Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY COSBY,

NO. CIV. S-08-505 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

AUTOZONE, INC., JIM KULBACKI

and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

This case arises under California’s Fair Employment and

Housing Act, and was removed to the district court based on

diversity jurisdiction. Following a trial in which the jury

awarded Plaintiff Randy Cosby $1,500,000, Defendant AutoZone 

appealed the jury award to the Ninth Circuit, which instructed the

district court to order remittitur of the damage award with the

option of a new trial on damages. Plaintiff did not accept the

damages award as remitted and opted for a new trial on damages. 

Now before the court is Defendant’s motion for reconsideration

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of this court’s order regarding the new trial on damages, Def’s

Mot., ECF No. 179, which Plaintiff opposes, Pl’s Opp’n, ECF No.

181. For the reasons provided below, the court grants Defendant’s

motion for reconsideration. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2008, Plaintiff Randy Cosby brought this diversity

action against Defendant Autozone, Inc., under California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act. Not. Removal, ECF No. 1. After a jury

trial in which AutoZone was found liable for failure to both

provide reasonable accommodation and engage in the interactive

process, Mr. Cosby was awarded $174,000 for lost wages and

benefits; awarded $1,326,000 for past mental suffering; and denied

punitive damages. See Jury Verdicts, ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83. 

After trial, AutoZone filed a motion for a new trial or

remittitur, which this court denied. Def’s Mot., ECF No. 97; Min.

Order, ECF No. 106. AutoZone appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which

reversed this court’s decision and remanded the case, instructing

this court to order remittitur with the option of a new trial on

damages. Ninth Cir. Order, ECF No. 149. The Ninth Circuit

specifically made the following determinations:

The jury awarded Mr. Cosby $1,326,000 in noneconomic damages, and the evidence in this case

simply cannot support this amount. Even by Mr.

Cosby’s own description, he testified that, after

his medical leave, he came back to AutoZone without

any restrictions and that his supervisor, Jim

Kulbacki, made supportive comments. Mr. Cosby

described himself as being only slightly upset at

being forced to take medical leave. It is also not

clear how the sexual harassment investigation was

caused by, or how the course of its proceedings was

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affected by, AutoZone’s failure to accommodate or

to engage in the interactive process. Indeed, Mr.

Cosby’s name was cleared in the investigation. 

Even if the jury found that AutoZone’s failure

reasonably to accommodate contributed to his later

termination, the evidence is insufficient to

support the non-economic award. Mr. Cosby

testified extensively regarding mental suffering on

the day of his termination. After his termination,

however, Mr. Cosby eventually found satisfactory

employment, and there is no evidence of any

enduring mental suffering. Accordingly, we remand

the issue of both economic and non-economic damages

to the district court for remittitur with the

option of a new trial on damages. . . . In the

event Mr. Cosby refuses remittitur, a new trial

will go only to the issue of damages. The issues

of liability and damages are distinct, and there is

no evidence in the record–-and neither party

contends-- that any passion or prejudice affected

the jury’s verdict on liability.

Id., at 4-5 (emphasis added). 

On January 10, 2012, this court remitted the economic damage

award for Plaintiff from $174,000 to $4,917.60. Order, ECF No.

172, at 8. The court remitted the non-economic damage award for

Plaintiff from $1,326,000 to $250,000. Id. Additionally, the

court denied Plaintiff’s request for additur to the punitive damage

award. Id.

Plaintiff requested clarification of the court’s January 10,

2012 order, and asked the following questions: (1) “If Plaintiff

elects a new trial rather than remittitur, must Plaintiff present

evidence that his termination was caused by Defendant’s failure to

accommodate?”; and (2) “Can Plaintiff accept remittitur of the noneconomic damages and elect a new trial on punitive damages only?”. 

Pl’s Req., ECF No. 173, at 1-2. 

In response, the court issued an order providing that, as to

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Plaintiff’s first question, “because the Ninth Circuit specifically

provided that a new trial would go only to the issue of damages,

upon electing a new trial, Plaintiff will not be required to

present evidence that his termination was caused by Defendant’s

failure to accommodate.” Order, ECF No. 174, at 2. As to

Plaintiff’s second question, the court determined that “Plaintiff

may either accept the remitted damages award as a whole, including

economic, non-economic, and punitive damage awards as remitted in

the January 10, 2012 order, or Plaintiff may elect a new trial on

the issue of damages as a whole, including economic, non-economic,

and punitive damage awards.” Id. at 2-3. The court further

provided that “Plaintiff may not accept remittitur of the noneconomic damages and elect a new trial on punitive damages only.” 

