Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03767/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03767-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Because Lori, Robert, and Coby share the same last name, the court refers to them by their

first names. The court intends no disrespect. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH

E-FILED on 8/24/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LORI BELTRAN, ROBERT BELTRAN, COBY

BELTRAN, by and through his Guardian Ad

Litem LORI BELTRAN,,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, MELISSA

SUAREZ, individually and as an employee of the

County of Santa Clara, JENNIFER HUBBS,

individually and as an employee of the County of

Santa Clara, EMILY TJHIN, individually and as

an employee of the County of Santa Clara, DOES

1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. C-03-03767 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re Docket No. 70]

Lori Beltran ("Lori"), Robert Beltran ("Robert") and Coby Beltran ("Coby")1 (collectively

"plaintiffs") sued the County of Santa Clara ("the County"), Melissa Suarez ("Suarez"), Jennifer Hubbs

("Hubbs"), Emily Tjhin ("Tjhin") (collectively "defendants") for civil rights and tort claims. On July 14, 2004

this court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. On August 27, 2004 plaintiffs

filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"). Defendants now seek summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Unfortunately, plaintiffs failed to include a statement of facts in their opposition brief. See

N.D. L.R. 7-4(a)(4) ("a brief or memorandum of points and authorities filed in . . . opposition to a motion

must contain . . . [a] succinct statement of the relevant facts"). The court thus divines plaintiffs' view of the

case from allegations in the complaint and declarations filed in support of the opposition. The court notes

that, by so doing, it does not deem any of the complaint's allegations established.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 2

claims. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The court has read the moving and responding papers and

considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves child protective proceedings instituted by the County on Coby's behalf. Except

as noted, the following facts are undisputed.2 Plaintiffs claim that Coby has suffered from bowel problems

since he was born. FAC ¶ 19. Doctors employ a Body Mass Index ("BMI") to monitor a child's growth. 

Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege that Coby has twice fallen below the BMI's "acceptable floor" of the fifth

percentile. Id. Plaintiffs claim that "all of his life, with the exception of . . . one 15 month period, Coby has

had an ongoing cycle of constipation and diarrhea." Id. at 21. As a result, doctors inserted a

gastrointestinal feeding tube ("G-tube") into Coby. Id. at 22. The G-tube allows Lori and Robert to feed

"high caloric liquid supplements" to Coby. Id. Plaintiffs assert that by the summer of 2002, they had

successfully weaned Coby from five cans of supplement per day to about one can per day. Id. at 23.

During the first four years of Coby's life, the County investigated four allegations that Lori was

abusing Coby. Id. at 26. Each referral claimed that Lori suffered from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. 

Id. Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy "is a condition characterized by a parent (usually the mother) who

takes affirmative steps to keep her child ill, in order to garner medical attention." Id. at 26 n.1. The County

ultimately dismissed each referral as "unfounded." Id. at 26.

On July 9, 2002 Dr. Suzanne Frank ("Dr. Frank"), Coby's pediatrician, informed the Santa Clara

County Department of Family and Children's Services ("the DFCS") that she believed that Lori was falsely

claiming that Coby was sick. Suarez Decl. Supp. Mot Summ. J. ("Suarez Decl.") ¶ 3. According to Dr.

Frank, Lori had solicited money, computers, and other resources on Coby's behalf. Id. The County

assigned Suarez, a social worker, to the case. Id. Suarez interviewed Dr. Frank, who stated that she

could not rely on Lori to provide accurate information about Coby's health and that Lori engaged in "doctor

shopping." Id. at ¶ 3. Suarez also interviewed Dr. Michael Durant ("Dr. Durant"), Coby's gastroenterlogist

at Kaiser Medical Center ("Kaiser"). Id. at ¶ 5. Dr. Durant suggested that the County hospitalize Coby for

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Section 300 states that "a child . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may

adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court" when, inter alia, "[t]he child has suffered, or

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the

child by the child's parent or guardian." Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 300(a).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 3

a week and allow Lori only limited access to him. Id. Finally, Suarez spoke to Dr. Oren Abramson ("Dr.

Abramson"), Coby's former gastroenterologist at Kaiser, who stated that (1) Coby's G-tube was

unnecessary, (2) Lori interfered with his staff when Coby was hospitalized, and (3) he believed that Lori

went to several doctors in the hopes of finding something wrong with Coby. Id. at ¶ 4. 

On August 12, 2002 the DFCS filed a warrant petition with the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 8. The

juvenile court issued a protective-custody warrant. On August 14, 2002 the County took Coby into

custody. Suarez claims that Coby said he was hungry during the ride to the Santa Clara County Children's

Shelter ("the shelter"). Id. at ¶ 10. Suarez asserts that her involvement with the case ended when Coby

was admitted to the shelter. Id. at ¶ 11. 

