Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02284/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02284-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shane Avington, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02284-PHX-DLR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Shane Avington has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions and sentences in two different cases in 

Maricopa County Superior Court, CR 2005-121081-001-SE (the Connolly case) and CR 

2005-034814-001-SE (the Dunbar case). (Doc. 1.) The Petition raises five grounds for 

relief. (Doc. 1.) In their answer, Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed 

as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which 

provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas 

corpus relief. (Doc. 15.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus 

review of most of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. Petitioner has filed a reply 

in support of his Petition. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition 

untimely, recommends that the Petition be dismissed, and does not consider 

Respondents’ alternative arguments. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. CR 2005-121081-001-SE (the Connolly case) 

 On July 22, 2005, a Maricopa County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging 

Petitioner, in relevant part, with aggravated assault against Lottie Connolly, a class four 

felony, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204.1

 (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 3.) The State 

subsequently alleged that Petitioner had six historical felony convictions, and that he 

committed the charged offense while on release from an offense he committed in the 

State of Washington. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Items 14, 16.) After Petitioner failed to appear at 

two pretrial conferences, the trial court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. A, Items 28, 31; Doc. 15, Ex. B, Items 19, 20, 35, 37.) On November 2, 2005, 

Petitioner was arrested in Seattle, Washington. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 33 at 6.) 

 On March 2, 2006, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion for change of 

counsel and appointed the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office to represent him in 

both the Connolly and the Dunbar cases. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 56; Doc. 15, Ex. B, Item 

46; Ex. D, Item 21.) On March 24, 2006, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion to 

proceed pro se and appointed Deputy Public Defender William Peterson to serve as 

advisory counsel in both cases. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 50; Ex.B, Item 49.) On April 10, 

2006, Petitioner rescinded his pro se status and asked the court to appoint Peterson as trial 

counsel in the Connolly case only. (Doc. 15, Ex. B, Item 77; Doc. 15, Ex. J, TR 4/10/06 

at 44-51.) 

 1. Evidence Presented at the Connolly Trial 

 On May 8, 2005, Petitioner lived at 1855 East Don Carlos, Tempe, Arizona, in 

apartment number 217, with Lottie Connolly and her three minor children. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. L; TR 4/12/06 at 51, 70-71, 76, 87-89, 98-100.) At the time of the incident giving 

rise to Petitioner’s challenged conviction, Jesse Bramley lived next door to Petitioner and 

John Dunbar lived in apartment below Petitioner’s apartment. (Id. at 40-41, 51, 54-55, 

 

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 The aggravated assault charge was originally Count Three of a six-count 

indictment. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 3.) The State dismissed the five other counts without 

prejudice. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 74; Ex. B, Item 76; Ex. BB, TR 6/15/06 at 5.) 

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57, 64, 70, 91-92.) The day of the incident, Dunbar and Bramley overheard Petitioner 

and Connolly fighting, starting around 7:00 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. (Id. at 40-44, 51-54.) At 

approximately 11:00 a.m., Dunbar noticed that the arguing was louder. (Id. at 54.) 

Dunbar later heard the door to Petitioner’s apartment slam, heard Petitioner descend the 

stairs, and saw Petitioner walk past his living room window. (Id. at 54.) Dunbar also 

heard Connolly yell at Petitioner through an open window. (Id. at 54-56.) 

 Dunbar observed Petitioner turned around, run past Dunbar’s window, climb the 

stairs, and forcefully enter his apartment. (Id. at 55-57, 62.) Both Dunbar and Bramley 

then overheard a loud banging noise, followed by the sounds of Connolly screaming. (Id.

at 43-45, 55.) Dunbar then observed Petitioner run down the stairs past his living room 

window, and saw him jump over the wall surrounding the apartment complex. (Id. at 57-

58, 63.) Dunbar and Bramley testified that the only adult voices that they had heard 

during this confrontation belonged to Petitioner and Connolly. (Id. at 41-43, 59.) 

 In response to a 911 call, Tempe Police Officers Natasha Hampton and John 

Rogers responded to the apartment complex at approximately 12:45 p.m. (Id. at 57, 69-

70, 86-87.) The officers discovered a trail of blood leading from the parking lot to the 

front door of Petitioner’s and Connolly’s apartment. (Id. at 70, 84-85, 90-92.) When she 

entered the apartment, Detective Hampton followed the blood and the sound of crying to 

the master bedroom, where she found Connolly. (Id. at 71-72, 87-89, 92-95.) Hampton 

took photographs of Connolly’s injuries. (Doc. 15, Ex. L, TR 4/12/06 at 72-75, 81, 129-

32; (State’s Trial Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6-8, 10.) Petitioner did not return home while the police 

were at his apartment. (Doc. 15, Ex. L, TR 4/12/06 at 45-46, 58, 63-64, 69-71, 81, 87-

88.) Connolly was taken to the hospital emergency room. (Id. at 81, 126.) Connolly told 

a physician assistant, Alejandro Figueroa, that “she was punched and kicked in the face, 

chest, and head.” (Id. at 126-28.) 

 2. Jury Verdict and Sentence 

 On April 13, 2006, the jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated assault as 

charged. (Doc. 15, Ex. M, TR 4/13/06 at 41-47.) After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

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court found that Petitioner had three historical felony convictions and also found two 

aggravating circumstances. (Doc. 15, Ex. B, Items 101, 107; Ex. BB, TR 6/15/06 at 8-9.) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of fifteen-years’ imprisonment. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. B, Item 107; Doc. 15, Ex. BB, TR 6/15/06 at 39-49.) 

 3. Direct Review 

 On July 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 83.) On May 16, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed an 

opening brief that presented the following arguments: (1) whether “the trial court err[ed] 

by using the fact of physical injury as an aggravating factor when it was also an element 

of the crime, resulting in an illegal sentence and a violation of due process[]”; (2) whether 

fundamental error occurred because there was insufficient evidence to support 

Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated assault; (3) whether Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 

right to confrontation was violated when Connolly did not testify, but the trial court 

permitted the admission of her statement “made to a physician’s assistant in the presence 

of a police officer”; and (4) whether the trial court erred by considering [Petitioner’s] 

Washington conviction for theft in the second degree a prior conviction for purposes of 

sentencing enhancement. (Doc. 15, Ex. O at 6-7.) On December 20, 2007, the appellate 

court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 15, Ex. R.) 

 On January 22, 2008, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 15, Ex. S.) On June 3, 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review. (Doc. 15, Ex. T.) Petitioner did not seek further review. 

B. CR 2005-034814-001 SE (the Dunbar case) 

 On November 15, 2005, the State charged Petitioner with aggravated assault 

against John Dunbar, a class four felony (the Dunbar case). (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 1.) 

The State later alleged that Petitioner committed the offense while released on bail in the 

Connolly case, and that Petitioner had several prior felony convictions from Washington 

State. (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Items 7, 8.) The State also alleged several aggravating 

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circumstances, including the infliction of serious physical injury, the presence of an 

accomplice, and emotional and financial harm to the victim. (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 10.) 

