Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01010/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01010-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARIN A. PALERMO,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05 CV 1010 LJO WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is challenging a disciplinary action, the hearing for which occurred on August 19,

2002. Petitioner’s administrative appeal was denied at the Director’s Level on December 23, 2002.

On April 30, 2003, 128 days after his administrative appeal was denied, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in superior court. The petition was denied on June 2, 2003. Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court Appeal, which was denied on August 29,

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2003. Petitioner subsequent petition to the California Supreme Court was summarily denied on

August 18, 2004. That decision was final when it was issued. Cal.R.Ct. 8.532(b)(2)(C). The

present petition was filed on August 5, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

 JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the violations alleged arises out of the California

Medical Facility at Vacaville, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Petitioner is challenging a 2002 disciplinary action taken against him. Respondent contends

that the petition must be dismissed because it was filed beyond the one-year limitations period set

forth in the AEDPA. Petitioner opposes the motion.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In the present case, Petitioner’s administrative appeal was denied on December 23, 2002, and

the limitations period ran from then until he filed his superior court petition on April 20, 2003, 128

days later. The limitations period was tolled while he pursued his state court remedies until August

18, 2004, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition. The statute of limitations then

began running again. However, Petitioner waited 352 days, until August 5, 2005, before filing the

present federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Thus, a total of 480 days elapsed before the

present petition was filed and, as Respondent argues, it is untimely under the statute of limitations

set forth above.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to the mailbox rule

in regard to date of filing of both his superior court petition and the present federal petition. See

Houston v. Lack , 4878 U.S. 266 (1988). The court agrees, but finds that the total difference of 7

days does not bring the filing of the present petition for writ of habeas corpus within the one-year

statute of limitations. Petitioner contends further that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

because he was ignorant of the law, unaware of the relevant statute of limitations, and dependent on

his fellow inmates for legal assistance. Petitioner’s claims of ignorance of the law and illiteracy are

insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d

905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but th

insufficient to establish cause); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000) (ignorance of th

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

law not does not excuse prompt filing). Further, a lack of legal assistance is generally insufficient to

justify tolling the statute of limitations. See, Hughes v. Idaho Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905,

909 (9 Cir. 1986). Petitioner is only entitled to a reasonably adequate opportunity to present his th

claims to the courts, see, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996), not to the

assistance of someone trained in the law. Id. at 356, 360. Finally, Petitioner contends that there

was no notice in any of the law libraries in the prisons where he was housed to alert any inmate to

the existence of a statute of limitations governing the filing of federal habeas petitions. Petitioner,

however, is not entitled to “notice” from any prison law library of the existence of any particular

statute of limitations. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10 Cir. 1998) (lack of relevant th

statutes and case law or procedure to request specific materials did not excuse untimely filing). The

court finds, therefore, that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling. 

In light of the above, the court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling and that this petition for writ of habeas corpus is therefore barred by the statute of

limitations found in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1). Accordingly, the court must recommend that the

petition be dismissed as untimely.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED:

2) this petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations;

3) Respondent’s request be GRANTED and the named Respondent in this action be amended to

Warden Schwartz;

4) the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01010-LJO-WMW Document 18 Filed 01/09/08 Page 6 of 6