Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Sean Garnand, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-00290-TUC-RM (LAB)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal/Disqualification, which 

seeks the undersigned’s recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Doc. 298.) The Motion is 

fully briefed. (Docs. 299, 301.) Also pending is Defendants’ Motion for Leave to 

Deliver Ex Parte and In Camera Supplement (Doc. 302), to which Plaintiffs responded 

(Doc. 303).

I. Background

Plaintiffs initiated this action on May 24, 2019. (Doc. 1.) As alleged in Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint, at all relevant times Defendant Sean Garnand was a Detective employed by 

the City of Tucson Police Department (“TPD”), Defendant Dain Salisbury was a TPD 

Sergeant, and Plaintiff Greg Moore was the President of a company that, among other 

activities, managed the Forgeus Apartments. (Id. at 3-5 ¶¶ 4-5, 12.) On June 8, 2017, the 

Forgeus Apartments were destroyed in a fire suspected to be arson. (Id. at 5-6 ¶ 14, 19, 

21.) Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First and Fourth 

Amendment violations arising from Defendants’ investigation of Plaintiffs in connection 

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with the fire. (Id. at 4-22 ¶¶ 10-81, 89-92; see also Doc. 38.)

This case was originally assigned to District Judge Cindy K. Jorgenson (Doc. 2), 

but it was randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman after Judge 

Jorgenson recused herself (Doc. 6). The case was assigned to the undersigned after a 

party elected assignment to a district judge. (Docs. 12, 15.) Pursuant to the 

undersigned’s standard procedures, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman 

for all pretrial proceedings and Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 16.)1 

On September 24, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion asserting the law enforcement 

investigatory privilege and requesting a stay of discovery. (Doc. 23.) Magistrate Judge 

Bowman found that the law enforcement investigatory privilege is applicable and she 

accordingly stayed discovery of TPD’s arson investigation files for the Forgeus 

Apartments. (Doc. 74.) Plaintiffs appealed to the district court (Doc. 84), and this Court

affirmed Magistrate Judge Bowman’s Order but noted that “application of the law 

enforcement investigatory privilege does not permit Defendants to indefinitely delay 

discovery in this case,” and that “[a] civil litigant has a right to a reasonably prompt 

determination of her claims.” (Doc. 113 at 12-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 

Accordingly, this Court ordered Defendants to provide to Magistrate Judge Bowman for 

in camera review a detailed report on the status of the criminal investigation into the 

Forgeus Apartment fires, as well as a predicted timeline for completion of the 

investigation. (Id.) Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration (Doc. 120) and clarification 

(Doc. 134). This Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration but partially granted the 

Motion for Clarification and ordered Defendants to provide to Magistrate Judge Bowman

for in camera review an anticipated reasonable terminus of the ongoing criminal 

investigation of Plaintiffs. (Doc. 154 at 9-10.) The Court directed Magistrate Judge 

Bowman to consider Defendants’ in camera submissions “to ensure that Plaintiffs’ 

claims in this action are litigated consistent with their due process rights and applicable 

1 On November 5, 2021, the case was reassigned to Judge John C. Hinderaker after his 

appointment to the bench, but the case was reassigned back to the undersigned after 

Judge Hinderaker recused himself. (Doc. 248.)

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case law, including ascertaining a reasonable terminus to Defendants’ criminal 

investigation of Plaintiffs and adjusting the discovery schedule accordingly.” (Id. at 10.)

Magistrate Judge Bowman’s most recently revised Scheduling Order sets a 

discovery deadline of February 9, 2022 and a dispositive motion deadline of March 9, 

2022. (Doc. 289.) Prior to the issuance of that revised Scheduling Order, Defendants 

filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment in Excess of 17 Pages 

(Doc. 274) and a Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 279). Those Motions are referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman and 

remain pending. Also referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman and pending is a Motion to 

Compel Deposition Appearance and Testimony of TPD Officers Edwin Arnaud and 

Matthew Stoner (Doc. 294), filed by Plaintiffs on August 4, 2021.

