Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00083/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00083-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN TOWLE, on behalf of himself and 

all other aggrieved non-exempt 

employees,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CUMMINS PACIFIC, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18cv83-LAB (JLB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

[Dkt. 38]

Plaintiff Juan Towle sued Defendant Cummins Pacific, LLC (“CP”) on behalf of 

himself and a class of similarly situated employees, alleging that it maintained a meal and 

rest break policy that was facially unlawful under California law. Towle now moves for 

class certification. For the reasons below, the Court finds that the certification 

requirements in Rule 23 are not satisfied, and therefore DENIES Towle’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Cummins Pacific, LLC (“CP”) sells and services commercial and 

industrial engines throughout California. Complaint, Dkt. 1-2 at ¶15. Plaintiff Juan Towle 

was a Rental Technician employed by CP from January 2000 until his termination in 

November 2015. Id. Towle was one of approximately 614 individuals employed by CP 

in California. Lloyd Decl., Dkt. 46-10 at ¶4. CP’s employees hold a wide range of 

positions, from office administrators, to warehouse personnel, to equipment technicians. 

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Id. Of CP’s 614 employees, approximately 185 are unionized employees, and the 

remainder are not unionized. Id. Towle was not unionized. Dkt. 1-2 at ¶17. 

Prior to his termination, Towle worked in CP’s El Cajon Sales and Service Center 

as a PowerGen Rental Technician. Dkt. 46-10 at ¶6. This was a specialized role that he 

performed mostly in the field, and mostly autonomously. He was tasked with, among 

other things, providing service to rental customers and performing repairs and 

preventative maintenance. Id at ¶8. In 2014, CP moved the power generator rental 

business from El Cajon to its Bloomington branch. Id. at ¶34. Towle remained in El Cajon 

and continued to perform the same duties, but he reported to supervisors in Bloomington. 

Id. at ¶36-37. Shortly thereafter, Towle was injured on the job and was placed on light 

duty in a position CP created for him. Id. at ¶9. He remained in this position with a 

modified schedule until his termination in November 2015. Id. 

In 2017, Towle brought this suit in San Diego Superior Court on behalf of himself 

and a class of fellow employees. CP removed the case to this Court, and Towle has now 

moved for class certification. The case centers on whether CP violated California law by 

providing insufficient meal and rest breaks to employees like Towle. CP’s employee 

handbook, which applied to all non-exempt employees, provided:

Employees are allowed a 15-minute break every four hours. 

These breaks will be paid. In addition, all employees who 

work at least five hours in a day are entitled to take at least a 

30-minute meal break. Meal breaks are generally unpaid and 

should be taken prior to the sixth hour of work. However, 

employees who are required to work or remain at their stations 

during the meal break will be paid for that time. Unused 

breaks or meal periods cannot be used for leaving early. The 

supervisor of each shift is responsible for scheduling 

employees’ meal and rest breaks....

Belong Decl., Ex. A, Dkt. 38-5 at 2-3. Towle argues that this policy is facially unlawful 

because, among other things, California law requires that employee meal breaks be taken 

prior to the fifth hour of work (not the sixth hour of work), and rest breaks be taken every 

“four hours or major fraction thereof” (not simply every four hours). Mot. for Class Cert., 

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Dkt. 38 at 14, 17-18. He also argues CP violated the meal and rest break requirements 

in practice as well as on paper. Specifically, he submits an expert report from Dr. Robert 

Fountain, who analyzed time cards from a sample of 55 class members and found a 

pattern of meal and rest break violations. See Fountain Decl., Dkt. 38-19.

For its part, CP does not dispute that this policy appeared in the handbook,

1 but 

says that the handbook was intended only to “highlight and summarize [CP’s] policies 

and practices” and that supervisors were responsible for scheduling meal and rest breaks. 

