Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06018/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06018-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDGAR CASTILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

BUNKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO RESPOND TO

DEFENDANT’S REPLY

(Docs. 151, 159, 165)

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Alfred Brown (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his first compliant on August

20, 2002, wherein he alleged that defendants CASTILLO, former Chief Medical Officer; CURTIS,

former American with Disabilities Act Medical Coordinator; KING, Correctional Counselor II;

BARBEIRO, former Medical Appeals Analyst; WALKER, Correctional Officer; BUNKER, Medical

Technical Assistant (MTA); MATHOS, former Public Health Nurse; DUVALL, Inmate Appeals

Coordinator; and DULAY, MTA, violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs from July 2001 until January 2002 (Doc. 1). Specifically,

plaintiff alleged that during his incarceration at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility

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 This case has an extensive procedural history that is not outlined fully as it is not relevant to the current 1

motion. However, it is noted that the other defendants in this case filed a motion for summary judgment on

September 27, 2005. Their motion will be addressed in a separate order.

As part of the motion for summary judgment, defendant Bunker has requested that the court take judicial

notice of plaintiff’s amended verified complaint filed on April 13, 2005. Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice shall

be denied. “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “Judicial notice is an

adjudicative device that alleviates the parties’ evidentiary duties at trial, serving as a substitute for the conventional

method of taking evidence to establish facts.” York v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 948, 958 (10th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotations omitted); see General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th

Cir. 1997). No purpose is served by taking judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff filed a verified complaint. The

facts contained within it are subject to dispute, making them inappropriate for judicial notice.

 Plaintiff also filed an opposition to the use of his deposition taken May 24, 2005, because the defendant 2

failed to provide the plaintiff with a verified copy of his deposition. In this motion, plaintiff requests that sanctions

be granted and that the motion be denied on that basis. (Doc. 159). Defendant Bunker filed an opposition to

plaintiff’s objection to the use of the transcripts arguing that he was not required to provide plaintiff with his own

copy of the deposition and that the local rules require that the relevant portions of the transcript be provided in

support of his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 161). 

The defendant is correct and plaintiff objections are misplaced. Pursuant to Rule 30(f)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain a copy of the deposition upon reasonable payment of fees. Therefore,

plaintiff is only entitled to a copy of the deposition if he requested one and paid for it. There is no provision under

the Federal Rules or the Local Rules for free copies of deposition transcripts. Further, the expenditure of public

funds on behalf of an indigent litigant is proper only when authorized by Congress. See Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d

210 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The in forma pauperis statute does not authorize the expenditure of public

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(CSATF) at Corcoran State Prison, defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by

falling to provide him with a replacement for his old wheelchair. (Complaint ¶¶ 16-18). He further

alleged that on January 28, 2002, he fell out of his wheelchair and suffered physical injuries.

(Complaint ¶¶ 16-18). 

On April 13, 2005, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 67). He reasserted his claims

that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to provide him with a

replacement wheelchair in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that he was injured after falling

from the wheelchair in January 2002. (Doc. 67). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants’ conduct

violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id.

On May 18, 2005, defendant Bunker filed a motion to dismissthe complaintfor failure to state

a claim. (Doc. 72). On February 21, 2006, the District Court granted defendant Bunker’s motion

to dismiss the ADA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 120).

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment defendant Bunker filed on December 27,

2007. (Doc. 151). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on March 1, 2007. (Docs. 157, 162). 1 2

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28 funds for the purpose sought by plaintiff in his objection.

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Defendant Bunker filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition on March 9, 2006. (Doc. 160). Plaintiff also

filed leave to respond to defendant Bunker’s reply to the motion forsummary judgment. (Doc. 165).

The court will grant plaintiff’s motion and has considered all of these documents in determining the

merits of the motion for summary judgment.

 B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in

reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discoveryand upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322.

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should

be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party

to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to

tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

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support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th

Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

///

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C. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff alleges that on July 15, 2001, he filed an emergency ADA, CDC appeal with

defendant Edgar Castillo, former Chief Medical Officer, because his wheelchair would not roll, the

wheels were wobbling, and the bearings were making loud cracking sounds. (Am. Comp. at 1). On

July 25, 2001, defendant Castillo ordered that plaintiff’s wheelchair be repaired. Id. Plaintiff alleges

that defendants Castillo and Curtis, R.N., ADA Medical Coordinator were contacted on several

occasions to get the wheelchair repaired between July 2001 and January 28, 2002 when he fell out

of the wheelchair. Id. at 2-3.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges nothing had been done to repair his wheelchair from July 25,

2001, until October 2001. He subsequently filed an appeal to the third level, the Director’s level of

review, because no repairs had been made. Id. at 3. He alleges that the appeal was returned to

defendant Doris Duvall, the appeals coordinator. Id. He never heard from defendant Duvall. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that in November 2001, defendant Curtis brought a wheelchair to replace the

plaintiff’s old wheelchair but did not make the required adjustments. Id. at 4. He alleges that

defendant Curtis did not wait for the plaintiff to go pick up the chair so that it could be adjusted. Id.

