Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_02-cv-01843/USCOURTS-alnd-7_02-cv-01843-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM L. MONTGOMERY, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

vs. ] CV-02-CO-01843-W

]

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER

GENERAL, in his official capacity,

]

]

]

]

Defendant. ]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This case came before the Court for trial without a jury on the 18th day

of April 2005. The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses,

received and reviewed all of the evidence, including the stipulations, and

having heard the arguments of the parties, makes the following findings of

fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Undisputed Facts

The following facts were undisputed:

1. Plaintiff William L. Montgomery was born on July 29, 1952. He

graduated from Northside High School in Samantha, Alabama, in 1970,

FILED

 2005 Apr-28 PM 03:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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and holds separate Bachelor of Science degrees in Chemistry and

Chemical Engineering from the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa,

Alabama.

2. In October of 1994, Mr. Montgomery took the U.S. Postal Service’s

entrance examination for distribution and delivery positions. He

scored an 88.50 and received a rating of “eligible.” Mr. Montgomery

was added to the U.S. Postal Service’s “hiring registers” for the

positions of clerk and carrier at the Fayette, Northport, and

Tuscaloosa, Alabama, post office locations. These were entrance level

positions for which no experience was required and Mr. Montgomery

met the physical requirements for the positions.

3. According to Postal Service Handbook EL-312, a "register" is a system

of records that contains applicant examination ratings, the results of

an evaluation process, or both. The Postal Service uses registers as a

source of qualified candidates from which to select and appoint new

employees.

4. Appointing (or selecting) officials are responsible for determining job

vacancies at particular post offices and are responsible for selecting

applicants for appointment to those vacant positions. The registers are

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used by the Postal Service's Human Resource Department to compile

a list of eligible applicants to be certified on what is called a “hiring

worksheet.” The list of certified eligible applicants [the hiring

worksheet] is then sent to the selecting official for the postal facility

at issue and interview notices are sent to each eligible applicant on the

hiring worksheet.

5. It is Postal Service policy to screen applicants for employment

“eligibility” and “suitability” prior to “considering” that applicant for

appointment to a postal position. Applicants who are found to be

ineligible or unsuitable for employment are made inactive on the hiring

register.

6. An applicant who is not suitable is disqualified from consideration for

employment. An applicant that is determined to be ineligible or

unsuitable for a position, and thus disqualified, is not to be included

among those available for consideration on the hiring worksheet.

7. The selecting official is required to make a selection for a position

from among the three highest rated applicants available for the type

of appointment being offered from the appropriate register. Selecting

officials are required to select the applicant whose qualifications make

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them the best fit for the positions for which they are being considered.

In order to do this, they must use the rule of three when making

selections.

8. The “rule of three” is described in the selection manual as follows:

“For the first vacancy, the appointing official selects from among the

three highest on the hiring worksheet who are available for the

position to be filled. If more than one vacancy is available, eligibles

not selected in filling the first vacancy and the next available eligible

on the hiring worksheet are then considered. An eligible who has been

considered three times for the same job category, and not selected,

is not considered again for the job category and installation. However,

the eligible's name remains on the active register until considered

three times for other job categories and installations for which the

register is used.”

9. Handbook EL-312 discusses the “eligibility” requirements of an

applicant, which include: (1) age requirements (generally, a minimum

age of 18), (2) restrictions on the employment of relatives, and (3)

selective service registration (for male applicants). “Suitability”

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criteria for candidates include: (1) conscientiousness, (2) adaptability,

(3) cooperation, and (4) communication.

10. Favorable eligibility and suitability decisions make it possible for the

applicant to advance in the hiring process. This means the applicant

can be considered, and if selected, given a bona fide job offer followed

by a medical assessment.

11. Between the dates of June 20, 1995, and November 16, 1998, the

plaintiff was called in approximately eleven (11) times to interview for

vacant clerk and/or carrier positions with the Postal Service.

12. During this time period, Mr. Montgomery was certified and appeared

on approximately nine “hiring worksheets” where he was in the group

of top three candidates (“group of three”) for eleven (11) different

positions. Mr. Montgomery was “considered” for these eleven positions

but was “non-selected,” or passed over for someone else, for each

position.

13. On or about June 20, 1995, Mr. Montgomery was within the group of

three that was considered for the position of carrier. Michael Sullivan

was selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Jimmy E.

Barker. At the time of the selection, Mr. Sullivan was 30 years of age,

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whereas Plaintiff was about to turn 43 on July 29, 1995. The starting

hourly rate for this position was $12.59 per hour. The number of hours

worked weekly in this position would average to 40.

14. On or about August 3, 1995, Mr. Montgomery was within the group of

three that was considered for the position of carrier. Janice Oden was

selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Jimmy E. Barker. At

the time of this selection, Ms. Oden was 32 years of age, and Plaintiff

was age 43. The starting hourly rate for this position was $12.77 per

hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this position would

average to 40.

15. On or about January 17, 1996, Mr. Montgomery was within three

separate groups of three that were considered for the position of

carrier. Freddy Long, Terri Horner, and Nikki Warren were each

selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Robert Hoffman. Mr.

Long's age has not been stated by Defendant. At the time of the

selection, Ms. Horner was 28 years of age, Ms. Warren was 21 years of

age, and Plaintiff was age 43. The starting hourly rate for this position

was $12.77 per hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this

position would average to 40.

