Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03146/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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15-cv-3146 LB

ORDER

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

MARION LEE CROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHUCK ETCHISON; et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. 15-cv-3146 LB

ORDER OF SERVICE AND PARTIAL

DISMISSAL

[Re: ECF No. 1]

INTRODUCTION

Marion Lee Cross, currently a prisoner at the California Correctional Center in Susanville, filed

this pro se prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He consented to proceed before a

magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) This action is now before the court for review of Mr. Cross’

complaint. This order finds Mr. Cross’s excessive force claim cognizable, directs the U.S. Marshal

to serve process on one defendant and dismisses the other two defendants. 

STATEMENT

The complaint alleges that Mr. Cross was “sentenced” by the “Manteca Superior Court” to a

“court appointed” drug treatment program called the Jericho Project in Brisbane, California. (ECF

No. 1 at 3.) While attending the drug treatment program, Mr. Cross “was choked out by the program

director, Chuck Etchison on or about 7/31 or 8/1 2014.” (Id.) Mr. Cross further alleges that the

Daly City police chief will have “supporting document[s] for this claim.” (Id.) In addition to

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UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 2

naming Mr. Etchison as a defendant, Mr. Cross names Jericho Project Inc. as a defendant “for

employing Mr. Etchison.” Id. Mr. Cross also names “Manteca Superior Court” as a defendant for

“sentencing [him] to a program where [he] was physically assaulted and later ignoring written proof

of this assault and further sentencing [him] to four yrs. state prison as part of the same case.” Id. 

ANALYSIS

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se

complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As relevant here, the court only has jurisdiction

to entertain this action if it raises a federal question, such as a civil rights claim asserted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (There are other federal statutes that grant other bases of federal court jurisdiction,

but none are applicable to this action.) In simple terms, this action can go forward in federal court if

a claim is stated under § 1983; if the complaint does not state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

should pursue his claim in state court. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

Mr. Cross alleges that he was “choked out” by Mr. Etchison while at the Jericho Project. The

constitutional right at issue when force is used on a person depends on the person’s status at the time

of the incident. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial detainee

from the use of force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10

(1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

of cruel and unusual punishments protects a convict from force used maliciously and sadistically for

the very purpose of causing harm. See generally Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Mr.

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 3

Cross alleges that he was sentenced to the Jericho Project by the state court, which would suggest he

was a convict at the relevant time, but it is not necessary to determine Mr. Cross’s status for present

purposes because (assuming state action existed) an allegation that a defendant choked a plaintiff

would suffice to plead a claim under either the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment. 

Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim against Mr. Etchison for

excessive force.

There is some question as to whether there was state action. Mr. Cross alleges that he was

physically assaulted by the head of a “court appointed” drug treatment program to which he had

been “sentenc[ed]” by a superior court. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The court will assume for present

purposes that, liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the second element of a §

1983 claim for his claim against Mr Etchison. Determining whether a private party’s conduct

should be considered action under color of state law can be a difficult matter. See generally

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-98 (2001)

(discussing tests and facts to be considered to determine whether actions taken by private individuals

or organizations should be considered to be taken under color of state law). The determination may

involve a detailed inquiry into the facts, many of which are better known to the defendant than the

plaintiff, such as the specific relationship between the Jericho Project and the state court that

allegedly sentenced the plaintiff to the program. See generally Kelly v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 2012

WL 6203691, *6 (D. N.J. 2012) (collecting cases and noting that “[f]ederal courts are split on the

question of whether organizations that operate halfway houses, and their employees, are state actors

for purposes of § 1983"). It therefore is preferable to let the defendant challenge the adequacy of the

pleading or proof on this element rather than to attempt to obtain facts via an amended complaint

from a plaintiff who may not know the details of the relationship between the state and the private

party.

The complaint does not state a claim against the Jericho Project, which apparently was named as

a defendant merely because it employed Mr. Etchison. There is no respondeat superior liability for

the actions of the private entity’s employees, i.e., no vicarious liability for the employer simply

because it employed the wrongdoer. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.

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ORDER 4

2012). 

