Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00352/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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Case No. 16-cv-00352 NC 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE DANIEL CASTILLO-ANTONIO,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CONNIE ALVAREZ, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-00352 NC 

ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT; 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 16 

 In this disability access case, plaintiff Jose Castillo-Antonio moves for default 

judgment against defendants Connie Alvarez, Gabriel Velazquez, and Donna Velazquez, 

owners and operators of Plaza Garibaldi Restaurant. Castillo-Antonio alleges that when he 

visited Plaza Garibaldi Restaurant, he encountered architectural barriers, such as poor 

signage to the accessible entrance. Castillo-Antonio contends that removal of those 

barriers is readily achievable. Castillo-Antonio seeks a permanent injunction under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, statutory damages under the California Unruh Act in the 

amount of $4,000, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $7,918.50. 

 The Court finds that default judgment is appropriate, and RECOMMENDS that the 

district court GRANT the damages award of $4,000, attorneys’ fees and costs of 

$7,918.50, and an injunction to remove the architectural barriers. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Jose Castillo-Antonio is substantially limited in his ability to walk, and 

must use a wheelchair for mobility. Motion for Default Judgment, Dkt. No. 16 ¶ 1. 

Castillo-Antonio is physically disabled as defined by all applicable California and federal 

laws. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6. Defendants own and operate the Plaza Garibaldi 

Restaurant in San Jose, California. Compl. ¶ 1. Additionally, Gabriel Velazquez and 

Donna Velazquez own the real property on which the business is operated. Id. 

 On January 29, 2014, Castillo-Antonio visited Plaza Garibaldi Restaurant and 

encountered barriers in the restaurant. Compl. ¶ 12. First, Castillo-Antonio did not have a 

safe route from his parking space to an accessible entrance because the parking area was 

not properly configured. Compl. ¶ 3(c). Second, Castillo-Antonio had difficulty in finding 

and using an accessible entrance door due to the main entrance’s lack of a posted 

international symbol of accessibility. Compl. ¶ 3(a). Third, Castillo-Antonio experienced 

difficulty entering the restaurant because the main entrance door and its hardware were not 

accessible for wheelchair occupants. Compl.¶ 3(b). Fourth, once Castillo-Antonio had 

entered the restaurant, he had difficulty moving about restaurant due to the wheelchairinaccessibility of the aisles. Compl. ¶ 3(d). Fifth, Castillo-Antonio was unable to access 

the sales area because the countertop for sales was not accessible for wheelchair occupants. 

Compl. ¶ 3(e). Finally, the restroom was not disability accessible, and as a result CastilloAntonio had difficulty in using the facilities. Compl. ¶ 3(f). 

 Castillo-Antonio is deterred from visiting the restaurant, but plans to return once the 

restaurant’s barriers are removed. Compl. ¶ 14. 

 Castillo-Antonio has had repeated conduct with defendants and defendants’ counsel 

since February 2014. Exhibit 2 in Support of Motion, Dkt. No. 16-2. However, the parties 

have been unable to reach a settlement agreement, and defendants have failed to respond to 

Castillo-Antonio’s motion for default judgment. Because defendants have not consented 

to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the undersigned orders that this case be reassigned to a 

district court judge, and writes this order as a report and recommendation. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an 

action and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

After entry of default, the Court has discretion to grant default judgment on the merits of 

the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 

deciding whether to grant default judgment, the Court considers the following factors: (1) 

the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive 

claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) 

the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. 

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The factual allegations of the complaint, 

except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties. 

Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995; see also Geddes 

v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[t]he general rule of law is that 

upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 

damages, will be taken as true”). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction and Service of Process 

 When presented with a motion for default judgment, the Court has “an affirmative 

duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 

172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Also, the Court may only enter default judgment 

against a minor or incompetent person if represented by a general guardian, conservator, or 

other like fiduciary who has appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 

 Here, Castillo-Antonio seeks relief under federal and state law, so subject matter 

jurisdiction is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants are neither minors nor 

incompetent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 

 Castillo-Antonio’s service processor has served defendants with a copy of the 

motion for default judgment, and Castillo-Antonio has provided proof of service. Dkt. No. 

