Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00408/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00408-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE MORRISON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv408 WQH (POR)

ORDER

vs.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. and

DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 8).

I. Background

On August 1, 2008, Plaintiff filed this action in San Diego Superior Court, where it was

designated as Case No. 37-2008-00088895-CU-OE-CTL (“Plaintiff’s Action”). (Doc. # 1,

Ex. A). Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action against Defendant, his former

employer: failure to pay overtime compensation; failure to provide meal and rest breaks; and

unfair competition. On August 7, 2008, Defendant was served with process. On September

5, 2008, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s Action to this Court, asserting diversity of citizenship

between the parties and attaching a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel agreeing that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. # 1, Ex. C).

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and a stipulation between the

parties, this Court transferred Plaintiff’s Action to the United States District Court for the

Central District of California, where a number of related cases were pending before the

Honorable Dean D. Pregerson. (Doc. # 1, Ex. D). On October 16, 2008, Judge Pregerson

Case 3:09-cv-00408-WQH-POR Document 21 Filed 07/10/09 Page 1 of 4
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issued an Order, sua sponte remanding Plaintiff’s Action to the San Diego Superior Court

(“October 16, 2008 Remand Order”). (Doc. # 1, Ex. E). The October 16, 2008 Remand Order

notes that Defendant, as the party asserting jurisdiction, has the burden of establishing that the

amount in controversy requirement is met. (Doc. # 1, Ex. E at 2). The October 16, 2008

Remand Order concludes that: “UPS has provided no evidence that the jurisdictional amount

has been met in this particular action.” (Doc. # 1, Ex. E at 3).

On March 2, 2009, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s Action to this Court, for a second

time alleging diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. # 1). The March 2, 2009 Notice of Removal states:

“Successive petitions for removal may be filed where Defendant discovers new facts ... that

establish the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.” (Doc. # 1, at 2

(citations omitted)). The second Notice of Removal then states that on February 2, 2009,

Defendant received Plaintiff’s responses to special interrogatories, wherein Plaintiff listed his

damages at $227,693. (Doc. # 1, at 3-4).

On March 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand, on the grounds that (1) the

Court cannot reconsider the October 16, 2008 Remand Order, and (2) the March 2, 2009

Notice of Removal was untimely because Defendant was aware at least as of August 8, 2008

that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. # 8).

On April 20, 2009, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion to Remand. Defendant

contends that this Court should reconsider the October 16, 2008 Remand Order on the grounds

that: (1) a sua sponte remand for a procedural defect was not proper, see Kelton Arms

Condominium Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure”); and (2) a

remand for a procedural defect forty-one days after removal is not timely, see Maniar v.

F.D.I.C., 979 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1992) (“the district court erred in remanding this case on

procedural grounds after the 30-day period expired”).

II. Analysis

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides that “a notice of removal may be filed within thirty

days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended

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pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is

one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis added); see also

Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2005). In August 2008,

Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendant’s counsel a letter stating that the amount in controversy

exceeded $75,000. (Doc. # 1, Ex. C). The § 1446(b) thirty-day clock began no later than

August 2008, upon Defendant’s receipt of this letter. See Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498

F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a letter from one counsel to another stating the

plaintiff’s estimated damages was sufficient to commence the thirty-day period within which

to file a notice of removal). Therefore, pursuant to § 1446(b), the March 2, 2009 Notice of

Removal is untimely. Since Plaintiff timely objected to this procedural defect by filing the

Motion to Remand within thirty days of March 2, 2009, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this action

must be remanded. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Babasa, 498 F.3d at 975.

Defendant contends that this Court should reconsider the October 16, 2008 Remand

Order on the grounds that it was erroneous. The Court is aware of no authority for the

proposition that if a defendant “re-removes” a case for the purpose of seeking reconsideration

of an earlier remand order, the procedural requirements of § 1446(b) do not apply to the second

notice of removal. However, Defendant cites two Eleventh Circuit cases for the proposition

that a “district court has jurisdiction to reconsider its own remand order.” (Opp’n to Mot. to

Remand, Doc. # 12, at 10).

In First Union National Bank of Florida v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1997), the

district court “issued an order remanding the ... claims,” then the defendants “moved the court

to reconsider its remand order, and the court ... vacated the remand order,” with no mention

of a second notice of removal. Id. at 1377. Because there was no second removal, this case

is inapplicable to the present situation.

The second case involves a district court reconsidering its first remand order after a

second removal. See Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. RX Solutions, 306 Fed. Appx. 450, 452 (11th

Cir., Dec. 17, 2008) (“Prescription Solutions and United Healthcare removed the action to

federal court.... In the interim, [plaintiff] filed an amended complaint that named Prescription

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Solutions, United Healthcare, and United Health Group as defendants.... Five days later, the

district court granted [plaintiff]’s motion to remand. ... United Health Group removed the

action on the identical grounds stated by Prescription Solutions and United Healthcare in their

motion to remove.”). The first issue addressed by the Eleventh Circuit was whether the second

removal was timely filed pursuant to § 1446(b). See id. at 453 (“United Health Group timely

removed the action to federal court.... [Plaintiff] filed an amended complaint that named

United Health Group as a defendant on February 20, 2008, and United Health Group timely

removed the action on March 5, 2008.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). This case supports the

position that even when a second removal is made for the purpose of asking a district court to

reconsider its earlier remand order, the requirements of § 1446(b) apply.

The Court finds that the requirements of § 1446(b) are applicable to the March 2, 2009

Notice of Removal. Because the Notice of Removal was filed more than thirty days after

Defendant received written notice that the case was removable, this action must be remanded.

See Babasa, 498 F.3d at 975.

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Remand is GRANTED. (Doc. # 8).

This action shall be REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,

where it was originally filed and assigned Case No. 37-2008-00088895-CU-OE-CTL.

DATED: July 10, 2009

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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