Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03378/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03378-68/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INFORMATICA CORPORATION

Plaintiff, No. C 02-03378 EDL

v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR RENEWED JMOL;

DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; AND

DECLINING TO ENHANCE DAMAGES 

BUSINESS OBJECTS DATA

INTEGRATION, INC.

Defendant.

___________________________________/

Jury trial in this patent infringement case commenced on March 12, 2007 and concluded with

a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $25,240,000 on April 2, 2007. On August 16, 2007,

the Court denied Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and granted

Defendant’s Motion for New Trial on damages unless Plaintiff accepted the Court’s remittitur in the

amount of $12,115,200. On September 10, 2007, Plaintiff accepted the remittitur. 

On August 28, 2007, Defendant filed this Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

or in the Alternative, for the Court to Decline Enhancement of Damages or to Grant a New Trial on

Willfulness based on the Federal Circuit’s August 20, 2007 decision in In re Seagate Technology,

LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which raised the threshold for finding willful infringement. 

Defendant urges the Court to grant a new trial on willfulness or to decline to enhance damages for

willfulness. 

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The Court held a hearing on October 2, 2007, and received supplemental briefs on October 9,

2007. Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the arguments at the hearing, the Court

hereby denies Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, denies as moot

Defendant’s motion for a new trial and declines to enhance damages in light of In re Seagate. 

The Court retains jurisdiction to decide whether to enhance damages

Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion because it was not

filed within the prescribed time after the entry of judgment on May 16, 2007. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(b) (“The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no

later than 10 days after the entry of judgment . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (“Any motion for a new

trial shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“Any

motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.”). 

Defendant responds that the Court may decide its motion because there has been no final judgment

divesting this Court of jurisdiction, but at most a judgment on only some of the claims for relief,

which is therefore still subject to revision. See Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b). 

The Court’s May 16, 2007 judgment stated in relevant part:

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant and $25,240,000.00 in

damages, to be enhanced by an amount which will be determined upon the

anticipated post-trial motions. . . . 

Judgment at 1:18-21. This judgment was appealable on an interlocutory basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(c)(2):

(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive

jurisdiction--

. . . (2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which

would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit and is final except for an accounting.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2); see also Pods, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1365 n. 4 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (“While the judgment as to the patent claims was still subject to enhancement of damages

(and enhancement was granted on August 25), that possibility did not bar an immediate appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), which gives this court jurisdiction over a judgment of patent

infringement that ‘is final except for an accounting.’”); Majorette Toys Inc. v. Darda, Inc., 798 F.2d

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1390, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“If an appeal in a patent case can come to this Court under §

1292(c)(2) after validity and infringement are determined but prior to determining damages, it makes

no sense not to allow an appeal after validity, infringement, and damages are ascertained, and an

award of attorney fees granted, even though the exact amount of attorney fees (and costs) has not

been precisely ascertained.”). 

Trial courts maintain jurisdiction to reconsider or reopen any part of a patent case which has

been appealed pursuant to § 1292(c)(2) precisely because the judgment is not final. Mendenhall v.

Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“‘Although the interlocutory decision of

the Court of Claims on the question of validity and infringement was appealable [under predecessor

statute to § 1292(c)(2)], [citations omitted], as are interlocutory orders of district courts in suits to

enjoin infringement, [citation omitted], the decision was not final until the conclusion of the

accounting. [citations omitted]. Hence the court did not lack power at any time prior to entry of its

final judgment at the close of the accounting to reconsider any portion of its decision and reopen

any part of the case.’”) (quoting Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47 (1943))

(emphasis added). Further, no party here exercised its right to appeal under § 1292(c)(2). Cf.

Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1580-81 (“A final judgment is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and

leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ [citation omitted]. A judgment on an

appeal under § 1292(c)(2) allowing interlocutory appeals of liability judgments in patent cases does

not end the litigation. [citations omitted]. The purpose of § 1292(c)(2) is to permit district courts to

stay and possibly avoid a burdensome determination of damages. [citation omitted]. This provision

for interlocutory appeal does not render a district court decision on fewer than all issues in the case a

‘final’ decision.”). 

