Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01344/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01344-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK ANTHONY MORENO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

D. MEDINA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:08-cv-1344-JAM-EFB P 

ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C § 1983.1

 The case was before the court on March 19, 2014, for hearing on Defendant 

Medina’s motion to modify the scheduling order to extend the time within which he may file a 

supplemental motion for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 121, 122. Deputy Attorney General 

Lawrence Bragg appeared at the hearing on behalf of defendant; plaintiff appeared pro se via 

video-conference. As stated on the record, and for the reasons provided below, the schedule will 

be modified but defense counsel shall also show cause why monetary sanctions should not be 

imposed for defendant’s failure to comply with this court’s previous scheduling orders and Rule 

16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 1

 Upon screening plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court 

determined that plaintiff had stated a claim that defendants Medina, James, Waterman, and 

Hitchcock were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that Medina had also 

retaliated against him. ECF No. 12. 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 1 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

I. Background 

 Over four years ago, the court issued the initial scheduling order for this case on June 9, 

2009. ECF No. 36. That order required that dispositive motions be filed no later than December 

18, 2009, and warned that requests to modify the schedule would be looked upon with disfavor 

and must be supported by good cause pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Id. 

 On September 18, 2009, defendants filed their first motion to modify the schedule. ECF 

No. 42. Defendants requested the modification because despite their diligence, their deposition of 

plaintiff was delayed. The court extended the time for deposing plaintiff, and as a result, had to 

also extend the deadline for filing dispositive motions, to January 29, 2010. ECF No. 43. 

 On January 28, 2010, defendants Medina, James, and Hitchcock timely moved for 

summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims.2 ECF No. 49. The court denied that motion 

without prejudice in light of plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) (now 56(d)), request for additional time to 

complete discovery. ECF No. 74. The court permitted defendants to either renew their previous 

motion, or file an amended motion for summary judgment. Id. On February 28, 2011, after the 

completion of discovery, defendants renewed their original motion for summary judgment. ECF 

No. 87. No new briefing was filed with the notice renewing the motion. 

 On June 29, 2012, the court issued findings and recommendations recommending that 

defendants’ motion be granted as to plaintiff’s claim that defendants James, Medina, and 

Hitchcock violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by confiscating his medical devices and 

chronos on June 4, 2008, but denied as to plaintiff’s remaining claims against defendants James 

and Medina. ECF No. 99. While those findings and recommendations were pending, defendants 

made their first request for leave to file a third summary judgment motion. ECF No. 100. 

///// 

///// 

///// 

 2

 Defendant Waterman had previously been dismissed after plaintiff failed to effect 

service of process. ECF No. 48. 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 2 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

Notwithstanding the language of Rule 56 (c)(1)(A)3, defendants argued that they could not 

reasonably foresee that the court would consider evidence of record not filed with the summary 

judgment motion or opposition (rather, filed in response to another motion on the docket) in 

determining defendants’ entitlement to summary judgment. Defendants stated that they could 

dispose of the deliberate indifference claims on which the court recommended denial of summary 

judgment through their filing of a third summary judgment motion. 

 On August 9, 2012 the court reluctantly granted defendants’ request to file a third 

summary judgment motion. ECF No. 105. The request was not granted because of any showing 

of due diligence by defense counsel but instead due to considerations of judicial economy, i.e., 

avoiding an unnecessary jury trial in a district with a severely impacted caseload.4

 

 On September 10, 2012, defendants filed their third motion for summary judgment. ECF 

No. 109. The motion only addressed plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

claims; it did not address the First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Medina. Id. 

On September 5, 2013, the court granted defendants’ motion, leaving the retaliation claim against 

Medina as the sole remaining claim. ECF No. 117. 

///// 

///// 

///// 

 3

 The rule provides that: “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 

must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular part of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or 

other materials.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”) 

4

 The court also addressed a new Ninth Circuit case, Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th 

Cir. 2012), which required that defendants provide pro se prisoner plaintiffs with notice of the 

requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion at the time they file their motions. 

Accordingly, the court vacated the pending findings and recommendations and instructed 

defendants to re-file and re-notice the motion (along with their requested supplementation) 

together with the contemporaneous notification of summary judgment standards required by 

Woods. ECF No. 105. 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 3 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

II. Medina’s Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order to Allow for the Filing of a 

Fourth Summary Judgment Motion 

 On September 13, 2012, a notice was filed on behalf of defendant informing the court that 

a different attorney in the California Attorney General’s office was assigned to the case in place 

of the previous attorney, Tracy Hendrickson. ECF No. 119. Thereafter, the newly-assigned 

deputy attorney general sought leave to modify the scheduling order and file, yet another, 

summary judgment motion. ECF Nos. 121, 122. Defendant represented that the remaining claim 

in this action, the retaliation claim against Medina, can be disposed of through a summary 

judgment motion. However, the only argument in support of defendant’s claim of good cause for 

again modifying the scheduling order is that “[d]efendant Medina has solid arguments” and that 

entertaining the motion will prevent an unnecessary jury trial. ECF No. 122 at 3-4. While the 

court has no interest in proceeding with a jury trial in an action where there are no genuine 

disputes of material fact, as stated at the hearing on this motion the court is not willing to ignore 

or suspend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to accommodate a party’s or its counsel’s 

inability or unwillingness to adhere to the rules and comply with court orders. 

