Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03133/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE YOUNGS

Plaintiff,

 vs.

CAPTAIN P.T. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C 05-3133 RMW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL

WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

(Docket No. 7)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) personnel. Plaintiff has

been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On November 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a

first amended complaint and a second amended complaint. Plaintiff also filed a motion to

appoint counsel. The court has reviewed the second amended complaint and concludes

that plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Accordingly, the court will

DISMISS the second amended complaint with leave to amend. The court will DENY

plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (docket no. 7) without prejudice. 

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Case 5:05-cv-03133-RMW Document 11 Filed 04/19/06 Page 1 of 7
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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. However, there is no constitutional

right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25

(1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to “request” that

counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

This does not give the courts the power to make “coercive appointments of counsel.” 

Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 only in

“exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of both

(1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate

his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Both of

these factors must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a request for counsel

under § 1915. See id. Neither the need for discovery, nor the fact that the pro se litigant

would be better served with the assistance of counsel, necessarily qualify the issues

involved as complex. See Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (where plaintiff’s pursuit of discovery

was comprehensive and focused and his papers were generally articulate and organized,

district court did not abuse discretion in denying request for counsel). The court

concludes that appointment of counsel is not necessary at this time. As set forth below, 

the court will grant plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint in order for the court

to review the merits of plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to appoint

counsel (docket no. 7) is DENIED without prejudice. 

B. The Merits

1. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

Case 5:05-cv-03133-RMW Document 11 Filed 04/19/06 Page 2 of 7
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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person

acting under the color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff

can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected

right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg,

664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional right

within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes

the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; Robins v.

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a claim a plaintiff must show a

specific constitutional or federal guarantee safeguarding the interests that have been

invaded. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). 

2. Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that on May 31, 2005 PBSP correctional officers placed his life in

jeopardy as well as the safety of the institution when they allowed a mixed reintegrated

group of black and white inmates out on the yard. Plaintiff claims that the officers knew

about black and white riots because at the time there were several inmates housed in

administrative segregation for riots between black and white inmates. Plaintiff names the

following defendants in his second amended complaint: Richard Kirkland, Warden,

Pelican Bay State Prison; K. Trimm, Correctional Officer, Pelican Bay State Prison; and

P.T. Smith, Facility Captain, Pelican Bay State Prison. Plaintiff seeks compensatory

damages and costs. See Second Amended Complaint at 1-2. 

Case 5:05-cv-03133-RMW Document 11 Filed 04/19/06 Page 3 of 7
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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In

particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners. Id. at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005);

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from

attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is,

objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately

indifferent to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040-41. 

A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison

officials only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of

serious harm or injury to an inmate by another prisoner, see Berg, 794 F.2d at 459. A

prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate

humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met,

i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference. See id. However, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that

a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate;

it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm. See id. at 842; see also Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-40

(9th Cir. 1995) (bystander-inmate injured when guards allegedly used excessive force on

another inmate need not show that guards intended to harm bystander-inmate). 

Allegations in a pro se complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named

prison officials acted with deliberate indifference – i.e, that they knew that plaintiff faced

a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it – states a “failure-to-protect” claim. See Hearns, 413 F.3d at 

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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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1041-42. 

Plaintiff’s claims fail at the outset because Plaintiff does not set forth specific facts

showing how each defendant proximately caused a constitutional deprivation. For a

claim to be cognizable, a plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual

defendant’s deprivation of protected rights. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. But here, plaintiff

makes conclusory allegations against all defendants without explaining exactly how the

alleged violations occurred, what happened, the circumstances, or the actions of each

individual involved. As such, the complaint does not state a cognizable claim against any

of the defendants. 

Plaintiff must allege facts supporting each claim against each individual defendant 

separately in his third amended complaint showing his entitlement to relief from each

defendant. For example, plaintiff should describe what the defendant(s) did or failed to

do, and describe how each defendant’s acts or omissions caused him injury. Plaintiff

must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability for each individual

defendant. He should not refer to the defendants as a group, i.e., “the defendants;” rather,

he should identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to a specific

claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his

constitutional rights. 

As to plaintiff’s claim against Warden Richard Kirkland, plaintiff is cautioned that

there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, i.e. no liability under the

theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of an employee. Liability

under Section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor may be liable under

section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the complaint to cure these deficiencies. 

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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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Accordingly, the court grants plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint within

thirty days of the date this order is filed to include sufficient facts to support his claim

against each defendant and the alleged constitutional violation he suffered.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (docket no. 7) is DENIED without 

prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is hereby DISMISSED with leave to 

amend, as indicated above, within thirty days from the date of this order. The amended

complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (05-3133

RMW (PR)) and the words “THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. 

Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must

include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 321 (1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate

material from the original complaint, such as supporting documentation or exhibits, by

reference. Plaintiff must include all documentation and supporting information with the

third amended complaint. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in

the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. 

 2. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed

“Notice of Change of Address.” He must comply with the court’s orders in a timely

fashion or ask for an extension of time to do so. Failure to comply may result in the

dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 4/15/2006 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte 

RONALD M. WHYTE 

United States District Judge

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Order of Dismissal With Leave to Amend; Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel Without Prejudice

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This is to certify that on 4/19/2006 , a copy of this

ruling was mailed to the following:

Tyrone Youngs

T-86123

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532-7500

Case 5:05-cv-03133-RMW Document 11 Filed 04/19/06 Page 7 of 7