Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05074/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 1997 Decided December 9, 1997 

No. 97-5009

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DANIEL R. GLICKMAN, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH,

INTERVENOR-APPELLANT

Consolidated with

Nos. 97-5031 & 97-5074

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv00408)

John S. Koppel, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellants, with 

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whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric 

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney at the time the briefs 

were filed, and Michael Jay Singer, Attorney, United States 

Department of Justice, were on the briefs.

Harris Weinstein argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

intervenor-appellant National Association for Biomedical Research.

Katherine A. Meyer argued the cause for appellees, with 

whom Valerie J. Stanley was on the briefs.

Andrew L. Frey was on the brief for amicus curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

Leslie G. Landau, Susan Hoffman, and Tiffany R. Hedgpeth were on the brief for amicus curiae The Jane Goodall 

Institute for Wildlife Research, Education and Conservation. 

Barry J. Cutler and Joseph R. Austin entered appearances.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: An animal welfare group and 

four individuals sued the United States Department of Agriculture and some of its officials (collectively, "USDA" or "the 

Department") under the Administrative Procedure Act 

("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1988). These plaintiffs 

argued that a USDA regulation concerning the treatment of 

primates failed to comply with the requirements of the governing statute, the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA" or "the Act"), 

and asked the district court to set the regulation aside. After 

concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the district 

court entered judgment invalidating the challenged regulation 

and ordered USDA to promulgate a new regulation in compliance with the Act. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. 

Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1996). USDA appealed.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that all of the 

plaintiffs (now appellees) lack constitutional standing to purUSCA Case #97-5074 Document #314419 Filed: 12/09/1997 Page 2 of 23
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sue their claims. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the 

district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the 

case for want of jurisdiction.

I. 

This appeal is but the latest chapter in the ongoing saga of 

Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.'s ("ALDF") effort to enlist 

the courts in its campaign to influence USDA's administration 

of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. Congress 

enacted the Act in 1966 to ensure the humane care and 

treatment of various animals used in research or for exhibition or kept as pets. 7 U.S.C. § 2131. Pursuant to a 1985 

amendment, the Act requires the Secretary of USDA ("Secretary") to "promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors." 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2143(a)(1). Such standards must include "minimum requirements ... for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates." 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2143(a)(2)(B).

In 1991, pursuant to section 2143(a), the Secretary promulgated rules on the handling, care and treatment of primates. 

See 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 et seq. The rule at issue in this appeal 

requires regulated entities to "develop, document, and follow 

an appropriate plan for environment enhancement adequate 

to promote the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates." 9 C.F.R. § 3.81. According to that rule, such a plan 

"must be in accordance with the currently accepted professional standards as cited in appropriate professional journals 

or reference guides, and as directed by the attending veterinarian," and must address several specified topics, including 

"[s]ocial grouping" and "[e]nvironmental enrichment." Id. 

In 1991, ALDF, along with three individuals and two other 

organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging several USDA regulations promulgated under the AWA, including section 3.81. 

The plaintiffs' principal argument was that, by permitting the 

regulated entities to develop their own environmental enhancement plans, the regulations failed to include "minimum 

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requirements" as mandated by the AWA, see 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2143(a)(2), and instead impermissibly delegated promulgation of these requirements to the regulated entities. The 

district court ruled for the plaintiffs, and set aside the challenged regulations. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. 

Secretary of Agriculture, 813 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1993). 

We reversed, holding that all of the plaintiffs lacked standing 

to challenge the regulations. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 

Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("ALDF II" ).1

ALDF mounted a second challenge to section 3.81 in 1996. 

This time, it was joined by a different group of individual coplaintiffs: Roseann Circelli, Mary Eagan, Marc Jurnove, and 

Audrey Rahn. Ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for summary 

judgment, the district court again invalidated section 3.81, 

and ordered the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation in 

compliance with the "minimum requirements" mandate of the 

AWA.

II. 

Under Article III of the Constitution, the "judicial power" 

of the United States is restricted to the resolution of "cases" 

and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In order 

to limit the docket of federal courts to "disputes ... which 

are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through 

the judicial process" and to restrict federal courts "to a role 

consistent with a system of separated powers," Valley Forge 

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting 

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), our Article III jurisprudence has identified a 

cluster of doctrines, " 'standing[,] mootness, ripeness, political 

question, and the like,' by which we test the fitness of 

controversies for judicial resolution." Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. 

1 We shall refer to this case as ALDF II to distinguish it from an 

earlier case with the same name, which involved a challenge to a 

different USDA regulation. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. 

v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("ALDF I").

