Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01804/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01804-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Queen first filed his Petition on August 19, 2009; then he

filed an Amended Petition on August 31, 2009, which differed from

the original because it contained Petitioner’s signed verification. 

(Pet. 14; Am. Pet. 14.) 

1 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADLEY DWAYNE QUEEN,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

California Department of

Corrections and 

Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 09CV1804 IEG (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

FILING A SECOND AMENDED

PETITION [DOC. NO. 4] AND

DENYING PETITIONER’S

APPLICATION TO STAY

PROCEEDINGS PENDING EXHAUSTION

OF STATE COURT REMEDIES [DOC.

NO. 7]

Petitioner, Bradley Dwayne Queen, a state prisoner represented

by counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [doc. nos. 1, 4].1 He also filed an

Application to Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of State Court

Remedies [doc. no. 7]. Respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Stay

and Abey was filed on December 14, 2009 [doc. no. 13]. Counsel for

Petitioner attempted to file Supplemental Facts in Support of

Application to Stay Proceedings and Hold Petition in Abeyance [doc.

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Because Queen’s state habeas corpus petition is not

consecutively paginated, the Court will cite this document using

the numbers assigned by the electronic filing system. 

2 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

no. 11], but the Court struck the entry from the docket because a

court order is required to file supplemental documents [doc. no.

14]. Instead, on December 29, 2009, Queen filed a Reply [doc. no.

15].

On February 2, 2010, the Court issued a Minute Order directing

Queen to submit to chambers, by February 5, 2010, a copy of the

state habeas corpus petition referred to in the Application to Stay

[doc. no. 16]. Petitioner complied with the request; Queen’s state

habeas corpus petition was filed by the Court on February 11, 2010,

and is described on the docket as “State Court Record” [doc. no.

17]. (State Ct. R. petition written habeas corpus.)2

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR EXHAUSTION

Before a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim, a

petitioner must exhaust all available state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (West 2006); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 273-74 (2005) (referring to total exhaustion requirement of

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), abrogated on other grounds

by Rhines, 544 U.S. 269). A claim is exhausted only when a

petitioner has fairly presented it to the state courts. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971)). To meet the fair presentation requirement, the

petitioner must “alert the state courts to the fact that he [is]

asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.” Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Duncan, 513

U.S. at 365-66). The petitioner must “provide the state courts

with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at

276-77). By giving state courts the “‘opportunity to pass upon and

correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights,”

comity is promoted, and disruption of state judicial proceedings is

prevented. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at

275); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518; Fields v. Waddington, 401

F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Constitutional claims raised in federal proceedings must be

presented to the state courts first. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 31-32 (2004). A petitioner must provide the highest state

court with a fair opportunity to consider the factual and legal

bases of his claims before presenting them to the federal court. 

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th

Cir. 1996); see also Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Scott v. Schriro, 567

F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1008

(9th Cir. 2008). A claim is not exhausted if it is pending before

the state’s highest court. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 515 (“[A]s a

matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a claim in a

habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an

opportunity to act . . . .”); Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027,

1036 (9th Cir. 2004) (“AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement entitles a

state to pass on a prisoner’s federal claims before the federal

courts do so.”). “It follows, of course, that once the federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

The Court may deny an application for habeas relief on the

merits even if the petitioner has not yet exhausted his state

judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). But the Court has no

authority to grant relief on unexhausted claims. Id. §

2254(b)(1)(A).

A. Whether Queen has Submitted a Mixed Petition 

A mixed petition is one that contains both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. Here, Queen’s

first ground for relief was raised on direct appeal and in his

petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court. (Am.

Pet. 4-6.) None of the claims asserted in ground two of Queen’s

federal Petition have been presented to the California Supreme

Court, and only two of the five arguments were included in the

habeas petition filed in the San Diego Superior Court. (Id. at 7-

12.) Likewise, ground three in Queen’s federal Petition has not

been raised before the state supreme court but is alleged in

Queen’s superior court habeas petition. (Id. at 12.) 

Queen’s state habeas corpus petition, filed in the superior

court, alleged the following claims: (1) The photo lineup used by

the police was unconstitutionally suggestive because his was the

only picture showing a man with a mustache, and the victim

described the suspect as having a mustache; (2) he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because she should have had

an expert evaluate the constitutionality of the photo lineup; she

did not adequately investigate facts relating to a third party’s

attempt to use the victim’s identity to cash a check after Queen

was in custody; and she failed to present a defense because she

discouraged Queen from testifying on his own behalf; and (3) he

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his

attorney failed to raise trial counsel’s failure to secure an

expert to evaluate the photo lineup and failure to adequately

investigate the third party’s use of the victim’s identity to cash

a check. (State Ct. R. petition writ habeas corpus at 6-8.) 

