Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01997/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CHAVIRA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. SOTO, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15cv1997-WQH (BGS)

ORDER

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR STAY 

AND ABEYANCE;

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; and

(3) DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Robert Chavira (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254.

1

(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego County Superior Court 

of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, eleven counts of robbery, nine counts of 

false imprisonment, one count of burglary, one count of arson, and two counts of assault 

with a semi-automatic firearm, with nineteen counts accompanied by firearm use findings.

 

1

 Although this case was randomly referred to United States Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a Report and Recommendation 

nor oral argument is necessary for the disposition of this matter. See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 71.1(d).

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(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 364-88.) He is serving a sentence of 717 years-tolife in state prison, enhanced under California’s Three Strikes law by two prior felony 

convictions. (CT 758-59; Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavira, et al., No. D063089, slip 

op. at 22 (Cal. App. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).) Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional 

rights were violated by ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (claims one through 

seven, nine and ten), by the imposition of procedural bars in his state habeas proceedings 

(claims eight and eleven), because there is insufficient evidence to support three of the false 

imprisonment counts (claim twelve), and because the burden of proof was lowered when 

the jury was given a permissive inference instruction on robbery and burglary (claim 

thirteen). (ECF No. 1 at 21-198.) 

Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged the state court record. (ECF Nos. 13-

14, 21.) Respondent argues that claims nine and ten were never presented to any state court 

but can be denied as plainly meritless, claims eight and eleven do not present claims for 

relief, and the adjudication by the state court of the remaining claims is neither contrary to, 

nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 4-13.) 

Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 16.) He has also filed a Motion for Stay 

and Abeyance requesting this matter be stayed and the Petition held in abeyance until the 

state court issues an opinion on a habeas petition in which he raised claims nine and ten.

(ECF No. 18.) In addition, he has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment in which he 

states that the state court has now denied the habeas petition presenting claims nine and 

ten, that his motion for stay and abeyance is therefore moot, and requesting claims nine 

and ten be considered on their merits. (ECF No. 20.)

The Court finds that federal habeas relief is unavailable as to any claim presented in 

the Petition because claims nine and ten fail under a de novo review, and the remaining

claims fail under the deferential standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The 

Court denies Petitioner’s motions as moot, and denies the Petition.

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a 28-count Consolidated Amended Information/Indictment filed in the San Diego 

County Superior Court on October 2, 2012, Petitioner and co-defendant Ryan McKnight 

were charged with one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of California 

Penal Code § 182(a)(1) (count 1), eleven counts of robbery in violation of California Penal 

Code § 211 (counts 2, 3, 8-11, 13, 15, 25-27), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon 

in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) (counts 4-5), nine counts of false 

imprisonment by violence in violation of California Penal Code §§ 236-37 (counts 6-7, 15-

21), one count of arson in violation of California Penal Code § 451(c) (count 22), two 

counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 

246(b) (counts 23-24), one count of burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459 

(count 12), and Petitioner alone was charged with one count of receiving stolen property 

in violation of California Penal Code § 496(a) (count 28). (CT 195-207.) Counts 4, 5, and 

28 were later dismissed. (Id.) As to counts 2-3, 8-11, 13-14 and 25-27, it was alleged that 

Petitioner and McKnight personally used a firearm within the meaning of California Penal 

Code § 12022.53(b), and as to counts 6-7 and 15-21, that they personally used a firearm 

within the meaning of California Penal Code § 12022.5(a). (CT 200-09.) It was also 

alleged that Petitioner had been convicted of two prior serious or violent felonies within 

the meaning of California Penal Code §§ 667(a)-(i) and 1170.12. (CT 195-209.)

On October 31, 2012, a jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts, other than count 5 

on which they deadlocked, and counts 4 and 28 which were dismissed prior to submission 

to the jury, and returned true findings on all the firearm use allegations other than count 

11. (CT 364-89.) The prior conviction allegations were found true on November 1, 2012. 

(CT 754.01.) On December 3, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to 425 years-to-life plus 288 

years and 8 months in state prison. (CT 758-59.)

Petitioner appealed, raising claims twelve and thirteen presented here, and joined 

McKnight’s appeal raising claims not presented here. (Lodgment No. 3.) The appellate 

court consolidated the appeals, corrected a sentencing error which increased Petitioner’s 

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sentence by 3 years and 4 months, and affirmed. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavira, et 

al., No. D063089, slip op. at 22.) On April 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for review 

in the state supreme court raising claims twelve and thirteen. (Lodgment No. 6.) The

petition was denied with an order which stated: “Petition for review denied.” (Lodgment 

No. 7, People v. Chavira, No. S218220 (Cal. June 11, 2014).)

On October 31, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court 

claiming: (1) his cell phones were searched without a valid warrant; (2) the search exceeded 

the scope of any warrant; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to investigate 

and object to perjured testimony by a police detective and a prosecution investigator; (4) his 

conviction was based on that perjured testimony; (5) prosecutorial misconduct when the 

prosecutor took on investigatory functions; and (6) ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel for failing to raise those and other claims on appeal. (Lodgment No. 8.) On 

December 9, 2014, the state superior court denied the habeas petition, finding that the first 

five claims were procedurally barred because they could have been but were not raised on 

direct appeal, and that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim (claims one 

through seven presented here) failed on the merits because Petitioner had not shown 

prejudice as a result of the alleged errors of his appellate counsel. (Lodgment No. 9, In re 

Chavira, No. HC20860, order at 2-4 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2014).) 

On December 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in 

the state appellate court alleging that a police detective and prosecution investigator 

testified falsely at trial. (Lodgment No. 10.) The appellate court summarily denied the 

petition without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 11, In re Chavira, No. D067233, 

order (Cal. App. Ct. Jan. 8, 2015).) On January 21, 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas petition 

in the appellate court raising the same claims presented in his superior court habeas petition 

(which included claims one through seven here), and adding claims that the state superior 

court erroneously denied most of his claims on procedural grounds (claims eight and eleven 

here). (Lodgment No. 12.) The appellate court denied the petition on the basis that the 

claims alleging unlawful search and seizure were procedurally barred for failing to raise 

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them on appeal, his claim of perjury was barred as repetitive and successive as it had

already been denied in his coram nobis proceeding, and the claim the superior court abused 

its discretion in finding his claims procedurally barred was not cognizable in an appellate 

court habeas proceeding. (Lodgment No. 13, In re Chavira, No. D067302, order at 1-2

(Cal. App. Ct. Jan. 22, 2015).) The court alternately found that to the extent any claim was

not procedurally barred, it failed on the merits, as the claim of perjury was based on minor 

conflicts in testimony insufficient to demonstrate falsity and so insignificant as to fail to 

support a reasonable probability the trial was affected, and: “The evidence of Chavira’s 

guilt introduced at trial was so strong, and the conclusory and factually unsupported claims

of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Chavira are so 

weak, that he has not shown ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’” (Id., quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).)

On March 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the state superior court 

seeking an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel failed to seek suppression 

of the cell phone evidence. (Lodgment No. 14.) On April 7, 2015, the state superior court 

denied the petition on the same basis it denied the claim in the first superior court habeas 

petition, because it could have been but was not raised on appeal. (Lodgment No. 15, In 

re Chavira, No. HC20860, order at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. April 7, 2015).) 

On March 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court in 

which he raised the same claims presented in the superior and appellate courts, including

claims one through eight and eleven here. (Lodgment No. 16.) That petition was denied 

on July 22, 2015, with an order which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” 

(Lodgment No. 17, In re Chavira, No. S225372, order (Cal. July 22, 2015).)

After the Answer was filed, in which Respondent correctly observed that claims nine 

and ten had not been presented to any state court, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the 

state supreme court presenting those claims. (ECF No. 18 at 8-122.) The state supreme 

court denied that petition in an order which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus 

is denied. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (courts will not entertain habeas 

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corpus claims that are untimely); In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (courts will 

not entertain habeas corpus claims that are successive).)” (ECF No. 20 at 57, In re Chavira, 

No. S237668, order at 1 (Cal. July 19, 2017).)

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

This summary of the evidence is taken from the appellate court opinion affirming 

Petitioner’s conviction on direct review. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981)

(state court findings of fact are presumed correct in federal habeas proceedings).

This case arises out of defendants’ four-month crime spree in late 2011. 

Because the details of all the crimes are not relevant to the issues raised on 

appeal, we here describe the crimes and the related investigations only briefly. 

We provide additional details in the Discussion section as needed to resolve 

particular claims of error.

A. The Jewelry Store Robberies

Robberies occurred at the following four jewelry stores in California on 

the dates indicated: The Watch Connection in Costa Mesa (Aug. 2, 2011); Ben 

Bridge Jeweler, Inc. in San Diego (Sept. 16, 2011); Ben Bridge Jeweler, Inc. 

in San Jose (Oct. 15, 2011); and Leeds & Son in Palm Desert (Oct. 26, 2011). 

At each location, the robbers used the same modus operandi: They stole a 

Honda Accord from the vicinity, drove to the jewelry store, entered the store 

during business hours wearing ski masks and gloves and carrying firearms, 

ordered the employees and customers to get on the floor, smashed display 

cases with sledgehammers, stole expensive watches and other jewelry, and 

then fled in and later abandoned the stolen Honda.

Forensic and video surveillance evidence linked defendants to these 

robberies. A ski mask containing DNA that matched Chavira’s profile was 

found on the ground near the Honda abandoned after the robbery at The Watch 

Connection. Blood left at the San Diego Ben Bridge store and in the Honda 

abandoned after the robbery of that store contained DNA that matched 

McKnight’s profile. At the San Jose Ben Bridge store, a video recorder 

captured the robbery, and one of the robbers had tattoos that matched 

McKnight’s. Blood found at that store on broken glass and on a 

sledgehammer the robbers left behind contained DNA matching McKnight’s 

profile. A sledgehammer left behind after the robbery at Leeds & Son also 

contained DNA matching McKnight’s profile, and DNA matching Chavira’s 

profile and McKnight’s fingerprints were found in the Honda abandoned after 

the robbery.

