Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01266/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Danny Hernandez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 15-01266-PHX-DGC (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Danny Hernandez (“Petitioner” or “Hernandez”), is currently 

incarcerated in the in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Buckeye, Arizona, serving a 

34 year imprisonment sentence arising from convictions in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court, case #CR97-010568, for second degree murder and reckless child abuse. 

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) on July 7, 2015, and an Amended Petition (“Amended 

Petition) (Doc. 7) on August 11, 2015. In an August 19, 2015 Order (Doc. 8), the Court 

required an answer to the Amended Petition. Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 

17) asserting that the Petition should be dismissed. Petitioner requested an extension of 

time to reply (Doc. 18), which the Court granted (Doc. 19). Petitioner filed a timely 

Reply (Doc. 20), and without requesting leave or giving reason therefore, Petitioner 

improperly filed a slightly longer second reply (Doc. 21), which was also timely under 

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the extension the Court had granted if Petitioner had not already filed a reply (Doc. 19). 

For the reasons below, undersigned recommends that the Petition be denied as untimely 

because it was filed on July 7, 2015, over 8 years after AEDPA’s 1-year statute of 

limitations expired. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence 

Respondent informs that Petitioner was first charged in juvenile court and there 

was a transfer from juvenile court to adult court (Doc. 17 at p. 7). Thereafter, on October 

8, 1997, the State charged Petitioner with first degree murder, three counts of child abuse, 

and one count each of forgery and false reporting (Exhibit D, Doc. 17-2 at p. 1-4).1

 The 

jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder, a class 1 felony and dangerous 

crime against children, and two counts of reckless child abuse, class 3 felonies (Exhibit 

E, Doc. 17-2 at p. 5-8). 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 34 years of imprisonment after finding 

several aggravating circumstances, including Petitioner’s history of abuse of the infant 

prior to the murder, his continued criminal activity after the murder, and his history of 

violence and long juvenile record (Exhibit F, Doc. 17-2 at p. 9- 28). The court also noted 

that Petitioner committed crimes while on release in other cases and that the community 

was in need of protection from him (Id.). The court imposed an aggravated term of 27 

years in prison for the murder charge, and aggravated 7-year terms on each count of child 

abuse, the first count to run concurrently with the murder charge but the second to run 

consecutively (Id.). Petitioner was also convicted by guilty plea to a misconduct 

involving weapons Class 4 felony which occurred in 2000; the sentence was ordered to 

run concurrently to one of the child abuse convictions and was a lesser sentence than the 

child abuse sentence (Id.) The misconduct with weapons charge is not at issue in the 

Amended Petition. 

 

1

 The referenced alphabetical exhibits were submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer, Doc. 10. The document and page references herein are to this Court’s electronic 

record. 

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B. Underlying Facts

On December 24, 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals set forth the relevant facts 

from trial, which this Court presumes to be correct:2

Hernandez lived in an apartment with his girlfriend, her mother 

(“Grandmother”), and the eight-month old victim, Angelica. Hernandez 

and his girlfriend were Angelica’s parents. Janson “Jay” Simms, a 

homeless person, lived in the apartment temporarily at the invitation of 

Grandmother. 

The week before the events giving rise to the charges, Angelica appeared 

fine as she visited with her great-grandparents. She did not typically cry, 

but had been crying sporadically because of teething pain. On the morning 

of the crime, Grandmother awakened and played with Angelica, who acted 

fine. Grandmother then drove Angelica’s mother to work and returned 

home. She played with Angelica again, who continued to seem fine. 

Grandmother eventually went to work at approximately 9:30 that morning. 

When she left the apartment, Angelica was in the bedroom with Hernandez. 

When Grandmother called home between approximately 11:30 and noon to 

check on Angelica, there was no answer. She called again a few minutes 

later and spoke to Hernandez, who stated that he had been home all 

morning but did not hear the telephone ringing. As she spoke to 

Hernandez, Grandmother heard Angelica crying in the background. She 

described the crying as a “fussy, hurting type [of] crying,” which she 

attributed to teething, although Angelica had not been crying, nor was she 

“fussy”, before Grandmother went to work. 

