Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02456/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02456-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 09cv2456

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NY NOURN, Civil No.   09‐cv‐2456‐BEN (WVG)

          Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING

vs. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

M. LATTIMORE,

       Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Ny Nourn, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her conviction for second degree murder.

(See Lodgement No. 1. Vol. 2 at 464.)  Petitioner contends that habeas relief is proper based on the

following five grounds:(1) The double jeopardy clausewas violatedwhenthe prosecutor argued facts

to which she had been previously acquitted; (2)the prosecutor presented a legally untenable theory

of liability; (3) the jury wasimproperly instructed; (4) there wasinsufficient evidence to support her

conviction; and (5) Petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to object

on double jeopardy grounds or argue the legal untenability of the prosecution’s theory at trial.

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all

supporting documents. Based on the documents and evidence presented, and for the reasons set

forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and recommends

that the Petition be DENIED.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35‐36 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).    The pertinent facts as found by the state appellate court, and

substantially taken from its opinion, are as set forth below. (See Lodgement 6 at 3‐8.)

On December 23, 1998, David Stevens’ body wasfound abandoned in the passengerseat of

a burning car. An autopsy revealed that Stevens had been fatally shot twice in the head before his

body was burned.

The case was unresolved for three years. However, in November 2001, Petitioner Ny Nourn

contacted the SanDiego PoliceDepartment andconfessedherrole in Stevens’murder. The following

description of the events leading up to the murder is from Nourn’s transcribed confession.

In August 1998, when Nourn was 17 years old she met Ronald Barker, then a 34‐year‐old

married man with a child, through the Internet. Within days, they developed an intimate

relationship.

Nourn’s relationship with Barker continued through the fall of 1998. In November 1998,

Nourn began working atthe Perfect Match dating service. She developed a friendly relationshipwith

her boss, David Stevens. On the evening of December 22, Nourn went on a date with Stevens. They

went to his apartment and had sex. After leaving Stevens’ apartment, Nourn returned home. When

she arrived, she saw Barker’s car parked near her house. She nervously parked and approached

Barker.

Barker asked Nourn where she had been. At firstshe said she had been shopping. Barker did

not believe her and Nourn admitted that she had “slept with [her] boss.” Barker became angry and

told her to get out of the car. Nourn said she was sorry and that it would never happen again. She

then told Barker that Stevens coaxed her into having sex with him, and changed her story, stating

that he had raped her. Barker replied, “I’m gonna kill him,” and told Nourn she had been “violated”

and was “used goods.” He told Nourn to take him to Stevens’ apartment so that he could confront

him, and Nourn agreed to do so.

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On their way to Stevens’ apartment, Barker and Nourn stopped and had sex in the back seat

of his car. Afterward, Barker suggested that he and Nourn should end their relationship. Nourn

begged him not to do so, and he responded that the “[o]nly way you stay with me isif you kill David

or I kill David.” Nourn replied, “I do anything you say.” Barker then stated that he needed to go to

his house to get his gun, and Nourn followed him there.

Barker then told Nourn to call Stevens and tell him that she was stranded on the freeway.

However, when Nourn called, Stevens did not answer. Barker and Nourn drove to Stevens’

apartment.

They planned for Nourn to tell Stevens that her car had broken down and ask him for

assistance. Barker would follow in his vehicle and when he flashed his headlights, Nourn would have

Stevens pull over. They would tell Stevens that Barker was Nourn’s brother.

When they arrived at Stevens’ apartment,Nourn called himon the intercomand told himshe

needed help with her car. When Stevens came out, he and Nourn left in his car and traveled

eastbound. Barkerfollowed in his own car. Barkerflashed hislights; Nourn told Stevensto pull over.

She told Stevens that she thought the person following them was her brother. Nourn walked to

Barker’s car and he told herto have Stevensfollow him.Nourn returned to Stevens’ car and told him

to follow Barker. They drove to a residential area and then stopped. Nourn introduced Barker to

Stevens as her brother. They then all got into Stevens’ car, with Barker in the back seat.

Barker directed Stevens to drive, on the pretense of looking for Nourn’s car. Nourn did not

say much and “just kept to [her]self.” Barker then directed Stevens to pull over.

After Stevens pulled over, he asked, “Where’sthe car?” Barker grabbed Stevens by the neck

and pointed the gun at his head. Barkersaid, “How doesit feel to sleep with someone’s girlfriend?”

Stevens replied “[D]on’t do this,” and Nourn said, “No, no.” Barker twice fatally shot Stevens in the

head. Nourn assisted Barker in moving Stevens’ car and later setting it on fire with Stevens’ body

inside.

During the following three years, Barker andNourn’srelationship continued and neithertold

anyone about Stevens’murder.Nourn stated thatshe went along with the plan because she thought

that Barker would kill her if she did not.

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Nourn denied thatshe wanted to see Stevens hurt or killed. She stated she liked Stevens very

much. She believed Barker would have killed her if she refused to participate in his plot to murder

Stevens.Nourn admittedBarkerhadneverphysically abusedherin anyway priorto Stevens’murder,

although she stated that Barker had slapped her one time on the night Stevens was killed. Nourn

asserted that although she knew Barker had a gun and had threatened to kill Stevens, she believed

he only intended to “confront” him. She believed Barker’s death threats were directed at her, not

Stevens. Nourn also recognized that Barker had no idea where Stevenslived and only her assistance

led Barker to him. Nourn admitted she was alone with Stevens several times as the plot unfolded.

