Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01463/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1463

___________

Sherryl Ann Snodgrass, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

Juliann Lawrence, *

*

Plaintiff, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Elizabeth Robinson, Chair of the Iowa *

Board of Parole, in her individual and *

official capacity; Karen Muelhaupt, *

Vice Chair of the Iowa Board of Parole, *

in her individual and official capacity; *

Richard S. Boardwell, Member, Iowa *

Board of Parole, in his individual and *

official capacity; Curtis S. Jenkins, *

Member, Iowa Board of Parole, in his *

individual and official capacity; Barbara *

Binnie, Member, Iowa Board of Parole, *

in her individual and official capacity; *

Iowa Board of Parole; and Chester J. *

Culver, Governor of Iowa, *

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: November 1, 2007

Filed: January 11, 2008

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
1

The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa, sitting by consent of the parties in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

State prisoner Sherryl Ann Snodgrass filed suit alleging that the Iowa Board of

Parole (“the Board”), the Board’s members, and the governor of Iowa violated her

constitutional rights by applying laws and regulations governing sentence

commutation requests even though the laws were passed after her conviction. She

alleges these acts violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution

and caused a deprivation of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Amend. V; Amend. XIV, § 1. The district court1

granted a motion to dismiss, finding commutation by the governor in Iowa to be an

act of grace unrestricted by substantive laws or rules. The district court concluded that

the speculative possibility of a lost opportunity for a commutation could not serve as

the basis for a state’s ex post facto violation and that Snodgrass had no liberty interest

in an act of grace by the governor. Accordingly, the district court held Snodgrass had

not stated a cause of action for any constitutional violations. We affirm.

I. Background

Snodgrass and her lover were convicted of first degree murder for the 1981

slaying of Snodgrass’s husband. The details of the offense and the state court

proceedings are described in State v. Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1984). First

degree murder is a class A felony in Iowa, Iowa Code § 707.2 (1981 and 2007), and

carries a mandatory life sentence. Id. § 902.1. Now, as it did in 1981, Iowa precludes

a grant of parole to a person serving a life sentence. Id. In other words, a life

sentence in Iowa is a life sentence without the possibility of parole, absent the

governor’s commutation of the sentence to a term of years. Id. (providing that if the

governor commutes a prisoner’s life sentence to a term of years, the prisoner becomes

eligible for parole). 

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
-3-

The Iowa constitution grants the governor the power to commute sentences,

“subject to such regulations as may be provided by law.” Iowa Const. Art. IV, § 16.

Iowa, however, has passed no substantive restrictions on the governor’s ability to

commute sentences, and, in fact, the Iowa Code provides, “The power of the Governor

. . . to grant a . . . commutation of sentence . . . shall not be impaired.” Iowa Code §

914.1 (2007). For the purpose of our analysis, then, we must view the Iowa

governor’s power to commute sentences as substantively unfettered. Lyon v. State,

404 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“No substantive predicates are placed

upon the governor’s discretion in granting a commutation of sentence.”).

Although the governor’s authority to commute sentences is not restricted by any

substantive laws, the Iowa Code does provide that the Board shall review certain

prisoners’ files, interview prisoners, and make commutation recommendations to the

governor. Iowa Code § 902.2 (2007). At the time of Snodgrass’s offense and

conviction, the Iowa Code provided that the Board was to interview class A felons

within five years of their incarceration “and regularly thereafter.” Iowa Code § 902.2

(1981). Applicable regulations added detail to this general requirement, providing for

interviews of class A felons at intervals of five, ten, thirteen, and fifteen years postconfinement, and annually thereafter. Iowa Admin. Code § 205-14.2(1) (902)

(1989). 

In 1995, well after Snodgrass’s 1981 conviction, the Iowa legislature amended

Iowa Code § 902.2 to provide that a Class A felon serving a life sentence could apply

to the governor for commutation “no more frequently than once every ten years.”

Iowa Code § 902.2 (1995). This amended code section also provides that the

governor is to forward such applications to the Board to enable the Board to make

recommendations. Id. Finally, the Board’s recommendations have never been

binding on the governor, and section 902.2 in no way restricts the power of the

Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections, who “may make a request to the

governor that a person’s sentence be commuted to a term of years at any time.” Iowa

Code § 902.2 (2007).

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
2

It is difficult to speak generically about differences between parole and

commutation, and it is necessary to focus specifically on the law at issue in a given

-4-

In support of her claims, Snodgrass alleges additional facts regarding the

practices of the Board, the history of her applications with the Board, and the

governor’s denial of a recent commutation application from Snodgrass. She argues

on appeal that the district court improperly granted the state’s motion to dismiss and

failed to accept the facts alleged in her complaint and the reasonable inferences from

those facts. We need not delve into her factual allegations. At the end of the day, any

form of relief for Snodgrass depends on a speculative, unpredictable, and wholly

discretionary grant of clemency by the governor. We agree with the district court that

Snodgrass cannot state an ex post facto or due process violation based on the

application of the challenged laws.

II. Ex Post Facto

“[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change

produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ nor . . . on whether an amendment

affects a prisoner’s ‘opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,’ but

on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the

penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S.