At approximately 12:30 p.m., law enforcement officers were called to the 

apartment complex to check on a report of a crying baby. The officers did 

not locate the child. As the officers walked through the complex, they 

encountered Simms, who was returning to the second floor apartment. 

Although asked, Simms could provide no information regarding a crying 

baby. 

 

2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made 

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”) See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 

546–47 (1981) (holding that the federal court is required to give deference to findings of fact made by the state courts, and this presumption of correctness applies to facts found by both trial and appellate courts. The petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Williams v. Rhoades, 354 

F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Simms entered the apartment, where he observed Hernandez take Angelica 

to the bedroom. A few minutes later, Simms entered the bathroom. While 

Simms was inside, Hernandez began to bang on the bathroom door, saying 

that Angelica had stopped breathing. Simms ran to Angelica and, believing 

she was choking, placed her over his shoulder and began applying 

percussions to her back. She spit up mucous and blood. Simms placed 

Angelica on the sofa and told Hernandez to call 911. Hernandez replied, 

“[N]o, don’t call 911, get her to breathe.” Simms ... recalled meeting the 

officers downstairs. Simms then ran out of the apartment onto the balcony 

and called for help. The officers heard him and responded by running 

upstairs to the apartment, where they found Angelica laying on a sofa and 

Hernandez standing behind it. 

Because Angelica was blue and had no pulse, the officers performed CPR 

until medical personnel arrived. The baby was thereafter taken to the 

hospital, where she was diagnosed with hypoxic eschemic encephalopathy. 

At trial, medical personnel described this condition as an injury to the brain 

due to lack of oxygen, caused when her heart stopped and she stopped 

breathing. The State also elicited testimony that eight-month-old children 

typically do not stop breathing for no reason, nor do their hearts usually 

stop for no reason. It would take a three to five minute deprivation of 

oxygen to stop an infant’s heart. Medical personnel found no evidence of 

any infarction or other medical reason that could have caused Angelica’s 

condition. 

Angelica also had ... a severely fractured right arm that had recently 

occurred. Medical experts opined that an eight-month-old child could not 

have caused this type of fracture. Angelica also had petechial 

hemorrhaging on her face. The presence of these hemorrhages suggested 

that Angelica had been suffocated. Additionally, the brain injury was 

consistent with suffocation, as was the fact that blood was present in 

Angelica’s mouth. No other explanation was given for Angelica’s brain 

injury. 

Angelica never regained consciousness and died five days after her 

admission to the hospital. The medical examiner opined that the arm 

fracture was not a result of accidental trauma, but was an inflicted injury. 

The cause of death was determined to be anoxic encephalopathy due to 

smothering. The manner of death was ruled a homicide. 

At the time of the crime, Hernandez knew he had an outstanding arrest 

warrant. Therefore, he concealed his true identity and gave the 

investigating officers the wrong name throughout their investigation. At 

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the request of Angelica’s mother, Grandmother misidentified Hernandez as 

well. At the time of Hernandez’s arrest, approximately one year after 

Angelica’s death, he provided several false names to investigating officers 

and signed a false name to his fingerprint card. 

The State theorized that Hernandez broke Angelica’s arm, causing her to 

cry. In turn, another resident heard the prolonged cries and called the 

police. Hernandez smothered Angelica in order to stop her crying, 

ostensibly to prevent the officers from coming to the apartment. While 

much of the evidence supporting Hernandez’s conviction is circumstantial, 

a conviction may be proven by such evidence. 

(Exhibit K, Doc. 17-2 at p. 131-135) (citations omitted). 