On August 31, 2009, the superior court denied Queen’s state

petition, finding that he had not made a prima facie showing that

he was entitled to relief. (Application Stay Attach. #1 Ex. A at

2.) The court stated, “Petitioner has submitted no independent

corroborating evidence in support of his instant petition for writ

of habeas corpus other than his conclusory, self-serving statement

of facts.” (Id.) It explained, “Petitioner’s own unsubstantiated,

self-serving statements in his petition do not provide a sufficient

basis upon which to prove his claims.” (Id.) Notably, the state

court did not deny the state habeas petition as untimely. (Id. at

2-4.)

As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, the Court

has not been informed that any additional state habeas corpus

petitions have been filed in either the California Court of Appeal

or the California Supreme Court. 

Queen’s federal Petition contains the following claims and

subclaims for relief: (1) Petitioner was denied due process and

his right to a fair cross section of jurors by the trial court’s

refusal to continue the trial so that he could challenge the method

of selecting the jury panel; (2) he was denied effective assistance

of trial counsel because his attorney did not investigate the fact

that a third party attempted to use the robbery victim’s identity

to cash a check, did not call a witness who would testify that a

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

gun was not fired on the night of the robbery, did not present

expert testimony that the pretrial identification of Queen was

suggestive, did not test Queen’s sweatshirt for gunpowder residue,

and did not obtain juror declarations that two jurors considered

Queen’s failure to testify in finding him guilty; and (3) he was

denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because his

attorney did not challenge the trial court’s denial of Queen’s

request for juror information to support his claim of jury

misconduct. (Am. Pet. 4, 7, 12.) 

A petitioner must give the state’s highest court an

opportunity to consider each federal habeas claim. See O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1999); Scott, 567 F.3d at 582;

Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364; see also Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr.,

397 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the failure to

include a claim raised below but not included in the petition to

the state supreme court supported an inference that petitioner

chose not to exhaust the claim).

One of Queen’s claims was raised on direct appeal and in a

petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court. (Am.

Pet. 9.) Other claims have only been alleged in a superior court

habeas petition and in this Court. (Id. at 7-11.) Others, still,

have only been asserted in this Court. (Id.) Queen’s federal

Petition is truly a “mixed” petition, that is, “one containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR STAY OF MIXED PETITIONS

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 276, the Supreme Court held

that district courts have the discretion to stay a mixed habeas

petition and hold it in abeyance to allow a petitioner to present

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

unexhausted claims to state court. “Once the petitioner exhausts

his state remedies, the district court will lift the stay and allow

the petitioner to proceed in federal court.” Id. at 275-76. 

“When a petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies before

filing a federal habeas petition, a district court may hold the

federal petition in abeyance, issue a stay of execution, and allow

the petitioner an opportunity to exhaust his state remedies.”

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470, 1472 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988); see

also Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575-76 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Nevertheless, federal courts are not required to “tolerate needless

piecemeal litigation, [or] to entertain collateral proceedings

whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.” Sanders v. United

States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). 

Normally, if the Court is presented with a mixed petition, one

including both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a three-step

approach to exhaustion may be applied. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist.

Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The procedure include[s] (1) allowing a petitioner to

amend his petition to remove the unexhausted claims -- as

Rose indicated; (2) staying and holding in abeyance the

amended, fully exhausted petition to allow a petitioner

the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the

deleted claims; and (3) permitting the petitioner after

completing exhaustion to amend his petition once more to

reinsert the newly exhausted claims back into the

original petition.

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted).

In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit stated that it had previously

approved the three-step procedure outlined in Taylor. Id. at 659. 

But Jackson noted that Rhines did not “comment on the validity of

the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure approved in Taylor and

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

Kelly.” Id. at 661. The Jackson court continued: “[W]e leave for

another day the question of whether the stay standard announced by

the Supreme Court in Rhines applies to our three-step stay-andabeyance procedure.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

In Rhines, the Supreme Court explained that any stay and

abeyance must be consistent with the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276. AEDPA contains a one-year limitations

period which underscores the statute’s goal of reducing delays in

the execution of criminal sentences and the “‘well-recognized

interest in the finality of state court judgments.’” Id. (quoting

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The Rhines Court

explained that, if granted too frequently, a stay and abeyance

would undermine AEDPA’s purposes. Id. Consequently, “stay and

abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id.

at 277. Still, when a petitioner shows good cause for his failure

to exhaust, presents potentially meritorious claims, and

demonstrates that he has not engaged in dilatory litigation

tactics, “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district

court to deny a stay.” Id. at 278. “In such a case, the

petitioner’s interest in obtaining federal review of his claims

outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution

of federal petitions.” Id. 

