Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02782/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANT HEWITT BALDERREE,

Petitioner,

v.

F. CHAVEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 11-2782-LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

I

INTRODUCTION

Grant Hewitt Balderree (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent F. Chavez

(“Respondent”) filed an Answer to the Petition (“Answer”). Petitioner filed a Traverse.

The Court, having reviewed the Petition, Answer, and

Traverse, hereby finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief

requested and therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition be

DENIED.

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II

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This statement of facts is substantially taken from the

unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, filed as

Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.

On June 12, 2007, police sought to arrest Petitioner based on

an arrest warrant for robbery from Washington State. Police believed

Petitioner was inside a residence on Princeton Avenue in La Mesa,

California and began the process of securing a search warrant for

that residence. While the police were waiting for the warrant,

Officers Sweeney, Runge, and Harman conducted undercover surveillance of the residence. Sweeney was sitting in a plain, unmarked

silver sports utility vehicle (“Silver SUV”) while Runge and Harman

were in a plain, unmarked brown sports utility vehicle (“Brown

SUV”).

The officers observed a woman leave the residence and drive

away in a Chrysler Sebring. Approximately five to ten minutes later,

the vehicle returned. As it approached the Silver SUV, the woman

driving it slowed down and stared into the Silver SUV. The woman

parked and re-entered the residence. She may also have made a

cellular telephone call. Sweeney assumed that he had been seen and

identified as a police officer. Therefore, he departed.

Runge and Harman continued their surveillance until a man, who

was not Petitioner, left the residence to walk a dog. The man passed

the Brown SUV and said good morning to Runge and Harman through the

open vehicle window. Runge and Harman were concerned that the man

was actually checking to see if they were police officers watching

the residence. Runge and Harman notified Sweeney that their position

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had also been compromised. Sweeney radioed for marked police

vehicles to set up a perimeter to contain the area until the search

warrant could be obtained. 

About 20 minutes later, Harman and Runge saw Petitioner leave

the residence and drive down Princeton Avenue in the Sebring. Runge

and Harman, in the brown SUV, began following Petitioner. Sweeney

also returned to Princeton Avenue, traveling in the opposite

direction. When Petitioner was about 40 or 50 feet from Sweeney, he

turned his vehicle around and started heading back towards Harman

and Runge. Runge, driving the Brown SUV, positioned his vehicle at

an angle in an attempt to block Petitioner from driving past him.

Sweeney, driving the Silver SUV that was now behind Petitioner,

activated the police lights and sounded the siren.

Then, Petitioner approached the gap between the front of the

Brown SUV and the side of an unoccupied parked truck and accelerated

through it. In doing so, Petitioner struck both vehicles and pushed

the Brown SUV out of the way.1/

Petitioner then drove away from the scene, eluding search

vehicles. Petitioner was apprehended later that evening.

1/ The prosecution argued, and the jury found, that Petitioner struck the Brown

SUV in a successful attempt to push it out of the way. The defense argued that

Petitioner struck the Brown SUV inadvertently while trying to escape past it.

Petitioner argues that his counsel presented this defense against his wishes and

without investigating Petitioner’s theory. Petitioner’s theory was that the Brown

SUV rammed him as he escaped past it. The record reveals that Petitioner raised

this theory and counsel’s failure to present it as early as his trial statement

in mitigation. (Resp. Lodg. No. 1 at 117).

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that counsel had not presented the ramming

defense but nevertheless found that “Balderree’s version of events was presented

to the jury...” (Resp. Lodg. No. 13 at 2). This is inconsistent.

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III

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty of (1)

assault with a deadly weapon against a police officer, (2) resisting

a police officer, and (3) committing vandalism resulting in damage

exceeding $400.00. (Resp. Lodg. No. 1 at 156, 400-01). On August 12,

2008, the court denied Petitioner’s Motion For A New Trial and a

Motion to Strike. Petitioner was sentenced to 35 years to life in

prison.2/ (Resp. Lodg. No. 2 at 418-19, 421).

On September 5, 2008, Petitioner appealed his convictions to

the California Court of Appeal, arguing that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that he had committed felony assault on a

police officer and that admission of prior high-speed chases was

reversible error. (Resp. Lodg. No. 4). On August 11, 2009, the Court

of Appeal affirmed his convictions. (Resp. Lodg. No. 7). On

September 14, 2009, Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme

Court for Review. (Resp. Lodg. No. 8). On October 22, 2009, the

California Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review. (Resp.