On August 15, 2002 the County assigned Hubbs to the case. Hubbs Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

("Hubbs Decl.") ¶ 3. Hubbs met with Coby, Lori, and Robert. Id. Lori and Robert said that Coby was

"starting to make progress" before entering the shelter. Id. Dr. Durant, however, stated that he thought that

Coby was not doing better and that Lori had left a voice message on August 12 saying that Coby was

getting worse. Id. On August 16, Hubbs signed a Dependency Initial Hearing Report. Id. at ¶ 4. The

report stated that Coby was being detained, in part, because "both parents have denied the allegations to

this worker, and indicated that they have consistently followed the advice of the medical professionals

involved with Coby's treatment." Id. Tjhin, as Hubbs' supervisor, signed the warrant petition and reviewed

Hubbs' recommendations. Tjhin Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Tjhin Decl.") ¶¶ 5-8. 

On August 19, the juvenile court held an initial detention hearing. The court concluded that (1) the

County had made a prima facie showing that Coby fell within Welfare and Institutions Code section 3003

("section 300") and (2) there was no reasonable means by which Coby's physical or emotional health could

be protected without removing him from his parents' physical custody. Id. at ¶ 5. The court ordered the

shelter to detain Coby pending a jurisdictional trial that would begin on August 26. While Coby was in the

shelter, plaintiffs claim that Suarez, Hubbs, and Tjhin "authorized, acquiesced . . . or ratified immediate

cessation of the G-tube feedings." FAC ¶ 39. Plaintiffs assert that defendants did not consult with Lori or

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 4

Robert before making this decision. Id. Plaintiffs allege that this decision constituted a "medical trial": an

"experiment with how [Coby] would tolerate not having any G-[t]ube supplemental feeds" in an effort "to

vindicate the position that Coby's medical problems were 'social' in origin and related to his mother, rather

than some physical etiology." Id. at ¶¶ 40, 52. Plaintiffs also argue that defendants took Coby to doctor's

appointments and administered inoculations without notifying Lori or Robert. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42. Plaintiffs

claim that Coby lost somewhere between 2.6 and 5 pounds while he was in the shelter. Id. at 43. 

However, both Tjhin and Hubbs deny being involved in any of the medical decisions relating to Coby. 

Tjhin Decl. ¶ 10; Hubbs Decl. ¶ 11. Hubbs also stated that she "made every effort [to] . . . inform Lori and

Robert" of Coby's appointments. Hubbs Decl. ¶ 11. 

On August 22, Hubbs signed a jurisdictional report summarizing her investigation and

recommending that Coby be made a dependent of the court. Id. In the report, Hubbs noted that agencies

in South Carolina and Minnesota had issued child abuse referrals with respect to Lori's other children. Id.

at ¶ 7. Hubbs also attached a contract that Kaiser required Lori to sign that stated that she would "not

harass or intimidate the nursing staff and other caregivers" or "interfere with the care by the nursing staff." 

Id. A month-long juvenile dependency trial ensured. During the trial, Hubbs testified numerous times. 

Hubbs Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that Hubbs "attempt[ed] to paint an idyllic picture of life for Coby in the

shelter," and thus committed fraud and perjury. FAC ¶ 44. Plaintiffs contend that Hubbs refused to place

Coby with Robert's parents during this time in order to "keep Coby in the shelter so that the medical trial 

. . . could continue." Id. at ¶ 52.

On September 16, 2002 the juvenile court found that Coby should not remain in protective custody

during the jurisdictional hearing. Transcript, Kiniyalocts Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Kiniyalocts Decl.")

Ex. V at 1803:8-16. The court released Coby to Lori and Robert. Id. at 1083:17-27. On September 30,

the court held that DFCS had not proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 2419:19-22. 

Dismissing the complaint, the court chastised the DFCS:

Now the court would also like to add not as a finding of fact but rather as a simple

expression of concern that the [DFCS] proceeded with this dependency action without

undertaking any real independent investigation. The treating physician's statements were

taken at face value.

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Plaintiffs apparently do not dispute that Suarez's involvement with Coby's case ended when

Coby was admitted to the shelter on August 14, 2002. See Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 14:1-10 (not

mentioning Suarez). Thus, because plaintiffs do not contend that Suarez caused a deprivation of their

constitutional rights, she is entitled to summary judgment on their section 1983 claims.

5 Plaintiffs also alleged a cause of action for battery against Suarez, Tjhin, and Hubbs. FAC

¶¶ 70-75. However, plaintiffs now concede that the court should dismiss their battery claims because the

individual defendants "did not personally offensively touch . . . Coby." Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 30:5-8. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 5

Id. at 2418:28-2419:6.

On August 12, 2003 plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. 

On July 14, 2004 this court dismissed several of plaintiffs' causes of action. However, the court denied

defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims with respect to Coby's medical treatment. The court did not

foreclose the possibility that plaintiffs would prove that defendants had violated plaintiffs' clearly-established

constitutional rights:

Defendants also note that the juvenile courthasa standingorder authorizing routine medical

and dentaltreatment for childrenin placement. Itremains unclear, however, whatmedical

examinations were performed on Coby, and whether these examinations were made

pursuant to the standing order. If the only medical examinations performed on Coby were

made pursuant to statute or court order, then there is no constitutional violation. Even if

certainexaminations orinoculations were not performed pursuant to statute or court order,

plaintiffs must still show that it would have beenclearto a reasonable social worker in the

position of either Suarez, Tjhin or Hubbs that their actions were unlawful. Without

knowingthe exactnatureofwhatmedicalexaminations or procedures were performedand

who authorized them, however, the court cannot make a determination of qualified

immunity.