AEDPA’s goals are served when the Rhines standard is applied

to the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure for mixed petitions. 

Rhines underscores the importance of reducing delays in the

execution of state criminal sentences. Furthermore, the interest

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

in recognizing the finality of state court judgments is fostered. 

Id. at 276. 

A. Whether Queen’s Petition Should be Stayed

 The Court will consider whether Petitioner is entitled to a

stay, for some or all of his unexhausted claims, under Rhines. 

1. Good Cause

Under Rhines, the first factor to consider is whether “there

was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims

first in state court.” Id. at 277. Neither the Supreme Court nor

the Ninth Circuit has defined what constitutes “good cause” for

failure to exhaust. The Ninth Circuit merely opined that good

cause requires something less than a showing of “extraordinary

circumstances.” Jackson, 425 F.3d at 662. 

Good cause for not previously exhausting a claim has long

been relevant in deciding whether to grant a stay of a habeas

petition. Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (9th Cir.

1993) (holding that district court abused its discretion when it

denied the petitioner’s request for a stay to permit new counsel

to raise claims overlooked by prior counsel); see Guillory v. Roe,

329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing tolling and

stating that “relevant measure of diligence is how quickly a

petitioner sought to exhaust the claims dismissed as unexhausted,

and how quickly he returned to federal court after doing so[]”). 

See generally Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (noting

that AEDPA’s clear purpose was to encourage litigants to exhaust

claims in state court before bringing federal habeas petition).

The good cause standard was recently analyzed in Wooten v.

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008). In Wooten, petitioner’s

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

attorney filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal

and a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, both of

which were denied. Id. Although Wooten was “under the

impression” that his counsel presented all of his claims at both

levels of appeal, one claim was omitted from the state supreme

court petition. Id. at 1022. On federal habeas review, the

district court held that the omitted claim was not exhausted. Id.

It denied petitioner’s motion to stay and hold the case in

abeyance while he returned to state court, concluding that Wooten

failed to establish good cause for his failure to exhaust. Id. at

1023. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision,

stating the following: 

To accept that a petitioner’s “impression” that a claim

had been included in an appellate brief constitutes “good

cause” would render stay-and-abey orders routine. 

Indeed, if the court was willing to stay mixed petitions

based on a petitioner’s lack of knowledge that a claim

was not exhausted, virtually every habeas petitioner, at

least those represented by counsel, could argue that he

thought his counsel had raised an unexhausted claim and

secure a stay. Such a scheme would run afoul of Rhines

and its instruction that district courts should only stay

mixed petitions in “limited circumstances.” 

Id. at 1024 (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277).

Wooten declined to adopt a “broad interpretation of ‘good

cause.’” Id. To do so would “allow[] for routine stays of mixed

petitions[] [and] would also be undermining the goals of AEDPA.” 

Id. (holding that good cause was not established when petitioner

mistakenly believed that his attorney exhausted all claims);

compare Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Nev.

2006) (finding good cause, pre-Wooten, when a petitioner shows “he

was prevented from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance

or confusion about the law or the status of the case . . .[]”). 

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

Queen claims he has shown good cause because while his

superior court habeas petition was pending, he obtained counsel,

and he has recently obtained his trial counsel’s file. 

(Application Stay Mem. P. & A. 7; Reply 3-4.)

a. Recently Obtained Counsel

Petitioner explains that after Queen filed his state habeas

petition pro se on July 8, 2009, the current counsel was hired to

“evaluate and determine if there were any issues outside the record

of the direct appeal that should be raised in a separate state

court petition.” (Application Stay Mem. P. & A. 7 (citation

omitted).) Because the state habeas petition was filed over a year

after the California Supreme Court denied Queen’s petition for

review and just six weeks before AEDPA’s statute of limitations

would expire, counsel was not sure that the superior court would

find the state petition timely, which was necessary for statutory

tolling. (Id. at 3-4, 7-8.) He chose to file a federal Petition

and request the Court to stay and hold the Petition in abeyance

until he could fully exhaust all claims. (Id.) Petitioner also

notes that because he has a claim that appellate counsel failed to

raise a meritorious claim, “petitioner therefore had good cause to

have counsel other than counsel on direct appeal review the record

and determine, independently, if there was a basis to file a habeas

petition.” (Id. at 8.) 

