Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01225/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01225-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVAN A. ADAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-1225 MCE EFB P 

vs.

R. SUBIA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds on his May 5, 2009 fourth amended complaint, wherein he alleges

that defendant Shirley violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and that defendant

Montanez violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

Currently pending is defendants’ January 19, 2010 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit and for failure to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendants also moved to sever misjoined claims or

to drop a misjoined defendant. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust must be granted and defendant’s motion to sever should

therefore be denied as moot.

////

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1

 A “matter in abatement” is “the suspension or defeat of an action for a reason unrelated

to the merits of the claim.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005). It has its

roots in the common-law “plea in abatement,” abolished by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(c). Rule 7

“unceremoniously abolishes a great deal of ancient procedural dogma that has little place in a

streamlined litigation system,” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 3d § 1181, including pleas in abatement. Black’s Law Dictionary 4 (6th ed.

2

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory

and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a

precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to

suit.” (citation omitted)). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis in an action

challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e

when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing any

papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id.

at 1051; McKinney, 311 F.3d 1198. 

The failure to exhaust nonjudicial administrative remedies as required by § 1997e(a) is

not jurisdictional. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor does 

§ 1997e(a) require a plaintiff to plead exhaustion. Id. at 1119. Rather, “§ 1997e(a) creates a

defense – defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit determined in Wyatt that because the defense of failure to exhaust “is not on

the merits” and summary judgment “is on the merits,” the defense should be treated as a matter

in abatement1 to be resolved pursuant to a motion made under “unenumerated Rule 12(b).” Id.

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1990). The “plea in abatement” is an archaic common law “plea which, without disputing merits

of plaintiff’s claim, objects to place, mode or time of asserting it. It allows plaintiff to renew suit

in another place or form, or at another time, and does not assume to answer an action on its

merits, or deny existence of a particular cause of action on which plaintiff relies.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1151 (6th ed. 1990). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 7(c) state that all

statutes using the word “plea” are “modified in form by this rule.” Thus, for example, the

Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (West 2006), which prohibits reversal of a District Court’s

ruling on non-jurisdictional “matters in abatement” in the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of

Appeals states, “Rule7(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished all pleas, and the

rules adopted the motion as a substitute therefor. The words ‘matters in abatement’ were,

therefore substituted for the abolished ‘plea in abatement’ and ‘plea to the jurisdiction.’”

Modernly, a party makes a motion under Rule 12 or Rule 41, as appropriate, instead of making a

plea in abatement. See Black’s Law Dictionary 4, 1151-1152 (6th ed. 1990) (“abatement of

action,” and “plea in abatement”).

3

The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust

nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact.” Id. at 1119-20. However, for the reasons discussed below, standards under Rule 56 must

be applied this “unenumerated Rule 12(b)” motion.

The United States Supreme Court confirmed in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007),

that failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. If the affirmative defense can

be decided on the pleadings alone, i.e. the face of the complaint establishes the fact that there has

been no exhaustion, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id. at 215. Using the example

of a motion to dismiss based on a statute limitations defense, the Court stated: 

A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations,

taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. If the allegations, for

example, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim; that does not make

the statute of limitations any less an affirmative defense, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

8(c). Whether a particular ground for opposing a claim may be the basis for

dismissal for failure to state a claim depends on whether the allegations in the

complaint suffice to establish that ground, not on the nature of the ground in the

abstract.

Id. 

However, where the facts supporting the affirmative defense are not established by the

allegations of the complaint and instead require the presentation of evidence outside the

pleadings (including failure to exhaust as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) a motion raising the

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2

 As discussed above, the reasoning in Wyatt for adhering to Rule 12(b) appears to have

been that frequently a motion for “summary judgment is on the merits,” and a failure to exhaust

is independent of the substantive claims before the court. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. But, a

motion asserting an affirmative defense, even when it does not address the merits of the

substantive claims, should be brought under Rule 56 if the motion relies upon matters extrinsic

to the complaint to establish the factual predicate for the defense. Motions challenging

exhaustion of administrative remedies frequently rely on declarations and exhibits that are

extrinsic to the complaint.

