Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05953/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05953-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD GLASS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

A. DIAZ, et al.,

Defendant. 

 /

1:04-cv-05953-AWI-DLB-P

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

RECUSE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DENNIS L. BECK

 (Document #102)

Plaintiff Donald Glass (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred

to United States Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck (“Magistrate Judge Beck”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On February 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the undersigned to recuse

Magistrate Judge Beck from this action. Plaintiff’s primary reason for requesting recusal is

Magistrate Judge Beck’s failure to rule on Plaintiff’s pending motions to compel. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides the standard for disqualifying a judge. Section 455 reads,

in pertinent part:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself

in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding;

Case 1:04-cv-05953-LJO-EPG Document 105 Filed 08/06/07 Page 1 of 3
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. . . .

Under Section 455, judges have an affirmative duty to recuse themselves in any

proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citation omitted). The alleged bias must stem from an “extrajudicial

source.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554-56; United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1454 (9 Cir. th

1997). Generally, rulings by a court during the course of a case cannot be extra-judicial conduct

requiring recusal. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 830 F. 2d 1513, 1523-24 (9 Cir. 1987); th

Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F. 2d 1538,

1548 (9 Cir. 1988). However, in Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that: th

The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial

proceedings is not a necessary condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since

predispositions developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit

rarely) suffice.

Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 554. However, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis

for a bias or partiality motion. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 940 (9th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9 Cir.1996). Judicial bias or prejudice th

formed during current or prior proceedings is sufficient for recusal only when the judge's actions

“display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” 

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1149. Thus, judicial rulings may support a

motion for recusal only “in the rarest of circumstances.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Chischilly, 30

F.3d at 1149.

In this case, Plaintiff asks that Magistrate Judge Beck be removed from this case because

Plaintiff asserts that Magistrate Judge Beck has required Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment without ruling on Plaintiffs’ motions to compel. Plaintiff’s basis

for claiming that Magistrate Judge Beck is biased arises from his orders in this case. As such, it

is not a proper reason for recusal without a showing of “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism

that would render fair judgment impossible.” The court notes that on February 23, 2007,

Magistrate Judge Beck specifically ruled that Plaintiff would not be required to respond to the

motion for summary judgment until his motion to compel was resolved. On July 9, 2007,

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Magistrate Judge Beck granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel. Based

on these two orders and a review of this entire action, there is no reason to recuse Magistrate

Judge Beck. Plaintiff has simply failed to show anything close to a deep-seated favoritism on

the part of Magistrate Judge Beck. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to recuse Magistrate

Judge Beck is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

9h0d30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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