She acknowledged she had several opportunities to stop the murder, but did not warn Stevens or

take any actions to prevent it because she was worried about her own safety. At trial, three

psychologists testified Nourn suffered from Battered Women’s Syndrome before, during and after

Stevens’murder.However, one psychologist admitted that atthe time ofthemurderNourn was not

so subjugated by Barker that she did not feel free to defy him by dating Stevens.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2003, a jury returned a verdict of first degree murder against Ny Nourn and found true a

lying in wait special circumstance allegation. (Lodgement 6 at 1.) In May 2004, the California Court

of Appeal affirmed Nourn’s conviction but reversed the special circumstance finding based on

instructional error. (Id.) Nourn filed a writ of habeas corpus which the California Court of Appeal

granted inDecember 2006.(Id.)  The courtreversedNourn’s conviction forfirst degreemurder based

on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 1‐2.)

In November 2007, Nourn was again put on trial on charges of murdering David Stevens and

committing arson to his car. (Id.) Prior to trial, the court dismissed a special circumstance lying‐in‐

wait allegation. (Id.) Afterthe close ofthe prosecution’s case,the trial court grantedNourn’smotion

for acquittal on the first degree murder charge. (Id.) The jury found Nourn guilty of second degree

murder and not guilty of arson. (Id.) Nourn was sentenced to 15 years to life. (Id.)

Nourn filed a direct appeal of her conviction in the California Court of Appeal, which upheld

her conviction, in a written opinion on April 27, 2009. (Lodgement 6.) Nourn then filed a petition for

review in the Supreme Court of California. (Lodgement 7.) The Supreme Court denied the petition

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without comment. (Lodgement 8.)  Nourn filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 on October 28, 2009. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent answered the petition

January 14, 2010. (Doc.No. 12.) Nourn filed hertraverse to the petition February 10, 2010. (Doc. No.

14.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, as amended by the 1996

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).  Section 2254(a) sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuitjudge, or a district courtshall entertain

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‐(2) (2006) (emphasis

added).

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferentialstandard for evaluating state‐courtrulings, which demands

that state‐court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). To obtain federal habeas

relief, Petitionermustsatisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).  SeeWilliams v. Taylor, 529U.S. 362,

403 (2000). Under section 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court has ruled that the “contrary to” clause to

permit a grant of habeasrelief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by

this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on

a set ofmaterially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412‐13. The Supreme Court has also interpreted the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the state court

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identifiesthe correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has clarified that

even an erroneous or incorrect application of clearly established federal law does not support a

habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

Where there is no reasoneddecision fromthe state’shighest court,the Court “looksthrough”

to the underlying appellate court decision.  See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805‐06 (1991).  If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision

is contrary to,or anunreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Courtlaw.  SeeDelgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981‐82 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538U.S. at 75‐

76).  However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim.  Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).  Absent citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas

relief is not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the reasoning nor the result of

Supreme Court rulings.  Id.

V. DISCUSSION

PetitionerNourn presentsthe Court with five claimsfor habeasrelief. She arguesthat(1)the

double jeopardy clause was violated when the prosecutor argued facts to which she had been

previously acquitted; (2) the prosecutor presented a legally untenable theory of liability; (3)the jury

was improperly instructed; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support a second degree murder

conviction; and (5) Petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to object

to the double jeopardy violation or the legally untenable theory.

A. TheDouble JeopardyClauseWasNotViolatedWhenThe ProsecutorArguedFactsWhich

Were Relevant to Both First and Second Degree Murder

Nourn contendsthat double jeopardy principles were violated when the prosecution argued

facts to which she was acquitted. (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 25.) Nourn is not entitled to

habeas relief on this issue because no double jeopardy principles were implicated where the trial

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court acquitted Nourn of first degree murder and the prosecution argued a second degree murder

theory.

At the close of the prosecution’s case, Nourn’s counsel moved for the trial court to acquit

Nourn of murder under California Penal Code Section 1118.1. The trial court acquittedNourn of first

degree murder only, concluding that, “Ms. Nourn did not believe that Mr. Barker would actually

engage in the ultimate act of such enormity as the cold blooded murder that he did.” (RT at 224.)

Nonetheless, the court allowed a second degree murder charge to stand. (RT at 225.) The trial court

reasoned that “a person can be convicted of a second degree murder ... based on an implied malice

theory, which does not necessarily require an intent to kill.” (RT at 212.) Ms. Nourn’s counsel

acknowledged that “one ofthe issues could be: (sic) wasshe reckless or wasshe negligent? And that,

wherein would be the difference in voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder.” (Id.) The

trial court further clarified that “there could be a basis for an implied malice, even absent intent to

kill. If you’re inviting somebody out to a threat that you believe is lethal and do that in conscious

disregard and so forth ... that could support implied malice.” (RT at 225.) The court briefly mused

“whethershe [Nourn]shared any intent to kill.” (RT at 225.) However, the court quickly disposed of

its doubt noting that, “I don’t need to decide that ... because the concept[s] of implied malice and

second degreemurder... no longer necessarily require... an intentto kill.” (RT at 225.) Afterthe close

of allthe evidence,the defense renewed itsmotion for acquittal under California Penal Code Section

1118.1. Nourn’s counselreiterated the argument that “no substantial evidence of malice” had been

introduced. (RT at 700.) The trial court disagreed and denied the motion allowing the second degree

murder charge to go to the jury. (RT at 700.)  