 On February 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for change of counsel, in which he 

requested “any other attorney.” (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 17.) As previously noted, on 

March 2, 2006, the trial court granted this motion and appointed the Maricopa County 

Public Defender’s Office to represent Petitioner in both the Connolly and the Dunbar 

cases. (Doc. 15, Ex. D, Item 21.) On March 24, 2006, the trial court granted Petitioner’s 

motion to proceed pro se and appointed Deputy Public Defender William Peterson to 

serve as advisory counsel in both cases. (Doc. 15, Ex. D, Item 23; Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 

50.) Although Peterson represented Petitioner at trial in the Connolly case, Petitioner 

acted as his own attorney during the rest of the proceedings in the Dunbar case. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. D, Items 24, 26, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 48, 54, 62, 67, 74, 77, 81.) 

 1. Evidence Presented at the Dunbar Trial

 The evidence at trial indicated that, at the time of the incident, Petitioner lived 

with Connolly and her three children in apartment 217 at an apartment complex in 

Tempe, Arizona. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 56-58, 72, 109-10, 118, 121, 123-24, 

127-28; Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 29-30, 36, 41, 61, 98-99.) At that time, Dunbar and his 

wife, Sheri Oclassen, lived in the apartment below Petitioner’s apartment. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. V, TR. 5/3/06 at 58, 123-24; Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 36, 41, 61.) Jesse Bramley and 

hiswife lived next door to Petitioner. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 56-58, 72, 80.) 

 Bramley testified that he had a few conversations with Petitioner and that he saw 

him “often,” such as when Petitioner was “either going up to [his] apartment, going down 

to his vehicle, walking around the grounds of the apartments, [or] talking in the back.” 

(Doc. 15, Ex. V at 72-74, 106.) Oclassen was never formally introduced to Petitioner, 

but she saw him “many times” as he was “coming and going” on the complex’s common 

grounds. (Id. at 127; Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 29.) Oclassen knew that Petitioner 

and Connolly lived in an apartment upstairs, she heard other people call Petitioner 

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“Shane,” and recognized Petitioner as Connolly’s boyfriend. (Exhibit V, TR 5/3/06 at 

127-28; Exh. W, TR 5/4/06 at 29-30.) 

 Dunbar testified that he frequently saw Petitioner in the public areas of the 

apartment complex and had several conversations with him before the incident. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 61-62, 74-75, 83-84.) Dunbar also saw Petitioner with Connolly 

inside apartment 217 because he went upstairs “many times” to complain about the noise 

they made when they were fighting. (Id. at 76-77.) 

 At approximately 9:30 p.m. the night of the alleged incident, Connolly went 

downstairs to the electric power box mounted near Dunbar’s and Oclassen’s apartment 

and repeatedly struck the box and lock with a hammer. (Id. at 36-40, 78-80, 112; 

Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 56-57, 124-25; Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 66, 75-76.) Bramley 

heard “a loud banging noise outside [his] second bedroom window.” (Doc. 15, Ex. V, 

TR 5/3/06 at 56, 86.) Dunbar and his wife heard loud thuds and noticed that their lights 

flickered after each banging noise. (Id. at 124; Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 36-38, 78.) 

 Dunbar went outside and saw Connolly hitting the electrical power box with a 

hammer. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 40-41.) Dunbar yelled at Connolly. (Id. at 42, 

79.) Connolly turned around, cursed at Dunbar, and swung the hammer at him. (Id. at 

42, 80; Ex. V, TR 5/3/06, at 56-57.) Bramley went outside on the balcony of his 

apartment and saw Connolly emerging from the bushes near the power box, yelling at 

Dunbar, and swinging her arms at Dunbar, who was retreating and trying to block 

Connolly from hitting him. (Id. at 57-59.) 

 As he backed away from Connolly, Dunbar noticed Petitioner approaching from 

his left side. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 43-44, 80.) Petitioner hit Dunbar on the left 

side of his head behind the ear. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 59; Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 

45, 83.) Petitioner then “rained punches down” on Dunbar’s head with his right fist, 

which made Dunbar start “blacking out.” (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 60; Ex. W, TR 

5/4/06 at 45-46.) 

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 While standing on the upstairs balcony, Bramley watched as Petitioner “punched 

[Dunbar] in the head, and took two steps back, and then punched him again, and then 

again, and then again,” approximately five or six times total. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 

at 59-60, 110.) After punching Dunbar repeatedly in the head, Petitioner put Dunbar in a 

headlock and hit him in the head. (Id. at 60-61; Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 46-48.) At the time 

of the incident, Petitioner was wearing a white tank-top shirt and Dunbar saw tattoos on 

his arms. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 46, 94; Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 74.) Bramley saw 

Petitioner drag Dunbar into the covered parking area between two cars, pin Dunbar to the 

pavement, and hit him in the head five or six more times. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 

60-62.) Dunbar became unconscious for a few seconds. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 

49-50.) 

 Bramley testified that Petitioner kicked Dunbar in the left temple and then started 

walking away. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 62.) When he was “about five paces 

away,” Petitioner “turned around, came back and stomped on Dunbar’s head with his 

heel four times.” (Id. at 62-63.) Bramley testified that Petitioner “came back over and he 

stood by Dunbar’s head, raised his knee up probably as high as he could probably get it. 

I’d say he got his . . . knee up about mid-waist and proceeded to bring . . . the bottom of 

his foot down, the bottom of his foot down forcibly with all his force . . . on [Dunbar’s] 

head.” (Id. at 64-66.) Then, about four times, Petitioner walked about six feet away and 

come back and stomped on Dunbar’s head several times on each return visit. (Id.) Then, 

Petitioner walked away again, returned, and kicked Dunbar in the face “like [he was] 

planning to kick a football, you know, punt a field goal, kick a soccer ball far.” (Id.) 

Bramley testified that all of Petitioner’s kicks landed on Dunbar’s head, and that the only 

other person nearby was Connolly, who “egg[ed] [Petitioner] on.” (Id. at 66.) 

 Dunbar testified that Petitioner’s repeated kicks to his head brought him back to 

consciousness. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 50-51.) Dunbar described Petitioner’s 

kicking as “a mixture of trying to kick a field goal . . . with the leg swinging back and 

down and stomps down” to his head. (Id. at 52.) Dunbar testified that he lapsed in and 

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out of consciousness, but remembered Petitioner kicking him in the head several times 

during a short interval. (Id. at 53-55.) 

 During the incident Bramley yelled at Petitioner to stop. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, 

TR 5/3/06, at 66-67, 111.) Oclassen heard Petitioner and Bramley shouting at each other 

and went to a lit area outside her apartment’s front door. She saw Dunbar “lying on the 

parking lot floor, curled up in the fetal position on his left side,” and Petitioner standing 

behind Dunbar “near his head.” (Id. at 125-26.) Oclassen then saw Petitioner “jump up 

and come down on one foot with the other foot impacting on Dunbar’s head.” (Id. at 

126.) Oclassen was standing “eight to ten feet” away when Petitioner “lifted [his body] 

anywhere from a foot to a foot and a half off the ground” and then stomped on Dunbar’s 

head with his right foot. (Id. at 129.) 

 After the last kick, Petitioner fled the parking lot, ran by Oclassen, and jumped the 

apartment complex’s fence. (Id. at 67, 115, 126, 130; Ex.W, TR 5/4/06 at 16, 55-56.) 