See Dkt. 46-38 at 11 (union employees), Dkt. 46-39 at 11 (non-union employees). To 

that end, CP notes that each of their twelve offices had widely differing practices regarding 

meal and rest breaks. This was further complicated by the fact that some of the offices 

were governed by union collective-bargaining agreements that imposed other unique 

requirements on those offices. See Dkt. 46-10 at ¶5. CP submitted declarations from 

approximately 50 employees—nearly one-tenth of the entire putative class—describing 

the various break policies in each of their offices. See Dkts. 46-51 – 46-110. CP has 

summarized these declarations in its Opposition, and a few examples give a sense of the 

wide variety of policies implemented:

 Sacramento: In Sacramento, managers instruct technicians to take their 

meal periods by noon. Field Techs are unsupervised. They have discretion 

in timing their meal periods. The rest of the employees must take their meal 

periods before the beginning of their sixth hour of work, and the meal 

periods should be staggered to allow for coverage. The Parts department 

employees stagger their meal periods with groups of employees taking 

breaks in 30-minute blocks until all lunches are completed by 12:30 p.m. or 

1:00 p.m. Warehouse employees also stagger their lunches to begin 

between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. The office manager takes her meal 

period at noon every day, and the Service Writer usually goes to lunch 

around 1:00 p.m. or 1:30 p.m. Overall, Sacramento employees have the 

discretion to take their meal periods when they choose. 

 El Cajon: In El Cajon, when working in the Shop, Techs’ meal periods are 

scheduled to be taken from 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.; however, fluctuations 

occur based upon customer needs. Sometimes Techs take meal periods 

 

1 This handbook was amended in 2016 to come into stricter conformance with California 

guidelines. Belong Decl., Ex. E, Dkt. 38-9.

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earlier or later at their discretion. When working in the field, Techs take their 

meal periods at their discretion, but are expected to take it before the end 

of the fifth hour of work. Field Techs are allowed to tell customers they need 

to take their meal periods when on a jobsite in order to do so. 

 Fresno: In Fresno, some employees’ meal periods are scheduled and 

some are not. Nonetheless, employees usually take their meal periods 

between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. The non-Tech employees stagger their 

lunches with the earliest beginning at 11:30 a.m. and ending at 12:30 p.m.

and the latest taking lunch from 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Techs typically take 

their lunches from 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m. on Monday through Thursday, 

and from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. on Fridays. Although these employees 

generally take their meal periods in these schedules, they have the 

discretion to take their meal periods when they deem appropriate to ensure 

coverage. When Techs are working in the field, they are generally 

unsupervised, and expected to take timely, 30-minute meal periods when 

they deem appropriate. 

Opp. to Class Cert., Dkt. 46 at 13-14, 16-18 (internal citations omitted). The excerpts 

above relate only to meal breaks, but CP submits similar summaries of the variances in 

rest break policies between offices as well. 

CP’s expert, Robert Crandall, also takes issue with the findings of Towle’s expert, 

Dr. Fountain. For example, based on his analysis, Crandall found that a meal break of at 

least 30 minutes occurred during 94.2% of meal-eligible shifts. Crandal Decl., Dkt. 46-37 

at ¶13. As to the remaining shifts, Crandall suggests a variety of reasons an employee 

might not take a break during a given meal-eligible shift other than being precluded from 

taking a break by CP. Id. at ¶21-29. 

II. Legal Standard

a. Class Certification Generally

"A party seeking class certification must satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a) and the requirements of at least one of the categories under Rule 23(b)." Wang v. 

Chinese Daily News, 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are: 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common 

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to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These are commonly referred to as the numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy requirements. The Court must perform "a rigorous analysis [to 

ensure] that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Wal-Mart Stores v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). Towle seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which 

applies where common questions predominate over individualized ones and a class 

action is the superior mechanism for dispute resolution.

"In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the 

plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the 

requirements of Rule 23 are met." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, the Court considers the 

merits of the underlying claims to the extent that the merits overlap with the Rule 23(a) 

analysis, but does not determine whether Towle actually could prevail. See Ellis v. Costco 

Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Although the Court must generally accept the substantive allegations made in the 

complaint as true, it must also consider the nature and range of proof necessary to 

establish those allegations. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 

1342 (9th Cir. 1982); Gomez v. Rossi Concrete, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 579, 585 (S.D. Cal. 

2010). "In addition, the court may consider supplemental evidentiary submissions of the 

parties." Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Products Inc., 268 F.R.D. 330, 335 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

"Neither the possibility that a plaintiff will be unable to prove his allegations, nor the 

possibility that the later course of the suit might unforeseeably prove the original decision 

to certify the class wrong, is a basis for declining to certify a class which apparently 

satisfies Rule 23." United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & 

Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 809 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citation and brackets omitted).