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16-1. The Court is satisfied that jurisdiction is appropriate and that the service of process 

was completed. 

B. Default Judgment 

1. Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

 Under the second and third Eitel factors, in deciding whether to grant default 

judgment, the Court must examine the merits of the Castillo-Antonio’s substantive claims 

and the sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. At this stage, the Court 

takes “the well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint as true; however, the 

“defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of 

law.” DIRECTV, Inc. v Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). “[N]ecessary facts 

not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of No. America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th 

Cir. 1992). 

 The motion seeks default judgment on two claims: (a) a violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act of 1990; and (b) a violation of the California Unruh Act. The Court 

examines each claim in turn. 

a. ADA Claim 

 “To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she 

is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, 

leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied 

public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, 

Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 As to the third element, discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural 

barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Readily achievable means “easily accomplishable and able to be 

carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); Molski, 481 F.3d 

at 730. 

 Title III claims are subject to the time limitation on personal-injury claims of the 

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state in which they are filed. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (recognizing 

that where federal law does not establish a time limitation, courts should adopt a local time 

limitation). In California, the statute of limitations for personal-injury claims is two years.

 Here, Castillo-Antonio alleges that he requires the use of a wheelchair for mobility. 

An individual who is substantially limited in his ability to walk is disabled under the ADA. 

42 U.S.C. § 12102. 

 Second, Castillo-Antonio alleges that defendants own and operate Plaza Garibaldi 

Restaurant. The ADA provides that a restaurant is a public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 

12181(7)(B). 

 Third, Castillo-Antonio alleges that he personally encountered barriers at the 

restaurant, such as his inability to access the restaurant entrance, access the sales counter, 

or easily utilize the restroom facilities. “The Ninth Circuit has yet to decide who has the 

burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable.” Vogel v. 

Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Under 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b), 

examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers include installing ramps, insulating 

lavatory pipes under sinks to prevent burns, repositioning the paper towel dispenser and 

other dispensers, installing accessible door hardware, and creating designated accessible 

parking spaces. 

 Here, Castillo-Antonio’s allegations fall within the scope of those readily 

achievable steps to remove barriers that the statute sets forth. For example, CastilloAntonio seeks to remove barriers in the entrance of the restaurant, to make accessible the 

sales counter, and to remove barriers in the restroom facilities. Other district courts have 

found similar allegations to be sufficient at the default judgment stage. See Vogel, 992 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1011; Johnson v. Hall, 2012 WL 1604715, *3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) 

(holding that plaintiff’s allegation that architectural barriers “are readily removable” and 

that he sought injunctive relief to remove all readily achievable barriers satisfied his 

burden). 

 Here, the events in question were on January 29, 2014, and the complaint was filed 

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January 21, 2016, so it is within the statutory limit. 

 Thus, the Court finds that, taking the complaint as true, Castillo-Antonio has 

sufficiently alleged his claim under the ADA. 

b. California Unruh Act 

 “Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” 

Molski, 481 F.3d at 731. Therefore, the Court also finds that Castillo-Antonio has 

sufficiently alleged his Unruh Act claim. 

 The Court finds that the second and third Eitel factors counsel towards granting 

default judgment. Castillo-Antonio has alleged sufficient facts for each element of his 

claim, and his complaint has merit. 

2. Remaining Eitel Factors 

 The first factor weighs in favor of Castillo-Antonio because he would be prejudiced 

if the motion is denied, as Castillo-Antonio would likely be without a recourse for 

recovery. See Young v. Law Offices of Herbert Davis, 13-cv-1108 JSW (NC), 2014 WL 

3418209, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014). 

 Second, the Court considers the sum of money Castillo-Antonio requests. 

