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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2011 Decided December 2, 2011

No. 10-7149

NIKITA SHONTA PETTIES,

BY HER PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND, JUDY MARTIN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:95-cv-00148)

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellants. With him on the briefs were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna

M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. Robert C. Utiger,

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Steven Ney argued the cause for appellees. With him on the

brief were Jennifer Lav and Bradford P. Johnson.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia appeals

the denial of its motion to vacate a preliminary injunction (and

related orders) pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The injunction was issued in 1995 in response

to a class action complaint alleging that the District of Columbia

was violating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., by failing to timely pay

private providers of special education services and thereby

jeopardizing students’ special education placements. In moving

to vacate the injunction after fourteen years, the District of

Columbia argued that because it had “cured the systemic

violations of law upon which the preliminary injunction and

other payment orders were predicated” and was “in compliance

with the [latest] payment order,” there were “substantially

changed circumstances concerning the administration and

processing of provider payments” that made unnecessary and

inequitable continued judicial supervision. Defs.’ Mem. of P. &

A. in Supp. of their Mot. to Vacate Prelim. Inj. and Payment

Orders at 1, 10. 

The district court denied the motion on two grounds: (1)

dissolving the injunction and subsequent payment orders “would

be disruptive to the status quo” and “counter-productive to the

goal” of settling the case “in short order,” and (2) the District of

Columbia had “overstated both the relevance and the

significance” of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Horne

v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2597 (2009). Mem. Op. and Order Sept.

30, 2010 at 2 (“Mem. Op.”). Because the district court failed to

address the changed circumstances, as Horne v. Flores

instructs, we reverse and remand the case for the district court

to determine whether, in view of changed circumstances, the

District of Columbia’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion should be granted.

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I.

Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public

education that emphasizes special education and related services

designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further

education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)(1)(A). On January 20, 1995, special education

students and their parents filed a class action complaint alleging

that the District of Columbia was depriving them of their civil

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by refusing to provide them with

a free, appropriate education as required by the IDEA. The

defendants included the Superintendent of the District of

Columbia Public Schools and the Director of the Special

Education Branch in the Office of the Superintendent of the

District of Columbia Public Schools. The plaintiffs alleged that

the District of Columbia was jeopardizing students’ special

education placements by failing to pay private providers of

special education services fully and on time. As a result, parents

of special education students were being forced to choose

between standing by as special education services were

discontinued or paying for these services. The complaint noted,

by way of example, that just days before the complaint was

filed, the Chelsea School had written a letter to parents stating

that because of the District of Columbia’s failure to make full

tuition payments for 42 of its 126 students, these students would

be disenrolled unless their parents paid the tuition. The school

explained that the District of Columbia had “[not] offered any

assurances that the problem will be satisfactorily resolved, or,

indeed, any assurance that Chelsea will be paid at all.” Compl.

¶ 23 at 13 (quoting letter of January 17, 1995 from Timothy E.

Hall, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Chelsea School). 

The prayer for relief sought: (1) temporary and permanent

injunctive relief requiring the defendants to pay immediately and

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fully all debts to private providers of special education, and to

give satisfactory written assurances of future timely payments;

(2) regular reports from defendants on their compliance with any

court order until such time as the district court determines the

rights of the plaintiff class are no longer being violated or in

immediate jeopardy of further violation and continued court

monitoring is unnecessary; (3) payment by defendants of

plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and (4) such

other relief as is just and proper. 

On March 17, 1995, the district court issued a preliminary

injunction. The district court found that the District of

Columbia had “not paid the costs of private special education

placements or related services either fully or on a current or

timely basis for at least the 1994-1995 school year,” and that the

District of Columbia’s “ongoing refusal to meet [its] financial

obligations . . . ha[d] placed plaintiffs’ education in constant

jeopardy.” Prelim. Inj. ¶¶ 3, 6. It ordered the District of

Columbia to pay all outstanding debts to private providers of

special education services within two weeks. In a series of

subsequent payment orders, issued as late as 2009, the district

court set detailed payment deadlines. On July 8, 1997, the

district court appointed a Special Master to assist with

implementation of a transportation services plan and later

extended the Special Master’s duties to include resolving

payment disputes between the District of Columbia and private

providers. In a status report filed on May 4, 2005, the Special

Master advised that “sufficient progress has been made to merit

discussion of exit criteria for the portion of the case related to

payments.” Status Rpt. of Spec. Master, May 4, 2005 at 5. 

Referencing a meeting with the parties on April 20, 2005, the

Special Master listed “four indicators” considered “necessary

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to ensure . . . a reliable, fair and efficient payment process

without judicial supervision.” Id.