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b. Rule 23(a)

Commonality requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). "What matters to class certification is not the raising of common 

questions . . . but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common 

answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (citation 

omitted). It is construed permissively, and indeed less rigorously than the predominance 

requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). "All questions of fact and law need not be common to 

satisfy the rule." Id. at 2562. One "significant question of law or fact" common to the 

class may be sufficient to warrant certification. Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc., 

731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 

589 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

The typicality inquiry under Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of 

the representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(a)(3). The representative claims don’t need to be "substantially identical" to those 

of absent class members, just "reasonably coextensive." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 

F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Rule 23(a)(4) permits certification of a class only if the "representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." This factor requires that the 

proposed representative Plaintiffs do not have conflicts of interest with the proposed 

class, and that Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel who will 

vigorously prosecute the action on the class's behalf. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

c. Rule 23(b)

In addition to establishing commonality, Towle must still prove that common 

questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class 

members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed 

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. Amchem 

Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). "When common questions present a 

significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a 

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single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative 

rather than on an individual basis." Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quotation omitted).

Superiority requires consideration of four factors. See Zinser v. Accufix Research 

Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001). They are: 

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions; 

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members; 

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). When analyzing these factors, the Court must "focus on the 

efficiency and economy elements of the class action so that cases allowed under 

subdivision (b)(3) are those that can be adjudicated most profitably on a representative 

basis." Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

a. Evidentiary Objections

Both Towle and CP make evidentiary objections. CP objects to various portions 

of the Juan Towle, Tyler Belong, and Chassen Palmer declarations that Towle submitted, 

while Towle objects to essentially every declaration CP submitted. See Dkt. 46-2 (CP’s 

Objections), 53-4 – 53-6 (Towle’s Objections). Towle also moves to strike the 

declarations of Andrew Alcantar and Suzanne Arabian on the basis that CP failed to 

produce these individuals for deposition. Dkt. 53-7.

As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, though, a motion to certify a class is a 

preliminary procedure, and courts don't require strict adherence to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 

901 (9th Cir.1975). “[E]vidence presented in support of class certification need not be 

admissible at trial.” Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 270 F.R.D. 477, 483 n. 5 

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(N.D.Cal.2010). The parties’ various objections and motions to strike are overruled. In 

any event, the Court does not rely heavily on any given piece of evidence in reaching its 

conclusion, so consideration of this evidence doesn't change the outcome.

b. Judicial Notice

Towle requests that the Court take judicial notice of various trial court documents 

from Medlock v. Taco Bell, 07-cv-1314 (E.D. Cal.) and Hohnbaum v. Brinker Rest. Corp., 

GIC834348 (San Diego Sup. Ct. 2013) in support of his motion for class certification. Dkt. 

38-3. Towle’s request is GRANTED and the Court will take judicial notice of those 

documents.

IV. DISCUSSION

Towle seeks to certify the following class and subclasses, defined as:

 Unlawful Meal Period Policy Subclass: All of Defendant’s 

non-exempt California employees who were subject to 

Defendant’s Meal and Rest Breaks policy and who were not 

relieved of all duties for a first meal period by the end of the 

fifth hour of work and/or a second meal period by the end of 

the tenth hour of work between December 4, 2013 and May 

31, 2016.

 Unlawful Meal Period Premium Pay Practice Subclass: All 

of Defendant’s non-exempt California employees who were 

not relieved of all duties for a first meal period by the end of 

the fifth hour of work and/or a second meal period by the end 

of the tenth hour of work, and who were not compensated with 

one hour of pay for all such instances between December 4, 

2013 and the date of judgment.

 Unlawful Rest Period Policy Subclass: All of Defendant’s 

non-exempt California employees who were subject to 

Defendant’s Meal and Rest Breaks policy and who did not 

receive a first, paid 10-minute rest period during work shifts of 

3.5 but less than 4 hours, a second rest period during shifts 

greater than 6 hours but less than 8 hours, or a third rest 

period during shifts greater than 10 hours but less than 12 

hours, any time between December 4, 2013 and May 31, 

2016.