Oclassen was certain that Petitioner was the person she saw hitting Dunbar because the 

incident took place a few feet away from her in an illuminated area, and the corridor 

down which Petitioner ran past her was illuminated. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 129; 

Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 22, 30.) 

 When Dunbar saw Petitioner run down the corridor towards Oclassen, he shouted 

for her to go inside. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 55-56.) Oclassen called the police. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 111-12, 119, 130-31.) After waiting a few minutes to 

make sure that Petitioner had not returned, Bramley went downstairs to the parking lot. 

(Id. at 67, 80, 82, 103, 111.) Bramley found Dunbar on the pavement, badly beaten, but 

trying to stand. (Id. at 67, 113-14, 119-20.) Bramley noticed blood and a pair of broken 

eyeglasses that Petitioner had been wearing. (Id. at 68-71, 113-14.) 

 By the time the police arrived, Dunbar had returned to his apartment. (Id. at 114, 

121, 130-31; Ex. W, R.T. 5/4/06 at 56-57.) Bramley took the police officers to 

Connolly’s and Petitioner’s apartment. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06, at 116, 118, 121.) 

Connolly did not open the door. (Id. at 118, 121.) 

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 Bramley testified that he was “100-percent certain” that Petitioner was the person 

whom he saw hitting Dunbar in the parking lot. (Id. at 83.) Bramley explained that 

“[Petitioner’s] hair, [his] height, [his] facial features [were] all visible by the streetlights 

that were down there . . . coming from the covered parking, the light post that was right 

near you guys during the incident.” (Id. at 103-04.) Bramley explained that this lighting 

gave him “a clear view of [Petitioner’s] facial features, [his] build, and [his] voice when 

[Petitioner] called up to him.” (Id. at 104.) Tempe Police Officer Rainey, who viewed 

the crime scene that night, corroborated Bramley’s assertions that the location of the 

incident was illuminated, and that the lighting was “sufficient that someone could 

positively identify [another] person there.” (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06, at 116.) 

 During an interview with Officer Benker the night of the incident, Bramley 

identified Dunbar’s assailant as “Connolly’s boyfriend,” but he could not identify 

Petitioner by name because he could not recall it because he was “shaken from the 

witnessing of something this brutal.” (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06, at 76-78, 80, 82, 106-

09.) Bramley told police Petitioner was Connolly’s boyfriend, he lived in the next door 

apartment with Connolly, he was a dark skinned African-American man, and at the time 

of the incident, Petitioner was wearing a white tank-top shirt, blue shorts, and white 

tennis shoes. (Id. at 107; Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 74, 77-79.) 

 When Officer Benker entered Dunbar’s apartment, he found him on the living 

room couch badly beaten. He was bleeding from the head and lapsing in and out of 

consciousness. (Doc. 15, Exh. X, TR 5/8/06 at 68.) The severity of Dunbar’s injuries 

prevented Benker from questioning him extensively. (Id. at 69, 77.) At trial, the State 

offered in evidence several photographs depicting Dunbar’s injuries that were taken when 

he was at the hospital. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 132-37.) 

 Dunbar told Officer Benker that when he went outside his apartment to investigate 

the flickering of his apartment’s interior lights, he saw Connolly hitting the power box. 

Connolly tried to hit him, and “a large black male” intervened and punched Dunbar in the 

head repeatedly. (Doc. 15, Ex. X, TR 5/8/06, at 70-71.) On cross-examination, Dunbar 

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explained that he did not tell Officer Benker Petitioner’s name because he was in a lot of 

pain, and he only knew Petitioner’s first name from overhearing other people calling him 

Shane. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 131; Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 60, 85-86.) Dunbar later 

identified Petitioner as his assailant from a photographic lineup that Detective Adams 

showed him. Dunbar told Detective Adams, “I knew him by Shane,” and that Petitioner 

lived upstairs with his girlfriend. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 86-87.) At trial, Dunbar 

identified Petitioner as his assailant. (Id. at 43-45.) 

 On the night of the incident, Oclassen did not identify Petitioner to the police by 

his name. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 141.) Oclassen explained that she did not 

mention Petitioner’s name to the police at that time because she was concerned about 

Dunbar’s injuries, the police did not ask her to give Petitioner’s name, and she had never 

been introduced to Petitioner. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 141-42.) Later, when police 

showed Oclassen a photographic lineup containing Petitioner’s picture, Oclassen selected 

Petitioner’s picture. (Doc. 15, Ex. V, TR 5/3/06 at 142.) At trial, Oclassen identified 

Petitioner as Dunbar’s attacker. (Id. at 126-27, 129-30, 137; Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 

at 22, 30.) 

 Tempe Police Officers Rainey and Benker testified that they saw Connolly in the 

parking lot shortly after they arrived on the scene. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 98-100, 

104, 110; Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 62-65.) Connolly claimed that Dunbar had assaulted her, 

showed the officers marks on her back and elbow, and alleged that she had sustained 

these injuries during the altercation that ensued when Dunbar interrupted her efforts to 

open the locked power box with a hammer. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 104-05, 114; 

Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 66.) 

 During her discussion with police, Connolly initially refused to identity Dunbar’s 

assailant. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 115.) Connolly eventually told the officers that 

her “boyfriend” had beaten Dunbar. (Id. at 113-15.) Connolly told the officers that her 

boyfriend was “a Hispanic male” named “Tony.” (Id. at 105-06, 110, 113-15.) Connolly 

refused to tell the officers “Tony’s” last name, address, or where he was hiding. (Id. at 

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106, 110, 114.) Before leaving her apartment, the officers told Connolly that they needed 

to talk with her boyfriend, but they never heard from “Tony” before Petitioner’s trial. 

(Id. at 113.) 

 During trial, Petitioner offered Connolly’s out-of-court statements identifying 

Dunbar’s assailant as her Hispanic boyfriend, “Tony.” (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 

105-06, 113-15.) Petitioner also presented the testimony of his friend and alleged 

fiancée, Gina Boone. (Doc. 15, Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 16-17, 27-28.) Boone testified that 

Petitioner arrived at her residence in Firebaugh, California, on September 1, 2005, and 

that he stayed with her until mid-October 2005. (Id. at 17-18, 21, 23, 25, 47-49.) Boone 

testified that she had not seen Petitioner for five years before he arrived, but they resumed 

a romantic relationship and got engaged on September 15, 2005, the day of the charged 

assault. (Id. at 17-18, 21, 28-29.) Boone testified that she and Petitioner stayed at her 

house for most of their time together, and that Petitioner did not take an overnight trip to 

Arizona. (Id. at 21, 20.) Boone testified that Petitioner never had any tattoos on his neck 

or arms. (Id. at 45-46.) 

 On cross-examination, Boone testified that Petitioner proposed to her after 

spending less than two weeks with her and following an absence of more than five years. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 25, 28-30.) Boone admitted that she was not wearing an 

engagement ring in the courtroom, but claimed that she had “forgotten” it at her kitchen 

sink. (Id. at 29.) Boone did not have any receipts for expenditures she made during 

Petitioner’s alleged stay in California. (Id. at 36-37.) Boone admitted that she did not 

call the police before trial to tell them that Petitioner had been with her on the date of the 

incident. (Id. at 37-38.) She also admitted that she had a conviction for misdemeanor 

theft. (Id. at 39.) 

