Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02127/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02127-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROXANNE TORQUATO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,1

Defendant. 

 Case No. 17-cv-02127-BAS-NLS 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF 

ATTORNEY’S FEES (ECF No. 17) 

 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Roxanne Torquato’s motion for approval of 

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 17.) The Commissioner of Social 

Security responded to the motion. (ECF No. 18.) The Court finds Torquato’s motion 

suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the 

motion for approval of attorney’s fees. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On August 23, 2013, Torquato filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 124–25, ECF 

No. 7.) The application was denied on initial administrative review and on reconsideration, 

1

 The Court substitutes Commissioner of Social Security Andrew M. Saul in place of the former 

official, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. Berryhill. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1). 

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after which Torquato requested her claim be heard before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”). (See AR 70–73, 75–79, 80–81.) A hearing was held before ALJ Eric Benham 

on September 26, 2014. (AR 37–51.) In a decision dated June 15, 2016, the ALJ 

determined that Torquato was not disabled under the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

(AR 21–36.) Torquato’s request for review was denied by the Appeals Council, making 

the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 

 To challenge the Commissioner’s decision, Torquato retained counsel and entered 

into a Social Security Representation Agreement (“Representation Agreement”). 

(Representation Agreement, Kalagian Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-1.) The Representation 

Agreement provides that the fee for “successful prosecution of this matter is . . . 25% of 

the past-due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work 

before the court.” (Id. § 4.) 

 On October 17, 2017, Torquato sought judicial review in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

She and the Commissioner then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 9, 

10.) On June 20, 2018, the Court issued an order granting Torquato’s motion for summary 

judgment and denying the Commissioner’s cross-motion. (ECF No. 13.) In brief, the 

Court found that the ALJ committed harmful error by improperly rejecting the opinion of 

Torquato’s treating physician. (Id.) Hence, the Court reversed the Commissioner’s 

decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. (Id.) 

 In light of the Court’s decision, the parties filed a joint motion for an award of 

attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). 

(ECF No. 15.) The Court granted the joint motion and awarded Torquato $3,400 in 

attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 16.) 

 Upon remand, the ALJ held a second hearing. And in a fully-favorable decision 

dated October 8, 2019, the ALJ found Torquato to be disabled as of August 17, 2012. 

(Kalagian Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2, ECF No. 17-2.) Accordingly, on November 27, 2019, the 

agency issued a Notice of Award indicating Torquato is entitled to approximately $108,000 

in past-due benefits. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 3, ECF No. 17-3.) 

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Torquato now returns to this Court to seek approval of attorney’s fees of $15,000—

approximately 13.9% of the past-due benefits. (Mot., ECF No. 17.) The real-party-ininterest, Torquato’s counsel, served a copy of the motion on Torquato and informed her 

that she could oppose the request. (Proof of Service, ECF No. 17 at 14.) She has not done 

so. The Commissioner, however, has filed a response. (ECF No. 18.) 

II. ANALYSIS 

 The law regulates the fees that attorneys may charge Social Security claimants for 

representation before the Social Security Administration and a reviewing court. See 42 

U.S.C. § 406(a)–(b). The representation here concerned Torquato’s claim for benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act. Title II “‘is an insurance program’ that ‘provides 

old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial 

need.’” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517, 519–20 (2019) (quoting Bowen v. 

Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 (1988)). A claim for Title II benefits may “result in payments 

of past-due benefits—i.e., benefits that accrued before a favorable decision—as well as 

ongoing monthly benefits.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 Torquato received an award of past-due benefits after this Court entered a judgment 

in her favor. Hence, the relevant fee provision is 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). This statute provides: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may 

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits 

to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the 

Commissioner of Social Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for 

payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such 

past-due benefits. 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, § 406(b) limits fees for representation before the 

court “to no more than 25% of past-due benefits and allows the agency to withhold pastdue benefits to pay these fees.” Culbertson, 139 S. Ct. at 520. 

 Social Security claimants routinely enter into “contingent-fee contracts that produce 

fees no higher than the 25 percent ceiling.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 800 

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(2002); see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). In 

Gisbrecht, the Supreme Court determined that “§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee 

agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social 

Security benefits claimants in court.” 535 U.S. at 807. Instead, because the statute 

authorizes a “reasonable fee,” it “calls for court review of such arrangements as an 

independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” See id. 

 Further, where a contingency agreement exists, the Supreme Court emphasized that 

the starting point for assessing the reasonableness of the fee amount is the agreement itself, 

not the familiar lodestar method. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 797–809. In testing the 

contingency agreement’s reasonableness, the court may appropriately reduce “the 

attorney’s recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the 

representative achieved.” Id. at 808. For example, a downward adjustment may be 

justified if the attorney was responsible for delay, “so that the attorney will not profit from 

the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.” Id. at 808. 

