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Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed July 13, 2001

No. 99-5430

Eric Eldred, et al.,

Appellants

v.

John Ashcroft, In his official capacity as Attorney General,

Appellee

On Petition for Rehearing

---------

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.*

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs-appellants in this

case, corporations, associations, and individuals who rely for

their vocations and avocations upon works in the public

domain, have petitioned for rehearing and filed a suggestion

for rehearing en banc. They renew their contentions that the

Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), Pub. L. No.

__________

* Circuit Judge Sentelle dissents from the denial of rehearing.

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105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, violates both the First Amendment

and the Copyright Clause of the Constitution of the United

States.

The plaintiffs-appellants further complain that this court

erred in its treatment of the contentions advanced by one of

the amici. We are not persuaded. The district court's

rejection of the plaintiffs-appellants' constitutional attack followed from its conclusion, in the light of our decision in

Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981), that "[t]he

introductory language of the copyright clause does not limit

[the Congress's] power." Upon appeal, the plaintiffsappellants did not challenge that determination; rather, they

maintained only that the substantive grant of power in the

Copyright Clause -- authorizing the Congress to grant copyrights for "limited Times" -- does not authorize the Congress

to extend the terms of copyrights as it did in the CTEA. In

sharp contrast, an amicus contended that the CTEA violates

the preamble to the Copyright Clause because extending the

term of a subsisting copyright does not "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."

As we stated in Part III of our opinion, 239 F.3d 372, 378

(2001), the court deems it "particularly inappropriate" in this

case to reach the merits of the amicus's position. To elaborate: First, in their brief the plaintiffs-appellants themselves

took the position, diametrically opposed to that of the amicus,

"that the preamble of the Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress' legislative power"; when expressly

offered the opportunity at oral argument to adopt the position

of the amicus, the plaintiffs-appellants did not do so. Therefore, even if we were to read the plaintiffs-appellants' brief

broadly as raising the issue whether the Copyright Clause as

a whole -- including both the preamble and the grant of

authority -- renders the CTEA unconstitutional, following

the lead of the Supreme Court we would still not reach what

would then be the supporting argument of the amicus. See

New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 761, 781 n.3 (1998)

(although arguments of amici and party stem from same

article of compact, court "must pass over the arguments of

the named amici for the reason that ... the party to the

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case[ ] has in effect renounced them, or at least any benefit

they might provide"); see also Amax Land Co. v. Quarterman, 181 F.3d 1356, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding where

the parties "request[ed] us to remand to the district court for

consideration of [legal] issue," whereas "the amicus' prefer[red] that we resolve it" ourselves, which we could readily

have done); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nat'l Indian

Gaming Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Because we ordinarily do not entertain arguments not raised by

parties ... we consider only the [party's] equal protection

challenge" where amicus filed brief "supporting [party's]

equal protection claim and reiterating its separation of powers and bill of attainder arguments"); Michel v. Anderson, 14

F.3d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (court ordinarily "would not

entertain an amicus' argument if not presented by a party").

Second, the point advanced by the amicus -- that the

preamble of the Copyright Clause is a substantive limitation

upon the power of the Congress -- implicates discrete terms

of the Clause that are not otherwise at issue. In that sense it

poses an additional constitutional question, subject to the

"rule of avoidance"; and there can hardly be a better reason

to avoid a constitutional question than that the parties are in

agreement. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)

("Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in

advance of the necessity of deciding it' ").

Third, because the plaintiffs-appellants did not take the

same tack as the amicus, the Government did not on brief

address the district court's interpretation of this court's decision in Schnapper. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. at

781 n.3. Therefore, our usual concern with "avoid[ing] unnecessary or premature constitutional rulings," here as in Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1989), "is

heightened by the absence of meaningful argument by the

parties on this question."

Finally, as explained in Part III of the opinion, id. at 378-

80, even if we considered the amicus's position we would not

reach a different result in this case: Regardless whether, as

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the amicus contends, the preamble limits the power of the

Congress, the CTEA still passes muster under the "necessary

and proper review" applicable to the Congress's "exercise of a

power enumerated in Article I." 239 F.3d at 378. The

Congress found that extending the duration of copyrights on

existing works would, among other things, give copyright

holders an incentive to preserve older works, particularly

motion pictures in need of restoration. Id. at 379. "Preserving access to works that would otherwise disappear -- not

enter the public domain but disappear -- 'promotes Progress'

as surely as does stimulating the creation of new works." Id.

We reject the plaintiffs-appellants' challenge under the

First Amendment for the reasons stated in the prior opinion.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is

Denied.