 2. Verdict and Sentence 

 Following a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Doc. 15, Ex. Z, TR 

5/10/06, at 14-15.) After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Petitioner had three 

historical felony convictions and two aggravating factors. The court imposed an 

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aggravated prison term of fifteen-years’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to Petitioner’s 

sentence in the Connolly case.2

 (Doc. 15, Ex. AA, TR 5/19/06 at 4-21; Ex. BB, TR 

6/15/06 at 11-12, 39-50.) 

 3. Direct Review 

 On July 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in the Dunbar case. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 83.) On July 11, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed an opening brief 

raising the following issues: (1) whether “the trial court erred by using the fact of 

physical injury as an aggravating factor when it was also an element of the crime, 

resulting in an illegal sentence and a violation of due process”; (2) whether the court 

abused its discretion by allowing “the state to introduce a photo showing [Petitioner’s] 

tattoos without establishing that the photo showed the presence of the tattoos at the time 

of the crime”; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s request to instruct 

the jury that “the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner] was the 

person who committed the crime”; (4) whether “the trial court improperly considered 

[Petitioner’s] Washington conviction for Theft in the Second Degree as a prior felony 

conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement”; and (5) whether the trial court erred 

by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury “on the alibi defense.” (Doc. 15, Ex. CC at 9-

10.) 

 On March 20, 2008, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 15, Ex. FF.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. The Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on June 9, 2008. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. C, Item 116.) 

C. First Consolidated Post-Conviction Proceeding 

On June 27, 2008, in the Dunbar case, Petitioner submitted a notice of postconviction relief, pursuant to Rule 32 of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, to prison 

officials for mailing. (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 117.) The notice was filed with the trial court 

 

2

 The trial court consolidated the sentencing proceedings for the Connolly and Dunbar cases. (Doc. 15, Ex. Z, TR 5/10/2006; Doc. 15, Ex. BB, TR 6/15/2006.) 

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on June 30, 2008. (Id.) On July 7, 2008, the trial court appointed Kenneth Countryman 

to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 15, Ex. D, Item 118.) 

 On July 11, 2008, Petitioner submitted a Rule 32 notice of post-conviction relief in 

the Connolly case to prison officials for mailing, which the state court filed on July 14, 

2008. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 123.) The trial court initially appointed the Maricopa 

County Public Defender’s Office to represent Petitioner in the Connolly case. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. A, Item 143.) However, the case was reassigned to Countryman on August 28, 2008. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. B, Items 142, 144.) 

 On January 6, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a consolidated petition for 

post-conviction relief raising four claims. In his first claim, Petitioner asserted that the 

State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the prosecutor: (a) did not 

inform Petitioner before the trial in the Connolly case that Connolly had recanted her 

statements to the physician assistant that Petitioner was her assailant; (b) falsely reported 

that Connolly did not want to be interviewed by the defense; and (c) did not disclose that 

Connolly would have testified in support of Petitioner’s alibi and misidentification 

defenses in the Dunbar case. 

 In his second claim, Petitioner asserted that the prosecutor engaged in 

prosecutorial misconduct by failing “to disclose [Connolly’s] recanted testimony and 

facts on both cases,” pursuant to Rules 15.1(b) and (c)(2) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, and by threatening to prosecute Connolly if she appeared at 

Petitioner’s two trials and testified that he did not commit either charged assault. In his 

third claim, Petitioner asserted that the trial judge was biased against Petitioner, as 

evidenced by the imposition of consecutive aggravated prison sentences, a “clear 

personality” conflict, and “numerous [unspecified] run ins” during “the course of two 

trials.” 

 In his fourth claim, Petitioner asserted that trial counsel in the Connolly case was 

ineffective because: (a) he “did not request an interview of Lottie Connolly” before trial, 

(b) he “failed to conduct any investigation into the whereabouts of Ms. Connolly or 

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determine that she had recanted her testimony regarding the incident” before trial, (c) he 

“did not investigate the second incident involving Jonathan Dunbar and determine that 

Ms. Connolly supported [Petitioner’s] alibi[;] and (d) he “failed to do any investigation or 

motion work to preclude the introduction of statements by physician assistant Figueroa.” 

(Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 150 at 7-13 and attachments; Ex. C, Item 124 at 7-13 and 

attachments.) 

 Petitioner attached several exhibits to his petition, including: (1) Connolly’s 

affidavit, which was notarized and sworn on March 23, 2009; (2) assorted court 

documents indicating that Dunbar obtained an order of protection against Connolly in 

September 2005; (3) copies of several letters that the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office 

and the Arizona Attorney General had sent Connolly regarding her rights as a crime 

victim; and (4) a copy of a degree Petitioner earned while in prison. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, 

Item 150, Attachments; Ex. C, Item 124, Attachments.) 

 In its response, the State argued that the court should deny post-conviction relief 

because: (1) the prosecutorial-misconduct and Brady claims were precluded by Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner failed to raise these claims at 

trial or on direct appeal; (2) alternatively, the prosecutorial-misconduct and Brady claims 

lacked merit; (3) Petitioner’s claim of judicial bias or disproportionate sentence lacked 

merit; and (4) Petitioner’s claims that counsel was ineffective in the Connolly case lacked 

merit. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 156; Ex. C, Item 132, at 6-23.) 

 In his reply, Petitioner argued that his prosecutorial misconduct claim was not 

precluded, and that the information that Connolly provided in her affidavit constituted 

new evidence that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 140.) 

 On November 1, 2010, the trial court issued an order stating that: 

On January 6, 2010, Defendant filed a Consolidated Petition for PostConviction Relief; on March 15, 2010, the State filed a response addressing Defendant’s contentions; and on May 19, 2010, Defendant filed a Reply. This Court has reviewed Defendant’s Petition, the State’s Response, and Defendant’s Reply, and finds the State’s arguments well taken. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, dismissing the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, and dismissing the post-conviction relief proceedings in Cause Number CR 2005-034814 and 

Cause Number CR 2005-121081. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. B, Item 164; Ex. D, Item 142.) 

 On January 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals arguing that he was “entitled to post-conviction relief because (1) he did not 

receive . . . effective assistance of counsel; (2) there was prosecutorial misconduct; 

(3) [there were] violations of Brady v. Maryland; and (4) [he] received a disproportionate 

sentence based upon the personal bias of the trial judge.” (Doc. 15, Ex. GG at 1.) On 

December 4, 2012, the appellate court summarily denied review. (Doc. 15, Ex. KK.) 

 Proceeding pro se, Petitioner timely petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for 

review of the denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL, Ex. MM.) On April 29, 

2013, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Doc. 15, Ex. OO.) 

 On July 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court. (Doc. 15, Ex. QQ.) On October 15, 2013, the Supreme Court 

denied the petition. (Exhibit QQ.) 