 Unlawful Rest Period Premium Pay Practice Subclass: All 

of Defendant’s non-exempt California employees who were 

not compensated with one hour of pay for all instances where 

they did not receive a first, paid 10 minute rest period during 

work shifts of 3.5 but less than 4 hours, a second rest period 

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during shifts greater than 6 hours but less than 8 hours, or a 

third rest period during shifts greater than 10 hours but less 

than 12 hours, any time between December 4, 2013 and the 

date of judgment. 

 Unlawful Derivative Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All of 

Defendant’s former non-exempt California employees who 

were not provided timely payments of all final wages as 

required by the California Labor Code upon separation of 

employment during any time between December 4, 2013 and 

the date of judgment.

Dkt. 38-1. 

CP’s opposition focuses primarily on what it sees as Towle’s inability to prove 

commonality (and the related requirement of predominance). However, CP also argues 

that even if commonality were satisfied, Towle is a uniquely ill-suited class representative 

and that typicality is therefore also lacking. The Court will address each requirement of 

Rule 23 in turn, with a focus on commonality and typicality.

a. Numerosity, Adequacy, Superiority

The parties agree that there are approximately 600 putative class members, and 

Towle argues that this meets the requirements of numerosity. CP does not contest this 

point. The Court finds that the putative class meets the numerosity requirement. 

Adequacy is similarly met here. Although it is closely related to typicality, 

discussed in more detail below, adequacy focuses more on the qualifications of counsel 

and whether they will fairly represent the class. Here, Plaintiff’s counsel represent that 

they have significant expertise and experience in the area of wage-and-hour class 

actions. See generally Belong Decl., Dkt. 38-4. CP does not dispute this, and the Court 

finds that adequacy is satisfied.

Likewise with superiority. CP does not contest superiority, and the Court is not 

aware of any other pending litigation that would render a class action an inferior method 

for adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court finds superiority is met. 

b. Commonality and Predominance

Commonality is the heart of this motion for class certification. Boiled down, Towle 

argues that CP for years maintained a meal and rest break policy that was facially 

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unlawful under California law. In Towle’s view, the facially unlawful policy standing alone 

is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of commonality because it applied to all CP 

employees. CP counters that the policy at issue was contained in a handbook intended 

only to highlight the company’s various policies, and that the break policies of CP’s twelve 

California offices varied significantly. Thus, in CP’s view, because the policies differed in 

practice, there are no issues common to the entire class. 

As noted above, Towle views CP’s written break policy as unlawful because 

California law requires that employee meal breaks be taken prior to the fifth hour of work 

(not the sixth hour of work, as provided in CP’s policy), and rest breaks be taken every 

“four hours or major fraction thereof” (not simply every four hours). In similar 

circumstances, courts have found that unlawful policies like this can provide a common 

question that would permit class certification. In Pena v. Taylor Farms. Pac., Inc., 305 

F.R.D. 197, 216 (E.D. Cal. 2015), for example, the court found that a similar policy 

surrounding meal breaks was sufficient to give rise to a common question.

But the critical aspect present in Pena and other cases that’s not present here is 

evidence that the defendant violated California law not just on paper, but also in practice

and in a consistent way that would permit classwide adjudication. In Pena, the employees 

all worked at a single facility and the court was able to determine that the official policy 

was applied consistently in practice. See id. at 205, 216-217. Here, that’s not the case. 

As this Court has noted previously, where “there is no good evidence showing the entire 

class was subject to the same non-compliant practice, . . . there is . . . no question 

common to the class. See Cortes v. Mkt. Connect Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 5772857, at *7 

(S.D. Cal. 2015). Plaintiff’s inability to show here that “the entire class was subject to the 

same non-compliant practice” dooms his argument for commonality. Defendant has 

submitted declarations from nearly one-tenth of the entire putative class describing the 

various break policies implemented in each of CP’s twelve offices in California. Without 

belaboring the point, the implemented practices could not be more different. 

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Towle submits expert testimony to try to support an argument that CP violated 

California law in practice as well as on paper. His expert, Dr. Fountain, purported to 

analyze time cards from a sample of 55 class members and, in doing so, found a variety 

of meal and rest break violations. For example, Dr. Fountain found that “a Meal Period 

Event [i.e., a violation] occurred on over one-half . . . of all Relevant Shifts. And, 100% of 

the Sample Class Members . . . incurred one or more Meal Period Events.” See Fountain 

Decl., Dkt. 38-19 at ¶9. But even in this, CP points out significant methodological flaws. 