It is undisputed that the Court retained jurisdiction after the May 16, 2007 judgment to

determine the final amount of damages with an enhancement. Thus, the Court has not yet rendered a

decision on all the issues as required for a final judgment that may not be revisited unless a party

files an appropriate motion within ten days. Moreover, acceptance of Plaintiff’s argument that the

Court may only set the amount of enhanced damages at something greater than zero, but may not

reconsider Plaintiff’s entitlement to any amount even in light of an intervening change in the law,

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

would elevate form over substance and ignore the wise admonition of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure to construe the Rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of

every action.” Indeed, the parties agree that if and when the final judgment in this case is appealed

to the Federal Circuit, the appellate court will scrutinize the jury’s finding of willfulness under

Seagate. The result could be an unnecessary remand and retrial of willfulness under the new legal

standard, hardly a speedy or inexpensive result. 

Plaintiff argues that the determination of the amount of the enhancement which was reserved

for a later date does not permit the Court to alter the underlying “judgment” of willfulness. But

willfulness was simply a finding of the jury which was the necessary (though not sufficient)

predicate of any enhancement (there being no claim here of bad faith litigation). The Court

considered the jury’s finding as triggering the need to assess the Read factors to decide whether the

balance tilted in favor of enhancement, and the balance has now shifted in light of Seagate. See

Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc). 

Moreover, in the face of this Court’s jurisdiction to reconsider any aspect of its prior ruling

under Mendenhall, Plaintiff has provided no binding or persuasive authority requiring the Court to

deny Defendant’s motion as untimely. Plaintiff only points to a district court case from another

circuit, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 723 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (D. Del.

1989). There, however, the court was plainly frustrated with what it considered to be pointlessly

repetitive motions after remand urging it to reopen the record, which it had repeatedly denied;

indeed, the court began its discussion of its rationale with the statement: “Reasons: This is the third

time that [defendant] has presented this or equivalent motions for this Court’s consideration and

decision.” E.I. DuPont, 723 F. Supp. at 1024. In addition to finding the motion untimely, the court

held in the alternative that even if the most recent iteration of the motion were timely, 

This is simply the third time this issue in one form or another has been presented to

the Court by Phillips. Thus, the Court again having considered the matter and

assuming the motion to be timely, denied the motion on the same grounds that it

elaborately set forth in its [prior] Opinion....Finally, the Court is left with the definite

impression that the pending motion presenting the same arguments for a third time is

totally frivolous and apparently is made for the purpose of delay. 

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 If Plaintiff’s hyper-technical argument were correct, the Court could achieve essentially the

same result by awarding only a nominal enhancement amount, because the Court has considerable

discretion in setting the amount. But the Court prefers to take the more straightforward route of

revisiting its initial, discretionary determination that enhancement was appropriate, in light of the

changed circumstances. 

5

Id. Here, by contrast, the Court wishes to revisit the already close call it made before Seagate on

whether to enhance damages even modestly, in light of the new argument that could only have been

made after Seagate issued that the balance of the Read factors no longer favors enhancement. This

Court has not yet entered final judgment, as Mendenhall makes clear, but instead expressly deferred

the question of the amount of any enhancement with the agreement of the parties until it ruled on the

motions leading to the remittitur. 1

Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is barred from bringing this renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law because, even though Defendant brought a motion for judgment as a

matter of law on the issue of willfulness during trial, it did not raise the Seagate argument at that

time. “A party cannot raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under

Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion.” Freund v. Nycomed

Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Advisory Comm. Notes to the 1991

amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P 50 (“A post-trial motion for judgment can be granted only on grounds

advanced in the pre-verdict motion.”)). There are two reasons for this rule:

First it preserves the sufficiency of the evidence as a question of law,

allowing the district court to review its initial denial of judgment as a

matter of law instead of forcing it to ‘engage in an impermissible

reexamination of facts found by the jury.’ [citation omitted]. Second, it

calls to the court’s and the parties’ attention any alleged deficiencies in the

evidence at a time when the opposing party still has an opportunity to

correct them. [citation omitted].

Freund, 347 F.3d at 761; see also Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1106-07

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law raising inequitable

conduct and the on-sale bar did not raise the obviousness issue that was raised in the post-verdict

motion for judgment as a matter of law, so the defendant had waived its right to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying the verdict on obviousness). 

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Here, Defendant did raise the issue of willfulness in its pre-verdict Rule 50 motion (docket

number 639), and now raises the same issue again in this motion for renewed judgment as a matter

of law. The only change is that the renewed motion is based on a different legal standard that did

not exist at the time of the initial motion. Plaintiff has cited no case in which an intervening change

in the law occurring after the pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion barred a renewed motion for judgment

as a matter of law challenging the same issue but based on the new legal standard. Further, if

Defendant had made an argument in its initial Rule 50 motion based on clairvoyance about the

willfulness standard that was subsequently adopted in Seagate, the Court would have been

constrained to follow the lower standard under existing Federal Circuit law. Defendant’s renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law is not barred for this procedural reason.