D. Second Consolidated Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On May 23, 2014, Petitioner, through counsel, filed petitions for post-conviction 

relief in the Connolly and Dunbar cases.3

 (Doc. 15, Exs. RR, SS.) The petitions were 

nearly identical and sought re-sentencing based upon the newly discovered evidence of 

 

3

 The record does not contain any evidence of Petitioner filing notices of post- conviction relief before filing the petitions. See Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that in Arizona, a state post-conviction proceeding is commenced when the petitioner files the notice in accordance with Rule 32.4(a)). In 

its July 18, 2014 order denying post-conviction relief, the trial court stated that the petitions were filed on May 23, 2014 and “are both untimely and successive” under Rule 

32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 15, Ex. TT at 2); See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a) (providing the deadlines for filing a notice of post-conviction relief). The Court has reviewed the docket in CR2005-034814 and CR2005-121081. There is no 

evidence that Petitioner filed notices of post-conviction relief in accordance with Rule 

32.4(a) before filing his petitions. 

Based on the state court’s July 18, 2014 order, the Court finds that the second 

post-conviction proceeding was commenced on May 23, 2014 when he filed his petitions. 

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Petitioner’s recent diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). (Id.) Petitioner 

requested to consolidate the post-conviction proceedings. (Id.) 

 On July 14, 2014, the trial court consolidated the post-conviction petitions, and 

denied relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. TT.) The trial court explained that: 

Now on May 23, 2014, Defendant has filed his second Petition for PostConviction Relief, and has filed [a] Motion to Consolidate Rule 32 

Petitions. Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), that 

there are newly discovered material facts that probably would have changed the verdict or the sentence in his case. This Court concludes that these 

petitions are both untimely and successive. 

To be entitled to post-conviction relief on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show the following: (1) the evidence appears on its face to have existed at the time of trial, but was discovered after trial, (2) the 

defendant shows diligence in discovering the evidence and bringing it to the trial court’s attention, (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence must be relevant to the case, and (5) the 

evidence must be such that it probably would have altered the verdict, 

finding, or sentence if known at the time of the trial . . . . Under this 

standard, Defendant fails to support this claim. Defendant states that he has 

been diagnosed with PTSD, but fails to provide any facts, affidavits, records, or other evidence to support why these facts could not have been produced at the trial phase through reasonable diligence. 

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting substantive grounds that bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order for the 

Court to grant relief . . . . Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief 

can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED dismissing Defendant’s Petition for Post- Conviction Relief. 

(Id. at 2.) 

 On July 28, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. UU.) On October 24, 2014, the trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 15, 

Exhibit VV.) 

 On November 14, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals challenging the denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 15, Exs. WW, 

XX.) Upon review of the Arizona Court of Appeals docket in 1 CA-CR 14-0775-PRPC, 

the appellate court has not ruled on this petition as of the date of this Report and 

Recommendation. 

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E. The § 2254 Petition

On October 9, 2014, Petitioner submitted the pending petition for writ of habeas 

corpus to prison officials for mailing.4

 (Doc. 1.) The Petition raises five grounds for 

relief. In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel in the Connolly case was 

ineffective because: (a) he did not “receive full discovery of what the prosecution ha[d],” 

and “not just what the State believe[d] they must hand over” (Ground One (a)); (b) he did 

not “meet with the prosecutor and go over all evidence, good and bad, in the case” 

(Ground One (b)); (c) he did not “do depositions with all parties concern[ed]” (Ground 

One (c)); (d) he did not “locate all witnesses, State or independent” (Ground One (d)); 

(e) he did not “do an interview with each and every party” (Ground One (e)); and (f) he 

did not meet with Petitioner before trial (Ground One (f)). (Doc. 1 at 18-19.) 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor in the Dunbar case engaged 

in prosecutorial misconduct because: (a) “the State failed to disclose that Ms. Connolly 

has recanted her testimony” (Ground Two (a)); (b) the State did not advise Connolly 

before trial of “her rights to be interviewed or not by the defense in this case” (Ground 

Two (b)); and (c) the State “threatened Ms. Connolly if she appeared and testified at this 

trial with prosecution,” purportedly because she “told [the State] the actual facts of the 

case” and thereby recanted or disavowed the statements that she had made to Physician 

Assistant Figueroa about the cause of her injuries (Ground Two (c)). (Id. at 19-21.) 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the State violated its disclosure obligations 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), by: (a) not informing the defense that Connolly had “recanted her testimony” — 

 

4

 To determine the filing dates of the Petition and state court filings that Petitioner filed when he was not represented by counsel, Respondents used the date on which Petitioner delivered the document to prison officials for mailing. Respondents consider that date to be the date the handwritten “certificate of mailing.” (Doc. 15 at 37 n.13.) See 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988) (a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Hernandez v. 

Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the inapplicability of the mailbox rule when state prisoner is assisted by counsel) (citing Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court also uses the mailbox rule to determine 

the filing dates of documents Petitioner filed without the assistance of counsel. 

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her statements to Physician Assistant Figueroa (Ground Three (a)); and (b) not disclosing 

“over 650 pages of documents to the defense (Chapman case)” (Ground Three (b)).5

 (Id.

at 21-24.) In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that he “received a disproportionate 

sentence based upon the personal bias of the trial judge.” (Id. at 24-27.) In Ground Five, 

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in the Dunbar case by not sua sponte instructing 

the jury on Petitioner’s alibi defense. (Id. at 27-28.)

 In their answer, Respondents assert that the Petition is untimely under the 

applicable statute of limitations, and that federal habeas review of most aspects of 

Grounds One through Five is procedurally barred. (Doc. 15.) Petitioner has filed a reply 

in support of his Petition. (Doc. 24.) As discussed below, the Court finds the Petition 

untimely. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “Section 

2244(d)(1) ‘contain[s] multiple provisions relating to the events that trigger its running.’” 

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 

––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2561 (2010)) (alteration in original). “The triggering 

events are the dates on which: direct review becomes final, an unlawful state-created 

impediment to filing is removed, a new constitutional right is made retroactively 

available, or the factual predicate of the claim(s) presented could have been discovered 

with ‘due diligence.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 933 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)). 

 

5

 Petitioner has not identified the “650 pages of documents [that the State allegedly admitted during trial that it had failed to disclose] to the defense.” (Doc. 1 at 

23.) It appears that Petitioner mistakenly construed post-conviction counsel’s reference to the facts of the “Chapman case” — the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 

Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 2008 WL 1947744 (9th Cir. 2008) — as a reference to events 

in his own cases. (Compare Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 150, at 9 (discussing the Chapman case) and Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 124, at 9 (same), with Chapman, 524 F.3d at 077 (“The 

district court dismissed an indictment against . . .[]Defendants[] after the prosecution admitted that it had failed to meet its obligations to disclose over 650 pages of documents to the defense.”). Therefore, this claim is not properly presented to this Court. 

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The one-year statute of limitations begins running on the latest of those dates. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 When a § 2254 petition advances multiple grounds for habeas corpus relief, the 

“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a 

habeas application on an individual basis.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court considers the limitations period as it applies to each 

of Petitioner’s claims.6

 

 1. Claims Related to the Dunbar Case

 Grounds Four and Five of the Petition relate to Petitioner’s conviction in the 

Dunbar case. Petitioner asserts that (1) he received a disproportionate sentence because 

the trial court was biased against him (Ground Four)7

; and (2) the trial court erred by 

failing to instruct the jury on Petitioner’s alibi defense (Ground Five). As Respondents 

argue, Petitioner did not file the pending § 2254 petition until after the AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations expired as to these claims. (Doc. 15 at 45.) 

