Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00325/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00325-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Buzayene Kidane, et al.,

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

County of Santa Clara, et al.,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 04-00325 JW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Buzayene Kidane ("Kidane"), Brian Logan ("Logan"), and Phillip Williams

("Williams") (collectively "Plaintiffs") bring this action against Defendants County of Santa Clara

("County"), Santa Clara County Probation Department ("SCCPD"), John Cavalli ("Cavalli"), Richard

Munley ("Munley"), Tenly Petrino ("Petrino"), and Debbie Hulen ("Hulen") (collectively

"Defendants"), alleging employment discrimination based on race and national origin, hostile work

environment, harassment and retaliation, and a pattern and practice of disparate treatment. 

Currently before this Court is County and SCCPD’s January 21, 2005 Motion to Dismiss

Certain Factual Allegations Contained in the Second Amended Complaint, or Alternatively, for a

More Definite Statement (hereinafter “Defendants’ Motion”). Plaintiffs Logan and Williams oppose

the Motion, but agree to voluntarily dismiss their claim for Wrongful Discipline. For the reasons set

forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion but also GRANTS Plaintiffs Leave to Amend

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their Second Amended Complaint. 

II. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of an employment discrimination action against Defendants. Plaintiffs

filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (42

U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e)(1)), and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") (CAL.

GOV’T CODE § 12900 et seq.).

A. Plaintiff Brian Logan

Plaintiff Logan began working for SCCPD in 1986. Logan was promoted to Group Counselor

II in 1989 and Senior Group Counselor in 1990. Logan alleges that he later made several unsuccessful

attempts at being promoted in 1992, October 1996, September 1999, October 2000, June 2001, and

March 2002. (SAC ¶¶ 63-64, 67, 70, 74-75, 80.) More specifically, Logan alleges that in December

2001, he applied for a promotion, but instead received the position of Deputy Probation Officer II,

which is effectively a demotion. (SAC ¶ 77.) Allegedly, Logan was denied promotion because: there

was a preference for non-African-American candidates with fewer qualifications and education than

Logan; there were newly implemented background check requirements; his co-workers and

supervisors provided wrongful assessments of his work ethics and enthusiasm; and he lacked access

to training at the "Leadership Academy." (SAC ¶¶ 67, 74-75, 79-80, 82.) Logan alleges that, on

several occasions, he sought promotion advice from a Supervisor. The Supervisor allegedly told

Logan that he was perceived as lazy and that he should be terminated even though he had no official

reprimands. Furthermore, the Supervisor told Logan that the Probation Department was "afraid" of his

knowledge based on his previous employment as a union representative and sought signs of "loyalty." 

(SAC ¶ 71.) Logan alleges that, following knee injury, he was placed on "light duty" work but that his

work was scrutinized more closely than non-African-American employees. (SAC ¶¶ 65-66.) Other

alleged instances of harassment and disparate treatment include: an anonymous letter distributed

through Juvenile Hall, stating that Logan ought to "refrain coming to work dressed as a 16-year old

gang banger"; unspecified harassment following his report on disparate treatment of African-American

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males in Juvenile Hall; a noose found around an African-American Star Trek character by another coworker; assault on an African-American co-worker for wearing a baseball cap backwards; an e-mail

sent out regarding "probation hate"; and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. (SAC ¶¶ 68, 73, 76,

81, 83.) Logan claims that internal complaints regarding these occurrences were not met with action,

but rather, further harassment resulted. (SAC ¶¶ 68, 78.)

Logan sought medical help after his health allegedly deteriorated because of work-related

stress. He is now taking anti-depressants and receiving counseling. (SAC ¶ 72.)

B. Plaintiff Philip Williams

Plaintiff Williams has a long-standing history with SCCPD. Williams began part-time work

with the SCCPD in 1982 and became a permanent hire in 1985. Williams received several

promotions: Group Counselor II in September 1986, Senior Group Counselor in October 1988,

Probation Deputy Officer II in June 1989, and Probation Deputy Officer in May 1993. He alleges that

his work has been consistently rated satisfactory. He has perfect attendance, and no records of

discipline. (SAC ¶ 84.) Williams contends that he has been ranked among the top seven candidates,

which has allowed him to interview for openings as a Supervising Probation Officer. Upon his

manager’s insistence that he obtain more cross-training in order to be promoted, Williams requested

and was granted assignment to the Juvenile Unit. (SAC ¶ 85.) Williams alleges that he experienced

harassment and disparate treatment while he was at the Juvenile Unit. These include: an anonymous

phone call cautioning him to "watch his back"; comments by a manager calling the promotional

candidates list the "worst list ever" based on the presence of African-American candidates; statements

by supervisors calling him lazy; statements by managers calling his behavior "stereotypical"; and

reference to three African-American candidates on the promotional list as "the three B’s." 

