Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00749/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00749-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO O. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00749-LJO-SAB

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Alejandro O. Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, filed the complaint in this action on 

May 15, 2015. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to 

state a claim.

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case if at any time the Court 

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard 

used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are „merely consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability . 

. . „stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.‟” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as 

true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff‟s legal 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555).

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

On September 10, 2004, Plaintiff purchased property located in Visalia, California which 

was financed by Bank of America. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff executed a 

promissory note for $124,000.00 on September 30, 2004 with Defendant Bank of America. (Id.

at ¶ 16.) The loan was an adjustable rate loan with a five year adjustable rate rider allowing the 

interest rate to increase by 2.250% each year. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff built a home on the property 

that was completed on March 30, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 18.) 

Subsequently, on September 18, 2009, Bank of America recorded a notice of default 

stating that $4,406.26 was due to reinstate the mortgage loan. (Id. at ¶ 21.) On February 19, 

2010, Bank of America and Cal Western Reconveyance Corporation filed a notice of default and 

election to sell the property. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The property was eventually sold for $223,000.00 on 

September 4, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to comply with the 

California Civil Code in foreclosing on and auctioning the property. Plaintiff brings this action 

against Defendants Bank of America and Reconstruct Company to quiet title to the property; and 

against Defendants Bank of America, Reconstruct Company, Cal-Western Reconveyance 

Corporation; and Northwest Trustee Services for wrongful foreclosure seeking monetary 

damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-49.)

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III.

DISCUSSION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power to adjudicate is limited to 

that granted by Congress. U.S v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 

U.S. C. § 1331, federal courts have original over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States. “A case „arises under‟ federal law either where federal law 

creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on 

some construction of federal law.” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction 

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (citations omitted)). “[T]he presence or 

absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the „well-pleaded complaint rule,‟ which 

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of 

the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Republican Party of Guam, 277 F.3d at 1089 

(citations omitted).

Plaintiff‟s complaint states that this action in brought for violation of the Fourth, Seventh, 

and Fourteenth Amendments and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, however, Plaintiff‟s stated causes of action do not include any of 

these claims. Furthermore, the Court finds that the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations 

that would plead a statutory or constitutional violation. To state a claim, Plaintiff must include 

sufficient factual allegations for the Court to reasonably infer that his federal rights were 

violated. 

A. The Constitution of the United States

Plaintiff‟s complaint references the Fourth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a 

plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre 

v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 

1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff‟s 

complaint does not allege that any of the defendants in this action were state actors. The 

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complaint contains no factual allegations that any of Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights were 

violated.

B. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

Plaintiff‟s complaint states that he brings this action for violation of RICO. RICO, which

was passed in 1970 as Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act, provides for both criminal 

and civil liability for certain prohibited activities. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 545 

(9th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to section 1962:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, 

directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection 

of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the 

meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or 

indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition 

of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is 

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A 

purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without 

the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of 

assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the 

securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate 

family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the 

collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate 

to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,

either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or 

through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or 

indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the 

activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 

commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 

enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 

unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions 

of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

Plaintiff does not allege which prohibited activities he is contending were violated by the acts 

alleges in the complaint. Nor does the complaint allege a pattern of racketeering activity by any 

defendant. Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for a violation of RICO. 

C. State Law Violations

Plaintiff‟s complaint alleges only state law causes of action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the district court 

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“shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such original 

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III. . . .” “The 

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) 

if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed 

before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America 

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

The Court declines to reach the viability of Plaintiff‟s state law tort claim at this time as

the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims unless Plaintiff is able 

to state a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. 

Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Leave to Amend

“Generally, Rule 15 advises the court that „leave [to amend the complaint] shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.‟ This policy is „to be applied with extreme liberality.‟” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). The factors the Court 

should consider in deciding whether to grant leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, and futility of the amendment. Id. at 1052. In accordance with the “extreme 

liberality” with which leave to amend should be granted, the Court will grant Plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified herein.

Plaintiff is advised that under Twombly and Iqbal “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. This requires factual content for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. A complaint stops short of the line between 

probability and the possibility of relief where the facts pled are merely consistent with a 

defendant‟s liability. Id. Further, while the court is to accept all “well pleaded factual 

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allegations” in the complaint as true, id. at 679, it is not bound to accept as true labels, 

conclusions, formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action or legal conclusions 

couched as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Further, Plaintiff includes a declaration in which he alleges that Defendant Bank of 

America continued a pattern of recording fraudulent documents. (Decl. of Plaintiff Alejandro O. 

Rodriguez in Support of Compl. 5, ECF No. 1-2.) However, when alleging a claim for fraud, 

Plaintiff‟s complaint must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9 provides that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state 

with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to comply with Rule 9.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to state any 

cognizable federal claims.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff‟s complaint is dismissed, with 

leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint, if any, within thirty (30) days from 

the date of service of this order. Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to file a timely amended 

complaint will result in a recommendation that this action be closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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