Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00899/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00899-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN C. MARTINEZ, CASE NO. CV F 09-0899 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND SEVER

vs. (Docs. 15, 17.)

DERRAL G. ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) defendant officials seek to

dismiss plaintiff inmate Steven C. Martinez’ (“Mr. Martinez’”) inadequate medical care and related

claims as insufficiently plead and barred by res judicata and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

CDCR defendant corrections officers and nurses seek to sever Mr. Martinez’ claims against them in that

the claims arise out of isolated events. This Court considered defendants’ F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss and motion to sever claims on the record and VACATES the March 11, 2010 hearing,

pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES Mr. Martinez’

claims against the CDCR defendant officials and SEVERS in part Mr. Martinez’ claims against the

CDCR defendant corrections officers and nurses.

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BACKGROUND1

The Parties

Since 2003, Mr. Martinez has been incarcerated at California State Prison – Corcoran (“CSPC”).

Mr. Martinez is a quadriplegic and insulin dependent diabetic and is “dependent on Defendants for all

aspects of living except breathing.”

Defendant Derral G. Adams (“Warden Adams”) is the CSPC warden. Defendant William J.

McGuinness, M.D. (“CMO McGuinness”), is the CSPC chief medical officer.

Defendants Frances Garza (“Nurse Garza”), Emily Vargas (“Nurse Vargas”), Catherine Nacar

(“Nurse Nacar”), Michael Van Natta (“Nurse Van Natta”), and Mike Smith (“Nurse Smith”) are CSPC

nurses, provided care to Mr. Martinez, and will be referred to collectively as the “nurse defendants.”

Defendants Cornelio Garcia (“Officer Garcia”) and Paul Sena (“Officer Sena”) are correctional

officers at the CSPC Acute Care Hospital.2

Individualized And General Allegations

The complaint alleges generally that Mr. Martinez is a victim of defendants’ “abuse,”

“negligence,” and “retaliation.” The complaint’s allegations against the individual and unidentified

defendants are summarized as follows.

Corrections Officer Defendants

On January 17, 2007 and February 11, 2007, Officers Garcia and Sena, respectively, “refused

to unlock the door to Plaintiff’s room at the urgent request of nursing staff and at a time when Plaintiff

needed urgent nursing care.” Officers Garcia and Sena “denied medical staff access to Plaintiff to

retaliate against Plaintiff and to unlawfully punish him.”

Non-defendant Officer Bradley“regularly” punishes Mr. Martinez “by turning his hospital room

light on at night to deprive him of sleep, and by repeatedly slamming the door to the room.”

Unidentified “[d]efendant correctional officers slam the door to Plaintiff’s room causing shock

The factual recitation is derived generally from Mr. Martinez’ Complaint for Damages for Willful

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Violations of Civil Rights and for Pendent State Claims (“complaint”).

Warden Adams, CMO McGuinness, Nurses Garza, Vargas, Nacar, Van Natta and Smith, and Officers

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Garcia and Sena will be referred to collectively as “defendants.”

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and distress,” “turn on Plaintiff’s bright room lights at night in order to disturb Plaintiff’s sleep,” and

“verbally abuse Plaintiff to further his torment.”

Nurse Defendants

Nurse Garza on an unspecified date “threatened Plaintiff with retaliation by her husband, who

is a correctional officer, for filing complaints” and “violated Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right

to confidential communications with this attorneyby reading mail between Plaintiff and his attorneyand

other protected documents.”

On November 4, 2007, Nurse Nacar “abused and battered Plaintiff when she simulated letting

him fall, and then catching him.” On an unspecified date, Nurse Nacar, during catheterization, “broke

the sterile field but continued to use the contaminated equipment” and jerked “the catheter from

Plaintiff’s uretha.”

On November 7, 2007, Nurse Vargas “assaulted Mr. Martinez by making a death threat against

him” in “retaliation for Plaintiff asserting his rights.” Nurse Vargas further retaliated by filing “charges

against Plaintiff which resulted in a disciplinary hearing.”

On November 17, 2007, Nurse Smith “pushed Plaintiff back into his chair by pushing on the

front of his throat” to retaliate against Mr. Martinez “for his complaint over Smith twisting Plaintiff’s

head during an attempt to reposition him.”

On November 21, 2007, Nurse Van Natta intentionally left Mr. Martinez “in a position on his

back known to Van Natta to be painful to Plaintiff and to cause him difficulty breathing” to retaliate

against Mr. Martinez “for complaints about the care he was receiving.”