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B. The Turner’s Outdoorsman Store Burglary

Around midnight on October 24, 2011, a Turner’s Outdoorsman store 

in San Diego was burglarized. The metal gate across the glass emergency exit 

door was pulled off by a chain, and the door was shattered. Video surveillance 

showed the burglar using a sledgehammer in an attempt to smash open a 

handgun display case. When the attempt proved unsuccessful, the suspect 

stuffed seven semiautomatic rifles into a bag and exited the store. The store 

manager testified two of the stolen rifles looked “very similar” to rifles 

depicted in video surveillance of the robbery at Leeds & Son. Shortly after 

the break-in at Turner’s Outdoorsman, police found a stolen Honda Accord 

abandoned in the alley behind the store.

C. The Barona Casino Robbery and Associated Arson

At 2:00 a.m. on November 9, 2011, a house under construction on an 

Indian reservation near the Barona Casino in Lakeside caught fire and 

eventually burned to the ground. Investigators found a nozzle from a gasoline 

can at the site and determined the fire had been deliberately set using gasoline 

as an accelerant.

While the fire was blazing, a Ford Explorer drove up to and parked at 

the entrance of the Barona Casino. Four men wearing ski masks and 

bulletproof vests exited the vehicle. The driver kept a rifle trained on casino 

employees outside the casino and ordered them to get on the ground, while 

the three other men hauled a chain from the back of the Explorer into the 

casino. After they entered the casino, one of the masked men fired a gun into 

the air and told everyone to get on the ground. The men then tried to wrap the 

chain around a display case advertising a $250,000 cash giveaway and 

containing stacks of cash. When they discovered the chain was too short, they 

knocked the display case over, smashed it open, stuffed stacks of cash into a 

bag, and fled in the Explorer.

Shortly after the robbers left the Casino, a patrol officer found the Ford 

Explorer abandoned near the casino. In a duffel bag inside the vehicle, an 

investigator found a box of .22 caliber bullets. Chavira’s fingerprints were 

found on the box. The bullets were of the same caliber as that of a shell casing 

found on the floor of the casino near the smashed display case.

D. Arrest of Defendants and Subsequent Searches

Police stopped defendants as they were traveling in Chavira’s car and 

arrested them on November 9, 2011. Police searched the vehicle and found a 

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black ski mask and several mobile telephones inside the vehicle. One of the 

telephones contained text messages written in Spanish that concerned the sale 

of watches and were dated between October 15 and 26, 2011. Tracking data 

on the telephones placed defendants in the vicinity of the San Jose Ben Bridge 

store and the Leeds & Son store on the dates those stores were robbed.

Police searched the motel room in which defendants were staying on 

the date of the Barona Casino robbery. They found bulletproof vests, ski 

masks, gloves, and two semiautomatic handguns. One of the handguns was 

“distinctive” and “appeared to match up perfectly” with a handgun depicted 

in video surveillance of the robberies at the two Ben Bridge stores and the 

Barona Casino. Police also found a pair of sneakers that contained gasoline 

residue and DNA matching McKnight’s profile. A Walmart receipt found on 

a nightstand recorded a purchase of two gasoline cans and a lighter on 

November 8, 2011. Video surveillance from the Walmart showed McKnight 

buying those items. The gasoline cans had nozzles that matched the one found 

during the investigation of the fire that destroyed the house under construction 

near the Barona Casino.

Police also searched two apartments leased by Chavira. In one, police 

found diamonds stolen in the robbery of Leeds & Son. In the other, police 

found four of the rifles stolen during the burglary of the Turner’s 

Outdoorsman store and numerous watches and other pieces of jewelry stolen 

in the robberies at the Ben Bridge stores and at Leeds & Son.

E. McKnight’s Trial Testimony

McKnight testified at trial. He admitted committing the robberies at 

the four jewelry stores and the burglary at the Turner’s Outdoorsman, as well 

as stealing the Hondas used in those crimes. McKnight also admitted he 

robbed the Barona Casino and started the fire at the nearby house to create a 

distraction for the tribal police. According to McKnight, Chavira was 

“innocent” and did not participate in any of the crimes.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavira, et al., No. D063089, slip op. at 2-6.)

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims his federal constitutional rights were violated because he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when his appellate counsel failed to raise the following 

claims on appeal: (a) claims alleging the digital contents of his cell phones were illegally 

obtained and improperly introduced at trial because the phones were searched incident to 

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his arrest without a warrant (claim one), and were obtained in excess of the warrants issued 

to their service providers (claim two); (b) claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel in failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained from the cell phones (claim 

three), failing to challenge the cell phone search warrant and cell phone providersubpoenas 

(claim four), failing to conduct any investigation, interview any witnesses, object to the 

admission of perjured testimony and irrelevant evidence, and seek suppression of a pretrial photographic lineup identification (claim five), and failing to move for a mistrial on 

the basis of perjured testimony (claim six); (c) a claim alleging numerous instances of 

prosecutorial misconduct (claim seven); (d) a claim alleging that one of his prior strike 

convictions is invalid and should not have been used to enhance his sentence (claim nine);

and (e) a claim alleging an error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction (claim ten). (ECF 

No. 1 at 23-118, 132-55.) He also claims that the state court erred in finding many of his 

claims procedurally barred (claim eight), and that he can show cause and prejudice to 

overcome those bars (claim eleven). (Id. at 119-31, 156-63.) Finally, he claims there is 

insufficient evidence to support three of the nine counts of false imprisonment (claim 

twelve), and that the burden of proof was lowered when the jury was instructed they could

find him guilty of robbery and burglary if they find he knowingly possessed recently stolen 

property coupled with even slight supporting evidence of robbery and burglary (claim 

thirteen). (Id. at 164-98.)

Respondent answers that the state court adjudication of claims one through seven, 

which were denied on state habeas on the basis Petitioner did not show Strickland prejudice 

arising from appellate counsel’s failure to raise the underlying claims on appeal, and claims 

twelve and thirteen, which were denied on direct appeal in a reasoned opinion, is 

objectively reasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Ans. Mem. at 5-13.) 

Respondent contends that claims eight and eleven do not present grounds for relief, and 

claims nine and ten are unexhausted because they have not been presented to the state court, 

but can be denied notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to exhaust because they are clearly 

without merit. (Id. at 7-9.) 

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Petitioner replies by requesting his Petition also serve as a Traverse. (Traverse at 1.) 

On June 7, 2017, after the Answer was filed, and apparently in response to Respondent’s 

contention that claims nine and ten had never been presented to any state court, Petitioner 

filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance indicating that he had recently presented claims nine 

and ten to the state supreme court in a habeas petition. (ECF No. 18.) On August 9, 2017, 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment indicating the habeas petition raising 

claims nine and ten had been denied, that his stay motion is therefore moot, and requesting 

he be allowed to proceed with those claims in this action. (ECF No. 20.)

A. Motion for Stay and Abeyance

Petitioner requested this action be stayed and the Petition held in abeyance while he 

awaited the decision of the state supreme court on the then-pending habeas petition in that 

court raising claims nine and ten. (ECF No. 18.) Petitioner now indicates his motion is

moot because the state supreme court has since denied that habeas petition. (ECF No. 20.)

Claims nine and ten are included in the Petition, but had not been presented to the state 

court when the Petition was filed. In fact, those claims were not presented to the state court 

until after the Answer was filed, and were denied by the state court as untimely and 

successive. (Id. at 57, In re Chavira, No. S237668, order at 1.) Although the timing and 

manner in which claims nine and ten were presented to and adjudicated by the state court 

presents issues of timeliness and procedural default which Respondent has not had the 

opportunity to address, it is clear that the motion for a stay and abeyance is moot. The 

Court therefore denies the motion as moot. 

B. Motion for Relief from Judgment

In his Motion for Relief from Judgment, Petitioner requests permission to proceed 

with claims nine and ten irrespective of his failure to exhaust state court remedies at the 

time he filed his Petition. (ECF No. 20.) A Motion for Relief from Judgment is not 

available at this time because no judgment has been entered in this case. Rather, claims 

nine and ten are included in the Petition, and there has yet to be any judgment entered with 

respect to those claims. Although Respondent has not had the opportunity to raise any 

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procedural defenses arising from the manner in which Petitioner presented claims nine and 

ten to the state court and the manner in which the state court adjudicated them, Respondent 

has indicated in the Answer that these claims can be denied as meritless irrespective of the 

procedural infirmity arising from Petitioner’s failure to timely exhaust state court remedies. 

(Ans. Mem. at 7-9.) As set forth below, the Court agrees, and in the exercise of judicial 

economy will deny claims nine and ten irrespective of any procedural infirmity because 

they fail on the merits under a de novo review. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 

390 (2010) (holding that irrespective of whether AEDPA deference applies, a federal 

habeas court may conduct a de novo review to deny a petition but not to grant one); 

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t may well make sense in 

some instances to proceed to the merits [rather than address procedural bars] if the result 

will be the same.”). Thus, there is no need to provide Respondent further briefing on the 

issue of procedural defenses, and no need to grant Petitioner relief from judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion for Relief from Judgment.

C. Merits

In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, a petitioner must show

a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

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from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only 

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there 

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 

134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

In order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the factual findings upon 

which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

1. Claims One through Seven

Petitioner alleges in claims one through seven that that his federal constitutional 

rights were violated because he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in 

numerous respects. In claims one and two he alleges his appellate counsel failed to present 

a claim on appeal challenging the search and seizure of his cell phones. (EFC No. 1 at 27-

40.) In claims three though six he alleges appellate counsel should have raised claims on 

appeal alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to: (a) move to suppress the 

evidence obtained from the cell phones (claim three); (b) challenge the subpoenas issued 

to the cell phone service providers (claim four); (c) investigate, interview witnesses, seek 

suppression of a suggestive pre-trial photographic lineup, and object to the admission of 

irrelevant evidence and perjured testimony (claim five); and (d) move for a mistrial based 

on perjured police testimony (claim six). (Id. at 41-88.) In claim seven he alleges appellate 

counsel failed to conduct a meaningful investigation and failed to raise a claim alleging 

numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct (claim seven). (Id. at 89-118.)

Respondent answers that the state court denial of these claims, on the basis there is 

no Strickland prejudice, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 5-7.)

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The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims is set forth in Strickland. Turner v. 

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). For ineffective assistance of counsel to 

provide for habeas relief, Petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.” Id. He must also show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense, which requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 

[Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To show prejudice, Petitioner 

need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have 

been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Petitioner must establish both 

deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Id. at 687. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 

U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both 

highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 105. These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state court decisions 

be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

Appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivolous issue 

on appeal. “In many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she 

foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker 

issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” Miller 

v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 

901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are 

clearly untenable.”)

