Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00702/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00702-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

First Solar Incorporated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JB Hunt Transport Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00702-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 22). Plaintiffs initially 

sued Defendant JB Hunt Transport, Inc. (“Hunt”), and several other parties in Maricopa 

County Superior Court on December 9, 2014, seeking damages for breach of contract, 

bailment, negligence, and negligence per se. (Doc. 1 at 7, 10-13.) According to the state 

court complaint, Plaintiffs hired Hunt to ship electrical equipment known as an inverter 

from Dateland, Arizona, to Phoenix. (Id. at 9.) The inverter was allegedly damaged on 

December 9, 2013, when the truck that was carrying it attempted to drive under an 

overpass that was too low to clear the inverter. (Id. at 9-10.) On April 17, 2015, Hunt 

filed a Notice of Removal, asserting this court had subject matter jurisdiction under a 

federal law known as the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which 

regulates interstate carriers and freight brokers. (Id. at 2; see 49 U.S.C. § 14706.) 

 As relevant to Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Carmack Amendment applies only to the 

transportation of goods “between a place in— (A) a State and a place in another State” or 

“(B) a State and another place in the same State through another State.” 49 U.S.C. 

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§§ 13501, 14706; see also Farrah v. Monterey Transfer & Storage, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 

1066, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Whether transportation is interstate or intrastate under the 

Interstate Commerce Act is determined by the essential character of the commerce, 

manifested by the shipper’s fixed and persisting transportation intent at the time of the 

shipment, and is ascertained from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 

transportation. When goods are shipped entirely within a state, the Interstate Commerce 

Act does not apply.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs therefore 

move to remand on the grounds that the shipment in this case was intended to, and did, 

occur entirely within the state of Arizona. They also request costs and attorneys’ fees 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides, “An order remanding the case may require 

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 

result of the removal.” 

 Hunt does not object to the remand request, but it maintains attorneys’ fees are not 

appropriate. “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under 

§ 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for 

seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be 

denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). In deciding 

whether an objectively reasonable basis exists, courts may ask “whether the relevant case 

law clearly foreclosed the defendant’s basis of removal.” See Lussier v. Dollar Tree 

Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, there was no objectively 

reasonable basis for removal. The bill of lading for Plaintiffs’ delivery clearly indicates 

that the shipment was to begin and end in Arizona. (Doc. 28-1 at 2.) Hunt has not 

produced any evidence that the trailer carrying the inverter passed through a different 

state on its way from Dateland to Phoenix. Under clearly established law, federal subject 

matter jurisdiction therefore did not exist. 

 Instead, Hunt asserts it had a reasonable basis for removal merely because it is a 

federally licensed freight broker and because the bill of lading—apparently a form 

contract used in many transactions—contains the following disclaimer near the bottom: 

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“Liability limitation for loss or damage in this shipment may be applicable. See 49 USC 

§ 14706(c)(1)(A) and (B).” (Id.) The cited provisions discuss a carrier’s ability to limit 

its liability for certain shipments governed by the Carmack Amendment. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 14706(c)(1). As explained above, the mere fact that an entity is licensed to carry goods 

between states does not necessarily bring all its activity within the Carmack Amendment; 

a particular shipment must actually be interstate for that Amendment to apply. And the 

fine print on the bill of lading does not change the fact that, in this case, Hunt well knew 

that its transportation of the inverter was entirely intrastate. 

 Hunt also opposes fees because it says Plaintiffs did not request a stipulation to 

remand before filing their Motion. “Had they done so,” Hunt claims, “[Hunt] would have 

agreed and the Motion to Remand would have become moot.” (Doc. 28 at 2.) It was 

reasonable for Plaintiff to present the analysis and authorities against removal. Plaintiff 

was entitled to assume Defendant had been diligent and serious about removal to the 

court and that authorities would be necessary. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 22) is 

granted. The Clerk shall remand this case to the Superior Court for Maricopa County. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may claim costs and attorneys’ fees 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule LRCiv 54.2. 

 Dated this 22nd day of June, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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