Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00459/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00459-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRANCE JAMES BURKE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0459 FCD DAD P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered by

the Placer County Superior Court on October 13, 1998. Respondents have moved to dismiss the

petition on the ground that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. For the reasons set forth below, the

undersigned will recommend that respondents’ motion be denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 18, 1998, a Placer County jury found petitioner guilty of committing

two counts of lewd and lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14, in violation of

California Penal Code § 288(a). The jury also found true the allegations that petitioner had

suffered two prior convictions for violent or serious felonies within the meaning of California

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Penal Code § 1170.12. Petitioner received a sentence of twenty-five years to life in state prison

pursuant to California Penal Code § 667.61 plus two consecutive terms of five years each for the

two prior felonies, for a total of 35 years to life in state prison. (Pet. at (2); Mot. to Dismiss at 1-

2 & Lodged Doc. 1 at 1-2.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District. Seven issues were raised in the appeal. On December 28, 2000,

the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. Petitioner then sought

review of four of the seven issues in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme

Court denied review on March 28, 2001. Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari

in the United States Supreme Court. (Pet. at (2), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(c) & Attachs. #1 & #2; Mot.

to Dismiss at 2 & Lodged Doc. 1 at 1-2.)

On June 4, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Placer

County Superior Court. Four issues were raised in the petition. On June 24, 2002, the Superior

Court denied the petition in an order that set forth the four grounds for relief advanced by

petitioner and addressed them as follows:

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED for the reasons

that the Petitioner has failed to adequately explain why these issues

were not raised on appeal. In addition, stated grounds for relief are

frivolous.

(Pet. at (3)(a), (3) (d), (4)(a) & Attachs. 3 & 4; Mot. to Dismiss at 2 & Lodged Docs. 2 & 3.)

On April 29, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. In this petition he raised the same

four issues he had raised in the habeas proceeding in Superior Court. The petition was denied on

May 15, 2003 without opinion or citation. (Pet. at (4)(a) & Attachs. #5 & #6; Mot. to Dismiss at

2 & Lodged Docs. 4 & 5.)

On December 8, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. In this petition he raised three of the four issues raised in the two

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lower courts. The petition was denied on February 22, 2006, with citations to In re Robbins, 18

Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). (Pet. at (4)(a), (4)(b) &

Attachs. 7 & 8; Mot. to Dismiss at 2 & Lodged Docs 6 & 7.)

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was received for filing on March 6, 2006.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Respondents’ Motion

Respondents argue that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(D), the statute of

limitations on petitioner’s claims began to run on June 26, 2001, upon expiration of the 90-day

period during which petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court, and that petitioner’s last day for filing a federal habeas petition was

therefore June 26, 2002, plus any time for tolling.

Respondents acknowledge that petitioner’s first state habeas petition, filed June 4,

2002, was filed prior to the expiration of the one-year period of limitation and stopped the

running of the statute after it had run for 343 days. Respondents do not argue that the first state

habeas petition was improperly filed, and they concede that petitioner is entitled to statutory

tolling from June 4, 2002, through June 24, 2002, when the petition was denied.

Respondents argue that petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute between

the denial of his first state habeas petition on June 24, 2002, and his filing of a second state

habeas petition on April 29, 2003, because petitioner’s unjustified delay of 307 days was

unreasonable under Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Respondents contend that the statute

of limitations resumed running on June 25, 2002, and expired on July 19, 2002.

Respondents do not argue that petitioner’s second state habeas petition was

improperly filed. They concede that petitioner would be entitled to statutory tolling for the

period from April 29, 2003, when the petition was filed, to May 15, 2003, when the petition was

denied, except for the fact that the statute of limitations expired before petitioner filed the second

petition.

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Respondents argue that, if the statute did not expire before the filing of the second

state habeas petition, petitioner would not be entitled to tolling of the statute between the denial

of the second petition on May 15, 2003, and the filing of a third state habeas petition on

December 8, 2004, because the unjustified delay of 572 days, a period even longer than the delay

between his first and second petitions, was unreasonable under Evans v. Chavis.

Respondents assert that petitioner’s third petition had no tolling effect because the

statute of limitation had expired long before petitioner filed it. Respondents conclude that

petitioner failed to file his federal habeas petition by the expiration date of June 26, 2002, as

extended by the brief period of tolling he was entitled to for the period between June 4, 2002, and

June 24, 2002, when his first state habeas petition was pending.

