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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FIL~D 

United States Co~<?f Appeals Tenth C1rcmt 

JOHN M. PEKAH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MANUEL LUJAN, as the U.S. Secretary of 

the Interior, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB 19 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-6181 

No . CIV-90-1599-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of thi s appeal. See Fed. R. App . P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. Appellant's motion for en bane 

consideration is denied. 

Pro se Plaintiff-appellant John M. Pekah (Appellant), a 

Comanche Indian, brought this action against the Secretary of the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppe l . 10th Ci r. R. 36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6181 Document: 010110226112 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 1 
Interior, alleging that the Secretary's determination of the 

heirship of another Comanche Indian, James Wermy Pekah (Pekah), 

violated several of Appellant's constitutional rights. None of 

the pertinent facts are in dispute. Pekah, Appellant's natural 

uncle, had adopted Appellant in a state proceeding. Upon Pekah's 

death, an administrative law judge (ALJ) from the Department of 

the Interior issued an Order Determining Heirs. The order 

recognized the adoption as valid and determined that Appellant, as 

Pekah's son and sole heir, would inherit Pekah's estate, including 

his real property held in trust. Other potential heirs challenged 

the order in an appeal to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. 

They contended that the adoption was void because the state was 

without jurisdiction to issue an adoption between Indians living 

in Indian country. 

After determining that it had jurisdiction to question the 

jurisdiction of a state court adoption for purposes of determining 

restricted Indian heirs, the Interior Board of Indian Appeals made 

several findings of fact and remanded the case to the Interior ALJ 

to determine whether the state had jurisdiction over such 

adoptions. The ALJ entered an order, finding that the state court 

was "without jurisdiction to adjudge the adoption." Order on 

Remand, Appellee's App. at 16. Appellant's appeal to the Interior 

Board of Indian Appeals resulted in an affirmance of the ALJ's 

order. The ALJ's order therefore became the final decision of the 

Secretary. See Ducheneaux v. Secretary of the Interior, 837 F.2d 

340, 341-42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). 

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Five years later, Appellant brought this action in federal 

district court, seeking review of the Secretary's decision under 

the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-576. His 

complaint alleged that the Secretary's decision denied Appellant 

access to state courts in contradiction of his status as a citizen 

under 8 U.S.C. § 140l(b), and violated his 

due process rights. Appellant contended 

decision was an abuse of his discretion. 

equal protection and 

that the Secretary's 

The Secretary moved to dismiss Appellant's suit for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that he had exclusive 

jurisdiction to make such a determination, and that his decision 

was not subject to judicial review, based on the wording of the 

statute granting the Secretary the authority to determine 

restricted Indian heirs, 25 U.S.C. § 372. Subsequently, Appellee 

moved to amend his motion to dismiss, noting that Congress had 

recently amended § 372 to allow for judicial review. In his 

amended motion, Appellee contended the 1990 amendment to§ 372 did 

not apply retroactively to the Secretary's 1985 decision regarding 

Pekah's heirs, and, alternatively, asserted that Appellant had 

failed to state a claim, arguing that if the amendment were found 

applicable, Appellant had raised a nonjusticiable political 

question. 

The district court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss, 

finding the Secretary's 1985 decision final and not subject to 

judicial review, and ruled that the 1990 amendment to 25 u.s.c. 

§ 372 should not be applied retroactively. This appe al followed . 

On appeal, we interpret Appellant's prose pleadings liberally, as 

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Appellate Case: 91-6181 Document: 010110226112 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 3 
required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), and 

review the district court's legal rulings de nova, United States 

v. Irvin, 906 F.2d 1424, 1426 (10th Cir. 1990). We affirm. 

"De nova review requires us to make an independent 

determination of the issues, similar to that which the trial court 

makes in its initial ruling." Id. First, and as Appellee notes 

in his brief, Appellant can challenge the constitutionality of the 

Secretary's decision, notwithstanding the language in § 372 

precluding judicial review. See Johnson v. Kleppe, 596 F.2d 950, 

952 (10th Cir. 1979)(citing Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 12 n.6 

(7th Cir. 1975)); Kicking Woman v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1203, 1206 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Appellant's complaint clearly intended to bring 

constitutionally-based challenges. Although the district court's 

opinion does not reflect a review of Appellant's pleadings for 

such claims, or a review of the Secretary's decision for 

constitutional errors, we can consider Appellant's constitutional 

claims at this point, given the procedural posture of this case, 

the lack of factual dispute, and the applicable standard of 

review. See Pell v. Azar Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949, 950 (10th Cir. 

1983); see also Bath v. National Ass'n of Intercollegiate 

Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1988)(appellate court 

can affirm on any grounds that find support in the record). 

Appellant attempts to invite constitutional review by 

invoking various rights he claims were violated by the Secretary's 

Nonetheless, 

his briefs 

not raise 

decision, such as due process and equal protection. 

our careful review of Appellant's complaint and 

convinces us that the majority of his arguments do 

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constitutional issues, because they do not constitutionally 

challenge the statutory basis for the Secretary's decision or the 

process by which that decision arose. See Johnson, 596 F.2d at 

952. Appellant's claims of due process and equal protection 

violations are not accompanied by allegations of fact that would 

lead, even under a liberal analysis, to the statement of legally 

recognizable claims for the violation of these rights. See Dunn 

v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 

U.S. 1059 (1990). 