C. Direct Appeal 

On March 15, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the convictions 

and sentences (Exhibit G, Doc. 17-2 at p. 29-31). Petitioner raised four issues in his 

appeal: 1) Whether the trial court erred in not granting him a judgment of acquittal; 2) 

Whether the trial court erred in admitting Petitioner’s outstanding warrants; 3) Whether 

the trial court erred in admitting Petitioner’s subsequent arrest on unrelated charges; and 

4) Whether the trial court erred in admitting out-of-court statements of Janson Simms 

(Exhibit H, Doc. 17-2 at p. 32-80). The State filed an opposing brief (Exhibit I, Doc. 17-

2 at p. 81-113), and Petitioner filed a reply (Exhibit J, Doc. 17-2 at p. 114-128). On 

December 24, 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences (Exhibit K, Doc. 17-2 at p. 130-142). On February 7, 2002, the court of 

appeals issued the Order and Mandate (Exhibit L, Doc. 17-2 at p. 144-148). Respondents 

assert that Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court 

(Doc. 17 at p. 8-9), while Petitioner alleges that he did so, but he had no records of such 

and relief was denied without an opinion issued (Doc. 7 at p. 3). 

D. PCR Proceedings 

Petitioner filed three separate state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings, the 

first of which was timely but was denied. Petitioner sought review of the denial in both 

the state court of appeals and the state supreme court. No relief was granted. The second 

petition was arguably properly filed, but was denied. The third petition was untimely and 

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was denied as such. The court of appeals denied review of both the second and third 

petitions. Petitioner requested review by the state supreme court of the third untimely 

PCR petition, and review was denied on July 25, 2014. 

1. First PCR Proceedings 

Regarding the first and timely PCR proceeding, on January 25, 2002, Petitioner, 

though counsel, filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) (Exhibit M, Doc. 17-2 at 

p. 149-151). On July 3, 2002, represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (Exhibit N, Doc. 17-2 at p. 152-159). The petition presented an affidavit 

of Simms’ ex-girlfriend as newly discovered evidence; the affidavit claimed that Simms 

made statements about harm to the victim (Id.). Subsequently, Petitioner, through 

counsel, moved to amend the petition to include an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim (Exhibit O, Doc. 17-2 at p. 177-179). Through counsel, Petitioner filed an 

amended supplemental PCR petition for ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing 

to call a medical expert regarding Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”) (Exhibit P, 

Doc. 17-2 at p. 180-189). The state responded to the petition’s claims (Exhibit Q, Doc. 

17-2 at p. 190-195). On February 5, 2003, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR 

petition, finding his claims unsupported and not colorable (Exhibit R, Doc. 17-2 at 214-

215). On March 5, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (Exhibits S, T, Doc. 17-2 at p. 216-218, p. 219-227). On March 24, 2004, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for review (Exhibit U, Doc. 17-2 at p. 247-

248). Petitioner then filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, but that 

Court denied review on September 23, 2004 (Exhibit S Doc. 17-2 at p. 216-218). 

2. Second PCR Proceedings 

On January 19, 2005, Petitioner, through counsel, filed his second PCR notice 

(Exhibit V, Doc. 17-2 at p. 250-263). The trial court dismissed the PCR on February 3, 

2005; after noting the first PCR proceeding had been dismissed, the court stated as its 

reason for the dismissal of the second PCR proceeding: 

Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that any 

notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), 

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(f), (g) or (h). Defendant has not provided the court with any specifics 

excusing him from the timeliness requirement, as required by Rule 32.2(b). 

(Exhibit X, Doc. 17-2 at p. 258-259). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 

arguing that he was entitled to the retroactive application of a significant change in the 

law, pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Exhibit W, Doc. 17-2 at 

p. 254-257), but the trial court denied the motion, stating. 

Defendant claims that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 

1354 (2004), is a significant change of law that applies to his case. As he 

correctly notes, he contended on appeal that his Confrontation Clause rights 

were violated by the admission of out-of-court statements by Janson 

Simms. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Defendant did not 

contest that the statements were excited utterances. The Court of Appeals 

has now ruled that Crawford does not apply to the type of excited utterance 

statements admitted in this case. State v. Aguilar, __ Ariz. __, __P.3d__, 

2005 WL 487124 (App. Div.1, March 3, 2005). 

(Exhibit Y, Doc. 17-2 at p. 260-261). Petitioner, through counsel, then filed a petition for 

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals from the denial of his second PCR petition 

(Exhibit Z, AA, Doc. 17-2 at p. 262-63, Doc. 17-3 at p. 1-29). On April 27, 2006, that 

court denied Petitioner’s petition for review (Exhibit Z, BB, Doc. 17-2 at p. 262-263, 

Doc. 17-3 at p. 30-33). Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Exhibit Z, Doc. 17-2 at p. 262-263). 