The complaint does not state a claim against the Manteca Superior Court. Mr. Cross alleges only

that the Manteca Superior Court caused him to be sent to the program at which the alleged wrongful

conduct occurred. Mr. Cross does not allege, for example, that the superior court ordered him to be

choked at the Jericho Project or played any role in determining the operations at the Jericho Project. 

The conduct of which Mr. Cross complains – being choked – simply cannot be attributed to the

Manteca Superior Court. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-05 (1982) (Medicaid recipients

challenging decisions made by nursing homes to discharge or transfer them to lower levels of care

failed to show that the state or state officials were responsible for those decisions); id. at 1003

(“[t]his case is obviously different from those cases in which the defendant is a private party and the

question is whether his conduct has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it

‘state’ action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Just as a sentencing court is not a

proper defendant in a routine § 1983 case about particular prison conditions a criminal defendant

experiences during the course of his incarceration, the Manteca Superior Court is not a proper

defendant in this § 1983 case about the particular conditions experienced at the treatment program to

which it sentenced the plaintiff. 

Finally, Mr. Cross states that he wants to assert a claim for damages based on the Manteca

Superior Court “further sentencing [him] to four yrs. state prison as part of the same case.” (ECF

No. 1 at 3.) Mr. Cross cannot challenge his criminal conviction or sentence in this civil rights

action. The case of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that a plaintiff cannot bring a civil

rights action for damages for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or

sentence already has been determined to be wrongful. See id. at 486-87. A conviction or sentence

may be determined to be wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside

when a state or federal court issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a

person from bringing an action that – even if it does not directly challenge the conviction or sentence

– would imply that the conviction or sentence was invalid. The practical importance of this rule is

that a plaintiff cannot attack his conviction in a civil rights action for damages; the decision must

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 5

have been successfully attacked before the civil rights action for damages is filed. The Heck rule

was first announced with respect to an action for damages, but the Supreme Court has since applied

the rule to an action that sought declaratory relief as well as damages. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 648 (1997). If success in the § 1983 action would "necessarily demonstrate the invalidity

of confinement or its duration," the § 1983 action is barred no matter the relief sought (i.e., damages

or equitable relief) as long as the conviction has not been set aside. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81-82 (2005). If Mr. Cross wants to challenge his state court conviction or sentence in

federal court, he may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus after he exhausts state court remedies

for each and every claim he wishes to present to the federal court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ("when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a

speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus"). 

CONCLUSION

1. Liberally construed the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim against Chuck Etchison

for excessive force against Mr. Cross. All other defendants and claims are dismissed. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the complaint, a copy of all the documents in the case

file, and a copy of the "consent or declination to magistrate judge jurisdiction" form upon Chuck

Etchison, the program director at Jericho Project, 51 Golden Aster Court, Brisbane, CA 94005.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for dispositive

motions is set:

a. No later than October 23, 2015, the defendant must file and serve a motion for

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If the defendant is of the opinion that this case

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, the defendant must so inform the Court prior to the date

the motion is due. If the defendant files a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must

provide to the plaintiff a new Rand notice regarding summary judgment procedures at the time he

files such a motion. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012). If the motion is based

on nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, the defendant must comply with the notice and

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ORDER 6

procedural requirements in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014).

 b. The plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion must

be filed with the court and served upon the defendant no later than November 20, 2015. The

plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in

this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. If the defendant wishes to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and served

no later than December 4, 2015.

4. The plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for

motions for summary judgment:

The defendants [may make] a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have your

case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. [¶] Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when

there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that

would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a

motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants'

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be

entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will

be no trial. 

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If a defendant files a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, he is seeking to have the case dismissed. A plaintiff faced with such a motion can oppose

it using the same methods as described above for other summary judgment motions. As with other

defense summary judgment motions, if a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is granted, the case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

5. All communications by the plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's counsel

by mailing a true copy of the document to the defendant's counsel. The court may disregard any

document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant's counsel

has been designated, the plaintiff may serve a document by mailing a true copy of the document

directly to the defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 7

UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

mailed to counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No further

court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required before the

parties may conduct discovery.

7. The plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. The plaintiff must promptly keep the

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every pending

case every time he is moved to a new facility or is released from custody.

8. The plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this case

on any document he submits to the court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2015 _______________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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