 On March 20, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction 

and sentence in the Dunbar case. (Doc. 15, Ex. FF.) Rule 31.19(a) of the Arizona Rules 

of Criminal Procedure provides that “[w]ithin 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues 

its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of [Arizona] Supreme 

Court.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Rule 1.3(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure extends that deadline by five days when the notice of determination is mailed 

by the clerk. See State v. Goracke, 106 P.3d 1035, 1036 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 

 

6

 In general, the court can consider the timeliness of the claims asserted in a 

habeas corpus petition collectively because most often a petitioner’s claims arise from a single trial and the triggering event for the statute of limitations is the finality of the conviction under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, the statute of limitations starts running on the same date for the petitioner’s claims. However, when a petitioner challenges convictions that became final on different dates or raises claims that implicate the triggering events in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D), the statute of limitations may begin on different dates for each claim. 

7

 Petitioner’s sentencing claim in Ground Four also pertains to the Connolly case. The Court discusses Ground Four as it pertains to the Connolly case in Section II.A.3. 

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(discussing Rule 1.3(a)). Thus, under Rules 31.19(a) and 1.3(a), Petitioner had until 

April 24, 2008 to file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 The record reflects that Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court on or before the April 24, 2008 deadline. (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 

116.) Thus, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction in the Dunbar case became final for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) on April 24, 2008, the date the time for seeking 

discretionary review in the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ 

U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 641, 646 (2012) (“We hold that, for a state prisoner who does not 

seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date that the 

time for seeking such review expires.”); Camacho v. Hobbs, 774 F.3d 931, 933-34 (8th 

Cir. 2015) (“noting that the Supreme Court in Gonzalez “instructed us that when a 

petitioner decides to forgo state-court appeals, we must ‘look to state-court filing 

deadlines to determine the ‘expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review’”); 

McMonagle v. Meyer, 766 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 

 The statute of limitations on Grounds Four and Five, to the extent that they allege 

judicial bias and instructional error in the Dunbar case, began running on April 24, 2008, 

the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct review under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A), because these claims do not implicate any of the other triggering dates 

for the statute of limitations. See § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D). 

 2. Statutory Tolling related to Dunbar Case Claims

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

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 The limitations period for Petitioner’s claims related to the Dunbar case, asserted 

in Grounds Four and Five, commenced on April 24, 2008 and ran until Thursday, June 

27, 2008, when Petitioner filed a pro per notice of post-conviction relief related to the 

Dunbar case.8

 (Doc. 15, Ex. C, Item 117.) See Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that in Arizona, a state post-conviction proceeding 

is commenced when the petitioner files the notice in accordance with Rule 32.4(a)). 

Thus, the 365-day limitations period ran for sixty-four days before it was tolled. See 

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (the “AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and 

the time the first collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during 

that interval.”). The limitations period remained tolled until April 29, 2013, when the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. D, Item 142; Exs. KK, Ex. OO.) 

 On July 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United 

States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 15, 2013. (Doc. 15, Ex. QQ.) The 

limitations period was not tolled during that time because a petition for writ of certiorari 

to the United States Supreme Court is not an application for state collateral review under 

§ 2244(d)(2). See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007) (“The application for 

state post-conviction review is therefore not ‘pending’ after the state court’s postconviction review is complete, and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1–year limitations 

period during the pendency of a petition for certiorari.”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

924 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 

Court is simply not an application for state review [under Section 2244(d)(2)].”) 

(collecting pre-Lawrence cases). 

 Accordingly, the statute of limitations, which had 301 days remaining, began 

running again on April 29, 2013. Thus, February 24, 2014 was the deadline for Petitioner 

 

8

 The post-conviction proceedings in the Dunbar and Connolly cases were consolidated after Petitioner’s counsel filed a consolidated petition for review. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 150; Ex. B, Item 164; Ex. C, Item 124.; Ex. D, Item 142.) 

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to file a § 2254 petition seeking federal habeas corpus relief on the claims related to the 

Dunbar case that are asserted in Grounds Four and Five.9

 

 After the February 24, 2014 deadline passed, on May 23, 2014, Petitioner, through 

counsel, commenced a second consolidated post-conviction proceeding in state court. 

(Doc. 15, Exs. RR, SS); See Section I.E n.3 (discussing the commencement of the second 

post-conviction proceeding). Because the AEDPA statute of limitations as to Grounds 

Four and Five had expired by the time Petitioner commenced that proceeding, it did not 

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of the limitations period that 

has ended before the state petition was filed.”). 

 As previously stated, the deadline for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition raising the 

claims related to the Dunbar case asserted in Grounds Four and Five, was February 24, 

2014. Applying the mailbox rule, see Section I.E. n.4, Petitioner did file his Petition until 

October 9, 2014, more than two-hundred days after the limitations period expired on the 

Dunbar case claims raised in Grounds Four and Five. Accordingly, the Petition is 

untimely as those claims unless Petitioner establishes that equitable tolling or an 

exception to the statute of limitations applies. The Court discusses equitable tolling in 

Section II.B. 

 3. Claims Related to the Connolly Case 

 The following four claims in the Petition relate to the Connolly case: (1) trial 

counsel was ineffective as alleged in Ground One (a) through One (f); (2) the prosecutor 

committed prosecutorial misconduct as alleged in Ground Two (a) through (c); (3) the 

State violated its obligations to disclose Brady material, as alleged in Ground Three (a) 

and (b); and (4) Petitioner received a disproportionate sentence because the trial court 

 

9

 Respondents state that the deadline was February 19, 2014. (Doc. 15 at 49.) It appears that Respondents miscalculated 301 days after April 29, 2013. However, that 

error does not impact Respondents’ analysis because the Petition is untimely whether it was due on February 19 or 24, 2014. 

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was biased against him (Ground Four).10 Respondents argue that these claims were not 

timely presented for federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 15 at 50.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in the 

Connolly case on December 20, 2007. (Doc. 15, Ex. R.) Petitioner filed a petition for 

review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on June 3, 2008. (Doc. 15, 

Exs S, T.) Petitioner then had ninety days, until Monday, September 2, 2008, to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.11 See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (a petition 

for writ of certiorari to review a judgment entered by a state’s highest court must be filed 

in the United States Supreme Court with ninety days after entry of the judgment). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“the period of direct review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari from 

the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a 

petition.”). 

 Accordingly, the statute of limitations on Ground Four (sentencing bias in the 

Connolly case), began running on September 2, 2008, the date on which Petitioner’s 

conviction in the Connolly became final on direct review under § 2244(d)(1)(A), because 

that claim does not implicate any of the other triggering dates for the statute of 

limitations. See § 2244 (d)(1)(B)–(D). 

 The statute of limitations also began running on September 2, 2008 for the claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the Connolly case asserted in Ground One (a) 

– (f), to the extent those claims involve witnesses other than Connolly, because those 

 

10 As previously stated, Ground Four also pertains to the Dunbar case. See

Section II.A.1 

11 Ninety days after Tuesday June 3, 2008 is Monday September 1, 2008. However, that date was Labor Day, the next business day was Tuesday, September 2, 2008. See Sup. Ct. R. 30 (governing computation and extension of time). 