II. Motion for Recusal

Plaintiffs argue in their Motion for Recusal that an appearance of bias exists due to 

this Court’s rulings regarding the law enforcement investigatory privilege, delay in these 

proceedings, and the undersigned’s “close, personal association with the Mayor of the 

City of Tucson, Regina Romero.” (Doc. 298.) Plaintiffs argue that the relationship 

between the undersigned and Mayor Romero warrants recusal because the City of Tucson 

employs the defendants in this case. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs attach to their Motion a 

Declaration of Greg Moore, who avers that during the course of this litigation, he learned 

that members of the undersigned’s family gave money to Mayor Romero’s mayoral 

campaign and that the undersigned administered oaths of office to Mayor Romero in 

2015 and 2019. (Doc. 298-1 at 3.)

Defendants filed a Response arguing that the Motion for Recusal should be denied

as untimely and without merit. (Doc. 299.) Defendants argue that the Motion is untimely 

because Plaintiffs knew of the undersigned’s connection to Mayor Romero at least since 

2019 but waited to move for recusal until after the Court ruled against them regarding 

application of the law enforcement investigatory privilege. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants also 

argue that the Motion for Recusal lacks merit because there is no evidence that the 

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undersigned holds deep-seated favoritism or antagonism and the undersigned’s 

connection to Mayor Romero is insufficient to support recusal. (Id. at 4-6.) 

In Reply, Plaintiffs argue that they did not conclude that the undersigned was 

impartial until Defendants’ procedural Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary 

Judgment in Excess of 17 Pages had languished without a ruling and Magistrate Judge 

Bowman had sua sponte extended the discovery deadline an additional six months. (Doc. 

301 at 2.) Plaintiffs indicate it was not until that point that they began to research 

possible grounds for seeking the undersigned’s recusal and thereby learned of the 

undersigned’s connection to Mayor Romero. (See id. at 1-2.)

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),2a judge “shall disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in 

which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).3 Section 

455(a) requires an objective inquiry: “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all 

the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might be questioned.” United 

States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983). The analysis focuses on “how things 

appear to the well-informed, thoughtful observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly 

suspicious person.” Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).

B. Timeliness

Courts have read a timeliness requirement into section 455. United States v. 

Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997). “‘[G]ranting a motion to recuse many 

months after an action has been filed wastes judicial resources and encourages 

manipulation of the judicial process.’” United States v. Sierra P. Indus., 759 F. Supp. 2d 

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, when a party “makes and files a timely and sufficient 

affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or 

prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no 

further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

144. Absent good cause for delay, such an affidavit must be filed “not less than ten days 

before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard.” Id. It does not 

appear that Plaintiffs are seeking relief under § 144; to the extent they are, the Motion is 

untimely under § 144.

3 A judge is also required to recuse herself under specific circumstances specified in 28 

U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)-(5), but Plaintiffs do not argue that any of those circumstances are 

applicable here, and the Court finds that they are not.

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1198, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Willner v. Univ. of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023, 1029 

(10th Cir.1988)). “[A] party having information that raises a possible ground for 

disqualification cannot wait until after an unfavorable judgment before bringing the 

information to the court’s attention.” Rogers, 119 F.3d at 1380.

The current action has been pending for approximately 2.5 years. Plaintiffs aver 

that they did not discover this Court’s connection to Mayor Romero until recently, but 

they could have discovered it at least since 2019, when the local newspaper published an 

article noting that the undersigned delivered Mayor Romero’s oath of office. Plaintiffs 

filed their Motion for Recusal only after adverse rulings regarding the law enforcement 

investigatory privilege, and they candidly indicate that they began to investigate potential 

grounds for recusal due to dissatisfaction with the Court’s management of this case. 

Plaintiffs attempt to seek the undersigned’s recusal due to their dissatisfaction with 

judicial rulings and judicial management of this case constitutes an attempt at strategic 

manipulation of the judicial process that is not to be encouraged. The Court finds that 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal is untimely.

C. Merits

Even if the Motion for Recusal were timely, the undersigned finds that recusal in 

the above-captioned matter is not appropriate. In their Motion for Recusal, Plaintiffs 

primarily focus on their dissatisfaction with the Court’s rulings on the law enforcement 

investigatory privilege and the delay that application of that privilege has caused in this 

case. (Doc. 298 at 1-8, 10.) “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis 

for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

“Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Id. “[O]pinions 

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of 

the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or 

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment impossible.” Id. The Court’s rulings in this matter do not display a 

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward either party. The Court also notes that 

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many of the rulings that Plaintiffs complain of were made by Magistrate Judge Bowman 

rather than the undersigned.