Lodg. No. 9).

On December 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Resp. Lodg. No. 10).

Petitioner raised two claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel

and (2) a Brady violation.3/ (Resp. Lodg. No. 10 at 11, 20). On

2/ On Count 1, Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life under the three

strikes law plus two consecutive terms of five years each for serious priors

alleged as enhancements. On Count 2, Petitioner was sentenced to the same term but

imposition was stayed, pursuant to California Penal Code 654.

3/ On collateral appeal to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner added the

two claims from his direct appeal. These claims were not included in Petitioner’s

San Diego Superior Court or California Court of Appeal collateral appeals.

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January 14, 2011, the petition was denied by the San Diego Superior

Court. (Resp. Lodg. No. 11). On March 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. (Resp. Lodg. No. 12). On April 26, 2011, the Petition was

denied by the California Court of Appeal. (Resp. Lodg. No. 13). On

May 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Supreme Court. (Resp. Lodg. No. 14). On November

11, 2011, the Petition was denied by the California Supreme Court.

(Resp. Lodg. No. 15).

On November 28, 2011, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus now before the Court. See Petition.

IV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a).

In habeas corpus cases, federal courts are bound by the state’s

interpretation of its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.62, 68

(1991) (federal courts may not reexamine state court determinations

on questions of state law); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th

Cir. 1990) (federal courts “have no authority to review a state’s

application of its own laws.”) Therefore, errors of state law only

concern a federal habeas court when those errors rise to the level

of a constitutional violation. See Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), the Court may only grant a habeas petition when the

underlying state court decision:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to , or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-75 (2003). A state court

decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case,”

or, “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not

apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 76.

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is 

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contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir.2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

75–76); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008).

However, where a state court’s decision is “unaccompanied by an

explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny

relief.” Harrington v. Richter,––– U.S. at –––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784

(2011).

V

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s Petition raises four grounds for relief: (1)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”),(2) Brady violation when

prosecutors withheld video evidence, (3) Improper admission of prior

high speed vehicular flight from police, and (4) Insufficient

evidence to prove felony assault upon police.

A. GROUND ONE: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

At trial, Petitioner was represented by Daniel Cohen, a

private attorney who was appointed by the trial court after the

Public Defender’s Office declared a conflict of interest and

withdrew from representation of Petitioner. At trial, Cohen

presented a defense based on the theory that Petitioner had

accidentally struck the Brown SUV while trying to escape. Petitioner

contends that Cohen failed to investigate Petitioner’s claim that

the Brown SUV had actually rammed him while he was driving past it.

Petitioner raises several arguments in support of his claim

that Cohen was ineffective as counsel: (1) Cohen refused to discuss

trial strategy or tactics with Petitioner and further refused to 

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accept telephone calls from, or meet with, Petitioner, (2) Cohen

failed to investigate witnesses identified by Petitioner, (3) Cohen

failed to conduct any reasonable pretrial investigation, (4) Cohen

improperly allowed the prosecution to withhold exculpatory evidence,

and (5) Cohen introduced evidence that “basically admitted guilt”

and was “very damaging” to Petitioner’s case. No deposition,

declaration, or other statement by Cohen is present in the record.

Under Strickland v. Washington, two elements are essential to

a successful IAC claim: deficient performance of counsel and

resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). To show deficient performance, the “person challenging a

conviction must show that ‘counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.’” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. 770 at

787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To show resulting

prejudice, the person must show “a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. The reviewing standards set forth by Strickland and

AEDPA are both “highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Consequently, when

both are in operation, review is doubly so. Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).

1. Refusal to Discuss Trial Tactics or Meet With Petitioner

The California Court of Appeal summarized this portion of

Petitioner’s IAC claim but did not directly address it. (Resp. Lodg.

