Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02498/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02498-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

James Daniel ALEXANDER, 

Petitioner,

v. 

Raymond MADDEN, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 15-cv-2498-GPC-AGS 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenges the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation’s denial of post-sentence conduct credits. The Court has reviewed the 

pertinent portions of the record and has considered the legal arguments presented by both 

parties. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). On September 7, 1995, Petitioner was found guilty of first 

degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code sections 459 and 460. (ECF No. 1-1 

at 4.) Having sustained a prior felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 667(d)(1) 

and two prior strike convictions under Penal Code section 667(e)(2), Petitioner was 

sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to an indeterminate term of thirty years to 

life in state prison with the possibility of parole. (Id.) 

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 On February 10, 2014, a three-judge panel ordered California adult correctional 

institutions to implement policies to reduce prison populations. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 44-

45.) Specifically, the Order required institutions to increase post-sentence conduct credits 

prospectively for non-violent second strike offenders and minimum custody inmates. (Id. 

at 45.) 

 On May 30, 2014, the CDCR issued a memorandum notifying all CDCR inmates of 

the changes to the post-sentence conduct credit provisions.1

 (ECF No. 1-1 at 40.) In 

response, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal with the CDCR complaining about his 

ineligibility to receive the 33.3 percent good conduct credit awarded to qualifying secondstrike offenders. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 1.) Petitioner argued such decision was a violation of 

his constitutional right to equal protection. (Id.) Petitioner’s administrative appeal was 

denied at the third and final level of review on April 15, 2015.

 2 (Id. at 7.) 

 Following Petitioner’s administrative denial, Petitioner filed petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus in state court challenging the CDCR’s denial of post-sentence conduct 

credits on equal protection grounds. (See generally ECF No. 1-1 at 9-35.) Upon exhausting 

his state court remedies, Petitioner filed the present petition with this Court on November 

3, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) 

                                               

1

 The memorandum provides: “As a result of the Federal Court Order effective February 10, 2014, 

non-violent offenders sentenced as a Second Striker pursuant to Penal Code (PC) Sections 667(b)-(i) or 

1170.12, whose prison conduct credit is limited to 20 percent and who are not required to register as a sex 

offender pursuant to PC Section 290 are eligible to earn 33.3 percent to reduce the prison term.” (ECF No. 

1-1 at 40) (emphasis added.) 

2

 Effective May 1, 2017, the CDCR further amended the good conduct credit provisions of the 

California Code of Regulations to permit a higher percentage of good conduct credit to qualifying inmates. 

15 C.C.R. § 3043.2. Specifically, sections 3043.2(b)(1)-(3) allow non-violent second and third strike 

offenders to earn between 33.3 to 50 percent of credit. The changes, which functionally give Petitioner 

his requested relief prospectively, are not retroactive. (ECF No. 24 at 2.) On July 27, 2017, Petitioner filed 

a motion for preliminary injunction asking the Court to require the CDCR to retroactively apply the newly 

implemented good conduct credit provisions, which the Court denied. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner’s arguments 

concerning section 3043.2 are not before the Court because they were not included in his petition and he 

has never moved to amend it. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Moreover, there is no evidence he has exhausted 

those arguments in state court. Accordingly, the Court does not discuss the amended good conduct credit 

provisions.

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In his petition, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing and challenges 

Respondent’s failure to provide him with post-sentence conduct credits to reduce the length 

of his sentence. First, Petitioner argues he is being “denied commensurate good conduct 

credit benefits that have been afforded to similarly situated prisoners.” (Id. at 6.) Next, 

Petitioner argues that his “fundamental right of physical/personal liberty” is at issue and 

that he is a “class of one” for purpose of his equal protection claim. (Id.) Finally, Petition 

argues there is “no legitimate governmental interest in denying [him] prison conduct 

credits.” (Id.) 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

A habeas petition will not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication was either: 

(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Further, a federal court shall presume that a 

determination of factual issues made by a state court is correct, and Petitioner has the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition without comment. 

However, federal courts presume that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

Thus, the Court will consider the Orange County Superior Court’s decision denying the 

petition. In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to 

decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an 

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. 

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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B. Equal Protection Analysis 

Petitioner, a third-strike offender under California’s Three Strikes law, claims the 

CDCR is violating his equal protection rights by denying him the post-sentence conduct 

credits available to second-strike offenders. 

1. “Class of One” Equal Protection Framework 

Petitioner formulates his equal protection claim as a “class of one” claim. (See ECF 

No. 1-1 at 6.) The Supreme Court has “recognized successful equal protection claims 

brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated 

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 

However, Petitioner is not a “class of one” for equal protection purposes. Petitioner is a 

non-violent third-strike offender who is being denied post-sentence conduct credits 

awarded to non-violent second-strike offenders. To bring a “class of one” equal protection 

claim, Petitioner must allege that he is being intentionally treated differently from the nonviolent third-strike offenders he is similarly situated to, but instead he argues that all thirdstrike offenders are treated differently than second-strike offenders without a rational basis. 

Thus, Petitioner’s “class of one” claim fails for the simple reason that Petitioner is not 

similarly situated to those offenders who are eligible for post-sentence conduct credits 

because he is a third-strike offender. Accordingly, the Court will address Petitioner’s 

arguments under the traditional equal protection framework. 