On unspecified dates, non-defendant Nurse Brewer “denied Plaintiff access to medical care to

address episodes of autonomic dysreflexia, removed his call button from him, refused to provide blood

sugar checks, or to catheterize him.”

An unidentified nurse on unspecified dates twice “put a pillow case over Plaintiff’s head during

treatment to punish him.”

Defendant CSPC Officials

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness:

1. Failed to train properly Officers Garcia and Sena “to prioritize patient health care” and

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“to protect patient health and safety”;

2. Were “personally aware of the allegations” in the complaint and “implemented a policy

that deprives Plaintiff of his constitutional rights”;

3. Received numerous written reports (no less than 25 for Warden Adams) “of medical

neglect and abuse” by staff;

4. Made “misleading and false statements claiming that no neglect and abuse was taking

place”;

5. “[I]mplemented a policy to cover up medical neglect and abuse thereby ratifying that

conduct”; 

6. “[I]mplemented a policy of turning a blind eye to constitutional deprivations thereby

allowing them to occur”; and

7. Engaged in “deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety” to repudiate Mr.

Martinez’ constitutional rights. 

Retaliation And Other Wrongs

Unidentified defendants:

1. “[R]etaliate against Plaintiff for filing complaints in violation of his rights as a patient

and his right to free speech.” “Some complaints are not processed by staff as a way to

retaliate against Plaintiff”;

2. “[D]eny Plaintiff the use of adaptive equipment, medical care, treatment, and

rehabilitation”;

3. “[M]ade false allegations about Plaintiff’s medical condition, personal history, and

character”;

4. “[P]laced Plaintiff in dangerous positions and left him alone unprotected and at risk of

harm to his health and safety”;

5. “[R]efused to provide the bowel and bladder program” and “forced Mr. Martinez to

eliminate in his bed instead of a toilet”;

6. Deprived Mr. Martinez of a tilt table; and

7. “[F]orced Plaintiff to sit on a Hoyer-lift strap which creates risk of skin breakdown”

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Legal Claims

The complaint alleges statutory and common law claims comprising:

1. A (first) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") claim that all defendants violated Mr.

Martinez’ Eighth Amendment “rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in

the form of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ personal health and safety”

and “medical needs”;

2. A (second) claim of abuse of dependent adult under California Welfare & Institutions

Code, §§ 15600, et seq., that all defendants failed to exercise reasonable care “by failing

to protect Plaintiff from health and safety hazards”;

3. A (third) medical negligence claim against unidentified “Defendant Health Care

Providers” that they “did not use reasonable care toward Plaintiff in providing

procedures, policies,facilities,supplies, and qualified personnel reasonablynecessaryfor

the treatment of Plaintiff” ;

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4. A (fouth) retaliation claim that all defendants retaliated against Mr. Martinez “to

discourage or prevent Plaintiff from taking part in the lawful exercise of his rights . . .

to be free from unlawful punishment and to free speech, and the loss of benefits

otherwise due him”;

5. A (fifth) intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that all defendants “acted with

reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiff would suffer emotional distress”;

6. A (sixth) assault claim against Nurse Vargas that she “intended to cause or place Plaintiff

in apprehension of a harmful or an offensive contact with Plaintiff’s person”; and

7. A (seventh) battery claim against Nurses Garza, Nacar, Smith and Van Natta that they

“acted in a manner that constituted a harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiff’s

person.”

The complaint seeks damages for Mr. Martinez’ “physical damage to his body and emotional

pain” and medical expenses, punitive damages and attorney fees. 

This Court construes the medical negligence claim as against CMO McGuinness and Nurses Garza, Vargas,

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Nacar, Van Natta and Smith.

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WARDEN ADAMS AND CMO McGUINNESS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness seek to dismiss the claims against them based on res

judicata, insufficiently plead factual allegations, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court

th

need not permit an attempt to amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an

amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

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some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness’

challenges to the complaint.

Res Judicata

Defendants invoke the res judicata doctrine to bar Mr. Martinez’ section 1983 claims against

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness. Defendants point out that in Martinez v. State of California,

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et al., Case No. CV F 07-0996 AWI DLB (“prior action”), Mr. Martinez pursued in this Court by a first

amended complaint (“prior action FAC”) claims against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinnessfor civil

rights violations under section 1983, Americans with Disabilities Act violations, abuse of dependent

adult under California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 15600, et seq., and medical negligence. 

