Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00016/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Guy Stern Jr.,

Petitioner,

v.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents.

_______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 06-16-TUC-DCB

ORDER

BACKGROUND: Petitioner's Claim

On January 17, 2006, Petitioner Stern filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

alleging violations of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during

the pre-trial investigation stage and trial stage of proceedings. (Petition at 5.) He alleges

that his attorney failed to effectively represent him at trial and on appeal. Specifically, he

alleges the following instances of ineffective assistance:

1. Trial counsel failed to investigate, examine or pursue medical evidence related

to head injuries that cause deaths in infants and young children that would

have supported Defendant's theory that the victim's death was caused

accidentally and not intentionally.

2. Trial counsel failed to review Fry's store surveillance tapes that would have

established that he was "not home alone" when the victim lapsed into a

comatose state.

3. Trial counsel failed to pursue severance of his trial from his co-defendant,

which would have resulted in a reversal of his case on direct appeal.

Id.; see also (Accompanying Memorandum filed 1/17/06.)

On July 14, 2006, the Respondents answered the Petition. Respondent asserts

that the Petition is untimely and should be dismissed. Also, Respondent argues that the

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

federal claims asserted by the Petitioner must be dismissed because they are precluded by

his failure to exhaust their review before the Arizona Supreme Court and have been

procedurally defaulted in the state courts under Rule 32.2(a)(3).

Petitioner argues that even if Defendant is correct, any procedural default of his

claims is overcome and he may obtain federal review of the merits of his claims by

demonstrating that evidence exists of his actual innocence sufficient to implicate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice that warrants habeas relief. He also asserts cause and

prejudice because he instructed his attorneys to file the claims he seeks to raise here with

the state courts pursuant to a Rule 32 motion for post conviction relief (PCR motion), but

they failed to do so and then delayed in sending him his records so he could not timely

exhaust these claims in the state courts. By these allegations, Petitioner asserts that his

PCR attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel. (Petition at Accompanying

Memorandum.) 

Respondents correctly assert procedural bar, but fail to respond to Petitioner's

assertion of actual innocence. The Court calls for further briefing of this gateway

exception to procedural default of Petitioner's claims.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: 28 U.S.C. § 2254

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law that is binding on state courts. Engle v. Isaac, 546 U.S.

107, 119 (1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). In other

words, a writ of habeas corpus is available to "a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), “to restrict the availability of habeas corpus relief,” Greenawalt v. Stewart,

105 F.3d 1268, 12751 (9th Cir. 1997), specifically as follows:

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).

A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

In deciding whether the state court ruling was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of the law, this Court looks exclusively to the holdings of the

United States Supreme Court. A state court decision is contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached

by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court confronts facts that are

materially indistinguishable from relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result

opposite that of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A

state court’s application of clearly established Supreme Court law is unreasonable where

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principal but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 407. This is an objective

assessment, id. at 378; an objectively unreasonable application of federal law is different

from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410.

It is not enough that the state court erroneously or incorrectly applied clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, “rather the application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. Accordingly, a writ only issues if the federal reviewing court has a firm

conviction that the state court committed clear error in its application of Supreme Court

precedent. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 112, 1153-54, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). In

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

other words, a Petitioner will not prevail even if he has the better of two reasonable legal

arguments because a writ will issue only if this Court has a firm conviction that one

answer, the one proposed by Petitioner and rejected by the state court, was correct and

the other, the one adopted by the state court was erroneous. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54).

Stern's Petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date, so the

provisions of the Act apply to this case. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 268 n. 3 (2000)). 

Timeliness: 1-Year Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposed, for the first time, a one-year statute of limitations on

habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The limitation period shall run from the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,

whichever comes latest. Id. To calculate when the clock starts running for the one-year

statute of limitations period, the conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing

a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of conviction, which is

90 days. Clay v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 1074 (2003)

(conviction becomes final 90 days later, when the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari expires); see Bowen v. Roe, 118 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (period of

direct review includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme court whether or not such a petition is filed).

In 1994, Stern was sentenced to life in prison for two counts of child abuse and

one count of felony first-degree murder for the death of a 2-year-old girl. His sentence

and conviction became final July 31, 1996, when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued

the mandate denying his direct appeal of his conviction. The Petition, filed on January

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

17, 2006, must be dismissed as untimely unless Petitioner can establish a basis for tolling

the one-year limitation period. 

The running of the statute of limitations is tolled for any period of time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction review is pending and

continues to toll while a Petitioner appeals the denial of a state application in state court. 

Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2244(d)(2) provides: "The

time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review . . . is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation."

