Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00163/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00163-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMADO VERGARA,

Booking #18177136,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ESCONDIDO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

SAN MARCOS SHERIFFS; JESICA 

ATKINS; MARK WILLIAMS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00163-LAB-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 4] 

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Amado Vergara (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”) 

in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 24, 2019. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims the 

Escondido Police Department, San Marcos Sheriffs, and two private citizens violated his 

Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights during what appear to be March, April, and May 2018

San Diego County Superior Court criminal proceedings involving the alleged violation of 

an “expired” restraining order and false charges of child abduction. (See Compl., ECF No. 

1 at 1-4.)

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff did not pay the fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). On February 6, 2019, the Court denied his IFP Motion 

because he failed to attach copies of his trust account statements as required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2), but granted leave to correct that deficiency. (See ECF No. 3.)

On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff responded by filing a renewed Motion to Proceed 

IFP, this time attaching the trust account documentation missing from his prior attempt 

(ECF No. 4).

II. Renewed Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his renewed IFP Motion, Plaintiff has now submitted a prison 

certificate certified by a San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Detentions Lieutenant, 

together with a copy of his Inmate Trust Account Activity from August 19, 2018 through 

February 19, 2019. See ECF No. 4 at 4, 6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiff had a total of $20 credited 

to his account over that time, and that he had only $.06 on the books at the time of filing. 

See ECF No. 4 at 6.

Based on this accounting, the Court assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which 

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to 

him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 

4), declines to exact any initial filing fee because his trust account statements show he has

“no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and instead directs the Watch Commander 

at the SDCJ, or his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fee required by 

28 U.S.C. § 1914 and to forward all payments to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the 

installment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

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III. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must review and sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint, and any complaint filed 

by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages 

from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to 

ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

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12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”). However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the 

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

While it is not altogether clear, Plaintiff appears to claim he was subject to a 

“probationary CPO” [civil protective order] that “expired when [his] probation terminated 

[on] 6/24/17,” after he completed a “court-ordered DV [domestic violence] class & paid 

[his] fines.” (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) 

On March 25, 2018, and again on April 12, 2018, Plaintiff claims Jesica Atkins, the 

mother of his children, lied to both the Escondido Police Department and the state court in 

an effort to “ruin [sic] [his] life” and his relationship with his kids by reporting he had 

violated a restraining order. (Id. at 2, 3.) Plaintiff further claims the Escondido Police 

“didn’t check to see if [the] CPO was current or expired,” and “gave doctored papers to 

Jesica to help her get a new CPO.” (Id. at 2.)

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff alleges Mark Williams, who is alleged only to be 

“retired” and to live in Valley Center, also lied to San Marcos Sheriffs and told them

Plaintiff had kidnapped his son. (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff contends he “had every right to be 

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with [his] son,” and “was walking to [his] sister’s house,” when the “cops” stopped, 

harassed, cornered him, searched him illegally by claiming he had a “4th waiver,” took his 

son, and gave him to Williams who “directly put[] him in danger” by allowing him to drive 

away without a car seat. (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff claims he was then charged with “willful 

harm to a child” and taken into custody. (Id.)

He seeks $20 million in general and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief 

preventing “future harassment,” “full custody of all [his] children and no child support for 

Jesica Atkins.” (Id. at 7.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 

F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Escondido Police Department and San Marcos Sheriff’s

First, to the extent Plaintiff names both the “Escondido Police Department” and “San 

Marcos Sheriffs” as Defendants, he fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be 

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; 

therefore, local law enforcement departments (like the Escondido Police Department or the 

San Marcos Sheriffs) are not proper parties. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. 

Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not 

an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation 

omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 

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1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under 

color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”).