Instead, plaintiff alleges that defendant Curtis left the wheelchair with MTA Behrens on the E-yard.

Plaintiff alleges that MTA Behrens told the plaintiff that defendant Curtis said he did not want to see

the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff believes that the reason that defendant Curtis did not want to see him was

because of the numerous calls and complaints that had made about the wheelchair not being repaired.

Id. at 4-5. Upon receiving the wheelchair, plaintiff alleges that it was too wide to fit through the cell

door in the building. Id. The new wheelchair was exchanged for the plaintiff’s old wheelchair so that

adjustments could be made on Monday. Id. In the interim, the wheelchair was given to another

inmate. Id at 6. The new wheelchair was never returned to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges several attempts to get this wheelchair repaired were made by contacting

defendants Curtis and Castillo but there was no response. Id. at 7. He filed another a second

emergency appeal on November 18, 2001. Id. Plaintiff alleges MTA Behrans attempted to contact

defendants Castillo and Curtis about the repairs not being made and nothing happened. Id. MTA

Behrens took plaintiff’s complaint to Derrall Adams, the Warden, and it was reported that the appeal

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he filed should be put through as an emergency appeal. 

On December 17, 2001, plaintiff was contacted by defendant King, Correctional Counselor

II, in response to the appeal he had filed in December 2001. Id. at 7. At that time, plaintiff informed

defendant King about this history of his wheelchair repair. Id. On or about December 20, 2001,

plaintiff received a second level response from defendant Barbeiro, former Medical Appeals Analyst,

and defendant Castillo, indicating that an appointment to repair the wheelchair would be made by

defendant Walker, Correctional Officer. If an appointment was not made, plaintiff should contact

defendant Walker to arrange a time to get the wheelchair repaired. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Walker was contacted by MTA Behrens to repair the chair and that defendant Walker told

MTA Behrens he would come and get the wheelchair that day. Id. at 8. Defendant Walker never

came to pick up the wheelchair. Id. Several calls were made to defendants Kings and Barbeiro about

the appointment not being kept but there was no response. Id.

On December 27, 2001, plaintiff alleges that the right footrest broke off of his wheelchair due

to the lack of repair of the chair. Id. at 8-9. As a result, he experienced pain because he had to cross

his right leg over his left leg to keep his right foot from dragging on the floor. Id. On December 28,

2001, plaintiff talked with MTA Behrens who called defendant Walker and was told by defendant

Walker that “he would get there when he got there.” Id. at 9.

On January 2, 2002, plaintiff saw defendant Jason Bunker and related the history and the

concerns about his wheelchair to him. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges defendant Bunker called defendant

Walker. Id. at 10. Defendant Bunker told plaintiff that he had spoken to defendants Walker and

Mathos and was told that they were aware of the problem and they were handling it. Id. Defendant

Bunker told plaintiff that he would not help him anymore. Id.

On January 8, 2002, plaintiff alleges he resubmitted the appeal. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that

rather than deal with the appeal, defendant Duvall, Appeals Coordinator, forwarded the appeal to the

Director’s level, the third level of review. Id. at 11.

On January 9, 2002, plaintiff attempted to interview Defendant Mathos but did not get a

response. Id. at 11. After that point, plaintiff alleges he would go to the MTA medication window

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on the E-yard repeatedly and when he tried to ask about the wheelchair, the staff would close the

office window and he was ignored. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges he went back to the MTA window

requesting an interview with defendants Castillo, King, Walker, Barbeiro, Duvall, and Mathos but

his requests were ignored. Id. at 12. 

Plaintiff alleges his wheelchair broke causing him to fall out of the wheelchair on January 28,

2002. Id. at 13. Plaintiff was given medical care and he was returned to his cell where he was

ordered to say in bed for two days pending a medical follow-up. Id. A brand new wheelchair was

brought to his cell. Id.

Later that day, defendant Walker came to plaintiff’s room with plaintiff’s old wheelchair

claiming that it had been fixed and requested that plaintiff return the new wheelchair. Id. at 14.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Walker was indignant and sarcastic and requested that plaintiff return

the new wheelchair in exchange for his old chair. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the right arm rest was still

broken and unfixed from the incident, the bottom of the wheelchair was still dropping out, and the

right footrest had still not been repaired. Id.

