Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02429/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02429-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACEY R. PERRON, No. 2:06-cv-02429-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Tracey Perron

(“Plaintiff”) alleges she was sexually harassed and retaliated

against while an employee of the Department of Health and Human

Services (“DHHS”) (“Defendant”), in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. and

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Government

Code § 12940 et seq.

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 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

Defendant now moves to dismiss all claims for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative,

for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 on all of Plaintiff’s

claims. As set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. 

1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant DHHS for

approximately fifteen years before accepting similar employment

at the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“DCIS”) in

December, 2005. James Greer was the Assistant Special Agent in

charge of the DHHS Inspector General’s Sacramento Office, where

he worked together with four female agents, including Plaintiff. 

Sarah Allen, as the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco

Regional Office, was Greer’s supervisor, as well as Plaintiff’s

second-level supervisor.

On September 7, 2005, Plaintiff learned that Greer and one

of the female agents in the Sacramento office, Pamela Kite, were

allegedly having an affair. Plaintiff claims that she had a

personal conversation with Greer the next day outside the

workplace at a local park. According to Plaintiff, she told Greer

that engaging in an affair was not the appropriate way to address

his marital difficulties.

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3

She also states she expressed the belief that Pamela Kite was not

a suitable partner for Greer. Plaintiff nonetheless states she

told Greer that she would voice no further objection to his

affair as long as Kite found employment elsewhere and the two

were not situated in the same office with Plaintiff. 

On September 9, 2005, Greer traveled to New Orleans to

assist with Hurricane Katrina relief as part of a DHHS response

team. Greer chose agent Kite from the Sacramento office to

assist him in completing this assignment. Kite thereafter

traveled to New Orleans to join the response team on

September 20, 2005. Sarah Allen stated that she told Greer that

Plaintiff was a more suitable candidate than Kite for the

response team effort. Greer remained adamant that Kite was a

better choice despite Plaintiff’s more extensive experience. 

Plaintiff thereafter began looking for a new job in the

middle of September 2005. She alleges she was seeking

alternative employment at DCIS only to give herself choices in

the event that the DHHS office environment did not improve. When

DCIS Supervisor Scott Mumper contacted Greer about Plaintiff’s

prospective employment with DCIS, Mumper claims that Greer gave a

negative recommendation and instead suggested that his alleged

paramour, Kite, be considered for the position. Mumper proceeded

to accuse Greer, in the course of a heated conversation, of being

disingenuous about his effort to secure Kite’s relocation so that

their affair could continue unimpeded.

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4

Although Plaintiff claims her subsequent acceptance of the

DCIS position in mid-October was still with the hope that the

DHHS office atmosphere would in fact allow her to stay, that hope

apparently failed to materialize. On November 8, 2005, after

Greer and Kite returned from New Orleans, Plaintiff complained to

Greer in an email about the uncomfortable environment created by

the affair and told him that the situation had to be addressed. 

Plaintiff alleges she also complained verbally to Greer later in

November 2005. According to Plaintiff, after Greer and Kite

returned from New Orleans, they worked from home on the same

days, took extended breaks together, were overheard giggling

together in their offices. She also claims that Kite dressed

provocatively, and Kite received packages delivered to the DHHS

office from Victoria’s Secret, a well-known purveyor of sometimes

revealing attire. 

On December 7, 2005, Plaintiff reported the affair to a

superior for the first time when she spoke with Sarah Allen. 

Allen contacted Plaintiff in Mid-October because she believed

Plaintiff appeared to be upset. At that time, Plaintiff told

Allen she thought Kite was not performing all of her job duties

and that Plaintiff was not receiving the assistance she needed

for her cases.

Plaintiff ultimately resigned on or about December 12, 2005

to commence employment with DCIS after her concerns about DHHS

were allegedly left unaddressed. She subsequently instituted the

present lawsuit.

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5

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss. On a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material

fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in

order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations

and quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 1965

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

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6

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that when a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

12(b)(6) is made and “matters outside the pleading are presented

to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as

one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in

Rule 56..." Because both parties have submitted extensive

exhibits going beyond the four corners of the complaint, the

Court will analyze this motion under the standard for summary

judgment.

B. Summary Judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provide for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party

“always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting

Rule 56(c).

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7

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-587 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Ser. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall.442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). 

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8

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts ... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586-87.

ANALYSIS

I. Sexual Harassment based on hostile environment

Both Federal courts as well as California courts have

adopted similar standards for discrimination claims, hostile work

environment sexual harassment claims and retaliation claims under

FEHA. See, e.g., Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal.

4th 264, 279 (2006); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21 (1993). 

Plaintiff claims she was subjected to a hostile work

environment because of Greer’s romantic relationship with Kite.

