Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05373/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 2010 Decided March 29, 2011

No. 09-5373

CARMEN S. TALAVERA,

APPELLANT

v.

RAJIV SHAH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-00720)

Jonathan L. Gould argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Alan R. Kabat was on the brief for amicus curiae

Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association in

support of appellant.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

USCA Case #09-5373 Document #1300390 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 1 of 18
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Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Concurring opinion by Senior Judge SILBERMAN.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Carmen Talavera, a former

employee of the United States Agency for International

Development (“USAID”), appeals the grant of summary

judgment on her claims of gender discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. Talavera contends that while employed by the

Office of Security she was referred for an unwarranted mental

health screening in retaliation for protected activity, and that she

was passed over for promotion to a GS 14 position in June 2004

and again in November 2004, and ultimately she was removed

from her position in September 2005, as a result of unlawful

gender discrimination and retaliation. We affirm the grant of

summary judgment except with regard to the June 2004 nonpromotion claim. As to that claim we hold that Talavera offered

sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of disputed fact

whether the USAID’s explanation for her non-promotion was

pretextual and from which a reasonable jury could find unlawful

gender discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm in part and we

reverse and remand Talavera’s June 2004 non-promotion gender

discrimination claim.

I.

Talavera, a Hispanic woman, had worked for the federal

government for twenty-two years1

 before working in the USAID

1

 Talavera worked at the General Services Administration

(“GSA”) from 1985 to 2001. From 1994 to 2001 she was a Physical

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Office of Security from September 2001 until she was removed

from her position four years later. The director of the Office of

Security until August 2004 was Michael Flannery. Talavera was

initially assigned as a GS 13 Security Specialist to the

Personnel, Information and Domestic Security Division

(“Information Security” division), which was headed by Randy

Streufert. In July 2003, she was transferred to a GS 13 Regional

Operations Officer position in the Physical Security Program

Overseas Division (“Physical Security” division), which was

headed by David Blackshaw; her immediate supervisor was

Gaylord Coston. 

Talavera had complained in early 2003 to her team leader

and Flannery about being sexually harassed by a contractor.

When the contractor was nevertheless hired and Talavera

complained to Flannery, Flannery transferred her to the Physical

Security Division. During a training trip with Coston in 2003,

Talavera challenged Coston’s personnel decisions as favoring

men. An Equal Employment Opportunity Office (“EEO office”)

report in December 2004 showed that there were no women in

GS 14 or higher positions in the Office of Security; March 2005

statistics showed no change. 

Security Specialist focusing on crime prevention and disaster

preparedness; from 1985-1994 she was an Equipment Specialist

working extensively with outside contractors and vendors. While at

GSA, Talavera received training in physical security, including from

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the American Society

for Industrial Security, the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration, and the Academy of Physical Security. She was

named GSA Employee of the Year in 1998. While working in the

USAID Office of Security, Talavera received excellent performance

evaluations and cash awards in the Personnel, Information and

Domestic Security Division, and was approved for a cash award based

on her outstanding performance in the Physical Security Program

Overseas Division, On the Spot Cash Award (May 27, 2004).

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The district court opinion relates the factual underpinnings

of Talavera’s claims with regard to her referral for a psychiatric

screening (that never took place) attendant to her medical

examination for clearance to serve a tour of duty in Iraq, her

non-promotion to a GS 14 position in November 2004, and the

eventual termination of her employment in September 2005. 

See Talavera v. Fore, 648 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2009). We

need not repeat them here because upon de novo review, see

Miller v. Hersman, 594 F.3d 8, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010), we cannot

conclude that summary judgment was inappropriately granted

on these claims. We therefore focus on what happened in

connection with Talavera’s non-promotion to a GS 14 position

in June 2004. From our review of the entire record we are

confident that doing so does not prejudice either party’s

contentions on appeal.

In May 2004, Talavera applied for a GS 14 Security

Specialist position in the Information Security division where

she had worked for 22 months and where she had earned two

cash bonuses approved by Streufert. She was placed on the best

qualified list, based on the applicants’ self assessments; an

asterisk indicated only she submitted complete documentation

to support her application. Streufert, the selecting official,

interviewed all of the candidates in early June 2004, including

Talavera. In that same time period Talavera told Coston and

Blackshaw that she was filing an EEO complaint regarding the

mental health screening referral. Streufert shortly thereafter

selected Regional Operations Officer Anthony Mira based on his

answers to the questions Streufert had asked during the

interview. Although Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)

regulations required promotion materials to be preserved for two

years, see 5 C.F.R. § 335.103(b)(5) (2002), and EEOC

Regulations required preservation for one year, see 29 C.F.R. §

1602.14 (1991), Streufert destroyed his interview notes in

August or September 2004. He also did not enter the questions

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he asked or the rankings and justification for his selection of

Mira into the Human Resources computer system; the USAID

regulations did not require him to do so.