II. Petitioner’s Opposition

Petitioner asserts that (1) his federal petition is timely, (2) respondents have

applied Evans v. Chavis erroneously and improperly, (3) he filed his state petitions in good faith

under the law as it existed at the time, and (4) his petition raises several grounds for relief that

fall within exceptions to California’s time limitations for collateral review. He argues that

respondents have failed to prove any procedural default in the state habeas proceedings.

For the most part, petitioner does not dispute respondents’ contentions with regard

to critical dates. He agrees that his state judgment became final on June 26, 2001, and that the

statute of limitations ran without interruption until June 4, 2002, when he filed his first state

habeas petition. Petitioner agrees that the limitations period had run for 343 days and that only

22 days remained when he filed his first state habeas petition. He argues, however, that the

statute of limitations was tolled continuously from June 4, 2002, until the California Supreme

Court denied his final state habeas petition on February 22, 2006. Petitioner asserts that he filed

his federal habeas petition on March 6, 2006, with eleven days to spare.

Petitioner acknowledges that the Supreme Court found an unjustified delay of six

months unreasonable in Evans v. Chavis. Petitioner cites a footnote in which the Court observed

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that Chavis never offered any explanation for a period of inactivity of at least six months. 

Petitioner quotes the Court’s instructions to federal courts in California, highlighting the point

that timeliness must be decided on a case-by-case basis:

In the absence of (1) clear direction or explanation from the

California Supreme Court about the meaning of the term

“reasonable time” in the present context, or (2) clear indication that

a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely,

the Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and

determine what the state courts would have held in respect to

timeliness. That is to say, without using a merits determination as

an “absolute bellwether” (as to timeliness), the federal court must

decide whether the filing of the request for state-court appellate

review (in state collateral review proceedings) was made within

what California would consider a “reasonable time.”

546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 852.

Petitioner examines the Court’s analysis of the timeliness of Chavis’ filings and

notes that Chavis had tried to explain a 37-month delay “by arguing that he could not use the

prison library to work on his petition during this time either because (1) his prison job’s hours

coincided with those of the library, or (2) prison lockdowns confined him to his cell” and that his

inability to use the library excused the entire delay and rendered his final state habeas petition

timely. Id. at 854. Petitioner cites the Supreme Court’s determination that Chavis conceded the

following facts: (1) he was given a new prison job about 18 months after the California Court of

Appeal denied his state habeas petition, (2) his new job permitted him to use the library, and (3)

the prison was relatively free of lockdowns for a period of at least six months after his job

change. Petitioner observes that the Court’s conclusion was that, “viewing every disputed issue

most favorably to Chavis, there remains a totally unexplained, hence unjustified, delay of at least

six months.” Id. Thus, petitioner reasons, the Court found that an unexplained delay of

approximately six months was unreasonable but did not find the remainder of the 37-month delay

unreasonable because the remaining delay was explained and justified.

Petitioner argues that, despite respondents’ assertion that his delays were

unexplained and unreasonable, in fact his delays were justified by circumstances which must be

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viewed by this court in the manner most favorable to him, just as the Supreme Court viewed the

disputed issues most favorably to Chavis. Petitioner states that the reasons for his delays were

set forth in the habeas petitions he filed in the California Court of Appeal and the California

Supreme Court. His justifications involve (1) conflicts with his job assignment, (2) access to the

prison law library, (3) medical problems, and (4) other legal matters.

Petitioner begins by explaining why he delayed the filing of his first state habeas

petition until 22 days before the statute of limitations would have expired: his sisters were

severely injured in a motor vehicle accident while returning home from visiting him in prison; he

suffered emotional difficulties in dealing with the accident, and his family relied on him for help

in dealing with the insurance company because he was a highly experienced insurance claims

adjuster prior to his arrest and conviction; he wrote letters and gave his family advice and

guidance in pursuing their claims.

Turning to the period of time between the denial of his first state habeas petition

and the filing of his second state habeas petition, petitioner contends that the second petition was

timely under California law and therefore served to toll the statute of limitations the entire period

of time between June 24, 2002, and April 29, 2003. Petitioner asserts that his delay between

June 24, 2002, and April 29, 2003, was justifiable for three reasons.

