Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01377/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01377-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK RAYE OWENS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1377 GEB DAD P

vs.

CHERYL K. PLILER, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a habeas petition filed on June

27, 2003. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred was denied on January 22,

2004, and respondent filed an answer on February 23, 2004. Petitioner filed his traverse on

March 26, 2004. A year and a half later, petitioner moved to hold this action in abeyance

pending exhaustion of a claim “not reasonably discoverable during the time the first federal

petition was filed.” (Pet’r’s Mot. filed Oct. 28, 2005, at 1.) The motion was denied as moot after

petitioner moved to file a first amended petition that includes the newly exhausted claim. 

Petitioner’s motion to amend has been briefed and is before the court.

BACKGROUND

On March 25, 1998, following a jury trial in San Joaquin County Superior Court,

petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder. On May 1, 1998, petitioner was sentenced

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to a term of nineteen years to life in state prison. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On

March 29, 2000, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the

judgment, and the California Supreme Court denied review on June 14, 2000. Petitioner sought

collateral review in a series of state habeas petitions, beginning with a petition filed in the trial

court on September 20, 2001. Petitioner’s final state habeas petition was denied by the

California Supreme Court on June 11, 2003. (Pet. at 2-4; Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3 and

Exs. A through J.)

The federal habeas petition filed June 27, 2003, alleges five grounds for relief:

 Ground one: In violation of the Fourteenth Amend. trial court

abused its discretion when it permitted the jury to visit crime scene.

 Ground two: In violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the trial

court failed to give limiting instruction.

 Ground three: Sixth Amendment violation of ineffective

assistance of counsel on limiting instruction(s).

 Ground four: Fourteenth Amendment violation of habeas corpus

relief by the California Courts (on IAC).

 Ground five: Sixth Amendment violation of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel whom [sic] acted in “conflict of interest”

to: (1) petitioner’s actual innocence defense; (2) when trial

Counsel refused/failed to present a “voluntary intoxication”

defense.

(Pet. at 5-7.) Pages attached in support of grounds one, two, and three appear to be copies of

pages from the petition for review filed on direct appeal. Pages attached in support of grounds

four and five appear to be copies of pages from the habeas petition filed in the California

Supreme Court.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Petitioner’s Motion to File a First Amended Petition

Petitioner asserts that he discovered a meritorious issue after he filed his federal

petition, that he moved to stay this action pending exhaustion of the new claim, and that he

proceeded to the California Supreme Court to exhaust the claim. Petitioner requests that

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respondent be ordered to answer his newly exhausted claim. Attached to petitioner’s motion is a

proposed first amended petition containing a sixth ground for relief: 

Ground six: The trial courts instruction defining the concept of

reasonable doubt violated petitioners federal and state

constitutional right to due process of law by reducing the

prosecutions required burden of proof.

(Pet’r’s Mot. to Amend, Attach. at page numbered “pg 6 cont.”)

II. Respondent’s Opposition

Respondent opposes petitioner’s motion on the ground that filing the amended

petition would be futile because the new claim is time-barred and does not relate back to any of

the claims alleged in the original federal habeas petition.

Respondent argues that futility of amendment can, by itself, justify denial of a

motion for leave to amend, and amendment is futile if the statute of limitations has run. Here,

respondent reasons, amendment would be futile because the statute of limitations expired in July

2003 and the claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the prosecution’s burden

of proof is not tied to the original timely federal petition by a common core of operative facts. 

Citing the decision in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), respondent states that an amended

petition does not relate back when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ

in time and type from those set forth in the original pleading. Respondent contends that none of

the five claims presented in petitioner’s original petition suggest that the trial court committed

instructional error in regard to the prosecution’s burden of proof by instructing the jury with

revised CALJIC No. 2.90, and that this new claim does not derive from the operative facts that

supported the five original claims.

III. Petitioner’s Reply

Petitioner states as follows: his original federal petition was filed with the help of

an inmate where petitioner was confined at the time; he was transferred to California State

Prison-Sacramento, where he found another inmate to help him; the second inmate found another

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issue that should have been raised; petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court and a motion in this court to hold the federal petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of

the “newly discovered claim”; the state petition was denied on May 10, 2006; petitioner filed his

motion for leave to file a first amended petition in this court in July 2006.

Petitioner argues that respondent is mistaken about the new claim not relating

back to any of the claims set forth in the original application for federal habeas relief. Petitioner

contends that the new claim “relates back to his direct appeal” and is a constitutional issue

already adjudicated in the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal. Petitioner addresses the

statute of limitations as follows:

Petitioner contends that since his petition was timely filed

and he had several more days before his petition would have been

barred as untimely, that the time which he filed his motion to hold

his petition in abeyance, and between the time which the California

Supreme denied the new claim should be equitably tolled, and

petitioner should be granted leave to file first amended petition.

(Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 3.) Petitioner argues that his new claim relates back

because it “arose from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, petitioner’s post conviction

proceedings, direct appeal, etc. [sic].” (Id. at 4.) He contends that the claim is one “respondent

was already prepared to defend against,” the issue will not burden respondent, and respondent

should be required to file a response because not ordering a response will deprive petitioner of

due process and a fair and impartial trial. (Id.) Petitioner asks the court to find that his new

claim relates back to the initial pleading and to order respondent to file an answer. Petitioner

also asks the court to find that he has shown due diligence, give him the benefit of the doubt, and

permit him to file the first amended petition.