The prior action FAC alleges that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness ignored negligence and abuse

of nurses and correctional officers, including those named as defendants in this action, and

“implemented or ratified policies that allowed the deprivations” or “turned a blind eye to the

deprivations thereby allowing them to occur.” The prior action FAC accused Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness of deliberate indifference in “failure to adequately supervise and train” employees.

Defendants in the prior action pursued a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss section 1983

claims against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness. This Court dismissed the prior action’s section

1983 claim against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness in the absence of sufficient facts that they

“personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself

is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” (Internal

citations omitted.) This Court further found that Warden Adams is not a health care provider under

California Government Code section 844.6

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry,

449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980). “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any

claims that were raised or could have been raised’ in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d

953, 956 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9 Cir. th th

2001) (emphasis in original)). 

Res judicata serves “the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an

identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing

needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979). Res

judicata “relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources,

and, bypreventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s]reliance on adjudication.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 94,

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101 S.Ct. 411. 

Res judicata applies when there is: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits;

and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (quoting Owens, 244 F.3d at 713).

Defendants correctly note the identity of the parties in this action and the prior action. As to

identity of claims, defendants point out that Mr. Martinez’ section 1983 claims against Warden Adams

and CMO McGuinness “were raised or could have been raised in the prior action” and that this action’s

claims “are a subset of the claims that Plaintiff asserted” in the prior action. 

Defendants argue that F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of the prior action’s section 1983 claim

against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness “was a final adjudication on the merits.” Defendants

point to F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) which provides that unless a dismissal order provides otherwise, dismissal

under F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.”

“The dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a

‘judgment on the merits.’” Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399, n. 3, 101 S.Ct.

2424 (1981).

Mr. Martinez offers no meaningful challenge that hissection 1983 claims against Warden Adams

and CMO McGuinness are barred by res judicata. In his opposition papers, Mr. Martinez merely “seeks

to dismiss the civil rights claims against Adams and McGuinness without prejudice to amending the

complaint pending discovery.” This Court construes Mr. Martinez lack of meaningful opposition on the

res judicata defense as concession that his section 1983 claims against Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness are barred. Mr. Martinez’ attempt to reserve “civil rights claims” is unavailing given the

res judicata effects of the prior action to subject to dismissal section 1983 claims against Warden Adams

and CMO McGuinness.

Section 1983 – Civil Rights Violation

Defendants challenge the absence of factual allegations to sustain section 1983 claims against

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness. Defendants note Mr. Martinez’ “unwillingness or inability to

acknowledge” F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standards given the complaint’s “conclusoryassertions of culpability

are unsupported by allegations of fact.” Defendants fault the (first) section 1983 claim’s failure to allege

facts that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness “personally participated” in alleged deprivation.

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Direct Participation

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). th

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807,

811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). 

Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes address liability “in favor of persons who are deprived

of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.

247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996

(1976)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of

a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689

(1979). Stated differently, the first step in a section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional

right allegedly infringed. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. at 811. “Section 1983 imposes liability

for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of

tort law.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;

thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct.

th

1822 (1997); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir. 1989) (“Liability under section 1983 arises th

only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”) “The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Section

1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the defendant’s actions and the

deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.

2018 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976). 

A plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable “because of his membership in a group without a

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showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9 Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff must “establish the th

‘integral participation’ of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935. 

“‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9 Cir. 2004). Integral th

participation requires “some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the

violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481, n. 12 (9 Cir. 2007). “A person th

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he

is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9 Cir. 1998). A section 1983 plaintiff “must state the allegations generally so as to provide notice to th

the defendants and alert the court as to what conduct violated clearly established law.” Preschooler II

v. Clark County School Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9 Cir. 2007). th

The complaint alleges that based on receipt of written reports, Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness were “personally aware of” neglect and abuse experienced by Mr. Martinez and

“implemented a policy that deprives Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” The complaint accuses

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness of making “misleading and false statements claiming that no

neglect and abuse was taking place” to “cover up medical neglect and abuse thereby ratifying that

conduct.” The complaint asserts that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness “implemented a policy of

turning a blind eye to constitutional deprivations thereby allowing them to occur” and engaged in

“deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety” to repudiate Mr. Martinez’ constitutional rights. 

The complaint further alleges that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness failed to train properly

Officers Sena and Garcia. 

Defendants identify as mere insufficient facts for section 1983 claims that Warden Adams and

CMO McGuinness “received some reports that made them aware of Plaintiff’s allegations of staff

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misconduct.” Defendants characterize remaining allegations as to Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness as “mere legal conclusions or threadbare recitations of elements.”