At closing argument, the prosecutor contended that Barker had engaged in cold blooded

murder. (RT at 718.) However, the prosecutor clearly explained that Nourn, as an aider and abettor,

did not need to share Barker’s specific intent to kill, nor did Nourn have that intent. (RT at 718.)

Nourn’sintent, as correctly described by the prosecutor, merely had to be “to facilitate and aid that

murder.” (RT at 718.) The prosecutor argued Nourn “had thatspecific intent to aid and abet Ronald

Barker pulling the trigger and killing David Stevens. She didn’t have to intend that act herself... to

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intend that David Stevens die.” (RT at 719.) It isthis argument that Nourn submits violated her right

against double jeopardy.

Nourn raised her double jeopardy argumentin herstate appeal. The Court ofAppealrejected

it. (Lodgement 6.) She then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court which denied

her petitionwithout comment.(Lodgement 8.) The lastreasoned state decisionwhich addressed the

merits of the claim is the California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming the verdict. (Lodgement 6.)

It is to that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805‐6.  

The Court of Appeal held that the double jeopardy clause was not violated when the

prosecutor argued Nourn was guilty of second degree murder. (Lodgement 6 at 11.) The trial court

specifically excluded second degree murder from itsruling acquitting Nourn of first degree murder.

(Lodgement 6 at 11.) The appellate court recognized that because “the court explicitly refused to

enter judgment on the lesser offense of second degree murder and found that theory of liability

remained ... no double jeopardy principles were implicated by trial of the second degree murder

charge.” (Lodgement 6 at 11.)

The appellate court properly identified Smith v. Massachusetts as the relevant case

controlling double jeopardy attachment in court issued acquittals. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543

U.S. 462 (2005). While the Smith Court did find a violation of double jeopardy where the trial court

reconsidered its unqualified acquittal order, the holding is properly distinguishable here. See id. at

474. The appeals courtfound significantthe factthatthe trial court’s acquittal in Smith, “waswithout

qualification” (Lodgement 6 at 11‐12) whereas at Nourn’strial, the trial courtspecifically limited its

acquittal ruling to pertain only to the first degree murder charge. (RT at 224.) The appeals court

concluded that “nothing in the Smith decision prohibits a trial court from limiting an acquittal ruling

allowing a lesser offense to proceed, as the court did in this case.” (Lodgement 6 at 12.)

The appellate court neither reached a decision contrary to nor unreasonably applied clearly

established law in determining that there was no double jeopardy violation. The Double Jeopardy

Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal” and “protects

the accused from attempts to relitigate the facts underlying a prior acquittal.” Brown v. Ohio, 432

U.S. 161, 165 (1977). It “prohibits reexamination of a court‐decreed acquittal to the same extent it

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prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467

(2005).    If the acquittal is issued before a conviction, “further proceedings to secure one are

impermissible.” Id.  However, “[t]he trial judge's characterization of his own ruling is not controlling

for purposes of double jeopardy, ...[ratherthe] inquir[y is]... “ ‘whetherthe ruling ofthe [trial]judge,

whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual

elements of the offense charged.’” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting United States

v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).)

Nourn contendsthat the trial court’s acquittal meant thatshe “wasfound not to have aided

and abetted Barker’s plan to kill Stevens” and consequently “the People could no longer argue that

appellant knew of and intended to assist Barker in any form of murder, whether express or implied,

based on a general aider and abettor theory.” (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 27.) She further

argues that the “Prosecution could not do ... what it did do, [which] was to factually argue that she

aided and abetted a premeditated murder for which she was acquitted.” (Traverse at 7.) Petitioner

arguesthat akin to Smith,she was “subjected to post acquittal fact finding proceedings going to her

guilt orinnocence although she had already been acquitted ofthe very same factual determination.”

(Traverse at 7 quoting Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. at 467.)

Petitioner’s contentions lack merit. Nourn incorrectly argues that the prosecutor elected to

remove second degreemalicemurderfromconsideration.(Traverse at 9.)In fact, impliedmalicewas

the only malice theory before the jury.(RT at 707‐08.) As the Court of Appeal recognized, the Smith

acquittal was unqualified, id. at 465, whereaswhen the trial courtruled onNourn’smotion to acquit,

the court specifically carved out second degree murder and lesser included offenses like

manslaughter from its order, and granted the motion asto first degree murder only. (RT at 225.) As

outlined above, and noted by the Court of Appeal, nothing in Smith v. Massachusetts, limitsthe trial

court’s ability to exclude lesser included offenses from its ruling.  543 U.S. 462.   

Additionally, the Court of Appeal aptly noted that “nowhere in the court’s ruling did it find

... [Nourn] had no knowledge Barker intended to kill Stevens.... [Rather ] the court only found ...she

[did not] share the same level of premeditation and deliberation [as] Barker.” (Lodgement 6 at 13.)

The trial court’s doubt that Nourn shared any intent to kill was not part of its ruling. As the Court

specifically noted, “I don’t need to decide that.” (RT at 225.) Contrary to Nourn’s contentions, the

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court’s acquittal was not “a conclusive factual determination thatthe People failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant knew and intended to facilitate Barker’s willful, deliberate, and

premeditated plan to kill Stevens.” (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 27.) The court merely ruled

that based on the evidence presented,Nourn did notshare Barker’s premeditation.(RT at 225.) Thus,

the court left open the possibility of Nourn’s conviction for second degree murder.