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Cir. 1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)) 

(additional citations and internal punctuation omitted).

In furtherance of the limitations of Article III, the standing 

doctrine requires would-be federal litigants to demonstrate an 

(1) injury in fact; (2) which is caused by, or is fairly traceable 

to, the alleged unlawful conduct; and (3) which is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Valley Forge,

454 U.S. at 471-72; see also Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 

1161 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560-61 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears 

the burden of establishing these elements, FW/PBS, Inc. v. 

Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), and may not pursue its 

claims before the federal judiciary if it fails to demonstrate 

any one of them. Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 

F.3d 658, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (in banc). Neither the 

individual appellees nor the Animal Legal Defense Fund have 

successfully borne that burden. We consider first the individual appellees Circelli, Jurnove and Eagan.2 We assume 

their factual allegations to be true for purposes of this appeal.

See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.

A. 

Roseann Circelli, Marc Jurnove and Mary Eagan have 

viewed primates housed in isolation at local zoos. Circelli saw 

an orangutan who could neither see nor hear other primates, 

and who sat quietly by himself in a corner. Circelli Affidavit 

¶ 8. Jurnove saw a large male chimpanzee who was kept in 

isolation from other primates, and whose hands and feet were 

covered with scars and cuts. Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 8. Eagan 

has seen primates housed in isolation as well, "including one 

baby baboon and another primate named Charlie." Eagan 

Affidavit ¶ 4.

These appellees, all of whom enjoy visiting animals in 

captivity, say they have suffered aesthetic and recreational 

2 The district court did not rule that plaintiff Audrey Rahn had 

standing to challenge section 3.81. See Animal Legal Defense 

Fund, Inc., 943 F. Supp. at 54-57. Thus, we shall not address her 

claims here.

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injuries resulting from their observation of these primates. 

Under some circumstances, interference with the observation 

and study of animals may constitute injury in fact for standing purposes.3 Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 

93, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It is not apparent, however, that 

these appellees have met their burden of demonstrating a 

cognizable injury in fact. "[G]eneral emotional 'harm,' no 

matter how deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for 

standing purposes." Id. at 98. It is part of the price of living 

in society, perhaps especially in a free society, that an individual will observe conduct that he or she dislikes. "[T]he 

psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees ... is not an injury 

sufficient to confer standing under Art. III...." Valley 

Forge, 454 U.S. at 485. Even assuming that appellees have 

suffered sufficient injury, we conclude that they nonetheless 

lack constitutional standing because their claimed injuries are 

not "fairly traceable" to the Secretary's alleged failure to 

promulgate "minimum requirements" as mandated by the 

AWA, and because such injuries are not likely to be redressed by the relief sought in this case. See Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d 

at 663-64.

B. 

In analyzing the "causation" element of constitutional 

standing, we ask whether it is "substantially probable" that 

the challenged acts of the defendantas opposed to the acts 

of an independent third partycaused a plaintiff's particularized injury. Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 663 (citations 

omitted). Our "redressability" inquiry asks whether the relief sought by a plaintiff is likely to alleviate the plaintiff's 

3 As our dissenting colleague acknowledges, see Dissent at 5 n.1, 

all of the Supreme Court cases recognizing such an injury have 

done so when the challenged conduct threatens to diminish the 

overall supply of an animal species available for observation or 

study. Since this case does not involve allegations of such conduct, 

none of the cases cited by the dissent compels the conclusion that 

the individual appellees have articulated a cognizable constitutional 

injury.

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injury. Id. at 663-64. Causation, then, focuses on whether a 

particular party is appropriately before the court; redressability focuses on whether the court is the appropriate forum 

for the parties' dispute. Id. at 664.

When a plaintiff asserts injuries attributed to " 'the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of 

someone else,' " the causation and redressability elements of 

standing analysis "require more exacting scrutiny." Freedom 

Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 13 F.3d 412, 

416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.) (emphasis in original) (quoting 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562). Under these circumstances, standing is not necessarily precluded, but the "indirectness of injury 'may make it substantially more difficult to 

meet the minimum requirements of Art. III: to establish 

that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the 

defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the 

harm.' " Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 

Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-45 (1976)). A plaintiff who claims to 

have been injured by the government's regulation of a third 

party must "adduce facts showing that the unfettered choices 

made by independent actors have been or will be made in 

such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury." Id. at 417 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

In this case, the zoos at which the primates were housed 

acted independently; no laws or regulations compelled them 

to keep the primates in the conditions witnessed by appellees. 

Granted, when the government takes action that has a "determinative or coercive effect" on a third party, the government 

may be said to have "caused" injuries which are directly 

attributable to the third party. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1164. 