499, 506 n. 3 (1995) (citation omitted). Simply put, not every change in the law raises

ex post facto concerns. The changed law must create a “significant risk” of increasing

the offender’s punishment. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000)

(announcing the rule that, to prove an ex post facto violation related to changes in

parole procedures, an inmate must, “show that as applied to his own sentence the law

created a significant risk of increasing his punishment”) (emphasis added). 

Here, Snodgrass’s claim does not hinge on the availability of parole, but on the

availability of a commutation—the only means by which she might become eligible

for parole.2

 Whereas changes to parole procedures may, in some circumstances raise

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
case. This is because each state may have slightly different degrees of discretion or

guidance imposed on its parole board’s or governor’s exercise of power, and the

relative degree of discretion or guidance factors largely into determining whether a

change in a relevant law create a significant risk of increasing a defendant’s

punishment. In Garner, for example, the Court described a Georgia parole board as

holding “broad discretion.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 253. That discretion was not

limitless, however, and the controlling state statute provided guidance for the parole

board’s consideration, repeatedly stating what factors the parole board “‘shall’” and

“‘shall not’” consider. Id. at 252-53 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-42(c)). The

Court ultimately remanded the case for further development because the record was

not sufficient to conduct “a more rigorous analysis of the level of risk [of increased

punishment] created by the change in law.” Id. at 255. In the present case, there are

no statutory “shalls” restricting the Iowa governor’s discretion or providing

benchmarks by which a reviewing court might conduct an analysis of the likelihood

that changes in the law will create a significant risk of increased punishment.

-5-

ex post facto concerns, changes to Iowa’s procedures for commutation applications

do not. See id. at 250 (“Retroactive changes in laws governing parole of prisoners,

in some instances, may be violative of [the ex post facto clause].”). This is because

most parole procedures are distinct from the highly personal, policy oriented, and

legislatively unchecked authority of the Iowa governor to grant sentence

commutations. 

The unpredictability of a wholly discretionary grant of commutation in Iowa

precludes Snodgrass from demonstrating that the changes in Iowa’s law raise a

“significant risk” that she will be denied a commutation she otherwise would have

received. As such, she cannot demonstrate there is a significant risk her punishment

will be longer than it would have been under former Iowa Code Section 902.2.

Accordingly, she cannot make out an ex post facto claim. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509

(stating that where the changed law gives rise to “only the most speculative and

attenuated possibility of . . . increasing the measure of punishment . . . such

conjectural effects are insufficient under any threshold we might establish under the

ex post facto clause”).

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
-6-

II. Due Process

To state a due process violation, Snodgrass must first identify a protected

liberty interest. She asserts a liberty interest in familial association and claims that the

changed law will increase her sentence thereby depriving her of contact with her

family. The proper focus, however, is not on whether Snodgrass has some liberty

interest that is affected by her continued incarceration. Her criminal acts and lawful

conviction caused her incarceration and extinguished or limited countless liberty

interests. Those liberty interests were removed under the myriad procedural

protections attendant to arrest and trial. The proper focus in this case is on whether

she has a liberty interest in the grant of a sentence commutation from the Iowa

governor—the only action that can in any manner shorten her term of incarceration.

On this question, the law is clear: “no liberty interest . . . is created unless the

state statute or regulation involved uses mandatory language and imposes substantive

limits on the discretion of state officials.” Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328-29

(8th Cir. 1993); see also, Marshall v. Mitchell, 57 F.3d 671, 672-73 (8th Cir. 1995)

(holding that a Missouri parole scheme that gives officials “virtually unlimited

discretion” to grant parole does “not create a liberty interest protected by the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Likewise, the Supreme Court has

refused to recognize a prisoner’s liberty interest in discretionary commutations based

on a statute that has “no definitions, no criteria, and no mandated shalls.” Conn. Bd.

of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981) (citations omitted); see id. at 464

(interpreting a Connecticut statute and holding that “an inmate has no constitutional

or inherent right to commutation of his sentence.”). Without a liberty interest in a

commutation, there can be no due process violation related to changes in the

procedure surrounding such a commutation. See id. at 463 (“Plainly, however, the

underlying right must have come into existence before it can trigger due process

protection.”). As we stated in Bagley, “ If a state law gives . . . the right to a certain

outcome in the event of the occurrence of certain facts, [there is] a right, by virtue of

the Fourteenth Amendment, to whatever process is due in connection with the

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841
-7-

determination of whether those facts exist.” Bagley, 5 F.3d at 328. Here, the

unfettered discretion vested in the governor gives no prisoner a “right to a certain

outcome in the event of the occurrence of certain fact.” As such, Iowa prisoners have

no liberty interest in commutations, just like the Missouri prisoners had no liberty

interest in the grants of parole in the scheme examined in Marshall.

To the extent Snodgrass argues her asserted liberty interest is an absolute right

to interviews with the Board as frequently as was permitted under Iowa law at the time

of her offense, her arguments are misplaced. Such an argument confuses the liberty

interested to be protected with the procedure provided for its protection.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-1463 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/11/2008 Entry ID: 3390841