Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06408/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06408-37/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ms. Hogan is the focus of the County defendant and Ms. Towne’s (collectively “defendants’”) motion.

1

To avoid confusion, this Court will refer to plaintiff Charlotte-Marie Hogan as “Charlotte-Marie.” Ms. Hogan and CharlotteMarie will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.”

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHRYN HOGAN and CASE NO. CV-F-03-6408 LJO WMW 

CHARLOTTE-MARIE HOGAN,

 

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS (Docs. 237, 239)

vs.

MICHAEL ROBINSON, Fresno County

Sheriff Deputy, COUNTY OF FRESNO,

PATRICIA TOWNE, 

Defendants,

and

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

ACCOUNTANCY,

Third Party Defendant.

 / 

I. Introduction

Defendants Michael Robinson and County of Fresno (“County defendants”) and Patricia Towne

(“Ms. Towne”) seek to dismiss this action based on plaintiff Kathryn Hogan’s (“Ms. Hogan’s”) refusal 1

to obey this Court’s orderto appearfor six hours of additional deposition testimony. Having considered

the full record and Ms. Hogan’s continued and willful refusal to comply with this Court’s orders, this

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART defendants’ motions to dismiss. This Court further

orders defendants to refile and serve their pending motions for summary judgment, in light of this order

and sets a briefing schedule on the pending motions for summary judgment. 

II. Background

After two years of discovery, Ms. Hogan was deposed January 3-5, 2007, by this Court’s order,

but was not completed. The parties sought this Court’s guidance on the parameters of Ms. Hogan’s

continued deposition. On January 12, 2007, this Court ordered six additional hours of Ms. Hogan’s

continued deposition. Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of that order but did not argue that further

deposition testimony was improper. This Court’s March 19, 2007 order denied reconsideration.

On April 13, 2007, this Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to continue the trial. Based on that order,

Ms. Hogan refused to appear at her additional deposition. Defendants sought clarification on the issue

of the additional six hours of deposition testimony. This Court issued an order clarifying that Ms. Hogan

was required to appear for an additional six hours. Ms. Hogan’s deposition was set for May 9, 2007 but

was cancelled because plaintiffs’ counsel Kevin Little (“Mr. Little”) did not respond. This Court denied

Mr. Little’s motion to withdraw as plaintiffs’ counsel. Mr. Little and plaintiffs sought reconsideration

of denial of Mr. Little’s withdrawal. This Court granted that motion for reconsideration in part on May

17, 2007. 

 On May 23, 2007, defendants filed an ex parte application for an order to allow them to

supplement their summary judgment motions because they lacked Ms. Hogan’s complete deposition

testimony. On May 24, 2007, defendants filed summary judgment motions. On that same date, Ms.

Towne filed an ex parte application to shorten time and a motion to compel Ms. Hogan’s deposition.

At the May 25, 2007 hearing on the motions, this Court granted defendants’ motions to supplement the

summary judgment motions and to compel deposition testimony. This Court ordered Ms. Hogan to

comply with previous Court orders and appear for a deposition on May 29, 2007. 

Ms. Hogan did not appear for her May 29, 2007 deposition. She filed a notice to appeal the

reconsideration motion. On May 30, 2007, defendants filed an ex parte motion to shorten time and

motions to dismiss Ms. Hogan from the action for disobedience this Court’s order to appear for her

additional deposition. The Court set a June 22, 2007 hearing for the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant Towne also asks the Court to consider dismissal based on this Court’s inherent powers. Because this 2

Court finds good cause under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court need not discuss this argument. 

3

The summary judgment motions hearing was reset to July 6, 2007. These dates were set to maintain the

then trial date of July 23, 2007 and in mind that this litigation is almost four years old. 

III. Analysis 

A. Standards of Review 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(b) allows for an involuntary dismissal of an action “[f]or failure of the

plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court.” Local Rule 11-110 also

provides that "[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court

may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or

within the inherent power of the Court." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37 permits a district court, in its discretion,

to issue an order “dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by

default” against a party who fails to comply with an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(C). The standards for dismissal or default under Rule 37 are essentially the same as those for

an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Malone v. United

States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Before imposing dismissal as a sanction, this Court must weigh five factors: (1) the public’s

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s needs to manage its docket; (3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on either merits; and (5)

the availability of less drastic sanctions. Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986). A court “may affirm a dismissal where at least four

factors support a dismissal...or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v.