Upon exhausting her administrative remedies, Talavera

filed a complaint on April 23, 2007, and an amended complaint

on January 4, 2008, alleging that the USAID had unlawfully

discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. 

The district court granted the USAID’s motion for summary

judgment, and Talavera appeals. 

II.

On appeal, Talavera contends that the district court erred by

failing to evaluate her evidence in its totality and failing to

assume the truth of the facts and draw inferences in her favor.

Specifically, as relevant to her July 2004 non-promotion, she

maintains that the district court ignored all of her evidence of

male favoritism in past promotions, bonus awards, and job

assignments; discounted comments that showed gender bias and

retaliatory animus in the GS 14 selecting official; allowed the

USAID to rely on interview results despite the selecting

official’s improper destruction of his interview notes and

excluded evidence that she was asked different questions during

her interview than the men who applied; and discounted

evidence of under-representation of women in upper

management. 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The evidence is to be viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the court

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must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party. Id. at 255; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). Although summary judgment is not the occasion for

the court to weigh credibility or evidence, see Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the nonmoving party ‘fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.’” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 (quoting Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “[T]here is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a [reasonable] jury to return a verdict for

that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “The mere existence of

a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will

be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 2

The foundation for analyzing Title VII claims was laid in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and

embracing subsequent Supreme Court decisions, this court has

applied the standard, see Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,

156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). More recently, the

court has clarified that once the employer has asserted a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the district

court should proceed to address “one central question: Has the

employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was

not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally

discriminated against the employee on the basis of . . .

[gender]?” Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d

490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670,

678 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we look to “(1) the plaintiff's

2

 Cf. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnable Foundation Co., Inc., 946

F.2d 930, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack

the employer's proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any

further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the

plaintiff . . . or any contrary evidence that may be available to

the employer.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289; see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).

The USAID claimed that Streufert’s selection in June 2004

of Anthony Mira over Talavera for the GS 14 promotion was

based on his superior performance during his interview by

Streufert. In support of her claim that she was passed over for

this promotion because of gender discrimination and retaliation,

Talavera offered evidence that included:

1. Statements by the Director of the Office of Security.

In her formal EEO complaint, Talavera recounted several

statements by Flannery, the Director of the Office of Security

until August 2004, who was Streufert’s boss, to demonstrate that

Streufert was biased against women. Flannery had told her, for

example, that Streufert was not “culturally sensitive,” had

“many issues” with women, and “couldn’t deal being an equal

colleague to a woman.” Memorandum for EEO Record from

Carmen S. Talavera (Mar. 25, 2005). Talavera contends that the

district court erred in discounting the probative value of these

statements by importing a requirement the comment be directly

connected to an adverse action or occur in the context of the

promotion decision.3

 See Talavera, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 131–32. 

3

 Talavera cites United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384,

1390–91 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding statements admissible because

reasonably close to the dates of an alleged conspiracy, construing FED.

R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)), and Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d

50, 55–56 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding, despite the lag time of statements

made over a year prior to the employee’s discharge, statements

admissible as part of a sequence of events culminating in the

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On appeal the USAID maintains that the statements were

inadmissible hearsay and not a party admission under Federal

Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), relying on the district court’s

analysis. 

Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a

statement is not inadmissible hearsay when it is an admission by

a party opponent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Although this

circuit has not spoken to the precise evidentiary issue, see

generally U.S. v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 734–35 (D.C. Cir.

1988), opinions from other circuits on the requirements of Rule

801(d)(2)(D) are instructive. 

In the employment discrimination context, the circuit courts

of appeal have held that Rule 801(d)(2)(D) requires only that the

declarant have some authority to speak on matters of hiring or

promotion or that the declarant be involved in the decisionmaking process in general. This, along with evidence that the

statements were made during the existence of the employment

relationship and relate to the challenged action, is sufficient to

allow the statements into evidence as party admissions. See

generally 30B M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE:EVIDENCE §7023(Interim Ed. 2006). For instance,

in Marra v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 497 F.3d 286 (3d

Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit held admissible statements

allegedly made by the employee’s direct supervisor that there

would be repercussions by the employer against anyone who

testified against the employer in a previous discrimination suit.

The court held that “[p]ersonal involvement in the employment

decision being litigated” is not “an absolute prerequisite” to

admissibility of a statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Id. at 297. 