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16. On or about February 2, 1996, Mr. Montgomery was within the group of

three that was considered for the position of clerk. Charles Fuller was

selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Robert Hoffman. At

the time of his selection, Mr. Fuller was 23 years of age, and Plaintiff

was age 43. The starting hourly rate for this position was $12.77 per

hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this position would

average to 40.

17. On or about February 15, 1996, Mr. Montgomery was within the group

of three that was considered for the position of clerk. Tommie Smith

was selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Robert Hoffman.

At the time of her selection, Ms. Smith was 27 years of age, and

Plaintiff was age 43. The starting hourly rate for this position was

$12.77 per hour. The number of hours worked weekly for this position

would average to 40.

18. On or about January 2, 1997, Mr. Montgomery was within the group of

three that was considered for the position of carrier. Jennifer

Killingsworth was selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was

Jimmy E. Barker. At the time of her selection, Ms. Killingsworth was

26 years of age, and Plaintiff was age 44. The starting hourly rate for

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this position was $13.03 per hour. The number of hours worked weekly

in this position would average to 40.

19. On or about April 1, 1997, Mr. Montgomery was within the group of

three that was considered for the position of clerk. Brandy Swinney

was selected over Plaintiff. Robert Hoffman was the selecting official.

At the time of this selection, Ms. Swinney was 22 years of age, and

Plaintiff was age 44. The starting hourly rate for this position was

$13.51 per hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this position

would average to 40.

20. On or about December 22, 1997, Mr. Montgomery was within the group

of three that was considered for the position of carrier. April McMillan

was selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Susan Rigsby.

At the time of her selection, Ms. McMillan was 22 years of age, and

Plaintiff was age 45. The starting hourly rate for this position was

$13.42 per hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this position

would average to 40.

21. On or about November 16, 1998, Mr. Montgomery was within the group

of three that was considered for the position of clerk. Chad Trull was

selected over Plaintiff. The selecting official was Susan Rigsby. At the

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1On January 23, 2004, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add a cause of action for

retaliation under the ADEA. (Doc. 36.) Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation was subsequently

dismissed voluntarily, and only Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination under the ADEA

remain before this Court.

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time of this selection, Mr. Trull was 25 years of age, and Plaintiff was

over the age of 46. Mr. Trull and Plaintiff had the same score on the

hiring worksheet. The starting hourly rate for this position was $13.61

per hour. The number of hours worked weekly in this position would

average to 40.

Discussion of Disputed Issues

Plaintiff William L. Montgomery filed suit against the defendant for

discrimination1 under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 29

U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). “When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, ‘liability

depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually

motivated the employer’s decision.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

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Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens,

507 U.S. 604 (1993)). “That is, the plaintiff’s age must have ‘actually played

a role in [the employer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative

influence on the outcome.’” Id.

 At trial, the defendant asserted that Mr. Montgomery was not hired

because of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Specifically, the

defendant presented evidence, through witnesses and exhibits, that Plaintiff

was not hired because interviewers concluded that he was arrogant, did not

work well with others, was not a “team player,” and otherwise did not have

the personality to work well with the public. 

The plaintiff, who was apparently relying upon the framework

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and

Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), to prove

intentional discrimination based upon circumstantial evidence, thus became

obligated to demonstrate “that the proffered reason[s] [were] not the true

reason[s] for the employment decision[s].” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. “[He]

may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by

showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”

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2Plaintiff complained that the defendant, in its responses to discovery, failed to

specify the reasons it subsequently presented at trial for its hiring decisions. The

defendant had previously argued that Plaintiff was simply not the best fit for the job. 

The Court notes, however, that the plaintiff did receive as part of discovery many,

if not all, of the exhibits admitted at the time of trial, which evidenced some of the

interviewers’ rationales for their decisions. In addition, at least one of the interviewers

was questioned by an attorney representing the plaintiff long before the trial. 

If the plaintiff felt Defendant’s responses to discovery were incomplete or

otherwise inadequate, he should have brought that to the attention of the Court through

a properly filed discovery motion. However, in an abundance of caution, the Court

nonetheless allowed the plaintiff to present his evidence of intent (including any evidence

of pretext) after the defendant concluded its evidentiary presentation. This allowed the

plaintiff to know exactly what the defendant proved (or attempted to prove) before he

was required to provide his evidence of intent. Despite this strategic advantage, the

plaintiff was unable to carry his burden of proving that age played a role in the

defendant’s decisions to not hire him.

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Id. at 256. Plaintiff testified in an effort to meet his burden of

demonstrating pretext, but was unsuccessful.2 

“The ultimate burden of persuading [this Court] that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the

plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The defendant’s intent in this case is

the “ultimate question.” Id. After full consideration of the evidence in this

case, it is this Court’s conclusion that the defendant did not intentionally

discriminate against the plaintiff for any reason prohibited by law. Plaintiff’s

age did not play any role in the defendant’s decisions to not hire him. 

Conclusion

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For the reasons stated above, judgment is due to be entered in favor

of the defendant and against the plaintiff. A separate order consistent with

this opinion will be entered.

Done this 28th day of April 2005.

 ____________ 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

124153

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