Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01339/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JARED BENJAMIN MIMMS,

Booking #17141130,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KEVIN FAULCONER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01339-CAB-AGS

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 3]

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

JARED BENJAMIN MIMMS (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at San Diego 

Central Jail (“SDCJ”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint naming the Mayor of 

San Diego and two San Diego County Superior Court Judges as Defendants, and seeking 

$500 million in damages based on claims that they have committed “high treason,” 

“grand larceny,” and attempted to murder and “discredit” him using “illegally 

introduced” eugenics during an ongoing criminal prosecution. See ECF No. 1 at 1-3.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence civil action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), instead has he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 3.

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the 

plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be granted leave to proceed IFP, but he 

nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). A “prisoner” is defined as “any person” who at the time of 

filing is “incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(h); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.

In order to comply with the PLRA, prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must 

also submit a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional 

equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an 

initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six 

months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, 

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); 

see Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner 

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

While Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), 

he has not attached a certified copy of his SDCJ trust account statements for the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly requires that prisoners “seeking to bring 

a civil action ... without prepayment of fees ... shall submit a certified copy of the trust 

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis 

added). 

Without Plaintiff’s trust account statements, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is incomplete 

and must be DENIED because the Court is unable to assess the appropriate amount of the 

initial filing fee statutorily required to initiate the prosecution of this action. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

In addition, while the Court would ordinarily grant Plaintiff leave to correct his IFP 

Motion’s deficiencies, it instead finds it appropriate to screen his Complaint pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A because at the time of filing Plaintiff was, and remains, “incarcerated 

or detained in any facility [because he] is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of 

Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 

Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 

practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 

Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of 

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§ 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-

47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall ... dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of 

§ 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

A pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the 

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts 

available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). Section 

1915 gives courts “the unusual power to pierce the veil” of a Complaint like Plaintiff’s 

and to “dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). Clearly baseless factual allegations include those 

“that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting 

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328).

Plaintiff identifies no arguable legal basis for his suit, and his factual allegations 

are plainly frivolous. Id.; see also O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(“An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in fact or law.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). For example, Plaintiff claims the “State 

of California is liable for eugenics” and “treasonous movements” as a result of “Calexit,” 

and that he has been “sanctioned to both lead and supply a war against the State” using an 

“army from Fort Mimms in Alabama” in a “defeat akin to Troy.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 

at 3. He further contends to have been slandered eight times, to have had his intellectual 

property stolen, and that the “communities of Del Mar and La Jolla have decided to 

commit crimes [against him] based on [his] height, weight, and face.” Id. at 5. 

///

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While conclusory, disjointed, and incoherent, Plaintiff’s factual allegations clearly 

appear grounded in delusion, are facially irrational, and wholly incredible. Therefore, his 

Complaint demands sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Denton, 504 U.S. at 25-26; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324; see also Suess v. Obama, 2017 WL 

1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (dismissing as frivolous complaint alleging 

conspiracy among President, CIA, and FBI to torment plaintiff over six year period); 

Frost v. Vasan, No. 16-CV-05883 NC, 2017 WL 2081094, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 

2017) (dismissing as frivolous claims against a United States Senator, a university, two 

corporate entities, and additional unspecified defendants for having allegedly conspired 

with a secret elite group of businessmen and the CIA to torment him); Sierra v. Moon, 

2012 WL 423483, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (dismissing as frivolous an alleged 

conspiracy by defendants with ex-military and CIA to defraud plaintiffs’ interests and 

murder him); Demos v. United States, 2010 WL 4007527, at *2 (D. Ore. Oct. 8, 2010) 

(dismissing as frivolous complaint alleging plaintiff was captured by pirates disguised as 

law enforcement officers); Reid v. Mabus, 2015 WL 9855875, at *1 (D. Ore. Nov. 16, 

2015) (dismissing complaint alleging a massive conspiracy targeting 300,000 individuals 

with “electronic harassment”).

If a Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the 

underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3];

2) DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

///

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4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and 

to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2018

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