Moreover, where counsel is set to receive a windfall because “the benefits are large in 

comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is 

similarly in order.” See id. at 808; accord Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1151 (“The court may 

properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in 

proportion to the time spent on the case.”). “As evidence of the reasonableness of the 

resulting fee, the court may require counsel to submit a record of hours spent and a 

statement of normal hourly billing charges.” Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1151. However, 

“‘satellite litigation’ over attorneys’ fees should not be encouraged.” Id. at 1152 (quoting 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). Finally, although the court’s focus is on the contingency 

agreement, the court can “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing 

the reasonableness of the fee.”2 Id. 

2

 Because fees under § 406(b) are paid from past-due benefits, the Commissioner of Social 

Security “has no direct financial stake in the answer to the § 406(b) question; instead [he] plays a part in 

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 Torquato’s Representation Agreement authorizes her counsel to receive “25% of the 

past-due benefits awarded . . . for work before the court.” (Representation Agreement § 

4.)3 In assessing whether the requested fee is reasonable, the Court initially notes that there 

is no evidence of “fraud or overreaching” in the negotiation of the Representation 

Agreement. See Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1145. Indeed, such agreements are common, and 

Torquato has been given the opportunity to oppose the motion for approval of her counsel’s 

fee. She has not done so. Further, a reduction for substandard performance is not 

warranted. Torquato’s counsel ably represented her and was successful in obtaining a 

favorable judgment that led to her award of substantial past-due benefits. Nor is a reduction 

for delay warranted here. Torquato’s counsel met every briefing deadline in this case, and 

there was thus no “‘excessive delay’ attributable to” Torquato’s counsel in the proceedings 

before this Court. See id. at 1146. 

 In addition, the proposed fee would not be a windfall to Torquato’s counsel. 

Although the Representation Agreement authorizes counsel to seek up to 25% of 

Torquato’s past-due benefits—$26,961.88—the requested fee of $15,000 is only 

approximately 13.9% of the past-due benefits. The requested fee, which is “significantly 

lower” than the fee bargained for in the Representation Agreement, is “not excessively 

large in relation to the benefits achieved.” See Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1151. Moreover, 

Torquato’s counsel’s decision to “voluntarily reduce[]” the requested fee from “the 

allowable 25%” suggests the fee will not be a windfall. See id. at 1152. 

the fee determination resembling that of a trustee for the claimants.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. The 

Commissioner has done so here and provides an analysis of Torquato’s fee request and “takes no position 

on the reasonableness of the request.” (ECF No. 18.) 

3

 The Representation Agreement also provides Torquato’s counsel may seek a separate 25% of 

her past-due benefits for work before the agency. (See Representation Agreement §§ 3–4.) The Supreme 

Court has determined that “the 25% cap” in § 406(b) “applies only to fees for representation before the 

court, not the agency.” Culbertson, 139 S. Ct. at 522. Torquato’s counsel states to the Court, however, 

that “[c]ounsel exercises billing discretion to limit the aggregate of all fees received to 25% of the pastdue benefits, the only withholding the Commissioner makes.” (Mot. 7; see also Kalagian Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Hence, although the Representation Agreement and the law may entitle Torquato’s counsel to seek a larger 

share of her past-due benefits than 25%, counsel is not doing so in her case. 

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Further, the Court notes that counsel spent 15.85 hours on Torquato’s case at the 

district court level. Therefore, counsel’s request for $15,000 in fees amounts to 

approximately $946 an hour. (See Kalagian Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 4, ECF No. 17-4.) Counsel 

highlights various district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit approving comparable fees 

at comparable hourly rates. (See Mot. at 6.) The Court is persuaded that the effective 

hourly rate in this case does not demonstrate the fee would be a windfall. 

Overall, the Court finds that the requested fee is reasonable. Torquato agreed that 

her counsel would be paid up to 25% of her past-due benefits, and her counsel chose to 

bear the risk of non-payment in the event that the appeal was unsuccessful. Her counsel 

now seeks only $15,000 or 13.9% of the past-due benefits. Given the circumstances of the 

case, the Court finds a downward adjustment to the requested fee is not appropriate. 

Therefore, the Court will grant Torquato’s motion for approval of $15,000 in fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b). 

* * * 

 Having approved fees under § 406(b), the Court briefly discusses Torquato’s 

counsel’s prior EAJA award. As mentioned, the Court awarded Torquato’s counsel $3,400 

in fees under the EAJA. “Congress amended the EAJA in 1985 to add a savings provision 

that allows attorneys to receive fees under both § 406(b) and [EAJA, 28 U.S.C.] § 2412.” 

Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). “However, 

in order to maximize the award of past-due benefits to claimants and to avoid giving double 

compensation to attorneys, the savings provision requires a lawyer to offset any fees 

received under § 406(b) with any award that the attorney receives under § 2412 if the two 

were for the ‘same work.’” Id.; see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (noting the claimant’s 

attorney must refund to the claimant the smaller fee amount). Because here Torquato’s 

counsel’s fees under the EAJA and § 406(b) are for the same work, the Court will order 

Torquato’s counsel to remit the $3,400 fee award to Torquato. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Torquato’s motion for approval of 

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 17). The Court approves Torquato’s 

counsel’s request to receive $15,000 in fees withheld by the Social Security 

Administration. Further, the Court ORDERS Torquato’s counsel to remit to Torquato the 

$3,400 that counsel received under the EAJA. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2020 

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