The Supreme Court interpreted this statutory tolling provision as covering the

time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher

state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). The Court held that the definition of

"pending," within the context of 2244(d)(2), "means that an application is pending as long

as the ordinary state collateral review process is "in continuance" – i.e., "until the

completion of" that process." Id. at 220. "In other words, until the application has

achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures, by definition it

remains 'pending.'" Id.

The Court explained that any other definition would defeat the important

principle of exhaustion codified in the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), that a federal

habeas petitioner must exhaust his state remedies as long as he has "'the right under

[state] law . . . to raise' in the State, 'by any available procedure, the question presented.'" 

Id. Otherwise, the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations would require state prisoners

to file federal habeas petitions before the State completes a full round of collateral

review. Id.

Filing for post-conviction relief in state court triggers the tolling of the statute of

limitations for filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court looks at the

state's laws and rules governing filings, and considers whether anything would prevent

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Ariz. R. Cr. P. 32.2(a)(3) provides for preclusion of claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in

any previous collateral proceeding.

6

the petition from being placed in the court's record. Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724,

726-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (following Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-11 (2000) (holding that

federal courts look to state law when analyzing AEDPA's tolling provision). It is

undisputed that Petitioner's PCR motions for post-conviction relief were properly filed

with the trial and appellate courts of Arizona for purposes of entry into the record.

Here, the direct appeal was final on July 31, 1996, and the Petitioner filed his

first notice of PCR on July 15, 1996. He was appointed counsel, and his attorney filed

the corresponding petition/memorandum for PCR on February 27, 1998. On July 9,

1998, the trial court denied PCR because all the claims were precluded. The Arizona

appellate court affirmed the trial court on June 30, 1999, pursuant to Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2(a)(3).1

 The mandate denying PCR issued on August 6,

1999.

Before dismissal of the first Rule 32 motion for PCR was final, Petitioner filed a

second notice of PCR on March 3, 1999, and counsel filed a corresponding "second"

PCR petition/memorandum on October 19, 2000. The trial court denied the PCR motion

on February 2, 2001, because all the claims were precluded. On June 21, 2001, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, pursuant to Ariz. R. Cr. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

The mandate dismissing the "second" PCR motion issued on October 4, 2001.

On December 10, 2002, Petitioner filed his "third" request in state court for PCR,

simultaneously filing the notice and the petition/memorandum. On July 28, 2003, the

trial court again denied PCR because all the claims were precluded. On September 13,

2004, the appellate court again affirmed the dismissal of the PCR motion, pursuant to

Rule 32.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review on December 29, 2004. 

The court of appeals issued its mandate on February 10, 2005. Eleven months and seven

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

days later, on January 17, 2006, Petitioner filed this case seeking habeas relief pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The statute of limitations ran from when the mandate issued dismissing the

"second" PCR motion, October 4, 2001, to when the Petitioner filed the "third" PCR

motion, December 10, 2002, because approximately one year and two months elapsed. 

An additional eleven months passed after his "third" PCR motion before Petitioner filed

this action on January 17, 2006. His federal habeas Petition is barred by the statute of

limitations.

Exhaustion: Procedural Default

The procedural posture of a Petition is as important as its timeliness because 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) provides for the presentation of claims of constitutional magnitude to

the district courts as follows:

(1) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that–(a) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or (b) (i) there is an absence of

available State corrective process; or . . .

(2) An applicant for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available to the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion

requirements or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless

the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

Before a federal district court may consider a state prisoner’s application for

relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state court, every claim

raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989). To properly exhaust remedies, the prisoner must

have afforded the state courts the opportunity to rule on the merits of his federal

constitutional claim by fairly presenting the claim to the state courts in a procedurally

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 A "mixed" Petition with exhausted and unexhausted claims may be held in abeyance until

state claims are exhausted, so that subsequently the prisoner may file an amended habeas petition

inclusive of all his claims. Calderon v. United States District Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986-88

(9th Cir. 1998); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2000); Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.

8

appropriate manner. Id. at 351-52; Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

State prisoners, except those sentenced to death or life imprisonment, exhaust

state court remedies by presenting their claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes

v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). When a life sentence has been imposed,

the "complete round" requires a defendant to seek discretionary review of his claims by

the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. "If state remedies have not been exhausted, a district

court is directed to provide the habeas petitioner "with the choice of returning to state

court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present

only exhausted claims to the district court." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).2

If a federal constitutional claim can no longer be raised because of a failure to

follow the state's prescribed procedure for presenting such an issue the claim is

"technically" exhausted but procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to present the

claim to the state's highest court in a procedurally proper manner. Boyd v. Thompson,

147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Calderon, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30)); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989).

The procedural default doctrine applies to bar a federal habeas claim when a state

court declined to address a prisoner's claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state

procedural requirement. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman,

501 U.S. at 731-32l; Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Even if the state court also addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim as an

alternative ruling, the claims are nevertheless procedurally defaulted and barred from

federal consideration. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989)); Poland v.