3. Third PCR Proceedings 

More than 5 years later, on October 24, 2011, through counsel, Petitioner filed his 

third PCR petition, claiming: (1) he had newly discovered evidence—Dr. Jonathan 

Arden, M.D.’s 2009 report and 2010 affidavit opining about the infant victim’s injuries 

and SIDS (Doc. 17-3 at p. 81-94); and (2) there was a significant change in the law—

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004)—which was applicable to him (Exhibit 

CC, Doc. 17-3 at p. 34-103). The State responded to Petitioner’s petition (Exhibit DD, 

Doc. 17-3 at p. 103-125), and Petitioner filed a reply (Exhibit EE, Doc. 17-3 at p. 126-

136). On August 3, 2012, the court dismissed the PCR petition, finding the claims 

precluded in a successive PCR petition and not colorable (Exhibit FF, Doc. 17-4 at p. 1-

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8). On September 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals (Exhibit GG, Doc. 17-4 at p. 9-29). The State filed its response opposing the 

petition for review (Exhibit HH, Doc. 17-4 at p. 30-50), and Petitioner, through counsel, 

filed a reply (Exhibit II, Doc. 17-4 at p. 51-61). On December 3, 2013, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied review (Exhibit JJ, Doc. 17-4 at p. 62-66). The court of appeals held 

that summary dismissal was appropriate given Petitioner’s “failure to comply with Rule 

32.2(b)” regarding timeliness and diligence of his claims (Id. at 66). Again through 

counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit KK, 

Doc. 17-4 at p. 67-83), and that court denied review on July 25, 2014 (Exhibit LL, Doc. 

17-4 at p. 83-84). 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

On July 7, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising four 

grounds for relief: (1)Petitioner’s sentence for second degree murder was 

“unconstitutionally enhanced” when the judge incorrectly applied the first degree murder 

statutes during sentencing; (2)Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel when his attorney failed to correct his “unconstitutional sentence”; 

(3)There was prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor used evidence obtained 

from Detective Armando Saldate, who has a history of perjury, and Dr. Jonathan Arden’s 

medical examination forensic report from 2009 constitutes newly discovered evidence; 

and (4)Dr. Jonathan Arden’s report shows that Petitioner is factually innocent of 

committing murder (Doc. 1). After Court Order (Doc. 5), he filed the Amended Petition, 

raising the same four grounds (Doc. 7). The Court ordered Respondent to answer the 

Petition (Doc. 8). 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Statutory Tolling

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

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(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of the AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). 

 1. One Year Limitations Period 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As a general matter, AEDPA’s 1-year 

statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the judgment against a petitioner 

became final either by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 

available to seek such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 

U.S. 113, 118–20 (2009); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(noting that direct appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further appellate 

review). 

After trial and sentencing, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences on December 24, 2001. Petitioner had 35 days, until January 28, 2002, to file a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, but there is no record that he did so. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a); State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 262, 263, 782 P.2d 737, 739 

(1989) (holding that a 5-day extension is warranted when a notice is mailed to the party 

who is required to act). Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions became “final” on January 

28, 2002, the day that Petitioner’s time expired for filing a petition for review. See 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012). Therefore, in the present case, AEDPA’s 

expired 1 year later, unless a timely PCR proceeding was filed, which would have tolled 

the limitations period. See section III(A)(2), infra. 