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed on: July 13, 2001

No. 99-5430

Eric Eldred et al.,

Appellants

v.

John Ashcroft, In his official capacity as Attorney General,

Appellee

---------

BEFORE: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams, Ginsburg,

Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

Appellants' petition for rehearing en banc and the response

thereto have been circulated to the full court. The taking of

a vote was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of

the court in regular active service did not vote in favor of the

petition. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE 

COURT:

Mark J. 

Langer, Clerk

A statement of Circuit Judge Sentelle, joined by Circuit

Judge Tatel, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc

is attached.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc, with whom Circuit Judge Tatel joins: In

my view, the decision in this case is not only incorrect, but is

worthy of en banc review on both circuit-specific procedural

grounds and fundamental constitutional grounds.

First, procedurally, the Court's opinion in this case effectively eliminates any role for amicus curiae in the practice of

this circuit, when it holds that an argument raised by an

amicus may not be considered by the Court. See Eldred v.

Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001). There is no dispute

that an amicus curiae may not raise new issues in an appeal.

Rather, the role of an amicus is to assist the court in

addressing the issues already raised with new arguments and

perspectives. In this case, the issue before the Court was, in

the panel's words, "whether ... the Copyright Clause of the

Constitution of the United States constrains the Congress

from extending for a period of years the duration of copyrights, both those already extant and those yet to come."

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 373. The amicus brief submitted on

behalf of Eagle Forum addressed this issue more persuasively than did appellants. But amicus did not "expand the

scope" of the appeal by "implicat[ing] issues" not raised by

the appellant. See Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill.

v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We are

constrained only by the rule that an amicus curiae generally

cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that

have not been presented by the parties to the appeal."

(emphases added)). Rather, as the majority noted, amicus

adopted a different "argument." Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378. A

new "argument" is not a new "issue." This is clear from our

circuit's rules. Specifically, an amicus brief "must avoid

repetition of facts or legal arguments made in the principal

(appellant/petitioner or appellee/respondent) brief and focus

on points not made or adequately elaborated upon in the

principal brief, although relevant to the issues before this

court." Circuit Rule 29. The role of amici is to help in this

process, by elaborating upon arguments made by the parties

and presenting arguments of their own that bear upon the

issues raised by the parties themselves. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) ("We consider as a preliminary

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matter an argument not considered below but urged by the

United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent.").

"When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the

court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced

by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to

identify and apply the proper construction of governing law."

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991);

see also United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins.

Agents of Am. Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993) (same). Merely

because the parties fail to advance the proper legal theory

underlying their claim does not--indeed cannot--prevent a

court from arriving at the proper legal disposition. Once the

issue is raised, a court has an obligation to determine what

the law is which will govern the case at hand. This is so

irrespective of whether amici curiae enter an appearance.

As it happened, Eagle Forum submitted an amicus curiae

brief augmenting appellants' position by making a different

argument on the issue before the Court, and at least one

member of the panel found it persuasive. Even if the majority did not find amicus's argument compelling, it was properly

before the Court.

The majority holds that the "argument" raised by one

amicus was "not properly before" this Court because it was

effectively renounced by appellants. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378.

This claim is not supported by the record. The relevant

amicus brief was submitted some two weeks after appellants'

opening brief. Insofar as the oral argument transcript shows

anything at all, it illustrates that appellants had not explicitly

adopted amicus's arguments in brief but had no problem

taking advantage of amicus's argument.1

__________

1 The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows:

THE COURT: Have you adopted any point--any arguments

that appear in any of these amicus briefs? Or maybe--I don't

remember--there is more than one, but in any brief other than

your own?

LESSIG: Well, in particular, Mr. Jaffe's brief is a brief that

makes textualist arguments that we believe are quite strong in

this way.

The language of New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 781

n.3 (1998), might be taken to suggest that a court must "pass

over ... arguments" raised only by an amicus, but I believe

that this is a misreading of the case. In New Jersey, the

Court noted that only amici took issue with the special

master's conclusion affirming the Court's prior holding that

"the 'boundary line' between the States established in Article

First [of the Interstate Compact]" was the line of sovereignty

between the states. Id. at 781. In other words, the amici,

and only the amici, sought to overturn Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, insofar as the amici sought to make an

exception to the special master's finding with regard to

Article First of the compact, it sought to obtain the Court's

judgment about a matter about which there was no present

controversy. See United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253,

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ception by either party accepted by Court due to lack of

"present controversy"), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).

Thus, even though the Court used the word "argument" to

characterize the claims put forward by amici, they were

raising issues beyond the purview of the case before the

Court.

