Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00833/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00833-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Mosher,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Mesa, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-22-00833-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 75) Counts II through VI 

of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. 70). Plaintiff filed a Response 

(Doc. 82), and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 84). After reviewing the briefing and 

relevant case law, the Court will grant the Motion as to Count III and deny the Motion as 

to all other Counts.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Mosher’s Arrest

In July 2021, Plaintiff William Mosher was driving in Mesa, Arizona with an 

acquaintance sitting in the front passenger seat. (Doc. 70 at 2 ¶¶ 9–10.) The acquaintance 

had a warrant for his arrest. (Id. ¶ 10.) While Mosher was stopped at a traffic light, several 

law enforcement agencies converged on Mosher’s position and utilized a “vehicle 

containment” tactic to prevent his vehicle from moving. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Law enforcement 

officers then told Mosher they were executing a warrant to arrest the acquaintance. (Id.

at 2–3 ¶¶ 14–15.) Mosher showed the officers his empty hands and proceeded to exit his

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vehicle. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 16–20.)

After Mosher exited his vehicle, an officer ordered him to “show that he had no 

weapons,” triggering Mosher to lift his shirt exposing his waistband. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) While 

Mosher’s shirt was lifted, an officer fired a beanbag shotgun round at his stomach. (Id. 

¶ 24.) The round struck Mosher, causing him to step back and turn. (Id. ¶25.) With 

Mosher’s back turned, Officer Jason Alexander fired another beanbag round striking 

Mosher’s buttocks, causing him to fall to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 24–28.) While Mosher was 

on the ground with his hands on his head, Officer Evan Wick, who was sitting in his 

vehicle, shot Mosher in the back with a taser. (Id. ¶ 30.) Officers then handcuffed Mosher 

and transported him to the Mesa Police Department Holding Facility. (Id. ¶ 31.) Police 

eventually transported Mosher to a hospital for treatment of the injuries sustained during 

his arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 32–36.) The police uncuffed Mosher, left the hospital, and did not engage 

in further contact. (Id. at 3–4 ¶ 37.)

B. The Police Reports and Mosher’s Criminal Case

Mosher alleges that after his arrest, Officer Alexander and Officer Wick

(collectively, the “Officers”) drafted police reports (the “Reports”) that contained 

substantial falsehoods, including “falsely claiming Mosher presented an imminent risk of 

serious harm to officers before Defendants shot and tased him.” (Id. at 4–5 ¶¶ 38, 52.) 

Mosher further alleges that Officer Alexander used the fabricated Reports to complete a 

“submission form” recommending Mosher be charged with resisting arrest under Arizona 

Revised Statute § 13-2508(A)(2) and obstructing governmental operations under Arizona 

Revised Statute § 13-2402(A)(2). (Id. at 4 ¶ 40.)

After the hospital released Mosher, he hired counsel to determine whether his 

interaction with law enforcement violated his civil rights. (Id. at 4 ¶ 45.) In doing so, 

Mosher’s counsel served public records requests on the Mesa Police Department. (Id.

¶ 46.) The Department did not respond to the initial request, so counsel followed up on 

November 17, 2021. (Id. ¶ 48.) Shortly thereafter, in December 2021, Mosher received a 

summons to appear before the Mesa Municipal Court for charges related to his arrest in 

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July 2021. (Id. ¶ 49.)

Mosher was charged under § 13-2508(A)(2) for resisting arrest and 

§ 13-2402(A)(2) for obstructing governmental operations. (Id. ¶ 50.) In Mosher’s view, 

the Officers weaponized fabricated evidence to mount a criminal prosecution intended to 

thwart any potential civil rights case Mosher might pursue because of the Officers’ use of 

excessive force. (Id. at 5 ¶ 54.) Before the case proceeded to trial, the City of Mesa (the 

“City”) dropped the obstruction charge. (Id. ¶ 57.) And on October 19, 2023, the jury 

rendered a not guilty verdict on the resisting arrest charge. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59.)