Petitioner’s first justification for this period of time involves medical issues: on

July 11, 2002, petitioner was diagnosed as diabetic with a hemoglobin A1c level of 13.8, when

6.0 is normal, 7.0 is high, and 9.0 is dangerous; treatment included medication and one hour of

exercise per day; his condition had been causing fatigue and other symptoms prior to the

diagnosis and continued to cause such symptoms; on August 13, 2002, his hemoglobin A1c level

was still high at 12.2; on October 18, 2002, the level was down to 7.9 and has remained in that

range; he is classified as a chronic care inmate.

Petitioner’s second justification involves law library issues in combination with

his work hours and his medical needs: his work hours during the 10-month interval between

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June 24, 2002 and April 29, 2003, practically precluded law library access; he worked Monday

through Friday from 0730 to 1345 hours; the law library was scheduled to be open Monday

through Saturday from 0830 to 1430 hours but was closed during some scheduled hours; after he

was diagnosed as diabetic and was directed to do one hour of brisk walking every day, the brief

time that he could have used the library on Monday through Friday had to be used for walking

because of limitations on inmates’ yard time; thus, for almost the entire 10-month period, his law

library access was limited to Saturdays.

Petitioner’s third justification involves the nature of the claims alleged in his

habeas petitions and the amount of law library time needed: his trial in 1998 involved recently

enacted state laws, including California Evidence Code § 1108, enacted in 1996, and the onestrike law that was enacted in 1995; petitioner worked diligently on his petitions, but research

into the constitutionality of the new laws and the jury instructions related to those laws was time

consuming and the prison law library is not run in a manner conducive to researching new law.

Petitioner argues that these circumstances support a finding of good cause for

substantial delay under state law as set forth in In re Robbins and In re Clark. Petitioner contends

that this court should find the 10-month delay between the denial of his first state habeas petition

and the filing of his second state habeas petition to be justified under California law and therefore

reasonable such that the statute of limitations was tolled during the interval.

Turning to the period between the denial of his second petition and the filing of

his third, petitioner contends that the third petition was also timely under California law and that

the statute of limitations should be tolled between May 15, 2003, and December 8, 2004. 

Petitioner asserts that the delay between these dates was justifiable for four reasons.

Petitioner’s first justification for this period of time is that he is incarcerated and

proceeding pro se. He argues that he is not knowledgeable in matters of law, that research is

difficult for incarcerated persons, and that legal rules and procedures are difficult for incarcerated

persons to discover and apply to their own cases.

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Petitioner’s second justification involves law library issues: his work hours

during the period between May 15, 2003, and December 8, 2004, interfered with his law library

access; when his second state habeas petition was denied on May 15, 2003, he was working

Monday through Friday from 0730 to 1345 hours; for the two-month period between July 16,

2003, and September 16, 2003, he did not have a prison job; from September 16, 2003, to

November 12, 2004, he worked Monday through Friday from 0600 to 1400 hours; for the fourweek period between November 12, 2004, and December 8, 2004, he did not have a prison job;

the law library was scheduled to be open Tuesday through Saturday from 0830 to 1430 hours but

was closed during some of the scheduled hours; during this time, petitioner was investigating

new grounds for relief and seeking evidence to support the grounds he had already raised.

Petitioner’s third justification involves the nature of the issues raised in his habeas

petitions: because many of the laws used in his trial were relatively new, petitioner continuously

reviewed court cases for changes that could affect his arguments; in his third state habeas

petition, he was able to cite a Ninth Circuit case decided on October 5, 2004, that dealt with a

jury instruction petitioner challenged on direct appeal and has raised in his federal petition.

Petitioner’s fourth justification involves another legal matter: in September 2003,

petitioner was told during a telephone conversation with an elder at his church that the pastor had

accused petitioner of an inappropriate relationship with a juvenile member of the church;

petitioner sent a long letter to the elder denying the accusation; in April 2004, petitioner was

served with a complaint in which he and the church were the defendants; petitioner spent many

hours defending himself against the suit while seeking representation by the church’s insurance

carrier; defense counsel was finally assigned to his case in October 2004.

Petitioner argues that, when all of the excused periods of time are removed from

the calculation, he actually filed his third state habeas petition within sixty days after the second

petition was denied. Petitioner asserts that this court should find that the 19-month delay

between the denial of his second state habeas petition and the filing of his third state habeas

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petition was justified under California law and therefore reasonable so that tolling applies during

the entire interval.