Id. at 3 (emphasis included). On January 31, 2012, Plaintiff

responded to the court’s order by rejecting the damages award as

remitted and filing a request for a new trial on damages. Pl’s

Req., ECF No. 175. 

On February 7, 2012, Defendant filed a notice of appeal to the

Ninth Circuit, for interlocutory review of the portion of this

court’s January 10, 2012 order specifically providing that any new

trial would include punitive damages in addition to compensatory

damages. Def’s Not., ECF No. 176. Defendant specifically argued

that, in the instant case:

[T]he District Court has acted outside of its

jurisdiction in that (1) no party ever moved for a

new trial on punitive damages; (2) the District

Court’s ordering of a new trial on punitive damages

on its own initiative is outside the time period

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permitted by Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 59(d) for such an

action; and (3) as no party challenged the size of

the original punitive damage award in the earlier

Ninth Circuit proceeding (USCA No. 10-16189) and

the Ninth Circuit in ruling on the compensatory

damages award nowhere addressed, or had cause to

address, the punitive damage award, the District

Court’s order of a new trial as to punitive damages

is outside the letter and/or spirit of the Ninth

Circuit’s mandate. 

Id. at 2. 

A. Arguments of the Parties

On February 10, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for

reconsideration, which is presently before the court. Def’s Mot.,

ECF No. 179. Defendant specifically contests the court’s

determination “that Plaintiff will not be required to present

evidence that his termination was caused by AutoZone’s failure to

accommodate.” Id. at 2. Defendant argues that “regardless of

whether liability is no longer in dispute, causation certainly is,”

and that “[n]othing in the Ninth Circuit’s decision suggests

anything to the contrary.” Id. at 5. Defendant further asserts

that “[a] new trial on damages must inherently include causation

of any such damages because a jury cannot be expected to properly

evaluate the extent of Plaintiff’s damages without evaluating

whether those damages were in fact caused by AutoZone’s failure to

accommodate/interact.” Id. Defendant continues by stating that

the court’s January 25, 2012 order improperly “holds as a matter

of law that whatever emotional distress damages Plaintiff suffered

as a result of his termination were in fact caused by AutoZone’s

failure to accommodate/interact.” Id. at 6. 

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As an additional matter, Defendant asserts that, in spite of

the Defendant’s pending interlocutory appeal, the instant motion

for reconsideration is procedurally proper because “the causation

of damages issue is separate from, and collateral to, [the]

punitive damages issue,” and because, “if AutoZone’s motion for

reconsideration is granted and resolved in AutoZone’s favor, it

could change Plaintiff’s decision to opt for a new trial, and

thereby render the appeal on the punitive damages issue moot.” Id.

at 3. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and

argues, inter alia, that: (1) “AutoZone’s Brief re: Remittitur or

New Trial on Damages raised the same arguments asserted in

Auto[Z]one’s Motion for Reconsideration” and AutoZone presents “no

new argument” in its motion for reconsideration; (2) “no new trial

can proceed until the punitive damages appeal is resolved” by the

Ninth Circuit; (3) AutoZone’s present argument “ignores the jury’s

verdicts finding that AutoZone engaged in unlawful conduct that

caused damages to Cosby”; and (4) “AutoZone did not request that

there be a separate question on the jury forms whether the failure

to accommodate/interact caused the termination.” Pl’s Opp’n, ECF

No. 181, at 2-4. 

II. STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides: “On motion and

just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding” in the case of mistake or excusable

neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a judgment that is void,

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satisfaction of the judgment, or for “(6) any other reason that

justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). This catch-all provision

of Rule 60(b)(6) “vests power in courts adequate to enable them to

vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish

justice.” Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615, 69 S.Ct.

384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949). Rule 60(b) “attempts to strike a proper

balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be

brought to an end and that justice should be done.” Delay v.

Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 11 Wright &

Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 2851 (2d ed. 1995)). 