The Seventh Circuit has reached the same conclusion. In

Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2009), the court held

discharge). Neither is directly on point. 

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that “[f]or an agent’s statement regarding an employment action

to constitute an admission, she need not have been personally

involved in that action, but her duties must encompass some

responsibility related to the decisionmaking process affecting

the employment action.” Id. at 793 (internal quotations omitted). 

The court had earlier held in an age discrimination case in

Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050 (1990), that a statement

by the employee’s immediate supervisor informing him that

other management officials had said the company wanted to get

rid of older workers was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)

because “[the statements] were direct warnings by [the

supervisor], himself a member of management, given to . . . his

subordinate, as to the attitude, intentions and/or policy of the

higher-ups in management.” Id. at 1053.

As Director of the Office of Security, it is undisputed that

Flannery was empowered to speak on the subject of promotions

within the Office and was involved generally in the promotion

process. His statements to Talavera, made during his tenure as

Director, were “direct warnings” about the “attitude” of a

management official he supervised. See Hybert, 900 F.2d at

1053. Regardless of whether or not Talavera has shown that

Flannery was personally involved in the June 2004 promotion,

and regardless of exactly when the statements were made, they

are directly relevant to the question of whether impermissible

gender discrimination may have played a part in Streufert’s

promotion decision. Talavera was not obligated to prove more

because Rule 801(d)(2)(D) does not require for admissibility

that the exact time and precise context in which a statement was

made be established. Further, on summary judgment Talavera,

as the non-moving party, is entitled to the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the evidence, see Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255, and a reasonable inference is that Flannery was speaking

about Streufert’s biased attitudes towards women and this bias

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had implications for the promotion decision that Streufert made

in June 2004. 

In ruling that Talavera had failed to establish the context of

Flannery’s statements and hence they were not probative of

Streufert’s discriminatory intent, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 132, the

district court relied on Figures v. Board of Public Utilities, 967

F.2d 357, 360–61 (10th Cir. 1992), which upheld pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, exclusion of “anecdotal evidence

of discrimination,” namely “racial comments” made by the

defendants, as “not probative of any issue in the case unless [the

plaintiff] could link those comments to personnel actions of

hiring, firing and promoting.” In contrast, the statements

Talavera seeks to introduce are not stray comments by an

employer; they are statements by the head of the Office of

Security relating specifically to alleged gender bias on the part

of the subordinate manager who was responsible for making the

employment decision that Talavera challenges. As a result, the

statements themselves are intrinsically linked to the disputed

personnel action, and Figures is inapposite. The district court

erred in concluding the statements were not probative of

Streufert’s discriminatory intent. 

By contrast, the district court properly ruled that the

statements by Michael Lessard were inadmissible hearsay. See

Talavera, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 131; cf. Carter v. George

Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

Talavera recounted in an affidavit that her colleague Michael

Lessard had told her that he and Roger Rowe were asked

different questions than Talavera during their interviews with

Streufert. Talavera offered no evidence that these statements

were within the scope of Lessard’s employment or that he was

given authority to speak on behalf of the USAID on the subject

of employment decisions and thus admissible under Rule

801(d)(2)(D). See, e.g., Stephens, 569 F.3d at 793–94; Jacklyn

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v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d

921, 928 (6th Cir. 1999). 

2. Streufert’s Statement. At least a year before the

June 2004 promotion decision, according to Talavera’s March

25, 2005 EEO memorandum, even though she also had served

in the military, Streufert had told her that the men in the office

had bonded because they served in the military. The district

court discounted this statement as a “stray remark” and as

unconnected to the promotion decision at issue, Talavera, 648

F. Supp. 2d at 132, but ruled that Talavera was entitled to have

this evidence considered as part of her overall claim that the

USAID discriminated against her, id. at 134. At the summary

judgment stage of proceedings the court is not to weigh the

evidence, see Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895, and Streufert’s

statement is relevant to Talavera’s claim of gender

discrimination, illustrative of Flannery’s statements about

Streufert’s animus toward women, and properly considered in

evaluating whether the totality of evidence shows the USAID’s

explanation was pretextual.