 Rule 16 provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with 

the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Good cause is shown where the schedule cannot 

be complied with despite the diligence of the party seeking modification. Thus, the good cause 

standard focuses primarily on the diligence of the requesting party. Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, 975 F.2 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). There has been no explanation as to why 

defendant Medina’s current argument could not have been included in any of the three prior 

motions seeking summary judgment. Indeed, the instant motion argues that Medina should be 

granted summary judgment for much of the same reasons that other defendants were granted 

summary judgment. ECF No. 122 at 2-3.5

 Obviously, counsel for defendants has not taken 

seriously the requirements of Rule 16 and this court’s scheduling orders. 

///// 

 5

 However, at oral argument counsel speculated that his predecessor in the case may have 

reviewed the file and decided not to pursue summary judgment as to Medina. 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 4 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

 The procedural history here demonstrates that counsel for defendants have already had 

three opportunities to file summary judgment motions. Defendants’ January 28, 2010 and 

February 28, 2011 motions for summary judgment addressed the retaliation claim. The court 

explained its reasons for recommending denial of summary judgment on the retaliation claim in 

its June 29, 2012 findings and recommendations. Despite the opportunity to again seek summary 

judgment on this claim in a third motion, defendants’ September 10, 2012 motion failed to 

address it. As explained at the hearing, the court will, again, modify the scheduling order and 

consider Medina’s motion on its merits, notwithstanding the complete lack of diligence shown by 

defense counsel’s predecessor in the California Attorney General’s Office. The docket of the 

assigned district judge, who will be tasked with presiding over a jury trial in this matter, has no 

room for matters that should have been efficiently resolved by summary judgment. But the court 

cannot countenance the utter disregard of Rule 16 and the court’s scheduling orders.6 The 

appropriate remedy, however, is not to burden a jury panel and an overburdened trial judge with 

an unnecessary trial. Nonetheless, when rules and orders are ignored, fairness and appropriate 

case management call for some consequence. 

 Defense counsel and the Office of the Attorney General’s continued reliance on “judicial 

economy” as a substitute for the good cause showing demanded by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure distorts the burden counsel must meet, frustrates the court’s ability to schedule 

this case and manage its heavy docket, and manifests no appreciation for why Rule 16 exists in 

the first place. Indeed, at oral argument counsel stated that if the court was considering monetary 

sanctions then he wanted to withdraw the motion, and further suggested that there was some irony 

that he might be sanctioned for suggesting a schedule modification consistent with judicial 

economy. The argument misses the point entirely. Of course cases that can be resolved by 

appropriate summary judgment motions should be so resolved. Indeed, it was defense counsel’s 

obligation to timely present any appropriate pretrial dispositive motion within the time prescribed 

 6

 Indeed, as counsel was informed at oral argument, this court has previously dismissed 

pro se inmates’ complaints as a sanction for failure to comply with the federal and local rules 

and/or court orders. There is no reason to extend greater leniency to the Office of the California 

Attorney General. 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 5 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

by the Rule 16 scheduling order. Not appreciated by counsel is that there were at least three 

previous opportunities to do so and it was never done. Moreover, there is no attempt to explain 

why the Office of the California Attorney General could not properly file the motion on behalf of 

its client, Medina, despite exercising due diligence. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

In this case, the principles of judicial economy necessitate the requested schedule 

modification, but do not excuse defense counsel’s total lack of diligence and failure to comply 

with Rule 16 and the court’s scheduling order. Accordingly, counsel is ordered to show cause 

why monetary sanctions should not be imposed to deter similar litigation practices in the future. 

III. Order 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendant Medina’s motion to modify the scheduling order to extend the time within 

which he may file a fourth motion for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 121, 122) is granted. 

2. Medina’s summary judgment motion shall be filed no later than April 2, 2014. 

3. Plaintiff’s response to Medina’s motion shall be filed no later than May 5, 2014. 

4. Defense counsel shall show cause, within 14 days, why monetary sanctions should not be 

imposed for his (or his predecessor’s) failure to comply with this court’s scheduling order 

and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

DATED: March 21, 2014. 

 

Case 2:08-cv-01344-JAM-EFB Document 128 Filed 03/21/14 Page 6 of 6