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). 

2

B. Dismissal of Ms. Hogan 

1. Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution

The first factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal because the public has a strong interest in

expeditious resolution of this litigation. This action was filed almost four years ago and has been

delayed numerous times. This Court’s May 25, 2007 order observed that “it is in the interest of justice

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to resolve all issues related to outstanding discovery, court orders, and dispositive matters in an

expeditious manner.” The conditions which existed at that time continue, namely Court orders have

been disobeyed, the trial and dispositive motions have been delayed because of Ms. Hogan’s refusal to

appear at her deposition, and her tactical filing of an untimely appeal. The public’s interest in

expeditious resolution is stronger at this time. Since the filing of this motion to dismiss, Ms. Hogan has

refused to meet with defense counsel and this Court in an apparent effort to delay this four-year-old

action. 

2. Court’s Need to Manage its Own Docket 

This factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. At the beginning of January 2007, Ms. Hogan

allowed the County defendants one afternoon for deposition testimony. Although the parties had

previously waived the time limitations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, Ms. Hogan wanted the court’s guidance

as to the remaining length of the deposition. This Court ordered Ms. Hogan to provide six hours of

additional testimony on January12, 2007. (Doc. 113). Ms. Hogan sought reconsideration of that motion

and Mr. Little stated that Ms. Hogan would not be produced until the Court heard the reconsideration.

On March 19, 2007, this Court denied the reconsideration motion and again ordered the additional

deposition testimony, because although “Plaintiffs had an opportunity to present substantive opposition

to the ruling. They presented none.” 

On April 13, 2007, this Court conducted a conference call with the parties and denied plaintiffs’

request to modify the scheduling order. After this ruling, Ms. Hogan and Mr. Little refused to appear

for the deposition, claiming that the April 13, 2007 order prevented further discovery. Defendants

sought clarification of the order on this issue, and on April 17, 2007, the Court ordered for a third time

that defendants could complete Kathryn Hogan’s deposition. On April 26, 2007, the County defendants

noticed Ms. Hogan’s deposition for May 9, 2007. However, since the County defendants were unable

to reach Mr. Little to confirm that she would be produced, this deposition was taken off the calendar.

At a May 17, 2007 hearing, this Court granted Mr. Little’s motion to withdraw, and plaintiffs

proceed pro se. Because Ms. Hogan was not present at the hearing, this Court suggested that the parties

conduct a conference call to discuss the matter of Ms. Hogan’s deposition. On May 18, 2007, the

County defendants noticed Ms. Hogan’s deposition for May 29, 2007 in Sacramento. Ms. Hogan

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

indicated her refusal to appear at the deposition continually by email to defense counsel. The County

defendants filed an ex parte motion to compel, which was granted at a May 25, 2007 hearing. 

Ms. Hogan’s deliberate refusal to appear for the Court-ordered deposition over this eight-month

period has caused numerous motions, filings, hearings, ex parte applications, ex parte hearings, and

orders from this Court. It has further caused Ms. Hogan to file an interlocutory appeal, which was

dismissed. Ms. Hogan filed a motion to reconsider the appeal’s dismissal. Ms. Hogan’s failure to

comply with the May 25, 2007 order to compel her additional deposition is one episode in a long history

of unreasonable behavior–indeed the six hours of deposition testimony had been ordered no less than

four times in the last eight months. Furthermore, since defendants filed the motion to compel in May,

Ms. Hogan has continued to ignore other Court orders. Ms. Hogan is intent to deliberately contribute

to the congestion of an already overburdened court. 

3. Prejudice to Defendants

This factor weighs in favor of dismissal. Defendants have been prejudiced considerably by Ms.

Hogan’s disregard of this Court’s orders. Defendants were prejudiced by the fact that they had to file

their summary judgment motions prior to completing Ms. Hogan’s deposition to give Ms. Hogan the

opportunity to review the motions and anticipate future lines of questioning. Ms. Hogan continues to

refuse to allow defendants to finish the deposition. Without Ms. Hogan’s further deposition testimony,

defendants are prejudiced in that their summary judgment motions would be considered without

additional, necessary evidence. Defendants have also been prejudiced in preparation for trial for, among

other reasons, Ms. Hogan has produced several thousand documents since January 5, 2007.

