Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00606/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00606-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN ROCHA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

NEIL MCDOWELL, Warden,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-CV-00606-GPC-AGS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

[Dkt. No. 24]:

(1) GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED PETITION 

[Dkt. No. 20]

(2) GRANTING MOTION TO HOLD 

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION IN 

ABEYANCE

[Dkt. No. 14]

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Juan Rocha, proceeding with counsel, filed a motion for leave to file his 

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“SAP”). Dkt. No. 20. Rocha 

previously amended his claims on August 1, 2016 when he filed a First Amended 

Petition. Dkt. No. 13. He also requests that the Court hold his SAP in abeyance while he 

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exhausts the latter two claims. Dkt. No. 14. United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. 

Stormes filed a Report and Recommendation granting petitioner’s motions for leave to 

file a second amended petition and motion to hold his habeas petition in abeyance while

he exhausts in state court. Based on the reasoning below, the Court ADOPTS the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS the petitioner’s motion for 

leave to file a second amended petition, and GRANTS the petitioner’s motion for stay 

and abeyance. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2016, Rocha filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. Dkt. No. 1. On August 1, 2016, Rocha filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”), 

Dkt. No. 13, and a motion to stay his federal habeas petition while he exhausted his state 

claims, Dkt. No. 14. 

Petitioner raised seven grounds for relief in the FAP: (1) insufficient evidence for 

charge of second degree murder; (2) insufficient evidence to warrant gang enhancement; 

(3) failure to instruct on primary activities of a criminal street gang; (4) failure to instruct 

jury on meaning of “gang allegations”; (5) failure to instruct jury on lesser included 

offense of involuntary manslaughter; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

request an instruction on involuntary manslaughter; (7) deprivation of Sixth Amendment 

right to confront the gang expert who testified with hearsay (as to petitioner’s gang 

membership). Dkt. No. 13. 

On September 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second 

amended petition. Dkt. No. 20. Petitioner’s SAP raises the previous seven grounds for 

habeas relief and adds (8) deprivation of Sixth Amendment right to confront the gang 

expert who testified with hearsay (as to gang’s predicate offenses). Petitioner is currently 

pursuing his unexhausted habeas claims in state court. Pet.’s Status Report, Dkt. No. 26.

On November 14, 2016, Magistrate Judge Stormes filed a Report and 

Recommendation granting the petitioner’s motion for leave to file a second amended 

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petition, which applies to the filing of both the first and second amended petitions,1and 

his motion for stay and abeyance. Dkt. No. 24. No objections have been filed to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “A judge of the court shall make a 

de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 

614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely objection, as is the case 

here, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

notes. When no objections are filed, a district court may assume the correctness of the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition

1. Legal Standard

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as 

provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, courts should give leave to amend freely “when justice so requires.” 

When ruling on a motion to amend, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly stressed that the 

 

1 Due to earlier confusion concerning whether Respondent consented to Petitioner filing his FAP (which 

the Magistrate Judge granted over Respondent’s objection), the Magistrate Judge ruled on Petitioner’s 

SAP as though it sought to amend the two claims originally introduced by the FAP and the additional 

claim named in the SAP. In other words, because the Magistrate Judge mistakenly thought that 

Respondent had no objections to the filing of the FAP, the Magistrate took the Report and 

Recommendation as an opportunity to assess whether all three of the claims should be amended to the 

original habeas petition. R&R, Dkt. No. 24 at 3 n.1. The Court’s analysis follows suit.

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court must remain guided by the underlying purpose of rule 15,” that is, “to facilitate 

decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 

808 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). However, a court may deny a motion to 

amend if it is made in bad faith, there was undue delay, prejudice would result to the 

opposing party, amendment would be futile, or amendment would delay the proceeding. 

See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Nunes, 375 F.3d at 808. Futility alone is 

a sufficient basis for denying a motion to amend. Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 

1020 (9th Cir. 2015). 

2. Discussion

 In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concludes that there was 

no evidence to indicate that Petitioner had made either amendment in bad faith, that he 

had acted with undue delay, or that the amendment would significantly delay these 

proceedings. The Court agrees. 

Petitioner’s original habeas petition was filed on March 10, 2016, and in it, 

Petitioner moved for five separate grounds for relief. Dkt. No. 1. According to a letter 

written by Petitioner’s prior counsel, the original petition was a “bare minimum,” filed

“just to prevent the [AEDPA] deadline from expiring.” Dkt. No 23-1.