3

 Several other Circuits have applied summary judgment principles when the defense of

failure to exhaust cannot be decided on the pleadings. See Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310

(2d Cir. 2006) (addressing exhaustion at summary judgment); Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637,

639 (3d Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of summary judgment on exhaustion and remanding for

further proceedings); Hinojosa v. Johnson, 277 Fed. Appx. 370, 379-80 (5th Cir. May 1, 2008)

(addressing exhaustion at summary judgment); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697-98 (8th Cir.

2001) (reviewing evidence elicited at trial as to whether prisoner exhausted available remedies);

Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing exhaustion

at summary judgment); but see Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that

PLRA exhaustion should be treated as a matter in abatement and should be decided on a Rule

12(b) motion, even when factual disputes exist); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008)

(rejecting the summary judgment and the Rule 12(b) approaches to PLRA exhaustion and instead

determining that once a PLRA exhaustion defense is raised, a special evidentiary hearing should

be held to address that defense before litigation on the merits proceeds). 

4

defense is properly considered under the standards for summary judgment, with disputed

material factual issues reserved for trial.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (where a party presents

affidavits or other matters outside the pleadings in support of its motion, the court must treat the

motion “as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”), 56(b); Panero v. City of North Las

Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2005).3 These fundamental principles under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure are not changed by the PLRA. The Supreme Court in Jones made clear

that, “beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself,” nothing in the PLRA suggests that

usual procedural practices should not be followed and cautioned that departures from the usual

procedural requirements are to be expressly made by Congress. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212, 214-16.

Thus, it appears that the requirement under Rule 12(b) that motions raising affirmative

defenses that require the submission of declarations or other matters extrinsic to the complaint

require that the motion be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, applies to motions

raising the failure a of prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit

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4

 Thus, whether a motion for failure to exhaust under the PLRA may be raised under

Rule 12 or Rule 56 is not determined by whether the defense asserted in the motion goes to the

“merits” of the claim. Regardless of whether judgment is sought on the merits or whether the

motion seeks to bar consideration of the merits based on a technical ground that precludes

reaching the merits (i.e., exhaustion, issue or claim preclusion, a statute of limitations, etc.), the

determining factor is whether the factual predicate for the motion is based on the text of the

pleading or instead depends upon evidence submitted with the motion. See Jones, 549 U.S. at

215 (“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as

true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”).

5

stated in Wyatt that when the district court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record, which

commonly occurs in deciding an exhaustion motion, the court must do so under “a procedure

closely analogous to summary judgment.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120, n.14.4

Here, defendant’s motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and

exhibits presented for the purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court

analyzes the motion, as Wyatt suggests, under a standard “closely analogous to summary

judgment.” 315 F.3d at 1120, n.14. If, under that standard, the court concludes that the prisoner

has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Id. at 1119-20.

B. Summary Judgment Standards

Under Rule 56, resolution of the exhaustion issue in favor of defendants is appropriate

when it is demonstrated that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” over the question. 

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus,

the rule functions to”‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is

a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those

portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070,

1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported

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motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir.1995).

For the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of fact the factual dispute must meet

two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that is material, i.e. one that makes a

difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248 (“Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is material is

determined by the substantive law, which here involves the question of whether plaintiff has met

the exhaustion requirement. Id. (“As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts

are material.”)

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In this regard, the court must focus on which party

bears the burden of proof on the factual dispute in question. Where the opposing party bears the

burden of proof on the issue in dispute, conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material,

are insufficient to defeat the motion. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). 

Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux,

263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the record relied

on by the opposing party must be such that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him]

on the evidence presented.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. If the

evidence presented could not support a judgment in that party’s favor, there is no genuine issue. 

Id.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323.

Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen cases lacking any genuine dispute over an issue that

affects the outcome of the case.

On August 31, 2009, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as well as a motion

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7

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry,

849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120, n.14. 

C. Exhaustion Under California Law

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). 

