Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00891/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00891-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Louis Alfonso Melendez, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 05-891 PHX SMM (VAM)

)

Warden Greg Fizer, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondent. )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Louis Alfonso Melendez ("petitioner") filed a pro se

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. (Doc. 1 at pp. 4-5). 

Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting of habeas

relief. (Doc. 11).

I. BACKGROUND

The following background facts were summarized by the

Arizona Court of Appeals on direct appeal and do not appear to be

in dispute:

 [Petitioner] was the live-in boyfriend of Joanne

C[oble]. On the morning of June 24, 1992, [petitioner]

and Joanne rushed Anthony, Joanne's ten-month-old son,

to the hospital after he started choking and turning

blue. Anthony was resuscitated and placed in the

intensive care unit where physicians diagnosed him as

suffering from a life-threatening injury to the brain. 

He also exhibited numerous non-life-threatening

injuries such as a second-degree burn on his right hand

and fingers, a swollen forearm, and bruises on his head

and ears. X-rays further revealed multiple fractures

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of various ages to his arms, legs, and ribs. Anthony's

brain continued to swell after he was admitted to the

hospital, which resulted in a significant, and

ultimately fatal, increase in intercranial pressure. 

On June 25, the day after he arrived at the hospital,

Anthony was pronounced brain-dead and removed from life

support.

The medical examiner determined that the brain

injury was caused by Anthony having been violently

shaken, a condition known as "shaken impact syndrome." 

When questioned by police, [petitioner] denied ever

striking, shaking or otherwise abusing Anthony. He

also denied ever observing anyone else abuse the child.

The State charged [petitioner] with child abuse,

a class two felony, and first-degree murder, a class

one felony, under the felony murder doctrine. A jury

convicted [petitioner] on both charges in 1994, but the

convictions were reversed on appeal. [Citation

omitted]. Upon retrial, a jury again found

[petitioner] guilty as charged. [Petitioner] received

life imprisonment with parole eligibility after thirtyfive years on the murder charge and a consecutive

twelve-year prison term on the child abuse charge.

(Doc. 1, Appendix B at pp. 2-3).

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences after the

second trial. Petitioner raised the following claims:

Argument I

The Judge Erred by Granting the State's Request to

Amend the Indictment by Expanding the Time Frame for

the Alleged Offenses. The Amendment Resulted in the

Loss of Double Jeopardy Protection, Denied Melendez a

Fair Opportunity to Defend, it Violated His Right to Be

Tried Solely on Charges Returned by the Grand Jury, and

it Violated the Statute of Limitations as to the Child

Abuse Count.

1. The amendment resulted in the loss of the double

jeopardy protection and denied Melendez fair notice of

the charges and an opportunity to defend against them.

2. By granting the motion to amend, the judge violated

Melendez' right to be tried only on charges returned by

the grand jury.

3. The statute of limitations question as it relates to

Child Abuse.

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Argument II

The Judge Committed Reversible Error When He Commented

on the Evidence by Giving Undue Prominence to Certain

Evidence, Intimating that Certain Evidence was Entitled

to Great Weight, and Calling into Question the Veracity

of the Accused.

Argument III

Arizona Revised Statute § 13-116 Bars the Imposition of

Consecutive Sentences in this Case.

.....

(Doc. 1, Appendix A at pp. 9, 21, 28).

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but

modified the sentences for child abuse and murder to run

concurrently not consecutively. (Doc. 1, Appendix B at pp. 8-11).

Petitioner next filed a petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the trial court. In his Rule

32 petition, petitioner raised the following claims:

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel because

petitioner "only talked to his trial counsel three

times before trial and was not given the opportunity to

discuss witnesses to be called." As a result "there

were witnesses from the 1994 trial who did not testify

at the second trial .... Testimony of witnesses [from

the first trial] not called in the [second] trial would

have corroborated [petitioner's] statements to police

that Anthony' injuries were not visible and he did not

know that the child had been abused."

 2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel "who

did not raise an issue pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986) ..."

(Doc. 1, Appendix C). The trial court denied both issues on the

merits. (Doc. 1 at Appendix I; Minute Entry Order Dated December

19, 2002). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for

review without comment. (Id. at Appendix E).

Petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition raising

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essentially the same grounds presented to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (See Doc. 1, Appendix A at pp. 9, 21 and 28; see also

Doc. 1, Memorandum in Support at pp. 7, 12 and 17).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent first asserts that each of petitioner's habeas

claims are procedurally defaulted because petitioner failed to

present them to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11 at pp. 4-7).

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

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evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court

shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

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available in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered

exhausted if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment,

the claims must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner

may reformulate somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua

v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on

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other grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the

substance of the federal claim must have been "fairly presented"

in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per

curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the

petitioner need not recite "book and verse on the federal

constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78 (quoting Daugherty v.

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that

all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state courts or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was

made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may

refuse to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of

comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

8

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

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term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel,

(citation omitted), or that "some interference by

officials," (citation omitted), made compliance

impracticable, would constitute cause under this

standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of

one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause

for the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

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327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Respondent's Claim of Procedural 

Default

In O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999), the U.S.

Supreme Court held that in order to properly exhaust state court

remedies for purposes of federal habeas review, a petitioner is

required to file petitions for discretionary review in state

supreme courts "when that review is part of the ordinary appellate

review procedure in the State ..." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847. 

The Court qualified this requirement by stating "nothing in our

decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific state

remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable." 

Id.

Following upon on O'Sullivan, in Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that under Arizona law a habeas applicant need not seek review in

the Arizona Supreme Court to fully exhaust state remedies unless

the applicant has been sentenced to death or life in prison. For

state prisoners given sentences of less that death or life in

prison, appeal or post-conviction review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals is sufficient to exhaust federal habeas claims. See

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 ("except in habeas petitions in lifesentence or capital cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are

exhausted for purposed of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them").

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2

Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison with eligibility

for parole after 35 years. (Doc. 1, Appendix B at p. 3). Nothing

11

Respondents have raised a nonsensical argument that does not

apply to the facts of this case since petitioner was sentenced to

life imprisonment. Specifically, respondents argue that Swoopes

was wrongly decided, particularly in light of the subsequent U.S.

Supreme Court decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). 

They contend that petitioner's failure to seek review of his

habeas claims in the Arizona Supreme Court either on direct appeal

or in a petition for post-conviction relief renders the claim

unexhausted and, ultimately, procedurally defaulted. (See Doc. 11

at pp. 4-6).

Upon review, nothing in Baldwin either explicitly or

implicitly overrules the Ninth Circuit's holding in Swoopes. In

fact, since Baldwin was decided the Ninth Circuit has reiterated

in at least one case that Swoopes remains good law. See Castillo

v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (n. 3) (9th Cir. 2005). Even if

the Court was convinced that Swoopes was wrongly decided, it has

no authority to overrule that decision. 

Swoopes itself requires that review to the Arizona Supreme

Court remains "available" for prisoners sentenced to death or life

in prison. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009 ("there is no right of

appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court except in capital cases or

when a life sentence is imposed" (emphasis added)). In this case,

petitioner was sentenced to life in prison. As a result, the

plain language in Swoopes requires petitioner to exhaust his

claims by seeking review in the Arizona Supreme Court.2

 See

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in Swoopes makes distinctions between types of life sentences

(e.g., life in prison with or without parole eligibility). Swoopes

merely states that those sentenced to death or life in prison

should seek review before the Arizona Supreme Court to fully

exhaust available state remedies. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009. 

12

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009. 

Petitioner, by his own acknowledgment, did not seek review

of any of the claims raised in his habeas petition in the Arizona

Supreme Court. (See Doc. 1 at p. 2). As a result, he did not

properly exhaust his habeas claims. The time to present these

claims to the Arizona Supreme Court has long since passed. As a

result, petitioner has no remaining state remedies and the claims

are technically exhausted. Technical exhaustion is not proper

exhaustion and in the absence of cause for failing to present

these claims to the Arizona Supreme Court, the claims are

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has presented no cause for

failing to raise his claims in the Arizona Supreme Court.

In spite of the procedural default, the Court may address

the claims on the merits if petitioner can demonstrate that

extraordinary circumstances exist which will result in his

conviction although he is actually innocent. Petitioner has made

no such showing. As a result, petitioner's claims are

procedurally defaulted and should be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation.

 DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

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