To prevail on her claim of sexual harassment in that regard,

Plaintiff must show that (1) she was subjected to verbal or

physical conduct because of her gender; (2) that the conduct was

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and

create an abusive work environment. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47

F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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9

The analysis is both objective and subjective: "[c]onduct that is

not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile

or abusive work environment -- an environment that a reasonable

person would find hostile or abusive -- is beyond Title VII's

purview." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22

(1993).

In most instances, workplace affairs in and of themselves

have not been found to a create a sexually harassing environment. 

See, e.g., Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d

588, 590 (9 Cir. 1992). An exception to this general rule th

exists, however, if the workplace affair entails “widespread”

sexual conduct to which other employees are exposed, such as

flagrant boasting about the relationship and/or public displays

of affection. Miller v. Dep’t of Corrections, 36 Cal.4th 446,

471 (2005).

There is no evidence here that Plaintiff’s supervisor,

Greer, and his alleged sexual paramour, Kite engaged in any such

public displays evidencing their purported affair akin to those

confronted by the Miller court. Nor were there sexually

offensive comments made to Plaintiff in relation to the affair. 

The only arguable evidence of conduct permeating the workplace

relates to Plaintiff’s claim that Greer wore provocative

clothing, received packages from Victoria’s Secret, and sometimes

was heard giggling together with Greer. Such behavior, even if

true, did not create an sexually hostile work environment akin to

that recognized as actionable by Miller. 

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10

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment based

upon a hostile work environment under Title VII and FEHA fails as

a matter of law.

II. Gender Discrimination

Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited under both

Title VII and California's FEHA. Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act makes it illegal for an employer "to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ...

sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). A plaintiff may show a

violation of this statute by proving disparate treatment,

disparate impact or the existence of a hostile work environment. 

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comm. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109

(9th Cir. 1991). Similarly, FEHA makes it an unlawful employment

practice for an employer, “because of the.... sex... of any

person,... to discriminate against the person in compensation or

in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov.

Code § 12940(j)(1).

Under the so-called McDonnell-Douglas test for Title VII and

FEHA discrimination claims, the Plaintiff can establish a prima

facie of sex discrimination by 1) demonstrating performance in

accordance with her employer’s legitimate expectations;

(2) showing that she suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) establishing the presence of circumstances indicative of a

discriminatory motive. 

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11

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973);

see also Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th

Cir. 1998). The amount that must be produced in order to create

a prima facie case, however, is “very little." Sischo-Nownejad,

934 F.2d at 1111.

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts back to the defendant to

articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-803. 

If defendant meets its burden in that regard, the burden shifts

back to plaintiff to establish that defendant's proffered reason

was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 

In attempting to allege gender discrimination in this case,

Plaintiff relies on the so called “paramour” theory of

discrimination, in which a supervisor’s relationship with a coworked coupled with favoritism is used to support a

discrimination claim. There is an uneven split in the circuits

regarding the validity of this theory. One District of Columbia

Court tacitly endorsed this theory, in dicta. See King v. Palmer,

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that "unlawful sexual discrimination

occurs whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial

factor in the discrimination.") Aside from this one decision,

however, "every other federal court which has considered the

propriety of the 'paramour' theory has rejected it as a Title VII

cause of action." Alberto v. Bank of Am., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

13520 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing DeCinto v. Westchester County Med.

Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986)); 

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12

Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996); Ackel v.

Nat'l Communs., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003); Schobert

v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002)

(Title VII does not prevent employers from favoring employees

because of personal relationships); Taken v. Oklahoma Corp.

Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); Womack v. Runyon,

147 F.3d 1298. Each of these courts reasons that "[w]hen an

employer discriminates in favor of a paramour, such an action is

not sex-based discrimination, as the favoritism, while unfair,

disadvantages both sexes alike for reasons other than gender." 

Ackel, 335 F.3d at 382 (citing Green v. Adm'rs of the Tulane

Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002)).

The analysis changes, however, where favoritism directed

from a supervisor to his paramour is transformed from simple

favoritism to the concrete bestowal of employment benefits denied

other employees. The implementing regulations to Title VII makes

it clear that such conduct can constitute prohibited

discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 104.11(g) states in pertinent part

as follows:

 “Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted

because of an individual’s submission to the employer’s

sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the

employer may be held liable for unlawful sex

discrimination against other persons who were qualified

for but denied that employment opportunity.” 

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13

In this case, Plaintiff has proffered evidence that Pamela

Kite may have received tangible employment opportunities by

virtue of her relationship with James Greer. Specifically, there

is evidence that Greer gave Kite a lucrative temporary assignment

in New Orleans (that apparently involved substantial overtime)

because Greer wanted to travel away from the office together with

his paramour. This favoritism may have impacted Plaintiff. As

stated above, Greer’s own supervisor opined that Plaintiff had

more experience and would have been a better choice for the

assignment than Kite.

