Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07801/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07801-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In Re.

VINCENT ROSENBALM,

Plaintiff. /

No. C 06-7801 SI (pr)

No. C 06-7802 SI (pr)

No. C 07-0316 SI (pr)

No. C 07-0606 SI (pr)

No. C 07-0776 SI (pr)

No. C 07-1295 SI (pr)

No. C 07-1555 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On March 21, 2007, the court ordered plaintiff, Vincent Rosenbalm, to show cause why

these actions should not be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides that a prisoner

may not bring a civil action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 "if the prisoner has, on

3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The order identified four

prior dismissals that appeared to count under § 1915(g) and ordered Rosenbalm to show cause

why pauper status should not be denied and the referenced actions dismissed. The order further

stated that Rosenbalm also could avoid dismissal by paying the filing fee by the deadline for

each of the referenced cases or “by showing that his current residence in the Napa State Hospital

is pursuant to a civil commitment, rather than as part of the criminal proceedings against him.”

March 21, 2007 Order To Show Cause Re. Contemplated Dismissal, p. 3. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

This information comes from page 2 of the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in

Rosenbalm v. Mendocino Superior Court, No. 06-7412 SI (pr).

2

Rosenbalm did not pay the filing fees, did not show that any of the prior dismissals could

not be counted under § 195(g), and did not otherwise show cause why these cases could not be

dismissed. He filed several documents that asserted further claims and made other

incomprehensible arguments. The only information he provided relevant to the court’s order

was his statement in a letter filed April 9, 2007, that his “incarceration at Napa is a civil

commitment under Penal Code 1370.” (Docket # 7 in C 06-7801 SI.) He asserted that the

hospital staff refused to give him a copy of the commitment order this court told him to provide

if he was claiming to have been civilly committed. See id. Even without the commitment order,

Rosenbalm’s reference to the statute under which he was sent to Napa provides enough

information for this court to determine that he is a prisoner to whom § 1915(g) applies. 

In April 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995 ("PLRA") to impose several restrictions, including the restriction in § 1915(g) on frequent

filers. Section 1915 has several provisions that apply only to prisoners. “As used in this

section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law

or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(h). Not all persons who are detained by the government are prisoners, however.

For example, an individual civilly committed pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predators

Act is not a "prisoner" within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136,

1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000), nor is an alien detained pending civil deportation proceedings,

Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2002).

Rosenbalm is a prisoner within the meaning of Section 1915(g). When he filed the first

five of the seven referenced actions, Rosenbalm was in the Mendocino County Jail because he

was awaiting trial on charges of making a criminal threat, see Cal. Penal Code § 422.1

 When

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For the Northern District of California

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he filed the last two actions, Rosenbalm was at Napa State Hospital, to which he had been

transferred in early February 2007. He is at Napa pursuant to California Penal Code § 1370.

That is not a civil commitment statute, despite Rosenbalm’s assertion to the contrary.

Section 1370 is in the chapter of the California Penal Code dealing with inquiries into the

competence of a criminal defendant. When the judge has a doubt about a criminal defendant’s

sanity “during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment,” the court can suspend the

criminal prosecution until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant is

determined. See Cal. Penal Code § 1368. Section 1369 provides the procedures for the trial of

the issue of the defendant’s mental competence to stand trial on the criminal charges against him.

If the defendant is found competent at the § 1369 trial, the criminal process resumes, i.e., the

defendant can be tried and judgment may be pronounced. Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a)(1)(A). If

the defendant is found incompetent at the § 1369 trial, the trial or judgment is suspended until

he becomes competent. Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a)(1)(B). The criminal defendant determined

to be incompetent is sent to a state hospital by the court. See Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a)(1-2).

Hospitalization under § 1370 is part of the criminal proceedings against the defendant rather than

a civil matter. For example, the commitment order must specify the criminal charges pending

and must be accompanied by a statement of the “maximum term of commitment” that includes

“credit for time served.” Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a)(3); see also § 1370(c). Where the

incompetent defendant is sent also depends on the charges pending against him. See, e.g., Cal.

Penal Code § 1370(a)(1)(B) (providing special procedures for sex offender registrants). Most

importantly, “[i]f the criminal charge against the defendant is dismissed, the defendant shall be

released from any commitment ordered under this section, but without prejudice to the initiation

of any proceedings that may be appropriate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.” Cal. Penal

Code § 1370(e). Because 1370 commitment is part of the criminal proceedings and inextricably

dependent on the existence of ongoing criminal proceedings, it is not a civil commitment.

Though now at a state hospital rather than in a county jail, Rosenbalm is being detained in a

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facility and accused of a violation of the criminal law and therefore is a prisoner for purposes

of § 1915. Unlike the plaintiff in Page v. Torrey, who had no criminal charges pending against

him, Rosenbalm is being detained because he stands “accused of . . . violations of criminal law.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).

Section 1915(g)’s frequent filer provision applies to Rosenbalm’s cases filed while he was

in the Mendocino County Jail as well as those filed when he was at Napa State Hospital.

Rosenbalm has not shown that any of the prior dismissals cannot properly be counted as

dismissals under § 1915(g) and has not shown that the referenced actions should not be

dismissed. The court finds that the four prior dismissals identified in the order to show cause

count as dismissals for purposes of § 1915(g).

Accordingly, Rosenbalm’s in forma pauperis application is DENIED in each of these

actions and each of these action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The dismissal of

each of these actions is without prejudice to Rosenbalm asserting his claims in an action for

which he pays the full filing fee at the time he files his complaint. In light of the dismissals, all

other pending motions are DISMISSED as moot. The clerk shall close the file for each of the

referenced actions.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2007 ______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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