But we are aware of no casesand appellees have provided 

us with nonein which the government was said to have 

caused a constitutional injury by failing to issue regulations 

that would have forbidden third parties from engaging in 

conduct that caused a plaintiff's injury. The attenuated 

connection between appellees' claimed injuries and the government's alleged failure to promulgate "minimum requirements" does not present a sufficient " 'causal nexus between 

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the agency action and the asserted injury' " to establish 

causation. Humane Soc'y, 46 F.3d at 100 (quoting Freedom 

Republicans, 13 F.3d at 418).

Our dissenting colleague is convinced that Jurnove's affidavit establishes standing because it alleges that the inhumane 

conditions at the Long Island Game Farm are permitted by 

USDA regulations. Dissent at 6. We disagree, first of all, 

that a regulation which permits third parties to engage in 

offensive behavior, but does not require them to do so, may 

fairly be said to cause an injury resulting from the behavior 

of the third parties; such a regulation would not have the 

"determinative or coercive effect" on the third parties which 

would render the alleged injuries fairly traceable to governmental action. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1164.

Furthermore, we disagree with the dissent's interpretation 

of Jurnove's affidavit. To be sure, as the dissent emphasizes, 

the affidavit states that USDA inspectors found the Long 

Island Game Farm to be in compliance with existing regulations on several occasions. See Dissent at 6-7. However, the 

gravamen of Jurnove's affidavit is that USDA failed to enforce existing regulations, not that the offensive behavior was 

permitted by them. Jurnove states this conclusion explicitly: 

he says that the USDA inspection report finding the Game 

Farm to be "in compliance with all standards" was "incorrect," Jurnove Affidavit WW 18-19, and adds that "[he] knew 

[that the appalling conditions in which the animals were 

housed] violated the minimum requirements of the Animal 

Welfare Act." Id. ¶ 17. The dissent ignores these allegations, which we are bound to accept as true. See Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.

We turn now to redressability. Our conclusion that appellees' alleged injuries are not "fairly traceable" to the Secretary's actions leads us to the related conclusion that appellees' 

injuries are not likely to be redressed by compelling the 

Secretary to promulgate new regulations. See National 

Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 

("causation" and "redressability" tend to merge in cases 

where plaintiffs seek cessation of allegedly illegal conduct). 

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Appellees have not shown that it is "likely" that the relief 

they want (compelling the Secretary to promulgate new regulations) will alleviate their claimed aesthetic and recreational 

injuries. See Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 663-64. In 

any event, appellees were not entirely clear as to how any 

such alleviation would be accomplished. For example, our 

review of their affidavits reveals that all of the appellees claim 

to suffer persisting, painful memories of animal mistreatment. 

See Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 43 ("I continue to think about [the 

animals I have witnessed at the Long Island Game Farm], 

and experience the assault on my senses from remembering 

their plight."); Circelli Affidavit ¶ 17 ("I continue to think 

about the animals I observed at the Scotch Plains Zoo in May, 

1995, and I continue to be haunted by the horrible conditions 

in which I saw them living."); Eagan Affidavit ¶ 4 ("I ... 

continue to carry the memories of these inhumanely treated 

animals with me every day, which depresses me and causes 

me distress."). Appellees do not claim, much less demonstrate, that their painful memories are likely to be obliterated 

by compelling the Secretary to promulgate new legal regulations.

Appellees' claims of redressability are further undercut, 

given that the district court, whether directly or through 

appellants, has no power to compel the exhibitors to continue 

maintaining primates at all, let alone in a manner aesthetically pleasing to appellees. By way of comparison, in Fulani v. 

Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), we rejected the 

claimed standing of a would-be competitor in the presidential 

debates who challenged the tax-exempt status of the sponsoring organization. We did so noting that if we ordered the 

Treasury to revoke that status, the sponsoring committee 

might decline to hold the debates at all, a possibility that 

would not enable the plaintiff to participate as she sought. 

Id. at 1329. Similarly, if a court ordered the Department to 

issue different regulations concerning primates, for all we 

know, the exhibitors might cease keeping primates.

We hold that appellees Jurnove, Circelli and Eagan have 

failed to carry their burden of alleging facts that would 

demonstrate that the choices of the animal exhibitors "have 

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been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation 

and permit redressability of injury." Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 562. Thus, these appellees lack constitutional 

standing to raise their claims, and we lack power to resolve 

them. 

III.

