Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_02-cv-01369/USCOURTS-almd-2_02-cv-01369-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES PERKINS, )

AIS #169906, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:02-CV-1369-T

) WO

)

PAUL WHALEY, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Charles Perkins [“Perkins”], a state inmate, contends

that the defendant violated his constitutional rights during the classification process. Paul

Whaley, the Director of Classification for the Alabama Department of Corrections, remains

as the sole defendant in this cause of action.

Defendant Whaley filed special reports and supporting evidentiary materials

addressing the plaintiff’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered herein, the court

deems it appropriate to treat these special reports as a motion for summary judgment. See

Order of March 3, 2003 - Court Doc. No. 10 and Order of May 16, 2005 - Court Doc. No.

33. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Upon

consideration of such motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the

plaintiff’s responses in opposition to the motion, the court concludes that the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

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This conviction arose from the murder of the plaintiff’s nephew, Rochester Perkins, which occurred

during what can best be characterized as an ongoing “family feud” between Perkins and his sister, the victim’s

mother. “The on scene investigation and subsequent post mortem examination revealed that Rochester

Perkins was in the rear yard of the residence [he shared with his mother] raking leaves when he was either

confronted by or saw his assailant entering the yard through a trail in the wooded area at the rear of [the]

residence. Rochester attempted to escape into the house by the rear door and was shot in the back by a high

powered rifle. He was able to make it into the house and dialed 911 to seek assistance. . . . [Emergency

Personnel responded] and were present while Rochester was being treated on the scene. When asked by Fire

Medic York, Rochester stated that his Uncle Charles Perkins had shot him. Rochester [subsequently] died

in surgery.” Attachment to Defendant’s Exhibit A - Investigation Report of the Alabama Board of Pardons

and Paroles at 3. 

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“In the past, the ADOC used the term ‘heinous’ to describe offenders whose crimes are considered

to have involved certain aggravated circumstances. ADOC modified that terminology in May 2004 and such

offenders are now considered ‘restricted,’ meaning that they cannot be considered for any custody, program,

or assignment that would permit them unsupervised access to the public. Thus, Perkins is now classified as

a restricted offender, not a heinous offender.” Defendant’s Exhibit B - May 12, 2005 Affidavit of Paul

Whaley. 

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I. FACTS

In 1992, a jury sitting before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama convicted

Perkins of conspiracy to commit murder.1 The trial court sentenced Perkins to life

imprisonment for this conviction. During his incarceration on this offense, correctional

officials utilized the facts underlying this 1992 conviction to classify Perkins as a heinous

offender and thereafter as a restricted offender.2

The plaintiff complains that defendant Whaley relied on false information to deny him

a less restrictive custody classification. He further argues that his classification as a heinous

or restricted offender deprives him of due process as he does not meet the requirements for

this classification designation. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff is required to produce some evidence based on personal knowledge which would

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be admissible at trial supporting his constitutional claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Specifically, the plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and . . .

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324. A plaintiff’s conjectural and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient

evidence to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th

Cir. 1995); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, when

a plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to his case, and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes

v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987). Where all admissible

evidentiary materials before the court indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, entry of

summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d

1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Brown

v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). In this case, the plaintiff has failed, after

being afforded an opportunity to do so, to establish that there is a genuine issue as to a

material fact in order to preclude summary judgment.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of a Particular Custody Classification

Perkins complains that he does not meet the criteria for a heinous/restrictive offender

and is entitled to a more favorable custody classification. An inmate in the Alabama prison

system has no constitutionally protected interest in the procedure affecting his classification

because the resulting restraint, without more, does not impose an “atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Thus, Perkins has no constitutionally protected interest in being

granted a particular custody classification and his claim to the contrary is without merit. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147 (11

th Cir. 1988);

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979). 

B. The False Information Claim

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1991), the court held that reliance on

admittedly false information to deny a prisoner consideration for parole was arbitrary and

capricioustreatment violative of the Constitution. However, the court carefully distinguished

its holding from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles,

678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982).

Our holding today does not conflict with our earlier holding in Slocum, supra.

In Slocum, the Plaintiff, who had been denied parole, made the conclusory

allegation that the Board must have relied upon erroneous information because

otherwise the Board would surely have granted him parole. Slocum, 678 F.2d

at 941. The plaintiff then sought to assert a due process right to examine his

prison file for the alleged errors. Unlike the instant case, in Slocum the state

did not admit that it had relied upon false information in denying parole nor

did the plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file even contained any

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3Although in his original affidavit defendant Whaley mistakenly referred to the conviction on which

plaintiff is classified as that of murder, rather than conspiracy to commit murder, Defendant’s Exhibit 1 -

January 23, 2003 Affidavit of Paul Whaley, he subsequently filed corrected affidavits, Defendant’s Exhibit

B and D - May 12, 2005 Affidavits of Paul Whaley, which establish that Perkins’ classification status is based

upon his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder and the details surrounding the commission of this

particular offense. Defendant Whaley also submitted evidentiary materials which demonstrate that

correctional personnel utilized the conspiracy conviction as the basis for each classification decision. See

Defendant’s Exhibit C - Progress Review Forms. 

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false information. We held in Slocum that prisoners do not state a due process

claim by merely asserting that erroneous information may have been used

during their parole consideration. Id. at 942. We also determined that

prisoners do not have a due process right to examine their prison files as part

of a general fishing expedition in search of false information that could

possibly exist in their files. Id. In the case at bar, we are confronted with

prison authorities who admit that information contained in Monroe's files is

false and that they relied upon such information, at least in part, to deny

Monroe parole and to classify him as a sex offender. As we stated, the parole

statute does not authorize state officials to rely on knowingly false information

in their determinations. Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d [487] at 489 [(11th Cir.

1982)].

Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442.

Slocum controls the disposition of the instant case. Defendant Whaley maintains that

the information contained in Perkins’ records is correct and that any reliance on this

information therefore did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. “To my knowledge

the PSI is a true and correct document which is utilized by the sentencing court and which

is furnished to this Department for inclusion into an offender’s file. Further, I have never

knowingly relied upon information I have known to be false in making any determination of

internal classification in the case of Perkins or any other criminal offender.” Defendants’

Exhibit A - February 19, 2003 Affidavit of Paul Whaley.3It is therefore clear from the

foregoing that there is no admission by defendant Whaley that the information on which he

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relied to classify Perkins is false. Moreover, Perkins has failed to come forward with any

evidence that the defendant knowingly used false information during the classification

process. Nevertheless, even without evidence to the contrary, Perkins’ assertion does

nothing more than raise the possibility that information in his records may be false and this

mere possibility fails to provide a basis for relief. Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1142; Jones v. Ray,

279 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[P]risoners cannot make a conclusory allegation regarding

the use of [false] information as the basis of a due process claim.”). Additionally, the law

is well settled that it is the nature and circumstances of a crime, not the type or nomenclature

of the conviction, which legitimately may be used by prison authorities to determine the

custody classification of prisoners and their viability for placement in favorable prison

programs. Cf. Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986).

The record in this case establishes that defendant Whaley did not rely on admittedly

false information to deny Perkins placement in a less restrictive custody classification.

Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a matter of law and summary judgment

is due to be granted in favor of defendant Whaley.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendant.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

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4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before June 15, 2005 the parties shall file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 2nd day of June, 2005.

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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