In reviewing Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the merits, the

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and draw all reasonable

inferences in its favor. See Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Bell v. Clackamus County, 341 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). “The

test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is

contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062. Here, although reasonable minds could

differ, viewing the evidence as required, the Court cannot conclude that the evidence only supports a

verdict in Defendant’s favor, even though under the new standard the jury would be more likely to

find for Defendant. For example, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence at trial

showed that Mike Boz, the engineer assigned as the architect of Defendant’s EDF feature, stated in

relation to the patent at issue that “This is a big one,” and “We are definitely infringing on this one;

just like anyone in the ETL business” (although if viewed in another light, his statement could be

taken as consistent with his belief in the patent’s invalidity). Trial Ex. 576 at 2. In addition,

Defendant’s in-house counsel stated that Plaintiff had “several patents on products/processes that

appear to be similar to the way our products work.” Trial Ex. 223 at 1. Defendant released its

infringing product in April 2001 while potentially on notice from Mr. Boz of infringement. Further,

Defendant continued to infringe after this lawsuit was filed, upgrading its product and continuing to

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

sell it. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 294 at 29, 34. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for renewed judgment as

a matter of law is denied. 

Enhancement of damages for willfulness

Based on the jury’s finding of willful infringement by Defendant and the Court’s evaluation

at that time of the factors set forth in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992),

abrogated on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975

(Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), the Court concluded in its May 16, 2007 Order that only a modest

enhancement of damages for willfulness was appropriate. See Read, 970 F.2d at 826 (instructing

that if a court decides to enhance damages, the court looks to the totality of circumstances and

considers the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct as well as factors that are mitigating or

ameliorating to set the amount of enhancement). The Court deferred determination of the amount

pending a ruling on Defendant’s first motion for a new trial. 

Although willful infringement may authorize the award of enhanced damages, “a finding of

willful infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble

damages.” Read, 970 F.2d at 826. In this case, the jury found willfulness based on now-obsolete

case law. In Seagate, the Federal Circuit overruled the due care standard for evaluating willful

infringement adopted in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-

90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and applied by the jury in this case to determine Defendant’s willfulness. 

Instead, the Seagate court held that “proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages

requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (requiring “clear

and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its

actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”). In addition, the patent holder must show “that

this objectively-defined risk ... was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the

accused infringer.” Id. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances in light of Seagate, which significantly raisd the

bar for a finding of willfulness, the Court now declines to award any enhancement in this case. Even

at the time when the Court determined that a modest enhancement was appropriate, one of the

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

primary Read factors weighing against a substantial enhancement was the closeness of the case. The

Court stated:

On the issue of closeness of the case, willfulness was a close question given the

uncertainty of how the claims would be construed in the software patents at issue and

the evolution of Informatica’s infringement theory, including the withdrawal of the

‘990 Patent shortly before trial. The invalidity defense was also a somewhat close

question. Although the jury resolved these issues in favor of Informatica, this result

is not determinative of whether the questions were closely balanced and hotly

contested. See Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. United States Surgical Corp., 967 F.Supp. 861, 865 (E.D. Va. 1997). 

May 16, 2007 Order at 11:3-9. 

Under the Seagate standard, the issue of willfulness becomes even closer; had the Seagate

standard been used in this case, Plaintiff might well have lost on willfulness. Moreover, the Court

has since determined and Plaintiff accepted a remittitur that represented the high end of damages

that a jury might have awarded. Cf. Riles v. Shell Exploration and Production Co., 298 F.3d 1302,

1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

enhancement of damages for willfulness, stating that: “the case was hard-fought, and that the jury

could have found for Shell on the infringement and willfulness issues and could have awarded

substantially less damages. In addition, the trial court weighed Shell’s litigation behavior and found

no reason for an award of enhanced damages.”). 

Motion for New Trial

Because the Court has declined to enhance damages based on willfulness, Defendant’s

Motion for a New Trial is denied as moot.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or for a New

Trial is denied. Based on the totality of the circumstances and in light of Seagate, the Court does not

award any enhanced damages in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2007 _____________________________ 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:02-cv-03378-EDL Document 734 Filed 10/29/07 Page 8 of 8