Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00071/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00071-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

---

1

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CITY OF SAN JOSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-03178-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 65

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-05152-EJD 

Re: Dkt. No. 49

CITY OF BERKELEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:16-cv-00071-EJD 

Re: Dkt. No. 39

In these related actions, Plaintiffs City of San Jose, City of Oakland, and City of Berkeley 

(collectively, “the Cities”) seek damages from Defendants Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”), 

Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”) because, between the 1930s 

and the late 1970s, Monsanto manufactured and sold products containing environmental 

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 1 of 10
2

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

contaminants called polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). The Cities allege that these PCBs have 

contaminated and continue to contaminate the San Francisco Bay (“the Bay”) through runoff from 

the Cities, forcing them to spend money to reduce PCB discharge and comply with state and 

federal regulatory requirements.

Presently before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaints. Case 

No. 15-cv-3178, Dkt. No. 65; Case No. 15-cv-5152, Dkt. No. 49; Case No. 16-cv-0071, Dkt. No. 

39 (collectively, “Mot.”). Pursuant to the Court’s previous order, the Cities have filed a single 

joint opposition to the motions. Case No. 15-cv-3178, Dkt. No. 75 (“Opp.”). The parties 

appeared for hearing on the motions on August 9, 2016. Case No. 15-cv-3178, Dkt. No. 81; Case 

No. 15-cv-5152, Dkt. No. 64; Case No. 16-cv-0071, Dkt. No. 54. After carefully considering the 

parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the Cities have failed to state a claim justifying relief. For 

the reasons set forth in further detail below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Each of the Cities raises nearly identical allegations its complaint. Case No. 15-cv-3178, 

Dkt. No. 1; Case No. 15-cv-5152, Dkt. No. 1; Case No. 16-cv-0071, Dkt. No. 1 (“Compls.”). 

PCBs, the Cities allege, are man-made chemical compounds that have become notorious as global 

environmental contaminants. Id., ¶ 1. PCB exposure can cause a number of health issues, 

including cancer, in humans, and PCBs also destroy populations of fish, birds, and other animal 

life. Id., ¶¶s 2, 4, 36-46. PCBs were used in a variety of applications, such as paint, caulking, 

electrical equipment, sealants, inks, lubricants, and other products. Id., ¶¶s 5, 33.

The Cities operate their own municipal stormwater systems, which collect stormwater and 

discharge it into the Bay. Id., ¶ 13. When it rains, PCBs often leach into stormwater and 

rainwater. Id., ¶¶s 5, 35. Thus, through no fault of their own, the Cities discharge PCBs into the 

Bay. Id., ¶¶s 5-6. As a result, the Bay has become contaminated with PCBs, and the United States 

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has approved a PCB Total Maximum Daily Load 

(“TMDL”) for the Bay, meaning the maximum amount of PCBs that the Bay can receive while 

still meeting water quality standards. Id., ¶¶s 7-10.

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 2 of 10
3

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Because they discharge stormwater into the Bay, the Cities are required to obtain 

Municipal Regional Stormwater Permits from the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality 

Control Board. Id., ¶ 13. Each of the Cities has received such a permit, which includes a TMDL 

that limits the amount of PCBs the Cities may discharge into the Bay through stormwater. Id., 

¶¶s 14-15. On May 11, 2015, a new draft permit, which would govern the next permitting period, 

was issued, which imposed even stricter TMDLs and would cost the Cities even more money to 

reduce their PCB discharge. Id., ¶¶s 18-19.

From 1935 until Congress banned PCBs in 1979, the company then known as Monsanto 

Corporation (“Old Monsanto”) was the sole manufacturer of PCBs in the United States. Id., ¶¶s 3, 

32.

1

 As early as the 1930s, Old Monsanto was aware that PCBs were toxic to humans and 

wildlife. Id., ¶¶s 47-55, 57, 59. By the early 1970s, Old Monsanto also had learned that PCBs 

were persistent and ubiquitous and could cause lasting harm. Id., ¶¶s 57-58, 61-62. Also in the 

early 1970s, the EPA began to research the effects of PCBs, issuing a report about their toxicity 

and finding that they were widespread in California bodies of water. Id., ¶¶s 66-68. Nevertheless, 

reluctant to stop selling a profitable product, Old Monsanto continued to develop and market 

products containing PCBs, and actively concealed their harmful effects from state and federal 

regulatory agencies. Id., ¶¶s 60, 62-64, 69-71, 73-76.

On the basis of these allegations, the Cities raise two causes of action: (1) public nuisance 

by manufacturing, distributing, marketing, and promoting PCBs that have harmed the Bay; and (2) 

equitable indemnity for the damage caused to the Cities. Id., ¶¶s 77-96. They seek compensatory 

damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees, as well as other relief. Id. at 19. Defendants 

have moved to dismiss both causes of action by each of the Cities. Mot. Plaintiffs oppose all of 

Defendants’ motions. Opp.