 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

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Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state petition that is not filed within 

the state’s required time limit, however, is not “properly filed,” and is thus not entitled to 

statutory tolling. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6–7 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely 

state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA tolling provision); 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is 

untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

Petitioner filed a timely PCR petition on January 25, 2002, and he is entitled to 

statutory tolling for the pendency of that PCR petition. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on September 23, 2004, 

thus concluding the PCR proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner’s time began running on 

September 23, 2004, and expired 1 year later, on September 23, 2005. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s second PCR petition did not toll the 

limitations period from January 19, 2005, until April 27, 2006, because it was not 

properly filed pursuant to Rule 32.1 and 32.4(a), of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure (Doc. 17 at 13). Indeed, the trial court dismissed the PCR as untimely. See 28 

U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State 

postconviction or other collateral review [is] pending shall not be counted toward any 

period of limitation under this subsection.”) (emphasis added); Pace, 544 U.S. at 414, 

417 (time limits, “no matter their form,” are “filing conditions,” with which 

noncompliance forecloses statutory tolling); Siebert, 552 U.S. at 4–5 (“Because Siebert’s 

petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected as untimely by the Alabama courts, it 

was not ‘properly filed’ under § 2244(d)(2)). 

The dismissal for untimeliness of the second PCR petition was not the end of the 

second PCR trial court proceedings, though. The trial court ruled on Petitioner’s motion 

for reconsideration addressing the merits of the Crawford argument raised by Petitioner. 

The question is whether or not that changed whether tolling was warranted during the 

second PCR proceedings. Respondent’s may have the better end of the argument, but 

close examination is not warranted. Even granting Petitioner statutory tolling for his 

second, improperly-filed PCR proceeding, his habeas petition would still be untimely. 

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The second PCR proceedings concluded on April 27, 2006. Petitioner did not file this 

habeas proceeding until July 7, 2015, more than 9 years later. Even with tolling due to 

and during the second PCR proceedings, the Petition was filed more than 8 years late. 

 Petitioner’s third and untimely PCR petition filed on October 24, 2011, did not 

statutorily toll the running of the limitations period because an untimely petition is not a 

“properly-filed” application, and does not toll the running of the statute. See Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)”) (internal 

quotation omitted); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, 

because the limitations period had already expired years before, Petitioner could not 

restart the clock by filing a subsequent PCR application. “A state-court petition . . . that 

is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because 

there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th 

Cir. 2000); see also Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Therefore, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition at least eight years 

before July, 2015, absent any equitable tolling.3 See section III(A)(3), infra. 

 3. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 

(2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The diligence required for equitable 

 

3

 Further, a subsequent PCR proceeding that is deemed untimely does not toll the time between the previous and subsequent 

R proceedings. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and 

[the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) 

(citations and internal emphasis omitted). Petitioner must also establish a “causal 

connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely 

petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the 

law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication 

is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also

Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV-06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances). Further, a prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

In Ramirez v. Yates, the petitioner argued that he had limited access to the law 

library and copy machine during the period in which he remained in administrative 

segregation. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). In denying equitable 

tolling for that period of time, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[o]rdinary prison 

limitations on [petitioner’s] access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial 

altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most 

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common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit 

the exception to swallow the rule—according to [petitioner’s] theory, AEDPA’s 

limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner’s stay in 

administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as 

well.” Id.; see also Gutierrez-Valencia v. Ryan, No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

1762978, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2014) (where petitioner did not allege a complete lack of 

access to his legal file, only his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security 

facility, court held that “Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details 

regarding what legal materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his 

habeas filing . . . [and] Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary 

prison limitation.”). Cf. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that 

lack of access to Spanish language legal materials or assistance could entitle habeas 

petitioner to equitable tolling). 

 Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

 Petitioner asserts his Petition was untimely because “he was unaware of several 

factors until filing Rule 32 PCR’s” (Doc. 7 at p. 11). As discussed above, this assertion is 

not a basis for equitable tolling. Petitioner also indicates that the 2013 Ninth Circuit case 

of Milke v. Ryan, 711 F. 3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013) provides basis for equitable tolling 

because of the detective in that case, Armando Saldate, Jr., but Petitioner provides no 

explanation as to the delay between March, 2013, and the filing of this case in July, 2015. 