Queen’s counsel has explained his activity in this case after

he was hired, which was sometime since July 8, 2009. (Id. at 7-8;

Reply 3-5.) Petitioner has not provided the Court with any

information regarding Queen’s efforts to exhaust his claims or seek

counsel at any time prior to July of 2009, approximately six weeks

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

before AEDPA’s statute of limitations was to expire on August 19,

2009. (See Application Stay Mem. P. & A. 3.) 

Petitioner provides no explanation for why he waited until

over a year after the California Supreme Court denied his petition

for review to file his first state habeas corpus petition. A

lengthy delay in exhausting a claim without adequate explanation is

not good cause. See Steger v. Thomas, No. 08-00305, 2008 WL

4056086, at *3 (D. Haw. Aug. 29, 2008) (failing to find good cause

where petitioner waited fifteen months to make a claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel and filed a federal petition

instead of a state postconviction motion). The court stated,

“Steger does not explain why he failed to file a post-conviction

motion in the state court, other than to say he ran out of time.” 

Id. at *2. 

Queen, essentially, makes the same argument. He states: 

“[P]etitioner, now with the assistance of counsel, filed the

instant [mixed] petition on August 19, 2009. He did so in order to

ensure that the instant petition was timely filed because it was

uncertain if the Superior Court would find the habeas petition in

case number HC19645 was timely.” (Application Stay Mem. P. & A.

4.) 

Although Queen could have filed a timely federal Petition

alleging the claim he had exhausted, ground one in his Petition, he

did not. (See Am. Pet. 4.) He argues that there is good cause for

the delay in exhausting his additional claims, stating that “[i]t

was . . . necessary for the petitioner to obtain his trial file

prior to filing any further petition in state court, in order to

avoid the same ruling[,] that he failed to offer sufficient

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

evidence to present a prima facie case of relief.” (Reply 4.) 

Even so, Queen acknowledges that his trial file was not needed to

allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ground three in

the federal Petition. (See Application Stay Mem. P. & A. 11.)

A failure of proof is not the equivalent of a failure to

exhaust. See Calleros v. Clark, 08-CV-00424 OWW SMS HC, 2008 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 82615, at **1-2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008). In

Calleros, the petitioner filed a state court habeas petition which

was denied for failure to raise a prima facie claim and failure to

exhaust. Calleros then filed a habeas petition with the California

Court of Appeal, followed by one to the California Supreme Court;

both were summarily denied. Id. at *2. The federal court

concluded that Calleros had exhausted his administrative and

judicial remedies. Id. at **5-6.

Wooten followed a similar path. There, “Wooten recited three

out of the four alleged substantive errors in his brief to the

California Supreme Court without developing any argument on those

errors. Indeed, Wooten specified that he included those errors in

order to exhaust them for the purpose of bringing a federal habeas

petition.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d at 1026. “The California

Supreme Court denied review without explanation . . . .” Id. at

1022. Wooten’s brief to the state supreme court did not include a

cumulative error claim. Id. at 1022, 1026. The claims asserted

before the state supreme court, even in a perfunctory manner, were

exhausted; the omitted cumulative error claim was not.

There is some authority that ineffective assistance of counsel

establishes good cause for a failure to exhaust claims first in

state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 408 F. Supp. 2d 844, 848-49 (D.

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

S.D. 2005), and Fradiue v. Pliler, No. CIV S-00-2209, 2005 WL

2204862, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2005), both support finding good

cause because of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. 

But Carter v. Friel, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (D. Utah 2006), and

Vasquez v. Parrott, 397 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (S.D. N.Y. 2005), are

to the contrary and hold that counsel’s ineffectiveness does not

establish good cause. 

Even if ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may

support a finding of good cause in some cases, it does not here. 

From the information provided to the Court, this is not a case

where Queen was prevented from raising his claims, had no knowledge

of their existence, or appellate counsel failed to follow a request

to include claims on appeal. See Kuzyk v. Edwards, No. ED CV 08-

01148, 2008 WL 4975877, at **3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008.)