 

1 Old Monsanto was spun off into three corporations, all of which are Defendants here. Compls., 

¶¶s 24-27.

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 3 of 10
4

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Although particular detail is not generally necessary, the factual allegations “must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 556-57. A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if 

it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal of a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); see Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2008).

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court must read and construe the complaint in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Autotel v. Nev. Bell Tel. Co., 697 F.3d 846, 850 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court 

generally “may not consider any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court may 

consider material submitted as part of the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also 

consider material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 

(9th Cir. 2001).

The court must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a 

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor is a complaint 

sufficient if it merely “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “to be entitled to the 

presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the 

elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give 

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 4 of 10
5

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Eclectic Props. E., LLC 

v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). “In all cases, evaluating a complaint’s plausibility is a ‘contextspecific’ endeavor that requires courts to ‘draw on . . . judicial experience and common sense.’”

Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Eclectic 

Props. E., 751 F.3d at 996).

In the event that a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless 

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could 

not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th 

Cir. 1986)). A district court may dismiss without leave to amend “where the amendment would be 

futile.” Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. 

v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III. DISCUSSION

As above, Defendants move to dismiss both claims that the Cities have brought. The Court 

considers each claim in turn.

A. Public Nuisance

Under California law, a nuisance is “[a]nything which is injurious to health, . . . or is 

indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 

with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, 

in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 3479. “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or 

neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons . . . .” Id. § 3480.

California permits two types of nuisance actions. First, “[a] civil action may be brought in 

the name of the people of the State of California to abate a public nuisance . . . by the city attorney 

of any town or city in which the nuisance exists.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Second, “any 

person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a 

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 5 of 10
6

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

nuisance,” may bring a civil action for abatement of the nuisance as well as damages. Id. A

public entity may bring the latter type of action if it “can show it has a property interest injuriously 

affected by the nuisance.” County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 

314 (2006) (quoting Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 221 Cal. App. 

3d 1601, 1616 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 

56, 70 (2008)).

Here, the Cities allege only the second type of nuisance. Opp. at 6. Defendants respond 

that (1) the Cities may not assert the public nuisance claim because none of their property has been 

affected; (2) Defendants, as mere product manufacturers, played no active or intentional rule in 

creating the alleged nuisance; (3) the intervening acts of the third parties who purchased and used 

the products break the chain of proximate causation; and (4) Defendants cannot be held liable for 

regulatory compliance costs as damages. Because the Cities have failed to establish that their 

property was affected, the Court does not reach the remaining issues.

As above, a public entity may bring a non-representative nuisance action for damages only 

if “it has a property interest injuriously affected by the nuisance.” Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 4th 

at 314 (quoting Selma Pressure, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1616).2 The Cities claim such a property 

interest not in the Bay itself, but in stormwater that has been polluted by Monsanto’s PCB 

products because the Cities are responsible for collecting stormwater and managing its discharge 

into the Bay. Opp. at 11-12.3

 

2

Plaintiffs also suggest that a municipality may bring an action to recover monetary damages if it 

establishes a “special injury” to the municipality. Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 4th at 307 n.6 

(quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3493; Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 24-25 (1919)). The 

quoted language in Santa Clara, however, is dictum, and both authorities cited refer only to 

“private person[s].” Cal. Civ. Code § 3493; Frost, 181 Cal. at 24-25. Meanwhile, courts that have 

directly addressed the issue have held that the existence of a “special injury” confers standing only 

on private persons and not public entities. Torrance Redevelopment Agency v. Solvent Coating 

Co., 763 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1991); City of Los Angeles v. Shpegel-Dimsey, Inc., 198 

Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1020 (1988). In keeping with the weight of authority, this Court also holds 

that the special injury requirement of Cal. Civ. Code § 3493 does not apply to public entities. The 

Court therefore does not address Plaintiffs’ argument that they have suffered a special injury.

3 At the hearing on this motion, the Cities clarified for the first time that they claim regulatory and 

usufructuary interests in stormwater. This contention does not appear in their briefs. In fact, the

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 6 of 10
7

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In support of this contention, the Cities cite Orange County Water District v. Arnold 

Engineering Co., 196 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2011). In Orange County, the public entity plaintiff, the 

Orange County Water District (“Water District”), brought five causes of action, including one for 

public nuisance and several more under various statutes, seeking damages for groundwater 

contamination resulting from the defendant’s dumping of hazardous waste. Id. at 1115-16. The 

defendants moved to disqualify the Water District’s law firm when the defendants discovered that 

the firm represented the Water District under a contingency fee agreement, an arrangement that is 

not allowed for actions on the public’s behalf. Id. at 1116 (citing People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior 

Court, 39 Cal. 3d 740, 750 (1985)). The Orange County court held that the Water District had not 

sued on the public’s behalf because the Water District primarily sought monetary damages. Id. at 

1125-26.