Even if this purported basis wasn’t stale, the transcript of Petitioner’s jury trial reveals 

that Saldate’s work on Petitioner’s case was not at the apartment complex or even 

questioning Petitioner on the scene; that was the work of three other officers (Doc. 17-1 

at p. 20-28, 30-31, 59-100, 143-171). Saldate’s very limited work relating to Petitioner’s 

case arose from a traffic stop the year after the baby’s death. After getting two different 

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names from Petitioner that did not appear to be valid, Saldate arrested Petitioner for 

failing to provide proof of his identity. Saldate then quickly uncovered Petitioner’s true 

identity by fingerprinting him. Saldate promptly learned there was a warrant for 

Petitioner’s arrest for murder and child abuse. Saldate arrested Petitioner on the warrant, 

and thereafter Petitioner was detained (Doc. 17-1 at p. 172-178). The Court has 

reviewed the Milke opinion as well as the transcript of Saldate’s testimony in Petitioner’s 

case and no equitable tolling is warranted. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances or 

reasonable diligence that would justify equitable tolling. Additionally, the record does 

not reveal any extraordinary circumstances that prevented Petitioner from filing a timely 

federal habeas corpus petition. Because Petitioner has not presented circumstances and 

met his burden that would justify equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations and 

there is no extraordinary circumstance reflected in the record which prevented the timely 

filing of a federal habeas corpus petition, the Petition is untimely and the Court will not 

consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. See White v. 

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2002) (whether a petition is barred by the statute 

of limitations is a threshold issue that must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of individual claims). 

4. Actual Innocence 

In the Ninth Circuit, a valid claim of actual innocence can act as a gateway to 

excuse an untimely filed habeas petition. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(applying Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 

1928 (2013). The “actual innocence gateway” is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” 

or the “miscarriage of justice exception.” 

To pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish 

his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 

2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

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evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 

S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. 

at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in 

virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 

U.S. 538, 559 (1998). 

Petitioner seems to argue actual innocence as a basis to excuse the late filing of his 

habeas petition (Doc. 7 at p. 9). There are several problems with this. First, the proffered 

new evidence by Petitioner is stale. He urges the Court to consider the same doctor 

report that was authored in 2009 and submitted to the Arizona courts in 2011 (Doc. 7-2 at 

35-48; Doc. 17-3 at p. 81-94). Petitioner has not acted diligently to bring his claims 

before this Court. Because Petitioner’s bases for purported actual innocence are so stale, 

it is not warranted to even consider the actual innocence/Schlup gateway in this case, let 

alone apply it to allow the untimely Petition. 

Even if this Court were to consider this evidence, Petitioner has not met the 

burden required by Schlup and its progeny. As the Arizona Court of Appeals wrote in 

2012 about the same doctor’s report and opinions: 

Even if this claim was not precluded, the court finds the defendant failed to 

establish this evidence, if presented at trial, would have changed the 

outcome. At trial, the State presented evidence the baby appeared fine 

when she visited with her great-grandparents the week before October 21, 

1996. The grandmother, with whom the defendant and baby resided, 

testified that the baby acted fine on the morning of October 21, 1996. 

When the grandmother left for work at 9:30 a.m. that day, the baby was in 

the apartment with the defendant. At approximately noon that day, the 

grandmother called the defendant and heard the baby crying in the 

background. At 12:30 p.m. that day, police were called to the apartment 

complex, they saw Simms. He told the officers he had no information 

about a crying baby. Simms later saw the defendant take the baby to the 

bedroom. Later, the defendant told him the baby had stopped breathing. 

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Simms ran to the baby, thinking she was choking, placed her over his 

shoulder and applied pressure to her back. She spit up mucous and blood. 

Simms told the defendant to call 911. When the defendant did not do so, 

Simms went to get the officers he had seen earlier to help with the baby.... 

The opinions of Dr. Arden do not address all the facts presented at trial. In 

addition, Dr. Arden’s report acknowledges that smothering is one 

mechanism that could cause anoxic encephalopathy, the cause of the baby’s 

death. 

(Doc. 17-4 at p. 5-6). Petitioner is not entitled to an actual innocence gateway for relief 

from the untimeliness of his Petition. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition more than 8 years after the expiration of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations, and neither equitable tolling or actual innocence render the 

petition timely. Accordingly, the Petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Because the Petition is untimely, the Court does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the petition be denied and dismissed. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent the Court 

adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 7) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 30th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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