurring in judgment)). Because of this, "[t]he gross

disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation

for only the extraordinary case." Id. at 77.

The Ninth Circuit has given courts some guidance as to the

kind of "exceedingly rare" Eighth Amendment claim that warrants

federal habeas relief. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000) ("[Ninth Circuit] cases may be persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state

court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court

law, and also may help us determine what law is 'clearly

established.'"). In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has

overturned three-strikes sentences where either the triggering

offense or the defendant's prior criminal history were not

sufficiently serious.

In Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004), the

court concluded that a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a

nonviolent shoplifting of a $199.00 VCR where the defendant's

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prior convictions were two nonviolent second degree robberies,

violated the Eighth Amendment. More recently, the Ninth Circuit

struck down a sentence of twenty-eight years to life imposed on a

defendant who had failed to update his sex offender registration

within five days of his birthday. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d

875, 876, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Ninth Circuit has upheld three-strikes sentences,

however, in cases where either the triggering offense or the

defendant's prior record involves violence or the threat of

violence. In Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the

court concluded that a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a

conviction for a felony petty theft did not violate the Eighth

Amendment because Rios's prior robbery "strikes" involved the

threat of violence; he "[had] a lengthy criminal history,

beginning in 1982, and he ha[d] been incarcerated several times." 

Id. at 1086. In Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2006),

the court upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life for

felony possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of drug

paraphenalia. Although the triggering felony was nonviolent,

Taylor's prior convictions included second-degree burglary,

robbery with a firearm, and voluntary manslaughter with the use of

a weapon. Id. at 1100.

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the

judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The last state court to address the merits of Petitioner's Eighth

Amendment claim was the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment

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No. 14, People v. Gallardo, No. D058810, slip op. at 10-15.) This

Court reviews that decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 806 (1991).

The appellate court rejected Gallardo's argument that his

sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Lodgment No.

14, People v. Gallardo, No. D058810, slip op. at 10, 15.) The

court first addressed Petitioner's contention that his sentence

was five times longer than the four-year sentence that a firsttime offender would receive and more than most people would

receive for second-degree murder. (Id. at 10.) Contrary to

Gallardo's characterization of his sentence as "three

indeterminate 25-year-to-life terms[,]" the court held that

Petitioner was only subject to serving one sentence of twenty-five

years to life for count four because the trial court stayed his

sentences for counts two and five pursuant to California Penal

Code § 654. (Id.) The court also stated that Gallardo failed to

appreciate that he had qualifying priors that triggered the

mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life under the threestrikes law. (Id.) "Thus it is as a recidivist felon that

Gallardo is being punished and not as a theoretical first time

offender for whom he bases most of his arguments." (Id. at 10-

11.) 

The court held that in addition to his most recent

convictions, Petitioner was previously convicted of armed robbery. 

(Id. at 13.) Armed robbery, the court noted, is serious and has a

"tremendous potential for injury or death." (Id.) The court also

stated that at the time of his most recent sentencing, Gallardo

"had already suffered four prior serious felony convictions,

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served a six-year prison term, plus additional prison time for

revocation of parole." (Id. at 14.) Further, Petitioner

committed his most recent offenses while on parole, evidencing

that he "has no intention of abiding by the laws of the State of

California." (Id.) In light of Gallardo's recidivist behavior,

the appellate court determined that his sentence was not so

disproportionate to his crimes as to violate the Constitution. 

(Id. at 15.)

When inquiring whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate

under a recidivist sentencing statute, courts look to whether an

"extreme sentence is justified by the gravity of [an individual's]

most recent offense and criminal history." Ramirez, 365 F.3d at

768. A court must consider the "factual specifics" of the

triggering offense and the individual's priors to determine

whether the conduct involved violence or was particularly serious. 

See Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Gallardo's felony convictions include (1) four

convictions for robbery "by force and while armed with a handgun";

(2) one conviction for striking the mother of his child in the

face; and (3) two convictions for choking the mother of his child

with a rope to the point of unconsciousness. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 58-60; Lodgment No. 14, People v. Gallardo,

No. D058810, slip op. at 5-6.) The exceptionally violent nature

of these acts weighs strongly against any finding of

disproportionality. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93 ("[N]onviolent

crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the

threat of violence."). Petitioner's offenses are serious in

nature and will likely have long-lasting effects on his victims. 

