Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02589/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02589-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL EDWARD EQUELS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2589 FCD KJM P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

On August 4, 2004, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint and gave him leave

to file an amended complaint on only one ground. On September 27, 2004, plaintiff filed a fiftytwo page amended complaint, which includes the grounds the court previously found not to state

a cause of action and the one ground the court found had the potential of stating a claim under the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In these findings and recommendations, the court will

discuss the new spin plaintiff has placed on his Sherman Act claim and his amended due process

attack on the changes to prison regulations that forbid an inmate’s family from sending quarterly

packages. For the reasons stated in the order of August 4, 2004, however, the court rejects

plaintiff’s attempts to have the case proceed as a class action, his claim that the regulation

violates the guarantee of equal protection, and his argument that the processing fee on packages

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is an excessive fine and violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. In addition, portions of the amended complaint simply are incomprehensible and do

not meet the requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the

complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claims. See, e.g., Am. Compl. at 32 (CDC

package regulations make “John Q. Public guilty by association, reducing them to Pretrial

Detainees because they are without due process they must therefore, submissively submit to

CDC’s will because in not doing so John Q. Public is “stymie) [sic] from contact.”).

A. Sherman Act

In the order filed August 5, 2004, this court rejected plaintiff’s Sherman Act

challenge to CDC’s regulation that requires all quarterly packages to come from approved

vendors rather than from family or friends, finding that the Sherman Act did not restrain state

action. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). In addition, this court relied on the Ninth

Circuit’s recognition that Parker immunity extends to the actions of state executives and

executive agencies “within their lawful authority.” Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corporation

v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1987). See 8/5/04 Order at 4-5. 

Plaintiff argues that the challenged regulation was not enacted under the

Department of Corrections’ “lawful authority” because the regulation was improperly adopted as

an emergency regulation when in fact no emergency justified it. Am. Compl. at 23-25. As

several Courts of Appeals have recognized, however, this does not defeat Parker immunity:

A state’s antitrust immunity springs from an essential principle of

federalism, the necessity to respect a sovereign capacity in the

several states. Given this purpose, it follows that actions otherwise

immune should not forfeit that protection merely because the

state’s attempted exercise of its power is imperfect in execution

under its own law.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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Ordinary errors or abuses in the administration of powers conferred

by the state should be left for state tribunals to control. A contrary

rule would tempt aggrieved parties to forego available state

corrective processes in hopes of obtaining the treble damages

remedy conferred by the Sherman Act. Here state corrective

processes were available, and the aggrieved parties could resort to

them.

Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation & citation omitted);

Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1987) (“the fact that the

activity may be (not obviously) unlawful under state law (for reasons having nothing to do with

antitrust) cannot make a legal difference for the purposes of antitrust immunity;” courts

considering antitrust actions should not be forced to review state administrative law disputes). 

Accordingly, even if the Department of Corrections violated California’s

Administrative Procedures Act in classifying the amendment to the package regulations as an

emergency, the actors nevertheless are immune from antitrust liability. Plaintiff’s remedy may

lie in the California Courts. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 11350(a). 

To the extent plaintiff is asking the federal court to resolve the administrative

questions, this court will recommend that the district court decline to exercise jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state claims in light of its recommendation that the federal claims be dismissed. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

B. California Law As A Source Of Property Rights

Plaintiff argues that California Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601 create inmate

property rights, which may not thereafter be infringed without the procedural protections

guaranteed by the due process clause. Am. Compl. at 8.

Section 2600 provides, in part, that an inmate may “be deprived of such rights,

and only such rights, as is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Section 

2601(a) defines one of the rights encompassed by the preceding section:

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 This section relates to profits from an inmate’s account of his offense.

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Except as provided in Section 2225 of the Civil Code1 to inherit,

own, sell or convey real or personal property, including all written

and artistic material produced or created by the person during the

period of imprisonment. However, to the extent authorized in

Section 2600, the Department of Corrections may restrict or

prohibit sales or conveyances that are made for business purposes.

Cal. Penal Code § 2601(a).

The California Courts have found that these penal statutes do not establish any

right to possess property in prison:

Yet in 1975, when the Legislature reenacted section 2601 setting

out the specific rights of prisoners “[t]o inherit, own, sell, or

convey real or personal property, . . .” it did not include the right to

wear, keep, and use his or her own personal possessions in prison. 

This legislative omission is significant.

In re Alcala, 222 Cal. App. 3d 345, 370-71 (1st Dist. 1990); see also Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d

1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) (interpreting similar federal regulation and noting the “difference

between the right to own property and the right to possess property while in prison”). Plaintiff’s

challenge is, at its core, an attack on restrictions to the type of property inmates may receive and

keep in prison. Nothing in California law establishes a right to receive and possess property sent

by one’s family. Accordingly, this portion of the complaint fails to state a claim cognizable in a

civil rights action. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 12, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2/eque2589.57

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