Petitioner argues that he acted with due diligence at all times and filed his

petitions in good faith under existing law. He asserts that his state petitions were also timely

under state law because the state courts decided his petitions on their merits and because there

are exceptions to the bar of untimeliness that apply to several of his claims. Citing In re Clark, 5

Cal. 4th 750 (1993), petitioner points to two exceptions he believes to be applicable: (1) errors

of constitutional magnitude that led to a trial so fundamentally unfair that, absent those errors, no

reasonable judge or jury would have convicted him and (2) he was convicted or sentenced under

an invalid statute. Petitioner refers to his claims concerning the prosecutor’s closing arguments,

jury instructions, and improper sentencing.

For all of these reasons, petitioner requests that respondents’ motion be denied

and that respondents be ordered to answer the petition. In the alternative, petitioner requests

appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has provided extensive

documentation of the reasons given for his delays in filing state habeas petitions.

III. Respondents’ Reply

Petitioner’s opposition includes a proof of service reflecting that the document

was served on respondents’ counsel on June 28, 2006. Respondents did not file a reply to

petitioner’s opposition.

ANALYSIS

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a

one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

period of limitation applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the statute was enacted. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Because this action was filed in 2006, the

AEDPA period of limitation is applicable.

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For most state prisoners, the one-year period of limitation begins to run when the

prisoner’s judgment of conviction becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). No other

provision of § 2244(d)(1) appears to be applicable to this case.

It is undisputed that judgment was entered in petitioner’s case on October 13,

1998, that on appeal the California Supreme Court denied review on March 28, 2001, and that

petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on June 26, 2001, upon expiration of the time

for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The AEDPA statute

of limitations began to run for petitioner on June 27, 2001, and expired one year later, on June

26, 2002, unless petitioner is entitled to the benefit of tolling provisions.

“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of

limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a judgment becomes final

and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state collateral proceedings are commenced, a state

habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in the state courts, including the time

between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, as long as the

intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

In reviewing habeas petitions originating from California, the Ninth Circuit

formerly employed a rule that where the California courts did not explicitly dismiss a state

habeas petition for lack of timeliness, the petition was presumed timely. In Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006), the Supreme Court rejected this approach and required the

federal court to determine whether a state habeas petition was filed within what California would

consider a reasonable period of time. 546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 852. When a postconviction

petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). 

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 In Pace v. DiGuglielmo the Supreme Court held that time limits for filing “go to the 1

very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition.” 544 U.S. 408, 417

(2005). 

 Respondents do not argue that petitioner’s state habeas petitions were improperly filed. 2

See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (a properly filed state application complies with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings).

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Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408[, 414], 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812). See also Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. 1

Here, it is undisputed that petitioner filed his first state collateral challenge on

June 4, 2002, after the statute of limitations had run for 343 days. Petitioner filed three state

habeas applications. The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court issued 2

summary denials. Each of these denials was an unexplained order, i.e., “an order whose text or

accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 802 (1991). When confronted with a state court’s unexplained order, the federal court

applies the following presumption: “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting

a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest

upon the same ground.” Id. at 803. See also Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004). In applying the look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804.

The Placer County Superior Court issued an order rejecting petitioner’s claims. 

This court has “looked through” the unexplained orders of the California Supreme Court and the

California Court of Appeal to the Superior Court’s order to determine whether the state courts

found the initial petition to be untimely as a matter of state law. In its June 24, 2002 order, the

Superior Court denied the petition for two reasons: petitioner failed to adequately explain why

his grounds for relief were not raised on appeal and the stated grounds for relief are frivolous. 

The state courts did not find petitioner’s initial petition to be untimely.

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s final state habeas petition

without a reasoned state judgment, but the court’s summary denial includes citations to In re

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 In what can fairly be characterized as a profound understatement, the Supreme Court 3

recognized that “[g]iven the uncertain scope of California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard, it may

not be easy for the [lower federal courts] to decide in each such case whether the petitioner’s

state-court review petition was timely.” 546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 852. In Bonner v. Carey

the Ninth Circuit noted that it was ironic that the complicated procedure necessitated under the

Supreme Court’s decision in Pace derives from the AEDPA, a statute purportedly designed to

streamline and simplify the complicated habeas process. 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.20 (9th Cir.

