Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02015/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dino Wayne Kyzar, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 06-2015 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) UPON REMAND

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On August 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On

November 7, 2007, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and

Recommendation recommending that the petition be denied. On

February 7, 2008, the Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation and denied relief. 

Petitioner appealed the District Court’s decision

denying habeas relief to the United States Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals. On August 3, 2009, the Ninth Circuit granted a

certificate of appealability with regard to whether Petitioner

was denied the right to due process of law; and (2) whether the

evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy

to commit deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner. Counsel

was appointed to represent Petitioner in his appellate

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proceedings. 

 On May 26, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part

and vacated in part the District Court’s decision denying the

writ and remanded the matter to the District Court. On June 3,

2011, the District Court appointed counsel to represent

Petitioner in these proceedings and referred the matter to the

Magistrate Judge for preparation of a Report and Recommendation

in light of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.

I Background

In March of 1997, Brent Lumley, a prison guard, was

fatally stabbed by a prisoner, Leroy Cropper, at the Arizona

State Prison in Perryville. See Arizona v. Cropper, 206 Ariz.

153, 155, 76 P.3d 424, 426 (2003). Mr. Cropper eventually pled

guilty to first degree murder, deadly assault by a prisoner, and

three counts of promoting prison contraband. The evidence

introduced at a trial indicated Mr. Cropper became angry at

Officer Lumley and another Detention Officer, Officer

Landsberger, after these officers searched his cell and

discovered contraband, including a knife. See Arizona v.

Cropper, 205 Ariz. 181, 182, 68 P.3d 407, 408 (2003). At the

time of the murder, Mr. Cropper’s cell-mate was Lloyd Elkins.

Id. 

The following background facts are taken from the

Arizona state court opinion regarding Mr. Cropper’s criminal

proceedings.

Through his cell door and a common vent

between cells 257 and 258, Cropper spoke to

several fellow inmates about his plan to kill

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Officer Lumley. Inmates Eugene Long and

Joshua Brice agreed to help and retrieved an

eight-inch steel carving knife buried in one

of the Building 26 yards. Using two

fly-swatters attached to one another, Long

passed Cropper the knife through the vent

between the two cells. ...

 Cropper needed to find a way out of his

cell. An inmate is able to leave a locked

cell if a fellow inmate “spins the lock” to

his cell door. This lock picking procedure,

performed manually on the cell door lock from

outside the cell, bypasses the control room’s

electronic lock command. Howell and another

inmate, Arthur Zamie, successfully opened the

door, and then looked for Officer[] Lumley

.... Howell and Long returned to Cropper’s

cell and told him that Lumley was in the

control room, with the door unlocked.

Id., 205 Ariz. at 204, 68 P.3d at 408. 

“Cropper left his cell, walked down the hall and

entered the control room” and killed Officer Lumley using the

knife supplied by Mr. Long. Id., 205 Ariz. at 205, 68 P.3d at

409. The Arizona state court further found Mr. Cropper hid

evidence of the murder in Mr. Howell’s cell, and that “Cropper

returned to his cell after an unidentified inmate spun the cell

door lock. Cropper’s cellmate Elkins helped him” conceal

evidence of the crime. Id.

An indictment issued April 14, 1997, charged Mr.

Cropper, Mr. Howell, and Mr. Long with the murder of Officer

Lumley and other crimes related to the acts surrounding the

murder. See Arizona v. Cropper, et al., No. CR1997-003949

(state court criminal docket); Arizona v. Howell, 2001 WL

34117458, Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court

of the United States. 

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1

 Allegedly Mr. Brice and Mr. Long did not find a knife

where Petitioner told them to look for one, but instead found a

different knife which they supplied to Mr. Cropper.

4

The indictment charging Petitioner with involvement in

the murder of Officer Lumley was issued approximately one year

later, on or about April 16, 1998. See Arizona v. Kyzar, No.

CR1998-005801 (state court criminal docket). The charges were

predicated on the allegation that Petitioner instructed Joshua

Brice to show Mr. Long where a knife was buried at the prison,

with the intent that Mr. Cropper would use the knife to kill

Officer Lumley.1 Petitioner, as a purported leader of “white”

prisoners, was alleged to have “instructed” Mr. Long to retrieve

the knife and give it to Mr. Cropper. The indictment charged

Petitioner with one count of conspiracy to commit dangerous or

deadly assault by a prisoner, one count of dangerous or deadly

assault by a prisoner, premised on accomplice liability, and one

count of promoting prison contraband. Doc. 24, Exh. DD at 9-11.