Further unlike the facts presented in Smith,where the trial courtimpermissibly reconsidered

its own ruling, here, Nourn argues that it was the prosecutor’s actions, not the court’s, that violate

double jeopardy. However, the prosecution was not barred from arguing that Nourn was guilty of

second degree murder. As the trial court specifically ruled, implied malice murder was to “remain

before the jury.” (RT at 225.) The prosecutor was carefulto argue thatNourn was not on trial forfirst

degree premeditated murder. The prosecutor explained that second degree aiding and abetting

liability meant that Nourn “had thatspecific intent to aid and abet Ronald Barker pulling the trigger

and killing David Stevens. She didn’t have to intend that act herself... to intend that David Stevens

die.” (RT at 719.) This argument presents a theory of aiding and abetting a second degree implied

malice murder. Under the court’sfirst degree acquittal ruling, the prosecution’s argument properly

presented a second degree murder theory. This did not violate double jeopardy principles unlike

Smith v.Massachusetts, because therewas no furtherfactfinding regarding first degreemurder. See

543 U.S. at 467. Petitioner was acquitted of first degree murder, the prosecution argued a theory of

second degree impliedmalicemurder, and consequently no double jeopardy violation occurred. For

the reasons stated above, the Court recommends this claim be DENIED.

B. Nourn’s Conviction Was Not Based on an Untenable Legal Theory

Nourn’s second ground for habeas relief challenges the legal theory upon which she was

convicted. Nourn contends she was convicted on an impermissible theory of law. (Petition, Points

and Authorities, at 21.)

On appeal to the state court, Nourn challenged the legal tenability of the prosecution’s

theory. The California Court of Appeal denied Nourn’s appeal. She then filed a petition for review in

the California Supreme Court which denied her petition without comment. (Lodgement 8.) The last

reasoned state decision which addressed the merits of the claim is the California Court of Appeal’s

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opinion affirming Nourn’s conviction on a second degree implied murder theory. (Lodgement 6.) It

isto that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805‐06.   On appeal,the state

court affirmed Nourn’s conviction for second degree murder, concluding that although Nourn “did

notshare [Barker’s] premeditation and deliberation[, it] had no impact on herliability as an aider and

abettor to second degree murder.” (Id. at 14.) The court found that “Barker’s specific intent to kill

is not incompatible with Nourn’s conviction for implied malice murder.” (Lodgement 6 at 13.)

In its opinion denying Nourn’s habeas claim, the Court of Appeal attempted to dissect the

confusing language with which the California Supreme Court defines the requisite mental state of

an aider and abettor. The Court of Appeal explained that “an aider and abettor’s liability is not

dependent upon, or affected by, the disposition of the charges against the direct perpetrator.”

(Lodgement 6 at 14, quoting  People v.Garcia, 28 Cal. 4th 1166, 1173 (2002).) The court clarified that

although the California Supreme Court opined that the “aider and abettor must share the

[perpetrator’s]specific intent” the phrase is applied to  mean that the aider and abettor “knowsthe

full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or

purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (Lodgement 6 at 14 quoting

People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1118 (2001).) The court confirmed that “aider and abettorliability

does not require proof of the specific intent that is an element of the underlying offense.”

(Lodgement 6 at 14, quoting People v. Mendoza, 18 Cal. 4th 1114, 1123 (1998).) The courtspecified

that the jury had to find only “the intent to encourage and bring about the conduct that is criminal,

not the specific intentthat is an element of the target offense.” (Lodgement 6 at 14.) In essence, the

Court of Appeal confirmed thatthe jury had to find Nourn knowingly helped Ronald Barker kill David

Stevens, not that Nourn wanted to kill David Stevens.

The appellate court also explained why the jury properly found that Nourn had the requisite

mentalstate to be convicted ofsecond degree murder as an aider and abettor to Barker’s plan. The

court reasoned that implied malice arises under two circumstances, either  when the killing reveals

an abandoned and malignant heart, or “when the killing resultsfrom an intentional act, the natural

consequences of which are dangerousto life, [and the] act was deliberately performed by a person

who knowsthat his conduct endangersthe life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for

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life.” (Lodgement 6 at 13, quoting People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593, 600 (1996).) Underthe reasoning

provided by the Court of Appeal, Nourn was guilty of second degree murder because the jury must

have found that Nourn knew that Barker’s acts either demonstrated a malignant heart or she

consciously disregarded known risks dangerous to human life, and knowing this, she nonetheless

aided Barker.  

Nourn contendsthatthe theory grounding her conviction was untenable because “appellant

[Nourn] could not aid and abet a perpetrator who intended to kill on a theory of shared implied

malice murder.” (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 21.) However, federal courts are bound by a

state court’s construction of its own penal statutes, and must defer to that interpretation, unless it

is “untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.”

Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993).

The appeals court found that Nourn was convicted on a legally tenable theory of law.  Nourn

was convicted of  aiding and abetting a second degree murder on an implied malice theory. (See

Lodgement No. 1., Vol. 2, at 464). California law permits an aider and abettor to be convicted of

second degree murder while the perpetrator was convicted of first degree murder. See People v.

Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1570, 1581 (1992.)

The California Penal Code defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being... with

malice aforethought.” Cal. Penal Code § 187.  Malice is “implied, when no considerable provocation

appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”

Cal. Penal Code § 188. The statute also defines first degree murder, and clarifies that “[a]ll other

kinds of murder are of the second degree.” Cal. Penal Code § 189. California law holds persons who

aid and abet a crime, liable for that crime. See Cal. Penal Code § 31.  

