Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00501/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00501-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970). 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL LEWIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

ROY A. CASTRO, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00501 OWW LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

[Doc. #17]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On February 6, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. In his petition, Petitioner does not specify his grounds for relief other than referring the Court

to his petition for review to the California Supreme Court and the opinion of the California Court of

Appeals. In those pleadings, Petitioner presented the following two claims: 1) Petitioner alleges the

trial court committed reversible error by failing to conduct a Marsden hearing; and 2) Petitioner 1

contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to strike a prior conviction pursuant to

Case 1:06-cv-00501-LJO-GSA Document 27 Filed 01/25/07 Page 1 of 5
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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996).

On August 14, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as a mixed petition

containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Respondent opposes a stay of the petition. 

On January 4, 2007, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion wherein Petitioner

requests a stay of the proceedings pending exhaustion of his state remedies.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the attorney

general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has

referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state

remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th

Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for

dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

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U.S. District Court

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F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition before the Court, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. Respondent

concedes that Ground One is exhausted; however, Respondent argues that Grounds Two has not

been fairly presented to the California Supreme Court and is therefore unexhausted. The Court has

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U.S. District Court

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reviewed the petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court. Ground Two was not

specifically noted as a ground for relief. Respondent correctly argues that it is unexhausted. 

Therefore, the instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted

claims. Petitioner requests that the Court stay the proceedings and hold the petition in abeyance

pending exhaustion of this state remedies. A district court has discretion to stay a petition which it

may validly consider on the merits. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005); Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9 Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d th

1268, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997). However, the Supreme Court recently

held that this discretion is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. In light of AEDPA’s objectives, “stay and abeyance [is]

available only in limited circumstances” and “is only appropriate when the district court determines

there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. at 277. 

Even if Petitioner were to demonstrate good cause for that failure, “the district court would abuse its

discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Id.

In this case, the Court finds good cause to excuse Petitioner’s failure. Although the

unexhausted claim was not specifically presented as a ground for relief in his petition for review to

the California Supreme Court, it appears Petitioner desired to have the claim reviewed since he

attached a copy of the appellate court’s opinion to his petition wherein the ground was addressed. In

addition, Petitioner claims he is illiterate and entirely dependent on other inmates for legal

assistance. Although this is a condition suffered by most inmates, it does lend support to Petitioner’s

claim that he intended to exhaust his claim by submitting a copy of the appellate court’s opinion to

the California Supreme Court. It should be noted that he did the very same thing in presenting his

claims to this Court. Therefore, the Court will recommend granting a stay of the proceedings so

Petitioner may return to the California Supreme Court to properly exhaust Ground Two of this

petition.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED,

and a stay of the proceedings be ISSUED. 

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U.S. District Court

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy

of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10)

court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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