Mr. Howell’s jury trial began June 16, 1998. On June

30, 1998, the jury entered verdicts finding Mr. Howell not

guilty of conspiracy to commit dangerous or deadly assault by a

prisoner, not guilty of first-degree murder and not guilty of

promoting prison contraband. See Arizona v. Howell, 2001 WL

34117458, Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court

of the United States. Because the jurors were unable to reach

a verdict on the charge of dangerous or deadly assault by a

prisoner, the trial court declared a mistrial on that count.

Id. A retrial on the remaining count, dangerous or deadly

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2

 Mr. Howell’s trial was severed from the trial of his codefendants because his statements to law enforcement officers raised

Bruton issues. Doc. 24, Exh. M at 12. Mr. Brice entered into a plea

agreement with the government. See Arizona v. Brice, No. CR1997-8509.

Mr. Zamie entered into a plea agreement with the government. See

Arizona v. Zamie, No. CR1997-007299. Mr. Elkins, Mr. Fipps, and Mr.

Geeslin, Petitioner’s cellmate, also known as “Blue,” were not

charged. 

5

assault by a prisoner, began on August 12, 1998, and Mr. Howell

was convicted of that charge. Id.2

After Mr. Howell’s second trial in August 1998, the

state moved to join the trials of Petitioner, Mr. Cropper, and

Mr. Long. Doc. 24, Exh. M. On September 3, 1998, after hearing

oral argument regarding the motion for joinder, the state trial

court granted the motion from the bench. Id., Exh. M. 

In May of 1999, Mr. Cropper pled guilty to all of the

charges against him. See Arizona v. Cropper, No. CR1997-003949

(Ariz.) (en banc decision). On August 16, 1999, Petitioner’s

counsel moved to sever his trial from that of his remaining codefendant, Mr. Long. Doc. 24, Exh. AA. The trial court denied

the motion at that time, and denied the motion again when it was

renewed at the close of the state’s case at Petitioner’s trial.

Id., Exh. BB & Exh. CC.

Petitioner was tried before a jury along with Mr. Long.

Id., Exh. BB & CC. At Petitioner’s trial, the inmate who

actually committed the murder, Mr. Cropper, testified that

neither Petitioner nor anyone else had been involved in the

planning or commission of the murder. Id., Exh. A at 7. Mr.

Cropper testified he used a knife he had smuggled into the

prison “in some legal papers” to kill Officer Lumley. See id.,

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3 Mr. Geeslin was never charged with a crime associated with

Officer Lumley’s death. When interviewed on March 8, 1997, about the

murder, Mr. Geeslin stated he had no information about the murder and

denied knowing Mr. Cropper. Traverse (Docket No. 28), Exh. J.

6

Exh. A at 7. Mr. Elkins and Mr. Brice also testified at the

trial. Doc. 68, Exh. KK & Exh. JJ.

 Mr. Brice testified that Petitioner directed him to

obtain the knife for Mr. Long. See id., Exh. KK at 131-33. Mr.

Elkins testified he observed Petitioner outside his and Mr.

Cropper’s cell prior to the murder of Officer Lumley and that

Mr. Cropper and Petitioner had a conversation indicating Mr.

Cropper wanted Petitioner to supply him with a good knife. Id.,

Exh. JJ at 44. Mr. Elkins stated he had told an investigator

the day after the murder that he heard Mr. Cropper tell Mr. Long

to “Go get Blue and tell him I need a piece, a good one.” Doc.

28, App., Exh. H at 69 & Exh. I (“Blue” is Shaun Geeslin, who

was Petitioner’s cellmate).3 

Testimony was introduced at Petitioner’s trial that

Petitioner was not a member of any organized prison gang and

that Petitioner did not “run the yard”. Id., App., Exh. D.

During his closing argument, Petitioner’s counsel argued that

the testimony of two inmates who were not offered deals and the

testimony of the prison guards contradicted Mr. Elkins’ and Mr.

Brice’s testimony that Petitioner “ran the yard.” Doc. 24, Exh.