Having determined that the individual appellees have no 

standing to bring the present action, we must consider the 

standing of the Animal Legal Defense Fund. Organizational 

plaintiffs may assert standing of two sorts. First, an organization may have standing on its own behalf when its rights 

and immunities as an entity have suffered recognizable injury, redressable in the action at bar. Second, "under proper 

conditions," it may "sue on behalf of its members asserting 

the members' individual rights." Common Cause v. Federal 

Election Comm'n, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). Either way, an 

organizational plaintiff still must meet the constitutional 

standing requirements set forth above.

In the present action, ALDF claims standing for injury to 

its own rights, rather than standing derived from its members. Its claimed injury is an alleged violation of its procedural rights in USDA's adoption of section 3.81 governing the 

"plans" for psychological enrichment of primates. Under the 

final version of the rule, the regulated keepers of primates 

need not file such plans with USDA, where they would be 

subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 

5 U.S.C. § 552, but only must maintain such plans on their 

own premises, making them available to USDA "upon request." ALDF, noting that the "upon request" language 

appeared for the first time in the final rule, complains that 

neither it nor any other party had the opportunity to submit 

comments on the language to USDA before its adoption. 

ALDF argues that the Secretary's failure to provide public 

notice of the "upon request" language constitutes a violation 

of the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative 

Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. According to ALDF, 

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this violation gave rise to a purely procedural injury: the 

inability to participate in rulemaking as provided by the APA. 

Indeed, ALDF specifically disclaims any informational injury 

resulting from a violation of the Animal Welfare Act; it 

insists instead that its injury "is caused by the agency's 

violation of the APA."

Both we and the Supreme Court have had recent occasion 

to analyze the standing requirements applicable to an assertion of procedural injury. We concluded that "a plaintiff may 

have standing to challenge the failure of an agency to abide 

by a procedural requirement only if that requirement was 

'designed to protect some threatened concrete interest' of the 

plaintiff." Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 664 (quoting 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8). Therefore, "[t]he 

mere violation of a procedural requirement ... does not 

permit any and all persons to sue to enforce the requirement." Id. Rather, a party claiming to be injured by a 

procedural violation must show that the violation is likely to 

harm the party in a specific and individualized way. Id.; see 

also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (holding that a 

plaintiff may enforce procedural rights "so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened 

concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his 

standing").

Here, ALDF claims that the Secretary has failed to comply 

with the notice and comment procedures of the APA. This 

abstract, generalized "injury" is not sufficient to afford standing. ALDF may have been deprived of the opportunity to 

submit comments on the "upon request" language of section 

3.81. But this predicament is shared by many others, indeed 

by the world at large. ALDF has failed to make the case 

that it has suffered a concrete injury as distinguished from 

the abstract procedural right to submit comments to USDA. 

Its articulated "injury" amounts to no more than a " 'general 

interest [in the alleged procedural violation] common to all 

members of the public.' " Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 

664 (quoting Ex Parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)). 

Thus, it lacks constitutional standing to pursue the asserted 

violation in federal court.

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IV.

We conclude that none of the appellees have standing to 

challenge section 3.81. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment 

of the district court, and remand the case with directions to 

dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

There are two additional appeals before us: (1) ALDF's 

appeal of the district court's order permitting the National 

Association of Biomedical Research ("NABR") to intervene in 

the case for purposes of appealing the district court's invalidation of section 3.81; and (2) NABR's appeal from the ruling 

of the district court that invalidated section 3.81. Given our 

decision to vacate the judgment of the district court, we order 

these separate appeals dismissed as moot.

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WALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I find that Marc Jurnove's uncontested affidavit is more than sufficient to meet 

both the constitutional and the prudential requirements of 

standing in this case. Hence, I will highlight Mr. Jurnove's 

claims, without passing on those of the other individual 

plaintiffs or ALDF. In my view, Mr. Jurnove's affidavit 

amply illustrates how far the majority opinion has strayed 

from a reasonable interpretation of standing requirements 

under Supreme Court and our circuit's law.

I. BACKGROUND

The 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA") 

direct the Secretary of Agriculture to "promulgate standards 

to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors." Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1752, 99 Stat. 1354, 1645 (1985) 

(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1994)). They further provide 

that such standards "shall include minimum requirements" 

for, inter alia, "a physical environment adequate to promote 

the psychological well-being of primates." Id. Pursuant to 

this authority, the United States Department of Agriculture 

("USDA") issued regulations for primate dealers, exhibitors, 

and research facilities that included a small number of mandatory requirements and also required the regulated parties 

to "develop, document, and follow an appropriate plan for 

environment enhancement adequate to promote the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates. This plan must be 

in accordance with the currently accepted professional standards as cited in appropriate professional journals or reference guides, and as directed by the attending veterinarian." 