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Stewart, 151 F.3d 1014, 1021 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1998); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333

(9th Cir. 1992). A subsequent “silent” denial of review affirms the lower court’s

application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803; Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,

7 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1992).

The procedural default doctrine also applies when the prisoner has not presented

a claim in state court, but pursuant to the state court’s procedural rules, there are no

currently available state court remedies or procedures to obtain review of the claim. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Engle, 456 U.S. at 125 n. 8; White, 874

F.2d at 602.

Here, the Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison so he was required to exhaust

his claims before the Arizona Supreme Court, which he only did with his third PCR

motion. He is, therefore, precluded from raising all the claims he raised in his first and

second PCR motions, including claims addressed on the merits, such as his severance

claim.

Additionally, even when the state courts discussed the merits of his claims, they

nevertheless found his claims procedurally defaulted. Specifically, the state court found

the claim that his trial counsel failed to investigate and/or pursue medical evidence related

to accidental infant head injuries was precluded from review because it was NOT a newly

discovered material fact (Answer, Ex. K: Decision Order at 1-2), and, therefore, this

claim did not satisfy the exception for filing an untimely appeal under Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.1(e). See also, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) (explaining that claims raised under Rule

32.1(e), such as PCR motions based on newly discovered evidence, are an exception to

the preclusion provisions of Rule 32). This forecloses the possibility for Petitioner to

bring a "fourth" motion for PCR to exhaust this claim.

Consequently, the Court finds that the Petitioner's claims are precluded from

federal review because they have been procedurally defaulted in the state courts. 

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

Cause and Prejudice: Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Procedural default precludes federal review of the claim unless the prisoner can

demonstrate “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Teague,

489 U.S. at 298; Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 900 F.2d 904, 907-08 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

To demonstrate cause, a state prisoner must show that some objective factor

external to the prisoner or his counsel impeded efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1977); Hughes, 900 F.2d at

908-09. To show prejudice, the prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). 

To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a state prisoner must establish by clear

and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could find him guilty of the offense. 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

Likewise the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional

limitation and may be equitably tolled if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's

control make it impossible to file a petition on time." See Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), overruled in part on other grounds,

(quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.1997)). Equitable

tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted

"[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure

to file a timely claim, . . .." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999)

(applying equitable tolling where delay on the part of prison officials was beyond

petitioner's control and petitioner demonstrated due diligence in submitting habeas

petition). Petitioner bears the burden of proving his entitlement to the equitable tolling of

his statute of limitations. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003).

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

There is an open question as to whether the fundamental miscarriage of

justice/actual innocence gateway exception for procedurally barred claims should also be

extended to cases barred by the statute of limitations. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770,

775-76 (9th Cir. 2002). In the Ninth Circuit, district courts are instructed to consider

whether there has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice or risk violating the

Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution, which ensures that "the privilege of

the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or

Invasion the public Safety may require it." Id. at 776-77.

Here, the Petitioner complains that he had trouble getting his attorneys to file his

state PCR motions to allege that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate,

examine or pursue medical evidence related to accidental head injuries that cause deaths

in infants. Instead, his PCR attorneys kept arguing that "newly discovered" medical

evidence existed to support his defense theory that the infant victim's death was caused

accidentally. Petitioner argues that this was ineffective assistance of counsel because it

prevented him from exhausting PCR for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

related to the failure to present medical evidence of accidental head injuries that cause

deaths in infants. The only other excuse Petitioner offers is that his PCR attorney failed

to timely return his file to him. Neither excuse establishes some objective factor external

to the Petitioner that prevented him from complying with the state's procedural rules or

the AEDPA's statute of limitations.

Petitioner filed the third PCR motion pro se allegedly to correct the mispresentation of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim related to the failure to

investigate and pursue medical evidence related to accidental head injuries that cause

death in infant victims. However, neither the Arizona Court of Appeals nor the Arizona

Supreme Court of Arizona found his presentation of the issue in the third PCR motion to

differ from the first or second PCR motions. In their opinions, Stern's third pro se PCR

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

motion was another attempt to frame his claim in terms of "newly discovered"

information to satisfy this requirement of the Rule 32.1(e) exception to preclusion. 

Assuming, however, that Stern's third PCR motion was necessitated by his attorneys'

failures to present his medical evidence claim related to accidental head-injury infant

deaths as an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim instead of a "newly discovered"

evidence claim, there is no excuse for why it took one year and two months to file the

third PCR motion. Petitioner knew that he could file a notice for PCR and later file the

petition/memorandum supporting his request for PCR because this was the procedure he

utilized in the first and second requests for PCRs. Additionally, Stern's presentation of

his claims pro se in the third PCR motion establishes that he had received the requisite

materials from his attorney by then so there is no excuse for his waiting another eleven

months after the state courts denied the third PCR motion before filing this action.