DD at 8 & 108. 

The prosecution argued to the jury that Petitioner 

set things in motion by agreeing to help

Cropper get a knife, and Eugene Long sealed

Officer Lumley’s fate when he dug up that

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knife and passed it through the vent...

As a result of the assistance of those two

men, Bren Lumley died a horrible death at the

age of 33 for no good reason. The best

explanation is the simplest. Dino Kyzar and

Eugene Long, because of their association

with Leroy Cropper, helped him in his quest

to kill Brent Lumley.

Id., Exh. DD at 31.

During closing arguments, the defendants’ counsel

pointed out the discrepancies in the testimony provided by the

inmate witnesses. Defense counsel called attention to the lack

of physical evidence connecting either defendant to the murder

weapon, i.e., fingerprints. Defense counsel noted that,

according to the testimony offered by the inmates, it was not

uncommon for an inmate to possess a knife in their cell.

Petitioner’s defense counsel also noted Mr. Elkins was not

charged with a crime arising from his involvement in the murder

and that Mr. Brice was offered a plea agreement in return for

his testimony inculpating Petitioner and Mr. Long. Id., Exh.

DD. 

Defense counsel pointed out to the jury that Mr. Brice

had not initially implicated Petitioner in the conspiracy. Id.,

Exh. DD. Petitioner’s counsel argued to the jury that, at the

time of the murder, Petitioner had six months left on the

sentence he was serving and reasoned that Petitioner would be

unwise to involve himself in an assault on a guard when his

release was imminent. Id., Exh. DD at 116.

The jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to

commit deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner, and acquitted

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4 At the time of his trial on the charges stated supra, Petitioner had finished serving the sentence of incarceration for a

1993 assault conviction, pursuant to which he was imprisoned at the

Perryville prison in March of 1997. Petitioner was held on $160,000

bond prior to trial. Doc. 28, Exh. N.

8

Petitioner of the other two charges. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner

was sentenced to an aggravated term of 21 years imprisonment for

this crime. Id., Exh. A.4 Petitioner’s co-defendant, Mr. Long,

was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder or

assault by a prisoner, first-degree murder, dangerous or deadly

assault by a prisoner, and promoting prison contraband. Id.,

Exh. A.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion seeking a

new trial on February 9, 2000. Original Answer, Exh. C, Attach.

Petitioner argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction. Id., Exh. C, Attach. at 5-

6. The motion for a new trial was denied.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner asserted the trial court

had improperly denied his motion to sever his trial from that of

his co-defendant. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner also asserted the

trial court erred by admitting “other bad act” evidence, and

that the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct. Id., Exh. A.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence on June 28, 2001. Id., Exh. A. The Arizona

Supreme Court denied review of the Court of Appeals’ decision on

October 30, 2001. Id., Exh. B.

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Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in

the Arizona Superior Court pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, on November 23, 2001. See Arizona v. Kyzar,

No. CR1998-005801-A. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief on October 2, 2002. Original Answer,

Exh. C. Petitioner asserted his pretrial counsel, his trial

counsel, and his appellate counsel were all unconstitutionally

ineffective. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner asserted his trial

counsel was ineffective, inter alia, because he had not

presented what Petitioner asserted was “newly discovered”

evidence at Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. C (Claim 13).

Petitioner alleged the prosecutor had knowingly presented

perjured testimony to the grand jury, in violation of his right

to due process. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner further asserted the

denial of effective assistance of counsel violated his

constitutional right to due process of law. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner also argued a recent Arizona Supreme Court opinion

undermined the soundness of his conviction for conspiracy. Id.,

Exh. C. Attached to Petitioner’s pro se Rule 32 brief was his

defense counsel’s motion seeking a new trial. The motion

seeking a new trial argued there was insufficient evidence to

convict Petitioner on the charge of conspiracy.

The state Superior Court considered the merits of

Petitioner’s claims for post-conviction relief and denied relief

in a decision issued January 16, 2003. Id., Exh. D. The

Superior Court determined Petitioner’s claim regarding the grand

jury proceedings was mooted by Petitioner’s subsequent trial.