No. 13 at 1). The Court therefore looks through to the Superior

Court’s opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Here, the Superior

Court’s opinion cites a California case for the proposition that 

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“the number of times [a defendant] sees his attorney ... does not

establish incompetence.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 11 at 3). Respondent

identifies no equivalent federal authority to support that proposition.4/

In the case cited by the Superior Court, the fact that a

defendant only met with appointed counsel once did not establish

incompetence. See People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 622 (1988). Here,

the Superior Court concluded that Silva was applicable because

“Petitioner has not shown ... what prejudice he suffered by not

having additional meetings with defense counsel.” (Resp. Lodg. No.

11 at 3, emphasis added). Therefore, it appears that the Superior

Court believed that Petitioner and Cohen met at least once. However,

Petitioner alleges that Cohen never met with him to discuss the

case.5/

Under federal case law, counsel is not necessarily ineffective merely because counsel failed to meet with a client in jail.

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2000)

(counsel who met defendant for the first time at trial but communicated daily thereafter and had previously discussed the case with

investigators and experts was not ineffective) [overruled on other

grounds, Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)].

Here, Petitioner contends that Cohen did not meet with him before

trial (except to encourage Petitioner to plea bargain). However,

Petitioner claims to have “made counsel aware on numerous occasions

4/ With regard to Petitioner’s IAC claims, Respondent’s argument is simply a

summary of the state courts’ opinions. See Answer at 5-6.

5/ Petitioner claims that Cohen’s contact with him was limited to five minutes

before pre-trial hearings. Petitioner contends that these limited meetings were

used only to pressure Petitioner to accept plea agreements. Nothing in the record

contradicts Petitioner’s allegations.

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of the existence of the witness Nancy Lattman, and the importance of

her testimony.” Petition at 14. Therefore, it is reasonable to

assume that Cohen and Petitioner communicated about the case at some

point before the conclusion of the trial.

Given the doubly-deferential standard of review established

by Strickland and AEDPA, the facts here do not show an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. Although meetings and trial

discussions with a client are desirable, it would not have been

unreasonable for the Superior Court to find that Cohen’s performance

was within the “wide range” of reasonable professional assistance

contemplated by the Supreme Court, despite his alleged failure to

meet and discuss.6/ See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 778. Furthermore,

the Superior Court’s implicit finding (that Cohen had met with

Petitioner at least once) was not an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence because Petitioner admitted that

Cohen had met with him for five minutes before pre-trial hearings.

Consequently, Petitioner has not shown that the Superior

Court erred when it determined that Cohen’s alleged failure to meet

or discuss trial tactics with Petitioner did not constitute IAC.

2. Failure to Interview Witnesses Identified by Petitioner

The California Court of Appeal did not summarize nor address

this issue. (Resp. Lodg. No. 13 at 1). Therefore, the Court looks

through to the Superior Court’s opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

06. The Superior Court cites a California case for the proposition

that the California Supreme Court “has never required counsel to

6/ The Superior Court did not explicitly make this finding. However, where a

state court does not explain its reasoning for its decision as to an element of

a multipart claim, a reviewing federal court must consider whether there was any

possible reasonable basis for the state court’s decision. See Harrington, 131

S.Ct. at 784.

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investigate all prospective witnesses.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 11 at 4).

Respondent identifies no equivalent federal authority to support

that proposition.

The Superior Court determined that Petitioner had not shown

prejudice because he had failed to identify which witnesses Cohen

failed to call to testify and because he had not submitted declarations establishing what their testimony would have been. (Resp.

Lodg. No. 11 at 4). However, Petitioner did identify his girlfriend,

Nancy Lattman, as an eyewitness to the incident and argued that

Cohen did not interview Lattman despite Petitioner’s request that he

do so. (Resp. Lodg. No. 10 at 11).

Furthermore, when Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeal,

he included a declaration from Lattman that established what her

testimony would have been. (Resp. Lodg. No. 12 at 12; Resp. Lodg.

No. 14 at Exh. D). Lattman declared that she was an eyewitness and

would have testified that Petitioner’s vehicle was rammed by the

Brown SUV. (Resp. Lodg. No. 14 at Exh. D) Lattman was never

interviewed by Cohen nor did he ask her to testify.7/ Id.

Lattman’s declaration was first presented to the California

Court of Appeal in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The opinion

of that court makes no mention of the declaration. Therefore, on

this issue, there is no reasoned opinion from any court and this

Court therefore conducts an independent review. See Delgado, 223

F.3d at 981-82.