 There being no cause and prejudice showing by the Petitioner, the only way he

can avoid dismissal of this action is to demonstrate evidence of actual innocence

sufficient to bring him within the narrow class of cases implicating a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, which occurs when a constitutional violation has probably resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense. Smith v. Baldwin, 466

F.3d 805, 811-812 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray, 477 U.S. at

485) (emphasis added). 

This gateway "actual innocence" claim differs from a substantive "actual

innocence" claim. Id. at 812. The Supreme Court described the gateway showing in

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as being a less stringent standard than a substantive claim of

actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir.1997) (en

banc) (suggesting that “a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence claim must

go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that he is

probably innocent”). 

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, this Court is only permitted to

review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. He will not be

entitled to a declaration of actual innocence or to any relief outright. Id. "Under Schlup,

'a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

To determine whether Plaintiff makes this gateway showing, this Court may

consider “all the evidence,” including evidence excluded at trial, admitted illegally, or

available only after the trial. Id. (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328). Petitioner does not

need to "'show that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of committing;

instead, he must show that ‘a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.'"

Id. (quoting Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). The inquiry is:

can we have confidence that the petitioner committed the offense of which he was

convicted? 

In House v. Bell, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006), the Supreme Court

reaffirmed the viability of Schlup post-AEDPA. In House, the Court emphasized that the

gateway actual innocence standard does not require absolute certainty about the

petitioner's guilt or innocence,” but rather requires only that a petitioner demonstrate that

it is “more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt” regarding

his guilt. Id. at 2077. The Court rejected any suggestion that the AEDPA had replaced

the Schlup standard with a stricter test and found that the AEDPA's standard of review is

inapplicable to a habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a

showing of actual innocence,” Id. at 2078.

The Respondent has not addressed Petitioner's gateway claim of actual

innocence. Petitioner has filed a "Motion to Correct Traverse" and "Motion for

Permission to Supplement Petitioner's Traverse with Dr. Plunkett's Preliminary Opinion"

and "Motion for Permission to Supplement Petitioner's Traverse with Dr. Plunkett's Final

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

Opinion Once Complete." Dr. Plunkett, a forensic expert, offers his opinion that

developments in science and medicine over the years since Petitioner's conviction support

his theory that the victim's death was caused by an accidental head injury. Dr. Plunkett's

report supports the expert opinion by Dr. Mendelsohn, already submitted by the

Petitioner. Respondent objected to admission of the latter and most likely will object to

the former, but this Court can not determine whether Petitioner passes through the actual

innocence gateway without considering them, and the evidence that was presented at trial,

excluded at trial, admitted illegally, or available only after the trial. The gateway analysis

requires full briefing by the parties.

In light of the serious consequences of this analysis, the Court shall appoint

counsel to represent Petitioner even though there is no constitutional right to the

appointment of counsel in a civil case. See, Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 307 n. 6

(8th Cir. 1981). The appointment of counsel in a civil case is required only when

exceptional circumstances are present. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.

1980); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). A determination

with respect to exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of

success on the merits as well as the ability of a plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (9th Cir.

1986). The Court finds that exceptional circumstances exist to appointment counsel to

represent the Petitioner.

The Court reviewed the second PCR filed by attorney Brick Storts and finds that

Petitioner was well served by this representation. Mr. Storts is generally familiar with

Petitioner's case, including his claim that medical evidence exists which supports his

defense that an accidental injury caused the victim's death. The Court has contacted Mr.

Storts, and he agrees to represent Petitioner. Mr. Storts is a member of the Criminal

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

Justice Reform Act (CJRA) panel from which this Court appoints counsel to represent

financially eligible persons when the interests of justice so require, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 30006A.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that attorney, Brick Storts, is appointed pursuant to the CJRA

to represent the Petitioner in this matter. The Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this

Order to Mr. Storts at 271 N. Stone Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Amend/Correct the

Traverse (document 31) and Motion to Supplement the Traverse (document 32) are

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Answer requesting the Petition be denied

and dismissed (document 24) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days of the filing date of this

Order, the Respondents shall file a Response to address Petitioner's gateway claim of

actual innocence. Within 30 days thereafter, Petitioner's Reply shall be due. Respondent

may file a sur-Reply with leave of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event this Court concludes that

Petitioner has met the threshold actual innocence test, the Respondent shall have 30 days

to file a dispositive motion responding to the merits of Petitioner's constitutional claims.

DATED this 22nd day of January, 2007.

copy to Storts, Voucher by cjs 1/23/07

Case 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 33 Filed 01/24/07 Page 15 of 15