Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02102/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02102-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

JOSEPH LIBBEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-2102

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff, Joseph Libbey, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. 

On August 7, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff now moves for an

award of $1705.29 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to

Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 6.65 attorney hours work

before the court at an hourly rate of $56.06 and 8.9 hours of contract attorney time at an

hourly rate of $75.00 per hour. (Doc. # 12). The defendant has filed a response, expressing

no objection to this award. (Doc. # 13).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits

was substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial

justification for the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128

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(8th Cir. 1986). Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security

claimant who obtains a sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of

benefits and remanding the case for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing

the record, we find plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996

(2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his

or her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees

under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation;

the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services;

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the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. 

Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate

counsel’s services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to

observe firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." 

Hickey v. Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879

F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a

fee request, even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v.

Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal,

fairness to the parties requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses

were computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal feeshifting statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with

"contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed

description of the subject matter of the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the

court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

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Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $156.06 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the

hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v.

Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.

1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof

of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than

$75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached

a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 12) and has presented evidence

of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for

enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that

plaintiff's counsel is entitled to an award at the rate of $150.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on

this case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 6.65 hours of attorney work

performed between May 16, 2005, and October 2, 2006. The Complaint was not filed in this

court until July 11, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note, time spent at the administrative level is not

compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir.

1984). However, the time submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation

for the filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we will allow the 1.25 hours. 

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However, we find that the attorney hours submitted on July 11, 2005(correspondence-

.05), October 21, 2005 (copying medical records-.05), and July 11, 2006 (case status given to

plaintiff-.05), could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v.

Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are

not compensable under the EAJA. Therefore, .15 attorney hours must be deducted from the

total compensable time sought by counsel.

We also find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to be compensated under the EAJA for

the 8.90 hours of his contract attorney at the reduced rate of $75.00 per hour. 

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for:

6.50 (6.65-0.15) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, and 8.90 contract

attorney hours at a rate of $75.00 for a total attorney's fee award of $1,642.50. This amount

should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be

awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order

to prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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