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ANALYSIS

A petition for writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as

provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see Rule 11,

Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. Thus, after an answer has been served, “a party may amend the

party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall

be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The decision to permit or deny a

motion for leave to amend after an answer has been filed rests within the sound discretion of the

trial court. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)). In deciding whether to grant leave to

amend, courts generally consider the following factors: undue delay, bad faith by the moving

party, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the party has

previously amended his pleadings. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995); DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 186 & n.3.

In the present case, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s motion to

amend be denied because the proposed amendment would be futile. The court previously

determined that the statute of limitations for filing his federal habeas petition began to run for

petitioner on September 13, 2000, and expired on July 12, 2003. (Findings & Recommendations

filed Dec. 17, 2003, at 4, adopted by Order filed Jan. 22, 2004.) Habeas petitions filed in state

courts after the federal statute of limitations has expired do not revive the limitations period. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court in 2005 did not

revive the statute of limitations for the filing of federal habeas claims stemming from petitioner’s

1998 conviction and does not entitle petitioner to any statutory tolling.

The undersigned has considered whether the statute of limitations for petitioner’s

new claim commenced at a later date under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) is

applicable only when the factual predicate for a claim is discovered after the petitioner’s

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judgment became final. For late discovered claims, the critical date is the date on which the

petitioner “could have discovered the factual predicate” of his claim, not the date on which he

actually discovered the factual predicate, the date on which he understood the legal significance

of the facts known to him, or the date on which he obtained evidence to support his late

discovered claim. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

the due diligence clock started ticking when the prisoner learned facts that supported a good faith

basis for arguing prejudice arising from ineffective assistance of counsel, whether or not the

prisoner understood the legal significance of the facts known to him); Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d

356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Time begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could

discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”);

Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not convey

a statutory right to an extended delay . . . while a habeas petitioner gathers every possible scrap of

evidence that might, by negative implication, support his claim.”).

In this case, the factual predicate for petitioner’s claim regarding the reasonable

doubt jury instruction was known to petitioner in 1999. On direct appeal, petitioner’s counsel

raised the following issue in Appellant’s Opening Brief: the trial court’s instructions defining the

concept of “reasonable doubt” violated appellant’s federal and state constitutional rights to due

process of law by reducing the prosecution’s required burden of proof.” (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex.

A. at ii & 32-38.) Although the issue was not included in petitioner’s subsequent petition for

review, it is clear that the factual predicate for the claim was known to petitioner in 1999. 

Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run for this claim, as it did for the five claims

alleged in the original federal habeas petition, on September 13, 2000, and expired on July 12,

2003.

Although petitioner’s reply refers to equitable tolling, the undersigned finds that

petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to such tolling. The AEDPA statute of limitations is

subject to equitable tolling “only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control

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make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). Equitable tolling is not routinely available in habeas

corpus cases because district courts must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the

federal habeas process.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89

(9th Cir. 1997)). See also Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases”). “[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005). A prisoner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he demonstrates that forces other

than his own lack of diligence accounted for his failure to file a timely federal habeas petition. 

See, e.g., Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying equitable tolling where

the district court’s error and its consequences consumed 258 days of the 365-day period for filing

a habeas petition); Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107 (applying equitable tolling where the delay in filing a

habeas petition was attributable to prison officials’ failure to mail a properly submitted and

timely petition).

Petitioner has not demonstrated that an extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control made it impossible for him to pursue the reasonable doubt jury instruction claim in a

timely manner. Moreover, the fact that the issue was raised on direct appeal in 1999 precludes a

finding that petitioner acted with diligence when he presented the issue to the California Supreme

Court for the first time in a habeas petition filed in 2005.

Finally, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s jury instruction claim does not

relate back to the habeas petition filed in this court on June 27, 2003. A habeas petitioner’s

amendments made or proposed after the statute of limitations has expired will relate back to the

date of his original pleading if the new claims arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence

set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, ,

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125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005). “The ‘original pleading’ to which Rule 15 refers is . . . the petition

in a habeas proceeding.” Id. at 2569-70. The relation back of new habeas claims “depends on

the existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted

claims.” Id. at 2572. See also Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2005). The

common core of operative facts must not be viewed at too high a level of generality, and an

“occurrence” consists of the set of facts that supports a ground for relief. 125 S. Ct. at 2573.

Petitioner’s proposed new claim is that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable

doubt violated petitioner’s federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law by

reducing the prosecution’s required burden of proof. Although petitioner’s original pleading

includes a claim of jury instruction error, his new claim concerning the instruction given on

reasonable doubt and its effect on the prosecutor’s burden of proof does not arise from the same

core of operative facts as the previously alleged claim concerning the trial court’s failure to give

a limiting instruction sua sponte concerning the use of impeachment evidence to prove

predisposition to commit a crime. See United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2005)

(“[A] petitioner does not satisfy the Rule 15 “relation back” standard merely by raising some type

of ineffective assistance in the original petition, and then amending the petition to assert another

ineffective assistance claim based upon an entirely distinct type of attorney misfeasance.”), cert.

denied U.S. 126 S. Ct. 2906 (2006).

The undersigned finds that amendment would be futile because petitioner’s new

claim is barred by the statute of limitations, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and the

new claim does not relate back to the claims alleged in the original federal habeas petition. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s July 17, 2006

motion to amend be denied.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

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serve written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections

shall be filed and served within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: January 26, 2007.

DAD:13

owen1377.mtaden

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