2005). The same observation is applicable to the case by case analysis that federal courts in

California must now engage in under Evans v. Chavis to determine whether state habeas

petitions were filed within what California courts would have deemed to be a “reasonable time”

under California law had they elected to consider the issue. All the while it becomes more and

more clear that the most simple and streamlined procedure to address the vast majority of federal

habeas petitions would be to address the merits. Indeed, in the undersigned’s experience, that is

in fact what the California Court of Appeals and California Supreme Court elect to do in

resolving the vast majority of state habeas petitions which come before those courts.

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Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). In Robbins, the

California Supreme Court cites Dixon as a case barring habeas corpus claims that could have

been raised on appeal. 18 Cal. 4th at 779. Thus, the citation to Dixon affirms the Superior

Court’s denial of petitioner’s first state habeas petition in part for failure to adequately explain

why the claims were not raised on appeal. While the California Supreme Court’s citation to page

780 of Robbins appears to be an allusion to timeliness, the mere reference to Robbins does not

clearly indicate a determination that petitioner’s third habeas petition was untimely. The page

cited sets out an analytical framework for timeliness determinations and provides that

substantially delayed claims will be considered on their merits if the petitioner demonstrates

good cause for the delay and that claims substantially delayed without good cause will be

entertained on the merits under certain circumstances. See King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the ambiguity of California’s timeliness rule barring habeas

petitions filed after substantial delay “is not clarified by the California Supreme Court’s

application of the timeliness bar, in part because the court usually rejects cases without

explanation, only citing Clark and Robbins”).

In the absence of a clear indication that petitioner’s state habeas petitions were

untimely, this court is now charged with the duty of independently determining whether the

petitions were filed within what California would consider a reasonable time. Chavis, 546 U.S. 3

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at , 126 S. Ct. at 852. If the second and third petitions were filed within a reasonable time,

then the statute of limitations under § 2242(d)(2) was tolled continuously from the filing of the

first state habeas petition through the denial of the third state habeas petition, thereby rendering

petitioner’s federal habeas petition timely.

As the Ninth Circuit recently noted,

California’s timeliness rule bars habeas petitions that are

filed after “substantial delay.” A habeas petitioner in California

must justify any “significant” or “substantial” delay in seeking

habeas corpus relief. Clark, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 855 P.2d at 738,

750-51. There are no standards for determining what period of time

or factors constitute “substantial delay” in noncapital cases. There

are also no standards for determining what factors justify any

particular length of delay. . . .

. . . . Clark did nothing to clarify the application of the

basic “substantial delay” standard with regard to noncapital cases.

Furthermore, the Clark exceptions, specifying when review can be

granted despite “substantial delay,” do nothing to clarify the

“substantial delay” standard itself.

King, 464 F.3d at 966.

In light of these ambiguous standards with respect to timeliness under California

law, inconsistent application among California courts is not surprising. In an earlier Ninth

Circuit decision, the court observed that when the petitioner’s case was litigated in the district

court

the California Supreme Court had denied 35 habeas petitions filed

three years or more after affirmance on direct appeal, and more

than half of those denials had not been on grounds of untimeliness. 

Only 6 cases had been denied on untimeliness alone. The State

does not dispute these figures . . . .

Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1996). The court continued:

It is theoretically possible, we suppose, to reconcile and

explain all of the California Supreme Court decisions entertaining

on the merits or rejecting as untimely petitions that are three or

more years old. Those divergent decisions may indeed represent

consistent exercises of discretion rather than random applications

of or exceptions to the timeliness rule. But we have no way of

knowing whether that is the case. The California Supreme Court’s

denials of habeas petitions that [petitioner] relies upon were

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accomplished by brief minute entries in what has been described as

“post-card denial.” We can discern no apparent relationship

between the time of delay and the findings concerning timeliness. 

Nor could [petitioner] be expected to do so.

Id. at 1392 (9th Cir. 1996). See also King, 464 F.3d at 966.

In considering whether California courts would have found the habeas petitions at

issue in this case untimely, it is important to note that petitioner’s is not a capital case. California

has been most concerned with the timeliness of habeas petitions in such cases, providing a

presumptive time period for timeliness applicable only to capital cases. See Cal. Rules of Court

Policy Statement 3, std. 1-1.1 (Deering 2005) (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus [in a

capital case] will be presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days

after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal . . . .”). The

undersigned recognizes that the United States Supreme Court found in Chavis an unexplained

six-month gap between the filing of habeas petitions in California courts was unreasonable and

therefore untimely, presumably, as a matter of California law. 546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 854. 