The complaint fails to allege facts of Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness direct participation

in alleged neglect or abuse of Mr. Martinez. As to “participation,” the complaint alleges no more than

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness’ inaction. The complaint fails to articulate a “policy” which

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness implemented to depriveMr. Martinez’ constitutional rights. The

complaint identifies no misleading or false statements attributable to Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness. The complaint fails to allege facts of Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness’ respective

individual participation in unlawful conduct to warrant dismissal of section 1983 claims against them.

First Amendment Retaliation

Defendants fault the (fourth) retaliation claim’s absence of facts of Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness’ “adverse action” to respond to Mr. Martinez’ exercise of a protected right. Defendants

reiterate the absence of facts that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness “participated in the alleged

deprivation.”

“Deliberate retaliation by state actors against an individual's exercise of this right [to access to

a tribunal] is actionable under section 1983.” Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314

(9 Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has enumerated elements for First Amendment th

retaliation in the “prison context”: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9 Cir. 2005). A “plaintiff th

alleging retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights must initially show that the

protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's decision.” Soranno's

Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1314.

The retaliation claim alleges that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff through coercion,

threats of punishment and bodily harm, actual punishment, denial of rights or privileges, denial of

medical and nursing care, and other activities intended to discourage or prevent Plaintiff from taking part

in the lawful exercise of his rights or benefitting therefrom.” The claim further alleges that the

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“retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals” and that Mr. Martinez “suffered a

chilling effect on the free exercise of his rights to be free from unlawful punishment and to free speech,

and the loss of benefits otherwise due him.” 

Defendants fault the retaliation claim’s “conclusory allegations” and lack of “factual support.” 

Defendants criticize the claim’s failure to identify:

1. Mr. Martinez’ conduct to motivate adverse action by Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness;

2. Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness’ “coercive actions,” “threats of punishment and

bodily harm,” and “actual punishment inflicted” on Mr. Martinez;

3. Rights, privileges, medical or nursing care denied by Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness; and

4. When Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness took adverse actions.

Mr. Martinez criticizes defendants’ narrow focus on the retaliation claim’s allegations without

reference to the preliminary and general allegations. Mr. Martinez points to allegations that Warden

Adams and CMO McGuinness have duties “to supervise the administration of health care for inmates”

and “to ensure that Mr. Martinez’ rights are guaranteed.” Mr. Martinez further notes allegations that

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness “knew of Mr. Martinez’ ongoing complaints of abuse, neglect

and deliberate indifference,” covered up wrongdoing, and “turned a blind eye to Mr. Martinez’

suffering.” Mr. Martinez claims that the complaint alleges that retaliation denied him free speech and

rights “to be free from unlawful punishment” and “to proper medical and nursing care.”

Much like his complaint,Mr.Martinez engagesin generalities and platitudes. Defendants validly

criticize the retaliation claim. The complaint chiefly articulates that Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness received reports of neglect and abuse and took no action. The retaliation claim merely

presents conclusions and threadbare recitations of elements of retaliation. The complaint lacks facts in

the areas identified by defendants. In the absence of facts to support elements of First Amendment

retaliation, the retaliation claims fails as to Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness to warrant its

dismissal against them. Mr. Martinez fails to articulate potential to cure deficiencies in the retaliation

claim against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness to further support dismissal of the claim against

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them.

Dependent Adult Abuse

Defendants argue that the second claim of dependent adult abuse under California Welfare and

Institutions Code sections 15600, et seq., fails as to CMO McGuinness in that such claim “cannot be

brought against healthcare providers.” Defendants also challenge insufficient allegations against Warden

Adams. 

California Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.2 provides: “Notwithstanding this article,

any cause of action for injury or damage against a health care provider, as defined in Section 340.5 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the health care provider's alleged professional negligence, shall

be governed by those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action.” 

The “Legislature apparently concluded that the high standard imposed by [Welfare and Institutions

Code] section 15657 – clear and convincing evidence of (i) liability and (ii) recklessness, malice,

oppression or fraud – adequately protects health care providers from liability under the statute for acts

of simple or even gross negligence.” Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 771, 785, 86

P.3d 290 (2004).

