Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01523/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01523-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES S. QUILICI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-1523 MCE AC (PS) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 

undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21). The court previously denied plaintiff’s 

request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because he failed to sign the IFP application, and 

because his complaint failed to state a claim. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff was granted leave to re-submit 

the IFP application and to amend his complaint. Id.

 Plaintiff has re-submitted his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff having now filed the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 

his IFP request will be granted. 

 Plaintiff has filed a document which the court construes to be his amended complaint 

(“Complaint”). ECF No. 4. The Complaint names the “CHP Office of Protective Intelligence 

(CA0349920),” and the California Department of Motor Vehicles as the sole defendants. Id. 

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Plaintiff has also filed an “Exhibit List” (ECF No. 5), which the court will consider to be 

incorporated into the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). 

 The complaint seeks only injunctive relief. 

I. SCREENING 

 Granting IFP status does not end the court’s inquiry. The federal IFP statute requires 

federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

 Plaintiff must assist the court in making this determination by drafting their complaint so 

that it contains a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the 

reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), as well as a short and plain 

statement showing that plaintiffs are entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiffs, and in 

what way). Plaintiffs’ claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. See “Rule 8” of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federalrules-civil-procedure. Forms are also available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint 

in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor, Sacramento, 

CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 

court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 

are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 

Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 However, the court need not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 

allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western 

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Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may 

only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an 

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 A. The Complaint 

 The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff suffered a false arrest and a due process 

violation, and is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations of the complaint are taken as 

true only for the purposes of this screening. 

 The amended complaint names “CHP Office of Protective Intelligence (CA0349920),” 

and California Department of Motor Vehicles as defendants. ECF No. 4. It alleges that on March 

27, 2014, defendant’s “Officer ANGLESEY” “falsely arrested” plaintiff for driving under the 

influence of an alcoholic beverage. Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 4) ¶ 1 (citing, 

inter alia, Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152(a)). As a result, plaintiff’s driver’s license was suspended. 

Id. On July 3, 2014, the same officer arrested plaintiff again, apparently for driving under the 

influence and for driving on a suspended license (“13353.2 BAC .08”). Complaint ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff’s car was impounded under Cal. Vehicle Code § 14602.6(e). Id. 

 Plaintiff was factually innocent of both charges, as blood tests taken on both occasions 

showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.00%. ECF No. 5 at 2 (Exh. 1 to the Complaint) (DMV letter 

states “[a] review of your complete file prior to the hearing revealed blood test results indicating 

your blood alcohol concentration in both incidents was 0.00% concluding a suspension action in 

either case is not warranted”). 

 The Complaint seeks a “settlement of Government claim G62555” from the CHP 

defendant, and a “New hearing” from the DMV defendant. Complaint at 3 ¶ 12. 

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 B. Section 1983 

 In order to state a Section 1983 claim for an unconstitutional false arrest, plaintiff must 

allege facts showing that he was arrested without probable cause or other justification. Dubner v. 

City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[a] claim for unlawful arrest 

is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was 

without probable cause or other justification”). In order to state a Section 1983 claim for 

violation of due process rights, plaintiff “must allege facts that, if true, show that ... [defendants] 

deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest without due process.” 

Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2009) 

 C. Analysis 

 Plaintiff’s complaint consists almost entirely of legal conclusions. It is devoid of the 

factual allegations that could show that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment or Due 

Process Rights. 

 1. False Arrest – Fourth Amendment Claim 

 The only factual allegations in the Complaint relative to this claim are that plaintiff was 

twice arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, that his license was suspended, and that 

plaintiff was factually innocent of both charges. However, these facts do not state a Section 1983 

false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment: 

The fact that plaintiffs had been previously acquitted in the criminal 

case is far removed from establishing whether probable cause 

existed for their arrests. The state's failure to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt does not mean in connection with the arrests that 

it did not meet the lesser probable cause standard – a reasonable 

belief that an offense has been committed and that the criminal 

defendant committed the crime. 

Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988). As the Supreme Court has stated, 

“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would 

provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted – indeed, for every suspect released.” 

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). 

 The exhibits incorporated into plaintiff’s complaint indicate that plaintiff was arrested 

because he was “driving erratically.” ECF No. 5 at 2. There are no contrary factual allegations in 

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the complaint that indicate that plaintiff was not driving erratically, or that otherwise show that 

there was no probable cause to arrest him. 

 2. Impoundment 

 Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on July 3, 2014. Complaint ¶ 4. As best the court 

can tell, plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and for 

driving on a suspended license. See Complaint ¶ 4 (plaintiff was “falsely arrested” and charged 

with “13353.2 BAC .08”).1 Plaintiff alleges that his car was impounded under Cal. Vehicle Code 

§ 14602.6(e). Id. Plaintiff asserts that this impoundment violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment and violated his Due Process rights. 

 Although the Complaint thus alleges that plaintiff’s car was taken, there are no facts 

alleged in the Complaint that show that this was done without due process. To the contrary, a 

peace officer is authorized by law to impound a vehicle driven by a person on a suspended 

license. Cal. Vehicle Code § 14602.6.2

 The statute provides for a prompt post-impoundment 

hearing to determine the validity of the impoundment, it provides for procedures to obtain the 

return of the vehicle, and it requires the impounding agency to pay all charges if it is determined 

that the impoundment was not valid. Id. §§ 14602.6, 22852. The Complaint does not allege that 

the procedures provided are insufficient, or that they were not available to plaintiff. The 

complaint therefore fails to state a Section 1983 Due Process claim. 

 There are also no facts alleged in the complaint that would indicate that the seizure of the 

vehicle was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The impoundment was specifically 

authorized by state statutes, as discussed above, and also by the “community caretaker doctrine.” 

See United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (under the “community caretaker 

doctrine,” once the arrest was made, the officer was permitted “to seize and remove any vehicle 

 

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 The exhibits to the Complaint, which are considered a part of the Complaint, confirm that 

plaintiff was “arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol ....” ECF No. 5 at 2. They also 

indicate that his license was suspended “effective May 15, 2014,” and was not set aside until 

August 4, 2014, id., indicating that it was suspended at the time of plaintiff’s July 3, 2014 arrest. 

See also, ECF No. 5 at 11 (“On August 4, 2014, DMV set aside the Order of Suspension”). 

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 The car may also be impounded by an officer who arrests (and takes into custody) a person for 

driving under the influence of alcohol, or for any other offense. Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(h)(1). 

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which may impede traffic, threaten public safety, or be subject to vandalism”), cert. denied, 547 

U.S. 1056 (2006). 

 D. Leave To Amend 

 The amended complaint is, in some ways, improved over the original complaint. Plaintiff 

no longer seeks monetary damages from the state agency defendants, and now seeks only 

injunctive relief. The exhibits to the amended complaint now reveal that plaintiff was twice 

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and that he was factually innocent of both 

charges. While the amended complaint still fails to state a claim, the undersigned cannot say with 

certainty that further amendment to the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, plaintiff will be 

granted another opportunity to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff has already been instructed on 

how to amend the Complaint, and plaintiff is referred to those instructions. See ECF No. 3 at 5-6. 

II. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6), is GRANTED; and 

 2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 4), is DISMISSED with leave to amend 

within 30 days. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to timely amend the complaint may result in a 

recommendation that this action be dismissed. 

DATED: September 30, 2016 

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