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5

 In Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 47 P.3d 1114,

1115–16 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court considered “whether one can

be convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder when the

state does not prove that the killing was committed with premeditation

but only that it occurred in the course and furtherance of committing

one of the underlying felonies.” Id., 47 P.3d at 1117, 1119. The

Arizona Supreme Court concluded that proof of intent to commit the

underlying felony in a case of felony murder is not sufficient to

support a conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

Id., 47 P.3d at 1117, 1119. In reaching that conclusion, the court

relied on state legal precedent to articulate the elements of

conspiracy to commit premeditated first-degree murder as: “the state

must prove that the defendant had the intent to promote the offense

of murder and an agreement with another one that will do the actual

killing.” 47 P.3d at 1117. In Arizona v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 47

P.3d 1048 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court held the defendant could

not be found guilty of premeditated murder based on accomplice

liability because the evidence did not show that he intended to

facilitate or aid in committing a murder. See 202 Ariz. 427, 436, 46

P.3d 1048, 1057 (2002). However, the Supreme Court further held that

the defendant had committed a felony and his accomplice in that felony

had murdered in the course of and to further that felony and,

accordingly, that the defendant was properly convicted of felony

murder.

10

Id., Exh. D. The state court found Petitioner’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel without merit because

Petitioner had not shown deficient performance by his counsel

nor prejudice arising from any alleged error. Id., Exh. D. The

state court also considered and denied Petitioner’s other claims

for relief on the merits of those claims. Id., Exh. D. The

court stated, inter alia, that Petitioner’s alleged “newly

discovered” evidence was not newly discovered for purposes of

his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. D. The court construed

Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim as one pursuant to

Evanchyk5 and denied relief based on that opinion.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on March 24, 2004.

Id., Exh. E. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the

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decision denying post-conviction relief in a decision issued

November 8, 2004. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner filed a second state action for postconviction relief on March 24, 2005. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner

asserted he was entitled to re-sentencing pursuant to the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington. Id.,

Exh. G. The Arizona trial court determined Blakely was not

applicable to Petitioner’s case, which had become final before

Blakely was decided. Id., Exh. G. Accordingly, the trial court

concluded, Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief was

not timely filed, i.e., it did not fall under the exception to

the timeliness rule for cases involving a new rule of law. Id.,

Exh. G. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of this

decision on February 23, 2006, and the Arizona Supreme Court

also denied review in a decision issued July 31, 2006. Id.,

Exh. H & Exh. I.

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner asserted,

inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support

Petitioner’s conviction on the conspiracy charge. In the first

Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that

each of Petitioner’s claims could be denied on the merits

regardless of any failure to exhaust some of the claims, as

asserted by Respondents.

In 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in

part and vacated in part the District Court’s decision denying

Petitioner relief. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the

District Court to reconsider Petitioner’s insufficiency of the

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evidence claim in light of the trial transcripts which were not

made available to the District Court during the pendency of the

section 2254 petition.

The Court ordered the matter be briefed. Petitioner,

through appointed counsel, briefed the issues addressed by the

Ninth Circuit to the Court. Respondents filed an answer to the

petition addressing the Ninth Circuit’s remand and maintaining

the petition must be denied.

II Argument

Petitioner asserts:

The evidence implicating Kyzar in the plot to

kill Brent Lumley was predicated mainly upon

the unreliable and incredible testimony of

fellow inmates Lloyd Elkins and Joshua Brice.

In fact, the evidence against Kyzar was so

untrustworthy that, significantly, if not

dispositively, the counts based upon it were

expressly rejected by the jury by their

verdicts. 

 The linchpin of the prosecution’s case was

two-fold: (1) Elkins testified that he

observed Kyzar outside Elkins and Cropper’s

cell at a time prior to the stabbing death of

Brent Lumley. [] However his testimony on

this point was severely impeached on

cross-examination regarding this subject with

both his prior statements to police and his

testimony in a previous trial. []

Significantly, Elkins’ trial testimony was

also not corroborated by the only-non-inmate

witness to the events, Officer Landsperger.

[]; and (2) Brice testified that Kyzar

directed him to obtain the knife for inmate

Long.[] However, this claim was also

uncorroborated and expressly contradicted by

two other inmate witnesses, i.e., Keith

Balmos [] and Dave Thomas [].

Doc. 62 at 8 (internal citations omitted).