To initiate the process, an inmate must fill out a simple form, Dept. of

Corrections, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, CDC 602 (12/87) (hereinafter Form

602), that is made “readily available to all inmates.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.1(c) (2004). The inmate must fill out two parts of the form: part A, which is

labeled “Describe Problem,” and part B, which is labeled “Action Requested.” 

Then, as explained on Form 602 itself, the prisoner “must first informally seek

relief through discussion with the appropriate staff member.” [] The staff member

fills in part C of Form 602 under the heading “Staff Response” and then returns

the form to the inmate.

If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the result of the informal review, or if informal

review is waived by the State, the inmate may pursue a three-step review process. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.5(b)-(d). Although California labels this

three-step process “formal” review (apparently to distinguish this process from

the prior step), the three-step process is relatively simple. At the first level, the

prisoner must fill in part D of Form 602, which states: “If you are dissatisfied,

explain below.” [ ] The inmate then must submit the form, together with a few

other documents, to the Appeals Coordinator within 15 working days-three

weeks-of the action taken. Id., § 3084.6(c). This level may be bypassed by the

Appeals Coordinator in certain circumstances. Id., § 3084.5(b). Within 15 workdays after an inmate submits an appeal, the reviewer must inform the inmate of

the outcome by completing part E of Form 602 and returning the form to the

inmate.

If the prisoner receives an adverse determination at this first level, or if this level

is bypassed, the inmate may proceed to the second level of review conducted by

the warden. Id., §§ 3084.5(c), (e)(1). The inmate does this by filling in part F of

Form 602 and submitting the form within fifteen work-days of the prior decision. 

Within ten working days thereafter, the reviewer provides a decision on a letter

that is attached to the form. If the prisoner’s claim is again denied or the prisoner

otherwise is dissatisfied with the result, the prisoner must explain the basis for his

or her dissatisfaction on part H of the form and mail the form to the Director of

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation within 15 working

days. Id., § 3084.5(e)(2). An inmate’s appeal may be rejected where “[t]ime

limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded and the appellant had the

opportunity to file within the prescribed time constraints.” Id., § 3084.3(c)(6). 

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8

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86 (2006). Generally, completion of the third level, the

Director’s Level of Review, exhausts the remedy. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). All steps

must be completed before a civil rights action is filed, unless a plaintiff demonstrates a step is

unavailable to him; exhaustion during the pendency of the litigation will not save an action from

dismissal. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200. The claim must be properly exhausted; therefore, an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal does not satisfy

the exhaustion requirement. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83-84.

II. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2006, while confined in a holding cage for three to five

hours, defendant Shirley denied and laughed at plaintiff’s repeated requests to use the restroom

facilities, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff informed Shirley of his inability to hold his urine

because of his benign prostrate hypertrophy and possible bladder cancer. Dckt No. 31, ¶¶ 9, 11. 

Plaintiff alleges that Shirley then escorted him to administrative segregation in front of “C” yard

inmates, while plaintiff was wearing only soiled boxers, a t-shirt and boots. Id. ¶ 13. Next,

plaintiff alleges that Shirley strip-searched him, seized all of his property and ignored his

requests for a “fish-kit” containing certain hygiene materials. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges he is a

practicing Tibetan Gelugpa Buddhist, and that while housed in administrative segregation from

April 6, 2006 through April 27, 2006, defendant Montanez repeatedly denied plaintiff’s requests

for his religious items, including his Buddhist prayer book, prayer beads, and his Tibetan Lunar

Calendar. Id. ¶¶ 17-19.

On June 24, 2009, the court found that the fourth amended complaint stated a cognizable

claim against defendant Shirley for violating plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights as well as a

cognizable claim against defendant Montanez for violating plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

Dckt. No. 32; see also Dckt. No. 28 at 9-10 (order granting plaintiff leave to file a fourth

amended complaint limited to Eighth Amendment claim against Shirley and claim against

Montanez regarding the events that transpired between April 6, 2006 and April 27, 2006).

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5

 While Foston purports to attach a copy of this grievance to his declaration as Exhibit A,

no exhibit is attached. See Foston Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff, however, submitted a copy of the

grievance with his opposition brief. See Dckt. No. 45 at 37-38. 