3. Streufert’s Destruction of Interview Notes. 

Approximately two months after conducting the interviews and

making his selection decision, Streufert destroyed all of his

interview notes. Streufert admitted that he had destroyed his

notes in August or September, 2004, stating that he “typically

destroy[ed] this type of material unless there [was] a reason to

keep it,” and he had “no information that any of the candidates

had officially questioned the selection.” Streufert Aff. 3, July

27, 2005. Streufert also did not enter any notes relating to his

promotion decision into the Human Resources computer system

although it provides space for comments on each applicant and

although other managers made such entries. This was despite

Streufert’s sworn statement that, having supervised all of the

applicants, the interview process would give him the

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information he needed to make a selection for the GS 14

promotion. The district court ruled that in the absence of

evidence of bad faith, Talavera was entitled to only a “weak

adverse inference” relating to the destruction of the notes

because the destruction was “at worst negligent” and not

intentional. Talavera, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 133. 

This court has recognized the negative evidentiary inference

arising from spoliation of records. See Webb v. D.C., 146 F.3d

964 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Observing that entry of a default judgment as

a sanction for destruction of records is a “drastic” sanction [that]

is merited only when “less onerous methods . . . will be

ineffective or obviously futile,” Webb, 146 F.3d at 971; see also

Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478, the court explained that the

evidentiary presumption that the destroyed documents contained

favorable evidence for the party prejudiced by their destruction

was a lesser, more common sanction. Webb, 146 F.3d at 974 &

n.20. Indeed, in Webb the court stated that the lack of

compliance — the defendant’s “general practice of discarding

files after a set period of time” and “failing to notify employees

systemwide of the federal regulations that imposed a duty to

retain such materials” — was “certainly serious and must be

addressed.” 146 F.3d at 975–76. Other circuits have similarly

held that violation of a regulation requiring document

preservation can support an inference of spoliation. See, e.g.,

Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 108–09

(2d Cir. 2001); Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir.

1994); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1419 (10th

Cir. 1987). Notably, in Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 109, the employer,

like Streufert, had a practice of destroying records after the

hiring process concluded. The Second Circuit held that where

there was a written policy requiring document preservation and

documents had been destroyed in violation of that policy, the

obligation to preserve records attaches as long as the party

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seeking the inference is “a member of the general class of

persons that the regulatory agency sought to protect in

promulgating the rule.” Id. Further, that “where, as here, a party

has violated an EEOC record-retention regulation, a violation of

that regulation can amount to a breach of duty necessary to

justify a spoliation inference in an employment discrimination

action.” Id. 

The USAID acknowledges that Streufert was required under

OPM regulations to keep his notes for two years, 5 C.F.R. §

335.103(b)(5) (2002). Further, regulations of the EEOC

required him to keep his notes for one year, 29 C.F.R. §

1602.14. These regulations do not contain an exception

encompassing Streufert’s “typical” practice. Streufert admits to

knowing or negligent destruction of his interview notes insofar

as the destruction was not accidental. See id. Talavera is a

member of the classes sought to be protected, for the EEOC

regulation pertains to employees who file Title VII complaints

and the OPM regulation pertains to grievances of promotion

decisions. The destroyed records were relevant to Talavera’s

challenge because the USAID defended on the ground that her

non-selection was based on her poor performance during

Streufert’s interview of her, and the notes might have

undermined his claim that the man he selected exhibited more

knowledge of the job than she did and might also have

confirmed Talavera’s assertion that Streufert asked her different

questions than he asked of the men he interviewed. See Byrnie,

243 F.3d at 109–10. The notes represented Talavera’s best

chance to present direct evidence that Streufert’s proffered

reason for the selection was pretextual.

A reasonable jury could conclude that Streufert’s nonaccidental destruction of his notes supports an inference that the

notes would have contained information favorable to her claim. 

For example, Streufert admitted that he could not recall whether

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Talavera had mentioned relevant portions of her prior federal

government experience. He also admitted that when in the past

he had been involved with an EEO complaint about his selection

of a man rather than a woman, he was asked to submit his

justification and had done so in writing. Also, a reasonable jury

could find that the statement in Streufert’s deposition that he

knew that agencies are required to keep records, but he thought

it was Human Resources’ responsibility to do so, was to some

extent contradictory with the statement in his prior affidavit that

he was not aware of any policy concerning note retention by

selecting officials. Given his failure to enter notes on his

promotion decision into the Human Resources computer system,

it is unclear how he imagined that Human Resources would be

able to keep records on the promotion decision when he had

provided them no notes on his selection decision. 

The district court thus erred in finding that Talavera was

entitled to only a “weak adverse inference” of spoliation, and

that “[t]he destruction of evidence, standing alone, is [not]

enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence – or

utterly inadequate evidence – in support of a given claim to

survive summary judgment on that claim.” Talavera, 648 F.

Supp. 2d at 133-34 (alteration in original; citations omitted). 

The spoliation inference must be considered along with

Talavera’s other admissible evidence regarding unlawful gender

discrimination.