9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (1997). Although these plans must be made 

available to the USDA, the regulated parties are not obligated to make them available to members of the public. See id.; 

infra at 7.

For his entire adult life, Mr. Jurnove has "been employed 

and/or worked as a volunteer for various human and animal 

relief and rescue organizations." Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 3. "By 

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virtue of [his] training in wildlife rehabilitation and [his] 

experience in investigating complaints about the treatment of 

wildlife, [he is] very familiar with the needs of and proper 

treatment of wildlife." Id. ¶ 6. "Because of [his] familiarity 

with and love of exotic animals, as well as for recreational and 

educational purposes and because [he] appreciate[s] these 

animals' beauty, [he] enjoy[s] seeing them in various zoos and 

other parks near [his] home." Id. ¶ 7.

Between May 1995 and June 1996, when he filed his 

affidavit, Mr. Jurnove visited the Long Island Game Farm 

Park and Zoo ("Game Farm") at least nine times. Throughout this period, and since as far back as 1992, USDA has not 

questioned the adequacy of this facility's plan for the psychological well-being of primates.

Mr. Jurnove's first visit to the Game Farm, in May 1995, 

lasted approximately six hours. While there, Mr. Jurnove 

saw many animals living under conditions that caused him 

deep distress. For instance, the Game Farm housed one 

primate, a Japanese Snow Macaque, in a cage lacking both a 

solid floor and any kind of heating device. Mr. Jurnove 

reports that he saw this monkey "shivering," "huddled up 

with her head tucked in and arms hugging herself." Id. ¶ 14. 

The Game Farm also placed adult bears next to squirrel 

monkeys, although Jurnove immediately saw evidence that 

the arrangement made the monkeys frightened and extremely agitated.

The day after this visit, Mr. Jurnove began to contact 

government agencies, including USDA, in order to secure 

help for these animals. Based on Mr. Jurnove's complaint, 

USDA inspected the Game Farm on May 3, 1995. According 

to Mr. Jurnove's uncontested affidavit, however, the agency's 

resulting inspection report "states that [the USDA inspectors] found the facility in compliance with all the standards." 

Id. ¶ 18. Mr. Jurnove returned to the Game Farm on eight 

more occasions because these purportedly legal conditions left 

him gravely concerned.

On July 17, 18, and 19, 1995, he observed "virtually the 

same conditions" that allegedly caused him aesthetic injury 

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during his first visit to the Game Farm in May. Id. ¶ 20. 

This time, Mr. Jurnove documented these conditions with 

photographs and sent them to USDA. Nevertheless, the 

responding USDA inspectors found only a few violations at 

the Game Farm; they reported nothing about many of the 

conditions that concerned Mr. Jurnove and that he had told 

the agency about.

Mr. Jurnove, however, remained unflagging in his determination to rectify conditions at the Game Farm that USDA had 

now twice concluded were legal. He devoted two trips in 

August and one in September to "videotaping the conditions 

that the inspection missed," and on each trip he found that 

the troubling conditions persisted. Id. ¶¶ 22-28. The Japanese snow monkey, for instance, still had no comfortable place 

to sit; her only cushion against the wire mesh of her cage was 

a small rag that one visitor had apparently thrown to her. At 

the end of September, USDA sent three inspectors to the 

Game Farm in response to Mr. Jurnove's continued complaints and reportage; they found violations, however, only 

with regard to the facility's fencing.

Mr. Jurnove returned to the Game Farm once more on 

October 1, 1995. Indeed, he only stopped his frequent visits 

and thorough surveys when he became ill and required major 

surgery. After his health returned, Mr. Jurnove visited the 

Game Farm in April 1996, hoping to see improvements in the 

conditions that he had repeatedly brought to USDA's attention. He was disappointed again; "the animals [were] in 

literally the same conditions as [he] had seen them over the 

summer of 1995." Id. ¶ 33; see also id. ¶ 35 ("The Japanese 

Snow Monkey had no access to a feeding station. No play 

toys were in her cage. She just sat huddled and shivering 

violently with head tucked in. She was doing the same thing 

she had done last April to deal with the cold and the fact she 

was not provided a heat lamp."). Mr. Jurnove's resulting 

complaints prompted USDA to inspect the Game Park in late 

May 1996. For the fourth time, the agency found the facility 

largely in compliance, with a few exceptions. In June 1996, 

Mr. Jurnove filed the affidavit that is the basis of his claim 

here. He concluded this affidavit by stating his intent to 

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"return to the Farm in the next several weeks" and to 

"continue visiting the Farm to see the animals there." Id.

¶ 43.