To obtain the remedies under California Welfare and InstitutionsCode section 15657, “a plaintiff

must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something more than

negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. The latter three

categories involve ‘intentional,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘conscious’ wrongdoing of a ‘despicable’ or ‘injurious’

nature.” Delaney v. Baker, 20 Cal.4th 23, 31, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610 (2004). “‘Recklessness’ refers to a

subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as a ‘deliberate

disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur.” Delaney, 20 Cal.4th at 31, 82

Cal.Rptr.2d 610 (citations omitted). “Recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than

‘inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions’ but rather rises to the level

of a ‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved

in it.’” Delaney, 20 Cal.4th at 31-32, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610 (citations omitted).

The dependent adult abuse claim merelyreferences absence of reasonable care. The claim points

to no specific misconduct of CMO McGuinness, a medical professional. Mr. Martinez offers nothing

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to support the claim as to Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness to warrant its dismissal as to them. 

Mr. Martinez merely suggests that “[i]f Defendants did what Plaintiff alleges they did, then he is entitled

to the relief requested.” Such platitude offers nothing to defend the claim. Mr. Martinez points to

nothing to salvage the claim, even with an attempt to amend. The complaint lacks facts of conduct of

sufficient degree to invoke dependent adult abuse remedies to warrant dismissal of the claim as to

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness.

Medical Negligence

Defendants fault the (third) medical negligence claim’s absence of facts to support elements of

medical negligence. 

“The courts require only that physicians and surgeons exercise in diagnosis and treatment that

reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the

medical profession under similar circumstances.” Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780, 788, 91

Cal.Rptr. 760 (1970). 

The medical negligence claim merely alleges that “Defendant health care providers did not use

reasonable care toward Plaintiff in providing procedures, policies, facilities, supplies, and qualified

personnel.” Defendants are correct that the complaint lacks allegations that CMO McGuinness’

diagnoses or treatment fell below the standard of care. Mr. Martinez offers nothing to suggest that even

an attempt to amend would salvage the claim. The complaint fails to raise facts to hint that CMO

McGuinness fell below the standard of care to warrant the claim’s dismissal as to him.

Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress

Defendants further challenge the (fifth) intentional infliction of emotional distress claim’s failure

to allege facts to support elements of the claim.

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)

defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant’s intention to cause, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (4) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious (outrageous) conduct and the emotional

distress. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 300, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 110

(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644 (1989);Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

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Cal.3d 148, 155, n. 7, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 (1987). The “[c]onduct to be outrageous must be so extreme 4

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of

Westminister, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 (1982) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24

Cal.3d 579, 593, 156 Cal.Rptr.198 (1979)). Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it is of a nature

which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to

mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, pettyoppressions, or other trivialities. Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 857 (1989).

To support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the conduct must be more than

“intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a

plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903, 2

Cal.Rptr.2d 79 (1991). The California Supreme Court has further explained: 

“The lawlimits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct

toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.” . . . The only exception to this rule

is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless disregard, of the

plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress

to that plaintiff. . . . Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff's interests is the theory of

recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the time the outrageous conduct occurs is

recognized as the element establishing a higher degree of culpability which, in turn,

justifies recovery of greater damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than allowed on a

negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. . . .

Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at 905-906, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 (citations omitted.)

“Whether a defendant's conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law

that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to

determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534,

61 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 (2007). There is no bright line standard for judging outrageous conduct, and a 

case-by-case appraisal of conduct is required. Cochran, 65 Cal.App.4th at 494, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 540.

The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim merely alleges that “Defendants acted with

reckless disregard of the probabilitythat Plaintiff would suffer emotional distress.” To defend the claim,

Other California courts have identified the elements as “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the

4

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff

suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the

defendant's outrageous conduct.” Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 (1998) (citing

KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 (1995)).

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Mr. Martinez offers inconsequential emotional pleas that “[u]nlawful punishment in violation of the

guarantees in the Eighth Amendment is outrageous behavior” and “[d]enying a dependent adult a safe

environment with appropriate care . . . is outrageous behavior.” Defendants are correct that the claim’s

elements are unsupported by allegations that Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness failed to train

properly Officers Garcia and Sena and failed to act in response to reports of neglect and abuse. Mr.

Martinez offers nothing to suggest resuscitation of the claim by an attempt to amend. The claim lacks

facts to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress elements as to Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness to warrant the claim’s dismissal as to them.

Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that the federal and state claims against Warden Adams and CMO

McGuinness are subject to dismissal due to Mr. Martinez’ failure to “seek a Director’s level decision

on any claim against Adams or McGuinness that he is asserting in this action.” Defendants point to Mr.

Martinez’ failure “to present or identify a single grievance he submitted concerning his claims against

Adams or McGuinness.”