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Petitioner presented claims one through seven to the state superior, appellate and 

supreme courts in a sequence of habeas petitions, which also included the underlying 

claims he alleges appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise. (Lodgment Nos. 8, 12, 

16.) The superior court first found that the underlying claims of illegal search and seizure, 

perjury, and prosecutorial misconduct were procedurally barred because they could have 

been but were not raised on appeal. (Lodgment No. 9, In re Chavira, No. HC20860, order 

at 2-3.) After acknowledging that Strickland sets forth the proper standard for ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, the superior court then addressed the merits of the claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise those issues on appeal, stating:

Here, Petitioner has not met his burden to show he was prejudiced by 

his purported ineffective counsel on appeal. Petitioner argues his appellate 

counsel failed to investigate the case thoroughly and failed to raise all 

applicable constitutional issues in the appeal. However, Petitioner has failed 

to show prejudice as a result of any of these perceived inadequacies on the 

part of counsel.

(Lodgment No. 9, In re Chavira, No. HC20860, order at 4.) 

The state appellate court, after finding that “most” of the claims raised on habeas 

were procedurally barred, stated:

To the extent any of Chavira’s claims are not procedurally barred, they 

fail on the merits. His claims asserting illegal police searches of his cell 

phones are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. (In re Reno, supra, 

55 Ca.4th at p. 507; In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 926.) The claims based 

on false testimony, though cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding (Pen. 

Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)), fail because the conflicts in the trial testimony 

Chavira identifies are insufficient by themselves to establish the law 

enforcement officers testified falsely. (In re Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726, 

742-743.) Moreover, even if their testimony was false, Chavira has not 

established it was so significant that there is a reasonable probability it could 

have affected the outcome of his trial. (In re Cox (2001) 30 Cal.4th 974, 

1008.) The evidence of Chavira’s guilt, as summarized in the opinion on 

direct appeal, was overwhelming. The few conflicts in the testimony he 

identifies concern minor points and do not undermine this court’s confidence 

in the outcome of the trial. (Id. at p. 1009.) For similar reasons, Chavira’s 

claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel also 

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fail. A petitioner is not entitled to relief on those grounds unless he shows 

there is a reasonable probability that but for the misconduct or the 

incompetence he would have obtained a better result. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 

839; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.) The evidence of 

Chavira’s guilt introduced at trial was so strong, and the conclusory and 

factually unsupported claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective 

assistance of counsel raised by Chavira are so weak, that he has not shown “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, 

at p. 694.)

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Chavira, No. D067302, order at 2.)

Finally, the state supreme court denied the claims in an order which stated: “Petition 

for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment No. 17, In re Chavira, No. S225372, order 

at 1.)

There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). 

That presumption has not been rebutted here, and the Court will therefore look through the 

silent denial of claims one through seven by the state supreme court to the last reasoned 

state court opinion addressing the claims, the appellate court order, which, as quoted above, 

found that Petitioner had not satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

Thus, in order to be entitled to habeas relief in this Court, Petitioner must show that 

the state appellate court determination that he had failed to show Strickland prejudice is 

objectively unreasonable. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Even if he can make such a showing, 

he must also satisfy the Strickland performance prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (both 

deficient performance and prejudice must be established in order to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel); Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-22 (holding that even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, 

a petitioner must show a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain relief). 

Because the state court denied these claims on the basis of Petitioner’s failure to satisfy the 

Strickland prejudice prong without addressing the performance prong, to the extent the 

performance prong is addressed in this Court, a de novo review is required. See Wiggins 

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v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (reviewing de novo the question whether petitioner 

suffered Strickland prejudice where the state court adjudication of the claim was predicated 

only on the Strickland deficient performance prong).

Petitioner argues in claim one that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

because his appellate counsel failed to challenge the search of his cell phones under Riley 

v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that the search incident to 

arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to a search of the digital 

information in a cell phone, and a warrant is generally required for such a search). (ECF 

No. 1 at 25-32.) He alleges in claim two that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing 

to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of his cell phones on the basis they 

were searched without a valid warrant, or their contents were searched in excess of the 

court order directing their service providers to produce information. (Id. at 33-40.)

Petitioner contends that Detective Dawn Wolf of the San Diego Police Department 

and Detective Brian Meeker of the San Jose Police Department searched his cell phones 

and seized photographs, text messages and contact lists from them without a valid warrant. 

(ECF No. 1 at 25.) Detective Wolf testified that Petitioner and his co-defendant McKnight 

were arrested in Petitioner’s vehicle during a traffic stop shortly after they left room 205 

of the Marina Inn on Pacific Highway. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 491-

92.) Detective Wolf searched the motel room and found items she believed were related 

to the robberies, including a ballistic vest, two black ski masks each paired with a pair of 

batting gloves, a red ski mask paired with a pair of batting gloves, a cell phone, two .22 

caliber Ruber Mark II semiautomatic handguns, one of which appeared on the surveillance 

videos from three of the robberies, 138 one dollar bills, and a receipt for the purchase of 

two five-gallon gasoline cans. (RT 493-504.) The loss report from the Barona Casino 

robbery included a large number of one dollar bills, and the casino was robbed shortly after 

a nearby fire was started with gasoline. (RT 499.) Prior to the search of the motel room, 

Detective Wolf searched Petitioner’s vehicle, which he was driving when he and McKnight 

were arrested, and recovered a black ski mask, a large number of one dollar bills, a key to 

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a white Nissan which had been used in the Barona Casino robbery, and five cell phones, 

four in the center console and one in McKnight’s lap. (RT 518-28.) Two of the cell phones 

from the vehicle with the last four digits 5508 and 0276 belonged to Petitioner; two of the 

cell phones belonged to McKnight, the one found in his lap in the vehicle with the last four 

digits 7907, and the one found in the motel room with the last four digits 6957; and one 

with the last four digits 2473 was registered to David Cilavida, who was never located. 

(RT 524, 534-39, 965-66, 2072-74.) Detective Wolf testified that she wrote warrants as to 

four of the phones found in the car to their service providers, and a warrant for McKnight’s 

phones was prepared by the San Jose Police Department. (RT 538-40.) Detective Brian 

Meeker of the San Jose Police Department testified that he obtained cell phone records 

from the service providers of the 7907 and 6957 phones belonging to McKnight, pursuant 

to a search warrant he wrote. (RT 965-66, 1028-29.) 

Detective Wolf testified that she and other San Diego Police officers manually 

searched the phones, and connected them to a machine with a Cellebrite program which 

allowed her to retrieve data, including contact information and text messages. (RT 538-

39, 2015-16.) In a search of McKnight’s 7907 phone, they found a photograph taken five 

hours after the Leeds & Son robbery of a diamond ring stolen in that robbery. (RT 2016-

17.) Petitioner’s 5508 phone and McKnight’s 7907 phones exchanged numerous text 

messages from April 18 through November 9, 2011, during the time frame of the robberies. 

(RT 2049-52.) Text messages on the 2473 phone appeared to have been exchanged 

between Petitioner and a person named Mark discussing the sale of and the need to “move” 

watches. (RT 2061-64, 2082-85.) The prosecutor later argued to the jury that the text 

messages between Petitioner and McKnight showed they were very close friends and that 

Petitioner was in charge when they planned the Barona Casino robbery, and the text 

messages on the 2473 phone showed Petitioner was trying to sell watches stolen in the

robberies. (RT 2501-04, 2526-33, 2549-50.) Petitioner’s defense counsel, on the other 

hand, argued the text messages implicated McKnight only, and showed that Petitioner was 

not involved in the robberies. (RT 2617-19.) Cell phone tracking data, obtained from the 

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service providers pursuant to a subpoena, placed Petitioner and McKnight at or near the 

scene of several robberies and where the cars were stolen for the robberies. (RT 705-25, 

1549-56, 2116-21, 2514-15, 2520-21.) Defense counsel argued there was no evidence 

Petitioner was in possession of his phone at those times, given that he often lent out his 

phone and there were five phones found in his car when he was arrested. (RT 2619-21.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained 

from his vehicle and motel room on the basis they were seized without a warrant, which 

the prosecutor opposed on the ground that Petitioner was a parolee without a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his vehicle or motel room. (CT 139-54.) During trial, Petitioner’s 

trial counsel moved to suppress the text messages from the 2437 phone discussing the need 

to “move” watches, arguing a lack of foundation as they were found on a phone which was 

not registered to Petitioner. (RT 2022-23.) Both motions were denied. (RT 21, 2025.) 

Petitioner claims that although the detectives obtained search warrants for records 

from the cell phone providers, such as subscriber and tracking data, they did not obtain 

warrants for a search of the digital contents of the phones themselves, such as text 

messages, contact lists and photographs stored on the phone. (ECF No. 1 at 27-30.) 

Although Petitioner states that he does not have a copy of the warrants, he attaches a portion 

of Detective Meeker’s affidavit requesting a court order directing McKnight’s cell phone 

provider to release information, and contends a similar affidavit must have been written by 

Detective Wolf on his phones. (Id. at 202-03.) Detective Meeker’s complete affidavit and 

accompanying court order are in the record. (CT 189-93.)

Petitioner arguesthat the search of his cell phones exceeded the warrants under Riley 

v. California, which was decided two weeks after the California Supreme Court denied his 

petition for review, and which recognized that the search incident to arrest exception to the 

warrant requirement generally does not apply to a search of the digital information in a cell 

phone. (ECF No. 1 at 25, 31.) He alleges in claims one and two that because there is no 

evidence in the record the detectives obtained warrants to search the contents of his phones, 

his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim 

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challenging those searches. He claims he was prejudiced by that failure because “at least 

two jurors stated that if not for the cell phone evidence, they would have acquitted 

[Petitioner] on all charges according to defense counsel Armstrong,” and that they “would 

have acquitted Petitioner were it not for the text messages.” (Id. at 37, 67.) 

Petitioner attaches to the Petition a letter from his appellate counsel dated July 14, 

2014, about one month after the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review 

on direct appeal on June 11, 2014, in which appellate counsel stated:

In regard to the cases that you mentioned in your recent letter, Riley v. 