Plaintiffs argue that they are disadvantaged by lack of legal counsel. They explain that although

they have diligently sought legal representation, they have not found anyone they can afford. Plaintiffs

conclude that they “cannot ascertain how the defendants claim to be ‘disadvantaged,’ as the plaintiffs

have been since their counsel was dismissed.” 

This Court is to consider the prejudice to defendants, not plaintiffs. Thomas, 782 F.2d 829, 831.

That said, plaintiffs have had three months to obtain counsel. Further, this Court notes that plaintiffs

originally requested the trial take place during the summer months, because they are teachers and they

would not be working. Thus, efforts to obtain counsel would have not been impeded by work during

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

these summer months. Finally, this Court stayed this case until the interlocutory appeal was dismissed.

Defendants have continued to experience prejudice from delay in discovery and trial preparation and

resolution. The delay has necessitated the filing and opposing serial motions and to prepare for a trial

that ultimately did not proceed. These considerations favor dismissal. 

4. Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on the Merits

The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits “is particularly important in civil

rights cases.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). Generally, this factor

weighs against dismissal; however, the “degree of plaintiff’s personal responsibility for malfeasance is

relevant to the propriety of dismissal.” Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 134. 

Ms. Hogan argues that she has little personal responsibility in not appearing for the deposition

because she has acted on advice of her counsel. Ms. Hogan attached an email response dated May 26,

2007 from email address “fwllaw@aol.com” from “Kevin.” Ms. Hogan indicates that this email is from

her attorney. In the email message, Kevin advised Ms. Hogan: “So, just to be clear, the bottom line is

that the filing of the notice of appeal will stay further proceedings until the appeal isresolved.” The next

line has been blacked out. A June 1, 2007 email, clearly from Mr. Little, reads:

Kathryn, you and Charmie should not participate in any more trial proceedings, i.e., you

should not even attempt to respond to the motion to dismiss or attempt to submit some

sort of pretrial statement. You have already made your position clear, in your notice of

appeal, that you believe your pending appeal stays matters related thereto...After all, your

appeal is based on the fact that the judge refused to consider appointing counsel and is

forcing you to go to trial after permitting, over your objection, my motion to withdraw,

maintaining the current trial date, and holding you to the failing of an attorney he found

incapable of representing you.

From the submitted evidence, Mr. Little apparently advised Ms. Hogan not to participate in these

proceedings after this Court granted reconsideration to permit Mr. Little to withdraw on May 17, 2007.

On May 21, 2007, this Court issued a separate order substituting plaintiffs in place of Mr. Little, to make

clear that, at their request, Mr. Little was no longer counsel of record. Attached to the submitted emails

is this Court’s May 24, 2007 order issued to set the ex parte hearing for May 25, 2007. Thus, there is

evidence that Ms. Hogan knew for several days that Mr. Little was no longer her attorney. In the email,

Mr. Little reiterates this decision when he notes that the Court found him “incapable of representing”

her. A client is unable reasonably to rely on advise of counsel who admits to being incapable of

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

representation. At the time the advice was given, Ms. Hogan knew he was no longer representing her.

Therefore, her current claim that she acted on advice of her counsel is disingenuous. Finally, Ms.

Hogan’s willful refusal to attend the court-ordered deposition is apparent through emails submitted by

defense counsel in this and previous motions stemming from this dispute. 

5. Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions

Defendants argue that although this Court has not previously ordered monetary sanctions, it

would have been justified in doing so under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(B), as there was no basis in the law

for Ms. Hogan to represent to County defendants that she was not going to appear for her deposition on

May 29, 2007 (which necessitated the motion to compel). Defendants further argue that because of

“Plaintiffs’ previous litigation tactics and disregard for court orders, there is no reason to believe that

Plaintiffs would timely comply with an order imposing a lesser sanction.” Thus, Defendants argue that

the fact that lesser sanctions have not been imposed should not prevent the Court from dismissing this

case. Plaintiffs did not respond to this factor in their response.