In addition to complaining about judicial rulings and judicial management of the 

above-captioned case, Plaintiffs argue that recusal is required due to the undersigned’s 

connection to Mayor Romero. (Doc. 298 at 8, 10.) A judge’s recusal is required based 

on the familial relationships described in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) and where the degree of a 

personal relationship prevents the judge from being impartial or would cause a reasonable 

person to question the judge’s impartiality. Id. “The more insignificant the relationship 

and the greater the temporal distance between contacts, the less likely it is that a judge’s 

impartiality can reasonably be questioned.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. General 

Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 169636, *5 (Jan. 16, 2008). “Reasonable, wellinformed observers of the federal judiciary understand that judges with political friends 

or supporters regularly cast partisan interests aside and resolve cases on the facts and 

law.” Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1990). The undersigned is unaware 

of any family members who donated to Mayor Romero’s mayoral campaign. Even if 

family members did donate, and even though this Court administered Mayor Romero’s 

oath of office, the connections between the undersigned and Mayor Romero, and between 

Mayor Romero and this case, are too attenuated to require recusal. See McWhorter v. 

City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678-79 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding district court did not 

abuse discretion in denying recusal motion based on friendship with Mayor of 

Birmingham where Mayor was neither a party nor a witness in the case, because the

Mayor’s “connection with the City [was] insufficient to create the appearance of 

impropriety”).

The undersigned finds that recusal in this matter is not appropriate and therefore 

will deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal.4

4 Plaintiffs also note in their Motion for Recusal that two other district judges—Judge 

Jorgenson and Judge Hinderaker—recused themselves from this case without specifying 

the reasons for their recusal. (Doc. 298 at 2-3, 10.) The fact that two other judges had 

conflicts requiring recusal from this matter has no bearing on whether the undersigned’s 

recusal is appropriate.

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IV. Case Delay and Motion to Deliver Supplement

The Court shares Plaintiffs’ concerns regarding delay in this case. The delay 

stems from the application of the law enforcement investigatory privilege, the ongoing 

criminal investigation of Plaintiffs, and the due process concerns that would arise from 

requiring Plaintiffs to litigate dispositive motions while evidence is shielded by the law 

enforcement investigatory privilege. As this Court previously found, Plaintiffs have a 

right to a reasonably prompt determination of their claims, and application of the law 

enforcement investigatory privilege does not justify indefinite delay in these proceedings. 

(Doc. 113 at 12.) Magistrate Judge Bowman previously found that a protective order 

would not mitigate the risk of harm justifying application of the law enforcement 

investigatory privilege because Plaintiffs are the target of an ongoing investigation. 

(Doc. 74 at 3.) But the Forgeus Fire occurred nearly 4.5 years ago. Defendants have had 

a lengthy period of time to complete their investigation. Given the length of time 

Defendants’ investigation and this action have been pending, the Court is considering 

requiring disclosure under a protective order of relevant matters previously shielded by 

the law enforcement investigatory privilege. However, before lifting the privilege, the 

Court will allow Defendants to deliver an ex parte and in camera supplement regarding 

the status of their investigation. (See Doc. 302.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the 

ex parte supplement should be delivered to the undersigned’s chambers. (See Doc. 303.)

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal (Doc. 298) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERD that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Deliver Ex 

Parte and In Camera Supplement (Doc. 302) is granted. Defendants shall deliver a 

supplement regarding the status of their criminal investigation to Judge Rosemary 

Márquez’s chambers for in camera review within seven (7) days of the date this Order is 

filed.

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the reference to Magistrate Judge Bowman

(Doc. 16) is withdrawn solely with respect to resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal 

and in camera review of Defendants’ ex parte supplement. The above-captioned case 

otherwise remains referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman for all pretrial proceedings and 

report and recommendation. Magistrate Judge Bowman is directed to promptly resolve 

the other Motions pending in this action (Docs. 274, 279, 294). 

Dated this 29th day of November, 2021.

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