C. The Instant Lawsuit

Mosher filed his first Complaint in May 2022. (Doc. 1.) On July 14, 2022, this 

Court entered an Order staying the case “pending resolution of Mosher’s parallel criminal 

case, number 2021078080.” (Doc. 23.) On November 17, 2023, after Mosher’s criminal 

case concluded, the Court lifted the stay (Doc. 37), and Mosher filed an Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 38). Thereafter, the parties stipulated to dismiss the state law assault and 

battery claims against the Officers because Mosher failed to individually serve them with 

a notice of claim pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute § 12-821.01. (Doc. 40.) On May 

17, 2024, Mosher filed his SAC, the operative complaint in this case. Therein, Mosher 

alleges two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Officers: excessive force (Count I) and 

malicious prosecution (Count II). (Id. at 5–6 ¶¶ 63–73.) Against the City, Mosher alleges

a federal local governing body liability claim under Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 

658 (1978) (Count III), and state law claims of battery (Count IV), negligence/gross 

negligence (Count V), and malicious prosecution (Count VI). (Id. at 6–8 ¶¶ 74–92.) 

Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts II through VI of the SAC. (Doc. 75.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a 

claim, a complaint must comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant 

has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. 

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 

(1957)). This exists if the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 

cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 

matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 

“probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pled factual allegations are 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. 

Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 

factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 

of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 

v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court briefly discusses two initial matters. First, Mosher agrees with 

Defendants that his Monell claim (Count III) should be dismissed. (See Doc. 82 at 2, 17.) 

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count III with prejudice.

Second, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “matters of judicial 

notice,” see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003), including 

information that is “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or can 

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be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); but see Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 

988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained 

in . . . public records.”). Importantly, considering matters of judicial notice does not 

transmute a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d 

at 908. Proper subjects of judicial notice include judgments and other court documents. 

See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Khoja, 899 

F.3d at 999 (“Just because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not 

mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its 

truth.”). A court should not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly 

subject to judicial notice,” nor “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 

1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Defendants request the Court to take judicial notice of the criminal trial transcript 

attached to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 75). Additionally, Defendants ask that 

the Court take notice of the Maricopa County Attorney Office submission form dated July 

8, 2021 (the “Submission Form”) for the limited purpose of establishing the date of 

submission. The Submission Form is referenced without a specific date in the SAC, (Doc. 

70 at 4 ¶¶ 38–40), and Defendants have provided a copy of the Submission Form obtained 

via subpoena duces tecum submitted to the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, (Doc. 

84-1). With seemingly no objection from Mosher, the Court will take judicial notice of 

both the criminal trial transcript and, for the limited purpose of establishing the date, the 

Submission Form.

A. Malicious Prosecution (Counts II and VI)

Defendants offer several distinct challenges to Mosher’s malicious prosecution 

claims. First, Defendants argue that Mosher’s federal malicious prosecution claim against 

the Officers is barred, as there is an adequate remedy existing under state law. (Doc. 75 

at 7 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985); Freeman v. City of Santa 

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Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Doc. 84 at 11–12.) Additionally, 

Defendants contend that Mosher’s federal and state malicious prosecution claims fail 

because he has not overcome the presumption of prosecutorial independence. (Doc. 84 

at 9.) Defendants also argue that both claims fail because Mosher cannot show a causal 

link between the criminal charges (resisting arrest and obstruction of governmental 

operations) and the alleged “fabricated evidence.” (Doc. 75 at 7; Doc. 84 at 8–9.) Finally, 

Defendants maintain that the claims fail because the record shows that probable cause 

existed to arrest Mosher and initiate criminal proceedings against him. (Doc. 75 at 9–10; 

Doc. 84 at 9–11.)

In response, Mosher argues that he sufficiently alleged all elements of his federal 

and state law § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, which includes his allegations that the 

Officers deprived him of his First Amendment right to free speech. (Doc. 82 at 16.) 

Mosher also contends that probable cause is not readily discernible given the allegations in 

the SAC. (Id. at 8–9.) And, according to Mosher, the SAC precludes finding probable 

cause as his allegations show his prosecution was induced by “fabricated evidence and 

wrongful conduct.” (Doc. 82 at 11 (citing Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2004)).)

“Federal courts rely on state common law for elements of malicious prosecution.”

Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “Federal 

and state malicious prosecution claims are intertwined; to adequately plead federal 

malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege the elements of a state malicious prosecution 

claim and establish that the prosecution was conducted for the purpose of denying plaintiff 

a specific constitutional right.” Henry v. City of Somerton, No. CV-18-03058-PHX-DJH, 

2020 WL 8574831, at *8 (D. Ariz. 2020) (citing Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066; Usher v. City 

of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)). Under Arizona law, a malicious prosecution 

claim requires: “(1) a criminal prosecution, (2) that terminates in favor of plaintiff, (3) with 

defendants as prosecutors, (4) actuated by malice, (5) without probable cause, and (6) 

causing damages.” Id. (citing Slade v. City of Phoenix., 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975)). 

