Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01198/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

VERSIAH M. TAYLOR,

 Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN W.T. TAYLOR, et al.,

 Respondents.

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Case Number: 1:15-cv-01198-KOB-JHE 

 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Petitioner Versiah M. Taylor (“Petitioner” or “Taylor”), a federal inmate, is currently 

incarcerated at the Talladega Federal Correctional Institution, in Talladega, Alabama, (“FCI 

Talladega”), where he is serving a sentence for Conspiracy to File False Claims, Wire Fraud, and 

Aiding and Abetting. (Docs. 2 & 10-1). Taylor’s projected release date is May 28, 2032, via 

good conduct release. (Id.). Taylor’s petition challenges his temporary assignment to 

administrative detention during the investigation of a suspected disciplinary infraction. (See doc. 

2). Taylor alleges it was an abuse of process to hold him in administrative detention when no 

disciplinary action was subsequently taken at the conclusion of the investigation. (Id. at 3-4). 

Taylor requests the court order the warden “to determine whether [he] should be released into 

general population and upon any decision in the negative to provide an adequate investigation as 

to the exculpatory evidence [he’s] pointed out and provide honest results in prompt manner.” 

(Id. at 8). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus be DENIED. 

FILED

 2016 Jul-12 PM 03:14

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. Background

The special housing unit—also referred to as the SHU—is a segregated housing unit 

where inmates are placed either for administrative or disciplinary purposes when they need to be 

removed from general population. 28 C.F.R. § 541.22. An inmate is placed in administrative 

detention when the inmate’s continued presence in general population poses a serious threat to 

life, property, self, staff, other inmates, or to the security or orderly running of the institution. 

Id.at § 541.22(a). Specifically, § 541.23(c)(1) provides an inmate can be placed in the special 

housing unit when “[he is] under investigation or awaiting a hearing for possibly violating a 

Bureau regulation or criminal law[.]” 

In this case, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials suspected Taylor had used a cell phone 

to contact a law firm during his incarceration. (Doc. 10-2 at ¶3). BOP policies prohibit cell 

phone use by inmates during their incarceration. (Id.; doc. 2 at ¶12). While BOP officials 

investigated the suspected rule violation, Taylor was temporarily placed in the special housing 

unit. (Doc. 10-2 at ¶4). At the conclusion of the investigation, Taylor was released back into 

general population. (Id.). 

II. Procedural History

In response to the court’s order to show cause, (doc. 5), Respondents have filed an 

answer in which they argue the petition is due to be dismissed because Taylor has failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies, Taylor’s claims are moot because he has been released from 

administrative detention, and Taylor’s claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus action. 

(Doc. 10). By order, the court advised the parties Respondents’ answer would be treated as a 

motion for summary dismissal and further advised Taylor of his right to file affidavits or other 

materials in opposition to the motion for summary dismissal and of the possible consequences of 

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not responding. (Doc. 11). In response, Taylor has filed a “Motion to Strike Affidavits, Deny 

Affirmative Defense and Order Respondents to Answer Petitioner’s Pleading Truthfully in its 

Entirety and Thereafter Petitioner Asks the Court to Construe the Appropriate Vehicle for 

Relief,” (doc. 12), and “Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record with New Evidence and 

Addendum Argument,” (doc. 13). More recently, Taylor has filed a “Motion for Leave to 

Renew Motion for Service Provider Records and To Supplement Record with Addendum 

Documentation in Support of Exhaustion.” (Doc. 16).

Taylor’s motion to strike, etc., (doc. 12), is DENIED. Taylor argues the affidavits fail to 

recognize or omit certain actions he took during the grievance process. (Doc. 12 at 1-2). 

Generally, an affidavit offered in support of summary judgment must be based on personal 

knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is 

competent to testify to the matters stated. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). As Taylor has not challenged 

the affidavits on any of these grounds, his motion is denied. Taylor’s motion for leave to 

supplement the record, (doc. 13), is GRANTED. 

Taylor’s most recent motion regarding service provider records and supplementation, 

(doc. 16), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Taylor’s request to renew his 

motion for service provider records is DENIED because such records are not necessary to 

evaluate his claims. Taylor’s request that the undersigned consider his “supplemental 

attachment,” (doc. 16 at 4-7), is GRANTED, and these records are considered below. 

III. Analysis

A. Failure to Exhaust

It is well-established that an inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies before

seeking relief in federal court via a § 2241 petition. Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th 

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Cir. 2004); United States v. Mitchell, 845 F.2d 951, 953 (11th Cir. 1988) (federal district court 

lacks jurisdiction over federal prisoner’s petition for jail time credit when prisoner has not 

exhausted his administrative remedies). The BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program, which 

applies to all inmates confined in institutions operated by the BOP, is set out in 28 C.F.R. § 

542.10 et seq. The three-tiered review process begins with the inmate filing a form that 

describes his complaint as well as the requested remedy. This “initial filing” is submitted to the 

warden at the institution where the inmate is confined (“BP-9”). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(c)(1), (4). 

The Warden then responds to the inmate’s formal complaint. If dissatisfied with the Warden’s 

response, the inmate may appeal to the Regional Director (“BP-10”). 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If 

dissatisfied with the response from the Regional Director, the inmate may appeal to the General 

Counsel (“BP-11”). Id. Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal under 

the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program. Id.

