Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08125/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth Jay Wilson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Robert J. Higgins, Brad Carlyon, Blaine 

Rhoton, 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-08125-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

 

 Before the Court are Defendant Higgins’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) and 

Defendants Carlyon and Rhoton’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10). The time to file 

responses has expired and no responses have been filed. Nevertheless, the Court 

considers the Motions on their merits and grants them to the extent stated in this order. 

 Plaintiff alleges in propria persona that he is a defendant in a criminal proceeding 

pending in the Superior Court of Navajo County, in which Defendant Higgins is the 

judge, Defendant Carlyon is the prosecuting County Attorney, and Defendant Rhoton is 

his Deputy. He sues all three because (1) the Judge denied, on the prosecutors’ objection, 

his request to appear telephonically from Houston, Texas, where he needs a stem cell 

transplant, (2) the prosecutors sought and the Judge ordered Plaintiff’s arrest, and (3) the 

prosecutors have failed to produce and have authorized the destruction of records needed 

for Plaintiff’s defense. 

 The Complaint alleges some injuries to Plaintiff, but the Complaint does not seek 

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any damages from any defendant. If the Complaint did seek damages, it would be barred 

by the absolute judicial or prosecutorial immunity of each Defendant. Pierson v. Ray, 

386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (judicial); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976) 

(prosecutorial). The Complaint seeks only injunctive relief, so it is not barred by those 

immunities. 

 The Complaint seeks injunctive relief ordering the Judge to order that Plaintiff 

may travel to Houston and appear from there by telephone, quashing the arrest warrant, 

and ordering production of documents, or in the alternative dismissing all charges against 

Plaintiff. The Complaint and this action must be dismissed for overlapping reasons. 

 First, the relief sought is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 

which bars federal courts from staying proceedings in a State court “except as expressly 

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect 

or effectuate its judgments.” Id. Second, principles of federal equity preclude federal 

courts from interfering in ongoing state criminal proceedings except in rare 

circumstances not present here. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971). All 

Plaintiff’s contentions of federal right can be presented in and decided in the Superior 

Court. Rulings that are not immediately appealable may still be presented for 

interlocutory review in the discretion of the Arizona appellate court under Arizona’s 

flexible remedy of special action for matters that cannot be effectively remedied upon 

review of a later appealable order. Rule 1(a), Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special 

Actions (“Relief previously obtained against a body, officer, or person by writs of 

certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition in the trial or appellate courts shall be obtained in an 

action under this Rule . . . .”); see generally 1 Arizona Appellate Handbook, ch. 7 (2015). 

This case is the paradigm for application of Younger v. Harris.

The limited jurisdictional bar against direct federal district court relief that by its 

terms overturns a final state court order does not fit here because none of the challenged 

superior court orders is final. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 

U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (“Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which 

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[the Supreme] Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments precludes a 

United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it 

would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate . . . .”) (citations omitted). Here, relief is 

not barred by jurisdictional limitations, as in the Rooker/Feldman doctrine, but by the 

clear boundaries of federal equity as in Younger v. Harris. 

 It is apparent that the failings in Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be cured by an 

amended pleading. Nor could Plaintiff plead a claim for money damages. Therefore, 

leave to amend would be futile. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Higgins’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 8) and Defendants Carlyon and Rhoton’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) are granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment dismissing this action 

without prejudice to raising Plaintiff’s assertions as claims or defenses in the state court 

proceedings. 

 The Clerk shall terminate this case. 

 Dated: October 1, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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