Here, the question is whether Cohen was ineffective as

counsel when he failed to interview an eyewitness whose testimony

7/ Mark Kirkness, the public defender initially assigned to Petitioner’s case,

did interview Lattman prior to his withdrawal from the case. (Resp. Lodg. No. 14

at Exh. D).

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would have supported a “ramming” defense and instead elected to

present an “inadvertent strike” defense. It is virtually certain

that, if Cohen had investigated both possible defenses, an election

to pursue one instead of the other would not constitute IAC. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“strategic choices made after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible

options are virtually unchallengeable”). However, there is no

evidence that Cohen investigated the “ramming” defense at all.

Furthermore, it is possible that Cohen never even knew that a

“ramming” defense existed due to his alleged failure to meet or

discuss the case with Petitioner.8/

Under federal case law, a “defense attorney’s failure to

consider alternative defenses constitutes deficient performance when

the attorney ‘neither conduct[s] a reasonable investigation nor

ma[kes] a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.’” Rios

v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2002). As a result, it

appears that Cohen’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“counsel has a duty

to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”) Cohen’s failure

to consult Petitioner about possible defenses satisfies the first

prong of Strickland. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004)

(“An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client

8/ Kirkness was aware of the “ramming” defense and interviewed Lattman.

However, Kirkness withdrew from the case when his office declared a conflict of

interest. Kirkness states that the results of his investigation were handed over

to the Alternate Public Defender (“APD”). Furthermore, he states that he is “sure

[the APD] gave them to attorney Cohen.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 14 at Exh. E). However,

there is no evidence in the record that Cohen received these documents or reviewed

them.

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regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching

defense strategy.”)

The second prong of Strickland requires that Petitioner show

resulting prejudice. Id. at 691-92. Specifically, Petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. In Johnson v.

Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit found prejudice when counsel failed to do

even ‘minimal investigation’ such as interviewing alibi witnesses or

investigate corroboration and the prosecution’s case was so weak

that even minimal investigation could have led to a trial strategy

that would have prevented the jury from deciding to convict. Johnson

v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, in contrast, the prosecution’s case was strong. The

jury found that Petitioner had hit the Brown SUV intentionally in an

attempt to escape. Even if the “ramming” defense had been raised

instead of the “inadvertent strike” defense, the jury would still

have heard from the witnesses they ultimately found believable: the

three police officers whose testimony supported the prosecution’s

theory of an intentional assault by Petitioner.

Petitioner suggests that his case parallels Larsen v. Adams,

718 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2010). In that case, trial counsel’s

failure to interview a percipient witness was ineffective and

prejudicial because the interview would have revealed another

witness, James McNutt, whose testimony would have contradicted the

prosecution’s theory of events. Larsen, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.

However, in that case, the credibility of the witness was much 

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higher than here. There, McNutt was a retired police chief and

combat veteran who was then working as a correctional officer. Id.

at 1211. Here, there is nothing in the record suggesting that

Lattman had training or experience to more accurately observe

stressful situations. Furthermore, in Larsen, McNutt had only a

tenuous connection to the defendant.9/ Here, in contrast, Lattman was

Petitioner’s girlfriend. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume

that a jury would find Lattman significantly less credible than the

jury in Larsen might have found McNutt.

Finally, even if Lattman had been called to testify, the jury

would still have heard propensity evidence about the two prior

incidents where Petitioner attempted to avoid arrest through highspeed vehicular chases. See infra at 20-21.

Therefore, while there is a remote possibility that the

result of the proceeding would have differed, Petitioner has not

shown that it rose to a “reasonable probability” in light of the

totality of evidence presented at trial. See id. at 693-94. (“It is

not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”)10/

Cohen’s failure to discuss the case with Petitioner resulted

in Cohen being unaware of the possibility of a “ramming” defense. As

a result, Cohen failed to investigate the viability of that defense.

These failures indicate that his performance as counsel fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness. However, it is not

9/ Specifically, McNutt intended to meet Daniel Harrison, his stepson, to

celebrate a birthday. McNutt’s wife testified that Harrison and the defendant

seemed to know each other but she did not think they were friends. Larsen, 718 F.

Supp. 2d at 1211-14.

10/ However, “a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more

likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.

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reasonably probable that the outcome of the case would have been

different but for these failures.