California and U.S. v. Wurie [which were consolidated in the Supreme Court 

in Riley v. California decided on June 25, 2014], which dealt with the use of 

evidence obtained from a warrantless search of cell phones, I have read those 

cases and, in the context of the facts in your case, I am afraid those new cases 

are not that helpful to you. The most damaging cell phone evidence in your 

case were call records obtained from the cell phone providers pursuant to 

subpoenas duces tecum issued by the trial court. The records were properly 

obtained through the subpoena process and are not subject to the warrant 

requirement established by the Riley and Wurie cases. Those records 

established that your co-defendant and you were in telephone contact during 

the crucial time periods and that you were in close physical proximity to the 

particular crime scenes near the time of the robberies. In Riley and Wurie, 

the cell phone evidence consisted of inculpatory photos, messages, and videos 

obtained directly from the cell phones by the police, without warrant or 

subpoena. The only evidence obtained directly from your cell phone were 

some text messages related to the possible sale of some watches. It is my 

opinion that although the text messages were somewhat damaging to your 

defense, it is unlikely that suppression of the evidence would have resulted in 

a more favorable verdict, particularly in light of the evidence against you.

(Id. at 205-06.) 

In light of the opinion of Petitioner’s appellate counsel, which, as discussed below 

in the prejudice section is well supported by the record, and in light of the fact that trial 

counsel tried and failed to suppress the evidence obtained from Petitioner’s cell phones on 

the grounds they were seized without a warrant, even if Petitioner could support his 

allegation that the search of his cell phone was conducted without a warrant or exceeded 

the subpoenas issued to the service providers, he has failed to overcome the strong 

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presumption that his appellate counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to raise a 

claim challenging the search of the phones. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003) (recognizing a strong presumption that counsel took actions “for tactical reasons 

rather than through sheer neglect”), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (holding that counsel 

is “strongly presumed” to make decisions in the exercise of professional judgment); Burt 

v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (“[T]he absence of evidence cannot 

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Miller, 

882 F.2d at 1434 (“In many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because 

she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of 

weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 

advocacy.”) Based on a de novo review, Petitioner has failed to establish deficient 

performance by his appellate counsel with respect to claims one and two. 

Even assuming Petitioner could show that his phones were searched without a valid 

warrant, and that his appellate counsel erred in failing to challenge the searches, habeas 

relief is unavailable because it is clear that Petitioner has failed to establish that the state 

court adjudication of the Strickland prejudice prong is objectively unreasonable. Although 

Petitioner alleges in his verified Petition that his trial counsel said that at least two jurors 

told trial counsel they would have acquitted Petitioner but for the text messages obtained 

from his cell phones, he provides no support for that self-serving declaration, which in any 

case would not support a challenge to the jury verdict in this Court. See Warger v. Shauers, 

574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 521, 527 (2014) (holding that statements by a juror, with 

exceptions only for extraneous information, outside influence, and mistakes in entering the 

verdict, are precluded from consideration in a hearing into the validity of a verdict); Clark 

v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 18 (1933) (“[T]he testimony of a juror is not admissible for 

the impeachment of his verdict.”) 

Rather, as the state court correctly observed: “The evidence of Chavira’s guilt 

introduced at trial was so strong, and the conclusory and factually unsupported claims of 

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prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Chavira are so 

weak, that he has not shown ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’” (Lodgment No. 13, In re Chavira, No. D067302, order at 2, quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice requires a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different absent the error, that is, “a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.”)) For the following reasons, it is clear that the determination

by the state court in that regard is objectively reasonable. 

Petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop driving his car, and inside the car was a 

black ski mask similar to the ones used in the robberies and a large number of one dollar 

bills (RT 519, 1913-14), as well as the keys to a Nissan Maxima parked two blocks from 

Petitioner’s residence which had been used in the Barona Casino robbery (RT 525-28), and

the ignition cylinder of the stolen Honda used in the Leeds & Son robbery (RT 1523-33, 

1921-22). The loss report from the Barona Casino robbery included a large number of one 

dollar bills. (RT 499.) The search of Petitioner’s motel room revealed two semiautomatic 

handguns, one of which was distinctive and appeared from surveillance videos to have 

been used in the robberies, along with black ski masks and gloves of the type used in the 

robberies (RT 494-97), 138 one dollar bills (RT 499), and a receipt for a lighter and two 

five-gallon gas cans (RT 502-03). A search of two apartments leased to Petitioner revealed 

a $60,000 diamond stolen in the Leeds & Son robbery, as well as diamond chips (RT 1939-

44), four of the rifles stolen in the Turner’s Outdoorsman robbery with the price tags still 

on them (RT 1108-11, 1948-49, 1957-58, 2049), 137 Rolex watches and 20 Tissot watches

(RT 1659-61), and assorted jewelry, some of which was stolen in the Leeds & Son robbery 

(RT 1962). Numerous Rolex and Tissot watches were stolen in the Leeds & Son and Ben 

Bridge robberies. (RT 294, 304-05, 935-37, 1397-98.) 

In addition to the evidence Petitioner was in possession of spoils from the crimes 

and equipment used to commit them, forensic evidence connected him to the crimes. His 

DNA was on the ski mask found on the ground just in front of the stolen Honda used in the 

Watch Connection robbery (RT 151-52, 176-91), on the steering wheel of the Honda used 

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in the Leeds & Son robbery (RT 1309-16, 1600-14, 2594-96), and on the ski masks and 

gloves recovered from his motel room following the Barona Casino robbery (RT 560-68). 

Petitioner’s fingerprint was found on an ammunition box in the Ford Explorer used in the 

Barona Casino robbery, which contained the same caliber ammunition found on the floor 

after the robbery (RT 1685-89, 1704-13, 2125), and gunshot residue was found on his hand

when he was arrested (RT 833-34).

In light of the strong evidence of Petitioner’s involvement in the crimes, it is clear 

that the evidence obtained from a search of the phones, which consisted of a photograph of 

a ring from McKnight’s phone, text messages between Petitioner and McKnight showing 

they were in communication with each other during the several months the robberies took 

place, and text messages from Petitioner to an unknown individual indicating a need to 

move watches, even if improperly admitted, was not of the quality to show “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of his trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. Although the evidence that he and McKnight were in telephonic contact during the 

time period of the robberies tended to undermine McKnight’s trial testimony that Petitioner

was not involved in the crimes, it was overshadowed by evidence that Petitioner and 

McKnight were arrested together in a vehicle containing evidence of the robberies after 

leaving a motel room together also containing evidence of the robberies. And although the 

text messages stating Petitioner needed to “move” watches was certainly incriminating, it 

too was overshadowed by the more than 150 expensive stolen watches recovered from his 

apartment. In light of that evidence, as well as the forensic evidence and evidence of other

stolen property found in Petitioner’s apartment, it was objectively reasonable for the state 

court to find that Petitioner had failed to show a reasonable probability of a more favorable 

outcome had his appellate counsel raised a claim challenging the search of his cell phones. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice requires “a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.”) The adjudication of claims one and two is therefore neither 

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (“The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are 

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both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.”); 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (these standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state 

court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”). Neither is there any basis to find that 

the state court adjudication was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. 

Habeas relief is denied as to claims one and two.

In claims three and four Petitioner alleges his appellate counsel should have raised 

claims on appeal alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in failing to move to 

suppress evidence obtained from the cell phones (claim three), and failing to challenge the 

cell phone search and telephone provider subpoenas (claim four). (ECF No. 1 at 41-60.) 

As set forth above, Petitioner’s trial counsel did in fact seek to have the text messages 

regarding moving watches suppressed on the basis that there was an insufficient foundation 

to show Petitioner sent or received them, as they were found on a phone which was not 

registered to him, and counsel sought to have all the evidence seized from Petitioner’s

vehicle and motel room suppressed, including the phones, on the basis they were seized 

without a warrant. For the reasons discussed above, even assuming trial counsel should 

have also argued that the search of the contents of the phones exceeded the scope of the 

subpoenas issued to obtain service provider records, or were searched without warrants, 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome

had that evidence been excluded. See Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (holding that where “trial counsel’s performance, although not error-free, did 

not fall below the Strickland standard,” no prejudice arose from appellate counsel’s failure 

to challenge trial counsel’s performance on appeal). It was objectively reasonable for the 

state court to find no prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to raise a claim on 

appeal challenging trial counsel’s challenges to the cell phone searches. See Woods v. 

Etherton, 576 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152-53 (2016) (finding no Strickland prejudice 

arising from appellate counsel’s failure to raise claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel where there was no Strickland prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged error). 

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Thus, for the same reasons discussed in claims one and two, Petitioner has not overcome 

the strong presumption that appellate counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to forego 

raising claims alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the search of the 

cell phones, and has failed to show it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to 

find he had not been prejudiced as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to raise these 

claims. Habeas relief is denied as to claims three and four.

Petitioner alleges in claims five and six that his appellate counsel was ineffective in 

failing to raise a claim on appeal alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: 

(a) thoroughly examine the search warrant obtained by Detective Meeker in order to 

determine if it could be attacked as failing to include permission to search the contents of 

the phone itself rather than merely obtaining the telephone provider records; (b) object to 

the testimony of Investigator Lopez at trial regarding when he logged in DNA evidence,

which Petitioner contends amounts to perjury because it differed from Lopez’s preliminary 

hearing testimony; (c) object to the preliminary hearing testimony of Detective Meeker as 

to who checked McKnight in at the Hampton Inn motel, which Petitioner contends amounts 

to perjury because the motel clerk testified someone else checked in McKnight; (d) seek a 

mistrial based on that perjured testimony; (e) challenge as unduly suggestive the 

photographic identification by the motel clerk of Petitioner as the man accompanying 

McKnight; (f) interview any witnesses or conduct any investigation, and rather than 

develop a trial strategy that would subject the prosecution’s evidence to meaningful 

adversarial testing, merely told Petitioner that his trial strategy would be to “pok[e] holes 

in their story”; and (g) object to the admission of a photograph of Tony Montana, aka 

Scarface, killing people with an assault rifle, which the prosecutor used during closing 

argument to argue McKnight was protecting Petitioner. (Id. at 61-88.) 

