Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01244/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 

---

1

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A.A., a minor, by and through his 

Guardian ad Litem, LORENA 

ARREOLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

ORDER:

1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO RECONSIDER, 

and

2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 19, 32]

On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff A.A., through his mother and guardian, Lorena Arreola, 

filed this action, asserting a single cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq., 1346(b), et seq., 1367, 1402(b), et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Arreola received negligent prenatal care at Vista Community 

Clinic, a community health center supported by the Department of Health and Human 

Services (“HHS”). (Id. at 2-6, ¶¶ 4, 12-29.) 

On December 9, 2016, Defendant United States of America filed a motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations 

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and the rule requiring plaintiffs to first present their claims to defendant agencies. (Doc. 

No. 19.) On February 9, 2017, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. No. 28.) In its summary judgment order, the Court held that there was a 

triable issue of material fact as to whether the claim was properly presented to the agency. 

(Id. at 8-9.) And construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

the Court determined that the claim may have been presented only a day late. (Id. at 10.) 

The Court equitably tolled the statute of limitations, finding sufficient diligence and 

extraordinary circumstances to justify one day of equitable tolling. (Id. at 11.)

On March 7, 2017, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the 

Court’s order on equitable tolling was inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision 

in Okafor v. United States, 846 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 2017). (Doc. No. 32.) Plaintiff filed an 

opposition on March 27, 2017. (Doc. No. 36.) Defendant filed a reply on April 3, 2017. 

(Doc. No. 37.) The Court, pursuant to its discretion under Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines

that the motion is fit for resolution without oral argument, submits the motion on the papers, 

and vacates the hearings set for April 10, 2017. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants

Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s 

previous motion for summary judgment.

Background

Plaintiff A.A. brings this action to recover damages for injuries he allegedly suffered 

as a result of being born prematurely on June 6, 2007. Plaintiff filed this action on June 3, 

2015, eight years after his birth, through his mother and guardian Lorena Arreola. (Doc. 

No. 1.) During her pregnancy with A.A., Ms. Arreola sought prenatal care at Vista 

Community Clinic (“VCC”), a community health center supported by HHS. (Doc. No. 19-

2 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that VCC provided negligent care to Ms. Arreola, causing A.A. 

to be born four months before his due date. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 5-6, ¶¶ 23-29; 19-2 at 41, 59.)

By way of background, Ms. Arreola had two miscarriages prior to her pregnancy 

with A.A., one at approximately 12 weeks, and the second at approximately 17.5 weeks. 

(Doc. No. 19-2 at 7-8.) Following her second miscarriage, Ms. Arreola was told that she 

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

had a weak cervix and should consider getting a cerclage for future pregnancies. (Id. at 9.)

A cerclage is a technique whereby a suture is placed in the cervix to prevent the mother 

from going into labor and delivering too early. (Id. at 43-44.) According to her doctor at 

VCC, the window to perform an elective cerclage is when a patient is between 14 and 18 

weeks of gestation. (Id. at 45.) Ms. Arreola was already at 20 weeks and two days of 

gestation when she presented at VCC and received an ultrasound. (Id.) On May 22, 2017, 

Ms. Arreola’s doctor and another specialist ruled out an emergency cerclage based on an 

ultrasound showing Ms. Arreola’s cervix to be thick and closed. (Id. at 43; 48-49.) A.A. 

was born prematurely on June 6, 2007. (Id. at 59.)

On June 4, 2009, Plaintiff’s law firm mailed a claim to HHS for $20 million in 

damages under the FTCA. (Doc. Nos. 20-2, ¶ 1; 19-2 at 59-64.) The claim was sent by 

certified mail to the “Parklawn Building,” in Rockville Maryland. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 59, 

62.) The claim lists 500 Fishers Lane as the HHS address (id. at 59), but the certified mail 

receipt only lists “Parklaw [sic] Bldg.” with no street address (id. at 62). Plaintiff submitted 

a declaration stating that the claim was sent to 5600 Fishers Lane, the intended address, as 

opposed to 500 Fishers Lane, the address listed on the claim. (Doc. Nos. 20 at 3; 20-1 ¶ 3.) 

Regardless of the address, the HHS claims office had left the Parklawn Building four 

years before (Doc. No. 19-3, ¶ 4), but divisions of HHS still operated in the building in 

2009. (Doc. No. 31 at 7.) The claim was sent from San Diego, California to Rockville, 

Maryland after 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 4, 2009. (Doc. Nos. 19-2 at 61-62; 20-2 ¶ 1.)

The two-year time period would have ended on June 7, 2009, which was a Sunday. FED.

R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1) (2009); see also, Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78, 80 (9th Cir. 1987)

(Rule 6(a) dictates how to compute time under the FTCA’s statute of limitations). The 

period would then have run until the end of the next non-holiday on Monday June 8, 2009. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(3) (2009). 

In attempting to timely file the claim, Plaintiff’s counsel relied on the United States 

Postal Service website, which purportedly stated that first class mail is delivered in “3 

business days or less.” (Doc. No. 20 at 5.) The return receipt indicates that the claim was 

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

delivered to the “Parklaw [sic] Bldg.” on Tuesday, June 9, 2009. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 62.) 