Nonetheless, in order to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the

movant must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances.” Liljeberg

v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S.Ct.

2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (quoting Ackermann v. United States,

340 U.S. 193, 199, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950)). 

In addition, Local Rule 230(j) applies to motions for

reconsideration filed in the Eastern District. That rule requires

the movant to brief the court on, inter alia, “what new or

different facts or circumstances . . . were not shown upon such

prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion; and . .

. why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the

prior motion.” L.R. 230(j)(3)-(4). 

III. ANALYSIS

In Defendant’s brief regarding remittitur or a new trial on

damages, Defendants raised similar arguments to those presented

here. Specifically, Defendant argued that “the Ninth Circuit,

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implicitly, but also clearly, found the requisite causal connection

lacking between Cosby’s failure to accommodate/interact claims and

any damages arising from his subsequent termination from

employment”. Def’s Mot., ECF No. 169, at 6-7. 

This court rejected Defendant’s argument. Order, ECF No. 172,

at 6. The court reasoned:

[T]he Ninth Circuit provided, “Even if the jury

found that AutoZone’s failure reasonably to

accommodate contributed to his later termination,

the evidence is insufficient to support the noneconomic award.” The conditional structure of this

sentence necessarily considers, as opposed to

invalidates, any causal link the jury drew between

AutoZone’s failure to accommodate and Mr. Cosby’s

subsequent termination. The court therefore

considers it proper to take into account Mr.

Cosby’s testimony as to his emotional state

following his termination in the remittitur on noneconomic damages.

Id. (internal citations omitted). However, upon reconsideration

of the court’s January 25, 2012 order, ECF No. 174, the court here

determines that even though the Ninth Circuit affirmatively

considered a causal link between the jury’s finding that AutoZone

failed to accommodate and Plaintiff’s subsequent termination, that

consideration does not take the place of an explicit finding that

the damages Plaintiff suffered due to his termination were, at

least in part, caused by Defendant’s failure to accommodate. 

Moreover, although the jury verdict form explicitly provides

that the jury found that “AutoZone’s failure to participate in a

good-faith interactive process [was] a substantial factor in

causing harm to Randy Cosby,” see Verdict, ECF No. 83, at 2, the

verdict form does not address the precise question of the causal

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connection between Defendant’s failure to accommodate and the harm

Mr. Cosby suffered as a result of his termination. Plaintiff

correctly notes that “AutoZone did not request that there be a

separate question on the jury forms whether the failure to

accommodate/interact caused the termination,” and therefore,

Defendant’s contestations after trial serve to prolong this

litigation. However, in the interests of justice, the court cannot

here substitute its assumption that the jury based its non-economic

damages award on its finding of Defendant’s liability for an

explicit finding thereon. For these reasons, the court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 179. Upon electing

a new trial, Plaintiff will now be required to present evidence

that his termination was caused, at least in part, by Defendant’s

failure to accommodate and/or engage in the interactive process.

The court, however, reaffirms that taking into account Mr.

Cosby’s testimony as to his emotional state following his

termination in remitting the non-economic damage award was proper. 

The findings in the court’s January 10, 2012 order regarding the

remittitur of Plaintiff’s damage awards therefore remain. 

Plaintiff is, however, granted twenty-one (21) days from the

issuance of this order to inform the court in writing whether he:

(1) consents to the remitted damages award, given the court’s

clarification that, upon electing a new trial, he must present

evidence that his termination was caused by Defendant’s failure to

accommodate; (2) seeks a new trial; or (3) plans to appeal the

remittitur. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court orders as follows:

[1] Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, ECF No.

179, is GRANTED. 

[2] The court’s prior order, ECF No. 174, is VACATED

only insofar as it relates to Plaintiff’s required

offers of proof upon electing a new trial. 

[3] Plaintiff’s request for a new trial, ECF No. 175,

is VACATED. 

[4] Plaintiff SHALL, within twenty-one (21) days from

the issuance of this order to inform the court in

writing whether he: (1) consents to the remitted

damages award, given the court’s clarification

that, upon electing a new trial, he will have to

present evidence that his termination was caused by

Defendant’s failure to accommodate; (2) seeks a new

trial; or (3) plans to appeal the remittitur.

[5] A status conference is SET for June 18, 2012, at

3:00 P.M. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2012.

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