1

On March 20, 2009, the District of Columbia filed a motion

to vacate the preliminary injunction and related payment orders

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). The “basic grounds” were “the

changed circumstances since the preliminary injunction and

subsequent payment orders were issued, the record of

compliance with [its] obligations to pay private providers, and

the new system for payment of private providers in the

Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007,” D.C. Law 17-9. 

Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Prelim. Inj. and Payment Orders at 1. 

“Under all the facts and circumstances,” as set forth in the

motion and attached exhibits, the District of Columbia argued

that “it is inequitable and unnecessary to continue in effect the

preliminary injunction and subsequent payment orders.” Id. 

D.C. Law 17-9 had shifted responsibility for the vast majority of

provider payments from the District of Columbia Public Schools

(“DCPS”) to the Office of the State Superintendent of Education

(“OSSE”), which, in turn, had established a new automated

system for tracking invoices. See generally id. at Ex. K. During

the first two months that the OSSE’s system was in place, all

1

 The “four indicators” were: (1) current Individual Education

Programs (“IEPs”) for every eligible special education student, with

placements determined annually; (2) written payment procedures

adopted as D.C. Board of Education polices or Superintendent

directives; (3) a special education advisory panel to examine policies

and regulations affecting special education students; and (4) accurate

projections by the District of Columbia of special education costs

based on rates commensurate with those in surrounding jurisdictions. 

Status Rpt. of Spec. Master, May 4, 2005 at 5–6. The Special Master

also mentioned “other endeavors” in the parties’ interests: a pro bono

or low-cost dispute resolution service capable of resolving payment

disputes with providers, and formation of an association to represent

the common interests of the private providers. Id. at 6.

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invoices were paid on time and the OSSE generated no payment

disputes. See Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate

Prelim. Inj. and Payment Orders at 18, 21. In addition, the

DCPS was paying 99% of provider invoices on time and only

three disputes initiated by it had come before the district court

in the previous year. See id. at 18–19. Consequently, “[n]o

private schools or providers have threatened to displace DCPS

students, or not take any more, or discontinue providing services

to them, for many years.” Id. at 12. Concluding that there can

be “no serious doubt” that the “goal” of this litigation, “to

correct systemic violations of the law . . . found in 1995,” has

been “achieved,” the District of Columbia argued that “the

changed circumstances, the evidence of [its] good faith . . . and

the heavy costs that this litigation continues to impose upon the

taxpayers of the District of Columbia, require the vacation of the

preliminary injunction and all subsequent payment orders.” Id.

at 34–35. 

The plaintiffs opposed the motion on the principal grounds

that the District of Columbia had yet to demonstrate “sustained

compliance” or to implement structural reforms identified by the

Special Master to sustain compliance. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n

to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Prelim. Inj. and Paym’t Orders at 2. 

Pointing to DCPS’s performance in the first four months of 2009

in which it disputed 215 invoices and made 335 late payments,

plaintiffs argued that the District of Columbia needed to

establish a quick, effective, low-cost dispute resolution

mechanism to replace the Special Master, a transparent and

equitable system for setting rates for special education services,

and a mechanism for monitoring the budget process to ensure

sufficient funding for special education. See supra note 1. In

response, the District of Columbia stated that the OSSE, which

handles roughly 90% of payments to providers (as measured by

dollar amount), was “in the process of developing an alternative

dispute resolution mechanism” with the Office of

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Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). Reply Mem. of Defs. in

Supp. of Mot. to Vacate at 2. 

While the Rule 60(b)(5) motion was pending, the parties

attended a conference before a Magistrate Judge on April 10,

2009 and met with the Special Master in the spring and summer

of 2010 in unsuccessful attempts at settlement. On April 20,

2010, the District of Columbia moved for a decision on its Rule

60(b)(5) motion. In that motion and a supplemental filing, it

called the district court’s attention to Horne v. Flores, decided

June 25, 2009, which it argued “stands for the principle that

where durable legal compliance is achieved by means other than

compliance with the requirements of a court order, ‘continued

enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but

improper.’” Supplement to Mot. of Defs. for Ruling in Resp. to

Ct. Order of Apr. 20, 2010 at 11 (quoting Horne v. Flores, 129

S. Ct. at 2595). Because the District of Columbia “has long

been in compliance with the [district] [c]ourt’s orders and the

law in the area of vendor payment,” the District of Columbia

suggested “[its] motion to vacate [did] not require the [district]

[c]ourt to define the precise scope of Horne [v. Flores].” Id. at

2. Included with its motion was a compilation of the District of

Columbia’s monthly reports on the timeliness of provider

payments and pending payment disputes. See Defs.’ Mot. for a

Ruling on their Mot. to Vacate the Prelim. Inj. and Paym’t

Orders at Exhibit U. Prior to the district court’s ruling, monthly

reports were filed through September 15, 2010. 