July 14 Order at 11:21-12:5. The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims relating

to Hubbs' conduct during the dependency hearing. Id. at 9:2-9.

On August 27, 2004 plaintiffs filed the FAC. The FAC alleges that (1) Hubbs violated plaintiffs'

Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association by detaining Coby rather than placing him with his

grandparents, FAC ¶¶ 61-65, (2) Tjhin and Hubbs4 violated Coby's "right to privacy in his body" and Lori

and Robert's right to familial association by performing the "medical trial" and not giving Lori or Robert

notice of Coby's examinations and inoculations, FAC ¶¶ 66-69, and (3) Tjhin and Hubbs intentionally

inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 76-81.5

III. ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity and Summary Judgment

Section 1983 "creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state

law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights." Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Section 1983 states that "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage" subjects another "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress . . . ." 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 6

F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en

banc)).6 To prevail on their section 1983 claims, plaintiffs "must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred

'under color of state law' and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal

statutory right." Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The doctrine of qualified immunity

shields defendants in section 1983 actions from liability if "their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has instructed district courts to "determine

first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all." County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998). The court must therefore "consider the materials submitted in

support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment, in order to decide whether a constitutional right would

be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Jeffers v. Gomez,

267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001). If the court finds that no constitutional violation occurred, "the inquiry

ends." Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2003). However, if "the parties'

submissions create a triable issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the second question is

'whether the right was clearly established.'" Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 943 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A right is "clearly established" when "it would be clear to a reasonable [defendant]

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

B. Substantive Due Process and Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs first claim that Tjhin and Hubbs violated their constitutional rights. The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. "Historically, this guarantee of due

process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty,

or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (emphasis in original). Substantive due

process rights guard against government arbitrariness: its "exercise of power without any reasonable

justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective." Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846. "[O]nly

the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense.'" Id. (citation

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7 Plaintiffs also assert that defendants violated Coby's First Amendment rights. Opp. Mot.

Summ. J. at 26:6. However, plaintiffs fail to back this conclusory assertion with factual or legal arguments. 

The court thus grants summary judgment in defendants' favor on plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 7

omitted). Accordingly, state action must "shock the conscience" to be actionable and "'mere negligence' . .

. is not sufficient to trigger the substantive due process protections of the fourteenth amendment." Redman

v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the parties agree that defendants

must have exhibited "deliberate indifference" toward plaintiffs to have violated their constitutional rights. Cf.

Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 (3d. Cir. 2000) (applying deliberate indifference standard to issue of

whether social worker violated foster child's substantive due process rights by letting him stay in an

allegedly abusive household); Redman, 896 F.2d at 395 (applying deliberate indifference standard to issue

of whether jail officials violated pretrial detainees' substantive due process rights).

Coby claims that Tjhin and Hubbs violated his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment by

subjecting him to the medical trial, appointments, and inoculations.7 In addition, plaintiffs claim that Hubbs

violated their Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain Coby in the shelter instead of placing him

with Robert's parents. The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and

provides that "no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "In the

context of a seizure of a child by the [s]tate during an abuse investigation . . . a court order is the equivalent

of a warrant." Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit "applie[s]

the same legal standard in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims" involving the removal of

children. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 827 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the court will apply the

"deliberate indifference" standard to all of plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court considers each in turn.

1. Continued Detention of Coby and Failure to Place Him With His

Grandparents

Plaintiffs assert that Hubbs and Tjhin violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial

association by detaining Coby in the shelter instead of turning him over to Robert's parents. FAC ¶¶ 51-

53, 61-65. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the juvenile court ordered Coby's detention, but contend that the

court's conclusion was unreasonable:

 Indeed, the fact that a prima facie case had not been made by September 16, 2002,

some 10 trial days in . . . after 9 witnesses (including a treating physician, prior social

workers involved with the family, defendants, Hubbs, Suarez, the 'expert' for DFCS . . .

and a significant number ofdocuments being introduced, begs . . . no,shoutsthe question,

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 Plaintiffs cite Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) for the proposition

that "a juvenile court referee's . . . temporary order to detain children [i]s not a bar to a subsequent civil

rights action." Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 12:10-12. The court agrees that the fact that the juvenile court

initially detained Coby, standing alone, does not exonerate Tjhin or Hubbs from liability for any subsequent

constitutional violation. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 8

how is it that a 'prima facie' case had been made [on] August 19, 2002, at the detention

hearing?

Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 10 n.4 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs are correct, they offer

no evidence that Hubbs or Tjhin were deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights. California law

entrusts the juvenile court—not social workers—with the decision whether to release a child. See Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 319(b) (requiring juvenile courts "order the release of [a] child from custody unless a

prima facie showing has been made" that the child is in danger). Because plaintiffs fail to prove that Hubbs

or Tjhin had any power to alter the juvenile court's conclusion that Coby should be detained, the court

grants defendants' motion for summary judgment on this aspect of plaintiffs' claims.8 

2. Medical Decisions During Coby's Detention

Plaintiffs argue that Tjhin and Hubbs violated their constitutional rights by ordering shelter

personnel to stop feeding Coby through the G-tube. FAC ¶ 39. Plaintiffs allege that Tjhin and Hubbs did

so to try to prove that Coby's "medical problems were 'social' in origin and related to his mother, rather

than some physical etiology." Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiffs also assert that shelter personnel inoculated Coby

without Lori and Robert's consent. Powell Decl. Ex. 12.

Plaintiffs rely on Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1126. In that case, young children and their parents sued

police officers from the city of Escondido who removed the children from their parents' home based on a

single allegation that the Ninth Circuit aptly described as "fantastic": a mental patient's statement that the

father "was planning to sacrifice his young son . . . to Satan at the 'Fall Equinox ritual.'" Id. at 1131. 

Without obtaining a court order or notifying the parents, an officer "ordered, on behalf of the Escondido

Police Department, an evidentiary physical examination of both children." Id. at 1135. At the time of the

examinations, child protective services had not determined whether to seek custody of the children. Id. at

1133. Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor, the Ninth Circuit held

that the plaintiffs had raised genuine issues of material fact that the examinations violated their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights: 

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9 Defendants assert—and plaintiffs do not contradict—that this was in accord with the

shelter's policy of permitting children who already have physicians to continue to see them "to ensure

continuity in their care." Graber Decl. ¶ 3.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 9

We agree with the Second Circuit whichheld, invan Emrik v. Chemung County Dept.

of Social Servs., that the 'Constitution assures parents that, in the absence of parental

consent, [physical examinations] of their child may not be undertaken for investigative

purposes at the behest ofstate officials unless a judicialofficerhasdetermined, uponnotice

to the parents, and anopportunityto be heard, that grounds for such an examination exist

and that the administration of the procedure is reasonable under all the circumstances.'

Id. at 1141 (quoting van Emrik, 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (alterations supplied by Wallis).

However, unlike Wallis, where it was undisputed that the defendants actually ordered the medical

procedures at issue, plaintiffs here have no evidence that Tjhin or Hubbs were responsible for examining

and inoculating Coby or discontinuing his G-tube feedings. Tjhin and Hubbs assert that they "did not direct

or authorize any medical treatment provided to Coby" because "[c]hildren who are placed in the [s]helter

receive medical care in accordance with directives from doctors." Tjhin Decl. ¶ 10, Hubbs Decl. ¶ 11. In

fact, "[w]hile Coby was in protective custody at the shelter, his treating doctors at Kaiser were responsible

for directing Coby's treatment." Graber Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Graber Decl.") ¶ 3. Thus, it is

undisputed that Dr. Durant, Dr. Frank, and Dr. Abramson—who Coby had been seeing before entering

protective custody—directed his medical care while he was in the shelter. Albin Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ.

J. ("Albin Decl.") ¶ 4.9 On August 14, 2002, the date that the County took Coby into protective custody,

Dr. Durant wrote to Suarez and recommended that Coby "receive regular thrice daily meals of a healthy,

well-balanced diet." Kiniyalocts Decl. Ex. E. Thus, it was Dr. Durant, and not Tjhin or Hubbs, who

ordered the discontinuation of Coby's G-tube feedings. 

This fact dooms plaintiffs' constitutional claims with respect to medical decisions during Coby's

detention. For one, plaintiffs fail to link Tjhin and Hubbs to the alleged constitutional violations. See Mabe

v. San Bernardino County, Dept. of Public Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001)

(affirming district court's grant of summary judgment where "no evidence was presented to show a causal

connection between any personal conduct by [defendant] and the alleged constitutional violation"). In

addition, plaintiffs fail to allege a constitutional violation at all: indeed, Dr. Durant, Dr. Frank, and Dr.

Abramson are private individuals, not state actors. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social

Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) ("nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the

[s]tate to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors"); Walter v.

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 10

U.S., 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) ("a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party does not

violate the Fourth Amendment"). Thus, plaintiffs' lack of evidence that Tjhin or Hubbs were personally

responsible for Coby's medical care is fatal to their claims. 

Plaintiffs argue that Tjhin and Hubbs fall within two exceptions to the rule that public officials cannot

be liable for private individuals' constitutional violations: the "state-created danger" and "special relationship"

doctrines. First, plaintiffs cite K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990) and Aristotle P. v.

Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989) for the proposition that "[a] government actor may not place

a child in danger." Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 13:12-21. Plaintiffs contend that because Tjhin knew that other

parents had recently sued the County for allegedly inoculating their children in the shelter without notifying

them, Tjhin Depo. at 56:4-9, Tjhin permitted Coby to be placed in peril. Plaintiffs also contend that the

juvenile court ruled that "[p]lacement and care of [Coby is] temporarily vested with the [DFCS]." Powell

Decl. Ex. G. In light of the juvenile court's order, plaintiffs assert that Hubbs, Coby's assigned social

worker, should be liable for any subsequent constitutional deprivations that he suffered. Second, plaintiffs

contend that Tjhin and Hubbs are liable by virtue of their "special relationship" with Coby. In Nicini, the

plaintiff sued the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Youth and Family Services

("DYFS") alleging that he had been molested by a person with whom he had been staying while in DYFS

custody. The Third Circuit held that "when the state places a child in state-regulated foster care, [it] has

entered into a special relationship with that child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties." Nicini,

212 F.3d at 808. Because there was evidence that the DYFS "acquiesced" to plaintiff staying with alleged

molester, the court held that the DYFS could be liable under section 1983. Id. at 810. 

Plaintiffs' arguments lack merit. Under both the "state-created danger" and "special relationship"

doctrines, courts find social workers liable for engaging in some act or omission after taking custody of the

plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff in K.H. contended that defendants had placed her in an abusive foster

home. K.H., 914 F.2d at 848. Likewise, Nicini featured a social worker who allegedly failed to

investigate the individual with whom he knew plaintiff was staying. Nicini, 212 F.3d at 814-15. Here,

though, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct that forms the basis of plaintiffs' "state-created danger" and

"special relationship theories is taking Coby into custody. Plaintiffs assert that Tjhin and Hubbs should be

responsible for "allow[ing] Coby to be placed" in the shelter where they "knew [that] he could receive

unauthorized and unlawful" medical care. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 14:7-10. The court has already held that

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Aristotle, on the other hand, involved a challenge to the Illinois child protective services'

practice of placing siblings in separate foster homes, and is wholly inapposite. See Aristotle, 721 F. Supp.

at 1004. 

11 Plaintiffs provide no evidence that this other lawsuit (1) involved similar constitutional issues

or (2) had merit.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 11

Tjhin is absolutely immune for signing the warrant petition placing Coby in protective custody. July 14

Order at 8:7-13. Although plaintiffs did not contend that Hubbs was liable for placing Coby in protective

custody, Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses any such claim. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("the critical decision to institute proceedings to make a child a ward of the state

is functionally similar to the prosecutorial institution of a criminal proceeding" and is thus entitled to absolute

immunity). Thus, because neither Tjhin nor Hubbs can be liable for their initial decision to place Coby in

the shelter, plaintiffs' "state-created danger" and "special relationship" theories fail.

In any event, the "state-created danger" and "special relationship" exceptions would not apply to the

facts of this case. Both doctrines require a state actor to ignore clear indications of a private actor's

dangerous propensity. For example, in K.H., the Seventh Circuit held that a trial court properly denied a

motion to dismiss allegations that social workers placed a child in an abusive foster home. K.H., 914 F.2d

at 848. The court construed the complaint to allege that the social workers violated the plaintiff's

substantive due process rights "by deliberately and without justification placing children with foster parents

having a known propensity to neglect or abuse children." Id. at 852.10 Defendants here did far less. 

Plaintiffs' sole contention that defendants placed Coby in danger is that Tjhin was aware of another lawsuit

against the County for allegedly inoculating children without parental consent.11 Of course, entrusting

children to known abusers creates a far more serious risk than placing children in a shelter that has

previously been sued.12 Similarly, Nicini ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the social worker

despite allegations that he failed to investigate the alleged abuser, an individual about whom others were

"suspicious." See Nicini, 212 F.3d at 814-15. Nicini thus reveals that even when a "special relationship"

exists between the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant will not be liable unless he fails to recognize clear

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 Defendants argue that this court's July 14 Order foreclosed this claim by ruling that "there is

no constitutional violation" if "the medical examinations performed on Coby were made pursuant to statute

or court order." July 14 Order at 12:1-3. The court disagrees. The issue of whether defendants violated

plaintiffs' rights by failing to inform them about Coby's appointments is different from whether defendants

violated plaintiffs' rights by actually conducting medical examinations. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 12

signs that a private actor is likely to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because plaintiffs fail to show

that Thjin or Hubbs recognized such clear signs, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

3. Failing to Notify Lori or Robert About Coby's Medical Appointments,

Inoculations, or the Cessation of G-tube Feedings

Plaintiffs argue that Tjhin and Hubbs violated their constitutional rights by "repeated failures to tell

[Lori and Robert] of . . . planned medical evaluations or examinations." Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 18:14-16. 

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that on two occasions, Hubbs did not tell Lori and Robert that Coby was

going to visit a doctor. Powell Decl. ¶ 5. In addition, Lori and Robert claim that they were "never

informed . . . that Coby was going to be subjected to a cessation of feeding through his G-Tube prior to it

occurring . . . or that Coby was going to receive any immunizations or inoculations while in the shelter." 

Lori Decl. ¶¶ 17, 18; Robert Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4. 