That conclusion was based, at least in part, on the notion that six months is far longer than the

thirty to sixty days allowed by most states for the filing of an appeal to their state supreme courts

and far longer than the ten days California provides for the filing of a notice of appeal. Id. Here,

however, time periods for the filing of notices of appeal under state law have little application. 

More important to resolution of the pending motion to dismiss is the Supreme Court’s holding in

Saffold that the 4 1/2 month delay between the denial of the petitioner’s habeas petition by the

California Court of Appeal and the filing of his habeas petition with the California Supreme

Court was not necessarily unreasonable and therefore did not necessarily render the petition to

the California Supreme Court untimely under California law for federal statute of limitations

purposes. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226; see also Chavis, 546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 858-59

(Stevens, J., concurring).

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In this case, petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on June 26, 2001. 

On June 4, 2002, petitioner submitted his first state habeas petition for filing with the Placer

County Superior Court. Respondents do not argue that the petition was untimely or improperly

filed. Given the evidence before the court in Morales that over a given period more than half of

the habeas petitions filed three years or more after affirmance on direct appeal had not been

denied on grounds of untimeliness by the California Supreme Court, as well as petitioner’s

explanations for his delay and the undersigned’s own experience in reviewing California habeas

proceedings, this court cannot conclude that the California courts, had they considered the issue,

would have concluded that the initial habeas petition was not filed within a “reasonable time.”

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was denied on June 24, 2002. On April 29,

2003, petitioner submitted his second state habeas petition for filing with the California Court of

appeal. Respondents do not argue that the petition was improperly filed but contend that

petitioner’s unexplained and unjustified delay of ten months cannot be considered reasonable

under California law. Given the evidence before the court in Morales, petitioner’s undisputed

explanations for his delay, and the undersigned’s experience in reviewing California habeas

proceedings, this court cannot conclude that the California courts, had they considered the issue,

would have concluded that the second habeas petition was not filed within a “reasonable time.”

The second state habeas petition was denied on May 15, 2003. On December 8,

2004, petitioner submitted his third state habeas petition for filing with the California Supreme

Court. Respondents do not argue that the petition was improperly filed but contend that the

statute of limitations expired prior to its filing. Given the evidence before the court in Morales,

petitioner’s undisputed explanations for his delay, and the undersigned’s experience in reviewing

California habeas proceedings, this court cannot conclude that the California Supreme Court, had

it considered the issue, would have concluded that the third habeas petition was not filed within a

“reasonable time.”

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In Chavis, the Supreme Court was confronted with a 3-year and 1-month delay

between the denial of a petition filed in the California Court of Appeal and the filing of a petition

in the California Supreme Court. 546 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 851. The Court considered

Chavis’ explanation that he could not use the prison law library to work on his petition during the

three years because his prison job’s hours coincided with those of the library or prison lockdowns

confined him to his cell. Chavis conceded that he was given a new job about a year and a half

after the California Court of Appeal denied his petition and did not deny the respondents’

assertion that the new job’s hours permitted him to use the library. He also conceded that the

prison was relatively free of lockdowns for a six-month period. The Court viewed the disputed

issues favorably to Chavis with regard to all but six months of his 3-year and 1-month delay. 546

U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 854. The Court concluded that the California Supreme Court would

not consider an unexplained and therefore unjustified 6-month filing delay “reasonable.” Id.

The petitioner in this case has explained and hence justified each period of delay. 

Respondents have offered no rebuttal to his explanations. Having determined that the delays

between the state court petitions cannot be said to have been unreasonable under state law, the

undersigned finds that the intervals between the properly filed petitions have been explained and

justified and that petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the entire time his habeas petitions

were pending in the state courts, including the intervals between the petitions. Statutory tolling

renders the federal petition timely. Respondents’ motion to dismiss should therefore be denied,

and respondents should be directed to file an answer to the petition.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ April 12, 2006 motion to dismiss the petition as barred by the

statute of limitations be denied; and

2. Respondents be directed to file their answer to the petition.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. A document containing objections

should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply

to objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain

circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 8, 2006.

DAD:13

burk0459.mtd

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