“Persons” under § 1983 are state and local officials sued in their individual 

capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, and/or the 

local governmental entity itself. Vance, 928 F. Supp. at 995-96. The Escondido Police 

Department and the San Marcos Sheriffs are departments of the City of Escondido, and /or 

the County of San Diego—but neither is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See e.g., 

United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[M]unicipal police 

departments and bureaus are generally not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 

section 1983.”); Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 2013 WL 5946112 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“Although 

municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell [v. Dep’t of 

Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as 

the police departments, are not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of 

§ 1983.”); Nelson v. Cty. of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

(dismissing Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from section 1983 action “with prejudice” 

because it “is a subdivision of a local government entity,” i.e., Sacramento County); 

Gonzales v. City of Clovis, 2013 WL 394522 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that the 

Clovis Police Department is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983); Wade v. Fresno 

Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 2353525 at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (finding the Fresno Police 

Department to not be a “person” under section 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue 

any § 1983 civil rights claims against either the “Escondido Police” or the “San Marcos 

Sheriffs.” See Boone v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 2:16-CV-1293-GEB-KJN-PS, 

2017 WL 117966, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (“Because the Solano County Sheriff’s 

Department is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of Section 1983, plaintiffs cannot maintain 

their claims against it under that statute as a matter of law.”).

/ / /

/ / /

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E. Private Parties

Second, to the extent the only other named Defendants (Atkins and Williams) are 

sued as private persons who allegedly “lied” to the police and sheriff’s officials regarding 

either the violation of a civil protective order, or based on claims that Plaintiff had 

“kidnapped” his own son, see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-4, his Complaint also fails to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising 

power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 

clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 

(1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Plaintiff claims 

Defendants are private citizens who provided information to law enforcement regarding 

ongoing domestic child custody disputes and Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in pending 

state criminal matters. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) “It is beyond question that, when a 

private party gives testimony in open court in a criminal trial, that act is not performed 

“under color of law.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1983).

A private actor may be liable under Section 1983 if the individual commits 

constitutional violations as part of a conspiracy or joint action with a state actor. See 

DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Private persons, jointly 

engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for 

purposes of § 1983 actions.”) (citation omitted); Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093

(9th Cir. 2003) (private individual acts “under color of state law” where “the state has so 

far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private entity that it must 

be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity”); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 

423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (private individual found liable under § 1983 based on conspiracy 

with state actor—i.e., entry into “an agreement or meeting of the minds” with the police to 

violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But

Plaintiff has the burden to establish state action, Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 

N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011), and his Complaint contains no allegations to

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plausibly suggest Atkins or Williams cooperated in any way with state actors, much less 

engaged in a conspiracy with them to violate his constitutional rights. DeGrassi, 207 F.3d 

at 647.

For this additional reason, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state 

a claim upon which § 1983 can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Watison, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Woldmskel v. Keg N Bottle Liquor Store, No. 15-CV2469 WQH (PCL), 2016 WL 245850, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (dismissing § 1983 

claims sua sponte against private actors not alleged to have acted under color of state law

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any plausible claim for relief 

against any named Defendant, and that therefore, the entire Complaint is subject to sua 

sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

Because he is proceeding pro se, the Court having now provided him with “notice 

of the deficiencies in his complaint,” also grants Plaintiff an opportunity to fix them, if he 

can.2 See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

2 The Court notes Plaintiff alleges he was “taken into custody,” that he filed suit while still detained at 

SDCJ, and he seeks damages based on what may still be ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 2, 4. To the extent criminal proceedings were initiated against Plaintiff but have since been 

resolved adverse to him, his civil action may also be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-

84 (1994), because success on the merits of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claims could necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the criminal judgment rendered against him. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 

F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (claim of false arrest is Heck-barred where a showing that there was no 

probable cause to arrest would necessary imply that the conviction was invalid); see also Kyles v. Baker, 

72 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same). Therefore, in further amending his Complaint, 

Plaintiff should also include facts relating to any criminal judgment that may have been rendered against 

him as the result of his April 13, 2018 arrest. In particular, Plaintiff should state whether such a judgment 

occurred and, if so, whether it has since been set aside or otherwise invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 

(“In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff 

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

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IV. Order

The Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a) (ECF No. 4);

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of the SDCJ, or his designee, to collect

from Plaintiff’s inmate trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s 

income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST 

BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California, 92101; and

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

/ / /

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”).

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If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2019

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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