Plaintiffs again rely on Wallis. In Wallis, the court recognized that the constitution forbade police

officers from subjecting two young children to "invasive vaginal and medical examinations" without notifying

their parents: 

[T]he state is required to notify parents and to obtain judicialapprovalbefore childrenare

subjected to investigatory physical examinations. [¶]. Moreover, parents have a right

arising from the libertyinterest infamilyassociationto be with their children while they are

receiving medical attention (or to be in a waiting room or other nearby area if there is a

valid reason for excluding them while all or a part of the medical procedure is being

conducted). Likewise, children have a corresponding right to the love, comfort, and

reassurance of their parents while they are undergoing medical procedures, including

examinations—particularly those, such as here, that are invasive or upsetting. 

Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1141-42.13

At first blush, Wallis appears to support plaintiffs' claims. Wallis seems to establish two

constitutional rights: (1) the right of parents to receive notice before their "children are subjected to

investigatory physical examinations" and (2) the right of parents and children to be together "while [the

children] are receiving medical attention." Id. However, Wallis cannot stand for the proposition that

parents and children have an unqualified right to be together during all state-initiated medical procedures. It

is well-established that parents only have a right to receive notice before their children undergo

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14 In any event, Wallis involved highly-intrusive investigatory examinations. Thus, any

suggestion that parents and children enjoy a broader right to be together during all medical procedures is

dicta. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 13

"investigatory physical examinations." See Chayo v. Kaladjian, 844 F. Supp. 163, 170 (S.D. N.Y. 1994)

(granting motion for summary judgment on claim that social workers unconstitutionally administered X-ray

examinations to children when the exams "for medical rather than investigative purposes"); Schwimmer v.

Kaladjian, 988 F. Supp. 631, 641 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (granting motion for summary judgment on claim that

social workers unconstitutionally took skeletal X-rays of children where "the record is devoid of evidence

that [the X-rays were] for investigatory purposes and that the [X]-rays were 'not medically necessary or

advisable'); Doe, 348 F.3d at 828 (reading Wallis to forbid "intrusive sexual abuse examination[s] without

parental consent or a court order"). If parents do not have the right to receive notice before the state

initiates non-investigatory, non-intrusive medical examinations, then it would be perverse to require the state

to ensure that parents are "with their children" during such procedures. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1142

(emphasis added). In fact, Wallis's reasoning does not support extending the right of parents and children

to be together to routine medical procedures. Wallis noted that recognition of such a right is necessary

"because of the possibility that a need to make medical decisions will arise, and in part because of the

family's right to be together during such difficult and often traumatic events." Id. Routine medical

examinations are far less likely to give rise to spur-of-the-moment, important medical decisions or to cause

severe trauma. The court thus reads Wallis to recognize that parents and children have a constitutional right

to be together only during intrusive or investigatory physical examinations.14

Here, plaintiffs offer no evidence that defendants failed to inform them about any intrusive or

investigatory examination. Instead, plaintiffs assert that defendants failed to inform them about routine

medical procedures: (1) "an inoculation that . . . cause[d] Coby's upper arm to swell up and a rash to

develop," Lori Beltran Special Interog. Resp. ("Special Rogs") No. 6, Kiniyalocts Decl. Ex. W and (2)

"two or three medical appointments Coby was taken to [sic] which we found out about after they occurred

. . . ." Special Rogs No. 7. Moreover, plaintiffs offer no evidence that Hubbs exhibited deliberate

indifference to plaintiffs' constitutional rights. First, Hubbs' conduct was consistent with the shelter's

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 The standing order allows the DFCS to give "[a] comprehensive health assessment and

physical examination" and "[l]imited, non-intrusive diagnostic tests that the physician determines are

necessary for evaluation of the minor's health status" but requires "appropriate legal consent, or a court

order" for "invasive diagnostic and clinical tests." Kiniyalocts Decl. Ex. T at 1(a)-(b) & 3(a). 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 14

standing order.15 In addition, the evidence supports Hubbs' claim that she "made every effort to ensure that

[she] was informed of all of Coby's medical appointments so that [she] could inform Lori and Robert . . . of

such appointments." Hubbs Decl. ¶ 11. In fact, Hubbs sent a memorandum to the shelter "remind[ing]

everyone that it is very important that [she] be notified when Coby . . . has any medical appointments." 

Kiniyalocts Decl. Ex. O. Plaintiffs' claims with respect to the inoculations and doctor's appointments thus

fail. 