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“Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be 

brought, as here, against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be 

filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066; see also Henry, 2020 WL 8574831, at *8 (“Plaintiffs 

must allege that a state or local official improperly exerted pressure, knowingly provided 

misinformation to the prosecutor, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged 

in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of 

legal proceedings.” (citing Lacy v. City of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (D. Ariz. 

2008))). 

Malicious prosecution is not a federal constitutional tort if state law provides a 

remedy. Bretz, 773 F.2d at 1031. But there is an exception to this rule, allowing a plaintiff 

to sustain a federal tort “when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to 

deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person 

to a denial of constitutional rights.” Id. Thus, while Defendants are correct that Mosher 

has not pleaded an equal protection violation, he has pleaded that his prosecution violated 

his First Amendment right to free speech. (See Doc. 70 at 6 ¶ 71; Doc. 82 at 16.) And the 

Ninth Circuit has recognized that First Amendment violations fit within the recognized 

exception giving way to federal malicious prosecution claims. See Awabdy, 368 F.2d at 

1070 (finding that the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments may provide a basis 

for asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983). Therefore, the Court rejects 

Defendants’ argument that Mosher’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the 

Officers should be dismissed based upon a remedy existing under Arizona law.

The Court now addresses the presumption of prosecutorial independence. As noted,

malicious prosecution cases require a plaintiff to prove, in part, that the defendant initiated 

a criminal prosecution without probable cause that terminated in his favor. Slade, 541 P.2d 

at 552. And, in malicious prosecution cases, Federal law recognizes a rebuttable 

presumption that “the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in 

determining that probable cause for accused’s arrest exists at that time.” See Newman v. 

County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 

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261, 266–67 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 

U.S. 250 (2006)). To hold the arresting officers liable for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff 

must overcome the presumption. See Smiddy, 655 F.2d at 266–67; see also Newman, 457 

F.3d at 994–95 (citing Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 

Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the plaintiff 

overcame the presumption where trial testimony revealed that, among other things,

prosecutor worked “hand-in-hand” with investigating officers). 

This presumption is most often considered at summary judgment or trial. See, e.g., 

Dupris v. McDonald, 2012 WL 210722, *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2012); Newman, 457 F.3d 

at 996; Smiddy, 655 F.2d at 266–67. Thus, despite discussion of the presumption in the 

briefing on this Motion, weighing whether Mosher has presented sufficient evidence to 

rebut the presumption is premature. Cf. West v. City of Mesa, 128 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1241 

(D. Ariz. 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim based on the 

presumption because “Plaintiff alleges [defendant] knowingly provided false evidence to 

the prosecutor and engaged in other bad faith conduct during Plaintiff’s investigation.”).

Indeed, doing so would, in a way, require Mosher to offer evidence beyond what a 

complaint requires, and thereby undermine a cornerstone of Rule 12 determination—to 

accept the well-pled factual allegations as true and to construe them in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067. Accordingly, the Court will 

not consider whether Mosher rebutted the presumption of prosecutorial independence at 

this time. 

Next, the Court addresses the issue of probable cause. To determine whether an 

officer had probable cause to make an arrest, courts “examine the events leading up to the 

arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 

objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause. District of Columbia v. 

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (cleaned up). Probable cause “requires only a probability 

or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. 

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at 57 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)).

Here, Mosher alleges that he followed law enforcement’s instructions to show his

hands, exit his vehicle, and lift his shirt to show that he did not have a weapon. (Doc. 70 

at 3 ¶¶ 16–23.) In other words, Mosher’s allegations are that he unequivocally complied 

with law enforcement commands, yet he was still shot with bean-bag rounds, tazed, and 

arrested. (Id. ¶¶ 23–31.) Additionally, at the scene, law enforcement announced that 

Mosher was not the target of the vehicle containment, and that the task force was present 

to arrest Mosher’s acquaintance. (Doc. 70 at 2 ¶ 14.) Accepting these allegations as true,

Mosher could not reasonably be determined to be engaged in, or suspected to be engaged 

in, criminal activity at the time of his arrest. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Mosher alleges 

that, after his arrest, the Officers fabricated the Reports to reflect that Mosher was an

“imminent risk of serious harm to officers,” and that information was then used to charge 

and prosecute him for resisting arrest and obstructing government operations. (Id. at 4–5 

¶¶ 50–56.) The purpose of the fabricated Reports was to manufacture a criminal case 

against him to waylay any potential civil rights case arising out of the Officers alleged 

excessive force. (Id. at 5 ¶ 54.) And, as part of the Officers scheme, they gave false 

information to the prosecution and Mosher’s criminal defense counsel. (Id. ¶ 56); cf. 