The Cities highlight one sentence in the Orange County opinion: “Indeed, regardless 

whether the Water District’s interest in the groundwater is classified as regulatory, proprietary, or 

usufructuary, the Water District is entitled to recover monetary damages for the investigation and 

remediation costs it incurred and will incur in the future.” Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted). In 

context, however, this sentence does not support the Cities’ position. The opinion goes on to 

explain that “both the [Uncodified Orange County Water District] Act and [Cal. Health & Safety 

Code §25363(e)] authorize the Water District to bring an action in its own name to recover 

investigation and remediation costs it incurred without regard to the particular interest the Water 

District holds in the contaminated groundwater.” Id. In other words, in Orange County, other 

statutory causes of action expressly allowed the public entity to recover damages incurred in 

investigating and remediating contamination. The Orange County court therefore did not need to 

decide whether the Water District had a proprietary interest in its groundwater for purposes of its 

nuisance claim. The Cities cite no other authority for their claim that they have a property interest 

 

nuisance claims in the Cities’ complaints do not mention stormwater management systems at all 

and refer only to the Bay itself. Compls., ¶¶s 78-90.

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 7 of 10
8

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

in stormwater.

On the other hand, Defendants point to a state statutory framework that suggests that 

stormwater belongs to the state of California. Under Cal. Water Code § 1201, “[a]ll water flowing 

in any natural channel,” unless appropriated or used, is “public water of the State.” Of course, 

stormwater drainage systems are not natural channels under § 1201. However, Cal. Water Code 

§ 10574 clarifies that “[u]se of rainwater collected from rooftops does not require a water right 

permit pursuant to Section 1201.” By exempting rainwater from the permitting requirement of 

§ 1201, § 10574 implies that rainwater otherwise falls within § 1201, meaning that rainwater is 

public water belonging to the state. The Cities do not take ownership of stormwater merely 

because it flows through municipal pipes on its way to the Bay. Cf. Cal. Water Code § 1202(d) 

(classifying as “unappropriated water” “[w]ater which having been appropriated or used flows 

back into a stream, lake, or other body of water”).

In sum, the Cities have failed to “establish[] a property interest the nuisance injuriously 

affected.” Orange County, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 1125 n.4 (citations omitted). Therefore, they 

cannot pursue nuisance claims for damages. Because the Cities cannot meet this threshold 

requirement, the Court need not address the remaining issues that Defendants have raised. The 

nuisance claims will be dismissed.

The only remaining question is whether to grant the Cities leave to amend their nuisance 

claims. The Cities have not yet had an opportunity to amend their complaints. As noted above, 

their complaints and briefing are not altogether clear on precisely what property interest they claim 

or why they have such a property interest. In light of this ambiguity, the Court cannot yet 

conclude that further amendment of the nuisance claims would be futile. Leave to amend these 

claims will be granted. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658.

B. Equitable Indemnity

In California, “[t]he equitable indemnity rule enables a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain 

partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.” Gen. Motors 

Corp. v. Duopnik, 1 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Am. Motorcycle Ass’n, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 8 of 10
9

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

598 (1978)). The purpose of equitable indemnity is to apportion monetary loss “between . . . 

wrongdoers in proportion to their relative culpability.” Selma Pressure, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1611-

12 (quoting Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 448, 495 (1985)).

“Joint and several liability is a prerequisite for equitable indemnity.” Leko v. Cornerstone 

Bldg. Inspection Serv., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1109, 1115 (2001) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. 

Paseman, 219 Cal. App. 3d 958, 964 (1990)). It is not necessary that the responsible parties “act 

in concert or in pursuance of a common design, nor is it necessary that they be joined as 

defendants.” Selma Pressure, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1612 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cicone v.

URS Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 194, 212 (1986)). However, “a cause of action for indemnity does 

not accrue until the indemnitee suffers loss through payment of an adverse judgment or 

settlement.” City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 30 Cal. App. 4th 575, 587 (1994) (citing 

Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consol., Inc., 33 Cal. 3d 604, 611 (1983); People ex rel. Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 748 (1980)).

The Cities contend that they and Monsanto are jointly responsible in the contamination of 

the Bay because the Cities have been required to spend money to reduce the levels of PCB 

contamination in stormwater they have released into the Bay. Compls., ¶ 82. However, as 

Defendants point out, the Cities have had to pay because of a regulatory requirement, not an 

adverse judgment. And although it may be true that the State of California could bring a public 

nuisance action against the Cities, an equitable indemnity cause of action is premature unless and 

until the State does so and obtains a judgment or settlement. The equitable indemnity causes of 

action will be dismissed. Furthermore, because no amendment could cure this defect in the claim, 

leave to amend will be denied. Gardner, 563 F.3d at 990.

IV. ORDER

The motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Leave to amend is GRANTED only as to the 

Cities’ nuisance causes of action. Any amended complaints shall be filed on or before September 

13, 2016.

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 9 of 10
10

Case Nos.: 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, 5:16-cv-00071-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-cv-00071-EJD Document 56 Filed 08/22/16 Page 10 of 10