Petitioner further argues:

[T]here was no scientific, forensic or

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physical proof linking this defendant to the

conspiracy in this case. There was no

substantial evidence that Kyzar agreed to

anything in this case. However, despite the

complete lack of evidence, Kyzar was

convicted of conspiracy to commit a dangerous

assault by a prisoner.

Id. at 8-9.

Noting that Petitioner was acquitted on the charges of

aiding the assault and promoting prison contraband, Petitioner

asserts: 

The record in this case contains

insufficient evidence to support Kyzar’s

conviction for conspiracy to commit a

dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner.

The government failed to prove that Kyzar

participated in the conspiracy to assault

Officer Lumley. In Arizona, to successfully

prosecute Kyzar on the conspiracy charge,

the government was required to prove: (1)

that within the charged time frame, i.e.,

March 7, 2009, with the intent to promote or

aid in the commission of the assault, Kyzar

agreed with one or more people that at least

one of them would commit the crime of a

dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner;

and (2) that Kyzar or another person

involved in the agreement intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly caused physical

injury to another person using an item that

is capable of inflicting death or serious

physical injury. A.R.S. §§ 13-105(11),

-1003, -1203, -1206. Here, the evidence was

too weak; a reasonable factfinder could not

find all the elements of conspiracy beyond a

reasonable doubt.... aiding in the assault,

and obtaining, possessing or conveying the

knife used in the assault.

 Thus, the specific allegations that Kyzar

promoted and aided in the commission of the

assault by Cropper by making the knife

available to Cropper were found not true by

the jury by way of their verdicts of not

guilty on aiding in the assault (count two)

and promoting prison contraband, i.e., the

knife (count three).

Id. at 10-11.

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Petitioner argues:

On review, even viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, the

evidence was still insufficient to show that

Kyzar had a connection to the conspiracy.

The principal evidence presented to the jury

was: (1) The testimony of Lloyd Elkins that

he saw Kyzar outside his cell at some time

prior to the stabbing of Lumley; and (2) the

discounted testimony of Joshua Brice that

Kyzar directed him to obtain the knife for

codefendant Long. The jury clearly did not

believe Brice as they acquitted Kyzar of

counts two and three: aiding Cropper in the

assault (count two) and promoting prison

contraband, to wit: the knife used in the

assault (count three).

***

Moreover, there is not testimony that Kyzar

provided the knife to Cropper, only

testimony that Kyzar told Brice to show Long

where a shank could be found and then

testimony that no shank was found, but that

instead some other inmate named Cliff showed

Long where to find a knife []. Further,

there was also no testimony that Kyzar was

“the ringleader of the conspiracy who

monitored the operation once he gave his

approval to Cropper.” Rather, there was

disputed testimony that Geeslin and Kyzar

“ran the yard,” impeached testimony that

Kyzar asked Fipps to see “if everything was

handled,” and absolutely no testimony that

Cropper solicited from, or that Kyzar

actually gave, “permission” or “approval” to

commit the assault.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original).

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim of

insufficient evidence was procedurally defaulted and that the

District Court erred in adopting a Report and Recommendation that

determined this claim could be denied on the merits without

determining whether the claim was exhausted. Because the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to reconsider

the issue of whether Petitioner’s right to due process was

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violated because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction, based on the availability of trial transcripts, the

Magistrate Judge will not discuss the issue of exhaustion.

III Analysis

In Petitioner’s state action for post-conviction

relief, the Arizona state appellate court considered, or at least

reviewed, the merits of Petitioner’s allegation that there was

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The court did

so in the context of reviewing his counsel’s performance with

regard to Petitioner’s motion for a new trial and Petitioner’s

contention that his conviction was against the weight of the

evidence. Although the state court did not explicitly use the

federal standard established by the United States Supreme Court’s

opinion in Jackson v. Virginia when considering these claims, the

issue before the District Court, per the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals’ remand, is whether Petitioner’s federal constitutional

right to due process was violated because there was insufficient

evidence to sustain a finding of guilt on the single count of

conviction. 

When undertaking habeas review of a state court

decision rejecting a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the

Court’s inquiry is limited; the Court may ask only whether the

state court’s decision was contrary to or reflected an

unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of a particular

case. See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010). A due

process claim based on insufficiency of the evidence can only

succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the light most

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favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324,

99 S. Ct. 2781, 2792 (1979). 

Because reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is

equivalent to a judgment of acquittal, “a reviewing court must

consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court,”

regardless whether that evidence was admitted erroneously.

McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 672. The Court must review the evidence

presented to the trier of fact “in the light most favorable to

the prosecution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we

may grant habeas relief only if “no rational

trier of fact could have found proof of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781

[]. In this review, all evidence must be

considered in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, and we presume “that the

trier of fact resolved any [conflicting

inferences] in favor of the prosecution.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781.

Furthermore, “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply the

standards of Jackson with an additional

layer of deference” to state court findings.

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th

Cir. 2005).

Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (some

internal citations omitted).

Insufficient evidence claims are reviewed by looking at

the elements of the offense under state law and, when determining

whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, the federal

courts are bound by a state court’s interpretation of state law.

See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2011).

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6 This subsection provides:

A person commits conspiracy if, with the intent

to promote or aid the commission of an offense,

such person agrees with one or more persons that

at least one of them or another person will

engage in conduct constituting the offense and

one of the parties commits an overt act in

furtherance of the offense, except that an overt

act shall not be required if the object of the

conspiracy was to commit any felony upon the

person of another, or to commit an offense under

§ 13-1508 [burglary] or 13-1704[arson].

17

Additionally, circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from

circumstantial evidence are sufficient to sustain a conviction.

See, e.g., Giurbino, 651 F.3d at 1114-15.

“The elements of [Arizona Revised Statutes] § 13–1206,

dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner, are: 1) a person in

the custody of the Department of Corrections, 2) commission of

an assault, and 3) use of a deadly or dangerous instrument, or

infliction of serious physical injuries.” Arizona v. Williams,

144 Ariz. 479, 486, 698 P.2d 724, 731 (1985). To prove

conspiracy, pursuant to Arizona law, the prosecution was required

to prove that Petitioner “inten[ded] to promote or aid the

commission of the assault”. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–1003(A);6

Arizona v. Gessler, 142 Ariz. 379, 383, 690 P.2d 98, 102 (Ct.

App. 1984) (noting that the crime of conspiracy focuses on the

agreement to commit a criminal act).

Mr. Elkins testified that after Mr. Cropper asked to

see them, Petitioner and “Blue” (Mr. Geeslin) appeared at the

cell. Doc. 68, Exh. JJ at 41. He testified that when Petitioner

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was at the window of the cell, he overheard Mr. Cropper and

Petitioner discuss Mr. Cropper’s desire to acquire a knife. Id.,

Exh. JJ at 43-44. Mr. Elkins testified that, after this

occurred, a knife was passed through a vent to Mr. Cropper in

their cell, Mr. Cropper left the cell, and that Mr. Cropper

returned to the cell and stated that he had used that knife to

kill Mr Lumley. Id., Exh. JJ at 49-51. 

Mr. Brice testified that he was present when a knife

was passed through a vent to Mr. Cropper and that, after Mr.

Lumley was killed, Petitioner told him to “keep [his] mouth

shut”. Id., Exh. LL at 35. Mr. Brice also testified that

Petitioner told Mr. Brice to show Mr. Long “where the shank is,”

meaning where in the prison yard Mr. Brice had kept watch while

another prisoner buried a knife. Id., Exh. LL at 46; Exh. KK at

131-32 & 135-37. Mr. Brice testified that Mr. Long did not

retrieve a buried knife, but that he did see Mr. Long retrieve

a knife from elsewhere in the prison yard. Id., Exh. KK at 141-

44.

Respondent contends:

Petitioner’s agreement to the intent of the

conspiracy was demonstrated by evidence

that: 1) Cropper had requested to see him

after becoming upset at the guards; 2)

Cropper made a stabbing motion while asking

Petitioner for a knife; 3) Petitioner asked

Cropper whether he was “sure about this” and

wanted to know how Cropper’s actions might

affect the length of Cropper’s

incarceration; and 4) Petitioner’s

instructions to Brice to “keep [his] mouth

shut” after the stabbing. 

 Petitioner undertook the overt action

necessary to further the conspiracy by

directing Brice to assist in the process of

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Cropper’s obtaining a knife. Stanley, 123

Ariz. at 104, 597 P.2d at 1007 (overt act

“can be any act which naturally advances the

intent of the conspiracy”).