On September 30, 2010, the district court denied the Rule

60(b)(5) motion. In a brief memorandum and order, the district

court stated that (1) dissolving the preliminary injunction and

subsequent payment orders “would be disruptive to the status

quo and counter-productive to the goal of finally resolving this

case in short order,” and (2) the District of Columbia had

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“overstated both the relevance and the significance of . . . Horne

v. Flores.” Mem. Op. at 2.

II.

On appeal, the District of Columbia contends, in light of

Horne v. Flores, that the district court abused its discretion in

failing to vacate the sixteen-year-old preliminary injunction and

the related payment orders. Interpreting Horne v. Flores to

mandate dissolution of institutional reform litigation orders

when the defendant has achieved compliance with federal law,

the District of Columbia seeks reversal and vacation of the

preliminary injunction and related payment orders because it has

achieved “sustained compliance” with the IDEA’s requirements. 

Appellants’ Br. 26. Alternatively, it seeks a remand for further

proceedings.

Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a district court may vacate an

order or judgment if “applying it prospectively is no longer

equitable.” In the context of institutional reform litigation, the

Supreme Court has instructed that district courts must employ “a

flexible modification standard” because such decrees “often

remain in place for extended periods of time” such that “the

likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the

decree is increased.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502

U.S. 367, 380–81 (1992). The Court reasoned that a flexible

standard is in the public interest “because such decrees ‘reach

beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the

public’s right to the sound and efficient operation of its

institutions.’” Id. at 381 (quoting Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d

1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989)). In Horne v. Flores, the Court

elaborated on the nature of the Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry while

reaffirming that district courts must engage in a “broad and

flexible” inquiry that focuses “only [on] whether ‘a significant

change either in factual conditions or in law’ renders continued

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enforcement . . . ‘detrimental to the public interest.’” 129 S. Ct.

at 2596–98 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384). 

In Horne v. Flores, students and their parents filed a class

action complaint alleging that the State of Arizona was violating

the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (“EEOA”), 20

U.S.C. § 1703(f), by providing inadequate instruction in the

English Language Learner program (“ELL”). The district court

entered a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff class and ordered

the State to establish a funding system that would create a

rational relationship between the amount of available funding

and the actual costs of ELL instruction. See 129 S. Ct. at 2590. 

Fourteen years after the complaint was filed, the State moved for

relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) on the ground that changed

circumstances had made continued enforcement of the district

court’s order inequitable. The Supreme Court reversed the

denial of the motion on the ground that the court of appeals and

the district court had “misunderstood . . . the nature of the

inquiry that is required when parties . . . seek relief under Rule

60(b)(5).” Id. at 2588. Noting that Rule 60(b)(5)’s “[u]se of the

disjunctive ‘or’ makes it clear that each of the provision’s three

grounds for relief is independently sufficient and therefore that

relief may be warranted even if [defendants] have not ‘satisfied’

the original order,” id. at 2597, the Court concluded that the

lower courts had erred by failing to determine whether there was

an ongoing violation of the EEOA, see id. at 2597–98. The

Court instructed that if there is no ongoing violation of federal

law and “a durable remedy has been implemented, continued

enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” 

Id. at 2595. The Court observed that the lower courts ought to

have “appl[ied] a flexible standard that seeks to return control to

state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal law has

been remedied” and “inquir[ed] broadly into whether changed

conditions” provided evidence of durable compliance with

federal law. Id.

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The District of Columbia’s brief recites detailed, undisputed

statistical evidence showing that it is timely paying private

providers of special education services. Between October 2009

and September 2010, the one-year period preceding the denial

of the District of Columbia’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion, the OSSE

paid 98.9% of invoices on time and the DCPS paid 94.8% of

invoices on time. See Appellants’ Br. 13–14 (Tables). During

this period the OSSE received 6,012 invoices, of which 46 were

paid late, 35 were disputed in part, and one was disputed in full;

the DCPS received 1,816 invoices, of which 89 were paid late,

170 were disputed in part, and 75 were disputed in full. See id.

13–16 (Tables). The record also shows: The OSSE and the

DCPS have adopted written policies and procedures for making

payments in conformance with the payment orders; the OSSE is

successfully using an automated system for processing invoices

and tracking payment deadlines; and the OSSE entered into a

Memorandum of Understanding with the OAH in January 2009,

providing the latter will adjudicate payment disputes between

providers and the OSSE. And, the District of Columbia has

promulgated a final rule, effective August 1, 2011, on provider

rates. Certificates of Approval for Nonpublic Special Education

Schools and Programs Serving Students with Disabilities

Funded by the District of Columbia and Special Education

Rates, 5 D.C.M.R. §§ 2821, 2833–34, 2844–54; see 58 D.C.