The California Supreme Court has identified an aider and abettor as a person who, “acting

with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of

committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids,

promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th

248, 259 (1996) (citing People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561 (1984)). One who aids and abets a

specific intent crime must “share the specific intent of the perpetrator.”  Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 560.

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As parsed by the Court of Appeal, noted above, this confusing statement is applied to mean that the

aider and abettor must know “the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and give[] aid or

encouragementwith the intent or purpose offacilitating the perpetrator’s commission ofthe crime.”

Id. As explained above, Nourn demonstrated the requisite intent and aid to Barker. No Supreme

Court law invalidates Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction under the theory of aiding and

abetting a second degree murder, for which the perpetrator was convicted of a first degree killing.

Thus, the theory is neither untenable nor a subterfuge and the state court’s denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Court recommends this claim

be DENIED.

C. The Jury Instructions Did Not Violate Due Process

In her traverse, Nourn challenges the jury instructions claiming that they lacked “the mens

rea elements of aider and abettor liability as to whether Petitioner shared Barker’s murderous

intent.” (Traverse at 5.) Cryptically,Nourn also arguesthatthe trial court’sfailure to include a natural

and probable consequences instruction eliminated a viable theory on which she could have been

convicted. (Traverse at 6.) While Nourn’s appeals touched on this jury instruction argument, the

appeals court did not address Nourn’s argument in its written opinion affirming her conviction. (See

Lodgement 6.)

The trial court instructed the jury on the requisite mental state to convict Nourn of second

degree murder. At the close of trial, the court presented the jury with the instruction that “the

people must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that she acted with

particular intents and mental states. The instruction for each crime and the instructions for aiding

and abetting will explain for you the intent and mental states required.” (Calcrim 225 (excerpt); RT

at 688; CT 346.) The trial court clarified that “as to any crime where the people’s theory that Ms.

Nourn is guilty in thatshe aided and abetted Mr. Barker in the commission of the crime, the mental

states of specific intent and knowledge must be proved. The specific intent for aiding and abetting

and knowledge are explained in the instructionsfor aiding and abetting.” (Calcrim 252(excerpt); RT

at 692; CT at 350.) The trial court further instructed the jury that to find Nourn guilty as an aider and

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The court also instructed the jury on malice required for murder. “The people must prove that, one the

defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person; and, two, when the defendant acted, she had a

state of mind called malice aforethought.” (Calcrim 520; RT at 707; CT at 375.) The court explained that “[a] defendant

acts with malice or has that state of mind if, one, ... she intentionally committed an act; two, the natural consequences

of the act were dangerous to human life; three, at the time ... she acted, ... she knew the act was dangerous to human

life; and four, ...she deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (Id.) During deliberation the jury asked

for clarification regarding the natural consequences described in the implied malice instruction. The court responded

“[a]nother way to view the natural consequences of the act were dangerous to human life,” is that it is an act having a

high probability of death.” (CT at 395.)

14 09cv2456

abettor in Stevens’ murder they must find the following four elements: “one, the perpetrator ...

committed the crime; two, the defendant [Nourn] knew that the perpetrator [Barker] intended to

commit the crime; three, that before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant [Nourn]

intended to aid and abet the perpetrator [Barker] in committing the crime; ... [a]nd four, the

defendant’s [Nourn’s] words or conduct did, in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s [Barker’s]

commission of the crime.” (Calcrim 401, RT at 705; CT at 373.) The trial court instructed that

“[s]omeone aids and abets a crime if ...she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and ...she

specifically intends to, and does, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage or instigate the

perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (Id.)

1

To the extent that Nourn challenges the jury instructions issued on California accomplice

liability laws,this claim is not properly before the courtin a federal habeas proceeding. See 28U.S.C.

§ 2254; Gutierrez v.Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). However, a federal habeas court can

overturn a conviction "where the instruction 'by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.'" Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Cupp

v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Further, [an] omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155

(1977).  Additionally,the alleged error cannot be judged in isolation.  Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

72 (1991).  Rather, it must be considered in the context ofthe entire trialrecord and the instructions

as a whole.  Id.; see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343‐44 (1993) (finding that the right to

present a complete defense does not entitle a defendant to a particular set of jury instructions).

Eveniftherewas constitutional error,petitionermust establish prejudice. See Brecht v.Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).  This Court must determine, therefore, whether the aiding and abetting

instructions given violated Nourn’s due process rights.

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The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[i]nstructions that allow a jury to convict without finding

every element of the offense violate the In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),requirement that ‘every

fact necessary toconstitute the crime’must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Keating v.Hood,

191 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999). In such instances, constitutional erroris presumed, and the court

must determine whether that error was harmless. Id. This is not a Winship‐type case, however,

because the instructions did not omit any element of aiding and abetting or murder. The California

Supreme Court hasidentified an aider and abettor asfollows: an aider and abettor is a person who,

“acting with (1) knowledge ofthe unlawful purpose ofthe perpetrator; and (2)the intent or purpose

of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids,

promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th

248, 259 (1996) (citing People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561 (1984)). This court must accept the

California Supreme Court'sidentification ofthe elements ofthe offense. See Illinois v.Vitale, 447U.S.

410, 416 (1980); Newton v. Superior Court of California, 803 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.1986).

