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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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Filed August 7, 1998

No. 94-5088

James E. Akins, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Federal Election Commission,

Appellee

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge; Wald, Silberman,

Williams, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph,

Rogers, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the mandate of the Supreme Court

of the United States issued on July 1, 1998, it is

ORDERED, by the court en banc, on its own motion, that

the order of the district court granting summary judgment to

the Federal Election Commission (FEC) be, and the same

hereby is, vacated. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the case be remanded to the

district court with instructions to remand the matter to the

FEC for further proceedings.

The Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of this

order to the district court in lieu of a formal mandate.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

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Mark J. Langer, Clerk

Silberman, Circuit Judge: I write only to explain to surely

mystified observers what has occurred in this case. The

Supreme Court, as is apparent, affirmed our en banc holding

as to standing, FEC v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1783-87 (1998),

but rather than decide the merits, vacated our decision so

that the case could be remanded to the FEC, id. at 1787-88.

The Court did so because it learned, through an amicus

brief filed by AIPAC in the Supreme Court (claiming the case

was "moot"), that the FEC might have an alternative rationale for declining to bring enforcement proceedings against

AIPAC. AIPAC pointed to a part of the Act that--for

purposes of counting the expenditures made by an organization to determine whether they surpass $1,000 (a prerequisite

to deeming an organization a "political committee")--excludes

from the definition of "expenditure" any disbursements made

in the course of the organization's communications with its

own "members." See Amicus Brief of AIPAC at 13, citing 2

U.S.C. s 431(9)(B)(iii). AIPAC asserted that if the people

who belong to AIPAC were "members" within the meaning of

the Act, its activities would qualify for the "membership

communications" exception and would therefore not exceed

the $1,000 threshold. AIPAC alerted the Court to constitutional doubts regarding the FEC's former regulation defining

"members," see Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.

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FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and to the FEC's pending

rulemaking to revise the regulation in light of those doubts.

See Amicus Brief at 13-19. All this led the Court to vacate

our decision and remand the case to the FEC to develop its

new rules defining "membership organization." The Court

stated that by remanding, "[w]e can thereby take advantage

of the relevant agency's expertise, by allowing it to develop a

more precise rule that may dispose of this case, or at a

minimum, will aid the Court in reaching a more informed

conclusion." Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1788.

What is so remarkable about the Court's decision to vacate

our decision and remand to the FEC rather than decide the

case on the merits is that the linchpin of the Court's decision

is an argument--pressed by an amicus curiae (ostensibly, as

a jurisdictional objection)--upon which the FEC did not rely

in declining to bring enforcement proceedings against

AIPAC, and which therefore forms no part of the agency

decision that the district court, we, and the Supreme Court

reviewed. Before us, the FEC defended its non-enforcement

decision solely on the ground that the Supreme Court's

definition of "political committee" in Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 79 (1976), which requires that the organization have as

its "major purpose ... the nomination or election of a candidate," is the statutory definition in all contexts; thus, the

FEC contended that AIPAC's lack of such "major purpose"

meant that AIPAC did not qualify as a "political committee."

AIPAC, not appearing before us--either as a party or as an

amicus--presented no defense at all of the FEC's decision.

We addressed the FEC's argument, and rejected it because

we thought the Buckley definition of "political committee"

does not apply when the constitutional concerns underlying

the Buckley Court's reasoning are not present. Akins v.

FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

In short, no one ever suggested to us that the issue raised

by AIPAC in the Supreme Court was even implicated in this

case.1 I recognize that the Supreme Court has moved pretty

far from traditional notions of judicial restraint that confine

courts to issues presented by the parties, see United States

Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,

Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 445-49 (1993), but I think this decision

represents another large step in that regrettable process

insofar as it was an amicus--an amicus who had not appeared until the case reached the Supreme Court--who made

the dispositive argument, one which was never once made

before us.

__________

1 The FEC's brief in the Supreme Court deceptively implied that

AIPAC had brought the membership communication issue to our

attention. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 7, n.7 ("AIPAC has

consistently maintained that the alleged contributions in this case

involved communications to its own members, which are specifically

exempted from the statutory definition of 'expenditure.' "). The

FEC neglected to mention that AIPAC made this contention only

to the FEC and that AIPAC did not even appear before either the

panel or the en banc court.

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The Supreme Court has seemingly inverted a central doctrine of administrative law to boot. In disposing of the case

based on a rationale for the agency's decision asserted for the

first time before the Supreme Court, the Court has turned

Chenery upside down. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery

I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Adherence to Chenery seemingly

would have required the Court to determine, based on the

ground asserted by the FEC in reaching its decision, the

validity of that decision. A holding that the FEC's decision

was invalid would leave the FEC free to reach the same

decision on another ground. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II),

332 U.S. 194 (1947).

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