Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04706/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04706-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DR. RALPH S. BEREN, ED.D.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALIFORNIA

STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-4706 MMC

ORDER GRANTING ELK GROVE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS;

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART CSU DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court are two motions: (1) the motion to dismiss plaintiff Ralph S. Beren’s

Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, filed July 16, 2007, by defendants Elk Grove Unified School District (“EGUSD”)

and Elizabeth Kaneko (“Kaneko”) (collectively, “Elk Grove Defendants”); and (2) the motion

to dismiss the TAC pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, filed July 16, 2007, by defendants Board of

Trustees of California State University (“Trustees”), California State University (“CSU”) and

Nathan Avani (“Avani”) (collectively, “CSU Defendants”). Plaintiff has filed a single

opposition to both motions, to which the Elk Grove Defendants and CSU Defendants have

separately replied. Having considered the parties’ submissions filed in support of and in

opposition to the motions, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers,

Case 3:06-cv-04706-MMC Document 104 Filed 08/21/07 Page 1 of 4
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VACATES the hearing scheduled for August 24, 2007, and rules as follows:

1. First Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

a. For the reasons stated by defendants, the First Cause of Action is subject

to dismissal to the extent it is based on a claim that plaintiff was deprived of his First

Amendment rights. Specifically, the speech in question, plaintiff’s having requested a

hearing to review negative evaluations made by students and/or Kaneko, is not speech

protected by the First Amendment. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F. 2d 1110, 1115

(9th Cir. 1983) (holding “speech by public employees may be characterized as not of ‘public

concern’ when it is clear that such speech deals with individual grievances”).

b. For the reasons stated by defendants, the First Cause of Action is subject

to dismissal to the extent it is based on a claim that plaintiff was deprived of equal

protection. Specifically, plaintiff cannot proceed under the theory he was discriminated

against on account of his disability. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 478 F. 3d

985, 993-996 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “class-of-one theory of equal protection is

inapplicable to decisions made by public employers with regard to their employees”); Lauth

v. McCollum, 424 F. 3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding “class-of-one” equal protection plaintiff

is one “who does not belong to any ‘suspect’ (that is, favored) class”); Doe v. Chandler, 83

F. 3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For the purposes of equal protection analysis, the

disabled do not constitute a suspect class.”); Sharer v. Oregon, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1156,

1162-63 (D. Ore. 2007) (holding, in light of Engquist, plaintiff could not proceed with equal

protection claim based on theory plaintiff was terminated by state on account of

discrimination based on disability).

c. For the reasons stated by defendants, the First Cause of Action is subject

to dismissal to the extent it is based on a claim that plaintiff was deprived of substantive

due process. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts in support of such theory. 

(See Order, filed June 11, 2007, at 2:6-14, 4:16 (holding conclusory allegations insufficient;

affording plaintiff leave to amend).) Moreover, nothing in the TAC suggests defendants

engaged in the type of “extreme” conduct required to support such a claim. See Engquist,

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Although the TAC states the Third Cause of Action is brought against “all

defendants,” (see TAC at 22:6), plaintiff states in his opposition that “all defendants” is a

typographical error, and that he is not alleging such claim against Kaneko or Avani, (see

Pl.’s Opp., filed August 3, 2007, at 7:16-18).

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478 F. 3d at 997 (holding claim plaintiff was deprived of substantive right to employment

requires allegation government employer engaged in “extreme” conduct, such as putting

plaintiff on “government blacklist, which when circulated or otherwise publicized to

prospective employers effectively excludes the blacklisted person from his occupation”).

d. For the reasons stated by defendants, the First Cause of Action is subject

to dismissal to the extent it is based on a claim that plaintiff was deprived of procedural due

process. Specifically, although plaintiff adequately alleges Avani did not provide plaintiff

with a hearing before demoting and terminating plaintiff, plaintiff fails to plead facts to

support his asserted conclusion that he has a property interest in continued government

employment. (See Order, filed June 11, 2007, at 2:6-14, 4:16 (holding conclusory

allegations insufficient; affording plaintiff leave to amend).)

2. Second Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1985)

For the reasons stated by defendants, plaintiff has failed to state a claim of

conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights under § 1985; specifically, plaintiff has not

adequately alleged a violation of § 1983. 

3. Third Cause of Action (29 U.S.C. § 794)1

a. For the reasons stated by Elk Grove Defendants, plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against EGUSD under § 794. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to allege that

EGUSD was his employer, let alone to allege any facts to support any such assertion. 

(See Order, filed June 11, 2007, at 3:16-19; 4:17-18 (noting said deficiency in pleading;

affording plaintiff leave to amend).)

b. For the reasons stated by plaintiff, the Third Cause of Action is not subject

to dismissal as against CSU. Although the TAC is not a model of clarity, the Court finds

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged he suffers from “anxiety and depression” that substantially

limit specified major activities, and that he was demoted and constructively terminated by

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As CSU Defendants correctly note, plaintiff is required to prove his impairments are

substantially limiting, see Toyota Motors Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,

198 (2002) (holding plaintiff must “prove a disability” by “offering evidence” to show extent

of limitation caused by impairment is “substantial”); plaintiff, however, is not required to

identify evidence in his pleadings. CSU Defendants also observe that plaintiff did not make

a disability discrimination claim until well after the termination of his employment; said

observation, however, does not provide a basis to dismiss the claim at the pleading stage. 

Finally, although plaintiff, in one sentence of ¶ 4 of the TAC, refers to his disability as

“limit[ing],” rather than as “substantially limit[ing],” the Court does not find dismissal for the

sole purpose of affording plaintiff leave to amend to add the word “substantially” to the

subject sentence is required, particularly given plaintiff’s earlier use in the same paragraph

of the phrase “substantially limit.”

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CSU because of such disability. (See TAC ¶¶ 4, 43.)2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Elk Grove Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and

plaintiff’s claims against Elk Grove Defendants are hereby DISMISSED without further

leave to amend; and

2. CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment

is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows.

a. The First and Second Causes of Action are hereby DISMISSED

without further leave to amend.

b. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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