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claims do not implicate any of the other triggering dates for the statute of limitations set 

forth in § 2244 (d)(1)(B)–(D).12 

 To the extent that Petitioner’s claims in Grounds One (a), (c), (d), and (e), 

Grounds Two (a), (b), and (c), and Ground Three (a) pertain to Connolly’s statements, 

Petitioner may argue that the statute of limitations on those claims did not begin to run 

until he was aware of the statements in Connolly’s affidavit. Petitioner submitted 

Connolly’s affidavit as an exhibit to his first petition for post-conviction relief (which 

was prepared by counsel). Thus, “through the exercise of due diligence,” Petitioner could 

have discovered the factual basis for his claims relating to Connolly — the ineffective 

assistance claims in Ground One (a), (c), (d), and (e), the prosecutorial-misconduct 

claims in Ground Two (a), (b), and (c), and the Brady claim in Ground Three (a) — no 

later than March 23, 2009, the date on which Connolly executed her affidavit before a 

notary public. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Items 150 at 10-11 and Attachment 1; Ex. C, Item 124 at 

10-11 and Attachment 1); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Thus, the statute of limitations 

began running on March 23, 2009 as to those claims. 

 4. Statutory Tolling related to Connolly Case Claims 

 As stated above in Section II.A.3, the limitations period began running on the 

Petitioner’s claims related to the Connolly case either on September 2, 2008 or March 23, 

2009. However, the limitations period was immediately tolled as to all of those claims 

because Petitioner had previously filed a notice of post-conviction relief related to the 

Connolly case on July 11, 2008. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 123.) The post-conviction 

proceeding was later consolidated with the post-conviction action in the Dunbar case. As 

discussed in Section II.A.2, the consolidated post-conviction proceeding remained 

pending, and tolled the limitations period, until April 29, 2013 when the Arizona 

 

12 In Ground One (a) – (f), Petitioner asserted that (1) counsel did not “receive full 

discovery of what the prosecution had,” (Ground One (a)); (2) counsel did not “meet with 

the prosecutor and go over all evidence, good and bad, in the case” (Ground One (b)); 

(3) counsel did not depose “all parties concern[ed]” (Ground One (c)); (4) counsel did not 

“locate all witnesses, state or independent” (Ground One (d)); (5) counsel did not “do an 

interview with each and every party” (Ground One (e)); and (6) counsel did not meet 

with Petitioner before trial (Ground One (f)). (Doc. 1-1 at 18-19.) 

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Supreme Court summarily denied review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. D, Item 142; Ex. KK; Ex. OO.) 

 On July 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United 

States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 15, 2013. (Doc. 15, Ex. QQ.) The 

limitations period was not tolled during that time because a petition for writ of certiorari 

to the United States Supreme Court is not an application for state collateral review under 

§ 2244(d)(2). See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 332. 

 Accordingly, the deadline for Petitioner to file a habeas corpus petition raising the 

claims pertaining to the Connolly case was April 29, 2014. See United States v. Hurst, 

322 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2003) (“A motion presented to the court on the 

anniversary date of a triggering event is within the ‘1-year period of limitation’ set out in 

§ 2255 and § 2244(d)(1).”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(applying Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to § 2254 cases and 

concluding that April 24, 1997 would be the expiration date of the 1-year limitations 

period for state prisoners whose convictions became final before the AEDPA’s effective 

date, April 24, 1996). As previously stated in Section I.E. n.4, under the mailbox rule, 

the pending Petition is considered filed on October 9, 2014, which is more than onehundred days after the AEDPA’s limitations period expired as to the claims that pertain 

to the Connolly case. 

 After the April 29, 2014 deadline passed, on May 23, 2014, Petitioner, through 

counsel, commenced a second consolidated post-conviction proceeding in state court. 

(Doc. 15, Exs. RR, SS); see Section I.E n.3 (discussing the commencement of the second 

post-conviction proceeding). Because the AEDPA statute of limitations as to the claims 

related to the Connolly case had expired by the time Petitioner commenced that 

proceeding, it did not toll the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. 

Accordingly, the Petition is untimely as to the claims related to the Connolly case unless 

Petitioner establishes that equitable tolling or an exception to the limitations period 

applies. 

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B. Equitable Tolling or Exception to the Limitations Period

 Because Petitioner filed the pending Petition after the statute of limitations expired 

as to all of his claims, the Petition is not subject to federal habeas corpus review unless 

Petitioner establishes a basis for equitably tolling or avoiding the limitations period. 

 1. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Petitioner does not argue that equitable tolling applies. (Docs. 1, 24.) 

Additionally, the record does not reveal any extraordinary circumstance that prevented 

Petitioner from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner’s lack of 

familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 

WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the 

law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity 

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

 2. Actual Innocence Exception 

Liberally construing the Petition, to avoid the statute of limitations, Petitioner 

argues that he is actually innocent based on the statements in Connolly’s affidavit. 

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(Doc. 24 at 3-4.) As set forth below, Petitioner has not established a claim of actual 

innocence that constitutes an equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations. 

 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the United States 

Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim 

of actual innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously 

recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for excusing the bar to 

federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 

1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) 

 The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension of the time 

statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 

133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address 

the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims; the Supreme 

Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides 

a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

“‘To be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not 

presented at trial,” Calderon v Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324), although “the habeas court’s analysis is not limited to such evidence.” 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006). “Schlup pointed out three types of evidence that 

would pass the threshold of reliability: exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts and critical physical evidence.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 945 (Kozinski, J., 

concurring) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-28). Actual innocence claims may not rest 

upon evidence that was available but not presented at trial. See Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 

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F.3d 333, 340 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“The only evidence that Hubbard asserts is ‘new’ is what 

he terms as ‘his own sworn testimony . . . . A defendant’s own late-proffered testimony 

is not ‘new’ because it was available at trial.”). 

 Here, Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent of the convictions in the 

Dunbar and Connolly cases based on the statements in Connolly’s affidavit. (Doc. 24 at 

3-4.) As discussed below, the assertions in Connolly’s affidavit are insufficient to 

establish that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

[Petitioner] in the light of [that evidence.]” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

 a. The Connolly Case 

 Regarding the Connolly case, Connolly’s affidavit states that: 

5. The [s]tatements introduced at trial by Physician Assistant Figueroa are inaccurate. When I arrived at the hospital, Detective Hampton and P.A. Figueroa worked together in trying to make me state that [Petitioner] 

assaulted me. Detective Hampton told P.A. Figueroa that I was assaulted 

and that she needed P.A. Figueroa’s assistance in filing charges on the case. 

6. I never told Mr. Figueroa that “my husband punched, kicked, and hit me.” I never said that to the physician assistant. Had I not been prevented from testifying in this case, I would have explained that the testimony was inaccurate. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 150, Attachment 1; Ex, C, Item 124, Attachment 1.) 

