Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00177/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00177-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GUSSIE R. WARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10cv177-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for supplemental security income benefits under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., alleging that she was

unable to work because of a disability. Her application was denied at the initial

administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the

plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. The ALJ,

therefore, denied the plaintiff’s claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a

subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

1

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 1

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 1 of 9
129, 131 (11 Cir. 1986). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to th

entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. The case is now before the

court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Based on the court's

review of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the

decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months . . . 

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 2

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 2

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.

2

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 2 of 9
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11 Cir. 1986). th 3

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11 Cir. 1997). “Substantial th

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of

the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its

entirety and take account of evidence which detracts fromthe evidence relied on by the ALJ. 

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11 Cir. 1986). th

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in

evaluating claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11 Cir. 1987). th

III. The Issues

A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 48 years old at the time of the hearing before the

ALJ and has a high school education. (R. 607). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded

that the plaintiff has severe impairments of diabetes with diabetic neuropathy, obesity, and

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11 Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI). 3 th

The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately

cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5 Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

th

3

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 3 of 9
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine. (R. 22). Following the hearing,

the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff could return to her past relevant work as a Nursery

School Attendant, and thus, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff is not disabled. (R. 25).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims. The plaintiff presents two issues for the court’s review. As

stated by the plaintiff, the issues are as follows.

1. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed[] because the ALJ

erred in mechanicallyapplying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and

in not obtaining vocational expert testimony.

2. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed[] because although

the ALJ found obesity to be a severe impairment, he failed to comply

with SSR 02-01p in not adequately considering the impact of the

obesity on Ms. Ward’s ability to work.

(Pl’s Br., doc, # 11, at 6). 

IV. Discussion

A. Mechanical Application ofthe Medical-Vocational Grids. The plaintiff argues

that the ALJ “erred in mechanically applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and in not

obtaining vocational expert testimony.” (Id.). See also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App.

2. However, the ALJ did not conclude that Ward was not disabled based solely upon the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) because, of course, exclusive reliance on the grids

is appropriate only when a claimant has no non-exertional impairments that significantly

limit his basic work activities. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553 (11 Cir. 1995); Sryock v.

th

Heckler, 764 F.2d 834 (11 Cir. 1985). In this case, the ALJ did not apply the Grids at all. th

4

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 4 of 9
Consequently, the ALJ did not err and Ward is entitled to no relief on this basis. 

To the extent that the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to obtain vocational expert

testimony, she is not entitled to a remand. The Social Security Administration has developed

a sequential evaluation process for determining if a plaintiff is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520 and 416.920. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that she cannot

perform her past relevant work. Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 (11 Cir. 1986).

th

After a plaintiff has shown that she cannot perform her past relevant work, the burden then

falls upon the Commissioner to show that there are other jobs in the national economy that

the plaintiff can perform. However, if the plaintiff can perform the kind or type of work she

has performed in the past, she is not disabled.

The ALJ found that the plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a nursery

school attendant at step 4 of the sequential analysis, and the plaintiff does not challenge this

finding. Vocational expert testimony is required at step 5 of the sequential analysis when

the ALJ must determine whether the plaintiff can perform other work in the national

economy. Because the ALJ truncated the sequential evaluation process at step 4 by

concluding that the plaintiff could return to her past relevant work, any failure on the part

of the ALJ to secure vocational expert testimony is of no consequence. While, as the court

has concluded, it is not error to obtain evidence from a vocational expert, it is also not

necessary and thus, not error to not do so. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b). See also Lucas v.

5

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 5 of 9
Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1573 n.2 (11 Cir. 1990) (Vocational expert testimony is not

th

required at step 4 to evaluate a plaintiff's ability to perform past relevant work). Therefore,

the ALJ’s failure to obtain vocational expert testimony does not warrant a remand in this

case.

B. Obesity. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the

although the ALJ found obesity to be a severe impairment, he failed to comply

with SSR 02-01p in not considering the impact of the obesity on Ms. Ward’s

ability to work. In his decision, the ALJ found that Ms. Ward suffers from the

severe impairment of obesity (Tr. 22). Despite the ALJ’s own findings, he

failed to consider this medically determinable impairment in his step two

determination and failed to consider the limitations imposed by this chronic

disease (see Tr. 20-25).

(Pl’s Br. at 8).