Generally, courts are hesitant to enter default judgments where large amounts of money are 

at stake. Manuel v. Thomas, 967 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that $4,405,000 award 

was too large to enter default judgment). Here, Castillo-Antonio seeks an injunction 

requiring defendant to remove the architectural barriers, $4,000 in statutory damages, and 

$7,918.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 Third, there is a possibility of a material dispute. 

 Fourth, it is unlikely that default was the result of excusable neglect. CastilloAntonio filed this case on January 21, 2016. Castillo-Antonio has had repeated contact 

with defendants’ attorney, on multiple occasions discussing a settlement agreement. 

However, defendants have chosen not to settle and have not responded to CastilloAntonio’s motion. 

 Finally, although federal policy generally favors decisions on the merits, Federal 

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Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) permits entry of default judgment in situations where the 

defendant refuses to litigate. 

 Considering all of the Eitel factors, the Court concludes that an entry of default 

judgment is appropriate in this case. 

C. Damages 

 While the Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true at the default 

judgment stage, the Court has discretion to award damages as appropriate. Geddes, 559 

F.2d at 560. Castillo-Antonio seeks (1) an injunction; (2) statutory damages; and (3) 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

1. Injunction 

 The ADA permits private individuals to seek injunctive relief. Molski, 481 

F.3d at 730. When the Court has determined that a defendant violated the ADA, 

“injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily 

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42. U.S.C.A. § 12188. 

 Castillo-Antonio seeks an injunction that would require defendants to make 

accessible: (1) the restaurant parking lot; (2) the restaurant entrance; (3) aisles in the 

restaurant; (4) the sales counter; and (5) the restroom facilities. 

 The Court finds such an injunction to be appropriate. 

2. Statutory Damages 

 The ADA does not provide for an award of monetary damages in private suits; 

however, the Unruh Act does allow for monetary damages. Molski, 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Under the Unruh Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to damages of “up to a 

maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four 

thousand dollars ($4,000).” Cal. Civ. Code § 52. Here, Castillo-Antonio seeks the 

minimum award of monetary damages for his one visit to Plaza Garibaldi Restaurant. 

 The Court finds this amount appropriate. 

3. Attorneys’ Fees 

 “The ADA gives courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing 

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parties.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. Additionally, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to 

attorneys’ fees under the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 52. 

 Here, Castillo-Antonio seeks attorneys’ fees for Richard Mac Bride of $350 per 

hour. The Court finds this rate to be reasonable, and notes that this Court has recently 

awarded similar rates and fees. See Block v. The Granary, No. 15-cv-4988, 2016 WL 

2984932 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016). Castillo-Antonio has included billing documentation 

for his attorneys’ fees request. In total, Castillo-Antonio seeks $7,140.00 in attorneys’ 

fees. Finally, Castillo-Antonio seeks costs in the amount of $778.50. 

 The Court finds this amount reasonable and recommends that the district court 

award Block’s requested attorneys’ fees and costs. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The Court ORDERS that this case be reassigned to a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). After considering the Eitel factors, the Court RECOMMENDS that the district 

court GRANT Castillo-Antonio’s motion and award: 

1. An injunction to remove the following barriers and to require that each item be 

brought into compliance with the accessibility requirements of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act and California Code of Regulations, Title 24 as follows: 

a. A properly configured and identified accessible route of travel from the 

designated accessible parking to the business entrance. 

b. The entrance door be made wheelchair-accessible and posted with the proper 

international symbol of Accessibility. 

c. The aisles be made wheelchair-accessible. 

d. The countertop for sales be made accessible to wheelchair occupants. 

e. The restroom be made accessible for wheelchair occupants, including the 

toilet handle, sink, pipes under sink, mirror, and sufficient space for 

maneuvering. 

2. Statutory damages under the Unruh Act in the amount of $4,000. 

3. Attorneys’ fees and costs of $7,918.50. 

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 Any party may object to this recommendation within 14 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 22, 2016 _____________________________________ 

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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