On January 29, 2002, plaintiff was not allowed to stay in bed because the medical lay-in had

not been posted. Id. at 15. Plaintiff alleges that he went to the MTA’s window and spoke to defendant

Dulay, Medical Technical Assistant. Plaintiff wanted to see the doctor for severe lower back pain and

bumps and numbness in his legs. Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dulay told him that plaintiff could

not see the doctor until January 30, 2002, even though the doctor was available on the day of the

request. Id.

On February 21, 2002, plaintiff filed a tort claim for CDC inmates which was rejected. Id at

16. On February 21, 2002, plaintiff alleges he contacted defendant Duvall about the appeals that were

not processed regarding the old wheelchair. Id. Plaintiff was interviewed by defendant Duvall. Id.

He alleges that she deliberately confused issues with regard to his appeal by construing his concerns

to relate to the new wheelchair which resulted in the Director denying his appeal on March 5, 2002.

Id. at 16-17. 

On March 12, 2002, plaintiff filed another ADA emergency appeal. Id. at 17. He alleges he

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was transferred from the E-yard to the C-yard on March 16, 2002, as a form of punishment for filing

the appeal. Id. He also alleges he was pressured to withdraw that appeal and was forced to purchase

the “older” wheelchair which had caused his injury. Id at 17.

D. Summary of Undisputed Facts

1. Plaintiff was incarcerated at CSATF at all times mentioned in the amended complaint.

2. Plaintiff is 350 pounds, 6 feet, 8 inches tall, and utilizes a wheelchair for mobility at

CSATF due to a medical condition.

3. In December 2001, plaintiff filed a CDC 1824 Form requesting wheelchair repairs or

replacement. He received a second level response from CSATF Medical Appeals Coordinator T.

Barbiero and Chief Medical Officer E. Castillo, M.D., on or about December 20, 2001. The response

indicated that an appointment to repair plaintiff’s wheelchair by Correctional Officer Walker had been

scheduled for approximately December 20, 2001. The response furtherinstructed plaintiff to contact

Officer Walker if the wheelchair was not repaired and another appointment would be scheduled as

soon as possible.

4. On the morning of January 2, 2002, plaintiff went to the MTA office where plaintiff was

housed to speak about obtaining repairs to the plaintiff’s wheelchair as his wheelchair had no yet been

repaired.

5. As of January 2002, defendant Bunker’s regular assignment was working with the

Correctional Treatment Clinic (CTC) at CSATF. However, on January 2, 2002, defendant Bunker

was substituting as MTA on the E-yard facility that day.

6. Prior to January 2, 2002, defendant Bunker had not met plaintiff and did not know anything

about Brown’s request for wheelchair repairs.

7. When plaintiff arrived at the E-yard MTA’s office, he related his story regarding his

wheelchair to MTA Bunker and showed Bunker his complaint forms regarding the issue of his

wheelchair.

8. Defendant Bunker immediately called to inquire regarding the wheelchair issue. MTA

Bunker then informed the plaintiff that he was going to call the CTC at the facility to get an

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understanding of what was going on.

9. Defendant Bunker told plaintiff that he should come back later that morning and wrote a

pass for plaintiff to return to the office. Plaintiff then left the MTA office.

10. Defendant Bunker then spoke with defendant Mathos at the CTC who was defendant

Bunker’s first supervisor at the time. Defendant Mathos informed Bunker that they were well aware

of plaintiff’s request and instructed defendant Bunker not to pursue the matter further as plaintiff’s

wheelchair request was being taken care of.

11. Plaintiff returned to the MTA’s office at about 9:00 am. He was informed by defendant

Bunker that Bunker had contacted defendant Mathos at the Clinic. Defendant Mathos had told

Bunker that she was aware of the issue regarding plaintiff’s wheelchair and that the issue was being

handled. Defendant Bunker returned plaintiff’s paperwork to him.

12. January 2, 2002, was the only date that plaintiff spoke with defendant Bunker regarding

his request for a wheelchair repairs/replacement.

E. Defendant Bunker’s Motion and Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition

Defendant Bunker argues his actions simply to do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation given the above facts. Defendant Bunker only saw the plaintiff on one occasion and

immediately made several phone calls to ascertain the status regarding plaintiff’s request for

wheelchair repairs. He was informed by his immediate supervisor not to pursue the matter further

because it was being taken care of. The fact that defendant Bunker was informed by the clinic that

they were aware of the issue and that the issue was being addressed does not constitute deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s medical care. Alternatively, defendant Bunker argues that even if the court

were to determine that he did violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified

immunity.

Defendant Bunker argues that the only disputed fact remaining is whether he had the

equipment or knowledge to repair plaintiff’s wheelchair, or the power to order anyone else at CSATF

or elsewhere to repair plaintiff’s wheelchair. Defendant Bunker argues that he did not have the

authority given his limited involvement in the case. Defendant Bunker also argues that plaintiff’s self

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serving statements regarding defendant Bunker’s motivation, knowledge, and authority, without more,

is insufficient to overcome defendant’s understanding of his authority at CSATF. 