Consequently, Cohen’s failure to discuss the case with

Petitioner or failure to interview Lattman did not result in

prejudice sufficient to meet Strickland’s prejudice test for IAC.

3. Cohen Failed to Conduct Any Reasonable Pretrial

Investigation

The California Court of Appeal and the Superior Court both

summarized this portion of Petitioner’s IAC claim but did not

directly address it. (Resp. Lodg. Nos. 13 at 1, 11 at 3). Therefore,

this Court must consider whether the prior courts could have had any

reasonable basis for their decision. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at

784 (where a state court does not explain its reasoning for its

decision as to an element of a multipart claim, a reviewing federal

court must consider whether there was any possible reasonable basis

for the state court’s decision).

Petitioner’s argument in this regard is that Cohen failed to

conduct any independent investigation and relied entirely on police

reports, police statements, and police photographs. See Petition at

16. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that counsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that

further investigations are unnecessary. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 521 (2003). Furthermore, counsel’s examination of the facts and

circumstances should be independent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680.

However, Petitioner does not identify any case suggesting that an

investigation must itself be independent to satisfy this requirement. In any event, counsel’s decision not to investigate should be

considered with “a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.” Id. at 691. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here 

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comes a point where a defense attorney will reasonably decide that

another strategy is in order, thus making particular investigations

unnecessary” and that decision is due a heavy measure of deference.

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407-08 (2011).

It was reasonable for the Superior and appellate courts to determine

that Cohen’s failure to independently investigate did not render him

ineffective. 

Consequently, Petitioner has not shown that Cohen’s alleged

reliance on documents produced by the police constituted IAC.

4. Cohen Improperly Allowed the Prosecution To Withhold 

Exculpatory Evidence in the Form of A Video of the Incident

The Court of Appeal summarized and addressed this issue.

(Resp. Lodg. No. 13 at 1-2). Petitioner argued that Cohen was

ineffective because he did not obtain video evidence from the marked

police cars that were present during the events that led to

Petitioner’s arrest. The Court of Appeal found that Petitioner

“concede[d] counsel made a discovery request and was told there were

no videotapes.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 13 at 2). However, it appears that

the Court of Appeal misread the Petition. Petitioner stated that

“Cohen made an informal request for video [evidence] from the

prosecutor, who told him that no such video [evidence] exists

because unmarked [vehicular] units do not have video capability.”

(Resp. Lodg. No. 12 at 17, emphasis added). The record presented to

the Court is unclear whether Cohen ever asked for video evidence

from the marked police cars that were present or whether Cohen ever 

made a formal discovery request.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the record to support

Petitioner’s conclusory claim that “it is common knowledge that all

black and white patrol units in La Mesa are equipped with video 

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devices.” See Petition at 20. Even if such police cars are equipped

with video cameras, there is no evidence in the record that they

were active and recorded the events of the car chase and collision.

The Superior Court determined that “Petitioner’s allegations [in

this regard] are conclusory and thus fail to state a prima facie

claim for relief.” Given the lack of supporting evidence, this

determination was reasonable. On appeal, Petitioner did not provide

new supporting evidence for this claim. 

Consequently, Petitioner has not shown that Cohen was

ineffective for failing to obtain videotapes of the events of this

case because there is no evidence that such videotapes existed.

5. Cohen Introduced Damaging Evidence

The California Court of Appeal did not summarize or address

this issue. (Resp. Lodg. No. 13 at 1). The Court therefore looks

through to the Superior Court’s opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

06. At trial, Cohen showed a computer simulation of the collision

produced by Ronald P. Carr, an expert accident reconstructionist

retained for this purpose. See Petition at 22-23; (Resp. Lodg. No.

14 at Exh. B). This simulation was largely based on documents

produced by the prosecution. See Petition at 22; (Resp. Lodg. No. 14

at Exh. B). The simulation relied upon the assumption that the Brown

SUV was stationary. (Resp. Lodg. No. 2 at 287). Carr did not visit 

the scene, conduct interviews, or inspect the vehicles involved in 

the collision. (Resp. Lodg. No. 14 at Exh. B).