The “failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies” is “a matter of abatement, which is subject to an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9 Cir. 2003), cert. denied,

th

540 U.S. 810, 124 S.Ct. 50 (2003). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. 

“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper

remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner

must exhaust nonjudicial remedies: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “Congress's

imposition of an obviously broader exhaustion requirement makes it highly implausible that it meant

to give prisoners a strong inducement to skip the administrative process simply by limiting prayers for

reliefto money damages not offered through administrative grievance mechanisms.” Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 732, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001).

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Following Booth, the U.S. Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93, 126 S.Ct.

2378 (2006), explained that exhaustion must be “proper”:

The PLRA strengthened this exhaustion provision in several ways. Exhaustion

is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory. See Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Prisoners must

now exhaust all “available” remedies, not just those that meet federal standards. Indeed,

as we held in Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even where

the reliefsought – monetary damages – cannot be granted by the administrative process.

Id., at 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819. Finally, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is

required for any suit challenging prison conditions, not just for suits under § 1983.

Nussle, supra, at 524, 122 S.Ct. 983.

A “grievant must use all steps the prison holds out, enabling the prison to reach the merits of the

issue.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9 Cir. 2009). th

California prisoners have a right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, action,

condition or policyperceived bythose individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). An inmate must submit an appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision

appealed. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c).

“[T]o exhaust administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through

several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal

form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, [and] (4) third level appeal to the

director of the California Department of Corrections.” Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235, 1237, 1238

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (“Because Plaintiff has attempted to appeal the prison officials' inaction with regard

to his treatment to every level of the prison grievance system, it does not appear (and the moving party

has not attempted to show) that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies within the

prison system.”).

Under California law, the “exhaustion of administrative remedies” rule “is that where an

administrative remedyis provided bystatute, reliefmust be sought from the administrative body and this

remedy exhausted before the courts will act.” Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 17

Cal.2d 280, 292, 109 P.2d 942 (1941). “If an administrative remedy is provided by statute, a litigant

must ordinarily show that he has invoked and exhausted the remedy before resorting to the judicial

process.” Myers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 172 Cal.App.3d 1059, 1064, 218 Cal.Rptr. 630 (1985). 

“Exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” Myers,

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172 Cal.App.3d at 1064, 218 Cal.Rptr. 630.

“The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted ‘applies to grievances lodged by

prisoners.’” In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925, 160 Cal.Rptr. 118 (1978). “Under state law, inmates are

required to exhaust administrative remedies, even when seeking money damages unavailable in the

administrative process.” Wright v. State, 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 666, 668, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 92 (2004) (the

PLRA exhaustion requirement “parallels the exhaustion requirement under state law”).

Defendants note that the California and PLRA exhaustion requirements serve “similar interests”

and that under comity principles, this Court should apply California exhaustion requirements. 

Defendants point out that Mr. Martinez has failed to pursue subject grievances “through the third level

of CDCR’s administrative process” and to exhaust administrative remedies prior to the May 21, 2009

filing of this action. Defendants note that Mr. Martinez has submitted 33 appeals through the CDCR 

system, none of which assert that Warden Adams or CMO McGuinness made false and misleading

statements when they “knew that reports of the neglect and abuse were true” and “implemented a policy

to cover up medical neglect and abuse thereby ratifying that conduct.” Defendants attribute none of Mr.

Martinez’ appeals to “describe or imply misconduct of any kind” by Warden Adams or CMO

McGuinness.

Mr. Martinez attributes defendants to seek dismissal in that “neither‘Adams’ nor ‘McGuinness’

appears in any administrative claims.” Mr. Martinez appears to argue that defendants attempt to hold

Mr. Martinez to an unjustified level of specificity to satisfy exhaustion requirements. Mr. Martinez

points to Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120, where the Ninth Circuit explained that “a prison’s own grievance

process, not the PLRA, determines how detailed a grievance must be to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion

requirement.”

In Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120, the Ninth Circuit addressed “the standard of factual specificity

required when a prison’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail.” The Ninth

Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s standard in Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7 Cir. 2002), that th

“when a prison’s grievance procedures are silent or incomplete as to factual specificity, ‘a grievance

suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Griffin, 557 F.3d

at 1120 (quoting Strong, 297 F.3d at 650)).

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Mr. Martinez attempts to twist lack of specificity to defend failure to exhaust all necessary

grievance levels. Defendants do not raise issues of lack of specificity of Mr. Martinez’ grievances. 