Harper, 533 F.3d at 1027–28. Ultimately, according to Mosher, the Officers, knowing 

there was no probable cause, acted with malice in falsifying documents to secure Mosher’s 

prosecution to suppress his First Amendment right to free speech. (Id. at 6 ¶¶ 70–71); see 

also Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066. At bottom, these facts, accepted as true, establish that the 

Defendant Officers lacked probable cause both to arrest and to charge Mosher. See 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066.

Defendants also contend that because the Mesa City Court judge found more than 

sufficient evidence for Mosher’s case to proceed to a jury, probable cause existed for his 

arrest and prosecution. (Doc. 75 at 10.) This argument is similar to one in West, in which

a defendant FBI agent argued a grand jury indictment should serve as conclusive evidence 

of probable cause and thus bar a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. 128 F. Supp. 3d 

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at 1241. Therein, the Court also noted that “[t]he argument here is, in essence, that if a 

conspiracy to lie is so successful that on the basis of the lies a grand jury finds probable 

cause, the conspirators become immunized for the constitutional injury they have caused.” 

Id. (quoting Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997)). Ultimately, the

Court refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s state law malicious prosecution claim because he 

alleged that “the probable cause that served as the basis for his indictment was tainted by 

the actions of [the FBI agents].” Id. (citing Harris, 126 F.3d at 1198 (“[A] finding of 

probable cause that is tainted by the malicious actions of government officials . . . does not 

preclude a claim against the officials involved.” (cleaned up))). Here, Mosher goes a step 

further than alleging that any probable cause was tainted, and instead alleges that probable 

cause simply did not exist. (See Doc. 70 at 6 ¶ 70.) Thus, like the grand jury indictment 

in West, the Mesa City Court judge’s determination regarding Mosher’s criminal case’s 

procession to a jury does not establish probable cause nor preclude Mosher’s claim. See

128 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.

In sum, in malicious prosecution cases, courts are generally concerned with whether 

the operative complaint evinces probable cause. See Overson v. Lynch, 83 Ariz. 158, 161 

(1957). If probable cause exists, it is an absolute defense to a suit for malicious 

prosecution. McClinton v. Rice, 265 P.2d 425, 431 (Ariz. 1953). Here, based on 

allegations in the SAC, probable cause to arrest and charge Mosher did not exist. 

Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Counts II and VI.

B. Battery and Negligence (Counts IV and V)

Mosher alleges that the Officers’ actions make the City vicariously liable for battery 

and negligence or gross negligence. (Doc. 70 at 7–8 ¶¶ 83–92.) Defendants contend that 

these claims are barred by Ryan v. Napier, 425 P.3d 230 (Ariz. 2018) and Arizona Revised 

Statute § 12-820.05. (Doc. 75 at 10–11.) In response, Mosher contends that Defendants 

misinterpret Ryan and § 12-820.05, and that neither bar Mosher’s claims. (Doc. 82 at 4–6.)

Common law battery consists of an intentional act by one person that “results in 

harmful or offensive conduct with the person of another.” Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. 

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Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 438 (Ariz. 2003) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 13, 

18 (1965)). A negligence claim requires proof of four elements: “(1) the existence of a 

duty recognized by law requiring defendants to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) 

defendants’ breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and plaintiff[’s]

resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Delci v. Gutierrez Trucking Co., 275 P.3d 632, 