Contrary to the suggestion of the panel majority, appellants' argument did implicate the "preamble" of the Copyright Clause, just not in the same fashion as amicus. Appellants stipulated to the reading postulated by the district

court, as the panel majority notes. Appellants' Opening Brief

at 29 n.15. Yet in the very footnote cited by the panel

majority, appellants claimed that the remaining portions of

the Copyright Clause must be read "in light of th[e] preamble." Id. Contrary to my colleagues' suggestion, this Court

was not asked to "anticipate" a question of constitutional law,

but to decide a very discreet question--whether the CTEA

exceeds the grant of power in the Copyright Clause. Wheth-

__________

THE COURT: Is there any place in which you have adopted

them, in your briefs?

LESSIG: We formally acknowledge them in our briefs. I

don't believe we have, Your Honor, no.

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er appellants asked this Court to recognize that the so-called

"preamble" is in fact the enumerated power, or merely to

read the rest of the clause "in light of that preamble" should

be immaterial. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted long ago

that the words of the Copyright Clause should be read "with

the words and sentences with which it stands connected."

Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 661 (1834); see also

Postmaster-General v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136, 152

(1827) (it is a "cardinal rule of construction" that "the whole

law is to be taken together, and one part expounded by any

other which may indicate the meaning annexed ... to ambiguous phrases").

Under the panel's holding, it is now the law of this circuit

that amici are precluded both from raising new issues and

from raising new arguments. If allowed to stand, this holding will effectively bar future amici from adding anything

except possibly rhetorical flourish to arguments already outlined and embraced by the parties. This is particularly the

case for those amici who, true to their traditional role as

"friends of the court," operate independently to assist the

Court in its determinations. If this Court is to adopt such a

rule--and I hope we do not--we should do so sitting en banc,

not by a divided panel.

Second, and more importantly, the Court's construction of

the Copyright Clause of the Constitution renders Congress's

power under Art. I, s 8, cl. 8, limitless despite express

limitations in the terms of that clause. The clause grants to

Congress the "power ... [t]o promote the progress of science

and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and

inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and

discoveries...." Under the Court's decision herein, Congress may at or before the end of each such "limited period"

enact a new extension, apparently without limitation. As the

majority conceded, "[i]f the Congress were to make copyright

protection permanent, then it surely would exceed the power

conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause." Eldred, 239

F.3d at 377. The majority never explained how a precedent

that would permit the perpetuation of protection in increments is somehow more constitutional than one which did it in

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one fell swoop. As the majority noted in describing my panel

dissent, "Judge Sentelle ... sees a categorical distinction

between extending the term of a subsisting copyright and

extending that of a prospective copyright." Id. at 379. Indeed I do. Establishing the term of a prospective copyright

is not an extension, nor does it in itself implicate the authority

of Congress to incrementally create perpetual exclusivity.

Contrary to my colleagues, I do not accept that it is

sufficient for Congress to merely articulate some hypothetical

basis to justify the claimed exercise of an enumerated power.

The Copyright Clause only bestows the power "to promote

the progress of science and useful arts." In exercising this

power, Congress "may not overreach the restraints imposed

by the stated constitutional purpose," which is "the promotion

of advances in the 'useful arts.' " Graham v. John Deere Co.,

383 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1966). I accept that extending copyright

terms for future works may well increase creative efforts at

the margin. Once a work is published, however, extending

the copyright term does absolutely nothing to induce further

creative activity by the author--and how could it? The work

is already published. A simple finding by Congress to the

contrary is not sufficient to demonstrate that the exercise of

that power is "necessary and proper." As the Supreme

Court noted in Lopez and again in Morrison, that Congress

concluded a given piece of legislation serves a Constitutional

purpose "does not necessarily make it so." United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (citation omitted); United

States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2000).

The panel concluded--wrongly in my view, see Eldred, 239

F.3d at 382-83 (Sentelle, J., dissenting)--that my interpretation of the Copyright Clause is precluded by Schnapper v.

Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which appeared to reject

any meaningful limit on the scope of the copyright power.

This interpretation of Schnapper erases from Article I half of

the Copyright Clause--indeed, that half which defines the

very power bestowed. If Schnapper indeed precludes a panel

of this Court from applying the Constitution as written, then

we have yet one more reason to consider this case en banc.

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The majority opinion in this case dramatically narrowed the

role of amici before this Court and, in my view, effectively

erased portions of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.

Though I believe that this Court should grant en banc review

quite sparingly, either issue individually merits en banc review. Because this case presents both questions, it is particularly worthy of the full Court's attention.

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