Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_12-cv-00330/USCOURTS-almd-3_12-cv-00330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CLYDE H. FRIEND, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:12-CV-330-TMH

) [WO]

)

TINA PELFREY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Clyde H. Friend ["Friend"], an individual confined

at the Russell County Jail, challengesthe treatment provided to him for an ear infection and

the nominal fees charged inmates for medical treatment. Friend seeks declaratory relief

and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

The defendants filed a specialreport and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

Friend's claims for relief. In these documents, the defendants adamantly deny Friend's

allegation of deliberate indifference to his ear condition. Specifically, the defendants

maintain they provided Friend all necessary and appropriate treatment, including referral

to a free-world specialist. The defendants further maintain the fees charged for medical

services did not violate Friend's constitutional rights. In addition, the defendants assert the

complaint is due to be dismissed because Friend failed to properly exhaust an

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administrative remedy available to him at the Russell County Jail with respect to the claims

presented in this cause of action. The defendants base their exhaustion defense on the

plaintiff's failure to appeal the grievances filed regarding the claims presently pending

before this court.

Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems

it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

July 18, 2012 - Doc. No. 15; Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11 Cir. 2008)

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(Although an exhaustion defense "is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary

judgment[,]" the defense is appropriate for summary judgment when the evidence

demonstrates administrative remedies "are absolutely time barred or otherwise clearly

infeasible."). Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Upon consideration of this motion and the evidentiarymaterialsfiled in support

thereof, the court concludes the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to

the exhaustion defense is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

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1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law."). The partymoving forsummary judgment "always bearsthe initial responsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact." Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact regarding the plaintiff's failure to exhaust this

administrative remedies. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was "revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 1

deciding summary-judgment motions." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

"[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),

changing only one word -- genuine 'issue' becomes genuine 'dispute.' 'Dispute' better reflects the focus of a

summary-judgment determination." Id. "'Shall' is also restored to express the direction to grant summary

judgment." Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and,

therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.") A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants' properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Friend is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which

would be admissible at trial demonstrating the proper exhaustion of previously available

administrative remedies. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule

56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party

relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be

granted." Id. at 249-250. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party’s

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position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could

reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir.

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1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279

(11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's th th

"conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are

insufficient to withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11

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Cir. 1995)(grant ofsummaryjudgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond

"his own conclusory allegations" challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v.

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) ("mere verification of party's own conclusory

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allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment...."). Hence, when a plaintiff

fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden

of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v.

Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the

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prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the

case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) ("Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine [dispute]

for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthat there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

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judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is appropriate

where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no

genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (To establish a

genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a

reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not

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mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil

case. In this case, Friend fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact

regarding his failure to exhaust administrative remedies so as to preclude summary

judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

Friend challenges the adequacy of medical treatment provided to him for an ear

infection and the marginal fees assessed for such treatment. Although Friend submitted

grievances regarding the treatment provided for his ears, he did not appeal the responses

received to the grievances. The defendants therefore maintain this case is subject to

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dismissal because Friend failed to properly exhaust the administrative remedy provided at

the Russell County Jail prior to filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available administrative

remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983 complaint.

Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctionalfacility untilsuch administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted." "Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate

must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative

remedies." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whethertheyallege excessive force orsome other

wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

(11 Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006). Moreover, "the

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PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93,

126 S.Ct. at 2387 (emphasis added). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an

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agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in

federal court] because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the courts of its proceedings.... Construing § 1997e(a) to require

proper exhaustion ... fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary]

interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative

remedies are no longer available] would turn that provision into a largely useless

appendage." 548 U.S. at 90-91, 93, 126 S.Ct. at 2386-2387. The Court reasoned that

because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary an inmate cannot

"satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement ... by filing an untimely

or otherwise procedurallydefective administrative grievance or appeal[,]" or byeffectively

bypassing the administrative processsimply by waiting until the grievance procedure is no

longer available to her. 548 U.S. at 83-84, 126 S.Ct. at 2382; Johnson v. Meadows, 418

F.3d 1152, 1157 (11 Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns

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the administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement of the PLRA).

The record in this case establishes that the Russell County Jail provides a grievance

procedure for inmate complaints. Defendants' Exhibit E - Doc. No. 14-9 at 2. The relevant

portion of the grievance procedure allows an inmate to file a grievance with respect to any

action of staff members regarding an alleged violation of his civil rights. Id. If the inmate

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is dissatisfied with the initial response to his grievance, the inmate "may appeal to the

Administrator of Corrections. [The] appeal must be filed within 72 hours [of the inmate

receiving the response], excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays...." Defendants'

Exhibit F - Doc. No. 14-10 at 2.

On July 18, 2012, the court entered an order allowing Friend the opportunity to

respond to the arguments made by the defendants in their special report. Doc. No. 15. As

of the present date, Friend has filed no response to this order. The court therefore

concludes the claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal. Ngo, 548

U.S. at 87-94, 126 S.Ct. at 2384-2388.

It is undisputed Friend failed to properlyexhaust an administrative remedy available

to him which is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. Specifically,

Friend did not appeal the grievances regarding those claims presented in this cause of

action as permitted by the grievance procedure in effect at the Russell County Jail and the

time for utilizing the grievance procedure expired prior to the filing of this case. Thus, the

administrative remedy provided by the defendants for the instant claim is no longer

available to Friend. Under these circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.1; Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157; Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710

(5 Cir. 1995) ("Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade

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the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally filing

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an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative remedies and gaining access to a

federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies."); Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85,

88 (2 Cir. 2004)(footnotes omitted)(inmate's "federal lawsuits... properlydismissed with

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prejudice" where previously available administrative remedies had become unavailable).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED to the extent the

defendants seek dismissal of this case due to the plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust an

administrative remedy previously available to him at the Russell County Jail.

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for the plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust an administrative remedy

provided to him during his confinement in the Russell County Jail as this remedy is no

longer available to him with respect to the claim presented in the this cause of action.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 10, 2012, the parties may file objections

to the Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled mustspecifically identify the findingsin the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

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appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981,

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en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 27th day of August, 2012.

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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