Petitioner’s repeated claims that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing to 

object to trial counsel’s failure to challenge the admission of the cell phone records do not 

support habeas relief for the reasons set forth above. With respect to the minor 

inconsistencies in the trial testimony which Petitioner contends amounts to perjury, the 

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state appellate court, as set forth above, prior to finding that Petitioner had not established 

Strickland prejudice, stated:

The claims based on false testimony, though cognizable in a habeas 

corpus proceeding (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)), fail because the conflicts 

in the trial testimony Chavira identifies are insufficient by themselves to 

establish the law enforcement officers testified falsely. (In re Roberts (2003) 

29 Cal.4th 726, 742-743.) Moreover, even if their testimony was false, 

Chavira has not established it was so significant that there is a reasonable 

probability it could have affected the outcome of his trial. (In re Cox (2001) 

30 Cal.4th 974, 1008.) The evidence of Chavira’s guilt, as summarized in the 

opinion on direct appeal, was overwhelming. The few conflicts in the 

testimony he identifies concern minor points and do not undermine this 

court’s confidence in the outcome of the trial. (Id. at p. 1009.)

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Chavira, No. D067302, order at 2.)

Petitioner contends that Detective Meeker testified at the preliminary hearing that 

Rajvomder Ghag told him she checked McKnight into the Hampton Inn the night before 

the Ben Bridge Jewelry store was robbed on October 15, 2011, which is about a twenty 

minute drive away from the motel (RT 815), but that Meeker perjured himself because 

Ghag testified at trial that McKnight was checked in by her coworker Jessica Ebbers. (ECF 

No. 1 at 64.) Jessica Ebbers testified at trial that she was working at the front desk of the 

Hampton Inn on October 14, 2011, when McKnight checked in. (RT 819.) Ebbers said

she had an extensive conversation with McKnight when he checked in, lasting about fifteen 

minutes, but did not remember seeing him when he checked out. (RT 819-20, 826.) 

Rajvomder Ghag testified at trial that she was working as the manager of the hotel that 

night, but that Ebbers checked in McKnight. (RT 809-16.) Petitioner claims that Detective 

Meeker committed perjury because he testified at the preliminary hearing that Ebbers told 

him that she had an extensive conversation with McKnight when he checked out, rather 

than when he checked in as Ebbers testified to at trial, and when he said Ghag told him she 

checked McKnight in when Ebbers testified at trial that she checked him in. (ECF No. 1 

at 64.) Petitioner fails to explain how minor errors in the preliminary hearing testimony, 

which were corrected at trial, amounted to perjury, or in any way affected his trial. 

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Petitioner contends that prosecution investigator Ernest Lopez committed perjury 

when he testified at trial that he transported DNA swabs from the San Bernardino Sheriff’s 

Crime Lab on November 10, 2011, because DNA analyst Jennifer Steel testified that she 

received those items on November 15, 2011, five days later. (ECF No. 1 at 78.) However, 

Investigator Lopez testified at trial that he transported DNA swabs on November 10, 2011

and November 14, 2011, and placed them in an evidence locker. (RT 1468, 1471.) Jennifer 

Steel testified that she first received the DNA evidence on November 15, 2011, but did not 

testify that she personally received it from Lopez, as opposed to having received it from 

the evidence locker where it had been deposited by Lopez. (RT 1601.) Petitioner contends 

Lopez testified in grand jury proceedings that he did not log in any DNA samples before 

November 15, 2011, which he contends supports McKnight’s testimony that he thought 

the Riverside County police detectives must have planted his DNA. (ECF No. 1 at 78-80.) 

However, Petitioner has failed to show any discrepancy in the trial testimony which would 

amount to perjury, and has failed to show a reasonable probability that his trial was affected

in any way. Thus, the state court adjudication of the claim that appellate counsel failed to 

challenge that testimony, or raise an appellate claim based on trial counsel’s failure to 

request a mistrial based on that testimony, on the basis that such minor discrepancies do 

not establish either perjury or prejudice, is objectively reasonable.

Petitioner next contends that his appellate counsel should have raised a claim 

alleging trial counsel failed to object to the photographic identification by Jessica Ebbers. 

(ECF No. 1 at 65.) Ebbers testified that McKnight was with another man when he checked 

in to the Hampton Inn. (RT 820-21.) She said Detective Meeker came to the motel at 

some point and showed her a photograph of McKnight, which she identified, and then 

showed her a photograph of Petitioner, which she identified as the man with McKnight. 

(RT 821-22.) At trial the prosecutor showed Ebbers a photograph of Petitioner, which she 

said was a photograph of the man with McKnight that night, but when asked if it was the 

same photograph Detective Meeker had previously showed her, she replied: “I think it’s a 

different photo than the one that he showed me, but it was kind of a long time ago.” (RT 

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823-24.) Ebbers was unable to identify Petitioner in court at trial as the man who 

accompanied McKnight. (RT 825.) 

Petitioner contends counsel should have challenged the identification, but does not 

explain what challenge was available other than that it was “subjective.” (ECF No. 1 at 

65, 70.) Because Petitioner does not allege any infirmity in the identification procedure at 

the motel, and because Ebbers could not identify Petitioner at trial, this claim does not 

provide a basis for habeas relief. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)

(holding that “convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial 

identification by photograph will be set aside . . . only if the photographic identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood 

of irreparable misidentification”). 

Petitioner next contends that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a 

claim based on trial counsel’s failure to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation and 

develop a reasonable trial strategy. (ECF No. 1 at 66.) Petitioner states that when he asked 

his trial counsel what his trial strategy was, counsel replied he would be “poking holes in 

their story,” which Petitioner contends is an insufficient trial strategy. (Id. at 68-69.) 

However, because Petitioner does not allege any facts which, if true, would demonstrate a 

reasonable possibility of a different outcome had his appellate counsel raised a claim 

challenging his trial counsel’s failure to develop a trial strategy or conduct a pretrial 

investigation, he has failed to show that the state court adjudication of this claim, on that 

basis, is objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner next contends appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim 

alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview witnesses, although he only 

identifies counsel’s failure to interview Jessica Ebbers regarding her identification. (ECF 

No. 1 at 66.) Petitioner does not explain how interviewing Ebbers could have assisted the 

defense, particularly since she was unable to identify him in court as the man who was with 

McKnight at the Hampton Inn on October 14, 2011, the day before the robbery of the 

nearby Ben Bridge Jewelry store. In any case, her identification was cumulative to cell 

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phone provider evidence obtained pursuant to a subpoena which placed Petitioner and 

McKnight in the area of the Hampton Inn that night and the next morning. (RT 711-20.)

Finally, Petitioner alleges in claim seven that his appellate counsel should have

raised a claim alleging the prosecutor committed misconduct when she misstated the law 

and evidence, took on investigatory functions, coached witnesses, commented on 

Petitioner’s failure to testify, asked leading questions, suborned perjury, allowed a witness 

to infer Petitioner was on probation, and showed the jury a photograph of Tony Montana, 

aka Scarface, killing people with an assault rifle. (ECF No. 1 at 71, 89-118.) 

In order to rise to the level of a federal due process violation, prosecutorial 

misconduct must be “‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s 

right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The alleged misconduct must be reviewed in the context 

of the entire trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). “The relevant 

question is whether the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to 

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 

744 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner first contends the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. The 

prosecutor, during closing argument, in response to defense counsel’s argument that there 

was no evidence Petitioner was using his cell phone when the provider records showed he 

was in the area of the robberies, and that it may have been used by Adrian Ramos who was 

also a suspect in the robberies, stated: “But if Adrian Ramos was using Mr. Chavira’s phone 

and talking to Mr. Chavira’s girlfriend and his children, why did they not testify that they 

were talking to Mr. Ramos?” (RT 2649.) That was a comment on the failure of the defense 

to call those other witnesses to support the defense argument that Petitioner had lent out

his phone, not a comment on Petitioner’s failure to so testify.

Petitioner contends the prosecutor misstated the law on reasonable doubt when she 

stated during closing argument: “And I will keep hammering ‘reasonable’ because that’s 

what our burden is. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt because everything in life is open to 

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some speculation or conjecture. You can’t do that. You have to reply [sic] upon the 

evidence in this case. And beyond a reasonable doubt simply means that guilty is the only 

reasonable interpretation of the evidence while innocence is not.” (RT 2637.) Petitioner 

has not shown this comment amounted to misconduct, misled the jury, or lowered the 

burden of proof. As discussed below in claim ten, the jury was correctly instructed 

regarding reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor and defense counsel repeatedly reminded 

the jury of the prosecution’s burden of proof as to every element of each offense.

Petitioner contends the prosecutor, during trial, allowed a witness to testify that a 

probation officer was involved in Petitioner’s arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 92-93.) Officer Walb 

testified that he was a San Diego Police Officer assigned to the gang suppression team and 

was called by the robbery division to assist in arresting Petitioner after his vehicle had been 

stopped by other officers. (RT 482-83.) Officer Walb testified that: “It was a high-risk 

vehicle stop and myself and my partner, probation officer Barnum,” responded to the scene. 

(RT 483.) The defense made a motion for mistrial on the basis that allowing Walb to 

mention the presence of a probation officer violated a pretrial order not to mention that 

Petitioner was on parole when he was arrested. (RT 504-05.) The trial judge denied the 

motion on the basis that: “There is nothing even close to the conclusion to be reached that 

either of the defendants were on probation. The fact that a probation officer may have been 

with a police officer at the time they were doing a stop doesn’t mean they were stopping a 

probationer,” and even offered to so instruct the jury. (RT 505.) Petitioner has not alleged 

misconduct by the prosecutor in failing to prevent the witness from mentioning that his 

partner was a probation officer, and has not shown it was “of sufficient significance to 

result in the denial of [his] right to a fair trial.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765.

Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when, during closing 

argument, she referenced text messages authored by McKnight and sent to Petitioner 

stating that Petitioner reminded McKnight of Tony Montana, aka Scarface. (RT 2529-30, 

2558.) The prosecutor argued that the jury could draw a reasonable inference from those 

texts that McKnight saw Petitioner as a gangster like Montana and wanted to work for him, 

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and that Petitioner was the brains of their criminal enterprise, which also undermined 

McKnight’s testimony that Petitioner was not involved in the crimes. (Id.) Petitioner has 

not shown misconduct by the prosecutor in referencing McKnight’s own comparison of 

Petitioner to Tony Montana, or in arguing the jury could draw reasonable inferences from 

that evidence. See Borg, 139 F.3d at 744 (“The relevant question is whether the 

prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.”).