 Second, the court does not believe that Wallis requires defendants to notify Lori and Robert

before feeding Coby solids instead of liquid through his G-tube. The manner in which defendants fed Coby

is simply not an "investigatory physical examination." For one, Wallis stems from a desire to avoid

subjecting children to intrusive and painful procedures. See Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1141 n.11 ("[i]t does not

require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of

constitutional rights of some magnitude") (citation omitted). But the challenged conduct here is nothing

more than treating Coby like other children in the shelter. This creates far less potential for physical or

mental trauma than the cavity search in Wallis. Moreover, despite Lori and Robert's unsubstantiated claims

to the contrary, it appears that Dr. Durant ordered shelter personnel to feed Coby solids for therapeutic,

rather than investigatory reasons. For example, Dr. Durant testified during the dependancy hearing that

feeding Coby solids and forcing him to try to defecate is a "proven treatment for behavioral disorders in

children such as severe fecal withholding." Kiniyalocts Decl. Ex. LL at 2030:10-21. Thus, because Lori

and Robert had no constitutional right to receive notice before shelter personnel fed Coby solid food,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

4. Hubbs' Conduct During the Dependency Hearing

i. "Hiding" James Dunn

James Dunn ("Dunn"), Lori's ex-husband, lives in Louisiana. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 22:20. Lori

and Dunn have a child named Brandon. Dunn Decl. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Dunn Decl.") ¶ 1. The DFCS

flew Dunn to California during the juvenile dependency trial. Dunn Decl. ¶ 2. Although the DFCS brought

Dunn into the courthouse while the trial was in progress, he did not testify. Id. Plaintiffs argue that they did

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 Plaintiffs also allege that neither Hubbs nor Tjhin took notes during conversations with

Dunn. The court is not sure how plaintiffs believe that this fact reveals that Hubbs or Tjhin were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs' rights. In any event, Tjhin testified that she did not take notes because

she "did not conduct [a] [f]ormal interview with [Dunn]." Tjhin Depo. at 70:16-18. Similarly, Hubbs

testified that she did not take notes because she did not conduct "a sit-down interview" with Dunn. Hubbs

Depo. at 26:5-18. Thus, there is no evidence that Tjhin or Hubbs' failure to take notes was in bad faith. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 15

not learn that the DFCS had flown Dunn to California until the discovery phase of this lawsuit. Powell

Decl. ¶ 3. During the trial, Hubbs testified that Dunn told her that until Brandon was three years old, Lori

"was receiving Social Security or SSI benefits based on Brandon being deaf and mentally retarded," when

"neither of those conditions existed." Transcript, Powell Decl. Ex. 2 ("Tr.") at 1171:7-11. Plaintiffs claim

that the DFCS and Hubbs "hid" Dunn because his testimony would have undermined their efforts to cast

doubt on Lori's credibility. Plaintiffs argue that Lori had informed Hubbs that Brandon received SSI

benefits for a different reason: specifically, because he had been born prematurely. Lori Decl. ¶ 14. 

Plaintiffs assert that Dunn's testimony would have (1) confirmed that Brandon had been born prematurely

and (2) revealed that Dunn had not seen Brandon when he was between the ages of two months to twoand-a-half years old, thus raising questions about how Dunn could have known whether Brandon actually

was disabled during this time. 

Plaintiffs' arguments are unpersuasive. For one, both Hubbs and Tjhin denied making the decision

not to call Dunn and stated that "the decision not to call [Dunn] was made after the court ruled that it would

not consider any evidence pertaining to [Lori's] other children." Hubbs Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

("Hubbs Decl.") ¶ 12; Thjin Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Thjin Decl.") ¶ 9. Likewise, Dunn claimed that he

was under the impression '[t]hat either the judge was not going to allow [his] testimony or that [his]

testimony wasn't needed." Dunn Depo. at 34:12-18. Plaintiffs argue that "the judge most certainly did not

say . . . nor is it in the transcript" that the court declined to hear Dunn's testimony. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at

24:1-4. However, plaintiffs' support for this contention is a non-specific citation to their attorney's

declaration: "[RRP Decl.]." Id. The one paragraph of the declaration that relates to Dunn says nothing

about this issue. See Powell Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs therefore have no evidence to suggest that defendants

made a bad faith effort to suppress Dunn's testimony.16

In addition, Dunn's testimony would have harmed, not helped, plaintiffs' case. Admittedly, Dunn

could have stated that Brandon was born three months prematurely. Dunn Depo. at 37:14-17. As

defendants correctly argue, though, plaintiffs did not need to call Dunn to establish this fact. Indeed,

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 16

plaintiffs could have done so by introducing Brandon's medical records into evidence. Moreover, the

negative aspects of Dunn's testimony would have overshadowed this slight boon to Lori's credibility. In his

deposition, Dunn explained that he and Lori have "a bad history" and that Lori "had lost custody" of

Brandon "through the courts in South Carolina." Dunn Depo. at 4:8-11. Dunn also described an incident

where Lori "used Brandon and told them that he was mentally retarded and deaf and needed a bicycle for

him and had obtained goods from the manager of a local K-Mart using the child." Dunn Depo. at 14:25-

15:4. This testimony would have been especially damaging in light of its similarity to Dr. Frank's allegation

that "Lori operated a web site on which she requested donations of money and goods for Coby's medical

expenses that she later sold on E-Bay." Suarez Decl. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Suarez Decl.") ¶ 3. No

reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' conduct with respect to Dunn constituted deliberate

indifferent to plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

ii. Hubbs' Testimony

Plaintiffs also allege that Hubbs perjured herself during the dependency trial. Plaintiffs claim that, on

September 10, 2002, Hubbs testified that Coby was "doing good" in the shelter:

Q: Is it fair to say that your testimony is that Coby is doing good in the shelter, maybe

not good, but certainly not bad. He is at least doing good?