Appellant contends that the Secretary's determination that 

the state court lacked jurisdiction over his adoption by Pekah 

violates his right of access to state courts and is impermissibly 

based on Appellant's race. Before the district court, Appellant 

alleged that no tribal court or CFR court1 existed in Oklahoma at 

the time of the adoption. Nonetheless, state jurisdiction over 

Indians cannot be constitutionally mandated by the lack of a 

tribal forum. Congress has consented to state civil jurisdiction 

over Indians in Indian country, but only where both the state and 

the tribe in question take affirmative steps to effect such 

jurisdiction. See 25 u.s.c. § 1322(a); Mcclanahan v. State Tax 

Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177 (1973)(§ 1322(a) requires consent of the 

tribe before state may assume jurisdiction over Indians); Kennerly 

v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (197l)(per curiam)(under 

1 A "CFR court" is a court created pursuant to Bureau of Indian 

Affairs regulations to preside over tribal matters in absence of a 

court established by tribal government. See Tillett v. Lujan, 931 

F.2d 636, 638, 640 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 91-6181 Document: 010110226112 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 5 
§ 1322(a), state must take affirmative legislative action to 

obtain jurisdiction over tribal matters). 2 

Appellant's charge of racial discrimination, likewise, must 

fail. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976). 

In Fisher, the Supreme Court denied Indian plaintiffs access to 

state courts for adoption purposes, holding that the tribe's own 

courts had exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. This 

determination was not racial discrimination, the Court said, 

because the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction stemmed from its status 

as a sovereign nation, not plaintiffs' race. Additionally, it 

noted that the denial of a state forum, though resulting in 

disparate treatment from nonindians, was justified because it was 

"intended to benefit the class of which [plaintiff] is a member by 

furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government." 

Id. Appellant's arguments, alleging lack of a tribal forum and 

discriminatory effect, cannot compel recognition of state 

jurisdiction over Indian adoptions. 

Finally, Appellant contends that the Secretary's decision is 

an abuse of his discretion, in light of the provision in 25 u.s.c. 

§ 372 recognizing state adoption procedures, and that the decision 

renders § 372 meaningless. This statute cannot confer 

jurisdiction over Indian adoptions to state courts. Fisher, 424 

U.S. at 388-89. Additionally, we cannot review the Secretary's 

1985 decision for an alleged abuse of discretion because we agree 

2 Appellant did not challenge the Secretary's determination, 

upon judicial notice, that the state had not assumed civil or 

criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. 

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with the district court's ruling that 25 u.s.c. § 372, as it 

existed in 1985, precludes judicial review of the Secretary's 

decision, and that the 1990 amendment to§ 372 should not be 

applied retroactively. We also agree with the district court's 

analysis on this point. 

The district court, applying the public policy analysis 

outlined in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 

308 U.S . 371, 374 (1940), 3 looked to the intent of Congress in 

enacting§ 372, which was to insure marketability of Indian title. 

The court found that "to allow the 1990 Amendment to be applied 

retroactively would render all decisions by the Secretary of the 

Interior regarding Indian trust lands under Section 1 of the Act 

[of June 25, 1910, 25 U.S.C. § 372] subject to collateral attack 

through judicial review. Such action would greatly disrupt 

marketability of Indian titles conveyed prior to 1990." 

court's Order, Appellee's App. at 69. 

District 

Appellant challenges this ruling, contending that the 

district court's public policy determination cannot stand in light 

of the fact that the real property contained in Pekah's estate is 

3 Appellee argues at length the applicability of Bradley v. 

School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), as discussed in this court's 

opinion in Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 

1377 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 799 (1991). These 

cases involve the retroactivity of statutes enacted during the 

pendency of cases on appeal, not the retroactivity of statutes 

enacted during a collateral attack on a final judgment. Bradley, 

416 U.S. at 710-11. We agree with the district court that a 

different analysis is require d whe n determining the latte r 

applicati on. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6181 Document: 010110226112 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 7 
still in trust, and has been condemned by the Town of Cache, 

Oklahoma, for 4 the construction of a sanitary system. Appellant 

misunderstands the nature of the district court's ruling. A 

court's public policy determination is not based solely on the 

facts of the case before the court. Public policy involves 

"'consideration[] of what is expedient for the community 

concerned.'" Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 

(199l)(quoting o. Holmes, The Common Law, 35-36 (1881)); see also 

Black's Law Dictionary 1041 (5th ed. 1979)(an act may be against 

public policy when it "has a tendency to be injurious to the 

public or against the public good"). The district court 

determined that public policy, when measured against the intended 

purpose of § 372, would not be served by opening up past 

determinations by the Secretary to collateral attack, and we 

agree. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

4 To the extent that Appellant attempts to state separate 

claims arising from the state condemnation proceedings, those 

claims were not presented to the district court, and will not be 

reviewed for the first time on appeal. See Gillihan v. 

Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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