Petitioner contends the prosecutor created a chart to explain to the jury the DNA 

evidence, thereby taking on investigative functions, misstated a penal code section to the 

trial judge, asked leading questions, coached witnesses, and misstated the DNA evidence 

(ECF No. 1 at 93-96, 107-15), but does not explain how these actions amounted to 

misconduct or, even if they did, how they affected his trial. His contention the prosecutor 

allowed Lopez and Meeker to commit perjury (id. at 97-98, 116-17), is without merit for

the reasons discussed above. Finally, his claim that appellate counsel failed to conduct a 

meaningful investigation by failing to identify all of the alleged trial errors (id. at 118), is 

without merit because the underlying claims are without merit. See Miller, 882 F.2d at

1434 (“In many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees 

little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is 

widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.”); Baumann, 

692 F.2d at 572 (stating that an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless legal argument does 

not constitute ineffective assistance). Habeas relief is denied as to claim seven.

In sum, with respect to claims one through seven, Petitioner has not shown his

appellate counsel was deficient, and has failed to show that the state court adjudication of 

these claims, on the basis of a lack of prejudice, is either contrary to, or involves an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high 

bar is never an easy task.”); Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (“The standards created by Strickland

and section 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review 

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is ‘doubly’ so.”); Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (these standards are “difficult to meet” and 

“demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”). Habeas relief is 

denied as to clams one though seven.

2. Claims Nine and Ten

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to 

counsel’s failure to raise claims alleging that one of the two prior strike convictions used 

to enhance his sentence is invalid (claim nine), and alleges error in the reasonable doubt 

jury instruction (claim ten). (ECF No. 1 at 132-55.) Respondent answers that habeas relief 

cannot be granted as to these claims because Petitioner failed to present them to any state 

court, but they should be denied notwithstanding that failure because they are without 

merit. (Ans. Mem. at 7-8.) After the Answer was filed, Petitioner submitted these claims 

to the state supreme court in a habeas petition, which was denied with an order which 

stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 770, 780 (courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are untimely); In re 

Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that 

are successive).)” (ECF No. 20 at 57, In re Chavira, No. S237668, order at 1.)

Although Respondent has not had the opportunity to address whether claims nine 

and ten are untimely and procedurally defaulted, which they likely are, the Court has the 

discretion to deny them without regard to any procedural infirmities if they are clearly 

without merit. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that “it may well make sense in some 

instances to proceed to the merits [rather than address procedural bars] if the result will be 

the same.” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232, citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be 

resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.”); see also Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 390 

(holding that irrespective of whether AEDPA deference applies, a federal habeas court may 

conduct a de novo review to deny a petition but not to grant one).

Petitioner alleges in claim nine that his appellate counsel should have raised a claim 

on appeal challenging the use of his prior conviction for witness intimidation to enhance 

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his sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 134.) He claims that his guilty plea in the prior conviction 

was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he would not have pled guilty 

but for the fact that his attorney advised him that it could not be used as a strike in a future 

case. (Id.) His trial counsel in this case filed a pretrial motion to preclude the use of that 

conviction as a strike on that basis. (CT 48-86.) Petitioner contends the trial judge denied 

the motion to dismiss, even though the judge felt it had merit, because only the court of 

appeal was in a position to grant relief, and therefore his appellate counsel was deficient in 

seeking such relief on appeal. (ECF No. 1 at 134.) Respondent answers that trial courts in 

California are not required to advise defendants of such potential, indirect consequences of 

guilty pleas, and that in any case the change of plea colloquy in the prior conviction 

indicates Petitioner knew it could be used as a strike in the future, and appellate counsel 

cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. (Ans. Mem. at 8.)

The change of plea form for Petitioner’s prior conviction is in the record (CT 64-

66), along with the transcript of the change of plea hearing (CT 68-84), as exhibits to his 

pretrial motion to preclude its use as a strike. Rather than containing Petitioner’s initials 

like the other boxes on the change of plea form, there is an X in the box next to the 

statement: “I understand that my conviction in this case will be a serious/violent felony 

(‘strike’) resulting in mandatory denial of probation and substantially increased penalties 

in any future felony case.” (CT 65.) However, Petitioner did initial the box indicating that 

his attorney had explained to him that one of the possible consequences of his guilty plea 

may be that the conviction is “Priorable (increased punishment for future offenses),” and 

that he would be subject to: “Reduced conduct credits a. Violent Felony (No credit or max. 

15%) b. Prior Strike(s) (No credit to Max. 20%).” (Id.) And at the change of plea hearing 

Petitioner was asked: “There would be increased penalties in the future if you’re not lawabiding. And because of the strike, it will amplify the punishment, and you’ll get no goodtime credits. You understand that?”; to which he responded: “Yes, sir.” (CT 74.)

Respondent is correct that under California law a criminal defendant pleading guilty 

is not required to be advised that the offense might be used in a subsequent criminal 

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proceeding to enhance his sentence. People v. Crosby, 3 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1356 (1992). 

However, Petitioner argued in the motion to dismiss that the attorney who represented him

at the guilty plea in the prior conviction rendered ineffective assistance in preparing the 

conflicting change of plea form and erroneously advising him that the conviction would 

not constitute a strike in the future, and stated that he and his prior counsel were prepared 

to so testify at an evidentiary hearing. (CT 50-54.) The trial judge stated that the record

appeared to indicate that everyone involved in the prior proceeding was operating “under 

the impression that there was no strike,” and said he would be inclined to grant the motion 

to dismiss but for the fact that his hands were tied by the California Supreme Court’s 

decision in Garcia v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 953, 966 (1997), which held: “In sum, we 

conclude that a defendant whose sentence for a noncapital offense is subject to 

enhancement because of a prior conviction may not employ the current prosecution as a 

forum for challenging the validity of the prior conviction based upon alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding.” (RT 1-9.) The trial judge rejected the same 

argument in a post-trial motion to strike the strike in the exercise of discretion, finding that 

Petitioner had just been convicted of 24 new strikes and was a career criminal before the 

instant offenses, and clearly fell within the spirit of the three strikes law. (RT 2751-58.)

There is no state court decision on the merits of this claim, as it was denied on the 

procedural grounds that it was presented in an untimely and successive habeas petition. 

However, the claim fails under a de novo review. Petitioner is unable to demonstrate 

deficient performance arising from his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the denial 

of the motion to dismiss his prior conviction because, as the trial judge correctly observed,

the California Supreme Court, following the United States Supreme Court, prohibits

challenges to a prior conviction in a current criminal prosecution based on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior conviction. Garcia, 14 Cal.4th at 963-66, 

discussing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) (holding that principles of 

finality associated with habeas corpus actions apply when a defendant seeks to attack, on 

the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence, 

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and those principles bear “extra weight” when the prior conviction was obtained as a result 

of a guilty plea). Petitioner is not able to collaterally challenge his prior conviction in this 

Court in a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lackawanna County 

District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001) (“[O]nce a state conviction is no 

longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to 

pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so

unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction 

is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the 

enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction 

was unconstitutionally obtained.”) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court 

has “recognized only one exception to the rule that collateral attacks are off-limits, and that 

was for challenges to state convictions alleged obtained in violation of the right to 

appointed counsel.” Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 303 (2005). However, in 

addition to the exception for a failure to appoint counsel, which does not apply here, a 

plurality of the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions where the state court “without 

justification, refuse[s] to rule on a constitutional claim that has been properly presented to 

it,” or where a petitioner has obtained “compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of 

the crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely

manner.” Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 

(2002) (same as to habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). For the following 

reasons, neither of those exceptions apply.

State law obligated Petitioner to challenge the prior conviction in a habeas petition

if he wished to challenge it at all. See Garcia, 14 Cal.4th at 966 (holding that a defendant 

“may not employ the current prosecution as a forum for challenging the validity of the prior 

conviction based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding,” 

but observing that “[i]f a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction in [a court 

of appropriate jurisdiction], and that conviction is vacated or set aside, however, the 

conviction no longer constitutes a proper basis for increased punishment for a subsequent 

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offense under a recidivist offender sentencing statute. A defendant according may obtain 

a reduction of a sentence that was imposed on the basis of that prior invalid conviction.”),

citing Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 12 Cal.4th 278, 284 (1995) (recognizing

that a criminal defendant can challenge the validity of the use of the prior conviction to 

enhance his sentence in “a habeas petition after the increased sentence has been imposed.”); 

People v. Goodrum, 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 400 n.4 (1991) (recognizing that challenges to 

guilty pleas based on fraud or duress by the prosecutor or judge are styled as a petition for 

a writ of error coram nobis, whereas “[o]bviously, if a defendant enters a plea based on the 

erroneous advice of counsel without judicial or prosecutorial involvement, the sole 

postappeal remedy would be a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel.”). The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel on state collateral review, even 

where state collateral review provides the only opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2012). Thus, Petitioner is unable 

to proceed with a claim in this Court alleging that his federal constitutional rights were 

violated by his appellate counsel’s failure to collaterally challenge the prior conviction. 

Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, 

or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State 

collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding 

arising under section 2254.”)

Accordingly, claim nine, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in 

failing to challenge the validity of the use of Petitioner’s prior conviction to enhance his

sentence, does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief because appellate counsel was 

precluded by state law from challenging the prior conviction on direct appeal, and 

Petitioner cannot rely on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to collaterally 

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attack the prior conviction. In addition, he has not established an exception under 

Lackawanna to the prohibition of attacking the validity of his prior conviction in this Court.

Based on a de novo review, habeas relief is denied as to claim nine.

Petitioner alleges in claim ten that his appellate counsel should have raised a claim 

on appeal directly challenging the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at his trial, or 

should have raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to challenge 

the instruction. (ECF No. 1 at 139-55.) He contends the instruction omitted the phrase 

“each element” from the requirement the prosecution must prove each element beyond a 

reasonable doubt, thereby lowering the burden of proof, which he contends is particularly 

problematic here because the evidence against him is entirely circumstantial. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that because the instruction was a correct statement of law, and 

because any error would likely have been found to be harmless, appellate counsel could 

reasonably have decided not to raise such a claim. (Ans. Mem. at 9.)

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Constitution requires the 

jury be instructed that the defendant’s guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979). In order to prevail on a claim alleging 

a defective reasonable doubt instruction, a petitioner must show there is a reasonable 

likelihood the jury understood the instructions to allow them to convict based on proof 

insufficient to meet the Winship standard. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); 

Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999). Any such instructional error is 

subject to harmless error review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 

508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).