II. ANALYSIS

To my mind, Mr. Jurnove has more than met the requirements for standing. First, his allegations solidly establish 

injury in fact. As the majority acknowledges, see Majority 

opinion ("Maj. op.") at 6, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 

made clear that injury to an aesthetic interest in the observation of animals is sufficient to satisfy the demands of Article 

III standing. In Japan Whaling Association v. American 

Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), for instance, the Court 

found that the plaintiffs had "undoubtedly ... alleged a 

sufficient 'injury in fact' in that the whale watching and 

studying of their members will be adversely affected by 

continued whale harvesting," id. at 230 n.4 (citing Sierra Club 

v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. SCRAP, 412 

U.S. 669 (1973)); see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734 

("Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic wellbeing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our 

society, and the fact that particular environmental interests 

are shared by the many rather than the few does not make 

them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial 

process."). Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 

(1992), reiterated that "the desire to use or observe an animal 

species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a 

cognizable interest for purpose of standing," id. at 562-63 

(emphasis added). This statement precisely describes Mr. 

Jurnove's claim. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, see

Maj. op. at 6, Mr. Jurnove has not only alleged "general 

emotional 'harm' " stemming from the observation of conduct 

with which he disagrees, Humane Soc'y v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 

93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Rather, Mr. Jurnove's affidavit 

describes in great detail how conditions at the Game Farm 

directly impair his well-established and lifelong aesthetic interest in observing, studying, and enjoying animals by preventing him from seeing these animals in a humane environment.

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This court's precedent specifically recognizes that people 

have a significant interest in observing animals living under 

humane conditions. In Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps,

561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the plaintiff organizations 

alleged, inter alia, an interest in "enjoy[ing] Cape fur seals 

alive in their natural habitat under conditions in which the 

animals are not subject to ... inhumane treatment," id. at 

1007. This court held that these plaintiffs' aesthetic interests 

satisfied the requirements of standing. See id. Similarly, 

Humane Society v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988), found 

standing based on a complaint "that the existence of hunting 

on wildlife refuges forces Society members to witness animal 

corpses and environmental degradation, in addition to depleting the supply of animals and birds that refuge visitors seek 

to view," id. at 52; see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. 

v. Espy (ALDF I), 23 F.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our 

own cases have indicated a recognition of people's interest in 

seeing animals free from inhumane treatment.").1

The majority also finds that Mr. Jurnove has not satisfied 

the causation and redressibility prongs of Article III standing. It contends, first, that Mr. Jurnove has failed to establish causation because he has not adequately established that 

the Game Farm's treatment of its animals is causally linked 

to the actions (or inactions) of the USDA. This argument is 

false. As the Supreme Court necessarily recognized in Ja1

I do not think it dispositive that the Supreme Court cases that 

have thus far recognized standing based on an aesthetic interest in 

the observation or study of animals have all involved challenged 

conduct that allegedly threatened to diminish the overall supply of 

an animal species available for observation or study. See Lujan,

504 U.S. at 562; Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230 n.4; see also 

Maj. op. at 6 n.3. I cannot believe that constitutional standing 

actually turns on the difference between an observer's aesthetic 

injury from government action that threatens to wipe out an animal 

species altogether and government action that leaves some of the 

animals in a persistent state of suffering, which in all probability 

eventually will insure their demise. Indeed, the latter seems 

capable of causing more serious aesthetic injury in many instances.

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pan Whaling Association, plaintiffs claiming aesthetic injury 

(there, injury to plaintiffs' interest in whale watching) can 

establish standing based on the government's failure to adequately regulate a third party (there, the government's failure 

to certify that the Japanese whaling industry was exceeding 

its quota under international law). See 478 U.S. 230 n.4. 

What is required in a case where "a plaintiff's asserted injury 

arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation 

(or lack of regulation) of someone else" is that the plaintiff 

"adduce facts showing that those choices [by the third party] 

have been or will be made in such manner as to produce 

causation and permit redressibility of injury." Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 562. I believe that Mr. Jurnove has met this test.

As Mr. Jurnove's affidavit makes clear, the Game Farm has 

repeatedly submitted to inspection by the USDA. The allegedly inhumane conditions at the Game Farm have persisted 

precisely because the USDA inspectors have always concluded on the basis of these visits that these conditions comply 

with USDA regulations; it is entirely reasonable to presume 

that if the USDA had found the Game Farm out of compliance with current regulations, or if the governing regulations 

had themselves been more stringent, the Game Farm's owners would have acted to remain in accord with the law, either 

by altering their practices or by going out of business and 

transferring their animals to exhibitors willing to operate 

legally (two scenarios that would do more to protect Mr. 

