Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00501/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dell Edwin Boswell, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 13–0501–TUC–LAB

ORDER

Pending before the court is an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on July

8, 2013, by Dell Edwin Boswell, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in

Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 4) Boswell argues (1) the state lacked sufficient evidence to support

a guilty verdict and (2) the trial judge personally found aggravating factors, which can only be

found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Magistrate Judge Bowman presides over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

(Doc. 14) The petition will be denied. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

On February 3, 1994, Boswell was convicted of sexual conduct with a minor under

fourteen. (Doc. 4, p. 2) He was subsequently sentenced to the aggravated maximum of 25 years

in prison. Id. Boswell appealed, arguing primarily that the victim’s testimony was unreliable

and that the evidence failed to corroborate her claims. (Doc. 4, p. 6) On June 4, 1996, the

Case 4:13-cv-00501-LAB Document 18 Filed 08/06/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. (Doc. 12, p. 2) Boswell did not seek further

review from the Arizona Supreme Court.

Approximately fourteen years later in 2010, Boswell petitioned for post-conviction relief

arguing that the trial judge erred in imposing an aggravated sentence without relying on a jury

to find aggravating factors. (Doc. 12-1, p. 12) In August of 2011, the Pima County Superior

Court denied the petition as untimely. (Doc. 12-1, pp. 26-27) In 2012, the Arizona Court of

Appeals denied Boswell’s subsequent petition for relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied

his petition for review. (Doc. 12, p. 3) 

On June 18, 2013, Boswell filed a petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc.

1) In his amended petition, he claims (1) he was convicted on insufficient evidence and (2) he

was improperly sentenced. (Doc. 4, pp. 6-7) In their answer, the respondents argue the petition

is time-barred. (Doc. 12) They are correct.

Discussion

The limitation period is set by the AEDPA’s section 2244(d)(1), which reads as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “[The] AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies

to each claim in a habeas application on an individual basis.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d

1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012).

Case 4:13-cv-00501-LAB Document 18 Filed 08/06/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Boswell argues first that because he filed his direct appeal in 1995, before the effective

date of the AEDPA, the 1-year limitation does not apply. (Doc. 4, p. 6) He is incorrect. The

AEDPA applies to all petitions filed after its effective date of April 24, 1996. Mejia v. Garcia,

534 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008); cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1117 (2009).

The limitation period for Claim (1) was triggered when Boswell’s judgment became

final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Boswell’s direct appeal was denied on June 4, 1996. (Doc.

12-1, pp. 2-4) He elected not to petition for review from the Arizona Supreme Court within the

30 days allotted by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). (Doc. 12, p. 4) As a result, his judgment became

final on July 4, 1996. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 829 (2008) The limitation period expired one year later on July 4, 1997.

Boswell filed his petition on June 18, 2013. (Doc. 1) Consequently, this claim comes roughly

16 years too late and must be dismissed.

In Claim (2), Boswell argues the trial judge erred by personally finding aggravating

factors, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Blakely, however, was decided after

Boswell’s case became final and does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Schardt v. Payne, 414

F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005); State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 597, 115 P.3d 629, 637 (App.

1st Div. 2005). Consequently, the limitation period for this claim was not triggered by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(C), which would have delayed the start of the limitation period by approximately

eight years.

Boswell argues to the contrary that this claim does not rely on Blakely, but instead relies

on a long-standing constitutional rule that Blakely merely applied. (Doc. 4, p.7); see

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (“[T]he Federal Constitution’s jury-trial

guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the

statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or

admitted by the defendant.”). Boswell’s argument, however, puts Claim (2) in the same boat

as Claim (1). The limitation period for Claim (2) was triggered on the date the judgment

became final just like Claim (1). Accordingly, Claim (2) is likewise time-barred.

Case 4:13-cv-00501-LAB Document 18 Filed 08/06/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that in habeas cases

“[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” 

Here, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because the petitioner has

not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” as required under 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Reasonable jurists would not find the court’s conclusions and ruling

debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on July 8,

2013, by Dell Edwin Boswell, is DISMISSED as time-barred.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment and close this case.

DATED this 5th day of August, 2014.

Case 4:13-cv-00501-LAB Document 18 Filed 08/06/14 Page 4 of 4