Nourn contendsthat the jury instructionsfailed to include the appropriate requisite mental

state to convict her of second degree murder. The Ninth Circuit analyzed a similar issue in Willard

v. People of State of California, 812 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1987). TheNinth Circuitreviewed an aiding

and abetting jury instruction held erroneous understate law because it failed to include California’s

requirement of specific intent. Upon reviewing this instruction, the Ninth Circuit failed to find a

violation of due process. The Ninth Circuit concluded that,

“[D]ue process‐‐independent of state law‐‐does not require that an aiding and abetting

charge contain a distinct instruction regarding specific intent. In Nye & Nissen v. United

States, 336U.S. 613 (1949),the Supreme Court upheld a conviction underthe federal aiding

and abetting statute. The Court found no error in the trial court's charge that one "'who

aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission of an act is as

responsible for that act as if he committed it directly,'" Id. at 618, even though the jurors

were given no further explanation of the terms involved, see id. at 628, (Murphy, J.,

dissenting); accord United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1380‐81 (1st Cir.1983). The Nye

&Nissen Courtwassatisfied thatthe "defendant'in some sort associate[d] himselfwith the

venture,that he participate[d] in it asin something that he wishe[d]to bring about,that he

[sought] by his action to make itsucceed.' " 336U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir.1938)); accord United States v. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d 1303,

1308‐09 (9th Cir.1982).” Willard v. People of State of Cal., 812 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the present case, Petitioner has not shown that the instruction that neglected “the mens rea

elements of aider and abettor liability as to whether Petitioner shared Barker’s murderous intent”

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so infected the entire trialthatthe resulting conviction violated herrightto due process. See Estelle,

502U.S. at 72; Traverse at 5.  Here,the trial court’sjury instructions comported with California aiding

and abetting law. See People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 259 (1996). The jury instructions properly

stated that Nourn had to know of Barker’s unlawful purpose to murder Stevens; Nourn must have

intended to aid, and actually aid, Barkerin that murder. (Calcrim 401(excerpt); RT at 705; CT at 373.)

FurthermoreNourn cannot demonstrate a violation of due process because, as  noted by the

appellate court, and in detail in the claim below, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find

thatNourn aided and abetted a second degreemurder. Asthe California Court of Appealfound, “the

jury could convict Nourn of second degree murder as an aider and abettor based upon evidence

[that:] (1) Barker either intended to kill the victim or intended to shoot the victim; (2) Nourn acted

to facilitate the commission of the offense; and (3) she did so with knowledge of Barker’s purpose

and the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, orfacilitating the commission ofthe offense.”

(Lodgement 6 at 17.) The appellate court further reasoned Nourn “knew Barker intended to kill

Stevens....WhenBarkersuggested he andNourn should end theirrelationship,she begged him, “No,

no, please I wantto stay with you.” (Lodgement 6 at 15.) Nourn agreed to do “anything you say” and

Barker instructed “the only way you stay with me isif you kill David or I kill David.” (Lodgement 6 at

15.) Barkerthen announced they must get his gun from his house. (Lodgement 6 at 15.) The appeals

court considered this to be “substantial evidence of Nourn’s knowledge of Barker’s intent to kill

Stevens and herliability as an aider and abettor ofthat crime.” Id.Nourn “lead ...[Barker]to Stevens,

and lured Stevens out of his home. She also acknowledged she was alone with Stevensforsignificant

periods of time prior to the murder and had numerous opportunities to prevent the

crime.”(Lodgement 6 at 17.)

Nourn also contends that the jury instructions prejudiced her because the jury was not

instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. (See Calcrim

402.)Nourn implicitly arguesthat had the natural and probable consequencestheory been provided

to the jury,she may have been found guilty of aiding and abetting an assault, a natural and probable

consequence ofwhich,wasDavid Stevens’ death.(See Traverse at 5 n.4, 6.) This argumentissimilarly

unavailing.

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Nourn cannot show that the trial court’s failure to give the natural and probable

consequences theory violated due process because the jury was instructed on the lesser included

offenses of involuntary manslaughter,simple assault, and simple battery. (Calcrim 580, 915, 960; RT

at 708‐712; CT at 377‐381.)  The jury wasinstructed furtherthat duress was a defense to involuntary

manslaughter. (Calcrim 3402.) Despite these instructions, the jury found Nourn guilty of aiding and

abetting a second degree murder. The jury rejected the opportunity to absolve Nourn of culpability

for Stevens’ death by holding her responsible for lesser included offenses. Instead, the jury

specifically concluded the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nourn wasresponsible

for a second degree murder.  

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on her claim asserting improper jury

instructions. Petitioner has notshown that the alleged "error, in the whole context of the particular

case, had a substantial and injurious effect orinfluence on the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507U.S. at 637.

Rather,the jurywas properly instructed asto the elements of aiding and abetting liability. In addition

to second degree murder,the jury was also instructed on both lesserincluded offenses and a duress

defense that would have negated Nourn’s culpability for Stevens’ murder. Nonetheless, the jury

rejected this theory. Petitioner cannot demonstrate any violation of due process because the jury

declined  to convict Nourn of manslaughter or assault, and similarly rejected the corresponding

defense of duress. The Court recommends this claim be DENIED.

D. There Was Substantial Evidence To Support A Second Degree Murder Conviction

Nourn contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict her of second

degreemurder because she did notshare Barker’sintentto commit premeditatedmurder.(Petition,

Points and Authorities, at 51.)

On appeal to the state court, Nourn challenged the sufficiency of evidence upon which she

was convicted. The California Court of Appeal denied Nourn’s appeal. She then filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court which denied her petition without comment.(Lodgement 8.)