 F. Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff alleges that when he first approached defendant Bunker, he informed Bunker of the

issues he was having with his wheelchair and the history of his efforts to have it repaired. Indeed,

accordingly to plaintiff’s allegations, at the time he approached defendant Bunker, the right footrest

was broken and plaintiff was required to cross his right leg over his left leg to keep his right foot from

dragging on the ground. The bearings were also making noise. Plaintiff contends that defendant

Bunker was helpful at first and indicated that he would inquire into the status of the needed repairs.

However, plaintiff alleges that when he saw Bunker later, Bunker was hostile, short and essentially

told plaintiff he was not going to help him. 

In plaintiff’s opposition to defendant Bunker’s motion, he argues that defendant Bunker had

other options at his disposal that were outlined in the operations manual to address plaintiff’s

wheelchair issues. Furthermore, the poor condition of plaintiff’s wheelchair at the time defendant

Bunker became involved required defendant Bunker to take further action rather than rely on his

supervisor’s directives.

G. Discussion

A prisoner’s claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the

prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2)

“the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted)). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A serious medical need

is one in which the failure to treat a condition could result in further significant injury or to the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1992).

Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more

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than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless

the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s

civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.”

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s

mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference.

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

a. Objective Component

The non-repair of plaintiff’s wheelchair is a denial of serious medical need. A medical need

is serious if the failure to treat it “‘could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059 (quotations and citation omitted)). “[T]he existence of an injury that a reasonable

doctor would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, . . . the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, and . . . the existence of chronic

or substantial pain” are indications of a serious medical need. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F. 3d

540, 546 n.3 (citing McGuckin,, 974 F. 2d at 1059-1060).

Plaintiff is immobile without the wheelchair which effects his activities of daily living and

a reasonable doctor would find the non-repair of plaintiff’s wheelchair worthy of comment.

Significant injury can also result if the condition of the wheelchair is compromised. Thus, plaintiff

is denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities when he is not able to use the chair

safely. Therefore, the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard is met.

b. Subjective Component

In this case, the subjective component is not met because Defendant bunker did not possess

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the culpable state of mind to establish deliberate indifference. Defendant Bunker’s sole interaction

with the plaintiff occurred on one day when defendant Bunker became aware of the plaintiff’s

problems with his wheelchair while he was the substituting MTA on the E-yard. Plaintiff does not

dispute that defendant Bunker immediately took action by inquiring into the status of the repairs by

calling his supervisor in an attempt to remedy the situation. UDF 8, 10. Bunker was told that

plaintiff’s request was being taken care of and not to pursue the matter further. UDF 11. Furthermore,

defendant Bunker asserts that he believes he has no power or authorityto order anyone else at CSATF

to repair wheelchairs. Thus, he did not believe that he had the power to do more.

The fact that defendant Bunker inquired about the status of plaintiff’s request immediately and

believed that it had been taken care of does not constitute deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical

needs. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). A

prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). 

In this case, plaintiff has not presented an issue of material fact demonstrating that defendant

disregarded an excessive risk to his safety. Plaintiff argues that Bunker should have been aware of

the risk given the poor condition of the wheelchair. Plaintiff further argues that Bunker should have

been familiar with the law and operating procedures related to the repair of wheelchairs outlined in

the Disability Placement Program Manual and that Bunker should have done more to insure that his

wheelchair was repaired. See, Plaintiff’s Opposition at Exhibit U. 

 Indeed, Operation Procedure 403 indicates that MTAs are responsible for logging in and

coordinating requests for wheelchair repairs. Id. However, plaintiff also does not dispute the fact that

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defendant Bunker called his supervisors and inquired about the status of the wheelchair. UDF 8, 11.

Although defendant Bunker did not do what plaintiff thought he should, Bunker’s actions indicate

that he attempted to take corrective action to address plaintiff’s safety by calling his supervisors to

ensure that wheelchair was repaired. As a result, defendant Bunker did not disregard the risk but

instead acted in manner that he thought would rectify the situation. Thus, he was not deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs or safety. 

 Plaintiff argues that Bunker should have done more rather than rely on the directive of his

supervisors. As a result, plaintiff may argue that Bunker was negligent. However, even gross

negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See, Wood

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1334. 

Based on the above, defendant Bunker was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious

medical need or safety and did not violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Because the court recommends granting

defendant’s motion forsummary judgment based on the foregoing analysis, the court does not reach

defendant’s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

H. Conclusions

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED :

1) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to respond to defendant Bunker’s reply to plaintiff’s opposition

to summary judgment is GRANTED;

2) Defendant Bunker’s motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim is GRANTED, thus concluding this action against defendant Bunker in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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