The delivery was one day late.1 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) (2009). 

In sending the claim to an out-of-date address, Plaintiff’s counsel relied on a letter 

he had received from HHS five years prior for a different lawsuit against VCC. (Doc. No. 

20-1, ¶ 3.) The letter informed counsel that because VCC is a federally supported health 

facility, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by employees of the health 

center. (Doc. No. 20 at 8.) The letter also informed counsel that the FTCA provides a two 

year statute of limitations. (Id.) 

Defendant contends that HHS never received Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. No. 19-3 ¶ 6.) 

The parties agree that HHS never sent Plaintiff an acknowledgment of the claim. (Id. at 

¶ 7; Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 7.) After attempting to submit the claim in 2009, Plaintiff waited six 

years before filing this action. (Id., ¶¶ 6-8; Doc. No. 26, ¶ 2.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may

reconsider and amend a previous order. Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not 

be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with 

newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in 

the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993)).

II. Analysis

The Supreme Court has held “that the FTCA’s time bars are nonjurisdictional and 

subject to equitable tolling.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1638. 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two 

 

1

If the mail went out after 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, and was delivered in three business days, it would have 

arrived on Monday June 8, 2009. If the mail went out on Friday, it would be untimely even if delivered in 

three business days. It is unknown whether the discrepancy in the address contributed to the delay.

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his way.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 

1414, 1419 (2012) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).

With regard to the diligence element, a litigant pursues his rights diligently if he puts 

forth “the effort that a reasonable person might be expected to deliver under his or her 

particular circumstances.” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), 

aff’d and remanded sub nom. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015)

(quoting Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). “Central to the analysis is 

whether the plaintiff was ‘without any fault’ in pursuing his claim.” Kwai Fun Wong v. 

Beebe, 732 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Williams, 104 F.3d 237, 240 

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

With regard to the extraordinary circumstances element of equitable tolling, a 

litigant must show that “extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file [the 

document] on time.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations 

omitted). Extraordinary circumstances do not include “a garden variety claim of excusable 

neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline.” 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Instead, litigants must generally show that they were “unable to file timely 

[documents] as a result of external circumstances beyond their direct control.” Kwai Fun 

Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008)).

The Court originally denied summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue.

(Doc. No. 28.) Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

the Court determined that Plaintiff’s claim may have been presented only a day late. (Id. at 

10.) The Court found sufficient diligence and extraordinary circumstances to justify one 

day of equitable tolling. (Id. at 11.)

In its motion for reconsideration, Defendant argues that the Court’s order was 

inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Okafor v. United States, 846 F.3d 

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

337 (9th Cir. 2017). (Doc. No. 32.) In Okafor, the plaintiff’s attorney mailed a claim for 

overnight delivery the day before the claim was due. The claim arrived one day late, and 

the district court refused to equitably toll the statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit 

affirmed the district court, explaining that a “delivery delay does not constitute the kind of 

extraordinary circumstance that [the Ninth Circuit has] found to justify equitable tolling.” 

Id. at 340. The court also explained “that an attorney’s filing by mail shortly before a 

deadline expires constitutes routine negligence.” Id. (citing Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 

646 (9th Cir. 2015)). The court “do[es] not recognize [such] run-of-the-mill mistakes as 

grounds for equitable tolling.” Id. (citing Luna, 784 F.3d at 647).

Okafor was not yet published when Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. Defendant 

cited the case in its reply brief, but Plaintiff never had a chance to address Okafor in the 

briefing on the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Defendant had argued that the 

statute of limitations had been missed by six years and that the Court did not have 

jurisdiction to hear the case because the claim had never been properly presented. Because 

the parties were focused on those issues, they did not reach Okafor and its similarities to 

this case. Now, however, the parties have fully briefed the Court on Okafor, operating 

under the Court’s assumption that the statute of limitations may have only been missed by 

one day.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s “law of the circuit” rule, courts are bound by a prior Ninth 

circuit decision unless that decision is “clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme 

Court precedent.” Biggs v. Sec’y of Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 717 F.3d 678, 689 (9th 

Cir. 2013). The Court has seen no intervening precedent contradicting the very recent 

Okafor decision. And the relevant facts at issue here are very similar to those of Okafor. In 

each case, the plaintiff relied on a mail delivery service to deliver a claim within a certain 

period of time, and each claim was delivered one day late. Under the clear language of 

Okafor, this cannot be considered an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable 

tolling. Okafor, 846 F.3d at 340 (a one-day “delivery delay does not constitute the kind of 

extraordinary circumstance that [the Ninth Circuit has] found to justify equitable tolling.”). 

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has offered no other potential extraordinary circumstance that would have 

prevented him from timely presenting his claim. Since an extraordinary circumstance is 

required for equitable tolling, the Court cannot toll the statute of limitations in this case. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and grants 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Court grants Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 32.) The Court 

grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s sole cause of action. 

(Doc. No. 19.) The clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 4, 2017

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:15-cv-01244-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 04/05/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7