2. Traditional Equal Protection Framework 

The Supreme Court has defined the Equal Protection Clause to mean “that no State 

shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal quotations 

omitted). The first step in any equal protection analysis is to identify Petitioner’s 

classification or group. Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner must show that the law has been applied in a discriminatory manner on him or 

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imposes different burdens on different groups. Id.; Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 

(9th Cir. 1988). The next step requires the Court to determine the level of scrutiny with 

which the Court should review the statute. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. A heightened 

standard of review is applied only “when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national 

origin” or infringes on fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Cleburne, 473 

U.S. at 440. By contrast, classifications that do not involve a suspect class or fundamental 

rights are subject to the rational relationship test and accorded a strong presumption of 

validity. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). 

The first inquiry into Petitioner’s equal protection claim requires an analysis of 

Petitioner’s classification. Petitioner claims that non-violent second-strike offenders are 

receiving post-sentence conduct credits which he has been denied. However, Petitioner is 

a non-violent third-strike offender. Accordingly, Petitioner’s ineligibility to receive postsentence conduct credits is based on his classification as a third striker rather than a second 

striker. 

 Petitioner further argues that his preclusion from receiving post-sentence conduct 

credits also violates his fundamental right to physical and personal liberty, which would 

require heightened review. However, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does 

not safeguard any right to good-time credit. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). 

Moreover, many federal circuits have held that there is no liberty interest in the potential 

to earn good-time credits. See Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2000); 

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 

(5th Cir.1995); Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, because 

the classification between second-strike offenders and third-strike offenders does not 

involve a suspect class and no fundamental rights are implicated, the Court will address 

Petitioner’s arguments under the rational basis test. 

 Petitioner argues that there is “no legitimate governmental interest in denying [him] 

the prison conduct credits.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) To support his claim, Petitioner offers only 

conclusory assertions that some inmates that have been convicted of the same crime–or 

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even of worse crimes–are being afforded the benefit of the new post-sentence conduct 

credit provisions. Specifically, Petitioner provides five examples of inmates who were 

convicted of crimes similar to his own, but did not receive a third strike because of 

conditions in their plea bargains. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 23-24.) 

On this issue, the state court found a rational basis, stating that “[t]he purpose of the 

Three Strikes law is ‘to impose longer terms of imprisonment on defendants with two 

strikes and generally still longer terms on defendants with three strikes.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 

5) (quoting In Re Cervera, 24 Cal. 4th 1073, 1077 (2001)). The state court’s finding is 

consistent with Supreme Court precedent holding that states have a “legitimate interest ‘in 

dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they 

are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal 

law.’” Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 144 (1986) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 

U.S. 263, 276 (1980)). 

Disparities in sentencing for similar crimes occur as a result of the discretion judges 

have to sentence certain crimes as a misdemeanor or felony. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 

11, 17 (2003). Judges consider various factors in determining sentences, such as the gravity 

of the current offense, tendency towards recidivism, and past criminal history. Id. at 13. In 

McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 845-35 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court found there was no 

denial of equal protection in having persons subject to different sentencing systems. 

 State legislatures have the discretion to treat situations differently where there is a 

difference in facts, and they are justified in making these classifications as long they are 

rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 

The Supreme Court found legitimate California’s Three Strikes law’s goal of treating three 

strikers more harshly than one or two strikers. See generally Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 

11 (2003). In Ewing, the Supreme Court specifically held that California has an interest in 

recidivism and crime deterrence, which are considered legitimate government interests. Id. 

at 28. Further, the Supreme Court held that California has a rational basis for increasing 

sentences to further the goal of reducing crime. See id. at 30. Thus, there is a rational basis 

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for deciding post-sentence conduct credit eligibility based on inmates’ classifications under 

California’s Three Strikes law. 

C. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner complains that had he been given an evidentiary hearing in regard to his 

state court petitions, he would have better developed the evidence as to the number of 

inmates receiving post-sentence conduct credits who committed his same offense. (ECF 

No. 1 at 10.) As Respondent points out, such a factual development would have been 

cumulative to the evidence and irrelevant to the legal analysis. (ECF No. 11-1 at 8.) The 

state court’s decision was based on a presumption that even if Petitioner’s factual assertions 

were true–that there were other inmates who committed the same or similar crimes as he 

who are receiving post-sentence conduct credits–that Petitioner as a third-strike offender 

is not similarly situated to any second-strike offender that would entitle him to relief under 

an equal protection analysis (See ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Thus, the state court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing does not show that the state court made any 

sort of factual error in determining whether Petitioner was entitled to relief. 

 “A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if: (1) the allegations in his 

petition would, if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, 

after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.” Phillips v. Woodford, 267 

F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s 

factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to 

hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Because this 

petition can be resolved on the record before the Court, the Court need not hold an 

evidentiary hearing. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, after an independent review of the record, the Court 

concludes the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s habeas petition. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that 

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“[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 

order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability should issue as to those claims 

on which a petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The standard is satisfied if “jurists of reason could disagree with 

the district court’s resolution of [the] constitutional claims” or 

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Neither is the case here, and so the Court 

declines to issue the certificate of appealability. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 15, 2018 

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