 If Connolly offered this testimony at trial, a reasonable juror could have resolved 

the conflicts in the evidence against Petitioner for the following reasons. First, Connolly 

had prior felony convictions that detracted from her credibility, but there was no evidence 

that Physician Assistant Figueroa or Detective Hampton had a criminal history. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. E, TR 3/27/06 at 55.) Second, if Connolly testified that someone other than 

Petitioner had assaulted her, the State would have been allowed to offer evidence of 

Connolly’s statement to Figueroa at that hospital that “she [had been] punched multiple 

times by her husband in the head, face, and chest.”13 (Doc. 15, Ex. K, TR 4/12/06 at 4-6, 

 

13 Connolly was unavailable to testify at trial and, therefore, was not subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Figueroa not to name Petitioner 

as Connolly’s reported assailant when relating her emergency-room statement to the jury, and directed Figueroa to testify that Connolly told him, “I was hit in the nose, face, and 

chest.” (Doc. 15, Ex. K, TR 4/12/06 at 124-25.) 

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124-28.) See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (hearsay exception for out-of-court statements 

that are “inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony”); State v. Mills, 995 P.2d 705, 710 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“The jury may consider prior inconsistent statements as 

impeachment and as substantive evidence.”). Third, Connolly’s post-trial statements in 

her affidavit carry little weight because recanted testimony is considered inherently 

unreliable. See Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1248-51 (9th Cir. 2014) (recantation 

testimony of molestation victim and relatives did not establish the petitioner’s actual 

innocence, considering their suspect motives, their delay in coming forward, their prior 

statements, and other evidence of guilt) (collecting cases). 

 Additionally, during trial the State presented evidence that Petitioner was 

Connolly’s assailant, including: (1) the testimony of two neighbors — Dunbar and 

Bramley — who overheard Petitioner and Connolly argue and saw Petitioner run from 

their apartment immediately afterwards; (2) the testimony of the first two responding 

police officers who stated that they followed a trail of blood to Petitioner and Connolly’s 

apartment where they found Connolly crying and bleeding; and (3) photographs of 

Connolly’s injuries and blood on the floor of Connolly’s and Petitioner’s apartment. (See

Section I.A.1.) 

 Although Connolly’s version of events contained in her affidavit would have 

conflicted with the State’s trial evidence, that conflict is insufficient to establish that “it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [Petitioner] in the 

light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. It is not enough that the new 

evidence show the existence of reasonable doubt. Id. at 329. 

 In short, even if Connolly presented testimony consistent with the statements in 

her affidavit, while that testimony may create some doubt about Petitioner’s guilt, that 

evidence does not meet Schlup’s exacting standard that, in light of the newly discovered 

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evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

Petitioner.14 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

 Accordingly, the actual innocence exception to the AEDPA limitations period 

does not apply to Petitioner’s claims related to the Connolly case. As emphasized in 

Schlup, the “actual innocence exception remains only a safety valve for the extraordinary 

case.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 333 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Petitioner has not established that standard. Because Petitioner has not 

established a basis to avoid the statute of limitations pertaining to his claims in the 

Connolly case his assertion of those claims is untimely and his request for relief on those 

claims should be denied on that basis. 

 b. The Dunbar Case

 As discussed below, Petitioner also fails to establish that “it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted [Petitioner in the Dunbar case] in the light 

of [Connolly’s statements in her affidavit].” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Connolly’s 

affidavit contains the following statements related to the Dunbar case: 

21. Mr. Dunbar attacked me on September 16, 2005, and my friend and neighbor “Tony” Anton Kopwasky came to my aid. 

22. Mr. Dunbar had shut off my electrical box and placed a lock on it. When I went to resolve the issue, Mr. Dunbar [Dunbar] screamed at me and 

pushed me down. 

23. Mr. Dunbar and Mr. Anton began fighting and Tony knocked Mr. Dunbar unconscious. Mr. Kowasky left the scene. [Petitioner] was not 

present and was residing in California when the incident occurred. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. A, Item 150, Attachment 1; Ex. C, Item 124, Attachment 1.) 

 The statements in Connolly’s affidavit do not satisfy Schlup’s high standard. First, 

although Connolly did not testify at the Dunbar trial, Petitioner presented her version of 

 

14 In other cases when it was determined that a federal habeas petitioner met the Schlup standard, the “new evidence” consisted of credible evidence such as the 

petitioner’s solid alibi, see Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), numerous eyewitness accounts of the crime that exonerated the petitioner, see 

Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 451-53 (E.D. Mo.1995) (on remand), and a credible 

confession by a likely suspect stating that he had framed the defendant, see Carriger v. 

Stewart, 132 F.3d at 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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events through the testimony of Officers Rainey and Benker. Those officers testified that 

on the night of the incident, Connolly reported that Dunbar had pushed her down during 

an argument about a lock on the electrical breaker box, and that someone other than 

Petitioner — a man she claimed to be her “boyfriend” and described as a “Hispanic 

male” — beat Dunbar. (Doc. 15, Ex. W, TR 5/4/06 at 105-16; Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 62-67, 

79.) Additionally, Petitioner called his alleged fiancée, Boone, to testify that Petitioner 

was in California with her and asked her to marry him on the day of the alleged incident. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. X, TR 5/8/06 at 16-23, 27-30, 47.) 

 Based on Petitioner’s conviction in the Dunbar case, the jury rejected this 

evidence. The statements in Connolly’s affidavit would have been cumulative to the 

evidence Petitioner presented to the jury through Rainey, Benker, and Boone. See 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (“To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial.”). Thus, the statements in Connolly’s affidavit related to the 

Dunbar case are not new evidence under Schlup. See Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 

971 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In any event, what Petitioner claims was known at trial, and cannot 

serve as a basis for a claim of actual innocence.”); Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 618 

(8th Cir. 1996) (“Putting a different spin on evidence that was presented to the jury does 

not satisfy the requirements set forth in Schlup.”). 

 At trial, three prosecution witnesses — the victim and two neighbors — positively 

identified Petitioner as the assailant. (See Section I.B.1). Although Connolly’s version 

of events contained in her affidavit might have conflicted with the State’s trial evidence, 

that conflict is insufficient to establish that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted [Petitioner] in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 316. It is not enough that the new evidence show the existence of reasonable 

doubt. Id. at 329. Even if Connolly had testified in a manner consistent with the 

statements in her affidavit, that evidence does not meet Schlup’s high standard that, in 

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light of the newly discovered evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted Petitioner. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. 

 Accordingly, the actual innocence exception to the AEDPA limitations period 

does not apply to Petitioner’s claims related to the Dunbar case. Because Petitioner has 

not established a basis to avoid the statute of limitations pertaining to his claims related to 

the Dunbar case, his assertion of those claims is untimely and his request for relief on 

those claims should be denied on that basis. 

III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition after the AEDPA limitations period had 

expired as to all of his claims. Therefore, the Petition is untimely. As set forth above, 

Petitioner has not established a basis to avoid the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the 

Petition should be denied as untimely and Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing 

should be denied.15 (Doc. 24 at 9.) The Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative 

grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 15 at 68-103.) 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

 

15 In his Reply, Petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 24 at 9.) 

This request is denied for the reasons set forth in the Court’s March 25, 2015 Order, in 

which the Court denied a previous request for counsel. (Doc. 13.) 

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recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2015. 

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