Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04063/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unittd Statef Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 8 1990 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARY B. CHYNOWETH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, in his capacity 

as Secretary of the Department of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-4063 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 86-C-0905W) 

Michael E. Bulson of Utah Legal Services, Ogden, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Carol S. Prescott, Off:ce of the General Counsel, Department of 

Health and Human Services, Denver, Colorado, (Richard D. Parry, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Dee v. Benson, United States 

Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, Ronald S. Luedernann, Chief 

Counsel, Region VIII, Thomas A. Nelson, Jr., Deputy Chief Counsel, 

Region VIII and Deana R. Ertl-Brackett, Assistant Regional 

Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Denver, 

Colorado, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-4063 Document: 01019956434 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Mary Chynoweth appeals from a district 

court ruling denying her request to exceed the $75 per hour cap on 

attorney's fees awarded to her pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Plaintiff argues that her 

attorney's expertise in Social Security disability law constituted 

a "special factor" under u.s.c. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) warranting an 

departure from the statutory rate. Our jurisdiction arises under 

28 u.s.c. § 1291. We affirm. 

I. 

Plaintiff is a 56-year-old widow with a history of health 

ailments. In 1984, she filed a claim with the Social Security 

Administration for Disabled Widow's Insurance benefits. 

Plaintiff's application was denied following an administrative 

hearing and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff then 

sought judicial review. The district court adopted the 

recommendation of the magistrate that the Secretary's 

determination of benefits failed to consider plaintiff's 

impairments in combination. On remand, the ALJ applied the 

standard enunciated by the district court and found plaintiff 

entitled to benefits. 

Plaintiff petitioned the district court for attorney's fees 

of $130 per hour pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. 

Plaintiff's counsel indicated that he was a specialist in Social 

Security benefits law and had litigated many cases in federal 

court involving disability benefits. Plaintiff produced 

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Appellate Case: 89-4063 Document: 01019956434 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 2 
affidavits from several attorneys attesting that there were few 

lawyers in plaintiff's vicinity willing to handle Social Security 

disability cases and that $130 per hour was a reasonable fee for 

such services. 

The district court found that the Secretary's denial of 

plaintiff's disability benefits was not substantially justified 

and consequently held that plaintiff was entitled to attorney's 

fees under EAJA. Exercising its discretion, the court increased 

the EAJA hourly rate of $75 to $96.75 to allow for cost-of-living 

increases. See 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). However, the 

district concluded that, based on Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552 (1988), counsel's expertise in Social Security benefits law 

did not constitute a "special factor" under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) justifying an additional increase in the $75 

rate. 

II. 

The Secretary does not controvert the district court's 

finding that plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees under EAJA, 

nor does he contest the court's cost-of-living adjustment. 1 The 

only question on appeal, therefore, is whether Social Security 

benefits law constitutes a specialized practice requiring 

enhancement of the $75 EAJA rate. We hold that it is not. 

1 The Secretary's appeal of the district court's order awarding 

attorney's fees was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). 

Chynoweth v. Bowen, No. 89-4054, unpub. order (10th Cir. Jul 14, 

1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-4063 Document: 01019956434 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 3 
EAJA awards attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an 

action brought by or against the United States unless the court 

finds that the position of the United States is substantially 

justified or special circumstances make such an award unjust. 28 

u.s.c. § 2412(d)(l)(A). EAJA mandates that attorney's fees 

awarded "be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and 

quality of the services furnished," but "shall not be awarded in 

excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an 

increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the 

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings 

involved, justifies a higher fee." 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d) (2) (A). 

The "special factor" exception 

refers to attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or 

specialized skill needful for the litigation in 

question--as opposed to an extraordinary level of the 

general lawyerly knowledge and ability useful in all 

litigation. Examples of the former would be an 

identifiable practice speciality such as patent law, or 

knowledge of foreign law or language. 

Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572. A district court's decision on whether 

to exceed the $75 rate is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 

at 571. 

Plaintiff argues that Social Security benefits law comprises 

a specialized practice area warranting payment in excess of the 

$75 rate. We disagree. "Incomparable expertise, standing alone, 

will not justify the higher rate." Vibra-Tech Eng'rs v. United 

States, 787 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1986). Rather, the 

statutory cap may be exceeded only in the "unusual situation" 

where the legal services rendered require specialized training and 

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Appellate Case: 89-4063 Document: 01019956434 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 4 
expertise unattainable by a competent attorney through a diligent 

study of the governing legal principles. See id. The law 

contains a myriad of practice areas; no attorney can be expected 

to master all areas at once. Yet merely because some scholarly 

effort and professional experience is required to attain 

proficiency in a particular practice area does not automatically 

require enhancement of the EAJA rate. Although Social Security 

benefits law involves a complex statutory and regulatory 

framework, the field is not beyond the grasp of a competent 

practicing attorney with access to a law library and the other 

accoutrements of modern legal practice. 

In. arguing that Social Security benefits law comprises a 

specialized practice area subject to enhancement of the EAJA rate, 

plaintiff places primary reliance upon Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 

536 (9th Cir. 1989). In Pirus, the district court found that 

plaintiff's class action against the Secretary was "no routine 

disability case" and that no attorney in the Los Angeles area 

capable of handling the case would take it for $75 per hour. Id. 

at 542. Because the Ninth Circuit could not say that the district 

court's findings were clearly erroneous, it held that the court 

had not abused its discretion by awarding fees in excess of the 

statutory cap. Id. In contrast, the district court in the 

instant case made no findings that plaintiff's action was a 

particularly difficult disability case or that she would be unable 

to obtain competent representation at the $75 rate. Moreover, 

although the Fourth Circuit in Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 383 

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(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987), enhanced an 

attorney's rate of pay $12 from the statutory rate on account of 

his expertise in Social Security disability law, the case was 

decided before the Supreme Court enunciated the standard for 

upward departures in Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572. We therefore find 

Pirus and Hyatt distinguishable. 

We cannot say that the law of Social Security benefits falls 

sufficiently outside the mainstream of general legal practice to 

be automatically entitled to enhancement under 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2412(d)(l)(A)(ii). The district court determined that the 

overall award was reasonable for the work performed and its 

underlying findings concerning the factors which comprise the fee 

award are adequately supported in the record. Accordingly, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exceed the 

statutory rate. See Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548, 552 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 507 (1989). 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4063 Document: 01019956434 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 6