634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). The Arizona Supreme Court considered, and ultimately refused 

to adopt, an amalgam of these two common law theories in Ryan. There, the plaintiff sued 

an officer for “negligently releas[ing] [a police dog] and that use the dog constituted a 

negligent, unjustified, and excessive use of force.” Ryan, 425 P.3d at 234 (quotation marks 

omitted). The plaintiff also sued the Pima County Sheriff under a theory of vicariously 

liability. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court held that “negligent use of intentionally inflicted 

force” is not a cognizable claim under Arizona law. Id. at 236. The court explained that 

the availability of such claim “could permit plaintiffs to ‘plead around’ statutory provisions 

that apply only to intentional tort claims.” Id. at 237. The court did not, however, preclude 

a plaintiff from pursuing a battery claim based upon intentional acts, or negligent hiring or 

training claims against an employer. See id. at 238. Here, Mosher asserts a battery claim 

against the City under a vicarious liability theory. (Doc. 70 at 7 ¶¶ 79–82.) Mosher also

asserts a separate, direct negligent hiring and supervision claim against the City. (Id. at 

7–8 ¶¶ 83–87.) Therefore, because Mosher is not asserting a claim akin to the rejected 

“negligent use of intentionally inflicted force” claim, Ryan is inapposite insofar as 

Defendants rely on its holding to preclude Mosher from asserting his distinct claims for 

battery and negligence. See 425 P.3d at 236.

Suing a public entity or employee for an intentional tort or negligence implicates 

certain statutory immunity provisions and presumptions. See § 12-820.05(B); see also 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-716(A)(1) (presuming a peace officer acted reasonably in the 

intentional use of physical force); § 12-716(A)(2) (presuming the employer of the peace 

officer to have reasonably hired and trained its officer to use that physical force). Under 

§ 12-820.05(B), “a public entity is immune from liability for damages caused by an 

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employee’s felony act unless the entity knew of the employee’s propensity to commit such 

acts.”

Defendants argue that Mosher states the “[t]aser and bean bag deployments were 

felony intentional acts.” (Doc. 75 at 13.) Although, upon review, no allegations in the 

SAC, or argument in Mosher’s Response to the instant Motion, posit that the Officers’

conduct was felonious.1 (See Doc. 70; Doc. 82.) Moreover, even if the Court found that 

the Officers’ acts fell within the ambit of § 12-820.05(B), Mosher sufficiently alleges that

the City knew of the Mesa police forces’ propensity for the alleged excessive force, which 

includes Officers Alexander and Wick. (See Doc. 70 at 8 ¶ 86); § 12-820.05(B); cf.

McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1235 (D. Ariz. 2003) (finding that, “while, 

Plaintiff neither explicitly alleges Scott’s propensity to comment felonious acts nor the 

State’s knowledge of this propensity,” her allegations implicitly established defendant’s 

propensity); Nees v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-21-01134, 2022 WL 17976422, at *6 (D. 

Ariz. Dec. 28, 2022) (“Because Plaintiff does not allege that the City knew of Defendant 

Cooke’s propensity, the material question is whether Defendant Cooke’s conduct amount 

1

 The Arizona Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether § 12-820.05 applies 

despite the absence of a criminal felony charge or conviction. However, the statute allows 

the Court to make a felony determination in the first instance. See Cameron v. Gila County, 

No. CV-11-00080-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 2115657, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2011); see also

Ryan, 425 P.3d at 237 (citing State v. Heinze, 993 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 

(“[I]nterpreting § 41-621(L), which has language similar to § 12-820.05(B), and 

concluding that a felony conviction is not a prerequisite to the application of the felony 

exclusion.”)); see also Rand v. City of Glendale, No. 1 CA-CV 07-0722, 2008 WL 

5383363, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2008) (finding “a felony conviction [was] not a 

prerequisite to application of the immunity provided by A.R.S. § 12-820.05” and that “the 

trial court did not err in determining that [] claims for battery and false arrest/imprisonment, 

as alleged in [the] complaint . . ., set forth conduct that would, if proven, constitute a felony 

under Arizona law”); Fernandez v. City of Phoenix, CV-11- 02001-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 

2343621, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jun. 20, 2012); Cameron, 2011 WL 2115657, at *4; Al-Asadi v. 

City of Phoenix, No. CV-09-00047-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 3419728, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 

27, 2010); McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1234 (D. Ariz. 2003); See Link v. Pima 

County, 972 P.2d 669, 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that immunity should be 

determined “at the earliest possible stage in litigation” (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 

224, 227 (1991))).

