Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05481/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Broadcast Music Incorporated, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

KCS Holdings LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-05481-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

This case was filed on October 23, 2019. (Doc. 1.) The Court has had no 

involvement in this case before now, aside from issuing its standard preliminary order. 

(Doc. 10.) On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed notices that service had been executed as 

to each defendant. (Docs. 12, 13, 14.) No defendant filed a response to the complaint.

Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to entry of a consent judgment 

(Doc. 15), in which the parties request that the Court decree that “Plaintiff Broadcast 

Music, Inc. licenses the right of public performance, and the other Plaintiffs own the 

copyrights, in the following musical compositions: Ms. New Booty; We Fly High; Badd; 

and My Boo,”1that “Defendants have knowingly and willfully infringed the copyrights in 

these musical compositions,” and that “Plaintiffs shall recover from Defendants KSC 

Holdings, LLC, Clinton T. Underhill, and Kimberly A. Underhill, jointly and severally, 

statutory damages in the amount of $78,000.00, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).” (Doc. 

15-1 at 1). The parties propose that the Court retain jurisdiction over this matter for 

1 The Court has no knowledge as to whether this is true and the parties’ stipulation 

does not suffice to establish this as a fact warranting a court decree.

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enforcement of the consent judgment. (Doc. 15-1 at 2.)

“A consent decree is no more than a settlement that contains an injunction.” Fed. 

Trade Comm’n v. Enforma Nat. Prod., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, “[w]hen the settlement involves no

injunctive relief but simply the payment of money, the often-used term is ‘consent 

judgment.’” Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and 

Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 277 n.2 (2010). In 

other words, a “consent judgment” is merely a run-of-the-mill monetary settlement that 

carries the full force of a court order. The order can be enforced through the Court’s 

contempt power, id. at 277-88, and it ensures that the parties can return to federal court to 

enforce the settlement, id. at 293-95.

Where a consent decree includes non-monetary terms providing injunctive relief 

and the issuing court has been involved in the matter, the federal judge’s familiarity with 

the case makes a return to federal court beneficial. Id. at 295. A consent judgment, on the 

other hand, merely involves the payment of money and “does not implicate any issues 

within the expertise of federal judges.” Id. 

Although it is true that a federal court may retain jurisdiction over a case that has 

settled, this is not the usual approach. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 

375, 381-82 (1994) (“[A]utomatic jurisdiction over such contracts is in no way essential to 

the conduct of federal-court business. If the parties wish to provide for the court’s 

enforcement of a dismissal-producing settlement agreement, they can seek to do so.”). 

Thus, “if parties wish to have a district court retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, they 

must apply for that relief and allow the court to make a reasoned determination as to 

whether retention is appropriate.” Cross Media Marketing Corp. v. Budget Marketing, 

Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A district court may “properly decline to 

retain jurisdiction where the administration of a settlement threatened to impose undue 

burdens on it.” Id. See also Camacho v. City of San Luis, 359 Fed. App’x 794, 798 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“[I]t was the court’s prerogative not to retain jurisdiction over any disputes 

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raised by the [settlement].”).

The Court has had no involvement in this case and perceives no reason to retain 

jurisdiction over the settlement by means of issuing a consent judgment. Of course the 

parties are free to enter into a private settlement contract and may stipulate to dismissal of 

the case, if they wish to do so.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulation to entry of a consent judgment (Doc. 

15) is denied.

Dated this 5th day of February, 2020.

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