Reg. 5442 (July 2011). As a consequence of its actions, the

District of Columbia states, “no student’s placement or services

have been jeopardized, due to non-payment, for many years.” 

Appellants’ Br. 18. 

Counsel for the plaintiffs acknowledged during oral

argument that “few if any placements are being jeopardized by

nonpayment” and that this circumstance has “obtained for

several years.” Oral Arg. Tape at 10:56-11:08. The parties thus

agree that the District of Columbia is in compliance with the

IDEA with regard to provider payments; they disagree as to

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whether the various steps the District of Columbia has

undertaken suffice to demonstrate that court supervision is no

longer necessary. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that a

durable remedy requires establishment and testing of a

mechanism to resolve payment disputes to replace the Special

Master and the adoption of time limits for initiating payment

disputes. See id. at 14:41-53, 17:05-13. Counsel for plaintiffs

appeared to acknowledge that the other structural reforms and

actions referenced in plaintiffs’ opposition to the District of

Columbia’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion were not relevant, at least at

this stage of the litigation. See, e.g., id. at 16:10-55.

The District of Columbia responds that whether it has

implemented a durable remedy is irrelevant at this stage. 

Durability, it suggests, is relevant only where a defendant moves

for relief from a final judgment, not where a defendant seeks

relief from a preliminary injunction and related orders. In

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290

(D.C. Cir. 2006), this court explained that a preliminary

injunction is not based on a judgment or finding of liability, but

rather on the need to prevent an “injury . . . of such imminence

that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to

prevent irreparable harm.” Id. at 297 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiffs do not dispute

that “few if any” special education placements have been

threatened by nonpayment for “several years,” the District of

Columbia emphasizes that there is “no risk” of imminent harm

to a class member. Oral Arg. Tape at 10:56-11:08; Reply Br.

10. With regard to identifying an alternative dispute resolution

mechanism, the District of Columbia maintains it is sufficient as

a matter of law that an adequate alternative forum exists, namely

in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Further, it

notes, the overwhelming majority of provider payments are

handled by the OSSE and any payment disputes with the OSSE

will be adjudicated by the OHA. And, it advises that the DCPS

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is prepared to enter into a similar agreement with the OHA so

that these disputes also can be adjudicated by the OHA. See

Appellant’s Br. 31-32; Reply Br. 13.2

Although Horne v. Flores did not involve a pre-judgment

preliminary injunction, the Court’s instruction that continued

enforcement of an order entered to remedy a violation of federal

law is unnecessary and improper if there is no ongoing violation

of federal law and “a durable remedy has been implemented,” is

instructive. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 2595. The District of

Columbia acknowledges, in effect, that the determination of

whether preliminary injunctive relief is required because

plaintiffs are at risk of imminent harm is tied to the question of

whether it has remedied the systemic payment problems that

caused the district court to conclude in 1995 it was violating the

IDEA. If the plaintiffs, in fact, face “no risk” of imminent harm,

it is because the District of Columbia has established procedures

for paying providers in a timely manner to ensure compliance

with the IDEA in the future, eliminating the systemic causes that

jeopardized special education placements during the 1994-1995

school year.

The district court’s Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry fell short of what

is required by Horne v. Flores. The question raised by the

District of Columbia’s motion was whether changed

circumstances had rendered continued enforcement of the

2

 By letter of November 16, 2011, the District of Columbia

provided as supplementary authority a recently executed

Memorandum of Understanding between the DCPS and the

OHA for adjudication of payment disputes involving DCPS and

private special education providers. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(j). 

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preliminary injunction and related payment orders contrary to

the public interest because special education placements were,

and had been, secure for years. The district court neither

determined whether the District of Columbia was making timely

private provider payments under the IDEA, nor evaluated the

systemic evidence that the District of Columbia is and has been

in compliance with the payment orders. Critically, it never

inquired into whether the risk of imminent harm that it found

warranted injunctive relief in 1995 — namely, that special

education students were in jeopardy of losing special education

services to which they were entitled under the IDEA — had

been ameliorated, if not eliminated, as a result of changed

circumstances. 

The district court has overseen this litigation for many

years, and this court would benefit from its assessment of the

likely risk of imminent harm to plaintiffs as a result of untimely

private provider payments were court supervision to be

withdrawn. Although actions taken by the District of Columbia

appear to have remedied the systemic payment problems that

existed in 1995, plaintiffs’ concerns about the appropriate

alternative to dispute resolution by the Special Master and the

time limits for initiation of payment disputes require fact finding

best done in the district court. Accordingly, we remand the case

for the district court to conduct the necessary factual inquiry and

to determine whether, in view of the changed circumstances, the

District of Columbia’s motion to vacate the preliminary

injunction and related payment orders pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5)

should be granted.

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