9

III. Discussion 

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing suit, and therefore, his complaint must be dismissed. Defs.’ Mot. to Dism. (“Mot.”), Mem.

of P. & A. in Supp. Thereof (“Defs.’ P. & A.”) at 3. Specifically, defendants contend that the

only grievance plaintiff filed that actually addressed his allegations against Shirley and

Montanez, is not sufficient to exhaust plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 4.

Defendants submit the declaration of R. Burton, appeals coordinator at Mule Creek State

Prison in Ione, California, where the events giving rise to this action allegedly occurred. Id.,

Decl. of R. Burton ¶ 1. Burton indicates that he is familiar with the record keeping system at

Mule Creek, and can verify the status of an inmate’s formal and second-level appeals. Id. ¶ 5. 

Burton states the he searched the records at Mule Creek to determine whether plaintiff filed an

appeal regarding the claims alleged in the complaint, and found that plaintiff filed only one such

appeal that was accepted at the First or Second Level of review. Id. ¶ 7 (referring to Mule Creek

State Prison Log Number 06-00818, discussed below).

Defendants also submit the declaration of D. Foston, the Chief of the Inmate Appeals

Branch in Sacramento California, which reviews all inmate appeals filed at the Director’s Level

of Review. Id., Decl. of D. Foston (“Foston Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 4. Foston indicates that he too has

searched the records for appeals accepted from plaintiff concerning the allegations raised in the

complaint. Id. ¶ 6. His search revealed that plaintiff submitted only one such appeal that was

accepted for review at the Director’s Level. Id. (also referring to Mule Creek State Prison Log

Number 06-00818).5

 Id. In this appeal, plaintiff stated:

I appeal the act(s) decision(s) of Warden R. Campbell and all staff under his

command/control involved in deliberately loosing [sic] my personal property

when being transported only wearing boxers and Tshirt and boots to AD-SEG

04-06-06 by c/o Shirlee, Duclose and Castro. I spoke to AD-SEG c/o Montanez

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 Not all of the pages of the opposition brief and exhibits are numbered. Accordingly, the

court has numbered them sequentially as pages 1 through 53. 

10

who doesn’t acknowledge receiving any property as claimed by c/o Shirlee. 

Property consists of, but isn’t limited to, prescription transitional white metal

framed glasses; gray turtle neck sweat top; BLK bic pen; legal notes; copy of 115;

CCR Title 15; Holds cold tabs; medically prescribed insoles; I/D card; copy of

chronos.

 

Dckt. No. 45 at 37, § A.6 As a remedy, plaintiff requested the “immediate return of [his] legal

property or fair market value of its replacement” and added that his “notes and copies are

irreplaceable and need to be returned.” Id.

Defendants argue that this appeal relates only to an alleged loss of personal property, and

that it would not have put the institution on notice of plaintiff’s claims that defendant Montanez

wrongfully denied plaintiff access to his religious property or that defendant Shirley denied him

access to restroom facilities, escorted him in soiled boxers, subjected him to an unclothed body

search and denied his request for a “fish-kit” containing hygiene supplies. Defs.’ P. & A. at 4-5. 

Therefore, defendants contend that the problem described in the appeal was insufficient to

exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies. Defendants note that while the appeal mentions the

April 6, 2006 escort, plaintiff did not suggest that the escort was wrongful, or otherwise provide

any facts that would have alerted staff of a potential Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 5. 

Indeed, this appeal did not exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies, as it would not notify the

prison of the problem described by plaintiff in the instant complaint, i.e., that Montanez violated

plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise right or that Shirley acted with deliberate indifference

in violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies

where it fails to “‘alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’”)

(citation omitted).

In opposition, plaintiff asserts that defendants refused his repeated requests for an appeal

form, thereby making the grievance process unavailable to him. Dckt. No. 45 at 9-10. Plaintiff

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 Plaintiff attached copies of various inmate appeals to his opposition brief. Although

plaintiff does not argue that any of these appeals exhausted his administrative remedies, the court

has, in an abundance of caution, reviewed them and determined that none of them would serve to

exhaust the administrative remedies as to the claims raised in the instant complaint.