***

Petitioner’s instructions to Brice to assist

in obtaining a knife constituted the

necessary overt act. The crime of conspiracy

was complete at that point; any subsequent

events are irrelevant. Gessler, 142 Ariz. at

383, 690 P.2d at 102 (crime of conspiracy

focuses on agreement). Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as this Court must, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19, sufficient evidence

supports Petitioner’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit deadly or dangerous

assault by a prisoner.

Doc. 68 at 12-13.

After a thorough review of the trial transcripts, the

Magistrate Judge concludes that a rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner

was convicted of conspiracy to commit dangerous or deadly assault

by a prisoner. The jury was properly instructed on the law and

the elements of the crime of conviction. The state’s summary of

the facts in the pleadings upon habeas review is accurate and

does not overstate the evidence. 

Petitioner need not have participated in an overt act

himself to be found guilty of conspiracy; the prosecution was

only required to prove that a co-conspirator committed an overt

act. This distinction is the difference between guilt predicated

on aiding and abetting, and guilt predicated on the theory of

conspiracy. Guilt based on participation in a conspiracy permits

conviction based on the defendant’s agreement to join a

conspiracy to commit a crime, whereas the focal point of guilt

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predicated on a theory of aiding and abetting requires proof the

defendant himself acted in furtherance of the crime. In this

matter Petitioner agreed to use his influence over other inmates

to cause one of them to locate a shank and provide it to Mr.

Cropper so that he could retaliate against a guard. The evidence

also established that Petitioner then tried to get a participant

in the conspiracy to keep silent after the guard was murdered.

Although evidence of Petitioner joining the conspiracy

is thin, finding there was not sufficient evidence under the

Jackson standard, i.e., that no reasonable fact-finder could have

found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would require

a redetermination of the credibility of the witnesses, i.e., Mr.

Brice and Mr. Elkins.

The United States Supreme Court recently offered

guidance regarding the proper evaluation of an insufficient

evidence habeas claim, reversing a decision of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, in Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011).

The opinion of the Court in Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781,

[](1979), makes clear that it is the

responsibility of the jury—not the court—to

decide what conclusions should be drawn from

evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing

court may set aside the jury’s verdict on

the ground of insufficient evidence only if

no rational trier of fact could have agreed

with the jury. What is more, a federal court

may not overturn a state court decision

rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge simply because the federal court

disagrees with the state court. The federal

court instead may do so only if the state

court decision was “objectively

unreasonable.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.

––––, ––––, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862, [] (2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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 Because rational people can sometimes

disagree, the inevitable consequence of this

settled law is that judges will sometimes

encounter convictions that they believe to

be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless

uphold. The Court of Appeals in this case

substituted its judgment for that of a

California jury on the question whether the

prosecution’s or the defense’s expert

witnesses more persuasively explained the

cause of a death. For this reason,

certiorari is granted and the judgment of

the Court of Appeals is reversed.

***

That conclusion [Ninth Circuit granting

writ] was plainly wrong. Jackson says that

evidence is sufficient to support a

conviction so long as “after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443

U.S., at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. It also

unambiguously instructs that a reviewing

court “faced with a record of historical

facts that supports conflicting inferences

must presume—even if it does not

affirmatively appear in the record—that the

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution.” Id., at 326, 99 S. Ct.

2781.

132 S. Ct. at 4-5.

Petitioner argues that no reasonable fact-finder could

have found him guilty because the testimony of the inmate

witnesses was impeachable, contradicted, or not credible.

However, if a rational jury chose to believe the testimony of the

inmate witnesses, then Petitioner is not entitled to relief. See

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S. Ct. 843, 851

(1983) (“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no

license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor

has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”);

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Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788-89 (6th Cir. 2003). The

jurors rendered their collective credibility determinations by

convicting Petitioner of conspiracy.

IV Conclusion

Having thoroughly reviewed the trial transcripts in

this matter and the pleadings upon habeas review, the Magistrate

Judge concludes that the state court did not unreasonably

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner

of the crime charged. A reasonable finder of fact assessing the

credibility of the witnesses could find each element of the crime

of conviction.

IT IS THEREFORE AGAIN RECOMMENDED that Mr. Kyzar’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

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of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 16th day of May, 2012.

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