Additionally, Williams alleges that supervisors made unfounded statements to a hiring panel regarding

his attendance. (SAC ¶¶ 86-90, 94.) Williams claims that he made internal complaints regarding

these instances, but that no subsequent action was taken, and so he was dissuaded from filing a formal

complaint. (SAC ¶¶ 86, 89, 92, 98.) Williams alleges that his work was more closely scrutinized

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than other non-African-American employees, that his working hours were closely monitored despite

no attendance problems, and that he was reprimanded for attending meetings. (SAC ¶ 92.) Williams

alleges that he made several unsuccessful attempts at promotion in August 1999, mid-2001, and

December 2002. (SAC ¶¶ 93, 98-99.) Williams claims multiple reasons for being denied promotion,

including: preference for non-African-American candidates, racially motivated comments made by a

manager, and the elimination of a promotion system based on objective criteria. (SAC ¶¶ 93, 96, 98-

99.) Williams also claims that he met with "the ultimate hiring authority" to request assistance, but that

this effort proved unsuccessful. (SAC ¶ 97.) Williams claims that he has suffered blood pressure

problems as the result of the stress induced by harassment. His doctor subsequently put him on sick

leave for a three-month duration based on work-related stress. He also began seeing a therapist. 

(SAC ¶ 95.)

 III. STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal can be based either on the lack of a cognizable legal

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistrer v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d

530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court "must presume

all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Any existing

ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the pleading. Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 396

(9th Cir. 1973). However, mere conclusory allegations couched in factual allegations are not

sufficient to state a cause of action. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also McGlinchy

v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint should not be dismissed under

Rule 12(b)(6) unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Moore v.

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City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement Under Rule 12(e)

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) permits a party to move for a more definite statement "[i]f a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be

required to frame a responsive pleading." Generally, this motion is limited "to situations where a

pleading suffers from unintelligibility rather than want of detail, and if the requirements of the general

rule as to pleadings are satisfied and the opposing party is fairly notified of the nature of the claim

such motion is inappropriate." Castillo v. Norton, 219 F.R.D. 155, 163 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citations

omitted). The court has wide discretion over a motion for a more definite statement, and "may require

that the complaint be amended, or that the information sought be supplied by declarations or other

means." Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 

Rule 12(e) motions "are not favored by the courts since pleadings in the federal courts are only

required to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean,

854 F. Supp. 626, 649 (D. Ariz. 1994) (citations omitted). "If the moving party could obtain the

missing detail through discovery, the motion should be denied." Davison, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1228

(citing Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). A Rule

12(e) motion should not be used "to assist in getting facts in preparation for trial as such; other rules

relating to discovery, interrogatories and the like exist for such purposes." Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 163

(citations omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Disparate Treatment Allegations

1. Title VII: 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(5)(e)(1)

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that claims for retaliation and failure to promote are

treated as claims for disparate treatment. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103

(2002).

Title VII prescribes two limitations periods: 180 days and 300 days. Which limitation period

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applies to a given plaintiff’s case depends upon which administrative agencies with which that

plaintiff filed her complaint(s). In a deferral state, such as California, which has its own civil rights

statute and agency, filing a complaint with California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”) and with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) entitles

plaintiffs to the substantive use of events up to 300 days prior to filing the administrative complaint. 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. 101, 102-03 (2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e)(1). By

contrast, filing only with the EEOC entitles Plaintiffs to the substantive use of events up to 180 days

prior to filing the administrative complaint. Morgan, at 103. Caselaw permits a plaintiff to use events

beyond the 180-day or 300-day limitations period for background purposes. Morgan, at 103. 

There is a dispute as to whether a Title VII’s 180- or 300- day limitations period applies here. 