Jurnove's aesthetic interest in observing animals living under 

humane conditions than the current situation). See id. at 585 

(Stevens, J., concurring) ("We must presume that if this 

Court holds that § 7(a)(2) requires consultation, all affected 

agencies would abide by that interpretation and engage in the 

requisite consultations."). Instead, however, USDA has not 

questioned the legality of the Game Farm's plan since 1992. 

Since May 1995, when Mr. Jurnove began visiting the Game 

Farm and complaining to the agency, USDA inspectors have 

examined, and largely approved, the actual conditions at the 

facility at least four times. USDA's first inspection report 

"states that [the USDA inspectors] found the facility in 

compliance with all the standards." Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 18. 

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Although subsequent inspection reports identify a few conditions that Mr. Jurnove agrees violate USDA regulations, 

USDA continuedin at least three more inspection reports

to conclude that the Game Farm was in compliance with 

existing USDA regulations in all other respects, including 

presumably the existence of a plan that met the regulations' 

standards. As the majority notes, see Maj. op. at 8, Mr. 

Jurnove alleges in his affidavit that USDA has failed to 

enforce even its own existing regulations. However, Mr. 

Jurnove's affidavit is not limited to this allegation. Instead, 

he additionally alleges that the conditions at the Game Farm, 

conditions that USDA inspectors repeatedly concluded comply with existing USDA regulations, violate "the minimum 

requirements" of the governing statutethe Animal Welfare 

Act. Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 17.

Asking Mr. Jurnove to show more than this as a constitutional prerequisite to standing places him in a Catch-22. One 

reason ALDF is dissatisfied with USDA's implementation of 

the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act is that 

USDA's present regulations do not require regulated entities 

to give a copy of their plans to the agency, where they would 

be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests. See 9 

C.F.R. § 3.81 (1997); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for 

Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1980) (finding 

that "FOIA is only directed at requiring agencies to disclose 

those 'agency records' for which they have chosen to retain 

possession or control"). This oversight structure means that 

Mr. Jurnove has no access to the Game Farm's plan, no way 

to determine whether the facility is following it, and no means 

to discover whether the plan itself conforms to current USDA 

regulations. See Oral Argument (statement of government 

counsel) (confirming that the Game Farm's owners are not 

obligated to show their plans to the plaintiffs) 2; Oral Argu2 The oral argument proceeded as follows:

Q. Correct me if I'm not mistaken: It's pretty hard for the 

plaintiffs or Mr. Jurnove to know what's in the plan because it 

isn't accessible to them. Is that correct?

A. Yes, your honor.

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ment (statement of ALDF counsel) (reporting that plaintiffs 

have not been able to see any exhibitor plans).3 Under the 

regulatory regime that USDA created, and that Mr. Jurnove 

challenges, all he can do is rely on USDA's repeated determinations that the Game Farm is operating legally. In my 

view, that is all a reasonable interpretation of causation can 

demand of him.

The majority's discussion of redressibility, in turn, mischaracterizes Mr. Jurnove's claims. Mr. Jurnove's alleged injuries are not limited to "persisting, painful memories of animal 

mistreatment." Maj. op. at 9. Rather, Mr. Jurnove also 

alleges that he has a current routine of regularly visiting the 

Game Farm and provides a limited time period within which 

he will make his next visit, stating that he plans to "return to 

the Farm in the next several weeks" and to "continue visiting 

the Farm to see the animals there." Jurnove Affidavit ¶ 43. 

More stringent regulations, that prohibit the inhumane conditions that have consistently caused Mr. Jurnove aesthetic 

injury in the past, will necessarily improve his aesthetic 

experience during his planned, future trips to the Game 

Farm. If one makes the assumption, which I think one 

should, that the Game Farm's owners will abide by the law, 

then tougher regulations will either allow Mr. Jurnove to visit 

Q. I mean, can they go to the Long Island Zoo, the farm, and 

say I want to see your plan?

A. Well, they can try. I don't think the exhibitors have any 

obligation.

Q. But the exhibitor doesn't have to make it available to him 

under the regulations.

3 The oral argument proceeded as follows:

Q. Have you ever, did.... At any point in this lawsuit, you 

didn't ever see any of these plans, did you?

A. No, your honor. We're not allowed to see them. That's the 

other thing. These are secret plans. This is secret law to the 

n

th degree, your honor. These are, these plans are taking the 

place of the minimum requirements that Congress directed the 

Secretary to promulgate, yet the public doesn't even get to see 

what those minimum requirements are because their plans are, 

by deliberate action of the agency, are kept at the facility and 

thereby kept from public disclosure.

a more humane Game Farm or (if the Game Farm's owners 

decide to close rather than comply with higher legal standards), to visit the animals he has come to know in their new 

homes within exhibitions that comply with the more exacting 

regulations.