In addition, Plaintiff contends she obtained no merit-based

monetary award for uncompensated overtime she had to perform in

Kite and Greer’s absence because Greer wanted to ensure Kite

received awards by giving the Plaintiff an unjustifiably weak

recommendation. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges she was denied a

Quality Step Increase promotion because Greer failed to make the

recommendation Plaintiff deserved in order to secure promotions

for Kite. 

In Candelore, while the Ninth Circuit upheld the District

Court of Nevada's grant of summary judgment for a defendant in a

sexual discrimination case also involving an alleged paramour, it

predicated that result on the fact that because Candelore “failed

to identify employment benefits or opportunities that she was

entitled to but did not receive, she has not stated a prima facie

case of discrimination under Title VII." Candelore, 975 F.2d at

590. Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff has identified such

benefits and opportunities. 

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14

Significantly, Candelore was relied upon and distinguished

in Prowell v. State, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25530 (D. Or. Aug. 11,

2003). In Prowell, the plaintiff alleged sexual discrimination

based on a workplace romance. Id. at 3-5. Prowell applied for a

superior position within the defendant organization, and alleged

that the applicant hired, who was less qualified, was only hired

because she was romantically involved with a member of the hiring

committee. Id. at 3-5. The court denied a motion to dismiss the

claim, finding the facts distinguishable from Candelore because

the plaintiff properly identified the employment benefits she was

entitled to but denied, as required by the Ninth Circuit. 

The facts of the present case are analogous to those in

Prowell. As stated above, Plaintiff has alleged she was denied

employment opportunities and promotions as a result of Greer’s

favorable treatment of Kite. Plaintiff also alleges she suffered

from an adverse employment action when Greer told Scott Mumper

that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position with DCIS and

that Mumper should hire Kite instead. Mumper stated he believed

Kite was not as qualified as Plaintiff and that Greer only

recommended her in order to maintain his affair. 

Plaintiff has presented enough evidence that she was denied

employment opportunities and promotions as a result of Greer and

Kite’s relationship in order to survive a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

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III. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims the adverse employment actions were

retaliatory in violation of Title VII as well as FEHA. In order

to establish a claim of retaliation thereunder, the Plaintiff

must demonstrate (1) that she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) that her employer was aware of the activity; (3) that she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch.

Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Yanowitz v.

L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). 

Plaintiff alleges adverse employment actions taken against

her by Greer were retaliatory. In order to proceed on this

claim, she must first allege she engaged in a protected activity

of which her employer was aware. Plaintiff asserts her

complaints to Greer regarding the alleged affair were a protected

activity for purposes of her retaliation claim. Plaintiff

specifically refers to her conversation with Greer on

September 7, 2005, and her subsequent complaints to Greer about

the ongoing situation involving Ms. Kite.

An employee's conduct may constitute protected activity for

purposes of a retaliation claim not only when the employee

opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be unlawful, but

also when the employee opposes conduct that the employee

reasonably and in good faith believes is unlawful, whether or not

that belief is ultimately borne out. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th 1028

(internal citations omitted). 

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Even if, as indicated above, Greer’s conduct cannot support a

viable discrimination claim, that fact alone consequently does

not defeat Plaintiff’s claim that she reasonably believed she was

opposing unlawful conduct. As a result, the Court cannot rule

out that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, especially

since it must resolve all inferences in that regard in

Plaintiff’s favor on a motion for summary judgment.

With respect to whether she sustained an adverse employment

action, Plaintiff claims that Greer lied to her future employer

in retaliation for her complaints about his affair, and failed to

submit appropriate documentation in support of performance awards

and a Quality Step Increase in Plaintiff’s salary. These

allegations are sufficient to constitute an adverse employment

action for purposes of stating a viable retaliation claim.

The more difficult inquiry identified by Plaintiff concerns

whether the adverse employment actions are causally related to

her protected activity. "The causal link between a protected

activity and the alleged retaliatory action 'can be inferred from

timing alone' when there is a close proximity between the two."

Id. (citing Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,

1065 (9th Cir. 2002)). While the time line of these events is

not completely clear at this stage, it is apparent that all of

these events took place during an approximately four-month

period. The Plaintiff has referred to several instances of

protected activity, and several instances of alleged retaliation

that occurred during this period. The Court must view the facts

before it and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving party. 

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Applying that standard, the Court can find a reasonable inference

of causal effect between Plaintiff's experiences of adverse

employment and her protected activity. 

The Plaintiff has sufficiently established a close proximity

between the activities in order to survive a motion for summary

judgment as to her retaliation claim. 

 CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, as to the lawsuit in its entirety, is DENIED.

Summary adjudication is however, GRANTED in favor of Defendant as

to Plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment. Defendant’s request

for summary adjudication is otherwise DENIED as to Plaintiff’s

remaining claims for gender discrimination and retaliation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-02429-MCE -GGH Document 52 Filed 11/29/07 Page 17 of 17