A: I would say that is a fair assessment, yes.

Tr. at 1143:25-1144:1. Plaintiffs argue that Hubbs' claim was inconsistent with the fact that Coby was

experiencing several health problems. As discussed below, plaintiffs' claim lacks merit.

First, plaintiffs note that Coby suffered from granulation—rotting skin—around his G-tube. Powell

Decl. Ex. 6. However, on September 9, Dr. Abramson testified during the dependency trial that Coby had

granulation before the DFCS took him into custody. Tr. at 878:17-25. Dr. Abramson also testified that

granulation is "a frequent occurrence" around G-tubes. Tr. at 864:13-865:2. Because Dr. Abramson had

previously opined that Coby's granulation was a pre-existing and (unfortunately) common problem, plaintiffs

fail to show that Hubbs tried to hide Coby's granulation from the juvenile court. 

Plaintiffs also contend that Coby told Lori that he had acid reflux in the shelter. Lori Decl. ¶ 15. 

However, plaintiffs have no evidence that Coby communicated this fact to anyone at the shelter, let alone

Hubbs. In addition, plaintiffs assert that Coby was not exhibiting a normal stooling pattern. Yet Hubbs

acknowledged this problem, testifying that "[m]y understanding [is that] the stools have been loose, and the

concern [is that] he was having too much laxative . . . ." Tr. at 1152:20-21. Hubbs' admission that Coby's

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 17

bowel patterns were irregular belies plaintiffs' argument that she tried to mislead the court into believing that

Coby was "doing good [sic]." 

Similarly, plaintiffs allege that Hubbs tried to hide that Coby (1) suffered from vomiting, diarrhea, a

cold, headaches, and diaper rash, (2) was being prompted to eat, and (3) had lost weight since entering the

shelter. But Hubbs actually testified about the majority of these issues: 

Q: What was the outcome of the evaluation?

A: I believe that the concern was that he was having diarrhea, he might be on too much

laxative. They reduced his dosage, I believe they actually eliminated it, but I'm not

completely certain.

Q: And he a cold too, didn't he?

A: Correct.

***

Q: Was there one incident in which he woke up and vomited?

A:I believe,I don'tknowifit was the same incident as a bad dream. There was one time

that he vomited.

***

Q: What has happened recently?

A:Recently I requested that we have a one-to-one shelter staff help himaround the eating

time so thatsomeone could encourage himto eat because, asthe parents have pointed out

as you have pointed out, he is somebody that I would consider a child that needs

assistance continuing to eat . . . . That was in response to a conversation with Dr. Albin

and the other doctors about how want to try to do other things besides immediately start

feeding him with the G-tube because he had had some weight loss . . . .

Tr. at 1229:21-27, 1707:20-22, 1273A:21-26. 

Finally, Hubbs' brief, cautious statement is hardly a ringing endorsement of Coby's well-being. 

Matters might be different if Hubbs had falsely denied that Coby was suffering from specific maladies. But

the question at issue—whether Coby is "maybe not good . . . certainly not bad [but] . . . at least doing

good"—invited a highly general response. Indeed, Hubbs qualified her reply by agreeing that counsel's

statement was "a fair assessment." In addition, counsel's question called for Hubbs' opinion, not for a

statement of empirical fact. Just because plaintiffs and Hubbs may disagree about what it means to be

"doing good [sic]" does not mean that Hubbs lied on the witness stand. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to show

that Hubbs displayed deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights. 

7. Monell Claims

The Monell doctrine permits lawsuits against municipalities for "constitutional deprivations visited

pursuant to governmental custom." Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To

establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2)

the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to her constitutional right;

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 18

and (4) the policy was the "moving force behind the constitutional violation." Van Ort v. Estate of

Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, a constitutional violation is a condition

precedent to a viable Monell claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th

Cir. 2001) ("[n]either a municipality nor a supervisor, however, can be held liable under § 1983 where no

injury or constitutional violation has occurred"). Because plaintiffs have failed to establish that defendants

have violated their constitutional rights, their Monell claim fails.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs claim that defendants are liable for intentionally inflicting emotional distress because they

"conducted themselves with . . . reckless disregard" for their constitutional "rights and safety." Opp. Mot.

Summ. J. at 29:21-22. As noted above, plaintiffs have failed to introduce evidence in support of this claim. 

The court thus grants summary judgment on plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of

action. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

DATED: 8/24/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—C-03-03767-RMW

DOH 19

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Robert R. Powell rrplaw@earthlink.net 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Gregory J. Sebastinelli gregory.sebastinelli@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

Melissa R. Kiniyalocts melissa.kiniyalocts@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered for

e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 8/24/05 DOH

 Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:03-cv-03767-RMW Document 102 Filed 08/24/05 Page 19 of 19