Defendants challenge his failure to exhaust the four levels of appeal. Mr. Martinez’ points regarding

screening of his grievances may warrant consideration if his complaint alleged sufficient claims against

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness. In the absence of sufficiently plead claims against Warden

Adams and CMO McGuinness, failure to exhaust further supports dismissal of the claims against

Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness. 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEVER CLAIMS

Defendants furtherseek to sever the claims against them in that they “do not arise from the same

series of transactions and occurrences, and do not share common questions of law or fact.” Defendants

note that the complaint lumps “separate instances of alleged inadequate medical care, harassment, or

abuse” arising from separate incidents in causes of action alleging claims “against many Defendants.”

Defendants point to the separate incidents, as alleged in the complaint, involving Officers Garcia and

Sena and the nurse defendants. Given Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness’ dismissals, this Court

need address severance as to only Officers Garcia and Sena and the nurse defendants. 

Permissive Joinder

F.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) addresses permissive joinder of defendants and providesthat defendants may

be joined if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

F.R.Civ.P. 20 “is designed to promote judicial economy, and reduce inconvenience, delay, and

added expense.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9 Cir. 1997). “If the test for permissive th

joinder is not satisfied, a court, in its discretion, may sever the misjoined parties, so long as no

substantial right will be prejudiced by the severance.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350. A district court’s

order granting severance under F.R.Civ.P. 20 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coughlin, 130 F.3d

at 1351.

F.R.Civ.P. 20(a) “imposes two specific requirements for the permissive joinder of parties: (1)

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a right to relief must be asserted by, or against, each plaintiff or defendant relating to or arising out of

the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) some question of law

or fact common to all parties must arise in the action.” Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North

America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9 Cir. 1980). In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7 Cir. 2007), th th

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained improper joinder in the prisoner context:

Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1

should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits . . .

F.R.Civ.P. 21 empowers a court “on just terms” to “drop a party” or “sever any claim against a

party.” “As long as there is a discrete and separate claim, the district court may exercise its discretion

and sever it.” Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016 (7 Cir. 2000). th

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 20(a) in that the claims against

the nine defendants “do not arise out of the same transactions or occurrences” and do not “share common

questions of law or fact.” As such, defendants conclude that Mr. Martinez should pursue claims against

one defendant in this action, and “file a new separate action for each other Defendant.”

In response, Mr. Martinez identifies as a “unitary problem” the need “to affect changes in

Plaintiff’s medical care and conditions of confinement through injunctive relief and those changes

motivated by the payment of damages.”

Same Transaction Or Occurrence

Defendants contend that Mr. Martinez’ claims do not arise from the same transaction or

occurrence to warrant severance. Defendants note that plaintiffs’ claims arise “at different times, by

different actions, and from different circumstances.” Defendants argue that a plaintiff is unable to

demonstrate the same transaction or occurrence “by merely asserting claims under the same right to

relief or by alleging that the claims have a common characteristic.” See Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027,

1031-1032 (4 Cir. 1983) (“Considering the record as a whole, it is apparent that each appellant's claim th

stands on its own.”); see Harris v. Spellman, 150 F.R.D. 130, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (prisoners’ claims did

not stem from “the same transaction or occurrence” in that they “were punished in separate hearings for

entirely different incidents of purported misconduct”).

To distinguish the claims against them, defendants note that:

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1. They held different position with different duties;

2. Officers Garcia and Sena dispensed no medical care; and

3. The alleged incidents arose at differing times over months with no connecting facts.

Mr. Martinez responds that all defendants “are responsible for perpetuating a policyto unlawfully

harm and punish Mr. Martinez through his medical care.”

The complaint alleges series of events regarding Mr. Martinez’ confinement, access to medical

care, and medical care provided. The gist of the allegations as to Officers Garcia and Sena is that they

denied Mr. Martinez’ access to medical care and tormented him. The gist of the allegations against the

nurse defendants is that they negligently cared for Mr. Martinez or retaliated against him because he

complained. A clear distinction arises in the claims against Officers Garcia and Sena, on one hand, the

nurse defendants, on the other hand, to demonstrate that the collective claims against them do not arise

out the same transaction or occurrence. 

Common Questions Of Law Or Fact

Defendant argue that the complaint lacks common questions of law or fact as to claims against 

defendants. Defendants note that common causes of action against them is insufficient to constitute

common legal or factual questions. See Wynn v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067,

1081 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“While it is true that Plaintiffs have alleged claims against Defendants based on

the same general theory of law, this is not a sufficient ground to find that their claims raise common legal

or factual questions.”). Defendants further note that whether the nurse defendants were negligent on

separate occasions “is not a question in common with whether another nurse was negligent.” Smith v.