Fountain’s analysis counts only the number of shifts in which no rest break was taken. It 

does not account for the differences between offices and positions that might explain why 

a rest break was not taken on a given day. CP’s expert, by contrast, found that meal 

periods were recorded in 94.2% of shifts and that the variety of positions helps explain 

why breaks were not recorded in the remaining 5.8% of shifts. See Crandal Decl., Dkt. 

46-37 at ¶13-16, 21-29. The Court cannot conclude from this evidence that there was a

common pattern of violations in practice. The Court, of course, does not dispute that CP 

may (or may not) have violated California’s rest break requirements. That’s not the 

question before the Court. The question before the Court is whether it did so in a way 

that is common to the class and would permit litigation on a class-wide basis. The Court 

cannot conclude that it did. 

Plaintiff also cannot show commonality by referencing CP’s alleged practice of 

failing to pay wage premiums in violation of California law. As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained, “[a] common practice of not paying wage premiums is not sufficient to show 

commonality for claims under these statutes.” Coleman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 649 F. App'x 

387, 388 (9th Cir. 2016). Failure to pay a wage premium is not a freestanding violation;

it is the remedy when an employer forces its employees to miss breaks. Id. Thus, in 

order for CP’s failure to pay wage premiums to count as a common question, Towle must

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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“show a common practice of forcing employees to take short or late meal [or rest] breaks.” 

Id. For the reasons already stated, he cannot do so.2 

Finally, permitting certification in a situation like this would run afoul of the policy 

rationales underlying class certification. Not only do the twelve offices each have differing

break policies, many of the offices have both union and non-union employees, each of 

which are governed by other distinct rules. As the Supreme Court has noted,

“[d]issimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the 

generation of common answers.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (2011). In this case, the 

dissimilarities make it unlikely that there will be common answers. For example, 

affirmative defenses applicable to employees in one office are likely to be entirely distinct 

from those applicable to employees in another office—or even from those applicable to 

other employees in the same office. These types of differences are likely to impede the 

resolution of otherwise-common issues. 

Even if the Court could find commonality, it could not find predominance. “[I]t is 

not enough simply that common questions of law or fact exist; predominance is a 

comparative concept that calls for measuring the relative balance of common issues to 

individual ones.” Marlo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 476, 483 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 

Here issues specific to each office would predominate over the class-wide (and companywide) questions. Predominance is therefore not satisfied. 

c. Typicality

CP contends that even if commonality were satisfied, Towle is uniquely ill-suited 

to be the class representative. The Court agrees. “The purpose of the typicality 

requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the 

 

2 The Court also declines to find commonality on the basis that failure to pay rest 

premiums violates California’s Unfair Competition Law. As CP points out, the case 

Plaintiff relies on for that proposition, Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. App. 4th 

1138 (2015), involved a specific theory of unfair competition—restitution for the lost 

market value of their jobs compared to jobs with other, premium-paying employers—not 

advanced here. 

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interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Where a Plaintiff’s “unique background and factual situation require him to prepare to 

meet defenses that are not typical of the defenses which may be raised against other 

members of the proposed class,” certification should be denied. Id. Towle worked for CP 

as a field technician. In this capacity, he functioned mostly autonomously and outside the 

office, taking breaks when appropriate. Towle’s claims would bear little resemblance to, 

for example, the claims of an administrative assistant in the Sacramento office, whose 

work schedule and breaks might be more regimented and dictated by her office’s 

management. The Court therefore finds Towle’s claims atypical of the class.

None of this is to pick on Towle or to cast doubt on his individual claims. Typicality 

in this case is tied closely to commonality. While Towle is especially ill-suited to be class 

representative, it would be difficult, given the wide variety of practices at each of CP’s 

branches, to find any representative whose claims are typical of the entire class. But this 

is further reason the class should not be certified.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Towle’s motion for class certification. Dkt. 

38. Having resolved that threshold issue, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach other 

questions, such as whether to approve the class trial plan or whether current counsel 

should be appointed as lead class counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 5, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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