Given the USAID’s proffer of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Streufert’s selecting Mira — that,

according to Streufert, Mira performed better during his

interview than Talavera and was the only candidate who had

learned the technical information Streufert was assessing — the

question is whether Talavera offered sufficient admissible

evidence, when considered in its totality and according her all

reasonable favorable interferences from the evidence, from

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which a reasonable jury could find that the USAID’s reason was

pretextual. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290; see also Brady, 520 F.3d

at 494. The district court did not consider either Flannery’s or

Streufert’s statements, both of which it excluded as irrelevant. 

It drew only a “weak” inference from Streufert’s destruction of

his interview notes. Viewing this evidence most favorably to

Talavera, a reasonable jury could find that the USAID’s reason

was pretextual. When the Director’s statements regarding

Streufert’s discriminatory attitude toward women, as illustrated

by Streufert’s own statement indicating a preference for male

colleagues in the workplace, is combined with Streufert’s

improper destruction of his interview notes on which he claimed

to have based his promotion selection, a reasonable jury could

find that his discriminatory attitude affected his decision to pass

over her for promotion and that the USAID’s stated reason for

Talavera’s non-promotion was a pretext for unlawful gender

discrimination. Because Talavera produced sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to find pretext, see Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290,

summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate.

By contrast, Talavera failed to present evidence from which

a reasonable jury could find that her June 2004 non-promotion

was the result of unlawful retaliation by Streufert for her June 8,

2004 EEO complaint regarding the unwarranted referral for a

mental health screening. To prove unlawful retaliation Talavera

had to show that Streufert, who made the promotion selection,

had knowledge of her protected activity. See Jones, 557 F.3d at

679. Although she “need only offer circumstantial evidence that

could reasonably support an inference” that Streufert knew of

her EEO activity, id. at 679, and context matters, Burlington

Northern, 548 U.S. at 69, Talavera offered only evidence from

which a reasonable jury would have had to speculate that he

knew and that is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

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Talavera asserts that Streufert worked closely with Coston

and Blackshaw, discussing personnel matters in the Office of

Security on a regular basis and they hung out together. She had

told Coston and Blackshaw that she was going to file an EEO

complaint about their referral of her for a mental health

screening. She therefore concludes that Streufert must also have

known given the close temporal proximity between the protected

activity on June 8, 2004, when she filed her EEO complaint, and

his promotion decision on June 16, 2004. Although an adverse

action that occurs shortly after protected activity can be part of

a finding of retaliation, see Clark County School District v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001), “positive evidence

beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption

that the proffered explanations are genuine,” Woodruff v. Peters,

482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Talavera offered no

evidence, for instance, of a managers’ meeting between June 8

and 16, much less that Coston or Blackshaw revealed the

referral for a mental health screening to anyone other than the

examining physician. Given Streufert’s denial under oath that

he knew of the June 8 EEO complaint, the fact that Streufert had

been her previous supervisor still requires a speculative leap that

her then-current supervisors would have discussed the complaint

with him.

Talavera’s reliance on her discussions with Streufert of

previous complaints is misplaced because too much time had

passed to link the past activity to the challenged action.

Talavera, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 129 n.6. See Taylor v. Solis, 571

F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530. 

In Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2000), on which

Talavera relies, at the time of the allegedly retaliatory action, the

employee’s EEO complaints were being investigated and the

employee was continuing to file formal discrimination and

retaliation complaints. Id. at 521. So too in Holcomb, 433 F.3d

at 903. Talavera’s complaints of sexual harassment by a

USCA Case #09-5373 Document #1300390 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 16 of 18
17

consultant and denial of a computer monitor occurred long

before her non-promotion and were either never presented to the

EEO office at all or not part of a formal EEO complaint. 

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment

except with regard to Talavera’s June 2004 non-promotion

gender discrimination claim, which we remand to the district

court.

USCA Case #09-5373 Document #1300390 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 17 of 18
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: Ijoin the court’s

opinion fully but wish to state that I think this is a close case. 

We affirmed virtually all of the district court’s determinations

– including its conclusion that Talavera’s discharge was not

discriminatory. Talavera, who was a marginal employee – as

reflected in her misrepresentations described in the district court

opinion, see Talavera v. Fore, 648 F. Supp. 2d 118, 137-40

(D.D.C. 2009) – barely produces sufficient evidence to escape

summary judgment on one of her prior to discharge nonpromotion claims. This case illustrates why district judges

typically decline Title VII cases when they take senior status.

USCA Case #09-5373 Document #1300390 Filed: 03/29/2011 Page 18 of 18