8

 While this grievance would not serve to exhaust plaintiff’s claims because (1) it would

not alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought, and (2) because there

is no evidence that it was accepted for review at the Director’s Level, the court is troubled by the

fact that Burton failed to mention it in his declaration, as it includes plaintiff’s complaints about

the handling of his personal property by Shirley and Montanez on April 6th, and without

suggesting it was wrongful, references Shirley’s alleged strip search. See Dckt. No. 45 at 49-50.

11

is not specific as to when he purportedly requested such forms. However, plaintiff indicates that

the forms are provided in the “fish-kits” that are “normally given to ad-seg admittees,” which

plaintiff alleges, the defendants refused to provide to him during the period of April 6, 2006

through April 27, 2006, when he was housed in administrative segregation. Dckt. No. 31, ¶¶ 15,

17-18; Dckt. No. 45 at 5-6, 9. From April 6, 2006 through April 27, 2006, however, plaintiff

filed at least five inmate appeals.7 Defs.’ Reply at 3 (referencing inmate appeals filed by

plaintiff, as evidenced by the attachments to plaintiff’s opposition brief); see also Dckt. No. 45 at

22 (plaintiff’s declaration that he filed an inmate appeal on April 17, 2006); 26 (copy of appeal 

# 06-973, filed April 25, 2006); 37 (copy of appeal # 06-818, filed April 21, 2006); 47 (copy of

appeal # 06-1004, filed April 6, 2006); 49 (copy of appeal # 06-010705, filed April 18, 20068). 

Thus, plaintiff’s own exhibits belie his assertion that the grievance process was made unavailable

to him. 

Contradicting his initial argument that the grievance process was made unavailable to

him, plaintiff submits a declaration stating that on April 17, 2006, he filed an inmate appeal

regarding the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights. Dckt. No. 45 at 22. Plaintiff

states that the appeal was returned to him because he failed to first attempt resolving the problem

at the informal level. Id. Plaintiff’s exhibits, however, suggest that this appeal was properly

screened out. In the exhibit identified by plaintiff as “602 of April 17th 2006,” plaintiff did not

note any attempt to resolve the grievance at the informal level. Dckt. No. 45 at 16 (Table of

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Contents), 19 (“602 of April 17th 2006”); see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.3(c)(4) (providing

that appeal may be rejected where inmate has not included evidence of attempt to resolve

grievance at informal level). In the exhibit identified by plaintiff as “April 18th 2006 602

Informal Level Return,” the Mule Creek Appeals Coordinator instructed plaintiff to return the

form to the Appeals Coordinator if plaintiff believed the screen out was in error. Dckt. No. 45 at

16 (Table of Contents), 35 (“April 18th 2006 602 Informal Level Return”). In his declaration,

plaintiff states that his attempts to resolve the problem with floor staff were fruitless. Id. at 22. 

However, rather than re-submitting his form to the Appeals Coordinator as instructed, plaintiff

decided to bypass this level and proceed directly to the second level by re-submitting the appeal

to the warden. Id. at 19 (“602 of April 17th 2006”), 22. See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.5(c) (“Second level is for review of appeals denied at first level or for which first level is

otherwise waived by these regulations.”). As plaintiff admittedly failed to follow proper

procedures, he has not shown that this grievance exhausted his First Amendment claim. See

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83-84 (requiring proper exhaustion).

As noted above, defendant has the burden to raise and prove the affirmative defense of

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921; Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119. Defendant has presented evidence carrying his burden in this regard. Plaintiff has not

responded with evidence demonstrating that he exhausted his administrative remedies, or that

such administrative remedies were unavailable, or that prison officials effectively obstructed his

ability to pursue his grievance through the director’s level of review. See Ngo v. Woodford, 539

F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008). He simply has not presented evidence sufficient to establish a

genuine dispute of material fact over this issue. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff

has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims and that

defendants’ motion to dismiss must therefore be granted.

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IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ January 19, 2010 motion to dismiss be granted; 

2. Defendants’ January 19, 2010 motion to sever therefore be denied as moot; and

3. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 16, 2010.

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