Petitioner contends that the simulation supported the

prosecution’s theory of the collision and that Carr’s testimony was

“one hundred percent for the prosecution.” Petition at 23. The

Superior Court found that the simulation was not contrary to the 

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defense raised at trial. This Court has previously determined that

Cohen’s decision to present a defense based on the inadvertent

strike theory did not cause prejudice. Therefore, the Superior

Court’s determination was reasonable because the simulation

supported a meritorious defense, albeit not the defense Petitioner

wished to present.

Furthermore, the fact that some of Carr’s statements on the

witness stand supported the prosecution’s case is not proof of IAC.

Witnesses are sworn to tell the whole truth, and nothing but the

truth. A witness is not sworn to selectively tell only those parts

of the truth that support the party calling him or her to the stand.

Therefore, counsel is not ineffective simply because some of the

testimony provided by a witness is damaging to counsel’s client. If

it were otherwise, calling any defense witness to the stand could

result in a retrial due to prejudice.

Consequently, Petitioner has not shown that Cohen was

ineffective for placing Carr on the stand or for using Carr’s

simulation in support of the inadvertent strike defense.

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has not shown

that Cohen’s performance as counsel was both ineffective and caused

prejudice. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s first

ground for relief be DENIED.

B. GROUND TWO: BRADY VIOLATION

Petitioner contends that the prosecution committed a Brady

violation by suppressing evidence in the form of video footage from

the marked police cars present during the collision. See Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962). The rule established by Brady is that

“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

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upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment” Id. at 87.

The Court notes that Petitioner’s Brady claim is dependent

upon the failure of Petitioner’s IAC claim. In that claim, Petitioner argued that Cohen was ineffective for failing to request

video evidence via the discovery process. Conversely, Brady seems to

require a finding that counsel actually requested the evidence at

issue. Compare U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (no Brady

violation where evidence allegedly suppressed was not actually

requested and the evidence was not sufficiently exculpatory) with

Smith v. Cain, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (failure to

voluntarily disclose evidence that would undermine sole prosecution

witness’s credibility was a Brady violation.)

In any event, the materiality test set forth in Agurs is not

germane here because there is no indication that the evidence

Petitioner claims was withheld even existed. Petitioner’s claim that

“it is common knowledge that all black and white patrol units in La

Mesa are equipped with video devices” lacks factual substantiation.

See Petition at 20. Furthermore, even assuming that the police cars

were equipped with video cameras, there is still no evidence in the

record that the cameras were turned on. Therefore, the Superior

Court’s determination that “Petitioner’s unsubstantiated claim that 

such evidence exists is insufficient to support” the Petition was a

reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence and

was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

(Resp. Lodg. No. 11 at 5); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s second

ground for relief be DENIED.

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C. GROUND THREE: EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED

Petitioner argues that evidence of two prior high-speed

vehicular police chases in which he had been involved were admitted

at trial in violation of his due process rights.11/ The trial court,

relying on Cal. Evid. Code § 1101, ruled that the evidence could be

admitted because it tended to prove that the collision with the

Brown SUV was not a mistake, that Petitioner wanted to escape, and

that Petitioner had prior knowledge of how police officers conduct

a vehicular pursuit. On direct appeal, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed, finding that this evidence showed Petitioner

previously “[went] to great lengths to flee from the police rather

than be arrested” and that this “buttressed the prosecution’s claim

that [Petitioner] intentionally chose to force his vehicle through

the gap [created] by hitting the [Brown] SUV.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 7 at

14).

Respondent argues that Petitioner raises no federal question

in this regard. Respondent points to Alberni v. McDaniel, in which

the Ninth Circuit noted the absence of Supreme Court precedent on

the issue of propensity evidence. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d

860, 863-67 (9th Cir. 2006); Duvardo v. Giurbino, 410 Fed. Appx. 69,

70 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at fn.5 (the Supreme

Court “express[es] no opinion on whether a state law would violate

the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’

evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.”) Therefore,

11/ The first chase occurred in July 1987, when Petitioner was stopped by police

while he was driving a stolen Winnebago, accelerated away from the officer who

stopped him, and eventually resorted to flight on foot when the Winnebago came to

rest. The second chase occurred in April 2000, when police sought to arrest

Petitioner and he fled in a truck on city streets at speeds up to 70 miles per

hour. Again, Petitioner attempted to escape on foot when the truck became lodged

in an embankment.