On July 8, 2009, Queen filed his own state habeas corpus

petition, which included claims that the photo lineup was

unconstitutionally suggestive; trial counsel failed to secure an

expert to evaluate the photo lineup and failed to adequately

investigate a third party’s use of the robbery victim’s identity to

cash a check; and appellate counsel failed to raise ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. (State Ct. R. petition writ habeas

corpus at 6-8; Am. Pet. 12.) Queen did not allege appellate

counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge the trial court’s

denial of the request for juror information to support Petitioner’s

claim of jury misconduct. (Id.) The factual basis for Queen’s new

claim against his appellate counsel would have been known to

Petitioner since the time of his appeal, and the claim that the

photo lineup was unconstitutionally suggestive was known even

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

earlier. Petitioner provides no explanation for failing to raise

these claims sooner, other than arguing that the federal Petition

should be stayed “to avoid successive piecemeal state petitions.” 

(Reply 6.) This is not good cause under Rhines.

b. Recently Obtained Trial File

Petitioner’s counsel explains that because the superior court

denied Queen’s state habeas corpus petition due to lack of

independent proof and failure to make a prima facie showing, the

trial file was necessary to support any future state petition.

(Application Stay Mem. P. & A. 8.) While this Petition was

pending, Queen’s current counsel contacted trial counsel who

explained that the trial file was in the custody of her former

employer. (Id. at 5.) After several communications between

Queen’s current counsel and the law firm possessing the trial file,

it was ultimately delivered to Petitioner’s counsel on December 28,

2009. (Reply 4-5.) 

Although Queen’s counsel details his attempts to obtain

Petitioner’s trial file from prior counsel, he provides the Court

with no information regarding any prior attempts by Queen to

retrieve his file at any time after his conviction. The

allegations in the federal Petition and the superior court habeas

petition show that Queen’s trial file was not essential to allege a

constitutional violation. (See State Ct. R. petition writ habeas

corpus at 6-8; Am. Pet. 4-12.) Assuming the trial file was

necessary to present a viable state habeas petition, Queen has not

shown that he made any efforts to obtain his trial file from

January 26, 2007, when he was sentenced, to August 19, 2008, when

his first federal Petition was filed. (See Am. Pet. 1.) As a

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

result, Petitioner has failed to show good cause, and he is not

entitled to a stay under Rhines.

Because Petitioner has failed to show good cause for his

failure to exhaust, the Court need not consider whether his

arguments are plainly meritless or whether he engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Wooten v. Kirkland

540 F.3d at 1023 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that Wooten did not have ‘good cause’ for failing to

exhaust his cumulative error claim. As a result, we need not reach

the other two factors in the Rhines test.”) Queen’s Application to

Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of State Court Remedies should

be DENIED [doc. no. 7]. 

III. CONCLUSION

Although the superior court held that Queen had not presented

a prima facie case for habeas relief, this does not mean that the

allegations in the state petition would not be sufficient to

exhaust judicial remedies if presented to the California Supreme

Court.

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 278, the Court concluded, “We

simply hold that the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim

must first be presented to the state courts.” See also Wooten, 540

F.3d at 1026. The first ground for relief in Queen’s federal

Petition has been presented to the California Supreme Court and is

fully exhausted. (Am. Pet. 4-6.) His second ground for relief,

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, contains five subclaims. 

(Id. at 7.) The arguments that trial counsel failed to investigate

a third party’s attempt to cash a check using the robbery victim’s

identity and failed to present expert testimony concerning the

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

suggestiveness of the photo lineup are contained in Queen’s

superior court habeas petition, filed July 8, 2009. (Id. at 9-10.) 

The subclaims that trial counsel failed to call a witness to

testify that he heard no shots fired, failed to test Petitioner’s

sweatshirt for gunshot residue, and did not obtain declarations

from jurors that at least two jurors considered Queen’s failure to

testify have not been presented to any state court. (Id. at 9-11.) 

Ground three in the federal Petition, ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, was included in the habeas petition Queen filed

in superior court. (Id. at 12.)

Queen has not established good cause for not presenting the

unexhausted claims to the California Supreme Court. Moreover, he

did not present three of his ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims to any state court. Consequently, the Application

to Stay Proceedings should be DENIED.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that 

Petitioner’s Application to Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of

State Court Remedies [doc. no. 7] be DENIED and that he be given

leave to file a Second Amended Petition that only contains his

first ground for relief, the sole claim that has been exhausted,

and if not filed, the Amended Petition should be DISMISSED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before March 19, 2010. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\QUEEN1804\R&RreSTAY.wpd 18 09cv1804 IEG(RBB)

objections shall be served and filed on or before March 29, 2010. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 4, 2010 _____________________________ 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez

All parties of record 

Case 3:09-cv-01804-IEG-RBB Document 18 Filed 03/04/10 Page 18 of 18