North Am. Rockwell Corp. Tulsa Div., 50 F.R.D. 515, 522 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (“even a cursory

examination of the potential factual and legal issues here presented reveals that again there is no

common ground among these plaintiffs”).

Mr. Martinez attempts to invoke common questions of law or fact arising from defendants’ joint

and several liability. Mr. Martinez cites no authority to impose joint and several liability for his alleged

claims, especially given that the complaint alleges separate, distinct incidents and actions of Officers

Garcia and Sena and the nurse defendants. Common questions of law or fact fail to support a joinder

of Officers Garcia and Sena and the nurse defendants.

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Other Factors

Defendants claim jury confusion and prejudice to defendants from joint trial of all claims against

the respective defendants. Mr. Martinez responds that “[w]ithout consolidating all of the issues, a jury

will be denied a meaningful understanding of Mr. Martinez’s [sic] story.”

“Although the specific requirements of Rule 20, discussed above, may be satisfied, a trial court

must also examine the other relevant factors in a case in order to determine whether the permissive

joinder of a party will comport with the principles of fundamental fairness. For example, when making

a decision whether to allow the permissive joinder of a party, a court should consider such factors as the

possible prejudice that may result to any of the parties in the litigation . . .” Desert Empire Bank, 623

F.2d at 1375; see Wynn, 234 F.Supp.2d at 1078 (even if F.R.Civ.P. 20(a) requirements are satisfied,

“there is no requirement that the parties must be joined” in that F.R.Civ.P. 20(a) is “permissive in

character” and “joinder in situations falling within the rule's standard is not required”).

Defendants point out that even with proper joinder, a court is empowered to sever and order

separate trials “to prevent delay, prejudice, or unnecessary delay.” See F.R.Civ.P. 42(b) (“For

convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of

one or more separate issues, claims . . .”) “Under Rule 20(b), the district court may sever trials in order

to avoid prejudice.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9 Cir. 2000) (district court th

properly severed claims in light of “legal confusion” and “likelihood of prejudice and confusion

outweighed the gains from judicial economy”).

Defendants argue that potential confusion and prejudice to defendants offset potential benefits

of a joint trial to warrant severance of Mr. Martinez’ claims against defendants. Defendants point out

that a single trial would present the jury with the “hopeless task of trying to discern who did and said

what to whom and for what reason.” Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 501 F.Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 

Defendants note that a joint trial would prejudice defendants in that each defendant “will be tainted by

the presentation of evidence regarding the alleged misdeeds of another, unfairly resulting in guilt by

association.” Wynn, 234 F.Supp.2d at 1089. Defendants further argue that a single trial’s judicial

economy “is far outweighed” by potential jury confusion and prejudice to defendants, especially given

that severance will not deprive Mr. Martinez of a substantial right.

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Defendants raise valid points. Nonetheless, Mr. Martinez suggests that he will attempt to prove

that the nurse defendants colluded to deprive him medical care or to retaliate against him. Overlap

appears with the claims against the nurse defendants, who are better suited to defend such collusion

claim jointly. Moreover, a joinder of the nurse defendants promotes economy of resources, especially

if Mr. Martinez’ claims are disposed of by summary judgment. As such, severance of claims against

Officers Sena and Garcia, on one hand, and the nurse defendants, on the other hand, is in order.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with prejudice the (first) section 1983, (second) dependent adult abuse,

(fourth) retaliation claim and (fifth) intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

against Warden Adams and CMO McGuinness;

2. DISMISSES with prejudice the (third) medical malpractice claim against CMO

McGuinness;

3. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants Derral G. Adams and

William J. McGuinness and against plaintiff Steven C. Martinez;

4. SEVERS and DISMISSES without prejudice claims against defendants Cornelio Garcia

and Paul Sena from this action; 

5. ORDERS Mr. Martinez, no later than March 22, 2010, to file a separate action against

defendants Cornelio Garcia and Paul Sena, if he continues to desire to pursue claims

against them; 

6. ORDERS the parties to proceed in this action with only Mr. Martinez’ claims against

nurse defendants Frances Garza, EmilyVargas, Catherine Nacar, Michael Van Natta, and

Mike Smith; and

7. ORDERS nurse defendants Frances Garza, EmilyVargas, Catherine Nacar, Michael Van

Natta, and Mike Smith, no later than March 22, 2010, to file and serve a response to Mr.

Martinez’ complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

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66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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