The last reasoned state decision which addressed the merits of the claim is the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion affirming Nourn’s conviction on a second degree implied murder theory.

(Lodgement 6.) It is to that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805‐06.

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Petitioner claimsthat there is no substantial evidence to support hersecond degree murder

conviction. Specifically Nourn challengesthat “the evidence failed to prove appellant had subjective

awareness or conscious disregard for Stevens’ life sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find her

guilty of implied malice murder.” (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 51.)

The Court of Appeal denied this claim, holding:

A “conviction ofsecond degree murder, based upon a theory of implied malice,

requires proof that the defendant acted with a conscious disregard of a known

danger to human life. Thus the jury could convict Nourn of second degree

murder as an aider and abettor based upon evidence (1) Barker eitherintended

to killthe victimorintended to shootthe victim;(2)Nourn acted to facilitate the

commission of the offense; and (3) she did so with knowledge of Barker’s

purpose and the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating

the commission ofthe offense. ...There issubstantial evidence, based upon her

statements to the police, that Nourn knew Barker intended to kill Stevens and

participated in his plan. Barker was only able to complete the crime with

Nourn’s assistance. She led him to Stevens, and lured Stevens out of his home.

She also acknowledged she was alone with Stevens for significant periods of

time priorto themurder and had numerous opportunitiesto preventthe crime.

However Nourn failed to warn Stevens or take any other action to prevent the

murder. She deliberately acted in conscious disregard for Stevens’s(sic) life and

wasintimately involved in facilitating, encouraging and instigating each state of

the events leading up to the murder. Her actions thus provide substantial

evidence she aided the murder of Stevens.” (Lodgement 6 at 16‐17.)   The appellate court also concluded that the three elements of aider and abettorliability,

“(a)the direct perpetrator’s actusreus, (b) the aider and abettor’s mensrea (knowledge

of the perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful

ends) and (c) the aider and abettor’s actusreus”  were met because Nourn “knew Barker

intended to kill Stevens, and aided and abetted inBarker’s commission ofthat crime.” (Id.

at 14‐15.) The court implicitly noted Nourn’s mental state of implied malice and

knowledge that Barker wanted to kill Stevens by pointing specifically to Nourn’s actions

of begging Barkerto not end the relationship, Barker’s clearstatement that to keep their

relationship alive “either you [Nourn] kill David or I kill David, and Nourn’sresponse that

“I do anything you say.” (Id. at 15.) Finally, Barker indicated that he needed to go to his

house for his gun. (Id.) The appeals court considered this to be “substantial evidence of

Nourn’s knowledge of Barker’s intent to kill Stevens and her liability as an aider and

abettor of that crime.” Id.

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In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the court must determine whether any

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright

v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 290 (1992); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Mikes v.

Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1991).  In making this determination, the Court is not

authorized “to ask itself whetherit believesthatthe evidence atthe trial established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443U.S. at 318‐19.  The courtmust view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and must presume the trier

of factresolved conflicting evidence in favor ofthe prosecution.  Wright v. West, 505U.S.

at 296‐97; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 908‐09

(9th Cir. 1994). If the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, the remedy is to

grant an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, barring retrial of Petitioner.  See Burks v.

United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978).

Under California law, “[s]econd degree murder isthe unlawful killing of a human

being with malice aforethought but withoutthe additional elements,such as willfulness,

premeditation, anddeliberation,thatwould support a conviction offirst degreemurder.”

People v. Knoller, 41 Cal.4th 139, 151 (2007); People v. Nieto Benitez, 4 Cal.4th 91, 102

(1992). “Malice, for the purpose of defining murder, may be express or implied.” Nieto

Benitez, 4 Cal.4th at 102; Knoller, 41 Cal.4th at 151;see Cal. Penal Code § 188. Malice “is

impliedwhennoconsiderable provocationappears, orwhen the circumstances attending

the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Cal. Penal Code § 188. When it is

established that a killing was the result of an intentional act committed with express or

implied malice, “no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state as

malice aforethought.” Id.

“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with

knowledge ofthe unlawful purpose ofthe perpetrator,(ii) and with the intent or purpose

of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice,

aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates the commission of the crime.” People v.

Richardson, 43 Cal.4th 959, 1023 (2008); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164 (1991).

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The intent to render such aid must be formed prior to or during the commission of the

crime. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d at 1164. A person may be convicted of murder based on his

status as an aider and abettor. Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 976‐77 (9th Cir.1999);

People v. Woods, 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1583‐84(1992).

The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a conviction, Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957‐58 (2004), and a federal courtin a habeas corpus proceeding

cannotredetermine the credibility ofwitnesseswhomthe federal courthasnotobserved.

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Rather, “[t]he reviewing court must

respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve

evidentiary conflicts, and drawreasonable inferencesfromproven facts by assuming that

the jury resolved all conflictsin a manner thatsupportsthe verdict.” Jones v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997).

Detective James Tefet testified that he interviewed Nourn once she had

contacted the police department about the murder. (RT at 130.) The second interview

between Nourn and Detective Tefet was recorded. (RT at 131.) The recorded interview

revealed Nourn’s verison of the eventssurrounding the murder. (RT 130‐131; CT at 225‐

317.) Nourn admited that Barker was waiting for her when she returned from Stevens’

apartment on the night of December 22, 1998. (CT at 280.) Barker questioned her about

where she had been, and once she claimed Stevensraped her, Barkerthreatened to end

the relationship. (CT at 260.) Previously the same evening, Stevens had told Nourn he

wantedanexclusive relationshipwith her.(CT at 257.)Nonetheless,NournbeggedBarker

“no please don’t do this... I love you.” (CT at 260.)  Barker immediately began raging “I’m

going to kill him [Stevens].” (CT at 262.) Barker appeared to reconsider his threats, and

Nourn persisted, begging Barker “no please I want to stay with you.” (CT at 263.)