The California courts have rejected the same challenge Petitioner presents here. 

People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423, 430 (1952); People v. Orchard, 17 Cal.App.3d 568, 576-77 

(1971). Thus, Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the 

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instruction on appeal, and Petitioner was not prejudiced by that failure, because the 

appellate court would have been bound by precedent to deny the claim.

It is also clear Petitioner has not established prejudice as a result of his appellate 

counsel’s failure to allege his trial counsel failed to challenge the instruction, because there 

is no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had such a claim been raised. 

Assuming it was error to omit the phrase “every element” in the instruction, it would have 

been futile to challenge the instruction on that basis because such an error is clearly 

harmless. In applying harmless error review, a federal habeas court must examine whether

the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). “Under this standard, an error 

is harmless unless the ‘record review leaves the conscientious judge in grave doubt about 

the likely effect of an error . . . (i.e.,) that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly 

balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.’” 

Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 

513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995) and citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) 

(“[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without 

stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially 

swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”)

The prosecutor told the jury during closing argument that “you have to find beyond 

a reasonable doubt that all the elements have been met.” (RT 2489.) Petitioner’s trial 

counsel told the jury during closing argument: “Remember that the prosecution must prove 

to you each and every element of each and every crime or charge beyond a reasonable 

doubt in order for you to reach a guilty verdict on any particular count.” (RT 2570.) 

Defense counsel later referenced the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case, and 

argued the prosecution has “to prove each and every element of each crime to find anybody 

guilty, and we get to what I think is if not the most important jury instruction, as least one 

of them, and it’s called CALCRIM 220. It’s the reasonable doubt instruction.” (Id.) 

Defense counsel later reminded the jury again of that requirement when he said: “Now, I 

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would ask that you hold the prosecution to task, again, in their burden of proof on all these 

elements of robbery from all of the robbery locations.” (RT 2627.) The prosecutor, in 

rebuttal, told the jury that: “The People have the burden in this case, absolutely. Our burden 

is to prove every count and every element of every count beyond a reasonable doubt. This 

is absolutely our burden.” (RT 2649.) There is no doubt whatsoever, much less a grave 

doubt, that the absence of the phrase “every element” in the reasonable doubt instruction 

did not “ha[ve] a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 623. 

Accordingly, the Court denies habeas relief as to claim ten because, based on a de 

novo review, Petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice as a result 

of his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the reasonable doubt instruction, or raise a 

claim that trial counsel erred in failing to challenge the instruction. 

3. Claim Eight 

Petitioner alleges in claims eight and eleven that the California Superior Court’s 

denied his state habeas claims as procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct 

appeal. ECF No. 1 at 120, 157. Petitioner alleges that this decision was erroneous because

his claims fall into the an exception to the rule barring petitioners from asserting claims not 

raised on appeal that applies to claims that were not raised on appeal due to ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. ECF No. 1 at 120 (citing In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 402 

(1993), as modified (Sept. 30, 1993)). 

Under California law, “an unjustified failure to present an issue on appeal will 

generally preclude its consideration in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus.” In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391 at 398. Failure of appellate counsel to raise an issue 

on appeal does not justify the failure to present that issue on appeal, and therefore does not 

allow a petitioner to present that issue in a habeas petition. Id. at 401. Rather, appellate 

counsel’s failure to present an issue on appeal can be addressed through a habeas petition 

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alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.2 Id. Consequently, the Superior Court correctly 

concluded that Petitioner’s habeas claims were procedurally barred because they were not 

raised on appeal; Petitioner has not identified an error in the Superior Court’s application 

of California’s procedural rules. Petitioner also does not contend that the procedural rules 

violate the Due Process Clause. Habeas relief is denied as to claim eight. See e.g.

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72 (holding that to merit federal habeas relief based on an error of 

state law, the petitioner must show that the error, considered in the context of the record as 

a whole, so infected the entire proceedings that the conviction violated due process). 

4. Claim Twelve

Petitioner alleges in claim twelve that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to 

support the false imprisonment convictions as to counts 15, 20 and 21, involving the Leeds 

& Son Jewelry robbery. (ECF No. 1 at 165.) He claims that the three victims in those 

counts were employees who hid in the back of the store during the robbery, and because 

the robbers did not know these victims were there and did not show any interest in the back 

of the store, they could not have had the intent to violate their personal liberty as required 

to support a false imprisonment conviction. (Id. at 186-88.) Respondent answers that the 

denial of this claim by the state court is objectively reasonable. (Ans. Mem. at 9-11.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review 

which was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) It 

was presented to the appellate court on direct appeal and denied in a written opinion. 

(Lodgment Nos. 3, 5.) The Court will look through the silent denial of this claim by the 

state supreme court to the appellate court opinion on direct appeal, which stated:

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three 

of the convictions for false imprisonment arising out of the robbery at Leeds 

& Son (counts 15, 20, & 21). Specifically, defendants argue that because the 

victims hid in a back office during the robbery, defendants could not have 

known of the victims’ existence and therefore could not have intended to 

 

2 Petitioner’s claim eleven seeks habeas relief based on his appellate counsel’s failure to raise issues 

on direct appeal. See Part III.C.4, infra. 

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restrict their personal liberty. After setting forth additional background and 

the applicable standard of review, we shall analyze this argument.

/ / /

1. Additional Background

Darlene Bingham, Christine Stein, and Kim Fuerst were working at 

Leeds & Son when defendants robbed the store. While Bingham and Stein 

were in the back office and Fuerst was on the sales floor, three armed men 

wearing ski masks and body armor entered the store, ordered all present to get 

on the floor and not move, and threatened to shoot them if they did not 

comply. Fuerst heard a security guard shout a code word indicating trouble, 

saw one of the masked men holding “a big gun,” and then ran to the back 

office. Stein heard loud noises, glanced at a video surveillance monitor of the 

sales floor, saw people moving about quickly, and suspected the store was 

being robbed. After Fuerst ran to the back office, Bingham or Stein closed 

the vault, and secured the office door, and all three hid under a desk until 

police arrived a few minutes later. While they were hiding in the back office, 

Bingham, Stein, and Fuerst were “scared” and did not feel free to leave the 

office.

Based in part on these facts, the People charged defendants with false 

imprisonment of Bingham (count 15), Stein (count 20) and Fuerst (count 21) 

by means of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a).) The 

jury returned guilty verdicts against both defendants on each count.

2. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must 

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citation.) We neither 

reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Citation.)

We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury 

reasonably could deduce from the evidence. (Citation.) If the circumstances 

reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the 

judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also 

reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 

50 Cal.4th 616, 638–639.

3. Legal Analysis

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To establish the false imprisonment offenses charged in counts 15, 20, 

and 21, the People had to present evidence that defendants committed an 

“unlawful violation of the personal liberty of” Bingham, Stein, and Fuerst by 

means of “violence, menace, fraud, or deceit.” (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a).) 

“(T)he essential element of false imprisonment is restraint of the person. Any 

exercise of express or implied force which compels another person to remain 

where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go, is 

false imprisonment.” (People v. Bamba (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1123 

(Bamba).) False imprisonment requires only general criminal intent, i.e., the 

defendant must intend to commit an act the natural, probable, and foreseeable 

consequence of which is the nonconsensual confinement of another person. 

(People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1399-1400 (Olivencia).) 

As used in section 237, subdivision (a), “‘violence’ means ‘“the exercise of 

physical force used to restrain over and above the force reasonably necessary 

to effect such restraint,”’” and “‘menace’ means ‘“a threat of harm express or 

implied by word or by act.”’” (Bamba, at p. 1123.)

The evidence the People presented at trial was sufficient to support the 

challenged false imprisonment convictions. The testimony of percipient 

witnesses and video surveillance established that three armed men wearing 

ski masks entered Leeds & Son during regular business hours when several 

employees were in the store, pointed guns at them, ordered them to get on the 

floor and not move or risk being shot, and then proceeded to smash display 

cases and steal watches and other jewelry. We think it a natural, probable, 

and foreseeable consequence of these intentional acts by the robbers that 

individuals already in the store would be so frightened that they would suffer 

nonconsensual confinement by obeying the robbers’ orders to get on the floor 

and remain motionless, or by fleeing to a location in the store they deemed 

safe and remaining there until help arrived. Indeed, Fuerst, Bingham, and 

Stein each testified to such fear and confinement. The testimony of these and 

other percipient witnesses and the video surveillance of the robbery thus 

established defendants committed an “unlawful violation of the personal 

liberty of another” by means of “violence” or “menace.” (§§ 236, 237, subd. 

(a); see Bamba, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) The People did not also 

have to prove, as defendants erroneously contend, that the robbers knew 

Bingham, Stein, and Fuerst were in the back office during the robbery or that 

“the robbers intended to violate the personal liberty of these women.” (See 

Olivencia, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1399 (“No specific state of mind is 

required.”); People v. Swanson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 110 (“No such 

mental state (analogous to specific intent) is involved in a false imprisonment 

charge.”).)

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavira, et al., No. D063089, slip op. at 8-12.)

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief, “if it is found 

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found 

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. A federal habeas 

court must apply an additional layer of deference in applying the Jackson standard, and 

“must ask whether the decision of the California Court of Appeal reflected an 

‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case.” Juan H. v. 

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Federal 

habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 

justice systems,” not as a means of error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103, quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5. 

Petitioner argues that the robbers were focused entirely on the front of the store and 

showed no interest in the vault or back area where the three victims were hiding, and the 

robbers could not have formed the intent to deprive them of their personal liberty without 

awareness of their presence. (ECF No. 1 at 187-88.) He contends the appellate court 

correctly noted that intent to commit an act, the natural, probable and foreseeable 

consequence of which is the nonconsensual confinement of a victim, is sufficient to satisfy 

the crime of false imprisonment, but argues that standard could not be satisfied where there 

is nothing in the record to even suggest the robbers were aware of the presence of the three 

people hiding in the back of the store. (Id.)

Jackson claims must be analyzed “with explicit reference to the substantive elements 

of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324 n.16; see also Bradshaw v. 

Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (holding that “a state court’s interpretation of state law . . . 

binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”) It was objectively reasonable for the state 

court to find that restraining employees of their personal liberty, even employees who were 

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hiding as a result of the robbery, was a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of 

entering the store brandishing automatic weapons, yelling for everyone to refrain from 

interfering with the robbery at the risk of their lives, and smashing the display cases with 

sledgehammers. Kim Fuerst testified that when she saw a man enter the store with “a very 

large gun in his hand,” she ran to the back room and ducked behind a desk, and she said 

she did not feel free to leave until the police arrived. (RT 1416-17.) Darlene Bingham 

testified that she was working in the back room of the store when Kim Fuerst ran in and 

hid behind a desk, and that Bingham then closed the door, hid behind a desk, and was afraid

the robbers might break down the door. (RT 1421-23.) Obviously, any employee in the 

store, whether standing by the display cases or sitting at a desk in the back room handling 

accounts, were subject to the robbers’ threat not to interfere with the robbery. There is 

nothing in the record to suggest the robbers had reason to believe there were not employees 

in the back of the store, such as, for example, if the robbers had targeted the store when it 

was closed.

In light of the additional layer of deference this Court must give in applying the 

Jackson standard, see Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274, and the Supreme Court’s admonition that 

federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 

criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error correction, Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 103, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5, it is clear that sufficient evidence was 

presented at trial to support Petitioner’s convictions for false imprisonment. The state court 

adjudication of this claim does not reflect “an ‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and 

Winship to the facts of this case.” Juan H, 408 F.3d at 1274. In addition, there is no basis 

to find that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of this claim rest 

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

Habeas relief is denied as to claim twelve because the state court adjudication of the 

claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

5. Claim Thirteen

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Petitioner alleges in his final claim, as he did in state court on direct appeal, that the 

prosecution’s burden of proof was lowered when the jury was instructed that if they found 

that Petitioner possessed recently stolen property, and knew it was stolen, they could find 

him guilty on the robbery and burglary charges if they found supporting evidence, however 

slight, of robbery and burglary. (ECF No. 1 at 165, 188-97.) Respondent answers that the 

rejection of this claim by the appellate court, on the basis that such a permissible inference 

instruction does not violate federal due process because it is based on reason and common 

sense, is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law. (Ans. Mem. at 12-13.) 

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) That petition was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner also presented the claim to the appellate court on direct 

appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.) The appellate court denied the claim in a written opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 5.) The Court will therefore look through the silent denial by the state 

supreme court to the last reasoned state court opinion addressing the claim, the appellate 

court opinion on direct appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. The appellate court stated:

C. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights 

by Instructing the Jury with CALCRIM No. 376

Defendants contend the trial court committed prejudicial error and 

violated their due process rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 

376 that it could find defendants guilty of robbery or burglary if they 

knowingly possessed recently stolen property and other evidence tended to 

prove their guilt. [Footnote 1] Defendants complain the instruction 

“permitted an inference of guilt without a rational basis,” “intruded on the 

fact-finding process, inadequately guided the jury’s deliberations, was 

misleading and confusing,” and “created an unbalanced charge to the jury.” 

These complaints have no merit.

Footnote 1: The trial court instructed the jury with the following 

adaptation of CALCRIM No. 376: “If you conclude that either 

defendant knew he possessed property and you conclude that the 

property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not convict a 

defendant of Robbery and/or Burglary based on those facts alone. 

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However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove 

his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 

prove he committed Robbery and/or Burglary. (¶) The 

supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough 

by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where, and when 

the defendant possessed the property, along with any other 

relevant circumstances tending to prove his guilt of Robbery 

and/or Burglary. (¶) Remember that you may not convict a 

defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact 

essential to the conclusion that a defendant is guilty of that crime 

has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

California appellate courts repeatedly have held CALCRIM No. 376 

and its predecessor, CALJIC No. 2.15, do not violate a defendant’s due 

process rights by lowering or shifting the People’s burden of proof or by 

permitting an irrational inference of guilt. For example, the California 

Supreme Court held that CALJIC No. 2.15 “does not create a mandatory 

presumption that operates to shift the People’s burden of proof to the defense,” 

and does “not create a permissive presumption that violate(s) due process, 

because ‘“reason and common sense”’ justif(y) the suggested conclusion that 

defendant’s conscious possession and use of recently stolen property tend() to 

show his guilt of robbery and burglary.” (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 

332, 355, 356; see People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 188, 189 

[CALJIC No. 2.15 “did not shift the burden of proof” or “invite (an) irrational 

inference”); People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 711 [CALCRIM 

No. 376 “expressly requires the jury to be ‘convinced that each fact essential 

to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt’” and “does nothing to diminish the prosecution’s 

burden of proof”); People v. Solórzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1036 

(“Like CALJIC No. 2.15, CALCRIM No. 376 neither undermines the 

presumption of innocence nor violates due process.”).) Defendants here have 

merely “dust(ed) off the old, hackneyed arguments that were thoroughly 

discredited under similarly worded CALJIC instructions and recycle(d) them 

before this court.” (People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.) 

We reject those arguments and agree with the conclusion reached by our 

colleagues in the Second District: “CALCRIM No. 376 itself accurately 

describes the law regarding mental state inferences to be drawn from

possession of stolen property. The instruction did not infringe on 

(defendants’) constitutional rights.” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 

Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577.)

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavira, et al., No. D063089, slip op. at 14-16.)

In order to be entitled to federal habeas relief based on an allegedly defective jury 

instruction, Petitioner must demonstrate that the instruction “so infected the entire trial that 

the resulting conviction violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. “It is well 

established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be 

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id., quoting 

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

Clearly established federal law provides that: “A permissive inference does not 

relieve the State of its burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to convince 

the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts 

proved. . . . A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested 

conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven fact 

before the jury.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1985); see also County Court

of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57 (1979) (holding that a lack of 

“rational connection” between the presumed fact and the proven facts would render a 

permissive inference invalid under the Due Process Clause). “A permissive inference is 

constitutional so long as it can be said ‘with substantial assurance’ that the inferred fact is 

‘more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’” United 

States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), quoting Ulster 

County, 442 U.S at 166 n.28. 

The jury here was instructed:

If you conclude that either defendant knew he possessed property and 

you can conclude that the property had, in fact, been recently stolen, you many

not convict a defendant of robbery and/or burglary based on those facts alone. 

However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt, 

you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove he committed 

robbery and/or burglary. The supporting evidence need only be slight and 

need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where 

and when the defendant possessed the property along with any relevant 

circumstances tending to prove his guilt of robbery and/or burglary. 

Remember that you may not convict a defendant of any crime unless you are 

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convinced that each fact essential to that conclusion that the defendant is 

guilty of the crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

(RT 2448.)

Here, the suggested conclusion in the permissive inference instruction, that 

Petitioner is guilty of robbery or burglary, has a rational connection to the proven fact, that 

he knowingly possessed property recently stolen in that robbery or burglary. Because such 

a conclusion “is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact,” the permissive 

inference is constitutional. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166 n.28. The jury was also 

instructed that they could not convict Petitioner of robbery unless the prosecution had 

proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of those crimes. As discussed 

above in claim ten, during closing argument the prosecutor and defense counsel reminded 

the jury of that burden. Thus, the instruction challenged here did not lessen the 

prosecution’s burden of proof, and did not permit the jury to find Petitioner guilty based 

merely on his possession of recently stolen property. Rather, it permitted the jury to find 

Petitioner guilty of robbery or burglary if the inference they drew from his knowing 

possession of stolen property, combined with corroborating evidence, was sufficient to find 

him guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. That determination is consistent 

with clearly established federal law which provides that: 

For centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference of guilty 

knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen 

goods. James Thayer, writing in his Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), 

cited this inference as the descendant of a presumption “running through a 

dozen centuries.” Early American cases consistently upheld instructions 

permitting conviction upon such an inference, and the courts of appeals on 

numerous occasions have approved instructions essentially identical to the 

instruction given in this case. This longstanding and consistent judicial 

approval of the instruction, reflecting accumulated common experience, 

provides strong indication that the instruction comports with due process. 

Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). 

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The instruction challenged here did not infect the trial with error, much less error

which “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. It merely informed the jury of a well-established permissive 

inference referring to “a ‘rational connection’ between inferred fact and proved fact.” Hall 

v. Haws, 861 F3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding a due process violation from a similar 

instruction allowing an inference of guilt of murder from possession of victim’s recently 

stolen ring, but recognizing historic connection between possession of recently stolen 

property and theft crimes), quoting Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166 n.28 (“A criminal 

statutory presumption must be regarded as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence 

unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed 

fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”). 

Evidence in this case was presented that watches recently stolen in the charged robberies 

were found in the apartment Petitioner leased. If the jury found that Petitioner knew they 

were stolen, and possessed them by virtue of his lease, then the challenged instruction 

permitted the jury to find Petitioner guilty of robbery, but not on that evidence alone, only 

if they found that the prosecutor had produced additional evidence of his involvement in 

the robberies. As set forth throughout this Order, the prosecution produced substantial 

evidence of Petitioner’s involvement in the robberies of the jewelry stores and the burglary 

of the sporting goods store. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court adjudication 

of this claim, on the basisthat the permissive instruction did not violate federal due process,

is contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 

or that it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Furthermore, even if the instruction violated due process, habeas relief would still 

be unavailable unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 

(1996). “Under this standard, an error is harmless unless the ‘record review leaves the 

conscientious judge in grave doubt about the likely effect of an error . . . (i.e.,) that, in the 

judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as 

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to the harmlessness of the error.’” Padilla, 309 F.3d at 621-22, quoting McAninch, 513 

U.S. at 435 and citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (“[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, 

after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude 

that substantial rights were not affected.”) 

The Court is not in grave doubt that the permissive inference instruction lowered the 

burden of proof and allowed the jury to find Petitioner guilty on evidence insufficient to 

satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The evidence that recently stolen property 

from some of the robberies was found in an apartment leased to Petitioner was less 

significant than the evidence he was in possession of equipment used in the crimes, 

including a distinctive weapon visible in several videos, and the forensic evidence that his 

fingerprint and DNA were on items connected with the crimes. The jury was clearly and 

repeatedly instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of establishing every element of 

every offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, there is no basis to find the instruction

“had a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdicts. Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 623. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim thirteen is 

neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and that any error is 

harmless. Habeas relief is denied as to claim thirteen.

IV. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance is DENIED, Petitioner’s Motion for 

Relief from Judgment is DENIED, and the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is 

DENIED.

Dated: February 12, 2018

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