Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01111/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01111-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0206 FLSA: Minimum Wage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIERRA DAVIS, on behalf of herself and 

on behalf of other current and former 

employees similarly situated et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RED EYE JACK’S SPORTS BAR, INC., 

a Nevada Corporation doing business as 

Cheetahs Gentleman’s Club, doing 

business as Cheetahs Nightclub, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01111-BEN-JMA

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION;

(2) VACATING IN PART MAY 9, 

2018 ORDER; and

(3) GRANTING MOTION TO 

COMPEL ARBITRATION

The factual background of this case as it relates to Plaintiff Cierra Davis (“Davis”)1

is well known to the parties and detailed in the Court’s May 9, 2018 Order, which the 

Court incorporates by reference herein. (See Docket No. 48 at pp. 2-3.) Davis asserts 

 

1 According to the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Davis and Amber Moore 

are the two named plaintiffs in this purported “hybrid collective action” under the federal 

Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and putative class action for alleged violations of 

California state law. (Docket No. 29, TAC ¶ 1.)

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claims against Defendants for: (1) violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (failure to pay 

minimum wage under the FLSA); (2) violation of multiple sections of the California 

Labor Code for failure to pay wages, overtime, provide adequate rest and meal breaks, 

and reimbursement of necessary work expenditures; and (3) conversion.

On May 9, 2018, this Court denied Defendants Red Eye Jack’s Sports Bar, Inc. 

(“Cheetahs”) and Suzanne Coe’s motion to compel arbitration of Davis’s claims.2 

(Docket No. 48.) Now pending before the Court is Cheetahs and Coe’s motion for 

reconsideration of their motion to compel arbitration of Davis’s claims. (Docket No. 51.) 

Davis did not timely file an opposition or other response to the motion. For the reasons 

that follow, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, the Court’s May 9, 

2018 Order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is VACATED in part, 

and Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Davis’s claims is GRANTED.

A. Motion for Reconsideration

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for 

reconsideration. However, a motion for reconsideration may be construed as a motion to 

alter or amend a judgment or order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

3

In re 

Arrowhead Estates Dev. Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Rule 60(b)(6), a 

court may relieve a party from an order for “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Reversing a prior order under Rule 60(b)(6) is an exercise of a court’s 

equitable power that “requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances.” Phelps v. 

Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). One such circumstance is an intervening 

change in law. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 

873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 

2 Defendant Rich Buonantony filed a notice of joinder in Cheetahs and Coe’s

motion to compel arbitration. (Docket No. 34.)

3 Unless otherwise specified, the Court’s reference to Rules in this Order are to the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Additionally, in this District, motions for reconsideration are permitted pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7.1.i. The party seeking reconsideration must show “what new or 

different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not 

shown, upon such prior application.” CivLR 7.1.i. 

Defendants previously moved for arbitration on the grounds that Davis agreed to 

submit the claims she alleges in the TAC to binding arbitration. The Court’s May 9, 2018 

Order denied Defendants’ motion because the arbitration agreement they relied upon (the 

“Arbitration Agreement”) contained a concerted action waiver, which under Ninth 

Circuit authority4at that time rendered it invalid and unenforceable. (See Docket No. 48 

at pp. 4-8.) The Court also stayed the action as to Davis’s claims pending the Supreme 

Court’s imminent decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 

2016), which it relied upon in denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and 

granted Defendants leave to file a motion for reconsideration once Morris was decided. 

(Id. at pp. 8-9.)

On May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Morris. See Epic Sys. 

Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, 2018 WL 2292444 (U.S. May 21, 2018). In short, the 

Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the mere inclusion of a 

concerted action waiver in an arbitration agreement rendered said agreement invalid and 

unenforceable as a standalone defense to arbitration. Id. at *17. The Court agrees with 

Defendants that this constitutes an intervening change in the law which justifies 

reconsideration of their motion to compel arbitration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); CivLR 

7.1.i; Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for 

reconsideration is GRANTED.

///

///

 

4 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), reversed by Epic 

Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, 2018 WL 2292444 (U.S. May 21, 2018). 

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B. Motion to Compel Arbitration 

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that:

A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction 

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 

thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be 

valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 demonstrates “‘a national policy favoring arbitration of claims 

that parties contract to settle in that manner.” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 352–53 

(2008) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)). 

Under Section 3 of the FAA, where an issue involved in a suit or proceeding is 

referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing, the district court “shall on 

application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 

had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 3. The language is 

mandatory, and district courts are required to order arbitration on issues as to which an 

arbitration agreement has been signed. Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052, 1058

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)). 

The role of the district court is “limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at 

issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

As discussed in the Court’s May 9, 2018 Order, which is hereby incorporated by 

reference, it is undisputed that: 1) Davis signed the “Arbitration Agreement” at issue, and 

2) the “Arbitration Agreement” covers all of her claims against Defendants. (See Docket 

No. 48 at pp. 4-6.) The parties only dispute whether the “Arbitration Agreement” is valid 

and enforceable as a result of its inclusion of a concerted action waiver based on the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Morris. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Epic Sys. Corp. reversing Morris, the Court concludes the entire “Arbitration 

Agreement,” including the concerted action waiver, is valid and enforceable. And 

because Davis does not assert the existence of any other valid contract defenses, the 

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Court is required to order arbitration of her claims. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 

1058. 

Accordingly, the portion of the Court’s May 9, 2018 Order denying Defendants’ 

motion to compel arbitration is hereby VACATED, and upon reconsideration, 

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Davis’s claims is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

In sum, for reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is 

GRANTED, the Court’s May 9, 2018 Order is VACATED in part, and Defendants’ 

motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Cierra Davis’s claims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2018

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