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to a ‘criminal felony.’” (emphasis added)). Thus, the allegations, accepted as true, would 

overcome the statutory immunity bar in § 12-805.05(B). Additionally, the allegations 

would satisfy the required elements of battery as Mosher alleges that the Officers 

intentionally used unjustified force against him when they employed bean-bag rounds and 

a taser, resulting in several injuries. (See Doc. 70 at 3 ¶¶ 23–30, 5 ¶¶ 60–62, 7 ¶¶ 79–82.) 

At bottom, Mosher has sufficiently pleaded facts to allow his battery claim against the City

to proceed. See Duncan, 70 P.3d at 438. 

Section 12-820.05 also applies to negligent training and supervision claims. See 

Gallagher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 349 P.3d 228, 230–31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) 

(applying § 12-820.05 to a negligent hiring and supervision claim); Nees, 2022 WL 

17976422, at *6 n.5 (same). As discussed, even if the Court found the Officers’ acts were 

felonious, Mosher has sufficiently alleged the City’s knowledge of the Officers’ propensity 

for such acts. Therefore, Mosher’s allegations would overcome the immunity bar imposed 

under § 12-805.05(B) as it applies to his negligent training and supervision claim. Thus, 

the remaining inquiry for the Court is simply whether Mosher has sufficiently pleaded his 

negligence claim.

Defendants did not initially challenge the sufficiency of Mosher’s negligence 

allegations, but in their Reply brief assert that a direct negligence claim against the City 

ought to fail because Mosher only offers generalized, cursory allegations. (Doc. 84 at 8.)

For a negligent supervision claim, “the plaintiff must allege that an employee committed a 

tort, that the defendant employer had a reason and opportunity to act, and that the defendant 

failed to perform its duty to supervise.” Kuehn v. Stanley, 91 P.3d 346, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2004). To state a claim for negligent training, a plaintiff must allege facts regarding the 

training that a defendant's employees received and showing that a defendant's training or 

lack thereof was negligent. Perry v. Arizona, CV-15-01338-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 

4095835, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2016) (citing Cotta v. County of Kings, 

1:13-cv-00359-LJO-SMS, 2013 WL 3213075, at *16 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2013) (dismissing 

negligent training and supervision claim where complaint did not allege facts regarding the 

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training of prison personnel)).

Defendants rely, in part, on in Davis v. City of Glendale, No. CV-23-00016-PHXDWL, 2023 WL 5333259, *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2023), wherein the Court found the 

allegations for a negligent hiring claim “wholly conclusory” and “broad, boilerplate 

allegations entirely lacking specificity.” Those allegations included claims that the 

defendant City:

[N]egligently hired, trained, supervised and/or retained the officers involved 

in the subject incident by: 

a. Implementing, maintaining and tolerating policies, practices and customs 

which contributed to the illegal and negligent actions of the officers . . . ;

b. Hiring the officers without reasonably investigating or adequately 

determining their propensity for the type of improper conduct which they 

committed against Plaintiff . . . ;

c. Failing to adequately train or supervise the officers . . . ;

d. Failing to adequately discipline, demote and/or terminate the officers for 

any improper conduct prior to the incident at issue . . . [.]

Id. Here, Mosher alleges that the City owed him a duty of care, the City breached that duty 

by failing to adequately train or supervise officers like Alexander and Wick, and as a result, 

the Officers used unreasonable, excessive force on him. (Doc. 70 at 7–8 ¶¶ 83–87.) 

Mosher also alleges that the City knew that officers, like Alexander and Wick, who worked 

on their task force repeatedly used excessive force. (Doc. 70 at 8 ¶ 86.) Unlike the 

complaint in Davis, Mosher’s allegations name the specific officers the City failed to train, 

identifies the task forces in which they work, and identifies the execution of the vehicle 

containment technique as an example of where the City has fallen short. Cf. Davis, 2023 

WL 5333259, at *7; Baker v. Tevault, No. CV 20-01960-PHX-JAT (JZB), 2021 WL 

1171492, *8 (D. Ariz. 2021) (dismissing a negligent hiring claim where the complaint was 

“devoid of any factual bases plausibly supporting the assertions of multiple prior violations 

. . . [and] no facts from which to infer that the City knew of and negligently failed to address 

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[the issue]”) In short, accepting the allegations in the SAC as true, Mosher has put forth 

sufficient factual basis to establish his negligent hiring or supervision claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 75).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Count III of Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint with prejudice.

Dated this 9th day of December, 2024.

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