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The dangerousness of Gallardo's conduct is not ameliorated by the

fact that "no one was injured" when he robbed four people at

gunpoint. (See Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Physical injury to a victim

is not required for an offense to be considered serious for

purposes of the gross disproportionality principle. See Solem,

463 U.S. at 292-93 (noting that acts involving threats of violence

are serious).

Moreover, Petitioner's most recent convictions bear a

rational relationship to his propensity to recidivate. See Solem,

463 U.S. at 296 (noting that states are justified in punishing a

recidivist more severely than a first-time offender); see

Gonzalez, 551 F.3d at 886-87 (noting that a petitioner's

propensity to recidivate is a factor to consider under the gross

disproportionality test). Gallardo's priors were for similarly

violent conduct, evidencing his propensity to recidivate when it

comes to acts of violence against others. See Ewing 538 U.S. at

31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (holding that a

recidivist offender's sentence of twenty-five years to life for

the theft of three golf clubs did not warrant habeas relief);

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285 (concluding that a recidivist offender's

sentence of life in prison for stealing $120.75 by false pretenses

did not warrant habeas relief). Moreover, as the California Court

of Appeal noted, Petitioner was on parole when he committed the

offenses against Angelica. (Lodgment No. 14, People v. Gallardo,

No. D058810, slip op. at 15.) California's interest in deterring

and incapacitating recidivist offenders justifies the severity of

Gallardo's sentence. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29-30; Gonzalez, 551

F.3d at 886. 

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Next, Gallardo argues that his prior armed robbery

convictions were "punished as a single incident [and] punished in

one case[.]" (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) On this basis, he appears to

contend that the state court's conclusion that he has a serious

criminal record is an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2). The gross disproportionality

principle is the only clearly established principle from the

Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that applies to

Petitioner's claims. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. Whether Gallardo's

prior convictions amount to a serious criminal record that can be

used to enhance his sentence under California's Three Strikes Law

is a matter of state law. See Saunders v. Almager, No. 09–0708

L(WMc), 2011 WL 2181320, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011). 

"Finally, 'for purposes of a Three Strikes sentence, the fact that

[the defendant's] prior convictions were adjudicated in a single

proceeding does not mean that they constitute one prior

conviction; two strikes can arise from one case.'" Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d at

758 n.3). Accordingly, on this basis, the state court's

resolution of Petitioner's claim is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court or an unreasonable determination of the facts based

on the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Additionally, while Gallardo's sentence of thirty-four years

to life is a severe penalty, the harshness is mitigated by the

availability of parole. See Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 893

(9th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing the punishment imposed in Solem

from Rummel on the basis that Rummel's punishment included the

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possibility of parole, making it less severe than that imposed in

Solem). Moreover, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, he does not

face "three potential life sentences[.]" (See Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) 

As the California Court of Appeal noted in its opinion, Gallardo's

sentences for counts two and five were stayed pursuant to

California Penal Code § 654 (prohibition against multiple

punishment). (See Lodgment No. 14, People v. Gallardo, No.

D058810, slip op. at 10.)

Given Petitioner's criminal history, coupled with the fact

that his current offenses are not "technical" violations of the

law, the Court cannot conclude that this is an "extremely rare"

case which gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality. 

See Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 770; see also Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1101-

02; Rios, 390 F.3d at 1086. Accordingly, the Court need not

compare Petitioner's sentence with sentences in this and other

jurisdictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05. The state

court's rejection of Gallardo's Eighth Amendment claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412-13 (2000). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on his Eighth Amendment claim. It is recommended that

Gallardo's Petition be DENIED.

B. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Answer, Neotti argues that an evidentiary hearing is

not warranted because the state courts decided Petitioner's claims

on the merits. (Answer 17, ECF No. 5.) Yet, Gallardo does not

request an evidentiary hearing in his Petition. (See generally

Pet. 1, 6, ECF No. 1.) In any event, even if it had been

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requested, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); see also

Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1126 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009).

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Larry A. Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation

and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 1, 2013, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

February 15, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2013 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All Parties of Record

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