In addition to satisfying the three constitutional requirements for standing, Mr. Jurnove also falls within the zone of 

interests protected under the AWA's provisions on animal 

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exhibitions:

"[I]n cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of 

the contested regulatory action, the [zone of interests] 

test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are 

so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be 

assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The 

test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose 

to benefit the would-be plaintiff."

Akins v. Federal Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d 731, 739 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. 

Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987)), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 

2451 (1997); see also ALDF I, 23 F.3d at 502 ("The [zone of 

interests] test precludes review of administrative action if the 

particular interest asserted is 'so marginally related to or 

inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 

cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to 

permit the suit.' " (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399)); Autolog 

Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he 

zone of interests test requires some indiciahowever slight

that the litigant before the court was intended to be protected, benefitted or regulated by the statute under which suit is 

brought. Courts should give broad compass to a statute's 

zone of interests in recognition that this test was originally 

intended to expand the number of litigants able to assert 

their rights in court.") (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In this case, logic, legislative history, and the 

structure of the AWA all indicate that Mr. Jurnove's injury 

satisfies the zone of interests test. The very purpose of 

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animal exhibitions is, necessarily, to entertain and educate 

people; exhibitions make no sense unless one takes the 

interests of their human visitors into account. The legislative 

history of the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act 

confirms that Congress acted with the public's interests in 

mind. In introducing these amendments, Senator Robert 

Dole explained "that we need to ensure the public that 

adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unnecessary 

abuses to animals, and that everything possible is being done 

to decrease the pain of animals during experimentation and 

testing." 131 CONG. REC. 29,155 (1985) (statement of Sen. 

Dole). Moreover, while the AWA establishes oversight committees with private citizen members for research facilities, 

see 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1) (1994), it creates no counterpart for 

animal exhibitions, leaving the representation of the public 

interest wholly to individuals like Mr. Jurnove. Mr. Jurnove, 

a regular viewer of animal exhibitions regulated under the 

AWA, clearly falls within the zone of interests the statute 

protects.

III. CONCLUSION

Twenty-five years ago, Justice Douglas argued in dissent 

that "[t]he critical question of 'standing' [in environmental 

cases] would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we 

fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to 

be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the 

name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, 

or invaded by roads and bulldozers." Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 

at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This case hardly requires us 

to recognize the independent standing of animals; Mr. Jurnove's allegations fall well within the requirements of our 

existing precedent. But it is striking, particularly in a world 

in which animals cannot sue on their own behalf, how far the 

majority opinion goes toward making governmental action 

that regulates the lives of animals, and determines the experience of people who view them in exhibitions, unchallengeable. 

See Oral Argument (statement of government counsel) (voicing his inability to identify one party who would have standing to challenge the USDA regulations implementing the 

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AWA provisions on animal exhibitions).4 Because such a 

result offends the compassionate purposes of the statute, and 

our precedents do not require it, I respectfully dissent.

4 The oral argument proceeded as follows:

Q. Can you conceive of a situation where, can you envision, or 

could you enlighten us on whether you think there could ever 

be a situation under this Act where any kind of a plaintiff could 

make a necessary showing?

A. Your honor, we wouldn't absolutely rule it out. But, we do 

believe....

Q. No, no. But I can't even, I can't conceptualize it myself. I 

thought you might help me, if your arguments here are valid 

ones.

A. Again, we are really only dealing with the parties, and the 

facts, and the circumstances of this case.

Q. Well, I know.

A. We can't rule out the possibility there would be a plaintiff.

Q. But you can't, you can't....

Q. (second judge) If the answer is no, you might want to say no.

Q. (back to original questioner) Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you can't 

think of it; I can't think of it. I don't know that that destroys 

your argument, I just thought there might be some extra 

element that you could identify that was, you know, missing 

here. Somebody says I go to the zoo, the highlight of my 

week, I go to the zoo every Saturday afternoon at two o'clock. 

And I know they have a plan on file, and I know that the 

USDA said the plan is adequate. But when I go there, there 

are these animals crying, and all alone, and lying in their feces, 

and all the other kinds of things there. That's not adequate? 

I'm just trying to figure out can anything ever be adequate? I 

guess the answer is no. I mean the answer that I can think 

of....

A. Probably not. Probably not, your honor.

Q. So what you're saying is Congress just never meant there to 

be anything except the official enforcement mechanism?

A. Yes, your honor.

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