Beyond this broad, generalized statement, Ward alleges no facts and points to no

evidence in the record in support of her position that her obesity impinges on her ability to

work. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the Commissioner’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence, and the argument of counsel is insufficient to meet this

burden.

More importantly, however, the court concludes that the ALJ considered the effects

of the plaintiff’s obesity on her ability to perform work. Dr. Vanderzyl opined that Ward

“had no limitation on her ability to sit, stand or walk and could perform the lifting and

carrying capacity of light work.” (R. 24). In determining Ward’s residual functional

capacity, the ALJ considered Dr. Vanderzyl’s opinion about her abilities to sit, stand, walk,

6

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 6 of 9
lift and carry as well as her range of motion in her joints. Thus, the ALJ met any

responsibility to consider the effect of Ward’s obesity on her ability to work.

Finally, the court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled. The

plaintiff filed an application for disability on January 9, 2004, alleging an onset date of April

17, 2003. (R. 90). This application was denied on October 3, 2005, and the plaintiff did not

appeal this denial. (R. 589-90). The plaintiff filed a new application for disability on

February 28, 2006 alleging an onset date of October 25, 2005. (R. 20.) The medical

evidence in the record also supports the ALJ’s determination that Ward is not disabled. A

MRI of Ward’s lumbar spine on June 7, 2004, revealed “[f]acet arthropathy” but “[N]o HNP

or significant stenosis.” (R. 459). A cervical MRI on March 3, 2004, revealed

“borderline/mild congenitally short pedicles from C3 through C6. Negative cervical spine

MRI without contrast otherwise.” (R. 460). X-rays on December 21, 2004 revealed a normal

spine with “no evidence of any significant spinal stenosis.” (R. 305). On November 29,

2005, Ward complained of lower back pain and pain in her left hip and right shoulder. (R.

482). X-rays of her shoulder and hip were normal with “[n] acute abnormalities.” (R. 502).

On December 28, 2005, she complained of left hip and lower back pain. (R. 478). “She fell

while trying to get her dogs untangled on their leash.” (Id.).

X-rays on February 8, 2008, indicated a “normal lumbar spine.” (R. 538). During his

consultative examination on August 19, 2008, Dr. Vanderzyl noted as follows:

7

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 7 of 9
SPINE: Examination of her cervicalspine shows a normal conformation in the

A-P and lateral planes as does the dorsal spine. She has full active range of

motion in the neck without significant pain, tenderness, or deformity. No

paravertebral muscle spasm is seen. Examination of the lumbar spine

demonstrates a normal lumbar lordosis. She has full flexion, full extension,

right and lateral rotation and bending, all with significant discomfort at the

extremes of motion. No paravertebral motion spasm is seen. . . . There is no

pain or tenderness about her sacrolliac joints. . . . She has full active range of

motion in the hips, knees, ankles and fore feet without pain, tenderness or

deformity.

LABORATORY AND X-RAYS: A-P and lateral x-rays were obtained of her

lumbar spine and her cervical spine. Examination of the lumbar spine

demonstrates a normal conformation in the A-P and lateral planes with a level

pelvis height. All vertebral bodies are of normal height and dimensions. All

vertebral disk spaces are of absolutely normal height. There are no

calcifications, either traction spurs or enlistetic calcifications present. All

neuro foramina are wide open and her bone structure appears excellent. Her

pelvis is of normal conformation with wide open symphysis pubis and bilateral

SI joints. Both hips appear to be completely normal. The lumbar spine

demonstrates no evidence of facet hypertrophy. There is no spondylolysis,

spondylolisthesis orsegmental instability present. A-P and lateral views of her

cervical spine were obtained. She has a normal conformation in the A-P and

lateral planes. All vertebral bones and all disk spaces appear of normal height

and dimensions without calcifications. Her A-P diameter of her cervical

medullary canal appear to be normal and all bone structure is normal.

(R. 560-61).

“Even though Social Security courts are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in nature,

claimants must establish that they are eligible for benefits.” Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11 Cir. 2007) (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1281

th

(11 Cir. 2001)). See also Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 Cir. 1988). This

th th

the plaintiff has failed to do.

8

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 8 of 9
V. Conclusion

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled. Thus, the

court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence

and is due to be affirmed.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 5 day of May, 2011.

th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

9

Case 1:10-cv-00177-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/11 Page 9 of 9