Respondents assert Taylor failed to timely submit a BP-11 to the BOP prior to instituting 

this habeas action on July 16, 2015, and, therefore, the petition is due to be dismissed for failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies. (See doc. 10 at 3 & doc. 13). Taylor contends his efforts to 

exhaust administrative remedies were “frustrated” by BOP officials and his BP-11 was returned 

from the Office of General Counsel on November 4, 2015. (Doc. 13). Records indicate the 

Regional Director received Taylor’s BP-10 on August 4, 2015. (Doc. 13 at 7-8). Therefore, 

even if Taylor filed his BP-11 immediately after receiving the Regional Director’s response, 

Taylor’s BP-11 would have been untimely, as it was submitted after he instituted his habeas 

action. Taylor’s “supplemental attachment” indicates he filed his Central Office Administrative 

Remedy Appeal on or about September 28, 2015. (Doc. 16 at 5). Because Taylor failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action, his petition is due to be dismissed. 

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Alternatively, Taylor’s petition is due to be dismissed because his claims are moot and 

because his claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus action.

B. Mootness

Even if Taylor had timely exhausted his administrative remedies, he would not be entitled 

to habeas relief. The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases or

controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). The 

controversy must be present at all stages of review. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 

520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997). A federal court has no authority to render a decision upon moot 

questions or to declare rules of law that cannot affect the matter at issue. Church of Scientology 

v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992).

A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live, or when the parties 

lack a cognizable interest in the outcome. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (throughout 

the litigation, plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to 

the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision”); Lane v. Williams, 455 

U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (holding that habeas petitions were moot after prisoners’ sentences expired

and where prisoners had attacked only their sentences).

Taylor’s challenge to his temporary assignment to administrative detention is moot 

because he is currently in the general population. On July 25, 2015, Taylor was released from 

administrative detention following the conclusion of the investigation that resulted in his 

temporary assignment to the special housing unit. (Doc. 10-2 at ¶ 4). As such, Taylor is no 

longer subject to the conditions about which he complains. Any order addressing Taylor’s 

confinement in the special housing unit would not impact him, as he is no longer there. Taylor

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has received the relief that he requested, in that he has been released from the special housing 

unit. Because no further relief can be provided by this court on this issue, Taylor’s claim is moot.

C. Not Cognizable in a Habeas Corpus Action

Taylor’s petition is also due to be dismissed because his claim is not cognizable in a 

habeas corpus action. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon 

the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from 

illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The only relief that can be 

gained in a habeas action is an immediate or speedier release from custody. See Rose v. Mitchell, 

443 U.S. 545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring with the judgment and noting that “the very 

purpose of the Great Writ is to provide some means by which the legality of an individual’s 

incarceration may be tested.”); see also Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(“The writ of habeas corpus extends only to custody and detention; it cannot address collateral or 

ancillary forms of administrative relief.”); Cook v. Hanberry, 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979) 

(noting that “the sole function of habeas corpus is to provide relief from unlawful imprisonment 

or custody, and it cannot be used to any other purpose.”).

Taylor does not seek an immediate or speedier release from custody. (See doc. 2). His 

challenge to a temporary assignment to administrative detention pending an investigation is 

therefore outside the scope of habeas relief. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 

(11th Cir. 2003) (dismissing as moot a petition where “[a]ppellant has not shown that the

disciplinary proceeding will affect the length of his confinement” and he had already been 

released from disciplinary segregation). Rather, Taylor attacks the circumstances, not the fact, of 

his confinement, and therefore his claims do not fall within the scope of a habeas corpus 

proceeding and should be dismissed.

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Furthermore, Taylor’s temporary assignment to administrative detention does not rise to 

the level of a significant and atypical hardship and therefore does not implicate the due process 

clause sufficient to warrant other relief. See, e.g., Portley El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th 

Cir. 2002); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 13 (6th Cir. 1998) (administrative segregation over 

900 days not “atypical”); Griffin v. Vaughan, 112 F.3d 703, 706 09 (3d Cir. 1997) (15 month 

administrative segregation was within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed); accord 

Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (placement in segregation, even without 

cause, is not itself an atypical and significant hardship, nor is the absence of contact visitation, 

exercise privileges, and chapel rights for 37 days); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 

1997).

IV. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Respondents= motion for 

summary dismissal be GRANTED, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED. 

V. Notice of Right to Object

Any party may file specific written objections to this report and recommendation. Any 

objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) calendar days from the date 

the report and recommendation is entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of 

fact and recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except for plain error. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 

(1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should 

specifically identify all claims contained in the petition which the report and recommendation 

fails to address. Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

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repeat legal arguments. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections on each other 

party to this action.

On receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objection is made 

and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings of fact and recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge. The district judge must conduct a hearing if required by law. 

Otherwise, the district judge may exercise discretion to conduct a hearing or otherwise receive 

additional evidence. Alternately, the district judge may consider the record developed before the 

magistrate judge, making an independent determination on the basis of that record. The district 

judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate judge with instructions for further 

proceedings.

A party may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation directly to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. A party may only appeal from a final 

judgment entered by a district judge.

DONE this 12th day of July 2016.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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