2 After substituting 

in new counsel on April 6, 2016, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition on August 1, 

2016, which contained the five original claims, plus two new ones. The Second 

Amended Petition was filed about a month later, on September 2, 2016, and contained an 

eighth claim. Not even six months passed between the time that Petitioner filed his 

original habeas petition and the time he filed his SAP. As such, the Court concurs in the 

Magistrate’s assessment that there is no evidence of bad faith or undue delay. 

Having found these factors to be neutral, the Magistrate Judge focused on 

Respondent’s argument that granting leave to amend would nonetheless be futile because 

 

2

Indeed, as Respondent points out, Petitioner’s previous counsel filed his habeas petition on the last day 

of AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. See Dkt. No. 22 at 1. 

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the statute of limitations for filing the amended claims had run. The Magistrate Judge 

concluded that it was not clear, based upon the parties’ arguments, that amendment 

would be futile. For the following reasons, the Court agrees. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), “a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” has a “1-year period of limitation” to 

petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). That one-year 

statutory limit “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). Litigants seeking equitable tolling bear the “burden of 

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

418 (2005). 

Respondent argues that granting leave to amend would be futile because Petitioner 

does not appear to warrant equitable tolling, as he was “represented by counsel since the 

time of filing.” Dkt. No. 18 at 2. Respondent further faults Petitioner for not addressing 

equitable tolling in his second motion to amend the habeas petition. Dkt. No. 22 at 3; see

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating equitable 

tolling). The Court observes, however, that contrary to what Respondent suggests, 

Petitioner did raise the issue of equitable tolling in his Motion to File a Second Amended 

Petition, albeit in a cursory fashion.

3

 See Dkt. No. 20 at 5 (“The March 10 letter shows 

that counsel only filed a form petition after retaining the records of the appeal for the 

entire time of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Equitable tolling right up to and 

including March 10, 2016 is eminently available under that circumstance.”). As such,

given the limited briefing on equitable tolling currently before the Court, the Court finds 

that the administration of justice is better served by allowing Petitioner’s SAP to be filed 

without prejudice as to any future timeliness challenge. See Day v. McDonough, 547 

 

3 The Court further observes that the R&R misspoke when it stated that Petitioner had not raised the 

issue of equitable tolling in his moving papers. See R&R, Dkt. No. 24 at 4. 

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U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (recognizing that district courts may, in certain cases, exercise 

discretion to decide whether justice is better served by dismissing the case on statute of 

limitations grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition). 

Both the futility and prejudice inquiries support this conclusion. First, the Court 

notes that its conclusion does not prejudice Respondent, as Respondent is still free to 

assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its answer or by way of 

motion to dismiss. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman

factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to 

amend.”) (emphasis in original). Two, the Court notes that its decision to allow the SAP 

to be filed comports with the permissive standard of Rule 15(a), which is broad enough to 

permit courts to defer considering challenges to an amended pleading until after leave to 

amend is granted. See Velasco v. SEI Pharms, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10505, at *4-

5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013) (deferring consideration of respondent’s argument that the 

amended habeas claims were “futile” until after the amended pleading is filed); see also

Netbula v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 538-39 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“A claim is 

considered futile . . . if there is no set of facts which can be proved under the amendment 

which would constitute a valid claim . . . denial of leave to amend on this ground is 

rare.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that neither futility nor prejudice weigh against

allowing leave to file the SAP. The Respondent is free to raise the statute of limitations 

as a defense in a later filing with the Court, at which time both parties can address the 

statute of limitations more fully. See Day, 547 U.S. at 210 (“a court must accord the 

parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions” before “acting on its own 

initiative” as to the statute of limitations).

B. Motion for Stay and Abeyance

1. Legal Standard

A state prisoner cannot petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus until he 

exhausts all state remedies, “giving the State ‘the opportunity to pass upon and correct 

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alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal citation omitted). Ordinarily, exhaustion requires 

that the petitioner “fairly present his federal claim to the highest state court with 

jurisdiction to consider it,” or that “he demonstrate[] no state remedy remains available.” 

Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 868 (9th Cir. 2007). The exhaustion requirement, 

however, is different for mixed habeas petitions, that is, petitions containing both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims. When a petitioner files a mixed petition, a district 

court has discretion to stay and hold the unexhausted claims in abeyance until those 

claims are completely exhausted, as long as the petitioner shows (1) “good cause for . . . 

the failure to exhaust his claims first in state court”; (2) that “his unexhausted claims are 

potentially meritorious”; and (3) that “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005).

A showing of “good cause turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a 

reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify that failure.” Blake v. 

Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Rhiner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 

1207, 1211 (D. Nev. 2006) (“[T]he good cause standard applicable in consideration of a 

request for stay and abeyance of a federal habeas petition requires the petitioner to show 

that he was prevented from raising the claims . . . by circumstances over which he had 

little or no control, such as the actions of counsel . . . when petitioner had no knowledge 

of the claim’s existence.”)

2. Discussion

Petitioner asks to add three new grounds for relief through his amended petition:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request an instruction on involuntary 

manslaughter; (2) deprivation of confrontation right through the improper admittance of 

hearsay testimony that petitioner was a “Carlsbad gang member for most of his life”; and

(3) deprivation of confrontation right through the improper admittance of hearsay 

testimony regarding petitioner’s alleged gang activity. 

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Beginning with the third Rhines factor, the Court concludes that there is no 

evidence that Petitioner has engaged in dilatory tactics by seeking to amend his petition. 

A court’s discretion to stay and abey is limited by concerns of timeliness, as some 

prisoners “might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and 

avoid execution of the sentence of death.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. Here, however, 

Petitioner has no reason to indefinitely prolong his federal habeas review as he is not 

facing the death sentence. The Court moreover concludes that Petitioner’s prompt 

initiation of state post-conviction proceedings militates against any finding of dilatory 

tactics. The first of the three claims that Petitioner seeks to amend (i.e., the IAC claim) 

has already been exhausted, and the latter two Sixth Amendment claims are already under 

review in the state post-conviction process. R&R, Dkt. No. 24 at 6 (citing Pet.’s Mot. to 

Stay, Dkt. No. 14 at 4). As such, the Court finds that there is no basis for concluding that 

the current motion to stay, filed just four months after new counsel was procured, was the 

result of dilatory measures. 

Next, the Court must consider whether any unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious. Courts may deny a petition on the merits only when it is “perfectly clear 

that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Here, the record supports finding that the three claims Petitioner seeks to 

amend are potentially meritorious. To demonstrate the merits of his IAC claim, 

Petitioner attached the dissent from the appellate court’s ruling on his direct appeal, 

which clearly states that the jury should have received an involuntary manslaughter

instruction. R&R, Dkt. No. 24 at 6. The dissent’s strong disagreement with the appellate 

court’s conclusion suggests that Petitioner’s claim has, at the very least, the potential to 

be meritorious. As for the merits of his confrontation right claims, Petitioner points to 

the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Sanchez. Sanchez

overturned street gang enhancement findings based on the use of hearsay testimony by

police officers because the practice violates gang members’ Sixth Amendment rights to 

confront the witnesses against them. 63 Cal. 4th 665, 699 (2016). Given the relevance of 

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the Sanchez holding to Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claims, the Court finds that both 

claims are equally, potentially meritorious. 

Finally, Petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust his 

claims in state court prior to filing them in federal court. “An assertion of good cause 

without evidentiary support will not typically amount to a reasonable excuse justifying a 

petitioner’s failure to exhaust.” Blake, 745 F.3d at 981. Yet “[w]hile a bald assertion 

cannot amount to a showing of good cause, a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence 

to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, will.” Id.

Here, Petitioner has provided a declaration from trial counsel stating that he had no 

strategic reason for not providing the jury with an involuntary manslaughter instruction. 

Pet.’s Mot. to Stay, Dkt. No. 14-2 at 1. Petitioner has also provided the Court with a 

declaration from appellate counsel stating that he had no tactical reason for not raising the 

Sixth Amendment issues raised by grounds seven and eight of Rocha’s amended petition

previously. Id., Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 20-1 at 16-17. In light of these 

declarations, and the fact that Petitioner has already begun to exhaust grounds seven and

eight in state court post-conviction proceedings, the Court concludes that Petitioner has 

demonstrated a reasonable excuse, supported by record evidence, for not failing to 

exhaust. Accordingly, this Court finds that good cause exists to hold this petition in 

abeyance while Petitioner continues to exhaust his last two claims in state court. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge, and: 

A. GRANTS petitioner’s motion for leave to file the SAP, without prejudice to 

Respondent filing a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations;

B. GRANTS the motion for stay and abeyance and STAYS the case;

C. ORDERS Petitioner to file a notice to lift the stay within 10 days of the 

California Supreme Court ruling on the unexhausted claims;

D. ORDERS that the stay be lifted when appropriate; 

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E. ORDERS Respondent to file a responsive pleading within 30 days of the stay 

being lifted; and 

F. DENIES Petitioner’s March 1, 2016 motion for extension of time to file 

additional briefing as moot (Dkt. No. 30). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2017

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