This Court should first consider less drastic alternatives, but need not exhaust other possible

sanctions or less drastic alternatives before dismissing the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). McHenry

v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing and Wrestling

Commission, 442 F.2d 1047, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1971). While this Court has considered less drastic

alternatives, and discussed them below, the Court may properly dismiss a case based on a single willful

violation of a Court order. Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric Eng. Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.

1998). “[W]illfulness” is evidenced by “disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the

litigant.” Henry v. Gill Industries, 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case, as discussed infra,

the evidence shows that there has been a continued and continual willful disobedience of this Court’s

order. 

6. Conclusion

Where a court order is violated, the first and second factors favor imposition of termination

sanctions and the fourth will cut against them. Adriana International Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406,

1412 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, whether terminating sanctions are appropriate turns on the third and

fifth factors. Id. The first and second factors in this case strongly favor dismissal, as discussed above.

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Further, although the fourth factor normally cuts against sanctions, “the degree of a plaintiff’s personal

responsibility... is relevant to the propriety of dismissal.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 134. In this case, there

is evidence of Ms. Hogan’s personal responsibility for the malfeasance in repeatedly violating this

Court’s order. The third factor also weighs in favor of dismissal, because the defendants have been

prejudiced by Ms. Hogan’s failure to appear at the deposition, especially now that the dispositive

motions have been filed. 

Although this Court has not previously ordered lesser sanctions, this Court finds dismissal

appropriate. Ms. Hogan has demonstrated repeatedly that court orders are unimportant and has refused

to appear for her deposition despite clear and direct orders. This Court has issued several orders to

appear for the deposition without compliance. Ms. Hogan suggests that she did not appear based on

advice from her counsel or former counsel. However, in opposition to this motion to dismiss, she

continues to make excuses why she should not comply with this Court’s order. She does not offer to

make herself available for her additional deposition. Completion of her deposition is in Ms. Hogan’s

control. She has steadfastly refused to complete it. Evidence submitted with this motion shows that

since no later than August 2005, defendants have attempted to depose Ms. Hogan to no avail. 

Ms. Hogan’s evidence demonstrates that she does not have much money. The further record

substantiates as much. Thus, monetary sanctions are unrealistic, as it would be ordering the impossible.

The lesser sanction of disallowing her to testify at trial is tantamount to granting a slow dismissal.

Finally, this Court has repeatedlywarned plaintiffsthat failure to comply with this Court’s orders would

result in sanctions, including the probability of dismissal. In this case, with this history, and with this

attitude, the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile. 

C. Dismissal of Charlotte-Marie Hogan

The first and third factors discussed above apply to the discussion of Charlotte-Marie as well.

However, because the other factors consider Ms. Hogan’s refusal to appear for the deposition, they do

not apply here. There is no evidence that Charlotte-Marie has acted with any personal responsibility for

malfeasance. The prejudice to the defendants is based on Ms. Hogan’s failure to complete the

deposition. Although this Court may dismiss the claims of co-plaintiffs for the prejudice caused by

plaintiff’s discovery violations,, Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 309 (9th Cir. 1997), this Court

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

does not find it appropriate to dismiss Charlotte-Marie’s claims. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. DISMISSES Kathryn Hogan as a plaintiff and her claims;

2. DENIES dismissal of Charlotte-Marie Hogan and her claims; 

3. VACATES the September 7, 2007 hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss; and

4. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants Michael Robinson, County

of Fresno and Patricia Towne and against plaintiff Kathryn Hogan.

In light of this ruling, the portions of defendants’ summary judgment motions as to Kathryn

Hogan are moot. As such, this Court:

1. ORDERS defendants, no later than September 11, 2007, to refile and serve summary

judgment papers on Charlotte-Marie Hogan’s remaining claims;

2. ORDERS Charlotte-Marie Hogan, no later than September 25, 2007, to file and serve

papers to oppose summary judgment;

3. ORDERS defendants, no later than October 2, 2007, to file and serve a reply papers; and

4. SETS summary judgment hearing for October 9, 2007 at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom

4 (LJO). Counsel may appear telephonically by arranging a one-line call and dialing

(559) 499-5680. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 254 Filed 08/29/07 Page 9 of 9