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the California courts could not have reached a decision contrary to

Supreme Court precedent because no precedent exists. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). Neither could they have misapplied Supreme Court

precedent. Id. Finally, the Court of Appeal’s determination of the

facts in this regard is not unreasonable given the evidence

presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Consequently, AEDPA forestalls granting a writ of habeas corpus.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s third

ground for relief be DENIED.

D. GROUND FOUR: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF FELONY ASSAULT

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him of felony assault upon a police officer, and the

conviction was therefore a violation of his right to a fair trial

under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically,

Petitioner raises two insufficiency of evidence claims: (1) the

evidence does not show that the collision was intentional and (2)

the evidence does not show that he knew, or should have known, that

the Brown SUV was occupied by police officers.

1. Collision Was Not Intentional

Petitioner argues that, under California case law, a driver

is guilty of felony assault if he uses the car as an instrument of

violence against another person but is not guilty of felony assault

when he merely drives recklessly and consequently causes a vehicle 

collision. Petition at 42. Petitioner asserts that he recklessly,

but not intentionally, caused contact between his vehicle and the

Brown SUV. Id. at 43. Further, he argues that he veered away from

the occupied Brown SUV to minimize the impact damage (albeit to keep

his car moving towards his goal of escaping police). Id.

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On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that the

requisite elements of assault under California law are that the

defendant “intentionally perform an act with actual knowledge of the

facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the act by

its nature will probably and directly result in the application of

physical force against another.” (Resp. Lodg. No. 7 at 7 [citing

People v. Williams, 26 Cal. 4th 779, 788, 790 (2001)]). Notably,

“the defendant need not have an intent to injure...” Id. Here, the

jury found that Petitioner’s attempted escape fit within these

elements. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found that there “was

sufficient evidentiary support for the jury to conclude that at the

time [Petitioner] accelerated through the gap, he knew his path was

blocked and that he would cause a collision.” Id. at 8. This support

came in the form of Runge’s testimony that he had stopped moving the

Brown SUV at the time of the collision. Id.

The Court of Appeal’s determination of the facts was

reasonable, in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). Furthermore, the Court of Appeal’s determination was

neither contrary to, nor a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

318-19 (1979) (determining whether sufficient evidence supports a

conviction requires a review of the entire record in the light most

favorable to the conviction to determine whether “any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.”)

To the extent that Petitioner challenges the state court’s

interpretation and application of state law, federal courts have no

authority to review those decisions. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (“it

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is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions.”) 

2. Evidence Does Not Prove Petitioner Knew or Should Have 

Known that the Brown SUV Was Occupied by Police Officers

Petitioner argues that he did not know that the Brown SUV was

occupied by police officers. The statute at issue, Cal. Pen. Code

245(c), requires proof that a defendant “knows or reasonably should

know that the victim is a peace officer.” Petitioner asserts that,

although he may have been aware that the occupants of the Silver SUV

were police officers, there was no evidence suggesting that he knew

the occupants of the Brown SUV were also police officers.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the jury determination

was reasonable. Specifically, the evidence at trial showed that

Petitioner was wanted for robbery in Washington State and encountered two SUVs when he tried to leave the residence. The Silver SUV

had flashing lights and a siren activated while the Brown SUV was

“positioned at an angle in the middle of the road to prevent

[Petitioner] from moving his car forward.” Id. at 10. The Court of

Appeal found that it was reasonable for the jury, confronted with

this evidence, to infer that Petitioner knew or should have known

that the occupants of the Brown SUV were police officers. Id.

The Court of Appeal’s determination of the facts was

reasonable, in light of the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal’s determination was neither

contrary to, nor a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-19

AEDPA bars this Court from granting a writ of habeas corpus

in the absence of an unreasonable determination of the facts or a

state court decision that is contrary to, or a misapplication of, 

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Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For the reasons

set forth above, Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claims

have not met this hurdle and thus no writ of habeas corpus may

issue.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s fourth

ground for relief be DENIED.

Since the Court has recommended that all of the grounds for

relief Petitioner has raised be denied, the Court further RECOMMENDS

that the Petition be DENIED.

VI

RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 23, 2012, any party to 

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than 

May 7, 2012, the parties are advised that failure to file objections 

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within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 2, 2012

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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