This is partly because Plaintiff’s filings are inconsistent. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

alleges they filed a complaint with the EEOC. (Docket No. 34.) However, Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion states they filed complaints with both the EEOC and the DFEH. (Docket No. 41.)

Although some of the allegedly discriminatory events occurred within the shorter 180-day

limitations period, many took place outside that period. 

Logan filed a complaint with the EEOC on December 13, 2002. (SAC ¶ 8.) Title VII’s 180-

day limitations period would limit Logan to sue only on events that occurred on June 16, 2002 or later. 

This includes events such as: the e-mail of June 22, 2002, the alleged failure to promote in September

2002, the "out of sight, out of mind" statement in September 2002, and the comments by Probation

Manager, Harold McLean, in both January 2003 and April 2003 stating "I hope you’re not making

trouble." (SAC ¶¶ 81-84.)

Williams filed a complaint with the EEOC on January 28, 2003. (SAC ¶ 8.) Title VII’s 180-

day limitations period would limit Williams to sue only on events that occurred on July 28, 2002 or

later. This includes events such as: the November 2002 filing of an internal complaint, the December

2002 failure to promote allegation, and the second-hand comments of disparate treatment regarding

other African-American employees. (SAC ¶¶ 98-99.)

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In the landmark case of Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Court

delineated several applicable legal principles. First, the Court held that discrete discriminatory acts,

which are not time-barred by the statutory guidelines of Title VII, are admissible as actionable events. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104 (2002). The Court also held that time-barred acts are nevertheless

admissible as background evidence to contextualize actionable events. Id. at 104. In other words, a

Title VII plaintiff may plead acts that occurred prior to the 180-day (or 300-day) time limitations

period for background purposes, provided that an actionable event amounting to disparate treatment

occurred within the time limitations period. See McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 300 F.3d 1103,

1115 (9th Cir. 2002); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001).

Thus, although Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint may be adequate as is, because

Plaintiffs plead pre-limitations period facts for background purposes, the Second Amended Complaint

is made ambiguous by judicial admissions in Plaintiffs' motion papers. This Court grants Defendants’

Motion. Logan and Williams are given Leave to Amend the Second Amended Complaint for the

purpose of adding allegations of a DFEH filing, if true. Such an allegation would help to clarify

whether Title VII’s 300-day limitations period applies here. 

2. FEHA: CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900 et seq.

There is no dispute as to the statutory timeliness of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. Under FEHA,

all events up to one year prior to the filing of the administrative complaint are admissible. CAL.

GOV’T CODE § 12960(d); Romano v. Rockwell Int’l Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996); Accardi v.

Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 349 (1993).

Logan filed his administrative complaint with the EEOC on December 13, 2002. Therefore,

events from December 13, 2001 are admissible for Logan. This includes: his demotion to Deputy

Probation Officer II in January 2002, the denial of access to the Leadership Academy, the background

check requirement, the e-mail regarding "overcoming probation hate," the statements Logan was "out

of sight, out of mind," and the statements by Probation Manager, Harold McLean, that, "I hope you are

not making any trouble." (SAC ¶¶ 77-83.) 

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Williams filed his administrative complaint with the EEOC on January 28, 2003. Therefore,

events from January 28, 2002 are admissible for Williams. This includes: the internal complaint he

filed in November 2002, the failure to promote in December 2002 despite his passing of a promotion

exam, and the second-hand comments of disparate treatment regarding other African-American

employees. (SAC ¶¶ 98-100.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions based upon a meritless Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 

Defendants have made their motion to dismiss in good faith and on appropriate grounds. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

against County and SCCPD is DENIED. Plaintiffs have alleged the bare minimum facts to comply

with the liberal pleading requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 

C. Wrongful Discipline Claim Is Voluntarily Dismissed

Plaintiffs have VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED their cause of action for Wrongful Discipline

against County and SCCPD. 

V. CONCLUSION 

This Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiffs Leave to Amend

their Second Amended Complaint in order to allege whether they made a filing with the DFEH. 

Dated: June 10, 2005

04cv325mtd

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

A. Catherine Lagarde aclagarde@aol.com

Charles A. Bonner cbonner799@aol.com

Lisa Herrick lisa.herrick@cco.sccgov.org

Dated: June 10, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:/s/JWchambers 

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

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