Barker told Nourn the “only way you stay with me is if you kill David or I kill

David.” (CT at 263.) Nourn confirmed “I do anything you say.” (CT at 264.) Barker and

Nourn then traveled to Barker’s house, afterNourn asked himif he had a gun.(CT at 264.)

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Nourn and Stevens then proceeded to Stevens apartment. (CT at 264.) Nourn

admitted thatshe was alone with Stevensin his car aftershe and Barkertraveled back to

his apartment. (CT at 264.) Nourn followed Barker’s devised plan and asked Stevens to

pull over when Barker “blinked” his  lights. (CT at 266).  Nourn introduced Stevens to

Barker as her brother.(CT at 267.)  When Barker pulled outthe gun after entering the car,

Nourn only then asked Barker “what are you doing.” (CT at 269.) Only after the murder

did Nourn confess to Barker that Stevens did not rape her. (CT at 262.)

The detective asked Nourn “Did you ever tell Ron [Barker] to kill him?” Nourn

responded “No, I just told him, you do what you have to do. But then again I don’t want

you to kill him.” (CT at 300.)

Detective Tefet also recorded calls between Barker andNourn.(RT at 146.)On the

calls Barker threatened Nourn that he would go to the police to confess to the murder

and implicate Nourn. (CT at 324.) Barker continuously asserted that Nourn would be

responsible for Stevens’ murder. (CT at 324‐325.) Barker told Nourn “you want me to do

it... You ask me to do this job... now you change your story Ny.” (CT at 325.)

Detective JohnYoung testified that he spokewithNournafterthemurderbecause

her number was on Stevens’ answering machine. (RT at 174.) They talked for “no more

than two minutes” and Nourn only asserted that “she was an employee at Perfect Match

and she worked for David Stevens.” (RT at 175.) Detective Young described her tone of

voice as “calm, [and] nonchalant.” (RT at 176.) Nourn mentioned nothing about the

murder. (RT at 174‐75.)

Here, as the California Court of Appeal found, there was ample evidence from

which the jury could determine Petitioner possessed the requisite implied malice and

knowledge of Barker’s plan to convict her of aiding and abetting a second degreemurder.

This evidence is more than sufficient to support Petitioner's second degree murder

conviction. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir.1998); People v. Gonzales,

87 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10‐11 (2001). Nourn knew Barker had a gun in his possession and

wanted Stevens dead. Furthermore,Nourn’s own statementstoBarkerillustrate thatshe

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agreed to “do anything” Barker demanded to keep their relationship alive, which

implicitlymeant Stevens had to die. There was ample evidence fromwhich the jury could

find that Nourn intended to aid Barker, knowing Barker’s purpose, and consequently

acted in reckless disregard of Stevens’ life. Accordingly, the appeals court's denial of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. The Court recommends this claim be DENIED.

E. Petitioner’s Counsel Was Not Ineffective

Nourn contends that her counsel provided ineffective assistance entitling her to

habeasrelieffortwo reasons:first,that he failed to objectto prosecution’s argumentthat

allegedly violated the due process clause (Petition, Points and Authorities, at 31); and

second, because he failed to object to a purported legally untenable theory of liability.

(Petition at 8.)

The Court of Appeal declined to consider Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim on appeal. It noted that “because we conclude that no double jeopardy

principleswere implicatedinthis case,we need notreachNourn’s contention her counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing tomake a double jeopardy argument

at trial.” (Lodgement 6 at 12 n.4.) Nourn then filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court which denied her petition without comment. (Lodgement 8.) The last

reasoned state decision which addressed the merits of the claim is the California Court

of Appeal’s opinion affirming the trial judgment. (Lodgement 6.) Itisto that decision that

this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805‐6.  

A claimof ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claimof denial ofthe

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v.Washington, 466U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark

for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. The right to effective assistance counsel

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appliesto the performance of both retained and appointed counsel without distinction.

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344‐45 (1980).

Toprevailona SixthAmendmentineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitionermust

establish two things. First, she must establish that her counsel's performance was

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687‐88. Second,she must establish

that she was prejudiced by her counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The Strickland

framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is considered to be

"clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States" forthe purposes of 28U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. SeeWilliams(Terry) v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 404‐08 (2000). It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas

ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the

petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v.

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, the record reflects that Petitioner's counsel thoughtfully considered the

prosecutions theory of liability, carefully reviewed jury instructions, and diligently

presented appropriatemotionslike themotion to acquit petitioner ofmurder. Petitioner

does not present any evidence that her counsel made errors. Nor does Petitioner show

that her counsel was unreasonable in making decisions. Thus, Petitioner has not

overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within reasonable

professional norms.

Because Nourn cannot identify any conduct by which her counsel failed to meet

reasonable professional norms, and the Court of Appeal properly found that there were

no issuesraised to which counselshould have objected on double jeopardy groundsthe

Court recommends that this claim be DENIED.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 16, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties.  The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than July 30, 2010. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order.  Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED:  June 14, 2010

    Hon. William V. Gallo     U.S. Magistrate Judge

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